The Panama Canal - A history and description of the enterprise

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Title: The Panama Canal - A history and description of the enterprise
Author: Mills, J. Saxon
Language: English
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THE PANAMA CANAL

[Illustration: _Clinedinst--Washington, D.C._
COL. GEORGE W. GOETHALS, U.S.A.,
Chairman and Chief Engineer Isthmian Canal Commission.]

THE PANAMA CANAL

A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTERPRISE

J. SAXON MILLS, M.A.

BARRISTER-AT-LAW

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

THOMAS NELSON AND SONS

LONDON, EDINBURGH, DUBLIN, MANCHESTER, LEEDS
PARIS, LEIPZIG, MELBOURNE, AND NEW YORK

PREFACE.

The literature on the subject of the Panama Canal is rather dispersed. A
full and entertaining history of the project will be found in Mr. W. F.
Johnson's "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal" (Cassell and Co., 1907),
a work to which I am greatly indebted. Dr. Vaughan Cornish has given the
results of much research and several visits to the canal in "The Panama
Canal and its Makers" (T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), and in several lectures,
especially one before the Royal Colonial Institute, June 11, 1912. An
inexhaustible mine of information will be found in Mr. Emory R.
Johnson's Official Report on Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls (Washington,
1912). The Report on the Trade and Commerce of the Republic of Panama
for the year 1911, by Mr. H. O. Chalkley, Acting British Consul at
Colon, contains useful information. A valuable series of articles on
the Panama Canal appeared in _The Times_ of 1912. The _National
Geographic Magazine_ of February 1911 contains an authoritative article
by Colonel G. W. Goethals, Chief Engineer of the Canal, and the number
for February 1912 an interesting appreciation by Mr. W. J. Showalter. In
_Scribner's Magazine_ for February 1913, Mr. J. B. Bishop, Secretary of
the Isthmian Canal Commission, writes a very useful paper on the
Sanitation of the Isthmus. In his recent work on South America Mr. Bryce
devotes one of his delightful chapters to the Isthmus of Panama. A
chapter on the Panama Canal will be found in Mr. A. E. Aspinall's "The
British West Indies," and many references in Mr. C. G. Murray's "A
United West Indies." I must thank Mr. G. E. Lewin, the Librarian of the
Royal Colonial Institute, for his unfailing help and courtesy.

BUSHEY, 1913.

CONTENTS.

PREFACE 5

DATE HISTORY OF THE CANAL 11

I. THE SECRET OF THE STRAIT 15

II. CANAL PROJECTS 23

III. THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY AND THE SUEZ CANAL 42

IV. THE FRENCH FAILURE 52

V. THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY 64

VI. THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA 77

VII. A MINIATURE REVOLUTION 88

VIII. THE BATTLE OF THE LEVELS 112

IX. MAN AND THE GNAT 129

X. LIFE AT THE ISTHMUS 153

XI. THE PROBLEM OF CONSTRUCTION 172

XII. THE CULEBRA CUT 186

XIII. THE LOCKS 195

XIV. THE COMPLETED CANAL 207

XV. PANAMA AND THE ISTHMUS 226

XVI. THE NEW OCEAN HIGHWAYS 242

XVII. THE CANAL AND THE AMERICAS 265

XVIII. THE CANAL AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE 284

XIX. THE NEW PACIFIC 316

APPENDIX I.--HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY 323

APPENDIX II.--PANAMA DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 327

APPENDIX III.--HAY-BUNAU-VARILLA TREATY CLAUSES 1-9 AND 23 332

APPENDIX IV.--PROCLAMATION AS TO CANAL TOLL RATES 343

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Col. George W. Goethals, U.S.A. _Frontispiece_
Chairman and Chief Engineer Isthmian Canal Commission.

Col. William C. Gorgas 144
Medical Department, U.S. Army, Head of the Department
of Sanitation, Ancon.

Culebra Cut, from West Bank 192

Gatun Locks, looking South-West 201

Gatun Upper Lock, looking North 208

Gatun Upper Lock--West Chamber 216

Pedro Miguel Locks 224

DATE HISTORY OF THE CANAL.

Conquest of Constantinople by Turks 1453

Columbus's First Voyage 1492

Columbus discovers Bay of Limon 1497

Rodrigo de Bastidas, Balboa, and La Cosa reach the Isthmus 1500

Columbus's Fourth Voyage, vainly seeks the strait 1502

Balboa sights the Pacific Sept. 25, 1513

Pedrarias founds the old town of Panama 1519

Magellan discovers the straits that bear his name 1519-21

Gonzalez de Avila discovers Lake Nicaragua 1522

The quest of Isthmian Strait given up as hopeless _circa_ 1532

Gomara appeals to Charles V. to construct canal 1551

Drake sights the Pacific 1573

Philip III. directs surveys for Darien Canal 1616

English seize Jamaica 1655

Henry Morgan destroys old Panama 1671

Paterson's settlement at Panama 1698

Spanish surveys of Tehuantepec and Nicaragua 1771 and 1779

Von Humboldt's residence in Central America 1799-1804

Panama declares its independence and joins New Granada 1822

Overtures made by Central America to United States for canal 1825

Goethe's prophecies 1827

Dutch canal concession from Nicaraguan Government 1829
abandoned 1830

British Honduras annexed by Great Britain 1835

United States Treaty with New Granada 1846

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 1850

Panama Railway opened to traffic 1855

Dickinson-Ayon Treaty between United States and Nicaragua 1868

President Grant recommends canal under United States control 1869

Appoints Interoceanic Canal Commission 1869

Suez Canal opened 1869

La Société Civile Internationale du Canal Interocéanique founded 1876

Grant's Commission reports in favour of Nicaraguan route 1876

The De Lesseps Company formed 1878

Company starts work 1881

Bankruptcy of French company 1889

New Panama Company formed 1889

Construction work at Nicaragua 1890-3

Ferdinand de Lesseps died 1894

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 1901

Spooner Act 1902

Panama revolts from Colombia 1903

Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 1904

American occupation of Isthmus begins 1904

Completion of canal 1914

Formal opening 1915

THE PANAMA CANAL.

CHAPTER I.

THE SECRET OF THE STRAIT.

It was either very careless or very astute of Nature to leave the entire
length of the American continent without a central passage from ocean to
ocean, or, having provided such a passage at Nicaragua, to allow it to
be obstructed again by volcanic action. This imperviousness of the long
American barrier had, as we shall see, important economic and political
results, and the eventual opening of a waterway will have results
scarcely less important. The Panama Canal will achieve, after more than
four centuries, the object with which Columbus spread his sails
westwards from the port of Palos--the provision of a sea-route westwards
to China and the Indies. The capture of Constantinople in 1453 by the
Turks interrupted the ancient trade routes between East and West.
Brigands held up the caravans which plodded across the desert sands from
the Euphrates and the Indus, and pirates swarmed in the Mediterranean
and Red Sea, intercepting the precious cargoes of silks and jewels and
spices consigned to the merchants of Italy. The eyes of all Europe were
turned to the Atlantic, and an ocean route westwards to India and the
Orient, the existence of which had been fabled from the days of
Aristotle, became an economic necessity.

Columbus, as every one knows, died in the belief that he had discovered
this route, and that the lands he had visited were fringes and islands
of the Eastern Asiatic continent. The geographers of those days greatly
exaggerated the eastern extension of Asia, with the result that the
distance from Europe to China and India was underestimated by at least
one-half. This was a fortunate mistake, for it is improbable that if
Columbus had known that Cathay and Cipangu (Japan) were a good 12,000
miles westwards from the coast of Spain he would have ventured upon a
continuous voyage of that length in the vessels of his time.

It was in his fourth voyage (1502) that Columbus first reached and
explored the coastline of the isthmus and Central America. He was
apparently not the first to land on the isthmus. That distinction
belongs either to Alfonso Ojeda, who is said to have reached "Terra
Firma" earlier in 1502, or to Rodrigo de Bastidas, who, we are told, set
sail from Cadiz with La Cosa in 1500, and, reached the isthmus somewhere
near Porto Bello. About the doings of Columbus on the mainland we get
some detailed information from the Portuguese historian and explorer of
the sixteenth century, Galvano. It is interesting to read that the great
navigator visited the exact spot where the newly-constructed canal
starts from the Caribbean coast. From the Rio Grande, we read, Columbus
"went to the River of Crocodiles which is now called Rio de Chagres,
which hath its springs near the South Sea, within four leagues of
Panama, and runneth into the North Sea." It was this same river, as we
shall see, that became the feeder of the canal when the high-level
scheme was adopted. So far out of his reckoning was Columbus that at
Panama he imagined himself to be ten days' journey from the mouth of the
Ganges! One of his objects, as we know from his own journal, was to
convert the Great Khan of Tartary to the Christian faith, and this
entanglement in what he called "the islands of the Indian Sea" was a
sore hindrance to that and all his other purposes. He began that search
for the strait which engaged the attention and tried the temper of
Spanish, Portuguese, and English navigators for the next thirty years.
He had heard from the natives of the coast of "a narrow place between
two seas." They probably meant a narrow strip of land as at Panama. But
Columbus understood them to mean a narrow waterway, and rumours of such
a passage no doubt existed then, as they still do among the isthmian
tribes. He must also have heard accounts of the great ocean only thirty
miles away, and it is rather surprising he should not have made a dash
across and anticipated Balboa and Drake. In May 1503, however, he
quitted the "Terra Firma" without solving the great secret, and he never
returned to the mainland. He died in 1506, still in complete ignorance
of the nature of his discovery. He knew nothing of the continent of
America or of that seventy million square miles of ocean beyond, to
which Magellan gave the name of "Pacific."

The Holy Grail itself was not pursued with more persistence and devotion
than this mythical, elusive strait by the navigators of the early years
of the sixteenth century. The isthmian governor sent out from Spain went
with urgent instructions to solve the "secret of the strait." In 1513
Balboa set himself to the great enterprise. If he could not discover a
waterway he would at least see what lay beyond the narrow land barrier.
From Coibo on the Gulf of Darien he struck inland on September 6 with a
hundred Indian guides and bearers. It is eloquent of the difficulties of
the country which he had to traverse that it was not until September 26
that he won, first of European men, his distant view of the nameless and
mysterious ocean.[1] It was he, and not Cortéz, who "with eagle eyes,
stared at the Pacific."

"And all his men
Looked at each other with a wild surmise,
Silent upon a peak in Darien."

Cortéz was himself a persistent searcher for the mythical strait. He
wrote home to the King of Spain saying, "If the strait is found, I shall
hold it to be the greatest service I have yet rendered. It would make
the King of Spain master of so many lands that he might call himself the
lord of the whole world."

These vain attempts had very important results. They led incidentally to
the exploration of the whole coastline of the American continent. For
example, Jacques Cartier, who was sent out by the King of France about
this time to find "the shorter route to Cathay," searched the coast
northwards as far as Labrador and thus prepared the way for the planting
of a French colony in Canada. At last, in 1520, a sea-passage from the
Atlantic to the Pacific was actually discovered by the first great
circumnavigator, Magellan, but it was far away from the narrow lands
between North and South America. Through the perilous straits that have
ever since borne his name at the southern extremity of the continent,
Magellan pushed his venturous way into the great ocean beyond. But even
Magellan had no idea that a few miles south of his strait the land ended
and Atlantic and Pacific mingled their waters in one great flood. That
truth was accidentally discovered by the English Drake more than fifty
years afterwards (1579). Drake had been driven southward by stormy
weather when he made the discovery which almost eclipsed in its
importance even Magellan's exploit. In his exultation, we are told, he
landed on the farthest island, and walking alone with his instruments to
its extremity threw himself down, and with his arms embraced the
southernmost point of the known world. From that point Drake sailed up
the western coast of South America, engaged mainly in his favourite
pursuit of "singeing the King of Spain's beard"--capturing, that is, the
treasure-ships bound to Panama. But he did not forget the more
scientific duty of searching for the strait. Far northward he held his
course, past the future California, till he must have been off the
coastline of what is now British Columbia, ever hoping to find the
Pacific outlet of the famous North-West Passage. But always the coast
trended to the north-west, and Drake, giving up the quest, turned his
prow westward and continued his voyage of circumnavigation.

But we are over-running our dates and must return to events at the
isthmus. It was about the year 1530 that the non-existence of a natural
waterway became recognized. And no sooner was this fact accepted than
projects for an artificial canal began to be put forward. It was clear
to the geographers and traders of those days that an isthmian route
westward offered great advantages to the routes _via_ the Cape of Good
Hope, Magellan Straits, or the problematical North-West Passage.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The eminence known as "Balboa Hill" in the American canal zone is
certainly not that from which Balboa first sighted the Pacific, though
very likely a tradition to that effect will now gradually be
established.

CHAPTER II.

CANAL PROJECTS.

It appears that the honour of first conceiving and proposing the project
of an artificial waterway through the isthmus belongs to Álvaro de
Saavedra Cerón, a cousin of Cortéz, who had been with Balboa at Panama.
Cerón had been for twelve years engaged in the search for the strait,
and had finally begun to doubt its existence. His thoughts turned to the
isthmus at Panama, where the narrowness and low elevation of the land
seemed to offer the likeliest chance of an artificial canal. We learn
from the old historian Galvano that Cerón prepared plans for the
construction of a waterway there--almost precisely along the route
chosen for the American canal nearly four hundred years later. Cerón's
death, however, put an end to this early project.

It is interesting to find the Portuguese historian Galvano, who
flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century, mentioning four
possible routes for the canal--namely, Darien, Panama, Nicaragua, and
Tehuantepec. The choice, however, quickly confined itself to the Panama
and Nicaraguan lines. The reader may feel some surprise that at such an
early date as this an engineering project should be seriously considered
which was only accomplished in the end by the wealth and mechanical
resources of one of the greatest of modern Powers. The explanation is
that the tiny vessels of the early sixteenth century could have taken
advantage of the natural rivers and lakes in the isthmus, especially
those on the Nicaraguan route, and that far less artificial construction
would have been necessary than in these days of the mammoth liner and
warship.

Charles V., King of Spain, seems to have been quite alive to the
importance of these canal projects. In 1534 he directed the Governor of
Costa Firme, the old name for the Panama district, to survey the valley
of the Chagres, the river which supplies the water for the upper reaches
of the American canal. This gentleman, however, seems scarcely to have
shared the royal enthusiasm. He may be supposed to have known the
isthmus at these points very well, and his scepticism about the prospect
of canal construction there in those days was not wholly groundless. The
Spanish historian Gomara, who wrote a history of the Indies in 1551 and
dedicated it to Charles V., declared a canal to be quite feasible along
any of the four routes mentioned by Galvano. It is true he recognized
obstacles. "There are mountains," he wrote, "but there are also hands.
If determination is not lacking, means will not fail; the Indies, to
which the way is to be made, will furnish them. To a king of Spain,
seeking the wealth of Indian commerce, that which is possible is also
easy."

But Charles V. died without making any practical advance in this
enterprise, and a rather remarkable reaction took place under his
successor, Philip II. It should be noted that by this time a permanent
roadway had been established across the isthmus from Panama to Porto
Bello, along which the Spanish treasure-convoys passed from sea to sea
without much interruption. The rapidly growing power of the English at
sea made Philip fear that, if a canal were built, he would be unable to
control it, and would probably lose his existing monopoly of isthmian
transit. So he issued a veto against all projects of canal construction.
He even persuaded himself that it would be contrary to the Divine
purpose to link together two great oceans which God had set asunder, and
that any such attempt would be visited by a terrible nemesis.[2] So his
Majesty not only forbade all such schemes but declared the penalty of
death against any one who should attempt to make a better route across
Central America than the land-route between Panama and Porto Bello.

In course of time the king's beard was so horribly singed by English
navigators and adventurers in the Caribbean Sea that the Atlantic end of
the overland trail became almost useless, and the Spanish argosies were
compelled to sail homewards round the far Magellan Straits. But in 1579,
as we have seen, Sir Francis Drake ("El Draque" as he was called by the
terrified Spaniards) had suddenly attacked, captured, and scattered the
Spanish ships off the Pacific coast of South America. So the isthmian
land-route was once more resumed, and it took the Spaniard all his time
to hold that open.

For many years no progress was made with the idea of an isthmian canal.
War between England and Spain was the natural order of things in these
Central American regions. In 1655 the English seized Jamaica, and soon
afterwards established themselves on the coast of Honduras and
Nicaragua. The old city of Panama, of which only a picturesque
church-tower remains to-day, had been founded by a Spanish governor
named Pedrarias in 1519. In 1671 the city was destroyed by that wicked
Welsh buccaneer, Sir Henry Morgan. The town was rebuilt two years later
by Alonzo Mercado de Villacorta, five miles west of the old site.

The project of a canal across the isthmus was never allowed entirely to
disappear. In 1694 a very determined attempt was made to plant a
British colony on the isthmus at Darien, a little east of the Panama
route. The pioneer was William Paterson, a Scotsman, who founded "the
Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies." Sir Walter Scott,
in his "Tales of a Grandfather," thus describes the project:--

The produce of China, Japan, the Spice Islands, and Eastern
India, brought to the Bay of Panama, were to be transferred
across the isthmus to the new settlement, and exchanged for
the commodities of Europe. In Paterson's enthusiastic words,
"This door of the seas and key of the universe will enable
its possessors to become the legislators of both worlds and
the arbitrators of commerce. The settlers at Darien will
acquire a nobler empire than Alexander or Cæsar, without
fatigue, expense, or danger, as well as without incurring
the guilt and bloodshed of conquerors."

So 1,200 settlers set sail from Leith in July 1698, no doubt with a high
hope and courage. In November the expedition arrived and established
itself at a point of the coast still called Puerto Escoces, or Scotch
Port, in Caledonian Bay, also named from the same event. "New Edinburgh"
and "New St. Andrews" were founded, but the settlers soon got into
difficulties. The climate was intolerable, and the project was opposed
from the outset by the English and Dutch East India Companies, who were
alarmed on the score of their own exclusive rights, while Spaniards and
Indians were a perpetual menace. Broken down by these adversities the
original settlers left the place, but were succeeded at once by another
company which, after some successful fighting with the Spaniards, were
compelled by the superior forces of the enemy to evacuate the
settlements in the year 1700. It is possible that if this attempt at
colonization had been made after and not before the Union of Scotland
and Ireland it would have met with much less opposition in England,
perhaps would have received government sympathy and support. In that
case the isthmus would have been added to the British dominions, and a
waterway might have been constructed under the British flag. It should
be added that Paterson, who had personally surveyed the isthmus,
positively declared that the construction of a canal was a feasible
undertaking.

During the eighteenth century, though surveying was carried out in many
parts of the isthmus by European engineers, the project of a canal was
never seriously taken up. It may be remembered that in 1780 our own
Nelson was at Nicaragua, annexing the lake and getting control of the
interoceanic route in this region, but doing little more than injuring
his own health. With the nineteenth century, however, events began to
move at the isthmus. The great scientist, Alexander von Humboldt, spent
the first few years of the new century in Mexico and Central America. In
his "Political Essay on New Spain" he described the impervious isthmus,
"the barrier against the waves of the Atlantic," as for ages "the
bulwark of the independence of China and Japan."

The absence of any water communication at the isthmus between the two
oceans has indeed had highly important political and economic results.
It kept East and West far asunder. It removed the west coast of North
America from the colonizing rivalries of the Old World. England and the
United States seemed for long ages only semiconscious of their
territories on the Pacific which were awaiting colonization. Even in
recent times very few emigrants from Europe, who went out with the
intention of going far west, penetrated much further than Chicago or
Manitoba. Population and industrial enterprise were concentrated in the
east of Canada and the United States, and have only begun within modern
times to move effectually westwards. England was indeed so indifferent
about her territories along a far coast, which could be reached only
round the Horn or by an almost impossible land-transit, that in the
settlement of the Oregon boundary in the middle of last century she
accepted a Canadian frontier-line much further north than would
otherwise have contented her. She had at least as good a right to
California and the territories to the northwards as the descendants of
her revolted colonists. The absence of a waterway at the narrow lands
secured to the United States and to England their expansion westwards,
but imposed on the westward movement a very slow and gradual pace. One
result of the new canal will be a very rapid development of these
Pacific slopes, especially those of British Columbia.

The effect on South America of this complete severance of East and West
has also been very important. The republics on the Pacific have been
sheltered as much as possible from European influences. Immigration has
been naturally restricted, the population, especially that of Chile,
kept free from negro admixture, and the development of the countries
effectually checked. The opening of the canal will, of course, have a
contrary effect all along these lines.

But, to return from this digression, Humboldt described six routes in
Central America where a canal would be practicable, including that which
was afterwards adopted at Panama. He investigated and discussed many
physiographical questions in connection with the subject. There had
arisen a general belief that the level of the Pacific was much higher
than that of the Atlantic, and that a sea-level canal would therefore be
impossible. Humboldt declared against this theory. But it is curious to
find him favouring the idea that the construction of a tide-level canal
might have the effect of diverting the Gulf Stream from our shores, and
thus making the climate of our British islands much more rigorous and
inhospitable.

The researches of Humboldt in the West Indies and Central America much
interested the scientist's great fellow-countryman, Goethe. A passage
from Goethe's "Conversations with Eckermann" is worth quoting as an
example of prophecy wonderfully fulfilled:--

Humboldt [said Goethe] has with great practical knowledge
mentioned other points where, by utilizing some of the
rivers which flow into the Gulf of Mexico, the end could
perhaps be more advantageously attained than at Panama.
Well, all this is reserved for the future, and for a great
spirit of enterprise. But so much is certain: if a project
of the kind succeeded in making it possible for ships of
whatever lading or size to go through such a canal from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, quite incalculable
results would ensue for the whole of civilized and
uncivilized humanity. I should be surprised, however, if
the United States were to let the opportunity escape them of
getting such an achievement into their own hands. We may
expect this youthful Power, with its decided tendency
westwards, in thirty or forty years to have also occupied
and peopled the extensive tracts of land beyond the Rocky
Mountains. We may further expect that along the whole
Pacific coast, where Nature has already formed the largest
and safest harbours, commercial cities of the utmost
importance will gradually arise, to be the medium of trade
between China, together with the East Indies, and the United
States. Were this to happen, it would be not alone desirable
but even almost necessary that merchantmen as well as
men-of-war should maintain a more rapid connection between
the west and east coasts of North America than has
previously been possible by the wearisome, disagreeable, and
costly voyage round Cape Horn. I repeat, then: it is
absolutely indispensable for the United States to effect a
way through from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean,
and I am certain they will compass it. This I should like to
live to see, but I shall not. Secondly, I should like to
live to see a connection established between the Danube and
the Rhine. But this, too, is an undertaking so gigantic that
I doubt its being accomplished, especially when I consider
our German means. Thirdly and lastly, I should like to see
the English in possession of a Suez Canal. These three great
things I should like to live to see, and it would almost be
worth while for their sakes to hold out for some fifty
years.

Many projects for canal construction, chiefly by the Nicaraguan route,
were started and failed during the first half of the nineteenth century.
The second decade of that century witnessed the revolt one by one of all
the Spanish provinces in Central and South America. The Colombian
Confederation, comprising Venezuela, Ecuador, and New Granada, achieved
their independence in 1821. Panama quickly followed, and allied itself
with New Granada (now Colombia). In 1825 the Central American envoy to
the United States urged the American government to co-operate in the
canal enterprise with the states he represented. The result was that
Henry Clay, the American Secretary of State, ordered an official survey
at Nicaragua, and scheme followed scheme in quick succession. In 1829
the King of Holland was granted a canal concession by the Nicaraguan
government. This enterprise was frustrated by the outbreak of the
revolution in the Netherlands and Belgium. It would be tedious to
enumerate the many projects started during the following years. But it
is worth recalling that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who was then a
prisoner in the fortress of Ham, became interested in the subject, and
while still a captive obtained a concession and franchise for a canal
company from the Nicaraguan government. He published a pamphlet on the
Isthmian Canal question which aroused a good deal of attention, though
its author's interest was soon diverted to political events nearer home.
A passage from his little book is interesting for its strong advocacy of
the Nicaraguan route by the San Juan River and the lakes:--

The geographical position of Constantinople rendered her the
queen of the ancient world. Occupying, as she does, the
central point between Europe, Asia, and Africa, she could
become the entrepot of the commerce of all these countries,
and obtain over them immense preponderance; for in politics,
as in strategy, a central position always commands the
circumference. This is what the proud city of Constantine
could be, but it is what she is not, because, as Montesquieu
says, "God permitted that the Turks should exist on earth,
as a people most fit to possess uselessly a great empire."
There exists in the New World a state as admirably situated
as Constantinople, and we must say, up to this time, as
uselessly occupied. We allude to the State of Nicaragua. As
Constantinople is the centre of the Ancient World, so is the
town of Leon the centre of the New, and if the tongue of
land which separates its two lakes from the Pacific Ocean
were cut through, she would command by virtue of her central
position the entire coast of North and South America. The
State of Nicaragua can become, better than Constantinople,
the necessary route of the great commerce of the world, and
is destined to attain an extraordinary degree of prosperity
and grandeur. France, England, and Holland have a great
commercial interest in the establishment of a communication
between the two oceans, but England has more than the other
Powers--a political interest in the execution of this
project. England will see with pleasure Central America
becoming a powerful and flourishing state, which will
establish a balance of power by creating in Spanish America
a new centre of active enterprise, powerful enough to give
rise to a feeling of nationality, and to prevent, by backing
Mexico, any further encroachments from the north.

The idea of a trans-isthmian canal seemed likely in the 'fifties of last
century to prove a cause of discord, if not of war, between England and
the United States. Under the rather "pushful" foreign policy of Lord
Palmerston, England rapidly increased her influence and possessions in
Central America. In 1835 "British Honduras" was practically constituted
a British colony, and British influence was subsequently extended into
Nicaragua and Mosquitia, thus covering the favourite route for an
isthmian waterway. The United States were establishing themselves on the
Pacific through their encroachments on Mexico. In 1846 they acquired the
states of California, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico, and naturally
began to attach more importance to the canal project and to feel more
sensitive as regards rival ambitions in Central America. Soon after they
had acquired these Pacific territories, began the great rush for gold to
California, and some shorter way from east to west became necessary than
the sea-trail round the Horn or the weary wagon-trek over the broad
North American continent. Already in 1846, before the Mexican War and
the discovery of gold in California, the United States had made a treaty
with New Granada, by which the former secured rights of transit over the
isthmus "upon any modes of communication that now exist or may hereafter
be constructed," and by which they guaranteed the sovereignty of New
Granada over all the territories at the isthmus.

It was under this treaty that the Panama Railway was constructed which
brought the town of Colon (formerly Aspinwall) into existence, and was
subsequently taken over by the United States government. This railroad
made the isthmus for the first time a highway of world-traffic. It had a
monopoly of isthmian transportation, and was able to make any charges it
pleased. Steamship services to the southern and northern coasts of
America from Panama were developed, and the railway succeeded so well
that it paid down to 1895 an average dividend of 15 per cent. It was
bought by the first French Panama Company for the outrageously high sum
of £5,100,000. The existence of the railway really determined De
Lesseps' choice of the Panama route, and the immense amount of
excavation done by the French had a great deal to do in turn with the
American choice of the same route, so that the construction of the
Panama Railway was a highly important event at the isthmus. The United
States took over the railroad from the French with the unfinished
canal, together with a steamship service from Colon to New York, owned
by the railroad.

The rivalry between England and the United States along the Nicaraguan
route became so acute and dangerous that a very important treaty was
concluded between the two countries in 1850, when we may say that the
Panama Canal question entered the domain of modern politics. The
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, so-called from Mr. John M. Clayton, the American
Secretary of State, and Sir Henry Bulwer, British Minister at
Washington, who negotiated it, held the field for fifty years, and
became the subject of endless discussion between England and the United
States.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] Herodotus tells a story how the people of Knidos were forbidden by
the Delphic oracle to make a canal through the isthmus, along which
their Persian enemies could advance by land to attack them. The oracle
said that if Zeus had wished the place to be an island he would have
made it one. There is a curious resemblance between this story and that
related in the text.

CHAPTER III.

THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY AND THE SUEZ CANAL.

The treaty of 1850 was concerned primarily with a canal along the
Nicaraguan route--that is, as the preamble expresses it, a canal
"between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by way of the river San Juan de
Nicaragua and either or both of the lakes of Nicaragua or Managua to any
port or place on the Pacific Ocean." But as Article VIII. says, it
established "a general principle" relating to any waterway across the
isthmus between North and South America. The two contracting parties
undertook in the treaty that neither should "obtain or maintain for
itself any exclusive control over the said canal," or "maintain any
fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof," or
"occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion
over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central
America." This agreement, as I said, subsisted for fifty years, but it
was scarcely concluded when it was found inconsistent with the growing
importance and ambition of the United States, where a demand quickly
arose for an American-owned canal.

Again there followed a series of schemes for canal construction at
various points of the isthmus. For example, Dr. Edgar Cullen created
some excitement in England in the early Victorian days by giving a very
favourable account of the Caledonian route across the isthmus at Darien,
in a lecture to the Royal Geographical Society. The doctor was received
by the young queen and the Prince Consort, a corporation was formed, and
an engineer sent out to make surveys from Caledonian Bay. A British and
a French man-of-war were dispatched to the isthmus to make
investigations. But the surveyor was driven from Caledonian Bay by local
tribes, and so went on to Panama, giving a favourable report of that
route on his return to England. But nothing came of these incidents,
and the American Civil War in the early 'sixties diverted the attention
of the United States from isthmian affairs. At the end of the war
American interest revived, and public opinion set more and more against
the idea of sharing a canal with any other Power. In 1869 President
Grant gave the first public expression to the demand for an American
canal under American control. "I regard it," he said, "as of vast
political importance to this country that no European government should
hold such a work." Later, in an article in the _North American Review_,
he said, "I commend an American canal, on American soil, to the American
people."

Just before the President's declaration of policy the United States had
concluded an important treaty, known as the "Dickinson-Ayon Treaty,"
with Nicaragua, securing a right of way for a canal over the Nicaraguan
route; and, just afterwards, President Grant appointed an Interoceanic
Canal Commission which investigated four routes for a canal, and
finally, in 1875, reported unanimously in favour of the Nicaraguan route
from Grey town to the San Juan River, to Lake Nicaragua, through the Rio
del Medio and Rio Grande valleys, to Brito on the Pacific coast.

In 1869 an event occurred which was to have a very decisive effect on
isthmian affairs--the opening for traffic of the Suez Canal. These two
isthmuses in the eastern and western hemispheres have some obvious
features in common. They both link two vast continents and form a
barrier between two oceans or oceanic systems. They are fairly equal in
breadth--Suez, sixty miles, and Panama about fifty-four. The shortest
line across each runs almost exactly north and south. And they were both
until recent times uninhabited country. But there are many
dissimilarities. The isthmus at Suez is a flat and sterile desert; that
at Panama is hilly and covered with an almost impenetrable jungle of
tropical vegetation. Again, Suez is a healthy district, whereas Panama
was, until recent years, a pest-house as deadly as Sierra Leone or the
Guinea coast.

Mr. Bryce in his charming book on "South America" compares these two
inter-continental causeways from a more historical point of view. He
writes:--

A still more remarkable contrast, between these two necks of
land, lies in the part they have respectively played in
human affairs. The isthmus of Panama in far-off prehistoric
days has been the highway along which those wandering tribes
whose forefathers had passed in their canoes from
North-eastern Asia along the Aleutian Isles into Alaska
found their way, after many centuries, into the vast spaces
of South America. But its place in the annals of mankind,
during the four centuries that have elapsed since Balboa
gazed from a mountain top rising out of the forest upon the
far-off waters of the South Sea, has been small indeed
compared to that which the isthmus of Suez has held from the
beginning of history. It echoed to the tread of the armies
of Thothmes and Rameses marching forth on their invasions of
Western Asia. Along the edge of it Israel fled forth before
the hosts of Pharaoh. First the Assyrian and afterwards the
Persian hosts poured across it to conquer Egypt; and over
its sands Bonaparte led his regiments to Palestine in that
bold adventure which was stopped at St. Jean d'Acre. It has
been one of the great highways for armies for forty
centuries, as the canal cut through it is now one of the
great highways for commerce.

The turn of the isthmus of Panama is now come, and,
curiously enough, it is the isthmus of Suez that brought
that turn, for it was the digging of a ship canal from the
Mediterranean to the Red Sea, and the vast expansion of
Eastern trade which followed, that led to the revival of the
old designs, mooted as far back as Philip II. of Spain, of
piercing the American isthmus. Thus the comparison of the
two isthmuses becomes now more interesting than ever, for
our generation will watch to see whether the commerce and
politics of the Western World will be affected by this new
route which is now being opened, as those of the Old World
have been affected by the achievement of Ferdinand de
Lesseps.

It will be seen from this quotation how the completion of the Suez Canal
affected the Panama project. Lesseps, fresh from his success at Suez
and not contented with his great achievement there, was easily attracted
by the schemes which were afoot for constructing a ship canal at another
land-barrier which, like the isthmus at Suez, had obstructed the
quickest lines of communication between East and West. In 1876 a
corporation was established, called "La Société Civile Internationale du
Canal Interocéanique," for the purpose of promoting canal schemes on the
lower isthmus. Its head was Lieutenant Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse,
who easily obtained a canal concession at Bogotá from the Colombian
government. In 1879 an International Engineering Congress was assembled
at Paris by Lesseps, whose partisans compelled a decision in favour of
the Panama route.

But the United States, determined by this time to construct a canal for
themselves without any joint control or international guarantee of
neutrality, opposed the French scheme from the outset. No amount of
bluff from the French promoters affected this opposition. The American
people had indeed some right to complain. The Colombian concession to
the French was quite inconsistent with the treaty of 1846 between this
South American republic and the United States. This treaty Lesseps tried
to induce Colombia to abrogate, and every effort, fair and foul, was
employed to overcome the American objection to the scheme. In 1880
Lesseps was fêted at a public banquet at New York, but even the personal
presence of the great man failed to have the desired effect. President
Hayes addressed a strong message to the Senate on the subject, a few
passages of which are interesting as showing the very decided views now
held by the American government and people:--

An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will
essentially change the geographical relations between the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and
between the United States and the rest of the world. It will
be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our
Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coastline of the
United States. Our mere commercial interest in it is larger
than that of all other countries, while its relation to our
power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defence,
our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of paramount
concern to the people of the United States. No other great
Power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a
rightful control over a work so closely and vitally
affecting its interests and welfare.

Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I repeat,
in conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of the
United States to assert and maintain such supervision and
authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus
that connects North and South America as will protect our
national interests. This, I am quite sure, will be found not
only compatible with, but promotive of, the widest and most
permanent advantage to commerce and civilization.

The reader will see that all this is inconsistent with the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, under which the United States had actually
undertaken to claim no such exclusive control as was now desired.
Lengthy negotiations were now set on foot with England for the
abrogation of a treaty which forbade the United States to build a canal
of their own and prevented them from effectually opposing the French
scheme. Lord Granville, however, saw no reason why England should
abandon the treaty solely in the interests of the United States, and the
negotiations were fruitless.

Meantime the French persisted in their undertaking. Their canal was to
be tide-level, twenty-eight feet deep, costing £26,400,000. A
corporation entitled the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique
de Panama was formed in 1881, and in the same year the work of
construction was begun. So it looked as though the Americans were to
lose all chance of constructing an isthmian canal under their own
control. Events, however, were to decide otherwise.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FRENCH FAILURE.

The French company began work on the isthmus in February, and such a
rake's progress set in as the world has seldom seen. The name of
Ferdinand de Lesseps inspired such confidence that plenty of money was
forthcoming from the French people. A great deal of it was subscribed by
small investors who could ill afford to lose their savings, and no fewer
than 16,000 women took shares in their own names. The beginning of the
excavations was celebrated with a "gala" performance in the little
theatre at Panama, among the artistes being Sarah Bernhardt. Then began
a drama or a melodrama of extravagance and profligacy lasting seven
years. Money was poured out like the torrential flood-waters down the
river Chagres. I have mentioned the exorbitant sum which the company
paid for the Panama Railway. All the expenditure was on the same scale.
Princely salaries were paid to the managers and directors, and elegant
mansions erected for their accommodation. Building operations--warehouses,
hospitals, hotels, etc.--were carried on "regardless." Mr. W. F. Johnson
tells of a man who owned thirty acres of land useful mainly as a
breeding-place for mosquitoes, but lying right across the route of the
canal. It was worth perhaps 300 dollars. The man demanded just a
thousand times that sum; the Colombian courts awarded it, and the French
paid it. For one great mistake the French made was that they failed to
secure a canal zone in which they would have exercised full powers of
administration. They began to build their canal on Colombian territory,
under Colombian control, and the consequence was that they were fleeced
on every side. Probably this mistake was inevitable, as the United
States would have vetoed any territorial concession by Colombia to
France as a transgression of the Monroe doctrine.

The isthmus rapidly degenerated into a moral as well as a climatic
pest-house. Froude described the condition of things at Panama in one
terrible sentence: "In all the world there is perhaps not now
concentrated in any single spot so much swindling and villainy, so much
foul disease, such a hideous dung-heap of moral and physical
abomination." In fairness, however, it must be said that Lesseps himself
cannot be held directly responsible for this state of affairs. He lived
in Paris, and had probably little notion of what was happening at
Panama. He furnished an example of the proverbial effects of too much
success and prosperity. He seems to have become a superstitious believer
in his own star, and to have thought that nothing could fail with which
he was associated. Still less can the French nation be blamed for the
wild doings of their representatives at the isthmus. And there is at
least one redeeming feature in the conduct of this enterprise. In the
midst of the moral and physical abominations that infested the isthmus
during the French occupation, the engineering work went on steadily and
conscientiously. Much of the French work was available for the Americans
when they took over the task, and the engineers of the United States
have always testified generously to the excellence of the French
excavation and construction along the Canal route.

It must be carefully noted that the French canal was to be sea-level
like the Suez, Corinth, and Kiel Canals. The construction of such a
waterway differed in many important ways from that of the high-level
lock canal which the United States have completed. To understand this we
must consider briefly the character of the country which lies between
Panama and Colon. The dominant and decisive features of the isthmus at
this point are the Chagres River and the Culebra Mountains. The Chagres
enters the Caribbean a little west of Colon. Its valley runs right
across the isthmus south-south-eastwardly towards Panama for about
twenty-six miles, then, at a place called Bas Opisbo, suddenly swerves
away to the north-east into the trackless and jungle-clad hill country.
This valley is the only transverse trench which the isthmus affords at
this stretch, and it has always fixed the attention of surveyors looking
out for a canal site. If the isthmus had been a rainless desert like
that of Suez, a canal could have been constructed by a further
preparation of this river valley and some heavy excavations along the
nine-mile reach from Obispo to the Pacific. The sea would then have been
admitted, the ebb and flow of the Pacific (the Atlantic shore is almost
tideless) being regulated by a tidal lock. But the problem is not nearly
so simple. The isthmus is one of the rainiest places in the world,
enjoying on the Atlantic side 140 inches of rain a year. At Panama the
rate is much smaller, not more than 60 inches. In the central hills the
rainfall averages 90 to 95 inches. The average number of rainy days in
the year is 246 at Bohio (inland on the Atlantic side), 196 at Colon,
and 141 at Panama. The reader must not imagine a perpetual downpour or
drizzle. The rain comes down in thundering tropical cataracts, leaving
spaces of fine weather between the storms. Still, the isthmus is
undoubtedly rainy and damp, and it is this humidity which makes the
climate so trying, though the variations of the thermometer are by no
means extreme and the average air temperature not particularly high. For
example, the average temperature at Panama ranges from 81.6 Fahrenheit
in November to 86.1 in March--that is, during the hottest time of the
day, from two to four o'clock p.m. The coolest time is from six to seven
a.m., when the average temperature ranges between 74.0 in January to
76.6 in June. The yearly average daily temperature is 79.6. The
thermometer seems never to have recorded 100 degrees Fahrenheit at
Panama, whereas 104 has been touched even at Washington.

But to return to the Chagres River. The tropical rains convert this
stream very quickly into a raging torrent. The Chagres is capable of
rising over forty feet in twenty-four hours. If the Chagres valley was
to be the site of the canal, as was obviously necessary, how did the
French propose to "care for" this tremendous and capricious flow of
water? Mr. Johnson remarks that "those who have seen the antics of the
Chagres under the stress of a characteristic isthmian rain must be
pardoned if they regard the harnessing of the Chagres to the canal as
something much like the harnessing of a mad elephant to a family
carriage." The only course open to the French with their sea-level
project was to divert the Chagres with its twenty-six tributaries,
chief of which are the Gatun and the Trinidad, from its old valley into
another channel, along which it could rage as it pleased on its short
journey to the Caribbean. This would have been a tremendous, though
probably not an impossible, task. The New Panama Company, which took the
French work from the Lesseps Company in 1893, dropped the tide-level in
favour of a lock or high-level canal, and adopted the plan of a dam
across the river valley at Bohio, creating a lake above this point and
discharging the flood waters to the level below by means of a spillway
in the adjacent hills. We shall see later how the Americans adopted the
same principle but modified it in practice.

So much at present for the Chagres problem. The other main feature of
the isthmus is met with about the point where the river suddenly changes
its direction--that is at Bas Obispo, or Gamboa, about nine miles from
the Pacific outlet. Here are the hills, the backbone or "continental
divide," averaging over 300 feet high but rising to much higher points,
which connects the Cordilleras of South with the Sierras of North
America. For eight or nine miles the canal must run through this
central barrier on its way to the Pacific. The earliest French notion
was for a ship tunnel--a project perhaps never seriously contemplated.
The only other course was to cut right down through this hilly country.
That was a tremendous undertaking, which required, even for its
inception, a good deal of the faith which is said to be able to "remove
mountains." We shall look more closely at the famous "Culebra Cut" when
we come to the American canal. Most of the work of the French companies
consisted of the dredging of the sea-level channels at the Atlantic and
Pacific ends. But they drove a pretty deep furrow as well through the
Culebra Mountains, excavating in all about 22,600,000 cubic yards.

With their sea-level scheme the French had, of course, a bigger
proposition before them at the hills than their American successors.
They would have had to cut right down below sea-level, whereas the
bottom of the cut in the American lock-canal is forty feet above that
level. Considering the difficulty the United States engineers have had
with "slides" and "breaks" along the sides of their cutting, one
suspects that the much deeper and narrower channel of the French would
have proved impracticable. The French scheme gave a width to the channel
at this point of only 74 feet, while the bottom width of the American
canal is 300 feet. The French work at the "Cut" was all utilizable by
the Americans, who, though with different machinery, adopted the same
general method of excavation.

In 1888 the French company suspended payments and went into bankruptcy.
The canal was completed to the extent of about two-fifths, and had
already cost nearly £80,000,000. It was said at the time that about
one-third of this sum was spent on the canal, one-third wasted, and
one-third stolen. The original capital with the eight subscription lists
between 1882 and 1888 produced nominally £78,701,020, but actually only
£40,309,348, the loss in discounts, etc., amounting to £38,391,672. The
collapse of the company was followed by investigations and trials in
France. Ten senators and deputies, together with the directors, were
brought to trial. Ferdinand and his son Charles de Lesseps were, among
others, condemned to fines and imprisonment, but the sentences upon the
Lesseps were never carried out. Neither the son nor the father was
probably responsible for the iniquities which had marked the history of
the company. The genius who had created the Suez Canal was indeed
completely broken down by the tragical conclusion of his second venture,
and died in 1894 in a condition of mental and physical collapse.

But financial profligacy was not the only cause of the French failure.
Disease and death fought against the enterprise from the first. Yellow
fever and malaria caused as much mortality among the French employees as
would suffice for a great military campaign. Sir Ronald Ross, the great
expert in tropical diseases, was told in 1904, when at the isthmus, that
the French attempt cost at least 50,000 lives. This may have been an
over-estimate, but there is no doubt that the mortality was terrible,
and would probably have brought the French operations to an end even if
greater economy and honesty had prevailed in the administration. It must
not be supposed that the French made no provision for the victims of
these endemic diseases. Excellent hospitals were built at Ancon, near
Panama, at a cost of over a million of money; while those at Colon cost
more than a quarter of a million--in both cases about three times a fair
and honest price. At the time of the French occupation of the isthmus
nothing was known of the real nature and cause of yellow fever and
malaria, of the manner in which they are transmitted, and the only
effective means of prevention. All the recent and marvellous advance in
scientific knowledge of these diseases was available when the Americans
began their work, and was applied with the greatest efficiency and
success. Medical science, quite as much as engineering skill, made a
Panama canal possible, and we shall have a good deal more to say on this
subject when we come to describe the American operations.

Let us not forget, then, that despite their failure the French did a
great deal of good work, which they passed on many years afterwards to
their American successors. A quantity of the French machinery, tools,
and hardware was also available. It is true that among this was included
a large consignment of snow-shovels (for use at sea-level less than 10
degrees from the Equator!), and a quantity of petroleum torches for the
festivities which were one day to celebrate the completion of the canal.
But a great deal of the plant was in good condition. The extravagance
and corruption which prevailed at the isthmus during the first French
company were almost incredible. But it may be doubted whether any other
nation could have succeeded in the 'eighties of last century where the
French failed.

CHAPTER V.

THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY.

In 1893 a new corporation, known as the New Panama Canal Company, took
over all the assets of the De Lesseps Company, including the railway,
and the work of construction was continued, or at least not wholly
interrupted. Meanwhile the people of the United States were not greatly
displeased at the collapse of the great French enterprise. They became
more and more determined to construct an American canal under American
control. The Nicaraguan route was still favoured by many as compared
with that at Panama. In 1887 a surveying party was sent to Nicaragua,
and the next year the Maritime Canal Company was established to promote
the building of a canal there. It is important to notice this particular
scheme, for under it work was actually begun. Wharves, warehouses, and
a breakwater were constructed at Greytown, a railway was built, and
some progress made with the canal itself. Outside the Panama route this
was the only actual work of canal construction performed in Isthmian and
Central America. The project failed owing to the great depression of
trade which occurred in 1893 and the impossibility of getting more
capital. It should be noticed that these projects of constructing an
American canal at Nicaragua quite independently of Great Britain were
right in the teeth of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which still
remained in force. Most sensible persons saw that the first preliminary
to an American canal was to get this treaty abrogated or modified. But
this purpose and canal schemes in general were delayed by the outbreak
in 1898 of the Spanish-American War.

This was a naval war, and the United States were to feel the
inconvenience and danger of having no sea communication between their
eastern and western coasts except _via_ the far southern extremity of
the continent. United fleet action over the whole theatre of the war was
rendered impossible. An event soon occurred which finally completed the
conviction of the American people that, in the words of President Grant,
"an American canal on American soil" was a national necessity. At the
beginning of the war the battleship _Oregon_, one of the finest ships in
the United States navy, lay off San Francisco. She was not wanted there,
but she was very badly wanted at the West Indies, the main scene of the
naval struggle. To get there the _Oregon_ had to sail 13,400 miles round
Cape Horn instead of 4,600 miles _via_ a Panama canal, if there had been
one. Everybody in the United States knew that the precious warship was
making that perilous journey exposed all the way to the attack of the
enemy. If she had been lost, the course of the war might have been very
different, and even the delay of this long passage was a serious
consideration at so critical a time. However, the vessel arrived safely
and in a record time off Florida, and the suspense and anxiety of the
American people were changed into jubilation. But "never again" was the
moral they drew from this painful and exciting experience.

At the end of the war a fresh canal campaign broke out in Congress, the
claims of Nicaragua and Panama being urged by their respective
champions. The outcome of this rivalry was the appointment of a
commission, the third of the kind, to go to the isthmus and investigate
both Nicaragua and Panama. We shall have something to say about the
report of this commission, which was issued in December 1900. But
already, before that appeared, negotiations had been set on foot between
the United States and Great Britain with regard to the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty. Allusions to the subject by Mr. M'Kinley in his second message
to Congress had brought the question prominently before the people of
both countries. The president had spoken thus:--

That the construction of such a maritime highway is now more
than ever indispensable to that intimate and ready
communication between our eastern and western seaboards
demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the
prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the
Pacific, and that our national policy now more imperatively
than ever calls for its control by this government, are
propositions which I doubt not the Congress will duly
appreciate and wisely act upon.

It is obvious that the annexation by the United States of Hawaii and the
Philippines, the beginnings of an American oversea empire, had greatly
strengthened the case for a canal owned and controlled by the United
States, and bringing the eastern coasts, the governmental centre of the
States, into far more direct communication with these new acquisitions
in the west.

Mr. M'Kinley's pronouncement was soon followed by conversations between
Mr. John Hay, the American Secretary of State, and Lord Pauncefote,
British Ambassador at Washington. The result was a treaty which was laid
before the Senate in February 1900. This first attempt, however, was
unsuccessful. The American people were annoyed to find that it did not
abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, but left the United States with
something very short of that independent control which they desired.
Amendments were introduced, and, so altered, the treaty was ratified by
the Senate on December 20, 1900. But in this new shape it proved
unacceptable to the British government, and it was permitted to lapse;
Lord Lansdowne, however, suggesting that another attempt at agreement
should be made.

It may be asked why Great Britain, who had hitherto taken the view that
it had nothing to gain, and perhaps much to lose, from the
reconsideration of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, should now have been so
willing to bring it under review. There was a variety of reasons. The
government of the United States had protested for nearly fifty years
against the agreement, and this pertinacity, together with the changed
conditions since the Spanish-American War, may have weighed with the
British government. Then the Alaskan boundary question was at that time
still under discussion between the two countries, and a settlement was
proving difficult. An obstinate resistance to the United States over the
canal question might have continued that deadlock indefinitely. At this
time, too, England was at the beginning of the Boer War, and finding
that business a good deal more intricate than she had expected. The
sentiment of Anglo-American friendship had also grown much warmer since
the days when Lord Granville had repulsed the advances of Mr. Blaine.

In November 1901 a new treaty made its appearance. This was ratified by
the Senate without amendment, and was ultimately concluded between the
two Powers, being known as the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.[3]

It is very important to note the provisions of this treaty, because it
establishes what is known as the political "status" of the new canal.
The Hay-Pauncefote expressly supersedes the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and
provides for the construction of a canal (mentioning no particular
route) "under the auspices of the government of the United States,"
which country is "to have and enjoy all the rights incident to such
construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the
regulation and management of the canal." It adopts the principles of
"neutralization" which were embodied in the Treaty of Constantinople of
1888 in connection with the Suez Canal. Both treaties provide for:--

1. Freedom of transit in time of peace or war for the vessels of all
nations.

2. Freedom of the canal and its terminals from blockade.

3. A code of procedure for war-vessels entering or leaving the canal.

No special reference is made to the question of fortification, but the
United States are to be at liberty to maintain such military police
along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness
and disorder. A treaty, however, subsequently concluded between the
United States and the Republic of Panama (known as the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty) contains the following provision:--

If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed
forces for the safety and protection of the canal, or of the
ships that make use of the same, or the railways and
auxiliary works, the United States shall have the right, at
all times and in its discretion, to use its police and its
land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for
these purposes.

But the most important provision of all related to the question of the
charges and other conditions of traffic through the canal. The meaning
of the section seems plain enough, though it became a subject of rather
acute controversy:--

The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce
and war of all nations observing these rules, on terms of
entire equality; so that there shall be no discrimination
against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in
respect of the conditions and charges of traffic, or
otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be
just and equitable.

This provision is reaffirmed in Article XVIII. of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty. There is no doubt that the British government regarded this
promise of equal treatment as some compensation for the surrender of
those rights of joint construction and control which Great Britain
enjoyed under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. In fact, Mr. Hay, in a
memorandum he sent to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
described the treaty as a sort of contract between Great Britain and
the United States by which the former gave up those rights just
mentioned in return for the "rules and principles" included in the new
treaty, the chief among these being, of course, the provision about
equality of treatment for all nations.

It was, therefore, a surprise when the United States government decided
that the expression "all nations" did not include the United States
themselves, and that it was quite open to them to give preferential
treatment to their "coastwise" traffic. Under the term "coastwise" the
United States include the sea-traffic not only between ports along a
continuous coast, but between such points as San Francisco or Washington
and the Philippine Islands. As a matter of fact, an amendment proposed
by Mr. Burd in the Senate, reserving to the United States the right of
favouring its "coastwise" traffic, had been defeated, when the new
treaty was under discussion.

But, leaving these controversial questions, the most important thing for
us to notice is that the Panama Canal has what is known as an
"international status." It is not quite the sole and absolute property
of the United States in the sense in which the Kiel Canal belongs to
Germany, the Corinth Canal to Greece, and the Amsterdam or North Sea
Canal to the Netherlands. Its status is governed by treaties which
impose certain obligations and restrictions upon the United States and
lay down certain rules of administration. It was intended at first to
make the status of the Panama and the Suez Canal identical. But there
are considerable differences. The "neutrality" of the Suez Canal is
guaranteed by all the Powers of Europe, that of the Panama Canal by two
only, England and the United States, and it is safeguarded and
maintained by the United States alone. Then the Suez Canal is and must
remain unfortified, while the Panama Canal will be strongly fortified by
the United States.

The reader may wonder what precisely is meant by the word "neutral" as
applied to the new waterway. The position will be as nearly as possible
that indicated by Dr. Vaughan Cornish in the following passage:--

If there be a war in which the United States is not a party,
the canal will be used by belligerents in exactly the same
way as was the Suez Canal--for example, in the
Russo-Japanese War--and the government of the United States
has pledged itself to see that such neutrality is preserved.
But if there be a war in which the United States is a party,
the circumstances of fortification and operation by the
United States in fact render it impossible for the other
belligerent to use the canal, and are intended to have that
effect. This being so, the United States is preparing to
defend the canal from attack. Thus it is important to the
proper understanding of the undertaking on which the United
States government has embarked that we should clearly
realize that the canal is only neutral in a restricted
sense.[4]

As a matter of fact the status of the Panama Canal lies somewhere
between neutralization and American control. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty
also lays down the rules which are to be observed by the ships of war
of a belligerent using the canal and the waters adjacent to the
canal--that is, within three marine miles of either end. They are
similar to those in force at Suez, and need not be repeated here.

FOOTNOTES:

[3] Appendix i.

[4] "The Panama Canal and its Makers," pp. 42, 43.

CHAPTER VI.

THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA.

Those citizens of the United States who thought that with the
disappearance of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty all the difficulties in the
way of obtaining a canal of their own had also disappeared were doomed
to a severe disappointment. They had not reckoned with a South American
republic on the verge of bankruptcy and suddenly presented with a
glorious opportunity to fill its empty treasury. Two preliminaries were
necessary before the United States could settle down at the isthmus of
Panama to the work of canal construction. They had to purchase the
concession, the unfinished works and the other assets of the New Panama
Company, at as reasonable a price as they could obtain; and, secondly,
it was necessary to conclude a treaty with Colombia, securing to the
United States on satisfactory terms the perpetual control of a strip of
territory on the isthmus from sea to sea within which the canal could be
constructed.

The first of these undertakings presented, as it turned out, no great
difficulty. The New Panama Company had begun to despair of its own
ability to get a canal finished across the isthmus, and to realize that
their best course was to transfer the whole business to the United
States. This disposition had been greatly strengthened by the Report of
the Third Canal Commission, issued in December 1900. Probably the
members of the commission were convinced of the advantages of the Panama
route and the desirability of continuing the work of the French
engineers. But they were shrewd people. They dwelt in their report on
the improbability that the New Panama Company would sell its property to
the United States, and on the difficulty of getting the Colombian
concession transferred. They decided, therefore, that "the most
practicable and feasible route for an isthmian canal to be under the
control, management, and ownership of the United States is that known as
the Nicaraguan route."

The commission probably foresaw the effect such a decision was likely to
have on the directors and shareholders of the New Panama Company. If an
American canal were constructed at Nicaragua, all the property and work
of the company at Panama would be thrown on the scrap-heap. The company
estimated the value of its property at $109,141,500, a price which the
commission, representing the American government, declined to look at.
The commission thought $40,000,000 quite enough for the property, and so
completely were the Americans master of the situation that that price
was agreed upon in January 1902. The commission thereupon issued a
supplementary report, which reversed the former decision and recommended
the Panama route and the purchase of the French property.

Then arose in the Congress of the United States a tremendous conflict
between the Nicaraguans and the Panamanians, the champions of the two
routes which had so long been in rivalry. The former party insisted that
Panama was farther from the United States than Nicaragua, and therefore
the journey from the eastern to the western seaboard of the States
would be longer. They argued that Panama was unfavourable to sailing
vessels on account of the prevailing calms on that coast; that it would
be easier to deal with Costa Rica and Nicaragua than with Colombia; and
that Nicaragua was "the traditional American route" as compared with the
Frenchified Panama. The claims of the old Darien route were also
advanced. This was probably done by American railway people who were
against any canal, for the Darien route would have involved a rock
tunnel five miles long and three hundred feet broad, the attempt to
achieve which would probably have ended all canal adventures at the
isthmus.

From these discussions emerged the celebrated "Spooner Bill," under
which the Panama Canal has been constructed. It empowered the American
government to secure the rights and property of the Panama Company for
not more than $40,000,000; to obtain from Colombia the perpetual control
of a strip of land, not less than six miles wide, in which the canal
should run; and then to proceed with the work. But if it should prove
impossible to come to terms with Colombia and the New Panama Company,
then the Nicaraguan project was to be revived. We shall see how, in the
sequel, this latter proviso came very near fulfilment. But, as a matter
of fact, the Spooner Bill marks the end of the great battle of the
routes which had lasted for four centuries.

The purchase price of the New Panama Company's property was happily
settled, but the purchase was of course conditional on the conclusion of
a satisfactory agreement between the United States and Colombia. It was
no use for the United States to acquire unfinished canal-works if they
were to be prevented from continuing and completing them. The situation
was interesting. The Republic of Colombia was extremely "hard up." Its
currency was debased, its treasury empty, its debt rapidly increasing
through a large annual deficit. The government, if one may so express
it, of the Colombian Republic was therefore not likely to overlook the
chance of "making a bit" out of the necessities of the bigger and richer
republic farther north. The United States wished to get their concession
as cheaply as possible; Colombia wished to sell as dearly as possible.
This is not infrequently the case with buyers and sellers; but Colombia
pushed her haggling a little too far, and in the end very badly
overreached herself.

The United States began by proposing terms on which they might obtain
the desired strip of territory. The conditions were carefully laid down.
The territory was to remain under Colombian sovereignty, but to be
administered by the United States. Sanitary and police services were to
be maintained by both governments jointly. Colombia was to police the
zone, with the help of the United States if necessary. But the business
terms were chiefly interesting to Colombia. The United States were to
pay Colombia a bonus of $7,000,000 in cash, and after fourteen years an
annuity of $250,000. These terms, which were not ungenerous, the
Colombian minister at Washington declined to accept.

A brilliant idea had, indeed, struck the statesmen of the Colombian
Republic. They had remembered that the concession to the Panama Company
lapsed in October 1904, and that all its property that could not be
carried away would revert to the Colombian government. Only defer any
agreement with the United States till then, and the $40,000,000 to be
paid to the New Panama Canal Company by the United States would drop
like a golden nest-egg into the empty exchequer of the Colombian
Republic. It was a brilliant idea, but the Colombian method of pursuing
it was rather too crude and obvious.

In order to meet the Colombian government the United States improved
their offer, considerably increasing the bonus and making other changes.
An agreement, known as the Hay-Herran Treaty, was actually arranged
between the United States and Colombia, the latter represented by her
minister at Washington, Dr. Tomas Herran. This treaty, before it became
operative, had to be ratified by the Congress of Colombia, and the
president of that state took care that a congress should be elected
which would do no such thing. Meantime all kinds of influences, secret
and open, were at work. The German "colonial party" had become
interested in the question, and had conceived the possibility of
Germany, rather than the United States, succeeding to the French
concession. It is quite certain that the United States would have
resisted any such proceeding, if necessary by actual war. There is
little doubt, also, that the party in the United States which had
supported the Nicaraguan scheme were throwing every obstruction in the
way of a satisfactory agreement between the big and the little republic.

The reader may guess what was the anxiety of the New Panama Canal
Company during all this diplomacy and intrigue. They knew that the
completion of the sale of its property to the United States depended on
an agreement being concluded between that country and Colombia; and they
also knew that unless they sold before October 1904, they would have
practically nothing to sell, because the franchise and possessions of
the company would be forfeited to the Colombian government at that date.
It would be better to sell on the best terms they could obtain to
Germany or anybody else before the fatal day arrived. Meantime the
United States brought every force of argument and menace to bear on the
Colombian government. Secretary Hay sent urgent dispatches to the
American minister at Bogotá. He reminded Colombia that the decision to
adopt the Panama route was not irrevocable. The Spooner law authorized
the American president to await only "a reasonable time" for an
agreement with Colombia. Having waited so long, he was able and indeed
bound to resume the Nicaraguan project.

When the Colombian Congress duly rejected the Hay-Herran Treaty in
August 1903, the New Panama Company became very seriously alarmed. Other
offers of purchase were renewed, and the situation became critical for
the United States. The American counsel for the company, Mr. William
Nelson Cromwell, who had done his utmost to promote the agreement, had
the utmost difficulty in keeping his clients to their compact with the
United States. He made a hurried trip to Paris, where he said something
which had the desired effect. There is no reason to believe that Mr.
Cromwell took any part in the surprising events which were soon to alter
the entire situation. But he had heard the proverbial "little bird," and
the tidings he passed on brought the New Panama directors to the desired
mood of patience and expectancy.

Colombia meanwhile kept on marking time. She suggested that a new treaty
should be negotiated between the United States and Colombia, to be
ratified by the Colombian Senate some time in 1904. That would have put
the clock forward splendidly, but the device was duly understood at
Washington. In October a committee of the Colombian Senate reported to
the Senate a recommendation that no agreement should be concluded with
the United States until the French concession had lapsed. This
recommendation was not acted upon by the Colombian Senate, nor yet were
any steps taken towards the negotiation of a new treaty. The American
government gave a generous interpretation to the "reasonable time"
specified in the Spooner Bill, and kept on waiting in the hope that the
Colombian Congress would still change its mind and ratify the Hay-Herran
Treaty, whose terms, as we have seen, were liberal to the Colombian
Republic. But when the congressional session at Bogotá came to an end on
October 31, 1903, without any further action over the Hay-Herran Treaty,
the Americans concluded that the whole business was over so far as
negotiations with Colombia on the Panama question were concerned.
Obviously the only course was to turn to the Nicaraguan alternative.
And the Colombian government no doubt thought it had won the day by
sheer force of astute statesmanship.

Then came a coincidence more astonishing than any since the day when Mr.
Weller, senior, upset the Eatanswill outvoters (purely by accident) into
another canal. The Panama revolution broke out, and the United States
suddenly and without further difficulty obtained all they wanted of the
isthmus. And Colombia? She lost every stick and stone of the canal which
was to have been hers in October 1904, never made a farthing on a Panama
deal, got no thanks from Germany or anybody else, and lost a whole
province into the bargain. Such were the results of very astute
statesmanship at Bogotá.

CHAPTER VII.

A MINIATURE REVOLUTION.

It was not to be expected that Panama, one of the constituent provinces
of the United States of Colombia, would be very enthusiastic about all
this haggling and intriguing at Bogotá. Panama asked for nothing better
than that a rich and powerful country like the United States should
continue the French enterprise and carry it through. The canal would run
right through the province, and would bring it into the main stream of
the world's traffic and commerce. No doubt the central government at
Bogotá would skim off as much as possible of this new wealth and
prosperity at the isthmus; but even so, Panama would reap a great
advantage from the running of this new and much-frequented highway of
communication between east and west through its territory. The dealings
of the central government with the United States had roused a growing
disgust and resentment at the isthmus.

The relations between the province of Panama with New Granada and its
successor Colombia had been very chequered ever since the revolt of the
Spanish colonies in Central and South America in the early years of last
century. Panama declared her independence in 1821, and allied herself at
once with New Granada. But troubles began forthwith. Again and again the
isthmian province seceded from New Granada or Colombia, and was induced
to return by promises of more favourable terms of union, these always
remaining unfulfilled. In his annual message to Congress in 1903,
President Roosevelt enumerated some fifty-three "revolutions,
rebellions, insurrections, riots, and other outbreaks" that had occurred
at the isthmus in fifty-seven years. Not long before these difficulties
between the United States and Colombia, Panama had received a new
constitution which was far from satisfactory to the people of the
province. There was in truth little to be gained by a continued
allegiance to the government at Bogotá. Some idea of the depths to
which Colombia had sunk through a long course of bad administration and
corruption may be gathered from a passage in the official address of Dr.
Marroquin on his becoming vice-president of Colombia in 1898. He said:--

Hatred, envy, and ambition are elements of discord; in the
political arena the battle rages fiercely, not so much with
the idea of securing the triumph of principles as with that
of humbling, and elevating persons and parties; public
tranquillity, indispensable to every citizen for the free
enjoyment of what he possesses either by luck or as the
fruit of his labour, is gradually getting unknown; we live
in a sickly atmosphere; crisis is our normal state; commerce
and all other industries are in urgent need of perfect
calmness for their development and progress; poverty invades
every home. The notion of mother country is mistaken or
obliterated, owing to our political disturbances. The
conception of mother country is so intimately associated
with that of political disorders, and with the afflictions
and distrust which they engender, that it is not unusual to
hear from one of our countrymen what could not be heard from
a native of any other country: "I wish I had been born
somewhere else." Could many be found among us who would feel
proud when exclaiming, "I am a Colombian," in the same way
as a Frenchman does when exclaiming, "I am a Frenchman"?

This was a cheerful pronouncement for a people to hear from the lips of
a man who was just assuming high office in their midst. It suggests some
further reasons why the Panamanians should have so readily asserted
their independence once more when the negotiations between Colombia and
the United States fell through.

Long before that happened, before the Colombian Congress which was to
deal with the Hay-Herran Treaty had assembled, a much-respected citizen
of Panama, Dr. Manuel Amador (Guerrero), had written to the Colombian
president warning him that serious consequences would follow at Panama
if that treaty were not ratified. For answer the central government
foisted on Panama a candidate for Congress who was well known as an
enemy of the United States and of the isthmian canal scheme.
Representations to the government at Bogotá were useless, and Panama saw
the prospect of a canal being constructed through her territory fading
into distance.

Then it was that an eminent Panamanian, José Agustin Arango, a senator
at the Colombian Congress of 1903, who had vainly urged the ratification
of the Hay-Herran Treaty, conceived the idea that Panama might declare
her independence and then make her own treaty with the United States
regarding a trans-isthmian canal. It soon turned out that the same idea
had struck many others, and a junta of zealous conspirators was quickly
formed. Señor Arango chanced to meet Dr. Amador one day at the offices
of the Panama Railroad, and unfolded his revolutionary design to that
gentleman. The doctor proved highly sympathetic. There was indeed no
difficulty in finding adherents. Señor Arango, Dr. Amador, and C. C.
Arosemena undertook the conduct of the movement, and among the other
leaders were Señor Arango's sons and sons-in-law, Nicanor A. de Obarrio,
Federico Boyd, Tomas and Ricardo Arias, and Manuel Espinosa. A very
important person, General Esteban Huertas, commander of the troops in
Panama, was easily enrolled, as were also alcaldes, chiefs of police,
and other important officials.

The first thing to do was to sound official opinion in Washington as to
what treatment the revolted province might expect from the American
government. Moreover, revolutions cost money, and supplies must be
obtained from somewhere. So Dr. Amador and Ricardo Arias were deputed to
go to the United States. There they called on Mr. Cromwell, the counsel
of the New Panama Company, who gave them very little encouragement.
Moreover, they were carefully "shadowed" by Colombian agents, so that
they were able to cable to their expectant friends at the isthmus only
the single depressing word, "desanimado" (disappointed).

Then Dr. Amador called at the office of a Panamanian friend and
sympathizer, Joshua Lindo, and asked for counsel in his difficulties.
Mr. Lindo at once suggested that the likeliest person to help was Mr.
Bunau-Varilla, who had been chief engineer under the French Canal
Company. It is interesting to know that this gentleman had been a
fellow-student of Alfred Dreyfus, and had given effective help in the
campaign which ended in that officer's liberation from the island prison
not so very far from the isthmus of Panama. Unfortunately, said Mr.
Lindo, Mr. Bunau-Varilla was in Paris; but even as the friends deplored
his absence the telephone rang, Mr. Lindo answered the call, and lo! Mr.
Bunau-Varilla announced his return to New York. Such a coincidence might
well seem providential, for Mr. Varilla proved a friend in need and in
deed. He promised the necessary funds as well as other practical help,
and asked for only one return--that he might be appointed minister of
the reconstituted Panama to the United States for just so long a time as
was necessary for the arrangement of the new treaty between the two
countries for the construction of the isthmian canal.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the next telegram sent home by the
revolutionary agents was more cheerful. It consisted of the single word
"esperanzas" (hopes). Dr. Amador now made some efforts to ascertain the
sentiment and intentions of the United States government. He called on
Mr. Hay, the Secretary of State, at the state department. Now it is
obvious that when a gentleman calls at a foreign office and announces
himself as a conspirator against a government with which that office has
friendly relations, the visitor cannot expect much practical help and
sympathy. But the authorities at Washington, whose nerves were raw from
the prolonged struggle with Colombia, would scarcely have been human if
they had not felt a secret joy at a movement which promised such an
ample retribution on Colombia and so easy a settlement of the Panama
problem. Dr. Amador was politely informed that he must pay no more calls
at the department. But he had seen and heard enough to assure him that
the United States would at least remain neutral, and, if the revolution
succeeded, would conclude a canal treaty with the new republic. He felt
that there were two very important conditions to be fulfilled. Firstly,
the revolution must be effected without bloodshed, for public sympathy
in the United States would be alienated by any fighting or violent
disturbance. The conspirators were also not without a certain natural
solicitude for their own skins. Secondly, there must be a brand-new
government ready to take the place of the Colombian administration so
soon as this was abolished.

The scene now changes to the isthmus. The conspirators were inclined at
first to be sceptical about Dr. Amador's report of the probable attitude
of the United States, but on November 2, 1903, the arrival of the
American gunboat _Nashville_ at Colon reassured them. The _Nashville_
had come, as American men-of-war had frequently come in the past to
Colon or Panama, not to take sides with any party in a scrimmage, but
calmly and impartially to maintain order and keep transit open at the
isthmus, in accordance with treaty obligations. The orders to the
_Nashville_, as subsequently to the _Boston_ and the _Dixie_, were
these:--

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption
threatened by armed force, occupy line of railroad. Prevent
landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either
government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or
other point.[5]

A similar order was sent to Rear-Admiral Glass at Acapulco, who was to
proceed to Panama with the same object.

But the coming _coup d'état_ was known at Bogotá as well as at
Washington. The date fixed for the outbreak was November 4. General
Huertas was to be ready with his troops, and the signal to be given by
the blowing of bugles by the firemen. But the Colombian government at
last decided to act, and on November 3 the steamer _Carthagena_ arrived
at Colon, having on board General Tovar with a force of about four
hundred and fifty men. The commander with three other resplendent
warriors, Generals Castro, Alban, and Amaya, at once took train for
Panama; while their troops, many of whom had brought their wives, camped
out in the streets of Colon. These events were duly telephoned to
Panama. The news reached Dr. Amador and his friends at ten o'clock,
just an hour before the arrival of the Colombian officers. It was "a
crowded hour of glorious life" for the conspirators, some of whom found
the excitement too much for their nerves, disappeared from the scene,
and gave up the conspiracy business altogether. But the leaders were of
better mettle, and while the trans-isthmian train was rapidly bringing
the representatives of the established government to Panama a good many
plans were discussed. The desperate nature of the occasion may be
gathered from the fact that one of the proposals was to drug the
Colombian officers, and when thus disabled convey them to durance vile.
In great perplexity Dr. Amador sought General Huertas; but he had put on
his dress uniform and gone to the station to meet his superiors. So
matters were to be allowed to take their own course.

At eleven o'clock a gush of glittering uniforms, fifteen in all,
counting the generals and the staffs, descended upon the Panama
platform. One might almost have expected them to advance to the
footlights and announce their arrival and intentions in a four-part
chorus. Here obviously were the properties, the stage scenery, and the
artistes, principals and chorus, of a first-rate comic opera. In the
harbour lay three Colombian gunboats whose political views were not
fully ascertained, though it was thought the commanders had been won
over to the revolutionary cause. The new arrivals were welcomed by
General Huertas and conducted to headquarters, while the conspirators,
no doubt with quickened pulses, awaited subsequent events from a
distance.

The Colombian officers wished to be conducted forthwith to the
fortifications and the sea-wall. Now this was precisely what General
Huertas, whose heart beat loyally under his official gold braid to the
cause of freedom and independence, wished to avoid, and for two reasons:
firstly, it would have been easy for the federal generals to signal to
the gunboats in the harbour and thus get command of the entire
situation; secondly, on that same sea-wall there were some modern
quick-firing guns, behind which even fifteen men might quickly get the
whole city at their mercy. So General Huertas determined that on the
whole he would conduct his guests anywhere but to the sea-wall. He
suggested that there were better ways of spending the hot hours of the
day than in going round fortifications in stiff and sweltering uniforms.
After luncheon, followed by a little siesta behind sun-shutters, would
be a better time for the business of inspection. The generals were
probably both hot and hungry, and they allowed themselves to be
persuaded.

But even as they lunched their suspicions seemed to have awakened. Some
one, it is said, warned them of the trap into which they had walked. And
moreover, why did the Bogotá troops not arrive from Colon? What exactly
happened is not recorded, but it is a fact that the generals suddenly
insisted on the Panama troops being paraded and themselves being
conducted to the fortifications.

General Huertas made some excuse for leaving the luncheon room, and
outside the door found Dr. Amador, the respectable physician of Panama,
now an arch-conspirator, though without the black mantle and stiletto.
"The contrast between these two men," writes Mr. Johnson, "was most
striking. The one was advanced in years, venerable and stately in
aspect, and yet impetuous as youth. The other was only a boy in stature
and scarcely more than a boy in years, yet at the time deliberate and
dilatory. The latter, however, quickly responded to the zealous
initiative of the former. 'Do it,' exhorted Dr. Amador in an impassioned
whisper, 'do it now.'"

The business was soon over. Huertas ordered out his soldiers, who knew
well enough what was going to happen. Then, as the military swells from
Bogotá came on the ground, the little general gave the order, the rifles
were levelled on the Colombians, and they were walked off to police
headquarters and safely locked up. Then Governor Obaldia was also
arrested and taken to prison, but this was only a formality. He was an
ardent conspirator, but as he represented the central government, it was
thought desirable to perform the symbolical act of arresting and
deposing him. He was at once released.

There was now no going back. The next step was to announce the fact of
the revolution to the gunboats, in the harbour, which were still a
doubtful factor. Two of them, the _Padilla_ and the _Chucuito_,
remained silent; but the third, the _Bogotá_, sent word that if the
generals were not released by ten o'clock it would turn its guns on to
the city. The generals were, of course, not released, so at ten o'clock
the _Bogotá_ launched three shells into the city. One of these killed an
unfortunate and innocent Chinese coolie near the barracks, and that was
the only casualty that occurred during the whole course of the great
Panama revolution. Then the _Bogotá_, that deed of slaughter
accomplished, steamed out of the harbour.

The next morning the gunboat _Padilla_, which had been considering the
situation during the night, suddenly made up its mind, steamed in to a
snug anchorage under the fortified sea-wall, and hoisted the flag of
free and independent Panama. The _Padilla_ might have been called upon
to make good its new allegiance, for a report was spread that the
terrible _Bogotá_ was returning to bombard, this time to good purpose.
So a letter was drawn up by the consuls of the United States, Great
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Salvador, Denmark, Belgium, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, Honduras, and Peru,
protesting against the bombardment of a defenceless city without due
notice to the consular corps as contrary to the rights and practices of
civilized nations. What answer the justly enraged commander of the
_Bogotá_ would have returned to this rather representative address
cannot be known, for the _Bogotá_, no doubt unnerved by the sensation of
casting three live shells into a live town, never returned to witness
the devastation it had wrought.

What in the meantime was occurring at Colon? Why had the 450 Colombian
soldiers not flown to the rescue and vengeance of their captured
officers? The explanation is simple, though perhaps unexpected--they
could not pay their railway fares! After the departure of the generals
for Panama on November 3, Colonel Torres, who had been left in charge of
the government troops, demanded a "special" to take them across the
isthmus. The superintendent of the line intimated that specials were
procurable, but that fares must be paid. And the fares of 450 persons
ran into money, in fact nearly $2,000 in gold, or quite a little
wheelbarrowful of the depreciated Colombian silver. Anywhere but in
Panama or Ruretania the plea of state necessity, which in presence of
the 450 needed no demonstration, would have procured some concession
from the railway authorities. But the railway rules provided for no such
emergencies. No fare, no journey--that was the immutable railway law,
and Colonel Torres had to lead his men back to their street encampments.
It is one of the many remarkable coincidences at this juncture that the
telegraphic and telephonic system also broke down, the wires refusing to
transmit any messages from Colon to the officers at Panama.

At last, on November 4, Colon received the news of the revolution and
the impounding of the Colombian officers. Some little impatience then
appeared among the Colombian troops. They actually threatened to seize
the railway and go across in spite of regulations. Also it was rumoured
that Colonel Torres, losing for a moment his self-command, threatened to
kill every American citizen in Colon unless his fellow-officers were at
once liberated. At any rate, that rumour was duly reported to the
commander of the _Nashville_, who, on the strength of it, at once
landed fifty bluejackets to preserve the peace of the town. The
commander also wrote to the alcalde of Colon and the chief of the
police, giving the gist of an official order he had received from
Washington. The order pointed out that to allow the passage of Colombian
troops from Colon to Panama would excite a conflict between the forces
of the two parties, and would thus interrupt the free and open transit
of the isthmus which the United States was bound to maintain. The
commander had therefore instructed the superintendent of the railways to
afford carriage to the troops of neither party. Never was officer so
outrageously impeded in the performance of his obvious duty as Colonel
Torres. And right in the middle of the situation thus created the
_Carthagena_, which had brought the Colombian troops to Colon, sailed
demurely home.

In a few days there assembled some nine or ten vessels of the United
States navy at Colon or Panama. On November 4 it was announced that the
United States would permit the landing of no forces hostile to Panama
within fifty miles of the city of Panama or anywhere at all on the
Caribbean coast. Was not the United States government compelled by
treaty obligations to preserve peace, the paying of fares, and "free and
uninterrupted transit" at the isthmus? How unreasonable to suggest that
the great and grown-up republic was protecting and taking the side of
the little baby republic which had just been born at Panama!

But the 450 soldiers encamped with their wives in the streets of Colon
were becoming an inconvenience, and it was highly desirable to remove
this substantial lump of grit from the machinery of revolution. The
commander of these troops himself helped to effect that object. He, in
fact, offered to take his little army away in return for a satisfactory
honorarium. The Panama treasury fortunately contained at that time a sum
of $140,000 in debased Colombian coinage, worth about $56,000 in gold. A
little of this might well be expended on clearing the country of the
Colombian troops. The commander accepted $8,000 in gold, and quickly
bundled the loyal troops and their spouses on board the Royal Mail
steamship _Orinoco_ for passage homewards. He himself did not propose
to return home and report himself. His scheme was to go to Jamaica and
spend his suddenly acquired wealth in "that loveliest of the Antilles."
Then a cruel thing happened. The 450 got wind of the bargain their
commander had made with the Panama government, and by a swift logical
process concluded that the $8,000 which had been paid for their
departure belonged to themselves as well as to their commander. So they
laid hands on the hapless officer and took all the money from him. We
may imagine the annoyance of the gentleman who had betrayed his country,
dishonoured his name, and then lost the "tip" which had made it all
worth while. His subsequent proceedings are nowhere recorded.

Just after the Colombian troops had set sail homewards a special train
arrived at Colon bringing the captive generals, who had promised to go
home without further fuss. They left Colon on November 12, so that they
had plenty of time to contemplate the beginnings of the new régime in
Panama. All kinds of reports began to arrive about the intentions of the
government at Bogotá. A naval expedition was said to be on the way from
Buenaventura, but the United States navy had instructions to take care
of any experiments of that sort. Then the news came that a land
expedition was approaching along the isthmus. That would have implied a
real triumph of original exploration. It would have meant clearing a
road for troops through impenetrable jungle, through which it is hard to
cut the narrowest track by means of the machete or the long Spanish
cutlass. The untamed San Blas Indians, who permit no white man to spend
a single night in their territory, would have mobilized against the
invasion, and so would the wild cats and anacondas and monkeys, who
share with the Indians the sovereignty of that tangled wilderness.

The revolution was an accomplished fact, and Colombia could do nothing
but accept the inevitable and reflect on the disappointment of her
golden dreams. The revolutionists had been ready with their
constitutional arrangements. The municipal council of Panama had met
immediately after the _coup d'état_. It was unanimously voted that
Panama should be a free and independent republic, and a provisional
ministry was at once appointed. These proceedings were ratified the
same afternoon at a mass meeting of the people of Panama held in the
cathedral square. A formal manifesto was also issued, constituting a
declaration of independence and a justification of the revolt. It opens
magniloquently: "The transcendental act that by a spontaneous movement
the inhabitants of the isthmus of Panama have just executed is the
inevitable consequence of a situation which has become graver daily." It
goes on to set forth the grievances of Panama under the Colombian
connection and the events which had led to the revolution. It ends in an
almost pathetic note:--

At separating from our brothers of Colombia we do it without
hatred and without any joy. Just as a son withdraws from his
paternal roof, the isthmian people in adopting the lot it
has chosen have done it with grief, but in compliance with
the supreme and inevitable duty it owes to itself--that of
its own preservation and of working for its own welfare. We
therefore begin to form a part among the free nations of the
world, considering Colombia as a sister nation, with which
we shall be whenever circumstances may require it, and for
whose prosperity we have the most fervent and sincere
wishes.[6]

By November 7 the new government had settled down so steadily to its
work, and so obviously commanded the adherence of the whole people, that
it received formal recognition from the United States in these words:--

As it appears that the people of Panama have, by unanimous
movement, dissolved their political connection with the
Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence, and as
there is no opposition to the provisional government in the
state of Panama, I have to inform you that the provisional
government will be held responsible for the protection of
the persons and property of citizens of the United States,
as well as to keep the isthmian transit free, in accordance
with the obligations of existing treaties relative to the
isthmian territory.

We need not dwell upon the desperate efforts made by the Colombian
government to retrieve the situation. A respected Colombian, General
Reyes, was sent to Washington to offer to revive the old Hay-Herran
Treaty, with modifications greatly in the American interest, if the
United States would help to restore Colombian sovereignty at the
isthmus. But all was in vain. Colombia must lie on the bed she had made,
and before the end of the year the new republic had been recognized by
all the leading Powers of the world. The new government was true to the
undertaking on the strength of which Mr. Bunau-Varilla had given his
help and support to the movement. On November 7 he was appointed
minister of Panama to the United States, and on November 18 the
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty[7] was signed at Washington, which finally
placed the United States in a position to begin the work of canal
construction at the isthmus.

FOOTNOTES:

[5] See "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal," p. 188 (W. F. Johnson).

[6] For full text of declaration see Appendix ii.

[7] Appendix iii.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE BATTLE OF THE LEVELS.

By the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty the United States guaranteed and
undertook to maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. The
new republic granted to the United States in perpetuity the use,
occupation, and control of a strip ten miles wide and extending three
nautical miles into the sea at either terminal, with all lands lying
outside of the zone necessary for the construction of the canal, and
with the islands in the Bay of Panama. The cities of Panama and Colon
were not embraced in the canal zone, but the United States assumed their
sanitation and, in case of need, the maintenance of order therein. All
railway and canal property rights belonging to Panama and needed for the
canal passed to the United States, including any property of the railway
and canal companies in the cities of Panama and Colon. The works,
property, and personnel of the canal and railways were exempted from
taxation in the cities of Colon and Panama as well as in the actual
canal zone. Free immigration of the workers and free importation of
supplies for the construction and operation of the canal were granted.
Provision was made for the use of military force and the building of
fortifications by the United States for the protection of the transit.
The United States were to pay $10,000,000 down on exchange of
ratifications and an annuity of $250,000, beginning nine years from the
same date. It will be noticed that the United States enjoyed in the
canal zone all the rights, though not the name and title, of
sovereignty.

The treaty was finally ratified on February 26, 1904, and four days
later the first Isthmian Canal Commission, consisting of seven members,
was appointed by President Roosevelt to arrange for the conduct of the
great enterprise. Careful instructions were given to the commission. The
Isthmian Canal Commission were authorized and directed:--

First.--To make all needful rules and regulations for the
government of the zone, and for the correct administration
of the military, civil, and judicial affairs of its
possessions until the close of the fifty-eighth session of
Congress. Second.--To establish a civil service for the
government of the strip and construction of the canal,
appointments to which shall be secured as nearly as
practicable by merit system. Third.--To make, or cause to be
made, all needful surveys, borings, designs, plans, and
specifications of the engineering, hydraulic, and sanitary
works required, and to supervise the execution of the same.
Fourth.--To make, and cause to be executed after due
advertisement, all necessary contracts for any and all kinds
of engineering and construction works. Fifth.--To acquire by
purchase or through proper and uniform expropriation
proceedings, to be prescribed by the commission, any private
lands or other real property whose ownership by the United
States is essential to the excavation and completion of the
canal. Sixth.--To make all needful rules and regulations
respecting an economical and correct disbursement and an
accounting for all funds that may be appropriated by
Congress for the construction of the canal, its auxiliary
works, and the government of the canal zone; and to
establish a proper and comprehensive system of bookkeeping
showing the state of the work, the expenditures by classes,
and the amounts still available. Seventh.--To make
requisition on the Secretary of War for funds needed from
time to time in the proper prosecution of the work, and to
designate the disbursing officers authorized to receipt for
the same.

The work of this commission was not wholly satisfactory, and in April
1905 another was appointed, which was ordered to meet at Panama
quarterly, the first commission having conducted its operations from
Washington.

The first two and a half years of the American occupation were spent
mainly in preparing for the great task. One very important question had
now to be finally decided. The battle of the routes was over, and now
began the battle of the levels. We have seen that the French began with
the idea of a tide-level canal. The New Panama Canal Company had changed
to the lock or high-level plan, but the French had not advanced in their
work to the point when the one or the other scheme must be definitively
adopted. The excavation they had carried out was all available for
either type of canal. But the Americans had now to come to a decision.

A few more words about the main physical features of the isthmus are
necessary for the reader to understand the nature of the problem. The
two most important factors in the problem, as we have seen, are,
firstly, the river Chagres with its tributaries, the Trinidad, Gatun,
and twenty others; and, secondly, the range of low hills on the Pacific
side through which any canal from Colon to Panama must pass. The river
Chagres is a great mountain torrent which enters the Caribbean Sea a
little west of Colon. The canal follows its course inland for about 26
miles, when the river valley turns sharply north-east and the canal
continues straight on to the Pacific. The Chagres is not a river to be
despised. The rainfall on the isthmus is very heavy, especially on the
Atlantic side, where 140 inches per annum have been recorded. The
isthmian rivers are all liable to quickly-swelling floods, the Chagres
at Gamboa having been known to rise 35-½ feet in twenty-four hours.
The two different types of canal involve equally different methods of
dealing with this formidable stream. It must either be harnessed to the
work or firmly and finally shut off from any interference with the
canal. De Lesseps, who had chosen the tide-level scheme, proposed to
turn the Chagres and other rivers into diversion channels, so that they
could get safely to the sea without crossing the line of the canal or
having any connection with it. This would have involved a work of
excavation and construction scarcely less gigantic than the building of
the canal itself.

On the other plan, the Chagres and its tributaries would be made the
feeders of the upper reaches of the canal. So far from being politely
shown off the premises, the question rather was whether they would be
able to supply sufficient water all the year round for the needs of the
canal. Then this harnessing of the Chagres meant the taming of its
waters in a huge artificial lake, in which the impetuous current would
be quenched and through which the dredged channel of the waterway would
run. The New Panama Company had recommended the construction of a huge
dam for this purpose at Bohio towards the Atlantic end of the canal, and
this plan had been adopted by the first American Isthmian Commission,
which issued its report in 1901. I may add that the Spooner Act, which
authorized the construction of a canal, also contemplated a lock or
high-level waterway. As we shall see, Bohio was not in the end adopted
as the site of the big dam, but Gatun, where it is now constructed, with
its concrete spillway carrying away the overflow waters of the lake down
the old Chagres channel to the near Atlantic. I need not say that these
were two very different ways of "caring for" the Chagres and its
affluents. The tide-level canal would also, of course, be supplied with
sea-water, while the high-level will be a fresh-water canal. Colonel
Goethals, the chief engineer of the canal, anticipates rather a curious
result from this latter circumstance. He thinks the bed of the upper
reaches of the canal will in course of time be quite paved with the
barnacles washed by the fresh-water from the bottoms of the great
ocean-going vessels passing through the canal.

The second physical feature is the hill country or the "Continental
Divide" which the canal enters near the point where the Chagres River
crosses its course. Here runs the famous Culebra Cut, the nine-mile-long
artificial canyon, the biggest excavation in the world. Now the highest
elevation of these hills along the centre line of the canal was 312 feet
above sea-level. The bottom of the canal at the cutting is 40 feet, so
that the vertical depth of the cut on the centre line is 272 feet. The
engineers of the tide-level scheme would have had not only to excavate
85 feet deeper--that is, to 45 feet below sea-level--but to make the
cutting immensely wider in order to avoid the danger of disastrous
landslides. This would have meant an enormous amount of additional work,
as well as expense. Nevertheless, the controversy between the two
principles was very warmly and equally sustained. It may be mentioned
that Mr. Bunau-Varilla was an especially ardent advocate of the
tide-level scheme. In fact, he was not for calling the waterway a canal
at all; he would have christened it "the Straits of Panama."

However, a decision was necessary, and in 1905 a board of consulting or
advisory engineers was appointed, mainly to consider whether the canal
should be constructed at high-level or sea-level. Five members were
appointed by European governments, and the president was Major-General
George W. Davis, formerly of the United States army. The instructions
given to this board by President Roosevelt will afford a very clear idea
of the problem it had to solve:--

There are two or three considerations which I trust you will
steadily keep before your minds in coming to a conclusion as
to the proper type of canal. I hope that ultimately it will
prove possible to build a sea-level canal. Such a canal
would undoubtedly be best in the end, if feasible; and I
feel that one of the chief advantages of the Panama route
is that ultimately a sea-level canal will be a possibility.
But while paying due heed to the ideal perfectibility of the
scheme from an engineer's standpoint, remember the need of
having a plan which shall provide for the immediate building
of a canal on the safest terms and in the shortest possible
time. If to build a sea-level canal will but slightly
increase the risk, then, of course, it is preferable. But if
to adopt the plan of a sea-level canal means to incur a
hazard, and to insure indefinite delay, then it is not
preferable. If the advantages and disadvantages are closely
balanced, I expect you to say so. I desire also to know
whether, if you recommend a high-level multi-lock canal, it
will be possible, after it is completed, to turn it into or
substitute for it, in time, a sea-level canal without
interrupting the traffic upon it. Two of the prime
considerations to be kept steadily in mind are:

First.--The utmost practicable speed of construction.
Second.--Practical certainty that the plan proposed will be
feasible; that it can be carried out with the minimum risk.

The quantity of work and the amount of work should be
minimized as far as possible.

There may be good reason why the delay incident to the
adoption of a plan for an ideal canal should be incurred;
but if there is not, then I hope to see the canal
constructed on a system which will bring to the nearest
possible date in the future the time when it is practicable
to take the first ship across the isthmus--that is, which
will in the shortest time possible secure a Panama waterway
between the oceans of such a character as to guarantee
permanent and ample communication for the greatest ships of
our navy and for the larger steamers on either the Atlantic
or the Pacific. The delay in transit of the vessels owing to
additional locks would be of small consequence when compared
with shortening the time for the construction of the canal
or diminishing the risks in its construction.

In short, I desire your best judgment on all the various
questions to be considered in choosing among the various
plans for a comparatively high-level multi-lock canal; for a
lower level, with fewer locks; and for a sea-level canal.
Finally, I urge upon you the necessity of as great
expedition in coming to a decision as is compatible with
thoroughness in considering the conditions.

The board went to the isthmus and investigated the subject with great
care. In January 1906 they issued three reports. A majority of eight to
five pronounced in favour of the sea-level scheme "as the only one
giving reasonable assurance of safe and uninterrupted navigation." "Such
a canal," it said, "can be constructed in twelve or thirteen years'
time; the cost will be less than $250,000,000; it will endure for all
time."

The minority were just as confidently in favour of a high-level canal.
They concluded:--

In view of the unquestioned fact that the lock canal herein
advocated will cost about $100,000,000 less than the
proposed sea-level canal; believing that it can be built in
much less time; that it will afford a better navigation;
that it will be adequate for all its uses for a longer time,
and can be enlarged, if need should arise, with greater
facility and less cost, we recommend the lock canal at
elevation 85 for adoption by the United States.

The third report was made by the chief engineer, Mr. Stevens, who, quite
apart from all considerations of expense, was strongly in favour of the
high-level plan.

The three reports were considered by the canal commissioners, a majority
of whom ultimately agreed with the minority of the advisory board. They
admitted that a sea-level canal was ideally the best, but considered
that the cost of making such a canal sufficiently wide would be
prohibitive. They declared therefore for a lock canal at an elevation of
85 feet above sea-level. They gave their decision thus:--

It appears that the canal proposed by the minority of the
board of consulting engineers can be built in half the time
and at a little more than half the cost of the canal
proposed by the majority of the board, and that when
completed it will be a better canal, for the following
reasons:

1. It provides greater safety for ships and less danger of
interruption to traffic by reason of its wider and deeper
channels.

2. It provides quicker passage across the isthmus for large
ships or a large traffic.

3. It is in much less danger of damage to itself or of
delays to ships from the flood-waters of the Chagres and
other streams.

4. Its cost of operation and maintenance, including fixed
charges, will be less by some $2,000,000 or more per annum.

5. It can be enlarged hereafter much more easily and cheaply
than can a sea-level canal.

6. Its military defence can be effected with as little or
perhaps less difficulty than the sea-level canal.

7. It is our opinion that the plan proposed by the minority
of the board of consulting engineers is a most satisfactory
solution of an isthmian canal, and therefore we recommend
that the plan of the minority be adopted.

In February 1906 the president referred the question for final decision
to Congress. In his message on the subject he spoke thus:--

It must be borne in mind that there is no question of
building what has been picturesquely termed "the Straits of
Panama"--that is, a waterway through which the largest
vessels could go with safety at uninterrupted high speed.
Both the sea-level canal and the proposed lock canal would
be too narrow and shallow to be called with any truthfulness
a strait, or to have any of the properties of a wide, deep
water strip. Both of them would be canals, pure and simple.
Each type has certain disadvantages and certain advantages.
But, in my judgment, the disadvantages are fewer and the
advantages very much greater in the case of a lock canal
substantially as proposed in the papers forwarded herewith;
and a careful study of the reports seems to establish a
strong probability that the following are the facts: The
sea-level canal would be slightly less exposed to damage in
the event of war; the running expenses, apart from the
heavy cost of interest on the amount employed to build it,
would be less; and for small ships the time of transit would
probably be less. On the other hand, the lock canal, at a
level of 80 feet or thereabouts, would not cost much more
than half as much to build, and could be built in about half
the time, while there would be very much less risk connected
with building it, and for large ships the transit would be
quicker; while, taking into account the interest on the
amount saved in building, the actual cost of maintenance
would be less. After being built, it would be easier to
enlarge the lock canal than the sea-level canal.

The law now on our statute books seems to contemplate a lock
canal. In my judgment a lock canal as herein recommended is
advisable. If the Congress directs that a sea-level canal be
constructed, its direction will, of course, be carried out.
Otherwise, the canal will be built on substantially the plan
for a lock canal outlined in the accompanying papers, such
changes being made, of course, as may be found actually
necessary.

In June 1906 Congress finally decided for a high-level canal, and the
controversy was officially closed. But the friends of the sea-level
scheme were by no means silenced. Whenever any serious difficulty
occurred in the construction of the canal on the lock principle their
voices were heard again. In fact, the conflict cannot be said to have
ended until 1909, and even then it is not certain that the sea-levellers
modified their convictions.

CHAPTER IX.

MAN AND THE GNAT.

Almost at the beginning of their great task the Americans were faced
with a problem which involved the success or failure of the whole
enterprise. I have said something about the climate and health
conditions at the isthmus. It is fairly certain that yellow fever and
malaria would have wrecked the French undertaking even if there had been
no other obstacles to its success. It is not less probable that if the
Americans had been in no better a position to wage war with these
plagues, their work at the isthmus would also have been in vain. The
French had built excellent hospitals and provided efficiently for the
comfort and recovery of those who were stricken with these diseases. But
being totally ignorant of the sources and method of transmission of
malaria and yellow fever, they could do nothing effectual in the way of
prevention and eradication. They could only take the individual victim
when they found him and do their best to cure him. They still believed
that malaria was produced by climatic conditions, by marshy emanations,
mists, and so forth. The fleecy clouds which gather round the isthmian
hills in the rainy season were given the very undeserved title of "the
white death" by the French workers at the isthmus. Yellow fever, again,
was just as mistakenly attributed to the climate, and especially to
filthy ways of living. It is not surprising that, with these
misconceptions, medical skill should have been almost useless during the
French occupation, and that the employees at the isthmus should have
died in their thousands.

But since the days of the Lesseps company, science had thrown a flood of
light on the nature of these tropical scourges and the secret of their
transmission. As these medical and scientific pioneers made a Panama
Canal possible, though their names are not directly linked with its
construction, we may look back for a few moments at their triumphs of
discovery. The credit for first discovering that malaria is not due to
poisonous emanations or contagion but is carried from people infected
with the disease by the _anopheles_ mosquito belongs to Major (now Sir)
Ronald Ross, formerly of the Indian Medical Service, who devoted himself
to this subject during the last years of the 19th century. By a series
of experiments he proved that malaria is due to the presence in the
human blood of an organism which is conveyed from person to person by
this mosquito, and that the mosquito is harmless unless it has become
infected with the germ by biting a person who has caught malaria. The
value of this discovery was soon shown by practical applications. Major
Ross was engaged by the Suez Canal Company to deal with the malaria
which had become firmly established at Ismailia, a little town of 10,000
inhabitants on that canal. No fewer than 2,500 cases had been supplied
in one year by this small population. The new methods founded on the new
discovery proved so effectual that in three years the disease was
stamped out, and there has been no relapse ever since. The same results
were achieved at Port Said.

Now, if malaria is thus caused by mosquito bite, there was some _à
priori_ reason for thinking that yellow fever might be transmitted in
the same way. At any rate the insect was again laid under a very grave
suspicion. The opportunity for studying this further question was
afforded during the Spanish-American war, when a serious outbreak
occurred among the troops occupying Havana, in Cuba. The doctors were
quite unable to deal with this most terrible of all diseases. Knowing
nothing whatever of its cause, their treatment of it could be only
experimental and casual. So a board of inquiry was formed consisting of
four army surgeons serving in Cuba--Walter Reed, James Carroll, Jesse W.
Lazear, and Aristides Agramonte. The experiments were begun in June
1900, and continued into the next year. Of these four, Dr. Agramonte was
not liable to the disease, and Dr. Reed was called away on duty to
Washington. The other two determined to experiment on their own persons
rather than risk the lives of other people.

Dr. Carroll first allowed himself to be bitten by the mosquitoes, not
the _anopheles_ but another variety known as the _stegomyia_. He fell
ill with a bad attack of yellow fever, which very nearly cost him his
life. Later, in the yellow fever hospital, Dr. Lazear deliberately
allowed a mosquito to feed on his hand. In four days he was down with
the disease in so acute a form that he died of it--a true martyr, if
ever there was, to the cause of science and the welfare of mankind.
These and other experiments proved conclusively that yellow fever, like
malaria, is transmitted by mosquito bites, but it was still uncertain
how soon after biting an infected person the mosquito becomes itself
harmful and how soon a person stricken with malaria is able to infect a
healthy mosquito. So further experiments were necessary, and volunteers
were invited to offer themselves for this service. Everybody in the army
knew what had happened to Doctors Carroll and Lazear, but in spite of
this plenty of willing martyrs appeared. The first to present themselves
were two young soldiers from Ohio, John R. Kissinger and John J. Moran.
Dr. Reed talked the matter over with them, explaining fully the danger
and suffering involved, and stating the money consideration offered by
General Wood. Both young men declared that they were prepared to
undergo the experiment, but only on condition that they should receive
no pecuniary reward. When he heard this declaration, Dr. Reed touched
his hat with profound respect, saying, "Gentlemen, I salute you!"[8]
Kissinger took the disease from the mosquito bites, and recovered. A
room was prepared for Moran, a sort of mosquito den into which fifteen
gnats, all suffering from yellow fever, had been admitted. Major Reed
describes what happened:--

At noon on the same day, five minutes after the mosquitoes
had been placed therein, a plucky Ohio boy, Moran by name,
clad only in his night-shirt and fresh from a bath, entered
the room containing the mosquitoes, where he lay down for a
period of thirty minutes. Within two minutes of Moran's
entrance he was being bitten about the face and hands by the
insects, that had promptly settled down upon him. Seven, in
all, bit him at this visit. At 4.30 p.m. the same day, he
again entered and remained twenty minutes, during which time
five others bit him. The following day, at 4.30 p.m., he
again entered and remained fifteen minutes, during which
time three insects bit him; making the number fifteen that
had fed at these three visits. On Christmas morning, at 11
a.m., this brave lad was stricken with yellow fever, and had
a sharp attack, which he bore without a murmur.

But still the demonstration was not complete. It was necessary to prove
by equally undeniable evidence that yellow fever is not conveyed by
contagion with the clothes and persons of infected people. These
experiments were even more trying and heroic than those which preceded.
A small wooden hut, 14 by 20 feet, was prepared, and into this was
stored a large amount of bedding and clothes which had been used and
worn by persons suffering from the fever. The building was carefully
guarded against the intrusion of mosquitoes, and a temperature of
seventy-six degrees, with a sufficient moisture, maintained. For twenty
consecutive days Dr. Clarke and his men went into this room, handled,
wore, and slept in the contaminated clothing, although the stench was so
offensive as to be almost appalling. They emerged from the ordeal in
perfect health, proving beyond possibility of dispute that the disease
was not contagious, and that the mosquito was the sole method of
transmission.

When distributing the credit for the new channel of world-traffic
through the isthmus of Panama, let us not forget Dr. Lazear who
sacrificed his life and the many others who cheerfully risked their
lives to establish truths and facts without which the construction and
continued operation of the canal would almost certainly have been
impossible.

One mosquito may look very much like another, but the _stegomyia_ and
the _anopheles_ differ in many important respects. The latter finds its
most favourable breeding-places in stagnant pools of fresh water, such
as are left by the heavy rains of the isthmus. It is essentially a gnat
of the country-side. The _stegomyia_, on the other hand, inclines to a
more frivolous town life. Cisterns and tanks and other receptacles for
storing water are his favourite haunts. In length of life and power of
flight the species also differ, though these details are not yet fully
ascertained. The _stegomyia_ is said to live three months. Dr. Cornish
states that it becomes dangerous only by attacking man during the first
three days of yellow fever, and that, even then, twelve days elapse
before its bite is infectious. Six days after a man has been bitten by
an infected _stegomyia_ he falls ill with yellow fever, and for the next
three days he is capable of transmitting it to the healthy mosquito. Mr.
Bishop informs us that if there is no fresh case of yellow fever within
a period of sixty days after the latest one in an epidemic, it is a safe
conclusion that the disease has been stamped out, because there is no
mosquito alive to carry the parasite. After a period of ninety days all
doubt on the subject is removed.[9] If a community, therefore, which has
thus got rid of its last case of yellow fever could be completely
isolated, yellow fever could never possibly return. It could only be
reintroduced from outside. It should be possible, with a proper system
of sanitation and quarantine, to free any district entirely from this
awful scourge.

The case of the _anopheles_ and his little contribution to human
suffering is very different. Whereas the victim of yellow fever either
dies or gets better and quickly ceases to be a source of infection to
the mosquito, the victim of malaria seldom dies of the disease, but he
remains infectious to the _anopheles_ for three years. The disease does
not simply attack new-comers or white people. Natives of the isthmus and
the West Indies are subject to it, and, indeed, seem to be in a
chronically malarious condition. It is said that 50 per cent. of the
population of the isthmus were found in 1904-5 to have the parasite of
malaria in their systems. It is difficult to estimate or imagine the
part played by this widespread malady on conditions of life and
civilization within the tropics.

Sir Ronald Ross, the greatest living authority on the subject, made some
interesting remarks in an address at the Royal Colonial Institute in
January of this year. He said:--

Nothing has been more carefully studied of recent years than
the existence of malaria amongst indigenous populations. It
often affects every one of the children, probably kills a
large proportion of the new-born infants, and renders the
survivors ill for years; only a partial immunity in adult
life relieves them of the incessant sickness. Here in Europe
nearly all our children suffer from certain
diseases--measles, scarlatina, and so on. But these maladies
are short and slight compared with the enduring infection of
malaria. When I was studying malaria in Greece in 1906, I
was struck with the impossibility of conceiving that the
people who are now intensely afflicted with malaria could be
like the ancient Greeks who did so much for the world; and I
therefore suggested the hypothesis that malaria could only
have entered Greece at about the time of the great Persian
wars. One can scarcely imagine that the physically fine race
and the magnificent athletes figured in Greek sculpture
could ever have spent a malarious and splenomegalous
childhood. And, conversely, it is difficult to imagine that
many of the malarious natives in the tropics will ever rise
to any great height of civilization while that disease
endures amongst them. I am aware that Africa has produced
some magnificent races, such as those of the Zulus and
Masai, but I have heard that the countries inhabited by them
are not nearly so disease-ridden as many of the larger
tracts. At all events, whatever may be the effect of a
malarious childhood upon the physique of adult life, its
effects on the mental development must certainly be very
bad, while the disease always paralyzes the material
prosperity of the country where it exists in an intense
form.

The isthmus of Panama was beautifully adapted to the breeding of the
_anopheles_ and the widest dissemination of malaria. In fact, the canal
zone taken over by the Americans was perhaps the most malarial strip of
territory in the world. The heavy rains leave the country covered with
those marshes and pools from which these little ghostly insects are
always rising in swarms, ready to carry the germs of disease from the
sick to the healthy and thus perpetuate and extend the domain of this
distressing malady. The reader will notice that, as the yellow fever
victim is only infectious to the mosquito for three days, while the
malarial person can convey the poison for three years, it is a much more
practical problem to eradicate yellow fever than to stamp out malaria.
It is true the causes of malaria are now fully known and the only
effective methods of propagation ascertained. If one could isolate all
malarial patients, including all who are capable of transmitting the
disease, in buildings screened with fine copper-gauze to keep out the
mosquitoes and thus gradually diminish the area of infection to
vanishing point, it would not be necessary to deal with the
breeding-places of the mosquitoes, and man and the gnat might live
together in perfect amity. But with fifty and even seventy per cent. of
the people malarially infected, such a heroic course is obviously
impossible, and one can hope only to diminish to a considerable degree
the prevalence of the disease.

The first two and a half years of the American occupation of the isthmus
was spent in looking round and preparing for the great work. It soon
became evident that the most pressing and immediate task was one of
cleaning up and sanitation. In July 1904, Colonel W. C. Gorgas, whose
name will always be associated with the triumphs won over disease at the
isthmus, became the head of the department of sanitation under the Canal
Commission. He quickly recognized that everything depended on the
efficiency and success of his own department. "The experience of our
predecessors," he wrote, "was ample to convince us that unless we could
protect our force against yellow fever and malaria we would be unable to
accomplish the work."[10] When the Americans took over, yellow fever,
though present, was quiescent, but the figures began almost at once to
mount up. In December 1904 there were six cases on the isthmus and one
death. In January 1905 there were nineteen cases and eight deaths, seven
and one respectively among the canal employees. In May there were
thirty-three cases, twenty-two on the canal, with seven deaths in all,
including three employees. In June there was an alarming advance.
Sixty-two cases occurred on the isthmus, thirty-four of them among the
employees. There were nineteen deaths, six on the canal. Something like
a panic then set in among the Americans engaged on the canal works. Many
threw up their positions, and the homeward-bound steamers were filled
with employees fleeing from this real "yellow peril." In the annual
report of the Commission for 1905 we read:--

A feeling of alarm, almost amounting to panic, spread among
the Americans on the isthmus. Many resigned their positions
to return to the United States, while those who remained
became possessed with a feeling of lethargy or fatalism,
resulting from a conviction that no remedy existed for the
peril. There was a disposition to partly ignore or openly
condemn all preventive measures. The gravity of the crisis
was apparent to all.

This loss of moral tone was the most dangerous symptom of all. A feeling
of "let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die" gained possession of
the canal workers, and in the indifference of despair many tore down the
nettings over the windows of the canal building and began to neglect all
the sanitary precautions enjoined on them by the department. Evidently a
calamity was in prospect which would have brought to an end, perhaps for
ever, American canal ambitions at the isthmus. The restoration of public
confidence and sense of responsibility seems to have been due largely to
Mr. Charles E. Magoon, governor of the canal zone. He set himself to
rebuke and remove the morbid bravado then prevailing. "He began by
frankly and publicly declaring that he, personally, was afraid of the
fever, and that in his opinion all non-immunes who professed not to be
afraid were 'talking rot!' Then he ordered all the window-screens to be
repaired and kept in place, and announced that if any man was caught
leaving them open or tearing holes in them, something uncommonly
unpleasant would happen to him. Now when a man of Judge Magoon's mental
and physical stature admits that he is afraid, any lesser man is a fool
to say he isn't; and when a man of Judge Magoon's resolution gives an
order and prescribes a penalty for its violation, that order is very
likely to be obeyed."[11]

[Illustration: _Clinedinst--Washington, D.C._
COL. WILLIAM C. GORGAS,
Medical Dept., U.S. Army, Head of the Department of Sanitation,
Ancon.]

Governor Magoon arrived at the isthmus in May 1905, just as the yellow
fever epidemic was reaching its climax. From that moment he and Colonel
Gorgas, to whom he gave the most complete support, set themselves to
fight the fever. The first thing to do was to get all the patients
within screened buildings, whether the hospital or their own homes, so
that no _stegomyia_ mosquitoes could saunter in and take the poison.
Then the towns of Colon and Panama were handed over to a campaign of
spring-cleaning such as the world has never witnessed. Then the canal
building was thoroughly fumigated with pyrethrum powder or sulphur, and
not simply the official building but every single house in the city of
Panama was similarly disinfected. Dust and refuse were everywhere burnt.
A very efficient system of inspection was adopted, and a rigid
quarantine enforced against all foreign places whence the yellow plague
could be imported into the zone.

But more important than the immediate expedients were the more
permanent sanitary improvements carried out in Colon and Panama. These
towns were repaired with brick or cement, and provided with what they
had never yet enjoyed, a proper system of drainage. Waterworks were also
constructed outside the towns, and a supply of pure water made available
for every household. Hitherto water had had to be stored during the dry
season in tanks and cisterns, in which the _stegomyia_ mosquito revelled
exceedingly. These were now no longer necessary, and stagnant water,
wherever it collected in the town, was drained away. In order to
expedite these splendid reforms, Governor Magoon withdrew the workers
from the canal and concentrated all efforts on the sewers and
waterworks. So speedily was the work carried forward that the water was
turned on for public use from the main in the Cathedral Plaza on July 4.

The results of this drastic campaign were soon apparent in the dwindling
of the yellow fever returns. In July there were still forty-two cases
and thirteen deaths on the isthmus, with twenty-seven cases and ten
deaths among the employees. August showed a great improvement, with
twenty-seven cases and nine deaths on the isthmus, and twelve cases and
only one death on the canal. The improvement continued through
September, October, November, and in December only one case was reported
on the isthmus and one on the canal. Three months having elapsed since
the last case, and, therefore, every _stegomyia_ which could possibly be
infected with malaria having departed this life, the epidemic was
entirely past and over. As I have pointed out, there cannot possibly be
any return of it under these conditions unless the infection is brought
from without. And if any new cases are at once isolated and screened
from afternoon calls of the mosquito, the outbreak may be easily and
infallibly suppressed. We may say, therefore, that the yellow spectre at
the isthmus has been shorn of all its terrors.

Malaria is, however, a very different proposition. A corresponding
crusade has been carried on for six years against the little _anopheles_
gnat, the little criminal who carries the malarial poison. His happy
breeding-grounds are in open country marshes and pools, and there is no
lack of these in the canal zone. It was impossible to deal with the
entire three-quarters of a million acres of that territory, but wherever
the canal workers were settled determined war was waged against the
mosquitoes. It should be remembered that the _anopheles_ can fly only
about a hundred or two hundred yards. The jungle was therefore cleared
away for a few hundred yards round each village and settlement, marshes
and pools in this area were drained off, and into all the ditches where
stagnant water had collected oil was poured, which so effectually turns
the mosquito's stomach that it never recovers. Some 1,200 acres of the
zone were thus treated, and of course the regulations as to
house-screening applied to malaria no less than to yellow fever. The
employees were also supplied freely and generously with quinine.

The result has been not the eradication of malaria, but the reduction of
the cases to about one-third the number at which they stood in 1906. Yet
even so, among the 40,000 employees on the canal during the year ending
June 30, 1912, there were 7,000 malaria cases in the hospitals, with 32
deaths, 22 of these being white people. The heavy rainfalls at the
isthmus will probably prevent the complete sanitation of the country in
this respect, for the simple reason that the destruction of the
_anopheles_ mosquito or the eradication of the malarial germ can never
be complete. There will always be people going about with the malarial
organism in their blood, and always _anopheles_ mosquitoes ready to
become infected with it and to carry the infection about. But, as we
have seen, much can be done by the means described to reduce the ravages
of the disease. In 1906, out of a working force of 26,000, there were
21,739 cases of malaria. We have seen how this figure had been brought
down in 1912. In 1906 it was almost certain that any white person coming
to reside at the isthmus would catch malaria. Now it is quite possible
to live there in perfect health, quite free from any malarial infection.

It may be useful to mention that the entire death-roll among the
employees on the Panama Canal and railway from the American occupation
down to June 30, 1912--that is, about eight years--was 5,141, of whom
284 were Americans. Of this total, 4,119 died of disease and 1,022 from
violence or accident. During the same period 49 American women and 87
American children died.[12] Sir Ronald Ross, as I have said, was told by
the British Consul at Panama in 1904 that the French lost in the nine
years of their occupancy some 50,000 lives, principally from malaria and
yellow fever. This may be an over-estimate, but there is no doubt that
the American figure shows an enormous improvement on the French.

It is easy to conclude that what has been done in sanitation at the
isthmus of Panama may be done anywhere else in the tropics, where
malaria and yellow fever prevail. That may be true, but we must also
remember that the work of Panama had behind it all the wealth and
resources of a mighty republic of 90,000,000 citizens. The expenditure
on these hygienic purposes at the isthmus has been enormous, though not
a penny has been wasted. Down to the end of December, 1912, the total
outlay of the Department of Sanitation was $15,500,000. Waterworks,
sewers, etc., accounted for another $2,500,000, so that we get a grand
total expenditure on sanitation of $18,000,000. This will certainly rise
to $20,000,000 before the canal is finished, so that for the ten and a
half years of its construction there will have been an annual
expenditure for all health purposes of $1,900,000. It is not likely that
there will be many tropical areas of this kind with so large a sum
available for the luxury of scientific sanitation. Again, it must be
noticed that the administration had special advantages at the isthmus.
It exercised something like military authority. It had absolute powers
of deportation, and could enforce its regulations as it pleased. And in
considering the statistics it must also be borne in mind that not only
the physical but the moral and mental health of the work-people at the
isthmus was promoted in every way. We shall look into the life of the
Panama construction camps in the next chapter. The social interest and
amusement provided for the employee must have counted for something
beside the sewering and screening and mosquito-hunting. All the same,
the success achieved at Panama is full of hope and promise for tropical
life in the future. Colonel Gorgas writes encouragingly:--

I think the sanitarian can now show that any population
coming into the tropics can protect itself against these two
diseases (malaria and yellow fever) by measures that are
both simple and inexpensive; that with these two diseases
eliminated life in the tropics for the Anglo-Saxon will be
more healthful than in the temperate zones; that gradually,
within the next two or three centuries, tropical countries,
which offer a much greater return for man's labour than do
the temperate zones, will be settled up by the white races,
and that again the centres of wealth, civilization, and
population will be in the tropics, as they were in the dawn
of man's history, rather than in the temperate zone, as at
present.

Apart from the question of disease, it is far from certain that the
white man can ever remain as "fit," as capable of bodily labour, in
equatorial regions as in his native temperate conditions, or that his
descendants will also maintain the same standard of health and strength.
Ordinary non-professional opinion would perhaps discount Colonel
Gorgas's forecast as a little too optimistic.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] "Sanitation of the Isthmus." Mr. J. B. Bishop in _Scribner's
Monthly_, February 1913.

[9] _Scribner's Monthly_, February 1913, p. 248.

[10] _Journal American Medical Association_, July 6, 1907.

[11] "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal."

[12] See _Scribner's Magazine_, February 1913, p. 251.

CHAPTER X.

LIFE AT THE ISTHMUS.

Before we go on to describe the canal and its method of construction, we
must look at the sort of social life and civil administration which has
prevailed since the Americans arrived. Construction camps in tropical
climes are not usually distinguished for order and good morals. The
Americans determined to make an exception at Panama. They had a
perfectly free hand and the enjoyment of all sovereign rights at the
isthmus, and were able to construct a brand-new little state on the most
approved and ideal principles. We have seen what instructions were given
by President Roosevelt to the first commission. An entire administrative
system had to be established within this little plot 10 miles wide and
50 long. Laws had to be framed and civil government established, with
all the needful accessories of judicial courts, police force,
fire-brigades, customs and revenue service, post-offices, public works
and financial department. The administration carried what is known as
"paternalism" to all lengths. That is, it did all the catering and
providing itself, and left little or nothing to private companies. Of
course, everything had to be imported, for the little territory itself
produced nothing. Whole villages and settlements with all the
accessories of social life had to be built along the line of works. Over
2,000 structures, including offices, hospitals, hotels, messes,
kitchens, shops, storehouses, and living quarters, were constructed, and
more than 1,500 buildings taken over from the French, which were made
available by necessary repairs.

Colonel Goethals gives us a brief insight into the work of the
Commissary Department of the Panama Railroad:--

The Commissary Department of the Panama Railroad Company was
enlarged until it is now [1911] a great department store,
supplying to the employees whatever may be necessary for
their comfort and convenience. Manufacturing, cold-storage,
and laundry plants were established, and turn out each day
about 90 tons of ice, 14,000 loaves of bread, 2,400 rolls,
250 gallons of ice-cream, 1,000 pounds of roasted coffee,
and 7,500 pieces of laundry. Four or five refrigerator cars,
loaded with meats, vegetables, and such fruits as can be
obtained, are sent out on the night freight to distant
points, and every morning a supply train of about 16 cars,
of which number six to eight are refrigerator cars, leaves
Cristobal at 4.30 to distribute foodstuffs and laundry to
the local commissaries along the line, where the employees
make their purchases, and where the hotels, messes, and
kitchens secure their supplies for the day.

A graphic and representative picture of one of the construction
settlements along the canal was given by the correspondent of _The
Times_ at Panama.[13] He chose "Emperador," or "Empire," as the typical
village. This is the headquarters of the central division of the
construction work, and is situated about halfway along the great
Culebra Cut. The correspondent writes:--

According to the census just completed, it contains 7,152
inhabitants, of whom 1,757 are whites, 3,701 negroes, 1,569
mestizos, 101 Chinese, and 24 East Indians. North of the
main street is a section called the "native town,"
apparently because it is inhabited by natives of other
countries than Panama, but really because here was situated
the native hamlet alongside which the French built their
construction camp in 1881. It is occupied by the part of the
population not employed by the government, and here are the
American saloons, the Spanish _cantinas_ and restaurants,
Chinese shops, East Indian fancy-work shops, and negro
tailoring and shoemaking places. On the south side of the
American settlement are the labour "camps," consisting of
barracks and eating-places. All the buildings are of wood,
constructed to last not over ten years; and none are large,
excepting the administration buildings and the club-house.
On three sides of the village are the huts of the labourers
who prefer the half-jungle life with its freedom; and here,
with discomfort and squalor and liberty, is the only
picturesque part of the settlement; all else is orderly, of
one pattern, almost smug. On the fourth side the village is
limited by the canal itself.

In the centre of the village is the commissariat, where the
canal and railroad workers buy their food and clothing. Here
congregate every morning the housewives of the village to do
their shopping, and at night, after work, the men, to
complete the family purchases. There is a similar store in
each canal village--eighteen in all. The commissariat does
away with the middleman's profit and buys in such large
quantities, and for cash, that it obtains the lowest prices,
while the many ways in which the materials purchased can be
used prevent waste. If there is cause for complaint on the
part of any class in the canal workers, that class is the
bachelors, for they are discriminated against in the matter
of quarters. But good provision is made for their meals, at
the so-called "hotels" for the white employees, and the
messes and kitchens for Spanish and negro labourers.

Another remarkable evidence of how the canal administration stands _in
loco parentis_ to all its work-people is that it has provided twenty-six
churches and maintains fifteen ministers of religion. This is
interesting because it shows how the state, when conducted on
common-sense principles, may provide for religious instruction without
causing any offence or inflicting any injustice. The administration
treated all denominations with perfect impartiality. Of the fifteen
ministers it supported, four were Episcopalian, four Baptist, three
Roman Catholic, one Wesleyan, and one Presbyterian. But this was not the
entire provision of churches and chapels on the isthmus. There were
fourteen other churches not under direct government control, but
assisted by the government in many ways. Of the forty in all, thirteen
were Episcopalian, seven Baptist, seven Roman Catholic, two Wesleyan,
and eight undenominational.

As I have pointed out, the moral sanitation of the isthmus was cared for
as well as the physical. For example, in September 1905, a man living in
the canal zone was charged with running a roulette table. He pleaded
that he owned a concession from the Republic of Panama. That excuse was
not allowed, and he was sentenced to fine and imprisonment for
transgressing one of the canal zone laws. Gambling, which had always
been one of the Panamanian vices, was quite forbidden within the zone.
Remembering the descriptions given of the state of morals at the isthmus
during the French occupation, one cannot help being struck with the
contrast afforded by the American regime. Criticisms of the canal
scheme, of climatic and social conditions in the zone, appeared in the
early days from time to time. Mr. Johnson quotes an example which is so
amusing as to bear repetition:--

A land as feverish to the imagination as to the body is
Panama. It is a land making a fitting environment to the
deeds of conspiracy, piracy, loot, cruelty, and blood that
have principally made its history for centuries. This
gloomy, God-forsaken isthmus is a nightmare region. One
descriptive writer has truly said of it that it is a land
where the flowers have no odour, the birds no song; where
the men are without honour and the women without virtue. He
is not far wrong. The birds, brilliant as is their plumage,
have no musical notes. The dense forests teem with
bright-hued parrots, parroquets, and other birds, which
squeak and scream but do not sing. There are beautiful
orchids to be found in the swamps and jungles--fair to look
upon, but they have no odour. The oranges have green skins
instead of golden, the plantains must be fried to make them
fit to eat, the reptiles and insects are often venomous, and
myriads of parasites are ever ready to invade the human body
and bring disease and death. In the atmosphere itself is
something suggestive of the days of the old pirates and
their fiendish cruelties and orgies. There is no life in the
air; it is depressing, damp, miasmatic, and intensely hot.
For a great part of the year thunder-showers succeed each
other all day long and half the night, with sheet lightning
all around the horizon after dark. There is practically no
twilight, day passing almost instantly into night. It is no
wonder that this uncanny land has made its residents
degenerate into plotters, revolutionists, murderers, and
thieves. Its aspect is one of darkness, treachery, and
curse.

President Roosevelt had something to say on these recurring criticisms
in a message to Congress in January 1906. He wrote:--

From time to time various publications have been made, and
from time to time in the future various similar
publications, doubtless, will be made, purporting to give an
account of jobbing or immorality or inefficiency or misery
as obtaining on the isthmus. I have carefully examined into
each of these accusations which seemed worthy of attention.
In every instance the accusations have proved to be without
foundation in any shape or form. They spring from several
sources. Sometimes they take the shape of statements by
irresponsible investigators of a sensational habit of mind,
incapable of observing or repeating with accuracy what they
see, and desirous of obtaining notoriety by widespread
slander. More often they originate with or are given
currency by individuals with a personal grievance. The
sensation mongers, both those who stay at home and those who
visit the isthmus, may ground their accusations on false
statements by some engineer who, having applied for service
on the commission and been refused such service, now
endeavours to discredit his successful competitors, or by
some lessee or owner of real estate who has sought action or
inaction by the commission to increase the value of his
lots, and is bitter because the commission cannot be used
for such purposes, or on the tales of disappointed bidders
for contracts, or of office-holders who have proved
incompetent, or who have been suspected of corruption and
dismissed, or who have been overcome by panic and have fled
from the isthmus. Every specific charge relating to jobbery,
to immorality, or to inefficiency, from whatever source it
has come, has been immediately investigated, and in no
single instance have the statements of these sensation
mongers and the interested complainants behind them proved
true. The only discredit adhering to these false accusations
is to those who originate and give them currency, and who,
to the extent of their abilities, thereby hamper and
obstruct the completion of the great work in which both the
honour and the interest of America are so deeply involved.
It matters not whether those guilty of these false
accusations utter them in mere wanton recklessness and
folly, or in a spirit of sinister malice to gratify some
personal or political grudge.

The soundness and purity of the canal zone administration has long ago
been established beyond all question and cavil. The Americans have given
an example to the world how a great work of this kind, involving the
gathering together of a large multitude of workers from many races and
nations, may be carried on without those moral and physical evils which
have marked too many enterprises of the kind. In fact, the way in which
the Americans have arranged and controlled the life of the canal zone
stands quite as much to their credit as the skill and determination they
have shown in the actual construction of the canal.

But we have said nothing yet about the workers themselves on the canal.
The Americans, on taking over the work from the French, found about 700
West Indian negroes engaged in excavating the Culebra Cut. From this
contingent as a nucleus a much larger army of workers was built up. The
numbers rapidly grew. In December 1905 there were 5,000 employees; in
1906, 24,000; in 1908, 31,000; the highest figure being reached in 1910,
when there were 50,000 workers available for duty. Of the employees,
speaking roughly, one-seventh have been white Americans, all, of course,
skilled workers, one-seventh European labourers, and five-sevenths West
Indian negroes. The British West Indies, especially Barbados, have
continued to be the main source of labour supply. But the West Indian at
the outset left a great deal to be desired in his work and efficiency.
In 1905 complaints were made on the subject by the chairman of the
canal commission to the President of the United States. In 1906 the
chief engineer reported:--

The criticisms of the character of the common labour which
were made in last year's report still hold good. Our labour
consists almost entirely of West Indian negroes, and their
efficiency is very low, although we have a few of this class
who are fairly steady workers--by this it is meant that they
average to work all the time, but the great body of them do
not. The majority work just long enough to get money to
supply their actual bodily necessities, with the result
that, while we are quartering and caring for twenty odd
thousand of these people, our daily effective force is many
thousands less. Preliminary steps have been taken toward
securing a large number of Spanish labourers direct from the
north-west provinces of Spain, also for the securing of a
trial shipment of Cantonese Chinese, as it is believed that
the introduction of labourers of different nationalities
will be beneficial.

The Chinese project was frustrated through the influence of trade unions
in the United States, backed up by representations from the Pacific
coast states. The West Indian labourer quickly began to earn a better
report. It was found that his inefficiency was largely due to
insufficient and improper food. He speedily improved when turned on to
the generous and nourishing diet provided in the zone. In order to be
certain that he had the full advantage of the provided meals, the price
of them was very wisely deducted from his wages. Moreover, the American
foremen soon began to learn that the men from Barbados, Trinidad, and
elsewhere were British subjects and could not be treated as though they
were southern state "coons." With a better understanding and more
sympathetic treatment of the black employees, much more work was got out
of them, and a good deal of the credit for the building of the Panama
Canal is due to the 30,000 workers[14] who have been recruited mainly
from the British islands in the West Indies.

But the southern European contingent has been found to be excellent
material. It was thought that the work-people of Spain, Italy, and
Greece would take more easily to navvying work in the tropics than
people from more northerly regions of the temperate zone. The results
were, on the whole, satisfactory. The Greeks were, it is true, not equal
to the Italians or the Spaniards, and very few of them were recruited
for canal work. The Italians, also, though several thousands of them
were engaged, proved rather hard to handle. They were bitten with
collectivist ideas, and inclined to act on trade union lines. The
Spaniard was, in every way, the most satisfactory workman introduced
from Europe. He was taken in an unsophisticated state directly from his
village in Galicia or Castile. He was tractable and orderly, and quick
and ready to learn. Hard labour under the tropical sun and in the hot
damp of the isthmus seemed to have no exhausting or enervating influence
whatever upon him. The Spaniard shows no sign of settling down on the
isthmus. He either goes home with his savings or on to railway work in
Brazil. Some 9,000 have been directly recruited, but this number does
not include all the Spanish labourers whose muscle has helped to the
completion of this great work.

A word or two should be said about the wages earned on the canal. The
West Indian recruit was offered 6-½d. an hour for common labour and an
eight-hour day, in addition to free quarters, medical care, and
repatriation. Meals were supplied to him at the rate of 1s. 2-½d. per
day. Later the pay of all not under contract was reduced to 5d. per
hour, and the price of the three meals to 1s. 1-½d. Negro artisans,
such as carpenters, masons, blacksmiths and others, of whom there were
some 5,000 employed in connection with the canal works, received pay
varying from 8d. to 22d. per hour. There were in 1912 4,400 negro
artisans receiving 8d. an hour or more, while 400 received 1s. an hour,
and the work was constant.

The European labourer, in addition to free quarters, received $1.60 per
eight-hour day, and more for overtime work. He was charged 40 cents a
day for his three meals, which left him a minimum net wage per day of
$1.20, or a little less than thirty shillings a week. Many, however,
received more, and a good number of Spanish work-people must have gone
home with a nice little nest-egg in their pockets.

The skilled labour was done almost entirely by United States employees,
though the "gold roll," as it was called, included at first some
Europeans. The pay was excellent, the social life, with its gymnasia,
billiard-rooms, concerts and so forth, attractive, and the commissariat,
with its three good meals at a fixed charge, quite up to the standard of
a good hotel. The billets on the isthmus were therefore popular, and
about 7,000 Americans on an average have been in employment there.

As I have pointed out, the responsibility for the construction of the
canal was vested in the President of the United States, who acted
through an executive commission resident in the canal zone. The work was
organized in a large number of departments, each responsible for a big
task. These were excavation and dredging; locks and dams; machinery and
buildings (also responsible for paving and other improvements in Colon
and Panama); labour, subsistence, and quarters; material and supplies;
sanitation (responsible also for hygiene in Panama and Colon, which
towns are technically outside the zone); civil administration; the
Panama railroad. There were also some smaller divisions, such as
accounts and an office of a purchasing officer in Washington, nearly all
the supplies for the canal being obtained in the United States. It
should be added that the Republic of Panama is responsible for the
policing of the two big towns, but the department of civil
administration of the Panama Canal Commission employed 200 police, 88 of
which were native West Indians.

This busy hive of labour will soon present a very different aspect. With
the approach of the canal to completion the numbers of the workmen will
gradually be reduced. A drastic process of sifting and selection will be
carried out among the Americans employed on the works. Only about 2,500
men will be necessary to operate the canal, when it is in full working
order. These will be established at the locks and other important
points. In fact, the canal authorities recommend a complete depopulation
of the isthmus except, of course, the terminal cities and the operating
stations on the canal. Otherwise, they think, a large expense for
sanitation will be necessary which might thus be avoided. But the
question of defence must not be forgotten. It will certainly be found
advisable to maintain a pretty large American garrison at the isthmus,
and to the population we have mentioned perhaps even 8,000 American
troops must be added. The busy scenes still prevailing in the canal zone
will now soon have disappeared like a dream, and the future traveller
who looks from the ship-rail over the shining waters of Gatun Lake or
beyond to the vast and silent tropical forest will have difficulty in
reconstructing the spectacle which the narrow lands presented during the
ten strenuous years of construction.

FOOTNOTES:

[13] _The Times_, September 26, 1912.

[14] This is the figure of official recruiting. Very many more came to
the isthmus of their own accord.

CHAPTER XI.

THE PROBLEM OF CONSTRUCTION.

We may now begin to consider the canal itself, the problems which its
designers had to solve, the methods of construction, and the features of
the completed work. As we have seen, the first two and a half years were
a time mainly of preparation for the titanic enterprise of excavation
and construction. In fact, it might have been better if the work during
that period had been entirely restricted to scavenging, sewering, and so
forth. The labourers were hurried a little too fast to the isthmus,
before the isthmus was properly cleaned up to receive them. Hence the
yellow fever panic and difficulties which might have been avoided. The
people of the United States were responsible for this over-haste at the
start. The great thing, they cried, is to "make the dirt fly." They
wanted evidence that the steam-navvies were actually at work in the bed
of the canal and that the task was well in hand. In fact, the public at
home took an interest in the canal operations which was sometimes
embarrassing. Some newspaper man at the isthmus would report an accident
or unforeseen difficulty, probably with a good deal of exaggeration, an
anxious excitement sprang up among the people, and special commissions
had to go to the isthmus in order to investigate the true state of
affairs and if possible restore confidence at home.

As the reader knows, the Americans had no clean slate on which to write
at Panama. They succeeded two French companies which had been at work
for twenty years. True, the New Panama Canal Company which succeeded the
Lesseps Company had not greatly perspired over the undertaking. It had
kept a certain amount of work going, chiefly in order to maintain its
concession. All the same, the French had ploughed a pretty deep furrow
between Colon and Panama, and much of the work they had done was
fortunately available whichever type of canal should be adopted,
high-level or tide-level. They had carried out a good deal of dredging
for the channel through the tidal flats at either end of the canal, and
they had made a very visible impression on the "continental divide" at
what is known as the Culebra Cut. Altogether the French companies
excavated 81,548,000 cubic yards. The Americans inherited from their
predecessors a large amount of machinery and tools, in addition to a
great deal of work well done. Much of the machinery, even of the Lesseps
Company, was found to be in serviceable condition, and operations could
be continued with it, though the extent and efficiency of the plant was,
of course, as time went on, greatly increased.

The main problem which the American engineers had to solve was how to
deal with the Chagres River. On the tide-level scheme, that violent and
capricious stream, which in the rainy season was navigable for half its
length of 100 miles, would have had to be diverted into another channel
or ponded back in its upper waters by a high dam at Gamboa, some of the
overflow of which might perhaps have been permitted to pass into the
canal. But, as we have seen, the Chagres would have to be utilized and
at the same time controlled if the high-level plan was adopted. A river
which is capable of rising 35-½ feet in twenty-four hours needed a
great deal of regulation and discipline before it could be used as the
feeder of the upper reaches of a lock canal. The only way to do this was
to diffuse its waters over a vast artificial lake which it would keep
full, but in which its floods and current would be effectually tamed.
This could only be done by a huge dam intercepting the course of the
river in its lower reaches, at some point before it entered the
Caribbean Sea. When the New Panama Canal Company changed its plans and
decided for an elevated waterway, it was intended to construct such a
barrier at Bohio, a point much higher up stream than Gatun, the site
ultimately chosen by the American engineers. The Isthmian Canal
Commission which reported in 1901, also arranged for a dam at Bohio to
control the Chagres River. On this plan the river would have been
intercepted much higher up, and the artificial lake would have been much
smaller. But when the Americans finally decided on the high-level type
in 1906, the site of the proposed dam was shifted from Bohio to Gatun,
nearer the river's mouth, which involved the inundation of a much vaster
area of country. This position for the dam was first suggested by a
French engineer, Godin de Lépinay, who, in a paper read before the
congress of engineers in Paris in 1879, advocated a lock canal with a
dam controlling the Chagres River at Gatun. This, then, was the biggest
problem peculiar to the high-level scheme, for the cutting through the
"continental divide," though an even more titanic labour, would have had
to be accomplished whatever type of canal had been adopted.

No feature of the construction has been subject to so much criticism and
anxious solicitude as this Gatun dyke. On it depends the maintenance of
Gatun Lake and the supply of water for the canal. If the dam fails,
everything fails. The real cause of the difficulty was the foundation
upon which this big artificial hill had to be laid. The great dam at
Assouan in Egypt is based upon the eternal granite, upon which masonry
of natural stone is built. It is, therefore, part and parcel of the
solid framework of our planet, and will probably last as long. The Gatun
dam is, however, founded upon the alluvial deposits of the Chagres
River. This alluvium consists of gravel firmly cemented with mud and
clay, and is unquestionably water-tight. These deposits go down in
places to a depth of 280 feet before the solid rock is reached. The dam
had, therefore, to be laid down on the top of them.

Now this foundation, though water-tight, is soft. It would have been
impossible to place upon it a massive structure of rock or concrete. The
deposits would have given way under its weight. The only plan was to
dump down in the valley an earthen dam, making it very broad so as to
distribute the weight over as large a space as possible of the alluvium
underneath. A steep slope would have been impossible, for the weight of
the central portion would have pushed the clay and gravel outwards, and
the whole mass would have subsided. The earth-dam was to block the
valley through which the Chagres had hitherto flowed uninterruptedly to
the sea. This valley is a mile and a half wide, and this is, therefore,
the length of the dam. Its base is 2,100 feet wide. It is 398 feet
through at the surface of the water, 100 feet wide at the top, and was
to be 115 feet above sea-level. The last figure has, it seems, been
brought down to 104 feet, which will be an advantage, as the weight upon
the foundations will be proportionately less.

In the middle of the dam the level of the lake is controlled by a
channel called the "spillway," with walls and floor of concrete, by
which the surplus waters will be sluiced off into the old bed of the
Chagres River and so passed on to the sea. The entrance to this channel
is closed with falling gates or doors. This safety-valve will no doubt
be capable of dealing with the biggest and quickest rise of the
lake-level that is ever likely to take place. It can pass off 137,000
cubic feet of water a second, the water issuing at a speed of 35 feet a
second. But, to complete the security, the big culverts of the mighty
Gatun locks close by can be turned open, and 170,000 cubic feet a second
carried off there. Indeed, as regards the Gatun Lake the anxiety, if
there be any, is that the water-supply will be insufficient rather than
dangerously excessive.

The level of the lake is to be kept at 85 feet above mean
sea-level--that is, the dam, or a considerable length of it, will be
exposed to what is called a "head" of water of 85 feet. The lake itself
will be 164 square miles in extent. There have been many rational
anxieties on the sufficiency of the dam. A certain American senator,
however, who visited the works during the construction, worried himself
rather unnecessarily on this last figure. Colonel Goethals was showing a
congressional delegation round the works, and in the course of the
survey they came to the dam with the broad expanse of water behind it.
"Colonel," he said, "how is it that so small a body of earth as the
Gatun dam can hold in check such a tremendous body of water as the Gatun
Lake?" The chief engineer explained that the pressure of a body of water
is determined by its height and not by its volume. The inquirer seems
not to have been satisfied with the statement of this hydrostatic law.
Senator Knox, afterwards Secretary of State, then came to his aid.
"Senator," he said, "if your theory were true, how could the dykes of
Holland hold in check the Atlantic Ocean?" This was a clincher, and the
sceptic joined in the laugh at his own expense.

All the same, the Gatun dam has two extremely responsible and heavy
duties to perform. It has to withstand the horizontal thrust of a head
of 85 feet of water so as not to be carried bodily down the Chagres bed
into the Atlantic. And it has to block up the valley so effectually that
the water of the lake shall not percolate through at any point. There is
every reason to believe that, in spite of all alarums and excursions
during its construction, it will fulfil both these requirements. Its
composition and construction may be briefly described. Two bulwarks of
big rocky fragments were built up on either outer line or "toe" of the
structure. This rough material was obtained from the lock site, or
Mindi, or the Culebra Cut twenty-six miles away. The area between these
piles is filled with silt, and water pumped into it by hydraulic dredges
from the Chagres valley. The surplus water is carried off through pipes.
The sodden silt remains and is packed down and consolidated by
atmospheric pressure. Such a "hydraulic fill" is impervious to water,
the thrust or "head" of which is very quickly lost in the minute
interstices or pores of the material. It will be seen how such a
structure differs from a dam of concrete or stone masonry. It is
porous, while at the same time impervious to water.

The future traveller through the Panama Canal will probably never guess
the immensity of the labour that has gone to the building of the Gatun
dam. Already, indeed, it looks so much like a part of the natural
landscape that it might well escape special observation altogether. Yet
nothing less than 21,145,931 cubic yards of material were laid
down--enough to make a wall of earth three feet high and three feet
thick reaching nearly halfway round the world. The spillway itself
contains 225,485 cubic yards of concrete.

It will be noticed that in the dam proper there is no core of masonry or
puddled chalk or clay whatever. It was at one time intended that there
should be. I have alluded to the alarmist rumours that were raised again
and again at Panama and created much uneasiness in the United States.
These were especially concerned with the great dam, and that word must
have frequently been on the lips of the engineers in more than one
significance. Every possible test was applied to determine the exact
character of the underlying materials, to ascertain whether there was
any connection between the swamp areas to the north and south through
the deposits in the gorges which the earthwork was to bridge, to prove
the ability of the material below to support the structure, and to find
out whether suitable material for the dam could be found in its
neighbourhood. "As the result of all these investigations," wrote
Colonel Goethals,[15] "it may be briefly stated that the underlying
material is impervious to water; that it possesses ample strength to
uphold the structure that will be placed upon it, and, the subsoil being
impervious, that there is no connection between the swamps above and the
sea below."

In order to make assurance doubly sure, Colonel Goethals planned the dam
so as to include triple interlocking steel sheet-piling across the
valley, driven down to bedrock, and decided to carry the dam to a height
of 135 feet. Even so, the news of a collapse was wired home, and this so
impressed President Roosevelt that he sent a commission of engineers to
the isthmus accompanied by President-elect Taft. The investigations had
a different result from what had been expected. Instead of being
dissatisfied with the size and strength of the dam, the engineers
declared that it was being built too high and that the steel piling was
unnecessary. It must be admitted, therefore, that the efficiency of the
Gatun dam has been subjected to the most rigorous tests, and that no
further anxiety on the subject need be felt.

With the blocking of the Chagres outlet at Gatun, the waters of the lake
have gradually accumulated until they cover an area of 164 square miles.
Not only the Chagres itself but its tributaries, the Trinidad and
others, are thus ponded back. The reservoir extends up a number of long
and winding arms, and is thus very irregular in shape. The bed of the
channel itself was cleared of brushwood and trees, but the rest of the
valley was thickly overgrown. As the waters rose, therefore, and
gradually submerged this primeval forest, a rather dismal spectacle was
presented of decay and destruction. The lake has, indeed, completely
altered the aspect of the country. Villages and even small towns, whose
names had come down from the days of the old navigators, lie buried for
ever beneath the waters of Lake Gatun. Even now the great expanse of
water with its wooded islands looks like a natural feature of the
landscape rather than yesterday's creation of engineering enterprise.
The vessels in transit will, of course, keep to the dredged and buoyed
channel, but the channel will itself be invisible, and the traveller,
after tossing on the restless Caribbean Sea, will enjoy the full
sensation of a cruise over a landlocked fjord or lake. Lake Gatun is
indeed twice the size of Lago Maggiore and four-fifths the size of Lake
Geneva. The journey from Gatun to Bas Obispo, where the waterway again
assumes the appearance of a canal and enters the Culebra gorge, is 22
miles, but the same 85-foot level is maintained right to the locks at
Pedro Miguel, where the waters of Lake Gatun are again retained by a dam
connecting the walls of the lock with a hill to the west. The rest of
the lake is held in by the natural configuration of the country, the
only outlets being at the Gatun spillway and, of course, through the
locks.

But we must not overlook the main purpose of the lake, which is to
supply the water for the canal and the lockages. For this purpose
everything, of course, depends on the rainfall at the isthmus, and the
question arises whether this may be relied upon to replenish the canal
with the needful water-supply. Colonel Goethals estimates that in an
average dry season 58 "lockages," or transits of the canal, per day
would be possible, which is a greater number than the twenty-four hours
of the day would permit, allowing vessels to follow each other at
intervals of one hour. Happily, a resource is still left if the supply
of water should show signs of proving insufficient. At Alhajuela, on the
Chagres River, some nine or ten miles above Obispo, there is an
excellent site for a dam, forming a reservoir where some of the surplus
water of the rainy season could be stored and supplied to the canal as
required in the dry months. Details of the construction of such a dam
were prepared in connection with a former canal-scheme, and would be
available in case of need.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] _The National Geographic Magazine_, February 1911.

CHAPTER XII.

THE CULEBRA CUT.

The most famous section of work on the canal has been that at the
vertebra or "continental divide," which runs along the isthmus on the
Pacific side and had to be pierced through by any canal running from
Colon to Panama. This tremendous work, known as the "Culebra Cut," from
the name of one of the hills, extends for nine miles from Bas Obispo to
Pedro Miguel. Mr. Bryce has truly said, referring to this section, that
"never before on our planet have so much labour, so much scientific
knowledge, and so much executive skill been concentrated on a work
designed to bring the nations nearer to one another and serve the
interests of all mankind."[16] The bottom of the canal in the cut, as in
the channel through Lake Gatun, is 40 feet above sea-level. The highest
elevation of the original surface of the ground above the centre line of
the canal was 312 feet above sea-level, so that the total excavation
along this saddle was 312 minus 40, or 272 feet. This was, however, not
actually the highest point of excavation. Gold Hill, close to the canal
line, is 534 feet above sea-level, and from the top of this hill a new
and steeper slope had to be made. The surface of the water is 85 feet
above sea-level, and so is 227 feet below the original saddle at its
highest elevation. We have already noticed that a tide-level canal would
have involved an excavation 85 feet deeper, and the width of the cutting
would have had to be immensely wider. The slides and breaks which have
rendered the American excavation so much more difficult lead one to
suppose that the tide-level cutting might have proved impracticable.

All the work at Culebra performed by the French was available for their
successors. The French companies accounted for 18,646,000 cubic yards of
material on this section. They had already cut down 152 feet below the
original surface at its highest elevation, and the cliff they had cut
in the face of Gold Hill was 374 feet in vertical height. It is well to
mention such figures, as some people imagine that the French wasted all
their time and resources at Panama. It may be added that the bottom
width of the channel adopted by the French engineers was 74 feet,
whereas that of the American canal will be 300 feet.

Many descriptions have been given by visitors of the spectacle presented
in this long and deep gash through the mountains during the progress of
the excavations. From these and the numerous photographs taken at that
stage the traveller will be able to reconstruct the scene--the two
hundred miles of railroad construction track, laid down tier above tier
at different levels; the thousands of men busily at work; the roar and
smoke of the dynamite tearing the rock into fragments; the mighty
steam-shovels like great dragons burying their iron teeth in the surface
of the bank, engulfing a huge mouthful, then swinging round and belching
it all into the dirt trucks, to be carried off to the dumping-ground at
Gatun near the Atlantic or Balboa at the Pacific end of the canal. At
Culebra, Colonel Goethals made the "dirt fly" to the full satisfaction
of public opinion in the United States. All sorts of devices and
machinery were employed to hasten and economize the process. For
example, there was the Ledgerwood Unloader. Railway trucks provided with
flaps were used, these flaps making a single platform of the whole
train. At the rear of the train was a plough which could be drawn by a
wire rope attached to a drum carried on a special car in the fore part
of the train. When the train arrived at the dumping-ground the drum was
started, and the plough, advancing from the rear, swept the 320 cubic
yards and rock from the sixteen cars in seven minutes. Then there was a
"track-shifter," invented by an employee on the isthmus, which lifted
and relaid the railway lines as the spoil-tracks had to be shifted. This
powerful engine raised the track and ties clear of the ground and
deposited them from three to nine feet sideways.

The "spoil trains" were treated with all the respect which is accorded
to the fastest mail trains of the day on an English main line. They
followed one another from the cutting at intervals of three minutes, and
any delay, of course, balked the mammoth steam-shovel of its gluttonous
meal on the stones and rubble of the mountain-side. Any cause of delay
was at once reported by telephone to the superintendent of
transportation at Empire, and the obstruction was immediately dealt
with. By this persistent concentration on the main object the dirt has
been made to fly not only more speedily but more cheaply.

One of the most serious causes of anxiety and difficulty along the canal
line were the "slides" and "breaks" which kept occurring in the Culebra
Cut. To use a condensed Americanism, the sides would not "stay put."
Large masses of material would slide or move from the banks into the
excavated area, closing off the drainage, upsetting the steam-shovels,
and tearing up the tracks. A very unpleasant phenomenon was the lifting
of the shovels in the bottom of the canal due to the bulgings of the
earth there. It is not necessary to enter into the distinction between
"slides" and "breaks," or into the learned disquisitions that have been
written about them. It is sufficient for us to note that they added
immensely to the amount of material which had to be got out of the
Culebra gorge. Colonel Goethals tells us that of the 14,325,876 cubic
yards removed during the year 1909, 884,530 cubic yards, or 6 per cent.,
were due to slides; that in 1910 of 14,921,750 cubic yards removed,
2,649,000, or 18 per cent., came from slides or breaks that had
previously existed or that had developed during the year.

It might have been imagined that these discouraging additions to the
work would have seriously delayed progress on the canal and put forward
the date of its completion. But able and economic organization triumphed
over all these lets and hindrances. At the beginning of the American
excavations the engineers estimated that 103 million cubic yards of
"dirt" had still to be removed, and that this work would take nine years
to accomplish. But that estimate of material proved to be greatly below
the mark. Enlargements of the canal and the unforeseen collapses in the
Culebra Cut brought up the total to 195 million cubic yards. It is a
remarkable evidence of the efficiency and economy of the American
organization that this immense task will have been completed in about
six years of actual full-swing work.

Some idea of the way in which Colonel Goethals made the dirt fly may be
gathered from the fact that in the first five years of his directorship,
down to April 1912, he removed 160 million cubic yards of material. "If
all this material," writes Mr. Showalter, "could be placed in a solid
shaft of the shape of the Washington Monument, with a base as large as
an average city block, it would tower more than six miles skyward,
overtopping the earth's loftiest mountain peak by more than a mile.
Again, if it were to be loaded on to the big Lidgerwood dirt cars used
on the canal, it would make a string of them reaching over two and a
half times around the earth, and requiring a string of engines reaching
from New York to Sac Francisco to move them." It is indeed a remarkable
achievement that, while the amount of material to be removed was
increased by about 90 per cent., the time of removal was cut down by 30
per cent. Nor has the increase of the work added to the estimate of
cost. The total cost of the completed canal was fixed in 1908 at 375
million dollars. Yet, in spite of the increased excavations, enough of
this sum, it is calculated, will be left over to build a new
breakwater, and perhaps a big storage reservoir at Alhajuela on the
upper reaches of the Chagres River. In the Culebra Cut, despite the
landslides, the cost of excavation has actually been reduced by more
than one-third.

[Illustration: Culebra Cut, from West Bank, showing Shovels at Work.]

The pessimists have of course been busy with these landslides in the
"Cut." They predicted that the canal along this section would always be
exposed to danger from that source. But here, too, every precaution has
been taken. The engineers have given a much lower slope to the sides of
the canal, which is therefore wider at the top than had been originally
planned. The slopes will also be sown with creeping grasses and other
plants, which will bind down the surface soil. When the forty-five feet
of water are in the canal, the bottom will be held down by the weight,
and the bulgings no longer take place. Moreover, any earth that, in
spite of all precautions, still manages to slide into the canal should
be easily dealt with by the big 20-inch suction dredges, which can be
brought up through the locks and set to work. So we need not trouble
much about the stability of things along this nine-mile section through
the Culebra Mountains.

Here as elsewhere it is possible to give only a very general idea of the
difficulties which were encountered and overcome in the course of
construction. The drainage of the "Cut" during the work was in itself a
heavy and important task. It was necessary to keep out the water of the
surrounding country and to rid the excavated area of water collecting in
it. A system of diversion channels, carrying off the Obispo River and
its tributaries, effected the first object, and the second problem was
solved by gravity drains and pumps. On the whole, this mighty trench
through the isthmian hills is not only the biggest thing to the credit
of a nation which delights in bigness, but the greatest achievement of
its kind the world has ever seen.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] "South America," p. 26.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE LOCKS.

The Panama Canal belongs to the "age of concrete." All other vast works
of construction, such as the Pyramids of antiquity and the Assouan Dam
of to-day, have been built of live natural rock. At Panama
everything--locks, wharves, piers, breakwaters--has been constructed of
concrete. The Americans have not only built these incomparable piles of
masonry; they have manufactured the material out of which they are
built. This circumstance makes the rapid completion of the canal all the
more wonderful. Not less than four and a half million cubic yards of
artificial stone have been produced for the built portions of the canal
and its accessories. This amount of concrete, we are informed, would
make an ordinary sidewalk nine feet wide by six inches thick reaching
more than twice round the earth.

The broken stone which is one of the ingredients of concrete was
quarried and transported from Porto Bello--a name famous in the annals
of West Indian romance--20 miles to the east of Colon; while the sand
came mostly from Nombre de Dios, also a celebrated place 20 miles
further to the east, the Atlantic terminal of the old paved
trans-isthmian road along which the Spanish mule convoys brought the
silver of the Incas from Panama. Millions of yards of stone came from
Porto Bello. Hundreds of bargeloads of sand came from Nombre de Dios and
from islands in the Atlantic and Pacific. Myriads of barrels of cement
were shipped from the United States to Cristobal, an outskirt of Colon,
thence carried by barges to Gatun or by railway to the Pedro Miguel and
Miraflores lock sites. Dozens of mighty "mixers" were ready to receive
these diverse materials. Each of these could accommodate ten tons of
sand, cement, crushed stones, and water. This indigestible mixture the
machine would toss and churn round for a minute or so in its interior
and then belch it all out in the shape of unhardened artificial stone.

The belief in concrete among the builders of the Panama Canal has been
almost a superstition. They invented a sort of cement gun to shoot sand
and water against the sides of the Culebra Cut, so as to form a coating
of solid artificial rock, but the experiment rather deserved than
achieved success. Of course all such structures as lighthouses were
built wholly of concrete, and it is reported that even barges were
constructed of this adaptable material. As regards concrete and its
nature and behaviour nothing was taken for granted. Every means was
taken of testing such important matters as the effect of sea-water on
this material, the time it takes for these huge masses of artificial
stone to settle, and many other questions on the answer to which the
permanence and stability of the locks and the entire waterway would
depend. The Panama Canal, writes Mr. Showalter, is "the greatest effort
man ever has made, and perhaps ever will make, to simulate the processes
of geologic ages, and do in days what Nature required unreckoned years
to accomplish."

These remarks about concrete naturally lead us to the subject of the
Panama locks, the magnificent stairway at Gatun, the single-step locks
at Pedro Miguel (or, as the worker quickly Anglicized it, Peter Magill),
and the double-step flight at Miraflores. The most impressive of these
is the colossal duplicated three-step flight at Gatun, up which the
vessel in transit is lifted from the end of the sea-level
seven-mile-long entrance channel through Limon Bay to Gatun up to the
surface of Gatun Lake, 85 feet above the level of the sea. This giant
staircase has been constructed in a cutting through the hill which
retains at this end the waters of the artificial lake. A tremendous
amount of excavation, upwards of 5,000,000 cubic yards, was necessary,
and the locks, which are constructed entirely of concrete, contain about
2,046,100 cubic yards of that material. The chambers of all the locks in
the canal will have a usable length of 1,000 feet and a width of 110
feet. These dimensions should prove large enough for the largest ships
not only existing but likely to be constructed for many years to come.
They satisfy the requirement of the Spooner Act that the canal shall be
"of sufficient capacity and depth to afford convenient passage for
vessels of the largest tonnage and greatest draft now in use, and such
as may reasonably be expected." More than 95 per cent. of the ships now
afloat are less than 600 feet in length, so that a good margin is
allowed. We may be certain that the American government has given the
closest attention to the question of the length and breadth of the
lock-chambers, for the canal, we must remember, is primarily a military
passage for the purpose of transferring, if need be, the entire American
fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific seaboard. The locks of the Kiel
Canal, it may be added for purposes of comparison, have an available
length of 492 feet and a width of 82 feet.

The vessel, then, in order to gain the level of Gatun Lake from the
Atlantic entrance, has to pass through a flight of three successive
locks. The maximum lift is 32 feet, or about four feet higher than at
any other locks now in use. All the locks along the Panama Canal are
duplicated--that is, there are two parallel sets with a common
centre-wall--so that two ships could be simultaneously put through both
flights in the same or in opposite directions. This "double-tracking"
is in itself one of the many precautions taken against accidents at the
locks. There are no locks in the world where these precautions are so
minute and numerous. It is all of course in the interests of the owners
to inspire the maximum of confidence in maritime circles. Complete
efficiency in the operation of the canal, absolute safety for the
vessels and cargoes entrusted for ten or twelve hours to its keeping,
are the elementary conditions of success. Each lock through which the
vessel passes is equipped with two pairs of mitre gates--that is, double
swinging doors--the biggest lock-gates in the world; but in all cases
the uppermost locks have a second pair of gates, so that if some unruly
vessel were to ram open one set of gates there would still be another
set ready to receive it. But even this is not all. Heavy chains are
stretched across the channel with the ends attached to hydraulic
paying-out machinery. These chains and their attachments are capable of
bringing to a dead stop a vessel of 10,000 tons moving at the rate of
five miles an hour. And still the precautionary devices are not
exhausted. Let us suppose that all these barriers were broken down,
though such a disaster is almost beyond the bounds of things possible.
At the head of each flight of locks there are provided great cantilever
swing-bridges which can be thrown across the channel in case of
accident. From these bridges a series of nickel-steel wicket girders
could be let down. The lower ends of these girders would drop into a
sort of sill at the bottom of the rushing waters. The girders would then
act as small perpendicular runways, down which large steel sheets on
rollers would be let down, gradually damming back the escaping waters.

And lastly, in order to avoid all recourse to these emergency
contrivances, it is ordained that no vessel shall enter any chamber of
any locks under its own steam. Nearly all the accidents that happen in
locks are due to the vessels being worked independently of the lock
authorities when passing through. Captains may be as anxious as possible
to avoid mistakes, but there is many a slip possible between an order
and its fulfilment. So the lock operators are not going to be
responsible for the safety of a vessel which is not entirely under their
own control. None will be allowed to negotiate the locks under its own
motive-power. A series of electric towing-stations will be set up on the
side walls of the locks. When a vessel approaches it will be brought to
a standstill outside the locks. Then four of these towing engines will
be fastened to it by means of hawsers--two at the stem, in order to draw
the vessel into the locks, and two at the stern, to check its speed and
bring it to a standstill when necessary. And this control will of course
be exercised all through its passage to the upper or lower levels. We
should certainly not hear of any accidents in the lock-chambers of the
Panama Canal.

[Illustration: Gatun Locks, looking South-West, showing North End of
the Locks.]

It is expected that a vessel will be passed through the three locks at
Gatun in about fifty minutes, though some delay may be caused in the
approach. On the Atlantic side the water of the canal will be smooth,
and the ship will be in some degree sheltered from the winds, so that
there should be no difficulty in the approach from that direction.
Coming from Lake Gatun to the locks the vessel may experience a little
rough water, though there is seldom a great force of wind there, and the
lake will be free from currents. As regards the Pacific side, the ocean
there fully corresponds with its name. It is always calm, and not the
slightest difficulty may be anticipated from either winds or waves or
currents.

Over thirty miles away at the southern extremity of the Culebra Cut the
vessel in transit will be lowered from the high-level lake 30 feet down
to the surface of another artificial lake much smaller in content, held
at a surface-height of 55 feet above sea-level. These are the
single-step duplicate locks known as the Pedro Miguel or "Peter Magill."
The construction of these locks required 770,000 cubic yards of cement.
On the west side of these locks is the other dam which, with the mighty
Gatun dam at the other end, holds up the waters of Lake Gatun. This
smaller dam is also of earth, and is about 1,400 feet long and 40 feet
wide at the top. It is subjected to a maximum "head" of water of 40
feet, but the average is from 25 to 30 feet. The length of the lake,
which is known by the pretty name of "Miraflores," between the Peter
Magill and the next set of locks, is about 2,000 yards, and the lake
itself covers about 1,200 acres. Its waters are held up at 55 feet
above sea-level by two dams at the Miraflores locks.

These are the third and last set of locks for a ship proceeding from the
Atlantic to the Pacific. They are in two steps, or, to use the more
technical expression, "two in flight," and they drop the vessel from the
Miraflores Lake at 55 feet elevation down to sea-level. It must be
noticed, however, that the fluctuations in the tide of the Pacific end
are about 20 feet, and that the height of the lake is given for mean
tide. In other words low water during "spring" tides is 10 feet below
the average sea-level. The maximum lift for these locks therefore will
be 65 feet. There are two dams holding up the waters of the Miraflores
Lake, one to the west of earth, and one to the east of concrete. The
former is 2,300 feet long and 40 feet wide at the top. The average
"head" to which it is subjected is 30 feet, the maximum 40. Its
construction is similar to that at Gatun. The concrete dam is about 500
feet long, and is provided with regulating works similar to and of the
same dimensions as those at Gatun, the crest in this instance being 39
feet above mean tide-level, with seven openings, allowing a discharge
of 7,500 cubic feet per second. The locks themselves will require
1,312,000 cubic feet of concrete. I should add that these dams at Pedro
Miguel and Miraflores are, unlike their big brother at Gatun, founded
upon the solid bedrock. There has, therefore, been no question as to
their permanence and stability. Moreover, as will have been noticed, the
pressure of water is only about a half of that at Gatun.

The relaying of most of the old Panama railroad was proceeding _pari
passu_ with the construction of the canal. Two sections of the old line,
one from Colon to Mindi at the Atlantic end, the other from Corozal to
Panama at the Pacific end, could be used for the new. All the rest had
to be built. The greater portion of the old track was, indeed, submerged
beneath the waters of Lake Gatun. The line is also being doubled
throughout almost its entire length. It was originally intended to carry
the line through the Culebra Cut along a berm 10 feet above the water
surface, to be left for this purpose during the excavations of the
channel; but the "slides" interfered with this project, and a new line
to the east of the Cut was selected. The heavy embankments along the
railway were among the most useful and convenient "dumps" for the
material taken out of the Culebra cutting. As a great part of the
railroad passes through the lake, culverts of reinforced concrete are
provided to equalize the water on both sides of the embankments. South
of Miraflores the new railway passes through a tunnel 800 feet long, and
a striking feature of the canal is a steel bridge across the Chagres
River near Gamboa, almost a quarter of a mile long. We need not dwell on
the excavations of the tidal stretches of the canal on the Atlantic and
Pacific ends or through Lake Gatun. A good deal of the French work was
available at the tidal levels, but a vast amount of excavation had still
to be done by steam-shovels as well as dredges, rocky elevations being
found in both channels. Below the Miraflores locks a million and a half
cubic yards of rock had to be removed. There will be some tidal current
at the Pacific end, but as the sea-level section here will be 500 feet
wide, the current will never run faster than about one foot per second.
The sea is practically tideless at the Atlantic terminal, the variation
being only 2.5 as a maximum, whereas at the Pacific it is 21.1.

CHAPTER XIV

THE COMPLETED CANAL.

We may now begin to consider the canal as a whole and in its completed
state. From deep water in Limon Bay, 41-foot depth at mean tide, to deep
water outside Panama, 45-foot depth at mean tide, is just about 50
miles. The greater part of the canal is at high elevation, only 15 miles
of it being at sea-level. We shall note the varying depths and widths of
the channel when we take our imaginary journey along it. Here it is
enough to say that the minimum width will be 300 feet, the minimum depth
41 feet, the breadth and depth being, however, for the greater portion
of its course, greater than these dimensions. Its highest point above
sea-level, as the reader already knows, is 85 feet--that is, 85 feet at
the surface of the water, and 40 feet at the canal bottom. The depth
along this stretch is therefore 45 feet. The Panama Canal, though not
so long as the Kiel and Suez Canals, is very much broader and deeper.
Suez is 108 feet wide and 31 feet deep as _minima_; Kiel, 72 feet and
29-½ feet. The Manchester Ship Canal is 120 feet by 26 feet. In length
Panama, with its 50 miles, comes third, Suez being 90, Kiel 61, and
Manchester 35-½ miles long.

During the building of the canal the department of construction and
engineering was arranged in three divisions--the Atlantic, embracing the
engineering construction from deep water in the Caribbean Sea to include
the Gatun locks and dam; the central division, extending from Gatun to
Pedro Miguel; and the Pacific division, from Pedro Miguel to deep water
in the Pacific Ocean. For the ordinary student, however, the channel
divides naturally into four sections, the Atlantic level, the lake, the
cutting, and the Pacific section (in two levels separated by locks).

The invisible channel of the waterway begins at the mouth of Limon Bay,
about eight miles from Gatun locks. Limon, also known as Colon or Navy
Bay, is about three miles wide and three and a half miles long from
north to south. It is shallow, from three to seven fathoms deep, and
seems to be steadily growing shallower. This is not surprising, as it is
fully exposed to the "northers," which blow with terrific force from the
Caribbean, and no doubt carry into the bay a good deal of detritus from
the bottom of the sea. The heavy rains of the isthmus must also scour
the land perpetually down into the bay. On the east side of the bay is
the flat Manzanillo Island, a mile long by three-quarters broad, on
which stands the city of Colon. This town, which was once known as
Aspinwall, owes its existence to the Panama Railway, of which it is the
northern or Caribbean terminus. Its position on the railway gave it an
advantage over the old town of Chagres, a little distance along the
coast to the west, which, though once a flourishing port, has now fallen
on evil days. Near Colon is Cristobal, the new Atlantic terminal of the
canal.

[Illustration: Gatun Upper Lock, looking North from Lighthouse.]

Without some protection the entrance to the canal would have been
exposed to the extremely violent storms which occur in the Caribbean
during the winter months. During these storms vessels cannot lie safely
in Colon harbour, and could not safely enter or issue from the canal.
So a breakwater two miles long has been run out from Toro point in an
easterly direction, covering the extremity of the canal. A glance at the
map will suggest a thought that this barrier will not provide sufficient
protection, and that another breakwater will have to be run out from the
eastern shore. Such a further protection will be provided if the need
should arise.

At this point then, west of Colon and at the mouth of Limon Bay, our
vessel enters the buoyed submarine channel of the canal and speeds
onwards along the first section of the waterway, 500 feet in
bottom-width and 41 feet deep, towards the locks at Gatun. But the locks
are not yet visible. It is not until the fifth mile--that is, at
Mindi--that a bend of the canal opens that gigantic structure to view,
and by that time the vessel has left the broad waters and is enclosed
within banks. The experience which awaits the traveller who has looked
forward with some excitement to see the world's greatest wonder of
to-day has been vividly imagined by Mr. Bryce. Our late American
Ambassador writes:--

The voyager of the future, in the ten or twelve hours of his
passage from ocean to ocean, will have much variety. The
level light of the fiery tropic dawn will fall on the houses
of Colon as he approaches it in the morning, when vessels
usually arrive. When his ship has mounted the majestic
staircase of the three Gatun locks from the Atlantic level,
he will glide slowly and softly along the waters of a broad
lake which gradually narrows toward its head--a lake
enclosed by rich forests of that velvety softness one sees
in the tropics, with vistas of forest-girt islets stretching
far off to right and left among the hills; a welcome change
from the restless Caribbean Sea which he has left. Then the
mountains will close in upon him, steep slopes of grass or
brushwood rising two hundred feet above him as he passes
through the great Cut. From the level of the Miguel lock he
will look southward down the broad vale that opens on the
ocean flooded with the light of the declining sun, and see
the rocky islets rising, between which in the twilight his
course will lie out into the vast Pacific. At Suez the
passage from sea to sea is through a dreary and monotonous
waste of shifting sand and barren clay. Here one is for a
few hours in the centre of a verdant continent, floating on
smooth waters, shut off from sight of the ocean behind and
the ocean before--a short sweet present of tranquillity
between a stormy past and a stormy future.

The Gatun locks, each chamber of which is a sort of "canyon of cement,"
will almost oppress the imagination with the sense of immensity. At the
foot of the locks the vessel will surrender its own volition and entrust
itself wholly to the canal operators. It will be attached to the
electric apparatus ashore and gently towed into the lock-chambers. In
less than an hour it should have climbed the three gigantic steps and be
afloat on the surface of the lake, 85 feet above sea-level. The
traveller might fail even to notice of himself the great dam which abuts
on the locks to the west. He may be surprised to hear that the whole
being of the canal depends upon that earthwork, and that with the
Culebra Cut it absorbed the greater part of the labour and skill and
solicitude of the canal-builders. The Gatun dam has indeed been so
adopted and transfigured by Nature that it appears only a part, and not
a very conspicuous part, of the landscape. Nor would our traveller,
without previous information, guess the history of the great expanse of
water which stretches to right and left up many a distant arm or loch
and round many a picturesque island, and over which his vessel, once
more resuming its own power and control, begins to advance. The buoys
alone indicate that the channel, the true and well-wrought link between
the two oceans, still holds its course through the bed of the lake. Mr.
Bryce has pointed out what a pleasant interlude in a long ocean journey
will be afforded by this placid glide of 22 miles over the inland lake
from Gatun to Gamboa. The bottom widths through the lake are 1,000 feet
for 16 miles, 800 feet for 4 miles, and 500 feet for about 3 miles.

At Gamboa the vessel enters the eight-mile section of the Culebra Cut.
Here again, though the traveller in future days will need no reminding
of the enterprise represented by this tremendous trench driven through
the backbone of the isthmus, he will have to imagine the busy scene
during the days of construction which will then have disappeared. He
must try to reproduce what was little less than a manufacturing town at
Gorgona, just near the entrance to the Cut, where stood the machine
shops, boiler shops, smith shops, car shops, pattern shops, where
repairs of all kinds were made and machines of all sorts and sizes
constructed. He should think of that model residential town to the west
of the Cut where the chief engineer and his assistants lived, surrounded
by the quarters of the men, each dwelling protected with its fine wire
netting to exclude the mosquitoes, the whole settlement scrupulously
clean and bright with well-kept lawns and flowerbeds. All this will have
passed away with the crowds of workers who interrupted for a dozen years
the stillness of the primeval forest. Nature and silence will in a large
degree have resumed their sway, but the world will not forget the debt
it owes to that conquering industrial army which divided the land here
in order to unite the nations.

Through the cutting the bottom width of the canal is 300 feet. Having
accomplished the eight or nine mile passage through the deep gorge, the
vessel reaches the end of the high-level section at the Pedro Miguel
locks. Here she is gently lowered 30 feet down to the bosom of little
Miraflores Lake, held at 55 feet above sea-level. The length of this
subsection is about a mile and a half, and it ends at the Miraflores
locks, where the ship is lowered by two steps to the level of the
Pacific. Then follows the last stage of this eventful transit--the
eight-mile tidal section along which the vessel glides between low
swamps to her own element of deep sea-water beyond the new port of
Balboa, west of Panama, whose wharves are being constructed from the
waste material of the inland excavations. The new breakwater which runs
out from Balboa to Naos Island suggests wind and storm. But eternal calm
reigns along these shores, and the object of the breakwater is to
protect the line of the canal, not from heavy seas, but from the
silt-bearing currents from the east which set at right angles to the
channel. Constant dredging was necessary to prevent the bed of the canal
becoming filled with this sediment. The dyke has proved very effectual
for this purpose.

Such is the Panama Canal which has for so many centuries been the desire
of the nations, and which is now one of the permanent geographical
features of the globe. It is so well and truly constructed that nothing
short of an earthquake could ever seriously damage it. The question
naturally arises whether this ultimate danger needs to be seriously
considered. Panama is rather suspiciously close to a region where
geological conditions are not remarkable for stability. The earthquake
at Kingston a few years ago was as destructive a calamity as those of
Messina and San Francisco. Costa Rica, too, almost an isthmian country,
enjoys a very bad reputation for this kind of friskiness. Panama,
however, seems happily to lie outside the zone of such disturbances.
Slight earthquake shocks have been felt, probably only the reflections
of severer shocks elsewhere. But there is no record or tradition of a
really serious convulsion. There is, indeed, one visible and reassuring
evidence of the self-possession of the earth's surface in this region.
To the east of the modern city of Panama is the site of old Panama, of
which the lofty tower of the old cathedral--a pathetic and picturesque
object--is still standing. This shows that there has been no serious
earthquake here for the greater part of four centuries. Still, the
danger--great or small--does exist, and it threatens a high-level canal,
with its elaborate lock-machinery and masonry, far more than it would
have affected a canal at sea-level. No very severe convulsion might be
necessary to throw one of these locks out of gear, and the entire canal,
therefore, out of operation for a considerable time. But against such
perils there is no guarding, and every precaution having been taken
against foreseeable and preventable dangers, all else must be left to
the disposal of that Providence "which by his strength setteth fast the
mountains," "who laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not
be removed for ever."

[Illustration: Gatun Upper Lock--West Chamber.]

It seems incredible that the canal should ever be in danger of injury or
destruction from the attack of any civilized Power, because all nations
are apparently interested in its preservation. What, then, is the
meaning of these slopes which are being prepared for forts and batteries
at either end of the canal? "With the two great forts at the two ends
of the canal," writes Mr. Showalter, "fitted with four 14-inch guns, six
6-inch guns, and twelve 12-inch mortars, with twelve companies of coast
artillery, one battery of field artillery, four regiments of infantry,
and one squad of cavalry, there is not likely to arise a time when these
fortifications, backed up by the American navy, will fail to command a
proper and wholesome respect from other nations." Yet if the object were
simply to maintain the neutrality of the canal, the best course would
seem to have been to leave the canal entirely unfortified, as is the
case at Suez, and trust to the moral influence of the great Powers and
their common interest in keeping the canal free and open to the world's
traffic. Obviously the idea of making the canal zone a big military camp
and arsenal is not so much to "police" the passage as a great
international waterway, but to defend it and the zone as a position of
immense strategic importance to the United States. President Hayes, in a
message to the Senate in 1880, spoke of the canal as "the great ocean
thoroughfare between our Atlantic and Pacific ports, and _virtually a
part of the coastline of the United States_." The words I have
italicized seem to show that the United States regard the new passage
rather as wholly proprietary, like those of Kiel and Corinth, than as
international in status, like the Suez Canal.

In the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty there is no specific reference to
fortification. The only allusion to the defence of the canal occurs in
the second subsection of the third clause: "The United States shall be
at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be
necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder." The
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty is rather more specific in its provisions on
this subject, though even that instrument seems scarcely to have
contemplated an armament and garrison on the large and permanent scale
intended at the isthmus.[17]

England has, however, acquiesced in the proposed fortification. The
decision is not likely to be challenged in any other quarter. The United
States have built the canal with their own money and enterprise. They
are more closely and immediately interested in the passage than any
other Power, and so long as they fulfil their undertaking to afford
equal treatment in tolls and other respects to the commerce of all
nations, nobody is likely to protest against the presence of American
men and guns at the isthmus.

Indeed, there is some force in the plea that the complete neutralization
of the canal would be inconsistent with American control and operation.
In time of war the Americans would have had either to refrain from using
the canal for their warships (an unthinkable proposition) or to permit
their enemy or enemies to use it on equal terms. This would have meant a
rather painful experience for the American engineers, managers, workmen,
and others on the isthmus. They would have been obliged to put the
enemy's vessels through the canal, and thus commit a sort of legalized
treason against their own government by giving "aid and comfort" to the
enemy. So it comes to this--that the canal will be neutral at all times
except when the United States are themselves a belligerent. Then it will
become part and parcel of the sovereign dominions of the great American
Republic.

But the United States will have to stand all the ulterior possibilities
of this position. If they were at war the canal would be at once liable
to attack. In fact it would invite attack as a very vulnerable point in
their armour. It has been truly said that the canal zone will have all
the disadvantages, without any of the advantages, of an island. It will
be entirely dependent on imported supplies and isolated from the centre
of American power. If the American fleet lost the command of the sea
even for a short time, the enemy could land troops at any part of the
isthmus, march them against any point of the extended canal line and
inflict on the United States a wound in a very sensitive, if not a vital
region. So that instead of simply doubling the efficiency of the
existing American fleet, by enabling it to be transferred swiftly and
bodily from the western to the eastern coast, it may rather add to the
naval responsibilities of the States and compel a considerable increase
in their sea-power. To Englishmen, however, this development of the
power and resources of the United States ought to bring no feelings but
those of pleasure and satisfaction. In view of the great secular
struggle between East and West for supremacy in the Pacific, which some
people think will fill the pages of future world history, anything that
strengthens the position and prestige of Anglo-Saxondom as the main
guardian of Western ideas and principles should be welcome to all the
members of that race.

It is estimated that the fortification of the canal will cost about
$12,000,000. This added to the $375,000,000, the estimated cost of
construction, will bring the entire bill up to the round and goodly sum
of $400,000,000 or £80,000,000. This puts all other expenditure on
artificial water-channels into the shade, as the Suez Canal cost only
£19,000,000, the Manchester Ship Canal £15,000,000, and the Kiel Canal
£8,000,000. As regards this expense and the possibilities of revenue
returns, Colonel Goethals has written an interesting passage:--

Much has been said and predicted as to the commercial value
of the canal to the United States. In this connection it
must be remembered that the commercial shipping of this
country never required the canal. The trip of the _Oregon_
in 1898 settled the question of the advisability of
constructing an isthmian canal, and had the canal been built
at that time, thereby saving that trip around the Horn,
there is no question that it would have been agreed
generally that the canal, even at an expenditure of
$375,000,000, was worth while.

In whatever light the Panama Canal is viewed, it will have
paid for itself if in time of war or threatened war a
concentration of the fleet is effected without that long,
tedious, uncertain route followed by the _Oregon_.

It will practically double the efficiency of that fleet,
and, notwithstanding the fact that we are a peaceful nation,
our outlying possessions make the Panama Canal a military
necessity, and it must be so recognized. From this point of
view the debt should be charged to the account which
necessitated its construction, and whatever revenues are
derived from other sources are so much to the good. The
traffic that will utilize the canal depends upon the tolls
that will be charged, and the President has asked the
Congress for legislation which will enable the establishment
of rates.

There is another policy which, if adopted, will have a
material bearing on the revenues of the enterprise. Through
the Panama railroad a large expenditure of money has been
made for providing the present working forces with supplies
of all kinds. Though the railroad has been reimbursed for
this plant through fixed charges on sales, it should not be
abandoned, but utilized for furnishing shipping with its
needed supplies. Suitable coaling plants should be erected
for the sale of coal to vessels touching at or passing
through the canal. In addition, since oil is now used on a
number of ships plying in the Pacific, such fuel should also
be on hand for sale by the canal authorities.

The extensive machine shops now located at Gorgona must be
moved before the completion of the canal, and they should be
established in connection with a dry dock that will be
needed for commercial purposes, and utilized as a revenue
producer for the canal. This policy also needs
Congressional action.

With properly regulated tolls, and with facilities for fully
equipping, supplying, and repairing ships, the Panama route
would offer many advantages and bring to it a sufficiently
remunerative return to pay, not only the operating expenses,
but to gradually absorb the debt which the United States has
incurred by its construction.

We shall return to the question of tolls in a later chapter.

[Illustration: Pedro Miguel Locks, from Hill on East Bank.]

FOOTNOTES:

[17] See _ante_, page 71.

CHAPTER XV.

PANAMA AND THE ISTHMUS.

It may be convenient to deal here with a few detached questions before
inquiring into the commercial and maritime changes likely to be produced
by the canal. The reader understands the position of the United States
at the isthmus. They control a zone of territory ten miles wide running
across from Panama to Colon. These two towns are, however, not included
politically, though they are geographically, within the zone. This
narrow strip of territory with its precious canal runs right through a
foreign country in which the social and political conditions existing
must be a matter of importance to the canal-owners. One cannot help
wondering how long this state of things is likely to continue. Panama,
the youngest of the South and Central American republics, is no better
than the rest in its governmental principles. Indeed, the republic had
scarcely got into being when it was threatened with a military
revolution. A pompous and polysyllabic self-importance, coupled with a
levantine standard of business and financial ethics, scarcely promises a
long continuance of the present political relations with a great
republic which is not likely to see its achievement at the isthmus in
the smallest degree prejudiced or endangered.

Some interesting little details of Panamanian manners have been
reported. For example, Chinese immigration is forbidden by law, yet,
strange to say, most of the retail trade of the isthmus is in Celestial
hands. This is because the law against immigration gave the opportunity
for the formation of a syndicate with the collusion of the authorities,
by which Chinese were introduced at a rate of $200 entrance fee. The
judicial standards which prevail in this little Bumbledom may be
gathered from another story. The mate of a British ship was recently
sentenced to twelve years' hard labour for manslaughter, because he was
held responsible on no evidence whatever for the loss of a ship and the
lives of several relatives of _those serving on the jury_.

It is scarcely to be expected that a people for whom ideals and
standards of this kind are good enough will take much trouble to develop
their country. An efficient and responsible administration might make a
good deal of these narrow lands between the two oceans, a territory of
33,000 square miles, larger, that is, than Scotland or Ireland. It is
perhaps as well that the construction of the canal has not made many
Panamanian fortunes or produced any great boom in trade. Otherwise the
withdrawal of the industrial army from the zone might have had the
effect produced when the French canal works were shut down. A grievous
famine desolated the whole country. This is not likely to happen again.
The zone has been largely an independent and detached enclave, such as
never existed during the French occupation, when the Panamanians became
dependent for work and wage on the industrial invaders. The American
canal employees have done very little shopping in Panama and Colon,
because they could buy every necessity and luxury duty-free in the
United States government stores. Some trade may be lost owing to the
departure of the workers, but it is hoped that this will be more than
replaced by the growing stream of tourists who will come to visit the
"big ditch," and increased business brought by the shipping which will
pass through the canal.

With a little thrift and enterprise the Panamanians might have profited
much more from the long period of construction. They might have supplied
the zone with a good many more articles. As it was, the only
contribution the country made to the zone or to the towns was about
28,000 head of cattle killed annually. The country is almost entirely
dependent on imported supplies, only a small fraction of which it pays
for by exports. Here is a little instructive table of the Panamanian
commerce:--

Imports. Exports.
1908 £1,561,362 £365,410
1909 £1,751,261 £300,495
1910 £2,008,679 £353,866
1911 £1,980,488 £179,941[18]

The excess of imports over exports looks rather alarming, but it is
adequately explained by the British Consul at Colon as "a measure of the
commercial value to Panama of its transit trade and of the trade with
canal employees and tourists." The great bulk of the imports is consumed
in the two towns of Panama and Colon, for, as in most of the South
American republics, the interior is undeveloped and therefore
self-supporting, being still in the "pack-mule" stage of civilization.

In 1911 the imports into Panama from the United States amounted to
£1,024,589, from the United Kingdom to £454,541, and from Germany to
£223,845. France, Italy, and Spain exported to Panama smaller
quantities. The exports from Panama to the United States amounted in
1910 to £301,684 (1911, first six months, £150,990); to the United
Kingdom, to £33,055 (1911, first six months, £15,921), with smaller
values to Germany and France. The reader will be interested to learn
what sort of things Panama exports. Here, then, is a list of the
principal exports for 1910, the last full year available:--

1910. £
Bananas Bunches 3,643,900 184,257
Cacao Kilos 18,021 940
Cocoanuts " 6,305,238 31,534
Cocobolo " 1,203,522 7,132
Gold " 2,748 26,995
Hides " 567,454 16,973
Horns " 6,893 1,410
Ivory Nuts " 2,102,743 26,527
Mother-of-pearl shell " 625,008 10,183
Rubber " 6,305,238 31,534
Sarsaparilla " 32,553 2,099
Skins " 257,740 4,750
Tortoise shell " 3,829 3,334

The United Fruit Company has now, in the province of Bocas del Toro,
32,000 acres of bananas under cultivation and 1,000 acres planted in
cacao, with about 165,000 trees; the bananas being exported to the
United States, and the chocolate to the United States and Europe. There
should be a considerable increase in rubber production during the next
few years, as 150,000 rubber trees have been recently planted in this
province, and these will soon be ready for tapping. Nearly all the
rubber exported at present is taken from the wild trees growing in the
virgin forests of this province. A curious article of exportation is the
ivory nut, or _tagua_, which in value now comes next after bananas.
These nuts are collected by Indians on the Caribbean coast, brought to
Colon, and there bought by merchants and shipped to New York and
Hamburg. They are used to make the big buttons which are now so
fashionable, and probably a good many English girls who are wearing
coats "made in Germany," are carrying about a number of these ivory nuts
which not long ago were lying on the tropical shores of the Caribbean.
The timber exports from Panama would grow rapidly with proper
exploitation. Exports of mahogany, cedar, and cocobolo have already
begun.

The gold exports come mainly from the mines of the Darien Company, a
French company which has been working for years. The whole isthmus is
strongly under suspicion of gold. All the streams show evidence of it,
and prospectors are always searching the Darien country and the
provinces of Los Santos and Veraguas for the saint-seducing metal. No
other minerals are worked in the isthmus. There are "coal-deposits" of a
sort in the canal zone, but the coal is of no commercial value.

The only railway at present existing in the republic is that between
Colon and Panama, the entire stock of which is owned by the United
States government, and is worked as a company under the laws of the
state of New York. This line, which has had to be largely reconstructed
owing to the course of the new canal, was opened in 1855. It is rather
surprising that it should not have been more extensively employed for
traffic between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of America. As a matter
of fact, it was the main highway of transcontinental traffic until 1869,
when the Missouri River was first linked up with the Pacific coast by
the Union and Central Pacific Railroads, and the first continuous line
across the States came into existence. After that date the traffic fell
off very rapidly. The causes of this decline are various. To begin with,
the great trunk-lines across the States competed ruthlessly with the old
isthmian route, getting control of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company,
which was for long the only regular line between the west coasts of the
United States and Panama. Then the French and American construction work
has seriously interfered with the route by limiting the amount of
commercial freight that could be handled across the isthmus.

Another cause of depression has been the opening of the Tehuantepec
route in South Mexico. In 1906 the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company
made an agreement with the Tehuantepec National Railway, which runs
across the isthmus, and withdrew its vessels from the old Magellan
route, establishing regular services between New York and Puerto Mexico
on the Atlantic side, and on the Pacific between Salina Cruz, the
Pacific terminal of the canal, and the west coast ports of the United
States and Hawaii. The route so organized was opened in 1907, and has
proved very successful, chiefly owing to the enormous increase in the
sugar exports from Hawaii. The intercoastal traffic by Tehuantepec from
New York to Pacific ports advanced from 114,900 tons in 1906 to 295,800
tons in 1911, and from Pacific ports to New York from 32,000 tons in
1906 to 162,500 in 1911.

All this competition hit the Panama route very badly. The Atlantic to
Pacific traffic by that railroad rose from 25,914 tons in 1906 to 46,394
tons in 1910, and the Pacific to Atlantic from 24,937 tons to 32,482
tons between the same years. But in 1911 there came a sudden expansion
to 96,420 tons (Atlantic to Pacific), and to 115,508 tons (Pacific to
Atlantic), owing largely to the development of shipping services on both
isthmian terminals. In fact, the commercial freight has had to be
seriously held up and restricted in the interests of canal construction
and the shipment of canal material.

The reader will perhaps ask whether the Tehuantepec route is likely to
compete seriously in the future with the Panama Canal. The distance from
New York to San Francisco is 1,016 nautical miles less _via_ Tehuantepec
than _via_ Panama, and from New Orleans 1,573 miles less. The difference
to Honolulu in favour of the Tehuantepec transit is almost exactly the
same. But the difference in time will be a good deal less than these
figures indicate. The cargo has to be transferred from shipboard to
railroad on one side of the isthmus of Tehuantepec and retransferred on
the other. This means on the average about four days' delay. At Panama,
a vessel can pass through the canal in half a day, or, reckoning other
causes of detention, coaling, etc., the total isthmian transit should
not take more than one day. Then there is the question of expense. The
cost of transferring freight at Tehuantepec could not be less than $2.50
per cargo ton. A Panama toll of $1.20 per vessel ton, net register,
would be equivalent to about $0.60 per cargo ton, giving Panama an
advantage of $2 over Tehuantepec. And the inconvenience and damage
resulting from transhipment, from which a through service through the
canal is free, will also be a considerable point in favour of the
waterway. It is not likely, however, that Tehuantepec will be ruined by
the opening of the canal. Considerable short-distance coasting trade is
sure to continue along that route, and it will share in the general
benefit of the developments which await Isthmian and Central America.

Has Panama any danger to fear from its old rival the Nicaraguan canal
project? The United States seems to have forestalled this possible
challenge of Panama's monopoly of water transit over the isthmus. Just
as I write comes the news of a new treaty between the United States and
Nicaragua, securing to the former, for the payment of $3,000,000, the
exclusive rights to construct a canal through Nicaraguan territory. The
United States are reported also to have obtained under the treaty
possession of Fonseca Bay, one of the few places on the west coast of
Central America affording ample deep water facilities.

Moreover, the Colombian Chargé d'Affaires in London recently made the
following communication to the press:--

I have received from my government the following information
respecting certain propositions made to Colombia by the
government of the United States, which the government of
Colombia has not accepted. The American propositions were as
follows:

1. That Colombia should grant the United States an option
for the construction of an interoceanic canal, starting from
the Gulf of Uraba on the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean,
through the region of the Atrato River.

2. That Colombia should give to the American government the
right to establish coaling stations in the islands of San
Andres and Providencia, which are located in the Caribbean
Sea.

3. In consideration of the above, the United States to pay
to Colombia $10,000,000 and to use their good influence for
the settlement of pending differences between Colombia and
Panama. Also to grant Colombia preferential rights for the
use of the canal and the settlement by arbitration of the
claims of Colombia against the Panama Railroad Company.

The government of Colombia declined to accept the above
proposals, insisting, at the same time, that all questions
pending between Colombia and the United States should be
settled by arbitration.

It is evident that the United States are not going to permit any
competitive canal scheme in Central America if they can help it.

What will be the effect of the opening of the canal on Panamanian
prosperity? The local merchants fear that the system of state-supply,
which has prevailed in the zone during the constructional period, will
be continued after completion and extended to the shipping which will
pass through the canal, and that coal and ship-chandlery will become
American government monopolies. Much depends on whether the Panamanian
merchant will be allowed to import freely through Colon and compete in
the supplying of the ships in transit.

No serious development can be expected in Panama until the country is
better provided with railways. The only other line in contemplation is
one from Empire, on the Culebra Cut, to David, a town close to the
Pacific near the far western frontier, in the province of Chiriqui. This
line would be 289 miles in length, and branches from it are proposed to
Anton, 5 miles, and to Los Santos, about 67 miles.

It is pretty safe to prophesy that the blue streak through the isthmus
of Panama will have a gradual but sure effect on the politics of Central
America. The need to protect the canal, and to surround it with orderly
conditions, social and political, will compel a good many states to put
themselves to amendment or force the big republic responsible for the
canal to provide them with good government whether they like it or not.
If the United States had to intervene in Cuba in order to put down
anarchy or misrule, they may be persuaded by an even stronger necessity
to intervene in the affairs of Central America in the defence of the
Panama Canal. It would be no surprise, especially after recent events in
Mexico, if the south-western frontier of the States gradually advanced
down the broad and narrow isthmus until it reached and passed the line
of the canal. This would be quite in accordance with the law which makes
it almost inevitable that a great and well-governed Power should absorb
weaker states along its borders, especially when these are unable to
keep their houses in order.

There is always the danger that foreign Powers will intervene in the
affairs of these republics in the interests of their bondholders, and
this would compel in turn the intervention of the United States in order
to make good the Monroe doctrine, which is directed against any such
foreign interference in American affairs. In order to avoid these
complications Mr. Taft actually proposed not long ago to refund the
debts of Honduras and Nicaragua, placing the custom-houses under the
control of American officials. The object was partly to secure loans
advanced by American bankers, but partly also to satisfy European
bondholders and to make the politics of these republics more stable.
Nothing came of this significant project. But I should not care to
ensure, except at a very high premium, the permanence of the political
arrangements now existing in these regions when the Panama Canal is in
working order and becomes more and more essential to the safety and
prosperity of the great republic. The canal may in the long run be not
"virtually" but actually "a part of the coastline of the United States."

FOOTNOTES:

[18] Six months.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE NEW OCEAN HIGHWAYS.

I have already mentioned that England and Europe gained much more from
the opening of the Suez Canal than the United States. Before the Suez
Canal was opened, the voyage both from Liverpool and from New York to
Asia and Australia was made _via_ the Cape of Good Hope. Liverpool had
then an advantage over New York of 480 miles in the journey to all
Asiatic and Australian as well as East African ports. When the Suez
Canal was opened the route to Asia was _via_ the Mediterranean and Red
Seas for both Liverpool and New York. But New York is 3,207 miles from
Gibraltar, while Liverpool is only 1,283, so that Liverpool has had an
advantage of 1,924 miles instead of 480, as formerly, on the voyage to
Asiatic ports. In other words, Liverpool gained a competitive benefit
of 1,444 miles from the opening of the Suez Canal.

Now let us take the voyage to Australia from New York and Liverpool.
From New York the journey is still made _via_ the Cape of Good Hope, but
from Liverpool chiefly _via_ Suez. Liverpool is 1,622 miles nearer than
New York to Australia _via_ Suez, but only 480 miles nearer round the
Cape. Liverpool therefore has owed a competitive "pull" of 1,142 miles
over New York to the Suez Canal.

Let us remember, therefore, that the Suez Canal has largely diminished
the advantage which the western route sought by Columbus and his
successors would once have conferred upon England and Europe in the
voyage to the Far East. The opening of the Panama Canal will readjust
the balance which was tilted against the United States when the Suez
Canal was opened in 1869. The United States will gain far more than the
western ports of Europe from the new highway through the American
isthmus. Speaking broadly, Suez was a British, Panama is an American
proposition.

There are so many facts and figures in connection with the changes in
distances and sea-routes as the result of the construction of the Panama
Canal that it may save the reader's attention to lay down a few more
obvious effects in succession. We can then go on to look at the subject
in closer detail.

1. The canal reduces the distance between New York on the eastern and
all ports on the western seaboard of America _north of Panama_ by 8,415
geographical miles. The saving from New Orleans is much greater.

2. Liverpool is brought 6,046 miles nearer to all ports on the western
seaboard of America (of course including Canada) north of Panama.

3. The saving between New York and the Pacific ports of America _south
of Panama_ depends how far south those ports are. But on the average the
shortening of distance is 4,709 miles. The saving varies from 8,415
miles at Panama to about 1,004 miles at Punta Arenas, the strange little
town on the Straits of Magellan. New Orleans and the Gulf ports benefit
still more.

[Illustration: OCEAN ROUTES]

4. Liverpool is brought on an average about 2,600 miles nearer to
Pacific ports of America _south of Panama_. The shortening of distance
varies from 6,046 miles at Panama itself down to zero at a point
between Punta Arenas and Coronel (the most southerly commercial port of
Chile).

5. All the Pacific ports of the Americas are, _via_ Panama, 2,759 miles
nearer to New York than to Liverpool.

6. The Panama Canal will not bring any port in Australia or the East
Indies, nor any ice-free port in Asia or Asiatic islands, nearer to any
European port. Of all ports on the western Pacific coasts, only those of
New Zealand and a few very chilly ones in Siberia will be brought nearer
to Liverpool.

7. All of Asia and all of Australia, with the exception of New Zealand,
will be nearer Europe by way of the Suez Canal than by way of the Panama
route.

8. Nearly all Japan, Shanghai, Hong-kong, the Philippines, New Guinea,
all Australia (save a far western strip), and all New Zealand are
brought nearer the Atlantic and Gulf ports of the United States and the
Atlantic ports of Canada.

9. The relative distances from New York and Liverpool to the Atlantic
coast of South America (nearly all way down), to Africa, and to Asiatic
ports south of Hong-kong are unchanged.

10. It is New York and not Liverpool which is now nearer to Yokohama,
Sydney, and Melbourne. Wellington, in New Zealand, formerly equidistant
between the two great ports, is now 2,739 miles nearer to New York than
to Liverpool. Sydney, which was formerly over 1,500 miles nearer
Liverpool (_via_ Suez) than New York (_via_ Cape of Good Hope), now
becomes 2,424 miles nearer New York (_via_ Panama) than Liverpool (_via_
Suez).

11. Nearly the whole of the Atlantic seaboard in the Old World and the
New is brought nearer to the Pacific ports of the United States and
Canada.

12. The Panama Canal cannot invade the main traffic field of the Suez
route--the countries of Southern Asia, East Africa, the Red Sea, and the
Persian Gulf. The competitive region of the two canals lies east of
Singapore.

[Illustration: THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA]

The reader will gather from the last proposition that the scene of the
new battle of the routes will lie in the Western Pacific, and this
probably will also be the scene of the main industrial and commercial
competitions of the future. It is in these regions, Australasia and
the countries along the Pacific Asiatic coasts, that the traffic zones
of the Suez and Panama Canals touch or overlap. The positive effect on
relative distances from American and European ports is of great
importance to commercial developments in these regions. Let us look at
the geographical results of the Panama Canal a little more closely. On
pages 252, 253 are two tables transcribed from the official report of
1912 on Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls, by Mr. Emory R. Johnson.

The following tables are given by Dr. Vaughan Cornish:--

Reduction
miles
New York to-- (geog.).

Yokohama { by Suez 13,564 }
{ by Panama 9,835 } 3,729

Shanghai { by Suez 12,514 }
{ by Panama 10,855 } 1,629

Sydney { by Cape of Good Hope 13,658 }
{ by Panama (_via_ Tahiti) 9,852 } 3,806

Melbourne { by Cape of Good Hope 13,083 }
{ by Panama (_via_ Tahiti) 10,427 } 2,656

Wellington, { by Straits of Magellan 11,414 }
N.Z. { by Panama 8,872 } 2,542

Hong-kong { by Suez 11,655
{ by Panama 11,744

Manila { by Suez 11,601 }
(Philippines) { by Panama _via_ San Francisco } 16
{ and Yokohama 11,585 }
{ by Panama, Honolulu and Guam 11,729

Comparative distances (in nautical miles) from New York and Liverpool to
New Zealand, Australia, Philippines, China and Japan, _via_ Suez and
Panama Canals.

Distances (in nautical miles) from Liverpool _via_ the Panama and Suez
routes to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippine Islands, China, and
Japan.

As figures are rather confusing and difficult to retain in the memory,
let us find a more graphic way of indicating this zone in the Western
Pacific where the chief conflict of canal and commerce is likely to take
place in the future. Let us mark out a block of sea and land between the
lines of latitude 40° north and 40° south and the lines of longitude
120° east and 160° east of Greenwich. This zone includes Japan and
Korea, Shanghai and the Philippines, New Guinea, and all Australia
except the farthest western coastline. New Zealand lies outside it. Now
along its western margin, the Suez and Panama routes to New York are
equal in length. Along its eastern margin, which lies outside Japan and
Australia (_not_ New Zealand), and only traverses the scattered islets
of the Pacific, the Suez and Panama routes to Liverpool are equal in
length. Now look down an imaginary line near the centre of the zone but
running rather west of north and east of south. Along this line all
places are the same distance from New York and Liverpool by Panama and
Suez respectively.

Can we, then, roughly forecast the changes in ocean trade-routes which
will result from this new channel of communication between East and
West? For this purpose we may divide the world traffic into three
parts--firstly, that part of it which the canal is almost certain to
secure; secondly, that for which it will have to fight with competitive
routes; thirdly, that which it will have no chance of securing.

As regards the first, Panama will almost certainly attract most, if not
all, the traffic which flows from the eastern American and Gulf ports to
Hawaii and the west coast of North and South America, and of the traffic
from the United Kingdom and the west of Europe to the whole western
seaboard of America. We have already seen the regions where the Panama
Canal will have to compete with the existing routes. Roughly, they
comprise Pacific Asia, a part of the East Indies, and Australasia. These
regions represent an enormous volume of traffic from which Panama will
have to try to detach as large a share as possible. The third part is
the main traffic-field of Suez--that is, Southern Asia, East Africa, the
Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. No efforts on the part of Panama, no
reductions of canal tolls, could possibly lure any of this traffic from
its determination to Suez; the competitive region of the two canals
lies all east of Singapore, and the greater part of the commerce of that
region with Western Europe will still continue to move _via_ Suez.

The question of tolls at Panama is, of course, very important in its
bearing upon the future popularity of the canal. It would certainly not
have done to make the Panama charges higher than those at Suez. These
latter have been reduced as from January 1, 1912. They are now 6.25
francs ($1.206) per net ton for loaded vessels. The passenger tolls are
10 francs a passenger above twelve years of age, and 5 francs for each
child from three to twelve years old. If these figures had been exceeded
at Panama the traffic there would have suffered. On the other hand, the
attempt to attract traffic by a great reduction on tolls would have
involved a loss on the assured traffic between the eastern and western
coasts of America which would have more than counterbalanced the
probable gain.

Mr. Taft's proclamation fixing the Panama tolls will be found at the end
of the book. It will be seen that the charge of $1.20 is almost
identical with the Suez toll. There are, however, to be no passenger
tolls at Panama. It must not be forgotten that the Suez Canal could very
well afford to lower its charges to meet the new competition. A dividend
of 30 per cent. leaves a considerable margin for this purpose.

[Illustration]

And we must remember that tolls, however important, are not by any means
the only determinants of traffic-routes. All sorts of commercial and
freight considerations come into play. For example, the shortest way
from Japan to the eastern coasts of North America will be _via_ Panama.
Fully loaded vessels will certainly go that way. But the ship that
leaves the land of the cherry blossom only partly loaded and wanting to
make up a full freight may choose the route past Asia and through the
Suez Canal as being more likely to serve that object.

Then the cost of coal is an important point. Other things being equal,
shipowners will select the routes by which coal is cheapest and the
coaling stations nearest each other. With plenty of cargo coming along
and good freight rates it is desirable to reserve as little bunker space
as possible. I cannot go into this question at any great length, but in
the competition with the Suez route it will be quite as important to
have abundant and cheap coal at Colon (the pun is accidental!) and
Panama as to keep the transit dues moderate.

But we have not yet exhausted the motives which may help to prompt the
choice of one route rather than another. There is the question of
climatic conditions--storms and winds and currents. In this respect
Panama should have a decided advantage over Suez. The Red Sea, as
everybody knows, is red hot. This is not good for some sorts of cargo,
and so terrible is the heat at times that the stokers are said to be
unable to maintain the steam at full pressure. This may involve an
appreciable delay in the 1,310-mile run from Suez to Aden. Moreover,
from a temper and character point of view, the North Pacific and
Caribbean are distinctly superior to the Indian Ocean and the North
Atlantic. The deliverance which the Panama Canal will afford to many
vessels and steamship lines from the perils and savageries of "Cape
Stiff," as the sailors call the Horn, or the reefs and currents of
Magellan's Straits, is in itself one of the blessings of the new route.
Travellers tell us that the biggest ocean rollers in the world are found
on the Pacific coast of America just a little north of the southern
straits. For these reasons insurance rates _via_ Panama are likely to be
lower than those round the far south of the American continent.

There is good reason to believe that the Panama Canal will pay its way
without imposing any new burden on the taxpayers of the United States.
It will probably not produce the dividends of the Suez Canal. It will
have cost four times as much, and is unlikely for many years to command
quite as large a volume of traffic. The increase in the traffic at Suez
has been enormous during the last fifteen years, owing largely to the
development of the resources of the Far East with the help of western
capital. The net tonnage of vessels passing through the canal in 1911
was 18,324,794, and the total passengers were 275,651. All forecasts of
the traffic _via_ Panama must, of course, be speculative, but it may be
mentioned that the net register tonnage of vessels that might have
advantageously used a Panama Canal in 1910 is officially estimated at
8,328,029.

Before discussing the more economic and commercial results likely to
follow from the opening of the canal, there are one or two subsidiary
questions we may consider. Is the Panama Canal likely to be used by
sailing vessels? The prevailing idea is that it will be no more
practicable a route for such craft than the Suez Canal. Winds, tides,
and currents have much more to say to the sailing vessel than to the
steamer, and the terminals of the canal, especially on the Pacific end,
are not always easy of approach to wind-driven ships. One effect of the
opening of the Panama Canal will be to hasten the decline of these
old-fashioned and more beautiful craft. It must not be imagined that the
"windjammer" or "limejuicer," in the sea-going vernacular, has already
nearly disappeared from the seven seas. A great deal of the world's
commerce is still carried on in such vessels. They still battle their
way round the Horn laden with the timber of Oregon or British Columbia
and the nitrates of Chile. But the unsuitability of the Panama transit
for sailing vessels will unquestionably lead to their quicker decline.
It is interesting to see how steam has gradually ousted sail in the
world's shipping. In 1873-4 the sea-going sail tonnage of the world was
14,185,836 tons. This declined to 11,636,289 in 1888-9; to 8,693,769 in
1898-9; and to 6,412,211 in 1910-11; while steam tonnage increased from
4,328,193 in 1873-4 to 41,061,077 in 1910-11. For many reasons, climatic
and economic, we may safely assume that the Panama Canal will be
confined exclusively to "steam circles." Steamers will be substituted
for the "limejuicers" in every canal-using line, and the snowy canvas
will be banished to other regions. Hitherto, such freights as coal,
lumber, grain, nitrate of soda, and sugar have been considered specially
suited for sail transportation, because they are shipped as full vessel
cargoes and do not require rapid transportation or delivery. But even
such cargoes are certain to be largely transferred to the steamship when
it is realized that the Panama Canal is "no road" for sailing vessels.

Another interesting question is the probable effect of the canal on the
American mercantile marine. The ocean-going merchantmen of the United
States engaged in the foreign trade are practically non-existent,
though the "coasting" trade, which includes the trade of Hawaii and the
Philippines with the United States, is strictly reserved to American
vessels, ships flying foreign flags being entirely excluded. But these
latter, which are in the main British, carry on all the foreign trade of
the United States with South America, New Zealand, Australia, Northern
China and Japan. It is almost unbelievable that in 1908 there was not a
single steamship flying the flag of the United States between the United
States ports and those of Brazil, the Argentine, Chile, or Peru. The
mails from New York and the other Atlantic ports of the American
republic go, or went until quite recently, _via_ Europe, though New York
is 370 miles nearer Brazil, etc., than the Old World coasts.[19] The
reasons for this want of a foreign-trade mercantile marine are chiefly
the greater cost of shipbuilding in the United States and the
requisitions with regard to wages and food of the American trade-unions.
The result of the high standards of comfort thus imposed has been that
the cost in wages and food to run American ships under American
conditions across the Pacific is double that in European or Japanese
steamers. It is scarcely to be wondered at, therefore, that some people
in the United States regard the Panama Canal as a very disinterested
gift from the United States to humanity at large, especially perhaps to
Great Britain and Japan--as an example of altruism run mad. But while
the United States may not be ready to reap the full advantage of the
canal at the start, it is highly probable that its opening will lead to
a rapid growth in the United States merchant service. A larger coasting
fleet will be required with larger vessels, and this will lead to a
general development of the larger classes of shipbuilding.

At present no vessels are permitted to fly the American flag unless
American-built. A large number of American-owned vessels are therefore
registered under the flags of some foreign nation. As the United States
begins to compete in cheapness and efficiency of shipbuilding with other
countries, the chief motive for this foreign registration will be
removed. Great Britain cannot expect to be the chief carrier of United
States trade for ever. This is indeed one of many directions in which
the opening of the Panama Canal may tend rather to the disadvantage than
to the benefit of the United Kingdom. There is no reason why the United
States should not build up a mercantile marine as swiftly as Germany and
Japan have done. England will have to consider seriously this and many
other probable effects of the canal closely touching her most important
interests.

I will conclude this chapter with an interesting little fact which may
already have occurred to the reader. From the moment the Panama Canal is
opened it will be possible for the first time to sail all round the
world from England wholly in the northern hemisphere and without
crossing the Equator. Who will be the first circumnavigator along the
all-northern trail?

FOOTNOTES:

[19] Many persons may have expected these countries to be much nearer
New York. They do not realize that _nearly all South America lies east
of North America_. Washington is on the same meridian as Callao on the
coast of Peru. Antofagasta and Iquique, the chief nitrate ports of
Chile, have the longitude of Boston. The eastern point of Brazil lies
2,600 miles east of New York, and is _equidistant from New York Bay and
the English Channel_.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE CANAL AND THE AMERICAS.

The likely effects of the Panama Canal on international commerce and the
development of the world's resources is so big a subject that one can do
little more than indicate the larger probabilities. The influence of the
canal on the British Empire must be left to another chapter. Here we
shall have to consider mainly the case of the United States, the country
which stands to gain far more than any other from this new link between
East and West.

The most obvious result of the new event, as it was the main object of
the canal's construction, must be the immensely quickened all-sea
communication between the eastern and western coasts of North America.
The motive for the building of the canal was military rather than
commercial. It was rendered necessary by painful experience during the
Spanish-American War of the effects of the 14,000-mile sea journey
between the two seaboards of the republic. But the commercial results
will not be the less important because they were not foremost in the
object and motive of the canal-builders. It is pretty clear that what we
may call the main developmental effect of the canal will be felt along
that Pacific coast of the Americas which has been so long shut out from
the great centres of industrial enterprise in the New World and the Old.

We are so accustomed to regard the United States as a fully developed
and fully equipped country that we forget how slowly her population and
industries advanced westward from the Atlantic coasts. Even now it
cannot be said that the railroad communications between the east and the
Pacific states beyond the great mountain-divide of the Rockies are fully
equal to the carriage of the produce which is or should be exchanged
between east and west. The transcontinental lines have scarcely yet
furnished a cheap and satisfactory connection between the Pacific coast
states and their largest and most natural markets. Hitherto the
railways have had to compete with only three alternative routes: (1) the
all-sea route round Cape Horn for sailers, and through Magellan Straits
for steamers; (2) the route _via_ Panama, with railroad transit over the
isthmus; (3) the route _via_ Tehuantepec, with railroad transit over
that isthmus from Puerto Mexico on the Gulf to Salina Cruz on the
Pacific. The new canal will be a much more formidable competitor. It is
highly important that the industries of the United States should have
the benefit of this healthy tug-of-war between railroad and canal, and
the government is perfectly justified in keeping that competition open,
even to the length of forbidding the use of the canal to ships owned,
controlled, or operated by railway companies.

There is no fear that the Panama Canal, even if it prospers exceedingly,
will ruin the transcontinental railroads. The report of the Isthmian
Canal Commission in 1901 made some interesting remarks on this subject,
and they are as pertinent to-day:--

The competition of the canal will affect, first, the volume
and rates of the through business of the Pacific railroads,
and secondly, the amount of their local traffic. At the
beginning of their existence these railways depended almost
entirely upon their through traffic; but their chief aim
throughout their history has been to increase the local
business, which is always more profitable than the through
traffic; and although the great stretch of country crossed
by them is still in the infancy of its industrial
development, the local traffic of some, if not all, of the
Pacific roads has already become of chief importance. A
vice-president of one of the railway systems states that
since 1893 "the increase in business of the transcontinental
lines has not come from the seaports, but from the
development of the intermediate country." The canal can
certainly in no wise check the growth of this local traffic,
and the evidence strongly supports the belief entertained by
many persons that the canal will assist largely in the
industrial expansion of the territory served by the Pacific
railways.

If this be true, the proximate effect of the isthmian canal
in compelling a reduction and readjustment of the rates on
the share of the transcontinental railway business that will
be subject to the competition of the new water route, will
be more than offset by the ultimate and not distant
expansion of the through and local traffic, that must
necessarily be handled by rail. It seems probable that the
increase in the population of the country, and the growth in
our home and foreign trade, will early demonstrate the need
of the transportation service of both the canal and the
railways.

The reduction of freight through the use of the canal is sure to give a
big stimulus to many leading industries of the Pacific states. One of
the most important is the lumber industry. California and Oregon are
very rich in forests of pine, spruce, cedar, and redwood, the last being
much in demand in Atlantic countries. A good deal of this timber is
exported to Europe and the eastern states, and it has all to be carried
in sailing ships round Cape Horn. It is calculated that the opening of
the Panama Canal will reduce the freight by 50 per cent., which means
that all this Pacific coast timber will be correspondingly increased in
value. The exports eastwards are sure to advance rapidly with the new
means of transport. Grain, wine, and fruit will benefit, and the
manufactured goods from the industrial states of the east will flow
through the same channel to the western states in an ever-increasing
volume.

Every staple industry of the United States will feel the new stimulus,
and England and Europe generally are certain to feel the pressure of
this new competitive power of the American republic. In cotton and iron
goods especially the exports from the eastern and southern states are
bound to forge ahead. Manufactured cotton goods exported from the
southern states have had to be carried by rail to the western ports, and
thence by steamer to China and Japan, or else eastward by the Suez
Canal, sometimes even _via_ England or Germany. We may imagine what a
boon the Panama Canal will be to this trade, and how conveniently it
will lie for the Gulf ports and all their raw and manufactured exports.
American iron and steel will also be immensely strengthened for
competition with those of England and Europe in the markets of China,
Japan, British Australasia, and along the coast of South America. We
need not describe in detail effects which are likely to be felt over the
entire range of American industry.

The United States appears, indeed, to be on the verge of tremendous
developments. In a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute,[20]
that well-known physical geographer and economist, Dr. F. B. Vrooman,
gave us a hint of further American enterprises in civil engineering,
after the Panama Canal is opened:--

The isthmian canal is but a part of the greater American
waterways project. As soon as this is finished it is
possible that the United States will start in a large way
with the project of the artificial canalization of the
Mississippi with its 16,000 miles of already navigable
waters and a drainage basis of 1,280,000 square miles. The
cutting-through of an ocean-ship canal to the Great Lakes
will make seaport towns of the Canadian cities on the Lakes
Ontario, Erie, and Superior. The Saskatchewan and the Red
River can be canalized for 1,000 miles, and a short haul
from Winnipeg will open the whole Saskatchewan valley from
near the foot-hills of the Rocky Mountains--downstream, but
for this short portage--all the way to the Gulf of Mexico,
and thence to Panama and the Pacific ports. Every
transcontinental freight-rate in Canada and the United
States will be reduced, and perhaps some in the middle
interior. As this great southern movement starts up the
industries of the southern states will receive a new
impulse. The Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea will
spring into a new life, together with the West Indies and
Central America and the vast and fertile interior drained by
the Orinoco and the Amazon.

CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AMERICA.

But there are no countries which will hear the call of the canal so
nearly and clearly as those of Central and Southern America. It is
astonishing how that forty-mile wide land barrier between the two
oceans has isolated all the western shore of the continent. The Panama
Canal Railroad has done very little to modify the situation. The Pacific
coast of America has looked westwards over its waste of waters, and has
scarcely been reached by the industrial and economic forces at work
behind it in the Old and New Worlds. Its trade has been carried on
mostly with Europe, and especially England, in sailing vessels that have
plodded round the distant Horn. An interesting example of this
geographical and commercial detachment of the west coast of Central and
South America is furnished by the port of Mazatlan in Western Mexico.
From this place there are considerable exports of logwood and mahogany.
But thirty times as much of this lumber has gone to Europe as to the
east of the American continent. On the opposite or eastern side of
Mexico is Tampico, where the returns of trade are just the reverse, the
United States being the largest customer for its exports. Despite the
old Spanish paved roads across the isthmus at Panama, by which the
silver and pearls of Peru and the Pacific were conveyed to Nombre de
Dios and Porto Bello, for shipment to Spain, despite the sixty years of
the little Panama Railway, the American continent even in its narrowest
parts has been something like an impenetrable screen between east and
west. Four centuries of continued agitation and effort to get the water
through show how seriously this physical divorce has been felt, and give
an earnest of the large results which are sure to follow the completion
of the task.

There have been other reasons for the backward development of western
South America. To begin with, the Spanish, not a progressive and
pioneering race, laid their hands on these countries four hundred years
ago, and have held them politically or racially ever since. This would
not in itself have kept out the Anglo-Saxon or the German. But these
countries have not yet been greatly needed as an outlet of the surplus
populations of Europe. Even the United States is very far from being
filled up, and Canada is likely to be giving away farms for many years
to come. The Teutonic race, to which above all others the trusteeship of
Western civilization is committed, has left these Spanish Americas,
with their revolutions coming almost as frequently and regularly as the
seasons, comparatively unvisited. As yet the North European emigration
to the southern continent has been mainly confined to Argentina and
Southern Brazil.

In one respect the isthmian breakwater has been profitable to these
states of the Pacific coast. It has sheltered them largely from the
negro element which has spread so widely over the West Indies and the
southern United States. But Japan and China are already there, and the
yellow will be laid on more and more thickly unless these countries are
brought quickly within the zone of Western ideas and enterprise. And
that process is likely to begin with the opening of the canal.

The backwardness of these regions is indeed almost unbelievable. Most
people think of them as producing mainly nitrates and revolutions. But
their possible resources and products are illimitable, and are only
awaiting the organized capital of the West to be made available for
human service. As yet these Latin republics are in their middle ages of
development. There are few railways, only one continuous
transcontinental line having been completed between Valparaiso, through
Mendoza, to Buenos Aires. Their internal communications are carried on
mainly by the pack mule, as they have been since the days of Pizarro and
Valdivia. Each country, of course, has a foreign trade, but the people
of the interior, the Indians or mixed breeds, live in isolated
communities which are self-sufficing, raise their own food and make
their own simple manufactures, knowing little or nothing of the products
of foreign countries.

The whole coast and its hinterland is engaged almost solely in what are
known as "extractive" industries--that is, in mining or agriculture. The
exports consist mainly of foodstuffs and raw materials, nitrate, ores of
copper, silver, and gold, grain, sugar, cotton, cocoa, coffee, wool,
hides, rubber, and woods. With these the people pay for their
manufactured goods, and these come mainly from Europe, and chiefly also
from the United Kingdom. The mineral wealth of the northern parts,
especially the Andean plateau, is still enormous, though vast quantities
have been extracted. For centuries the Andes furnished the civilized
world with most of the bullion used for its current coinage. Between
1630 and 1803 Peru alone sent out £250,000,000 worth of silver. Bolivia
has contributed £800,000,000 worth; the famous mines of Potosi alone
accounted for £600,000,000 worth of this metal. The nitrate works of
Chile are in the hands of Englishmen and Germans, and American and other
foreigners hold the sugar plantations of Peru. But, as I have said, the
range of production is enormous and only awaits the stimulus of imported
capital. To give one example of the variety of products, it is said that
the Aconcagua valley in Chile would alone furnish annually from its
vineyards 1,000,000 gallons of claret, if the grapes were not used to
produce a local drink named "chica." There is no sign of the exhaustion
of any of the natural products of these regions. Even the nitrate of
soda, that most valuable of fertilizers, though it is being shovelled
out at a great rate, covers about 220,000 acres, or about 400 miles from
north to south, and is sufficient to last for a very long time to come.

Nitrate, minerals, wheat, barley, wool, hides--these are the main
exports of the Pacific west, the returning imports being cotton goods,
machinery, steel rails, woollens, coal, and all sorts of miscellaneous
manufactures and supplies. But, as I said, the trade has been almost
wholly with Europe, England enjoying a very predominant position. The
United States have competed with Europe at great disadvantages. The
trade has been mostly carried on in sailing vessels. Now such craft, to
get from New York to South America, have been obliged to sail eastwards
almost as far as the Canaries in order to catch the trade winds and
weather Cape St. Roque on the coast of Brazil. The sailing vessel from
Europe, on the other hand, sails right past the Canaries, and can give
the American ship ten days' start in the journey to any part of South
America south or west of the most easterly point of Brazil. If the
reader will turn back to the chapter on the new distances he will see
how the little streak of blue water at Panama will alter all this. Take
one little fact to illustrate the change. Callao, on the coast of Peru,
is, before the opening of the canal, farther by steam from New York than
is the South Pole, but the Panama Canal will bring the city 1,000 miles
nearer to New York by steam than San Francisco will then be. The canal
will reduce the distance from New York to the Chilean nitrate port of
Iquique by 5,139 miles (nautical), to Valparaiso by 3,747, to Coronel
(farther south) by 3,296, to Valdivia (about 1,000 miles north of
Magellan's Straits, nearly at the farthest southern limit of the
commercially important part of western South America) by 2,900. Take
Iquique, an important North Chilean nitrate port. By Panama this place
is 4,004 miles from New York, but 6,578 from Liverpool. Their respective
distances _via_ Magellan were 9,143 and 9,510.

It looks, therefore, as though the United States, with its new
advantages, which begin when the first vessel is passed through the
Panama locks, would have a good chance of securing for the future the
main share of the South American trade. Its cotton, iron and steel
goods, electrical machinery, etc., will be able to compete on very
different terms with those of England and Germany. Cotton manufactures
have reached Chile and the other countries of Pacific South America by a
rather absurdly roundabout route. The raw cotton has been grown in the
southern parts of the United States, carried to Europe for manufacture,
and brought back to South America _via_ the Straits of Magellan. These
goods will, we may be sure, tend in future to go direct from the
American factories _via_ New York, Charleston, or New Orleans, without
trans-shipment, thus saving about 7,000 miles of transportation. A very
small part of the American trade with these countries has passed by the
Panama railroad. The rates charged by the steamers which have picked up
the goods for the west coast at Panama have been kept so high as to be
practically prohibitive. It has actually been cheaper to send goods from
the United States by way of England or Germany--that is, a journey of
14,000 miles--than by way of Panama, a journey of three or four
thousand. One of the surest results, then, of the Panama Canal opening
will be a rapid development of the Pacific coasts of America, especially
of South America, and a great expansion of trade between these countries
and the United States.

The effect of the canal on the Atlantic coasts and hinterland of South
America will naturally be less striking. There has never been much
interchange of trade between the two coasts of the southern continent,
for the simple reason that their products are not complementary but
mostly identical. Most of the trade of the eastern coast states is with
the countries of the North Atlantic. But some trade to the more
northerly and tropical parts of this coast is certain to flow through
the canal. Lumber from the Pacific coasts of North America is used in
Atlantic South America, and a part of this trade, which is likely to
grow in extent, will be passed through the canal. It should be noticed,
however, that the temperate reaches of the eastern coast of South
America farther to the south will be nearer the Pacific coasts of the
United States and Canada _via_ the Horn and the Straits of Magellan
owing to the big easterly projection of Brazil.

We must leave the probable effects of the Panama Canal on the British
possessions in America to another chapter. It has not been possible to
deal with prospective commercial developments in great detail. Only some
general idea could be given of the vast changes and developments in
progress. On the day on which I am writing the Washington correspondent
of _The Times_ summarizes the meaning and effect of the Panama Canal in
three rather formidable words. He says it "symbolizes commercial
Pan-Americanism." The canal is going to help America to keep its trade
more to itself. It represents in commerce and economics what the Monroe
doctrine represents in politics. It will immensely assist the United
States to become the chief industrial supplier of the great continent,
with the other states mainly as agricultural or mining annexes. One
incident in the furthering of this ambition was the attempt to conclude
a treaty of reciprocity with Canada, the effect of which, as Mr. Taft
admitted, would have been to make Canada such an "annexe" of the
republic. The Canadian people, however, realizing the ulterior political
and commercial effects of such a treaty, refused to ratify it. Canada,
in fact, belongs to another political and economic system. She gives
valuable trade-preference to the manufactures of the mother-country in
the Old World, and there is happily no reason to believe that she will
abandon the Imperial ideals for the objects of continental
Pan-Americanism. After all, the citizens of Canada and the United States
are mostly of the same stock, speaking the same language and cherishing
the same great traditions. The two branches of the Anglo-Saxon family
ought to be able, while each maintaining its own life and growth, to
remain happily side by side, sharing in the new prosperity which the
world owes to this latest achievement of the great republic.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] March 19, 1912.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CANAL AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

One of the most important results of the Panama Canal, one which is
likely to have the largest influence on future political history, seems
scarcely to have been noticed by writers on this subject. I have shown
how much nearer Australia and New Zealand are brought to New York than
to Liverpool, owing to the isthmian passage. They are brought of course
proportionately nearer to the eastern provinces, which are also the
governmental headquarters of Canada. But the moving away, so to speak,
of these great countries from England, and their closer approximation to
the great and growing branches of the Anglo-Saxon stock in America, has
the effect of locating the centre of gravity of the English-speaking
races more firmly and permanently than ever in the New World. When
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have grown for another quarter of a
century, and the United States have reaped for so long the advantage in
wealth and power of the new waterway, the little islands of the United
Kingdom may begin to appear as a detached and distant fragment, rather
than as the "heart and hearth," of the British Empire and the
English-speaking world. In the eighteenth century, when the English
plantations in America began to develop their manufactures and had
increased rapidly in population, the question was discussed in England
how long she could continue to control an oversea empire, likely to be
in time more populous and prosperous than the home-country itself, from
these far-away islands of the Old World. It was actually suggested at
that time that the King of England should carry his crown and throne
where the most part of his subjects were congregated. That suggestion is
not likely to be repeated. We have found a way of harmonizing local
self-government with imperial unity. But the position of England in her
empire is sure to be greatly modified as time goes on, and the Panama
Canal, by bringing these vast and undeveloped continents and isles of
the far south-west so much nearer to North America than to the imperial
centre, cannot fail to have some influence in this direction. From a
commercial point of view, its effect will be to increase the value and
importance of those trade preferences which Australia gives the home
country in her markets.

Probably no single country in the world, certainly no portion of the
British Empire, stands to gain so tremendously from the opening of the
canal as British Columbia. England has not yet realized what enormous
resources are locked up in this province of the furthest west, which
looks out from a hundred harbours to the Pacific and across to the
awakening East. The long haul across the continent, the interminable
sea-trail round the Horn, twice crossing the equator, kept British
Columbia, until lately, outside the thought and interest, not only of
Englishmen, but even of the Canadians of the administrative East. Even
with the gradual filling of the empty middle and west, geography would
have continued to be against British Columbia. But the Panama Canal
makes all the difference. This province will no longer look vaguely and
dreamily to the western sea-spaces and a still half-slumbering Orient.
She will suddenly find herself at one end of a sea-route which will
shorten her distance from New York by 8,415 miles and from Liverpool by
6,046 miles.

Her timber and other produce will no longer toil wearily in the holds of
the "windjammer" down the whole length of Northern, Central, and
Southern America. There at Balboa, less than halfway down, is the
entrance of the long-desired short-cut to the world-centres of progress
and enterprise. The electric thrill of this new circuit will be felt not
only along the havens and fjords of the British Columbian coast, but
nearly a thousand miles inland. We may say that almost the whole western
half of Canada, where the golden wheat frontiers are ever advancing,
will face about and henceforth look west instead of east. All the corn
and produce of Alberta and Western Saskatchewan will flow, not eastwards
as heretofore, but to the Pacific shores, there to be shipped for
transit _via_ the canal to the southern and eastern United States, to
the north and east of South America, and to the Old World over the
Atlantic. Even the eastern and western fronts of the Dominion will feel
the grip of a new link, which may serve important naval and defensive
interests for Canada.

The new Pacific outlet will have many advantages over the eastern. For
one thing, it is always ice-free, whereas the eastern route is icebound
for five months in the year. Even now, I understand, it is appreciably
cheaper in winter to send wheat from Calgary to Liverpool by Vancouver
than by St. John's, New Brunswick. The freight-rate between British
Columbian and United Kingdom ports should be at least halved when the
canal is in operation. Of all cities in any clime or hemisphere,
Vancouver seems to stand most surely on the threshold of a new and
mighty future. She will have "greatness thrust upon her." Her citizens
are preparing for the spacious days that are about to set in. A "Great
Vancouver" will probably arise from the nine local municipalities, to
provide an area and administration worthy of the dawning era. Dr. F. B.
Vrooman eloquently voiced the sentiment of the great port and of British
Columbia at a recent luncheon of the Progress Club at Vancouver. He
said:--

We are on the verge of nothing less than a revolution of the
world's commerce, and industry, and finance, which now, as
sure as fate, are destined to be transferred to the lands of
the Pacific Ocean. It is not only revolution. It is such a
revolution as never has been and never again can be
foreordained before chaos primeval for this twentieth
century of the Christian era, for there are no more
hemispheres to cut in two. There are no more oceans, with
half the water area on the world and twenty million square
miles more than all the land surface of the globe, to be
suddenly transferred into the arena of world trade. There
are no more continents with the widest reaches, the richest
resources, and the densest populations of the world to be
awakened and developed after Asia has achieved its
resurrection.

Therefore I say to you that there has got to be one port at
least in the British Empire big enough to be equal to the
greatest opportunity the world ever offered any city since
time began. And if that city is not destined to be
Vancouver, it will be for one, and for only one,
reason--because the men of Vancouver have been too timid and
feeble, too shortsighted and too little to take hold of what
the good God has offered them.

I have already alluded to the question of coal in connection with the
new canal. All the new routes will have to be cheaply and abundantly
"coaled," or they will be at a great disadvantage in the competition for
traffic with Suez. The Isthmian Canal Commission of 1899-1901 pointed
out that the coaling stations at San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver
will in the future bear about the same relation to the route _via_ the
Panama Canal to the Orient as the coaling stations at or near the Suez
Canal bear to the route from Europe _via_ Suez to the Orient. Among the
Pacific Islands, at Colon and Panama, and among the West Indies coal
will have to be stored in big quantities for the tramps and liners and
warships which will soon be drawn along these seaways by the new canal.
British Columbia has coal illimitable, and this interest alone ought to
be quickly and mightily developed in the coming years. Happily there are
men of imagination and public spirit in this great Pacific province of
the empire who understand what the canal means to it in future wealth
and welfare, and are preparing its people to take advantage of the new
opportunities. Let an eloquent British Columbian, Dr. Vrooman again,
open for us the broad and bright prospect:--

New markets will be found on the Atlantic for British
Columbia lumber and paper. This new large demand will
increase the price. But the saving of freight is an enormous
item. The present freight-rates from Vancouver to Liverpool
are sixteen dollars per 1,000 feet. The canal will give
British Columbia a rate of about eight dollars per 1,000
feet. This difference per 1,000 will add to the value of
British Columbia timber destined for Europe. But it is for
more reasons than this that British Columbia is destined to
be a vast Imperial industrial workshop. While her
agricultural and horticultural possibilities are far beyond
what is generally supposed, British Columbia is in natural
resources and raw materials of industry one of the richest
areas on the globe. But above all is she rich in mechanical
power--water-power and coal. These are about to be opened up
and developed. Their development soon will be beyond
computation, for, roughly speaking, there is not an
investment in British Columbia to-day which will not be
directly increased in value by the new canal; but also much
indirectly in the impetus given to development. This one
thing--this canal--costing us nothing--will double,
quadruple, and quintuple values out there in a few brief
years. With easier access will come new trade, and new
demands will create new products, and soon the innumerable
water-powers of British Columbia will start the wheels of a
thousand new industries. The illimitable resources of the
province will be opened up, developed, and utilized at home
or shipped abroad. The value of every town lot and of every
acre of land of the 395,000 square miles of the province
will be greatly enhanced; town sites will be hewed out of
the forests, and the forests themselves--every stick of wood
of their 182,000,000 acres of forest and woodland--will be
increased in value directly, by reason of cheaper shipping
alone, to the extent of several dollars per 1,000 feet; and
in the items of lumber and wood-pulp alone the Panama Canal
will make as a free gift to British Columbia considerably
more than the United States is spending on the whole canal.

The mines of British Columbia, which have already produced
over £70,000,000, will leap forward with renewed prosperity.
Her fisheries, which have produced £21,000,000, will be more
extensively developed and, let us hope, be made again a
British asset--since they are wholly in the hands of the
Japanese, who not only send their earnings home to Japan,
but are criminally wasteful in their methods. The coal
deposits of the province, which promise to be the most
extensive in the world, will, with immense deposits of iron,
be opened to the world's markets. It is said that the
coal-fields of one small district in the Kootenay are
capable of yielding 10,000,000 tons of coal a year for over
seven thousand years, and a new district has been discovered
within a twelvemonth which the provincial mineralogist told
me on Christmas Eve was the most important economic
discovery ever made in British Columbia, where there are
known to be 1,000 square miles of the best of anthracite,
and which is probably the richest known anthracite district
in the New World west of Pennsylvania.[21]

The references to coal are especially interesting in this passage. It is
an evidence of the public alertness in this matter that the British
Columbian government has just appointed a special commissioner "to
investigate and report upon all circumstances and conditions incident to
the production and sale or other disposition of coal in British
Columbia."

It may be certain, therefore, that the opening of the canal will be
followed by a rapid growth of exports from Canadian ports, serving a
thousand miles of hinterland, many of the vessels returning laden with
the manufactures of the eastern United States and Europe, both streams
of traffic flowing through the isthmian canal. But we must not overlook
the growth in passenger traffic. The sea-passage round by the canal from
Europe to the Pacific states of North America will be much cheaper and
to many people more pleasant than the fatiguing transcontinental railway
journey. Fresh brain and muscle will enter Canada by its western
portals, new needs will arise, new industries spring up, a new æon of
progress and enterprise begin on the far Pacific slopes when the first
vessel mounts and descends the mighty steps of this wonder-working
isthmian highway.

THE WEST INDIES.

But there is another region of the British Empire which will benefit
only less, if less at all, than the Pacific province of Canada. The West
Indies will feel at once the throb of a new life and interest when the
canal is thrown open to the world's traffic. These "pearls of ocean,"
the oldest of England's oversea possessions, have lain hitherto in what
the Americans call a "dead end." They are thrown across the entrances to
a land-girt sea, the Mediterranean of the New World, from which there
has hitherto been no exit to the west or the south, but only a return by
the same passages to east and north. A glance at a map will show how
these islands, the Greater and Lesser Antilles,[22] cluster round the
Atlantic end of the canal and beset all the possible sea-routes from
east and north and south-east. Every vessel that makes from the Atlantic
for the canal entrance or quits the canal for the Atlantic will have to
pass through this star-thick storied archipelago.

The islands naturally fall into two groups, with the names I have just
mentioned. The Greater Antilles, lying further to the west and
north-west, consist of Jamaica, the Bahamas, and the Turks and Caicos
Islands, these last being administered by Jamaica. To this group
belongs, geographically and historically, the mainland colony of
British Honduras, a territory rather larger than Wales, whose great
value England has scarcely begun to appreciate. The Lesser Antilles,
stretched like a jewelled coronet round the eastern entrance to the
Caribbean, consist, north to south, of the Virgin Islands, St. Kitts and
Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica (these forming the Leeward Islands
Confederation), St. Lucia, Barbados, St. Vincent, Grenada, Trinidad, and
Tobago (the Windward Islands). With this group goes naturally British
Guiana, on the continent east of the Spanish Main, a territory much
larger than Great Britain, which should also begin to develop its vast
resources more adequately when the canal is opened.

These islands, being largely inhabited by black people, cannot be
entrusted with complete self-government like purely white communities.
They are under various forms of what is known as crown colony
government. For example, Trinidad and the Windward Islands are under the
complete control of the British Colonial Office, while Barbados and
Jamaica enjoy a large measure of self-rule. But this division into a
large number of small governments without any connection with each
other is extremely expensive, and proposals have been made for a
federation of the British West Indies either in one great system,
including them all, with British Honduras and Guiana thrown in, or in
two systems embracing respectively the Greater and the Lesser Antilles.

England, it must be confessed, has treated her splendid West Indian
empire very badly. In order that she might have sugar "dirt-cheap" at
home she allowed the great staple product of the isles and mainland,
cane-sugar, to be brought to the verge of ruin by the competition of
European bounty-fed beet-sugar. Happily there was a statesman of strong
imperial sympathies in England, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, who arranged the
Brussels Sugar Convention with certain Powers of Europe, all of which
agreed to suppress their own bounties and to impose countervailing
duties on bounty-fed sugar imported from countries outside the
convention. This gave the West Indies a fairer chance of competition,
and they quickly felt the benefit. But the convention was always opposed
in England by certain industries in which sugar is used and is therefore
wanted as cheap as possible, and notice has recently been given,
despite the protests and alarms of the West Indies, that England intends
to withdraw from the convention. And this, too, without any sort of
compensation for the sugar-islands, which had begun to rely upon the
protection against unfair competition afforded by that instrument.

England has withdrawn her garrisons and, what is still more serious,
almost her entire navy from the West Indies. When the terrible
earthquake occurred at Kingston in Jamaica in 1907, there was no English
ship-of-war anywhere near to render help and to maintain order, and this
duty had to be performed by vessels of the American fleet. Five days
after that disaster the correspondent of _The Times_ wrote: "It is
difficult to describe the sense of humiliation with which an Englishman
surveys Kingston harbour this evening--two American battleships, three
German steamers, a Cuban steamer, and one British ship; she leaves
to-night, and the white ensign and the red ensign will be as absent from
Kingston harbour as from the military basins of Kiel and Cherbourg." And
this is what England calls ruling the waves and being mistress of the
seas! Later in the same year she had another lesson. Rioting broke out
in St. Lucia, once, but no longer, an important naval base. It was a
whole week before an English cruiser arrived, though a Dutch man-of-war,
the _Gelderland_, was anchored in the spacious harbour of Castries, St.
Lucia's capital.

This, one must allow, is a slovenly way of conducting a great empire. If
these methods are pursued after the Panama Canal is opened, the results
will be disastrous. A complete change will have to be made in the
attitude of England and the Colonial Office to the British West Indian
Islands. For these islands, instead of being tucked away in a sort of
cul-de-sac, or inland lake, will henceforth be thrown right across or
alongside the main highways of the world's ocean-traffic. Look again at
the map and see how the most direct sea-route from New York, the eastern
states and Canada to Colon and Cristobal comes down through the Windward
Passage, between Cuba and Haiti, and then right past the eastern end of
Jamaica, quite close to the magnificent bay on which Kingston stands.

Look again and see how the routes from Liverpool, Southampton, and the
Old World pass through the Lesser Antilles, either Leeward or Windward,
further east. The most direct of these trails passes through the Virgin
Islands, the most northerly group, and one of these is said to possess a
harbour of which a good deal might be made. But this is not by any means
the only line of approach to the entrance of the canal. A more southerly
route near Barbados or Trinidad might be chosen, and certainly would be
chosen by vessels intending to call at ports along the old Spanish Main.

Trinidad will indeed lie right across the direct route from ports on the
Pacific coasts of the United States and Canada, as well as from the Far
East, to Brazil and the Atlantic coast of South America--a trade which
may well grow to very large proportions, considering the vast
undeveloped resources of the Orinoco and Amazon basins. Valuable
deposits of petroleum have also been discovered in Trinidad, and this
should add greatly to the wealth and importance of that island as oil
replaces coal for fuel. Oil-bunkering stations will be wanted at many
points in the West Indies.

Trinidad and Kingston seem likely to benefit most from the traffic to
and from Cristobal, the new Atlantic terminal of the canal. Both are
splendidly equipped by Nature to act as coaling and repairing stations
as well as centres for the distribution of goods. Kingston has a superb
harbour, and so also has Port of Spain (the capital of Trinidad) in the
Gulf of Paria, a natural landlocked harbour in which the fleets of the
whole world could lie in safety--and, it is important to add, outside
the hurricane zone. Trinidad lies right athwart the mouths of the
Orinoco River. The years that are coming will see a tremendous
development of the resources of these rich tropical basins, and Port of
Spain is a natural port of exit and entry for the trade of regions where
Raleigh sought the fabled Manoa or El Dorado.

It is too soon to try to indicate in detail the effects which the Panama
Canal is likely to have on the trade and production of the islands
themselves. The sugar industry is reviving under the influence of the
Treaty of Reciprocity concluded between a large number of the islands
and the Dominion of Canada. Probably the sugar for the tea-tables and
apple-tarts of Vancouver, and a good many places far to the north and
east, will be brought from the West Indies to Vancouver. But the islands
will benefit more directly and immediately through the immense growth of
traffic in the Caribbean Sea, the supply of coal and other necessities
to this increased shipping, and in general through the publicity the
islands will enjoy, which will mean a growing invasion of
"globe-trotters," and consequently a big development of agricultural
resources and an influx of new capital.

An almost certain and immediate result of the new route, I may say in
passing, will be a large increase of the tourist traffic to England and
Europe from the western coasts of North and South America. When the
fares are lowered, and the traveller can do the journey wholly by water,
without the trouble of changing from railroad to steamer, we may be sure
that a rapidly growing tide of passengers will set eastwards as well as
westwards through the canal.

But, to return to the West Indies, every nation is preparing to develop
or establish in these regions harbours and coaling-stations and other
facilities for its trade. For example, a Danish company proposes to
establish connection between Copenhagen and San Francisco through the
island of St. Thomas, one of the Virgin group. At St. Thomas, by the
way, is shown the castle of Edward Teach, or "Blackbeard," the very beau
ideal of a skull and crossbones pirate who, according to "Tom Cringle's
Log," wore a beard in three plaits a foot long, and a full-dress purple
velvet coat, under which bristled many pistols and two naked daggers
over eighteen inches long, and who had generally a lighted match in his
cocked hat with which he lit his pipe or fired a cannon, as the occasion
demanded. "One of his favourite amusements when he got half-slewed was
to adjourn to the hold with his compotators, and, kindling some
brimstone matches, to dance and roar as if he had been the devil
himself, until his allies were nearly suffocated. At another time he
would blow out the candles in the cabin and blaze away with his loaded
pistols at random right and left.... He was kind to his fourteen wives
as long as he was sober, and never murdered above three of them." This
very improper, but picturesque, gentleman was run down at last by H.M.
frigates the _Lime_ and the _Pearl_ to a creek of North Carolina, where,
with thirty men in an eight-gun schooner, he made a desperate fight for
life, killing and wounding more than the number of his own crew, and
dying where he fell, faint with the loss of blood, overcome by superior
numbers alone. Whether "Blackbeard" ever inhabited the castle at St.
Thomas may be questioned, but the island ought to benefit from the
canal, as it lies right across the main entrance to the Caribbean from
the Atlantic.

The German steamship lines are awake to the new opportunities, the
Hamburg-Amerika preparing for the new emigrant traffic between Europe
and Western America. Germany, it is said, is negotiating for a
coaling-station in Hayti, which, with its two negro republics, stands to
profit immensely from the new conditions. No one has troubled much about
this splendid island of late. It has had a dark and terrible history.
Discovered by Columbus, who called it _Hispaniola_, it was occupied by
the Spanish adventurers who found alluvial gold there. Then it became
the headquarters of the "buccaneers" who succeeded to the gallant and
courtly sea-rovers of the Elizabethan period and became formidable
about the year 1630. One of these buccaneers was that Henry Morgan who
sacked the old town of Panama in 1671, and then became quite a
respectable character, governor of Jamaica, and dubbed knight by Charles
II. It was in Hispaniola, or Hayti, that this species of Western viking
got their name. The island had been depopulated by the Spaniards, but
the cattle and hogs they had introduced became wild and repopulated the
land in their own kind. Thus Hispaniola became a splendid provisioning
base for the ships of the buccaneers. They hunted the cattle and
preserved the meat, smoke-drying it in the Indian fashion. This industry
was called _boucanning_, and from it the buccaneers were named.

Hispaniola was the mother colony of the Spanish Empire in the West
Indies which has now wholly disappeared, very unfortunately for Spain in
view of the enhanced value these islands will now soon acquire. In 1795
it was ceded to France, and soon afterwards the emancipated slaves
gained possession of the island, and after a period of anarchy and
bloodshed established their independence. It is divided into two negro
and mulatto republics, Hayti and San Domingo, and, as might have been
expected, has sunk to the lowest depths of possible human degradation.
Fetishism, human sacrifice, and even cannibalism prevail in this
sea-girt Paradise, placed right among the possessions of the most
civilized Powers of the world and now across the main ocean routes from
the West to the United States, Canada, and the Old World. Can anybody
believe that beautiful Hispaniola, an island 30,000 square miles in
extent, whose economic and strategic value will be increased a
hundredfold in the years that are coming, will long remain under this
blighting shadow of ignorance and barbarism? Here certainly the Panama
Canal will work a beneficent political change.

France, too, is beginning to look up her possessions and opportunities
in the Caribbean. Here her two islands, Martinique and Guadeloupe, are
placed most conveniently for her ships coming westwards from Havre,
Bordeaux, and St. Nazaire, while Tahiti and New Caledonia will pass them
on over the Pacific to the Far East. M. Gilquin, writing in _La vie
Maritime_, says:--

In Martinique, Guadeloupe, New Caledonia, and Tahiti our
commerce--that is to say, exports and imports together--was,
in the year 1909, ninety millions of francs; this rose to
one hundred and twenty-two millions in 1910, and it is
probable that when we get the figures for 1911 they will be
found to be even more favourable. It is certain that with
the opening of the Panama Canal a great increase in traffic
will take place, and possessing, as we do, ports so
advantageously placed on the principal lines of route, we
should benefit extensively by that development of traffic
between Europe and the western coasts of both North and
South America. In order that we may reap the benefit,
however, of the situation of our colonial harbours, it is
necessary that these be taken in hand at once and rendered
fit for the commerce they will be called upon to handle.

And what is England doing to prepare for the new epoch in these regions
where she has planted her flag on so many rich and beautiful islands,
strung like pearls of necklace and tiara over these warm tropical seas?
We hear of Jamaica providing a new site for coaling and ships' repairs
near Kingston, of harbour improvements at Port of Spain (Trinidad) and
St. George (Grenada), of oil-bunkering stations at Barbados and St.
Lucia. All this is good, but England will have to enter upon a very
different policy for the future with regard to her West Indian empire.
She must show that she values her priceless inheritance in and round the
Caribbean; that she is determined to maintain her position, to promote
her commerce, and to further the interests of all her subjects in these
regions.

What the West Indies need in order to be able to take the new
opportunity by the forelock are organization and combination. Schemes
have been proposed for federalizing the constitution of the
islands--placing them, that is, under a strong central government for
those purposes that are common to them all. There are many difficulties
in the way of such proposals. The nearest island of the Greater Antilles
is 1,000 miles away from the nearest of the Lesser, so that Nature seems
to have pronounced for the present against any federal scheme embracing
all the islands. But space is always shrinking. Wireless telegraphy and
aeroplanes may make 1,000 miles an inconsiderable distance for such
political purposes. The Leeward Islands have already been organized
under a single federal government, and it ought to be possible to extend
the system. Moreover, the islands and the colonies on the continent are
learning the value of common consultation and action in such matters as
quarantine, and they meet together in annual agricultural conferences.

We need not wait for a formal and complete federal constitution. Some
central council for consultation on the best means of taking advantage
of the new opportunities, some central fund for promoting common
objects, such as advertising the wonderful attractions of the islands
and preparing for the birds of passage that will soon be coming from
every civilized country in the Old and New World--all this is possible
now. It is important, too, that the West Indian colonies should have
some assembly or council through which they can address the Imperial
Power with a single voice. England can give these colonies invaluable
help. She can assist them to develop those steamship and telegraphic
communications between the islands which are still so inadequate. She
can indicate the best locations for harbours, coaling and repairing
stations, and the other facilities which the new traffic will require.
In view of the certain growth in wealth and prosperity, the colonies
ought to be able by contributions among themselves to provide a
substantial fund for objects they can carry out in common for the
advantage of each and all.

Some valuable information and very practical suggestion will be found in
the report of the West Indian Commission presided over by Lord Balfour
of Burleigh which was issued in 1910. Besides recommending a system of
reciprocal trade preference between Canada and the West Indies, the
commissioners made important proposals with regard to steamship and
telegraphic communications. They favoured the public ownership and
operation of the West Indian cables and possibly of the whole system
northward to Halifax. They wrote:--

The single cables now connecting Halifax with Bermuda and
Bermuda with Jamaica ought either to be duplicated or
supplemented by wireless. A cable should be laid between
Bermuda and Barbados, with a branch to Trinidad, and perhaps
another to British Guiana. The cables which run from Jamaica
to the eastern islands and British Guiana, sometimes single
and sometimes duplicate, are very old. The bed of this part
of the Caribbean being trying for cables, we believe it
would be found advantageous in most cases not to renew them,
but to replace them by wireless installations. If these were
well arranged, they might form a satisfactory connection
between the eastern islands and Jamaica and an alternative
route to Bermuda, and render unnecessary duplication of the
suggested Bermuda-Barbados cable. While it is desirable to
connect British Honduras with Jamaica, we consider that the
probable volume of traffic would not warrant the cost of a
cable. We therefore recommend the employment of wireless for
this purpose. Small installations should also be supplied
to the outlying Leeward and Bahamas Islands.

England will have to foster the welfare of her possessions in these
regions as she has never done before. The Brussels Convention forbade
her to give any preference to sugar produced in her own dominions. But
she is about to step out of that agreement, and will be at liberty, if
she thinks fit, to encourage by preferential favours the one great
staple for which these colonies can find no substitute. There may be
differences of opinion on the fiscal question, but surely everybody must
agree that the naval power and political prestige of the British Empire
must be represented in the Caribbean Sea by something rather more
impressive than two small and obsolete cruisers. If England is to
maintain her position against the severer competition she will now have
to face, if she is to get her share of the new commerce now in prospect,
she will have to give her traders, and shippers, and merchants all the
confidence and encouragement which her flag should inspire. One or two
well-equipped naval bases, a squadron of up-to-date cruisers for police
and patrol work in the Caribbean and down the Pacific coasts of America,
are indispensable. There must be no more earthquakes and destructions of
British cities with never a British vessel to bring the sorely-needed
help, no more riots in British islands with only a Dutch warship
standing helplessly by.

Both British Columbia and the West Indies have complained with reason of
the absenteeism of the British fleet from their shores. The necessity
for concentrating all our naval power in the North Sea to meet the
German menace has no doubt been the cause of these withdrawals from the
outer sea-marches of the empire. But at any cost this wrong will have to
be righted in the future. The West Indies and British Columbia are just
the two portions of the empire which the Panama Canal may benefit most
and most immediately, and they have a right to expect the support and
co-operation of the imperial government wherever it can be given. All
the Powers of the world will be afloat on the Caribbean and along the
Pacific sea-trails to Balboa. Let the white ensign return to these seas
and shores as an earnest to all that the same national spirit that won
for England her political and commercial supremacy avails to maintain it
now and in the new era which is just dawning.

FOOTNOTES:

[21] From the already-quoted paper read before the Royal Colonial
Institute, March 19, 1912.

[22] Marco Polo, following Aristotle's nomenclature, had given the name
of "Antilla" to an island off the eastern coast of Asia. The name was
transferred by Columbus, or Peter Martyr, to the islands of the
Caribbean.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE NEW PACIFIC.

Some readers may perhaps think that these forecasts of the results of
running a canal through the isthmus of Panama are somewhat exaggerated.
It is sufficient to point out to such a critic how different the course
of American and world history might have been if Nature had left a
practicable channel between the two Americas. The effect of erecting an
artificial passage there in these days may be even greater than at
present we can imagine. Some of these results will be apparent at once;
others may take decades or even centuries to materialize. Many of the
commercial and political results which have followed the construction of
the Suez Canal were quite unforeseen in 1869. We may be similarly
mistaken in our forecast with regard to the Panama Canal. Mr. Bryce
suggests that if a dozen experts were, in 1914, to write out and place
in the libraries of the British Museum and of Congress their respective
forecasts bearing on this subject, sealed up and not to be opened till
A.D. 2000, they might make curious reading in that year. We may
venture to predict that the results of Panama will be much more profound
and revolutionary than those of Suez. The Panama Canal, says Mr. Bryce,
is "the greatest liberty man has ever taken with Nature." It will
involve a far greater shifting of centres of gravity, political and
commercial, a more radical readjustment of ideas and points of view than
the Suez Canal.

As the past four hundred years have belonged to the Atlantic, the
present century and others to come may belong to the Pacific. That area
of 70,000,000 square miles may become the main theatre of the
rivalries--commercial, political, and racial--of the most powerful
nations of East and West. Some believe that the world is advancing to
that loud and fateful day when East and West will fight out their long
difference in some naval and aerial Armageddon on and above this
miscalled Pacific. Without straining our imaginations to this extent, we
may well observe that the canal brings Eastern and Western
civilizations into much closer contact and competition than before. Mr.
Kipling has informed us that East is East and West is West, and never
the twain shall meet; and a still earlier author, desiring to give the
penitent sinner the uttermost consolation, declared that the Lord
removes his transgressions from him "as far as the east is from the
west."

The new canal rather diminishes the force of such similitudes. It is not
simply that the east of Canada and the United States, as representing
Western civilization, is brought much closer to China and Japan; that
the passage from West to East which the early navigators vainly sought
is now thrown open. The important thing is that the Pacific is going to
be the scene of commercial and political rivalries in which the slowly
awakening people of China and the already wide-awake people of Japan
will take part. All the Pacific Ocean westward to 160 degrees of
longitude east of Greenwich is brought nearer to England and the western
coasts of Europe. The entire ocean right back to the western extremity
of Australia is brought closer to the governmental and industrial
centres of the United States and Canada.

English people have been thinking "Atlantically" up to now. The Pacific,
held at an unimaginable distance by a broad continent or an abyss of
ocean, has been known to them chiefly through stories of adventure among
its coral islands familiar to their childhood. Yet England is the
greatest Pacific Power in the world. British Columbia alone has a
Pacific sea-front longer than the United States, and holds 383,000
square miles, an area as large as France and Spain put together. And yet
the population of that vast and fertile province is only 134,000. And
what of the lonely continent that bounds this oceanic abyss in the far
south-west? Australia, without New Zealand, is about 3,000,000 square
miles in extent, and has to-day a white population of about 4,600,000,
or about 4,700,000 people all told. The northern part of this mighty
island-continent, known as the "Territory," 560 miles wide, 900 miles
long, and 523,620 square miles in extent, a region of great potential
wealth, has a total European population of 1,274! And to the north and
north-west there are a billion (1,000,000,000) brown and yellow people,
packed together in crowded islands and territories, whose mere
overspill would quickly fill that delectable island-continent to the
south where England has done so little to make good her nominal title to
sovereignty by actual and effective settlement.

Such a possession, an empire in itself, held so precariously and
offering such a ceaseless temptation to swarming land-hungry hordes, is
rather a weakness than a strength to England on the threshold of the new
era. And from all this Pacific region and its adjuncts where she has
secured all the empty and desirable plots and pegged out so many claims
for posterity, she has had to withdraw her fleets, as Rome had to draw
in her legions from the outer provinces to defend the central heart of
her empire. We may hope that this North Sea danger, so embarrassing and
disastrous in its strategic needs to a power like England, whose empire
is scattered over every ocean and continent, may disappear through the
growth of better relations between the German and Anglo-Saxon branches
of the Teutonic race. To that stock more than any other is committed the
defence of Western and Christian ideas, and the great issues of the
future may compel a Pan-Teutonic alliance, embracing the British and
German Empires and the United States.

England has two responsibilities in the Pacific--the one to herself and
her empire, and the other to Christendom and Western civilization. If
she is true to the former, she cannot well be false to the latter. She
must bring her fleets back to this great ocean and assert an influence
in its politics proportionate to her territorial domains and the extent
of her commerce in those regions. But there are objects more important
than the interests of any single Power. The entire coast of the Pacific
from Behring Straits to the Horn, and round south by New Zealand and
Australia, must be kept "white"--reserved, that is, for the Occidental
and Christian races. Perhaps the United States may one day so far modify
the Monroe doctrine as to welcome Germany to a sovereign foothold among
the unstable politics of South America, in order to strengthen still
more the outposts of Christian civilization in the Western hemisphere.

It is possible to talk great nonsense about what is called the "yellow
peril." No sensible person imagines that the nimble Japanese, the
inscrutable Chinaman, and the subtle Hindoo are suddenly going to rise
as one man and throw down the gage of challenge to Christianity and the
West. East, like West, has its own political and religious divisions;
nevertheless it is impossible to foresee what the results of the
Oriental resurgence may mean, and England and the United States, and
perhaps Germany, may some day have a joint responsibility in the Pacific
compared with which their rivalries among themselves may seem trifling
and irrational.

But I do not wish to end this little book with presages of future
discord. We must all hope that the Panama Canal will prove a new and
powerful influence for peace, that it will bring even East and West
together, not in strife and suspicion, but in friendship and a better
mutual understanding. There is surely a human interest and sympathy
transcending even those racial divisions which may seem most
insuperable. The great nation which has given this splendid gift to the
world should ask no better or more selfish reward than that it may
contribute to the welfare and progress of humanity at large.

APPENDIX I.

THE ISTHMIAN CANAL CONVENTION (COMMONLY CALLED THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE
TREATY), 1901.

1. The high contracting parties agree that the present treaty shall
supersede the aforementioned (Clayton-Bulwer) convention of April 19,
1850.

2. It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of
the government of the United States either directly at its own cost, or
by gift or loan of money to individuals or corporations, or through
subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the
provisions of the present treaty, the said government shall have and
enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the
exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the
canal.

3. The United States adopts as the basis of the neutralization of such
ship canal the following rules substantially as embodied in the
Convention of Constantinople, signed the 28th October, 1888, for the
free navigation of the Suez Canal; that is to say:

First.--The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and
of war of all nations observing these rules, on terms of entire
equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such
nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or
charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic
shall be just and equitable.

Second.--The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war
be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The United
States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police
along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness
and disorder.

Third.--Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any
stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the
transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the
least possible delay in accordance with the regulations in force, and
with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the
service. Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as
vessels of war of the belligerents.

Fourth.--No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of
war or warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidental
hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed
with all possible despatch.

Fifth.--The provisions of this article shall apply to waters adjacent to
the canal, within three marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a
belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four
hours at any one time except in case of distress, and in such case shall
depart as soon as possible, but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall
not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of
war of the other belligerent.

Sixth.--The plant, establishment, buildings and all works necessary to
the construction, maintenance and operation of the canal shall be deemed
to be parts thereof for the purpose of this treaty, and in time of war,
as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury
by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as
part of the canal.

4. It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of
international relations of the country or countries traversed by the
before-mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of
neutralization or the obligation of the high contracting parties under
the present treaty.

5. The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United
States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by
His Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at
Washington or at London at the earliest possible time within six months
from the date thereof.

APPENDIX II.

THE PANAMA DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1903.

The transcendental act that by a spontaneous movement the inhabitants of
the isthmus of Panama have just executed is the inevitable consequence
of a situation which has become graver daily.

Long is the recital of the grievances that the inhabitants of the
isthmus have suffered from their Colombian brothers; but those
grievances would have been withstood with resignation for the sake of
harmony and national union had its separation been possible and if we
could have entertained well-founded hopes of improvement and of
effective progress under the system to which we were submitted by that
republic. We have to solemnly declare that we have the sincere and
profound conviction that all the hopes were futile and useless, all the
sacrifices on our part.

The isthmus of Panama has been governed by the Republic of Colombia with
the narrow-mindedness that in past times was applied to their colonies
by the European nations--the Isthmian people and territory were a source
of fiscal resources and nothing more. The contracts and negotiations
regarding the railroad and the Panama Canal and the national taxes
collected in the isthmus have netted to Colombia tremendous sums which
we will not detail, not wishing to appear in this exposition which will
go down to posterity as being moved by a mercenary spirit, which has
never been nor is our purpose; and of these large sums the isthmus has
not received the benefit of a bridge for any of its numerous rivers, nor
the construction of a single road between its towns, nor of any public
building nor of a single college, and has neither seen any interest
displayed in advancing her industries, nor has a most infinite part of
those sums been applied toward her prosperity.

A very recent example of what we have related above is what has occurred
with the negotiations of the Panama Canal, which, when taken under
consideration by Congress, was rejected in a summary manner. There were
a few public men who expressed their adverse opinion, on the ground that
the isthmus of Panama alone was to be favoured by the opening of the
canal by virtue of a treaty with the United States, and that the rest of
Colombia would not receive any direct benefits of any sort by that work,
as if that way of reasoning, even though it be correct, would justify
the irreparable and perpetual damage that would be caused to the isthmus
by the rejection of the treaty in the manner in which it was done, which
was equivalent to the closing of the doors to future negotiations.

The people of the isthmus, in view of such notorious causes, have
decided to recover their sovereignty and begin to form a part of the
society of the free and independent nations, in order to work out its
own destiny, to insure its future in a stable manner, and discharge the
duties which it is called on to do by the situation of its territory and
its immense richness.

To that we, the initiators of the movement effected, aspire and have
obtained a unanimous approval.

We aspire to the formation of a true republic, where tolerance will
prevail, where the law shall be the invariable guide of those governing
and those governed, where effective peace be established, which consists
in the frequent and harmonious play of all interests and all activities,
and where, finally, civilization and progress will find perpetual
stability.

At the commencement of the life of an independent nation we fully
appreciate the responsibilities that state means, but we have profound
faith in the good sense and patriotism of the Isthmian people, and we
possess sufficient energy to open our way by means of labour to a happy
future without any worry or any danger.

At separating from our brothers of Colombia we do it without hatred and
without any joy. Just as a son withdraws from his paternal roof, the
Isthmian people in adopting the lot it has chosen have done it with
grief, but in compliance with the supreme and inevitable duty it owes to
itself--that of its own preservation and of working for its own
welfare.

We therefore begin to form a part among the free nations of the world,
considering Colombia as a sister nation, with which we shall be whenever
circumstances may require it, and for whose prosperity we have the most
fervent and sincere wishes.

José Agustin Arango,
Federico Boyd,
Tomas Arias.

APPENDIX III.

THE PANAMA CANAL CONVENTION (COMMONLY CALLED THE HAY-BUNAU-VARILLA
TREATY), 1904.

The United States of America and the Republic of Panama being desirous
to insure the construction of a ship-canal across the isthmus of Panama
to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Congress of the
United States of America having passed an Act approved June 28, 1902, in
furtherance of that object, by which the President of the United States
is authorized to acquire within a reasonable time the control of the
necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia, and the sovereignty of
such territory being actually vested in the Republic of Panama, the high
contracting parties have resolved for that purpose to conclude a
convention and have accordingly appointed as their plenipotentiaries--

The President of the United States of America, John Hay, Secretary of
State, and the government of the Republic of Panama, Philippe
Bunau-Varilla, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the
Republic of Panama, thereunto specially empowered by said government,
who after communicating with each other their respective full powers
found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the
following articles:

Article 1.

The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the
Republic of Panama.

Article 2.

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the
use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for
the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of
said canal of the width of ten miles extending to the distance of five
miles on each side of the centre line of the route of the canal to be
constructed; the said zone beginning in the Caribbean Sea three marine
miles from mean low water mark, and extending to and across the isthmus
of Panama into the Pacific Ocean to a distance of three marine miles
from mean low water mark, with the proviso that the cities of Panama and
Colon and the harbours adjacent to said cities, which are included
within the boundaries of the zone above described, shall not be included
within this grant. The Republic of Panama further grants to the United
States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of any other lands
and waters outside of the zone above described which may be necessary
and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation
and protection of the said canal or of any auxiliary canal or other
works necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance,
operation, sanitation and protection of the said enterprise.

The Republic of Panama further grants in like manner to the United
States in perpetuity all islands within the limits of the zone above
described and in addition thereto the group of small islands in the Bay
of Panama, named Perico, Naos, Culebra, and Flamenco.

Article 3.

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power
and authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article 2 of
this agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters
mentioned and described in said Article 2 which the United States would
possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within
which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the
exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power
or authority.

Article 4.

As rights subsidiary to the above grants the Republic of Panama grants
in perpetuity to the United States the right to use the rivers, streams,
lakes and other bodies of water within its limits for navigation, the
supply of water or water-power or other purposes, so far as the use of
said rivers, streams, lakes and bodies of water and the waters thereof
may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance,
operation, sanitation and protection of the said canal.

Article 5.

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity a
monopoly for the construction, maintenance and operation of any system
of communication by means of canal or railroad across its territory
between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

Article 6.

The grants herein contained shall in no manner invalidate the titles or
rights of private landholders or owners of private property in the said
zone or in or to any of the lands or waters granted to the United States
by the provisions of any Article of this treaty, nor shall they
interfere with the rights of way over the public roads passing through
the said zone or over any of the said lands or waters unless said rights
of way or private rights shall conflict with rights herein granted to
the United States, in which case the rights of the United States shall
be superior. All damages caused to the owners of private lands or
private property of any kind by reason of the grants contained in this
treaty or by reason of the operations of the United States, its agents
or employees, or by reason of the construction, maintenance, operation,
sanitation and protection of the said canal or of the works of
sanitation and protection herein provided for, shall be appraised and
settled by a joint commission appointed by the governments of the United
States and the Republic of Panama, whose decisions as to such damages
shall be final and whose awards as to such damages shall be paid solely
by the United States. No part of the work on said canal or the Panama
railroad or on any auxiliary works relating thereto and authorized by
the terms of this treaty shall be prevented, delayed or impeded by or
pending such proceedings to ascertain such damages. The appraisal of the
said private lands and private property and the assessment of damages to
them shall be based upon their value before the date of this convention.

Article 7.

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States within the limits of
the cities of Panama and Colon and their adjacent harbours and within
the territory adjacent thereto the right to acquire by purchase or by
the exercise of the right of eminent domain, any lands, buildings, water
rights or other properties necessary and convenient for the
construction, maintenance, operation and protection of the canal and of
any works of sanitation, such as the collection and disposition of
sewage and the distribution of water in the said cities of Panama and
Colon, which, in the discretion of the United States, may be necessary
and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation
and protection of the said canal and railroad. All such works of
sanitation, collection and disposition of sewage and distribution of
water in the cities of Panama and Colon shall be made at the expense of
the United States, and the government of the United States, its agents
or nominees shall be authorized to impose and collect water rates and
sewage rates which shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of
interest and the amortization of the principal of the cost of said works
within a period of fifty years, and upon the expiration of said term of
fifty years the system of sewers and water works shall revert to and
become the properties of the cities of Panama and Colon respectively;
and the use of the water shall be free to the inhabitants of Panama and
Colon, except to the extent that water rates may be necessary for the
operation and maintenance of said system of sewers and water.

The Republic of Panama agrees that the cities of Panama and Colon shall
comply in perpetuity with the sanitary ordinances whether of a
preventive or curative character prescribed by the United States, and in
case the government of Panama is unable or fails in its duty to enforce
this compliance by the cities of Panama and Colon with the sanitary
ordinances of the United States the Republic of Panama grants to the
United States the right and authority to enforce the same.

The same right and authority are granted to the United States for the
maintenance of public order in the cities of Panama and Colon and the
territories and harbours adjacent thereto in case the Republic of Panama
should not be, in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain
such order.

Article 8.

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all rights which it
now has or hereafter may acquire to the property of the New Panama Canal
Company and the Panama Railroad Company as a result of the transfer of
sovereignty from the Republic of Colombia to the Republic of Panama over
the isthmus of Panama, and authorizes the New Panama Canal Company to
sell and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges,
properties and concessions, as well as the Panama Railroad and all the
shares or part of the shares of that company; but the public lands
situated outside of the zone described in Article 2 of this treaty now
included in the concessions to both said enterprises and not required in
the construction or operation of the canal shall revert to the Republic
of Panama except any property now owned by or in the possession of said
companies within Panama or Colon or the ports or terminals thereof.

Article 9.

The United States agrees that the ports at either entrance of the canal
and the waters thereof, and the Republic of Panama agrees that the
towns of Panama and Colon shall be free for all time, so that there
shall not be imposed or collected custom-house tolls, tonnage,
anchorage, lighthouse, wharf, pilot, or quarantine dues or any other
charges or taxes of any kind upon any vessel using or passing through
the canal or belonging to or employed by the United States, directly or
indirectly, in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation,
sanitation and protection of the main canal, or auxiliary works, or upon
the cargo, officers, crew, or passengers of any such vessels, except
such tolls and charges as may be imposed by the United States for the
use of the canal and other works, and except tolls and charges imposed
by the Republic of Panama upon merchandise destined to be introduced for
the consumption of the rest of the Republic of Panama, and upon vessels
touching at the ports of Colon and Panama and which do not cross the
canal.

The government of the Republic of Panama shall have the right to
establish in such ports and in the towns of Panama and Colon such houses
and guards as it may deem necessary to collect duties on importations
destined to other portions of Panama and to prevent contraband trade.
The United States shall have the right to make use of the towns and
harbours of Panama and Colon as places of anchorage, and for making
repairs, for loading, unloading, depositing, or transshipping cargoes
either in transit or destined for the service of the canal and for other
works pertaining to the canal.

* * * * *

Article 23.

If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed forces for the
safety or protection of the canal, or of the ships that make use of the
same, or the railways and auxiliary works, the United States shall have
the right, at all times and in its discretion, to use its police and its
land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for these purposes.

* * * * *

APPENDIX IV.

PANAMA CANAL TOLL RATES.

By the President of the United States of America, Washington, November
14, 1912.

A PROCLAMATION.

I, William Howard Taft, President of the United States of America, by
virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the Act of Congress,
approved August twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred and twelve, to provide
for the opening, maintenance, protection and operation of the Panama
Canal and the sanitation and government of the canal zone, do hereby
prescribe and proclaim the following rates of toll be paid, by vessels
using the Panama Canal.

1. On merchant vessels carrying passengers or cargo one dollar and
twenty cents ($1.20) per net vessel ton--each one hundred (100) cubic
feet--of actual earning capacity.

2. On vessels in ballast without passengers or cargo forty (40) per
cent. less than the rate of tolls for vessels with passengers or cargo.

3. Upon naval vessels, other than transports, colliers, hospital ships,
and supply ships, fifty (50) cents per displacement ton.

4. Upon army and navy transports, colliers, hospital ships and supply
ships one dollar and twenty cents ($1.20) per net ton, the vessels to be
measured by the same rules as are employed in determining the net
tonnage of merchant vessels.

The Secretary of War will prepare and prescribe such rules for the
measurement of vessels and such regulations as may be necessary and
proper to carry this proclamation into full force and effect.

THE END.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Panama Canal - A history and description of the enterprise" ***

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