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Title: The Story of the Great War, Volume 5 - Battle of Jutland Bank; Russian Offensive; Kut-El-Amara; East Africa; Verdun; The Great Somme Drive; United States and Belligerents; Summary of Two Years' War
Author: Miller, Francis Trevelyan, 1877-1959 [Editor], Reynolds, Francis J. (Francis Joseph), 1867-1937 [Editor], Churchill, Allen L. (Allen Leon), 1873- [Editor]
Language: English
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Transcriber's note:
Obvious printer's errors have been corrected. Hyphenation
and accentuation have been made consistent. All other
inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's
spelling has been retained.
Page 26: "notwithstanding he or they may believe to the
contrary" has been changed to "notwithstanding what he or
they may believe to the contrary".
Pages 178/179: Words are missing between "cross-" and "of"
in the sentence: Ten miles west of Kolki the Russians
succeeded in cross-of Gruziatin, two miles north of
Godomitchy, the small German garrison of which, consisting
of some five hundred officers and men, fell into Russian
captivity.
Page 200: "during pursuit of the Russians" has been
changed to "during pursuit by the Russians".
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
History of the European War from Official Sources
Complete Historical Records of Events to Date,
Illustrated with Drawings, Maps, and Photographs
Prefaced by
What the War Means to America
Major General Leonard Wood, U.S.A.
Naval Lessons of the War
Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S.N.
The World's War
Frederick Palmer
Theatres of the War's Campaigns
Frank H. Simonds
The War Correspondent
Arthur Ruhl
Edited by
Francis J. Reynolds
Former Reference Librarian of Congress
Allen L. Churchill
Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
Francis Trevelyan Miller
Editor in Chieft, Photographic History of the Civil War
P. F. Collier & Son Company
New York
[Illustration: Jutland.]
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Battle of Jutland Bank · Russian
Offensive · Kut-El-Amara
East Africa · Verdun · The
Great Somme Drive · United
States and Belligerents
Summary of Two Years' War
VOLUME V
P · F · Collier & Son · New York
Copyright 1916
By P. F. Collier & Son
CONTENTS
PART I.--AUSTRIAN PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER Page
I. Austrian Ambassador Implicated in Strike Plots--his
Recall--Ramifications of German Conspiracies 9
II. The Plot To Destroy Ships--Pacific Coast
Conspiracies--Hamburg-American Case--Scope of New York
Investigations 15
III. Von Rintelen's Activities--Congressman Involved--Germany's
Repudiations--Dismissal of Captains Boy-Ed and
Von Papen 22
IV. Great Britain's Defense of Blockade--American
Methods in Civil War Cited 28
V. British Blockade Denounced As Illegal and Ineffective
by the United States--The American Position 35
VI. Great Britain Unyielding--Effect of the Blockade--The
Chicago Meat Packers' Case 44
VII. Seizure of Suspected Ships--Trading With the Enemy--The
Appam--The Anglo-French Loan--Ford Peace Expedition 49
VIII. American Pacificism--Preparedness--Munition Safeguard 54
PART II.--OPERATIONS ON THE SEA
IX. Naval Engagements in Many Waters 59
X. Minor Engagements and Losses 66
XI. The Battle of Jutland Bank--Beginning 70
XII. Some Secondary Features of the Battle 89
XIII. Losses and Tactics 94
XIV. Death of Lord Kitchener--Other Events of the Second Year 108
PART III.--CAMPAIGN ON THE EASTERN FRONT
XV. The Eastern Front at the Approach of Spring, 1916 116
XVI. The Russian March--Offensive from Riga to Pinsk 122
XVII. Resumption of Austro-Russian Operations 133
XVIII. Thaw and Spring Floods 141
XIX. Artillery Duels 149
XX. The Great Russian Offensive 154
XXI. The Russian Reconquest of the Bukowina 162
XXII. In Conquered East Galicia 173
XXIII. The German Counteroffensive Before Kovel 178
XXIV. Progress of the Bukowinian Conquest 183
XXV. Temporary Lull in the Russian Offensive 188
XXVI. Advance Against Lemberg and Kovel 192
XXVII. The Germans' Stand on the Stokhod 198
XXVIII. Increased Strength of the Russian Drive 207
PART IV.--THE BALKANS
XXIX. Holding Fast in Saloniki 212
XXX. Military and Political Events in Greece 216
PART V.--AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
XXXI. Resumption of Operations on the Italian Front 229
XXXII. The Spring of 1916 on the Austro-Italian Front 235
XXXIII. The Austrian May Drive in the Trentino 244
XXXIV. The Rise and Failure of the Austro-Hungarian Drive 255
XXXV. The Italian Counteroffensive in the Trentino 265
XXXVI. Continuation of the Italian Counteroffensive 276
XXXVII. Minor Operations on the Austro-Italian Front in
Trentino Offensive 283
PART VI.--RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN
XXXVIII. Russian Successes After Erzerum 292
PART VII.--CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA AND PERSIA
XXXIX. Renewed Attempt To Relieve Kut-el-Amara 307
XL. The Surrender of Kut-el-Amara 318
XLI. Spring and Summer Trench War on the Tigris 326
XLII. Russian Advance Toward Bagdad 330
XLIII. Turkish Offensive and Russian Counteroffensive in
Armenia and Persia 335
PART VIII.--OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT
XLIV. Renewal of the Battle of Verdun 340
XLV. The Struggle for Vaux Fort and Village--Battle of
Mort Homme 348
XLVI. Battle of Hill 304 and Douaumont--The Struggle at
Fleury 361
XLVII. Spring Operations in Other Sectors 371
XLVIII. Battle of the Somme--Allied Preparations--Position
of the Opposing Forces 377
XLIX. The British Attack 382
L. The French Attacks North and South of the Somme 387
LI. The British Attack (Continued) 392
LII. The Second Phase of the Battle of the Somme 401
PART IX.--THE WAR IN THE AIR
LIII. The Value of Zeppelins in Long-Distance
Reconnoitering--Naval Auxiliaries 412
LIV. Aeroplane Improvements--Giant Machines--Technical
Developments 418
LV. Losses and Casualties in Aerial Warfare--Discrepancies
in Official Reports--"Driven Down" and "Destroyed" 424
LVI. Aerial Combats and Raids 427
PART X.--THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS
LVII. War Cloud in Congress 433
LVIII. The President Upheld in Armed-Merchantmen Issue--Final
Crisis With Germany 439
LIX. The American Ultimatum--Germany Yields 449
TWO YEARS OF THE WAR. _By Frank H. Simonds_
The German Problem 461
The Belgian Phase 463
The French Offensive 466
The Battle of the Marne 469
The End of the First Western Campaign 472
The Russian Phase 476
Tannenberg and Lemberg 476
Warsaw and Lodz 479
The Galician Campaign 480
The Battle of the Dunajec 481
Russia Survives 484
The Balkan Campaign 484
In the West 487
Italy 488
Verdun 488
The February Attack 490
Later Phases 491
Gettysburg 493
The Austrian Offensive 494
Germany Loses the Offensive 495
The Russian Attack 496
The Battle of the Somme 499
Gorizia 499
As the Third Year Begins 501
THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR, STATEMENTS FROM THE BRITISH,
FRENCH, AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS TO THE UNITED STATES 503
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Jutland _Frontispiece_
Opposite Page
Queen Mary, British Battle Cruiser 78
Earl Kitchener 110
Austrian 30.5-Centimeter Gun 158
Austrian Intrenchment High on a Mountain 238
German Crown Prince Giving Crosses for Valor 350
French Aviation Camp Near Verdun 366
U-C-5, German Mine-Laying Submarine 446
Motor-Mounted French 75's 494
LIST OF MAPS
Page
Expansion of the War--Dates on Which Declarations of War
Were Made (_Colored Map_) _Front Insert_
Battle of Jutland Bank, the
Plate I--Distribution of Forces 74
Plate II--Running Fight to the Southward 77
Plate III--Running Fight to the Northward 79
Plate IV--British Grand Fleet Approaching from Northwest 81
Plate V--British Grand Fleet Coming into Action 83
Plate VI--Jellicoe and Beatty Acting Together to "Cap"
German Fleet 85
Plate VII--Jellicoe and Beatty Pass Around the German
Flank, "Capping" It 86
Plate VIII--British Forces Heading Off to Southward to
Avoid Attack During Darkness 88
Plate IX--Movement of Forces 103
Plate X--Movement of Jellicoe's Forces on May 31 105
Plate XI--What Von Scheer Should Have Done 106
Eastern Battle Front, August, 1916 119
Russian Offensive from Pinsk To Dubno, The 157
Russian Offensive in Galicia, The 175
Italian Front, The 241
Austrian Offensive, May, 1916, Detail of 263
Gorizia 272
Kut-el-Amara 322
Russians in Persia, The 333
Russians in Armenia, The 338
Western Battle Front, August, 1916 343
Four Zone Maps (_colored_) _Opposite_ 344
Verdun, First Attack on 346
Verdun, Northeast District in Detail 352
Verdun, Northwest District in Detail 356
Mort Homme Sector in Detail 364
Verdun to St. Mihiel 366
Verdun Gain up to August, 1916 369
Sector Where Grand Offensive was Started 379
English Gains, The 394
French Gains, The 406
Two Years of the War
August 18, 1914, When the Belgian Retreat to Antwerp
Began 465
August 23, 1914, After the Allies Had Lost All the First
Battles 467
September 6, 1914, the Battle of the Marne 471
September 20, 1914, the Deadlock 473
November 15, 1914, the End of the Western Campaign 475
October 24, 1914, the Battle of the Vistula 478
October 1, 1915, at the End of the Russian Retreat 483
The Conquest of Serbia, December, 1915 485
The Russian Spring Offensive, 1916 497
Austro-Italian Campaigns, May to September, 1916 500
PART I--AUSTRIAN PROPAGANDA
CHAPTER I
AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IMPLICATED IN STRIKE PLOTS--HIS
RECALL--RAMIFICATIONS OF GERMAN CONSPIRACIES
Public absorption in German propaganda was abating when attention
became directed to it again from another quarter. An American war
correspondent, James F. J. Archibald, a passenger on the liner
_Rotterdam_ from New York, who was suspected by the British
authorities of being a bearer of dispatches from the German and
Austrian Ambassadors at Washington, to their respective Governments,
was detained and searched on the steamer's arrival at Falmouth on
August 30, 1915. A number of confidential documents found among his
belongings were seized and confiscated, the British officials
justifying their action as coming within their rights under English
municipal law. The character of the papers confirmed the British
suspicions that Archibald was misusing his American passport by acting
as a secret courier for countries at war with which the United States
was at peace.
The seized papers were later presented to the British Parliament and
published. In a bulky dossier, comprising thirty-four documents found
in Archibald's possession, was a letter from the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dumba, to Baron Burian, the
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. In this letter Dr. Dumba took "this
rare and safe opportunity" of "warmly recommending" to the Austrian
Foreign Office certain proposals made by the editor of a
Hungarian-American organ, the "Szabadsag," for effecting strikes in
plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company and others in the Middle West
engaged in making munitions for the Allies.
The United States Government took a serious view of the letter
recommending the plan for instigating strikes in American factories.
Dr. Dumba, thrown on his defense, explained to the State Department
that the incriminating proposals recommended in the document did not
originate from him personally, but were the fruit of orders received
from Vienna. This explanation was not easily acceptable. The
phraseology of Dr. Dumba far from conveyed the impression that he was
submitting a report on an irregular proposal inspired by instructions
of the Austrian Government. Such a defense, however, if accepted, only
made the matter more serious. Instead of the American Government
having to take cognizance of an offensive act by an ambassador, the
Government which employed him would rather have to be called to
account. Another explanation by Dr. Dumba justified his letter to
Vienna on the ground that the strike proposal urged merely represented
a plan for warning all Austrians and Hungarians, employed in the
munition factories, of the penalties they would have to pay if they
ever returned to their home country, after aiding in producing weapons
and missiles of destruction to be used against the Teutonic forces.
This defense also lacked convincing force, as the letter indicated
that the aim was so to cripple the munition factories that their
output would be curtailed or stopped altogether--an object that could
only be achieved by a general strike of all workers.
The Administration did not take long to make up its mind that the time
for disciplining foreign diplomats who exceeded the duties of their
office had come. On September 8, 1915, Austria-Hungary was notified
that Dr. Konstantin Theodor Dumba was no longer acceptable as that
country's envoy in Washington. The American note dispatched to
Ambassador Penfield at Vienna for transmission to the Austrian Foreign
Minister was blunt and direct. After informing Baron Burian that Dr.
Dumba had admitted improper conduct in proposing to his Government
plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants, the
United States thus demanded his recall:
"By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Dr. Dumba to conspire
to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States
and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant
violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen,
protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer of official
dispatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the
President directs us to inform your excellency that Dr. Dumba is no
longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the
Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty at Washington."
Dr. Dumba was not recalled by his Government until September 22, 1915,
fourteen days after the American demand. Meanwhile Dr. Dumba had
cabled to Vienna, requesting that he be ordered to return on leave of
absence "to report." His recall was ostensibly in response to his
personal request, but the Administration objected to this resort to a
device intended to cloak the fact that he was now _persona non grata_
whose return was really involuntary, and would not recognize a recall
"on leave of absence." His Government had no choice but to recall him
officially in view of the imminent contingency that otherwise he would
be ousted, and in that case would be denied safe conduct from capture
by an allied cruiser in his passage across the ocean. His request for
passports and safe conduct was, in fact, disregarded by the
Administration, which informed him that the matter was one to be dealt
directly with his Government, pending whose official intimation of
recall nothing to facilitate his departure could be done. On the
Austrian Government being notified that Dr. Dumba's departure "on
leave of absence" would not be satisfactory, he was formally recalled
on September 28, 1915.
The seized Archibald dossier included a letter from the German
military attaché, Captain Franz von Papen, to his wife, containing
reference to Dr. Albert's correspondence, which left no doubt that the
letters were genuine:
"Unfortunately, they stole a fat portfolio from our good Albert in the
elevated (a New York street railroad). The English secret service of
course. Unfortunately, there were some very important things from my
report among them such as buying up liquid chlorine and about the
Bridgeport Projectile Company, as well as documents regarding the
buying up of phenol and the acquisition of Wright's aeroplane patent.
But things like that must occur. I send you Albert's reply for you to
see how we protect ourselves. We composed the document to-day."
The "document" evidently was Dr. Albert's explanation discounting the
significance and importance of the letters. This explanation was
published on August 20, 1915.
The foregoing disclosures of documents covered a wide range of
organized German plans for embarrassing the Allies' dealings with
American interests; but they related rather more to accomplished
operations and such activities as were revealed to be under way--e. g.,
the acquisition of munitions combined with propaganda for an
embargo--were not deemed to be violative of American law. But this
stage of intent to clog the Allies' facilities for obtaining sinews of
war, in the face of law, speedily grew to one of achievement more or
less effective according to the success with which the law interposed
to spoil the plans.
The autumn and winter of 1915 were marked by the exposure of a number
of German plots which revealed that groups of conspirators were in
league in various parts of the country, bent on wrecking munition
plants, sinking ships loaded with Allies' supplies, and fomenting
strikes. Isolated successes had attended their efforts, but
collectively their depredations presented a serious situation. The
exposed plots produced clues to secret German sources from which a
number of mysterious explosions at munition plants and on ships had
apparently been directed. Projected labor disturbances at munition
plants were traced to a similar origin. The result was that the docket
of the Federal Department of Justice became laden with a motley
collection of indictments which implicated fifty or more individuals
concerned in some dozen conspiracies, in which four corporations were
also involved.
These cases only represented a portion of the criminal infractions of
neutrality laws, which had arisen since the outbreak of the war. In
January, 1916, an inquiry in Congress directed the Attorney General to
name all persons "arrested in connection with criminal plots affecting
the neutrality of our Government." Attorney General Gregory furnished
a list of seventy-one indicted persons, and the four corporations
mentioned. A list of merely arrested persons would not have been
informative, as it would have conveyed an incomplete and misleading
impression. Such a list, Mr. Gregory told Congress, would not include
persons indicted but never arrested, having become fugitives from
justice; nor persons indicted but never arrested, having surrendered;
but would include persons arrested and not proceeded against. Thus
there were many who had eluded the net of justice by flight and some
through insufficient evidence. The seventy-one persons were concerned
in violations of American neutrality in connection with the European
war.
The list covered several cases already recorded in this history,
namely:
A group of Englishmen, and another of Montenegrins, involved in
so-called enlistment "plots" for obtaining recruits on American soil
for the armies of their respective countries.
The case of Werner Horn, indicted for attempting to destroy by an
explosive the St. Croix railroad bridge between Maine and New
Brunswick.
A group of nine men, mainly Germans, concerned in procuring bogus
passports to enable them to take passage to Europe to act as spies.
Eight were convicted, the ninth man, named Von Wedell, a fugitive
passport offender, was supposed to have been caught in England and
shot.
The Hamburg-American case, in which Dr. Karl Buenz, former German
Consul General in New York, and other officials or employees of that
steamship company, were convicted (subject to an appeal) of defrauding
the Government in submitting false clearance papers as to the
destinations of ships sent from New York to furnish supplies to German
war vessels in the Atlantic.
A group of four men, a woman, and a rubber agency, indicted on a
similar charge, their operations being on the Pacific coast, where
they facilitated the delivery of supplies to German cruisers when in
the Pacific in the early stages of the war.
There remain the cases which, in the concatenation of events, might
logically go on record as direct sequels to the public divulging of
the Albert and Archibald secret papers. These included:
A conspiracy to destroy munition-carrying ships at sea and to murder
the passengers and crews. Indictments in these terms were brought
against a group of six men--Robert Fay, Dr. Herbert O. Kienzie, Walter
L. Scholz, Paul Daeche, Max Breitung, and Engelbert Bronkhorst.
A conspiracy to destroy the Welland Canal and to use American soil as
a base for unlawful operations against Canada. Three men, Paul Koenig,
a Hamburg-American line official, R. E. Leyendecker, and E. J.
Justice, were involved in this case.
A conspiracy to destroy shipping on the Pacific Coast. A German baron,
Von Brincken, said to be one of the kaiser's army officers; an
employee of the German consulate at San Francisco, C. C. Crowley; and
a woman, Mrs. Margaret W. Cornell, were the offenders.
A conspiracy to prevent the manufacture and shipment of munitions to
the allied powers. A German organization, the National Labor Peace
Council, was indicted on this charge, as well as a wealthy German,
Franz von Rintelen, described as an intimate friend of the German
Crown Prince, and several Americans known in public life.
In most of these cases the name of Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the German
naval attaché, or Captain Franz von Papen, the German military
attaché, figured persistently. The testimony of informers confirmed
the suspicion that a wide web of secret intrigue radiated from sources
related to the German embassy and enfolded all the conspiracies,
showing that few, if any, of the plots, contemplated or accomplished,
were due solely to the individual zeal of German sympathizers.
CHAPTER II
THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS--PACIFIC COAST
CONSPIRACIES--HAMBURG-AMERICAN CASE--SCOPE OF NEW YORK INVESTIGATIONS
The plot of Fay and his confederates to place bombs on ships carrying
war supplies to Europe was discovered when a couple of New York
detectives caught Fay and an accomplice, Scholz, experimenting with
explosives in a wood near Weehawken, N. J., on October 24, 1915. Their
arrests were the outcome of a police search for two Germans who
secretly sought to purchase picric acid, a component of high
explosives which had become scarce since the war began. Certain
purchases made were traced to Fay. On the surface Fay's offense seemed
merely one of harboring and using explosives without a license; but
police investigations of ship explosions had proceeded on the theory
that the purchases of picric acid were associated with them.
Fay confirmed this surmise. He described himself as a lieutenant in
the German army, who, with the sanction of the German secret
information service, had come to the United States after sharing in
the Battle of the Marne, to perfect certain mine devices for
attachment to munition ships in order to cripple them. In a Hoboken
storage warehouse was found a quantity of picric acid he had deposited
there, with a number of steel mine tanks, each fitted with an
attachment for hooking to the rudder of a vessel, and clockwork and
wire to fire the explosive in the tanks. In rooms occupied by Fay and
Scholz were dynamite and trinitrotoluol (known as T-N-T), many caps of
fulminate of mercury, and Government survey maps of the eastern coast
line and New York Harbor. The conspirators' equipment included a fast
motor boat that could dart up and down the rivers and along the water
front where ships were moored, a high-powered automobile, and four
suit cases containing a number of disguises. The purpose of the
enterprise was to stop shipments of arms and ammunitions to the
Allies. The disabling of ships, said Fay, was the sole aim, without
destruction of life. To this end he had been experimenting for several
months on a waterproof mine and a detonating device that would operate
by the swinging of a rudder, to which the mine would be attached,
controlled by a clock timed to cause the explosion on the high seas.
The German secret service, both Fay and Scholz said, had provided them
with funds to pursue their object. Fay's admission to the police
contained these statements:
"I saw Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen on my arrival in this
country. Captain Boy-Ed told me that I was doing a dangerous thing. He
said that political complications would result and he most assuredly
could not approve of my plans. When I came to this country, however, I
had letters of introduction to both those gentlemen. Both men warned
me not to do anything of the kind I had in mind. Captain von Papen
strictly forbade me to attach any of the mines to any of the ships
leaving the harbors of the United States. But anyone who wishes to,
can read between the lines.
"The plan on which I worked was to place a mine on the rudder post so
that when it exploded it would destroy the rudder and leave the ship
helpless. There was no danger of any person being killed. But by this
explosion I would render the ship useless and make the shipment of
munitions so difficult that the owners of ships would be intimidated
and cause insurance rates to go so high that the shipment of
ammunition would be seriously affected, if not stopped."
The Federal officials questioned the statement that Fay's design was
merely to cripple munition ships. Captain Harold C. Woodward of the
Corps of Engineers, a Government specialist on explosives, held that
if the amount of explosive, either trinitrotoluol, or an explosive
made from chlorate of potash and benzol, required by the mine caskets
found in Fay's possession, was fired against a ship's rudder, it would
tear open the stern and destroy the entire ship, if not its passengers
and crew, so devastating would be the explosive force. A mine of the
size Fay used, three feet long and ten inches by ten inches, he said,
would contain over two cubic feet:
"If the mine was filled with trinitrotoluol the weight of the high
explosive would be about 180 pounds. If it was filled with a mixture
of chlorate of potash and benzol the weight would be probably 110
pounds. Either charge if exploded on the rudder post would blow a hole
in the ship.
"The amount of high explosive put into a torpedo or a submarine mine
is only about 200 pounds. It must not be forgotten that water is
practically noncompressible, and that even if the explosion did not
take place against the ship the effect would be practically the same.
Oftentimes a ship is sunk by the explosion of a torpedo or a mine
several feet from the hull.
"Furthermore, if the ship loaded with dynamite or high explosive, and
the detonating wave of the first explosion reaches that cargo, the
cargo also would explode. In high explosives the detonating wave in
the percussion cap explodes the charge in much the same manner in
which a chord struck on a piano will make a picture wire on the wall
vibrate if both the wire and the piano string are tuned alike.
"Accordingly, if a ship carrying tons of high explosive is attacked
from the outside by a mine containing 100 pounds of similar explosive,
the whole cargo would go up and nothing would remain of either ship or
cargo."
Therefore the charge made against Fay and Scholz, and four other men
later arrested, Daeche, Kienzie, Bronkhorst, and Breitung, namely,
conspiracy to "destroy a ship," meant that and all the consequences to
the lives of those on board. Breitung was a nephew of Edward N.
Breitung, the purchaser of the ship _Dacia_ from German ownership,
which was seized by the French on the suspicion that its transfer to
American registry was not bona fide.
The plot was viewed as the most serious yet bared. Fay and his
confederates were credited with having spent some $30,000 on their
experiments and preparations, and rumor credited them with having
larger sums of money at their command.
The press generally doubted if they could have conducted their
operations without such financial support being extended them in the
United States. A design therefore was seen in Fay's statement that he
was financed from Germany to screen the source of this aid by
transferring the higher responsibility _in toto_ to official persons
in Germany who were beyond the reach of American justice. These and
other insinuations directed at the German Embassy produced a statement
from that quarter repudiating all knowledge of the Fay conspiracy, and
explaining that its attachés were frequently approached by "fanatics"
who wanted to sink ships or destroy buildings in which munitions were
made.
A similar conspiracy, but embracing the destruction of railroad
bridges as well as munition ships and factories, was later revealed on
the Pacific Coast. Evidence on which indictments were made against the
men Crowley, Von Brincken, and a woman confederate aforementioned,
named Captain von Papen, the German military attaché, as the director
of the plot. The accused were also said to have had the cooperation of
the German Consul General at San Francisco. The indictments charged
them, _inter alia_, with using the mails to incite arson, murder, and
assassination. Among the evidence the Government unearthed was a
letter referring to "P," which, the Federal officials said, meant
Captain von Papen. The letter, which related to a price to be paid for
the destruction of a powder plant at Pinole, Cal., explained how the
price named had been referred to others "higher up." It read:
"Dear Sir: Your last letter with clipping to-day, and note what you
have to say. I have taken it up with them and 'B' [which the Federal
officials said stood for Franz Bopp, German Consul at San Francisco]
is awaiting decision of 'P' [said to stand for Captain von Papen in
New York], so cannot advise you yet, and will do so as soon as I get
word from you. You might size up the situation in the meantime."
The indictments charged that the defendants planned to destroy
munition plants at Aetna and Gary, Ind., at Ishpeming, Mich., and at
other places. The Government's chief witness, named Van Koolbergen,
told of being employed by Baron von Brincken, of the German Consulate
at San Francisco, to make and use clockwork bombs to destroy the
commerce of neutral nations. For each bomb he received $100 and a
bonus for each ship damaged or destroyed. For destroying a railway
trestle in Canada over which supply trains for the Allies passed, he
said he received first $250, and $300 further from a representative of
the German Government, the second payment being made upon his
producing newspaper clippings recording the bridge's destruction. It
appeared that Van Koolbergen divulged the plot to the Canadian
Government.
The three defendants and Van Koolbergen were later named in another
indictment found by a San Francisco Federal Grand Jury, involving in
all sixty persons, including the German Consul General in that city,
Franz Bopp, the Vice Consul, Baron Eckhardt, H. von Schack, Maurice
Hall, Consul for Turkey, and a number of men identified with shipping
and commercial interests.
The case was the first in which the United States Government had asked
for indictments against the official representatives of any of the
belligerents. The warrants charged a conspiracy to violate the Sherman
Anti-Trust Law by attempting to damage plants manufacturing munitions
for the Allies, thus interfering with legitimate commerce, and with
setting on foot military expeditions against a friendly nation in
connection with plans to destroy Canadian railway tunnels.
The vice consul, Von Schack, was also indicted with twenty-six of the
defendants on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States by
sending supplies to German warships in the earlier stages of the war,
the supplies having been sent from New York to the German Consulate in
San Francisco. The charges related to the outfitting of five vessels.
One of the latter, the _Sacramento_, now interned in a Chilean port,
cleared from San Francisco, and when out to sea, the Government
ascertained, was taken in command by the wireless operator, who was
really a German naval reserve officer. Off the western coast of South
America the _Sacramento_ was supposed to have got into wireless
communication with German cruisers then operating in the Pacific.
There she joined the squadron under a show of compulsion, as though
held up and captured. In this guise the war vessels seemingly convoyed
the _Sacramento_ to an island in the Pacific, where her cargo of food,
coal, and munitions were transferred to her supposed captors. The
_Sacramento_ then proceeded to a Chilean port where her commanding
officer reported that he had been captured by German warships and
deprived of his cargo. The Chilean authorities doubted the story and
ordered the vessel to be interned.
Far more extensive were unlawful operations in this direction
conducted by officials of the Hamburg-American line, as revealed at
their trial in New York City in November, 1915. The indictments
charged fraud against the United States by false clearances and
manifests for vessels chartered to provision, from American ports,
German cruisers engaged in commerce destroying. The prosecution
proceeded on the belief that the Hamburg-American activities were
merely part of a general plan devised by German and Austrian
diplomatic and consular officers to use American ports, directly and
indirectly, as war bases for supplies. The testimony in the case
involved Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché, who was named as
having directed the distribution of a fund of at least $750,000 for
purposes described as "riding roughshod over the laws of the United
States." The defense freely admitted chartering ships to supply German
cruisers at sea, and in fact named a list of twelve vessels, so
outfitted, showing the amount spent for coal, provisions, and charter
expenses to have been over $1,400,000; but of this outlay only $20,000
worth of supplies reached the German vessels. The connection of
Captain Boy-Ed with the case suggested the defense that the implicated
officials consulted with him as the only representative in the United
States of the German navy, and were really acting on direct orders
from the German Government, and not under the direction of the naval
attaché. Military necessity was also a feasible ground for pleading
justification in concealing the fact that the ships cleared to deliver
their cargoes to German war vessels instead of to the ports named in
their papers. These ports were professed to be their ultimate
destinations if the vessels failed to meet the German cruisers. Had
any other course been pursued, the primary destinations would have
become publicly known and British and other hostile warships
patrolling the seas would have been on their guard. The defendants
were convicted, but the case remained open on appeal.
About the same time the criminal features of the Teutonic propaganda
engaged the lengthy attention of a Federal Grand Jury sitting in New
York City. A mass of evidence had been accumulated by Government
agents in New York, Washington, and other cities. Part of this
testimony related to the Dumba and Von Papen letters found in the
Archibald dossier. Another part concerned certain revelations a former
Austrian consul at San Francisco, Dr. Joseph Goricar, made to the
Department of Justice. This informant charged that the German and
Austrian Governments had spent between $30,000,000 and $40,000,000 in
developing an elaborate spy system in the United States with the aim
of destroying munition plants, obtaining plans of American
fortifications, Government secrets, and passports for Germans desiring
to return to Germany. These operations, he said, were conducted with
the knowledge of Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador. Captains
Boy-Ed and Von Papen were also named as actively associated with the
conspiracy, as well as Dr. von Nuber, the Austrian Consul General in
New York, who, he said, directed the espionage system and kept card
indices of spies in his office.
The investigation involved, therefore, diplomatic agents, who were
exempt from prosecution; a number of consuls and other men in the
employ of the Teutonic governments while presumably connected with
trustworthy firms; and notable German-Americans, some holding public
office.
Contributions to the fund for furthering the conspiracy, in addition
to the substantial sums believed to be supplied by the German and
Austrian Governments, were said to have come freely from many Germans,
citizens and otherwise, resident in the United States. The project,
put succinctly, was "to buy up or blow up the munition plants." The
buying up, as previously shown, having proved to be impracticable, an
alternative plan presented itself to "tie up" the factories by
strikes. This was Dr. Dumba's miscarried scheme, which aimed at
bribing labor leaders to induce workmen, in return for substantial
strike pay, to quit work in the factories. Allied to this design was
the movement to forbid citizens of Germany and Austria-Hungary from
working in plants supplying munitions to their enemies. Such
employment, they were told, was treasonable. The men were offered high
wages at other occupations if they would abandon their munition work.
Teutonic charity bazaars held throughout the country and agencies
formed to help Teutons out of employment were regarded merely as means
to influence men to leave the munition plants and thus hamper the
export of war supplies. Funds were traced to show how money traveled
through various channels from the fountainhead to men working on
behalf of the Teutonic cause. Various firms received sums of money, to
be paid to men ostensibly in the employ of the concerns, but who in
reality were German agents working under cover.
Evidence collected revealed these various facts of the Teutonic
conspiracy. But the unfolding of such details before the Grand Jury
was incidental to the search for the men who originated the scheme,
acted as almoners or treasurers, or supervised, as executives, the
horde of German and Austrian agents intriguing on the lower slopes
under their instructions.
CHAPTER III
VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES--CONGRESSMAN INVOLVED--GERMANY'S
REPUDIATIONS--DISMISSAL OF CAPTAINS BOY-ED AND VON PAPEN
In this quest the mysterious movements and connections of one German
agent broadly streaked the entire investigation. This person was Von
Rintelen, supposed to be Dr. Dumba's closest lieutenant ere that
envoy's presence on American soil was dispensed with by President
Wilson. Von Rintelen's activities belonged to the earlier period of
the war, before the extensive ramifications of the criminal phases of
the German propaganda were known. At present he was an enforced
absentee from the scenes of his exploits, being either immured by the
British in the Tower of London, or in a German concentration camp as a
spy. This inglorious interruption to the rôle he appeared to play
while in the United States as a peripatetic Midas, setting plots in
train by means of an overflowing purse, was due to an attempt to
return to Germany on the liner _Noordam_ in July, 1915. The British
intercepted him at Falmouth, and promptly made him a prisoner of war
after examining his papers.
Whatever was Von Rintelen's real mission in the United States in the
winter of 1914-15, he was credited with being a personal emissary and
friend of the kaiser, bearing letters of credit estimated to vary
between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000. The figure probably was
exaggerated in view of the acknowledged inability of the German
interests in the United States to command anything like the lesser sum
named to acquire all they wanted--control of the munition plants. His
initial efforts appeared to have been directed to a wide advertising
campaign to sway American sentiment against the export of arms
shipments. His energies, like those of others, having been fruitless
in this field, he was said to have directed his attention to placing
large orders under cover for munitions with the object of depleting
the source of such supplies for the Allies, and aimed to control some
of the plants by purchasing their stocks. The investigation in these
channels thus contributed to confirm the New York "World's" charges
against German officialdom, based on its exposé of the Albert
documents. Mexican troubles, according to persistent rumor, inspired
Von Rintelen to use his ample funds to draw the United States into
conflict with its southern neighbor as a means of diverting munition
supplies from the Allies for American use. He and other German agents
were suspected of being in league with General Huerta with a view to
promoting a new revolution in Mexico.
The New York Grand Jury's investigations of Von Rintelen's activities
became directed to his endeavors to "buy strikes." The outcome was the
indictment of officials of a German organization known under the
misleading name of the National Labor Peace Council. The persons
accused were Von Rintelen himself, though a prisoner in England; Frank
Buchanan, a member of Congress; H. Robert Fowler, a former
representative; Jacob C. Taylor, president of the organization; David
Lamar, who previously had gained notoriety for impersonating a
congressman in order to obtain money and known as the "Wolf of Wall
Street," and two others, named Martin and Schulties, active in the
Labor Peace Council and connected with a body called the Antitrust
League. They were charged with having, in an attempt to effect an
embargo (which would be in the interest of Germany) on the shipment of
war supplies, conspired to restrain foreign trade by instigating
strikes, intimidating employees, bribing and distributing money among
officers of labor organizations. Von Rintelen was said to have
supplied funds to Lamar wherewith the Labor Peace Council was enabled
to pursue these objects. One sum named was $300,000, received by Lamar
from Von Rintelen for the organization of this body; of that sum Lamar
was said to have paid $170,000 to men connected with the council.
The Labor Peace Council was organized in the summer of 1915, and met
first in Washington, when resolutions were passed embracing proposals
for international peace, but were viewed as really disguising a
propaganda on behalf of German interests. The Government sought to
show that the organization was financed by German agents and that its
crusade was part and parcel of pro-German movements whose
ramifications throughout the country had caused national concern.
Von Rintelen's manifold activities as chronicled acquired a tinge of
romance and not a little of fiction, but the revelations concerning
him were deemed sufficiently serious by Germany to produce a
repudiation of him by the German embassy on direct instructions from
Berlin, i. e.:
"The German Government entirely disavows Franz Rintelen, and
especially wished to say that it issued no instructions of any kind
which could have led him to violate American laws."
It is essential to the record to chronicle that American sentiment did
not accept German official disclaimers very seriously. They were too
prolific, and were viewed as apologetic expedients to keep the
relations between the two governments as smooth as possible in the
face of conditions which were daily imperiling those relations.
Germany appeared in the position of a Frankenstein who had created a
hydra-headed monster of conspiracy and intrigue that had stampeded
beyond control, and washed her hands of its depredations. The
situation, however, was only susceptible to this view by an inner
interpretation of the official disclaimers. In letter, but not in
spirit, Germany disowned her own offspring by repudiating the deeds of
plotters in terms which deftly avoided revealing any ground for the
suspicion--belied by events--that those deeds had an official
inception. Germany, in denying that the plotters were Government
"agents," suggested that these men pursued their operations with the
recognition that they alone undertook all the risks, and that if
unmasked it was their patriotic duty not to betray "the cause," which
might mean their country, the German Government, or the German
officials who directed them. Not all the exposed culprits had been
equal to this self-abnegating strain on their patriotism; some, like
Fay, were at first talkative in their admissions that their pursuits
were officially countenanced, another recounted defense of Werner
Horn, who attempted to destroy a bridge connecting Canada and the
United States, even went so far as to contend that the offense was
military--an act of war--and therefore not criminal, on the plea that
Horn was acting as a German army officer. In other cases incriminating
evidence made needless the assumption of an attitude by culprits of
screening by silence the complicity of superiors. Yet despite almost
daily revelations linking the names of important German officials,
diplomatic and consular, with exposed plots, a further repudiation
came from Berlin in December, 1915, when the New York Grand Jury's
investigation was at high tide. This further disavowal read:
"The German Government, naturally, has never knowingly accepted the
support of any person, group of persons, society or organization
seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the United States by
illegal acts, by counsels of violence, by contravention of law, or by
any means whatever that could offend the American people in the pride
of their own authority.... I can only say, and do most emphatically
declare to Germans abroad, to German-American citizens of the United
States, to the American people all alike, that whoever is guilty of
conduct tending to associate the German cause with lawlessness of
thought, suggestion or deed against life, property, and order in the
United States is, in fact, an enemy of that very cause and a source of
embarrassment to the German Government, notwithstanding what he or they
may believe to the contrary."
The stimulus for this politic disavowal, and one must be sought, since
German statements always had a genesis in antecedent events--was not
apparently due to continued plot exposures, which were too frequent,
but could reasonably be traced to a ringing address President Wilson
had previously made to Congress on December 7, 1915. The President,
amid the prolonged applause of both Houses, meeting in joint session,
denounced the unpatriotism of many Americans of foreign descent. He
warned Congress that the gravest threats against the nation's peace
and safety came from within, not from without. Without naming
German-Americans, he declared that many "had poured the poison of
disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life," and called
for the prompt exercise of the processes of law to purge the country
"of the corrupt distempers brought on by these citizens."
"I am urging you," he said in solemn tones, "to do nothing less than
save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of
passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out."
Three days before this denunciation, the Administration had demanded
from Germany the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen, respectively
the military aid and naval attaché of the German embassy. Unlike the
procedure followed in requesting Dr. Dumba's recall, no reasons were
given. None according to historic usage were necessary, and if
reasons were given, they could not be questioned. It was sufficient
that a diplomatic officer was _non persona grata_ by the fact that his
withdrawal was demanded.
Germany, through her embassy, showed some obduracy in acting upon a
request for these officials' recall without citing the cause of
complaint. There was an anxiety that neither should be recalled with
the imputation resting upon them that they were concerned, say, in the
so-called Huerta-Mexican plot--if one really existed--or with the
conspiracies to destroy munition plants and munition ships, or, in
Captain Boy-Ed's case, in the Hamburg-American line's chartered ships
for provisioning of German cruisers, sailing with false manifests and
clearance papers.
An informal note from Secretary Lansing to Count von Bernstorff so far
acceded to the request for a bill of particulars, though not
customary, that the German embassy professed to be satisfied.
Secretary Lansing stated that Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen had
rendered themselves unacceptable by "their activities in connection
with naval and military affairs." This was intended to mean that such
activities here indicated had brought the two officials in contact
with private individuals in the United States who had been involved in
violation of the law. The incidents and circumstances of this contact
were of such a cumulative character that the two attachés could no
longer be deemed as acceptable to the American Government. Here was an
undoubted implication of complicity by association with wrongdoers,
but not in deed. The unofficial statement of the cause of complaint
satisfied the embassy in that it seemed to relieve the two officers
from the imputation of themselves having violated American laws. The
record stood, however, that the United States had officially refused
to give any reasons for demanding their recall. Germany officially
recalled them on December 10, 1915, and before the year was out they
quitted American soil under safe conducts granted by the British
Government.
Captain von Papen, however, was not permitted to escape the clutches
of the British on the ocean passage. While respecting his person, they
seized his papers. These, duly published, made his complicity in the
German plots more pronounced than ever. His check counterfoils showed
a payment of $500 to "Mr. de Caserta, Ottawa." De Caserta was
described in British records as "a dangerous German spy, who takes
great risks, has lots of ability, and wants lots of money." He was
supposed to have been involved in conspiracies in Canada to destroy
bridges, armories, and munition factories. He had offered his services
to the British Government, but they were rejected. Later he was
reported to have been shot or hanged in London as a spy.
Another check payment by Captain von Papen was to Werner Horn for
$700. Horn, as before recorded, was the German who attempted to blow
up a railroad bridge at Vanceboro, Maine. Other payments shown by the
Von Papen check book were to Paul Koenig, of the Hamburg-American
line. Koenig was arrested in New York in December, 1915, on a charge
of conspiracy with others to set on foot a military expedition from
the United States to destroy the locks of the Welland Canal for the
purpose of cutting off traffic from the Great Lakes to the St.
Lawrence River.
The German consul at Seattle was shown to have received $500 from
Captain von Papen shortly before an explosion occurred there in May,
1915, and $1,500 three months earlier. Another payment was to a
German, who, while under arrest in England on a charge of being a spy,
committed suicide.
CHAPTER IV
GREAT BRITAIN'S DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE--AMERICAN METHODS IN CIVIL WAR
CITED
Issues with Great Britain interposed to engage the Administration's
attention, in the brief intervals when Germany's behavior was not
doing so, to the exclusion of all other international controversies
produced by the war. In endeavoring to balance the scales between the
contending belligerents, the United States had to weigh judicially the
fact that their offenses differed greatly in degree. Germany's crimes
were the wanton slaughter of American and other neutral noncombatants,
Great Britain's the wholesale infringements of American and neutral
property rights. Protests menacing a rupture of relations had to be
made in Germany's case; but those directed to Great Britain, though
not less forceful in tone, could not equitably be accompanied by a
hint of the same alternative. Arbitration by an international court
was the final recourse on the British issues. Arbitration could not be
resorted to, in the American view, for adjusting the issues with
Germany.
The Anglo-American trade dispute over freedom of maritime commerce by
neutrals during a war occupied an interlude in the crisis with
Germany. The dispatch of the third _Lusitania_ note of July 21, 1915,
promised a breathing spell in the arduous diplomatic labors of the
Administration, pending Germany's response. But a few days later the
Administration became immersed in Great Britain's further defense of
her blockade methods, contained in a group of three communications,
one dated July 24, and two July 31, 1915, in answer to the American
protests of March 31, July 14, and July 15, 1915. The main document,
dated July 24, 1915, showed both Governments to be professing and
insisting upon a strict adherence to the same principles of
international law, while sharply disagreeing on the question whether
measures taken by Great Britain conformed to those principles.
The United States had objected to certain interferences with neutral
trade Great Britain contemplated under her various Orders in Council.
The legality of these orders the United States contested. Great
Britain was notified by a caveat, sent July 14, 1915, that American
rights assailed by these interferences with trade would be construed
under accepted principles of international law. Hence prize-court
proceedings based on British municipal legislation not in conformity
with such principles would not be recognized as valid by the United
States.
Great Britain defended her course by stating the premise that a
blockade was an allowable expedient in war--which the United States
did not question--and upon that premise reared a structure of argument
which emphasized the wide gap between British and American
interpretations of international law. A blockade being allowable,
Great Britain held that it was equally allowable to make it effective.
If the only way to do so was to extend the blockade to enemy commerce
passing through neutral ports, then such extension was warranted. As
Germany could conduct her commerce through such ports, situated in
contiguous countries, almost as effectively as through her own ports,
a blockade of German ports alone would not be effective. Hence the
Allies asserted the right to widen the blockade to the German commerce
of neutral ports, but sought to distinguish between such commerce and
the legitimate trade of neutrals for the use and benefit of their own
nationals. Moreover, the Allies forebore to apply the rule, formerly
invariable, that ships with cargoes running a blockade were
condemnable.
On the chief point at issue Sir Edward Grey wrote:
"The contention which I understand the United States Government now
puts forward is that if a belligerent is so circumstanced that his
commerce can pass through adjacent neutral ports as easily as through
ports in his own territory, his opponent has no right to interfere and
must restrict his measure of blockade in such a manner as to leave
such avenues of commerce still open to his adversary.
"This is a contention which his Majesty's Government feel unable to
accept and which seems to them unsustained either in point of law or
upon principles of international equity. They are unable to admit that
a belligerent violates any fundamental principle of international law
by applying a blockade in such a way as to cut out the enemy's
commerce with foreign countries through neutral ports if the
circumstances render such an application of the principles of blockade
the only means of making it effective."
In this connection Sir Edward Grey recalled the position of the United
States in the Civil War, when it was under the necessity of declaring
a blockade of some 3,000 miles of coast line, a military operation for
which the number of vessels available was at first very small:
"It was vital to the cause of the United States in that great struggle
that they should be able to cut off the trade of the Southern States.
The Confederate armies were dependent on supplies from overseas, and
those supplies could not be obtained without exporting the cotton
wherewith to pay for them.
"To cut off this trade the United States could only rely upon a
blockade. The difficulties confronting the Federal Government were in
part due to the fact that neighboring neutral territory afforded
convenient centers from which contraband could be introduced into the
territory of their enemies and from which blockade running could be
facilitated.
"In order to meet this new difficulty the old principles relating to
contraband and blockade were developed, and the doctrine of continuous
voyage was applied and enforced, under which goods destined for the
enemy territory were intercepted before they reached the neutral ports
from which they were to be reexported. The difficulties which imposed
upon the United States the necessity of reshaping some of the old
rules are somewhat akin to those with which the Allies are now faced
in dealing with the trade of their enemy."
Though an innovation, the extension of the British blockade to a
surveillance of merchandise passing in and out of a neutral port
contiguous to Germany was not for that reason impermissible. Thus that
preceded the British contention, which, moreover, recognized the
essential thing to be observed in changes of law and usages of war
caused by new conditions was that such changes must "conform to the
spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war." The phrase
was cited from the American protest by way of buttressing the argument
to show that the United States itself, as evident from the excerpt
quoted, had freely made innovations in the law of blockade within this
restriction, but regardless of the views or interests of neutrals.
These American innovations in blockade methods, Great Britain
maintained, were of the same general character as those adopted by the
allied powers, and Great Britain, as exemplified in the _Springbok_
case, had assented to them. As to the American contention that there
was a lack of written authority for the British innovations or
extensions of the law of blockade, the absence of such pronouncements
was deemed unessential. Sir Edward Grey considered that the function
of writers on international law was to formulate existing principles
and rules, not to invent or dictate alterations adapting them to
altered circumstances.
So, to sum up, the modifications of the old rules of blockade adopted
were viewed by Great Britain as in accordance with the general
principles on which an acknowledged right of blockade was based. They
were not only held to be justified by the exigencies of the case, but
could be defended as consistent with those general principles which
had been recognized by both governments.
The United States declined to accept the view that seizures and
detentions of American ships and cargoes could justifiably be made by
stretching the principles of international law to fit war conditions
Great Britain confronted, and assailed the legality of the British
tribunals which determined whether such seizures were prizes. Great
Britain had been informed:
"... So far as the interests of American citizens are concerned the
Government of the United States will insist upon their rights under
the principles and rules of international law as hitherto established,
governing neutral trade in time of war, without limitation or
impairment by order in council or other municipal legislation by the
British Government, and will not recognize the validity of prize-court
proceedings taken under restraints imposed by British municipal law in
derogation of the rights of American citizens under international
law."
British prize-court proceedings had been fruitful of bitter grievances
to the State Department from the American merchants affected. Sir
Edward Grey pointed out that American interests had this remedy in
challenging prize-court verdicts:
"It is open to any United States citizen whose claim is before the
prize court to contend that any order in council which may affect his
claim is inconsistent with the principles of international law, and
is, therefore, not binding upon the court.
"If the prize court declines to accept his contentions, and if, after
such a decision has been upheld on appeal by the judicial committee of
His Majesty's Privy Council, the Government of the United States
considers that there is serious ground for holding that the decision
is incorrect and infringes the rights of their citizens, it is open to
them to claim that it should be subjected to review by an
international tribunal."
One complaint of the United States, made on July 15, 1915, had been
specifically directed to the action of the British naval authorities
in seizing the American steamer _Neches_, sailing from Rotterdam to an
American port, with a general cargo. The ground advanced to sustain
this action was that the goods originated in part at least in Belgium,
and hence came within the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, which
stipulated that every merchant vessel sailing from a port other than a
German port, carrying goods of enemy origin, might be required to
discharge such goods in a British or allied port. The _Neches_ had
been detained at the Downs and then brought to London. Belgian goods
were viewed as being of "enemy origin," because coming from territory
held by Germany. This was the first specific case of the kind arising
under British Orders in Council affecting American interests, the
goods being consigned to United States citizens.
Great Britain on July 31, 1915, justified her seizure of the _Neches_
as coming within the application of her extended blockade, as
previously set forth, which with great pains she had sought to prove
to the United States was permissible, under international law. Her
defense in the _Neches_ case, however, was viewed as weakened by her
citing Germany's violations of international law to excuse her
extension of old blockade principles to the peculiar circumstances of
the present war. In intimating that so long as neutrals tolerated the
German submarine warfare, they ought not to press her to abandon
blockade measures that were a consequence of that warfare, Great
Britain was regarded as lowering her defense toward the level of the
position taken by Germany. Sir Edward Grey's plan was thus phrased:
"His Majesty's Government are not aware, except from the published
correspondence between the United States and Germany, to what extent
reparation has been claimed from Germany by neutrals for loss of
ships, lives, and cargoes, nor how far these acts have been the
subject even of protest by the neutral governments concerned.
"While these acts of the German Government continue, it seems neither
reasonable nor just that His Majesty's Government should be pressed to
abandon the rights claimed in the British note and to allow goods from
Germany to pass freely through waters effectively patrolled by British
ships of war."
Such appeals the American Government had sharply repudiated in
correspondence with Germany on the submarine issue. Great Britain,
however, unlike Germany, did not admit that the blockade was a
reprisal, and therefore without basis of law, on the contrary, she
contended that it was a legally justifiable measure for meeting
Germany's illegal acts.
The British presentation of the case commanded respect, though not
agreement, as an honest endeavor to build a defense from basic facts
and principles by logical methods. One commendatory view, while not
upholding the contentions, paid Sir Edward Grey's handling of the
British defense a generous tribute, albeit at the expense of Germany:
"It makes no claim which offends humane sentiment or affronts the
sense of natural right. It makes no insulting proposal for the barter
or sale of honor, and it resorts to no tricks or evasions in the way
of suggested compromise. It seeks in no way to enlist this country as
an auxiliary to the allied cause under sham pretenses of humane
intervention."
The task before the State Department of making a convincing reply to
Sir Edward Grey's skillful contentions was generally regarded as one
that would test Secretary Lansing's legal resources. The problem was
picturesquely sketched by the New York "Times":
"The American eagle has by this time discovered that the shaft
directed against him by Sir Edward Grey was feathered with his own
plumage. To meet our contentions Sir Edward cites our own seizures and
our own court decisions. It remains to be seen whether out of strands
plucked from the mane and tail of the British lion we can fashion a
bowstring which will give effective momentum to a counterbolt launched
in the general direction of Downing Street."
CHAPTER V
BRITISH BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL AND INEFFECTIVE BY THE UNITED
STATES--THE AMERICAN POSITION
Secretary Lansing succeeded in accomplishing the difficult task
indicated at the conclusion of the previous chapter. The American
reply to the British notes was not dispatched until October 21, 1915,
further friction with Germany having intervened over the _Arabic_. It
constituted the long-deferred protest which ex-Secretary Bryan vainly
urged the President to make to Great Britain simultaneously with the
sending of the third _Lusitania_ note to Germany. The President
declined to consider the issues on the same footing or as susceptible
to equitable diplomatic survey unless kept apart.
The note embraced a study of eight British communications made to the
American Government in 1915 up to August 13, relating to blockade
restrictions on American commerce imposed by Great Britain. It had
been delayed in the hope that the announced intention of the British
Government "to exercise their belligerent rights with every possible
consideration for the interest of neutrals," and their intention of
"removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing with American
cargoes," and of causing "the least possible amount of inconvenience
to persons engaged in legitimate trade," as well as their "assurance
to the United States Government that they would make it their first
aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "measures taken
by the allied governments," would in practice not unjustifiably
infringe upon the neutral rights of American citizens engaged in
trade and commerce. The hope had not been realized.
The detentions of American vessels and cargoes since the opening of
hostilities, presumably under the British Orders in Council of August
20 and October 29, 1914, and March 11, 1915, formed one specific
complaint. In practice these detentions, the United States contended,
had not been uniformly based on proofs obtained at the time of
seizure. Many vessels had been detained while search was made for
evidence of the contraband character of cargoes, or of intention to
evade the nonintercourse measures of Great Britain. The question
became one of evidence to support a belief--in many cases a bare
suspicion--of enemy destination or of enemy origin of the goods
involved. The United States raised the point that this evidence should
be obtained by search at sea, and that the vessel and cargo should not
be taken to a British port for the purpose unless incriminating
circumstances warranted such action. International practice to support
this view was cited. Naval orders of the United States, Great Britain,
Russia, Japan, Spain, Germany, and France from 1888 to the opening of
the present war showed that search in port was not contemplated by the
government of any of these countries.
Great Britain had contended that the American objection to search at
sea was inconsistent with American practice during the Civil War.
Secretary Lansing held that the British view of the American sea
policy of that period was based on a misconception:
"Irregularities there may have been at the beginning of that war, but
a careful search of the records of this Government as to the practice
of its commanders shows conclusively that there were no instances when
vessels were brought into port for search prior to instituting prize
court proceedings, or that captures were made upon other grounds than,
in the words of the American note of November 7, 1914, evidence found
on the ship under investigation and not upon circumstances ascertained
from external sources."
Great Britain justified bringing vessels to port for search because of
the size and seaworthiness of modern carriers and the difficulty of
uncovering at sea the real transaction owing to the intricacy of
modern trade operations. The United States submitted that such
commercial transactions were essentially no more complex and disguised
than in previous wars, during which the practice of obtaining evidence
in port to determine whether a vessel should be held for prize-court
proceedings was not adopted. As to the effect of size and
seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon search at sea, a board of naval
experts reported:
"The facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships are in
fact greater than in former times, and no difference, so far as the
necessities of the case are concerned, can be seen between the search
of a ship of a thousand tons and one of twenty thousand tons, except
possibly a difference in time, for the purpose of establishing fully
the character of her cargo and the nature of her service and
destination."
The new British practice, which required search at port instead of
search at sea, in order that extrinsic evidence might be sought (i. e.,
evidence other than that derived from an examination of the ship
at sea), had this effect:
"Innocent vessels or cargoes are now seized and detained on mere
suspicion while efforts are made to obtain evidence from extraneous
sources to justify the detention and the commencement of prize
proceedings. The effect of this new procedure is to subject traders to
risk of loss, delay and expense so great and so burdensome as
practically to destroy much of the export trade of the United States
to neutral countries of Europe."
The American note next assailed the British interpretation of the
greatly increased imports of neutral countries adjoining Great
Britain's enemies. These increases, Sir Edward Grey contended, raised
a presumption that certain commodities useful for military purposes,
though destined for those countries, were intended for reexportation
to the belligerents, who could not import them directly. Hence the
detention of vessels bound for the ports of those neutral countries
was justified. Secretary Lansing denied that this contention could be
accepted as laying down a just and legal rule of evidence:
"Such a presumption is too remote from the facts and offers too great
opportunity for abuse by the belligerent, who could, if the rule were
adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high seas and prey with
impunity upon neutral commerce. To such a rule of legal presumption
this Government cannot accede, as it is opposed to those fundamental
principles of justice which are the foundation of the jurisprudence of
the United States and Great Britain."
In this connection Secretary Lansing seized upon the British
admission, made in the correspondence, that British exports to those
neutral countries had materially increased since the war began. Thus
Great Britain concededly shared in creating a condition relied upon as
a sufficient ground to justify the interception of American goods
destined to neutral European ports. The American view of this
condition was:
"If British exports to those ports should be still further increased,
it is obvious that under the rule of evidence contended for by the
British Government, the presumption of enemy destinations could be
applied to a greater number of American cargoes, and American trade
would suffer to the extent that British trade benefited by the
increase. Great Britain cannot expect the United States to submit to
such manifest injustice or to permit the rights of its citizens to be
so seriously impaired.
"When goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in the mass of
merchandise for sale in a neutral country it is an unwarranted and
inquisitorial proceeding to detain shipments for examination as to
whether those goods are ultimately destined for the enemy's country or
use. Whatever may be the conjectural conclusions to be drawn from
trade statistics, which, when stated by value, are of uncertain
evidence as to quantity, the United States maintains the right to sell
goods into the general stock of a neutral country, and denounces as
illegal and unjustifiable any attempt of a belligerent to interfere
with that right on the ground that it suspects that the previous
supply of such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew
or replace, has been sold to an enemy. That is a matter with which the
neutral vendor has no concern and which can in no way affect his
rights of trade."
The British practice had run counter to the assurances Great Britain
made in establishing the blockade, which was to be so extensive as to
prohibit all trade with Germany or Austria-Hungary, even through the
ports of neutral countries adjacent to them. Great Britain admitted
that the blockade should not, and promised that it would not,
interfere with the trade of countries contiguous to her enemies.
Nevertheless, after six months' experience of the "blockade," the
United States Government was convinced that Great Britain had been
unsuccessful in her efforts to distinguish between enemy and neutral
trade.
The United States challenged the validity of the blockade because it
was ineffective in stopping all trade with Great Britain's enemies. A
blockade, to be binding, must be maintained by force sufficient to
prevent all access to the coast of the enemy, according to the
Declaration of Paris of 1856, which the American note quoted as
correctly stating the international rule as to blockade that was
universally recognized. The effectiveness of a blockade was manifestly
a question of fact:
"It is common knowledge that the German coasts are open to trade with
the Scandinavian countries and that German naval vessels cruise both
in the North Sea and the Baltic and seize and bring into German ports
neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports. Furthermore,
from the recent placing of cotton on the British list of contraband of
war it appears that the British Government had themselves been forced
to the conclusion that the blockade is ineffective to prevent
shipments of cotton from reaching their enemies, or else that they are
doubtful as to the legality of the form of blockade which they have
sought to maintain."
Moreover, a blockade must apply impartially to the ships of all
nations. The American note cited the Declaration of London and the
prize rules of Germany, France, and Japan, in support of that
principle. In addition, "so strictly has this principle been enforced
in the past that in the Crimean War the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council on appeal laid down that if belligerents themselves
trade with blockaded ports they cannot be regarded as effectively
blockaded. (The Franciska, Moore, P. C. 56). This decision has
special significance at the present time since it is a matter of
common knowledge that Great Britain exports and reexports large
quantities of merchandise to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland,
whose ports, so far as American commerce is concerned, she regards as
blockaded."
Finally, the law of nations forbade the blockade of neutral ports in
time of war. The Declaration of London specifically stated that "the
blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts."
This pronouncement the American Government considered a correct
statement of the universally accepted law as it existed to-day and
prior to the Declaration of London. Though not regarded as binding
upon the signatories because not ratified by them, the Declaration of
London, the American note pointed out, had been expressly adopted by
the British Government, without modification as to blockade, in the
Order in Council of October 9, 1914. More than that, Secretary Lansing
recalled the views of the British Government "founded on the decisions
of the British Courts," as expressed by Sir Edward Grey in instructing
the British delegates to the conference which formulated the
Declaration of London, and which had assembled in that city on the
British Government's invitation in 1907. These views were:
"A blockade must be confined to the ports and coast of the enemy, but
it may be instituted of one port or of several ports or of the whole
of the seaboard of the enemy. It may be instituted to prevent the
ingress only, or egress only, or both."
The United States Government therefore concluded that, measured by the
three universally conceded tests above set forth, the British policy
could not be regarded as constituting a blockade in law, in practice,
or in effect. So the British Government was notified that the American
Government declined to recognize such a "blockade" as legal.
Stress had been laid by Great Britain on the ruling of the Supreme
Court of the United States on the _Springbok_ case. The ruling was
that goods of contraband character, seized while going to the neutral
port of Nassau, though actually bound for the blockaded ports of the
South, were subject to condemnation. Secretary Lansing recalled that
Sir Edward Grey, in his instruction to the British delegates to the
London conference before mentioned, expressed this view of the case,
as held in England prior to the present war:
"It is exceedingly doubtful whether the decision of the Supreme Court
was in reality meant to cover a case of blockade running in which no
question of contraband arose. Certainly if such was the intention the
decision would _pro tanto_ be in conflict with the practice of the
British courts. His Majesty's Government sees no reason for departing
from that practice, and you should endeavor to obtain general
recognition of its correctness."
The American note also pointed out that "the circumstances surrounding
the _Springbok_ case were essentially different from those of the
present day to which the rule laid down in that case is sought to be
applied. When the _Springbok_ case arose the ports of the confederate
states were effectively blockaded by the naval forces of the United
States, though no neutral ports were closed, and a continuous voyage
through a neutral port required an all sea voyage terminating in an
attempt to pass the blockading squadron."
Secretary Lansing interjected new elements into the controversy in
assailing as unlawful the jurisdiction of British prize courts over
neutral vessels seized or detained. Briefly, Great Britain arbitrarily
extended her domestic law, through the promulgation of Orders in
Council, to the high seas, which the American Government contended
were subject solely to international law. So these Orders in Council,
under which the British naval authorities acted in making seizures of
neutral shipping, and under which the prize courts pursued their
procedure, were viewed as usurping international law. The United
States held that Great Britain could not extend the territorial
jurisdiction of her domestic law to cover seizures on the high seas. A
recourse to British prize courts by American claimants, governed as
those courts were by the same Orders in Council which determined the
conditions under which seizures and detentions were made, constituted
in the American view, the form rather than the substance of redress:
"It is manifest, therefore, that, if prize courts are bound by the
laws and regulations under which seizures and detentions are made, and
which claimants allege are in contravention of the law of nations,
those courts are powerless to pass upon the real ground of complaint
or to give redress for wrongs of this nature. Nevertheless, it is
seriously suggested that claimants are free to request the prize court
to rule upon a claim of conflict between an Order in Council and a
rule of international law. How can a tribunal fettered in its
jurisdiction and procedure by municipal enactments declare itself
emancipated from their restrictions and at liberty to apply the rules
of international law with freedom? The very laws and regulations which
bind the court are now matters of dispute between the Government of
the United States and that of His Britannic Majesty."
The British Government, in pursuit of its favorite device of seeking
in American practice parallel instances to justify her prize-court
methods, had contended that the United States, in Civil War contraband
cases, had also referred foreign claimants to its prize courts for
redress. Great Britain at the time of the American Civil War,
according to an earlier British note, "in spite of remonstrances from
many quarters, placed full reliance on the American prize courts to
grant redress to the parties interested in cases of alleged wrongful
capture by American ships of war and put forward no claim until the
opportunity for redress in those courts had been exhausted."
This did not appear to be altogether the case, Secretary Lansing
pointed out that Great Britain, during the progress of the Civil War,
had demanded in several instances, through diplomatic channels, while
cases were pending, damages for seizures and detentions of British
ships alleged to have been made without legal justification. Moreover,
"it is understood also that during the Boer War, when British
authorities seized the German vessels, the _Herzog_, the _General_ and
the _Bundesrath_, and released them without prize court proceedings,
compensation for damages suffered was arranged through diplomatic
channels."
The point made here was by way of negativing the position Great
Britain now took that, pending the exhaustion of legal remedies
through the prize courts with the result of a denial of justice to
American claimants, "it cannot continue to deal through the diplomatic
channels with the individual cases."
The United States summed up its protest against the British practice
of adjudicating on the interference with American shipping and
commerce on the high seas under British municipal law as follows:
"The Government of the United States has, therefore, viewed with
surprise and concern the attempt of His Majesty's Government to confer
upon the British prize courts jurisdiction by this illegal exercise of
force in order that these courts may apply to vessels and cargoes of
neutral nationalities, seized on the high seas, municipal laws and
orders which can only rightfully be enforceable within the territorial
waters of Great Britain, or against vessels of British nationality
when on the high seas.
"In these circumstances the United States Government feels that it
cannot reasonably be expected to advise its citizens to seek redress
before tribunals which are, in its opinion, unauthorized by the
unrestricted application of international law to grant reparation, nor
to refrain from presenting their claims directly to the British
Government through diplomatic channels."
The note, as the foregoing series of excerpts show, presented an array
of legal arguments formidable enough to persuade any nation at war of
its wrongdoing in adopting practices that caused serious money losses
to American interests and demoralized American trade with neutral
Europe. Great Britain, however, showed that she was not governed by
international law except in so far as it was susceptible to an elastic
interpretation, and held, by implication, that a policy of expediency
imposed by modern war conditions condoned, if it did not also
sanction, infractions.
Nothing in Great Britain's subsequent actions, nor in the utterances
of her statesmen, could be construed as promising any abatement of the
conditions. In fact, there was an outcry in England that the German
blockade should be more stringent by extending it to all neutral
ports. Sir Edward Grey duly convinced the House of Commons that the
Government could not contemplate such a course, which he viewed as
needless, as well as a wrong to neutrals.
As to the hostility of the neutrals to British blockade methods, Sir
Edward Grey said:
"What I would say to neutrals is this: There is one main question to
be answered--Do they admit our right to apply the principles which
were applied by the American Government in the war between the North
and South--to apply those principles to modern conditions, and to do
our best to prevent trade with the enemy through neutral countries?
"If they say 'Yes'--as they are bound in fairness to say--then I would
say to them: 'Do let chambers of commerce, or whatever they may be, do
their best to make it easy for us to distinguish.'
"If, on the other hand, they answer it that we are not entitled to
interrupt trade with the enemy through neutral countries, I must say
definitely that if neutral countries were to take that line, it is a
departure from neutrality."
CHAPTER VI
GREAT BRITAIN UNYIELDING--EFFECT OF THE BLOCKADE--THE CHICAGO MEAT
PACKERS' CASE
The existing restrictions satisfied Great Britain that Germany,
without being brought to her knees, was feeling the pinch of food
shortage. To that extent--and it was enough in England's view--the
blockade was effective, the contentions of the United States
notwithstanding. So Great Britain's course indicated that she would
not relax by a hair the barrier she had reared round the German coast;
but she sought to minimize the obstacles to legitimate neutral trade,
so far as blockade conditions permitted, and was disposed to pay ample
compensation for losses as judicially determined. The outlook was
that American scores against her could only be finally settled by
arbitral tribunals after the war was over. Satisfaction by arbitration
thus remained the only American hope in face of Great Britain's
resolve to keep Germany's larder depleted and her export trade at a
standstill, whether neutrals suffered or not. Incidentally, the United
States was reminded that in the Civil War it served notice on foreign
governments that any attempts to interfere with the blockade of the
Confederate States would be resented. The situation then, and the
situation now, with the parts of the two countries reversed, were
considered as analogous.
A parliamentary paper showed that the British measures adopted to
intercept the sea-borne commerce of Germany had succeeded up to
September, 1915, in stopping 92 per cent of German exports to America.
Steps had also been taken to stop exports on a small scale from
Germany and Austria-Hungary by parcel post. The results of the
blockade were thus summarized:
"First, German exports to overseas countries have almost entirely
stopped. Exceptions which have been made are cases in which a refusal
to allow the export goods to go through would hurt the neutral country
concerned without inflicting injury upon Germany.
"Second, all shipments to neutral countries adjacent to Germany have
been carefully scrutinized with a view to the detection of a concealed
enemy destination. Wherever there has been a reasonable ground for
suspecting the destination, the goods have been placed in charge of a
prize court. Doubtful consignments have been detained pending
satisfactory guarantees.
"Third, under agreement with bodies of representative merchants of
several neutral countries adjacent to Germany, stringent guarantees
have been exacted from importers. So far as possible all trade between
neutrals and Germany, whether arising from oversea or in the country
itself, is restricted.
"Fourth, by agreements with shipping lines and by vigorous use of the
power to refuse bunker coal in large proportions the neutral
mercantile marine which trades with Scandinavia and Holland has been
induced to agree to conditions designed to prevent the goods of these
ships from reaching Germany.
"Fifth, every effort is being made to introduce a system of rationing
which will insure that the neutrals concerned will import only such
quantities of articles as are specified as normally imported for their
own consumption."
The case of the Chicago meat packers, involving food consignments to
neutral European countries since the war's outbreak, came before a
British prize court before the American protest had been lodged.
Apparently the issues it raised dictated in some degree the
contentions Secretary Lansing made. The British authorities had seized
thirty-three vessels mainly bearing meat products valued at
$15,000,000, twenty-nine of which had been held without being
relegated for disposal to the prize courts. The remaining four
cargoes, held for ten months, and worth $2,500,000 were confiscated by
a British prize court on September 15, 1915. The goods were declared
forfeited to the Crown. One of the factors influencing the decision
was the sudden expansion in shipments of food products to the
Scandinavian countries immediately after the war began. The president
of the prize court, Sir Samuel Evans, asserted that incoming vessels
were carrying more than thirteen times the amount of goods to
Copenhagen--the destination of the four ships involved--above the
volume which under normal conditions arrived at that port. He cited
lard, the exportation of which by one American firm had increased
twentyfold to Copenhagen in three weeks after the war, and canned
meat, of which Denmark hitherto had only taken small quantities, yet
the seized vessels carried hundreds of thousands of tins.
The confiscation formed the subject of a complaint made by Chicago
beef packers to the State Department on October 6, 1915. The British
Court condemned the cargoes on the grounds: (1) that the goods being
in excess of the normal consumption of Denmark, raised a presumption
that they were destined for, i. e., eventually would find their way
into Germany. (2) That, owing to the highly organized state of
Germany, in a military sense, there was practically no distinction
between the civilian and military population of that country and
therefore there was a presumption that the goods, or a very large
proportion of them, would necessarily be used by the military forces
of the German Empire. (3) That the burden of proving that such goods
were not destined for, i. e., would not eventually get into the hands
of the German forces, must be accepted and sustained by the American
shippers.
The Chicago beef firms besought the Government to register an
immediate protest against the decision of the prize court and demand
from the British Government adequate damages for losses arising from
the seizure, detention and confiscation of the shipments of meat
products. They complained that the judgment and the grounds on which
it was based were contrary to the established principles of
international law, and subversive of the rights of neutrals. The
judgment, they said, was unsupported by fact, and was based on
inferences and presumptions. Direct evidence on behalf of the American
firms interested, to the effect that none of the seized shipments had
been sold, consigned or destined to the armed forces or to the
governments of any enemy of Great Britain, was uncontradicted and
disregarded and the seizures were upheld in the face of an admission
that no precedent of the English courts existed justifying the
condemnation of goods on their way to a neutral port.
An uncompromising defense of the prize court's decision came to the
State Department from the British Government a few days later. Most of
the seizures, it said, were not made under the Order in Council of
March 11, 1915, the validity of which and of similar orders was
disputed by the United States Government. The larger part of the
cargoes were seized long before March, 1915. The ground for the
seizures was that the cargoes were conditional contraband destined
from the first by the Chicago beef packers, largely for the use of the
armies, navies and Government departments of Germany and Austria, and
only sent to neutral ports with the object of concealing their true
destination.
From cablegrams and letters in the possession of the British
Government and produced in court, the statement charged, "it was clear
and that packers' agents in these neutral countries, and also several
of the consigners, who purported to be genuine neutral buyers, were
merely persons engaged by the packers on commission, or sent by the
packers from their German branches for the purpose of insuring the
immediate transit of these consignments to Germany.... No attempt was
made by any written or other evidence to explain away the damning
evidence of the telegrams and letters disclosed by the Crown. The
inference was clear and irresistible that no such attempt could be
made, and that any written evidence there was would have merely
confirmed the strong suspicion, amounting to a practical certainty,
that the whole of the operations of shipment to Copenhagen and other
neutral ports were a mere mask to cover a determined effort to
transmit vast quantities of supplies through to the German and
Austrian armies."
A portion of the Western press had denounced the confiscation as a
"British outrage" and as "robbery by prize court"; but the more
moderate Eastern view was that, while American business men had an
undoubted right to feed the German armies, if they could, they were in
the position of gamblers who had lost if the British navy succeeded in
intercepting the shipments.
Exaggerated values placed on American-owned goods held up for months
at Rotterdam and other neutral ports by British became largely
discounted on October 1, 1915, under the scrutiny of the Foreign Trade
Advisers of the State Department. These goods were German-made for
consignment to the United States, and would only be released if the
British Government were satisfied that they were contracted for by
American importers before March 1, 1915, the date on which the British
blockade of Germany began. Early protests against their detention
complained that $50,000,000 was involved; later the value of the
detained goods was raised to $150,000,000. But actual claims made by
American importers to the British Embassy, through the Foreign Trade
Advisers, seeking the release of the consignments, showed that the
amount involved was not much more than $11,000,000 and would not
exceed $15,000,000 at the most.
CHAPTER VII
SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS--TRADING WITH THE ENEMY--THE APPAM--THE
ANGLO-FRENCH LOAN--FORD PEACE EXPEDITION
The next issue the United States raised with Great Britain related to
the seizure of three ships of American registry--the _Hocking_,
_Genesee_ and the _Kankakee_--in November, 1915, on the ground that
they were really German-owned. France had also confiscated the
_Solveig_ of the same ownership for a like reason. The four vessels
belonged to the fleet of the American Transatlantic Steamship Company,
the formation of which under unusual circumstances was recorded
earlier in this history. Great Britain and France served notice that
this company's vessels were blacklisted, and became seizable as prizes
of war because of the suspicion that German interests were behind the
company, and that its American officials with their reputed holdings
of stock were therefore really prizes for German capital. The Bureau
of Navigation had at first refused registry to these vessels, but its
ruling was reversed, and the vessels were admitted, the State
Department taking the view that it could not disregard the company's
declaration of incorporation in the United States, and that its
officers were American citizens. Great Britain sought to requisition
the vessels for navy use without prize-court hearings, but on the
United States protesting she agreed to try the cases.
Another dispute arose, in January, 1916, over the operation of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, one of Great Britain's war measures, the
provisions of which were enlarged to forbid British merchants from
trading with any person or firm, resident in a neutral country, which
had German ownership or German trade connections. The United States
objected to the prohibition as constituting a further unlawful
interference with American trade. It held that in war time the trade
of such a person or firm domiciled in a neutral country had a neutral
status, and consequently was not subject to interference; hence goods
in transit of such a trader were not subject to confiscation by a
belligerent unless contraband and consigned to an enemy country.
An example of the working of the act was the conviction of three
members of a British glove firm for trading with Germany through their
New York branch. They had obtained some $30,000 worth of goods from
Saxony between October, 1915, and January, 1916, the consignments
evading the blockade and reaching New York, whence they were reshipped
to England. One defendant was fined $2,000; the two others received
terms of imprisonment.
While the act would injure American firms affiliated with German
interests, it aimed to press hardest upon traders in neutral European
countries contiguous to Germany who were trading with the Germans and
practically serving as intermediaries to save the Germans from the
effect of the Allies' blockade.
The appearance of a captured British steamer, the _Appam_, at Newport
News, Va., on February 1, 1916, in charge of a German naval
lieutenant, Hans Berg, and a prize crew, involved the United States in
a new maritime tangle with the belligerents. One of the most difficult
problems which Government officials had encountered since the war
began, presented itself for solution. The _Appam_, as elsewhere
described, was captured by a German raider, the _Moewe_ (Sea Gull),
off Madeira, and was crowded with passengers, crews, and German
prisoners taken from a number of other ships the _Moewe_ had sunk.
Lieutenant Berg, for lack of a safer harbor, since German ports were
closed to him, sought for refuge an American port, and claimed for his
prize the privilege of asylum under the protection of American
laws--until he chose to leave. Count von Bernstorff, the German
Ambassador, immediately notified the State Department that Germany
claimed the _Appam_ as a prize under the Prussian-American Treaty of
1828, and would contend for possession of the ship.
This treaty was construed as giving German prizes brought to American
ports the right to come and go. The British Government contested the
German claim by demanding the release of the _Appam_ under The Hague
Convention of 1907. This international treaty provided that a
merchantman prize could only be taken to a neutral port under certain
circumstances of distress, injury, or lack of food, and if she did not
depart within a stipulated time the vessel could not be interned, but
must be restored to her original owners with all her cargo. Were the
_Appam_ thus forcibly released she would at once have been recaptured
by British cruisers waiting off the Virginia Capes. The view which
prevailed officially was that the case must be governed by the
Prussian treaty, a liberal construction of which appeared to permit
the _Appam_ to remain indefinitely at Newport News. This was what
happened, but not through any acquiescence of the State Department in
the German contention. The _Appam_ owners, the British and African
Steam Navigation Company, brought suit in the Federal Courts for the
possession of the vessel, on the ground that, having been brought into
a neutral port, she lost her character as a German prize, and must be
returned to her owners. Pending a determination of this action, the
_Appam_ was seized by Federal marshals under instructions from the
United States District Court, under whose jurisdiction the vessel
remained.
After twelve months of war Great Britain became seriously concerned
over the changed conditions of her trade with the United States.
Before the war the United States, despite its vast resources and
commerce, bought more than it sold abroad, and was thus always a
debtor nation, that is, permanently owing money to Europe. In the
stress of war Great Britain's exports to the United States, like those
of her Allies, declined and her imports enormously increased. She sold
but little of her products to her American customers and bought
heavily of American foodstuffs, cotton, and munitions. The result was
that Great Britain owed a great deal more to the United States than
the latter owed her. The unparalleled situation enabled the United
States to pay off her old standing indebtedness to Europe and became
a creditor nation. American firms were exporting to the allied powers,
whose almoner Great Britain was, commodities of a value of
$100,000,000 a month in excess of the amount they were buying abroad.
Hence what gold was sent from London, at the rate of $15,000,000 to
$40,000,000 monthly, to pay for these huge purchases was wholly
insufficient to meet the accumulating balance of indebtedness against
England.
The effect of this reversal of Anglo-American trade balance was a
decline in the exchange value of the pound sterling, which was
normally worth $4.86-1/2 in American money, to the unprecedented level
of $4.50. This decline in sterling was reflected in different degrees
in the other European money markets, and the American press was
jubilant over the power of the dollar to buy more foreign money than
ever before. Because Europe bought much more merchandise than she sold
the demand in London for dollar credit at New York was far greater
than the demand in New York for pound credit at London. Hence the
premium on dollars and the discount on pounds. It was not a premium
upon American gold over European gold, but a premium on the means of
settling debts in dollars without the use of gold. Europe preferred to
pay the premium rather than send sufficient gold, because, for one
reason, shipping gold was costly and more than hazardous in war time,
and, for another, all the belligerents wanted to retain their gold as
long as they could afford to do so.
An adjustment of the exchange situation and a reestablishment of the
credit relations between the United States and the allied powers on a
more equitable footing was imperative. The British and French
Governments accordingly sent a commission to the United States,
composed of some of their most distinguished financiers--government
officials and bankers--to arrange a loan in the form of a credit with
American bankers to restore exchange values and to meet the cost of
war munitions and other supplies. After lengthy negotiations a loan of
$500,000,000 was agreed upon, at 5 per cent. interest, for a term of
five years, the bonds being purchasable at 98 in denominations as low
as $100. The principal and interest were payable in New York City--in
gold dollars. The proceeds of the loan were to be employed exclusively
in the United States to cover the Allies' trade obligations.
The loan was an attractive one to the American investor, yielding as
it did a fraction over 5-1/2 per cent. It was the only external loan
of Great Britain and France, for the repayment of which the two
countries pledged severally and together their credit, faith, and
resources. No such an investment had before been offered in the United
States.
Strong opposition to the loan came from German-American interests. Dr.
Charles Hexamer, president of the German-American Alliance, made a
country-wide appeal urging American citizens to "thwart the loan" by
protesting to the President and the Secretary of State. Threats were
likewise made by German depositors to withdraw their deposits from
banks which participated in the loan. The Government, after being
consulted, had given assurances that it would not oppose the
transaction as a possible violation of neutrality--if a straight
credit, not as actual loan, was negotiated. Conformity to this
condition made all opposition fruitless.
Toward the close of 1915 an ambitious peace crusade to Europe was
initiated by Henry Ford, the automobile manufacturer. Accompanied by
148 pacifists, he sailed on the Scandinavian-American liner, _Oscar
II_, early in December, 1915, with the avowed purpose of ending the
war before Christmas. The expedition was viewed dubiously by the
allied powers, who discerned pro-German propaganda in the presence of
Teutonic sympathizers among the delegates. They also suspected a
design to accelerate a peace movement while the gains of the war were
all on Germany's side, thus placing the onus of continuing hostilities
on the Allies if they declined to recognize the Ford peace party as
mediators. The American Government, regardful of the obligations of
neutrality, notified the several European Governments concerned that
the United States had no connection with the expedition, and assumed
no responsibility for any activities the persons comprising it might
undertake in the promotion of peace.
CHAPTER VIII
AMERICAN PACIFICISM--PREPAREDNESS--MUNITION SAFEGUARD
The Ford peace mission, lightly regarded though it was, nevertheless
recorded itself on the annals of the time as symptomatic of a state of
mind prevailing among a proportion of the American people. It might
almost be said to be a manifestation of the pacifist sentiment of the
country. This spirit found a channel for expression in the Ford
project, bent on hurling its protesting voice at the chancellories of
Europe, and heedless of the disadvantage its efforts labored under in
not receiving the countenance of the Administration.
"The mission of America in the world," said President Wilson in one of
his speeches, "is essentially a mission of peace and good will among
men. She has become the home and asylum of men of all creeds and
races. America has been made up out of the nations of the world, and
is the friend of the nations of the world."
But Europe was deaf alike to official and unofficial overtures of the
United States as a peacemaker. The Ford expedition was foredoomed to
failure, not because it was unofficial--official proposals of
mediation would have been as coldly received--but more because the
pacifist movement it represented was a home growth of American soil.
The European belligerents, inured and case-hardened as they were to a
militarist environment, had not been sufficiently chastened by their
self-slaughter.
The American pacifists, with a scattered but wide sentiment behind
them, consecrated to promoting an abiding world peace, and espousing
the internationalism of the Socialists to that end, and President
Wilson, standing aloof from popular manifestations, a solitary
watchman on the tower, had perforce to wait until the dawning of the
great day when Europe had accomplished the devastating achievement of
bleeding herself before she could extend beckoning hands to American
mediation.
In the autumn of 1915 the President inaugurated his campaign for
national defense, or "preparedness," bred by the dangers more or less
imminent while the European War lasted. "We never know what to-morrow
might bring forth," he warned. In a series of speeches throughout the
country he impressed these views on the people:
The United States had no aggressive purposes, but must be prepared to
defend itself and retain its full liberty and self-development. It
should have the fullest freedom for national growth. It should be
prepared to enforce its right to unmolested action. For this purpose a
citizen army of 400,000 was needed to be raised in three years, and a
strengthened navy as the first and chief line of defense for
safeguarding at all costs the good faith and honor of the nation. The
nonpartisan support of all citizens for effecting a condition of
preparedness, coupled with the revival and renewal of national
allegiance, he said, was also imperative, and Americans of alien
sympathies who were not responsive to such a call on their patriotism
should be called to account.
This, in brief, constituted the President's plea for preparedness. But
such a policy did not involve nor contemplate the conquest of other
lands or peoples, nor the accomplishment of any purpose by force
beyond the defense of American territory, nor plans for an aggressive
war, military training that would interfere unduly with civil
pursuits, nor panicky haste in defense preparations.
The President took a midway stand. He stood between the pacifists and
the extremists, who advocated the militarism of Europe as the
inevitable policy for the United States to adopt to meet the dangers
they fancied.
The country's position, as the President saw it, was stated by him in
a speech delivered in New York City:
"Our thought is now inevitably of new things about which formerly we
gave ourselves little concern. We are thinking now chiefly of our
relations with the rest of the world, not our commercial relations,
about those we have thought and planned always, but about our
political relations, our duties as an individual and independent force
in the world to ourselves, our neighbors and the world itself.
"Within a year we have witnessed what we did not believe possible, a
great European conflict involving many of the greatest nations of the
world. The influences of a great war are everywhere in the air. All
Europe is embattled. Force everywhere speaks out with a loud and
imperious voice in a Titanic struggle of governments, and from one end
of our own dear country to the other men are asking one another what
our own force is, how far we are prepared to maintain ourselves
against any interference with our national action or development.
"We have it in mind to be prepared, but not for war, but only for
defense; and with the thought constantly in our minds that the
principles we hold most dear can be achieved by the slow processes of
history only in the kindly and wholesome atmosphere of peace, and not
by the use of hostile force.
"No thoughtful man feels any panic haste in this matter. The country
is not threatened from any quarter. She stands in friendly relations
with all the world. Her resources are known and her self-respect and
her capacity to care for her own citizens and her own rights. There is
no fear among us. Under the new-world conditions we have become
thoughtful of the things which all reasonable men consider necessary
for security and self-defense on the part of every nation confronted
with the great enterprise of human liberty and independence. That is
all."
Readiness for defense was also the keynote of the President's address
to Congress at its opening session in December, 1915; but despite its
earnest plea for a military and naval program, and a lively public
interest, the message was received by Congress in a spirit approaching
apathy.
The President, meantime, pursued his course, advocating his
preparedness program, and in no issue abating his condemnation of
citizens with aggressive alien sympathies.
In one all-important military branch there was small need for anxiety.
The United States was already well armed, though not well manned. The
munitions industry, called into being by the European War, had grown
to proportions that entitled the country to be ranked with first-class
powers in its provision and equipment for rapidly producing arms and
ammunition and other war essentials on an extensive scale. Conditions
were very different at the outset of the war. One of the American
contentions in defense of permitting war-munition exports--as set
forth in the note to Austria-Hungary--was that if the United States
accepted the principle that neutral nations should not supply war
materials to belligerents, it would itself, should it be involved in
war, be denied the benefit of seeking such supplies from neutrals to
amplify its own meager productions.
But the contention that the country in case of war would have to rely
on outside help could no longer be made on the face of the sweeping
change in conditions existing after eighteen months of the war. From
August, 1914, to January, 1916, inclusive, American factories had sent
to the European belligerents shipment after shipment of sixteen
commodities used expressly for war purposes of the unsurpassed
aggregate value of $865,795,668. Roughly, $200,000,000 represented
explosives, cartridges, and firearms; $150,000,000 automobiles and
accessories; and $250,000,000 iron and steel and copper manufacturing.
This production revealed that the United States could meet any war
emergency out of its own resources in respect of supplies. Its army
might be smaller than Switzerland's and its navy inadequate, but it
would have no cause to go begging for the guns and shells needful to
wage war.
How huge factories were built, equipped, and operated in three months,
how machinery for the manufacture of tinware, typewriters, and countless
other everyday articles was adapted to shell making; and how methods for
producing steel and reducing ores were revolutionized--these
developments form a romantic chapter in American industrial history
without a parallel in that of any other country.
The United States, in helping the European belligerents who had free
intercourse with it, was really helping itself. It was building better
than it knew. The call for preparedness, primarily arising out of the
critical relations with Germany, turned the country's attention to a
contemplation of an agreeable new condition--that the European War,
from which it strove to be free, had given it an enormous impetus for
the creation of a colossal industry, which in itself was a long step
in national preparedness, and that much of this preparedness had been
provided without cost. The capital sunk in the huge plants which
supplied the belligerents represented, at $150,000,000, an outlay
amortized or included in the price at which the munitions were sold.
Thus, when the last foreign contract was fulfilled, the United States
would have at its own service one of the world's greatest munition
industries--and Europe will have paid for it.
CHAPTER IX
NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN MANY WATERS
The months which brought the second year of war to a close were marked
by increased activity on the part of all the navies engaged. Several
single-ship actions took place, and the Germans pursued their
submarine tactics with steady, if not brilliant, results.
It was during this period that they sent the first submersible
merchant ship across the Atlantic and gave further proof of having
developed undersea craft to an amazing state of efficiency. On their
part the British found new and improved methods of stalking submarines
until it was a hazardous business for such craft to approach the
British coast. A considerable number were captured; just how many was
not revealed.
After a slackening in the submarine campaign against merchant ships,
due partly to a division of opinion at home and largely to the growing
protests of neutrals, Germany declared that after March 1, 1916, every
ship belonging to an enemy that carried a gun would be considered an
auxiliary, and torpedoed without warning. (For an account of the
negotiations with the United States in relation to this edict, see
United States and the Belligerents, Vol. V, Part X.)
A spirited fight took place in the North Sea on March 24, 1916, when
the _Greif_, a German auxiliary of 10,000 tons, met the _Alcantara_,
15,300 tons, a converted British merchantman. The _Greif_ was
attempting to slip through the blockade under Norwegian colors when
hailed. She parleyed with the British vessel until the latter came
within a few hundred yards of her. Then, seeing a boat put out, the
German unmasked her guns and opened fire. Broadside after broadside.
In twelve minutes the _Greif_ was on fire and the _Alcantara_ sinking
from the explosion of a torpedo. The _Greif_ might have got away had
not two other British vessels come on the scene, the converted cruiser
_Andes_ ending her days with a few long-range shots. One hundred and
fifteen men and officers out of 300 on the _Greif_ were saved, and the
British lost five officers and sixty-nine men. Both vessels went to
the bottom after as gallant an action as the war had produced. The
_Greif_ was equipped for a raiding cruise and also was believed to
have had on board a big cargo of mines. When the fire started by
exploding shells reaching her hold she blew up with a terrific
detonation and literally was split in twain. Officers of the
_Alcantara_ spoke warmly of their enemy's good showing. One of them
said that they approached to within two hundred yards of the _Greif_
before being torpedoed and boarding parties actually had been ordered
to get ready. They were preparing to lash the rigging of the two
vessels together in the time-honored way and settle accounts with
sheath knives when the torpedo struck and the _Alcantara_ drifted away
helpless.
On the stroke of midnight, February 29, 1916, the German edict went
into effect placing armed merchantmen in a classification with
auxiliary cruisers. The opening of March also was marked by the
deliverance of a German ultimatum in Lisbon, demanding that ships
seized by the Portuguese be surrendered within forty-eight hours.
Thirty-eight German and Austrian steamers had been requisitioned,
striking another blow at Teutonic sea power. Most of these belonged to
Germany. Coincident with Portugal's action Italy commandeered
thirty-four German ships lying in Italian ports, and several others in
her territorial waters. All Austrian craft had been seized months
before, but the fiction of peace with Germany still was punctiliously
observed by both nations. Despite this action Germany did not declare
war upon her quondam ally.
Italy brought another issue sharply to the fore in the early days of
March. A few of her passenger vessels running to America and other
countries had been armed previous to that time. It was done quietly,
and commanders found many reasons for the presence of guns on their
vessels. Of a sudden all Italian passenger craft sailed with 3-inch
pieces fore and aft.
Berlin announced that on the first day of March, 1916, German
submarines had sunk two French auxiliaries off Havre, and a British
patrol vessel near the mouth of the Thames. Paris promptly denied the
statement, and London was noncommittal. No other particulars were made
public. Russian troops landed on the Black Sea coast on March 6, 1916,
under the guns of a Russian naval division and took Atina,
seventy-five miles east of Trebizond, the objective of the Grand Duke
Constantine's army. Thirty Turkish vessels, mostly sailing ships
loaded with war supplies, were sunk along the shore within a few days.
Winston Spencer Churchill, former First Lord of the Admiralty, on
March 7, 1916, delivered a warning in the House of Commons against
what he believed to be inadequate naval preparations. He challenged
statements made by Arthur J. Balfour, his successor, on the navy's
readiness. Mr. Balfour had just presented naval estimates to the
House, and among other things set forth that Britain had increased her
navy by 1,000,000 tons and more than doubled its personnel since
hostilities began. This encouraging assurance impressed the world, but
Colonel Churchill demanded that Sir John Fisher, who had resigned as
First Sea Lord, be recalled to his post.
An announcement from Tokyo, March 8, 1916, served to show the new
friendship between Russia and Japan. Three warships captured by the
Japanese in the conflict with Russia were purchased by the czar and
added to Russian naval forces. They were the _Soya_, the _Tango_ and
the _Sagami_, formerly the _Variag_, _Poltava_ and _Peresviet_, all
small but useful ships. Following the capture of Atina, the Russians
took Rizeh on March 9, 1916, a city thirty-five miles east of
Trebizond, an advance of forty miles in three days toward that
important port. The fleet cooperated, and it was announced that the
defenses of Trebizond itself were under fire and fast crumbling away.
On March 16, 1916, the Holland-Lloyd passenger steamer _Tubantia_, a
vessel of 15,000 tons, was sunk near the Dutch coast by a mine or
torpedo. She was commonly believed to have been the victim of a
submarine. Her eighty-odd passengers and 300 men reached shore.
Several Americans were aboard. Statements by some of the crew that
four persons lost their lives could not be verified, but several of
the _Tubantia's_ officers made affidavit that the vessel was
torpedoed.
The incident aroused public feeling in Holland to fever pitch, and
there were threats of war. Germany hastened to deny that a submarine
attacked the ship, and made overtures to the Dutch Government,
offering reparation if it could be established that a German torpedo
sank the steamer. This was never proved, and nothing came of the
matter. But it cost Germany many friends in Holland and intensified
the fear and hatred entertained toward their neighbor by the majority
of Hollanders. It served to keep Dutch troops, already mobilized,
under arms, and gave Berlin a bad quarter hour.
Fast on the heels of this incident came the sinking of another Dutch
steamer, the _Palembang_, which was torpedoed and went down March 18,
1916, near Galloper Lights in a Thames estuary. Three torpedoes struck
the vessel and nine of her crew were injured. This second attack in
three days upon Dutch vessels wrought indignation in Holland to the
breaking point. The Hague sent a strong protest to Berlin, which again
replied in a conciliatory tone, hinting that an English submarine had
fired on the _Palembang_ in the hope of embroiling Holland with
Germany. This suggestion was instantly rejected by the Dutch press and
people. Negotiations failed to produce any definite result, save to
prolong the matter until tension had been somewhat relieved. The
French destroyer _Renaudin_ fell prey to a submarine in the Adriatic
on the same day. Three officers, including the commander, and
forty-four of her crew, were drowned. Vienna also announced the loss
in the Adriatic of the hospital ship _Elektra_ on March 18, 1916. She
was said to have been torpedoed, although properly marked. One sailor
was killed and two nuns serving as nurses received wounds.
German submarine activity in the vicinity of the Thames was emphasized
March 22, 1916, when the Galloper Lightship, well known to all
seafaring men, went to the bottom after being torpedoed. The vessel
was stationed off dangerous shoals near the mouth of the river. The
Germans suffered the loss of a 7,000-ton steamship on this day, when
the _Esparanza_ was sunk by a Russian warship in the Black Sea. She
had taken refuge in the Bulgarian port of Varna at the outbreak of the
conflict and attempted to reach Constantinople with a cargo of
foodstuffs, but a Russian patrol vessel ended her career.
Another tragedy of the sea came at a moment when strained relations
between Germany and the United States made almost anything probable.
The _Sussex_, a Channel steamer plying between Folkestone and Dieppe,
was hit by a torpedo March 24, 1916, when about three hours' sail from
the former port, and some fifty persons lost their lives. A moment
after the missile struck there was an explosion in the engine room
that spread panic among her 386 passengers, many of whom were Belgian
women and children refugees bound for England. One or two boats
overturned, and a number of frightened women jumped into the water
without obtaining life preservers. Others strapped on the cork jackets
and were rescued hours later. Some of the victims were killed outright
by the impact of the torpedo and the second explosion. Fortunately the
vessel remained afloat and her wireless brought rescue craft from both
sides of the Channel.
The rescuers picked up practically all of those in the water who had
donned life belts and took aboard those in the boats. Many of the
passengers, including several Americans, saw the torpedo's wake. It
was stated that the undersea craft approached the _Sussex_ under the
lee of a captured Belgian vessel, and when within easy target distance
fired the torpedo. According to this version, the Belgian ship then
was compelled to put about and leave the stricken steamer's passengers
and crew to what seemed certain destruction. The presence of this
third craft never was definitely established, although vouched for by
a number of those on the _Sussex_.
Of thirty American passengers five or six sustained painful injuries.
The victims included several prominent persons, one of whom was
Enrique Granados, the Spanish composer, and his wife. They had just
returned from the United States where they had witnessed the
presentation of his opera "Goyescas."
The _Sussex_, which flew the French flag, although owned by a British
company, had no guns aboard and was in no wise an auxiliary craft. She
reached Boulogne in tow, and the American consul there reported that
undoubtedly she had been torpedoed. (For an account of the
negotiations between the United States and Germany in relation to this
affair see United States and the Belligerents, Vol. V, Part X.)
Ambassador Gerard, in Berlin, was instructed to ask the German
Government for any particulars of the incident in its possession, so
as to aid the United States in reaching a conclusion. Berlin, after
much evasion, admitted that a submarine had sunk a vessel near the
spot where the _Sussex_ was lost, but gave it an entirely different
description.
The British converted liner _Minneapolis_, used as a transport, was
torpedoed in the Mediterranean with a loss of eleven lives, although
this vessel also stayed afloat, according to a statement issued in
London, March 26, 1916. She was a ship of 15,543 tons and formerly ran
in the New York-Liverpool service. In a brush between German and
British forces near the German coast, March 25, 1916, a British light
cruiser, the _Cleopatra_, rammed and sunk a German destroyer. The
British destroyer _Medusa_ also was sunk, but her crew escaped to
other vessels. In addition the Germans lost two of their armed fishing
craft.
Fourteen nuns and 101 other persons were killed or drowned March 30,
1916, when the Russian hospital ship _Portugal_ was sunk in the Black
Sea between Batum and Rizeh on the Anatolian coast by a torpedo. The
_Portugal_ had stopped and was preparing to take aboard wounded men on
shore. Several of those on the vessel saw the periscope of a
submarine appear above the waves, but had no fear of an attack, as the
_Portugal_ was plainly marked with the Red Cross insignia and was
flying a Red Cross flag from her peak.
The submarine circled about the ships twice and then, to the horror of
those who were watching, fired a torpedo. The missile went astray, but
another followed and found its mark. Although the ship was at anchor,
with the shore near by, it was impossible to get all of her crew and
wounded to safety.
This attack greatly incensed Russia. She sent protests to all of the
neutral powers, calling attention to the deed perpetrated against her.
The flame of national anger was fanned higher when Constantinople
issued a statement saying that a Turkish submarine had sunk the
_Portugal_, claiming that she flew the Russian merchant flag without
any of the usual Red Cross markings upon her hull. It was said that
the explosion which shattered the vessel was caused by the presence of
ammunition.
On the morning of March 30, 1916, the steamship _Matoppo_, a British
freighter, put into Lewes, Delaware, with her master and his crew of
fifty men held prisoners by a single individual. Ernest Schiller, as
he called himself, had gone aboard the _Matoppo_ in New York, March
29, 1916, and hid himself away until the vessel passed Sandy Hook,
bound for Vladivostok. Then he came out and with the aid of two
weapons which the captain described as horse pistols, proceeded to cow
the master and crew. Schiller announced that the _Matoppo_ was a
German prize of war and that he would shoot the first man who moved a
hostile hand. The crew believed him. They also had an uneasy fear that
certain bombs which Schiller mentioned would be set off unless they
obeyed.
With Schiller in command the _Matoppo_ headed down the coast, her
captor keeping vigil. Off Delaware he ordered the captain to make
port. The latter obeyed, but also signaled to shore that a pirate was
aboard. Port authorities then sent a boat alongside, and Schiller was
arrested. He admitted under examination that he and three other men
had plotted to blow up the Cunard liner _Pannonia_. They bought the
dynamite and made the bombs, but his companions' courage failed, and
the plan was abandoned. Then it was proposed to stow away on some
outward bound ship, seize her at sea and make for Germany. With this
purpose in mind Schiller got aboard the _Matoppo_, but the other
conspirators deserted him. Not to be foiled, he captured the vessel
single-handed. It developed that his name was Clarence Reginald
Hodson, his father having been an Englishman, but he was born of a
German mother, had been raised in Germany, and was fully in sympathy
with the German cause. After a trial he was sent to prison for life,
the only man serving such a sentence in the United States on a charge
of piracy.
CHAPTER X
MINOR ENGAGEMENTS AND LOSSES
The beginning of April found growing discontent among neutrals against
the British blockade of Germany and the virtual embargo on many other
nations. Sweden especially demonstrated resentment. The United States
made new representations about the seizure and search of first-class
mail. All of this did not deter the Allies from pursuing their policy
of attrition toward Germany.
The opening day of the month saw the arrival in New York harbor of the
first armed French steamer to reach that port. The _Vulcain_, a
freighter, tied up at her dock with a 47-millimeter quick-firing gun
mounted at the stern. Inquiries followed, with the usual result, and
the advancing days found other French vessels arriving, some of the
passenger liners carrying three and four 75-millimeter pieces, the
famous 75's.
On April 5, 1916, Paris announced that French and British warships had
sunk a submarine at an unnamed point and captured the crew. In this
connection it should be said that many reports were current of
frequent captures made by the Allies of enemy submersibles. The
British seldom admitted such captures, seeking to befog Berlin as to
the fate of her submarines. But there was little doubt that numbers of
them had been taken by both French and British.
An Austrian transport was torpedoed by a French submarine and lost in
the Adriatic, April 8, 1916. Neither the loss of life nor the name of
the vessel was made public by Vienna.
Two days later a Russian destroyer, the _Strogi_, rammed and sunk an
enemy submersible near the spot where the hospital ship _Portugal_ was
torpedoed.
Reports from Paris, April 18, 1916, stated that the French had
captured the submarine that torpedoed the _Sussex_. It was said that
her crew and commander were prisoners, and that documentary evidence
had been obtained on the vessel to prove that she sank the _Sussex_.
The report could not be verified, but Paris semiofficially intimated
that she had indisputable proof that the _Sussex_ was a submarine's
victim. The two incidents coincided so well that the capture of the
vessel was believed to have been made.
Trebizond fell April 18, 1916, the Russian fleet cooperating in a
grand assault. This gave Russia possession of a fine port on the
Turkish side of the Black Sea and marked important progress for her
armies in Asia.
Zeebrugge, Belgium, was shelled by the British fleet, April 25, 1916,
the city sustaining one of the longest and heaviest bombardments which
it had suffered since its capture by the Germans. As a convenient base
for submarines it was a particularly troublesome thorn to the Allies,
and the bombardment was directed mainly at buildings suspected of
being submarine workshops, and the harbor defenses. Several vessels
were sunk and much damage wrought, the German batteries at Heyst,
Blankenberghe, and Knocke coming in for the heavy fire.
Naval vessels on guard engaged the Germans and succeeded in driving
them off, although outnumbered. Two British cruisers were hit, without
serious injury. The attack was part of a concerted plan which
contemplated a smashing blow at the British line, while the Irish
trouble engaged attention.
One British auxiliary was lost and her crew captured and a destroyer
damaged in a scouting engagement off the Flanders coast on April 25,
1916. The identity of the vessel was never learned. The _E-22_, a
British submarine, went down April 25, 1916, in another fight. The
Germans scored again when they sank an unidentified guard vessel off
the Dogger Bank after dusk April 26, 1916.
Reports from Holland, April 28, 1916, told of the sinking by an armed
British trawler of a submarine near the north coast of Scotland. The
enemy vessel had halted two Dutch steamers when the trawler appeared.
The submersible was said to be of the newest and largest type and
sixty men were believed to have been lost with her. The British
announced the sinking of a submarine on the same day off the east
coast, one officer and seventeen men being taken prisoners. It was
believed that the two reports concerned the same craft.
London also admitted the loss on April 28, 1916, of the battleship
_Russell_, which struck a mine or was torpedoed in the Mediterranean.
Admiral Freemantle, whose flag she bore, was among the 600 men saved.
The loss of life included one hundred and twenty-four officers and
men.
The _Russell_ was a vessel of 14,000 tons, carried four 12-inch guns,
twelve 6-inch pieces, and a strong secondary battery. She belonged to
the predreadnought period, but was a formidable fighting ship.
The quality of Russia's determination to win victory, despite serious
reverses in the field, was well indicated by an announcement made in
Petrograd, May 1, 1916. A railroad from the capital to Soroka, on the
White Sea, begun since the war started, had just reached completion.
It covered a distance of 386 miles and made accessible a port that
hitherto had been practically useless, where it was proposed to divert
commercial shipments. This left free for war purposes the port of
Archangel, sole window of Russia looking upon the west until Soroka
was linked with Petrograd. German activity had halted all shipping to
Russian Baltic ports. At the moment announcement was made of this
event more than 100 ships were waiting for the ice to break up,
permitting passage to Archangel and Soroka, which are held in the
grip of the north for many months of each year. A majority of these
vessels carried guns, ammunition, harness, auto trucks and other
things sorely needed by the Czar's armies. Additional supplies were
pouring in through Vladivostok for the long haul across Siberia.
May 1, 1916, witnessed the destruction of a British mine sweeper, the
_Nasturtium_, in the Mediterranean along with the armed yacht
_Aegusa_, both said to have been sunk by floating mines.
The _Aegusa_ formerly was the _Erin_, the private yacht of Sir Thomas
Lipton, and valued at $375,000 when the Government took it over. The
craft was well known to Americans, as Sir Thomas, several times
challenger for the international cup held in America, had made more
than one trip to our shores on the vessel.
The French submarine _Bernouille_ was responsible for the sinking of
an enemy torpedo boat in the Adriatic, May 4, 1916.
Washington received a note from Germany, May 6, 1916, offering to
modify her submarine orders if the United States would protest to
Great Britain against the stringent blockade laid upon Germany. This
offer met with prompt rejection, President Wilson standing firm and
insisting upon disavowal for the sinking of the _Sussex_ and search of
merchantmen before attack. (See United States and the Belligerents,
Vol. V, Part X.)
Laden with munitions, the White Star liner _Cymric_ was torpedoed and
sunk May 9, 1916, near the British coast with a loss of five killed.
The vessel remained afloat for several hours, and the remainder of her
110 officers and men were saved. She had no passengers aboard.
An Austrian transport, name unknown, went down in the Adriatic, May
10, 1916, after a French submarine torpedoed her. She was believed to
have had a heavy cargo of munitions, but few soldiers, and probably
was bound for Durazzo, Albania, from Pola, the naval base.
The _M-30_, a small British monitor, was struck by shells from a
Turkish battery upon the island of Kesten in the Mediterranean and
sunk on the night of May 13, 1916. Casualties consisted of two killed
and two wounded.
The sunny weather of May brought a resumption of attacks by British
and Russian submarines in the Baltic. May 18, 1916, London announced
that four German steamers, the _Kolga_, _Biancha_, _Hera_ and _Trav_,
had been halted and destroyed in that sea within a few days. Other
similar reports followed and German shipping was almost driven from
the Baltic, thereby cutting off an important source of supply with
Sweden and Norway, the only neutrals still trading with Germany to any
considerable extent. For her part, Germany alleged that several
merchant ships torpedoed by the British were sunk without warning and
some of the crews killed. London denied the charge and there was none
to prove or disprove it.
An Italian destroyer performed a daring feat on the night of May 30,
1916, running into the harbor at Trieste and sinking a large transport
believed to have many soldiers aboard. Scarcely a soul was saved,
current report stated. The raider crept out to sea again and made good
her escape.
CHAPTER XI
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK--BEGINNING
A great naval battle was fought in the North Sea off Jutland, where,
in the afternoon and evening hours of May 31, 1916, the fleets of
England and Germany clashed in what might have been--but was not--the
most important naval fight in history. Why it missed this ultimate
distinction is not altogether clear. Nor is it altogether clear to
which side victory leaned. To pronounce a satisfactory judgment on
this point we need far more information than we have at present, not
only as to the respective losses of the contending fleets, but as to
the objects for which the battle was fought and the degree of success
attained in the accomplishment of these objects. The official German
report states that the German fleet left port "on a mission to the
northward." No certain evidence is at hand as to the nature of this
mission; but whatever it was, it can hardly have been accomplished, as
the most northerly point reached was less than 180 miles from the
point of departure, and the whole fleet, or what was left of it, was
back in port within thirty-six hours of the time of leaving.
It has been surmised, and there is some reason to believe, that the
German plan was to force a passage for their battle cruisers through
the channel between Scotland and Norway into the open sea, where, with
their high-speed and long-range guns, they might, at least for a time,
have paralyzed transatlantic commerce with very serious results for
England's industries, and still more serious results for her supplies
of food.
Another and a somewhat more plausible theory is that the plan
contemplated the escape to the open sea, not of the battle cruisers
themselves, but of a number of very fast armed merchant cruisers of
the _Moewe_ type, which were to repeat the _Moewe's_ exploit on a
large scale, serving the same purpose that the submarines served
during the period of their greatest activity. Color is lent to this
theory by what is known of the controversy now going on in Germany
between those who advocate a renewal of the submarine warfare against
commerce, and those who are opposed to this. It is evident that if
fast cruisers could be maintained on England's trade routes they might
do all that the submarine could do and more, and this without raising
any question as to their rights under international law.
Whatever the plan was, we must assume that it was thwarted by the
interposition of the British fleet; and from this point of view the
battle takes on the aspect of a British victory. The German fleet is
back behind the fortifications and the mine fields of the Helgoland
Bight, in the waters which have been its refuge for nearly two years
of comparative inactivity. And the British fleet still holds the
command of the sea with a force which makes its command complete, and,
in all human probability, permanent.
From the narrower point of view of results on the actual field of
battle, it appears from the evidence at present available that,
although the Germans were first to withdraw, they had the advantage
in that they lost fewer ships than their opponents and less important
ones. This is not admitted by the British, and it may not be true, but
we have the positive assurance of the German Government that it is so,
and no real evidence to the contrary. It must therefore be accepted
for the present, always with remembrance of the fact that the first
reports given out by the German authorities are admitted to have been
understated "for military reasons." Only time can tell us whether the
world has the whole truth even now. But taking the situation as it
appears from the official statements on both sides the losses are as
follows:
BRITISH: GERMAN:
_Battleships_ _Battleships_
None One
_Battle Cruisers_ _Battle Cruisers_
Three One
_Armored Cruisers_ _Armored Cruisers_
Three None
_Light Cruisers_ _Light Cruisers_
None Four
_Destroyers_ _Destroyers_
Eight Five
It is certain that the British losses as here given are substantially
correct. It is possible, as has been said, that the German losses are
much understated. British officers and seamen claim to have actually
seen several large German ships blow up, and they are probably quite
honest in these claims. They may be right. But it is only necessary to
picture to one's self the conditions by which all observers were
surrounded while the appalling inferno of the battle was at its height
to understand how hopelessly unreliable must be the testimony of
participants as to what they saw and heard. Four or five 15-inch
shells striking simultaneously against the armor of a battleship and
exploding with a great burst of flame and smoke might well suggest to
an eager and excited observer the total destruction of the ship. And
an error here would be all the easier when to the confusion of battle
was added the obscurity of darkness and of fog.
No doubt the time will come when we shall know, if not the full truth,
at least enough to justify a conclusion as to the comparative losses.
Until that time comes, we may accept the view that, measured by the
narrow standard of ships and lives lost, the Germans had the
advantage. This may be true, and yet it may be also true that the real
victory was with the British, since they may have bought with their
losses, great as these were, that for which they could well afford to
pay an even higher price.
According to the statement of Admiral Jellicoe, the British fleet has
for some months past made a practice of sweeping the North Sea from
time to time with practically its whole force of fighting ships, with
a view to discouraging raids by the German fleet, and in the hope of
meeting any force which might, whether for raiding or for any other
purpose, have ventured out beyond the fortifications and mine fields
of the Helgoland Bight.
On May 31, 1916, the fleet was engaged in one of these excursions,
apparently with no knowledge that the German fleet was to be abroad at
the same time.
In accordance with what appears to have been the general practice, the
Grand Fleet was divided; the main fighting force under the command of
Admiral Jellicoe himself occupying a position near the middle of the
North Sea, while the two battle-cruiser divisions under Vice Admiral
Beatty, supported by a division of dreadnoughts of the _Queen
Elizabeth_ class under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, were some seventy
miles to the southward (Plate I). Admiral Jellicoe had a division of
battle cruisers and another of armored cruisers in addition to his
dreadnoughts, and both he and Admiral Beatty were well provided with
destroyers and light cruisers.
[Illustration: PLATE I. Map of Distribution of Forces. 2:30 P.M., May
31, 1916. Not drawn to scale, all distances distorted.]
The day was pleasant, but marked by the characteristic mistiness of
North Sea weather; and as the afternoon wore on the mist took on more
and more the character of light drifting fog, making it impossible at
times to see clearly more than two or three miles.
At two o'clock in the afternoon Admiral Beatty's detachment was
steaming on a northerly course, being then about ninety miles west of
the coast of Denmark, accompanied by several flotillas of destroyers
and with a screen of light cruisers thrown out to the north and east.
At about 2.20 p. m. the _Galatea_, one of the light cruisers engaged
in scouting east of Beatty's battle cruisers, reported smoke on the
horizon to the eastward, and started to investigate, the battle
cruisers taking up full speed and following. The _Galatea_ and her
consorts were soon afterward engaged with a German force of similar
type, and at 3.30 p. m. a squadron of five battle cruisers was made
out some twelve miles farther to the eastward.
Beatty immediately swung off to the southeast in the hope of getting
between the German squadron and its base; but the German commander,
Vice Admiral von Hipper, changed course correspondingly, and the two
squadrons continued on courses nearly parallel but somewhat converging
until, at about 3.45 p. m., fire was opened on both sides, the range
at that time being approximately nine miles. About ten minutes after
the battle was fully joined, the _Indefatigable_, the rear ship of the
British column, was struck by a broadside from one or more of the
enemy ships, and blew up; and twenty minutes later the _Queen Mary_,
latest and most powerful of the British battle cruisers, met the same
fate. The suddenness and completeness of the disaster to these two
splendid ships has not yet been explained and perhaps never will be.
Their elimination threw the advantage of numbers actually engaged from
the British to the German side, but very shortly afterward the leading
ships of Rear Admiral Thomas's dreadnought division came within range
and opened fire (Plate II), thus throwing the superiority again to the
British side. For the next half hour or thereabouts, Von Hipper's five
battle cruisers were pitted against four battle cruisers and four
dreadnoughts, and Beatty reports that their fire fell off materially,
as would naturally be the case. They appear, however, to have stood up
gallantly under the heavy punishment to which they must have been
subjected.
Beatty was drawing slowly ahead, though with little prospect of being
able to throw his force across the enemy's van, as he had hoped to do,
his plan being not only to cut the Germans off from their base, but to
"cap" their column and concentrate the fire of his whole force on Von
Hipper's leading ships. Had he been able to do this he would have
secured the tactical advantage which is the object of all maneuvering
in a naval engagement, and would at the same time have compelled Von
Hipper to run to the northward toward the point from which Jellicoe
was known to be approaching at the highest speed of his dreadnoughts.
With this thought in mind, Beatty was holding on to the southward,
taking full advantage of his superiority in both speed and gunfire,
when a column of German dreadnoughts was sighted in the southeast
approaching at full speed to form a junction with Von Hipper's
squadron (Plate II). Seeing himself thus outmatched, Beatty made a
quick change of plan. There was no longer any hope of carrying out the
plan of throwing himself across the head of the German column, but if
Von Hipper could not be driven into Jellicoe's arms it was conceivable
that he might be led there, and with him the additional force that Von
Scheer was bringing up to join him. So Beatty turned to the northward,
and, as he had hoped, Von Hipper followed; not, however, until he had
run far enough on the old course to effect a junction with Von Scheer,
whose battleships fell in astern of the battle cruisers as these last
swung around to the northward and took up a course parallel to that of
Beatty and Thomas. Thus the running fight was resumed, with the
difference that both forces were now heading at full speed toward the
point from which Beatty knew Jellicoe to be approaching. Von Hipper's
delay in turning had permitted Beatty to draw ahead, and the relative
positions of the engaged squadrons were now those shown in Plate III.
[Illustration: PLATE II. Map of The Running Fight to the Southward.
3:48 to 4:40 P.M.]
It is during this part of the fight that the British accounts speak of
Beatty as engaging the whole German fleet and as being thus
tremendously overmatched. A moment's study of Plate III will make it
clear that this claim is not tenable. Without fuller information
than we have of positions and distances, it is impossible to say
exactly how many of Von Scheer's ships were able to fire on Beatty's
column, but certainly the total German force within effective range
could not have been materially larger than the British force it was
engaging.
As far as can be figured out from Beatty's own report, the only time
when he was actually pitted against a force superior to his own,
within fighting range, was after he had lost the _Indefatigable_ and
the _Queen Mary_, and before the dreadnoughts of Admiral Thomas's
force had reached a point from which they were able to open an
effective fire. He entered the fight with six battle cruisers opposed
to five. He then, for a short time, had four opposed to five. A little
later he had four battle cruisers and four dreadnoughts opposed to
five battle cruisers, and a little later still, as has just been
stated, the forces actually opposed within firing range became
practically equal.
About six o'clock, having gained enough to admit of an attempt to
"cap," Beatty turned his head to the eastward, but Von Hipper refused
to accept this disadvantage and turned east himself, thus continuing
the parallel fight on a large curve tending more and more to the east
(Plate IV). It was about this time that the _Lützow_, Von Hipper's
flagship and the leader of the German column, dropped out of the
formation, having been so badly damaged that she could no longer
maintain her position in the formation. Von Hipper, calling a
destroyer alongside, boarded her and proceeded, through a storm of
shell, to the _Moltke_, on which he resumed his place at the head of
the fleet.
[Illustration: The "Queen Mary," sister ship of the "Lion" and the
"Princess Royal" and capable of a speed of 28-1/2 knots an hour. The
modern British battle cruiser was sunk about half an hour after the
battle was fully joined.]
Jellicoe, seventy miles to the northward with the main fighting force,
received word about three o'clock that the scouting force was in
contact with the enemy, and started at once to effect a junction with
Beatty. He may well have wished at that moment that his forces were
separated somewhat less widely. Under his immediate command he had
three squadrons of the latest and most powerful fighting ships in the
world, twenty-five in all, including his own flagship, the _Iron
Duke_. His squadrons were led by three of the youngest and most
efficient vice admirals in the service, Sir Cecil Burney, Sir Thomas
Jerram, and Sir Doveton Sturdee (Plate V). With him also were Rear
Admirals Hood and Arbuthnot, the former commanding three of the
earlier battle cruisers, _Invincible_, _Inflexible_, and
_Indomitable_, the latter commanding four armored cruisers, of which
we shall hear more hereafter.
[Illustration: PLATE III. Map of Running Fight to Northward. 4:40 to
6:00 P.M.]
A majority of the battleships were capable of a speed of 21 to 22
knots, but it is improbable that the force, as a whole, could do
better than 20 knots. Hood, with his "Invincibles," was capable of
from 27 to 28 knots, and Jellicoe appears to have sent him on ahead to
reenforce Beatty at the earliest possible moment, while following
himself at a speed which, he says, strained the older ships of his
force to the utmost. The formation of the fleet was probably somewhat
like that shown at A, Plate V, which doubtless passed into B before
fighting range was reached.
Of the southward sweep of this great armada, the most tremendous
fighting force the world has ever seen on sea or land, we have no
record. They started. They arrived. Of the hours that intervened no
word has been said. Yet it is not difficult to picture something of
the dramatic tenseness of the race. The admirals, their staffs, the
captains of the individual ships, all were on the bridges, and there
remained not only through the race to reach the battle area, but
through all the fighting after they had closed with the enemy. The
carefully worked-out plans for directing everything from the shelter
of the conning tower were thrown aside without a thought. So there we
see them, grouped in the most exposed positions on their ships,
straining their eyes through the haze for the first glimpse of friend
or foe, and urging those below, at the fires and the throttle, to
squeeze out every fraction of a knot that boilers and turbines could
be made to yield.
[Illustration: PLATE IV. British Grand Fleet Approaching from
Northwest. Beatty turns eastward at 6 P.M. to meet Jellicoe and cap
Von Hipper. Von Hipper turns east to avoid cap.]
Word must have been received by wireless of the loss of the
_Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_, while the battleships were still
fifty or sixty miles away, for Beatty at this time was running south
faster than Jellicoe could follow. It was perhaps at this time that
Hood was dispatched at full speed to add his three battle cruisers to
the four that remained to Beatty. They arrived upon the scene about
6.15 p. m., shortly after Beatty had turned eastward, and swung in
ahead of Beatty's column, which, as thus reenforced, consisted of
seven battle cruisers and four dreadnoughts (Plate IV). Admiral Beatty
writes in terms of enthusiastic admiration of the way in which Hood
brought his ships into action, and it is easy to understand the thrill
with which he must have welcomed this addition to his force.
But his satisfaction was not of long duration. Hardly had the
_Invincible_, Hood's flagship, settled down on her new course and
opened fire than she disappeared in a great burst of smoke and flame.
Here, as in the case of the _Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_, the
appalling suddenness and completeness of the disaster makes it
impossible of explanation. The survivors from all three of the ships
totaled only about one hundred, and none of these are able to throw
any light upon the matter.
By this time Beatty's whole column had completed the turn from north
to east, and Jellicoe was in sight to the northward with his
twenty-five dreadnoughts, coming on at twenty knots or more straight
for the point where Beatty's column blocked his approach. Jellicoe
writes of this situation:
"Meanwhile, at 5.45 p. m., the report of guns had become audible to
me, and at 5.55 p. m. flashes were visible from ahead around to the
starboard beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished,
and the position of the enemy's fleet could not be determined.
"... At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle
cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to
ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels."
[Illustration: PLATE V. British Grand Fleet Coming into Action. 6:30
P.M. (Probable Formation.)]
Here is a bald description of a situation which must have been charged
with almost overwhelming anxiety for the commander in chief. He knew
that just ahead of him a tremendous battle was in progress, but of the
disposition of the forces engaged he had only such knowledge as he
could gather from the few fragmentary wireless messages that Beatty
had found time to flash to him. He could see but a short distance, and
he knew that through the cloud of mingled fog and smoke into which he
was rushing at top speed, all ships would look much alike. That he
was able to bring his great force into action and into effective
cooperation with Beatty without accident or delay is evidence of high
tactical skill on his part and on that of every officer under his
command; and, what is even more creditable, of supremely efficient
coordination of all parts of the tremendous machine which responded so
harmoniously to his will.
As Jellicoe's leading ships appeared through the fog, Beatty realized
that he must make an opening in his column to let them through.
Accordingly, he called upon his own fast battle cruisers for their
highest speed and drew away to the eastward, at the same time
signaling Admiral Evan-Thomas to reduce speed and drop back (Plate
VI). The maneuver was perfectly conceived and perfectly timed. As
Jellicoe approached he found Beatty's column opening before him. As he
swept on through, steering south toward the head of the German line,
Beatty also swung south on a course parallel and a little to the
eastward, and, by virtue of his high speed, a little ahead. The result
was that neither force blanketed the other for a moment, and the head
of the German column a little later found itself under the
concentrated fire of practically the whole British fleet. It may well
have "crumpled" as Jellicoe says it did; and whether it is true or
not, as British reports insist, that several of the leading ships were
destroyed at this time, it appears to be true, at least, that a second
battle cruiser dropped out, leaving only three of this type under Von
Hipper's command.
[Illustration: PLATE VI. Jellicoe and Beatty acting together to "cap"
German Fleet Germans turn to Westward.]
The situation quickly passed from that shown in Plate VI to that shown
in Plate VII. The British had succeeded in establishing a cap, and
their position was so favorable that it looked as if nothing could
save the Germans from destruction. But night was coming on, the mist
was thickening into fog, and the only point of aim for either fleet
was that afforded by the flash of the enemy's guns. Von Scheer, who,
as Von Hipper's senior, was in command of the German forces as a
whole, turned from east to west, each ship swinging independently, and
sent his whole force of destroyers at top speed against the enemy. It
would be difficult to imagine conditions more favorable for such an
attack. Jellicoe saw the opportunity and acted upon it as quickly
as did Von Scheer, with the result that as the German destroyers swept
toward the British fleet they met midway the British destroyers bent
on a similar mission, and a battle followed in the fog between
destroyers, which broke up both attacks against the main fleets and
saved the capital ships on both sides from what must otherwise have
been very serious danger. Meantime, as the German fleet drew off to
the westward, Jellicoe and Beatty passed completely around the German
flank and reached a position to the southward and between the German
fleet and its base at Helgoland (Plate VIII). By the time this was
accomplished it was nearly ten o'clock, and the long day of that high
northern latitude was passing into darkness rendered darker by the
fog. Contact between the main fleets had been lost, and firing had
ceased. Both sides continued destroyer attacks through the night, and
some of these were delivered with great dash and forced home with
splendid determination. The British claim to have sunk at least two of
the German capital ships during these attacks. But this the Germans
deny.
[Illustration: PLATE VII. Jellicoe and Beatty pass around flank of
German Fleet, "capping" it and interposing between the Fleet and its
base. Both sides send out destroyer attacks, which continue throughout
the night.]
The Battle of Horn Reef, if that is to be its name, was at an end. The
German fleet, now heading west, evidently soon afterward headed south
toward the secure waters of the Helgoland Bight, which it was allowed
to reach without interference by the British main fleet and apparently
without discovery. The British may well have been cautious during the
night about venturing far into the fog, which, as they knew, if it
concealed the capital ships of Von Hipper and Von Scheer, concealed
also their destroyers, and possibly a stretch of water strewn with
mines laid out by the retreating enemy. It must not be forgotten,
however, that the British were between the German fleet and its base
when they ceased the offensive for the night, and that only a few
hours, in that high latitude, separate darkness from dawn.
With daylight, which was due by two o'clock or thereabouts, and with
the lifting of the fog, Jellicoe reports that he searched to the
northward and found no enemy. The following day, June 2, 1916, his
fleet was back in port taking account of its losses, which were
undeniably great, though whether or not they were greater than those
of the enemy, only the future can prove.
[Illustration: PLATE VIII. 10:00 P.M. Darkness and Fog. British Forces
heading off to Southward to avoid attack during darkness and to keep
between German Fleet and its Base. Protecting rear with Destroyers
and Light Cruisers.]
CHAPTER XII
SOME SECONDARY FEATURES OF THE BATTLE
One of the most inexplicable incidents of the day occurred as
Jellicoe's fleet approached the battle area and shortly before the
leading ship of his column passed through the opening in Beatty's
column as already described. The four armored cruisers, _Duke of
Edinburgh_, _Defence_, _Warrior_, and _Black Prince_, under Rear
Admiral Arbuthnot, were in company with Jellicoe, but separated from
his main force by several miles. These ships were lightly armed and
very lightly armored, and had absolutely no excuse for taking part in
the main battle. Yet they now appeared, somewhat in advance of the
main fleet and to the westward of it, standing down ahead of
Evan-Thomas's division of battleships, which, as has been explained,
had dropped back to allow Jellicoe to pass ahead of them. As Arbuthnot
appeared from the mist, several German ships opened on him at short
range, and within a very few moments three of his four ships were
destroyed. The _Defence_ and _Black Prince_ were sunk immediately. The
_Warrior_ was so badly damaged that she sank during the night while
trying to make port. The _Duke of Edinburgh_ escaped.
Another incident belonging to this phase of the battle was the jamming
of the steering gear of the _Warspite_, of Admiral Evan-Thomas's
division of dreadnoughts. Apparently the helm jammed when in the
hard-over position, and the ship for some time ran around in a circle.
Through the whole of this time she was under heavy fire, and is
reported to have been struck more than one hundred times by heavy
shells, in spite of which she later returned to her position in column
and continued the fight. In the course of her erratic maneuvers, while
not under control, she circled around the _Warrior_ and received so
much of the fire intended for that ship as to justify the belief that
her accident saved the _Warrior_ from immediate destruction and made
it possible, later, to rescue her crew before she finally sank, as she
did during the night following the battle. It was for a time believed
that the _Warspite_ had deliberately intervened to save the _Warrior_,
and there was much talk of the "chivalry" of the _Warspite's_
commander in thus risking his own ship to save another--this from
those who overlooked the fact that the duty of the _Warspite_, as one
of the most valuable fighting units of the fleet, was to keep place in
line as long as possible, and to carry out the general battle plan;
which, of course, is exactly what the _Warspite_ did to the best of
her ability.
It is an interesting fact that of the small number of capital ships
lost or disabled, four were flagships. Two rear admirals, Hood and
Arbuthnot, went down with their ships. Two vice admirals, Von Hipper
and Burney, shifted their flags in the thickest of the fight, Von
Hipper from the _Lützow_ to the _Moltke_, Burney from the
_Marlborough_ to the _Revenge_.
A large part of Admiral Jellicoe's official report deals with the work
of the light cruisers and destroyers, which, while necessarily
restricted to a secondary rôle, contributed in many ways to the
operations of the main fighting forces, securing and transmitting
information, attacking at critical times, and repelling attacks from
the corresponding craft of the enemy. All of these tasks took on a
special importance as the afternoon advanced, because of the
decreasing visibility due to fog and darkness. The light cruisers were
constantly employed in keeping touch with the enemy, whose capital
ships they approached at times to within two or three thousand yards.
And the destroyers of both fleets were repeatedly sent at full speed
through banks of fog within which the enemy battleships were known to
be concealed. It is rather remarkable that so few of either type were
lost, and still more remarkable, so far as the destroyers are
concerned, that so few of the large ships were torpedoed.
The _Marlborough_ was struck and badly damaged, but she made her way
safely to port. The _Frauenlob_, _Rostock_, and _Pommern_ were sunk.
And that is the whole story so far as known at present. Yet several
hundred torpedoes must have been discharged, most of them at ranges
within 5,000 yards. It looks a little as if the world would be obliged
to modify the view that has been held of late with reference to the
efficiency of the torpedo--or at least of the torpedo as carried by
the destroyer.
The loss of the three large battle cruisers, _Indefatigable_,
_Invincible_, and _Queen Mary_ is, and will always remain, the most
dramatic incident of the battle, and the most inexplicable. It is
doubtful if we shall ever know the facts, but that something more than
gunfire was involved is made clear by the fact that in each case the
ship was destroyed by an explosion. Whether this was due to a shell
actually penetrating the magazine, or to the ignition of exposed
charges of powder, or to a torpedo or a mine exploding outside in the
vicinity of the magazine, it is impossible to do more than conjecture.
There is a suggestion of something known, but kept back, in the
following paragraph from a description of the battle by Mr. Arthur
Pollen, which is presumably based upon information furnished by the
British admiralty:
"As to the true explanation of the loss of the three ships that did
blow up, the admiralty, no doubt, will give this to the public if it
is thought wise to do so. But there can be no harm in saying this. The
explanation of the sinking of each of these ships by a single lucky
shot--both they and practically all the other cruisers were hit
repeatedly by shots that did no harm--is, in the first place,
identical. Next, it does not lie in the fact that the ships were
insufficiently armored to keep out big shell. Next, the fatal
explosion was not caused by a mine or by a torpedo. Lastly, it is in
no sense due to any instability or any other dangerous characteristic
of the propellants or explosives carried on board. I am free to
confess that when I first heard of these ships going down as rapidly
as they did, one of two conclusions seemed to be irresistible--either
a shell had penetrated the lightly armored sides and burst in the
magazine, or a mine or torpedo had exploded immediately beneath it.
But neither explanation is right."
One of the most striking and surprising features about the battle is
the closeness with which it followed conventional lines, both in the
types of vessels and weapons used and in the manner of using them.
Neither submarines nor Zeppelins played any part, although both were
at hand. Some effective scouting was done by an aeroplane sent up from
one of the British cruisers early in the afternoon, and the British
report that they saw and fired on a Zeppelin early in the morning of
June 1, 1916. But this is all.
There have been stories for many months of a 17-inch gun of marvelous
power carried by German dreadnoughts, but no such weapon made its
appearance on this occasion.
And the tactics employed on both sides were as conventional as the
weapons used. The fight was a running fight in parallel columns from
the moment when Beatty and Von Hipper turned simultaneously toward the
south upon their first contact with each other, until night and fog
separated them at the end. Beatty's constant effort to secure a "cap"
contained no element of novelty, and Von Hipper's reply, refusing the
cap by turning his head away and swinging slowly on a parallel
interior curve, was the conventional, as it was the proper, reply.
Unfortunately, as we shall presently have occasion to note, the German
fleet ultimately allowed itself to be capped, with results which ought
to have been far more disastrous than they actually were. The
destroyers availed themselves of the opportunities for attack
presented from time to time by smoke and fog, and their drive was
stopped by opposing destroyers.
So little is known of the German injuries that there is hardly
sufficient ground for comment on the British marksmanship, but it does
not appear to have been what the world had expected. Exactly the
reverse is true of the German marksmanship, especially at long ranges.
It was surprisingly good, and the most surprising thing about it was
the promptness with which it found the target. The _Indefatigable_ was
blown up ten minutes after she came under fire. Hood, in the
_Invincible_, had barely gained his place in line ahead of Beatty's
column when the ship was smothered by a perfect avalanche of shells.
If it is true that the Germans had the best of the fight so far as
material damage is concerned, the explanation must be sought in their
unexpectedly excellent marksmanship, with, perhaps, some sinister
factor added, either of weakness in the British ships or of amazing
power in the German shells, yet to be made known. It should be noted
that the sinking of the _Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_ belongs
to a phase of battle in which Beatty had a distinct advantage of
force, his six battle cruisers being opposed to five.
While the torpedo, as has been said, played no important part in the
action, the destroyers on both sides appear to have been active and
enterprising, and if they accomplished little in a material way, the
threat involved in their presence and their activity had an important
moral effect at several critical stages of the battle. When Jellicoe
decided not to force his offensive during the night he was no doubt
influenced in a large degree by the menace of the German destroyers.
Destroyers, too, contributed indirectly to the loss of Arbuthnot's
armored cruisers. When Jellicoe's fleet was seen approaching,
"appearing shadowlike from the haze bank to the northeast," the German
destroyers were thrown against them, and it was apparently to meet and
check this threat that Rear Admiral Arbuthnot pushed forward with his
armored cruisers into the area between the two main battle lines. It
may be that he could not see what lay behind the thrust he sought to
parry. Both the British and the German stories of the battle assume
that he was surprised. But whether this is true or not, the fact is
that it was in seeking to shield the battleships from a destroyer
attack that he came under fire of the main German force and lost three
of his ships almost immediately; for the _Warrior_, although she
remained afloat for several hours, was doomed from the first.
CHAPTER XIII
LOSSES AND TACTICS
The British losses as reported officially, and no doubt truthfully,
are as follows:
BATTLE CRUISERS: Tonnage Officers and Men
_Queen Mary_ 27,500 1,000
_Invincible_ 17,250 790
_Indefatigable_ 18,750 780
ARMORED CRUISERS:
_Defence_ 14,600 850
_Black Prince_ 13,500 750
_Warrior_ 13,500 750
DESTROYERS:
_Tipperary_ 1,850 160
_Turbulent_ 980 100
_Fortune_ 950 100
_Sparrowhawk_ 935 100
_Ardent_ 950 100
_Nestor_ 950 100
_Nomad_ 950 100
_Shark_ 950 100
The reported German losses are as follows. The actual losses may be
much greater:
BATTLE CRUISERS: Tonnage Officers and Men
_Lützow_ 28,000 1,150
BATTLESHIP:
_Pommern_ 13,040 736
LIGHT CRUISERS:
_Wiesbaden_ ...... ...
_Frauenlob_ 2,657 281
_Elbing_ ..... ...
_Rostock_ 4,820 373
DESTROYERS:
Five .... ...
_Total Tonnage Lost_
British 117,150
German 60,720 (acknowledged)
_Total Personnel Lost_
British 6,105
German 2,414 (acknowledged)
When the losses above given are analyzed they are found to be much
less favorable to the German side than they appear to be on the
surface. To begin with, we may eliminate the three armored cruisers on
the British side as of no military value whatever. This reduces the
_effective_ tonnage lost on the British side by more than 40,000 tons.
The _Queen Mary_ and the _Lützow_ offset each other.
If we accept the German claim that the _Pommern_, which was lost, was
actually the old predreadnought of that name, it is fair to say that
she offsets the _Invincible_. There is, however, very good reason for
believing that she was a new and very powerful dreadnought. If this is
the case, her loss easily offsets that of both the _Invincible_ and
the _Indefatigable_. Accepting the German statement, however, as we
have done at all other points, we may say that so far as _effective_
capital ships are concerned, the British lost one more than the
Germans. This, after all, is not a very great difference, and it is to
a large extent offset by the loss of four light cruisers which the
German admiralty admit. In destroyers the advantage is with the
Germans.
With regard to the armored cruisers already referred to, it is
interesting to note the fact that these three ships were practically
presented to the Germans, thus paralleling the fate of their sister
ships, the _Cressy_, _Hogue_ and _Aboukir_, which, as will be
remembered, were destroyed by a submarine in September, 1914, under
conditions of inexplicable carelessness. The military loss represented
by all six of these ships was small (disregarding the loss of
personnel), but they all selected a fate which was so timed, and in
its character so spectacular, as to contribute enormously to the
lessening of the prestige with which the British navy had entered upon
the war.
As bearing still further upon the comparative losses of the battle,
account must be taken of ships seriously injured. Of these, reports
from sources apparently unprejudiced insist that the German fleet has
a large number and that the number includes several of the most
powerful ships that took part in the battle. It is known that the
_Seydlitz_, one of the latest and largest of the German battle
cruisers, was so badly damaged that it will be many months before she
can take the sea again. There are stories of two other large ships
which reached port in such a condition that it was necessary to dock
them at once to keep them from sinking. Contrasted with this is the
fact that the British ships which reached port were but little
injured. This gives an air of probability to the story that the German
fire tactics provided for concentrating the fire of several of their
ships on some one ship of the enemy's line until she was destroyed.
This would explain the otherwise inexplicable fact that, while the
_Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_ were being overwhelmed, the ships
ahead and astern of them were hardly struck at all.
It may well be that the total damage done the German ships by the
steady pounding of the whole line vastly exceeds the total received by
the British ships. Something will be known on this subject when it
becomes clear that the Germans are, or are not, ready to take the sea
again. If their losses and their injuries were as unimportant as they
would have the world believe, if their victory was as great as they
claim that it was, they should be ready at an early date to challenge
the British again, this time with a fleet practically intact as to
ships, and with a personnel fired with enthusiastic confidence in its
own superiority. If, instead of this, they resume the attitude of
evasion which they have maintained so long, the inference will be
plain that they have not given the world the truth with regard to what
the battle of May 31, 1916, meant to them.
A significant fact in this connection is that, regardless of what
others may say on the subject, the officers and men of the British
navy are convinced that the victory was with them, and are eager for
another chance at the enemy, which they fully believe they would have
destroyed if night and fog had not intervened to stay their hand.
The net result of the battle as seen by the world, after careful
appraisement of the claims and counterclaims on both sides, is that
England retains the full command of the sea, with every prospect of
retaining it indefinitely, but that the British navy has, for the
moment, lost something of the prestige which it has enjoyed since the
days of Nelson and Jervis. There is nothing to support the belief that
the control of the North Sea or of any other sea has passed, or by any
conceivable combination of circumstances can pass, into the hands of
Germany during the present war, or as a result of the war.
All accounts of the battle by those who participated in it represent
the weather as capricious. The afternoon came in with a smooth sea, a
light wind, and a clear, though somewhat hazy, atmosphere. The smoke
of the German ships was made out at a distance which must have been
close to twenty miles, and the range-finding as Beatty and Von Hipper
closed must have been almost perfect, as is proved by the promptness
with which the Germans began making hits on the _Queen Mary_ and the
_Indefatigable_. But this did not continue long. Little wisps of fog
began to gather here and there, drifting about, rising from time to
time and then settling down and gathering in clouds that at times cut
off the view even close at hand.
As the sun dropped toward the horizon it lighted up the western sky
with a glow against which the British ships were clearly outlined,
forming a perfect target, while the dark-colored German ships to the
eastward were projected against a background of fog as gray as
themselves. It is interesting to recall the fact that these are
exactly the conditions which existed when the British and German
squadrons in the Pacific met off Coronel. In that case, as in the
present one, the British fleet was to the westward, clearly
silhouetted against the twilight sky. And the fate of the
_Indefatigable_ and the _Queen Mary_ was not more sudden or more
tragic than that of the _Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_. It may be that
the unfavorable conditions were a matter of luck in both cases. But it
may be also that the Germans chose the time of day for fighting in
each case to accord with the position which they expected to occupy.
The British complain much of their bad luck, but there are
well-recognized advantages of position with regard to light and wind
and sea, and the Germans seem to have the luck, if luck it be, to find
these advantages habitually on their side.
The British call it luck that both in the battle off Horn Reef and
that off Dogger Bank the Germans escaped destruction through the
coming on of night. But how would this claim look if it were shown
that the Germans timed their movements with direct regard for
this--allowing themselves time for a decided thrust, to be followed by
withdrawal under cover of night before they could be brought to a
final reckoning? A careful study of the operations of the present war
shows, on both sea and land, a painstaking attention on the German
side to every detail, however small; and instances are not rare in
which they have benefited from this in ways which could hardly have
been anticipated.
TACTICS
There has been much discussion of the tactics of the battle. And
critics, not in foreign countries alone, but in England, have pointed
out errors of Beatty and Jellicoe, while many more have come to their
defense and shown conclusively that everything done was wisely done,
and that the escape of the German fleet and the losses by the British
fleet were due not to bad management but to bad luck.
The first point selected for criticism by those who venture to
criticize is the initial separation of Beatty's force from Jellicoe's
by from sixty to seventy miles. This certainly proved unfortunate, and
if it was deliberately planned it is undoubtedly open to criticism. A
reference, however, to the letter which Mr. Balfour addressed to the
mayors of Yarmouth and Lowestoft on May 8, 1916, suggests an
explanation which makes the separation of the two forces seem a
reasonable one. Mr. Balfour states, for the reassurance of the mayors
and their people, that a policy is to be adopted of keeping a force of
fast and powerful ships in certain ports near the English Channel,
where they will be ready to sally forth at short notice to run down
any force which may venture to cross the North Sea, whether for
raiding or for any other purpose. This foreshadows the assignment of a
force of battle cruisers to the south of England, and it is altogether
probable that Beatty, instead of having been detached by Jellicoe for
operations to the southward, had, in fact, gone out directly from the
mouth of the Thames to sweep northward toward a junction with the main
fleet. This view of the matter is confirmed by the opening sentence of
Beatty's official report to Jellicoe:
"I have the honor to report that at 2.37 p. m. on 31st May, 1916, I
was cruising and steering to the northward to join your flag."
Another point which has been criticized is the action of Beatty in
turning south instead of north when he first found himself in touch
with Von Hipper.
It is not clear from the evidence at hand whether he followed Von
Hipper in this move or whether Von Hipper followed him. If Von Hipper
headed south, Beatty could not well refuse to follow him. Beatty was
there to fight if there was a chance to fight, and there is no
question that in heading south, whether he was following Von Hipper's
lead or taking the lead himself, he took the one course which made the
existing chance a certainty.
From this point of view he was right. From another point of view he
was wrong, for he was running at full speed directly away from his own
supports and directly toward those of his opponent. He thought, and
Jellicoe appears to have thought, that the Germans did not wish to
fight. But when Beatty finally turned north, both Von Hipper and Von
Scheer followed readily enough, although they must have known pretty
accurately what lay ahead of them. Beatty's error, then, if error it
was, seems to have been not so much in judging the tactical situation
as in judging the spirit of his opponent.
Very severe criticism has been directed against Beatty for fighting at
comparatively short ranges--9,000 to 14,000 yards--when he had a
sufficient excess of speed to choose his distance. This is hardly a
fair criticism of the early stages of the battle, as he was then
opposed to ships of the same type as his own, so that if he was
accepting a disadvantage for himself, he was forcing the same
disadvantage upon his opponent. And after all, 14,000 yards is not a
short range, though it is certainly much shorter to-day than it would
have been ten years ago.
When, in the later stages of the battle, he was opposed to
dreadnoughts, it would perhaps have been wiser to maintain a range of
from 18,000 to 20,000 yards, but the situation was complicated by the
necessity of holding the enemy and leading him to the northward, and
it is not possible to say with any confidence that he could have done
this if he had held off at a distance as great as prudence might have
suggested. Circumstances placed him in a position where it seemed to
him desirable to forget the distinction between his ships and
battleships, and this is exactly what he did.
Broadly speaking, it must be said that Beatty's course throughout the
day was, to quote the favorite expression of British writers on naval
matters, "in keeping with the best traditions of the service." And
while it was bold and dashing, it was entirely free from the rashness
which the British public has been a little inclined to attribute to
him since the Dogger Bank engagement.
The only further criticism of the conduct of the battle is that which
insists that the German fleet should not have been allowed to escape.
And here it is difficult to find an explanation which is at the same
time an excuse. Of the situation at 9 p. m. Admiral Jellicoe writes
that he had maneuvered into a very advantageous position, _in which
his fleet was interposed between the German fleet and the German
base_. He then goes on to say that the threat of destroyer attack
during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary to dispose
the fleet with a view to its safety, _while providing for a renewal of
the action at daylight_. Accordingly, he "maneuvered so as to remain
between the Germans and their base, placing flotillas of destroyers
where they could protect the fleet and attack the heavy German ships."
Admiral Beatty reported that he did not consider it desirable or
proper to engage the German battle fleet during the dark hours, _as
the strategical position made it appear certain he could locate them
at daylight under most favorable circumstances_.
Here, then, is the situation between nine and ten o'clock at night,
when the approach of darkness made it seem desirable to call a halt
for the night--a huge fleet, of more than thirty capital ships, was
interposed between the Germans and their base. The general position of
the Germans was known, and destroyers, of which the British had at
least seventy-five available, were so disposed as to keep in touch
with the Germans and attack them during the night. The German fleet
was slower than the British fleet by several knots, and if the
statements by Jellicoe and Beatty of the damage done are even
approximately true, Von Hipper and Von Scheer must have been
embarrassed by the necessity of caring for a large number of badly
crippled ships. The night is short in that high latitude--not over
five hours at the maximum.
And this is the report of what happened at daylight:
"At daylight on the first of June the battle fleet, being southward of
Horn Reef, turned northward in search of the enemy vessels, and for
the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat
destroyers. The visibility early on the first of June was three to
four miles less than on May 31, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being
out of visual touch, did not rejoin the fleet until 9 a. m. The
British fleet remained in the proximity of the battle field and near
the line of approach to German ports until 11 a. m., in spite of the
disadvantages of long distances from fleet bases and the danger
incurred in waters adjacent to the enemy's coasts from submarines and
torpedo craft.
"The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to
the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port.
Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our
position must have been known to the enemy, as, at 4 a. m., the fleet
engaged a Zeppelin about five minutes, during which time she had ample
opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of
the British fleet."
Here is the mystery of the Battle of Horn Reef, and here we may place
our finger on the point at which the explanation lies (if we could
only make out what the explanation is) of the reason why this battle
cannot take rank, either in its conduct or in its results, with the
greatest naval battles of history--with Trafalgar and the Nile, to
speak only of English history. It is an unfinished battle;
inconclusive, indecisive. And in this respect it cannot be changed by
later news of greater losses than are now known. When Jellicoe, with a
force materially superior to that commanded by Von Scheer _and with
higher speed_, had interposed between the latter and his base, it
would seem that there should have been no escape for the German fleet
from absolute destruction. It should have been "played" during the
night, and either held or driven northward. How it could work around
the flank of the British fleet and be out of sight at dawn is
impossible of comprehension even when we have made due allowance for
low visibility. And its disappearance was complete. The only German
force that was seen was a lone Zeppelin, which was engaged for five
minutes. The mystery is increased by Jellicoe's statement that at
daylight he "turned northward in search of the enemy's vessels."
His story ends with something in the nature of a reproach for the
Germans because they did not return, although "our position must have
been known to them."
[Illustration: PLATE IX. Movement of Forces. 10 P.M. May 31st to 4
A.M. June 1st.]
Let us consider what the situation actually was at daylight. The
German fleet, as a whole, had a maximum speed of perhaps 18 knots when
fresh from port, and with every ship in perfect condition. According
to the English account it had suffered very severely, many of its
units being badly crippled. It is inconceivable that it was in a
condition when Jellicoe lost touch with it at ten o'clock at night to
make anything like its maximum speed without deserting these cripples.
Let us suppose, however, that it could and did make 18 knots in some
direction between 10 p. m. and 4 a. m. It would run in that time 108
miles. If, therefore, we draw a circle around the point at which it
was known to have been at ten o'clock, with 108 miles as a radius, we
shall have a circle beyond which it cannot have passed at 4 a. m.
(Plate IX).
If we assume a lower limit for its speed, say 12 knots, we may draw
another circle with 72 miles as a radius, and say that in all
probability the fleet has passed beyond this circle, in some
direction, by 4 a. m. We have now narrowed the space within which the
German fleet may be at 4 a. m. of June 1, 1916, to the narrow area
between our two circles.
But we know that the fleet, if it is in reality badly crippled, will
be under the necessity of making its way back to a base at once, and
that the detour which it makes to avoid the British fleet will
accordingly be as slight as possible. It certainly will not attempt to
reach Helgoland by running north or east. It will doubtless start off
toward the west or southwest and swing around to the south and
southeast as soon as Von Scheer feels confident of having cleared the
western flank of the British fleet. We may then draw two bounding
lines from the point which the Germans are known to have occupied at
ten o'clock, and feel reasonably sure that four o'clock will find them
between these lines. In other words, Jellicoe knew with almost
mathematical certainty that at four o'clock on the morning of June 1,
1916, the German fleet was within the area _A_, _B_, _C_, _D_, Plate
IX. His own more powerful fleet was at _E_ and _F_, _still between the
Germans and their base_, with an excess of speed of at least three
knots, and probably much more than this. He searched _to the north_,
and not finding them there, "was reluctantly compelled to the
conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port." He
accordingly returned to port himself.
THE GERMAN TACTICS
[Illustration: PLATE X. Movements of Jellicoe's Forces--3:30 P.M. to
9:30 P.M. May 31st. (as shown in Jellicoe's Official Report). Note:
The movements of the German Forces here shown correspond nearly, but
not exactly, with the information on which plates VI and VII are
based.]
If it is true that the British blundered in allowing the Germans to
escape from a trap from which escape should have been impossible,
it is equally true that the Germans blundered in allowing
themselves to be caught in such a trap. In the early part of the
battle the German tactics were all that they should have been. In
turning south, when Beatty's force was sighted, Von Hipper was right
from every point of view, for he was closing with Von Scheer while
drawing Beatty away from Jellicoe. He was equally sound a little later
when he turned north, for he did not turn until he had been joined by
Von Scheer. He was still sound when at six o'clock he turned east,
refusing to be capped, for there was as yet no threat of any important
increase in the force to which he was opposed. His mistake--or that of
his superior, Von Scheer--came when the British battleships were
sighted to the northeastward, heading down across his course. He knew,
or should have known, that he was now opposed by a force
overwhelmingly superior to his own and with considerably higher speed;
and yet he not only did not attempt to withdraw, but held his course
and allowed himself to be capped, thus deliberately accepting battle
with a greatly superior force and with conditions the most unfavorable
that could have been devised. That he suffered much at this point, as
he undoubtedly did, was the result of his own bad tactics. That he
suffered less than he deserved was the result of the equally bad
tactics on the part of his opponent.
[Illustration: PLATE XI. What Von Scheer should have done when British
battleship fleet was sighted. NOTE: Compare this with Plates VII and
VIII.]
As soon as the British battleships were seen approaching the German
fleet should have turned south and proceeded at full speed (Plate X),
not necessarily with intent to refuse battle permanently, but with
intent to refuse it until conditions could be made more favorable than
they were at this time. There would have been no difficulty about
reproducing on a larger scale the parallel fight which had marked the
earlier phases of the battle; and with night coming on and the weather
thickening, this would have reduced the British advantage to a
minimum. This plan would, moreover, have led the British straight
toward the mine and submarine area of the Helgoland Bight; or, if they
refused to be so led, would have made it necessary for them to abandon
the fight.
It is true, of course, that they did abandon the fight in spite of
the great advantage which the German tactics gave them, but it is
equally true that the German admiral had no reason to hope for
anything so amazingly fortunate for his reputation as a tactician.
CHAPTER XIV
DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER--OTHER EVENTS OF THE SECOND YEAR
The night of June 7, 1916, a storm raged along the Scottish shore.
There was wind, rain, and high seas. Toward dusk a British cruiser
approached a point on the extreme northerly end of the coast and took
aboard Earl Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, and his staff.
Among those with him were Lieutenant Colonel Oswald Arthur Fitzgerald,
his military secretary; Brigadier General Arthur Ellershaw, one of the
war secretary's advisers; Sir Hay Frederick Donaldson, munitions
expert, and Hugh James O'Beirne, former counselor at the British
embassy in Petrograd and for some time secretary of the embassy in
Washington.
The cruiser, which was the _Hampshire_, of an old class, put to sea
and headed for Archangel, whence Lord Kitchener was to travel to
Petrograd for a war council with the czar and his generals. About
eight o'clock, only an hour after the party embarked, a mine or
torpedo struck the _Hampshire_ when she was two miles from land
between Merwick Head and Borough Brisay, west of the Orkney Islands.
It is supposed that the cruiser's magazine blew up. Persons on shore
saw a fire break out amidships, and many craft went to her assistance,
although a northwest gale was blowing and the sea was rough.
Four boats got away from the _Hampshire_, all of which were swamped.
According to one report Lord Kitchener and his staff were lost after
leaving the cruiser, but a survivor said that he was last seen on the
bridge with Captain Herbert J. Savill, her commander. According to
this man Kitchener had on a raincoat and held a walking stick in his
hand. He said that the two men calmly watched preparations for
departure and saw at least two lifeboats smashed against the ship's
side.
Twenty minutes after being torpedoed the _Hampshire_ sank, with a loss
of 300 lives.
On July 9, 1916, two days after the _Hampshire_ went down, eleven men
of the cruiser reached the Orkneys, after forty-eight hours buffeting
by the waves upon a raft. The body of Colonel Fitzgerald was washed
ashore the same day of the sinking, but the sea did not give up
Kitchener or any of the other members of his staff.
The Italian admiralty made known June 9, 1916, that the transport
_Principe Umberto_ had fallen victim to a submarine in the Adriatic
with a large loss of life. Estimates of the dead ran from 400 to 500.
King George and Queen Mary attended a memorial service at St. Paul's
in honor of Kitchener on June 13, 1916, when many of the most
prominent officials and citizens of the realm were present. They had a
large military escort to and from the cathedral in respect to the dead
war minister. Other services were held at Canterbury and in many
cities through the kingdom.
On the night of June 18, 1916, a squadron of Russian submarines,
destroyers and torpedo boats surprised a German convoy of merchant
vessels at a point southeast of Stockholm and not far from Swedish
waters. Owing to the heavy losses of German shipping in the Baltic
practically all Teuton ships in that sea traveled under escort only,
and there was a dozen or more vessels in the convoy. An engagement
took place lasting forty-five minutes, during which the Russians sank
the auxiliary cruiser _Herzmann_, capturing her crew and two other
craft, one of which was believed to have been a destroyer. In the
confusion all of the merchant ships reached the Swedish coast and
other destroyers and armed trawlers accompanying them made good their
escape. Berlin admitted the loss, adding that the _Herzmann's_
commander and most of her crew were saved.
During the night of June 16, 1916, the British destroyer _Eden_
collided with the transport _France_ in the English Channel and sank.
Thirty-one men and officers escaped.
The German submarine _U-35_, commanded by Lieutenant von Arnauld, put
into Cartagena, Spain, June 21, 1916, after a 1,500 mile run from Pola
with a personal letter to King Alfonso, signed by Kaiser Wilhelm. The
missive bore thanks for the treatment of German refugees from the
Kameruns who had been interned in Spain, and the submarine also
brought hospital supplies for the fugitives. Its arrival made a strong
impression on the Spanish public and was taken as a new sign of
Germany's power. No such trip ever had been made before for such a
purpose. It was a precedent in the communication of kings.
The British steamship _Brussels_, carrying freight and a number of
passengers, most of whom were Belgian refugees bound from Rotterdam to
Tillbury, a London suburb, was captured in the channel by German
destroyers and taken to Zeebrugge, Belgium on the night of June 23,
1916. The incident proved that German warcraft were again far afield.
It was said that the capture had been made by means of previous
information as to the time of the _Brussels's_ sailing and with the
aid of a spy. Her course lay about forty miles north of Zeebrugge, and
a suspected passenger was seen to wave a lantern several times before
the destroyers came up.
Captain Fryatt attempted to ram the nearest vessel and escape, but the
effort failed and he was arrested and charged with piracy. Germany had
announced early in the war that she would consider any merchant
captain who made a hostile move, even in defense of his vessel, as a
franc-tireur.
Loss of the Italian auxiliary cruiser _Citta di Messina_, 3,495 tons,
and the French destroyer _Fourche_ was announced by Paris June 25,
1916. The _Messina_ was carrying troops across the Strait of Otranto
when a submarine torpedoed her. The _Fourche_, serving as a convoy,
gave pursuit without result, then turned back to save such survivors
as she could. Within a few minutes she was struck by a second torpedo
and sunk. All on board the two vessels, probably 300 men, were
drowned.
[Illustration: Earl Kitchener.]
The Austrians lost two transports in the harbor of Durazzo, June 26,
1916, when Italian submarines succeeded in passing the forts and
inflicting a heavy blow. Both ships had troops, arms and ammunition
aboard, according to a Rome report. The casualties were unknown.
Petrograd announced that Russian torpedo craft intercepted a large
convoy of Turkish sailing vessels in the Black Sea on June 29, 1916,
and destroyed fifty-four ships. The attack took place off the
Anatolian coast, and several hundred men were believed to have been
drowned. If the number of ships sunk was correct it established a
record for the war.
The former German warship _Goeben_, renamed the _Sultan Selim_,
shelled Tournose, a Russian Black Sea port, on July 3, 1916, and did
considerable damage. One steamship in the harbor went down as a result
of shell fire and large oil works near the city broke into flames. The
_Breslau_, called the _Midullu_ by the Turks, bombarded Scotchy, a
near-by port, about the same time. Several fires started in the latter
city and there were some casualties at both points.
A second Russian hospital ship, the _Vperiode_, was torpedoed in the
Black Sea, July 9, 1916, with a loss of seven lives. She was a ship of
850 tons, having accommodations for about 120 wounded. Like the
_Portugal_, sunk by a submarine some weeks before the _Vperiode_ was
plainly marked with the usual Red Cross emblem. The attack came in
daylight and was accepted by the Russians as having been deliberately
made, which once more aroused the indignation of the Russian people.
Berlin announced July 7, 1916, that the British steamer _Lestris_,
outward bound from Liverpool had been captured near the British East
Coast and taken to a German port. This second capture in the channel
within a few days caused considerable criticism in England.
As dawn was breaking on July 10, 1916, a submarine came alongside a
tug in Hampton Roads and asked for a pilot. The pilot went aboard and
found himself on the subsea freighter _Deutschland_, first merchant
submarine to be built and the first to make a voyage. She came from
Bremerhaven, a distance of 4,000 miles, in sixteen days. Reports had
been current since the _U-35_ made her trip to Cartagena that the
kaiser would send a message to President Wilson by an undersea boat.
The American public scouted the idea as being impossible of
accomplishment, but the report persisted, and cities along the
Atlantic Coast line had been on the watch for several days. The
_Deutschland_ eventually turned into Hampton Roads, piloted by a
waiting tug, and tied up at a Baltimore dock.
The submarine, which was the largest ever seen in American waters,
became a seven days' wonder. Captain Paul Koenig and his twenty-nine
men and officers told some interesting stories of their trip across
the ocean. It was said that the _Deutschland_ could remain submerged
for four days. When they got into the English Channel there was a
cordon of warships barring exit to the Atlantic that made them
extremely cautious. So Captain Koenig let his vessel lay on the bottom
of the channel for a day and a night while the men enjoyed themselves
with a phonograph and rousing German songs. When their enemies thinned
out to some extent the submarine started again on her way and headed
directly for Baltimore, which she reached without special incident.
The _Deutschland_ immediately received the name of supersubmarine.
Some thousand tons of dyes and other valuable products filled her
hold. They were reported to be worth $1,000,000. The vessel was able
to make twelve knots an hour on the surface and about seven knots when
submerged. She traveled most of the way across on the surface, being
under water about one-third of the time. In addition to her valuable
cargo, she brought a special message from Kaiser Wilhelm to the
president.
No other submarine, so far as known, had made a trip of such distance
as the _Deutschland_ up to that time. Longer voyages have been
accredited to several British submarines, but they were either made
with a convoy or broken by stops enroute. Soon after the beginning of
the war, several Australian submarines journeyed from their far-away
home ports to the Dardanelles, traveling 13,000 miles. They called at
various points in the two Americas. Submarines built in America and
assembled in Canada proceeded from Newfoundland to Liverpool before
the _Deutschland_ crossed the Atlantic, but they had another ship as
convoy.
The _Sultan Selim_ and the _Midullu_ clashed with Russian ships in the
Black Sea, July 11, 1916, sinking four merchant vessels. They also
bombarded harbor works on the Caucasian Coast near Puab. Both
attacking vessels made their escape without injury.
Vienna reported on the same day the sinking of five British patrol
boats in the Otranto Road, between Italy and Albania, by the cruiser
_Novara_. Only nine men were saved.
Seaham Harbor, a small coal port near Sunderland, on the British
Channel coast, was shelled by a submarine the night of July 11, 1916.
Thirty rounds of shrapnel started several fires and caused the death
of one woman. Berlin also claimed the sinking of a British auxiliary
cruiser of 7,000 tons and three patrol vessels on the night of that
day. The statement was never denied in London, and no details were
made public as to the fate of the crews.
The Italian destroyer _Impetuoso_ was torpedoed in the Adriatic, July
16, 1916, with a loss of 125 lives.
In retaliation for Turkish attacks upon her hospital ships, Russia
announced July 21, 1916, that she would no longer respect hospital
ships of the Ottomans. It was pointed out that hitherto all vessels
bearing the markings of the Red Crescent Society, which is the Turkish
equivalent of the Red Cross, had been uniformly respected. This
declaration by Russia implied a depth of resentment that had swept
through all of the allied countries because of deeds said to have been
committed by the Teutons and their Turkish cohorts. Some few reprisals
were taken by France in the way of air raids in retaliation for the
bombardment of open cities. But this was the first recorded step of
Russia in that direction and foretold a war in which all quarter would
disappear.
Two years of fighting had cost both sides heavily upon the sea. Up to
August 1, 1915, according to the best available figures, the allied
navies lost seventy-one warships, with a tonnage of 326,855. Great
Britain was a sufferer to the extent of forty-two ships in that first
year, aggregating 254,494 tons, represented by eight battleships,
three armored cruisers, four protected cruisers, four light cruisers,
and twenty-three smaller craft. In the same period France lost twelve
ships of 28,027 tons; Russia six ships of 21,775 tons; Japan seven
ships of 4,801, and Italy four ships of 17,758 tons.
The losses of Germany, Austria and Turkey in 1915 were placed at
eighty-nine ships, with a gross tonnage of 262,791. Of these Germany
lost sixty-nine vessels, aggregating 238,904 tons, and consisting of
one battle cruiser, five armored cruisers, ten protected cruisers and
fifty smaller craft. Austria lost seven ships of 7,397 tons, and
Turkey thirteen ships of 16,490 tons.
Curiously enough the second year's figures show smaller losses for
both sides. The Allies are accredited with forty-one ships having a
tonnage of 202,600, and the Teutonic allies with thirty-three ships,
having a tonnage of 125,120. Thirty-four British ships were sunk,
including two battleships, three battle cruisers, seven protected
cruisers, two light cruisers, and seventeen smaller craft. The other
losses were distributed between her partners in arms.
Germany's loss in 1916 was twenty-six ships--four battleships, one
battle cruiser, six protected cruisers, and fifteen smaller craft,
approximating 114,620 tons. The remaining casualties on the German
side were divided between Austria and Turkey.
These figures do not take into account several vessels claimed to have
been sunk by both sides but are predicated upon known sea casualties.
During the two years Germany sustained a reduction of 18.5 of her
strength in battleships and battle cruisers of the dreadnought era,
which means ships built since 1904, and these are the units that
really count in modern warfare. Britain is believed to have lost 6.6
of similar vessels. In light cruisers her loss was only 5.2 per cent,
while Germany was weakened nearly 45 per cent in that class of vessel.
The figures shift for vessels of an older type, showing a ratio of
about two to one against Great Britain. This is due largely to the
Dardanelles enterprise and because in some instances older craft were
assigned to many dangerous undertakings where the newer ships were
held in reserve.
In every engagement of any consequence that took place during the
first two years of war, with the single exception of the fight off
Chile, Britain won and Germany lost. But Germany inflicted greater
injury upon her opponent than any other nation in all the years of
Britain's maritime supremacy. The actual material loss to her enemies
was larger than her own. Despite this and the fact of Germany's
strongest efforts Britain still ruled the waves.
PART III--CAMPAIGN ON THE EASTERN FRONT
CHAPTER XV
THE EASTERN FRONT AT THE APPROACH OF SPRING, 1916
In the preceding volumes we have followed the fates of the Austrian,
German, and Russian armies from the beginning of the war up to March
1, 1916. Although spring weather does not set in in any part of the
country through which the eastern front ran until considerable time
after that date, events along the western front, where the Germans
were then hammering away at the gates of Verdun, had shaped themselves
in such a manner that they were bound to influence the plans of the
Russian General Staff. It was, therefore, not much of a surprise that
a Russian offensive should set in previous to the actual arrival of
spring.
As we shall see shortly, the first two weeks or so of March, 1916, saw
a renewal of active fighting at many points along the entire eastern
front. But most of this was restricted during this period to
engagements between small bodies of troops and in most instances
amounted to little more than clashes between patrols. This preliminary
period of reconnoitering was followed by another short period of
preparatory work on the part of the Russian armies consisting of
artillery attacks on certain selected points and undertaken with a
violence and an apparently unlimited supply of guns and ammunition
such as had not been displayed by the Russian forces on any previous
occasion, and when, after these preliminaries the actual offensive was
launched, the number of men employed was proportionally immense.
Before we follow in detail developments along the eastern front, it
will be well for a fuller understanding of these, to visualize again
its location and to determine once more the distribution of the forces
maintaining it on both sides. In its location the eastern front had
experienced very little change since the winter of 1915 had set in and
ended active campaigning. Its northern end now rested on the southwest
shore of the Gulf of Riga at a point about ten miles northwest of the
Baltic town of Pukkum on the Riga-Windau railroad and about thirty
miles northwest of Riga itself. From these it ran in a southeasterly
direction through Schlock, crossed the river Aa where it touches Lake
Babit, passed to the north of the village of Oley and only about five
miles south of Riga, and reached the Dvina about halfway between
Uxkull and Riga. From there it followed more or less closely the left
bank of the Dvina, passed Friedrichstadt and Jacobstadt to a point
just west of Kalkuhnen, a little town on the bend of the Dvina,
opposite Dvinsk. There it continued, generally speaking, in a
southerly direction, at some points with a slight twist to the east,
at others with a similarly slight turn to the west. It thus passed
just east of Lake Drisviaty, crossed the Disna River at Koziany, then
ran through Postavy and just east of Lake Narotch, crossed the Viliya
River and the Vilna-Minsk railroad at Smorgon, and reached the Niemen
at Lubcha. From thence it passed by the towns of Korelitchy, Zirin,
Luchowtchy and entered the Pripet Marshes at Lipsk. About ten miles
south of the latter town the line crossed the Oginsky Canal and
followed along its west bank through the town of Teletshany to about
the point where the canal joins the Jasiolda River. From that point
the Germans still maintained their salient that swings about five
miles to the east of the city of Pinsk.
Up to just south of the Pinsk salient, where the line crossed the
Pripet River, it was held, for the Central Powers, almost exclusively
by German troops. Below that point its defense was almost entirely in
the hands of Austro-Hungarian regiments. Soon after crossing the
Pripet River the line reached the Styr River and followed its many
turns for some thirty miles, now on its western bank and then again on
its eastern shore. This river was crossed between Czartorysk and
Kolki. About thirty miles south of Kolki, just to the east of the
village of Olyka the Russians had succeeded in maintaining a small
salient, the apex of which was directed toward their lost fortress of
Lutsk almost twenty miles to the west, while the southern side passed
very close to that other fortress, Dubno, even though it ran still
some distance to the east of it. Crossing then the Lemberg-Rovno
railroad, the line ran along both banks of the Sokal River to Ikva and
crossed the Galician border near Novo Alexinez.
A short distance south of the border, about twenty miles, it crossed
the Lemberg-Tarnopol railroad, at Jesierne, a little town about sixty
miles east of Lemberg and less than twenty miles west of Tarnopol. Ten
miles further south the Strypa River was crossed and followed within a
mile or so along its west bank for a distance of some twenty miles,
passing west of Burkanow and Buczacz. Just south of the latter town
the line overspread both banks of the Strypa up to its junction with
the Dniester, thence along the banks of this stream for almost twenty
miles to a point about ten miles west of the junction of the Sereth
River with the Dniester. At that point the line took another slight
turn to the east, passing just east of the city of Czernowitz, and
crossing at that point the river Pruth into the Austrian province of
Bukowina. Less than ten miles southeast of Czernovitz the border of
Rumania was reached near Wama and thereby the end of the line.
As the crow flies, the length of this line, from the Gulf of Riga to
the Rumanian border was six hundred and twenty miles. Actually,
counting its many turns and twists and salients, it covered more than
seven hundred and fifty miles. From the Gulf to the Pripet River the
eastern front was held by German troops with one single exception.
From there an Austrian army corps with only a very slight admixture of
German troops completed the front of the Central Empires down to the
Bessarabian border.
[Illustration: Eastern Battle Front, August, 1916.]
From the Gulf of Riga down to the Oginski Canal five distinct German
army corps were facing the Russians. The most northern of these
covered the Gulf section and the Dvina front down to a point near
Friedrichstadt. The second group was lined up from that point on down
to somewhere just south of Lake Drisviaty, the third from Lake
Drisviaty to the Viliya River, the fourth from the Viliya River to the
Niemen River, and the fifth from the Niemen to the Oginski Canal.
Generals von Scholz, von Eichhorn, von Fabeck, and von Woyrsch, were
in command of these difficult units, with Field Marshal von Hindenburg
in supreme command. The sector south of the Oginski Canal and up to
the Pripet River was held by another army group under the command of
Field Marshal Prince Leopold of Bavaria.
The first Austrian army corps, forming the left wing of the front held
by the Austro-Hungarian forces, was commanded by Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand. Later on, as the rapid success of the Russian offensive
made it necessary for German troops to come to the assistance of their
sorely pressed allies, General von Linsingen was dispatched from the
north with reenforcements and assumed supreme command of this group of
armies located in Volhynia. The command of the Galician front was in
the hands of the Bavarian general, Count von Bothmer, while the forces
fighting in the Bukowina were directed by General Pflanzer.
On the Russian side of the line General Kuropatkin, well known from
the Russo-Japanese War, was in command of the northern half of the
front. Of course, there were a number of other generals under him in
charge of the various sectors of this long line. But on account of the
comparative inactivity which was maintained most of the time along
this line, their names did not figure largely. South of the Pripet
Marshes General Alexeieff was in supreme command. Under him were
General Brussilov and General Kaledin in Volhynia, General Sakharoff
in Galicia, and the Cossack General Lechitsky in the Bukowina along
the Dniester. Here, too, of course were a number of other commanders
who, however, came into prominence only occasionally.
An intimate view of some of the Russian generals and their troops is
presented in the following description from the pen of the official
English press representative:
"The head of the higher command, General Alexeieff, early in the
Galician campaign clearly proved, as chief of staff to General
Ivanoff, his extraordinary capacity to direct an advance. As commander
on the Warsaw front he made it evident that he could, with an army
short of all material things, hold until the last moment an enemy
equipped with everything, and then escape the enemy's clutches. At
Vilna he showed his technique by again eluding the enemy.
"General Kaledin, the commander of the army on the Kovel front, is
relatively a new figure in important operations. At the beginning of
the war, as commander of a cavalry division, his universal competence
in all operations committed to his care brought him rapid promotion,
until now he is the head of this huge army. Meeting him frequently as
a guest, I have come to feel great confidence in this resolute, quiet
man, who is surrounded by a sober, serious staff, each officer picked
for his past performance.
"I note an infinite improvement since last year in the army. In the
first place I see no troops without rifles, and there is no shortage
of ammunition apparent. Then there is an extraordinary improvement in
the organization of the transport. In spite of the large volume of
troops on this front they are moving with less confusion than the
transport of single corps entailed two years ago. The compact
organization of munition columns and the absence of wasted time have
speeded up communications fully fifty per cent., enabling three units
to be moved as easily as two last year.
"The transport has been further improved by the addition of motor
vehicles. The staff organization is incomparably better than at the
beginning of the war, and I have not seen a single staff on this front
which is not entirely competent. The system of transporting the
wounded has been well organized, and vast numbers are being cleared
from the front stations without confusion or congestion.
"In comparison I can recall the early Galician days when unimagined
numbers of wounded, both our own and Austrian, flooded Lemberg in a
few days, and there were countless casualties. In spite of the numbers
of wounded here I have not seen any congestion, and I find all the
clearing stations cleared within a few hours after every fight, the
wounded passing to base hospitals and being evacuated into the
interior of Russia with great promptness.
"Owing to the few good roads and the distance from the railway of much
of the fighting, in many places the wounded have been obliged to make
trips of two or three days in peasants' carts before reaching the
railways.
"Finally, the morale of the army has reached an unexampled pitch. In
the hospitals which I inspected with the general many of the wounded,
even those near death, called for news of the front, asking if the
trenches were taken, and saying they were willing to die if the
Germans were only beaten. Such sentiments typify the extent to which
this conflict is now rooted in the hearts of the Russian army and
people."
CHAPTER XVI
THE RUSSIAN MARCH--OFFENSIVE FROM RIGA TO PINSK
Beginning with March 1, 1916, active campaigning was renewed along the
eastern front. Climatic conditions, of course, made any extensive
movements impossible as yet. But from here and there reports came of
local attacks, of more frequent clashes between patrols, and of
renewed artillery activity. Some of these occurred in the Bukowina, in
Bessarabia, and in Galicia, others in the neighborhood of
Baranovitchy, north of the Pripet Marshes, and, later, toward the
middle of March, 1916, fighting took place at the northernmost point
of the line, near Lake Babit.
It was not until March 17, 1916, however, that it became more apparent
what was the purpose of the many encounters between Russian and German
patrols that had been officially reported with considerable regularity
since the beginning of March. On March 17, 1916, both the German and
Austro-Hungarian official statements reported increased Russian
artillery fire all along the line. On the following day, March 18,
1916, the Russians started a series of violent attacks. The first of
these was launched in the sector south of Dvinsk. This is the region
covered with a number of small marshy lakes that had seen a great deal
of the most desperate fighting in 1915. With great violence Russian
infantry was thrown against the German lines that ran from Lake
Drisviaty south to the town of Postavy; another attack of equal
strength developed still further south along both banks of Lake
Narotch. But the German lines not only held, but threw back the
attacking forces with heavy losses which, according to the German
official statement of that day were claimed to have numbered at Lake
Narotch alone more than 9,000 in dead.
In spite of these heavy losses and of the determined German
resistance, the Russians repeated the attack with even increased force
on March 19, 1916. At Lake Drisviaty, in the neighborhood of Postavy
and between Lake Vishnieff and Lake Narotch attack after attack was
launched with the greatest abandon. This time the Germans not only
repulsed all these attacks, but promptly launched a counterattack near
Vidzy, a little country town on the Vilna-Dvinsk post road, capturing
thereby some 300 men. The German official statement claimed that these
prisoners belonged to seven different Russian regiments, giving
thereby an indication of the comparatively large masses of troops
employed on the Russian side.
Again on March 30, 1916, new attacks were launched in the same
locality. At one point the Germans were forced to withdraw a narrow
salient which protruded to a considerable distance just south of Lake
Narotch. Russian machine guns had been placed in such positions that
they enfiladed the salient in three directions and made it untenable.
The German line here was withdrawn a few hundred feet toward the
heights of Blisuiki. During the night of March 20, 1916, especially
violent attacks were again launched against the German lines between
Postavy and Vileity, a small village to the northwest of that town.
There the Russians succeeded in gaining a foothold in the German
trenches. During the afternoon the Russians attempted to extend this
success. With renewed violence they trained their guns on the German
positions. In order to throw back a strong German counterattack, a
curtain of fire was laid before the trenches stormed earlier in the
day. At the same time German artillery strongly supported the attack
of their infantry. On both sides the gunfire became so violent that
single shots could not be distinguished any longer. Shrapnel exploded
without cessation and rifle fire became so rapid that it sounded
hardly less loudly than the gunfire. Late in the afternoon the Germans
succeeded in retaking the trenches which they had lost in the morning,
capturing at that time the Russian victors of the morning to the
number of 600.
On the same day, March 21, 1916, the Russians extended the sphere of
their attack. At the same time that they were hammering away at the
German lines south of Dvinsk other attacks were launched all along the
northern front. In the Riga region, near the village of Plakanen, as
well as in the district south of Dahlen Island, heavy engagements were
fought. Farther south, between Friedrichstadt and Jacobstadt, on the
south bank of the Dvina River the Russians captured a Village and wood
east of Augustinhof.
At many other points, along the entire eastern front from Lake Narotch
south attacks developed. In most of these the Russians assumed the
initiative. But here and there--near Tverietch, just south of Vidzy;
along Lake Miadziol, just north of Lake Narotch, and around Lake
Narotch itself--the Germans attempted a series of counterattacks
which, however, yielded no tangible results. All in all, the day's
fighting made little change in the respective positions and the losses
in men were about evenly divided.
The violence and energy with which the Russian attacks during March
were executed may readily be seen from reports of special
correspondents, who were behind the German lines at that period.
Their collective testimony also tends to confirm the German claims
that very large Russian forces were used and that their losses were
immense.
"From Riga to the Rumanian border," says one of these eye-witnesses,
"thundered the crashing of guns.... About seventy miles northeast of
Mitau, a chain of lakes runs through the wooded, swampy country,
narrow, long bodies of water follow the course of Mjadsjolke River, a
natural trench in a region that is otherwise a very difficult
territory by nature. In the south the chain is closed by Lake Narotch,
a large secluded body of water of some thirty-five square miles,
through which now runs the front. In the north of this chain of lakes,
near the village of Postavy, a thundering of guns commenced on the
morning of March 18, 1916, such as the eastern front had hardly ever
heard before. Russian drum fire! From out of the woods, across the ice
and snow water of the swamps, line after line came storming against
the German trenches.... On the same day, farther south, between Lakes
Narotch and Vishnieff another Russian attack was launched.... The
losses of the Russians are immense. More than 5,000 dead and wounded
must be lying before our positions only about ten miles wide. During
the night a lull came. But with the break of dawn the drum fire broke
out once more, and again the waves of infantry rolled up against our
positions.... During the night from March 19 to March 20, 1916, the
drum fire of the Russian guns increased to veritable fury. As if the
entire supply of ammunition collected throughout the winter months
were to be used up all at once, shells continuously shrieked and
howled through the darkness: 50,000 hits were counted in one single
sector...."
Another correspondent writes: "The numbers of the Russians are
immense. They have about sixty infantry divisions ready. Their losses
are in proportion and were estimated on a front of about ninety miles
to have been near to 80,000 men. For instance, against one German
cavalry brigade there were thrown seven regiments with a very narrow
front, but eight lines deep. Four times they came rushing on against
the German barbed-wire obstacles without being able to break through,
but losing some 3,000 men just the same.... On March 24, 1916, 6,000
Russian shells were counted in a small sector on the Dvinsk front."
In the latter sector and to the north of it, heavy fighting had
developed on March 22 and 23, 1916. Especially around Jacobstadt,
attack followed attack, both sides taking turns in assuming the
offensive. The Russian attacks were particularly violent during the
evening and night of March 22, 1916, and in some places resulted in
the temporary invasion of the German first-line trenches. Especially
hard was fighting along the Jacobstadt-Mitau railroad. Between Dvinsk
and Lake Drisviaty a violent artillery and rifle duel was kept up
almost continuously, resulting at one point, just below Dvinsk near
Shishkovo, in the breaking up of a German attack. South of the lake,
at the village of Mintsiouny, however, a German attack succeeded and
drove the Russians out of some trenches which they had gained only the
day before. Here, too, both artillery and rifle fire of great violence
carried death into both the Russian and German ranks. At Vidzy, a few
miles farther south, the Russians stormed four times in quick
succession against the German positions. Northwest of Postavy another
Russian attack failed, the Germans capturing over 900 men and officers
at that particular point. On the other hand, a German attack still
farther south and northwest of Lake Narotch was repulsed and the
Russians made slight gains in the face of a most violent fire. Near
the south shore of Lake Narotch a German attack supported by
asphyxiating gas forced back the Russians on a very narrow front for a
very short distance. From Lake Narotch down to the Pripet Marshes the
Russians maintained a lively cannonade at many points without,
however, making any attacks in force.
During March 23, 1916, a determined Russian attack against the
bridgehead at Jacobstadt broke down under the heavy German gunfire.
During the night repeated Russian attacks to the north of the
Jacobstadt-Mitau railroad a surprise attack southwest of Dvinsk and
violent attacks along the Dvinsk-Vidzy sector suffered the same fate,
although in some instances the Russian troops succeeded in coming
right up to the German barbed-wire obstacles. Between Lake Narotch and
Lake Vishnieff the Russians captured some woods after driving out
German forces which had constructed strong positions there.
Without cessation the Russian attacks continued day by day. Fresh
troops were brought up continuously. The munition supply, which in the
past had been one of the chief causes of Russian failure and disaster,
seemed to have become suddenly inexhaustible. Not only was each attack
carefully and extensively prepared by the most violent kind of
artillery fire, but the latter was directed also against those German
positions which at that time were immune from attack on account of the
insurmountable natural difficulties brought about by climatic
conditions. For by this time winter began to break up and ice and snow
commenced to melt, signifying the rapid approach of the spring floods.
To a certain extent these climatic conditions undoubtedly had an
important influence on Russian plans. Almost along the entire northern
part of the front the Germans possessed one great advantage. Their
positions were located on higher and drier ground than those of the
Russians, whose trenches were on low ground, and would become next to
untenable, once thaw and spring floods would set in in earnest. There
is little doubt that the great energy and superb disregard of human
life which the Russian commanders developed throughout the March
offensive were principally the result of their strong desire to get
their forces on better ground before it was too late or too difficult,
and from a tactical point of view the risks which they took at that
time and the price which they seemed to be willing to pay to achieve
their ends were not any too great.
In spite of the lack of any important success the Russian attacks
against the Jacobstadt sector were renewed on March 24, 1916. But the
German guns had shot themselves in so well that it availed nothing.
Other attacks, attempted to the southwest of Dvinsk and at various
points north of Vidzy suffered the same fate. In the neighborhood of
Lake Narotch Russian activities on that day were restricted to
artillery fire.
The Germans assumed the offensive on March 25, 1916, on the
Riga-Dvinsk sector. Their guns were trained against Schlock, a small
town on the south shore of the Gulf of Riga, just northwest of Lake
Babit, against the bridgehead at Uxkull, fifteen miles southeast of
Riga on the Dvina, and against a number of other positions between
that point and Jacobstadt. A German attempt to gain ground north of
the small sector of the Mitau-Jacobstadt railway, that was still in
Russian hands, failed in the face of a devastating Russian cannonade.
A German trench was captured by Russian infantry ably supported by
artillery west of Dvinsk, but neither southwest nor south of this
fortress were the Russians able to register any success. Northwest of
Postavy and between Lake Narotch and Lake Vishnieff heavy fighting
still continued and in some places developed into hand-to-hand
fighting between smaller detachments. From Lake Narotch down to the
Pripet Marshes German and Russian guns again raked the trenches facing
them.
On March 26, 1916, the following day, the Russians attacked at many
points. Northwest of Jacobstadt, near the village of Augustinhof, a
most violent attack brought no results. Northwest of Postavy the
Russians stormed two trenches. Southwest of Lake Narotch repeated
heavy attacks were repulsed and some West Prussian regiments recovered
an important observation point which they had lost a week before. Over
2,100 officers and men were captured that day by the Germans.
Aeroplanes of the latter also resumed activity and dropped bombs on
the stations at Dvinsk, and Vileika, as well as along the
Baranovitchy-Minsk railroad.
Russian artillery carried death and destruction into the German
trenches on March 27, 1916, before Oley, south of Riga, and before the
Uxkull bridgehead. In the Jacobstadt sector, as well as near Postavy,
violent engagements, launched now by the Germans and then again by the
Russians, occurred all day long without yielding any results to either
side. Southwest of Lake Narotch the Russians made a determined attack
with two divisions against the positions captured by German regiments
on the previous day, but were not able to dislodge the latter.
Fighting also developed now in the Pripet Marshes and the territory
immediately adjoining. Weather conditions were rapidly changing for
the worse all along the eastern front. Thaw set in, and all marsh and
lake ground was flooded. Everywhere, not only in the southern region,
but also in the northern, the ice on the rivers and lakes became
covered with water and was getting soft near the banks. Throughout the
northern region the melting of the thickly lying snow in the roads was
making the movements of troops and artillery extraordinarily
difficult.
As a result of these conditions, which were growing more difficult
every day, a decided decrease in activity became immediately
noticeable on both sides. For quite a time fighting, of course,
continued at various points. But both the numbers of men employed as
well as the intensity of their effort steadily increased.
Before Dvinsk and just south of the fortress artillery fire formed the
chief event on March 28, 1916. But south of Lake Narotch the Russians
still kept up their attacks. At one point, where the Germans had
gained a wood a few days ago the Russian forces attacked seven times
in quick succession and thereby recovered the southern part of the
forest. Along the Oginski Canal fighting was conducted at long range.
German aeroplanes again dropped bombs, this time on the stations at
Molodetchna on the Minsk-Vilna railroad, as well as at Politzy and
Luniniets.
Both March 30 and 31, 1916, were marked by a noticeable cessation of
attacks on either side. Long-range rifle fire and artillery
cannonades, however, took place at many points from the Gulf down to
the Pripet Marshes. German aeroplanes again attacked a number of
stations on railroads leading out of Minsk to western points.
Of all the violent fighting which took place during the second half of
March, 1916, along the northern half of the eastern front, the little
village of Postavy, perhaps, saw more than any other point. The
special correspondent of a Chicago newspaper witnessed a great deal of
this remarkably desperate struggle during his stay with Field Marshal
von Hindenburg's troops. His vivid description, which follows, will
give a good idea of the valor displayed both by German and Russian
troops, as well as of the immense losses incurred by the attackers
during this series of battles lasting ten days.
"Despite the artillery, despite the machine guns and despite the
infantry fire, the apparently inexhaustible regiments of Russians
swept on over the dead, over the barbed-wire barriers before the
German line, over the first trenches and routed the German soldiers,
who were half frozen in the mud of their shattered shelters. A
terrible hand-to-hand conflict followed. Hand grenades tore down
scores of defenders and assailants' attacks. The men fought like
maniacs with spades, bayonets, knives and clubbed guns.
"But the Russians won at a fearful price for so slight a gain. They
stopped within a hundred feet of victory. It may have been lack of
discipline, lack of officers or lack of reserves; no one knows.
"The Russians seemed helpless in the German trenches. Instead of
sweeping on to the second lines they tried to intrench themselves in
the wrecked German first line. Immediately German artillery hurled
shells of the heaviest caliber into those lines and tore them into
fragments.
"Then came the reserves and by nightfall the Russians had again been
driven out.
"Four days later, suddenly without warning, a mud-colored wave began
to pour forth from the forest. It was a line of Russians three ranks
deep containing more than 1,000 men. Behind this was a second wave
like the first, and then a third.
"The German artillery tore holes in the ranks, which merely closed up
again, marched on, and made no attempt to fire. They marched as though
on parade. 'It was magnificent but criminal!' said a German officer.
"When a fourth line emerged from the woods the German artillery
dropped a curtain of fire behind it, and then a similar wall of shells
ahead of those in front. They then moved these two walls closer
together with a hail of shrapnel between them, while at the same time
they cut loose with the machine guns.
"The splendid formation of Russians, trapped between the walls of
fire, scattered heedlessly in vain. Shells gouged deep holes in the
dissolving ranks. The air was filled with clamor and frantic shrieks
were sometimes heard above the incessant roar and cracking of
exploding projectiles.
"Defeated men sought to dig themselves into the ground in the foolish
belief that they could find safety there from this deluge of shells.
Others raced madly for the rear and some escaped in this way as if by
a miracle. Still others ran toward the German lines only to be cut
down by the German machine-gun fire.
"In less than twenty minutes the terrible dream was over. The attack
had cost the Russians 4,000 lives, and yet not a Russian soldier had
come within 600 yards of the German line."
Another important feature of the March offensive, especially in its
early phases, was the patrol work, executed on both sides. This
required not only courage of the highest order, but also a high degree
of intelligence on the part of the leader as well as of the men
working under him. The results obtained by patrol work are, of course,
of the greatest importance to the respective commanding officers, and
many times the way in which such a mission is carried out is the
decisive factor in bringing success or failure to an important
movement. At the same time patrol work is, of course, a matter of
chiefly local importance, and no matter how difficult the problem or
how cleverly it is solved it is only on rare occasions that the result
reaches the outside world, even though a collection of detailed
reports which patrol leaders are able to make would form a story that
would put to shadow the most impossible book of fiction or the most
unbelievable adventure film.
The following two descriptions of such work, therefore, make not only
a highly sensational story, but prove also that war in modern times
relies almost as much on personal valor and initiative as in times
gone by, all claims to the contrary notwithstanding, and in spite of
the wonderful technical progress which military science of our times
shares with all other sciences.
An American special newspaper correspondent with Von Hindenburg's army
reports the following occurrences and also gives a vivid pen picture
of conditions in the territory immediately behind the front:
"In a forest near the town of Lyntupy a patrol of thirteen Russian
spies hid in an abandoned German dugout in the course of a night march
southward to destroy a bridge over the river Viliya with high
explosives.
"Desperate for food, they finally intrusted their safety to a Polish
forester, ordering him to bring food. The forester promptly gave the
Germans information. The Germans surrounded the dugout, throwing in
three hand grenades. On entering the dugout they discovered ten
Russians killed by grenades and three by bullets.
"The Russian lieutenant had shot two comrades not killed by grenades
and then himself, in order to escape execution as spies, for the
patrol was not in uniform.
"Another audacity was performed during a Russian attack on the German
trenches. From the darkness came a voice calling in perfect German,
'What is the matter with you? Are you soldiers? Are you Germans? Are
you men? Why don't you get forward and attack the Russians? Are you
afraid?'
"Bewildered by these words coming up to them direct from the nearest
wire entanglements, the Germans turned a searchlight in the direction,
discovering the speaker to be a Russian officer who had taken his life
in his hands on the chance of drawing the Germans from the trenches.
His audacity cost him his life, for instantly he fell before a volley
of bullets.
"The Germans speak well of the marksmanship of considerable bodies of
the Russian infantry. Personally, I can say they shoot as well as I
have any desire to have men shoot when aiming at me. Twice on Friday I
was sent scurrying off exposed ridges by the waspish whisper of
bullets coming from a Russian position jutting from the south shore of
Lake Miadziol.
"There is not only railroad building, but also much farming going on
around Karolinow. The land for a distance of thirty miles has been
divided into thirteen farm districts by the Germans and planted to
potatoes, rye, oats and summer barley. In many parts the Germans are
taking a census, all their methodicalness contributing vastly to the
troops' comfort and happiness. Their health is amazing. The records
of one division show five sick men daily, which is not as many as one
would find in any town of 20,000 in any part of the world.
"German caution and inventiveness also keep down the casualties
marvelously. Records I saw to-day showed thirty-eight wounded in one
division in the month of March, though the division was attacked twice
during the offensive. The percentage of heavily wounded for all the
German troops in this region in the last three months averages seven.
"Despite the horrible roads, Field Marshal von Hindenburg has
penetrated to numerous villages on the front in the last few days to
greet and thank the troops. Returning to his headquarters Von
Hindenburg attended a banquet given by princes, nobles and generals of
the empire to mark the fiftieth year of the field marshal's army
service. Present amid the notables was a private soldier, in civil
life a blacksmith, who was elected with two officers by their comrades
to represent Von Hindenburg's old regiment at the banquet. The private
was chosen because he had been in all the battles, but never had been
wounded and never sick. He wears the Iron Cross of both classes."
CHAPTER XVII
RESUMPTION OF AUSTRO-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS
Just as was the case along the Russo-German line, considerable local
fighting took place during the early part of March, to the south,
along the Austro-Russian front. Here, too, much of it was between
scouting parties and advanced outposts who attempted to feel out each
other's strength. Occasionally one or the other side would launch an
attack, with small forces, which, however, had little influence on
general conditions, even though the fighting always was furious and
violent.
On March 4, 1916, a detachment of Russian scouts belonging to General
Ivanoff's army captured and occupied an advanced Austrian trench,
close to the bridgehead of Michaleze, to the northeast of the town of
Uscieszko on the Dniester River. Austrian forces immediately attempted
to regain this position, launching three separate attacks against it.
But the Russian troops held on to their slight gain. Near by, in the
neighborhood of Zamnshin on the Dniester, Russian engineers had
constructed elaborate mining works which were exploded on the same
day, doing considerable damage to the Austrian defense works, and
enabling the Russian forces to occupy some advanced Austrian trenches.
During the next two weeks considerable fighting of this nature
occurred at many points along the front from the Pripet Marshes down
to the Dniester. At no time, however, were the forces engaged on
either side very numerous, nor did the results change the front
materially. The various engagements coming so early in the year, quite
some time before spring could be expected, signified, however, that
there were more important undertakings in the air. The fact that the
Russians were especially active in these scouting expeditions--for
they really amounted to little more at that time--rather pointed
toward an early resumption of the offensive on their part.
It was, therefore, not at all surprising that, before long, a
considerable increase in Russian artillery activity became noticeable.
About the middle of March, coincident with a similar increase of
artillery attacks along the German-Russian front, the Russian guns in
South Poland, Galicia, and the Bukowina began to thunder again as they
had not done since the fall of 1915. This was especially done along
the Dniester River and the Bessarabian front.
During the night of March 17, 1916, the Austrian position near
Uscieszko, which had been attacked before in the early part of March,
again was subjected to extensive attacks by means of mines and to a
considerable amount of shelling. This was a strongly fortified
position, guarding a bridgehead on the Dniester, which had been held
by the Austrians ever since October, 1915. The mining operations were
so successfully planned and executed that the Austrians, were forced
to withdraw a short distance, when the Russians followed the explosion
of their mines with a determined attack with hand grenades. In spite
of this, however, the Austrians held the major part of this position
until March 19, 1916.
How furious the fighting was on both sides is indicated in the
official Austrian statement announcing on March 20, 1916, the final
withdrawal from this position:
"Yesterday evening, after six months of brave defense, the destroyed
bridge and fortifications to the northwest of Uscieszko (on the
Dniester) were evacuated. Although the Russians succeeded in the
morning in exploding a breach 330 yards in width, the garrison, which
was attacked by an eightfold superior force, despite all losses held
out for seven hours in a most violent gun and infantry fire.
"Only at 5 o'clock in the afternoon the commandant, Colonel Planckh,
determined to evacuate the destroyed fortifications. Smaller
detachments and the wounded reached the south bank of the Dniester by
means of boats. Soon, however, this means of transport had to be given
up, owing to the concentrated fire of the enemy.
"There remained for our brave troops, composed of the Kaiser Dragoons
and sappers, only one outlet if they were to evade capture. They had
to cut their way through Uscieszko, which was strongly occupied by the
enemy, to our troops ensconced on the heights north of Zaleszczyki.
The march through the enemy position succeeded. Under cover of night
Colonel Planckh led his heroic men toward our advanced posts northwest
of Zaleszczyki, where he arrived early this morning."
During the next few days the fire from the Russian batteries increased
still more in violence. It did not, however, at any time or place
assume the same strength which it had reached by that time at many
points along the Russo-German front, north of the Pripet Marshes. Nor,
indeed, did the Russians duplicate in the south their attempt at a
determined offensive which they were making then in the north.
Considering the relative importance of Russian activities during the
month of March, 1916, most of the engagements which took place in
Galicia and Volhynia must be classed as unimportant. On March 21,
1916, it is true, almost the entire Austrian front was subjected to
extensive artillery fire. But only at a few points was this followed
by infantry attacks, and these were executed with small detachments
only. Along the Strypa River Russian forces attempted to advance at
various points, without gaining any ground.
Throughout the following days many engagements between individual
outposts were again reported. On March 27, 1916, a Russian attempt to
capture Austrian positions near Bojan, after destroying some of the
fortifications by mines, failed. A similar fate met the attempt made
during that night to cross the Strypa River at its junction with the
Dniester. Other parts of the front, especially near Olyka and along
the Bessarabian border, were again subjected to heavy artillery fire.
Although, generally speaking, the Austrians restricted themselves in
most instances to a determined resistance against all Russian attacks,
they took the offensive in some places, without, however, making any
more headway than their adversaries. By the end of March, 1916,
aeroplanes became more active on this part of the front, just as they
did further north. On March 28, 1916, both sides report more or less
successful bombing expeditions, which on that day seemed to bring
better results to the Austrians than to the Russians, though these
operations, too, must be considered of minor importance. Increasingly
bad weather now began to hamper further undertakings, just as it did
in the north, and by March 31, 1916, the Russian activities seemed to
have lost most of their energy. Along the entire southeastern front
thaw set in and the snows were melting. Although the territory along
the Austro-Russian front, south of the Pripet Marshes, is not as
difficult as further north, not being equally swampy, the fact that
the line ran to a great extent along rivers and through a mountainous,
or at least hilly country, resulted in difficulties hardly less
serious. Rivers and creeks which only a few weeks before held little
water suddenly became torrents and caused a great deal of additional
suffering to the troops on both sides by invading their trenches.
The Russian offensive had barely slowed down when the Austrians
themselves promptly assumed offensive operations. But here, too, it
must be borne in mind that, although we used the word offensive,
operations were altogether on a minor scale and restricted to local
engagements. Some of the heaviest fighting of this period occurred
near the town of Olyka, on the Rovno-Brest-Litovsk railroad. Just
south of this place repeated Austrian attacks were launched against a
height held by the Russians, both on April 1 and 2, 1916, but they
were promptly repulsed.
On April 3, 1916, another attack in that neighborhood, this time
northeast of Olyka, near the villages of Bagnslavka and Bashlyki, also
failed to carry the Austrians into the Russian trenches. On the same
day Austrian attacks were reported northwest of Kremenets on the Ikva,
along the Lemberg-Tarnopol railway and in the vicinity of Bojan.
Against all of these the Russian troops successfully maintained their
positions. Austrian aeroplanes continued their bombing expeditions
against some of the more important places immediately to the rear of
the Russian front, without, however, inflicting any very important
damage.
Again a comparative lull set in. Of course, artillery duels as well as
continuous fighting between scouting parties and outposts took place
even during that period. But attacks in force were rare, and then
restricted to local points only. The latter were made chiefly by the
Austrians, but did not lead to anything of importance. The official
Russian statements report such engagements on April 6, 1916, near Lake
Sosno, south of Pinsk, along the upper Strypa in Galicia, and north of
Bojan. On April 7, 1916, an Austrian offensive attack attempted with
considerable force on the middle Strypa, east of Podgacie, in Galicia,
did not even reach the first line of the Russian trenches. On April 9,
1916, the Russians captured some Austrian trenches in the region of
the lower Strypa, and on April 11, 1916, repulsed Austrian attacks
north and south of the railway station of Olyka. Once more comparative
quiet set in along the southern part of the eastern front, broken
only by engagements between outposts and by a considerable increase in
aeroplane activity.
But on April 13, 1916, the Russians again began to hammer away against
the Austrian lines. A violent artillery attack was launched against
the Austrian positions on the lower Strypa, on the Dniester and to the
northwest of Czernowitz, and the Austrians were forced to withdraw
some of their advanced positions to their main position northeast of
Jaslovietz. Southeast of Buczacz an Austrian counterattack failed. A
height at the mouth of the Strypa, called Tomb of Popoff, fell into
the hands of the Russian troops. Both Austrian and Russian aeroplanes
dropped bombs, without however inflicting any serious damage, even
though the Russians officially announced that as many as fifty bombs
fell on Zuczka--about half a mile outside of Czernowitz--and on North
Czernowitz.
On April 14, 1916, the Russian artillery attacks on the lower Strypa,
along the Dniester and near Czernowitz, were repeated. Again the
Russians launched attacks against the advanced Austrian trenches at
the mouth of the Strypa and southeast of Buczacz. An advanced Russian
position on the road between that town and Czortkov was occupied by
the Austrians.
For the balance of April, 1916, comparative quiet again ruled along
the southeastern front. The muddy condition of the roads made
extensive movements practically impossible. Outposts engagements,
artillery duels, aeroplane bombardments, isolated attacks on advanced
trenches and field works, of course, continued right along. But both
success and failure were only of local importance, so that the
official reports in most cases did not even mention the location of
these engagements.
On the last day of April, 1916, however, the army of Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand started a new strong offensive movement north of Mouravitzy
on the Ikva in Volhynia. Heavy and light artillery prepared the way
for an attack in considerable force against Russian trenches which
formed a salient at that point, west of the villages of Little and
Great Boyarka. The Russians had to give ground, but soon afterward
started a strong counterattack, supported by heavy artillery fire,
and regained the lost ground, capturing some 600 officers and men. In
the southern half of the eastern front, just as in the northern half,
there was little change in the character of fighting with the coming
of May and the improvement in the weather. Artillery duels, aeroplane
attacks, scouting expeditions, and local infantry attacks of limited
extent and strength were daily occurrences.
On May 1, 1916, Austro-Hungarian detachments were forced to withdraw
from their advanced positions to the north of the village of Mlynow.
This place is located on the Ikva River, some ten miles northwest of
the fortress of Dubno. Here the Russians had made a slight gain on
April 28, 1916, and when they made an attack with superior forces from
their newly fortified positions, they were able to drive back the
Austro-Hungarians still a little bit farther.
Twenty miles farther north, in the vicinity of Olyka, the little town
about halfway between the fortress of Lutsk and Rovno, on the railway
line connecting these two points, the Russian forces reported slight
progress on May 2, 1916. Northwest of Kremenets, in the Ikva section,
Austro-Hungarian engineers succeeded in exploding mines in front of
the Russian trenches. But the Russians themselves promptly utilized
this accomplishment by rushing out of their trenches and making an
advanced trench of their own out of the mine craters dug for them by
their enemies.
Two days later, on May 4, 1916, the Russians were able to improve
still more their new positions southeast of Olyka station, and to gain
some more ground there. Repeated Austro-Hungarian counterattacks were
repulsed. The same fate was suffered by determined infantry attacks on
the Russian trenches in the region of the Tarnopol-Pezerna railway, in
spite of the fact that these attacks were made in considerable force
and were supported by strong artillery and rifle fire. Later the same
day an engagement between reconnoitering detachments in the same
region, southwest of Tarnopol, resulted in the capture of one Russian
officer and 100 men by their Austro-Hungarian opponents.
Minor engagements between scouting parties and outposts were the rule
of the day on May 5, 1916. These were especially frequent in the
region of Tzartorysk on the Styr, just south of the Kovel-Kieff
railway and south of Olyka station where Austro-Hungarian troops were
forced to evacuate the woods east of the village of Jeruistche. A
slight gain was made on May 6, 1916, by Russian troops in Galicia, on
the lower Strypa River, north of the village of Jaslovietz.
Extensive mining operations, which, of course, were carried on at all
times at many places, culminated successfully for the Russians in the
region northwest of Kremenets on the Ikva and south of Zboroff on the
Tarnopol-Lemberg railway. In the latter place Russian troops crept
through a mine crater toward a point where Austro-Hungarian
engineering troops were preparing additional mines and dispersed the
working parties by a shower of hand grenades.
Throughout the balance of May operations along the southern part of
the eastern front consisted of continued artillery duels, of frequent
aeroplane attacks, and of a series of unimportant though bitterly
contested minor engagements at many points, most of which had no
relation to each other, and were either attacks on enemy trenches or
attempts at repulsing such attacks. Equally continuous, of course,
also were scouting expeditions and mining operations. None of these
operations, however, yielded any noticeable results for either side,
and the story of one is practically the story of all. The result of
the artillery duels frequently was the destruction of some advanced
trenches, while occasionally a munitions or supply transport was
caught, or an exposed battery silenced. Mining operations sometimes
would also lead to the destruction of isolated trenches, and thus
change slightly the location of the line. But what one side gained on
a given day was often lost again the next day, and the net result left
both Germans and Russians at the end of May practically where they had
been at the beginning. Most of these minor engagements occurred in
regions that had seen a great deal of fighting before. Again and again
there appear in the official reports such well-known names as
Tzartorysk, Kolki, Olyka, Kremenets, Novo Alecinez, Styr River, Ikva
River, Strypa River. Inch by inch almost this ground, long ago
drenched with the blood of brave men, was fought over and over
again--and a gain of a few hundred feet was considered, indeed, a
gain.
CHAPTER XVIII
THAW AND SPRING FLOODS
With the coming of thaw and the resulting spring floods roads along
the eastern front, not any too good under the most favorable climatic
conditions, had become little else than rivers of mud. Many of them,
it is true, had been considerably improved during the long winter
months, especially on the German-Austrian side of the line. But in
many instances this improvement consisted simply of covering them with
planks in order to make it possible to move transports without having
wheels sink into the mud up to the axles. When the creeks and rivers
along the line were now suddenly transformed by the melting snows into
streams and torrents, much of this improvement was carried away and
many roads not only sank back into their former impossible state, but,
becoming thoroughly soaked and saturated with water in many places
became impassable even for infantry. Movements of large masses soon
were out of the question. To shift artillery, especially of the
heavier kind, as quickly as an offensive movement required, and to
keep both guns and men sufficiently supplied with munitions, were out
of the question. The natural result, therefore, of these conditions
was the prompt cessation of the Russian offensive which had been
started in March, 1916, just before the breaking up of a severe
winter.
However, this did not mean everywhere a return to the trench warfare,
such as had been carried on all winter, although in many parts of the
front activities on both sides amounted to little more. At other
points, however, offensive movements were kept up, even if they were
restricted in extent and force. Throughout the months of April and
May, 1916, no important changes took place anywhere on the eastern
front. A great deal of the fighting, almost all, indeed, was the
result of clashes between scouting detachments or else simply a
struggle for the possession of the most advantageous points, involving
in most instances only a trench here or another trench there, and
always comparatively small numbers of soldiers.
Though the story of this series of minor engagements as it can be
constructed from official reports and other sources offers few thrills
and is lacking entirely in the sensational accomplishments which mark
movements of greater extent and importance, this is due chiefly to the
fact that few details become known about fighting of only local
character. In spite of this it must be borne in mind that all of this
fighting was of the most determined kind, was done under conditions
requiring the greatest amount of endurance and courage, and resulted
in innumerable individual heroic deeds, which, just because they were
individual, almost always remained unknown to the outside world.
On April 1, 1916, a German attack against the bridgehead at Uxkull was
repulsed by Russian artillery. Farther south, in the Dvinsk sector
German positions were subjected to strong artillery bombardment at
many points, especially at Mechkele, and just north of Vidzy. On the
following day, April 2, 1916, fighting again took place in the Uxkull
region. Mines were exploded near Novo Selki, south of Krevo, a town
just south of the Viliya River. The Germans launched an attack north
of the Baranovitchy railway station. This is the strategically
important village through which both the Vilna-Rovno and the
Minsk-Brest-Litovsk railways pass and around which a great deal of
fighting had taken place in the past. Even though this attack was
extensively supported by aeroplanes, which bombarded a number of
railway stations on that part of the Minsk-Baranovitchy railway which
was in the hands of the Russians, it was repulsed by the Russians.
April 3, 1916, brought a renewal of the German attacks against the
Uxkull bridgehead. For over an hour and a half artillery of both heavy
and light caliber prepared the way for this attack. But again the
Russian lines held and the Germans had to desist. Before Dvinsk and to
the south of the fortress artillery duels inflicted considerable
damage without affecting the positions on either side. Just north of
the Oginski Canal German troops crossed the Shara River and attacked
the Russian positions west of the Vilna-Rovno railway, without being
able to gain ground. All along the line aircraft were busily engaged
in reconnoitering and in dropping bombs on railway stations.
The bombardment of the Uxkull region was again taken up on April 4,
1916, by the German artillery. South of Dvinsk, before the village of
Malogolska, the German troops had to evacuate their first-line of
trenches when the arising floods of neighboring rivers inundated them.
German aeroplanes bombarded the town of Luchonitchy on the Vilna-Rovno
railway, just southeast of Baranovitchy.
By April 5, 1916, the German artillery fire before Uxkull had spread
to Riga and Jacobstadt, as well as to many points in the Dvinsk
sector. Floods were still rising everywhere and the ice on the Dvina
began to break up.
Again on April 7, 1916, the German guns thundered against the Russian
front from Riga down to Dvinsk. Lake Narotch, where so many battles
had already been fought, again was the scene of a Russian attack which
resulted in the gain of a few advanced German positions. The next day
the Germans promptly replied with a determined artillery attack which
regained for their side some of the points lost the previous day.
Artillery duels also were staged near Postavy, in the Jacobstadt
sector, and at the northernmost end of the line where the German guns
bombarded the city of Schlock.
All day on April 9, 1916, the guns of all calibers kept up their
death-dealing work along the entire Dvina front, and in the Lake
district south of Dvinsk. The railway stations at Remershaf and Dvinsk
were bombarded by German aeroplanes, while other units of their
aircraft visited the Russian lines along the Oginski Canal. Both on
April 11 and 12, 1916, artillery activity on the Dvina was maintained.
A German infantry attack against the Uxkull bridgehead, launched on
the 11th, failed.
By this time the ice had all broken up and the floods had stopped
rising. In the Pinsk Marshes considerable activity developed on both
sides by means of boats. A vivid picture of conditions as they existed
at this time in the Pripet Marshes may be formed from the following
description from the pen of a special correspondent on the staff of
the Russian paper "Russkoye Slovo":
"The marshes," he writes, "have awakened from their winter sleep. Even
on the paved roads movement is all but impossible; to the right and
left everything is submerged. The small river S----en has become
enormously broad; its shores are lost in the distance.
"The marshes have awakened, and are taking their revenge on man for
having disturbed the ordinary life of Poliessie. But however difficult
the operation, the war must be continued and material obstacles must
be overcome. Owing to the enormous area covered by water the
inhabitants have taken to boat building. Sentries and patrols move in
boats, reconnoitering parties travel in boats, fire on the enemy from
boats, and escape in boats from the attentions of the German heavy
guns.
"The great marshy basin of the S----en and the P---- is full of new
boats, which are called 'baidaka.' These 'baidaka' are small,
constructed to hold three or four men. The boats are flat-bottomed and
steady. The scouts take the 'baidaka' on their shoulders, and as soon
as they come to deep water launch their craft and row to the other
side. Small oars or paddles are used, and punting operations are often
necessary.
"On the S----en these boats move with great secrecy in the night; in
the daytime they are hidden in rushes and reeds.
"It was a foggy day when we decided on making a voyage in a 'baidaka.'
'The Germans came very suddenly to this place,' said one of my
companions. 'Our soldiers are concealed everywhere.' We decided to row
near the forest, so that in case of necessity we might gain the
shelter of the trees. The silence was broken by occasional rifle
reports from the direction of Pinsk, and a big gun roared now and
then. Once a shell flew overhead, hissing as it went. But this was
very ordinary music to us.
"I was more interested in the intense silence of the marsh, for I knew
that all this silence was false. Our secret posts abounded, and
perhaps German scouts were in the vicinity. The marsh was full of men
in hiding, and the waiting for a chance shot was more terrible than a
continuous cannonade. Our sentinels fired twice close by; we did not
know why. The shots resounded in the forest. We lay down in our boat
and hid our heads. It was difficult for us to advance through the
undergrowth as the spaces between the bushes were generally very
narrow. We could not row, and we had to punt with our oars.
"We advanced in this fashion half an hour. Then we reached a lakelike
expanse clear of growth. 'This is the river S----en,' I was further
informed. 'The Germans are on the other side.'
"I could not see where the 'other side' was. The water spread to the
horizon and ended only in the purple border of the forest. 'We must be
quiet here,' one whispered. The boat moved along the river without a
splash, and strange, unaccustomed outlines grew up as we proceeded.
'What place is that yonder?' I asked my neighbor. 'Pinsk,' he replied.
I felt excited; we were near a town that was occupied by the Germans,
and I wished that boat would turn back.
"We got into the rushes and moved through the jungle as though we were
advancing in open water, for the path through the rushes had been
prepared in the autumn. We advanced in this manner forty minutes until
we could distinctly hear the whistling of steam engines and the bells
ringing in the monastery at Pinsk. It was evident that the monks had
remained. 'The kaiser himself was in Pinsk in November,' said one of
my companions, 'and we knew it. The Germans blew horns all over the
railway line and sang their national hymn. In Pinsk there was much
animation.'
"A minute or two later the boat stopped and I was told it was
dangerous to go farther. On the right we could see the outlines of
houses and of the quay at Pinsk, only about a thousand paces distant.
The town was covered by a thin mist and a faint fog was rising from
the marsh.
"'There on your left are their heavy guns.' I could see nothing except
some trenches near the quay.
"We took our leave of Pinsk. The twilight had arrived and it was
necessary to retire."
Though the ice on the rivers and lakes had well broken up by the
middle of April, thaw, of course, steadily increased, and with it the
volume of water carried by the creeks and rivers. More and more
difficult it became, therefore, to carry out military operations, and,
as a result of these conditions, they were especially limited at this
period.
In spite of this the Russians attempted local advance on April 13,
1916, in the region of Garbunovka, northwest of Dvinsk and south of
Lake Narotch; however, though their losses were quite heavy, they
could not gain any ground. This was also true of another local attack
made against the army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria near Zirin, on the
Servetsch River northeast of Baranovitchy. Similarly unsuccessful were
German attacks made the same day between Lakes Sventen and Itzen.
German artillery still kept up its work along the entire front,
especially at Lake Miadziol, south of Dvinsk at Lake Narotch, and at
Smorgon, the little railroad station south of the Viliya River on the
Vilna-Minsk railway.
On the following day, April 14, 1916, the Russians repeated their
efforts in the Servetsch region. After strong artillery preparation
they launched another attack near Zirin, and southeast of Kovelitchy,
but were again repulsed. The same fate was suffered by an attack
attempted northwest of Dvinsk. South of Garbunovka, however, they
registered a slight local success. After cutting down four lines of
barbed-wire obstacles that had been erected by the Germans, they
stormed and occupied two small hills west and south of this village.
This gain was maintained in the face of strongly concentrated
artillery and rifle fire, and repeated German counterattacks, which
later proved very sanguinary to the German troops. German artillery
again directed violent fire against the Russian positions between Lake
Narotch and Lake Miadziol and near Smorgon. A German attack made
northwest of the latter village broke down under Russian gunfire.
At this point the Germans resumed their offensive at daybreak on April
15, 1916, after strong artillery preparation accompanied by the use of
asphyxiating gas. Concentrated fire from the Russian artillery,
however, prohibited any noticeable advance. During the following day,
April 16, 1916, both sides restricted themselves more or less to
artillery bombardments, which became especially violent on the Dvina
line, around the Uxkull bridgehead, and in the neighborhood of the
Russian positions south of the village of Garbunovka, as well as
between Lake Narotch and Lake Miadziol.
Two days later, on April 18, 1916, German detachments temporarily
regained some of the ground lost about a week before south of
Garbunovka. Again on that day the guns on both sides roared along the
entire northern sector of the eastern front. On the 19th the
bombardment became especially intense at the bridgehead at Uxkull and
south of lake.
The artillery attack against the former was maintained throughout the
following two days. German scouting parties which crossed the river
Shara, north of the Oginski Canal, on April 22, 1916, were surrounded
in the woods adjoining and practically annihilated. On the same day a
German squadron of ten aeroplanes bombarded the Russian hangars on the
island of Oesel, a small island in the Baltic across the entrance to
the Gulf of Riga.
As if both sides had agreed to observe the Easter holidays, a lull set
in during the next four or five days. Only occasional unimportant
local attacks and artillery duels were reported. Aeroplanes were the
only branch of the two armies which showed any marked activity. Dvinsk
was visited repeatedly by German machines and extensively bombarded.
On April 26, 1916, a German airship dropped bombs on the railway
station at Duna-Muende, at the mouth of the Dvina, and caused
considerable damage. Other railway stations and warehouses at various
points, as well as a number of Russian flying depots, were attacked on
April 27, 1916.
The end of April, 1916, brought one more important action, the most
important, indeed, which had occurred anywhere on the eastern front
since the Russian offensive of the latter half of March, 1916. On
April 28, 1916, at dawn, German artillery began a very violent
bombardment of the Russian positions south of Lake Narotch. There,
between the village of Stavarotche and the extensive private estate of
Stakhovtsy, the Germans had lost a series of important trenches on
March 20, 1916, during the early part of the short Russian offensive.
Part of these positions had been recaptured a few days later on March
26, 1916. Now, after a considerable artillery preparation, a strong
attack was launched with the balance of the lost ground as an
objective. Large bodies of German infantry came on against the Russian
positions in close formation. They recaptured not only all of the
ground lost previously but carried their attack successfully into the
Russian trenches beyond. The most fierce hand-to-hand fighting
resulted. Losses on both sides were severe, especially so on the part
of the Russians, who attempted unsuccessfully during the night
following to regain the lost positions by a series of violent
counterattacks, executed by large forces of infantry, who, advancing
in close formation over difficult ground, were terribly exposed to
German machine-gun fire and lost heavily in killed and wounded. The
Germans officially claimed to have captured as a result of this
operation the remarkably large number of fifty-six officers, 5,600
men, five guns, twenty-eight machine guns and ten trench mortars.
During the same day artillery attacks were directed against Schlock on
the Gulf of Riga and Boersemnende near Riga, as well as against
Smorgon, south of the Lake district. An infantry attack, preceded by
considerable artillery preparation, near the village of Ginovka, west
of Dvinsk, was met by severe fire from the Russian batteries and the
Germans were forced to withdraw to their trenches. In the early
morning hours German airships bombarded railway stations along the
Riga-Petrograd railroad as far as Venden, about fifty miles northeast
of Riga, and along the Dvinsk-Petrograd railway as far as Rzezytsa,
about fifty miles northeast of Dvinsk. At the latter point
considerable damage was done by a dirigible which dropped explosive
and incendiary bombs.
Throughout the last day of April, 1916, artillery duels were fought
again at many points. Once more the railway station and bridgehead at
Uxkull was made the target for a most violent German artillery attack.
Along the Dvinsk sector, too, guns of all caliber were busy.
CHAPTER XIX
ARTILLERY DUELS
With the beginning of May, the weather became warmer and the rain and
watersoaked roads more accessible. In spite of this, however,
conditions along the eastern front throughout the entire month of May
were very much the same as during April. Continuously the guns on both
sides thundered against each other, with a fairly well-maintained
intensity which, however, would increase from time to time in some
places. Frequently, almost daily, infantry attacks, usually preceded
by artillery preparation, would be launched at various points. These,
however, were almost all of local character and executed by
comparatively small forces. Even smaller detachments, frequently
hardly more than scouting parties, often would reach the opponent's
lines, but only rarely succeed in capturing trenches, and then usually
were soon forced to retire to their own lines in the face of
successive counterattacks. Again in May the story of events on the
eastern front is lacking in sensational movements, accompanied by
equally unsensational success or failure. But, nevertheless, it is on
both sides a story of unceasing activity, of unending labor, of
unremitting toil, of endless suffering, of unlimited heroism, and of
unsurpassed courage, the more so, because much of all that was
accomplished was counted only as part of the regular daily routine,
and lacked both the incentive and the reward of widespread publicity,
which more frequently attaches to military operations of more
extensive character. Not for years to come will it be possible to
write a detailed history of this phase of the Great War as far as the
eastern front is concerned. Not until the regimental histories of the
various Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian military units will have
been completed will it become practicable to recount all the uncounted
deeds of valor accomplished by heroes whose names and deeds now must
remain unknown to the world at large, even though both perchance have
been for months and months on the lips of equally brave comrades in
arms.
The new month was opened by the Germans with another intensive
artillery bombardment of the Uxkull bridgehead. Farther to the south,
before Dvinsk, and also at many points in the Lake district to the
south of this fortress, the Russian positions likewise were raked by
violent gunfire. An attempted offensive movement on the extreme
northern end of the line before Raggazem, on the Gulf of Riga, broke
down before the Russian gunfire, even before it was fully developed.
German naval airships successfully bombarded Russian military depots
at Perman, while another squadron of sea planes inflicted considerable
damage to the Russian aerodrome at Papenholm. A Russian squadron was
less successful in an attack on the German naval establishment at
Vindau on the east shore of the Baltic Sea.
May 2, 1916, brought a continuation of artillery activity at many
points. It was especially intensive in the Jacobstadt and Dvinsk
sectors of the Dvina front, as well as in the Ziriu-Baranovitchy
sector in the south and along the Oginski Canal, still farther to the
south. At two other points the Germans, after extensive artillery
preparation, attempted to launch infantry attacks, but were promptly
driven back. This occurred near the village of Antony, ten miles
northwest of Postavy, where two successive attacks failed, and farther
north in the region east of Vidzy.
The following day again was devoted to artillery duels at many points.
Aeroplanes, also, became more active. German planes bombarded many
places south of Dvinsk, and attacked the railway establishments at
Molodetchna, on the Vilna-Minsk railway, at Minsk, and at Luniniets,
in the Pripet Marshes, east of Pinsk on the Pinsk-Gomel railway. May
4, 1916, brought especially intensive artillery fire along the entire
Dvina front, in the Krevo sector south of the Vilna-Minsk railway, and
along the Oginski Canal, particularly in the region of Valistchie.
The Dvina front along its entire length was once more the subject of a
violent artillery attack from German batteries on May 5, 1916. Uxkull,
so many times before the aim of the German fire, again received
special attention. The Friedrichstadt sector, too, came in for its
share. All along this front aeroplanes not only guided the gunfire,
but supported it extensively by dropping bombs. Between Jacobstadt and
Dvinsk a Russian battery succeeded in reaching a German munition depot
and with one well-placed hit caused havoc among men and munitions.
Southeast of Lake Med a surprise attack, carried out by comparatively
small Russian forces, resulted in the capture of some German trenches.
Northwest of Krochin strong German forces, after artillery preparation
lasting over three hours, attacked the village of Dubrovka. Some
ground was gained, only to be lost again shortly after as a result of
a ferocious counterattack made by Russian reenforcements which had
been brought up quickly.
May 6, 1916, brought a slightly new variation in fighting. Russian
torpedo boats appeared in the Gulf of Riga, off the west coast, and
bombarded, without success, the two towns of Rojen and Margrafen.
Artillery fire of considerable violence marked the next day, May 7,
1916. Russian batteries before Dvinsk caused a fire at Ill, the little
town just northwest of Dvinsk on the Dvinsk-Ponevesh railway, and so
well was this bombardment maintained that the Germans were unable to
extinguish the conflagration before it had reached some of their
munition depots. In the early morning hours very violent gunfire was
directed south of Illuxt. But an infantry attack, for which this
bombardment was to act as preparation, failed. Other bombardments were
directed against Lake Ilsen and the sector north of it, and against
the region south of the village of Vishnieff on the Beresina River.
Mining operations of considerable extent were carried out that night
near the village of Novo Selki, south of the town of Krevo. On May 8,
1916, artillery fire again roared along the Dvina front, especially
against the Uxkull bridgehead. An attack in force was made by German
troops against the village of Peraplianka north of Smorgon on the
Viliya May 9, 1916. After considerable artillery preparation the
Germans rushed up against the Russian barbed-wire obstacles. There,
however, they were stopped by concentrated artillery and rifle fire
and, after heavy losses, had to withdraw. A Russian attack of a
similar nature south of Garbunovka was not any more successful. In the
Pripet Marshes, too, artillery operations had by now become possible
again and the Russian positions west of the village of Pleshichitsa,
southeast of Pinsk, were subjected to a violent bombardment.
Throughout the balance of May not a day passed during which guns of
all calibers did not maintain a violent bombardment at many points
along the entire front. Especially frequent and severe was the gunfire
which the Germans directed against the Dvina sector of the Russian
positions. But, just as in the past weeks, the result, though not at
all negligible as far as the damage inflicted on men, material, and
fortifications was concerned, was practically nil in regard to any
change in the location of the front.
Infantry attacks during this period were not lacking, though they were
less frequent than artillery bombardments, and were at all times only
of local character, and in most cases executed with limited forces. A
great deal of this kind of fighting occurred in the region of Olyka
where engagements took place almost every day. One of the few more
important events was a German attack against the Jacobstadt sector of
the Dvina front. For two days, May 10 and 11, 1916, the fighting
continued, becoming especially violent to the north of the railway
station of Selburg on the Mitau-Kreutzburg railway. There very heavy
artillery fire succeeding the infantry attacks had destroyed some
small villages for the possession of which the most furious kind of
hand-to-hand fighting ensued. Finally the Germans captured by storm
about 500 yards of the Russian positions as well as some 300 unwounded
soldiers and a few machine guns and mine throwers.
Engagements of a similar character, though not always yielding such
definite results to either side, occurred on May 11, 1916, southwest
of Lake Medum, on May 12, 1916, at many points along the Oginski Canal
and also in the Pripet Marshes, where fighting now had again become a
physical possibility. On the latter day a Russian attempt to recapture
the positions lost previously near Selburg failed.
Thus the fortunes of war swayed from side to side. One day would bring
to the Germans the gain of a trench, the capture of a few hundred men
or guns, or the destruction of an enemy battery, to be followed the
next day by a proportionate loss. So closely was the entire line
guarded, so strongly and elaborately had the trenches and other
fortifications been built up, that the fighting developed into a
multitude of very short but closely contested engagements. In each one
of these the numbers engaged were very small, though the grand total
of men fighting on a given day at so many separate points on a front
of some 500 miles was, of course, still immense.
Amongst the places which saw the most fighting during this period were
many which had been mentioned a great many times before. Again and
again there appeared in the official records such names as: Lake
Sventen, Krevno, Lake Miadziol, Ostroff, Lake Narotch, Smorgon, Dahlen
Island, and many others.
The net result of all the fighting during May, 1916, was that both
sides lost considerable in men and material. Both Russians and
Germans, however, had succeeded in maintaining their respective lines
in practically the same position in which they had been at the
beginning of May.
CHAPTER XX
THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE
During the first two days of June, 1916, a lull occurred at almost all
important points of the eastern front. Only one or two engagements of
extremely minor importance between scouting parties were reported. In
the light of future events this remarkable condition might well be
called ominous, especially if one connects with it a decided increase
in Russian aeroplane activity, which resulted in two strong attacks on
June 1, 1916, against points on the Vilna-Minsk and Sarny-Kovel
railways.
On June 2, 1916, a more or less surprising increase in the strength of
the Russian artillery fire was noticed, especially along the
Bessarabian and Volhynian fronts and in the Ikva sector. So strong did
this fire become that the official Austrian statement covering that
day says that at several places the artillery duels "assumed the
character of artillery battles."
More and more the extent and violence of the Russian artillery attack
increased. The next day, June 3, 1916, Russian artillery displayed the
greatest activity all along the southern half of the eastern front,
and covered the Dniester, Strypa, and Ikva sectors, as well as the gap
between the last two rivers, northwest of Tarnopol, and the entire
Volhynian front. Near Olyka in the region of the three Volhynian
fortresses of Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk, the Russian gunfire was
especially intense along a front of about seventeen miles. That this
unusually strong artillery activity increased the alarm of the
Austro-Hungarian commanders may readily be seen from the concluding
sentence of that day's official Austrian statement, which read:
"Everywhere there are signs of an impending infantry attack."
The storm began to break the next day, June 4, 1916. That it was
entirely unexpected, was not likely, for this new Russian offensive
coincided with the Austro-Hungarian offensive against the Italian
front which by that time had assumed threatening developments.
Undoubtedly it was one of the objects of the Russian offensive to
force the Austrians to withdraw troops from the Italian front and at
least curtail their offensive efforts against the Italian armies, if
not to stop them entirely. At the same time the limits within which
the Russian offensive was undertaken indicated that the Russian
General Staff had another much more important object in view, the
breaking of the German-Austrian front at about the point where the
German right touched the Austrian left. Along a front of over 300
miles the Russian forces attacked. From the Pinth in the south--at the
Rumanian border to the outrunners of the Pripet Marshes--near Kolki
and the bend of the Styr--in the north the battle raged. At many
points along this line the Russians achieved important successes, with
unusual swiftness they were pushing whatever advantage they were able
to gain. But not only swiftness did they employ. Immense masses of men
were thrown against the strongly fortified Austrian lines and
quantities of munitions of the Russian artillery which transcended
everything that had ever been done along this line on the eastern
front. Not against one or two points chosen for that particular
purpose, but against every important point on the entire line the
Russian attacks were hurled. The most bitter struggle developed at
Okna, northwest of Tarnopol, at Koklow, at Novo Alexinez, along the
entire Ikva, at Sanor, around Olyka and from there north to Dolki. No
matter how strong the natural defenses, no matter how skillful the
artificial obstacles, on and on rolled the thousands and thousands of
Russians. So overwhelming was this onrush that the Austro-Hungarians
had to give way in many places in spite of the most valiant
resistance, and so quick did it come that as a result of the first
day's work the Russians could claim to have captured 13,000 prisoners,
many guns and machine guns.
By June 5, 1916, this number had increased to 480 officers, 25,000
men, twenty-seven guns and fifty machine guns. The battle on the
northeast front continued on the whole front of 218 miles with
undiminished stubbornness. North of Okna, the Austrians had, after
stiff and fluctuating battles, to withdraw their shattered first
positions to the line prepared three miles to the south. Near
Jarlowiec, on the lower Strypa, the Russians attacked after artillery
preparation. They were repulsed at some places by hand fighting. At
the same time a strong Russian attack west of Trembowla (south of
Tarnopol) broke down under Austrian fire. West-northwest of Tarnopol
there was bitter fighting. Near Sopanow (southeast of Dubno) there
were numerous attacks by the enemy. Between Mlynow, on the Ikva, and
the regions northwest of Olyka, the Russians were continually becoming
stronger, and the most bitter kind of fighting developed.
Especially heavy fighting developed in the region before Lutsk. There
the pressure from the Russian army of General Brussilov had become so
strong that the Austrians had found it necessary by June 6, 1916, to
withdraw their forces to the plain of Lutsk, just to the east of that
fortress and of the river Styr. This represented a gain of at least
twenty miles made in two days. The official Russian statement of that
day claimed that during the same period General Brussilov's armies had
captured 900 officers, more than 40,000 rank and file, seventy-seven
guns, 134 machine guns and forty-nine trench mortars, and, in
addition, searchlights, telephone, field kitchens, a large quantity of
arms and war material, and great reserves of ammunition.
On the other hand, the Austrians were still offering a determined
resistance at most points south and north of Lutsk, and Russian
attacks were repulsed with sanguinary losses at many places, as for
instance at Rafalowka, on the lower Styr, near Berestiany, on the
Corzin Brook, near Saponow, on the upper Strypa, near Jazlovice, on
the Dniester, and on the Bessarabian frontier. Northwest of Tarnopol
were repulsed two attacks. At another point seven attacks were
repulsed.
The Russians also suffered heavy losses in the plains of Okna (north
of the Bessarabian frontier) and at Debronoutz, where there were
bitter hand-to-hand engagements.
[Illustration: The Russian Offensive from Pinsk to Dubno.]
It was quite clear by this time that the Russian offensive
threatened not only the pushing back of the Austrian line, but their
very existence. Unless the Austrians either succeeded in repulsing the
Russians decidedly or else found some other way of reducing
immediately the strength of this extensive offensive movement, it was
inevitable that many of the important conquests which the Central
Powers had made in the fall of 1915 would be lost again. In spite of
this and in spite of the quite apparent strength of the Russian
forces, it caused considerable surprise when it was announced
officially on June 8, 1916, that the fortress of Lutsk had been
captured by the Russians on June 7, 1916.
The fortress lies halfway between Rovno and Kovel, on the important
railway line that runs from Brest-Litovsk to the region southwest of
Kiev. It is this railway sector, between Rovno and Kovel, that has
been the objective of the Russian attacks ever since the Teuton
offensive came to a standstill eight months ago, for its control would
give the Russians a free hand to operate southward against the lines
in Galicia.
[Illustration: An Austrian 30.5 centimeter mortar in position. The
gunner is ready and the officer is just giving the command to fire.
Meanwhile, another great 12-inch shell is being brought up for the
next loading.]
Lutsk is a minor fortress, the most westerly of the Volhynian triangle
formed by Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk. The town is the center of an
important grain trade, and the districts of which it is the center
contained before the war a considerable German colony. It is supposed
to have been founded in the seventh century. In 1791 it was taken by
Russia. It is the seat of a Roman Catholic bishop and at the outbreak
of the war had a population of about 18,000. During the war it
suffered a varied fate. On September 1, 1915, it was captured by the
combined German and Austro-Hungarian forces which had accomplished a
month before the capture of Warsaw and had forced the Russian legions
to a full retreat. Twenty-three days later it was evacuated by the
forces of the Central Powers and recaptured by the Russians on
September 24, 1915. Four days later, September 28, 1915, the Russians
were forced to withdraw again, and on October 1, 1915, it fell once
more into the hands of the Austrians. During the winter the Russians
had made a dash for its recapture, but had not succeeded, and ever
since the front had been along a line about twenty miles to the east.
The capture of the fortress was due primarily to the immensity of
the Russian artillery, which maintained a violent, continuous fire,
smashing the successive rows of wire entanglements, breastworks, and
trenches. The town was surrounded with nineteen rows of entanglements.
The laconic order to attack was given at dawn on June 7, 1916. Up to
noon the issue hung in the balance, but at 1 o'clock the Russians made
a breach in the enemy's position near the village of Podgauzy. They
repulsed a fierce Austrian counterattack and captured 3,000 prisoners
and many guns. Almost simultaneously another Russian force advanced on
Lutsk along the Dubno and stormed the trenches of the village of
Krupov, taking several thousand prisoners. General Brussilov seemed to
have at his disposal an immense infantry force, which he sent forward
in rapid, successive waves after artillery preparation. Reserves were
brought up so quickly that the enemy was given no time to recover from
one assault before another was delivered.
Fifty-eight officers, 11,000 men and large quantities of guns, machine
guns, and ammunition fell in the hands of the victorious Russian
armies. On the same day on which Lutsk was captured other forces
stormed strong Austrian positions on the lower Strypa in Galicia
between Trybuchovice and Jazlovice and crossed both the Ikva and the
Styr. Along the northern part of the front, north of the Pripet River,
comparative quiet reigned throughout the early stages of the Russian
offensive. During the evening of June 7, 1916, however, German
artillery violently bombarded the region northeast of Krevo and south
of Smorgon, southeast of Vilna. The bombardment soon extended farther
north, and during the night of June 8, 1916, the Germans took the
offensive there with considerable forces.
In the neighborhood of Molodetchna station (farther east) on the
Vilna-Minsk railway, a German aeroplane dropped four bombs.
Five German aeroplanes carried out a raid on the small town of
Jogishin, north of Pinsk, dropping about fifty bombs.
The battle in Volhynia and Galicia continued with undiminished force
on June 8, 1916. Near Sussk, to the east of Lutsk, a squadron of
Cossacks attacked the enemy behind his fortified lines, capturing two
guns, eight ammunition wagons, and 200 boxes of ammunition.
Near Boritin, four miles southeast of Lutsk, Russian scouts captured
two 4-inch guns, with four officers and 160 men. A 4-inch gun and
thirty-five ammunition wagons were captured, near Dobriatin on the
Ikva below Mlynow, fourteen miles southeast of Lutsk.
Young troops, just arrived at the front, vied with seasoned Russian
regiments in deeds of valor. Some regiments formed of Territorial
elements by an impetuous attack drove back the Austrians on the Styr,
and pressing close on their heels forced the bridgehead near
Rozhishche, thirteen miles north of Lutsk, at the same time taking
about 2,500 German and Austrian prisoners, as well as machine guns and
much other booty. Other regiments forced a crossing over the Strypa
and some advanced detachments even reached the next river, the Zlota
Potok, about five miles to the west.
The number of prisoners captured by the Russians continually
increased. Exclusive of those already reported--namely, 958 officers,
and more than 51,000 Austrian and German soldiers, they captured in
the course of the fighting on June 8, 1916, 185 officers and 13,714
men, making the totals so far registered in the present operations
1,143 officers and 64,714 men.
The next day, June 9, 1916, the troops under General Brussilov
continued the offensive and the pursuit of the retreating Austrians.
Fighting with the latter's rear guards, they crossed the river Styr
above and below Lutsk.
In Galicia, northwest of Tarnopol, in the regions of Gliadki and
Cebrow, heavy fighting developed for the possession of heights, which
changed hands several times. During that day's fighting the Russians
captured again large numbers of Austrians, consisting of ninety-seven
officers and 5,500 men and eleven guns, making a total up to the
present of 1,240 officers and about 71,000 men, ninety-four guns, 167
machine guns, fifty-three mortars, and a large quantity of other war
material.
At dawn of June 10, 1916, Russian troops entered Buczacz on the west
bank of the Strypa and, developing the offensive along the Dniester,
carried the village of Scianka, eight miles west of the Strypa. In the
village of Potok Zloty, four miles west of the Strypa, they seized a
large artillery park and large quantities of shells.
In the north the Germans again attempted to relieve the pressure on
their allies by attacking in force at many points. Artillery duels
were fought along the Dvina front and on the Oginski Canal.
Without let up, however, the Russian advance continued. So furious and
swift was the onslaught of the czar's armies that the Austrians lost
thousands upon thousands of prisoners and vast masses of war material
of every kind. For instance, in one sector alone the Austrians were
forced to retreat so rapidly that the Russians were able to gather in,
according to official reports, twenty-one searchlights, two supply
trains, twenty-nine field kitchens, forty-seven machine guns, 193 tons
of barbed wire, 1,000 concrete girders, 7,000,000 concrete cubes, 160
tons of coal, enormous stores of ammunition, and a great quantity of
arms and other war material. In another sector they captured 30,000
rounds of rifle ammunition, 300 boxes of machine-gun ammunition, 200
boxes of hand grenades, 1,000 rifles in good condition, four machine
guns, two optical range finders, and even a brand-new Norton well, a
portable contrivance for the supply of drinking water.
The prisoners captured during June 10, 1916, comprised one general,
409 officers, and 35,100 soldiers. The material booty included thirty
guns, thirteen machine guns, and five trench mortars. The total
Russian captures in the course of about a week thus amount to one
general, 1,649 officers, more than 106,000 soldiers, 124 guns of all
sorts, 180 machine guns, and fifty-eight trench mortars.
This was now the seventh day of the new Russian offensive, and on it
another valuable prize fell into the hands of General Brussilov, the
town and fortress of Dubno. This brought his forces within twenty-five
miles of the Galician border and put the czar's forces again in the
possession of the Volhynian fortress triangle, consisting of Lutsk,
Dubno, and Rovno.
Dubno, which had been in the hands of the Austrians since September 7,
1916, lies on the Rovno-Brody-Lemberg railway, and is about eighty-two
miles from the Galician capital, Lemberg. The town has about 14,000
inhabitants, mostly Jews, engaged in the grain, tobacco, and
brickmaking industry. It was in existence as early as the eleventh
century.
So powerful was the Russian onrush on Dubno that the attackers swept
westward apparently without meeting any resistance, for on the same
day on which the fortress fell, some detachments crossed the Ikva. One
part of these forces even swept as far westward as the region of the
village of Demidovka, on the Mlynow-Berestetchko road, thirteen miles
southwest of the Styr at Mlynow, compelling the enemy garrison of the
Mlynow to surrender. Demidovka is twenty-five miles due west of Dubno.
Thus the Russians have in Volhynia alone pushed the Austro-Hungarian
lines back thirty-two miles.
CHAPTER XXI
THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF THE BUKOWINA
Simultaneously with the drive in Volhynia, the extreme left wing of
the Russian southern army under General Lechitsky forced the
Austro-Hungarians to withdraw their whole line in the northeastern
Bukowina, invaded the crownland with strong forces and advanced to
within fourteen miles of the capital, Czernowitz. On the Strypa the
Austrians had to fall back from their principal position north of
Buczacz. In spite of the most desperate resistance and in the face of
a violent flanking fire, and even curtain fire, and the explosions of
whole sets of mines, General Lechitsky's troops captured the Austrian
positions south of Dobronowce, fourteen miles northeast of Czernowitz.
In that region alone the Russians claimed to have captured 18,000
soldiers, one general, 347 officers, and ten guns. Southeast of
Zaleszcyki on the Dniester the Russians again were victorious and
forced the withdrawal of the Austrian lines. Fourteen miles north of
Czernowitz the Austrian troops tried to stem the tide by blowing up
the railroad station of Jurkoutz. At the same time they made their
first important counterattack in the Lutsk region. Making a sudden
stand, after being driven over the river Styr, north of Lutsk, they
turned on the Russians with the aid of German detachments rushed to
them by General von Hindenburg, drove the Muscovite troops back over
the Styr and took 1,508 prisoners, including eight officers. At other
points, too, the Austrian resistance stiffened perceptibly, especially
in the region of Torgovitsa, and on the Styr below Lutsk.
Dubno, a modern fortress, built, like Lutsk, mainly in support of
Rovno, to ward off possible aggression, now supplied an excellent
starting point for a Russian drive into the heart of Galicia.
Proceeding on both sides of the Rovno-Dubno-Brody-Lemberg railway the
Russians should be able to cover the eighty-two miles which still
separates them from the Galician capital within a comparatively short
time, provided that Austrian resistance in this region continues as
weak as it has been up to date.
A greater danger than the capture of Lemberg was, however, presented
by the Russian advance into the Bukowina. If these two Russian
drives--to Lemberg and to Czernowitz--would prove successful the whole
southeastern Austro-Hungarian army would find itself squeezed between
two Russian armies, and its only escape would be into the difficult
Carpathian Mountain passes, where the Russians, this time well
equipped and greatly superior in numbers, could be expected to be more
successful than in their first Carpathian campaign.
Still the Russian advance continued, although on June 11, 1916, there
was a slight slowing down on account of extensive storms that
prevailed along the southern part of the front.
In Galicia, in the region of the villages of Gliadki and Verobieyka,
north of Tarnopol, the Austrians attacked repeatedly and furiously,
but were repulsed on the morning of the 11th. Farther south, however,
near the town of Bobulintze, on the Strypa, fifteen miles north of
Buczacz, the Austro-Hungarians, strongly reenforced by Germans, scored
a substantial success. They launched a furious counterattack, bringing
the Russian assaults to a standstill and even forcing the Muscovite
troops to retreat a short distance. According to the German War Office
more than 1,300 Russian prisoners were taken.
Simultaneously with this partial relief in the south Field Marshal von
Hindenburg began an attack at several points against the Russian right
wing and part of the center. He penetrated the czar's lines at two
points near Jacobstadt, halfway between Riga and Dvinsk, and at
Kochany between Lake Narotch and Dvinsk. At the three other points, in
the Riga zone, south of Lake Drisviaty and on the Lassjolda, his
attacks broke down under the Russian fire.
Lemberg, Galicia's capital, was now threatened from three sides.
Czernowitz, the capital of the Bukowina, was even in a more precarious
position. It had been masked by the extreme left wing of the Russian
armies and, unless some unexpected turn came to the assistance of the
Austrians, its fall was sure to be only a matter of days, or possibly
even of hours. All of southern Volhynia had been overrun by the
Russians who were then, on the ninth day of their offensive, forty-two
miles west of the point from where it had begun in that province.
Northwest of Rojitche, in northwestern Volhynia, after dislodging the
Germans, General Brussilov on June 12, 1916, approached the river
Stokhod. West of Lutsk he occupied Torchin and continued to press the
enemy back.
On the Dniester sector and farther General Lechitsky's troops, having
crossed the river after fighting, captured many fortified points and
also the town of Zaleszcyky, twenty-five miles northwest of
Czernowitz. The village of Jorodenka, ten miles farther, northwest of
Zaleszcyky, also was captured.
On the Pruth sector, between Doyan and Niepokoloutz, the Russian
troops approached the left bank of the river, near the bridgehead of
Czernowitz.
The only point at which the Austrian line held was near Kolki in
northern Volhynia, south of the Styr. There attempts by the Russians
to cross that river failed and some 2,000 men were captured by the
Austro-Hungarians. In the north Field Marshal von Hindenburg's efforts
to divert the Russian activities in the south by a general offensive
along the Dvina line had not developed beyond increased artillery
bombardments which apparently exerted no influence on the movements of
the Russian armies in Volhynia, Galicia and the Bukowina.
The only hopeful sign for the fate of the threatened Austro-Hungarian
armies was the fact that the daily number of prisoners taken by the
Russians gradually seemed to decrease, indicating that the Austrians
found it possible by now, if not to withstand the Russian onslaught,
at least to save the largest part of their armies. Even at that the
Russian General Staff claimed to have captured by June 12, 1916, a
total of 1,700 officers and 114,000 men. Inasmuch as it was estimated
that the total Austrian forces on the southwestern front at the
beginning of the operations were 670,000, of which, according to
Russian claims, the losses cannot be less than 200,000, including an
estimated 80,000 killed and wounded, the total losses now constituted
30 per cent of the enemy's effectives.
How the news of the continued Russian successes was received in the
empire's capital and what, at that time, was expected as the immediate
results of this remarkable drive, secondary only to the Austro-German
drive of the summer and fall of 1915, are vividly described in the
following letter, written from Petrograd on June 13, 1916, by a
special correspondent of the London "Times":
"As the successive bulletins recording our unprecedented victories on
the southwestern fronts come to hand, the pride and joy of the Russian
people are becoming too great for adequate expression. There is an
utter absence of noisy demonstrations. The whole nation realizes that
the victory is the result of the combined efforts of all classes,
which have given the soldiers abundant munitions, and of an admirable
organization.
"The remarkable progress in training the reserves since the beginning
of this year was primarily responsible for the enormous increase in
the efficiency of our armies and the heightening of their morale. The
strategy of our southwestern offensive has been seconded by a
remarkable improvement in the railways and communications. Last, but
not least, it must be noted that the Russian high command long ago
recognized that the essential condition of the overthrow of the
Austro-German league, so far as this front is concerned, was the
completion of the work of disintegration in the Austrian armies, in
which Russia has already achieved such wonderful results. At the rate
at which they are at present being exterminated it would require many
weeks completely to exhaust the military resources of the Dual Empire
and to turn the flank of the German position in Poland.
"The consensus of military opinion is inclined to the belief that the
Germans will not venture to transfer large reenforcements to the
Galician front, as it would require too much time and give the Allies
a distinct advantage in other theaters. But as the Germans were
obviously bound to do something to save the Austrian army, they are
endeavoring to create a diversion north of the Pripet in various
directions. The points selected for these efforts are almost
equidistant on the right flank of the Riga front, near Jacobstadt, and
south of Lake Drisviaty, where the enemy's maximum activity
synchronized with General Lechitsky's greatest successes on the
southern front....
"On the southwestern front all eyes are now focused on General
Lechitsky's rapid advance on Zaleszcyky and Czernowitz. As the
official reports show, the Austrians have already blown up a bridge
across the Pruth at Mahala, thus indicating that they entertain scant
hope of being able to hold Czernowitz, and they may even now be
evacuating the city. General Lechitsky's gallant army, which some
months ago stormed the important stronghold of Uscieszko on the
Dniester, has performed prodigies of valor in its advance during the
last few days. The precipitous banks of the Dniester had been
converted into one continuous stronghold which appeared impregnable
and last December defied all our efforts to overcome the enemy's
resistance. In the first few days of the offensive we took one of the
principal positions between Okna and Dobronowce, southeast of
Zaleszcyky. Dobronowce and the surrounding mountains, which are
thickly covered with forests, were regarded by the enemy as a
reliable protection against any advance on Czernowitz. The country
beyond offers no such opportunities for defense.
"General Brussilov's operations on the flanks of the Austro-German
army under Von Linsingen are proceeding with wonderful rapidity. All
the efforts of German reenforcements to drive in a counterwedge at
Kolki, Rozhishshe and Targowica, at the wings and apex of our Rovno
salient, proved ineffectual. On the other hand, we have scored most
important successes west of Dubno, capturing the highly important
point of Demidovka, marking an advance of twenty miles to the west.
Demidovka places us in command of the important forest region of
Dubno, which, as its name indicates, is famous for its oak trees.
These forests form a natural stronghold, of which the Ikva and the
Styr may be compared to immense moats protecting it on two sides. The
possession of this valuable base will enable General Brussilov to
checkmate any further effort on the part of the enemy to counter our
offensive at Targowica, which is situated fifteen miles to the north.
"The valiant troops of our Eighth Army, who have altogether advanced
nearly thirty miles into the enemy's position in the direction of
Kovel, will doubtless be in a position powerfully to assist the thrust
of the troops beyond Tarnopol and join hands with them in the possible
event of an advance on Lemberg."
On June 13, 1914, the progress of the Russian armies continued along
the entire 250-mile front from the Pripet River to the Rumanian
border. The capture of twenty officers, 6,000 men, six cannon, and ten
machine guns brought the total, captured by the Russian troops, up to
about 120,000 men, 1,720 officers, 130 cannon and 260 machine guns,
besides immense quantities of material and munitions.
South of Kovel the Austrians, reenforced by German troops, offered the
most determined resistance near the village of Zaturzi halfway between
Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynski. Southwest of Dubno, in the direction of
Brody and Lemberg, Kozin was stormed by the Russians, who were now
only ten miles from the Galician border. To the north of Buczacz, on
the right bank of the Strypa, a strong counterattack launched by the
Austrians could not prevent the Russians from occupying the western
heights in the region of Gaivivonka and Bobulintze, where only two
days before the Austrians had been able to drive back their opponents.
But the most furious battle of all raged for the possession of
Czernowitz. A serious blow was struck to the Austro-Hungarian
defenders when the Russians captured the town of Sniatyn, on the
Pruth, about twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, on the
Czernowitz-Kolomea-Lemberg railway. This seriously threatened the
brave garrison which held the capital of the Bukowina, as it put the
Russians in a position where they could sweep southward and cut off
the defenders of Czernowitz, if they should hold out to the last. In
fact the entire Austro-Hungarian army in the Bukowina was now facing
this peril.
The first massed attack against Von Hindenburg's lines since the
offensive in the south began was delivered on June 13, 1916, when,
after a systematic artillery preparation by the heaviest guns at the
Russians' disposal, troops in dense formation launched a furious
assault against the Austro-German positions north of Baranovitchy. The
attack was repeated six times, but each broke down under the Teuton
fire with serious losses to the attackers, who in their retreat were
placed under the fire of their own artillery.
Baranovitchy is an important railway intersection of great
strategical value and saw some of the fiercest fighting during the
Russian retreat in the fall of 1915. It is the converging point of
the Brest-Litovsk-Moscow and Vilna-Rovno railways. Sixty-one miles
to the west lies Lida, one of the commanding points of the entire
railway systems of western Russia.
Again, on June 14, 1916, the number of prisoners in the hands of the
Russians was increased by 100 officers and 14,000 men, bringing the
grand total up to over 150,000. All along the entire front the
Russians pressed their advance, gaining considerable ground, without,
however, achieving any success of great importance.
Closer and closer the lines were drawn about Czernowitz, though on
June 16, 1916, the city was still reported as held by the Austrians.
On that day furious fighting also took place south of Buczacz, where
the Russians in vain attempted to cross the Dniester in order to join
hands with their forces which were advancing from the north against
Czernowitz with Horodenka, on the south bank of the Dniester as a
base. To the west of Lutsk in the direction toward Kovel, now
apparently the main objective of General Brussilov, the
Austro-Hungarians had received strong German reenforcements under
General von Linsingen and successfully denied to the Russians a
crossing over the Stokhod and Styr Rivers.
June 17, 1916, was a banner day in the calendar of the Russian troops.
It brought them once more into possession of the Bukowinian capital,
Czernowitz.
Czernowitz is one of the towns whose people have suffered most
severely from the fluctuating tide of war.
Its cosmopolitan population, the greater part of whom are Germans,
have seen it change hands no less than five times in twenty-one
months. The first sweep of the Russian offensive in September, 1914,
carried beyond it, but they had to capture it again two months later,
when they proceeded to drive the Austrians out of the whole of the
Bukowina. By the following February, however, the Austrians, with
German troops to help them, were again at its gates, and they forced
the Russians to retire beyond the Pruth. For a week the battle raged
about the small town of Sudagora, opposite Czernowitz, the seat of a
famous dynasty of miracle-working rabbis, but the forces of the
Central Powers were in overwhelming numbers, and with the loss of
Kolomea--the railway junction forty-five miles to the west, which the
Russians were again rapidly approaching--the whole region became
untenable and the Russians retired to the frontier.
Czernowitz is a clean and pleasant town of recent date. A century ago
it was an insignificant village of 5,000 people. To-day it has several
fine buildings, the most conspicuous of which is the Episcopal Palace,
with a magnificent reception hall. In one of the squares stands the
monument erected in 1875 to commemorate the Austrian occupation of
the Bukowina.
The population consists for the most part of Germans, Ruthenes,
Rumanians, and Poles. Among these are 21,000 Jews and there are also a
number of Armenians and gypsies. With all these diverse elements,
therefore, the town presents a very varied appearance, and on market
days the modern streets are crowded with peasants, attired in their
national dress, who mingle with people turned out in the latest
fashions of Paris and Vienna.
How violently the Russians assaulted Czernowitz is vividly described
in a letter from a correspondent of a German newspaper who was at
Czernowitz during this attack.
"The attack began on June 11, 1916. Shells fell incessantly, mostly in
the lower quarter of the town and the neighborhood of the station.
They caused a terrible panic. Incendiary shells started many fires.
"Austrian artillery replied vigorously. The Russians during the night
of June 12, 1916, attempted a surprise attack against the northeast
corner defenses, launching a tremendous artillery fire against them
and then sending storming columns forward. These were stopped,
however, by the defenders, who prevented a crossing of the Pruth,
inflicting severe losses upon the Russians.
"The Russian artillery attack on the morning of June 16, 1916, was
terrific. It resembled a thousand volcanoes belching fire. The whole
town shook. Austrian guns replied with equal intensity. The Russians
advanced in sixteen waves and were mown down and defeated. Hundreds
were drowned. Russian columns were continually pushed back from the
Pruth beyond Sudagora."
Serious, though, this loss was to the Central Powers, they had one
consolation left. Before the fall of Czernowitz the Austro-Hungarian
forces were able to withdraw and only about 1,000 men fell into
Russian captivity. In one respect then the Russians had not gained
their point. The Austrian army in the Bukowina was still in the field.
Slowly but steadily the force of Von Hindenburg's offensive in the
north increased. On the day on which Czernowitz fell attacks were
delivered at many points along the 150-mile line between Dvinsk in the
north and Krevo in the south. Some local successes were gained by the
Germans, but generally speaking this offensive movement failed in its
chief purpose, namely, to lessen the strength of the Russian attack
against the Austrian lines.
A more substantial gain was made by the combined German and
Austro-Hungarian forces, opposing the Russians west of Lutsk, in order
to stop their advance against Kovel. There the Germans drove back the
center of General Brussilov's front and captured 3,500 men, 11
officers, some cannon, and 10 machine guns.
On the day of Czernowitz's fall the official English newspaper
representative with the Russian armies of General Brussilov secured a
highly interesting statement from this Russian general who, by his
remarkable success, had so suddenly become one of the most famous
figures of the great war.
"The sweeping successes attained by my armies are not the product of
chance, or of Austrian weakness, but represent the application of all
the lessons which we have learned in two years of bitter warfare
against the Germans. In every movement, great or small, that we have
made this winter, we have been studying the best methods of handling
the new problems which modern warfare presents.
"At the beginning of the war, and especially last summer, we lacked
the preparations which the Germans have been making for the past fifty
years. Personally I was not discouraged, for my faith in Russian
troops and Russian character is an enduring one. I was convinced that,
given the munitions, we should do exactly as we have done in the past
two weeks.
"The main element of our success was due to the absolute coordination
of all the armies involved and the carefully planned harmony with
which the various branches of the service supported each other.
"On our entire front the attack began at the same hour and it was
impossible for the enemy to shift his troops from one quarter to
another, as our attacks were being pressed equally at all points.
"The most important fighting has been in the sector between Rovno, and
here we have made our greatest advances, which are striking more
seriously at the strategy of the whole enemy front in the east.
"If we are able to take Kovel there is reason to believe that the
whole eastern front will be obliged to fall back, as Kovel represents
a railway center which has been extraordinarily useful for the
intercommunications of the Germans and Austrians.
"That this menace is fully realized by the enemy is obvious from the
fact that the Germans are supporting this sector with all the
available troops that can be rushed up. Some are coming from the west
and some from points on the eastern front to the north of us.
"In all of this fighting the Russian infantry has proved itself
superb, with a morale which is superior even to that of 1914, when we
were sweeping through Galicia for the first time. This is largely due
to the fact that the army now represents the feeling of the whole
people of Russia, who are united in their desire to carry the war to
its final and successful conclusion."
To the question how he had been able to make such huge captures of
prisoners the Russian general replied:
"The nature of modern trenches, which makes them with their deep
tunnels and maze of communications, so difficult to destroy, renders
them a menace to their own defenders once their position is taken in
rear or flank, for it is impossible to escape quickly from these
elaborate networks of defenses.
"Besides, we have for the first time had sufficient ammunition to
enable us to use curtain fire for preventing the enemy from retiring
from his positions, save through a scathing zone of shrapnel fire,
which renders surrender imperative."
CHAPTER XXII
IN CONQUERED EAST GALICIA
Another very interesting account of conditions along the southeastern
front can be found in a letter from the Petrograd correspondent of a
London daily newspaper, who spent considerable time in Tarnopol, a
city which had been in the hands of the Russians ever since the early
part of the war:
"We are in Austria here, but no one who was plumped down into
Tarnopol, say from an aeroplane, would ever guess it. Not only are the
streets full of Russian soldiers: all the names on the shop fronts are
in Russian characters. The hotels have changed their styles and
titles. The notices posted up in public places are Russian. Everywhere
Russian (of a kind) is talked. German, the official language of
Austria, is neither heard nor seen.
"It is true that this part of Galicia has been in the possession of
Russia since the early days of the war. Even so, it is a surprise to
find a population so accommodating.
"The people in this part of Austria are Poles, Ruthenes and Jews.
Polish belongs to the same family of languages as Russian, and the
Poles are Slavs. So are the Ruthenes, whose speech is almost identical
with that of southwestern Russia. They are very like the 'Little'
Russians, so called to distinguish them from the people of 'Great'
Russia on the north. They live in the same neat, thatched and
whitewashed cottages. They have the same gayly colored national
costumes still in wear, and the same fairy tales, the same merry
lilting songs, so different from the melancholy strains of northern
folk music. Almost the same religion.
"The finest churches in Tarnopol belong to the Poles, who are Roman
Catholics. The Russian soldiers, many of them, seem to find the Roman
mass quite as comforting as their Orthodox rite. They stand and listen
to it humbly, crossing themselves in eastern fashion, only caring to
know that God is being worshiped in more or less the same fashion as
that to which they are accustomed. But in the Ruthenian churches they
find exactly the same ritual as their own. With their blood relations
they are upon family terms. There was an interesting exhibition in
Petrograd last year illustrating the Russian racial traits in the
Ruthenian population. Down here one recognizes these at once.
"No clearer proof could be found of the gentle, kindly character of
the Russians than the attitude toward them of the Austrian Slavs
generally. At a point close to the firing line, early this morning, I
saw three Austrian prisoners who had been 'captured' during the night.
They had, in point of fact, given themselves up. They were Serbs from
Bosnia, and they were quite happy to be in Russian hands. I saw them
again later in the day on their way to the rear, sitting by the
roadside smoking cigarettes which their escort had given them.
Captives and guardians were on the best of terms.
"The only official evidences of occupation which I noticed are notices
announcing that restaurants and cafes close at 11, and that there must
be no loud talking or playing of instruments in hotels after 10--an
edict for which I feel profoundly grateful. Signs of peaceful
penetration are to be found everywhere. The samovar (urn for making
tea) has become an institution in Galician hotels. The main street is
pervaded by small boys selling Russian newspapers or making a good
thing out of cleaning the high Russian military 'sapogee' (top boots).
They get five cents for a penny paper and ninepence or a shilling for
boot-blacking, but considering the mud of Galicia (I have been up to
my boot tops--that is, up to my knees--in it), the charge is not too
heavy, especially if the unusual dearness of living be taken into
account.
[Illustration: The Russian Offensive in Galicia.]
"Very gay this main street is of an afternoon, crowded with officers,
who come in from the trenches to enjoy life. A very pleasant lot of
young fellows they are, and very easily pleased. One I met invited me
to midday tea in his bombproof shelter in a forward trench. I accepted
gratefully and found him a charmingly gay host. He took a childlike
pleasure in showing me all the conveniences he had fitted up, and kept
on saying, 'Ah, how comfortable and peaceful it is here,' with the
sound of rifle shots and hand grenade and mine explosions in our ears
all the time.
"From highest to lowest, almost all the Russian officers I have met
are friendly and unassuming. The younger ones are delightful. There is
no drink to be had here, and therefore no foolish, tipsy loudness or
quarreling among them."
On June 18, 1916, further progress and additional large captures of
Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners were reported by the Russian
armies fighting in Volhynia, Galicia, and the Bukowina. However, both
the amount of ground gained and the number of prisoners taken were
very much slighter than had been the case during the earlier part of
the Russian offensive. This was due to the fact that the armies of the
Central Powers had received strong reenforcements and had apparently
succeeded in strengthening their new positions and in stiffening their
resistance. Powerful counterattacks were launched at many points.
One of these, according to the Russian official statement, was of
special vigor. It was directed against General Brussilov's armies
which were attempting to advance toward Lemberg, in the region of the
village of Rogovitz to the southwest of Lokatchi, about four miles to
the south of the main road from Lutsk to Vladimir-Volynski. There the
Austro-Hungarian forces in large numbers attacked in massed formation
and succeeded in breaking through the Russian front, capturing three
guns after all the men and officers in charge of them had been killed.
The Russians, however, brought up strong reenforcements and made it
necessary for the Austro-Hungarians to withdraw, capturing at the same
time some hundred prisoners, one cannon, and two machine guns.
At another point of this sector in the region of Korytynitzky,
southeast of Svinioukhi, a Russian regiment, strongly supported by
machine-gun batteries, inflicted heavy losses on the Austro-Hungarian
troops and captured four officers, a hundred soldiers, and four
machine guns.
South of this region, just to the east of Borohoff, a desperate fight
developed for the possession of a dense wood near the village of
Bojeff, which, after the most furious resistance, had to be cleared
finally by the Austro-Hungarian forces, which, during this engagement,
suffered large losses in killed and wounded, and furthermore lost one
thousand prisoners and four machine guns.
At still another point on this part of the front, just south of
Radziviloff, a Russian attack was resisted most vigorously and heavy
losses were inflicted on the attacking regiments. Here, as well as in
other places, the Austro-Hungarian-German forces employed all possible
means to stem the Russian onrush, and a large part of the losses
suffered by General Brussilov's regiments was due to the extensive use
of liquid fire.
The troops of General Lechitsky's command, after the occupation of
Czernowitz, crossed the river Pruth at many points and came frequently
in close touch with the rear guard of the retreating Austro-Hungarian
army. During the process of these engagements, about fifty officers
and more than fifteen hundred men, as well as ten guns, were captured.
Near Koutchournare, four hundred more men and some guns of heavy
caliber, as well as large amounts of munitions fell into the hands of
the Russian forces. The latter claimed also at this point the capture
of immense amounts of provisions and forage, loaded on almost one
thousand wagons. At various other points west and north of Czernowitz,
large quantities of engineering material had to be left behind at
railroad stations by the retreating Austro-Hungarian army and thus
easily became the booty of the victorious Russians.
Farther to the north, along the Styr, to the west of Kolki, in the
region of the Kovel-Rovno Railway, General von Linsingen's
Austro-German army group successfully resisted Russian attacks at some
points, launched strong counterattacks at other points, but had to
fall back before superior Russian forces at still other points.
In the northern sector of the eastern front, along the Dvina, activity
was restricted to extensive artillery duels during this day.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE BEFORE KOVEL
An extensive offensive movement was developed on June 19, 1916, by
General von Linsingen. The object of this movement apparently was not
only to secure the safety of Kovel, but also to threaten General
Brussilov's army by an enveloping movement which, if it had succeeded,
would not only have pushed the Russian center back beyond Lutsk and
even possibly Dubno, but would also have exposed the entire Russian
forces, fighting in Galicia and the Bukowina, to the danger of being
cut off from the troops battling in Volhynia. This movement developed
in the triangle formed by the Kovel-Rafalovka railroad in the north,
the Kovel-Rozishtchy railroad in the south, and the Styr River between
these two places. The severest fighting in this sector occurred along
the Styr between Kolki and Sokal.
On the other hand Russians scored a decided success in the southern
corner of the Bukowina where a crossing of the Sereth River was
successfully negotiated.
Artillery duels again were fought along the Dvina front as well as
along the Dvina-Vilia sector. In the latter region a number of
engagements took place south of Smorgon, near Kary and Tanoczyn, where
German troops captured some hundreds of Russians as well as four
machine guns and four mine throwers. A Russian aeroplane was compelled
to land west of Kolodont, south of Lake Narotch, while German
aeroplanes successfully bombarded the railroad station at Vileika on
the Molodetchna-Polotsk railway.
With ever increasing fury the battle raged along the Styr River on the
following day, June 20, 1916. Both sides won local successes at
various points, but the outstanding feature of that day's fighting was
the fact that in spite of the most heroic efforts the Russian troops
were unable to advance any farther toward Kovel. Ten miles west of
Kolki the Russians succeeded in cross- [see TN] of Gruziatin, two miles
north of Godomitchy, the small German garrison of which, consisting of
some five hundred officers and men, fell into Russian captivity. Only
a short time later, on the same day, heavy German batteries
concentrated such a furious fire on the Russian troops occupying the
village that they had to withdraw and permit the Germans once more to
occupy Gruziatin. How furious the fighting in this one small section
must have been that day may readily be seen from the fact that the
German official statement claimed a total of over twenty thousand men
to have been lost by the Russians.
Hardly less severe was the fighting which developed along the Stokhod
River. This is a southern tributary of the Pripet River, joining it
about thirty miles west of the mouth of the Styr. It is cut by both
the Kovel-Rovno and the Kovel-Rafalovka railways, and forms a strong
natural line of defense west of Kovel. In spite of the most desperate
efforts on the part of large Russian forces to cross this river, near
the village of Vorontchin northeast of Kieslin, the German resistance
was so tenacious that the Russians were unable to make any progress.
Large numbers of guns of all calibers had been massed here and
inflicted heavy losses to the czar's regiments. Another furious
engagement in this region occurred during the night near the village
of Rayniesto on the Stokhod River.
To the north heavy fighting again developed south of Smorgon, where,
with the coming of night, the Germans directed a very intense
bombardment against the Russian lines. Again and again this was
followed up with infantry attacks, which in some instances resulted in
the penetrating of the Russian trenches, while in others it led to
sanguinary hand-to-hand fighting. However, the Russian batteries
likewise hurled their death-dealing missiles in large numbers and
exacted a terrific toll from the ranks of the attacking Germans. Along
the balance of the northern half of the front a serious artillery duel
again was fought, which was especially intense in the region of the
Uxkull bridgehead, in the northern sector of the Jacobstadt positions
and along the Oginsky Canal.
German aeroplane squadrons repeated their activity of the day before
and successfully bombarded the railroad stations at Vileika,
Molodetchna, and Zalyessie.
The well-known English journalist, Mr. Stanley Washburn, acted at this
time as special correspondent of the London "Times" at Russian
headquarters and naturally had exceptional opportunities for observing
conditions at the front. Some of his descriptions of the territory
across which the Russians' advance was carried out, as well as of
actual fighting which he observed at close quarters, therefore, give
us a most vivid picture of the difficulties under which the Russian
victories were achieved and of the tenacity and courage which the
Austro-German troops showed in their resistance.
Of the Volhynian fortress of Lutsk, as it appeared in the second half
of June, 1916, he says:
"This town to-day is a veritable maelstrom of war. From not many miles
away, by night and by day, comes an almost uninterrupted roar of heavy
gunfire, and all day long the main street is filled with the rumble
and clatter of caissons, guns, and transports going forward on one
side, while on the other side is an unending line of empty caissons
returning, mingled with wounded coming back in every conceivable form
of vehicle, and in among these at breakneck speed dart motorcycles
carrying dispatches from the front.
"The weather is dry and hot, and the lines of the road are visible for
miles by the clouds of dust from the plodding feet of the soldiery and
the transport. As the retreat from Warsaw was a review of the Russian
armies in reverse, so is Lutsk to-day a similar spectacle of the
Muscovite armies advancing; but now all filled with high hopes and
their morale is at the highest pitch.
"Along the entire front the contending armies are locked in a fierce,
ceaseless struggle. No hour of the day passes when there is not
somewhere an attack or a counterattack going forward with a bitterness
and ferocity unknown since the beginning of the war. The troops coming
from Germany are rendering the Russian advance difficult, and the
general nature of the fighting is defense by vigorous counterattacks."
Of the fighting along the Kovel front he says: "The story of the
fighting on the Kovel front is a narrative of a heroic advance which
at the point of the bayonet steadily forced back through barrier after
barrier the stubborn resistance of the Austrians, intermingled
occasionally with German units, till at one point the advance measured
forty-eight miles.
"After two days spent on the front I can state without any reservation
that I believe that the Russians are engaged in the fiercest and most
courageous fight of their entire war, hanging on to their hardly won
positions and often facing troops concentrated on the strategic points
of the line outnumbering them sometimes by three to one.
"I spent Thursday at an advanced position on the Styr, where the
Russian troops earlier forced a crossing of the river, facing a
terrific fire, and turning the enemy out of his positions at the point
of the bayonet. In hurriedly dug positions offering the most meager
kind of shelter, the Russians in one morning drove back four
consecutive Austrian counterattacks. Each left the field thickly
studded with Austrian dead, besides hundreds of their wounded who had
been left.
"From an observation point in the village I studied the ground of the
day's fighting, and though familiar with Russian courage and tenacity,
I found it difficult to realize that human beings had been able to
carry the positions which the Russians carried here.
"I was obliged to curtail my study of the enemy's lines and of the
position on account of the extremely local artillery fire, the shells
endeavoring to locate our observation point, which was evidently
approximately known. At any rate, two shells bursting over us and one
narrowly missing our waiting carriage, besides three others falling in
the mud almost at our feet, prompted our withdrawal. Fortunately the
last three had fallen in the mud and did not explode.
"Along this front the Russians are holding against heavy odds, but
they are certainly inflicting greater losses than they are receiving.
"The next day I spent at the Corps and Divisional Headquarters west
of the Kovel road. The forward units of this corps represent the
maximum point of our advance, and the Russians' most vital menace to
the enemy, as is obvious from the numbers of Germans who are attacking
here in dense masses, without so far seriously impairing the Russian
resistance.
"After spending three days on this front motoring hundreds of versts,
and inspecting the positions taken by the Russians, their achievement
becomes increasingly impressive. The first line taken which I have
inspected represents the latest practice in field works, in many ways
comparing with the lines which I saw on the French front. The front
line is protected by five or six series of barbed wire, with heavy
front line trenches, studded with redoubts, machine-gun positions, and
underground shelters twenty feet deep, while the reserve positions
extend in many places from half a mile to a mile in series behind the
first line, studded with communication trenches, shelters, and
bomb-proofs.
"It must not be thought that the Austrians offered only a feeble
resistance, for I inspected one series of trenches where, I was
informed, the Russians in a few versts of front buried 4,000 Austrian
dead on the first lines alone. This indicates the nature and tenacity
of the enemy resistance. I am told also that far fewer Slavs and Poles
have been found among the Austrians than in any other big action. It
is believed that most of these have been sent to the Italian front on
account of their tendency to surrender to the Russians.
"Another interesting point about their advance is the fact that the
Russians practically in no place used guns of the heaviest caliber,
and that the preliminary artillery fire in no place lasted above
thirty hours, and in many places not more than twelve hours.
"Last summer's experience is not forgotten by the Russians and there
has probably been the most economic use of ammunition on any of the
fronts in this war commensurate with the results during these
advances. Rarely was a hurricane fire directed on any positions
preceding an assault, but the artillery checked each shell and its
target, which was rendered possible by the nearness of our front
lines.
"In this way avenues were cut through the barbed wire at frequent
intervals along the line through which the attacks were pressed home
and the flanking trenches and the labyrinths were taken in the rear or
on the flanks before the Austrians were able to effect their escape.
The line once broken was moved steadily forward, taking Lutsk six days
after the first attack, and one division reaching its maximum advance
of forty-eight miles just ten days after the first offensive
movement."
CHAPTER XXIV
PROGRESS OF THE BUKOWINIAN CONQUEST
On June 21, 1916, the Russians gained another important victory by the
capture of the city of Radautz, in the southern Bukowina, eleven miles
southwest of the Sereth River, and less than ten miles west of the
Rumanian frontier. This river Sereth must not be confused with a river
of the same name further to the north in Galicia. The latter is a
tributary of the Dniester, while the Bukowinian Sereth is a tributary
of the Danube, which latter it joins near the city of Galatz, in
Rumania, after flowing in a southeasterly direction through this
country for almost two hundred miles.
The fall of Radautz was an important success for various reasons. In
the first place, it brought the Russian advance that much nearer to
the Carpathian Mountains. In the second place, it gave the invading
armies full control of an important railway running in a northwesterly
direction through the Bukowina. This railway was of special
importance, because it is the northern continuation of one of the
principal railroad lines of Rumania which, during its course in the
latter country, runs along the west bank of the Sereth River.
In Galicia, General von Bothmer's army successfully resisted strong
Russian attacks along the Hajvoronka-Bobulinze line, north of
Przevloka.
Without cessation the furious fighting in the Kolki-Sokal sector on
the Styr River continued. There General von Linsingen's German
reenforcements had strengthened the Austro-Hungarian resistance to
such an extent that it held against all Russian attempts to break
through their line in their advance toward Kovel.
The same condition existed on the Sokal-Linievka line, where the
Russian forces had been trying for the best part of a week to force a
crossing of the Stokhod River, the only natural obstacle between them
and Kovel. Further south, west of Lutsk, from the southern sector of
the Turiya River down to the Galician border near the town of
Gorochoff, the Teutonic forces likewise succeeded in resisting the
Russian advance. This increased resistance of the Teutonic forces
found expression, also, in a considerable decrease in the number of
prisoners taken by the Russians.
Along the northern half of the front, Field Marshal von Hindenburg
renewed his attacks south of Dvinsk. South of Lake Vishnieff, near
Dubatovka, German troops, after intense artillery preparation, stormed
a portion of the Russian trenches, but could not maintain their new
positions against repeated ferocious counterattacks carried out by
Russian reenforcements. Near Krevo, the Germans forced a crossing over
the River Krevlianka, but were again thrown back to its west bank by
valiant Russian artillery attacks.
The Russian advance in the Bukowina progressed rapidly on June 22,
1916. Three important railroad towns fell into their hands, on that
day, of the left wing of the Russian army, Gurahumora in the south,
Straza in the center, and Vidnitz in the northwest. Gurahumora lies
fifty miles south of Czernowitz, and is situated on the only railway
in the southern part of the crownland. The town is ten miles from the
Russian border. Straza lies a few miles east of the western terminal
of the Radautz-Frasin railway. Its fall indicates a Russian advance of
eighteen miles since the capture of Radautz. Vidnitz is on the
Galician border, a few miles south of Kuty, and twenty-five miles
southwest of Czernowitz.
In spite of these successes, however, it became clear by this time that
the Russian attempt to cut off the Austrian army fighting in the
Bukowina had miscarried. Each day yielded a smaller number of prisoners
than the preceding day. The main part of the Austro-Hungarian forces had
safely reached the foot-hills of the Carpathians, while other parts
farther to the north had succeeded in joining the army of General von
Bothmer.
In Galicia and Volhynia the Teutonic forces continued to resist
successfully all Russian attempts to advance, even though there was
not the slightest let-up in the violence of the Russian attack.
Along many other points of the front, more or less important
engagements took place, especially so along the Oginsky Canal, where
the Russians suffered heavy losses. Von Hindenburg's troops in the
north also were active again, both in the Lake district south of
Dvinsk, and along the Dvina sector from Dvinsk to Riga.
Once more a Russian success was reported in the Bukowina on June 23,
1916. West of Sniatyn the Russian troops advanced to the Rybnitza
River, occupying the heights along its banks. Still further west,
about twenty miles south of the Pruth River, the town of Kuty, well up
in the Carpathian Mountains, was captured. Kuty is about forty miles
west of Czernowitz, just across the Galician border and only twenty
miles almost due south from the important railroad center Kolomea,
itself about one-third the distance from Czernowitz to Lemberg on the
main railway between these two cities.
A slight success was also gained on the Rovno-Dubno-Brody-Lemberg
railway. A few miles northeast of Brody, just east of the
Galician-Russian border, near the village of Radziviloff, Russian
troops gained a footing in the Austro-Hungarian trenches and captured
a few hundred prisoners. Later that day, however, a concentrated
artillery bombardment forced them to give up this advantage and to
retire to their own trenches.
In Volhynia the German counterattacks against General Brussilov's army
extended now along the front of almost eighty miles, stretching from
Kolki on the Styr River to within a few miles of the Galician border
near Gorochoff. Along part of this line, General von Linsingen's
forces advanced on June 23, 1916, to and beyond the line of
Zubilno-Vatyn-Zvinatcze, and repulsed a series of most fierce
counterattacks launched by the Russians which caused the latter
serious losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The country covered
by these engagements is extremely difficult, impeded by woods and
swamps, and a great deal of the fighting, therefore, was at close
quarters, especially so near the town of Tortchyn, about fifteen miles
due west of Lutsk. Other equally severe engagements occurred near
Zubilno and southeast of Sviniusky, near the village of Pustonyty.
In the north, the Russians took the offensive in the region of Illuxt,
on the Dvina, and in the region of Vidzy, north of the Disna River.
Although successful in some places, the German resistance was strong
enough to prevent any material gain. German aeroplanes attacked and
bombarded the railway stations at Kolozany, southwest of Molodetchna,
and of Puniniez.
West of Sniatyn, Russian troops, fighting as they advanced, occupied
the villages of Kilikhoff and Toulokhoff on June 24, 1916.
Late on the preceding evening, June 23, 1916, the town of Kimpolung
was taken after intense fighting. Sixty officers and 2,000 men were
made prisoners and seven machine guns were captured. In the railway
station whole trains were captured.
With the capture of the towns of Kimpolung, Kuty and Viznic, the whole
Bukowina was now in the hands of the Russians. So hurried had been the
retirement of the Austro-Hungarian forces that they left behind
eighty-eight empty wagons, seventeen wagons of maize, and about 2,500
tons of anthracite, besides structural material, great reserves of
fodder and other material.
On the Styr, two miles south of Sminy, in the region of Czartorysk,
the Russians, by a sudden attack, took the redoubt of a fort whose
garrison, after a stubborn resistance, were all put to the bayonet.
North of the village of Zatouritzky, the German-Austrian forces
assumed the offensive, but were pushed back by a counterattack, both
sides suffering heavily in the hand-grenade fighting.
North of Poustomyty, southeast of Sviusky (southwest of Lutsk), the
Germans attacked Russian lines, but were received by concentrated
fire, and penetrated as far as the Russian trenches in only a few
points, where the trenches had been virtually destroyed by the
preparatory artillery fire.
German artillery violently bombarded numerous sectors of the Riga
positions. A strong party of Germans attempted to approach Russian
trenches near the western extremity of Lake Babit, but without result.
On the Dvina, between Jacobstadt and Dvinsk, German artillery was also
violently active. German aeroplanes dropped twenty bombs on the
station at Polochany southwest of Molodetchna.
On June 25, 1916, there was again intense artillery fire in many
sectors in the regions of Jacobstadt and Dvinsk.
Along the balance of the front many stubborn engagements were fought
between comparatively small detachments. Thus for instance, in the
region east of Horodyshchy north of Baranovitchy, after a violent
bombardment of the Russian trenches near the Scroboff farm on Sunday
night, the German troops took the offensive, but were repulsed. At the
same time, on the road to Slutsk, a German attempt to approach the
Russian trenches on the Shara River was repulsed by heavy fire.
In the region northwest of Lake Vygonovskoye, at noon the Germans
attacked the farm situated five versts southwest of Lipsk. At first
they were repulsed; but nevertheless they renewed the attack afterward
on a greatly extended front under cover of heavy and light artillery.
Especially heavy fighting again developed along the Kovel sector of
the Styr front. From Kolki to Sokal the Germans bombarded the Russian
trenches with heavy artillery and made many local attacks, most of
which were successfully repulsed.
Repeated attacks in mass formation in the region of Linievka on the
Stokhod, resulted also in some successes to the German troops. West of
Sokal they stormed Russian positions over a length of some 3,000
meters and repulsed all counterattacks.
On the reaches of the Dniester, south of Buczacz, Don Cossacks, having
crossed the river fighting and overthrowing elements of the
Austro-Hungarian advance guards, occupied the villages of Siekerghine
and Petruve, capturing five officers and 350 men. Russian cavalry,
after a fight, occupied positions near Pezoritt, a few miles west of
Kimpolung.
Additional large depots of wood and thirty-one abandoned wagons were
captured at Molit and Frumos stations on the Gurahumora-Rascka
railway.
On the other hand the number of prisoners and the amount of booty
taken by General von Linsingen's army alone in Volhynia since June 16,
1916, increased to sixty-one officers, 11,097 men, two cannon and
fifty-four guns.
CHAPTER XXV
TEMPORARY LULL IN THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE
So strong had the combined Austro-Hungarian-German resistance become
by this time, that by June 26, 1916, the Russian advance seemed to
have been halted all along the line. The resistance had stiffened,
especially in front of Kovel, where the Central Powers seemed to have
assembled their strongest forces and were not only successful in
keeping the Russians from reaching Kovel but even regained some of the
ground lost in Volhynia.
Southwest of Sokal they stormed Russian lines and took several hundred
prisoners. Russian counterattacks were nowhere successful. This was
especially due to the fact that both on the Kolki front and on the
middle Strypa the Germans bombarded all Russian positions with heavy
guns.
To the north of Kuty and west of Novo Posaive Russian attacks were
repulsed likewise with heavy losses.
The fighting in the north, along the Dvina front and south of Dvinsk
in the lake district, had settled down to a series of local
engagements between small detachments and to artillery duels. German
detachments which penetrated Russian positions south of Kekkau brought
back twenty-six prisoners, one machine gun and one mine thrower.
Another detachment which entered Russian positions brought back north
of Miadziol one officer, 188 men, six machine guns and four mine
throwers. Numerous bombs were again dropped on the railway freight
station at Dvinsk. In the Baltic, however, three Russian hydroplanes
in the Irben Strait engaged four German machines, bringing down one.
On the Riga front and near Uxkull bridgehead there was an artillery
duel. Against the Dvinsk positions, too, the Germans opened a violent
artillery fire at different points, and attempted to take the
offensive north of Lake Sventen, but without success.
In the region north of Lake Miadziol, south of Dvinsk, the Germans
bombarded with heavy and light artillery Russian trenches between
lakes Dolja and Voltchino. They then started an offensive which was
stopped by heavy artillery fire. A second German offensive also
failed, the attacking troops being again driven back to their own
trenches.
In the region of the Slutsk road, southeast of Baranovitchy, the
Germans after a short artillery preparation attempted to take the
offensive, but were repulsed by heavy fire.
The Germans also resumed the offensive in the vicinity of a farm
southwest of Lipsk, northeast of Lake Vygonovskoe, and succeeded in
reaching the east bank of the Shara, but soon afterward were dislodged
from it and fell back.
The Russian official statement of that day, June 26, 1916, announced
that General Brussilov had captured between June 4th and 23d, 4,413
officers and doctors, 194,941 men, 219 guns, 644 machine guns and 195
bomb throwers.
Again, during the night of June 26, 1916, southeast of Riga, the
Germans, after bombarding the Russian positions and emitting clouds of
gas, attacked in great force in the direction of Pulkarn.
Reenforcements, having been brought up quickly by the Russians, they
succeeded with the assistance of their artillery, in repulsing the
Germans, who suffered heavy losses.
On the Dvina and in the Jacobstadt region there was an artillery and
rifle duel. German aeroplanes were making frequent raids on the
Russian lines. They dropped sixty-eight bombs during a nocturnal raid
on the town of Dvinsk on June 27, 1916. The damage both to property
and life was considerable.
An attempt on the part of German troops to take the offensive south of
Krevo was repulsed by gunfire. On the rest of the front as far as the
region of the Pripet Marshes there was an exchange of fire.
On the same day General von Linsingen's forces stormed and captured
the village of Linievka, west of Sokal and about three miles east of
the Svidniki bridgehead on the Stokhod, and the Russian positions
south of it. West of Torchin, near the apex of the Lutsk salient, a
strong Russian attack collapsed under German artillery and infantry
fire.
In Galicia, southwest of Novo Pochaieff, east of Brody,
Austro-Hungarian outposts repulsed five Russian night attacks.
Gradually the Russians were closing in on the important position of
Kolomea, near the northern Bukowina border. On the east they were only
twelve miles off, on the north they had crossed the Dniester
twenty-four miles away, and in a few days they reported having driven
the Austrians across a river thirteen miles to the southeast, while at
Kuty, twenty miles almost due south, one attack followed another.
On the following day, June 28, 1916, strong offensive movements again
developed both in East Galicia and in Volhynia. In the former region
the Russians were the aggressors; in the latter, the Germans.
In East Galicia General Lechitsky, commander of Brussilov's center,
began a mighty onrush against the Austro-Hungarian lines, between the
Dniester and the region around Kuty, in an effort to push his
opponents beyond the important railway city of Kolomea, strategically
the most valuable point of southern Galicia.
He succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat upon the
Austro-Hungarians, taking three lines of trenches and 10,506
prisoners. This success was achieved in the northern part of the area
of attack, between the Dniester and the region around the Pruth. The
fall of Kolomea looked inevitable because of this new advance.
Persistent fighting took place on the line of the River Tchertovetz, a
tributary of the Pruth, and also in the region of the town of Kuty.
Both sides again suffered heavy losses at these points.
East of Kolomea the Russians again attacked in massed formations on a
front of twenty-five miles. At numerous points, at a great sacrifice,
Russian reserves were thrown against the Austrian lines, and succeeded
in advancing in hand-to-hand fighting, but during the evening were
forced to evacuate a portion of their front near Kolomea and to the
south. On the Dniester line superior Russian forces were repulsed
north of Obertyn. All Russian attempts to dislodge the Austrians west
of Novo Peczaje failed. At many other points in Galicia and the
Bukowina there were artillery duels.
In Volhynia, especially in the region of Linievka, and at other points
on the Stokhod, the desperate fighting which had been in progress for
quite a few days continued without abatement.
Russian attacks made by some companies between Dubatowska and Smorgon
failed in the face of terrific German fire.
Near Guessitschi, southeast of Ljubtscha, a German division stormed an
enemy point of support east of the Niemen, taking some prisoners and
capturing two machine guns and two mine throwers.
On the Dvina front German artillery bombarded the region of
Sakowitche, Seltze and Bogouschinsk Wood, northwest of Krevo. Strong
forces then proceeded to attack, but were repulsed by Russian machine
guns and infantry fire.
On June 29, 1916, the fighting northwest of Kuty continued. As a
result of pressure on the part of the superior forces of the Russians
the Austro-Hungarians were forced to withdraw their lines west and
southwest of Kolomea. The town of Obertyn was taken after a stubborn
fight, as well as villages in the neighborhood, north and south. In
the region south of the Dniester, the Russians were pursuing the
Austrians, who were forced to leave behind a large number of convoys
and military material.
Near the village of Solivine, between the rivers Stokhod and Styr, to
the west of Sokal, the Germans attempted to take the offensive. Their
attack was repulsed, but an artillery duel continued until late in the
day.
In the morning German aviators dropped thirty bombs on Lutsk. Light
and heavy German artillery opened a violent fire on the Russian
trenches in the Niemen sector, northeast of Novo Grodek. Under cover
of this fire German forces crossed the Niemen and occupied the woods
east of the village of Guessitschi.
On the Dvina front German artillery bombarded Russian positions
southeast of Riga and the bridgehead above Uxkull. North of Illuxt the
Germans attempted to move forward, but were thrown back by Russian
gunfire.
CHAPTER XXVI
ADVANCE AGAINST LEMBERG AND KOVEL
Late that day, June 29, 1916, General Lechitsky captured Kolomea, the
important railway junction for the possession of which the battle had
been raging furiously for days past. This was a severe blow to the
Central Powers. It meant a serious danger to the remainder of General
Pflanzer's army and likewise threatened the safety of General von
Bothmer's forces to the north.
Still the Russian advances continued. On the last day of June their
left wing drove back the retreating Austro-Hungarians over a front
situated south of the Dniester and occupied many places south of
Kolomea.
Northwest of Kolomea, Russian troops, after a violent engagement,
drove back their opponents in the direction of the heights near the
village of Brezova, and as the result of a brilliant attack, took part
of the heights.
The number of prisoners taken by General Lechitsky during the last
days of June, 1916, was 305 officers and 14,574 men. Four guns and
thirty machine guns were captured. The total number of prisoners taken
from June 4 to June 30, 1916, inclusive, was claimed to have reached
the immense total of 217,000 officers and men.
During June, in the region south of Griciaty, 158 officers and 2,307
men, as well as cannon and nineteen machine guns, fell into the hands
of the Central Powers.
In the region of the Lipa Austrian artillery continued to bombard the
Russian front with heavy artillery and field artillery. Desperate
attacks made by newly arrived German troops were, however, repulsed
with heavy losses to the attacking forces.
Near Thumacz an attack of cavalry, who charged six deep along a front
of three kilometers, was successfully repulsed by Austro-Hungarian
troops.
German forces drove back Russian troops south of Ugrinow, west of
Tortschin, and near Sokal.
At other points on the Kovel front engagements likewise took place,
though the violence of the combat had somewhat abated.
West of Kolki, southwest of Sokal, and near Viczny, German forces
conquered Russian positions. West and southwest of Lutsk various local
engagements occurred. Here the Russians on June 30, 1916, lost fifteen
officers, 1,365 men; since June 16th, twenty-six officers, 3,165 men.
The next objective of General Lechitsky's army was Stanislau, about
thirty miles farther northwest than Kolomea, on the Czernovitz-Lemberg
railway. On July 1, 1916, in the region west of Kolomea, the army of
General Lechitsky, after intense fighting, took by storm some strong
Austrian positions and captured some 2,000 men.
Further north, German and Austro-Hungarian troops of General von
Bothmer's army stormed the hill of Vorobijowka, a height southwest of
Tarnopol, which had been occupied by the Russians, and took seven
officers and 891 men. Seven machine guns and two mine throwers were
captured.
On the Volhynia front the German troops continued to deliver desperate
attacks against some sectors between the Styr and Stokhod and south
of the Stokhod.
In the afternoon German artillery produced gusts of fire in the region
of Koptchie, Ghelenovka and Zabary, southwest of Sokal. An energetic
attack then followed, but was repulsed. Southwest of Kiselin Russian
fire stopped an offensive. At the village of Seniawa and in the same
region near the village of Seublino there was a warm engagement. A
series of fresh German attacks southwest of Kiselin-Zubilno-Kochey was
repulsed. The German columns were put to flight with heavy losses. The
fugitives were killed in large numbers, but, reenforced by reserves,
the attacks were promptly renewed, without, however, meeting with much
success.
South of the village of Zaturze, near the village of Koscheff, Russian
forces stopped an Austrian offensive by a counteroffensive. Austrian
attempts to cross the River Shara southwest of Lipsk and south of
Baranovitchy were likewise repulsed.
On July 2, 1916, Russian torpedo boats bombarded the Courland coast
east of Raggazem without result. They were attacked effectively by
German coastal batteries and by aeroplanes.
At many points along the front of Field Marshal von Hindenburg the
Russians increased their fire, and repeatedly undertook advances.
These led to fighting within the German lines near Niki, north of
Smorgon. The Russians were ejected with losses.
On the front of Prince Leopold the Russians attacked northeast and
east of Gorodische and on both sides of the Baranovitchy railway,
after artillery preparation lasting four hours.
Farther south fierce battles occurred between the Styr and the Stokhod
and to the south of these rivers. On the Koptche-Ghelenovka-Zobary
front, after gusts of gunfire, the Germans left their trenches and
opened an assault upon the Russian line. Under cover of a bombardment
of extreme violence German troops opened an offensive south of
Linievka, but were checked. In the region of Zubilno and Zaturze (west
of Lutsk) the Austrians took the offensive in massed formation, but
were repulsed with heavy losses. East of the village of Ougrinov,
midway between Lutsk and Gorochoff, fresh German forces held up
Russian attacks. At other points on the front of General von
Linsingen strong Russian counterattacks were delivered west and
southwest of Lutsk, but failed to stop the German advance. Large
cavalry attacks broke down under German fire. The number of prisoners
was increased by the Germans by about 1,800. As the result of a week
of costly onslaughts by the Austro-German army between the Stokhod and
the Styr Rivers in Volhynia, the Russian forces had now been forced
back a distance of five miles along the greatest part of the front
before Kovel.
In the region of Issakoff, on the right bank of the Dniester,
southeast of Nijniff, the Austrians took the offensive in superior
numbers. The Russians launched a counteroffensive, which resulted in a
fierce fight.
On July 3, 1916, the Russian advance west of Kolomea still continued
in this direction. The Austrians were dislodged from several
positions, and as a result of this the Russians occupied the village
of Potok Tcharny. The booty taken by the Russians here was four cannon
and a few hundred prisoners.
Further north in Galicia the army group of General Count von Bothmer,
southeast of Thumacz, in a quick advance, forced back the Russians on
a front more than twelve and a half miles wide and more than five and
a quarter miles deep.
On the Styr-Stokhod front the Russians again threw strong forces, part
of them recently brought up to this front, in masses against the
German lines to stay their advance, but were repulsed.
An attempt of German troops to cross the Styr in the region of the
village of Lipa was repulsed. During the night the Russians captured
on this front eleven officers, nearly 1,000 men and five machine guns.
Still farther north, local counterattacks at points where the Russians
first succeeded in making some advances, all yielded finally some
successes for the Germans, who captured thirteen officers and 1,883
men. Two lines of German works south of Tzirine, northeast of
Baranovitchy, however, were pierced by the Russians. In this fighting
they captured seventy-two officers, 2,700 men, eleven cannon and
several machine guns and bomb throwers.
On the northerly front there was lively artillery fire, which became
violent at some points. In the region of the village of Baltaguzy,
east of Lake Vichnevskoye the Germans attempted to leave their
trenches, but were prevented by Russian fire. A Russian air squadron
raided the Baranovitchy railway station.
Once more, on July 4, 1916, the coast of Courland was bombarded
fruitlessly from the sea by Russian ships. The operations of the
Russian forces against the front of Field Marshal von Hindenburg were
continued, especially on both sides of Smorgon. On the Riga-Dvinsk
front the artillery duels were growing more intense. Northwest of
Goduziesk, Russian troops dislodged German forces from the outskirts
of a wood. German aeroplane squadrons dropped bombs freely on the
railway.
The Russians recommenced attacking the front from Tzirin to a point
southeast of Baranovitchy. Hand-to-hand fights in some places were
very stubborn. The Russians were driven out of the sections of the
German lines into which they had broken and suffered very heavy
losses.
On the lower Styr and on the front between the Styr and Stokhod, and
farther south as far as the region of the lower Lipa, everywhere there
were fought most desperate engagements.
In the region of Vulka-Galouziskai the Russians broke through wire
entanglements fitted with land mines. In a very desperate fight on the
Styr west of Kolki the Russians overthrew the Germans and took more
than 1,000 prisoners, together with three guns, seventeen machine guns
and two searchlights, and several thousand rifles.
In the region north of Zaturse and near Volia Sadovska the Russians
seized the first line of enemy trenches, and stopped by artillery fire
an enemy attack on Schkline.
In the region of the lower Lipa the Germans made a most stubborn
attack without result. At another point the Germans, who crossed the
Styr above the mouth of the Lipa, near the village of Peremel, were
attacked and driven back to the river.
On the Galician front, in the direction of the Carpathians, there was
an artillery action. The left wing of the Russians continued to press
the Austrians back. On the road between Kolomea and Dalatyn the
Russians captured the village of Sadzadka at the point of the bayonet.
Southeast of Riga and at many points on the front between Postavy and
Vishnieff, further partial attacks by the Russians were repulsed on
July 5, 1916. On the Dvina front and the Dvinsk position and further
south there were also lively artillery engagements at numerous points.
Near Boyare, on the Dvina above Friedrichstadt, Russian light
artillery smashed a German light battery. Attempts by the Germans to
remove the guns were unsuccessful. The gun team, which endeavored to
save one of the guns, was annihilated. All the guns were eventually
abandoned.
Extremely fierce fighting, especially in the region east of Worodische
and south of Darovo, was everywhere in German favor. The losses of the
Russians were very considerable.
In the direction of Baranovitchy the fighting continues, developing to
Russian advantage. The Germans delivered repeated counterattacks in
order to regain positions captured by the Russians, but each was
easily repulsed.
South of the Pinsk Marshes the Russians had important new successes.
In the region of Gostioukhovka they captured an entire German battery
and took prisoners twenty-two officers and 350 soldiers. Northwest of
Baznitchi, on the Styr, north of Kolki, the Russians captured two
cannon, three machine guns, and 2,322 prisoners. North of
Stegrouziatine they captured German trenches and took more than 300
prisoners and one machine gun. Between the Styr and the Stokhod, west
of Sokal and southward, the Germans launched many counterattacks under
the protection of artillery.
In Galicia, after intense artillery preparations, the Russians took up
an energetic offensive west of the lower Strypa and on the right bank
of the Dniester. The Germans were defeated and driven back. The
Russian troops were now approaching the Koropice and Souhodolek
Rivers, tributaries of the Dniester. They took here nearly 5,000
prisoners and eleven machine guns. On the front of the Barysz sector
the defense, after the repulse of repeated Russian attacks, was
partially transferred to the Koropice sector. Russian assaults
frequently broke down before the German lines on both sides of
Chocimirz, southeast of Tlumach.
Near Sadzadka the Russians with superior forces were successful in
penetrating the Austrian positions, who then retreated about five
miles to the west, where they formed a new line and repulsed all
attacks.
Southwest and northwest of Kolomea the Austrians maintained their
positions against all Russian efforts.
Southwest of Buczacz, after heavy fighting at Koropice Brook, the
Austrians recaptured their line.
CHAPTER XXVII
THE GERMAN STAND ON THE STOKHOD
General Von Linsingen saw himself forced to abandon on July 6, 1916, a
corner of the German lines protruding toward Czartorysk on account of
the superior pressure on its sides near Kostiukovka and west of Kolki,
and new lines of defense were selected along the Stokhod. On both
sides of Sokal, Russian attacks broke down with heavy losses. West and
southwest of Lutsk the situation remained unchanged that day.
Against the front of Field Marshal von Hindenburg, the Russians
continued their operations. They attacked with strong forces south of
Lake Narotch, but after fierce fighting were repulsed. Northeast of
Smorgon and at other points they were easily repulsed.
The fighting in the vicinity of Kolomea was extended. A strong Russian
advance west of the town was checked by a counterattack. Southeast of
Tlumach German and Austro-Hungarian troops broke up with artillery and
infantry fire an attack over a front of one and a half kilometers by a
large force of Russian cavalry.
The number of prisoners the Russians took on July 4 and 5, 1916,
during the fighting which still continued on west of the line of the
Styr and below the town of Kolki, totals more than 300 officers and
7,415 men, mostly unwounded. The Russians also captured six guns,
twenty-three machine guns, two searchlights, several thousand rifles,
eleven bomb throwers, and seventy-three ammunition lights.
The Russians repulsed violent German attacks near Gruziatyn. On the
right bank of the Dniester, in the region of Jidatcheff and Hotzizrz,
there also was desperate fighting.
There was a lively artillery duel in many sectors of the front north
of the Pinsk Marshes. East of Baranovitchy, the Austro-Hungarian
forces launched several desperate counterattacks which were repulsed
by the Russians. Several times the Austrians opened gusts of fire with
their heavy and light guns against the region of the village of
Labuzy, east of Baranovitchy. Under cover of this fire, the Austrians
delivered two violent counterattacks. The Russians drove the
Austro-Hungarians back on both occasions, bringing to bear on them the
fire of their artillery, machine guns, and rifles.
During the repulse of repeated attacks made on July 7, 1916, south of
Lake Narotch, the Germans captured two officers and 210 men. They
repelled weak advances at other points.
Repeated efforts by strong Russian forces against the front from
Tzirin to the southeast of Gorodische and on both sides of the Darovo
ended in complete failure. The dead lying before the German positions
numbered thousands. In addition to these the Russians lost a
considerable number of prisoners.
Austro-Hungarian troops fighting along the bend of the Styr, opposed
for four weeks past to hostile forces which have increased from
threefold to fivefold superiority, found it necessary to withdraw
their advanced lines which were exposed to a double outflanking
movement. Assisted by the cooperation of German troops west of Kolki
and by the Polish Legion near Kaloda, the movement was executed
undisturbed by the Russians.
In the region of the lower Styr, west of the Czartorysk sector, the
Russians were closely pressing the Austrians. After the battle they
occupied the Gorodok-Manevichi station on the Okonsk-Zagorovka-Gruziatyn
line. In combats seventy-five officers in the zone of the railway were
taken with 2,000 men, and also in the Gruziatyn region.
Following the capture of the village of Grady, and after a hot bayonet
encounter, the village of Dolzyca, on the main road between Kolki and
Manevichi, and village of Gruziatyn were taken. The number of German
and Austrian prisoners continued to increase.
In the region of Optevo a great number of Austrians were sabered
during pursuit by the Russians after a cavalry charge. More than 600
men, five cannon, six machine guns, and three machine gun detachments,
with complete equipment, were captured.
East of Monasterzyska (Galicia), the Russians took possession of the
village of Gregorov, carrying off more than 1,000 prisoners. There
were artillery duels at many points. Russian troops continued to press
back the Austrians. In southeastern Galicia, between Delatyn and
Sadzovka, a Russian attack in strong force was defeated by Alpine
Territorials.
In the Bukowina, in successful engagements, Austrian troops brought in
500 prisoners and four machine guns.
On July 8, 1916, the Russians fighting against the army group of
Prince Leopold of Bavaria, repeated several times their strong
attacks. The attacks again broke down, with heavy losses for the
Russians. In the fighting of the last few days the Germans captured
two officers and 631 men.
The Russian offensive on the lower Stokhod continued. South of the
Sarny-Kovel railway the villages of Goulevitchi and Kachova were
occupied after fighting. Farther south there were fires everywhere in
the region of the villages of Arsenovitchi, Janovka, and Douchtch.
In southern Galicia, General Lechitsky occupied Delatyn after very
violent fighting. Delatyn is a railway junction of great importance.
Depots of war material, steel shields, grenades, cartridges, iron, and
wire abandoned by the Austrians have been captured at many points.
On the northern section of the front, apart from fruitless Russian
attacks in the region of Skobowa, east of Gorodische, nothing of
importance occurred on July 9, 1916.
The Russians advancing toward the Stokhod line were repulsed
everywhere. Their attacks west and southwest of Lutsk were
unsuccessful. German aeroplane squadrons made a successful attack on
Russian shelters east of the Stokhod.
Near the villages of Svidniki, Starly Mossor and Novy Mossor, on the
left bank of the Stokhod, lively fighting was in progress. The
Russians took German prisoners at three points. Between Kiselin and
Zubilno the Austrians attempted a surprise attack, but it was repulsed
with heavy loss.
The total number of prisoners taken by General Kaledine, from July 4
to July 8, 1916, was 341 officers and 9,145 unwounded soldiers. He
also captured ten pieces of artillery, forty-eight machine guns,
sixteen bomb throwers, 7,930 rifles, and depots of engineering
materials. These figures were supposed to be added to those given
previously, which included 300 officers, 12,000 men and forty-five
pieces of artillery.
On the Galician front there was a particularly intense artillery
action on both banks of the Dniester.
From the coast to Pinsk no events of special importance occurred
during July 10, 1916.
The Russians made futile attacks with very strong forces at several
points against the German line along the Stokhod River, notably near
Czereviscze, Hulevicze, Korysmi and Janmaka, and on both sides of the
Kovel-Rovno railway.
Near Hulevicze the Germans drove back Russian troops beyond their
position by a strong counterattack, capturing more than 700 prisoners
and three machine guns.
In the Stokhod region the Germans received strong reenforcements and
brought up powerful artillery, enabling them to offer a very stubborn
resistance.
On the Briaza-Fondoul-Moldava front, northwest of Kimpolung, in the
southern Bukowina, considerable Austro-Hungarian forces were thrown
back by Russian troops after violent engagements at various points.
German aeroplanes successfully attacked the railway station at Zamirie
on the Minsk-Baranovitchy railway line, dropping as many as sixty
bombs.
An attempt to cross the Dvina made by weak Russian forces west of
Friedrichstadt on July 11, 1916, and attacks south of Narotch Lake
were frustrated.
Russian detachments which attempted to establish themselves on the
left bank of the Stokhod River, near Janowka, were attacked. Not a
single man of these detachments got away from the southern bank. At
this point and on the Kovel-Rovno railroad the Germans took more than
800 prisoners. The booty taken on the Stokhod during the two days,
apart from a number of officers and 1,932 men, included twelve machine
guns. The German aerial squadron continued their activity in attacks
east of the Stokhod. A Russian captive balloon was shot down.
Russian artillery dispersed Germans who were attempting to bring
artillery against the Ikakul works. Near the village of Grouchivka,
north of Hulevicze, the Germans made their appearance on the right
bank of the river, but later were ejected therefrom.
In the sector of the Tscherkassy farm, south of Krevo, the Germans,
supported by violent artillery fire, took the offensive, but were
repulsed by Russian counterattacks.
On the whole front from Riga to Poliessie, there was intermittent
artillery fire, together with rifle fire. German aviators dropped
bombs on the station of Zamirie and the town of Niesvij, where several
houses were set on fire.
German troops, belonging to General von Bothmer's army group, by an
encircling counterattack, carried out near and to the north of Olessa,
northwest of Buczacz, on July 12, 1916, drove back Russian troops
which had pushed forward and took more than 400 prisoners.
On the Stokhod there were violent artillery duels. German aeroplanes
appeared behind the Russian front and dropped many bombs, doing
considerable damage.
Again, on July 13, 1916, the Russians advanced on the Stokhod, near
Zarecz, but were driven back by troops belonging to General von
Linsingen's army, and lost a few hundred men and some machine guns
which fell into the hands of the Germans. Other German detachments
successfully repeated their attacks on the east bank of the Stokhod
River.
German aeroplanes bombarded Lutsk and the railway station at Kivertsk,
northeast of Lutsk.
To the north of the Sarny-Kovel railway the Russians gained a footing
in their opponents' positions on the west bank of the Stokhod. A
surprise attack, made by strong German forces late in the evening,
drove them back again to the opposite bank.
In the region of the lower Lipa, German guns opened a violent fire
against the Russian trenches and inflicted heavy losses.
The town of Polonetchki, northeast of Baranovitchy, was attacked by
German aeroplanes, which threw many bombs and caused considerable
damage.
West of the Strypa the Austro-German forces launched a series of
furious counterattacks, as a result of which the Russians claimed to
have captured over 3,000 prisoners.
West and northwest of Buczacz the Russians made two attacks on a broad
front which were repulsed. During the third assault, however, they
succeeded in penetrating the Austro-Hungarian positions northwest of
Buczacz, but were completely ejected during a most bitter night
battle.
On July 14, 1916, the Germans under cover of a violent fire,
approached the barbed-wire entanglements of the Russians on the
grounds in the region of the River Servitch, a tributary of the
Niemen. They were repulsed by Russian artillery fire.
The same day the Germans opened a violent artillery fire against
Russian lines eastward of Gorodichtche (Baranovitchy sector), after
they assumed the offensive in the region of the village of Skrobowa,
but were repulsed with heavy losses. A little later, after a
continuation of the bombardment, the Germans took the offensive in
massed formation a little farther north of Skrobowa, but were again
repulsed by Russian fire.
After having taken breath the Germans made a fresh attack in the
region of the same village, but the Russian troops repulsed the
Germans with machine-gun and rifle fire. The Russians then made a
counterattack which resulted in the capture of more ground.
Repeated German attempts to advance toward the sector southwest of the
village of Skrobowa were also repulsed by Russian fire.
On the front of the Russian position southeast of Riga the Germans
took the offensive against the Russian sectors near Frantz, northeast
of Pulkarn, but were repulsed by Russian artillery and infantry fire
and by hand-grenade fighting. Russian detachments which attempted to
cross the Dvina, near Lennewaden, northwest of Friedrichstadt, were
repulsed. Numerous bombs were dropped from German aeroplanes on
railway stations on the Smorgon-Molodetchna line.
On the right wing of their Riga positions, the Russians, supported
strongly by artillery on land and sea, made some progress during July
15, 1916, in the region west of Kemmern. On the remainder of the north
front there were some local engagements which, however, did not modify
the general situation.
Troops belonging to the army of Field Marshal Prince Leopold of
Bavaria recaptured some positions in the region of Skrobowa, which had
been lost the previous day. The Russians in turn attempted to regain
this ground by making a number of very strong counterattacks, but were
not successful. In this attempt they lost a few hundred men and six
officers.
Austrian troops dispersed some Russian detachments southwest of
Moldaha. Near Jablonica their patrols captured, by a number of daring
undertakings, a few hundred prisoners.
Near Delatyn, in the Carpathian Mountains, there was increased
activity. Russian advance guards entered Delatyn, but were driven back
to the southern outskirts. Another Russian attack to the southwest of
the town broke down under the Austrian fire.
There also was a renewal of the fighting in the region southwest of
Lutsk, west of Torchin. A number of Russian attacks were repulsed in
this neighborhood.
At other points of the Volhynian front, in the region southeast of
Sviniusky, near Lutsk, the Germans again assumed the offensive and
attacked in massed formations. This resulted in a series of strong
counterattacks, which enabled the Russians to maintain their
positions.
At many points in the region of Ostoff and Goubine, Russian troops
registered local successes by very swiftly executed attacks which
threatened to outflank their opponents, who were, therefore, forced to
retreat in great haste. As a result of this, the Russians captured one
heavy and one light battery as well as numerous cannon which had been
installed in isolated locations. Upward of 3,000 prisoners fell into
their hands.
In Volhynia, on July 16, 1916, to the east and southeast of Svinisuky
village, Russian troops under General Sakharoff broke down the
resistance of the Germans. In battles in the region of Pustomyty, more
than 1,000 Germans and Austrian prisoners have been taken, together
with three machine guns and much other military booty.
In the region of the lower Lipa the successful Russian advance
continued. The Germans were making a stubborn resistance. In battles
in this region the Russians took many prisoners and guns, as well as
fourteen machine guns, a few thousand rifles and other equipment.
The total number of prisoners taken on July 16, 1916, in battles in
Volhynia, was claimed to be 314 officers and 12,637 men. The Russians
also claimed to have captured thirty guns, of which seventeen were
heavy pieces, and a great many machine guns and much other material.
In the direction of Kirliababa, on the frontier of Transylvania,
Russians have occupied a set of new positions.
In the region of Riga, skirmishes on both sides have been successful
for the Russians, and parts of German trenches have been taken,
together with prisoners. Increased fire west and south of Riga and on
the Dvina front preceded Russian enterprises. Near Katarinehof, south
of Riga, considerable Russian forces attacked. Lively fighting
developed here.
On the Riga front artillery engagements continued throughout July 17
and 18, 1916. At Lake Miadziol, Russian infantry and a lake flotilla
made a surprise attack on the Germans in the night. German airmen
manifested great activity from the region south of the Dvina to the
Pinsk Marshes.
On the Stokhod there was artillery fighting at many places.
Russian troops repulsed by artillery fire an attempt on the part of
the Germans to take the offensive north of the Odzer Marsh. Owing to
the heavy rains the Dniester rose almost two and one half meters,
destroying bridges, buttresses and ferry-boats, and considerably
curtailing military operations.
On the Russian left flank, in the region of the Rivers Black and White
Tscheremosche, southwest of Kuty, Russian infantry were advancing
toward the mountain defiles.
Southwest of Delatyn the German troops drove back across the Pruth
Russian detachments which had crossed to the western bank. The Germans
took 300 prisoners.
On July 19, 1916, General Lechitsky's forces, which were advancing
from the Bukowina and southern Galicia toward the passes of the
Carpathians leading to the plains of Hungary, met with strong
opposition in the region of Jablonica, situated at the northern end of
a pass leading through the Carpathians to the important railroad
center of Korosmezo, in Hungary.
Jablonica is about thirty-three miles west of Kuty and fifteen miles
south of Delatyn. It is on the right of the sixty-mile front occupied
by the advancing army of General Lechitsky.
No let-up was noticeable in the battle along the Stokhod, where the
combined forces of the Central Powers seemed to be able to withstand
all Russian attacks. Along the Lipa increased artillery fire was the
order of the day. In Galicia the floods in the Dniester Valley
continued to hamper military operations. Many minor engagements were
fought both in the northern and central sectors of the front.
CHAPTER XXVIII
INCREASED STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN DRIVE
As the month of July approached its end the Russian assaults became
more and more violent. Along the entire front the most bitter and
sanguinary fighting took place day after day and night after night.
Artillery bombardments such as never had been heard before raged at
hundreds of places at the same time. Troops in masses that passed all
former experience were employed by the Russians to break the
resistance of the Teutonic allies.
The latter, however, seemed to have their affairs well in hand. At
many points they lost local engagements. At other points advanced
positions had to be given up, and at still other points occasional
withdrawals of a few miles became inevitable. But, all in all, the
Austro-German lines held considerably well.
During the last two or three days of July, 1916, however, the
German-Austrian forces suffered some serious reverses. On July 21,
1916, General Sakharoff had succeeded in crossing the Lipa River and
in establishing himself firmly on its south bank. This brought him
within striking distance of the important railway point of Brody on
the Dubno-Lemberg railway, very close to the Russo-Galician border,
and only fifty miles northeast of Lemberg.
In spite of the most determined resistance on the part of the Austrian
troops, the Russian general was able to push his advantage during the
next few days, and on July 27, 1916, Brody fell into his hands.
Less successful was the continued attack on the Stokhod line with the
object of reaching Kovel. There the German-Austrian forces repulsed
all Russian advances.
In the Bukowina, however, the Russians gradually pushed on. Slowly but
surely they approached once more the Carpathian Mountain passes.
The same was true in eastern Galicia. After the fall of Kolomea in the
early part of the month, the Russian advance had progressed steadily,
even if slowly, in the direction of Stanislau and Lemberg. Closer and
closer to Stanislau the Russian forces came, until on July 30, 1916,
they were well within striking distance.
In the north, too, General Kuropatkin displayed greatly increased
activity against Von Hindenburg's front, although as a result he
gained only local successes.
Midsummer, 1916, then saw the Russians once more on a strong offensive
along their entire front. How far this movement would ultimately carry
them, it was hard to tell. Once more the way into the Hungarian plains
seemed to be open to the czar's soldiers, and a sufficiently
successful campaign in Galicia might easily force back the center of
the line to such an extent that they might then have prospects of
regaining some of the ground lost during their great retreat.
Interesting details of the terrific struggle which had been going on
on the eastern front for many weeks are given in the following letter
from an English special correspondent:
"I reached the headquarters of a certain Siberian corps about midnight
on July 15, 1916, to find the artillery preparation, which had started
at 4 p. m., in full blast. Floundering around through the mud, we came
almost on to the positions, which were suddenly illuminated with fires
started by Austrian shells in two villages near by, while the jagged
flashes of bursting shells ahead caused us to extinguish the lights of
the motor and to turn across the fields, ultimately arriving at the
headquarters of a corps which I knew well on the Bzura line in Poland.
"Sitting in a tiny room in an unpretentious cottage with the
commander, I followed the preparations which were being made for the
assault. The ticking of the instruments gave news from the front, the
line of which was visible from the windows by flares and rockets and
burning villages. By midnight ten breaches had been made in the barbed
wire, each approximately twenty paces broad, and the attacks were
ordered for three o'clock in the morning.
"Rising at 5 a. m. I accompanied the commander of the corps to his
observation point on a ridge. The attacks had already swept away the
resistance of the enemy's first line.
"Thousands of prisoners were in our hands, and the enemy was already
retiring rapidly. He therefore halted but a few minutes, pushing on to
the advanced positions. The commander stopped repeatedly by the
roadside tapping the field wires, and giving further instructions as
to the disposition of the troops.
"As we moved forward we began to meet the flood from the battle field,
first the lightly wounded, and then Austrian prisoners helping our
heavily wounded, who were in carts.
"Before we were halfway to the positions a cavalry general splashed
with mud met the commander and informed him that six guns were already
in our hands. The next report from the field telephone increased the
number to ten guns, with 2,000 prisoners, including some Germans.
"At quite an early hour the entire country was alive, and every
department of the army beginning to move forward. All the roads were
choked with ammunition parks, batteries, and transports following up
our advancing troops; while the stream of returning caissons, the
wounded, and the prisoners equaled in volume the tide of the advancing
columns.
"The commander took up his position on a ridge which but a few hours
before had been our advanced line. Thence the country could be
observed for miles. Each road was black with moving troops, pushing
forward on the heels of the enemy, whose field gun shells were
bursting on the ridges just beyond.
"Here I met the commander of the division and his staff. Plans were
immediately made for following up our success. Evidently the size of
our group was discernible from some distant enemy observation point,
for within five minutes came the howl of an approaching projectile and
a 6-inch shell burst with a terrific crash in a neighboring field. Its
arrival, which was followed at regular intervals by others ranging
from 4-inch upward, was apparently unnoticed by the general, whose
interest was entirely occupied with pressing his advantage.
"So swift was our advance that nearly half an hour elapsed before the
newly strung field wires were working properly.
"The fire had become so persistent that our group scattered and
hundreds of prisoners, whose black mass could be seen by the enemy,
were removed beyond the possibility of observation. Then the corps
commander, stretched on straw on the crest of the ridge, with his maps
spread out, dictated directions to the operator of the field telephone
who crouched beside him.
"Before and beneath us lay the abandoned line of Austrian trenches,
separated from ours by a small stream, where since daylight the heroic
engineers were laboring under heavy shell fire to construct a bridge
to enable our cavalry and guns to pass in pursuit.
"Leaving the general we proceeded. Our troops had forced the line here
at 3 a. m., wading under machine-gun and rifle fire in water and marsh
above their waists, often to their armpits. The Austrian end of the
bridge was a horrible place, as it was congested with dead, dying and
horribly wounded men, who, as the ambulances were on the other side of
the river, could not be removed. A sweating officer was urging forward
the completion of the bridge, which was then barely wide enough to
permit the waiting cavalry squadrons to pass in single file. On the
opposite bank waited the ambulance to get across after the troops had
passed. A number of German ambulance men were working furiously over
their own and the Austrian wounded, many of whom, I think, must have
been wounded by their own guns in an attempt to prevent the bridging
of the stream. A more bloody scene I have not witnessed, though within
a few hours the entire place was probably cleared up.
"Passing on I, for the first time, witnessed the actual taking of
prisoners, and watched their long blue files as they passed out from
their own trenches and were formed in groups allotted to Russian
soldiers, who served as guides rather than guards, and sent to the
rear.
"Near here I encountered about fifty captured Germans and talked with
about a dozen of them. Certainly none of them showed the smallest
lack of morale or any depression.
"By noon sufficient details of the fighting were available to indicate
that this corps alone had taken between three and five thousand
prisoners and twenty guns, of which four are said to be howitzers.
When one is near the front the perspective of operations is nearly
always faulty, and it was, therefore, impossible to estimate the
effect of the movement as a whole, but I understand that all the other
corps engaged had great success and everywhere advanced."
PART IV--THE BALKANS
CHAPTER XXIX
HOLDING FAST IN SALONIKI
The six months ending with March, 1916, had been not only an eventful
period in the Balkans, but a most unfortunate one for the Allies. In
no theater of the war had they sustained such a series of smashing
disasters in diplomacy as well as on the field of battle. First of
all, early in the fall, the Austrians had begun their fourth invasion
of Serbia, this time heavily reenforced by the Germans and in such
numbers that it was obvious before the first attack was begun that
Serbia by herself would not be able to hold back the invaders. And
then, hardly had the real fighting begun, when Bulgaria definitely
cast her lot in with the Teutons and Hungarians and attacked the
Serbians from the rear.
While it was true that King Ferdinand and his governing clique had
made this decision months before, it is nevertheless a fact that it
was probably the blundering diplomacy of the Allies which was
responsible for this action on the part of the Bulgarians. Under all
circumstances King Ferdinand would probably have favored the Teutons,
since by birth and early training he is an Austrian and, moreover, as
he once expressed himself publicly, he was firmly convinced that the
Teutons would ultimately win. But the Bulgarian people are
sentimentally inclined toward the Russians and dislike the Germans.
Had not the diplomatic policy of the Allies played into the hands of
the king, they would naturally have turned toward the Allies.
Above all else the Bulgarians have desired either the freedom or the
annexation of Macedonia, which is almost entirely inhabited by
Bulgars. The Germans made the definite promise that Macedonia should
be theirs if they allied themselves with them. The Allies endeavored
to promise as much, but the protests of Greece and Serbia stood in the
way. Neither of these two nations was willing to give up its
possessions in this disputed territory, though later, when she saw
that her very existence was at stake, Serbia did make some
concessions, but not until after Bulgaria had already taken her
decision. Had the Allies disregarded these greedy bickerings on the
part of her minor allies and promised as much as the Germans had
promised, there is no doubt that the popular sentiment in Bulgaria
would have been strong enough to block Ferdinand's policy.
In Greece, too, there had been the same blundering policy. Here the
situation was much the same as in Bulgaria; the king, with his
Teutonic affiliations, was in favor of the Germans, while the
sentiment of the people was in favor of the Allies. Moreover, here the
popular sentiment was voiced by and personified in quite the strongest
statesman in Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos. Had the Allies made known
to the Greeks definitely and in a public manner just what they were to
expect by joining the Entente, the policy of the king would have been
frustrated. But here again the ambitions of Italy in Asia Minor and in
the Greek archipelago caused the same hesitation. The result was that
popular enthusiasm was so dampened that the king was able to pursue
his own policy.
Then came the disastrous invasion of Serbia; the Serbian armies were
overwhelmed and practically annihilated, a few remnants only being
able to escape through Albania. The assistance that was sent in the
form of an Anglo-French army under General Sarrail came just too late.
Having swept Macedonia clear of the Serbians, the Bulgarians next
attacked the forces under Sarrail and hurled them back into the Greek
territory about Saloniki.
The Italians, too, had attempted to take part in the Balkan
operations, but with their own national interests obviously placed
above the general interests of the whole Entente. They had landed on
the Albanian coast, at Durazzo and Avlona, hoping to hold territory
which they desire ultimately to annex. Then followed the invasion of
Montenegro and Albania by the Austrians and the Bulgarians, and the
Italians were driven out of Durazzo, retaining only a foothold in
Avlona.
By March, 1916, all major military operations had ceased. Except for
the British and French at Saloniki and the Italians at Avlona, the
Teutons and the Bulgarians had cleared the whole Balkan peninsula
south of the Danube of their enemies and were in complete possession.
The railroad running down through Serbia and Bulgaria to
Constantinople was repaired where the Serbians had had time to injure
it, and communications were established between Berlin and the capital
of the Ottoman Empire, which had been one of the main objects of the
campaign.
In the beginning, however, the Bulgarians did not venture to push
their lines across the Greek frontier, though this is a part of
Macedonia which is essentially Bulgarian in population. There are
several reasons why the Bulgarians should have restrained themselves.
The traditional hatred which the Greeks feel for the Bulgarians, so
bitter that an American cannot comprehend its depths, would
undoubtedly have been so roused by the presence of Bulgarian soldiers
on Greek soil that the king would not have been able to have opposed
successfully Venizelos and his party, who were strong adherents of the
Allies. This would not have suited German policy, though to the
victorious Bulgarians it would probably not have made much difference.
Another reason was, as has developed since, that the Bulgarian
communications were but feebly organized, and a further advance would
have been extremely precarious. The roads through Macedonia are few,
and the best are not suited to automobile traffic. The few prisoners
that the French and English were able to take evinced the fact that
the Bulgarians were being badly supplied and that the soldiers were
starved to the point of exhaustion. And finally, from a military point
of view, the Allied troops were now in the most favorable position.
Their lines were drawn in close to their base, Saloniki, with short,
interior communications. The Bulgarians, on the contrary, were
obliged to spread themselves around the wide semicircle formed by the
Anglo-French lines. To have taken Saloniki would have been for them an
extremely costly undertaking, if, indeed, it would have at all been
possible.
On the other hand, it was equally obvious that the Allies were not,
and would not be, for a long time to come, in a position to direct an
effective offensive against the Bulgarians in Macedonia. That they and
their German allies realized this was apparent from the fact that the
German forces now began withdrawing in large numbers.
The Bulgarians, however, did not attempt to assist their German allies
on any of the other fronts, a fact which throws some light on the
Bulgarian policy. Naturally, it is in the interests of the Bulgarians
that the Teutons should win the war, therefore it might have been
expected that they would support them on other fronts, notably in
Galicia. That this has never been done shows conclusively that the
alliance with the Germans is not popular among the Bulgarians. They
have, rather reluctantly, been willing to fight on their own
territory, or what they considered rightly their own territory, but
they have not placed themselves at the disposal of the Germans on the
other fronts. It is obvious that Ferdinand has not trusted to oppose
his soldiers against the Russians.
Meanwhile the forces under Sarrail were being daily augmented and
their position about Saloniki was being strengthened. By this time all
the Serbians who had fled through Albania, including the aged King
Peter, had been transported to the island of Corfu, where a huge
sanitarium was established, for few were the refugees that did not
require some medical treatment. Cholera did, in fact, break out among
them, which caused a protest on the part of the Greek Government. Just
how many Serbians arrived at Corfu has never been definitely stated,
but recent reports would indicate that they numbered approximately
100,000. All those fit for further campaigning needed to be equipped
anew and rearmed.
CHAPTER XXX
MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS IN GREECE
On March 27, 1916, a squadron of seven German aeroplanes attempted to
make a raid on Saloniki. Their purpose was to drop bombs on the
British and French warships in the harbor, but the fire of the Allied
guns frustrated their efforts and four of the aeroplanes were brought
down. But during the encounter some of these aircraft dropped bombs
into the city and twenty Greek civilians were killed, one of the bombs
falling before the residence of General Moschopoulos, commander of the
Greek forces in Saloniki.
Deep resentment against the Germans flared up throughout Greece on
account of this raid, which found expression in bitter editorials in
the Liberal press against the continued neutrality of Greece. The
question of the declaration of martial law was raised in an exciting
session of the Chamber of Deputies, which lasted till late at night.
The Government discouraged all hostile comment on the action of the
Germans, and Premier Skouloudis declined to continue a debate
involving discussion of foreign relations "because the highest
interests impose silence." Notwithstanding the attitude of the
government the raid was characterized in the chamber as "simply
assassination" and as "German frightfulness." Plans were started to
hold mass meetings in Athens and Saloniki, but the police forbade
them. At the funerals of the victims, however, large crowds gathered
in spite of the efforts of the police to disperse them and the
ceremonies were marked by cries of "Down with the barbarians!" and
"Down with the Germans!"
Hardly had this agitation died down when Venizelos, who for a long
time had remained silent, so aloof from politics that, to quote his
own statement, "I do not even read the reports of the proceedings in
the Chamber," resumed active participation in the nation's affairs by
giving out a lengthy interview to the press, as well as with an
editorial in his own personal organ. This latter occupied an entire
page and reviewed completely the position of the Greek monarch since
the dissolution of the last Chamber of Deputies. Referring to the
king's alleged characterization of himself as a "dreamer," M.
Venizelos said:
"By keeping the country in a state of chronic peaceful war through
purposeless mobilization, the present government has brought Greece to
the verge of economic, material and moral bankruptcy. This policy,
unhappily, is not a dream, but downright folly." He further laid great
stress on the Bulgarian peril, pointing out that the utmost to be
gained by the present policy would be to leave Greece the same size,
while Bulgaria, flushed with victory, trained for war, enlarged by the
addition of Serbia and Macedonia and allied with the Turks, would not
wait long before falling on her southern neighbor. "Who thinks," he
continued, "that under these conditions that Greece, unaided, could
drive the Bulgars from Macedonia, once they have seized it, is a fool.
The politicians who do not see this inevitable danger, are blind, and
unfortunate are the kings following such politicians, and more
unfortunate still the lands where sovereigns fall their victims."
And, indeed, the ex-premier's references to the economic ruin of the
country were strongly supported by the dispatches that had for some
time been coming from the Greek capital. "Greece," said a prominent
official to a press correspondent, "is much more likely to be starved
into war than Germany is to be starved out of it."
The deficit in the Greek treasury for the previous year was now shown
to have amounted to £17,000,000, or $85,000,000. The budget for 1916
authorized an expenditure of $100,000,000, which was double the entire
state revenues. For the masses the situation was daily becoming more
difficult. The streets of Athens were said to be alive with the
beggars, while the island of Samos was in a sporadic state of revolt.
At Piraeus and Patras there were disquieting demonstrations of popular
discontent with the increasing cost of living. Many commodities had
more than doubled in price. This situation was largely due to the
mobilization, as in the case of the fishermen. As most of them were
with the colors, the price of fish, which had hitherto been one of the
main food supplies, had become prohibitive to the poorer families.
The sentiment of the people was further expressed on April 7, 1916,
when the Greeks celebrated the 100th anniversary of their national
independence. On this occasion Venizelos appeared in public for the
first time since his retirement from political life, after he had been
obliged to resign by the king. When he left the cathedral in Athens,
where services were held, thousands of persons followed his motor car,
cheering enthusiastically. Finally his car could proceed no farther,
being densely packed about by the people, who broke forth into
deafening cheers and shouts of "Long live our national leader!" and
"Long live Venizelos!"
At about this time, on April 14, 1916, a new critical situation was
precipitated between the Allies and the Greek Government. On that date
the British Minister at Athens had asked permission of the Greek
Government to transport Serbian troops from Corfu to Saloniki by way
of Patras, Larissa, and Volo, which involved the use of the
Peloponnesian railway. This was peremptorily refused as involving a
breach of Greek neutrality.
Under ordinary conditions transports would have conveyed the Serbians
from Corfu to Saloniki, such a trip requiring less than three days.
But the German submarines had been so active in these waters of late
that the Allies desired to evade this danger, contending that it was
with the connivance of the Greek Government officials that the Germans
were able to maintain submarine bases among the islands. Moreover,
they also contended that the cases were different from what it would
have been had the request concerned French or British troops. The
Greeks were allies of the Serbians, bound to them by a formal treaty,
and though they had refused to assist them in a military sense, as the
terms of the treaty demanded, they might at least help them in their
need. Two days later, on April 16, 1916, the Chamber of Deputies
adjourned for the session, which left the whole matter in the hands
of the government. However, this question hung fire for some time, and
later dispatches would indicate that the Allies did not press their
point, for eventually when the arrival of the Serbian troops in
Saloniki was announced, it was stated incidentally that they had come
by means of transports.
But meanwhile Venizelos was continuing his campaign against the
ministry. On April 16, 1916, the Liberals had attempted to hold
several public meetings in Athens, which were vigorously broken up by
the police, or, according to some reports, by agents of the government
in civilian dress. The following day Venizelos gave out an interview
to the press in which he said:
"I beg you to bring the events of yesterday and the earnest protest of
a majority of the Greeks to the knowledge of the American people, who
have struggled for so long to establish free speech as the fundamental
right of a free people. Here in Greece we are confronted by the
question whether we are to have a democracy presided over by a king or
whether at this hour of our history we must accept the doctrine of the
divine rights of kings. The present government represents in no sense
the majority of the Greek people. We Liberals, in the course of a year
received the vote of the majority. At the last election, which was
nothing more than a burlesque on the free exercise of the right of
suffrage, we were not willing to participate in a farcical
formality.... Now it is even sought to deny us the right of free
speech. Our meetings were held within inclosed buildings. Those who
came to them were invited, but the police threw out our doorkeepers,
put in their own and let enter whomsoever they, the police, wanted to
be present at the meetings."
It was now evident that Venizelos had determined to fight the present
government to the bitter end.
On May 7, 1916, it was demonstrated that the contention of the king,
that the agitation in favor of Venizelos and the demonstrations in his
favor were largely artificial, was not true, in one electoral district
of Greece at least. Venizelos had been nominated candidate for deputy
to the National Assembly in Mytelene, and when the election took
place, on the above date, he was elected with practically no
opposition and amid a tremendous enthusiasm. On the following day, May
8, 1916, at a by-election in Kavalla, Eastern Macedonia, Constantine
Jourdanou, a candidate of the Venizelos Liberty party, was also
elected a deputy to the National Assembly by an 85 per cent majority
vote.
But these were merely demonstrations--meant merely as indications of
popular sentiment--for neither Venizelos nor the Kavalla
representative had any intention of taking their seats in the chamber,
which they considered illegally elected.
Meanwhile practically no military activity had been displayed. On
March 17, 1916, a dispatch was issued from Vienna to the effect that
the Austrian army had reached the vicinity of Avlona and had engaged
the Italians in pitched battle outside the town, into which they were
driving them. But apparently there was little truth in this report,
for some weeks later a body of Italian troops were reported to have
crossed the Greek frontier in Epirus, which caused an exchange of
notes between the Greek and Italian governments, by no means the best
of friends, on account of their conflicting ambitions in Albania.
Further encounters between both Austrians and Bulgarians and the
Italians in Avlona were reported during the spring, but apparently the
Italians were well able to hold their own.
There were, however, indications that the Allies in Saloniki had been
steadily strengthening their positions and augmenting their numbers,
and that, conscious of their growing strength, they were throwing out
their lines. In the first week in May came a dispatch announcing that
they had occupied Florina, a small town only some fifteen miles south
of Monastir, though still on Greek territory.
That there was really some truth in these announcements; that the
Allies were really showing some indications of expanding their lines
and were assuming a threatening attitude, was indicated by the next
move made on the board, this time by the Bulgarians; a move, however,
which was obviously of a defensive nature, though at the time it
seemed to portend a Bulgarian offensive.
On May 26, 1916, the Bulgarians for the first time ventured across the
Greek frontier. And not only did they cross the frontier, but, instead
of attacking the Allies, they forced the Greek forces occupying a
point of strategic value to evacuate it and occupied it themselves.
Fort Rupel, on the Struma River, and north of Demir Hissar, is about
six miles within Greek territory. It commands a deep gorge, or defile,
which forms a sort of natural passageway through which troops can be
marched easily into Greek territory from Bulgaria. To either side
tower difficult mountains and rocky hills. On account of these natural
features Greece had fortified this defile after the Balkan Wars so
that she might command it in case of a Bulgarian invasion. On the
commanding prominences the Greeks had also built fortifications.
It was the chief, the most important, of these forts that the
Bulgarians took. A courier was sent forward with notice to the Greek
commander that he had two hours in which to evacuate the position with
his troops. This he did peacefully, and before evening the Bulgarians
were installed, though it was said that they had given due assurances
that their occupation was merely a temporary measure undertaken as a
defensive precaution, and that as soon as the need should cease the
fort would be returned to Greece.
On the following day came the announcement that the Bulgarians, in
strong force, had deployed from Fort Rupel and had also occupied Fort
Dragotin and Fort Kanivo. At the same time unusual activity on the
part of the Bulgarians was also reported from Xanthi. Here, on the
left bank of the Mesta River, which for some distance from its mouth
forms the Bulgar-Greek boundary, the Bulgarians were collecting
material for building pontoon bridges.
Naturally this action on the part of the Bulgarians caused wild
excitement throughout Greece. The government organs stated that the
forts had been taken by German forces, but this was soon proved to be
untrue.
In reporting this movement the Bulgarian Government added, by way of
explanation and excuse:
"Two months ago the Anglo-French troops began the abandonment of the
fortified camp at Saloniki and started a movement toward our frontier.
The principal enemy forces were stationed in the Vardar Valley and to
the eastward through Dovatupete to the Struma Valley, and to the
westward through the district of Subotsko and Vodena to Florina. A
part of the reconstituted Serbian army has also been landed at
Saloniki. Artillery fire has occurred daily during the past month."
Evidently Bulgaria was anxious to impress on the outside world the
fact that she had invaded Greek territory entirely for defensive
purposes, for only several days later a correspondent of the
Associated Press was allowed to send through a report of an inspection
he had made of the Bulgarian camp, something that had not previously
been permitted. From this report it was evident that the Bulgarian
army was not contemplating a forward movement.
These assurances probably had their effect in calming the excitement
in Greece, a result which Germany was no doubt wishful of obtaining.
Nevertheless the fact that the government had quietly permitted the
Bulgarians to take the forts was not by any means calculated to
increase its popularity with the masses and made for the strengthening
of the Venizelos party.
In spite of the formal protests which the Greek Government made
against the occupation of its territory and fortifications by
Bulgarian troops, there was not a little reason for suspecting that
the Skouloudis government was working on some secret understanding, if
not with the Bulgarians, then with the Germans. At least this was the
general impression that was created in France and England, as
reflected in the daily press.
On June 8, 1916, it was reported from Saloniki that the Allies were
about to institute a commercial blockade of Greek ports, preliminary
to presenting certain demands, the exact nature of which was not given
out, but which were expected to include the demobilization of the
Greek army.
The notice of the blockade again aroused the excitement of the Greek
population, but not so much against the Allies as against the
Skouloudis government. And this was because what the Allies were
expected to demand was just what the majority of the Greek masses
seemed most to want, the demobilization of the army; the return to
their vocations of the thousands of workingmen with the colors. The
Venizelos party was especially in favor of such a measure, for its
leaders claimed that it was because the mass of the voters was with
the army and was therefore deprived of their suffrage, that the
sentiment of the Greek people could not be determined.
On June 9, 1916, it was announced from Athens that the king had signed
an order demobilizing twelve classes of the army, amounting to 150,000
men. But this order was not, for some reason, put into execution, nor
was there any indication of the Allies putting an end to the blockade.
On the contrary, on the same day it was announced that the Greek
captain of the port at Saloniki had been removed and a French naval
officer had been put in his place. Entry to the port had also been
refused to Greek ships from Kavala, and an embargo had been placed on
Greek ships in French ports. Obviously the Allies were demanding
something more than the demobilization of the army. As a matter of
fact, they had not yet formally presented their demands.
From later reports it was shown that the Allies had prepared their
demands formally and that they were to have been presented on June 13,
1916. But the evening before, on the 12th, certain events took place
in Athens which caused them to delay the presentation of their note,
holding it back for revision.
On the 12th a military fête had been held at the Stadium, at which
members of the British Legation were present, including the military
attaché and Admiral Palmer, the new chief of the British Naval
Mission. When the king and his suite appeared at the Stadium, Greek
police officers immediately grouped themselves around the British
representatives, giving the inference that the royal party needed to
be protected from them. The indignant Englishmen immediately left the
Stadium. After the fête a mob collected in the street and began a
demonstration against the Allies. The crowd was escorted by fifty or
sixty policemen in uniform. It first marched to the Hotel Grande
Bretagne, where the French Minister resided, and began shouting
insulting remarks. Next the British Legation building was visited and
a similar hostile demonstration was made. Thence the mob proceeded to
the office of the "Nea Hellas," a Venizelist journal, hurled stones
through the windows and assaulted the editor and his staff. The
editor, in defending himself, fired a revolver over the heads of the
mob, whereupon he was arrested and thrown into jail. During the same
evening another demonstration was made in a theater, in which the
performers made most insulting remarks regarding the representatives
of the Allies. Several meetings were held in other parts of the city
at the same time, at which resolutions were passed against the Allies,
one of these resolutions denouncing the conduct of the Allies toward
neutral countries, "and especially their conduct toward the President
of the United States."
Finally, on June 23, 1916, the full text of the demands of the Allies
on Greece, signed by the representatives of France, Great Britain, and
Russia and indorsed by Italy, was given out, simultaneously with the
official announcement that all the conditions had been accepted by the
Greek Government. The text was as follows:
"As they have already solemnly declared verbally and in writing, the
three Protecting Powers of Greece do not ask her to emerge from her
neutrality. Of this fact they furnish a striking proof by placing
foremost among their demands the complete demobilization of the Greek
army in order to insure to the Greek people tranquillity and peace.
But they have numerous and legitimate grounds for suspicion against
the Greek Government, whose attitude toward them has not been in
conformity with repeated engagements, nor even with the principles of
loyal neutrality.
"Thus, the Greek Government has all too often favored the activities
of certain foreigners who have openly striven to lead astray Greek
public opinion, to distort the national feeling of Greece, and to
create in Hellenic territory hostile organizations which are contrary
to the neutrality of the country and tend to compromise the security
of the military and naval forces of the Allies.
"The entrance of Bulgarian forces into Greece and the occupation of
Fort Rupel and other strategic points, with the connivance of the
Hellenic Government, constitute for the allied troops a new threat
which imposes on the three powers the obligation of demanding
guarantees and immediate measures.
"Furthermore, the Greek Constitution has been disregarded, the free
exercise of universal suffrage has been impeded, the Chamber of
Deputies has been dissolved a second time within a period of less than
a year against the clearly expressed will of the people, and the
electorate has been summoned to the polls during a period of
mobilization, with the result that the present chamber only represents
an insignificant portion of the electoral college, and that the whole
country has been subjected to a system of oppression and of political
tyranny, and has been kept in leading strings without regard for the
legitimate representations of the powers.
"These powers have not only the right, but also the imperative duty,
of protesting against such violations of the liberties, of which they
are the guardians in the eyes of the Greek people.
"The hostile attitude of the Hellenic Government toward the powers,
who have emancipated Greece from an alien yoke, and have secured her
independence, and the evident collusion of the present cabinet with
the enemies of these powers, constitute for them still stronger
reasons for acting with firmness, in reliance upon the rights which
they derive from treaties, and which have been vindicated for the
preservation of the Greek people upon every occasion upon which it has
been menaced in the exercise of its rights or in the enjoyment of its
liberties.
"The Protecting Powers accordingly see themselves compelled to exact
immediate application of the following measures:
"1. Real and complete demobilization of the Greek Army, which shall
revert as speedily as possible to a peace footing.
"2. Immediate substitution for the existing ministry of a business
cabinet devoid of any political prejudice and presenting all the
necessary guarantees for the application of that benevolent neutrality
which Greece is pledged to observe toward the Allied Powers and for
the honesty of a fresh appeal to the electors.
"3. Immediate dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, followed by
fresh elections within the time limits provided by the constitution,
and as soon as general demobilization will have restored the electoral
body to its normal condition.
"4. Dismissal, in agreement with the Allied Powers, of certain police
officials whose attitude, influenced by foreign guidance, has
facilitated the perpetration of notorious assaults upon peaceable
citizens and the insults which have been leveled at the Allied
Legations and their members.
"The Protecting Powers, who continue to be inspired with the utmost
friendliness and benevolence toward Greece, but who are, at the same
time, determined to secure, without discussion or delay, the
application of these indispensable measures, can but leave to the
Hellenic Government entire responsibility for the events which might
supervene if their just demands were not immediately accepted."
The treaties referred to in the note, on which the "three Protecting
Powers" base their right to intervene in the affairs of Greece to
enforce the carrying out of her constitution, date back to the early
period of last century, when the three nations in question assisted
the newly liberated Greeks in establishing a government and assumed a
semiprotectorate.
This note was presented to Premier Skouloudis, but he refused to
accept it on the ground that no Greek Cabinet existed, as it had been
deposited at the Foreign Office while he was on his way back from the
residence of the king, where he had presented the resignation of the
ministry.
The people were unaware of what had happened until evening, when
newspapers and handbills, distributed broadcast, made known the text
of the demands. King Constantine returned hastily to Athens. All the
troops in the city were ordered under arms. The Deputies were
summoned to the Chamber, where Skouloudis announced that he had
resigned, after which the Chamber immediately adjourned again.
On the following day the king summoned Alexander Zaimis, a Greek
politician, reputed to be in favor of the Allies, to form a new
Cabinet. He immediately organized a new ministry, comprising himself
as Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs; General Callaris, Minister
of War and Marine; George Rallis, Minister of Finance; Phocian Negria,
of Communications; Colonel Harlambis, of the Interior; Anthony
Momperatos, of Justice; Constantine Libourkis, of Instruction, and
Colligas, of National Economy. The first act of the new Cabinet was to
announce a new election of Deputies to the National Chamber, to take
place on August 7, 1916. The new Premier also announced that the
demands of the Allies would be carried out to the letter. As a token
of good faith, the chief of police of Athens was immediately dismissed
and Colonel Zimbrakakis, who had been police chief during the
Venizelos régime, was installed in his place. The Allies, on their
part, at once raised the blockade and agreed to advance Greece a loan
to tide over her present financial difficulties.
For some days afterward large and enthusiastic pro-Venizelos
demonstrations took place in Athens and other Greek cities, in which
the labor unions and the soldiers were reported to take a very
prominent part. Meanwhile the demobilization of the Greek army was
begun in good faith.
During this period there had been no further aggression, or advance,
on the part of the Bulgarians. And while there had been a number of
German officers present at the demand for the evacuation of Fort Rupel
by the Greeks, as well as a small force of German engineers, all the
reports emanating from Bulgaria indicated, directly or indirectly,
that the German forces had been almost entirely drawn away from the
Balkans, to meet the gradually increasing pressure that both the
Russians on the eastern front and the English and French on the
western front were bringing to exert on the Teutonic forces. Being
practically left to themselves, for the Turks, too, had their hands
full in their Asiatic provinces, and considering the need of forces
for garrison duty in conquered territory, especially in Albania and
upper Serbia, as well as the army needed to watch the movements of the
Rumanians, it was doubtful if the Bulgarians had more than 300,000 men
to spare for their lines opposing those of the Allies at Saloniki.
The Allies, on the other hand, had been daily waxing stronger. At
least 100,000 Serbians had been added to their forces about Saloniki
before the beginning of August. There were, at this time, about
350,000 French and British soldiers in Saloniki, so that the total
force was not very far short of half a million. General Mahon, the
British commander, had gone to Egypt, to superintend the removal to
Saloniki of the British troops there, who had been provided as a
defending force when the danger of a German attack in that section
seemed imminent. These forces were estimated at another 200,000. Added
to this the favorable position of the Allies from a strategic point of
view, it was obvious, by the middle of August, that if active
hostilities were to break out on the Saloniki front very shortly, the
initiative would most likely come from the Allies.
PART V--AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER XXXI
RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS ON THE ITALIAN FRONT
Throughout the early part of March, 1916, military operations on the
Italian front were very restricted. At the end of February the
atmospheric conditions, which up till then had remained exceptionally
favorable, changed suddenly, giving place to a period of bad weather,
with meteorological phenomena particularly remarkable in that theater
of the operations, which among all those of the European war is the
most Alpine and the most difficult. In the mountain zone snow fell
very heavily, causing frequent great avalanches and sometimes the
movement of extensive snow fields. Communications of every kind were
seriously interrupted. Not only shelters and huts, but in many cases
columns of men and supplies on the march were swept away. The
unceasing tempest made it difficult and in some cases quite impossible
to render any aid, but owing to an organized service for such
eventualities, ample and effective assistance was given in the great
majority of cases. This led to the speedy restoration of
communications and supplies. Nevertheless the distressing but
inevitable loss of human lives was comparatively large.
In the lowland zone heavy and constant rains caused landslides in the
lines of defense and shelters. The rise of the rivers and the
consequent floods soon made the ground impassable. Even the main roads
were interrupted at several points. In the whole theater of operations
it was a regular battle against adverse circumstances.
Austrian troops in many places used the heavy snowfall to their
advantage. By means of mines, bombs and artillery fire they produced
avalanches artificially. Thus on March 8, 1916, some damage was done
in this manner to Italian positions in the Lagaznos zone. On the same
day Italian forces succeeded in pushing their lines forward for a
slight distance in the zone between the Iofana peaks (in the
Dolomites), as well as in the valley of the middle Isonzo and in the
Zagara sector. Along the entire front vigorous artillery fire was
maintained.
The artillery combat gradually increased in vehemence during the next
few days, especially on the Isonzo front, indicating a resumption of
offensive movements. About the middle of March, 1916, Italian troops
began again to attack the Austrian positions. On March 15, 1916, a
lively artillery duel and a series of attacks and counterattacks were
repulsed from the Isonzo front.
Italian infantry carried out a number of successive attacks in the
region of Monte Rombon in the Plezzo basin and on the height
commanding the position of Lucinico, southeast of San Martino del
Carso. After an intensive preparation by artillery fire the Austrians,
on March 16, 1916, launched at dawn a counterattack against the
positions conquered by the Italians the day before, but were at first
everywhere repulsed, suffering heavy losses.
The Austrian concentration of artillery fire, in which guns of all
caliber were employed, lasted uninterruptedly throughout the day,
forcing the Italians to evacuate the positions during the course of
the night.
The Fella sector of the Carinthian front and also the Col di Lana
sector in the Tyrol were shelled by Italian artillery. Italian airmen
dropped bombs on Trieste without doing any damage.
Again atmospheric conditions enforced a lull in military operations
during the next few days and brought to a sudden end what had seemed
to be an extensive offensive movement on the part of the Italian
forces on the Isonzo front.
On March 17, 1916, however, violent fighting again developed on the
Isonzo front in the region of the Tolmino bridgehead. It began with
greatly increased artillery activity along the entire sector between
Tolmino and Flitsch. Later that day the Austro-Hungarians launched an
attack against the Italian forces which netted them considerable
ground on the northern part of the bridgehead, as well as some 500
prisoners.
The battle in the Tolmino sector continued on March 18 and 19, 1916,
and to a slighter degree on March 20, 1916. On the first of these
three days the Austro-Hungarian troops succeeded in advancing beyond
the road between Celo and Ciginj and to the west of the St. Maria
Mountain. Italian counterattacks failed. South of the Mrzli, too, the
Italians lost a position and had to withdraw toward Gabrije, losing
some 300 prisoners. Increased artillery activity was noticeable on the
Carinthian front, particularly in the Fella sector; in the Dolomites,
especially in the Col di Lana sector; in the Sugana Valley and at some
points on the west Tyrol front. Goritz, too, was again subjected to
heavy Italian gunfire.
On the following day, March 19, 1916, fighting continued at the
Tolmino bridgehead as a result of Italian efforts to conquer positions
firmly in Austro-Hungarian hands. The number of Italians captured
reached 925 and the number of machine guns taken was increased to
seven. Several Italian attacks against Mrzli and Krn (Monte Nero)
broke down. On the Rombon the Austro-Hungarians captured a position
and took 145 Italians and two machine guns.
Lively fighting continued on the Carinthian front. In the Tyrol
frontier district Italian artillery again held the Col di Lana section
and some points south of the front under heavy artillery fire.
On the Goritz bridgehead Austro-Hungarians in the morning set fire to
an Italian position before the southern part of Podgora Height. In the
afternoon Austro-Hungarian artillery shelled heavily the front before
the bridgehead. During the night they ejected Italian forces from a
trench before Bevma.
Again on March 20, 1916, Italian counterattacks against the positions
captured by the Austro-Hungarians during the preceding days failed.
Again fighting slowed down for a few days.
As usual, resumption of military operations was indicated by increased
artillery fire.
In the Rovereto zone on March 23, 1916, an artillery duel was followed
during the night by Austro-Hungarian attacks against Italian positions
at Moriviccio, near Rio Comeraso, and in the Adige and Terragnole
Valleys. These were repulsed. Throughout the theater of operations bad
weather limited, however, artillery action on the Isonzo, which was
active only near Tolmino and the heights northwest of Goritz.
On March 25, 1916, Italian artillery again bombarded the Doberdo
Plateau (south of Goritz), the Fella Valley and various points on the
Tyrolese front. East of Ploecken Pass (on the Carnia front) Italian
positions were penetrated and Italian attacks repulsed near Marter
(Sugana Valley).
Severe fighting took place on March 26, 1916, at several points. At
the Goritz bridgehead the Austro-Hungarians captured an Italian
position fronting on the northern portion of Podgora Heights, taking
525 prisoners. Throughout the entire day and the following night the
Italian troops in vain attempted to regain the positions which they
had lost the day before east of Ploecken Pass.
In the Doberdo sector on March 27, 1916, the artillery was again
active on both sides. Italian attacks on the north slope of Monte San
Michele and near the village of San Martino were repulsed. East of
Selz a severe engagement developed.
In the Ploecken sector all Italian attacks were beaten back under
heavy losses. Before the portion of the Carinthian front held by the
Eighth Chasseurs Battalion more than 500 dead Italians were observed.
Austro-Hungarian airmen dropped bombs on railroads in the province of
Venice.
Especially severe fighting occurred once more in the region of the
Gonby bridgehead during March 27, 28 and 29, 1916. On the last of
these days the Italians lost some 350 prisoners. Without cessation the
guns thundered on both sides on these three days on the Doberdo
Plateau, along the Fella and Ploecken sectors, in the Dolomites and to
the east of Selz. Scattered Italian attacks at various points failed.
Then, with the end of March, the weather again necessitated a stoppage
of military operations.
An interesting description of the territory in which most of this
fighting occurred was rendered by a special correspondent of the
London "Times" who, in part, says:
"There is no prospect on earth quite like the immense irregular
crescent of serrated peak and towering mountain wall that is thrown
around Italy on the north, as it unrolls itself from the plains of
Lombardy and Venetia. How often one has gazed at it in sheer delight
over its bewildering wealth of contrasting color and fantastic form,
its effect of light and shade and measureless space! But now, for
these many months past, keen eyes have been bent upon it; eyes, not of
the artist or the poet, but those of the soldier.
"It was such a pair of military eyes that I had beside me a day or two
ago, as I stood upon the topmost roofs of a high tower, in a certain
little town in northern Italy, where much history has been made of
late; and, since the owner of the eyes was likewise the possessor of a
very well-ordered mind and a gift of lucid exposition, I found myself
able to grasp the main elements of the extraordinarily complex
strategic problem with which the chiefs of the Italian army have had
to grapple. As I looked and listened I felt that the chapter which
Italy is contributing to the record of the greatest war of all time is
one of which she will have every reason to be proud when she has at
length brought it to its victorious conclusion.
"There are few such viewpoints as this. In the luminous stillness of a
perfect morning of the Italian summer I could look north, and east,
and west, upon more than a third of the battle line, that goes snaking
among the mountains from near the Swiss frontier to the Adriatic. And
what a length of line it is! In England some people seem to think this
is a little war that Italy has on hand, little in comparison with the
campaigns in France and Russia. But it is not small, weighed even in
that exacting balance. The front measures out at over 450 miles, which
is not very far short of the length of ribbon of trench and earthwork
that is drawn across western Europe.
"Here, as there, every yard is held and guarded. It is true that there
is not a continuous row of sentries; for on the Austro-Italian front
there are places where the natural barriers are impassable even for
the Alpine troops, who will climb to the aerie of the eagles. But
wherever nature has not barred the way against both sides alike the
trenches and fortified galleries run, stretching across the saddle
between two inaccessible peaks, ringing around the shoulder of a
mountain, dipping it into the valley, and then rising again to the
very summit or passing over it.
"There are guns everywhere--machine guns, mountain guns, field guns,
huge guns of position, 6-inch, 10-inch, 12-inch--which have been
dragged or carried with all their mountings, their equipment, their
tools and appurtenances, up to their stations, it may be, 3,000,
4,000, 6,000 feet above the level. And at those heights are the
larders of shell which must always be kept full so that the
carnivorous mouths of the man-eaters may not go hungry even for the
single hour of the single day which, at any point, an attack may
develop.
"Such is the long Italian battle line. When you know what it is you
are not surprised that here and there, and now and again, it should
bend and give a little before an enemy better supplied with heavy
artillery, and much favored by the topographical conditions; for he
has the higher mountain passes behind him instead of in front, and is
coming down the great Alpine stairway instead of going up.
"That of course is the salient feature of the campaign. The Italians
are going up, the Austrians coming, or trying to come, down. On the
loftier uplands, range beyond range, in enemy territory, the Austrians
before the war had their forts and fortified posts and their strategic
roads; and almost everywhere along the front they have observing
stations which overlook, at greater or less distance, the Italian
lines. Thus the Italians have had to make their advance, and build
their trenches, and place their guns, in the face of an enemy who lies
generally much above them, sometimes so much above them that he can
watch them from his nests of earth and rock as though he were soaring
in an aeroplane."
CHAPTER XXXII
THE SPRING OF 1916 ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT
During the early part of the spring of 1916, a large number of
engagements took place at many scattered points along the entire
Austro-Italian front. Neither side apparently had determined as yet
upon any definite plan of operations, or, if they had, they took
special pains to avoid a premature disclosure. To a certain extent the
fighting which occurred was little more than of a reconnoitering
nature. Each side attempted with all the facilities at its command to
improve its positions, even if only in a small way, and to find out
weak spots in the lines of its adversary. It was only natural that
during the process of this type of warfare, fortune should smile one
day on one side and turn its back promptly the next day.
During the first week of April, 1916, there was little to report
anywhere along the front. On the 6th, however, considerable artillery
activity developed along the Isonzo front, where the Italians shelled
once more the city of Goritz. This activity gradually increased in
vehemence. At the end of about two weeks it decreased slightly for a
few days, only to be taken up again with renewed vigor and to be
maintained with hardly a break during the balance of April, 1916.
Coincident with this artillery duel there developed a series of
violent engagements on the Carso plateau to the east of the lower
Isonzo. The first of these occurred on April 12, 1916, when Italian
advance detachments approached Austrian trenches between Monte San
Michelo and San Martino, wrecking them with hand grenades and bombs.
Another engagement of somewhat greater importance occurred on April
22, 1916, east of Selz. Italian infantry, supported by artillery,
despite obstinate resistance occupied strong trenches 350 meters long.
The Austrians receiving reenforcements, violently counterattacked
twice during the night, the second time succeeding in retaking part
of the lost trenches. After a deadly hand-to-hand struggle in which
the Austrians suffered severely, the Italians drove them out,
capturing 133, including six officers, two machine guns, 200 rifles,
several flame throwers, and numerous cases of ammunition and bombs.
The following day, April 23, 1916, Austrian artillery of all calibers
violently shelled the trenches occupied east of Selz, obliging the
Italians to evacuate a small section north of the Selz Valley, which
was especially exposed to the Austrian fire. Another strong attack,
supported by a very destructive gunfire was launched by the Austrians
against these trenches on April 25, 1916, and enabled them to reoccupy
some of the ground previously lost.
Two days later the Italians attempted to regain these positions. At
first they succeeded in entering the Austrian trenches on a larger
front than they had held originally, but when they manifested an
intention to continue the attack, the Austro-Hungarians, by
counterattacks drove them into their former positions and even ejected
them from these in bitter hand-to-hand fighting, thereby regaining all
their former positions.
During the balance of April, and up to May 15, 1916, military
operations on the entire Isonzo front were restricted to artillery
bombardments, which, however, at various times, became extremely
violent, especially so with respect to Goritz and the surrounding
positions.
In the next sector, the Doberdo Plateau, much the same condition was
prevalent. From the 1st of April, until the middle of May, 1916, there
was always more or less artillery activity. Occasionally infantry
engagements of varying importance and extent would occur. On April 7,
1916, the Italians were driven back from some advanced saps. South of
Mrzlivrh, Austro-Hungarian troops conquered Italian positions, taking
forty-three prisoners and one machine gun.
Again on the 9th, hand-to-hand fighting, preceded by bomb throwing,
was reported on the Mrzlivrh front. Another attack, launched early in
the morning of April 13, 1916, by the Austrians, lasted throughout
the day, with varying fortune, but finally resulted in a success for
the Italians. On April 14, 1916, the Austro-Hungarians captured an
Italian position at Mrzlivrh and repulsed several counterattacks. The
Italians suffered heavy losses. Artillery vigorously shelled the
Italian positions at Flitsch and Hontebra.
Other violent engagements took place on the Doberdo Plateau on April
27, May 9, 10, 12, and 13, without, however, having any influence on
the general situation.
In all the other sectors very much the same conditions prevailed.
Artillery fire was maintained on both sides almost constantly.
Infantry attacks were launched wherever and whenever the slightest
opportunity offered itself. Scarcely any of these, however, resulted
in any noticeable advantage to either side, especially in view of the
fact that whenever one side would register a slight gain, the other
side immediately would respond by counterattack and frequently nullify
all previous successes. Comparatively unimportant and restricted,
though, as most of this fighting was, it was so only because it
exerted practically no influence on the general situation. On the
other hand, it was carried on with the greatest display of valor and
persistence that can be imagined and, because of the very nature of
the ground on which it occurred, it forms one of the most spectacular
periods of the war on the Austro-Italian front.
Of these many local operations there were only a few which developed
to such an extent that they need to be mentioned specifically.
One of these was a series of engagements in the Ledro Valley,
southwest of Riva and west of Lake Garda. There the Italians on April
11, 1916, by systematic offensive actions, pushed their occupation of
the heights north of Rio Tonale, between Concei Valley and Lake Garda.
Efficaciously supported by their artillery, their infantry carried
with the bayonet a strong line of intrenchments and redoubts along the
southern slopes of Monte Pari Cimadoro and the crags of Monte Sperone.
On the following day, however, April 12, 1916, the Austro-Hungarians,
by violent surprise attacks, succeeded in rushing a part of the
trenches taken by the Italians at Monte Sperone. In the evening,
after an intense preparation by artillery, Italian infantry
counterattacked, reoccupying the lost positions, after a deadly
hand-to-hand struggle and extending their occupation to the slopes of
Monte Sperone. This was followed by a still further extension on April
16, 1916.
Much of the fighting involved positions on mountain peaks of great
height, creating difficulties for both the attacker and the defender,
which at first glance appeared to be almost insurmountable. Of this
type of warfare in the high mountains, the special correspondent of
the London "Times" gives the following vivid description:
"The Italian dispositions are very complete, and it is at this point
necessary to say a few words upon Alpini warfare, which the Italians
have brought to such a pitch of perfection. They are not the only
mountaineers in the world, nor the only people to possess warriors
famous on the hillside, but they were the first people in Europe,
except the Swiss, to organize mountain warfare scientifically, and in
their Alpine groups they possess a force unrivaled for combat in the
higher mountains. The Alpini are individualists who think and act for
themselves and so can fight for themselves. They are the cream of the
army.
"Locally recruited, they know every track and cranny of the hills,
which have no terrors for them at any season, and their self-contained
groups, which are practically the equivalent of divisions, contain
very tough fighters and have achieved remarkable results during the
war. Their equipment, clothing, artillery, and transport are all well
adapted to mountain warfare, and as the whole frontier has been
accurately surveyed, and well studied from every point of view, the
Italians are at a great advantage in the hills.
[Illustration: An Austrian entrenchment high up on a mountainside. The
soldiers are pulling barbed wire devices up the slope in order to
strengthen their defenses.]
"There is nothing new about these troops, whose turnout and tactics
have been a subject of admiration for many years, but in this war much
has changed, in the Alps as elsewhere, and the use of the heaviest
artillery in the mountains is one of the most striking of these
changes. One finds oneself under the fire of twelve-inch howitzers
from the other side of mountains 10,000 feet high, and it is no
extraordinary experience to find Italian heavy howitzers sheltering
behind precipices rising sheer up several thousand feet, and fighting
with Austrian guns ten miles distant, and beyond one, if not two, high
ranges of hills. One imagines that the Austrians must have many
twelve-inch howitzers to spare, for there are, to give an example, a
couple near Mauthen, beyond the crest of the Carnic Alps, and other
heavy artillery in the same district hidden in caverns. In these
caverns, which are extremely hard to locate, they are secure against
shrapnel and cannot be seen by airmen. I fancy the Austrians use
galleries with several gun positions, which are used in turn.
"This style of fighting compels the Italians to follow suit, or at
least it is supposed to do so, and then, as no road means no heavy
guns, there comes in the Italian engineer, the roadmaker, and the
mason, and in the art of roadmaking the Italian is supreme.
"They are very wonderful, these mountain roads. They play with the
Alps and make impossibilities possible. Thanks to them, and to the
_filovia_, or air railway on chains, it is possible to proceed from
point to point with great rapidity, and to keep garrisons and posts
well supplied. The telephones run everywhere, and observing stations
on the highest peaks enable Italian howitzers to make sure of their
aim. I am not quite sure whether the Italians do not trust too much to
their telephones and will not regret the absence of good flag
signalers. When large forces are operating, and many shells bursting,
the telephone is often a broken reed. The motor lorries, with about a
one and one-half ton of useful load, get about wherever there is a
road, and the handy little steam tractors, which make light of
dragging the heaviest guns up the steepest gradients, are valuable
adjuncts to the defense. At the turns of bad zigzags, the Italians
have a remarkable drill for men on the dragropes, and in fact all
difficulties have been overcome.
"I recall some Italian batteries mounted at an elevation of about
9,000 feet, of which each gun weighed eleven tons, the carriage five
tons, and the platform, which was divided into sections, thirty tons.
These guns, the battery officers declared, were brought up from the
plains by a new mountain road in seven hours, and placed in position
on these platforms five hours later. It is all a question of roads,
but the _filovia_ can carry 400 kilos, and any gun under that weight
can get up to a peak by way of the air.
"It is all very marvelous and very perfect, and the Italians are also
adepts at trench building, and make them most artistically. The only
objection I can see to the mountain road is that, when the enemy gets
a hold of the territory which they serve, he has the benefit of them.
This is true of Trentino operations now, and the enemy has many more
roads at his disposal than the old maps show. Sometimes I wonder
whether the Italians do not immerse themselves a little too much in
these means of war and lose sight a little of the ends, but over
nine-tenths of Italy's frontier the war is Alpine, and it must be
allowed that Italian soldiers have brought the art of mountain
fighting to a degree of perfection which it has never attained before.
"The Italian Alpine group varies in strength and composition. It
usually has the local Alpine battalions reenforced by the mountaineers
of Piedmont, and completed, when necessary, by line infantry, who
usually act in the lower valleys, leaving the high peaks to the
mountaineers. Artillery is added according to needs--mountain, field,
and heavy--while there are engineers in plenty, and the mule transport
is very good.
"The Alpini wear a good hobnailed boot for ordinary service, but for
work on the ice the heel of the boot is taken off, and an iron clamp
with ice nails substituted. For mountaineering feats they often use
_scarpe da gatto_, or cat shoes, made of string soles with felt
uppers, which are more lasting than the Pyrenean straw sandals. The
_Gavetta_, or mess tin of the Alpini, is very practical. It is of the
same shape as ours, but a little deeper, and has a reserve of spirit
at the base and a spirit lamp, enabling the Alpini to make coffee or
heat their wine. They use racquets or skis on the snow, and carry
either the alpenstock or the ice ax.
[Illustration: The Italian Front.]
"I did not realize before coming here that trench warfare, and the
close proximity of hostile trenches, had become as usual in the
mountains as in the plains. The defenses are, of course, not
continuous over such a long, and in parts, impassable line, but tend
to concentrate at the passes and other points of tactical importance.
But here the adversaries draw together, and one often finds lines only
separated by twenty yards.
"The Alpini are usually as much deprived of the power of maneuvering
as their comrades in the plains, and all that is left for them is to
act by surprise. They have a system of attacking by infiltration
forward, not so very dissimilar from Boer methods, and they have a
number of devices and surprises which repay study.
"Their enemy is worthy of them, for the chamois hunters, the
foresters, the cragsmen of the Austrian Alps are no mean antagonists,
as all of us know who have shot and climbed with them. Very fine men,
they shoot quick and straight, and when an officer of Alpini tells us
not to dally to admire the scenery, because we are within view of an
Austrian post within easy range, we recall old days and make no
difficulty about complying.
"The Germans trained their Alpine corps here before it went to Serbia,
and the Italians made many prisoners from it--Bavarians, Westphalians,
and East Prussians. So at least I am told by officers of Alpini who
fought with it, and it is certainly proved beyond all doubt that
German artillery has been, and is now, cooperating with the Austrians
on the Italian front.
"The Alpini hold their positions winter and summer on the highest
peaks and have made a great name for themselves. They have lost
heavily, and the avalanches have also taken a serious toll of them.
One parts with them with regret, for they are indeed very fine
fellows, and the war they wage is very hard.
"One point more. Pasubio is not one of the highest peaks in Italian
hands, but snow fell there in the end of May and will fall again at
the end of August. The time allowed for big things in the Alps by big
armies is strictly limited. Also we must remember that there are
winter defenses to be made in the snow, and summer defenses to be made
in the earth and rock. The Austrians were clever in attacking the
other day, just as the snow defenses had crumbled and the summer
defenses had not been completed. The barbed-wire chevaux-de-frise are
often covered by snow in a night and have to be renewed. When the
snow thaws, all this jumble of obstacles reappears tangled together.
"Other ghastly sights also reappear, like the 600 Austrian corpses on
Monte Nero--almost awe-inspiring of heights. They had fallen in the
snow which had covered them. In the summer they reappeared one morning
in strange attitudes, frozen hard and lifelike, and gave the Italian
garrison their first fright."
On April 11, 1916, in the Monte Adamello zone, while a heavy storm was
raging, Italian detachments attacked the Austrian positions on the
rocky crags of the Lobbia Alta and the Doss di Genova, jutting out
from the glaciers at an altitude of 3,300 meters, (10,918 feet). On
the evening of April 12, 1916, they completely carried the positions,
fortifying themselves in them and taking thirty-one prisoners,
including one officer and one machine gun.
The next day, April 13, 1916, saw some severe fighting in the Sugana
Valley in the Dolomites, where Italian troops carried with the
bayonet, a position at Santosvaldo, west of the Sarganagna torrent,
taking seventy-four prisoners, including five officers.
Three days later, April 17, 1916, Italian Alpine troops in the Monte
Adamello zone, occupied and strengthened the Monte Val di Fumo Pass,
at an altitude of 3,402 meters (11,161 feet).
During the night of April 18, 1916, one of the most spectacular and
important exploits of this period was executed. In the upper Cordevole
zone Italian troops, after successful mining operations, attacked
Austrian positions on the Col di Lana and occupied the western ridge
of Monte Ancora. The Austrian detachment occupying the trenches was
mostly killed. The Italians took as prisoners 164 Kaiserjägers,
including nine officers.
This successful operation of the Italians was of exceptional
importance. The Col di Lana is a mountain 4,815 feet high, which forms
a natural barrier in the valley of Livinallengo and protects the road
of the Dolomites from Falzarego to the Pordoi Pass and dominates the
road to Caprile. The Italians had already occupied Col di Lana, but
could not drive the Austrians from its western peak, where an entire
battalion of Alpine troops, Kaiserjägers, was strongly intrenched and
protected by semipermanent fortifications with field and machine guns.
It was impossible for the Italians to attack the enemy's positions,
within range of the Austrian artillery on Mount Sief, which is nearly
on the same level, so the entire western margin of Col di Lana was
carefully and patiently mined, an undertaking which probably took
months of hard work, and several tons of high explosives were
distributed in such a way as to destroy the whole side of the mountain
above which the enemy was intrenched.
The explosion that followed was terrific. The earth shook as if rocked
by an earthquake, and the havoc wrought was so great that out of the
1,000 Austrians who held the position, only 164 survived.
Of course, the Austrians launched many counterattacks against this new
strong position of the Italians. But the latter had fortified it so
well that all attempts of their opponents to dislodge them failed.
Considerable further fighting also occurred during the second half of
April, 1916, and the first half of May, 1916, in the Adamello zone,
adjoining the Camonica Valley, especially in the region of the Tonale
Pass. The same was true of the Tofana sector on the upper Boite. But
though spectacular, the results were of comparatively small
importance.
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE AUSTRIAN MAY DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO
About May 15, 1916, the Italians were at the gates of Rovereto, less
than twelve miles south of Trent and seriously threatening that city.
East of Rovereto the Italian lines ran along the crest of Doss di
Somme to the Monte Maggio beyond Val Terragnolo and then northward to
Soglio d'Aspio. The Austrian forts of Folgaria and Lavarone compelled
the Italians to follow the frontier as far as Val Sugana, where they
occupied good strategical positions on Austrian territory and held
Ronsegno, on the railroad between Borgo and Trent. Further north the
Italians held dominating positions in front of the Austrian forts at
Fabonti and Monte Cola.
During the preceding months the Austrian forces along the Italian
front had gradually been increased, until they now numbered about
thirty-eight divisions. Of these, it was estimated that sixteen
divisions, or over 300,000 men had been massed by May 15, 1916,
between the Adige and Brenta Rivers. Artillery, too, in comparatively
great quantity and of as heavy caliber as the country permitted, had
been assembled.
Suddenly on May 15, 1916, the Austrians along the Trentino front
followed up an intense bombardment which had lasted throughout May 14,
1916, with an attack by large masses of infantry against the Italian
positions between the Adige and the upper Astico. Although the
Italians valiantly resisted the first onrush they had finally to give
way, losing some 2,500 men and sixty-five officers. Austrian troops
have occupied Italian positions on Armentara Ridge, south of the
Sugana Valley, on the Folgarone Plateau, north of Cagnolo Valley and
south of Rovereto. On the Oberdo Plateau they entered trenches east of
Monfalcone, capturing five officers and 150 soldiers belonging to five
different Italian cavalry regiments.
The following vivid picture of the vehemence of the Austrian attack is
given in the "Comere della Sera":
"The Austrians have opened a breach in the wall of defense which we
have won by heavy sacrifices beyond our frontier. They have beaten
with a hurricane of fire upon our Alpine line at its most delicate
point, striving with desperate fury to penetrate into Italian
territory. This is the hardest moment of our war; it is also one of
the most bitter and violent assaults of the whole European war.
"The battle rages furiously. The Austrian attack is being made with
colossal forces in the narrow zone between the Adige and the Val
Sugana. The enemy had assembled fourteen divisions of his best troops.
An Austrian officer who was taken prisoner said:
"'You are not far from the truth in reckoning that there are three
hundred thousand men against you. These comprise the armies of Dankl,
Koevess, and the Boroevic, and these armies are served by unlimited
artillery. More than two thousand pieces are raining on a
twenty-five-mile front projectiles of all calibers.'"
"On Sunday morning, May 14, 1916, three shadows approached the Italian
trenches. As they advanced they were recognized as Austrian Slav
deserters. They said:
"'The attack has been ordered for to-morrow. The bombardment will last
from dawn to 6 p. m., when the infantry will attack.'
"The information was exact. A bombardment of incredible violence
began. Aeroplanes regulated the fire of a 15-inch naval gun, which
sent five projectiles on the town of Asiago. After the bombardment had
ceased the first infantry attack came. The troops attacked _en masse_,
and at the same time attacks were made from the Adige to the Val
Sugana. Four onslaughts were made on Zugna Torta. Our machine guns cut
down the blue masses of men; the wire entanglements were heaped with
dead. The bombardment had destroyed all the first-line trenches. The
infantry then hurled itself against the advance posts of the Val
Terragnolo. The Alpini, deafened by twelve hours of bombardment,
defended every foot of the ground, fighting always in snow. Three
terrible bayonet counterattacks lacerated the Austrian lines, but the
assailants were innumerable, and no help could come, as the entire
front was in action. The Alpini who remained, so few in number, threw
themselves on the enemy again, permitting the retirement of the main
body to the line running from Malga Milegna to Soglio d'Aspio. Even
here there was one avalanche of fire. The enemy artillery had been
pouring explosives on these positions for ten hours. The enemy
infantry here attacking were annihilated and the enemy dead filled the
valleys, but fresh troops swarmed up from all parts.
"Night fell on the first day's slaughter."
The following day, May 16, 1916, the Austrians attacked again the
Italian positions on the northern slopes of the Zugna Torta in the
Lagarina Valley in five assaults. In the zone between the Val
Terragnolo and the upper Astico a violent concentrated fire from the
Austrian artillery of all calibers forced the Italians to abandon
their advanced positions. In the Asiago sector persistent attacks were
repulsed. In the Sugana Valley the Austrians vigorously attacked
between the Val Maggio bridgehead and Monte Collo. The prisoners taken
by the Austrians were increased to forty-one officers and 6,200 men,
and the booty to seventeen machine guns and thirteen guns. Along the
whole remaining front there was artillery fire. Sporadic infantry
attacks were made in the San Pellegrino Valley, the upper But, at
Monte Nero, Mrzli, the Tolmino zone, the northern slopes of Monte San
Michele, the region east of Selz, and Monfalcone.
Austrian aeroplanes shelled Castel Tesino, Capedaletto, Montebelluna,
and the stations at Carnia and Gemona. Italian aeroplanes shelled
Dellach and Kotsschach in the Gail Valley.
The shelling of Zugna Torta was renewed on May 17, 1916, when five
attacks against the Italian positions were repulsed with heavy losses.
Meanwhile artillery fire continued against the Italian positions
between Val Terragnolo and the upper Astico. After three days of
intense and uninterrupted artillery fire the Italians abandoned their
positions on Zugna Torta on May 18, 1916, but repulsed two attacks
against their positions further south. The Italians also abandoned
their line of resistance between Monte Soglio d'Aspio and retired upon
other prepared positions.
Zugna Torta, the ridge running down upon Rovereto, between Val
Lagarina and Vallarsa, was a dangerously exposed salient. The western
slopes were commanded by the fire of the Austrian artillery positions
at Biaena, north of More, on the western side of Val Lagarina, and the
rest of the position lay open to Ghello and Fenocchio, east of
Rovereto. The Italians had never been able to push forward their lines
on either side of this salient. Biaena blocked the way on the west,
and the advance east of Vallarsa was held up by the formidable group
of fortifications on the Folgaria Plateau. When the Austrians attacked
Zugna Torta, under cover of a converging artillery fire, the position
quickly became untenable.
On the same day the Austrians, for the first time since the beginning
of hostilities between Italy and Austria, crossed the Italian frontier
in the Lago di Garda region and established themselves on the
Costabella, a ridge of the Monte Baldo, between the lake and the
Lagarina Valley. At this point, where the Austrian offensive met with
the greatest success, the Italians were driven back four miles from
the positions on Austrian soil which they occupied at the opening of
the attack and which they had held early in the war.
The Austrian advance was well maintained on the following day, May 19,
1916, when the Italians were driven from their positions on the Col
Santo, almost directly to the west of Monte Maggio captured the day
before, between the Val di Terragnolo and the Vallarsa.
By that time the number of Italians taken prisoners by the Austrians
since May 15, 1916, had increased to 257 officers and 13,000 men and
the booty to 109 guns, including twelve howitzers, and sixty-eight
machine guns.
An Austrian dispatch forwarded at that time from Trent tells of the
violent fighting which was in progress in the zone of Monte Adamello
and the Tonale Pass and gives a description of the capture by the
Austrians of an unarmed mountain in this region.
The preparatory bombardment was begun at three o'clock in the
afternoon, the Italian guns making only a desultory reply. The
bombardment was continued until after sunset, when the Austrian
infantry began to move forward from the direction of Fort Strino, on
the Noce River, northeast of the Tonale Pass, guided by searchlights
and star shells.
The seasoned Austrian troops encountered an extremely heavy
machine-gun and rifle fire as they climbed the slope, using their
bayonets to give them support on the slippery ground, but continued
the advance, and near the summit engaged the Italian defenders in a
hand-to-hand combat, and after an hour of bayonet fighting drove the
Italians from their positions. Both sides engaging in the encounter
lost heavily, according to the dispatch.
According to Rome dispatches the Austrian troops were under the
command of the Austrian heir-apparent, Archduke Charles Francis
Joseph, as well as Field Marshal Count von Hoetbendorff, chief of the
Austrian General Staff. General Cadorna, the Italian commander in
chief, was also said to have established his headquarters on the
Trentino front to take personal command of the defense.
The special correspondent of the London "Times" describes the fighting
in the Trentino at this period as follows:
"It is the fifth day of the Austrian offensive. 'We have an action in
progress,' says the colonel. The night is clear and mild. A moon, full
red, is rising on the horizon. Headquarters are located in an ancient
Austrian feudal castle, which crowns a hilltop. At our feet the valley
spreads out, and the mountain-chains to the right and left seem to
meet at an angle in the west. Here a blackened mountain mass dominates
the valley. It is the Panarotta, the stronghold of the enemy.
"'The eye of the Austrians,' a young officer exclaims, as from the
crest a beam of light breaks forth, flaring with great intensity on
the Italian positions lower down. Immediately an Italian light
endeavors to shine directly in the path of the Austrian light and
blind its rays. Another Austrian light darts forth from across the
valley. Promptly an Italian searchlight gives battle. Thus for more
than an hour the opposing searchlights endeavor to intercept one
another. To-night the Austrians are on the offensive. Their lights
sweep the hill crests, pursued by Italian rays.
"The moon is now high in the heavens, the snow-clad peaks, the shadowy
ravines, the villages within Italian lines, as well as those beyond
the invisible ring of steel, are bathed in a silvery light. We are
standing less than four miles from the advanced enemy positions. The
stage is set, the battle is about to begin. Information brought in
during the day tells of fresh units of the enemy, massed in second
line. Deserters, surrendering to Italian patrols, report that an
important action is impending. The general commanding bids us good
night.
"We make our way on foot through quiet country lanes. Through the
trees, the glimmer of the searchlights' flashes comes and goes like
giant fireflies. The clear notes of a nightingale ring out in the
stillness of the night. Nestling in the valley lies a large town,
which only a fortnight ago was filled with civilians, 'redeemed
Italians,' who had enjoyed eight months of prosperity and liberty
under Italian rule. Now these have been evacuated and scattered in the
four corners of Italy, and the deserted houses and empty streets add
to the unreality of the scene. The whirring of the field-telephone
wires which hang low, hastily looped over the branches of olive and
mulberry trees, alone indicates any activity of man. There are no
troops in sight, save a patrol which stops us and examines our papers.
It seems difficult to realize that a great battle is impending. No
scene could be more peaceful. In the marshes, frogs are croaking in
loud unison. The scent of new-mown hay is wafted across the valley.
"The minutes hang heavily. A half hour passes. An hour seems
interminable. This afternoon, beyond the mountains, in the next
valley, not more than nine miles away as the crow flies, a bloody
action was fought. Not a sound of the cannonade reached us; what had
happened there we did not know, for the Austrians are attacking from a
single base, and their battle line is not more than fifteen miles
long, pivoting on a central position, whereas the Italian forces in
this same sector are compelled, by the configuration of the mountains
and the intersecting valleys, to fight separate actions which can only
be coordinated with utmost difficulty.
"Shortly before one o'clock in the morning the Austrian batteries open
fire. From the west, the north, the east, the hail of shell and
shrapnel tears open the crest of the hill, the Monte Collo, against
which the attack is directed. So intense an artillery fire has not
hitherto been witnessed on the Italian front; 380's, 305's, 240's,
149's, 105's rain upon the short line of Italian intrenchments.
"For more than three hours the bombardment continues. The Italian guns
apparently refrain from answering. But every battery is in readiness,
every Italian gun is trained on the spot where the enemy must pass.
Every man is at his post, waiting, waiting. It is just before dawn.
The air of this Alpine Valley is cold and raw. A bleak wind blows
through the trees. The cannonade slackens. From our position we cannot
see the enemy advancing, but the black, broad strip of newly-upturned
soil on the crest of the Monte Collo shows the effect of the
bombardment. Split wide open like a yawning crater, the hilltop has
been plowed up in every direction. Barbed wire, parapets, and trench
lines have disappeared, buried under the tangled earth clumps.
"A minute, perhaps five or ten! 'They are coming,' is whispered in the
observation post. A thunder of Italian artillery greets the attacking
forces. On they come. Instinctively one can discern a shadowy mass
moving forward. Huddled together, they crouch low. Shells are falling
and then cease, and the 'click,' 'click,' of the machine gun's
enfilading fire is heard. The enemy reaches the Italian advance
trenches. The first streaks of light, gray and cold, show new
attacking forces coming up over the hill. They penetrate deep into the
plowed soil. They seem to hold the hill. Stumbling through the
cratered terrain the Austrians advance toward the Italian positions.
Then from out of the tawny earth an Italian battalion springs up. One
can almost imagine that one hears their hoarse battle cry, 'Avanti,
Savoia! Avanti!' as they fall upon their enemies.
"We learn later that the losses have been heavy. The Italian
possessions have been badly damaged and have been temporarily
evacuated. Both sides have taken prisoners, and what was the battle
ground is now a neutral zone. Some hours later I again look across to
the Monte Collo. The hill crest is deserted. Below the summit fresh
Italian troops are occupying new and stronger positions, while an
endless stream of pack-mules is winding slowly up the mountainside."
On May 20, 1916, the battles in southern Tyrol, on the Lavarone
Plateau, increased in violence as the result of Italian attacks. The
Austrians reached the summit of the Armentara Ridge and on the
Lavarone Plateau penetrated the first hostile position.
The troops of Archduke Charles Francis Joseph also added to their
successes. They captured the Cima dei Laghi and the Cima di Nesole.
The Italians also were driven from the Borgola Pass toward the south
and lost three more twenty-eight centimeter howitzers and 3,000 men,
84 officers, 25 guns and 8 machine guns.
Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Vicenza.
Although the Italian line still held in the main, it could not deny
Austrian advances at certain important points. Slowly the
Austro-Hungarians pushed on everywhere toward the Italian frontier. On
May 21, 1916, an attack of the Graz Corps on Lavarone Plateau was
attended with complete success. The Italians were driven from their
entire position. Other Austrian troops captured Fima, Mandriolo and
the height immediately west of the frontier from the summit as far as
the Astico Valley.
The troops of Archduke Charles Francis Joseph reached the Monte
Tormino Majo line.
Between the Astico and Brenta, in the Sugana Valley, the Austrian
attacks likewise continued, supported by powerful artillery, against
advanced lines in the west valleys of Terra Astico, Doss Maggio and
Campelle.
Since the beginning of the offensive 23,883 Italians, among whom are
482 officers, had now been captured and the number of cannon taken had
been increased to 172.
Between Lake Garda and the Adige large Austrian forces were massed on
May 22, 1916, in the Riva zone. There was also considerable aerial
activity on that day on Monte Baldo (the mountain ridge to the east of
the lake). From the Adige to the Astico there were only
reconnoiterings. Between the Astico and the Brenta Rivers in the
Sugana Valley, the Italians were again forced to fall back gradually
on their main lines after repulsing heavy attacks throughout the day.
The retreat, however, was orderly and spontaneous.
Besides accomplishing their advance in the Val Sugana, the Austrians
continued the reduction of the forts protecting Arsiero, well across
the Italian frontier on the way toward Vicenza. Arsiero is the
terminus of a railway leading down into the Vicenza plain and the city
of Vicenza. Through the capture of the Spitz Tonezza and Monte
Melignone the Austrians now held the entire line across the frontier
as far as Forni on the Astico. They also pushed their advance toward
the ridge north of the Val dei Laghi, and toward Monte Tormino and
Monte Cremone, all three outlying defenses of Arsiero. Meanwhile the
right wing of the Austrian army, after storming Col Santo, had moved
toward Monte Pasubio, and the left wing had stormed the Sasso Alto,
commanding the Armentara Ridge, enabling the Austrians to advance into
the Sugana Valley and to take Roncegno.
In order to appreciate the difficulties connected with all of this
fighting, it must be remembered that the fighting is going on in the
mountains, on ground varying in altitude as much as 5,000 feet per
mile. The mountains were still partly covered with snow and the
transportation of supplies, therefore, was exceedingly difficult.
As the month of May drew to its end, the Austrian advance spread
steadily. By May 23, 1916, the Austrians had occupied north of the
Sugana Valley the ridge from Salubio to Borgo. On the frontier ridge
south of the valley the Italians were driven from Pompeii Mountain.
Further south the Italians successfully defended the heights east of
the Val d'Assa and the fortified district Asiago and Arsiero. The
armored work of Campolono, however, fell into Austro-Hungarian hands.
The Austro-Hungarian troops approached more closely the Val d'Assa and
Posina Valley.
Orderly as the Italian retreat was, it was nevertheless a hasty one.
For the official Italian report for May 23, 1916, admits that
artillery "that could not be removed" was destroyed.
Both the violence and unexpectedness of the Austrian attacks are
testified to by articles published at this time in Italian newspapers.
A writer in the "Giornale d'Italia" of Rome says that "the Austrian
offensive came as a surprise to the Italian command and the taking of
Monte Maggio and other important positions was possible, because the
Italians were not looking for so heavy an attack."
A correspondent of the "Corriere della Sera" of Milan, writing of the
extensive preparations made by the Austrians for the present
offensive, says "that the Austrians massed 2,000 guns, mostly of large
caliber, on the twenty-four-mile front attacked."
Though it was now scarcely more than a week since the beginning of the
Austrian offensive, 24,400 Italians had been made prisoners, among
them 524 officers, and 251 cannon; 101 machine guns had been taken.
The Italians, of course, appreciated fully the deeper meaning of this
Austrian offensive. They understood that the Austrian objective was
not simply to reduce the Italian pressure on Trent or to drive the
Italians out of southern Tyrol, but to advance themselves into Italy.
At the same time, Italy also knew that, though such an advance was not
an impossibility, its successful accomplishment for any great distance
or duration would be seriously handicapped by the fact that the
preponderance of numbers was unquestionably on the Italian and not the
Austrian side. This confidence found expression in an order of the day
issued at this junction by King Victor Emmanuel in which he says:
"Soldiers of land and sea: Responding with enthusiasm to the appeal of
the country a year ago, you hastened to fight, in conjunction with our
brave allies, our hereditary enemy and assure the realization of our
national claims.
"After having surmounted difficulties of every nature, you have fought
in a hundred combats and won, for you have the ideal of Italy in your
heart. But the country again asks of you new efforts and more
sacrifices.
"I do not doubt that you will know how to give new proofs of bravery
and force of mind. The country, proud and grateful, sustains you in
your arduous task by its fervent affections, its calm demeanor and
its admirable confidence.
"I sincerely hope that fortune will accompany us in future battles, as
you accompany my constant thoughts."
Still further Austrian successes were reported on May 24, 1916. In the
Sugana Valley they occupied the Salubio Ridge and drove the Italians
from Kempel Mountain.
In the Lagarina Valley, after an intense night bombardment, Austrian
forces attacked twice toward Serravalle and Col di Buole, but were
vigorously repulsed. Next morning the attack on Col di Buole was
renewed with fresh troops, but again repulsed with heavy loss. Italian
troops followed up this repulse and reoccupied the height of Darmeson,
southeast of Col di Buole.
Between the Val d'Assa and Posina the Austrians, after having kept
Italian positions at Pasubio under violent bombardment, launched a
night attack with strong columns of infantry, which were mowed down by
Italian fire and thrown back in disorder. Between Posina and the
Astico the Austrians unmasked their heavy artillery along the Monte
Maggio-Toraro line, but Italian guns replied effectively.
On May 25, 1916, the Austro-Hungarians occupied the Cima Cista,
crossed the Maso rivulet and entered Strigno in the Val Sugana, four
miles northeast of Borgo and a little less than that distance
southeast of Salubio, with the Maso stream between. They also captured
the Corno di Campo Verde to the east of Grigno, on the Italian border
and occupied Chiesa on the Vallarsa Plateau, southwest of Pasubio.
CHAPTER XXXIV
THE RISE AND FAILURE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DRIVE
By May 26, 1916, the center of the Austro-Hungarian army was sweeping
down toward Arsiero, while another strong force further west was
within ten miles of the Italian city of Schio. Both of these points
are terminals of the railroad system of which Vicenza is the center.
That day some of the armored works of Arsiero and some strongly
fortified positions southwest of Bacarola were captured and Monte
Mochicce was occupied. Another Austrian success was the capture of the
entire mountain range from Corno di Campo Verde to Montemeata (in the
Val d'Assa). The Italians suffered sanguinary losses and also lost
more than 2,500 prisoners, four guns, four machine guns, 300 bicycles
and much other material.
In the Monte Nero zone on the night of May 26, 1916, the
Austro-Hungarians attacked Italian trenches near Vrsic and succeeded
in gaining a temporary foothold. When reenforcements arrived, after a
violent counterattack, the Italians drove out the enemy, taking some
prisoners and machine guns.
The natural difficulties in the way of the Austro-Hungarian invaders
were so manifold and severe that it appeared at times as if the
offensive had come to a standstill. However, this was not the case.
Slowly but surely it progressed and as it progressed it even spread
out. Thus on May 27, 1916, the Austrians not only captured a
fortification at Coronolo, west of Arsiero, and also a barricade in
the Assa Valley, southwest of Monte Interrotto, but also carried their
offensive further toward the west until it included the northern end
of Lake Garda.
Again on May 28, 1916, the Italians had to give way. The Austrians
crossed the Assa Valley near Roana, four and a half miles southwest of
Asiago. They also repulsed Italian attacks near Canove, between Asiago
and Schio, and occupied the southern slopes and captured the
fortifications on the Monte Ingrotto heights, north of Asiago, after
having taken Monte Cebio, Monte Sieglarella and the Corno di Campo
Bianco. In the upper Posina Valley the Italians were driven out of
their positions west and south of Webalen.
With renewed vigor the Austrians attacked on May 29, 1916. As a result
the armored work of Punta Gorda fell into their hands, and west of
Arsiero they forced the crossing of the Posina Brook and occupied the
heights on the southern bank in the face of determined Italian
resistance.
The next day, May 30, 1916, Austrian troops, northeast of Asiago,
drove the Italians from Gallio and stormed positions on the heights
northward. Monte Baldo and Monte Fiara fell into their hands. West of
Asiago the Austrian line south of the Assa Valley was advanced to the
conquered Italian position of Punta Gorda. The troops which had
crossed the day before the Posina took Monte Priafora.
This brought the Austrians so near to Asiago that the Italians deemed
it wise to evacuate this town, holding, however, the hills to the
east. In spite of the gradual advance of the Austrian center, the
Italian wings held and severely punished the attacking Austrians. This
was made possible by the admirable Italian motor transports which
enabled the Italian command to bring up great reenforcements and stop
the gap made in the first line. The most serious loss which they
suffered was that of the big guns the Italians were obliged to abandon
on the Monte Maggio-Spitz Tonezza line.
The Austrian offensive was now in its second week. So far it had
yielded in prisoners 30,388 Italians, including 694 officers and 299
cannon.
Reviewing the Austro-Hungarian offensive up to this point, the
military critic of the Berlin "Tageblatt" says:
"The Austro-Hungarian advance is in progress on a front of thirty-one
miles between the Adige and the Brenta. This is about the same
distance as the front between Gorlice and Tarnow, in Galicia, over
which the offensive against the Russians was conducted thirteen months
ago.
"The general direction of the advance is toward the Italian line
running through Asiago, Arsiero, and Schio, which up to the present
time had been protected by advanced positions. This line represents
the third and last fortified defensive position, the strategic object
of which is to prevent an invasion of the Venetian plain.
"The Austro-Hungarian troops already have disposed of the loftiest
heights, which presents a situation favorable to them. When the heavy
artillery has been brought into place there will be visible evidence
of this.
"The total Italian casualties thus far are not less than 80,000 men.
The loss of more than 200 cannon is exceedingly serious for the
Italians, since they cannot be replaced during the war."
In spite of the fact that on May 30, 1916, the Austrians had forced
their way across the Posina torrent between Posina and Arsiero and
succeeded in partly enveloping the latter, a force which attempted to
take Sant' Ubaldo, immediately southeast of Arsiero, on May 31, 1916,
was driven back by the Italians beyond the Posina, thus relieving the
strongest pressure on the town. A little further west another Austrian
force attacked the Italian positions on Monte Spin, southeast of
Posina. The Italian lines held on the mountain slopes and the Austrian
advance here was checked. West of Posina an Austrian assault on Monte
Forni Alti was repulsed. On the Sette Comuni Plateau, where the
Austrians were advancing against Asiago, they began operations against
the Italian positions on Monte Cengio and Campo Niulo.
On June 1, 1916, however, the Austro-Hungarians in the Arsiero region
captured Monte Barro and gained a firm footing on the south bank of
the Posina torrent. Repeated night attacks along the Posina front
against the northern slopes of Monte Forni Alti and in the direction
of Quaro, southwest of Arsiero, were repulsed.
All day long an intense uninterrupted bombardment by Austrian
batteries of all calibers was maintained against the Italian lines in
the Col di Xomo-Rochette sector (southwest of Posina).
On the left wing the Austrians, leaving massed heavy forces between
Posina and Fusine (in the Posina Valley, east of Posina), made
numerous efforts to advance toward Monte Spin.
On the right wing strong Austro-Hungarian columns in the afternoon
launched a violent attack against Segheschiri. These were completely
repulsed after a fierce engagement.
In the uplands of the Sette Comuni there was an intense and obstinate
struggle along the positions south of the Assa Valley as far as
Asiago. Italian troops holding the Monte Cengio Plateau determinedly
withstood powerful infantry attacks supported by a most violent
bombardment.
On the front parallel with the Asiago-Guglio-Valle road near Campo
Mullo the Italians gained ground by a violent counteroffensive in
spite of the strong Austrian resistance.
Intense artillery and infantry fighting along the Trentino front
continued unabated on June 2, 1916, and according to the official
Italian statement the Austrian offensive in some places was checked.
The Austrian infantry on Zugna Torta was scattered by the fierce
Italian infantry fire.
Around Asiero and on the Asiago Plateau in Italy, the Italians
repulsed Austrian infantry. The Belmonte position northeast of Monte
Cengio, where the struggle was fiercest and which was repeatedly taken
and lost, was finally definitely occupied by the Italians.
Several Italian towns, including Vicenza and Verona, were attacked by
Austrian aeroplanes, while Italian air squadrons in a raid on objects
of military importance in the lower Astico Valley, dropped 100 bombs
on various enemy camps and munition depots.
The next day, June 3, 1916, the Austrian attack once more found fresh
impetus. In spite of desperate Italian resistance on the ridge south
of the Posina Valley and before Monte Cengio, on the Asiago front,
south of Monte Cengio, considerable ground was won and the town of
Cesuna was captured. Italian counterattacks were repulsed.
During this one day 5,600 prisoners, including seventy-eight officers,
were taken and three cannon, eleven machine guns and 126 horses were
captured.
In the region west of the Astico Valley fighting activity was
generally less pronounced on June 4, 1916, than it had been during the
preceding days. South of Posina Austrian troops took a strong point of
support and repulsed several Italian counterattacks.
East of the Astico Valley, Austrian groups situated on the heights
east of Arsiero stormed Monte Panoccio (east of Monte Barco) and
thereby gained command of the Canaglio Valley.
Considerable fighting occurred on June 5, 1916, without, however,
resulting in any important changes. Austro-Hungarian attacks,
preceded by intensive artillery fire, were launched all along the
Trentino front, but were met everywhere with determined Italian
resistance. Italian aeroplanes attacked the railway stations of San
Bona di Piava, Livenca and Lati Sana, while Austrian airmen bombed the
stations of Verona, Ala and Vicenza.
Since June 1, 1916, 9,700 Italians, including 184 officers, had been
captured, as well as thirteen machine guns and five cannons.
On June 6, 1916, activities were restricted to artillery duels,
although the Austrians southwest of Asiago continued the attack near
Cesuna and captured Monte del Busiballo, southwest of Cesuna.
More and more it became evident now that the force of the Austrian
offensive had been spent. The pressure on the Italian center in the
Trentino front gradually diminished as a result of the determined
Italian resistance, which had made impossible an equal progress of the
Austrian wings. Possibly, too, the great Russian offensive on the
southeastern front made itself felt even now. At any rate, there was a
decided slowing down of infantry attacks. At one point, however, on
the Sette Comuni Plateau, the battle raged along the whole front. On
the evening of June 6, 1916, after an intense artillery preparation,
the Austro-Hungarians made repeated attacks against Italian positions
south and southwest of Asiago. The action, raging fiercely throughout
the night of June 6-7, ended in the morning of June 7th with the
defeat of the Austrian columns. During the afternoon the Austrians
renewed their violent efforts against the center and right wing of the
Italian positions. Preceded by the usual intense bombardment, dense
infantry masses repeatedly launched assaults against positions south
of Asiago, east of the Campo Mulo Valley, but were always repulsed
with heavy losses.
Concerning the Austro-Hungarian troops who had carried this offensive
into Italy, the special correspondent of the London "Times" says:
"Trench warfare, for the time being, has been abandoned here. Trench
lines no longer count.
"Great troop masses are maneuvering in the open, through the valleys
and gorges, swarming over the summits of these mountains. The
Austrians dare advance only as far as the long arm of their guns will
reach, and are bending all their energy to bring up these guns. It is
a gigantic task, and the skill of the enemy commander in holding
together and coordinating his attacks, now that his troops have
entered these defiles, must be acknowledged.
"It is sledge-hammer tactics, so dear to the Prussians, that the
Austrian commanders have adopted, and from the general aspect of their
plans, it would appear that these were prepared and matured in Berlin
rather than in Vienna.
"How long can it last? How long before the Austrian effort will have
spent itself?" are the questions that are being asked here as the
second week of this great battle is drawing to a close. For, unlike
Verdun, it is not a fortress that is being assaulted, but a great
drive, carried on by siege methods. Not converging on a single center,
but radiating, like sticks of a fan, from a central base.
"So much has been written regarding the exhaustion of the resources of
the Dual Monarchy, not only of materials, but of men. In how far is
this true?
"To deal first with the question of ordnance. The Austrians, it is
estimated by competent experts, have well over 2,000 pieces of
artillery in action along this battle line. These include a great
number of heavy-caliber guns. Naval guns, with an extreme length of
range, are being used with great skill throughout the engagement. Kept
in reserve, and silent, though posted close up to the firing line,
they have had a disconcerting effect, in that their fire has reached
far behind the Italian lines at intervals between the attacks, firing
shots at random which did little actual damage, but gave the
impression of continued advance. With the front of this battle line
extending now to a length of twenty-two miles, the artillery of the
enemy works out at nearly 100 pieces to the mile, or one gun every
twenty yards.
"The shells fired by this artillery are of excellent workmanship. I
have on my table as I write a fragment of a 10-inch shell which I
picked up here. It is rent in deep fissures, which would prove,
according to competent authority, that the explosive materials used
are good. 'The Austrians fired away all their bad shells during
preliminary actions,' was the comment of a young staff officer who is
in the habit of recording the efficiency of enemy shells. But it is
quantity as well as quality which the enemy is relying upon.
"'Twenty thousand shells were fired against my position the first two
days of the engagement,' an Alpini major, commanding a small knoll,
remarked to me. Using this as a basis, it would not be far from the
truth to assert that over 1,000,000 shells have been fired by the
enemy in the present battle, and there is as yet no slackening of
effort.
"And the troops? This morning a group of some 250 Austrians, taken
during the action last night, are in this village. They are divided in
squads of twenty-five, each in charge of an Austrian noncommissioned
officer. The men had had six hours' rest before I saw them. These
prisoners are Rumanians from Transylvania. They are young, well-set-up
troops. They are naturally glad to be prisoners, though their captors
tell me that they fought valiantly. The equipment of these men is new,
and I was struck by the excellent quality of their boots; high, new
leather, thick mountain boots. In fact, all their leather
accouterments are new, and of good leather. Their uniforms are in many
cases of heavy cotton twill, very tough, and resisting the hard
mountain fighting better than the usual cloth uniform. Nearly every
man has an overcoat, which is of stout new cloth. Only five or six of
the men are without caps. None have helmets of any kind, but all wear
the soft cap with ear flaps tied back. According to answers given to
the interpreter, they are of the class of 1915, and have seen fighting
in Galicia.
[Illustration: Detail of Austrian Offensive, May, 1916.]
"Asked about their food, they replied that they did not get enough to
eat, but their looks belied their statements. Whatever may be the
truth in regard to the meatless and fatless days in the Hapsburg
Empire, the armies in the field are not suffering in this respect,
and, though the civilians at home are now put on strict rations,
their soldiers' rations, in this sector at least, have not been cut
down. I was shown small tins of meat, taken from the knapsack of a
prisoner, and several carried 3-ounce tins of a good quality of
butter. In another sector I saw Bosnian prisoners wearing a gray fez,
and looking much like Turkish troops. They also impressed me as very
fit men; in fact, all the prisoners taken recently would seem to be of
strong fiber, and far better equipped than Austrian troops which I
have seen elsewhere.
"It is evident that the Austrian commanders have assembled the picked
troops of the Dual Monarchy for the storming of these Trentino
heights. Everything would point to the fact that they are making a
supreme and final effort to win the war. Prisoners confirm this by
stating that the war cannot go on much longer.
"Are the last good reserves being used up in this battle? Yesterday
morning an Italian patrol coming in from the night's tour of
inspection of their positions bring in a prisoner. He is a burly,
thick-lipped peasant boy of twenty, dressed in a Russian uniform. On
his loose-fitting blouselike tunic, torn in many places, is pinned a
black and yellow ribbon, and hanging from a thin remaining strand
shines the silver medal of St. George. An Italian subaltern takes
charge of the prisoner.
"'A Russian refugee,' the officer remarks, in answer to my look of
surprise at the sight of a Russian prisoner being brought in by an
Italian patrol on the Trentino front. The Russian smiles
good-naturedly, as he feels secure, now that he is among friends. In
due time he will be repatriated, or perhaps join the Russian corps in
France. We leave him busy over a big bowl of macaroni.
"'There are close to 20,000 Russian prisoners of war employed by the
Austrians along our front, repairing roads, making trenches, and
engaged on other 'noncombatant military duties,' the officer informed
me. 'A few manage to escape into our lines nearly every day, but many
more Russian dead lie in the silent crevasses of our high mountains
who have lost their lives while attempting to escape.
"'You see, they need the men,' he concluded, as we watched an endless
stream of fresh Italian troops winding their way up from the valley."
CHAPTER XXXV
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE TRENTINO
Hardly had the Austro-Hungarian offensive shown signs of weakening
when the Italians themselves began to attack the invaders. The first
indication of this change was gleaned from the wording of the official
statements, covering military operations on the Italian front for June
9, 1916. No longer is there any mention of Austro-Hungarian advances,
but on the contrary this term appears now in the reports concerning
the military operations of the Italian troops, who are also reported
as "making attacks." Of course, this turn in affairs developed slowly
in the beginning.
Thus, although on June 9, 1916, the Italian troops attacked at many
points along the entire front between the Adige and Brenta Rivers,
most of these attacks were repulsed by the Austro-Hungarians, who were
still able to claim the capture of some 1,600 prisoners. At the same
time Italian forces began to push back the invaders at some points and
were able to advance in the upper Arsa Valley in the Monte Novegno
region, between the Posina and Val d'Astico, as well as on the western
slopes of Monte Cengio. Artillery duels were maintained along the
entire balance of the front to the sea. Austrian aeroplanes dropped
bombs on various localities in the Venetian plain, while an Italian
squadron shelled Austro-Hungarian positions in the Arsa Valley and the
Val d'Astico.
Much the same was the result of the fighting on June 10 and 11, 1916.
On the former day the Austro-Hungarians concentrated their efforts
still more and restricted themselves to an attack against a small
portion of the Italian front southeast of Asiago. After an intense
bombardment strong forces numbering about one division repeatedly
attacked the Monte Lemerle positions. They were repulsed with very
heavy losses by counterattacks.
From the Adige to the Brenta the Italian offensive action was
increasing. Infantry, effectively supported by artillery, made fresh
progress along the Vallarsa height, south of the Posina, in the Astico
Valley, at the Frenzela Valley bridgehead, on the Asiago Plateau, and
to the left of the Maso torrent.
During the following day Austro-Hungarian artillery intensely
bombarded the Italian positions near Conizugna in the Lagarina Valley.
In the Arsa Valley, in the Pasubio sector, on the Posina, and on the
Astico line Italian infantry advance continued despite violent
artillery fire and a snowstorm.
Two Austrian counterattacks toward Forni Alti and Campigliazione were
repulsed with very heavy losses. In the plateau of the Sette Comuni,
southwest of Asiago, Italian advanced detachments, after passing the
Canaglia Valley, progressed toward the southeastern slopes of Monte
Cengio, Monte Barco, and Monte Busibello. In the Sugana Valley
detachments progressed toward the Masso torrent, repulsing two
Austrian counterattacks near Sucrelle. Along the remainder of the
front there were artillery duels and bomb-throwing activity by small
detachments. Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Vicenza, hitting the
military hospital, and also attacked Thiene, Venice, and Mestre,
causing slight damage.
Still further ground was gained by the Italian forces on June 12,
1916, in spite of the most obstinate resistance.
In the Lagarina Valley, by a strong attack after artillery preparation,
the Italians carried the strongly fortified line from Parmesan, east of
the Cima Mezzana, to Rio Romini. The Austro-Hungarians immediately
launched violent counterattacks, but were always repulsed.
Along the Posina-Astico front there was an intense bombardment by both
sides. Austrian infantry, which succeeded in penetrating Molisini, was
driven out by gunfire, pursued and dispersed.
In the Sugana Valley on the night of June 12, 1916, and the following
morning, Austrian detachments attempting to advance east of the Maso
torrent were repulsed with very heavy losses.
Once more the Austro-Hungarians attempted to wrest the initiative from
their opponents, without, however, succeeding to any extent. On the
Posina front on the evening of June 12, 1916, after violent artillery
preparation, they attacked Monte Forni Alti, the Campiglia (both
southwest of Posina), Monte Ciove and Monte Brazonne (both south of
Arsiero), but were everywhere repulsed with heavy losses.
During the day they bombarded with numerous batteries of all calibers
the Italian positions along the whole front from the Adige to the
Brenta, especially in the Monte Novegno zone. The Italian troops
firmly withstood the violent fire and repelled infantry detachments
which attempted to advance.
Austro-Hungarian hydroaeroplanes attacked the station and military
establishments at San Giorgio di Nogaro, as well as the inner harbor
at Grado.
More and more it became evident that the Austro-Hungarian drive in the
Trentino region had definitely been stopped or abandoned. From time to
time, it is true, the Austrians returned to the offensive. But this
was always of local importance only and restricted in strength and
extent. The Italians, on the other hand, not only maintained their new
offensive movement, but even extended gradually its sphere.
Two attempted attacks by the Austro-Hungarian forces in the region of
Monte Novegno, made in the direction of Monte Ciove and Monte
Brazonne, were repulsed. But on Monte Lemerle, against which the
Austrians had launched without success a very violent attack only a
few days before, they now surprised a hostile detachment near the
summit and captured the mountain completely, taking 500 prisoners.
Italian activity was renewed again on the Isonzo front. After intense
artillery preparation a Naples brigade, supported by dismounted
cavalry detachments, in a surprise attack, penetrated Austrian lines
east of Monfalcone. The trenches remained in Italian possession after
a severe struggle, during which 10 officers, 488 men, and 7 machine
guns were captured.
Italian squadrons of aeroplanes bombarded the railway station at
Mattarello, in the Lagarina Valley, and encampments at the junction of
the Nos and Campomulo Valleys on the Asiago Plateau, while Austrian
aeroplanes dropped bombs on Padova, Giorgio di Nogaro, and Porto
Rosega.
The Italian advance was steadily maintained from now on, not without,
however, finding everywhere the stiffest kind of resistance, which at
times made it even possible for the Austro-Hungarians to gain slight
local successes. These, however, were not extensive or frequent enough
to change the general picture of military operations on the
Austro-Italian front. The Austrians, though still on Italian territory
in a number of localities, were on the defensive with the Italians,
though making only very slow and painful progress, unquestionably on
the offensive.
On June 16, 1916, the Italians advanced northeast of Asiago, between
the Frenzela Valley and Marcesina. Notwithstanding the difficult and
intricate nature of the terrain and the stubborn resistance of the
Austrians, intrenched and supported by numerous batteries, the Italian
troops made progress at the head of the Frenzela Valley, on the
heights of Monte Fior and Monte Castel Gomberto and west of Marcesina.
The best results were attained on the right wing, where Alpine troops
carried the positions of Malga Fossetta and Monte Magari, inflicting
heavy losses on the Austrians and taking 203 prisoners, a battery of 6
guns, 4 machine guns, and much material.
During the next few days the most fierce fighting occurred on the
plateau of Sette Comuni. All Austrian attempts to resume the offensive
and continue their advance failed. The Italian advance was scarcely
more successful; fighting had to be done in the most difficult
territory; strong Austrian resistance developed everywhere.
Thunderstorms frequently added to the difficulties already existent.
Yet slowly the Italian forces pushed back the invader.
On June 18, 1916, Alpine troops carried with the bayonet Cima di
Sidoro, north of the Frenzela Valley. Fighting developed in the Boite
sector, where the Italians had made some slight gains during the
previous days, which the Austrians tried to dispute. Heavy Italian
artillery bombarded the railway station at Toblach and the Landro
road in the Rienz Valley. Artillery and aeroplane activity was
extremely lively during this period. Not a day passed without
artillery duels at many scattered points along the entire front from
the Swiss border down to the Adriatic. Aeroplane squadrons of
considerable force paid continuously visits to the opposing lines,
dropping bombs on lines of communication and railway stations.
Alpine troops captured a strong position for the Italians on June 20,
1916, at the head of the Posina Valley, southwest of Monte Purche. On
the 22d the Italians pushed their advance beyond Romini in the Arsa
Valley, east of the Mezzana Peak, and on the Lora Spur, west of Monte
Pasubio.
On the same day the Austrians counterattacked with extreme violence at
Malga Fossetta and Castel Gomberto, but were repulsed with heavy
losses. On the 21st a further Austrian attack at Cucco di Mandrielle
resulted in a rout. On the 22d the Italians, while holding all the
Austrian first-line approaches under heavy fire to prevent the
bringing up of reserves, attacked on the entire front, but still
encountered a strong resistance. During the night of the 24th the
remaining peak of Malga Fossetta, held by the Austrians, Fontana
Mosciar, and the extremely important Mandrielle were taken by storm,
while the Alpini on the right made themselves masters of the Cima
Zucadini by the 22d.
Henceforth retreat was inevitable, and during the night of the 25th
the Italians on Monte Fior, seeing that the Austrian resistance had
greatly diminished, pushed their offensive vigorously. Shortly after
the advance was begun along the whole right. Monte Cengio, which had
received an infernal bombardment for three days and nights, fell at
last, and the advance proceeded apace.
On June 26, 1916, Italian troops in the Arsa Valley carried strong
trenches at Mattassone and Naghebeni, completing the occupation of
Monte Lemerle. Along the Posina front, after driving out the last
Austrian detachments from the southern slopes of the mountain, the
Italians crossed the torrent and occupied Posina and Arsiero,
advancing toward the northern slopes of the valley.
On the Sette Comuni Plateau Italian infantry, preceded by cavalry
patrols, reached a line running through Punta Corbin, Fresche,
Concafondi, Cesuna, southwest of Asiago, and passing northeast of the
Nosi Valley, and occupied Monte Fiara, Monte Lavarle, Spitzkaserle and
Cimasaette.
On the right wing Alpine troops, after a fierce combat, carried Grolla
Caldiera Peak and Campanella Peak.
The inside workings of the Italian armies engaged in this offensive
movement are interestingly pictured in the following account from the
pen of the special correspondent of the London "Times," who, of
course, had special opportunities for observation:
"Thanks to the courtesy of the Italian Government and higher command,
I have been allowed to go everywhere, to see a great deal on the chief
sectors of a 400-mile Alpine border, and to study the administrative
services on the lines of communication.
"I have visited the wild hills of the upper Isonzo, have inspected the
strange Carso region on the left bank of the river, and have continued
my investigations on the Isonzo front as far as Aquileia and the sea.
I have threaded beautiful and rugged Carnia nearly as far west as
Monte Croce, have ascended the valley of the But to Mount Timau, where
the Austrians, as elsewhere, are in close touch, and, passing on to
wonderful Cadore, have visited the haunts of the Alpini above the
sources of the Tagliamento and Piave.
"Coming then to the Trentino sector, I have traversed the Sugana
Valley as far as was practicable, accompanied the army in its
reconquest of Asiago Plateau, and concluded an instructive tour by
ascending the mountains which dominate Val Lagarina to the point of
contact between the contending armies.
"The rest of the front, from the Lago di Garda to the Stelvio and the
frontier of Switzerland, is not at present the scene of important
operations, so I contented myself by ascertaining at second hand how
matters stand between the Valtellina and the Chiese.
"I have had the honor of a private audience with his Majesty the King
of Italy, and have seen and talked to nearly all the leading soldiers.
Nothing could exceed the kindness with which I have been received, and
my grateful thanks are due especially to Colonels Count Barbarich and
Claricetti, who were placed at my disposal by General Cadorna and
accompanied me during my tour.
"It is necessary for those who wish to have a clear understanding of
Italy's share in the war to look back and realize the situation of our
Italian friends when, at the most critical moment for the cause, they
threw the weight of their sword into the scales.
"Italy, like England, had lost the habit of considering policy in
military terms. Home politics ruled all decisions. The army had been
much neglected, and the campaign in Libya had left the war material at
a very low ebb. United Italy had not yet fought a great modern
campaign, and neither the army nor the navy possessed in the same
measure as other powers those great traditions which are the outcome
of many recent hard-fought wars. Italy was without our coal and our
great metallurgic industries. She did not possess the accumulation of
resources which we were able to turn to warlike uses; nor could she
find in her oversea possessions, as we did, the strength and vitality
of self-governing younger people of her own race. The old Sardinian
army had given in the past fine proofs of valor, but it was not known
how the southern Italians would fight, and it was at first uncertain
whether the whole country would throw itself heart and soul into the
war.
"These impediments to rapid decisions and the extreme difficulty of
breaking with an old alliance explain the apparent hesitation of Italy
to enter the war.
[Illustration: Gorizia.]
"On the other hand, there were compensations. The heart of Italy was
always with the Allies, and the hatred of Austria was very deep. There
was every hope that the long-prevailing system of amalgamating the
various races of Italy in the common army would at last bear fruit,
and that this amalgamation, combined with the moral and material
progress of Italy in recent years, and the pride of the country in its
past history, would enable Italy to play an honorable and notable
part in the war by land and sea, and to wrest from her hereditary
enemy those portions of unredeemed Italy which still remained in
Austrian hands.
"These hopes have either been fulfilled or are in course of
fulfillment. United Italy is unitedly in the war, and, except among a
few political busybodies, who intrigue after the manner of their kind,
there are not two opinions about the war. There are many cases of
mothers compelling their sons to volunteer and other cases of fathers
insisting upon being taken because their sons are at the front. The
prefect of Friuli told me that nearly all the 24,000 men in his
province who were absent abroad when the war broke out returned home
to fight before they were recalled. The south and the island areas
warm for war as the north, and the regiments of Naples and of Sicily
have done very well indeed in the field. Some people think that
Piedmont is not quite so enthusiastic as other parts of Italy, because
she flags her streets rather less, but I do not think that there is
any real difference of feeling. In all the capitals of the Allies the
political climate has been a trifle unhealthy, and of Rome it has been
said that the old families of the Blacks have not taken a leading part
in the campaign. My inquiries make me doubt the accuracy of this
statement, and I think on the whole it will be found that, despite the
old and persistent divergence of opinion on certain topics, all ranks
and all classes are heartily for the war, and that an enemy who counts
on assistance from within Italy will be grievously disappointed.
"Italy is fortunate in having at her head, at this critical hour of
her destinies, a king who is a soldier born and bred.
"It is a common saying here that the King of Italy is homesick when he
is absent from the army, and it is certain that his majesty spends
every hour that he can spare from state affairs with his troops. He
wears on his breast the medal ribbon, only given to those who have
been at the front for a year, and, though he deprecates any allusion
to the fact, it is true that he is constantly in the firing line, has
had many narrow escapes, and is personally known to the whole army,
who love to see him in their midst.
"I have not found any officer of his army who has a better, a more
intimate, or a more accurate knowledge of his troops than the king.
His attention to the wants of the army is absolutely untiring, and I
fancy that his cool judgment and large experience must often be of
great service to his ministers and his generals.
"I do not know whether the field headquarters of the King of Italy or
of King Albert of Belgium is the most unpretentious, but certainly
both monarchs live in circumstances of extreme simplicity. My
recollection is that when I last had the honor of visiting King
Albert's headquarters, the bell in what I must call the parlor did not
ring, and the queen of the Belgians had to get up and fetch the tea
herself.
"When I had the honor of being received by the King of Italy I found
his majesty in a little villa which only held four people, and the
king was working in a room of which the only furniture which I can
recall consisted of a camp bed close to the ground and of exiguous
breadth, a small table, and two chairs of uncompromising hardness. The
only ornament in the room was the base of the last Austrian shell
which had burst just above the king's head and has been mounted as a
souvenir by the queen.
"When a prince of the House of Savoy lives in the traditions of his
family, and shares all the hardships of his troops, it needs must that
his people follow him. And so they do.
"The hardy Alpini from the frontiers, the stout soldiers of Piedmont,
the well-to-do peasantry of Venetia, the Sardinians, who are ever to
the front when there is fighting to be enjoyed, the Tuscans,
Calabrians, and those Sicilians once so famous amongst the
legionaries, are all here or at the depots training for war.
Mobilization must have affected two and a half million Italians at
least. There have been fairly heavy losses, and fighting of one kind
or another is going on in every sector that I have visited, and every
day, despite the great hardships of fighting on the Alpine frontier,
the moral of the army remains good, the men are in splendid health,
and Italy as a whole remains gay and confident, less affected on the
whole by the war than any other member of the grand alliance.
"There are certainly more able-bodied men of military age out of
uniform in Italy than there are in France, or than there are now with
us. Except volunteers, no men under twenty are at the front. There are
large reserves still available upon which to draw. The army has been
more than doubled since the war began.
"The Italian regular officers, and the officers of reserve, are quite
excellent. The spirit of good comradeship which prevails in the army
is most admirable, and the corps of officers reminds me of a large
family which is proverbially a happy one. Those foreign observers who
have seen much of the Italian officers under fire tell me that they
have always led their men with superb valor and determination, while,
though Italy has not such a professional body of N. C. O.'s as
Germany, I believe that most of these men are capable of leading when
their officers fall.
"But there are not enough of good professional officers and N. C. O.'s
to admit for the moment of a considerable further expansion of the
army. Existing formations can be, and are being, well maintained, and
this is what matters most for the moment.
"The peasant in certain parts of Italy rarely eats meat. In the army
he gets 300 to 350 grams a day, according to the season, not to speak
of a kilogram of good bread and plenty of vegetables, besides wine and
tobacco. He is having the time of his life, and if, as cynics say,
peace will break up many happy homes in England, peace in Italy will
certainly make some peasants less joyful than before."
CHAPTER XXXVI
CONTINUATION OF THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE
Between the Adige and the Brenta the retreating Austro-Hungarian
forces had now reached strongly fortified and commanding positions
which considerably increased their power of resistance. The Italians,
however, continued, even if at reduced speed, to make progress. On
June 27, 1916, they shelled Austrian positions on Monte Trappola and
Monte Testo and took trenches near Malga Zugna. Between the Posina and
the Astico they took Austrian positions on Monte Gamonda, north of
Fusine, and Monte Caviojo. Cavalry detachments reached Pedescala (in
the Astico Valley, about three miles north of Arsiero).
On the Asiago Plateau other Italian forces occupied the southern side
of the Assa Valley and reached the slopes of Monte Rasta, Monte
Interrotto and Monte Mosciagh, which were held strongly by the
Austrian rear guards. Further north, after carrying Monte Colombara,
Italian troops began to approach Calamara Valley.
On June 28, 1916, the Vallarsa Alpine troops stormed the fort of
Mattassone, and detachments of infantry carried the ridge of Monte
Trappola. On the Pasubio sector Italian troops took some trenches near
Malga Comagnon. Along the Posina line their advance was delayed by the
fire of heavy batteries from the Borcola.
In the Astico Valley they occupied Pedescala. On the Sette Comuni
Plateau the Austrians strengthened the northern side of the Assa
Valley Heights on the left bank of the Galmarara to the Agnella Pass.
The Italians established themselves on the southern side of the Assa
Valley and gained possession of trenches near Zebio and Zingarella.
The following day, June 29, 1916, the Italian line in the region
between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana was pushed forward still
further until it reached the main Austrian line of resistance. The
Italians occupied the Valmorbia line, in the Vallarsa, the southern
slopes of Monte Spil, and began an offensive to the northwest of
Pasubio, in the Cosmagnon region.
Farther east on the line of the Posina Valley, the Italians took Monte
Maggio, the town of Griso, northwest of Monte Maggio; positions in the
Zara Valley and Monte Scatolari and Sogliblanchi. Monte Civaron and
the Zellonkofel, in the Sugana Valley, fell into the hands of the
Italians.
The Italians continued their advance along the Posina front on June
30, 1916, despite the violent fire of numerous Austro-Hungarian
batteries dominating Borcola Pass, and also Monte Maggio and Monte
Toraro. Italian infantry occupied Zarolli in the Vallarsa, north of
Mattassone. On the left wing, overcoming stubborn resistance, Italian
troops scaled the crest of Monte Cosmagnon, whose northerly ridges
they shelled to drive out the enemy hidden among the rocks. On the
Sette Comuni Plateau they kept in close contact with Austrian
positions. Conflicts in the densely wooded and rocky ground were
carried on chiefly by hand grenades.
Between the Adige and the Brenta the Italians continued their
offensive vigorously on July 1, 1916. In the Vallarsa infantry began
an attack on the lines strongly held by the Austrians between Zugna
Torta and Foppiano.
Italian artillery shelled Fort Pozzacchio. On Monte Pasubio the
Austrians were offering stubborn resistance from their fortified
positions between Monte Spil and Monte Cosmagnon.
Along the Posina-Astico line Italian forces completed the conquest of
Monte Maggio and occupied the southern side of Monte Seluggio. On the
Asiago Plateau there were skirmishes on the northern side of the Assa
Valley.
On July 2, 1916, in the region of the Adige Valley, the Austrians
directed a heavy bombardment against the Italian positions from
Serravalle, north of Coni Zugna to Monte Pasubio. Some shells fell on
Ala. Italian artillery replied effectively. The infantry fighting on
the northern slopes of Pasubio was continued with great violence. In
the Posina Valley Italian troops occupied the spur to the northwest of
Monte Pruche, Molino, in the Zara Valley (northwest of Laghi), and
Scatolari, in the Rio Freddo Valley. The operations against Corno del
Coston, Monte Seluggio, and Monte Cimono (northwest and north of
Arsiero), the main points of Austrian resistance, were continued.
On the Asiago Plateau Italian detachments were pushed forward beyond
the northern edge of Assa Valley. On the remainder of this sector
there was a lull in the fighting, preparatory to further attacks on
the difficult ground. In the Brenta Valley small encounters took place
on the slopes of Monte Civaron north of Caldiera.
Monte Calgari, in the Posina Valley, was occupied by the Italians on
July 3, 1916, while other detachments completed the occupation of the
northern edge of the Assa Valley on the Asiago Plateau.
Between the Adige and the Brenta the Austrians on July 4, 1916,
contested with great determination the Italian advance and attempted
to counterattack at various points.
After several attempts, Alpine troops reached the summit of Monte
Corno, northwest of the Pasubio.
In the upper Astico Basin they captured the crest of Monte Seluggio
and advanced toward Rio Freddo.
Between the Lagarina and Sugana Valleys the Italian offensive was
continued on July 5, 1916. In the Adige Valley and in the upper Astico
Basin pressure compelled the Austrians to withdraw, uncovering new
batteries on commanding positions previously prepared by them.
On the Asiago Plateau Italian artillery bombarded the Austrian lines
actively. In the Campelle Valley the Austrians evacuated the positions
they still held on the Prima Lunetta, abandoning arms, ammunitions and
supplies.
The following day brought some new successes to the Italians on the
Sette Comuni Plateau. With the support of their artillery they renewed
their attack on the strongly fortified line of the Austrians from
Monte Interrotto to Monte Campigoletto and captured two important
points of the Austrian defenses, near Casera, Zebio and Malga Pozza,
taking 359 prisoners, including 5 officers and 3 machine guns. Between
the Adige and the Astico, north of the Posino and along the Rio Freddo
and Astico Valleys there was intense artillery activity, especially in
the region of Monte Maggio and Monte Camone. The same condition
continued throughout July 7, 1916.
On July 8, 1916, Italian infantry advanced on the upper Astico in the
Molino Basin and toward Forni. Dense mist prevented all activity of
artillery on the Sette Comuni Plateau. In the northern sector the
Italians stormed some trenches north of Monte Chiesa, and occupied
Agnella Pass.
A great deal of the fighting, both during the Austro-Hungarian
offensive in the Trentino and the Italian counteroffensive, took place
in territory abounding with lofty mountain peaks. Though it was now
midsummer, these were, of course, covered with eternal snow and ice.
Austrians and Italians alike faced difficulties and hardships, the
solution and endurance of which would have seemed utterly impossible a
few years ago until the Great War swept away many long-established
military and engineering maxims. An intimate picture of this new mode
of warfare was given by a special correspondent of the London "Daily
Mail" who, in part, says:
"The villages in the lower ground behind the front have been aroused
from their accustomed appearance of sleepy comfort. In their streets
are swarms of soldiers on their way to the front or back from it for a
holiday. Thousands are camping out in the neighborhood of the villages
or billeted on the inhabitants. Constant streams of motor vehicles
rumble through the villages on their way up the steep road, bearing
ammunition, food and supplies of all sorts, to the batteries, trenches
and dugouts on the peaks.
"The road over which these vehicles travel was before the war a mere
hill path--now the military engineers have transformed it into a
modern road, graded, metaled and carried by cunningly devised spirals
and turns three-quarters of the way up the mountains.
"It is a notable piece of military engineering, but it is not merely
that. It will serve as an artery of commerce when it is no longer
needed for the passage of guns and army service wagons. There is
nothing temporary or makeshift about it. Rocks have been blasted to
leave a passage for it and solid bridges of stone and steel thrown
across rivers.
"Because the Austrians started with the weather gauge in their favor,
being on the upper side of the great ridges, it was necessary for the
Italians to get their guns as high as they could. The means by which
they accomplished this task was described to me. They would seem
incredible if one had not ocular demonstration of the actual presence
of the cannon among these inaccessible crags.
"There are some of them on the ice ledges of the Ortler nearly 10,000
feet above sea level, in places which it is by way of an achievement
for the amateur climber to reach with guides and ropes and porters,
and nothing to take care of but his own skin. But here the Alpini and
Frontier Guides had to bring up the heavy pieces, hauling them over
the snow slopes and swinging them in midair across chasms and up
knife-edged precipices, by ropes passed over timbers wedged somehow
into the rocks. I was shown a photograph of a party of these pioneers
working in these snowy solitudes last winter. They might have been a
group of Scott's or Shackleton's men toiling in the Antarctic
wilderness.
"By means of a suspension railway made of wire rope with sliding
baskets stretched across chasms of great depth, oil, meat, bread and
wine are sent up, for the soldier must not only be fed, but must be
fed with particular food to keep the blood circulating in his body in
the cold air and chilling breezes of the snow-clad peaks. Kerosene
stoves in great numbers have been sent aloft to make the life of the
mountaineer soldiers more comfortable."
On July 9, 1916, there was bitter fighting between the Brenta and the
Adige. Strong Alpine forces repeatedly attacked the Austrian lines
southeast of Cima Dieci, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Shells
set fire to Pedescala and other places in the upper Astico Valley. An
attempt by the Austrians to make attacks on Monte Seluggio was
checked promptly.
In the Adige Valley another intense artillery duel was staged on July
10, 1916. On the Pasubio front the Italians captured positions north
of Monte Corno, but the Austrians succeeded in obtaining partial
repossession of them by a violent counterattack. On the Asiago Plateau
Alpine detachments successfully renewed the attack on the Austrian
positions in the Monte Chiesa region.
The next day, July 11, 1916, the Italians again made some progress in
the Adige Valley, north of Serravalle and in the region of Malga
Zugna, and reoccupied partially some of the positions lost on the
northern slopes of Monte Pasubio on the previous day. Heavy artillery
duels took place in the Asiago Basin and on the Sette Comuni Plateau.
The Austrians promptly responded on July 12, 1916, by attacking in the
Adige Valley, after artillery preparation on an immense scale, the new
Italian positions north of Malga Zugna. They were driven back in
disorder, with heavy loss, by the prompt and effective concentration
of the Italian gunfire.
Fighting in the Adige Valley and on the Sette Comuni Plateau continued
without cessation during the next few days without yielding any very
definite results. In that period there also developed extremely severe
fighting at the head of the Posina Valley. During the night of July
13, 1916, the Italians succeeded in carrying very strong Austrian
positions south of Corno del Coston and east of the Borcola Pass,
notwithstanding the strong resistance of the Austrians and the
difficulty presented by the roughness of the ground. During the night
the Austrians launched several violent but unsuccessful counterattacks
in which they lost heavily.
In spite of violent thunderstorms, seriously interfering with
artillery activity, fighting continued in this sector on July 14 and
15, 1916. Italian troops made some progress on the southern slopes of
Sogli Bianchi, south of Borcola and the Corno di Coston and in the
Boin Valley, where they occupied Vanzi on the northern slopes of Monte
Hellugio.
Austrian reenforcements arrived at this time, and as a result a
series of heavy attacks was delivered in the upper Posina area in an
attempt to stop the Italian advance between Monte Santo and Monte
Toraro. Italian counterattacks, however, were launched promptly and
enabled the Italian forces to maintain and extend their lines.
Throughout the balance of July, 1916, the Italian troops succeeded in
continuing their advance, although the Austro-Hungarian resistance
showed no noticeable abatement and frequently was strong enough to
permit not only very effective defensive work, but rather considerable
counterattacks. However, all in all, the Italians had decidedly the
better of it. Step by step they pushed their way back into the
territory from which the Austro-Hungarian offensive of a few weeks ago
had driven them.
On July 18, 1916, the Italians gained some new positions on the rocky
slopes of the Corno del Coston in the upper Posina Valley. Four days
later, July 22, 1916, they captured some trenches on Monte Zebio on
the Sette Comuni Plateau. The next day, July 23, 1916, between Cismon
and Aviso they completed the occupation of the upper Trevignolo and
St. Pellegrino Valleys, taking the summit of Monte Stradone and new
positions on the slopes of Cima di Bocche.
On the Posina-Astico line at daybreak of July 24, 1916, after a fierce
attack by night, they captured Monte Cimone, for the possession of
which violent fighting had been in progress for days.
Further north, Alpine troops renewed their efforts against the steep
rock barrier rising to more than 2,000 yards between the peaks of
Monte Chiesa and Monte Campigoletto. Under heavy fire from the
Austrian machine guns they crossed three lines of wire and succeeded
in establishing themselves just below the crest.
Again and again the Austrians launched attacks against the Italian
positions on these various mountains without, however, accomplishing
more than retarding the further advance of General Cadorna's forces.
The second anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War, August 1, 1916,
found the Italians on the Trentino front still strongly on the
offensive and well on their way toward regaining all of the ground which
they had lost in June and July, 1916, before the Austro-Hungarian
offensive had been brought to a standstill, while the Austrians were
yielding only under the force of the greatest pressure which their
opponents could bring to bear on them.
CHAPTER XXXVII
MINOR OPERATIONS ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT IN TRENTINO OFFENSIVE
Just as soon as the Austro-Hungarian forces began to concentrate their
activities in the latter part of May, 1916, on their drive in the
Trentino, military operations in the other sectors of the
Austro-Italian front lost in importance and strength. During the
greatest part of both the Austro-Hungarian drive and the Italian
counteroffensive in the Trentino--May to July, 1916--operations along
the rest of the Austro-Italian fronts--on the northwestern frontier of
Tyrol, along the Boite River in the northeastern Dolomites, in the
Carnic and Julian Alps, and on the Isonzo front--were practically
restricted to artillery duels. Only occasional, and then but very
local infantry engagements took place, none of which had any
particular influence on general conditions in these various sectors.
However, as the Italian counteroffensive in the Trentino progressed,
there developed from time to time minor operations along the other
parts of the front. Quite a number of these were initiated by the
Austro-Hungarians, undoubtedly in the hopes that they might thereby
reduce the Italian pressure on their newly gained successes in the
Trentino. Others found their origin on the Italian side, which at all
times attempted to avail itself of every opportunity to extend and
strengthen its positions anywhere along the front. And as the Austrian
resistance against the Italian counteroffensive stiffened and showed
no signs of abatement, General Cadorna, in undertaking operations in
other sectors of the front than the Trentino, was undoubtedly
influenced by motives similar to those guiding his opponents. He,
too, hoped to impress his adversary sufficiently by minor operations
in sectors unconnected with the Trentino, to reduce their strength
there.
Considerable light is thrown upon the organization of the Italian
army, which made it possible to carry on successfully these
operations, in the following article from the pen of the special
correspondent of the London "Times":
"I have been allowed to visit the offices of the general staff at army
headquarters and those of the administrative services at another point
within the war zone. This is not a favorable moment for describing how
the army machinery works; but there is no harm done in saying that all
these services appear to run smoothly, have good men at their head,
and produce good results.
"I was particularly struck by the maps turned out. They do great
credit to the Military Geographical Institute at Florence, and to the
officers at headquarters who revise the maps as new information pours
in. All the frontiers have been well surveyed and mapped on scales of
1:25,000, 1:50,000, 1:100,000, and 1:200,000. These maps are very
clear and good. I like best the 1:100,000, which is issued to all
officers, and on which operation orders are based. The photographs are
also very fine, and the panoramas excellent, while the airmen's
photographs, and the plans compiled from them, are quite in the front
rank.
"The service of information at headquarters also appears to me to be
good. There are more constant changes in all the Italian staffs than
we should consider desirable, and officers pass very rapidly from one
employment to another, but in spite of this practice the information
is well kept up, and the knowledge of the enemy's dispositions is up
to standard, considering the extraordinary difficulty of following the
really quite chaotic organization of the Austro-Hungarian forces.
"I am not sure that I like very much the liaison system in Italy. The
comparatively young officers intrusted with it report direct to army
headquarters, and on their reports the communiqués are usually based.
These officers remind us of the _missi dominici_ of the great Moltke,
but on the whole I confess that the system does not appeal to me very
much.
"All the rearward services of the army are united under the control of
the intendant general, who is a big personage in Italy. He deals with
movements, quarterings, railways, supply, munitions in transit, and,
in fact, everything except drafts and aviation, both of which services
come under the general staff. There is a representative of the
intendant general in each army and army corps. An order of movement is
repeated to the intendant general by telephone and he arranges for
transport, food, and munitions.
"The means of transport include the railways, motor lorries, carts,
pack mules, and porters. The railways have done well. They had 5,000
locomotives and 160,000 carriages available when war broke out, and on
the two lines running through Venetia, they managed during the period
of concentration to clear 120 trains a day. Between last May 17 and
June 22, 1916, for the purposes of General Cadorna's operations in the
Trentino, the railways carried 18,000 officers, 522,000 men, about
70,000 animals, and 16,000 vehicles, with nearly 900 guns. These
figures have been given by the Italian press, so there is no harm done
by alluding to them. The railway material is much better than I
expected it to be, but coal is very dear.
"The motor lorries work well. There are three types in use--the heavy
commercial cars, the middleweight lorries, which carry over a couple
of tons, and the lightweights, taking about one and a half tons. These
lorries form an army service. Each army park has a group of lorries
for each army corps forming part of the army, and each group has two
sections for each division. The motor cars of the commanders and
staffs are good. I traveled several thousand miles in them, and having
covered 300 miles one day and 350 another, am prepared to give a good
mark to Italian motor-car manufacturers, and also to Italian roads and
Italian chauffeurs.
"I may also point out that the army has hitherto administered the
Austrian districts which have been occupied on various parts of the
front, and has had to deal with agriculture, roads, births, deaths,
marriages, police, and a great many other civil matters. As I had
once seen a French corps of cavalry farming nearly 5,000 acres of land
I was prepared to see the Italian army capable of following suit; but
I fancy that if Signor Bissolati is to take over all these civil
duties General Porro will be far from displeased.
"There is the little matter of the 4,000 ladies who remain at Cortina
d'Ampezzo while their men are away fighting in the Austrian ranks, and
there are such questions as those of the Aquileia treasures, which
have fortunately been preserved intact. I must confess that it is a
novelty and a pleasure to enter an enemy's territory and sit down in a
room marked _Militär Wachtzimmer_, with all the enemy's emblems on the
walls, but on the whole I liked best the advice _evitare di fumare
esplosioni_ painted by some Italian wag on an Austrian guardhouse, and
possibly intended as a hint to Austro-German diplomacy in the future.
"The Italians regard Austria as we regard Germany, and Germany as we
regard Austria. Austria is the enemy, but at the same time, while
every crime is attributed to Austria on slight suspicion, I find no
unworthy depreciation of Austrian soldiers. I am told that while
Austrian discipline is very severe, and the officer's revolver is ever
quick to maintain it, the Austrian private soldier has a sense of deep
loyalty toward his emperor, and that this is a personal devotion which
will not easily be transferred to a successor. In meeting the
Kaiserjäger so often the Italians perhaps see Austria's best, but the
fact remains that the Italian has a good word for the Austrian as a
soldier, and that I did not see many signs of such willful and
shameless vandalism by the Austrians as has disgraced the name of
Germany in Belgium and in France. Even towns which are or have been
between the contending armies have not, I think, been willfully
destroyed, but they have naturally suffered when one army or the other
has used the town as a pivot of defense.
"The officers who have to keep the tally of the Austrian forces and to
locate all the divisions have my deepest sympathy. Long ago the
Austrian army corps ceased to contain the old divisions of peace
times, but one now finds army corps with as many as four divisions,
while the division may be composed of anything from two to eight
battalions. A certain number of the divisions reckoned to be against
the Italians on the whole front are composed of dubious elements, and
there are some sixty Austrian battalions of rifle clubmen.
"The Austrians shift regiments about in such apparently haphazard
fashion that it is hard to keep track of them. They may take half a
dozen battalions from different regiments and call it a mountain
group. In a week or two they will break it up and distribute the
battalions elsewhere. They usually follow up their infantry with
so-called march battalions, but whether these battalions are 100 or
1,000 strong seems quite uncertain. Some surprise occurs elsewhere,
and away go some of the march battalions. They may lose prisoners,
say, on the Russian front, and the Russians naturally believe that the
regiment and the division to which the regiment belongs are all on the
Russian front, whereas only one weak battalion of drafts may be there
and all the rest may still be against the Italians. The Austrians also
take a number of regiments from a division and send them elsewhere,
leaving a mere skeleton of the divisional command behind.
"For these reasons one must regard with a good deal of scepticism any
estimate which professes to give an accurate distribution list of the
Austrian army. Also it is difficult to believe that any real _esprit
de corps_ can remain when such practices are common, and we are
reduced to the belief that the only real soldier of the army is the
personal devotion to the emperor of which I have already written.
"I could not find time to study the Italian air service, but foreign
officers with the army speak well of it. The Austrian airmen deserve
praise. They watched us daily and bombed with pleasing regularity.
"My view of the war on the Italian front is that Italy is in it with
her whole heart, and has both the will and the means to exercise
increasing pressure on Austria, whom she is subjecting to a serious
strain along 400 miles of difficult country. I think that few people
in England appreciate the special and serious difficulties which
confront both combatants along the Alpine borderland, and especially
Italy, because she has to attack. The Italian army is strong in
numbers, ably commanded, well provided, and animated by an excellent
spirit. As this army becomes more inured to war, and traditions of
victory on hard-fought fields become established, the military value
of the army is enhanced.
"As I think over the Italian exploits during the war, I remember that
the men of Alps, of Piedmont and Lombardy, of Venetia, and Tuscany, of
Rome, Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily have one and all contributed
something to the record, and have had the honor of distinguished
mention in General Cadorna's bulletins, which are austere in character
and make no concessions to personal or collective ambitions. I find
much to admire in the cool and confident bearing of the people, in the
endurance of great fatigues by the troops, and in the silent patience
of the wounded on the battle field. I fancy that the army is better in
the attack than in the defense, and I should trust most with an
Italian army to an attack pressed through to the end without halting."
The first indications of renewed activity, outside of artillery duels,
anywhere except in the Trentino, appeared during the last days of
June. On June 28, 1916, the Italians suddenly, after a comparative
quiet of several months, began what appeared to be a strong offensive
movement on the Isonzo front. They violently bombarded portions of the
front on the Doberdo Plateau (south of Goritz). In the evening heavy
batteries were brought to bear against Monte San Michele and the
region of San Martino. After the fire had been increased to great
intensity over the whole plateau, Italian infantry advanced to attack.
At Monte San Michele, near San Martino and east of Vermigliano,
violent fighting developed. At the Goritz bridgehead the Italians
attacked the southern portion of the Podgora position (on the right
bank of the Isonzo), and penetrated the first line trenches of the
Austrians, but were driven out.
The Italian offensive was continued the next day, June 29, 1916, and
resulted in the capture of Hills 70 and 104 in the Monfalcone
district. The Austrians undertook a counteroffensive at Monte San
Michele and Monte San Marino, on the Doberdo Plateau, attacking the
Italian lines under cover of gas. Fighting continued in the Monfalcone
sector of the Isonzo front for about a week, during which time the
Austrians vainly endeavored to regain the positions which they had
lost in the first onrush of the Italian offensive. After that it again
deteriorated into artillery activity which was fairly constantly
maintained throughout the balance of July, 1916, without producing any
noteworthy changes in the general situation.
Coincident with this short Italian offensive in the Monfalcone sector
of the Isonzo front, there also developed considerable fighting to the
east on the Carso Plateau, north of Trieste, which, however, was
equally barren of definite results.
Minor engagements between comparatively small infantry detachments
occurred in the adjoining sector--that of the Julian Alps--on July 1,
1916, especially in the valleys of the Fella, Gail and Seebach. These
were occasionally repeated, especially so on July 19, 1916, but
throughout most of the time only artillery duels took place.
In the Carnic Alps hardly anything of importance occurred throughout
the late spring and the entire summer of 1916, excepting fairly
continuous artillery bombardments, varying in strength and extent.
Considerable activity, however, was the rule rather than the exception
in the sector between the Carnic Alps and the Dolomites. There, one
point especially, saw considerable fighting. Monte Tofana, just beyond
the frontier on the Austrian side, had been held by the Italians for a
considerable period, and with it a small section of the surrounding
country, less than five miles in depth. The Italians at various times
attempted, with more or less success, to extend and strengthen their
holdings, while the Austrians, with equal determination, tried to
wrest from them what they had already gained, and to arrest their
further progress.
In this region Alpine detachments of the Italian army on the night of
July 8, 1916, gained possession of a great part of the valley between
Tofana Peaks Nos. 7 and 2, and of a strong position on Tofana Prima
commanding the valley. The Austrian garrison was surrounded and
compelled to surrender. The Italians took 190 prisoners, including
eight officers, and also three machine guns, a large number of rifles
and ammunition.
A few days later, on July 11, 1916, the Italians exploded a mine,
destroying the Austro-Hungarian defenses east of Col dei Bois peak.
This position commanded the road of the Dolomites and the explosion
blew it up entirely, and gave possession of it to the Italians. The
entire Austrian force which occupied the summit was buried in the
wreckage. On the following night the Austrians attempted to regain
this position which the Italians had fortified strongly in the
meantime, but the attack broke down completely.
Three days later, July 14, 1916, Italian Alpine detachments surprised
and drove the Austrians from their trenches near Castelletto and at
the entrance of the Travenanzes Valley. They took some prisoners,
including two officers, as well as two guns, two machine guns, one
trench mortar and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. An Austrian
counterattack against this position was launched on July 15, 1916, but
was repulsed.
Finally on July 30, 1916, the Italians registered one more success in
this region. Some of their Alpine troops carried Porcella Wood and
began an advance in the Travenanzes Valley.
Throughout this period considerable artillery activity was maintained
on both sides. As a result Cortina d'Ampezzo, on the Italian side,
suffered a great deal from Austrian shells, while Toblach, on the
Austrian, was the equally unfortunate recipient of Italian gunfire.
On the western frontier, between Italy and Austria, along Val
Camonica, only artillery bombardments were the order of the day. These
were particularly severe at various times in the region of the Tonale
Pass, but without important results.
Aeroplanes, of course, were employed extensively, both by the
Austro-Hungarians and the Italians, although the nature of the
country did not lend itself as much to this form of modern warfare as
in the other theaters of war. Some of these enterprises have already
been mentioned. The Austrians, in this respect, were at a decided
advantage, because their airships had many objects for attacks in the
various cities of the North Italian plain. Among these Bergamo,
Brescia, and Padua were the most frequent sufferers, while Italian
aeroplanes frequently bombarded Austrian lines of communication and
depots.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM
With the same surprising vigor with which the Russian armies in the
Caucasus had pushed their advance toward Erzerum, they took up the
pursuit of the retreating Turkish army, after this important Armenian
stronghold had capitulated on February 16, 1916. With Erzerum as a
center the Russian advance spread out rapidly in all directions toward
the west in the general direction of Erzingan and Sivas; in the south
toward Mush, Bitlis and the region around Lake Van, and in the north
with the important Black Sea port of Trebizond as the objective. This
meant a front of almost 300 miles without a single railroad and only a
limited number of roads that really deserved that appellation. Almost
all of this country is very mountainous. To push an advance in such
country at the most favorable season of the year involves the solution
of the most complicated military problems. The country itself offers
comparatively few opportunities for keeping even a moderate-sized army
sufficiently supplied with food and water for men and beasts. But
considering that the Russian advance was undertaken during the winter,
when extremely low temperatures prevail, and when vast quantities of
snow add to all the other natural difficulties in the way of an
advancing army, the Russian successes were little short of marvelous.
As early as February 23, 1916, the right wing of the Russian army had
reached and occupied the town of Ispir on the river Chorok, about
fifty miles northwest of Erzerum, and halfway between that city and
Rizeh, a town on the south shore of the Black Sea, less than fifty
miles east of Trebizond. At the same time Russian destroyers were
bombarding the Black Sea coast towns. Under their protective fire
fresh troops were landed a few days later at Atina on the Black Sea,
about sixty miles east of Trebizond, which promptly occupied that
town. From there they rapidly advanced southward toward Rizeh, forcing
the Turks to evacuate their positions and capturing some prisoners as
well as a few guns, together with rifles and ammunition.
The center, in the meantime, had advanced on the Erzerum-Trebizond
road, and by February 25, 1916, occupied the town of Ashkala, about
thirty miles from Erzerum. From all sides the Russian armies were
closing in on Trebizond, and their rapid success threw the Turkish
forces into consternation, for the loss of Trebizond would mean a
serious threat to their further safety, having been up to then the
principal point through which supplies and ammunition reached them
steadily and rapidly by way of the Black Sea. No wonder then that the
London "Times" correspondent in Petrograd was able to report on March
5, 1916, that all accounts agreed that the population of the Trebizond
region were panic-stricken and fleeing even then in the direction of
Kara-Hissar and Sivas, flight along the Black Sea route being out of
question on account of the presence of Russian warships.
In the south the left wing of the Russian army was equally successful.
On March 1, 1916, it occupied Mamawk, less than ten miles north of
Bitlis, a success foreshadowing the fall of that important Armenian
city. And, indeed, on the next day, March 2, 1916, Bitlis was occupied
by the Russians. This was indeed another severe blow to the Turkish
armies. Bitlis, 110 miles south of Erzerum, in Armenian Tamos, is one
of the most important trade centers, and commands a number of
important roads. It is only about fifty miles north of the upper
Tigris, and even though it is more than 350 miles from Bagdad, its
occupation by Russian forces seriously menaced the road to Bagdad,
Bagdad itself, and even the rear of the Turkish army, fighting
against the Anglo-Indian army in Mesopotamia.
Hardly had the Turks recovered from this blow when their left wing in
the north suffered another serious reverse through the loss of the
Black Sea port of Rizeh. This event took place on March 8, 1916, and
the capture was accomplished by the fresh Russian troops that had been
landed a few days before at Atina, from which Rizeh is only twenty-two
miles distant. Along the Black Sea coast the Russians were now within
thirty-eight miles of Trebizond. On and on the Russians pressed, and
by March 17, 1916, their advance guard was reported within twenty
miles of Trebizond. However, by this time Turkish resistance along the
entire Armenian front stiffened perceptibly. This undoubtedly was due
to reenforcements which must have reached the Turkish line by that
time. For on March 30, 1916, the official Russian statement announced
that seventy officers and 400 men who had been captured along the
Caucasus littoral front belonged to a Turkish regiment which had
previously fought at Gallipoli. At the same time it was also announced
that fighting had occurred northwest of Mush. The Turkish forces
involved in this fighting must have been recent reenforcements,
because Mush is sixty-five miles northwest of Bitlis, the occupation
of which took place about four weeks previously, at which time the
region between Erzerum and Bitlis undoubtedly had been cleared of
Turkish soldiers. Their reappearance, now so close to the road between
Bitlis and Erzerum, presented a serious menace both to the center and
to the left wing of Grand Duke Nicholas's forces, for if the Turkish
troops were in large enough force, the Russians were in danger of
having their center and left wing separated. This condition, of
course, meant that until this danger was removed, the closest
cooperation between the various parts of the Russian army became
essential, and therefore resulted in a general slowing down of the
Russian advance for the time being.
In the meantime the Russian center continued its advance against
Erzingan. This is an Armenian town of considerable military
importance, being the headquarters of the Fourth Turkish Army Corps.
On March 16, 1916, an engagement took place about sixty miles west of
Erzerum, resulting in the occupation by the Russians of the town of
Mama Khatun, located on the western Euphrates and on the
Erzerum-Erzingan-Sivas road. According to the official Russian
statement the Turks lost five cannon, some machine guns and supplies
and forty-four officers and 770 men by capture. Here, too, however,
the Turks began to offer a more determined resistance, and although
the official Russian statement of the next day, March 17, 1916,
reported a continuation of the Russian advance towards Erzingan, it
also mentioned Turkish attempts at making a stand and spoke even of
attempted counterattacks.
This stiffening of Turkish resistance necessitated apparently a change
in the Russian plans. No longer do we hear now of quick, straight,
advances from point to point. But the various objectives toward which
the Russians were directing their attacks--Trebizond, Erzingan, the
Tigris--are attacked either successfully or consecutively from all
possible directions and points of vantage. Not until now, for
instance, do we hear of further advances toward Erzingan from the
north. It will be recalled that as long ago as February 23, 1916, the
Russians occupied the town of Ispir, some fifty miles northwest of
Erzerum on the river Chorok.
The headwaters of this river are located less than twenty-five miles
northeast of Erzingan, and up its valley a new Russian offensive
against Erzingan was started as soon as the new strength of the
Turkish defensive along the direct route from Erzerum made itself
felt.
On April 1, 1916, and again on April 12, 1916, the Turks reported that
they had repulsed attacks of Russian scouting parties advancing along
the upper Chorok, and even claimed an advance for their own troops.
But on the next day, April 3, 1916, the Russians apparently were able
to turn the tables on their opponents, claiming to have crossed the
upper basin of the Chorok and to have seized strongly fortified
Turkish positions located at a height of 10,000 feet above sea level,
capturing thereby a company of Turks. Again on the following day,
April 4, 1916, the Russians succeeded in dislodging Turkish forces
from powerful mountain positions.
Concurrent with these engagements, fighting took place both in the
south and north. On April 2, 1916, a Turkish camp was stormed by
Russian battalions near Mush to the northwest of Bitlis. Still farther
south, about twenty-five miles southeast of Bitlis, the small town of
Khizan had fallen into the hands of the Russians, who drove its
defenders toward the south. The Russian advance to the southwest of
Mush and Bitlis continued slowly but definitely throughout the next
few days, with the town of Diarbekr on the right bank of the upper
Tigris as its objective.
Beginning with the end of March, 1916, the Turks also launched a
series of strong counterattacks along the coastal front. The first of
these was undertaken during the night of March 26, 1916, but
apparently was unsuccessful. It was an answer to a strong attack on
the part of the Russians during the preceding day which resulted in
the dislodgment of Turkish troops holding strong positions in the
region of the Baltatchi Darassi River and in the occupation by the
Russians of the town of Off on the Black Sea, thirty miles to the east
of Trebizond. This success was due chiefly to the superiority of the
Russian naval forces, which made it possible to precede their infantry
attack with heavy preparatory artillery fire. By March 27, 1916, the
Russians had advanced to the Oghene Dere River, another of the
numerous small rivers flowing into the Black Sea between Rizeh and
Trebizond. There they had occupied the heights of the left (west)
bank. During the night the Turks made a series of strong
counterattacks, all of which, however, were repulsed with considerable
losses to the attackers. Another Turkish counterattack in the
neighborhood of Trebizond was launched on April 4, 1916. Although
strongly supported by gunfire from the cruiser _Breslau_, it was
repulsed by the combined efforts of the Russian land forces and
destroyers lying before Trebizond. During the next few days the Turks
offered the most determined resistance to the Russian advance against
Trebizond, especially along the river Kara Dere. This resistance was
not broken until April 15, 1916, when the Turks were driven out of
their fortified positions on the left bank of that river by the
combined action of the Russian land and naval forces. The Russian army
was now, after almost a fortnight's desperate fighting, within sixteen
miles of its goal, Trebizond. On April 16, 1916, it again advanced,
occupying Surmench on the Black Sea, and reaching later that day,
after a successful pursuit of the retreating Turkish army, the village
of Asseue Kalessi, only twelve miles east of Trebizond.
With this defeat the fall of Trebizond apparently was sealed. Although
reports came from various sources that the Turkish General Staff was
making the most desperate efforts to save the city by dispatching new
reenforcements from central Anatolia, the Russian advance could not be
stopped seriously any longer. Every day brought reports of new Russian
successes along the entire Armenian front. On April 17, 1916, they
occupied Drona, only six and a half miles east of Trebizond. Then
finally, on April 18, 1916, came the announcement that Trebizond
itself had been taken.
Trebizond is less important as a fortified place than as a port and
harbor and as a source of supply for the Turkish army. It is in no
sense a fortress like Erzerum, though the defenses of the town,
recently constructed, are not to be despised. As a vital artery of
communications, however, its value is apparent from the fact, first,
that it is the Turks' chief port in this region, and secondly, that
railway facilities, which are so inadequate throughout Asia Minor, are
nonexistent along the northern coast. Hence the Turks will have to
rely for the transport of troops and supplies upon railways which at
the nearest point are more than 300 miles from the front at Trebizond.
Trebizond is an ancient seaport of great commercial importance, due
chiefly to the fact that it controls the point where the principal
trade route from Persia and central Asia to Europe, over Armenia and
by way of Bayezid and Erzerum, descends to the sea. It has been the
dream of Russia for centuries to put her hands forever upon this
important "window on the Black Sea."
Trebizond's population is about 40,000, of whom 22,000 are Moslems and
18,000 Christians. The city first figured in history during the
Fourth Crusade, when Alexius Comnenus, with an army of Iberian
mercenaries, entered it and established himself as sovereign. In 1461
Trebizond was taken by Mohammed II, after it had for two centuries
been the capital of an empire, having defied all attacks, principally
by virtue of its isolated position, between a barrier of rugged
mountains of from 7,000 to 8,000 feet and the sea.
As far as capturing important ports of the Turkish left wing was
concerned, the victory of Trebizond was an empty one. For the Turks
evacuated the town apparently a day or two before the Russians
occupied it. The latter, therefore, had only the capture of "some
6-inch guns" to report. This quick evacuation, at any rate, was
fortunate for the town and its inhabitants, for it saved them from a
bombardment and the town did not suffer at all as a result of the
military operations.
The campaign resulting in the fall of Trebizond did really not begin
until after the fall of Erzerum on February 16, 1916. Up to that time
the Russian Caucasian army had apparently been satisfied to maintain
strong defensive positions along the Turkish border. But since the
occupation of Erzerum a definite plan of a well-developed offensive
was followed looking toward the acquisition of Turkish territory which
had long been coveted by Russia.
With the fall of Trebizond Russia became the possessor, at least
temporarily, of a strip of territory approximately 125 miles wide
along a front of almost 250 miles length, or of an area of 31,250
square miles. In the north this valuable acquisition was bounded by
that part of the south shore of the Black Sea that stretches from
Batum in Russian Transcaucasia to Trebizond. In the south it
practically reached the Turko-Persian frontier, while in the west it
almost reached the rough line formed by the upper Euphrates and the
upper Tigris. It thus comprised the larger part of Armenia. As soon as
the Russians had found out that the Turks had a start of almost two
days, they began an energetic pursuit. The very first day of it, April
19, 1916, brought them into contact with Turkish rear guards and
resulted in the capture of a considerable number of them. The retreat
of the Turks took a southwesterly direction toward Baiburt along the
Trebizond-Erzerum road and toward Erzingan, to which a road branches
off the Trebizond-Erzerum road. Baiburt was held by the Turks with a
force strong enough to make it impossible for the Russians to cut off
the Trebizond garrison. Along the coast the Russians found only
comparatively weak resistance, so that they were able to land fresh
forces west of Trebizond and occupy the town of Peatana, about ten
miles to the west on the Black Sea.
A desperate struggle, however, developed for the possession of the
Trebizond-Erzerum road. The Russians had been astride this road for
some time as far as Madan Khan and Kop, both about fifty miles
northwest of Erzerum and just this side of Baiburt. There the Turks
put up a determined resistance and succeeded in holding up the Russian
advance. Although they were not equally successful farther north, the
Russians managed to advance along this road to the south of Trebizond
only as far as Jeyizlik--about sixteen miles south of Trebizond--where
they were forced into the mountains toward the Kara Dere River. This
left still the larger part of the entire road in possession of the
Turks, and especially that part from which another road branched off
to Erzingan.
In the Mush and Bitlis region the Russians had made satisfactory
progress in the meantime. On April 19, 1916, progress was reported to
the south of Bitlis toward Sert, although the Turks fought hard to
hold up this advance toward Diarbekr. This advance was the direct
result of the defeat which the Russians had inflicted on a Turkish
division at Bitlis as early as April 15, 1916. By April 23, 1916, the
Turks had again gathered some strength and were able to report that
they had repulsed Russian attacks south of Bitlis, west of Mush, east
of Baiburt, and south of Trebizond. From then on, however, the
Russians again advanced to the south of Bitlis as well as in the
direction of Erzingan. By the beginning of May, 1916, the Russian
official statements do not speak any longer of the "region south of
Bitlis," but mention instead "the front toward Diarbekr." This
important town is about 100 miles southwest of Bitlis, and apparently
had become, after the fall of Trebizond, together with Erzingan, one
of the immediate objectives of the Russian campaign.
Diarbekr is a town of 35,000 inhabitants, whose importance arises from
its being the meeting point of the roads from the Mediterranean via
Aleppo and Damascus from the Black Sea via Amasia-Kharput, and Erzerum
and from the Persian Gulf via Bagdad. Ras-el-Ain, the present railhead
of the Bagdad railway, is seventy miles south.
The stiffening of the Turkish defensive was being maintained as April,
1916, waned and May approached. The Russian campaign in the Caucasus
had resolved itself now into three distinctive parts: In the north its
chief objective, Trebizond, had been reached and gained. There further
progress, of course, would be attempted along the shore of the Black
Sea, and in a way it was easier to achieve progress here than at any
other part of the Caucasian front. For first of all the nature of the
ground along the coast of the Black Sea was much less difficult, and
then, too, the Russian naval forces could supply valuable assistance.
That progress was not made faster here by the Russians was due
entirely to the fact that the advance along the two other sectors was
more difficult and the Turkish resistance more desperate. And, of
course, if the front of any one sector was pushed considerably ahead
of the front of the other two, grave danger immediately arose that the
most advanced sector would be cut off from the rest of the Russian
armies by flank movements. For in a country such as Turkish Armenia,
without railroads and with only a few roads, it was of course
impossible to establish a continuous front line, such as was to be
formed on the European battle fields both in the east and west. This
explains why by May 1, 1916, the Russian front had been pushed less
than twenty-five miles west of Trebizond, even though almost two weeks
had elapsed since the fall of Trebizond.
In the center sector the immediate objective of the Russians was
Erzingan. Beyond that they undoubtedly hoped to advance to Swas, an
important Turkish base. Toward this objective two distinct lines of
offensive had developed by now--one along the valley of the river
Oborok and the other along the Erzerum-Erzingan road and the valley of
the western Euphrates. The latter was somewhat more successful than
the former, chiefly because it did not offer so many natural means of
defense. But to both of these offensives the Turks now offered a most
determined resistance, and the Russians, though making progress
continuously, did so only very slowly.
In the southern sector conditions were very similar. Here, too, two
separate offensives had developed, although they were more closely
correlated than in the center. One was directed in a southwestern
direction from Mush, and the other in the same direction from Bitlis.
Both had as their objective Diarbekr, an important trading center on
the Tigris and a future station on the unfinished part of the Bagdad
railroad. Here, too, Russian progress was fairly continuous but very
slow.
Some interesting details regarding the tremendous difficulties which
nature put in the way of any advancing army, and which were utilized
by the Turks to their fullest possibility, may be gleaned from the
following extracts from letters written by Russian officers serving at
the Caucasian front:
"We have traveled sixty miles in two days, and never have we been out
of sight of the place from whence we started. South and north we have
scouted until we have come into touch with the cavalry of the
---- Corps of the vedettes which the Cossacks of the Don furnished for
the ---- Brigade. Sometimes it is wholly impossible to ride. The
slopes of these hills are covered with huge bowlders, behind any of
which half a company of the enemy might be lurking. That has been our
experience, and poor K---- was shot dead while leading his squadron
across a quite innocent-looking plateau from which we thought the
enemy had been driven.
"As it turned out, a long line of bowlders, which he thought were too
small to hide anything but a sniper, in reality marked a rough trench
line which a Kurdish regiment was holding in strength, K---- was shot
down, as also was his lieutenant, and half the squadron were left on
the ground. Fortunately, at the foot of the road leading down to the
plateau, the sergeant who led the men out of action found one of our
Caucasian regiments who are used to dealing with the fezzes, and they
came up at the double, and after two hours' fighting were reenforced
by another two companies and carried the trench.
"Farther back we found the enemy in a stronger plateau. Almost within
sight of the enemy we made tea and rested before attempting to push
forward to the fight.
"An officer of the staff who does not understand the Caucasian way
reproved the colonel for delaying, but he took a very philosophical
view, and pointed out that it was extremely doubtful whether he even
now had men enough to carry the enormous position, and that he
certainly could not do so with exhausted troops. So we had the
extraordinary spectacle of our men lying down flat, blowing their
fires and drinking their tea and laughing and joking as though they
were at a picnic, but when they had finished and had formed up they
made short work of the fellows in the trench. But think of what would
have happened if we had left this plateau unsearched!"
"On the Baiburt road," writes another Russian officer, "there was one
small pass which had been roughly reconnoitered, and through this we
were moving some of the heavy guns, not imagining that there were any
Turks within ten miles, when a heavy fire was opened from a fir wood a
thousand feet above us. The limbers of the guns were a long way in the
rear, and there was no way of shelling this enemy from his aerie.
There was nothing to do but for the battalion which was acting as
escort to the guns to move up the slope under a terrific machine-gun
and rifle fire and investigate the strength of the attack. The guns
were left on the road, and mules and horses were taken to whatever
cover could be found, and an urgent message was sent back to the
effect that the convoy was held up, but the majority of the infantry
had already passed the danger point. Two mountain batteries were
commandeered, however, and these came into action, firing incendiary
shells into the wood, which was soon blazing at several points.
"The battle which then began between the Turks who had been ejected
from the wood and the gun escort lasted for the greater part of the
afternoon. It was not until sunset that two of our batteries, which
had been brought back from the front for the purpose, opened fire upon
the Turks' position, and the ambushers were compelled to capitulate.
The progress on the left was even more difficult than that which we
experienced in the northern sector. The roads were indescribable.
Where they mounted and crossed the intervening ridges they were almost
impassable, whilst in the valleys the gun carriages sank up to their
axles in liquid mud."
From still another source we hear:
"In the Van sector a Russian brigade was held up by a forest fire,
started by the Turks, which made all progress impossible. For days a
brigade had to sit idle until the fire had burned itself out, and even
when they moved forward it was necessary to cover all the munition
wagons with wet blankets, and the ashes through which the stolid
Russians marched were so hot as to burn away the soles of their boots.
"A curious discovery which was made in this extraordinary march was
the remains of a Turkish company which had evidently been caught in
the fire they had started and had been unable to escape."
On May 1, 1916, Russian Cossacks were able to drive back Turkish
troops, making a stand somewhere west of Erzerum and east of Erzingan.
Other detachments of the same service of the Russian army were equally
successful on May 2, 1916, in driving back toward Diarbekr resisting
Turkish forces west of Mush and Bitlis, and a similar achievement was
officially reported on May 3, 1916. On the same date Russian regiments
made a successful night attack in the upper Chorok basin which netted
some important Turkish positions, which were immediately strongly
fortified. May 4, 1916, brought a counterattack on the part of Turkish
forces in the Chorok sector at the town of Baiburt, which, however,
was repulsed. On the same day the Russians stormed Turkish trenches
along the Erzerum-Erzingan road, during which engagement most savage
bayonet fighting developed, ending in success for the Russian armies.
Turkish attacks west of Bitlis were likewise repulsed. On May 5, 1916,
the Turks attempted to regain the trenches in the Erzingan sector
lost the day before, but although their attack was supported by
artillery, it was not successful.
The Russian official statement of May 7, 1916, gives some data
concerning the booty which the Russians captured at Trebizond. It
consisted of eight mounted coast defense guns, fourteen 6-inch guns,
one field gun, more than 100 rifles, fifty-three ammunition wagons,
supply trains and other war material. This, taken in connection with
the fact that practically the entire Turkish garrison escaped,
confirms the view expressed previously that the capture of Trebizond
was of great importance to the Russians, not so much on account of
what they themselves gained thereby, but on account of what the Turks
lost by being deprived of their principal harbor on the Black Sea,
comparatively close to the Caucasian theater of war.
The Turkish artillery attack of May 5, 1916, in the Erzingan sector
was duplicated on May 7, 1916, but this time the Russians used their
guns, and apparently with telling effect. For so devastating was the
Russian fire directed toward the newly established Turkish trenches
that the Turks had to evacuate their entire first line and retire to
their second line of defensive works. Throughout the entire day on May
8, 1916, the Turks doggedly attacked the Russian positions. Losses on
both sides were heavy, especially so on the Turkish side, which hurled
attack after attack against the Russian positions, not desisting until
nightfall. Though no positive gain was made thereby, the Russians at
least were prevented from further advances. The same day, May 8, 1916,
yielded another success for the Russians in the southern sector, south
of Mush. There, between that town and Bitlis, stretches one of the
numerous mountain ranges, with which this region abounds. On it the
Turks held naturally strong positions which had been still more
strengthened by means of artificial defense works. A concentrated
Russian attack, prepared and supported by artillery fire, drove the
Turks not only from these positions, but out of the mountain range.
On May 9, 1916, engagements took place along the entire front. In the
center fighting occurred near Mount Koph, in the Chorok basin
southeast of Baiburt, and the Turks made some 300 prisoners. Farther
south a Turkish attack near Mama Khatun was stopped by Russian fire.
In the south another Turkish attack in the neighborhood of Kirvaz,
about twenty-five miles northwest of Mush, forced back a Russian
detachment after capturing some fifty men. All this time the Russians
were industriously building fortifications along the Black Sea coast
both east and west of Trebizond. During the night of May 9, 1916, the
Turks made a successful surprise attack against a Russian camp near
Baschkjoej, about thirty-five miles southeast of Mama Khatun. There a
Russian detachment consisting of about 500 men, of which one-half was
cavalry and one-half infantry, found themselves suddenly surrounded by
the bayonets of a superior Turkish force. All, except a small number
who managed to escape, were cut to pieces.
As the Russians succeeded in pushing their advance westward, even if
only very slowly, they became again somewhat more active in the north
along the Black Sea. On May 10, 1916, they were reported advancing
both south and southwest of Platana, a small seaport about twelve
miles west of Trebizond. Throughout May 11, 1916, engagements of
lesser importance took place at various parts of the entire front.
During that night the Turks launched another strong night attack in
the Erzingan sector, without, however, being able to register any
marked success. The same was true of an attack made May 12, 1916, near
Mama Khatun. In the south, between Mush and Bitlis, an engagement
which was begun on May 10, 1916, concluded with the loss of one
Turkish gun, 2,000 rifles and considerable stores of ammunition. In
the Chorok sector the Turks succeeded on May 13, 1916, in driving the
Russian troops out of their positions on Mount Koph and in forcing
them back in an easterly direction for a distance of from four to five
miles. There, however, the Russians succeeded in making a stand,
though their attempt to regain their positions failed. May 14, 1916,
was comparatively uneventful. Some Russian reconnoitering parties
clashed with Turkish advance guards near Mama Khatun, and a small
force of Kurds was repulsed west of Bitlis. On May 16, 1916, the
Russians announced officially that they had occupied Mama Khatun, a
small town on the western Euphrates, about fifty miles west of Erzerum
and approximately the same distance from Erzingan. Throughout the
balance of May, 1916, fighting along the Caucasian front was
restricted almost entirely to clashes between outposts, which in some
instances brought slight local successes to the Russian arms, and at
other times yielded equally unimportant gains for the Turkish sides.
To a certain extent this slowing down undoubtedly was due to the
determined resistance on the part of the Turks. It is also quite
likely that part of the Russian forces in the north had been diverted
earlier in the month to the south in order to assist in the drive
against Bagdad and Moone, which was pushed with increased vigor just
previous to and right after the capitulation of the Anglo-Indian
forces at Kut-el-Amara in Mesopotamia.
PART VII--CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA AND PERSIA
CHAPTER XXXIX
RENEWED ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KUT-EL-AMARA
As far as the Turko-English struggle in the Tigris Valley is
concerned, the preceding volume carried us to the beginning of March,
1916. On March 8, 1916, an official English communiqué was published
which raised high hopes among the Allied nations that the day of
delivery for General Townshend's force was rapidly approaching. That
day was the ninety-first day of the memorable siege of Kut-el-Amara.
On it the English relief force under General Aylmer had reached the
second Turkish line at Es-Sinn, only eight miles from Kut-el-Amara.
After an all night march the English forces, approaching in three
columns against the Dujailar Redoubt, attacked immediately after
daybreak. Both flanks of the Turkish line were subjected to heavy
artillery fire. But, although this resulted quickly in a wild stampede
of horses, camels and other transport animals and also inflicted heavy
losses in the ranks of the Turkish reenforcements, which immediately
came up in close order across the open ground in back of the Turkish
position, the English troops could not make any decisive impression on
the strongly fortified position. Throughout the entire day, March 8,
1916, the attacks were kept up, but the superior Turkish forces and
the strong fortifications that had been thrown up would not yield.
Lack of water--all of which had to be brought up from the main
camp--made it impossible for the English troops to maintain these
attacks beyond the end of that day. In spite of the fact that they
could see the flash of the guns of their besieged compatriots who were
attacking the rear of the Turkish line from Kut, they were forced to
give up their attempt to raise the siege. During the night of March 8,
1916, they returned to the main camp, which was located about
twenty-three miles from Kut-el-Amara.
The unusual conditions and the immense difficulties which confronted
the English relief force may be more easily understood from the
following very graphic description of this undertaking rendered by the
official representative of the British press with the Tigris Corps:
"The assembly was at the Pools of Siloam, a spot where we used to
water our horses, two miles southwest of Thorny Nullah. We left camp
at seven, just as it was getting dark. We had gone a mile when we saw
the lamps of the assembly posts--thousands of men were to meet here
from different points, horse, foot, and guns. They would proceed in
three columns to a point south of west, where they would bifurcate and
take a new direction, Columns A and B making for the depression south
of the Dujailar Redoubt, Column C for a point facing the Turkish lines
between the Dujailar and Sinn Aftar Redoubts. There was never such a
night march. Somebody quoted Tel-el-Kebir as a precedent, but the
difficulties here were doubled. The assembly and guidance of so large
a force over ground untrodden by us previously, and featureless save
for a nullah and some scattered sand hills, demanded something like
genius in discipline and organization.
"I was with the sapper who guided the column. Our odd little party
reported themselves to the staff officer under the red lamp of Column
A. 'Who are you?' he asked, and it tickled my vanity to think that we,
the scouts, were for a moment the most vital organ of the whole
machine. If anything miscarried with us, it would mean confusion,
perhaps disaster. For in making a flank march round the enemy's
position we were disregarding, with justifiable confidence, the first
axiom of war.
"We were an odd group. There was the sapper guide. He had his steps to
count and his compass to look to when his eye was not on a bearing of
the stars. And there was the guard of the guide to protect him from
the--suggestions of doubts as to the correctness of his line.
Everything must depend on one head, and any interruption might throw
him off his course. As we were starting I heard a digression under the
lamp.
"'I make it half past five from Sirius.'
"'I make it two fingers left of that.'
"'Oh, you are going by the corps map.'
"'Two hundred and six degrees true.'
"'I was going by magnetic bearing.'
"Ominous warning of what might happen if too many guides directed the
march.
"Then there was the man with the bicycle. We had no cyclometer, but
two men checked the revolution of the wheel. And there were other
counters of steps, of whom I was one, for counting and comparison.
From these an aggregate distance was struck. But it was not until we
were well on the march that I noticed the man with the pace stick, who
staggered and reeled like an inebriated crab in his efforts to
extricate his biped from the unevennesses of the ground before he was
trampled down by the column. I watched him with a curious fascination,
and as I grew sleepier and sleepier that part of my consciousness
which was not counting steps, recognized him as a cripple who had come
out to Mesopotamia in this special rôle 'to do his bit.' His humped
back, protruding under his mackintosh as he labored forward, bent into
a hoop, must have suggested the idea which was accepted as fact until
I pulled myself together at the next halt and heard the mechanical and
unimaginative half of me repeat 'Four thousand, seven hundred, and
twenty-one.' The man raised himself into erectness with a groan, and a
crippled greengrocer whom I had known in my youth, to me the basic
type of hunchback--became an upstanding British private.
"Walking thus in the dark with the wind in one's face at a kind of
funeral goose step it is very easy to fall asleep. The odds were that
we should blunder into some Turkish picket or patrol. Looking back it
was hard to realize that the inky masses behind, like a column of
following smoke, was an army on the march. The stillness was so
profound one heard nothing save the howl of the jackal, the cry of
fighting geese, and the ungreased wheel of an ammunition limber, or
the click of a picketing peg against a stirrup.
"The instinct to smoke was almost irresistible. A dozen times one's
hands felt for one's pipe, but not a match was struck in all that army
of thousands of men. Sometimes one feels that one is moving in a
circle. One could swear to lights on the horizon, gesticulating
figures on a bank.
"Suddenly we came upon Turkish trenches. They were empty, an abandoned
outpost. The column halted, made a circuit. I felt that we were
involved in an inextricable coil, a knot that could not be unraveled
till dawn. We were passing each other, going different ways, and
nobody knew who was who. But we swung into direct line without a
hitch. It was a miracle of discipline and leadership.
"At the next long halt, the point of bifurcation, the counter of steps
was relieved. An hour after the sapper spoke. The strain was ended. We
had struck the sand hills of the Dujailar depression. Then we saw the
flash of Townshend's guns at Kut, a comforting assurance of the
directness of our line. That the surprise of the Turk was complete was
shown by the fires in the Arab encampments, between which we passed
silently in the false dawn. A mile or two to our north and west the
campfires of the Turks were already glowing.
"Flank guards were sent out. They passed among the Arab tents without
a shot being fired. Soon the growing light disclosed our formidable
numbers. Ahead of us there was a camp in the nullah itself. An old man
just in the act of gathering fuel walked straight into us. He threw
himself on his knees at my feet and lifted his hands with a biblical
gesture of supplication crying out, 'Ar-rab, Ar-rab,' an effective,
though probably unmerited, shibboleth. As he knelt his women at the
other end of the camp were driving off the village flock. Here I
remembered that I was alone with the guide of a column in an event
which ought to have been as historic as the relief of Khartum."
After this unsuccessful attempt at relief comparative quiet reigned
for about a week, interrupted only by occasional encounters between
small detachments. On March 11, 1916, English outposts had advanced
again about seven miles toward Kut-el-Amara to the neighborhood of Abn
Roman, among the sand hills on the right bank of the Tigris. There
they surprised at dawn a small Turkish force and made some fifty
prisoners, including two officers. Throughout the next two or three
days intermittent gunfire and sniping were the only signs of the
continuation of the struggle. On March 15, 1916, two Turkish guns were
put out of action and during that night the Turks evacuated the sand
hills on the right bank of the river, which were promptly occupied by
English troops in the early morning hours of March 16, 1916.
During the balance of March, 1916, conditions remained practically
unchanged. The siege of General Townshend's force was continued by the
Turks along the same lines to which they had adhered from its
beginning--a process of starving their opponents gradually into
surrender. No attempt was made by them to force the issue, except that
on March 23, 1916, the English general reported that his camp at
Kut-el-Amara had been subjected to intermittent bombardment by Turkish
airships and guns during March 21, 22, and 23, 1916. No serious
damage, however, was inflicted.
As spring advanced the difficulties of the English forces attempting
the relief of General Townshend increased, for with the coming of
spring, there also came about the middle of March--the season of
floods. Up in the Armenian highlands, whence the Tigris springs, vast
quantities of snow then begin to melt. Throughout March, April, and
May, 1916, a greatly increased volume of water finds the regular
shallow bed of the Tigris woefully insufficient for its needs. The
entire lack of jetties and artificial embankments results in the
submersion of vast stretches of land adjacent to the river. Military
operations along its banks then become quite impossible, although in
many places this impossibility exists throughout the entire year,
because the land on both sides of the river for miles and miles has
been permitted to deteriorate into bottomless swamps, through which
even the ingenuity of highly trained engineering troops finds it
impossible to construct a roadway within the available space of time.
These natural difficulties were still more increased by the fact that
the equipment of the relief force was not all that might have been
expected. This is well illustrated by the following letter from a
South African officer, published in the "Cape Times:"
"The river Tigris plays the deuce with the surrounding country when it
gets above itself, from melting snows coming down from the Caucasus,
when it frequently tires of its own course and tries another. The
river is the only drinking water, and you can imagine the state of it
when Orientals have anything to do with it. A sign of its fruity state
is the fact that sharks abound right up to Kurna.
"We have all kinds of craft up here, improvised for use higher up. His
Majesty's ship _Clio_, a sloop, was marked down in 1914 to be
destroyed as obsolete, but she, with her sister ships, _Odin_ and
_Espiegle_, have done great work in the battles to date. Now that we
have got as far as Amara and Nassariyeh, the vessels that give the
greatest assistance are steam launches with guns on them,
flat-bottomed Irrawaddy paddle steamers. For troops we have 'nakelas'
a local sailing vessel, and have 'bellums,' a long, narrow, small
cone-shaped thing, holding from fifteen to twenty men; barges for
animals, etc. Rafts have been used higher up to mount guns on. Here we
have also motor boats.
"The difficulties as we advance are increased to a certain extent,
though country and climate are improving. Our lines of communication
will lengthen out, and we shall have to look out for Arab tribes
raiding. Our aerial service is increasing; we have now a Royal Navy
flight section, which has hydroplanes as well."
In spite of these handicaps, however, General Lake, in command of the
English relief force, reported on April 5, 1916, that a successful
advance was in progress and that the Tigris Corps at five o'clock in
the morning of that day had made an attack against the Turkish
position at Umm-el-Hannah, and had carried the Turkish intrenchments.
Umm-el-Hannah is at a much greater distance from Kut-el-Amara than
Es-Sinn which was reached on March 8, 1916, but from where the relief
force had to withdraw again that same night to a position only a short
distance beyond Umm-el-Hannah. However, it is located on the left bank
of the Tigris, the same as Kut-el-Amara, and the success of taking
this position, small as it was, promised therefore, once more an early
relief of General Townshend.
This successful attack against Umm-el-Hannah on April 5, 1916, was
carried out by the Thirteenth Division, which had previously fought at
the Dardanelles. It now stood under the command of Lieutenant General
Sir G. Gorringe who had succeeded to General Aylmer. The most careful
preparations had been made for it. For many weeks British engineering
troops had pushed forward a complicated series of sap works, covering
some sixteen miles and allowing the British forces to approach to
within 100 yards of the Turkish intrenchments. With the break of dawn
on April 5, 1916, bombing parties were sent forward, whose cheers soon
announced the fact that they had invaded the first line of Turkish
trenches. Already on the previous day the way had been cleared for
them by their artillery, which by means of incessant fire had
destroyed the elaborate wire entanglements which the Turks had
constructed in front of their trenches.
The storming of the first line of trenches was followed quickly by an
equally successful attack on the second line. By 6 a. m., one hour
after the beginning of the attack, the third line had been carried
with the assistance of concentrated machine-gun and artillery fire.
Within another hour the same troops had stormed and occupied the
fourth and fifth lines of the Turks. The latter thereupon were forced
to fall back upon their next line of defensive works at Felahieh and
Sanna-i-Yat, about four and six miles respectively farther up the
river. Reenforcements were quickly brought up from the Turkish main
position at Es-Sinn, some farther ten miles up, and with feverish
haste the intrenchments were made stronger. General Gorringe's
aeroplane scouts promptly observed and reported these operations, and
inasmuch as the ground between these new positions and the positions
which had just been gained by the British troops is absolutely flat
and offers no means of cover whatsoever, the British advance was
stopped for the time being.
In the meantime the Third British Division under General Keary had
advanced along the right bank of the river and had carried Turkish
trenches immediately in front of the Felahieh position. In the
afternoon of April 5, 1916, the Turks tried to regain these trenches
by means of a strong counterattack with infantry, cavalry and
artillery, but were unable to dislodge the British forces.
With nightfall General Gorringe again returned to the attack along the
left bank and stormed the Felahieh position. Here, too, the Turks had
constructed a series of successive deep trenches, some of which were
taken by the British battalions only at the point of the bayonet. This
attack as well as all the previous attacks were, by the nature of the
ground over which they had to be fought, frontal attacks. For all the
Turkish positions rested on one side of the river and on the other on
the Suwatcha swamps, excluding, therefore, any flank attack on the
part of the British forces.
Again General Gorringe halted his advance, influenced undoubtedly by
the open ground and increasing difficulties caused by stormy weather
and floods. April 6, 7, and 8, 1916, were devoted by the British
forces to the closest possible reconnoissance of the Sanna-i-Yat
position and to the necessary preparatory measures for its attack,
while the Turks energetically strengthened this position by means of
new intrenchments and additional reenforcements from their position at
Es-Sinn.
With the break of dawn on April 19, 1916, General Gorringe again
attacked the Turkish lines at Sanna-i-Yat. The attack was preceded by
heavy artillery fire lasting more than an hour. In the beginning the
British troops entered some of the Turkish trenches, but were driven
back at the point of the bayonet. After this stood success. Again the
floods came to the assistance of the Turkish troops. Increasing, as
they were, day by day, they covered more and more of the ground
adjoining the river bed and thereby narrowed the front, on which an
attack could be delivered, so much so that most of its force was bound
to be lost. According to Turkish reports the British lost over 3,000
in dead. Although the British commanding general stated that his
losses were much below this number, they must have been very heavy,
from the very nature of the ground and climatic conditions, and much
heavier, indeed, than those of the Turks which officially were stated
to have been only seventy-nine killed, 168 wounded and nine missing.
After this unsuccessful attempt to advance further a lull ensued for a
few days. On April 12, 1916, however, the Third Division again began
to attack on the right bank of the Tigris and pushed back the Turks
over a distance varying from one and one-half to three miles. At the
same time a heavy gale inundated some of the advanced Turkish trenches
on the left bank at Sanna-i-Yat with the waters from the Suwatcha
marshes. This necessitated a hurried withdrawal to new positions,
which British guns made very costly for the Turks. A heavy gale made
further operations impossible for either side on April 13 and 14,
1916. On the following day, April 15, 1916, the Third Division again
advanced a short distance on the right bank, occupying some of the
advanced Turkish trenches. Further trenches were captured on April 16
and 17, 1916, at which time the Turks lost between 200 and 300 in
killed, 180 by capture as well as two field and five machine guns,
whereas the English losses were stated to have been much smaller. This
was due to the fact that for once the English forces had been able to
place their guns so that their infantry was enabled to advance under
their protection up to the very trenches of the Turks, which, at the
same time, were raked by the gunfire and fell comparatively easily
into the hands of the attackers. The latter immediately pressed their
advantage and succeeded in advancing some hundred yards beyond the
position previously held by the Turks near Beit Eissa. Here, as well
as during the fighting of the few preceding days, the British troops
were frequently forced to advance wading in water up to their waist,
after having spent the night before in camps which had no more solid
foundation than mud. They were now within four miles of the Turkish
position at Es-Sinn, which in turn was less than ten miles from
Kut-el-Amara. However, this position had been made extremely strong by
the Turks and extended much further to the north and south of the
Tigris than any of the positions captured so far by the British relief
force.
In spite of this the Turks recognized the necessity of defending the
intermediate territory to the best of their ability. After the British
success at Beit Eissa in the early morning of April 17, 1916, they
again brought up strong reenforcements from Es-Sinn, and at once
launched two strong counterattacks, both of which, however, were
repulsed by the British.
During the night of April 17 and 18, 1916, the Turks again made a
series of counterattacks in force on the right bank of the Tigris, and
this time they succeeded in pushing back the British lines between 500
and 800 yards. According to English reports, about 10,000 men were
involved on the Turkish side among whom there were claimed to be some
Germans. The same source estimates Turkish losses in dead alone to
have been more than 3,000, and considerably in excess of the total
British losses. On the other hand the official Turkish report places
the latter as above 4,000, and also claims the capture of fourteen
machine guns. Storms set in again on April 18 and 19, 1916, and
prevented further operations.
Beginning with April 20, 1916, the relief force prepared for another
attack of the Sanna-i-Yat position on the left bank of the Tigris, by
a systematic bombardment of it, lasting most of that night, the
following night, April 21, 1916, and the early morning of April 22,
1916. On that day another attack was launched. Again the flooded
condition of the country fatally handicapped the British troops. To
begin with, there was only enough dry ground available for one brigade
to attack, and that on a very much contracted front against superior
forces. To judge from the official British report, the leading
formations of this brigade gallantly overcame the severe obstacles in
their way in the form of logs and trenches full of water. But,
although they succeeded in penetrating the Turkish first and second
lines, and in some instances even in reaching the third lines, their
valor brought no lasting success, because it was impossible for
reenforcements to come up quickly enough in the face of the determined
Turkish resistance strongly supported by machine-gun fire. According
to the Turkish reports, the British lost very heavily without being
able to show any gain at the end of the day. The same condition
obtained on the right bank of the Tigris. In spite of this failure the
bombardment of the Sanna-i-Yat position was kept up by the British
artillery throughout April 23, 1916. On the next day, April 24, 1916,
the British troops again registered a small success by being able to
extend their line at Beit Eissa, on the right Tigris bank--in the
direction of the Umm-el-Brahm swamps. On the left bank, however, the
line facing the Sanna-i-Yat position remained in its original
location.
All this time General Townshend was able to communicate freely by
means of wireless with the relief forces. As the weeks rolled by it
became evident that his position was becoming rapidly untenable on
account of the unavoidable decrease of all supplies. Having had his
lines of communication cut off ever since December 3, 1915, it was now
almost five months since he had been forced to support the lives of
some 10,000 men from the meager supplies which they had with them at
the time of their hurried retreat from Ctesiphon to Kut-el-Amara,
which were only slightly increased by whatever stores had been found
at the latter place. So complete was the circle which the Turks had
thrown around Kut that not a pound of food had come through to the
besieged garrison. It was well known that the latter had been forced
for weeks to exist on horse flesh. Beyond that, however, few details
concerning the life of the Anglo-Indian force during the siege were
known at that time except that they had not been subjected to any
attack on the part of the Turks.
During the night of April 24, 1916, one more desperate effort was made
to bring relief to General Townshend's force. A ship, carrying
supplies, was sent up the Tigris. Although this undertaking was
carried out most courageously in the face of the Turkish guns
commanding the entire stretch of the Tigris between Sanna-i-Yat and
the Turkish lines below Kut-el-Amara, it miscarried, for the boat went
aground near Magasis, about four miles below Kut-el-Amara. Another
desperate effort to get at least some supplies to Kut by means of
aeroplanes also failed. The British forces had only some comparatively
antiquated machines, which quickly became the prey of the more modern
equipment of the Turks.
CHAPTER XL
THE SURRENDER OF KUT-EL-AMARA
By the end of April it had become only a question of days, almost of
hours, when it would be necessary for General Townshend to surrender.
It was, therefore, no surprise when in the morning of April 29, 1916,
a wireless report was received from him reading as follows:
"Have destroyed my guns, and most of my munitions are being destroyed;
and officers have gone to Khalil, who is at Madug, to say am ready to
surrender. I must have some food here, and cannot hold on any more.
Khalil has been told to-day, and a deputation of officers has gone on
a launch to bring some food from Julnar."
A few hours afterward another message, the last one to come through,
reached the relief forces, announcing the actual surrender:
"I have hoisted the white flag over Kut fort and towns, and the guards
will be taken over by a Turkish regiment, which is approaching. I
shall shortly destroy wireless. The troops at 2 p. m. to camp near
Shamran."
It was on the hundred and forty-third day of the siege that General
Townshend was forced by the final exhaustion of his supplies to hoist
the white flag of surrender. According to the official British
statements this involved a force of "2970 British troops of all ranks
and services and some 6,000 Indian troops and their followers."
About one o'clock in the afternoon of April 29, 1916, a pre-arranged
signal from the wireless indicated that the wireless had been
destroyed. It was then that the British emissaries were received by
the Turkish commander in chief, Khalil Bey Pasha, in order to arrange
the terms of surrender. According to these it was to be unconditional.
But the Turks, who expressed the greatest admiration for the bravery
of the British, readily agreed to a number of arrangements in order to
reduce as much as possible the suffering on the part of the captured
British forces who by then were near to starvation. As the Turks
themselves were not in a position to supply their captives with
sufficiently large quantities of food, it was arranged that such
supplies should be sent up the Tigris from the base of the relief
force. It was also arranged that wounded prisoners should be exchanged
and during the early part of May, 1916, a total of almost 1,200 sick
and wounded reached headquarters of the Tigris Corps as quickly as the
available ships could transport them.
The civil population of Kut-el-Amara had not been driven out by
General Townshend as had been surmised. This was undoubtedly due to
the fact that a few civilians who, driven by hunger, had attempted to
escape, had been shot promptly by the Turks. Rather than jeopardize
the lives of some 6,000 unfortunate Arabs, the English commander
permitted them to remain and the same rations that went to the British
troops were distributed to the Arabs. This, of course, hastened the
surrender, an eventuality on which the Turks undoubtedly had counted
when they adopted such stringent measures against their own subjects
who were caught in their attempt to flee from Kut. Although Khalil
Pasha refused to give any pledge in regard to the treatment of these
civilians, he stated to the British emissaries that he contemplated no
reprisals or persecutions in regard to the civilian population and
that their future treatment at the hands of the Turkish troops would
depend entirely on their future behavior.
With the least possible delay the Turks moved their prisoners from
Kut-el-Amara to Bagdad and from there to Constantinople, from which
place it was reported on June 11, 1916, that General Townshend had
arrived and, after having been received with military honors, had been
permitted to visit the United States ambassador who looked after
British interests in Turkey during the war. An official Turkish
statement announced that together with General Townshend four other
generals had been captured as well as 551 other officers, of whom
about one-half were Europeans and another half Indians. The same
announcement also claimed that the British had destroyed most of their
guns and other arms, but that in spite of this the Turks captured
about forty cannon, twenty machine guns, almost 5,000 rifles, large
amounts of ammunition, two ships, four automobiles, and three
aeroplanes.
It was only after the capitulation of General Townshend that details
became available concerning the suffering to which the besieged army
was subjected and the heroism with which all this was borne by
officers and men, whites and Hindus alike. An especially clear picture
of conditions existing in Kut-el-Amara during the siege may be gained
from a letter sent to Bombay by a member of the Indian force and later
published in various newspapers. It says in part:
"Wounded and diseased British and native troops are arriving from
Kut-el-Amara, having been exchanged for an equal number of Turkish
prisoners. They bring accounts of Townshend's gallant defense of
Mesopotamia's great strategic point. Some are mere youngsters while
others were soldiers before the war.
"All are frightfully emaciated and are veritable skeletons as the
result of their starvation and sufferings. The absolute exhaustion of
food necessitated the capitulation, and if General Townshend had not
surrendered nearly the whole force would have died of starvation
within a week.
"The Turkish General Khalil Pasha provided a river steamer for the
unexchanged badly wounded, the others marching overland. Because of
the wasted condition of the prisoners the marches were limited to
five miles a day.
"When the capitulation was signed only six mules were left alive to
feed a garrison and civilian population of nearly 20,000 persons.
"In the early stages of the siege, the Arab traders sold stocks of
jam, biscuits, and canned fish at exorbitant prices. The stores were
soon exhausted and all were forced to depend upon the army
commissariat. Later a dead officer's kit was sold at auction. Eighty
dollars was paid for a box of twenty-five cigars and twenty dollars
for fifty American cigarettes.
"In February the ration was a pound of barley-meal bread and a pound
and a quarter of mule or horse flesh. In March the ration was reduced
to half a pound of bread and a pound of flesh. In April it was four
ounces of bread and twelve ounces of flesh, which was the allowance
operative at the time of the surrender. The food problem was made more
difficult by the Indian troops, who because of their religion refused
to eat flesh, fearing they would break the rules of their caste by
doing so.
"When ordinary supplies were diminished a sacrifice was demanded of
the British troops in order to feed the Indians, whose allowance of
grain was increased while that of the British was decreased. Disease
spread among the horses and hundreds were shot and buried. The
diminished grain and horse feed supply necessitated the shooting of
nearly 2,000 animals. The fattest horses and mules were retained as
food for forty days.
"Kut-el-Amara was searched as with a fine tooth comb and considerable
stores of grain were discovered beneath houses. These were
commandeered, the inhabitants previously self-supporting receiving the
same ration as the soldiers and Sepoys. It was difficult to use the
grain because of inability to grind it into flour, but millstones were
finally dropped into the camp by aeroplanes.
"In the first week in February scurvy appeared, and aeroplanes dropped
seeds, which General Townshend ordered planted on all the available
ground, and the gardens bore sufficient fruit to supply a few patients
in the hospital.
[Illustration: Kut-el-Amara.]
"Mule and horse meat and sometimes a variety of donkey meat were
boiled in the muddy Tigris water without salt or seasoning. The
majority became used to horseflesh and their main complaint was that
the horse gravy was like clear oil.
"Stray cats furnished many a delicate 'wild rabbit' supper. A species
of grass was cooked as a vegetable and it gave a relish to the
horseflesh. Tea being exhausted, the soldiers boiled bits of ginger
root in water. Latterly aeroplanes dropped some supplies. These
consisted chiefly of corn, flour, cocoa, sugar, tea, and cigarettes.
"During the last week of the siege many Arabs made attempts to escape
by swimming the river and going to the British lines, twenty miles
below. Of nearly 100, only three or four succeeded in getting away.
One penetrated the Turkish lines by floating in an inflated mule
skin."
Another intimate description was furnished by the official British
press representative with the Tigris Corps and is based on the
personal narratives of some of the British officers who, after having
been in the Kut hospital for varying periods of the siege on account
of sickness or wounds, were exchanged for wounded Turkish officers
taken by the relief force. According to this the real privations of
the garrison began in the middle of February and were especially felt
in the hospital.
"When the milk gave out the hospital diet was confined to corn, flour,
or rice water for the sick, and ordinary rations for the wounded. On
April 21, 1916, the 4 oz. grain rations gave out. From the 22d to the
25th the garrison subsisted on the two days' reserve rations issued in
January; and from the 25th to the 29th on supplies dropped by
aeroplanes.
"The troops were so exhausted when Kut capitulated that the regiments
who were holding the front line had remained there a fortnight without
being relieved. They were too weak to carry back their kit. During the
last days of the siege the daily death rate averaged eight British and
twenty-one Indians.
"All the artillery, cavalry, and transport animals had been consumed
before the garrison fell. When the artillery horses had gone the
drivers of the field batteries formed a new unit styled 'Kut Foot.'
One of the last mules to be slaughtered had been on three Indian
frontier campaigns, and wore the ribbons round its neck. The supply
and transport butcher had sent it back twice, refusing to kill it, but
in the end it had to go with the machine-gun mules. Mule flesh was
generally preferred to horse, and mule fat supplied good dripping;
also an improvised substitute for lamp oil.
"The tobacco famine was a great privation, but the garrison did not
find the enforced abstention cured their craving, as every kind of
substitute was there. An Arab brand, a species similar to that smoked
in Indian hookahs, was exhausted early in April. After that lime
leaves were smoked, or ginger, or baked tea dregs. In January English
tobacco fetched forty-eight rupees a half pound (equal to eight
shillings an ounce).
"Just before General Townshend's force entered Kut a large consignment
of warm clothing had arrived, the gift of the British Red Cross
Society. This was most opportune and probably saved many lives. The
garrison had only the summer kit they stood up in.
"Different units saw very little of each other during the siege. At
the beginning indirect machine-gun and rifle fire, in addition to
shells, swept the whole area day and night. The troops only left the
dugouts for important defense work. During the late phase when the
fire slackened officers and men had little strength for unnecessary
walking. Thus there was very little to break the monotony of the siege
in the way of games, exercise, or amusements, but on the right bank
two battalions in the licorice factory, the 110th Mahratas and the
120th Infantry, were better off, and there was dead ground here--'a
pitch of about fifty by twenty yards'--where they could play hockey
and cricket with pick handles and a rag ball. They also fished, and
did so with success, supplementing the rations at the same time. Two
companies of Norfolks joined them in turn, crossing by ferry at night,
and they appreciated the relief."
A personal acquaintance of the heroic defense of Kut-el-Amara drew in
a letter to the London "Weekly Times" the following attractive picture
of this strong personality:
"A descendant of the famous Lord Townshend who fought with Wolfe at
Quebec, and himself heir to the marquisate, General Townshend set
himself from boyhood to maintain the fighting traditions of his
family. His military fighting has been one long record of active
service in every part of the world. Engaged first in the Nile
expedition of 1884-85, Townshend next took part in the fighting on the
northwest frontier of India in 1891-92, when he leaped into fame as
commander of the escort of the British agent during the siege of
Chitral. He fought in the Sudan expedition of 1898, and served on the
staff in the South African War. In the peaceful decade which followed
Townshend acted for a time as military attaché in Paris, was on the
staff in India, and finally commanded the troops at Bloemfontein,
Orange River Colony.
"The outbreak of the Great War found him in command of a division in
India, longing to be at the front in France, but destined, as events
turned out, to win greater fame in Mesopotamia. All accounts agree as
to the masterly strategy with which he defeated Nur-ed-Din Pasha at
Kut-el-Amara, and subsequently fought the battle of Ctesiphon. Those
two battles and his heroic endurance of the long siege of Kut have
given his name a permanent place in the annals of the British army.
"Townshend has always attributed his success as a soldier to his
constant study of the campaigns of Napoleon, a practice which he has
long followed for a regular period of every day wherever he has
happened to be serving. He has mastered the Napoleonic battle fields
at first hand, and is an ardent collector of Napoleonic literature and
relics. Everyone who knows him is familiar with the sight of the
paraphernalia of his studies in peace time--the textbooks and maps,
spread on the ground or on an enormous table, to which he devotes his
morning hours. During the present campaign his letters have been full
of comparisons with the difficulties which confronted Napoleon.
"But Townshend possesses other qualities besides his zeal for his
profession, and one of them at least must have stood him in good stead
during these anxious months. He is indomitably serene and cheerful, a
lover of amusement himself and well able to amuse others. In London
and Paris he is nearly as well known in the world of playwrights and
actors as in the world of soldiers. He can sing a good song and tell a
good story. Like Baden-Powell, the hero of another famous siege, he is
certain to have kept his gallant troops alert and interested during
the long period of waiting for the relief which never came. Up to the
last his messages to the outside world have been full of cheery
optimism and soldierly fortitude. No general was ever less to blame
for a disastrous enterprise or better entitled to the rewards of
success."
CHAPTER XLI
SPRING AND SUMMER TRENCH WAR ON THE TIGRIS
After the surrender of Kut-el-Amara a lull of a few weeks occurred.
The Turkish forces seemed to be satisfied for the time being with
their victory over their English opponents for which they had striven
so long. The English forces below Kut-el-Amara likewise seemed to have
ceased their activities as soon as the fall of Kut had become an
established fact.
Almost for three weeks this inactivity was maintained. On May 19,
1916, however, both sides resumed military operations. The Turks on
that day vacated an advanced position on the south bank of the Tigris
at Beit Eissa, which formed the southern prolongation of the
Sanna-i-Yat position. On the north bank the latter was still held
strongly by the Sultan's forces.
Immediately following this move the English troops, who under General
Sir Gorringe had attempted the relief of Kut-el-Amara, attacked.
Advancing about three miles south of the Tigris and south of the
Umm-el-Brahm marshes, they threw themselves against the southern end
of the Turkish position at Es-Sinn. The latter is about seven miles
west of the former and about the same distance east of Kut-el-Amara.
It began on the north bank of the Tigris, a few miles north of the
Suwatcha marshes, continued between these and the Tigris and for
almost five miles in a southeasterly direction. On its southern end
the Turks had erected a strong redoubt, known under the name Dujailar
Redoubt, from which a strong line of six lesser redoubts run in a
southwesterly direction to the Shatt-al-hai. This body of water is the
ancient bed of the Tigris. In the first half of the year it is a
navigable stream, carrying the waters of the Tigris across the desert
to the Euphrates near Nasiriyeh, a town which British forces have held
since the spring of 1915. It was against the key of this very strong
line of defense, the Dujailar Redoubt, which General Gorringe's
battalions attacked. At various other times before English troops had
attempted to carry this point, but had never succeeded. This time,
however, they did meet with success. In spite of strong resistance
they stormed and carried the position.
On the same day, May 19, 1916, it was officially announced that a
force of Russian cavalry had joined General Gorringe's troops. This
cavalry detachment, of course, was part of the Russian forces
operating in the region of Kermanshah in Persia. Inasmuch as these
troops were then all of 200 miles from Kut-el-Amara and had to pass
through a rough and mountainous country, entirely lacking in roads and
inhabited by hostile and extremely ferocious Kurdish hillmen, the
successful dash of this cavalry detachment was little short of
marvelous. The difficulties which had to be faced and the valor which
was exhibited is interestingly described by the official British press
representative with the Mesopotamian forces:
"The Cossacks' ride across country was a fine and daring achievement,
an extreme test of our Allies' hardness, mobility, and resource. Their
route took them across a mountainous territory which has been a
familiar landmark in the plains where we have been fighting for the
last few months.
"The country traversed was rough and precipitous and the track often
difficult for mules. They crossed passes over 8,000 feet high. Enemy
forces were likely to be encountered at any moment, as these hills are
infested with warlike tribes, whose attitude at the best might be
described as decidedly doubtful.
"Their guide was untrustworthy. He roused their suspicions by
constant attempts to mislead them, and eventually he had to point the
way with a rope round his neck. Nevertheless, they met with no actual
opposition during the whole journey other than a few stray shots at
long range.
"They traveled light. For transport they had less than one pack animal
for ten men. These carried ammunition, cooking pots, and a tent for
officers. Otherwise, beyond a few simple necessaries, they had no
other kit than what they stood up in, and they lived on the country,
purchasing barley, flour, rice, and sheep from the villagers. Fodder
and fuel were always obtainable.
"For ambulance they had only one assistant surgeon, provided with
medical wallets, but none of these Cossacks fell sick. They are a hard
lot.
"Their last march was one of thirty miles, during which five of their
horses died of thirst or exhaustion on the parched desert, and they
reached camp after nightfall. Yet, after a dinner which was given in
their honor, they were singing and dancing all night and did not turn
in till one in the morning.
"The ride of the Cossacks establishing direct contact between the
Russian force in Persia and the British force on the Tigris, of
course, has impressed the tribesmen on both sides of the frontier."
On the next day the Turks withdrew all their forces who, on the south
bank of the Tigris, had held the Es-Sinn position. Only at a bridge
across the Shatt-al-Hai, about five miles below its junction with the
Tigris, they left some rear guards. On the north bank of the Tigris
they continued to hold, not only the Es-Sinn position, but also the
Sanna-i-Yat position, some eight miles farther down the river. This
meant that General Gorringe not only had carried an important
position, but also that he had advanced the British lines on the south
bank of the Tigris by about ten miles, for on May 20, 1916, the
British positions were established along a line running from the
village of Magasis, on the south bank of the Tigris, about five miles
east of Kut-el-Amara, to a point on the Shatt-al-Hai, about equally
distant from Kut.
The withdrawal of the Turkish forces on the south bank of the Tigris
naturally left their positions on the north bank very much exposed to
British attacks. It was, therefore, not at all surprising that English
artillery subjected the Turks on the north bank to heavy bombardments
during the following days, nor that this fire was extremely effective.
However, in spite of this fact, the Turks continued to maintain their
positions on the north bank of the Tigris.
Throughout the balance of May, June, and July, 1916, nothing of
importance occurred in Mesopotamia. The temperature in that part of
Asia during the early summer rises to such an extent that military
operations become practically impossible. It is true that from time to
time unimportant skirmishes between outposts and occasional artillery
duels of very limited extent took place. But they had no influence on
the general situation or on the location of the respective positions.
During the early part of the month the British trenches on the north
bank of the Tigris were pushed forward a short distance, until they
were within 200 yards of the Turkish position, Sanna-i-Yat, where they
remained for the balance of midsummer. To the south of Magasis, on the
south bank of the river, British troops occupied an advanced position
about three and one-half miles south of the main position. Then they
stopped there too. About the same time, June 10, 1916, Turkish guns
sunk three barges on the Tigris, the only actual success which the
Sultan's forces won since the fall of Kut-el-Amara.
Along the Euphrates, where British troops had held certain positions
ever since 1915, there was also an almost entire lack of activity,
except that occasional small and entirely local punitive expeditions
became necessary in order to hold in hand the Arab tribes of the
neighborhood.
Climatic conditions continued extremely trying, and enforced further
desistance from military activity until, toward the end of July,
relief in the form of the _shamal_ (northwest wind) would come and
once more make it possible to resume operations.
CHAPTER XLII
RUSSIAN ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD
Coincident with the Russian advance in Armenia and the English attempt
at capturing the city of Bagdad by advancing up the Tigris, the
Russian General Staff also directed a strong attack against this
ancient Arabian city from the northeast through Persia.
Before the Mesopotamian plain, in which Bagdad is situated, could be
reached from Persia the mountains along the Persian-Turkish frontier
had to be crossed, an undertaking full of difficulties.
Just as in Armenia, here completed railroads were lacking entirely.
Such roads as were available were for the most part in the poorest
possible condition. The mountains themselves could be crossed only at
a few points through passes located at great height, where the
caravans that had traveled for centuries and centuries between Persia
and Mesopotamia had blasted a trail. At only one point to the north of
Bagdad was there a break in the chain of mountains that separated
Persia from Mesopotamia. That was about one hundred miles northeast of
Bagdad in the direction of the Persian city of Kermanshah. There one
Russian army was advancing undoubtedly with the twofold object of
reaching and capturing Bagdad and of submitting the Turkish army
operating in that sector to an attack from this source as well as from
the British army advancing along the Tigris. A Russian success at this
point would have meant practically either the capture of all the
Turkish forces or their ultimate destruction. For the only avenue of
escape that would have been left to them would have been across the
desert into Syria. And although there were a number of caravan routes
available for this purpose, it would have been reasonably sure that
most of the Turkish forces attempting such a retreat would have been
lost. For a modern army of the size operating around Bagdad could not
have been safely brought across the desert with all the supplies and
ammunition indispensable for its continued existence.
In order to prevent the escape of these Turkish forces in a northerly
direction along the Tigris and the line of the projected but
uncompleted part of the Bagdad railroad, the Russians had launched
another attack from the north. This second army advanced to the south
of the region around Lake Urumiah, a large body of water less than
fifty miles east of the Turko-Persian border. This attack was directed
against another important Arabian city, Mosul. This town, too, was
located on the Tigris, and on the line of the Bagdad railroad, about
200 miles northwest of Bagdad.
Still another Russian attack was developed by a third army, advancing
about halfway between the other two army groups and striking at
Mesopotamia from Persia slightly north of the most easterly point of
the Turkish frontier.
Broadly speaking the Russian attack through Persia covered a front of
about 200 miles. It must not be understood, however, that this was a
continuous "front" of the same nature as the front in the western and
eastern theaters of war in Europe. The undeveloped condition of the
country made the establishment of a continuous front not only
impossible, but unnecessary. Each of the three Russian groups were
working practically independent of each other, except that their
operations were planned and executed in such a way that their
respective objectives were to be reached simultaneously. Even that
much cooperation was made extremely difficult, because of the lack of
any means of communication in a horizontal direction. No roads worthy
of that name, parallel to the Turko-Persian frontier, existed.
Telegraph or telephone lines, of course, were entirely lacking, except
such as were established by the advancing armies. How great the
difficulties were which confronted both the attacking and the
defending armies in this primitive country can, therefore, readily be
understood. They were still more increased by the climatic conditions
which prevail during the winter and early spring. If fighting in the
comparatively highly developed regions of the Austro-Italian
mountains was fraught with problems that at times seemed almost
impossible of solution, what then must it have been in the more or
less uncivilized and almost absolutely undeveloped districts of
Persian "Alps!" The difficulties that were overcome, the suffering
which was the share of both Russians and Turks make a story the full
details of which will not be told--if ever told at all--for a long
time to come. No daily communiqué, no vivid description from the pen
of famous war correspondents acquaints us of the details of the heroic
struggle that for months and months progressed in these distant
regions of the "near East." Not even "letters from the front" guide us
to any extent. For where conditions are such that even the transport
of supplies and ammunition becomes a problem that requires constantly
ingenuity of the highest degree, the transmission of mail becomes a
matter which can receive consideration only very occasionally.
Whatever will be known for a long time to come about this campaign is
restricted to infrequent official statements made by the Russian and
Turkish General Staffs, announcing the taking of an important town or
the crossing of a mountain pass, up to then practically unknown to the
greatest part of the civilized world.
It was such a statement from the Russian General Staff, that had
announced the fall of Kermanshah on February 27, 1916. This was an
important victory for the southernmost Russian army. For this ancient
Persian town lies on the main caravan route from Mesopotamia to
Teheran, passing over the high Zaros range, as well as on other roads,
leading to Tabriz in the north and to Kut-el-Amara and Basra in the
south. It brought this Russian army within less than 200 miles of
Bagdad. Toward this goal the advance now was pushed steadily, and on
March 1, 1916, Petrograd announced that the pursuit of the enemy to
the west of Kermanshah continued and had yielded the capture of two
more guns. The next important success gained by the Russians was
announced on March 12, 1916, when the town of Kerind was occupied.
This town, too, is located on the road to Bagdad and its occupation
represented a Russian advance of about fifty miles in less than two
weeks, no mean accomplishment in the face of a fairly determined
resistance.
[Illustration: The Russians in Persia.]
On March 22, 1916, it was officially announced that a Russian column,
advancing from Teheran, to the south, had reached and occupied Ispaha,
the ancient Persian capital in central Persia. This, of course, had no
direct bearing on the Russian advance against Mosul and Bagdad, except
that it increased Russian influence in Persia and by that much
strengthened the position and security of any Russian troops operating
anywhere else in that country.
Fighting between the northernmost Russian army and detachments of
Turks and Kurds was reported on March 24, 1916, in the region south of
Lake Urumiah. Throughout the balance of March, 1916, and during April,
1916, similar engagements took place continuously in this sector. On
the Turkish side both regular infantry and detachments of Kurds
opposed the Russian advance in the direction of Mosul and the Tigris.
Russian successes were announced officially on April 10 and 12, 1916,
and again on May 3, 1916.
In the meantime the advance toward Bagdad also progressed. On May 1,
1916, the Russians captured some Turkish guns and a number of
ammunition wagons to the west of Kerind. On May 6, 1916, a Turkish
fortified position in the same locality was taken by storm and a
considerable quantity of supplies were captured.
Up to this time the Russian reports were more or less indefinite,
announcing simply from time to time progress of the advance in the
direction of Bagdad. From Kerind, captured early in March, 1916, two
roads lead into Mesopotamia, one by way of Mendeli, and another more
circuitous, but more frequented and, therefore, in better condition,
by way of Khanikin. Not until May 10, 1916, did it become apparent
that the Russians had chosen the latter. On that day they announced
the occupation of the town of Kasr-i-Shirin, about twenty miles from
the Turkish border, between Kerind and Khanikin. Not only were the
Russian forces now within 110 miles of Bagdad--an advance of
forty-five miles since the capture of Kerind--but they were also
getting gradually out of the mountains into the Mesopotamian plain.
At Kasr-i-Shirin, they took important Turkish munition reserves,
comprising several hundred thousand cartridges, many shells and hand
grenades, telegraph material, and a camel supply convoy laden with
biscuits, rice, and sugar.
Five days later, on May 15, 1916, another important Russian success
was announced, this time further north. The Russian forces that had
been fighting for a long time ever since the early part of 1915 to the
south of Lake Urumiah, and whose progress in the direction of Mosul
was reported at long intervals, were now reported to have reached the
Turkish town of Rowandiz. This represented an advance of over 100
miles from the town of Urumiah and carried the Russian troops some
twenty-five miles across the frontier into the Turkish province of
Mosul. Rowandiz is about 100 miles east of Mosul, and in order to
reach it it was necessary for the Russian forces to cross the
formidable range of mountains that runs along the Turko-Persian border
and reaches practically its entire length, a height of 8,000 to 10,000
feet.
CHAPTER XLIII
TURKISH OFFENSIVE AND RUSSIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN ARMENIA AND PERSIA
On the last day of May, 1916, the Turks scored their first substantial
success against the Russians since the fall of Erzerum. Having
received reenforcements, the Turkish center assumed the offensive
between the Armenian Taurus and Baiburt and forced the Russians to
evacuate Mama Khatun. This was followed by a withdrawal of the Russian
lines in that region for a distance of about ten miles.
For the next few days the Turks were able to maintain their new
offensive in full strength. The center of the Russian right wing was
forced back continuously until it had reached a line almost
twenty-five miles east of its former positions.
In the south, too, the Turkish forces scored some successes against
the Russian troops, who had been pushing toward the Tigris Valley from
the mountains along the Persian border. On June 8, 1916, Turkish
detachments even succeeded in crossing the border and occupied
Kasr-i-Shirin, just across the frontier in Persia. By June 10, 1916,
these troops had advanced sixteen miles farther east and fought slight
engagements with Russian cavalry near the villages of Serpul and
Zehab.
In the north the Turkish advance continued likewise. An important
engagement between Turkish troops and a strong Russian cavalry force
occurred on June 12, 1916, east of the village of Amachien and
terminated in favor of the Turks.
Fighting continued throughout the balance of June, 1916, all along the
Turko-Russian front from Trebizond down to the Persian border
northeast of Bagdad. At some points the Russians assumed the
offensive, but were unable to make any impression on the Turks, who
continued to push back the invader and, by quickly fortifying their
newly gained positions, succeeded in maintaining them against all
counterattacks.
By June 30, 1916, Kermanshah in Persia, about 100 miles across the
border, was seriously threatened. On that day Russian forces, which
retreated east of Serai, could not maintain their positions near
Kerind, owing to vigorous pursuit. Russian rear guards west of Kerind
were driven off. Turkish troops passing through Kerind pursued the
Russians in the direction of Kermanshah.
On July 5, 1916, Kermanshah was occupied by the Turkish troops after a
battle west of the town which lasted all day and night. The first
attempt of the Russians to prevent the capture of the city was made at
Mahidesst, west of Kermanshah. Here the Russians had hastily
constructed fortifications, but the Turks, by a swift encircling move,
made their position untenable and forced them to retreat farther east.
A strong Russian rear guard defended the village for one day and then
followed the main body to a series of previously prepared positions
just west of the city. Here a terrific battle lasting all day and all
night was waged, and resulted in the retreat of the Russians to
Kermanshah. Three detachments of Turks, almost at the heels of the
Muscovites, drove them out before they could make another stand.
On July 9, 1916, Turkish reconnoitering forces came in contact with
the Russians who were ejected from Kermanshah at a point fifteen miles
east of the city, while they were on their way to join their main
forces. After a fight of seven hours the Russians were compelled to
flee to Sineh.
By this time, however, the Russians had recovered their breath in the
Caucasus. On July 12, 1916, they recaptured by assault the town of
Mama Khatun. The next day, after a violent night battle, they occupied
a series of heights southeast of Mama Khatun. The Turks attempted to
take the offensive, but were thrown back. Pressing closely upon them,
the Russians took the villages of Djetjeti and Almali.
The Russian offensive quickly assumed great strength. By July 14,
1916, the Russians were only ten miles from Baiburt, had again taken
up their drive for Erzingan and had wrested from the Turks some
strongly fortified positions southwest of Mush.
Baiburt fell to the Russians on July 15, 1916. From then on the
Russian advance continued steadily, although the Turks maintained a
stiff resistance.
On July 18, 1916, the Russians occupied the town of Kugi, an important
junction of roads from Erzerum, Lhaputi and Khzindjtna. On July 20,
1916, the Grand Duke's troops captured the town of Gumuskhaneh,
forty-five miles southwest of Trebizond.
The next day, July 21, 1916, these forces had advanced to and occupied
Ardas, about thirteen miles northwest of Gumuskhaneh. The West
Euphrates was crossed the following day. On July 23, 1916, Russian
troops on the Erzingan route, in the Ziaret Tapasi district, repulsed
two Turkish counterattacks and occupied the heights of Naglika.
East of the Erzingan route they captured a Turkish line on the Durum
Darasi River. After having repulsed several Turkish attacks Russian
cavalry has reached the line of Boz-Tapa-Mertekli.
[Illustration: The Russians in Armenia.]
Closer and closer the Russians approached to the goal for which they
had striven for many months, Erzingan. On July 25, 1916, this strongly
fortified Turkish city in Central Armenia, fell into the hands of the
Russian Caucasus army under Grand Duke Nicholas.
Erzingan, situated at an altitude of 3,900 feet, about one mile from
the right bank of the Euphrates, manufactures silk and cotton and lies
in a highly productive plain, which automatically comes into
possession of the Russians. Wheat, fruit, wines, and cotton are grown
in large quantities, and there are also iron and hot sulphur springs.
With its barracks and military factories, the city formed an important
army base.
Erzingan has frequently figured in ancient history. It was here that
the Sultan of Rum was defeated by the Mongols in 1243, and in the
fourth century St. Gregory, "the Illuminator," lived in the city.
Erzingan was added to the Osman Empire in 1473 by Mohammed II, after
it had been held by Mongols, Tartars, and Turkomans.
With the capture of Erzingan the Russians not only removed the
strongest obstacle on the road to Sivas, Angora, and Constantinople,
but also virtually completed their occupation of Turkish Armenia.
Throughout the Russian advance, considerable fighting had occurred in
the region of Mush, which, however, resulted in no important changes.
The main object of the Russian attacks there was to hold as large a
Turkish force as possible from any possible attempt to relieve the
pressure on Erzingan.
In the south, near the Persian border at Roanduz, and in Persia, near
Kermanshah, there were no important developments after the fall of
Kermanshah. Considerable fighting, however, went on in both of these
sectors without changing in any way the general situation.
PART VIII--OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT
CHAPTER XLIV
RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN
In another part of this work we have followed the intense struggle
that marked the German assault that began on February 21, 1916, and
continued without cessation for four days and nights. Despite the
tremendous force employed by the Germans and the destruction wrought
by their guns, the French by incessant counterattacks had held back
their opponents and, by depriving them of the advantage of surprise,
had undoubtedly saved Verdun for the Allies. Though losing heavily in
men and material, they held the Bras-Douaumont front until they could
be relieved by fresh forces. The German advance was stayed on the
night of the 24th.
In the morning of February 25, 1916, the Germans succeeded in
penetrating Louvemont, now reduced to ruins by fire and shell.
Douaumont village to the right seemed in imminent danger of being
captured by the Germans, who were closing in on the place. But the
French infantry attacking toward the north, and the vigorous action of
the Zouaves east of Haudromont Farm, cleared the surroundings of the
enemy. At the close of the day they occupied the village and a ridge
to the east. Though they were in such position as to half encircle the
fort, yet a body of Brandenburgers succeeded by surprise in forcing
their way into its walls, from which subsequent French attacks failed
to dislodge them.
East and west of Douaumont the Germans made incessant efforts to
break through the new French front, but only succeeded in gaining a
foothold in Hardaumont work. Douaumont village was attacked with fresh
forces and abundant material on the morning of the 27th. The struggle
here was marked by hand-to-hand fighting and bayonet charges in which
the Germans were clearly at a disadvantage. They won a French redoubt
on the west side of Douaumont Fort, but after an intense struggle were
forced out and retreated, leaving heaps of dead on the ground.
Douaumont became again the center of German attack, and though driven
off with terrible losses, they brought up fresh troops and renewed the
fray. Advances were pushed with reckless bravery, but in vain, for
their forces were shattered before they could reach the French
positions. Their losses in men must have been enormous, and for two
days no further attacks were made. The French knew that they had not
accepted defeat and were only reorganizing their forces for a fresh
onslaught. On March 2, 1916, the Germans renewed the bombardment,
smothering the village under an avalanche of shells. Believing that
this time the way was clear to advance, they rushed forward in almost
solid ranks. French machine-gun and rifle fire cut great gaps in the
advancing waves, but this time the brave defenders could not hold them
back, and Douaumont was penetrated.
The Germans occupied the place, but they were not permitted to leave
it, for the French infantry were posted only a hundred yards away and
every exit was under their fire.
On the day following, the 3d, the French, after bombarding the ruins
of Douaumont and working havoc in the ranks of the enemy, rushed two
battalions during the night against the German barricades, and after a
stubborn fight occupied the place. But their victory was short lived.
Before dawn the Germans, attacking with large reenforcements, after
four or five hours of intense and murderous struggle, again occupied
the village. The French, somewhat shattered in numbers but by no means
discouraged, fell back some two hundred yards to the rear, where they
proceeded to reestablish their line and there await their opportunity
to strike again.
Some idea of the great courage and devotion displayed by the French
troops during the intense struggle around Douaumont village may be
gained from the statement made by an infantry officer which appeared
in the Army Bulletin, and from which some quotations may be made.
The Germans on March 2, 1916, at 3.15 a. m. had attacked the village
simultaneously from the north by a ravine and on the flank, where they
debouched from the fort, and certain covered positions which the
French had not had time to reconnoiter.
"The Germans we saw first were those who came from the fort. They were
wearing French helmets, and for a moment our men seemed uncertain as
to their identity. Major C---- called out: 'Don't fire! They are French.'
The words were hardly out of his mouth before he fell with a bullet in
his neck. This German trick made us furious, and the adjutant cried:
'Fire for all you're worth! They are Germans!' But the enemy continued
his encircling movement with a view to taking the village.
"The battalion which was charged with its defense had lost very
heavily in the bombardment, and most of its machine guns were out of
action, but they were resolved to make any sacrifice to fulfill their
trust. When their left was very seriously threatened, the Tenth
Company made a glorious charge straight into the thick of the oncoming
German masses. The hand-to-hand struggle was of the fiercest
description, and French bayonets wrought deadly havoc among the German
ranks. This company went on fighting until it was at length completely
submerged in the flood, and the last we saw of it was a handful of
desperate heroes seeking death in the heart of the struggle."
An attempt at this time was made by the Germans to debouch from
Douaumont village on the southwestern side, with the evident purpose
of forcing their way to the top of the crest in the direction of
Thiaumont Farm.
[Illustration: Western Battle Front, August, 1916.]
"The commander of the Third Company," to continue the French officer's
narrative, "immediately made his dispositions to arrest their
progress. A machine gun was cleverly placed and got to work. In a
short time the hundred or so of Germans that had got through were so
vigorously peppered that only about twenty of them got back. This gun
was in action until nightfall, dealing with successive German parties
that attempted to advance from the western and southwestern sides of
the village."
After describing how the French built barricades during the night and
adjusted their front in such a way as to present a solid wall facing
the east, the narrator continues:
"Our counterattack took place at nightfall on March 3, and was
undertaken by two battalions (the Four Hundred and Tenth and the Four
Hundred and Fourteenth) of consecutive regiments. After an intense
rifle fire we heard the cry of 'Forward with the bayonet!' and night
rang with the shouts of the men. Our first line was carried beyond the
village.
"The Germans returned to the attack about 8 o'clock, but were stopped
dead by our rifle and machine-gun fire. Two hours later another attack
was attempted, but was likewise dashed to pieces before our unshaken
resistance. The Germans came on in very close formation, and on the
following morning we counted quite eight hundred dead before the
trench.
"At daybreak on March 4 the Germans launched a fresh counterattack
against Douaumont after an intense bombardment accompanied by the use
of aerial torpedoes. No detailed description is possible of the
terrible fighting from house to house, or the countless deeds of
heroism performed by our men in this bloody struggle, which lasted for
two hours. The gaps in our ranks increased from moment to moment.
Finally we were ordered to retire to a position about 200 meters south
of the exit from Douaumont. The enemy tried in vain to dislodge us and
exploit the success he had so dearly won."
On March 4, 1916, an Order of the Day issued by the crown prince was
read to the troops in rest billets in which they were urged to make a
supreme effort to conquer Verdun, "the heart of France." For four days
following the German command was busy organizing for an onslaught on a
gigantic scale, which they hoped would so crush the French army as to
eliminate it as a serious factor in the war.
In order to clear the way for this great attack the German General
Staff decided that it would be necessary first to capture the French
positions of Mort Homme and Cumières on the left bank of the Meuse.
At this time the French line to the west of the Meuse ran by the
village of Forges, the hills above Béthincourt and Malancourt, crossed
Malancourt Wood and passed in front of Avocourt. The Germans held
positions on the heights of Samogneux and Champneuville, and their
operations were threatened by the French artillery in the line west of
the river.
On March 6, 1916, the Germans began to bombard the French positions
from the Meuse to Béthincourt. They pursued their usual methods,
smashing a selected sector, demolishing advance works, and keeping a
curtain fire over roads and trenches. The village of Forges during the
first half of the day of attack was literally covered with shells.
Crossing the Forges Brook, which ran through a ravine, and where they
were protected from French artillery fire, the Germans advanced along
the northern slopes of the Côte de l'Oie. Following the railway line
through Regnéville, at all times under heavy fire from French guns,
they attacked Hill 265 on the 7th. An entire division was employed by
the Germans in this assault, and the French, overwhelmed by weight of
men and metal, were forced out of the position.
In the morning of March 7, 1916, the Germans began a furious
bombardment of Corbeaux Wood. At first the French enjoyed every
advantage, for though the Germans had penetrated the position, the
French by a dashing attack occupied almost the whole of the wood. A
mass attack made by the Germans against Béthincourt having failed,
they counterattacked at Corbeaux Wood, during which their force was
almost annihilated. By evening of March 8, 1916, the French had
recovered all the wood but a small corner.
[Illustration: First Attack on Verdun.]
The Germans were persistent in their attempts to gain the wood,
despite many failures and heavy losses. On the 10th, after being
reenforced, they threw three regiments against the wood. The French
defense was broken when they lost their colonel and battalion
commanders during the opening bombardment. The brave defenders,
badly hit, were forced to yield ground and retire, but they held the
enemy in the wood, thus preventing him from advancing on Mort Homme,
the next objective.
This is a double hill, having a summit of 265 meters at the northwest
and the main summit of 295 meters at the southeast. The road from
Béthincourt to Cumières scales Hill 265 and divides it in two. When it
reaches Hill 295 it encircles it and bends toward the northeast.
After a lull that lasted for four days the Germans at half past 10 in
the morning began a terrific bombardment to capture Béthincourt, the
Mort Homme, and Cumières. In this they employed a great number of
heavy guns, and all the points of attack and the region around was
flooded with shells of every variety. They were said to have fallen at
the rate of one hundred and twenty a minute.
In the afternoon about 3 o'clock the German infantry attacked. They
succeeded in capturing the first French line, where many soldiers had
fallen half asphyxiated by the gas shells, or were buried under the
débris. Hill 265 was occupied, but the highest summit, owing to the
valor of its defenders, remained in French hands. During the night the
French succeeded in stemming the German advance by executing a
brilliant counterattack which carried them to the slope between Hill
295 and Béthincourt, where they came in touch with the enemy.
The French at once proceeded by daring efforts to improve their
positions, and were so successful that when during the 16th and 18th
the Germans after prolonged bombardments resumed their attack on Hill
295 they were repulsed with appalling losses.
Having failed to capture Mort Homme from the front, the Germans now
attempted to outflank it. They enlarged the attacking front in the
sector of Malancourt and tried to take Hill 304. In order to do this
it was necessary for them to take the southeastern point of the
Avocourt Wood which was held by the French. On March 20, 1916, the
crown prince threw a fresh division against these woods, the Eleventh
Bavarian, belonging to a selected corps that had seen service in the
Galician and Polish campaigns with Mackensen's army. This division
launched a number of violent attacks, making use of flame throwers.
They succeeded in capturing Avocourt Wood, but in the advance on Hill
304 they were caught between two converging fires and suffered the
most appalling losses. According to the figures given by a neutral
military critic, Colonel Feyler, between March 20 and 22, 1916, the
three regiments of this division lost between 50 and 60 per cent of
their number.
This decisive result had the effect of stopping for the time at least
any further attacks by the Germans in this sector. A period of calm
ensued, which they employed in bringing up fresh troops and in
reconstituting their units. Their costly sacrifices in men and
material had brought them little gain. They had advanced their line to
Béthincourt and Cumières, but the objective they had been so eager to
capture, Mort Homme, was in French possession, and so strongly held
that it could only be captured at an exceedingly heavy price.
CHAPTER XLV
THE STRUGGLE FOR VAUX FORT AND VILLAGE--BATTLE OF MORT HOMME
On the right bank of the Meuse the Germans on March 8, 1916, resumed
their offensive against the French lines to the east of Douaumont
Fort. The advance was rapidly carried out, and they succeeded in
penetrating Vaux village. A little later by a dashing bayonet charge
the French drove them out of the greater part of the place except one
corner, where they held on determinedly despite the furious attacks
that were launched against them all day long. Vaux Fort had not been
included in this action, or indeed touched, yet a German communiqué of
March 9, 1916, announced that "the Posen Reserve Regiments commanded
by the infantry general Von Gearetzki-Kornitz had taken the armored
fortress of Vaux by assault, as well as many other fortifications
near by."
At the very hour, 2 p. m., that this telegram appeared an officer of
the French General Staff entered the fort and discovered that it had
not been attacked at all, and that the garrison were on duty and quite
undisturbed by the bombardment storming about the walls.
During the following days the Germans attempted to make good the false
report of their capture of the fort by launching a series of close
attacks. The slopes leading to the fort were piled with German dead.
According to what German prisoners said, these attacks were among the
costliest they had engaged in during the entire campaign. It was
necessary for them to bring up fresh troops to reconstitute their
shattered units.
At daybreak on March 11, 1916, the Germans renewed their attack on
Vaux village with desperate energy. The French had had time to fortify
the place in the most ingenious manner. The defense was so admirably
organized that it merits detailed description, if only to illustrate
that the French are not inferior to the Germans in "thoroughness" in
military matters.
The French trenches ran from the end of the main street of the village
to the church. Barricades had been constructed at the foot of
Hardaumont Hill at intervals of about a hundred yards. Around the
ruined walls of the houses barbed wire was strongly wound and the
street was mined in a number of places. The houses on the two flanks
were heavily fortified with sandbags, while numerous machine guns with
steel shields were set up in positions where they could command all
the approaches. Batteries of mountain guns firing shrapnel were also
cunningly hidden in places where they could work the greatest
destruction.
The French had so skillfully planned the defenses that the Germans
twice fought their way up and back the length of the main street
without discovering the chief centers of resistance.
For nine hours the German bombardment of Vaux Fort and village was
prolonged. Enormous aerial torpedoes were hurled into the ruined
houses, but in the chaos of dust and flame and smoke the French held
fast, and not a position of any importance within the village or its
surroundings was abandoned.
The first regiments to attack were drawn from the Fifteenth and
Eighteenth German Army Corps. At daybreak, when the German hosts
debouched from the plain of the Woevre, there was a heavy white mist
which enabled them to reach the French trenches. Owing to the enemy's
superiority in numbers, and fearing that they might be surrounded, the
French retired from their first positions. The Germans pushed their
way as far as the church, losing heavily, and could go no farther.
They found some shelter behind the ruined walls of the church and
neighboring houses. Each time that they attempted to leave the
protective walls the French guns smashed their ranks and slew
hundreds.
When the mist vanished and the air cleared, the French batteries of
75's and 155's opened a heavy fire on and behind the foremost German
regiments, which not only cut gaps in their formations, but shut them
off from any help. The German commanders were in a desperate state of
mind, for they could not send either men or ammunition to the relief
of the troops under fire. The Germans did not start any new attacks
after that for a day and a half, although their artillery continued
active.
Vaux Fort the Germans claimed to have captured, when after four days
of the bloodiest fighting they had not succeeded in reaching even the
entanglements around the position.
The struggle in the village was of the most desperate character, but
while it lasted there was no more terrible fighting during the Verdun
battle than that which raged back and forth on the outskirts of the
fort. French officers from their commanding positions on the
neighboring heights afterward testified that they had never seen the
German command so recklessly and wantonly sacrifice their men. Column
after column was sent forward to certain death. Giant shells hurled by
the French burst in the midst of the exposed German battalions, and
the dead were piled in heaps over acres of ground.
[Illustration: The Crown Prince, who commands the German forces on the
Verdun front, giving Iron Crosses to men who have distinguished
themselves for valor.]
While this slaughter was going on the German artillery was trying to
destroy the French batteries on the plateau, but being cunningly
concealed few were silenced. The French freely acknowledged the
great bravery displayed by the Germans, who, after gaining the foot
of the slope, fought splendidly for an hour to get up to the fort.
Then reserve Bavarian troops were brought forward and endeavored to
climb the slopes by clinging to rocks and bushes. Many lost their
foothold, or were struck down under the rain of shells. At last even
the German command sickened of the slaughter and ordered a retreat.
It was an especially bitter fact to the Germans that they had incurred
such great losses without gaining any advantage. The French positions
before the fort and in Vaux village remained intact, and the enemy had
failed utterly in their attempts to pierce the Vaux-Douaumont line.
After some days' pause for reorganization, on March 16, 1916, the
Germans made five attacks on the village and fortress of Vaux. After a
bombardment by thousands of shells they must have believed that their
opponents would be crushed, if not utterly annihilated. But the French
soldiers clung stubbornly to the shell-ravaged ground, and though
sadly reduced in numbers, held their positions and flung back five
times the German horde.
Two days later, on the 18th, the Germans resumed their offensive, and
no less than six attacks were made, in which flame projectors were
freely used and every effort made to smash the stubborn defense. But
the French wall of iron held firm, and in every instance the Germans
were beaten back with colossal losses. Again they were compelled to
pause and reorganize their lines. The calm that succeeded the storm
was no less welcome to the French defenders in this sector, for they
too had been hit hard, and it was questionable if they could have held
their positions against another strong attack.
[Illustration: Verdun Northeast District in Detail.]
Attacks on the sector north of Verdun having failed, the Germans began
on March 20, 1916, and continued during succeeding days to turn the
French by their (German) right in the Malancourt sector. The woods of
Montfaucon and Malancourt, where the Germans were strongly
established, crown a great island of sand and clay. The southeastern
portion of Malancourt Wood forms a sort of promontory known as
Avocourt Wood, and was the objective of the next German attack. The
main purpose in this operation was to extend their offensive front.
On March 20, 1916, after intense bombardment in which their heaviest
guns were employed, the Germans sent a new division that had been
hurried up from another front against the French positions between
Avocourt and Malancourt. The attackers were thrown back in disorder at
every point but a corner of Malancourt Wood. During the night, though
strongly opposed by the French, who contested every foot of ground,
and despite heavy losses, the Germans penetrated and occupied Avocourt
Wood, from which they could not be dislodged. The French were,
however, in a position to prevent them from leaving the wood, and
every attempt made by the Germans to debouch met with failure.
On March 22, 1916, the Germans having bombarded throughout the day,
made a number of attacks between Avocourt Wood and Malancourt village.
The French defeated every effort they made to leave the wood, but they
obtained a foothold on Haucourt Hill, where the French occupied the
redoubt.
For five days the Germans were engaged in filling up their broken
units with fresh troops and in preparing plans of attack. On March 28,
1916, strong bodies of German infantry were thrown against the French
front at Haucourt and Malancourt. In numbers they far outmatched the
French defenders, but they gained no advantage and were thrown back in
disorder. Emboldened by this success, the French on the 29th
counterattacked to recover Avocourt Wood, and occupied the southeast
corner, which included an important stronghold, the Avocourt Redoubt.
The Germans attacked and bombarded throughout the day. Their attempts
to regain the captured position in the wood failed, but they secured a
foothold on the northern edge of the village of Malancourt.
This place was held by a single French battalion. It formed a salient
in the French line, and the Germans appeared to be desperately eager
to capture it. In the night of March 30, 1916, they launched mass
attacks from three sides of the village. The fighting was of the most
violent character and raged all night long. There were hand-to-hand
struggles from house to house; the losses were heavy on both sides.
Finally the French were forced to evacuate, the place now a mass of
ruins. They occupied, however, positions that commanded the exits to
the place.
Early in the evening of the following day, the 31st, the Germans
launched two violent attacks on French positions northeast of Hill 295
in the Mort Homme sector. Tear shells and every variety of projectile
were rained upon the French defenses. The attacks were delivered with
dash and vigor, and in one instance they succeeded in penetrating a
position. But the German success was only temporary. The French
rallied, and fell upon the intruders in a counterattack that drove
them from the field.
During the evening and all night long the Germans violently bombarded
the territory between the wood south of Haudremont and Vaux village.
Twice they attacked in force. The French defeated one assault, but the
second carried the Germans into Vaux, where they occupied the western
portion of the place.
On April 2, 1916, the fighting was prolonged throughout the day. The
Germans employed more than a division in the four simultaneous attacks
they made on French positions between Douaumont Fort and Vaux village.
Southeast of the fort they succeeded for a time in occupying a portion
of Caillette Wood, but were subsequently ejected.
On the same day the Germans on the northern bank of Forges Brook, to
the west of Verdun, made a spirited attack on the French lines on the
southern bank, but it was not a success, and they lost heavily. They
also failed on the following day in an attack on Haucourt.
During the night between March 5 and 6, 1916, the Germans attacked two
of the salients of the Avocourt-Béthincourt front with a large body of
troops. On the French right they failed entirely, and suffered heavy
losses. In the center, after many costly failures, they gained a
foothold in Haucourt Wood. On the other hand, the French delivered a
strong counterattack from the Avocourt Redoubt and succeeded in
reoccupying a large portion of the so-called "Square Wood" and in
capturing half a hundred prisoners.
During the night of March, 6, 1916, new German attacks were launched
along the Béthincourt-Chattancourt road. Part of the French first line
was occupied, but was later lost.
On the 7th the Germans attacked on a front of over a mile. The
assailants lacked neither dash nor daring, and were strong in numbers,
but they were shattered against the wall of French defense and driven
back with slaughter to their own line. Attempts on the French
positions south and east of Haucourt during the night of the 7th
failed, except in the south, where the Germans occupied two small
works.
As a result of the fighting between March 30 and April 8, 1916, the
Germans had possession of the French advanced line on Forges Brook and
were in a position to strike at the most formidable line of French
defense, the Avocourt-Hill 304-Mort Homme-Cumières front.
The French General Staff during this gigantic struggle was constantly
guided by the following rule: Make the Germans pay dearly for each of
their advances. When it was believed that in order to defend a certain
point too many sacrifices would have to be made, they evacuated that
point. As soon as the Germans took hold of the point, however, they
were the target of a terrific fire from all of the French guns, which
were put to work at once. This was what General Pétain, commanding the
Verdun army, called "the crushing fire."
[Illustration: Verdun Northwest District in Detail.]
On April 9, 1916, a general attack was made by the Germans on the
front between Haucourt and Cumières, and simultaneously assaults were
delivered north and west of Avocourt and in Malancourt Wood and the
wood near Haudromont Farm. The struggle for the possession of Mort
Homme developed into one of the most notable and important battles of
Verdun. The attacking front of the Germans ran from west of Avocourt
to beyond the Meuse as high as the wood in the Haudromont Farm. This
general attack, one of the most violent that the Germans had made at
Verdun, failed completely. On the left of the French, a little strip
of land along the southern edge of the Avocourt Wood was won, but in a
dashing counterattack the French recaptured it. In the center the
Germans were repulsed everywhere, except south of Béthincourt, where
they succeeded in penetrating an advanced work. On the right bank, at
the side of Pepper Hill, the Germans only gained a foothold in one
trench east of Vacherauville. The main summit of Mort Homme, Hill 295,
as well as Hill 304, the principal positions, remained firmly in the
hands of the French.
A captain of the French General Staff, and who was an eyewitness, has
described in a French publication some striking phases of the fight:
"It is Sunday, and the sun shines brilliantly above--a real spring
Sunday. The artillery duel was long and formidable. Mort Homme was
smoking like a volcano with innumerable craters. The attack took place
about noon. At the same time, from this same place, lines of
sharpshooters could be seen between the Corbeaux Wood and Cumières and
the gradient at the east of Mort Homme. They must have come from the
Raffecourt or from the Forges Mill, through the covered roads in the
valley-like depressions in the ground. It was the first wave
immediately followed by heavy columns. Our artillery fire from the
edge of Corbeaux Wood isolated them.... At times a rocket appeared in
the air; the call to the cannons, then the marking of the road. The
regular ticktack of the machine guns and the cracking of the shells
were distinctly heard even among the terrific noises of the
bombardment.
"The German barrage fire in the rear of our front lines is so
frightful that one must not dream of going through it. Where will our
reenforcements pass? The inquietude increases when at 3.15 p. m. sharp
numerous columns in disorder regain on the run the wood of Cumières.
What a wonderful sight is the flight of the enemy! The sun shines
fully on these small moving groups. But our shells also explode among
them, and the groups separate, stop disjointed. They disappear; they
are lying down. They get up--not all of them--but do not know where to
go, like pheasants flying haphazard before the fusillade.
"With a tenacity that must be acknowledged the enemy comes back to the
charge, but the new attacks are less ordinate, less complete, and
quite weak. Even from a distance one feels that they cannot succeed as
well as the first. This lasts until sunset."
To honor the French troops for their brilliant defense General Pétain
issued the following Order of the Day:
"April 9, 1916, has been a glorious day for our armies. The furious
assaults of the crown prince's soldiers have been broken everywhere;
infantry, artillerymen, sappers, and aviators of the Second Army have
rivaled each other in heroism. Honor to all!
"The Germans will attack again without a doubt; let each work and
watch, so that we may obtain the same success.
"Courage! We will win!"
Far from showing the effects of their defeat, the Germans on April 10,
1916, attacked Caillette Wood, but were repulsed. Further attempts
made in the course of the night to eject the French from the trenches
to the south of Douaumont also failed. These futile assaults by no
means weakened the Germans' determination, and on March 11, 1916, they
attacked in force the front between Douaumont and Vaux. At some points
they succeeded in penetrating the French trenches, but were driven out
by vigorous counterattacks.
On March 12, 1916, the French learned that the enemy was making
elaborate preparations to the west of the Meuse for a great assault.
Before the Germans could make ready for the attack the French
artillery showered their trenches and concentration points with
shells, and the assaulting columns that were in the act of assembling
were scattered in disorder. The French fire was so intense that the
Germans who occupied the first line of trenches were unable to leave
them.
Artillery duels continued for several days, marked on the 15th by a
spirited attack made by the French on the German trenches at
Douaumont, during which they took several hundred prisoners and
wrested from the enemy some positions.
The German bombardment now reached the highest pitch of intensity, and
the sector between Bras on the Meuse and Douaumont was swept by a
storm of fire. Poivre (or Pepper) Hill, Haudremont, and Chaufour Wood
especially, were subjected to such destruction that old landmarks were
wiped out as by magic, and the very face of nature was changed and
distorted.
Having, as they believed, made the way clear for advance, the Germans
launched an attack in great force. It was estimated that the attacking
mass numbered 35,000 men. Believing that their guns had so crushed the
French forces that they would be unable to present any serious
defense, the German hordes swept on to attack on a front of about
three miles. Their reception was hardly what had been anticipated.
Great ragged gaps were torn in their formations as the French brought
rifles, machine guns, and heavy artillery into play. Their dead lay in
heaps on the ground, and along the whole front they were only able on
the right to penetrate a French trench south of Chaufour Wood. The
greater part of this was subsequently won back by their opponents in a
counterattack. On the 19th a German infantry assault launched against
Eparges failed.
There was a lull in the fighting during most of the day of April 28,
1916, but in the twilight the Germans attacked at points between
Douaumont and Vaux and west of Thiaumont, but were forced back by the
French artillery.
During the following day the Germans incessantly bombarded French
positions and made a futile attack. On the 30th the French forces
north of Mort Homme were on the offensive, and carried a German
trench. East of Mort Homme on the Cumières front on the same day they
captured from the Germans 1,000 meters of trenches along a depth
varying from 300 to 600 meters.
The Germans reattacked almost immediately with two of their most
famous corps, the Eighteenth and the Third Brandenburgers, which had
suffered so severely at Douaumont that they had been relegated to the
rear. It was estimated by the neutral military critic, Colonel Feyler,
that the first of these corps had lost 17,000 men and the second
22,000. After the fight in which they had been so hard hit the two
corps had spent seven weeks resting and were now drawn again into the
battle. Both were in action in the evening of April 30, 1916, the
Third north of Mort Homme and the Eighteenth at Cumières.
According to the evidence given by German prisoners, the Third Corps
again received heavy punishment. Of one regiment, the Sixty-fourth,
only a remnant survived, and one battalion lost nearly a hundred men
during the first attack.
The Eighteenth Corps of Brandenburgers succeeded in penetrating one
point in the French lines, but a French regiment rushed the trench
with fixed bayonets and destroyed or captured all the Germans in
occupation.
Some futile attempts were made by the Germans to retrieve their
failure, but the French firmly maintained their positions.
In the evening of May 1, 1916, the French again assumed the offensive
and successfully stormed a 500-yard sector south of Douaumont. On the
front northwest of Mort Homme, between Hills 295 and 265, the French
made a brilliant attack in the evening of May 3, 1916, which was
entirely successful, the Germans being pushed back beyond the line
they had won early in March, 1916.
The position of the French front on May 5, 1916, was as follows: It
was bounded by a line that ran through Pepper Hill, Hardaumont Wood,
the ravine to the southwest of the village of Douaumont, Douaumont
plateau to the south, and a few hundred yards from the fort, the
northern edge of Caillette Wood, the ravine and village of Vaux, and
the slopes of the fortress of Vaux.
On May 5, 1916, this line was on the whole intact. Only in one place
had the Germans gained a small advance; they had captured Vaux
village, which consisted of a single street, but the French occupied
the slopes near by that commanded the place.
There was no change on the French line on the left bank, where the
character of the ground was favorable for defense. For two months the
French line had remained fixed on Hill 304 and on Mort Homme. Only the
covering line, which extended from the wood of Avocourt to the Meuse
along the slopes of Haucourt, the bed of Forges Brook, and the crests
north of Cumières, had been broken by the terrific attacks of the
enemy.
The crown prince's army, which had been badly punished and suffered
heavy losses in this area in March, renewed the attempt to capture
Mort Homme and Hill 304 in May, 1916. It was evident from the
elaborate preparations made to possess these points that the Germans
considered them of first importance and that their conquest would
hasten the defeat of the French army.
CHAPTER XLVI
BATTLES OF HILL 304 AND DOUAUMONT--THE STRUGGLE AT FLEURY
It will be recalled that on April 9, 1916, the crown prince had
launched a general attack on the whole front between Avocourt and the
Meuse, the capture of Hill 304 being one of his chief objectives. The
onslaught, carried out on a huge scale, was a failure, and another
attempt made on the 28th also collapsed. Since then the Germans had
been held in their trenches, unable to engage in any action owing to
the vigilance of the French artillery gunners.
On May 3, 1916, the Germans began a violent bombardment as a prelude
to another attempt to capture Hill 340. On the following day, about 2
p. m., their assaulting waves were hurled against the French positions
on the counterslope north of the hill. The bombardment had been so
destructive that large numbers of French soldiers were buried in the
trenches. The active defenders that remained were not strong enough in
numbers to repel the masses of Germans thrown against them, and the
slopes were occupied by the enemy. During the night there was a French
counterattack; it was directed by a brilliant officer of the General
Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Odent, who had at his own request been
assigned the duty of defending this dangerous position. Rallying the
men of his regiment, he threw them against the foe. The French
succeeded in reaching the edges of the plateau facing northeast. This
advance was not gained without considerable losses, and during the
charge Lieutenant Colonel Odent was killed.
On May 5, 1916, the Germans after an intense bombardment, in which gas
shells were lavishly used, tried to turn Hill 304, and also attacked
the Camart Wood and Hill 287. On the northern slope of Hill 304 the
French trenches were so badly damaged that they could not be held. But
the Germans, caught by the French artillery fire, found it impossible
to advance. Having failed to reach the plateau from the north, an
attempt was made through the ravine and behind the woods west and
northwest of Hill 304. This plan was frustrated by the French, who
repulsed them with the bayonet.
The German attacks having failed everywhere, Hill 304 was subjected to
continuous and violent bombardment. In the afternoon of the 7th they
attacked again. With the exception of a strip of trench east of the
hill, which was retaken the following night, they did not register any
advance.
Among the German regiments participating in these attacks the
following were identified: Regiments of the Eleventh Bavarian
Division, a regiment of the Hundred and Ninety-second Brigade, the
Twelfth Reserve Division, the Fourth Division, and the Forty-third
Reserve Division.
From the 13th to the 16th of May, 1916, the Germans continued their
attacks on the Camart Wood west of Hill 304. In these operations they
employed a fresh corps, the Twenty-second Reserve Corps, for the first
time.
After a lull lasting a few days the battle assumed an increasing
violence on the left bank. In the afternoon of the 20th the Germans
threw four divisions to the assault of Mort Homme. During the night
and on the following day the battle raged with undiminished fury. At a
heavy cost the Germans succeeded at last in capturing some trenches
north and west of Mort Homme. At one time the French second lines were
seriously threatened, but a spirited defense scattered the attackers.
After intense fighting the French won back some of the ground they had
lost on Hill 287, and during May 21 and 22, 1916, succeeded in
regaining other positions captured by the enemy.
The recovery of Fort Douaumont which had been occupied by
Brandenburgers since February 25, 1916, was now the aim of the French.
General Mangin, one of the youngest officers of that rank in the
French army and commanding the Fifth Division, directed operations.
The French brought into action their heaviest artillery, which opened
a terrific fire on the German lines.
The French soldiers accepted it as an omen of success when about 8
o'clock in the morning of May 22, 1916, six captive balloons stationed
over the right bank of the Meuse exploded, thus depriving the German
batteries of their observers on whom they counted to get the range.
At about 10 in the morning the French infantry by a brilliant charge
captured three lines of German trenches. The fortress of Douaumont was
penetrated, and during the entire night a fierce struggle was
continued within its walls. In spite of the most violent efforts of
the Germans to dislodge the French they maintained their positions
within the fort.
Throughout the morning of May 23, 1916, the Germans rained shells on
French positions defended by the Hundred and Twenty-ninth Regiment.
The bombardment spread destruction among the French troops, but they
still clung to the terrain they had won and refused to yield or
retreat.
Throughout the night of May 23, 1916, the bloody struggle continued
unabated. On the morning of May 24, 1916, the fortress was still in
the hands of the French, with the exception of the northern salient
and some parts to the east. On the following day two new Bavarian
divisions were thrown into the fight and succeeded in retaking the
lines of the fortress, driving back the French as far as the immediate
approaches; that is, to the places they occupied previous to their
attack.
On the left bank of the Meuse the fighting slowed down, decreasing
gradually in intensity. The Germans were reacting feebly in this
territory, concentrating their greatest efforts on the right bank.
Throughout the whole region of Thiaumont, Douaumont, and Vaux they
pressed the fighting and were engaged in almost continuous attacks
and bombardments.
[Illustration: The Mort Homme Sector in Detail.]
On the 1st of June, 1916, all the French front in this sector was
attacked. The Germans, disregarding their heavy losses, returned
repeatedly to the charge. It was ascertained through a document found
on a prisoner that General Falkenhayn, chief of the German General
Staff, had given the order to advance at all costs.
The Germans attacked fearlessly, but the only progress they succeeded
in making was through the Caillette Wood to the southern edge of Vaux
Pool.
For five days this battle continued, one of the most desperately
fought around Verdun, and yet the Germans made insignificant gains,
out of all proportion to their immense losses. The Bavarian Division
which led the attack displayed an "unprecedented violence," according
to a French communiqué issued at the time. The Germans, repulsed again
and again, returned to the charge, and succeeded in obtaining a
foothold in the first houses of Damloup.
The struggle was continued without pause during the night from June 2
to June 3, 1916. By repeated and vigorous attacks the Germans at last
entered the ditches to the north of the fortress of Vaux, but were
unable to penetrate the works occupied by the French.
About 8 o'clock in the evening of June 3, 1916, the Germans attempted
to surprise the fortress at the southeast by escalading the ravine
which cuts the bank of the Meuse near Damloup. This was foiled by the
French, who drove them back in a sharp counterattack. The Germans did
not make the attempt again at this time, but continued to bombard the
fort with heavy guns.
On June 4, 1916, at 3 in the afternoon, several German battalions
advancing from Vaux Pool attempted to climb the slopes to the wood of
Fumin, but were swept back by French machine-gun fire. In the evening
and during the night the Germans repeatedly attacked without gaining
any advantage. The wood of Fumin remained in French possession.
[Illustration: Verdun to St. Mihiel.]
There were no attacks on the following day, owing to weather
conditions and the general exhaustion of the German troops. But
the Sixth German Artillery resumed its firing on the fortress,
throwing such an avalanche of shells that every approach to the place
became impassable. Inside the works a mere handful of French under
Major Raynal firmly held its ground.
[Illustration: The thoroughly organized French Aviation camp near
Verdun, as seen by an aviator flying at a height of 500 meters (about
1640 feet). As the war continues, the daring and skill of aviators win
more and more admiration.]
In the evening of June 6, 1916, the garrison of the fortress of Vaux
repulsed a savage German attack; but during the night, owing to the
tremendous bombardment which cut off all communication with the
fortress, the position of the French became serious indeed. The brave
garrison was now entirely surrounded. Finally by means of signals they
were able to make their condition known to French troops at some
distance away. Unless they could get speedy assistance there was no
hope of their holding the fort. The struggle continued more
desperately than ever as the Germans realized how precarious was the
French hold on the place.
On June 6, 1916, the French gunner Vannier, taking with him some
comrades, most of whom were wounded, succeeded in escaping through an
air hole and tried to reach the French lines.
The heroic garrison had now reached the limit of human endurance.
Without food or water, it was hopeless for them to continue their
defense of the place. When the last hope was gone, Major Raynal
addressed this message to his men:
"We have stayed the limit. Officers and men have done their duty. Long
live France!"
On June 7, 1916, the Germans took possession of the fortress and its
heroic garrison.
Major Raynal for his brave conduct was by order of General Joffre made
a Commander of the Legion of Honor. According to a German report
Raynal was permitted by the crown prince to retain his sword in
appreciation of his valorous defense of the fort. It must be conceded
that the capture of Fort Vaux, though costly, was a valuable
acquisition to the Germans, and served to hearten and encourage the
troops who had met with so many disasters in this area.
By this victory they were brought into contact with the inner line of
the Verdun defenses, and now if ever were in a position for a supreme
effort which might decide the war, as far as France was concerned. But
if this desired end was to be obtained, the crushing blow must be
delivered at once, for time threatened. Russian successes on the
southeastern front had created a new and serious problem. It was known
that a Franco-British offensive was imminent. The Germans were in a
situation that called for heroic action: the capture of Verdun with
all possible speed.
During the month of June, 1916, the Germans used up men and material
on a lavish and unprecedented scale. On June 23, 1916, they started a
general attack against the French positions of Froideterre, Fleury,
and Souville. From papers taken from prisoners it was learned that a
very great offensive was intended which the Germans believed would
carry them up to the very walls of Verdun. The German troops were
ordered to advance without stopping, without respite, and regardless
of losses, to capture the last of the French positions. The assaulting
force that was to carry out this program was estimated to number
between 70,000 and 80,000 men.
Preceded by a terrific bombardment the Germans attacked at 8 o'clock
in the morning of June 23, 1916, on a front of five kilometers, from
Hill 321 to La Lauffée. Under the fury of the onslaught the French
line was bent in at a certain point. The Thiaumont works and some
near-by trenches were carried by the Germans. One of their strong
columns succeeded in penetrating the village of Fleury, but was
speedily ejected. To the west in the woods of Chapître and Fumin all
the German assaults were shattered. During the night the French
counterattacked; they recaptured a part of the ground lost between
Hills 320 and 321 and drove the Germans back as far as the Thiaumont
works.
[Illustration: Verdun gain up to August, 1916.]
The battle raged with varying fortunes to the combatants all day long
on June 24, 1916. The village of Fleury in the center was directly
under fire of the German guns, and they succeeded in occupying a group
of houses. The French delivered a dashing counterattack, and were
successful in freeing all but a small part of the place. On the 25th
the Germans doubled the violence of their bombardment. Not since they
assumed the offensive had they launched such a tornado of
destructive fire. Another objective of the Germans besides Fleury was
the fortress of Souville. In the ravines of Bazile they suffered
appalling losses, but succeeded in gaining a foothold in the wood of
Chapître. The French, counterattacking, regained most of the lost
ground, and still held the village of Fleury.
The struggle around Thiaumont works continued for days, during which
the place changed hands several times. It was recaptured by the French
on June 28, 1916, lost again on the following day, retaken once more,
and on July 4, 1916, it was again in German hands. The struggle over
this one position will give some impression of the intensity of the
fighting along the entire front during this great offensive which the
Germans hoped and believed would prove decisive.
The general tactics pursued by the Germans in these attacks never
varied. They made their efforts successively on the right and on the
left of the point under aim, so that they could encircle the point
which formed in this manner a salient, and was suitable for
concentration of artillery fire.
The Germans failed to make any serious advance in the center of the
French lines, being halted by vigorous counterattacks.
On July 12, 1916, the Germans attacked with six regiments and pushed
their way to the roads to Fleury and Vaux within 800 meters of the
fortress of Souville. This advance during the next few days was halted
by the French.
The Germans claimed to have captured thirty-nine French officers and
2,000 men during their attack. They did not, apparently, attempt to
pursue their advantage and press on, but returned to bombarding the
French works at Souville, Chênois, and La Lauffée. As the Allied
offensive on the Somme developed strength, the German attacks on
Verdun perceptibly weakened, and beyond a few patrol engagements in
Chênois Wood, no further infantry fighting was reported from Verdun on
July 16, 1916. But the French continued to "nibble" into the German
positions around Fleury three miles from Verdun, and had improved and
strengthened their positions at Hill 304. Fleury was now the nearest
point to Verdun that the Germans had succeeded in reaching, but here
their advance was halted.
The British had meanwhile been pressing forward on the Somme, and by
July 23, 1916, had penetrated the German third line. The Russians too
were winning successes, and had dealt a destructive blow in Volhynia.
The pressure from the east and west forced the Germans to withdraw
large bodies of troops from the Verdun sector and send them to the
relief of their brothers on other fronts.
In the closing days of July, 1916, the Franco-British "push" became
the principal German preoccupation. The great struggle for Verdun, the
longest battle continuously fought in history, from that time on
became a military operation of only second importance.
The magnitude of this great struggle may be illustrated by a few
statistics. In the six months' combat some 3,000 cannon had been
brought into action. About two millions of men had attacked or
defended the stronghold. No correct estimate can be made of the losses
on both sides, but it is stated that at least 200,000 were killed, and
the end was not yet in sight.
The second anniversary of the war found the Germans on the defensive.
Twenty million fighters had been called to the colors of twelve
belligerent nations; about four million had been killed, and over ten
million wounded and taken prisoners. For all this vast expenditure in
blood and treasure no decisive battle had been fought since the German
defeat on the Marne in September, 1914.
CHAPTER XLVII
SPRING OPERATIONS IN OTHER SECTORS
While greater issues were being fought out in the Verdun sector, from
the beginning of the second phase of the German attack during March,
there was considerable sporadic "liveliness" on other parts of the
western front. Though the main interest centered for the time around
the apparently impregnable fortresses of which Verdun is the nucleus,
a continuous, fluctuating activity was kept in progress along the
whole line up to the opening of the big allied offensive on the last
day of June. March 1, 1916, found the battle line practically
unchanged. From Ostend on the North Sea it ran straightway south
through the extreme western comer of Belgium, crossing the French
frontier at a point northwest of Lille. From there it zigzagged its
way to a point about sixty miles north of Paris, whence it then
followed an eastern tangent paralleling the northern bank of the River
Aisne; thence easterly to Verdun, forming there a queer half-moon
salient arc with the points bent sharply toward the center. From the
south of Verdun the line extended unbroken and rather straight south
and a little easterly to the Swiss frontier.
In the Ypres sector during the first four days of March the fighting
was confined to the usual round of violent artillery duels, mine
springing, hand grenade skirmishing, intermittent hand-to-hand attacks
and effective aircraft raids. On March 1, 1916, twenty British
aircraft set out seeking as their objective the important German lines
of communication and advanced bases east and north of Lille.
Considerable damage was inflicted with high explosive bombs. One
British aeroplane failed to return. From all parts thrilling, tragic
and heroic aerial exploits are recorded. While cruising over the
Beanon-Jussy road a German Fokker observed a rapidly moving enemy
transport. Reversing his course, the pilot floated over the procession
and dropped bombs. The motor lorries stopped immediately, when the
aeroplane dropped toward the earth, attacked the transport at close
range and got away again in safety. On the same day also a French
biplane equipped with double motors encountered an enemy plane near
Cernay, in the valley of the Thur, and brought it down a shattered
mass of flame. North of Soissons, near the village of Vezaponin, a
French machine was shot down into the German lines; another French
aero was struck by German antiaircraft guns; with a marvelous dive and
series of loops it crashed to earth. Both pilot and observer were
buried with their machine. During the evening of March 1, 1916, the
German infantry, after a furious cannonading north of the Somme,
delivered a sharp assault on a line of British trenches, but were held
back by machine-gun fire. Along the Ypres sector the same night
violent gunfire took place on both sides with apparently small effect
or damage. In a previous volume it was mentioned that the Germans had
once more recaptured the "international trench" on February 14, 1916.
For a fortnight the British artillery constantly held the position
under fire and prevented the consolidation of the ground. At 4.30 a. m.
the British infantry suddenly emerged from their trenches. The
grenadiers dashed ahead, smothering the surprised Germans with bombs.
The general disorder was increased by the fact that the trench parties
were just being relieved. In a few minutes the lost ground was
recovered, the German line dangerously pushed in and 254 prisoners,
including five officers, fell to the British. At midday the Germans
bombarded the line with fifty batteries for four hours. Then waves of
assaulting columns were let loose against the British. The latter
noticed that the front line of infantry hurled their bombs several
yards _behind_ the British trenches and rushed forward with hands up.
Immediately a hurricane of shells from their own guns burst among the
German infantry. The survivors flung themselves on the ground and
crawled into the British trenches for protection. This action was the
more significant in that the men who thus surrendered were all very
young and belonged to a regiment which, until then, had fought with
conspicuous bravery. At the end of the day the British counted more
than 300 corpses, while their own losses were slight and their entire
gains maintained.
Most of the combats in the Artois and Ypres sectors consisted of mine
springing and crater fighting. What was once the Hohenzollern Redoubt
was particularly the scene of some vigorous subterranean warfare. What
happened there on March 2 is thus described by an eyewitness: "Many
huge craters have been made, won, and what is more, retained by a rare
combination of skill, courage, and endurance. Men who fought all
through the war have seen nothing comparable with the largest of
these craters. They are amphitheaters, and cover perhaps half an acre
of ground. When the mine exploded at 5.45 p. m. on March 2, 1916, a
thing like a great black mushroom rose from the earth. Beneath it
appeared, with the ponderous momentum of these big upheavals, a white
growth like the mushroom's gills. It was the chalk subsoil following
in the wake of the black loam. With this black and white upheaval went
up, Heaven knows, how many bodies and limbs of Germans, scattered
everywhere with the rest of the débris. And the explosion sent up many
graves as well as the bodies of the living. One of the British bombers
who occupied the crater and spent a crowded hour hurling bombs from
the farther lip found that he was steadying himself and getting a
lever for the bowling arm by clinging on to a black projection with
his left hand. It was a Hessian boot. The soil of the amphitheater was
so worked, mixed, and sieved by the explosive action and the effects
of the melting snow that it was almost impassable. A staff officer,
among others, who went up to help, had to be pulled out of the morass
as he was carrying away one of the wounded. There is no fighting so
terrible and so condensed as crater fighting. The struggle is a
veritable graveyard, a perfect target for bomb and grenade and the
slower attack of the enemy's mine. The British held a circle of German
trenches on a little ridge of ground north of Loos. The capture meant
that they could overlook the plain beyond and win a certain
projection. At 6.00 p. m. on March 2, 1916, the engineers exploded
four mines under the nearer arc, and within a few minutes, while
artillery thundered overhead, the British infantry advanced in spite
of terrible mud and occupied each crater. Not a single machine gun was
fired at them as they charged--probably the mines had destroyed them
all--and their casualties were very small indeed."
Germans counterattacking hurried up their communication trenches, and
as they came on some examples of prompt handiwork stopped their
advance. A sergeant and one man stopped one rush; a color sergeant and
private, well equipped with sandbags, each holding a score of bombs,
performed miracles of resistance. Every night the Germans came on,
capping a day of continuous bombardment with showers of bombs, rifle
grenades, and artillery, mostly 5.9 howitzers, and with infantry
onsets at close quarters. They stormed with dash and determination,
backed by good artillery and an apparently inexhaustible stock of
grenades. The tale of the German losses was high. One communication
trench packed with men was raked from end to end with a British Lewis
gun till it was a graveyard. On this occasion the British artillery
was overwhelming in amount and volume; shells were not spared, and
they fired ten to the Germans' one. Within less than a mile and a half
there were eight groups of mines.
On March 3, 1916, an intense artillery duel progressed for possession
of the Bluff, an elevated point above the Ypres-Comines Canal. The
Germans evidently regarded the point as important, for they flung
great masses of troops over the Bluff, when the British attacked and
captured more than their lost lines of trenches running along an
eastern hillock by the canal. The next night and morning the British
heavy artillery poured a continuous stream of shell on the Bluff in
well-marked time. The men in the front trenches began cheering, as
always before an attack, but instead of advancing they shot over a
heavy shower of bombs. One soldier alone was credited with having
flung more than 300 bombs into the German trenches. In the obscurity
of the gray dawn British troops quietly and suddenly dashed into the
Germans and cleared the trenches with bayonets. This was accomplished
in two minutes, when the large guns spread a curtain of fire over the
Germans, inflicting severe losses. The German soldiers then attempted
resolute counterattacks, but were repulsed with machine-gun fire.
Between the 1st and 4th of March, 1916, there was sharp grenade
fighting southeast of Vermelles, in some mine craters. After severe
bombardment the Germans attempted to recapture the craters by infantry
attacks, but apparently without success. In Artois they endeavored to
drive the French from a crater they occupied near the road from
Neuville to La Folie, and failed in the enterprise. In the Argonne the
French bombarded the German organizations in the region southeast of
Vauquois and demolished several shelters, while in Lorraine, in the
neighborhood of the Thiauville Ponds, the French carried sections of
German trenches after artillery preparation, capturing sixty
prisoners, including two officers, and some machine guns. On March 4,
1916, a serious explosion occurred in the powder magazine known as
"Double Couronne," St. Denis, a fort used by the French as a munitions
store. The concussion was so terrific that a car a considerable
distance away and containing thirty-two passengers was overturned and
nearly all were injured. Altogether the casualties amounted to about
thirty-five killed and 200 wounded.
In the Ypres sector during March 4 and 5, 1916, the fighting came to a
standstill and the positions remained unchanged. In the Champagne
vigorous artillery action continued on both sides with occasional
infantry attacks and counterattacks of little consequence. In the
district about Loos and northeast of Ypres heavy cannonading endured
all day on the 6th, the Germans hurling quantities of large caliber
shells over the enemy's trenches without any apparent object. On the
Ypres-Comines Canal the British still held the positions gained by
storm on March 2, 1916. Near Soissons the French heavily bombarded the
German works, and their terrific fire at Badenviller in Lorraine
compelled a German retirement from the positions established there
February 21, 1916. In the Flanders sector, on the Belgian front,
concentrated artillery fire silenced German bomb throwers in a futile
attempt to capture a trench. In the Woevre district the German troops,
after a fierce assault, stormed the village of Fresnes and captured
it, the French retaining a few positions on the outskirts. The German
infantry advanced in close formation and literally swarmed into the
village, while the French 75's and machine guns tore great gaps in
their ranks. Northeast of Vermelles small detachments of British
troops penetrated the German trenches on March 6, 1916, but were
compelled to retire. Active engagements and furious hand-to-hand
fighting centered around Maisons de Champagne. The positions the
French had taken on February 11, 1916, were recaptured by surprise
bayonet attacks, the Germans taking two officers and 150 men
prisoners. In the Argonne region attempts on the part of the Germans
to occupy some mine craters were repulsed.
CHAPTER XLVIII
BATTLE OF THE SOMME--ALLIED PREPARATIONS--POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING
FORCES
Picardy, where the great battle of the Somme was staged in the summer
of 1916, is a typical French farming region of peasant cultivators, a
rolling table-land, seldom rising more than a few hundred feet, and
intersected by myriad shallow, lazy-flowing streams. Detached farms
are few, the farmers congregating in and around the little villages
that stand in the midst of hedgeless corn and beet fields stretching
far and wide. Here the Somme flows with many crooked turns, now
broadening into a lake, now flowing between bluffs and through swamps.
There is, or rather was, an inviting, peaceful look about this
country. Untouched, remote from the scene of battle it seemed, yet
here in the spring of 1916 preparations were already going forward for
what was to prove one of the fiercest struggles of the Great War.
In July, 1915, the British had taken over most of the line from Arras
to the Somme, and had passed a quiet winter in the trenches. The long
pause had been occupied by the active Germans in transforming the
chalk hills they occupied into fortified positions which they believed
would prove impregnable. The motives for the Allies' projected
offensive on the Somme were to weaken the German pressure on Verdun,
which had become severe in June, and to prevent the transference of
large bodies of troops from the west to the eastern front where they
might endanger the plans of General Brussilov.
The British had been receiving reenforcements steadily, and were at
the beginning of 1916 in a position to lengthen their line sensibly.
In the neighborhood of Arras they were able to relieve an entire
French army, the Tenth. The French on their side had by no means
exhausted their reserves at Verdun, but it would prove a welcome
relief to them if by strong pressure the long strain were lifted in
Picardy. Sir Douglas Haig, it was stated, would have preferred to
delay the Somme offensive a little longer, for while his forces were
rapidly increasing, the new levies were not as yet completely trained.
In view, however, of the general situation of the Allies in the west
it was imperative that the blow should be delivered not later than
midsummer of 1916.
The original British Expeditionary Force, popularly known as the "Old
Contemptibles," who performed prodigies of valor in the first terrible
weeks of the war, had largely disappeared. In less than two years the
British armies had grown from six to seventy divisions, not including
the troops sent by India and Canada. In addition there were large
numbers of trained men in reserve sufficient, it was believed, to
replace the probable wastage that would occur for a year to come. It
was in every sense a New British Army, for the famous old regiments of
the line had been renewed since Mons, and the men of the new
battalions were drawn from the same source that supplied their drafts.
The old formations had a history, the new battalions had theirs to
make. This in good time they proceeded to do, as will be subsequently
shown.
In the Somme area the German front was held by the right wing of the
Second Army, once Von Billow's, but now commanded by Otto von Below a
brother of Fritz von Below commanding the Eighth Army in the east. The
area of Von Below's army in the Somme region began south of Monchy,
while the Sixth Army under the Crown Prince of Bavaria lay due north.
The front between Gommecourt and Frise in the latter part of June was
covered in this manner. North of the Ancre lay the Second Guard
Reserve Division and the Fifty-second Division (two units of the
Fourteenth Reserve Corps raised in Baden, but including Prussians,
Alsatians, and what not), the Twenty-sixth and Twenty-eighth Reserve
Divisions, and then the Twelfth Division of the Sixth Reserve Corps.
Covering the road to Péronne south of the river were the One Hundred
and Twenty-first Division, the Eleventh Division, and the Thirty-sixth
Division belonging to the Seventeenth Danzig Corps.
[Illustration: Sector where Grand Offensive was Started.]
The British General Staff had decided that the Fourth Army under
General Sir Henry Rawlinson should make the attack. General Rawlinson
was a tried and experienced officer, who at the beginning of the
campaign had commanded the Seventh Division, and at Loos the Fourth
Army Corps. His front extended from south of Gommecourt across the
valley of the Ancre to the north of Maricourt, where it joined the
French. There were five corps in the British Fourth Army, the Eighth
under Lieutenant General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston; the Tenth under
Lieutenant General Sir T. L. N. Morland, the Third under Lieutenant
General Sir W. P. Pulteney, the Fifteenth under Lieutenant General
Home, and the Thirteenth under Lieutenant General Congreve, V. C. The
nucleus for another army, mostly composed of cavalry divisions, lay
behind the forces along the front. Called at first the Reserve, and
afterward the Fifth Army under the command of General Sir Hubert
Gough, it subsequently won renown in some of the hottest fights of the
campaign.
The French attacking force, the Sixth Army, once commanded by
Castelnau, but now by a famous artilleryman, General Fayolle, lay from
Maricourt astride the Somme to opposite Fay village. It comprised the
very flower of the French armies, including the Twentieth Corps, which
had won enduring fame at Verdun under the command of General
Balfourier. It was principally composed of Parisian cockneys and
countrymen from Lorraine, and at Arras in 1914, and in the Artois in
the summer of 1915, had achieved memorable renown. There were also the
First Colonial Corps under General Brandelat, and the Thirty-fifth
Corps under General Allonier. To the south of the attacking force lay
the Tenth Army commanded by General Micheler, which was held in
reserve. The soldiers of this army had seen less fighting than their
brothers who were to take the offensive, but they were quite as eager
to be at the enemy, and irked over the delay.
During the entire period of bombardment the French and British
aviators, by means of direct observation and by photographs, rendered
full and detailed reports of the results obtained by the fire. The
British and French General Staffs thus followed from day to day, and
even from hour to hour, the progress made in the destruction of German
trenches and shelters.
During the bombardment some seventy raids were undertaken between
Gommecourt and the extreme British left north of Ypres. Some of these
raids were for the purpose of deceiving the enemy as to the real point
of assault and others to identify the opposing units. Few of the
raiders returned to the British line without bagging a score or so of
prisoners. Among these raiding parties a company of the Ninth Highland
Light Infantry especially distinguished themselves.
Fighting in the air continued every day during this preliminary
bombardment. It was essential that the Germans should be prevented
from seeing the preparations that were going forward. The eyes of a
hostile army are its aeroplanes and captive balloons. Owing to the
daring of the French and British aviators the German flyers were
literally prohibited from the lines of the Allies during all that
time. In five days fifteen German machines were brought to the ground.
Very few German balloons even attempted to take the air.
On June 24, 1916, the bombardment of German trenches had reached the
highest pitch of intensity. The storm of shells swept the entire enemy
front, destroying trenches at Ypres and Arras and equally obliterating
those at Beaumont-Hamel and Fricourt.
By July 28, 1916, all the region subjected to bombardment presented a
scene of complete and appalling devastation. Only a few stumps marked
the spot where leafy groves had stood. The pleasant little villages
that had dotted the smiling landscape were reduced to mere heaps of
rubbish. Hardly a bit of wall was left standing. It seemed impossible
that any living thing could survive in all that shell-smitten
territory.
As the day fixed upon for the attack drew near the condition of the
weather caused the British command some anxious hours. The last week
of June, 1916, was cloudy, and frequent showers of rain had
transformed the dusty roads into deep mud. But in the excitement that
preceded an assault of such magnitude the condition of the weather
could not dampen the feverish ardor of the troops. There was so much
to be done that there was no time to consider anything but the work in
hand. A nervous exhilaration prevailed among the men, who looked
eagerly and yet fearfully forward to the hour for the great offensive
from which such great things were expected.
In the afternoon of the last day of June, 1916, the sky cleared and
soon the stars shone brightly in the clear, blue night. Orders were
given out to the British commanders to attack on the following morning
three hours after daybreak.
CHAPTER XLIX
THE BRITISH ATTACK
The first day of July, 1916, dawned warm and cloudless. Since half
past 5 o'clock every gun of the Allies on a front of twenty-five miles
was firing without pause, producing a steady rumbling sound from which
it was difficult to distinguish the short bark of the mortars, the
crackle of the field guns, and the deep roar of the heavies. The
slopes to the east were wreathed in smoke, while in the foreground lay
Albert, where German shells fell from time to time, with its shattered
church of Notre Dame de Bebrières, from whose ruined campanile the
famous gilt Virgin hung head downward. At intervals along the Allies'
front, and for several miles to the rear, captive kite balloons,
tugging at their moorings, gleamed brightly in the morning light.
The Allies' bombardment reached its greatest intensity about 7.15,
when all the enemy slopes were hidden by waves of smoke like a heavy
surf breaking on a rock-bound coast. Here and there spouts and columns
of earth and débris shot up in the sunlight. It seemed that every
living thing must perish within the radius of that devastating
hurricane of fire.
At 7.30 exactly there was a short lull in the bombardment--just long
enough for the gunners everywhere to lengthen their range, and then
the fire became a barrage. The staff officers, who had been studying
their watches, now gave the order, and along the twenty-five mile
front the Allies' infantry left the trenches and advanced to attack.
In this opening stage of the battle the British aim was the German
first position. The section selected for attack ran from north to
south, covering Gommecourt, passing east of Hebuterne and following
the high ground before Serre and Beaumont-Hamel, crossed the Ancre
northwest of Thiepval. From this point it stretched for about a mile
and a quarter to the east of Albert. Passing south around Fricourt, it
turned at right angles to the east, covering Mametz and Montauban.
Midway between Maricourt and Hardecourt it turned south, covering
Curlu, crossing the Somme at a marshy place near Vaux, and finally
passed east of Frise, Dompierre, and Soyecourt, to leave east of
Lihons the sector in which the Allied offensive was in progress which
we are describing.
The disposition of the British forces on the front of attack was as
follows: The right wing of Sir Edmund Allenby's Third Army and General
Hunter-Weston's Eighth Corps lay opposite Gommecourt, and down to a
point just south of Beaumont-Hamel. North of Ancre to Authuille was
General Morland's Tenth Corps, and east of Albert General Pulteney's
Third Corps, a division directed against La Boiselle, and another
against Ovillers. Adjoining the French forces on the British right
flank lay General Congreve's Thirteenth Corps.
The Allies' attack was not unexpected by the Germans, and they were
not entirely wrong as to the area in which the blow would be
delivered. From Arras to Albert they had concentrated large forces of
men and many guns, but south of Albert they were less strongly
prepared. Their weakest point was south of the Somme, where the Allies
had all the advantage. In recording the history of the day's fighting
two separate actions must be described, in the north and in the south.
The Allies failed in the first of these, but in the second they gained
a substantial victory over the German hosts. The most desperate
struggle of the day was fought between Gommecourt and Thiepval.
Three of the British divisions in action here were from the New Army;
one was a Territorial brigade and the two others had seen hard
fighting in Flanders and Gallipoli. They confronted a series of
strongly fortified villages--Gommecourt Serre, Beaumont-Hamel, and
Thiepval--with underground caves that could shelter whole battalions.
A network of underground passages led to sheltered places to the rear
of the fighting line, and deep pits had been dug in which, in time of
bombardment, the machine guns could be hidden. The Germans had also
direct observation from the rear of these strongholds, where their
guns were massed in large numbers.
Occupying such strong positions with every advantage in their favor,
it is easy to understand why the British troops that attacked from
Gommecourt to Thiepval failed to attain their objective. If the
British bombardment had reached a high pitch of intensity on the
morning of July 1, 1916, the German guns were no less active, and
having the advantage of direct observation, their explosive shells
soon obliterated parts of the British front trenches, compelling the
British to form up in the open ground. A hot barrage fire of shrapnel
accurately directed followed the British troops as they advanced over
no-man's-land. Into a very hell of shrapnel, high explosives, rifle
and machine-gun fire they pushed on in ordered lines. Soon the
devastating storm of German artillery fire cut great gaps in their
formation, yet not a man hung back or wavered. And this destructive
German fire, accurate and relentless, the British soldiers faced
unflinchingly from early dawn to high noon. Here and there the German
position was penetrated by the more adventurous spirits, some
detachments even forcing their way through it, but they could not hold
their ground. The attack was checked everywhere, and by evening what
was left of the British troops from Gommecourt to Thiepval struggled
back to their old line.
The British had failed to win their objective, but the day had not been
wholly wasted; they had struck deep into the heart of the German defense
and inspired in the enemy a wholesome respect for their fighting powers.
In this stubborn attack nearly every English, Scotch, and Irish regiment
was represented--a Newfoundland battalion, a little company of
Rhodesians, as well as London and Midland Territorials--all of whom
displayed high courage. Again and again the German position was pierced.
Part of one British division broke through south of Beaumont-Hamel and
penetrated to the Station road on the other side of the quarry, a
desperate adventure that cost many lives. It was at Beaumont-Hamel,
under the Hawthorne Redoubt, that exactly at 7.30 a. m., the hour of
attack, the British exploded a mine which they had been excavating for
seven months. It was the work of Lancashire miners, the largest mine
constructed thus far in the campaign. It was a success. Half the village
and acres of land sprang into the air, blotting out for a time the light
of the sun on the scene and hiding in a pall of dust and smoke the
rapidly advancing British troops.
In the day's fighting the Irish soldiers were especially distinguished
for many remarkable acts of bravery. The Royal Irish Fusiliers were
the first to leave the trenches. To the north of Thiepval the Ulster
Division broke through the German position at a point called "The
Crucifix," holding for a time the formidable Schwaben Redoubt, and
some even penetrated the outskirts of Grandcourt. The Royal Irish
Rifles swept over the German parapet, and, assisted by the
Inniskillings, cleared the trenches and destroyed the machine gunners.
Through the enemy lines they swept, enfiladed on three sides, and
losing so heavily that only a few escaped from the desperate venture.
But the gallant remnant that struggled back to their own line took 600
prisoners, one trooper alone bringing in fifteen through the enemy's
own barrage.
The village of Fricourt, as will be seen by the map, forms a prominent
salient, and the British command decided to cut it off by attacking on
two sides. An advance was planned on the strongly fortified villages
of Ovillers and La Boiselle. The British on the first day won the
outskirts and carried all the intrenchments before them, but had not
gained control of the ruins, though a part of a brigade had actually
entered La Boiselle and held a portion of the place. To complete the
operation of cutting off Fricourt it was necessary to carry Mametz on
the south; this accomplished, the forces would unite in the north at
La Boiselle and Ovillers and, following the long depression popularly
known as Sausage Valley toward Contalmaison, would be able to squeeze
Fricourt so hard that it must be abandoned by the enemy. The British
plans worked out successfully. A division that had been sorely
punished at Loos and was now occupying a position west of Fricourt had
now an opportunity to avenge its previous disaster. With grim
determination to clean up the old score against the Germans, they
advanced rapidly into the angle east of Sausage Valley, carrying two
small woods and attacking Fricourt from the north and occupying a
formidable position that threatened Fricourt.
The strongly fortified village of Montauban fell early in the day of
July 1, 1916. Reduced to ruins, it crowned a ridge below the position
of the British lines in a hollow north of the Péronne road at Carnoy.
The British artillery had done effective work, and the attack on
Montauban resulted in an easier victory than had been expected. The
Sixth Bavarian Regiment which defended the place was said to have lost
3,000 out of the 8,500 who had entered the battle. Here for the first
time in the campaign was witnessed the advance in line of the soldiers
of Britain and France.
It was a moving sight that thrilled and heartened all the combatants.
The Twentieth Corps of the French army lay on the British right, while
the Thirty-ninth Division under General Nourisson marched in line with
the khaki-clad Britons.
Only after surveying the captured ground did the French and British
realize what a seemingly impregnable stronghold had been won. Endless
labor had been expended by the Germans not only in fortifying the
place but in constructing dugouts that were well furnished and
homelike. The best of these were papered, with linoleum on the floor,
pictures on the wall, and contained bathrooms, electric lights and
electric bells. There were also at convenient points bolt holes from
which the occupants could escape in case of surprise. Some of the
dugouts had two stories, the first being reached by a thirty-foot
staircase. Another stairway about as long communicated with the lower
floor. Every preparation seemed to have been made for permanent
occupation. The Germans had good reasons for believing that their
position was impregnable. The utmost ingenuity had been employed to
fortify every point. Carefully screened manholes used by the snipers
were reached by long tunnels from the trenches. The most notable piece
of military engineering was a heavily timbered communication trench
300 feet long, and of such a depth that those passing through it were
safe from even the heaviest shells.
Late in the afternoon Mametz fell, after it had been reduced to a
group of ruined walls, above which rose a rough pile of broken masonry
that represented the village church. The Germans who occupied trench
lines on the southern side had shattered the British trenches opposite
Mametz so completely that the British infantry were forced to advance
over open ground.
CHAPTER L
THE FRENCH ATTACKS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE SOMME
From the hamlet of Vaux, ruined by German artillery, on the right bank
of the Somme, part of the battle field, with the configuration of a
long crest, looks like a foaming sea stretching away to the horizon.
Against the whitish yellow background the woods resolve into dark
patches and the quarries into vast geometric figures. In the valley
the Somme zigzags among the poplars; its marshy bed is covered with
rushes and aquatic plants; on the left stand crumbled walls
surrounding an orchard whose trees were shattered by German shells.
This is the mill of Fargny through which the French line passes. A
little beyond at a place called Chapeau-de-Gendarme was the first
German trench, and farther still in the valley stands the village of
Curlu, its surrounding gardens occupied by Bavarian troops. To the
eastward, half hidden by the trees, a glimpse could be had of the
walls of the village of Hem. In the distance a solitary church spire
marked the site of Péronne, a fortress surrounded by its moat of three
streams.
General Foch had planned his advance in the same methodical manner as
the British command. At half past 7 on the morning of July 1, 1916,
the French infantry dashed forward to assault the German trenches.
During a period of nearly two years the Germans had been allowed
leisure to strongly fortify their positions. At different points there
were two, three and four lines of trenches bounded by deep ditches,
with the woods and the village of Curlu organized for defense. But the
magnificent driving power of the French infantry carried all before
it, and by a single dash they overran and captured the foremost German
works. Mounting the steep ascent of the height that is called
Chapeau-de-Gendarme the young soldiers of the class of 1916, who then
and there received their baptism of fire, waved their hats and
handkerchiefs and shouted "Vive la France!"
The French troops had reached the first houses of the village of Curlu
occupied by Bavarian troops, who offered a most stubborn resistance.
Machine guns and mitrailleuses, which the French bombardment had not
destroyed, appeared suddenly on the roofs of houses, in the ventholes
of the cellars, and in every available opening.
The French infantry, obedient to the orders they had received, at once
stopped their advance and crouched on the ground while the French
artillery recommenced a terrible bombardment of the village. In about
half an hour most of the houses in the place had been razed to the
ground, and the enemy guns were silenced. This time without pause the
French infantry went forward and Curlu was captured without a single
casualty. The Germans later attempted a counterattack, but the village
remained in French hands.
There were found in the ruined houses a large number of packages which
had been put together by the Bavarians, consisting of articles of
dress, pieces of furniture, household ornaments, and a great variety
of objects stolen from the inhabitants of the village. The sudden
attack of the French troops did not allow the Bavarians time to
escape with their loot.
During the three days that followed the French were entirely occupied
with organizing and consolidating the positions they had conquered.
At 7 a. m. on July 5, 1916, they began a fresh offensive. In a few
hours' fighting the village of Hem and all the surrounding trenches
had been captured. About noon the few houses in the village to which
the Germans had clung tenaciously were evacuated.
Thanks to the prudence of the French command and the wisdom of their
plans and the rapidity with which the attack had been carried out, the
casualties were less than had been anticipated and out of all
proportion to the value of the conquered positions.
While the French were thus forcing the pace and winning successes
north of the Somme, their brothers in arms south of the river were
carrying out some important operations with neatness and dispatch.
In this area the French launched their attack on July 1, 1916, at 9.30
a. m., on a front of almost ten kilometers from the village of Frise
to a point opposite the village of Estrees.
Here it was that a Colonial corps that had especially distinguished
itself during the war delivered an assault that was entirely
successful. The Germans were taken by surprise. The French captured
German officers engaged in the act of shaving or making their toilet
in the dugouts; whole battalions were rounded up, and all this was
done with the minimum of loss. One French regiment had only two
casualties, and the total for one division was 800. The villages of
Dompierre, Becquincourt, and Bussu were in French hands before
nightfall, and about five miles had been gouged out of the German
front. Southward the Bretons of the Thirty-fifth Corps, splendid
fighters all, had captured Fay. Between them the Allies had captured
on this day the enemy's first position without a break, a front of
fourteen miles stretching from Mametz to Fay. They had taken about
6,000 prisoners and a vast quantity of guns and military stores.
On July 2, 1916, the French infantry attacked the village of Frise,
and by noon the Germans were forced to evacuate the place. Here the
French captured a battery of seventy-sevens which the enemy had not
had time to destroy. Pushing rapidly on, the French took the wood of
Mereaucourt. The village of Herbecourt, a little more to the south,
was captured by the French after an hour's fighting. By early dark the
entire group of German defenses was taken, thus linking Herbecourt to
the village of Assevillers.
Between this last place and the river they broke into the German
second position. Fayolle's left now commanded the light railway from
Combles to Péronne, his center held the great loop of the Somme at
Frise village, while his right was only four miles from Péronne
itself.
During the day of July 3, 1916, the French continued their victorious
advance, capturing Assevillers and Flaucourt. During the night their
cavalry advanced as far as the village of Barleux, which was strongly
held by the Germans. On the day following, July 4, 1916, the Foreign
Legion of the Colonial Corps had taken Belloy-en-Santerre, a point in
the third line. On July 5, 1916, the Thirty-fifth Corps occupied the
greater part of Estrees and were only three miles distant from
Péronne.
The Germans attempted several counterattacks, aided by their
Seventeenth Division, which had been hurried to support, but these
were futile, and finally the German railhead was moved from Péronne to
Chaulnes.
There followed a few days' pause, employed by the French in
consolidating their gains and in minor operations. On the night of
July 9, 1916, the French commander Fayolle took the village of
Biaches, only a mile from Péronne. The German losses had been very
great since the beginning of the French offensive, and at this place
an entire regiment was destroyed. On July 10, 1916, the French
succeeded in reaching La Maisonette, the highest point in that part of
the country, and held a front from there to Barleux--a position beyond
the third German line. In this sector nothing now confronted Fayolle
but the line of the upper Somme, south of the river. North of the
stream some points in the second line had been won, but it had been
only partly carried northward from Hem.
The French attacks north and south of the Somme had at all points won
their objectives and something more. In less than two weeks Fayolle
had, on a front ten miles long and having a maximum depth of six and a
half miles, carried fifty square miles of territory, containing
military works, trenches, and fortified villages. The French had also
captured a large amount of booty which included 85 cannon, some of the
largest size, 100 mitrailleuses, 26 "Minenwerfer," and stores of
ammunition and war material. They took prisoner 236 officers and
12,000 men.
It might well be said that this was a very splendid result. But it
only marked the first stage in the French assault.
The measured and sustained regularity of this advance, the precision
and order of the entire maneuver, are deserving of a more detailed
description. If we examine what might be called its strategic
mechanism, it will be noted that south of the Somme the French line
turned with its left on a pivot placed at its right in front of
Estrees.
The longer the battle continued the more this turning movement became
accentuated. On July 3, 1916, the extreme left advanced from Mericourt
to Buscourt, the left from Herbecourt to Flaucourt, which was taken,
while the center occupied Assevillers.
On the 4th the right, abandoning in its turn the rôle of fixed point,
moved forward and took the two villages of Estrees and Belloy. Thus in
the first four days of July, 1916, the French forces operating south
of the Somme constantly marched with the left in advance.
After a pause for rest and to consolidate positions won, the attack
was again resumed by the left wing on the 9th, and carried before
Péronne, Biaches, and La Maisonette.
It will be seen by this outline of operations that the maneuver, which
began early in an easterly direction, developed into a movement toward
the south. The object as stated in the official communiqué was to
clear the interior of the angle of the Somme and to cover the right of
the French troops operating north of the river. This delicate maneuver
involved great difficulty and risk, inasmuch as the French right
flank became the target for an enfilading fire from the south. By
consulting the map it will be seen that the artillery positions south
of Villers direct an enfilading fire on the plateau of Flaucourt and
points near by. The French General Staff showed keen foresight in
parrying this danger by advancing the right at the proper moment.
By these operations the French had reached the actual suburbs of the
old fortified city of Péronne, occupying a strong strategic position
above the angle made by the Somme between Bray and Ham.
It is a natural and necessary road of passage for all armies coming
from the north or south that want to cross the river. Blücher in his
pursuit of the French armies after the Battle of Waterloo crossed the
Somme exactly at this point.
As a matter of fact at this time both adversaries were astride of the
river, the Allies facing the east and the Germans facing toward the
west. It is interesting to note that this is exactly the situation
that prevailed in the war of 1870, but with the rôles reversed. At
that time the Germans were attacking Péronne as the French forces were
attacking it in July, 1916; they came, however, from the direction of
Amiens, precisely as the French came on this occasion.
The French, on the other hand, were in the positions of the
Germans--they came from the north. The army of Faidherbe had its bases
at Lille and Cambrai as the Crown Prince of Bavaria had his in the
present war.
CHAPTER LI
THE BRITISH ATTACK (CONTINUED)
The British captured the fortified villages of Mametz and Montauban on
July 1, 1916. This success, as will have been noted, put the British
right wing well in advance of their center; and to make the gap in the
German position uniform over a broad enough front it was necessary to
move forward the left part of the British line from Thiepval to
Fricourt. At this time the extreme British left was inactive, in the
circumstances it seemed doubtful that a new attack would be
profitable, so what was left of the advanced guard of the Ulster
Division retired from the Schwaben Redoubt to its original line. The
front had now become too large for a single commander to manage
successfully, so to General Hubert Gough of the Reserve, or Fifth
Army, was given the ground north of the Albert-Bapaume road, including
the area of the Fourth and Eighth Corps.
Sunday, July 2, 1916, was a day of steady heat and blinding dust, and
the troops suffered severely. At Ovillers and La Boiselle the Third
Corps sustained all day long a desperate struggle. Two new divisions
which had been brought forward to support now joined the fighting. One
of these divisions successfully carried the trenches before Ovillers
and the other in the night penetrated the ruins of the village of La
Boiselle.
The Germans had evidently not recovered from their surprise in the
south, for no counterattacks were attempted, nor had any reserve
divisions been brought to their support. Throughout the long, stifling
July day squadrons of Allied aeroplanes were industriously bombing
depots and lines of communication back of the German front. The
much-lauded Fokkers were flitting here and there, doing little damage.
Two were sent to earth by Allied airmen before the day was over. The
Allies had a great number of kite balloons ("sausages") in the air,
but only one belonging to the Germans was in evidence.
With the capture of Mametz and positions in Fricourt Wood to the east,
Fricourt could not hold out, and about noon on July 2, 1916, the place
was in British hands. Evidently the Germans had anticipated the fall
of the village, for a majority of the garrison had escaped during the
night. But when the British entered the village, bombing their way
from building to building, they captured Germans in sufficiently large
numbers to make the victory profitable.
On Monday, July 3, 1916, General von Below issued an order to his
troops which showed that the German officers appreciated the
seriousness of the Allied offensive:
[Illustration: The English Gains.]
"The decisive issue of the war depends on the victory of the Second
Army on the Somme. We must win this battle in spite of the enemy's
temporary superiority in artillery and infantry. The important ground
lost in certain places will be recaptured by our attack after the
arrival of reenforcements. The vital thing is to hold on to our
present positions at all costs and to improve them. I forbid the
voluntary evacuation of trenches. The will to stand firm must be
impressed on every man in the army. The enemy should have to carve his
way over heaps of corpses...."
To understand the exact position of the British forces on July 3,
1916, the alignment of the new front must be described in detail.
The first section extended from Thiepval to Fricourt, between which
the Albert-Bapaume road ran in a straight line over the watershed.
Thiepval, Ovillers, and La Boiselle were positions in the German front
line. East of the last place the fortified village of Contalmaison
occupied high ground, forming as it were a pivot in the German
intermediate line covering their field guns.
The British second position ran through Pozières to the two Bazentins
and as far as Guillemont. Thiepval and Ovillers had not yet been
taken, and only a portion of La Boiselle, but the British had broken
through the first position south of that place and had pushed well
along on the road to Contalmaison. This northern section had been
transformed by warfare into a scene of desolation, bare, and
forbidding, seamed with trenches and pitted with shell holes. The few
trees along the roads had been razed--the only vegetation to be seen
being coarse grass and weeds and thistles.
The southern section between Fricourt and Montauban presented a more
inviting prospect. A line of woods extended from the first village in
a northeasterly direction, a second line running from Montauban around
Longueval. In this sector all the German first positions had been
captured. The second position ran through a heavily wooded country and
the villages of the Bazentins, Longueval, and Guillemont.
During the night of July 2, 1916, the British had penetrated La
Boiselle, and throughout the following day the battle raged around
that place and Ovillers. The fighting was of the most desperate
character, every foot of ground being contested by the opposing
forces. The struggle seesawed back and forth, here and there the
Germans gaining a little ground, only to lose it a little later when a
vigorous British attack forced them to fall back, and so the tide of
battle ebbed and flowed.
On July 4, 1916, the heat wave was broken by violent thunderstorms and
a heavy rain that transformed the dusty terrain into quagmires,
through which Briton and German fought on with undiminished spirit and
equal valor. On the morning of July 5, 1916, the British, after one of
the bloodiest struggles in this sector, captured La Boiselle and
carried forward their attack toward Bailiff Wood and Contalmaison.
In the five days' fighting since they assumed the offensive the
British had been hard hit at some points, but at others had registered
substantial gains. They had captured a good part of the German first
line and carried by assault strongly fortified villages defended
stubbornly by valiant troops. The total number of prisoners taken by
the British was by this time more than 5,000. These first engagements
had for the British one exceedingly important result: it gave to the
troops an absolute confidence in their fighting powers. They had shown
successfully that they could measure themselves with the best soldiers
of the kaiser and beat them.
During the day of July 5, 1916, the British repulsed several
counterattacks and fortified the ground that they had already won. On
this date Horseshoe Trench, the main defense of Contalmaison from the
west, was attacked, and here a battalion of West Yorks fought with
distinction and succeeded in making a substantial advance.
There was a pause in the fighting during the day of July 6, 1916, as
welcome to the Germans as to the British, for some rest was
imperative.
On Friday, July 7, 1916, the British began an attack on Contalmaison
from Sausage Valley on the southwest, and from the labyrinth of copses
north of Fricourt through which ran the Contalmaison-Fricourt
highroad.
South of Thiepval there was a salient which the Germans had organized
and strongly fortified during twenty months' preparation. After a
violent bombardment the British attacked and captured this formidable
stronghold. More to the south they took German trenches on the
outskirts of Ovillers.
The attack ranged from the Leipzig Redoubt and the environs of
Ovillers to the skirts of Contalmaison. After an intense bombardment
the British infantry advanced on Contalmaison and on the right from
two points of the wood. Behind them the German barrage fire, beating
time methodically, entirely hid from view the attacking columns.
By noon the British infantry, having carried Bailiff Wood by storm,
captured the greater part of Contalmaison. There they found a small
body of British soldiers belonging to the Northumberland Fusiliers who
had been made prisoners by the Germans a few days before and were
penned up in a shelter in the village. The British were opposed by the
Third Prussian Guard Division--the famous "Cockchafers"--who lost 700
men as prisoners during the attack. In the afternoon of the same day,
July 7, 1916, the Germans delivered a strong counterattack, and the
British, unable to secure reenforcements, and not strong enough to
maintain the position, were forced out of the village, though able to
keep hold of the southern corner.
On the following day, July 8, 1916, the British struggled for the
possession of Ovillers, now a conglomeration of shattered trenches,
shell holes and ruined walls. Every yard of ground was fought over
with varying fortunes by the combatants. While this stubborn fight was
under way the British were driving out the Germans from their
fortified positions among the groves and copses around Contalmaison,
and consolidating their gains.
In the night of July 10, 1916, the British, advancing from Bailiff
Wood on the west side of Contalmaison, pressed forward in four
successive waves, their guns pouring a flood of shells before them,
and breaking into the northwest corner, and after a desperate
hand-to-hand conflict, during which prodigies of valor were performed
on both sides, drove out the Germans and occupied the entire village.
The victory had not been won without considerable cost in casualties.
The British captured 189 prisoners, including a commander of a
battalion.
Ovillers, where the most violent fighting had raged for some days,
continued to hold out, though surrounded and cut off from all relief
from the outside. Knowing this the German garrison still fought on,
and it was not until July 16, 1916, that the brave remnant consisting
of two officers and 124 guardsmen surrendered.
We now turn to the British operations in the southern sector where
they were trying to clear out the fortified woods that intervened
between them and the German second line.
On July 3, 1916, the ground east of Fricourt Wood was clear of Germans
and the way opened to Mametz Wood. During the day the Germans
attempted a counterattack, and incidentally the British enjoyed "a
good time." A fresh German division had just arrived at Montauban,
which received such a cruel welcome from the British guns that it must
have depressed their fighting spirit. East of Mametz a battalion from
the Champagne front appeared and was destroyed, or made prisoner, a
short time after detraining at the railhead. The British took a
thousand prisoners within a small area of this sector. An eyewitness
describes seeing 600 German prisoners being led to the rear by three
ragged soldiers of a Scotch regiment "like pipers at the head of a
battalion."
The British entered the wood of Mametz to the north of Mametz village
on July 4, 1916, and captured the wood of Barnafay. These positions
were not carried without stiff fighting, for the Germans had fortified
the woods in every conceivable manner. Machine-gun redoubts connected
by hidden trenches were everywhere, even in the trees there were
machine guns, while the thick bushes and dense undergrowth impeded
every movement. In such a jungle the fighting was largely a matter of
hand-to-hand conflicts. The German guns were well served, and every
position won by the British was at once subjected to a heavy
counterbombardment. Indeed from July 4, 1916, onward, there was
scarcely any cessation to the German fire on the entire British front,
and around Fricourt, Mametz, and Montauban in the background.
On July 7, 1916, the British General Staff informed the French high
command that they would make an attack on Trônes Wood on the following
morning, asking for their cooperation. Assisted by the flanking fire
of the French guns, the British penetrated Trônes Wood, and obtained a
foothold there, seizing a line of trenches and capturing 130 prisoners
and several mitrailleuses. On the same day the French on the British
right were pushing forward toward Maltzhorn Farm.
Trônes Wood which for some days was to be the scene of the hottest
fighting in the southern British sector, is triangular in form and
about 1,400 meters in length, running north and south. Its southern
side is about forty meters. The Germans directed against it a violent
bombardment with shells of every caliber.
Owing to its peculiar position every advantage was in favor of the
defense. Maltzhorn Ridge commanded the southern part, and the German
position at Longueval commanded the northern portion. The German
second line in a semicircle extended around the wood north and east,
and as the covert was heavy, organized movement was impossible while
the German artillery had free play.
The British, however, continued to advance slowly and stubbornly from
the southern point where they had obtained a foothold, but it was not
until the fire of the German guns had been diverted by pressure
elsewhere that they were able to make any appreciable gains on their
way northward.
On July 9, 1916, at 8 o'clock the Germans launched desperate
counterattacks directed from the east to the southeast. The first
failed; the second succeeded in landing them in the southern part of
the wood, but they were ultimately repulsed with heavy losses. During
the night there was a fresh German attack strongly delivered that was
broken by British fire. Of the six counterattacks delivered by the
Germans between Sunday night and Monday afternoon, July 9-10, 1916,
the last enabled them to gain some ground in the wood, but it was at
a heavy cost. They did not long enjoy even this small success, for on
Tuesday, July 11, 1916, the British had recaptured the entire wood
excepting a small portion in the extreme northern corner.
On the same date the British advanced to the north end of Mametz Wood,
and by evening of July 12, 1916, had captured virtually the whole of
it, gathering in some hundreds of German prisoners in the operation.
The place had not been easily won, for while the whole wood did not
comprise more than two hundred acres or so, there was a perfect
network of trenches and apparently miles of barbed-wire entanglements,
while machine guns were everywhere. It was only after the British
succeeded in clearing out machine-gun positions on the north side, and
enfiladed every advance, that they were able to get through the wood
and to face at last the main German second position. This ran, as will
have been noted, from Pozières through the Bazentins and Longueval to
Guillemont. The capture of Contalmaison was a necessary preliminary to
the next stage of the British advance. After the fall of this place
Sir Douglas Haig issued a summary of the first of the gains made by
the Allies since the beginning of the offensive:
"After ten days and nights of continuous fighting our troops have
completed the methodical capture of the whole of the enemy's first
system of defense on a front of 14,000 yards. This system of defense
consisted of numerous and continuous lines of fire trenches, extending
to various depths of from 2,000 to 4,000 yards and included five
strongly fortified villages, numerous heavily wired and intrenched
woods, and a large number of immensely strong redoubts. The capture of
each of these trenches represented an operation of some importance,
and the whole of them are now in our hands."
General Haig's summary of what had been accomplished in the first
stage of the battle of the Somme was modest in its claims. The British
had failed in the north from Thiepval to Gommecourt, but in the south
they had cut their way through almost impregnable defenses and now
occupied a strong position that promised well for the next offensive.
At the close of the first phase of the battle the number of prisoners
in the hands of the British had risen to 7,500. The French had
captured 11,000. The vigor with which the offensive had been pushed by
the Allies caused the Germans to bring forward the bulk of their
reserves, but they were unable to check the advance and lost heavily.
CHAPTER LII
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
British commanders are methodical and believe in preparing thoroughly
before an attack, but they are ready at times to take a gambler's
chance if the moment seems opportune to win by striking the enemy a
sudden and unexpected blow.
At half past three in the morning of July 14, 1916, the British
started an attack with full knowledge of the risk involved, but hoping
to find the Germans poorly prepared. At Contalmaison Villa and Mametz
Wood they held positions within a few hundred yards of the German
line. It was the section from Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval where
the danger lay, for here there was a long advance to be made, as far
as a mile in some places, up the slopes north of Caterpillar Valley.
French officers are not inclined to err on the side of overcaution,
but on this occasion more than one of them expressed a doubt that the
projected British attack would succeed.
The 14th of July is a national holiday in France, the anniversary of
the fall of the Bastille. Paris was in gala attire, the scene of a
great parade, such as that city had not witnessed in its varied
history, when the Allied troops, Belgians, Russians, British, and the
blue-clad warriors of France, were reviewed by the President of the
Republic amid the frantic acclamations of delighted crowds. On this
day so dear to the heart of every French patriot the British troops in
Picardy were dealing hammer blows to the German line with the rallying
cry of "Vive la France" that made up in sincerity what it lacked in
Parisian accent.
The front selected for the British attack was a space of about four
miles from a point southeast of Longueval, Pozières to Longueval, and
Delville Wood. The work cut out for the British right flank to perform
was the clearing out of Trônes Wood still partly occupied by the
Germans. The two Bazentins, Longueval, and the wood of Delville were
either sheltered by a wood, or there was one close by that was always
a nest of cunningly hidden guns. More than a mile beyond the center of
the German position, High Wood, locally known as Fourneaux, formed a
dark wall in the background.
The British had only consolidated their new line on the day before the
attack of July 14, 1916, so every preparation was hurried at topmost
speed. In the first hours of the morning they began a furious
bombardment of the German positions. This was continued until 3.20 a. m.,
when the hurricane of fire abated. The Germans, as it developed
later, were not expecting an assault, such bombardments being of
frequent occurrence, a part of the day's program intended to impress
them, or to hide some stupid British strategy.
At 3.25 a. m., when the day was breaking and a faint light covered the
scene from a cloudy sky, the British infantry attacked. The Germans
were so completely surprised that the battalions which were assigned
to strike at the most distant points, hardly suffered a casualty
before they were within a few hundred yards of the enemy's defensive
wires. When the Germans did awake to their danger and loosed their
barrage fire, it fell to the rear of the attackers.
Success crowned the British efforts at every point on the line of
attack, though in such places where the German defenses had not been
destroyed the advance was necessarily slow. It may be of interest to
cite one instance to show how the British military machine worked on
this important day in the history of the battle of the Somme. In one
division there were two attacking brigades, each composed of two
battalions of the New Army, and two of the old regulars. It might
appear a hazardous experiment that the British command should have
placed the four battalions of the New Army in the first line, but the
inexperienced troops justified the confidence that had been placed in
them. They went forward with the dogged determination of old veterans,
and shortly after noon had triumphantly carried out the work assigned
to them. They had captured their part of the line and taken 662
unwounded men and 36 officers (among whom was a battalion commander),
while the booty included four howitzers, four field guns, and fourteen
machine guns and quantities of military stores.
By nightfall the British had captured the whole of the German second
line from Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval, a front of over three miles,
and had netted over 2,000 prisoners. Many of these belonged to the
Third Division of the German Guard, and included the commander of a
regiment. The commander of the Ninety-first Bavarian Regiment was
discovered by the British at the bottom of his dugout.
One of the most striking incidents of the day occurred on the British
right flank in Trônes Wood. On the night of July 13, 1916, an attack
had been delivered there when 170 men belonging to the Royal West
Kents were separated from their battalion. Having a few machine guns,
and being well supplied with ammunition, they fortified one or more
positions, and in spite of vigorous German attacks, were able to
maintain their posts all night until the British advance in the
morning gathered them in.
It was a bit of good luck that these men had strayed away from their
regiment, for the positions they had fortified now proved of great
value in clearing the Germans out of the wood.
One of the most picturesque episodes of the day's fighting was a
brilliant cavalry charge. This was the first time since the battle of
the Marne that the British had any opportunity to engage the enemy on
horseback. The French, however, had employed two squadrons in their
offensive in Champagne in September, 1915.
A British division, pushing their way northward against the Tenth
Bavarian Division, had penetrated the third German position at High
Wood supported by cavalry--a troop of the Dragoon Guard and a troop
of Deccan Horse. The mounted men proceeded to show their mettle and to
share in the fighting honors of the day. Beyond Bazentin-le-Grand on
the valley slopes they found cover for a time in the growing corn.
About eight in the evening the cavalry set out on their last advance
on foot and on horseback through the corn, riding down the enemy, or
cutting him down with lance and saber, and capturing a number of
prisoners. Their rapid success had a heartening effect on the whole
British line. Having reached their objective, the cavalry proceeded to
intrench, in order to protect the British infantry that was advancing
from High Wood.
Throughout the day's fighting the British airmen had been constantly
active despite the haze which hampered observation. In twenty-four
hours they had destroyed four Fokkers, three biplanes, and a
double-engined plane without the loss of a single British machine.
On July 15, 1916, the British consolidated the new ground they had
won, while their left advancing to the outskirts of Pozières attacked
the Leipzig Redoubt, and renewed the struggle for Ovillers which had
been fought over with scarcely any pause since July 7, 1916. Strong
counterattacks by the German Seventh Division forced the British out
of High Wood, or the greater portion of it, but the loss was not
serious, the place having served its purpose as a screen for the
British while consolidating their line.
Perhaps the fiercest struggle in this area was waged around Longueval
and Delville Wood, which became popularly known by the soldiers as
"Devil Wood." The struggle started there on the morning of July 14,
1916, and continued almost without pause for thirteen days. The losses
on both sides reached a formidable figure.
A better situation for defense could not have been selected. Delville
Wood presented a frightful jungle of shattered tree trunks and ragged
bushes interspersed with shell holes. There were cuttings through it
along which ranged the German trenches. Some seventy yards from the
trees on the north and east sides the Germans had a strong trench that
was crowded with machine guns, and the whole interior of the wood was
incessantly bombarded. Longueval, a straggling village to the
southwest of the wood, was a less troublesome problem.
Brigadier General Lukin's South African Brigade, which had been
ordered to clear the wood, succeeded in carrying it completely about
midday.
Those brigades which had been assigned the task of capturing Longueval
only gained a portion of it, and the Germans launching a counterattack
from the north end of the village, succeeded in forcing the British
back. Lukin's South Africans tried again on the 16th and 17th, but
failed with heavy losses, hanging on stubbornly to the southern
corner, where they were not relieved until the 20th.
It was during the four days' fighting in and around Delville Wood that
Lieutenant Colonel Thackera from the Transvaal, of the Third
Battalion, with Scots of other formations, made a desperate and heroic
defense. Without food or water the remnant clung to the position,
undismayed even when the withering fire of the enemy had thinned their
ranks and at last killed or wounded all the officers of one battalion.
But even under these depressing conditions the spirit of those who
remained had not weakened, and an attack subsequently made by
Brandenburgers of the Fifth Division was repulsed with considerable
losses.
[Illustration: The French Gains.]
The splendid courage displayed by the British New Army during these
days of intense fighting, and when all the odds were in favor of the
enemy, had done much to sustain the courage of the British command and
to offset the effect caused by heavy losses. The New Army for some
days had been trying conclusions with the German Third Guard Division
brought over from the Russian front in the spring, and considered by
the kaiser as the very flower of his forces. This division included
the Lehr Regiment, the Ninth Grenadiers, and the Guards Fusiliers.
Their reputation had preceded them, but the New Army were not disposed
to take them overseriously, and fought against them with as grim
determination as if they had been ordinary soldiers and not
distinguished soldiers of the War Lord. The crack regiments fought in
the main bravely, but the comparatively green troops of England made
up in initiative and audacity what they lacked in military experience,
and were more than a match for them. Each of these famous German
formations lost heavily.
Ovillers which had been bravely defended for some days was finally
captured by the British on July 16, 1916, thus clearing out the
principal obstacle in the way of a general assault on Pozières. On
this day the British were also successful in taking Waterlot Farm,
about midway between Longueval and Guillemont, which cut another slice
out of the German front. For three days a heavy rain and low mists
hindered the observation of the British airmen, who were unable to
detect the positions of the new batteries they knew the enemy was
setting up. The Germans had all the advantage, as the British were now
occupying their old trench lines and they had the register.
On July 20, 1916, the British Seventh Division attacked again at High
Wood in the hopes of extending their situation at Longueval, which by
this time was exposed to the enemy's attacks. They carried the entire
wood, but a portion to the north, where the Eighth Division of the
Fourth Magdeburg Corps were intrenched, and where for many weeks they
defied every effort of the British to oust them.
At this stage in the battle of the Somme the total of unwounded
prisoners captured by the British numbered 189 officers and 10,779
men. The German losses in guns included five 8-inch and three 6-inch
howitzers, four 6-inch guns, five other heavies, thirty-seven field
guns, sixty-six machine guns, and thirty trench mortars.
No exact estimate of the German losses in dead and wounded could be
made, but captured letters spoke of desperate conditions and of
terrible slaughter. One German battalion was reduced to three officers
and twenty-one men, and there was mention in these letters of several
other formations which had broken down through exhaustion and retired
from action.
* * * * *
It was imperative now for the British to finish off their capture of
the German second position and to prepare for a German attack which
might develop at any moment. From east of Pozières to Delville Wood
the enemy had lost their second line and were forced to construct a
switch line to establish a connection between the third position and
an uncaptured point, such as Pozières, in his second position.
There was stubborn fighting among the orchards of Longueval and the
outskirts of Delville, where the British made little headway, but
registered some gains. All their hopes were centered at this time on
their chief objectives, Guillemont and Pozières. The latter was
especially important, for it formed a part of the plateau of Thiepval.
If the British succeeded in gaining the crest of the ridge all the
country to the east would come under direct observation. The most
important points on the watershed were Mouquet Farm, between Thiepval
and Pozières, the Windmill east of the last place, High Wood, and the
high ground that lay directly east of Longueval. It was important that
the British should capture Guillemont in order to align the next
advance with the French forces. This task presented many difficulties,
for the advance from Trônes Wood must be made over a bare and
shelterless country that was under the Germans' direct observation
from Leuze Wood. There was also a strongly fortified quarry on its
western edge and a ravine to the south of it between Maltzhorn and
Falfemont Farms, while Angle Wood in the center was a German
stronghold.
The difficulties of the British position were summarized by Sir
Douglas Haig:
"The line of demarkation agreed upon by the French commander and
myself ran from Maltzhorn Farm due eastward to the Combles Valley, and
then northeastward up the valley to a point midway between
Sailly-Saillisel and Morval. These two villages had been fixed upon as
the objective respectively of the French left and my right. In order
to advance in cooperation with my right and eventually to reach
Sailly-Saillisel, our Allies had still to fight their way up that
portion of the main ridge which lies between Combles Valley on the
west and the river Tortille on the east. To do so they had in the
first place to capture the strongly fortified villages of Maurepas, Le
Forest, Rancourt, and Fregicourt, besides many woods and strong
systems of trenches. As the high ground on each side of the Combles
Valley commands the slopes of the ridge on the opposite side, it was
essential that the advance of the two armies should be simultaneous
and made in the closest cooperation."
The British made an attack on Guillemont from Trônes Wood on July 19,
1916. It was a rainy, foggy day, that hampered military operations,
and they failed to advance.
On the day following the French made a general attack that achieved
brilliant results. North of the Somme over a front of five kilometers
from Ridge 139 (800 meters north of Hardecourt) the French carried the
first German trenches. They reached as far as the slope east of the
height of Hardecourt. Their line passed the boundary of Maurepas, and
followed the highway from Maurepas to Feuillières. South of the Somme
they carried the whole of the German defense system from Barleux to
Vermandovillers. During the two following days the British guns
incessantly bombarded the entire German front. Two new corps had been
joined with the Fifth Army, the Second and First Anzac, which occupied
ground between the Ancre and south of the Albert-Bapaume road.
On July 23, 1916, the British launched a strong attack over a wide
front. The heaviest blows were centered on Pozières and the Windmill
on the left. The village was now a mass of rubble, but amid the ruins
the Germans had fortified almost every yard of ground, there were deep
and carefully prepared dugouts, cunningly concealed machine-gun
emplacements, and lines of covered trenches on every hand.
The British forces began the movement about midnight, delivering the
assault from two sides. A division of Midland Territorials advanced
from the southwest over the ground between Pozières and Ovillers.
About the same time an Anzac division advanced from the southeast.
German defenses south of the village were rapidly cleared by the
Midland "Terriers," who then occupied a line in the outskirts of the
village extending toward Thiepval.
To the Australian troops which had displayed such valor at Gallipoli
was assigned the most difficult task in this assault, for there was
first a sunken road heavily organized to capture which ran parallel
with the highway, then a strong line of trenches, and finally the
highway itself which ran through the center of the village in a direct
line.
The Australians gave a good account of themselves, and added to the
reputation they had gained on many fields early in the war. They were
of one opinion that they had never tackled a more dangerous job or
come under a hotter fire than in this attack. It was only after
intense fighting that they won the highway and established a line so
near the enemy that only the width of the road separated them.
Instances of personal bravery were many and a number of Victoria
Crosses were awarded for especially heroic deeds, a few of which
deserve special mention. Private Thomas Cooke, a machine gunner,
continued to fire after all his companions had been killed and was
found dead beside his gun. Second Lieutenant Blackburn having led four
parties of bombers against a formidable enemy position, captured 250
yards of trench, then after crawling forward and reconnoitering
returned and led his men to the capture of another long trench. Of all
the Australians who won the V. C. on this day none was more deserving
of the honor than Private John Leak. He was one of a party that had
captured a strongly fortified place. Noticing that the German bombs
were outranging the British he sprang from the trench and dashing
forward under hot machine-gun fire at short range, after bombing the
enemy's post, leaped in and bayoneted three German bombers.
Private John Leak's bravery received special mention in the official
report. "His courage was amazing, and had such an effect on the enemy
that, on the arrival of reenforcements, the whole trench was
recaptured."
The battle continued almost without pause, and by evening of July 24,
1916, the British had captured the greater part of Pozières. In the
morning of the following day the entire place was in their hands. The
Midland Territorials having taken two lines of trenches, linked up
with the Australians at the north corner of the village, where they
established themselves in a cemetery. As the Germans still held the
Windmill on much higher ground, they had good observation, and made
the most of it, bombarding the British position unceasingly until it
seemed smothered in smoke and fire. It seemed incredible that anything
could live in such a zone of death.
Captain C. W. Bean, who was with the Australians, has recorded his
impressions of the German bombardment in a few graphic lines.
"Hour after hour, day and night, with increasing intensity as the time
went on, the enemy rained heavy shell into the area. Now he would send
them crashing in on a line south of the road--eight heavy shells at a
time, minute after minute followed by a burst of shrapnel. Now he
would place a curtain straight across this valley or that till the sky
and landscape were blotted out.... Day and night the men worked
through it, fighting the horrid machinery far over the horizon as if
they were fighting Germans hand to hand, building up whatever it
battered down, burying some of them, not once, but again and again and
again. What is a barrage against such troops? They went through it as
you would go through a summer shower, too proud to bend their heads,
many of them, because their mates were looking. As one of the best of
their officers said to me: 'I have to walk about as if I liked it;
what else can you do when your own men teach you to?'"
PART IX--THE WAR IN THE AIR
CHAPTER LIII
THE VALUE OF ZEPPELINS IN LONG-DISTANCE RECONNOITERING--NAVAL
AUXILIARIES
The growing intensity and fierceness of the gigantic struggle between
the great nations of the world in the second half of the second year
naturally was reflected in the extraordinary activities of the aerial
fleets of the combatants. To give in detail the thousands of
individual and mass attacks is manifestly impossible in a restricted
work of this kind, and we shall have to be satisfied with a
description of the more important events in this latest of all
warfares.
Undoubtedly the most pronounced feature of aerial combat in 1916 was
the complete rehabilitation of the Zeppelin type of rigid airship
construction as an invaluable aid to the land and naval forces in the
difficult and dangerous task of reconnoitering the enemy forces. There
can be no doubt that the frequent raids of the eastern counties of
Great Britain were undertaken far more with the idea of gaining as
clear an idea as possible of the distribution of British naval units
in the North Sea than with the desire of hurling destruction from the
sky upon sleeping villages, towns, and, of course, harbors and
factories which might be of value to the British military forces. And
there also can be no doubt that for this purpose of reconnoitering
over immense areas the Zeppelin airship stands to-day unchallenged by
any other single means at the disposal of the army leaders.
The German Zeppelin airship carries at present a powerful
wireless-sending apparatus, the electric current for which is
furnished by one of the motors. These motors, five in number, are of
the six-cylinder Mercedes type, furnishing a total of 1,200
horsepower. Four of the motors are usually in service, the fifth being
held in reserve, and used in the meantime for furnishing the required
electric current. The wireless equipment is stated to have an
effective range of about 300 miles, due mainly to the great height of
the "sending station." It was this wireless equipment which is now
known to have precipitated the great naval battle off the Jutland
coast, and to have sent the German fleet to its home base before the
full force of the much superior British fleet had a chance to exercise
its crushing power.
According to the report of the captain of one of the German battle
cruisers, the Zeppelins, of which there were two in the early hours of
the battle, sighted a strong British naval force in the North Sea,
about two-thirds of the way from the British coast to Helgoland. The
information was flashed to Helgoland by the leading Zeppelin, which
was hovering more than two miles in the air, commanding an immense
area of the North Sea. The approach of the German fleet was unknown to
the British, although the Zeppelins could distinguish both fleets from
their great height.
As the battle developed and the British battle cruiser squadron became
sorely pressed by the superior forces opposed to them, calls for
assistance were flashed from them to the main fleet. The Zeppelins, of
course, caught the calls and set off at high speed northward with the
intention of giving timely warning to the German squadron battling
several thousand feet below them against the gradually increasing
British force.
The mist which hung over the North Sea made it difficult for the
Zeppelin commanders to distinguish objects clearly, but the same mist
prevented the British ship crews from sighting the airships in the
clouds. When the heavy black smoke from the battleships rushing south
at their highest speed was sighted by the northernmost Zeppelin, word
of the apparent strength of the reenforcements was flashed to the
German commander in chief and the order for retreat was given. While
the fleets executed their maneuvers, the British main forces arrived
and the greatest battle in naval history took place. Had it not been
for the timely warning from the Zeppelins hanging high in the air
above the sea, the German fleet might have been overwhelmed by the
huge forces rushing south to destroy it. Outnumbered by more than two
to one, its only safety lay in retreat--and so heavy had been the
fire, that the British commander did not press the pursuit too close.
For while the Germans knew to a ship the strength of their adversary,
the latter had to reckon with the unknown, hidden possibilities of
forces not yet seen. It cannot be denied that the Jutland naval battle
was a complete vindication of the use of Zeppelins as naval scouts, a
value now recognized by every naval officer in the world.
The second field of action in which the Zeppelin airship has shown a
certain measure of success is that of destroying small naval units of
the enemy. And not only the German airships have had occasion to show
their value, but the French have been especially successful in this
work. For several months previous to February, 1916, little had been
heard of the activities of the new French dirigibles, which were
reported to have been built, although a number of them were
continually cruising high in the air above Paris and in the district
north of the capital. Occasionally hints were dropped here and there
concerning their activity above the Channel and portions of the North
Sea, and in the early summer a fairly substantial report reached this
country to the effect that the new French lighter-than-air machines
were utilized chiefly in "submarine hunting."
In the early stages of the war, when military and naval aviation was
trying to adopt peace-time theories to war-time facts, Great Britain
attempted to hunt the German submarines with aeroplanes, or
hydroaeroplanes; but the method had its serious draw-backs. The
aeroplane is of necessity a fast traveling machine; it must make at
least forty miles an hour to be able to stay aloft. Whizzing through
the air at such speed is not conducive to a careful scrutiny of the
surface of the water below, necessary in order to detect the vague,
dim outlines of a submerged submarine. At first the pilots of naval
aeroplanes had considerable success in locating the submarines, and
Germany lost quite a few of them, before the reason was discovered.
Some one in Great Britain announced that it was easy to locate a
submarine from an aeroplane by the peculiar reflection in the sunlight
caused by the fine film of lubricating oil on the surface of the
water. As soon as this "tip" was communicated to Germany, submarines
discontinued the use of oil for lubrication, employing instead
deflocculated graphite. The fuel oil used in the Diesel engines for
propulsion on the surface is so thoroughly consumed and the exhaust
now is so free of oil that an oil film as an indication of submarine
proximity is no longer trustworthy. Besides, the submerged boat
_might_ be a friendly one, a fact which was borne upon the British
authorities on two separate occasions when scouting aeroplanes
reported submarines near, and speedy motor boats rushed to the attack.
In one case the British submarine is reported to have been rammed, and
in the other--so the story goes--the commander of the submarine
liberated a little buoy attached to the outside of the boat, which
rose to the surface and informed the watchers above that "a friend is
down below--not an enemy!"
The system followed now in the locating and possible destruction of
German submarines in the Channel and North Sea by French dirigibles is
as follows: The airships, chiefly of the _Astra_ type, travel at a
height of not more than 500 feet above the surface of the ocean, while
the observers constantly sweep the water within a radius of half a
mile with their glasses. Usually the airships are sent ahead at low
speed in spirals, or in a series of curves which enable them to cover
every square mile of watery area below. As soon as one of these
airships sights a submarine traveling submerged, it flashes the news
by wireless to destroyers which at the time may be fifty or more miles
away, and in the meantime endeavors to remain directly above the
submerged boat. Soon the destroyers arrive and, following the
direction of the airship, can ram or sink the submarine with almost
certain success. The French admiralty claims to have accounted for a
number of submarines by this method, but has found that the scheme no
longer will work. The German naval department, learning of the
airship patrol, has given its submarine commanders orders to travel at
great depth during daylight hours in the Channel and the southwestern
section of the North Sea, or to go to sleep on the bottom where the
sea is too shallow. In the evening the boat makes its escape from the
dangerous neighborhood.
The third field of action of airships--devastating hostile
countries--is the least valuable, although perhaps the most
spectacular of the activities of airships of the Zeppelin type. The
damage caused by the numerous Zeppelin raids over England, for
instance, is a subject of so much dispute that a true appreciation of
their value cannot be formed at present. While the German official
bulletins repeatedly declare that great material damage was done by
the bombs to military establishments, factories, harbor works, etc.,
the British statements dwell more upon the number of noncombatants who
were killed, and deny the infliction of any material damage.
Information of this kind is considered legitimate secrecy and it is
only when files of the British local and trade papers are examined
that an inkling of the real damage is obtained. Fires, boiler
explosions, railway traffic suspensions, and similar highly suggestive
items fill the columns of the papers, after every one of the Zeppelin
raids. On only one occasion, February 2, 1916, has the British War
Office admitted serious military damage in its official communication.
This communication was issued after exaggerated reports of the damage
caused had appeared in the German and neutral press, covering the
Zeppelin raids of January 30-31, 1916, and February 1, 1916, and
admitted officially the following: Bombs dropped totaled 393;
buildings destroyed: three railway sheds, three breweries, one tube
factory, one lamp factory, one blacksmith shop; damaged by explosions:
one munition factory, two iron works, a crane factory, a harness
factory, railway grain shed, colliery and a pumping station. "One of
the spectacular incidents of this raid was the chase of an express
train by the Zeppelin, the train rushing at its utmost speed of
seventy miles an hour into a tunnel, disappearing just as the first
bombs began to drop. The train remained in the tunnel for more than
an hour, waiting for the Zeppelin to fly away!" The official figures
of killed and wounded in this raid are given as sixty-seven killed,
and 117 injured.
During the month of July, reports of the new German super-Zeppelins
began to appear in British reports, and a number of neutral
correspondents endeavored to obtain authentic data concerning them.
Conflicting descriptions arrived from many sources, and it was not
until a Swiss reporter, equipped with extremely powerful glasses,
watched the trial flights of two of these super-Zeppelins above Lake
Constance, that fairly reliable information could be compiled.
One of these airships leaves Friedrichshafen every week for duty in
the North Sea, and the factory on the shore of Lake Constance expects
to be able to complete five machines every month after July, 1916. The
super-Zeppelin has two armored gondolas, without a visible connection,
although it is highly probable that such communication is provided for
within the outer envelope. Each gondola carries six machine guns and,
in addition, two quick-firing guns, as well as an aerial
torpedo-launching device, which was first used in the extensive air
raids on England in the last week of July.
The super-Zeppelin contains approximately 1,000,000 cubic feet of gas
and has a capacity of ten tons useful load. Of this load, about four
tons can be composed of bombs or other munitions, the remainder being
needed for fuel, machinery, and the crew, as well as ballast and
provisions. The gross weight of a fully equipped and loaded
super-Zeppelin is thirty tons, or roughly, 60,000 pounds. The
envelope, which heretofore has been painted gray with liquid aluminum
paint, now is impregnated thoroughly with finely divided metal, by
means of the Schoop metal-coating process, which is heralded as one of
the most far-reaching improvements in aerial navigation. By its means
the airship envelope is made absolutely impervious to atmospheric
influences.
For its protection against antiaircraft fire the new super-Zeppelins
carry apparatus in each gondola, producing artificial clouds of such
size and intensity as to envelop and shroud completely the entire
airship, rendering it absolutely invisible from below. While this
cloud expands and gradually grows thinner, the airship rises rapidly
in a vertical direction, speeding away while under protection of the
self-made clouds.
The motors of the latest Zeppelins weigh only 595 pounds each,
although developing 240 horsepower, which means that one horsepower is
developed for every three and three-quarter pounds of metal used. They
are fitted with twin pumps, double jet carburetors, and are usually
operated on mixtures consisting of one part benzol with one part
alcohol.
CHAPTER LIV
AEROPLANE IMPROVEMENTS--GIANT MACHINES--TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The experience gathered in the first eighteen months of the war by the
aviators of the hostile armies has done more for the development of
aeroplanes than many years of peaceful improvements could possibly
have accomplished. The ever increasing size, power and stability of
the heavier-than-air machine is plainly shown in the latest types of
battle planes, in which a spread of wings exceeding seventy-five feet
is no longer a novelty. True, the heralded approach of the gigantic
German battle triplanes did not take place in the second year of the
Great War, although it is an incontrovertible fact that such machines
have been built and are being used for some purpose. But none of them
took part in the fighting on the western front, nor has one of them
been seen on the Russian battle lines. There is reason to believe,
however, that these planes are used in naval reconnoitering, and their
great size permits of the carrying of large supplies of fuel, giving
them a great cruising radius. Reports from steamers plying the Baltic
state that gigantic aeroplanes have been sighted high up in the air by
captains and officers on Swedish and Danish ships, seemingly
maintaining a careful patrol of that sea against possible Russian and
British naval exploits.
There have been numerous unconfirmed reports concerning the use of
_cellon_, a tough and yet completely transparent material, in the
construction of aeroplanes on the German side, and occasional hints of
new "invisible" machines were dropped now and then. The reports
probably are based on some foundation of fact, but there is little to
show that _cellon_ is used to any large extent by the Teuton forces.
Samples of the material reached New York late in 1915, but the actual
uses to which it was put were not known at the time.
The tendency in recent months, especially on the western battle front,
has been the "attack in squadrons," instead of the individual combats
which made international heroes out of Boillot, Immelmann, Boelke,
Warneford and Navarre. The squadron attack was first employed by the
Germans in the Verdun operations. Previous to that time, only bombing
expeditions had been undertaken en masse, as many as sixty aeroplanes
taking part in a single attack. But actual aerial combat usually
engaged only two or four aviators.
Early in February of the second year of the war, several famous French
aviators fell victims to the new mode of warfare. It seems that as
soon as a machine would appear above the trenches in that section, six
or more German machines would rise quickly and surround the Frenchman.
Outnumbered and surrounded on all sides the French machines rarely got
back safely to their lines, among the first to be lost being George
Boillot, world-famous as an automobile racer.
The German tactics at once were imitated and improved on by the allied
forces, and by July, 1916, the French had perfected a system of
defense which, paradoxically speaking, may be termed "air-tight."
French aviation squadrons would be held in readiness at all times to
repel attacks, and twenty machines usually were considered a "unit."
At first sign of a hostile aeroplane approaching, ten French machines
would rise at top speed to a height of 10,000 feet, while five minutes
later the second ten would follow, rising to 5,000 feet. The
attacking machine usually would be found at a height intermediate
between the upper and lower French squadrons, both of which would
attack the invader vigorously, and with highly satisfactory results.
One of the lessons of these true aerial battles between opposing
squadrons has been the efficiency of the biplane, as compared with
that of the monoplane. When the war started the monoplane was
considered the machine par excellence for war use; its high speed and
quick maneuvering being cited as most important for fighting in the
air. Eighteen months of aerial battles have shown that for all-round
fighting, bombing and reconnoitering the biplane is far more
effective, and the construction of new monoplanes has been practically
abandoned by the allied governments. The Germans, it is true, have
found the Fokker type of monoplane a very efficient one, but the
number of Fokkers in use is comparatively small, when the great fleets
of Aviatiks and other well-known types of German biplanes are
remembered.
Exact statistics regarding the number of aeroplanes at present in use
along the various battle fronts are not available, but estimates made
by aviation officers, by correspondents and from notes in the
respective publications devoted to aviation abroad, fix it as in
excess of 12,000 machines. More than half of these are used by the
Allies on the western front; Germany is credited with 3,000
aeroplanes, Russia with about 1,000, Austria with 1,500, and Bulgaria
and Turkey with 500. In a statement made in the British House of
Commons, Mr. Tennant, speaking of the Royal British Flying Corps,
declared that 835 officers and 521 civilians were on the waiting list
of the Flying Corps in the last week of February, 1916.
France has definitely discontinued the use of monoplanes and is
manufacturing them solely for the British forces, as some of the
British aviators greatly prefer the monoplane. One of the reasons
given by the French for their action is the construction of Fokker
monoplanes by the Germans, which are so accurate a copy of the earlier
Morane monoplanes of the French that they could not be distinguished
from them in the air. Furthermore, the German copy of the Morane was
far speedier and could easily outdistance or overtake the French
machines of the same type. In place of the original Morane France now
has three types of speed planes, the Maurice Farman, a 110 mph.
biplane, the Morane-Saulnier, 111 mph., and Spad, 107 mph. The older
Nieuports, too, are fast machines, being capable of more than 100
miles per hour.
The new Maurice Farman speed plane is a biplane of small wing area,
the upper plane overhanging the lower. It is equipped with a new type
of Renault-Mercedes eight-cylinder motor, giving 240 horsepower at the
highest crank shaft speed. The Morane-Saulnier and the Spad are both
monoplanes, but of different shape and construction from the original
Morane; it is of the so-called monocoque type, made familiar to
Americans by the Duperdessin monocoques which took part in the Gordon
Bennett Cup race in Chicago in 1912. It is equipped with a device
which was first used in Germany and which permits the firing of the
gun through the propeller. It is an electric synchronizing device
which fires the gun at the exact moment when the bullet will pass
between the propeller blades.
Following the destructive raids of the German naval Zeppelins over the
eastern counties of England during the last days of January, 1916,
there came a period of retaliation flights by Allied aviators over
German cities, attacks on railway stations and munition depots,
culminating in the great attack of the coast of Schleswig-Holstein by
a fleet of British aeroplanes. On a certain section of this coast the
Germans have erected a series of Zeppelin hangars behind one of the
most elaborate systems of defenses known at present. According to
information which had reached the British admiralty, the German coast
north of the Kiel Canal is protected at intervals by the most powerful
antiaircraft artillery, including 4.1-inch guns, capable of firing
thirty-five pound shells to a height of 26,000 feet at the rate of ten
every minute. The risk which the British sea planes underwent was
great, but there seems to have been no hesitation on the part of the
aviators to fly to the attack.
Early in the morning of March 25, 1916, two sea-plane "mother ships,"
accompanied by a squadron of eight protected cruisers and fast
destroyers under the command of Commodore Tyrwhitt, started from the
east coast of England. When about fifty miles from Schleswig-Holstein
five sea planes and one "battle aeroplane" (according to the German
version of the attack) rose from the mother ships and flew toward
shore. What happened during the next two hours is still a matter of
doubt. Only two of the machines returned from the invasion, torn and
riddled with bullets and shrapnel, reporting the most terrific shell
fire from batteries of antiaircraft guns. The aviators declared,
however, that they "successfully bombarded the airship sheds." The
subsequent German report denied the claim, stating that none of the
machines succeeded in even reaching the Zeppelin stations, which were
several miles inland. Three of the sea planes were shot down by the
German guns, and the aviators were made prisoners. It was a gallant
attempt against heavy odds on the part of the British Flying Corps,
and its failure probably was due to the small number of machines
employed. If fifty or sixty machines had taken part in the attack, ten
or twelve might have been lost, but the others would probably have
been able to reach the sheds and do great damage to the Zeppelins
stationed there.
It was from the same sheds that three days later the Zeppelins arose
for their tremendous raids of England, during the week of March 30 to
April 4, 1916, as many as seven of the airships appearing over the
British Isles at the same time. During this series of raids London was
visited by one of the airship squadrons, the visit resulting in
twenty-eight deaths and forty-four injuries. Another squadron turned
northward and dropped bombs on Stowmarket, Lowestoft, and Cambridge,
while a third section of the air fleet attacked the northeast coast.
One of the attacking air cruisers was hit by gunfire, as well as by
bombs thrown from an aeroplane piloted by Lieutenant Brandon to a
height of several hundred feet above the Zeppelin. This ship, believed
to be the _L-15_, was so severely damaged that it was forced to
descend in the mouth of the Thames, after dropping overboard portions
of its machinery, gun, ammunition, and gasoline tank. The loss of the
airship was admitted by the German admiralty in a statement issued on
April 2, 1916, which said: "In spite of violent bombardment all the
airships returned, with the exception of _L-15_, which, according to
report, was compelled to descend in the waters of the Thames River.
Searches instituted by our naval forces have, up to the present, not
been productive of any result."
Zeppelin raids followed each other in quick succession, no less than
forty having been chronicled by July 31, 1916. They became so common,
in fact, that the people of England lost much of their first terror
and began to view the spectacle of a bombardment from the air as
something that was quite "interesting" to watch! How great the damage
caused to manufacturing and to railroads and shipping has been in the
course of these two-score air raids is something that the British
censor has jealously guarded. That such damage has been done is but
natural, for tons of explosives cannot be hurled from heights of two
miles upon a thickly populated district without doing considerable
harm. In one case, it is known, the first bomb dropped upon the power
house of the manufacturing town which was attacked, and put the entire
electric power and light supply out of business for a week.
Another Zeppelin raid, in which the attacking squadron suffered the
loss of an airship, took place on February 22, 1916, in the
neighborhood of Verdun. The Zeppelin _L-77_, one of the largest and
latest of the German air fleet, crossed the French battle lines at a
height of about 2,500 yards, when it was picked up by searchlights
stationed in the rear. A violent bombardment immediately began and one
of the exploding shells damaged the motor of the rear gondola. The
speed of the Zeppelin was reduced by the failure of the motor, and one
of the new French incendiary shells struck the gas bag near its
center, causing a violent explosion. The two ends of the big gas bag
dropped and as the gondolas hit the ground the entire load of bombs
exploded, tearing the ship and its crew to shreds. Two other
Zeppelins, flying at greater height, about ten miles to the north of
the scene of the accident, watched the destruction and then continued
inland over the French positions, dropping bombs for more than an
hour. They returned undamaged to the German lines.
Still another Zeppelin, _L-19_, was lost in the North Sea, on February
2, 1916, while returning from an "invasion" of England. Hit by gunfire
from the British antiaircraft batteries--or by the Dutch, as some
reports have it, for crossing over Dutch territory--the _L-19_
gradually dropped lower and lower until it floated on the surface of
the sea. The British trawler, _King Stephen_, appeared and the crew of
the Zeppelin asked to be taken off, and offered to surrender. The
captain of the trawler frankly declared that he would not take the
chance of rescuing twenty-eight well-armed German sailors, as his own
crew only amounted to nine men, unarmed. He steamed away, leaving the
Zeppelin crew to drown. When destroyers of the British fleet appeared
later on, guided to the spot by the trawler captain's report, the
Zeppelin and its crew had vanished.
CHAPTER LV
LOSSES AND CASUALTIES IN AERIAL WARFARE--DISCREPANCIES IN OFFICIAL
REPORTS--"DRIVEN DOWN" AND "DESTROYED"
To tabulate or chronicle accurately the losses and casualties suffered
by the various armies in their aerial warfare is absolutely
impossible. Not so much because of censorship or secrecy, but because
of the fact that when an aeroplane is "driven down" by the French
behind the German lines, it cannot be said that this aeroplane is
actually destroyed or even damaged, or that its pilot has received a
wound. Similarly when German machines attack and force a French or
British machine to descend swiftly behind its own lines. The reporting
of machines "driven down" among those "destroyed" is the cause of all
the discrepancies between the official reports of the contending
forces.
The following figures have been gathered with the greatest care from
the British "Roll of Honor," covering the killed, missing and wounded
members of the Royal British Flying Corps. They are for the month of
February, 1916, a month of comparative quiet, and there can be no
doubt that proportionately larger casualty lists could be compiled
from the more active months of the summer of 1916. The first week of
February resulted in nine officers killed, one wounded, and five
"missing"; two noncommissioned officers were also reported "missing."
The second week six officers were killed, two wounded, while one
noncommissioned officer was killed and another wounded. During the
third week three flight lieutenants were killed, five wounded, and two
captured by the enemy, while eight noncommissioned officers were
wounded. In the last week of the month there were three officers
killed, five wounded, and six "missing," while three noncommissioned
men were listed as killed. The total losses for the month on the short
battle line held by the British forces were therefore: twenty-one
officers killed, thirteen wounded, and thirteen missing; fifteen
noncommissioned officers killed or wounded. The losses among German
aviators, taken from the regularly published casualty lists issued by
the German Government, were twenty-four killed, and eleven wounded,
during the month of January.
The casualty lists become a deep mystery when compared with the losses
of machines admitted by the respective war departments. During the
month of February, for instance, the British announced the loss of
_six_ aeroplanes--yet the casualty lists showed a loss of sixty-two
officers and men! During the same month the French lost six machines,
the Germans eight, the Russians three, Austria one, and Italy one.
Statistics for the four months from April to July, 1916, gathered from
the periodical press of Great Britain and Germany, and probably far
more accurate than the occasional "estimates" made by the war
departments themselves, show the following losses in officers killed
in aerial combats:
_April_--British 18, French 15, Russian 7, Italian 3; German 16,
Austrian 3, Turkish 1, Bulgarian 0.
_May_--British 16, French 11, Russian 5, Italian 4; German 10,
Austrian 5, Turkish 0, Bulgarian 0.
_June_--British 19, French 10, Russian 11, Italian 3; German 8,
Austrian 6, Turkish 1, Bulgarian 0.
_July_--British 15, French 15, Russian 13, Italian 5; German 16,
Austrian 8, Turkish 0, Bulgarian 1.
Total losses in aviation officers: Allies, 170; Central Powers, 75.
A cursory examination of the records of aerial combats on the western
battle front shows an average of eighteen combats daily; on some days
there were as many as forty distinct aerial battles, while on others,
in blinding snow and rainstorms no machines were aloft. In the
3,000-odd duels in the air, the Franco-American Flying Corps began to
take a prominent part early in the spring of 1916, shortly after the
various American volunteer aviators had been gathered into a single
unit and been placed at the point of the greatest danger--the Verdun
sector of the front.
The formation of the Franco-American Flying Corps was formed by
Frazier Curtis and Norman Prince, after many unsuccessful attempts
since December, 1914. At the time of gathering the scattered Americans
into a single corps there were about thirty experienced aviators in
the group, but the number has been greatly augmented since then, and
in the latter part of July nearly a hundred are reported to have been
gathered in the aviation corps near Verdun.
The first American aviator to fly over the Verdun battle field since
the beginning of the great battle still raging in that sector, was
Carroll Winslow, of New York, who piloted one of the Maurice Farman
speed planes. Previous to the beginning of that battle, Lieutenant
William Thaw of Pittsburgh and Elliott Cowdin of New York had crossed
the battle field repeatedly.
CHAPTER LVI
AERIAL COMBATS AND RAIDS
February, 1916, because of foggy, stormy weather, did not furnish many
thrilling aerial combats. With the exception of a Zeppelin raid over
England and an attack on Kent by two German Fokker aeroplanes, in the
course of which bombs were dropped on Ramsgate and Broadstairs, few
events worthy of chronicling occurred on either of the big battle
fronts. In Egypt, early in that month, an officer of the R. F. C. flew
from Daba, railhead of the Mariut railway, to El Gara and return,
without a stop. The entire trip was made in eight hours, covering 400
miles. It was one of the most splendid pieces of reconnoitering work
accomplished by a British aviation officer.
On February 25, 1916, announcement was made in the British House of
Commons to the effect that the total loss of life in the twenty-nine
great and small Zeppelin raids up to that date had been 266.
On March 1, 1916, an Aviatik aeroplane, piloted by Lieutenant Faber,
and containing Lieutenant Kuehl as observer, succeeded in wrecking the
leading truck of a motor transport train on the Besançon-Jussey road.
The bomb struck squarely and blockaded the road for a considerable
time, causing confusion and delay in the transport. While the drivers
of the trucks endeavored to straighten out the tangle, the aviators
poured a withering fire from their machine gun into the crowd of men,
while circling over the truck at low altitude.
Four days later an extensive Zeppelin raid was directed at the east
coast of England, the result being twelve killed and thirty-three
injured, while considerable material damage was admitted by British
papers.
Aerial duels and combats over the battle lines began to increase in
number to such an extent as to cause their omission from the official
bulletins. Only the most spectacular feats thereafter were considered
worthy of record. Among these was an attack by four German sea planes,
which set out from some part of the Belgian coast and raided the
English coast from Dover to Margate, killing nine and injuring
thirty-one persons. One of the planes was damaged by the defending
guns.
A few days later the British returned the visit with five sea planes,
accompanied by a cruiser and destroyers, with disastrous results. As
related in a former chapter at some length, only two of the machines
succeeded in escaping from the withering fire of the strong
antiaircraft defense guns.
Then followed the series of Zeppelin raids between March 31 and April
5, 1916, when practically the entire eastern and northeastern coast of
England was bombarded by the German air fleet. Even Scotland was
visited by some of the Zeppelins, and there is every reason to believe
that the main object of the raid was to discover the whereabouts of
the main British battleship fleet. However, the airships seem to have
returned southward before locating the fleet. The German admiralty
never gave up hope of locating the main base with certainty, for many
Zeppelin and submarine raids were made with no other object in view.
Had the ships succeeded, there is no doubt that all available
submarines would have been dispatched to the spot, ordered to lie in
wait, and then entice the fleet out by offering a couple of older
ships as a sacrifice. The plan did not work out to the satisfaction of
the German navy heads, but it still remains one of their pet hopes.
On April 3, 1916, a French dirigible appeared above Audun-le-Roman,
bombarding the railway station, while on the same day a German Aviatik
was winged at Souchez, crashing to the earth and killing the
occupants.
On April 4, 1916, a sensational aerial battle took place between more
than a score of Austrian and Italian machines above Ancona. Three
Austrian planes were reported shot down, while two of the Italians
seemed severely damaged.
The next day a German official résumé of the aerial battles was issued
by the Germans, in which it was claimed that fourteen German machines
and forty-four British and French were lost in March. In this
compilation the German statement differentiated between "destroyed"
and "brought down," claiming to have listed only those which were
actually shot down under conditions which precluded the safety of
pilot and observer, or which were captured in the German lines.
April 7, 1916, saw a heavy bombardment of Saloniki by Bulgarian and
Austrian aeroplanes; the camp of the Australian section and that of
the French contingent were severely damaged, and fire broke out in
them.
A week later, three naval British aeroplanes dropped bombs on
Constantinople and also farther north on Adrianople, in an attempt to
destroy the large powder factories and hangars there. The damage
reported was very slight, and of no military value. The machines made
a trip of 300 miles length, in order to carry out this attack, an
achievement worthy of special notice.
A strong French squadron shelled the stations at Nantillons and
Brieulles on April 10 and 11, 1916, doing considerable material damage
to buildings.
On April 12, 1916, the Czar of Russia had a narrow escape from death
when an Austrian aeroplane, of the Rumpler-Taube type, appeared over
the parade grounds at Czernowitz, throwing several bombs on the
officers present. The aviator did not know of the presence of the
czar, and the incident did not become public for several days after.
On April 15, 1916, a large French battle plane, fitted with a
37-millimeter gun, attacked a German steamer in the North Sea, but the
ship escaped without damage, as all the shells went wide of the mark.
The French résumé of the operations on the west front during March
challenges the statement of the German authorities concerning the
number of machines lost. "During the month of March," says the
official communiqué, "our military aircraft displayed great activity
along the entire front, notably in the region of Verdun. In the course
of the many aerial engagements thirty-one German machines were
'brought down' by our pilots, nine of which descended or crashed to
the ground within our lines, while twenty-two were brought down in
the German lines. There is no doubt concerning the fate of those
twenty-two machines which our pilots attacked over the enemy's lines.
Twelve of these aeroplanes were seen coming down in flames, and ten
descended in headlong spirals under the fire of our airmen. Moreover,
four German machines were brought down by our special guns, one in our
lines in the environs of Avocourt and three in the enemy lines--one
near Suippes, one near Nouvion and one near Sainte-Marie-à-Py. This
total of thirty-five machines should be contrasted with the figures of
our own aerial losses, which amount to thirteen aeroplanes, as
follows: One French machine brought down in our lines and twelve
brought down in the German lines."
A pitched battle between Zeppelins, battle cruisers, and submarines on
the German side, and destroyers, land batteries, aeroplanes and sea
planes on the British side, took place in the morning of April 25,
1916, near Lowestoft. A number of aeroplanes and sea planes rose to
attack the Zeppelins which were flying high and bound westward. In the
course of the battle the airships turned toward the sea, bringing the
pursuing aeroplanes within range of the naval guns. Four submarines
also appeared on the surface and began firing their high-angle guns
against the British aeros. One of the latter was destroyed by fire
from a Zeppelin quick-firing gun, while two sea planes were severely
damaged by the fire from the battle cruisers and submarines.
May, 1916, began with three disasters for the German aerial forces. On
the 3d of the month, the naval airship _L-20_ (Schuette-Lanz type)
which had raided the coast of England and Scotland on the preceding
day, ran out of fuel on the return trip and was carried by a strong
wind eastward onto the Norwegian coast, where it stranded near
Stavanger. The Norwegian authorities interned the crew and blew up the
ship.
Two more Zeppelins were lost two days later; the _L-7_ (one of the
oldest airships in the service) was shot down by French warships off
Saloniki, while the other fell a victim to the guns of a British
squadron off the coast of Schleswig-Holstein.
An Italian airship, the _M-3_, attempted a reconnoitering trip over
the Austrian positions on the Gorizia front, but was heavily bombarded
with incendiary shells. Fire broke out on the airship and the
resulting explosion tore it apart, killing the crew of six men.
Sixteen Allies' aeroplanes undertook a bombing expedition upon the
German aerodromes at Mariakerke, dropping thirty-eight large and
seventeen small bombs. A sea plane dropped one 100-pound bomb and two
65-pound bombs on the Solvay Works at Zeebrugge. All the machines are
reported to have returned in safety, with one exception.
Aerial combats increased in number and violence during the summer
months, as many as thirty separate fights taking place in a single day
on a short stretch of the battle fronts. In one of the combats, early
in June, Lieutenant Immelmann, of the German forces, was shot down and
killed. At first the report included his famous comrade, Lieutenant
Boelke, among the killed, but news received later mentioned his name
among the fighting corps.
Dover and other ports on the English coast were raided by two German
sea planes on June 9 and 10, 1916, according to the German official
report. The British denied that any such raid took place. The next
day, two German sea planes attacked Calais, on the French side of the
Channel, dropping bombs on the port and the encampments. They returned
to their base undamaged.
German aeroplanes also raided Kantara, thirty miles south of Port
Said, and fired on Romani with machine guns. A number of casualties
occurred at Kantara.
A raid of considerable magnitude was carried out by the German forces
against the port of Reval, during which they bombarded cruisers,
destroyers, military buildings, and several submarines lying in the
harbor. One of the latter is reported to have been hit four times. The
sea planes had been convoyed to the port by a fleet of cruisers and
destroyers which waited in the open sea for the return of the
aeroplanes. The attacking party had no losses.
An aerial battle between more than forty machines took place on July
3, 1916, near Lille. A British squadron set out to bombard the city of
Lille, but was attacked during the bombardment by a fleet of twenty
German monoplanes and biplanes. The British claim to have brought down
two of the German machines, while all the British returned safely to
their lines.
Similar raids continue every day along the battle front in Flanders,
Belgium, and France, and even to enumerate them would be merely a
repetition entirely without value to the reader.
PART X--THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS
CHAPTER LVII
WAR CLOUD IN CONGRESS
A confused situation prevailed in Congress on March 1, 1916, the date
on which Germany decreed that her submarines would sink all armed
merchantmen of the Allied Powers without warning. The promulgation of
this decree had abruptly interrupted the imminent settlement of the
_Lusitania_ case, the Administration having taken a serious view of
Germany's latest step, which injected new elements into the whole
submarine dispute with that country. Once more the old question of the
danger to Americans traveling on belligerent vessels arose in an
aggravated form. The Administration was steadfast in upholding the
right of Americans to travel the seas when and whither they chose,
immune under international law from interference or menace on the part
of any belligerent power. Strong factions in Congress, in the face of
Germany's new decree, feared that the Administration's stand was
driving the country into certain war with Germany. Americans were
bound to be among the crews of passengers of the armed merchantmen
that Germany was determined to sink on sight, and this country had
already clearly indicated to Berlin what would happen if any fatality
befell them.
Hence, as mentioned in the previous volume of the history, a feverish
agitation developed in Congress for the passage of resolutions
forbidding Americans to travel on belligerent ships at all during the
war. German-American influences, especially congressional delegations
from districts, chiefly in the Middle West, where the German vote was
a decisive factor, assiduously fanned this movement, but there was a
scattered sentiment, wholly American at heart, and unallied with
pro-Germanism, which also held the view that Americans ought not to
jeopardize the peace of their country by traveling in belligerent
vessels. Resolutions pending in the House and Senate prohibiting them
from doing so had been pigeonholed in committee. President Wilson had
interposed, urging that no action be taken on them. He held that the
executive and legislature ought not to be at cross-purposes on a
question of foreign policy, and any antagonistic step by Congress
against the Administration would weaken the United States in the sight
of the world. The Congressional leaders, at heart opposed to the
President, reluctantly agreed that the two branches of the Government
should not be rent by divided counsels on such a dangerous issue as
the country's relations with Germany.
The President faced a critical and exasperating situation. He changed
his earlier view that Congress should not put itself in the position
of wrangling with the executive over the armed-merchantmen issue. If
divided counsels there were in Congress regarding his submarine
policy, let them now declare themselves, and let the stronger prevail!
Hence, instead of any longer desiring that the armed-merchantmen
resolutions should remain smothered in committee, he challenged the
leaders in Congress to bring them to a vote so that the world might
know whether Congress was with him or against him. The President would
not brook the continuation of an impasse which lent a spurious color
to the manufactured impression current abroad, that he was playing a
lone hand in his submarine policy, unsupported by Congress and the
country. He strove to emphasize that his insistence on the right of
Americans to travel on belligerent merchant ships, whether armed for
defense or otherwise, would not mean war with Germany, the latter
would rather surrender to the American demands to avoid war.
The immediate effect of the President's demand for a vote on the
armed-merchantmen resolutions was to clear the air regarding the
strength of their supporters in Congress. The overwhelming sentiment
in their favor rapidly diminished--if it ever really existed--under
the searchlight of careful canvassing by the Administration's
supporters, until it began to be manifest that, far from Congress
ranging itself against the President, the latter would carry the day.
Then came a reversal of tactics by the congressional factions opposed
to the President. When the belief or illusion prevailed that the
armed-merchantmen resolutions would pass the House by a big majority,
strident demands were heard for submitting them to a roll call and
unrestrained resentment against the President was expressed for
thwarting such action. But now, when national sentiment ranged itself
in support of the President, and many Congressmen had heard from their
constituents, there was a disposition in Congress to turn the tables
on the President by preventing the resolution being put to the vote
that is, by keeping them in the limbo where they had been consigned at
the President's original request, since, to be sure, the vote would
compel Congressmen to go on record as to their pro-German leanings,
and would, moreover, be defeated. This and other influences deferred
action by the House for a week.
Meantime national sentiment had rapidly crystallized to a simple
viewpoint, and Congressmen could not wisely ignore it. The general view
was that if Congress opposed the executive on the armed-merchantmen
issue, and proscribed the present rights of American citizens to travel
on the trading ships of belligerent nations, the whole diplomatic
negotiations with Germany on the submarine dispute would be reduced to
chaos. No president, oppressed by such a precedent, could enter with
confidence on any contention with a foreign power. His most earnest
representations and most solemn protestations might be rendered
meaningless by the intrusion of a Congress influenced by incorrect
reports or overcome by personal antagonism. Such a condition of
executive impotence was viewed as endangering rather than safeguarding
the country's tranquillity. The paramount need then was that Congress
should support the presidency, not the temporary occupant of the White
House. The country was in a controversy with a European power and the
American stand had been taken on definite and well-understood
principles.
In the midst of that dispute the demand had been voiced that the
American attitude be radically changed and the conditions seriously
altered. The inevitable effect of such a change in American policy, it
was felt, would be to hearten the power that was at issue with the
United States, to embarrass the President, and encourage the belief
that those to whom he must look for support would withhold it from
him. That injury could only be repaired by the repudiation by Congress
of the influences at work within it aiming at the overthrow of the
President's policy, and by a convincing exhibition of the unity of the
republic.
The Senate was the first to act. The armed-ship resolution, forbidding
Americans to travel on such craft, was introduced by Senator Gore, of
Oklahoma, who thus explained his purpose in doing so:
"I introduced this resolution because I was apprehensive that we were
speeding headlong upon war; perhaps, I ought to go further and say
what I have hitherto avoided saying, that my action was based on a
report which seemed to come from the highest and most responsible
authority, that certain Senators and certain members of the House, in
a conference with the President of the United States, received from
the President the information, if not the declaration, that if Germany
insisted upon her position the United States would insist upon her
position, and that it would result probably in a breach of diplomatic
relations, and that a breach of diplomatic relations would probably be
followed by a state of war, and that a state of war might not be of
itself and of necessity an evil to this republic, but that the United
States, by entering upon war now, might be able to bring it to a
conclusion by midsummer and thus render a great service to
civilization.
"Mr. President," added the Senator, "I cannot say what the truth may
be. I tell you the tale as it was told to me. This came to my ears in
such a way, with such a concurrence of testimony, with such internal
and external marks of truth, that I feared it might be the truth, and
if such a thing be conceivable I did not feel that, discharging my
duty as a Senator, I could withhold whatever feeble service I might
render to avert the catastrophe of war."
The President immediately authorized an unqualified denial to be made
that he had expressed any utterance to which such a meaning could be
attached. On the contrary, the President, in his talks with members of
Congress, had insisted that war was the last happening he wanted and
that his and not Congress' course would best insure peace. One version
of what transpired at the conference referred to by Senator Gore
credited the President with making these statements to the Senators
and Congressmen who consulted him: That the way to avoid war was to
convince the rest of the world that the people of the United States
were standing solidly behind the executive; that the course Congress
was seeking to pursue would lead toward war rather than away from it,
because yielding to Germany on the present issue would result in
further curtailments of American rights; that the only course the
United States could safely pursue now was to abide by international
law; that any other course would result in making circumstances
themselves the sole guide, and this policy would eventually cause the
fabric of international law itself to crumble and disappear; that any
concession to Germany, abridging the right of Americans to travel on
the seas, would necessitate a concession to Great Britain; and that
such a weakening of American policy would cause the country to drift
toward war. Asked what would happen if a German submarine sank an
armed merchantman with the loss of American life, the President was
quoted as intimating that in that event only a break in diplomatic
relations would follow; further asked as to the effect such a rupture
would probably have, he carefully replied that "it had been
represented that this would lead to war," and that the participation
of the United States in the European upheaval might result in ending
hostilities in six months.
The effect of the disputed disclosure of the President's views on the
issues with Germany, coupled with his disavowal of Senator Gore's
statements, was an accession of congressional support to the
Administration, and the dooming of the Gore resolution to certain
failure. After a couple of days' debate the resolution was put to the
vote and defeated March 3, 1916, by sixty-eight to fourteen. But this
only meant an overwhelming rejection of the intent of the Gore
resolution, for its proposer, foreseeing that it could not pass,
confused the President's supporters at the last minute by resorting to
a parliamentary maneuver changing its purport. The resolution, as put
before the Senate, had been reversed; instead of forbidding Americans
to travel on belligerent vessels, it had become a hypothetical
declaration of war against Germany--a bellicose affirmation in
irreconcilable contrast with the senator's well-known pacifism.
Originally the resolution read:
"Whereas a number of leading powers of the world are now engaged in a
war of unexampled proportions; and
"Whereas the United States is happily at peace with all of the
belligerent nations; and
"Whereas it is equally the desire and the interest of the American
people to remain at peace with all nations; and
"Whereas the President has recently offered fresh and signal proofs of
the superiority of diplomacy to butchery as a method of settling
international disputes; and
"Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on unarmed
belligerent vessels has recently received renewed guarantees of
respect and inviolability; and
"Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on armed belligerent
vessels rather than upon unarmed vessels is essential neither to their
life, liberty, or safety; nor to the independence, dignity, or
securing of the United States; and
"Whereas Congress alone has been vested with the power to declare war,
which involved the obligations to prevent war by all proper means
consistent with the honor and vital interest of the nation; therefore
be it
"Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives, concurring),
That it is the sense of the Congress, vested as it is with the sole
power to declare war, that all persons owing allegiance to the United
States should, in behalf of their own safety and the vital interest of
the United States, forbear to exercise the right of travel as
passengers upon any armed vessel of any belligerent power, whether
such vessel be armed for offensive or defensive purposes; and it is
the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or
renewed by the Secretary of State, or by anyone acting under him, to
be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for
purpose of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent power."
As voted upon by the Senate, this resolving clause had disappeared and
the following substitute with the preamble unaltered, had taken its
place:
"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That the sinking by a submarine without notice or warning of an armed
merchant vessel of her public enemy, resulting in the death of a
citizen of the United States, would constitute a just and sufficient
cause of war between the United States and the German Empire."
CHAPTER LVIII
THE PRESIDENT UPHELD IN ARMED-MERCHANTMEN ISSUE--FINAL CRISIS WITH
GERMANY
The issue in the Senate, as far as the text of the resolution was
concerned, was beclouded. Senators on both sides vainly sought to
ascertain what the change meant. Senator Gore himself even voted
against his amended proposal. But out of the confusion the upshot was
plain. The debate before the Senate had been on the question whether
Americans should be allowed to travel on armed belligerent ships, and,
whatever the resolution finally expressed, that was the question on
which Senators really declared their aye or nay. Technically, the
Senate had failed, if it had not actually refused, to adopt a
resolution hostile to the Administration's foreign policy. Another
resolution similar to that originally proposed by Senator Gore,
sponsored by Senator Jones of Washington, was withdrawn by him, and a
bitter debate continued for hours without any measure pending. Hence
the Senate had technically gone on record against declaring war on
Germany if any of her submarines sank an armed merchantman without
warning, thereby causing the death of any American on board. Actually
it supported the Administration in its policy upholding the right of
Americans to travel on belligerent ships, and the handful of Senators
who voted for the amended resolution were hostile to the President's
stand.
Meantime parliamentary tactics by the President's opponents in the
House of Representatives successfully delayed the submission of the
McLemore resolution to a vote. The Foreign Relations Committee had
decided, by 17 to 2, to report it, with the recommendation that it be
"tabled." The resolution had even been abandoned by its author,
Representative Jeff McLemore of Texas, who was of opinion that it had
really served its purpose without being adopted. "The main object of
the resolution," he said, "was to prevent this country being plunged
into war with one or more of the belligerent nations, simply because
of the heedless act of some indiscreet American citizens, and I feel
sure that this object has now been attained."
But the object the President sought, which was a virtual vote of
confidence, by both Houses of Congress, on his submarine policy, had
not been attained, and would not until the resolution had been brought
into the open House and squarely voted upon. The issue between the
House and the President had gone too far for further cross-fires of
parliamentary moves to succeed in preventing the resolution from
coming to a vote, and, on March 7, 1916, it reached this crucial stage
and was defeated by 276 to 143, after six hours of turbulent debate.
The majority of 133 in favor of shelving the resolution, achieved by
the aid of many Republican votes, was interpreted as a decisive
compliance with the request of the President.
The voting in both the House and Senate on the armed-merchantmen issue
ranged more on geographical than on political divisions, and
indicated that on questions of foreign policy Congressional sentiment
was governed by sectional, not by party lines. Thus, of the fourteen
votes cast in the Senate against "tabling" the Gore resolution twelve
were recorded by Senators from States west of Indiana and Lake
Michigan, while a geographical analysis of the House vote revealed
that President Wilson met the strongest opposition from the Middle
West delegations, and derived his chief support from the Atlantic
Seaboard States.
Secretary Lansing later issued a ruling of the State Department
defining the status of armed merchant ships. Germany was thereby
notified that the United States recognized the equity of her
argument--that if a vessel was armed and used its armament to attack a
submarine the latter could not be called upon to give warning in
advance, for in so doing the safety of the submarine and its crew was
imperiled. But the United States reiterated what it had frequently
pointed out before as the only criterion governing such
occurrences--each case must be judged by itself. Only a belligerent
vessel which had been proved guilty of such an offensive use of
armament could be regarded as a warship. The presence of armament
could not of itself be construed as a presumption of hostility.
Summarized, the State Department's ruling laid down:
(1) That the status of an armed merchantman must in each case be
determined before it could be regarded as a warship--a neutral
government, on entry of the ship into port, presuming that the
armament was aggressive unless the belligerent proved otherwise.
(2) The belligerents on the high seas must assume that the armed ship
carried armament only for protection, and, unless resistance or an
attempt to escape was immediately made, the merchantman could not be
attacked without receiving due warning.
(3) That Americans and all others who took passage on armed ships
intermittently engaged in commerce raiding could not expect to be
immune, for such vessels acquired a "hostile taint." This was
Germany's contention; but the United States refused to agree to the
German idea that, because a few British vessels might be guilty of
wrongful use of armament, all British ships must consequently be
regarded as warships.
(4) The right of "self-protection" could be exercised by an armed
merchantman; and this was different from cruising the high seas for
the special purpose of attacking hostile ships.
(5) If belligerent vessels were under orders to attack submarines in
all circumstances they lost their status as "peaceful merchantmen."
Germany claimed England had so ordered. England denied the charge.
Evidence in each case must reconcile the difference of opinion.
The Administration's position in the submarine issue with Germany, now
that Congress had upheld the President, seemed to be that Germany's
decree condemning armed merchantmen curtailed the liberty of Americans
to travel on the high seas. The status quo had not been affected.
Germany, in the _Arabic_ case, had undertaken that merchant vessels
would not be torpedoed without first being warned, and that pledge the
United States looked to her to respect, whether the vessels were armed
for defense or not. What, then, would now happen, with Germany's
latest decree sent ringing round the world with resounding bombast, by
way of telling neutral noncombatants, including Americans, to stay at
home, as though cataclysmic destruction awaited all vessels which
dared to show a gun at the stern? The United States waited. Nothing,
so far as the German armed-merchantmen decree was concerned, did
happen. There was no appreciable increase in the number of vessels
sunk by Teutonic submarines, and armed merchantmen did not especially
figure among the victims.
In the face of this tame execution of the terrible decree, providing a
sorry anticlimax to its noisy proclamation, the German press called
for a policy of no compromise with the United States. The "Berliner
Tageblatt" announced that Germany intended to wage a ruthless U-boat
war against her enemies, whatever the American attitude might be.
Apparently the German people believed that a renewal of submarine
activity was vitally necessary, and were convinced of the propriety of
their stand, both from the point of view of ethics and international
law. Germany's armed-merchantmen decree, as indicated, was not
immediately followed by any submarine activity of a character in
keeping with the dire threat made; but toward the close of March,
1916, a sudden indiscriminate outbreak of destruction came against
merchantmen of every type. Many were sunk without warning, the
question of whether they were armed or not seemingly being disregarded
in the new crusade. The United States began to take stern cognizance
of these reckless operations when four ships having Americans on
board, either among the crews or passengers, became targets for the
kaiser's torpedoes, without warning. These were the _Eagle Point_, the
_Manchester Engineer_, the _Englishman_, and the _Sussex_. All were
sunk except the last-named vessel, and the Americans were saved except
one on the _Englishman_, though not, in several cases, without injury.
The circumstances of the torpedoing of the _Sussex_ provoked a final
clash between the United States and Germany. This vessel plied as a
Channel ferryboat between Folkestone and Dieppe. On March 24, 1916, at
4.30 p. m., while near the latter port, with 436 persons on board,
including seventy-five Americans, she was struck by a torpedo from a
submarine. The captain observed a torpedo about 100 meters from the
side and immediately maneuvered to avoid it; but the vessel was struck
in the forward part, which was destroyed. Rescuing craft towed the
disabled boat to Boulogne, where a majority of the passengers were
landed. About fifty persons lost their lives, and three Americans were
hurt.
The State Department at once instructed the American ambassador at
Berlin to inquire whether the torpedo which almost sunk the _Sussex_
came from a German submarine, though the Government entertained little
doubt that this was the case. The American suspicions were later
confirmed by incontestable evidence; but the Government first sought
to give Germany the opportunity of having her day in court before
acting.
Unofficially came reports from Berlin scouting as impossible the
assumption that a German submarine was the culprit, the assurance
being repeated that Germany in no circumstance would violate her
pledge to the United States not to destroy enemy vessels except after
full warning to enable crews and passengers to save their lives. No
official statement was forthcoming. The German admiralty declined to
"deny or explain" until all the submarines operating off the French
coast had returned and reported.
The American procedure in the _Sussex_ case differed from that
followed in previous issues with Germany arising from submarine
warfare. There were no official representations made to Berlin;
Ambassador Gerard was merely asked to ascertain informally and
transmit to Washington any pertinent facts he could gather bearing on
Germany's culpability. The submarine issue, in fact, had reached a
stage where explanations and excuses were of minor importance.
Evidence showing whether Germany had or had not broken her pledge not
to torpedo passenger vessels without warning was alone of interest to
the President. Proof of Germany's guilt foreshadowed an unqualified
threat by the United States to break off diplomatic relations. The
United States determined to be the judge with Germany in the dock as a
defendant, instead of arguing an issue with Berlin, as in the past.
This attitude placed Germany in the position of having to prove her
innocence in the face of damaging evidence of her guilt. No discussion
was even invited with the German ambassador over the case, and Count
von Bernstorff apparently did not want to make his usual extenuatory
or defensive pleas.
Germany assumed a mien of innocence. Her spokesmen by implication
declined to consider that she was in any way involved in the _Sussex_
case; hence there could be no need for Count von Bernstorff to make it
a subject of discussion with the American Government.
"I cannot help it," said the ambassador unofficially. "One cannot
blame Germany because the _Sussex_ struck a British mine. Why should
we discuss it? It does not concern us."
This was Germany's first informal explanation. The readiest means of
exculpating Germany from complicity in the _Sussex_ affair was
eagerly seized upon and clung to. What other cause except a British
mine would there be for the calamity the _Sussex_ had encountered when
Germany had pledged herself not to make such attacks?
Meantime information reached Washington that the German secret orders
to submarine commanders relating to the armed-merchantmen decree did
not conform to the pledges given to the United States, but urged the
importance of a policy of concealment in their operations, so that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to lay the proof at Germany's
door, if any vessel was sunk contrary to pledge. By this means the
German Government could decline to acknowledge responsibility for any
attack unless the United States could prove that the submarine was of
German nationality.
Whether Washington was correctly informed or not, Germany's attitude
gave color to the theory that she had predetermined on repudiating
having any hand in submarine attacks if she could successfully cloak
the operations of her U-boat commanders. The situation embarrassed the
United States and influenced the procedure of the diplomatic
negotiations necessary to elucidate any given case. Germany's
attitude, in short, placed the United States in the position of either
assuming that the word of a friendly government could not be accepted
at its face value, or of abandoning further inquiry, as happened in
the case of the _Persia_, recorded in the previous volume. The
President boldly undertook to act on the first of these alternatives.
Before the crisis reached this stage, the German point of view
regarding submarine warfare was, despite pledges, more than ever
unalterably opposed to modifying that warfare to conform to the wishes
of any foreign power. For eleven days after the attack of the _Sussex_
the Berlin Foreign Office preserved an attitude of ignorance regarding
the torpedoing; but the seriousness with which the case was viewed in
the United States, coupled with the instructions from Washington to
Ambassador Gerard, at length caused the Foreign Office to call upon
the admiralty for a report on the destruction of the _Sussex_ if any
submarine commander could throw any light upon it. No hope, however,
was entertained that a satisfactory statement would be received from
Berlin. A resort to evasion, a professed lack of information, the
familiar assumption of an English or French mine being to blame, were
expected to be embodied in any defense Berlin made, and an explanation
of this tenor was rejected in advance.
Germany's answer was received on April 10, 1916, and fulfilled
expectations. The United States was informed that the admiralty had
subjected the affair to the fullest investigation, with this
results--that no German submarine attacked the _Sussex,_ but that one
torpedoed another vessel, about the same time in the same vicinity,
with the same result. A sketch the submarine commander made of the
vessel he struck was submitted to show that it was not the _Sussex_,
as the sketch differed from the published pictures of that ship. The
submarine commander, the German note said, had been led to attack the
"unknown" vessel in the belief that it was a warship, that is, "a mine
layer of the recently built _Arabic_ class." A violent explosion
occurred in the fore part of the ship after the torpedo had been
fired, which "warrants the certain conclusion that great amounts of
ammunitions were on board." The German note proceeded:
"No other attack whatever by German submarines at the time in question
for the _Sussex_ upon the route between Folkestone and Dieppe
occurred. The German Government must therefore assume that the injury
to the _Sussex_ is attributable to another cause than an attack by a
German submarine.
"For an explanation of the case the fact may perhaps be serviceable
that no less than twenty-six English mines were exploded by shots by
German naval forces in the channel on the 1st and 2nd of April alone.
The entire sea in that vicinity is, in fact, endangered by floating
mines and by torpedoes that have not sunk. Off the English coast it is
further endangered in an increasing degree through German mines which
have been laid against enemy naval forces.
"Should the American Government have at its disposal further material
for a conclusion upon the case of the _Sussex_ the German Government
would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material
also to an investigation.
[Illustration: British sailors and officers boarding the captured U-C-5
German mine-laying submarine. The open grating shows one of the
openings through which mines are laid.]
"In the event that differences of opinion should develop hereby
between the two Governments, the German Government now declares itself
ready to have the facts of the case established through mixed
commissions of investigation, in accordance with the third title of
'The Hague agreement for the peaceful settlement of international
conflicts, November 18, 1907.'"
In explanation of the sinking of the _Manchester Engineer_, the
_Englishman_, and the _Eagle Point_, which vessels had Americans on
board, the German note professed to be unable to say whether the
first-named ship was attacked by a German submarine, but in the case
of the two last-named they were attacked after attempting to escape
and disregarding signals to stop.
The communication made the worst of impressions on the Washington
Government. The clumsy prevarication of attempting to show that a
steamer other than the _Sussex_ had been torpedoed in the belief that
it was a war vessel merely sufficed to complete the accumulating
circumstantial evidence in the possession of the Government that the
_Sussex_ had been torpedoed by a German submarine without warning in
violation of an express pledge. The Administration had become weary of
Germany's protestations of innocence and good behavior, and of shallow
excuses for breaking her word, and had lost faith in any German
utterance. The cabinet view of the situation, as expressed at a
meeting called the day following the receipt of the German note, was
that a nation which would accept perjured affidavits as a basis for a
note charging that the _Lusitania_ was armed would not hesitate to
enter a blanket denial of any act if perpetrated.
The tension created by Germany's unconvincing alibi caused alarm in
Berlin, and government officials were reported as showing a nervous
anxiety to strain every nerve to avoid a rupture with the United
States. A loophole had been provided in the German note for a possible
withdrawal of her denial of responsibility for the destruction of the
_Sussex_ as will be seen from this passage:
"Should the American Government have at its disposal further material
for a conclusion upon the case of the _Sussex_ the German Government
would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material
also to an investigation."
This saving clause gave the German note the aspect of a preliminary to
the usual backdown and to an admission of liability, with the
palliating excuse of ignorance of the vessel's identity. At any rate
signs were not wanting that Germany recognized, had she had a choice
to make, with the American Government reenforced with clinching
testimony, to be duly presented, that a German submarine and none
other torpedoed the _Sussex_ and jeopardized the lives of twenty-five
Americans on board.
On April 19, 1916, President Wilson had the issue with Germany before
Congress and addressed that body in person, solemnly informing the
legislators that "a situation has arisen in the foreign relations of
the country of which it is my plain duty to inform you very frankly."
This he proceeded to do, speaking, he said, on behalf of the rights of
the United States and its citizens and the rights of humanity in
general. He announced that he had notified Germany that "unless the
Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an
abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against
passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United
States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the
German Empire altogether."
The President's address was more or less a paraphrase of the note he
had that day sent to Berlin, and was in fulfillment of a promise he
made to notify Congress of any action he took to bring Germany to
realize the serious condition of her relations with the United
States.
CHAPTER LIX
THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM--GERMANY YIELDS
The American note was an indictment of Germany's conscienceless
practices and broken faith. Secretary Lansing informed the kaiser's
advisers that their note denying any attack on the _Sussex_, but
acknowledging that another vessel had been torpedoed under identical
circumstances as to time, place, and result, confirmed the inferences
the American Government had drawn from information it possessed
establishing "the facts in the case of the _Sussex_."
A "statement of facts" relating to the _Sussex_ accompanied the
virtual American ultimatum. It set forth a chain of testimony, citing
the source thereof, showing that the passengers of the _Sussex_, which
included about twenty-four American citizens, were of several
nationalities, many of them women and children, and half of them
subjects of neutral states; that the _Sussex_ carried no armament;
that the vessel has never been employed as a troopship, but solely as
a Channel ferryboat, and was following a route not used for
transporting troops from Great Britain to France; that a torpedo was
seen driving toward the vessel and the captain was unable to swing the
vessel out of the torpedo's course; that on a subsequent inspection of
the broken hull a number of pieces of metal were found which American,
French, and British naval experts decided were not parts of a mine,
but of a torpedo, with German markings, and were otherwise different
from parts of torpedoes used by the French and British.
Regarding the sketch made by the German submarine commander of the
steamer which he said he torpedoed, showing that it did not agree with
a photograph of the _Sussex_ as published, the American statement made
this comment:
This sketch was apparently made from memory of an observation of the
vessel through a periscope. As the only differences noted by the
commander, who relied on his memory, were the position of the
smokestack and the shape of the stern, it is to be presumed the
vessels were similar in other respects.
This conclusion was the more certain because no other German
submarines, on the day the _Sussex_ was wrecked, attacked steamers in
the same locality. Hence, in the American views, "as no vessel is
reported to have been torpedoed without warning by a submerged
submarine other than the _Sussex_, it is beyond question that that
vessel was torpedoed by the submarine whose commander's report is
relied upon in the note of April 10, 1916."
The United States had spoken its last word. No attempt was made to
disguise the gravity of the situation, and there was a quiet
recognition of the fact that the continuance of friendly relations
rested wholly on the action of the German Government. Just now,
however, political conditions in Germany were believed to be such that
the Government itself, even if it desired to give full satisfaction in
word and deed to the United States, would be facing a problem in
finding a way of doing so. The Imperial Chancellor, Dr.
Bethmann-Hollweg, representing the civilian part of the federated
government, had so far succeeded in holding the concessions to the
United States. But the military element, including the naval and
submarine advocates of a continued campaign of "frightfulness," headed
until recently by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, had nevertheless pursued
its course of ruthless destruction, either with the reluctant and
tacit consent of the chancellor or in spite of his opposition. There
thus existed a fundamental cleavage of policy between these two
factions of the German Government. The chancellor made pledges to the
United States and the naval authorities disregarded them, the kaiser
apparently being helpless or lukewarm in his support of the
chancellor's commitments. Presently, however, when Admiral von
Tirpitz's retirement was announced, the civilian element appeared in
the ascendant. His resignation smote the German people with the
startling effect of a coup d'état, and was plainly the outcome of a
long and silent struggle in the inner councils of the Government. All
the political influence of the chancellor, supported by the romantic
weight of the kaiser's name, was exercised to stifle an outburst of
criticism in the Reichstag. Meantime, under the German system of
censorship, the submarine warfare was reported to the German people in
boastful terms, which made them almost a unit in demanding its
continuance without abatement. They heard little of the hundreds of
noncombatants killed by their submarines, or else these casualties
were explained as the result of the explosion of cargoes of munitions.
They had been told week by week of the steady reduction of British
tonnage, that the pinch of hunger which they had experienced was also
being felt in England, and that the German submarine was the only
shield between Germany and starvation. So the German people were
behind the military and naval element for an unrestricted U-boat
warfare. The situation was such that the gravest doubt was felt
whether the chancellor, even with the kaiser's support, could adjust
the submarine issue in a way satisfactory alike to the United States
and to the clamorous radical militarists upheld by a misled people.
The German Government brooded over the ultimatum of the United
States for fifteen days before it decided upon a declaration that
averted a rupture of diplomatic relations. The German note,
dispatched May 5, 1916, grudgingly admitted "the possibility that
the ship mentioned in the note of April 10, 1916, as having been
torpedoed by a German submarine is actually identical with the
_Sussex_." It characteristically withheld an unreserved admission,
but "should it turn out that the commander was wrong in assuming the
vessel to be a man-of-war, the German Government will not fail to
draw the consequences resulting therefrom." This hesitating and
qualified acknowledgment was accepted as about as near to a
confession of guilt as Germany was then capable of making.
On the vital question of the conduct of submarine warfare, a change in
which the United States was determined upon forcing Germany to make,
the note was more explicit and thus yielded to the American demand:
"The German Government will only state that it has imposed
far-reaching restraint upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in
consideration of neutrals' interests, in spite of the fact that these
restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. No
such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Britain and
her allies.
"The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct the
submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit
and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by
international law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare
against enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships encountered in the
war zone surrounding Great Britain.
"With regard to these no assurances have ever been given to the
Government of the United States. No such assurances are contained in
the declaration of February 8, 1916.
"The German Government cannot admit any doubt that these orders were
given or are executed in good faith."
Having said so much, the German note proceeded to cloud the issue by
virtually blaming the United States for the continued existence of
conditions calling for the sea warfare Germany practiced:
"The German Government has made several proposals to the Government of
the United States in order to reduce to a minimum for American
travelers and goods the inherent dangers of naval warfare.
Unfortunately, the Government of the United States decided not to
accept the proposals. Had it accepted, the Government of the United
States would have been instrumental in preventing the greater part of
the accidents that American citizens have met with in the meantime.
"The German Government still stands by its offer to come to an
agreement along these lines."
As though this reproach did not go far enough, the German note, while
affirming that the German Government attached no less importance to
the sacred principles of humanity than the American Government did,
accused the United States of showing favoritism in its humanitarian
sympathies:
"As matters stand, the German Government cannot but reiterate regret
that the sentiments of humanity, which the Government of the United
States extends with such fervor to the unhappy victims of submarine
warfare, are not extended with the same warmth of feeling to many
millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intention
of the British Government, shall be starved, and who by sufferings
shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into
ignominious capitulation.
"The German Government, in agreement with the German people, fails to
understand this discrimination, all the more as it has repeatedly and
explicitly declared itself ready to use the submarine weapon in strict
conformity with the rules of international law as recognized before
the outbreak of the war, if Great Britain likewise was ready to adapt
the conduct of warfare to these rules.
"The German people knows that the Government of the United States has
the power to confine the war to armed forces of the belligerent
countries, in the interest of humanity and maintenance of
international law. The Government of the United States would have been
certain of attaining this end had it been determined to insist against
Great Britain on the incontrovertible rights to freedom of the seas.
But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that
the Government of the United States, while demanding that Germany,
struggling for existence, shall restrain the use of an effective
weapon and while making compliance with these demands a condition for
maintenance of relations with Germany, confines itself to protest
against illegal methods adopted by Germany's enemies. Moreover, the
German people knows to what considerable extent its enemies are
supplied with all kinds of war material from the United States.
"It will, therefore, be understood that the appeal made by the
Government of the United States to sentiments of humanity and
principles of international law cannot, under the circumstances, meet
the same hearty response from the German people which such an appeal
otherwise always is certain to find here."
This complaint was an allusion to the refusal of the United States to
involve its issues with Great Britain with those it had with Germany
or to mediate the proposal that Great Britain raise her food blockade
against Germany, who would then discontinue her submarine war on
British merchantmen. The tone of an injured party Germany assumed in
taking this attitude, as though she had a just cause of complaint
against the United States, was accepted as a plaintive prelude to her
final surrender; but even this surrender she did not make without
again clogging her concessions with the same proposal which the United
States had already flatly rejected.
"The German Government, conscious of Germany's strength, twice within
the last few months announced before the world its readiness to make
peace on a basis safeguarding Germany's vital interests, thus
indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld
from the nations of Europe. The German Government feels all the more
justified in declaring that responsibility could not be borne before
the forum of mankind and in history if after twenty-one months of the
war's duration the submarine question, under discussion between the
German Government and the Government of the United States, were to
take a turn seriously threatening maintenance of peace between the two
nations.
"As far as lies with the German Government, it wishes to prevent
things from taking such a course. The German Government, moreover, is
prepared to do its utmost to confine operations of the war for the
rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents,
thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which
the German Government believes, now as before, that it is in agreement
with the Government of the United States.
"The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government
of the United States that German naval forces have received the
following orders:
"'In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and
the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law,
such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war
zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives
unless the ship attempts to escape or offer resistance.'
"But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for
existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use
of an effective weapon if the enemy is permitted to continue to apply
at will methods of warfare violating rules of international law. Such
a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and
the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United
States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the
Government of the United States repeatedly declares that it is
determined to restore the principle of freedom of the seas, from
whatever quarter it has been violated.
"Accordingly, the German Government is confident, that in consequence
of the new orders issued to the naval forces, the Government of the
United States will also now consider all impediments removed which may
have been in the way of a mutual cooperation toward restoration of the
freedom of the seas during the war, as suggested in the note of July
23, 1915, and it does not doubt that the Government of the United
States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall
forthwith observe the rules of international law universally
recognized before the war, as are laid down in the notes presented by
the Government of the United States to the British Government,
December 28, 1914, and Nov. 5, 1915.
"Should steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain
the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all
belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new
situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of
decision."
The first feeling aroused by the German note, with its wounded tone
and qualified compliance with the American demand, was one of
irritation. But after closer study the President was willing to accept
the German undertaking on probation, without taking a too liberal view
of the phraseology employed, and to regard the intrusive strictures
on the United States as intended for German, not for American reading.
The disposition was to be charitable and to take cognizance of the
matter rather than the manner of Germany's backdown, and to wait and
see if her government would live up in good faith to its new
instructions to submarine commanders, without recognizing the
impossible conditions imposed.
But in the country at large public opinion was less ready to interpret
the German note except as it read textually. It was denounced in
scathing language as shuffling, arrogant and offensive, or as
insulting and dishonest. One paper deemed its terms to be a series of
studied insults added to a long inventory of injuries. Said another,
Germany's mood is still that of a madman. A third comment on the note
described it as "a disingenuous effort to have international petty
larceny put on the same plane as international murder and visited with
the same punishment." A fourth paper remarked: "If an American can
read the note without his temples getting hot then his blood is poor
or his understanding dense." The weight of American press opinion was
against Germany, especially in the South, and either called for the
breaking of diplomatic relations or considered such a course
inevitable.
For the United States even to contemplate, as Germany proposed, "an
alliance between Germany and the United States to break a British
blockade that Germany cannot break" was viewed as unthinkable.
Intellectual dishonesty, characteristic of Germany in its attitude
toward the world since the war began, and especially shown in
negotiations with the United States, was seen in the effort to place
upon Great Britain the responsibility for wrongs committed by Germany
against the United States and in the renewed attempt to convict the
American Government of lapses because it has not controlled Great
Britain's sea policy. In fact, the attempt to dictate the American
attitude to Great Britain in return for a promise to restrict
submarine warfare was generally resented as an impertinence.
When all was said, however, the German reply, although having the
appearance of being as little conciliatory as words could make it,
did in fact yield to President Wilson on the main issue.
The President, in considering this view, was guided by Ambassador
Gerard's dispatches reporting his interview with the kaiser on the
submarine crisis. The kaiser, he said, was animated by a keen desire
that relations between the two Governments should continue amicable,
but he felt that German public opinion must be considered in making
concessions to the United States. From the kaiser's concern for
popular approval the ambassador gathered that the German Government
faced the necessity of so wording its answer to the United States that
the German people would not feel that the Government had been forced
to modify the rules under which submarines operated. The
Administration received the impression that Germany would go to great
length to avoid a rupture with the United States, and the German note
must therefore be construed in the light of this feeling. The kaiser's
views, as transmitted by the ambassador, tended to soften the
irritating tone and language of the German note, and was not without
effect on the President and cabinet when they determined to accept it
provisionally.
The President decided to ignore the pointed suggestion of Germany that
the United States should now seek to prevail on Great Britain to
abandon her blockade of Germany. One source of irritation caused by
the note was the statement that should the United States fail to raise
the British embargo "the German Government would then be facing a new
situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of
action." The Administration had no intention of accepting any
conditional compliance with its demand for the abandoning of illegal
submarine warfare; but the opinion officially prevailed that this
effort of Germany to lecture the United States as to its duty toward
another nation might be overlooked in view of the accomplishment of
the main object for which the Administration had been contending.
Nor would the Government heed Germany's proposal that it undertake the
rôle of peacemaker in the absence of any indication that the Allied
Powers were willing to respond to Germany's willingness to make
peace--presumably on Germany's own terms.
The promises in the German note were accepted per se, and the
qualifications and animadversions Germany attached to them ignored.
This determined upon, the intimation was made plain to Germany that
should another ship be sunk in contravention of her new pledge no
exchange of notes would ensue, but a severance of diplomatic relations
would automatically be effected by the forbidden act. German submarine
commanders held in their hands the key to the situation. Any
infraction of Germany's latest word would not call for a disavowal or
punishment of the commander; the United States would merely act on the
presumption that Germany could not or would not control her own naval
forces. Berlin would not be consulted again.
The American response to the German note was sent three days later. It
was brief, and swept aside the considerable debating ground Germany
had invitingly spread to inveigle the United States into discussing
mediation in the war. Its principal passage ran:
"Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of
the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between
the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon
a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the
Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an
interruption of the good relations existing between the United States
and Germany.
"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that
it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not
intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is
in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic
negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other
belligerent government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages
in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to
be susceptible of that construction.
"In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the
Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that
it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion
that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of
the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the
slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other
government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants.
Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not
relative."
Secretary Lansing, in a comment on this reply, said the German note
was devoted to matters which the American Government could not discuss
with the German Government. He took the ground, as the American reply
indicated, that the only "questions of right" which could be discussed
with the German Government were those arising out of German or
American action exclusively, not out of those questions which were the
subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and any
other country.
"So long as she (Germany) lives up to this altered policy," he
explained, "we can have no reason to quarrel with her on that score,
though the losses resulting from the violation of American rights by
German submarine commanders operating under the former policy will
have to be settled.
"While our differences with Great Britain cannot form a subject of
discussion with Germany, it should be stated that in our dealings with
the British Government we are acting, as we are unquestionably bound
to act, in view of the explicit treaty engagements with that
Government. We have treaty obligations as to the manner in which
matters in dispute between the two Governments are to be handled. We
offered to assume mutually similar obligations with Germany, but the
offer was declined."
Mr. Lansing's comment appeared to be more enlightening to German
opinion than the official communication. But while the German was
frankly puzzled by the American contention--holding that there was an
intimate connection between England's "illegal blockade policy" and
the submarine war--and wondered naïvely whether or not he was the
simple victim of an American confidence game, or strongly suspected
that he had been hoodwinked by President Wilson into parting with the
effective submarine weapon, with no guarantee of getting any action
against England in return, hard German common sense discerned through
these doubts, and made the most of the one all-important fact it could
comprehend--that the dreaded break had been avoided.
With the air thus cleared, the usual anticlimax came to the
situation--the tumbling down of Germany's elaborate and grandiose
defense of her misdeeds--by a tardy confession of error, which swept
everything she had previously said into the discard. On May 8, 1916,
the same day on which the American note had been dispatched, Germany
sent a further communication acknowledging that, as result of further
investigation, her previous contention "that the damage of the
_Sussex_ was to be traced back to a cause other than the attack of a
German submarine cannot be maintained." It now seems that the _Sussex_
had been mistaken by the submarine commander for a British transport.
Nothing could be more complete than Germany's belated resort to an
amende honorable after the United States had proved her guilt:
"In view of the general impression of all the facts at hand the German
Government considers it beyond doubt that the commander of the
submarine acted in the bona fide belief that he was facing an enemy
warship. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that, misled by the
appearance of the vessel under the pressure of the circumstances, he
formed his judgment too hurriedly in establishing her character and
did not, therefore, act fully in accordance with the strict
instructions which called upon him to exercise particular care.
"In view of these circumstances the German Government frankly admits
that the assurance given to the American Government, in accordance
with which passenger vessels were not to be attacked without warning,
has not been adhered to in the present case.... The German Government
does not hesitate to draw from this resultant consequences. It
therefore expresses to the American Government its sincere regret
regarding the deplorable incident, and declares its readiness to pay
an adequate indemnity to the injured American citizens. It also
disapproved of the conduct of the commander, who has been
appropriately punished."
TWO YEARS OF THE WAR
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS
The purpose of this article is to review rapidly and briefly the
history of the military operations in the European conflict during the
first two years, from the attack upon Liege to the opening of the
first general Allied offensive. Necessarily, in view of the space
limitations it will be confined to a summary of events in the three
more considerable campaigns, that of Germany against France in 1914,
that of Germany against Russia in 1915, and the second German attack
upon France at Verdun in 1916. All other land operations have been
subsidiary or minor and will claim only passing comment.
THE GERMAN PROBLEM
In the years that lay between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and
the outbreak of the present conflict the Great General Staff of the
German Army had carefully elaborated plans for that war on two fronts
which the Franco-Russian alliance forecast. In company with the staffs
of her two allies, Austria and Italy, Germany had formulated the
methods by which she purposed to repeat the great success of 1870.
With Italy in the war, with Great Britain out of it, it was plain that
with German efficiency and the numbers that she and her allies would
possess, Germany could count on a permanent advantage in numbers as
well as material. But the events of the early years of the century,
the incidents beginning at Tangier in 1905, and extending to the
Balkan Wars in 1913, clearly established the possibility that Italy
might enter the war as an enemy, and the probability that Britain
would decline to stay out while France was being destroyed.
If either of these things should happen, as both did, then German
soldiers recognized that Germany and her Austrian ally would
ultimately be outnumbered, although superior preparation would give
them the advantage in the first and perhaps in the second years of the
conflict. It was therefore the problem of German high command to
prepare its plans in such fashion as to win the war, while it still
possessed the advantage of numbers and before the enemy could equip
and train its own forces.
In fact the problem was this: Should the Germans hurl the mass of
their great army first at Russia or first at France, leaving only a
small containing force on the other front? The question was much
debated and remains a matter of dispute, now, when the attack
ultimately decided upon has failed. (Vol. I, 85.)
The decision to attack France, which seems to have been reached well
in advance of the actual coming of the war, involved new
considerations. Russia's mobilization was notoriously known to be a
slow thing, although it turned out far more rapid than Germany had
calculated. But at the least German high command figured upon two
months, during which it could safely turn all of its energies and
resources against France. (Vol. I, 85.)
Unhappily in the years since the Franco-Prussian War France had built
up a great barrier of fortresses from Luxembourg to Switzerland.
Granted the great superiority of German heavy artillery, it was clear
that this barrier could be forced, but defended by the mass of the
French army this forcing would consume more than two months.
If France were to be attacked first, then it must be attacked by some
other road than that leading from the valleys of the Rhine and the
Moselle, the route of the 1870 invasion. And the route manifestly lay
through Belgium. The fortresses of the Meuse were patently of little
modern value, the Belgian army was weak in numbers and only at the
beginning of a process of reorganization. By coming through Belgium
the Germans could hope, even if the Belgians resisted, to get to Paris
in six weeks, having delivered their decisive battle on the road.
(Vol. I, 85.)
The element of additional opposition supplied by the Belgian army and
the small British Expeditionary Army, if it came to the Continent, did
not offset in the German mind the strength of the French barrier
fortresses from Verdun to Belfort, and Belgium seemed the line of
least resistance even if that resistance were to be reckoned at the
maximum. If France were crushed within six weeks, it was safe to
reckon that there would be time to turn east and deal with Russia,
still unprepared and so far held up--if not defeated--by Austria. If
Italy merely remained neutral up to the moment of the decisive battle
in France, the outcome of this conflict would decide Italian policy.
Here, briefly, is the basis of German strategy and the reason for
German decision. (Vol. I, 86.)
THE BELGIAN PHASE
Germany declared war upon Russia on August 1, 1914. (Vol. I, 279.) She
was already mobilizing, and in a more or less complete form all Europe
had been mobilizing for at least a week. While there were delays in
the exchange of other declarations, this date may be accepted as the
real beginning of the world war. Moreover, when the declaration of war
was sent to Russia, Germany was already aware that France purposed to
stand by her ally. (Vol. I, 280.)
The first step in German action, then, was to seize the road through
Belgium. It might be had by diplomacy, but this hope was speedily
extinguished when King Albert revealed his determination to defend his
country. (Vol. I, 280.) Liege, the most important outer barrier, might
still be won by a quick blow, and thus the opening move of the
struggle was the dash of a few thousand German troops, not yet put on
a complete war basis, westward from Aix-la-Chapelle and along the main
Berlin-Cologne-Brussels railroad to the environs of Liege. (Vol. II,
9.)
As a _coup-de-main_ this attack upon Liege failed. The forts resisted.
For several days Belgian field forces held the open spaces between the
eastern forts, and the first German troops suffered bloody repulses
and were presently compelled to pause until heavy artillery could be
brought up. Meantime German troops moved north of the city and forced
the crossing of the Meuse at Visé. Thereupon the Belgian field forces,
which had been defending Liege, retired, to escape envelopment. The
German army penetrated in the wide unfortified gaps between the Liege
forts and occupied the city of Liege on August 7, 1914. The forts held
out for another week, one by one succumbing to the new heavy German
and Austrian howitzers, which were making their first noise in Europe.
(Vol. II, 12-23.)
Meantime, behind Liege the German concentration was going forward, the
main mass of the German army was getting ready for its great drive on
Paris, while west of Liege German cavalry was slowly but methodically
driving in the slender Belgian field forces, which took their stand
behind the north and south flowing rivulets of the central Belgian
plain. Here were fought some of the minor engagements which filled the
press of the world in the early days, but had no actual value. (Vol.
II, 9-11.)
Early in the third week of August, 1914, the German preparations were
complete and one great German army under Kluck, crossing the Meuse
about Liege moved directly west upon Brussels, while a second, under
Bülow, crossed the Meuse about Huy, between Liege and Namur, and
advanced upon the latter place. Still a third army, under Hausen,
moved across the Ardennes toward the Meuse crossings southeast of
Namur, while a fourth under the Crown Prince of Württemberg aimed
farther south through the Ardennes at the Meuse crossings in France.
(Vol. II, 25, 26.)
Before this torrent the Belgian army was swept with little or no
delay. (Vol. II, 27.) By August 19, 1914, it was fleeing back to the
intrenched camp of Antwerp. (Vol. II, 27.) Brussels fell on August 20,
1914 (Vol. II, 30), and on August 22, 1914, the Belgian phase was over
and the German troops had come to grips with French and British troops
along the whole Belgian frontier from Luxemburg to Mons. (Vol. II,
37.) So far German plans had worked about as they had been expected to
work, and at the end of the third week Germany was on the eve of the
decisive battle, which she had planned.
[Illustration: On August 18, 1914, when the Belgian Retreat to Antwerp
began.
_Allies._--A, Belgians; B, British; C, Lanrezac; D, Langle de Cary; E,
Ruffey; F, Castelnau; G, Dubail; H, Pau.
_Germans._--I, Kluck; II Bülow; III Hausen; IV, Württemberg; V, Crown
Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heoringen; VIII, Deimling.]
THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE
Meantime the French had mobilized with expected speed and before
mobilization was completed had pushed a raid into southern Alsace,
wholly comparable to the German raid on Liege. (Vol. II, 38.) This
advance had taken, lost and retaken Mülhausen by August 15, 1914.
(Vol. II, 41-45.) At this time the French were approaching the Rhine,
in this sector, and had crossed the Vosges and come down the Rhine
affluents for some distance.
But this was a minor operation. The main thrust of the French General
Staff, the answer to the German drive through Belgium, had long been
prepared. It was to be a swift and heavy advance through Lorraine,
between Metz and Strassburg, rolling up the German forces here,
cutting communications between these fortresses, and moving down the
Rhine Valley and menacing the rear of the German armies which had
invaded Belgium. (Vol. II, 43.)
While the German armies were beginning their main advance upon
Brussels and Namur, the French thrust was pushed out, was very
successful for several days until the French had reached the main
Metz-Strassburg railroad, and from Delme to Saarburg stood far within
the German boundary. But at this point came the first real disaster.
(Vol. II, 44.)
Resting on the hills of Delme and the marshes of the Seille, the
Germans had constructed strong fortified lines and furnished them with
heavy artillery. When the French reached these positions they were
assailed by artillery which was beyond the reach of their own guns,
they suffered heavy losses, were thrown into confusion, and presently
were flowing back upon Nancy and Lunéville in something approximating
a rout, having lost flags, cannon, and many thousand prisoners. This
was the Battle of Morhange, or of Metz--as the Germans name it--and it
was over by August 22, 1914. (Vol. II, 44, 45.)
[Illustration: August 23, 1914, after the Allies had lost all the
First Battles.
_Allies._--A, Belgians; B, British; C, Lanrezac; D, Langle de Cary; E,
Ruffey; F, Castelnau; G, Dubail; H, Pau.
_Germans._--I, Kluck; II, Bülow; III, Hausen; IV, Württemberg; V,
Crown Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heeringen; VIII, Deimling.]
At the same time another French army had pushed across the Meuse into
Belgium from the district between Sedan and Montmédy, it had won
minor initial successes, and about Neufchâteau it had suffered exactly
the same sort of reverse that the French army to the south had met at
Morhange, German heavy artillery had procured another French defeat,
which again approximated a rout and this French army was also in rapid
retreat, having lost flags and guns as well as many thousand
prisoners.
Finally, still farther to the northeast, a French army had taken its
stand in the angle between the Meuse and the Sambre, from Dinant,
through Namur to Charleroi, and the British army prolonged the line to
the east of Mons. Against this dike there now burst the full fury of
the German advance made by the armies of Kluck and Bülow. (Vol. II,
46-49.) Again the French were defeated after a desperate battle about
Charleroi (Vol. II, 54), this time without any rout and after having
inflicted very heavy losses. But retreat was inevitable because the
Germans succeeded in forcing the crossings of the Meuse at
Dinant--that is, in the rear of the main army--while the fall of Namur
(Vol. II, 55-59), another triumph for German heavy artillery and a
complete surprise to the Allies, completed the ruin of their plans.
Meantime the British army about Mons, after a day of hard fighting
which had compelled them to contract their lines somewhat, but left
them unshaken, was thrown in the air by the French retreat from
Charleroi (Vol. II, 60), tardily announced to it, and was compelled to
begin its long and terrible retreat, which so nearly ended in
destruction. (Vol. II, 66.)
By the middle of the third week in August, 1914, the Germans had then
made good their way through Belgium, defeated the French counterthrust
in Lorraine, routed two French armies and heavily defeated a third,
together with its British supports. (Vol. II, 9-68.)
It was not yet clear whether the French armies could rally for another
general battle, but it was clear that if this should happen, the
Germans had still time, accepting their original time-table.
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
In the fourth week of August, 1914, Joffre, the French commander in
chief, was compelled to make a momentous decision. All his first plans
had failed, all his armies had been defeated. It very promptly turned
out that none of the defeats had materially affected the fighting
value of his armies. Thus the army defeated at Morhange was promptly
reenforced by the troops drawn out of Mülhausen and in turn defeated
and repulsed its conquerors before Nancy, in one of the bloodiest
battles of the war. The army defeated at Neufchâteau made good its
position behind the Meuse from Verdun to Charleville and inflicted
grave losses upon the Germans endeavoring to pass the river. Even the
army defeated at Charleroi was able, a few days later at Guise, to
pass to the offensive and throw back the Prussian Guard into the Oise.
(Vol. II, 90-92.)
Meantime two new armies, one under Foch, the other under Manoury, were
in the making and there was reason to believe that it would be
possible to renew the battle on the line of the Aisne, the Oise, and
the Somme. But there was one grave peril. German plans had not only
taken the French by surprise in making the main thrust through
Belgium, but had prepared to send this way a far greater number of men
than France had expected and had sent them much farther to the west.
The result was that the weight of the blow had fallen upon the
British. The British army had been compelled to make a night and day
retreat and had narrowly escaped destruction at Cambrai on August 26,
1914, "the most critical day." (Vol. II, 77.) The British army was too
heavily outnumbered to meet the German attack, its retreat had been so
rapid that the line of the Somme was about to be lost before the
British could be supported by Manoury's army, which came up on its
western flank too late. There was, therefore, the real danger that
Kluck might get between Paris and the main mass of the Allied armies,
enveloping them and producing a Sedan ten times greater than that
which had wrecked the Third Empire.
Joffre, accordingly, decided to continue the retreat and brought all
his forces that were west of the Meuse, in good order and no longer
heavily pressed back behind the Marne and on a line from Paris,
through Meaux, Sézanne, La Fère Champenoise, Vitry-le-François,
Bar-le-Duc, and thence north to Verdun. He thus stood with his forces
in a semicircle, the concave side toward the Germans and his flanks
resting upon Paris and Verdun, whose forts covered these flanks. (Vol.
II, 83.)
By September I, 1914, it was plain to the Germans that the French army
had escaped its embrace and that no envelopment was longer possible.
It remained possible to destroy them by main force, since German
numbers were still superior, German artillery unchallenged, and the
early successes productive of unbounded confidence. The German armies
thus leaped forward for the final decisive battle, which had been just
missed at the French frontier. (Vol. II, 84, 85.)
But the new situation imposed new strategy. It was no longer possible
to envelop the Allies, and accordingly, Kluck, on the western flank,
turned southeast and marched across the face of Paris, crossing the
Marne near Meaux and leaving only one corps to guard his flank toward
Paris. This was a sound maneuver, if the French troops in Paris were
too few or too broken to strike; it was perilous in the extreme, if
the opposite were the case. And it was the case, for Joffre had
concentrated behind Paris a new army, Manoury's, which was now to
attack.
On September 5, 1914, the Germans having now fallen into Joffre's
trap, the French commander in chief issued his famous order, and the
whole Anglo-French army suddenly passed from the defensive to the
offensive. (Vol. II, 102.) The first shots of the conflict, the great
Battle of the Marne, were fired by some German field pieces, at
Monthyon, just north of the Marne and less than twenty miles from
Paris. They greeted the advance of Manoury's army coming east out of
Paris and striking at Kluck's open flank. (Vol. II, 103.)
[Illustration: September 6, 1914, the Battle of the Marne.
_Allies._--A, Belgians; B, Manoury; C, British; D, Franchet d'Esperey
(Lanrezac); E, Foch; F, Langle de Cary; G, Sarrail (Ruffey); H,
Castelnau; I, Dubail.
_Germans._--I, Kluck; II, Bülow; III, Hausen; IV, Württemberg; V,
Crown Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heeringen.]
The next day Manoury rolled up Kluck's flank, drove his troops in on
the Ourcq River, and threatened his army with destruction. Kluck saved
himself by extraordinary clever work, he drew his troops back from
the front of the British south of the Marne, put them in against
Manoury and by September 10, 1914, had driven Manoury back toward
Paris and was threatening him. The first blow had failed, but it had
brought a chain of consequences fatal to German plans. (Vol. II,
99-110.)
First of all the British, once Kluck had drawn his main masses from
their front, began somewhat tardily to advance, threatening Kluck's
other flank, and Franchet d'Espérey's army, to the east, about
Montmirail, in turn, attacked Bülow's, whose position had been made
dangerous by the retreat of Kluck. Bülow had to go back north of the
Marne, suffering severe losses and his retirement uncovered the flank
of Hausen's army fighting to the east from La Fère Champenoise to
Vitry. (Vol. II, 107.)
Meantime things had been going badly on this line for the French, and
their troops under Foch had been driven back many miles. The Germans,
feeling the danger from the west, were making one final effort to
break the French center and win the decisive contest. But Bülow's
retreat opened the way for a supreme piece of strategy on the part of
Foch, who descended from the heights, struck Hausen, almost routed him
and sent him in quick retreat beyond the Marne. (Vol. II, 120, 121.)
This settled the battle. Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen were now forced to
retreat, their retreat communicated itself all along the line and by
September 13, 1914, the Germans were all withdrawing, Kluck was over
seventy miles north of the Grand Morin, just taking root behind the
Aisne, the Battle of the Marne was over, and the great German plan to
deal with France in six weeks had been completely wrecked. Actually
the first phase of the war was over, unless the Germans could regain
the offensive and restore the conditions existing before the Marne.
(Vol. II, 120-123.)
THE END OF THE FIRST WESTERN CAMPAIGN
In this the Germans failed. They did succeed in rallying and beating
down the Anglo-French pursuit with great skill and promptitude. The
Battle of the Aisne (Vol. II, 130-146) marked the beginning of the
deadlock and the Germans took the positions they were to hold for the
next two years between the Oise and the Meuse.
[Illustration: September 20, 1914, the Deadlock. Solid lines show
trench fronts. Dotted lines show extension toward Belgium--"the race
to the sea" in September and October.]
But the effort to renew the attack failed. It began with an effort,
made by troops brought from before Nancy, where a new French defensive
success had saved the Lorraine capital, to come south to Paris along
the west bank of the Oise. It was continued in the so-called "race to
the sea," when French and German commanders tried to outflank their
opponents along the Oise, the Somme, and the Lys. But this resulted
only in extending the lines of parallel trenches which now stretched
to the Belgian frontier from Noyon.
Finally, having beaten down the Belgian resistance and taken Antwerp
in the second week of October (Vol. II, 168-172), the Germans made a
last attempt to interpose between the Allies and the sea, take Calais
and Boulogne and come south through Artois and Picardy.
They were halted in the desperate battles along the Yser and the Lys.
(Vol. II, 169-175.) The Belgian army, escaping from Antwerp, stood
solidly behind the Yser, the British just managed to cling to Ypres
(Vol. II, 171-172), and the French under Foch performed new miracles
on the defensive. Two months after the German defeat at the Marne, the
loss of the western campaign was made absolute by the unsuccessful
termination of the Battle of Flanders and a war of movement had fallen
to a war of trenches, a state of deadlock had succeeded to the
operations in the open field and the German tide had been permanently
checked. (Vol. II, 174-177.) But actually the check had been at the
Marne and in this battle the original German plan had been decisively
defeated. France had not been disposed of in two months, but had won
the decisive battle that German strategy had prepared. But she had
lacked the numbers and the artillery to turn the victory to best
account and had failed wholly in the attempt to free her own territory
as she was to continue to fail for two years.
[Illustration: November 15, 1914, the End of the Western Campaign.]
THE RUSSIAN PHASE
We have seen that it was the plan of the German General Staff to hold
the Russian armies while the great attack upon France was being made.
To do this the Germans had left a very small force in East Prussia,
but had practically assigned to Austria the task of holding up Russia.
(Vol. II, 371.)
German calculations as to Russian mobilization proved sadly
inaccurate. While the German troops were still in Belgium and the
Battle of Charleroi unfought, Russian troops crossed the East Prussian
boundary and began an invasion which produced something approximating
a panic. (Vol. II, 434.) One Russian army came due west from the
Niemen, another north from Warsaw, and all of Germany east of the
Vistula seemed in grave peril. (Vol. II, 437.)
TANNENBERG AND LEMBERG
It was then that the kaiser summoned Hindenburg, gave him the task of
defending East Prussia, and thus introduced one of the few famous and
successful soldiers of the war. (Vol. II, 438.) Hindenburg cleverly
concentrated his forces, leaving only a screen in front of the Russian
army coming from the Niemen toward Königsberg, practically surrounded
the other Russian army in the marshes about Tannenberg, brought into
action great parks of German heavy artillery, and routed and destroyed
the Russian army about September 1, 1914. (Vol. II, 438-441.)
On "Sedantag" Germany was able to celebrate one of the most decisive
of all her many victories, and the Russian peril in East Prussia had
been quickly abolished.
But the East Prussian incident was only a detail, due, it is still
insisted, to the prompt yielding of Russian strategy to Allied appeals
for some action in the east that might relieve the terrible pressure
now being exerted upon the Anglo-French forces in the west. And if the
East Prussian invasion did not, as was asserted at the time, compel
the Germans to send troops from Belgium to East Prussia, it did hold
up new formations and seriously complicate the German problem,
contributing materially to the French victory at the Marne thereby.
The real Russian blow was delivered against Austria. Faithful to her
agreement, Austria had promptly undertaken the invasion of southern
Poland and in the third week of August an Austrian army was
approaching Lublin, while another stood in a wide circle about the
Galician city of Lemberg. (Vol. II, 376-379.)
Ignoring the first army, the Russians sent their main masses westward
on a front extending from the Rumanian boundary to the Kiev-Lemberg
railroad. Before Lemberg the Austrian army was overwhelmed in a
terrible rout, which ended in a wild flight, costing some 300,000
prisoners and almost destroying the Austrian military establishment.
(Vol. II, 385, 386.)
The Austrian army, which had advanced into Poland was left in the air,
and its retreat was transformed into a new disaster. Lemberg fell
about September 1, 1914, and meantime a Serbian victory at the Jedar
had destroyed still another Austrian army and emphasized the weakness
of Hapsburg military power. (Vol. II, 329-335.)
At about the time the German blow at France was failing along the
Marne, the Russian victories were mounting, Russian armies were
sweeping through Galicia and approaching the San. (Vol. II, 398.)
Serbian armies were across the Bosnia frontier, (Vol. II, 323), and
the eastern situation was becoming perilous in the extreme for the
Central Powers, despite the great victory of Tannenberg, which had
cost the Russians an army of 100,000 men. (Vol. II, 438-450.) Thus in
the first six weeks of the war the whole German conception had been
defeated, France had not been destroyed by one great blow, and Russia
had not been held up by Austria, pending the delivery of this blow and
the return of the German troops who had delivered it.
[Illustration: October 24, 1914, The Battle Of The Vistula. Arrows
show Hindenburg's attack on Warsaw and Ivangorod.]
WARSAW AND LODZ
October brought the plain necessity to the Germans of coming to the
aid of their ally. While they were still endeavoring to reopen the
decision in the west it was necessary to send troops to Hindenburg and
to take pressure off Austria. The blow took the form of a rapid
advance upon Warsaw through Central Poland, which was destitute of
Russian troops. (Vol. II, 454-461.)
The thrust almost succeeded, German troops reached the suburbs of
Warsaw, German guns were heard by the citizens of the town and Warsaw
was in deadly peril, but Siberian troops arrived in the nick of time
and Hindenburg was obliged to retire. (Vol. II, 462-466.) Still his
main purpose was achieved. Russian armies in Galicia had been weakened
to save Warsaw and were compelled to retire behind the San and the
Vistula. (Vol. II, 420-427.)
Hindenburg's retreat was masterly, he flowed back upon Cracow and
Breslau, pursued by a great Russian army. (Vol. II, 458-462.) Meantime
the Russian armies in Galicia again took the offensive and November
saw Russian armies at the outskirts of Cracow and approaching the
boundary of Silesia. (Vol. II, 413-423.) Taken in connection with the
German repulses all along the western front and the defeat in
Flanders, which disclosed the final collapse of the original German
plan, this moment marked the high-water stage of allied fortunes for
many, many months.
Having led the Russian army after him to the German frontier,
Hindenburg quickly moved his troops on strategic railroads to the
north, invaded Poland again between the Vistula and the Warta (Vol.
II, 462-481), almost succeeded in interposing between the Russian army
and Warsaw, and won the great victory of Lodz. (Vol. II, 466, 467.)
But Russian numbers saved the day. After terrific fighting and
tremendous losses the Russians got back to the Bzura line, which they
were to hold for nearly a year and the German advance was beaten down
in fighting wholly similar to that in Flanders. (Vol. II, 471-478.)
THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN
Once more the Russian advance in Galicia was resumed. (Vol. III, 264.)
Russian armies never again approached Cracow, but they did come to the
Dunajec line, while to the south they began the slow ascent of the
Carpathians (Vol. III, 261-264), across which raiding forces of
Cossacks had several times passed. They also concentrated against the
fortress of Przemysl, the last Austrian stronghold along the San. This
campaign endured throughout the winter. Finally Przemysl, with a
garrison of 125,000 men, surrendered in early March (Vol. III,
249-257), and Russia was at last free to strike either at Cracow or
through the Carpathians for the Hungarian Plain.
Her decision to go south was probably influenced by the great victory
of the Serbs at Valievo. While German aid was taking pressure off the
Austrians a new Hapsburg thrust had been delivered at Serbia,
Austro-Hungarian troops had passed the Drina and penetrated deeply
into Serbia, Belgrade had fallen, and the end of Serbia seemed in
sight. But new Russian attacks having compelled Austria to recall many
of her troops, the remaining Hapsburg forces in Serbia were almost
destroyed in the bloody defeat of Valievo in December. (Vol. II,
325-357.)
To offset this the Germans soon won one more great victory in East
Prussia, at the Mazurian Lakes, where another Russian army was
well-nigh destroyed by the quick-marching, better-trained German
troops. And this victory beat down another Russian invasion of East
Prussia and, as it turned out, closed the period of immediate peril
for the German territories in the east.
In March and April the Galician campaign reached its climax in the
bloody battles of the Carpathians and Russian armies seemed slowly but
surely pushing their way over the mountains and descending into the
Hungarian Plain. (Vol. III, 235-276.) It was at this moment that Italy
had chosen to enter the war on the allied side, and there was every
reason to believe that Rumania would follow.
THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC
Instead there came a sudden and tremendous German victory which was to
prove the prelude to more victories and to a summer of unparalleled
success for German arms. This victory was won at the Battle of the
Dunajec--named Gorlice by the Germans--which may well rank with the
Marne as the second great struggle of the war, since it saved Austria,
brought Russia to the edge of ruin and wholly transformed the horizons
of the conflict. (Vol. III, 264-276.)
It will be recalled that at the outset of the war the German General
Staff had to choose between two possible operations, an offensive
against France or an offensive against Russia. It had chosen to attack
France and had lost the campaign. It had in addition failed measurably
in its defensive against Russia and the result had been the loss of
most of Galicia with the incidental Austrian disasters.
But the campaign in the west had resulted in the occupation of
advantageous positions far within French territory and in the conquest
of most of Belgium.
Now the German General Staff was again able to decide whether it would
turn its entire energies for the summer of 1915 against France or
against Russia. If it chose to attack Russia there was solid reason
for believing that neither in munitions nor in numbers would the
Allies in the west reach a point where they would become dangerous
before autumn and between May and October Germany could hope to put
Russia out of the war, particularly as Germany knew what the rest of
the world did not, that Russia was at the end of her munitions, and
her long and terrible campaigns in Galicia, together with her defeats
in East Prussia, had temporarily much reduced the fighting value of
her armies.
Accordingly Germany decided to get east and put Russia out of the war
as she had undertaken nine months before to go west and had tried and
failed to put France out of the war. But she was again faced with the
fact that failure would expose her to new perils, this time on the
west.
For her first attack Germany selected the point in the Russian line
between the Vistula and the Carpathians, about Tarnow, where the
Russian line stood behind the Dunajec River. If the Russian line
should be suddenly broken here, the German General Staff might hope to
sweep up all the Russian armies which were facing south and
endeavoring to push through the Carpathians.
Just about May 1, 1915, the blow fell and Germany, massing hitherto
unheard-of numbers of heavy guns on a narrow front, and using untold
ammunition, not merely routed, but abolished Radko Dmitrieff's army
(Vol. III, 267-276), and moved rapidly in on the rear of the Russian
Carpathian armies. With difficulty these extricated themselves and
retired behind the San. (Vol. III, 276.) But they were unable here to
withstand Mackensen who had assumed command in all this field, and
fell back first upon Lemberg and then upon the Volhynian triangle of
fortresses within the Russian frontier. Przemysl fell, Lemberg was
lost and Dubno and Lutsk, two of the three Volhynian fortresses, fell.
(Vol. III, 276-312.)
Having thus disposed of the Galician armies, Mackensen turned
northeast from the San, struck at Lublin and Cholm (Vol. III,
357-365), and through them at Brest-Litovsk, far in the rear of the
Russian armies in Poland. At the same time Hindenburg in East Prussia
moved south, aiming at Grodno and Vilna, also behind the Warsaw front
(Vol. III, 256-361), while a third Germany army invaded the Courland
and aimed at Riga. (Vol. III, 337.)
The Russian armies in Poland were thus threatened with complete
envelopment; they were caught between the closing jaws of the pincers,
which were Mackensen and Hindenburg. For a certain time it was not
clear whether the gigantic double thrust might not result in the
capture of the whole Russian army in Poland. But this did not happen.
Warsaw was evacuated (Vol. III, 356), Ivangorod, Novo Georgievsk, the
fortresses along the Bobr-Narew-Niemen barrier fell (Vol. IV,
176-181), but the Russian armies drew back upon Riga, Vilna, and
Brest-Litovsk. (Vol. IV, 186-188.)
[Illustration: October 1, 1915, at the End of the Russian Retreat.
Dotted line shows Russian front on April 1, 1915.]
RUSSIA SURVIVES
At Brest-Litovsk there was only a brief halt and then the Russians
resumed their retreat upon Pinsk and the Pripet Marshes. Behind the
Dvina from Riga to Dvinsk the northern army stood fast. But the
central armies, retiring upon Vilna, were nearly trapped and once were
actually cut off by German cavalry. (Vol. IV, 193-223.)
By September the great campaign approached its end. The Russians at
last took root on a line from Riga, through the Pripet Marshes to
Rovno and thence to the Rumanian boundary. (Vol. IV, 184-255.) The
czar sent the grand duke to the Caucasus and took command himself
(Vol. IV, 188), an allied offensive in the west in Champagne and
Artois (Vol. IV, 52-81) made sudden demands upon German man power, as
the Russian advance in East Prussia and Galicia had taxed German man
power in the days of the Marne, and so, by October, it was plain that
the second great German effort had also failed. Russia had not been
destroyed, she had not been put out of the war for any long period;
Russian armies were to resume the offensive the following June.
As in the west, Germany had conquered wide territories, she had taken
fortresses, provinces, vast numbers of prisoners and guns, but a
decision had escaped her. She was still confronted by the certainty
that at some future time all her foes, superior in numbers and
munitions, would beat upon all her fronts at once. But she was no
longer able to push eastward to follow the pathway of Napoleon and
meet a Russian winter on the road; moreover the situation in the
Balkans demanded attention and the Italian offensive along the Isonzo,
as well as Anglo-French pressure in the west, also claimed notice.
THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN
Early in the spring the Anglo-French fleets had made a desperate and
almost successful attempt to force the Dardanelles. (Vol. III,
423-437.) Their failure had been followed by a land expedition, which
took root at the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, made slight
progress inward and was halted only a short distance south and west of
the commanding hills. (Vol. III, 429-437.)
[Illustration: The Conquest of Serbia, December, 1915.
Arrows show routes taken by Austrian, German, and Bulgar invaders.
_A_--Route of retreating Serbs
_B_--Route of Allies from Saloniki in their unsuccessful attempt to
rescue the Serbs.]
A new effort in August directed from the Gulf of Saros through Suvla
Bay had also just missed supreme success, through failures in
preparation and command which were beginning to show in all British
operations. (Vol. IV, 344.)
For the moment Turkey had saved Constantinople, but the Turks'
supplies of munitions were running short and there was reason to
believe that the Gallipoli thrust might presently end in victory and
open the straits to Russia, if Germany did not take a hand.
Thus spurred, Germany and Austria planned and executed the most
successful single campaign of the war. German diplomacy succeeded in
enlisting Bulgaria. (Vol. IV, 269-274.) Allied diplomacy chained
Serbian action while there was yet time for Serbia to save herself,
Greece deserted her old ally and in November a great Austro-German
army under Mackensen suddenly burst into Serbia from the north and
west (Vol. IV, 268-269), while a Bulgarian army entered from the east.
(Vol. IV, 269-273.) The result was inevitable. Serbia was crushed. Her
gallant army fled over the mountains after heroic resistance and
reached the Adriatic, but as a mob rather than as an army. (Vol. IV,
263-307.)
Tardy Allied efforts to come to the rescue through Saloniki were
blocked by the Bulgarians south of Uskub (Vol. IV, 308-316), all
Macedonia was taken (Vol. IV, 267-334), and the Anglo-French
expedition was driven south under the very shadow of the old walls of
Saloniki, and the roads to Constantinople and to Albania were opened
to Germany and Austria, the Balkans were conquered at a blow and
Berlin began to forecast a German-led drive upon Egypt by Suez and
even upon India by Bagdad.
As for the Gallipoli troops, December saw them hurriedly withdrawn
after great losses and terrible suffering. (Vol. IV, 369-380.)
Germany and Austria had now broken the iron circle about them; for the
moment Germany had realized the German dream of expansion to the Near
East, the conception of a Central Empire, a Mittel-Europa, fronting
the Baltic and the Adriatic, overflowing the Sea of Marmora into Asia
Minor and bound by the German-built railroad uniting Berlin, Vienna,
and Constantinople with Bagdad and Hamburg and Antwerp with Suez and
the Persian Gulf. Here at last was a solid gain, a real victory after
two great disappointments.
IN THE WEST
Meantime there had been a long trench struggle in the west. The German
attack at the outset of the war had terminated in Flanders. It was not
for several months that the Allies felt able to undertake any
offensive. Then in rapid succession came French attacks in Alsace, in
Champagne, and south of St. Mihiel (Vol. III, 151-169), while the
British made a desperate drive about Neuve Chapelle. (Vol. III,
83-98.) All these were checked by the Germans who passed to the
offensive themselves in April, and made a new attack about Ypres,
marked by the first use of poison gas. (Vol. III, 99-115.)
German success was inconsiderable, but it did reveal the fact that the
Allies were not yet dangerous and Germany turned her whole attention
toward the great Russian campaign just beginning. In May and June the
French made terrific attacks under Foch in Artois (Vol. III, 121-125),
and won some ground north of Arras. (Vol. III, 155.) But the attacks
had to be abandoned because they were too costly in men, while a
British attempt to support the French failed dismally.
Not until late September, when Russia was just at the lowest ebb in
her fortunes, did the western Allies try again. Then, starting on
September 25, 1915, they launched terrific drives in Champagne and
Artois, came within an ace of piercing the German lines, captured some
30,000 prisoners and many guns, but in the end failed to get through.
(Vol. IV, 61-131.) German troops were recalled from Russia and
Russia's escape was made certain, but this was the only considerable
consequence of the Allied attack, preparation for which had consumed
many months. Again it was demonstrated that England was not ready and
France, alone, could not free her own territory.
ITALY
Italy had entered the war just as Russia was suffering her first
terrible defeats in Galicia. (Vol. III, 382-392.) Had Italian decision
been reached a few months earlier the effect might have been decisive.
As it was, Italy came too late, her attack was halted south of Trent
and along the Isonzo, after inconsiderable progress. A certain number
of Austrian divisions, which conceivably might have been directed
against Russia and contributed to making the outcome of that campaign
decisive, were drawn off to the south. (Vol. III, 392-402.)
In September, and again when the Austro-German attack upon Serbia was
at its height, Italy attacked along the Isonzo. (Vol. IV, 415-417.)
Once more the result was limited to drawing off certain divisions, a
useful but not highly important service. In opening another front
Italy had contributed to the further consumption of the reserves of
the Central Powers, she had begun an operation to be compared with
that of Britain in Spain in the later days of the First Empire. She
was taking off a portion of the weight that France and Russia were
carrying, she was contributing to the exhaustion of Austria, but
neither in the first nor the second year of the war was the
contribution to be considerable and Italy was presently to require aid
from Russia, when at last Austria decided to pass to the offensive in
the Trentino.
VERDUN
With the coming of winter the German General Staff had to face a new
situation, full of menace. Their first great conception, the
destruction of the military power of France, had failed, although it
had won much territory and provided an admirable defensive position
far beyond their own frontiers. Their second major conception, the
elimination of Russia from the war, had failed, but it had also given
them much territory and they were not overoptimistic in assuming that
their victories would keep Russia on the defensive for many months;
their actual mistake, it turned out, was in overestimating the length
of time.
Again, then, there was offered the original choice: Should the next
blow be postponed until spring and directed at Petrograd or Moscow, or
should it be prepared and delivered before spring and in the west? The
decision for the west was made. Apparently the German reasoning was
this: Britain was not yet ready, winter and defeat had reduced the
value of Russia so low that it was safe to turn the best of their
troops from the east to the west. Actually the whole weight of the
military machine could be exerted against France.
From this second blow at France the Germans expected to derive the
benefits missed at the Marne. If the French lines were broken, as the
Russian had been at the Dunajec, then a wide swinging advance would
carry German troops deep into the French territory, end French hope
and compel French surrender. This was the maximum of possibility.
On the other hand, if there were no actual and deep piercing of the
French lines, the pressure upon the French would lead them to call
upon the British for help. British attack, while the British force was
still unready, would lead to great losses and would exhaust the
reserves in men and munitions of both France and Britain. At the worst
this would mean that neither France nor Britain would be ready to take
the field in their long-promised general offensive in 1916.
There was, of course, the possibility that the German attack would be
repulsed, that the French and British would not undertake a premature
offensive, and that Russia would rally and be able to storm the
eastern lines stripped of reserves to strengthen the western attack.
If all these things happened then Germany might herself lose the
offensive and conceivably the war. But no German soldier could believe
these things would happen and the remote possibility did not weigh
against the apparent opportunity to win a sweeping and decisive
victory, while the British and Russians were still unready and France
alone in the field.
THE FEBRUARY ATTACK
Accordingly Germany decided to attack in the west. She selected Verdun
as the objective for reasons not at first clear but now well known.
Verdun was in the public mind a great fortress, surrounded by
impregnable works, the strongest point on the French front. In fact it
was the weakest sector. The forts had been evacuated, the first line
defenses some miles north of the town were strong, but the second and
third had been neglected. The line was held by less than two army
corps of territorials; there were other faults in preparation
chargeable to the politicians. Worst of all of these was the lack of
rail communications due to failure to build new lines to replace those
cut by the Germans, who at St. Mihiel blocked the north and south line
from the Paris-Nancy trunk line and at Montfaucon and Varennes
interrupted the Paris-Verdun railroad by indirect fire.
There was every reason why the Germans could expect that a sudden and
terrific blow would permit them to get to Verdun, take the forts on
the east bank, and possibly cut clear through the French lines and
break them into two parts. Not impossibly this would mean retirement
as far as the old Marne battle field: certainly it would mean the
extinction of French hope. So the Germans reasoned.
The first blow fell on February 21, 1916. The initial attack was made
east of the Meuse on a very narrow front; it resulted in an immediate
local success. The French trenches were abolished, the French line was
threatened, and the German army overflowed south in great force. The
possibility of a repetition of the Dunajec success was at this time
plain.
Worst of all, from the allied point of view, there now came a
difference in opinion between the French General Staff and the French
Civil Government. The former wished to retire behind the Meuse and
evacuate the eastern forts and trenches, thereby gaining a strong
defensive line, but surrendering Verdun. The Government felt that such
a retreat would be accepted as a grave disaster, would depress the
French people, and result in a political overturn.
At the outset the general staff seems to have adhered to its view, and
for some days the German advance was steady. Even Fort Douaumont, on
the outer rim of the old permanent fortifications, was lost, and the
German press announced the fall of the city itself. But in the end the
army listened to the Government, Castelnau and Pétain went to the
front to organize the defense. By the middle of March the first crisis
was about over and the French had restored their line, the most
expensive detail in their defense. But they had not been able to
retake Douaumont, and German possession was to prove a thorn in their
side thenceforth.
With the great general attack of April 9, 1916, the first phase of the
battle for Verdun was over. This check abolished all chance of a
piercing of the French lines, of a second Dunajec. It assured to the
French time to complete their second- and third-line defenses, and it
gave ample evidence that the dangers of the first hours, due to
failures and errors which cost many generals their positions, were at
an end. Above all, it demonstrated that the wonderful motor-transport
system which had been improvised had proved adequate to save a city
deprived of all railroad communications.
LATER PHASES
Still the Germans kept on. Halted on the east bank, they transferred
their attack to the west, and Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme became famous
the world over. But their advances were slight and their losses were
tremendous. French tactics were now disclosed. It was the purpose of
the French to exact the very heaviest price for each piece of ground
that they defended, but they held their lines with very small
contingents, and, save in the case of a few vital points, surrendered
the positions whenever the cost of holding them was too great.
German high command had seen its larger aims fail. Why did it continue
to assail Verdun after the chance of piercing the French lines had
passed and when the cost was so terrific? The answer is not wholly
clear, but we do know that the concentration of artillery and men had
taken months; these could not quickly be moved elsewhere. Such a
change in plans would mean the loss of several months, which would be
improved by the British and the Russians; it would give France the
"lift" of a great victory.
Conversely it was clear that, while the French lines could not be
pierced, Verdun might be taken and the moral value of the capture
would be enormous in Germany, France, and the neutral world, although
the military value would be just nothing. Again, there remained the
fair chance that the continued pressure upon France would lead the
French to ask the British to attack, and the premature attack would
spoil the allied offensive, obviously preparing.
Against this chance the Germans had massed not less than 800,000
troops along the British front. Meantime they told the world that
Verdun was exhausting France, that it was making an allied offensive
impossible, and they used their slow but considerable advances, which
resulted from the French policy of "selling" their positions at the
maximum of cost to the Germans and minimum of loss to themselves, to
convince the world that they were systematically approaching Verdun
and would take it at the proper moment.
This phase lasted from April 9, 1916, down to the opening of July.
During that time the Germans pushed out from Douaumont and captured
Vaux; they crowded up and over Dead Man's Hill and up the slope of
Hill 304; by July 1, 1916, they had pushed the French right back to
the extreme edge of the hills, on the east bank of the Meuse, and the
French were just holding the inside line of forts--Belleville,
Souville, and Tavannes--with their backs to the river and with German
trenches coming right up to the ditches of these three forts.
By July 1, 1915, the French were in their last ditch before
Verdun--that is, on the east bank--but on July 1, 1916, there began
that allied offensive at the Somme which changed the whole face of the
western operations. Thus, by August 1, 1916, the Germans had been
compelled to remove many troops from Verdun and the French were able
to take the offensive here again, and by August 6, 1916, had made
material progress in retaking portions of the ground they had "sold"
the Germans for so great a price in previous weeks.
GETTYSBURG
After the German checks in April the French compared the Verdun fight
to Gettysburg. General Delacroix used that example to me in March, but
it was not until June that General Joffre was ready to adopt it. By
this time it was well established in all minds. Gettysburg had been
the final effort of the South to win a decision on the field while
superior organization gave her advantage over a foe that had
superiority in ultimate resources, both of money and men. The failure
at Gettysburg was promptly followed by the loss of the initiative, the
North passed to the attack, and the rest of the war consisted in the
steady wearing out of the Confederacy.
A victory at Gettysburg would probably have won the Civil War for the
South. A victory of the Dunajec style might have won the Great War for
the Germans. But the victory did not come, the struggle went on for
many months, and presently the consequence of stripping the eastern
lines was disclosed in new Russian victories, while the absolute
failure to provoke a premature offensive in the west, or prevent any
offensive, was disclosed in the Battle of the Somme.
Verdun, then, was the third failure of Germany to win the war by a
major thrust. It was a failure which was wholly similar to the
failures at the Marne and in Russia. Relatively speaking, it was a far
greater failure, because it brought no incidental profit as did the
other campaigns: it won only a few square miles of storm-swept hills,
it has cost not less than 250,000 casualties, and allied statements
placed the cost at half a million. From the military, the moral, the
political points of view, Verdun was a defeat for the Germans of the
first magnitude. Conversely, the French victory filled the world with
admiration. The French success at the Marne had been won in complete
darkness, and after two years the world still has only a vague notion
of the facts of this grandiose conflict. But there never was any
possibility of concealment about Verdun. The fight was in the open,
the issue was unmistakable, and French courage and skill, French
steadiness and endurance, surprised the world once more.
THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE
While the German attack upon Verdun was still in its more prosperous
phase the Austrians delivered a wholly similar attack upon Italy.
(Vol. V, 244-264.) Precisely as the Russian defeats had enabled
Germany to turn many troops west, they had provided Austria for the
first time with reserves that could be used against Italy.
Conceivably, success would put Italy out of the war, for it was plain
Italian sentiment was wearying of the long strain of sterile
sacrifice.
For the attack the Austrians selected the Trentino district. If they
could drive their masses through the Italian lines between the Adige
and the Brenta, and enter the Venetian Plain, taking Verona and
Vicenza, all the Italian forces to the eastward along the Isonzo would
have to retreat and might be captured. At the least, Austria might
hope to carry her front to the Po and the Adige, and thus stand on the
defensive far within Italian frontiers, as Germany stood within French
frontiers.
The same artillery preparation was made here as before Verdun, the
battle opened in the same way (Vol. V, 244), and for many weeks, until
June 1, 1916, the Austrian advance was steady, and finally passed the
old frontier and actually approached the Venetian Plain about Vicenza.
(Vol. V, 260.) For the first time Austria seemed within reach of a
great victory, and Italian apprehension was great. As for the moral
effect, an Italian ministry fell because of the reverses, and many
Italian generals were retired.
[Illustration: The mobility of the French motor-mounted batteries
makes them most effective, not only in bringing down aircraft but in
strengthening the line at any point. The gun is the famous 75. The
motor in the rear carries a supply of shells.]
By June 1, 1916, the Italian situation had become critical, (Vol. V,
258), just as the French situation about Verdun became critical on
July 1, 1916. But at this point the Russian attack upon the east front
changed the whole face of affairs, and Austria was forced shortly to
abandon her offensive in Venetia and hurry her reserves eastward.
(Vol. V, 265-291.) Accordingly, in a brief time Italian troops were
advancing again and regaining the lost ground. The Verdun attack
actually failed in all but local value, the Trentino thrust was still
succeeding when it had to be abandoned, but in abandoning it Austria
confessed her great preparations and considerable sacrifices had been
vain. Compared with Verdun, it was a minor defeat; but coming with
Verdun, it was a further blow to Austro-German prestige.
GERMANY LOSES THE OFFENSIVE
At the outset of the war Germany found herself with greater numbers,
superior artillery, and possessing a mechanical efficiency surpassing
anything that war had known. She was able to mobilize more men,
transport them more quickly, and employ them more effectively than her
opponents. Her heavy artillery gave her a decisive advantage both in
the matter of enemy fortresses and enemy armies. But they did not
quite avail to give her the decisive victory she had expected.
The second year of the war revealed the enormous resources of Germany
and the incredible fashion in which her people had been disciplined
and her preparations made. The collapse of Austria and the defeat of
the Marne did not deprive her of the offensive, and the weight of her
initial blow sufficed to hold her western foes incapable of effective
action, while she reorganized Austrian resources, put new armies in
the field, and won the great battles in the Russian field, which
carried her advance to the Beresina and the Dvina.
But the Russian operation in 1914 had been sufficient to deprive her
of the troops needed to deliver the final blow in the west, and the
French, Italian, and British attacks in September, 1915, had compelled
her to stay her hand against Russia at the critical hour. When she
chose to attack France at Verdun she had always to recognize that
sooner or later Russia would again take the field, and that unless her
second blow at France had already succeeded before this time came her
position would be difficult, while if her blow at France did not
suffice to prevent an allied offensive in the west, she might at last
have to fight a defensive war on both fronts.
Hitherto she had been able to fight offensively on one front while
holding on the other. Hitherto she had been able to move her reserves
from one front to the other whenever the need was urgent. She reckoned
that Russia would be incapable of a real offensive in 1916; she
reckoned that Britain would not be able to train her armies for
effective action in the same year, and she gambled on the probability
that her blows at Verdun would dispose of France. In addition, she
reckoned the Austrian attack upon Italy would dispose of Italian
threats for the summer.
But long before the war Bernhardi had foretold a German defeat in her
next conflict if all her foes were able to get their forces into the
field at one time, and Germany should fail to dispose of at least one
of her enemies before all were ready. It is not the time or the place
to assert that what Bernhardi forecast has now come true, but it is
clear that Germany, temporarily or permanently, as it may prove, lost
the initiative following her defeat at Verdun, that she was compelled
to accept the defensive on all fronts by July, and that up to the date
this article is written, August 8, 1916, she has been losing ground on
all fronts.
THE RUSSIAN ATTACK
Very briefly, now, in the remaining space allowed me, I purpose to
discuss the remarkable change in the whole face of the war that had
come by the second anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict. The
first authentic sign of this change was the great Russian success in
Volhynia and Galicia about June 1, 1916. (Vol. V, 154.) As far back as
February Russian successes in Asia Minor had suggested that the
Russian army was regaining power and receiving adequate munitions. The
captures of Erzerum and Trebizond were a warning that deserved, but
did not earn, attention in Berlin and the British failure and
surrender at Kut-el-Amara served to obscure the Eastern situation.
(Vol. V, 318-326.)
[Illustration: The Russian Spring Offensive, 1916. Shaded section
shows ground gained, June to September.]
But about June 1, 1916, Russia suddenly stepped out and assailed the
whole Austro-German line with fire and steel. The weight of the blow
fell between the Pripet Marshes and the Rumanian frontier. From this
front Germany had drawn many troops to aid in her Verdun operation,
Austria had made similar drafts to swell her forces attacking Italy.
Too late Berlin and Vienna realized that they had weakened their line
beyond the danger point and had hopelessly underestimated the
recuperative power of the Slav.
By July 1, 1916, the magnitude of the Russian success was no longer
hidden from German or Austrian. An advance of over forty miles in the
north threatened Kovel and Lemberg, twice as extensive an advance in
the south had reconquered Bukowina (Vol. V, 162-182), brought Cossacks
to the Carpathians, and threatened Lemberg from the south. (Vol. V,
192-198.) Lutsk (Vol. V, 159), Dubno (Vol. V, 163), and Czernowitz
(Vol. V, 162) had been taken, Kolomea and Stanislau were threatened
and were soon to fall. Upward of 400,000 prisoners were claimed by the
Russians, whose estimates of prisoners had hitherto proved reliable;
guns, supplies, munitions had been captured in incredible amounts, and
an Austrian collapse like to that of Lemberg seemed at hand.
In this situation Germany, seemingly on the point of taking Verdun,
had to turn her attention toward the east and direct new troops and
new reserves of munitions and guns to Volhynia and Galicia to save
Lemberg. (Vol. V, 198.) This effort was temporarily successful, and
July saw the Russian sweep slowing down, although by no means halted.
(Vol. V, 207-212.) Since the German victory at the Dunajec there had
been no such single success, and save for the Russian victory at
Lemberg, the Allies had won no such offensive victory.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
But on July 1, 1916, just as the Russian drive was slowing down and
while Germany was straining every nerve to meet the eastern crisis,
the French and British along the Somme suddenly broke out in a
terrific attack over twenty miles of front. The French rapidly
approached Péronne, the British more slowly by steadily moving toward
Bapaume. Here was the answer to the German assertion that Verdun had
exhausted France and made an allied offensive in the west impossible.
It was as complete a refutation of reckonings for the west as the
Russian victory had been of the German calculations for the east.
And after six weeks the Somme drive is continuing, slowly, but
steadily, actually recalling in every detail the slow but steady
advance of the Germans before Verdun. Meantime about Verdun itself a
new operation has begun, the Germans have been forced to recall troops
to use at the Somme and the French, passing to the offensive, have
temporarily, at least, retaken much ground and abolished the grave
danger that existed on July 1, 1915, when they stood in their last
ditch, with the river at their backs.
GORIZIA
The Russian blow had fallen in the first days of June, 1916; the
Anglo-French attack had opened in the early days of July, 1916; now,
in the first week of August, 1916, Italy suddenly launched against the
Gorizia bridgehead, the gateway into Austria between the sea and the
Julian Alps, which recalls in a grandiose fashion the Spartan position
at Thermopylæ, the most considerable and the most successful military
effort in modern Italian history.
[Illustration: Austro-italian Campaigns, May to September, 1916. Lined
section shows ground gained by the Austrians in May and June, 1916.
Dotted section shows ground gained by Italians in August, 1916.]
On a front of thirty miles from the Alps to the Adriatic, their flanks
secured by the mountains and the sea, the Austrians had erected a
formidable system of trenches which closed the Italian road to Austria
and to Trieste, twenty miles to the south. (Vol. V, 288-290.) Monte
Sabotino on the north, Podgora Hill in the center, Monte San Michele
on the south at the edge of the Carso Plateau were the main features
of this position, and Gorizia lay in the cuplike valley of the Wippach
behind Podgora.
After some days of bombardment, first directed at the whole front and
then concentrated upon Sabotino and San Michele, the Italians swept
forward, took both hills, turned the Austrians out of Podgora and
Gorizia, took 15,000 prisoners and a vast booty of guns and munitions.
They had completed the first phase of their task by August 7, 1916. It
remained to be seen--and it remains to be seen now on August 15, 1916,
when these lines are written--whether they will get Trieste and force
the Austrians back from the whole position between the Adriatic and
the Alps. If they do, then an invasion of Austria on a wide front will
be inevitable; if they fail, they will have won a great local victory
and made a new draft upon Austrian man power.
Finally, in the Balkans a great Anglo-French-Serb army is standing
before Saloniki (Vol. V, 212-215), only waiting until Germany shall
have recalled her troops from the Peninsula and Austria summoned back
her contingents to strike the Bulgarians and strive to reopen the road
from the Ægean to Belgrade, thus cutting the railroad that binds
Berlin to Byzantium and the Osmanli to the Teuton. Similarly the
victorious Russians have passed Erzingan in Asia Minor (Vol. V, 337),
completed the conquest of Armenia, and are pushing on toward Sivas and
the Bagdad railroad. (Vol. V, 335-339.)
AS THE THIRD YEAR BEGINS
For the first time since the war broke out Germany and her allies are
everywhere on the defensive, and everywhere they have been and are
ceding ground. Their enemies, imperfectly prepared two years ago, are
now the rivals of Germany in preparation; England has millions of men
where she had hundreds of thousands in August, 1914; France and
Britain both have heavy artillery, and Russia is demonstrating her
wealth of munitions and her resources in men. Such is the great
transition that has come as the third year of the Great War begins.
Conceivably, Germany may still be able to forge a new thunderbolt, to
pass to the offensive again, and win the war; conceivably she can hold
her present lines until the fury of the Allies abates and losses and
economic strain impose a drawn battle and a peace without victory for
any contestant. But all these considerations are for the future. What
it is now important to recognize is that the three great efforts of
Germany to win the war in the Napoleonic fashion have failed. She has
had neither an Austerlitz, a Jena, nor a Friedland. She has instead
the Marne, Verdun, and the Russian failure. She has failed to
eliminate any one of her great foes as Napoleon eliminated, first
Austria, then Prussia, and then Russia. She has failed to win the war
while she had superior numbers, incomparably greater resources in
equipment, and unrivaled supremacy in artillery. She is outnumbered,
outgunned, and her foes control the sea and possess vastly greater
resources in money than she can boast.
The parallel of Napoleon before Leipzig, of the Confederacy after
Gettysburg, is in many men's minds to-day. But it is for the future to
disclose whether the parallel be true or false. What is clear as the
third year of the war opens is that all three of Germany's major
conceptions have gone wrong; all three of her great campaigns have
failed to accomplish their main purpose, and that, as a consequence,
Germany is now on the defensive on all fronts for the first time in
the war.
A moment ago I mentioned Bernhardi's words. Perhaps they will serve as
the best comment with which to close this review. The quotation is
from his book, "On War of To-day":
"If at some future time Germany is involved in the slowly threatening
war, she need not recoil before the numerical superiority of her
enemies. But so far as human nature is able to tell, she can only rely
on being successful if she is resolutely determined to break the
superiority of her enemies by a victory over one or the other of them
before their total strength can come into action, and if she prepares
for war to that effect, and acts at the decisive moment in _that_
spirit which made the great Prussian king once seize the sword against
a world in arms."
THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR
Statements from the British, French, and German Ambassadors to the
United States
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
July 19, 1916.
DEAR SIR:
I beg to acknowledge with thanks your courteous invitation to my
government to make a statement concerning the war on the occasion of
the second anniversary of its outbreak.
My government fully appreciates your kindness and courtesy in placing
at its service the Review which has already contributed to such an
honourable extent to the world's knowledge of the great events which
are now passing before us. Had the policy of my government undergone
any change since the war's commencement I have no doubt that a
statement explaining such a change would have been issued. But the
policy of the British government is now what it was when the war first
began under circumstances with which your readers are entirely
familiar. To quote Sir Edward Grey's words: "Is there anyone who
thinks it possible that we could have sat still and looked on without
eternal disgrace?"
Yours faithfully,
CECIL SPRING RICE.
The Editor
_Collier's Weekly_,
NEW YORK.
AMBASSADE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS
WASHINGTON, le July 10, 1916.
DEAR SIR:
I had not failed to forward to my Government your request for a
statement concerning the war on the occasion of its impending second
anniversary.
I am instructed to convey to you, in answer, the expression of the
Prime Minister's regret at his inability to comply with the wish of a
review so honorably known as _Collier's Weekly_. The case of France is
so plain that it is not felt there can be need for explanations, much
less for pleadings; and it is enough to refer to public documents.
They show how that war, which France had done her utmost to prevent,
was declared on her by the Germans on the 3rd of August, 1914, for
such frivolous motives as a shelling by her aeros of places as distant
as Nurenberg: an imaginary deed of which she never dreamt, which she
has never been able to duplicate, and which an inspection of the local
newspapers has proved to have passed unmentioned by them and unnoticed
by the inhabitants. As she was considered a prey to be dealt with at
once and at all cost, the invasion of her territory was effected
through Belgium, and that invasion, entailing on the Belgian and
French populations untold misery, still continues.
It still continues; not for very long, a day will soon dawn which will
be the day of Justice.
I have the honor to be, dear Sir,
Sincerely yours,
JUSSERAND.
The Editor
_Collier's Weekly_,
NEW YORK.
KAISERLICH DEUTSCHE BOTSCHAFT
GERMAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
NEW YORK, August 28, 1916.
P. F. COLLIER & SON,
Publishers.
DEAR SIRS:
With reference to previous conversations I beg to send you the
enclosed statement for the "Story of the Great War". It has been
written by Baron Mumm von Schwarzenstein, former Ambassador to Japan,
now attached to the Foreign Office in Berlin.
Yours very sincerely,
F. BERNSTORFF.
WHAT HAS GERMANY ACHIEVED IN TWO YEARS OF WAR?
In order to appreciate what Germany has accomplished during two years
of war, one has to recall to mind the great expectations which her
enemies had attached to this war, into which their powerful coalition,
after years of political scheming and thorough military preparations,
had enmeshed the prosperous Empire.
At the outset, the avowed purpose of Germany's enemies was to
annihilate her,--her army, her fleet, her commerce and her industry.
France hoped to regain Alsace Lorraine and the western bank of the
Rhine. Russia expected to gratify her desire for territorial expansion
by conquering the provinces of East and West Prussia and Posen, which
probably were to receive the blessings of Russian culture.
Austria-Hungary was to be dismembered; the Balkan states were to be
rendered tributary to the Czar; Constantinople and the Dardanelles
were to be added to the Romanoff's dominions. As for England, she
deliberately entered this war because she thought that she would run
small risk in helping to bring the war to a speedy termination.
The world will remember the vainglorious way in which Germany's
enemies foretold that before long their armies would meet in the heart
of Germany, where Cossacks would parade the streets of Berlin and
Indian lancers and Gurkhas would stroll through the parks of Potsdam.
The German fleet, it was asserted, would be at the bottom of the sea
before it had time to think. When this fond hope was not realized, the
German fleet was to be dug out like a rat of a rat-hole. In their
expectations our enemies saw German industry ruined. Germany was soon
to be paralyzed, nay, would soon be passing away.
Such were the expectations of the enemies, attacking us from all
sides. Germany was drawn into a war of self-defense. Her fight is a
fight for national existence. And to-day how do matters stand?
Have the hopes and plots of our enemies been realized? Has Germany
successfully fought her war of self-defense or has she not?
Excepting one small corner of the Empire, the only enemy soldiers on
German soil are vast numbers of prisoners of war. The war is fought on
enemy soil. Germany and her allies occupy three independent kingdoms.
They hold vast areas of enemy territory in east and west. They hold
these territories firmly and without fear of losing them by force of
arms.
Consider the efforts that our enemies have made on the west front. In
their unsuccessful attempts at Loos and in Champagne last autumn they
suffered terrible losses and made no headway. In the spring Germany
took up the offensive against Verdun. Step by step, and with but small
losses, we are steadily gaining ground; the French positions, although
defended with desperate courage, are crumbling away one by one.
Thanks to the genius of Hindenburg, East Germany is no longer
threatened by Russia. Last year, in cooperation with our valiant
ally, Austria-Hungary, we drove back the Russians, overwhelming their
armies as well as their strongholds. We took possession of Courland,
Lithuania and Poland. For the last two months, it is true, the
Russians have resumed the offensive. But, although they have gained
considerable local advantages at terrible cost, they have not
succeeded in breaking through our lines.
Even at the very moment when our enemies, after months of careful
preparation, seek to bring to bear their greatest possible pressure on
both German fronts they attain nothing but terrible losses. They
achieve but little substantial gain. They have in no material way
deranged our general position on the western front. The tide has
turned again. Our enemies will probably realize in time that they are
biting on granite and that partial successes will sooner or later lead
to their exhaustion without materially changing the military
situation. To-day Germany awaits the outcome of the present combined
offensive of the Allies with calmness and confidence. Then her turn
may come once more. The Allies have been rejoicing over the collapse
of Germany. They have repeatedly and positively prophesied it.
Repeatedly it has been postponed. It seems now as if it would have to
be adjourned _ad Kalendas Graecas_.
Last autumn the world saw the rapid conquest of Serbia and Montenegro
by German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. The result was the
establishment of direct communication between Berlin and Bagdad. Who
can underestimate the political, military and economic importance of
this feat to Germany and to her allies?
Bulgaria joined the alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey
because she realized that theirs was to be the ultimate victory. The
four Central Powers form a solid and powerful political combination;
they adjoin each other and are bound together by economic interests.
Let us now consider the naval situation. Instead of the German fleet
being at the bottom of the sea, considerably more British than German
men-of-war find themselves in that position. Since the great battle of
the Skagerrak, where the German High Sea Fleet successfully fought
against the entire British Grand Fleet, the British losses have
increased alarmingly. The German Navy is young, but it has proved its
merit; more than that, it has proved that the proud British fleet is
by no means invincible. Our submarines have shown to the world that
Germany possesses a powerful weapon against England, even though, out
of consideration for neutral interests, this arm of her navy has not
yet been fully tested against the illegal methods adopted by England
in her effort to starve Germany's entire civilian population. The
exploits of the _Emden_, the _Moewe_ and the _Appam_ are still fresh
in everybody's memory. To them can now be added the achievements of
the submersible _Deutschland_, by means of which we have begun to
resume our trade relations with the United States despite the
so-called British blockade.
For two years we have been fighting for the freedom of the seas.
Doubtless, Great Britain's sea power, which has caused us the loss of
our distant colonies and the suspension of most of our maritime trade,
is not yet broken. Nevertheless, to-day British prestige is not what
it used to be.
British sea power has caused Germany and the neutral nations of the
world many inconveniences, and it will no doubt continue to do so
until the end of the war. But we know that this will not advance our
enemies' cause. Victory does not lie this way. Germany has learned to
live on her resources during the war. All the raw materials necessary
for her economic life she produces herself. For such as are not
accessible at present, she has found substitutes. Our food supply is
ample for the maintenance of our military forces as well as for our
civilian population. The skillfully organized distribution of food,
recently introduced, will enable us to hold out in spite of the
British blockade, even if our harvest, which promises to be excellent,
should not come up to our expectations.
Looking back upon her achievements during the last two years, Germany
enters into the third year of the war with unaltered confidence in her
final triumph. Germany is willing to terminate this terrible
bloodshed, she is willing to make an honorable peace on condition that
her legitimate interests are safeguarded; but she is prepared to
continue the struggle with the same dogged determination that she has
manifested up to now, since her enemies are still virtually resolved
to annihilate her, even if, for appearance's sake, they have of late
somewhat modified their war aims by declaring that they merely intend
to wipe out what they call German "Militarism."
Germany is fighting against the greatest odds known in history. She is
not only fighting against the most powerful combination of enemies,
but at the same time has to contend with a world of prejudice,
skillfully created against her, as well as with lukewarmness toward
our enemies' tyranny on the part of the neutral nations. Sometimes we
wonder at this; but unerringly we go on fighting for our cause.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Story of the Great War, Volume 5 - Battle of Jutland Bank; Russian Offensive; Kut-El-Amara; East Africa; Verdun; The Great Somme Drive; United States and Belligerents; Summary of Two Years' War" ***
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