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Title: The Great War and How It Arose
Author: Anonymous
Language: English
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THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE
1915
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee
12, Downing Street, London, S.W.
CONTENTS.
PAGE.
Serbia's Position 3
Russia's Position 6
Germany's Position 6
Italy's Position 8
Germany's Selected Moment 8
Peace Thwarted by Germany 10
I. Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian
Ultimatum 11
II. Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia 11
III. Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers 12
IV. Germany Asked to State Form of Mediation between
Russia and Austria-Hungary 13
V. Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary 14
VI. Russia's Final Attempt at Peace 15
German Militarism Wins 17
How France Came In 19
How Great Britain Came In 19
War with Austria 22
Japan's Ultimatum to Germany 22
Allies' Declaration of Common Policy 23
Turkey Joins Germany 24
More German Intrigues 26
The Near East 26
The Far East 27
West Africa 28
South Africa 28
How the Germans Make War 29
Germany's Attempted Bribery 36
APPENDIXES.
A. Germany's Knowledge of Contents of Austro-Hungarian
Ultimatum 40
B. How Germany Misled Austria-Hungary 46
C. Some German Atrocities in Belgium 48
D. Germany's Employment of Poisonous Gas 52
E. Efforts of German Ministers of State to lay Blame on
England 52
F. List of Parliamentary Publications respecting the War 55
THE GREAT WAR.
SERBIA'S POSITION.
On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and the Archduchess
were assassinated on Austrian territory at Serajevo by two Austrian
subjects, both Bosniaks. On a former occasion one of these assassins had
been in Serbia and the "Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and
dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian
authorities, found that the latter protected him, and said that he was
an innocent and harmless individual."[1] After a "magisterial"
investigation, the Austro-Hungarian Government formally fixed upon the
Serbians the guilt both of assisting the assassins and of continually
conspiring against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on
July 23, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Serbia of which the following were
the chief terms[2]:--
"The Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of
their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following
declaration:--
"'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary--_i.e._, the general tendency of which the
final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal
consequences of these criminal proceedings.
"'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and
functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda...."
"The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:
"To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which
is directed against its territorial integrity; ...
"To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both
as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of
instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the
propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
"To remove from the military service, and from the administration
in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the
Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of
communicating to the Royal Government;
"To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the
Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive
movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
Monarchy;
"To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of
the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
relating thereto."
In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (_a_) to admit a guilt which
was not hers; (_b_) to condemn officers in her army without trial at
Austria's direction[3]; (_c_) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense
such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words,
Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all
these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours--until 6
p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the
specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of
Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary
for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an
explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the
participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial
proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power--Germany
not excepted--had ever thought probable. But the same day the British
Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left
the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported
that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so
drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature
of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same
evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general
mobilisation.
An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an
hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany
the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented
itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna
through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed
on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the
British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a
pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.
As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the
Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the
Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there
were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be
expected to accept."[5]
During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at
peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be
extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable
settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain
asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that
Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.
Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of
conciliation. Italy assented, France assented, Russia declared herself
ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria
and Russia became threatening."
Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade
were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet
Austria.
But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had
expired.
The British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true
object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:--
"I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably
beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I
gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador
here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica
under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the
Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented
with Serbian rule."[6]
So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan
settlement to which she and Germany had been parties so recently as
1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan
peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest
right down to the Ægean Sea.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 30.
[2] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 4.
[3] This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at the
Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:--
"Serbia ... must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria
should subsequently name. Those officers had just emerged from a war
where they had added lustre to the Serbian arms; they were gallant,
brave and efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their
efficiency that prompted Austria's action! But, mark you, the
officers were not named; Serbia was to undertake in advance to
dismiss them from the army, the names to be sent in subsequently.
Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that?
Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to
this country, saying 'You must dismiss from your Army--and from your
Navy--all those officers whom we shall subsequently name.' Well, I
think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener would go; Sir John
French would be sent away; General Smith-Dorrien would go, and I am
sure that Sir John Jellicoe would have to go. And there is another
gallant old warrior who would go--Lord Roberts. It was a difficult
situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a
great military power that could have put half-a-dozen men in the
field for every one of Serbia's men, and that Power was supported by
the greatest military Power (Germany) in the world."
[4] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 39.
[5] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 46.
[6] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 82.
RUSSIA'S POSITION.
Russia's interest in the Balkans was well-known. As late as May 23,
1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the
Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans" and it was known that
any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be
regarded as a menace to that policy. The Russians are a Slav people like
the Serbians. Serbian independence was one of the results of the Great
War which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877. If Serbia was, as the
Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on July 29, "regarded as being
in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated,
then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a
question of the policy of Russian statesmen at Petrograd, but of the
deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian
people by more than two centuries of development. It was known to the
Austrians and to every foreign secretary in Europe, that if the Tsar's
Government allowed Serbia to be crushed by Austria, they would be in
danger of a revolution in Russia. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey
said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan War, "a
commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of
the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and
retested during the last decade.
GERMANY'S POSITION.
Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book
which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case
prior to the outbreak of hostilities,[7] in the following terms:--
"=The Imperial and Royal Government (Austria-Hungary) ... asked for
our opinion. With all our heart we were able to ... assure him
(Austria) that any action considered necessary ... would meet with
our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike
attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon
the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in
accordance with our duties as allies. We could not ... advise our
ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity,
nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this
all the less as our own interests were menaced through the
continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of
Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the
gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs
under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making
untenable the position of the Teutonic Race in Central Europe.=
"=A morally weakened Austria ... would be no longer an ally on whom
we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be
able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our
Easterly and Westerly neighbours.=
"_=We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her
action towards Serbia.=_"
Farther on in the German Official White Book (page 7) it is stated that
the German Government instructed its Ambassador at Petrograd to make the
following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to
Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone[8]:--
"=Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.=
"=But mobilisation means war.=
"=As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France....="
Here, then, we have the plain admission:--
That the steps subsequently taken were directed against Russia and
France.
That from the first Austria was given a free hand even to the
calculated extent of starting a great European war.
That a morally weakened Austria was not an ally on whom Germany
"could count" or "have confidence" though no reference is made to
Italy in this Official document.
FOOTNOTES:
[7] The German White Book (only authorised translation). Druck und
Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin, pages 4 and 5. (Price, 40 pf.)
[8] Cd. 7717, No. 109. In a despatch from Berlin, July 30, 1914, Mons.
Jules Cambon (French Ambassador) says:--
"Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the
Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the
success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything
depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise
completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this
might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and
consequently that of Germany.
"I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me
that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if
Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not
being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the
army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for
the German army, and 'that the words of which I reminded him did not
constitute a firm engagement on his part.'"
ITALY'S POSITION.
Italy's position on the eve of the Great War, and while the above
machinations were in progress, is quite clear for the reason that she
had been approached twelve months before to take part in a similar
enterprise and had peremptorily refused. On August 9, 1913, the Italian
Premier, Signor Giolitti, received a telegram from the Marquis di San
Guiliano (Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs), acquainting him with
the fact that Austria had just confided to Italy that, with the approval
of Germany, she was about to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia, in essence
identical with that actually sent on July 23, 1914, whereby the present
Great War was kindled. Austria then asked Italy to consider this move to
be a _casus foederis_ under the Triple Alliance--which is purely a
treaty of defence--involving Italy's military assistance on the side of
Austria and Germany.[9] To this the Italian Premier (Signor Giolitti)
replied[10]:--
"If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a _casus
foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking
on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch
as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a
declaration to this effect should be hope for action on the part of
Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."
Italy, having on this occasion made her position clear, maintained her
neutrality last July (1914) when Germany and Austria decided to proceed
with the plans arranged over twelve months before. Italy remained
neutral because she held that Germany and Austria were the
aggressors--not Russia and France.[11] By not consulting Italy on the
subject of action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary violated one of the
fundamental clauses of the Triple Alliance, and eventually this led
Italy to denounce the Treaty on May 4th, 1915, and finally, on May 24th,
1915, to declare war on Austria-Hungary.
FOOTNOTES:
[9] See Appendix "A." Italy denounced this treaty May 4th, 1915.
[10] Cd. 7860.
[11] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 152.
GERMANY'S SELECTED MOMENT.
The past history of Germany shows that she has always made her wars at
her own "selected moment," when she thought her victim was isolated or
unprepared. As General von Bernhardi says in his book, _Germany and the
Next Great War_: "English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us
as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary
and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of
success." On July 23, 1914, when Austria launched her ultimatum to
Serbia, the Chancelleries of Europe were taken by surprise. Germany and
Austria chose their moment well.
(1) The British representatives were away from both Berlin and
Belgrade.
(2) M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, and the other
Ministers were away electioneering.
(3) The Russian Ambassadors were absent from Vienna, Berlin and
Paris, and the Russian Minister was absent from Belgrade. Indeed
the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had left "for the country in
consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the
(Austro-Hungarian) Ministry for Foreign Affairs."[12]
(4) The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister
were out of France at Reval, on board the French Battleship "La
France."
(5) The Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had
left the Capital and his presence at Ischl was constantly used by
the Germans and Austrians as an excuse for not being able to get
things done in time.
The known facts of the crisis out of which the Great War arose and the
messages of our Ambassadors suggest that Germany chose this particular
time:--
(1) Calculating that Russia, if she did not fight, would be
humiliated, whilst Austria--Germany's ally--would be strengthened
by the conquest of Serbia; and
(2) Believing that if Russia chose to fight, even if she fought
with France as her ally, still it was a favourable moment.
The deepening of the Kiel Canal to permit German battleships to pass
from the Baltic to the North Sea was just completed. Germany had at her
disposal the larger part of a huge war tax of £50,000,000, and had added
enormously to her land forces. The murder of the Archduke created a
pretext which roused enthusiasm for war in Austria, and there can be
little doubt that Germany was ready to use this wave of popular feeling
for her own ends. Germany appears to have instilled into Austria-Hungary
the belief that there was small danger in coercing Serbia.[13]
On the other hand, Germany aimed at thoroughly humiliating Russia and
France, and appears to have calculated that if the worst came to the
worst, she and Austria-Hungary would be in a position to beat them
both. The German view of the European situation may be briefly set forth
as follows:--
=Russia.=--Russia was passing through serious industrial troubles,
which it was thought might end in revolution.
=France.=--France was passing through a period of political chaos,
no Government being able to hold together for more than a few
weeks. And on July 13 the French had appointed a Committee to
inquire and report immediately on alleged deficiencies in various
defensive preparations.
=Belgium.=--Belgium was beginning a re-organisation of her Army
which would have gradually increased it to almost double its
present strength.
=Britain.=--Germany thought the Irish and general political
position in Britain made it impossible for her to show a united
front in foreign affairs, and that therefore she would be unable to
fight. The Germans seem to have assumed that Britain would be glad
incidentally to seize the chance of making money through neutrality
and would repudiate her treaty obligations to Belgium and her
friendship for France, and be content to see Germany ruthlessly
crushing the smaller Powers of Europe. Sir Edward Grey, on July 27,
1914, telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Petrograd:--"I have
been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian
circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand
aside."[14]
Our Ambassadors at Petrograd, (July 24, 1914), Rome, (July 29, 1914) and
Paris (July 30, 1914), each stated that the Foreign Offices of Russia,
Italy and France respectively thought that Germany was counting on our
neutrality, while the German Foreign Minister, after war was actually
declared, seemed totally unable to understand how we could go to war for
what he called "a Scrap of Paper." The "Scrap of Paper" happened to be a
treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and signed by both Great
Britain _and_ Germany![15] The whole case is put in a nutshell in the
despatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna, dated August 1, 1914, in
which he says:--
"=I agree ... that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from
the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his
action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
Government also desired war from the first.... Nothing can alter
the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on
their present course, if they have made up their mind with the
approval of Germany.="[16]
FOOTNOTES:
[12] Cd. 7717, No. 18.
[13] See Appendix "B."
[14] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 47.
[15] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 80, 99 and 160.
[16] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 141.
PEACE THWARTED BY GERMANY.
The attitude taken up by Germany and Austria-Hungary throughout the
whole crisis can only lead to one conclusion--that both countries were
determined to force their point, even at the risk of a European war. As
showing the endeavours to devise means of averting a general conflict,
they should be considered seriatim, together with the persistency with
which they were blocked in Berlin:--
_(I.)--Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to
Serbia._
On July 25, in reply to the Anglo-Russian efforts, to extend the
forty-eight hour "time-limit" of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to
Serbia, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna telegraphed that he had
been officially informed that "the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse
our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note."[17] How
Austria-Hungary was aided and abetted by Germany in this refusal is made
plain in the despatch from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin on
the same day:--
"The (German) Minister for Foreign Affairs ... tells me that the
British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to
extend the time limit of the ultimatum, ... but he fears that in
the absence of Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs) "who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time,
his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the
wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined
to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance
of Serbia."[18]
_(II.)--The Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary and
Serbia._
When the extension of the time-limit of the Ultimatum to Serbia was
refused by Austria, Sir Edward Grey thought the question of preventing
or delaying hostilities might serve as a basis for discussion. The
Austrian Ambassador explained that:--
"the Austrian Note should not be regarded as an Ultimatum; it
should be regarded as a step which, in the event of no reply, or in
the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would
be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations, and the immediate
departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade, without,
however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities."[19]
As Sir Edward Grey said in his Despatch to the British Chargé d'Affaires
at Berlin, July 24, 1914:--
"The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march
into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should
march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria
not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But
none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany
would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should
inform Secretary of State."[20]
The following day (July 25, 1914), Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British
Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin:--
"The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the
Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be
to break off diplomatic relations and commence military
preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German
Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of
mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had
urged yesterday should be delayed."[21]
But here again Germany was lukewarm, to say the least of it, as will be
seen in the Despatch from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Sir
Edward Grey, dated July 26, 1914:--
"Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that
German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to
Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a
favourable view of Serbian reply if it corresponds to the forecast
contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.
"Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this
communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they
associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German
Government do not see their way to going beyond this."[22]
_(III.)--Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers._
On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey suggested to the German Ambassador
that the only chance he could see of a mediating or moderating influence
being effective was:--
"that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should
work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour
of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and
Russia becoming threatening."[23]
Finding that Russia consented to this idea, Sir Edward telegraphed to
our representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome on July 26, 1914, to the
following effect:--
"Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct
Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and
Germany, and myself, to meet here in conference immediately for the
purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications?
You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do
this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of
the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at
Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request
that all active military operations should be suspended pending
results of conference."[24]
The Powers, _with the exception of Germany_, consented. Germany again
proclaimed herself the disturbing element, as is shown in the following
Despatch from the British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated
July 27, 1914:--
"(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would
practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his
opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and
Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion,
desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.
I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with
arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not
directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a
dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference
as you proposed was not practicable."[25]
Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported:--
"I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told
me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government,
to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that
events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late
to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the
basis of discussion."[26]
_(IV.)--Germany asked to State any Form which Mediation between Russia
and Austria-Hungary might take._
How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the
four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which
Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward
Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:--
"The German Government ... seemed to think the particular method of
conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations à
quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German
Government should suggest _any method_ by which the influence of
the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between
Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of
mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation
by _any method that Germany could suggest_ if mine was not
acceptable. _In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by
any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would
'press the button' in the interests of peace._"[27]
Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from
the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30,
1914:--
"The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the
button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he
had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had
been precipitated rather than otherwise."[28]
Sir Edward Grey's telegram was sent off about 4 p.m. on July 29. His
appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About
midnight a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's
Ambassador at Berlin.[29] The German Chancellor had sent for him late at
night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in
a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from
France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany
would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained
passive, no territory would be taken from her.
Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an
exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace.
That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If
Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great
Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the
whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the
scale of peace in years to come.
_(V.)--Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary._
Another excuse given by Germany for refusing mediation by the four
Powers was the possibility of direct negotiations between Russia and
Austria-Hungary. The British Ambassador in Berlin on July 27, in
recording Germany's excuses, said that the German Secretary of State--
"added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed
that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof" (Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs) "to exchange views with Count
Berchtold" (Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs). "He thought
that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result,
and that it would be best before doing anything else to await
outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian
Governments."[30]
It is worth noting that, in reply to this Despatch from the British
Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 29:--
"I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct
between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I
would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that,
but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government
have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the
Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to
discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the
means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict."[31]
Russia had done her best to open these negotiations, and endeavoured to
get the German Government to advise Austria to continue negotiations
thus opened. How the proposal was received by Germany is found in the
following Despatch from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, dated
July 27, 1914:--
"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal
in Vienna that Szapary" (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Russia)
"should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of
views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which
would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow" (German Foreign
Secretary of State) "answered that he was aware of this proposal
and that he agreed with Pourtalès" (German Ambassador in Russia)
"that as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go
on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German
Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater
insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that _he
could not advise Austria to give way_."[32]
The result of Germany's hostile attitude to the plan was at once made
apparent the next day in Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador reported
on July 28, 1914:--
"Count Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs)
"replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and
of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg
Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the
energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no
longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the
Austro-Hungarian note."[33]
_(VI.)--Russia's Final Attempt at Peace._
Finally, on July 30, 1914, another attempt at peace by Russia is
indicated in the Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
to the Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome,
in the following terms:--
"The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether
Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might
give--that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of
Serbia--and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we
would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him
the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate
action: 'If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question
has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready
to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the
sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military
preparations.'
"Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German
Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to
do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question,
for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order
that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military
preparations."[34]
And subsequently this was amended according to the following Despatch
from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors
abroad, dated July 31, 1914, Petrograd:--
"Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British
Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me
of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in
the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I
replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send
you the text of the modified formula, which is as follows:--
"'If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on
Serbian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between
Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest,
she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and
decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the
Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a
sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to
maintain her waiting attitude."[35]
The possibility of peace was not thought hopeless by Sir Edward Grey,
for, in a despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated August 1,
he says:--
"I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only
a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power
begins war.
"The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of
Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to
accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections
raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.
"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are
ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able
to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in
order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully
abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."[36]
That Austria was at last taking a more reasonable attitude is shown by
the despatch from the Russian Ambassador in Paris, dated August 1,
1914:--
"The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani" (French
Minister for Foreign Affairs), "and declared to him that Austria,
far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia,
was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against
Servia with the other powers. The French Government are much
exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the
French frontier for they are convinced that under the guise of
'Kriegszustand,' mobilisation is, in reality, being carried
out."[37]
Unfortunately at this point, when the Austro-Hungarian Government
appeared ready to debate amicably with Russia, Germany stopped all
efforts at peace by issuing an Ultimatum to Russia. News of this is
given in a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad on August 1,
in the following terms:--
"At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the
instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by
midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only
against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government
would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my
enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the
negative, but added that we were very near it."[38]
As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, tersely put
it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward
Grey:--
"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna
were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous
ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany
intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to
St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which
only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on
the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. _A few days' delay
might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest
calamities in history._"[39]
FOOTNOTES:
[17] Cd. 7626, No. 12.
[18] Cd. 7626, No. 14.
[19] Cd. 7626, No. 16.
[20] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.
[21] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 25.
[22] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 34.
[23] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.
[24] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 36.
[25] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.
[26] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 75.
[27] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.
[28] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 107.
[29] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 85 and 101.
[30] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.
[31] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.
[32] Cd. 7626, No. 38.
[33] Cd. 7626, No. 45.
[34] Cd. 7626, No. 60.
[35] Cd. 7626, No. 67.
[36] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 131.
[37] Cd. 7626, No. 73.
[38] Cd. 7626, No. 70.
[39] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 161.
GERMAN MILITARISM WINS.
Thus Germany rejected all suggestions, while Austria, supported by
Germany, was determined on war. The Serbian episode was clearly an
excuse. Germany's alliance with Austria was "defensive." She was bound
to join with Austria only in case of the latter being _attacked_ by
Russia. Austria claimed that because Russia would not stand idle while
Serbia was crushed, therefore Russia was the aggressor. Germany was a
party to the Austrian attack on Serbia. The British Ambassador at Vienna
on July 30 says: "I have private information that the German Ambassador
(at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia _before it
was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor_. I know from
the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."[40]
Germany, therefore, chose this moment to send a challenge to Russia
knowing that Russia must fight unless she were willing to be humiliated
and disgraced in the eyes, not only of men of the Slav race in the
Balkans, but in the eyes of the whole world.
The French Foreign Minister, telegraphing on July 31 to the French
Ambassador in London as to Germany's aggressive steps on the
Franco-German frontier, said: "All my information goes to show that the
German preparations began on Saturday (July 25)."[41] What has actually
happened in the war goes to show that this must have been the case.
The precise situation at this point is well shown in the British Foreign
Office introduction to _Great Britain and the European Crisis_:--
"At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched
an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her
mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for
the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown,
overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be
said is that, _according to the information in the possession of
His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time
proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general
mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next
day, the 1st August_. France also began to mobilise on that day.
The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal
from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy
until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the
German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war.
Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great
Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the
Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her
troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a
collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday
morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small
independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the
Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium.
The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had
become inevitable."
FOOTNOTES:
[40] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.
[41] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 105--Enclosure 3.
HOW FRANCE CAME IN.
France, by her alliance with Russia, was bound to stand by Russia if she
was attacked by Germany and Austria. On July 31 the German Ambassador at
Paris informed the French Government that Russia had ordered a complete
mobilisation, and that Germany had given Russia twelve hours in which to
order demobilisation and asking France to define her attitude. France
was given no time, and war came, when German troops at once crossed the
French frontier. Germany, by her attitude towards France, plainly
admitted that she was the aggressor. She made no pretence of any cause
of quarrel with France, but attacked her because of France's defensive
alliance with Russia.
HOW GREAT BRITAIN CAME IN.
Great Britain was primarily drawn in to save Belgium. We were bound by a
Treaty (1839) to which Germany and France were also parties,
guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. When Germany attacked France in
1870, Prince Bismarck gave Belgium a written declaration--which he said
was superfluous in view of the Treaty in existence--that the German
Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium,
provided that neutrality were respected by the other belligerent Powers.
France has been faithful to her Treaty. She even left her Belgian
frontier unfortified. On August 3, 1914, on the verge of war, our
position was made plain by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, when
he said:--
"When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be
a most important element in our policy--a most important subject
for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar
terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us
to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were
prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of
Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government
this reply:--
"'The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality
of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other
Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself
under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her
security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given
several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to
the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels
has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.'
"From the German Government the reply was:--
"'The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not
possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the
Imperial Chancellor.'
"Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an
answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long
delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir
Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they
could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail,
in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing,
to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign."[42]
This clearly indicated that Germany would not respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and the day after Sir Edward Grey's speech, on August 4, the
German Army had penetrated Belgium on its way to France after a
peremptory notice to the Belgian Government to the effect that the
Imperial Government "will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry
out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered
indispensable." Thus began the nightmare of German "Kultur," to which
unoffending Belgium was subjected, and against which she appealed to the
British Government: "Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and
Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory."[43]
On August 4 Great Britain asked Germany for a definite assurance by
midnight that she would not violate Belgian neutrality. Germany's
attitude is unmistakable in the following report of an interview by our
Ambassador in Berlin with the German Secretary of State:--
"Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his
answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having
crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been
already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why
the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely,
that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest
way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and
endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.
"It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by
the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
time.
"This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for
bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action
was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an
inexhaustible supply of troops....
"I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of
seeing him.... I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency
at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He
said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible
to a degree; just for a word--'neutrality,' a word which in war
time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great
Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation.... He held Great
Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.
I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I
would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should
keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept,
or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great
Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: 'But at what price will
that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of
that?' I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear
of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking
solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so excited, so evidently
overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear
reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
argument."[44]
Thus, when midnight struck on Tuesday, August 4, 1914, it found us at
war with Germany for tearing up the "scrap of paper" which was Britain's
bond.[45] And earlier in the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. von
Bethmann Hollweg, in the course of a remarkable speech in the Reichstag,
admitted the naked doctrine, that German "necessity" overrides every
consideration of right and wrong, in the following words:--
"=Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity
knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps" (as a
matter of fact the speaker knew that Belgium had been invaded that
morning) "are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary
to the dictates of international law.... The wrong--I speak
openly--that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as
soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is
threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest
possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his way
through (wie er sich durchhaut)!="[46]
FOOTNOTES:
[42] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Part II.
[43] Statements by Prime Minister, House of Commons, August 4 and 5,
1914.
[44] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 160.
[45] See Appendix E.
[46] The _Times_, August 11, 1914.
WAR WITH AUSTRIA.
From now onwards we were definitely allied with France in defence of
Belgium's neutrality.
At 6 p.m. on August 6, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.
On August 12 Sir Edward Grey was compelled to inform Count Mensdorff
(Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London) at the request of the French
Government, that a complete rupture having occurred between France and
Austria, a state of war between Great Britain and Austria would be
declared from midnight of August 12.
JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY.
On August 17 the text of an ultimatum by Japan to Germany was published
in the following terms:--
"We consider it highly important and necessary in the present
situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance
of the peace in the Far East and to safeguard general interests as
contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great
Britain.
"In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the
establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the
Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty
to give advice to the Imperial German Government, to carry out the
following two propositions:--
"(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters
the German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to
disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.
"(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the
Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or
compensation the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a
view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.
"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that
in the event of its not receiving by noon of August 23 an answer
from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional
acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese
Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may
deem necessary to meet the situation."[47]
FOOTNOTES:
[47] Under Art. II of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, signed on July 13,
1911, it was agreed that if the two contracting parties should conduct a
war in common, they should make peace in mutual agreement, etc.
BRITISH APPROVAL.
The Official Press Bureau issued the following on August 17:--
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in
communication with each other, are of opinion that it is necessary
for each to take action to protect the general interest in the Far
East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping specially
in view the independence and integrity of China, and provided for
in that Agreement.
"It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the
Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be
necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor
beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any
foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the
Continent of Eastern Asia."
_DECLARATION OF COMMON POLICY._
On September 5, 1914, the British Official Press Bureau issued the
following statement from the Foreign Office:--
DECLARATION.
The undersigned duly authorised thereto by the respective
Governments hereby declare as follows:--
The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to
conclude peace separately during the present war. The three
Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no
one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous
agreement of each of the other Allies. In faith whereof the
undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto
their seals.
Done at London in triplicate, the 5th day of September, 1914.
E. Grey, His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.
Paul Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.
Benckendorff, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of
Russia.
TURKEY JOINS GERMANY.
Directly war broke out the Turkish Army was mobilised, under the supreme
command of Enver Pasha, who was entirely in German hands.[48] Although
the Turkish Government had declared their intention of preserving their
neutrality, they took no steps to ensure its maintenance. They forfeited
their ability to do so by the admission of the German warships, "Goeben"
and "Breslau," which, fleeing from the Allied Fleets, had entered the
Dardanelles on August 10.
Instead of interning these war vessels with their crews, as they were
repeatedly asked to do by the Allied Governments, the Turkish Government
allowed the German Admiral and his men to remain on board, and while
this was the case the German Government were in a position to force the
hand of the Turkish Government whenever it suited them to do so.
In pursuance of a long-prepared policy, the greatest pressure was
exercised by Germany to force Turkey into hostilities. German success in
the European War was said to be assured; the perpetual menace to Turkey
from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by an alliance with
Germany and Austria; Egypt might be recovered for the Empire; India and
other Moslem countries would rise against Christian rule, to the great
advantage of the Caliphate of Constantinople; Turkey would emerge from
the War the one great power of the East, even as Germany would be the
one great power of the West. Such was the substance of German
misrepresentations.
Enver Pasha, dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal, and by the
conviction of the superiority of German arms, proved a most active agent
on behalf of Germany.
A strong German element was imported into the remainder of the Turkish
Fleet, even before the British Naval Mission, which had been reduced to
impotence by order of the Minister of Marine, was recalled by His
Majesty's Government. Large numbers of Germans were imported from
Germany to be employed in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus,
and at other crucial points.
Numerous German merchant vessels served as bases of communication, and
as auxiliaries to what had become in effect the German Black Sea Fleet.
Secret communications with the German General Staff were established by
means of the "Corcovado," which was anchored opposite the German Embassy
at Therapia. The German Military Mission in Turkey acted in closest
touch with the Turkish Militarist Party. They were the main organisers
of those military preparations in Syria which directly menaced Egypt.
Emissaries of Enver Pasha bribed and organised the Bedouins on the
frontier; the Syrian towns were full of German officers, who provided
large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. The Khedive of
Egypt, who was in Constantinople, was himself a party to the conspiracy,
and arrangements were actually made with the German Embassy for his
presence with a military expedition across the frontier. All the Turkish
newspapers in Constantinople and most of the provincial papers became
German organs; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany
or Austria, and minimised everything favourable to the Allies.
Millions of money were consigned from Germany to the German Embassy in
Constantinople, and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank.
At one time these sums amounted to £4,000,000. A definite arrangement
was arrived at between the Germans and a group of Turkish Ministers,
including Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey and Djemal Pasha, that Turkey should
declare war as soon as the financial provision should have attained a
stated figure.
The final point was reached when Odessa and other Russian ports in the
Black Sea were attacked by the Turkish Fleet on October 29, 1914. It is
now certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the
German Admiral on the evening of October 27.
On October 30 the Russian Ambassador asked for his passports and there
was nothing left but for the British and French Ambassadors to demand
theirs on the same day. The Russian Ambassador left Constantinople on
October 31, while the British and French Ambassadors left the following
evening.[49]
Thenceforward the Turks, at the instigation of the Germans,
unsuccessfully endeavoured to raise Mahomedans in all countries against
Great Britain and her Allies. The Sultan of Turkey, misusing his
position as Padishah and Titular Head of the Moslems, gave a perverted
history of the events and proclaimed a Holy War. The Sultan, in his
speech from the Throne on December 14, 1914 (at which ceremony the
ex-Khedive of Egypt was present), said:--
"We were just in the best way to give reforms in the interior a
fresh impetus when suddenly the great crisis broke out. While our
Government was firmly resolved to observe the strictest neutrality,
our Fleet was attacked in the Black Sea by the Russian Fleet.
England and France then began actual hostilities by sending troops
to our frontiers. Therefore I declared a state of war. These
Powers, as a necessity, compelled us to resist by armed force the
policy of destruction which at all times was pursued against the
Islamic world by England, Russia, and France, and assumed the
character of a religious persecution. In conformity with the Fetwas
I called all Moslems to a Holy War against these Powers and those
who would help them."[50]
What the Moslems of India thought of the situation is succinctly shown
by a speech delivered on October 1, 1914, by the Agha Khan, the
spiritual head of the Khoja community of Mahomedans and President of the
All-India Moslem League.[51] He said he had always been convinced that
Germany was the most dangerous enemy of Turkey and other Moslem
countries, for she was the Power most anxious to enter by "peaceful
penetration" Asia Minor and Southern Persia. But she had been posing for
years past as a sort of protector of Islam--_though Heaven forbid that
they should have such an immoral protector_.
FOOTNOTES:
[48] Cd. 7716.
[49] Cd. 7628 and Cd. 7716.
[50] A Reuter's Amsterdam telegram of December 15, 1914.
[51] _Times_, October 2, 1914,
MORE GERMAN INTRIGUES.
The vastness of German intrigues throughout the world in preparation for
a great war have come out piece by piece.
=The Near East.=--Taking the Near East first, we find that Germany,
having suborned the ex-Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi, proceeded weeks
before the rupture with Turkey to give orders, through the Ottoman
Empire, to Shukri, the acting Chief of the Turkish Special Mission, to
prepare public opinion in Egypt for Turkish invasion and to await the
coming of the German Mors, whose trial was attended by such startling
disclosures.[52]
Mors had been introduced to Enver Pasha by Dr. Pruefer (Secretary to
Prince Hatzfeldt when he was German Agent in Egypt) and had held long
conferences with Omar Fauzi Bey, of the Turkish General Staff, who on
September 6, 1914, worked out a scheme for disturbances in Egypt by
bands of criminals led by Turkish officers and for an attack on the Suez
Canal.
In 1908 Prince Hatzfeldt succeeded Count Bernstorff, as German Agent in
Egypt, and he at once established close relations with the Egyptian
disloyalists of the extreme faction. In this he appears to have been
aided by Baron von Oppenheim, and by Dr. Pruefer, the Oriental Secretary
of the Agency, who was a fine Arabic scholar, and who had travelled a
great deal in Syria and the Near East. The leaders of the disloyal
section in Egypt were kept in the closest touch, and visited Prince
Hatzfeldt at the German Agency, and were in constant communication with
Dr. Pruefer, who, in Oriental disguise, often visited them, and other
Panislamic Agents.[53]
=The Far East.=--In India the German merchants joined our Chambers of
Commerce and were elected as representatives of commercial life, and as
trustees of port trusts, which gave them a knowledge of our local
defences. In some instances they appear to have become volunteers, and
so to have gained knowledge of our forts and armouries. Small German
merchants and traders in the Punjab and other districts constantly
endeavoured to undermine the British Raj, and preached sedition wherever
they went. Such were the agents and spies of the German Government.
Since the Mutiny at Singapore it has been proved that the Germans were
calling home their reserves from Singapore and the East in May, 1914,
and even as early as April of last year.[54] The first thing the
mutineers did was to go to the German Encampment, open the doors, and
supply those inside with rifles. Sir Evelyn Ellis, member of the
Singapore Legislative Council, who was President of the Commission
appointed by the Governor to collect evidence with reference to the
Mutiny, which took place on February 15, 1915, stated that:--
"They were not to think that they had been engaged in suppressing a
small local disturbance. On the contrary, there was evidence to
show that they had assisted in defeating one of the aims of the
destroyer of Europe. They had been dealing with work that had been
engineered by the agents of our common foes, and they had
contributed to the suppression of a most diabolical plot. What had
taken place in Singapore was only part of a scheme for the murder
of women and children such as they had had instances of on the East
Coast of England."[55]
The head of a big German firm in Singapore, after being released on
parole, was found with a wireless installation in his house, with which
he was stated to have kept the "Emden" supplied with news.[56]
In Persia and Arabia there is abundant proof of German intrigues, while
in China few opportunities have been lost by German agents of impugning
British good faith, and German money appears to have been used for years
in keeping the Chinese press--in Peking more particularly--as
anti-British as possible. Since the declaration of war an attempt has
been made by Captain Pappenheim, Military Attaché of the German Legation
in Peking, to organise an expedition into Russian Siberia to damage the
Trans-Siberian railway. His action was, of course, a gross abuse of his
diplomatic position, and has been disclaimed by the Chinese
Government.[57]
=West Africa.=--In West Africa the report of Colonel F. C. Bryant on
operation in Togoland shows how well the Germans were prepared for war
in that region.[58]
=South Africa.=--In South Africa[59] it has been proved that so far back
as 1912 the Germans were in communication with Lieut.-Colonel Maritz
with a view to a rebellion. The latter appears to have brooded over
schemes for the establishment of a Republic in South Africa. As the Blue
Book, published in Cape Town on April 28, 1915, states: "One witness,
Captain Leipold, of the Government Intelligence Department, who was sent
to find out how things stood with Maritz, describes how the rebel leader
dramatically threw his cards on the table in the shape of a bundle of
correspondence with the German Administration at Windhuk, dating as far
back as August, 1912."[60]
In a speech to his troops on August 9, 1914, Maritz declared that he had
6,000 Germans ready to help him, and he further stated that Beyers and
De Wet had been fully informed of his plans long before the war.[61]
Evidence was also given during the trial of De Wet that the rebellion in
South Africa "was planned a couple of years ago when General Hertzog
left the Ministry."[62] The Germans, either directly or indirectly,
suborned, amongst others, Maritz, De Wet, De La Rey, Beyers, Kemp, and
Kock. But the magnificent services of General Botha and the loyalists
of South Africa--both British and Dutch--rendered nugatory the
machinations of the German Government.
The history of German intrigues, both before and since the war, in
British and French colonies, and in neutral countries throughout the
world, which are now known and proved to the hilt, may be gauged from
the examples given in the foregoing brief notes. The German newspaper
_Der Tag_, which, during the first month of the war, declared: "Herr
Gott, sind diese Tage schön" (O Lord, how beautiful are these days),
subsequently summarised the German outlook when it naively
declared:--[63]
"So many of our calculations have deceived us. We expected that
British India would rise when the first shot was fired in Europe,
but in reality thousands of Indians came to fight with the British
against us. We anticipated that the whole British Empire would be
torn to pieces, but the Colonies appear to be closer than ever
united with the Mother Country. We expected a triumphant rebellion
in South Africa, yet it turned out nothing but a failure. We
expected trouble in Ireland, but instead, she sent her best
soldiers against us. We anticipated that the party of 'peace at any
price' would be dominant in England, but it melted away in the
ardour to fight against Germany. We reckoned that England was
degenerate and incapable of placing any weight in the scale, yet
she seems to be our principal enemy.
"The same has been the case with France and Russia. We thought that
France was depraved and divided and we find that they are
formidable opponents. We believed that the Russian people were far
too discontented to fight for their Government, and we made our
plans on the supposition of a rapid collapse of Russia, but,
instead, she mobilised her millions quickly and well, and her
people are full of enthusiasm and their power is crushing. Those
who led us into all those mistakes and miscalculations have laid
upon themselves a heavy responsibility."
FOOTNOTES:
[52] _Times_, April 28, 1915.
[53] _Times_, January 6, 1915.
[54] _Times_, April 24, 1915. (Speech by the Bishop of Singapore.)
[55] _Daily News and Leader_, April 27, 1915.
[56] _Morning Post_, March 27, 1915.
[57] Letter from the Chinese Legation to the _Times_, March 13 and 20,
1915.
[58] _Daily News and Leader_, April 22, 1915.
[59] Cd. 7874.
[60] _Times_, April 30, 1915.
[61] _Times_, March 17, 1915.
[62] _Times_, February 19, 1915.
[63] _Times_, April 26, 1915.
HOW THE GERMANS MAKE WAR.
It has often been asked what would happen if savages were armed with the
products of modern science and with the intelligence to use them.
Germany has answered the question. Every resource of science lies at the
German command; the chemist, the physicist, the metallurgist, have all
worked in this war to place the most effective tools of destruction in
the Germans' hands, and to satisfy their ambitions they have shut the
gates of mercy on mankind. The Official Handbook of Instructions issued
to Officers of the German Army by the German General Staff urges the
"exploitation of the crimes of third parties (assassination,
incendiarism, robbery and the like) to the prejudice of the enemy."
This Official Handbook says:--
"A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the
combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it
will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual
and material resources of the latter."[64]
The German Emperor, addressing the troops which he sent to take part in
the International Expedition in China in 1900, said:--
"When you come into contact with the enemy strike him down.
_Quarter is not to be given. Prisoners are not to be made._ Whoever
falls into your hands is into your hands delivered. Just as a
thousand years ago the Huns, under their King Attila, made for
themselves a name which still appears imposing in tradition, so may
the name of German become known in China in such a way that never
again will a Chinaman dare to look askance at a German. The
blessing of the Lord be with you. Give proof of your courage and
the Divine blessing will be attached to your colours."
At midnight on August 4, Great Britain declared war on Germany for
violating the neutrality of Belgium, and it will be remembered that
earlier in the day the German Imperial Chancellor had stated that German
troops "perhaps are already on Belgian soil," and that Germany could
only have one thought--how she was to "hack her way through."
Simultaneously with the thought, came action. What was actually taking
place is described, by Lord Bryce's Committee of Inquiry, in the
following words[65]:--
"On August 4th the roads converging upon Liège from north-east,
east, and south were covered with German Death's Head Hussars and
Uhlans pressing forward to seize the passage over the Meuse. From
the very beginning of the operations the civilian population of the
villages lying upon the line of the German advance were made to
experience the extreme horrors of war. 'On the 4th of August,' says
one witness, 'at Herve' (a village not far from the frontier), 'I
saw at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, near the station, five
Uhlans, these were the first German troops I had seen. They were
followed by a German officer and some soldiers in a motor car. The
men in the car called out to a couple of young fellows who were
standing about 30 yards away. The young men, being afraid, ran off,
and then the Germans fired and killed one of them named D----.'
"The murder of this innocent fugitive civilian was a prelude to the
burning and pillage of Herve and of other villages in the
neighbourhood, to the indiscriminate shooting of civilians of both
sexes, and to the organised military execution of batches of
selected males. Thus at Herve some 50 men escaping from the burning
houses were seized, taken outside the town and shot. At Melen, a
hamlet west of Herve, 40 men were shot. In one household alone the
father and mother (names given) were shot, the daughter died after
being repeatedly outraged, and the son was wounded. Nor were
children exempt....
"The burning of the villages in this neighbourhood and the
wholesale slaughter of civilians, such as occurred at Herve,
Micheroux, and Soumagne, appear to be connected with the
exasperation caused by the resistance of Fort Fléron, whose guns
barred the main road from Aix la Chapelle to Liège. Enraged by the
losses which they had sustained, suspicious of the temper of the
civilian population, and probably thinking that by exceptional
severities at the outset they could cow the spirit of the Belgian
nation, the German officers and men speedily accustomed themselves
to the slaughter of civilians."
As a German soldier's diary, examined by Lord Bryce's Committee,
says:--"The inhabitants without exception were brought out and shot.
This shooting was heart-breaking as they all knelt down and prayed, but
that was no ground for mercy. A few shots rang out and they fell back
into the green grass and slept for ever."[66]
During the invasion of Belgium and France, German procedure was almost
the same in all cases. "They advance along a road, shooting inoffensive
passers-by--particularly bicyclists--as well as peasants working in the
fields. In the towns or villages where they stop, they begin by
requisitioning food and drink, which they consume till intoxicated.
Sometimes from the interior of deserted houses they let off their rifles
at random, and declare that it was the inhabitants who fired. Then the
scenes of fire, murder, and especially pillage, begin, accompanied by
acts of deliberate cruelty, without respect to sex or age. Even where
they pretend to know the actual person guilty of the acts they allege,
they do not content themselves with executing him summarily, but they
seize the opportunity to decimate the population, pillage the houses,
and then set them on fire. After a preliminary attack and massacre they
shut up the men in the church, and then order the women to return to
their houses and to leave their doors open all night."[67]
Innumerable German atrocities are on record and well authenticated. For
example, Professor Jacobs, at a medical meeting in Edinburgh, stated
that, as head of the Belgian Red Cross, he "had visited a chateau but
found the Red Cross had not been respected. It had been completely
destroyed, and the bodies of six girls, aged from ten to seventeen, were
lying on the lawn. A convent containing sixty sisters had been entered
by the German soldiers and every one had been violated. On the evidence
of the doctor of the institution twenty-five were pregnant. Professor
Jacobs had operated on the wife of a doctor living near Namur. Three
weeks after the operation, when convalescing and still in bed, their
house was entered by German soldiers; she was raped by seven of them and
died two days after."[68]
1. A few typical examples of the wholesale atrocities of German troops
are given in Appendix C, but to show that in many cases such atrocities
were not only countenanced, but ordered by officers in command, we quote
the following:--
August 22, 1914.
The inhabitants of the town of Andenne, after having protested
their peaceful intentions, made a treacherous surprise attack on
our troops.
It was with my consent that the General had the whole place burnt
down, and about 100 people shot.
I bring this fact to the knowledge of the town of Liége, so that
its inhabitants may know the fate with which they are threatened if
they take up a similar attitude.
The General Commanding-in-Chief,
VON BULOW.[69]
2. Here is an order of the day given on August 26 by General Stenger
commanding the 58th German Brigade:--
After to-day no more prisoners will be taken. All prisoners are to
be killed. Wounded, with or without arms, are to be killed. Even
prisoners already grouped in convoys are to be killed. Let not a
single living enemy remain behind us.
Oberlieutenant und Kompagnie-Chef STOY;
Oberst und Regiments Kommandeur NEUBAUER;
General-Major und Brigade-Kommandeur STENGER.[70]
With reference to the above Order, Professor Joseph Bédier says: "Some
thirty soldiers of Stenger's Brigade (112th and 142nd Regt. of the Baden
Infantry), were examined in our prisoners' camps. I have read their
evidence, which they gave upon oath and signed. All confirm the
statement that this order of the day was given them on August 26, in one
unit by Major Mosebach, in another by Lieut. Curtius, &c.; the majority
did not know whether the order was carried out, but three of them say
they saw it done in the forest of Thiaville, where ten or twelve wounded
French soldiers who had already been spared by a battalion were
despatched. Two others saw the order carried out on the Thiaville road,
where some wounded found in a ditch by a company were finished off."[71]
3. The following are extracts from a Proclamation posted by the Germans
at Namur on August 25, 1914:--
(3) Every street will be occupied by a German Guard, who will take
ten hostages from each street, whom they will keep under
surveillance. If there is any rising in the street the ten hostages
will be shot.
(4) Doors may not be locked, and at night after eight o'clock there
must be lights in three windows in every house.
(5) It is forbidden to be in the street after eight o'clock. The
inhabitants of Namur must understand that there is no greater and
more horrible crime than to compromise the existence of the town
and the life of its citizens by criminal acts against the German
Army.
The Commander of the Town,
VON BULOW.[72]
4. On October 5 the following Proclamation was posted in Brussels "and
probably in most of the Communes of the Kingdom."
During the evening of September 25, the railway line and the
telegraph wires were destroyed on the line Lovenjoul-Vertryck. In
consequence of this, these two localities have had to render an
account of this, and had to give hostages in the morning of
September 30.
In future, the localities nearest to the place where similar acts
take place will be punished without pity; _it matters little if
they are accomplices or not_. For this purpose _hostages have been
taken_ from all localities near the railway line thus menaced, and
at the first attempt to destroy the railway line, or the telephone
or telegraph wires, _they will be immediately shot_.
Further, all the troops charged with the duty of guarding the
railway have been ordered to shoot any person who, in a suspicious
manner, approaches the line, or the telegraph or telephone wires.
The Governor-General of Belgium,
(S.) BARON VON DER GOLTZ, Field-Marshal.[73]
For purposes of record it should be noted that Lord Bryce's Committee
mention by name three German Generals whose armies have disgraced
civilisation; they are those of General Alexander von Kluck, General von
Bülow and General von Hausen.[74]
Some of the main heads of the barbarities of Germany and of the way she
has violated the recognised rules of International Law, may be set out
as follows:--[75]
(_a_) The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the North of
France has been made public by the Belgian and French Governments, and
by those who have had experience of it at first hand. Modern history
affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the
defenceless and non-combatant population in the territory that has been
in German military occupation. Even the food of the population was
confiscated, until, in Belgium, an International Commission, largely
influenced by American generosity and conducted under American auspices,
came to the relief of the population, and secured from the German
Government a promise to spare what food was still left in the country,
though the Germans still continue to make levies in money upon the
defenceless population for the support of the German Army.
(_b_) We have from time to time received most terrible accounts of the
barbarous treatment to which British officers and soldiers have been
exposed after they have been taken prisoner, while being conveyed to
German prison camps. Evidence has been received of the hardships to
which British prisoners of war are subjected in the prison camps,
contrasting most unfavourably with the treatment of German prisoners in
this country. The Germans make no attempt to save sailors from British
war vessels they sink, although we have saved a large number of German
sailors in spite of great danger to our men.[76]For example, on May 1,
1915, in the destroyer action in the North Sea, the Germans imprisoned
two British sailors below and when their vessel was sinking, saved
themselves, but left their prisoners to sink below because "time was
short."
As Lord Kitchener said, Germany "has stooped to acts which will surely
stain indelibly her military history and which would vie with the
barbarous savagery of the Dervishes of the Sudan."[77] On the same day,
in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister declared: "When we come to
the end of this war, which, please God, we may, we shall not forget--and
ought not to forget--this horrible record of calculated cruelty and
crime, and we shall hold it to be our duty to exact such reparation
against those who are proved to have been guilty agents or actors in the
matter, as it may be possible for us to exact. I do not think we should
be doing our duty to these brave and unfortunate men or to the honour of
our own country and the plain dictates of humanity if we were content
with anything less than that."[78]
(_c_) At the very outset of war a German mine-layer was discovered
laying a mine-field on the high seas. Further mine-fields have been laid
from time to time without warning, and are still being laid on the high
seas, and many neutral, as well as British vessels, have been sunk by
them.
(_d_) At various times during the war German submarines have stopped and
sunk British merchant vessels, thus making the sinking of merchant
vessels a general practice, though it was admitted previously, if at
all, only as an exception; the general rule, to which the British
Government have adhered, being that merchant vessels, if captured, must
be taken before a Prize Court. The Germans have also sunk British
merchant vessels by torpedo without notice, and without any provision
for the safety of the crew. They have done this in the case of neutral
as well as of British vessels, and a number of non-combatant and
innocent lives, unarmed and defenceless, have been destroyed in this
way. The Germans have sunk without warning emigrant vessels, have tried
to sink an hospital ship, and have themselves used an hospital ship for
patrol work and wireless. The torpedoeing of the "Lusitania" on May 7,
1915, involving the murder of hundreds of innocent civilians--British
and neutral--was acclaimed with great relish in Berlin.
(_e_) Unfortified, open, and defenceless towns, such as Scarborough,
Yarmouth and Whitby, have been deliberately and wantonly bombarded by
German ships of war, causing, in some cases, considerable loss of
civilian life, including women and children.
(_f_) German aircraft have dropped bombs on the East Coast of England,
in places where there were no military or strategic points to be
attacked.
(_g_) The Germans have used poisonous gases in killing Allied troops at
the Front, although Germany was a signatory to the following article in
the Hague Convention:--
"The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of
projectiles, the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating
or deleterious gases."[79]
And finally the German troops in South Africa have poisoned drinking
wells and infected them with disease.[80]
FOOTNOTES:
[64] _Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege._ Berlin, 1902, in the series
"Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften," published in 1905. A translation
of this monograph by Professor J. H. Morgan has recently been published.
[65] Cd. 7894, page 7, 8.
[66] Cd. 7894, page 9.
[67] See Appendix C. Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation
(1914). The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian
reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President);
Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the
Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of
Antwerp; M. van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and,
as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the
Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.
[68] Meeting of Edinburgh Obstetrical Society, December 9, 1914.
_Lancet_, December 19, 1914, page 1, 440.
[69] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
and Customs of War in Belgium.
[70] _German Atrocities from German Evidence._ One of the series of
"Studies and Documents on the War." Publishing Committee: Mm. Ernest
Lavisse, of the Académie française, Président; Charles Andler, professor
of German literature and language in the University of Paris; Joseph
Bédier, professor at the College de France; Henri Bergson, of the
Académie française; Emile Boutroux, of the Académie française; Ernest
Denis, professor of history in the University of Paris; Emile Durkheim,
professor in the University of Paris; Jacques Hadamard, of the Académie
des Sciences; Gustave Lanson, professor of French literature in the
University of Paris; Charles Seignobos, professor of history in the
University of Paris; André Weiss, of the Académie des Sciences morales
et politiques.
[71] _German Atrocities from German Evidence._ See footnote on page 32.
[72] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
and Customs of War in Belgium.
[73] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
and Customs of war in Belgium.
[74] Cd. 7894, page 10.
[75] Most of the points referred to in the following record are to be
found in Sir Edward Grey's reply to the U.S. Note--dated March 15.
[76] Cd. 7921, issued May 19, 1915, shows that although 1,282 men had
been rescued by the British from German warships, not a single rescue
had been effected by German men-of-war.
[77] House of Lords, April 27, 1915.
[78] House of Commons, April 27, 1915.
[79] See Appendix D.
[80] Report _re_ Swakopmund, issued by Secretary of State for Colonies.
_Times_, May 6, 1915.
GERMANY'S ATTEMPTED BRIBERY.
We thus see with what an easy conscience Germany tears up her treaties
and how she repudiates her most solemn pledges. In light of these facts
let us examine the rush of promises Germany was prepared to give in
order to ensure our neutrality in the War.
On July 29, 1914, Germany, having decided on the War in conjunction with
Austria against Russia and France, made what our Ambassador at Berlin
called "a strong bid for British neutrality," to which reference has
been made, on page 14. Provided that Britain remained neutral Germany
stated that every assurance would be given to Great Britain that the
German Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
France in Europe, should they prove victorious. Germany categorically
stated that she was unable to give a similar undertaking with reference
to the French colonies. She made a statement with regard to the
integrity of Holland, and said that it depended upon the action of
France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium,
but that when the War was over Belgian integrity would be respected if
she had not sided against Germany. In other words, Great Britain was to
stand by and
=See Belgium invaded and, if she resisted, annexed by Germany;=
=See all the French Colonies taken by Germany;=
=Acquiesce in France, our neighbour and friend, being crushed under
the iron heel of Germany, and, as Bismarck threatened, bled white
by a war indemnity when all was over.=
As Sir Edward Grey replied on July 30: "From the material point of view
such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory
in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her
position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
Altogether, apart from that it would be a disgrace for us to make this
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
good name of this country would never recover."[81]
That is the "infamous bargain" which Britain spurned and to which the
Prime Minister referred on August 6 in the House of Commons, in the
following words:--
="What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day ... if
we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to
get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of
our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise--nothing
more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain
eventualities; a promise, be it observed--I am sorry to have to say
it, but it must be put upon record--given by a Power which was at
that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty
and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied
or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves
with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this
country, of which we are trustees."=[82]
This suggestion of Germany is not the only infamous proposal she has
made to Great Britain. She has made them with a persistence worthy of a
better cause. In February, 1912, Lord Haldane went to Berlin on behalf
of the Cabinet in order to obtain the basis of a friendly understanding
between the two countries. What transpired is made clear in a speech
delivered by Mr. Asquith, at Cardiff, on October 2, 1914, when the Prime
Minister said:--
"We laid down in terms, carefully approved by the Cabinet, and
which I will textually quote, what our relations to Germany ought,
in our view, to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German
Government:--
'Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any
unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not
the subject, and forms no part of any Treaty, understanding,
or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she
become a party to anything that has such an object.'
"There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that. But that was
not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further.
They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality, in the
event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a
time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and
defensive forces, and especially upon the sea. They asked us--to
put it quite plainly--for a free hand, so far as we were concerned,
if and when they selected the opportunity to overpower and dominate
the European world. To such a demand one answer was possible, and
that was the answer we gave."[83]
FOOTNOTES:
[81] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 101.
[82] House of Commons, August 6, 1914.
[83] _South Wales Daily News_, October 3, 1914.
IF BRITAIN HAD REFUSED TO FIGHT.
If, in view of all this evidence, Britain had refused to fight, what
would have been her position? The Prime Minister, speaking at the
Guildhall on September 4, 1914, said:--
"But let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would
have been our condition as a nation to-day if, through timidity, or
through a perverted calculation of self-interest or through a
paralysis of the sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough
to be false to our word and faithless to our friends?
"Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the
whole civilised world to Belgium--a small State which has lived for
more than 70 years under a several and collective guarantee, to
which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were parties--and we
should have seen, at the instance, and by the action of two of
these guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her
independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the
easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression
against France.
"We, the British people, should have at this moment been standing
by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command,
while this small and unprotected State (Belgium), in defence of her
vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and
overwhelming force.
"We should have been watching as detached spectators the siege of
Liège, the steady and manful resistance of a small Army, the
occupation of Brussels with its splendid traditions and memories,
the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native
land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by
them, and buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil
population, and finally the greatest crime committed against
civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War--the sack of
Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its
unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable
treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance....
"For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness--which
means in effect a willing accomplice--of this tragic triumph of
force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this
country of ours blotted out of the pages of history."
Further, we need not imagine that the peace we should have gained would
have been a lasting one. If we had dishonoured our name in the manner
Mr. Asquith has described, we should have been left without a friend in
the world. Who can doubt that we should have been Germany's next victim
if she had succeeded in crushing Belgium and France and warding off the
blows of Russia? As Mr. Bonar Law said, on the same occasion:--
"We are fighting for our national existence, for everything which
nations have always held most dear."
The fate which has fallen upon Belgium would have been our fate in a few
years' time, but with this difference, that we should have had no
powerful friends to give back as far as humanly possible what we had
lost, as Russia, France and Britain are determined to do for Belgium.
APPENDIX A.
GERMANY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE ULTIMATUM DELIVERED BY
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERBIA ON JULY 23, 1914.
Germany did her utmost to make the Great Powers believe that she had no
knowledge of the contents of the Ultimatum delivered by Austria-Hungary
to Serbia at 6 p.m. on Thursday, July 23, 1914.
Two days before the delivery of the Ultimatum, the Russian Chargé
d'Affaires in Berlin, at the Diplomatic Audience, said to Herr von Jagow
(German Secretary of State), that he supposed the German Government then
had full knowledge of the Note prepared by Austria. Herr von Jagow
protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that
Note, and expressed himself in the same way on that date (July 21) to
the French Ambassador also. The very next day (July 22), however, M.
Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, in a despatch to the
Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, stated:--
"Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador,
who stated to him that at Berlin a _démarche_ of the
Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian Government was expected.
Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were
endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but
that up to the present time they had not been successful in this,
and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a
_démarche_ of this kind.... The communications of Prince Lichnowsky
had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did
not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the
Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension
in Austro-Serbian relations."[84]
Here it will be noticed that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in
London, stated that the German Government were endeavouring to "hold
back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna." How could they have done this
if they were not aware of the general terms of the Ultimatum which
Austria-Hungary proposed sending to Serbia. Moreover, the impression
given by the Italian Ambassador was probably derived from his knowledge
of what had happened over a year before, when Austria appears to have
been resolved on provoking war with Serbia on August 9, 1913.
But unfortunately for Germany the statement was refuted by one of its
own States, Bavaria. The Ultimatum to Serbia was not delivered until 6
p.m. on the evening of July 23; yet earlier on that day M. Allizé, the
French Minister at Munich, in his Report to Paris, stated:--
=" ... Official circles have for some time been assuming with more
or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.=
="In particular, the President of the Council said to me to-day
that the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him
(dont il avait connaissance) was in his opinion drawn up in terms
which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the
existing situation appeared to him to be very serious."=[85]
It is difficult to think that the President of the Bavarian Council knew
the contents of the Austrian Note while the German Secretary of State at
Berlin was kept in ignorance of its terms. Yet, the next day, Herr von
Jagow again makes the denial which is forwarded to Paris in the French
Ambassador's despatch, dated Berlin, July 24:--
"I asked the Secretary of State to-day in the interview which I had
with him if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that
Austria had presented a Note to the Powers on her dispute with
Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.
"Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the
Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government
having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria....
_Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been
entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were
communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I
showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support
claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less
striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the
officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they
were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to
Serbia._"[86]
Confirmation of Germany's complicity is received in a despatch to his
Government from the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon) in London, dated
July 24, 1914:--
"I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a
surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have
despatched her Ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.
"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg
and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
Capital by the rumours of a naval _entente_ between Russia and
England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening
of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this
that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in
Germany.
"The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have
been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return
from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so,
she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."[87]
Again on the same day (July 24, 1914) we have an interesting despatch
from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris to the French
Ambassadors abroad, detailing what transpired at a visit received from
Herr von Schoen (the German Ambassador in Paris), at which the latter
twice read (but refused to leave copy of) a note which said:--
"Under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of
the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified.
In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the
Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the
apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply
with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried
away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The
Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to
abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no
choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the
Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, by using
military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to
them.... The German Government consider that in the present case
there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought
seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately
concerned.
"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the
dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing
to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable
consequences...."[88]
A note of similar effect was left with Sir Edward Grey by the German
Ambassador in London.[89]
Now the details of the Ultimatum to Serbia were only communicated to the
French and Russian Governments on July 24, 1914, after 10 o'clock in the
morning (nearly 17 hours after they had been delivered to Serbia), and
presumably they were communicated to all the other Governments at about
the same time. Germany would have us believe that she received the
contents at the same time and on the same day as the other Governments.
Yet, a few hours later, the German Ambassador in Paris is able, on
instructions from his Government, to present a detailed note and to
argue the matter in all its bearings. That is to say, Germany would have
us believe that the Kaiser and his Ministers received the contents of
the Ultimatum in the morning, and, almost within a few minutes, gathered
together and discussed a question which they knew, if not carefully
handled, must mean a European war; pretend that it was a matter to be
settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; and promptly
instruct their Ambassador in Paris to the minutest details.
As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to the British
Ambassador in Petrograd on this fateful morning, "Austria's conduct was
both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action
unless Germany had first been consulted."[90]
It has since been proved that Germany and Austria were parties not only
to this, but to an exactly similar conspiracy which took place twelve
months before.
On December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Signor Giolitti
(ex-Premier of Italy) made the following momentous statement:--
"During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year
before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I
received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano (late
Foreign Minister), the following telegram:--
"'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention
of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as
defensive, hoping to bring into operation the _casus foederis_
of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to
be inapplicable. (_Sensation._)
"'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with
Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it
may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider
such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that,
therefore, we do not consider that the _casus foederis_
arises.
"'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'
"I replied:--
"'If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a
_casus foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she
is taking on her own account, since there is no question of
defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It
is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made
to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for
action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this
most perilous adventure.' (_Hear, hear._)
"This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and
recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our
relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality
made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects
to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an
interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already
accepted by the Allies.
"I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes
of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely
loyal to the observance of her pledges." (_Loud applause._)[91]
As the _Times_ of December 11, 1914, said in a Leading Article:--
"In the face of these facts, what becomes of the pretence of the
German White Book that it was the murders which forced Austria to
take action; what of the contention that Russia, or that England,
is answerable for the war? Germany had known Austria's purpose for
a year when she granted that Power a free hand to deal with Serbia
at her discretion." ... These contemporary telegrams read by Signor
Giolitti "prove that the war is no result of Russian arrogance, of
French revenge, or of English envy, as the German Chancellor avers,
but that it is the consequence of schemes long harboured, carefully
thought out, and deliberately adopted by Austria and by Germany."
On the occasion referred to above it was not the murder of the
heir-apparent at Serajevo which was the pretext for aggression; the
issue of the moment was the Treaty of Bucharest.
Two days after the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914,
Herr von Jagow issued another denial. In his Report to the Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, the French Ambassador at Berlin
on July 25 wrote:--
"The English Chargé d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as
I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the
Austrian Note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a
reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter
further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at
the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria."[92]
On the same day (July 25) the Russian representative in Paris reports to
his Government, that the German Ambassador (Herr von Schoen) said:--
"that Austria had presented her Note to Serbia without any definite
understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved
of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly 'the bolt once
fired' (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by
her duties as an ally."[93]
The next day the Acting Director of the "Direction Politique" in Paris,
in a note on the visit to that Office paid by Herr von Schoen, the
German Ambassador, stated (Paris, Sunday, July 26):--
"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian Note, and had
only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that
Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to
forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a
situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He
declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian
reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied
Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often
ill-informed, represented it to be."[94]
A denial by the German Ambassador to England of his Government's
cognisance of the Note is referred to in a despatch from the Russian
Ambassador in London (Count Benckendorff) to M. Sazonof, dated July 25,
1914:--
"Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him
that the German Government were not informed of the text of the
Austrian Note, but that they entirely supported Austria's
action."[95]
On July 25, 1914, a Note was handed by the German Ambassador at
Petrograd to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:--
"We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by
certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the
Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany
is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the
text of the Austrian Note before it was presented, and exercised no
influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly
attributed to Germany.
"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims
made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers
justified."[96]
That this assumed ignorance was received with scepticism, and in some
cases frank disbelief in other quarters, is apparent. The French
Ambassador in Berlin reported on July 25:--
"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of
events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the
Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's démarche.
"He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the
Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly
chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the
Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."[97]
From the French Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 came the following
statement to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris:--
"Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution
of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed
her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able
herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances
which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under
conditions which have been thoroughly considered."[98]
Up to this date, as the Russian Berlin representative reported to his
Government the Official German Wolff Bureau (News Agency) had not
published the text of the conciliatory Serbian reply, although it had
been communicated to them; nor had it appeared _in extenso_ in any of
the local papers--because of the _calming_ effect it would have had on
German readers![99]
On the same day (July 28) the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in
Paris sent the following message to the French Ambassadors abroad:--
"I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning;
he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to
make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk
over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action
which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's
intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant
of the nature of the means of coercion which she was
preparing."[100]
But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram
sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:--
"I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
unreliable."[101]
On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:--
"I report the following impressions of my interview with M.
Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact
information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies
every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian
Government would have taken an initiative which would lead,
according to a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without
previous arrangement with the Emperor William.
"The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take
peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there
is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us
would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues
share this feeling."[102]
Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in
Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:--
="I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the
text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched,
and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German
Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."=[103]
Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for
as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank,
stated on January 29, 1915:--
"On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great
commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to
sell their securities. This was recognised as the first
semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...."
FOOTNOTES:
[84] Cd. 7717, No. 19.
[85] Cd. 7717, No. 21.
[86] Cd. 7717, No. 30.
[87] Cd. 7717, No. 32.
[88] Cd. 7717, No. 28.
[89] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 9.
[90] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 6.
[91] Cd. 7860, page 401.
[92] Cd. 7717, No. 41.
[93] Cd. 7626, No. 19.
[94] Cd. 7717, No. 57.
[95] Cd. 7626, No. 20.
[96] Cd. 7626, No. 18.
[97] Cd. 7717, No. 35.
[98] Cd. 7717, No. 83.
[99] Cd. 7626, No. 46.
[100] Cd. 7717, No. 78.
[101] Cd. 7717, Appendix 5, No. 3.
[102] Cd. 7717, No. 87.
[103] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.
APPENDIX B.
HOW GERMANY MISLED AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
Germany's view is very clearly indicated in a despatch from the British
Ambassador at Vienna, dated July 26, 1914:--
"According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will
keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is
resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Serbian
territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my
question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by
public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he
said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose,
the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of
Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was
perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would
not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step
which would probably result in many frontier questions in which
Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian
and Persian questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France,
too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.... He doubted
Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia,
acting as if she made any such claim. _As for Germany, she knew
very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this
matter._"[104]
Germany's view is further explained by the British representative at
Berlin, on July 26, 1914:--
"Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador
at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria
annexed bits of Serbian territory Russia would not remain
indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia
would not act if Austria did _not_ annex territory."[105]
The result of this German influence is shown on the Austrian Ambassador
in Berlin by the following despatch from Sir Edward Goschen, the British
Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914:--
"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."[106]
So successful were the Germans in impressing this false view upon the
Austrians that the position is best described by the British Ambassador
in Vienna in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:--
"I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the
Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the
Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war (with Serbia)
inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved
to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a
Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been
administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to
proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the
prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention
would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."[107]
Added to which we have further proof in a despatch from the British
Ambassador at Rome, dated July 23, 1914:--
"Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign
Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the
conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was
absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has
occasioned, to score a definite success."[108]
FOOTNOTES:
[104] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 32.
[105] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 33.
[106] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 71.
[107] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 41.
[108] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 38.
APPENDIX C.
SOME GERMAN ATROCITIES IN BELGIUM.
In December, 1914, a Committee was appointed by the British Government
to inquire into the German outrages in Belgium and France. Under the
Chairmanship of Lord Bryce, this Committee was composed of:--
THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M. (Regius Professor of Civil Law at
Oxford, 1870; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1886;
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster (with seat in Cabinet), 1892;
President of Board of Trade, 1894; one of the British Members of
the International Tribunal at The Hague; Chief Secretary for
Ireland, 1905-6; His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary at Washington, 1907-12).
THE RT. HON. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bt., K.C., LL.D., D.C.L. (Judge
of Admiralty Court of Cinque Ports since 1914; Editor of Law
Reports since 1895; Chairman, Royal Commission on Public Records,
1910; Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1883-1903; Author
of The Law of Torts, 1887; History of English Law, 1895.)
THE RT. HON. SIR EDWARD CLARKE, K.C. (Solicitor-General, 1886-92).
SIR ALFRED HOPKINSON, K.C. (Professor of Law, Owen's College,
Manchester (Principal, 1898-1904); Adviser to the Bombay
University, 1913-14).
MR. H. A. L. FISHER (Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University;
Chichele Lecturer in Foreign History, 1911-12).
MR. HAROLD COX, M.A. (Editor, _Edinburgh Review_).
SIR KENELM E. DIGBY, K.C., G.C.B. (Permanent Under-Secretary of
State at Home Office, 1895-1903).
This eminent and impartial Tribunal, after carefully weighing the
evidence (Cd. 7894 and Cd. 7895) came to the following grave
conclusions:--
"(i) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and
systematically organised massacres of the civil population,
accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.
"(ii) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians,
both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated,
and children murdered.
"(iii) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of
property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the
German Army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic
incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings
and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be
alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorisation.
"(iv) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken,
particularly by the using of civilians, including women and
children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a
less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the
frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.
"Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the
Committee conceive that they would be doing less than their duty
if they failed to record them as fully established by the evidence.
Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a
scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the
last three centuries."
The Report makes it plain that apart from the first outbreak of outrages
intended to cow the Belgians into submission, fresh bursts of plunder
and rapine took place on specific occasions when the Germans suffered
defeat. Cowardly vengeance was thus wreaked on the innocent Belgian
civilians for the defeat of German arms. For example, on August 25,
1914, the Belgian Army, sallying out from Antwerp, drove the enemy from
Malines. The Germans promptly massacred and burnt at Louvain, "the
signal for which was provided by shots exchanged between the German Army
retreating after its repulse at Malines and some members of the German
garrison of Louvain, who mistook their fellow-countrymen for
Belgians."[109] Similarly when a successful sortie from Antwerp drove
the Germans from Aerschot, they retaliated by a blood-vendetta upon the
civil population.
The Germans have endeavoured to justify their brutal excesses by
bringing counter-charges against Belgian civilians. For instance, the
Chancellor of the German Empire, in a communication made to the press on
September 2, 1914, and printed in the _Nord Deutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung_, of September 21, said: "Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of
the German wounded. Officials of Belgian cities have invited our
officers to dinner, and shot and killed them across the table. Contrary
to all international law, the whole civilian population of Belgium was
called out, and after having at first shown friendliness carried on in
the rear of our troops terrible warfare with concealed weapons. Belgian
women cut the throats of soldiers whom they had quartered in their homes
while they were sleeping."
Upon this Lord Bryce's Committee make the comment: "No evidence whatever
seems to have been adduced to prove these tales."[110]
Of both individual and concerted acts of barbarity, the report
teems--for example:--[111]
"It is clearly shown that many offences were committed against
infants and quite young children. On one occasion children were
even roped together and used as a military screen against the
enemy, on another three soldiers went into action carrying small
children to protect themselves from flank fire. A shocking case of
the murder of a baby by a drunken soldier at Malines is thus
recorded by one eye-witness and confirmed by another:--
"'One day when the Germans were not actually bombarding the town I
left my house to go to my mother's house in High Street. My husband
was with me. I saw eight German soldiers, and they were drunk. They
were singing and making a lot of noise and dancing about. As the
German soldiers came along the street I saw a small child, whether
boy or girl I could not see, come out of a house. The child was
about two years of age. The child came into the middle of the
street so as to be in the way of the soldiers. The soldiers were
walking in twos. The first line of two passed the child; one of the
second line, the man on the left, stepped aside and drove his
bayonet with both hands into the child's stomach, lifting the child
into the air on his bayonet and carrying it away on his bayonet, he
and his comrades still singing. The child screamed when the soldier
struck it with his bayonet, but not afterwards.'"[112]
The following brief extracts of German atrocities are taken from
Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation:--[113]
"On the evening of the 22nd" (August, at Tamines) "a group of
between 400 and 450 men was collected in front of the church, not
far from the bank of the Sambre. A German detachment opened fire on
them, but, as the shooting was a slow business, the officers
ordered up a machine gun, which soon swept off all the unhappy
peasants still left standing. Many of them were only wounded, and,
hoping to save their lives, got with difficulty on their feet
again. They were immediately shot down. Many wounded still lay
among the corpses," and some of these were bayoneted....
"Next day, Sunday, the 23rd, about 6 o'clock in the morning,
another party consisting of prisoners made in the village and the
neighbourhood were brought into the square, ... in the square was a
mass of bodies of civilians extending over at least 40 yards by 6
yards. They had evidently been drawn up and shot.... An officer
asked for volunteers to bury the corpses. Those who volunteered
were set to work and dug a trench 15 yards long, 10 broad and 2
deep. The corpses were carried to the trench on planks.... Actually
fathers buried the bodies of their sons, and sons the bodies of
their fathers.
"There were in the square both soldiers and officers. They were
drinking champagne. The more the afternoon drew on the more they
drank.... We buried from 350 to 400 bodies." ... A wounded man was
buried alive, a German doctor having apparently ordered his
interment....
"About 9 in the morning" (at Dinant, August 23) "the German
soldiery, driving before them by blows from the butt-end of rifles,
men, women, and children, pushed them all into the Parade Square,
where they were kept prisoners till 6 o'clock in the evening. The
guard took pleasure in repeating to them that they would soon be
shot. About 6 o'clock a captain separated the men from the women
and children. The women were placed in front of a rank of infantry
soldiers, the men were ranged along a wall. The front rank of them
were told to kneel, the others remaining standing behind them. A
platoon of soldiers drew up in face of these unhappy men. It was in
vain that the women cried out for mercy for their husbands, sons,
and brothers. The officer ordered his men to fire. There had been
no inquiry nor any pretence of a trial. About 20 of the inhabitants
were only wounded, but fell among the dead. The soldiers, to make
sure, fired a new volley into the heap of them. Several citizens
escaped this double discharge. They shammed dead for more than two
hours, remaining motionless among the corpses, and when night fell
succeeded in saving themselves in the hills. Eighty-four corpses
were left on the square and buried in a neighbouring garden."
"On Friday, August 21st, at 4 o'clock in the morning" (at Andenne,
between Namur and Huy) "the" (German) "soldiers spread themselves
through the town, driving all the population into the streets and
forcing men, women, and children to march before them with their
hands in the air. Those who did not obey with sufficient
promptitude, or did not understand the order given them in German,
were promptly knocked down. Those who tried to run away were shot.
It was at this moment that Dr. Camus" (the Burgomaster), "against
whom the Germans seemed to have some special spite, was wounded by
a rifle shot, and then finished off by a blow from an axe. His body
was dragged along by the feet for some distance....
"Subsequently the soldiers, on the order of their officers, picked
out of the mass some 40 or 50 men who were led off and all shot,
some along the bank of the Meuse, and others in front of the Police
Station.
"The rest of the men were kept for a long time in the Place. Among
them lay two persons, one of whom had received a ball in the chest,
and the other a bayonet wound. They lay face to the ground with
blood from their wounds trickling into the dust, occasionally
calling for water. The officers forbade their neighbours to give
them any help.... Both died in the course of the day.... In the
morning the officers told the women to withdraw, giving them the
order to gather together the dead bodies and to wash away the
stains of blood which defiled the street and the houses."
FOOTNOTES:
[109] Cd. 7894, p. 14.
[110] Cd. 7894, p. 26.
[111] Professor J. H. Morgan, Representative of the Home Office,
attached to the Headquarters Staff of the British Expeditionary Force,
states in a letter to the _Times_, dated May 20, 1915:--
" ... There has lately come into my hands--unfortunately too late
for use by the Committee--evidence which establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that the outrages upon combatants in the field are
committed by the orders of responsible officers, such as Brigade and
Company Commanders, and that British and Belgian soldiers are the
objects of peculiar malignancy.... _There is some evidence to show
that the East Prussian and Bavarian regiments are the worst
offenders. The French military authorities, who have been of great
assistance to me in my inquiries, informed me that they have now a
very considerable 'black list' of this character. When the time
comes to dictate terms of peace and to exact reparation that list
will be very useful...._ In the earlier stages of the war there was
a widespread disinclination on the part of our officers and men to
credit stories of 'atrocities.' Nothing has impressed me more than
the complete change of conviction on this point, especially among
our officers. As a Staff Officer of the highest eminence said to me
lately, 'The Germans have no sense of honour in the field.' Any
sense of the freemasonry of arms has practically disappeared among
them, and deliberate killing of the wounded is of frequent
occurrence."
[112] Cd. 7894. p. 32.
[113] The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian
reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President);
Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the
Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of
Antwerp; M. Van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and,
as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the
Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.
APPENDIX D.
GERMANY'S EMPLOYMENT OF POISONOUS GAS.
The following is a copy of a Report dated May 3, 1915, by Field-Marshal
Sir John French on the employment by the Germans of poisonous gases as
weapons of warfare:--
"The gases employed have been ejected from pipes laid into the
trenches, and also produced by the explosion of shells especially
manufactured for the purpose. The German troops who attacked under
cover of these gases were provided with specially designed
respirators, which were issued in sealed pattern covers. This all
points to long and methodical preparation on a large scale.
"A week before the Germans first used this method they announced in
their official _communiqué_ that we were making use of asphyxiating
gases. At the time there appeared to be no reason for this
astounding falsehood, but now, of course, it is obvious that it was
part of the scheme. It is a further proof of the deliberate nature
of the introduction by the Germans of a new and illegal weapon, and
shows that they recognised its illegality and were anxious to
forestall neutral, and possibly domestic, criticism.
"Since the enemy first made use of this method of covering his
advance with a cloud of poisoned air he has repeated it both in
offence and defence whenever the wind has been favourable.
"The effect of this poison is not merely disabling, or even
painlessly fatal, as suggested in the German Press. Those of its
victims who do not succumb on the field, and who can be brought
into hospital, suffer acutely, and in a large proportion of cases
die a painful and lingering death. Those who survive are in little
better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a
permanent character and reduces them to a condition which points to
their being invalids for life. These effects must be well known to
the German scientists who devised this new weapon and to the
military authorities who have sanctioned its use.
"I am of opinion that the enemy has definitely decided to use these
gases as a normal procedure, and that protests will be useless."
APPENDIX E.
EFFORTS OF GERMAN MINISTERS OF STATE TO LAY BLAME ON BRITAIN.
Since the war, both the German Imperial Chancellor, Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, have
endeavoured to explain away the former's phrase: "a scrap of paper,"
which shocked the diplomatic conscience of the world. Both have
endeavoured to lay the blame for the conflict at Great Britain's
door.[114] The German Imperial Chancellor now declares that:--
"Documents on the Anglo-Belgian Military Agreement which ... we
have found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office ... showed
that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium
without the consent of the Belgian Government."[115]
The true facts of the case are to be seen in the following extract from
the statement issued by the Belgian Minister in London, on March 17,
1915:--
"A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery
discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which
had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military
Attachés and two Chiefs of the Staff of the Belgian Army. In order
to transform these reports into documents which would justify
Germany's conduct it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such
was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could
be made to appear decent.... Thus it came to pass that, with a
shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German
Chancery gave out that a 'Convention' had existed, by which Belgium
had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own
neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on
those ignorant of the facts, 'German honesty' suppressed, when the
précis of the above-named conversations was published, the clause
in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein
recorded _did reference only to the situation that would be created
if Belgian neutrality had already been violated_. The Belgian
Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only
answer that they deserve--they are a tissue of lies, all the more
shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have
studied the original documents.
"But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to
prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:--
"(1) The narrative of certain interviews which took place between
Lieutenant-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the
course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views
as to the way in which England could help Belgium _in case the
latter were attacked by Germany_. One phrase in the document
clearly proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a
hypothetical case--viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium
would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by
Germany.' The translation in the _Norddeutsche Zeitung_ of November
25 _omits this clause_, the phrase which gives its exact scope and
significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General
Ducarne's report contains the words, 'The officer with whom I spoke
insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.'
For the word _conversation_ the _Norddeutsche Zeitung_ substitutes
the word 'convention.' Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that
'our convention' has been absolutely confidential![116]
"Such proceedings need no commentary.
"(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the
same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth
and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation
the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in
favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression,
could only take place with our consent.' The British Military
Attaché raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her
rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium,
without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel
Bridges' personal opinion only. The British Government has always
held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter
was a necessary preliminary.
"The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no
'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two
Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the
conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great
Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her
behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole
Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no
conclusions arising from these conversations were ever brought
before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.
The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all
this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of
them is either garbled or suppressed.
"In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government,
faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its
duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of
infamy--his only legitimate reward. It also takes the opportunity
of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is
obvious, that:--
"(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the
smallest size, had entered Belgium.
"(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help
offered by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the
declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her
guarantors.
"(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her
fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such
help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for
that defence.
"Belgium the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head
before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehood. She
has faith in the justice of the world. On the day of judgment the
triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to
serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right, and Honour."
In the foregoing connection, the following extract from a statement
authorised by Sir Edward Grey on January 26, 1915, is of interest:--
"As regards the conversation ... the Belgian officer said to the
British: 'You could only land in our country with our consent,' and
in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical
assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality
of Belgium; and that 'so long as it was not violated by any other
Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their
territory.'
"The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated
in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying 'he did
not believe England would take such a step, because he did not
think English public opinion would justify such action.' What Sir
Edward Grey actually wrote was:--'I said that I was sure that this
Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of
Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be
the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of
it.'
"If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were
conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian
officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him,
namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of
strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian
frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract--railways
deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium,
such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough
to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on
the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality
unless it were previously violated by another Power...."
FOOTNOTES:
[114] Interview with Herr von Jagow, by the _New York World_, March 28,
1915; interview with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, by the Associated Press,
in New York papers, January 25, 1915.
[115] No such "conversations" took place in 1911. A passing reference
only to the Morocco situation of 1911 was made in the 1912
"conversations." This appears to be the German Chancellor's sole
foundation for his assertion. Cd. 7860, p. 360.
[116] In a letter to the _Morning Post_ of February 8, 1915, Mr. A.
Hamon, Professor de l'Université, Nouville de Bruxelles, writes:--
"In October and November last (13th and 24th) the _Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung_ published the documents seized by the Germans
in the Belgian archives. The German Government then published a
Dutch edition of these documents, accompanied by a photographic
reproduction of the said documents. The pamphlet bears the name of
R. W. E. Wijnmalen as publisher, in the town of Den Haag (The
Hague). On the photographic document we read in the margin: 'The
entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the
violation of our neutrality by Germany.' Now, this extremely
important note is omitted in the Dutch translation. It was also
omitted in the German translation. This is a falsification through
omission, a very serious falsification, as it modified the meaning
of the document.
"But we have worse still. On the top of page 2 of General Ducarne's
letter to the Minister, he says: 'My interlocutor insisted on this
fact that "our conversation was quite confidential...."' In the
Dutch translation, instead of 'conversation,' there is 'convention'
(overeenkomst)! The mistake is great and cannot be but purposely
made. The German Government thus changes into a convention, that is
to say, an agreement, what is but a simple conversation."
APPENDIX F.
LIST OF PARLIAMENTARY PUBLICATIONS RESPECTING THE WAR.
Correspondence respecting the European Crisis. Misc. No. 6 (1914).
Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German Government. Despatch
from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 8 (1914).
German Organisation for Influencing the Press of other Countries.
Despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 9 (1914).
Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.
Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. Misc. 10 (1914).
Documents respecting Negotiations preceding the War published by the
Russian Government. Misc. No. 11 (1914).
Papers relating to the Support offered by the Princes and Peoples of
India to His Majesty in connection with the War. (I.O. paper.)
Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the Belgian
Government. Misc. No. 12 (1914).
Correspondence respecting Events leading to the Rupture of Relations
with Turkey. Misc. No. 13 (1914).
Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising
Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey and Reply. Misc.
No. 14 (1914).
Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the French
Government. Misc. No. 15 (1914).
Despatch to Sir H. Howard containing instruction respecting his Mission
to the Vatican. Misc. No. 1 (1914).
Temperance Measures adopted in Russia since the outbreak of the War.
Despatch from Petrograd enclosing Memo. Misc. No. 2 (1915).
Letter July 31/14 from President of French Republic to the King
respecting the European Crisis, and His Majesty's Reply. Misc. No. 3
(1915).
Treatment of German Prisoners in United Kingdom. Correspondence with the
U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 5 (1915).
Rights of Belligerents: Correspondence with U.S. Government. Misc. No. 6
(1915).
Treatment of Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in the U.K. and
Germany respectively: Correspondence between His Majesty's Government
and U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 7 (1915).
Release of Interned Civilians and the Exchange of Diplomatic. &c.,
Officers, and of certain classes of Naval and Military Officers,
Prisoners of War in the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. Misc.
No. 8 (1915).
Sinking of German Cruiser "Dresden" in Chilean Territorial Waters: Notes
exchanged with the Chilean Minister. Misc. No. 9 (1915).
List of certain Commissions and Committees set up to deal with Public
Questions arising out of the War.
Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions and Transport Areas: Report and
Statistics.
Alleged German Outrages: Report of Committee.
Alleged German Outrages: Appendix to Report of Committee.
Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European
War. Misc. No. 10 (1915).
Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians at certain
places of detention in Germany: Report by United States Officials. Misc.
No. 11 (1915).
Correspondence regarding the Naval and Military Assistance afforded to
His Majesty's Government by His Majesty's Oversea Dominions. (Cd. 7607.)
Correspondence relating to Gifts of Food-Stuffs and other Supplies to
His Majesty's Government from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies. (Cd.
7608.)
Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies.
(Cd. 7646.)
Papers relating to Scales of Pensions and Allowances of Officers and Men
of the Oversea Contingents and their Dependents. (Cd. 7793.)
Correspondence on the subject of the proposed Naval and Military
Expedition against German South-West Africa. (Cd. 7873.)
Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the Government
with regard to its suppression. (Cd. 7874.)
Further Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and
Colonies. (Cd. 7875.)
* * * * *
Transcriber's note:
The transcriber made this change to the text to correct an obvious
error:
1. p. 34, "appproaches" --> "approaches"
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