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Title: The Life of Yakoob Beg - Athalik Ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar
Author: Boulger, Demetrius Charles, 1853-1928
Language: English
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project.)
Transcriber's Note:
Variations in spelling and hyphenation have been retained as in
the original.
Some typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected. A
complete list follows the text.
Words italicized in the original are surrounded by _underscores_.
Superscripted words are surrounded by {} brackets.
The 'oe' ligature is represented as oe.
THE LIFE
OF
YAKOOB BEG;
ATHALIK GHAZI, AND BADAULET;
AMEER OF KASHGAR.
BY
DEMETRIUS CHARLES BOULGER,
MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
_WITH MAP AND APPENDIX._
LONDON:
W{M} H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE, S.W.
1878.
_[All rights reserved.]_
LONDON:
PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER,
MILFORD LANE, STRAND, W.C.
THE LIFE
OF
YAKOOB BEG.
TO MY FATHER,
BRIAN AUSTEN BOULGER,
I Dedicate
THE FOLLOWING PAGES, AS SOME FAINT TOKEN
OF FILIAL AFFECTION AND GRATITUDE.
PREFACE.
The following account of the life of Yakoob Beg was written with a
twofold intention. In the first place, it attempts to trace the career
of a soldier of fortune, who, without birth, power, or even any great
amount of genius, constructed an independent rule in Central Asia, and
maintained it against many adversaries during the space of twelve years.
The name of the Athalik Ghazi became so well known in this country, and
his person was so exaggerated by popular report, that those who come to
these pages with a belief that their hero will be lauded to the skies
must be disappointed. Yakoob Beg was a very able and courageous man, and
the task he did accomplish in Kashgaria was in the highest degree
creditable; but he was no Timour or Babur. His internal policy was
marred by his severity, and the system of terrorism that he principally
adopted; and his external policy, bold and audacious as it often was,
was enfeebled by periods of vacillation and doubt. Yet his career was
truly remarkable. He was not the arbiter of the destinies of Central
Asia, nor was he even the consistent opponent of Russian claims to
supremacy therein. He was essentially of the common mould of human
nature, sharing the weaknesses and the fears of ordinary men. The
Badaulet, or "the fortunate one," as he was called, was essentially
indebted to good fortune in many crises of his career. He cannot, in any
sense, be compared to the giants produced by Central Asia in days of
old; and among moderns Dost Mahomed of Afghanistan probably should rank
as high as he does. Yet he gives an individuality to the history of
Kashgar that it would otherwise lack. The recent triumphs of the Chinese
received all their attraction to Englishmen from the decline and fall of
Yakoob Beg, the hero they had erected in the country north of Cashmere.
In the second place, the following pages strive to bring before the
English reader the great merits of China as a governing power; and this
object is really the more important of the two. It is absolutely
necessary for this country to remember that there are only three Great
Powers in Asia, and of these China is in many respects the foremost.
Whereas both England and Russia are simply conquering Governments, China
is a mighty and self-governing country. China's rule in Eastern
Turkestan and Jungaria is one of the most instructive pages in the
history of modern Asia, yet it may freely be admitted that the brief
career of Yakoob Beg gave an interest to the consideration of the
Chinese in Central Asia that that theme might otherwise have failed to
supply. The authorities used in the compilation of the facts upon which
the following pages have been erected are principally and above all the
official Report of Sir Douglas Forsyth, and the files of the _Tashkent_
and _Pekin Gazettes_ since the beginning of 1874. Mr. Shaw's most
interesting work on "High Tartary," Dr. Bellew's "Kashgar," and
Gregorieff's work on "Eastern Turkestan," have also been consulted in
various portions of the narrative. A vast mass of newspaper articles
have likewise been laid under contribution for details which have not
been noticed anywhere else.
In conclusion, the author would ask the English reader to consider very
carefully what the true lesson of Chinese valour and statesmanship may
be for us, because those qualities have now become the guiding power in
every Indian border question, from Siam and Birma to Cashmere. Mr.
Schuyler's "Turkestan," which still maintains its place as the leading
work on Central Asia, although not treating on the affairs of Kashgar,
has been frequently referred to for the course of affairs in Khokand;
but, in the main, Dr. Bellew's historical narrative in Sir D. Forsyth's
Report has been followed.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR 1
CHAPTER II.
ETHNOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR 14
CHAPTER III.
HISTORY OF KASHGAR 22
CHAPTER IV.
THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA 41
CHAPTER V.
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR 54
CHAPTER VI.
THE BIRTH OF YAKOOB BEG AND CAREER IN
THE SERVICE OF KHOKAND 76
CHAPTER VII.
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR BY BUZURG KHAN
AND YAKOOB BEG 92
CHAPTER VIII.
WARS WITH THE TUNGANI 119
CHAPTER IX.
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR 137
CHAPTER X.
YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA 173
CHAPTER XI.
YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND 212
CHAPTER XII.
YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA,
AND DEATH 236
CHAPTER XIII.
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR 268
CHAPTER XIV.
THE CHINESE FACTOR IN THE CENTRAL
ASIA QUESTION 277
APPENDIX.
THE POSITION OF LOB-NOR 303
TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA 308
TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND CASHMERE 315
TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KASHGAR 320
TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND KASHGAR 322
RULES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE JOINT
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THE
NEW ROUTE TO EASTERN TURKESTAN 330
A STORY FROM KASHGAR 334
YAKOOB BEG.
CHAPTER I.
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR.
The state of Kashgar, which comprises the western portion of Eastern or
Chinese Turkestan, has been defined as being bounded on the north by
Siberia, on the south by the mountains of Cashmere, on the east by the
Great Desert of Gobi, and on the west by the steppe of "High Pamere."
This description, while sufficiently correct for general speaking,
admits of more detail in a work dealing at some length with that
country. Strictly, the name Kashgar or Cashgar applies only to the city,
and it was not until after the time of Marco Polo, when it was the most
populous and opulent town in the whole region, that it became used for
the neighbouring country. The correct name is either Little Bokhara or
Eastern Turkestan, and the Chinese call it Sule. Recent writers have
styled the territory of the Athalik Ghazi Kashgaria. It certainly
extended through a larger portion of Chinese Turkestan than did any past
native rule in Kashgar, the Chinese of course excepted. The definition
given above of the limits of Kashgar states that on the north it is
bounded by Siberia, but this is erroneous, for the extensive territory
of Jungaria or Mugholistan intervenes. Jungaria under the Chinese was
known as Ili from its capital, and now under the Russians is spoken of
as Kuldja, another name for the same city. This very extensive and
important district was included in the same government with Kashgar when
the Chinese dominated in all this region from their head-quarters at
Ili; but in the final settlement after the disruption of the Chinese
power in 1863, while Kashgar fell to the Khoja Buzurg Khan, and the
eastern portion of Jungaria, together with the cities of Kucha,
Karashar, and Turfan south of the Tian Shan range, to the Tungani;
Kuldja or Ili was occupied by the Russians. The frontier line between
Kuldja and Kashgar is very clearly marked by the Tian Shan, and the same
effectual barrier divides the continent into two well-defined divisions
from Aksu to Turfan and beyond. Eastern Turkestan is, therefore, bounded
on the north by the Tian Shan, and on the south the Karakoram Mountains
form a no less satisfactory bulwark between it and Kohistan and
Cashmerian Tibet. As has been said, on the west the steppe of Pamir and
on the east the desert of Gobi present distinct and secure defences
against aggression from without in those directions. There are few
states in Asia with a more clearly marked position than that of which we
have been speaking. Nature seems to have formed it to lead an isolated
and independent existence, happy and prosperous in its own resources and
careless of the outer world; but its history has been of a more troubled
character, and at only brief intervals has its natural wealth been so
fostered as to make it that which it has been called, "the Garden of
Asia." This condition of almost continual warfare and disturbance during
centuries, has left many visible marks on the external features of the
country, and in nothing is this more strikingly evident than in the
small population. A region which contains at the most moderate estimate
250,000 square miles, is believed by the highest authorities to contain
less than 1,000,000 inhabitants. In breadth Kashgaria may be said to
extend from longitude E. 73° to 89°, and in width from latitude N. 36°
to 43°; but the ancient kingdom of Kashgar has been always considered to
have reached only to Aksu, a town about 300 miles north-east of Kashgar.
When the Chinese about fifty years ago conceded certain trade privileges
to Khokand, they were not to have effect east of Aksu; this fact seems
conclusive as to the recognized limits of the ancient dynasty of
Kashgar. The capital of this district, which at one time has been a
flourishing kingdom under a native ruler, at another a tributary of some
Tartar conqueror, and then distracted by the struggles of his effete
successors, and at a third time a subject province of the Chinese, has
fluctuated as much as the fortunes of the state itself. Now it has been
Yarkand, now Kashgar, and yet again, on several occasions, Aksu. The
claims of Kashgar seem to have prevailed in the long run, for, although
Yarkand is still the larger city, Yakoob Beg established his capital at
Kashgar, and made that town known throughout the whole of Asia by the
means of his government.
Kashgar is situated in a plain in the north of the province, and the
small river on which it is built is known as the Kizil Su. Immediately
beyond it the country becomes hilly and mountainous, until in the far
distance may be seen the snow-clad peaks of the Tian Shan, and the Aksai
Plateau. Although the population is barely 30,000, there is now an air
of brisker activity in the bazaars and caravanserais of this capital
than in any other city in the country. The trade carried on with Russia
in recent years has given some life to the place; but few, if any,
merchants proceed more inland than this, whether they come from Khokand
or from Kuldja. The town stretches on both sides of the river, which is
crossed by a wooden bridge; but there are no buildings of any
pretensions for external beauty or internal comfort. The _orda_ or
palace of the Ameer, which is in Yangy Shahr, five miles from the city,
is a large gloomy barrack of a place with several buildings within each
other; the outer ones are occupied by the household troops and by the
court officials, and the inner one of all is set apart for the family
and _serai_ of the ruler himself. In connection with this is a hall of
audience, in which he receives in solemn state such foreigners as it
seems politic for him to honour. In the old days, Kashgar used to be a
strongly fortified position, but the only remains of its former strength
are the ruins which are strewn freely all around. Kashgar is, therefore,
an open and quite defenceless town, and lies completely at the mercy of
any invader who might come along the high road from Aksu or Bartchuk, or
across the mountains from Khokand or Kuldja; but at Yangy Shahr, about
five miles south of Kashgar, Yakoob Beg constructed a strong fort, where
he deposited all his treasure, and this may be taken to be the citadel
of Kashgar as well as the residence of the ruler. Yangy Shahr means new
city, and as a fortification erected by a Central Asian potentate with
very limited means, it must be considered to be a very creditable piece
of military workmanship. The Andijanis or Khokandian merchants who have
at various times settled here, form a very important class in this town
in particular, and it was they who more than any one else contributed to
the success of the invasion of Buzurg Khan and Mahomed Yakoob. It is,
however, said that these merchant classes had become to some extent
dissatisfied with the late state of things, whether because Yakoob Beg
did not fulfil all his promises, or for some other reason, is not clear.
If Kashgar under its late rule was not restored to that prosperous
condition which excited the admiration of Marco Polo, and the Chinese
traveller, Hwang Tsang, before him, it may be considered to have been as
fairly well-doing as any other city in either Turkestan, while life and
property were a great deal more secure than in some we could mention.
Situated about half-way on the road to Yarkand is Yangy Hissar, a town
which has always been of importance both as a military position and as a
place of trade. It has greatly fallen into decay, however, but still
possesses a certain amount of its former influence from being a military
post, and from the exceptional fertility of the neighbouring country.
Yarkand, about eighty miles as the crow flies, and 120 by road, to the
south-east of Kashgar, is still the most populous of all the cities of
Eastern Turkestan. It lies in the open plain on the Yarkand river, and
its walls, four miles in circuit, testify to its former greatness. Under
the Chinese it was quite the most flourishing town in the region, and
even now Sir Douglas Forsyth estimates that it contains 40,000 people,
while the surrounding country has nearly 200,000 more. The fruit gardens
and orchards, which extend in a wide belt round it, give an air of
peculiar prosperity to the country, and quite possibly induce travellers
to take a too sanguine view of the resources of the country. In addition
to the abundance of fruit and grain produce that is brought into the
city for sale, there is a large and profitable business carried on in
leather. Yarkand has almost a monopoly of this article, and the
consumption of it is very great indeed. The Ameer himself took large
quantities yearly for his army, for, in addition to that required for
boots and saddles, many of his regiments wore uniforms of that
substance.
But, although Yarkand is the chief market-place of the richest province,
and although its population is thriving and energetic, there is a
general _consensus_ of opinion that it has become much less prosperous
and much more of a rural town since the transference of the seat of
government to Kashgar, and the disappearance of Chinese merchants with
the Chinese ruler. A very intelligent merchant of the town replied as
follows to questions put to him, as to the Chinese and native rulers,
and it will be seen that it was especially favourable to the claims of
the Chinese as the better masters.
"What you see on market-day now, is nothing to the life and activity
there was in the time of the Khitay. To-day the peasantry come in with
their fowls and eggs, with their cotton and yarn, or with their sheep
and cattle and horses for sale, and they go back with printed cotton, a
fur cap, or city made boots, or whatever domestic necessaries they may
require, and always with a good dinner inside them; and then we shut up
our shops and stow away our goods till next week's market-day brings
back our customers. Some of us, indeed, go out with a small venture in
the interim to the rural markets around, but our great day is market-day
in town. It was very different in the Khitay time. People then bought
and sold every day, and market-day was a much jollier time. There was no
Kazi Rais, with his six Muhtasib, armed with the _dira_ to flog people
off to prayer, and drive the women out of the streets, and nobody was
bastinadoed for drinking spirits and eating forbidden meats. There were
mimics and acrobats, and fortune-tellers and story-tellers, who moved
about amongst the crowd and diverted the people. There were flags and
banners and all sorts of pictures floating at the shop fronts; and there
was the _jallab_, who painted her face and decked herself in silks and
laces to please her customers." And then, replying to a question whether
the morals were not more depraved under this system than under the
strict Mahomedan rule of the Athalik Ghazi, the same witness went on to
say--"Yes, perhaps so. There were many rogues and gamblers too, and
people did get drunk and have their pockets picked. But so they do now,
though not so publicly, because we are under Islam, and the shariàt is
strictly enforced."
This very graphic piece of evidence gives a clearer picture of the two
systems of government, than perhaps paragraphs of explanatory writing;
and, to return to the immediate subject before us, it shows that Yarkand
has deteriorated in wealth and population since the Chinese were
expelled from it fifteen years ago.
Khoten is situated 150 miles south-east of Yarkand, and about ninety
miles due east of Sanju. It lies on the northern base of the Kuen Lun
Mountains, and is the most southern city of any importance in Kashgaria.
Under the Chinese, it was one of the most flourishing centres of
industry, and as the _entrepôt_ of all trade with Tibet it held a
bustling active community. The Chinese called it Houtan, and even now it
is locally called Ilchi. In addition to the wool and gold imported from
Tibet, it possessed gold mines of its own in the Kuen Lun range, and was
widely celebrated for its musk, silk, and jade. It likewise has suffered
from the departure of the Chinese; and the energy and wealth of that
extraordinary people have found, in the case of this city also, a very
inadequate substitute in the strict military order and security
introduced by Yakoob Beg.
Ush Turfan, New Turfan, is a small town on the road from Kashgar to
Aksu, and is not to be confounded with the better known Turfan which is
situated in the far east on the highway to Kansuh. This latter town is
called Kuhna Turfan, or Old Turfan, to distinguish it from the other.
Ush Turfan, without ever having been a place of the first importance,
derived very considerable advantage from its position on the road
followed by the Chinese caravans, and Yakoob Beg converted it into a
strong military position by constructing several forts there.
Aksu, one of the old capitals of Kashgar, may fairly be called the third
city of the state, although it has, perhaps, more than any other
declined since the expulsion of the Khitay. Before that event took place
there was a road across the mountains to Ili, by the Muzart glacier, and
relays of men were kept continually employed in maintaining this
delicately constructed road in a state fit for passage both on foot and
mounted. But all this has been discontinued for many years now, and not
only is the road quite impassable, but it would require much labour and
more outlay to restore it to its former utility. In the neighbourhood of
this town there are rich mines of lead, copper, and sulphur. These
have, practically speaking, been untouched in recent years. Coal is also
the ordinary fuel among the inhabitants; and both in intelligence as
well as in worldly prosperity, the good people of Aksu used to be
entitled to a foremost position among the Kashgari. As a consequence of
the blocking up of the Muzart Pass, the old trade with Kuldja has
completely disappeared, and all communications with this Russian
province are now carried on by the Narym Pass to Vernoe. This change
benefits the city of Kashgar, but is a decided loss to Aksu. Aksu may
still justly rank as an important place, and under very probable
contingencies may regain all the ground it has lost. In conclusion, we
may say that Yakoob Beg has converted its old walls and castles into
fortifications, which are said to be capable of resisting the fire of
modern artillery.
We have enumerated six cities--Kashgar, Yangy Hissar, Yarkand, Khoten,
Ush Turfan, and Aksu--and these constitute the territory of Kashgar
proper. At one time, indeed, it was called Alty Shahr, or six cities,
from this fact. In addition to these may be mentioned, in modern
Kashgaria, Sirikul, or Tashkurgan, in the extreme south-west, which is
principally of importance as the chief post on the frontier of
Afghanistan. Near Sirikul are Badakshan and Wakhan, and it has been
asserted that Shere Ali, of Afghanistan, viewed with a suspicious eye
the presence of Kashgar in this quarter. It is quite certain that he
would not have tolerated that further advance along the Pamir, which
Yakoob Beg seemed on several occasions inclined to make. Sirikul
commands the northern entrance of the Baroghil Pass, and has
consequently been often mentioned in recent accounts of this road to
India.
Maralbashi, or Bartchuk, a military post of some strength, is
strategically important, as being placed at the junction of the roads
from Kashgar and Yarkand, which lead by the bed of the Yarkand river to
Kucha. But it possesses greater interest for us, as being the chief
town of the district inhabited by the extraordinary tribe of the Dolans.
These people are in the most backward state of intelligence that it is
possible to imagine human beings to be capable of. In physical strength
and stature they are, perhaps, the most miserable objects on the face of
the earth, but their social position is still more deplorable. Some of
their customs are of the most disgusting character, and their dwellings,
such as they are, are of the rudest kind and subterranean. Travellers
who have seen them in the larger cities, say that all the rumours that
have been circulated about them do not exaggerate the true facts of the
case; and the most pitiable part of the matter is, that they have become
so resigned to their degraded position, that they are averse to any
measure calculated to improve their existence. They have been compared
to the Bhots of Tibet, but these latter are quite superior beings in
comparison with them. They are treated with contempt and derision by all
the neighbouring peoples.
Kucha is, or rather was, another very flourishing city which has never
recovered the loss of Chinese wealth, and the subsequent disturbances
during the Tungan wars. At one time Kucha had at the least 50,000
people, and it was not less famed than Aksu for the resources and
ingenuity of its people. But now it is almost a deserted city. The
greater part of the old town is a mass of ruins, and during the nine
years that have elapsed since the Tungani were crushed by the Athalik
Ghazi, scarcely anything has been done to repair the damage caused in
those very destructive wars.
Korla, Kouralia, or Kouroungli, as it has been named, and Karashar, two
towns which lie to the east of Kucha, have likewise never revived from
the period of anarchy and bloodshed, through which the whole of this
district has passed; but even the state of these places contrasts
favourably with the far worse ruin wrought at Turfan. Turfan, perhaps
more than any other, profited by the trade with China, for, although it
may not itself have been as rich as either Aksu or Kucha, it derived a
certain source of income as the rendezvous of all the caravans
proceeding either east or west, or north to Urumtsi and Chuguchak. Very
often a delay of several weeks took place, before merchants had arranged
all the details for crossing the Tian Shan to Guchen, or for proceeding
on to Hamil through the desert, and Turfan flourished greatly thereby.
Now its streets are desolate, the whole country round it is represented
to be a desert, and all its former activity and brightness have
completely disappeared. Yakoob Beg had extended his rule a short
distance east of Turfan, to a place called Chightam, but Turfan may be
styled his most eastern possession.
We have now given a somewhat detailed description of the chief cities of
Kashgaria, and in doing so we have distinctly intended thereby to convey
the impression to the reader that it is only these and their suburbs
that were at all productive under the late _régime_. To those who have
been to Kashgar, nothing has remained more vividly impressed on their
mind, than the exceedingly prosperous appearance of the farms in the
belt of country from Yarkand to Kashgar; but at the same time this
wealth of foliage and of blossom has only made the barrenness of the
intervening and surrounding country more palpable. The farms are
certainly not small in extent, but rather isolated from each other, and
surrounded by orchards of plums, apples, and other fruit trees, in which
they are completely embowered. A Kashgarian village is not a main
street with a line of cottages and a few large farms; but it is a
conglomeration of farmsteads covering a very extensive area of country,
and presenting to the eye of a stranger rather a thinly peopled district
than a community of villagers. Again, although the soil is naturally
fertile, the system of agriculture is of an exhaustive character, and it
seems probable that only a small portion of the land on each farm is at
all productive. But these settlements, which present an exterior of
rural happiness and simplicity, are but oases in an enormous extent
of barren country. If each proprietor seems to possess more land than
he can require, and if the fertile soil produces bountifully that
which is unskilfully sown therein, the total amount of land under
cultivation is still very limited indeed. Worse still, the soil is
gradually exhausted, and as the system of sowing but one kind of grain
seems to have taken deep root among the people, it is to be feared that
it may be perpetuated without hope of recovery. There is a constant
difficulty to be overcome, too, on account of the meagre supply of
water. The general aspect of the region is barren, a bleak expanse
stretches in all directions, and in the distance on three sides the
outlines of lofty ranges complete the panorama. The scarcely marked
bridle track that supplies the place of a highway in every direction
except where the Chinese have left permanent tokens of their presence,
offers little inducement to travellers to come thither; nor must these
when they do come expect anything but the most imperfect modes of
communication and of supply that a backward Asiatic district can
furnish. If we wish to imagine the scene along the road from Sanju to
Yarkand, we have only to visit some of the wilder of the Sussex Wealds
to have it before us in miniature. The spare dried-up herbage may be
still more spare, and the limestone may be more protruding on the
Central Asian plain; and the wind will certainly remind you that it
comes either from the desert or from the mountain regions; but you have
the same undulating, dreary expanse that you have above Crowborough. The
miserable sheep watched by some nomad Kirghiz will alone forcibly remind
you that you are far away from the heights of the South Downs. In the
far distance you will see the cloud-crested pinnacles of the Sanju Devan
or of the Guoharbrum, and then the traveller cannot but remember that he
is in one of the most inaccessible regions in the world. But if these
southern roads are scarcely worthy of the name, the great high road from
Kashgar to Aksu, Kucha, Korla, Karashar, and Turfan is a masterpiece of
engineering construction. It need not fear to brave comparison with
those of imperial Rome herself, and remains an enduring monument to
Chinese perseverance, skill, and capacity for government. In China
itself there are many great and important highways, but there the task
was facilitated by the possession of great and navigable rivers. In
Eastern Turkestan no such assistance was to be found, and consequently
this road, along which was conducted all the traffic that passed from
China to Jungaria, Kashgar, Khokand, and Bokhara, had to be maintained
in the highest state of efficiency. To do this we cannot doubt was a
most expensive undertaking, and, not mentioning such an exceptional work
as the Muzart Pass, one that required a very perfect organization to
accomplish with the success that for more than a century marked it.
The great drawback in the geographical position of Kashgar, is the want
of a cheap and convenient outlet by water. The country itself suffers in
a less degree from the same cause, but with a more perfect system of
irrigation, the rivers, such as the Artosh, &c., which in spring carry
down the mountain snows, might be made to give a more extended supply
throughout western Kashgar at all events. The climate is equable, and
the people suffer from no very prevalent disease, except in the more
mountainous parts, and in Yarkand, where goitre is of frequent
occurrence. The people themselves seem to be frugal and honest, but
indeed there are so many races to be met with in this "middle land,"
that no general description can be given of them all. The Andijanis, or
Khokandian merchants, are the most prosperous class in the community,
and they appear to be, from all accounts, possessed of more than an
average amount of business capacity in the arts of buying and selling.
The Tarantchis are the descendants of Kashgarian labourers imported by
the Chinese into Kuldja in 1762, and there is still both in the army and
in the state a large number of Khitay remaining, who were permitted to
pursue in secret the observances of their religion. The other races are
ill disposed towards them, and attribute all the vices they can think of
to their doors. But these Khitay managed to efface themselves in the
country, and although they formed a very important minority among the
males, they never appear to have been regarded in the light of a
possible danger when their brethren from China should draw near. In
addition to the native Kashgari, and these two important elements just
mentioned, there are numerous immigrants from the border states,
particularly from Khokand, to the people of whom Yakoob Beg naturally
manifested especial favour. We have now given at some length a
description of the geographical features of Kashgar, and are about to
follow it up with an ethnological description as well as a historical
statement of the past features of the same region. It is hoped that
these preliminary chapters will clear the way from some obscurity for a
correct appreciation of the career of the late Athalik Ghazi.
Kashgaria may be said to be a portion of Asia which possesses some great
advantages of position and very considerable resources, but by a
singularly hard fortune, except for the brief period of Chinese rule in
modern times, it has been so distracted by intestine disturbances that
it has retrograded further and further with each year. It is quite
possible that its natural wealth has been too hastily taken for granted,
and that it does not possess the necessary means of restoring itself in
some degree to its former position. This is quite possible, but the best
authorities at our disposal seem to point to a more promising
conclusion, and to justify us in assuming that the position, natural
resources, and general condition of Kashgar will enable a strong and
settled rule to raise it into a really important and flourishing
confederacy.
CHAPTER II.
ETHNOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR.
In the extensive region stretching from the Caspian and Black Seas to
the Kizil Yart and Pamir plateaus, and from the Persian Gulf to Siberia,
the two great families, the Aryan and the Turanian, have in past
centuries striven for supremacy. The latter, embracing in its bosom in
this part of the world the more turbulent and warlike tribes, succeeded
in subjecting those who claimed the same parent stock as European
nations. The Tajik or Persian is the chief representative in this region
of the Aryan family, and he has now for many centuries been the subject
of the Turk rulers of the various divisions of Western Turkestan. These
latter are the personifiers of Turanian traditions. The Tajik appears to
have been subdued, not so much by the superiority of his conqueror in
the art of war, as by his own inclination to lead a peaceful and
harmless life. The pure Tajik, hardly to be met with now anywhere in
Asia, except in the mountainous districts of the Hindoo Koosh, is
represented to us to have been of an imposing presence, with a long
flowing beard, aquiline nose, and large eyes. He is generally tall and
graceful; yet in Khokand and Bokhara the Tajik is at present viewed much
as the Saxons were by the Normans. In those states, too, a man is spoken
of by his race. He is an Usbeg, a Kipchak, a Kirghiz, or a Tajik, as the
case may be, and by this means the rivalry of past ages is to some
extent preserved down to the present time. It is the dissension spread,
or rather the destruction of any sympathy between the various races
caused, by these outward tokens of diversity in origin, that has made
Western Turkestan the familiar home of intestine disturbance, which has
in its turn led up to the easy dismemberment of the various Khanates by
Russian intrigue and by Russian force. In Eastern Turkestan the rivalry
of races has become less bitter, and in nothing is this better
manifested than in the fact that there a man is described by his native
town. He may be a Tajik, or an Usbeg, or a Kirghiz, or a Kipchak, too,
but he is only known as a Yarkandi, or a Kashgari. And while we are at
once struck by this broad and salient difference in popular custom, and
consequently in popular sentiment also, between the Western and Eastern
divisions of Turkestan, a slight inquiry is sufficient to show that the
antipathies of the various races towards each other have become much
more a thing of the past in Kashgaria than they have in the Khanates of
Khokand and its neighbours. At all events, the antipathies that still
prevail in that state are clearly traceable to other causes than
Aryan-Turanian hostility, and are undoubtedly produced either by
religious fanaticism, motives of personal ambition, or the hatred roused
by Chinese pretensions on the one hand, and Khokandian on the other, to
the supreme control of Kashgaria. Bearing these facts clearly in mind,
it is evident that ethnographical descriptions will not make the
political relations of the peoples of the state more easily
intelligible; yet, as matter of historical import, these cannot be
altogether passed over in silence.
The inhabitants of the little known regions now variously known as
Jungaria and Eastern Turkestan were, until recent years, considered to
be of pure Tartar origin, and consequently members of the Turanian
family. There are some still who believe that this definition is the
most accurate. Others dispute it on various grounds, and with much
plausibility. There is no question that the original inhabitants,
historically speaking, were the Oigurs, or Uigurs, and these people
were certainly Tartars. But frequently the Tajik merchants who traded
with Kashgar in the earlier centuries of the Middle Ages, took up their
abode in the country, and by degrees a large colony of Tajik immigrants
was formed on the foundation of the original Oigur stock. These Tajiks
gradually became Tartarised, but they still retained the unmistakable
characteristics of the Aryan family. The two brothers Schlagintweit, and
Mr. Shaw following in their footsteps, were the first to maintain this
view, which is becoming generally accepted. We have, therefore, in
Kashgar the strange spectacle of a Tajik people becoming not only
unidentifiable from the Turanian stock with which it has been
intermingled; but we have also a race tolerance that is unknown in any
other portion of Asia. Undoubtedly the hostility of the settled and
peaceful Andijani immigrant and Kashgari resident to the irreclaimable
Kirghiz is deep-rooted, and, so long as the latter continues a source of
danger to all peaceful communities, abiding; but even this sentiment,
and the religious hatred that has at various epochs marked the political
intercourse of Buddhist and Mahomedan, are probably less durable, and
susceptible of greater improvement in the future, than the race
antipathies that seem perennially vital among the tribes of Western
Asia. The vast majority of the inhabitants of Alty Shahr are of Tajik
descent. In the course of centuries the purity of their lineage has been
leavened by much intermingling with Tartar blood, both at the time of
the Mongol subjection and of the Chinese. In addition to these two great
divisions, there are many Afghan and Badakshi settlers, who have flocked
to Kashgar whenever the progress of events seemed to justify the
expectation that military service in that state would prove a
remunerative engagement. Many of these remained, and they have also left
a clear impression on the features of the inhabitants. It is, however,
to pre-historic times, or certainly to a period lost in the mist of
history, that we must refer for that general exodus of the Aryan family
from the Hindoo Koosh and the plains of Western Asia into the more
secluded prairies of Kashgar, which took place when the Turanian nations
first spread like destroying locusts over the face of that continent. It
was at this period that Khoten, which in its name shows its Aryan
origin, was founded.
The great nomadic tribe of the Kirghiz, or Kara Kirghiz, as the Russians
call them, to distinguish them from the Kirghiz of the various hordes
who, by the way, are not true Kirghiz at all, has at all times played a
fitful, yet important part in the histories of Khokand, Jungaria, and
Eastern Turkestan. Preserving their independence in the inaccessible
region lying west of Lake Issik Kul, and along the Kizil Yart plateau
and range, this tribe has always been a source of trouble to its
neighbours, whosoever they might be. On various occasions, too, they
have joined the career of conquest to their usual avocation of plunder,
and under the few great leaders that have arisen amongst them they have
appeared as conquerors, both of Eastern and Western Turkestan. But their
achievements have never been of a permanent nature. Like the irregular
undisciplined mass of horsemen which constitute their fighting force,
their chief strength lay in a sharp and decisive attack. They had not
the organization or the resources necessary for the accomplishment of
any conquest of a permanent kind. Their incursions, even when most
formidable and most sweeping, were essentially mere marauding
onslaughts. Their object was plunder, not empire; and having secured the
former, they recked little of the value of the latter. At one time they
were able to carry their raids in almost any direction with perfect
impunity; but as settled governments arose around their fastnesses, and
curtailed their field of operations, what had been a life of adventure
through simple love of excitement, became a struggle for sheer
existence. The region where they dwelt was far too barren to support
throughout the year even the limited numbers of the Kirghiz, and yearly
they had to issue forth against prepared and disciplined enemies in
search of the sustenance that, to preserve their existence, had to be
obtained. But for the intestine quarrels that were sapping the life
strength of the Asiatic states slowly away, there is no doubt that the
Kirghiz would have been gradually exterminated. Soon, however, they had
the skill to avail themselves of these disagreements to sell their
services as soldiers to the highest bidders; and although they were not
equal to the Kipchak tribes in valour, their alliance was considered of
importance, and on many a dubious occasion sufficed to turn the fortune
of the day. By such measures of policy their existence has been
preserved, and at the present time they perform much the same functions,
and are regarded in much the same manner by their neighbours, as in the
past.
The Kipchaks, another great tribe, who however are scarcely represented
at all in Kashgaria, pride themselves on being the most select of all
the Usbegs, but their day of power has passed by, for the present at all
events. Thirty years ago they were at the height of their success, but
they incurred the jealousy of other Usbeg tribes and of the Kirghiz.
Owing to the abilities of their great chief, Mussulman Kuli, they
succeeded in erecting in Khokand a powerful state, which was able to
restrain the encroachments of Bokhara, at that time the great enemy of
the former Khanate. But the plots that broke out against them in 1853,
in conjunction with the advance of Russia on the Syr Darya, were crowned
with success, and with the execution of Mussulman Kuli the Kipchak power
was completely broken. Since that date, however, several of the more
distinguished leaders who have appeared on the scene, such as Alim Kuli
and Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, have been members of this clan. The eastern
portion of the dominion of Yakoob Beg is almost exclusively inhabited
by Calmucks, or tribes of Calmuck descent. The great majority of the
inhabitants of Manchuria and Jungaria are of Calmuck descent, and even
in Russia in Europe there are many settlements of this tribe along the
Volga and the Don. None of these, however, possess any political
importance except those who inhabit the country north of Gobi and
between Eastern Turkestan and China, and the chief of these are the
Khalkas. The Calmucks are attached by old associations to the Government
of Pekin; and, although they have sometimes revolted against, and often
caused trouble to, the Central Government, they have generally
acknowledged their culpability and submitted to the Chinese authorities.
In the revolt of the Tungani the Calmucks remained true to China, and
performed very opportune service on various occasions. The Chinese army
in Eastern Turkestan was mainly recruited from among these tribes, who
became distinguished from the Tungani by their religion and fidelity.
The origin of the Tungani, or Dungans, as the Russians call them, is
much in dispute; and as they played so important a part in the loss of
Kashgar and Ili by China, as well as in the history of the rule of
Yakoob Beg, it may be as well to put the facts as they stand at some
length before the reader. There is no question, we believe, that the
Chinese in applying the term Tungani attach the meaning thereto of
Mahomedan. There is equal reason for supposing that the term Khitay,
literally meaning simply Chinese, has been applied to the Buddhists by
general usage. If we acknowledge the validity of these two
assumptions--and, so far as we have been able to ascertain, the best
authorities have adopted them--there would be little difficulty in
explaining who the Tungani were. Granting these, they would simply be
the Mahomedan subjects in the eastern portions of China. But others
believe that the Tungani are a distinct race, presenting peculiar
ethnological features. According to this version, the tribe of the
Tungani can be traced back as a distinct community to the fifth and
sixth centuries, when they were seated along the Tian Shan range, with
their capital at Karashar. The most recent investigations, under Colonel
Prjevalsky, are believed to show no signs of there having been any
important cities in this quarter. It may be convenient to mention here,
that at that time they were Buddhists; but when Islamism broke over Asia
in the eighth century, they were among the first to adopt the new
tenets. This defection from the religion of China brought them into
collision with the Emperors of Pekin, and many of these Tungani were
deported into Kansuh and Shensi, where we are to suppose they continued
a race apart, with their own religion and their own code of morality,
for more than ten centuries. Even granting the possibility of such a
consistency to a new religion, which history informs us was thrust upon
them at the point of the sword, it seems scarcely credible that we
should not hear more of this troublesome tribe in Chinese history.
Frequent allusions are made in imperial edicts and other official
proclamations to the Tungani, but always in reference to their religion,
and not in any way as if they were any other but heretic Chinamen.
Besides, even in this way little is heard of the Tungani until the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when very sharp measures were taken
against them by the emperors, solely because religious propagandists
from their ranks were appearing as enemies of a Buddhist Government. The
theory that the Tungani were a people and not a sect is new, but it is
possible that it may be a true discovery. On the other hand, it is far
more probable that it is only an ingenious attempt at elucidating what
appears on the face of it to be a simple matter enough. The reader must
decide for himself between the two versions. If the Tungani are to be
considered a distinct race, then the majority of the inhabitants of
Eastern Turkestan are not Calmucks, but Tungani; if the view taken here
is adopted, then they are Calmucks who have at various times adopted
Mahomedanism. These are the chief tribes of this portion of Central
Asia; and in the following pages it may be as well to bear in mind that
Khitay is applied exclusively to the Buddhist or governing class, and
Tungani to the Mahomedan or subject race in Kansuh and its outlying
dependencies. As race antipathies have not entered during recent times
so much into the contests of the people of the regions immediately under
consideration as religions, the difference as to the true significance
of the term Tungani does not materially affect one's view of the general
question.
CHAPTER III.
HISTORY OF KASHGAR.
The great difficulty encountered in giving a description of the past
history of Kashgar is to evolve, out of the series of successive
conquests and subjections that have marked the existence of that state
for almost two thousand years, a narrative which shall, without
confusing the reader with a mere repetition of names that convey little
meaning, place the chief features of its history before us in a light
that may make its more recent condition intelligible to us. We may say
in commencement, that those who desire a historical account in all its
fulness of Kashgar must turn to that contributed by Dr. Bellew to the
Official Report of Sir Douglas Forsyth on his embassy to Yarkand. They
will there find ample details of the events that took place in this
region of Central Asia from the commencement of our era; but a mere
reiteration of the various calamities, with brief and intermittent
periods of prosperity, each wave of which bore so striking a similarity
to its predecessor, would not serve the purpose we have at present in
view--viz., of considering its own history, for the purpose of better
understanding its relations with its neighbours and with China, and how
the state consolidated by the Athalik Ghazi was constructed on ruins
handed down by an almost indistinguishable antiquity.
For a considerable number of years anterior to the ninth century, the
Chinese Empire extended to the borders of Khokand and Cashmere. But the
dissensions that marked the latter years of the Tang dynasty were not
long in producing such weakness at the extremity of this vast empire
that the subject races and their proper ruling families were enabled to
obtain either their personal liberty or their lost positions once more,
unhappily without in any case achieving with the severance of their
connection with China any perceptible amelioration in their lot--indeed,
on almost every occasion only binding themselves with harder fetters,
and sinking into a deeper state of servitude. When the petty princelets
of Kashgar, Yarkand, Turfan, and the rest broke away from their
allegiance to Pekin, and when the imperial resources were unable to
coerce their rebellious subjects, the whole country passed under the
hands of their feudatories, who split up into innumerable factions,
waged continuous war, and sacrificed the happiness and welfare of the
subject people to a desire to promote their own individual interests. As
the barons and counts of Italy in the Middle Ages devastated some of the
fairest provinces of Europe, so these Oigur princes fought for their own
hand in the valleys of the Artosh and the Ili. It is very possible that
this state of things would have continued until China became
sufficiently strong and settled to reassert once more her dormant rights
over her lost provinces, but that a new force appeared on the western
frontiers of Kashgar. As early as 676 the Arabs, under Abdulla Zizad,
had crossed over from Persia, and were carrying destruction and terror
in their course along the banks of the Oxus. At that moment a beautiful
and gifted queen, named Khaton, ruled for her son in Bokhara. She had
not long been left a widow when her country was threatened by this
unexpected and terrible invasion. Although assistance came to the queen
from all the neighbouring States, including Kashgar, she was defeated
twice in the open field, and compelled to seek safety within the walls
of her capital. But the Arab leader was unable to take the city by
storm, and slowly retired, with a large number of captives and an
immense quantity of booty, back to Persia. Some years later the Arabs
again returned, but withdrew on the payment of a heavy indemnity.
Another chief, Kutaiba, was still more successful, for on one occasion
he carried fire and sword through Kashgar to beyond Kucha. This was the
first occasion on which the doctrines of Mahomed had been carried into
the realms of China, and with so cogent an argument as the sword it is
not wonderful that some hold was secured on the country. Subsequent
expeditions in the next few centuries strengthened this beginning, and
it was not long before the ruling classes of Kashgar became infected
with the new doctrine.
In the tenth century, Satuk Bughra Khan, the ruling prince of Kashgar,
who had been converted to Islam, forced his people to adopt that
religion, although it is tolerably clear that up to this time there had
been no acknowledgment of supremacy to the representative of Mahomed on
earth. A disunited state, which had on several occasions felt the heavy
hand of the authority of its generals, and at whose very gates its power
was consolidated, could not but be in some sort of dependence to the
stronger power, as there was no ally to be found sufficiently powerful
to protect it, now that the Chinese had retrogressed into Kansuh.
Towards the end of the tenth century the Mahomedans met with a series of
reverses from the Manchoo and Khoten troops, who still preserved their
relations, political and commercial, with China. It was in the
neighbourhood of Yangy Hissar that their general, Khalkhalu, inflicted
the most serious defeat on the Mahomedan rulers of Kashgar, but within
the next twenty years, assistance having come from Khokand, these
defeats were retrieved, and Khoten itself for the first time passed
under the rule of Islam. The family of Bughra Khan was now firmly
established as rulers of Eastern Turkestan, and their limits were almost
identical with those of the late Yakoob Beg.
The Kara Khitay, who had migrated from the country bordering on the
Amoor and the north of China, after long wanderings, had settled in the
western parts of Jungaria, and, having founded the city of Ili, in
course of time formed, in union with some Turkish tribes, a powerful and
cohesive administration. Their chief was styled Gorkhan, Lord of Lords,
and their religion was Buddhism. It was of this tribe, according to
some, that the celebrated Prester John, or King John, was supposed to be
the chief in the Middle Ages. Some neighbours who had been harassed by
predatory tribes came to Gorkhan for assistance, which was willingly
conceded; but, having successfully repulsed the Kipchaks and other
tribes, this leader did not withdraw from the country he had occupied as
a friend and ally. Not only did he then annex Kashgar and Khoten, but he
crossed the Pamir into the province of Ferghana, and in a short period
brought Bokhara, Samarcand, and Tashkent under his dominion. This
extensive empire was of very brief duration however, and civil war was
waged for more than half a century after the first successes of Gorkhan,
in which Khiva, or Khwaresm, and the Kara Khitay fought for supremacy. A
chief of the Naiman tribe of Christians, Koshluk by name, then entered
the lists against the aged Gorkhan, who was, after some hard fighting,
defeated and captured. This was in the year 1214. Koshluk's triumph was
also, however, of very brief duration, for he now came into contact with
one of the most formidable antagonists that the soil of Asia has ever
produced, Genghis Khan.
The Mongols or Mughols began to appear as a distinct tribe about the
same time that the Kara Khitay migrated to Jungaria, and as early as the
commencement of the twelfth century they had carried destruction into
the Chinese provinces of Shensi and Kansuh. When Genghis Khan appeared
upon the scene he found the tribe which he was destined to lead to such
great triumphs in a state of singular strength, and its neighbours
either at discord among themselves or only just recovering from a long
period of anarchy. The Chinese were particularly divided at that moment,
and Genghis Khan, who had family connections in that empire, soon found
it an easy task to lead successful inroads into the heart of his rich
but defenceless neighbour. Genghis Khan was born at Dylon Yulduc, in the
year 1154. His father, Mysoka Bahadur, was a great warrior, and waged
several successful wars with the Tartars. The earlier years of Genghis
Khan were occupied exclusively in overcoming the difficulties of his own
position. His tribe, divided into several distinct bodies, formed only
one confederacy when a foe had to be encountered in the field. It
required years to remove the dislike they experienced at submission to a
distinct authority; and it was only when the renown of his military
achievements threw a halo over his name that these tribes could be
induced to acknowledge a supremacy which they had become powerless to
resist. But during these years, when he led a life unknown and
insignificant as the chief of a small nomad clan, he was all the time
preparing for a wider career, and for a more extended authority. It was
while he was residing in the remote district round the salt springs of
Baljuna that he drew up the code on which his administrative system was
founded. It was based on the fundamental principle of obedience to the
head, on the maintenance of order and sobriety in the ranks of the
warriors, and on the equal participation in the spoils of battle by all;
but its regulations were so strict on the former points, and the gain of
the individual had to be so completely sacrificed for the advantage of
the many, that at first the establishment of this code of order had
rather the effect of driving his followers from him, than of attracting
to his standard zealots capable of the conquest of a world. It was not
until the year 1203, when he was nearly forty-nine years of age, that
Genghis Khan succeeded in bringing all the Mongol tribes under his
leadership. No sooner had he accomplished this much than he embarked on
military enterprises, which, in the course of a very few years, placed
the greater part of Asia at his disposal. Having subjugated various
Tartar and Tangut tribes, he included them in his military organization,
and by making them embrace his system of compulsory service in the army,
he found himself in the possession of an enormous following. Genghis
Khan therefore ruled at the time we have specified over Kashgar,
including Khoten, Jungaria, and the Tangut country; and there was no
force capable of opposing his except, in the east China, and in the west
the government of Khiva, at this period omnipotent in Western Turkestan.
The rumours which reached the Shah of Khwaresm of the formation of this
new confederacy in Mugholistan induced him to send an embassy to
discover the true facts of the case, and accordingly, while Genghis Khan
was prosecuting a war against the Chinese, there arrived in his camp the
emissaries of Western Asia. Haughty and imperious as this conqueror
undoubtedly was, he received the embassy affably, and with expressions
of the deepest friendship. He sent them back with rich presents and the
following characteristic message:--"I am King of the East. Thou art King
of the West. Let merchants come and go between us and exchange the
products of our countries." In furtherance of this wish he sent a
mission composed of merchants and officials to represent the advantages
that would be derived from mutual intercourse. But the Shah of Khiva,
either incredulous of the formidableness of the adversary with whom he
had to deal, or mistaking his own strength, did not reciprocate the
amicable expressions of Genghis Khan, nor, when the merchants who had
been despatched to his country were murdered, did he make any offer of
reparation. Such treatment would not be tolerated by any civilized ruler
of the nineteenth century, much less was it brooked by an irresponsible
conqueror, whose will was his sole law, in the thirteenth. As soon as
his campaign with China had closed with success, Genghis Khan made
every preparation for the punishment of this act of treachery. It was
then that Genghis Khan, with an armed horde of many hundred thousands,
burst upon the astonished peoples of Western Asia like a meteor from the
east. It was then that some of the fairest regions of the earth were
given over to a soldiery to devastate, a soldiery who had raised the
work of destruction to the level of one of the fine arts; and whose
handiwork in Bokhara, Balkh, Samarcand, Khiva and the lost cities of the
desert, is to be seen clearly imprinted in the ruins which mark the site
of ancient capitals, even at the present moment, 700 years after the
Tartar conqueror swept all resistance from his path. Afghanistan, and
the mountain ranges which are now considered to be impassable by
Russians, did not retard the progress of this "Scourge of God." Cabul,
Candahar, Ghizni fell to the warriors of far distant Mongolia, as they
fell not forty years ago to British valour, and as they must again fall
when the onset shall be made with equal intrepidity and with equal
discipline. And not content with having defaced the map of Asia, with
having converted rich and populous cities into masses of ruins, and with
having depopulated regions once prolific in all that makes life
enjoyable, Genghis Khan carried the terror of his name into the most
remote recesses of the Hindoo Koosh. He wintered in the district of Swat
on our north-west frontier, a territory which is quite unknown to us
except by hearsay, and which has only been occupied by the Mongol and
Macedonian conquerors. From his headquarters on the banks of the
Panjkora he sent messengers to Delhi; and it is uncertain whether he did
not meditate the addition of an Indian triumph to those already
obtained.
A rebellion in the far eastern portion of his dominions distracted his
attention from the Indus, and he was compelled to hasten with all speed
to quell in person the rising that was jeopardising his position in the
seat of his power. He hastily broke up from his quarters in Swat, and,
by the valley of the Kunar and Chitral, he entered Kashgar, through the
Baroghil Pass. Although he suffered much loss from a journey across
mountain roads, which were scarcely practicable in the early spring, he
succeeded in reaching Yarkand, with his main body, and hastening across
Turkestan arrived at Karakoram, his capital, in time to quell the
disturbance. After this his life was spent in conquering China, a feat
which he never accomplished. But in several campaigns, extending over a
period of about twenty years, he worsted the Imperial troops so
continually, that before his death, in 1227, he had occupied all the
northern provinces of that empire, with Pekin, and left to his son and
successor, Ogdai Khan, the task of completing the work which he had
commenced. On the death of Genghis Khan, his vast possessions were
divided amongst his children, and Kashgar, including Jungaria, Khwaresm,
and Afghanistan, fell to the lot of Chaghtai Khan. This ruler was able
to hold during his life the extensive territory he had succeeded to; but
on his death dissensions broke out in all quarters of the country, and
produced a fresh distribution of the various provinces. It may be
mentioned that, although Chaghtai was a fanatical Buddhist and a
confirmed debauchee, he was a prudent and sagacious ruler, and no
unworthy successor to his distinguished father. The dissensions that
broke out on his decease continued, with more or less violence, for a
period of almost 100 years after that event took place, and they finally
only received a momentary solution in the formation of a new kingdom of
Mugholistan, or Jattah Ulus, as it was more specifically called, under
one of Chaghtai's descendants.
As briefly and as clearly as possible, we will endeavour to lay before
the reader the chief events of this troubled epoch, when the numerous
progeny of Genghis Khan warred throughout the whole extent of Central
Asia, and a term was only at last placed to their restlessness by their
disappearance. In the first place, it may be as well to mention, that
the religions of Christ, Buddha, and Mahomed, were equally tolerated in
Eastern Turkestan during the greater part of this period. The Arab
invasion and the advance of Islam, had been hurled back beyond Bokhara
"the Holy," by the victorious arms of the great Buddhist conqueror,
Genghis Khan; and for a long period after the Mongol conquests, little
was heard of attempts at conversion to the tenets of the "true Prophet."
But it must not be supposed that, although Genghis Khan, in the sack of
Bokhara, had almost exterminated the race of Mahomedan priests, he was
disposed to stamp out the new heresy from his realms. Having crushed its
power in the field, he was quite content to let it live on or die out,
so long as his imperial or personal interests were not affected. So we
have the strange picture before us, of the three great doctrines of the
earth flourishing side by side in Eastern Turkestan in the fourteenth
century. The Nestorian Christians of Kashgar, who in the time of Marco
Polo were rich and flourishing, were obliged later on to succumb to the
violent measures of the other members of the community, and have
entirely disappeared for many centuries.
Shortly after the death of Chaghtai Khan, Kaidu, a great-grandson of
Genghis, obtained the throne of Kashgar and Yarkand; and a few years
later on, by a skilful piece of diplomacy, backed up by force, added
thereto the greater part of Khokand and Bokhara. His triumph was,
however, of brief duration, and he was displaced by other competitors.
Dava Khan, the son of Burac, the great-grandson of Chaghtai, had been
appointed governor of Khoten, but his ambition was not satisfied with
less than the throne of Western Turkestan also. He eventually obtained
his desire; but in a rash moment he threw himself in the path of the
Chinese Emperor, Timour Khan, who was returning from a raid carried
almost to the gates of Lahore. He was defeated somewhere in the
neighbourhood of Maralbashi, and was compelled to acknowledge the
supremacy of China. He is of some note to us, as having been the father
of Azmill Khoja, who was selected as ruler by the people themselves,
about the year 1310, and from whom descend that line of Khoja kings of
Kashgar, who have clung to their hereditary claims for a longer time
than any other royal Central Asian house. The last of the Chaghtai Khans
who held the sceptre with any effective purpose, was Kazan Ameer. On his
death another period of trouble broke out, and military governors and
rival princelets of dubious titles advanced their pretensions to the
vacant seat. Up to this all the rulers had, however, been Buddhists.
Toghluc Timour, one of the few remaining representatives of the Genghis
families, had only been saved by the pity of a leading man in Kashgar,
from one of the most extensive massacres of his kinsmen, and for years
he was obliged to lead an uncertain existence in the mountains or
deserts bordering on the state. His associations were all Buddhist; but
one day he was so struck by the definition of the "true faith" given by
the descendant of a Mahomedan priest, spared by Genghis Khan at the
destruction of Bokhara, that he made a vow to become a Mussulman when he
had regained his rights. Not long after this the turn of events in
Kashgar made people seek for some person with recognized claims to be
their ruler, and none in this respect surpassed Toghluc Timour. He, on
succeeding to the throne, openly owned his conversion to Islam, and in a
few years he was gradually imitated by all the leading chiefs of
Turkestan. From this time downwards to the present day, the religion of
the majority in this state has been Mahomedanism, except perhaps during
the Chinese rule, when the number of Chinese merchants, officials, and
soldiers, put the minority of the followers of Buddha on a par with
those of the rival religion. Toghluc died in 1362.
It was about this time that the second great conqueror of Asia appeared
upon the scene. Timour was born in 1333 in the Shahrisebz suburb of
Kish. He was the son of Turghay, governor of that district and chief of
the Birlas tribe, and on the death of his father he himself became
governor of Kish also. During his earlier years he was hospitably
received at the Court of Kazan Ameer, and that ruler, in addition to
giving him several high and distinguished appointments, married him to
his beautiful granddaughter Olja Turkan Khaton. Timour did not continue
long in favour at Court. His restless spirit impelled him to fields of
greater activity than any the Ameer could, or indeed felt disposed to,
place at his disposal. He openly mutinied against the central authority
in his government of Kish, and on being overthrown by the troops of the
state, he sought safety with his wife among the Turcomans of the Khivan
desert. Among these uncertain nomads he felt scarcely secure, and
collecting round him a small band of desperadoes, he entered upon a more
ambitious enterprise by undertaking a marauding expedition into the
Persian province of Seistan. This was attended with considerable
success, but he himself was wounded in the foot by an arrow. From the
effects of this wound he never completely recovered, and was known
henceforth as Timour Lang, Timour the Lame, whence the well-known name
of Tamerlane. The _éclat_ obtained by this marauding expedition stood
him in good stead, for shortly afterwards he was able to raise a
sufficient force to invade Tashkent. He occupied the whole of what is
now Russian Khokand including Ferghana, and he placed a fresh occupant
on the throne, Kabil Shah, in 1363. In the following years he contended
for supremacy with another chief named Husen, and in 1369 had so far
been victorious that he threw off the mask, and declared himself king.
He made Samarcand his capital, and converted that once populous city
into the wonder and admiration of Western Asia. Having settled his
internal affairs, he commenced operations against the states lying
beyond his border. The mountaineers of Badakshan were the first to incur
his wrath, and after several stubborn battles they were obliged to
acknowledge his supremacy. He then turned his attention to his northern
frontiers, beyond which the Jattah princes reigned in Jungaria. He
overcame their prince, Kamaruddin, in several encounters, but not with
complete success until his final campaign against him in 1390. As he
advanced they retired to the fastnesses east of Lake Issik Kul, and only
reissued from their hiding-places when the invader had withdrawn.
To return to Kashgar, on the death of Toghluc, his son Khize Khoja was
displaced and did not regain possession of his kingdom till 1383, when
he was thirty years of age. He was a stanch Mussulman, and was on terms
of as much amity and as close alliance with Timour as it was possible
for any neighbour, wishing to preserve his independence, to be. Allied
as he was with, yet not participating in the wars of Timour, against the
Jattahs, he suffered in common with those people from the expedition of
1389-90, when both sides of the Tian Shan were ravaged by the armies of
that ruler. Although for the next fifteen years they maintained friendly
relations, it can easily be imagined that Khize Khoja was not very
comfortable with so formidable a suzerain just over his frontiers. The
irksomeness of the position is well illustrated by the orders
transmitted to Khize Khoja by Timour, to have corn planted and cattle
collected at certain places for the immense army which he was levying
for the invasion of China. It was while engaged in fulfilling these
commands, that news reached the ruler of Kashgar that this "Scourge of
God" had died suddenly on the 5th of February, 1405. Khize Khoja himself
survived but a short time afterwards. For the second time within the
short space of 150 years had the possessions of a great conqueror to
undergo the process of redistribution. In Timour's case it was simpler
than it had been in that of Genghis Khan, for the former ruler left no
worthy representative of his cause as the Mongol conqueror had in Ogdai
and Chaghtai. The branches of the great family of Genghis struck root so
deeply, that down to modern times he has had descendants who perpetuate
his name, but Timour left none such. With the death of his favourite son
Jehangir, his hopes of having a worthy successor expired.
Kashgar was in particular the scene of confusion and trouble, and it was
not until about 1445 that any settled government was attained, when
Seyyid Ali, grandson of the aged and patriotic minister Khudadar,
restored some order and cohesion to the distracted country for a short
period. He died in 1457. During these years Yunus, king of Jungaria,
played a very prominent part in all the disturbances that were occurring
on his borders. He is represented to have been a very enlightened
prince, and emissaries from foreign nations returned from his court
relating with surprise how they had found a courteous and refined man
where they expected to have seen a coarse and savage Mongol. While Yunus
ruled in Jungaria another striking individual was predominant in
Kashgar. Ababakar, son of Saniz, who was the son of Seyyid Ali, ruler of
Kashgar, was one of the few sovereigns of that state whose acts entitle
them to consideration. During a long and troubled tenure of power he had
the good fortune to overcome many difficulties, and although his career
was to become clouded before his death, the brilliant years that
preceded the catastrophe justify us in considering his career for a
little while. He was a great athlete, hunter and soldier, and was so
favoured by his mother on that account that he distanced his brethren in
the race for supremacy. As governor of Khoten he soon absorbed Yarkand,
and long and furious were the wars he waged with Hydar, the ruler of
Kashgar, who was assisted by Yunus of Jungaria. Nor, although successful
on several occasions in the field against the allied forces, could
Ababakar hope to overcome the huge armies at the disposal of Yunus; and
it was not until Hydar himself foolishly broke off from Yunus, that
Ababakar succeeded in asserting his claim to all Eastern Turkestan. War
then broke out between Hydar and Yunus, and the latter with the
assistance of large reinforcements from Jungaria overthrew and captured
his former ally. But these dissensions favoured the cause of Ababakar,
and on the death of Yunus in 1486, his possession of Kashgar became
undisputed. The first serious danger with which he was menaced after his
complete possession of Kashgar, was in 1499, when Ahmad, the son of
Yunus, or Alaja the "slayer," as he was generally called, invaded his
territory at the head of the Jattah Mongols. The campaign was in the
commencement indecisive, but Ababakar before long triumphed over his
northern invader.
During the next fifteen years Ababakar ruled in peace and prosperity in
Kashgar, accumulating great riches and presenting an object of
attraction to his covetous neighbours. During these years the country,
although ruled in an arbitrary way, flourished, and, as one of the
native chronicles put it, "A traveller could go from Andijan to Hamil on
the borders of China without fear of molestation, and without having to
make an extra long march in order to find a place wherein to rest and
obtain refreshment." But in 1513 a storm broke upon his country that
resulted in his complete overthrow. Said, son of Ahmad and brother of
Mansur, who was ruling in Jungaria, undertook the invasion of Kashgar in
that year, and it was not long before he occupied Kashgar, which,
however, Ababakar left but a heap of ruins. His advance on Yangy Hissar
was opposed, but, having defeated the army of Kashgar before that city,
he occupied it without any further opposition, and thus secured what
has been called the key of Yarkand as well as of Kashgar. For some
months Ababakar remained shut up in Yarkand, but on the approach of
Said's army he abandoned that position and fled to Khoten. But not long
afterwards he retired still further into the mountainous country
south-east of Kashgar, and halted some time at Karanghotagh. But being
first plundered and then deserted by his attendants, he withdrew into
the valleys and deserts of the Tibetan table-land. For many months he
wandered, half-starved and solitary, in this deserted region, and at
last it was reported that he had been found murdered by some of the
mountaineers. Such was the end of the once magnificent Ababakar, a
prince who in his fortunes reminds us very much of the great Darius.
That he was avaricious is clear to those who read of the great treasures
he had stored away; that he was bloodthirsty and cruel is impossible of
denial; but that he possessed in his earlier years many of the virtues,
with some of the vices, of a great ruler is equally incontestable. His
son Jehangir, whom he had left in command at Yarkand, on the approach of
the army of Said fled to Sanju, and was in a few months captured and
executed. About this epoch the third great Asiatic conqueror was
appearing on the scene. Babur was born in 1481, and was chosen to
succeed his father Uman Sheikh on the throne of Khokand, by the nobles
of that state, when he was only twelve years of age. This conqueror of
India influenced but indirectly the fortunes or Kashgar. His career was
in another sphere, and it is not necessary here to enter into any
description of his life, such as has been given of his predecessors
Genghis Khan and Timour.
Said, having overcome Ababakar, employed himself in extending his rule
over the neighbouring states. He was seized with the desire of occupying
that mountainous region, which is divided into almost as many petty
states as it contains mountain chains, lying between our Indian
frontier and the Pamir and Badakshan. But although he employed all his
resources in endeavouring to subject the Kafirs of Bolor, or Kafiristan
as it is now called, he was unable to make any permanent additions in
this direction. In other years he carried fire and sword into Tibet and
Cashmere; and it was when returning from one of these expeditions, in
the year 1532, that he expired from the effects of the rarefied
atmosphere, near the Karakoram pass. His death was the signal for the
outbreak of fresh disturbances. His legitimate sons were ousted by
Rashid, the son of Said by a slave, who had already distinguished
himself as a general in the wars against Kafiristan and Tibet, and on
the death of Rashid after a brief reign, the confusion became, if
possible, worse confounded. It would be tedious in the extreme to follow
the variations that now took place. Benedict Goes, a Portuguese
missionary and traveller, found a ruler named Mahomed Khan on the throne
in 1603, by whom he was hospitably received; but as he had placed the
sister of the Khan, when returning from a pilgrimage to Mecca, under an
obligation to him, this is scarcely a fair criterion either of the
personal merits of this ruler, or of the state of civilization to which
the country had attained.
It was now that the Khoja family appeared prominently upon the scene.
Two factions were playing the parts of Montagu and Capulet in Eastern
Turkestan in the earlier years of the seventeenth century. They were
known as the Aktaghluc and Karataghluc, and in the course of their
strife the leader of the former called in to his aid the Khoja Kalar of
Khodjent, a descendant of Azmill before mentioned. It was in the year
1618 that this Khoja first came to Kashgar, and his grandson,
Hadayatulla, was the chief means of attracting the affections of the
people to this family. That veneration has not disappeared to-day, and
the Hazrat Afak, as he is generally spoken of, is scarcely inferior in
the eyes of the people to Mahomed himself. The great miracles he is
reported to have wrought, and the peculiar sanctity which attached to
him during his life, gave him complete ascendancy throughout the
country, and before his death he was entrusted with the supreme
authority. His son, Yahya or Khan Khoja, succeeded him during his
lifetime, but was murdered in a riot a few months after the death of
Hadayatulla. Then recommenced with fresh vigour the old series of
disturbances. Aspirant after aspirant appeared in the political arena,
but, as each had little claim to lead on account of original merit, a
successful rival always was forthcoming, and so this wearying cycle
continued until 1720.
The course of the history of Kashgar has now been brought down to the
commencement of the eighteenth century, during which a fresh change
occurred in the history of the country by the Chinese conquest. It may
be well, therefore, before narrating that event and the causes which
immediately produced it, to consider the chief lessons taught us by the
history of Eastern Turkestan, as revealed in the preceding pages. The
most cursory reader must have been struck by the fact, that only twice
in the course of eight centuries did the country secure a firm and
settled government, and they were when two conquerors, Genghis Khan and
Tamerlane, reduced every semblance of authority to one bare level of
subjection. At fitful moments there arose, indeed, some leader, Yunus,
Ababakar, or the first Khojas, capable of preserving for a few years his
frontiers against the inroads of hostile neighbours, and of maintaining
an outward show of prosperity and tranquillity to foreign travellers;
but even such gleams of sunshine as these were transitory on the dark
horizon of the condition of mankind in Central Asia. With the fall of
each pretender, too, hopes of an improvement became fainter in the
breasts of the people; and when the successors of the Khoja saint showed
themselves not less amenable to the errors and frailties of their
predecessors than any past ruler had been, it was to some extraneous
circumstance, we may feel sure, that the people looked for aid. There is
an old saying in this part of the world, that when "the people's tithe
of bricks is full, then comes a Moses in the land;" and it cannot be
doubted that in the year 1720 the people of Kashgar had suffered much
and for so long, that relief, so that it came effectually from some
quarter or another, could not be otherwise than welcome. But the Moses
who had been, for centuries almost, expected, had as yet not proved
forthcoming, and as "hope deferred maketh the heart sick," so had the
Kashgari lost the courage even to look forward to a period when their
life of misery, under oppressive tyrants and exorbitant taxation,
aggravated by every form of peculation in its levy, might be changed for
a more favourable state of being. There can be no doubt that if the
chaos which reigned throughout Jungaria and Kashgar had continued much
longer those vast regions would have been completely exhausted. As it
was the population decreased in alarming proportions, and the wealth and
general resources of the country disappeared with no apparent means of
supplying the gap. What is, perhaps, most surprising of all is that all
these later rulers seem to have lived in a sort of fools' paradise with
regard to the resources of their state. The thought never seems to have
occurred to them that there must be an end some day or other to a realm
distracted by continual wars and sedition, and that subjects who have
been tyrannised over for centuries will at last rise up in arms and
teach their tyrants, in the words of the poet, "how much the wretched
dare." These Khans or Ameers of Central Asia are not worthy of one
moment's consideration for their own sake; but, as some account of them
is a proper preparation for the modern history of Kashgar, they have
been described in this chapter. From the disappearance of Chinese
authority in Central and Western Asia in the eighth and ninth
centuries, down to the commencement of the eighteenth century, the
history of Kashgar, in common with that of its neighbours, was a series
of misfortunes. There is nothing to attract our sympathies in any of the
rulers, with the exception perhaps of Yunus; and all our commiseration
is monopolised for the unhappy races who peopled that region. We
therefore have arrived at this crisis in a fit state to appreciate the
feelings of the Kashgari at the changes that occurred in the eighteenth
century; and before we consider, in a fresh chapter, those alterations
we may close this without regret at the disappearance of a long line of
Central Asian Khans, who possessed scarcely one redeeming quality among
many vices.
CHAPTER IV.
THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA.
Before continuing the narrative of the events that took place in Kashgar
after the year 1720, until it fell into the hands of the Chinese in
1760, it may be as well to consider briefly the history of China, in
order that it may be intelligible to us how that power was induced to
undertake such far distant enterprises, and how, moreover, it was able
to accomplish them successfully. In the earlier years of the seventeenth
century the dynasty of Ming was seated on the throne of Pekin, but its
power had been shaken to its foundations by repeated disasters in wars
with the Mantchoo Tartars, who had wrested the province of Leaou Tung
from the Emperor Wan-leh, before his death in 1620. The Mantchoos are
said to have been the descendants of the Mongol conquerors of the
thirteenth century, who had been forced to take refuge in the wilds
north of China when the native Chinese rose up and destroyed their
power. Whether this very plausible suggestion be true or not, or
whether, as some affirm, these were a new race issuing from the frozen
regions of Kamschatka and driven south by the necessity for obtaining
sustenance for their increasing numbers, matters little for our present
purpose. It is certain that they were a warlike people at this time, and
that they could bring considerable numbers into the field, and it is
very probable that, when they had obtained some success, their ranks
were swollen by recruits from their Tartar kinsmen of Eastern Jungaria.
On the death of the Chinese Emperor Wan-leh, dissensions broke out in
China as to his successor, and in the struggle that ensued the Mantchoos
were invited in to support the cause of one of the claimants. Their aid
turned the scale in his favour; but when the fortunes of war had been
clearly manifested, the Mantchoos showed no disposition to take their
departure as had been stipulated. As the Saxons in our own history, and
the Mongols in the Chinese had acted, so now did the Mantchoos, and in
1644 their first Emperor Chuntche was installed in the imperial
dignities, as the first of the present ruling dynasty of Tatsing, or
"sublimely pure," When Chuntche was crowned by his victorious soldiery,
it must not be supposed that he had conquered the whole of China. During
the seventeen years of his reign he was constantly engaged in warring
with the native Chinese forces; but always with invariable success. In
1661 Kanghi, his son, ascended the throne, and by a series of judicious
measures and successful enterprises, firmly maintained the position won
in China by his father. It was during this brilliant reign that Tibet
was annexed to the Chinese Empire, and from Cochin-China and the
frontiers of Birma to the River Amoor there was none to question the
power of the Mantchoo Government. It cannot be doubted that the conquest
of Tibet opened up fresh ideas in the minds of the Chinese as to their
right to rule in Eastern Turkestan; and with the re-assertion of their
old suzerainty over the Tibetan table-land, the remembrance of a similar
claim, at a far distant epoch, over Jungaria and Turkestan would be
forced on the minds of the Chinese people, until some ambitious ruler or
viceroy might avail himself of the opportunity of distinction by
acquiescing in, and giving effect to, the popular desire. Kanghi was too
prudent to jeopardize his recently consolidated state by expeditions
either into Jungaria or Turkestan; and was quite satisfied with the
respect shown to his empire by the Eleuthian princes of those regions.
On Kanghi's death, in 1721, his son, Yung-Ching, came to the throne,
and during his short reign, the example of his two predecessors not to
interfere in the troubles of the states lying beyond Kansuh, was closely
followed. Yung-Ching died in 1735, and thus made way for his ambitious
and warlike son, Keen-Lung. When Keen-Lung first commenced to reign for
himself he found that he was irresponsible ruler of a most powerful
empire, at peace within itself, and satisfied to all outward seeming
with its _de facto_ government. His treasury was full; the country was,
perhaps, at its very highest point of prosperity, and the sovereign had
only to maintain in this wealth and vigour the nation which had been
brought to such a pitch by the wisdom of his predecessors. To a warlike
monarch, however, the career of ruler of a thriving, peace-loving, and
domestic people, has never been a palatable one, and Keen-Lung thought,
as have many other great sovereigns of our own age, that the only use of
a wealthy and numerous subject race was to enable the ruler to undertake
high-sounding enterprises, and to spread the terror of his name through
distant regions. The reputation and the real strength of the Chinese
Empire were so great at this time in Asia, that no single power, or even
any possible confederacy, would have thought of entering the lists
against it. Keen-Lung had, therefore, no just cause for hostilities with
the neighbouring states, as they were always too willing to offer the
amplest reparation for any cause of offence to the Imperial dignity. The
conquest of Turkestan was therefore an object with which he would
heartily sympathise; and when we remember his warlike disposition, and
the exact condition of China at the time, possessing a superabundance of
wealth, and of numbers sufficient to achieve far more difficult
enterprises than the one in question, it is easier to understand the
eagerness with which Keen-Lung intervened in the affairs of Jungaria,
when the following opportunity, which we are about to narrate, offered
for so doing.
It is now time to return to Kashgar and narrate the events that were
happening in that troubled district. The feud between the Aktaghluc and
Karataghluc factions reached its height when Afak, who had been placed
on the throne of Yarkand by the Calmucks, under Galdan, the chief
representative of the Aktaghluc, succeeded in expelling all the
prominent supporters of the rival clan. Afak ruled for some years, but
with difficulty maintained himself in some parts of Kashgar, against the
Calmucks, Kirghiz, and Kipchak. His sons had no better fortune, and the
state was finally divided between a Kipchak and a Kirghiz leader. These
quarrelled between themselves, but happily they each expired in the
first encounter. Acbash, one of the sons of Afak, was executed at Yangy
Hissar in the course of this contention; but he had previously called in
to his assistance from Khodjent, in Khokand, a Khoja, Danyal, of the
rival Karataghluc faction. This roused the enmity of the more bitter
among the Aktaghluc, and, on this, Khoja Ahmad was brought in to
represent their interests. Danyal was besieged in Yarkand, but, with the
assistance of a contingent of Kirghiz, he was able to repulse his
assailants. But, although successful in the field, Danyal was compelled
shortly afterwards to flee, and leave his rival in possession of the
state. He fled to the Calmucks, in Jungaria, and pleaded so well, that
an army was lent him to regain Kashgar. Victory attended this
expedition, but the Calmuck leader, who had captured Ahmad at the siege
of Kashgar, instead of placing Danyal in power, took both him and his
rival as prisoners to his capital of Ili. With so forcible a settlement
of the question, little room was left for useless complaining to the
ambitious Danyal, and from this time down to the Chinese conquest, the
Calmuck rulers of Ili asserted their right to supremacy over Eastern
Turkestan. Danyal, himself, was appointed, some years later on, governor
of Kashgar, now called Alty Shahr, or six cities; but, under him, there
was a local governor for each town, appointed by the Calmucks
themselves. His power was more apparent than real. His eldest son was
kept at Ili as a hostage for the good behaviour of his father, and
Danyal, himself, had frequently to proceed to Ili to make his report on
the state of affairs in Kashgar. Such was the condition of Kashgar, as a
subject province of the Calmuck rulers of Ili, governed by Danyal, a
member of the Karataghluc party, in the year 1740. On the death of
Galdan, the son of Arabdan Khan of Jungaria, in 1745, two chiefs,
Amursana and Davatsi, or Tawats, seized the governing power, and for a
time they divided the authority fairly between them; but it was not long
before they fell out, and resolved to advance their own interests at the
expense of each other. Amursana was unable to cope with the armies of
his rival, Davatsi, and, having been defeated in several encounters,
fled from Jungaria to China. On his arrival at Lanchefoo he demanded
permission to proceed to Pekin to lay his grievances at the feet of the
Emperor, and to offer in his name, and in that of many of his
compatriots, the districts of Ili and of Kashgar to his omnipotent
majesty.
The request was granted, and Keen-Lung received him with favour,
promised to consider what he had stated, and, in the meanwhile, gave him
titles and revenues within the Chinese Empire. Amursana's address was so
insinuating, and he played so skilfully on the king's ambition and love
for military renown, that at last Keen-Lung consented to lend him the
forces, which he had been so lavish of promises to secure. In 1753, the
Chinese army, under Amursana, appeared in Jungaria, and, after several
desperate encounters, Davatsi was driven out of that state, and,
according to one account, was delivered up to the Chinese by Khojam Beg,
the governor of Ush Turfan. According to another version, he was
captured in the field; but both agree that he was taken to Pekin and
there executed. Amursana, having regained his position in Jungaria, now
turned his attention to the conquest of its dependency, Kashgar. He was
now supreme in Jungaria, with his capital at Ili; but his army, which
maintained him in his position, was a Khitay force, owing allegiance
solely to the Emperor of Pekin, and only obeying the instructions issued
by his general accompanying the Eleuth prince Amursana. At this epoch
Yusuf, a son of Galdan, had seized the chief authority in Kashgar, and,
raising a cry that the true religion of Islam was in danger from the
advance of the Khitay, endeavoured to rally to his cause in the struggle
that he saw was approaching the Mahomedan governments of Khokand and
Bokhara. Amursana, on the northern frontiers of Kashgar, was eagerly
watching for the opportunity to arise for an active interference in that
state, and Yusuf was prudent in seeking beyond his frontiers for allies
that were able to assist him against the machinations of his foes. Yusuf
had made himself the leader and representative of the Karataghluc party
in the state, and Amursana accordingly resolved to put forward the
pretensions of the rival Aktaghluc faction. In this design the Chinese
general acquiesced, and, with the assistance of the Calmuck governors of
Ush Turfan, and Aksu, no delay interfered with its prompt realization.
The descendants of the ancient Khojas were consequently sought out, and
Barhanuddin, son of Ahmad, was selected for the purpose. He, at the head
of a mixed following, promptly seized Ush Turfan, and was there received
with acclamation, and several of the minor tribes joined him at once.
Yusuf was, however, hurrying up with a large force from Yarkand, and
Barhanuddin's chances seemed to be more than doubtful, when Yusuf died
on the way. His son Abdulla, who took the name of Khoja Padshah,
hastened on, however, and besieged Barhanuddin in Ush Turfan. Abdulla
then endeavoured to come to terms with Barhanuddin, and made overtures
for the reconciliation of the Karataghluc and Aktaghluc parties to be
cemented in a crusade against the invading Khitay. Barhanuddin, a true
Mussulman, was personally inclined to accept the arrangement offered,
but, as he was surrounded by Chinese officials and their allies, he was
constrained to give instead the advice that Abdulla should surrender to
the Chinese and acknowledge their supremacy. Abdulla was not at all
willing to forfeit his independence without some struggle, and the siege
of Ush Turfan was pressed on. In the camp of the besieging forces there
were some who favoured the pretensions of Barhanuddin, and these
deserting from the Karataghluc cause, the remaining forces of Abdulla
were compelled to retreat with precipitation. Barhanuddin immediately
advanced on Kashgar, where he was received with open arms. Yarkand soon
afterwards fell into his possession, and the conquest of Kashgar by the
descendant of the Khojas and the triumph of the Aktaghluc party were
complete.
So far the Chinese had been merely spectators of the progress of events
in Kashgar. Amursana had induced them to approve of this enterprise of
Barhanuddin, and they had given general support in the war with Yusuf
and his son; and it was not until Barhanuddin, elated with his success,
set their wishes at defiance, that they resolved to occupy the country.
But before that, Amursana's career had been cut short. Although escorted
by a large force of native Chinese troops, he had aspired, in 1757, to
establish himself as an independent prince in Jungaria, and had broken
loose from Chinese control. The forces he raised were, however, defeated
with remarkable ease by the Chinese, and Amursana was compelled to flee
once more from his home--this time with no certain refuge, as he had
before in Pekin. The Russians were then in possession of Siberia, but
their influence for good or for ill beyond their desert and almost
impenetrable stations was practically _nil_; but, such as it was, it
seemed to Amursana the only place affording any prospect of security.
He died at Tobolsk, in 1757, soon after he arrived there; but the
implacable Chinese haughtily demanded from the Russians his body as a
proof of his decease, and the Russian government sent it to Kiachta for
surrender to them. Such was the career of the ill-fated, but ambitious,
Amursana, who was the immediate cause of the introduction of Chinese
power into Eastern Turkestan.
With so unmistakable a proof before his eyes of the power of the
Chinese, it is strange to find Barhanuddin also proving contumacious in
Kashgar, but so it was. In 1758, the very next year after the death of
Amursana, this ruler and his brother Khan Khoja broke out in open mutiny
to the Chinese. At Ili some Khitay officers were maltreated, and
outspoken contempt was shown for Chinese commands. Such attitude could
not be brooked by any established rule, and, to do the Chinese simple
justice, never had been tolerated by them on any occasion; and
accordingly a Chinese army was despatched from Ili to chastise this
recalcitrant ruler, and to remind him that the arm of Chinese power was
terribly long. Barhanuddin and his brother were defeated in several
pitched battles, city after city opened its gates to the dreaded
invader, and the last representatives of the Khojas were compelled to
seek refuge in the isolated region of Badakshan. But even here they were
not safe. The terror of the Chinese name had gone before them, and the
sovereign of Badakshan, eager to propitiate the conqueror, sent the
heads of the two brothers to the Chinese general, who was advancing from
Yarkand. Only one of the numerous sons of Barhanuddin escaped the
destruction wrought in the family of the Khojas by the victorious
Chinese: his name was Khoja Sarimsak. The Chinese had now completely
annexed all the territory north of the Karakoram and east of the Pamir
and Khokand, and it does not appear that in doing so they had suffered
any great loss. By availing themselves of Amursana's claims in Jungaria
they had obtained a firm foothold in that state, and then by an equally
skilful manipulation of the rival parties of Aktaghluc and Karataghluc,
they had extended their authority over Kashgar as well. When their
puppets, Amursana and Barhanuddin, became restive as Chinese vassals,
and strove for independence, the Chinese forces were called into action
and swept all opposition from their path. All this may seem the most
unjustifiable ambition, nor do we wish to palliate in any way the
terribly harsh repressive measures adopted by the Chinese. There is no
doubt that, so long as there remained the shadow of any opposition to
their rule, they did not temper their power with any exhibition of
mercy. It is computed that almost half a million of people were slain
during the wars of these two or three years, and that the great majority
of these were the innocent inhabitants, who had been massacred. Nor,
although we should be disposed to think that this is a greatly
exaggerated number, have we any reason to doubt that the sword of the
Chinese was called into use whenever any resistance was offered to their
advance, and that the feelings of the soldiers were embittered to a
great extent by religious fervour, in their encounters with the
Mussulmans. The Chinese, having conquered Kashgar, turned their arms
against Khokand, and entered Tashkent and the city of Khokand in
triumph. As the year 1760 was drawing to a close, quite a panic was
spreading through Western Asia at the advance of the Chinese.
Afghanistan, then as now the only formidable Mahomedan territory left
intact from foreign conquest, was implored by the suffering Islamites to
check the Chinese advance. Then, as recently on a somewhat similar
occasion, Afghanistan thought prudence the better part of valour, and
confined her action to the invasion of Badakshan, which she coveted, in
order to punish its ruler for the murder of the fugitive Khojas. But,
having terrified Khokand, the Chinese wisely retired to the proper
frontier of Kashgar, and then set about consolidating their rule there
by an energy and administrative capacity which must excite the
admiration of every governing nation.
It was some years, however, before the conquest of Kashgar, which had
been so rapidly accomplished, could be considered to have been
altogether completed. Fresh troops had to be summoned from Kansuh, and
military settlers imported in large numbers from Shensi and other
Chinese provinces, to supply the place of the massacred Kashgari.
Settlers were also brought from the neighbourhood of Urumtsi and Hamil;
and with these and imperial troops sent from Pekin, the Chinese felt
complete masters of the situation. It was only then that the Chinese
viceroy considered himself sufficiently strong to place his army in
detachments in the various cities. Up to that time it had been kept
mobilised in one, or at most two or three stations, ready for instant
action. When the Chinese withdrew from Khokand they imposed a tribute on
that state, and then they turned their arms against the nomad tribes on
the north of the Jungarian frontier. The various hordes of the Kirghiz
nomads sent in their submission one after the other, and the Chinese
invariably accepted their fealty, and as a rule rewarded their duteous
behaviour with Chinese titles and rank Thus Ablai, Chief of the Middle
Horde, was made Prince in 1766, and Nur Ali, of the Little Horde, went
so far as to send special emissaries to Pekin, where they were
favourably received, and returned with recompenses for the fidelity of
their master. The Chinese had thus secured their position in Jungaria
and Kashgar before the dose of 1765, and by their possession of Khoten,
they had opened up communications with their province of Tibet. On the
south they possessed an admirable frontier, and it was only in the
south-west that any check seemed to be put upon their advance. As
already mentioned, the Ameer of Afghanistan had overran Badakshan, in
chastisement for the murders of Barhanuddin and his brother; and he was
continually receiving applications to declare an open war against the
Chinese. His own troubles with the rulers of Scinde and Persia were
sufficient to keep his religions sympathies within due bounds. But he
sent an embassy to Pekin, to point out that his fellow-religionists were
suffering under the conquering sway of the Chinese forces in Central
Asia; and on its return with an unsatisfactory reply, he appears to have
stationed a large body of troops in Badakshan. The proud Durani monarch
was probably eager to oppose the Chinese, but, wiser than his
contemporaries in Turkestan and Jungaria, he accurately reckoned up the
risks of the enterprise, and contented himself with the maintenance of
the powerful empire he had erected on the ruins of the conquests of
Nadir Shah. When the Afghans had done so much, and given promises of aid
in the defence of Samarcand, it is not to be wondered at if the people
of Kashgar thought they would do more, and risings took place in several
parts of the state, notably at Ush Turfan. The Chinese measures were
prompt and effectual; the rebellion was suppressed, the inhabitants
massacred, and the town destroyed. This failure struck so complete a
panic into the hearts of the people, that no inducements, for more than
half a century, could encourage them to rise against the Chinese. The
Chinese conquest of Kashgar gave an effectual solution to the rivalries
of the numerous claimants to its sovereignty, and among other
competitors to the Khojas, that is, to the descendants of that Sarimsak
who alone survived the massacre of his family in 1760. While very
possibly the people may have suffered that mental depression which must
accompany the installation of a foreign rule, and despite the very harsh
and unmistakable evidences given by the Chinese of their intolerance of
opposition, there was some prospect, notwithstanding these, that the
Chinese would prove permanent masters, and that their rule would
consequently become milder and milder every year. It was this feeling,
that things could not become much worse, that rendered the Kashgari
apathetic in their resistance to the Chinese. They did not dare to
expect much improvement in their lot; but at all events they might
suppose that Chinese massacres would cease with the disappearance of
resistance, whereas massacres by their own countrymen and tyrants had
been for centuries an every-day occurrence.
Before considering the Chinese occupation of Kashgar, it may be useful
to give some description of the Aktaghluc and Karataghluc parties, of
whose rivalry the history of Kashgar in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and
eighteenth centuries is so full. It may be remembered that in 1533,
Reshid, the younger son of Said, who had distinguished himself in his
father's wars, seized the state from his brothers, to whom he was
inferior both in age and in birth on his mother's side. In effecting
this he availed himself of the alliance of the Usbeg rulers west of
Pamir, and during the negotiations that were transacted between them,
the distinguished divine, Maulana Khoja Kasani, of Samarcand, visited
him. He was greeted with the most striking marks of Reshid's affection,
and granted a large estate in Kashgar. He married and left two sons in
that state to represent his interests and share his possessions. The
elder son, whose mother was a Samarcand lady, was averse to the younger,
whose mother was a native of Kashgar. In the course of time they each
rose prominently in the service of the state, but they transmitted their
antipathy to their descendants. Khoja Kalan, the elder, whose influence
was greatest in Yarkand and Karatagh, was the founder of the
Karataghluc, or "Black Mountaineers." Khoja Ishac, the younger, whose
influence was greatest in Kashgar and Actagh, another form of Altai,
was the founder of the Aktaghluc, or "White Mountaineers." The
descendants of either of these Khojas, or priests, the sons of the great
divine of Samarcand, claim the title of Khoja, but that must not be
confounded with the more exclusive signification it possesses as
representing the once ruling family.
CHAPTER V.
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR.
The Chinese conquest of Jungaria and Eastern Turkestan having become an
accomplished fact, what did the new rulers do to justify their forcible
interference in Central Asia? What measures did they adopt to conciliate
the subject peoples, and what to increase the prosperity of a vast
region, naturally fertile, but impoverished by centuries of improvident
government and of civil anarchy and war? Did they follow the precedent
that had been set them by every past ruler of those countries, and leave
the people to their own devices, to starve or to exist as best they
might, so long as the tribute money was forthcoming? Did the Chinese
Viceroys of Ili, or their lieutenants in Kashgar, Yarkand, Aksu, or
Kucha adopt a policy of inaction, and pursue a line of conduct of
unprincipled selfishness in advancing their own personal fortunes, and
thus prove that they were of the same stamp as all other Asiatic
despots, careless of the day and utterly regardless of the morrow? The
best way to see how they acted, what they did, and what they did not
that was possible, is to follow their rule in Kashgar with some
attention. In itself this may be found to be no uninstructive lesson for
us, who are also a great governing people; and from the perusal of what
the Chinese administrators did in Central Asia we may arise willing to
accord them high praise, because we are better able than other nations
to appreciate the difficulties of their task.
After the fall of Amursana, the Chinese, in the first place, organized
their administrative system upon the following basis:--The supreme
authority was vested in the hands of the Viceroy of Ili. Under him an
amban, or lieutenant-governor, administered affairs in Kashgar. His
place of abode was Yarkand. In internal matters the Yarkand Amban was
without a superior south of the Tian Shan, but in external affairs he
only acted in subordination to the Viceroy of Ili, who alone was in
communication with Pekin. Under each of these potentates there were the
usual deputy-ambans and Tay Dalays, or military commanders. All the
cities had Gulbaghs constructed outside of them, and these forts were
held by Chinese troops--that is, by a mixture of Khitay and Tungani. It
is computed that 20,000 troops used to garrison Kashgar and the
neighbourhood alone. The military posts were restricted to Chinamen, and
the higher judicial and administrative offices were also withheld from
the subjected race. But these were the only privileges retained by the
Chinese.
The Khan, or chief Amban, who resided in Yarkand, made all the
appointments to the minor offices, which were filled almost exclusively
by Mahomedans. The only precaution the Chinese seem to have taken was to
refuse employment to a Kashgari in his native town, so that a Yarkandi
would have to go to Aksu, or some other place away from his home, if he
desired to participate in the government of his country. But beyond this
there was no restriction, and nominally the Hakim Beg, the highest
Mussulman officer, ranked on an equality with the Chinese amban. His
subordinates were all Mahomedans, with the exception of his personal
guard of Khitay troops. In the hands of these natives of the country lay
all the administration of justice among their co-religionists, the
collection of the revenue, and the levying of customs dues on the
frontier and of trade taxes in the cities. It was only when cause for
litigation arose between a Buddhist and a Mussulman that the amban
interfered. We have therefore the instructive spectacle before us of a
Buddhist conquest becoming harmonized with Mussulman institutions, and
Chinese arrogance not content with tolerating, but absolutely fostering,
a régime to which its hostility was scarcely concealed. This is the only
instance of the Chinese exhibiting such more than Asiatic restraint
towards Mahomedans; for their dealings with Tibet, a country of peculiar
sanctity and Buddhist as well, is not a case in point. The scheme worked
well, however. Chinese strength was husbanded by being employed only
when absolutely necessary to be called into play, and the people, to a
great degree their own masters, did not realise the fact of their being
a subjected nation. Their first anxiety was the payment of their
taxes--far from exorbitant, as it had been under their own rulers; but
that task accomplished, they could free their minds from care.
Very often their own countryman, the Hakim Beg, was a greater tyrant
than the Chinese amban in the fort outside their gates; but against his
exactions they could obtain speedy redress. When their Hakims, or Wangs
as the Chinese called them, became unpopular in a district, the amban
promptly removed them; even if he considered they were not much to
blame, he always transferred them to some other district. The first
object in the eyes of the amban was the maintenance of order, and he
knew well enough that order could not be maintained, unless he resorted
to force, which he studiously avoided, if the people were discontented.
The people therefore could repose implicit trust in the Chinese amban
securing a fair hearing and justice for them in their disagreements with
their own leaders; and the Mussulman Wangs, who were the old ruling
class, saw the unfortunate tax-payer at last secure from their tyranny
through the clemency of a Buddhist conqueror. We are justified in
assuming that the population saw the force of these patent facts, and
that, if not perfectly to be relied on in any emergency, the Chinese had
no danger to expect from the tax-producing and patient Kashgari.
So long as the Chinese rule remained vigorous--that is, for about the
first fifty years--the Ambans worked in perfect concord with the Wangs,
and through them with the people. But the internal relations between
these various personages became more complicated and less cordial
through the importation, about the beginning of this century, of a fresh
factor into the question. The Chinese had granted the cities west of,
and including, Aksu very considerable privileges in carrying on trade
with Khokand; and in the course of commercial intercourse a Khokandian
element was slowly imported into these cities, when it became a people
within a people, enjoying the prosperity to be derived from the Chinese
Empire, but not experiencing any sentiment of gratitude towards those by
whom the favours were conferred. After some years, when these Khokandian
immigrants had become numerous, the Chinese acquiesced in their
selecting a responsible head for each community, and this head, or
Aksakal, was nominated by the Khan of Khokand, the only temporal
sovereign these people recognized. The creation of this third power in
the state, which was first sanctioned as a matter of convenience, was to
be fraught with the direst consequences for the Chinese. The Khitay
would be justified in saying that the Aksakals were "the cause of all
their woe," in Kashgar at all events. The Aksakals were far too prudent
to challenge the supremacy of the Chinese officials, and their first
object was rather to make themselves independent of the Wangs than to
compete with the Ambans. In this they were successful, for the Chinese
neglected to take into account the dangers that might arise from these
same bustling, intriguing, and alien Aksakals. The Wangs had always been
obedient vassals, but the plausibility of the Aksakals put them on a par
with their rivals. The Chinese washed their hands of the quarrel, and
may have imagined that their rule was made more assured by divisions
among the Mussulmans. In this they were mistaken. The Aksakals, who
after a time repudiated their obligations to the Wangs, became the
centre of all the intrigue that marked the last half-century of Chinese
rule, and, puffed up by their triumph over the Wangs, did not hesitate
to challenge the right of the Ambans to exercise jurisdiction over them.
But of this more later on.
While the Chinese adopted these liberal measures in their dealings with
the Mussulman population, they did not neglect those other duties which
belong to the government by right. The greatest benefit they could
confer was of course the preservation of order, and to maintain the
balance impartially between the numerous litigants was the first article
in the creed of the Chinese viceroys. As tranquillity settled down over
these distracted regions, trade revived. The native industries, which
had greatly fallen off, became once more active; and foreign enterprise
was attracted to this quarter, which Chinese power soon made the most
favoured region in Central Asia. But the rulers did not rest content
with the mere preservation of good order. They did not leave it to the
inclination of an indolent people to progress at as tortoise-like a
speed as they would wish; but they themselves set the example which the
rest felt bound to imitate. Not only did the enterprising Khitay
merchant from Kansuh and Szchuen visit the marts of Hamil and Turfan,
but many of this class penetrated into Kashgar proper, where they became
permanent settlers. These invaluable agents supplied the deficiency that
had never before been filled up in the life of the state, for they
brought the highest qualities of enterprise and practical sagacity,
together with capital, as their special characteristics. In the train of
these Khitay merchants came wealth and increased prosperity. Yarkand,
Kashgar, Aksu, and Khoten became cities of the first rank, and the
population of the country in the year 1800 was greater than it had ever
been before.
There was perfect equality too between all the various races in respect
to trade. The Chinese did not demand special immunities for their own
countrymen, as might have been expected. The Khitay, who came all the
way from Lanchefoo in search of a fortune, must be prepared to compete
in an equal race with the Khokandi, the Kashgari, or the Afghan. His
nationality would obtain for him no immunity from being taxed, or could
give him no advantage over the foreign or native traders. The main
portion of the trade of the country remained in the old hands. Khokand
benefited as much as Kashgar by the trade, and China, in a direct
manner, least of the three.
The Chinese have at all times been justly famous for their admirable
measures for irrigating their provinces. The wonderful canals which cut
their way, where there are no great rivers, in China proper are
reproduced even in this outlying dependency. Eastern Turkestan is one of
the worst-watered regions in the world. In fact there is only a belt of
fertile country round the Yarkand river, stretching away eastward along
the slopes of the Tian Shan as far as Hamil. The few small rivers which
are traced here and there across the map are during many months of the
year dried up, and even the Yarkand then becomes an insignificant
stream. To remedy this, and to husband the supply as much as possible,
the Chinese sank dykes in all directions. By this means the cultivated
country was slowly but surely spread over a greater extent of territory,
and the vicinity of the three cities of Kashgar, Yangy Hissar, and
Yarkand became known as the garden of Asia. Corn and fruit grew in
abundance, and from Yarkand to the south of the Tian Shan the traveller
could pass through one endless orchard. On all sides he saw nothing but
plenty and content, peaceful hamlets and smiling inhabitants. These
were the outcome of a Chinese domination.
The Chinese, besides possessing a dual line of communication with their
own country, one north and the other south of the Tian Shan, had also a
caravan route from Khoten to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. There was also
some intercourse with Cashmere by this way. The jade, for which Khoten
was justly, and is still, famous, was exported in immense quantities,
both to Tibet and to China, through Maralbashi. This mineral was held in
high esteem by Chinese ladies, and alone sufficed to make the prosperity
of Khoten assured. Gold, silk, and musk, were other articles included in
the commerce of this flourishing city. There was also, in the Chinese
time, a very extensive manufacture of carpets and cotton goods. The gold
mines, which, with two exceptions, have not been worked since the same
time, are believed to be scarcely touched, and only await a fostering
hand to be put in working order once more.
The Chinese also devoted great attention to the coal mines in the
vicinity of Aksu, and these were worked both by private enterprise and
the Government. Coal was an article of common use in that city, but it
does not appear to have been exported beyond the neighbourhood. It is
known that the Chinese took greater interest in the development of the
internal means of wealth of the country than in inducing foreigners to
enter it. Thus, we see that mines, in a special degree, received state
approval and support. The gold mines of Khoten, the coal of Aksu, and
the zinc of Kucha, are all conspicuous instances of this; as, under all
past, and the recent Mahomedan, rule, they have been most foolishly, but
consistently neglected.
Nor were those special trades for which Kashgar had in prosperous
moments been renowned, neglected. The leather-dressers of Yarkand and
Aksu, the silk-mercers of Kashgar and Khoten, were never so busy as in
the warlike days of Keen-Lung, and the great mass of the people, the
agricultural class in the villages, was equally prosperous and well
governed. Trade was fostered on all sides, and the conquering power was
content to stand aside and witness the steady progress of its subjects
towards hitherto unattained and unattainable prosperity.
Lastly, the Chinese directed their attention to the improvement of the
means of communication between one part of the province and another. It
was absolutely necessary to the security of their rule that there should
be an easy and always open road between Ili and Kashgar. Therefore, a
way was cut, at great expense, through the Tian Shan, north of Aksu, and
this pass was known as the Muzart, or Glacier. So difficult was the
country through which it passed, and such the danger from ice-drifts and
snow-storms, that relays of men had to be kept constantly at work in
order to prevent it getting out of repair for a day. The construction of
this road was, in the first place, most expensive, but, perhaps, the
cost of repairing was much more. This, the most striking engineering
achievement of the Chinese, has become practically useless, through
fifteen years of neglect. If China is to regain Ili, it will, no doubt,
be restored. The passes west of this, by the Narym River to Vernoe, and
through Terek to Khokand, were those selected by Yakoob Beg to supply
its place.
The next object to which the Chinese specially paid attention was the
preservation of their road home to China. Thus the road in Tian Shan Pe
Lu, and the other in Tian Shan Nan Lu, were kept in the most effective
state possible. The former, north of the mountains, passed through Manas
and Urumtsi to Hamil; the latter, south of them, through Aksu and Kucha
to the same place. The alternative route from Kucha to Kashgar and
Yarkand, through Maralbashi, was also much used, more especially,
however, by those who desired to break off at that outpost in the desert
to reach Khoten and Sanju. In each city there was appointed a committee
to superintend the roads in the district, and this Road Board was a
highly important and useful corporation. It was by such measures as
these that the Chinese made their rule a blessing to Kashgar and
Jungaria for more than fifty years. Of course, there was the fiscal side
of these schemes of public utility. Roads could not be opened up and
maintained in order, canals could not be dug, the state could not
administer justice, promote trade, and make itself respected abroad,
without an assured revenue, and this revenue, after the first ten years,
was very productive.
The principal taxes were the tithe on the produce of the land, called
"_ushr_" and the _zakat_ (fortieth), on merchandise and cattle. Then, in
the cities, there was a house tax, which was essentially, like our own
income tax, a war tax, fluctuating in accordance with the military
necessities, caused by foreign or civil war. From the mines, too, the
state derived a large annual sum, which was generally devoted to some
object of public utility. There was also the tribute money from the
Kirghiz nomads, whose flocks and horses were numbered and taxed at a low
rate, in return for which they were taken under the protection of China.
In addition to these great taxes there were several smaller ones, such
as a fee on fuel sold in the market, and another levy on milch-kine kept
in cities. A writer on Kashgar has said that these "proved a ready means
of oppression, and a prolific source of that discontent which left the
rulers without a single helping hand, or sympathising heart, in the hour
of their distress and destruction." But this assumption of cause and
effect is scarcely just.
Of course, all taxes can be made a ready means of oppression by the
tax-gatherer, who, in this case, was a Mussulman and fellow-countryman.
But taxes are absolutely necessary to all good government, and when we
consider what China did with her revenue, with what public spirit her
representatives laid it out in plans for the advantage of the state, can
we pronounce an opinion that she imposed unfair burdens on the
subjected race? Moreover, no one denies the prosperity general
throughout Kashgar in those days, a period looked back to with regret by
the inhabitants during the most favoured years of Yakoob Beg's rule. It
is not in accordance with facts, then, to imply that the Chinese ground
Kashgar under them by severe taxation, and whatever petty tyranny there
was, was carried on not by the Khitay Ambans, but by the Mahomedan
Wangs.
In the hour of distress and destruction the people, indeed, proved
traitorous to their best friends, or, more generally, apathetic; leaving
to the energetic Andijani element within their gates the task of
crossing swords with Buddhist rule, to which the hostility of these
immigrants had always been declared.
The short-sightedness of the Kashgari played the game of the more
fanatical and ambitious people of Khokand; but the rule of China did not
pass out of Eastern Turkestan until the disturbances of forty years had
generated ill-feeling that formerly was not, and had so embittered the
relations of governing and governed, that what had come to be considered
a lenient and impersonal government, assumed all the darker hues of a
military and foreign despotism. Even then China did not fall until there
was dissension within herself, when, split into three hostile camps, her
sword dropped nerveless from her hand in Central Asia, 2,000 miles away
from her natural border. To follow Chinese rule in Kashgar down to 1820,
is to observe the monotonous course of never varying prosperity. From
that year to 1860, the tale is of a different complexion, less
monotonous but also less satisfactory.
In 1758 and 1760 Chinese armies entered Khokand. Tashkent fell in the
former year, and the capital in the latter. The Chinese then withdrew,
after imposing a tribute upon Khokand. During the long reign of
Keen-Lung--that is, down to 1795--the tribute was regularly paid. After
that year, however, the payment became irregular, and border warfare of
frequent occurrence between the two neighbours. At last, in 1812,
Khokand, then under an able prince, refused to pay tribute any longer,
and the Chinese acquiesced in the repudiation. Nor did the change in the
relations between China and Khokand stop here; for, a few years
afterwards, the Chinese found it expedient to pay Khokand an annual sum
to keep the Khoja family, whose representatives were residing in
Khokand, from intriguing against them. The amount of the subsidy was
£3,500 of our money. In addition to this, the Khan of Khokand was
permitted to levy a tax on all Mahomedan merchandise sold in Kashgar
through Andijan merchants. This tax was collected by the Aksakals before
mentioned, and was a very profitable source of income for the
impecunious khans. But even these concessions and perquisites did not
satisfy the Mussulmans of Central Asia, who saw in Chinese moderation an
evidence of weakness and decline. The Aksakals, in these years of
Mahomedan revival, became political agents of the greatest importance.
It was they who gave a point to all the discontent there might be in
Kashgar; it was they who attributed to the Chinese the blame for
whatever evils this world is never wholly free from; and it was they who
agitated for the return of the old Khoja kings, who were always
destined, in their eyes, to bring the most perfect happiness. With such
causes at work both within and without their position, the Chinese had
not to wait long before their authority was more openly challenged.
Sarimsak, the only member of the Khoja family surviving the massacre by
the Chinese, had fled, as a child, into the impenetrable recesses of
Wakhan. From thence, in later years, he had gone to settle in Khokand,
where he married. This prince had three sons--Yusuf, Bahanuddin, and
Jehangir, the youngest and best known. In 1816, the first outbreak
against Chinese authority occurred, when a small rising took place in
Tash Balik, a town to the west of Kashgar. This was speedily put down,
and its leaders executed. It was but the forerunner of the storm.
In 1822, Jehangir resolved to reassert his claims over Kashgar, and,
while his eldest brother continued to reside in retirement at Bokhara,
he joined the Kara Kirghiz. With a party of these, under the command of
their chief, Suranchi Beg, Jehangir raided up to the city of Kashgar. He
was there repulsed in the suburbs, and compelled to flee. He then joined
the Kirghiz of Bolor round Narym, who were nominally feudatories of
China, and, with their aid, commenced a petty sort of border war. A
small Chinese force was despatched against him, and drove the Kirghiz up
as far as Fort Kurtka. On their return from this successful attack, they
were, however, surprised in one of the defiles, and almost all were
destroyed. This was the first reverse the Chinese had ever met with in
the field, and it was at once bruited about through all parts of Central
Asia. It gave a life to the Khoja cause which it had hitherto lacked,
and adventurers from all parts flocked to the standard Jehangir now
raised on the borders of Kashgar. The Khan of Khokand so far assisted
him as to send him a skilled general, Isa Dadkhwah, and extended over
his cause that protection and sanction which Khokand has ever since
thrown over the Khoja family.
In the spring of 1826, Jehangir advanced in force against Kashgar, and
the Chinese, despising their assailant, left their fortifications to
encounter him in the open. A battle then ensued, of which the
particulars have not come down to us, but which resulted in the defeat
of the Chinese. Jehangir entered Kashgar in triumph, was received with
acclamations by the people, urged on by the Aksakals, and proclaimed
himself sovereign of the country, under the style of Seyyid Jehangir
Sultan. His first act--the most significant exposure of the true
sentiment of the Kashgarian people there well could be--was to order
the execution of the Mahomedan Wang of Kashgar, by name Mahomed Seyyid.
The fall of Kashgar was the signal to the Aksakals throughout Altyshahr
to begin that work for which they had been long preparing. In Yangy
Hissar, Yarkand, and Khoten risings at once took place. The Chinese,
surprised and unarmed, were butchered in the streets, and the Gulbaghs,
as the visible token of the foreign rule, were razed with the ground.
The Gulbagh of Kashgar itself alone held out, but it at last fell, after
sustaining a long siege, into the hands of Jehangir. His triumph
completed, he had to concern himself more with his relations with
Khokand than about the Chinese, who were mysteriously quiet. Mahomed Ali
Khan, of Khokand, who thought that Jehangir's success was solely due to
him, laid claim to a certain historical superiority over his vassal of
Kashgar, to which the Khoja prince was not willing to assent. A large
Khokandian army which had been sent to Kashgar returned, after losing
1,000 men before the walls of the Gulbagh, and its withdrawal was the
signal for plots and counterplots to break out in the palace of the new
ruler. These he promptly repressed, reduced the intriguing general, Isa
Dadkhwah, in rank, and had emancipated himself from his thraldom to
Khokand, when the news came that the Chinese were at last returning.
Although the western portion of Altyshahr had fallen away from the
Chinese, Aksu and Maralbashi remained true to their allegiance. The
Chinese still possessed the military keys of the country. Moreover,
their possession of Ili gave them an enormous strategical advantage, and
in the Tungan population they possessed an almost inexhaustible supply
for recruiting "revindicating" armies. It is apropos here to state that
China retained both of these advantages down to the time of Buzurg Khan
and Yakoob Beg, and that, so long as she possessed them, the utmost
Mussulman fanaticism and Khokandian patronage of the Khojas could do
was futile against the arrest of fate. During six months Jehangir ruled
in Kashgar, and during six months the Chinese viceroy made his
preparations at Ili for a thorough revenge. An army of more than 100,000
men, raised from the Tungani, the Calmucks, and the Khitay garrison, was
despatched from Ili, and in January, 1827, entered Aksu. Here all the
brigades were concentrated, and the Viceroy, in conjunction with the
general under him, by name Chang-Lung, drew up the plan of campaign,
which was as follows:--A small army of 12,000 men was sent against
Khoten across the desert through Cày Yoli, while the remainder of the
host advanced on Maralbashi. Here another detachment of 7,000 strong was
directed against Yarkand, while the main body marched on Kashgar by the
banks of the Kizil Su.
Their advance was unopposed until they reached Yangabad, or Yangiawat,
where Jehangir had concentrated an army computed at 50,000 men, but
probably considerably less. When the armies sighted each other they
pitched their camps in preparation for the decisive contest that was at
hand. In accordance with immemorial custom, each side put forward on the
following day its champion. On the part of the Chinese a gigantic
Calmuck archer opposed on the part of Jehangir an equally formidable
Khokandi. The former was armed with his proper weapons, the latter with
a gun of some clumsy and ancient design, and while the Khokandi was
busily engaged with his intricate apparatus, the Chinese archer shot him
dead with an arrow through the breast. Of course, neither army would
have acquiesced in the decree of the God of Battles as shown by the fate
of its champion, but, in this case, it was true that--
"Who spills the foremost foeman's life,
His party conquers in the strife."
After a sharp, but brief, skirmish, the Kashgarian army withdrew in
confusion, and the following day the Chinese surrounded Kashgar on three
sides. During the night the heart of Jehangir misgave him, and he fled
to the Karatakka mountains. But here the snow had rendered the passes
impracticable, and, after hiding for a few days in that difficult
region, he was captured by the Chinese. His fate was that usually met
with by traitors to that empire, for, being sent to Pekin, he was
executed after torture. In this war Ishac Wang, of Ush Turfan, played a
great part against the Khoja prince, and was rewarded for his good
service by being appointed Wang of Kashgar. The Chinese constructed a
fresh fort, Yangyshahr, in the place of the destroyed Gulbagh, and left
a large Khitay garrison under Jah Darin. But Ishac Wang, who was given
some such title as Prince of Kashgar, was soon afterwards deposed and
recalled to China.
The Chinese authority was re-established without difficulty in the three
cities, and peace settled down over Eastern Turkestan. But the
repressive and punitive measures that the Chinese felt compelled to
adopt raised a bitterer sentiment in the minds of the people than had
previously existed. The Chinese were, indeed, only employing the same
weapons that had been used against themselves, but none the less did
these reciprocal atrocities dissipate whatever friendship there had
been. Among other acts the Chinese removed 12,000 Mahomedan families
from Kashgar to Ili, and these, destined to play an important part in
the history of that province, became known as Tarantchis, or Toilers.
The Chinese resolved to punish Khokand as well. They broke off all trade
with that state, and happy would it have been for them if they could
have continued to preserve a closed frontier. But the Khan of that time
was Mahomed Ali Khan, the most ambitious, as he was the ablest, of the
princes of that country. He had just annexed Karategin, and had acquired
some of the outlying provinces of Badakshan, which Mourad Beg, of
Kundus, had absorbed about the same time. It was not probable that he
would put up with the Chinese defiance. He was prudent enough to delay
his advance until the main body of their army had been withdrawn. But,
as soon as he was informed that the Chinese had gone back to Ili,
Mahomed Ali, calling Yusuf, Sarimsak's eldest son, from his retirement
in Bokhara, placed him at the head of an army, under the charge of his
own brother-in-law, Hacc Kuli Beg. The Chinese were worsted at Mingyol,
and all the cities west of Aksu turned against the Chinese, as before,
and proclaimed for Yusuf Khoja. Then the massacres were repeated, and
the invasion of Yusuf was that of Jehangir over again in exact detail.
But Yusuf's triumph was still more brief. Whereas Jehangir had ruled for
nine months, Yusuf only swayed the sceptre for three.
The Chinese movements were delayed by small Mussulman revolts in Barkul
and Shensi until the spring of 1831, but then, when they returned, they
found that Yusuf and the Khokandian army had retreated some months
before. The facts were that the moment Khokand invaded Kashgar, Bokhara
attacked Khokand, and Hacc Kuli Beg had to be recalled to cope with
matters more pressing than Khoja rights. With the general had gone
Yusuf, far from anxious to encounter the Chinese alone. The return of
the Khokandian army sufficed to dispel all danger from Bokhara, and, a
few months after, Mahomed Ali Khan recommenced operations--in the east
this time--against the Kirghiz under Chinese protection. The Chinese
were thoroughly sick of these petty disputes, and made a treaty with
Khokand, by which that state acquired fresh commercial privileges, in
addition to the old ones, and by which the importance of the Aksakals
rather increased than waned. Mahomed Ali Khan had acquired all he
wanted, and discouraged the Khoja party, as, indeed, the terms of this
treaty compelled him to do. The risings under Jehangir and Yusuf were
undoubtedly a great blow to Chinese prestige. To all appearance each had
nearly been successful, and the Chinese, whose prestige was enormous in
Central Asia--quite as great as that of Russia is now--had been, on one
or two occasions, openly defeated. But, after all, this was a little
matter compared to the shock the sentiments, called into being by sixty
happy years, had received. Between Buddhist and Mussulman, between
Chinaman and Central Asiatic, all the old antipathy was revived in the
butcheries of Yarkand and Kashgar. The Kashgari showed that they could
not appreciate the benefits they had received from China, and the
Chinese, enraged at the slaughter of their countrymen, and, perhaps,
also at the ingratitude evinced towards them, retaliated in kind. They
did not appreciate that moderation, which Europeans have not always
shown under similar circumstances, and wrought out their revenge in
their own ancient fashion. It is absolutely necessary that the reader
should remember that the two rapidly succeeding invasions of Jehangir
and Yusuf form a turning-point in the history of the Chinese rule in
Kashgar. Up to that epoch it is difficult to find words sufficient to do
justice to China's beneficent government there; after that year it would
be absurd to employ the same language. For the change the chief blame
must fall upon the fickle and ungrateful Kashgari themselves, and then
on the intriguing Andijanis. The Chinese are justified, at least, in
saying that, having for more than half a century ruled this people with
justice, they only relaxed in their efforts to promote its well-being
when their unarmed countrymen and soldiers had been surprised and
butchered by thousands.
Strange, and almost contradictory, as it may appear, there was a brief
respite during which things seemed to have got into their old groove of
happy prosperity; and the chief credit for this must be given to a
Mahomedan sub-governor of the Chinese viceroy. Zuhuruddin, such was his
name, had raised himself to the high post of Amban in Kashgar, a post
never before held by any other than a Khitay. By birth he was of
Kashgar, but he always represented himself as having been born and
brought up in Khokand, where he had been imprisoned for a political
offence. For seven or eight years he governed Kashgar to the perfect
satisfaction both of the people and of the Chinese, and among some of
his public acts may be mentioned the reconstruction of new forts outside
the cities, in the place of those destroyed in the recent revolts. These
were known now as Yangyshahr instead of Gulbagh. But in 1846
Zuhuruddin's rule was disturbed by hostilities on the part of Khokand
and the Khojas.
In 1845 Khudayar Khan had been called to the throne after the death of
Mahomed Ali, but his authority was not without its rivals. In the state
of confusion that then ensued, Khokandian adventurers urged the Khoja
princes, who were now represented by the sons of Jehangir, to renew
their old attacks against the Chinese. To these advisers the Khojas
turned a willing ear, and preparations were accordingly made for the
enterprise. At that time Khokand was full of adventurers to whom Mahomed
Ali had been able to give constant employment, but who now under the
more peaceful rule of Khudayar idled their time in the cities of that
khanate. Among these and the ever willing Kirghiz, it was not difficult
for the princes of Kashgar to raise an army, formidable in numbers, if
not remarkable for cohesion. At that time there were seven prominent
Khoja princes in Khokand, of whom we may here mention Eshan Khan,
usually called Katti Torah, Buzurg Khan, and Wali Khan. This inroad did
not take its name from any one of these, but from them all combined;
thus it was distinguished as Haft Khojagan, or that of the Seven Khojas.
With his brothers and relations and a considerable following, Katti
Torah advanced upon Kashgar, always the first object of these invaders,
which fell after a siege of thirteen days through treachery. This was
the only success they achieved; the other cities would have nothing to
do with them; and after two months' indulgence in unbridled licence the
Chinese beat them in a fight at Kok Robat, and drove them out of the
country. For the first time there was an air of ridicule thrown over
these Khoja invasions in the eyes of the Kashgari, while the outrages
they had committed during their brief stay had raised bitterer feelings
still. Zuhuruddin, who fell under the displeasure of the Chinese, was
removed from his post, and fresh Ambans, once more Khitay, were
appointed. For nine years the Khojas remained passive, but in 1855 Wali
Khan and his brother Kichik Khan, began to bustle once more on the
Kashgarian frontier. It was not until 1857 that Wali Khan succeeded in
forcing the advanced guard of pickets maintained in the passes by the
Chinese, but having accomplished that his triumph was rapid. Kashgar
fell into his possession by a _coup de main_, and once more a Khoja
prince was seated in the _orda_ at Kashgar. Artosh and Yangy Hissar fell
into his possession, and he threatened Yarkand. But everywhere the
Chinese garrisons remained unconquered in the forts, biding the
exhaustion of their foe and the arrival of reinforcements. After a rule
of nearly four months the armies of Wali Khan having been then defeated
by the Chinese, the Khoja fled to the remote state of Darwas, where he
was surrendered to Khokand by its chief Ismail Shah. This ruler, the
most tyrannical, bloodthirsty, and licentious of all the Khojas, met the
fate which he deserved long afterwards at the hands of Yakoob Beg. His
temporary tenure of power is still remembered with dread by the people,
who consider him to have been the most incarnate monster who ever held
the destinies of their country in his hand. The Chinese were more severe
in their punitive measures after this campaign than they had been after
any other, but, notwithstanding the part Khudayar and his people had
played in Wali Khan's affair, the old relations between "these
incompatible people," as Dr. Bellew aptly calls them, were restored.
After this event there was but one minor disturbance caused by an inroad
of Kirghiz nomads, headed by the sons of one of the principal victims of
Chinese vengeance, but this had no political importance.
The invasion of Wali Khan was the last of those Khoja expeditions which
took place prior to the Tungan revolt. In the thirty-two years that
elapsed from the date of Jehangir's attempt to that of his son, there
had in all been four of them. That of Jehangir himself being the first;
of his elder brother Yusuf, the second; of Yusuf's eldest son, Katti
Torah, the third; and of Jehangir's second son, Wali, the fourth. Not
one of these is in any sense noteworthy, except for the crimes with
which it was attended, and none of them did more than inflict an untold
amount of misery and suffering on their own followers, as well as on the
people they claimed to represent by right divine. It may also be noticed
that with each enterprise there was a decline in moral character. Thus
Jehangir was infinitely the best of them in every sense, and ruled
fairly according to his lights. His brother Yusuf was of a more timid
mind, but evidently not less imbued with some notion as to the sanctity
of his mission. But from these to Katti Torah is a long descent. That
prince seemed to aspire to securing his personal comfort and enjoyment
alone, and disregarded all his subjects' complaints at the arbitrary
rule of his deputies. But Wali Khan, the next of these Khoja kings from
"over the mountains," excelled his cousin in vice, and tyranny, and
utter want of purpose, not to speak of honour, quite as much as Katti
Torah surpassed their sires. Nor can there be much hesitation in saying,
from what Buzurg Khan did during the few months he held power, that, had
not Yakoob Beg clipped his flight, he would have surpassed Wali Khan in
his own peculiar vices. The reader will scarcely be disposed to take
much interest in this irredeemable family, mad with the insanity of
wickedness. But in justice to the Chinese, and to Yakoob Beg, it is only
right that the rivals of the former should be made to appear in their
true colours. All the sanctity that a peculiarly venerable descent from
Hazrat Afak could give; all the stories told of the good deeds of some
of their ancestors; all the affection that naturally attaches to a
native rule, and all the dislike that must undermine a foreign, be it
never so beneficent; all these things were destroyed by the weakness and
ill success that attended the first two Khojas, and by the cruelty,
indifference, and licentiousness that marked the last two. When Buzurg
Khan came he found loyalty to the Khoja the heirloom of a few families,
not of a people.
Had the Chinese restrained their vindictive feelings after the war with
Jehangir, and proclaimed a free pardon to every one save the Khokandis,
and then devoted their attention with the old vigour to peaceful
pursuits, we believe that the Chinese rule would have been permanently
secured. At that moment the Chinese were strong enough to have defied
Khokand, and to have broken off all intercourse with that state. By
dismissing the Aksakals, and severing the connection between the two
states, the Chinese would have dispelled a danger that was for forty
years to be ever before them, and, in the end, when the Tungani also
rose, was to overcome them. Even clemency after Yusuf's inroad, which
was really caused by the Chinese repressions, might not have been wholly
in vain, and would have consolidated their position, when reinvigorated
by Zuhuruddin's tenure of power. But the Chinese did not appreciate the
quality of mercy. They could be just and impartial in the ordinary
avocations of life, but to those who revolted against their authority
they showed no trace of human feeling. For a man to rebel against them
was certain death; for a people, history tells us, the fate was not far
different. Nor in dealing with such did they hesitate to supplement
their military strength by the most despicable of artifices. Garrisons,
accorded honourable terms, ruthlessly butchered; princes, who threw
themselves on their mercy, deported to Pekin to be hanged or tortured
out of life: these are frequent occurrences in the history of China, and
of her career in Central Asia the tale is identical. Yet, while drawing
a veil over these blots on an otherwise brilliant surface, should we not
desire to conceal them wholly from the view. It is necessary that they
should be stated to understand what Chinese domination means as a whole;
of its great benefits there can be no doubt, if the people will remain
quiescent. For fifty years, or for five hundred, China will rule an
unmurmuring people with justice, and lead them into the paths of
prosperity and peace; but if they rebel, if they openly defy authority,
if they invite a hostile stranger within their borders, the punishment
will be as sweeping, as cruel, and, in one and a higher sense, as
wrongfully foolish, whether the association of the races may have been
for fifty years or five centuries, as it was in the case of Kashgar.
There is not much reason for hoping that China will deviate from her
ancient custom, on the occasion now transpiring, of demanding "an eye
for an eye" and "a tooth for a tooth."
CHAPTER VI.
THE BIRTH OF YAKOOB BEG AND CAREER IN THE SERVICE OF KHOKAND.
We have now traced the history of Kashgar and of the neighbouring states
down to the year 1860, immediately before the last Khoja invasion under
Buzurg Khan, and the Kooshbege, Mahomed Yakoob. Before giving an account
of that enterprise it is necessary that the reader should know what the
past career of the future Athalik Ghazi had been. The previous chapters
have, it is hoped, thrown some light on the state of Central Asia, and
will assist the student of the question in comprehending how it was that
Yakoob Beg achieved success, and what claims he may have to be
considered a great ruler, for having done a work that is unique in the
annals of modern Asia.
Mahomed Yakoob was born in or about the year 1820, in the flourishing
little town of Piskent, in the khanate of Khokand. His father, Pur
Mahomed Mirza, had, at various periods of his life, filled positions of
responsibility in the government of the towns in which he resided. Thus,
a native of Dihbid, near Samarcand, he had migrated to Khodjent, in the
reign of Mahomed Ali Khan, with the intention of entering the priestly
order. There, although he enrolled himself as a student in a religious
seminary, for some reason or other, he appears to have changed his mind,
and, instead of entering the Church, turned his attention to secular
affairs. He was soon made Kazi of Kurama, a district and town of
Khokand, and married a lady of that place. By this marriage he had one
son, Mahomed Arif, who has since filled several posts of trust in
Kashgar, notably that of Governor of Sirikul; but of late this
half-brother of Yakoob Beg seems to have been, either for incompetence
or some other reason, under a cloud. Pur Mahomed, or Mahomed Latif, as
he was more usually called, changed his residence from Kurama to
Piskent, about the year 1818, and he shortly after his settlement in his
new abode married again, his second wife being the sister of Sheik
Nizamuddin, the Kazi of Piskent. Yakoob Beg was the issue of this
marriage. The family of Yakoob Beg's father seems originally to have
come from Karategin, on the borders of Badakshan, but in the time of the
Usbeg conquest of that district the father of Mahomed Latif, then an
infant, took refuge in Khokand. It is uncertain whether Mahomed Latif
was born before their arrival at Dihbid or afterwards; and it is now
asserted that he claimed descent from Tamerlane. Whether this was a
claim brought forward when his son was advancing in the world or not, it
is impossible to test its accuracy. The parents of Yakoob Beg were
therefore not without some pretensions, and it would seem that the bad
fortune, from which for some generations they had been suffering, was
beginning to disappear before the ability of Yakoob Beg raised it to a
higher point than ever. In addition to the claims of his father and
grandfather as Kazis of an important community, a sister of Yakoob Beg
married Nar Mahomed Khan, Governor of Tashkent; and, as we shall see
later on, this connection was very instrumental in promoting the
interests of the youthful Yakoob.
Piskent, Pskent, or Bis-kent, as it is sometimes spelt, is still a
flourishing little community, fifty miles south of Tashkent, on the road
to Khodjent. Its inhabitants are a thrifty, good-tempered set of people,
who take great pride in the fact that the great Athalik Ghazi, the
supporter of Islam, and the reputed terror of the Russians, was one of
themselves. In this little settlement there are many Tajiks, and this,
doubtless, with other reasons, induced Mahomed Latif, a Tajik himself,
to take up his abode there. To the east of Piskent the mountains begin
to rise, which stretch onward until they become the Tian Shan and the
Kizilyart ranges, and in these elevated regions the Tajik descendants
muster in strong numbers. The Tajiks are Persian in their origin, and
consequently of the Aryan stock, in contradistinction to the Turk or
Tartar ruling class in Western Turkestan. They have, however, for so
many generations been restricted to a limited career in the organization
of the state, that, quite unjustly as it is, they have come to be
regarded as an inferior race. English writers have fallen into this
mistake, and have accepted as correct the definition given by the Turks
of this subject race. As a matter of fact the contrary holds true, and
the Tajik is superior to any of his masters in point of mental capacity.
They are represented to still retain the fine presence and long flowing
beards which distinguish those of Aryan blood from their Tartar
opposite; and in height and strength they quite eclipse every other race
of Central Asia. It was of this race that Yakoob Beg was the
representative, and, although the greater part of his life was passed in
ruling nations almost exclusively Tartar, some of the more prominent
among his supporters, as well as the flower of his army, boasted that
they, too, represented that master race, whose birth-place was to be
found in the Indian Caucasus. The Tajiks still speak a Persian dialect,
and their Iranian origin is thereby rendered almost indisputable.
Mahomed Yakoob's early years were passed at his home at Piskent, and it
is said that it was intended that he should follow the profession which
his father had repudiated. As a youth he was too wayward to submit to
any check on his impulses, and the design of educating him as a
"mollah," if it was ever seriously entertained, was abandoned long
before he arrived at man's estate. He appears to have passed the first
twenty years of his life in an idle, uneventful manner at Piskent, and
then suddenly to have resolved to seek his fortune as best he might in
the troubled waters of Khokandian politics. In 1845, we find him in the
train of the newly seated khan, Khudayar, as "mahram," or chamberlain,
and shortly afterwards, by the influence of his brother-in-law, the
Governor of Tashkent, nominated a Pansad Bashi, a commander of 500. This
was in 1847, about which year he married a Kipchak lady of Zuelik, a
village in the district of Ak Musjid. He had three sons, of whom we
shall hear more hereafter, by this marriage--Kooda Kul Beg, Kuli Beg,
and Hacc Kuli Beg. Later on, in the year 1847, he was raised to the rank
of Koosh-Bege, or "lord of the family"--more intelligibly described as
vizier--and entrusted with the charge of the important post on the Syr
Darya, called Ak Musjid, "White Mosque." This post he held with credit
for six years, until 1853, when the Russians commenced that forward
movement, of which we have not yet seen the close. At that time, Russia
had not acquired one of the numerous strategic points now in her
possession. The Syr Darya then was as far off from her frontier as the
Oxus is now. Ak Musjid, built in the lower reaches of the river, and
representing a Khokandian outpost of exceptional importance, was the
grand obstacle in the path of the Russians operating from Kazalinsk, at
the mouth of the Syr Darya. It was resolved, therefore, that this post,
which, doubtless, encouraged all the marauders in the neighbourhood to
continue their depredations against the Russian caravans, should be
wrested from the hands of its owners, and either razed to the ground or
converted into a Russian stronghold. General Perovsky was entrusted with
this undertaking. The distance from Kazalinsk, or Fort No. 1, to Ak
Musjid is not much over 200 miles, along the banks of the Syr Darya. Not
many commissariat arrangements were necessary, nor did the distance to
march require much time to delay the Russian officer in beginning his
operations against the fort. The army with which he appeared before the
walls may not have been large in numbers when compared with the armies
of modern times, but, in all that makes a disciplined force formidable,
it was exceptionally well supplied. The artillery was in greater
strength than is usually considered necessary, and the expedition was
still more efficient in engineers and cavalry. The garrison of Ak Musjid
was, on the other hand, ill supplied, both in provisions and in
ammunition, and the fort itself presented, neither in its position nor
in its construction, any feature that an engineer officer would have
considered calculated to make it capable of sustaining the attack of
artillery for twenty-four hours. The Russian lines were constructed in
the most approved method; but twice were their approaches destroyed, and
twice their mines counter-mined. During twenty-six days the Russian
bombardment was fast and furious, and during all that time the
Khokandian defence was stubborn and persistent. But all the efforts of
the garrison to break through the beleaguering lines were unavailing,
and after so long a cannonade little more resistance could be expected
from ramparts which were pierced in several places by wide and gaping
breaches. The resolute commandant, who had done everything required by
the most exacting code of military honour, confessed that there was
nothing to be gained by a continued defence, and as it was known that
the Russians were making preparations for an early assault, a messenger
was despatched without delay to the Russian commander, expressing the
willingness of the garrison to capitulate on honourable terms. General
Perovsky, who had expected an easy triumph here, and possibly some more
extended triumph in farther regions, was indignant at the resistance
opposed to him by a paltry place like Ak Musjid, and received the
messenger from the fort with ill-concealed impatience. Scarcely
bestowing any attention on the letter, couched in humble terms as it
was, of the commandant, General Perovsky petrified the astonished
emissary with the declaration that on the morrow the fort would be taken
by assault. This arbitrary assertion of his power, which was carried
into practice, of course successfully, the next day, on an occasion when
magnanimity ought to have been shown by the successful general, does not
redound to the credit of the officer in question, and throws an
instructive light on the latitude left to Russian generals in their
instructions, and on the opinion felt for Central Asiatics by the
civilizing representatives of the White Czar. To say that General
Perovsky was urged to this act of gratuitous tyranny by a desire to
obtain a cross of either St. Anne or St. George, is, after all, only to
magnify the offence, and that Ak Musjid has taken the name of its
conqueror, Fort Perovsky, is the means of perpetuating, not his fame,
but his infamy, and the courageous conduct of the defenders. In the
winter following its fall Yakoob Beg, with Sahib Khan, brother of the
Khan of Khokand, attempted to retake the fort, but the _coup_ proved
abortive, and the Russians have never receded from their new
acquisition.
Khudayar Khan had been elevated to the throne of Khokand in 1845, by the
energy of Mussulman Kuli, a Kipchak chief, of singular astuteness, and
aptitude for business. During his tenure of the post of Wazir, Khokand
was peacefully and beneficently governed; but, as on every similar
occasion in Central Asia, the ruler soon became jealous of the
popularity acquired by his minister, although his own position was in
reality confirmed by the wise measures of the very man to whom he had
conceived a covert hostility. So with Khudayar Khan, the effeminate, and
his minister, Mussulman Kuli, in the decade of which we are now
speaking; as with Buzurg Khan, the debauchee, but correct representative
of the Khojas, and his general and vizier, the Kooshbege, Mahomed
Yakoob, in the following. In 1858, Mussulman Kuli was seized by order of
Khudayar Khan, and barbarously murdered; and from that occurrence the
decadence of this unfortunate ruler of Khokand can be traced until, at
last, he became a mere pensioner on the bounty of the Russians. Although
Yakoob Beg became, to a certain extent, notorious for his gallant
defence of Ak Musjid, it would appear, from his being styled after that
event simply "Mir," or chief, that he had sunk in grade in his official
status. It is probable that the chief cause of this was his failure to
retake it, and not his ill success in defending it. He was, however,
entrusted with the charge of the Kilaochi fort, a post which he held
down to the murder of Mussulman Kuli.
Khudayar Khan had an elder brother, Mullah Khan, who had been passed
over by Mussulman Kuli, when the state was put in order after the
dissensions that arose on the death of the great ruler, Mahomed Ali.
Now, on the death of Mussulman Kuli, who had given vitality to the
régime of Khudayar, Mullah Khan and his partisans began to intrigue once
more. Several Kipchak and Kirghiz leaders joined his cause, and Yakoob
Beg at once became one of his most active supporters. Khudayar Khan was
deposed, and retired into temporary seclusion. For his services to the
new ruler Yakoob Beg was made Shahawal, an officer corresponding to a
chamberlain or court intendant. He was soon restored to his old rank of
Kooshbege, and appointed governor of the frontier fort of Kurama, the
same place of which his father had been Kazi. And in 1860 he came still
more to the front, when he was summoned to Tashkent to assist Kanaát
Shah, the Nahib of Khokand, in making preparations in case the Russians,
who had for some time seemed to be threatening Khokand, should cross the
frontier. Mullah Khan was murdered at this time, having held the reins
of power but for the brief space of two years, and Khudayar Khan emerged
from his hiding place. He was welcomed both by Kanaát Shah and Yakoob
Beg; and in return for their support he consented to forget the past.
Yakoob Beg, as his reward, received the governorship of Kurama. It was
during these troubles that Alim Kuli, a Kirghiz chieftain, appeared upon
the scene. He possessed many of the attributes that distinguished his
predecessor Mussulman Kuli, and his successor, in the eyes of the
people, Yakoob Beg. He had undoubtedly a great capacity for intrigue,
but was inferior to the former in administrative capacity, and to the
latter in military skill. He now set Shah Murad, grandson of Shere Ali
Khan, up as a claimant to the throne, and was speedily joined by Yakoob
Beg, who once more abandoned the cause of Khudayar Khan, who, it must be
remembered, had always treated Yakoob Beg in a friendly way, and who in
their early days had been his boon companion. This conspiracy was
unsuccessful, and Yakoob Beg, who had yielded up Khodjent, with the
defence of which he had been entrusted by Alim Kuli, on the approach of
the forces of Khudayar Khan, took refuge in Bokhara. Here he was
favourably received, and resided as a noble attached to the court. In
1863 the Ameer of Bokhara, Muzaffur Eddin, marched a large army into
Khokand for the purpose of restoring his brother-in-law, Khudayar, to
the throne, for he had again been deposed by the intrigues of Alim Kuli;
Yakoob Beg accompanied this force, and once more appears, for the last
time, on the troubled arena of Khokandian politics. The Bokhariot army
was soon recalled, and Khudayar Khan was left to face the difficulties
of his position unaided. In a few months an arrangement was come to
between Alim Kuli and Yakoob Beg and other leading nobles against
Khudayar. Sultan Murad, who had first been supported and then murdered
by Alim Kuli, having been thus effectually removed, this king-maker had
set up Sultan Seyyid in his place. Yakoob Beg so far profited by this
new confederacy that he was restored to his old offices and
perquisites, and sent once more to hold his former post as governor of
Kurama. He collected as many allies as he was able, and brought them
with him to assist in the capture of Khodjent. On this important town
being secured the regent Alim Kuli passed through Kurama on his way to
seize and settle the capital, Tashkent. He appointed a connection of his
own, Hydar Kuli, with the title of Hudaychi, as governor of Kurama, and
took Yakoob Beg in his train to Tashkent. Shortly after their arrival at
Tashkent, news came of the Russian occupation of Tchimkent, and the
survivors of the force driven out by Tchernaief soon appeared with a
confirmation of the intelligence. This was in April, 1864, and until
October of that year, when the Russians appeared before the town, Yakoob
Beg was engaged in strengthening the fortifications of the capital. When
the army of General Tchernaief did appear in the neighbourhood, Yakoob
Beg, with a rashness that cannot be too strongly condemned, went forth
to encounter it in the open. As might have been expected, the Russians
were victorious, and Yakoob Beg was compelled to seek refuge with his
shattered forces within the walls of Tashkent. The Russians themselves
had suffered some loss, and either awed by the bold demeanour of their
old antagonist, or, as is more probable, encountering some difficulty in
bringing up supplies, and being unprovided with a siege train, thought
the more prudent policy would be to retire to Tchimkent until
reinforcements and other necessaries should arrive. Alim Kuli, in the
course of a few days after this reverse, arrived at Tashkent in person
with a large body of troops, and employed all his energies in
strengthening the defences before the return of the Russians. It is very
certain that on this occasion, the first on which Yakoob Beg had a
command of any consequence, he permitted his natural impetuosity to get
the better of his discretion, and that it was the height of madness on
his part to enter into an engagement in the open with the disciplined
and formidable forces of Tchernaief, when, by leaving that general to
undertake the siege of Tashkent, he might have had it in his power to
inflict a serious, and for the time conclusive, blow against the
Russians when the reinforcing army of Alim Kuli came up. With half his
army discouraged by defeat, Alim Kuli found himself restricted to a
policy of inaction, through the over-hastiness of his lieutenant. The
Russians did not return until after the departure of Yakoob Beg for
Kashgar, but when they did they found that Alim Kuli had made every
preparation in his power to receive them. On the first occasion they
were again forced to retreat after a skirmish which the Khokandians
claim as a victory; but in 1865 they appeared before the walls in
greater force. Alim Kuli, with a gathering vastly superior in numbers to
the Russians, attacked them a few miles to the north of Tashkent, and
the fortunes of the day hung in the balance, until the fall of Alim
Kuli, who, whilst boldly leading a charge of Kirghiz cavalry, was
pierced in the chest by a musket ball. He was carried from the field by
a faithful officer, and expired that night in Tashkent. Alim Kuli
appears to have been actuated to some extent by a disinterested
patriotism, as much as by more personal motives. With his fall, and the
departure of Yakoob Beg for another sphere of operations, all hope of a
continued state of independence for Khokand was dissipated. After this
severe defeat the Russians laid close siege to Tashkent. The Khokandians
in their distress applied to Bokhara for aid, and the Russians hastened
to occupy Chinaz to intercept it. The Bokhariot army was routed by the
Russian army under General Romanoffski at the battle of Irjar, in May,
1866, eleven months after Tashkent had been occupied by Tchernaief. It
was during this period of anarchy, with a hostile Russian and an allied
Bokhariot force on his soil, that Khudayar Khan once more supplanted the
nominee of Alim Kuli, Sultan Seyyid, and at the close of the campaign
Khudayar was left in possession of the southern portion of Khokand. This
Khan appears to have been of an unambitious nature, for, during his
various exiles, he devoted himself to private business with an energy he
had never shown in the management of the public affairs, and when he at
last sank into private life and became a pensioner of the Russian Court,
on the complete annexation of his state, he is said to have acquired not
only a happiness, but many virtues unknown to him in his more elevated
lot. The unfortunate Sultan Seyyid, after wandering for some years out
of Khokand, was, when he ventured to return in 1871, executed. Many of
the partisans of Seyyid on the defeat by the Russians, and on the
overthrow of his rivals by Khudayar, sought refuge in the mountains of
the Kizilyart, whence they proceeded to join Yakoob Beg in Kashgar,
where they arrived at a most opportune moment as will be seen.
To return to Yakoob Beg. After his defeat before Tashkent he was
employed under Alim Kuli in repairing the defences of that town and
collecting troops from the whole district, but his reputation had been
lowered by that reverse. There was a certain jealousy between the
Kirghiz chief and the Tajik soldier of fortune. Yakoob Beg saw in Alim
Kuli an obstacle to his further promotion, and Alim Kuli recognized in
the Kooshbege a possible rival and successor. Any excuse therefore to
keep Yakoob Beg in the background, or indeed to get rid of him
altogether, would be very welcome to Alim Kuli. We hear little more of
the unsuccessful general until his departure for Kashgar a few months
afterwards. He had to wipe out in other regions and against other foes
the stain he had incurred in his encounters with the Russians.
While these events were in progress at Tashkent, an envoy arrived there
from Sadic Beg, a Kirghiz prince on the frontiers of Ili and Kashgar. He
brought intelligence that his master had availed himself of the
dissensions among the Chinese, to seize the city of Kashgar, and he
requested the Khan of Khokand to send him the heir of the Khojas, in
order that he might place him on the throne. As the facts really stood,
Sadic Beg had only laid siege to Kashgar, and, finding that he was met
with a strenuous resistance, had recourse to the plan of setting up a
Khoja king to strengthen his failing efforts, but of the true state of
affairs in Kashgar it is evident that everybody in Tashkent was
primarily ignorant. The Khokandian policy had always been, however, to
maintain their interests intact in Eastern Turkestan, and to weaken in
every possible way the credit of the Chinese. An envoy bringing news of
a fresh revolt in Kashgar was, therefore, sure of a friendly reception
at Tashkent, even if he did not return with some more striking tokens of
amity. But on this occasion the danger from Russian movements was so
close at hand, and all the efforts of the state were so concentrated in
preparations for defence, that Alim Kuli, whatever he may have thought
of its prospects, and however much he may have sympathized with its
object, was unable to give the Kirghiz emissary any aid in his
enterprise. When, however, Buzurg Khan, the only surviving son of
Jehangir Khan, either of his own free will, or instigated, as some say,
by Yakoob Beg, offered to assert his claims on Kashgar, Alim Kuli
expressed his approval of the design, and gave his moral assistance so
far as was compatible with no active participation therein. He, however,
gave Buzurg Khan the services of Kooshbege Mahomed Yakoob to act as his
commander-in-chief, or Baturbashi. Thus did Alim Kuli free himself from
his troublesome subordinate, and despatched on an errand which seemed
likely to end in disgrace and defeat, but which really led to empire,
the only native whom he dreaded as being capable of supplanting him.
Yakoob Beg had up to this point given little promise of future
distinction. He had, indeed, earned the reputation of being a gallant
soldier, if a not very prudent one; and in the intrigues that had marked
the history of his state for twenty years, he had borne his fair share.
But no one would have dreamt of prognosticating that he possessed the
ability necessary to win campaigns against superior forces, and then to
erect a powerful state on the ruins that fell into his possession. The
most favourable opinion would have been, that he would have died
manfully as a soldier, and as a true Mussulman. When he embarked in the
enterprise of conquering Kashgar, he was no longer in the first flush of
youth, but was a man who covered his fiery spirit and great ambition
with a cloak of religious zeal and diplomatic apathy. Twenty years'
experience in the most intriguing court in Central Asia had placed every
muscle at his complete command, and even in the most disastrous moments
in his career, he is always represented as being calm and
collected--calm in his belief in Kismut, and collected in a persuasion
of his own resources. One fact that will account for the slowness with
which he advanced into notoriety is that he was entirely dependent on
his own capacity for promotion. He had no wealth, no large following,
and in the two leaders, Kipchak and Kirghiz, Mussulman and Alim Kuli, he
had competitors of almost equal merit with himself, while they each
possessed personal power and family connections that placed them far
beyond the reach of the hardy soldier and court chamberlain. Some of his
detractors had availed themselves of his impecuniosity to circulate
stories of his having had dealings with the Russians; but these,
although invested with circumstances originating in non-Russian
quarters, are probably without any truth. The chief charge, to be taken
for what it is worth, is, that the weakness of his defence of the Ak
Musjid district, after the fall of the fort, was owing to his having
received a large bribe from the Russians. Another is, that in 1863,
after his return from Bokhara, he neglected to retard the Russian
movements for a pecuniary consideration. In both cases the sum mentioned
is very large; and besides the apparent falseness of these rumours, we
have only to consider that he was not worth a bribe, and that his
opposition to the Russians was marked by all the want of foresight of
religious zeal. All these considerations make such rumours appear in
their true light; and although we are aware that a follower of Yakoob
Beg confirmed, if he did not originate, these charges, it seems to us
that the Russians, if there had been truth in the report, would long ago
have placed the fact before the peoples of Asia, and required Yakoob Beg
when Ameer of Kashgar to have acted in a more friendly way towards his
former employers. But the simple reason that Yakoob Beg could not have
rendered any service to the Russians worth the thousands of pounds he is
said to have received, ought to demolish the whole fabrication. If
Yakoob Beg's life proves one thing more than another, it was that he was
a most fanatical Mussulman, and as such hating the Russians, as the most
formidable enemy of Islam, with the most intense hate his fiery nature
was capable of. This man's whole life must have been the greatest
hypocrisy if he was not genuine in his religious intolerance, and that
intolerance rendered any connivance with Russian measures an
impossibility. Owing to his early connection with the church, and his
maternal grandfather's high position therein, Yakoob Beg was always
distinguished for the strict orthodoxy of his views. Through all his
life he seems to have made it his chief object to keep the church on his
side. When he was reduced to the most desperate straits in his after
life in Kashgar, when some of the most faithful of his followers fell
off from him, and when even Buzurg Khan, the man whom he had placed upon
a throne, declared him a rebel and a traitor, he never lost heart so
long as the ministers of the church held by him; and, on the other
hand, they, recognizing the fidelity of their champion, supported him
through good and ill repute. Whilst residing at Bokhara "the holy" he
had attached to his person several of the most distinguished preachers
of Islam throughout Asia, and he had taken all the vows that give a
peculiar sanctity to the relations that connect the layman with his
priest. It was here that he publicly announced his intention of going on
pilgrimage to Mecca; an intention which he repeated on several occasions
during his rule of Kashgar, but was obliged, by the position and
precarious existence of that state, always to perform by deputy. When he
had established himself as ruler, his first measure was to re-enforce
the Shariàt and to endow several shrines that had been erected to the
memory of the chief Khoja saints. It was by such means that he at every
crisis of his life had striven to make his interests identical with
those of his religion, and when he became a responsible and successful
prince his past life stood him in such good stead, that he easily came
to be regarded throughout Asia as the most faithful and redoubtable
supporter of Islam.
At this period of his life he is described by one who knew him as being
of a short but stoutish build, with a keenly intelligent and handsome
countenance. He had, during the vicissitudes of his career in Khokand,
been so often near assassination, or execution, that the result of the
morrow had, to all external appearance, become a matter of secondary
consideration to him, and his features, schooled to immobility by a long
career of court intrigue, appeared to the casual observer dull and
uninteresting. When, however, the conversation turned on subjects that
specially interested him, such as the advance of Russia, the future of
Islam, or the policy of England, he threw aside his mask, and became at
once a man whose views, with some merit in themselves, were rendered
almost convincing by the singular charm of his voice and manner. He was
honourably distinguished at all times by the simplicity of his dress,
and his freedom from the pretension and love of show characteristic of
most Asiatics; and at the very highest point of his power he was only a
soldier, occupying a palace. As was well said of Timour, the Athalik
Ghazi placed the "foot of courage in the stirrup of patience," and he
evidently set himself to copy the great lessons of military success that
might be learnt from the careers of Genghis Khan, Timour, and Baber.
Such is some account of the commander-in-chief to the expedition of
Buzurg Khan. The Khoja, himself, was a man about the same age as his
lieutenant, but in every other respect as different as he well could be.
Personally a coward, fond of show and every kind of luxury, and of the
treacherous, fickle nature that marked his race, he had done nothing
during his past life to compensate for the want of the most ordinary
virtues. Although he participated in the expedition of Wali Khan, he
showed no possession of merit, and in the subsequent occupation that the
Khojas maintained in Kashgar during a few weeks, he, perhaps more than
any other of his kinsmen, disgusted the people by his open and unbridled
licentiousness. Such were the two men who, in the latter days of 1864,
set out from Tashkent for the recovery of a kingdom. Of their chances of
success few would have ventured then to predict a settlement in their
favour; none, certainly, such as was obtained by Yakoob Beg. It is now
time for us to relate how they fared in Eastern Turkestan.
CHAPTER VII.
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR BY BUZURG KHAN AND YAKOOB BEG.
The Chinese were on several occasions, as we have seen, threatened in
Eastern Turkestan by the pretensions of the Khojas, and the secret or
open machinations of Khokand. But they had at all times triumphed over
every combination of circumstances, so long as they themselves were
united. The temporary success of Jehangir Khan was obliterated by the
excesses which characterized his occupation of the country, and by the
energy and large display of force, with which the Chinese pacified the
state on his flight; and the last, under Wali Khan, can scarcely be
dignified by any other appellation than that of a marauding incursion.
But a great and important change had occurred in the few years that had
elapsed since 1859. The Chinese no longer presented a collected force to
the onslaught of an assailant. In every quarter of their empire,
victorious rebels had established themselves, and had detracted in an
immeasurable degree from the effective strength of the Government. A
Mahomedan ruler swayed over the Panthays, in Yunnan, from his capital at
Ta-li-foo; the Taepings round Nankin were at the summit of their career,
just before the appearance of Colonel Gordon, when, in 1862, a fresh
danger broke out in the provinces of Kansuh and Shensi. From a remote
period there had been extensive Mussulman settlements in these
provinces, and so early as the seventeenth century they had been the
cause of trouble to the great Kanghi. The Emperor Keen-Lung, indeed, at
one time attempted to settle the question for ever by ordering the
massacre of every Mahomedan over fifteen years of age. Even this
sweeping measure did not have the desired effect, and whether
persecution was the means or not of giving vitality to the cause, it is
certain that they had become more numerous, more resolute, and more
confident in their own superiority to the other Chinese by the middle of
the present century. These Mahomedans were known as Tungani, Dungani, or
Dungans, while the Buddhist Chinese are spoken of as Khitay. Many
writers are not satisfied with this simple explanation of the name
Tungani, and will have it that they were a distinct race, who were
either transported to China at some period of Chinese conquest, or were
compelled to seek refuge there by some advancing barbarian horde. They
even assert that they can trace the name and origin of this people to a
tribe dwelling in the country of the lower waters of the Amoor; but
while there is complete uncertainty on the subject it seems simpler to
accept the signification that the word Tungani conveys to the Chinese,
and that is Mahomedan. We know, for certain, that these people had
resided in Kansuh and its neighbouring province for centuries--that they
were remarkable for a superiority in strength and activity over the
Khitay, and that they possessed the virtues of sobriety and honesty.
They were also not infected by the disease of opium smoking, and we
should imagine them to have been a quiet, contented, and agreeable
people at their most prosperous period. Their physical superiority to
the Khitay would probably be owing to their abstention from "bang" and
opium, and we need not suppose that they were the descendants of a
stronger race, who had issued from the frigid north, when we have an
explanation so much simpler and more natural at hand. They were found by
their Khitay rulers to form excellent soldiers, policemen, and other
Government servants, such as carriers, &c. In this last employment many
found their way to Hamil, thence to Turfan and Urumtsi, and their
numbers were increased by discharged soldiers, who remained as military
settlers sooner than return to Kansuh. In the course of a few
generations their numbers became much greater, until, at last, in the
cities we have named, they formed the majority of the inhabitants. In
Kuldja, too, they were very numerous, but south of the Tian Shan they do
not seem to have advanced westward of Kucha in any great force. At Aksu
the Andijan influence, supreme in Western Kashgar, presented an
impassable barrier to the Tungani, who, it must be remembered, had no
sympathy with Khokand. The Tungani were, therefore, Mahomedan subjects
of China, originating in Kansuh, but who had also, in the course of
time, spread westward into Chinese Turkestan and Jungaria. They were
employed in the service of the country without restriction, nor can we
find that they were subjected to any unfair usage, after the measures
taken against them in the earlier days of Keen-Lung. They may not have
been as highly favoured as the Sobo tribes, and they may have been
subjected to some ridicule in Kansuh; but in Jungaria they were on an
equality with all the other Chinese, and immeasurably better placed in
the political scale than the Andijanis or Tarantchis. The Chinese had
just grounds for believing that no danger to their rule in Eastern
Turkestan or Jungaria would ever be caused by the Tungani, and it is not
easy to explain how their reasonable anticipations were falsified. The
Tungani were fervent, if not the most orthodox in form of, Mahomedans,
and it would appear that they were not free from a belief in their own
superiority to the Khitay. This feeling was fostered by the "mollahs,"
or priests, who became very active within the Chinese dominions, when
these had been extended by conquest into the heart of Asia. As if in
retaliation for a Khitay conquest the Mahomedan religion was undermining
the outworks of its rival's power slowly, but surely. The impulse given
to trade by the security and patronage that accompanied Chinese rule
was, at least from a purely Chinese point of view, neutralized as an
advantage by the admission into the empire of energetic and eloquent
preachers of the superior merits of Mahomedanism. It required many
generations before the effect of their efforts became perceptible, and
it was not until the power of China fell into an extraordinary
decline--a decline which many thought, with some show of reason, was to
herald the fall, but which later events have seemed to make but the
prelude to a more vigorous life than ever--that these Mahomedan
missionaries among the Tungani knew that the time to reap what they had
sown with patience and persistency was at hand. It is impossible not to
connect this event in some degree with that unaccountable revival of
fanaticism among Mahomedans, which has produced so many important events
during the last thirty years, and of which we are now witnessing some of
the most striking results.
In 1862, a riot occurred in a small village of Kansuh; it was suppressed
with some loss of life, and people were beginning to suppose that it
possessed no significance, when a disturbance broke out on a large scale
at Houchow, or Salara. The Tungani had risen, and the unfortunate
unarmed Khitay were massacred right and left. The rising soon assumed
the proportions of a civil war, and the infection spread to the
neighbouring province of Shensi. Then ensued scenes of the most
atrocious barbarity. The Khitay, who all their lives had lived at peace
and as neighbours with the Tungani, were butchered without mercy. The
Mahomedan priests seized all the governing power into their own hands,
and set their followers the example of unscrupulous ferocity. The
movement, even if we make allowance for the difficulties besetting the
government in other regions, must be considered to have been attended by
unexpected success. It can only be accounted for by the supposition that
the Khitay were taken completely by surprise, and realized neither the
extent nor the nature of the danger to which they were exposed. Before
the end of 1862, a Tungan government was established in Kansuh, and its
jurisdiction was for a time acknowledged in Shensi. The priests formed
an administration amongst themselves, and set themselves to the task of
consolidating what they had won, and of preparing for the time when the
Chinese should come for vengeance. The events happening in Kansuh were
naturally of interest to the Tungani in the country lying beyond it, and
it was not long before the example set them was followed in Hamil,
Turfan, Urumtsi, Manas, and other cities of that district. The same
success attended the movement here as in Kansuh. The Chinese power was
subverted, the Khitay massacred with greater circumstances of cruelty,
if possible, and a new Tungan state was formed in those cities. Each
district retained a nominal independence, under the headship of a
priest, or body of priests, or of one of the native Tungan princes, and
then the movement spread with irresistible strides to Karashar, Kucha,
and Aksu. There it stopped, and south of the Tian Shan the Tungan revolt
proper never extended west of Aksu.
In Altyshahr and Kuldja for some months longer the Chinese maintained
the external show of power, but all their communications with China were
cut off, and neither in numbers nor resources had they sufficient means
to cope with the Tungani unaided. They would have accomplished as much
as could have been expected from them if they succeeded in keeping
possession of that which they still occupied. The Tungan element in
Kucha and Aksu was not predominant. It had to share power with the
Khojas, and, as we shall see later on, the Khojas of these two cities
seized the governing power for themselves. It was the appearance of the
Tungan sedition in these cities, which occupy a middle relation to the
purely Chinese cities of Hamil and Urumtsi, and the almost totally
Khokandian cities of Yarkand and Kashgar, that roused the Kashgari to a
full appreciation of the importance to themselves of this movement, and
the Chinese garrisons and settlers to an equally just realization of
their own danger. The Kashgari, not free from the fanaticism of all
their co-religionists, and naturally elated at the successes of the
Tungani, forgot, with their well proved fickleness, all the benefits
they had received from the Chinese, and waited eagerly for a favourable
opportunity to come for them to imitate the example set them by their
eastern neighbours. Nor had they long to wait, although it was not from
them that came the first spark that lighted the firebrand of civil war
and anarchy throughout the length and breadth of Altyshahr.
It will be remembered that the Khokandian government had the right to
nominate in each city, where they received dues on Mahomedan
merchandise, an agent or tax-collector to look after the proper levy of
the tax. In some of the larger cities this official would require a
considerable staff of assistants, and thus a certain number of skilled
Khokandian officials were permanently located on Kashgarian or Chinese
territory. After the failure of the expedition of Wali Khan, in which
these officials seem to have disappeared, either having become merged in
the body of his partisans or sacrificed during the massacres of that
time, a fresh batch of Khokandians was installed, and occupied, in a
legal sense, the same position as their predecessors. It would appear,
however, that the natural result of their aid to Wali Khan followed, and
that the Chinese Ambans regarded their presence with scarcely concealed
dislike, and proclaimed that these Khokandian tax-gatherers were
devoting more of their attention to the propagation of heretical
religious and political doctrines than to the collection of dues on silk
and other articles of commerce. It would require but the slightest
untoward circumstance to fan this ill-feeling into the most insatiate
hatred and hostility. The danger was rendered the more serious when the
Chinese Ambans perceived for the first time that the sympathies of a
large portion of their Tungan soldiery were estranged from them. It was
doubtful whether the Tungan regiments could be relied on against a fresh
Khoja revolt, and it was certain that they would not combine in any
repression of the Mahomedan religion, even though the sufferers should
only be Andijanis. Such was the state of the public mind in Altyshahr in
1862, when the Tungani revolted and obtained success in Kansuh and
Shensi.
As early as 1859 the hostility of the Chinese Ambans to the Andijani
tax-collectors received a forcible illustration in the town of Yarkand.
At that time Afridun Wang was governor, and, whether there was any
personal enmity at the root of the action or not, he found little
difficulty in convincing both himself and the other Chinese residents
that the Andijani agent had been stirring up discontent against them in
the town. Accordingly, as self-preservation is the first law of nature,
this Khokandian official, with his attendant, was arrested and executed.
There may have been some foundation for the accusations made by Afridun
Wang against his rival: more probably there was none; but on referring
the matter to the Viceroy of Ili for decision it was decided that the
governor should be removed. The Khokandian government sent fresh agents,
and it is not stated that any reparation was given to the families of
the sufferers. From this it would appear that the post of tax-collector
in Altyshahr for His Highness the Khan of Khokand was not a very
desirable position. Afridun Wang retired to his native town of Turfan,
where, three years later on, he contributed more than any one else to
the success of the Tungan movement. His policy, if anti-Khokandian, was
pro-Mahomedan or Tungan, and his case is very typical of the nature of
this rising. In Turfan he continued to be one of the chief men, until,
six years later on, it fell to the Athalik Ghazi.
His successor in the governorship of Yarkand did not interfere with the
Khokandian officials, but for this moderation he made up by the
exactions he committed on the residents, more particularly on the
Mahomedan portion of them. His extortions and cruelties had the effect
as much of disgusting his own followers as of rousing a spirit of
opposition among the oppressed. It was while things were in this
uncertain state at Yarkand that the governor received secret notice of
the Tungan revolt in Kansuh, and he at once perceived that, when this
important intelligence became known, not only would his own Tungan
troops become more openly mutinous, but that the Khojas might seize the
opportunity to assert their claim to the country once more. In this
special case, in addition to the general apprehension that would be felt
by any Chinese governor at the aspect of affairs, there was personal
fear for the unjustifiable acts of his government, and the Amban, in his
trepidation, resolved on the most strenuous precautions to avert the
danger from himself. He summoned a council of war of his Buddhist
lieutenants, and stated the exact position to them; how the Tungan
portion of their forces could not be depended on; how the Tungan
settlers would join them; and how the Andijani agents would do their
utmost to unite in one cause against themselves all those who followed
the teaching of Islam; and how all these events, which before were
possible, had been rendered probable by the Tungan successes in the
east. He dwelt on the fact that no time was to be lost in the execution
of such precautions as they thought necessary; that at any moment the
news might arrive, and then they would be in a minority; and he did not
attempt to conceal the purport of his address--that he was in favour of
sharp measures, of going to the root of the evil at once, and of
massacring every Mussulman in the town. The council of war was not
prepared to endorse such a violent proceeding without careful
consideration. There were many dissentients, and the meeting was
adjourned. It reassembled, and, on this occasion, although the
supporters of more moderate measures had decreased, it adjourned once
more before deciding. The danger evidently appeared more appalling to
the governor than to his subordinates; perhaps also there was some
personal dislike for their chief even among his Khitay following. At the
second meeting they seemed, indeed, more willing to acquiesce in his
proposed strong measures, and this may have been caused by their
observation of the state of public opinion in the interval. But even
then no final decision could be arrived at, and the Khitay never had a
chance after that of making any defence in Yarkand. The Tungan troops
were not long in hearing, through their chief officer, Mah Dalay, that
there was a plot on foot among the Khitay to disarm, or, as others said,
to massacre them, and they then learnt of the Mahomedan revolt in China
and along the road thither. They immediately determined to be beforehand
with the Amban and his lukewarm council, and no weak hesitation marred
the execution of their plot, as it had that of the Chinese governor.
The Khitay troops, unarmed, were surprised during the night, and cut
down without quarter, and the small body of survivors sought refuge in
the Yangyshahr fort. This was in August, 1863, and no fewer than 7,000
Khitay soldiers are computed to have fallen on this single occasion. The
Tungan troops were thereupon joined by the townspeople, and the question
then to be decided was, who was to be supreme, the Tungani or the
Andijan-Kashgari Mahomedans. The former were simply an unlettered and
rather savage soldiery; the latter possessed keen intellects for
manipulating a fanatical people, and for improvising an administration
of a superficial character. The balance of power was evenly distributed
until reinforcements arrived from Aksu and Kucha to the anti-Tungan
party. Two Khojas who had been banished from Kucha, for endeavouring to
promote their own interests in the name of Khokand, had fled to Aksu,
where they met the same fate. In this latter flight many of similar
principles joined them, so that when they reached Yarkand they had a
numerous force at their back. The Khojas in the first place joined their
forces to the Tungani, to storm the remaining Khitay in the Yangyshahr.
The Khitay after a gallant resistance perceived that further opposition
was impossible. Then occurred one of those deeds, which, if Europe
instead of Asia had been the scene, would have been handed down to
posterity as a rare example of military devotion and courage, but which,
although not unique even in the annals of the campaign we are entering
upon, having occurred in little-known Eastern Turkestan, is not realized
as an event that has actually taken place. It is a myth of the myth-land
to which it belongs. And yet, when we read how the Amban summoned all
his officers to his chamber, where he sat in state surrounded by his
wives, his family, and his servants; how all were silent, and yet sedate
and prepared; how, at the given signal that all were present, and that
the foe was at the gate, the aged warrior dropped his lighted pipe into
the mine beneath; how the exulting foe won after all but a barren
triumph; and how the Khitay taught the natives that if they had
forgotten how to conquer they had not how to die, we feel that there is
an under-current throughout the story, that, apart from the admiration
it must command, has claims to our own special sympathy. The Chinese, as
we did in India in the dark hours of 1857, asserted their superiority
over the semi-barbarous races under their sway, even when all hopes of a
recovery seemed to be abandoned. After the fall of the citadel the
Khoja element was supreme in Yarkand, and a priest named Abderrahman
was set up as king.
The other cities of Altyshahr promptly followed the example of Yarkand,
and the Chinese power was completely subverted on all hands. The Khitay
were massacred whenever they fell into the hands of the Mahomedans, and
the only places that still held out were the citadels, notably the
Yangyshahr of Kashgar. The inhabitants of this city appear to have been
unable to keep their advantage over the Chinese, for they appealed to
the Kirghiz to come in and assist them. These nomads, under their chief,
Sadic Beg, were nothing loth to join in expelling the Chinese, as such a
change could only increase their advantages by substituting an unsettled
for a settled government. Siege was accordingly laid to the citadel of
Kashgar, but the irregular troops of the new allies were unable to make
any impression on the fort, defended as it was by a large Khitay
garrison. If the Chinese commander had assumed a more active policy, he
might have destroyed his opponents, but he was waiting for the arrival
of reinforcements, which he expected before many months. In not relying
solely on his own resources he proved himself unable to read the changed
signs of the time; if, indeed, he was not already meditating that
surrender, which he ultimately concluded with Yakoob Beg. Sadic Beg,
finding himself unable to take the fort, and knowing that it was
uncertain how long the Kashgari would remain friendly to himself,
resolved to play the part of king-maker, and sent the embassy to
Tashkent for a Khoja to come and rule Kashgar, only he omitted to say
that Kashgar was not conquered.
We can now return to Buzurg Khan and his commander-in-chief. When they
left Tashkent they had only a following of six, among whom were Abdulla,
Pansad; Mahomed Kuli, Shahawal; and Khoja Kulan, Hudaychi. All of these
played a very prominent part under Yakoob Beg. From Tashkent they went
to Khokand, where their numbers rose to sixty-eight. Here the final
preparations were made, and during the first days of January, 1865, this
band of adventurers crossed the Khokand frontier into Eastern Turkestan.
The mountain forts seem to have been deserted, for no opposition was
encountered in the passage of the Terek defile. Several small bodies of
troops joined them, and they reached Mingyol in the neighbourhood of
Kashgar with increased numbers and confidence. Sadic Beg had conceived a
more sanguine view of his situation by this time, and half repented that
he had invited the Khojas in at all, more particularly when he found
that the Khoja had a following of his own, and a skilled commander and
minister in Yakoob Beg. He then strove to dissuade Buzurg Khan from
proceeding further with an enterprise fraught with great peril, for he
represented the Chinese as sure to return, when summary vengeance would
be exacted. But his arguments were unavailing. Either Buzurg Khan or his
adviser, Yakoob Beg, was deaf to all entreaty. The enterprise they had
embarked on must be continued to the bitter end. They could not think of
returning to Khokand with nothing accomplished, with the stigma
attaching to them of a retreat when there had been no foe. Sadic Beg
could not but submit with the best grace possible; and Buzurg Khan was
accordingly placed on the throne of his ancestors.
In his "_orda_" or palace he administered justice and received the
congratulations of his own followers and of the Andijani townspeople.
The court rules were drawn up on the model of those in use in Khokand,
and while the expedition had but established itself, in an uncertain
manner, in one city it was thought necessary that etiquette should be as
strictly defined and enforced as if all this were taking place in a
brilliant and luxurious capital. In a few days Sadic Beg, on finding
that he played but a secondary part, revolted, and set himself up as
ruler at Yangy Hissar. It was now that Yakoob Beg came to the front,
and assumed the control of affairs until the fall of the contemptible
Buzurg. With great difficulty after the desertion of their Kirghiz
allies was a force of 3,000 men collected around the new Khoja in
Kashgar. Sadic Beg advanced on the capital with a much larger army, and
Yakoob Beg had for a time to remain on the defensive. Each day, however,
brought in recruits to his camp, while, the army of the Kirghiz leader
presenting no object of sympathy to the people, his rival's remained
stationary, if it did not decrease. An encounter at last commenced
between the two forces which was made general by the intrepidity of
Abdulla. The Kirghiz levies of Sadic were unable to withstand the
vigorous charges that were led against them, and broke after a short
combat into headlong flight. In the mountains the Kirghiz gathered
around their chieftain in force, and, hovering on the northern districts
of Kashgar, presented a danger that must be removed by Yakoob Beg before
he could advance farther. His troops were therefore directed to proceed
against the Kirghiz in their fastnesses, and it was not long before the
Kirghiz, driven into a corner, turned at bay on their pursuer. The
forces on either side were about equal, some 5,000 men in either army.
But, as is customary in the East, the Kirghiz army put forth a champion,
Suranchi by name, who had obtained great renown for his extraordinary
height and strength. The challenge did not remain unanswered, for
Abdulla stepped forward to the encounter. The fight, though furious, was
short, and the smaller Khokandian warrior was victorious over his more
ponderous antagonist. The Kirghiz power after this reverse was broken
up, and Sadic Beg took refuge with Alim Kuli at Tashkent. Yakoob Beg's
first campaign against the Kirghiz, who had sworn alliance with him, and
by whose invitation he was present in Kashgar, had thus ended
victoriously, and he was now able to resume the main purpose of
conquering Kashgar. Having rendered Kashgar secure from surprise on the
north, and leaving a force to maintain their hold on it, and to keep in
check the Khitay garrison, Buzurg and Yakoob proceeded south to occupy
Yangy Hissar. The town was occupied without difficulty, but an attempt
to storm the citadel in which the Khitay had taken refuge was repulsed
with loss. Sending Buzurg Khan back to Kashgar, Yakoob Beg resolved to
go on to Yarkand and endeavour to bring that city under their immediate
influence.
At this period he loudly proclaimed that there should be no differences
among the Tungani, or Mahomedans, in their war with the Buddhists, and
that Khojas and Tungani had but one interest in common. As we have seen,
the Tungan disturbances broke out first in Yarkand of any city of
Altyshahr, and accordingly an earlier settlement founded on a compromise
had been attained there, than was the case in its northern neighbours,
Kashgar and Yangy Hissar, where an ambitious Kirghiz chief had sought to
carve a kingdom for himself. After Abderrahman Khoja had been made king
or ruler in Yarkand, and after the Khitay had been destroyed with their
citadel, a fresh arrangement was agreed upon between the Tungani and the
Khoja party. By its terms the Tungani maintained possession of the
citadel, and the Khojas held jurisdiction in the city. Neither of them
would be disposed to view with any friendly eye the appearance of a
claimant to supremacy in the person of a Khoja sovereign of the whole
country, and it was as the representative of such a person that Yakoob
Beg resolved to visit Yarkand. His march was delayed as much as
possible, and it was not without some difficulty that he at last
obtained admittance with his small following into the city. Yakoob Beg
was naturally incensed at this inimical treatment from his
fellow-religionists, and he soon set himself to the task of humbling the
dominant Khojas of Yarkand. During a street riot that was probably
instigated by the wily Khokandian, the leading Khojas were seized, and
their followers expelled from the city. With a force of only a few
hundred men, Yakoob Beg had established himself as master in the largest
city of the country; his success on this occasion was very temporary. As
ill fortune would have it for him, a fresh army of 2,000 men from Kucha
had arrived at Tagharchi, and, there joined by the forces from Yarkand
and the neighbourhood, presented a very formidable appearance. They
marched on the city at once with complete confidence in their superior
numbers, and Yakoob Beg, always in favour of the boldest course, marched
out to meet them. In a skirmish, however, the detachment under Abdulla
was badly cut up owing to the rashness of that officer, and Yakoob Beg
at once recognized the necessity for a prompt retreat. During the
following night he made a forced march and arrived the next day at Yangy
Hissar with no very great loss in men, but without any baggage whatever.
The enterprise to Yarkand then appeared in its true light as a rash
venture.
The Khitay in the fort of Yangy Hissar still held out, and Yakoob Beg
resolved to overcome them before he attempted any fresh enterprise. He
called up reinforcements from Kashgar, and pressed the siege with
renewed vigour, and alter strictly environing it for forty days the
garrison surrendered. Although Yakoob Beg himself seemed desirous of
showing moderation to the prisoners, more than 2,000 Chinese were
massacred. During all these petty events, which had not produced even
the results of past Khoja enterprises, there had been discontent and
division within, as well as opposition from without. At this time a
fresh danger was appearing on the horizon. A Badakshi army was advancing
with hostile intent on Sirikul, and although Yakoob Beg disregarded its
approach while he pressed on the works against the citadel of Yangy
Hissar, when that fort fell it attracted his attention once more. The
Khitay garrison in the Yangyshahr of Kashgar was also a source of danger
to the newly founded dynasty, and, although its inactivity had continued
for a long period, it was uncertain at what moment it might pass off. We
can only account for the extraordinary lethargy of the Chinese commander
by supposing that he was in complete ignorance of what was passing in
the country. At many moments it must seem to an observer of the facts
that the Chinese governor, who had under him 6,000 or 7,000 disciplined
troops, could have crushed all the opposition of such heterogeneous
crowds as those fighting under or against Yakoob Beg were up to this
time. With the destruction of the Yangy Hissar garrison the prospects of
Yakoob Beg greatly improved, and less opportunity was left to the
Chinese governor for assuming the offensive, than when he possessed an
ally in so close a position as Yangy Hissar. Yakoob Beg also resolved to
press the Khitay still more in this their last stronghold, and before he
encountered other opponents to crush the Khitay, as he already had the
Kirghiz. At this point Sadic Beg reappears in Kashgar at the head of a
Kirghiz force to oppose Yakoob Beg, and for a moment it seemed as if he
were to have better fortune on this occasion. But Abdulla, the most
trusted as well as the most courageous of Yakoob Beg's lieutenants,
collected such forces as he could, boldly threw himself in his path,
and, having routed Sadic in a sanguinary engagement, prepared to press
that unfortunate chieftain into flight or ruin. Yakoob Beg, in want of
allies and soldiers however, interfered and suggested an alliance
instead of a war _à outrance_. The thwarted Sadic was only too glad to
get off on such favourable terms, and joined his forces to those of his
late enemy now besieging the Khitay with renewed vigour. This merciful
termination of a difficulty, that might have become serious had it not
been cured in time, was a performance very creditable in a diplomatic
sense to Yakoob Beg. In a small way it may be compared with Frederick
the Great's action at Pirna, where he received the services of 40,000
Saxon troops. But, perhaps, still more remarkable was the manner in
which Yakoob Beg averted the danger from the Badakshi army. The
Badakshi, like their kinsmen the Afghans, may be considered, _cæteris
paribus_, to be superior soldiers, on account of their larger build and
more active habits, to other Asiatics, so that Yakoob Beg with his
half-disciplined followers would have had some difficulty and must have
incurred considerable loss in overcoming these new invaders. He made
overtures to them, and the Badakshi, seeing that he was likely to give
them exciting and profitable employment, entered into negotiations with
him. The result was that they took service under him; and Yakoob Beg for
the first time found himself at the head of a large army, composed of
Khokand, Kashgar, Kirghiz, and Badakshan levies. It was fortunate for
himself that he had been able to arrange his affairs so satisfactorily,
for a fresh danger was approaching from the east.
The reader may have observed that we have said little of Buzurg Khan
during the operations of the campaign up to this point. Indeed, there is
little or nothing to say of the movements of that prince, for he had
been mainly stationary at Kashgar, where he passed his time in his
harem, or besotted under the use of drugs. Yakoob Beg had from the very
commencement come to the front as responsible chief, and as events
progressed the people and the army came to look upon him as their future
ruler. But Yakoob Beg, it would seem, was really in earnest in
supporting the Khoja prince, for on several occasions not only did he
give Buzurg the most salutary advice, but he also compelled him to take
an active part in the public business. Such fits of action were most
distasteful to the effeminate prince, and he always returned with
renewed zest to the illicit pleasures in which he indulged. One of the
occasions on which Yakoob Beg endeavoured to instil into his sovereign
some idea of the responsibilities of his office was this invasion by the
Khoja-Tungani power of Altyshahr. Early in the summer a large force,
estimated at 40,000 men, collected by the cities of Aksu, Kucha, and
Turfan, appeared at Maralbashi, whence it equally threatened Kashgar or
protected Yarkand. Yakoob Beg's utmost efforts, if we are to credit the
native report, only availed to bring some 2,500 men into the field; but
it is more reasonable to suppose, that, with his Kirghiz, Kipchak, and
Badakshi auxiliaries, he had many more troops under him, perhaps 12,500
instead of 2,500 men. Be the exact numbers of the forces what they may,
however, it is certain that he was greatly outnumbered by the invader,
and that the diverse elements of his army detracted very much from its
effective strength. The Tungan army advanced from Maralbashi on Yangy
Hissar, where Yakoob Beg had concentrated his army. He had drawn Buzurg
Khan and such of the court followers as he could from their ignominious
inaction in the capital to encounter the dangers and risks of a field of
battle. Both sides were eager for the encounter, which took place in the
neighbourhood of Yangy Hissar. The tactical disposition made by Yakoob
Beg of his forces was such as would command the approval of skilled
officers, and, having done all that mortal man could do to insure the
result, he commended himself and his cause to Allah. The battle was long
and stoutly contested. During hours it was impossible to say to which
side the balance of victory was inclining; at last the Kirghiz troops,
half-hearted in their fighting, were driven from the field, and the
Badakshi division, which had up to that moment stubbornly held its
ground, immediately followed the shameful example thus set it. There now
only remained the division under the immediate orders of Yakoob Beg to
withstand the onset of a whole army victorious in two different quarters
of the field. The situation, on which the fate of the whole enterprise
depended, might have filled the boldest heart with momentary despair.
Yakoob Beg had, however, so braced himself to the effort, that no more
than ordinary emotion was permitted to betray the disturbed mind within,
and with the exclamation that "Victory is the gift of God," he inspired
his soldiery to continue the fight throughout the afternoon. The enemy,
dismayed at the dauntless courage shown by this mere handful of men, and
having incurred great loss in his effort to crush them, drew off his
weakened forces towards evening; and Yakoob Beg, boldly seizing the
opportunity for assuming the offensive, drove them from the field in
disorder and with considerable loss. In addition to the loss in killed
and wounded, more than 1,000 Tungan soldiers enlisted under the standard
of Yakoob Beg, and that general found himself on the morrow of one of
his greatest battles, with a greater force under his command than he had
just before it commenced. This great triumph gave fresh lustre to the
Khoja family, and redounded to the military renown of Yakoob Beg. Nor
should it be forgotten that on this occasion he showed that he
possessed, besides military genius of some merit, qualities of an
estimable character. For the first time in the annals of these wars the
prisoners were treated with some consideration. For some reason or other
this victory was not followed up, and the defeated Kucha army retired on
Maralbashi, which it continued to hold for some months longer. The
indirect results of this victory were scarcely less important, however,
than the immediate and direct consequences of it.
Buzurg Khan, who had been present at this battle, was among the first to
seek refuge in flight; and when he received intelligence of the final
success his satisfaction was almost eclipsed by his personal chagrin and
mortification. Up to this event he had been content to let Yakoob Beg
act the king so long as he could indulge undisturbed in his
debaucheries; but from this date there became mingled with his wounded
vanity a conviction that Yakoob Beg was becoming so powerful and so
popular that he might prove a dangerous subject. The weak-minded prince
then permitted himself to be made the tool of every rival that the
success of Yakoob Beg had raised up for himself either in the court or
in the camp, and listened to tales brought him of his lieutenant's
plots, when the conspirators most to be feared by himself were the
ambitious chieftains in whose power he was placing his person and his
crown. After the defeat of the Kucha army, the ruling parties in Yarkand
thought it would be wise to come to terms with their victorious and
aggressive neighbour, and accordingly an embassy was despatched to Yangy
Hissar by the Khojas of Yarkand to tender their submission to the
sovereign of Kashgar, and to ask to be favoured by the nomination of a
city governor, who would be agreeable to Buzurg Khan and his vizier,
Yakoob Beg. It is suggestive to watch how the name of the vizier
occupies almost as prominent place in all their addresses as that of his
master. The Tungan governor in the Yarkand Yangyshahr, not to be
behindhand in his worship of the rising sun, immediately sent a similar
expression of obedience to Kashgar.
The course of events once more takes us back to Kashgar, where the
Chinese still held the citadel against all comers. But with each fresh
success of Yakoob Beg over his numerous opponents, and with the spread
of the Tungan power into Jungaria, hope almost completely deserted the
unfortunate Khitay, who, in this solitary fort, alone maintained the
name of Chinese authority. Treason, within the walls, was now to aid the
efforts from without. Kho Dalay, the superior officer in the citadel,
although not the commandant, came to an arrangement with Yakoob Beg, by
which honourable terms were conceded to the garrison; and 3,000 Khitay
troops surrendered and settled in Kashgar. They were required to
acknowledge formally the supremacy of the Khoja, and to make a
profession of Islamism. But they were never really interfered with in
the observance of their own rites among themselves, and had nothing to
complain of in their duty. They were called after their recantation
"Yangy Mussulmans," or "New Mussulmans." These were the last Khitay
troops who surrendered to the new conquerors, and with them every
vestige of Chinese authority disappeared from every part of Jungaria and
Eastern Turkestan. Even among this garrison, reduced by a long siege and
its attendant deprivations to despair, there was a small minority who
preferred death to the dishonour involved in surrender. Chang Tay, the
commandant, refused to be any party to the arrangement made between Kho
Dalay and Yakoob Beg. When the day approached for the entry of the
Kashgarian army, this resolute Amban withdrew to his palace, and having
collected his family and dependents around him blew them all up with the
explosion of a mine that he had constructed underneath. In the confusion
that arose from this incident, the enemy broke into the fort, and it was
not for some hours that Yakoob Beg succeeded in obtaining control over
them once more. During that interval of insubordination many Khitay were
murdered, but not without resistance. Kho Dalay and almost 3,000 men
remained to take service in the conquering army, as already explained.
The new alliance was cemented by the marriage of Yakoob Beg to the
beautiful daughter of Kho Dalay, by whom he has had several children,
too young as yet to take any part in public affairs. Perhaps Yakoob
Beg's moderation to the Khitay is to be explained by this circumstance,
and it is certain that down to the very end his Khitay wife exercised
great influence over her husband.
This was in September, 1865, nine months after his first arrival in
Altyshahr, and in that period he had worked, if not very rapidly, with
considerable thoroughness. The Khitay destroyed, the Kirghiz subdued,
and the Tungan influence checked in its aggression against Western
Kashgar, such was the tale of his achievements. Several battles and
sieges successfully brought to an issue, and a numerous army formed out
of the diverse fragments of conquered and conquerors. Personally, too,
Yakoob Beg had done much towards preparing the public mind for the
assumption of power by himself, and the reigning chief had done still
more by his neglect of duty and abandonment to pleasure. Buzurg Khan
might stand for the typical _roi fainéant_, and Yakoob Beg was a more
than ordinarily resolute and determined _maire du palais_.
The citadel of Kashgar had not long surrendered when messengers arrived,
reporting the near approach of a large body of men from Khokand, but who
they were, or with what intention they came, none knew. These were the
unsuccessful conspirators against Khudayar Khan, who, after the death of
Alim Kuli, had obtained his power once more; and these having been
driven out of Khokand by his armies, were compelled to seek refuge in
Kashgar. Yakoob Beg sent them the laconic message, while they were
hovering on the frontier, that "if they came as friends, they were
welcome; if as foes, he was ready to fight them." Until the arrival of
this declaration there appears to have been some hesitation among the
Khokandians what to do, as some were wishing to attempt the conquest of
Kashgar in their own interests; but when so clear a statement was sent
them by Yakoob Beg, and when they learnt more definitely of the
permanence of his success, they threw off their reserve and joined the
confederacy of Kashgar. In the meanwhile fresh disturbances were
breaking out in Yarkand, and thither he proceeded in the later months of
1865 to quell them, taking Buzurg Khan with him. On his arrival before
the town both the Khojas and the Tungani hastened to profess the
greatest desire to fulfil his wishes, although they kept him outside
their gates. It is probable that neither party could have offered any
prolonged resistance to him, had they not been encouraged to do so by
Buzurg Khan. That prince had for some time been fretting against the
iron will of his lieutenant, and, now, in an ill humour at being carried
from his amusements and idleness at Kashgar to suffer the deprivations
of a camp life before Yarkand, broke loose from all control, and plotted
in his own camp, and in the enemy's, to free himself from his
troublesome general. The plot among the Tungan soldiery had assumed
alarming proportions, and all was ready to put an end to the career of
Yakoob, when it was fortunately discovered by his faithful friend
Abdulla. Precautions were taken, and the plot in the camp was
effectually thwarted; but Yakoob Beg was not strong enough then to show
his resentment. This danger was only removed to give place to another.
The Tungani soldiers in Yakoob's service now opened up communications
with their kinsmen in the Yangy-Shahr, and they formed the following
plan to destroy the remaining portion of the Kashgarian forces. The
garrison was to simulate a desire to yield into the hands of Yakoob Beg
both their own persons and the fort, and when he, unsuspecting any
covert design, should be lulled into a false sense of security, the
Tungani in his service could join the Tungani in the fort in making a
night attack on the other forces. The plan promised well. Yakoob Beg was
deceived by the friendly overtures of the Tungani, and relaxed his
precautions, and, during the night that was to precede the surrender of
the Tungani, the conspirators marched out of the fort, and being joined,
as had been arranged, by the other confederates, surprised Yakoob Beg
and his immediate followers. A desperate resistance was offered by the
half-armed men, but the Tungani were victorious, and Yakoob Beg had much
difficulty in collecting around him on the morrow a few hundred
soldiers. Among those, however, was Abdulla and some of his more trusted
companions. The Kirghiz under Sadic Beg could not be trusted, and it
seemed that that chief was still inclined to play for his own hand. At
this, the most critical period of his life, Yakoob Beg's tact and
resolution were most conspicuous. When he was surrounded on every hand
by hostile factions, and could count on the fidelity of scarce five
hundred men, he triumphed over every obstacle, and rose omnipotent over
the petty jealousies and dissensions of those who sought to crush him.
Buzurg Khan seized the moment of this disaster to draw off into a
separate camp with a large body of troops and all the Kirghiz, and it is
very possible, as has been asserted, that he instigated the successful
Tungan _coup_. There is no evidence that he did, and I am personally of
opinion that it originated among the Tungani themselves, and that Buzurg
Khan only rejoiced at its occurrence, as he would have done at any other
reverse to Yakoob. The position now was as follows:--In the citadel were
the victorious Tungani, and in the town they shared the distribution of
power with the townspeople. Outside in one part was Buzurg Khan, with a
force that was equivocal in its sympathies, and that might at any moment
become hostile, to Yakoob Beg; and in another part was Yakoob Beg
himself and his attenuated following. Affairs could not look less
hopeful, and if the three parties could have accommodated their own
differences for but the short space of twenty-four hours, Yakoob Beg
must infallibly have been destroyed: as it was, they did nothing with an
enemy like Yakoob Beg in their proximity, and permitted him to redeem
all he had lost by his too great credulity in the good faith of his
brother Mussulmans. Let us now see how he saved himself. The first point
to do was to restore the courage and self-confidence of his own
soldiers, and to do that, it was necessary to strike a sharp blow that
was sure of success. The fort could not be taken by a _coup de main_,
but the city, large and straggling, presented a more inviting aspect for
such an attempt. Abdulla, the Murat of the army of Kashgar, with the
most determined intrepidity, carried it by assault, although here again
he attacked without awaiting the arrival of the other contingents. Like
Edward Bruce,
"Such was his wonted reckless mood,
Yet desperate valour oft made good,
Even by its daring, venture rude,
Where prudence might have failed."
This achievement put an end to the rejoicings among the Tungani, and
compelled them to recognize what a terribly energetic and enterprising
foe they had to deal with. But, at this moment, a severe mishap occurred
which almost neutralized the advantage thus gained. Buzurg Khan, unable
either to crush Yakoob Beg or to enjoy the indulgences to which he had
enslaved himself, resolved to secure the latter, happen what might. He
accordingly fled from Yarkand with many followers, and retired to his
palace at Kashgar. There, not content with pillaging the palace of
Yakoob Beg, he proclaimed him a traitor and rebel, and offered a reward
to whomsoever should bring him his head. Another general was appointed
to the command of the army, and preparations were made for defending
Kashgar against any attempt of Yakoob Beg to attack it. But fortunately
the Tungani in the citadel of Yarkand were not aware of this dissension
among the Kashgari, and as they were struck with admiration for the
valour of Yakoob Beg, they surrendered to him soon after the flight of
Buzurg. He was then able to turn his undivided attention to his
refractory chief. Yakoob Beg had always, as we have said, befriended the
church; he was now to experience some benefit for that very commendable
respect. Among the first means of crushing Yakoob Beg that Buzurg Khan
had employed was an appeal to the Sheikh-ul-islam of Kashgar to proclaim
his Baturbashi outside the pale of the law. This the ecclesiastic
refused to do, and asserted, on the contrary, that Yakoob Beg had
deserved well both of his country and of the Mahomedan world. Foiled in
his effort to stir up a religious feeling against his general, Buzurg
Khan was reduced to the more cogent, but in his hands quite useless,
argument of the sword. Nor was the field, limited as it must appear to
us, free from other pretenders. Sadic Beg, instead of coalescing with
Buzurg Khan, set up his own pretensions to rule the country; and the
Kucha Khojas and Tungani began to collect troops in view of possible
eventualities.
The army of Buzurg Khan, which had marched out to oppose the entry of
Yakoob Beg, was outflanked and defeated by Abdulla in the country
between Yangy Hissar and the capital; and Yakoob Beg, pressing on with
irresistible strides, was received in Kashgar with the acclamations of
the people and of his soldiers. He was then publicly proclaimed ruler,
and his friend the Sheikh-ul-islam ratified the people's choice. Buzurg
Khan, who had taken refuge in the Yangy-Shahr, was seized in his palace
there, after a very slight resistance. Some of the more prominent of
Yakoob Beg's rivals were executed, and Buzurg Khan himself was placed in
a state of honourable confinement. He still persisted in futile
intrigues, and so long as he remained in Kashgar was a source of endless
trouble to the new government. For more than eighteen months he was
permitted to remain however, and then, being detected in instigating the
murder of Yakoob Beg, was banished to Tibet. After wandering for some
years, he found his way to Khokand, where he is believed to be still
residing with a large family. He may be considered to have been the last
Khoja prince ruling Kashgar, for it is scarcely probable that, in any
future settlement of that country, a restoration of the old reigning
family will be supported by any one. He is no exaggerated type of the
rule among Central Asian despots, who present to our gaze a long series
of petty tyrants and debauchees, until for a few years they are
displaced by a successful soldier such as the Athalik Ghazi, or by a
skilful minister such as Mussulman Kuli was in Khokand.
The Kirghiz chief, Sadic Beg, did not long hold out against the
consolidated power of Yakoob Beg; and the Kucha movements were
suspended. In a little more than twelve months Yakoob Beg had occupied
Kashgar, Yangy Hissar, and Yarkand. Sirikul and Khoten also acknowledged
his rule; but his further operations against them will be narrated
by-and-by. He felt now so secure in his seat that he permitted the
Badakshi contingent to return home, presenting each soldier with a large
present. Ever since that time Yakoob Beg seems to have maintained some
influence in Badakshan, and to have been inclined on several occasions
to compete with Shere Ali of Afghanistan for the possession of that
province. His ambition was never fully revealed in this quarter; but it
is certain that Shere Ali regarded him with scarcely concealed suspicion
and dislike.
With the assumption of personal power by Yakoob Beg, on the deposition
of the Khoja Buzurg Khan, the first part of the enterprise undertaken in
the later days of 1864 was brought to a termination. In the more
extended operations of Yakoob Beg against the Tungani and Khoten, may be
perceived the effects of events outside his immediate sphere upon, this
energetic ruler, who, until his last years, never realized the strength
of the Russians, and who had, up to the year 1870 when Kuldja was
occupied, convinced himself that he could retard the progress of the
great Northern power. It was that idea, besides a thirst for military
renown and excitement, that urged him on to the construction of what he
fondly believed might prove a formidable and extensive state. As ruler
of Kashgar, he could not be anything but a kind of vassal of the Khan of
Khokand; as monarch of Eastern Turkestan, he might treat on terms of
equality with the Czar of Russia or the Emperor of China. It was no
unworthy ambition, and Yakoob Beg, created Athalik Ghazi, Champion
Father, in 1866 by the Ameer of Bokhara, accomplished so much of it as
was possible.
CHAPTER VIII.
WARS WITH THE TUNGANI.
Yakoob Beg, having deposed Buzurg Khan and suppressed all resistance on
the part either of the Tungani or of the Chinese in Western Kashgar, had
some leisure to make a careful survey of his exact position. The result
of the desultory fighting of the previous twelve months had been
eminently satisfactory to himself; but, to say the least, it was dubious
how long this state of things might last. Former adventurers had
accomplished as much as he had, but the Chinese had always returned with
renewed vigour. How was Yakoob Beg to know that the rumours were well
founded which asserted that that empire had been sore stricken in other
fields than against the Tungani, and that even the victories over the
Taepings were not considered a complete set-off to the disasters in
every other quarter of the empire? European critics predicted that the
last hour of the Chinese Empire was fast approaching; but Yakoob Beg,
with far more imperfect means of intelligence at his disposal, feared
still, even when the citadel of Kashgar surrendered, that the Khitay
would return for revenge. His fears were not groundless, as we now know,
but he anticipated events by more than ten years. Yakoob Beg was not so
sanguine in his own resources or good fortune that he believed that he
should not have to encounter the danger that had overwhelmed all his
predecessors, and his first object accordingly was to gather all his
strength together in a compact mass to resist the Chinese when they
should come. But the dissensions that had, during the conquest of
Altyshahr, manifested themselves so palpably in the ill-assorted
conglomeration which had gathered round the standard of Buzurg Khan
brought home to the mind of Yakoob Beg the disadvantages of a divided
people. He accordingly determined that, whatever else he might fail or
succeed in achieving, his most resolute effort should be to weld into
one cohesive and effective whole Andijani and Tungani, Kashgari and
Khitay. It was no mean ambition; but to cement such discordant elements
a policy of "blood and iron" was required. Yakoob Beg did not shrink
certainly in its application; but when he had accomplished the task he
had set himself to bring about he discovered that the cost had been so
great that the state, both in population and in wealth, was at a lower
point than it had ever been before. But in the earlier days of 1866 no
doubt crossed his mind on this latter point. It must be remembered that,
strange to say, the great success of Yakoob Beg in Kashgar had alienated
the sympathy of the government of Khokand from his cause; and, although
this may be explained by the antipathy of Khudayar Khan, now firmly
seated on the throne, who could not entertain any amity for a subject
who had on several occasions deserted his cause, it is impossible to
attribute to that sentiment alone a fact which must have had some deeper
and less personal explanation. At all stages of the history of these
petty princes of Asia are we met by the spectacle of mutual jealousy and
recrimination, whenever any one of themselves seemed about to exalt
himself above his fellows, either by the success of his arms or by the
beneficence of his rule. Rarely, indeed, had any of them shown that he
possessed more than ordinary ability or courage; but, whenever the
phenomenon did appear, he was at once proclaimed by his neighbours to be
a dangerous innovation, and as such to be thwarted and opposed. The
practice has come down to our own day, and during the long wars that
Russia has waged in Asia we have never beheld two states, no matter how
insignificant, combine to oppose the common foe. The Khokandians have
never aided the Bokhariots or the Khivans, nor have the Afghans or the
Kashgari the Khokandians. They have kept the ring, so to speak, as each
of them has gone down singly before the prowess of the Muscovite, in a
manner that ought to excite the admiration of all those who preserve the
memories of the traditional honours of the prize ring; but, as their own
existence has been the penalty, it is questionable whether their
conduct, inspired by regard for no law of chivalry, but simply by mutual
antipathy, has been very prudent. Over such petty jealousies had Yakoob
Beg to triumph before he could hope to complete his dream of an united
Kashgaria. His path was beset with difficulties. In satisfying himself
with too little he might imperil what he had secured, but in attempting
too much he might jeopardize everything he had won. Under such
circumstances the boldest man might have stood uncertain, and the most
resolute inactive until hurried into action by the progress of events.
For some months Yakoob Beg seems to have remained uncertain what should
be his next move.
In 1865, before his last advance on Yarkand, he had seized Maralbashi or
Bartchuk, and by so doing not only had he secured communication between
Aksu and Yarkand, but also between Aksu and Khoten. This position, lying
200 miles to the east of Yangy Hissar, has always been and is still very
important, and Yakoob Beg is supposed to have fortified it very
strongly. This success was the permanent result of his great victory
over the Tungani from Aksu and Kucha in the neighbourhood of Yangy
Hissar, and it effectually secured his flank during further operations.
It was not, however, until he turned his attention to the southern city
of Khoten, that the importance of this acquisition was made
incontestable. Then it enabled him to devote his attention exclusively
to the extension of his sway southward to the mountains of Karakoram
and Kuen Lun, beyond which he might expect no enemy. In Khoten the Mufti
Habitulla had been invested with supreme control, after the deposition
of the Chinese authorities; and during his government of the city and
district, order appears to have been maintained without unnecessary
exactions. When Yakoob Beg made his first appearance in Yarkand, after
his earlier successes round Kashgar, it will be remembered that the
Yarkandi acknowledged the supremacy of the new Khoja king. Their example
was speedily followed by Habitulla of Khoten, and it is not stated that,
even during the progress of hostilities with Yarkand, this ruler
repudiated the arrangement into which he had entered. It is true that he
was far removed from the immediate sphere of action, but that will not
alone account for an indifference to the progress of events in Kashgar,
which Khoten had never manifested on any previous occasion. Khoten may,
therefore, be considered to have been exceptionally well behaved towards
the new Khoja dynasty located at Kashgar; and when Yakoob Beg advanced
to the south of Yarkand, Habitulla hastened to send representatives to
the camp of the conqueror. They were received with consideration, but
deep down in the breast of Yakoob Beg there lurked either an inveterate
distrust of, or dislike to, the Mufti Habitulla. Dissembling his true
feelings, Yakoob Beg sent a message requesting the presence of the Mufti
in his camp. The Mufti, deluded by the friendly treatment bestowed on
his emissaries, came with many of his relations and followers into the
camp of the Kashgarian general. At first, we are told, they were treated
with every mark of respect and kindness; they were feasted and clothed
in precious garments, but all these honours were but the preliminaries
to the concluding ceremony. During the progress of the evening meal they
were disarmed, and led out to execution, while an attack was made from
several quarters on the town. Even then the resistance was prolonged,
and the slaughter by the infuriated soldiery of the Athalik Ghazi
continued long after all serious opposition had ceased. It is impossible
to exonerate Yakoob Beg from the chief blame on this occasion, and if he
had been a civilized European general, we should have made use of the
phrase, that "It must ever remain a blot on his career;" but it would be
the height of irony to apply such a phrase to this unscrupulous Asiatic,
who, if not worse than the school in which he was brought up, was
certainly not much better in a moral sense. As the fact stands, the
seizure of Khoten, and the massacre of the unarmed leaders of that city,
appear to have been acts as unnecessary as they were unjustifiable.
Khoten may have seemed to the Athalik Ghazi of exceptional importance
for several reasons, and he may have felt doubtful of the fidelity of
Habitulla and his followers; but, so far as we are aware, the reasons
for this action are shadowy in the extreme, even regarded from the point
of view of political expediency. Down to the present day, too, the
memory of this massacre, needless even in the eyes of a people
accustomed to the shortest cuts to power by wholesale slaughter, has
rankled in the minds of the inhabitants of Khoten and Sanju, and the
Athalik Ghazi was least popular in that part of his state in which,
according to the traditions of his predecessors, his action had been
most sweeping, and accordingly most safe. This was early in the year
1867, and the Athalik Ghazi had now an opportunity for settling his
relationship with his eastern neighbours, the Tungani.
The Tungan movement proper originated, as explained in the last chapter,
in the Chinese provinces of Kansuh and Shensi, and then extended with
scarcely a check to Turfan south of the Tian Shan and to Urumtsi north
of that range. The flame soon spread from Turfan to Karashar, Kucha, and
Aksu, and at all of these towns it was fomented by the appearance of the
new element of the Mahomedan Khokandian, and native settlers, acting in
combination with the Chinese Tungani. North of the Tian Shan the
movement received a temporary repulse; and it is necessary to say
something in explanation of the course of the Mahomedan revival in Ili
before we proceed to discuss the earlier wars of Yakoob Beg with the
Tungani. As early as 1860 serious complications had arisen in that
province, although the Chinese had always been more firmly situated
there than in Kashgar. In that year a plot was concocted to murder the
Chinese viceroy and to upset the existing government. It was discovered,
however, and fell through. There appear to have been more causes at work
in Ili to produce discontent than in the southern state, and it was not
so much a question here between Khitay and Tungani, as it was between a
people clamouring for work, for less taxation, and for payment for what
they had done, and an administration that was unable to satisfy the
demands made upon it from all sides. That last resource of a government
at its wits' ends for money, the depreciation of the current coin and
the issue of fictitious paper, was adopted by the Viceroy of Ili. The
measure, which it had been expected would lessen the difficulty, only
added fuel to the flame. The situation of affairs was becoming
desperate; the people were encouraged by the disasters of the Chinese in
the neighbouring states to increase the number of their demands; and the
Chinese officials appear to have lost their heads in the storm that was
gathering from all sides around them. They were but the effete
representatives of a system which in its vigorous days had claims to
general admiration, and they are only saved from incurring our contempt
by the possession of courage, the sole virtue left them. When the
Chinese first conquered Eastern Turkestan they brought from Kashgar a
large number of settlers, and placed them in the country round Ili. They
became known as Tarantchis, and, in the course of two or three
generations, had increased into a very numerous community. These were
always at heart disaffected to the Chinese, but, as they occupied a
very subordinate position, would probably never have thought of revolt
had not a large division of the conquerors set them the example of
insubordination. So soon as the discontent among the working classes had
assumed formidable proportions by the pecuniary embarrassment of the
Chinese, and the Tungan successes in the east of Jungaria had raised a
fanatical feeling to swell the hatred against a declining and Buddhist
rule, the Tarantchis were not backward for their part in reviving their
almost forgotten grievances, and in joining in a defensive and offensive
alliance with the Tungani. Each party collected such forces as they
could, out in the encounter that ensued the disciplined soldiers of the
Viceroy overcame the far more numerous mob by which they were opposed.
The fortress of Bazandai, however, within the next few days, fell into
the power of the insurgents, and that achievement more than compensated
for the disaster in the open field. Ili itself surrendered in January,
1866, and a Tungani-Tarantchi government was formed. The Chinese viceroy
had in the meanwhile destroyed himself and many of his followers and
assailants by setting fire to a mine of gunpowder under his palace. The
Tungan element gradually superseded the Tarantchi in the administration
of the state, and the five years of independence, which continued until
the Russians came in 1871, were chiefly marked by petty disagreements
which had no influence on the progress of events in this part of Asia.
The trade with Ili fell off, and many other valid reasons for Russian
intervention were accumulated during those few years of national
existence.
With the beginning of 1867, Yakoob Beg, secure on the south and on the
west from aggression, found himself in a position to cope with the
disjointed but allied Tungan states on his north and east. The hostility
of the Tungani and Khojas of Aksu and Kucha had been already
demonstrated, and it was to be surmised that they were only waiting to
recover from the disastrous campaign of 1865 to renew their efforts to
drive the Khokandian adventurers out of Kashgar. The facts that they
acknowledged the same religious tenets, and that they had overcome, to
some extent, a common enemy in the Chinese, and that they certainly had
each to fear most from their return, seem to have weighed little with
either the Tungani or the Athalik Ghazi. To do the latter simple
justice, it must be remembered that the Tungani had been the aggressors,
and that their attitude never ceased to be unfriendly towards himself.
It is certain that he made some efforts to effect an amicable
arrangement with the ruling party in Aksu, but his advances were
received with coldness, and both the Khojas and the Tungani of that city
held aloof from all intercourse with the new-comer. Both parties
remained watching each other for some time, each waiting for the other
to take the initiative. The Tungani had experienced the weight of the
military power of Yakoob Beg, when they had taken the offensive in the
earlier days of his appearance at Kashgar. It was, therefore, not very
probable that they would repeat the experiment when he presented a far
more formidable and united presence to their attack. Practically
speaking, Yakoob Beg was safe from invasion from the east so long as he
maintained order within his own frontier; and the Tungani in Ili on his
north had manifested no special hostility against his state. Secure from
any aggression on the part of the Tungani, Yakoob Beg might with some
reason have declined to push to extremities his relations with them. It
was certainly inconvenient that an antagonistic state should exist on
his very borders, but, as he was in a very strong position for defence,
the disadvantages of abandoning it to assume an offensive policy were
all the more apparent. What necessity could be alleged to justify a
scarcely excusable attack in a moral sense, and a quite unnecessary in a
political? The proximity of Aksu was in a strategic sense more than
neutralized by the possession of Maralbashi, and, with the lapse of
time and the return of peace, the trade route from Kashgar to Aksu might
be expected to revive once more. But such temporizing measures as these,
involving the endurance of Tungan indifference, could not be brooked by
the Athalik Ghazi. The orthodoxy of these Mahomedans was not above
suspicion, and to so devout and energetic a Sunni as Yakoob Beg these
differences were scarcely less offensive than if they had been believers
in a rival religion. Dictatorial announcements were made to the
Khoja-Tungan rulers of Aksu; and, on their persisting in defiance,
Yakoob Beg collected his forces to chastise them. The doctrines of the
Tungani were impeached as not being in strict accordance with the
Shariàt, and the religious fervour of the Sunnis was appealed to, to
bring these recalcitrant people to an acknowledgment of the error of
their ways. In addition to the semi-religious element thus imported into
the question, Yakoob Beg also laid claim to the country up to Kucha as
part of the old territory of the Khoja kings.
In the spring of 1867 his army set out in two divisions for Aksu. The
Tungani appear to have been paralyzed when the danger that had for many
months appeared menacing came upon them. The resistance encountered at
Aksu, naturally and artificially a very strong place, was not prolonged,
and Yakoob Beg swept on against Kucha. Here the Tungani, having somewhat
recovered from their trepidation, made a desperate stand, and with the
reinforcements that had arrived from Turfan presented a sufficiently
formidable appearance. The ruling authorities in Kucha were Khojas, who
in the time of the Chinese had the custody of a shrine sacred to the
memory of a Mahomedan saint, but who at the outbreak of disturbances
left the temple for the council chamber, and the offering up of prayers
to the memory of the saint for the more difficult task of issuing edicts
for the management of a people. Unhappily for their reputation in our
eyes, they had specially distinguished themselves in the massacres of
the Khitay. Their brief tenure of power seems to have been fairly
beneficent, and, in the lull that succeeded the deposition of the
Chinese and preceded the invasion of Yakoob Beg, they obtained without
doing anything very noteworthy the approval and affection of their
subjects. At Kucha, therefore, more than 500 miles distant from his own
capital, with a long line of hostile country in his rear, Yakoob Beg
found himself opposed by the full power of the Tungani. Previous to
advancing beyond Aksu he had sent back officers to Kashgar to bring up
fresh levies, and he had resorted to that doubtful expedient of drafting
into his army many of the Tungani captured at Aksu. Arrived in front of
Kucha he was unable to prosecute the siege with any vigour until the
arrival of his reinforcements. The moment of delay was attempted to be
turned to account by Yakoob Beg and some of the more prudent of his
counsellors; but the Tungani, whether unwilling to acknowledge their
inferiority or incredulous of the good faith of the Athalik Ghazi,
refused to enter into negotiations that they asserted were unnecessary.
Yakoob Beg had invaded them in their possessions, and he had annexed
Aksu; the only condition in which they could acquiesce was a withdrawal
of his army. All the efforts of the more peaceful and the more prudent
on either side were unavailing, and each party used every exertion to
bring up fresh troops to decide the question of superiority between
Tungani and Kashgari. For several weeks the two armies stood facing each
other, the one stationed on the hills to the north and west of the city,
commanding the main road from Aksu, the other in the environs and the
fortifications of the city itself. The Tungani were far the more
numerous, but in the quality of his main body, and in general efficiency
both of weapons and of experience among the officers, the advantage was
completely on the side of Yakoob Beg. The nucleus of his force comprised
Afghan, Khokandian, and Badakshi troops, veterans in the wars of the
two previous years. The Tungani were either the assassins of helpless
Chinese, or the fugitives of Aksu or Yangy Hissar. They were imperfectly
armed, without any organization, and without any competent leaders.
Above all, the cause they were fighting for was vague, and many of them
in their hearts sympathized more with Yakoob Beg than they did with
their own chiefs. The Kashgarian army, on the other hand, was encouraged
by a long series of brilliant achievements, and looked forward with
eagerness to the fray as the means of exalting their own religion, and
as affording them an opportunity for advancing their own personal
interests by the plunder of so rich a city as Kucha. The reinforcements
were consequently eagerly expected, and some of the more ardent spirits
demanded that they should be led without delay against the enemy. Yakoob
Beg was so far prudent that he refused to be urged into premature action
by the impetuosity of his followers, and the arrival of reinforcements
sooner than was anticipated enabled him not only to keep the excitement
of his soldiery within due bounds, but also to commence active
operations at an earlier date than had seemed possible. The Tungan
leaders, deluded by the inaction of Yakoob Beg into a belief that he was
unable to prosecute the enterprise he had undertaken, assumed the
offensive, only to be worsted in several minor engagements. The Tungan
troops were driven within the walls, and the siege was prosecuted with
the closest rigour. The garrison of Kucha was not sufficiently numerous
to guard in proper strength the wide-stretching suburbs and extensive
fortifications of the existing Kucha, and the cities that had in olden
days stood upon its site. Not many days elapsed before Yakoob Beg
perceived that the defence was confined to a limited portion of the
fortifications, and that several points were entirely neglected. He
resolved, therefore, to put an end to the slow process of a siege by
carrying the town by a general assault. With the whole of his available
force he attacked the city on three sides; but the Tungani resisted
strenuously, and all his direct attacks were repulsed with heavy loss.
To his son Khooda Kul Beg he had entrusted an attack in the rear of the
city, and on the success of that movement now entirely depended the
result of the assault on Kucha. That division by great good fortune and
the gallantry of its leader was victorious, and, although this promising
son of Yakoob Beg, then only a little more than twenty years of age, was
killed in the confusion that ensued on the entrance into the city, Kucha
fell. The triumph was, perhaps, not too dearly purchased. The Tungan
power had received a blow, which took the sting out of its menace, and
effectually protected Kashgar from any possible confederacy among the
Tungan cities. Yakoob Beg followed up the success of Kucha with all his
usual promptitude, but his power was not yet sufficiently matured to
justify him in carrying on extensive operations at such a distance from
the base of his resources. But another reason at this time combined to
recall his attention to another part of his dominions. The Russians were
advancing both in Khokand and in the district of Vernoe to the west of
Kuldja.
It was evident that prudence demanded a prompt return, and for the
present all further triumph must be abandoned. However, before Yakoob
Beg returned to regulate events in the western portion of his dominions,
he had the satisfaction of receiving the submission humbly tendered by
the ruling bodies of Karashar, Turfan, Hamil, and Urumtsi. After this
brilliant campaign, he slowly retraced his steps through Kucha to Aksu.
Then he turned into the mountains, and reduced Ush Turfan, which in his
onward march he had passed by; and, after this acquisition, the Tungani
of Ili expressed a desire to enter into terms of amity with one who had
brought his empire into direct contact with their state. All these
events occurred during the year 1867; and, although now and then
uncertain rumours reached England of these changes in Eastern
Turkestan, the world in general, even the Russian world, remained
indifferent to the progress of events of which it is now difficult to
trace the exact course. But, with the close of this first Tungan
campaign, and with the extension of the new state up to the walls of
Kucha, the Russian Government, as will be seen in a later chapter,
endeavoured to arrive at some clear view on the exact condition of the
newly formed confederacy to which they in their career of conquest were
approaching so rapidly.
This commencement of foreign interest in, nay, almost supervision of,
his actions in Eastern Turkestan, imposed some restriction on the
hitherto unrestrained caprice of Yakoob Beg, and the country beyond
Kucha up to Turfan was saved for a short time from the depredations from
which in 1871-73 it suffered so much. On his return to Kashgar after
this triumphant progress, and after having annexed the three important
cities, Aksu, Kucha, and Ush Turfan, the danger which had seemed to
threaten the state from Russia passed off, and Yakoob Beg proceeded to
consolidate his hold on what he had secured. Aksu and Kucha were
fortified, and various small forts were constructed in the passes
leading to Khokand and Kuldja. Every precaution was taken that he had it
in his power to observe, to ensure the safety of his little kingdom from
without, and for the moment all murmur within seemed to be hushed by the
loud acclamations at the victories of the Athalik Ghazi. He had, indeed,
accomplished no slight task, and could afford to regard his handiwork
with some complacency. To erect a powerful state on the ruins of the
Chinese power, and to unite in some sort of settled government turbulent
races and antagonistic sects, was no mean achievement; and to all the
credit due to such Yakoob Beg has indisputable claims. But for him,
confusion and disunion would have settled down over Eastern Turkestan,
until either the Russians or the Chinese had come to establish a
respectable government; but for him Kashgar would have lapsed into a
state of almost hopeless disorder, and Russian triumphs would have been
facilitated. But, when Yakoob Beg returned to find that he was not
seriously threatened in Kashgar, he experienced deep regret and
mortification that he had abstained from prosecuting his wars with the
Tungani with a greater vigour. He eagerly looked forward to an excuse
for resuming his discontinued operations against them. In the interval
that elapsed, he waged a small war in the mountainous region of his
territory extending into Badakshan and the Chitral. Sirikul had, ever
since the appearance of the Badakshi army in the service of Kashgar,
acknowledged a certain kind of obedience to Yakoob Beg; but in 1868, the
governor hitherto supported by the Athalik Ghazi broke out into revolt,
and committed several acts of depredation in the contiguous districts of
Sanju and Yarkand. Yakoob Beg without delay despatched a small force
against him, and, by the help of some mountain guns and the judicious
employment of a small but select body of cavalry, was successful in
overcoming all resistance with very slight loss. In February, 1869,
Yakoob Beg, having tried several milder alternatives, formally annexed
this district, and carried the inhabitants into Yarkand. He resettled
the territory with Kirghiz nomads and Yarkandis. Once more, he was able
to turn his attention to the east, and in 1869 commenced those final
campaigns against the Tungani which only ceased with the reappearance of
the Chinese. The great blot in the career of Yakoob Beg is the
resumption of hostilities against the Tungani. In 1867, when he first
engaged with any vigour the Tungani, some excuse may be found for that
unforeseeing action, in the fact that the Tungani were unbroken, and
might have proved formidable neighbours. But in 1869, they had been
hurled back on Korla, and, although it may be true that they were
inconvenient neighbours, robbing caravans and molesting travellers, it
is difficult to justify the later campaigns of Yakoob Beg against them,
especially as they were conducted by himself and his lieutenants with
exceptional ferocity. But, however weak may have been the impulse, and
however disastrous in the result may have been his crusade against the
Tungani, it was not difficult to discover a plausible excuse for
proceeding to extreme measures with his troublesome neighbours. In the
autumn of 1869, Korla fell before his triumphant arms, and it would
appear that he then turned north into the valleys of the Tekes and the
Yuldus, two rivers rising in the Tian Shan, and flowing through
Jungaria. This movement aroused the susceptibilities of the Russians,
and afforded a very simple excuse for the acquisition of Kuldja. In that
state, disturbances had arisen between the Tungani and the Tarantchis,
and it must have fallen an easy prey to the Athalik Ghazi had he been
permitted to advance. The Russians had, however, in 1871, entered
Kuldja, and explained their action by asserting that they had only done
so to restore order, and to prevent its falling into the hands of Yakoob
Beg. They merely held it in trust for the Chinese, so they said, and
would restore it to them, its rightful owners, so soon as they should be
able to keep permanent possession of it. While Yakoob Beg despatched a
large detachment into the country of the Tian Shan, his main body was
prosecuting with vigour the war against Karashar and Turfan. Yakoob Beg
did not always conduct the war in person, for his two sons, Kuli Beg and
Hacc Kuli Beg, were now growing up, and they, assisted by some of the
older lieutenants, triumphed in various actions over the Tungan rulers
of Turfan and Hamil, while even the princes of Urumtsi and Manas over
the Tian Shan were unable to oppose the valour and energy of their
adversary. The glory of these military achievements was tarnished by the
ruthless manner in which the district was laid waste, and the
inhabitants were massacred; and the senselessness of these proceedings
only required an hour of trial, such as the Chinese invasion, to prove
how fatal it would be to the enacters of these atrocities. Without any
great cessation, their operations were carried on down to the end of
1873, and it does not appear that Yakoob Beg derived any benefit
whatever from these costly and remote undertakings. Although the Tungan
chiefs of Urumtsi and Hamil were on several occasions defeated by the
armies of the Athalik Ghazi, their cities were never occupied, and they
consequently escaped that desolation which stretched from the walls of
Kucha to the regions north of Lake Lob. Chightam, a small town lying
half way between Turfan and Hamil, was the extreme point to which the
Kashgarian forces penetrated. The noble families of Urumtsi, Turfan, and
Hamil were almost totally destroyed in the fall of Turfan; and their
place in their own cities was seized by Tungan generals and adventurers,
who began to retreat westward from Kansuh, on the rumours of Chinese
preparations for invading Jungaria.
The wars against the Tungani certainly served one useful purpose in
enabling Yakoob Beg to collect a large and disciplined force round his
standard; but the attractions of service in his army lost much of their
value in the eyes of the hardier clans of Turkestan and the neighbouring
states, when it became known that the prospect of loot and prize money
in districts impoverished by several years of hostilities had
diminished. The rigour of the discipline maintained, too, was irksome to
nomads and irregulars accustomed to the easier service and freedom from
restraint of the other Asiatic princes; and during the later years of
his rule there were many desertions, and a difficulty was encountered in
inducing recruits to enter his army. The old practice, employed with
such success in the earlier years of his rule, of inducing the conquered
to combine with the conqueror, was no longer possible, for
extermination had become the order of the day. The Usbegs, Kirghiz, and
other tribes, could not supply in sufficient numbers the requirements of
the state, and the Tungani, who should have comprised the largest
portion of the subjects of the Athalik Ghazi, were coerced into
subjection with an undiscriminating severity. The result was really a
paralysis through sheer want of people, and it was not known until the
hour of trial came how weakened his forces had become. Every inducement
was held forth to Afghan, Badakshi, and, above all, to Indian soldiers
to join, but these, although they formed a nucleus of trustworthy and
efficient soldiers, were far too few to constitute a formidable army. We
are justified in assuming from the facts that these Tungan wars,
conducted in an unsparing manner, were the greatest mistake that marked
the career of Yakoob Beg. So far as his occupation of Kucha goes, he
could at least say that he had secured a valuable prize. He had acquired
every part of what could be considered Kashgar, and his kingdom was
effectually guarded, and his revenues prospectively increased, by the
possession of the great cities of Aksu and Kucha. He might exclaim with
justice that he had eclipsed all his predecessors in military prowess,
and if he had been wise he would then have turned his attention to the
well government of his state, and by so doing have demonstrated that he
was of a higher capacity for ruling a people, as well as for commanding
an army, than any Khoja prince of the past. Had he abstained from
prosecuting with such unflagging persistency his inveterate dislike of
the Tungani, he might easily have come to terms with his neighbours, and
the harm they could have done him would have been infinitesimally small.
But the chief advantage of that more prudent policy would have been
visible when the Chinese advanced to chastise the Tungani. Not only
would the Tungani have been more capable of resisting the Khitay, not
only would Manas and Urumtsi have been capable of offering a more
determined defence, but the Tungani could have retired on Turfan, and
held the country round that town, as well as Karashar and Korla, for a
protracted period against General Kin Shun. The Athalik Ghazi with
untouched resources could have awaited with just confidence the advance
of the Chinese upon his strong frontier city of Kucha, and, as the
Chinese accomplished the difficult task of crushing the Tungani, he
would have had the satisfaction of knowing that in all probability the
Chinese effort would have been spent before it reached his own borders.
It is impossible to judge men except by the results of their actions,
and the result of Yakoob Beg's incessant and unnecessary interference
with the Tungani was that the Chinese army was able in a few months to
dissipate the remaining Tungan communities, and to encounter in the full
flush of their triumph the numerically weaker forces of Yakoob Beg. It
is, therefore, impossible to exonerate the ruler from great blame in
hastily undertaking operations which a little consideration ought to
have shown to be unwise. Having traced Yakoob Beg's wars with the
Chinese Mahomedans, it is time to consider his rule of Kashgaria proper,
and the events that during these years were transpiring in other
quarters of the state.
CHAPTER IX.
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR.
Yakoob Beg's chief claim to our consideration is that, for more than
twelve years, he gave a settled government to a large portion of Central
Asia, and that, however faulty his external policy may have been in
critical moments, his internal management was founded on a practical and
sufficiently just basis. As a warrior he had done much to justify
admiration, and had proved on many a well-fought field, and in many a
desperate encounter, his claims to be considered a fearless and resolute
soldier; but in this quality he was equalled, if not excelled, by his
own lieutenant, Abdulla Beg, the Murat of Kashgar, while some of the
deeds of his son, Beg Bacha, will rank in daring and surpass in ferocity
anything achieved by the Athalik Ghazi. But in capacity for
administration Yakoob Beg far surpassed his contemporaries, and the
merit of his success was enhanced, not so much by the originality of the
method adopted, as by the unique vigour and perseverance with which it
was put into force. The secret of his power can only be discovered by
constantly bearing in mind the fact that he had constituted himself the
champion of the Mahomedan religion in Central Asia. The Ameers of
Bokhara and Afghanistan might trifle with the seductive promises of the
Russians, and might consent to sacrifice the interests of their religion
for a transitory advancement of their worldly possessions; but to such
degradations the Athalik Ghazi--true "champion father" as he was--never
stooped. With whatever imaginary power the sympathy and good-will of
the Mahomedan peoples of Turkestan may have clothed this ruler, there is
no question that his attitude towards the Muscovite would have warranted
the assertion of greater power than was ever attributed to him; and the
secret of this delusion, an attitude of defiant strength without any
solid foundation for so bold a course, can only be unravelled by
remembering that the Athalik Ghazi strove to represent, not so much
Kashgaria, as the whole Mahomedan world of Central Asia. The necessities
of his own position, when, having conquered Kashgar, he found that he
had aroused the susceptibilities of the Russians, compelled him to seek
in every direction for aid, and to have recourse to every artifice for
increasing his strength, or its semblance, in order to avoid the
dissolution of his state and a subjection to the Czar. So well did he
succeed in his efforts, and so prompt were his movements and so fearless
his attitude, that the Russians were deluded into a belief--which was,
as we emphatically insist, unfounded--that Kashgar would prove a more
formidable antagonist than either Bokhara, or Khokand, or Khiva.
The interior management of a state, which, young in years, yet seemed to
tower among its fellows, might be supposed to be a very interesting
topic to dilate upon; but on this subject there is less direct evidence
than could be wished. Even Sir Douglas Forsyth, in his official report,
is not able to throw as much light as is desired on the inner working of
the administrative system of Yakoob Beg. Still, such as it is, with the
exception of the Russian writer, Gregorieff, he is the only authority on
the subject.
To commence with the court and the immediate surroundings of Yakoob Beg,
we are struck by two inconsistencies. In the first place, there were no
great nobles, or indeed adherents or his family; those chiefs who,
whether they were Khokandian nobles or Kirghiz or Afghan adventurers,
had proved their fidelity to his rule, and their capacity for service,
were actively employed as governors of districts, or as commandants of
fortresses in the wide-stretching dominions of their imperious master.
Periodically they came to pay their respects in the capital, and at
frequent intervals Yakoob Beg, in his journeys to the frontier, visited
them, and superintended their operations in person; but, in so active a
community where there was a dearth of mankind, the intellectually gifted
members of the society were too valuable to be permitted to devote their
energies and their attention to the object of becoming palace ornaments.
Yakoob Beg had forced himself on a people who regarded him with
indifference, and he had to maintain himself in his place by a never
relaxing vigour. To make this possible, he required a large staff of
efficient and trustworthy subordinates, who may be divided into three
classes of various capacities, viz., soldiers, administrators, and
tax-gatherers. Until the last few months of his reign there was no
symptom that his system was declining in vigour, or that his supply of
competent officials was limited and susceptible of being exhausted. Even
in his most prosperous years, however, there was always a difficulty in
obtaining a full supply; and in all inferior posts the disaffected
Khitay had to be employed. The Tungani of Kucha and Aksu were scarcely
more to be trusted in an emergency than their Buddhist kinsmen. Yet the
extensive civil service of the state, which undertook the education, the
religion, the civil order, the local administration of the people all
into its own hands, had to be kept in working order, whatever else might
happen. It can at once be perceived that, when a government which never
obtained any deep hold on the affections of the people had only a
limited population to draw upon, it was only a question of time to solve
the difficulty by an exhaustion of the supply of suitable brain
material, or by the uprising of an, at heart, dissatisfied people. No
one will ever understand the secret of Yakoob Beg's rule unless he
constantly bears in mind that his strict orthodoxy as a Mussulman, and
his still stricter enforcement of the laws of his religion within his
borders, were elements of strength only in his external relations; in
his internal affairs they placed him in the light of a tyrant, and
prevented his people ever experiencing any enthusiasm for his person and
rule. It is doubtful whether outside the priesthood and the more
fanatical Andijanis there was any great religious zeal at all, and it is
quite a delusion to speak of the Kashgari, as a whole, as being
fanatical Mahomedans, in the same degree that it is true to say so of
the Bokhariots or Afghans. In addition to there being no noble or
wealthy official class in the city of Kashgar, there was also the
strange inconsistency of an intensely strict etiquette being enforced
side by side with extreme plainness in costume and ceremonial. It is
rare indeed to hear any traveller to Kashgar speaking of the richness or
finery of court functionaries. Even Hadji Torah, or the Seyyid Yakoob
Khan, as he is now called, and Mahomed Yunus, the governor of Yarkand,
two of the most trusted and prominent followers of the Athalik Ghazi,
were not to be distinguished from a host of minor luminaries in the
court circle by any external insignia of their elevated position. Some
of the military, officers of the household troops, wore a device of a
dragon's head worked in silk over their plain uniform of leather; and
this seems to have been a custom surviving the disappearance of the
Chinese. Hadji Torah--who recently visited this country, and who had on
previous occasions travelled in Russia, Turkey, and India--however,
alone among Kashgarian notables, had introduced into his household some
of the comforts and luxuries of European life. His example was not
imitated by many others, and, after a brief period of fashion, the
improvements he had striven to make popular died out and were lost sight
of. The ordinary dress of a person above the rank of gentleman is a
large blanket-like cloak worn over a close-fitting tunic and breeches;
and the dress of the peasant is similar, only his cloak is usually a
sheepskin. The Ameer himself set the example of exceeding plainness in
his costume, and his followers were far too skilled courtiers to vary
their practice from that of their ruler. But what his court lacked in
pomp it gained in impressiveness by the perfect system of etiquette
enforced, and by the external show of reverence to the ruler and to his
religion, manifested in every petty detail of the palace ceremonial. The
Ameer received publicly in his audience-chamber every day, when all
petitions and stringent punishments were submitted to him. His
_shaghawals_, or foreign secretaries, made their report to him on
whatever business might be most pressing, whether it was concerning his
relations with India or Russia, with Afghanistan or the Tungani; and the
local governors, who might happen to have arrived at the capital, were
received in audience, either to present their personal respects to the
ruler, or their reports of the government of their provinces. But with
the exception of a few of his kinsmen, and more intimate associates,
such as Abdulla, none were permitted to be seated in his presence. Even
these could not sit within a certain distance of their sovereign. All
subjects who were allowed to approach his person had to do so in the
humblest manner, and with the deepest expressions of humility and
subjection. His son, Kuli Beg, was still more particular in his
intercourse with his subjects. Even his cousin, Hadji Torah, a man whose
experience and lineage entitled him to exceptional consideration, never
placed himself on an equality with this youthful despot, and always
clothed his words and thoughts when in conversation with him in an
outward show of humble respect and deferential obsequiousness. It will
be at once surmised, and, so far as our information warrants an opinion,
with correctness, that all this terrorism alienated any good feeling
from the ruling family that its prowess in the field and the cabinet
might have secured for it. In Kashgar we have a forcible proof of the
truth of Tennyson's line, that "he who only rules by terror doeth
grievous wrong;" and yet, founded as it was on a military system, and on
the deepest distrust of the subject races, it could not well have been
otherwise.
The most unmistakable proof of how Yakoob Beg's rule was founded, and
how it was maintained, is to be seen in the fact that his _orda_, or
palace, was one large barrack, the interior compartments of which were
devoted to the accommodation of the royal household. His out-houses were
filled with cannon of every description, from antiquated Chinese irjirs
to modern Krupps and Armstrongs, and his select corps of artillerymen,
clothed in a scarlet uniform, seldom left the chief cities, except for
serious operations against foreign enemies. At the Yangy-Shahr of
Kashgar, too, he kept his military stores, and it was said that in his
workshops there he was able to construct cannon and muskets in
considerable numbers in imitation of the most perfect weapons of
European science. But it must be noted that we have no record of any of
his home-made weapons being used in actual hostilities, while the supply
of arms received from Russia, or this country, is known to have been
made the most of. Besides the natural aptitude of his subjects of
Chinese descent for imitation, he had in his service, particularly in
his artillery, many sepoys who had deserted our service either at the
time of the mutiny or since. These soldiers, valuable either as
non-commissioned officers or in higher ranks still, combined with a
large number of good troops from Khokand and the mountain tribes of the
neighbourhood, gave a cohesion and vigour to the whole army that was
simply inestimable. That army, it may be here convenient to say, was
divided into two classes widely differing from each other, and called
upon, except in an emergency, when all the resources of the state were
summoned to take part in its defence, to perform duties as opposite as
their own composition. The army of the Ameer, founded on that confused
assemblage with which he conquered Kashgar, was divided into two bodies,
the _jigit_ or _djinghite_, the horse soldier, and the _sarbaz_, or foot
soldier. The former of these was the more formidable warrior, being
selected for personal strength or skill. The _jigits_ were trained to
fight on foot as well as on horse, and were armed with a long
single-barrelled gun and a sabre. Their uniform was a serviceable coat
of leathern armour mostly buff in colour, and to all intents and
purposes they correspond with our dragoons, or, perhaps, still more
closely with the proposed corps of mounted riflemen. The _sarbaz_, among
whom are included the artillerymen, presented greater varieties of
efficiency than his mounted comrade; still he had gone through some
regular drill and training, and resided in barracks. He was a regular
soldier, and might be trusted in defence of his country up to a certain
point. In numbers it is impossible to state accurately how many _jigits_
and _sarbazes_ there were in the service of the state; some months ago
they would have been placed as high as 50,000 or 60,000 strong, possibly
at a higher number still; now we are wiser on the subject, and we have
gone to the other end of the scale. It is probable, however, that Yakoob
Beg never had 20,000 perfectly trustworthy soldiers in his army, and
that after the conclusion of the Tungan wars, half that number would
more accurately represent his force of _jigits_ and _sarbazes_. But in
addition to the more or less effective main body, there was a
nondescript following of Khitay, Tungani, half-savage Kirghiz, and rude
degraded savages like the Dolans, that in numbers would have presented a
very formidable appearance. The Khitay must at once be struck out of the
estimate, for they were never permitted to go beyond the immediate
vicinity of Yarkand and Kashgar, where they kept themselves apart, and
were employed as military servants, as sentries, and as workmen in the
military shops and factories. The Tungani, who enrolled themselves at
various epochs in the service of Kashgar, were more than dubious in
their fidelity to the state; besides they were of such questionable
courage, that they were no allies of any importance. Even as compared
with one another, these were of varying kinds of efficiency; the Tungani
who joined Yakoob Beg in the earlier portion of his career seeming to be
the best of them. Those who joined after the fall of Aksu and Kucha,
less efficient and more ambiguous in their fidelity; and those who dwelt
in the country from Korla to Turfan and Manas, were totally inefficient,
and not to be trusted to any degree whatever. The Kirghiz and Kipchak
nomads were rather a source of danger to their friends than of dread to
their foes. Yakoob Beg had, therefore, at his orders but a very limited
force to maintain his own dynasty against the machinations of Khoja and
Tungan, and to defend a long and vulnerable frontier against many
powerful and ambitious neighbours. It was absurd for him to think of
venturing single-handed across the path of Russia, and to do him justice
he never deluded himself into the idea that he could. All he seems to
have aspired to was to resist to the uttermost any invasion of his
territory by them, and to die sooner than surrender. Limited in numbers
as his regular forces were, they seem to have had every claim to be
placed high in the rank of Asiatic soldiers. They were certainly not as
formidable a body as the Sikhs or Ghoorkas, probably not as the Afghans;
still they were infinitely superior, except in numbers, to any forces
the Ameer of Bokhara or the Khan of Khokand could place in the line of
battle. To Yakoob Beg alone belongs the credit of their organization.
Yakoob Beg's system of administration was simple in the extreme. A
_Dadkwah_, or governor, was appointed for each district, and in his
hands was vested the supreme control in all the affairs of his province.
Yet he was no irresponsible minister who could tyrannize as he pleased.
Tyrannize in small ways, undoubtedly, many of them did, but, as the life
of the subject could only be taken away by order of the ruler himself,
the most powerful weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous viceroy was
removed.
At stated periods, too, he had to proceed to Kashgar to give a report of
the chief occurrences in his province, and on such occasions petitions
containing charges against the Dadkwah were formally considered in his
presence. It may be said that this proceeding was a farce, and it is
probably true that a favoured viceroy could laugh at any ordinary
accusation against his character. But that would be an exceptional case.
Many Dadkwahs were reduced in official rank, for malpractices, and some,
such as Yakoob Beg's own half-brother, were removed for incompetence in
their charges. Side by side, too, with the Dadkwah, ruled the Kazi or
Judge, who, if of course not on a par in rank with the viceroy, was
still invested with complete authority in all legal decisions on crime.
This prominence given to the legal authorities had a good effect on the
public mind, for, although the Kazi, as a rule, might not dare to thwart
the wishes of the Dadkwah, the effect of the law being supreme was
scarcely detracted from. And what was that law? it may naturally be
asked. Precisely the same as the law of every other Mahomedan state,
with a few innovations traceable to the influence of the Chinese. The
Shariát, the holy code of the Prophet followed in all the Sunni states,
was enforced by Yakoob Beg, with particular severity; and in its working
no sense of mercy was permitted to temper the harshness of its
regulations. Crimes committed by women were punished with greater
inflictions than the same committed by men; and the ordinary
punishments, whipping, mutilation, and torture could be inflicted by
order of the Dadkwah. Only in capital cases had the decision to rest
with the sovereign. Thieves, beggars, and vagrants found wandering about
the streets at prohibited hours were immediately locked up, and brought
before the Kazi, who would either administer a caution, or a whipping,
if the accused had previously offended. Another check on the abuse of
power by the officials was to be found in the following regulation. A
charge to be visited with a severer punishment than twenty heavy strokes
from the _dira_--a leather strap, fixed in a wooden handle--had to be
investigated by a member of each official rank; so the Kazi passed a
culprit on, with his comments, to the Mufti, the Mufti to the Alim, and
the Alim to the Dadkwah. If any of these officials dissented from the
remarks of his subordinate, and the matter was found impossible to
arrange by mutual concessions, it was either referred to the sovereign
for solution, or was permitted to fall through. The Dadkwah had also to
be present at every punishment within his jurisdiction, and was directly
responsible to the Ameer for any miscarriage of justice. The Kazi Rais,
or head judge, had the right to decide all minor matters for
himself--for instance, in his patrols through the streets, if he met a
woman unveiled he could order her to be struck so many times with the
_dira_; or if he found a man selling adulterated food, or using light
weights, he could confiscate his goods, or in some other manner mulct
him in addition to administering a certain number of strokes. He and his
attendants were particularly energetic and zealous in compelling idlers
about the bazaars to repair to the mosques at prayer time, and in a very
paternal and authoritative manner did the Rais exercise his petty power
for the good of his people. Even on his despotism there was some check,
as he had no authority to inflict more than forty blows with the _dira_
for one offence. Intimately connected with the administration of justice
was the police system, which in its intricate ramifications permeated
all sections of society. Much as we may feel admiration for the judicial
code, which, up to a certain point admirably administered, ensured a
certain kind of rough justice throughout the Athalik Ghazi's dominions,
the police laws and discipline have greater claims to our favourable
opinion, as evidences of an astonishing capacity for government. In his
legal code, Yakoob Beg simply adopted the laws enforced on all true
believers by the Koran, and he had no claims to originality as a
lawgiver. But as a ruler adopting all those checks on sedition which lie
at the disposal of an unscrupulous sovereign, and which were brought to
such a pitch of perfection under Fouché and the Second Empire, Yakoob
Beg has reason to be placed in the very highest class of such
potentates. In this achievement, too, he was not a plagiarist, and, as
he must have been ignorant of similar regulations existing in Europe, he
must be allowed the credit of having originated a system of police in
which it is difficult to find a single flaw. In China, indeed, something
of the same kind has at all times existed, and at periods when the
Emperor grasped the sceptre firmly, and made his individuality felt in
the management of affairs, the police were one of the most active tools
of power. But even in that empire there is no record of their having
attained so complete a control over the actions and sentiments of the
people as in Kashgaria during the last decade. It appears, too, that in
superiority of system lay the sole pre-eminence of the latter; for the
Tungan, or policeman, of China was, individually man for man, a superior
class to the Kashgarian and other constables of Yakoob Beg. In short,
the whole credit of their existence belongs to that ruler.
Let us now give some account of this important body. It was divided into
two chief divisions quite distinct from and irrespective of each other,
secret and municipal. The _secret_ was not, like ours, a perceptible
class of detectives, acting in combination with the municipal, to which
was entrusted the discovery of crimes and conspiracies. It may loosely
be described as consisting of every member of the community, for all
desired to stand well with the powers that be, and the easiest way to
attain that object would be to place all confidential information at
their disposal. But it is evident that even in a state of irresponsible
power, like Kashgar, a clear encouragement, such as this, to invent
libels of one's neighbours, could only end in unprofitable litigation
and confusion. There was certainly a check on the too zealous
imaginations of the subjects, and, although there is not much evidence
on the subject, it appears to have been twofold. In the first place a
libeller incurred the risk of receiving very severe punishment,
particularly if the person libelled were of saintly lineage, or if he
filled any official post. This operated as a check on too hasty
accusations, especially when it became known that the reward for such
service was seldom speedily forthcoming, and scarcely ever answered the
expectations of the informer. But this check, which alone seems to have
been adopted in the earlier years of Yakoob Beg's authority, was found
to be insufficient as his power became consolidated. The secret police
then became organized to a certain degree; that is to say, they so far
formed a distinct corps that a member had to be approved of either by
the Dadkwah or the Rais. So well, however, was the secret of their
individuality maintained that few of them were generally known to the
people. Suspicion was wide-spread throughout all ranks of society, and
the governor in his _orda_, or the Rais in his hall of justice, or the
shopkeeper in his booth, or the artisan in his hut, never felt safe that
his neighbour, the man with whom he was holding the most friendly
converse, was not dissecting his expressions to discover whether they
contained anything treasonable. Members of this formidable body were
always attached to the suite of either foreign envoys or merchants; and
their presence in the rear of the _cortége_, always effectually closed
the mouths of the inhabitants, or only induced them to open them to give
false or contradictory replies.
There can be no doubt that this secret organization, brought to a high
pitch of perfection during the later years of his reign, gave a
consistency and strength to Yakoob Beg's tenure of power that was
wanting to all his predecessors. In leaving this part of the system, it
is as well to point out in conclusion that this detective force was
only useful in discovering what was about to occur in the state among
Andijani or Tungani, and that it was powerless to attempt the repression
by force of any outbreak of popular feeling. Its members were simply
spies, and as a body its value vanished when its members became
generally known. Constant changing, and the introduction of fresh
members, were the sole effectual means of preserving the _incognito_ of
a large body of men, and women even, who preserved official
communication only with the local governor or judge.
The municipal police were subdivided into urban and suburban, and they
present a complete contrast to the vague body we have just attempted to
describe. Their functions were known and recognizable. They were the
functionaries who put into practice the behests of the Kazi, and they
maintained order in the streets and bazaars, much as our own do. The
_Corbashi_ is the head of this body, and his subordinates are styled
_tarzagchi_. They wore a distinct uniform, and had drilling grounds
attached to barracks, in which, however, they were not all compelled to
reside. They were essentially military in their rules, and presented a
powerful first front to all evil-doers and would-be rebels. It was they
who accompanied the Kazi Rais in his daily circuit of the streets and
market-place, and it was from their weapon, the _dira_, that the
ordinary punishment was received. Their principal avocation seems to
have been to maintain order in the towns during the night-time, for in
the day we only hear of a few of them being detailed for personal
attendance on the Dadkwah and Kazi. With sunset their true importance is
more visible, for not only were they stationed in all main
thoroughfares, squares, and other open places of the city; but until
sunrise patrols at frequent intervals throughout the night visited all
the chief quarters of the town. The power vested in their hands during
these hours was very great, and it was dangerous for any stranger to
venture out after prohibited hours. All persons found in the streets
after sunset were arrested and incarcerated until the morning, when, if
they could give a satisfactory account of themselves, they were
released, with a caution not to keep such unseemly hours for the future.
If, however, they were unable to explain their business, a further term
of imprisonment was imposed; and it was a matter of some difficulty for
a stranger to obtain his complete liberty for some time afterwards. The
suburban police fulfilled much the same duties, and on all the country
roads patrols passed up and down during the night, while pickets were
stationed at the cross-roads. In the same manner as in the towns all
travellers, except those armed with a passport, were interned for a
minute investigation into their affairs in the morning. And "thieves,
beggars, and wanderers" were chastised at the discretion of the local
magistrate. The vagrant laws were as much enforced, too, as they were in
this country in the days of Queen Elizabeth, and in a general mode of
interference with the thoughts and actions of its subjects, the
Kashgarian government had attained a height of excellence that would
entitle it to rank with the Inquisition. Still there was order. No riots
occurred to distract the harmony of the public weal, and to an external
observer, especially to one belonging to a country where order is
considered the greatest _desideratum_, the government of the Athalik
Ghazi seemed to be the perfection of an Asiatic state, and that order a
reason for attributing all other virtues to its originator.
Travellers, however, who were provided with a passport, were accorded
privileges of transit, and were permitted, if they felt so disposed, to
continue their journeys during hours interdicted to less privileged
mortals. In each chief town there were offices for the issue of these
permits to travel. Not many obstacles were thrown in the path of those,
who left permanent guarantees in the shape of property behind them for
their return, in accomplishing their desire for travel; but rarely was
permission granted to any one, not blessed with these worldly
advantages, to proceed farther than the neighbouring district. Indeed in
all cases leave to visit foreign states, other than Khokand or Bokhara,
was a matter of difficulty to be obtained, and only in the most
exceptional cases was it granted. But it appears that there were some
evasions of this regulation by a simulation of religious zeal, for the
Sheikh-ul-Islam had it in his power to grant permits to leave the
country on pilgrimages to Bokhara the "holy," or to Mecca. In themselves
the passports were simple in phraseology. They merely stated the name
and address of the traveller, the nature of his business, and his
destination. Having obtained the consent of the Dadkwah, and the
authority of the Kazi, no difficulty was experienced in procuring the
necessary slip of paper. Infractions of this permission, by too long an
absence, or by proceeding in some forbidden direction, were visited on a
first offence with a fine. On a repetition of it, however, the
punishment became more severe. It would be interesting to know how these
protectors of the public peace were paid, and by what means. But on this
point there is little trustworthy information. We, however, know of one
tax which was devoted to the support of the urban police, but of the
funds from which the suburban were remunerated, we have no authority for
any assertion. A weekly tax was levied from all the shop and booth
owners, to go towards the payment of their protectors; but it is not
supposed that this amounted to a sufficient sum to maintain the large
force in the more important cities. The difference was probably paid out
of the state coffers under the head of justice. Judging from this we
cannot be far wrong in assuming that a similar tax was levied on the
farmers and country residents for the support of the suburban police;
and as the secret police required less outlay in the country than in the
cities, it is possible that that tax more nearly defrayed the total
cost, than it did in Yarkand or Kashgar. The police supervision and the
military terrorism, freely resorted to on all occasions offering an
excuse for such an extreme measure, have not been without their effect
in leaving traces of their existence and influence in the daily life of
the Kashgari, and on the countenances and sentiments of the subject
peoples. Where formerly lived a light-hearted and happy race there now
seemed as if a never-to-be-removed gloom had settled down on the face of
the land, and neither the assurance of security nor the irregular
encouragement of the ruler to commerce could remove the blight that had
fallen upon the energies and happiness of the people. As one of them
expressed it, in pathetic language, "During the Chinese rule there was
everything; there is nothing now." The speaker of that sentence was no
merchant, who might have been expected to be depressed by the
falling-off in trade, but a warrior and a chieftain's son and heir. If
to him the military system of Yakoob Beg seemed unsatisfactory and
irksome, what must it have appeared to those more peaceful subjects to
whom merchandise and barter were as the breath of their nostrils? All
the advantages of a perfect police system, heavily weighted by the
incumbrance of a costly addition of spies and tale-bearers, would seem
as nothing compared with the loss incurred by the fetters placed on
individual motion and enterprise. Considered by itself, the police
organization of Kashgar was, perhaps, the most perfect design achieved
by Yakoob Beg, and his community of spies will rank with anything in
effectiveness that has ever been accomplished by any potentate. But as a
permanent addition to his strength it is permissible to doubt whether he
really secured his rule by employing the latter, or obtained much more
by the formation of the former than the services of a trained body of
trustworthy, courageous men. The restrictions imposed on trade by the
severance of all communications with the East by the Tungan wars and by
the limited amount of liberty granted the native Kashgari, proved most
deterrent to all mercantile adventure, and placed in the hands of
Khokandians or Russians on the north, and of Cashmerians and Punjabis on
the south, most of the trade still carried on with Eastern Turkestan.
The trade carried on by the Athalik Ghazi's state, if we are to judge
solely by amount, with foreign countries, was greatest with Russia and
her dependencies; but if we investigate the matter more closely we find
that the result is a little more satisfactory to ourselves. The direct
trade that was carried on by way of Leh with Khoten and Sanju was
steadily increasing, while that of Russia by Khokand had for some time
remained stationary, if it had not even decreased. And then much of the
Russian trade has to be scored to this country, for in the marts of
Kashgar, underneath Russian exteriors, were very often to be found
English interiors, and the brand of well-known Manchester and Liverpool
makers was discovered beneath some gaudy and brilliant-looking cover
hailing from Moscow or Nishni Novgorod. Besides, recent investigations
have proved that some of the goods exported from Shikarpore, in Scinde,
through the Bholan Pass find their way through the mountainous districts
that intervene into the territory of his late Highness the Ameer of
Kashgar. Nor had Yakoob Beg totally neglected all means for inducing
merchants to enter his state; indeed, his chief objection seemed to have
been, not that they should have entered his state, but that they should
leave it. Serais were built in all the chief towns for the accommodation
of such merchants as might take up a temporary abode within his
territory, and the Andijani Serai, or hotel, specially constructed for
merchants from Khokand, was one of the largest and most striking
buildings in the city of Kashgar. Yakoob Beg had even detailed off to
take care of the serai and its occupants a large number of the old
Khitay, or Yangy Mussulmans, who were generally employed throughout the
city as domestic servants. When we come to the description of the
relations of Yakoob Beg with England and with Russia we will speak more
fully of the details of those treaties of commerce which were ratified
on several occasions, and whose ostensible object was the promotion of
trade and other friendly intercourse.
We have now considered the army, the police, the administration of
justice, and the court of Yakoob Beg, and the only chief subject that
remains to be discussed are the principles of finance adopted by the
Ameer. To keep any state, even an Asiatic state, in a fit condition for
preserving its independence, a settled revenue is requisite, and Yakoob
Beg, whose atmosphere was one of almost continual warfare, was on
several occasions pressed for money in a manner difficult to be
conceived by us. His military operations languished for the want of the
sinews of war, and we are told on credible authority that many of his
soldiers received only payment out of the spoil taken at the sack of
Turfan and other places. So long as his ordinary expenditure was
increased by the addition of an extraordinary war outlay, so long was he
unable to make his receipts and expenditure balance. On the cessation of
hostilities against the Tungani, and the partial revival of trade in
consequence, his fiscal affairs assumed a brighter aspect, and it is
possible that during the last few years of his reign his revenue showed
a surplus. But to obtain that success, a most joyful one to every
embarrassed potentate, Yakoob Beg had to resort to many strange
expedients, and to manifest much patience and long-suffering; and in
overcoming petty obstacles and minor details, he proved himself to be a
man of more than average ability, no less than he had previously by the
skilful manipulation of armies and intriguers. Here again he erected a
structure distinct and separate from that handed down to him by the
Chinese. Comparatively speaking, the Chinese had been wealthy to the
Athalik Ghazi, and they received in moderate imposts on merchandise
alone almost a sufficient sum to defray the total cost of their
administration. Yakoob Beg had no such certain source of revenue; he had
to raise from an impoverished and only half-conquered state a sum almost
as large as that required by the Chinese. That he did it remains the
chief proof of his skill as a finance minister, and is another reason
for our regarding this extraordinary ruler with admiration. We may feel
sure that if we could follow closely the history of his fiscal efforts,
and the numberless plans that proved abortive, we should have revealed
one of the most instructive and interesting narratives of modern Asia.
There are no materials out of Kashgar, if there are such there, for such
an investigation however, and we can only follow as best we may be able,
the thread of events by the light of such authorities as are at our
disposal. In court and personal expenditure he set an example that might
with advantage be followed by other rulers in Asia even at the present
day, and in a strict economy and supervision of the petty sums that in
the aggregate make all the difference in any state between a surplus and
a deficit, were to be found the two guiding principles of his conduct.
Kashgaria might be in a very backward state of cultivation, and years of
commotion and warfare had undoubtedly thrown it back in the ranks of
prosperity and civilization, but the Athalik Ghazi was persuaded of the
truth of the Latin philosopher's saying, that "Parsimonia magna
vectigalia est." It must be remembered that Yakoob Beg set himself a
different task to accomplish than had the Chinese. Their idea was not so
much to extend their empire, although there has always been a tendency
with the Chinese to be aggressive against small neighbours, as to
acquire a territory that could be made a paying thing: much as the
pioneers of Anglo-Saxon conquest have made their impression in every
quarter of the globe in search of wealth and adventure, did the Chinese
by a seemingly irresistible impulse spread over the continent of Asia.
In doing so they were actuated as much by calculation of possible profit
as by any desire for military renown. The Emperor Keen-Lung himself was
flattered by the triumphs achieved beyond Gobi; but his lieutenants and
viceroys aimed at more mercenary objects, and but for the golden promise
held forth by a permanent conquest of Turkestan would have induced their
master to direct his efforts to some more profitable undertaking. The
Chinese, having acquired Kashgar, were far too sagacious to use up its
resources by an organized system of pillage, and they accordingly, let
it be granted chiefly with a view to their own personal aggrandizement,
devoted their attention to the development of its natural wealth by
means already detailed in a previous chapter. For three generations the
officials grew rich on the prosperity of their dependency, and for the
same period the people themselves were scarcely less flourishing. The
Chinese had accepted no slight responsibility in undertaking the
government of Kashgar on principles identical with those by which they
held authority in Tibet; but, owing to wonderful perseverance and good
management, they triumphed over every difficulty. The revenue raised for
state and local purposes was very great, and it sufficed to preserve
good order for many years, and to add permanent improvement to the state
in every direction. The task voluntarily undertaken by the Chinese was
far more onerous than that Yakoob Beg found he had to execute; but they
came to it with many advantages that he wanted. They had a large and
faithful army; he had only an uncertain gathering, which might flee or
desert on the first symptom of disaster: they had the resources of a
great and powerful empire at their back; he had nothing but his own
energy and determination: and above all, they had a reputation that
added to their strength and facilitated their undertakings, while he was
regarded as a mere military adventurer, receiving the contempt of Tungan
and Khoja alike. The very nature of things made the Chinese turn most of
their attention to commerce, while for years Yakoob Beg's sole thought
was to consolidate his military strength and form a large standing army.
For many years, then, Yakoob Beg only spent money on the drilling of
soldiers and the purchase of weapons. Now and then, when some danger
seemed to threaten him, either from Russia, Afghanistan, or the Tungani,
he would devote considerable sums to the construction of forts in the
line of the menaced position. But his chief expenditure was confined to
his army, and the maintenance of his dynasty by his police system. The
administration of justice required a certain sum of money, and the
Church for its support came in for a fair share of the good things that
were going. It is clear that his expenditure, if not very great in our
eyes, would severely tax a population of 1,000,000 people in no very
high state of prosperity. The chief source of wealth in the past had
always been the trade with China, and when that was broken off, the
slight increase in intercourse with Russia and India was not a
sufficient compensation. In fact, the country was very poor, without the
ingenuity and commercial instincts of the Khitay. During the days of the
war under Buzurg Khan, the only means of obtaining the necessary revenue
was by despoliation and enforced levies on the occupied portion of the
territory. When the western portion of Kashgaria was subdued, Yakoob Beg
found himself without any money in his exchequer, and no easy means of
filling it presented itself to him. In these straits he had recourse to
an expedient that, if not very novel, was at all events very effective.
He issued a proclamation to his faithful subjects to the effect that as
conqueror he was landowner of the whole state; but that he was
willing--eager would have been the more correct expression--to sell it
to them at a cheap rate. He, however, exempted from this the old
possessions of the Chinese Wangs and Ambans, and distributed their
extensive domains among the more prominent of his followers, who in
return acknowledged their liability to military service. The system was
an exact copy of the old feudal régime, and Yakoob Beg was vested with
all the rights and authority of the feudal lord of the Middle Ages. The
parallel is still further maintained by the large reward that the Church
received for its aid to the new ruler. The old revenues, devoted to the
support of the temples and religious seminaries in the past, and which
had miscarried during the troublous period of the war for the possession
of Turkestan, were restored, and fresh possessions were added thereto,
to demonstrate the generosity of the sovereign and his veneration for
the religion of Mahomed. His old friend the Sheikh-ul-Islam was still
more fortunate, and a large estate was set apart for his special
enjoyment. Nor does it appear that the Mussulman priests abused the
fresh power and advantages they thus secured; for among the toilers in
Kashgaria none were more energetic than they in educating the people,
and in extending their influence over their minds, both for the benefit
of their religion and for the security of the power of the Athalik
Ghazi. But in one respect, and it is impossible to exaggerate its
importance, Yakoob Beg's endeavours to found a strong military class,
bound to him by ties of past favours and others yet to come, were
abortive; for with rare exceptions his followers refused to fill their
new avocation of landed proprietors. Instead of devoting their attention
to the questions arising from agriculture and other rural pursuits, they
sub-let all their possessions to Andijani immigrants, and, residing in
their city _ordas_, gave themselves over either to lascivious pleasures
or to complete indolence. Even so distinguished a warrior as Abdulla
Beg, the slayer of more than 12,000 persons, as his panegyrists boasted,
suffered from the pervading effeminacy on the cessation of active
hostilities; and in the lower ranks of the service such deterioration in
energy was still more manifest. This change in the spirit of his earlier
supporters, among other things, obliged Yakoob Beg to depend the more on
the Andijani merchants and shopkeepers, and conduced to his adopting
more favourable views on foreign trade in the later years of his power.
The sum of money which he immediately received by the sale of lands
placed him in a condition to undertake those wars against the Tungani,
which added so much to the extent of his territory and to the
responsibilities of his position. Indeed, for several years after its
first enforcement it continued to bring in a certain amount to the
coffers of the State. But even this resource was transitory, and the sum
of money received by this means and in the shape of spoil, from Yarkand,
Kashgar, Khoten, and other places, was not sufficient to meet the
expenditure caused by the formation of a large army. Neither of these
practices could be regarded as a permanent means of obtaining a revenue,
for the former would scarcely admit of a repetition, and the latter soon
exhausted itself. So when his rule had become a little settled, and
these modes of raising money, in addition to the still more
reprehensible practice of robbing foreign merchants, had become out of
date to a certain degree, the Athalik Ghazi had to place his fiscal
arrangements on a more practical and honourable basis. While he laboured
under some disadvantages, already enumerated, as compared with the
Chinese, he had the great advantage over them that he strove for an
object more easily accomplished than the restoration of Kashgar to its
pristine welfare; and in his budget he had only steadily to keep in view
how much he required to maintain so many _jigits_, and so many police in
his pay, and to keep in his exchequer a small surplus for any untoward
emergency. He left the roads to take care of themselves; the irrigation
works, sadly wanted in various parts of the state, must be reserved for
his successors; and all proposals for the amelioration of the people
were shelved for a more opportune occasion. But so many thousand
_jigits_ must be in the ranks; so many fresh guns and cartridges must be
placed in the arsenals; and so many adventurers must be induced by good
pay to take service in the army as non-commissioned officers, in order
that the rank and file should be well drilled. The very necessities of
his position compelled Yakoob Beg to make all these military
preparations; but the cost was great, and the sacrifices thus imposed on
ruler and on people were a terrible strain. Recent events make us
inclined to believe that a less active military and foreign policy, and
a more peaceable and domestic one, would have tended to have added more
strength to the Athalik Ghazi's rule than the somewhat ostentatious
military parade to which he had recourse. Be that as it may, Yakoob Beg
instituted in 1867 two taxes, which may be supposed to represent the two
chief classes of receipts during his tenure of authority. The first of
these was a tithe on all the cereal produce of the country; this tax was
called the _Ushr_. The second, called the _Zakat_, was a customs due
levied on all merchandise entering Kashgar. The _Ushr_ was payable on
all land except that occupied by the Church, or by those who owed
military service to the crown instead of other payment; and even those
who rented land from the noble classes were obliged to surrender a tithe
to the ruler. It would appear, therefore, from this that it was not so
much the land as its legal possessor who was exempt from liability to
the usual obligations of citizenship. The danger contained in the
acquisition of all the crown lands by Andijani merchants, and the
gradual displacement of his more immediate followers through the energy
of these people, was not imperceptible to Yakoob Beg, and he accordingly
adopted measures for preventing his nobles selling their land without
his sanction. The receipts from this _Ushr_ were very considerable, and
it was the main source of his revenue for years. We have some idea of
the approximate value of land in Kashgar. The method of measuring land
for sale, and consequently also for taxation, is peculiar. It is not by
any given size that it is computed, or, indeed, strictly speaking by the
amount of crop it produces; but at a rate in accordance with the amount
of wheat with which it had been planted. The average rate was about a
pound for as much land as was sown with 20 lb. of wheat. The tenant, as
has been said, paid the government dues and handed over three-fourths of
the net produce to the landlord as rent, receiving for his portion only
the one-fourth remaining. Under this system it was only in very
prosperous years that any but very large tenants made sufficient to earn
a competent livelihood. In bad years it is possible that the landlord
had to satisfy himself with a smaller share, if he was not induced to
surrender his claim altogether for the disastrous period. But the
tax-farmers, entrusted with the collection of this rate, were eager to
become rich, no less than to earn a good name with the authorities for
bringing in a list with no defaulters. The unfortunate people were
completely at their mercy, and without any means of ascertaining the
accuracy of the claim, or of opposing extortionate demands on the part
of the tax-collectors. They paid without a murmur, perhaps without a
suspicion of the imposition that was being practised upon them, the sum
demanded of them, if they were able; and as their dues were payable
without delay and on demand before anything else was taken out of the
total sum of the produce, the Athalik Ghazi received his share with
regularity, and his tax-collector pocketed the excess sum for his own
satisfaction. In many cases it is known that the amount claimed by the
official exceeded by threefold the legal demand. Such a system was no
less hurtful to the ruler than it was ruinous to the people. That in one
tax alone a larger sum should be extracted from the people for the
benefit of the officials than was contributed for the necessities of the
state, exhibited a very loose system of supervision on the part of the
sovereign, and is a strong piece of evidence that in many ways Yakoob
Beg was a mixture of contradictions. We can scarcely persuade ourselves
that he was aware of these occurrences, and yet how could he be ignorant
of them?
In addition to the _Ushr_ there was another tax on home produce, viz.,
the _Tanabi_, or tax on land devoted to the production of vegetables or
fruit. The Tanab is, by the way, a lineal measure of forty-seven yards,
and a Tanabi is a piece of land forty-seven yards square. On this extent
of land cultivated for vegetables, or fruit, a small tax was raised.
More than any other tax did this vary according to the character of the
district, and to the quality of the year's crop. It was seldom less than
a shilling a Tanabi, even in the least renowned district, whereas in
some parts, in good years, it was five shillings, or even more. Here
again, however, the middleman interfered, and exacted as much as he saw
there was any possibility of his obtaining. This tax undoubtedly ought
to have produced a large sum, as a larger portion of the soil is laid
out as fruit and vegetable gardens than for crops; but whether it was
more difficult to raise, or there was more peculation _in transitu_ from
the tax-payer to the imperial exchequer, it is certain that we hear much
less of this tax than we should be disposed to imagine. The two great
taxes on home productions were therefore a corn due and a fruit due. The
rate was not in itself excessive, and could be paid by any community
without embarrassment. It is uncertain to what extent the avarice of the
officials had made the conditions of these two taxes more onerous,
although, on the most favourable supposition, the citizen was mulcted in
no inconsiderable sum. A more serious question for the ruler was, how
did it affect his own position with regard to his subjects? Did Yakoob
Beg appear in the eyes of the Kashgari as an exacting and oppressive
tyrant on account of these heavy impositions?
It is impossible to speak on this point with any degree of certainty,
but it is only natural to expect that such was the case. No tiller of
the ground can feel grateful to a sovereign who required him to hand
over almost one-third of his receipts before he made use of one penny of
them, even for the payment of his rent. It is scarcely probable that
Yakoob Beg approved of such enormous profits going to his officials;
but, that having tolerated petty exactions in his earlier days, he found
himself unable to attempt the task of coping with the evil when it had
assumed such alarming proportions. It is impossible to believe that he
remained in ignorance of what was occurring under his very eyes, and
there is some evident foundation for the accusation that he participated
in the division of the profits of his tax-gatherers. We should be loth
to admit the accuracy of such a charge, and yet the arguments in its
favour are too plausible to admit of a very confident contradiction. It
would not speak well for the efficiency of his secret police if he had
remained in ignorance of a fact which was losing him the sympathy of his
subjects.
The gold mines at Khoten were worked after the fall of that city in
1868, and continued productive down to the present time. There is no
information on the quantities of the precious metal that are there
turned out in the year, but it is probable that they are not very great.
The coal mines near Aksu and Kucha are no longer made use of, except by
a few individuals, and the copper mines in that district have, since the
departure of the Chinese, only been very partially explored. The jade
that used to come in great quantities from Aksu and Khoten, is still to
be found throughout Kashgar; but although it is probable that it still
nearly all comes from those cities, the Kashgari themselves tell a
hesitating tale as to its place of production. A visitor to Kashgar, on
going the round of the bazaars, soon found that the people's tongues
were tied by the presence, in his train, of a number of the secret
police, who had been specially told off to prevent the Feringhee
obtaining any troublesome information on the state of the people, or the
resources of the state. A striking instance was given him of the close
attention paid by these guardians of order to the veriest trifles. The
traveller inquired in one stall where the jade, which was the chief
commodity of the merchant in question, came from, and received the
reply, Aksu. Proceeding to another shop in the street, he repeated the
question, when he was informed that it was imported from Khokand. But
the traveller said, your neighbour told me it came from Aksu. The
shopkeeper, taken aback by this abrupt remark, became confused, and
admitted that it came from Aksu. Warned by a look from the official, he
then repeated his original assertion that it came from Khokand. The use
of all this absurd shuffling, and attempt to throw dust in strangers'
eyes, is impossible to discover; for it was a matter of little moment
whether jade came from Aksu, or Khokand, so long as we knew that it
formed an important commodity, both in the rough and in the chiselled
state, in the cities of Kashgaria.
The customs tax, or _Zakat_, is sanctioned by the Shariát, and was
levied at all the border posts on the various roads leading into the
state. Up to the ratification of the treaties with Great Britain and
Russia, its regulations were vague and elastic in the extreme. In fact,
any merchant who might have been so foolhardy as to venture into Kashgar
would have had reason, before these events, to think himself fortunate
if he escaped the penalty of his rashness; for assuredly his luggage
would not, but would have been confiscated for the special benefit of
his Highness the Ameer. So late as 1869, Russian merchants were robbed
of their baggage, and personally ill-treated, and only after long years
of negotiation did the Russian Government obtain any satisfaction for
the injuries and loss inflicted on one of their subjects. And then how
did the Athalik Ghazi send the sum of money he agreed to pay for the
loss the merchant had incurred?--why in a depreciated Chinese currency,
part of a large number of coins that he had found in a disused temple in
Kashgar! Before this, all the external trade had been carried on with
Khokand and Bokhara, Afghanistan and Badakshan, and the receipts from
_Zakat_ were quite insignificant, barring such treasure trove as the
spoliation of a merchant from Tashkent, or from Leh. But with the
persistent efforts on the part of the Russians on the north, and of the
English native merchants on the south, to pierce the gloom hiding the
country of Eastern Turkestan, it became impossible for Yakoob Beg to
maintain much longer the incognito he was so jealous in maintaining.
Perhaps also the prospect of deriving an income from _Zakat_, that
should smooth down many of his difficulties, was not without some
influence on his mind when he came into direct contact with civilized
empires. His expectations were far too sanguine, and he seems to have
once more, during the last twelve months of his life, become indifferent
to the advantages or disadvantages of trade with his neighbours. In
fact, when he placed his customs on a fair footing, he found that it
would require many years to recoup him for the excessive exactions he
surrendered. The merchants who first attempted to commence intercourse
with Kashgar became speedily discouraged by the dangers of the route,
and the small opening for a large remunerative trade in a country whose
wealth and population had been magnified tenfold. In a country where the
richest merchant in the chief town possessed only a capital of £8,000,
not much could be expected in the way of fortune; and although the legal
dues on all merchandise were fixed at an _ad valorem_ rate of 2-1/2 per
cent., it was soon discovered that if the ruler happened to be in want
of cash he would not scruple to take what he could from the stranger.
Both to the ruler, and to the foreign merchant, the new arrangement
contained distasteful matter. The former perceived that he had
surrendered some of his imperial rights, and that he was not to be
recompensed by his receiving more money, and the latter knew that the
treaty stipulation would not save him from having to pay excess fees.
The _Zakat_, far from showing the expected disposition to increase,
seemed rather inclined to remain stationary, if not to decrease; and
the foreign merchant had obtained some promise on the part of the ruler
of personal protection, and of assistance in the disposal of his wares.
His discontent at the stagnation in the customs soon showed itself by
his exacting excess dues, sometimes on British, sometimes on Russian,
but more often on Khokandian and Afghan merchants. Instead of increasing
his receipts, these strong measures only threw them back, and left him
in a worse plight than he was in before. He had not the patience
necessary to enable him to wait with confidence the fuller development
of trade, nor had he the perseverance or tact to place fresh inducements
in the path of merchants to renew their intercourse with him and his
state. Many visited Kashgar with merchandise a first time; but few,
indeed, repeated the visit. The ruler was off-handed in his reception of
them. They were scarcely accorded any liberty in their movements, and
the profit of their journey was greatly reduced by the payment of a due
of 5 per cent. instead of the stipulated condition of 2-1/2 per cent. It
is a pure fiction, therefore, to say that trade with Kashgar had
increased during the rule of the Athalik Ghazi through his friendly
inclination. If the amount of merchandise imported into his state had
increased, it was owing only to the necessities of its inhabitants, and
was a fact that must have taken place either by intercourse direct, or
through native states, with the two great providers of Central Asia. The
exaggerated enthusiasm that it was endeavoured to raise up in this
country about this same mythical ruler of Yarkand never spread far, and
there was always some scepticism, if there could be no disproof, of the
reports of the formidableness of this new kingdom. Looking calmly at the
real state of Yakoob Beg's position, even at the height of his power, we
find him to have always been a pecuniarily embarrassed ruler, glad of
the smallest windfall in the shape of the spoil of a single merchant.
The _Zakat_, his advisers pointed out to him, might be made a most
productive source of revenue, if foreign merchants could be induced to
bring their wares into the country. The loss the people had felt in the
departure of the Chinese might be amply repaired by the appearance of
Russian and English merchants to supply the same place that they filled.
If his aspirations were disappointed, and the _Zakat_ did not show any
signs of possessing that elasticity which had been predicted, it is
probable that in his impatience, heightened by the perception that
foreign trade might lead to foreign complications, he did not give the
scheme a sufficient time for a fair trial. His other sources of revenue,
_Ushr_ and _Tanabi_, and the gold mines of Khoten, brought in a sum
enough to meet the current expenses of the government and to maintain in
his service as many soldiers as his recruiting officers were able to
secure. But there was little if any surplus; and local improvements, and
all outlay that might have been reproductive and for the benefit of the
people, were strictly forbidden. The only works we can find constructed
by him, with a view to the advancement of the interests of his subjects,
were the merchants' _serais_, built in each city, and these were
self-supporting. Yakoob Beg has no claim to being considered as a
beneficent ruler. He was a military dictator, who had shown a rare power
for inaugurating a rough system of government, and whose campaigns had
always been singularly successful. As a ruler, showing a full
appreciation of the wants of his people, and adopting the best possible
measures to obtain them, he had no claims to consideration. Indeed, he
could not be compared with the Chinese, who, however personal may have
been their motives, certainly raised the state to a high pitch of
material prosperity, and left many enduring marks of their past
occupation. These two dominations, foisted on the Kashgari by the strong
arm, while each immeasurably superior to the Khoja claimants,
represented two distinct modes of governing a subject race. The Chinese
endeavoured to conciliate, and to make the necessity for their presence
felt by the people; the Athalik Ghazi was supremely indifferent to the
prosperity of his subjects, so long as they were willing to pay him the
tribute money, and to serve in his army. An exactly opposite result
might have been expected, for there was far more kinship between the
Khokandian adventurer and the Kashgari, than there was between the
Khitay and the Andijani. Admirers of Yakoob Beg may, of course, plead
that his rule had not acquired sufficient consistency to justify him in
tasking his strength by great undertakings, such as the construction of
roads and canals. In one respect he had not the labour at his disposal,
and he was, consequently, hampered by a difficulty that the Chinese were
free from. Still when we remember that all these works ought to have
been remunerative, and to have strengthened Yakoob Beg's individual
power, instead of taxing his resources, the excuse cannot be admitted as
entitled to our consideration. Yakoob Beg has claims only to be admired
for having given us something better than a repetition of the depravity
of the Khoja rulers, and of course among his coevals he is entitled to
far the highest place. If it is only asked for him that he should be
placed above them, no one can raise the slightest objection to it; for
beyond the shadow of a doubt, he was the most energetic and talented
ruler that had appeared among the Khanates for several centuries. But it
would be affectation to deny that a higher place than this has been
claimed for him; and before according his right to occupy it, the
evidence on which his claim rests must be sifted with the greatest care.
Even now I do not say that his claims are unproven; but that it is open
to doubt whether his work has not been exaggerated, I think must be
admitted by every one who has studied the course of his life in Kashgar.
It is absurd to talk of Yakoob Beg having been an equal of Genghis Khan
or of Timour, in any other way than that of showing that his personal
abilities were of a transcendent order. As a legislator and public
benefactor, it is fair to compare him with the Chinese, who possessed
some advantages over him, but who laboured under some disadvantages in
religion, and other conditions, as compared with him. And when we do
this, after impartial consideration we find that the balance is greatly
in favour of the Chinese. What can we judge from this, but that the rule
of Yakoob Beg, while presenting some striking features, was inferior in
degree to that of the Chinese? It is only fair to remember that the
difficulties in his path were great, and that he overcame many of them.
Before closing this chapter some description of the chief men who
assisted him to conquer the country, and then to govern it, may be not
without interest to the reader.
First among these, by right of his position as well as by his high
abilities, comes the Seyyid Yakoob Khan, or Hadji Torah, as he has more
conveniently been called, the prince who has recently visited several of
the principal courts of Europe. He is a near relative of the Athalik
Ghazi, although, strange to say, there is no consanguinity between them.
He is a son of Nar Mahomed Khan, the governor of Tashkent, who married
as his second wife Yakoob Beg's sister, and who was instrumental in
advancing the interests of Yakoob Beg during the earlier days of his
career in Khokand. The Seyyid was almost as old as his uncle, the Ameer
of Kashgar, having been born in Tashkent in 1823; but despite this near
connection Hadji Torah played no part in the conquest of Kashgar. Until
Yakoob Beg achieved complete success in his enterprise in Eastern
Turkestan he was considered by Khokandians of high rank a simple
adventurer. The Seyyid Yakoob Khan was of the best lineage in Turkestan,
and it is very possible that until the year 1867 he regarded his uncle
with a considerable amount of indifference. Certain it is that Hadji
Torah was far otherwise employed than in assisting his relative when
the latter was engaged in some of the desperate encounters of his not
uneventful career. In the civil administration of Khokand he filled,
under Alim Kuli, high posts, such as Principal of the Madrassa of
Tashkent, and then he was appointed Kazi, or Judge. It was after the
fall of Ak Musjid that he commenced that career of activity as a
traveller and a negotiator which brought him to the shores of the
Bosphorus and to the banks of the Neva and the Thames. That was in the
year 1854, and he was appointed as a sort of secretary to the embassy of
Mirza Jan Effendi, the ambassador sent by Mollah Khan to Constantinople
for aid. On a subsequent occasion he again visited Constantinople in a
similar capacity, after the death of Mollah Khan, and during the brief
tenure of power by his successor, Mahomed Khan, the nominee of Alim
Kuli. This was in 1865, and during the troubles that ensued in Khokand
and the final success of Khudayar Khan, the legal ruler of Khokand and
antagonist of Alim Kuli, Hadji Torah resided quietly at Constantinople,
where Abdul Aziz entertained him with sumptuous hospitality. It would
appear that he obtained some kind of reputation among the numerous
visitors from either Turkestan who came to Turkey, and apart from his
sacrosanct character few could fail to be impressed favourably by his
cheerful yet dignified manner. His uncle in 1870 had indeed overcome all
opposition to his rule, and it might at a first glance appear strange
why he should desire to secure the services of a man of whom he could
have seen or known little for many years. But Hadji Torah possessed
abilities and experience rare among the inhabitants of Central Asia, and
to Yakoob Beg the very talents his nephew possessed were those he was
most in need of.
In 1870 the Athalik Ghazi was anxious to draw close the bonds of
alliance with the Porte; who could assist him better than the man who
had resided in Constantinople for several years, and who had formed a
friendly intimacy with the Sultan? In 1871 Yakoob Beg first recognized
the imminence of danger to his state from Russia, then put in possession
of Kuldja; who could instruct him in the most effectual way of warding
off that danger, either by an alliance with England or by propitiating
the Russians, than the travelled Hadji Torah? The very qualities that
the Seyyid Yakoob Khan possessed were those the Ameer Yakoob Beg stood
most in need of. He might search among all his followers, those who had
shared every vicissitude of his strange fortunes, and he could not find
one other with an identical capacity. The overtures to his nephew are
thus easily intelligible, and the nephew himself gladly greeted his
entry into a wider career than was that of an honoured guest on the
hospitality of the Porte. His subsequent embassies in the service of
Kashgar to St. Petersburg, Calcutta, Constantinople, and London are too
recent and too well known to require mention here. When he settled in
Kashgar he married a daughter of Mahomed Khoja, the Sheikh-ul-Islam of
Kashgaria. His weight with the people was consequently very great, and
his judgment was greatly valued by the Ameer. Even over Beg Bacha, the
turbulent and ferocious heir-apparent, Hadji Torah had acquired some
influence by his ready tact and _bonhomie_.
Of the two chief personages, Mahomed Khoja and Abdulla Pansad, the
priest and the soldier, who assisted Yakoob Beg, it is unfortunately
impossible to discover much, and that little has already been stated in
the preceding pages. There can be no doubt, however, that they were the
principal instruments in promoting the aggrandizement of Yakoob Beg, and
the two who enjoyed more than any other the confidence and friendship of
the man they had supported so faithfully. But of another well-tried
follower we know more, chiefly through the pages of Dr. Bellew. Mahomed
Yunus seems to have been the most educated and well informed among the
governors of Yakoob Beg. He had the reputation of being quite the
best-informed man in Kashgar, but as the _curriculum_ of instruction did
not include modern languages, it is difficult to guage the exact degree
of that reputation. He was an old and trusted follower of the Athalik
Ghazi, for when he was in the service of Khokand Mahomed Yunus
officiated as his scribe. He, however, as a civilian, took no part in
the expedition of Buzurg Khan, and it was not until after the death of
Alim Kuli and the success of Khudayar Khan that he joined his firm
friend and master in Kashgar. So high an opinion had Yakoob Beg of his
talents, and so pressed was he for skilled rulers, that Mahomed Yunus
was at once appointed Dadkwah of the recently conquered district of
Yarkand, the richest, the most populous, and the most turbulent of all
the governorships in Kashgaria. The skill with which he brought the
troublesome Yarkandis into complete submission to the new ruler, and the
rare ability he manifested in his administration of his province down
almost to the present time, justify the selection of his whilome comrade
in Khokand. At first it seems that the governor ruled with a high hand,
and that the slightest symptom of insubordination was checked by an
immediate arrest and a not long-delayed execution. During the last seven
years, however, his government had become milder, chiefly because all
evil-doers had been got rid of. Among some of the minor followers may be
mentioned Alish Beg, Dadkwah of Kashgar; Ihrar Khan Torah, the first
envoy despatched from Kashgar to India; and Mahomed Beg of Artosh: but
we have no sufficient information of them to give an account of them
that would be interesting to the general reader.
CHAPTER X.
YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA.
Yakoob Beg had in the earlier days of his career come into contact with
the Russians, and although, in the long interval between the fall of Ak
Musjid and his departure from Khokand, the Russians, chiefly owing to
the prostration resulting from the Crimean War, did not press on with
the energy that their first advance on the Syr Darya seemed to promise,
there is no doubt that the possibility of its occurrence was the
foremost thought in the minds of Yakoob Beg and his contemporaries. In
1865, when the Russians threatened and eventually occupied Tashkent, and
brought their frontier halfway on its journey to the Oxus, Yakoob Beg
was far too much occupied with his own affairs in Kashgar to attempt any
interference in Khokand. With, however, the dismemberment of Khokand and
the rout of the Bokhariot army in the spring of 1866, his attention was
forcibly claimed by a fact that seemed in the future to involve him as
the next victim of Russian aggrandizement. In that year, too, he had not
only overcome all resistance in the more important districts of
Kashgaria, but he had to a greater extent than before, become
responsible for the political actions of the people of this state
through the deposition of Buzurg Khan. As early as 1866, it may be
assumed that the new ruler of Kashgar had his attention directed to the
movements of his old antagonist, by their successes against the
Khokandians and Bokhariots; but it is clear that the Russians were not
equally interested in his doings at this period. With the occupation of
the northern portion of Khokand, the rule of Russia was brought into
nearer proximity with that of the new power of Kashgar, and it became
only a question of time whether the two governments were to attain a
harmonious agreement, or whether a series of petty disputes was to
result in a further extension of the Russian Empire, towards both India
and China. The independent portion of the Khanate of Khokand still
intervened, and the difficult country of the Kizil Yart mountains served
the useful purpose of giving the Athalik Ghazi breathing time, ere he
should arrive at a decision about his future relations with Russia.
Indeed, up to this point the interest of Russia in the affairs of
Kashgar had been very slight, for it does not appear that much, if any,
intercourse had been carried on between the two territories in the past.
Far otherwise was it in Ili, where the Russians had for many years been
located as merchants or as consuls. Their station at Almatie or Vernoe,
an important town and fort situated about 50 miles north of Issik Kul
and 250 west of Ili itself, had in a few years become a large and
flourishing city, instead of preserving its original character of a
small mountain fort. Russian merchants carried on a very extensive trade
by this road with Ili, Urumtsi, Hamil, and Pekin, and their relations
with the Chinese merchants had attained a very satisfactory basis. It
was, therefore, with no friendly feeling, that the Tungan rising in Ili
was regarded by a very large section of the Russians in the
neighbourhood. The disturbances that thereupon broke out, effectually
put a stop to all trade in this quarter for some time, and the old
traffic, or such of it as continued, with China had to be conducted
along the less direct route through Siberia. For six years, the Russians
tolerated the uncertain state of affairs in Ili, where the Tungani and
the Tarantchis disputed between themselves as to which should be the
ruling party; but their dissatisfaction was scarcely concealed at the
substitution of a native government for that of China. When, therefore,
Yakoob Beg, having conquered the country south of the Tian Shan, seemed
to threaten the provinces north of that barrier, it is not surprising
that the Russians availed themselves of excuses for forestalling him,
and for placing their commercial relations on an equally good footing as
they had been in the past with the inhabitants of Ili, by a forced
occupation of that territory. But the Russians were resolved to give as
little umbrage as possible to the Chinese. Ili was formally acknowledged
to be Chinese territory, and the Czar voluntarily promised, through his
representative at Pekin, to restore it as soon as the Emperor of China
was able to despatch a sufficient force to preserve order therein. This
tact secured the permanent goodwill of the Chinese, and Russia obtained,
in several important trade concessions, a very gratifying reward for her
skilful diplomacy. Her friendly action to the Celestials was also
heightened in its effect by a piece of unfortunate policy on our part.
The Panthays had erected in Yunnan a Mahomedan power, which seemed to
have broken off completely from Pekin, and report brought such tales to
our frontier of the power and goodwill of the Sultan of the Panthays
ruling in Ta-li-foo, that in an ill-advised moment we entered into
negotiations with this potentate. The Chinese authorities very naturally
took umbrage at this tacit support of a rebellious vassal, and all our
subsequent efforts have been unable to remove the suspicions produced by
our vacillating attitude on that occasion. The Russians still further
preserved the appearance of friendship for China by their refusal,
maintained during several years, to acknowledge the government set up in
Kashgar by Buzurg Khan and Yakoob Beg. This action was however the less
worthy of approval, because at that period the Russians had no immediate
concern in Kashgaria. Their sole interest lay in the course of events in
Jungaria, with which they were intimately connected by trade and
political associations, stretching back for almost a century.
Undoubtedly Jungaria was much affected by commotions in Kashgaria, and
we accordingly see, when the march of events in the latter province
assumed an aspect menacing to the future independence of Jungaria, the
Russians taking prompt measures to secure the possession of that
province for themselves. When Ili passed into the hands of Russia, the
old trade revived along this route to a certain degree, and some
intercourse ensued with the Tungani of Urumtsi, Manas and Hamil.
Measures seem to have been taken to impress on the rulers of those
cities the prudence of not interfering with merchants or travellers, and
matters became to a certain degree satisfactory for Russian
tranquillity. The city of Ili never, however, recovered its former
prosperity, for Vernoe still remains the most important town in this
region. Originally a fort constructed in 1854, as a small mountain post,
to defend the road from the marauding Kirghiz, it has increased from its
insignificant origin into a large settlement of Cossacks and Calmucks,
and is now a very thriving community. It was, therefore, it must be
remembered, primarily with Jungaria that Russia was interested. So far
as the internal affairs of Kashgar were concerned, she could have
disregarded the dispute between the rivals, Yakoob Beg and the Chinese;
it was only when a powerful Mahomedan state was erected in Eastern
Turkestan, and threatened both the independence of Ili, and also to
raise up disunion in Khokand, that Russia was compelled to consider what
policy it would be wise to adopt towards the recently proclaimed Athalik
Ghazi. Whether it was absolutely necessary or even prudent to annex Ili,
may be doubted with some reason, but it is impossible to find fault with
the Russians for that step. Probably it was the most excusable of all
their conquests, none the less may the decision have been founded on a
misapprehension of circumstances, or it may have been premature to shut
Yakoob Beg out from advancing into a region where he would have been at
the complete mercy of the Russians. Nor is it clear even that Yakoob Beg
had the intention, so generously attributed to him, of committing what
would certainly have resulted in political extinction, viz., an advance
to the northern side of the Tian Shan. The reader will, we hope,
perceive that as little interest was felt by the Russians in the events
transpiring in Kashgar as there was in India, and this indifference
continued down at all events to the end of 1866. At that date Yakoob
Beg's enterprise had been crowned with complete success and the Russian
Government, far more promptly and accurately apprised of the course of
events than our Government in India, was obliged to devote some
attention to this new power, whose appearance was already beginning to
raise a ferment in the Mahomedan states lying to the west of Kashgar.
In 1866, however, some indefinite agreement was arrived at by the
commanders of forces along the Naryn borders, to abstain from
interfering with each other's actions. The Russian forces were permitted
to follow refugees from Khokand and predatory Kirghiz within the nominal
frontier of Kashgar, and when occasion arose a similar right was
accorded to the Kashgarian officials. By some good fortune, perhaps
caused by a feeling of mutual respect, no collisions of any consequence
occurred between the representatives of the two powers during these
early and vague negotiations. Although the Russian governors of Siberia
and Turkestan refused to acknowledge either Buzurg Khan or Yakoob Beg,
they seem to have done their best to make use of these conciliatory
measures along the northern frontier as a lever for inducing Yakoob Beg
to make overtures to them for their support. If such was their intention
the firmness of Yakoob Beg thwarted all their designs, as will be seen
in the sequel. To obtain, however, some advantage out of the apparent
apprehension of the Kashgarian ruler for Russian power was absolutely
necessary, if only to demonstrate the perfection to which Muscovite
diplomacy had attained. So, while refusing to acknowledge the new state
in Eastern Turkestan and deeply deploring the departure of the Chinese,
orders were given to the frontier officers to obtain the sanction of the
Kashgarian officials in the neighbourhood to the construction of a
bridge across the Naryn and of a military road over the Tian Shan into
Kashgar. This was in 1867, and it is not to be wondered at that the
Kashgarian authorities replied with a categorical refusal. To have
acquiesced in this demand would have been to have placed the city of
Kashgar at the complete mercy of the Russians. The position of that city
is most disadvantageous in a military point of view, and the only
obstacle an army advancing from Issik Kul has to encounter is the
difficulty of the road from the Naryn torrent, and the general
impracticability of the passes through this portion of the Tian Shan
range. The Russian government was much disappointed at this rebuff
experienced at the hands of a native ruler, and accordingly in great
haste it was resolved that a fort should be constructed on the Naryn
just within their frontier. In 1868 this fort was completed, but by that
time a fresh change had taken place in the state of affairs, and hopes
were entertained that an agreement might yet be arranged by peaceful
means with Kashgar. During these two years there had been continual
disturbances and fighting in Western Turkestan. Bokhara, instigated,
according to Russian assertions, by Yakoob Beg, had joined with Khokand
and Khiva in a combined uprising against Russia; but in so far as that
uprising was combined it never occurred, for both Bokhara and Khokand
fell an easy prey in detail to the armies of the Czar. The punishment of
Khiva was reserved for a future occasion, and indeed of all the
confederates Khiva was the only one which obtained any successes in the
field. The most palpable result of that campaign was the acquisition of
Samarcand by Russia, and for a time all opposition seemed to be stamped
out. No sooner, however, had the main Russian army returned to Tashkent
than a large force invested the small garrison left in Samarcand, and
the whole country rose in arms again. The Russian garrison held tightly
on to its post, and, although in comparison to its strength its loss was
most severe, the town was preserved until the arrival of General
Kaufmann with reinforcements. Bokhara then sued for peace, which, after
some delay, was concluded with the unfortunate Ameer Mozaffur Eddin. By
that treaty the Russians obtained the right to place military
cantonments at Kermina, Charjui, and Karshi. Kermina is situated about
fifty miles east of the town of Bokhara, on the road from Katti Kurgan
and Samarcand; Karshi about sixty miles south of Katti Kurgan, and half
way to the Oxus; while Charjui is on the Oxus and some eighty miles west
of Bokhara. Of all these the last is the most important, for thence a
direct caravan route leads to Merv and Meshed. Once more, in 1870-71,
Bokhara entered the field, but the enterprise collapsed through the
unconcerted measures of the allies and the weakness of Khokand. During
these five eventful years of rebellion amongst the races of Western
Turkestan, Yakoob Beg preserved his neutrality. If the assertion is
correct that he had played an underhand part in the formation of the
league against Russia, assuredly he endeavoured to make his actions
contradict his diplomacy. Not a Kashgarian soldier participated in the
efforts made so repeatedly by Bokhara and Khokand to shake off the bonds
of Russian vassalage. Like Shere Ali of Cabul, he devoted his attention
exclusively to the affairs of his immediate province, and wars in the
extreme east of his dominions against co-religionists were a preferable
alternative to the risks attending a _jehad_ against the most formidable
enemy of Islam! Russia had indeed little to complain of in Yakoob Beg's
interference in their possessions. His instigation of premature
rebellions, or, if he did not instigate them, the approval extended to
them by some of his chief ministers, was the very kindest act he could
have conferred on the ruling power of Turkestan, for Russia never has
had anything to fear from any isolated risings among the people of this
part of Central Asia. Nothing less than an unanimous and concerted
rising in Western Turkestan, aided with a nucleus of regular troops and
officers, such as, to go no farther, either Afghanistan can supply, or
Kashgar could at one time have supplied--nothing less than this will
ever produce a complete catastrophe to the Russian arms, and in a short
campaign of a few months send the Russian legions back to their old
quarters of thirteen years ago. Whether Yakoob Beg ever was strong
enough to risk the independence of his state on so important an
enterprise may fairly be doubted, and he showed a commendable prudence
in abstaining from hostilities when he had sufficient matters to occupy
all his attention, and to task all his resources within his own borders;
but assuming such to have been the case, his indifference to the
suffering thereby inflicted on the Khokandians must remain a blot on his
fair fame. If the part he played in these earlier plots was scarcely
honourable, how much less so was his action in the last rebellion of
1875. But it may be as well to postpone considering that event until
later on in this chapter. Yakoob Beg most probably took a very selfish
view of the state of affairs. His own extremely uncertain tenure of
power made him anxious lest any storm from beyond his frontier should
wreck the frail bark in which he had asserted his claim to independence,
and the whole object of his policy was simply to divert attention from
himself to other quarters. The Russians above all must have their work
cut out for them in repression of continual sedition in their
possessions; while each day of respite witnessed Yakoob Beg in a better
position for making a strenuous resistance when the time should come,
according to Russian ideas, for an attempt to be made to crush his
power. Viewed from this standpoint, the conduct of Yakoob Beg towards
his fellow-countrymen appears in a slightly more favourable aspect,
although his policy of expediency has little in it to command
admiration. Yet the result answered his expectations. In 1868 the
construction of Fort Naryn was the avowed preliminary measure to an
occupation of Kashgar; from that danger this policy of compromise saved
him. Again, in 1870, was he pronounced an incorrigible enemy of the
Czar, and an expedition was prepared which was to bring him to his
senses; once more a revolt in Khokand intervened to distract Russian
attention and Russian arms from the Naryn to Ferghana. The expedition
against Khiva in 1873 also served the purpose of diverting to another
quarter the blow which should, according to many, have descended on the
offending head of the Athalik Ghazi; and lastly, in 1875 the
insurrection in Khokand, the most serious and the most nearly successful
of all the native wars against Russia, saved him from an invasion for
which every preparation had been made.
To return to the year 1868, when the Russian government had constructed
the fort on the Naryn, and had openly proclaimed its intention of
punishing the slight put upon it by Yakoob Beg's refusal to permit the
construction of a road over the mountains to Artosh. Up to that year the
intercourse had been of a semiofficial character between the officers on
either side of the frontier. We have now come to a phase of the question
of a slightly different import. The Russian officials endeavoured to
obtain from Yakoob Beg concessions that would be advantageous to their
country, at the same time that they categorically declined to recognize
his official _status_ as an independent prince. Their antagonist was far
too astute to permit himself to be out-manoeuvred by so simple a
device, and his officials were quite unauthorized to enter into any
arrangement without its being brought before their master in the manner
consistent with his dignity. We have seen that the Russians, failing in
their diplomatic chicane, had recourse to threats, although the irony of
fate prevented those threats ever being put into execution. But
concurrently with these efforts on the part of the Russian government,
others of a different kind were being made by individuals. The Russian
merchants of Kuldja contained in their ranks several men whose
enterprise and courage had been remarkable in the manipulation of trade
with the Chinese and the Tungani. They were not easily deterred from any
undertaking which promised them brilliant remuneration, even though the
risk and uncertainty might be great. The pioneers of commerce were free
from the fetters that hampered official movements. It was of little
moment to them who ruled in Kashgaria so long as he extended his
protection to their goods and their persons whilst they were within his
territory. The Russian government viewed with favour the efforts that
were made to cross the Tian Shan, for on the individual fell the
greatest portion of the risk, while the government profited much by the
fruits of his experience. The Russian merchants were, therefore, not
discouraged by their authorities when they laid their proposals before
General Kolpakovsky, as English merchants would have been under similar
circumstances by the authorities at Calcutta--nay, it is tolerably
certain that they received many inducements to persist in their
intention; both their patriotism and desire for advancing their own
worldly concerns were appealed to, to urge them to attempt to obtain
admission into Kashgar. When, therefore, it became evident in 1868 that
nothing was to be obtained from Yakoob Beg by indirect means, and when
it was also decided that a military remedy would not be convenient, the
field was fairly cleared for another kind of performers to begin
operations.
Early in the year 1868 a Russian merchant, named Kludof, collected at
Vernoe a small caravan. His chief commodities consisted of those
gewgaws, which, prepared in Moscow, have been found, according to
Russian experience, the most marketable articles in Western Turkestan;
but, in addition to these trumpery packages, more useful necessaries,
such as cotton goods and cutlery, were taken as specimens of some of the
real advantages that would come in the wake of Russian trade. Kludof set
out with the intention of crossing the Tian Shan by the Naryn, and
making for the border town of Ush Turfan, whence Kashgar is easily
reached by the high road. But he had not proceeded far beyond Fort
Naryn, then in course of construction, when he was attacked by a band of
marauders. With the loss of all his possessions he must still be
considered fortunate in having escaped without any serious personal
injury. Perhaps the robbers were inspired with some respect for the
person of a Russian subject, or, as the indictment against Yakoob Beg
affirms, by the express orders of that ruler, who wished to deter,
without causing any serious complication with the government, Russian
subjects of any kind whatever from entering his kingdom. As it happened,
however, Kludof was a very determined fellow, one not easily balked when
he had set his mind on accomplishing anything. The government viewed his
case with commiseration, and he was assisted in collecting together
another caravan of larger proportions than its predecessor. But before
setting out on the same road he determined to make an effort to reach
the ear of Yakoob Beg himself, and by a singular piece of good fortune
he was able to do so through a Kashgarian subject residing in Kuldja.
The presents, judiciously selected, with which he accompanied his letter
complaining of the injury he had received at the hands of Kirghiz
subjects of the ruler of Kashgar, yet only demanding as a reparation
permission to come into that state as a peaceful subject of the Czar,
fully propitiated Yakoob Beg, who sent a safe conduct to Vernoe for
Kludof and his caravan. This merchant made a most favourable impression
on the ruler of Kashgar, and it seemed at one moment as if he would
achieve what all the diplomacy of the two previous years had failed in
accomplishing. Even Yakoob Beg was induced to take a slight step towards
a better agreement with his neighbour, for in the summer of 1868, he
sent Shadi Mirza, one of his nephews, to Vernoe, requesting that he
might be permitted to go on to Tashkent, to place before the governor of
Turkestan certain proposals from his master for a complete understanding
with Russia. Simultaneously with the despatch of Shadi Mirza by Yakoob
Beg, a Russian officer, Captain Reinthal, was commissioned by General
Kolpakovsky, the governor of Kuldja, to proceed to Kashgar and demand
the surrender of some Kirghiz robbers, who, from within Yakoob Beg's
dominion, had sallied forth to pillage Russian merchants. They had also
seized several inhabitants of Khokand and the Naryn district; and the
Russian government demanded the unconditional surrender of these
individuals as her subjects. Captain Reinthal was instructed to make
these two demands in a peremptory way, and to convince the new
government that Russia would not permit any infraction of the spirit of
the treaties concluded with the old government under the Chinese.
Captain Reinthal was received in a sufficiently hospitable manner, but
his movements were scrupulously restricted to the city. He did not, on
this occasion, learn much of importance about the country, but he was
impressed favourably by the appearance of such of the army as he saw.
The Kirghiz robbers were captured by the order of Yakoob Beg, but he
stoutly refused to surrender them. The Russian prisoners were also kept
in honourable confinement as a guarantee for the safe return of Shadi
Mirza. They were, however, permitted to return to Russian territory when
it became known that Shadi Mirza was progressing favourably with his
mission to Tashkent. Captain Reinthal accomplished little or nothing on
this embassade, and had to report, on his return to his superior, the
strange tidings that the new power was resolved to play an independent
part in Asia, and to answer defiance with defiance, and threat with
threat. This report must have seemed scarcely credible, but there is no
doubt that Captain Reinthal advised, as the result of his experience,
the adoption of a lenient and friendly policy towards the new-comer.
This concession to a Central Asian despot was not agreeable at
head-quarters, and the question was shelved for the time. Shadi Mirza,
who had been detained at Vernoe, was at last permitted to continue his
journey to Tashkent, where he found General Kaufmann absent in Europe.
Instructions were then issued to send him on to St. Petersburg, where he
arrived in the last days of 1868. He had several informal interviews
with the governor of Turkestan, but he was not received by the Czar or
any of the higher officials. In fact, he was only treated as an ordinary
traveller, and not as the representative of a neighbouring state.
Nothing up to this had been done by the Russian government, showing that
they recognized Yakoob Beg as ruler of Kashgaria. The Chinese were
still, in their eyes, the _de jure_ owners of that province, whoever
might be the temporary owners _de facto_. On the return of Shadi Mirza
to Kashgar, in January, 1869, the relations between Russia and Yakoob
Beg may be said to have returned to the exact _status quo ante_. All the
Russian demands for trade had been unsuccessful, and, except the
brilliant journey of Mr. Kludof, no one had broken through the mystic
charm that shut out the Garden of Asia from all foreign spectators.
Their envoy, Captain Reinthal, had been treated in a precisely similar
manner to that in which Shadi Mirza had been received at Vernoe and St.
Petersburg; and a firm and dignified attitude had effectually checked
the Russian officer when he attempted to express those threats which
formed the principal part of his instructions. There was something
imposing in the quiet way in which Yakoob Beg asserted his equality in
rank with the Czar of All the Russias. His invariable reply, when the
great power of Russia was made use of as an argument to overcome his
refusal to accede to the trade concessions demanded, was, "My brother,
the White Czar, is a most powerful monarch, and rules over the greater
portion of the earth, and I am only an insignificant prince in
comparison to him. But none the less can I encounter the danger like a
true man, and esteem it a happiness to die in defence of my country and
my faith." To so courageous and so honourable a reply what rejoinder
could be made by the abashed officers? It is impossible to refuse Yakoob
Beg the highest admiration for his stanchness in his opposition to
Russia. If for his own narrow interests it may have been imprudent to
throw down the gage of battle so freely, all the more does that attitude
claim respect when we see him trampling on purely selfish motives, and
asserting his claim to leadership in that wider question of Asiatic
against Muscovite, of Mahomedan against Greek. Had he only been
consistent throughout his career, had he only been as firm in his
convictions and as prompt in carrying them into practice as he generally
was, when the occasion came for a great effort against Russia, how
different might have been his own fate and the present aspect of affairs
in Central Asia!
For some time after these abortive proceedings the Russians abstained
from any direct interference in Kashgar, but the conferring of the title
of Athalik Ghazi, or Commander of the Faithful, on Yakoob Beg by the
Ameer of Bokhara had roused the susceptibilities of Russia too much to
be allayed. It seemed, indeed, as if this acknowledgment of the
orthodoxy of Yakoob Beg by the Head of Islam in Central Asia heralded
forth some understanding between the two states, and that a menace was
directed against the Russian government. Whether there was any agreement
between Mozaffur Eddin and Yakoob Beg it is not possible at present to
say, but that such should have been brought about by their mutual
antipathy to Russia would not have been very wonderful. However, in the
disturbances of 1870 Yakoob Beg took no active part. While the Russian
arms were triumphing over every opponent in their newly acquired
province of Ferghana and its vicinity, Yakoob Beg was busily engaged
with the Tungani, who at that time were causing trouble to him along his
far eastern frontier. The revolt collapsed in Khokand, and Yakoob Beg,
apparently unconcerned with the events transpiring in the West, was
carrying his victorious arms to new conquests in the East. During the
year 1870, when murmurs of the approaching storm were becoming audible,
the Russian government endeavoured to obtain the alliance of Khudayar
Khan, of Khokand, for the purpose of bringing Yakoob Beg within their
influence. This Khan had, as has been already mentioned, been betrayed
by Yakoob Beg, who had followed the example of the ambitious Vizier Alim
Kuli, and was now mainly dependent on the Russians for support against
his rebellious subjects. He could not be considered in any way,
therefore, as likely to be favourably disposed towards his neighbour of
Kashgar, or as lukewarm in the cause of his protectors and benefactors.
The Russians felt assured of his hearty support in advocating their
plan, which was as follows. From time immemorial, as has been seen in
the sketch of the history of Kashgar, there have been two rival elements
in Kashgaria--the Chinese and the Khokandian. The Chinese was triumphant
in modern times for a little more than a century, while the Khokandian
has, more or less, at all other times been paramount. But whenever a
native dynasty had attained a certain degree of security therein, it was
always threatened by the ambitious designs of the Khan of Khokand, who
had generally contributed most towards its successful establishment. The
Russian government resolved to avail themselves of this historical fact
to pour into the ear of Khudayar Khan insidious counsels as to his
claims as feudal lord over Eastern Turkestan. There once more, so they
argued, had a Khokandian subject formed an independent and rival
administration, and all his victories had been won by Khokandian
sympathies, and by the good right arms of Khokandian subjects. And how
had this soldier of fortune acted towards his own country when he had
received everything from her that he needed? By offering an asylum to
all those who had participated in the plots against Khudayar Khan
himself, by encouraging sedition in the state itself against the
Russians and their nominee, Khudayar, the legal ruler of the state. As
if these crimes were not sufficiently serious, he had added thereto the
insult of having refused to recognize in Khudayar his liege lord; and
Khudayar's own personal fears were worked upon to yield that
acquiescence to the Russian proposal that was necessary to secure its
success. It was pointed out to him that a strong military power in
Kashgar might give an impetus to the plots then fermenting in the active
brain of Aftobatcha, the ambitious son of Mussulman Kuli, the prime
minister and vizier of thirty years ago. The arguments were specious,
and it cannot be doubted that they made some impression on Khudayar
Khan. This much-to-be-pitied ruler, forced by the necessities of his
position to humour his Russian advisers, still had the courage to refuse
to assert his claims as lord over Kashgar. With a gentle irony he
pointed to the map, and showed how Khokand's frontier should extend
farther to the west than it did, and that a conquest over the barren
regions of the Kizil Yart would be but a sorry equivalent for the loss
of Tashkent and Hodjent. He, however, promised to make use of his best
means for inducing Yakoob Beg to make overtures to the Russian
government for the ratification of a treaty of commerce. So Khudayar
Khan indited a letter to Yakoob Beg, at the dictation of his Russian
friends, to this effect; but he silvered the pill by a private message
giving information of the Russian intentions in the future. The tenor of
that communication was that the Russians were less eager than might
have been supposed to bring matters to a final crisis with Yakoob Beg,
and that they were most desirous of settling the question without any
flagrant loss of dignity by being the first to recommence negotiations.
Both publicly and privately Khudayar Khan advised that the Athalik Ghazi
should make some concessions in form to the Russian government. The
Russians themselves, having failed to induce Khudayar Khan to put
pressure on Yakoob Beg, appear to have arrived at the same conclusion as
that set out in the letters of Khudayar. Yakoob Beg must make the sign,
and they would meet him half way in his desire to share in the great
benefits accruing from a Muscovite alliance. The authorities at Tashkent
went so far as to flatter themselves that they had attained a solution
of one of their chief annoyances. They had, by making use of the
mediation of Khudayar, gone so far as to open the door for Yakoob Beg to
abase himself. Such condescension was unheard of, and no doubt was
entertained but that this proud Mahomedan ruler would gladly hasten to
avail himself of the last chance accorded him by the clemency of the
Czar.
But they were reckoning without their host. Yakoob Beg quickly perceived
that the bold exterior of the Russian demands concealed a vacillating
purpose, and that a power which would go out of its way so far to bring
about an arrangement, would yield much more when the discussion became
directly carried on. He had evidently impressed the few Russians who had
visited him with a belief in his strength, and rumour had magnified his
resources, and converted his small and heterogeneous following into a
regular and trained army. He was not the man to destroy, when the game
was almost in his hands too, all the favourable impressions, that stood
him in such good stead during his career, which his policy for four
years had succeeded in creating about his personality. After a suitable
delay his formal reply to the official letter of Khudayar arrived, and
its contents must have been eminently displeasing to the Russians. In
general terms he refused to enter into negotiations with the Russians,
because they had refused to acknowledge his own government, and had ever
supported the cause of his enemies the Chinese. But, not content with
this blunt refusal to the offer made from Tashkent, he went on to minor
matters and dealt with the question of Russian policy in specific
language. The common enemy of him and all his co-religionists was not
worthy of any consideration from him or his allies, the rulers of
Khokand and Bokhara. "The Russians that have come here, into my state of
Kashgar, look at these localities and become acquainted with the state
of the country, and therefore it is better to forbid their coming, for
they are a treacherous and crooked-minded people." In such plain terms
did Yakoob Beg speak of a power which could without any serious risk
have crushed him at any moment. Yet in one sense his boldness was the
height of prudence, and succeeded when perhaps a less decided attitude
would have completely failed. The Russians were fairly deluded in their
estimate of their new antagonist, and all means having been exhausted
for inducing Yakoob Beg to abandon his indifferent attitude towards
themselves, it began to be seriously discussed at Tashkent whether, if
simply for the purpose of obtaining accurate information of his country,
it would not be prudent to acknowledge the existence of a ruler who had
for nearly six years been established as responsible sovereign of a very
large portion of Asia. The path was smoothed, too, for the Russian
diplomatists by Yakoob Beg sending a letter to the governor of
Turkestan, stating that it was useless for the Czar to attempt the
establishment of diplomatic relations through the good offices of
Khudayar Khan; but that if the Russians really desired to enter into
alliance with him they could send an embassy to him, when formal steps
could be commenced for securing the trade and other agreements that were
desirable. The letter was a very dignified piece of writing, such as
one European sovereign would have sent to another in the Middle Ages.
"He did not deny," he said, "either the power or the resources of
Russia, but as a brave man he placed his trust in God, and he would
never shirk the contest, because all he aspired to was to die for his
faith." This letter produced a great impression at Tashkent, and it was
resolved to send an ambassador to Kashgar.
Before pursuing the narrative, it may be as well to sum up what had
passed between Russia and Kashgar up to this period, for henceforth
these two states were to stand in a completely different relationship
towards each other. The Russians strove to induce Yakoob Beg to make the
most favourable commercial and political concessions to them, while they
refused to grant him any equivalent, except the dubious one, "advantage
from the produce of Russian manufactures." They even added insult to
injury by openly proclaiming that they only recognized the Chinese as
the rulers of Kashgar, and refused to discuss the arguments advanced by
Shadi Mirza in favour of his uncle's claim to be considered _de facto_
sovereign. They adopted an attitude of bullying towards this Asiatic
prince, and loudly proclaimed in their practice the truth of the
aphorism, that might is right. They backed up their verbal threats on
several occasions by a show of military preparations, but not once did
they put those threats into execution. On the other hand, Yakoob Beg's
policy was consistent throughout and dignified. While studiously
avoiding any aggressive measures, even under the excuse of defensive
precautions, he was always firm in his refusal to recognize any of the
semi-official overtures that were repeatedly made to induce him to show
his hand. Instead of appearing in the light of a suppliant, as according
to all precedent he should, he assumed the position of a dictator.
"Acknowledge me as legally constituted ruler of Kashgaria, or else there
is an end to all negotiation. Send a properly accredited ambassador to
me, and he shall be honourably received. A representative of recognized
rank shall then convey my token of friendship to your master. Refuse to
grant me these just considerations, and my kingdom is closed to your
merchants and officials without exception. Admission shall only be
obtained over my own body and that of my devoted army." For the first
time in the annals of Russian history an Asiatic ruler had tired out the
finessing and intrigue that had become customary with that empire as the
means for infinite conquest. Yakoob Beg was the only sovereign who
refused to be subservient to the Czar, and eventually achieved a
diplomatic triumph over his representatives. In the spring of 1872,
Yakoob Beg was at the very acme of his prosperity. Not yet had he
commenced those later campaigns against the Tungani, which more than
anything else tended to weaken his power and to raise discontent against
his administration; and, fresh from his diplomatic success over the
Russians, he appeared in the eyes of many Asiatics as a fit champion to
redeem their fortunes in a conflict with Russia. Excusable as their
enthusiasm undoubtedly was, it is tolerably certain that the power of
Yakoob Beg was exaggerated both by the adulation of his friends and by
the nervous susceptibilities of the Russians. It is noteworthy that
Russia proved herself on one occasion to be quite as liable to this
latter disease as England is assumed to be.
To Baron Kaulbars, the explorer of the sources of the Syr Darya, was
entrusted the delicate mission of representing the Russian government
for the first time at the court of the Athalik Ghazi, and to no better
diplomatist could it have been consigned. He set out from Kuldja early
in May, 1872, carrying with him a large collection of presents for the
ruler and his chief advisers, and arrived in Kashgar without any mishap
in June of the same year. Here he was received in the most cordial
manner, and the consideration and hospitality exhibited towards him by
the ruler were beyond all expectation. In the picturesque phraseology
of the East, the Athalik Ghazi, at his first audience with Baron
Kaulbars, said, "Sit upon my knees, on my bosom, or where ye like; for
ye are guests sent me from heaven." The most complete freedom of action
was accorded, for the first time, to all the members of the embassy, and
two merchants who had accompanied it for the purpose of exploring the
country received a safe-conduct to go on to Yarkand and Khoten. Yakoob
Beg scarcely attempted to conceal his gratification at the presence of
the Russians; possibly his pleasure chiefly arose from such an
unmistakable admission of his skill as a diplomatist. But in every way
facilities were afforded his visitors for seeing all objects of interest
round Kashgar. Reviews were held in honour of the occasion, and as there
happened to be a considerable number of troops in the vicinity, passing
through to operate against the Tungani beyond Kucha, the show was
imposing enough. The Russians were favourably impressed by what they
saw, and Baron Kaulbars expressed himself surprised at the military
exactitude with which the manoeuvres were carried out. Yakoob Beg,
always open to flattery, exclaimed in an enthusiastic moment, "I look
upon the Russians as my dearest friends; if I had not, should I have
shown you my military power? Assuredly it is not usual even with you to
make known one's actual condition to an enemy." Matters were now in a
fair way to a pleasant solution. Baron Kaulbars and Yakoob Beg were
mutually delighted; but, after the time for pleasant talk had expired,
it was necessary that some definite arrangements should be drawn up for
the political and commercial relations of the two countries in the
future.
The chief objects the Russians had in view when they sent Baron Kaulbars
to Kashgar were three. In the first place they wanted to acquire general
information about that state, and to discover whether Yakoob Beg was as
powerful as report had asserted. In the second, they wished to put their
relations on such a recognized basis with him that they might know what
policy he was disposed to adopt in Turkestan and Kuldja; and in the
third they desired to secure the monopoly of the trade of his state, so
that they might forestall British enterprise, already beginning to
direct its attention to this quarter, since the journeys of Messrs. Shaw
and Forsyth. The last of these was the easiest to obtain, and the
Athalik Ghazi considered all the Russian proposals with regard to trade
in a very amicable spirit; but with regard to the second _desideratum_
nothing but the vaguest generalities could all the tact and ingenuity of
Kaulbars succeed in obtaining from his host. The first object was amply
secured, in so far as geographical and scientific information was
concerned; but the precautions taken by the Athalik Ghazi to deceive the
Russians as to his power and hold on the country appear to have been
successful. Baron Kaulbars certainly confirmed much that had previously
rested on mere hearsay; the question is rather, did he not vouch for
more than his experience justified him in doing? The result of his
mission was, that the Athalik Ghazi was elevated to a position on a
level with the Ameer of Cabul, and there is no doubt whatever that such
a comparison was not warranted by the facts. A treaty was signed by the
Athalik Ghazi and Baron Kaulbars, on the 2nd of June, 1872, but
according to the Old Style, still adopted by the Russians, this was the
21st of May, St. Constantine's day. There are two stories with respect
to this coincidence, and there is as much evidence for one version as
there is for the other.
It was said at the time that Yakoob Beg was so desirous of showing his
goodwill to the Russians that he had insisted on signing it on that day
in honour of the Grand Duke Constantine. Now there were two or three
improbabilities in this statement that struck several observers. In the
first place it was extremely improbable that Yakoob Beg knew it was St.
Constantine's day at all; and again, in the second place he was quite as
probably ignorant of the existence of a Grand Duke Constantine. At all
events, there was no valid reason why a Central Asian ruler should
conceive that his politeness to that Grand Duke in particular would
demonstrate his desire to be on good terms with Russians in general. The
other version, which, like many other circumstances, has only leaked out
in the pages of Mr. Schuyler, is altogether more probable, and is not
open to the same objections. According to this, it was Baron Kaulbars,
who of course was aware of the saint's day, who demanded that the treaty
should bear that date, and who, as soon as it was signed, sent off a
message to General Kaufmann saying that the Athalik Ghazi, out of
friendship to that general, had specially requested that the treaty
should be signed on that day in honour of General Kaufmann's patron
saint. However flattered that distinguished general and governor may
have felt at the delicate attention of his ambassador, he had to decline
the proposed honour; and in the despatch that was sent to St.
Petersburg, describing the event, the name of the Grand Duke Constantine
was substituted for his own. There is little doubt that this is the
correct statement, and it certainly suggests quite a revelation as to
the system in Russian Asia of making things pleasant and agreeable to
one another, always, however, assuming that there be an exceptional
degree of power and pomp reserved for his Excellency General Kaufmann.
Soon after the signature of this treaty, which bears the name of its
framer, Baron Kaulbars took his departure, with many expressions of
friendship and goodwill from the Athalik Ghazi. Arrangements were,
however, made, before he left, for an envoy to visit Tashkent from
Yakoob Beg. This ambassador took with him the signed stipulations to be
ratified, and was received at Tashkent with every demonstration of amity
and respect. So certain did the Russian government appear that their
relations with Kashgar would, if only for a short period, be
satisfactory, that special care was taken to make a favourable
impression on the Kashgarian envoy, and after a short residence in the
capital of Turkestan, the nephew of Yakoob Beg, Hadji Torah, who had
followed the train of the treaty on a special mission, went on to St.
Petersburg, where he was entertained by the Czar, taken to the reviews,
and treated in a most hospitable and princely fashion. The contrast
between the reception accorded to him in 1873 and that to Shadi Mirza in
1869 clearly marks the difference that was considered in well-informed
official circles to have taken place in their relations with Kashgar.
We have now to consider whether the Russian Government was justified in
assuming so confidently that it had secured the permanent friendship of
the Mahomedan ruler of Eastern Turkestan. On concluding his visit at St.
Petersburg, Hadji Torah turned south, and after stopping for a brief
delay at Moscow and Odessa, he arrived in Constantinople, where he
already had many friends and connections. Without inquiring too deeply
into his actions at the Imperial City--for of them the reader will be
able to judge best by the sequel--we will here simply observe, that
having also concluded his residence on the Golden Horn, he took passage
by the Suez Canal for India, and arrived there in time to join the
mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth, then on its way to Kashgar. Hadji Torah
therefore brought to his uncle a vast amount of information concerning
the three Powers chiefly concerned in the fortunes of Kashgar--Russia,
Turkey, and England. But even before his return home, fresh
disagreements had broken out between Russia and Yakoob Beg. The year
1872 had not closed, before the Athalik Ghazi concluded some secret
negotiations that had been pending for some time with the Sultan, and
this champion of Islam appeared in a new and holier light to Asiatics as
Emir, or Ameer. He acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte; and, not
content with this formal declaration, gave an extra significance to the
event by issuing a fresh coinage, bearing on one side the head of Abdul
Aziz. The Russians were, it can well be imagined, displeased at this
alliance between two Mahomedan states which might both be considered
hostile to their interests, and a very large party in military circles
clamoured for an expedition to be sent at once against the insolent
Mussulman. At one moment it seemed as if this bellicose party was to
gain the day, for the testimony of all the officers and merchants who
had visited Kashgar showed that each day Yakoob Beg was becoming more
formidable. Prompt measures were pressed on the government of Tashkent,
and General Kaufmann seemed half disposed to acquiesce in the proposal
to inflict summary chastisement on the Athalik Ghazi. Fortunately for
Kashgar, the Khan of Khiva had been an older offender in the eyes of the
Russians, and the Home Government peremptorily forbade any steps being
taken in the regions bordering on the Chinese Empire. It is sufficiently
clear that the moderation of the home authorities was a wiser policy
than the impulsive demands of certain officers in Tashkent; but it is
not so evident why Yakoob Beg abstained from appearing in the _rôle_ of
the liberator of Khokand, at so opportune a moment as that afforded by
the great expedition against Khiva in 1873. The treaty of Baron Kaulbars
had stipulated for the free admission of Russian merchants into the
state on the payment of a 2-1/2 per cent. _ad valorem_ duty. Not only
was there to be no further exaction, but good treatment was guaranteed
to such Russian subjects as desired to travel in Kashgar, and who came
provided with a passport, and permission to travel, from a Russian
governor. During Baron Kaulbars' residence in the country, nothing could
be more considerate than the treatment extended towards the members of
his suite, and the merchants who went on to Yarkand were afforded
facilities for disposing of the small stock of merchandise which they
had brought with them on this journey. This friendly reception of such
merchants as came to Kashgar was maintained during the period over which
these negotiations extended down to the departure of Yakoob Beg's own
ambassador from Russian territory; but with the arrival of Hadji Torah
at Constantinople, and the proclamation of the fact that Yakoob Beg had
been elevated to the dignified position of Emir by the Sultan of Roûm, a
change came over the spirit of his policy towards Russia. Indeed, Yakoob
Beg saw himself menaced by an unforeseen danger in this treaty of
commerce. He had formerly been averse to the presence of Russian
merchants in his state because he regarded them as spies; but now that
the necessities of his position had to some extent compelled him to
enter into a formal treaty with their government, he perceived that his
little state literally ran the risk of being invaded by the Russian
merchants and traders who flocked to Kuldja for the purpose of
participating in the spoils to be obtained by trafficking with the
inhabitants of Eastern Turkestan. He had always been averse to trade. He
was a warrior, and inclined to feel and to express contempt at the
juggling tricks of Muscovite or Khitay.
But as the former could provide him with better weapons for his army,
and warmer clothes for his people, in addition to trinkets for his
_serai_, their presence, if only they came in limited numbers, and at
stated intervals, could be tolerated; but when he perceived they were
about to descend on his state, like so many birds of prey on an
abandoned carcase, and when he surmised that in all likelihood they
would endeavour to mix themselves up in the political divisions of
Kashgar as they had in Bokhara and Khokand, he determined to impose some
other check on their visits besides that insignificant 2-1/2 per cent.
on goods that returned a profit of cent. per cent. He had given his
plighted word, however, that merchants should receive fair treatment,
and how could he find a loophole to avoid fulfilling what he had
promised, and yet at the same time escape bringing about an open rupture
with the Russian Government. The matter required most delicate
manipulation, but Yakoob Beg proved himself equal to the occasion. It
was not to be expected, however, that Yakoob Beg could accomplish his
task of discouraging Russian enterprise without giving some umbrage to
the government.
Despite the friendly reception of Baron Kaulbars, there still remained
some uncertainty in the minds of individuals, whether the Athalik Ghazi
was as sincere in his protestations as he would have it believed. There
was, consequently, some disinclination among the merchants of Kuldja to
be the first to send a caravan to Kashgar. They were all willing enough
to share the profits, but it was a risky experiment all the same; and
each would prefer that his neighbour should inaugurate the enterprise.
In commercial circles, there was much discussion on the new state, and
the prospects of trade therewith, and there was much talk as to "who
should bell the cat." The hesitation, if indeed so natural a sentiment
deserves to be specified here, soon passed off, and Mr. Pupyshef, a
merchant, who had had very large business connections with most parts of
Central Asia, resolved to send the first consignment of merchandise to
Kashgar. Mr. Pupyshef was, however, unable to go in person, so his
caravan set out under the charge of his clerk Somof. It arrived without
"let or hindrance" in Kashgar, where Mr. Somof was provided with
accommodation in the Caravanserai specially set apart for foreign
merchants. But a change was at once perceptible in the sentiments of the
ruler, as the personal freedom of the members of the expedition was
curtailed, and all their movements were watched with the most exacting
surveillance; and the residence of Mr. Somof was brief in the extreme,
for the Athalik Ghazi himself bought up the whole of his stock of
merchandise. Viewed as a commercial speculation, this result should have
been eminently satisfactory; the Russian merchant had to experience no
loss from delay in finding a purchaser for his articles. There was,
however, another matter to be taken into consideration, and that was the
mode of payment by the purchaser. Mr. Somof received so many Chinese
coins at a value fixed by the Ameer himself, and Mr. Pupyshef, on the
return of his representative, estimated the loss at 15,000 roubles. The
Russian government took up the case of their subject, and presented a
remonstrance at Kashgar, demanding the immediate restitution of the loss
incurred by the Russian merchant. Yakoob Beg's reply to this summary
request was a model of courtesy and tact. He denied altogether that Mr.
Somof had in any way been interfered with. That gentleman was always at
perfect liberty to do what, and to go where, he pleased, and he was
quite mistaken in supposing that he, the Ameer, had purchased his goods.
The Badaulet had nothing whatever to do with trade, which he left
entirely to his subjects. He was simply a warrior and a follower of the
Prophet. He had nevertheless instituted inquiries into the matter, and
he had discovered that some of his officers, who should be punished, had
purchased the merchandise in his name, hoping thereby to obtain it at a
cheaper rate. The Athalik Ghazi expressed his regret at the occurrence,
and would be most happy to refund whatever sum the Russian government
considered their subject had lost by the transaction. A commission was
appointed at Tashkent, to inquire into all the circumstances of the
case, and after some discussion the demand of Mr. Pupyshef was reduced
from 15,000 to 12,000 roubles. The Ameer acquiesced in the decision, but
many months elapsed before Mr. Pupyshef received his money, and then it
was again in a depreciated Chinese coinage. We are justified in assuming
that this was all planned, and that the obstacles thrown in the path of
Mr. Pupyshef were part and parcel of a systematic attempt to disgust
Russian merchants with Kashgar. The Russian government, too, was
afforded no clear case for complaint, as Yakoob Beg expressed his regret
without reserve for the occurrence, all the responsibility of which he
shifted on to the shoulders of some of "his officials whom he had
ordered to be punished." He paid without a murmur the fair demands of
Mr. Pupyshef, and if there was some delay in the refunding of the money,
it must be attributed to the poverty of his exchequer, and not to any
want of goodwill. The burden of his complaint was, "I am a poor prince;
my country is impoverished by the wars that have occurred since the
departure of the Chinese; and you will find little therein to repay you
for your trouble and expense in entering it. Why therefore will you
persist in coming to it? You can do neither yourselves nor my people any
good by doing so, and you only cause me anxiety and trouble in
preserving your countrymen from insult and injury, which you must admit
I have ever done." There was an under-current of truth in this statement
of the case, although it was not credited in Kuldja, where everything
that went amiss was set down to the hostility of the Ameer. Yakoob Beg
had, however, succeeded in throwing cold water on the enthusiastic
preparations that were being made for exploiting Eastern Turkestan, and
his mode of doing so had been quite original and characteristic. Few
rulers would have foreseen that the best way to get rid of a troublesome
visitor was to purchase what he had brought to sell to the people; and
that the simple remedy of paying in a questionable currency would
suffice to deter hundreds from following the example of Mr. Somof.
Yakoob Beg, however, was not satisfied with leaving well alone. Having
paid the claim of Mr. Pupyshef, it might have been supposed that he
would maintain a discreet silence on his intentions in the future with
regard to Russian merchants. He might have let the question, indeed,
find, as it would have found, its own solution; but, in a weak moment,
to place his own _bona fides_ beyond suspicion, he desired the Russian
government to send another merchant to Kashgar, and then it could judge
by his reception whether the Ameer was not amicably disposed towards his
"close allies," the Russians. The Russian authorities took him at his
word, and after an interval of more than twelve months, during which
Kashgar had been unvisited by a Russian merchant, another, a Mr.
Morozof, came to put Yakoob Beg's assertions to the test. True to his
word, the reception of this gentleman was most cordial. Facilities were
placed in his way for getting purchasers of his articles, and the Ameer
bought for his arsenals such of them as seemed suitable. Mr. Morozof
returned to Kuldja, narrating how cordially he had been welcomed by the
ruler himself, and how the enterprise had commercially been a success.
Others followed his example, and during the last two and a half years of
his rule Russian merchandise, either through Russian or native agents,
found its way in considerable quantities into Kashgar. But this trade
was always liable to periods of depression through the clouds that
frequently darkened the political horizon, and the Russians did not
derive the advantages from trade with this state, that they had
previously convinced themselves they were to do. Indeed, English
manufactures, after the year 1873, entered into keen competition with
theirs in the cities of Kashgar, and had driven their goods out of the
market of Yarkand at all events before the close of the year 1876. But
this fact only served to impress more forcibly on the Russians the
necessity either for annexing Kashgaria or establishing on its throne
some puppet, who would be content with the post of deputy of the Czar.
Indeed, many suggested that the Chinese should be brought back; but then
they were so far off, and apparently so weak. The party advocating the
absorption of Kashgaria every day became stronger and more pronounced;
and all observers agree that it was only a question of time when the
imperial fiat should go forth for the extinction of the rule of Yakoob
Beg. Colonel Reinthal was sent in 1874, to endeavour to place matters on
a more hopeful footing, but with little success. In addition to the
question of trade privileges, the Russians, in negotiating with native
states, or securing treaties at the point of the sword, always demanded
the right of having consular agents in the chief cities of the state.
The ostensible duty of these official representatives was to look after
the interests of their government, and to protect the lives and property
of Russian subjects as best they might be able. So far as these very
necessary functions were concerned, Russia had a perfect right in
demanding these safeguards, when such were deemed to be required. But
unfortunately for the reputation of that country, the experience of
Asiatics had amply demonstrated that these declared duties were the
least important part of their office.
Their secret instructions were to lose no opportunity of discovering the
drift of public sentiment in the state where they were stationed; to
learn all the ramifications of the dynastic intrigues that unfortunately
form the chief incidents in the history of these states, and to promote,
by every means at their disposal, the interests of the great empire into
whose service they had been admitted. When such latitude was allowed in
their instructions, and so many private and public inducements were
offered to raise their zeal, it cannot be matter of surprise if we find
the government informed promptly of the shiftings of public opinion in
the independent and semi-independent Khanates of Central Asia. Yakoob
Beg was keenly alive to the dangers that would arise to him personally
from the introduction of such a system into Kashgar, where the
discordant elements out of which he had welded a military organization
were far from being completely healed. If the presence of a mirza in
Khokand and Bokhara had entailed a decade of troubles and of gradual
subjection, what was he to expect, a mere military adventurer and a
foreigner in the land, from their presence in Eastern Turkestan? But
Baron Kaulbars had demanded this concession, perhaps more than any
other, and Yakoob Beg had to yield something in form, if he did not
surrender much in substance, to the importunities of his visitor. As a
great favour he consented to the appointment of _caravanbashis_, or
superintendents of the personal comforts of the merchants when they
should arrive; but a _caravan-bashi_ was an uneducated, unimportant
personage, from whom nothing need be feared. This did not at all please
the Russian administrators, and all their subsequent efforts were mainly
devoted to the attempt to obtain an alteration of this unimportant
personage into the prying and inquisitive _mirza_. To defeat their
design Yakoob Beg was no less firmly resolved, and the history of the
embassies, from that of Baron Kaulbars to that of Captain Kuropatkine,
was one long course of fruitless efforts to force the hand of the
Athalik Ghazi on this point. Colonel Reinthal was sent in 1874, after
the successful journey of Mr. Morozof, to see if any better arrangement
could be attained, but, although the Ameer entertained him very
hospitably, he fared no better than any of his predecessors. In that
year, too, Yakoob Beg's position had become firmer in his own state. The
Tungani had been driven back north of the Tian Shan beyond Turfan, and
into the regions east of Lake Lob; the disaffection, too, in the cities
of Kucha and Korla was also, to all appearance, dying out; but, above
all, the vast ægis of English protection had appeared to be thrown over
the integrity of his state. However unjustified this supposition was by
the treaty with Sir Douglas Forsyth, the Ameer made as much use as
possible of his new-found ally; and the large section of Anglo-Indians,
and authorities in this country on the affairs of Central Asia, who,
either out of sympathy for the man, or from a belief in the identity of
British interests with his cause, proclaimed the advisability of
supporting him against Russian aggression, gave a colourable excuse to
his declaration that England had extended for the first time in her
Trans-Himalayan policy her protection to a native state lying north of
her natural frontier. The Russian governments in Siberia and Turkestan,
emphatically cautioned by their Foreign Office to give this country no
cause for umbrage, were at first inclined to make that assertion an
excuse for pushing their friendly relations with the Ameer; but their
advances were not reciprocated, and as it became more clear that the
importance of the Forsyth mission had been greatly exaggerated by the
representations of the Ameer, the language of the Russian authorities
became once more peremptory and menacing. In short, matters after more
than two years' discussion had retrogressed to the condition they were
in before the Kaulbars treaty. The Russians had not obtained their chief
desire, the establishment of consular agents in Kashgar, and Yakoob Beg,
as in the past, boldly met threat with threat. Relying on his increased
reputation as the most orthodox and the most puissant of Mahomedans in
Central Asia, and confident that England would intervene between the
Russians and the collapse of his state, he even went so far as to temper
his defiant, and almost bellicose, attitude with such irony as the
following incident is a characteristic specimen of. Early in the year
1874 the Duke of Edinburgh married Marie Alexandrovna, the only daughter
of the Czar; and Yakoob Beg seized the occasion to send a message of
congratulation to the Czar of All the Russias on the auspicious
event--saying, that he had heard that the son of his good ally, the
Queen of England and of India, was about to wed the daughter of his
friend the Czar, and that he hastened to send him his congratulations
upon the event. To this effusive epistle no reply was deigned, and it is
doubtful whether it ever got farther than Tashkent. There is no
difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that such exhibitions as this
is an instance of detraction from the otherwise great and striking
characteristics of the ruler of Kashgar. His opposition to Russia was
most laudable; his maintenance of his privileges as an independent ruler
was prudent and worthy of our respect; but his petty insults to Russia
were neither wise nor dignified. He was clearly in the right in
checking the aggressive instincts of Russia, clothed in the specious
garb of commercial advantage; he commands not less our admiration for
the energetic and persistent manner in which he thwarted every endeavour
to introduce Russian espionage and intrigue into Kashgaria; but why
should he have weakened the effect of these splendid achievements, why
should he have risked all he had secured, by so senseless an insult as
the message to the Czar that has been just referred to?
The authorities in Tashkent, perceiving that it was doubtful whether
English public opinion was ripe yet for an active interference in
Central Asia, reverted, despite all orders from the home authorities to
the contrary, to their original intention of coercing the ruler of
Kashgar. In 1874, therefore, all preparations for commencing the
campaign in the approaching spring were made ready. Provisions and
munitions of war were despatched to Naryn, and an auxiliary division was
to make a flank movement by the Terek Pass on the west. It has been laid
to the charge of the Russian generals in Asia, that expeditions are
arranged for their mutual advantage, both in obtaining higher rank and
orders. So seriously bitten had every officer since Perovsky become by
the desire for promotion and distinction, that the disease became
generally known as the St. George or the St. Ann Cross fever. Now during
the seven years previous to the date at which we have arrived, if there
had been a fair share of distinction and spoil for the soldiers and the
lower ranks of the officers, some of those in higher posts considered
that they were aggrieved by the monopoly of supreme credit obtained by
General Kaufmann. This, indeed, had shown itself very clearly after the
fall of Khiva, a success for which Kaufmann obtained all the credit, and
yet towards which the division under his command contributed little or
nothing. The etiquette, too, maintained in the little court at Tashkent,
and the semi-regal state observed by the successful general, were
irksome to officers more accustomed to the licence of a camp than to the
punctilio of a palace. Nor were there wanting more sinister motives
still among some of the chief general officers who filled the
subordinate posts in the service of the Czar's representative. Prominent
among them was the youthful Scobelef, who, burning to distinguish
himself, clamoured loudly for some expedition which, when accomplished
successfully, would be recompensed with the Cross of St. George. Strong
as General Kaufmann may really be in the good opinion of his superiors,
he was unable to resist, if he were inclined, the demands pressed upon
him by Scobelef and his father, and the more warlike portion of his
forces. It is said, that in addition to these palpable reasons there
were others touching the family rivalries of the Kaufmanns and
Scobelefs, who appear to have been at feud with each other when younger
men in the service of the palace, when Nicholas was Czar. To remove
these differences, and to satisfy the demands of his other subordinates,
General Kaufmann consented that an expedition should be arranged against
Kashgar, and entrusted to the command of the younger Scobelef. Towards
the end of 1874 the war-cloud was drawing ominously over the Athalik
Ghazi, and to all observers it seemed as if it were about to break with
destructive violence on his devoted head. Loudly was it asserted that
nothing but British intervention would save him, and it was only too
clear that England's policy would be guided by events. The Viceroy had
certainly not advised that an active participation should be undertaken
in this question. The failure, too, of the Granville-Gortschakoff
negotiations to define a neutral zone had convinced this country of the
inutility of solving the question between the two countries by treaty.
But it was not clear that, even if Kashgar were to fall into the power
of Russia, our interests would suffer so much as to justify us in
adopting an extreme remedy. The path being thus left clear for Russia
to strike, every precaution was taken by Generals Kaufmann and Scobelef
that the blow should be sharp and decisive. Not fewer than 20,000
Russian troops in all were to be directed against Yakoob Beg, who too
late now attempted some concessions to his neighbours. Such troops as he
could raise were massed in the neighbourhood of Kashgar, while another
force under his son was stationed at Aksu. But of the result there could
not be two opinions. Very few weeks' respite remained to the intended
victim, when an event occurred which changed the whole current of
Russian thought into a different channel. Yakoob Beg was saved by the
outbreak of disturbances in Khokand, and, although the Russians never
acknowledged that they were so serious as to prevent them persisting in
their Kashgarian enterprise, still gradually the troops who had been
despatched to the frontier were recalled, and those who had been ordered
to set out for Naryn were retained in Tashkent and Hodjent, the two
towns chiefly threatened. Although this event is not part of Kashgarian
history, yet it performed so useful a function to that state, which
indeed it may be said to have saved, that some brief account of it here
may not be unwelcome.
Khudayar Khan, after the death of Alim Kuli, his hostile minister, in
1865, had been reinstated in his possession of Khokand, partly by the
efforts of his own faction, and partly by Russian assistance. From that
year to the year 1875 he was _de facto_ as he was _de jure_ Khan of
Khokand, and, although imbroiled on several occasions with Russia and
with his own subjects in those ten years, he still maintained a nominal
independence in the western half of Khokand, with his capital at the
city of the same name. For some reason, however, this Khan never was
popular. So far as we know concerning him, he does not appear to have
been any way worse than his neighbours; but one party in the state
accused him of being a tool of the Russians, while another, urged on by
the agents employed by that government, declared that he was gradually
drifting the country into a hopeless contest with that Power. Widespread
throughout the state there was dissatisfaction at his rule, and the
occasion afforded by a commotion among the Kirghiz was eagerly seized by
his subjects to rise for the purpose of subverting his power. At first
this movement seemed to possess no importance for the Russians, and was
regarded as one of those dynastic squabbles that had become too ordinary
an occurrence to occasion any surprise. The insurrectionary party, too,
had put on the throne Nasruddin, the eldest son of the Khan, a youth who
was supposed to be friendly to Russia, and who was not likely to prove
in any way formidable, having become passionately addicted to _vodka_
drinking. But behind this ostensible ruler there were others who aspired
to greater eminence than the king-makers of a petty state like Khokand.
Chief among these was Khudayar's brother-in-law, Abderrahman Aftobatcha,
who was entrusted with the chief control of the military arrangements.
This chief was the son of Mussulman Kuli, the Kipchak minister of
Khudayar's earlier days. Either incredulous of the maintenance of a
neutral attitude by Russia, or urged on by a patriotic impulse to free
the enslaved portion of Khokand, these confederates issued a
proclamation of war against General Kaufmann. The border districts rose
in response to the proclamation, the communications between Tashkent and
Hodjent were severed, and confusion for a time reigned supreme within
the Russian possessions. The Khokandian forces hesitated to make any
serious attack and wasted their time in useless depredations in the
mountains. Had a prompt move been made on Tashkent, or even on Hodjent,
the insurrection might have been successful. Bokhara might have struck
in at the critical moment, and Yakoob Beg awoke from the lethargy into
which his warlike spirit was sinking. Such was not to be, however; and
gradually the Russian scare wore off. Colonel Scobelef scoured the
country with his Cossacks; telegraphic communication was restored
between Hodjent and Tashkent; and the country was rapidly cleared of the
rebels. The fugitives who had accompanied Khudayar in his flight were
sent to the rear, and reinforcements were hastily summoned to take part
in the necessary offensive measures against Khokand. It will be
sufficient here to say that, having been defeated in the fight at
Makhram and several other small engagements, the party of Nasruddin and
Aftobatcha sued for peace. This was granted, but Khokand became the
Russian province of Ferghana, Colonel Scobelef was raised to a
major-general, and obtained his Cross of St. George by the battle of
Makhram. This event, generally known as the revolt of the Khokandians
against Russia of 1875, marks an important era, for it convinced the
Khokandians and other Asiatics that any attempt to obtain their liberty,
short of a concerted and organized movement, would be fruitless. There
has been no renewal of the attempt that then failed, but which ought to
have achieved more success.
To the discord unhappily existent among its victims has Russia been
chiefly indebted for the facility with which her Asiatic conquests have
been acquired, and to the same ally it seems probable that she will be
chiefly indebted for their preservation. There is no clearer evidence of
this than the history of this last war with Khokand. But when we
endeavour to divide the share of culpability for this dissension, we are
on this occasion bound to admit that the chief blame attaches to Yakoob
Beg. More than any other Asiatic ruler had he assumed to himself the
title of general protector of his religion and his order, against the
conquering strides of Russia; more than any other had he fostered, by
his bold and defiant attitude towards that state, the belief that there
still remained some hope of coping with the danger by a united league of
Central Asian states; more than any other had he seemed to justify this
aspiration; and more than any other must he be held culpable when he
permitted the moment that seemed most auspicious to slip by unutilized.
Moreover, when this insurrection broke out in Khokand, he had made every
preparation to defend himself against a Russian invasion. He saw the
Russians compelled, by the very necessities of their position, to call
off their forces to other quarters, and yet he abstained from striking a
blow in defence of those interests which he had ever declared were most
sacred to him. It is impossible to explain such apathy on so important
an occasion as this was; and his refusal to strike in on the side of
Aftobatcha must remain the greatest blot on an otherwise brilliant
reputation. With the collapse of that effort, and the subsequent
occupation of Ferghana, Russian attention seemed to become more occupied
with the state of affairs on the Oxus and in Cabul, than with the
fortunes or misfortunes of Kashgar. During the few months that
intervened between the annexation of Khokand and the appearance of the
Chinese north of the Tian Shan, Yakoob Beg adopted a more conciliatory
policy towards Russia, and might in a short time have sunk into the
position of a somewhat more important Khudayar or Mozaffur Eddin. Other
events intervened, however, and gave a complete change to the question,
as will be considered in a later chapter. We take our leave of this
narrative of his dealings with Russia with an admiration that would be
perfect but for the weakness he exhibited in 1875. Even that vacillation
will scarcely destroy all the claim that his bold defiance and
consistent opposition to all Russian pretensions to supremacy over
Eastern Turkestan gives him to our respectful and admiring
consideration.
CHAPTER XI.
YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND.
In describing the relations that subsisted between England and Kashgar,
while under the rule of Yakoob Beg, there will be no necessity for us to
enter so deeply into the under-currents that guided those relations, as
was necessary in the preceding chapter, where we detailed the rivalry of
Russia and Kashgar. While England could hold out a hand of friendship to
the Athalik Ghazi, because he sought to please us by making commercial
concessions, Russia felt doubly piqued with the man who for long refused
her a similar foothold, and who, for a brief space, went still farther
in his defiance, secure--as he thought--under British protection. Our
government could not fail to see, in the bold conduct of this ruler, the
result of a mistaken notion of what it would do in the event of a war in
Central Asia, and it strove to bring home to the mind of Yakoob Beg and
his emissaries a sense of our determination not to interfere beyond the
Karakoram. Looking back now on the old legends that successive
travellers brought us from Eastern Turkestan, where such strange things
had been wrought, where the Chinese had been expelled, and a new king
from Khokand enthroned, and regarding them in the light of our greatly
extended information, even since Mr. Shaw penned his interesting volume
on High Tartary, it will not be without some interest to trace back the
story of how Yakoob Beg's name first became known to us, and how, for
eight or nine years, a large section of Englishmen wove a romance round
his name, and converted "the land of the six cities" into a fertile and
populous region, which might serve as a barrier to Russian progress, and
which, like Cabul elsewhere, should extend as another "cushion" from the
mountains of Hindostan to the Celestial range of the Chinese. Those
dreams have vanished now, and in their place has risen up the very
unromantic and matter-of-fact spectacle of a Chinese triumph.
Whoever has chanced to reside in the valleys of the Himalaya--Mr. Shaw
is the authority--must experience a desire to know of the countries
beyond that range. The desire is natural, but the obstacles of nature
are stupendous. To enter Tibet has been the object of numerous
Englishmen, from the time of Warren Hastings, yet that object has been
only attained by three of our countrymen, the latest sixty-six years
ago. There are forty or fifty passes of various degrees of
practicability leading into Tibet from Nepaul, Sikhim, and Bhutan; and
to act as a spur to the explorer there is a highly civilized and
peaceable race just beyond our border of whom we know scarcely anything.
Yet the vision of Warren Hastings and of Thomas Manning remains
unfulfilled.
North of the Karakoram there were no similar incentives. Mr. Moorcroft
who, fifty years ago, resided in Ladakh, does not appear to have
manifested any desire to pierce the iron barrier to the north, although
towards Ruduk and Tibet he turned as if irresistibly fascinated. The
character which the brothers Michell gave Little Bokhara, or Eastern
Turkestan, expressed a fact, which long deterred any traveller from
attempting to explore it. "Little Bokhara," they said, "was a country
where every man carried his life in his hand, and there were indubitable
excuses for each successive traveller who recoiled before the hardships
and dangers of a journey through that country." But although no
Englishman traversed the dizzy passes of the Karakoram and the Kuen Lun,
now and then the people from Sanju, Khoten, and the neighbourhood came
to Ladakh, where they brought intelligence of the political events that
were taking place further north. Their intelligence was often completely
false, it was always vague and exaggerated, but it, at all events, told
us whether peace or war, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, was the
existing circumstance in Eastern Turkestan. It was known in a general
sense that China was the nominal ruler of this vast region; but the
exact relations China held there, how she conquered the country and
when, and by what means she retained her conquest, all these were
unascertained. There had, indeed, been one break in this state of
darkness when the learned traveller, Adolph Schlagintweit, in 1857,
penetrated, with a few native followers, into Kashgar. The initial
difficulties were successfully overcome, and fortune seemed at first
disposed to smile upon his enterprise. Herr Schlagintweit had come,
however, at a singularly inopportune moment. The Khoja Wali Khan had
just invaded Kashgar, and his forces had spread as far south as Yarkand,
when the traveller approached that city. He appears to have been able to
report himself to the Aksakal, representing Cashmere at Yarkand, who, in
turn, communicated with the Chinese Amban, for permission for him to
enter the city; but while detained outside the walls he was captured by
a roving party of Wali Khan's army. He was at once hurried off to Wali
Khan's head-quarters at Kashgar, where that despot, in a fit of fury,
brought about by excess in "bang," ordered him to be executed. His
followers escaped, and brought back the tale of his death to Ladakh.
Such was the untoward fate of the first explorer of Kashgar. In the
course of the early summer of 1868, it became generally known that the
Chinese had been driven out of Kashgar, and that Yakoob Beg was ruling
the country, under the title, conferred upon him by the Ameer of
Bokhara, of Athalik Ghazi. He had sent a sort of semi-official
messenger, Mahomed Nazzar, in that year into the Punjab, to take notes,
as it were, of our dominions. Mr. Shaw, in Ladakh, had heard of the
recent changes in Eastern Turkestan, and mentioned to this envoy on his
return the desire he had to visit Kashgar, and see the widely famed
Athalik Ghazi. The envoy received the proposition with enthusiastic
approval, but it was considered more prudent to await the formal assent
of the ruler himself. After overcoming the difficulties that beset his
task, with prompt resolution Mr. Shaw entered the dominions of the
Athalik Ghazi in December, 1868, being the first Englishman who had ever
entered Little Bokhara. His reception was singularly cordial, and
everything that the officials could do to make his sojourn in the
country pleasant to him was done. One and all of the Khokandian
dignitaries received him as a friend and a brother; and even Mahomed
Yunus, Dadkwah of Yarkand, the second man in the kingdom, treated him in
a spirit of marked cordiality. It should be remembered that Mr. Shaw
went there without any official _status_ whatever, and simply as an
English traveller. Of course, it was the best policy for the Kashgarian
rulers to greet him hospitably, and prove that they had completely
pacified Eastern Turkestan; but in pointing out the hospitable reception
that was given to Mr. Shaw, it is impossible to detract from its merit
by referring to such latent political motives as these. Yakoob Beg
received the English traveller in special audience at Kashgar, and
treated him in the most cordial manner. On Mr. Shaw offering him a few
presents that he had brought from India, such as rifles, &c., the ruler
laughed, and said, "What need is there of presents between you and me?
We are already friends, and your safe arrival has been sufficient
satisfaction to me." During Mr. Shaw's residence in Kashgar, which
extended over a period of three months, he had three interviews with the
Athalik Ghazi, who on each occasion became, if possible, more friendly
than on the previous one. Mr. Shaw was fairly treated on the whole, and
has of all writers on Kashgar given us the most graphic description of
the people and the country. Mr. Shaw's position was to a certain extent
compromised by the arrival of another Englishman, the lamented Mr.
Hayward, who was murdered in a somewhat mysterious manner, three or four
years afterwards, in the neighbourhood of the Cashmerian fortress of
Gilgit. Both travellers were for a time detained in a sort of honourable
confinement in Kashgar, but all ended happily, and the first two English
explorers of Eastern Turkestan returned in perfect safety to Ladakh. The
result of Mr. Shaw's interesting journey was not made known in England
until 1871, after he had set out and returned from Kashgar a second
time, in the first embassy of Mr., now Sir, Douglas Forsyth. The result
of this visit to Yarkand and Kashgar was almost magnetic. Not only did
the Indian Government promptly take into its consideration the question
of what our political relations were to be with the Athalik Ghazi, but
the whole Anglo-Indian community turned an attentive ear to the stories
told of the new country. A new avenue for commerce had been opened up,
and Eastern Turkestan might, after all, prove the true gateway to the
marts of Bokhara and Kuldja. In our more immediate vicinity there was
the jade trade of Khoten to be revived, and the wool of Tartary, of
ancient fame, should alone form a staple article of commerce. For
Manchester goods and Indian wares there was also a very inviting
prospect in the thickly populated districts of Yarkand and Kashgar,
which were at first supposed to contain a much larger population than as
a matter of fact they did. At first it is probable that the main
sentiment was one of satisfaction on commercial grounds alone; later on,
the progress of events in Khokand and Kuldja made the political motives
appear more prominently before English minds. A trading company was
formed in conception, but it did not begin operations until several
years later on, after the signature of the Forsyth treaty, for which,
and the official regulations concerning the working of that company,
the reader may be referred to the Appendix of this volume.
Mr. Shaw himself formed a very roseate estimate of the future of the
trade between India and Kashgar, and participated with all his wonted
activity in promoting the fortunes of the Yarkand Trading Company from
his advantageous post at Lêh. Although the more sanguine expectations
were never realized, the company itself was successful, and performed a
very useful work under no easy circumstances. Its functions are
suspended during the uncertainty that always follows a change in the
ruling power of a state, until it is seen what steps are taken by the
Chinese, or this country, to perpetuate, under the Chinese sway, those
good feelings which first arose under Yakoob Beg. Many are sceptical of
the possibility of living on terms of good neighbourship with the
Chinese, and of carrying on an intercourse, which certainly does not
exist anywhere along the whole extent of the Anglo-Chinese frontier. But
these persons will scarcely admit that the Chinese are to blame in this
respect if we neglect the subject, for Russia by right of several
treaties, and by right also of diplomatic tact, has a commercial
_status_ in every northern mart of the Chinese Empire, from Ourga to
Urumtsi, Manas, Chuguchak, Kuldja and Kashgar. If the Chinese were
reinstalled in every one of their old possessions, yet Russia would have
a legal foothold in all those outlying dependencies. English commerce
must not by any means despair of success in opening up the interior of
China from the direction of India and Cashmere. In most cases, political
action generally follows upon commercial enterprise; but in our dealings
with the Chinese the order is reversed, and political overtures and
diplomatic arrangements must clear the way for the commerce that must
infallibly spring up between Hindostan and not only Tartary and Tibet,
but also the home provinces of Yunnan and Szchuen. The root of the
difficulty is no doubt to be found in the fact that the Mantchoo caste
is in many respects as much a race apart from the mass of Chinamen as
the Norman was in England during the twelfth century. The Mantchoo
mandarin believes that in some undefined manner the introduction of
European science and civilization into China would tend to lower his
influence and political power. But if we are wise, we shall ignore this
sentiment, and endeavour to reach the people through their legitimate
authorities, the Tartar conquering race of two centuries and a half ago,
and not by attempting to influence the rulers by a propagandist crusade
among the people, as some advise.
Some months after the return of Mr. Shaw to Lêh, the Athalik Ghazi, who
had doubtless considered very attentively that gentleman's suggestion to
maintain a representative at Lahore, despatched an envoy to India for
the purpose of expressing his desire for the establishment of friendly
relations with the British Government, for the development of trade
between the countries, and for the visit of a British officer to his
capital. He had fully realized by this time what Mr. Shaw meant by
saying that he came in no official capacity. If he intended, therefore,
to reap any reward for the manifestation of his friendship towards
England, or to be able to play England's alliance off against Russia's
hostility, he discovered that he must take the initiative. In
consequence of that discovery, Ihrar Khan came to India, and was
entertained by our Government in a very friendly manner. It was in
response to Ihrar Khan's visit that Mr. Forsyth was sent as our first
envoy to Kashgar, in the following year.
Mr. Forsyth was accompanied by Mr. Shaw, who had volunteered for the
service, and by Dr. Henderson. He reached Yarkand, by the same route as
that followed by Mr. Shaw, in safety, and without suffering any great
amount of inconvenience. But the mission had reached the scene of its
labours at a very inopportune moment. The Athalik Ghazi had just been
summoned away to the far eastern frontier to repress hostile movements
on the part of the Tungan cities of Turfan and Urumtsi, and it was very
uncertain for how long a time he might be detained there. Mr. Forsyth
accordingly left Yarkand in the month of September on his return
journey, without having had an opportunity of settling the future of the
relations between India and Kashgar. Dr. Henderson, in his "Lahore to
Yarkand," chronicled the events of this journey to the region north of
the Himalaya.
The very next year, 1871, Yakoob Beg sent Ihrar Khan once more to India
to renew his protestations of friendship, entrusting him with letters,
not only for the Viceroy but also for Her Majesty the Queen. But there
was no immediate result from this later overture.
In the meanwhile Russia had broken ground more firmly in Eastern
Turkestan. The treaty of commerce between Russia and her neighbour,
which had been for several years on the carpet, had at last been signed
at Kashgar on the 8th of June, 1872. That treaty conceded no
inconsiderable trade privileges to Russia, for, as will be seen from a
perusal of its clauses, Russian goods entering the country could not be
subjected to a higher tax than 2-1/2 per cent. _ad valorem_. In fact,
but for Yakoob Beg's prudence in restricting the appointment of Russian
commercial agents in the cities to the inferior _caravan-bashi_, a far
different personage to the Aksakal, that treaty would have placed
Kashgar virtually in the possession of General Kaufmann. Even as it was,
Russia, regarded as a foe, had out-distanced England, who was held to be
a friend; and for a considerable time afterwards, English commerce,
which had no status there, hesitated to seek admission into the
dominions of the Athalik Ghazi.
But the treaty of Baron Kaulbars was in its essence a sham, for no good
feeling sprang up between the countries; and where there was distrust on
either side, trade languished, as was to be expected. Two months after
this treaty, Yakoob Beg sent his nephew, the Seyyid Yakoob Khan, on a
special embassy to Russia, whence he went on to Constantinople, and
returned _viâ_ India. He then had several long discussions with our
authorities relative to the measures that should be adopted to place
everything on a friendly footing between Kashgar and ourselves. The
Sultan had conferred upon the ruler of Kashgar the high title of Emir ul
Moomineen, and shortly afterwards Yakoob Beg proclaimed himself in
consequence of that decree Emir or Ameer of Kashgar, under the title of
Yakoob Khan. It is appropriate here to say something of these two
titles, Khan and Beg. In this work the ruler of Kashgar has been
consistently called Beg or prince, and not Khan or lord; and for the
following reasons. The title of Khan is much higher than that of Beg; it
is, moreover, hereditary. Gibbon, whose authority in these Central Asian
matters stands higher than many modern scholars will admit, defines it
as the distinguishing mark of the descendants of Genghis Khan. His heirs
and their children became the Khans of Western Asia. The Mongol who
grafted himself on the Turk and the Usbeg, brought with him the unique
authority that was vested by public voice in the house of Genghis, the
Khan of Khans. Now, although in his later days Yakoob Beg, or his
admirers, invented a lineage for himself back to Timour, consequently
making him of Mongol descent, it is highly improbable that this mythical
descent was based on any reliable _data_, nor can we admit any other
claim to according Yakoob Beg that higher title than one that will stand
the criticism of history. Yakoob Beg was not free from some of that
craving that haunts the minds of rulers "born out of the purple" to
claim cousinship with the select caste of former sovereigns; and the
visible embodiment of temporal sovereignty in Turkestan was this very
title of Khan, which has been so much abused in its application.
It is wrong, in a strict sense, to apply the title of Khan to Yakoob
Beg, although he undoubtedly made use of it during the last three years
of his reign; but as a matter of mere convenience, it is also
misleading. On the stage of Asiatic politics there is another Yakoob
Khan, who is, by descent, a Khan, and possesses qualities not less
eminent than did his namesake in Eastern Turkestan. Confusion was often
caused by the confounding of one of these personages with the other,
whereas if each had been defined by his legitimate title, there would
have been no misunderstanding. Towards the close of the year 1873, the
Seyyid Yakoob Khan, who, by descent, could claim the title which was not
his uncle's, returned to India, where he found that the English mission
was a few days ahead of him on its journey to Kashgar.
The Indian government had, in the meanwhile, appointed Mr. T. Douglas
Forsyth as their envoy to Kashgar once more, and, during the summer of
1873, preparations were busily in progress for the important embassy
that was to counteract the adverse effects of Baron Kaulbars' treaty. As
this is the turning-point in Anglo-Kashgarian relations, it is necessary
to follow it in considerable detail. Upon Mr. Forsyth's embassy depends
the whole fabric of our policy in, and intercourse with, Eastern
Turkestan during the past four years. In fact, but for Sir Douglas
Forsyth's Report and Treaty, even Mr. Shaw's interesting volume and
intrepid journey would have failed to have preserved the vitality of our
interest in Kashgar and its ruler.
By the month of July, everything was in readiness for a forward
movement, but owing to the delay in the arrival of Seyyid Yakoob Khan,
or Hadji Torah as he was more usually termed, Mr. Forsyth still lingered
at Murree. Captains Biddulph and Trotter, and Dr. Stoliczka, in the
meanwhile set out for Lêh to explore the routes between that town and
Shahidoola. These three gentlemen explored the country beyond Ladakh
very carefully, although it had already been described by Messrs. Shaw
and Hayward, and Dr. Cayley. Mr. Forsyth and the headquarters, after a
short stay at Srinagar in Cashmere, arrived at Lêh on the 20th of
September. It may be useful to give here the names of those who
comprised this important embassy. In the first place there was the envoy
himself, Mr., now Sir, T. Douglas Forsyth, C.B., and now K.C.S.I. His
second in command was Lieut.-Colonel T. E. Gordon, C.S.I., who, after
the prime object of the mission had been accomplished, explored a very
considerable portion of the Pamir, the result of whose investigations is
to be found in his work "The Roof of the World." Then came Dr. Bellew,
C.S.I., Surgeon-Major, entrusted with the medical control of the
expedition. The three military men--Captains Chapman, Trotter, and
Biddulph--held various functions; the first as secretary, the latter two
in scientific capacities. In addition to these there were the learned
Dr. Stoliczka, who died from the effects of the rarefaction of the
atmosphere; an English corporal of a Highland regiment, and six native
officers and skilled assistants. There was also an escort of ten sowars,
one naick, and ten sepoys furnished by the Corps of Guides.
The appointments of the embassy were also most carefully selected, and
with special regard to the difficulties that lay before it in the
obstacles of nature, and the inconveniences attending complete
dependence on natives for the means of transporting the large quantity
of _impedimenta_. One hundred mules "of a fair stamp" were accordingly
purchased in India by Tara Sing, a merchant, and the treasurer to the
embassy. And these were equipped with saddles and trunks of a special
pattern, made in the government workshops at Cawnpoor. Altogether, then,
this English embassy to Kashgar was a very formidable undertaking, and
in its proportions assumed something of the appearance of a small army;
in camp there were "300 souls and 400 animals." The day had gone by when
English travellers entertained doubts of entering Kashgar in company at
the same time, lest they should arouse the apprehensions of the people.
Mr. Forsyth came vested with all the authority of his Sovereign and the
Viceroy, to negotiate a treaty of amity with the ruler of Kashgar, and
the people generally saw in that fact a guarantee of the preservation of
their liberties and independence.
So far as Shahidoola, the journey was in a well known region, and
outside the frontier of Yakoob Beg. At that place the first sign of that
ruler's power was encountered in the same way as Mr. Shaw, five years
before, had witnessed the advanced limit of the power of the Athalik
Ghazi in a southerly direction. A captain of the Kashgarian army,
Yuzbashi Mahomed Zareef Khan, had been deputed to receive our envoy at
the frontier, and to give him a hearty welcome. After a rest of four
days, the whole expedition, advancing in two bodies over the Grim Pass,
Sanju Devan, entered the inhabited territory of Sanju. Here Hadji Torah,
who had been travelling "post" after them from India, caught them up,
and by his tact and real friendship for this country, contributed
greatly to the complete success of the mission. The passage of the Grim
Pass, although accomplished with success, was no easy task. Dr. Bellew,
in his book "Kashmir and Kashgar," gives the following graphic
description of it, which may be quoted with advantage as showing some of
the "obstacles of nature" to the advance either of an army or a caravan
in this quarter:--
"The scene which now burst upon our view is one not easy to describe,
still less to forget. Immediately on either hand, like the portals of a
gate, stood bare banks of silver grey slate, which gently spread away on
each side into the slopes that, inclining together, formed the theatre
of the spectacle they limited. And immediately in front commenced that
gentle rise over slabs of slate _débris_--the natural dark hue of which
was lost in the bright sparkle of its abundant mica--which led at once
on to the field of our vision. Here, at the foot of the ascent, one
step took us from the tiresome monotony of the bare rocks behind, with
all their dulness of hue, on to the snow, which overspread all before
with a white sheet of the most dazzling brilliance. On the left and on
the right it spread with uniform regularity to the crests of the
bounding ridges in those directions; whilst in front, it rose up as a
vast wall, whose top cut the sky in a succession of sharp peaks with a
clearness of outline rarely witnessed. And above all, stretched the wide
expanse of heaven, with a depth unsearchable, in the speckless purity of
its azure, and with a calm such as often precedes the storm. Wonderful
was the scene!"
Such is the description of an eye-witness of this striking scene, which
in its solemnity approached the sublime, in its grandeur the terrible.
The last hundred feet of the ascent was a sheer wall of ice, like the
Matterhorn, and up this the troopers' horses, and the baggage mules and
ponies, had to be lifted by human force. More than a whole day was
occupied in surmounting this obstacle alone, but it was surmounted with
the small loss of eight mules and three ponies. With the crossing of the
Grim Pass, the difficulties of nature disappeared, and henceforth the
course of the mission lay in the more sheltered plains of Kashgaria.
After leaving Sanju, the country had, for some days' journey, an
appearance of barrenness, that was only relieved by the avidity with
which patches of more promising soil had been cultivated, a fact which
testified alike to the beneficence of the ruler and to the assiduity of
his people. There is good reason for believing that in the Yarkand and
Khoten districts, Yakoob Beg's administration was most successful. This
may have been caused by the superior qualities of the people over the
Tungani, and mixed populations farther east; but it must also be
attributed to the absence of those desolating wars which went on without
any long intervals down to the year 1874, in the country held by the
Tungani. The treachery of Yakoob Beg in murdering the Khan Habitulla of
Khoten had aroused suspicions as to his good faith that only lay dormant
during the days of his power; but the people of Khoten, Sanju,
Karghalik, and Kilia were far too thrifty and too prudent to sit down
supinely and dwell upon their wrongs. They neither forgot nor forgave,
but they suppressed all trace of seditious opinions against the new
ruler.
The next city which Mr. Forsyth reached, Karghalik, showed still further
signs of prosperity and civilization. "An eating-house, with its clean
table, and forms, and piles of china plates and bowls, at once took us
back across the seas to the recollection of many a country restaurant in
France." Special preparations had in every way been made for the
reception of the representatives of England, and Mr. Forsyth expressed
his surprise at finding fire-places, like our own, ventilators, and rich
carpets from Khoten, famous in days of yore for its manufacture of those
articles, in the quarters that had been set apart as his residence.
Similar preparations had been made at every stopping place, and the
people not less than the sovereign did their best, and spared no
exertion, to make the stay of the Feringhees as pleasant as possible for
them. More than that, even at the resting places during the daily march,
the headman or local magnate, without exception, always entertained them
at a "dastarkhwan," that is to say, at a course of refreshments. The
"dastarkhwan" literally means table-cloth, and consists of any number of
distinct dishes, sometimes as many as a hundred, held by as many
attendants. This is a national custom, from which there is never any
deviation. It is incumbent upon the guest to break bread first, and then
present it to his host. One of their customs is refreshing to any one
who has come fresh from India, with all its troublesome caste
distinctions. "Be the host Turk or British, he and his guests eat alike
from the same dish, and hand food to the surrounding attendants, who are
troubled with no scruples of caste to interfere with their hearty
appetite."
The mission was now drawing close to Yarkand, politically and
commercially the most important city in the state, and accordingly
preparations were made for a formal entry. At a village called Zilchak a
chamberlain, or Yasawal-Bashi, came out with a party of the royal
body-guard, Yakoob Beg's favourite _jigits_, in their buff leather
uniform, to act as an escort, and the party was swollen _en route_ by
numerous influential citizens and merchants, who advanced to give an
early welcome to the new arrivals. By these additions quite an imposing
cavalcade drew nigh to the walls of Yarkand. The quarters set apart for
the Englishmen were in the fort, which lies to the north of the city, so
that Yarkand had to be ridden through before their halting place was
reached. The people who thronged to witness the sight seemed very well
disposed, and altogether there was every reason to feel well satisfied
with these mutual first impressions, which, some had asserted, would be
far from pleasant.
The following day there was an interview of ceremony with the Dadkhwah
of Yarkand, Mahomed Yunus Jan, for whose history the reader is referred
to Chapter IX., and then the visitors were permitted to go wherever they
liked. On Mr. Forsyth's former visit a similar freedom had not been
accorded him. Their first appearance in the streets was the occasion for
a great deal of bustling on the part of the curious, but of friendly
goodwill also. All the principal streets and bazaars were visited in
turn, such as the butchers' street, or market, where the varieties of
meat were clearly to be seen, and their quality tested by their tails or
heads being left untouched. It appears to be the fashion in Yarkand to
purchase the necessaries of life during the morning, and the luxuries in
the evening. There is a special evening bazaar, called Shám, where hats
and other clothes, in addition to various other articles, are put up for
sale in the afternoon. This, when lit up with Chinese lamps, must have
presented a stirring sight, very similar to a country fair in our
country. Sir Douglas Forsyth does not tell us whether under Yakoob Beg
it was customary to illuminate this bazaar with the gaudy lamps of the
Chinese, or whether our imagination of such a scene must be referred
back to the days of the old domination.
Nor were these harmonious relations confined to the lower people and
ourselves alone. Their rulers set an example that all strove to imitate.
Between the officers of the mission and the Dadkhwah something more
cordial than a chivalrous sentiment of guest towards host sprang up, and
was heartily reciprocated; while Hadji Torah smoothed down all
difficulties by his ready tact and never-failing resource. The latter
did not remain the whole time of the three weeks that the mission
remained at Yarkand, but set out for the capital, in order to put the
Ameer _au courant_ with English affairs, and the exact objects our
authorities had before them with regard to his country.
Mahomed Yunus had placed at the disposal of the mission a considerable
number of the carts of the country, which proved very serviceable. These
carts are strongly built, with two wheels, six feet in diameter, and are
drawn by four or six ponies, as the case may be. They are not permitted
to carry a greater weight than ten hundredweight, but with that load it
is quite customary for them to perform journeys of twenty and
twenty-five miles a day. In carts of this kind the heavier baggage was
carried from Yarkand to Kashgar, while the members of the mission with a
lighter camp followed on some days afterwards. While mentioning these
carts, so superior to the Indian modes of conveyance, we will remark
that they also are used as omnibuses and stage coaches. They ply
frequently between the fort and city of Kashgar, a distance of five
miles, and they are also used as a stage coach doing the whole distance
from Yarkand to Kashgar in five stages. But no company, with its
regulations and bye-laws has a monopoly of this branch of locomotion,
and there is a tariff fixed by law which cannot be departed from.
On the 28th of November the mission set out from Yarkand, and for a
certain distance high officials, by order of the Dadkwah, bore it
company to speed it on its journey. From Yarkand to Yangy Hissar the
country was equally prosperous-looking, but there was much desert land
as well. The villages of Kok Robat and Ak Robat (names meaning Blue and
White Post-house respectively) wore a flourishing look, and the
appearance of Yakoob Beg's soldiery, still _jigits_, who looked prim on
parade, and yet could play the part of waiter, carpenter, or what not,
with equal facility, added a sense of order and cohesion to the whole
display. The appearance of Yangy Hissar was made more imposing to the
view by the proximity of the formidable fort Yakoob Beg had erected
there; but in itself, owing to the houses being surrounded by mud walls,
with crenellated tops, it closely resembled a fortification. There was
only a brief stay here, and the mission then commenced its last stage of
all. The 4th of December, 1873, was the eventful day which first saw an
English envoy enter that capital, which Mr. Shaw had visited four years
before in a non-official capacity. Special quarters had been prepared,
at a short distance from the fort, where is also the royal palace, for
the envoy, and these Elchi Khana had been fitted up in a very
comfortable, if not luxurious style. Ihrar Khan Torah, who had visited
India as envoy twice before, was the first to pay a visit to the new
arrivals, and to request that they would come at once to see the Athalik
Ghazi. The following description is Sir Douglas Forsyth's own account of
his first interview with the Ameer:--
"According to etiquette we dismounted at about forty paces from the
gateway, and walked slowly along with Ihrar Khan, the Yasawal-Bashi, or
head chamberlain, with white wand in hand going ahead. In the outer
gateway soldiers were seated on a dais with their firearms laid on the
ground before them, their arms folded, and their eyes on the ground. We
then crossed obliquely an empty court-yard, and passing through a second
gateway filled with soldiers, crossed another court, on all sides of
which soldiers in gay costumes were ranged seated. From this court we
passed into the penetralia, a small court, in which not a soul was
visible, and everywhere a deathlike stillness prevailed. At the further
end of this court was a long hall, with several window doors. Ihrar Khan
then led us in single file, with measured tread, to some steps at the
side of the hall, and, entering almost on tiptoe, looked in, and,
returning, beckoned with his hand to me to advance alone. As I
approached the door he made a sign for me to enter, and immediately
withdrew. I found myself standing at the threshold of a very
common-looking room, perfectly bare of all ornament, and with a not very
good carpet on the floor: looking about I saw enter at a doorway on the
opposite side a tall stout man, plainly dressed. He beckoned with his
hand, and I advanced, thinking that it must be a chamberlain who was to
conduct me to 'the presence.' Instinctively, however, I made a bow as I
advanced, and soon found myself taken by both hands, and saluted with
the usual form of politeness, and I knew that I was standing before the
far-famed ruler of Eastern Turkestan. After a few words of welcome the
Athalik led me across the room and seated me near him, by the side of a
window. At this moment a salute of fifteen guns was fired. His Highness
asked in an eager tone after the health of Her Majesty, and of the
Viceroy, and soon afterwards called, in a low voice, to Ihrar Khan to
bring in the other officers. They came in one by one, and each was
shaken by the hand, and made to sit down by my side. Then there was a
long and somewhat trying pause, during which the Athalik eyed each one
of us with intent scrutiny. I had been told that etiquette forbade the
guest to speak much on the first interview, and that it was a point of
good manners to sit perfectly still with downcast eyes.... After this
silent ordeal had been undergone for some time, at a sign from the
Athalik, sixteen soldiers came in with the dastarkhwan, and the Athalik
breaking a loaf of bread shared it with us. After the cloth was removed,
we, remembering our lesson in manners, rose up, and stroking our beards,
said, 'Allah o Akbar;' soon after which the Athalik said, 'Khush,
amadeed' ('You are welcome')."
Thus ended this imposing interview, imposing not for any magnificence or
barbaric splendour that appertained either to the court or person of the
ruler, but by reason of the mysterious character of the Ameer himself,
of his vague power and influence, and of the hold he had acquired over
such of his subjects as comprised his court and his body guard. All his
Khokandian friends and relations, whose fortunes, indeed, depended on
his power, were stanchly attached to his person. It could not be given
to envoys to possess such complete prescience as to foresee that the
jarring elements, that still existed beneath the surface would suffice
to overthrow his rule still more irretrievably when it received its
first shock from external foes. To the observer, the appearance of
Yakoob Beg and his military following was the highest evidence of latent
power. Order was supreme, and discipline was as apparent in the palace
of the Ameer as in the barrack yards of his fortresses.
The formal interview took place on the 11th of December, when the
presents from our government to the Ameer, carried by over 100 men, were
delivered to His Highness. There were guns of all kinds, including two
small cannon, vases, &c., &c.; but the token of friendship at which the
ruler showed most symptoms of pleasure was the autograph letter of Her
Majesty. This letter was enclosed in a "magnificent casket of pale
yellow quartz, clamped with gilt bands and handles, and bossed with onyx
stones." The Ameer received this with unconcealed satisfaction, several
times repeating, "God be praised." And then he made those declarations
of friendship which, taken in conjunction with our admiration for the
man, were the means of riveting England and Kashgar into a closer
alliance than any that has as yet subsisted between ourselves and any
other Central Asian ruler. "Your Queen is a great sovereign. Her
government is a powerful and a beneficent one. Her friendship is to be
desired, as it always proves a source of advantage to those who possess
it. The Queen is as the sun, in whose genial rays such poor people as I
flourish. I particularly desire the friendship of the English. It is
essential to me. Your rule is just. The road is open to every one, and
from here to London any one can come and go with perfect freedom."
On the 13th of December our representatives paid their first visit to
the city of Kashgar. The country round Kashgar is very fertile, highly
cultivated, and thickly populated, and the mission was not less struck
by the air of prosperity prevalent here than it had been at Yarkand. In
addition, the people had a healthier appearance, mainly through the
absence of goitre. The Dadkhwah of Kashgar, Alish Beg, who was a
Kashgari and not a Khokandian, was not less friendly than the Governor
of Yarkand had been, and a very pleasant day was passed in his company.
On the 18th a grand review was held, but for some reason, far from
clear, only of the old Chinese troops who had taken service under the
new ruler when Kashgar citadel fell. The description of the manoeuvres
which this force performed reads more like the display of an itinerant
circus than of a disciplined army, but, nevertheless, these Khitay
troops were excellent material for an army. Their practice with the
_tyfu_, an awkward weapon, being a sort of gun-cannon, carried by two
men and served by three, was pronounced very good up to 250 yards.
It is proper to state here, very clearly, that while the English mission
was on Kashgarian soil it lived and travelled free of all expense, and
as the Ameer paid his subjects in hard cash for whatever service they
rendered, it is obvious that for a small state such as his was this was
no trivial expense. It is only fair that this fact should be as widely
known as possible, for some discontent was aroused by a similar
hospitality being extended to the Seyyid Yakoob Khan last year. That
discontent arose from ignorance; for it is hardly to be imagined that
any Englishman would grumble at reciprocating the courteousness of a
Central Asian potentate. The mission remained at the capital almost four
months, and altogether the time passed very pleasantly. The weather was
certainly rigorous; but then there was much to be done in the way of
business, sight-seeing and amusement.
On the 2nd of February Yakoob Beg placed his seal to the treaty of
commerce, and this act concluded the business portion of the English
mission. On the 16th of March formal leave was taken of the Athalik
Ghazi, and the mission returned to India. It had accomplished its task
with pre-eminent success, and the Forsyth Embassy deserves long to be
remembered as the most ably conducted and practically useful embassy
that ever set out from India.
Since the signature of that treaty the Turkestan Trading Company has
been very actively engaged in despatching several caravans annually into
Kashgaria; but now, whether temporarily or permanently remains to be
seen, its operations have come to a standstill. In these later years,
Mr. Shaw, in his old post as Commissioner in Ladakh, had been as quietly
performing his useful work as ever before; and there were rumours that
he was to receive his reward in being sent as another envoy, or rather
as a resident agent, into Kashgaria, last year. If the appointment were
made, it has at this date (October 1st) been for the time suspended; and
such entirely new considerations have come into play that it may be
postponed for an indefinite period. Hadji Torah's visit to this country,
in June and July, 1877, when the Turko-Russian war had rendered the
Eastern Question once more acute, revived our interest, which had been
flagging, in Eastern Turkestan. But he came at an unfortunate moment,
for June brought us tidings of reverses round Turfan, and July did not
pass away without the intelligence of the death of the Athalik Ghazi
himself.
There had, before the receipt of this definite intelligence, been absurd
rumours of the part Yakoob Beg was resolved to play in Central Asia as
the ally of the Porte, while he, poor man, was opposing with despair,
and at the cost of his life, a relentless and irresistible foe. Such is
the irony of circumstance! The vanquished in Asia was by some freak of
imagination converted in Europe into the arbiter of a great question,
and the guide of all those peoples of either Turkestan who chafe at the
bit because of Russian rule. But in reality, with the return of Sir
Douglas Forsyth, our relations with Kashgar, which at one time promised
to have been most cordial, languished for want of a motive. No amount of
admiration would suffice to make us permanently guarantee Kashgar
against Russia, for the bare facts concerning the intervening country at
once chilled the sympathy at our hearts. The Grim Pass, and the road
lined with desiccated travellers and animals, effaced the bright picture
of the orchards of Kashgar and the busy streets of Yarkand. There was a
sigh of profound relief, that would not be suppressed, when Sir Douglas
Forsyth's report made the fact clear, that wherever else India might be
menaced she was safe, at least, from attack north of Cashmere. It is
true that there is a feasible route from Khoten to Ruduk, and thence to
India; but Yakoob Beg did not hold it, and its consideration was
considered to be beside the question. In fact, after 1874, we
entertained much the same opinion towards Kashgar and Yakoob Beg that we
did towards Poland and Kosciusko; and we were beginning to reconcile
ourselves to a Russian installation in that state, when the returning
Chinese made us reflect more deeply on Central Asian matters, and
discover that after all has been said against the assertion there exists
a third, and hitherto neglected, great Power in Central Asia. There was
never anything save a kindly feeling between the two countries, and all
who could admire bravery and justice and hospitality and frank courtesy
were attached to the individual who had proved that he possessed all
these attributes in no mean degree. But there was no deeper sympathy
than this, or rather there was no stronger connecting link. The Indian
government felt that it would be championing an unrecognized cause in
supporting Yakoob Beg against all comers, and in the press of more
urgent matters our relations with the Athalik Ghazi became lost sight
of.
The effect of this treatment upon the Ameer was not unapparent, and
during the last twelve months of his rule he had become more Russian and
less English in his policy. But we preserved "the even-tenor of our
way." Yakoob Beg had no hold over us such as must always be possessed by
the ruler of Afghanistan. Practically speaking, his state was more
inaccessible to us than Tibet, and the Russians at Yarkand would be a
source of far less danger to us than warlike and hostile Chinese might
become at Lhasa. To sum up, England and Kashgar were friends because
they had no reason to be foes; but they were indifferent friends. The
tear might be shed for mutual misfortunes, and condolences might be
uttered when cause for grief arose; but that was all. There was no
alliance in the true sense, nor was there firm and unswerving
friendship. There was a brief space occupied by sympathy and goodwill;
then ensued an unbroken period of unvarying indifference. Before 1877,
the spark that had been kindled by Mr. Shaw, and fanned to the
dimensions of a flame by Sir Douglas Forsyth, had gone out, and with its
extinction passed away the solid fabric that many had hoped to rear upon
the base which the enterprise of a few intrepid men had diligently
prepared. Whether we were prudent or imprudent, true or false, kind or
unkind, Yakoob Beg leaned on a broken reed when he bade defiance to
Russia, trusting on our support. This chapter of our policy in Central
Asia may be closed as speedily as possible; if we do not come out of it
with much glory, it is to be hoped that a lenient posterity may judge
our demerits with a merciful consideration for the preservation of a
strict and irresponsible neutrality.
CHAPTER XII.
YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA, AND DEATH.
Until the close of the autumn of 1876 Yakoob Beg had not devoted much
personal attention to his eastern frontier. After the first Tungan war
and the capture of Kucha he had confided to his son and his lieutenants,
the charge of maintaining order in the annexed districts, and of
protecting his dominions against any hostile attempt on the part of the
Chinese. About the month of September in that year couriers arrived with
strange tidings in Kashgar. The message, we can well imagine, was
terrible in its brevity. The Chinese had appeared north of the Tian
Shan. They had sacked Urumtsi, and were laving close siege to Manas.
Their numbers rumour had magnified to almost a hundred thousand
combatants, and they came armed with all the auxiliaries Western science
could supply.
Before following the movements of the ruler of Kashgar upon the receipt
of this intelligence, it will be necessary to consider what had been the
history of this Chinese army which had so suddenly appeared in Jungaria.
When in the natural course of events the Chinese government, having
solved the Taeping and Panthay difficulties, having restored order where
disorder had been supreme, and having created an army where there had
been only a disorganized rabble, turned its attention to the question,
which it had never lost sight of, of chastising the Tungan rebels beyond
Kansuh, the victorious soldiers of Yunnan, instead of being disbanded,
were invited to participate in a fresh campaign in the regions beyond
Gobi. It requires no great stretch of imagination to realize the scene
when the imperial edict came before these veterans, calling on all true
soldiers to vindicate their country's honour and their outraged religion
against the Tungan outcasts; how the generals, such as Chang Yao, set an
example of enthusiasm which the main body of their soldiers speedily
followed. In the presence of such military enthusiasm we are transported
back to the days of imperial Rome, when the subjection of one province
was only the prelude to some fresh triumph, and when every campaign
found in the ranks of the army the veterans of the last. So it was that
the victors of Talifoo, by long marches through Szchuen and Shensi,
reached Lanchefoo, the capital of Kansuh, where the viceroy of that
province was gathering together the munitions of war, and the recruits
who were to swell the nucleus of trained soldiers to the proportions
suitable to an invading army. Some have considered, and we are far from
denying that there is much to support such a view, that there was a
political motive at the root of this enterprise, the motive being a
desire on the part of the ruling family to give employment to a large
disciplined body of men, who if retained in China proper would be at the
service of any powerful conspirator or presumptuous aspirant to imperial
honours. Whether there is any foundation or not for this supposition, it
is certain that those troops who were not required for garrison work in
Yunnan were taken by a round-about route at a great distance from the
capital to the north-west frontier town of Lanchefoo, there to prepare
for the most arduous military enterprise China had undertaken since her
conquest of Eastern Turkestan in the last century.
It is not certain when these movements began to be carried out, but
there appears to be no reason to doubt that the advanced portion of the
Chinese army had commenced its march westward before the end of the
year 1874. In the barren region between Lanchefoo and Hamil, a tract of
country some 900 miles as the crow flies, but probably nearer 1,200 by
the road followed by the Chinese, such difficulties were encountered
that one if not two winters were occupied in overcoming these
preliminary obstacles to the advance of the main force. The interval was
not passed in complete idleness at headquarters, where magazines of arms
and stores were being collected, recruits enlisted and drilled, and the
plan of campaign that was to astonish Asia, if not Europe also, was
being drawn up by the Viceroy of Kansuh in person and his able
lieutenants. At last, with the break of spring upon the desert plains of
Gobi, the Chinese army, which numbered in its entirety some 50,000 men,
set out on the long road across the desert to the more fertile regions
lying north and south of the Celestial Mountains. Of the details of this
portion of the enterprise the _Pekin Gazette_ is strangely reticent. The
most profound secrecy was observed, and, although it was known that
military events were in progress in the north-west, their object and
their extent were mysteries. After the delay experienced by the advanced
guard, which had to form fixed encampments, or rather settlements, in
the desert, and plant the corn that was to enable it to advance in the
following spring, no serious check was experienced by the Chinese until
they appeared before the walls of Urumtsi, which the Tungan leaders had
resolved to defend.
Although several officers in the service of Yakoob Beg happened to be in
the city, and several of the leading Tungani resided there, the defence
was not prolonged, and after a few days Urumtsi surrendered to the
Chinese. Many of the inhabitants had fled to the neighbouring city of
Manas, but the garrison was massacred by order of the Chinese generals.
There is no mention in this case of what fate befell those of the
inhabitants who remained.
Urumtsi surrendered towards the close of August, 1876, and on the 2nd
of September the Chinese sat down before the fortifications of Manas, a
much more strongly situated city, and defended with the whole force of
the Tungan people. The first panic at the appearance of the Chinese had
passed off, and the defenders of Manas recognized that they were not
only fighting for their cause and independence, but also for their lives
and the honour of their families. The terrible lesson of Urumtsi was not
without its effect upon the resolute but despairing garrison of Manas.
The capture of Urumtsi was a creditable performance in a military sense,
but the campaign had to be decided before the ramparts of Manas. On the
2nd of September the Chinese batteries commenced to play on the
north-east portion of the wall, and for two months the bombardment was
carried on on all sides with more or less vigour. Several assaults were
repulsed, and the Tungani, in face of superior odds and weapons, had
behaved like brave men. But the Chinese were as persistent in their
attack after an eight weeks' siege as they had been on the first day of
their arrival, and the provisions of the Tungani were almost exhausted.
With their supplies ebbed also their courage, and, after an unsuccessful
sortie, the Tungan general, Hai-Yen, presented himself to the Chinese
outposts begging to be accorded an honourable capitulation. Ostensibly,
terms were granted--or, rather, to put the matter as it is expressed in
the official Chinese report, everything was left vague--and on the 6th
of November Hai-Yen and the main body of his fighting men came forth
from the city towards the Chinese camp. The subsequent events are not
clear, but it seems that the attitude of this body was suspicious. The
men were armed, they were in a well-ordered phalanx, and to the Chinese
on the hills around it looked as if they were about to attempt to cut
their way through. Once the Chinese generals entertained the suspicion,
they proceeded to act promptly upon it, as if it were an incontestable
fact, and the Tungani, attacked from all sides, by artillery, horse,
and foot, were in a short time annihilated. Such of their chiefs as were
not slain were brought before the Chinese generals, and forthwith
executed "with the extreme of torture." Every able-bodied man found in
the city or its vicinity was massacred; but the report distinctly states
that the women, children, and old men were spared, and there is no
reason to doubt the veracity of the Chinese. There would, in their eyes,
be no need to palliate such strictly just acts of retribution as these.
Not content with having chastised the living Tungani, by annihilating
them, as a race capable of self-defence for a generation to come, the
bodies of some of the prime movers in the Tungan movement in its
infancy, such as To-teh-lin, Heh-tsun, and Han-Hing-Nung, were exhumed
and quartered, as an example to all traitors to the Chinese Empire. The
fall of Manas struck a blow that resounded throughout Central Asia, and
at the intelligence a panic spread among all the peoples of Chinese
Turkestan and Jungaria. The enterprise had been conducted with such
astonishing secrecy, and the blow had been struck with such rapidity and
skill, that the effect was enhanced by these causes, new alike in the
annals of China and Central Asia. Not only had the Khitay returned for
revenge, but they had brought with them all the auxiliaries that make
England and Russia the dominant powers in that continent. The Khitay no
longer advanced in the clumsy formation of a long-forgotten age, but in
obedience to orders based on the models of France and Germany. Their
artillery was not a source of danger to the artillerists alone, but as
effective as the workshops of Herr Krupp can supply. But, above all,
their generals had made still more astonishing progress. In the sieges
of Urumtsi and Manas they had proved themselves to be no mean
tacticians; in their next and more extended enterprise they were to show
that they must be ranked still higher as strategists.
Before the end of 1870 the Tungani had ceased to be an independent
people. The great majority of them had fallen either in the field or by
the hand of the executioner; and with their disappearance the first
portion of the task of the Chinese army was completed. The blood of the
Khitay massacred in 1862 and 1863 was atoned for, and Chinese prestige
restored to as great a height as at any time it had been in the present
century. More remained to be accomplished, in its danger as in its
result more important, which we have now to consider, before their full
task should be consummated; but the Chinese army and its generals had
done, even up to this point, a feat of which any country might be proud.
These events appear sudden and strange to us who are far removed from
their influence, and who only entertain a languid kind of supercilious
interest in matters in which the Chinese are the guiding spirit. But
what must they have appeared to Yakoob Beg in his palace at Kashgar,
although that palace was 1,000 miles removed from the spot where his
victorious enemies lay encamped? It is impossible for us to gauge the
feeling of apprehension with which these first triumphs of the Chinese
were viewed throughout Eastern Turkestan; and if the bold heart of the
Athalik Ghazi did not misgive him, it was not through any light spirit
as to the gravity of the danger.
Intelligence of the fall of Manas reached Yakoob Beg, probably, before
the end of November, and in consequence of the lateness of the season he
had the whole of the winter before him to make his preparations for
defence. The surrender of these cities was not generally known in this
country until April, 1877, when we also heard of Yakoob Beg's march
eastward to protect his menaced frontier. There is very little to be
learnt of the internal affairs of Kashgar between March, 1876, and
March, 1877; that is to say, between the close of the revolt in Khokand,
with the surrender of Abderrahman Aftobatcha, and the mustering of
Yakoob Beg's army round the city of Turfan, or Tarfur. There can be no
doubt that in that period some important changes had taken place in the
sentiment of the Kashgarian people; these changes may not have been very
perceptible to a casual observer, yet in their consequences they were as
important as manifest sedition. It is not difficult to suggest what some
of these modifications may have been; of what they resulted in there can
be no doubt--the weakening of the power of the Athalik Ghazi.
Yakoob Beg's over-caution in November, 1875, when the last rising broke
out in Khokand, damaged his prestige more than a lost battle. It damped
the ardour of the Khokandian element among his followers, and when we
remember that these were his ablest and most devoted partisans, this
alone was a serious blow. But there are many tokens that the
disaffection was not confined to any special party among his people, but
was spread amongst them all. The Tungan wars had never been popular, and
had been costly and sanguinary operations. The old trade with Russian
territory, that once had been so lucrative, languished for want of a
fostering hand, and the difficulties of that northern range of
mountains, which the patience and care of the Chinese had for a time
pierced through, were made the most of to prevent intercourse with
Kuldja and Vernoe. More than all, too, all Yakoob Beg's skill as a
"manipulator of phrases" could not conceal the fact that his treaty with
England was a failure. It did not give him that British protection which
alone he cared for, and it did not provide, through the greater
obstacles of nature, his people with that new trade outlet which was the
sole object worth securing in their eyes. The Forsyth treaty seemed to
bring the relations of England and Kashgar to a sudden termination; and
the Kashgari were quite shrewd enough to perceive that the Athalik Ghazi
would not be buttressed by English bayonets against Russian aggression,
if that instrument was to be held, as in their eyes it could not be
otherwise than held, the only connecting link between the countries. The
consequence of this belief was a resignation to a Russian subjection at
no distant date.
Yakoob Beg's tenure of power would be morally weakened by the existence
of these causes for discontent among his people, and it was at such a
moment, when they had perhaps only slightly become clear to his eyes,
that the return of the Chinese was heralded. In the face of a great and
common danger a well-affected people would have rallied round their
head, and in the crisis have found a joint necessity to produce a better
understanding than existed before among their component parts. The
country east of Kucha, where it was inhabited at all, was inhabited by
the few survivors of the massacres ordered by Yakoob Beg's
representatives. Amongst these there could be no great amount of
affection towards his cause. The garrison of the city of Kashgar
consisted in the main of the pardoned Khitay soldiers--Yangy Mussulmans,
as they were called--and from them no stanch support could be expected
against their Buddhist countrymen (see Appendix). The Tungani of Kucha
and Aksu and the neighbourhood were the most numerous recruits in the
army, and from them at least it might have been supposed that the
Athalik Ghazi would obtain faithful service. Even among them, however,
there was discontent. They had everything to dread at the hands of the
Chinese. It was they who had massacred the helpless Khitay, a deed from
the stain of which Yakoob Beg at least was free; and it was they against
whom the wrath of China would in the first place be directed. But they
had also their grudges against the ruler. He had beaten them in the
field of battle, and had compelled more than he had induced them to join
his army. They hated the Mahomedan Andijani only one degree less than
the Buddhist Chinaman, and their ambitious game had been foiled by the
military talents of their present ruler. They had run, in the years
1862-65, all the risk attaching to a revolt against China, and when they
had accomplished their task they found themselves defrauded of their
reward. Therefore, in the face of a Chinese invasion there was disunion
in the ranks of the very Mahomedan rebels who had originated all these
troubles. The nucleus of Yakoob Beg's army, when these have been struck
out as non-efficient, was small indeed; but it was only on that nucleus
he could depend in fighting for his crown and his religion.
During the winter of 1876, when he was busy in collecting arms,
ammunition, and stores at Yarkand and Kashgar, he must have discovered
many of these discordant elements; yet he pushed his preparations
resolutely on. He conceived that under the circumstances the boldest
policy would be the most prudent, and that if he could but beat the
Chinese in the field by superior tactics he might ride triumphant over
all his difficulties and dangers. With these views uppermost in his mind
he concentrated all his forces, Tungan included, along the southern
slopes of the Tian Shan, with his headquarters at Turfan. The Russian
officer, Captain Kuropatkine, who had been sent to Kashgar on a mission,
and who had journeyed through the whole extent of Kashgaria to meet the
Ameer at Turfan, computed Yakoob Beg's army at the following strength,
and supplied the accompanying information concerning its disposition
along the frontier.
The fort of Devanchi, guarding the principal defile through the mountain
range, was garrisoned by 900 _jigits_, armed with muskets and two
guns--one a breech-loader. At Turfan there were with the Ameer 3,500
_jigits_ and 5,000 _sarbazes_, with 20 guns, mostly of ancient make.
Toksoun, a fortified place, some miles nearer Korla, on the main road,
was occupied by 4,000 _jigits_ and 2,000 _sarbazes_ with five guns.
Hacc Kuli Beg had command here. At Korla there were also about 1,500
men, who were brought up to the front shortly after Captain
Kuropatkine's departure. With these 17,000 men, scattered over a widely
extended area, Yakoob Beg had to defend himself against an enemy
superior in numbers, and, as the result showed, in generalship as well.
The Russian officer gave, on his return, a very gloomy account of Yakoob
Beg's affairs, predicting the speedy disintegration of his state. He
also asserted that the Tungani were deserting in great numbers, and that
everywhere east of Kucha there was discontent and distrust of the
Kashgarian rulers. This disparaging account was confirmed by Colonel
Prjevalsky, some months afterwards, upon his return from his adventurous
journey to Lob Nor. In a letter, dated from Little Yuldus, May 28, 1877,
he said he had been very kindly received, but also suspiciously watched
by Yakoob Beg. "All the way from Hoidu Got to Lob Nor he was escorted by
a guard of honour, who officiously endeavoured to satisfy his smallest
wishes, but would not allow him, or any of his people, to come in
contact with the inhabitants. Yakoob Beg somewhat peremptorily asked
Colonel Prjevalsky to explain why the Russians had provisioned the
Chinese forces arrayed against him; but, in an interview at Korla, he
again and again assured the Russian traveller that he was a friend and
well-wisher to Russia. Notwithstanding these precautions, Colonel
Prjevalsky and the other members of the expedition succeeded in making
the natives tell them that they were disgusted with the military
despotism of Yakoob Beg, and that they hoped the Russians would soon be
coming."
The information contained in this letter refers to the end of April,
1877, or to a time after the first defeat of Yakoob Beg by the Chinese,
and his withdrawal to Korla; but it is _à propos_ in this place as
confirming Captain Kuropatkine's remarks.
In addition to the 17,000, more or less, disciplined soldiers whom
Yakoob Beg had mustered at the frontier, Captain Kuropatkine mentioned
10,000 Doungans--that is, the Tungani inhabitants of this eastern
region. Not only were these notoriously untrustworthy, but they were
also badly armed, and were, on the whole, a source of weakness rather
than of strength. Before the close of the month of February the Athalik
Ghazi was at Turfan, constructing forts at Toksoun and towards the Tian
Shan, and endeavouring to inspire his followers with his own indomitable
spirit.
In the meanwhile the Chinese had not been idle. They had, after their
triumph over the Tungani, established their headquarters at Guchen, near
Urumtsi, and had so far secured their communications with Kansuh that a
regular service of couriers was organized, and a continual supply of
arms, military stores, and men flowed across Gobi to the invading army.
For instance, a large arsenal for the storage of arms was erected at
Lanchefoo, and on one occasion as many as 10,000 rifles of the Berdan
pattern were sent in a single convoy. While Tso Tsung Tang, the Viceroy
of Kansuh and Commander-in-Chief, was making these preparations north of
the Tian Shan, for forcing the range with the melting of the snow,
another Chinese general, Chang Yao, was stationed at Hamil for the
purpose of seconding the main attack by a diversion south of the range.
In estimating the total number of the Chinese army at 60,000 men--that
is, 50,000 round Guchen and 10,000 at Hamil--we would express only what
is probable. The total number may have been more or less, but in
estimating it at 60,000 men we believe we are as close to exactitude as
is possible under the circumstances. In the month of March the Chinese
generals had made all their preparations for attacking Yakoob Beg. So
far as our geographical information goes there is no direct road from
Guchen to Turfan, and consequently the chief Chinese attack was made
from Urumtsi against Devanchi, where Yakoob Beg had constructed a fort.
But, although the larger army was manoeuvring north of the Tian Shan,
the decisive blow was in reality struck by the smaller force advancing
from Hamil. If we are to judge from the disposition of the Kashgarian
army, the movements of this brigade had not obtained that attention from
the Athalik Ghazi which they merited.
General Chang Yao captured the small towns of Chightam and Pidjam in the
middle of April without encountering any serious opposition. And from
the latter of these places, some fifty miles east of Turfan, commenced
that concerted movement with his superior, Tso Tsung Tang, which was to
overcome all Kashgarian resistance. A glance at the map will show that
Yakoob Beg at Turfan was caught fairly between two fires by armies
advancing from Urumtsi and Pidjam, and if defeated his line of retreat
was greatly exposed to an enterprising enemy. Upon the Chinese becoming
aware of the success of their preliminary movements a general advance
was ordered in all directions. It is evident that the Chinese were met
at first with a strenuous resistance at Devanchi, and that the forcing
of the Tian Shan defiles had not been accomplished when news reached the
garrison that their ruler had been expelled from Turfan by a fresh
Chinese army. It was then that confusion spread fast through all ranks
of the followers of Yakoob Beg; in that hour of doubt and unreasoning
panic the majority of his soldiers either went over to the enemy or fled
in headlong flight to Karashar. In this moment of desperation the
Athalik Ghazi still bore himself like a good soldier. Outside Turfan he
gave battle to the invader, and though driven from the field by
overwhelming odds he yet once more made a stand at Toksoun, forty miles
west of Turfan, and when a second time defeated withdrew to Karashar to
make fresh efforts to withstand the invading army. Yakoob Beg probably
lost in these engagements not less than 20,000 men, including Tungani,
by desertion and at the hands of the enemy. He consequently conceived
that it would be prudent to withdraw still farther into his territory,
and accordingly left Karashar, after a few days' residence, for Korla.
Some weeks before the occurrence of these striking events Yakoob Beg had
sent an envoy to Tashkent to solicit the aid of the Russians against the
advancing Chinese. But the Russians only gave his messenger fair words,
and did not interfere with Mr. Kamensky's commercial transactions with
the Chinese army. At the moment, too, Russia was so busily occupied in
Europe that she had no leisure to devote to the Kashgarian question.
The Chinese had for many years been good friends with Russia, and Yakoob
Beg had all his life been a scarcely concealed enemy. Between two such
combatants the sympathies of the Russian government must at first have
certainly gone with the former; nor had Yakoob Beg's attitude towards
Russia of late been as discreet as it might have been. His nephew, the
Seyyid Yakoob Khan, was notoriously an agent for some indefinite purpose
at Constantinople. His protection of the Bokharan prince, Abdul Melik,
or Katti Torah, the most bitter enemy of Russia in Central Asia, was
also ill calculated to attract Russian sympathy to his side.
Moreover there was little or nothing to arouse Russian susceptibilities
in Chinese victories so far distant as Urumtsi or Turfan. In many
respects, too, this Chinese invasion was a relief for Russia. It freed
her hands in Central Asia in a manner that perhaps will never be
sufficiently appreciated. Buddhist victories in Eastern Turkestan struck
a severe blow at Mahomedan vigour throughout the Khanates, and the
waning prestige of the Badaulet, or the "fortunate one," acted as a
warning of strange significance to all the neighbouring princes.
It is not difficult, therefore, to discover valid reasons why the
Russians declined to negotiate between the combatants, and although
Yakoob Beg endeavoured to come to terms with the Chinese, on the
understanding that his personal safety should be guaranteed, all his
diplomatic overtures were met by categorical refusals.
The Chinese after entering Toksoun came to a sudden halt, for which the
causes are not evident. But the terror of their name had gone before
them, and the country east of Karashar was hurriedly abandoned by its
inhabitants. The Chinese delay may have been caused by the necessity for
collecting provisions to enable them to advance further, or perhaps it
may have arisen from the outbreak of some epidemic, as asserted by one
of the Indian journals. On this point the _Pekin Gazette_ is profoundly
silent. The number for the 23rd of June contained a narrative of the
operations round Turfan, and also a list of the honours and rewards
given to the successful generals; but it and its subsequent issues are
silent as to the causes for the Chinese inactivity that then for many
months ensued. The most striking sentence in this report is that which
says that "the Mahomedans who submitted themselves were permitted to
revert to their peaceful avocations;" and if this be true, this is one
instance, at all events, of the Chinese exercising moderation. Strange
as it may seem, with this preliminary success the vigour of the Chinese
invasion appeared to die away, and for five months nothing more was
heard of the whereabouts of the Chinese army. In that interval the most
important events occurred in Kashgaria, but with these, the Chinese,
although the originators of them, had nothing to do. In the closing
scene of all of the eventful life we have been in these pages
considering the invading Khitay had no part. They were probably not
aware of what was taking place some 300 miles from their camp until many
weeks after it had happened; and then conceived that their best policy
would be to give time for the disintegrating causes at work within the
state to have their full effect before they advanced westward. When
Colonel Prjevalsky saw Yakoob Beg it must have been within a very short
period of his death. The shadow of approaching events may have been upon
the defeated conqueror, who from recent disaster could only presage
worse yet to come.
Of the exact manner of Yakoob Beg's death there are various accounts.
The most probable is that he was murdered by a party of conspirators,
who were led by Hakim Khan Torah. The date given is the 1st of May. That
Yakoob Beg should meet with a violent death, considering that he was
surrounded by such doubtful followers as the Tungan chiefs, is not to be
marvelled at, and that the first reverse in his career should be the
signal for fresh disturbances is only what we should expect from a
consideration of his country and its peoples in the light of past
history. So far, then, as the assertion goes, that Yakoob Beg was
murdered, there is nothing improbable about it. But there are many
discrepancies in the accompanying narrative. The first intelligence of
the death of the Ameer of Kashgar was contained in a telegram published
in the _Times_ of July 16 last year. It stated that his death occurred
at Korla, after a short illness, and that he had nominated as his
successor Hakim Khan Torah, to the express disregard of his own sons.
The telegram went on to say that Hakim Khan had declined to accept the
gift, and that the Ameer's eldest son, Beg Kuli Beg, had succeeded to
the throne. A few days after this telegram Hakim Khan Torah was
identified with the ancient dynasty of Kashgar, which Yakoob Beg had
first seated on the throne, and then displaced in the person of Buzurg
Khan. All this intelligence came from Tashkent. On the 23rd of July we
learnt in this country, from the same source, that Beg Kuli Beg had
notified his father's death and his own accession to the throne to
General Kaufmann. There no longer remained any doubt that Yakoob Beg was
really dead.
For some reason or other Beg Kuli Beg does not appear to have been a
favourite with the Russians; but this aversion to him was based on some
mistake, for Beg Kuli Beg was certainly unfriendly to England, and was
scarcely civil to our envoy, Sir Douglas Forsyth. Moreover, he at once
placed himself in communication with the Russian government, asking for
advice as to the course he should pursue with regard to the Chinese
invasion, and renewing his father's request that Russia should stop the
supplies sent to Urumtsi and Turfan from Kuldja. It was reported, but
not confirmed, that his latter demand was complied with.
Nothing more was heard of the history of these events until the end of
August, when news reached India through Ladakh and Cashmere that Yakoob
Beg "had been assassinated by Hakim Khan Torah, the son of Buzurg Khan."
This was the first hint that Yakoob Beg had fallen by the hands of
discontented partisans. In itself so natural, it threw fresh light on
the strange deed he was reported to have done of disinheriting his own
family, and it speedily became the accepted version. The question then
was, who was Hakim Khan Torah? Two versions were put forward; one was
that he was the son of Buzurg Khan, the other that he was a Khoja chief
of Kucha. The former was the more plausible, but as his name does not
occur in Sir Douglas Forsyth's exhaustive report, it is open to some
objection, more particularly when we are told that he bore a principal
part in the conquest of Kashgar by Yakoob Beg. The latter suggestion was
much more difficult to prove, but was not open to the same objection.
Grant that Hakim, or Aali, Khan Torah was a pardoned Kucha chief when
that city fell into the hands of the Athalik Ghazi, and there was
nothing extraordinary in his having proved a traitor. Assume that he
still conceived he had claims upon the governorship of that city, of
which the _Turkestan Gazette_ asserts he had been Dadkwah, and there is
nothing inconsistent in his having sought to realize his own ambitious
schemes the moment fortune frowned upon his conqueror. That Hakim Khan,
if son to Buzurg Khan, should seek to revenge his father's deposition
and life of exile is not in itself strange we admit; but if he were a
subjected ruler, who regarded Yakoob Beg as an adventurer from Khokand
with no claims to his fealty, his plot against and murder of the
Kashgarian prince at once appears not only possible, but the true story.
As a leading Khoja of Kucha he would also have claims to represent one
branch of the old reigning family of Kashgar. In the face, too, of a
great and pressing danger from the Chinese, his hereditary enemies, a
son of Buzurg Khan would scarcely make confusion worse confounded by
murdering the _de facto_ sovereign; whereas a Kucha leader might aspire
to play in such a crisis the same part that Amursana did in the last
century. It was said that Hakim Khan entered into some negotiations with
the Chinese, who gave him little encouragement.
The _Turkestan Gazette_ still adhered to its original statement that
Yakoob Beg had died of fever on the 1st of May, after an illness of
seven days' duration, and that on the 13th of May the body was brought
in state from Korla to Kashgar for the purpose of being deposited in the
mausoleum of Appak Khoja. Then, according to the _Turkestan Gazette_,
there ensued one of those atrocious deeds which have so often marked the
history of Central Asian states. The second son of the dead Ameer, Hacc
Kuli Beg, who had been with him during his last moments, escorted the
funeral cortége, and was met at a short distance from the city by his
elder brother, Kuli Beg. The elder son at once knelt before his father's
coffin, and then rising, without a moment's delay fired a pistol at his
brother, who dropped down dead. Not content with this fratricide, Kuli
Beg had the whole of the escort put to the sword, and returned to
Kashgar with his own followers escorting the coffin. We know nothing
whatever of the reasons for this atrocious act, but the fact of Kuli Beg
being in Kashgar, and not in the east, shows how Hakim Khan was able to
establish his authority in Kucha and Korla. It will be more convenient
to consider in another chapter the further course of these internal
troubles, and also the final triumph of the Chinese.
There are, therefore, two versions of how Yakoob Beg met his death, and
in support of each view there is a certain amount of evidence. All the
information on the subject has been recorded, and it is conflicting. The
Chinese reports in the _Pekin Gazette_ ignore the subject altogether.
Their personal hatred was directed more against Bayen Hu, a Tungan
leader who had fled from Hamil some years before, than against the
Athalik Ghazi. Of the main fact that Yakoob Beg died at Korla in May,
1877, there is no doubt, and that the most eventful career that has
marked its track in the history of Central Asia for several generations
was then brought to a close.
Whatever opinion may be formed of the man from his varied fortunes,
there will be few who will deny that he possessed great mental
qualities; some will be found, no doubt, to question his action in
deposing Buzurg Khan, and with more justice may his earlier life be
blamed for his repeated desertion of his friend and patron Khudayar.
Others will call to mind his vacillating conduct in 1875, and deny that
he possessed that decision of character which is the salient feature in
all truly great men. His unnecessary wars with the Tungani, and the
short-sighted policy he pursued of extending his empire up to the
vicinity of China, were also calculated to lower his claims to be
considered a general or a statesman. In extenuation of these acts, which
decidedly undermined the fabric of his rule, it may be mentioned that
there is one side of Yakoob Beg's character that has never received
sufficient attention. It is what was the secret to his foreign policy.
He certainly did not aspire, as many thought, to contest unaided the
palm of superiority with Russia in Central Asia. He was far too well
informed to dream of that. Nor could he expect to be able to extend his
power to the south, where both Afghanistan and Cashmere would resent his
presence. The only option left to him as a conqueror was to continue
aggrandizing himself at the expense of China. We know not what dreams
may have entered the mind of the stanch Mussulman in his palace at
Kashgar of uniting in one crusade against China all the followers of the
Prophet in Central Asia and of emulating the deeds of some of his
predecessors who had carried fire and sword into the border provinces of
China, and whom even the Great Wall could not withstand. Over these
bright imaginings, arising from tales told of the decadence of China, we
know not how much Yakoob Beg may have brooded as he saw his power spread
eastward through fifteen degrees of longitude, through Aksu to Kucha,
Kucha to Korla, Korla to Karashar, and Karashar to Turfan, until from
his far outpost at Chightam he could almost see the rich cities of Hamil
and Barkul, cities which are the key to Western China and Northern
Tibet, and imagine them to be within his grasp. But the policy of Yakoob
Beg will not be clearly appreciated, unless we bear in mind that these
ambitious longings were held in check by fear of Russia, and by the
hostility of the Tungani, who continued to plot even when subdued. His
keen spirit must have chafed greatly under the inability to accomplish
that which he conceived to be possible, and despite his numerous
triumphs he was at heart a disappointed man.
Moreover, during these later years, when the task he had set before him
had been nearly accomplished, and he had leisure to look around, he was
no longer young or as energetic as he had been. He was entering, for an
Asiatic, upon the evening of life, and had no longer the physical power
to essay any protracted and desperate enterprise. For a "forlorn hope"
he was as eager and as effective as ever, but for those undertakings
which require not only desperate courage but also forethought and
patience he was no longer fit. But the Chinese invasion dispelled all
these, and many other illusions. In their eyes and before their power,
he was only another Sultan of Talifoo. His great qualities, which
attracted sympathy and a certain amount of respect, in India and England
were vain in the eyes of a people whose "empire has," in their own
tongue, "been planted by heaven." Before Chinese viceroys and Mantchoo
chivalry Khokandian soldiers and Mussulman pride must be held vain. So
thought the Chinese, if they thought upon the subject at all. And so
must we think who view past history by the aid of Yakoob Beg's
overthrow. Yakoob Beg's rule in Kashgar was for twelve years a visible
fact; it was recognized by England and by Russia. The Central Asian
Khans gladly acknowledged the admission of another to their fast
dwindling ranks. Even Shere Ali, an ostensibly powerful ruler, honoured
Yakoob Beg not so much with his friendship as with his jealousy. Yet it
was all fleeting fast away.
In comparison with Chinese power his was as nothing; in comparison with
Chinese perseverance his was weakness; in comparison with Chinese
tactics, his tactics were those of a school-boy; and even in comparison
with Chinese courage his courage had to confess an equal. There was not
only the dead weight of numbers against him, but there was also the
quick weight of superior intellect. There were superior strategy and
superior weapons; greater force and greater determination; no hesitation
in action, and perfect unanimity in council; all combined to crush one
poor forlorn man, fighting with all the desperation of despair for life,
if not for liberty. Worthier of a better fate, and meeting destiny with
the calm that is natural to brave men, Yakoob Beg's defeat and death may
serve to "point a moral and adorn a tale." The tale has been told in
these pages with as close a regard for fact as the meagre records will
supply, and for the personage whose name is the pivot round which the
main facts concentrate, it may be claimed that he deserved attention
even from Englishmen. It may well be that some future generation may
recur to this career with interest as marking the only real break in the
Chinese domination in Eastern Turkestan. When the massacres and other
atrocities that marked the Khoja invasions and the Tungan outbreak on
both sides shall have been forgotten or condoned, then it will be
admitted that, despite the great benefits conferred by China on the
people in the way of trade-fostering and good government, there was some
merit in the administration which a Khokandian soldier had unaided
created in this region. High credit, then, let us, who view the subject
from an impartial stand-point, pay this departed warrior, who as a
soldier met few equals, as a governor none in his long career. Much as
we may marvel at, and perhaps impugn, Chinese strength, let us not judge
Yakoob Beg harshly, because Chinamen out-manoeuvred him, and overthrew
him in fair fight. It is an easy gauge to apply, and one which would
dispel all the reputation the Athalik Ghazi had secured, if we deny the
Chinese the great qualities those who know them best will accord them
without hesitation. But in applying so shallow a test to the case before
us, we should be wronging our own understanding quite as much as its
victim. However much we may blame Yakoob Beg for going out to encounter
an enemy whom he ought to have awaited either at Kucha or Aksu, his
valour, and also his mistaken contempt for the Chinese, are made all the
more clear. We may fairly claim for him that he was the most remarkable
man Central Asia in its fullest extent has produced since Nadir Shah;
and that he accomplished with insignificant means a task which ordinary
men, though born in the purple and ruling a prosperous and thickly
populated state, might have failed to do. What better epitaph could be
placed over a courageous and just ruler?
The moral of his career is a short one, but for us full of significance.
Those independent rulers who establish themselves for a space on the
confines of China are mere ephemeral excrescences; birds of passage who
must betake themselves away, if they can, when their little hour has
struck. English governments have never understood the vitality of
Chinese institutions. They should appreciate it better in the future.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR.
When Yakoob Beg died at Korla the task of reconquering Kashgar had
barely commenced. The Chinese army, victorious at Turfan, was lingering
in idleness round that city, exhausted, as some believed, by the
greatness of the effort. It was not clear even that the Chinese aspired
to achieve any greater triumph than that they had already won, viz., the
subjection of the Tungani, a subjection which could not be considered
accomplished so long as Yakoob Beg remained in the neighbourhood at the
head of a large army; and that with the withdrawal of the Kashgarian
army to Karashar the Chinese generals might call a halt of an indefinite
duration. Nor did it follow as a matter of necessity that because the
Chinese had taken Turfan they could capture Kashgar or Yarkand. Distance
alone was no slight obstacle, and when added to the barrenness of the
country, which would be made more desolate by the retreating army of the
Mussulmans, an impartial observer might have hesitated to predict any
very speedy triumph for the Chinese. But besides these, there were other
impediments, of which a prudent general had to take careful cognizance.
To seize Karashar or Korla only needed a bold attack; but to subject
Kucha might have been a more arduous undertaking than was even the siege
of Manas. A delay of two months in the heart of Eastern Turkestan must
have strained the resources of the Chinese very much, and might have
ruined their whole enterprise. And even if Kucha fell there still
remained Aksu, and afterwards Ush Turfan in the north, and Maralbashi
in the south, barring the way to the vital portion of the state round
Kashgar and Yarkand. Now the death of Yakoob Beg did not remove any one
of these defences, and for a time it was believed that his son, who had
always the repute of being a good soldier, would make the best of the
very strong line of defence that he undoubtedly possessed. As a matter
of fact, the death of Yakoob Beg was an irretrievable disaster, for it
destroyed whatever cohesion and unity there were in the country. He
himself might have been unable to avert a final overthrow, but the
contest would have been made more protracted. Therefore in the months of
May and June, 1877, immediately after the death of the Athalik Ghazi, it
is strictly true to say that the Chinese reconquest of the country had
barely commenced.
The hesitation shown by the invading generals after the victory of
Turfan was at first caused by a belief in the formidableness of their
antagonist, and, when that antagonist died, by a prudent resolve to
permit the disintegrating causes that speedily manifested themselves in
Kashgaria to have full time to work in their favour. Meanwhile they
formed their plans in secret, laid in large stores of supplies from
Russian territory, and explored the little-known passes of Tekes and
Yuldus. A large number of fresh troops was received from the Calmucks
north of Chuguchak, who during the worst period of the Tungan revolt had
preserved that city for the Chinese.
But before following the forward movement of the Chinese it is necessary
to say something of the internal disturbances in Eastern Turkestan, more
especially of the rivalry of Beg Bacha and Hakim Khan for supremacy. In
the first place, it is necessary that it should be distinctly understood
that of the events that occurred in Kashgaria between the death of the
Athalik Ghazi and the final advance of the Chinese army we are really
without any definite intelligence at all, and it is not probable that
we shall ever be accurately informed of the course of events during
those five months. In the absence of exact _data_, we must assume the
events to have taken place which are most in accordance with
probability. On Yakoob Beg's death, his eldest son, Beg Kuli Beg, was
either in the city of Kashgar or somewhere on the road thither. It is
probable that he had been despatched to the rear, to bring up
reinforcements after the defeat at Turfan, and in his absence Hacc Kuli
Beg, the Ameer's second son, assumed the command of the army when his
father died. It is certain that he accompanied the funeral cortége of
Yakoob Beg back to Kashgar, and that he was murdered outside the walls
by his brother. It was during this time that Hakim Khan Torah appeared
upon the scene. It should be remembered that tidings of the death of
Yakoob Beg travelled very slowly to this country, and that almost
immediately after it arrived we received intelligence of events that had
occurred many weeks after the death of the Ameer. We were therefore
hearing at the same time the particulars of the circumstances of Yakoob
Beg's death, and of those commotions which broke out some weeks after
that event.
When Hacc Kuli Beg left Korla no personal representative remained there
of the dynasty of the Athalik Ghazi, and during that interval the
occasion arose for the intriguing elements that a mixed court, such as
that of Yakoob Beg, could never be free from. Hakim Khan seized that
opportunity, and established his authority in Karashar, Korla, and,
probably, Kucha also; and during a short time Kashgaria was accordingly
divided into three hostile camps. It appears that Beg Bacha, lulled into
a false sense of security by the inactivity of the Chinese, resolved to
chastise the insolence of his rebellious governor, a task which he
should have left for the Chinese. A war then broke out between Beg Bacha
and Hakim Khan, which exhausted the few resources that still remained to
a ruler of Kashgar. The contest appears to have been of a desultory
nature, and although the final result was in favour of Beg Bacha, he
never appears to have recovered possession of Karashar and Korla. In the
neighbourhood of Aksu the battle of this war took place, and Hakim Khan
was defeated, "by the overwhelming numbers of his enemy." Beg Bacha's
chief loss was the death of Mahomed Yunus, the Dadkhwah of Yarkand, his
ablest and most faithful adviser. Hakim then fled to Russian territory,
with 1,000 _sarbazes_, who were promptly interned by order of General
Kolpakovsky, and there he sought to restore his shattered fortunes by
carrying on intrigues with the Russian government. It is scarcely
necessary to say that these came to nothing, and that Hakim Khan has
sunk into that insignificance which, to judge from his acts when called
into public life, is his most befitting atmosphere.
While engaged on this successful campaign east of Aksu, an event
occurred of singular significance, as illustrating the condition of
Kashgar under Beg Bacha. The Kirghiz chief Sadic Beg, who had
disappeared from the scene since his old rivalry with Yakoob Beg
thirteen years before, seized the opportunity afforded by Beg Bacha's
embarrassment to attack the city of Kashgar, denuded of the greater
portion of its garrison. He plundered the suburbs, and only withdrew
when the young Ameer hastened back from Aksu to defend his capital. The
Kirghiz, true to their nature, at once sought the desolate regions of
Kizil Yart. They had, however, made the confusion arising from the death
of the Ameer and the disaffection of Hakim Khan worse confounded, and
completed those elements of weakness and discord which had always proved
an invaluable ally to the Chinese. By themselves both Hakim Khan and the
Kirghiz depredator were beneath contempt; but with an enemy established
on the soil of the country, they assumed a too clear and mischievous
importance. The minor seditions that manifested themselves in Sirikul
and at Khoten completed the round of dissension that, combined with
external force, shattered the fair show of Yakoob Beg's empire. We are
completely ignorant of the details of the disturbances that were
reported to have taken place round Tashkurgan or Sirikul; but it is
plausible to suppose that these were caused either by inroads on the
part of the Wakhis or Badakshis, or by some fresh Kirghiz attack. The
inhabitants of Tashkurgan being Yarkandi settlers, it is not probable
that the rising, or whatever form the commotion assumed, originated with
them; at Khoten the rising was more tangible, and more easily
understood. The people of that city never forgave Yakoob Beg his
treachery towards their ruler, and the instant he disappeared they
hastened to take their revenge. When the Kashgarian garrison was
withdrawn the towns-people simply deposed their _dadkwah_, and nominated
a ruler of their own, who retained authority until the triumph of the
Chinese made it politic for them and him to bow to the rising sun. The
example of Khoten had been followed by Sanju and the vicinity; and thus
the whole southern portion of the state acquiesced in the Chinese
conquest, after the fall of Kashgar, without the necessity for a single
Chinese soldier to be advanced south of Yarkand. It seems probable that
at this very moment the Chinese troops have remained content with the
submission of these districts, and have not garrisoned those important
towns which skirt the Kuen Lun range with their own soldiers.
When Beg Bacha returned post haste to Kashgar, to encounter the Kirghiz,
we said that Sadic Beg fled to the Kizil Yart; but he did not remain
there long, for soon we find him back again at the capital in high
favour with the Ameer, with whom he had come to terms. His Kirghiz
followers were taken into the pay of the state, and just as this
alliance had been struck up, tidings came of events that made that
alliance, however futile and insignificant, a matter of the first
necessity, both to Kirghiz and Kashgar. The Chinese army was at last
advancing. The danger that had for five months been hanging in suspense
over the devoted heads of a Mussulman people was close upon them. The
long-feared and long-expected Khitay were drawing nigh to the capital,
in irresistible strength; and the apprehensions of a cowed people made
them know, too surely, that their end was at hand. The dissensions among
the people themselves, the discord in the ruling house, and the
dissentient elements in every effort towards unity, had all operated in
favour of the invader. While the Chinese had plotted and prepared in the
deliberate manner of a great nation, the people of Kashgar had entered
into cabals and schemes of party tactics that were well nigh ludicrous.
And all the time that the sap of their vigour was being expended, the
Chinese generals were drawing the noose more closely together that was
to strangle the newly erected state beyond all chance of recovery. It
would almost seem as if the Kashgari and their rulers had recovered from
their first shock at the Chinese invasion, and were becoming reconciled
to their presence east of Korla, when they experienced a second, more
severe, and more lasting shock, in the announcement that the Chinese
were again advancing. Their brief contentment passed away, and all their
old terror revived in tenfold force. Hope died within their bosoms, and
the resignation of despair only nerved them to bear a fate which their
own valour should have striven to avert. It is time for us now to return
to the Chinese army, and to follow its decisive operations.
North of the Tian Shan the supreme command was vested in the hands of
Tso Tsung Tang, generalissimo of the army operating against Kashgar, and
Viceroy of the province of Kansuh. South of it the commanders were
Generals Kin Shun and Chang Yao, the former the hero of the siege of
Manas, the latter of the diversion against Turfan from Hamil. The base
of the former was Manas, of the latter Turfan. Their sources of supply
were Hamil, Barkul, and Chuguchak, within the Chinese frontier, and
Kuldja, Semiretchinsk, and Semipalatinsk, without. Their weapons and
ammunition were transported across the desert from Lanchefoo, and their
ranks were swollen by recruits from the Calmuck and other tribes. It
does not appear that the Chinese were very eager to enlarge their army
in size; they rather aimed at increasing its efficiency by the
distribution of Berdan rifles and Krupp's cannon; and during the heat of
the summer months they remained at rest in their recently acquired
possessions. Nor is it probable that those epidemics broke out in their
ranks which it was asserted had appeared amongst them. A sensational
paragraph was published in the _Tashkent Gazette_, which was copied by
some of the London newspapers, asserting that a species of cholera,
known in Kashgar by the name of _vuoba_, had decimated the Chinese army,
and that in consequence of that calamity its advance was permanently
checked. Certainly, this was a piece of gross exaggeration, even if
there were a substratum of fact for the assertion. Then, again, we were
apprised, on high authority, that the Russian government had put a stop
to the despatch of provisions to the country occupied by the Chinese
army, at the request of its new-found friend, Beg Bacha. Yet there is no
question that the caravans of Mr. Kamensky continued to pass between
Kuldja and Manas, and that the chief caterers for the Chinese army were
the Russian merchants of Central Asia. In the course of their
intercourse the best feelings do not appear to have prevailed between
the Russians and Chinese. The latter, flushed with their triumph, had
become arrogant, and were too fond of referring to the question of
Kuldja to be agreeable to the actual possessors of that province. On one
or two occasions these verbal disputes assumed a more dangerous aspect,
and from words the disputants proceeded to blows. Whether this collision
was magnified or not, the Russian government took no diplomatic steps
to secure reparation for injury to their subjects, and continued to wink
at, if they did not actually approve of, their merchants supplying the
Chinese. The clearest proof of this is that the moment Aksu fell a large
caravan was despatched there by Mr. Kamensky. Still there was no little
bad blood between the two people, and for a long time it was doubtful
whether Russia would preserve her attitude of neutrality until Kashgar
had been finally subdued. Beneath all this doubt, and the uncertainty of
the strength and of the ultimate intentions of China, there existed a
sentiment of dissatisfaction in the minds of the Russians at the renown
China was acquiring, as well as at the prospect of having to restore a
rich and paying province.
In short, beneath the Tungan and the Kashgarian questions there
smouldered the Kuldja question. Having now shown how well prepared the
Chinese were at every point, how well armed, and how well fed was the
tactical unit, and how Russia, although far from indifferent as to the
results, was really abetting the side of China, we may pass on to those
more active movements which proved that the Chinese generals possessed
the ability and military knowledge necessary to make full use of the
very powerful weapon which they had created, and which was capable of
accomplishing the most arduous of enterprises.
The first move was made south of the Tian Shan. So far as we know, Tso
Tsung Tang did not break up from Manas until many weeks afterwards. A
brigadier-general, by name Tang Jen-Ho, left Toksoun on the 25th of
August, 1877, with the advanced guard, to occupy the outlying villages
of Subashi and Agha Bula. He does not appear to have had under him more
than a few hundred men. A fortnight later, on the 7th of September,
Generals Tung Fuh-siang and Chang Tsun followed after him with 1,500
troops, all infantry. They advanced through Agha Bula, Kumush, and Usha
Tal to Kuhwei. At this place the troops were concentrated.
The chief duty of these detachments was to prepare the road for the
advance of the main body, to lay in at stated places stores of fuel and
water, and to erect temporary fortifications. So thoroughly was this
portion of the task performed, that General Kin Shun, now known as Liu
Kin-Tang, gave the order for a general forward movement on the 27th of
September.
The infantry followed the main road, while the cavalry, under the
immediate orders of the general, proceeded by by-paths in the same
direction. On the 2nd of October the Chinese army south of the Tian Shan
was assembled at Kuhwei. Its numbers were probably about fifteen
thousand men all told. On the 24th of September a small force of
Kashgarian troops threatened General Tang Jen-Ho's communications, but
on the appearance of the Chinese they "turned tail and dashed away." The
very next day after his arrival at Kuhwei General Kin Shun continued his
forward movement. Two brigadier-generals, whose names it is not
necessary to mention, were entrusted with one division, 6,000 strong,
with which to perform a flanking movement against Korla. The commander
in person led his main body against Korla, arriving at the River Kaidu,
which flows into Lake Bostang, half-way between Karashar and Korla. But
his advance was here checked, as Bayen Hu, the rebel leader, had flooded
the country by damming up the course of the river. The depth of the
inundation was said to be in the deepest parts over a man's head, and in
the shallowest it came up to the horses' cruppers. The Chinese march was
then changed to a northerly direction, in order to strike the river
higher up, where the obstruction raised by the enemy would be more
easily overcome. A cart-road was carefully constructed along these
alkaline plains, and the Kaidu was dammed to stop the flow from the
upper course, and a bridge was erected over it. This détour had caused
some delay, yet Karashar was reached on the 7th of October, four days
after Kin Shun had set out in person from Kuhwei. The inundation from
the Kaidu had spread as far as here, and the town was several feet under
water. All the official and private residences had been destroyed alike,
and the Turki-Mussulman, as the _Pekin Gazette_ styles them, population
had been compelled by Bayen Hu to follow him in his retreat. It would be
interesting to know whom the Chinese meant by Bayen Hu, but it is almost
impossible to say. As it was not Hakim Khan, the most probable personage
would be one of the Tungan leaders, either of Urumtsi or Hamil, who had
been mediatized by Yakoob Beg and placed in command of the Turfan
region. He appears to have been the commander of that portion of the
Kashgarian army which was left round Korla.
Not only was Karashar deserted by its inhabitants, but so was the whole
country round about. Some, indeed, had fled to the mountains, but these
were afraid to return when they saw the Chinese established in their
homes. And then the conquerors followed out their usual plan by settling
fresh colonists in the town. The Mongol noble, Cha-hi-telkh, was
directed to move up some hundreds of the members of his tribe to occupy
this important post, to restore the homes and to retill the fields; and
while this work of restoration was proceeding on territory conquered by
the Chinese, that through which they passed in hostile guise was
subjected to far other treatment. On the 9th of October the Chinese
marched against Korla from two sides, and on that day a cavalry skirmish
took place, in which fifteen of Bayen Hu's horsemen were slain, and two
taken prisoners. From the evidence of these, who were dressed in the
Khokandian garb, but were Mussulman subjects of China, being natives of
Shensi, it was learnt that Bayen Hu had withdrawn with all his forces to
Kucha, taking with him the produce of the country and the majority of
the people. They affirmed that the small detachment to which they
belonged was only a scouting party, sent out to learn what the Chinese
army was doing. When the Chinese had exhausted their stock of
information they beheaded them. The same day they entered Korla, which
they found to be completely deserted, although not flooded. The walls
remained, but many of the houses had been thrown down. Here the general
was nearly reduced to a desperate plight, as the provision train, which
was transported by cart and camel, did not come up, and there was the
prospect of starvation compelling the victorious army to retreat. But
happily the thought struck the able general, or perhaps some one gave
him a hint, that there might be some stores concealed in the city which
the Kashgari had been unable to carry away with them. Accordingly the
whole army set to work to search the houses, and to dig into the ground
in all likely places for hidden stores. Their toil was soon rewarded,
and "several tens of thousand catties' weight of food" were discovered.
As a catty weighs 1-3/4 lb., this was no slight supply for an army of
men which was probably under 10,000 strong. These concerted movements of
the army south of the Tian Shan placed the country as far west as
Karashar in the possession of the invader. Their next advance, which
they could not expect to be as unopposed as their late one, would bring
them into the plain of Kashgar. No sooner had Karashar and Korla fallen
into their possession than an edict was issued inviting the Mahomedan
population to return to their homes, and many of them accepted the
invitation. In this quarter the arms of China were not disgraced by any
excesses, and moderation towards the unarmed population extenuated their
severity towards armed foes.
While halting some days at Korla, Kin Shun heard that Bayen Hu was
coercing the people east of Kucha at Tsedayar and other places, and
compelling them to withdraw to Kucha and to destroy their crops. He at
once resolved to frustrate the plan, and set out in person at the head
of 1,500 light infantry and 1,000 cavalry to protect the inhabitants. By
forced marches, sometimes carried on through the better part of the
night, he reached Tsedayar on the 17th of October, when he learnt that
Bayen Hu had driven off the whole of the population, and was already at
Bugur, on the road to Kucha. At the next village to Tsedayar, a
fortified post known as Yangy Shahr, he found that Bayen Hu was still
ahead of him, and that he was setting fire to the villages on his line
of march. Kin Shun left a portion of his infantry behind to put out the
conflagration, and resolutely pressed on with the remainder of his force
to Bugur. This small town had also been set on fire, but here the
rapidity of the Chinese general's advance was rewarded with the news
that the enemy's army, with a large number of the inhabitants, was only
a short distance ahead. The rear-guard, composed of 1,000 cavalry, was
soon touched, and the Kashgari, emboldened by the small numbers of the
Chinese, came on to the attack in gallant fashion. Their charge was
broken, however, by the steadiness of the Chinese infantry, armed with
excellent rifles, and the cavalry performed the rest. The Kashgari left
100 slain on the field of battle and twelve prisoners. From these latter
it was discovered that the main body of 2,000 soldiers was some distance
on the road to Kucha, with the family of Bayen Hu and the villagers
under its charge. It was too late to advance further that day, but on
the next the forward movement was resumed. A large multitude--"some tens
of thousands of people"--was speedily sighted by the advanced guard, but
on examining these through glasses it was discovered that scarcely more
than a thousand carried arms. All the troops were then brought to the
front, and Kin Shun issued instructions that all those found with arms
in their hands should be slain, but the others spared.
The armed portion of the Kashgarian army drew off from the unarmed,
leaving in the midst the large assemblage of Mussulman villagers who
were being carried off to Kucha. These were sent to the rear by order of
Kin Shun, and distributed in such of the villages as were most
convenient. In the meanwhile a sharp fight took place a few miles in the
rear of the old position, near a village called Arpa Tai. The action
appears to have been well contested, but the superior tactics and
weapons of Kin Shun's small army prevailed; and the Mussulman army
retreated with considerable loss and in great disorder. Kin Shun
followed up his success with marvellous rapidity and restless energy,
while the Kashgarian troops fled incontinently to Kucha, abandoning the
people and the country to the invader. The unfortunate inhabitants
implored with piteous entreaties the mercy of the conqueror, and it is
with genuine satisfaction we record the fact that Kin Shun informed them
of their safety, and bade them have no further alarm.
By this time it is probable that the Chinese army had been largely
reinforced from the rear, for we have now come to a more arduous portion
of the enterprise, the attack against Kucha. When the Chinese appeared
before its walls they found that a battle was proceeding there between
the Kashgarian soldiers and the townspeople, who refused to accompany
them in a further retreat westward. On the appearance of the Chinese
army, the Kashgarian force evacuated the city, and joined battle with it
on the western side of Kucha. The Chinese at once attacked them, at
first with little success; and a charge of the cavalry, numbering some
four or five thousand men, was only repulsed with some difficulty. But
the cannon of the Chinese were playing with remarkable effect upon the
Mahomedans, and the Chinese reserves were every moment coming upon the
ground. The infantry were at last ordered to advance, under cover of a
heavy artillery fire, and the cavalry made a charge at a most opportune
moment. The whole army then broke and fled in irretrievable confusion,
leaving more than a thousand of their number on the ground. Their
general, Ma-yeo-pu the Chinese called him, was wounded early in the day,
but, although stated to be a noted man, it is impossible to recognize
his identity under the Chinese appellation. This was certainly the most
sanguinary and the best-contested action of the whole war. The numbers
on each side were probably about 10,000 men, and it was won as much by
superior tactics and skill as by brute force and courage. All the
movements of the Chinese were characterized by remarkable forethought,
and evinced the greatest ability on the part of the general and his
lieutenants, as well as obedience, valour, and patience on the part of
his soldiers. The rapid advance from Kuhwei to Karashar, the forced
march thence to Bugur, the capture of Kucha, the forbearance of the
conqueror towards the inhabitants, all combine to make this portion of
the war most creditable to China and her generals, to Kin Shun in
particular. The reason given in the Official Report for the Kashgarian
authorities attempting to carry off the population was that the rebels
wished in the first place to deprive the invading force of all
assistance, thus making further pursuit a work of difficulty, and in the
second place, to ingratiate themselves with the new Pahia (probably
Bacha) of Kashgar, Kuli Beg, by delivering this large mass of
Turki-Mussulmans into his hands. Bayen Hu was, therefore, certainly not
Hakim Khan. It is tolerably clear that he must have been either a Tungan
refugee or a subordinate of Beg Bacha's.
A depôt was formed at Kucha, and a large body of troops remained there
as a garrison; but the principal administrative measures were directed
to the task of improving the position of the Turki-Mussulman population.
A board of administration was instituted for the purpose of providing
means of subsistence for the destitute, and for the distribution of
seed-corn for the benefit of the whole community. It had also to
supervise the construction of roads, and the establishment of ferry
boats, and of post-houses, in order to facilitate the movements of trade
and travel, and to expedite the transmission of mails. Magistrates and
prefects were appointed to all the cities, and special precautions were
taken against the outbreak of epidemic or of famine. All these wise
provisions were carried out promptly, and in the most matter-of-fact
manner, just as if the legislation and administration of alien states
were the daily avocations of Chinamen. There is no reason to believe
that in the vast region from Turfan to Kucha the Chinese have departed
from the statesmanlike and beneficent schemes which marked their
re-installation as rulers; and whatever harshness or cruelty they
manifested towards the Tungani rebels and the Kashgarian soldiers was
more than atoned for by the mildness of their treatment of the people.
On the 19th, or more probably the 22nd of October, Kin Shun resumed his
forward movement, encountering no serious opposition. His first halt was
at a village called Hoser, where he halted for one night, which he
employed in inditing the report to Pekin, which described the successes
and movements of the previous three weeks. At the next town, known as
Bai, Kin Shun halted to await the arrival of the rear-guard, under
General Chang Yao. This force came up before the close of October, and
the advance against Aksu was resumed. Up to this point the chief
interest centred in the army south of the Tian Shan, and in the
achievements of Kin Shun. Our principal, in fact our only, authority for
this portion of the campaign is the _Pekin Gazette_.
We have now to describe the movements of the Northern Army, which was
under the immediate command of Tso Tsung Tang, and which was operating
in the north of the state, in complete secrecy. That general had under
him, at the most moderate computation, an army of 28,000 men. By some it
was placed at a higher figure; but a St. Petersburg paper, on the
authority of a Russian merchant, who had been to Manas, computed it to
be of that strength. It was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Manas,
and along the northern skirts of the Tian Shan; and also on the
frontier of the Russian dominions in Kuldja. To all appearance this army
was consigned to a part of enforced inactivity, since it was impossible
to enter Kuldja, and thus proceed by their old routes through the passes
of Bedal or Muzart. But it was not so; the travels of Colonel Prjevalsky
in the commencement of 1877 had not been unobserved by the Chinese, and
it was assumed that where a Russian officer with his Cossack following
could go, there also could go a Chinese army. By those little-known
passes, which are made by the Tekes and Great Yuldus rivers, the Chinese
army, under Tso Tsung Tang, crossed over into Kashgaria; and it is
probable that the two armies joined in the neighbourhood of Bai. It was
by this stroke of strategy on the part of Tso Tsung Tang that the
Chinese found themselves before the walls of Aksu, with an overwhelming
army, at the very sight of which all thought of resistance died away
from the hearts of the Mussulman peoples and garrisons. Tso Tsung Tang
appeared before the walls of Aksu, the bulwark of Kashgar on the east,
and its commandant, panic stricken, abandoned his post at the first
onset. He was subsequently taken prisoner by an officer of Kuli Beg, and
executed. The Chinese then advanced on Ush Turfan, which also
surrendered without a blow. As we said, the Chinese have not published
any detailed description of this portion of the war, and we are
consequently unable to say what their version is of those reported
atrocities at Aksu and Ush Turfan, of which the Russian papers have made
so much. There is no doubt that a very large number of refugees fled to
Russian territory, perhaps 10,000 in all, and these brought with them
the tales of fear and exaggerated alarm. We may feel little hesitation
in accepting the assertion as true, that the armed garrisons were
slaughtered without exception; but that the unarmed population and the
women and children shared the same fate we distinctly refuse to credit.
There is every precedent in favour of the assumption that a more
moderate policy was pursued, and there is no valid reason why the
Chinese should have dealt with Aksu and Ush Turfan differently to Kucha
or Turfan. The case of Manas has been greatly insisted upon by the
agitators on this "atrocity" question; but there is the highest
authority for asserting that only armed men were massacred there. This
the Chinese have always done; it is a national custom, and they
certainly did not depart from it in the case of the Tungani and Kashgar.
But there is no solid ground for convicting them of any more heinous
crime, even in the instances of Manas and Aksu, which are put so
prominently forward.
Early in December the last move of all began against the capital, and on
the 17th of that month the Chinese took it by a _coup de main_. Beg Kuli
Beg, according to one account, fought a battle outside the town, in
which he was defeated; according to another report, he had withdrawn to
Yarkand, whence he fled to Russian territory, when he heard of the fall
of Kashgar. It is more probable that he resisted the Chinese attack on
Kashgar, for he certainly reached Tashkent, in company with the Kirghiz
Chief, Sadic Beg, who was wounded in that battle. With the fall of
Kashgar the Chinese reconquest of Eastern Turkestan was completed, and
the other cities, Yangy Hissar and Yarkand, speedily shared the same
fate. Khoten and Sirikul also sent in formal promises of subjection. But
the capture of Kashgar virtually closed the campaign. No further
resistance was encountered, and the new rulers had only to begin the
task of reorganization. When Kashgar fell the greater portion of the
army, knowing that they could expect no mercy at the hands of the
Chinese, fled to Russian territory, and then spread reports of fresh
Chinese massacres, which probably only existed in their own imagination.
There can be no doubt that the Chinese triumph has been thorough, and
that it will be many years before the people of Eastern Turkestan will
have again the heart to rebel against their authority. The strength of
China has been thoroughly demonstrated, and the vindication of her
prestige is complete. Whatever danger there may be to the permanence of
China's triumph lies rather from Russia than from the conquered peoples
of Tian Shan Nan Lu; nor is there much danger that the Chinese laurels
will become faded even before an European foe. Tso Tsung Tang and his
lieutenants, Kin Shun, who has since fallen into disgrace,--perhaps he
had excited the envy of his superior--and Chang Yao, accomplished a task
which would reflect credit on any army and any country. They have given
a lustre to the present Chinese administration which must stand it in
good stead, and they have acquired a personal renown that will not
easily depart. The Chinese reconquest of Eastern Turkestan is beyond
doubt the most remarkable event that has occurred in Asia during the
last fifty years, and it is quite the most brilliant achievement of a
Chinese army, led by Chinamen, that has taken place since Keen-Lung
subdued the country more than a century ago. It also proves, in a manner
that is more than unpalatable to us, that the Chinese possess an
adaptive faculty that must be held to be a very important fact in
every-day politics in Central Asia. They conquered Kashgar with European
weapons, and by careful study of Western science and skill. Their
soldiers marched in obedience to instructors trained on the Prussian
principle; and their generals manoeuvred their troops in accordance
with the teachings of Moltke and Manteuffel. Even in such minor matters
as the use of telescopes and field glasses we find this Chinese army
well supplied. Nothing was more absurd than the picture drawn by some
over-wise observer of this army, as consisting of soldiers fantastically
garbed in the guise of dragons and other hideous appearances. All that
belonged to an old-world theory. The army of Eastern Turkestan was as
widely different from all previous Chinese armies in Central Asia as it
well could be; and in all essentials closely resembled that of an
European power. Its remarkable triumphs were chiefly attributable to
the thoroughness with which China had in this instance adapted herself
to Western notions.
With the flight of Beg Kuli Beg to Tashkent closed the career of the
house of the Athalik Ghazi in Kashgar. Whatever turn events may take in
this portion of Central Asia, whatever schemes there may be formed in
Khokand, or elsewhere, of challenging anew the Chinese domination, it
will not be round the banner of Kuli Beg that the ousted Khokandian
officials will rally. By his flight in the hour of danger, by the
hesitation which marked all his movements, and by the murder of his
brother in cold blood, this prince, of whom much at one time was
expected, has irretrievably ruined both his career and his reputation.
If on any future occasion Russia should seek to play the part played of
old by Khans of Khokand in the internal history of Kashgar, it will not
be Kuli Beg whom they will put forward as their puppet. His old rival,
Hakim Khan, stands a much better chance than he, more especially if it
be true that he is the representative of the Khojas, being the son of
Buzurg Khan, as many have asserted. But the fact remains clear, that all
the dreams of Yakoob Beg of founding a personal dynasty in Eastern
Turkestan are now dispelled beyond all prospect of realization.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE CHINESE FACTOR IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.
The overthrow of the Tungani, and the reconquest of Kashgaria, have not
completed the task that lay before Chinese generals and soldiers in
Central Asia. Great and remarkable as those triumphs were, the Chinese
are not satisfied with them, because there yet remains more work to be
done. They have restored to the Emperor Tian Shan Nan Lu, but so long as
the Russians hold Kuldja, Tian Shan Pe Lu is only half won back.
Moreover, so long as a great military power is domiciled in Kuldja,
China's hold on the country west of Aksu must be only on sufferance. As
of old, the Chinese so often reconquered Kashgar, when it had shaken off
the Chinese rule, from Ili, so might the Russians at their good pleasure
play the same part against the Chinese. In short, the Russians remaining
in Ili would neutralize all the advantages that China had secured by her
recent military success. But, although there is a foundation of well
grounded apprehension at the strategical advantages of Russia, at the
root of China's demand for the surrender of Kuldja, that is not the only
cause, or even the principal one, for the Chinese making it. Of all
their Central Asian possessions, Ili was the most cherished, and it was
to recover that region more especially that Tso Tsung Tang undertook
those arduous campaigns which have so far ended in triumph, and which
were designed for, among other purposes, the purpose of giving that
Viceroy a prestige and influence that would enable him to play the
rival to Li Hung Chang. Ili was their metropolis in Central Asia, and
its fall marked the wide difference that there was between the
Tungan-Khoja rising of 1862-63 and all its predecessors. The fall of Ili
meant the fall of Chinese power, and Chinese power cannot be held to be
completely restored so long as Ili remains in alien hands. On this point
the Chinese are very keen.
Russia, on the other hand, hesitates to hand over Ili for various
reasons. In the first place, it is not certain that China has
_permanently_ reconquered Eastern Turkestan, nor is it clear that the
Imperial exchequer will be able to bear a continual strain upon it for
Central Asian expenditure. Moreover there is the unknown quantity of the
rivalry of Li Hung Chang and Tso Tsung Tang, and whatever influence the
latter may have with the army and the ruling caste on account of his
Mantchoo blood, the former holds the purse in his hands, and can at any
moment paralyse Chinese activity and strength in Central Asia. The
Russians also, whatever rash promises they may have given at Pekin--and
they certainly did promise to retrocede Kuldja to China, whenever the
Chinese should be strong enough to return to Central Asia--formally
(_teste_ General Kolpakovsky's proclamation) annexed Kuldja "in
perpetuity." In the eyes of the people of Central Asia, that
proclamation defines Russia's tenure of Kuldja, and not the vague
promise that was uttered in the ears of the authorities at Pekin. Now
Russia knows this as well as we do; and she is aware that no strict
adherence to her word of honour will induce the people of Western, as
well as of Eastern, Turkestan to believe that she retrocedes Kuldja for
any other cause than fear of the Chinese. The Khokandians, the
Bokhariots, as well as the Kirghiz, the Calmucks, and the Kashgari, will
all argue that Russia restores Kuldja not through any desire to fulfil
her engagements, but simply because she cannot decline to fulfil them
without engaging in a war with China, and her compliance with the
demand would then be construed as an admission of her disinclination to
encounter China in the field. In fact, even if Russia had promptly
restored Kuldja, she would not have secured the credit she might have
claimed for her good faith, and she would have had no guarantee that the
Chinese would have rested content with the cession of Ili proper and not
gone on to claim, in a moment of military arrogance, the restoration of
the Naryn district, which China at a period of weakness had herself
ceded to Russia more than twenty years ago. Then, besides these
objections to the surrender of Kuldja on political grounds, there are
commercial and fiscal reasons why Russia should be loth to restore this
province. Not only has it become highly prosperous and thickly populated
under Russian rule, but it has also been raised into one of the most
fiscally remunerative portions of the Russian possessions in Central
Asia, and then there is its admirable frontier in the Tian Shan, which
places the future trade with the western parts of China more at its
disposal, than it is through the Semipalatinsk and Chuguchak route, and,
above all, it effectually dispels all sense of real danger from attack.
The Chinese would find that to force the Tian Shan range into Kuldja
would be a task almost impossible for them, and they would be compelled
to enter the province from the north by Karkaru. By so doing, they would
leave the whole of their flank and line of communication exposed to an
attack with telling effect both at Manas and in Kashgar, and with a
scientific foe such as Russia, no sane Chinaman could dream of attacking
Kuldja except in the most overwhelming force. It may be as well to
sketch here the history of Russia's rule in Kuldja from 1871 to the
present time, before proceeding with the consideration of the questions
aroused by the difficulty between Russia and China.
When an independent government had been founded in Kuldja in 1866, a
ruler of the name of Abul Oghlan was placed upon the throne. He appears
to have been a Tungan, and he certainly was a truculent and
self-confident potentate. He refused to abide by the stipulations of the
Treaties of Kuldja and Pekin, and in petty matters as in great, set
himself in direct opposition to Russia. For five years he pursued his
career undisturbed by exterior influences, and during that period he
tolerated the inroads of his subjects into Russian territory, urged the
Kirghiz tribes beyond his frontier to revolt, and forbade Russian
merchants to enter his dominions. On a small scale, he aped the manners
subsequently adopted by Yakoob Beg. But he was only a minor and
insignificant despot. His people groaned under his tyranny, and the
75,000 slaves within his dominions were only too anxious to be relieved
from their bondage by any deliverer whatsoever. The state of Kuldja, as
administered by Abul Oghlan, was pre-eminently one that would fall to
pieces at the first rude shock from outside. For five years, or
thereabouts, the Russian authorities at Vernoe, Naryn, and in
Semiretchinsk put up with his veiled hostility; but when it became
evident that his state was on the eve of falling into divers fragments,
of which Yakoob Beg would, probably, come in for the lion's share, the
Russians, whose patience had become well-nigh exhausted, resolved not to
be forestalled in Kuldja, either by the Athalik Ghazi, or the Tungani
Confederation. A kind of _ultimatum_ was presented to Kuldja, in which
Abul Oghlan was given a last chance of retaining power, if he consented
to ratify the terms of the past treaties with China. He does not appear
to have distinctly refused to do so, when he was required to enter into
this agreement with Russia. But he prevaricated and delayed, until at
last the patience of the Muscovite authorities was quite exhausted. They
resolved to destroy the government of Abul Oghlan, to annex Kuldja, and
to bring their frontier down to the Tian Shan.
In May, 1871, Major Balitsky crossed the river Borodshudsir, which
formed the boundary between the two countries, and, at the head of a
small detachment, advanced some distance into the dominions of Abul
Oghlan. His force, however, was small, and, after a brief
reconnaissance, he retired within Russian territory. Six weeks
afterwards the main body under General Kolpakovsky crossed the frontier
into Kuldja and marched on the capital. That invading army consisted of
only 1,785 men and sixty-five officers. At first the forces of Abul
Oghlan offered a brave resistance, but the Russian cannon and rifles
carried everything before them; and on the 4th of July the ruler
presented himself at the Russian outposts. When taken before General
Kolpakovsky, he said, "I trusted to the righteousness of my cause, and
to the help of God. Conquered, I submit to the will of the Almighty. If
any crime has been committed, punish the sovereign, but spare his
innocent subjects." The next day the Russian general entered the capital
after a campaign that had only lasted eight or nine days. Protection was
promised to all who would lay down their arms, and the army of Abul
Oghlan was disbanded. Abul Oghlan was pensioned, and Orel was appointed
as his place of residence. Kuldja or "Dzungaria," as it is called in the
proclamation, was annexed "in perpetuity," and became the Russian
sub-governorship of Priilinsk. There can be no doubt but that the
Russian occupation of Kuldja was an unqualified benefit to the
inhabitants of that region. The declaration of the abolition of slavery
alone released seventy-five thousand human beings from a life of
hardship and hopelessness. The return of trade, which had become
stagnant, ensured the prosperity and advancement of the active portion
of the community, and during the seven years Russia has ruled in Kuldja,
the people have steadily progressed in moral and material welfare. The
population has during the same period remarkably increased, and the
valleys of the Ili teem with a population at once contented and
prosperous. The rule of Russia in Kuldja is the brightest spot in her
Central Asian administration. The Chinese in demanding the retrocession
of Kuldja labour under the one disadvantage that they come to oust a
beneficent rule. This disadvantage is made the greater by the bad name
the Chinese have earned in Kashgar and the Tungan country, by the
atrocities they are said to have committed. Those who will take the
trouble to scan the matter carefully, and to consult the _Pekin
Gazette_, as much as they do the _Tashkent_, will find that these
atrocities are for the most part the creation of panic, and of malicious
observers, and in the few cases where Chinese vindictiveness overcame
military discipline, as at Manas and Aksu, we have clear evidence that
women and children were spared. The _Tashkent Gazette_ has laboured
strenuously, and not in vain, to disseminate the report of Chinese
atrocities; and one London paper has so far assisted the object of the
Russian press in raising a feeling of indignation against China, on
account of these reported massacres in Eastern Turkestan, that it has
placed translations of these charges before the English reader, and, on
the authority of the _Tashkent Gazette_, has indicted and summarily
convicted the Chinese of the grossest acts of inhumanity. We would
venture to suggest, that in common fairness to the Chinese this journal
should place before its readers the temperately worded and dignified
reports that have appeared in the _Pekin Gazette_ of those events upon
which the _Tashkent Gazette_ has commented so indignantly.
As we said, the Chinese are fully resolved to regain Ili. They may not
be able to induce Russia easily to surrender it, yet they will not
despair. In all probability they will fail altogether to re-acquire it
by diplomatic means, yet they will not omit to employ all the artifices
that are sanctioned by modern diplomacy. There have been rumours that
China intended handing over to Russia a strip of territory in
Manchuria, which would give to the Russian harbour of Vladivostock a
land communication with the forts on the Amoor. But this rumour had no
solid foundation, and the latest intelligence goes to show that China's
successes beyond Gobi, instead of making her moderate in the north, have
given her confidence sufficient to arouse her into a state of opposition
to further encroachments on the part of Russia in that direction. It is
now said that Russia demands pecuniary indemnification for the money she
has expended in raising Kuldja to its present highly prosperous
condition; and at a first glance nothing could seem fairer, nor do we
think that the Chinese would have raised objections to the payment of a
moderate sum. But the sum demanded by the Russians is far from moderate.
The exact amount has not been mentioned, but the Chinese declare that it
exceeds the total cost of the campaign in the north-west, and that
certainly was not less than two millions sterling. This is, of course,
too exorbitant, and is only put forward as a reason for declining to
abide by her former agreement, and to give her diplomatists a _locus
standi_ in their discussions with the Chinese representatives. A Chinese
Embassy has been authorized to proceed to St. Petersburg, and to
endeavour to effect an understanding with Russia upon the Kuldja
question; but it does not appear to have started, and the real
settlement lies in the hands of Tso Tsung Tang and General Kaufmann. The
latest report is that the former has demanded afresh the restoration of
Kuldja; the Russian reply is awaited with eagerness and some anxiety. In
the meanwhile the Chinese have suffered a local reverse of no
significance at the hands of a chief of Khoten, and their power does not
seem to extend south of Yarkand. But they are hurrying up
reinforcements, and 20,000 fresh troops had reached Manas some weeks
ago. They have also an extensive recruiting ground amongst the Calmucks,
and their position of Chuguchak might be of great strategical
importance. If the Kuldja question give rise to a Russo-Chinese war, the
Chinese are sufficiently numerous and sufficiently prepared to task the
capacity of an army of 20,000 Russians; and it is quite certain there
are not 5,000 in Kuldja at present. But the Kuldja question, despite the
prominence it has attained, is only one, if the most important and
pressing, of those questions that are raised and suggested by the
appearance of the Chinese in Central Asia. More especially is this the
case if, as can scarcely be doubted, the Russians refuse to restore
Kuldja; yet the Chinese, knowing the strength of their adversary, shall
hesitate to attack where they cannot but recognize that the penalties of
failure must be immense. In that event the Kuldja question will long
remain unsolved, and for a time perhaps it will be forgotten. But the
Chinese will not forget, nor will they condone the offence. But whatever
may be the interval, and however great the delay, the Kuldja question
will continue to remain a most important portion of Central Asian
politics, and must, so long as it is unsettled, operate in a manner
adverse to the interests of Russia. The Chinese need only maintain their
camps at Chuguchak, Karakaru, Manas, Aksu, Ush Turfan and Kashgar, and
slowly bring up reinforcements from Kansuh and from the Calmuck country,
to render Russia's hold on Kuldja dangerously insecure. In fact, in this
matter the Chinese have the game in their own hands, and can play a
waiting game; whereas Russia can only hope to profit by precipitation on
the part of Tso Tsung Tang. If the Chinese refuse to hold any
intercourse with the faithless Russians, and simply content themselves
with the declaration that they cannot re-enter into political or
commercial relations with them until Kuldja is retroceded, Russia can
never rest tranquil either in Kuldja, Naryn, or Khokand. Above all, so
long as she is occupied in Western Asia as she is at present, she could
never dare to cross the path of China, and enter upon a war which would
rage from Vladivostock and the Amoor to Kuldja and Kashgar. Therefore
the settlement of the Kuldja question is not such an easy matter as
might be supposed; nor does it find Russia so strong or China so weak as
might have been expected. But after all, as we have just said, the
Kuldja question is not the only one suggested by the appearance of the
Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. There is the far wider one raised by the
appearance of the Chinese as a factor in the great Central Asian
question. The three great Asiatic Powers have now converged upon a
point; what is to be the result?
The only way to be in a position to venture upon a surmise as to the
future, is to realize in its full significance the lessons of the past.
What have been the mutual relations between England, Russia, and China?
We have assumed throughout this volume, and we shall assume here, the
irreconcilable hostility of England and Russia, in Asia at all events,
veneered over as it is by a lacquer of politeness and civilization. We
have only to consider the relations between England and China, and
between Russia and China. To take the latter first, they have always
been united by ties of friendship and reciprocity in commercial and
political rights. Their intercourse has been on the whole singularly
harmonious, and while we have been compelled to wage three wars to
obtain a standing for our merchants in the seaports, Russia, without
being compelled to resort to anything like the same extreme measures,
has been able to secure all she, or her merchants, wanted in Middle and
Western China. She has made the Amoor a Russian river; she dominates the
Yellow and Japanese seas from Vladivostock; and she has acquired in her
position among the Khalkas, and in Kuldja, two portals to various weak
points in the Chinese Empire. Yet all the time she has been on terms of
the closest amity with China. She has several commercial treaties of the
most favourable character, and she has always been on the footing of
"the most favoured nation." But she has been more than that; she has
been the most favoured nation. But the Chinese have not failed to
observe that this good understanding with Russia has, so far as
advantages arising from it go, been a very one-sided affair. For all
Russia's protestations of friendship and good-will, what advantages has
China reaped from those high-flown promises? Whereas, the patriotic
Chinaman has but to look to the Amoor, and to the attenuated province of
Manchuria, to see what Russian friendship means. He can go farther
still. He has only to enquire into the relations Russia has managed to
conclude with the Taranath Lama; he has only to hear what the people of
Ourga think of Russia's position in the vicinity of that important city;
and he cannot fail to form a very clear and decided opinion as to what
Russia's friendship signifies. The Chinese have, in the full extent of
their northern frontier, a great question in discussion with Russia. So
long as China was weak, and consequently unable to resent the patronage
of her friend, so long was Russia able to play "my lady bountiful" with
a good grace and perfect success. But the moment China became strong,
and in a position to resent the condescension of her whilome ally, the
Chinese took a different tone, and already we hear of the Chinese
assuming a semi-hostile attitude in the Amoor region. But whereas
China's apprehension--for it is apprehension that is at the root of her
hostility to Russia, at Russia's designs in Manchuria and among the
Khalkas is vague at present--her indignation is clear and easily defined
at Russia retaining possession of Kuldja after she has demanded its
restoration. In short, all her apprehension along the northern frontier,
which has slumbered, but never died out, since the Russians seized the
Amoor posts during the Crimean War, is reduced to a focus in Central
Asia, where Russia appears inclined to throw herself in the path of, or
at least to retard, their victorious career. It is not so much the
Kuldja question, which is of local importance, that is of pressing
moment, as the rupture between Russia and China, that a crisis in the
Issik Kul region will make complete. That rupture has already taken
place, and no concession on the part of Russia will restore her good
name with the Chinese. She may hand Kuldja over now, or she may keep it
by the strong arm if she can; but she has forfeited all claim to
consideration by the Chinese, through delaying to accede to that which
those people consider in every sense their right and due. Had Russia at
once said to China, "We will abandon Kuldja, and only require you to
guarantee the safety of the population," there would have been not only
the preservation of the good understanding between the countries, but
there might have been, for fresh purposes, a Russo-Chinese alliance in
Central Asia. That alliance must have been fraught with danger to this
country, and for reasons that will best be described under the head of
Anglo-Chinese relations.
But the Russian authorities failed to grasp the situation in its full
extent. They treated the Kuldja question as a mere local affair, and
they trifled with the Chinese as if the latter had no very strong
interest in the matter. They altogether ignored the terrible earnestness
of the Chinese character, and they treated the demands of Tso Tsung Tang
in a spirit of levity that must have roused the ire of that general.
Their policy, regarded from any point of view, was shallow and unwise,
but, bearing in mind the past tact and diplomatic skill shown by Russia
in her dealings with China, it must appear more shallow and foolish. Of
course this Kuldja question differs from all previous questions in the
essential point of all, that here for the first time Russia had to go
back instead of advancing, as always had been the case heretofore. The
Russian authorities simply regarded the matter from the point of view
of what effect it would have upon the peoples of Central Asia. They
persuaded themselves that to hand over Kuldja would be to give an
impetus to every hostile element in Western Turkestan, as well as to
lower their prestige generally throughout Asia. As a leading Russian
paper expressed it, "the retrocession of Kuldja would be an act of
political suicide, for not only would it raise the prestige of China to
a higher point than ever before, but it would also undermine our
position in Eastern Asia, by giving the Chinese a strong military
position within our natural frontier. For these reasons Kuldja cannot be
restored." That paragraph sums up the arguments the Russians will employ
in defence of their continuing to retain possession of Kuldja. They add
something to their effect in the popular mind by diatribes against the
Chinese for rumoured barbarities, by drawing comparisons, flattering to
themselves and to their administrative capacity, between the present
condition of Kuldja, and what it would become under a restored Chinese
rule. In depicting what this would be, they entirely ignore the
prosperous condition of Kuldja before the Tungan revolt, and they appear
to assume that the anarchy existing there, when they entered it in 1871,
was due to the Chinese, instead of being caused by the ingratitude and
fickleness of its own people. And they shut their eyes to the great
benefits China conferred upon Central Asia during the century that she
was paramount therein. They would like us, and every other observer of
the crisis, to do the same. That is impossible, for the teaching of
history is clear, and points to a diametrically opposite conclusion. We
do not dispute the beneficence of Russia's government of Kuldja. We
freely admit it. That is no reason for maligning the Chinese, and
asserting that they are utter barbarians; nor is it a reason, in the
eyes of Chinamen, for a refusal to restore Kuldja. By refusing to
entertain the overtures of Tso Tsung Tang, which were made, there is
reason to believe, before the attack on Yakoob Beg, the Russians huffed
the Chinese; and by procrastinating ever since, when questioned upon the
subject, they have still further displeased them. The Russians are aware
of this, and feel convinced that, no matter how obliging they might be
disposed to be, the Chinese will now no longer appreciate their
moderation. If we admit this, as can scarcely be gainsaid, what becomes
of the Kuldja question, and of its peaceful solution that many claim to
see? How can it be peacefully solved, if Russia will not accede to the
terms from which China is resolved not to budge? Surely not by a fresh
commotion on the part of the Mussulman population, which some persons
have pretended to forecast by magnifying a petty success that has been
obtained by the insignificant ruler of Khoten over a Chinese detachment.
Surely not by such trivial circumstances as the hostility of an outlying
dependency, will China be either expelled from Kashgar, or induced to
forego her claims on Kuldja. The success of the Khoten chief is but a
minor incident in the campaign, and for that district and its people it
must be pronounced a great misfortune. The Chinese will exact a terrible
revenge. The Kuldja question will not be solved by such means, English
readers can feel assured; and the hostility of Russia and China towards
each other will become more pronounced every day. Already petty
disturbances are reported to have taken place along the border. Russian
merchants have been molested by parties of brigands, among whom the
assailed assert there were Chinese soldiers; and no satisfaction could
be obtained from their generals. Representations have been made to Tso
Tsung Tang upon the subject, and his reply has not been very amicable.
Russian caravans, which were always welcome during the progress of the
war at Manas, Karakaru, and Urumtsi, are now no longer greeted with the
same cordiality, and the Chinese are evincing an intention to close
their frontier to Russians. Few caravans, the _Tashkent Gazette_ informs
us, now care to leave Kuldja for the territory occupied by the Chinese
army; and slowly, but none the less surely, is the old alliance between
Russia and China departing to join the things that were, but are not.
But, although so much is clear, it is almost impossible to predicate the
future course of the Kuldja question. It is not probable that Tso Tsung
Tang will openly attack the Russians, yet his hand may be forced by the
home authorities, and he may be left no alternative between that and the
abandonment of his enterprise. It must be always remembered that
Russia's best weapon is intrigue at Pekin, and a skilful envoy might so
far manipulate the rivalry between Tso and Li Hung Chang as to induce
the latter to paralyze the ambition of the former by withholding
supplies and reinforcements from the army of Central Asia. So
unpatriotic a course would, we believe, be hateful to Li Hung Chang, and
it, certainly, would be attended with great danger, sure to recoil upon
his guilty head, if for a personal rivalry he debased himself so far as
to become the tool of his country's foe. But yet it is in vain to deny
that there is danger to the preservation of China's most cherished
interests in the rivalry of some of her chief statesmen. The Kuldja
question, which scarcely admits of peaceful solution in Central Asia,
might be solved in the palace at Pekin more easily and more effectually
than by a campaign on a large scale in Jungaria and Turkestan; and there
is a possibility that Russia may by this means seek to nullify the
danger from Tso Tsung Tang, and to stultify the recent Chinese
successes. It is very doubtful whether they would succeed, for Chinese
opinion runs high upon the topic, and the Mantchoo caste is united in
its support of its member Tso Tsung Tang. Even if they did, it would
only be shelving the Kuldja question, for so long as the Chinese remain
in Kashgaria, and at Manas and Karakaru, they must regard the presence
of Russia in Kuldja as a slight to themselves, as well as a menace to
their line of communications.
But every probability is against their succeeding. Li Hung Chang's
position is not so secure that he can dare to put himself in face of
those who champion a national cause, as is the re-absorption of Chinese
Turkestan. The return of Tso Tsung Tang with his veterans would be the
least danger that the adoption of an unpatriotic policy would entail. If
this home danger, then, does not arise, the Kuldja question will be
settled between Tso and the Russian authorities in Khokand and Kuldja.
The result of that discussion cannot be doubtful. The advocates on
either side are soldiers, each equally confident in their own abilities
and power, and each flushed by a long tide of success. They will come to
the discussion of the question with heated blood and excited nerves;
reason will not be the presiding goddess at the council board. There
will be accusations and recriminations bandied from one side to the
other. If such be the case, the Kuldja question will not be long in
discussion, and before the close of the present year perhaps, but more
probably early next spring, there will be war between Russia and China
along the Tian Shan range. Even if Tso is content to permit his
arguments to be clothed in diplomatic language, there will be no
solution of the difficulty, so long as Russia remains where she is; and
consequently the difference will be as great between Russia and China as
if there were open hostilities between the countries. And this, after
all, is the main point, for the destruction of all friendly sentiment
between Russia and China means the addition of another element to "the
great game in Central Asia," and that element, as an adverse one to
Russia, is a beneficial circumstance for this country. The difference
over the Kuldja question magnifies the previously existing discordant
points between the countries, and irretrievably wrecks whatever prospect
there once was of Russia and China pursuing an identical policy towards
Baroghil and Cashmere. We have now to consider the past relations
between England and China, in order that we may be in a position to
appreciate the full significance of China's reappearance in Central
Asia, and also what is to be the probable outcome of the gradual
approximation of the three Great Powers, and the slow extinction of the
once innumerable petty states of Asia.
What, then, have been the mutual relations between England and China in
the past? There is no necessity to enter into the question of the
footing we are on along the sea-coast, for that is really beside the
question; nor need we recapitulate the wars which we have at various
times been compelled to wage in Eastern China. The result of those wars,
those treaties, and that constant inter-communication has been, that
Englishmen have secured a foothold in many of the principal cities, and
that English trade is supreme there. But the relations along the land
frontier are quite the opposite of those obtained on the sea-board, and
they are influenced by entirely different considerations. During the
last century, and for a considerable portion of the present, we were
not, strictly speaking, neighbours of the Chinese; for between the two
empires there intervened a belt of semi-independent states, who
nominally owned allegiance to China. Some of these were Nepaul, Sikhim,
Bhutan and Birmà, with its dependency of Assam. It was in the days of
Lord Cornwallis that we first realized the significance of the fact that
Chinese prestige had penetrated south of the Himalaya. The Ghoorka
rulers of Nepaul had, on several occasions, molested the peaceable
Tibetans, and at last had grown so bold, that on one expedition they
advanced as far as Lhasa, which they plundered. At that moment the aged
Keen-Lung was meditating the retirement from public life, which a few
years afterwards, like the Asiatic Charles the Fifth that he was, he
adopted; but, on the news of this insult to his authority, his warlike
spirit fired up, and he vowed that the marauders of Khatmandoo should
dearly pay for their audacity. A large army, of the reputed strength of
70,000 men, was collected, and the Chinese generals advanced by the
Kirong Pass upon the Nepaulese capital. A desperate battle was fought
along this elevated road, resulting in victory to the Chinese. Several
other encounters took place with the same result, and the Ghoorkas were
compelled to sue for terms. The Chinese showed no disposition to stay
their advance, until Lord Cornwallis mediated between the foes, and
peace ensued. Nepaul acknowledged its suzerainty to China, and agreed to
send tribute every five years to Pekin. For more than half a century
this was regularly sent, but during the last thirty years it has been
either discontinued, or has grown irregular. But for us the main point
is, after all, that the Chinese, although yielding to the remonstrance
of Lord Cornwallis, really did so with a bad grace. We had stood between
them and their prey.
But this was not the full extent of the mistake we had actually
committed. We had annoyed the Chinese; but we had absolutely offended
the people and the ruling Lamas of Tibet. Warren Hastings had sent two
missions--one under Mr. George Bogle, the other under Captain Turner--to
the Teshu Lama, and by means of these embassies had broken ground very
happily in Tibet. He had also conferred an obligation upon him by
dealing leniently with the intractable Bhutanese or Bhuteas; and he had
followed up that sense of obligation by the despatch of two successful
missions. When Lord Cornwallis threw the _ægis_ of British protection
over Nepaul, it is true that we had no diplomatic relationship with
Tibet, but we were on a good footing with the people generally, having a
native representative at Lhasa named Purungir Gosain, and being in high
repute at Shigatze, the chief city of the southern portion of Tibet. The
Tibetans, the instant the Ghoorkas raided their country, notified the
same to our government, and requested its good offices to prevent the
Ghoorkas invading their country. The Chinese, their lawful protectors,
were so far away that much damage could be inflicted upon them before
the Chinese could have time to despatch a vindicating army; therefore
they appealed to their friends the English, whom they had always found
so just, for assistance in their extremity. Their appeal was evidently
made with the impression that it would be granted. Therefore it was with
double regret they saw the English remain indifferent while the Ghoorkas
were pressing on against Lhasa, and ravaging the fertile districts
watered by the Sanpu. But their regret and surprise at our government
remaining indifferent were as nothing compared with their indignation
when they learnt that we were actually interfering on behalf of the
marauding Ghoorkas. We saved the Ghoorkas from condign chastisement, and
we of course prevented the establishment of a Chinese garrison at
Khatmandoo, which we could whenever we chose have easily expelled; but
we offended the Tibetans and the Chinese, and induced them to unite in a
policy of hostility against ourselves. After that war (1792) the
Himalayan passes were closed against us, and the Chinese block-houses
have effectually barred the way to Tibet and Northern Asia ever since.
Mr. Thomas Manning, one of the most intrepid and highly gifted of
English travellers, penetrated into Tibet in 1812, and resided there
some time. But that is the only instance in which an English traveller
overcame Bhutea and Ghoorka indifference and Chinese hostility. Tibet
remains a sealed book, and, despite treaty rights to enter it, no
Englishman goes thither, although the attraction is great, and the prize
to be secured far from vague or trivial. The assumed reason is the
covert hostility of the Chinese.
If we turn farther to the east, to Assam--which we have absorbed--to
Birmà, and even to Siam, we find the same causes in operation. We
recognized in Yunnan the Panthay Sultan of Talifoo; we have always
striven to treat the kings of Birmà and Siam as independent princes,
whereas they are only Chinese vassals; and we are believed to have
carried on intrigues with the Shans and other tribes beyond the Assamese
frontier. These steps may be prudent or they may not for other reasons;
but they certainly are imprudent for the reason that they offend the
Chinese. As a policy intended to conciliate the Chinese, our frontier
policy on the north and the east has been the worst possible, and a
tissue of blunders from beginning to end; and the result is that for the
last half-century we have lived on the very worst terms with the
Chinese. We should have conciliated them, but we aroused instead all
their latent suspicion and dislike. We should have become friendly
neighbours, and, on the contrary, we are neighbours who, if not
decidedly hostile to each other, shun each other's presence. And the
real base of our sentiment towards the Chinese is to be seen in the fact
that one of the first articles in the creed of Indian state policy is
"to keep China as far off as possible." That precept, which may have
been very useful, has served its turn, and it is time that our
Indo-Chinese policy should be set upon a new basis. With China once more
supreme upon our whole northern frontier, and with her presenting
ultimatums at Bangkok, and coercing the ruler of Mandalay as she esteems
fit, it is high time for us, apart from the Central Asian question
altogether, to set our house in order with the Chinese. The mistakes we
made in championing the Ghoorkas, in acknowledging the Panthays, and in
a general policy of indifference to Chinese opinion, have all tended to
bring about the present deadlock in our relations with China. Our
acknowledgment of the Athalik Ghazi cannot have conduced to the creation
of any very friendly sentiment among the Chinese towards us, and,
therefore, at the present moment we must assume that the state of
feeling existing among the Chinese in Tibet and Yunnan towards us exists
in Kashgaria also; and that feeling is a veiled hostility. Therefore,
while the Chinese are beginning to regard Russia with the hostile
feelings that once were reserved for England, they have by no means
altered their old sentiments towards us. We have done nothing whatever
to induce them to do so. We have not helped them in any way to regain
Kashgar, and on the whole English opinion may be said to have been more
adverse to, than in favour of, their claims. They have found in the
arsenals of Kashgar and Yarkand many proofs of England's alliance with,
and friendship for, Yakoob Beg; and, on the other hand, they certainly
owe much to the assistance of Russian merchants, and the forbearance of
the Russian government. Nor should we for an instant delude ourselves
with the fallacy that the Chinese will look to us for aid against
Russia, as Yakoob Beg did. They have conquered Eastern Turkestan without
us--in fact, despite of our moral opposition; and they will retain it if
they can by their own right arms. It will not enter their head for an
instant to play the old game of Yakoob Beg, of setting England off
against Russia. But, although they will play a perfectly independent
game, it by no means follows that they will be hostile to this country,
if by some fortunate stroke of diplomacy we could bring home to their
minds the fact that England is glad at the result of the war in Central
Asia, however much she may have failed during its progress to recognize
which was the rightful cause. But what is that fortunate stroke of
diplomacy to be? and how is it to be brought to pass? To each of these
questions it would be rash to give any confident reply. In dealing with
the Chinese we are not only treating with a people whom we very
imperfectly understand, but also with a government the secret springs of
whose policy we neither know nor appreciate. The action we might
therefore adopt, founded though it should be on the experience of some
Englishman versed in the mysteries of China, might fail to accomplish
what it seemed calculated to secure. It might be crowned with success,
it might be condemned with failure. Of course the first thing to decide
is, how are we to take official cognizance of China's reconquest of
Kashgaria, and how are we to bring home to the minds of Tso Tsung Tang
and his lieutenants the knowledge that we have repented of our
shortsighted policy towards Yakoob Beg, and are willing to atone for it
in so far as we are able by an ample recognition of the change in
affairs north of the Karakoram?
The Che-foo Convention gave us the right to send an embassy to Tibet, on
the condition that it should be acted upon within a given space. We did
not avail ourselves of that concession, and the Chinese, we are
informed, consider that the right has lapsed. We may have been wise or
we may have been foolish--in my opinion we have been foolish--in
declining to enforce the only real concession China made, in reparation
for the murder of Mr. Margary. Does this concession, which we never made
use of, entitle us to send a mission to the Chinese in Kashgar? Acting
upon this precedent, are we justified in supposing that the Chinese
would hold out a hand of friendship to an English envoy coming from Leh
to Yarkand? It is much to be feared that it would not. At the present
moment, too, the country must be in such a disturbed state, that the
Chinese would have a ready excuse if any accident befel our envoy.
Moreover, at the present moment an envoy would have no definite object
before him. A few years hence, when the Chinese rule shall be completely
restored throughout Eastern Turkestan, it may be reasonable to expect a
revival of trade in this direction; but at present it would be premature
to agitate for it. Nor would a simple embassy of congratulation look
well. We have too recently befriended the Athalik Ghazi to make our
congratulations to his conqueror anything but a mockery. The Chinese
would be puffed up with vanity, and think that we were only worshipping
their rising sun. Whatever action we do take in Central Asia, to effect
an understanding with the Chinese, we must be very careful that it has
been well considered, and that it is as cautious as it must be clearly
defined. Any mistake would be simply fatal to the preservation of good
relations with China. Therefore, we must do nothing. _Quieta non movere_
must be our motto, and we must only look forward to some auspicious
occasion when it may be possible to enter into cordial relations with
China.
But, although our hands are tied in Central Asia, they are not fettered
at Pekin, and we certainly should congratulate, if we have not done so
already, the Chinese on their remarkable successes in the Tian Shan
regions. That step might be pregnant with beneficent results, and our
desire to be on good terms with our new, yet our old, neighbour might be
met in a cordial manner by the Chinese. The Chinese will not stoop to
propitiate us in order to preserve their rule in Eastern Turkestan; but
it is against common sense to suppose that they will be eager to embroil
themselves with us at the same moment that they are quarrelling with the
Russians. The Kuldja question must throw China into our alliance, if we
are not precipitate, and do not offer her any slight by meddling with
this semi-independent chief of Khoten, who is said to have overthrown a
Chinese detachment. And, in negotiating with the rulers of Kashgaria, we
must remember that commercial advantages are all very well, but that
political are infinitely more important. It has been tersely said that
we patronized Yakoob Beg in order to make a market for Kangra tea; but
the very trivial advantages we secured in a commercial sense were far
more than counterbalanced by the political disadvantages we derived from
a recognition of the Athalik Ghazi. In dealing with the Chinese we must
not set before us, as our guiding star, the privilege of supplying the
good people of Kashgar and Yarkand with tea and other necessaries. What
we aspire to is to be on terms of amity with China, as a power in
Central Asia, which will possess everything it desires when Ili has
been restored, and which most accordingly be inclined to resent with us
the undue aggrandizement of Russia. These are the future advantages that
may accrue from an understanding between England and China. But at the
present juncture there are others similar in kind, but immediate in
effect. The Afghan question, which now clamours for solution, and which
will scarcely pass through this crisis without finding our hold on Cabul
made more assured, is in many respects connected with the Kuldja.
In each case the ambition of Russia is the motive power, and in each she
seeks to play her game with as little risk, and as much gain, as
possible. In neither will she fight, if she can avoid the necessity, yet
in each there is a point beyond which her honour and her interests alike
refuse to permit her to remain concealed and neutral. The solution of
the two questions is being worked out simultaneously, and the progress
of the Afghan question will at least very seriously affect the later
stages of the Kuldja. If Russia has to fight to defend Shere Ali, then
we may be sure that Tso Tsung Tang's legions will not remain inactive,
and that General Kolpakovsky will either have to beat a retreat to
Vernoe, or engage in a war out of which, on his own resources alone, it
will be impossible for him to issue victorious. If Russia interfere
openly in defence of Shere Ali, Kuldja must be restored to the Chinese,
otherwise Russia's flank would be exposed to a crushing blow, which the
Chinese would not be slow to take advantage of. Present events on the
Ili and on the Cabul have, therefore, this much in common, that they
both aim, directly or indirectly, at the fabric of Russian supremacy in
Central Asia. The occupation of Afghanistan by England, or even a
partial occupation of it as is very probable, would seriously weaken
Russian prestige in Western Turkestan. A Chinese occupation of Kuldja
would undermine her position in Vernoe and Naryn and among the Kirghiz.
Admitting these, is it not natural to suppose that in each case Russia
will fight, or that, even if she does not fight in each case, she will
fight in the one that she may deem of the most importance? But we need
not pursue the subject farther. The Chinese are face to face with Russia
in the heart of Central Asia, just as a few short months ago they were
opposed to Yakoob Beg and the power of the Tungani.
Their army is drawn up in hostile array; it is each day becoming more
numerous and more perfectly prepared. Its generals are the same who have
led it to constant victory; its main body is the veterans of three
campaigns. The Chinese are persuaded, and it is impossible to say not
justly persuaded, of the righteousness of their cause. The Russians can
have no equal confidence either in their strength, or in their moral
position. They are not exactly championing a bad cause, or a lost one,
but, in comparison to the Chinese, they have no legal position. It
remains to be seen whether by force of arms, or by diplomatic
superiority, they can make up for the flaw in their tenure of Kuldja.
Farther on, in the vista of the events yet to come, there looms the
prospect of an Anglo-Chinese alliance, that must be most beneficial to
the peoples of Asia generally. But, before it will be possible for
Englishmen to count upon the presence of the Chinese as a favourable
"factor in the Central Asian question," our relations with China must be
placed upon a firmer and a more friendly basis than any which has yet
existed. We have it in our power to do this, and the ever-widening
breach between Russia and China simplifies our task in no slight degree.
The day will come when Russia will discover that the Kuldja question was
no trivial matter at all, and that to it can be traced many important
events in Central Asia. England may also recognize in it one of the most
useful circumstances that have ever operated in her favour in her long
rivalry with Russia. At the very crisis of our border history, when we
are on the eve of dealing out well merited chastisement to an Ameer of
Cabul, Russia finds herself weakened by being compelled to discuss a
question with China, when her attention is required elsewhere. She will
not yield what the Chinese demand, yet she dare not refuse; and the
latter will simply bide their time until she is hampered elsewhere. It
is no rash prophecy to say that China will be reinstalled, either by
peaceful means or by force, in Kuldja before the close of next year,
probably long before. An alliance between any two of the three great
Asiatic Powers must then be conclusive in all Central Asian matters,
and, before that alliance, the third will have the prudence to submit.
It behoves us to learn our lesson, when that day comes, thoroughly and
in good time.
APPENDIX.
THE POSITION OF LOB-NOR.
Lake Lob-Nor is placed in the map accompanying this volume in accordance
with the explorations of Colonel Prjevalsky in 1876-77; the result of
which was published in Dr. Petermann's _Mittheilungen_ as an extra
number during the spring of the present year. The accuracy of the
gallant explorer in identifying Lob-Nor with his lake of Kara Koshun had
not been challenged when this map was drawn, and when the following good
reasons for doubting its accuracy were published on the 14th of
September, it was too late to make the necessary alteration.
The quotation of Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen's strictures on Colonel
Prjevalsky's lakes is taken from the _Athenæum_ of the 14th of
September, 1878:--
"It would appear that the Russian traveller Prejevalsky, in his last
remarkable journey in the heart of Central Asia, did not explore Lob-Nor
at all, as he claims to have done. Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, one
of the first comparative geographers of the day, has examined the
account of the journey, more especially by the light of Chinese
literature, and proves, almost incontestably to our thinking, that the
true Lob-Nor must lie somewhere north-east of the so-called Kara Kotchun
Lake discovered by Prejevalsky, and that, in all probability, it is fed
by an eastern arm of the Tarim river. This, at all events, would account
for the remarkable diminution in bulk undergone by the waters of that
stream as they proceed southward, which could not but strike an
attentive reader of the Russian explorer's narrative. We have not space
to reproduce all the arguments which Von Richthofen adduces, but the
more important are these:--Prejevalsky's lake was fresh, whereas Lob-Nor
has been called _The_ Salt Lake, _par excellence_, in all ages; Shaw,
Forsyth, and other authorities, report that the name Lob-Nor was known
in those regions, whereas Prejevalsky found no such name applied to his
lake; the Chinese maps, of the accuracy of which Von Richthofen has had
repeated proofs, represent Lob-Nor as lying more to the north-east, and
call two lakes lying nearly in the position of those discovered by
Prejevalsky, Khasomo, Khas being the Mongolian for jade, a famous
product of Khotan of which mediæval traders from China went in quest,
passing by these very lakes _en route_. Another important argument is,
as we have mentioned, based on the bulk of water discharged by the Tarim
at its mouth. Von Richthofen's theory presupposes that the Tarim River
has altered its course, and that the main rush of water is now
south-east instead of due east as formerly. The whole question is well
worthy of further investigation, and it is possible that Prejevalsky,
whom a recent telegram from St. Petersburg reports about to return to
Central Asia, may be enabled to elucidate it. He will return to Zaissan,
the Russian frontier post, and thence endeavour to make his way into
Tibet by way of Barkul and Hami.
"It is, however, certain that he will encounter great, if not
insuperable, obstruction, for we learn from private advices from India,
that the ill-advised publication in the Chefoo Convention of the then
proposed mission to Tibet has resulted in the issue of the most
stringent orders to the Tibetan officials at all the various routes and
passes to allow no European traveller to enter into the country on any
pretext whatever."
Having stated the view of Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, which is
endorsed by the high authority of the _Athenæeum_, and which bears,
moreover, conviction upon its face, it is but fair to give the vital
portion of Colonel Prjevalsky's own description. The _Geographical
Magazine_, for May, 1878 Contains _in extenso_ the report, and the
sentences here quoted are from that translation.
"At a distance of fifteen versts from the smaller lake, Kara Buran, the
party diverged southward to the village of Charchalyk, built about
thirty years ago by outlaws from Khotan, of which there are at present
114 engaged in tilling fields for the state.... Where Charchalyk now
stands, and also at the distance of two days' journey from it, are the
ruins of two towns, called Ottogush-Shari (from Ottogush, a former
ruler) and Gas-Shari respectively. Close to Lob-Nor (Kara Koshun) are
the ruins of a third and pretty extensive town called Kune-Shari. From
inquires, Prejevalsky ascertained that about 1861 or 1862 a colony of
Russians numbering about 160 or 170 people, including women and
children, with their pack-horses and armed with flint-lock muskets,
settled on the Lower Tarim and at Charchalyk, but that they made no long
stay, and soon returned to Urumchi, via Turfan.... Turning to the
Lob-Nor Lake (Kara Koshun), which the travellers reached in the early
days of February, it should be observed that the Tarim discharges itself
first into a smaller lake (from thirty to thirty-five versts in length,
and between ten and twelve versts in breadth) called Kara Buran (_i.e._
black storms) into which the Cherchendaria flows as well. A great part
of the Kara Buran, as of Lob-Nor, is overgrow with reeds, the river
flowing in its bed in the centre. The name Lob-Nor is applied by the
natives to the whole lower course of the Tarim, the larger lake being
called Chok-kul or Kara Koshun. This lake, or rather morass, is in the
shape of an irregular ellipse running south-west and north-east.
"Its major axis is about 90 or 100 versts in length, its minor axis not
more than twenty versts. This information is derived from the natives,
as Prejevalsky himself explored only the southern and western end, and
proceeded by boat down the river for about half the length of the lake,
further progress being rendered impossible by the increasing shallowness
of the water and the masses of reeds in every direction. The water
itself is clear and sweet, though there are salt marshes all round the
lake, and beyond them a strip of ground parallel with the present
borders of the lake and overgrown with tamarisks. It is probable that
this strip was formerly the periphery of the lake, and this conclusion
is corroborated by the natives, who say that thirty years ago the lake
was deeper."
It is clear that the true position of Lob-Nor has yet to be defined by
modern exploration, but we may safely assume with the _Athenæum_ that
Colonel Prjevalsky's Kara Koshun is _not_ Lob-Nor. The accompanying map
then, in this particular, is unfortunately erroneous.
There is every reason for believing that Lob-Nor will be found in the
position assigned to it on the Chinese chart, the accuracy of which has
been so strikingly proved by the correct position given to the two lakes
Khas-omo, which are identical with the Kara Koshun and Kara Bunar of
Prjevalsky.
It would be most interesting to obtain a diary or other account of those
Russian settlers mentioned by Prjevalsky, who entered the _terra
incognita_ of Central Asia during the halcyon days after the signature
of the Treaty of Kuldja, and just before the outbreak of the Tungan
revolt. It is possible that they may have solved during their return
journey to Urumtsi the enigma of Lob-Nor without knowing what they had
achieved. The reader will, therefore, have the kindness to bear in mind
that Lob-Nor is really (probably about three-quarters of a degree)
north-east of where it is placed on the map, and that the lake
represented there is only the Kara Koshun, or Chok Kul of Colonel
Prjevalsky.
The most recent information is, that Colonel Prjevalsky adheres to his
view as to the position of Lob-Nor, and is preparing a reply which will
be published in a few weeks from this date (October 1st).
TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA.
TREATY OF COMMERCE CONCLUDED BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA, AT KULDJA, ON THE
25TH DAY OF JULY, 1851, AND RATIFIED ON THE 13TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1851.
The plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and
the plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Bogdokhan of Tatsing, hereby
declare; the Governor General of Ili, and its dependent provinces, as
well as his deputy, have, after consulting together, concluded in the
city of Ili (Kuldja), in favour of the subjects of both empires, a
Treaty of Commerce, which establishes a traffic in the cities of Ili
(Kuldja), and of Tarbagatai (Chuguchak). This treaty is composed of the
following articles:--
ARTICLE I.
The present Treaty of Commerce, concluded in the interests of both
powers, by demonstrating their mutual solicitude for the maintenance of
peace between, as well as for the well-being of, their respective
subjects, ought to draw still closer together those links of friendship
which at the present moment unite the two Powers.
ARTICLE II.
The merchants of the two Empires will regulate between themselves the
interchange of commerce, and arrange the various charges at their own
will, and without any extraneous pressure. On the part of Russia a
consul will be appointed to superintend the affairs of all Russian
subjects; and on the part of China, a functionary of the superior
administration of Ili. In the event of any collision between the
subjects of either Power, each of these agents will decide, in
accordance with justice, the affairs of his own countrymen.
ARTICLE III.
This commerce being opened in consideration of the mutual friendship of
the two Powers, it will not be in contravention of existing rights on
either side.
ARTICLE IV.
Russian merchants going either to Ili (Kuldja) or to Tarbagatai
(Chuguchak) will be accompanied by a syndic (caravanbashi). When a
caravan going to Ili (Kuldja) shall arrive at the Chinese picket of
Borokhondjir, and when that destined for Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) shall
reach the first Chinese picket, the syndic shall present to the officer
of the guard the certificate of his government. The said officer, after
having noted the number of men, of beasts, and of loads of merchandise,
shall permit the caravan to pass, and shall furthermore cause it to be
escorted from picket to picket by an officer and soldiers. During the
march, all disturbance, or cause for such, shall be interdicted to
soldiers and merchants alike.
ARTICLE V.
In order to facilitate the task of officers and soldiers, Russian
merchants shall be obliged, in virtue of the present treaty, to follow
the route chosen by their body guard, both going and returning.
ARTICLE VI.
If, whilst Russian caravans follow their route outside the limit of the
guard of Chinese soldiers, bands of brigands from the outer clans
(Kirghiz) shall commit acts of pillage, of assault, or other crimes, the
Chinese government shall not be required to interfere in the matter.
When the caravan shall have arrived on Chinese territory, similarly also
during its residence in the factories where merchandise is stored,
Russian merchants must themselves guard and defend their property. They
will be expected still more carefully to look after their animals when
out at pasturage. If, despite all precaution, something should happen to
go astray, notice of such loss must be promptly given to the Chinese
official; who conjointly with the Russian consul shall trace out with
all possible diligence the lost article. If traces of it are discovered,
and those in a village held by Chinese subjects, and the thief be
captured, the punishment shall be prompt and severe. If the thing lost
be recovered, or any portion of it, it shall be restored to the person
to whom it belonged.
ARTICLE VII.
In the event of disputes, litigations, or other trivial incidents,
between the respective subjects, the Russian consul and the Chinese
official, of whom mention has previously been made, shall use all their
efforts to settle the affair satisfactorily. But if, despite every
effort to avoid such, a criminal case or one of general importance
should arise, it shall be decided conformably with the regulations
actually in force on the Kiachta frontier.
ARTICLE VIII.
Russian merchants shall arrive each year with their merchandise between
the 25th day of March and the 10th day of December (of our style, or
according to the Chinese calendar between the day Tchin-ming and the day
Tong-tchi); after the latter of these dates, the arrival of caravans
shall cease. If the merchandise imported during that period (8-1/2
months) should not be sold, it shall be permissible to the merchants to
remain a longer space in China, in order to complete their sale; after
which the consul shall take charge of their departure. It is moreover
understood that Russian merchants shall not obtain an escort of officers
and soldiers, neither for going nor for returning, if they have not at
the least twenty camels laden with merchandise. If a merchant or the
Russian consul has need for some special matter to send an express
message, every facility shall be accorded him for doing so. But in order
that the service of officers and soldiers should not become too onerous,
there shall only be twice in the same month these extraordinary
expeditions outside the line of the advanced guards.
ARTICLE IX.
Russian and Chinese merchants can see each other without restriction
about matters of business; but Russian subjects, finding themselves in
the factory under the care of the Russian consul, may not walk about in
the suburbs and the streets, unless provided with a "permit" from the
consul; without such permit, they must not go out of their enclosure.
Whoever shall go out without permission shall be led back to the
consul, who will proceed against him according to law.
ARTICLE X.
If a criminal belonging to either of the two Empires should flee to the
other, he shall not be afforded sanctuary; but, on the part of each
Power, the local authorities shall take the most severe measures, and
make the most searching enquiries to arrest him. There shall be
reciprocal extradition of fugitives of this class.
ARTICLE XI.
As it is to be foreseen that the Russian merchants, who shall come to
China on commercial matters, will have with them carriages and beasts of
burden, there shall be assigned for their use, near the city of Ili,
certain places on the banks of the river Ili, and also near the city of
Tarbagatai other places where there is both water and pasturage. In
these encampments the Russian merchants shall confide their animals to
the charge of their own people, who shall take care that neither
cultivated lands nor cemeteries shall be in any case injured or
desecrated. Those who may contravene this enactment shall be brought
before the consul to be punished.
ARTICLE XII.
In the exchange of articles of merchandise between the merchants of the
two Empires, nothing shall be left on credit on either side. If,
notwithstanding this clause, some one should purchase his merchandise on
credit, the Russian and Chinese officials shall on no account interfere,
and shall admit of no complaint, even if cause for such might exist.
ARTICLE XIII.
As Russian merchants arriving in China for commercial reasons should
necessarily have special places for their warehouses, the Chinese
government shall assign them, in the two commercial cities of Ili and
Tarbagatai, plots of land near the bazaar, so that the Russian subjects
may be able to construct there, at their own expense, dwelling-houses
and factories for their wares.
ARTICLE XIV.
The Chinese government shall not interpose obstacles in any case where
Russian subjects celebrate, within their own buildings, divine service
according to the rite of their religion. In case a Russian subject in
China should happen to die either at Ili or at Tarbagatai, the Chinese
government shall set apart an empty space outside the walls of those
cities, to serve as a cemetery.
ARTICLE XV.
If Russian merchants should take to Ili or Tarbagatai sheep for the
purpose of exchanging them, the local authorities shall take, on account
of the government, two sheep out of every ten, and shall give in
exchange for each sheep a piece of linen cloth (_da-ba_, of the legal
measure); the remainder of the animals and every other kind of
merchandise shall be exchanged between the merchants of the two Empires
at a price mutually agreed upon, and the Chinese government shall not
intermeddle in any manner whatsoever.
ARTICLE XVI.
The ordinary official correspondence between the two Empires shall be
made, on the part of the Russian government, through the medium of the
superior administration of Western Siberia, and under the seal of that
administration; and on the part of the Chinese government through the
medium, and under the seal, of the superior administration of Ili.
ARTICLE XVII.
The present Treaty shall be authenticated by the signatures and seals of
the respective plenipotentiaries. On the part of Russia there will be
prepared four copies in the Russian language, signed by the
plenipotentiary of Russia; on the part of China, four copies in the
Mantchoo language, signed by the Chinese plenipotentiary and his
adjunct. The respective plenipotentiaries will each keep a copy in the
Russian language, and a copy in the Mantchoo, for the purpose of putting
the treaty into execution, and to serve for constant reference. A
Russian copy and a Mantchoo copy shall be sent to the directing Senate
of Russia; and a copy in each language to the Chinese Tribunal for
Foreign Affairs, to be there sealed and preserved after the ratification
of the Treaty.
All the above articles of the present Treaty concluded by the respective
plenipotentiaries of Russia and China are hereby signed and sealed. The
twenty-fifth day of July, in the year 1851, in the 26th year of the
reign of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of All the
Russias.
(Signed) Colonel in the corps of Engineers.
KOVALEVSKI.
I Chan,
Bovyantai.
TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND CASHMERE.
TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA RUNBEER
SINGH, G.C.S.I., MAHARAJA OF JUMMOO AND CASHMERE, HIS HEIRS AND
SUCCESSORS, EXECUTED ON THE ONE PART BY THOMAS DOUGLAS FORSYTH, C.B., IN
VIRTUE OF THE FULL POWERS VESTED IN HIM BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE RICHARD SOUTHWELL BOURKE, EARL OF MAYO, VISCOUNT MAYO OF
MONYCROWER, BARON NAAS OF NAAS, K.P., G.M.S.I., P.C., &c., &c., &c.,
VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, AND ON THE OTHER PART BY HIS
HIGHNESS MAHARAJA RUNBEER SINGH AFORESAID, IN PERSON.
Whereas in the interest of the high contracting parties and their
respective subjects it is deemed desirable to afford greater facilities
than at present exist for the development and security of trade with
Eastern Turkestan, the following Articles have with this object been
agreed upon:--
ARTICLE I.
With the consent of the Maharaja, officers of the British Government
will be appointed to survey the trade routes through the Maharaja's
territories from the British frontier of Lahoul to the territories of
the Ruler of Yarkand, including the route _viâ_ the Chang Chemoo Valley.
The Maharaja will depute an officer of his Government to accompany the
surveyors, and will render them all the assistance in his power. A map
of the routes surveyed will be made, an attested copy of which will be
given to the Maharaja.
ARTICLE II.
Whichever route towards the Chang Chemoo Valley shall, after examination
and survey as above, be declared by the British Government to be the
best suited for the development of trade with Eastern Turkestan shall be
declared by the Maharaja to be a free highway in perpetuity, and at all
times for all travellers and traders.
ARTICLE III.
For the supervision and maintenance of the road in its entire length
through the Maharaja's territories, the regulation of traffic on the
free highway described in Article II., the enforcement of regulations
that may be hereafter agreed upon, and the settlement of disputes
between carriers, traders, travellers, or others using that road, in
which either of the parties or both of them are subjects of the British
Government or of any foreign State, two Commissioners shall be annually
appointed, one by the British Government, and the other by the Maharaja.
In the discharge of their duties, and as regards the period of their
residence, the Commissioners shall be guided by such rules as are now
separately framed, and may, from time to time, hereafter be laid down by
the joint authority of the British Government and the Maharaja.
ARTICLE IV.
The jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be defined by a line on each
side of the road, at a maximum width of two statute _koss_, except where
it may be deemed by the Commissioners necessary to include a wider
extent for grazing grounds. Within this maximum width the surveyors
appointed under Article I. shall demarcate and map the limits of
jurisdiction which may be decided on by the Commissioners as most
suitable, including grazing grounds; and the jurisdiction of the
Commissioners shall not extend beyond the limits so demarcated. The land
included within these limits shall remain in the Maharaja's independent
possession, and, subject to the stipulations contained in this Treaty,
the Maharaja shall continue to possess the same rights of full
sovereignty therein as in any other part of his territories, which
rights shall not be interfered with in any way by the Joint
Commissioners.
ARTICLE V.
The Maharaja agrees to give all possible assistance in enforcing the
decisions of the Commissioners, and in preventing the breach or evasion
of the regulations established under Article III.
ARTICLE VI.
The Maharaja agrees that any person, whether a subject of the British
Government, or of the Maharaja, or of the Ruler of Yarkand, or of any
foreign State, may settle at any place within the jurisdiction of the
Commissioners, and may provide, keep, maintain, and let for hire at
different stages the means of carriage and transport for the purposes of
trade.
ARTICLE VII.
The two Commissioners shall be empowered to establish supply depôts, and
to authorize other persons to establish supply depôts, at such places on
the road as may appear to them suitable; to fix the rates at which
provisions shall be sold to traders, carriers, settlers, and others, and
to fix the rent to be charged for the use of any rest-houses or serais
that may be established on the road. The officers of the British
Government in Kullu, &c., and the officers of the Maharaja in Ladakh
shall be instructed to use their best endeavours to supply provisions on
the indent of the Commissioners at market rates.
ARTICLE VIII.
The Maharaja agrees to levy no transit duty whatever on the aforesaid
free highway, and the Maharaja further agrees to abolish all transit
duties levied within his territories on goods transmitted in bond
through His Highness's territories from Eastern Turkestan to India and
_vice versá_, on which bulk may not be broken within the territories of
His Highness. On goods imported into or exported from His Highness's
territory, whether by the aforesaid free highway or any other route, the
Maharaja may levy such import or export duties as he may think fit.
ARTICLE IX.
The British Government agree to levy no duty on goods transmitted in
bond through British India to Eastern Turkestan or to the territories of
His Highness the Maharaja. The British Government further agree to
abolish the export duties now levied on shawls and other textile fabrics
manufactured in the territories of the Maharaja, and exported to
countries beyond the limits of British India.
ARTICLE X.
This Treaty, consisting of ten Articles, has this day been concluded by
Thomas Douglas Forsyth, C.B., in virtue of the full powers vested in him
by His Excellency the Right Honourable Richard Southwell Bourke, Earl of
Mayo, Viscount Mayo, of Monycrower, Baron Naas of Naas, K.P., G.M.S.I.,
P.C., &c., &c., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, on the part of
the British Government, and by the Maharaja Runbeer Singh aforesaid; and
it is agreed that a copy of this Treaty, duly ratified by His Excellency
the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, shall be delivered to the
Maharaja on or before the 7th of September, 1870. Signed, sealed, and
exchanged at Sealkote on the second day of April, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy, corresponding with the 22nd
day of Bysack Sumbut, 1927.
Signature of the Maharaja of Cashmere.
(Signed) T. D. FORSYTH,
MAYO.
This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India at Sealkote on the 2nd day of May, 1870.
(Signed) C. U. AITCHISON,
Officiating Secretary to the Government
of India, Foreign Department.
TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KASHGAR.
THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS OF FREE TRADE WERE PROPOSED AND AGREED UPON
BETWEEN GENERAL AIDE-DE-CAMP VON KAUFMANN AND YAKOOB BEG, CHIEF OF
DJETY-SHAHR.
ARTICLE I.
All Russian subjects, of whatsoever religion, shall have the right to
proceed for purposes of trade to Djety-Shahr, and to all the localities
and towns subjected to the Chief of Djety-Shahr, which they may desire
to visit in the same way as the inhabitants of Djety-Shahr have hitherto
been, and shall be in the future, entitled to prosecute trade throughout
the entire extent of the Russian Empire. The honourable chief of
Djety-Shahr undertakes to keep a vigilant guard over the complete safety
of Russian subjects, within the limits of his territorial possessions,
and also over that of their caravans, and in general over everything
that may belong to them.
ARTICLE II.
Russian merchants shall be entitled to have caravanserais, in which they
alone shall be able to store their merchandise, in all the towns of
Djety-Shahr in which they may desire to have them. The merchants of
Djety-Shahr shall enjoy the same privilege in the Russian villages.
ARTICLE III.
Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to have
commercial agents (caravanbashis) in all the towns of Djety-Shahr, whose
business it is to watch over the regular courts of trade, and over the
legal imposition of customs dues. The merchants of Djety-Shahr shall
enjoy the same privilege in the towns of Turkestan.
ARTICLE IV.
All merchandise transported from Russia to Djety-Shahr, or from that
province into Russia, shall be liable to a tax of 2-1/2 per cent. _ad
valorem_. In every case this tax shall not exceed the rate of the tax
taken from Mussulmans being subject to Djety-Shahr.
ARTICLE V.
Russian merchants and their caravans shall be at liberty, with all
freedom and security, to traverse the territories of Djety-Shahr in
proceeding to countries conterminous with that province. Caravans from
Djety-Shahr shall enjoy the same advantages for passing through
territories belonging to Russia.
* * * * *
These conditions were sent from Tashkent on the 9th of April, 1872.
General Von Kaufmann I., Governor-General of Turkestan, signed the
treaty and attached his seal to it.
In proof of his assent to these conditions, Mahomed Yakoob, Chief of
Djety-Shahr, attached his seal to them at Yangy-Shahr, on the 8th of
June, 1872.
* * * * *
This treaty was negotiated by Baron Kaulbars.
TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND KASHGAR.
TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND HIS HIGHNESS THE AMEER MAHOMED
YAKOOB KHAN, RULER OF THE TERRITORY OF KASHGAR AND YARKAND, HIS HEIRS
AND SUCCESSORS, EXECUTED ON THE ONE PART BY THOMAS DOUGLAS FORSYTH,
C.B., IN VIRTUE OF FULL POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM IN THAT BEHALF BY HIS
EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON. THOMAS GEORGE BARING, BARON NORTHBROOK OF
STRATTON, AND A BARONET, MEMBER OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF HER MOST
GRACIOUS MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, GRAND MASTER OF
THE MOST EXALTED ORDER OF THE STAR OF INDIA, VICEROY AND
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, IN COUNCIL, AND ON THE OTHER PART BY SYUD
MAHOMED KHAN TOORAH, MEMBER OF THE 1ST CLASS OF THE ORDER OF MEDJIDIE,
&C., IN VIRTUE OF FULL POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM BY HIS HIGHNESS.
Whereas it is deemed desirable to confirm and strengthen the good
understanding which now subsists between the high contracting parties,
and to promote commercial intercourse between their respective subjects,
the following Articles have been agreed upon:--
ARTICLE I.
The high contracting parties engage that the subjects of each shall be
at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass with their
merchandise and property into and through all parts of the dominions of
the other; and shall enjoy in such dominions all the privileges and
advantages with respect to commerce, protection or otherwise, which are,
or may be, accorded to the subjects of such dominions, or to the
subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.
ARTICLE II.
Merchants of whatever nationality shall be at liberty to pass from the
territories of the one contracting party to the territories of the
other, with their merchandise and property at all times, and by any
route they please; no restriction shall be placed by either contracting
party upon such freedom of transit, unless for urgent political reasons
to be previously communicated to the other; and such restriction shall
be withdrawn as soon as the necessity for it is over.
ARTICLE III.
European British subjects entering the dominions of His Highness the
Ameer, for purposes of trade, or otherwise, must be provided with
passports certifying to their nationality. Unless provided with such
passports they shall not be deemed entitled to the benefit of this
treaty.
ARTICLE IV.
On goods imported into British India from territories of His Highness
the Ameer, by any route over the Himalayan passes, which lie to the
south of His Highness's dominions, the British Government engages to
levy no import duties. On goods imported from India into the territories
of His Highness the Ameer, no import duty exceeding 2-1/2 per cent., _ad
valorem_, shall be levied. Goods imported, as above, into the dominions
of the contracting parties may, subject only to such excise regulations
and duties, and to such municipal or town regulations and duties, as may
be applicable to such classes of goods generally, be freely sold by
wholesale or retail, and transported from one place to another within
British India, and within the dominions of His Highness the Ameer
respectively.
ARTICLE V.
Merchandise imported from India into the territories of His Highness the
Ameer will not be opened for examination, till arrival at the place of
consignment. If any disputes should arise as to the value of such goods,
the customs officer, or other officer acting on the part of His Highness
the Ameer, shall be entitled to demand part of the goods, at the rate of
one in forty, in lieu of the payment of duty. If the aforesaid officer
should object to levy the duty by taking a portion of the goods, or if
the goods should not admit of being so divided, then the point in
dispute shall be referred to two competent persons, one chosen by the
aforesaid officer, and the other by the importer, and a valuation of the
goods shall be made, and if the referees shall differ in opinion, they
shall appoint an arbitrator whose decision shall be final, and the duty
shall be levied according to the value thus established.
ARTICLE VI.
The British Government shall be at liberty to appoint a Representative
at the Court of His Highness the Ameer, and to appoint a Commercial
Agent, subordinate to him in any town or place considered suitable
within His Highness's territories. His Highness the Ameer shall be at
liberty to appoint a Representative with the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India, and to station Commercial Agents at any
places in British India considered suitable. Such Representatives shall
be entitled to the rank and privileges accorded to ambassadors by the
law of nations, and the Agents shall be entitled to the privileges of
Consuls of the most favoured nation.
ARTICLE VII.
British subjects shall be at liberty to purchase, sell, or hire land, or
houses, or depôts for merchandise, in the dominions of His Highness the
Ameer, and the houses, depôts, or other premises of British subjects,
shall not be forcibly entered or searched without the consent of the
occupier, unless with the cognizance of the British Representative or
Agent, and in presence of a person deputed by him.
ARTICLE VIII.
The following arrangements are agreed to for the decision of Civil Suits
and Criminal Cases within the territories of His Highness the Ameer, in
which British subjects are concerned:--
(_a._) Civil suits in which both plaintiff and defendant are
British subjects, and Criminal Cases in which both
prosecutor and accused are British subjects, or in which the
accused is a European British subject, mentioned in the
Third Article of this Treaty, shall be tried by the British
Representative or one of his Agents, in the presence of an
Agent appointed by His Highness the Ameer;
(_b._) Civil suits in which one party is a subject of His Highness
the Ameer, and the other party a British subject, shall be
tried by the Courts of His Highness, in the presence of the
British Representative or one of his Agents, or of a person
appointed in that behalf by such Representative or Agent;
(_c._) Criminal cases in which either prosecutor or accused is a
subject of His Highness the Ameer shall, except as above
otherwise provided, be tried by the Courts of His Highness
in presence of the British Representative, or of one of his
Agents, or of a person deputed by the British
Representative, or by one of his Agents;
(_d._) Except as above otherwise provided, Civil and Criminal Cases
in which one party is a British subject, and the other the
subject of a foreign power, shall, if either of the parties
be a Mahomedan, be tried in the Courts of His Highness; if
neither party is a Mahomedan, the case may, with consent of
the parties, be tried by the British Representative or one
of his Agents; in the absence of such consent, by the Courts
of His Highness;
(_e._) In any case disposed of by the Courts of His Highness the
Ameer to which a British subject is party, it shall be
competent to the British Representative, if he considers
that justice has not been done, to represent the matter to
His Highness the Ameer, who may cause the case to be
re-tried in some other Court, in the presence of the British
Representative, or of one of his Agents, or of a person
appointed in that behalf by such Representative or Agent.
ARTICLE IX.
The rights and privileges enjoyed within the dominions of His Highness
the Ameer by British subjects under the Treaty, shall extend to the
subjects of all Princes and States in India in alliance with Her Majesty
the Queen; and if, with respect to any such Prince or State, any other
provisions relating to this Treaty or to other matters should be
considered desirable, they shall be negotiated through the British
Government.
ARTICLE X.
Every affidavit and other legal document filed or deposited in any Court
established in the respective dominions of the high contracting parties,
or in the Court of the Joint Commissioners in Ladakh, may be proved by
an authenticated copy, purporting either to be sealed with the seal of
the Court to which the original document belongs, or, in the event of
such Court having no seal, to be signed by the Judge, or by one of the
Judges of the said Court.
ARTICLE XI.
When a British subject dies in the territory of His Highness the Ameer
his movable and immovable property situate therein shall be vested in
his heir, executor, administrator, or other representative on interest
or (in the absence of such representative) in the Representative of the
British Government in the aforesaid territory. The person in whom such
charge shall be so vested shall satisfy the claims outstanding against
the deceased, and shall hold the surplus (if any) for distribution among
those interested. The above provisions, _mutatis mutandis_, shall apply
to the subjects of His Highness the Ameer, who may die in British India.
ARTICLE XII.
If a British subject residing in the territories of His Highness the
Ameer becomes unable to pay his debts or fails to pay any debt within a
reasonable time after being ordered to do so by any Court of Justice,
the creditors of such insolvent shall be paid out of his goods and
effects; but the British Representative shall not refuse his good
offices, if needs be, to ascertain if the insolvent has not left in
India disposable property which might serve to satisfy the said
creditors. The friendly stipulations in the present Article shall be
reciprocally observed with regard to His Highness's subjects who trade
in India under the protection of the laws.
This treaty having this day been executed in duplicate and confirmed by
His Highness the Ameer, one copy shall, for the present, be left in the
possession of His Highness, and the other, after confirmation by the
Viceroy and Governor-General of India, shall be delivered to His
Highness within twelve months in exchange for the copy now retained by
His Highness.
Signed and sealed at Kashgar on the second day of February, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four, corresponding
with the fifteenth day of Zilhijj, one thousand two hundred and ninety
Hijree.
(Signed) T. DOUGLAS FORSYTH,
Envoy and Plenipotentiary.
Whereas a Treaty for strengthening the good understanding that now
exists between the British Government and the Ruler of the territory of
Kashgar and Yarkand, and for promoting commercial intercourse between
the two countries, was agreed to and concluded at Kashgar, on the second
day of February, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and
seventy-four, corresponding with the fifteenth day of Zilhijj, twelve
hundred and ninety Hijree, by the respective Plenipotentiaries of the
Government of India and of His Highness the Ameer of Kashgar and
Yarkand, duly accredited and empowered for that purpose: I, the Right
Hon. Thomas George Baring, Baron Northbrook of Stratton, &c., &c.,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India, do hereby ratify and confirm the
Treaty aforesaid.
Given under my hand and seal at Government House, in Calcutta, this
thirteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-four.
(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
+-------+
| |
| Seal. |
| |
+-------+
RULES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE JOINT COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THE NEW
ROUTE TO EASTERN TURKESTAN.
1. As it is impossible, owing to the character of the climate, to retain
the Commissioners throughout the year, the period during which they
shall exercise their authority shall be taken to commence on 15th May,
and to end on 1st December.
2. During the absence of either Commissioner, cases may be heard and
decided by the other Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Joint
Commissioners.
3. In the months when the Joint Commissioners are absent, _i.e._ between
1st December and 15th May, all cases which may arise shall be decided by
the Wuzeer of Ladakh, subject to appeal to the Joint Commissioners.
4. The Joint Commissioners shall not interfere in cases other than those
which affect the development, freedom, and safety of the trade, and the
objects for which the Treaty is concluded, and in which one of the
parties, or both, are either British subjects, or subjects of a foreign
state.
5. In civil disputes the Commissioners shall have power to dispose of
all cases, whatever be the value of the property in litigation.
6. When the Commissioners agree, their decision shall be final in all
cases. When they are unable to agree, the parties shall have the right
of nominating a single arbitrator, and shall bind themselves in writing
to abide by his award. Should the parties not be able to agree upon a
single arbitrator, each party shall name one, and the two Commissioners
shall name a third, and the decision of the majority of the arbitrators
shall be final.
7. In criminal cases the powers of the Commissioners shall be limited to
offences such as in British territory would be tried by a subordinate
Magistrate of the First Class, and as far as possible the procedure of
the Criminal Procedure Code shall be followed. Cases of a more heinous
kind should be made over to the Maharaja for trial, if the accused be
not a European British subject; in the latter case he should be
forwarded to the nearest British Court of competent jurisdiction for
trial.
8. All fines levied in criminal cases, and all stamp receipts levied
according to the rates in force for civil suits in the Maharaja's
dominions, shall be credited to the Cashmere Treasury. Persons sentenced
to imprisonment shall, if British subjects, be sent to the nearest
British jail. If not British subjects, offenders shall be made over for
imprisonment in the Maharaja's jails.
9. The practice of cow-killing is strictly prohibited throughout the
jurisdiction of the Maharaja.
10. If any places come within the line of road from which the towns of
Leh, &c., are supplied with fuel or wood for building purpose, the Joint
Commissioners shall so arrange with the Wuzeer of Ladakh that those
supplies are not interfered with.
11. Whatever transactions take place within the limits of the road shall
be considered to refer to goods in bond. If a trader opens his load, and
disposes of a portion, he shall not be subject to any duty so long as
the goods are not taken for consumption into the Maharaja's territory
across the line of road. And goods left for any length of time in the
line of road subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be
free.
12. Where a village lies within the jurisdiction of the Joint
Commissioners, then, as regards the collection of revenue, or in any
case where there is necessity for the interference of the usual Revenue
authorities on matters having no connection with the trade, the Joint
Commissioners have no power whatever to interfere; but, to prevent
misunderstanding, it is advisable that the Revenue officials should
first communicate with the Joint Commissioners before proceeding to take
action against any person within their jurisdiction. The Joint
Commissioners can then exercise their discretion to deliver up the
person sought, or to make a summary inquiry to ascertain whether their
interference is necessary or not.
13. The Maharaja agrees to give rupees 5,000 this year for the
construction of the road and bridges, and in future years His Highness
agrees to give rupees 2,000 per annum for the maintenance of the road
and bridges. Similarly for the repairs of serais a sum of rupees 100 per
annum for each serai will be given. Should further expenditure be
necessary, the Joint Commissioners will submit a special report to the
Maharaja, and ask for a special grant. This money will be expended by
the Joint Commissioners, who will employ free labour at market rates for
this purpose. The officers in Ladakh and in British territory shall be
instructed to use their best endeavours to supply labourers on the
indent of the Commissioners at market rates. No tolls shall be levied on
the bridges on this line of road.
14. As a temporary arrangement, and until the line of road has been
demarcated, or till the end of this year, the Joint Commissioners shall
exercise the powers described in these rules over the several roads
taken by the traders through Ladakh from Lahoul and Spiti.
(Signed) MAHARAJA RUNBEER SINGH.
" T. D. FORSYTH.
(These rules were agreed upon in 1872, between the Indian Government and
Cashmere, for the purpose of promoting trade with Eastern Turkestan and
Central Asia, which had been sanctioned by the Treaty of Commerce of
1870.)
A STORY FROM KASHGAR.
Mirza Mulla Rahmat, of Kashgar, who arrived at Peshawur lately, on his
way to Mecca, has told what he knows about events in Kashgar. The
following is his story:--In the month of Jamadi-us-sani 1294 (June-July,
1877), that Mahomed Yakoob Khan, the Badshah of Kashgar, collected a
large army to fight the Chinese. He died near the town of Balisan (?
Bai), and his army then recognized Hakim Khan Torah as his successor.
The mullahs in Kashgar in the meantime appointed Beg Kuli Beg, Yakoob's
eldest son, as their Badshah, according to Yakoob's will. Hakim Khan and
the army which joined him then came to Aksu, where Beg Kuli Beg also
arrived, meaning to capture the place and the person of the usurper. A
battle was fought between Kuli Beg and Hakim Khan on the 26th and 27th
of Rajah (27th and 28th July, 1877), and Hakim Khan was defeated. Many
of the soldiers belonging to Hakim Khan's force fell in the battle, and
many others were starved, and some were drowned crossing a river. Hakim
Khan then went into Russian territory with 1,000 chosen soldiers. Beg
Kuli Beg now seized several towns and returned to Kashgar. In the
meantime Naiz Hakim Beg, the Governor of Khoten, rebelled, and Kuli Beg
met him in the field, and captured Khoten. The Beg was scarcely a week
at that place when he heard that the Chinese had arrived at Aksu and had
taken it. An officer (Kho Dalay?) of the Chinese army who had turned
Mahomedan (but subsequently recanted) attacked Yangy Shahr, the
capital, and, capturing it, shut himself up there. The town was then
besieged by the Governor of Kashgar, and the siege continued for fifty
days. Then Kuli Beg came up, and, forcing his entry into the town, took
possession of it, and destroyed the fort. But on the 10th of Zillhij
(16th of December) a strong Chinese force entered the country, and
rapidly reconquered the possessions of the late Yakoob Khan. Beg Kuli
Beg then fled with his men to Tashkent, which he reached by Mingyol Osh
and Marghilan, and put himself under the protection of the Russian
Governor there. Mulla Yunus Jan, the Governor of Yarkand, and his son
and brother fell into the hands of Hasan Jan Bai, Ikskal (? Aksakal).
The above is taken from the columns of an Indian journal, and is
inserted here for the purpose of showing that the converted Chinese, or
Yangy Mussulmans, did revolt from their allegiance to Yakoob Beg the
instant a Khitay force appeared in Altyshahr.
INDEX OF SUBJECTS.
Aali, _see_ Hakim Khan.
Ababakar, 34-36.
Abderrahman Aftobatcha, 18, 209-210, 211.
Abderrahman Khoja (King of Yarkand), 102.
Abdul Aziz, 170, 196.
Abdul Melik, 248.
Abdullah (Yusuf's son), 46, 47.
Abdullah Pansad, 102, 104, 107, 114-116, 117, 137, 158, 171.
Abdullah Zizad, 23.
Ablai (Kirghiz chief), 50.
Acbash, 44.
Ægis of British protection, 204.
Afak, 44.
Afghan Ameer sends embassy to Pekin, 51.
Afghanistan, 8, 49.
Afghan settlers, 16, _passim_.
Afridun Wang, 98-99.
Agha Bula, 265.
Ahmad, 35, 46.
Ak Musjid, siege of, 79-81.
Ak Robat, 228.
Aksai Plateau, 3.
Aksakal, 57-58, 64, 69, _passim_.
Aksakals (risings under), 66, _passim_.
Aksu, 2, 3, 37, 46, 66, 272, 273.
coal at, 163.
description of, 7.
siege of, 127, 273.
Aktaghluc, 37, 44-46, 47, 49.
description of, 52-53.
Alaja "the slayer," 35; _see_ Ahmad.
Alim, 146.
Alim Kuli, 83-85, 86, 87, _passim_.
Alish Beg, 172, 231.
Almatie, _see_ Vernoe.
Alty Shahr, 8, 16, 44, _passim_.
Amban, 54, 63, _passim_.
of Yarkand, or Khan Amban, 54.
Ameer, or Emir, 196, 220, _passim_.
Ameers of Central Asia, 39.
Amoor, 25, 42.
Amursana, 45-48, 49, 252.
Andijani, 4, 12, 158, 160.
Andijani Serai, 153.
Appak Khoja, 252.
Arabdan Khan, 45.
Arabs, 23.
Arpa Tai, battle of, 270.
Artosh, 12, 22, 181.
Aryan family, 14, 17.
Athalik Ghazi, 1, 118, 186, _passim_.
Azmill Khoja, 31.
Babur, 36.
Badakshan, 8, 33, 36, 48, 49, 106, 107, 118.
Badakshi settlers, 16.
Badaulet, 200, 248.
Bahanuddin (son of Sarimsak), 64.
Bai, 272.
Barhanuddin, 46, 47, 48, 49.
Baroghil, 8, 29.
Bartchuk, 3; _see_ also Maralbashi.
Bayen Hu, 253, 266, 267, 271.
Bazandai, 125.
Bedal Pass, 273.
Beg, 220-221.
Beg Bacha, _see_ Kuli Beg.
Bellew, Dr., 22, 171, 222.
Benefits conferred by China on Kashgar, 58, _passim_.
Berdan rifles, 246.
Bhots, 9.
Biddulph, Capt., 222.
Birlas, 32.
Birma, 42.
Black Sea, 14.
Bokhara, 18, 23, 25, 30, 69, 83, 178, 209, _passim_.
Russian treaty with, 179.
sack of, 30.
Bolor, 37, 65.
Bostang Lake, 266.
Buddhism, 25, _passim_.
Buddhists, 16, 31, _passim_.
Bugur, fight at, 269.
Burac, 30.
Buzurg Khan, 2, 71, 87, 91, 103, 107, 108, 110.
intrigues against Yakoob Beg, 111, 117.
deposed by Yakoob Beg, 117.
Cabul, 28, 211.
Calmucks, 19, 44, _passim_.
Calmuck settlements, 19, 44.
Canals, 59.
Candahar, 28.
Caravanbashi, 204.
Carts used in Kashgar, 227-228.
Cashmere, 1, 37, 60.
Caspian, 14.
Cay Yoli, 67.
Chaghtai Khan, 29.
Cha-hi-telkh, 267.
Champion Father, 118.
Chang Lung, 67.
Chang Tay, 112.
Chang Yao, 237, 246, 247, 263, 272.
Chapman, Capt., 222.
Charjui, 179.
Chightam, 10, 134, _passim_.
China, 41-43, _passim_.
Chinaz, 85.
Chinese and Khokand, 49.
Chinese army, character of, 275.
Chinese at Lhasa, 234.
Chinese Empire in Central Asia, 22, 39, 43.
Chinese, first reverse of, 65.
Chinese in Kashgar, 49, 54-75.
Chinese merchants, 5.
Chinese moderation, 249, 270.
Chinese north of Tian Shan, 236.
Chinese overthrow Tungani, 236-237, 238.
Chinese pay Khokand annual sum, 64.
Chinese principle in ruling Kashgar, 156.
Chinese reconquer Kashgar, 258-276.
Chinese revindicating army, strength of, 246.
Chinese rule, benefits and disadvantages of, 74-75.
Chinese, strategical advantages of, 66.
Chinese Turkestan, _see_ Eastern Turkestan.
Chitral, 29.
Christians, 25.
Chuguchak, 10, _passim_.
Chuntche, 42.
Coal mines, 60.
Cochin China, 42.
Comparison between rule of Chinese and Yakoob Beg, 168-169, 255-257.
Constantinople, 196, _passim_.
Corbashi, 149.
Corps of artillerymen, 142.
Crusade, propagandist, against Khitay, 47.
Czar, the, 185.
Dadkwah, _passim_, functions of, 144-145.
Danyal, 44, 45.
Darius, 36.
Darwas, 72.
Dastarkhwan, 225.
Dava Khan, 30.
Davatsi, 45-46.
Delhi, 28.
Destruction caused by Genghis Khan, 28.
Devanchi, 244, 247.
Devan defile, 244, _passim_.
Difference between Eastern and Western Turkestan, 15.
Dihbid, 76.
Disunion in Central Asia, 120-121, 210-211.
in China, 92.
in Kashgar, 259-263.
Djinghite, _see_ Jigit.
Dolans, 9, 143.
Dungani, _see_ Tungani.
Dungans, _see_ Tungani.
Durani, 51.
Dylon Yulduc, 26.
Eastern Turkestan, 1, 15, 17, 38-42, 59, _passim_.
Edinburgh, Duke of, 205.
Effects of Khoja risings on China's prestige, 70.
Effects of past misrule in Kashgar, 39.
Elchi Khana, 228.
Eleuthian, or Eleuth princes, 42, 46.
Emir, or Ameer, 198, 220, _passim_.
England's policy towards China, 257; _see_ chapter 14 also.
towards Kashgar, 212-235.
trade with Kashgar, 153, 202.
trans-Himalayan policy, 204; _see_ chapter 14 also.
English mission guests of Yakoob Beg, 232.
Eshan Khan, 71.
Ferghana, 25, 32, 181, 187, 210.
First outbreak against China in Eastern Turkestan, 64.
Forsyth, Sir T. D., 6, 22, 194, 196, 204, 216, 218-219, 233, 234.
Forsyth's report, 221, 233.
interview with Yakoob Beg, 228-230.
second mission to Kashgar, 221-232.
Galdan, 44, 45.
"Garden of Asia," 2, 59.
Genghis Khan, 25-20, 220, _passim_.
code of, 20.
Ghizni, 28.
Gibbon, 220.
Glacier, _see_ Muzart Pass.
Gobi, 1, 2, 19, 156, 246, _passim_.
Goes Benedict, 37.
Goitre, 12, _passim_.
Gordon, Col., 92, 222.
Gorkhan, 25.
Granville-Gortschakoff negotiations, 207.
Great road from Kashgar to Hamil and Kansuh, 12.
Great Yuldus, 273.
Gregorieff, Professor, 138.
Grim Pass, 223-224.
Guchen, 10, 246.
Gulbagh, 55, 66.
Guoharbrum, 11.
Hacc Kuli Beg (Khokandian general), 69.
Hacc Kuli Beg (Yakoob Beg's son), 79, 133, 244, 252-253, 260.
Hadayatulla, 37, 38.
Hadji Torah, 140, 141, 169-171, 196, 220, 221, 223, 232, 233, 248.
Haft Khojagan, 71.
Hai Yen, 239.
Hakim Beg, 55.
Hakim Khan, 250-253, 259-261.
Hamil, 10, 59, 130, 246, 247.
Han Hing Nung, 240.
Hastings, Warren, 213.
Hayward, Mr., 216.
Hazrat Afak, 37, 38, 74.
Heh Tsun, 240.
Henderson, Dr., 218, 219.
Her Majesty, autograph letter of, 230.
"High Tartary," 212.
Himalaya, 213.
Himalayan passes, 213.
Hindoo Koosh, 14, 17, 28.
Hodjent, 37, 44, 84, 208, 209, _passim_.
Hordes, Kirghiz, 50.
Hoser, 272.
Houchow, 95.
Houtan, 7.
Husen, 32.
Hwang Tsang, 4.
Hydar Kuli, Hudaychi, 84.
Hydar, 35.
Ihrar Khan Torah, 172, 218, 219, 228.
Ilchi, 7.
Ili, 1, 2, 7, 22, 25, 44, 45, 48, 176; _see_ chapter 14, _passim_.
Ili, Viceroy of, 56, _passim_.
Irjar, 85.
Isa Dadkwah, 65-66.
Ishac Wang, 68.
Islamism, 20.
Ismail Shah, 72.
Issik Kul, 17, 33, 174.
Jade, 60, 163-164, _passim_.
Jallab, 6.
Jattah Ulus, or Jattahs, 29, 33, 35.
Jehangir (Ababakar's son), 36.
Jehangir (Sarimsak's son), 64, 65-68.
Jehangir (Timour's son), 34.
Jigit, 143, _passim_.
Jungaria, 1, 2, 15, 17, 25, 33, 34, 47, 134, 175, 236, _passim_.
Kabil Shah, 32.
Kafiristan, 37.
Kafirs, 37.
Kaidu River, 30, 266.
Khalkhalu, 24.
Kamaruddin, 33.
Kamensky, Mr., 248, 264, 265.
Kamschatka, 41.
Kanaát Shah, 82-83.
Kanghi, 42.
Kansuh, 20, 24, 43, 92, _passim_.
Kara Khitay, 24, 25.
Kara Kirghiz, 17.
Karakoram, 2, 37, 48, 213.
Karakoram (city), 29.
Karanghotagh, 36.
Karashar, 2, 9, 20, 130, 247, 266.
Karataghluc, 37, 44, 46, 49.
description of, 52-53.
Karatakka mountains, 68.
Karategin, 68, 77.
Karghalik, 225.
Karshi, 179.
Kashgar River, _see_ Kizil Su.
Kashgari resigned to Chinese conquest, 52.
Kashgar, 12, 25, 35, 45, 178, _passim_.
history of, 22-40.
Kashgaria, 1, 2, 13, _passim_.
Kashgarian valley, description of, 10.
Kashgarian scenery, 11.
Kashgari not fanatics, 140.
dress of, 140.
"Kashmir and Kashgar," 223.
Katti Torah, Khoja, 71.
Kaufmann, General, 185, 195, 197, 206, 207, 209, 250.
Kaulbars, Baron, 192-195, 197.
Kaulbars Treaty, 219.
Kazalinsk, 79.
Kazan Ameer, 31, 32.
Kazi, 145, 146.
Kazi Rais, 6, 146.
Keen-Lung, 43-45, 63, 93, 156, _passim_.
Kermina, 179.
Khalkas, 19.
Khan, 220-221.
Khan Amban, _see_ Amban of Yarkand.
Khan Khoja, 38, 48.
Khans of Central Asia, 39.
Khaton, 23.
Khitay, 5, 21, 46, 93, 143, 240, _passim_.
Khitay merchants, 58.
Khiva, 25, 27, 178, 181, 197, 206.
Khivan desert, 32.
Khize Khoja, 33.
Kho Dalay, 111.
Khoja Ahmad, 44.
Khoja family, 37, 48, 64.
Khoja invasion, 73.
Khoja Ishac, 52.
Khoja Kalan, 52.
Khoja Kalar, 37.
Khoja Kings, 31.
Khoja Kulan, 102.
Khoja Padshah, _see_ Abdullah.
Khojam Beg, 45.
Khokand, 3, 17, 36, 48, 49, 187, _passim_.
Khokand pays tribute to China, 50, 63-64.
Khokand, rising in, 209-210.
Khokandian intrigues, 57.
Khokandian tax-gatherers, 97.
Khoten, 17, 24, 25, 50, 118, 121-123, 224-225.
description of, 6.
rising at, 262.
Khoten gold mines, 163.
Khoten jade, 163, _passim_.
Khudadar, 34.
Khudayar Khan, 71, 81-86, 120, 187-189, 208-209, _passim_.
Khwaresm, _see_ Khiva.
Kiachta, 48.
Kichik Khan, 72.
Kin Shun, 136, 263, 266-272.
Kipchak, 14, 25, _passim_.
description of, 18.
Kirghiz, 14, 16, 17, 104, 143, 184, 209, _passim_.
description of, 17.
nomads submit to China, 50.
Kish, 32.
Kizil Su, 3.
Kizil Yart, 17, _passim_.
Kludof, 182-185.
Kohistan, 2.
Kok Robat, battle of, 72, 228.
Kolpakovsky, General, 182, 184, 281.
Kooda Kuli Beg, 79, 130.
Koosh Bege, 79, _passim_.
Korla, description of, 9, 245, 248, 267, 268, _passim_.
Koshluk, 25.
Kouralia, _see_ Korla.
Kouroungli, _see_ Korla.
Kucha, 2, 8, 127-130, 268, 269, 270, _passim_.
battle at, 270-271.
description of, 9.
Kucha coal mines, 163.
Kucha Khojas, 127, _passim_.
Kuen Lun, 7.
Kuhna Turfan, 7; _see_ Turfan.
Kuhwei, 265, 266.
Kuldja, 2, 94.
Kuldja question, 265.
Kuli Beg. 79, 133, 137, 141, 171, 250, 251, 252-253, 260-263, 274, 276.
Kumush, 265.
Kunar, 29.
Kurama, 76, 82, _passim_.
Kuropatkine, Capt., 204, 244-245.
Kurtka Fort, 65.
Kutaiba, 24.
Ladakh, 213.
Lahore, 31.
"Lahore to Yarkand," 219.
Lake Lob, 134, 245.
Lanchefoo, 45, 59, 246, _passim_.
Laws in Kashgar, 145-146.
Leaoutung, 41.
Lêh, 153.
Lhasa, 60.
Little Bokhara, 1, 213.
Liu Kin Tang, _see_ Kin Shun.
Lob Nor, _see_ Lake Lob.
Mah Dalay, 100.
Mahomedanism in Kashgar, 24.
Mahomedanism, _passim_.
Mahomed Ali Khan (ruler of Khokand), 37, 66, 68, _passim_.
Mahomed Arif, 77.
Mahomed Beg of Artosh, 172.
Mahomed Khan, 170.
Mahomed Khoja, 171; _see_ also Sheikh-ul-Islam.
Mahomed Kuli, 102.
Mahomed Latif, _see_ Pur Mahomed.
Mahomed Nazzar. 214, 215.
Mahomed Seyyid Wang, of Kashgar, 66.
Mahomed Yunus Jan, 140, 171-172, 215, 226, 227, 261.
Makhram, battle of, 210.
Manas, 133, 236, 263.
siege of, 239-240.
Manchuria, 19.
Manning, Thomas, 213, 294.
Mansur, 35.
Mantchoo, 41, 42.
Maralbashi, 8, 31, 66, 110, 121; _see also_ Bartchuk.
Marco Polo, 14, 30.
Maulana Khoja Kasani, 52.
Ma-yeo-pu, 270.
Mecca, 37.
Merv, 179.
Meshed, 179.
Michell, Messrs, opinion on Kashgar, 213.
Military settlers, 50.
Mines in Kashgar, 8.
Ming dynasty, 41.
Mingyol, battle at, 69.
Mir, 82.
Mirza, 204.
Mirza Jan Effendi, 170.
Mollah Khan, 82, 170.
Mongols, 25, 41.
Mongols, murder of, 27.
Moorcroft, Mr., 213.
Moral of Yakoob Beg's career, 257.
Morozof, Mr., 202.
Moscow gewgaws, 182.
"Moses in the land," 39.
Mourad Beg, 69.
Mozaffur Eddin, 83, 179, 186, _passim_.
Mufti, 146.
Mufti Habitulla, 122-123.
murder of, 123.
Mughol _see_ Mongol.
Mugholistan. 1, 29.
Muhtasib, 6.
Mussulman Kuli, 18, 81-82, _passim_.
Muzart Pass, 61, 78, 273.
Mysoka Bahadur, 26.
Nadir Shah, 51, _passim_.
Naiman tribe, 25.
Nankin, 92.
Nar Mahomed Khan, 77, 169.
Naryn, 8, 61, 177, 178, 180, 183, _passim_.
Nasruddin, 209-210.
Nestorian Christians, 30.
New Turfan, 7.
Nur Ali (Kirghiz), 50.
Ogdai Khan, 29, 34.
Oigur princes, 23.
Oigurs, 16.
Old saying in Kashgar, 39.
Olja Turkan Khaton, 32.
Opinion of Chinese rule, 152.
Orda, or palace, at Kashgar, 3, 142.
Orda, _passim_.
Oxus, 23, 211.
Pamere, _see_ Pamir.
Pamir, 1, 2, 8, 25, 36, 48.
Panjkora, 28.
Panthays, 92, 175, _passim_.
Pekin, 29, 47, _passim_.
_Pekin Gazette_, 238, 249, 253, 267, 272.
Perovsky, General, 79-81.
Perovsky Fort, 81.
Persia, 14, 23.
Piskent, 76, 77.
Population of Kashgaria, 2, 59, 157.
of city of Kashgar, 3.
of city of Kucha, 9.
of city of Yarkand, 5.
Powers interested in Kashgar, 196.
Presents to Yakoob Beg, 230-231.
Prester John, 25.
Prince of Kashgar, _see_ Ishac Wang.
Prjevalsky, Col., 20, 245, 250, 273.
Pupyshef, Mr., 199-200.
Pur Mahomed Mirza, 76.
Rashid, 37, 52.
Reinthal's, Capt., mission to Kashgar, 184-185, 202-204.
Rising against Russia, folly of, if not combined, 180.
Risings in Khokand, _see_ Khokand.
Road between Ili and Kashgar, 61.
"Road Board," 62.
Romanoffski, General, 85.
"Roof of the World," 222.
Royal Body Guard, 226.
Ruduk, 233.
Russia at Vernoe, 130.
Russia demands Consuls in Kashgar, 203, 205.
Russia in Central Asia, 47, 173.
Russia in Kuldja or Ili, 133, 174-177, 279-282.
Russia invades Kuldja, 206.
Russia promises to restore Ili, 175.
Russian attitude towards Chinese, 248.
Russian merchants, 164, 182, 193, 197, 199, 202.
Russian policy towards Kashgar, 177-209.
Russian trade with Kashgar, 153.
Sadic Beg, 86, 87, 102, 103, 104, 107, 116, 117, 261, 263, 275.
embassy to Tashkent, 87.
truce with, 107.
Sahib Khan, 81.
Said, 35, 36, 37, 52.
Salara, 95.
Samarcand, 25, 33, 52, 179.
Saniz, 34.
Sanju, 7, 36, 224, _passim_.
Sanju Devan, 11, 223.
Sarbaz, 143, _passim_.
Sarimsak Khoja, 48, 51, 64, 65.
Satuk Bughra Khan, 24.
Schlagintweit, Messrs., 16, 214 _passim_.
Schuyler, Eugene, 195.
Scobelef, Gen., 207.
Scobelef, Col., 207, 210.
Scourges of God, 28, 33.
Seistan, 32.
Seven Khoja princes, 71.
Seyyid Ali, 34.
Seyyid Yakoob Khan, _see_ Hadji Torah.
Shadi Mirza, 184-185.
Shahidoolah, 223.
Shahrisebz, 32.
Sham, 226.
Shariàt, 90, 145.
Shaw, Robt., 16, 194, 212, 213, 215, 218, 221, 232, 234.
Sheikh-ul-Islam, 116-117, 151, 158.
Sheikh Nizamuddin, 77.
Shensi, 20, 92, 237.
Shere Ali (Cabul), 8, 118, 179.
Shere Ali Khan (Khokand), 83.
Siberia, 1, 47.
Sirikul, 8, 106, 118, 132.
Six Cities, _see_ Altyshahr.
Sobo tribes, 94.
Somof, Mr., 109-200.
St. George and St. Anne Cross Fever, 206.
St. Petersburg, 185, 196.
Stoliczka, Dr., 222.
Story of St Constantine's day, 194.
Subashi, 265.
"Sublimely Pure," 42.
Sule, 1.
Sultan Mourad, 83.
Sultan Seyyid, 83, 86.
Suranchi Beg, 65, 104.
Syr Darya, 18, 79, 192.
Swat, 28.
Szchuen, 58, 237.
Taepings, 92.
Tagharchi, 106.
Tajik, 14, 78.
Talifoo, 92, 175, 237.
Tamerlane, _see_ Timour.
Tanab, 162.
Tanabi, 162.
Tang dynasty, 22.
Tang Jen Ho, 265.
Tangut, 27.
Tarantchis. 12, 68, 124-125.
Tarfur, _see_ Turfan.
Tartar, 15 _passim_.
Tarzagchi, 149.
Tash Balik, 65.
Tashkent, 25, 32, 49, 84, 208.
battle of, 85, 209, _passim_.
etiquette at, 206.
_Tashkent Gazette_, _see_ Turkestan.
Tashkurgan, 8.
Tatsing, 42.
Tawats, _see_ Davatsi.
Taxes in Kashgar, 56, 62, 63, 151-160.
Tay Dalay, 55.
Tchernaief, 84-85.
Tchimkent, 84.
Tekes, river and pass, 133, 273.
Tenure of land in Kashgar, 161.
Terek Pass, 61, 103.
Tian Shan, 2, 20, 33, 59, 247, _passim_.
Tian Shan Nan Lu, 61.
Tian Shan Pe Lu, 61.
Tibet, 7, 37, 42, 50, 56, 60, 213, 217.
Cashmerian, 2.
Tibetan table-land, 36.
Timour, 32-34, 91.
Timour Khan (Chinese Emperor), 31.
Timour, Yakoob Beg's descent from, 77.
Tobolsk, 48.
Toghluc Timour, 31, 33.
Toksoun, 242, 244, 264.
battle at, 247.
To Teh Lin, 240.
Trade, 153.
Trade privileges, 57.
Trade with China, 217-218; _see_ chapter 14.
Trade with Kashgar, 106, 216-217.
Treaty between England and Kashgar, 232.
Treaty between Russia and Kashgar, 194.
Treaty with Khokand, 69.
Trotter, Captain, 222.
Tsedayar, 268.
Tso Tsung Tang, 246, 247, 263, 265, 272, 275, _passim_.
army of, 272.
Tungani, 2, 19, 20, 21, 93, 130, 144, 239, 241, 243, _passim_.
description of, 19, 93-94.
Tungan rising proper, 95, 96, 123-124.
in Kashgar, 96, 102.
in Kuldja, 124-125.
Tungani desert Yakoob Beg, 249.
Tungani unorthodox, 127.
defend Kucha, 127-130.
Turanian family, 14, 15.
Turcomans, 32.
Turfan, 21, 130, 242, 244, 264.
battle at, 247.
Turfan Ush, _see_ Ush Turfan.
Turghay, 32.
Turkestan, Eastern, _see_ Eastern Turkestan.
Western, _see_ Western Turkestan.
_Turkestan Gazette_, 251, 252, 264, _passim_.
Turkestan Trading Company, 232.
Tyfu, 231.
Uigurs, _see_ Oigurs.
Uman Sheikh, 36.
Urumtsi, 10, 130, 131, 134, 236.
siege of, 238-239.
Usbeg, 14.
Usha Tal, 265.
"Ushr" tax, 62, 160.
Ush Turfan, 7, 45, 46, 47, 130, 183, 273.
rising at, 51.
Vagrants, laws against, 150.
Value of land in Kashgar, 160-161.
Vernoe, 8, 130, 174, 176, 182.
Viceroy of Ili, 55, _passim_.
Viceroy of Kansuh, 237-238; _see also_ Tso Tsung Tung.
"Vodka," 209.
"Vuoba," 264.
Wakhan, 8, 64.
Wali Khan, 71, 72, 214.
character of, 72-73.
Wangs, 56, 63, _passim_.
Wanleh, 41.
Wealth of Kashgar merchants, 165.
Western Turkestan, 14, 15, _passim_.
Yahya, 38.
Yakoob Beg, birth of, 76;
early career, 78-91;
character of, 88, 91;
charges against, 89;
sets out against Kashgar, 91;
expedition against Kashgar, 103-118;
fails to take Yarkand, 106;
defeats Tungan army near Yangy Hissar, 109;
marries Kho Dalay's daughter, 112;
attacks Yarkand again, 113-116;
reverse at Yarkand, 114;
takes Yarkand, 116;
reasons for wars with Tungani, 120;
wars with Tungani, 126-127, 127-130, 132-136;
retrospect of his invasion of Kashgar, 119;
his army, 134-135, 142-144;
policy towards Tungani, 135-136;
internal policy, 137-139;
foreign policy, _see_ chapters 10 and 11;
court of, 138-139;
police system of, 146-152;
principles of finance of, 154-167;
expenses of, 157;
revenue of, 167;
reply to Russian threats, 186, 191-192;
reply to Khudayar Khan's overtures, 190;
sends envoy to Tashkent, 195;
arrangement with Sultan, 196;
his opinion of trade, 198;
out-manoeuvres Russia, 199-201;
congratulates Czar on marriage of his daughter, 205;
prepares to defend himself against Russia, 208;
weakness of his foreign policy, 210-211;
policy towards England, 218-233;
decline of friendship towards England, 231;
prepares to defend himself against China, 244-246;
comparison with China, 241-249;
death of, 250-253;
résumé of career, 253-257, _passim_.
Yakoob Khan, 220; _see_ Yakoob Beg.
Yakoob Khan, of Cabul, 221.
Yangabad, battle of, 67.
Yangy Hissar, 4, 24, 35, 36, 44, 105, 228.
fort surrenders to Yakoob Beg, 106.
Yangy Mussulmans, 112, 243, _passim_.
Yangy Shahr, 34, 68, _passim_.
at Yarkand, gallant defence of, 101.
at Kashgar, 102, 107, 111-112.
Yarkand, 3, 5, 44, 226.
embassy to, 22.
river, 5, 59.
Tungan rising in, 99-102, 105-106.
Yuldus, 133; _see also_ Great Yuldus.
Yung Ching, 43.
Yunus, 34, 35, 40.
Yusuf (son of Galdan), 46.
Yusuf (son of Sarimsak), 64, 69.
Yuzbashi Mahomed Zareef Khan, 223.
"Zakat" tax, 62, 160, 164-167.
Zilchak, 226.
Zuelik, 79.
Zuhuruddin, 70-72.
Woodfall & Kinder, Printers, Milford Lane, Strand, London, W.C.
Transcriber's Note:
The following modifications have been made to the text.
Page 205: detracted replaced with detraction.
There is no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that such
exhibitions as this is an instance of detracted from the
otherwise great and striking characteristics of the ruler of
Kashgar.
Page 250: Missing period added at the end of sentence.
They were probably not aware of what was taking place some 300
miles from their camp until many weeks after it had happened;
and then conceived that their best policy would be to give time
for the disintegrating causes at work within the state to have
their full effect before they advanced westward.
Page 255: unaminity replaced with unanimity.
There were superior strategy and superior weapons; greater force
and greater determination; no hesitation in action, and perfect
unaminity in council; all combined to crush one poor forlorn
man, fighting with all the desperation of despair for life, if
not for liberty.
Page 258: Missing t added, aken replaced with taken.
Nor did it follow as a matter of necessity that because the
Chinese had aken Turfan they could capture Kashgar or Yarkand.
Page 278: momet replaced with moment.
Moreover there is the unknown quantity of the rivalry of Li Hung
Chang and Tso Tsung Tang, and whatever influence the latter may
have with the army and the ruling caste on account of his
Mantchoo blood, the former holds the purse in his hands, and can
at any momet paralyse Chinese activity and strength in Central
Asia.
Page 306: accurracy replaced with accuracy.
the accurracy of which has been so strikingly proved by the
correct position given to the two lakes Khas-omo,
Page 337: Period replaced with comma after 209-210.
Abderrahman Aftobatcha, 18, 209-210. 211.
Page 339: Hyder replaced with Hydar.
Hyder, 35.
Page 340: Kalkhalu replaced with Khalkhalu.
Kalkhalu, 24.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Life of Yakoob Beg - Athalik Ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar" ***
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