Grace, Actual and Habitual - A Dogmatic Treatise

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Title: Grace, Actual and Habitual - A Dogmatic Treatise
Author: Pohle, Joseph, 1852-1922
Language: English
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Grace

Actual and Habitual

A Dogmatic Treatise

The Rt. Rev. Msgr. Joseph Pohle, Ph.D., D.D.

Formerly Professor of Dogmatic Theology at St. Joseph’s Seminary, Leeds
(England), Later Professor of Fundamental Theology at The Catholic
University of America

Adapted and Edited by

Arthur Preuss

Third, Revised Edition

W. E. Blake & Son, Limited

Catholic Church Supplies

123 Church St.

Toronto, Canada

1919

CONTENTS

Imprimatur
Introduction
Part I. Actual Grace
Chapter I. The Nature Of Actual Grace
Section 1. Definition Of Actual Grace
Section 2. Division Of Actual Grace
Chapter II. The Properties Of Actual Grace
Section 1. The Necessity Of Actual Grace
Article 1. The Capacity Of Mere Nature Without Grace
Article 2. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For All Salutary Acts
Article 3. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For The States Of
Unbelief, Mortal Sin, And Justification
Section 2. The Gratuity Of Actual Grace
Section 3. The Universality Of Actual Grace
Article 1. The Universality Of God’s Will To Save
Article 2. God’s Will To Give Sufficient Grace To All Adult Human
Beings In Particular
Article 3. The Predestination Of The Elect
Article 4. The Reprobation Of The Damned
Chapter III. Grace In Its Relation To Free-Will
Section 1. The Heresy of The Protestant Reformers And The Jansenists
Section 2. Theological Systems Devised To Harmonize The Dogmas Of
Grace And Free-Will
Article 1. Thomism And Augustinianism
Article 2. Molinism And Congruism
Part II. Sanctifying Grace
Chapter I. The Genesis Of Sanctifying Grace, Or The Process Of
Justification
Section 1. The Necessity Of Faith For Justification
Section 2. The Necessity Of Other Preparatory Acts Besides Faith
Chapter II. The State Of Justification
Section 1. The Nature Of Justification
Article 1. The Negative Element Of Justification
Article 2. The Positive Element Of Justification
Section 2. Justifying Or Sanctifying Grace
Article 1. The Nature Of Sanctifying Grace
Article 2. The Effects Of Sanctifying Grace
Article 3. The Supernatural Concomitants Of Sanctifying Grace
Section 3. The Properties Of Sanctifying Grace
Chapter III. The Fruits Of Justification, Or The Merit Of Good Works
Section 1. The Existence Of Merit
Section 2. The Requisites Of Merit
Section 3. The Objects Of Merit
Index
Footnotes

IMPRIMATUR

_NIHIL OBSTAT_

_Sti. Ludovici, die 18 Jan. 1919_

_F. G. Holweck,_
_ Censor Librorum_

_IMPRIMATUR_

_Sti. Ludovici, die 21 Jan. 1919_

_Joannes J. Glennon_
_ Archiepiscopus_
_ Sti. Ludovici_

_Copyright, 1914_
_ by_
_ Joseph Gummersbach_

_All rights reserved_

_Printed in U. S. A._

BECKTOLD
PRINTING & BOOK MFG. CO.
ST. LOUIS. U. S. A.

INTRODUCTION

Humanity was reconciled to God by the Redemption. This does not, however,
mean that every individual human being was forthwith justified, for
individual justification is wrought by the application to the soul of
grace derived from the inexhaustible merits of Jesus Christ.

There are two kinds of grace: (1) actual and (2) habitual. Actual grace is
a supernatural gift by which rational creatures are enabled to perform
salutary acts. Habitual, or, as it is commonly called, sanctifying, grace
is a habit, or more or less enduring state, which renders men pleasing to
God.

This distinction is of comparatively recent date, but it furnishes an
excellent principle of division for a dogmatic treatise on grace.(1)

PART I. ACTUAL GRACE

Actual grace is a transient supernatural help given by God from the
treasury of the merits of Jesus Christ for the purpose of enabling man to
work out his eternal salvation.

We shall consider: (1) The Nature of Actual Grace; (2) Its Properties, and
(3) Its Relation to Free-Will.

GENERAL READINGS:—St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu.
109-114, and the commentators, especially Billuart, _De Gratia_
(ed. Lequette, t. III); the Salmanticenses, _De Gratia Dei_
(_Cursus Theologiae_, Vol. IX sqq., Paris 1870); Thomas de Lemos,
_Panoplia Divinae Gratiae_, Liège 1676; Dominicus Soto, _De Natura
et Gratia_, l. III, Venice 1560; *Ripalda,(2) _De Ente
Supernaturali_, 3 vols. (I, Bordeaux 1634; II, Lyons 1645; III,
Cologne 1648).

*C. v. Schäzler, _Natur und Übernatur: Das Dogma von der Gnade_,
Mainz 1865; IDEM, _Neue Untersuchungen über das Dogma von der
Gnade_, Mainz 1867; *J. E. Kuhn, _Die christliche Lehre von der
göttlichen Gnade_, Tübingen 1868; Jos. Kleutgen, S. J., _Theologie
der Vorseit_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 152 sqq., Münster 1872; R.
Cercià, _De Gratia Christi_, 3 vols., Paris 1879; *C. Mazzella, S.
J., _De Gratia Christi_, 4th ed., Rome 1895; *J. H. Oswald, _Die
Lehre von der Heiligung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnadenwahl_,
3rd ed., Paderborn 1885; *D. Palmieri, S. J., _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, Gulpen 1885; *Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische
Theologie_, Vol. VIII, Mainz 1897; *S. Schiffini, S. J., _De
Gratia Divina_, Freiburg 1901; G. Lahousse, S. J., _De Gratia
Divina_, Louvain 1902; Chr. Pesch, S. J., _Praelectiones
Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1908; G. van Noort, _De
Gratia Christi_, Amsterdam 1908; E. J. Wirth, _Divine Grace_, New
York 1903; S. J. Hunter, S. J., _Outlines of Dogmatic Theology_,
Vol. III, pp. 1 sqq.; Wilhelm-Scannell, _A Manual of Catholic
Theology_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 227 sqq., London 1901; A. Devine,
_The Sacraments Explained_, 3rd ed. pp. 1-43, London 1905.—L.
Labauche, S. S., _God and Man, Lectures on Dogmatic Theology II_,
pp. 123 sqq., New York 1916.—J. E. Nieremberg, S. J., _The Marvels
of Divine Grace_, tr. by Lady Lovat, London 1917.

On the teaching of the Fathers cfr. Isaac Habert, _Theologiae
Græcorum Patrum Vindicatae circa Universam Materiam Gratiae Libri
III_, Paris 1646; E. Scholz, _Die Lehre des hl. Basilius von der
Gnade_, Freiburg 1881; Hümmer, _Des hl. Gregor von Nazianz Lehre
von der Gnade_, Kempten 1890; E. Weigl, _Die Heilslehre des hl.
Cyrill von Alexandrien_, Mainz 1905.

Chapter I. The Nature Of Actual Grace

Section 1. Definition Of Actual Grace

1. GENERAL NOTION OF GRACE.—The best way to arrive at a correct definition
of actual grace is by the synthetic method. We therefore begin with the
general notion of grace.

Like “nature,”(3) grace (_gratia_, χάρις) is a word of wide reach, used in
a great variety of senses. Habert(4) enumerates no less than fourteen;
which, however, may be reduced to four.

a) Subjectively, grace signifies good will or benevolence shown by a
superior to an inferior, as when a criminal is pardoned by the king’s
grace.

b) Objectively, it designates a favor inspired by good will or
benevolence. In this sense the term may be applied to any free and
gratuitous gift (_donum gratis datum_), as when a king bestows graces on
his lieges.

c) Grace may also mean personal charm or attractiveness. In this sense the
term frequently occurs in Latin and Greek literature (the Three Graces).
Charm elicits love and prompts a person to the bestowal of favors.

d) The recipient of gifts or favors usually feels gratitude towards the
giver, which he expresses in the form of thanks. Hence the word _gratiae_
(plural) frequently stands for thanksgiving (“_gratias agere_,” “_Deo
gratias_,” “to say grace after meals”).(5)

The first and fundamental of these meanings is “a free gift or favor.” The
benevolence of the giver and the attractiveness of the recipient are
merely the reasons for which the gift is imparted, whereas the expression
of thanks is an effect following its bestowal.

Dogmatic theology is concerned exclusively with grace in the fundamental
sense of the term.

e) Grace is called a gift (_donum_, δωρεά), because it is owing to free
benevolence, not required by justice. It is called gratuitous (_gratis
datum_), because it is bestowed without any corresponding merit on the
part of the creature. A gift may be due to the recipient as a matter of
distributive or commutative justice, and in that case it would not be
absolutely gratuitous (_gratis_). Grace, on the contrary, is bestowed out
of pure benevolence, from no other motive than sheer love. This is
manifestly St. Paul’s idea when he writes: “And if by grace, it is not now
by works: otherwise grace is no more grace.”(6) It is likewise the meaning
of St. Augustine when he says, in his Homilies on the Gospel of St. John,
that grace is “something gratuitously given ... as a present, not in
return for something else.”(7)

2. NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL GRACE.—Grace is not necessarily supernatural.
Sacred Scripture and the Fathers sometimes apply the word to purely
natural gifts. We petition God for our daily bread, for good health, fair
weather and other temporal favors, and we thank Him for preserving us from
pestilence, famine, and war, although these are blessings which do not
transcend the order of nature.(8)

a) Our petitions for purely natural favors are inspired by the conviction
that creation itself, and everything connected therewith, is a gratuitous
gift of God. This conviction is well founded. God was under no necessity
of creating anything: creation was an act of His free-will. Again, many of
the favors to which human nature, as such, has a claim, are free gifts
when conferred upon the individual. Good health, fortitude, talent, etc.,
are natural graces, for which we are allowed, nay obliged, to petition
God. The Pelagians employed this truth to conceal a pernicious error when
they unctuously descanted on the magnitude and necessity of grace as
manifested in creation. It was by such trickery that their leader
succeeded in persuading the bishops assembled at the Council of Diospolis
or Lydda (A. D. 415) that his teaching was quite orthodox. St. Augustine
and four other African bishops later reported to Pope Innocent I, that if
these prelates had perceived that Pelagius meant to deny that grace by
which we are Christians and sons of God, they would not have listened to
him so patiently, and that, consequently, no blame attached to these
judges because they simply took the term “grace” in its ecclesiastical
sense.(9)

b) Generally speaking, however, the term “grace” is reserved for what are
commonly called the supernatural gifts of God, the merely preternatural as
well as the strictly supernatural.(10) In this sense "grace" is as sharply
opposed to purely natural favors as nature is opposed to the supernatural.

The importance of the distinction between supernatural and purely natural
grace will appear from an analysis of the concept itself. Considered as
gifts of God, the strictly supernatural graces (_e.g._, justification,
divine sonship, the beatific vision) ontologically exceed the bounds of
nature. Considered as purely gratuitous favors, they are negatively and
positively undeserved. The grace involved in creation, for instance, is
not conferred on some existing beneficiary, but actually produces its
recipient. The creation itself, therefore, being entirely _gratis data_,
all that succeeds it, supernatural grace included, must be negatively
undeserved, in as far as it was not necessary for the recipient to exist
at all. But the supernatural graces are _indebitae_ also positively,
_i.e._ positing the creation, because they transcend every creatural claim
and power. Both elements are contained in the above-quoted letter of the
African bishops to Pope Innocent I: “Though it may be said in a certain
legitimate sense, that we were created by the grace of God, ... that is a
different grace by which we are called predestined, by which we are
justified, and by which we receive eternal beatitude.”(11) Of this
last-mentioned grace (_i.e._ grace in the strictly supernatural sense),
St. Augustine says: “This, the grace which Catholic bishops are wont to
read in the books of God and preach to their people, and the grace which
the Apostle commends, is not that by which we are created as men, but that
by which as sinful men we are justified.”(12) In other words, natural is
opposed to supernatural grace in the same way that nature is opposed to
the supernatural. “[To believe] is the work of grace, not of nature. It
is, I say, the work of grace, which the second Adam brought us, not of
nature, which Adam wholly lost in himself.”(13) Adding the new note
obtained by this analysis we arrive at the following definition: Grace is
a gratuitous _super-natural_ gift.(14)

3. THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE GRACE OF CHRIST.—Though all supernatural
graces are from God, a distinction is made between the “grace of God” and
the “grace of Christ.” The difference between them is purely accidental,
based on the fact that the “grace of Christ” flows exclusively from the
merits of the atonement.

a) The following points may serve as criteria to distinguish the two
notions:

A) The _gratia Dei_ springs from divine benevolence and presupposes a
recipient who is unworthy merely in a negative sense (=not worthy, _non
dignus_), whereas the _gratia Christi_ flows from mercy and benevolence
and is conferred on a recipient who is positively unworthy (_indignus_).

B) The _gratia Dei_ elevates the soul to the supernatural order (_gratia
elevans_), while the _gratia Christi_ heals the wounds inflicted by sin,
especially concupiscence (_gratia elevans simul et sanans_).

C) The _gratia Dei_ is a gratuitous gift conferred by the Blessed Trinity
without regard to the theandric merits of Jesus Christ, whereas the
_gratia Christi_ is based entirely on those merits.

b) The Scotists hold that the distinction between _gratia Dei_ and _gratia
Christi_ is purely logical. They regard the God-man as the predestined
centre of the universe and the source of all graces.(15) The Thomists, on
the other hand, regard the grace of the angels, and that wherewith our
first parents were endowed in Paradise, purely as _gratia Dei_; they hold
that the merits of Christ did not become operative until after the Fall,
and that, consequently, there is a real distinction between the grace of
the angels and that of our first parents on the one hand, and the grace of
Christ on the other.

As it cannot reasonably be supposed that the angels are endowed with
specifically the same graces by which mankind was redeemed from sin, the
Scotists are forced to admit a distinction between the grace of Christ as
God-man (_gratia Christi Dei-hominis_) and the grace of Christ as Redeemer
(_gratia Christi Redemptoris_), so that even according to them, the
dogmatic treatise on Grace is concerned solely with the grace of Christ
_qua_ Redeemer.

Hence, grace must be more particularly defined as a gratuitous
supernatural gift _derived from the merits of Jesus Christ_.(16)

4. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL GRACE.—External grace (_gratia externa_)
comprises all those strictly supernatural institutions which stimulate
pious thoughts and salutary resolutions in the human soul. Such are, for
example, Holy Scripture, the Church, the Sacraments, the example of Jesus
Christ, etc. Internal grace (_gratia interna_) inheres or operates
invisibly in the soul, and places it in relation with God as its
supernatural end. Internal graces are, _e.g._, the theological virtues,
the power of forgiving sins, etc. The Pelagians admitted external, but
obstinately denied internal grace.(17)

St. Paul(18) emphasizes the distinction between external and internal
grace by designating the former as “law” (_lex_, νόμος) and the latter as
“faith” (_fides_, πίστις). With one exception, (_viz._, the Hypostatic
Union, which is the climax of all graces), external is inferior to,
because a mere preparation for, internal grace, which aims at
sanctification. We are concerned in this treatise solely with internal
grace. Hence, proceeding a step further, we may define grace as a
gratuitous, supernatural, _internal_ gift of God, derived from the merits
of Jesus Christ.(19)

5. “GRATIA GRATIS DATA” and “GRATIA GRATUM FACIENS.”—The supernatural
grace of Christ, existing invisibly in the soul either as a transient
impulse (_actus_) or as a permanent state (_habitus_), tends either to the
salvation of the person in whom it inheres or through him to the
sanctification of others. In the former case it is called ingratiating
(_gratia gratum faciens_), in the latter, gratuitously given (_gratia
gratis data_). The term _gratia gratis data_ is based on the words of our
Lord recorded in the Gospel of St. Matthew: “Heal the sick, raise the
dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils: freely have you received,
freely give.”(20)

a) The _gratia gratum faciens_ is intended for all men without exception;
the _gratia gratis data_ only for a few specially chosen persons. To the
class of gratuitously bestowed graces belong the charismata of the
prophets and the ordinary powers of the priesthood.(21)

Each of these two species of internal grace may exist independently of the
other because personal holiness is not a necessary prerequisite for the
exercise of the charismata or the power of forgiving sins, etc.

b) Considered with regard to its intrinsic worth, the _gratia gratum
faciens_ is decidedly superior to the _gratia gratis data_. St. Paul,
after enumerating all the charismata, admonishes the Corinthians: “Be
zealous for the better gifts, and I show unto you yet a more excellent
way,”(22) and then sings the praises of charity:(23) “If I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as
sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And if I should have prophecy and
should know all the mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all
faith, so that I could remove mountains, I am nothing, etc.”(24) Charity
is a _gratia gratum faciens_. Hence, since the _gratia gratis data_ is
treated elsewhere (Apologetics, Mystic and Sacramental Theology), we must
add another note to our definition: Grace is a gratuitous, supernatural,
internal gift, derived from the merits of Jesus Christ, _by which man is
rendered pleasing in the sight of God_.(25)

6. ACTUAL AND HABITUAL GRACE.—The _gratia gratum faciens_ is given either
for the performance of a supernatural act or for the production of a
permanent supernatural state (_habitus_). In the latter case it is called
habitual, or, as it sanctifies the creature in the eyes of God,
sanctifying grace.

Actual grace comprises two essential elements: (1) divine help as the
principle of every salutary supernatural act, and (2) the salutary act
itself. Hence its designation by the Fathers as Θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἡ τοῦ Λόγου
χείρ, θεία κίνησις, or, in Latin, _Dei auxilium, subsidium, adiutorium,
motio divina_,—all of which appellations have been adopted by the
Schoolmen. Actual grace invariably tends either to produce habitual or
sanctifying grace, or to preserve and increase it where it already exists.
It follows that, being merely a means to an end, actual grace is inferior
to sanctifying grace, which is that end itself.

Actual grace may therefore be defined as an unmerited,
supernatural, internal divine help, based on the merits of Jesus
Christ, which renders man pleasing in the sight of God, enabling
him to perform salutary acts; or, somewhat more succinctly, as a
supernatural help bestowed for the performance of salutary acts,
in consideration of the merits of Jesus Christ.

Actual grace is (1) a _help_ (_auxilium_), because it consists in a
transient influence exercised by God on the soul. (2) A _supernatural_
help, to distinguish it from God’s ordinary providence and all such merely
natural graces as man would probably have received in the state of pure
nature.(26) (3) It is attributed to the merits of Jesus Christ, in order
to indicate that the graces granted to fallen man are all derived from the
atonement both as their efficient and their meritorious cause. (4) Actual
grace is said to be given for the performance of salutary acts to show
that its immediate purpose or end is an act, not a state, and that the
acts for which it is given must be in the order of salvation.

7. THE TWOFOLD CAUSALITY OF ACTUAL GRACE.—If grace is a supernatural help,
mere nature cannot, of its own strength, perform salutary acts.
Consequently, actual grace exercises a causal influence without which man
would be helpless in the matter of salvation.

The causality of actual grace is both moral and physical.

a) As a moral cause grace removes the obstacles which render the work of
salvation difficult. Besides this negative it also has a positive effect:
it inspires delight in virtue and hatred of sin.

This mode of operation manifestly presupposes a certain weakness of the
human will, _i.e._ _concupiscence_, which is an effect of original sin.
Actual grace exercises a healing influence on the will(27) and is
therefore called _gratia sanans sive medicinalis_. “Unless something is
put before the soul to please and attract it,” says St. Augustine, “the
will can in no wise be moved; but it is not in man’s power to bring this
about.”(28) Concretely, this moral causality of grace manifests itself as
a divinely inspired joy in virtue and a hatred of sin, both of which
incline the will to the free performance of salutary acts. These
sentiments may in some cases be so strong as to deprive the will
temporarily of its freedom to resist. The sudden conversion of St. Paul is
a case in point. Holy Scripture expressly assures us that God is the
absolute master of the human will and, if He so chooses, can bend it under
His yoke without using physical force. Cfr. Prov. XXI, 1: “The heart of
the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will, he shall turn
it.” “Who will be so foolish as to say,” queries St. Augustine, “that God
cannot change the evil wills of men, whichever, whenever, and wheresoever
He chooses, and direct them to what is good?”(29) It is but rarely, of
course, that God grants to any man a summary victory over his sinful
nature; but this fact does not prevent the Church from praying:
“Vouchsafe, O Lord, to compel our wills to thee, even though they be
rebellious.”(30)

b) Even more important than the moral causality of grace is its physical
causality. Man depends entirely on God for the physical strength necessary
to perform salutary works. Grace elevates the faculties of the soul to the
supernatural sphere, thereby enabling it to perform supernatural acts.

Physical is as distinct from moral causality in the order of grace as in
the order of nature. The holding out of a beautiful toy will not enable a
child to walk without support from its elders. Moral causality is
insufficient to enable a man to perform salutary acts. Grace (as we shall
show later) is absolutely, _i.e._ metaphysically, necessary for all
salutary acts, whether easy or difficult, and hence the incapacity of
nature cannot be ascribed solely to weakness and to the moral difficulty
resulting from sin, but must be attributed mainly to physical impotence. A
bird without wings is not merely impeded but utterly unable to fly;
similarly, man without grace is not only handicapped but absolutely
incapacitated for the work of salvation. Considered under this aspect,
actual grace is called _gratia elevans_, because it elevates man to the
supernatural state.(31)

This double causality of grace is well brought out in Perrone’s classic
definition: “_Gratia actualis est gratuitum illud auxilium,_(_32_)_ quod
Deus_(_33_)_ per Christi merita_(_34_)_ homini lapso_(_35_)_ largitur, tum
ut eius infirmitati consulat,_(_36_)_ ... tum ut eum erigat ad statum
supernaturalem atque idoneum faciat ad actus supernaturales
eliciendos,_(_37_)_ ut iustificationem possit adipisci_(_38_)_ in eaque
iam consecuta perseverare, donec perveniat ad vitam aeternam._”(39) In
English: “Actual grace is that unmerited interior assistance which God, by
virtue of the merits of Christ, confers upon fallen man, in order, on the
one hand, to remedy his infirmity resulting from sin and, on the other, to
raise him to the supernatural order and thereby to render him capable of
performing supernatural acts, so that he may attain justification,
persevere in it to the end, and thus enter into everlasting life.” This
definition is strictly scientific, for it enumerates all the elements that
enter into the essence of actual grace.

Section 2. Division Of Actual Grace

Actual grace may be divided according to: (1) the difference existing
between the faculties of the human soul, and (2) in reference to the
freedom of the will.

Considered in its relation to the different faculties of the soul, actual
grace is either of the intellect, or of the will, or of the sensitive
faculties. With regard to the free consent of the will, it is either (1)
prevenient, also called coöperating, or (2) efficacious or merely
sufficient.

1. THE ILLUMINATING GRACE OF THE INTELLECT.—Actual grace, in so far as it
inspires salutary thoughts, is called illuminating (_gratia illuminationis
s. illustrationis_).

This illumination of the intellect by grace may be either mediate or
immediate. It is mediate if grace suggests salutary thoughts to the
intellect by purely natural means, or external graces, such as a stirring
sermon, the perusal of a good book, etc.; it is immediate when the Holy
Ghost elevates the powers of the soul, and through the instrumentality of
the so-called _potentia obedientialis_,(40) produces in it entitatively
supernatural acts.

The existence of the grace of immediate illumination follows from its
absolute necessity as a means of salvation, defined by the Second Council
of Orange, A. D. 529.(41)

a) The grace of mediate illumination may be inferred aprioristically from
the existence of a divine revelation equipped with such supernatural
institutions as the Bible, the sacraments, rites, ceremonies, etc. In
conformity with the psychological laws governing the association of ideas,
intelligent meditation on the agencies comprised under the term “external
grace”(42) elicits in the mind salutary thoughts, which are not
necessarily supernatural in their inception.

It is not unlikely that Sacred Scripture refers to such graces as these
when it recommends “the law of God” or “the example of Christ” as fit
subjects for meditation. Cfr. Ps. XVIII, 8 sq.: “The law of the Lord is
unspotted, converting souls, ... the commandment of the Lord is lightsome,
enlightening the eyes.”(43) 1 Pet. II, 21: “Christ also suffered for us,
leaving you an example that you should follow his steps.”(44) St.
Augustine probably had in mind the grace of mediate illumination when he
wrote: “God acts upon us by the incentives of visible objects to will and
to believe, either externally by evangelical exhortations, ... or
internally, as no man has control over what enters into his thoughts.”(45)
The grace of mediate illumination has for its object to prepare the way
quietly and unostentatiously for a grace of greater import, namely, the
immediate illumination of the mind by the Holy Ghost.

b) The grace of immediate far surpasses that of mediate illumination
because the supernatural life of the soul originates in faith, which in
turn is based on a strictly supernatural enlightenment of the mind.

α) St. Paul expressly teaches: “And such confidence we have, through
Christ, towards God; not that we are sufficient to think anything of
ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is of God.”(46)

The salient portion of this text reads as follows in the original Greek:
Οὐχ ὅτι ἱκανοί ἐσμεν λογίσασθαί τι ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ὡς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ
ἱκανότης ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Speaking in the plural (_pluralis
maiestaticus_), the Apostle confesses himself unable to conceive a single
salutary thought (λογίσασθαι), and ascribes the power (ἱκανότης) to do so
to God. Considered merely as vital acts, such thoughts proceed from the
natural faculties of the mind (ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν), but the power that produces
them is divine (ἐκ Θεοῦ), not human (ἐξ ἑαυτῶν). Hence each salutary
thought exceeds the power of man, and is an immediate supernatural grace.

A still more cogent argument can be derived from 1 Cor. III, 6 sq.: “I
have planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase. Therefore,
neither he that planteth is anything, nor he that watereth; but God that
giveth the increase.”(47) In this beautiful allegory the Apostle compares
the genesis of supernatural faith in the soul to that of a plant under the
care of a gardener, who while he plants and waters, yet looks to God for
“the increase.” The Apostle and his disciple Apollo are the spiritual
gardeners through whose preaching the Corinthians received the grace of
mediate illumination. But, as St. Paul says, this preaching would have
been useless (_non est aliquid_) had not God given “the increase.” In
other words, the grace of immediate illumination was necessary to make the
Apostolic preaching effective. “For,” in the words of St. Augustine, “God
Himself contributes to the production of fruit in good trees, when He both
externally waters and tends them by the agency of His servants, and
internally by Himself also gives the increase.”(48)

β) The argument from Tradition is based chiefly on St. Augustine, “the
Doctor of Grace,” whose authority in this branch of dogmatic theology is
unique.(49) His writings abound in many such synonymous terms for the
grace of immediate illumination, as _cogitatio pia, vocatio alta et
secreta, locutio in cogitatione, aperitio veritatis_, etc., etc.

He says among other things: “Instruction and admonition are external aids,
but he who controls the hearts has his cathedra in heaven.”(50) Augustine
esteems human preaching as nothing and ascribes all its good effects to
grace. “It is the internal Master who teaches; Christ teaches and His
inspiration.”(51) In harmony with his master, St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, the
ablest defender of the Augustinian (_i.e._ Catholic) doctrine of grace,
says: “In vain will our sacred discourses strike the external ear, unless
God by a spiritual gift opens the hearing of the interior man.”(52)

2. THE STRENGTHENING GRACE OF THE WILL.—This grace, usually called _gratia
inspirationis_,(53) may also be either mediate or immediate, according as
pious affections and wholesome resolutions are produced in the soul by a
preceding illumination of the intellect or directly by the Holy Ghost.
Owing to the psychological interaction of intellect and will, every grace
of the mind, whether mediate or immediate, is _eo ipso_ also a mediate
grace of the will, which implies a new act of the soul, but not a new
grace. What we are concerned with here is the immediate strengthening
grace of the will, which is far more important and more necessary.

We are not able to demonstrate this teaching from Sacred Scripture. The
texts John VI, 44 and Phil. II, 13, which are usually adduced in this
connection, are inconclusive.

Hence we must rely solely on Tradition. The argument from Tradition is
based mainly on St. Augustine. In defending divine grace against Pelagius,
this holy Doctor asserts the indispensability and superior value of the
strengthening grace of the will.

“By that grace it is effected, not only that we discover what ought to be
done, but also that we do what we have discovered; not only that we
believe what ought to be loved, but also that we love what we have
believed.”(54) And again: “Let him discern between knowledge and charity,
as they ought to be distinguished, because knowledge puffeth up, but
charity edifieth.... And inasmuch as both are gifts of God, although one
is less and the other greater, he must not extol our righteousness above
the praise which is due to Him who justifies us in such a way as to assign
to the lesser of these two gifts the help of divine grace, and to claim
the greater one for the control of the human will.”(55) St. Augustine
emphasized the existence and necessity of this higher grace of the will in
his controversy with the Pelagians. He was firmly convinced that a man may
know the way of salvation, and yet refuse to follow it.(56) He insisted
that mere knowledge is not virtue, as Socrates had falsely taught.

Ecclesiastical Tradition was always in perfect accord with this teaching,
which eventually came to be defined by the plenary Council of Carthage (A.
D. 418) as follows: “If any one assert that this same grace of God,
granted through our Lord Jesus Christ, helps to avoid sin only for the
reason that it opens and reveals to us an understanding of the [divine]
commands, so that we may know what we should desire and what we should
avoid; but that it is not granted to us by the same (grace) to desire and
be able to do that which we know we ought to do, let him be
anathema;—since both are gifts of God: to know what we must do and to have
the wish to do it.”(57)

Like the illuminating grace of the intellect the strengthening grace of
the will effects vital acts and manifests itself chiefly in what are known
as the emotions of the will. St. Prosper, after Fulgentius the most
prominent disciple of St. Augustine, enumerates these as follows: “Fear
(for ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom’); joy (‘I rejoiced
at the things that were said to me: We shall go into the house of the
Lord’); desire (‘My soul longeth and fainteth for the courts of the
Lord’); delight (‘How sweet are thy words to my palate, more than honey to
my mouth’);”—and he adds: “Who can see or tell by what affections God
visits and guides the human soul?”(58)

3. ACTUAL GRACES OF THE SENSITIVE SPHERE.—Though it cannot be determined
with certainty of faith, it is highly probable that actual grace
influences the sensitive faculties of the soul as well as the intellect
and the will.

God, who is the first and sole cause of all things, is no doubt able to
excite in the human imagination phantasms corresponding to the
supernatural thoughts produced in the intellect, and to impede or paralyze
the rebellious stirrings of concupiscence which resist the grace of the
will,—either by infusing contrary dispositions or by allowing spiritual
joy to run over into the _appetitus sensitivus_. The existence of such
graces (which need not necessarily be supernatural except _quoad modum et
finem_) may be inferred with great probability from the fact that man is a
compound of body and soul. Aristotle holds that the human mind cannot
think without the aid of the imagination.(59) If this is true, every
supernatural thought must be preceded by a corresponding phantasm to
excite and sustain it. As for the sensitive appetite, it may either assume
the form of concupiscence and hinder the work of salvation, or aid it by
favorable emotions excited supernaturally. St. Augustine says that the
_delectatio victrix_ has for its object “to impart sweetness to that which
gave no pleasure.”(60) St. Paul, who thrice besought the Lord to relieve
him of the sting of his flesh, was told: “My grace is sufficient for
thee.”(61)

4. _The Illuminating Grace of the Mind and the Strengthening Grace of the
Will Considered as Vital Acts of the Soul._—If we examine these graces
more closely to determine their physical nature, we find that they are
simply vital acts of the intellect and the will, and receive the character
of divine “graces” from the fact that they are supernaturally excited in
the soul by God.

a) The Biblical, Patristic, and conciliar terms _cogitatio_, _suasio_,
_scientia_, _cognitio_, as well as _delectatio_, _voluptas_, _desiderium_,
_caritas_, _bona voluntas_, _cupiditas_, all manifestly point to vital
acts of the soul. But even where grace is described as _vocatio_,
_illuminatio_, _illustratio_, _excitatio_, _pulsatio_, _inspiratio_, or
_tractio_, the reference can only be—if not _formaliter_, at least
_virtualiter_—to immanent vital acts of the intellect or will. This is the
concurrent teaching of SS. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The former says:
“God calls [us] by [our] innermost thoughts,” and: “See how the Father
draws [and] by teaching delights [us].”(62) The latter quotes the
Aristotelian axiom: “_Actus moventis in moto est motus._”(63)

If the graces of the intellect and of the will are supernaturally inspired
acts of the soul, by what process does the mind of man respond to the
impulse of illumination and inspiration?

The language employed by the Fathers and councils leaves no doubt that
supernatural knowledge manifests itself mainly in judgments. But simple
apprehension and ratiocination must also play a part, (1) because these
two operations are of the essence of human thought, and the grace of
illumination always works through natural agencies; and (2) because some
intellectual apprehensions are merely condensed judgments and syllogisms.

The graces of the will naturally work through the spiritual emotions or
passions, of which there are eleven: love and hatred, joy and sadness,
desire and abhorrence, hope and despair, fear and daring, and lastly
anger. With the exception of despair (for which there is no place in the
business of salvation), all these passions have a practical relation to
good and evil and are consequently called “graces” both in Scripture and
Tradition. Love (_amor_) is the fundamental affection of the will, to
which all others are reducible, and hence the principal function of grace,
in so far as it affects the will, must consist in producing acts of
love.(64) The Council of Carthage (A. D. 418) declares that “both to know
what we must do, and to love to do it, is a gift of God.”(65) It would be
a mistake, however, to identify this “love” with theological charity,
which is “a perfect love of God above all things for His own sake.”(66)
Justification begins with supernatural faith, is followed by fear, hope,
and contrition, and culminates in charity.(67)

St. Augustine sometimes employs the word _caritas_ in connections where it
cannot possibly mean theological love.(68) This peculiar usage is based on
the idea that love of goodness in a certain way attracts man towards God
and prepares him for the theological virtue of charity. In studying the
writings of St. Augustine, therefore, we must carefully distinguish
between _caritas_ in the strict, and _caritas_ in a secondary and derived
sense.(69) The champions of the falsely so-called Augustinian theory of
grace(70) disregard this important distinction and erroneously claim that
St. Augustine identifies “grace” with _caritas_ in the sense of
theological love; just as if faith, hope, contrition, and the fear of God
were not also graces in the true meaning of the term, and could not exist
without theological charity.

b) Not a few theologians, especially of the Thomist school, enlarge the
list of actual graces by including therein, besides the supernatural vital
acts of the soul, certain extrinsic, non-vital qualities (_qualitates
fluentes, non vitales_) that precede these acts and form their basis. It
is impossible, they argue, to elicit vital or immanent supernatural acts
unless the faculties of the soul have previously been raised to the
supernatural order by means of the _potentia obœdientialis_. The _gratia
elevans_, which produces in the soul of the sinner the same effects that
the so-called infused habits produce in the soul of the just, is a
supernatural power really distinct from its vital effects. In other words,
they say, the vital supernatural acts of the soul are preceded and
produced by a non-vital grace, which must be conceived as a “fluent
quality.” These “fluent” (the opponents of the theory ironically call them
“dead”) qualities are alleged to be real graces.(71) Alvarez and others
endeavor to give their theory a dogmatic standing by quoting in its
support all those passages of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers and councils
in which prevenient grace is described as _pulsatio_, _excitatio_,
_vocatio_, _tractio_, _tactus_, and so forth. The act of knocking or
calling, they say, is not identical with the act of opening, in fact the
former is a grace in a higher sense than the latter, because it is
performed by God alone, while the response comes from the soul coöperating
with God.(72)

The theory thus briefly described is both theologically and
philosophically untenable.

α) Holy Scripture and Tradition nowhere mention any such non-vital
entities or qualities,—a circumstance which would be inexplicable if it
were true, what Cardinal Gotti asserts,(73) that the term “grace” applies
primarily and in the strict sense to these qualities, while the vital acts
are merely effects. Whenever Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church
speak literally, without the use of metaphors, they invariably apply the
term “grace” to these vital acts themselves and ascribe their supernatural
character to an immediate act of God.(74) In perfect conformity with this
teaching St. Augustine explains such metaphorical terms as _vocare_ and
_tangere_ in the sense of _credere_ and _fides_.(75) God employs no
“fluent qualities” or “non-vital entities” in the dispensation of His
grace, but effects the supernatural elevation of the soul immediately and
by Himself.(76)

β) The theory under consideration is inadmissible also from the
philosophical point of view. A quality does not “flow” or tend to revert
to nothingness. On the contrary, its very nature demands that it remain
constant until destroyed by its opposite or by some positive cause. It is
impossible to conceive a quality that would of itself revert to
nothingness without the intervention of a destructive cause. Billuart
merely beats the air when he says: “_Potest dici qualitas incompleta
habens se per modum passionis transeuntis._”(77) What would Aristotle have
said if he had been told of a thing that was half ποιόν and half πάσχειν,
and consequently neither the one nor the other? Actual grace is
transitory; it passes away with the act which it inspires, and
consequently may be said to “flow.” But this very fact proves that it is
not a dead quality, but a _modus vitalis supernaturalis_. In the
dispensation of His grace, God employs no fluent qualities or non-vital
entities, but He Himself is the immediate cause of the supernatural
elevation of the human soul and its faculties. St. Thomas is perfectly
consistent, therefore, when he defines actual grace as a vital act of the
soul.(78)

5. PREVENIENT AND COÖPERATING GRACE.—The vital acts of the soul are either
spontaneous impulses or free acts of the will. Grace may precede free-will
or coöperate with it. If it precedes the free determination of the will it
is called prevenient; if it accompanies (or coincides with) that
determination and merely coöperates with the will, it is called
coöperating grace.

Prevenient grace, regarded as a divine call to penance, is often styled
_gratia vocans sive excitans_, and if it is received with a willing heart,
_gratia adiuvans_. Both species are distinctly mentioned in Holy
Scripture. Cfr. Eph. V, 14: “Wherefore he saith: Rise thou that sleepest,
and arise from the dead: and Christ shall enlighten thee.” 2 Tim. I, 9:
“Who hath delivered us and called us by his holy calling, not according to
our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us
in Christ Jesus before the times of the world.” Rom. VIII, 26: “Likewise
the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity.” Rom. VIII, 30: “And whom he
predestinated, them he also called. And whom he called, them he also
justified. And whom he justified, them he also glorified.” Apoc. III, 20:
“Behold I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear my voice, and
open to me the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he
with me.”

St. Augustine says: “Forasmuch as our turning away from God is our own act
and deed, and this is [our] depraved will; but that we turn to God, this
we cannot do except He rouse and help us, and this is [our] good
will,—what have we that we have not received?”(79)

An equivalent division is that into _gratia operans_ and _coöperans_,
respectively—names which are also founded on Scripture. Cfr. Phil. II, 13:
“For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish,
according to his good will.” Mark XVI, 20: “But they going forth preached
everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs
that followed.”

St. Augustine describes the respective functions of these graces as
follows: “He [God] begins His influence by working in us that we may have
the will, and He completes it by working with us when we have the
will.”(80)

A third division of the same grace is that into _praeveniens_ and
_subsequens_. It is likewise distinctly Scriptural,(81) and its two
members coincide materially with _gratia vocans_ and _adiuvans_, as can be
seen by comparing the usage of St. Augustine with that of the Tridentine
Council. “God’s mercy,” says the holy Doctor, “prevents [_i.e._ precedes]
the unwilling to make him willing; it follows the willing lest he will in
vain.”(82) And the Council of Trent declares that “in adults the beginning
of justification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of God,
through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, without
any merits existing on their part, they are called.”(83)

If we conceive a continuous series of supernatural graces, each may be
called either prevenient or subsequent, according as it is regarded either
as a cause or as an effect. St. Thomas explains this as follows: “As grace
is divided into working and coöperating grace, according to its diverse
effects, so it may also be divided into prevenient and subsequent grace,
according to the meaning attached to the term grace [_i.e._, either
habitual or actual]. The effects which grace works in us are five: (1) It
heals the soul; (2) moves it to will that which is good; (3) enables man
efficaciously to perform the good deeds which he wills; (4) helps him to
persevere in his good resolves; and (5) assists him in attaining to the
state of glory. In so far as it produces the first of these effects, grace
is called prevenient in respect of the second; and in so far as it
produces the second, it is called subsequent in respect of the first. And
as each effect is posterior to one and prior to another, so grace may be
called prevenient or subsequent according as we regard it in its relations
to different effects.”(84)

Among so many prevenient graces there must be one which is preceded by
none other (_simpliciter praeveniens_), and this is preëminently the
_gratia vocans s. excitans_.

There is a fourth and last division, mentioned by the Council of Trent,
which is also based on the relation of grace to free-will. “Jesus Christ
Himself,” says the holy Synod, “continually infuses His virtue into the
justified, and this virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their
good works.”(85) The opposition here lies between _gratia antecedens_,
which is a spontaneous movement of the soul, and _gratia concomitans_,
which coöperates with free-will after it has given its consent. This
terminology may be applied to the good works of sinners and saints alike.
For the sinner no less than the just man receives two different kinds of
graces—(1) such as precede the free determination of the will and (2) such
as accompany his free acts.

Thus it can be readily seen that the fundamental division of actual grace,
considered in its relation to free-will, is that into prevenient and
coöperating grace. All other divisions are based on a difference of
function rather than of nature.(86)

a) The existence of prevenient grace (_gratia praeveniens s. excitans s.
vocans_) may be inferred from the fact that the process of justification
begins with the illumination of the intellect, which is by nature unfree,
_i.e._ devoid of the power of choosing between good and evil. That there
are also graces which consist in spontaneous, indeliberate motions of the
will,(87) is clearly taught by the Council of Trent,(88) and evidenced by
certain Biblical metaphors. Thus God is described as knocking at the gate
(Apoc. III, 20), as drawing men to Him (John VI, 44), and men are said to
harden their hearts against His voice (Ps. XCIV, 8), etc. Cfr. Jer. XVII,
23: “But they did not hear, nor incline their ear: but hardened their
neck, that they might not hear me, and might not receive instruction.”

The Catholic tradition is voiced by St. Augustine, who says: “The will
itself can in no wise be moved, unless it meets with something which
delights or attracts the mind; but it is not in the power of man to bring
this about.”(89) St. Prosper enumerates a long list of spontaneous
emotions which he calls supernatural graces of the will.(90)

Prevenient grace is aptly characterized by the Patristic formula: “_Gratia
est in nobis, sed sine nobis_,” that is, grace, as a vital act, is in the
soul, but as a salutary act it proceeds, not from the free will, but from
God. In other words, though the salutary acts of grace derive their
vitality from the human will, they are mere _actus hominis_ (θέλησις), not
_actus humani_ (βούλησις).(91) “God,” explains St. Augustine, “does many
good things in man, which man does not do; but man does none which God
does not cause man to do.”(92) And again: “[God] operates without us, in
order that we may become willing; but when we once will so as to act, He
coöperates with us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good
works of piety without Him either working that we may will, or coöperating
when we will.”(93) St. Bernard employs similar language.(94)

b) Coöperating grace (_gratia cooperans s. adiuvans s. subsequens_)
differs from prevenient grace in this, that it supposes a deliberate act
of consent on the part of the will (βούλησις, not θέλησις). St. Gregory
the Great tersely explains the distinction as follows: “The divine
goodness first effects something in us without our coöperation [_gratia
praeveniens_], and then, as the will freely consents, coöperates with us
in performing the good which we desire [_gratia cooperans_].”(95) That
such free and consequently meritorious acts are attributable to grace is
emphasized by the Tridentine Council: “So great is the bounty [of God]
towards all men that He will have the things which are His own gifts to be
their merits.”(96) Such free salutary acts are not only graces in the
general sense, but real actual graces, in as far as they produce other
salutary acts, and their existence is as certain as the fact that many men
freely follow the call of grace, work out their salvation, and attain to
the beatific vision. It is only in this way, in fact, that Heaven is
peopled with Saints.

α) St. Augustine embodies all these considerations in the following
passage: “It is certain that we keep the commandments when we will; but
because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we may
will so much as is sufficient to make us act in willing. It is certain
that we will whenever we like, but it is He who makes us will what is
good, of whom it is said (Prov. VIII, 35): ‘The will is prepared by the
Lord,’ and of whom it is said (Ps. XXXVI, 32): ‘The steps of a [good] man
are ordered by the Lord, and his way doth He will,’ and of whom it is said
(Phil. II, 13): ‘It is God who worketh in you, even to will.’ It is
certain that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He who causes us to
act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers to our will, who has said
(Ezech. XXXVI, 27): ‘I will cause you to walk in my commandments, and to
keep my judgments, and do them.’ When He says: ‘I will cause you ... to do
them,’ what else does He say in fact than (Ezech. XI, 19): ‘I will take
away the stony heart out of their flesh,’ from which used to rise your
inability to act, and (Ezech. XXXVI, 26): ‘I will give you a heart of
flesh,’ in order that you may act.”(97)

β) The manner in which grace and free-will coöperate is a profound
philosophical and theological problem. A salutary act derives its
supernatural character from God, its vitality from the human will. How do
these two factors conjointly produce one and the same act? The unity of
the act would be destroyed if God and the free-will of man in each case
performed, either two separate acts, or each half of the same act. To
preserve the unity of a supernatural act two conditions are required: (1)
the divine power of grace must be transformed into the vital strength of
the will and (2) the created will, which by its own power can perform at
most a naturally good act, must be equipped with the supernatural power of
grace. These conditions are met (a) by the supernatural elevation of the
will (_elevatio externa_), and (b) by the supernatural concurrence of God
(_concursus supernaturalis ad actum secundum_). The supernatural elevation
of the will is accomplished in this wise: God, by employing the
illuminating and strengthening grace, works on the _potentia
obœdientialis_, and thus raises the will above its purely natural powers
and constitutes it a supernatural faculty _in actu primo_ for the free
performance of a salutary act. The divine concursus supervenes to enable
the will to perform the _actus secundus_ or salutary act proper. This
special divine concurrence, in contradistinction to the natural concursus
whereby God supports the created universe,(98) is a strictly supernatural
and gratuitous gift. Consequently, God and the human will jointly perform
one and the same salutary act—God as the principal, the will as the
instrumental cause.(99)

6. EFFICACIOUS GRACE AND MERELY SUFFICIENT GRACE.—By efficacious grace
(_gratia efficax_) we understand that divine assistance which with
infallible certainty includes the free salutary act. Whether the certainty
of its operation results from the physical nature of this particular
grace, or from God’s infallible foreknowledge (_scientia media_), is a
question in dispute between Thomists and Molinists.(100)

Merely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_) is that divine
assistance whereby God communicates to the human will full power to
perform a salutary act (_posse_) but not the action itself (_agere_).

The division of grace into efficacious and merely sufficient is not
identical with that into prevenient and coöperating. Coöperating grace
does not _ex vi notionis_ include with infallible certainty the salutary
act. It may indeed be efficacious, but in matter of fact frequently fails
to attain its object because the will offers resistance.

a) The existence of efficacious graces is as certain as that there is a
Heaven filled with Saints. God would be neither omnipotent nor infinitely
wise if all His graces were frustrated by the free-will of man. St.
Augustine repeatedly expresses his belief in the existence of efficacious
graces. Thus he writes in his treatise on Grace and Free-Will: “It is
certain that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He [God] who causes
us to act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers to the will.”(101) And
in another treatise: “[Adam] had received the ability (_posse_) if he
would [_gratia sufficiens_], but he had not the will to exercise that
ability [_gratia efficax_]; for if he had possessed that will, he would
have persevered.”(102)

b) Before demonstrating the existence of sufficient grace it is necessary,
in view of certain heretical errors, carefully to define the term.

α) Actual grace may be regarded either in its intrinsic energy or power
(_virtus_, _potestas agendi_) or in its extrinsic efficacy (_efficientia_,
_efficacitas_). All graces are efficacious considered in their intrinsic
energy, because all confer the physical and moral power necessary to
perform the salutary act for the sake of which they are bestowed. From
this point of view, therefore, and _in actu primo_, there is no real but a
purely logical distinction between efficacious and merely sufficient
grace. If we look to the final result, however, we find that this differs
according as the will either freely coöperates with grace or refuses its
coöperation. If the will coöperates, grace becomes truly efficacious; if
the will resists, grace remains “merely sufficient.” In other words,
merely sufficient grace confers full power to act, but is rendered
ineffective by the resistance of the will.

The inefficacy of merely sufficient grace, therefore, is owing to the
resistance of the will and not to any lack of intrinsic power. This is a
truth to which all Catholic systems of grace must conform.

Merely sufficient grace may be subdivided into _gratia proxime sufficiens_
and _gratia remote sufficiens_.

Proximately sufficient grace (also called _gratia operationis_) confers
upon the will full power to act forthwith, while remotely sufficient grace
(also termed _gratia orationis_) confers only the grace of prayer, which
in its turn brings down full power to perform other salutary acts.

The _gratia orationis_ plays a most important rôle in the divine economy
of grace. God has not obliged Himself to give man immediately all the
graces he needs. It is His will, in many instances, as when we are
besieged by temptations, that we petition Him for further assistance. “God
does not enjoin impossibilities,” says St. Augustine, “but in His
injunctions He counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to
ask His aid in what you cannot do.”(103)

Hence, though grace may sometimes remain ineffective (_gratia inefficax_ =
_gratia vere et mere sufficiens_), it is never insufficient
(_insufficiens_), that is to say, never too weak to accomplish its
purpose.

Calvinism and Jansenism, while retaining the name, have eliminated
sufficient grace from their doctrinal systems.

Jansenius (+ 1638) admits a kind of “sufficient grace,” which he calls
_gratia parva_, but it is really insufficient because no action can result
from it unless it is supplemented by another and more powerful grace.(104)
This heretic denounced sufficient grace in the Catholic sense as a
monstrous conception and a means of peopling hell with reprobates.(105)
Some of his followers even went so far as to assert that “in our present
state sufficient grace is pernicious rather than useful to us, and we have
reason to pray: From sufficient grace, O Lord, deliver us!”(106)

β) It is an article of faith that there is a merely sufficient grace and
that it is truly sufficient even when frustrated by the resistance of the
will. The last-mentioned point is emphasized by the Second Council of
Orange (A. D. 529): “This also we believe, according to the Catholic
faith, that all baptized persons, through the grace received in Baptism,
and with the help and coöperation of Christ, are able and in duty bound,
if they will faithfully do their share, to comply with all the conditions
necessary for salvation.”(107) The existence of sufficient grace was
formally defined by the Council of Trent as follows: “If any one saith
that man’s free-will, moved and excited by God, ... no wise coöperates
towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of
justification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it would, ... let him
be anathema.”(108)

This dogma can be convincingly demonstrated both from Sacred Scripture and
Tradition.

(1) God Himself complains through the mouth of the prophet Isaias: “What
is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to
it? Was it that I looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it hath
brought forth wild grapes?”(109) This complaint clearly applies to the
Jews. Yahweh did for the Jewish nation whatever it behooved Him to do
lavishly (_gratia vere sufficiens_), but His kindness was unrequited
(_gratia mere sufficiens_). In the Book of Proverbs He addresses the
sinner in these terms: “I called, and you refused: I stretched out my
hand, and there was none that regarded.”(110) What does this signify if
not the complete sufficiency of grace? The proffered grace remained
inefficacious simply because the sinner rejected it of his own free will.
Upbraiding the wicked cities of Corozain and Bethsaida, our Lord exclaims:
“If in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought
in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.”(111) The
omniscient God-man here asserts the existence of graces which remained
inefficacious in Corozain and Bethsaida, though had they been given to the
inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, they would have proved effective. The
conclusion evidently is: these graces remained ineffective, not because
they were unequal to the purpose for which they were conferred, but simply
and solely because they were rejected by those whom God intended to
benefit.(112)

(2) Though they did not employ the name, the Fathers were thoroughly
familiar with the notion of sufficient grace.

Thus St. Irenaeus comments on our Lord’s lamentation over the fate of the
Holy City: “When He says: (Matth. XXIII, 37): ‘How often would I have
gathered together thy children, ... and thou wouldest not,’ He manifests
the ancient liberty of man, because God hath made him free from the
beginning.... For God does not employ force, but always has a good
intention. And for this reason He gives good counsel to all.... And those
who do it [_gratia efficax_] will receive glory and honor, because they
have done good, though they were free not to do it; but those who do not
do good will experience the just judgment of God, because they have not
done good [_gratia inefficax_], though they were able to do it [_gratia
vere et mere sufficiens_].”(113) St. Augustine is in perfect agreement
with ecclesiastical tradition, and the Jansenists had no right whatever to
claim him for their teaching. “The grace of God,” he expressly says in one
place, “assists the will of men. If in any case men are not assisted by
it, the reason lies with themselves, not God.”(114) And again: “No one is
guilty because he has not received; but he who does not do what he ought
to do, is truly guilty. It is his duty to act if he has received a free
will and amply sufficient power to act.”(115)

READINGS:—St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1; qu.
111, art. 1-5.—J. Scheeben, _Natur und Gnade_, Mainz 1861.—M. Glossner,
_Lehre des hl. Thomas vom Wesen der Gnade_, Mainz 1871.—Palmieri, _De
Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 1-16, Gulpen 1885.—Oswald, _Die Lehre von
der Heiligung_, 3rd ed., § 1-3, Paderborn 1885.—S. Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, disp. 1, sect. 2; disp. 3, sect. 1-5, Freiburg
1901.—Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 3 sqq.,
Mainz 1897.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol.
II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 234 sqq.

Chapter II. The Properties Of Actual Grace

Actual grace has three essential properties: (1) necessity, (2) gratuity,
and (3) universality. The most important of these is necessity.

Section 1. The Necessity Of Actual Grace

In treating of the necessity of actual grace we must avoid two extremes.
The first is that mere nature is absolutely incapable of doing any thing
good. This error was held by the early Protestants and the followers of
Baius and Jansenius. The second is that nature is able to perform
supernatural acts by its own power. This was taught by the Pelagians and
Semipelagians.

Between these two extremes Catholic theology keeps the golden mean. It
defends the capacity of human nature against Protestants and Jansenists,
and upholds its incapacity and impotence against Pelagians and
Semipelagians. Thus our present Section naturally falls into three
Articles.

Article 1. The Capacity Of Mere Nature Without Grace

The capacity of nature in its own domain may be considered with regard
either to the intellect or to the will.

*Thesis I: Man is capable by the natural power of his intellect to arrive
at a knowledge of God from a consideration of the physical universe.*

This proposition embodies an article of faith defined by the Vatican
Council: “If any one shall say that the one true God, our Creator and
Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason
through created things, let him be anathema.”(116)

For a formal demonstration of this truth we must refer the reader to our
treatise on _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 17 sqq.
The argument there given may be supplemented by the following
considerations:

1. The Vatican Council vindicates the native power of the human intellect
when it says: “The Catholic Church, with one consent, has ever held and
does hold, that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in
principle and in object: in principle, because our knowledge in the one is
by natural reason, and in the other by divine faith; in object, because,
besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are
proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely
revealed, cannot be known.”(117) This teaching, which the Church had
repeatedly emphasized on previous occasions against the scepticism of
Nicholas de Ultricuria,(118) the rationalistic philosophy of Pomponazzi,
the “log-stick-and-stone” theory(119) of Martin Luther, the exaggerations
of the Jansenists, and the vagaries of the Traditionalists,(120) is based
on Revelation as well as on sound reason. Holy Scripture clearly teaches
that we can gain a certain knowledge of God from a consideration of the
created universe.(121) Reason tells us that a creature endowed with
intelligence must be capable of acquiring natural knowledge, and that
supernatural faith is based on certain _praeambula_, which are nothing
else than philosophical and historical truths.(122) “The existence of God
and other like truths,” says St. Thomas, “are not articles of faith, but
preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even
as grace presupposes nature, and perfection something that can be
perfected.”(123) Luther denounced reason as the most dangerous thing on
earth, because “all its discussions and conclusions are as certainly false
and erroneous as there is a God in Heaven.”(124) The Church teaches, in
accordance with sound philosophy and experience, that the original powers
of human nature, especially free-will, though greatly weakened, have not
been destroyed by original sin.(125) The Scholastics, it is true, reckoned
ignorance among the four “wounds of nature” inflicted by original
sin.(126) But this teaching must be regarded in the light in which the
Church condemned Quesnel’s proposition that “All natural knowledge of God,
even that found in pagan philosophers, can come from nowhere else than
God, and without grace produces nothing but presumption, vanity, and
opposition against God Himself, instead of adoration, gratitude, and
love.”(127) The Traditionalist contention that the intrinsic weakness of
the human intellect can be cured only by a primitive revelation handed
down through the instrumentality of speech and instruction, or by a
special interior illumination, involves the false assumption that there
can be a cognitive faculty incapable of knowledge,—which would ultimately
lead to a denial of the essential distinction between nature and the
supernatural, because it represents exterior revelation or interior grace
as something positively due to fallen nature.(128) Following the lead of
St. Thomas,(129) Catholic apologists, while maintaining the necessity of a
supernatural revelation even with regard to the truths of natural religion
and ethics, base their argument not on the alleged physical incapacity of
reason to ascertain these truths, but on the moral impossibility (_i.e._
insuperable difficulty) of finding them unaided. “It is to be ascribed to
this divine Revelation,” says the Vatican Council, “that such truths among
things divine as are not of themselves beyond human reason, can, even in
the present state of mankind, be known by every one with facility and firm
assurance, and without admixture of error.”(130) In conformity with the
teaching of Revelation and Tradition, the Church has always sharply
distinguished between πίστις and γνῶσις,—faith and knowledge, revelation
and philosophy,—assigning to reason the double rôle of an indispensable
forerunner and a docile handmaid of faith. Far from antagonizing reason,
as charged by her enemies, the Church has on the contrary always valiantly
championed its rights against Scepticism, Positivism, Criticism,
Traditionalism, Rationalism, Pantheism, and Modernism.(131)

2. As regards those purely natural truths that constitute the domain of
science and art, Catholic divines are practically unanimous(132) in
holding that, though man possesses the physical ability of knowing every
single one of these truths, even the most highly gifted cannot master them
all. Cardinal Mezzofanti had acquired a knowledge of many languages,(133)
and undoubtedly was capable of learning many more; yet without a special
grace he could not have learned all the languages spoken on earth, though
their number is by no means infinite. The science of mathematics, which
embraces but a limited field of knowledge, comprises an indefinite number
of propositions and problems which even the greatest genius can not
master. Add to these impediments the shortness of human life, the
limitations of the intellect, the multitude and intricacy of scientific
methods, the inaccessibility of many objects which are in themselves
knowable, (_e.g._ the interior of the earth, the stellar universe)—and you
have a host of limitations which make it physically impossible for the
mind of man to encompass the realm of natural truths.(134)

*Thesis II: Fallen man, whether pagan or sinner, is able to perform some
naturally good works without the aid of grace.*

This thesis may be technically qualified as _propositio certa_.

Proof. A man performing moral acts may be either in a state of unbelief,
or of mortal sin, or of sanctifying grace. The question here at issue is
chiefly whether all the works of pagans, that is all acts done without
grace of any kind, are morally bad, or whether any purely natural works
may be good despite the absence of grace. Baius and Jansenius affirmed
this; nay more, they asserted that no man can perform good works unless he
is in the state of grace and inspired by a perfect love of God
(_caritas_). If this were true, all the works of pagans and of such
Christians as have lost the faith, would be so many sins. But it is _not_
true. The genuine teaching of the Church may be gathered from her official
condemnation of the twenty-fifth, the twenty-sixth, and the thirty-seventh
propositions of Baius. These propositions run as follows: “Without the aid
of God’s grace free-will hath power only to sin;”(135) “To admit that
there is such a thing as a natural good, _i.e._ one which originates
solely in the powers of nature, is to share the error of Pelagius;”(136)
“All the actions of unbelievers are sins and the virtues of philosophers
vices.”(137) To these we may add the proposition condemned by Pope
Alexander VIII, that “The unbeliever necessarily sins in whatever he
does.”(138)

1. Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, St. Augustine included, admit the
possibility of performing naturally good, though unmeritorious, works
(_opera steriliter bona_) in the state of unbelief; and their teaching is
in perfect conformity with right reason.

a) Our Divine Lord Himself says:(139) “If you love them that love you,
what reward(140) shall you have? Do not even the publicans this? And if
you salute(141) your brethren only, what do you more? Do not also the
heathens(142) this?” The meaning plainly is: To salute one’s neighbor is
an act of charity, a naturally good deed, common even among the heathens,
and one which, not being done from a supernatural motive, deserves no
supernatural reward. But this does not by any means imply that to salute
one’s neighbor is sinful.

St. Paul(143) says: “For when the gentiles,(144) who have not the
law,(145) do by nature(146) those things that are of the law; these having
not the law are a law to themselves: who shew the work of the law written
in their hearts.” By “gentiles” the Apostle evidently means genuine
heathens, not converts from paganism to Christianity, and hence the
meaning of the passage is that the heathens who know the natural law
embodied in the Decalogue only as a postulate of reason, are by
nature(147) able to “do those things that are of the law,”(148) _i.e._
observe at least some of its precepts. That St. Paul did not think the
gentiles capable of observing the whole law without the aid of grace
appears from his denunciation of their folly, a little further up in the
same Epistle: “Because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified
him as God, or given thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their
foolish heart was darkened, etc.,”(149) and also from the hypothetic form
of Rom. II, 14 in the original Greek text: “Ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη ... τὰ τοῦ νόμου
ποιῶσιν—_Si quando gentes, ... quae legis sunt, faciunt._”(150)

In Rom. XIV, 23: “For all that is not faith is sin,”(151) a text often
quoted against our thesis, “faith” does not mean the theological habit of
faith, but “conscience,”(152) as the context clearly shows.(153)

b) The teaching of the Fathers is in substantial harmony with Sacred
Scripture.

α) Thus St. Jerome, speaking of the reward which Yahweh gave to
Nabuchodonosor for his services against Tyre,(154) says: “The fact that
Nabuchodonosor was rewarded for a good work shows that even the gentiles
in the judgment of God are not passed over without a reward when they have
performed a good deed.”(155) In his commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to
the Galatians the same holy Doctor observes: “Many who are without the
faith and have not the Gospel of Christ, yet perform prudent and holy
actions, _e.g._ by obeying their parents, succoring the needy, not
oppressing their neighbors, not taking away the possessions of
others.”(156)

β) The teaching of St. Augustine offers some difficulties. There can be no
doubt that this Father freely admitted that pagans and infidels can
perform naturally good works without faith and grace. Thus he says there
is no man so wicked that some good cannot be found in him.(157) He extols
the moderation of Polemo(158) and the purity of Alypius, who were both
pagans.(159) He admires the civic virtues of the ancient Romans,(160) etc.
Holding such views, how could Augustine write: “Neither doth free-will
avail for anything except sin, if the way of truth is hidden.”(161) And
what did his disciple Prosper mean when he said: “The whole life of
unbelievers is a sin, and nothing is good without the highest good. For
wherever there is no recognition of the supreme and immutable truth, there
can be no genuine virtue, even if the moral standard be of the
highest.”(162)

To understand these and similar passages rightly and to explain at the
same time how it was possible for Baius and Jansenius to bolster their
heretical systems with quotations from the writings of St. Augustine and
his disciples, it is necessary to observe that the quondam rhetorician and
Platonic idealist of Hippo delights in applying to the genus the
designation which belongs to its highest species, and _vice versa_.(163)
Thus, in speaking of liberty, he often means the perfect liberty enjoyed
by our first parents in Paradise;(164) in using the term “children of God”
he designates those who persevere in righteousness;(165) and in employing
the phrase “a good work” he means one supernaturally meritorious. Or,
_vice versa_, he designates the slightest good impulse of the will as
“_caritas_,” as it were by anticipation, and brands every unmeritorious
work (_opus informe s. sterile_) as false virtue (_falsa virtus_), nay sin
(_peccatum_). To interpret St. Augustine correctly, therefore, allowance
must be made for his peculiar idealism and a careful distinction drawn
between the real and the metaphorical sense of the terms which he employs.
Baius neglected this precaution and furthermore paid no attention to the
controversial attitude of the holy Doctor. Augustine’s peculiar task was
not to maintain the possibility of naturally good works without faith and
grace, but to defend against Pelagius and Julian the impossibility of
performing supernaturally good and meritorious works without the aid of
grace. It is this essential difference in their respective points of view
that explains how St. Augustine and Baius were able to employ identical or
similar terms to express radically different ideas.(166)

c) It can easily be demonstrated on theological grounds that fallen man is
able, of his own initiative, _i.e._ without the aid of grace, to perform
morally good works, and that Baius erred in asserting that this is
impossible without theological faith.

α) With regard to the first-mentioned point it will be well, for the sake
of clearness, to adopt Palmieri’s distinction between physical and moral
capacity.(167) Man sins whenever he transgresses the law or yields to
temptation. This would be impossible if he were physically unable to keep
the whole law and resist temptation. Hence he must be physically able to
do that which he is obliged to do under pain of sin, though in this or
that individual instance the difficulties may be insuperable without the
aid of grace. To put it somewhat differently: Baius and Jansenius hold
that fallen man can perform no morally good works because of physical or
moral impotence on the part of the will. This assumption is false. Man is
physically able to perform good works because they are enjoined by the
moral law of nature under pain of sin; he is morally able because, in
spite of numerous evil tendencies, not a few gentiles and unbelievers have
led upright lives and thereby proved that man can perform good works
without the aid of grace.(168) This is also the teaching of St.
Thomas.(169)

β) It is an expressly defined dogma that the process of justification
starts with theological faith (_fides_), preceded by the so-called grace
of vocation, which prepares and effects conversion. To say, as Baius did,
that all good works performed in a state of unbelief are so many sins, is
tantamount to asserting that the preliminary acts leading up to faith, and
which the unbeliever performs by the aid of prevenient grace, are sinful;
in other words, that God requires the unbeliever to prepare himself for
justification by committing sin. This is as absurd as it is
heretical.(170)

The whole argument of this section applies _a fortiori_ to the theory that
no act can be morally good unless prompted by both theological charity and
theological faith.(171)

2. We must now define the limitations of fallen nature unaided by grace.
Though the graces dispensed by Providence even for naturally good deeds
are in the present economy _de facto_ nearly all supernatural, nothing
prevents us from conceiving a different economy, consisting of purely
natural helps, such as would have been necessary in the state of pure
nature.(172)

As regards the limitations of man’s moral power in the natural order, we
may say, in a general way, that the will is able to keep the easier
precepts of the moral law of nature without the assistance of grace
(either supernatural or natural). However, as it is impossible in many
instances to determine just where the easier precepts end and the more
difficult ones begin, a broad field is left open for theological
speculation.

a) Theologians are practically unanimous in holding that man cannot
observe the natural law in its entirety for any considerable length of
time without the aid of grace.

Suarez is so sure of this that he does not hesitate to denounce the
contrary teaching,—which is (perhaps unjustly) ascribed to Durandus,
Scotus, and Gabriel Biel—as “rash and verging on error.”(173) In matter of
fact the Church has formally defined that, because of concupiscence, no
one, not even the justified man, much less the sinner, is able, without
divine assistance (grace), to keep for any considerable length of time the
whole Decalogue, which embodies the essentials of the moral law.
“Nevertheless,” says the Council of Trent, “let those who think themselves
to stand take heed lest they fall, and with fear and trembling work out
their salvation, ... for ... they ought to fear for the combat which yet
remains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, wherein they
cannot be victorious unless they be with God’s grace obedient to the
Apostle, who says: ‘We are debtors, etc.’ ”(174)

St. Paul, who lived, so to speak, in an atmosphere of grace, yet found
reason to exclaim: “I am delighted with the law of God, according to the
inward man, but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law
of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my
members,”(175) and: “Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the
body of this death? The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord.”(176)
Surely it would be vain to expect the proud ideal of the Stoics or
Pelagius’ presumptuous claim of impeccability ever to be realized on earth
except by a special privilege of grace, such as that bestowed upon the
Blessed Virgin Mary.(177)

The Fathers follow St. Paul in describing the power of concupiscence, even
after justification.(178)

b) A pertinent question, closely allied to the proposition just treated,
is this: Can the human will, without the aid of grace, overcome all the
grievous temptations to mortal sin by which it is besieged?

It is the common teaching of theologians that, without the aid of grace,
man in the fallen state succumbs with moral (not physical) necessity to
grievous temptations against the moral law, _i.e._ to mortal sin. This
conclusion flows from the impossibility, which we have demonstrated above,
of observing the whole law of nature for life or for any considerable
length of time without the help of grace. If man were able to resist all
violent temptations, he would be able to keep the whole law.

The theological teaching which we are here expounding may be formulated in
two different ways: (1) No man can overcome all grievous temptations
against the moral law without the aid of grace; (2) there is no man living
who is not now and then assailed by temptations to which he would
inevitably succumb did not God lend him His assistance.

In its first and rather indefinite form the proposition is attacked by
Ripalda,(179) Molina,(180) and many later Scholastics. These writers argue
as follows: It is impossible to deduce from Revelation or experience a
definite rule by which man could determine the conditions on which the
grievousness of a temptation depends. To say that a temptation is grievous
when it cannot be resisted without the aid of grace, would be begging the
question. Besides, the possibility always remains that there be men who,
though in theory unable to withstand all grievous temptations without the
aid of grace, _de facto_ never meet with such temptations, but only with
the lighter kind which can be overcome without supernatural help.

The second and more specific formulation of our proposition is supported
by Sacred Scripture, which explicitly declares that all men are subject to
temptations which they could not resist if God did not uphold them.(181)

If the just are obliged to watch and pray constantly, lest they fall,(182)
this must be true in an even higher degree of sinners and unbelievers. St.
Augustine writes against the Pelagians: “Faithful men say in their prayer:
‘Lead us not into temptation.’ But if they have the capacity [of avoiding
evil], why do they pray [for it]? Or, what is the evil which they pray to
be delivered from, but, above all else, the body of this death?... the
carnal lusts, whence a man is liberated only by the grace of the
Saviour.... He may be permitted to pray that he may be healed. Why does he
presume so strongly on the capability of his nature? It is wounded, hurt,
harassed, destroyed; what it stands in need of is a true confession [of
its weakness], not a false defense [of its capacity].”(183)

c) Another question, on which Catholic divines disagree, is this: Can
fallen man, unaided by grace, elicit an act of perfect natural charity
(_amor Dei naturalis perfectus_)?

Scotus answers this question affirmatively,(184) and his opinion is shared
by Cajetan,(185) Bañez,(186) Dominicus Soto,(187) and Molina.(188) Other
equally eminent theologians, notably Suarez(189) and Bellarmine,(190) take
the negative side.

In order to obtain a clear understanding of the question at issue we shall
have to attend to several distinctions.

First and above all we must not lose sight of the important distinction
between the _natural_ and the _supernatural_ love of God. Supernatural
charity, in all its stages, necessarily supposes supernatural aid. The
question therefore can refer only to the _amor Dei naturalis_.(191) That
this natural charity is no mere figment appears from the ecclesiastical
condemnation of two propositions of Baius.(192)

Another, even more important distinction is that between _perfect_ and
_imperfect_ charity. Imperfect charity is the love of God as our highest
good (_amor Dei ut summum bonum nobis_); perfect charity is the love of
God for His own sake above all things (_amor Dei propter se et super
omnia_). The holy Fathers and a number of councils(193) declare that it is
impossible to love God perfectly without the aid of grace. The context and
such stereotyped explanatory phrases as “_sicut oportet_” or “_sicut
expedit ad salutem_,”(194) show that these Patristic and conciliary
utterances apply to the _supernatural_ love of God. Hence the question
narrows itself down to this: Can fallen man without the aid of grace love
God for His own sake and above all things by a purely natural love? In
answering this question Pesch,(195) Tepe,(196) and other theologians
distinguish between _affective_ and _effective_ love. They hold that
whereas the _amor affectivus_ in all its stages is possible without the
aid of grace, not so the _amor effectivus_, since that would involve the
observance of the whole natural law. This compromise theory can be
demonstrated as highly probable from Scripture and Tradition. St. Paul
says(197) that the gentiles knew God and should have glorified Him. This
evidently supposes that it was possible for them to glorify God, and
consequently to love Him affectively, as easily and with the same means by
which they knew Him. Else how could the Apostle say of those gentiles who,
“when they knew God, glorified him not as God,” that they “changed the
truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather
than the Creator”?(198) This interpretation of Rom. I, 21 sqq. is
explicitly confirmed by St. Ambrose when he says: “For they were able to
apprehend this by the law of nature, inasmuch as the fabric of the cosmos
testifies that God, its author, is alone to be loved, as Moses hath set it
down in his writings; but they were made impious by not glorifying God,
and unrighteousness became evident in them when, knowing, they changed the
truth into a lie and refused to confess the one God.”(199)

3. It follows, by way of corollary, that Vasquez’s opinion,(200) that
there can be no good work without supernatural aid in the shape of a
_cogitatio congrua_, is untenable, as is also the assertion of
Ripalda(201) that in the present economy purely natural good actions are
so invariably connected with the prevenient grace of Christ that they
practically never exist as such.

a) Vasquez, whose position in the matter is opposed by most other
theologians, contends(202) that no man can perform a good work or resist
any temptation against the natural law (Decalogue) without the help of
supernatural grace derived from the merits of Christ. To avoid the
heretical extreme of Baianism, however, he makes a twofold limitation. He
assumes with the Scotists that there is such a thing as a morally
indifferent act of the will,(203) and defines the grace which he holds to
be necessary for the performance of every morally good deed, as _cogitatio
congrua_. This “congruous thought,” he says, is in itself, _i.e._
ontologically, natural, and can be regarded as supernatural only _quoad
modum et finem_. The subtle argument by which Vasquez tries to establish
this thesis is based principally on St. Augustine and may be summarized as
follows: Whenever the Fathers and councils insist on the necessity of
grace for the performance of good works, they mean _all_ good works,
natural as well as supernatural. The only alternative they know is virtue
or vice, good or evil. Consequently the grace of Christ, in some form or
other, is a necessary requisite of all morally good deeds.

As we have already intimated, we regard this opinion of the learned
Spanish divine as erroneous.(204) Three solid reasons militate against it.
The first is that, to guard against Baianism, Vasquez is compelled to
assume the existence of morally indifferent acts of the will, which is
untenable, as “St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and theologians generally
teach that there is no such thing in the concrete as a morally indifferent
act of the free will, and consequently, if the will is able, without
grace, to perform acts that are not evil, it is also able to perform good
acts.”(205) Second, Vasquez’s theory counterfeits the notion of Christian
grace. “Good thoughts” come so natural to man, and are so closely bound up
with the grace of creation, that even Pelagius found no difficulty in
admitting this sort of “grace.”(206) Surely fallen nature is not so
utterly corrupt that a good child is unable to honor and love his parents
without the aid of “grace” (in the sense of _cogitatio congrua ex meritis
Christi_). The third reason which constrains us to reject Vasquez’s
theory, is that it leaves no room for natural morality (_naturaliter
honestum_) to fill the void between those acts that are naturally bad
(_moraliter inhonesta_, _i.e._ _peccata_) and such as are supernaturally
good (_supernaturaliter bona_, _i.e._ _salutaria_). The existence of such
naturally good acts would seem to be a highly probable inference from the
condemnation, by Pius VI, of a certain proposition taught by the
pseudo-Council of Pistoia.(207)

b) Martinez de Ripalda (+1648) tried to improve Vasquez’s theory by
restoring the Christian concept of grace and adding that Providence
invariably precedes all naturally good works, including those performed by
heathens and sinners, with the entitatively supernatural grace of
illumination and confirmation.(208) In this hypothesis the necessity of
grace is not theological but purely historic.(209)

Despite the wealth of arguments by which Ripalda attempted to prove his
theory,(210) it has not been generally accepted. While some, _e.g._
Platel(211) and Pesch,(212) regard it with a degree of sympathy, others,
notably De Lugo(213) and Tepe,(214) are strongly opposed to it. Palmieri
thinks it may be accepted in a restricted sense, _i.e._ when limited to
the faithful.(215)

Ripalda’s hypothesis of the universality of grace is truly sublime and
would have to be accepted if God’s salvific will could be demonstrated by
revelation or some historic law to suffer no exceptions. But Ripalda has
not been able to prove this from Revelation.(216) Then, too, his theory
entails two extremely objectionable conclusions: (1) a denial, not indeed
of the possibility (Quesnel), but of the existence of purely natural good
works, and (2) the possibility of justification without theological faith.
Neither of these difficulties probably occurred to Vasquez or
Ripalda,(217) because at the time when they wrote Pius VI had not yet
condemned the teaching of the pseudo-Council of Pistoia,(218) nor had
Innocent XI censured the proposition that “Faith in a broad sense, as
derived from the testimony of creatures or some other similar motive, is
sufficient for justification.”(219) If the love of God, even perfect love,
(such as we have shown to be possible in the natural order), were of
itself necessarily supernatural, as Ripalda contends, it would be possible
for a pagan to receive the grace of justification without theological
faith, which he does not possess, as is evident from the Vatican teaching
that it is “requisite for divine faith that revealed truth be believed
because of the authority of God who reveals it.”(220)

*Thesis III: Not all actions performed by man in the state of mortal sin
are sinful on account of his not being in the state of grace.*

This is _de fide_.

Proof. Though this thesis is, strictly speaking, included in Thesis II, it
must be demonstrated separately on its own merits, because it embodies a
formally defined dogma which has been denied by the Protestant Reformers
and by the followers of Baius and Jansenius. Martin Luther taught,—and his
teaching was adopted in a modified form by the Calvinists,—that human
nature is entirely depraved by original sin, and consequently man
necessarily sins in whatever he does,(221) even in the process of
justification. Against this heresy the Tridentine Council defined: “If any
one shall say that all the works done before justification ... are indeed
sins, ... let him be anathema.”(222)

The Protestant notion of grace was reduced to a theological system by
Baius(223) and Jansenius,(224) whose numerous errors may all be traced to
their denial of the supernatural order.

The Jansenist teaching was pushed to an extreme by Paschasius Quesnel, 101
of whose propositions were formally condemned by Pope Clement XI in his
famous Constitution “_Unigenitus_.”(225) The Jansenistic teachings of the
Council of Pistoia were censured by Pius VI, A. D. 1794, in his Bull
“_Auctorem fidei_.” The quintessence of this heretical system is embodied
in the proposition that whatever a man does in the state of mortal sin is
necessarily sinful for the reason that he is not in the state of grace
(_status caritatis_). Baius(226) and Quesnel(227) gave this teaching an
Augustinian turn by saying that there is no intermediate state between the
love of God and concupiscence, and that all the works of a sinner must
consequently and of necessity be sinful. This heretical teaching is
sharply condemned in the Bull “_Auctorem fidei_.”(228) Quesnel pushed it
to its last revolting conclusion when he said: “The prayer of the wicked
is a new sin, and that God permits it is but an additional judgment upon
them.”(229)

The teaching of Baius and Quesnel is repugnant to Revelation and to the
doctrine of the Fathers.

a) The Bible again and again exhorts sinners to repent, to pray for
forgiveness, to give alms, etc. Cfr. Ecclus. XXI, 1: “My son, thou hast
sinned? Do so no more: but for thy former sins also pray that they may be
forgiven thee.” Ezech. XVIII, 30: “Be converted, and do penance for all
your iniquities: and iniquity shall not be your ruin.” Dan. IV, 24:
“Redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to
the poor: perhaps he will forgive thy offences.” Zach. I, 3: “Thus saith
the Lord of hosts: Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of hosts: and I will turn
to you.” If all the works thus enjoined were but so many sins, we should
be forced to conclude, on the authority of Sacred Scripture, that God
commands the sinner to commit new iniquities and that the process of
justification with its so-called dispositions consists in a series of
sinful acts. Such an assumption would be manifestly absurd and
blasphemous.

Quesnel endeavored to support his heretical conceit by Matth. VII, 17 sq.:
“Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and the evil tree
bringeth forth evil fruit; a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit,
neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.” But as our Lord in this
passage speaks of prophets, the fruits he has in mind must obviously be
doctrines not works.(230) And what if they were works? Are not doctrines
and morals ultimately related, and may we not infer from the lives they
lead (according to their doctrines) whether prophets are true or false? By
their fruits (_i.e._ works) you shall know them (_i.e._ the soundness or
unsoundness of the teaching upon which their works are based).

b) In appealing to the testimony of the Fathers the Jansenists were
notoriously guilty of misinterpretation.

α) Origen plainly teaches that prayer before justification is a good work.
“Though you are sinners,” he says, “pray to God; God hears the
sinners.”(231) The seemingly contradictory text John IX, 31: “Now we know
that God doth not hear sinners,”(232) is thus explained by St. Augustine:
“He speaks as one not yet anointed; for God also hears the sinners. If He
did not hear sinners, the publican would have cast his eyes to the ground
in vain and vainly struck his breast saying: O God, be merciful to me, a
sinner.”(233) Moreover, since there is question here of extraordinary
works and signs only (_viz._ miracles), the text is wholly irrelevant in
regard to works of personal righteousness. St. Prosper teaches: “Human
nature, created by God, even after its prevarication, retains its
substance, form, life, senses, and reason, and the other goods of body and
soul, which are not lacking even to those who are bad and vicious. But
there is no possibility of seizing the true good by such things as may
adorn this mortal life, but cannot give [merit] eternal life.”(234)

β) Baius and Quesnel succeeded in veiling their heresy by a phraseology of
Augustinian color but with implications foreign to the mind of the Doctor
of Grace. Augustine emphasized the opposition between “charity” and
“concupiscence” so strongly that the intermediary domain of naturally good
works was almost lost to view. Thus he says in his _Enchiridion_: “Carnal
lust reigns where there is not the love of God.”(235) And in his treatise
on the Grace of Christ: “Here there is no love, no good work is reckoned
as done, nor is there in fact any good work, rightly so called; because
whatever is not of faith is sin, and faith worketh by love.”(236) And
again in his treatise on Grace and Free Will: “The commandments of love or
charity are so great and such, that whatever action a man may think he
does well, is by no means well done if done without charity.”(237) We have
purposely chosen passages in which the “Doctor of Grace” obviously treats
of charity as theological love, not in the broad sense of _dilectio_.(238)
At first blush these passages seem to agree with the teaching of Baius,
who says: “Every love on the part of a rational creature is either sinful
cupidity, by which the world is loved, and which is forbidden by St. John,
or that praiseworthy charity which is infused into the heart by the Holy
Spirit, and by which we love God;”—(239) and with the forty-fifth
proposition of Quesnel: “As the love of God no longer reigns in the hearts
of sinners, it is necessary that carnal lust should reign in them and
vitiate all their actions.”(240) Yet the sense of these propositions is
anything but Augustinian. Augustine upholds free-will in spite of grace
and concupiscence, whereas the Jansenists assert that the _carnalis
cupiditas_ and the _caritas dominans_ produce their effects by the very
power of nature, _i.e._ necessarily and of themselves.(241)

Besides this capital difference there are many minor discrepancies between
the teaching of St. Augustine and that of Baius and Quesnel. Augustine, it
is true, in his struggle with Pelagianism,(242) strongly emphasized the
opposition existing between grace and sin, between love of God and love of
the world; but he never dreamed of asserting that every act performed in
the state of mortal sin is sinful for the reason that it is not performed
in the state of grace. Scholasticism has long since applied the necessary
corrective to his exaggerations. It is perfectly orthodox to say that
there is an irreconcilable opposition between the state of mortal sin and
the state of grace. “No one can serve two masters.”(243) This is not,
however, by any means equivalent to saying, as the Jansenists do, that the
sinner, not being in the state of grace, of necessity sins in whatever he
does. Augustine expressly admits that, no matter how deeply God may allow
a man to fall, and no matter how strongly concupiscence may dominate his
will, he is yet able to pray for grace, which is in itself a distinctly
salutary act. “If a sin is such,” he says in his _Retractationes_, “that
it is itself a punishment for sin, what can the will under the domination
of cupidity do, except, if it be pious, to pray for help?”(244) Compare
this sentence with the fortieth proposition of Baius: “The sinner in all
his actions serves the lust which rules him,”(245) and you will perceive
the third essential difference that separates the teaching of St.
Augustine from that of the Jansenists. The former, even when he speaks,
not of the two opposing habits, but of their respective acts, does not,
like Jansenism, represent the universality of sin without theological
charity as a physical and fundamental necessity, but merely as a
historical phenomenon which admits of exceptions. Thus he writes in his
treatise On the Spirit and the Letter: “If they who by nature do the
things contained in the law, must not be regarded as yet in the number of
those whom Christ’s grace justifies, but rather as among those whose
actions (although they are those of ungodly men who do not truly and
rightly worship the true God) we not only cannot blame, but actually
praise, and with good reason, and rightly too, since they have been done,
so far as we read or know or hear, according to the rule of righteousness;
though were we to discuss the question with what motive they are done,
they would hardly be found to be such as to deserve the praise and defense
which are due to righteous conduct.”(246)

In conclusion we will quote a famous passage from St. Augustine which
reads like a protest against the distortions of Baius and Jansenius.
“Love,” he says, “is either divine or human; human love is either licit or
illicit.... I speak first of licit human love, which is free from censure;
then, of illicit human love, which is damnable; and in the third place, of
divine love, which leads us to Heaven.... You, therefore, have that love
which is licit; it is human, but, as I have said, licit, so much so that,
if it were lacking, [the want of] it would be censured. You are permitted
with human love to love your spouse, your children, your friends and
fellow-citizens. But, as you see, the ungodly, too, have this love, _e.g._
pagans, Jews, heretics. Who among them does not love his wife, his
children, his brethren, his neighbors, his relations and friends? This,
therefore, is human love. If any one would be so unfeeling as to lose even
human love, not loving his own children, ... we should no longer regard
him as a human being.”(247) Tepe pertinently observes(248) that St.
Augustine in this passage asserts not only the possibility but the actual
existence of naturally good though unmeritorious works (_opera steriliter
__ bona_), and that the theory of Ripalda(249) is untenable for this
reason, if for no other, that the quoted passage is cited in Pius VI’s
Bull “_Auctorem fidei_.”(250)

Article 2. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For All Salutary Acts

Salutary acts (_actus salutares_) are those directed to the attainment of
sanctifying grace and the supernatural end of man.

According to this double purpose, salutary acts may be divided into two
classes: (1) those that prepare for justification (_actus simpliciter
salutares_), and (2) those which, following justification, gain merits for
Heaven (_actus meritorii_).

In consequence of the supernatural character of the acts which they
comprise, both these categories are diametrically opposed to that class of
acts which are good only in a natural way,(251) and hence must be
carefully distinguished from the latter. The Fathers did not, of course,
employ the technical terms of modern theology; they had their own peculiar
phrases for designating what we call salutary acts, _e.g._ _agere sicut
oportet vel expedit, agere ad salutem, agere ad iustificationem, agere ad
vitam aeternam_, etc.(252)

1. PELAGIANISM.—Pelagianism started as a reaction against Manichaeism, but
fell into the opposite extreme of exaggerating the capacity of human
nature at the expense of grace. It denied original sin(253) and grace.

As the necessity of grace for all salutary acts is a fundamental dogma of
the Christian religion, the Church proceeded with unusual severity against
Pelagian naturalism and condemned its vagaries through the mouth of many
councils.

a) Pelagius was a British lay monk, who came to Rome about the year 400 to
propagate his erroneous views.(254) He found a willing pupil in Celestius,
who after distinguishing himself as a lawyer, had been ordained to the
priesthood at Ephesus, about 411.

The Pelagian heresy gained another powerful champion in the person of
Bishop Julian of Eclanum in Apulia. Its strongest opponent was St.
Augustine. Under his powerful blows the Pelagians repeatedly changed their
tactics, without however giving up their cardinal error in regard to
grace. Their teaching on this point may be summarized as follows: The
human will is able by its natural powers to keep all the commandments of
God, to resist temptation, and to gain eternal life; in fact it can attain
to a state of holiness and impeccability(255) in which the petition
“Forgive us our trespasses” no longer has any meaning except perhaps as an
expression of humility.(256) In so far, however, as free-will is itself a
gift of the Creator, man can perform no good works without grace. At a
later period of his career Pelagius admitted the existence of merely
external supernatural graces, such as revelation and the example of Christ
and the saints,—which led St. Augustine to remark: “This is the hidden and
despicable poison of your heresy that you represent the grace of Christ as
His example, not His gift, alleging that man is justified by imitating
Him, not by the ministration of the Holy Spirit.”(257) But even this
external grace, according to Pelagius, does not confer the strength
necessary to perform good works; it merely makes it easier to keep the
commandments. Pelagius did not deny that justification and adoptive
sonship, considered in their ideal relation to the “kingdom of Heaven,” as
distinguished from “eternal life,”(258) are not identical in adults with
the grace of creation, but he denied their gratuity by asserting that the
free will is able to merit all these graces by its own power.(259)

Whatever may have been the variations of Pelagianism, it is patent from
the writings of St. Augustine that its defenders one and all rejected the
necessity and existence of the immediate grace of the will.(260) Their
attitude towards the illuminating grace of the intellect is in dispute.
Some theologians(261) think the Pelagians admitted, others(262) that they
denied its existence. No matter what they may have held on this point,
there can be no doubt that the followers of Pelagius conceived the object
of grace to be nothing more than to facilitate the work of salvation.

b) Within the short span of twenty years (A. D. 411 to 431) no less than
twenty-four councils occupied themselves with this new heresy.

At first the wily heretic succeeded in deceiving the prelates assembled at
Lydda (Diospolis), A. D. 415; but the bishops of Northern Africa, among
them St. Augustine, roundly condemned his teaching at two councils held
with the sanction of Pope Innocent I at Carthage and Mileve in 416.
Shortly afterwards, deceived by the terms of the creeds and explanations
which they circulated, Pope Zosimus (417-418) declared both Pelagius and
Celestius to be innocent. Despite this intervention, however, two hundred
African bishops, at a plenary council held at Carthage, A. D. 418,
reiterated the canons of Mileve and submitted them for approval to the
Holy See. These proceedings induced Zosimus to adopt stronger measures. In
his _Epistula Tractoria_ (418) he formally condemned Pelagianism and
persuaded the Emperor to send Julian of Eclanum and seventeen other
recalcitrant bishops into exile. The canons of Carthage and Mileve were
subsequently received by the universal Church as binding definitions of
the faith. The most important of them in regard to grace is this: “If
anyone shall say that the grace of justification is given to us for the
purpose of enabling us to do more easily by the aid of grace what we are
commanded to do by free-will, as if we were able, also, though less
easily, to observe the commandments of God without the help of grace, let
him be anathema.”(263) The Ecumenical Council of Ephesus (A. D. 431), with
the approval of Pope Celestine I, renewed the condemnation of Celestius,
but it was not until nearly a century later that Pelagianism received its
death-blow. In 529 the Second Council of Orange defined: “If any one
assert that he is able, by the power of nature, and without the
illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, who grants to all men the
disposition believingly to accept the truth, rightly (_ut expedit_) to
think or choose anything good pertaining to eternal salvation, or to
assent to salutary, _i.e._ evangelical preaching, such a one is deceived
by a heretical spirit.”(264) This decision was reiterated by the Council
of Trent: “If any one saith that the grace of God through Jesus Christ is
given only for this, that man may be able more easily to live justly and
to merit eternal life, as if by free-will without grace he were able to do
both, though hardly indeed and with difficulty, let him be anathema.”(265)

2. PELAGIANISM REFUTED.—Sacred Scripture and the Fathers plainly teach
that man is unable to perform any salutary act by his own power.

a) Among the many Biblical texts that can be quoted in support of this
statement, our Lord’s beautiful parable of the vine and its branches is
especially striking. Cfr. John XV, 4 sq.: “As the branch cannot bear fruit
of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you
abide in me. I am the vine; you the branches: he that abideth in me, and I
in him, the same beareth much fruit: for without me you can do
nothing.”(266)

α) The context shows that Jesus is not speaking here of purely natural
works of the kind for which the _concursus generalis_ of God suffices, but
that He has in mind salutary acts in the strictly supernatural sense; and
the truth He wishes to inculcate is that fallen nature cannot perform such
acts except through Him and with His assistance. This supernatural
influence is not, however, to be understood exclusively of sanctifying or
habitual grace, because our Divine Saviour refers to the fruits of
justification and to salutary works. “Of these he does not say: ‘Without
me you can do but little,’ but: ‘Without me you can do nothing.’ Be it
therefore little or much, it cannot be done without Him, without whom
nothing can be done.”(267) If this was true of the Apostles, who were in
the state of sanctifying grace,(268) it must be true _a fortiori_ of
sinners. Consequently, supernatural grace is absolutely necessary for the
performance of any and all acts profitable for salvation.

β) Nowhere is this fundamental truth so clearly and insistently brought
out as in the epistles of St. Paul, who is preëminently “the Doctor of
Grace” among the Apostles.

There are, according to him, three categories of supernatural acts:
salutary thoughts, holy resolves, and good works.

St. Paul teaches that all right thinking is from God. 2 Cor. III, 5: “Not
that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves;
but our sufficiency is from God.”(269)

He also declares that all good resolves come from above. Rom. IX, 15 sq.:
“For he saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I
will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy. So then it is not of him that
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.”(270)

He furthermore asserts that all good works come from God. Phil. II, 13:
“For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish,
according to his good will.”(271) 1 Cor. XII, 3: “No man can say: Lord
Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost.”(272) Pronouncing the holy name of Jesus is
obviously regarded as a salutary act, because mere physical utterance does
not require the assistance of the Holy Ghost.(273) But the act as a
salutary act is physically impossible without divine assistance, because
it is essentially supernatural and consequently exceeds the powers of
nature.(274)

b) The argument from Tradition is based almost entirely on the authority
of St. Augustine, in whom, as Liebermann observes, God wrought a miracle
of grace that he might become its powerful defender. There is no need of
quoting specific texts because this whole treatise is interlarded with
Augustinian dicta concerning the necessity of grace.

α) An important point is to prove that the early Fathers held the
Augustinian, _i.e._ Catholic view. It stands to reason that if these
Fathers had taught a different doctrine, the Church would not have so
vehemently rejected Pelagianism as an heretical innovation. Augustine
himself insists on the novelty of the Pelagian teaching. “Such is the
Pelagian heresy,” he says, “which is not an ancient one, but has only
lately come into existence.”(275) And this view is confirmed by Pope
Celestine I, who declares in his letter to the Bishops of Gaul (A. D.
431): “This being the state of the question, novelty should cease to
attack antiquity.”(276)

In fact the teaching of the Apostolic Fathers, although less explicit,
agrees entirely with that of Augustine. Thus St. Irenaeus says: “As the
dry earth, if it receives no moisture, does not bring forth fruit, so we,
being dry wood, could never bear fruit for life without supernatural rain
freely given.... The blessing of salvation comes to us from God, not from
ourselves.”(277)

The necessity of grace is indirectly inculcated by the Church when she
petitions God to grant salutary graces to all men—a most ancient and
venerable practice, which Pope St. Celestine explains as follows: “The law
of prayer should determine the law of belief. For when the priests of holy
nations administer the office entrusted to them, asking God for mercy,
they plead the cause of the human race, and together with the whole Church
ask and pray that the unbelievers may receive the faith, that the
idolaters may be freed from the errors of their impiety, that the veil be
lifted from the heart of the Jews, and they be enabled to perceive the
light of truth, that the heretics may return to their senses by a true
perception of the Catholic faith, that the schismatics may receive the
spirit of reborn charity, that the sinners be granted the remedy of
penance, and that the door of heavenly mercy be opened to the catechumens
who are led to the sacraments of regeneration.”(278) In matters of
salvation prayer and grace are correlative terms; the practice of the one
implies the necessity and gratuity of the other.(279)

β) That the Fathers not only conceived grace to be necessary for the cure
of weakness induced by sin (_gratia sanans_) in a merely moral sense, but
thought it to be metaphysically necessary for the communication of
physical strength (_gratia elevans_), is evidenced by such oft-recurring
similes as these: Grace is as necessary for salvation as the eye is to
see, or as wings are to fly, or as rain is for the growth of plants.

It will suffice to quote a passage from the writings of St. Chrysostom.
“The eyes,” he says, “are beautiful and useful for seeing, but if they
would attempt to see without light, all their beauty and visual power
would avail them nothing. Thus, too, the soul is but an obstacle in its
own way if it endeavors to see without the Holy Ghost.”(280)

This view is strengthened by the further teaching of the Fathers that
supernatural grace was as indispensable to the angels in their state of
probation (in which they were free from concupiscence) and to our first
parents in Paradise (gifted as they were with the _donum integritatis_),
as it is to fallen man; the only difference being that in the case of the
latter, grace has the additional object of curing the infirmities and
overcoming the difficulties arising from concupiscence. In regard to the
angels St. Augustine says; “And who made this will but He who created them
with a good will, that is to say with a chaste love by which they should
cleave to Him, in one and the same act creating their nature and endowing
it with grace?... We must therefore acknowledge, with the praise due to
the Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it
can be said that ‘the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the
Holy Ghost, who is given unto them.’ ”(281)

Equally convincing is the argument that Adam in Paradise was unable to
perform any salutary acts without divine grace. “Just as it is in man’s
power to die whenever he will,” says St. Augustine, “... but the mere will
cannot preserve life in the absence of food and the other means of life;
so man in Paradise was able of his mere will, simply by abandoning
righteousness, to destroy himself; but to have led a life of righteousness
would have been too much for his will, unless it had been sustained by the
power of Him who made him.”(282)

This is also the teaching of the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529):
“Even if human nature remained in the state of integrity, in which it was
constituted, it would in no wise save itself without the help of its
Creator. If it was unable, without the grace of God, to keep what it had
received, how should it be able without the grace of God to regain what it
has lost?”(283)

c) The theological argument for the metaphysical necessity of grace is
based on the essentially supernatural character of all salutary acts.

α) St. Thomas formulates it as follows: “Eternal life is an end
transcending the proportion of human nature, ... and therefore man, by
nature, can perform no meritorious works proportioned to eternal life, but
requires for this purpose a higher power,—the power of grace.
Consequently, man cannot merit eternal life without grace. He is, however,
able to perform acts productive of some good connatural to man, such as
tilling the soil, drinking, eating, acts of friendship, etc.”(284) For the
reason here indicated it is as impossible for man to perform salutary acts
without grace as it would be to work miracles without that divine
assistance which transcends the powers of nature.(285)

β) Catholic theologians are unanimous in admitting that all salutary acts
are and must needs be supernatural; but they differ in their conception of
this supernatural quality (_supernaturalitas_). The problem underlying
this difference of opinion may be stated thus: A thing may be supernatural
either entitatively, _quoad substantiam_, or merely as to the manner of
its existence, _quoad modum_. The _supernaturale quoad substantiam_ is
divided into the strictly supernatural and the merely preternatural.(286)
The question is: To what category of the supernatural belong the salutary
acts which man performs by the aid of grace? Undoubtedly there are actual
graces which are entitatively natural, _e.g._ the purely mediate grace of
illumination,(287) the natural graces conferred in the pure state of
nature, the actual graces of the sensitive sphere,(288) and the so-called
_cogitatio congrua_ of Vasquez.(289) The problem therefore narrows itself
down to the _immediate_ graces of intellect and will. Before the
Tridentine Council theologians contented themselves with acknowledging the
divinely revealed fact that these graces are supernatural; it was only
after the Council that they began to speculate on the precise character of
this _supernaturalitas_.

Some, following the teaching of the Scotist school, ascribed the
supernatural character of salutary acts to their free acceptation on the
part of God, holding them to be purely natural in their essence and raised
to the supernatural sphere merely _per denominationem extrinsecam_.(290)
This view is untenable. For if nature, as such, possessed the intrinsic
power to perform salutary acts, irrespective of their acceptation by God,
the Fathers and councils would err in teaching that this power is derived
from the immediate graces of illumination and strengthening.(291)

Others hold that the salutary acts which grace enables man to perform, are
supernatural only _quoad modum_; because while it is the Holy Ghost
Himself who incites the natural faculties to salutary thoughts and good
resolves, He does not _eo ipso_ raise these thoughts and resolves to the
supernatural plane. This theory, besides being open to the same objection
which we have urged against the first, involves another difficulty. If all
salutary acts were supernatural only _quoad modum_, sanctifying grace,
which is as certainly supernatural in its essence as the beatific vision
of God,(292) would cease to have an adequate purpose; for the intrinsic
reason for its existence is precisely that it raises the nature of the
justified into a permanent supernatural state of being.

A third school of theologians tries to solve the difficulty by adding to
the natural operation of the intellect and the will some accidental
supernatural _modus_. There are several such _modi_, which, though
inhering in nature and really distinct therefrom, depend solely on the
Holy Ghost, and consequently transcend the natural powers of man, _e.g._
the duration or intensity of a salutary act. This theory at first blush
appears more plausible than the other two, but it cannot be squared with
the teaching of Tradition. In the first place, the duration or intensity
of a salutary act cannot affect its essence or nature. Then again, every
such accidental supernatural _modus_ is produced either by grace alone, or
by grace working conjointly with free-will. In the former hypothesis it
would be useless, because it would not render the free salutary act, as
such, supernatural; in the latter case it could do no more than aid the
will to do what is morally impossible, whereas every salutary act is in
matter of fact a physical impossibility, that is, impossible to unaided
nature.(293)

There remains a fourth explanation, which ascribes to every salutary act
an ontological, substantial, intrinsic _supernaturalitas_, whereby it is
elevated to a higher and essentially different plane of being and
operation. This theory is convincingly set forth by Suarez in his treatise
on the Necessity of Grace.(294)

It may be asked: If the salutary acts which we perform are supernatural in
substance, why are we not conscious of the fact? The answer is not far to
seek. Philosophical analysis shows that the intrinsic nature of our
psychic operations is no more a subject of immediate consciousness than
the substance of the soul itself. Consequently, sanctifying grace cannot
reveal its presence through our inner consciousness. Having no intuitive
knowledge of our own Ego, we are compelled to specify the different acts
of the soul by means of their respective objects and their various
tendencies (cognition, volition). To our consciousness the supernatural
love of God does not present itself as essentially different from the
natural.(295)

Article 3. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For The States Of Unbelief,
Mortal Sin, And Justification

Every adult man, viewed in his relation to actual grace, is in one of
three distinct states:

(1) The state of unbelief (_status infidelitatis_), which may be either
negative, as in the case of heathens, or positive, as in the case of
apostates and formal heretics;

(2) The state of mortal sin (_status peccati mortalis_), when the sinner
has already received, or not yet lost, the grace of faith, which is the
beginning of justification;

(3) The state of justification itself (_status iustitiae sive gratiae
sanctificantis_), in which much remains yet to be done to attain eternal
happiness.

The question we have now to consider is: Does man need actual grace in
every one of these three states, and if so, to what extent?

1. SEMIPELAGIANISM.—Semipelagianism is an attempt to effect a compromise
between Pelagianism and Augustinism by attributing to mere nature a
somewhat greater importance in matters of salvation than St. Augustine was
willing to admit.

a) After Augustine had for more than twenty years vigorously combatted and
finally defeated Pelagianism, some pious monks of Marseilles, under the
leadership of John Cassian, Abbot of St. Victor,(296) tried to find middle
ground between his teaching and that of the Pelagians. Cassian’s treatise
_Collationes Patrum_,(297) and the reports sent to St. Augustine by his
disciples Prosper and Hilary, enable us to form a pretty fair idea of the
Semipelagian system. Its principal tenets were the following:

α) There is a distinction between the “beginning of faith” (_initium
fidei_, _affectus credulitatis_) and “increase in faith” (_augmentum
fidei_). The former depends entirely on the will, while the latter, like
faith itself, requires the grace of Christ.

β) Nature can merit grace by its own efforts, though this natural merit
(_meritum naturae_) is founded on equity only (_meritum de congruo_), and
does not confer a right in strict justice, as Pelagius contended.

γ) Free-will, after justification, can of its own power secure the gift of
final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_); which consequently is not a
special grace, but a purely natural achievement.

δ) The bestowal or denial of baptismal grace in the case of infants, who
can have no previous _merita de congruo_, depends on their hypothetical
future merits or demerits as foreseen by God from all eternity.(298)

b) Informed of these errors by his disciples, St. Augustine energetically
set to work, and in spite of his advanced age wrote two books against the
Semipelagians, entitled respectively, _De Praedestinatione Sanctorum_ and
_De Dono Perseverantiae_. The new teaching was not yet, however, regarded
as formally heretical, and Augustine treated his opponents with great
consideration, in fact he humbly acknowledged that he himself had
professed similar errors before his consecration (A. D. 394).(299)

After Augustine’s death, Prosper and Hilary went to Rome and interested
Pope Celestine in their cause. In a dogmatic letter addressed to the
Bishops of Gaul, the Pontiff formally approved the teaching of St.
Augustine on grace and original sin, but left open such other “more
profound and difficult incidental questions” as predestination and the
manner in which grace operates in the soul.(300) But as this papal letter
(called “_Indiculus_”) was an instruction rather than an ex-cathedra
definition, the controversy continued until, nearly a century later (A. D.
529), the Second Council of Orange, convoked by St. Caesarius of Arles,
formally condemned the Semipelagian heresy. This council, or at least its
first eight canons,(301) received the solemn approbation of Pope Boniface
II (A. D. 530) and thus became vested with ecumenical authority.(302)

2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—The Catholic Church teaches the absolute
necessity of actual grace for all stages on the way to salvation. We shall
demonstrate this in five separate theses.

*Thesis I: Prevenient grace is absolutely necessary, not only for faith,
but for the very beginning of faith.*

This is _de fide_.

Proof. The Second Council of Orange defined against the Semipelagians: “If
any one say that increase in faith, as well as the beginning of faith, and
the very impulse by which we are led to believe in Him who justifies the
sinner, and by which we obtain the regeneration of holy Baptism, is in us
not as a gift of grace, that is to say, through the inspiration of the
Holy Ghost, but by nature, ... is an adversary of the dogmatic teaching of
the Apostles....”(303)

a) This is thoroughly Scriptural doctrine, as St. Augustine(304) and
Prosper(305) proved. St. Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians had
opened the eyes of Augustine, as he himself admits. 1 Cor. IV, 7: “For who
distinguisheth(306) thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?
And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not
received it?” The Apostle means to say: In matters pertaining to salvation
no man has any advantage over his fellow men, because all receive of the
grace of God without any merits of their own. This statement would be
false if any man were able to perform even the smallest salutary act
without the aid of grace.

With a special view to faith the same Apostle teaches: “For by grace you
are saved through faith,(307) and that not of yourselves,(308) for it is
the gift of God;(309) not of works,(310) that no man may glory.”(311)
This, too, would be false if faith could be traced to a purely natural
instinct or to some _meritum de congruo_ in the Semipelagian sense.(312)
Our Lord Himself, in his famous discourse on the Holy Eucharist,
unmistakably describes faith and man’s preparation for it as an effect of
prevenient grace. “No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent
me, draw him.”(313) The metaphorical expression “come to me,” according to
the context, means “believe in me;” whereas the Father’s “drawing” plainly
refers to the operation of prevenient grace. Cfr. John VI, 65 sq.: “But
there are some of you that believe not.... Therefore did I say to you,
that no man can come to me, unless it be given him by the Father.” John
VI, 29: “This is the work of God,(314) that you believe in him whom he
hath sent.” According to our Saviour’s own averment, therefore, preaching
is of no avail unless grace gives the first impulse leading to faith.

b) As regards the argument from Tradition, it will suffice to show that
the Fathers who wrote before Augustine, ascribed the beginning of faith to
prevenient grace.

α) In the light of the Augustinian dictum that “prayer is the surest proof
of grace,”(315) it is safe to assume that St. Justin Martyr voiced our
dogma when he put into the mouth of a venerable old man the words: “But
thou pray above all that the gates of light may be opened unto thee; for
no man is able to understand the words of the prophets [as _praeambula
fidei_] unless God and His Christ have revealed their meaning.”(316)
Augustine himself appeals to SS. Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory of
Nazianzus, and then continues: “Such doctors, and so great as these,
saying that there is nothing of which we may boast as of our own, which
God has not given us; and that our very heart and our thoughts are not in
our own power, ... attribute these things to the grace of God, acknowledge
them as God’s gifts, testify that they come to us from Him and are not
from ourselves.”(317)

β) Like the Pelagians in their teaching on original sin,(318) the
Semipelagians in their teaching on grace relied mainly on the authority of
St. John Chrysostom, from whose writings they loved to quote such
perplexing passages as this: “We must first select the good, and then God
adds what is of His; He does not forestall our will because He does not
wish to destroy our liberty. But once we have made our choice, He gives us
much help. For while it rests with us to choose and to will antecedently,
it lies with him to perfect and bring to an issue.”(319)

To understand St. Chrysostom’s attitude, and that of the Oriental Fathers
generally, we must remember that the Eastern Church considered it one of
its chief duties to safeguard the dogma of free-will against the
Manichaeans, who regarded man as an abject slave of Fate. In such an
environment it was of supreme importance to champion the freedom of the
will(320) and to insist on the maxim: “Help yourself and God will help
you.” If the necessity of prevenient grace was not sufficiently
emphasized, the circumstances of the time explain, and to some extent
excuse, the mistake. St. Augustine himself remarks in his treatise on the
Predestination of the Saints: “What need is there for us to look into the
writings of those who, before this heresy sprang up, had no necessity of
dwelling on a question so difficult of solution as this, which beyond a
doubt they would do if they were compelled to answer such [errors as
these]? Whence it came about that they touched upon what they thought of
God’s grace briefly and cursorily in some passages of their
writings.”(321) Palmieri remarks(322) that it would be easy to cite a
number of similar passages from the writings of the early Latin Fathers
before Pelagius, who certainly cannot be suspected of Semipelagian
leanings.(323)

The orthodoxy of St. Chrysostom can be positively established by a twofold
argument. (1) Pope Celestine the First recommended him as a reliable
defender of the Catholic faith against Nestorianism and Pelagianism.(324)
(2) Chrysostom rejected Semipelagianism as it were in advance when he
taught: “Not even faith is of ourselves; for if He [God] had not come, if
He had not called, how should we have been able to believe?”(325) and
again when he says in his explanation of the Pauline phrase ἀρχηγὸς τῆς
πίστεως:(326) “He Himself hath implanted the faith in us, He Himself hath
given the beginning.”(327) These utterances are diametrically opposed to
the heretical teaching of the Semipelagians.(328)

c) The theological argument for our thesis is effectively formulated by
Oswald(329) as follows: “It is faith which first leads man from the sphere
of nature into a higher domain,—faith is the beginning of salutary action.
That this beginning must come wholly from God, and that it cannot come
from man, goes without saying. By beginning we mean the very first
beginning. Whether we call this first beginning itself faith, or speak, as
the Semipelagians did, of certain preambles of faith,—aspirations,
impulses, desires leading to faith (_praeambula fidei: conatus, desideria,
credulitatis affectus_), makes no difference. Wherever the supernatural
domain of salutary action begins—and it is divided off from the natural by
a very sharp line—there it is God who begins and not man, there it is
grace which precedes,—_gratia praeveniens_, as it has come to be known by
a famous term.”

Indeed, if man were able by his own power to merit for himself the first
beginnings of grace, then faith itself, and justification which is based
on faith, and the beatific vision, would not be strictly graces.

As for the precise moment when prevenient grace begins its work in the
soul, the common opinion is that the very first judgment which a man forms
as to the credibility of divine revelation (_iudicium credibilitatis_) is
determined by the immediate grace of the intellect,(330) and that the
subsequent _affectus credulitatis_ springs from the strengthening grace of
the will. St. Augustine, commenting on 2 Cor. III, 5, demonstrates this as
follows:

“Let them give attention to this, and well weigh these words, who think
that the beginning of faith is of ourselves, and the increase of faith is
of God. For who cannot see that thinking is prior to believing? For no one
believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be
believed.... Therefore, in what pertains to religion and piety [of which
the Apostle was speaking], if we are not capable of thinking anything as
of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God, we are certainly not capable
of believing anything as of ourselves, since we cannot do this without
thinking, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is of
God.”(331)

*Thesis II: The sinner, even after he has received the faith, stands in
absolute need of prevenient and co-operating grace for every single
salutary act required in the process of justification.*

This proposition also embodies an article of faith.

Proof. The Semipelagians ascribed the dispositions necessary for
justification to the natural efforts of the will, thereby denying the
necessity of prevenient grace. This teaching was condemned as heretical by
the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529),(332) and again by the Council of
Trent, which defined: “If any one saith that without the prevenient
inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without His help, man can believe,
hope, love, or be penitent as he ought, so that the grace of justification
may be bestowed upon him; let him be anathema.”(333)

a) The Scriptural texts which we have quoted against Pelagianism(334) also
apply to the Semipelagian heresy.

Our Lord’s dictum: “Without me you can do nothing,”(335) proves the
necessity of prevenient and co-operating grace, not only at the beginning
of every salutary act, but also for its continuation and completion. St.
Augustine clearly perceived this. “That he might furnish a reply to the
future Pelagius,” he observes, “our Lord does not say: Without me you can
with difficulty do anything; but He says: Without me you can do
_nothing_.... He does not say: Without me you can _perfect_ nothing, but
_do_ nothing. For if He had said _perfect_, they might say that God’s aid
is necessary, not for beginning good, which is of ourselves, but for
perfecting it.... For when the Lord says, Without me you can do nothing,
in this one word He comprehends both the beginning and the end.”(336)

St. Paul expressly ascribes the salvation of man to grace when he says:
“... with fear and trembling work out your salvation; for it is God who
worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish.”(337)

The Tridentine Council, as we have seen, designates the four salutary acts
of faith, hope, love, and penitence as a preparation for justification.
Now St. Paul teaches: “The God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in
believing, that you may abound in hope and in the power of the Holy
Ghost;”(338) and St. John: “Charity is of God.”(339)

b) The argument from Tradition is chiefly based on St. Augustine, who in
his two treatises against the Semipelagians, and likewise in his earlier
writings, inculcates the necessity of grace for all stages on the way to
salvation.

Thus he writes in his _Enchiridion_: “Surely, if no Christian will dare to
say this: It is not of God that showeth mercy, but of man that willeth,
lest he should openly contradict the Apostle, it follows that the true
interpretation of the saying (Rom. IX, 16): ‘It is not of him that
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,’ is that
the whole work belongs to God, who both prepares the good will that is to
be helped, and assists it when it is prepared. For the good will of man
precedes many of God’s gifts, but not all; and it must itself be included
among those which it does not precede. We read in Holy Scripture, both
‘God’s mercy shall prevent me’ (Ps. LVIII, 11), and ‘Thy mercy will follow
me’ (Ps. XXII, 6). It precedes the unwilling to make him willing; it
follows the willing to render his will effectual. Why are we taught to
pray for our enemies, who are plainly unwilling to lead a holy life,
unless it be that God may work willingness in them? And why are we
admonished to ask that we may receive, unless it be that He who has
created in us the wish, may Himself satisfy the same? We pray, then, for
our enemies, that the mercy of God may precede them, as it has preceded
us; we pray for ourselves, that His mercy may follow us.”(340)

That grace accompanies us uninterruptedly on the way to Heaven is also the
teaching of St. Jerome: “To will and to run is my own act; but without the
constant aid of God, even my own act will not be mine; for the Apostle
says (Phil. II, 13): ‘It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to
accomplish.’... It is not sufficient for me that He gave it once, unless
He gives it always.”(341)

St. Ephraem Syrus prays in the name of the Oriental Church: “I possess
nothing, and if I possess anything, Thou [O God] hast given it to me.... I
ask only for grace and acknowledge that I shall be saved through
Thee.”(342)

The Second Council of Orange summarizes the teaching of Tradition on the
subject under consideration.(343)

c) The theological argument for our thesis is based on the character of
the adoptive sonship resulting from the process of justification.(344)
This sonship (_filiatio adoptiva_) is essentially supernatural, and hence
can be attained only by strictly supernatural acts, which unaided nature
is both morally and physically incapable of performing.(345)

*Thesis III: Even in the state of sanctifying grace man is not able to
perform salutary acts, unless aided by actual graces.*

This is likewise _de fide_.

Proof. The faculties of the just man are permanently kept in the
supernatural sphere by sanctifying grace and by the habits of faith, hope,
and charity. Hence the just man in the performance of salutary acts does
not require the same measure of prevenient grace as the unregenerate
sinner, who lacks all, or at least some, of the habits mentioned.

The question here at issue, therefore, can only be: Is actual grace (as
_gratia excitans s. vocans_, not _elevans_) absolutely necessary to enable
a man in the state of sanctifying grace to perform salutary acts? The
answer is—Yes, and this teaching is so firmly grounded on Sacred Scripture
and Tradition, and so emphatically sanctioned by the Church, that we do
not hesitate to follow Perrone in qualifying it as _de fide_.(346) The
councils in their teaching on the necessity of grace, assert that
necessity alike for the justified and the unjustified. That of Trent
expressly declares: “Whereas Jesus Christ Himself continually infuses His
virtue into the justified,—as the head into the members, and the vine into
the branches,—and this virtue always precedes and accompanies and follows
their good works, which without it could not in any wise be pleasing and
meritorious before God, we must believe that nothing further is wanting to
the justified....”(347)

a) Our thesis can be easily proved from Holy Scripture. We have already
shown that the Bible and Tradition make no distinction between the
different stages on the way to salvation, or between different salutary
acts, but indiscriminately postulate for all the illuminating grace of the
intellect and the strengthening grace of the will. It follows that to
perform salutary acts the justified no less than the unjustified need
actual grace. Our Saviour’s pithy saying: “Without me you can do
nothing,”(348) was not addressed to unbelievers or sinners, but to His
Apostles, who were in the state of sanctifying grace.(349)

This interpretation is fully borne out by Tradition. St. Augustine, after
laying it down as a general principle that “We can of ourselves do nothing
to effect good works of piety without God either working that we may will,
or co-operating when we will,”(350) says of justified man in particular:
“The Heavenly Physician cures our maladies, not only that they may cease
to exist, but in order that we may ever afterwards be able to walk
aright,—a task to which we should be unequal, even after our healing, were
it not for His continued help.... For just as the eye of the body, even
when completely sound, is unable to see, unless aided by the brightness of
light, so also man, even when fully justified, is unable to lead a holy
life, unless he be divinely assisted by the eternal light of
righteousness.”(351)

This agrees with the practice of the Church in exhorting all men without
exception, saints as well as sinners, to pray: “Precede, we beseech Thee,
O Lord, our actions by Thy holy inspiration, and carry them on by Thy
gracious assistance, that every prayer and work of ours may begin always
from Thee, and through Thee be happily ended.”(352)

b) Some theologians have been led by certain speculative difficulties to
deny the necessity of actual grace in the state of justification.

Man in the state of justification, they argue, is endowed with sanctifying
grace, the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity, and the
infused moral virtues, and consequently possesses all those qualifications
which are necessary to enable him to perform salutary acts with the
supernatural concurrence of God. Why should the will, thus supernaturally
equipped, require the aid of additional actual graces to enable it to
perform strictly supernatural, and therefore salutary, actions?(353)

We reply: The necessity of actual grace in the state of justification is
so clearly taught by divine Revelation that no theological theory is
tenable which denies it. Besides, the objection we have briefly summarized
disregards some very essential considerations, _e.g._ that there remains
in man, even after justification, concupiscence, which is accompanied by a
certain weakness that requires at least the _gratia sanans sive
medicinalis_ to heal it.(354) Furthermore, a quiescent _habitus_ cannot
set itself in motion, but must be determined from without; that is to say,
in our case, it must be moved by the _gratia excitans_ to elicit
supernatural thoughts and to will supernatural acts. Just as a seed cannot
sprout without the aid of appropriate stimuli, so sanctifying grace is
incapable of bearing fruit unless stimulated by the sunshine and moisture
of actual graces. Man may perform purely natural acts even though he be in
the supernatural state of grace; hence if any particular act of his is to
be truly supernatural and conducive to eternal salvation, God must lend
His special aid.(355)

*Thesis IV: Except by a special privilege of divine grace, man, even
though he be in the state of sanctifying grace, is unable to avoid venial
sin throughout life.*

This is likewise _de fide_.

Proof. The Pelagians held that man is able to avoid sin, nay to attain to
absolute impeccability,(356) without supernatural assistance. Against this
error the Second Council of Mileve (A. D. 416) defined: “It likewise hath
pleased [the holy Synod] that whoever holds that the words of the Our
Father: ‘Forgive us our trespasses,’ when pronounced by saintly men, are
pronounced in token of humility, but not truthfully, should be
anathema.”(357) Still more to the point is the following declaration of
the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that a man once justified ... is
able, during his whole life, to avoid all sins, even those that are
venial, except by a special grace from God, as the Church holds in regard
of the Blessed Virgin; let him be anathema.”(358)

To obtain a better understanding of this Tridentine definition it will be
well to ponder the following considerations:

The Council declares that it is impossible for man, even in the state of
sanctifying grace, to avoid all sins during his whole life, except by
virtue of a special privilege such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin
Mary.(359) A venial sin is one which, because of the unimportance of the
precept involved, or in consequence of incomplete consent, does not
destroy the state of grace. Such a sin may be either deliberate or
semi-deliberate. A semi-deliberate venial sin is one committed in haste or
surprise. It is chiefly sins of this kind that the Tridentine Council had
in view. For no one would seriously assert that with the aid of divine
grace a saint could not avoid at least all deliberate venial sins for a
considerable length of time. The phrase “_in tota vita_” indicates a
period of some length, though its limits are rather difficult to
determine. Were a man to die immediately after justification, the
Tridentine canon would _per accidens_ not apply to him. As the Council
says in another place that “men, how holy and just soever, at times fall
into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial,”(360) it
is safe practically to limit the period of possible freedom from venial
sin to one day. Theoretically, of course, it may be extended much farther.
The phrase “_omnia peccata_” must be interpreted collectively, not
distributively, for a sin that could not be avoided would cease to be a
sin. For the same reason the term “_non posse_” must be understood of
(moral, not physical) disability; in other words, the difficulty of
avoiding sin with the aid of ordinary graces for any considerable length
of time, is insuperable even for the just. This moral impossibility of
avoiding sin can be removed only by a special privilege, such as that
enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin Mary. It may incidentally be asked whether
this privilege was also granted to other saints, notably St. Joseph and
St. John the Baptist. Suarez lays it down as a theological conclusion that
no human being has ever been or ever will be able entirely to avoid venial
sin except by a special privilege, which must in each case be proved.
Palmieri maintains that the moral impossibility of leading an absolutely
sinless life without the special assistance of grace is taught by
indirection in the canons of Mileve (416) and Carthage (418), which
declare that no such life has ever been led by mortal man without that
assistance.(361)

a) The Scriptural argument for our thesis was fully developed by the
councils just mentioned. The careful student will note, however, that
those texts only are strictly conclusive which positively and exclusively
refer to venial sins. Thus when St. James says: “In many things we all
offend,”(362) he cannot mean that all Christians now and then necessarily
commit mortal sin. For St. John expressly declares that “Whosoever abideth
in him [Christ], sinneth not.”(363)

It follows that not even the just can wholly avoid venial sin. Hence the
most devout and pious Christian may truthfully repeat the petition of the
Lord’s Prayer which says: “Forgive us our trespasses,(364) as we forgive
those who trespass against us.”(365) Profoundly conscious of the
sinfulness of the entire human race, the author of the Book of Proverbs
exclaims: “Who can say, My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?”(366)

Other Scripture texts commonly cited in confirmation of our thesis lack
cogency, because they either deal exclusively with mortal sin or do not
refer to sin at all. Thus Prov. XXIV, 16: “A just man shall fall seven
times and shall rise again,” is meant of temporal adversities.(367)
Eccles. VII, 21: “There is no just man upon earth, that doth good and
sinneth not,”(368) can scarcely be understood of venial sin, because the
sacred writer continues: “For thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast
often spoken evil of others.”(369) 1 John I, 8: “If we say that we have no
sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us,”(370) would be a
splendid argument for our thesis, could it be shown that the Apostle had
in mind only the venial sins committed in the state of justification. This
is, however, unlikely, as the term _peccatum_ throughout St. John’s first
Epistle(371) is obviously employed in the sense of mortal sin.(372)

b) Tradition is again most effectively voiced by St. Augustine, who
writes: “There are three points, as you know, which the Catholic Church
chiefly maintains against them [the Pelagians]. One is, that the grace of
God is not given according to our merits.... The second, that no one lives
in this corruptible body in righteousness of any degree without sins of
any kind. The third, that man is born obnoxious to the first man’s
sin....”(373) To Pelagius’ objection: “If all men sin, then the just must
die in their sins,” the holy Doctor replies: “With all his acuteness he
[Pelagius] overlooks the circumstance that even righteous persons pray
with good reason: ‘Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.’...
Even if we cannot live without sin, we may yet die without sin, whilst the
sin committed in ignorance or infirmity is blotted out in merciful
forgiveness.”(374) In another chapter of the same treatise he says: “If
... we could assemble all the afore-mentioned holy men and women, and ask
them whether they lived without sin, ... would they not all exclaim with
one voice: ‘If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth
is not in us’?”(375)

c) We come to the theological argument. The moral impossibility of
avoiding venial sin for any considerable length of time results partly
from the infirmity of human nature (_infirmitas naturae_), partly from
God’s pre-established plan of salvation (_ordo divinae providentiae_).

α) The infirmity of human nature flows from four separate and distinct
sources: (1) concupiscence (_fomes peccati_); (2) imperfection of the
ethical judgment (_imperfectio iudicii_); (3) inconstancy of the will
(_inconstantia voluntatis_); and (4) the weariness caused by continued
resistance to temptation. In view of these agencies and their combined
attack upon the will, theologians speak of a _necessitas antecedens
peccandi_;—not as if the will were predestined to succumb to any one
temptation in particular, but in the sense that it is morally unable to
resist the whole series (_suppositione disiunctâ_). The will simply grows
weaker and weaker, and in course of time fails to resist sin with
sufficient energy.

Let us exemplify. The proofsheets of a book are scrutinized by several
trained readers, yet in spite of the greatest care and many ingenious
devices for the elimination of error, a perfect book, _i.e._ one entirely
free from mistakes, is a practical impossibility. How much harder must it
be for man to avoid moral lapses throughout his whole life, considering
that he cannot choose his own time for meeting temptations, but must keep
his mind and will under constant control and be prepared to resist the
enemy at any moment.(376)

St. Thomas Aquinas says: “Man cannot avoid all venial sin, because his
sensual appetite is depraved. True, reason is able to suppress the
individual stirrings of this appetite. In fact, it is on this account that
they are voluntary and partake of the nature of sin. But reason is not
able to suppress them all [collectively], because, while it tries to
resist one, there perhaps arises another, and, furthermore, reason is not
always in a condition to exercise the vigilance necessary to avoid such
impulses.”(377)

It follows that the _necessitas peccandi antecedens_ does not destroy the
liberty of the will or the moral imputability of those venial sins which a
man actually commits; for it is merely a _necessitas indeterminata_, which
refers not to certain particular instances, but to the one or other
indeterminately. It follows further that God does not command the
impossible when He insists that we should avoid venial sin, for He does
not in each single case command something which is physically or morally
impossible,(378) but merely demands a perfection which in itself is not
entirely unattainable _hic et nunc_ with the assistance of ordinary
grace.(379)

β) The second theological reason for the impossibility of avoiding venial
sin for any considerable time is based on the eternal scheme of salvation
decreed by Divine Providence. This scheme of salvation must not, of
course, be conceived as a divine precept to commit venial sins. It is
merely a wise toleration of sin and a just refusal, on the part of the
Almighty, to restore the human race to that entirely unmerited state of
freedom from concupiscence with which it was endowed in Paradise, and
which alone could guarantee the moral possibility of unspotted innocence.
Both factors in their last analysis are based upon the will of God to
exercise those whom He has justified in humility and to safeguard us
against pride, which is the deadliest enemy of our salvation.(380) In
making this wise decree God, of course, infallibly foresaw that no man
(with the sole exception of those to whom He might grant a special
privilege) would _de facto_ be able to pass through life without
committing venial sins. This infallible foreknowledge is based not alone
on the _scientia media_, but also on the infirmity of human nature.

Hence Suarez was entirely justified in rejecting the singular opinion of
de Vega,(381) that the Tridentine definition does not exclude the
possibility of exceptions.(382)

Nevertheless the faithful are wisely warned against both indifference and
despondency. “Let no one say that he is without sin, but let us not for
this reason love sin. Let us detest sin, brethren. Though we are not
without sins, let us hate them; especially let us avoid grievous sins, and
venial sins, too, as much as we can.”(383)

*Thesis V: No man can persevere in righteousness without special help from
God.*

This proposition is also _de fide_.

Proof. The Semipelagians asserted that man is able by his own power to
persevere in righteousness to the end.(384) Against this teaching the
Second Council of Orange defined: “Even those who are reborn and holy must
implore the help of God, in order that they may be enabled to attain the
good end, or to persevere in the good work.”(385) This definition was
repeated in substance by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that the
justified either is able without the special help of God to persevere in
the justice received, or that, with that help, he is not able; let him be
anathema.”(386)

Perfect perseverance is the preservation of baptismal innocence, or, in a
less strict sense, of the state of grace, until death. Imperfect
perseverance is a temporary continuance in grace, _e.g._ for a month or a
year, until the next mortal sin. Imperfect perseverance, according to the
Tridentine Council, requires no special divine assistance (_speciale
auxilium_).(387)

Final perseverance is either passive or active, according as the justified
dies in the state of grace irrespective of his will (as baptized children
and insane adults),(388) or actively coöperates with grace whenever the
state of grace is imperilled by grievous temptation. The Council of Trent
has especially this latter case in view when it speaks of the necessity of
a _speciale auxilium_, because the special help extended by God
presupposes coöperation with grace, and man cannot strictly speaking
coöperate in a happy death. The Council purposely speaks of an _auxilium_,
not a _privilegium_, because a privilege is by its very nature granted to
but few, while the special help of grace extends to all the elect. This
_auxilium_ is designated as _speciale_, because final perseverance is not
conferred with sanctifying grace, nor is it a result of the mere power of
perseverance (_posse perseverare_). The state of sanctifying grace simply
confers a claim to ordinary graces, while the power of perseverance of
itself by no means insures actual perseverance (_actu perseverare_). The
power of perseverance is assured by those merely sufficient graces which
are constantly at the command of the righteous. Actual perseverance, on
the other hand, implies a series of efficacious graces. God is under no
obligation to bestow more than sufficient grace on any man; consequently,
final perseverance is a special grace, or, more correctly, a continuous
series of efficacious graces. The Council of Trent is therefore justified
in speaking of it as “a great gift.”(389)

a) Sacred Scripture represents final perseverance as the fruit of prayer
and as a special gift not included in the bare notion of justification.

α) Our Divine Saviour Himself says in His prayer for His disciples, John
XVII, 11: “Holy Father, keep them in thy name whom thou hast given me,
that they may be one, as we also are.”(390) St. Paul teaches in his
Epistle to the Colossians: “Epaphras saluteth you ... who is always
solicitous for you in prayers, that you may stand perfect and full in all
the will of God.”(391) Hence the necessity of constantly watching and
praying: “Watch ye and pray that ye enter not into temptation.”(392)

β) That perseverance is not included in the bare notion of justification
appears from such passages as these: Phil. I, 6: “Being confident of this
very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it
unto the day of Christ Jesus.”(393) 1 Pet. I, 5: “Who, by the power of
God, are kept by faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last
time.”(394)

b) The threads of Tradition run together in the hands of St. Augustine,
who has written a special treatise On the Gift of Perseverance.(395)

His main argument is based on the necessity of prayer. “Why,” he asks, “is
that perseverance asked for from God, if it is not given by God? Is it a
mocking petition inasmuch as that is asked of Him which it is known He
does not give, but, although He gives it not, is in man’s power?... Or is
not that perseverance, perchance, asked for from Him? He who says this, is
not to be rebuked by my arguments, but must be overwhelmed with the
prayers of the saints. Is there indeed one among them who do not ask for
themselves from God that they may persevere in Him, when in that very
prayer which is called the Lord’s—because the Lord taught it—whenever it
is prayed by the saints, scarcely anything else is understood to be prayed
for but perseverance?”(396) He then proceeds to show, in accordance with
St. Cyprian’s little treatise On the Lord’s Prayer, that the seven
petitions of the “Our Father” are all prayers for perseverance, and
concludes as follows: “Truly in this matter let not the Church look for
laborious disputations, but consider her own daily prayers. She prays that
the unbelieving may believe; therefore God converts to the faith. She
prays that believers may persevere; therefore God gives perseverance to
the end.”(397) And again: “For who is there that would groan with a
sincere desire to receive what he prays for from the Lord, if he thought
that he received it from himself and not from the Lord?”(398)

c) From this teaching flows a corollary of great practical importance, to
wit: The grace of final perseverance cannot be merited by good works, but
it can be obtained by pious and unremitting prayer.

“This gift of God,” says St. Augustine, speaking of final perseverance,
“may be obtained suppliantly [by prayer], but when it has been given, it
cannot be lost contumaciously.”(399) And again: “Since it is manifest that
God has prepared some things to be given even to those who do not pray for
them, such as the beginning of faith, and other things not to be given
except to those who pray for them, such as perseverance unto the end,
certainly he who thinks that he has this latter from himself, does not
pray to obtain it.”(400)

Between merit (_meritum_) and prayer (_oratio, preces_) there is this
great difference, that merit appeals to God’s justice, prayer to His
mercy. If man were able to merit final perseverance by good works
(_meritum de condigno_), God would be in justice bound to give him this
precious grace. But this is plainly incompatible with the Catholic
conception of final perseverance.

It may be asked: Is God determined by the _meritum de congruo_ inherent in
all good works to grant the gift of final perseverance as a reward to the
righteous? Theologians are at variance on this point. Ripalda(401) thinks
that this is the case at least with the more conspicuous good works
performed in the state of grace. Suarez modifies this improbable
contention somewhat by saying that prayer alone can infallibly guarantee
final perseverance.(402) Our prayers are infallibly heard if we address
the Father through Jesus Christ, because Christ has promised: “If you ask
the Father anything in my name, he will give it you.”(403) To insure its
being infallibly heard, prayer for perseverance must be made in the state
of grace and unremittingly. True, Christ did not make sanctifying grace a
necessary condition of efficacious prayer. But, as Suarez points out,
prayer cannot be infallibly efficacious unless it proceeds from one who is
in the state of grace, because the moral conditions that render it
efficacious are found only in that state.(404) As to the second point, if
we say that prayer for perseverance must be unremitting, we mean, in the
words of the same eminent theologian, that it must continue throughout
life and must be made with becoming trustfulness and zeal, especially when
there is a duty to be fulfilled or a temptation to be overcome.(405)

READINGS:—Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. I-II.—*Tricassin, O. Cap., _De
Necessaria ad Salutem Gratia_.—Byonius, _De Gratiae Auxiliis_, in
Becanus, _Theologia Scholastica_, Rouen, 1658.—Scheeben _Natur und
Gnade_, Mainz 1861.—IDEM, _Dogmatik_, Vol. III, § 292-298,
Freiburg 1882.—*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 19-29,
Gulpen 1885.—Oswald, _Lehre von der Heiligung_, § 9-11, 3rd ed.,
Paderborn 1885.—Tepe, _Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol. III, pp.
8-51, Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_,
Vol. VIII, § 396-416, Mainz 1897.—Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones
Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Freiburg
1908.—Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 2, Freiburg 1901.

On St. Augustine and his teaching cfr. *J. Ernst, _Werke und
Tugenden der Ungläubigen nach Augustinus_, Freiburg 1871.—F.
Wörter, _Die Geistesentwicklung des hl. Augustinus bis zu seiner
Taufe_, Paderborn 1898.—Wolfsgruber, _Augustinus_, Paderborn
1898.—Boucat, _Theologia Patrum Dogmatico-Scholastico-Positiva_,
disp. 3, Paris 1718.—*Zaccaria, _Dissert. de Adiutorio sine quo
non_, in the _Thesaurus Theol._, Vol. V, Venice 1762.—O.
Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Geistesfrüchte aus der Klosterzelle_,
München 1908.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of
Dogmas_, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 306 sqq., 374 sq.

On the heresy of Pelagianism cfr. *F. Wörter, _Der Pelagianismus
nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre_, Freiburg 1874.—F. Klasen,
_Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus_, Freiburg
1882.—Schwane, _Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., § 60 sqq.,
Freiburg 1895.—H. Zimmer, _Pelagius in Irland_, Berlin
1901.—Warfield, _Two Studies in the History of Doctrine_, New York
1897.—Tixeront, _Histoire des Dogmes_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris
1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).—Pohle in the _Catholic
Encyclopedia_, Vol. XI, pp. 604-608.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual
of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, pp. 357 sqq.

On Semi-Pelagianism cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, Prolegom., V, 5
sqq.—Livinus Meyer, _De Pelag. et Semipelag. Erroribus._—Wiggers,
_Geschichte des Semipelagianismus_, Hamburg 1835.—A. Hoch, _Lehre
des Johannes Cassianus von Natur und Gnade_, Freiburg 1895.—*A.
Koch, _Der hl. Faustus, Bischof von Riez_, Stuttgart 1895.—Fr.
Wörter, _Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semipelagianismus_, Münster
1900.—Sublet, _Le Semipélagianisme_, Namur 1897.—Tixeront,
_Histoire des Dogmes_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris 1909 (English tr.,
St. Louis 1914).—Pohle in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. XIII,
pp. 703-706.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of
Dogmas_, Vol. I, pp. 379 sqq.

On Jansenism cfr. *Steph. Dechamps, _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris
1645.—Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, Vol. III: “Contra Baium et
Baianos,” Cologne 1648.—Duchesne, _Histoire du Baianisme_, Douai
1731.—*Linsenmann, _Michael Bajus und die Grundlegung des
Jansenismus_, Tübingen 1867.—A. Schill, _Die Konstitution
Unigenitus, ihre Veranlassung und ihre Folgen_, Freiburg
1876.—Ingold, _Rome et France: La Seconde Phase du Jansénisme_,
Paris 1901.—P. Minges, O. F. M., _Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus
auf ihren angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semipelagianismus
geprüft_, Münster 1906.—Lafiteau, _Histoire de la Constitution
Unigenitus_, 2 vols., Liège 1738.—Van den Peereboom, _Cornelius
Jansenius, Septième Évêque d’Ypres_, Bruges 1882.—J. Forget in the
_Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. VIII, pp. 285-294.—B. J. Otten, S.
J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, pp. 507 sqq.

Section 2. The Gratuity Of Actual Grace

All grace _ex vi termini_ is a free gift.(406) This applies particularly
to Christian grace, which is so absolutely gratuitous that its gratuity,
together with its necessity, may be called the groundwork of the Catholic
religion.

1. STATE OF THE QUESTION.—To show what is meant by “gratuity”
(_gratuitas_) we must first explain the technical term “merit.”

a) “Merit” (_meritum_=that which is earned) is that property of a good
work which entitles the performer to receive a reward from him to whose
advantage the work redounds.

α) An analysis of this definition shows that (1) merit is found only in
such works as are positively good; (2) merit and reward are correlative
terms which postulate each other; (3) merit supposes two distinct persons,
one who deserves and another who awards; (4) the relation between merit
and reward is based on justice, not on benevolence or mercy. The
last-mentioned determination is by far the most important of the
four.(407)

β) Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign
merit,(408) which is merit in the strict sense (_meritum adaequatum sive
de condigno_), and (2) congruous merit (_meritum inadaequatum sive de
congruo_), so called because of the congruity, or fitness, that the claim
should be recognized. Condign merit presupposes some proportion between
the work done and the reward given in compensation for it (_aequalitas s.
condignitas dati et accepti_). It is measured by commutative justice and
thus confers a real claim to a reward. For example, a conscientious
workman has a strict claim to his wage. Owing to the lack of intrinsic
proportion between service and reward, congruous merit can claim a
remuneration only on grounds of fairness.

A distinction between these two kinds of merit was already made by the
Fathers, though not in the terms of present-day theology. It was known to
the older Scholastics and emphasized anew by Luther’s famous adversary
Johann Eck.(409)

No relation of strict justice is conceivable between the Creator and His
creatures. On the part of God there can only be question of a gratuitous
promise to reward certain good works,—which promise He is bound to keep
because He is veracious and faithful.(410)

b) Two other terms must also be clearly defined in order to arrive at a
true conception of the gratuity of Christian grace. They are prayer for
grace,(411) and a capacity or disposition to receive it.(412) To pray
means to incite God’s liberality or mercy by humble supplication.

α) Despite the contrary teaching of Vasquez(413) and a few other
theologians, congruous merit and prayer are really distinct because one
can exist without the other. As the angels in Heaven are able to pray for
us without earning a _meritum de congruo_, so conversely, all salutary
works are meritorious even without prayer. Moreover, humble supplication
does not involve any positive service entitled to a reward.

There is another important and obvious distinction, _viz._: between purely
natural prayer (_preces naturae_) and supernatural prayer inspired by
grace (_oratio supernaturalis_).

β) Capacity or disposition, especially when it takes the form of
preparation, may be either positive or negative. Positive capacity is
defined as “that real mode by which a subject, in itself indifferent,
becomes apt to receive a new form.” Such a capacity or disposition always
entails a claim to its respective form.

Positive capacity or disposition differs from both prayer or quasi-merit
(_meritum de congruo_). Quasi-merit is entitled to a reward on the ground
of fairness, whereas the _capacitas s. dispositio positiva_ is at most the
fulfilment of an expectation based upon purely teleological
considerations. Again, a reward can be bestowed upon some subject other
than the one by whom the service was rendered, whereas the introduction of
a new form necessarily supposes a subject disposed for or prepared to
receive it. Thus only he who is hungry is disposed for the reception of
food and entitled to have his craving satisfied.

Negative capacity consists in the absence or removal of obstacles that
impede the reception of a new form, as when green wood is dried to become
fit for burning.

c) There arises the important question whether or not divine grace is an
object of merit, and if so, to what extent it can be merited by prayer and
preparation.

It is of faith that the just man, by the performance of supernaturally
good deeds, can merit _de condigno_ an increase in the state of grace and
eternal glory, and that the sinner is able to earn justification _de
congruo_. On the other hand, it is also an article of faith that divine
grace is strictly gratuitous.(414) The two dogmas seem incompatible, but
they are not, as will become evident if we consider that the good works of
the just and the salutary works of the sinner are entirely rooted in
divine grace and consequently the merits which they contain are strictly
merits of grace in no wise due to nature.(415) When we speak of the
absolute gratuity of grace, therefore, we mean the very first or initial
grace (_gratia prima vocans_), by which the work of salvation is begun. Of
this initial grace the Church explicitly teaches that it is absolutely
incapable of being merited; whence it follows that all subsequent graces,
up to and including justification, are also gratuitous,(416) _i.e._
unmerited by nature in strict justice, in so far as they are based on the
_gratia prima_.

2. THE GRATUITY OF GRACE PROVED FROM REVELATION.—Keeping the above
explanation well in mind we now proceed to demonstrate the gratuity of
divine grace in five systematic theses.

*Thesis I: Mere nature cannot, in strict justice (de condigno), merit
initial grace (gratia prima), nor, consequently, any of the series of
subsequent graces in the order of justification.*

This proposition embodies an article of faith.

Proof. It was one of the fundamental errors of Pelagius that grace can be
merited by purely natural acts.(417) When, at the instance of the bishops
assembled at Diospolis (A. D. 415), he retracted his proposition that “the
grace of God is given according to our merits,”(418) he employed the term
_gratia Dei_ dishonestly for the grace of creation. The Second Council of
Orange (A. D. 529) formally defined that grace cannot be merited, but is
purely and strictly gratuitous.(419) And the Council of Trent declared:
“In adults the beginning of justification is to be derived from the
prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His
vocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their parts, they are
called....”(420) The non-existence of merits prior to the bestowal of the
_prima gratia vocans,_ so positively asserted in this definition, plainly
excludes any and all natural merit _de condigno._

a) St. Paul demonstrates in his Epistle to the Romans that justification
does not result from obedience to the law, but is a grace freely bestowed
by God.

The Apostle regards the merciful dispensations of Providence in favor of
the Chosen People, and of the entire sinful race of men in general, as so
many sheer graces. Rom. IX, 16: “So then it is not of him that willeth,
nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.”(421) The gratuity
of grace is asserted in terms that almost sound extravagant two verses
further down in the same Epistle: “Therefore he hath mercy on whom he
will; and whom he will, he hardeneth.”(422) The same truth is emphasized
in Rom. XI, 6: “And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace
is no more grace.”(423) Lest any one should pride himself on having
obtained faith, which is the root of justification, by his own merits, St.
Paul declares in his Epistle to the Ephesians: “For by grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not
of works, that no man may glory. For we are his workmanship, created in
Christ Jesus in good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in
them.”(424) These and many similar passages(425) make it plain that grace
cannot be merited without supernatural aid.

b) The leading champion of the dogma of the gratuity of grace among the
Fathers is St. Augustine, who never tires of repeating that “Grace does
not find merits, but causes them,”(426) and substantiates this fundamental
principle thus: “Grace has preceded thy merit; not grace by merit, but
merit by grace. For if grace is by merit, thou hast bought, not received
gratis.”(427)

c) The theological argument is based (1) on the disproportion between
nature and grace and (2) on the absolute necessity of grace for the
performance of salutary works.

There is no proportion between the natural and the supernatural, and it
would be a contradiction to say that mere nature can span the chasm
separating the two orders. To assume the existence of a strict _meritum
naturae_ for it, would be to deny the gratuity as well as the supernatural
character of grace. To deny these would be to deny grace itself and with
it the whole supernatural order that forms the groundwork of Christianity.
We know, on the other hand,(428) that grace is absolutely indispensable
for the performance of salutary acts. Hence, to deny the gratuity of grace
would be to credit nature with the ability to perform salutary acts by its
own power, or at least to merit grace by the performance of naturally good
deeds. In the first hypothesis grace would no longer be necessary for
salvation; in the second, it would be proportionate to natural goodness,
and therefore no grace at all. Consequently, the gratuity of grace cannot
be consistently denied without at the same time denying its
necessity.(429)

*Thesis II: There is no naturally good work by which unaided nature could
acquire even so much as an equitable claim to supernatural grace.*

This proposition may be technically qualified as _fidei proxima saltem_.

Proof. The Semipelagians held that, though nature cannot merit grace in
strict justice, it can merit it at least congruously, _i.e._ as a matter
of fitness or equity.(430) This contention was rejected by the Second
Council of Orange (A. D. 529), which defined that “God works many good
things in man that man does not work, but man works no good deeds that God
does not give him the strength to do.”(431) And again: “[God] Himself
inspires us with faith and charity without any preceding [natural] merits
[on our part].”(432) The phrase “without any preceding merits” (_nullis
praecedentibus meritis_) excludes both the _meritum de condigno_ and the
_meritum de congruo_.

a) The Scriptural argument given above for thesis I also covers this
thesis.

The Semipelagians quoted Matth. XXV, 15 in support of their teaching: “To
one he gave five talents, and to another two, and to another one, to every
one according to his proper ability.”(433) But this text is too vague to
serve as an argument in such an important matter. Not a few exegetes treat
it as a kind of rhetorical figure. Others, following the example of the
Fathers, take “talents” to mean purely natural gifts, or _gratiae gratis
datae_, while by “ability” (_virtus_) they understand the already existing
grace of faith or a certain definite measure of initial grace.(434) But
even if _virtus_ meant natural faculty or talent, it cannot be identical
with “merit.” Considering the common teaching of theologians that the
angels were endowed with grace according to the measure of their natural
perfection,(435) we may well suppose that man receives grace likewise
according to his natural constitution (_gratia sequitur naturam_)—a
predisposition or aptitude which God ordained in His infinite wisdom to be
the instrument through which His graces should operate either for personal
sanctification or the good of others.

b) St. Augustine and his disciples, in defending the orthodox faith
against the Semipelagians, strongly insisted on the gratuity of the grace
of faith, and above all of the initial _gratia praeveniens_.

α) St. Augustine comments on 1 Cor. IV, 7 as follows: “Nothing is so
opposed to this feeling as for any one to glory concerning his own merits
in such a way as if he himself had made them for himself, and not the
grace of God,—a grace, however, which makes the good to differ from the
wicked, and is not common to the good and the wicked.”(436) And in another
place he says: “For it would not in any sense be the grace of God, were it
not in every sense gratuitous.”(437)

β) Certain of the Greek Fathers have been suspected of Semipelagian
leanings because they appear to assign the chief rôle in the business of
salvation to nature.(438) A careful study of their writings, however,
shows that these authors had in mind co-operating, not prevenient grace.
The general teaching of the Orientals on the gratuity of grace is
sufficiently indicated by the demand made at the Council of Lydda (A. D.
415), that Pelagius be compelled to retract the proposition: “_Gratiam Dei
secundum merita nostra dari._” The Fathers who have been accused of
Semipelagian sympathies merely wished to emphasize free-will and to incite
the morally indifferent to co-operate heartily with divine grace.

St. Chrysostom, in particular, expressly asserts the absolute gratuity of
grace when he says of faith: “That which is a merit of faith, may not be
ascribed to us, for it is a free gift of God,”(439) and directly
contradicts Cassian and the Massilians when he declares: “Thou hast it not
of thyself, thou hast received it from God. Hence thou hast received
whatever thou hast, not only this or that, but all thou hast. For it is
not thine own merit, but the grace of God. Although thou allegest the
faith, thou hast received it by vocation.”(440)

c) The theological argument for our thesis may be succinctly stated thus:
The grace of God is the cause of our merits, and hence cannot be itself
merited. Being the cause, it cannot be an effect.(441)

*Thesis III: Nature cannot merit supernatural grace even by natural
prayer.*

This thesis, like the preceding one, may be technically qualified as
_fidei proxima saltem_.

Proof. Let us first clearly establish the state of the question. Our
thesis refers to that particular kind of prayer (_preces naturae_) which
by its intrinsic value, so to speak, obliges Almighty God to grant what
the petitioner asks for, as is undoubtedly the case with supernatural
prayer, according to our Saviour’s own promise: “Ask and ye shall
receive.”(442) The inefficacy of natural prayer asserted in our thesis, is
not, as in the case of merit,(443) due to any intrinsic impossibility, but
to a positive divine decree to grant supernatural prayer.

The Second Council of Orange defined against the Semipelagians: “If any
one says that the grace of God can be obtained by human [_i.e._ natural]
prayer, and that it is not grace itself which causes us to invoke God, he
contradicts the prophet Isaias and the Apostle who say: I was found by
them that did not seek me; I appeared openly to them that asked not after
me.”(444)

a) Sacred Scripture teaches that, unless we are inspired by the Holy
Ghost, we cannot pray efficaciously. It follows that to be efficacious,
prayer must be an effect of prevenient grace. We should not even know for
what or how to pray, if the Holy Ghost did not inspire us. Cfr. Rom. VIII,
26: “For we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit
himself asketh for us [inspires us to ask] with unspeakable
groanings.”(445) 1 Cor. XII, 3: “No man can say: Lord God, but by the Holy
Ghost.”(446) Supernatural union with Christ is an indispensable condition
of all efficacious prayer. John XV, 7: “If you abide in me, and my words
abide in you, you shall ask whatever you will, and it shall be done unto
you.”(447)

b) This is also the teaching of the Fathers. “Who would truly groan,
desiring to receive what he prays for from the Lord,” says St.
Augustine,(448) “if he thought that he received it from himself, and not
from God? ... We understand that this is also itself the gift of God, that
with a true heart and spiritually we cry to God. Let them, therefore,
observe how they are mistaken who think that our seeking, asking, knocking
is of ourselves, and is not given to us; and say that this is the case
because grace is preceded by our merits; that it follows them when we ask
and receive, and seek and find, and it is opened to us when we
knock.”(449)

c) From the theological point of view the inefficacy of purely natural
prayer in matters pertaining to salvation can be demonstrated thus:
Revelation tells us that the work of salvation requires for its beginning
an initial supernatural grace. Now prayer, that is to say, efficacious
prayer, is in itself a salutary act. Consequently, there can be no
efficacious prayer without prevenient grace, and purely natural prayer is
inefficacious for salvation.

Ripalda holds that, in an economy different from the present, natural
prayer would have a claim to be heard. This opinion can be defended
without prejudice to the dogma of the gratuity of grace. No doubt God
might condescend to hear such petitions if He would, though, of course, He
is not bound to do so by any intrinsic power inherent in natural prayer.
Unlike merit, prayer appeals to the mercy of God, not to His justice.
Ripalda’s theory, however, rests upon an unprovable assumption, namely,
that man in the state of pure nature would be able to know of the
existence, or at least the possibility, of a supernatural order and to
strive for the beatific vision as his final end.(450)

*Thesis IV: Man cannot move God to the bestowal of supernatural grace by
any positive disposition or preparation on his part.*

This thesis may be qualified as _propositio certa_.

Proof. Positive preparation or disposition for grace (_capacitas sive
praeparatio positiva_) is practically on a level with natural prayer. The
positive disposition for a natural good sometimes includes a certain
demand to satisfaction, as _e.g._ thirst demands to be quenched. This is
still more the case when the disposition has been acquired by a positive
preparation for the good in question. Thus a student, by conscientiously
preparing himself for examination, acquires a claim to be admitted to it
sooner or later. Can this also be said of grace? Does there exist in man a
positive disposition for grace in the sense that the withholding of it
would grievously injure and disappoint the soul? Can man, without
supernatural aid, positively dispose himself for the reception of
supernatural grace, confident that God will reward his efforts by
bestowing it on him? Both these questions must be answered in the
negative.

a) If there were something in the natural make-up of man which would move
the Almighty to give him grace, the bestowal of grace would no longer be a
free act of God. But to assert the consequent would be Semipelagian, hence
the antecedent must be false.

b) This truth can easily be deduced from the teaching of the Fathers in
the Semipelagian controversy. They declare, in perfect conformity with St.
Paul, that grace is bestowed gratuitously because God can give or withhold
it as He pleases. St. Augustine says(451) that the grace of Baptism is
granted freely, that is, without regard to any positive disposition on the
part of the baptized infant. It should be remembered, moreover, that
nature never existed in its pure form, and is now tainted by original
sin.(452) Surely a nature tainted by sin cannot possibly possess the power
of meriting divine grace.

c) The contention of the so-called Augustinians, that pure nature needs
actual grace to save itself, and consequently has a claim to such grace at
least _ex decentia Creatoris_ and _ex lege iustissimae providentiae_,
perilously resembles Baius’ condemned proposition that the state of pure
nature is impossible.(453)

*Thesis V: Man may prepare himself negatively for the reception of
supernatural grace by not putting any obstacles in its way.*

This proposition is held by a majority of Catholic theologians (_sententia
communior_).

Proof. The solution of this question is intimately connected with the
famous Scholastic axiom: “_Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat
gratiam_,” that is, to the man who does what he can, God does not refuse
grace. This axiom is susceptible of three different interpretations.

a) It may mean: _Facienti quod est in se cum auxilio gratiae Deus confert
ulteriorem gratiam_, _i.e._, to him who does what he can with the help of
supernatural grace, God grants further and more powerful graces up to
justification. This is merely another way of stating the indisputable
truth that, by faithfully coöperating with the grace of God, man is able
to merit additional graces, and it holds true even of infidels and
sinners. The first freely performed salutary act establishes a _meritum de
congruo_ towards other acts disposing a man for justification. And since
the first as well as all subsequent salutary acts, in this hypothesis, are
pure graces, this interpretation of our axiom is entirely compatible with
the dogma of the gratuity of grace.(454)

b) _Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturalibus Deus non denegat
gratiam_ (to him who does what he can with his natural moral strength, God
does not refuse grace.) This does not mean that, in consequence of the
efforts of the natural will, God may not withhold from anyone the first
grace of vocation. In this sense the axiom would be Semipelagian, and has
been rejected by a majority of the Schoolmen. It is said of Molina that he
tried to render it acceptable by the hypothesis that God bound Himself by
a contract with Christ to give His grace to all men who would make good
use of their natural faculties. But how could the existence of this
imaginary contract be proved? In matter of fact Molina taught, with a
large number of other divines,(455) that God in the bestowal of His graces
freely bound Himself to a definite rule, which coincides with His
universal will to save all mankind. In the application of this law He pays
no regard to any positive disposition or preparation, but merely to the
presence or absence of obstacles which would prove impediments to grace.
In other words, God, generally speaking, is more inclined to offer His
grace to one who puts no obstacles in its way than to one who wallows in
sin and neglects to do his share.(456)

c) _Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturae negative se disponendo
[i.e. obicem non ponendo] Deus non denegat gratiam_ (to the man who does
what he can with his natural moral strength, disposing himself negatively
[_i.e._, by not placing any obstacle] God does not deny grace. In this
form the axiom is identical with our thesis. The question arises: Can it
be made to square with the dogma of the absolute gratuity of grace?
Vasquez,(457) Glossner,(458) and some others answer this question in the
negative, whereas the great majority of Catholic theologians hold with
Suarez(459) and Lessius,(460) that there is no contradiction between the
two. Though Lessius did not succeed in proving his famous contention that
the axiom _Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam_, was for
three full centuries understood in this sense by the schools,(461) there
is no doubt that many authorities can be cited in favor of his
interpretation.(462)

The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated thus: The
gratuity of grace does not imply that the recipient must have no sort of
disposition. It merely means that man is positively unworthy of divine
favor. Otherwise the Church could not teach, as she does, that the grace
bestowed on the angels and on our first parents in Paradise was absolutely
gratuitous, nor could she hold that the Hypostatic Union of the two
natures in Christ, which is the pattern and exemplar of all true
grace,(463) was a pure grace in respect of the humanity of our Lord. The
dogma of the gratuity of grace is in no danger whatever so long as the
relation between negative disposition and supernatural grace is conceived
as actual (_facienti=qui facit_), not causal (_facienti=quia facit_). The
motive for the distribution of grace is to be sought not in the dignity of
human nature, but in God’s will to save all men. We must, however, guard
against the erroneous notion that grace is bestowed according to a fixed
law or an infallible norm regulating the amount of grace in accordance
with the condition of the recipient. Sometimes great sinners are
miraculously converted, while others of fairly good antecedents perish.
Yet, again, who could say that to the omniscient and all-wise God the
great sinner did not appear better fitted to receive grace than the
“decent” but self-sufficient pharisee?

READINGS:—Hurter, _Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae_, Vol. III,
thes. 187.—Oswald, _Lehre von der Heiligung_, § 8, Paderborn
1885.—*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, c. 3, Gulpen
1885.—Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, §
417-420, Mainz 1897.—Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol.
V, 3rd ed., pp. 105 sqq., Freiburg 1908.—Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 468 sqq., Freiburg 1901.

Section 3. The Universality Of Actual Grace

The gratuity of grace does not conflict with its universality. Though God
distributes His graces freely, He grants them to all men without
exception, because He wills all to be saved.

This divine “will to save” (_voluntas Dei salvifica_) may be regarded in
relation either to the wayfaring state or to the _status termini_.
Regarded from the first-mentioned point of view it is a merciful will
(_voluntas misericordiae_) and is generally called first or antecedent
will (_voluntas prima s. antecedens_) or God’s salvific will (_voluntas
Dei salvifica_) in the strict sense of the word. Considered in relation to
the _status termini_, it is a just will, as God rewards or punishes each
creature according to its deserts. This second or consequent will
(_voluntas secunda s. consequens_) is called “predestination” in so far as
it rewards the just, and “reprobation” in so far as it punishes the
wicked.

God’s “will to save” may therefore be defined as an earnest and sincere
desire to justify all men and make them supernaturally happy. As _voluntas
antecedens_ it is conditional, depending on the free co-operation of man;
as _voluntas consequens_, on the other hand, it is absolute, because God
owes it to His justice to reward or punish every man according to his
deserts.(464)

Hence we shall treat in four distinct articles, (1) Of the universality of
God’s will to save; (2) Of the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as the will to
give sufficient graces to all adult human beings without exception; (3) Of
predestination, and (4) Of reprobation.

Article 1. The Universality Of God’s Will To Save

Although God’s will to save all men is practically identical with His will
to redeem all,(465) a formal distinction must be drawn between the two,
(a) because there is a difference in the Scriptural proofs by which either
is supported, and (b) because the latter involves the fate of the fallen
angels, while the former suggests a question peculiar to itself, _viz._
the fate of unbaptized children.

*Thesis I: God sincerely wills the salvation, not only of the predestined,
but of all the faithful without exception.*

This proposition embodies an article of faith.

Proof. Its chief opponents are the Calvinists and the Jansenists, who
heretically maintain that God wills to save none but the predestined.
Against Calvin the Tridentine Council defined: “If any one saith that the
grace of justification is attained only by those who are predestined unto
life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive
not grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him
be anathema.”(466)

The teaching of Jansenius that Christ died exclusively for the
predestined,(467) was censured as “heretical” by Pope Innocent X. Hence it
is of faith that Christ died for others besides the predestined. Who are
these “others”? As the Church obliges all her children to pray: “[Christ]
descended from heaven for us men and for our salvation,”(468) it is
certain that at least all the faithful are included in the saving will of
God. We say, “at least all the faithful,” because in matter of fact the
divine _voluntas salvifica_ extends to all the descendants of Adam, as we
shall show further on.(469)

a) Holy Scripture positively declares in a number of passages that God
wills the salvation of all believers, whether predestined or not. Jesus
Himself says in regard to the Jews: Matth. XXIII, 37: “Jerusalem,
Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent
unto thee, how often would I (_volui_) have gathered together thy
children, as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou
wouldst not (_noluisti_).” Two facts are stated in this text: (1) Our
Lord’s earnest desire to save the Jewish people, anciently through the
instrumentality of the prophets, and now in His own person; (2) the
refusal of the Jews to be saved. Of those who believe in Christ under the
New Covenant we read in the Gospel of St. John (III, 16): “God so loved
the world, as to give his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in
him(470) may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” However, since
many who believe in Christ do actually perish,(471) the divine _voluntas
salvifica_, in principle, extends not only to the predestined, but to all
the faithful, _i.e._ to all who have received the sacrament of Baptism.

b) The teaching of the Fathers can be gathered from the quotations given
under Thesis II, _infra_.

c) The theological argument may be briefly summarized as follows: God’s
will to save is co-extensive with the grace of adoptive sonship (_filiatio
adoptiva_), which is imparted either by Baptism or by perfect charity.
Now, some who were once in the state of grace are eternally lost.
Consequently, God also wills the salvation of those among the faithful who
do not actually attain to salvation and who are, therefore, not
predestined.

*Thesis II: God wills to save every human being.*

This proposition is _fidei proxima saltem_.

Proof. The existence of original sin is no reason why God should exclude
some men from the benefits of the atonement, as was alleged by the
Calvinistic “Infralapsarians.” Our thesis is so solidly grounded on
Scripture and Tradition that some theologians unhesitatingly call it an
article of faith.

a) We shall confine the Scriptural demonstration to two classical
passages, Wisd. XI, 24 sq. and 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.

α) The Book of Wisdom, after extolling God’s omnipotence, says of His
mercy: “But thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things,
and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of repentance. For thou
lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast
made.... Thou sparest all, because they are thine, O Lord, who lovest
souls.”(472)

In this text the mercy of God is described as universal. _Misereris
omnium, parcis omnibus_. This universality is based (1) on His omnipotence
(_quia omnia potes_), which is unlimited. His mercy, being equally
boundless, must therefore include all men without exception. The
universality of God’s mercy is based (2) on His universal over-lordship
and dominion (_quoniam tua sunt; diligis omnia quae fecisti_). As there is
no creature that does not belong to God, so there is no man whom He does
not love and to whom He does not show mercy. The universality of God’s
mercy in the passage quoted is based (3) on His love for souls (_qui amas
animas_). Wherever there is an immortal soul (be it in child or adult,
Christian, pagan or Jew), God is at work to save it. Consequently the
divine _voluntas salvifica_ is universal, not only in a moral, but in the
physical sense of the term, that is, it embraces all the descendants of
Adam.

β) 1 Tim. II, 2 sqq.: “I desire therefore, first of all, that
supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all
men.... For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour,
who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the
truth. For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man
Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all.”(473)

The Apostle commands us to pray “for all men,” because this practice is
“good and acceptable in the sight of God.” Why is it good and acceptable?
Because God “will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of
the truth.” In other words, God’s will to save is universal.

The question arises: Is the universality of the divine _voluntas
salvifica_, as inculcated by St. Paul, merely moral, or is it physical,
admitting of no exceptions? The answer may be found in the threefold
reason given by the Apostle: the oneness of God, the mediatorship of
Christ, and the universality of the Redemption. (1) “For there is [but]
one God.”(474) As truly, therefore, as God is the God of all men without
exception, is each and every man included in the divine _voluntas
salvifica_. (2) “There is [but] ... one mediator of God and men, the man
Christ Jesus.” The human nature which Christ assumed in the Incarnation is
common to all men. Hence, whoever is a man, has Jesus Christ for his
mediator.(475) (3) Christ “gave himself a redemption [_i.e._ died] for
all.” That is to say, God’s will to save is co-extensive with His will to
redeem. The latter is universal,(476) consequently also the former.(477)

b) The Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers were wont to base their
teaching in this matter on the above-quoted texts, and clearly intimated
that they regarded the truth therein set forth as divinely revealed.
Passaglia(478) has worked out the Patristic argument in detail, quoting no
less than two hundred authorities.

α) We must limit ourselves to a few specimen citations. St. Ambrose
declares that God wills to save all men. “He willed all to be His own whom
He established and created. O man, do not flee and hide thyself! He wants
even those who flee, and does not will that those in hiding should
perish.”(479) St. Gregory of Nazianzus holds God’s _voluntas salvifica_ to
be co-extensive in scope with original sin and the atonement. “The law,
the prophets, and the sufferings of Christ,” he says, “by which we were
redeemed, are common property and admit of no exception: but as all [men]
are participators in the same Adam, deceived by the serpent and subject to
death in consequence of sin, so by the heavenly Adam all are restored to
salvation and by the wood of ignominy recalled to the wood of life, from
which we had fallen.”(480) St. Prosper concludes that, since all men are
in duty bound to pray for their fellowmen, God must needs be willing to
save all without exception. “We must sincerely believe,” he says, “that
God wills all men to be saved, since the Apostle solicitously prescribes
supplication to be made for all.”(481) The question why so many perish,
Prosper answers as follows: “[God] wills all to be saved and to come to
the knowledge of truth, ... so that those who are saved, are saved because
He wills them to be saved, while those who perish, perish because they
deserve to perish.”(482) In his _Responsiones ad Capitula Obiectionum
Vincentianarum_ the same writer energetically defends St. Augustine
against the accusation that his teaching on predestination is incompatible
with the orthodox doctrine of the universality of God’s saving will.(483)

β) St. Augustine aroused suspicion in the camp of the Semipelagians by his
general teaching on predestination and more particularly by his
interpretation of 1 Tim. II, 4. The great Bishop of Hippo interprets this
Pauline text in no less than four different ways. In his treatise _De
Spiritu et Litera_ he describes the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as
strictly universal in the physical sense.(484) In his _Enchiridion_ he
restricts it to the predestined.(485) In his _Contra Iulianum_ he says:
“No one is saved unless God so wills.”(486) In his work _De Correptione et
Gratia_: “God wills all men to be saved, because He makes us to will this,
just as He sent the spirit of His Son [into our hearts], crying: Abba,
Father, that is, making us to cry, Abba, Father.”(487) How did St.
Augustine come to interpret this simple text in so many different ways?
Some think he chose this method to overwhelm the Pelagians and
Semipelagians with Scriptural proofs. But this polemical motive can hardly
have induced him to becloud an obvious text and invent interpretations
which never occurred to any other ecclesiastical writer before or after
his time. The conundrum can only be solved by the assumption that
Augustine believed in a plurality of literal senses in the Bible and held
that over and above (or notwithstanding) the _sensus obvius_ every exegete
is free to read as much truth into any given passage as possible, and that
such interpretation lay within the scope of the inspiration of the Holy
Ghost quite as much as the _sensus obvius_. In his _Confessions_(488) he
actually argues in favor of a _pluralitas sensuum_. He was keen enough to
perceive, however, that if a Scriptural text is interpreted in different
ways, the several constructions put upon it must not be contradictory. As
he was undoubtedly aware of the distinction between _voluntas antecedens_
and _consequens_,(489) his different interpretations of 1 Tim. II, 4 can
be reconciled by assuming that he conceived God’s _voluntas salvifica_ as
_antecedens_ in so far as it is universal, and as _consequens_ in so far
as it is particular. St. Thomas solves the difficulty in a similar manner:
“The words of the Apostle, ‘God will have all men to be saved, etc.,’ can
be understood in three ways: First, by a restricted application, in which
case they would mean, as Augustine says, ‘God wills all men to be saved
that are saved, not because there is no man whom he does not wish to be
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will.’ Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not of every individual of each class; in which case they
mean that ‘God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of
every condition.’ Thirdly, according to the Damascene, they are understood
of the antecedent will of God, not of the consequent will. The distinction
must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is
nothing antecedent or consequent; but to the things willed. To understand
which we must consider that everything, so far as it is good, is willed by
God. A thing taken in its strict sense, and considered absolutely, may be
good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstance is taken into
account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into its contrary.
Thus, that men should live is good; and that men should be killed is evil,
absolutely considered. If in a particular case it happens that a man is a
murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him becomes good, to let him
live an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge that antecedently he
wills all men to live, but consequently he wills the murderer to be
hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but
consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we
will simply what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications.
Hence we will a thing simply in as much as we will it when all particular
circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing
consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the
hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to
live, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a
willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever
God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not
take place.”(490)

*Thesis III: The lot of unbaptized infants, though difficult to reconcile
with the universality of God’s saving will, furnishes no argument against
it.*

Proof. The most difficult problem concerning the divine _voluntas
salvifica_—a real _crux theologorum_—is the fate of unbaptized children.
The Church has never uttered a dogmatic definition on this head, and
theologians hold widely divergent opinions.

Bellarmine teaches that infants who die without being baptized, are
excluded from the divine _voluntas salvifica_, because, while the
non-reception of Baptism is the proximate reason of their damnation, its
ultimate reason must be the will of God.

a) This rather incautious assertion needs to be carefully restricted. It
is an article of faith that God has instituted the sacrament of Baptism as
the ordinary means of salvation for all men. On the other hand, it is
certain that He expects parents, priests, and relatives, as his
representatives, to provide conscientiously for its proper and timely
administration. Sinful negligence on the part of these responsible agents
cannot, therefore, be charged to Divine Providence, but must be laid at
the door of those human agents who fail to do their duty. In exceptional
cases infants can be saved even by means of the so-called Baptism of blood
(_baptismus sanguinis_), _i.e._ death for Christ’s sake. On the whole it
may be said that God has, in principle, provided for the salvation of
little children by the institution of infant Baptism.

b) But there are many cases in which either invincible ignorance or the
order of nature precludes the administration of Baptism. The well-meant
opinion of some theologians(491) that the responsibility in all such cases
lies not with God, but with men, lacks probability. Does God, then, really
will the damnation of these innocents? Some modern writers hold that the
physical order of nature is responsible for the misfortune of so many
innocent infants; but this hypothesis contributes nothing towards clearing
up the awful mystery.(492) For God is the author of the natural as well as
of the supernatural order. To say that He is obliged to remove existing
obstacles by means of a miracle would disparage His ordinary
providence.(493) Klee’s assumption that dying children become conscious
long enough to enable them to receive the Baptism of desire (_baptismus
flaminis_), is scarcely compatible with the definition of the Council of
Florence that “the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, or only in
original sin, forthwith descend to hell.”(494) A still more unsatisfactory
supposition is that the prayer of Christian parents acts like a baptism of
desire and saves their children from hell. This theory, espoused by
Cardinal Cajetan, was rejected by the Fathers of Trent,(495) and Pope Pius
V ordered it to be expunged from the Roman edition of Cajetan’s
works.(496)

A way out of the difficulty is suggested by Gutberlet and others, who,
holding with St. Thomas that infants that die without Baptism will enjoy a
kind of natural beatitude, think it possible that God, in view of their
sufferings, may mercifully cleanse them from original sin and thereby
place them in a state of innocence.(497) This theory is based on the
assumption that the ultimate fate of unbaptized children is deprivation of
the beatific vision of God and therefore a state of real damnation (_poena
damni, infernum_), and that the remission of original sin has for its
object merely to enable these unfortunate infants to enjoy a perfect
natural beatitude, which they could not otherwise attain. It is reasonable
to argue that, as these infants are deprived of celestial happiness
through no guilt of their own, the Creator can hardly deny them some sort
of natural beatitude, to which their very nature seems to entitle them.
“Hell” for them probably consists in being deprived of the beatific vision
of God, which is a supernatural grace and as such lies outside the sphere
of those prerogatives to which human nature has a claim by the fact of
creation. This theory would seem to establish at least some manner of
salvation for the infants in question, and consequently, to vindicate the
divine _voluntas salvifica_ in the same measure. Needless to say, it can
claim no more than probability, and we find ourselves constrained to
admit, at the conclusion of our survey, that there is no sure and perfect
solution of the difficulty, and theologians therefore do well to confess
their ignorance.(498)

c) The difficulty of which we have spoken does not, of course, in any way
impair the certainty of the dogma. The Scriptural passages cited
above(499) clearly prove that God wills to save all men without exception.
In basing the universality of God’s mercy on His omnipotence, His
universal dominion, and His love of souls, the Book of Wisdom(500)
evidently implies that the unbaptized infants participate in that mercy in
all three of these respects. How indeed could Divine Omnipotence exert
itself more effectively than by conferring grace on those who are
inevitably and without any fault of their own deprived of Baptism? Who
would deny that little children, as creatures, are subject to God’s
universal dominion in precisely the same manner as adults? Again, if God
loves the souls of men, must He not also love the souls of infants?

1 Tim. II, 4(501) applies primarily to adults, because strictly speaking
only adults can “come to the knowledge of the truth.” But St. Paul employs
certain middle terms which undoubtedly comprise children as well. Thus, if
all men have but “one God,” this God must be the God of infants no less
than of adults, and His mercy and goodness must include them also. And if
Jesus Christ as God-man is the “one mediator of God and men,” He must also
have assumed the human nature of children, in order to redeem them from
original sin. Again, if Christ “gave himself a redemption for all,” it is
impossible to assume that millions of infants should be directly excluded
from the benefits of the atonement.(502)

Article 2. God’s Will To Give Sufficient Grace To All Adult Human Beings
In Particular

In relation to adults, God manifests His saving will by the bestowal of
sufficient grace upon all.(503) The bestowal of sufficient grace being
evidently an effluence of the universal _voluntas salvifica_, the granting
of such grace to all who have attained the use of reason furnishes another
proof for the universality of grace.

God gives all men sufficient graces. But He is not obliged to give to each
_efficacious_ graces, because all that is required to enable man to reach
his supernatural destiny is coöperation with sufficient grace, especially
with the _gratia prima vocans_, which is the beginning of all salutary
operation.

To prove that God gives sufficient grace to all adult human beings without
exception, we must show that He gives sufficient grace (1) to the just,
(2) to the sinner, and (3) to the heathen. This we shall do in three
distinct theses.

*Thesis I: God gives to all just men sufficient grace to keep His
commandments.*

This is _de fide_.

Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches: “If any one saith that the
commandments of God are, even for one that is justified and constituted in
grace, impossible to keep; let him be anathema.”(504)

A contrary proposition in the writings of Jansenius(505) was censured by
Pope Innocent the Tenth as “foolhardy, impious, blasphemous, and
heretical.”

The Church does not assert that God gives to the just sufficient grace at
all times. She merely declares that sufficient grace is at their disposal
whenever they are called upon to obey the law (_urgente praecepto_). Nor
need God always bestow a _gratia proxime sufficiens_; in many instances
the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_) fully serves the
purpose.(506)

This dogma is clearly contained in Holy Scripture. We shall quote the most
important texts.

a) 1 John V, 3 sq.: “For this is the charity of God, that we keep his
commandments, and his commandments are not heavy. For whatsoever is born
of God, overcometh the world.”(507) According to this text the “charity of
God” manifests itself in “keeping his commandments” and “overcoming the
world.” This is declared to be an easy task. Our Lord Himself says: “My
yoke is sweet and my burden light.”(508) Hence it must be possible to keep
His commandments, and therefore God does not withhold the absolutely
necessary graces from the just.

St. Paul consoles the Corinthians by telling them that God will not suffer
them to be tempted beyond their strength, but will help them to a happy
issue, provided they faithfully coöperate with His grace. 1 Cor. X, 13:
“God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which
you are able, but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be
able to bear it.”(509) As it is impossible even for the just to overcome
grievous temptations without supernatural aid,(510) and as God Himself
tells us that we are able to overcome them, it is a necessary inference
that He bestows sufficient grace. The context hardly leaves a doubt that
St. Paul has in mind the just, for a few lines further up he says:
“Therefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he
fall.”(511) But there is no exegetical objection to applying the text to
all the faithful without exception.(512)

b) This dogma is clearly set forth in the writings of the Fathers. Some of
them, it is true, when combating the Pelagians and Semipelagians, defended
the proposition that “grace is not given to all men,”(513) but they meant
_efficacious_ grace.

α) A typical representative of this group of ecclesiastical writers is the
anonymous author of the work _De Vocatione Omnium Gentium_,(514) whom Pope
Gelasius praised as “_probatus Ecclesiae magister_.” This fifth-century
writer, who was highly esteemed by his contemporaries, discusses the
question whether and in what sense all men are called, and why some are
not saved. He begins by drawing a distinction between God’s general and
His special providence.(515) “It so pleased God,” he says, “to give His
efficacious grace to many, and to withhold His sufficient grace from none,
in order that it might appear from both [actions] that what is conferred
upon a portion is not denied to the entire race.”(516)

β) The Jansenists appealed in favor of their teaching to such Patristic
passages as the following: “After the withdrawal of the divine assistance
he [St. Peter] was unable to stand;”(517) and: “He had undertaken more
than he was able to do.”(518) But the two Fathers from whose writings
these passages are taken (SS. Chrysostom and Augustine) speak, as the
context evinces, of the withdrawal of efficacious and proximately
sufficient grace in punishment of Peter’s presumption. Had St. Peter
followed our Lord’s advice(519) and prayed instead of relying on his own
strength, he would not have fallen. That this was the mind of St.
Augustine clearly appears from the following sentence in his work _De
Unitate Ecclesiae_: “Who shall doubt that Judas, had he willed, would not
have betrayed Christ, and that Peter, had he willed, would not have thrice
denied his Master?”(520)

c) The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated as follows:
Since the state of grace confers a claim to supernatural happiness, it
must also confer a claim to those graces which are necessary to attain it.

To assert that God denies the just sufficient grace to observe His
commandments, to avoid mortal sin, and to persevere in the state of grace,
would be to gainsay His solemn promise to His adopted children: “This is
the will of my Father that sent me: that every one who seeth the Son and
believeth in him, may have life everlasting, and I will raise him up in
the last day.”(521) Consequently, God owes it to His own fidelity to
bestow sufficient graces upon the just.

Again, according to the plain teaching of Revelation, the just are
obliged, under pain of sin, to observe the commandments of God and the
precepts of His Church.(522) But this is impossible without the aid of
grace. Consequently, God grants at least sufficient grace to his servants,
for _ad impossibile nemo tenetur_.(523)

*Thesis II: In regard to Christians guilty of mortal sin we must hold: (1)
that ordinary sinners always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin
and do penance; (2) that God never entirely withdraws His grace even from
the obdurate.*

The first part of this thesis embodies a theological conclusion; the
second states the common teaching of Catholic theologians.

1. _Proof of the First Part._ The distinction here drawn between
“ordinary” and “obdurate” sinners has its basis in revelation and is
clearly demanded by the different degrees of certainty attaching to the
two parts of our thesis.

An “ordinary” sinner is a Christian who has lost sanctifying grace by a
grievous sin. An “obdurate” sinner is one who, by repeatedly and
maliciously transgressing the laws of God, has dulled his intellect and
hardened his will against salutary inspirations. A man may be an habitual
sinner (_consuetudinarius_) and a backslider, without being obdurate, or,
which comes to the same, impenitent. Weakness is not malice, though sinful
habits often beget impenitence, which is one of the sins against the Holy
Ghost and the most formidable obstacle in the way of conversion.

With regard to ordinary sinners, our thesis asserts that they always
receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance.

a) Experience teaches that a man falls deeper and deeper if he does not
hasten to do penance after committing a mortal sin. But this is not the
fault of Almighty God, who never withholds His grace; it is wholly the
fault of the sinner who fails to coöperate with the proffered supernatural
assistance.

α) A sufficient Scriptural argument for this part of our thesis is
contained in the texts cited in support of Thesis I. If it is true that
God suffers no one to be tempted beyond his strength,(524) this must
surely apply to Christians who have had the misfortune of committing
mortal sin. St. John says that the commandments of God “are not heavy” and
that faith is “the victory which overcometh the world.”(525) Faith in
Christ remains in the Christian, even though he be guilty of mortal sin,
and consequently if he wills, he is able, by the aid of sufficient grace,
to overcome the “world,” _i.e._ the temptations arising from
concupiscence,(526) and thus to cease committing mortal sins.

β) As for the teaching of Tradition, St. Augustine lays down two
theological principles which apply to saint and sinner alike.

“God does not enjoin impossibilities,” he says, “but in His injunctions
counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in
what you cannot do.”(527) It follows that the sinner always receives at
least the grace of prayer, which Augustine therefore calls _gratia
initialis sive parva_, and of which he says that its right use ensures the
_gratia magna_.

The second principle is this: “_Cum lege coniuncta est gratia, quâ lex
observari possit._” That is, every divine law, by special ordinance,
carries with it the grace by which it may be observed. In other words, the
laws of God can always be obeyed because the lawgiver never fails to grant
sufficient grace to keep them.(528)

b) That the sinner always receives sufficient grace to be converted,
follows from the Scriptural injunction of conversion. If conversion to God
is a duty, and to comply with this duty is impossible without the aid of
grace,(529) the divine command obviously implies the bestowal of
sufficient grace.

That conversion is a duty follows from such Scriptural texts as these: “As
I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that
the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil
ways!”(530) “The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but
dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but
that all should return to penance.”(531)

This teaching is faithfully echoed by Tradition.

2. _Proof of the Second Part._ Obduracy is a serious obstacle to
conversion because the obdurate sinner has confirmed his will in
malice(532) and by systematic resistance diminished the influence of
grace. The question here is whether or not God in such cases eventually
withdraws His grace altogether.

Some rigorists hold that He does so, with the purpose of sparing the
sinner greater tortures in hell.(533) Though this assertion cannot be said
to contravene the dogma of the universality of God’s salvific will, (its
defenders do not deny that He faithfully does His share to save these
unfortunate reprobates), we prefer to adopt the _sententia __ communis_,
that God grants even the most obdurate sinner—at least now and then,
_e.g._ during a mission or on the occasion of some terrible
catastrophe—sufficient grace to be converted. The theological reasons for
this opinion, which we hold to be the true one, coincide in their last
analysis with those set forth in the first part of our thesis.

a) Sacred Scripture, in speaking of the duty of repentance, makes no
distinction between ordinary and obdurate sinners. On the contrary, the
Book of Wisdom points to one of the most wicked and impenitent of nations,
the Canaanites, as a shining object of divine mercy and patience.(534)
According to St. Paul, God calls especially upon hardened and impenitent
sinners to do penance. Rom. II, 4 sq.: “Or despisest thou the riches of
his goodness, and patience, and long suffering? Knowest thou not that the
benignity of God leadeth thee to penance? But according to thy hardness
and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath, against the day
of wrath, and revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to
every man according to his works.”(535)

There are some Scriptural passages which seem to imply that God withdraws
His grace from those who are obdurate, nay, that He Himself hardens their
hearts in punishment of sin. Thus the Lord says of Pharao: “I shall harden
his heart,”(536) and Moses tells us: “The Lord hardened Pharao’s heart,
and he harkened not unto them.”(537) But it would be wrong to assume that
this denotes a positive action on the part of God. Pharao, as we are told
further on, “hardened his own heart” (_ingravavit cor suum_).(538) The
fault in all cases lies with the sinner, who obstinately resists the call
of grace. God’s co-operation in the matter is merely indirect. The greater
and stronger graces which He grants to ordinary sinners, He withholds from
the obdurate in punishment of their malice. This is, however, by no means
tantamount to a withdrawal of sufficient grace.(539)

b) The Fathers speak of God’s way of dealing with obdurate sinners in a
manner which clearly shows their belief that He never entirely withdraws
His mercy. They insist that the light of grace is never extinguished in
the present life. “God gave them over to a reprobate mind,” says St.
Augustine, “for such is the blindness of the mind. Whosoever is given over
thereunto, is shut out from the interior light of God: but not wholly as
yet, whilst he is in this life. For there is ‘outer darkness,’ which is
understood to belong rather to the day of judgment; that he should rather
be wholly without God, whosoever, whilst there is time, refuses
correction.”(540)

It follows that no sinner, how desperate soever his case may appear, need
be despaired of. As long as there is life there is hope.(541) The Fathers
consistently teach that the reason why reprobates are lost is not lack of
grace but their own malice. Thus St. Chrysostom comments on Isaias’
prophecy regarding the impenitence of the Jews: “The reason they did not
believe was not that Isaias had predicted their unbelief, but his
prediction was based on the fact that they would not believe. They were
unable to believe, _i.e._ they had not the will to believe.”(542)

c) The theological argument for our thesis is well stated by St. Thomas.
He distinguishes between _obstinatio perfecta_ and _obstinatio imperfecta_
and says: Perfect obstinacy exists only in hell. Imperfect obstinacy is
that of a sinner who has his will so firmly set on evil that he is
incapable of any but the faintest impulses towards virtue, though even
these are sufficient to prepare the way for grace.(543) “If any one falls
into sin after having received Baptism,” says the Fourth Lateran Council,
“he can always be restored by sincere penance.”(544) As the power of the
keys comprises all sins, even those against the Holy Ghost, so divine
grace is held out to all sinners. The Montanistic doctrine of the
unforgivableness of the “three capital sins” (apostasy, murder, and
adultery) was already condemned as heretical during the life-time of
Tertullian. The sinner can obtain forgiveness only by receiving the
sacrament of Penance or making an act of perfect contrition.(545) Justly,
therefore, does the Church regard despair of God’s mercy as an additional
grievous sin. If the rigorists were right in asserting that God in the end
absolutely abandons the sinner, there could be no hope of forgiveness, and
despair would be justified.

*Thesis III: The heathens, too, receive sufficient graces for salvation.*

This proposition may be qualified as _certa_.

Proof. The “heathens” are those whom the Gospel has not yet reached. They
are called _infideles negativi_ in contradistinction to the _infideles
positivi_, _i.e._ apostates and formal heretics who have fallen away from
the faith. We assert that God gives to the heathens sufficient grace to
know the truth and be saved. Pope Alexander VIII, on December 7, 1690,
condemned Arnauld’s Jansenistic proposition that “pagans, Jews, heretics,
and others of the same kind experience no influence whatever from Christ,
and it may therefore be rightly inferred that there is in them a nude and
helpless will, lacking sufficient grace.”(546) A proposition of similar
import, set up by Quesnel, was censured by Clement XI.(547) Though not
formally defined, it is a certain truth—deducible from the infallible
teaching of the Church—that God does not permit any one to perish for want
of grace.

a) The Biblical argument for our thesis is based on the dogma that God
wills all men to be saved. 1 Tim. II, 4: “[God] will have all men to be
saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth [_i.e._ the true faith].”
In speaking of the “day of wrath,” St. Paul emphasizes the fact that the
Almighty Judge “will render to every man according to his works,”—eternal
life to the good, wrath and damnation to the wicked.(548) And he
continues: “But glory, and honor, and peace to every one that worketh
good, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek; for there is no respect of
persons with God.”(549) “Greek” is here evidently synonymous with gentile
or heathen. It follows that the heathens are able to perform supernatural
salutary acts with the aid of grace, and that they will receive the reward
of eternal beatitude if they lead a good life.

In another passage (1 Tim. IV, 10) the Apostle calls Christ “the Saviour
of all men, especially of the faithful.”(550) Consequently, Christ is the
Saviour also of unbelievers and heathens.(551)

b) St. Paul’s teaching is faithfully echoed by the Fathers. Thus St.
Clement of Rome,(552) in commenting on the penitential sermons of Noë and
the prophet Jonas, says: “We may roam through all the ages of history and
learn that the Lord in all generations(553) gave opportunity for penance
to all who wished to be converted, ... even though they were strangers to
him.”(554)

St. Chrysostom says in explanation of John I, 9: “If He enlightens every
man that comes into this world, how is it that so many are without light?
For not all know Christ. Most assuredly He illumines, so far as He is
concerned.... For grace is poured out over all. It flees or despises no
one, be he Jew, Greek, barbarian or Scythian, freedman or slave, man or
woman, old or young. It is the same for all, easily attainable by all, it
calls upon all with equal regard. As for those who neglect to make use of
this gift, they should ascribe their blindness to themselves.”(555)

Similar expressions can be culled from the anonymous work _De Vocatione
Omnium Gentium_(556) and from the writings of SS. Prosper and Fulgentius,
and especially from those of Orosius, who says that grace is given to all
men, including the heathen, without exception and at all times.(557)

c) Catholic theologians have devoted considerable thought to the question
how God provides for the salvation of the heathen.

To the uncivilized tribes may be applied what has been said regarding the
fate of unbaptized infants. The real problem is: How does the merciful
Creator provide for those who are sufficiently intelligent to be able to
speculate on God, the soul, the future destiny of man, etc.? Holy
Scripture teaches: “Without faith it is impossible to please God, for he
that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that
seek him.”(558) Faith here means, not any kind of religious belief, but
that theological faith which the Tridentine Council calls “the beginning,
the foundation, and the root of all justification.”(559) Mere intellectual
assent to the existence of God, immortality, and retribution would not be
sufficient for salvation, even if elevated to the supernatural sphere and
transfigured by grace. This is evident from the condemnation, by Pope
Innocent XI, of the proposition that “Faith in a wide sense, based on the
testimony of the created universe, or some other similar motive, is
sufficient unto justification.”(560) The only sort of faith that results
in justification, according to the Vatican Council, is “a supernatural
virtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe
that the things which He has revealed are true; not because of the
intrinsic truth of the things, viewed by the natural light of reason, but
because of the authority of God Himself, who reveals them, and who can
neither be deceived nor deceive.”(561) Of special importance is the
following declaration by the same Council: “Since without faith it is
impossible to please God and to attain to the fellowship of His children,
therefore without faith no one has ever attained justification....”(562)

The Catechism demands of every one who desires to be saved that he have a
supernatural belief in six distinct truths: the existence of God,
retribution in the next world, the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the
immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The first two are
certainly necessary for salvation, both _fide explicitâ_ and _necessitate
medii_. With regard to the other four there is a difference of opinion
among theologians. We base our argumentation on the stricter, though not
absolutely certain view, that all six articles must be believed
_necessitate medii_. On this basis God’s method of providing sufficient
graces for the heathen may be explained in one of two ways, according as a
_fides explicita_ is demanded from them with regard to all the
above-mentioned dogmas, or a _fides implicita_ is deemed sufficient in
regard to all but the first two. By _fides explicita_ we understand the
express and fully developed faith of devout Christians; by _fides
implicita_, an undeveloped belief of desire or, in other words, general
readiness to believe whatever God has revealed.

α) The defenders of the _fides explicita_ theory are compelled to assume
that God must somehow reveal to each individual heathen who lives
according to the dictates of his conscience, the six truths necessary for
salvation. “Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of
Christ.”(563)

But how can the gentiles believe in a revelation that has never been
preached to them? Here is an undeniable difficulty. Some theologians say:
God enlightens them interiorly about the truths necessary for salvation;
or He miraculously sends them an apostle, as He sent St. Peter to
Cornelius;(564) or He instructs them through the agency of an angel.(565)
None of these hypotheses can be accepted as satisfactory. “Interior
illumination” of the kind postulated would practically amount to private
revelation. That God should grant a special private revelation to every
conscientious pagan is highly improbable. Again, an angel can no more be
the _ordinary_ means of conversion than the miraculous apparition of a
missionary. Nevertheless, these three hypotheses admirably illustrate the
firm belief of the Church in the universality of God’s saving will,
inasmuch as they express the conviction of her theologians that He would
work a miracle rather than deny His grace to the poor benighted
heathen.(566) The difficulties to which we have adverted constitute a
strong argument in favor of another theological theory which regards
explicit belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation merely as a _necessitas
praecepti_, from which one may be dispensed.

β) The _fides implicita_ theory is far more plausible, for it postulates
no miracles, implicit faith (or _fides in voto_) being independent of the
external preaching of the Gospel, just as the baptism of desire
(_baptismus in voto_) is independent of the use of water.

Cardinal Gotti regards the first-mentioned of the two theories as safer
(_tutior_), but admits that the other is highly probable, because it has
the support of St. Thomas.(567) However, a great difficulty remains.
Though it may suffice to hold the dogmas of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, and _a fortiori_ those of the immortality of the soul and the
necessity of grace, with an implicit faith, it is the consentient teaching
of Revelation, the Church, and Catholic divines that the two principal
truths of religion, _viz._: the existence of God and retribution, must be
held _fide explicitâ_ and _necessitate medii_, because a man cannot be
converted to God unless He knows Him. But how is he to acquire a knowledge
of God? Does this not also necessitate a miracle (_e.g._ the sending of an
angel or of a missionary, which we have rejected as improbable)? There can
be but one answer to this question. Unaided reason may convince a
thoughtful pagan of the existence of God and of divine retribution, and as
these two fundamental truths have no doubt penetrated to the farthest
corners of the earth also as remnants of primitive revelation, their
promulgation may be said to be contained in the traditional instruction
which the heathen receive from their forebears. This external factor of
Divine Revelation, assisted by interior grace, may engender a supernatural
act of faith, which implicitly includes belief in Christ, Baptism, etc.,
and through which the heathen are eventually cleansed from sin and attain
to justification.(568)

Some theologians hold that those to whom the Gospel has never been
preached, may be saved by a quasi-faith based on purely natural
motives.(569)

For the rest, no one will presume to dictate to Almighty God how and by
what means He shall communicate His grace to the heathen. It is enough,
and very consoling, too, to know that all men receive sufficient grace to
save their souls, and no one is eternally damned except through his own
fault.(570)

READINGS:—*Didacus Ruiz, _De Voluntate Dei_, disp. 19
sqq.—Petavius, _De Deo_, X, 4 sqq.; _De Incarnatione_, XIII, 1
sqq.—Fontana, _Bulla __“__Unigenitus__”__ Dogmatice Propugnata_,
prop. 12, c. 5, Rome 1717.—Passaglia, _De Partitione Voluntatis
Divinae in Primam et Secundam_, Rome 1851.—*Franzelin, _De Deo
Uno_, thes. 49-51, Rome 1883.—*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, thes. 59-62, Gulpen 1885.—A. Fischer, _De Salute
Infidelium_, Essen 1886.—*J. Bucceroni, _De Auxilio Sufficiente
Infidelibus Dato_, Rome 1890.—Fr. Schmid, _Die ausserordentlichen
Heilswege für die gefallene Menschheit_, Brixen 1899.—Chr. Pesch,
_Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 144 sqq.,
Freiburg 1906.—L. Capéran, _Le Problème du Salut des Infidèles_,
Paris 1912.—A. Wagner, _Doctrina de Gratia Sufficiente_, Graz
1911.—J. Bainvel, S. J., _Is There Salvation Outside the Catholic
Church?_ (tr. J. L. Weidenhan), St. Louis 1917.

Article 3. The Predestination Of The Elect

1. WHAT IS MEANT BY PREDESTINATION.—We have shown that God antecedently
wills to save all men,(571) and that He gives to all sufficient grace to
work out their eternal salvation.

On the other hand, Sacred Scripture assures us that some are lost through
their own fault. Cfr. Matth. XXV, 41: “Depart from me, you cursed, into
everlasting fire.”

It follows that God’s will to save, considered as _voluntas consequens_,
remains ineffective with regard to a portion of the human race, and
consequently, in this respect, is no longer universal but particular.

Being omniscient, God has foreseen this from all eternity and disposed His
decrees accordingly. It is in this sense that Catholic theology teaches
the existence of a twofold predestination: one to Heaven, for those who
die in the state of grace, another to hell, for those who depart this life
in mortal sin.

Present-day usage reserves the term _predestination_ for the election of
the blessed.

a) Rightly does the Council of Trent call predestination a “hidden
mystery.”(572) For in the last analysis it rests solely with God, who are
to be admitted to Heaven and who condemned to hell. But why does God give
to some merely sufficient grace, with which they neglect to coöperate,
while on others He showers efficacious graces that infallibly lead to
eternal salvation? In this unequal distribution of efficacious grace lies
the sublime mystery of predestination, as St. Augustine well knew, for he
says in his treatise On the Gift of Perseverance: “Therefore, of two
infants equally bound by original sin, why the one is taken and the other
left; and of two wicked men already mature in years, why one should be so
called that he follows Him that calleth, while the other is either not
called at all, or is not called in such a manner,—are unsearchable
judgments of God.”(573)

b) What is meant by “predestination of the elect”? In view of the many
errors that have arisen with regard to this important dogma, it is
necessary to start with clearly defined terms.

Predestination may mean one of three different things. A man may be simply
predestined to receive certain graces (_praedestinatio ad gratiam
tantum_); or he may be predestined to enjoy eternal happiness without
regard to any merits of his own (_praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_); or,
again, he may be predestined to both grace and glory, glory as the end,
grace as a means to that end—vocation, justification, and final
perseverance. When the concepts of grace and glory are considered
separately, and each is made the object of a special predestination, we
have what is called incomplete or inadequate predestination
(_praedestinatio incompleta sive inadaequata_). It is this incomplete
predestination that St. Paul(574) and St. Augustine(575) have in mind when
they apply the term to the vocation of men to grace, faith, and
justification. Theologians speak of _praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_,
that is, _ante praevisa merita_, as a true predestination, but disagree as
to its existence.(576)

The dogma of predestination, which mainly concerns us here, has for its
sole object predestination in the complete or adequate sense of the term,
which is explained by St. Augustine as follows: “Predestination is nothing
else than the foreknowledge and the preparation of those gifts of God
whereby they who are delivered are most certainly delivered [_i.e._
saved].”(577) St. Thomas expresses himself more succinctly:
“Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory
in the future.”(578)

2. THE DOGMA.—Complete predestination involves: (a) the first grace of
vocation (_gratia prima praeveniens_), especially faith as the beginning,
foundation, and root of justification; (b) a number of additional actual
graces for the successful accomplishment of the process; (c) justification
itself as the beginning of the state of grace; (d) the grace of final
perseverance; (e) eternal happiness in Heaven.

The question arises; Do men really seek and find their eternal salvation
with infallible certainty by passing through these successive stages—not
merely in the foreknowledge of God (_praescientia futurorum_), but by
virtue of an eternal decree (_decretum praedestinationis_)?

The Pelagians asserted that man works out his eternal salvation of his own
free will, and that consequently God merely foreknows but does not
fore-ordain who shall be saved. The Semipelagians held that the beginning
of faith (_initium fidei_) and final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_)
are not pure graces but may be obtained by natural means, without special
aid from above. Against these heretics the Catholic Church has always
taught the eternal predestination of the elect as an article of
faith.(579)

a) St. Paul says explicitly: “We know that to them that love God, all
things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are
called to be saints. For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be
made conformable to the image of his Son; that he might be the firstborn
amongst many brethren. And whom he predestinated, them he also called. And
whom he called, them he also justified. And whom he justified, them he
also glorified.”(580) Here we have all the elements of complete
predestination: God’s eternal foreknowledge (_praescivit_, προέγνω), an
eternal decree of the divine will (_praedestinavit_, προώρισε), and the
various stages of justification, beginning with vocation (_vocavit_,
ἐκάλησε) up to justification proper (_iustificavit_, ἐδικαίωσε), and
eternal beatitude (_glorificavit_, ἐδόξασεν).(581)

b) The Fathers of the fifth century undoubtedly taught the predestination
of the elect as an article of faith. Thus St. Augustine says: “There never
was a time when the Church of Christ did not hold this faith in
predestination, which is now defended with fresh solicitude against the
new heretics.”(582) His faithful disciple St. Prosper writes: “No Catholic
denies predestination by God.”(583) And again: “It would be as impious to
deny predestination as to oppose grace itself.”(584)

c) Several important theological corollaries follow from the dogma of
predestination.

α) The first is the immutability of the divine decree of predestination.
This immutability is based on God’s infallible foreknowledge that certain
individuals will die in the state of grace, and on His unchangeable will
to reward them with eternal happiness.

St. Augustine says: “If any one of these [the predestined] perishes, God
is mistaken; but none of them perish because God is not mistaken.”(585)

God’s unerring foreknowledge is symbolized by the “Book of Life.”(586)
Christ Himself said to His Apostles: “Rejoice in this, that your names are
written in heaven.”(587) The “Book of Life” admits neither addition nor
erasure. This does not, however, mean that a man is unable to change God’s
hypothetical decree of predestination with regard to himself into an
absolute one. He can do this by prayer, good works, and faithful
co-operation with grace.(588) Whatever promotes our salvation is included
in the infallible foreknowledge of God, and consequently also in the scope
of predestination. In this sense, but in no other, can we accept the
somewhat paradoxical maxim: “If you are not predestined, conduct yourself
so that you may be predestined.” Sacred Scripture occasionally refers to
another “Book of Life,” which contains the names of all the faithful,
irrespective of their predestination. This “book,” of course, is capable
of alterations. Cfr. Apoc. III, 5: “I will not blot out his name out of
the book of life.”(589) Finally, there is the “Book of Reprobation,” which
records the wicked deeds of men and by which the unrepentant sinners will
be judged. This is the “_liber scriptus_” of the “_Dies Irae_”:

“_Liber scriptus proferetur._
_In quo totum continetur._”(590)

β) If the divine decree of predestination is immutable, the number of the
elect must be definitively fixed. “The number [of those who are
predestined to the kingdom of God] is so certain,” says St. Augustine,
“that no one can either be added to or taken from them.”(591) We must
distinguish between the absolute and the relative number of the
predestined.

God, being omniscient, knows not only the abstract number of the elect,
but every individual predestined to Heaven. To us the number of the elect
is wrapped in impenetrable mystery. St. Thomas justly observes: “Some say
that as many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
angels left; others, in fine, so many as the number of angels who fell,
added to that of all the angels created by God. It is, however, better to
say that ‘God alone knows the number for whom is reserved eternal
happiness,’ as the prayer for the living and the dead expresses it.”(592)
Whether God will round out the number of the elect by suddenly
precipitating the end of the world or by a sort of “natural selection,” is
an open question. To assume the latter could hardly be reconciled with the
dogma of the universality of His saving will. St. Augustine seems to favor
the former.(593)

As regards the relative number of the elect, some writers (_e.g._
Massillon) represent it as so infinitesimally small that it would almost
drive a saint to despair,—“as if the Church had been established for the
express purpose of populating hell.”(594) Even St. Thomas held that
relatively few are saved.(595) But the arguments adduced in support of
this contention are by no means convincing.(596) Recently, the Jesuit
Father Castelein(597) impugned the rigorist theory with weighty arguments.
He was sharply attacked by the Redemptorist Godts,(598) who marshalled a
great number of authorities in favor of the sterner view. The controversy
cannot be decided either on Scriptural or traditional grounds. In our
pessimistic age it is more grateful and consoling to assume that the
majority of Christians, especially Catholics, will be saved.(599) If we
add to this number not a few Jews, Mohammedans, and heathens, it is
probably safe to estimate the number of the elect as at least equal to
that of the reprobates. Were it smaller, “it could be said to the shame
and offense of the divine majesty and mercy, that the [future] kingdom of
Satan is larger than the kingdom of Christ.”(600)

3. THE MOTIVE OF PREDESTINATION.—The efficient cause of predestination is
God; its instrumental cause, grace; its final cause, the divine glory; its
primary meritorious cause, the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus
Christ. On these points all theologians are agreed. Not so as to the
motive that induced God to predestine certain individuals to the exclusion
of others. The question narrows itself down to this: What influence, if
any, do the merits of a man exert on the eternal decree of
predestination?—and may be formulated in three different ways.

a) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to
the initial grace of vocation? Recalling the dogma of the absolute
gratuity of grace, our answer must be: None. For whatever merits one may
have acquired before he receives the initial grace of vocation, must be
purely natural, and consequently worthless in the eyes of God for
supernatural predestination. “To assume,” says St. Thomas, “that there is
on our part some merit, the foreknowledge of which [on the part of God]
would be the cause [motive] of our predestination, would be to assume that
grace is given to us [as a reward] of our [natural] merits.”(601)

b) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to
grace and glory? Catholic theologians are unanimous in holding that, since
grace is absolutely gratuitous and inseparably connected with glory as its
effect, the union of both can no more be based upon _natural_ merit than
the initial grace of vocation itself, which transmits the quality of
gratuitousness to each and every one of the graces that follow in its
wake, up to and including justification and eternal beatitude. Those among
the Fathers who defended the gratuity of predestination against the
Pelagians and Semipelagians, really aimed at safeguarding the gratuity of
initial grace, in order not to be constrained to say with Pelagius that
“the grace of God is given as a reward of merit.”(602) “What compelled me
in this work of mine [_De Dono Perseverantiae_] to defend more abundantly
and clearly those passages of Scripture in which predestination is
commended,” says St. Augustine, “if not the Pelagian assertion that God’s
grace is given according to our [natural] merits?”(603) Obviously these
Fathers did not have in view the _praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_, as
the champions of the _praedestinatio ante praevisa merita_ mistakenly
assert, but what they meant was that complete predestination which
comprises grace and glory as one whole. Similarly, the early Schoolmen,
when they speak of the “gratuity of predestination,” usually mean complete
predestination.(604) D’Argentré’s researches show how necessary it is to
draw sharp distinctions and carefully to establish the real state of the
question before claiming the common teaching of the Scholastics in favor
of any particular theory of predestination.

c) What influence do the _supernatural_ merits of a man exert on his
predestination to glory as such? Here the controversy begins.
Predestination may be considered either as the cause of supernatural merit
or as its effect. If it is considered as the cause, the problem takes this
shape: Did God, by an absolute decree, and without any regard to their
future supernatural merits, eternally predestine certain men to the glory
of heaven, and only subsequently decide to give them the efficacious
graces necessary to reach that end, particularly final perseverance? If,
on the other hand, predestination be considered as an effect of
supernatural merit, the question will be: Did God predestine certain men
to the glory of Heaven by a merely hypothetical decree, making His will to
save them dependent on His infallible foreknowledge of their supernatural
merits? The lack of decisive Scriptural and Patristic texts on this
subject has led to a division of Catholic opinion, some theologians
favoring absolute predestination _ante praevisa merita_, others
hypothetical predestination _post praevisa merita_. Without concealing our
conviction that absolute predestination is untenable, we shall set forth
both theories impartially and examine the arguments on which they rely.

4. ORTHODOX PREDESTINATIONISM, OR THE THEORY OF PREDESTINATION ANTE
PRAEVISA MERITA.—Some theologians conceive the divine scheme of salvation
in this wise: (a) _In ordine intentionis_, God, by an absolute decree,
first predestines certain men to eternal salvation, and then, in
consequence of this decree, decides to give them all the graces necessary
to be saved; (b) in time, however, or _in ordine executionis_, He observes
the reverse order, that is to say, He first bestows the pre-appointed
graces and subsequently the glory of heaven as a reward of supernatural
merit acquired by the aid of those graces.

This theory reverses the relation of grace and glory. While it
correctly(605) represents glory as the fruit and reward of supernatural
merit in the order of execution, it wrongly represents it in the order of
intention as the cause of supernatural merit, whereas it is merely an
effect. This opinion is championed by most Thomists,(606) some
Augustinians,(607) and a few Molinists.(608) Their arguments may be
sketched as follows:

a) In innumerable passages of Sacred Scripture predestination to eternal
happiness is represented as a work of pure mercy, nay, even as an
arbitrary act of God. Take, _e.g._, Matth. XXIV, 22 sqq.: “And unless
those days had been shortened, no flesh should be saved: but for the sake
of the elect those days shall be shortened.... For there shall arise false
Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders,
insomuch as to deceive (if possible) even the elect.”(609) Here, it is
claimed, the elect are represented as so thoroughly confirmed in faith and
in good works as to be proof against error.

This conclusion is unwarranted. The phrase “those days” manifestly refers
either to the destruction of Jerusalem or to the end of the world. If it
refers to the destruction of Jerusalem, the “elect,” according to Biblical
usage,(610) are the faithful Christian inhabitants of the Holy City, for
whose sake God promises to shorten the terrible siege. If it referred to
the end of the world, _electi_ would indeed stand for _praedestinati_, but
the context would not forbid us to interpret their predestination
hypothetically, as merely indicating the immutability of the divine
decree, which is not denied by the opponents of the theory.

Another text quoted in favor of absolute predestination _ante praevisa
merita_, is Acts XIII, 48: “As many as were ordained (_praeordinati_,
τεταγμένοι) to life everlasting, believed.” Here, we are told,
predestination to eternal life is given as the motive why many believed.
But the text really says nothing at all about predestination. Τεταγμένοι
is not synonymous with προτεταγμένοι or προωρισμένοι. The more probable
explanation is the following: As many believed as were disposed to receive
the faith. It is wellnigh impossible to assume that all who received the
faith at that time were predestined, while those that refused to be
converted were without exception reprobates. But even if _praeordinati_
were synonymous with _praedestinati_, the text would merely say that
certain predestined souls embraced the faith, without affording any clue
as to the relation between conversion and predestination.

The ninth chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans is the main reliance
of the advocates of absolute predestinationism, though the passage is
unfit to serve as a _locus classicus_ because of its obscurity. Let us
examine a few of the verses most frequently quoted. Rom. IX, 13: “Jacob I
have loved, but Esau I have hated,” is alleged to prove the absolute
predestination of Jacob and the negative reprobation of Esau. But many
theologians hold that Esau was saved, and, besides, the Apostle is not
dealing with predestination to glory, but with Jacob’s vocation to be the
progenitor of the Messias. Esau, who was not an Israelite but an Idumaean,
was simply passed over in this choice (_odio habere __ minus diligere_;
cfr. Matth. X, 37). If the passage is interpreted typically, it should be
done in harmony with the context, that is to say, as referring to the
gratuity of grace, not to predestination.

The same may be said of Rom. IX, 16 and 18: “It is not of him that
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.... He
hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.”(611)

The strongest text alleged by the advocates of absolute predestination is
Rom. IX, 20 sq.: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the
thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or
hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one
vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?” Here the Apostle really
seems to have thought of predestination. But the simile must not be
pressed, lest we arrive at the Calvinistic blasphemy that God positively
predestined some men to heaven and others to hell. The _tertium
comparationis_ is not the act of the Divine Artificer, but the willingness
of man to yield his will to God like clay in the hands of a potter.

Nor is it admissible to read into the Apostle’s thought even a _negative_
reprobation of certain men. For the primary intention of the Epistle to
the Romans is to insist on the gratuity of man’s vocation to Christianity
and to reject the presumption that the Mosaic law and their bodily descent
from Abraham gave the Jews preference over the heathens. The Epistle to
the Romans has no bearing whatever on the speculative question whether or
not the free vocation of grace is a necessary result of eternal
predestination to glory.(612)

b) Among the Fathers the only one to whom the advocates of absolute
predestinationism can appeal with some show of justice is St. Augustine,
who, with the possible exception of Prosper and Fulgentius, was the most
rigorous among early ecclesiastical writers,—so rigorous, in fact, that
Oswald does not hesitate to call him “the head and front of all rigorists
in the Church.”(613)

However, this is saying too much. Augustine’s genuine teaching is still in
dispute among our ablest theologians. Some(614) deny that he broke with
the almost unanimous teaching of his predecessors, while others think that
in the treatises _De Dono Perseverantiae_ and _De Praedestinatione
Sanctorum_, and in several of his letters, the Saint frankly taught
absolute predestinationism. The latter group of writers is split into two
classes. A number of Thomists and Cardinal Bellarmine not only assert that
Augustine taught absolute predestination, but boldly adopt his supposed
teaching. Petavius, Maldonatus, Cercià, Oswald, and others censure this
view. Franzelin(615) undoubtedly strikes the right note when he says: “If
there were a manifest discrepancy between Augustine’s teaching and that of
the other Fathers, I should not hesitate to follow Pighius, Catharinus,
Osorius, Camerarius, Maldonatus,(616) Toletus,(617) and Petavius(618) in
reverently departing from his doctrine, because in that case we should be
dealing merely with a private opinion.”(619) Under these circumstances the
Patristic argument for the theory of absolute predestination evidently
lacks convincingness.(620)

c) It was probably because they felt its weakness that some of the later
champions of the theory attempted to prove absolute predestination _ante
praevisa merita_ by philosophical arguments. Gonet reasons as follows: “He
who proceeds in an orderly way, wills the end before he wills the means
necessary to attain it. But God proceeds in an orderly way. Therefore he
wills the end before the means. Now, glory is an end, and merits are means
to attain that end. Consequently, God wills glory before He wills merits,
and a man’s preëlection to glory cannot be based on foreknowledge of his
merits.”(621) This argument, if it proved anything, would prove the
logical impossibility of conditional predestination. But it overshoots the
mark and consequently proves nothing at all. _Qui nimium probat, nihil
probat._

Gonet moreover assumes what he sets out to prove, namely, that God
_voluntate antecedente_ decreed the glory of certain men to the exclusion
of others. This _petitio principii_ vitiates the entire polysyllogism.
God’s will to save is universal. He wills the eternal happiness of all men
_antecedenter_, and the reprobation of some only _consequenter_; hence
eternal predestination is not absolute, but hypothetical, that is, it
depends on merit. That the divine scheme of grace can take a different
course _in ordine intentionis_ from that _in ordine executionis_ is a mere
fiction. If eternal salvation in the order of temporal execution is given
only as a reward of merit, it must be a reward of merit also in the order
of intention. In both cases predestination depends upon a future
condition.

Perhaps the worst feature of the theory of absolute predestination is the
fact that it involves the absolute reprobation of those not predestined to
glory. “If it could be validly argued,” says Gutberlet, “that, since the
end must be willed before the means, salvation must be decreed before the
means to its attainment (_i.e._ merits), the argument would be applicable
also to the damned. If God _voluntate antecedente_ wills to lead only a
few to salvation, and if this intention must precede every other, then He
must likewise _voluntate antecedente_ have in view the end of the
reprobates, which is His own glorification through the manifestation of
His justice and mercy. Hence He must also decree the means necessary to
obtain this end, _i.e._ He must cause these unfortunate creatures to sin,
in order that they may reach the end for which He has predestined them; in
other words, He must pre-ordain them to sin and eternal damnation,”(622)
which is what Calvin teaches. The advocates of the theory naturally shrink
from adopting such a blasphemous conclusion, and fall back upon the theory
of _negative_ reprobation, which, however, amounts practically to the same
thing.(623)

5. THE THEORY OF HYPOTHETICAL PREDESTINATION POST PRAEVISA
MERITA.—Predestination, like God’s will to save all men, is based on a
hypothetical decree. Those only are predestined to eternal happiness who
shall merit it as a reward. It is solely by reason of His infallible
foreknowledge of these merits that God’s hypothetical decree of
predestination becomes absolute. Or, as Becanus puts it, “God first
prepared the gifts of grace, and then elected to eternal life those whose
good use of the gifts He foresaw.”(624)

This view, which strongly appeals to us for the reason that it sets aside
the cruel theory of “negative reprobation,” was defended by such earlier
Scholastics as Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus, and by many eminent
later writers, _e.g._ Toletus, Lessius, Frassen, Stapleton, Tournely, and
is held to-day by nearly all theologians outside the Thomist school. What
gave it special authority in modern times was the recommendation of St.
Francis de Sales, who, in a letter to Lessius (Aug. 26, 1618) described
the theory of conditional predestination _post praevisa merita_ as “more
in harmony with the mercy and grace of God, truer and more
attractive.”(625) This view has a solid basis both in Scripture and
Tradition.

a) Holy Scripture clearly teaches the universality of God’s saving will.
Now if God _voluntate antecedente_ wills the eternal salvation of all men
without exception,(626) He cannot possibly intend that only some shall be
saved.

It is further to be noted that the Bible makes not only the temporal
realization but likewise the eternal promise of glory dependent on the
performance of good works. St. Paul, whose Epistle to the Romans is cited
as a _locus classicus_ by the advocates of the theory,(627) wrote towards
the end of his life to Timothy: “I have fought a good fight, I have
finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid
up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to
me in that day.”(628) In writing these lines the Apostle no doubt had in
mind the sentence of the Universal Judge: “Come, ye blessed of my Father,
possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the
world,”(629)—which may with far greater reason be termed a “classical”
text than the obscure ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. To
prepare for men the kingdom of heaven from the foundation (_i.e._
beginning) of the world, is to predestine them to eternal happiness. Now,
God has “prepared” the kingdom of heaven for men in view of their foreseen
merits, that is to say, conditionally. The causal conjunction _enim_ in
the sentence following the one just quoted (Matth. XXVI, 25): “_Esurivi
enim et dedistis mihi manducare_, etc.,” refers to the entire preceding
sentence, not only to the _possidete_ in time, but also to the _paratum_
in eternity. Consequently, the eternal decree of predestination itself,
like its temporal execution, depends on good works or merit. This
interpretation of Matth. XXV, 34-36 is confirmed by the sentence
pronounced upon the reprobates, Matth. XXV, 41 sqq.: “Depart from me, you
cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his
angels. For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc.” The
“everlasting fire” is manifestly decreed from all eternity in the same
sense in which it is inflicted in time, namely, _propter et post praevisa
merita_. Billuart’s contention(630) that hell has been prepared solely for
“the devil and his angels” is untenable, because in several other
Scriptural passages(631) the reprobates are expressly classed among the
followers of Satan. If we add to this that our Divine Lord, in foretelling
the last judgment, had naturally to formulate his prediction so as not
only to show its absolute justice but likewise to intimate that, had they
so willed, the damned might have had their place on the right hand of the
Great Judge, we must admit that the theory of predestination _post
praevisa merita_ has a solid foundation in Scripture.(632)

b) The Greek Fathers unanimously favor hypothetical predestination, which
fact has caused the theory to be commonly referred to as “_sententia
Graecorum_.”(633)

Thus St. Chrysostom interprets the judgment of the Son of Man as follows:
“Possess ye the kingdom [of heaven] as your own by heredity, as a paternal
heritage, as a gift long due to you; for it was prepared and arranged for
you before you came into existence, because I knew beforehand that you
would be what you are.”(634) Theodoret says: “He did not simply predestine
[men], but He predestined them because He foreknew [their merits].”(635)

The Latin Fathers before St. Augustine all without exception taught
hypothetical predestination. St. Hilary says: “Many are called, but few
are chosen.... Hence election is not a matter of indiscriminate choice,
but a selection based on merit.”(636) And St. Ambrose: “Therefore the
Apostle says: ‘Whom he foreknew he also predestined’ (Rom. VIII, 29); for
He did not predestine before He foreknew, but He predestined a reward to
those whose merits He foresaw.”(637)

The question cannot, as Bellarmine contends,(638) be decided on the sole
authority of St. Augustine, because he is claimed by both parties to the
controversy.(639)

On account of the existing differences of opinion it is impossible to
establish the theory of hypothetical predestination on the basis of
Scholastic teaching.(640) The opinion of St. Thomas is in dispute;(641)
likewise that of St. Bonaventure. Scotus in his controversy with Henry of
Ghent shows a disposition to favor absolute predestination, but leaves the
question open. “Let every one,” he says,(642) “choose whichever opinion
suits him best, without prejudice to the divine liberty, which must be
safeguarded against injustice, and to the other truths that are to be held
in respect of God.”(643)

6. A COMPROMISE THEORY.—For the sake of completeness we will add a few
words on a theory which takes middle ground between the two just reviewed,
holding that, while the common run of humanity is predestined
hypothetically, a few exceptionally favored Saints enjoy the privilege of
absolute predestination.

Among the champions of this “eclectic” theory may be mentioned:
Ockam,(644) Gabriel Biel,(645) Ysambert,(646) and Ambrosius
Catharinus.(647) The Saints regarded by these writers as absolutely
predestined to eternal glory are: the Blessed Virgin Mary, the prophets
and Apostles, St. Joseph, St. Aloysius, and a few others, as well as all
infants dying in the grace of Baptism. Billuart,(648) Dominicus Soto, and
certain other divines attack this theory on the ground that it makes the
salvation of the great majority of the elect a matter of chance and
thereby imperils the dogmatic teaching of the Church. This objection is
unfounded. For though the “eclectic” theory has little or no support
either in Revelation or in reason, it sufficiently safeguards the dogma of
predestination by admitting that _voluntate consequente_ none but the
predestined can attain to eternal beatitude.

Only with regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary are we inclined to make an
exception. It is probable that she was predestined to eternal glory _ante
praevisa merita_, because, in the words of Lessius, the privileges she
enjoyed “exceed all measure and must not be extended to any other human
being.”(649)

Article 4. The Reprobation Of The Damned

The reprobation of the damned is sometimes called _praedestinatio ad
gehennam_, though, as we have remarked, the term “predestination” should
properly be restricted to the blessed.

There can be no absolute and positive predestination to eternal
punishment, and the pains of hell can be threatened only in view of mortal
sin. Hence reprobation may be defined, in the words of Peter Lombard, as
“God’s foreknowledge of the wickedness of some creatures and the
preparation of their damnation.”(650)

A distinction must, however, be made (at least in theory), between
_positive_ and _negative_ reprobation. To teach positive reprobation would
be heretical. Negative reprobation, on the other hand, is defended by all
those Catholic theologians who advocate the theory of absolute
predestination _ante praevisa merita_.(651)

1. HERETICAL PREDESTINARIANISM OR THE THEORY OF THE POSITIVE REPROBATION
OF THE DAMNED.—Heretical Predestinarianism was taught by Lucidus,
Gottschalk, Wiclif, Hus, the younger Jansenius, and especially by Calvin.
The latter asserted that the salvation of the elect and the damnation of
the reprobate are the effects of an unconditional divine decree.(652)

According to this abominable heresy, the sin of Adam and the spiritual
ruin which it entailed upon his descendants are attributable solely to the
will of God. God produces in the reprobate a “semblance of faith,” only to
make them all the more deserving of damnation. In the beginning of the
seventeenth century Arminius and a few other theologians of the Dutch
Reformed Church, repelled by Calvin’s _decretum horribile_, ascribed the
positive reprobation of the damned to original sin (_lapsus_). These
writers, called Infralapsarians or Postlapsarians, were opposed by the
strict school of Calvinist divines under the leadership of Gomarus. The
great Calvinist Synod of Dordrecht (1618-1619) condemned the principles of
Arminius, and subsequently his adherents were driven from Holland.

The Catholic Church condemned Predestinarianism as early as 529 at the
Second Council of Orange, which among other things declared: “We not only
refuse to believe that some men are by divine power predestined to evil,
but if there be any who hold such a wicked thing, we condemn them with
utter detestation.”(653)

The Tridentine Council defined against Calvin: “If any one saith that the
grace of justification is attained to only by those who are predestined
unto life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but
receive not grace, as being by divine power predestined unto evil; let him
be anathema.”(654)

Calvinism, both supra- and infra-lapsarian, is easily refuted from
Revelation and Tradition.

a) It runs counter to all those texts of the Bible which assert the
universality of God’s saving will,(655) the bestowal of sufficient grace
on all sinners,(656) and the divine attribute of holiness.(657)

Calvin endeavored to prove his blasphemous doctrine chiefly from the ninth
chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans.(658) His disciple Beza relied
mainly on 1 Pet. II, 7 sq.: “But to them that believe not, the stone which
the builders rejected, the same is made the head of the corner: and a
stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal, to them who stumble at the
word, neither do believe, whereunto also they are set,”(659) _i.e._,
according to Beza, predestined not to believe.(660) But this
interpretation is obviously wrong. For we know from Is. VIII, 14(661) and
Matth. XXI, 44,(662) that those who fall on this stone are ground to
powder as a punishment for the sin of unbelief.(663)

b) The Fathers, especially those of the East, are unanimous in upholding
the orthodox teaching of the Church. The only one whom adherents of
Predestinarianism have dared to claim is St. Augustine.

Yet the “Doctor of Grace” expressly teaches: “God is good, God is just. He
can deliver some without merits because He is good; but He cannot damn any
one without demerits, because He is just.”(664) St. Prosper re-echoes this
teaching when he says of the reprobates: “Of their own will they went out;
of their own will they fell; and because their fall was foreknown, they
were not predestined. They would, however, be predestined if they were to
return and persevere in holiness; hence God’s predestination is for many
the cause of perseverance, for none the cause of falling away.”(665) St.
Fulgentius expresses himself in similar language.(666)

2. THE THEORY OF “NEGATIVE REPROBATION.”—Negative reprobation is defined
by its defenders as an eternal decree by which God excludes from Heaven
those not absolutely predestined, in other words, determines not to save
them.

a) Gonet explains the difference between negative and positive reprobation
in Scholastic terminology as follows: “_... quod haec [i.e. positiva]
habet non solum terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria, sed etiam
terminum ad quem, scil. poenam sive damni sive sensus; illa vero [i.e.
negativa] solum habet terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria ut
beneficio indebito, non vero terminum ad quem, quia ex vi exclusionis ut
sic praecise et ut habet rationem purae negationis, non intelligitur
reprobus esse damnandus aut ulli poenae sive damni sive sensus
deputandus._”(667)

The general principle laid down in this quotation is variously developed
by Thomist theologians.

The rigorists (Alvarez, John a S. Thoma, Estius, Sylvius) assign as the
motive of reprobation the sovereign will of God. God, they say, without
taking into account possible sins and demerits, determined _a priori_ to
exclude from Heaven those who are not predestined. De Lemos, Gotti, Gonet,
Gazzaniga, and others condemn this view as incompatible with the teaching
of St. Thomas, and, appealing to St. Augustine’s doctrine of the _massa
damnata_, find the ultimate reason for the exclusion of the reprobates
from heaven in original sin, in which God, without being unjust, could
leave as many as He saw fit. Goudin, Graveson, Billuart, and others assume
that the reprobates are not directly excluded from eternal glory but
merely from “effective election” thereunto, God simply having decreed
_ante praevisa merita_ to leave them to their weakness.(668)

While the Thomists found no difficulty in harmonizing this view with their
theory of physical premotion, the few Molinists who espoused it were hard
put in trying to square it with the _scientia media_.(669) On the whole
these Molinists endorse the third and mildest of the above-quoted
opinions, which differs only theoretically from the rigoristic view
described in the first place. Practically it makes no difference whether
God directly excludes a man from heaven or refuses to give him the graces
necessary to attain it.

Surveying all three of the theories under consideration we cannot but
regard the first and third as heartless and cruel, because they attribute
eternal reprobation to a positive decree that takes effect independently
of sin; the second, (which ascribes reprobation to original sin), is open
to the serious dogmatic objection that it contradicts the teaching of St.
Paul and the Tridentine declaration that “there is no condemnation (_nihil
damnationis_) in those who are truly buried together with Christ by
baptism into death.”(670)

b) Negative reprobation is rightly regarded as the logical counterpart of
absolute predestination.(671) If Almighty God, by an absolute decree,
without regard to any possible merits, merely to reveal His divine
attributes and to “embellish the universe,” had determined that only those
could enter the “Heavenly Jerusalem” who were antecedently predestined
thereto, it would inevitably follow that the unfortunate remainder of
humanity by the very same decree were “passed over,” “omitted,”
“overlooked,” “not elected,” or, as Gonet honestly admits, “excluded from
Heaven,” which is the same thing as being negatively condemned to hell.

The logical distinction between positive and negative reprobation,
therefore, consists mainly in this, that the former signifies absolute
damnation to hell, the latter (equally absolute) non-election to Heaven.
To protect the Catholic champions of negative reprobation against unjust
aspersions, however, it is necessary to point out certain fundamental
differences between their theory and the heresy of Calvin.

Calvin and the Jansenists openly deny the universality both of God’s
saving will and of the atonement; they refuse to admit the actual bestowal
of sufficient grace upon those fore-ordained to eternal damnation; and
claim that the human will loses its freedom under the predominance of
efficacious grace or concupiscence. The Catholic defenders of negative
reprobation indignantly reject the charge that their position logically
leads to any such heretical implications.

c) The theory of negative reprobation can be sufficiently refuted by
showing that it is incompatible with the universality of God’s will to
save all men. For if God willed absolutely and antecedently to “exclude
some men from Heaven,” as Gonet asserts, or “not to elect them to eternal
glory,” as Suarez contends, then it would be His absolute will that they
perish.

α) For one thus negatively reprobated it is metaphysically impossible to
attain eternal salvation. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to
assuming that an essentially absolute decree of God can be frustrated.
This consideration led certain Thomists(672) to describe the divine
_voluntas salvifica_ as rather an ineffectual _velleitas_.(673) But this
conflicts with the obvious teaching of Revelation.(674) Suarez labors in
vain to reconcile the sincerity of God’s salvific will with the theory of
negative reprobation. The two are absolutely irreconcilable. How could God
sincerely will the salvation of all men if it were true, as Suarez says,
that “it is not in man’s power to work out his eternal salvation in case
he falls under non-election, non-predestination, or, which amounts to the
same thing, negative reprobation”?(675)

β) The cruel absurdity of the theory of negative reprobation becomes fully
apparent when we consider the attitude it ascribes to God. Gonet writes:
“Foreseeing that the whole human race would be depraved by original sin,
God, in view of the merits of Christ who was to come, elected some men to
glory and, in punishment of original sin and to show His justice towards
them and His greater mercy towards the elect, permitted others to miss the
attainment of beatitude, in other words, He positively willed that they
should not attain it.... In virtue of this efficacious intention He
devised appropriate means for the attainment of His purpose, and seeing
that some would miss beatitude by simply being left in the state of
original sin, and others by being permitted to fall into actual sins and
to persevere therein, He formally decreed this permission, and finally ...
by a command of His intellect ordained these means towards the attainment
of the aforesaid end.”(676) Translated into plain every-day language this
can only mean that God tries with all His might to prevent the reprobate
from attaining eternal salvation and sees to it that they die in the state
of sin. Suarez is perfectly right in characterizing Gonet’s teaching as
“incompatible with sound doctrine.”(677) But his own teaching is equally
unsound and cruel. For he, too, is compelled to assert: “Predestination to
glory is the motive for which efficacious or infallible means towards
attaining that end are bestowed. Hence to refuse to predestine a man for
glory is to deny him the means which are recognized as fit and certain to
attain that end.”(678)

Holy Scripture fortunately speaks a different language. It describes God
as a loving Father, who “wills not that any should perish, but that all
should return to penance.”(679)

γ) Practically it makes no difference whether a man is positively
condemned to eternal damnation, as Calvin and the Jansenists assert, or
negatively excluded from Heaven, as held by the orthodox theologians whom
we have just quoted. The alleged distinction between positive and negative
reprobation is “a distinction without a difference.” For an adult to be
excluded from Heaven simply means that he is damned. There is no such
thing as a middle state or a purely natural beatitude. Lessius justly says
that to one reprobated by God it would be all the same whether his
reprobation was positive or negative, because in either case he would be
inevitably lost.(680)

READINGS:—*Ruiz, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_, Lyons
1628.—Ramirez, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_, 2 vols.,
Alcalá 1702.—*Lessius, _De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis_,
XIV, 2.—*IDEM, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_ (_Opusc._,
Vol. II, Paris 1878).—Tournely, _De Deo_, qu. 22 sqq.—Schrader,
_Commentarii_, I-II, _De Praedestinatione_, Vienna 1865.—J. P.
Baltzer, _Des hl. Augustinus Lehre über Prädestination und
Reprobation_, Vienna 1871.—Mannens, _De Voluntate Dei Salvifica et
Praedestinatione_, Louvain 1883.—O. Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Der
Augustinismus_, München 1892.—O. Pfülf, S. J., “_Zur
Prädestinationslehre des hl. Augustinus_,” in the Innsbruck
_Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie_, 1893, pp. 483 sqq.—B. J. Otten,
S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, St. Louis
1917, pp. 281, 378, 382 sqq.

Chapter III. Grace In Its Relation To Free-Will

When we speak of the relation of grace to free-will, we mean efficacious
grace; merely sufficient grace, as such, does not involve consent.

The Protestant reformers and the Jansenists denied the freedom of the
human will under the influence of efficacious grace.

Catholic theologians have always staunchly upheld both the freedom of the
will and the efficacy of grace, but they disagree in explaining the mutual
relations between grace and free-will.

Section 1. The Heresy of The Protestant Reformers And The Jansenists

1. THE HERETICAL ERRORS OF LUTHER, CALVIN, AND JANSENIUS CONTRASTED WITH
THE ORTHODOX TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—Luther and Calvin asserted that the
freedom of the will was irretrievably lost by original sin. Jansenius
taught that the will is overcome by efficacious grace in exactly the same
way as it is overpowered by concupiscence in the absence of grace. Against
both these heresies the Church has always maintained that the will remains
free under the influence of efficacious grace.

a) Luther taught(681) that original sin has so completely annihilated
man’s free-will that he resembles a horse compelled to go in whatever
direction it is driven (according as “God or the devil rides him”),(682)
and that the grace of Christ, far from restoring man’s liberty, compels
him to act with intestine necessity.

Calvin(683) carried this teaching to its logical conclusions by asserting:
(1) that the will of our first parents was free in Paradise, but lost its
freedom by original sin; (2) that we cannot be delivered from the slavery
of Satan except by the grace of Christ, which does not, however, restore
liberty, but simply compels the will to do good; (3) that, though the will
under the influence of grace is passive, and must needs follow the impulse
to which it is subjected, yet its acts are vital and spontaneous.(684)

Against these heresies the Council of Trent maintained the existence of
free-will both in the state of original sin(685) and under the influence
of efficacious grace: “If any one saith that man’s free-will, moved and
excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, ... cannot
refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does
nothing whatever and is merely passive: let him be anathema.”(686)

b) Jansenius differed from Luther and Calvin mainly in drawing a sharper
distinction between freedom from external constraint (_libertas a
coactione_) and freedom from internal compulsion (_libertas a
necessitate_), and maintaining that the will, when under the influence of
grace, is exempt from external constraint, though not from interior
compulsion, and that the _libertas a coactione_ is entirely sufficient to
gain merit or demerit in the fallen state.(687)

The Jansenist teaching on the subject of grace may be outlined as follows:
(1) By original sin man lost the moral liberty which he had enjoyed in
Paradise and became subject to a twofold delectation—_delectatio coelestis
victrix_ and _delectatio terrena sive carnalis victrix_. (2) These two
delectations are continually contending for the mastery; the stronger
always defeats the weaker, (3) and the will, unable to offer resistance,
is alternately overpowered now by the one and then by the other.(688) (4)
In each case the _delectatio coelestis_ is either stronger than the
_delectatio terrena_, or it is weaker, or it is of equal strength. When it
is stronger, the will is overcome by grace, which in that case becomes
_efficax_ or _irresistibilis_. When it is weaker, the will simply _must_
sin, because the _delectatio coelestis_ is too weak to overcome the
_delectatio terrena_. The grace given to a man under such conditions is
called by the Jansenists _gratia parva sive sufficiens_. When the two
delectations are equally strong, the will finds itself unable to come to a
definite decision.

This false teaching inspired the famous “five propositions” of Jansenius,
to-wit: (1) Man is unable to keep some of God’s commandments for want of
grace; (2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior
grace; (3) To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature it is
sufficient to be free from external constraint; (4) The Semipelagian
heresy consisted in assuming the existence of a grace which man may either
obey or resist; and (5) Christ did not die for all men, but solely for the
predestined.

These propositions were condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X in his
dogmatic Bull “_Cum occasione_,” of May 31, 1653. All five are implicitly
contained in the second, _viz._: In the state of fallen nature no one ever
resists interior grace. “If it is true that fallen man never resists
interior grace (second proposition), it follows that a just man who
violates a commandment of God has not had the grace to observe it, that he
therefore transgressed it through inability to fulfil it (first
proposition). If, however, he has sinned and thus incurred demerit, it is
clear that the liberty of indifference is not a requisite condition of
demerit, and what is said of demerit is likewise true of its correlative,
merit (third proposition). On the other hand, if grace is wanting to the
just whenever they fall, it is wanting still more to sinners; it is
therefore impossible to maintain that the death of Jesus Christ assured to
every man the graces necessary for salvation (fifth proposition). As a
further consequence, the Semipelagians were in error in admitting the
universal distribution of a grace which may be resisted (fourth
proposition).”(689)

2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH PROVED FROM REVELATION.—Far from favoring
the determinism of the Reformers and of Jansenius, the Bible and Tradition
positively contradict the contention that free-will is overpowered by
grace.

a) The operation of grace and the liberty of the will never appear in
Sacred Scripture as mutually exclusive, but invariably as coöperating
factors, though sometimes the one is emphasized, and sometimes the other,
according to the purpose the sacred writer happens to have in view.

The Council of Trent expressly calls attention to this:(690) “When it is
said in the sacred writings, ‘Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you,’(691)
we are admonished of our liberty; and when we answer: ‘Convert us, O God,
to thee, and we shall be converted,’(692) we confess that we are
forestalled by the grace of God.”

St. Paul, it is true, asks: “Who resisteth his [God’s] will?”(693) But he
also admonishes his favorite disciple Timothy: “Exercise thyself unto
godliness.”(694) St. Stephen testifies that the grace of the Holy Ghost
does not compel the will. “You always resist the Holy Ghost,” he tells the
Jews; “as your fathers did, so do you also.”(695) Our Lord Himself teaches
that grace exerts no interior compulsion but invites free coöperation: “If
thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”(696) The exhortations,
promises, and threats uttered in various portions of Holy Writ would be
meaningless if it were true that grace destroys free-will.(697)

b) As regards Tradition, the Greek Fathers who wrote before St. Augustine
defended the freedom of the will so energetically that they were
subsequently accused of harboring Pelagian and Semipelagian errors.(698)
Calvin himself admits that with but one exception the Fathers are
unanimously opposed to his teaching.(699)

The one exception noted is St. Augustine, to whom both Calvin and
Jansenius appeal with great confidence. It should be noted, however, that
the point which chiefly concerned St. Augustine in his controversies with
the Pelagians and Semipelagians, was the necessity and gratuity of grace,
not its relation to free-will. Where he incidentally touches upon the
latter, he shows by the manner in which he formulates his sentences that
he regards the relation of grace to free-will as a great mystery. But he
does not try to solve this mystery in the manner in which Alexander the
Great cut the Gordian knot. He does not declare: Grace is everything,
free-will is nothing. If the power of grace destroyed the freedom of the
human will, their mutual relation would be no problem.(700) Possibly St.
Augustine in the heat of controversy now and then expressed himself in
language open to misinterpretation, as when he said: “Therefore aid was
brought to the infirmity of the human will, so that it might be
unchangeably and invincibly influenced by divine grace.”(701) But this and
similar phrases admit of a perfectly orthodox interpretation. As the
context shows, Augustine merely wished to assert the hegemony of grace in
all things pertaining to salvation, and to emphasize the fact that
free-will, strengthened by grace, is able to resist even the most grievous
temptations.(702) At no period of his life did the Saint deny the freedom
of the will under the influence of grace. We will quote but two out of
many available passages in proof of this statement. “To yield consent or
to withhold it, whenever God calls, is the function of one’s own
will.”(703) “For the freedom of the will is not destroyed because the will
is aided; but it is aided precisely for the reason that it remains
free.”(704) St. Bernard of Clairvaux echoes this teaching when, in his own
ingenious way, he summarizes the Catholic dogma as follows: “Take away
free will and there will be nothing left to save; take away grace and
there will be no means left of salvation.”(705)

READINGS:—*Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_ (_Opera
Omnia_, ed. Fèvre, Vols. V and VI, Paris 1873).—*Dechamps, S. J.,
_De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris 1645.—F. Wörter, _Die christliche
Lehre über das Verhältnis von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf
Augustinus_, Freiburg 1856.—*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_,
thes. 39-48, Gulpen 1885.—S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp.
357 sqq., 377 sqq., Freiburg 1901.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual
of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 507 sqq.

Section 2. Theological Systems Devised To Harmonize The Dogmas Of Grace
And Free-Will

The relation of grace to free-will may be regarded from a twofold point of
view. We may take grace as the primary factor and trace it in its action
on the human will; or, starting from the latter, we may endeavor to
ascertain how free-will is affected by grace.

The first-mentioned method has given birth to two closely related
theological systems, Thomism and Augustinianism; the latter to Molinism
and Congruism, which are almost identical in substance.

Besides these there is a fifth theory, which tries to reconcile the two
extremes and may therefore be called eclectic.

That the human will is free, yet subject to the influence of grace, is an
article of faith unhesitatingly accepted by all Catholic theologians. It
is in trying to explain how grace and free-will coöperate, that the
above-mentioned schools differ.

In approaching this extremely difficult and obscure problem we consider it
our duty to warn the student against preconceived opinions and to remind
him that the different systems which we are about to examine are all
tolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more important things are at
stake and the faith is viciously assailed from without, the ancient
controversy between Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance.

Article 1. Thomism And Augustinianism

Thomism and Augustinianism both hinge on the concept of _gratia efficax ab
intrinseco s. per se_, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not admit even
the existence of such a grace.

1. THE THOMISTIC THEORY OF GRACE.—The true founder of the Thomistic system
is not St. Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the Molinists, but the
learned Dominican theologian Bañez (1528-1604). His teaching may be
summarized as follows:

a) God is the First Cause (_causa prima_) and Prime Mover (_motor primus_)
of all things, and all created or secondary causes (_causae secundae_)
derive their being and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any
creature could act independently of God, God would cease to be _causa
prima_ and _motor primus_.(706)

The influence of the First Cause is universal, that is to say, it produces
all creatural acts without exception,—necessary and free, good and
bad,—because no secondary cause has power to act unless it is set in
motion by the _motor primus_.

In influencing His creatures, however, God adapts himself to the peculiar
nature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the
free causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode
of action.(707) The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His
determining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not
moved.

b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which God exerts on His
rational creatures is irresistible because it proceeds from an absolute
and omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What God wills
infallibly happens.(708)

Nevertheless, God is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform
an act; but He does not move Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of
sin derives solely from the free will of man.(709)

c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, God’s
concurrence with creatural causes (_concursus generalis_) must be
conceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only
makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by moving the will from
potentiality to actuality.(710) Consequently, the causal influence which
the Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere _motio_, but a
_praemotio_,—and not merely moral, but physical (_praemotio
physica_).(711) It is by physical premotion that God’s prevenient
influence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to
their assent.(712) Free-will is predetermined by God before it determines
itself.(713)

d) If we analyse God’s physical predeterminations in so far as they are
created entities, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and
execution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the _praedeterminatio
physica_. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called
_praemotio physica_. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a
temporal _praemotio_, but of an eternal _praedeterminatio_, in fact the
terms are often used synonymously.(714)

Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal
predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to
determine itself. Since God has from all eternity made absolute and
conditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination
without regard to the free consent of His creatures, physical
predetermination constitutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow
their future free actions, and hence there is no need of a _scientia
media_. If God knows His own will, He must also know the free
determinations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very
foundation of His foreknowledge.(715)

This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thomistic system. Its
champions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as
follows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the
supernatural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation.(716)

e) To physical predetermination or premotion in the order of nature, there
corresponds in the supernatural sphere the _gratia efficax_, which
predetermines man to perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts
freely but at the same time with metaphysical necessity (_necessitate
consequentiae_, not _consequentis_). It would be a contradiction to say
that efficacious grace given for the purpose of eliciting consent may
co-exist with non-consent, _i.e._, may fail to elicit consent.(717) The
will freely assents to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved
thereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does not derive its
efficacy from the consent of the will; it is efficacious of itself and
intrinsically (_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_).(718)

It follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as a _praedeterminatio
ad unum_.(719)

f) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature
inseparably bound up with the consent of the will, it must differ
essentially from merely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_), which
confers only the power to act (_posse operari_), not the act itself (_actu
operari_). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, includes the free
consent of the will, while merely sufficient grace lacks that consent,
because with it, it would cease to be merely sufficient and would become
efficacious.(720)

Here the question naturally arises: How, in this hypothesis, can
sufficient grace be called truly sufficient? The Thomists answer this
question in different ways. Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers
the power to perform a good deed, but that something more is required for
the deed itself.(721) De Lemos ascribes the inefficacy of merely
sufficient grace to a defect of the will.(722) If the will did not resist,
God would promptly add efficacious grace.(723)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE THOMISTIC THEORY.—The Thomistic system
undoubtedly has its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts divine
grace as the prime factor in the business of salvation, and magnificently
works out the concept of God as _causa prima_ and _motor primus_ both in
the natural and the supernatural order.

But Thomism also has its weak points.

A. The Thomistic conception of efficacious grace is open to two serious
theological difficulties.

(1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial distinction between efficacious
and merely sufficient grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace.

(2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace is incompatible with the
dogma of free-will.

Though in theory the Thomists defend the sufficiency of grace and the
freedom of the will as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their
attempts at squaring these dogmas with the fundamental principles of their
system.

a) Sufficient grace, as conceived by the Thomists, is not truly sufficient
to enable a man to perform a salutary act, because _ex vi notionis_ it
confers merely the power to act, postulating for the act itself a
substantially new grace (_gratia efficax_). A grace which requires to be
entitatively supplemented by another, in order to enable a man to perform
a salutary act, is clearly not sufficient for the performance of that act.
“To be truly sufficient for something” and “to require to be complemented
by something else” are mutually exclusive notions, and hence “sufficient
grace” as conceived by Thomists is in reality insufficient.

Many subtle explanations have been devised to obviate this difficulty.
Billuart and nearly all the later Thomists say that if any one who has
received sufficient grace (in the Thomistic sense of the term) is denied
the _gratia efficax_, it must be attributed to a sinful resistance of the
will.(724) But this explanation is incompatible with the Thomistic
teaching that together with the _gratia sufficiens_ there co-exists in the
soul of the sinner an irresistible and inevitable _praemotio physica_ to
the entity of sin, with which entity formal sin is inseparably bound
up.(725) If this be true, how can the will of man be held responsible so
long as God denies him the _gratia ab intrinseco efficax_?

Speaking in the abstract, the will may assume one of three distinct
attitudes toward sufficient grace. It may consent, it may resist, or it
may remain neutral. It cannot consent except with the aid of a
predetermining _gratia efficax_, to merit which is beyond its power. If it
withstands, it _eo ipso_ renders itself unworthy of the _gratia efficax_.
If it takes a neutral attitude, (which may in itself be a sinful act), and
awaits efficacious grace, of what use is sufficient grace?

To resist sufficient grace involves an abuse of liberty. Now, where does
the right use of liberty come in? If coöperation with sufficient grace
moves God to bestow the _gratia per se efficax_, as the Thomists contend,
then the right use of liberty must lie somewhere between the _gratia
sufficiens_ and the _gratia efficax per se_. But there is absolutely no
place for it in the Thomistic system. The right use of liberty for the
purpose of obtaining efficacious grace is attributable either to grace or
to unaided nature. To assert that it is the work of unaided nature would
lead to Semipelagianism. To hold that it is owing to grace would be moving
in a vicious circle, thus: “Because the will offers no resistance, it is
efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act; that it offers no sinful
resistance is owing to the fact that it is efficaciously moved to perform
a salutary act.”(726)

It is impossible to devise any satisfactory solution of this difficulty
which will not at the same time upset the very foundation on which the
Thomistic system rests, viz.: “_Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi
sit efficaciter determinata a prima [scil. per applicationem potentiae ad
actum]_,” that is to say, no secondary cause can act unless it be
efficaciously determined by the First Cause by an application of the
latter to the former as of potency to act.

b) The Thomistic _gratia efficax_, conceived as a _praedeterminatio ad
unum_, inevitably destroys free-will.

α) It is important to state the question clearly: Not physical premotion
as such,(727) but the implied connotation of _praevia determinatio ad
unum_, is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. The freedom of the
will does not consist in the pure contingency of an act, or in a merely
passive indifference, but in active indifference either to will or not to
will, to will thus or otherwise. Consequently every physical
predetermination, in so far as it is a _determinatio ad unum_, must
necessarily be destructive of free-will. Self-determination and physical
predetermination by an extraneous will are mutually exclusive. Now the
Thomists hold that the _gratia per se efficax_ operates in the manner of a
supernatural _praedeterminatio ad unum_. If this were true, the will under
the influence of efficacious grace would no longer be free.

To perceive the full force of this argument it is necessary to keep in
mind the Thomistic definition of _praemotio physica_ as “_actio Dei, quâ
voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet
insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus cum illa
praemotione coniungere_.”(728) That is to say: As the non-performance of
an act by the will is owing simply and solely to the absence of the
respective _praemotio physica_, so conversely, the performance of an act
is conditioned simply and solely by the presence of a divine premotion;
the will itself can neither obtain nor prevent such a premotion, because
this would require a new premotion, which again depends entirely on the
divine pleasure. If the will of man were thus inevitably predetermined by
God, it could not in any sense of the term be called truly free.

-------------------------------------

β) The Thomists meet this argument with mere evasions. They make a
distinction between _necessitas consequentis_ (_antecedens_), which really
necessitates, and _necessitas consequentiae_ (_subsequens_), which does
not. A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical premotion,
but it is not on that account in itself necessary. But, we answer, a
_determinatio ad unum_, which precedes a free act and is independent of
the will, is more than a _necessitas consequentiae_—it is a _necessitas
consequentis_ destructive of free-will. The Thomists reply: Considered as
a created entity, physical premotion may indeed be incompatible with
free-will; not so if regarded as an act of God, who, being almighty, is
able to predetermine the will without prejudice to its freedom.(729) The
obvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic contradiction cannot be solved by
an appeal to the divine omnipotence, because even God Himself cannot do
what is intrinsically impossible.(730) He can no more change a
_determinatio ad unum_ into a _libertas ad utrumque_ than He can create a
square circle, because the two notions involve an intrinsic contradiction.
Furthermore, if the Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to
perform some definite act, would He not choose precisely that _praemotio
physica_ which, the Thomists claim, also produces free acts? Not so,
replies Alvarez; “for the will remains free so long as the intellect
represents to it an object as indifferent.”(731) That is to say: Liberty
remains as long as its root, _i.e._ an indifferent judgment, is present.
But this new rejoinder, far from solving the riddle, simply begs the
question. Liberty of choice resides _formaliter_ in the will, not in the
intellect, and consequently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless
it possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not to act. This
_indifferentia activa ad utrumlibet_, as it is technically termed, is
absolutely incompatible with the Thomistic _praemotio ad unum_. What would
it avail the will to enjoy the _indifferentia iudicii_ if it had to submit
to compulsion from some other quarter?

γ) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort to the famous
distinction between the _sensus compositus_ and the _sensus divisus_. The
Molinists argue: “_Liberum arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia non
potest dissentire; ergo non est liberum._” The Thomists reply:
“_Distinguo:—non potest dissentire in sensu diviso, nego; non potest
dissentire in sensu composito, concedo._” They explain this distinction by
certain well-known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart says:
“_Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in sensu composito, quod
possit sedere simul et stare; ... in sensu diviso, quod sedens sub
sessione retinet potentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem cum
sessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat potentiam simultaneitatis,
sensus divisus simultaneitatem __ potentiae._”(732) As one who sits cannot
at the same time stand (_sensus compositus_), although he is free to rise
(_sensus divisus_), so the consent of the will effected by efficacious
grace, cannot become dissent (_sensus compositus_), though the will
retains the power to dissent instead of consenting (_sensus divisus_), and
this is sufficient to safeguard its freedom.

Is the distinction between _sensus compositus_ and _sensus divisus_
correctly applied here? Can the will, under the predetermining influence
of the _gratia efficax_, change its consent into dissent at any time and
as easily as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby
demonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? Alvarez(733)
describes the Thomistic _potentia dissentiendi_ as a faculty which can
never under any circumstances become active. But such a _potentia_ is
really no _potentia_ at all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand;
his natural _potentia standi_ is neutralized by external restraint.
Similarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic _gratia
efficax_, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, and the alleged _potentia
resistendi_, by which the Thomists claim to save free-will, is a chimera.

δ) It is at this decisive point in the controversy that the Molinists
triumphantly bring in the declaration of the Council of Trent that “man
... while he receives that inspiration [_i.e._ efficacious grace], ... is
also able to reject it.” And again: “If any one saith that man’s
free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and
calling, does in no wise coöperate towards disposing and preparing itself
for obtaining the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its
consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing
whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.”(734) To adjust their
system to this important dogmatic decision, the older Thomists claimed
that the Tridentine Council had in mind merely the _gratia sufficiens_, to
which the will can refuse its consent. But this interpretation is
untenable. The Council plainly refers to that grace with which the will
coöperates by giving its consent (_cooperatur assentiendo_) and which it
can render inefficacious by withdrawing its consent, in other words, with
the grace which disposes and prepares a sinner for justification, and
under the influence of which, according to Luther and Calvin, the will
remains inanimate and merely passive. This can only be the _gratia
efficax_. Other Thomist theologians, not daring to contradict the obvious
sense of the Tridentine decree, assert that the Council intentionally
chose the term _dissentire_ (_sensus divisus_) rather than _resistere_
(_sensus compositus_), in order to indicate that under the predetermining
influence of grace it is possible for the will to refuse its consent
(_posse dissentire_) but not to offer resistance (_posse resistere_).(735)
This interpretation is no longer tenable since the Vatican Council has
defined that “Faith, even when it does not work by charity, is in itself a
gift of God, and the act of faith is a work appertaining to salvation, by
which man yields voluntary obedience to God Himself, by assenting to and
coöperating with His grace, which he is able to resist.”(736) If
efficacious grace can be successfully resisted, it can not possess that
“irresistible” influence which the Thomists ascribe to it.(737)

-------------------------------------

B. The Thomistic system is open to two serious objections also from the
philosophical point of view. One of these concerns the medium by which God
foreknows the future free acts of His rational creatures; the other, His
relation to sin.

a) In regard to the first-mentioned point we do not, of course,
underestimate the immense difficulties involved in the problem of God’s
foreknowledge of the free acts of the future.

-------------------------------------

The Molinistic theory also has its difficulties, and they are so numerous
and weighty that in our treatise on God(738) we made no attempt to
demonstrate the _scientia media_ by stringent arguments, but merely
accepted it as a working hypothesis which supplies some sort of scientific
basis for the dogmas of divine omnipotence and free-will in both the
natural and the supernatural order.

b) A more serious objection than the one just adverted to is that the
Thomistic hypothesis involves the blasphemous inference that God
predetermines men to sin.

α) Under a rigorous application of the Thomistic principles God would have
to be acknowledged as the cause of sin. As the predetermination of the
will to justification can take no other form than the _gratia per se
efficax_, so sin, considered as an act, necessarily postulates the
predetermining influence of the _motor primus_.(739) Without this
assumption it would be impossible in the Thomistic system to find in the
absolute will of God an infallible medium by which He can foreknow future
sins. Bañez says on this point: “God knows sin with an intuitive
knowledge, because His will is the cause of the sinful act, as act, at the
same time permitting free-will to concur in that act by failing to observe
the law.”(740) Though the Thomists refuse to admit that God Himself is the
immediate author of sin, the conclusion is inevitable from their premises.
And this for two reasons. First, because the alleged _praemotio ad malum_
is as irresistible as the _praemotio ad bonum_; and secondly, because the
material element of sin must be inseparable from its formal element;
otherwise God would foreknow sin merely _materialiter_ as an act but not
_formaliter_ as a sin. The teaching of the Church on this point was
clearly defined by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that it is not
in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God
worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly
and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own
proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.”(741)

If the rational creature were compelled to perform a sinful act, as act,
resistance would be impossible. And if it were true that the malice of an
act practically cannot be separated from its physical entity, then in the
Thomistic hypothesis God would be the author not only of the _entitas_ but
likewise of the _malitia peccati_. The devil tempts us only by moral
means, _i.e._ by suggestion; are we to assume that God tempts us
physically by inducing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the
_praemotio ad bonum_, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? This
consideration may be supplemented by another. So-called “sins of malice”
are comparatively rare. Most sins are committed for the sake of some
pleasure or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral theology
in forbidding sin forbids its physical entity. How gladly would not those
who are addicted to impurity, for instance, separate the malice from the
entity of their sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their
passion without offending God!

β) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist theologians defend
themselves by a simile. The soul of a lame man, they say, enables him
indeed to move his disabled limb; however, the cause of limping is not the
soul but a crooked shinbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes of such
reasoning as follows: “The will of Adam before the fall was not a crooked
shinbone, but it was absolutely straight, and became crooked through
physical premotion.”(742)

Another and more plausible contention of the Thomist school is that
Molinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin somehow to God. “It is
impossible for a man to sin unless God lends His coöperation. Do not,
therefore, the Molinists also make God the author of sin?” Those who argue
in this wise overlook the fact that there is a very large distinction
between the _concursus simultaneus_ of the Molinists and the _praemotio
physica_ of the Thomists. The _praemotio physica_ predetermines the sinful
act without regard to the circumstance whether or not the will is able to
offer resistance. The _concursus simultaneus_, on the other hand, begins
as a mere _concursus oblatus_, which is in itself indifferent and awaits
as it were the free consent of the will before it coöperates with the
sinner as _concursus collatus_ in the performance of the sinful act.(743)
For this reason the distinction between _actus_ and _malitia_ has a
well-defined place in the Molinistic system, whereas it is meaningless in
that of the Thomists.(744)

2. AUGUSTINIANISM.—This system, so called because its defenders pretend to
base it on the authority of St. Augustine, has some points of similarity
with Thomism but differs from the latter in more than one respect,
especially in this that the Augustinians,(745) though they speak with
great deference of the _gratia per se efficax_, hold that the will is not
physically but only morally predetermined in its free acts. Hence
Augustinianism may fitly be described as the system of the
_praedeterminatio moralis_. Its most eminent defender is Lawrence Berti,
O. S. A. (1696-1766), who in a voluminous work _De Theologicis
Disciplinis_(746) so vigorously championed the Augustinian theory that
Archbishop Jean d’Yse de Saléon, of Vienne,(747) and other contemporary
theologians combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. Pope Benedict
XIV instituted an official investigation, which resulted in a decree
permitting Augustinianism to be freely held and taught.

a) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of _causa prima_ and _motor
primus_, Augustinianism is based on the notion of _delectatio coelestis_
or _caritas_. Berti holds three principles in common with Jansenius: (1)
Actual grace consists essentially in the infusion of celestial
delectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (_i.e._ grace) causally
precedes free-will in such wise that its relative intensity in every
instance constitutes the law and standard of the will’s disposition to do
good.

(3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concupiscence
(_delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia_) is doing its work in fallen man,
and the two powers constantly contend for the mastery. So long as
celestial delectation (_i.e._ grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with,
concupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salutary act to
which it is invited by the former. It is only when the _delectatio
coelestis_ overcomes concupiscence (_delectatio coelestis victrix_) that
free-will can perform the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth
principle, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which brings out the
essential difference between Augustinianism and Jansenism, _viz._: the
_delectatio coelestis_ never overpowers the will but leaves it free to
choose between good and evil.(748)

b) The relation between merely sufficient and efficacious grace in the
Augustinian system, therefore, may be described as follows: Merely
sufficient grace imparts to the will the _posse_ but not the _velle_, or
at best only such a weak _velle_ that it requires the _delectatio victrix_
(_gratia efficax_) to become effective. Efficacious grace (_delectatio
coelestis victrix_), on the other hand, impels the will actually to
perform the good deed. Hence there is between the two an essential and
specific difference, and the efficacy of that grace which leads to the
performance of salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on
the _delectatio coelestis_, which must consequently be conceived as
_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_.(749)

c) Nevertheless, the necessity of the _gratia efficax ab __ intrinseco_,
according to the Augustinian theory, is not due to the subordination of
the _causa secunda_ to the _causa prima_, as the Thomists contend, but to
a constitutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this that its
evil impulses can be overcome solely by the _delectatio coelestis victrix_
(_gratia efficax, adiutorium quo_. The case was different before the Fall,
when the _gratia versatilis_ (_gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine quo
non_) sufficed for the performance of salutary acts.(750)

d) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jansenists, that the
delectatio _coelestis_ (_i.e._ efficacious grace) does not intrinsically
compel the will, but acts merely as a _praemotio moralis_, and that while
the will obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (_infallibiliter_) it
does not do so necessarily (_non necessario_). With equal certainty,
though not necessarily, the will, when equipped solely with sufficient
grace, succumbs to concupiscence. The ultimate reason for the freedom of
the will is to be found in the _indifferentia iudicii_.(751) By way of
exemplification the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man who,
though physically free and able to do so, would never turn summersaults on
a public thoroughfare or gouge out his own eyes.

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF AUGUSTINIANISM.—On account of its uncritical methods
Augustinianism has found but few defenders and deserves notice only in so
far as it claims to base its teaching on St. Augustine.

Like the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have been quoted in
support of many contradictory systems.(752) If the use of Augustinian
terms guaranteed the possession of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have
a strong claim to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. Yet
how widely does not the “Augustinus Iprensis,” as he has been called,
differ from the “Augustinus Hipponensis”! Augustinianism, too, utterly
misconceives the terms which it employs. Space permits us to call
attention to one or two points only.

a) In the first place Augustinianism labors under an absolutely false
conception of sufficient grace.

How can that grace be sufficient for justification which is first
described in glowing colors as _parva et invalida_ and then in the same
breath is declared to be insufficient except when reinforced by a _gratia
magna_ in the shape of _delectatio victrix_? What kind of “grace” can that
be which in its very nature is so constituted that the will, under the
prevailing influence of concupiscence, infallibly does the opposite of
that to which it is supernaturally impelled? It is quite true that the
distinction between _gratia parva_ and _gratia magna_(753) is found in St.
Augustine. However, he understands by _gratia parva_ not sufficient grace,
but the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_), and by _gratia
magna_, not efficacious grace as such, but grace sufficient to perform a
good act (_gratia proxime sufficiens_).(754)

b) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its theory of a _praemotio
moralis_ with the dogma of free-will.

Under the Augustinian system the influence of efficacious grace can be
conceived in but two ways. Either it is so strong that the will is
physically unable to withhold its consent; or it is only strong enough
that the consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral certainty.
In the former alternative we have a prevenient necessity which determines
the will _ad unum_ and consequently destroys its freedom. In the latter,
there can be no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of
rational creatures on the part of God, because the Augustinians reject the
_scientia media_ of the Molinists and expressly admit that the same grace
which proves effective in one man remains ineffective in another because
of the condition of his heart.(755)

c) Finally, the three fundamental principles of the Augustinian system are
false and have no warrant in the writings of St. Augustine.

It is not true that pleasure (_delectatio_) is the font and well-spring of
all supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds may also be inspired by hatred,
fear, sorrow, etc.(756) With many men the fear of God or a sense of duty
is as strong an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of
treading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard “celestial
delectation” as the essential mark of efficacious grace, nor concupiscence
as the characteristic note of sin.(757)

The second and third principles of the Augustinian system are likewise
false. If delectation is only one motive among many, its varying intensity
cannot be the standard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that
the will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the relatively
stronger as against the weaker delectation; for any necessitation that
does not depend on the free will excludes the _libertas a coactione_, but
not that _libertas a necessitate_ which constitutes the notion of liberty.
There can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to resist
delectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth principle of the
Augustinians, by which they pretend to uphold free-will, is also
false.(758)

READINGS:—The literature on the different systems of grace is
enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works.

On the Thomist side: *Bañez, O. P., _Comment. in S. Theol. S.
Thom._, Salamanca 1584 sqq.—*Alvarez, O. P., _De Auxiliis Gratiae
et Humani Arbitrii Viribus_, Rome 1610.—IDEM, _Responsionum Libri
Quatuor_, Louvain 1622.—Ledesma, O. P., _De Divinae Gratiae
Auxiliis_, Salamanca 1611.—*Gonet, O. P., _Clypeus Theologiae
Thomisticae_, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69.—Contenson, O. P.,
_Theologia Mentis et Cordis_, Lyons 1673.—De Lemos, O. P.,
_Panoplia Divinae Gratiae_, 4 vols., Liège 1676.—Goudin, O. P.,
_De Scientia et Voluntate Dei_, new ed., Louvain 1874.—*Gotti, O.
P., _Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem __ Divi Thomae_,
Venice 1750.—Gazzaniga, O. P., _Theologia Dogmatica in Systema
Redacta_, 2 vols., Vienne 1776.—*Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 5
(ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.).—IDEM, _Le Thomisme
Triomphant_, Paris 1725.—*Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., _Die Lehre des
hl. Thomas über die Willensfreiheit_, Prague 1890.—IDEM, in
Commer’s _Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie_,
1894 sqq.—*Dummermuth, O. P., _S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis
Physicae_, Paris 1886.—I. A. Manser, _Possibilitas Praemotionis
Physicae Thomisticae_, Fribourg (Switzerland) 1895.—Joh. Ude,
_Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus Voluntatis Humanae_,
Graz 1905.—Del Prado, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, 3 vols.,
Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.—P. Garrigou-Lagrange, _S. Thomas et
le Néomolinisme_, Paris 1917.

On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, _Vindiciae
Augustinianae,_ Padua 1677.—*Berti, _De Theologicis Disciplinis_,
8 vols., Rome 1739 sqq.—Bellelli, _Mens Augustini de Modo
Reparationis Humanae Naturae_, 2 vols., Rome 1773.—L. de
Thomassin, _Mémoires sur la Grâce, etc._, Louvain 1668.

For a list of Molinistic and Congruistic authors see pp. 269 sq.

Article 2. Molinism And Congruism

The point in which these two systems meet, and in regard to which they
differ from Thomism and Augustinianism, is the definition of efficacious
grace as _efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens_.

This conception was violently attacked by the Spanish Dominican Bañez and
other divines. About 1594, the controversy between the followers of Bañez
and the Molinists waxed so hot that Pope Clement VIII appointed a special
commission to settle it. This was the famous _Congregatio de Auxiliis_,
consisting of picked theologians from both the Dominican and the Jesuit
orders. It debated the matter for nine full years without arriving at a
decision. Finally Pope Paul V, at the suggestion of St. Francis de Sales,
declared both systems to be orthodox and defensible, and strictly forbade
the contending parties to denounce each other as heretical.(759)

While Thomism devoted its efforts mainly to the defense of grace, Molinism
made it its chief business to champion the dogma of free-will.

1. MOLINISM.—Molinism takes its name from the Jesuit Luis de Molina, who
published a famous treatise under the title _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum
Gratiae Donis_ at Lisbon, in 1588. His teaching may be outlined as
follows:

a) In _actu primo_ there is no intrinsic and ontological but merely an
extrinsic and accidental distinction between efficacious and sufficient
grace, based upon their respective effects. Sufficient grace becomes
efficacious by the consent of the will; if the will resists, grace remains
inefficacious (_inefficax_) and _merely_ sufficient (_gratia mere
sufficiens_). Consequently, one and the same grace may be efficacious in
one case and inefficacious in another. It all depends on the will.(760)

b) This theory involves no denial of the priority and superior dignity of
grace in the work of salvation. The will, considered as a mere faculty,
and _in actu primo_, is raised to the supernatural order by prevenient
grace (_gratia praeveniens_), which imparts to it all the moral and
physical power necessary to perform free salutary acts. Neither can the
_actus secundus_ be regarded as a product of the unaided will; it is the
result of grace coöperating with free-will.(761) Consequently, the will by
giving its consent does not increase the power of grace, but it is grace
which makes possible, prepares, and aids the will in performing free acts.
To say that the influence of grace goes farther than this would be to
assert that it acts independently of the will, and would thereby deny the
freedom of the latter.(762)

c) The infallibility with which efficacious grace works its effects is to
be explained not by God’s absolute will, but by His infallible
foreknowledge through the _scientia media_,—a Molinistic postulate which
was first defined and scientifically demonstrated by Father Fonseca, S.
J., the teacher of Suarez.(763) God foreknows not only the absolutely free
acts (_futura_) of His rational creatures by the _scientia visionis_, but
likewise their hypothetically free acts (_futuribilia_) by means of the
_scientia media_, and hence He infallibly knows from all eternity what
attitude the free-will of man would assume in each case if grace were
given him. Consequently, when God, in the light of this eternal
foreknowledge, actually bestows a grace, this grace will prove efficacious
or inefficacious according as He has foreknown whether the will will give
or withhold its consent. Thus can the infallibility of efficacious grace
be reconciled with the dogma of free-will without prejudice to such other
dogmas as final perseverance and the predestination of the elect, because
God by virtue of the _scientia media_ has it absolutely in His power to
give or withhold His graces in each individual case.(764)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF MOLINISM.—Even the most determined opponents of
Molinism admit that this system possesses three important advantages.

a) First, it gives a satisfactory account of the sufficiency of “merely
sufficient grace,” which in its physical nature does not differ
essentially from efficacious grace.

Second, Molinism safeguards free-will by denying that efficacious grace
either physically or morally predetermines the will to one course of
action.

Third, Molinism explains in a fairly satisfactory manner why efficacious
grace is infallibly efficacious. God in virtue of the _scientia media_
knows with metaphysical certainty from all eternity which graces in each
individual case will prove efficacious through the free consent of the
will and which will remain inefficacious, and is thereby enabled to bestow
or withhold grace according to His absolute decrees.

b) The question may justly be raised, however, whether, in endeavoring to
safeguard freewill, the Molinists do not undervalue grace, which is after
all the primary and decisive factor in the work of salvation.

There is something incongruous in the notion that the efficacy or
inefficacy of divine grace should depend on the arbitrary pleasure of a
created will. If sufficient grace does not become efficacious except by
the consent of the will, how can the resultant salutary act be said to be
an effect of grace? St. Paul, St. Augustine, and the councils of the
Church do not say: “_Deus facit, si volumus_,” but they declare: “_Deus
facit, ut faciamus_,” “_Deus ipse dat ipsum velle et facere et
perficere_,” and so forth. What can this mean if not: Divine grace need
not concern itself with external circumstances, occasions, humors, etc.,
but it takes hold of the sinner and actually converts him, without regard
to anything except the decree of the Divine Will. On account of this and
similar difficulties Cardinal Bellarmine, who was a champion and protector
of P. Molina, seems to have rejected Molinism(765) in favor of
Congruism.(766)

c) The same reasons that induced Bellarmine to embrace Congruism probably
led the Jesuit General Claudius Aquaviva, in 1613, to order all teachers
of theology in the Society to lay greater emphasis on the Congruistic
element in the notion of efficacious grace. This measure was quite in
harmony with the principles defended by the Jesuit members of the
_Congregatio de Auxiliis_ before Clement VIII and Paul V. Aquaviva’s order
is of sufficient importance to deserve a place in the text of this volume:
“_Nostri in posterum omnino doceant, inter eam gratiam quae effectum re
ipsâ habet atque efficax dicitur, et eam quam sufficientem nominant, non
tantum discrimen esse in actu secundo, quia ex usu liberi arbitrii etiam
cooperantem gratiam habentis effectum sortiatur, altera non item; sed in
ipso actu primo, quod positâ scientiâ conditionalium [scientiâ mediâ] ex
efficaci Dei proposito atque intentione efficiendi certissime in nobis
boni, de industria ipse ea media seligit atque eo modo et tempore confert,
quo videt effectum, infallibiliter habitura, aliis usurus, si haec
inefficacia praevidisset. Quare semper moraliter et in ratione beneficii
plus aliquid in efficaci, quam in sufficienti gratia est, in actu primo
contineri: atque hac ratione efficere Deum, ut re ipsâ faciamus, non
tantum quia dat gratiam quâ facere possimus. Quod idem dicendum est de
perseverantia, quae procul dubio donum est._” This modified, or perhaps we
had better say, more sharply determined form of Molinism is called
Congruism.(767)

2. CONGRUISM.—The system thus recommended by Aquaviva in its fundamental
principles really originated with Molina himself. It was developed by the
great Jesuit theologians Suarez, Vasquez, and Lessius, and became the
official system of the Society of Jesus under Muzio Vitelleschi (d. 1645)
and Piccolomini (d. 1651).

a) The distinction between _gratia congrua_ and _gratia incongrua_ is
founded on the writings of St. Augustine, who speaks of the elect as
“_congruenter vocati_.”(768) The Congruists maintain against the extreme
Molinists that the efficacy of grace is not attributable solely to a free
determination of the will, but, at least in part, to the fact that grace
is bestowed under circumstances favorable to its operation, _i.e._
“congruous” in that sense. When the circumstances are comparatively
adverse (_incongrua_), grace remains merely sufficient. A prudent father
who knows how to govern his children without physical force will speak the
right word to each at the proper time. Similarly God adapts His grace, if
it is to prove efficacious, to the circumstances of each individual case,
thereby attaining His purpose without fail. Thus the reckless youth on the
city streets needs more powerful graces than the pious nun in her secluded
convent cell, because he is exposed to stronger temptations and his
environment is unfavorable to religious influences. Since grace is
conferred with a wise regard to temperament, character, inclinations,
prejudices, time and place, there exists between it and free-will a sort
of intrinsic affinity, which in the hands of God becomes an infallible
means of executing His decrees.(769)

b) The actual bestowal of congruous grace, considered _in actu primo_, is
undoubtedly a special gift of God, and hence the _gratia congrua_
possesses a higher value than the _gratia incongrua sive inefficax_. An
entitatively weaker impulse of grace, if conferred under comparatively
favorable conditions, is more precious than a stronger impulse which fails
in its purpose by reason of unfavorable circumstances created by
inclination, training, or environment. Little David accomplished more with
a handful of pebbles in his scrip than had he been heavily armed.(770)

c) Congruism assigns a far more important rôle to grace than extreme
Molinism. It makes the will depend on efficacious grace, not the efficacy
of grace upon the will. Bellarmine illustrates this difference by the
example of a sermon which, under an entirely equal distribution of
internal grace, converts one sinner while it leaves another
untouched.(771)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF CONGRUISM.—Among the different systems devised for
the purpose of harmonizing the dogmas of grace and free-will, Congruism
probably comes nearest the truth. It strikes a golden mean between the two
extremes of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism on the one hand, and Calvinism
and Jansenism on the other, and its principal theses can be supported by
clear and unmistakable passages from the writings of St. Augustine.

a) Other points in its favor are the following: “Sufficient grace,” in the
Congruist hypothesis, is truly sufficient so far as God is concerned,
because its inefficaciousness is attributable solely to the human will.
That free-will is properly safeguarded under the influence of efficacious
grace (_gratia congrua_) is admitted even by theologians of the opposing
schools. True, Congruism does not regard the will as an abstract notion,
but as a factor closely interwoven with the concrete circumstances of
daily life. As favorable circumstances (education, association,
temperament) merely influence the will but do not compel it, so
supernatural grace (_gratia congrua s. efficax_) may soften the will and
occasionally even break down its resistance, but (rare cases
excepted)(772) will never compel it to do good. Congruism marks a distinct
advance over extreme Molinism also in this, that it bases the difference
between _gratia efficax_ (_congrua_) and _gratia inefficax_ not entirely
on the will of man, but likewise on the will of God, whereby it is able to
explain such formulas as “_Deus facit, ut faciamus_,” “_Deus est, qui
discernit_,” _etc._, in a manner entirely compatible with the dogmatic
teaching of the Church.(773)

The _modus operandi_ of the _gratia congrua_ (efficacious grace) is
explained by Congruism, in common with Molinism, as follows: There is a
threefold efficacy: the efficacy of power (_efficacia virtutis_), the
efficacy of union (_efficacia connexionis_), and the efficacy of
infallible success (_efficacia infallibilitatis_). Grace (both efficacious
and sufficient) does not derive its _efficacia virtutis_ from the
free-will of man, nor from the knowledge of God (_scientia media_), but
from itself. The _efficacia connexionis_ (of union between act and grace)
on the other hand, depends entirely on the free-will, since, according to
the Council of Trent as well as that of the Vatican, efficacious grace
does not operate irresistibly but can be “cast off.” The _efficacia
infallibilitatis_ springs from God’s certain foreknowledge (_scientia
media_), which cannot be deceived.(774)

b) Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to contend that Congruism solves
all difficulties. The mystery surrounding both the unequal distribution of
efficacious grace and the _scientia media_ still remains. Moreover, the
theory that God adjusts himself slavishly to all the circumstances of His
creatures, can hardly be reconciled with His dignity and omnipotence. It
would no doubt be far worthier of His majesty to seize upon the free will
of man and compel it to perform the salutary act which He wishes it to
perform. Whoever has studied the lives of saints and eminent converts
knows that the sudden and seemingly unaccountable changes of heart which
many of them have experienced can hardly be regarded as miracles in the
strict sense, though on the other hand it seems certain that grace worked
in them with little or no regard to the “congruity” of circumstances.
Again, it is one of the highest and most sublime missions of grace not to
be balked by unfavorable circumstances but to re-shape them by changing a
man’s temperament, dulling concupiscence, weakening the power of
temptation, and so forth. In other words, grace does not depend on but
controls and fashions the circumstances of the recipient.

After all is said, therefore, the relation of grace and free-will still
remains an unsolved mystery.(775)

3. SYNCRETISM.—Seeing that each of the different systems which we so far
reviewed contains grains of truth, some theologians(776) have adopted the
good points of all four and combined them into a fifth, called Syncretism.

These authors begin by assuming the existence of two quite distinct sorts
of efficacious grace, the (Thomistic-Augustinian) _gratia efficax ab
intrinseco_, and the (Molinistic-Congruistic) _gratia efficax ab
extrinseco_. The former, they contend, is bestowed for the performance of
more difficult good works, such as resisting grievous temptations,
observing onerous precepts, exercising patience in severe tribulation,
etc.; while the latter enables man to accomplish less difficult acts, such
as short prayers, slight mortifications, etc. The connecting link between
the two is prayer, which has been instituted for the purpose of enabling
man to obtain that _gratia efficax ab intrinseco_ which is necessary for
the performance of the more difficult works of salvation. Sacred Scripture
teaches that prayer originates in grace, that it is binding upon all men,
and that it accomplishes its purpose infallibly.(777)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF SYNCRETISM.—The outstanding characteristic of
Syncretism is its insistence on prayer as a highly important, not to say
the most important, factor in the work of salvation.

a) In this the Syncretistic school is undoubtedly right. Sacred Scripture
and Tradition both strongly emphasize the importance and necessity of
prayer, so much so that one naturally expects to find prayer playing an
essential and indispensable rôle in every complete and orthodox system of
grace. “The present economy of grace is essentially and intrinsically an
economy of prayer,” is a theological axiom which cannot be too strongly
insisted upon. To have brought out this great truth forcibly and
luminously is the merit of Syncretism.

b) We do not mean to intimate, however, that the Syncretistic theory has
solved the problem of the relation between free-will and grace. On the
contrary, by adopting two such heterogeneous concepts as _gratia efficax
ab intrinseco_ and _gratia efficax ab extrinseco_ it has actually
increased the difficulties found in the other systems. For now we are put
before the dilemma:—the Thomistic _gratia efficax_ either supposes
free-will or it does not: if it does, there is no reason to limit this
grace to the more difficult works of salvation; if it does not, then the
_gratia efficax_ can be of no assistance in the performance of more
difficult works, because these too, to be meritorious, require the
coöperation of free-will.

The Syncretists try to evade this dilemma by contending that prayer, as
the connecting link, communicates its own liberty and meritoriousness to
the salutary acts performed through its agency, in other words, that these
acts are the effect of prayer (_effectus orationis_). But aside from the
fact that prayer itself is quite often a difficult act, the more arduous
works of salvation would in the Syncretist hypothesis be stripped of their
meritoriousness and degraded to the level of a _voluntarium in causa_,
which is an untenable assumption.(778) Finally, there is something
illogical and unsatisfactory in admitting on equal terms, as it were, two
such incompatible notions as the Thomistic _cognitio Dei in decretis
praedeterminantibus_ and the Molinistic _scientia media_.

Thus in the end all attempts to harmonize the dogmas of grace and
free-will fail to solve the mystery, and we are compelled to exclaim with
St. Paul: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of
God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His
ways!”(779)

READINGS:—Molinistic and Congruistic works of importance are:
*Molina, S. J., _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis_,
Lisbon 1588 (repr. Paris 1876).—Platel, S. J., _Auctoritas contra
Praedeterminationem Physicam pro Scientia Media_, Douai
1669.—Henao, S. J., _Scientia Media Historice Propugnata_, Lyons
1655.—IDEM, _Scientia Media Theologice Defensa_, Lyons 1674-6.—De
Aranda, S. J., _De Deo Sciente, Praedestinante et Auxiliante seu
Schola Scientiae Mediae_, Saragossa 1693.—*Suarez, S. J., _De
Concursu, Motione et Auxilio Dei_, new ed., Paris 1856.—IDEM, _De
Auxilio Efficaci_, Paris ed., 1856, t. XI.—IDEM, _De Vera
Intelligentia Auxilii Efficacis_ (_Op. Posthum._, t. X,
Appendix).—*Lessius, S. J., _De Gratia Efficaci_ (_Opusc._, t. II,
Paris 1878).—Sardagna, S. J., _Theologia Dogmatico-Polemica_,
Ratisbon 1771.—Wirceburgenses (Kilber, S. J.), _De Gratia_, new
ed., Paris 1853.—Murray, _De Gratia_, Dublin 1877.—B. Jungmann, S.
J., _De Gratia_, 6th ed., Ratisbon 1896.—Th. de Régnon, S. J.,
_Bañez et Molina, Histoire, Doctrines, Critique, Métaphysique_,
Paris 1883.—Card. Mazzella, S. J., _De Gratia Christi_, 3rd ed.,
Rome 1882.—Palmieri, S. J., _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes.
49-58, Gulpen 1885.—*V. Frins, S. J., _S. Thomae Doctrina de
Cooperatione Dei cum Omni __ Natura Creata, Praesertim Libera, seu
S. Thomas Praedeterminationis Physicae Adversarius_, Paris
1890.—*Schiffini, S. J., _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 5, Freiburg
1901.—Card. Billot, S. J., _De Gratia Christi et Libero Hominis
Arbitrio_, I, Rome 1908.—Limbourg, S. J. “_Selbstzeichnung der
thomistischen Gnadenlehre_,” in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift für
kath. Theologie_, 1877.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the
History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 493 sqq.

Among the theologians who have tried to harmonize Thomism and
Molinism we may mention, besides Ysambert and St. Alphonsus de’
Liguori, *Tournely, _De Gratia_, Venice 1755.—Card. Jos. Pecci,
_Sentenza di S. Tommaso circa l’Influsso di Dio sulle Azioni delle
Creature Ragionevoli e sulla Scienza Media_, Rome 1885.—A.
Adeodatus, J. _Pecci’s Schrift: Lehre des hl. Thomas über den
Einfluss Gottes, etc., analysiert_, Mainz 1888.—C. Krogh-Tonning,
_De Gratia Christi et de Libero Arbitrio S. Thomae Doctrina_,
Christiania 1898.—J. Herrmann, C. SS. R., _De Divina Gratia_, Rome
1904.

The history of the great controversy between Thomism and Molinism
can be studied in H. Serry, O. P., _Historia Congregationum de
Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae_, Louvain 1700 and Antwerp 1709.—Livinus
de Meyer, S. J., _Historia Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae
Auxiliis_, Antwerp 1705.—*Schneemann, S. J., _Entstehung der
thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_, Freiburg 1879.—*IDEM,
_Weitere Entwicklung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_,
Freiburg 1880.—*IDEM, _Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae
Liberique Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progressus_, Freiburg 1881.

PART II. SANCTIFYING GRACE

The grace of justification, commonly called sanctifying grace, is related
to actual grace as an end to its means. Actual grace introduces the state
of sanctifying grace or preserves and augments it where it already exists.

This fact makes it advisable to consider the genesis of sanctifying grace
before studying its nature and effects.

We shall therefore treat in three chapters: (1) of the Process of
Justification (_iustificatio in fieri_); (2) of the State of Justification
(_iustificatio in esse_), and (3) of the Fruits of Justification
(_iustificatio in facto esse_), or the Merit of Good Works.

Chapter I. The Genesis Of Sanctifying Grace, Or The Process Of
Justification

The justification of an adult human being does not take place suddenly,
but runs through certain well-defined stages, which in their totality are
called the process of justification.

Being a “regeneration in God,” justification bears a striking resemblance
to the development of the fœtus in the maternal womb. Like physical birth,
spiritual regeneration is preceded by travailing, _i.e._ fear and painful
contrition.

The dogmatic teaching of the Catholic Church on justification is formally
defined by the Tridentine Council, whose decrees(780) contain a masterly
analysis of this most interesting of psychological processes. The holy
Synod puts faith at the beginning. “Faith,” it says, “is the beginning of
human salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification.”(781)
The nature of faith and the part it plays in justification were the chief
points in dispute between the Church and the so-called Reformers. Luther
and his followers denatured the traditional Catholic teaching by basing
justification solely on faith, which they falsely defined as mere
confidence or trust in the mercy of God.

Section 1. The Necessity Of Faith For Justification

1. THE LUTHERAN HERESY VS. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—The Protestant
Reformers, notably Luther and Calvin, did not deny that justification is
wrought by faith, but they defined justifying faith in a manner altogether
foreign to the mind of the Church.

a) They distinguished three kinds of faith: (1) belief in the existence of
God and the historical fact that Christ has come on earth, suffered, and
ascended (_fides historica_); (2) the sort of trust which is required for
exercising the gift of miracles (_fides miraculorum_); and (3) faith in
the divine promises with regard to the remission of sin (_fides
promissionum_). The last-mentioned species of faith they subdivided into
general and particular. _Fides generalis_ is that by which we believe that
the righteousness of Christ “covers” (but does not wipe out) our sins.
_Fides specialis_ or fiduciary faith (_fiducia_) is that by which a man
applies to himself the righteousness of the Redeemer, firmly trusting that
his sins are for Christ’s sake not imputed to him. Thus the Reformers
erroneously transferred the seat of justifying faith from the intellect to
the will and completely subverted the Catholic notion of faith as an
intellectual assent to revealed truth.

b) To this fundamental error the Fathers of Trent opposed the orthodox
doctrine that (adults) “are disposed unto justice when, excited and
assisted by divine grace, receiving faith by hearing, they are freely
moved towards God, believing those things to be true which God has
revealed and promised, ...”(782) and they solemnly anathematized those who
assert “that justifying faith is nothing else but confidence in the divine
mercy which remits sin for Christ’s sake, or that this confidence alone is
that whereby we are justified.”(783)

Hence it is _de fide_ that the faith whereby man is justified, is not a
confident persuasion of being esteemed righteous in the sight of God, but
a dogmatic or theoretical belief in the truths of Divine Revelation.

2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FIDUCIARY FAITH.—Whenever Sacred
Scripture and Tradition speak of justifying faith, they mean a dogmatic
belief in the truths of Revelation,—that faith which the Protestants call
_fides historica_.

a) Christ Himself solemnly commanded His Apostles and their successors to
preach the Gospel to all nations, and before baptizing them to convert
them to a firm belief in certain specified truths which no man may reject
except at the peril of his eternal salvation.

α) Mark XVI, 15 sq.: “Go ye into the whole world, and preach the
gospel(784) to every creature: He that believeth [_i.e._ in the Gospel]
and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be
condemned.” Agreeable to this injunction St. John declares it to be the
object of his Gospel “that you may believe that(785) Jesus is the Christ,
the Son of God, and that believing, you may have life in his name.”(786)
The Gospel is written “that we may believe.” What must we believe? That
“Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God.” This is a revealed truth by firmly
believing which we shall be saved. When the treasurer of Queen Candace
begged to be baptized, Philip the deacon said to him: “If thou believest
with all thy heart, thou mayest.” The eunuch replied: “I believe that
Jesus Christ is the Son of God,” whereupon Philip baptized him.(787)

β) St. Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians eloquently
insists on the necessity of faith, not a mere _fides fiducialis_, but a
believing acceptance of Divine Revelation. Cfr. Rom. X, 9 sq.: “For if
thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that
God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the
heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto
salvation.”(788) We must confess with the mouth and believe with the
heart. External profession and internal faith go together and have for
their common object a certain truth open to our knowledge, _viz._: the
resurrection of Christ,—a dogma in which the whole teaching of the
atonement lies imbedded.

The character of justifying faith is still more plainly evident from Heb.
XI, 6: “Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh
to God [he that is to be justified], must believe that He is [the
existence of God], and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”(789) The
Apostle here clearly asserts both the necessity of justifying faith and
the minimum of doctrine to be explicitly “believed,” _viz._: the existence
of God and eternal retribution.(790)

γ) The Lutherans appeal chiefly to Matth. IX, 2, Luke XVII, 19, Rom. IV,
5, and Heb. XI, 1. But not a single one of these texts represents
fiduciary faith as the instrumental cause of justification. The word
πίστις occurs no less than eighty times in the Synoptic Gospels and in St.
Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, but there are only six passages in which it
could possibly be construed as synonymous with _fiducia_, and in none of
these is the interpretation entirely certain. Not once does the New
Testament employ πίστις in the sense of “fiduciary faith,” _i.e._ a
confident persuasion of one’s own righteousness.(791)

b) Tradition is in such perfect agreement with Scripture on this point
that the Reformers did not venture to deny that their doctrine ran counter
to the time-honored teaching of the Church. The Fathers unanimously insist
on the necessity of dogmatic faith as a requisite of justification.

α) St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, who is regarded as “the best theologian of his
time” (468-533),(792) in his golden booklet _De Fide seu de Regula Verae
Fidei ad Petrum_, says: “I rejoice that you take care to preserve the true
faith without which conversion is useless, nay, impossible. Apostolic
authority tells us that we cannot please God without faith. For faith is
the foundation of all good [works]; it is the beginning of human
salvation, and without it no one can obtain a place among the children of
God, because without it no one can obtain the grace of justification in
this world or possess eternal life in the next.”(793) St. Fulgentius was a
faithful disciple of St. Augustine, and the whole trend of his treatise
shows that by _vera fides_ he understands not the Lutheran _fiducia
propriae iustificationis_, but Catholic belief in revealed truth.(794)

β) This teaching is corroborated by the ancient practice of instructing
the catechumens in the truths of revelation and requiring them to make a
public profession of faith before Baptism. It was because they believed
and professed the true faith that the early Christians, who knew nothing
of the Lutheran _fides fiducialis_, were called “faithful” (_fideles_,
πιστοί), to distinguish them from false believers or heretics
(_haeretici_, αἱρητικοὶ, from αἱρεῖσθαι to choose), who denied some
portion or other of the orthodox creed.

c) In analyzing the notions of _fides_ and _necessitas_ theologians
distinguish between _fides explicita_ and _fides implicita_, and between
_necessitas medii_ and _necessitas praecepti_.

_Fides explicita_ is an express and fully developed belief in the truths
of revelation; _fides implicita_, a virtual belief in whatever may be
contained in a dogma explicitly professed. I make an act of implicit faith
when I say, for instance: “I believe whatever the Church teaches,” or: “I
heartily accept whatever God has revealed.”

The _necessitas medii_ is based on the objective relation of means to an
end, and consequently binds all men, even the ignorant and those who are
in error without their own fault. Such, for example, is the necessity of
the eye for seeing, of wings for flying, of grace for performing salutary
acts, of the _lumen gloriae_ for the beatific vision. The _necessitas
praecepti_, on the other hand, is founded entirely on the will of God, who
positively commands or forbids under pain of grievous sin, but is willing
to condone non-compliance with his precepts when it is owing to guiltless
ignorance. This applies to all positive divine precepts, _e.g._ the law of
fasting and abstinence. It is to be noted that the _necessitas medii_
always involves the _necessitas praecepti_, because God must needs will
and impose upon us by positive precept whatever is objectively necessary
as a means of salvation.

α) The first question that arises with regard to this twofold faith and
necessity is: Are sinners preparing for justification, and the faithful in
general, obliged by necessity of precept to believe explicitly all
revealed truths? The answer is, No; because this is practically
impossible, and God does not demand the impossible.

Generally speaking, it is sufficient to have an explicit knowledge of, and
give one’s firm assent to, the more important dogmas and moral
precepts—the twelve articles of the Apostles’ Creed, the Commandments of
God and the Church, the Sacraments (as needed), and the Our Father. All
other revealed truths need be held only _fide implicitâ_.(795) More is of
course demanded of educated persons and those who are in duty bound to
instruct others, such as priests and teachers.(796)

β) A more important and more difficult question is this: Are there any
dogmas, and if so how many, which must be believed by all men _fide
explicitâ_ and _necessitate medii_? St. Paul says: “Without faith it is
impossible to please God, for he that cometh to God, must believe that He
is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”(797)

With but few exceptions,(798) Catholic theologians maintain that the
Apostle in this passage means theological faith, based upon supernatural
motives. This interpretation is borne out by the context, by such parallel
texts as John III, 11 sqq., 32 sqq., 2 Tim. I, 12, 1 John V, 9 sq., and by
the decisions of several councils.(799) There can be no reasonable doubt
that all men, to be justified and saved, must have an explicit belief in
at least two dogmas, _viz._: the existence of God and eternal retribution.
Pope Innocent XI condemned the Jansenist proposition that explicit belief
in divine retribution is not necessary for salvation.(800)

Are there any other dogmas which must be explicitly believed _necessitate
medii_? The only dogmas which might come in question are: the Trinity, the
Incarnation, the immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The
last-mentioned two may be omitted from the list, because St. Paul does not
mention them,(801) and for the additional reason that belief in
immortality is included in the dogma of eternal retribution, while the
necessity of grace is inseparably bound up with the dogma of Divine
Providence, which in its turn is but a particular aspect of eternal
retribution.(802) Hence the only two dogmas in regard to which the
question at the beginning of this paragraph can reasonably be asked, are
the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation.

Theologians are divided in the matter. Some maintain that no human being
can or could ever be saved without explicit belief in both the Trinity and
the Incarnation. Others(803) hold that this _necessitas medii_ did not
exist under the Old Covenant. A third school(804) avers that no such
necessity can be proved either for the Old or the New Dispensation.

The first of these three opinions is excessively rigorous and
intrinsically improbable. The Jews had no clearly revealed knowledge of
the Trinity and the Incarnation, and consequently were under no obligation
to believe them. As the divinely constituted guardians of the Messianic
prophecies, they were bound to believe in the Redeemer, though only
_necessitate praecepti_. The gentiles were dispensed even from this.

The second opinion, which limits the _necessitas medii_ to the New
Testament, lacks solid proof. The Scripture texts cited in its support
merely prove the efficaciousness of belief in Christ,(805) or the duty of
embracing that belief on the strength of the Apostolic preaching,(806) or,
finally, the impossibility of redemption except through the mediation of
Jesus;(807)—all truths which in themselves have nothing to do with the
question under discussion.

The third and most probable opinion is that even under the New Covenant,
explicit faith in Christ, and _a fortiori_ in the Divine Trinity, cannot
be regarded as an indispensable medium of justification and salvation, (1)
because St. Paul does not mention these two dogmas in the decisive
passage, Heb. XI, 6; and (2) because a supernatural act of justifying love
and contrition may be inspired by belief in the existence of God and
divine retribution; and (3) because this latter belief implicitly, by way
of desire (_fides in voto_), includes belief in Christ and the
Trinity.(808) Nevertheless it must be held that an adult who desires to be
received into the Church and is baptized in the name of the Most Holy
Trinity, is bound to believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation by more
than a mere _necessitas praecepti_, namely, by what is technically called
_necessitas medii per accidens_, a necessity from which God dispenses only
in exceptional cases, when it is either physically or morally impossible
to elicit an act of explicit faith.(809) It is for this reason that the
Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office decided, February 28, 1703, that
missionaries are bound to explain to all adult converts who have the use
of reason, even though they be near death, those mysteries of the faith
which are necessary for salvation _necessitate medii_, especially the
Trinity and the Incarnation.(810)

Section 2. The Necessity Of Other Preparatory Acts Besides Faith

1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—Martin Luther, to
quiet his conscience, evolved the notion that faith alone justifies and
that the Catholic doctrine of the necessity of good works is pharisaical
and derogatory to the merits of Jesus Christ. This teaching was
incorporated into the symbolic books of the Lutherans(811) and adopted by
Calvin.(812) It has been called one of the two basic errors of
Protestantism. The Tridentine Council solemnly condemns it as follows: “If
anyone saith that by faith alone the impious is justified, in such wise as
to mean that nothing else is required to coöperate in order to obtain the
grace of justification, and that it is not in any way necessary that he be
prepared and disposed by the movement of his own will; let him be
anathema.”(813) Other acts that dispose or prepare the soul for
justification, according to the same Council, are: the fear of divine
justice; hope in God’s mercy; charity, which is the font of all
righteousness; detestation of sin, and penitence.(814)

2. REFUTATION OF THE SOLA FIDES THEORY.—The Lutheran theory involves an
open rupture with the traditional teaching of the Church and is positively
unscriptural. Luther himself felt this, as appears from his interpolation
of the word “alone” in Rom. III, 28 and his rejection of the entire
canonical Epistle of St. James.(815)

a) The teaching of the Bible in regard to the rôle played by good works in
the process of justification may be summarized as follows:

(1) A man may believe all that the Church teaches and yet be lost for want
of good works or because he has not the love of God; consequently, faith
alone does not justify or insure eternal salvation. Our Divine Saviour
Himself declares: “Not every one that saith to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter
into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father who is
in heaven, he shall enter into the kingdom of heaven.”(816) St. James
says: “Do you not see that by works a man is justified, and not by faith
only?”(817) And St. Paul: “If I should have all faith, so that I could
remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.”(818)

(2) Besides faith, justification requires certain other preparatory or
dispositive acts. There is, for example, the fear of divine justice. Cfr.
Ecclus. I, 28: “He that is without fear cannot be justified.”(819) Also,
hope in God’s mercy. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 24: “For we are saved by hope.”(820)
Again, charity. Cfr. Luke VII, 47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she
hath loved much.”(821) Furthermore, contrition or penitence. Cfr. Luke
XIII, 3: “Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise
perish.”(822) Finally, good works in general. Cfr. St. James II, 17: “So
faith also, if it have not works, is dead in itself.”(823) No one who
ponders these and similar texts can maintain, as Calvin and Melanchthon
did, that the good works mentioned merely accompany justification, for
they are unmistakably described as causes which dispose and prepare the
sinner for it.

(3) It is not faith alone that justifies, but faith informed and actuated
by charity. Cfr. Gal. V, 6: “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision
availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh by
charity.”(824) The Greek text shows that the word _operatur_ in the
Vulgate must be taken passively, so that a more correct translation would
be: “... but faith effected or formed by charity.” But even if ἐνεργουμένη
were used as a deponent (ἐνεργεῖσθαι=_agere_, _operari_) the meaning would
be substantially the same, _i.e._ a dead faith, without charity, avails
nothing. Cfr. St. James II, 26: “For even as the body without the spirit
is dead, so also faith without works is dead.”(825)

In Rom. III, 28: “For we account a man to be justified by faith, without
the works of the law,”(826) Luther deliberately inserted the word “alone.”
The context shows that this is a falsification. The Apostle contrasts
justifying faith, not with those preparatory acts of salvation which
spring from it, but with the sterile “works of the law” (_i.e._ the Old
Testament), which, as such, possessed no more power to justify than the
good works of the heathen. Keeping this contrast in mind, it would not be
incorrect to say, and St. Paul might well have said, that “supernatural
faith alone (_i.e._ only) justifies, while the works of the law do not.”
But if faith be taken in contradistinction to the other acts operative in
the process of justification, such as fear, hope, contrition, love,—and
this is the sense in which Luther takes it,—then it is false and contrary
to the mind of St. Paul to say: “Faith alone justifies, nothing else is
required.” For in this sense faith is merely the beginning, the
foundation, the root of justification and cannot justify the sinner until
it has absorbed the other preparatory acts required by Holy Scripture and
transformed them into perfect love. This fact was already pointed out by
St. Augustine. “Unintelligent persons,” he says, “with regard to the
Apostle’s statement: ‘We conclude that a man is justified by faith without
the works of the law,’ have thought him to mean that faith is sufficient
for a man, even if he leads a bad life and has no good deeds to allege. It
is impossible that such a character should be deemed ‘a vessel of
election’ by the Apostle, who, after declaring that ‘in Christ Jesus
neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision,’ adds the
important remark: ‘but faith that worketh by charity.’ It is such faith
which separates the faithful children of God from unclean devils,—for even
these ‘believe and tremble,’ as the Apostle James says, but they do no
good works. Therefore they possess not the faith by which the just man
lives,—the faith which operates through love in such wise that God
recompenses it according to its works with eternal life.”(827)

There is another sense in which faith alone may be said to justify,
_viz._: if the term be taken to include all those things which God has
ordained for our salvation, that is to say, the sum-total of “revelation”
or “the true religion” as opposed to “heresy.” The term πίστις (_fides_)
is sometimes employed in this sense by the Fathers, but never in Sacred
Scripture.(828)

b) There is a unanimous and unbroken tradition in favor of the Catholic
doctrine. St. Polycarp writes in his Epistle to the Philippians: “... the
faith (πίστις) given you, which is the mother of us all when hope (ἐλπίς)
follows and love (ἀγάπη) goes before.”(829) St. Augustine teaches that
while faith is _per se_ separable from hope and love, it is ineffective
without them. “Man begins with faith, but the demons, too, believe and
tremble; to faith, therefore, must be added hope, and to hope, love.”(830)
And again: “Without love, faith can indeed exist, but it availeth
nothing.”(831) St. Gregory the Great, paraphrasing St. James, says:
“Perhaps some one will say to himself: I have believed, I shall be saved.
He speaks truly if he sustains faith by works. For that is true faith
which does not contradict by deeds what it asserts in words.”(832)

c) This teaching is in perfect conformity with reason.

α) No supernatural enlightenment is needed to perceive the intrinsic
propriety of a moral preparation for justification. Not only must the
sinner learn to know God as His supernatural end and the source of all
righteousness, but he must also be persuaded that it is his duty, with the
help of sufficient grace, to direct his will towards this final end.

Every tendency or movement presupposes a _terminus a quo_, from which it
starts, and a _terminus ad quem_, to which it tends. The movement of the
will in the process of justification, besides faith, demands a voluntary
withdrawal from sin (contrition, good resolutions) and an approach to
righteousness (hope, love, desire).(833)

This argument would have made no impression on Luther, since he bluntly
denied free-will in the moral order and regarded human nature as so
radically depraved by original sin as to be incapable of coöperating with
divine grace. In fact he compared man to a “log, stick or stone.” This
view was shared by Amsdorf, Flacius, and others, whereas Osiander and
Butzer admitted that “inherent righteousness” is at least a partial factor
in justification. Melanchthon, in an endeavor to reconcile the
contradictions of this discordant system, unwittingly gave rise to the
so-called Synergist dispute. When Pfeffinger(834) undertook the defence of
free-will, many Lutheran theologians, especially of the University of
Jena, boldly attacked the log-stick-and-stone theory(835) and tried to
force their adversaries to admit that man is able to coöperate with grace.
The “Half-Melanchthonians,” as they were called, succeeded in smuggling
Synergism into the “Book of Torgau;”(836) but before the “Formulary of
Concord” was finally printed in the monastery of Bergen, near Magdeburg
(A. D. 1577), the strict Lutherans had eliminated that article as
heterodox and substituted for it the log-stick-and-stone theory as it
appears in the official symbols of the Lutheran Church. In the Syncretist
dispute, and through the efforts of the Pietists, this harsh teaching was
afterwards moderated. But what probably contributed most to the crumbling
of the system was the rapid growth of Socinianism and Rationalism among
the Lutherans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To-day, with
the exception of a small band of “orthodox” Lutherans in Saxony and the
United States, Protestants no longer hold the log-stick-and-stone theory.
The school of Luther proclaimed it as the distinguishing tenet of
Protestantism, as “the criterion of a standing or falling
church,”(837)—and by this criterion the Lutheran Church has indeed fallen.
Common sense has led modern Protestants to admit that contrition and
penance are quite as necessary for justification as faith, an opinion
which, in the words of Dorner,(838) “comes dangerously near the Catholic
system.” In Scandinavia, according to Dr. Krogh-Tonning,(839) the Lutheran
Church has experienced a “quiet reformation” and now unconsciously defends
the Catholic doctrine of justification.(840)

β) As the sufficiency of the Bible without Tradition is the formal
principle of “orthodox” Protestantism, so justification by faith alone may
be said to be its material principle. The absurdity of the Lutheran
position is evident from the fact that these two principles are mutually
destructive. So far from teaching justification by faith alone, the Bible
inculcates the exact contrary, while its sufficiency as the source of
faith could be proved from its own pages, if at all, only by a vicious
circle.(841) Thus the whole Protestant system is based on contradiction.

The _sola fides_ theory is open to serious objection also from the ethical
point of view. It cannot be put into practice without grave danger. “Sin
lustily,” writes Luther, “but be yet more lusty in faith.”(842) The first
part at least of this injunction was promptly obeyed by his followers, and
the rapid deterioration of morals which followed was but a natural sequel
of the _sola fides_ theory. If faith alone were sufficient for
justification, it would make no difference what kind of life a man led,
for unbelief, _i.e._ the loss of fiduciary faith, would be the only sin.
No wonder this ethical antinomism of the Lutheran system, so radically
opposed to the teaching of St. James, was rejected by Hugo Grotius, George
Buller, and other honest Protestants.

Another weighty objection against the Lutheran theory of justification is
that it disregards the law of causation. According to Luther a man is
justified by the firm belief and trust that his sins are forgiven. This
“belief” is either true or false. If it is false, I can have no certainty
with regard to my salvation, but am deceiving myself. If true, it
presupposes that which it is to effect, in other words, it puts the cause
before the effect. An orthodox Lutheran theologian of the old school would
probably retort: My sins are actually forgiven by virtue of the atonement,
because all men without exception are redeemed through the merits of Jesus
Christ. If this be true, then why not be consistent and say: All men are
justified because all are redeemed, consequently there is no need of faith
and sacraments, and keeping the commandments is a matter of indifference!
It is at this point that the incompatibility of Luther’s teaching with the
Bible and sound ethics becomes most glaringly apparent. True, Luther
himself at times emphasized the necessity of good works; but this merely
proves that he had lucid intervals when his honest nature rebelled against
the inconsistency of his teaching.(843)

3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—The Council of Trent assigned to
faith its proper place in the process of justification,(844) and gave a
luminous and profound analysis of the process itself.(845) Scholastic
theology, in elaborating the teaching of Scripture and Tradition, drew a
distinction between _fides formata_, which truly justifies, and _fides
informis_, which falls short of justification.

a) As regards the intrinsic relation of (dogmatic) faith to other
preparatory acts in the process of justification, the Tridentine Council
declares: “Faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and
the root of all justification.”(846) Supernatural faith, therefore, is the
beginning of salvation, and not, as Harnack makes Luther say, “at once the
beginning, the middle, and the end,” because no man can be converted
unless he has believingly embraced God as his final goal. This faith is
preceded by certain preliminary conditions, of which the first is an
illumination of the intellect and a strengthening of the will, which
results in the _affectus credulitatis_ (_initia fidei_). For justifying
faith does not flash forth suddenly, like a _deus ex machina_, but
requires time for its development, as the history of many conversions
proves.(847)

Faith is called the “foundation” of justification because it not only
marks its beginning, but constitutes the basis upon which all subsequent
stages of the process rest. To exclude the mistaken notion that the
process of justification is a series of mechanical and disconnected acts,
the Council calls faith the “root” of justification, from which the other
preparatory acts spring organically, as the trunk of a tree from its root.

The psychological description of the whole process given by the Tridentine
Fathers, which even Harnack admits to be “a masterly piece of work,” runs
as follows: “Now they [adults] are disposed unto justice when, excited and
assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith by hearing, they are freely
moved towards God, believing those things to be true which God has
revealed and promised,—and this especially, that God justifies the impious
by His grace through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ; and when,
understanding themselves to be sinners, they, by turning themselves from
the fear of divine justice, whereby they are profitably agitated, to
consider the mercy of God, are raised unto hope, confiding that God will
be propitious to them for Christ’s sake; and they begin to love Him as the
fountain of all justice, and are therefore moved against sins by a certain
hatred and detestation, to wit: by that penitence which must be performed
before Baptism; lastly, when they purpose to receive Baptism, to begin a
new life, and to keep the commandments of God....”(848) The four ordinary
stages in the process of justification, therefore, are: (1) From faith to
fear of divine justice; (2) from fear to hope; (3) from hope to initial
love;(849) (4) from initial love to contrition and a firm purpose of
amendment.(850) If contrition is dictated and transfused by perfect
love,(851) and the sinner has an explicit or at least implicit desire for
the Sacrament,(852) justification takes place at once. If, on the other
hand, the sinner’s sorrow is imperfect (_attritio_), he attains
justification only by actual reception of the Sacrament (Baptism or
Penance).(853)

b) Does conversion always follow this conciliary schema? No. The Council
did not mean to define that these acts must follow one another in strict
sequence or that they are one and all absolutely indispensable for
justification. It is certain, however, that the process invariably begins
with faith and ends with contrition accompanied by a firm purpose of
amendment. In exceptional cases (_e.g._ the Prodigal Son, Mary Magdalen)
perfect charity seems immediately to follow faith, and may then be said
virtually to include the intermediate stages of fear, hope, and
contrition. Yet this is not the usual way. Ordinarily faith elicits fear,
which in turn produces two kinds of hope—hope of forgiveness (_spes
veniae_) and hope in God (_spes theologica_), which marks the beginning of
charity (_amor concupiscentiae_). Contrition is always a _conditio sine
qua non_, because there can be no forgiveness of sin without sorrow for
it.(854) It is for this reason that, according to St. Thomas, explicit
contrition for mortal sins is necessary for justification even when there
is perfect charity, and the sufficiency of the so-called _poenitentia
virtualis_ is limited to venial offenses and such grievous sins as cannot
be remembered.(855) Fear, while not absolutely indispensable, is seldom
absent. Holy Scripture tells us that “the fear of God is the beginning of
wisdom,” and it is natural for the sinner seeking forgiveness to detest
his sins out of fear of divine justice before he attains to the motive of
perfect charity.(856)

c) Certain utterances of Scripture and the Fathers with regard to the
possibility of a “dead” faith(857) have led theologians to distinguish
between _fides informis_ and _fides formata_. _Fides informis_ is a dead
faith, devoid of charity, and without justifying power. The only faith
that can justify a man is that which is animated by charity and productive
of good works.(858) This is the _fides formata_ of the Schoolmen, which
includes all the preparatory acts enumerated by the Tridentine Council,
from fear to perfect charity. These acts, however, though united in the
_fides formata_, retain their respective independence, and can disappear
singly, one after another, as they came. Zwingli’s assertion that faith,
hope, and charity are identical, or at least inseparable, has been
expressly condemned by the Tridentine Council: “If any one saith that,
grace being lost through sin, faith also is always lost with it; or that
the faith which remains, though it be no live faith, is not a true faith;
or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian; let him be
anathema.”(859)

READINGS:—Besides the respective chapters in the various
text-books, the student may consult: *A. Vega, _De Iustificatione
Doctrina Universa Libris XV Absolute Tradita_, Venice 1548
(reprinted at Cologne, 1572).—*Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione
Impii_, 1. V (ed. Fèvre, Vol. VI, pp. 149 sqq. Paris
1873).—*Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. VI sqq.—Becanus, _Theol.
Scholast._, “_De Gratia Habituali_,” Rouen 1658.—L. Nussbaum, _Die
Lehre der kath. Kirche über die Rechtfertigung_, München 1837.—C.
von Schätzler, _Neue Untersuchungen über das Dogma von der Gnade
und das Wesen des christl. Glaubens_, Mainz 1867.—Oswald, _Die
Lehre von der Heiligung_, § 5, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.—B.
Bartmann, _St. Paulus und St. Jakobus und die Rechtfertigung_,
Freiburg 1897.—L. Galey, _La Foi et les Oeuvres_, Montauban
1902.—W. Liese, _Der heilsnotwendige Glaube, sein Begriff und
Inhalt_, Freiburg 1902.—Card. Newman, _Lectures on the Doctrine of
Justification_, 8th impression, London 1900.—Hugh Pope, O. P.,
art. “Faith” in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. V.—J. Mausbach,
_Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists_ (tr. by A. M.
Buchanan), pp. 150 sqq., New York 1914.—L. Labauche, S. S., _God
and Man_, pp. 203 sqq., N. Y. 1916.

On the teaching of the Reformers cfr. *Möhler, _Symbolik_, § 18
sqq., 11th ed., Mainz 1890 (English tr. by James Burton Robertson,
pp. 82 sqq., 5th ed., London 1906); Ad. Harnack, _Lehrbuch der
Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. III, 4th ed., Freiburg 1910;
Denifle-Weiss, O. P., _Luther und Luthertum in der ersten
Entwicklung_, Vol. II, Mainz 1909; H. Grisar, S. J., _Luther_,
Vol. I, Freiburg 1911 (English tr., Vols. I and II, London 1913).

Chapter II. The State Of Justification

Though the term “justification” may be extended to the preparatory acts
that lead up to the state of justice, strictly speaking it signifies only
that decisive moment in which the sinner is cleansed from mortal sin by an
infusion of sanctifying grace. Hence a careful distinction must be made
between justification as an act (_actus iustificationis_) and
justification as an habitual state (_habitus iustificationis s. status
gratiae sanctificantis_). The transient act introduces a permanent state,
just as the Sacrament of Holy Orders constitutes a man in the sacerdotal
state or priesthood.

Both as an act and as a state justification possesses three distinct
properties; it is uncertain, unequal, and capable of being lost.

This gives us the basis for a division of the present Chapter into three
Sections: (1) On the Nature of Justification, (2) On Justifying, _i.e._
Sanctifying Grace, and (3) On the Properties of that Grace.

Section 1. The Nature Of Justification

Justification in the active sense (_iustificatio_, δικαίωσις) is defined
by the Tridentine Council as “a translation from that state wherein man is
born a child of the first Adam, to the state of grace and of the adoption
of the sons of God through the second Adam, Jesus Christ, our
Saviour.”(860)

Justification, therefore, has both a negative and a positive element. The
positive element is interior sanctification through the merits of Jesus
Christ. The negative element consists in the forgiveness of sin. Though
these elements are objectively inseparable, the forgiveness of sin being
practically an effect of interior sanctification, yet we must treat them
separately in order to be able to refute more effectively the Lutheran
heresy that sin is not wiped out but merely “covered,” and that
justification consists in an external “imputation” of the righteousness of
Christ.

Article 1. The Negative Element Of Justification

1. THE HERESY OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMERS AND THE TEACHING OF THE
CHURCH.—Luther held that human nature was radically depraved by original
sin(861) and that justification consists in this, that sin (original and
mortal) is no longer “imputed” to the sinner; that is to say, it is not
blotted out but merely “covered” by the merits of Christ.

a) Forgiveness of sins, therefore, according to Luther, consists simply in
their being no longer imputed.(862) This heresy was incorporated in the
Formula of Concord and other symbolical books of the Lutheran Church,(863)
and subsequently adopted by Calvin.(864)

b) The Catholic Church has always maintained that justification is a
renewal of the soul by which a man’s sins are blotted out and he becomes
truly just. This applies first of all to original sin. “If,” says the
Council of Trent, “anyone denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus
Christ, which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is
remitted, or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and
proper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only raised or
not imputed, let him be anathema.”(865) What it here defines in regard to
original sin, the Council elsewhere reaffirms in respect of mortal
sin.(866)

2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY.—The theory thus solemnly condemned
by the Tridentine Fathers is unscriptural and opposed to Catholic
Tradition.

a) The teaching of the Bible on this point may be reduced to four distinct
heads.

(1) The remission of sin granted in the process of justification is a real
annihilation of guilt; that is to say, the sins remitted cease to exist in
the moral (though not, of course, in the historical) order. Cfr. Ps. L, 3:
“Have mercy on me, O God, according to thy great mercy; and according to
the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my iniquity.”(867) Is. XLIII,
25: “I am he that blot out thy iniquities.”(868) After God has blotted out
a sin, it no longer exists. Cfr. Is. XLIV, 22: “I have blotted out thy
iniquities as a cloud, and thy sins as a mist.”(869) Acts III, 19: “Be
penitent, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted
out.”(870) Elsewhere God is said to “take away” sin. Cfr. 2 Kings XII, 13:
“The Lord also hath taken away thy sin.”(871) 1 Paral. XXI, 8: “I beseech
thee, take away the iniquity of thy servant.”(872) When He takes away sin,
it is really and truly blotted out. Cfr. Mich. VII, 18 sq.: “Who is a God
like to thee, who takest away iniquity?... He will put away our
iniquities, and he will cast all our sins into the bottom of the
sea.”(873) Ps. X, 15: “His sin shall be sought, and shall not be
found.”(874) Ps. CII, 12: “As far as the east is from the west, so far
hath he removed our iniquities from us.”(875) Consequently, when our
Divine Saviour said of Mary Magdalen: “Many sins are forgiven her,”(876)
He meant that her sins were completely blotted out and taken away.

(2) Justification washes the soul from iniquity and purifies the heart.
Cfr. Ps. L, 4: “Wash me yet more from my iniquity, and cleanse me from my
sin.”(877) Is. I, 16: “Wash yourselves, be clean.”(878) After one’s sins
are washed away, the heart is clean and pure. Cfr. Ez. XXXVI, 25 sq.: “And
I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your
filthiness, ... and I will give you a new heart.”(879) 1 Cor. VI, 11: “And
such [fornicators, etc.] some of you were; but you are washed, but you are
sanctified, but you are justified.”(880) Spotless purity takes the place
of the impurity that previously defiled the soul of the sinner. Cfr. Ps.
L, 9: “Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed: thou
shalt wash me, and I shall be made whiter than snow.”(881) Is. I, 18: “If
your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made as white as snow: and if they
be red as crimson, they shall be white as wool.”(882) No trace of sin
remains in the soul after it has been washed in the Precious Blood of
Christ. Apoc. I, 5: “... Jesus Christ, ... hath loved us, and washed us
from our sins in his own blood.”(883) 1 John I, 7: “... the blood of Jesus
Christ ... cleanseth us from all sin.”(884)

(3) Justification is an awakening of the sinner from death to life, a
transition from darkness to light. Cfr. 1 John III, 14: “We know that we
have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren; he that
loveth not, abideth in death.”(885) Col. II, 13: “And you, when you were
dead in your sins, ... he hath quickened together with him, forgiving you
all offences.”(886) Eph. V, 8: “For you were heretofore darkness, but now
light in the Lord.”(887)

(4) Baptism, in particular, completely removes all guilt. Cfr. Acts XXII,
16: “Rise up, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins.”(888) Hence, though
concupiscence remains, the soul has no longer in it anything damnable,
_i.e._ any trace of original or mortal sin. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 1: “There is
now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.”(889)

It requires no special acuteness to perceive that this Biblical teaching
is irreconcilably opposed to the Protestant theory of non-imputation. If,
as the Lutherans allege, God merely _declared_ the believer just,
justification would not blot out or take away sin, nor could it be
truthfully said that light and life take the place of death and darkness;
something deserving of condemnation would still remain in those that are
in Christ Jesus.(890)

There are a few Scriptural texts that seem to favor the Lutheran view, but
they must be interpreted in conformity with the general teaching of the
Bible as outlined above. Among these texts is Ps. XXXI, 1 sq.: “Blessed
are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.
Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin, and in whose
spirit there is no guile.”(891) The parallelism apparent in this verse
allows us to conclude that “covered” is used in the sense of “remitted”
and that “he to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin” is identical with the
man “in whose spirit there is no guile.” The text manifestly refers to a
real _forgiveness_ of sins, for any sin that God “covers” and ceases to
“impute,” must be blotted out and swept away, because “all things are
naked and open to the eyes” of the omniscient Creator.(892)

Another favorite text of the Lutheran theologians is Rom. VII, 17: “Now
then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.”(893) This
passage clearly refers to concupiscence, which remains in the sinner after
justification, but, according to Rom. VIII, 1 and James I, 14 sq., is not
truly and properly sin but merely called “sin”(894) by metonymy,
“because,” in the words of the Tridentine Council, “it is of sin and
inclines to sin.”(895)

b) The Fathers of the Church, both Greek and Latin, unanimously teach that
justification effects the forgiveness of sins.

St. Justin Martyr says: “By doing penance, all who desire it can obtain
mercy from God, and Scripture calls them blessed in saying: ‘Blessed is he
to whom God hath not imputed sin,’ which means that he receives
forgiveness of his sins from God, not as you, deceiving yourselves, and
others like you aver, that God does not impute [their] sin to them, though
they are [still] sinners.”(896) Clement of Alexandria likens Baptism to “a
bath in which sins are washed off.”(897) St. Gregory Nazianzen says: “It
is called Baptism [βαπτισμός, from βάπτειν, to immerse] because the sin is
buried in water, ... and a bath (λουτρόν), because it washes off.”(898)
St. Augustine indignantly opposes the erroneous opinion of the Pelagians
that Baptism does not take away sins but merely “trims them off.” “Who but
an unbeliever,” he exclaims, “can affirm this against the Pelagians? We
say, therefore, that Baptism gives remission of all sins and takes away
crimes, not merely trims them off (_radere_) in such wise that the roots
of all sins may be preserved in an evil flesh, as of hair trimmed on the
head, when the sins cut down may grow again.”(899) Pope St. Gregory the
Great seems almost to have foreseen the heresy of the Protestant
Reformers, for he says: “But if there are any who say that in Baptism sins
are forgiven as to outward appearance only, what can be more un-Catholic
than such preaching?... He who says that sins are not completely forgiven
in Baptism might as well say that the Egyptians did not perish in the Red
Sea. But if he admits that the Egyptians actually died [in the Red Sea],
let him also admit that of necessity sins completely die in Baptism.”(900)

c) The theological argument may be briefly formulated as follows: We can
imagine but two reasons why God should not truly forgive us our sins in
the process of justification: inability and unwillingness. To say that He
is _unable_ to forgive us our sins would be to assert that the remission
of sin involves a metaphysical impossibility. This no Protestant will
admit, because all believe that “nothing defiled shall enter into
heaven.”(901) To assert that God is _unwilling_ to forgive our sins would
be to contradict the plain teaching of Scripture, as set forth above.
Consequently there is no reason whatever for assuming that God does not
truly forgive us our sins in the process of justification. Furthermore, it
would be incompatible with His veracity and holiness to assume that He
merely declares the sinner to be “free from sin,” without actually
cleansing his soul. It would be a contradiction to assert that a man whom
the truthful and all-holy God has declared free from sin, remains steeped
in iniquity. Cfr. Prov. XVII, 15: “He that justifieth the wicked [_i.e._
absolves him from his sins], and he that condemneth the just, both are
abominable before God.”

According to Revelation the justification of the sinner is not a mere
change, with a privation for its _terminus a quo_(902) and an indifferent
form for its _terminus ad quem_, but involves a movement from extreme to
extreme, and hence the genesis of the one extreme must coincide with the
destruction of the other. Sin, being in contrary opposition to
righteousness, must depart when righteousness enters the soul.(903)

Article 2. The Positive Element Of Justification

1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE CHURCH.—Calvin held that justification
consists essentially and exclusively in the remission of sins.(904) The
other “Reformers” maintained that there must also be a positive element in
the process, but differed in determining its nature.

a) The ambiguous language employed by Luther and Melanchthon gave rise to
many different opinions, which agreed only in one point, that is, in
holding, contrary to Catholic teaching, that the positive element of
justification is not inward sanctification or inherent righteousness
(_i.e._ sanctifying grace). Probably the view most common among the
supporters of the Augsburg Confession was that the sinner, by a “fiduciary
apprehension” of God’s mercy, as proclaimed in the Gospel, “apprehends”
the extrinsic justice of Christ, and with it covers his sins, which are
thereupon no longer “imputed” to him. In other words, he is outwardly
accounted and declared righteous in the sight of God, though inwardly he
remains a sinner. With the exception of “_sola fides_” there was probably
no shibboleth in the sixteenth century so persistently dinned into the
ears of Catholics and Protestants alike as “_iustitia Christi extra nos_.”
It is found in the _Apologia_ written in defence of the Augsburg
Confession(905) and recurs in the Formula of Concord.(906) According to
the “orthodox” Lutheran view, therefore, justification on its positive
side is a purely forensic and outward imputation of the righteousness of
Christ, which the sinner seizes with the arm of faith and puts on like a
cloak to hide the wounds of his soul.(907)

b) Against this dismal heresy the Tridentine Council solemnly declared
that “Justification ... is not remission of sins merely, but also the
sanctification and renewal of the inward man through the voluntary
reception of the grace and of the gifts,”(908) and anathematized all those
who say that “men are justified either by the sole imputation of the
justice of Christ or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of
the grace and the charity which is poured forth in their hearts by the
Holy Ghost and is inherent in them, or even that the grace whereby we are
justified is only the favor of God.”(909)

In thus defining the doctrine of the Church, the Council did not, however,
mean to deny that the sinner is in a true sense “justified by the justice
of Christ,”—in so far namely, as our Lord has merited for us the grace of
justification. He merely wished to emphasize the fact that a sinner is not
_formaliter_ justified by the imputation of Christ’s justice. For the sake
of greater clearness the various “causes” of justification are enumerated
as follows: “Of this justification the causes are these: the final cause
indeed is the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, and life everlasting;
while the efficient cause is a merciful God, who washes and sanctifies
gratuitously; ... but the meritorious cause is His most beloved
only-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, who ... merited justification
for us by His most holy Passion on the wood of the Cross; ... the
instrumental cause is the Sacrament of Baptism, which is the sacrament of
faith, without which no man was ever justified; lastly, the sole formal
cause is the justice of God, not that whereby He Himself is just, but that
whereby He maketh us just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed are
renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reputed, but are truly
called, and are, just.”(910)

So important did the distinction between the _causa meritoria_ and the
_causa formalis_ of justification appear to the Fathers of Trent, that
they made it the subject of a separate canon, to wit: “If anyone saith
that men are just without the justice of Christ, whereby He merited for us
to be justified; or that it is by that justice itself that they are
formally just; let him be anathema.”(911) Justification in the Catholic
sense, therefore, is not a mere outward imputation of the justice of
Christ, but a true inward renewal and sanctification wrought by a grace
intrinsically inhering in the soul. This grace theologians call the “grace
of justification.”

2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY OF IMPUTATION.—Nothing is so foreign
to both the spirit and the letter of Holy Scripture as the idea that
justification merely covers a man’s sins with a cloak of justice and
leaves him unsanctified within.

Justification is described in the Bible not only as a remission of
sins,(912) but likewise as the beginning of a new life,(913) a renewal of
the spirit,(914) a new creation,(915) a regeneration,(916) a supernatural
likeness of God,(917) etc. All these similes point to a permanent state of
sanctity in the soul of the just.

α) The Lutheran theory of imputation can be most effectively refuted by an
analysis of the Scriptural term “regeneration” (_regeneratio_,
ἀναγέννησις, παλιγγενεσία). “Unless a man be born again of water and the
Holy Ghost,” says our Divine Lord, “he cannot enter into the kingdom of
God.”(918) This spiritual rebirth wipes out sin and inwardly sanctifies
the soul. The regenerate sinner receives a new and godlike nature. That
this nature can be conceived in no other way than as a state of sanctity
and justice appears clearly from Tit. III, 5 sqq.: “Not by the works of
justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us, by
the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, whom he hath
poured forth upon us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour: that,
being justified by His grace, we may be heirs, according to the hope of
life everlasting.”(919) Both text and context show that the Apostle is
here speaking of the justification of adult sinners in Baptism, which he
describes as a “laver of regeneration and renovation” resulting in an
“outpouring of the Holy Ghost.” These phrases plainly denote a positive
quality of the soul as well as a permanent interior grace. Regeneration
consists in the remission of sin through Baptism, and also, more
particularly, in man being made like God, _i.e._ becoming a child of
God,(920) while “renovation” means “putting off the old man”(921) and
“putting on the new.”(922) The “outpouring of the Holy Ghost” effected by
Baptism is not, of course, an outpouring of the Hypostasis of the Third
Person of the Trinity, but of created grace, which re-forms the sinner and
makes him just.(923) This justifying grace must not be conceived as an
actual grace, much less as a series of actual graces, for it is not given
us merely as an aid in the performance of some particular act, but as a
new nature. Regeneration and renovation denote a state of being, as we can
plainly see in the case of baptized infants. It is for this reason that
the Apostle speaks of it as a lasting state;—that which theologians call
the _status gratiae sanctificantis_.(924)

Closely akin to the notion of “regeneration” is that of “re-creation.”
Justification renews the sinner inwardly and makes of him, so to speak, a
new creature, which has sloughed off sin and become just and holy in the
sight of God. Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 17: “If then any be in Christ a new creature,
the old things are passed away, behold all things are made new.”(925) This
is all the more true since re-creation effects an “incorporation of man
with Christ,” and is closely connected with “regeneration of God.” Cfr.
James I, 18: “For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of
truth, that we might be some beginning of his creature.”(926) A comparison
with Gal. VI, 15 and Gal. V, 6 fully establishes it as a Biblical truth
that in the process of justification the sinner, through faith informed by
charity, is changed into a new creature. “For in Christ Jesus,” says St.
Paul, “neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a
new creature.”(927) And again: “In Christ Jesus neither circumcision
availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith that worketh by
charity.”(928) In both these texts the Jewish rite of circumcision is
rejected as useless and contrasted with justification, which by means of
the _fides formata_ gives birth to a “new creature.” This is incompatible
with the Protestant notion that a man is justified by being declared
righteous in the sight of God, though he remains inwardly unchanged.(929)

β) The Lutherans vainly appeal to the fact that Holy Scripture employs the
word “justify”(930) for the purpose of declaring a man to be just in a
purely forensic sense, as in Is. V, 23: “Who justify the wicked for
gifts.” This proves nothing against the Catholic doctrine, which is based
entirely on texts that exclude the judicial meaning of the term and
plainly refer to inward sanctification.(931)

The word “justification” also occurs in two other meanings in the Bible.
Ps. CXVIII, 8 and 26 it stands in the plural for the “law”: “I will keep
thy justifications;”(932) and “Teach me thy justifications.”(933) Apoc.
XXII, 11 and in a few other passages it signifies “growth” in interior
holiness, which theologians call _iustificatio secunda_.(934)

The Lutherans are equally unfortunate in maintaining that St. Paul
countenances their theory when he speaks of “putting on Christ.” Cfr. Gal.
III, 27: “For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on
Christ.”(935) The Apostle in employing this simile does not mean to say
that justification consists in putting on an outward cloak of grace to
cover sins which inwardly endure, but precisely the contrary, _viz._: that
the sinner by being justified is inwardly cleansed from sin and becomes a
new creature and a child of God. This interpretation is supported by
various parallel texts(936) and by the staple of St. Paul’s teaching.

Another passage which the Lutherans cite in their favor is 1 Cor. I, 30:
“... who [Christ Jesus] of God is made unto us wisdom, and justice, and
sanctification, and redemption.”(937) Christ is made unto us justice and
sanctification, in what sense? Manifestly in the same sense in which He is
made unto us wisdom of God, that is to say, in so far as He imparts to us
wisdom, which thereupon becomes our own, but not in the sense that the
wisdom of Christ is outwardly imputed to us. Note that St. Paul in this
and many other passages of his Epistles merely wishes to emphasize the
gratuity of the Redemption and of grace to the exclusion of all natural
merit on the part of man.(938)

b) As regards the teaching of the Fathers, the “Reformers” themselves
admitted that it was against them.(939)

We read in the Epistle of Barnabas, which was probably composed about A.
D. 100:(940) “Since then He made us new by the remission of sins, he made
us another type, that we should have the soul of children, as though He
were creating us afresh.”

The reason why St. Paul calls Baptism the “laver of regeneration” rather
than the laver of forgiveness, is explained by St. John Chrysostom(941) as
follows: “Because it [Baptism] not only remits our sins and wipes out our
misdeeds, but accomplishes all this in such a way as if we were born
anew;(942) for it entirely re-creates and re-forms us.”(943)

St. Ambrose regards innocence as the positive element of justification:
“After this [_i.e._ Baptism] you received a white robe, to indicate that
you stripped off the vesture of sin and put on the chaste garments of
innocence.”(944)

Harnack claims that St. Augustine first stemmed the current dogmatic
tradition and reshaped it by going back to St. Paul. Bellarmine(945)
refuted this audacious assertion long before it was rehashed by the German
rationalist. The Council of Trent was so thoroughly imbued with the
teaching of Augustine that its decrees and canons on justification read as
though they were lifted bodily from his writings. The great “Doctor of
Grace” flatly contradicts the Protestant theory of imputation in such
utterances as these: “He [St. Paul] does not say, ‘the righteousness of
man,’ ... but ‘the righteousness of God,’—meaning not that whereby He is
Himself righteous, but that with which He endows man when He justifies the
ungodly.... The righteousness of God is by faith of Jesus Christ, that is,
by the faith wherewith one believes in Christ. For _here_ is not meant the
faith with which Christ Himself believes, just as _there_ was not meant
the righteousness whereby God is Himself righteous. Both no doubt are
ours; but yet they are called [in one case] God’s, and [in the other]
Christ’s, because it is by their bounty that these gifts are bestowed upon
man.”(946) Again: “When righteousness is given to us, it is not called our
own righteousness, but God’s, because it becomes ours only so that we have
it from God.”(947) Again: “The grace of God is called the righteousness of
God through our Lord Jesus Christ, not that by which the Lord is just, but
that by which He justifies those whom from unrighteous He makes
righteous.”(948) Again: “The love of God is said to be shed abroad in our
hearts, not because He loves us, but because He makes us lovers of
Himself; just as the righteousness of God is used in the sense of our
being made righteous by His gift.”(949) According to St. Augustine,
therefore, justification culminates in a true sanctification of the soul.
“When he [St. Paul] says: ‘We are transformed into the same image,’ he
assuredly means to speak of the image of God; and by calling it ‘the
same,’ he means that very image which we see in the glass,... and that we
pass from a form that is obscure to a form that is bright,... and this
[human] nature, being the most excellent among things created, is changed
from a form that is defaced into a form that is beautiful, when it is
justified by its Creator from ungodliness.”(950)

The Augustinian passages which we have quoted (and they are not by any
means all that could be quoted) enumerate the distinguishing marks of
sanctifying grace in so far as it is the formal cause of
justification.(951)

c) The argument from Revelation can be reinforced by certain philosophical
considerations which show the absurdity of the imputation theory from the
standpoint of common sense.

A man outwardly justified but inwardly a sinner would be a moral monster,
and Almighty God would be guilty of an intrinsic contradiction were He to
regard and treat such a one as just. This contradiction is not removed but
rather intensified by the Lutheran appeal to the extraneous justice of
Christ.(952)

The incongruity of the Lutheran doctrine of justification becomes fully
apparent from the consequences which it involves, to wit: (1) all
Christians without distinction would possess exactly the same degree of
sanctity and justice; (2) justification once obtained by fiduciary faith
could not be lost except by the sin of unbelief; and (3) children would
not be justified by Baptism because they are not sufficiently advanced in
the use of reason to enable them to “apprehend” the external righteousness
of Christ. The first of these inferences runs counter to common sense and
experience. The second, which Luther clothed in the shameful exhortation,
“_Pecca fortiter et crede fortius et nihil nocebunt centum homicidia et
mille stupra_,”(953) is repugnant to the teaching of Scripture and
destructive of morality.(954) The third consistently led to the rejection
of infant baptism by the Anabaptists, the Mennonites, and other Protestant
sects.

3. SANCTIFYING GRACE THE SOLE FORMAL CAUSE OF JUSTIFICATION.—In declaring
that “inherent grace” is the “sole formal cause of justification,” the
Council of Trent(955) defined it as an article of faith that sanctifying
grace of itself is able to produce all the formal effects of
justification, _e.g._ forgiveness of sins, the sanctification of the
sinner, his adoption by God, etc.,(956) and consequently requires no
supplementary or contributory causes. In other words, justification is
wholly and fully accomplished by the infusion of sanctifying grace.

a) It appears from the discussions preceding its sixth session that the
Tridentine Council not only meant to condemn the heretical contention of
Butzer that “inherent grace” must be supplemented by the “imputed justice
of Christ” as the really essential factor of justification,(957) but also
wished to reject the view of divers contemporary Catholic theologians(958)
that “intrinsic righteousness” is inadequate to effect justification
without a special _favor Dei externus_.(959) In this the Fathers of the
Council were on Scriptural ground. The principal effects of
justification,—forgiveness of sins and internal sanctification,—are both
produced by sanctifying grace. Sacred Scripture is perfectly clear on this
point. It represents sin as opposed to grace in the same way in which
darkness is opposed to light,(960) life to death,(961) the new man to the
old.(962) The one necessarily excludes the other. Sanctifying grace and
sin cannot co-exist in the same subject.

Internal sanctification may be defined as a permanent, vital union with
God, by which the soul becomes righteous and holy in His sight and obtains
a claim to Heaven. That this is also a function of sanctifying grace
appears from those Scriptural texts which treat of the positive element of
justification.(963) With this doctrine Tradition is in perfect accord, and
consequently the Fathers of Trent were right in teaching as they did, in
fact they could not have taught otherwise.(964)

b) While all Catholic theologians admit the incompatibility of grace and
sin in the same subject, they differ as to the kind and degree of
opposition existing between the two. Some hold that this opposition is
purely moral, others that it is physical, again others that it is
metaphysical.

α) Nominalists(965) and Scotists(966) before the Tridentine decision
maintained that the distinction between sanctifying grace and (original or
mortal) sin is based on a free decree of the Almighty, and therefore
purely moral. God, they held, by a _favor externus superadditus_,
externally supplies what sanctifying grace internally lacks, just as a
government’s stamp raises the value of a coin beyond the intrinsic worth
of the bullion. Followed to its legitimate conclusions, this shallow
theory means that sanctifying grace is of itself insufficient to wipe out
sin, and that, but for the superadded divine favor, grace and sin might
co-exist in the soul. This is tantamount to saying that justification
requires a twofold formal cause, _viz._: sanctifying grace and a _favor
Dei superadditus_,—which runs counter to the teaching of Trent. Henno
tries to escape this objection by explaining that the _favor Dei
acceptans_ appertains not to the formal but merely to the efficient cause
of justification. But this contention is manifestly untenable. Sanctifying
grace is either able to wipe out sin, or it is unable: if it is unable to
produce this effect, the _favor Dei acceptans_ must be part of the _causa
formalis_ of justification, and then, in Henno’s hypothesis, we should
have a _duplex causa formalis_, which contradicts the Tridentine decree.
If, on the other hand, sanctifying grace is able to wipe out sin without
any _favor superadditus_, then the Scotistic theory has no _raison
d’être_.

β) From what we have said it follows that there must be at least a
physical contrariety between grace and sin. The difference between
physical and metaphysical opposition may be illustrated by the example of
fire and water. These two elements are incompatible by a law of nature.
But as there is no metaphysical contradiction between them, Almighty God
could conceivably bring them together. It is this physical kind of
opposition that Suarez and a few of his followers assume to exist between
grace and sin. Absolutely speaking, they say, there is no intrinsic
contradiction in the assumption that God could preserve the physical
entity of sanctifying grace in a soul guilty of mortal sin.(967) In so far
as this school admits the existence of an internal opposition, which
actually prevents original or mortal sin from ever co-existing in the soul
with justifying grace, its teaching may be said to be acceptable to all
Catholic theologians. The Scotistic view, on account of its
incompatibility with the teaching of the Tridentine Council, is no longer
held.

It may be questioned, however, whether Suarez goes far enough in this
matter, and whether the opposition between grace and sin could really be
overcome by a miracle. The simultaneous co-existence of grace and sin
seems to involve an absolute, _i.e._ metaphysical, contradiction.

γ) This is what the Thomists maintain with the majority of Jesuit
theologians.(968) As some subtle objections have been raised against this
view, it cannot be accepted as theologically certain; but it undoubtedly
corresponds better than its opposite to the spirit and letter of
Scripture. The Bible, as we have already pointed out, likens the
opposition existing between grace and sin to that between life and
death,(969) justice and injustice, Christ and Belial, God and an
idol.(970) But these are contradictories, _ergo_.(971) The same conclusion
can be reached by arguing from the character of sanctifying grace as a
_participatio divinae naturae_.(972) If grace is a participation in the
divine nature, it must be opposed to sin in the same way in which God
Himself is opposed to it. Now God as the All-Holy One is metaphysically
opposed to sin; consequently, the same kind of opposition must exist
between sanctifying grace and sin.

It is alleged against this teaching that between habitual grace and
habitual sin there is merely a disparate opposition, _i.e._ that of a
physical to a moral form, the concepts of which are not mutually
exclusive. But sanctifying grace is more than a physical ornament of the
soul; it is an ethical form which has for its essential function to render
the soul holy and righteous in the sight of God.(973)

READINGS:—St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 113, and the
commentators, especially Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 7, art. 1
sqq.; *Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, l. II (_Opera Omnia_, ed.
Fèvre, Vol. VI, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1873).

Besides the current text-books cfr. *Jos. Wieser, _S. Pauli
Apostoli Doctrina de Iustificatione_, Trent 1874; H. Th. Simar,
_Die Theologie des hl. Paulus_, 2nd ed., §33 sqq. Freiburg 1883.

On the Protestant notion of justification cfr. Möhler, _Symbolik_,
§10 sqq., Mainz 1890 (Robertson’s translation, pp. 82 sqq., 5th
ed., London 1906); _Realenzyklopädie für prot. Theologie_, Vol.
XVI, 3rd ed., pp. 482 sqq., Leipzig 1905 (summarized in English in
the _New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge_, Vol.
VI, pp. 275 sqq., New York 1910); Card. Newman, _Lectures on the
Doctrine of Justification_, 8th impression, London 1900; J.
Mausbach, _Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists_, New York
1914, pp. 150 sqq.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of
Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 246 sqq., 464 sq., 470 sqq.

Section 2. Justifying Or Sanctifying Grace

Sanctifying grace is defined by Deharbe as “an unmerited, supernatural
gift, imparted to the soul by the Holy Ghost, by which we are made just,
children of God, and heirs of Heaven.” As it makes sinners just,
sanctifying grace is also called justifying, though this appellation can
not be applied to the sanctification of our first parents in Paradise or
to that of the angels and the sinless soul of Christ. Justification, as we
have shown, consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace, and hence it is
important that we obtain a correct idea of the latter. We will therefore
consider (1) The Nature of Sanctifying Grace, (2) Its Effects in the Soul,
and (3) Its Supernatural Concomitants.

Article 1. The Nature Of Sanctifying Grace

1. SANCTIFYING GRACE A “PERMANENT QUALITY” OF THE SOUL.—Having no
intuitive knowledge of sanctifying grace, we are obliged, in order to
obtain an idea of its true nature, to study its effects, as made known to
us by Revelation. Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Church do,
however, enable us to form certain well-defined conclusions, of which the
most important is that sanctifying grace must be conceived as a permanent
quality (_qualitas permanens_) of the soul. If it is a permanent quality,
sanctifying grace cannot be identical with actual grace or with “uncreated
grace,” _i.e._ the Person of the Holy Ghost.

a) In conformity with such Biblical expressions as “the new life,”
“renovation of the spirit,” “regeneration,” “divine sonship,” etc., the
Council of Trent defines justifying grace as a supernatural something
“infused” into and “inherent” in the soul. Both ideas denote a permanent
state, not a mere transient act or the result of such acts. “The charity
of God is poured forth by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those that are
justified, and is inherent therein.”(974) “That justice which is called
ours, because we are justified from its being inherent in us, that same is
(the justice of God) because it is infused into us by God, through the
merit of Christ.”(975) “If any one saith that men are justified ... to the
exclusion of the grace and the charity which is poured forth in their
hearts by the Holy Ghost and is inherent in them,... let him be
anathema.”(976) Hence Justification is defined by the Fathers of Trent as
“a translation ... to the state of grace and adoption of the sons of
God.”(977)

Before the Tridentine Council a number of theologians held that
sanctifying grace consists in some particular actual grace or in a
consecutive series of actual graces. This view is incompatible with the
definition just quoted; in fact Suarez, Bellarmine, Ripalda, and others
regard it as positively heretical or at least intolerably rash. During the
preliminary debates at Trent some of the Fathers asked for an express
declaration of the Council to the effect that justification is wrought by
the instrumentality of an infused habit; but their request was set aside
on the ground that the nature of justifying grace as a stable habit is
sufficiently indicated by the word “_inhaeret_.”(978)

That sanctifying grace is a permanent state of the soul may also be
inferred from the Catholic teaching that the grace which Baptism imparts
to children does not differ essentially from that which it imparts to
adults. True, this teaching was not always regarded as certain;(979) but
at the Ecumenical Council of Vienne, A. D. 1311, Pope Clement V declared
it to be “the more probable opinion,”(980) and it was rendered absolutely
certain by the Tridentine decision that infant Baptism results not only in
the remission of sins, but likewise in an infusion of sanctifying grace.
This being so, there can be no essential difference between the
justification of children and that of adults. Now it cannot be actual
grace which renders children righteous in the sight of God, for they are
unable to avail themselves of actual grace on account of the undeveloped
state of their intellect. The grace that Baptism imparts to them is
consequently a _gratia inhaerens et informans_, that is, a permanent state
of grace; and it must be the same in adults.(981)

Peter Lombard(982) identified sanctifying grace with the _gratia
increata_, _i.e._ the Person of the Holy Ghost. This notion was combatted
by St. Thomas(983) and implicitly rejected by the Tridentine Council when
it declared that sanctifying grace inheres in the soul and may be
increased by good works.(984) To say that the Holy Ghost is poured forth
in the hearts of men, or that He may be increased by good works, would
evidently savor of Pantheism. The Holy Ghost pours forth sanctifying grace
and is consequently not the formal but the efficient cause of
justification.(985)

b) The _gratia inhaerens permanens_ is not a mere relation or _denominatio
extrinseca_, but a positive entity productive of real effects,(986) and
must consequently be conceived either as a substance or as an accident. We
have shown that it is not identical with the uncreated substance of the
Holy Ghost. Neither can it be a created substance. The idea of an
intrinsically supernatural created substance involves a
contradiction.(987) Moreover, sanctifying grace in its nature and purpose
is not an entity independently co-existing with the soul but something
physically inherent in it. Now, a thing which has its existence by
inhering in some other thing is in philosophic parlance an “accident.” St.
Thomas expressly teaches that, “since it transcends human nature, grace
cannot be a substance nor a substantial form, but is an accidental form of
the soul itself.”(988) Agreeable to this conception is the further
Thomistic teaching that sanctifying grace is not directly created by God,
but drawn (_educta_) from the _potentia obedientialis_ of the soul.(989)
Not even the Scotists, though they held grace to be created out of
nothing(990) claimed that it was a new substance.

An accident that inheres in a substance permanently and physically is
called a quality (_qualitas_, ποιότης). Consequently, sanctifying grace
must be defined as a supernatural quality of the soul. This is the express
teaching of the Roman Catechism: “Grace ... is a divine quality inherent
in the soul, and, as it were, a certain splendor and light that effaces
all the stains of our souls and renders the souls themselves brighter and
more beautiful.”(991)

2. SANCTIFYING GRACE AN INFUSED HABIT.—Sanctifying grace may more
specifically, though with a lesser degree of certainty, be described as a
habit (_habitus_). Being entitatively supernatural, this habit must be
infused or “drawn out” by the Holy Ghost.

a) Aristotle(992) distinguishes four different sets of qualities: (1)
habit and disposition; (2) power and incapacity; (3) _passio_ (the power
of causing sensations) and _patibilis qualitas_ (result of the
modification of sense); (4) figure and circumscribing form (of extended
bodies). As sanctifying grace manifestly cannot come under one of the
three last-mentioned heads, it must be either a habit or a disposition.
Habit denotes a permanent and comparatively stable quality, by which a
substance, considered as to its nature or operation, is well or ill
adapted to its natural end.(993) As a permanently inhering quality,
sanctifying grace must be a habit. Hence its other name, “habitual grace.”
The Scholastics draw a distinction between entitative and operative
habits. An operative habit (_habitus operativus_) gives not only the power
(_potentia_) to act, but also a certain facility, and may be either good,
bad, or indifferent. An entitative habit (_habitus entitativus_) is an
inherent quality by which a substance is rendered permanently good or bad,
_e.g._ beauty, ugliness, health, disease.

Philosophy knows only operative habits. But sanctifying grace affects the
very substance of the soul. Hence the supplementary theological category
of entitative habits. “Grace,” says St. Thomas, “belongs to the first
species of quality, though it cannot properly be called a habit, because
it is not immediately ordained to action, but to a kind of spiritual
being, which it produces in the soul.”(994) There is another reason why
grace cannot be called a habit in the philosophical sense of the term:—it
supplies no acquired facility to act. This consideration led Suarez to
abstain altogether from the use of the term “habit” in connection with
grace,(995) and induced Cardinal Bellarmine to describe sanctifying grace
as a _qualitas per modum habitus_,(996) by which phrase he wished to
indicate that it imparts a supernatural perfection of being rather than a
facility to act. To obviate these and similar subtleties the Council of
Trent defined sanctifying grace simply as a permanent quality.

Nevertheless scientific theology employs the term _habitus_ because it has
no other philosophical category ready to hand. This defect in the
Aristotelian system is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that
besides the supernatural, there are distinctly natural qualities which
“belong to the first species,” though they impart no facility to act but
merely a disposition to certain modes of being, _e.g._ beauty, health,
etc.

There is also a positive reason which justifies the definition of
sanctifying grace as a habit. It is that grace imparts to the soul, if not
the facility, at least the power to perform supernaturally meritorious
acts, so that it is really more than a _habitus entitativus_, namely, a
_habitus_ (at least remotely) _operativus_.(997)

b) The Scholastic distinction between native and acquired habits does not
apply in the supernatural domain, because the supernatural by its very
definition can never be either a part or an acquisition of mere
nature.(998) It follows from this that supernatural habits, both
entitative and operative, can be imparted to the human soul in no other
way than by infusion (or excitation) from above. Hence the name _habitus
infusus_. When the Holy Ghost infuses sanctifying grace, the _habitus
entitativus_ imparts to the soul a supernatural principle of being, while
the _habitus operativus_ confers upon it a supernatural power, which by
faithful coöperation with (actual) grace may be developed into a facility
to perform salutary acts. Hence, if we adopt the division of habits into
entitative and operative, sanctifying grace must be defined first as an
entitative habit (_habitus entitativus_), because it forms the groundwork
of permanent righteousness, sanctity, divine sonship, etc.; and, secondly,
as an infused habit, because it is not born in the soul and cannot be
acquired by practice. This view is in accord with Sacred Scripture, which
describes the grace of justification as a divine seed abiding in man,(999)
a treasure carried in earthen vessels,(1000) a regeneration by which the
soul becomes the abode of God(1001) and a temple of the Holy Ghost.(1002)

3. THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE ALLEGED IDENTITY OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND
CHARITY.—As justifying grace and theological love (charity) are both
infused habits, the question arises as to their objective identity. The
answer will depend on the solution of the problem, just treated, whether
sanctifying grace is primarily an entitative or an operative habit. Of
theological love we know that it is essentially an operative habit, being
one, and indeed the chief of the “three theological virtues.” What we have
said in the preceding paragraph will enable the reader to perceive, at the
outset, that there is a real distinction between grace and charity, and
that consequently the two can not be identical.

a) Nevertheless there is an imposing school of theologians who maintain
the identity of grace with charity. They are Scotus(1003) and his
followers,(1004) Cardinal Bellarmine,(1005) Molina, Lessius, Salmeron,
Vasquez, Sardagna, Tournely, and others. Their principal argument is that
Holy Scripture ascribes active justification indiscriminately to
theological love and sanctifying grace, and that some of the Fathers
follow this example. Here are a few of the Scriptural texts quoted in
favor of this opinion. Luke VII, 47: “Many sins are forgiven her, because
she hath loved much.”(1006) 1 Pet. IV, 8: “Charity covereth a multitude of
sins.”(1007) 1 John IV, 7: “Every one that loveth is born of God.”(1008)
St. Augustine seems to identify the two habits in such passages as the
following: “Inchoate love, therefore, is inchoate righteousness; ... great
love is great righteousness; perfect love is perfect righteousness.”(1009)
According to the Tridentine Council, “the justification of the impious”
takes place when “the charity of God is poured forth ... in the hearts of
those that are justified, and is inherent therein.”(1010) It is argued
that, if charity and grace produce the same effects, they must be
identical as causes, and there can be at most a virtual distinction
between them. This argument is strengthened by the observation that
sanctifying grace and theological love constitute the supernatural life of
the soul and the loss of either entails spiritual death.

These arguments prove that grace and charity are inseparable, but nothing
more. All the Scriptural and Patristic passages cited can be explained
without recourse to the hypothesis that they are identical. Charity is not
superfluous alongside of sanctifying grace, because the primary object of
grace is to impart supernatural being, whereas charity confers a special
faculty which enables the intellect and the will to elicit supernatural
salutary acts.

b) The majority of Catholic theologians(1011) hold with St. Thomas(1012)
and his school that grace and charity, while inseparable, are really
distinct, sanctifying grace as a _habitus entitativus_ imparting to the
soul a supernatural being, whereas charity, being purely a _habitus
operativus_, confers a supernatural power.

Let us put the matter somewhat differently. Grace inheres in the substance
of the soul, while charity has its seat in one of its several faculties.
Inhering in the very substance of the soul, grace, by a physical or moral
power, produces the three theological virtues—faith, hope, and love. “As
the soul’s powers, which are the wellsprings of its acts, flow from its
essence,” says the Angelic Doctor, “so the theological virtues flow from
grace into the faculties of the soul and move them to act.”(1013) And St.
Augustine: “Grace precedes charity.”(1014)

This is a more plausible view than the one we have examined a little
farther up, and it can claim the authority of Scripture, which, though it
occasionally identifies the effects of grace and charity, always clearly
distinguishes the underlying habits. Cfr. 2 Cor. XIII, 13: “The grace of
our Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God.”(1015) 1 Tim. I 14: “The
grace of our Lord hath abounded exceedingly with faith and love.”(1016)
Furthermore, “regeneration” and “new-creation” in Biblical usage affect
not only the faculties of the soul, but its substance. Finally, many
councils consistently distinguish between _gratia_ and _caritas_ (_dona_,
_virtutes_)—a distinction which has almost the force of a proof that grace
and charity are not the same thing.(1017) These councils cannot have had
in mind a purely virtual distinction, because theological love presupposes
sanctifying grace in exactly the same manner as a faculty presupposes a
substance or nature in which it exists. The Roman Catechism expressly
designates the theological virtues as “concomitants of grace.”(1018)

The question nevertheless remains an open one, as neither party can fully
establish its claim, and the Church has never rendered an official
decision either one way or the other.(1019)

4. SANCTIFYING GRACE A PARTICIPATION OF THE SOUL IN THE DIVINE NATURE.—The
highest and at the same time the most profound conception of sanctifying
grace is that it is a real, though of course only accidental and
analogical, participation of the soul in the nature of God. That
sanctifying grace makes us “partakers of the divine nature” is of faith,
but the manner in which it effects this participation admits of different
explanations.

a) The fact itself can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr. 2 Pet. I, 4:
“By whom [Christ] He [the Father] hath given us great and precious
promises: that by these you may be made partakers of the divine
nature.”(1020) To this text may be added all those which affirm the
regeneration of the soul in God, because regeneration, being a new birth,
must needs impart to the regenerate the nature of his spiritual
progenitor. Cfr. John I, 13: “Who are born, not of blood, ... but of
God.”(1021) John III, 5: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.”(1022) St. James I, 18:
“For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth.”(1023) 1
John III, 9: “Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin.”(1024)

The Fathers of the Church again and again extol the deification
(_deificatio_, θείωσις) of man effected by sanctifying grace and compare
the union of the soul with God to the commingling of water with wine, the
penetration of iron by fire, etc. St. Athanasius(1025) begins his
Christological teaching with the declaration: “He was not, therefore,
first man and then God, but first God and then man, in order that He might
rather deify us.”(1026) St. Augustine describes the process of deification
as follows: “He justifies who is just of Himself, not from another; and He
deifies who is God of Himself, not by participation in another. But He who
justifies also deifies, because He makes [men] sons of God through
justification.... We have been made sons of God and gods; but this is a
grace of the adopting [God], not the nature of the progenitor. The Son of
God alone is God; ... the others who are made gods are made gods by His
grace; they are not born of His substance, so as to become that which He
is, but in order that they may come to Him by favor and become co-heirs
with Christ.”(1027) The idea underlying this passage has found its way
into the liturgy of the Mass,(1028) and Ripalda is justified in declaring
that it cannot be denied without rashness.(1029)

b) In trying to explain in what manner grace enables us to partake of the
divine nature, it is well to keep in view the absolutely supernatural
character of sanctifying grace and the impossibility of any deification of
the creature in the strict sense of the term. The truth lies between these
two extremes.

A few medieval mystics(1030) and modern Quietists(1031) were guilty of
exaggeration when they taught that grace transforms the human soul into
the substance of the Godhead, thus completely merging the creature in its
Creator. This contention(1032) leads to Pantheism. How can the soul be
merged in the Creator, since it continues to be subject to concupiscence?
“We have therefore,” says St. Augustine, “even now begun to be like Him,
as we have the first-fruits of the Spirit; but yet even now we are unlike
Him, by reason of the old nature which leaves its remains in us. In as
far, then, as we are like Him, in so far are we, by the regenerating
Spirit, sons of God; but in as far as we are unlike Him, in so far are we
the children of the flesh and of this world.”(1033)

On the other hand it would be underestimating the power of grace to say
that it effects a merely external and moral participation of the soul in
the divine nature, similar to that by which those who embraced the faith
of Abraham were called “children of Abraham,” and those who commit heinous
crimes are called “sons of the devil.” According to the Fathers(1034) and
theologians, to “partake of the divine nature” means to become internally
and physically like God and to receive from Him truly divine gifts, _i.e._
such as are proper to God alone and absolutely transcend the order of
nature.(1035) Being self-existing, absolutely independent, and infinite,
God cannot, of course, be regarded as the formal cause of created
sanctity; yet the strictly supernatural gifts which He confers on His
creatures, especially the beatific vision and sanctifying grace, can be
conceived only _per modum causae formalis_ (not _informantis_), because
through them God gives Himself to the creature in such an intimate way
that the creature is raised up to and transfigured by Him.(1036)
Consequently, the so-called _deificatio_ of the soul by grace is not a
real deification, but an assimilation of the creature to God.(1037)

c) Which one of God’s numerous attributes forms the basis of the
supernatural communication made to the soul in the bestowal of grace, is a
question on which theologians differ widely. The so-called incommunicable
attributes, (self-existence, immensity, eternity, etc.), of course, cannot
be imparted to the creature except by way of a hypostatic union.(1038)

Gonet(1039) misses the point at issue, therefore, when He declares the
essential characteristic of deification to be the communication to the
creature of the divine attributes of self-existence and infinity.
Self-existence is absolutely incommunicable.(1040) Somewhat more
plausible, though hardly acceptable, is Ripalda’s opinion that deification
formally consists in the participation of the creature in the holiness of
the Creator, particularly in the supernatural vital communion of the soul
with God in faith, hope, and charity, thus making sanctifying grace the
_radix totius honestatis moralis_.(1041) While it is perfectly true that
the supernatural life of the soul is a life in and through God, and that
the very concept of sanctifying grace involves a peculiar and special
relation of the soul to God, the Biblical term κοινωνία θείας φύσεως
points to a still deeper principle of the sanctifying _vita deiformis_.
This principle, as some of the Fathers intimate, and St. Thomas expressly
teaches,(1042) is the absolute intellectuality of God. Hence the object of
sanctifying grace is to impart to the soul in a supernatural manner such a
degree of intellectuality as is necessary to perceive the absolute
Spirit—here on earth in the obscurity of faith, and in the life beyond by
the _lumen gloriae_.(1043) This view is to a certain extent confirmed by
Sacred Scripture, which describes the regeneration of the sinner as a
birth of spirit from spirit.(1044) It is also held by some of the Fathers,
who attribute to sanctifying grace both a deifying and a spiritualizing
power. Thus St. Basil(1045) says: “The spirit-bearing souls, illuminated
by the Holy Ghost, themselves become spiritual(1046) and radiate grace to
others. Hence ... to become like unto God,(1047) is the highest of all
goals: to become God.”(1048) Finally, since the Holy Ghost, as the highest
exponent of the spirituality of the divine nature, by His personal
indwelling crowns and consummates both the regeneration of the soul and
its assimilation to God, there is a strong theological probability in
favor of Suarez’s view. Of course the process does not attain its climax
until the creature is finally admitted to the beatific vision in Heaven.
Cfr. 1 John III, 2: “We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet
appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be
like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.”(1049)

Article 2. The Effects Of Sanctifying Grace

We shall better understand the nature of sanctifying grace by studying
what are known as its “formal effects.” As the _causa efficiens_ of a
thing is commonly farther removed from our mental grasp than its effects,
we are ordinarily more familiar with the latter than with the former. For
this reason the glories of divine grace can be best explained to children
and to the faithful in general by describing the effects it produces in
the soul.(1050)

1. SANCTITY.—The first among the formal effects of sanctifying grace (an
effect connoted by its very name) is sanctity. Eph. IV, 24: “Put on the
new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of
truth.”(1051) The Tridentine Council explicitly mentions sanctity as an
effect of sanctifying grace: “Justification ... is not remission of sins
merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man through
the voluntary reception of the grace and of the gifts whereby man from
unjust becomes just.”(1052) It follows that the two elements of active
justification, _viz._: remission of sin and sanctification, are also
constitutive elements of habitual or sanctifying grace. For it is
precisely by the infusion of sanctifying grace that sin is wiped out and
sanctity established in its place.(1053)

a) By sanctifying grace the justified man becomes a living member
(_membrum vivum_) of the mystical body of Christ. His sins, it is true,
did not forfeit membership in the Church, so long as he preserved the
faith, but by sinning he became a dead member who can regain life only by
returning to the state of grace. Grace is the life of the soul, sin its
death. Hence the evil of mortal sin can be most effectively illustrated by
contrast with the glory of divine grace, and _vice versa_. Cfr. Gal. II,
20: “And I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.”(1054)

b) He who hates mortal sin and faithfully obeys the will of God, enjoys
peace of heart,(1055) whereas the sinner is incessantly harassed by qualms
of conscience. The faithful Christian rejoices in serving His Master and
combats the flesh, the world, and the devil with a fortitude that not
infrequently rises to heroic proportions, as the example of many holy men
and women proves.

c) Sanctifying grace entails a particular providence, inasmuch as, by
means of it, God grants man His special assistance towards preserving the
state of grace, without, of course, interfering with free-will. Cfr. Is.
XLIX, 16: “Behold, I have graven thee in my hands.”(1056) Rom. VIII, 28:
“... to them that love God, all things work together unto good.”(1057)
Mediately, God also proves his special love for the just man by shielding
him from bodily and spiritual danger.

2. SUPERNATURAL BEAUTY.—Though we can quote no formal ecclesiastical
definition to prove that sanctifying grace beautifies the soul, the fact
is sufficiently certain from Revelation. If, as is quite generally held by
Catholic exegetes, the Spouse of the Canticle typifies the human soul
endowed with sanctifying grace, all the passages describing the beauty of
that Spouse must be applicable to the souls of those whom Christ embraces
with His tender love. The Fathers of the Church frequently extol the
supernatural beauty of the soul in the state of grace. Ambrose calls it “a
splendid painting made by God Himself;” Chrysostom compares it to “a
statue of gold;” Cyril, to “a divine seal;” Basil, to “a shining light,”
and so forth. St. Thomas says: “Divine grace beautifies [the soul] like
light,”(1058) and the Roman Catechism declares: “Grace ... is a certain
splendor and light that effaces all the stains of our souls and renders
the souls themselves brighter and more beautiful.”(1059)

In defining beauty as “the representation of an idea in a sensual form,”
modern aesthetics has eliminated the spiritual element and in consequence
is unable to appreciate the spiritual beauty of God and of the soul. Being
composed of body and soul, man is naturally most impressed by beauty when
it appears in a material guise. But this does not prove that there is no
spiritual beauty, or that true beauty abides solely in matter. Some
present-day writers strongly emphasize the need of realism as against an
idealism which, they claim, is not truly human because it exalts the
spiritual at the expense of the material. In its last conclusions this
perverted realism harks back to the sophistry of Protagoras who held that
“man is the measure of all things.”(1060) Idealism, on the other hand, is
based on the true Platonic doctrine that God is the measure of all
things.(1061) St. Augustine defines beauty as “unity in variety,” which is
a correct definition, because it is adaptable to both the spiritual and
the material order.(1062) Applying this definition we find that the soul
is not only naturally beautiful by the substantial unity and simplicity
which shines forth in the variety of its faculties and powers, but also
supernaturally by virtue of sanctifying grace, which transfuses nature
into a new unity with the supernatural,—at the same time producing a
variety of theological and moral virtues and the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost, and thus creating a true work of art. Moreover, by enabling man to
participate in the Divine Nature,(1063) grace produces in the soul a
physical reflection of the uncreated beauty of God, a likeness of the
creature with its Creator, which far transcends the natural likeness
imprinted by creation. True, only God and the Elect in Heaven perceive and
enjoy this celestial beauty; but we terrestrial pilgrims can, as it were,
sense it from afar and indulge the hope that we may one day be privileged
to contemplate and enjoy the divine beauty that envelops the souls endowed
with grace.

The beauty produced by sanctifying grace must be conceived not merely as a
reflection of the absolute nature of God, who is the pattern-exemplar of
all beauty, but more specifically as an image of the Trinity impressed
upon the soul. St. Paul teaches that the soul is transformed into an image
of the Divine Logos, to whom, as the holy Fathers tell us, beauty is
appropriated in an especial manner.(1064) Cfr. Rom. VIII, 29: “Whom he
foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his
Son.”(1065) Gal. IV, 19: “My little children, of whom I am in labor again,
until Christ be formed in you.”(1066) In virtue of the adoptive sonship
effected by grace,(1067) the soul becomes a true “temple of the Holy
Ghost.”(1068)

3. THE FRIENDSHIP OF GOD.—Closely connected with the beauty which
sanctifying grace confers, is the supernatural friendship it establishes
between God and the soul. True beauty elicits love and benevolence. By
nature man is merely a servant of God; in fact, since the fall, he is His
enemy. Sanctifying grace transforms this hostile relation into genuine
friendship. By grace, says the Council of Trent, “man of unjust becomes
just, and of an enemy a friend.”(1069) And again: “Having been thus
justified and made the friends and domestics of God.”(1070) God loves the
just man as His intimate friend and enables and impels him, by means of
habitual grace and habitual charity, to reciprocate that love with all his
heart. Here we have the two constituent elements of friendship. The Bible
frequently speaks of friendship existing between God and the just. Cfr.
Wisd. VII, 14: “They [the just] become the friends of God.”(1071) John XV,
14 sq.: “I will not now call you servants, ... but I have called you
friends.”(1072) This friendship is sometimes compared to a mystic
marriage. Cfr. Matth. IX, 15: “And Jesus said to them: Can the children of
the bridegroom mourn, as long as the bridegroom is with them?”(1073) Apoc.
XIX, 7: “The marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath prepared
herself.”(1074)

a) Friendship (φιλία), according to Aristotle,(1075) is “the conscious
love of benevolence of two persons for each other.” Hence, to constitute
friendship, there must be (1) two or more distinct persons; (2) pure love
of benevolence _(amor benevolentiae_, not _concupiscentiae_), because only
unselfish love can truly unite hearts; (3) mutual consciousness of
affection, because without a consciousness of the existing relation on
both sides there would be merely one-sided benevolence, not friendship. It
follows that true friendship is based on virtue and that a relation not
based on virtue can be called friendship in a qualified or metaphorical
sense only (_amicitia utilis, delectabilis_).

From what we have said it is easy to deduce the essential characteristics
of true friendship. They are: (1) benevolence; (2) love consciously
entertained by both parties; (3) a mutual exchange of goods or community
of life; (4) equality of rank or station. The first condition is based on
the fact that a true friend will not seek his own interest, but that of
his friend. It is to be noted, however, that one’s joy at the presence or
prosperity of a friend must not be inspired by selfishness or sensual
desire, for in that case there would be no true friendship.(1076) The
second condition is based on the necessity of friendship being mutual
love, for friendship is not a one-sided affection, nor does it spend
itself in mutual admiration. The third condition is necessary for the
reason that love, if it is to be more than “Platonic,” must result in acts
of benevolence and good will.(1077) Of the fourth condition St. Jerome
says: “Friendship finds men equal or makes them equal.”(1078)

b) All these conditions are found in the friendship with which Almighty
God deigns to honor those who are in the state of sanctifying grace.

(1) That God loves the just man with a love of pure benevolence and
eagerly seeks his companionship, is proved by the mysteries of the
Incarnation and the Holy Eucharist. Cfr. Prov. VIII, 31: “And my delight
[is] to be with the children of men.”(1079)

(2) The just man is enabled to return God’s love by the habit of
theological charity, which is inseparably bound up with and spontaneously
flows from sanctifying grace.(1080) God’s consciousness of this mutual
love is, of course, based on certain knowledge, whereas man can have
merely a probable conjecture. This, however, suffices to establish a true
friendship, as the example of human friends shows.(1081)

(3) There is also community of life and property between God and man when
the latter is in the state of sanctifying grace; for not only is he
indebted to God for his very nature and all natural favors which he
enjoys, but likewise and especially for the supernatural blessings
bestowed upon him.(1082) On his own part, it is true, he cannot give his
Benefactor anything in return which that Benefactor does not already
possess; but the just man is ever eager to further God’s external
glorification, agreeable to the first petition of the Our Father:
“Hallowed by Thy name.”(1083) God has furthermore given him a kind of
substitute for operative charity in the love of his neighbor, which has
precisely the same formal object as the love of God. Cfr. 1 John III, 17:
“He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in
need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God
abide in him?”(1084)

(4) There can be no real equality between God and the human soul, but God
in His infinite goodness, elevating the soul to a higher plane and
allowing it to participate in His own nature,(1085) makes possible an
_amicitia excellentiae s. eminentiae_, which is sufficient to constitute a
true relation of friendship. Without this elevation of the soul by grace
there could be no friendship between God and man.(1086)

4. ADOPTIVE SONSHIP.—The formal effects of sanctifying grace culminate in
the elevation of man to the rank of an adopted child of God (_filius Dei
adoptivus_), with a claim to the paternal inheritance, _i.e._ the beatific
vision in Heaven. This truth is so clearly stated in Scripture and
Tradition that its denial would be heretical. The Tridentine Council
summarily describes justification as “the state of grace and of the
adoption of the sons of God,”(1087) The teaching of Holy Scripture can be
gathered from such texts as the following. Rom. VIII, 15 sqq.: “... You
have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba
(Father). For the spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we
are the sons of God. And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and
joint heirs with Christ.”(1088) 1 John III, 1 sq.: “Behold what manner of
charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and
should be the sons of God.... Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of
God.”(1089) Gal. IV, 5: “... that we might receive the adoption of
sons.”(1090) That the just become the adopted sons of God follows likewise
as a corollary from the doctrine of regeneration so frequently taught by
Scripture. This regeneration is not a procession of the soul from the
divine essence, but a kind of accidental and analogical procreation
substantially identical with adoption (_filiatio adoptiva_, υἱοθεσία).
Cfr. John I, 12 sq.: “... He gave them power to be made the sons of God,
... who are born ... of God.”(1091)

a) St. Thomas defines adoption as “the gratuitous acceptance of a child of
other parents to be the same as one’s own child and heir.”(1092) Adoption
implies (1) that the adopted child be a stranger to the adopting father;
(2) that it have no legal claim to adoption; (3) that it give its consent
to being adopted; (4) that it be received by the adopting father with
parental love and affection. All these elements are present, in a far
higher and more perfect form, in the adoption of a soul by God.

(1) The rational creature, as such, is not a “son” but merely a “servant
of God,”(1093) and, if he be in the state of mortal sin, His enemy.

(2) That adoption is a gratuitous favor on the part of the Almighty,
follows from the fact that the adopted creature is His enemy and that
grace is a free supernatural gift, to which no creature has a natural
claim. Adoption furthermore implies the right of inheritance.(1094) The
heritage of the children of God is a purely spiritual possession which can
be enjoyed simultaneously by many, and consequently excels every natural
heritage. Men, as a rule, do not distribute their property during life,
while, after their death, it is usually divided up among several
heirs.(1095)

(3) Whereas adoption among men owes its existence to the desire of
offspring on the part of childless parents, the adoption of the soul by
God springs from pure benevolence and unselfish love, and for this reason
presupposes (in the case of adults) the free consent of the adopted. No
one can become an adopted son of God against his will.(1096)

(4) Whereas human adoption supposes substantial equality between father
and child, and therefore at best amounts to no more than a legal
acceptance, adoption by God elevates the soul to a higher level by
allowing it to participate in the Divine Nature, and consequently is a
true (even though merely an accidental and analogical) regeneration in
God.

b) From what we have said it follows—and this is a truth of considerable
speculative importance—that there are essential points of difference as
well as of resemblance between Jesus Christ, the true Son of God, and the
justified sinner adopted by the Heavenly Father.

α) The difference between the “natural Son of God” and an “adopted son” is
exactly like that between God and creature. The Logos-Son, engendered by
eternal generation from the divine substance, is the true natural Son of
the Father, the Second Person of the Divine Trinity, and Himself
God.(1097) The just man, on the other hand, is a child of God merely by
the possession of sanctifying grace,(1098) which can be lost by mortal sin
and consequently is founded upon a free relation that may be terminated by
man as freely as it was entered into between himself and God.

Intimately related to this distinction is another:—Christ is the Son of
the Father alone, the just man is an adopted child of the whole
Trinity.(1099) This fact does not, however, prevent us from
“appropriating” adoptive sonship to each of the three Divine Persons
according to His peculiar hypostatic character:—the Father as its author,
the Son as its pattern, and the Holy Ghost as its conveyor.(1100) Now, if
Christ, as the true Son of God, is the efficient cause (_causa efficiens_)
of that adoptive sonship of which, as God, He is also the pattern-exemplar
(_causa exemplaris_), it follows that He cannot be an adopted son of God.
“_Christus est incapax adoptionis_,” as Suarez puts it.(1101) To say that
He is both the natural and an adopted Son of God would be heretical.(1102)
Consequently, sanctifying grace, in Him, did not exercise one of the
functions it invariably exercises in the souls of men, _i.e._ it did not
make Him an adopted son of God.

β) It is to be noted, however, that the unique position enjoyed by our
Lord gives rise, not only to essential distinctions but also to an equal
number of analogies between the Only-begotten Son of God and His adopted
sons. The first and most fundamental of these analogies is the attribution
of the common appellation “son of God” both to Christ and to the just.
Though Christ is the only true Son of God, the Heavenly Father has
nevertheless charitably “bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and
should be, the sons of God.”(1103) According to John I, 13, Christ “gave
power to be made the sons of God” to them “who are born ... of God.” Hence
divine sonship formally consists in an impression of the hypostatic
likeness of the Only-begotten Son of God, by which the soul in a
mysterious manner becomes an image of the Trinity, and especially of the
Only-begotten Son of God, who is the archetype and pattern-exemplar of
adoptive sonship. This hypostatic propriety and exemplariness was the
reason why the Second Person of the Trinity became man.(1104) That the
soul of the justified is transformed into “an image of the Son of God” is
expressly taught by the Greek Fathers. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria says:
“Christ is truly formed in us, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost impresses on us
a certain divine likeness by means of sanctity and justice.... But if any
one is formed in Christ, he is formed into a child of God.”(1105)

These considerations also explain the points of resemblance between the
adoptive sonship of God and the Holy Eucharist. Being our Father by
adoption, God is bound to provide us with food worthy of a divine
progenitor. The food He gives us (the Holy Eucharist) corresponds to our
dignity as His children, sustains us in this sublime relation, and at the
same time constitutes the pledge of a glorious resurrection and an eternal
beatitude.

c) Is the adoptive sonship of the children of God constituted entirely by
sanctifying grace, or does it require for its full development the
personal indwelling in the soul of the Holy Ghost?(1106) This subtle
question formed the subject of an interesting controversy between Joseph
Scheeben and Theodore Granderath, S. J. Father Granderath claimed on the
authority of the Tridentine Council that divine sonship is an inseparable
function of sanctifying grace, and through that grace alone, without the
_inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti_, constitutes the _unica causa formalis_ of
justification. Against this theory Dr. Scheeben maintained with great
acumen and, we think, successfully, that sanctifying grace of itself
alone, without the aid of any other factor, not only completely justifies
the sinner but raises him to the rank of an adopted son of God, though
there is nothing to prevent us from holding that the indwelling of the
Holy Ghost forms the climax of the process, and develops and perfects the
already existing _filiatio adoptiva_.(1107)

Petavius had contended(1108) that the just men of the Old Testament,
though in the state of sanctifying grace, were not adopted children of
God, because the _filiatio adoptiva_ is an exclusive privilege of those
living under the Christian Dispensation. This theory became untenable when
the Tridentine Council defined sanctity and adoptive sonship as
inseparable formal effects of sanctifying grace. There can no longer be
any doubt, therefore, that the patriarchs, together with sanctifying grace
also enjoyed the privilege of adoptive sonship, though, as Suarez
observes,(1109) adoptive sonship under the Old Covenant depended both as
to origin and value upon the adoptive sonship of the New Testament, and
therefore was inferior to it in both respects.(1110)

READINGS:—Scheeben, _Lehrbuch der Dogmatik_, Vol. II, § 168 sqq.,
Freiburg 1878.—J. Kirschkamp, _Gnade und Glorie in ihrem inneren
Zusammenhang_, Würzburg 1878.—P. Hagg, _Die Reichtümer der
göttlichen Gnade und die Schwere ihres Verlustes_, Ratisbon
1889.—Card. Katschthaler, _De Gratia Sanctificante_, 3rd ed.,
Salzburg 1886.—P. Einig, _De Gratia Divina_, Part II, Treves
1896.—Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp.
575 sqq., Mainz 1897.—Scheeben, _Die Herrlichkeiten der göttlichen
Gnade_, 8th ed., by A. M. Weiss, O. P., Freiburg 1908 (English
translation, _The Glories of Divine Grace_, 3rd ed., New York _s.
a._).—Th. Bourges, O. P., _L’Ordre Surnaturel et le Devoir
Chrétien_, Paris 1901.—*B. Terrien, _La Grâce et la Gloire ou la
Filiation Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu Etudiée dans sa Réalité,
ses Principes, son Perfectionnement et son Couronnement Final_, 2
vols., Paris 1897.—*P. Villada, _De Effectibus Formalibus Gratiae
Habitualis_, Valladolid 1899.—L. Hubert, _De Gratia
Sanctificante_, Paris 1902.

Article 3. The Supernatural Concomitants Of Sanctifying Grace

Besides producing the effects described in the preceding Article,
sanctifying grace also confers certain supernatural privileges, which,
though not of the essence of grace, are, in the present economy at least,
inseparably connected with it and may therefore be regarded as its regular
concomitants.

The existence of these privileges is established by the fact that certain
councils (_e.g._ those of Vienne and Trent), couple “grace and gifts” in
their official definitions.(1111) The doctrine is clearly stated by the
Roman Catechism as follows: “To this [sanctifying grace] is added a most
noble accompaniment of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the
soul together with grace.”(1112)

We will treat of the supernatural concomitants of sanctifying grace in
four theses.

*Thesis I: The three divine virtues of faith, hope, and charity are
infused into the soul simultaneously with sanctifying grace.*

Some theologians (notably Suarez, Ripalda, and De Lugo) declare this
thesis to be _de fide_, while others (Dom. Soto, Melchior Cano, and
Vasquez) hold it merely as certain. Under the circumstances it will be
safest to take middle ground by characterizing it as _fidei proxima_.

Proof. The Council of Trent teaches: “Man through Jesus Christ, in whom he
is ingrafted, receives, in the said justification, together with the
remission of sins, all these [gifts] infused at once—faith, hope, and
charity.”(1113)

a) That theological charity, as a habit, is infused together with
sanctifying grace can be convincingly demonstrated from Holy Scripture.
Cfr. Rom. V, 5: “... the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.”(1114) In connection with charity,
Holy Scripture frequently mentions faith. Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 2: “And if I
should have ... all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not
charity, I am nothing.”(1115) All three of the theological virtues are
expressly enumerated in 1 Cor. XIII, 13: “And now there remain faith,
hope, and charity, these three: but the greatest of these is
charity.”(1116) Unlike certain other texts, the one last quoted leaves no
doubt that faith, hope, and charity are to be conceived as _dona
inhaerentia_, _i.e._ habits or qualities inherent in the soul. This
interpretation is approved by the Fathers and Scholastics.

b) St. Thomas proves the necessity of the three theological virtues for
salvation as follows: “In order that we be properly moved towards our end
[God], that end must be both known and desired. Desire of an end includes
two things: first, hope of attaining it, because no prudent man will
aspire to that which he cannot attain; and secondly, love, because nothing
is desired that is not loved. And hence there are three theological
virtues,—faith, by which we know God; hope, by which we trust to obtain
Him; and charity, by which we love Him.”(1117)

When are the three theological virtues infused into the soul? This is an
open question so far as faith and hope are concerned. Of charity we know
that it is always infused with habitual grace. Suarez contends that, when
the soul is properly disposed, faith and hope are infused before
justification proper, that is to say, in the process leading up to it. St.
Thomas and St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, hold that faith and hope,
like charity, are infused at the moment when justification actually takes
place in the soul. This last-mentioned opinion is favored by the
Tridentine Council.(1118)

Mortal sin first destroys sanctifying grace together with the habit of
charity that is inseparable from it. Faith and hope may continue to exist
in the soul, and if hope, too, departs, faith may remain alone. But the
loss of faith invariably entails the destruction of hope and charity.

*Thesis II: Together with sanctifying grace there are also infused the
supernatural moral virtues.*

This proposition may be characterized as _sententia communior et
probabilior_. Though denied by some theologians, it can claim a high
degree of probability.(1119)

Proof. The infused moral virtues (_virtutes morales infusae_) differ from
the theological virtues in that they have for their immediate formal
object, not God Himself, but the creature in its relation to the moral
law.

The moral virtues may be reduced to four, _viz._: prudence, justice,
fortitude, and temperance. These are called the “cardinal” virtues; first,
because they perfect the principal faculties of the soul; secondly,
because all the other virtues may be scientifically deduced from
them.(1120) In the supernatural order the infusion of the cardinal virtues
and of the other virtues subordinate to them has for its object the
government of intellect and will in their relation towards created things
and the guidance of these faculties to their supernatural end.

a) The existence of supernaturally infused moral virtues is intimated in
Wis. VIII, 7: “And if a man love justice: her labors have great virtues;
for she teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,
which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in
life.”(1121) The teacher of the three cardinal virtues here mentioned is
“Divine Wisdom,” _i.e._ God Himself, and we may assume that He inculcates
them by the same method which He employs in infusing the theological
virtues of faith, hope, and charity.

Another relevant text is Ezechiel XI, 19 sq.: “... and I will take away
the stony heart out of their flesh, and give them a heart of flesh, that
they may walk in my commandments, and keep my judgments.”(1122) Here
Yahweh promises to give the just men of the New Covenant a “heart of
flesh” as opposed to the “stony heart” of the Jews. The meaning evidently
is that a disposition to do good will be a characteristic of the New
Testament Christians in contradistinction to the hardhearted Old Testament
Jews. He who has a “heart of flesh” will walk in God’s commandments and
keep His judgments. Hence “heart” signifies the sum-total of all those
habits which impel and enable a man to lead a good life. Since it is God
Himself who gives the “heart of flesh,” _i.e._ the moral virtues, it
follows that they are supernaturally infused.(1123)

b) Some of the Fathers ascribe the moral virtues directly to divine
infusion.

Thus St. Augustine observes that the cardinal virtues “are given to us
through the grace of God.”(1124) And St. Gregory the Great says that the
Holy Ghost does “not desert the hearts of those who are perfect in faith,
hope, and charity, and in those other goods without which no man can
attain to the heavenly fatherland.”(1125) St. Thomas shows the theological
reason for this by pointing to the parallel that exists between nature and
the supernatural. “Effects,” he says, “must always be proportionate to
their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral,
which we acquire by our acts, proceed from certain natural principles
preëxisting in us.... In lieu of these natural principles God confers on
us the theological virtues, by which we are directed to a supernatural
end.... Hence there must correspond to these theological virtues,
proportionally, other habits caused in us by God, and which bear the same
relation to the theological virtues that the moral and intellectual
virtues bear to the natural principles of virtue.”(1126)

*Thesis III: The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are also infused with
sanctifying grace.*

This proposition may be qualified as “_probabilis_.”

Proof. The Church’s teaching with regard to the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost is based on Isaias XI, 2 sq.: “And the spirit of the Lord shall rest
upon him: the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of
counsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge, and of godliness. And
he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.” Four of these
supernatural gifts (wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge) perfect
the intellect in matters pertaining to salvation, while the remaining
three (fortitude, godliness, and the fear of the Lord) direct the will to
its supernatural end. Are these seven gifts, (or some of them), really
distinct from the infused moral virtues? Are they habits or habitual
dispositions, or merely transient impulses or inspirations? What are their
mutual relations and how can they be divided off from one another? These
and similar questions are in dispute among theologians. The prevailing
opinion is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused habitual
dispositions, _realiter_ distinct from the theological and moral virtues,
by which the soul is endowed with a supernatural capacity for receiving
the inspirations of the Holy Ghost and a supernatural readiness to obey
His impulses in all important matters pertaining to salvation.(1127)

That the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused into the soul simultaneously
with sanctifying grace, can be demonstrated as follows: Christ, as the
mystical head, is the pattern of justification for the members of His
spiritual body, who are united to Him by sanctifying grace.(1128) Now the
Holy Ghost dwelled in Christ with all His gifts as permanent habits.(1129)
Consequently, these gifts are imparted by infusion to those who receive
the grace of justification. This is manifestly the belief of the Church,
for she prays in the “_Veni Sancte Spiritus_”:

“Shed upon thy faithful fold,
By unbounded hope controlled,
Thy seven gifts.”(1130)

*Thesis IV: The process of justification reaches its climax in the
personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul of the just.*

This thesis embodies what is technically called a _propositio certa_.

Proof. There are two ways in which God may dwell in the soul, either by
virtue of His created grace (_inhabitatio per dona accidentalia_,
ἐνοίκησις κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν) or by virtue of His uncreated substance
(_inhabitatio substantialis sive personalis_, ἐνοίκησις κατ᾽ οὐσίαν). The
personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost, therefore, may consist in a twofold
grace: _gratia creata_ and _gratia increata_, of which the former is the
groundwork and necessary condition of the latter, while the latter may be
described as the climax and consummation of the former.(1131) The
indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just is taught by Holy
Scripture and attested by the Fathers.

a) Holy Scripture draws a clear-cut distinction between the accidental and
the substantial indwelling of the Holy Ghost.

α) Our Lord Himself, in addition to the charismata, promised His Apostles
the Holy Ghost in Person. John XIV, 16 sq.: “... the Father ... shall give
you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you for ever, ... but you
shall know him, because he shall abide with you, and shall be in
you.”(1132) This promise was made to all the faithful. Cfr. Rom. V, 5:
“... the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,
who is given to us.”(1133) Hence the Holy Ghost abides in the just and
sets up His throne in their souls. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 11: “And if the spirit
of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up
Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because
of his Spirit that dwelleth in you.”(1134) By His indwelling our souls
become temples of God. 1 Cor. III, 16 sq.: “Know you not that you are the
temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?... For the
temple of God is holy, which you are.”(1135) 1 Cor. VI, 19: “Or know you
not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in you,
whom you have from God; and you are not your own?”(1136)

β) Agreeable to this teaching of Scripture the Fathers, especially those
of the East, assert the substantial indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the
souls of the just.

The fact that no one but God can dwell substantially and personally in a
creature was cited by the Greek Fathers in their controversies with the
Pneumatomachians to prove the divinity of the Holy Ghost. St. Athanasius
writes to Serapion:(1137) “If we by receiving the Holy Ghost are allowed
to participate in the Divine Nature, no one but a fool will assert that
the Holy Ghost is not of divine but of human nature. For all those in whom
He abides become deified(1138) for no other reason. But if He constitutes
them gods, there can be no doubt that His nature is divine.” St. Basil
comments as follows on Ps. LXXXI, 6 (_Ego dixi, dii estis_): “But the
Spirit that causes the gods to be gods, must be divine, and from God, ...
and God.”(1139) St. Cyril of Alexandria(1140) glowingly describes the soul
inhabited by the Holy Ghost as inlaid with gold, transfused by fire,
filled with the sweet odor of balsam, and so forth.

The Latin Fathers, with one exception, are less definite on this point.
St. Augustine says that the Holy Ghost “is given as a gift of God in such
a way that He Himself also gives Himself as being God,”(1141) and that
“the grace of God is a gift of God, but the greatest gift is the Holy
Spirit Himself, who therefore is called a grace.”(1142) Again: “... the
Holy Spirit is the gift of God, the gift being Himself indeed equal to the
giver, and therefore the Holy Ghost also is God, not inferior to the
Father and the Son.”(1143)

b) While theologians are unanimous in accepting the doctrine of the
personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the just as clearly contained in
Sacred Scripture and Tradition, they differ in explaining the manner in
which He dwells in the soul.

α) The great majority hold that the Holy Ghost can not dwell in the soul,
as the human soul dwells in the body, _per modum informationis_, nor yet
by a hypostatic union, as godhead and manhood dwell together in the Person
of Christ; and that consequently His indwelling is objectively an
indwelling of the whole Trinity, which is appropriated to the Third Person
merely because the Holy Ghost is “hypostatic holiness” or “personal love.”
This view is based on what is called “the fundamental law of the Trinity,”
_viz._: “In God all things are one except where there is opposition of
relation.”(1144) Sacred Scripture speaks of the personal indwelling of the
Father and the Son as well as of the Holy Ghost. Cfr. John XIV, 23: “If
any one love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we
will come to him and will make our abode with him.”(1145) St. Athanasius
concludes from these words that “the _energia_ of the Trinity is one....
Indeed when the Lord says: I and the Father will come, the Spirit also
comes, to dwell in us in precisely the same manner in which the Son dwells
in us.”(1146) And St. Augustine teaches: “Love, therefore, which is of God
and is God, is properly the Holy Spirit, by whom the love of God is shed
abroad in our hearts,—that love by which the whole Trinity dwells in
us.”(1147) Accordingly, the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost consists
in the state of grace as bearing a special relation to the Third Person of
the Trinity; the “higher nature” which sanctifying grace imparts to the
soul is not an absolute but a relative form (σχέσις), by which the soul is
mysteriously united with the Three Divine Persons and, by appropriation,
with the Holy Ghost, thereby becoming a throne and temple of God. It is in
this sense that the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul is called the
climax of justification.(1148)

β) Other eminent theologians (Petavius, Passaglia, Schrader, Scheeben,
Hurter, _et al._) regard the explanation just given as unsatisfactory.
They contend that the Fathers, especially those of the East, conceived the
indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just, not as an
indwelling (ἐνοίκησις) of the Trinity, appropriated to the Holy Ghost, but
as a union (ἕνωσις) of the Holy Ghost Himself with the soul.(1149) This
union, they say, is neither physical nor hypostatic, but an altogether
unique and inexplicable relation by which the soul is morally,
accidentally, and actively united to the person of the Holy Ghost.(1150)

γ) Unfortunately this exalted and mystic theory cannot be squared with the
theological principles underlying the Catholic teaching on the Trinity,
especially that portion of it which concerns the appropriations and
missions of the three Divine Persons.(1151) It is true that sanctifying
grace culminates in a communication of the Divine Nature, and that this
θείωσις is effected by imprinting upon the soul an image of the divine
processes of generation and spiration,—the first by adoptive filiation,
the second by an indwelling of the Holy Ghost.(1152) In fact all the
Trinitarian relations are reflected in the justification of the sinner.
Thus regeneration corresponds to the generation of the Logos by the
Father; adoptive sonship and the accompanying participation of the soul in
the Divine Nature corresponds to our Lord’s natural sonship and his
consubstantiality with the Father; the indwelling of the Holy Ghost and
His union with the soul, on the other hand, corresponds to the divine
process of Spiration, inasmuch as it is preëminently a supernatural union
of love and effects a sort of mutual inexistence or perichoresis of the
soul in the Holy Ghost or the three Divine Persons respectively.(1153)
Since, however, this union of the soul with the substance of the three
Divine Persons in general, and the Holy Ghost in particular, is not a
substantial and physical but only an accidental and moral union, the
regeneration of the sinner must be conceived as generation in a
metaphorical sense only, divine sonship as adoptive sonship, the
deification of man as a weak imitation of the divine _homoousia_, and the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul as a shadowy analogue of the
Divine Perichoresis.(1154)

READINGS:—Deharbe, _Die vollkommene Liebe Gottes nach dem hl.
Thomas von Aquin_, Ratisbon 1856.—Marchant, _Die theologischen
Tugenden_, Ratisbon 1864.—Mazzella, _De Virtutibus Infusis_, 4th
ed., Rome 1894.—G. Lahousse, S. J., _De Virtutibus Theologicis_,
Louvain 1890.—S. Schiffini, S. J., _Tractatus de Virtutibus
Infusis_, Freiburg 1904.—J. Kirschkamp, _Der Geist des
Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe_,
Paderborn 1894.—C. Weiss, _S. Thomae Aquinatis de Septem Donis
Spiritus Sancti Doctrina Proposita et Explicata_, Vienna 1895.

On the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just see
A. Scholz, _De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti_, Würzburg
1856.—*Franzelin, _De Deo Trino_, pp. 625 sqq., Rome
1881.—Oberdörffer, _De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti in Animabus
Iustorum_, Tournai 1890.—* B. Froget, O. P., _De l’Inhabitation du
S. Esprit dans les Âmes Justes d’après la Doctrine de S. Thomas
d’Aquin_, Paris 1901.—De Bellevue, _L’Oeuvre du S. Esprit ou la
Sanctification des Âmes_, Paris 1901.

On the historic development of the dogma see Schwane,
_Dogmengeschichte_, 2nd ed., Vol. II, § 56-75, Freiburg 1895.

Section 3. The Properties Of Sanctifying Grace

By a property (_proprium_, ἴδιον) we understand a quality which, though
not part of the essence of a thing, necessarily flows from that essence by
some sort of causation and is consequently found in all individuals of the
same species.(1155) A property, as such, is opposed to an accident
(_accidens_, συμβεβηκός), which is neither part of, nor necessarily
attached to, the essence, but may or may not be present in the individual.
Thus the ability to laugh is a property of human nature, whereas the color
of the skin is an accident.

How do the properties of grace differ from its formal effects, and from
its supernatural concomitants? The formal effects of grace, as we have
seen, are the elements constituting its nature, the properties are
determinations necessarily flowing from that nature, while the
supernatural concomitants are free gifts superadded by God.

According to the Protestant theory, justification is absolutely certain,
equal in all men, and incapable of being lost. The Catholic Church, on the
contrary, teaches that justification is (1) uncertain, (2) unequal, and
(3) amissible. We will explain this teaching in three theses.

*Thesis I: No man knows with certainty of faith whether he is justified or
not.*

This proposition is _de fide_.

Proof. The Tridentine Council rejected the “fiduciary faith”(1156) of
Luther as “an empty heretical confidence,”(1157) and in three distinct
canons denied the properties attributed to faith by the early Protestant
dogmaticians.(1158)

a) Holy Scripture again and again warns us that we can never be sure of
our salvation. St. Paul, though himself “a vessel of election,” freely
admits: “I am not conscious to myself of any thing, yet I am not hereby
justified; but he that judgeth me is the Lord,”(1159) and declares: “I
chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, when I have
preached to others, I myself should become a castaway.”(1160) He exhorts
the faithful to work out their salvation “with fear and trembling.”(1161)

b) The Fathers also teach the uncertainty of justification in the
individual, and attribute it to the fact that, while we know that God
pardons penitent sinners, no man can be entirely certain that he has
complied with all the conditions necessary for justification.

“Our fate,” says St. Chrysostom, “is uncertain for a number of reasons,
one of which is that many of our own works are hidden from us.”(1162) St.
Jerome, commenting on Eccles. IX, 1 sq.,(1163) observes: “In the future
they will know all, and all things are manifest to them, that is to say,
the knowledge of this matter will precede them when they depart this life,
because _then_ the judgment will be pronounced, while _now_ we are still
battling, and it is now uncertain whether those who bear adversities, bear
them for the love of God, like Job, or because they hate Him, as do many
sinners.”(1164) Pope St. Gregory the Great said to a noble matron who
asked him whether she could be sure of her salvation: “You ask me
something which is both useless and difficult [to answer]; difficult,
because I am unworthy to receive a revelation; useless, because it is
better that you be uncertain with regard to your sins, lest in your last
hour you should be unable to repent.”(1165)

c) We now proceed to the theological explanation of the dogma embodied in
our thesis.

α) The purpose of this dogma is not, as Harnack(1166) thinks, “partly to
assuage and partly to excite the restlessness that still remains, by means
of the sacraments, indulgences, liturgical worship and ecclesiastical
encouragement of mystical and monkish practices,” but to prevent undue
security and careless assurance. What the Church condemns, in accordance
with Sacred Scripture and Tradition, is the _certitudo fidei_, that vain
confidence which leads men to feel certain that they are in the state of
grace (_inanis fiducia_), not the _certitudo spei_, _i.e._ humble trust in
God’s abundant mercy. “As no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of
God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the
sacraments,” says the Tridentine Council, “even so each one, when he
regards himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may have fear and
apprehension touching his own grace; seeing that no one can know with a
certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained
the grace of God.”(1167)

One needs but to apply to theology the epistemological principles and
criteria furnished by philosophy to perceive that the Catholic dogma is as
reasonable as the Protestant theory is absurd. The Protestant syllogism:
“I know with a certainty of faith that the penitent sinner who does his
share, is justified through the grace of Christ; now, I, who am a penitent
sinner, know with a certainty of faith that I have done my share;
therefore, I know with a certainty of faith that I am justified,” may be
formally correct, but the minor premise embodies a material error, because
no man knows with a certainty of faith that he has done his share, unless
it be specially revealed to him by God. No matter how sure I may feel of
my own goodness, I have no certainty of faith, such as that which Mary
Magdalen had, or that which was vouchsafed to the penitent thief on the
cross, that I am justified. It is one of the approved rules of syllogistic
reasoning that “the conclusion must follow the weaker premiss.”(1168)
Hence, in the above syllogism the certainty cannot be of faith, but human
and moral only. We do not mean to deny that God may grant to this or that
individual a certainty of faith with regard to his justification; in fact
theologians expressly teach that in such a rare and exceptional case the
privileged person would be obliged to believe in his own justification,
_fide divinâ_.(1169)

β) Can any one, without a special revelation, be _theologically_ certain
that he is justified? Theological certainty (_certitudo theologica_) is
the result of a syllogism which embodies an article of faith in one of its
premises and an obvious truth of reason in the other. Ambrosius
Catharinus(1170) stands alone among Catholic theologians in holding that
there are rare cases in which men do have a theological certainty as to
their justification without a private revelation. All other writers deny
the possibility: (1) because Scripture and Tradition do not countenance
the proposition; (2) because there are no criteria available for such
certainty outside of private revelation, and (3) because the Tridentine
Council censured the assertion “that they who are truly justified must
needs, without any doubt whatever, settle within themselves that they are
justified.”(1171)

γ) For precisely the same reasons no man can be _metaphysically_ certain
of his own justification. Hence there remains only _moral_ certainty.
Moral certainty admits of varying degrees. The highest degree of moral
certainty concerning justification can be had in the case of baptized
infants, though, of course, we can never be metaphysically certain even in
regard to them, because there is always room for doubt as to the intention
of the minister and the validity of the matter and form employed in the
administration of the sacrament. In the case of adults, certainty
regarding justification varies in proportion to the measure in which it
can be ascertained whether one has complied with all the requirements
demanded by God. However, certainty may be so great as to exclude all
reasonable doubt. St. Paul says: “I am sure that neither death nor life
... shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ
Jesus our Lord.”(1172) And St. Augustine: “What do we know? We know that
we have passed from death to life. Whence do we know this? Because we love
our brethren. Let no one ask another. Let each question his own heart; if
he there finds fraternal charity, let him be sure that he has passed from
death to life.”(1173) This teaching has led theologians to set up certain
criteria by which the faithful may be relieved of unreasonable anxiety and
obtain some sort of assurance as to the condition of their souls. Such
criteria are: a taste for things spiritual; contempt of earthly pleasures;
zeal and perseverance in doing good; love of prayer and pious meditation;
patience in suffering and adversity; a fervent devotion to the Blessed
Virgin Mary; frequent reception of the sacraments, etc.(1174)

*Thesis II: Sanctifying grace admits of degrees and therefore can be
increased by good works.*

Both propositions contained in this thesis are _de fide_.

Proof. The Protestant contention that the grace of justification is shared
in an equal measure by all the justified, was a logical deduction from
Luther’s false principle that men are justified by faith alone through the
external justice of Christ. If this were true, good works would be
superfluous, and all Christians would enjoy an equal measure of grace.
Luther formally asserted this in his sermon on the nativity of the Blessed
Virgin: “All we who are Christians are equally great and holy with the
Mother of God.”(1175) The Catholic Church rejects this teaching. She holds
that justification is an intrinsic process by which the justice and
holiness of Christ becomes our own through sanctifying grace, and that
consequently sanctifying grace may be present in the soul in a greater or
less degree, according to the liberality of God and the disposition of the
individual Christian, and those who are in the state of grace may augment
it by good works. The Council of Trent formally defines these truths when
it says: “[We receive] justice within us, each one according to his own
measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and
according to each one’s proper disposition and coöperation.”(1176) And:
“[The justified], faith coöperating with good works, increase in that
justice which they have received through the grace of Christ, and are
still further justified....”(1177) The second and more important of these
truths is re-iterated and emphasized in the canons of Session VI: “If
anyone saith that the justice received is not preserved and also increased
before God through good works, but that those works are merely the fruits
and signs of justification obtained, but not a cause of the increase
thereof: let him be anathema.”(1178)

a) The Tridentine Fathers base their teaching on a number of Scriptural
texts which either expressly declare or presuppose that grace is capable
of being increased in the soul after justification.

Thus we read in Prov. IV, 18: “The path of the just, as a shining light,
goeth forwards and increaseth even to perfect day.”(1179) Ecclus. XVIII,
22: “Let nothing hinder thee from praying always, and be not afraid to be
justified even to death: for the reward of God continueth for ever.”(1180)
2 Pet. III, 18: “Grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and
Saviour Jesus Christ.”(1181) 2 Cor. IX, 10: “[God] will increase the
growth of the fruits of your justice.”(1182) Eph. IV, 7: “But to every one
of us is given grace, according to the measure of the giving of
Christ.”(1183) Apoc. XXII, 11 sq.: “He that is just, let him be justified
still; and he that is holy, let him be sanctified still. Behold, I come
quickly, and my reward is with me, to render to every man according to his
works.”(1184)

Such texts could easily be multiplied.

b) Tradition found definite utterance as early as the fourth century.

When Jovinian attempted to revive the Stoic theory of the absolute
equality of all virtues and vices, he met with strenuous opposition on the
part of St. Jerome, who wrote a special treatise _Contra Iovinianum_, in
which he said: “Each of us receives grace according to the measure of the
grace of Christ (Eph. IV, 7); not as if the measure of Christ were
unequal, but so much of His grace is infused into us as we are capable of
receiving.”(1185) St. Augustine teaches that the just are as unequal as
the sinners. “The saints are clad with justice (Job XXIX, 14), some more,
some less; and no one on this earth lives without sin, some more, some
less: but the best is he who has least.”(1186) But, we are told, life as
such is not capable of being increased; how then can there be an increase
of spiritual life? St. Thomas answers this objection as follows: “The
natural life pertains to the substance of man, and therefore can be
neither augmented nor diminished; but in the life of grace man
participates _accidentaliter_, and consequently he can possess it in a
larger or smaller degree.”(1187)

c) From what we have said it is easy to understand the distinction which
theologians make between justification as _gratia prima_ and justification
as _gratia secunda_. The latter is merely another term for an increase of
grace after justification.

α) Such an increase may be effected either _ex opere operantis_, that is,
by good works, or _ex opere operato_, through the sacraments, and is
called justification (_iustificatio_, δικαίωσις) partly because Sacred
Scripture refers to it by that name(1188) and partly because “to become
just” (_iustum fieri_) and “to become more just” (_iustiorem fieri_) both
imply true sanctification.

In this connection the question may be raised whether sanctifying grace is
diminished by venial sin. Venial sin does not destroy the state of grace
and consequently cannot augment or diminish grace. To assume that it
could, would lead to the absurd conclusion that a definite number of
venial sins might eventually grow into a mortal sin, or that repeated
venial sins gradually diminish grace until finally it disappears. The
first-mentioned assumption is impossible because venial differs
generically from mortal sin, and a transition from the one to the other
would be a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. The second assumption would entail
the heretical inference that the state of grace can be lost without mortal
sin.(1189) No doubt venial sin influences the state of grace unfavorably;
but this evil influence must be conceived as indirect—by committing venial
sins man weakens his will-power, and temptation eventually grows so strong
as to make mortal sin inevitable. “He that contemneth small things, shall
fall little by little.”(1190)

β) If we inquire how sanctifying grace increases in the soul, we find that
the process must be conceived as a growing intensity analogous to that of
light and heat in the physical order.

_Gratia prima_, as we have seen in a previous chapter, is a supernatural
physical quality.(1191) Hence its increase, _i.e._ _gratia secunda_, must
be an increase of physical quality. Such an increase is called in
Scholastic parlance _intensio_.(1192) In what does this process consist?
Certain Thomists(1193) describe it as a _maior radicatio in subiecto_,
while the majority of theologians hold that it is simply an _additio
gradus ad gradum_. This latter explanation is probably the correct one.
Sanctifying grace is either capable of gradual increase, or it is not. If
it is, there is no reason why God should deny such an increase under
certain conditions. If it is not, Luther would have been right in
contending that a newly baptized infant enjoys the same measure of
holiness as the Blessed Virgin Mary or the human soul of our Divine Lord.
It is impossible to imagine how grace could produce a quantitatively
higher holiness by simply striking its roots deeper into the soul.(1194)

γ) A question of greater practical importance is this: Is the increase of
sanctifying grace accompanied by a corresponding increase of the infused
virtues, and _vice versa._

Every increase or decrease of sanctifying grace must _eo ipso_ entail a
corresponding increase or decrease, respectively, of theological charity.
Charity is either identical with grace or it is not.(1195) If it is, an
increase of the one implies an increase of the other; if it is not, the
one cannot increase without an increase of the other, because they are
inseparable and related to each other as nature to faculty, or root to
blossom. Moreover, the degree of heavenly glory enjoyed by a soul will be
commensurate with the measure of charity which it possessed at death. Now
grace and glory bear a proportional relation to each other. Consequently,
grace is augmented as charity increases, and _vice versa_. The same
argument applies to the infused moral virtues.

The case is different, however, with the theological virtues of faith and
hope. These may continue to exist in the soul after charity has departed,
and hence are not inseparable from sanctifying grace and charity, nor from
the moral virtues. This consideration led Suarez to infer that, as the
theological virtues of faith and hope may be infused into the soul
independently of charity and before justification, they must be
susceptible of increase in the course of justification without regard to
the existing state of grace and charity.(1196) This is true of the sinner.
In the justified, as Suarez himself admits, an increase of grace (or
charity) probably always entails an increase of faith and hope,(1197)—a
proposition which finds strong support in the decree of Trent which says:
“This increase of justification Holy Church begs, when she prays: ‘Give
unto us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope, and charity.’ ”(1198)

δ) A final question forces itself upon the enquiring mind, _viz._: Is
sanctifying grace capable of an indefinite increase, or is there a limit
beyond which it cannot grow? In trying to find an answer to this question
we must draw a careful distinction between the absolute and the ordinary
power of God.

There is no intrinsic contradiction in the assumption that grace can be
indefinitely augmented. True, it can never become actually infinite, as
this would involve an absurdity.(1199) But if we regard the power of God
as He sees fit to exercise it in the present economy (_potentia Dei
ordinata_), we find that it is limited by two sublime ideals of holiness
to which neither man nor angel can attain, _viz._: the overflowing measure
of sanctifying grace in the human soul of our Lord Jesus Christ(1200) and
the “fulness of grace” granted to His Mother.(1201) Though these ideals
are beyond our reach, we must not be discouraged, but try to approach them
as nearly as possible.(1202)

*Thesis III: Sanctifying grace is lost by mortal sin.*

This thesis also embodies an article of faith.

Proof. Calvin asserted that neither justification nor faith can be lost by
those who are predestined to salvation, and that the unpredestined are
never truly justified. Luther held that justifying grace is lost solely
through the sin of infidelity. Against the former the Council of Trent
declared: “If anyone saith that a man once justified can sin no more, nor
lose grace, and that therefore he that falls and sins was never truly
justified; ... let him be anathema.”(1203) Against the latter the same
council defined: “If anyone saith that there is no mortal sin but that of
infidelity, or that grace once received is not lost by any other sin,
however grievous and enormous, save by that of infidelity, let him be
anathema.”(1204) At the same time, however, the Holy Synod expressly
declared that venial sin does not destroy the state of grace: “For
although during this mortal life, men, how holy and just soever, at times
fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial,
they do not therefore cease to be just.”(1205)

a) This teaching is so obviously in accord with Sacred Scripture that we
confine ourselves to quoting three or four passages. Ezechiel says that
sanctifying grace may be irretrievably lost: “If the just man turn himself
away from his justice, and do iniquity according to all the abominations
which the wicked man useth to work, shall he live? All his justices which
he hath done shall not be remembered; in the prevarication, by which he
hath prevaricated, and in his sin, which he hath committed, in them he
shall die.”(1206) Our Lord Himself admonishes His Apostles: “Watch ye and
pray, that ye enter not into temptation.”(1207) St. Paul not only warns
the faithful in general terms: “He that thinketh himself to stand, let him
take heed lest he fall;”(1208) but expressly designates certain mortal
sins as a bar to Heaven: “Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor
adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind, nor thieves, nor
covetous, nor drunkards, nor railers, nor extortioners, shall possess the
kingdom of God.”(1209)

b) The teaching of Tradition was brought out clearly in the fight against
Jovinian.

That wily heretic claimed the authority of St. John for the assertion that
the grace of Baptism can never be lost. The Johannean passage in question
reads: “Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin: for His seed abideth
in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.”(1210) St. Jerome in
his reply paraphrases the passage as follows: “Therefore I tell you, my
little children, whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, in order
that you may not sin and that you may know that you will remain sons of
God so long as you refrain from sin.”(1211) St. Augustine teaches: “If a
man, being regenerate and justified, relapses of his own will into an evil
life, assuredly he cannot say: ‘I have not received,’ because of his own
free choice of evil he has lost the grace of God that he has
received.”(1212) And St. Gregory the Great:

“As he who falls away from the faith is an apostate, so he who returns to
an evil deed is regarded by Almighty God as an apostate, even though he
may seem to retain the faith; for the one without the other can be of no
use, because faith availeth nought without [good] works, nor [good] works
without faith.”(1213) The penitential discipline of the primitive Church
furnishes additional proofs for the doctrine under consideration. If grace
could be lost in no other way than by unbelief, the Sacrament of Penance
would be useless.(1214)

c) In connection with this subject theologians are wont to discuss the
question whether or not the forfeiture of sanctifying grace involves the
loss of its supernatural concomitants.

Theological love or charity is substantially identical with sanctifying
grace, or at least inseparable from it, and hence both are gained and lost
together. This is an article of faith. To lose sanctifying grace,
therefore, is to lose theological love. On the other hand, it is equally
_de fide_ that theological faith (_habitus fidei_) is not destroyed by
mortal sin;(1215) it can be lost only by the sin of unbelief.(1216) The
same is true, _mutatis mutandis_, of theological hope. True, the Church
has not definitely declared her mind with regard to hope, but it may be
set down as her teaching that hope is not lost with grace and charity but
survives like faith.(1217) The two contrary opposites of hope are
desperation and presumption, concerning which theologians commonly hold
that the former destroys hope, while the latter probably does not. But
even if hope and charity are lost, faith may remain in the soul like a
solitary root, from which, under more favorable conditions, new life is
apt to spring. As regards the infused moral virtues and the seven gifts of
the Holy Ghost (and, _a fortiori_, His personal indwelling in the
soul),(1218) it is the unanimous teaching that these disappear with
sanctifying grace and charity, even though faith and hope survive. The
reason is that these virtues and gifts are merely supernatural adjuncts of
sanctifying grace and cannot persist without it. “_Accessorium sequitur
principale._”(1219)

Chapter III. The Fruits Of Justification, Or The Merit Of Good Works

The principal fruit of justification, according to the Tridentine
Council,(1220) is the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the
state of sanctifying grace.

Merit (_meritum_), as we have explained in the first part of this
treatise,(1221) is that property of a good work which entitles the doer to
a reward (_praemium, merces_).

Ethics and theology distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign merit or
merit in the strict sense of the term (_meritum adaequatum sive de
condigno_), and (2) congruous merit or quasi-merit (_meritum inadaequatum
sive de congruo_). Condign merit supposes an equality between service and
return. It is measured by commutative justice and confers a strict claim
to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of
strict proportion between service and recompense, confers no such claim
except on grounds of equity.(1222)

In this treatise we are concerned with merit only in the theological sense
of the term, _i.e._ supernatural merit. We shall consider (1) its
Existence,(1223) (2) its Requisites,(1224) and (3) its Objects.(1225)

Section 1. The Existence Of Merit

1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—a) The medieval
Beguins and Beghards held that man is able to attain such a perfect state
of holiness here below as no longer to require an increase of grace or
good works.(1226) Luther, holding that justification consists in the
covering up of sin and the external imputation of the justice of Christ,
consistently though falsely asserted that “the just man sins in every good
work,”(1227) that “a good work, no matter how well performed, is a venial
sin,”(1228) and that “every work of the just deserves damnation and is
mortally sinful, if it be considered as it really is in the judgment of
God.”(1229) Calvin rejected good works as “impurities and
defilements,”(1230) which God covers with the cloak of the merits of Jesus
Christ and which He sometimes rewards with temporal blessings but never
with eternal life. Modern Protestantism has given up or at least
attenuated these harsh doctrines.(1231)

b) The Church had defined her teaching on this point centuries before the
time of the “Reformers.” Thus the Second Council of Orange declared as
early as 529: “Good works, when performed, deserve a reward; but grace,
which is a free gift, precedes good works and is a necessary condition of
them.”(1232) The Fourth Lateran Council reiterated this doctrine: “Not
only virgins and those who practice continence, but the married also, who
please God by having the right faith and performing good works, deserve to
obtain eternal happiness.”(1233) The Tridentine Council goes into the
matter at length in the sixteenth Chapter of its Sixth Session, where we
read _inter alia_: “And for this reason life eternal is to be proposed to
those working well unto the end and hoping in God, both as a grace
mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a
reward which is according to the promise of God Himself to be faithfully
rendered to their good works and merits.”(1234)

The same Council formally condemned the Lutheran position as heretical:
“If anyone saith that in every good work the just man sins at least
venially, or, which is more intolerable still, mortally, and consequently
deserves eternal punishments; and that for this cause only he is not
damned that God does not impute those works unto salvation; let him be
anathema.”(1235) The positive teaching of the Church may be gathered from
the following condemnation: “If anyone saith that the just ought not, for
their good works done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense
from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if so be that
they persevere to the end in well-doing and in keeping the commandments;
let him be anathema.”(1236) The existence of merit in the true and proper
sense of the term is specially emphasized as follows: “If anyone saith
that ... the justified, by the good works which he performs through the
grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is,
does not truly merit increase of grace...; let him be anathema.”(1237) The
quietistic errors of Michael de Molinos were condemned by Pope Innocent
XI, Nov. 20, 1687.(1238)

2. THE MERITORIOUSNESS OF GOOD WORKS DEMONSTRATED FROM SCRIPTURE AND
TRADITION.—Both Holy Scripture and Tradition employ _opus bonum_ and
_meritum_ as reciprocal or correlative terms.

a) In the Old Testament the good deeds of the just are often declared to
be meritorious in the sight of God. Cfr. Wisd. V, 16: “But the just shall
live for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord.”(1239) Ecclus.
XVIII, 22: “Be not afraid to be justified even to death, for the reward of
God continueth for ever.”(1240) The New Testament teaching culminates in
the “eight beatitudes,” each of which is accompanied by a special reward.
After enumerating them all, with the promises attached to each, our Divine
Saviour significantly adds: “Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is very
great in heaven.”(1241)

St. Paul, who so strongly insists on the absolute gratuitousness of
Christian grace, nevertheless acknowledges the existence of merits to
which a reward is due from God. Cfr. Rom. II, 6 sq.: “[God] will render to
every man according to his works, to them indeed who according to patience
in good work, seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.”(1242)
2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course,
I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of
justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day, and
not only to me, but to them also that love his coming.”(1243) 1 Cor. III,
8: “Every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own
labor.”(1244) Col. III, 23 sq.: “Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart,
as to the Lord, and not to men, knowing that you shall receive of the Lord
the reward of inheritance.”(1245) The most eloquent exponent of the
necessity of good works is St. James, who also insists on their
meritoriousness: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he
hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath
promised to them that love him.”(1246) In the Apocalypse Jesus says: “Be
thou faithful until death, and I will give thee the crown of life.”(1247)

b) The teaching of the Fathers is an effective commentary on the
Scriptural doctrine just expounded, as may be seen from their homilies
reproduced in the Roman Breviary.

St. Ignatius of Antioch says: “Suffer me to be eaten by the beasts,
through whom I can attain to God.”(1248) St. Irenæus: “Precious should be
to us the crown which we gain in battle, ... and the more we obtain it by
combat, the more precious it is.”(1249) St. Ambrose: “Is it not evident
that the reward and punishment of merits endure after death?”(1250) St.
Augustine: “Eternal life contains the whole reward in the promise of which
we rejoice; nor can the reward precede desert, nor be given to a man
before he is worthy of it. What can be more unjust than this, and what is
more just than God? We should not then demand the reward before we deserve
to get it.”(1251) And again: “As death is given, so to speak, to reward
the merit of sin, so eternal life is given to reward the merit of justice,
... and hence it is also called reward in many Scriptural passages.”(1252)

c) Theologically the meritoriousness of good works is based on the
providence of God. There must be some sort of sanction to enforce the
divine laws,—not only the natural law (_lex naturae_), but, _a fortiori_,
the “law of grace” (_lex gratiae_), as the supernatural order is so much
more important than the natural.

α) By the good works which he performs in the state of sanctifying grace,
and with the aid of actual graces (_in gratia et ex gratia_), man acquires
a twofold merit,—he helps to execute the divine plan of governance in
regard to his fellow-creatures and assists in furthering the external
glory of God, which is the ultimate purpose of creation. For this he is
entitled to a double reward, just as the sinner is deserving of a double
punishment for the injury he does to his fellowmen and the dishonor he
reflects upon his Creator.(1253)

It is objected against this argument that our supernatural merits, being
finite, are in no proportion to the possession and enjoyment of an
Infinite Good. This objection vanishes in the light of the following
considerations: (1) Sanctifying grace is a kind of _deificatio_, which
raises man above himself to a quasi-divine dignity that colors all his
actions.(1254) (2) The ability of the justified to perform supernaturally
good works is based entirely upon the infinite merits of Jesus
Christ.(1255) (3) The Infinite Good is possessed by the creature, not in
an infinite but in a merely finite manner. Hence there _is_ a due
proportion between good works and merit.(1256)

One difficulty still remains, _viz._: By what title do infants who die in
the state of baptismal innocence attain to eternal beatitude, which they
have been unable to merit? We answer: The just man has two distinct claims
to Heaven, one as a child of God,(1257) and another as a laborer in His
vineyard. Baptized infants who have not yet arrived at the use of reason,
possess only the first claim, while adult Christians who lead a good life
enjoy also the _titulus mercedis_ and consequently are entitled to a
richer reward. Both claims ultimately rest on the merits of Jesus
Christ.(1258)

β) What we have said is sufficient to disprove the groundless assertion
that the Catholic doctrine concerning the meritoriousness of good works
derogates from the merits of Christ and fosters “self-righteousness.”
Would it not be far more derogatory to the honor of our Saviour to assume
that He failed to obtain for those for whom He suffered and died, a
limited capacity for gaining merits? Does it in any way impair the dignity
of God as the _causa prima_ to assume that He communicates to His
creatures a limited causality, by which they are enabled to act as true
_causae secundae_, instead of being mere _causae occasionales_, as the
Occasionalists assert?(1259) As regards the other charge, no true Catholic
is guilty of “self-righteousness” because he regards his good works as
“fruits of justification,” owing purely to grace. The “self-righteousness”
of which Luther speaks is incompatible with the virtue of humility. The
faithful Christian, according to St. Paul, may safely rejoice over his
merits, because the uncertainty of justification and the consciousness
that his good works are but limited at best, are a sufficient protection
against self-righteousness and presumption.(1260)

3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—Though the Tridentine Council
merely defined in general terms that all good works performed in the state
of sanctifying grace are meritorious,(1261) it is theologically certain
that the merit due to good works is the merit of condignity.

a) According to Pallavicini(1262) the Fathers of Trent without exception
were convinced that the merit inherent in good works is a _meritum de
condigno_, based upon divine justice, and they purposely employed the term
_vere_ to exclude that quasi-merit which in the technical terminology of
the Schools is called _meritum de congruo_.(1263) They refrained from
expressly employing the term _meritum de condigno_, because _meritum
verum_ is a plain and adequate term, and for this additional reason that
they wished to avoid certain theological controversies regarding the
nature of the _meritum de condigno_ and its requisites.(1264)

b) We need not enter into these controversies to understand that condign
merit supposes an equality between service and reward. The proposition can
be proved from Sacred Scripture by an indirect argument. The _meritum de
condigno_ is based on a strict claim of justice, not on mere equity. Now
the Bible leaves no doubt that God meant to make himself a debtor to man
in strict justice. Cfr. Heb. VI, 10: “For God is not unjust, that he
should forget your work.”(1265) 2 Tim. IV, 8: “... there is laid up for me
a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in
that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his
coming.”(1266) James I, 12: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation;
for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which
God hath promised to them that love him.”(1267) That there must be a
_condignitas_ between service and reward is clearly apparent from such
texts as these:—Wis. III, 5: “... God hath tried them and found them
worthy of himself.”(1268) 2 Thess. I, 4 sq.: “... in all your persecutions
and tribulations, which you endure, for an example [as a token] of the
just judgment of God, that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of
God, for which also you suffer.”(1269) Apoc. III, 4: “... they shall walk
with me in white, because they are worthy.”(1270) Not merely as their
benefactor but as the just judge, Christ will say to the elect on judgment
day: “Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for
you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to
eat....”(1271) Justly therefore is sanctifying grace, as the _principium
dignificativum operum_, called the “seed of God,”(1272) because it
contains a celestial reward even as an acorn contains the oak. True, St.
Thomas, to whom we are indebted for this simile,(1273) in another part of
the _Summa_(1274) defends the theological axiom: “_Deus punit circa
condignum et remunerat ultra condignum_,” but he does not mean to deny the
equality between service and reward, but merely to exalt the generosity
that prompts God to bestow upon creatures what is due to them more
bountifully than they deserve. Cfr. Luke VI, 38: “Give, and it shall be
given to you: good measure and pressed down and shaken together and
running over shall they give into your bosom.”(1275)

Section 2. The Requisites Of Merit

As we are dealing with the “fruits of justification,” it becomes necessary
to ascertain the requisites or conditions of true merit. There are seven
such; four have reference to the meritorious work itself, two to the agent
who performs it, and one to God who gives the reward.

1. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE MERITORIOUS WORK.—A work, to be
meritorious, must be morally good, free, performed with the assistance of
actual grace, and inspired by a supernatural motive.

a) As every evil deed implies demerit and is deserving of punishment, so
the notion of merit supposes a morally good work (_opus honestum_).

Cfr. Eph. VI, 8: “Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man shall do, the
same shall he receive from the Lord.”(1276) 2 Cor. V, 10: “We must all be
manifested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive
the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be
good or evil.”(1277) There are no morally indifferent works _in
individuo_, _i.e._ practically; and if there were, they could be neither
meritorious nor demeritorious, but would become meritorious in proportion
as they are made morally good by means of a “good intention.” It would be
absolutely wrong to ascribe merit only to the more perfect works of
supererogation (_opera supererogatoria_), such as the vow of perpetual
chastity, excluding all works of mere obligation, such as the faithful
observance of the commandments. Being morally good, the works of
obligation are also meritorious, because goodness and meritoriousness are
correlative terms.(1278) Whether the mere omission of an evil act is in
itself meritorious, is doubtful.(1279) But most theologians are agreed in
holding that the external work, as such, adds no merit to the internal
act, except in so far as it reacts on the will and sustains and
intensifies its operation. This and similar questions properly belong to
moral theology.

b) The second requisite of merit is moral liberty (_libertas indifferens
ad actum_), that is to say, freedom from both external and internal
compulsion. This has been dogmatically defined against Jansenius.(1280)

That there can be no merit without liberty is clearly inculcated by Sacred
Scripture. Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 17: “For if I do this willingly, I have a
reward.”(1281) Matth. XIX, 17: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the
commandments.”(1282) “Where there is compulsion,” says St. Jerome, “there
is neither a crown nor damnation.”(1283) The morality of an act depends
entirely on its being an _actus humanus_. Now no act is truly “human”
unless it be freely performed. Consequently, freedom of choice is an
indispensable condition of moral goodness and therefore also of merit.

What kind of liberty is necessary to enable the will to acquire merit?
Theologians answer by saying that it is _libertas contradictionis sive
exercitii_. If I do a good deed which I am free to do or not to do, I
perform a morally good and therefore meritorious work. As regards the
_libertas specificationis_, (that freedom by which a person may act thus
or otherwise, _e.g._ give alms to one applicant in preference to another,
or mortify himself in this or that particular manner), there can be no
doubt that, whatever the choice made, the action is always good and
meritorious. However, theologians have excogitated a hypothetical case in
which an action may be _physically_ free without being meritorious. It is
when one is compelled to do a certain thing and is free only in so far as
he is able to choose between two actions exactly equal in moral worth.
This would be the case, for instance, if he had to pay a debt of ten
dollars and were left free to pay it either in coin or in currency. The
more common opinion is that in a case of this kind there would be a lack
of that liberty which is necessary to render an act morally good and
therefore meritorious.(1284)

c) The third requisite of merit is actual grace. Its necessity is evident
from the fact that, to be meritorious, an act must be supernatural and
consequently cannot be performed without the aid of prevenient and
coöperating grace.(1285)

d) Merit further requires a supernatural motive, for the reason that every
good work must be supernatural, both as regards object and circumstances
(_ex obiecto et circumstantiis_), and the end for which it is performed
(_ex fine_). In determining the necessary qualities of this motive,
however, theologians differ widely.

α) A considerable number, mostly of the Thomist persuasion, demand the
motive of theological charity, and consequently regard the state of
charity (_caritas habitualis sive status caritatis et gratiae_) as
essential for the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state
of grace, even if they are performed from some other, truly supernatural
though inferior motive, such as obedience, the fear of God, etc. This
rigorous school is constrained to raise the question whether every single
good work, to be supernaturally meritorious, must proceed from an act of
divine charity (_toties quoties_), or whether the virtual influence of one
act is sufficient to endow a series of subsequent acts with
meritoriousness. Only a few Thomist theologians(1286) defend the
first-mentioned theory. The majority(1287) hold that the _influxus
virtualis caritatis_ is sufficient. This view is vigorously defended by
Cardinal Bellarmine, who says: “It is not enough to make a general good
intention at the beginning of a year, or month, or day, by which all
future actions are referred to God; but it is necessary to refer each
particular act to God before it is performed.”(1288) The advocates of this
theory base their opinion on certain Scriptural and Patristic texts, and
especially on St. Thomas, whose teaching they misunderstand.(1289)

The dogmatic question whether good works can be meritorious without being
inspired by supernatural charity, has nothing to do with the moral problem
whether there is an obligation to make an act of charity from time to
time, except in so far as habitual charity,—_i.e._ the state of charity,
which is always required for merit, nay even for the preservation of
sanctifying grace,—cannot be permanently sustained unless renewed from
time to time and effectuated by a fresh act of that virtue.(1290) St.
Alphonsus teaches that every man is obliged to make an act of charity at
least once a month, but he is contradicted by other eminent moralists. In
practice it is well to insist on frequent acts of charity because such
acts not only confirm and preserve the state of grace, but render our good
works incomparably more meritorious in the sight of God. Hence, too, the
importance of making a “good intention” every morning before beginning the
day’s work.(1291)

β) There is a second group of very eminent theologians, including
Suarez,(1292) Vasquez,(1293) De Lugo, and Ballerini, who hold that, to be
meritorious, the good works of a just man, who has habitual charity, need
only conform to the divine law, no special motive being required. These
writers base their teaching on the Tridentine decree which says: “For this
is that crown of justice which the Apostle declared was, after his fight
and course, laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the Just Judge, and
not only to him, but also to all that love His coming. For, whereas Jesus
Christ Himself continually infuses His virtue into the said justified,—as
the head into the members and the vine into the branches,—and this virtue
always precedes, and accompanies, and follows their good works, which
without it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God
(can. 2), we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified
to prevent their being accounted to have, by those very works which have
been done in God, fully satisfied the divine law according to the state of
this life, and to have truly merited eternal life, to be obtained also in
its [due] time, if so be, however, that they depart in grace.”(1294) This
teaching is in harmony with Scripture. The Bible nowhere requires an act
of charity to make good works meritorious for Heaven. In the “eight
beatitudes”(1295) our Lord Himself promises eternal glory for works which
are not all works of charity, nor even dictated by charity, either formal
or virtual. When He was asked: “Master, what good shall I do that I may
have life everlasting?”(1296) he did not answer with Bellarmine: “Steep
all thy works in the motive of charity,” but declared: “If thou wilt enter
into life, keep the commandments.”(1297) And when requested to specify, He
simply cited the ordinary precepts of the Decalogue.(1298) We also know
that at the Last Judgment He will receive the elect into the “kingdom of
His Father” solely in consideration of the works of mercy they have
done.(1299)

Theological reasoning lends its support to this view. If good works
performed without the motive of charity were not supernaturally
meritorious, this would be attributable to one of three causes. Either the
just would sin by doing good; or good works performed without charity
would not be deserving of eternal beatitude; or, finally, there would be
no strict equality between service and reward. All three of these
suppositions are untenable. The first would lead to Bajanism or
Jansenism.(1300) The second and third overlook the fact that the requisite
proportion (_condignitas_) between service and reward is furnished by
sanctifying grace or habitual charity, which, as _deificatio_, adoptive
sonship, and union with the Holy Ghost, actually supplies that for which
the _motivum caritatis_ is demanded.

We might ask the advocates of the more rigorous opinion, whence the act of
charity which they demand for every meritorious work, derives its peculiar
proportionality or _condignitas_ with the beatific vision. Surely not from
itself, because as an act it is merely _primus inter pares_, without in
any essential respect excelling other motives. There is no alternative but
to attribute it to that quasi-divine dignity which is imparted to the just
man and his works by sanctifying grace.

For these reasons present-day theology regards the second theory as
sufficiently well established and the faithful are largely guided by it in
practice.(1301)

2. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE AGENT WHO MERITS.—The agent who
merits must be a wayfarer and in the state of sanctifying grace.

a) The wayfaring state (_status viae_) is merely another name for life on
earth. Death as the natural, though not essentially necessary limit of
life, closes the time of meriting. Nothing is more clearly taught in Holy
Scripture than that we must sow in this world if we desire to reap in the
next.(1302)

b) The second requisite is the state of sanctifying grace. Only the just
can be “sons of God” and “heirs of heaven.”(1303) Cfr. John XV, 4: “As the
branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so
neither can you, unless you abide in me.”(1304) Rom. VIII, 17: “And if
sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ.”(1305)

Does the degree of sanctifying grace existing in the soul exert a decisive
influence on the amount of merit due to the good works performed? This
question can be easily solved on the theological principle that the
supernatural dignity of the soul increases in proportion to its growth in
sanctifying grace. Vasquez holds that, other things being equal, one who
is holier gains no greater merit by performing a given work than one who
is less holy.(1306) All other theologians(1307) hold with St. Thomas(1308)
that the meritoriousness of a good deed is larger in proportion to the
godlike dignity of the agent, which in turn is measured by the degree of
sanctifying grace in the soul. This explains why God, in consideration of
the greater holiness of some saints who are especially dear to Him, often
deigns through their intercession to grant favors which He refuses to
others.(1309)

3. THE REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF GOD.—Merit requires but one
thing on the part of God, _viz._: that He accept the good work _in actu
secundo_ as deserving of reward. Since, however, theologians are not
agreed on this point, we are dealing merely with a more or less
well-founded opinion.

Though the good works of the just derive a special intrinsic value from
the godlike dignity of adoptive sonship, and, consequently, _in actu
primo_, are truly meritorious prior to and apart from their acceptance by
God, yet human service and divine remuneration are separated by such a
wide gulf that, in order to make a good deed meritorious _in actu
secundo_, the divine acceptance and promise of reward must be expressly
superadded.

In regard to the relation between service and reward Catholic theologians
are divided into three schools.

The Scotists(1310) hold that the _condignitas_ of a good work rests
entirely on God’s gratuitous promise and free acceptance, without which
even the most heroic act would be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it
even naturally good works may become meritorious. This rather shallow
theory almost completely loses sight of the godlike dignity peculiar to
the just in their capacity of “adopted children of God” and “temples of
the Holy Ghost,” and is unable to account for such important Biblical
terms as “crown of justice,” “prize of victory,” “just judge,” etc.

Suarez and his school contend that there is such a perfectly balanced
equality between merit and reward that God is obliged in strict justice
(_ex obligatione iustitiae_), prior to and apart from any formal act of
acceptance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the beatific
vision. This view is scarcely tenable because there is no common basis on
which to construe a relation of strict justice between the Creator and His
creatures,(1311) and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that “The
sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to
come.”(1312)

Hence we prefer to hold with Lessius,(1313) Vasquez,(1314) and De
Lugo(1315) that the _condignitas_ or equality existing between merit and
reward, owes its origin both to the intrinsic value of the good work
itself and to the free acceptance and gratuitous promise of God. This
solution duly respects the intrinsic value of merit _in actu primo_,
without derogating from the sublime dignity of God, who rewards good works
not because He is obliged to do so by the merits of a mere creature, but
solely because He is bound by His own truthfulness and fidelity. Thus
God’s justice towards His creatures is placed upon a free basis, and there
is no violation of justice (_iniuria_) on His part. “From the fact that
our actions have no merit except on the supposition that God so ordained,”
says St. Thomas, “it does not follow that God is simply our debtor; He is
His own debtor, _i.e._ He owes it to Himself to see that His commands are
obeyed.”(1316) This teaching can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr.
James I, 12: “He shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised
to them that love him.”(1317) It is reechoed by St. Augustine: “God is
made our debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but because it pleased
Him to promise us something. For it is in a different sense that we say to
a man: You are indebted to me because I have given you something, and: You
owe this to me because you have promised it. To God we never say: Give
back to me because I have given to Thee. What have we given to God, since
it is from Him that we have received whatever we are and whatever good we
possess? We have therefore given Him nothing.... In this manner,
therefore, may we demand of God, by saying: Give me what Thou hast
promised, because we have done what Thou didst command, and it is Thyself
that hast done it because Thou hast aided our labors.”(1318) The
Tridentine Council seems to endorse this view when it says: “Life eternal
is to be proposed to those ... hoping in God ... as a reward which is,
according to the promise of God Himself, to be faithfully rendered to
their good works and merits.”(1319)

Section 3. The Objects Of Merit

After defining the existence of merit the Tridentine Council enumerates
its objects as follows: “If anyone saith that the justified, by the good
works which he performs, ... does not truly merit increase of grace,
eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,—if it be so,
however, that he depart in grace,—and also an increase of glory: let him
be anathema.”(1320) Hence merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an
increase of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; and (3) an increase of
that glory. The expression “_vere mereri_” shows that all three of these
objects can be merited in the true and strict sense of the term (_de
condigno_). This is, however, no more than a theologically certain
conclusion.

1. INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE.—The first grace of justification
(_gratia prima_) can never be merited;(1321) hence the meaning of the
above-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be increased by good
works. This increase is technically called _gratia secunda_. All
Scriptural texts which assert that sanctifying grace is unequal in
different individuals, also prove that it can be increased or augmented by
the performance of meritorious works.(1322)

a) No adult person can merit the first grace of assistance (_gratia prima
actualis_), nor any one of the series of actual graces which follow it,
and by which justification ultimately comes to pass. They are all purely
gratuitous. Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (_gratia
prima habitualis_) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner preparing for
justification. This is the express teaching of Trent: “But we are
therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things
which precede justification—whether faith or works—merit the grace itself
of justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now by works;
otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace.”(1323) To
deny this would not only imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace
(because if the first grace given before active justification could be
strictly merited, this would necessarily involve the _gratia prima
actualis_), but it would also start a vicious circle (because the _gratia
prima habitualis_ is an indispensable condition of merit). This explains
why St. Paul and St. Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both
of the first grace of assistance and the grace of justification
proper.(1324) “This grace of Christ,” says St. Augustine, “without which
neither infants nor adults can be saved, is not bestowed for any merits,
but is given freely, on account of which it is also called grace. ‘Being
justified,’ says the Apostle, ‘freely through His blood.’ ”(1325)

In the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the question, raised by
Vasquez, whether perfect contrition justifies the sinner merely _per modum
dispositionis_ or _per modum causae formalis_. Both contrition and
charity, be they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose
the soul for justification.(1326) Hence, no matter how perfect, neither is
capable of effecting justification itself by way of merit (_merendo_),
nay, of entering even partially, as Vasquez would have it, into the formal
cause of justification, because, according to the Tridentine Council,
sanctifying grace and not perfect contrition is the _unica causa formalis_
of justification.(1327)

b) In connection with the dogma just explained theologians discuss the
question whether a just man may strictly (_de condigno_) merit the actual
graces which God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between
merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theologians commonly hold(1328)
that merely sufficient graces may be merited _de condigno_, not so
efficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would
necessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (_donum
perseverantiae_), which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. Assuming
that the justified could by good works strictly merit the _prima gratia
efficax_ (an impossible hypothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious
grace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth
grace—and ultimately to the final grace of perseverance, which, in matter
of fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict
right to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the
greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from
righteousness.(1329) For this reason the Tridentine Council mentions
neither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of
merit.(1330)

2. ETERNAL LIFE OR HEAVENLY GLORY.—The second object of merit is eternal
life. The dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given above.(1331)
Eternal life is described by the Tridentine Council(1332) both as a grace
and as a reward.

a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Section the same
Council(1333) enumerates four apparently separate and distinct objects of
merit, _viz._: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal
life, and increase of glory. Why the distinction between “eternal life”
and the “attainment of eternal life”? Does this imply a twofold reward,
and consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was
the intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently
coincides with the right to the payment of the same. An unattainable
eternal life would be a chimera.(1334) Nevertheless, the distinction is
not superfluous, since the attainment of eternal life does not coincide
with the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then
depends upon the condition of the soul: “_si tamen in gratia decesserit_”
(provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod
also wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying
grace _ipso facto_ entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired
merits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal
sin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his
former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new
justification.(1335)

b) A close analysis of the Tridentine canon under review gives rise to
another difficulty. Can the _gloria prima_ be merited? In defining the
_gratia secunda_ as an object of strict merit, the Council expressly
excludes the _gratia prima_. It makes no such distinction in regard to
glory, but names both “eternal life” (_gloria prima_) and “increase of
glory” (_gloria secunda_) as objects of merit. This naturally suggests the
query: Why and to what extent can the just man merit the _gloria prima_,
seeing that he is unable to merit the _gratia prima_? Some
theologians(1336) contend that the justified are entitled to the _gloria
prima_ only as a heritage (_titulo haereditatis_), never as a reward
(_titulo mercedis_). Because of its intimate causal connection with the
_gratia prima_, which is beyond the reach of merit, the _gloria prima_,
they argue, cannot be regarded as an object of merit except on the
assumption that the merits which precede justification confer a claim to
the _gloria prima_. This assumption is false, because without sanctifying
grace no condign merits can be acquired.(1337) In spite of this
difficulty, however, most theologians(1338) hold that, unlike the _gratia
prima_, the _gloria prima_ may under certain conditions be an object of
strict merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is not a
necessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good works, while the state
of grace is, the former may _positis ponendis_ be an effect of the
_meritum de congruo_, though the latter may not. A mere statement of the
problem shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we
distinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of two distinct
hypotheses. It is generally agreed that infants dying in the state of
baptismal grace owe that grace, and the state of glory which they enjoy in
Heaven, solely to God’s mercy and have no claim to beatitude other than
that of heredity (_titulus hereditatis_). Adults who preserve their
baptismal innocence until death, manifestly cannot merit the _gloria
prima_ by their good works, because they already possess a legal title to
it through Baptism.(1339) It follows that their good works increase, but
do not merit, the _gloria prima_, to which these souls are already
entitled _titulo haereditatis_. The case is quite different with
catechumens and Christians guilty of mortal sin, who are justified by an
act of perfect contrition before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament
of Penance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that
they merit for themselves _de condigno_, not indeed the first grace of
justification, but the _gloria prima_, because perfect contrition, being
an _opus operans_, at the very moment of its infusion becomes an _opus
meritorium_ entitled to eternal glory.(1340) As regards the great majority
of adult Catholics who, because of defective preparation, never get beyond
imperfect contrition (_attritio_), and therefore are not justified until
they actually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe whatever
grace they possess and whatever glory they have a claim to, entirely to
the _opus operatum_ of the Sacrament.(1341)

3. INCREASE OF HEAVENLY GLORY.—The third object of merit, according to the
Tridentine Council, is “increase of glory.” This must evidently correspond
to an increase of grace, which in its turn is conditioned upon the
performance of additional good works. That there is a causal connection
between meritorious works performed on earth and the glory enjoyed in
Heaven is clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. XVI, 27: “For the
Son of man shall ... render to every man according to his works.”(1342) 1
Cor. III, 8: “And every man shall receive his own reward, according to his
own labor.”(1343) A further argument may be derived from the unequal
apportionment of glory to the elect in Heaven.(1344) This inequality is
based on inequality of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact that
grace can be augmented by good works. Consequently, the inequality of
glory depends ultimately on good works.(1345)

4. NOTE ON THE MERITUM DE CONGRUO.—Congruous, as distinguished from
condign merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a quasi-claim
based on equity (_ex quadam aequitate_, _congruentia_, _decentia_).

Hence congruous merit and condign merit are not species of the same genus,
but merely analogous terms. Because of the ambiguity of the word “equity”
Dominicus Soto, Becanus, and a few other Scholastics rejected the use of
the term _meritum de congruo_ in theology. But this was a mistake. The
Fathers engaged in the Semipelagian controversy, notably St.
Augustine,(1346) did not assert that the justifying faith of the sinner is
entirely without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are identical
with those of condign merit(1347) in all respects except one,—the _meritum
de congruo_ does not require the state of grace.

a) According to the common opinion, from which but few theologians
dissent,(1348) a Christian in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment
he begins to coöperate with supernatural grace, merit _de congruo_ by good
works, and obtain by prayer the dispositions necessary for justification,
and ultimately justification itself.

“Prayer relies on mercy,” says St. Thomas, “condign merit on justice. And
therefore man obtains from the divine mercy many things by prayer which he
does not merit in strict justice.”(1349) This teaching is based partly on
Holy Scripture and partly on the writings of St. Augustine, and is
confirmed by certain utterances of the Council of Trent. By
conscientiously preparing himself with the aid of actual grace, the sinner
probably merits an additional claim (in equity) to justification. Cfr. Ps.
L, 19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled
heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.”(1350) Dan. IV, 24: “Redeem thou thy
sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor:
perhaps he [God] will forgive thy offences.”(1351) St. Augustine says:
“The remission of sins itself is not without some merit, if faith asks for
it. Nor is that faith entirely unmeritorious by which the publican was
moved to say: ‘God, be merciful to me, a sinner,’ and then went away
justified through the merit of faithful humility.”(1352)

b) By good works the just may merit for themselves, not in strict justice
(_de condigno_), but as a matter of equity (_de congruo_), final
perseverance, conversion from mortal sin, spiritual favors for others, and
also such temporal blessings as may be conducive to eternal salvation.

α) It is a theologically certain conclusion, accepted by all theologians
without exception, that the grace of final perseverance (_donum
perseverantiae_) cannot be merited in the strict sense (_de condigno_).
Most authors hold, however, that it can be merited de congruo. This
_meritum_ is technically called _meritum de congruo fallibili_. Those who
deny that it can be merited at all, admit that it can be infallibly
obtained by fervent and unremitting prayer.(1353)

β) It is impossible to answer with anything like certainty the question
whether the just man is able to merit for himself in advance the grace of
conversion against the eventuality of a future lapse into mortal sin.
Following the lead of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas takes a negative
view,(1354) on the ground that mortal sin interrupts the state of grace
and annihilates all former merits. In another passage of his writings,
however, the Angelic Doctor says: “There are two kinds of merit, one based
on justice, and this is called condign; and another based solely upon
mercy, and this is called congruous. Of the latter St. Paul says that it
is just, _i.e._ congruous, that a man who has performed many good works
should merit.... And in this wise God does not forget our work and
love.”(1355) Scotus,(1356) Bonaventure,(1357) and Suarez(1358) regard this
as “a pious and probable opinion,” well supported by Holy Scripture. The
prophet Jehu said to Josaphat, King of Juda: “Thou helpest the ungodly,
and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and
therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord; but good works
are found in thee.”(1359) To this argument add the following
consideration: If previous mortal sin does not prevent those acts whereby
man is disposed for justification from being at least to a limited extent
meritorious, there is no reason to assume that merits cancelled by
subsequent mortal sin will not be imputed to the sinner, with due regard,
of course, to a certain proportion between past merits and future
sins.(1360) To pray for the grace of conversion against the eventuality of
future mortal sin, is always good and useful,(1361) because it cannot but
please God to know that we sincerely desire to be restored to His
friendship if we should ever have the misfortune of losing it.(1362)

γ) The just man may congruously merit for others whatever he is able to
merit for himself, _e.g._ the grace of conversion, final perseverance, and
also the first prevenient grace (_gratia prima praeveniens_), which no man
in the state of original sin is able to merit for himself.(1363) The
reason for this, according to St. Thomas, is the intimate relation of
friendship which sanctifying grace establishes between the just man and
God.(1364) However, as Sylvius rightly observes, it is not in the power of
the just to obtain by this friendship favors which would involve the
abrogation of the divinely established order of salvation. Such a favor
would be, for example, the justification of a sinner without the medium of
grace, or of a child without the agency of Baptism. An unreasonable
petition deserves no consideration, even if made by a friend. What may be
obtained by the merit of good works may be even more effectively obtained
by prayer for others. The Apostle St. James teaches: “Pray for one another
that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth
much.”(1365) This consoling truth is confirmed by the dogma of the
Communion of Saints, by many illustrious examples from the Bible(1366) and
ecclesiastical history,(1367) and by the traditional practice of the
Church in praying God to give strength and perseverance to the faithful
and the grace of conversion to the heathen and the sinner.(1368)

δ) A final question remains to be answered: Can the just congruously merit
such temporal blessings as good health, a comfortable living, and success
in business? They can, but only in so far as these favors are conducive to
eternal salvation; for otherwise they would not be graces. St. Thomas
seems to go even further than this by describing temporal favors as
objects of condign merit when they are conducive to salvation, and of
congruous merit when they bear no relation to that end.(1369) We have no
space left to enter into an argument on this point, but in conclusion wish
to call attention to two important facts: first, that prayer is more
effective than good works in obtaining temporal as well as spiritual
favors; and secondly, that we should not strive with too much anxiety for
earthly goods, but direct our thoughts, desires, prayers, and actions to
God, the Infinite Good, who has promised to be our “exceeding great
reward.”(1370)

READINGS:—St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1
sqq.—Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 8, art. 1-5.—*Bellarmine, _De
Iustificatione_, V, 1-22.—*Suarez, _Opusc. de Divina
Iustitia_.—IDEM, _De Gratia_, l. XII, cap. 1 sqq.—Oswald, _Lehre
von der Heiligung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnodenwahl_, § 7,
3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.—Tepe, _Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol.
III, pp. 223 sqq., Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische
Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 473 sqq., Mainz 1897.—Chr. Pesch,
_Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 215 sqq.,
Freiburg 1908.—*S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 594 sqq.,
Freiburg 1901.—Kneib, _Die Lohnsucht der christlichen Moral_,
Vienna 1904.—I. J. Remler, C. M., _Supernatural Merit_, St. Louis
1914.—A. Devine, C. P., _The Sacraments Explained_, 3rd ed.,
London 1905, pp. 74-89.—L. Labauche, S. S., _God and Man_, pp.
254-270, N. Y. 1916. (On merit in general see M. Cronin, _The
Science of Ethics_, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 544 sqq.)—B. J.
Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St.
Louis 1918, pp. 249 sqq.

On the Protestant idea of the fruits of justification see Möhler,
_Symbolik_, § 21 sqq. (English edition, pp. 157 sqq.).

INDEX

Acceptance of good works by God, 419 sqq.

Actual Grace, 3 sqq.;
Its nature, 5 sqq.;
Its relation to habitual Grace, 14 sqq.;
Definition of, 15;
Its two-fold causality, 15 sqq.;
Division of, 19 sqq.;
Properties of, 49 sqq.;
Necessity of, 50 sqq.;
Gratuity of, 131 sqq.;
Universality of, 152 sqq.;
Its relation to free-will, 222 sqq.;
As a requisite of supernatural merit, 413 sqq.

_Actus humanus_, 412.

Adoption, 357.

Adoptive sonship, 155, 356 sqq.

Adults, all receive sufficient grace, 167 sqq.

_Affectus credulitatis_, 105.

Albertus Magnus, 206, 432.

Alexander VIII, 179 sq.

Alexander of Hales, 206.

Aloysius, St., 211.

Alphonsus, St., 415.

Alvarez, 30, 216, 242, 243.

Ambrose, St., 69, 102, 158, 209, 319, 349, 404.

_Amor affectivus et effectivus_, 68.

Amsdorf, 291.

Anabaptists, 322.

Aquaviva, 260, 262.

Aristotle, 26, 31, 333, 353.

Arnauld, 180.

Athanasius, St., 341 sq., 373, 374.

Attributes, Divine, 344 sq.

“_Auctorem Fidei_,” Bull, 74 sq.

Augustine, St., 7, 8, 9, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24 sq., 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36,
37, 39, 42, 43, 47, 56, 59 sqq., 66, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81,
83, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108
sq., 112, 118 sq., 126, 127, 138, 140, 141, 144, 146, 159
sqq., 171, 174, 177, 188, 189 sq., 191 sq., 194, 197, 203 sq.,
210, 215, 228 sqq., 249, 252, 253, 254, 259, 262, 264, 289,
308, 319 sq., 337 sq., 339, 342, 343, 350, 368, 373 sq., 375,
383, 387, 394, 404, 421, 424 sq., 430, 431.

Augustinianism, 147, 200, 232 sqq.

Baius and Bajanism, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 74 sqq., 147, 417.

Ballerini, 415.

Bañez, 232 sqq., 246, 255.

Baptism, 163 sqq., 279, 306, 308 sq., 314, 315, 318, 319, 330 sq., 394,
428, 434.

Barnabas, Epistle of, 318.

Basil, St., 346, 349, 373.

Beatitudes, 402, 416.

Beauty, Supernatural, an effect of sanctifying grace, 349 sqq.

Becanus, 206.

Beghards, 399.

Beguins, 399.

Bellarmine, 163, 203, 210, 260, 263, 319, 330, 334, 337, 414.

Benedict XIV, 249.

Bernard, St., 37, 230.

Berti, 249.

Beza, 214.

Biel, Gabriel, 63, 211.

Billuart, 31, 211, 216, 238, 242.

Bonaventure, St., 210, 365, 433.

Boniface II, 99.

Book of Life, The, 192 sq.

Book of Torgau, 292.

Butzer, 292, 322.

Cæsarius of Arles, St., 99.

Cajetan, 165.

Calvin and Calvinism, 44, 153, 156, 206, 212, 213, 214, 218, 221, 223 sq.,
228, 285, 302, 310, 392, 399.

Camerarius, 204.

Cano, Melchior, 363.

Capacity for grace, 133 sqq., 145 sqq.

Capacity of nature, 50 sqq.

Carthage, Councils of, 25, 28, 85, 116.

Cassian, John, 97, 142.

Castelein, 195.

Catharinus, 204, 211, 382.

Causality of Grace, 15 sqq.

Celestine I, St., 89, 90, 99, 104.

Celestius, 83, 85, 86.

Cercià, 203.

Certainty regarding justification, 379 sqq.

Charismata, 13.

Charity, 29, 56, 60, 67 sqq., 78, 336 sqq., 352, 363 sqq., 390, 395, 413
sqq., 417.

Children, see Infants.

Christ, The Grace of, 10, 70, 226.

Chrysostom, St., 91, 102 sqq., 141, 171, 178, 181, 209, 318, 349, 380.

Clement of Alexandria, 308.

Clement of Rome, 181.

Clement V, 331.

Clement VIII, 255, 261.

Clement XI, 74, 180.

_Cogitatio congrua_, 69 sqq., 94.

Concupiscence, 64, 120.

_Condignitas_ (equality) between merit and reward, 417 sqq.

Condign Merit, 132 sq., 397 sq., 407 sqq.

_Congregatio de Auxiliis_, 255, 261.

Congruism, 261 sqq.

Congruous Grace, 262 sqq.

Congruous Merit, 132, 397, 407 sqq., 430 sqq.

Conversion, 174 sqq., 297, 432 sq.

Coöperating Grace, 32 sqq.

Cyprian, St., 102, 126.

Cyril of Alexandria, St., 349, 360, 373.

D’Argentré, 198.

Definition of Grace, 5 sqq.

Deharbe, 328.

Deification of man, 341 sq., 405.

_Delectatio victrix_, 27, 225, 249 sqq.

De Lemos, 216, 236.

De Lugo, 72, 363, 415, 420.

Despair, 179.

“_De Vocatione Omnium Gentium_,” 170, 182.

Diospolis, Council of, 8, 85, 136, 141.

Dordrecht, Synod of, 213.

Dorner, 293.

Durandus, 63.

Eck, Johann, 132.

Efficacious Grace, 41 sqq.

Efficacy, Threefold, 265 sq.

Elect, Number of the, 194 sq.

Ephesus, Ecumenical Council of, 86.

Ephrem, St., 109.

Estius, 216.

Eternal life, 426 sqq.

Eucharist, The Holy, 360.

External and Internal Grace, 11 sqq.

_Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam_, 147 sqq.

Faith, 62, 73, 100 sqq., 272, 274 sqq., 298 sqq., 363 sq., 390 sq., 395.

_Fides explicita—implicita_, 184 sqq., 279.

Fiduciary faith, 274 sqq., 310 sq.

_Filiatio adoptiva_, 110.

Final perseverance, see Perseverance.

Flacius, 291.

Florence, Council of, 164.

Fonseca, 257.

Francis de Sales, St., 207, 256.

Franzelin, 203.

Frassen, 206.

Freedom a requisite of merit, 411 sqq.

Free-will, 32 sqq.;
How Grace coöperates with, 40 sq.;
Its relation to Grace, 222 sqq.

Friendship, 353.

Friendship of God, an effect of sanctifying grace, 351 sqq.

Fulgentius, St., 23, 182, 215, 278.

Gazzaniga, 216, 236.

Gelasius, Pope, 170.

Gifts of the Holy Ghost, 369 sq.

Glory, 426 sqq.

Glossner, 149.

God, The Grace of, 10.

Godts, 195.

Gomarus, 213.

Gonet, 204 sq., 216, 218, 219 sq., 345.

Good intention, 411, 414.

Good works, Merit of, 397 sqq.

Gotti, 30, 185, 216.

Gottschalk, 212.

Goudin, 216.

Grace of justification, 313.

Granderath, 361.

_Gratia antecedens—concomitans_, 35.

_Gratia congrua—incongrua_, 262 sqq.

_Gratia efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens_, 255 sqq., 268.

_Gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_, 232 sqq., 267, 268.

_Gratia est in nobis, sed sine nobis_, 37.

_Gratia gratis data_, 12 sqq.

_Gratia gratum faciens_, 12 sqq.

_Gratia inspirationis_, 23.

_Gratia magna_, 252 sq.

_Gratia orationis_, 43.

_Gratia parva_ (of Jansenius) 44, 252 sq.

_Gratia prima_, 136 sqq., 388 sqq., 424, 427 sqq.

_Gratia sanans s. medicinalis_, 16, 91, 114.

_Gratia secunda_, 388 sqq.

_Gratia vocans_, 32, 35, 111.

Gratuity of Grace, 131 sqq.

Graveson, 216.

Gregory of Nazianzus, 102, 159, 308.

Gregory the Great, St., 38, 290, 308, 368, 380, 394.

Grotius, Hugo, 294.

Gutberlet, 165, 205.

Habits, 333 sqq.

“Half-Melanchthonians,” 292.

Harnack, 295, 296, 319, 381.

Heathens, The, receive sufficient grace for salvation, 179 sqq.

Henno, 324.

Henry of Ghent, 210.

Hilary, St., 97, 99, 209.

Holy Ghost, 331 sq., 335, 346, 361 sq., 368, 369 sq.

Hope, 363 sqq., 390, 396.

Hurter, 375.

Hus, 212.

Hypostatic Union, 12, 150, 345.

Ignatius of Antioch, St., 404.

Illuminating grace of the intellect, 19 sqq.

Imputation, Lutheran theory of, 313 sqq.

Incarnation, Dogma of the, 282 sqq.

Incompatibility of Grace and sin, 323 sqq.

Increase of glory, 429 sq.

Increase of sanctifying grace, 384 sqq., 423 sqq., 429.

“Indiculus,” 99.

Infants, Unbaptized, 163 sqq.,
Baptized, 406.

Infralapsarians, 156, 213.

_Inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti_, 361 sq., 370 sqq.

Innocent I, 8, 9, 85, 154.

Innocent X, 168, 226.

Innocent XI, 73, 183, 281, 402.

_Intensio gratiae_, 389.

Irenæus, St., 47, 90, 404.

Isaias, 178.

Jacob and Esau, 201 sq.

James, St., 286, 287, 288, 289, 294, 403, 434.

Jansenius and Jansenism, 44, 52, 55, 62, 74, 77, 79, 80, 153 sq., 168,
171, 180, 212, 218, 221, 222, 223, 224 sqq., 249, 252, 281,
411, 417.

Jehu, 433.

Jerome, St., 58, 109, 354, 380, 387, 394, 412.

Jews, 137, 155, 195, 282, 367.

John a S. Thoma, 216.

John the Baptist, St., 116.

Joseph, St., 116, 211.

Jovinian, 387, 394.

Julian of Eclanum, 83, 85.

Justification, 36, 73, 97, 113 sq., 136 sqq.;
Process of, 272 sqq.;
Necessity of faith for, 274 sqq.;
Necessity of other preparatory acts, 285 sqq.;
The state of, 300 sqq.;
The nature of, 301 sqq.;
Negative element, 302 sqq.;
Positive element, 310 sqq.;
Sanctifying Grace the sole formal cause of, 322 sqq.;
Qualities of, 378 sqq.;
Increase of Grace, 388;
Fruits of, 397 sqq.

Justin Martyr, St., 102, 308.

Klee, 164.

Κοινωνία θείας φύσεως, 345.

Krogh-Tonning, 293.

Lateran, Fourth Council of the, 179, 400.

Law of grace, 405.

Lessius, 150, 206, 211, 221, 262, 337, 420.

Liberty, see Freedom.

Liebermann, 89.

Logos, The Divine, 358, 359 sq.

Log-stick-and-stone theory, 291, 292.

Lucidus, 212.

_Lumen gloriae_, 345.

Luther, 52, 74, 132, 223, 285, 288, 291, 293, 295, 302, 310, 322, 384,
389, 392, 399, 407.

Maldonatus, 203, 204.

Mary, B. V., 64, 116, 211, 384, 389, 391.

Massillon, 194.

Melanchthon, 292, 310.

Mennonites, 322.

Mercy, Works of, 416.

Merely sufficient Grace, 41 sqq.

Merit, 128, 131 sqq., 397 sqq., 430.

_Meritum de congruo_, 430 sqq.

_Meritum naturae_, 138.

Mezzofanti, Cardinal, 54.

Mileve, Council of, 85, 114, 116.

Modernism, 54.

Molina and Molinism, 65, 148, 200, 217, 255 sqq., 337.

Molinos, M. de, 401.

Moral virtues, Infused, 366 sqq.

Mortal sin, 97, 106 sqq., 392 sqq.

Nabuchodonosor, 58.

Natural and Supernatural Grace, 7 sqq.

Nature, Capacity of, 50 sqq.

_Necessitas antecedens peccati_, 120 sqq.

_Necessitas medii—praecepti_, 279 sqq.

Obduracy, 175 sq.

Objects of merit, 423 sqq.

Obstinacy, 178 sq.

Occasionalists, 406.

Ockam, 211.

_Opera steriliter bona_, 57, 81 sq.

Orange, Second Council of, 20, 44, 86, 92, 99, 100, 106, 110, 123, 136,
139, 143, 213, 400.

Origen, 77.

Original sin, 303, 434.

Orosius, 182.

Osiander, 292.

Osorius, 204.

Oswald, 104, 203.

Palmieri, 61, 72, 103, 116.

Pantheism, 343.

Passaglia, 158, 375.

Passions, The, 28.

Paul, St., 12, 13, 16, 21, 22, 27, 57, 64, 65, 68, 88, 100 sq., 105, 107,
125, 137, 146, 157 sq., 166, 169 sq., 180, 189, 191, 201 sq.,
207, 227 sq., 259, 269, 276, 277, 281 sq., 283, 288 sq., 314,
316, 317, 318, 319 sq., 351, 383, 393, 402, 407, 420, 424.

Paul V, 256, 261.

Pelagius and Pelagianism, 56, 64, 66, 71, 79, 82 sqq., 89, 97, 103, 114,
119, 136, 141, 170, 190, 197, 228, 308.

Penance, Sacrament of, 395, 428.

Perrone, 18.

Perseverance, Final, 123 sqq., 425 sq., 432 sqq.

Pesch, Chr., 68, 72, 248.

Petavius, 203, 204, 361, 375.

Peter Lombard, 331.

Peter, St., 171, 184.

Pfeffinger, 292.

Piccolomini, 262.

Pighius, 204.

Πίστις, 277 sq., 290.

Pistoia, Council of, 71, 74.

Pius V, 165.

Pius VI, 71, 73.

Platel, 72.

Plato, 350.

Pneumatomachians, 373.

Polycarp, St., 290.

Pomponazzi, 52.

Postlapsarians, 213.

_Potentia obedientialis_, 19, 30, 40.

_Praeambula fidei_, 52, 102, 105.

_Praemotio moralis_, 249, 253.

_Praemotio physica_, 233 sqq., 248.

Prayer, 43, 91, 127 sqq., 133, 142 sqq., 266 sqq., 431, 433, 435.

Predestinarianism, Heretical, 212.

Predestination, 152, 187 sqq.;
_ante praevisa nierita_, 199 sqq.;
_post praevisa merita_, 206 sqq.

Predestinationism, Orthodox, 199 sqq.

Prevenient Grace, 32 sqq.

Priesthood, 13.

Properties of sanctifying Grace, 378 sqq.

Prosper, St., 25, 37, 59, 77, 97, 99, 100, 159, 182, 192, 215.

Protagoras, 350.

Qualitates Fluentes, 29 sqq.

Qualities, 333 sq.

Quasi-Merit, 134.

Quesnel, 53, 72, 74 sqq., 180.

Quietists, 343, 401.

Re-Creation, 315, 339.

Regeneration, 314 sq., 329, 339, 341, 346.

Repentance, 176.

Reprobation, 152, 178, 212 sqq.

Requisites of supernatural merit, 410 sqq.

Ripalda, 65, 69, 71 sqq., 128, 145, 149, 330, 342, 345, 363.

Roman Catechism, 333, 340, 349, 363.

Saints absolutely predestined, 211;
Favored by God, 419.

Salmeron, 337.

Salutary acts, 82 sqq.

Sanctification, Internal, 323, 347, 348.

Sanctifying Grace, 271 sqq.;
Genesis of, 272 sqq.;
The sole formal cause of justification, 322 sqq.;
Nature of, 328 sqq.;
A permanent quality of the soul, 328 sqq.;
An infused habit, 333 sqq.;
Not identical with charity, 336 sqq.;
A participation of the soul in the divine nature, 340 sqq.;
The effects of, 347 sqq.;
Sanctity, 347 sqq.;
Supernatural beauty, 349 sqq.;
Divine friendship, 351 sqq.;
Adoptive sonship, 356 sqq.;
Supernatural concomitants, 362 sqq.;
Properties of, 378 sqq.;
Admits of degrees and therefore can be increased, 384 sqq.;
Lost by mortal sin, 392 sqq.;
Fruits of, 397 sqq.;
As a requisite of merit, 418 sq.;
Increased by merit, 424 sqq.

Sanctity, an effect of sanctifying Grace, 347 sqq.

Sardagna, 337.

Scheeben, 361, 375.

Schrader, 375.

_Scientia media_, 245, 253, 257 sq., 266.

Scotus and the Scotists, 10, 63, 67, 94, 210, 325, 332, 337, 419, 433.

“Seed of God,” Why grace is called the, 409.

Self-righteousness, 406 sq.

Semipelagianism, 97 sqq., 139 sqq., 146, 148, 170, 190, 197, 226, 228,
239.

Sensitive sphere, Graces of the, 26 sqq.

Sinners, Ordinary and obdurate, 172 sqq.

Sin, Incompatible with Grace, 323 sqq.;
Is sanctifying Grace diminished by venial sin? 388 sq.

Sins of malice, 247.

Society of Jesus, 260 sqq., 325.

Socinianism, 292.

Socrates, 25.

Sola fides theory, 286 sqq.

Soto, Dominicus, 211, 363, 430.

Stapleton, 206.

Stoics, 64, 387.

Strengthening Grace of the will, 23 sqq.

Suarez, 63, 96, 116, 122, 128, 150, 218, 219, 257, 262, 325, 330, 334,
346, 359, 362, 363, 365, 390 sq., 415, 420, 433.

Sufficient Grace, 41 sqq., 167 sqq.

Supererogation, Works of, 411.

Supernatural character of merit, 413 sqq.

Sylvius, 216, 434.

Syncretism, 267 sqq.

Synergist dispute, 292.

Temporal blessings, 435.

Temptations, 65 sqq.

Tepe, 68, 72, 81.

Tertullian, 179.

Θείωσις, 341, 376.

Theodoret, 209.

Theological systems devised to harmonize the dogmas of grace and
free-will, 231 sqq.;
Thomism, 232 sqq.;
Augustinianism, 248 sqq.;
Molinism, 255 sqq.;
Congruism, 261 sqq.;
Syncretism, 267 sqq.

Thomas, St., 27, 32, 34, 52, 53, 62, 70, 93, 121, 149, 161, 165, 178, 185,
194, 210, 232, 298, 331, 332, 334, 338, 339, 345, 349, 357,
365, 368 sq., 387, 409, 414, 419, 421, 431, 432, 435.

Thomism and the Thomists, 11, 29, 200, 203, 216, 219, 232 sqq., 325, 332,
389, 413, 414.

Toletus, 204, 206.

Tournely, 207, 337.

Traditionalism, 52.

Trent, Council of, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 74, 86, 94, 106, 107, 111, 115 sq.,
122, 123, 124, 125, 136, 153, 165, 168, 182, 188, 213, 224,
227, 243 sq., 247, 265, 272, 275, 285, 295 sqq., 303, 307, 311
sqq., 319, 322 sq., 324, 325, 329 sq., 331, 335, 338, 352,
361, 363, 365, 383, 385, 391, 392, 400, 401, 407 sq., 415, 421
sq., 423, 425, 426, sqq., 431.

Trinity, Dogma of the, 282 sqq.

Ultricuria, Nicholas de, 52.

Unbelief, 97.

“Unigenitus,” Constitution, 74.

Vasquez, 69 sqq., 72, 94, 133, 149, 262, 337, 363, 415, 418, 420, 425.

Vatican Council, 51, 54, 73, 183, 244 sq., 265.

Vega, 122.

Venial sin, Possibility of avoiding, 117 sqq.;
Is sanctifying Grace diminished by? 388 sq.

Vienne, Council of, 331, 363.

Vital acts of the soul, 27 sqq.

Vitelleschi, 262.

Vocation, The grace of, 190, 196.

_Voluntas salvifica Dei_, 152 sqq.

Wiclif, 212.

Will to save, God’s, 152 sqq.

Ysambert, 211.

Zosimus, 85.

Zwingli, 298.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Fathers and the Schoolmen “do not emphasize the difference, and
frequently speak of habitual and actual grace as of one whole.
Controversial reasons account for this discrepancy, which readers of
the older theologians should constantly bear in mind.”
(Wilhelm-Scannell, _Manual of Catholic Theology_, Vol. II, p. 229,
2nd ed., London 1901.)

2 The asterisk before an author’s name indicates that his treatment of
the subject is especially clear and thorough. As St. Thomas is
invariably the best guide, the omission of the asterisk before his
name never means that we consider his work inferior to that of other
writers. There are vast stretches of theology which he scarcely
touched.

3 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 181 sqq., St. Louis 1912.

_ 4 Theologiae Graecorum Patrum Vindicatae circa Universam Materiam
Gratiae Libri III_, I, 4, Paris 1646.

5 “The same name is loosely applied to the act of ‘blessing’ the food
before taking it, which is properly the function of a priest, but
which is suitably performed by every Christian.” (Hunter, _Outlines
of Dogmatic Theology_, Vol. III, p. 6.) Cfr. S. Thomas, _Summa
Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1: “_Secundum communem loquendi
modum tripliciter gratia accipi consuevit: uno modo pro dilectione
alicuius...; secundo sumitur pro aliquo dono gratis dato...; tertio
modo sumitur pro recompensatione beneficii gratis dati, secundum
quod dicimur agere gratias beneficiorum._”

6 Rom. XI, 6: “_Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia
iam non est gratia._”

_ 7 Tract. in Ioannem_, III, n. 9: “_Quid est gratia? Gratis data. Quid
est gratis data? Donata, non reddita._”

_ 8 Debitum naturae._

_ 9 Epistula ad Innocent._, n. 2: “_Nam si intellexissent illi
episcopi, eam illum dicere gratiam, quam etiam cum impiis habemus,
cum quibus homines sumus, negare vero eam quâ Christiani et filii
Dei sumus, quis eum patienter ... ante oculos suos ferret?
Quapropter non culpandi sunt iudices, qui ecclesiasticâ consuetudine
nomen gratiae_ [_i.e._ _christianae] audierunt._”

10 On the difference between these two categories see Pohle-Preuss,
_God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 180 sqq.

_ 11 Epist. ad Innocent._, _l.c._: “_Etsi quâdam non improbandâ ratione
dicitur gratia Dei quâ creati sumus [gratia naturalis], ... alia est
tamen, quâ praedestinati vocamur, iustificamur, glorificamur [gratia
supernaturalis]._”

_ 12 Epist. ad Sixt._, 194, n. 8: “_Haec est enim gratia, quam in libris
Dei legere et populis praedicare catholici antistites consueverunt,
et gratia quam commendat Apostolus non est ea quâ creati sumus, ut
homines essemus, sed quâ iustificati sumus, quum mali homines
essemus._”

13 St. Augustine, _Ep._, 217: “_Hoc [scil. credere] opus est gratiae,
non naturae. Opus est, inquam, gratiae quam nobis attulit secundus
Adam, non naturae quam totam perdidit in seipso Adam._”

_ 14 Gratia est donum gratis datum supernaturale._

15 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology. A Dogmatic Treatise on the
Redemption_, pp. 24 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

_ 16 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, ex meritis Christi._

17 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum_, IV, 15.

18 Cfr. Rom. III, 21 sqq.; Gal. II, 16.

_ 19 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, internum, ex meritis
Christi._

20 St. Matthew X, 8: “_Infirmos curate, mortuos suscitate, leprosos
mundate, daemones eiicite: gratis accepistis, gratis date_ (δωρεὰν
δότε).”—The name “gratuitously given,” as Fr. Hunter observes
(_Outlines_, III, 10), is “tautological and not particularly
expressive,” and “helps in no way to indicate what is the nature of
the graces which it is intended to exclude. These are such as, for
want of a better word, we call ingratiating: the Latin name used by
theologians (_gratum faciens_) denotes that they make a man pleasing
to God, grateful to Him, if we understand _grateful_ of that which
gives pleasure, and not in its commoner sense, which is nearly the
same as thankful.”

21 For a list of the charismata see 1 Cor. XII, 4 sqq. Cfr. Englmann,
_Von den Charismen im allgemeinen und von dem Sprachencharisma im
besonderen_, Ratisbon 1848; Cornely, _Comment. in S. Pauli Priorem
Epistolam ad Corinthios_, pp. 410 sqq., Paris 1890; Chr. Pesch,
_Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 243 sqq., Freiburg 1908.

22 1 Cor. XII, 31: “_Aemulamini autem charismata meliora, et adhuc
excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro._”

_ 23 Caritas_, ἀγάπη.

24 1 Cor. XIII, 1 sqq. Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae,
qu. 111, art. 5: “_Unaquaeque virtus tanto excellentior est, quanto
ad altius bonum ordinatur. Semper autem finis potior est his, quae
sunt ad finem [i.e. media]. Gratia autem gratum faciens ordinat
hominem immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi finis; gratiae autem
gratis datae ordinant hominem ad quaedam praeparatoria finis ultimi,
sicut per prophetiam et miracula et huiusmodi homines inducuntur ad
hoc quod ultimo fini coniungantur. Et ideo gratia gratum faciens est
multo excellentior quam gratia gratis data._”

_ 25 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, internum, gratum
faciens, ex meritis Christi._

26 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 229 sq.

_ 27 Ibid._, pp. 298 sq.

_ 28 Ep. ad Simplician._, I, 9, 22: “_Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid
occurrerit quod delectet et invitet animum, moveri nullo modo
potest; hoc autem, ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate._”

_ 29 Enchiridion_, c. 98: “_Quis tam impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum
malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi
voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere?_”

30 “_Domine, ... ad te nostras etiam rebelles compelle propitius
voluntates._” For a full treatment of God’s moral causality the
student is referred to Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 109,
sect. 2 sq.

31 Cfr. D. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 15.

_ 32 Causa formalis._

_ 33 Causa efficiens._

_ 34 Causa meritoria._

_ 35 Causa materialis._

_ 36 Causalitas moralis._

_ 37 Causalitas physica._

_ 38 Causa finalis inadaequata._

_ 39 Causa finalis adaequata._

40 On the _potentia obedientialis_ see Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of
Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 188 sqq.

41 Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180.

_ 42 Supra_, p. 11.

43 “_Lex Domini immaculata, convertens animas, ... praeceptum Domini
lucidum, illuminans oculos._”

44 “_Christus passus est pro nobis, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut
sequamini vestigia eius._”

_ 45 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 34: “_Visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut
velimus et ut credamus, sive extrinsecus per evangelicas
exhortationes sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate, quid ei
veniat in mentem._”

46 2 Cor. III, 4 sq.: “_Fiduciam autem talem habemus per Christum ad
Deum; non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex
nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est._”

47 1 Cor. III, 6: “_Ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit; sed Deus incrementum
dedit_ (ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς ηὔξανεν). _Itaque neque qui plantat est aliquid
neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, Deus_ (ὁ αὐξάνων θεός).”

_ 48 De Gratia Christi_, c. 19: “_Ipse in bonis arboribus cooperatur
fructum, qui et forinsecus rigat atque excolit per quemlibet
ministrum et per se dat intrinsecus incrementum._” Cfr. also Eph. I,
17 sq., Acts XXVI, 16 sqq., 2 Cor. IV, 6, 1 John II, 20 and 27.

49 Cfr. Mazzella, _De Gratia_, disp. 1, art. 1, §4, 3rd ed., Rome 1882.

_ 50 Tract. in Ioa._, III, 13: “_Magisteria forinsecus adiutoria quaedam
sunt et admonitiones; cathedram in coelo habet, qui corda tenet._”

_ 51 L.c._: “_Interior magister est, qui docet; Christus docet,
inspiratio ipsius docet._”

_ 52 Ep. 17 de Incarn. et Grat._ n. 67: “_Frustra [divinus sermo]
exterioribus auribus sonat, nisi Deus spiritali munere auditum
hominis interioris aperiat._” Other Patristic texts will be found in
the classic work of Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 101,
sect. 3-4.

53 It is to be noted, however, that the term _gratia inspirationis_,
both in the writings of St. Augustine and in the decrees of Trent
(Sess. VI, can. 3), sometimes also denotes the immediate
illuminating grace of the mind.

_ 54 De Gratia Christi_, c. 12: “_Quâ gratiâ agitur, non solum ut
facienda noverimus, verum etiam ut cognita faciamus, nec ut solum
diligenda credamus, verum etiam ut credita diligamus._”

_ 55 Op. cit._, c. 26: “_Cognitionem et dilectionem, sicut sunt
discernenda, discernat, quia scientia inflat, quando caritas
aedificat.... Et quum sit utrumque donum Dei, sed unum minus,
alterum maius, non sic iustitiam nostram super laudem iustificatoris
extollat, ut horum duorum quod minus est divino tribuat adiutorio,
quod autem maius est humano usurpet arbitrio._”

56 He applies a variety of practically synonymous terms to the
strengthening grace of the will, for instance: _delectatio
coelestis_, _spiritus caritatis_, _inspiratio dilectionis_, _bona
voluntas_, _voluptas_, _sanctum desiderium_, _inspiratio
suavitatis_, _cupiditas boni_, etc.

57 Canon 4: “_Quisquis dixerit, eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum
D. N. propter hoc tantum adiuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam
nobis aperitur el revelatur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus
quid appetere et quid vitare debeamus, non autem per illam nobis
praestari ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus
atque valeamus, a. s.; ... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire
quid facere debeamus et diligere ut faciamus._” (Denzinger-Bannwart,
n. 104.)

_ 58 Contra Collator._, c. VII, 2: “_Trahit timor; principium enim
sapientiae timor Domini (Prov. I, 7). Trahit laetitia, quoniam
laetatus sum in his, quae dicta sunt mihi: in domum Domini ibimus
(Ps. CXXI, 1). Trahit desiderium, quoniam concupiscit et deficit
anima mea in atria Domini (Ps. LXXXIII, 3). Trahunt delectationes:
quam dulcia enim faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel et favum ori
meo (Ps. CXVIII, 103). Et quis perspicere aut enarrare possit, per
quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum?_” Cfr. Schiffini,
_De Gratia Divina_, thes. 11; Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_,
thes. 8.

_ 59 De Anima_, I, 8: Ἄνευ φαντάσματος οὐκ ἔστι νοεῖν.

_ 60 De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione_, II, 19, 33: “_... ut suave
faciat, quod non delectabat._”

61 2 Cor. XII, 9: “_Sufficit tibi gratia mea._” For further information
on this point the student is referred to Ripalda, _De Ente
Supernaturali_, disp. 44, sect. 9.

_ 62 In Psalmos_, 102, n. 16: “_Vocat [Deus] per intimam
cognitionem._”—_Tract. in Ioa._, 26, n. 7: “_Videte quomodo trahit
Pater, docendo delectat._”

_ 63 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2.

_ 64 S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 25, art. 2.

65 “_... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus, et
diligere ut faciamus._” (_V. supra_, p. 25.)

66 “_Amor Dei propter se super omnia._”

_ 67 V. infra_, Part II, Ch. I.

68 Cfr., _e.g._, _De Trinitate_, VIII, 10: “_Quid est dilectio vel
caritas, quam tantopere Scriptura divina laudat et praedicat, nisi
amor boni?_”—_Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag._, II, 9, 21: “_Quid est
boni cupiditas nisi caritas?_”—_De Gratia Christi_, c. 21: “_Quasi
vero aliud sit bona voluntas quam caritas._”

69 It should also be noted that in Augustine’s writings _inspiratio
caritatis_, as an immediate grace of the will, is not necessarily
identical with the infusion of theological love.

_ 70 E.g._ Berti, _De Theol. Discipl._, XIV, 7.

71 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Aux._, disp. 67, n. 6.

72 Alvarez, _op. cit._, disp. 74.—Cfr. John VI, 44: “_Nemo potest
venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum._” Apoc. III,
20: “_Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis audierit vocem meam et
aperuerit mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum._”

_ 73 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aquinatis_, p. 2, tr. 6, qu. 2,
art. 2, §2.

_ 74 V. supra_, Nos. 1 and 2.

_ 75 Ad Simplic._, I, 2, n. 21: “_Quis potest credere, nisi aliquâ
vocatione, h. e. aliquâ rerum testificatione tangatur? Quis habet in
potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo eius voluntas moveatur
ad fidem?_”

76 Cfr. Suarez, _De Div. Grat._, III, 4: “_In Conciliis et Patribus
nullum vestigium talis gratiae invenimus, quin potius ipsam
inspirationem ponunt ut gratiam primam et praeterea indicant
immediate infundi ab ipso Spiritu Sancto et non mediante aliquâ
qualitate._”

_ 77 De Gratia_, diss. 4, art. 2.

_ 78 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2: “_In eo, qui dicitur
gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei
voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra (qu. 109, art. 1), quod
dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur: uno modo
inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel
volendum vel agendum; et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine
non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animae; actus enim moventis in
moto est motus, ut dicitur (Phys. 1, 3, text. 18). Alio modo
adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, secundum quod aliquod
habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur ... et sic donum gratiae
qualitas quaedam est._”—Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Div. Actuali_,
thes. 16; Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 23 sqq.;
Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 220 sqq. The Thomistic doctrine
on this point is viewed with favor by several Molinist theologians,
_e.g._, Platel (_De Gratia_, n. 547) and Gutberlet (_Dogmatische
Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 25 sq., Mainz 1897).

_ 79 De Peccat. Merit. et Rem._, II, 18: “_Quoniam quod a Deo nos
avertimus nostrum est, et haec est voluntas mala; quod vero ad Deum
nos convertimus nisi ipso excitante et adiuvante non possumus, et
haec est voluntas bona._”

_ 80 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 17, 33: “_Ipse ut velimus, operatur
incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens._”—On certain
differences of opinion on this point between Suarez (_De Div.
Motione_, III, 5) and St. Thomas (_Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 111,
art. 2), see Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 252 sqq.

81 Cfr. Ps. LVIII, 11; XXII, 6.

_ 82 Enchiridion_, c. 32: “_Nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem
subsequitur, ne frustra velit._”

_ 83 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 5: “_Declarat praeterea, ipsius
justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Iesum Christum
praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, h. e. ab eius vocatione, qua
nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur._” (Denzinger-Bannwart,
n. 797.)

_ 84 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 3: “_Sicut gratia dividitur in
operantem et cooperantem secundum diversos effectus, ita etiam in
praevenientem et subsequentem, qualitercumque gratia accipiatur
(i.e. sive habitualis sive actualis). Sunt autem quinque effectus
gratiae in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur; secundus ut
bonum velit; tertius est ut bonum quod vult efficaciter operetur;
quartus est ut in bono perseveret; quintus est ut ad gloriam
perveniat. Et ideo gratia, secundum quod causat in nobis primum
effectum, vocatur praeveniens respectu secundi effectus; et prout
causat in nobis secundum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi
effectus. Et sicut unus effectus est posterior uno effectu et prior
alio, ita gratia potest dici praeveniens et subsequens secundum
eundem effectum respectu diversorum._”

_ 85 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_Iesus Christus in ipsos
iustificatos iugiter virtutem influit, quae virtus bona eorum opera
semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur._”

86 On the distinction to be drawn between the various members of these
pairs, whether it be real or merely logical, theologians differ.
Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat._, thes. 18; Chr. Pesch, _Praelect.
Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 17 sqq.; Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 241 sqq.

_ 87 V. supra_, Nos. 1 and 4.

88 Sess. VI, cap. 5 and can. 4, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s
_Enchiridion_, n. 797 and 814.

_ 89 Ad Simplic._, I, qu. 2, n. 22: “_Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid
occurrerit, quod delectet atque invitet animum, moveri nullo modo
potest; hoc autem ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate._”

_ 90 Contr. Collator._, c. VII, 2: “_Et quis perspicere aut enarrare
possit, per quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum, ut
quae fugiebat sequatur, quae oderat diligat, quae fastidiebat
esuriat, ac subitâ commutatione mirabili quae clausa ei fuerant sint
aperta, quae onerosa levia, quae amara sint dulcia, quae obscura
sint lucida?_”

91 Cfr. M. Cronin, _The Science of Ethics_, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq., Dublin
1909.

_ 92 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagian._, II, 9, 21: “_Multa Deus facit in
homine bona, quae non facit homo; nulla vero facit homo, quae non
facit Deus, ut faciat homo._”

_ 93 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 17, n. 33: “_Ut ergo velimus, sine
nobis operatur; quum autem volumus et sic volumus ut faciamus,
nobiscum cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel
cooperante quum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus._”

_ 94 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 14: “_Si ergo Deus tria haec, h. e.
bonum cogitare, velle, perficere, operatur in nobis (2 Cor. III, 5;
Phil. II, 13), primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum,
tertium per nos facit. Siquidem immittendo bonam cogitationem, nos
praevenit; immutando etiam malam voluntatem sibi per consensum
iungit; ministrando et consensui facultatem foris per apertum opus
nostrum internus opifex innotescit. Sane ipsi nos praevenire
nequaquam possumus. Qui autem bonum neminem invenit, neminem salvat,
quem non praevenit. A Deo ergo sine dubio nostrae fit salutis
exordium, nec per nos utique nec nobiscum. Verum consensus et opus,
etsi non ex nobis, non iam tamen sine nobis._”—On the
misinterpretation of this text by the Jansenists, see Palmieri, _De
Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 84 sq.

_ 95 Moral._, XVI, 10: “_Superna pietas prius agit in nobis aliquid sine
nobis [gratia praeveniens], ut subsequente libero arbitrio bonum,
quod appetimus, agat nobiscum [gratia cooperans]._”

_ 96 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, c. 16: “_Tanta est [Dei] erga homines
bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita quae sunt ipsius dona._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 810.)

_ 97 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 16, 32: “_Certum enim est nos mandata
servare, si volumus; sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo
petendum est, ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit, ut volendo
faciamus. Certum est nos velle, quum volumus; sed ille facit ut
velimus bonum, de quo dictum est quod paulo ante posui (Prov. VIII,
35): ____Praeparatur voluntas a Domino____; de quo dictum est (Ps.
XXXVI, 32): ____A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur et viam eius
volet____; de quo dictum est (Phil. II, 13): ____Deus est qui
operatur in nobis et velle.____ Certum est nos facere quum facimus;
sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas
voluntati, qui dixit (Ezech. XXXVI, 27): ____Faciam ut in
iustificationibus meis ambuletis et iudicia mea observetis et
faciatis.____ Quum dicit: ____Faciam ut faciatis,____ quid aliud
dicit nisi (Ezech. XI, 19): ____Auferam a vobis cor lapideum,____
unde non faciebatis, (Ezech. XXXVI, 26), et ____dabo vobis cor
carneum,____ unde facitis._”—On the subject of this paragraph see
Palmieri, _op. cit._, thes. 10, and Chr. Pesch, _op. cit._, pp. 14
sqq.

98 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 67 sqq.

99 Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat. Actuali_; thes. 17, and Chr. Pesch,
_Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 28 sqq.

_ 100 V. infra_, Ch. III, Sect. 2.

_ 101 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 16, 32: “_Certum est nos facere, quum
facimus; sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas
voluntati._”

_ 102 De Corrept. et Grat._, c. 11: “_Acceperat posse, si vellet [gratia
sufficiens]; sed non habuit velle [gratia efficax] quod posset, nam
si habuisset, perseverasset._” Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat.
Actuali_, thes. 11.

_ 103 De Nat. et Grat._, 43: “_Nam Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed
iubendo monet, et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et
adiuvat ut possis._”

_ 104 De Gratia Christi_, IV, 10: “_... ita inefficax, ex qua operatio ne
possit quidem sequi, nisi eius inefficacia per aliam suppleatur._”

105 “_Illud a recentioribus prolatum gratiae sufficientis genus, quo
adiuvante nullum unquam opus factum est aut fiet unquam, videtur
monstrum quoddam singulare gratiae, solummodo peccatis faciendis
maiorique damnationi accersendae serviens._” (_De Grat. Christi_,
III, 3).

106 “_Gratia sufficiens statui nostro non tam utilis quam perniciosa
est, sic ut proinde merito possimus petere: A gratia sufficienti
libera nos, Domine._” This assertion was condemned by Pope Alexander
VIII in 1690. It is convincingly refuted by Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 354 sqq.

107 “_Hoc etiam secundum fidem catholicam credimus, quod acceptâ per
baptismum gratiâ omnes baptizati Christo auxiliante et cooperante,
quae ad salutem pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare
voluerint, adimplere._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)

108 Sess. VI, can. 4: “_Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo
motum et excitatum nihil cooperari Deo, ... neque posse dissentire,
si velit, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.)

109 Is. V, 4: “_Quid est, quod debui ultra facere vineae meae et non
feci ei? An quod exspectavi, ut faceret uvas et fecit labruscas?_”

110 Prov. I, 24: “_Vocavi et renuistis, extendi manum meam et non fuit
qui adspiceret._”

111 Matth. XI, 21.

112 Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 37; Acts VII, 51; 1 Cor. X, 13; 2 Cor. VI, 1; 1
Thess. V, 19.

_ 113 Contra Haer._, IV, 37, 1: “_Illud autem quod dicit (Matth. XXIII,
37): Quoties volui colligere filios tuos, et noluisti, veterem
libertatem hominis manifestat, quia liberum eum fecit Deus ab
initio.... Vis enim a Deo non fit, sed bona sententia adest illi
semper. Et propter hoc consilium quidem bonum dat omnibus.... Et qui
operantur quidem illud [gratia efficax], gloriam et honorem
percipient, quoniam operati sunt bonum, quum possint non operari
illud; hi autem, qui illud non operantur, indicium iustum excipient
Dei, quoniam non sunt operati bonum [gratia inefficax], quum possint
operari illud [gratia vere et mere sufficiens]._”

114 “_Gratia Dei ... quae hominum adiuvat voluntates: qua ut non
adiuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo._” _De Peccat.
Mer. et Rem._, II, 17.

_ 115 De Lib. Arbitr._, III, 16: “_Ex eo quod non accepit, nullus reus
est; ex eo autem quod non facit quod debet, iuste reus est. Debet
autem [facere], si accepit et voluntatem liberam et
sufficientissimam facultatem._” On the Jansenist distortions of St.
Augustine’s teaching see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes.
48. The doctrine of the Greek Fathers is thoroughly rehearsed by
Isaac Habert, _Theol. Patr. Graec._, II, 6 sq.

_ 116 Conc. Vat.,_ Sess. III, De Revel., can. 1: “_Si quis dixerit, Deum
unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae facta
sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse,
anathema sit._”

_ 117 Conc. Vat._, Sess. III, cap. 4: “_Hoc quoque perpetuus Ecclesiae
catholicae consensus tenuit et tenet, duplicem esse ordinem
cognitionis, non solum principio, sed obiecto etiam distinctum:
principio quidem, quia in altero naturali ratione et altero fide
divinâ cognoscimus; obiecto autem, quia praeter ea, ad quae
naturalis ratio pertingere potest, credenda nobis proponuntur
mysteria in Deo abscondita, quae, nisi revelata divinitus,
innotescere non possunt._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1795.)

118 Nicholas d’Autricourt, a master in the University of Paris, in 1348,
was compelled by the Sorbonne and the Apostolic See to retract a
number of propositions taken from his writings which were infected
with scepticism. These propositions, most of which had been censured
as heretical, and some as merely false, may be found in Natalis
Alexander, _Hist. Eccles._, ed. Bing., XV, 195, and also, with some
explanatory remarks, in Denifle-Chatelain, _Chartularium Univ.
Paris._, II, 1, Paris 1891.

119 “_Klotz-, Stock- und Steintheorie_.”

120 On Traditionalism, see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence,
and Attributes_, pp. 44 sqq., 2nd ed., St. Louis 1914.

121 Wisd. XIII, 1 sqq.; Rom. I, 20 sq.; Rom. II, 14 sq. Cfr.
Pohle-Preuss, _op. cit._, pp. 17 sqq.

_ 122 Ibid._, pp. 38 sqq.

_ 123 Summa Theol_., 1a, qu. 2, art. 2, ad 1: “_Deum esse et alia
huiusmodi ... non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos;
sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia
naturam et perfectio perfectibile_.”

_ 124 Luther’s Werke_, ed. Walch, XII, 400, Halle 1742: “_Alles, was sie
örtert und schleusst, so gewisslich falsch und irrig ist, als Gott
lebt._”

_ 125 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 1 and canon 5.

126 On the _vulnera naturae_ cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of
Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 298 sqq., St. Louis 1912. Already
St. Augustine observed: “_Ad miseriam iustae damnationis pertinet
ignorantia et difficultas, quam patitur homo ab exordio nativitatis
suae, nec ab isto malo nisi Dei gratiâ liberatur._” (_Retract._, I.
9.)

_ 127 Propos._ 41: “_Omnis cognitio Dei etiam naturalis, etiam in
philosophis ethnicis, non potest venire nisi a Deo; et sine gratia
non producit nisi praesumptionem, vanitatem et oppositionem ad ipsum
Deum loco affectuum adorationis, gratitudinis et amoris._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1391.)

128 On the _debitum naturae_ cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of
Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 184 sq.

_ 129 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 4.

_ 130 Conc. Vatic._, Sess. III, _De Revel._, cap. 2: “_Ut ea, quae in
rebus divinis humanae rationi per se impervia non sunt, in praesenti
quoque generis humani conditione ab omnibus expedite, firmâ
certitudine et nullo admixto errore cognosci possint._”

131 Cfr. Chastel, S. J., _De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine_, Paris
1854; O. Willmann, _Geschichte des Idealismus_, Vol. III, 2nd ed.,
pp. 811 sqq., Braunschweig 1908; Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero
Arbitrio_, V, 1 sqq.

132 The only dissenting voice is that of Cardinal Cajetan.

133 Mezzofanti spoke perfectly thirty-eight languages, thirty others
less perfectly, and was more or less familiar with fifty dialects.
Cfr. U. Benigni in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. X, p. 271.

134 On the question whether grace can enable a man to acquire an
unlimited, universal knowledge, see Pohle-Preuss, _Christology_, pp.
258 sqq., St. Louis 1913. Cfr. also St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a
2ae, qu. 109, art. 1, and Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_,
thes. 19.

_ 135 Prop. Baii Damn._, 27: “_Liberum arbitrium sine gratiae Dei
adiutorio nonnisi ad peccandum valet._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
1027.)

_ 136 Prop. Baii Damn._, 37: “_Cum Pelagio sentit, qui boni aliquid
naturalis, i.e. quod ex naturae solis viribus ortum ducit,
agnoscit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1037.)

_ 137 Prop. Baii Damn._, 25: “_Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et
philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.)

_ 138 Prop. Damn. ab Alex. VIII_: “_Necesse est infidelem in omni opere
peccare._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1298.)

139 Matth. V, 46 sq.

_ 140 Mercedem_, μισθόν.

_ 141 Salutaveritis_, ὰσπάσησθε.

_ 142 Ethnici_, οἱ ἐθνικοί.

143 Rom. II, 14 sqq.

_ 144 Gentes_, ἔθνη.

145 That is, the _Mosaic_ law.

_ 146 Naturaliter_, φύσει.

_ 147 Naturaliter_, φύσει.

148 “_Quae legis sunt, faciunt._”

149 Rom. I, 21 sqq.

150 For other germane texts see Ezech. XXIX, 18 sqq.; Rom. I, 21.

151 πᾶν δὲ ὅ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως, ἁμαρτία ἐστιν.

152 πίστις = συνείδησις.

153 Cfr. also 1 Cor. VIII, 10 sqq. For a fuller explanation see
Scheeben, _Dogmatik_, Vol. III, pp. 954 sqq.

154 Ezech. XXIX, 20: “And for the service that he hath done me against
it [the city of Tyre], I have given him the land of Egypt, because
he hath labored for me, saith the Lord God.”

_ 155 In Ezech._, XXIX, 20: “_Ex eo quod Nabuchodonosor accepit mercedem
boni operis, intelligimus etiam ethnicos, si quid boni fecerint, non
absque mercede Dei iudicio praeteriri._”

_ 156 In Gal._, I, 15: “_Multi absque fide et evangelio Christi vel
sapienter faciunt aliquid vel sancte, ut parentibus obsequantur, ut
inopi manum porrigant, non opprimant vicinos, non aliena diripant._”

_ 157 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 28: “_Sicut enim non impediunt a vita
aeterna iustum quaedam peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non
ducitur, sic ad salutem aeternam nihil prosunt impio aliqua bona
opera, sine quibus difficillime vita cuiuslibet pessimi hominis
invenitur._”

_ 158 Ep._, 144, 2.

_ 159 Confess._, VI, 10.

_ 160 Ep._, 138, c. 3: “_Deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo et
praeclaro imperio Romanorum, quantum valerent civiles etiam sine
verâ religione virtutes, ut intelligeretur hâc additâ fieri homines
cives alterius civitatis, cuius rex veritas, cuius lex caritas,
cuius modus aeternitas._”

_ 161 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 3, n. 5: “_Neque liberum arbitrium
quidquam nisi ad peccandum valet, si lateat veritatis via._”

_ 162 Sent. ex August._, n. 106: “_Omnis vita infidelium peccatum est et
nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio summae et
incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est etiam in optimis
moribus._”

163 What Augustine himself observes of the literary style of St. Cyprian
(_Ep._, 93, c. 10, n. 39): “_Habet quandam propriam faciem, quâ
possit agnosci_,” applies in an even truer sense to his own
writings.

164 Cfr. _Enchirid._, c. 30.

165 Cfr. _De Correptione et Gratia_, c. 9, n. 20 sqq.

166 For a fuller and more adequate treatment of this question see J.
Ernst, _Werke und Tugenden der Ungläubigen nach Augustinus_,
Freiburg 1871; Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, t. III, Cologne
1648; S. Dechamps, _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris 1645; and, more
briefly, Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 21.

167 Palmieri, _l.c._, thes. 20. Concerning the effects of original sin
on free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the
Supernatural_, pp. 291 sq.

168 On this distinction see _supra_, pp. 15 sqq.

_ 169 Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4: “_Bona opera, ad quae
sufficit bonum naturae, aliqualiter operari possunt [infideles].
Unde non oportet quod in omni suo opere peccent; sed quandocunque
aliquod opus operantur ex infidelitate, tunc peccant._”

170 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 7: “_Si quis dixerit, opera
omnia quae ante iustificationem fiunt, quacunque ratione facta sint,
vere esse peccata vel odium Dei mereri, aut quanto vehementius quis
nititur se disponere ad gratiam, tanto eum gravius peccare, anathema
sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 817.)

_ 171 V. infra_, No. 3.

172 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 226 sqq.

173 “_Propositio temeraria et errori proxima._”

_ 174 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 13: “_Verumtamen qui se existimant
stare, videant ne cadant, et cum timore ac tremore salutem suam
operentur.... Formidare enim debent ... de pugna, quae superest cum
carne, cum mundo, cum diabolo, in qua victores esse non possunt,
nisi cum Dei gratiâ Apostolo obtemperent dicenti: Debitores etc._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 806.)

175 Rom. VII, 22 sqq.

176 Rom. VII, 24 sq.

177 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Mariology_, pp. 80 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

178 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 5;
Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 416, Mainz
1897.

_ 179 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 114, sect. 18.

_ 180 Concord._, art. 13, disp. 19.

181 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, pp. 87 sqq.

182 Cfr. the following passage from the Tridentine Council: “_... cum
timore ac tremore salutem suam operentur in laboribus, in vigiliis,
in eleemosynis, in orationibus et oblationibus, in ieiuniis et
castitate._”

_ 183 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 48, n. 62: “_Fideles enim orantes dicunt:
Ne nos inferas in tentationem. Si adest possibilitas, ut quid orant?
Aut a quo malo se liberari orant nisi maxime de corpore mortis
huius?... de vitiis carnalibus, unde non liberatur homo sine gratiâ
Salvatoris.... Orare sinatur, ut sanetur. Quid tantum de naturae
possibilitate praesumitur? Vulnerata, sauciata, vexata, perdita est;
verâ confessione, non falsâ defensione opus habet._” The necessity
of grace, and of prayer to obtain grace, is admirably and
exhaustively treated by Suarez, _De Necessitate Gratiae_, I, 23,
sqq. Cfr. also Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, V, 7 sqq.

_ 184 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, III, dist. 27, qu. unica:
“_Ratio recta docet, solum summum bonum infinitum esse summe
diligendum et per consequens voluntas hoc potest ex puris
naturalibus; nihil enim potest intellectus recte dictare, in quod
dictatum non possit voluntas rationalis naturaliter tendere._”

_ 185 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu._, 2a 2ae, qu. 171, art. 2.

_ 186 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu._, 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 2.

_ 187 De Natura et Gratia_, I, 21.

_ 188 Concord._, qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 14.

_ 189 De Gratia_, I, 33.

_ 190 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, VI, 7: “_Existimamus non posse Deum
sine ope ipsius diligi neque ut auctorem naturae neque ut largitorem
gratiae et gloriae, neque perfecte neque imperfecte ullo modo, ...
quicquid aliqui minus considerate in hac parte scripserint._” On the
attitude of St. Thomas (_Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3)
cfr. Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 3, art. 4.

191 It is not true, as Bellarmine argues, that the _amor Dei naturalis_
at its highest would result in justification.

_ 192 Prop. Baii Damn._, 34: “_Distinctio illa duplicis amoris, naturalis
videlicet, quo Deus amatur ut auctor naturae, et gratuiti, quo Deus
amatur ut beatificator, vana est et commentitia._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1034).—36: “_Amor naturalis, qui ex viribus
naturae exoritur, ex sola philosophia per elationem praesumptionis
humanae cum iniuria crucis Christi defenditur a nonnullis
doctoribus._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1036.)

_ 193 Cfr. Conc. Arausic._ II, a. 529, can. 25: “_Prorsus donum Dei est
diligere Deum._”

194 Cfr. _Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, can. 3.

_ 195 Praelect. Dogm._, Vol. V, pp. 73 sqq.

_ 196 Instit. Theolog._, Vol. III, pp. 19 sqq.

197 Rom. I, 21.

198 Rom. I, 25.

_ 199 In Epist. ad Roman._, I, 18: “_Potuerunt enim id per legem naturae
apprehendere, fabricâ mundi testificante auctorem Deum solum
diligendum, quod Moyses literis tradidit; sed impii facti sunt non
colendo Creatorem et iniustitia in eis apparet, dum videntes
dissimulabant a veritate, non fatentes unum Deum._”

_ 200 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu._, 1a 2ae, disp. 189 sq.

_ 201 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 20.

_ 202 Op. cit._

203 To admit the possibility of true _actus humani_ that are neither
good nor bad, but ethically indifferent, is to escape the error of
Baius that “Free-will without the aid of divine grace avails for
nothing but sin.” (_Prop. Damn._, 27.)

204 We should not, however, apply the ecclesiastical censures pronounced
against Baius to the writings of Vasquez. This, as Schiffini
convincingly shows (_De Gratia Divina_, pp. 159 sqq.), would be an
injustice.

205 Suarez, _De Gratia_, I, 8, 46: “... _quia secundum Augustini et divi
Thomae sententiam communis a theologis probatam non datur in
voluntate libere operante actus indifferens in individuo, et ideo
iuxta veram theologiam recte sequitur, si liberum arbitrium potest
sine gratia non male operari, posse etiam bene._”

_ 206 Supra_, p. 8.

207 “_Quâ vero parte inter dominantem cupiditatem et caritatem
dominantem nulli ponuntur affectus medii, a natura ipsa insiti
suapteque naturâ laudabiles ... falsa, alias damnata._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1524.)

_ 208 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 20, sect. 2: “_Quotiescunque homo
agit quod sibi datum est, ut actum virtutis naturalem efficiat, iam
adesse antecedenter Deum auxilio intrinsece supernaturali gratiae,
... ita [ut] nullus sit conatus moraliter bonus naturae, quem aliqua
gratia supernaturalis non praeveniat._”

209 This must be kept in mind in judging Ripalda’s famous thesis: “_Ad
quodlibet bonum opus morale sive ad quemlibet virtutis moralis actum
necessarium esse per se naturae rationali elevatae auxilium
theologicum gratiae._” (_Ibid._, sect. 3.)

210 He urges the supernatural character, in principle, of the present
economy of salvation; the practical identity of the naturally good
with the supernaturally salutary acts of the will, which he claims
is taught in Sacred Scripture (cfr. Acts XIV, 14 sqq.; Rom. I, 19
sqq.), and also by St. Augustine and his disciples Prosper and
Orosius; the merciful dispensation of grace towards heathens,
unbelievers, and sinners (_v. infra_, Sect. 3, Art. 2); the
universal belief of Christians in the salutary effects of all good
works, including those of the purely natural order, etc. For a
discussion of these arguments consult Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, pp. 254 sqq.

_ 211 Synopsis de Gratia_, n. 530.

_ 212 Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, p. 72.

_ 213 De Virtute Fidei Divinae_, disp. 12, sect. 2.

_ 214 Instit. Theolog._, Vol. III, pp. 22 sq., 248 sqq.

_ 215 De Gratia Div. Actuali_, p. 268: “_Si tamen ad solos fideles
coarctetur, quum nulla argumenta obstent et pro hac hypothesi maxime
valeant rationes Ripaldae, eam censemus veram esse._”

_ 216 V. supra_, No. 1.

217 Cfr. Mazzella, _De Gratia Christi_, disp. 2, art. 9.

_ 218 V. supra_, p. 71.

219 “_Fides late dicta ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo ad
iustificationem sufficit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1173.)

_ 220 Conc. Vat._, Sess. III, De Fide, can. 2: “_Si quis dixerit, ... ad
fidem divinam non requiri, ut revelata veritas propter auctoritatem
Dei revelantis credatur, anathema sit._” On this whole dispute cfr.
Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 156 sqq. The arguments adduced by
the defenders of Ripalda’s opinion can be studied in Palmieri, _De
Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 265 sqq. Cfr. also Scheeben, _Dogmatik_,
Vol. III, pp. 996 sqq. A difficulty arises from the twenty-second
canon of the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529): “_Nemo habet de
suo nisi mendacium et peccatum._” But this canon was probably never
approved by the Holy See. It is ably discussed by Gutberlet in his
continuation of Heinrich’s _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, §
415.

221 “_Ex viribus suis [natura] coram Deo nihil nisi peccare potest._”
(_Solida Declar._, I, § 22.) Cfr. J. A. Möhler, _Symbolik_, § 6-7
(English tr. by J. B. Robertson, _Symbolism_, 5th ed., London 1906,
pp. 54 sqq.)

_ 222 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, can. 7: “_Si quis dixerit, opera omnia,
quae ante iustificationem fiunt, ... vere esse peccata, ... anathema
sit._”

223 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 183 sqq., _et passim_.

224 A. D. 1585-1638. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _op. cit._, pp. 223 sqq.

225 On this important document (issued A. D. 1713) see A. Schill, _Die
Konstitution Unigenitus_, Freiburg 1876; Thuillier, _La Seconde
Phase du Jansénisme_, Paris 1901; M. Ott, art. “Unigenitus” in Vol.
XV of the _Catholic Encyclopedia_.

_ 226 Prop. Damn._, 38.

_ 227 Prop. Damn._, 44.

228 “_Doctrina synodi de duplici amore enuntians, hominem sine gratia
esse sub virtute peccati ipsumque in eo statu per generalem
cupiditatis dominantis influxum omnes suas actiones inficere et
corrumpere—quatenus insinuat, in homine, dum est sub servitute sive
in statu peccati, ... sic dominari cupiditatem ut per generalem
huius influxum omnes illius actiones in se inficiantur et
corrumpantur, aut opera omnia quae ante iustificationem fiunt,
quacunque ratione fiant, sint peccata, quasi in omnibus suis actibus
peccator serviat dominanti cupiditati: falsa, perniciosa, inducens
in errorem a Tridentino damnatum ut haereticum, iterum in Baio
damnatum art. 40._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1523).

_ 229 Prop. Damn._, 59: “_Oratio impiorum est novum peccatum, et quod
Deus illis concedit, est novum in eos iudicium._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1409.)

230 This passage, and the meaning it evidently bears in the context of
St. Matthew’s Gospel, is thoroughly discussed by Suarez, _De
Gratia_, I, 4. Cfr. also J. B. Faure, _Notae in Enchiridion S.
August._, c. 15. Other Scriptural texts distorted by the Jansenists
are quoted and explained in their true sense by Scheeben,
_Dogmatik_, Vol. III, pp. 923 sqq.

_ 231 Hom. in Is._, 5, n. 2.

232 “_Scimus autem quia peccatores Deus non audit._”

_ 233 Tract. in Ioa._, 44, n. 13: “_Adhuc inunctus loquitur; nam et
peccatores exaudit Deus. Si enim peccatores Deus non exaudiret,
frustra ille publicanus oculos in terram demittens et pectus suum
percutiens diceret: Domine, propitius esto mihi peccatori [Luc.
XVIII, 13]._”

_ 234 Contr. Collat._, n. 36: “_Naturae humanae, cuius creator est Deus,
etiam post praevaricationem manet substantia, manet forma, manet
vita et sensus et ratio ceteraque corporis et animi bona, quae etiam
malis vitiosisque non desunt. Sed non illis veri boni perceptio est,
quae mortalem vitam honestare possunt, aeternam conferre non
possunt._” For additional Patristic texts in confirmation of our
thesis see Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, t. III, disp. 20, sect.
4.

_ 235 Enchiridion_, c. 117, n. 31: “_Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non
est Dei caritas._”

_ 236 De Gratia Christi_, c. 26: “_Ubi non est dilectio, nullum bonum
opus imputatur, non recte bonum opus vocatur, quia omne quod non est
ex fide peccatum est et fides per dilectionem operatur._”

_ 237 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrìo_, c. 18: “_Praecepta dilectionis, i.e.
caritatis, tanta et talia sunt, ut quidquid se putaverit homo facere
bene, si fiat sine caritate, nullo modo fiat bene._”

238 Cfr. _supra_, p. 29.

_ 239 Proposit. Baii Damn._, 38: “_Omnis amor creaturae rationalis aut
vitiosa est cupiditas quâ mundus diligitur, quae a Ioanne
prohibetur, aut laudabilis caritas quâ per Spiritum Sanctum in corde
diffusa Deus amatur._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1038.)

_ 240 Prop. Quesnelli Damn._, 45: “_Amore Dei in corde peccatorum non
amplius regnante necesse est, ut in eo carnalis regnet cupiditas
omnesque actiones eius corrumpat._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1395.)

_ 241 Infra_, Ch. III, Sect. 1.

242 Especially against Julian of Eclanum. Cfr. _Contra Iulianum_, IV, 3.

243 Matth. VI, 24.

_ 244 Retract._, I, 15: “_Quando peccatum tale est, ut idem sit poena
peccati, quantum est quod valet voluntas sub dominante cupiditate,
nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxilium?_”

_ 245 Prop. Baii Damn._, 40: “_In omnibus suis actibus peccator servit
dominanti cupiditati._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1040.)

_ 246 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 27, n. 48: “_Si hi qui naturaliter, quae
legis sunt, faciunt, nondum sunt habendi in numero eorum quos
Christi iustificat gratia [Rom. II, 24], sed in eorum potius, quorum
(etiam impiorum nec Deum verum veraciter iusteque colentium) quaedam
tamen facta vel legimus vel novimus vel audimus, quae secundum
iustitiae regulam non solum vituperare non possumus, verum etiam
merito recteque laudamus; quamquam si discutiantur, quo fine fiant,
vix inveniuntur quae iustitiae debitam laudem defensionemve
mereantur._”

_ 247 Serm. de Temp._, 349, c. 1, 1 sq.: “_Caritas alia est divina, alia
humana; alia est humana licita, alia illicita.... Prius ergo loquor
de humana licita, quae non reprehenditur; deinde de humana illicita,
quae damnatur; tertio de divina, quae nos perducit ad regnum....
Licitam ergo caritatem habete; humana est, sed ut dixi licita, sed
ita licita ut, si defuerit, reprehendatur. Liceat vobis humanâ
caritate diligere coniuges, diligere filios, diligere amicos
vestros, diligere cives vestros. Sed videtis istam caritatem esse
posse et impiorum, i.e. paganorum, Iudaeorum, haereticorum. Quis
enim eorum non amat uxorem, filios, fratres, vicinos, affines,
amicos? Haec ergo humana est. Si ergo tali quisque crudelitate
effertur, ut perdat etiam humanum dilectionis affectum, et non amat
filios suos, ... nec inter homines numerandus est._” (Migne, _P.
L._, XXXIX, 1529.)

_ 248 Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol. III, p. 23.

249 As explained above, pp. 71 sqq.

250 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1524. On the teaching of St. Augustine, see
J. Mausbach, _Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus_, Vol. II, pp. 260 sqq.,
Freiburg 1909.

251 Cfr. _supra_, Art. 1.

252 On these and similar formulas see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, thes. 22.

253 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 218 sqq.

254 For details of his life see J. Pohle, art. “Pelagius and
Pelagianism” in Vol. XI of the _Catholic Encyclopedia_.

_ 255 Impeccantia_, ἀναμαρτησία.

256 Cfr. St. Augustine, _De Haeres. ad Quodvultdeum_, n. 88.

257 “_Hoc est occultum et horrendum virus haeresis vestrae, ut velitis
gratiam Christi in exemplo eius esse, non in dono eius, dicentes
quia per eius imitationem fiunt iusti, non per subministrationem
Spiritus Sancti._” (S. Aug., _Opus Imperf. contr. Iulian._, II,
146.)

258 On the _regnum coelorum_ in contradistinction to _vita aeterna_, in
the teaching of Pelagius, see St. Augustine, _De Pecc. Mer. et
Rem._, I, 18 sqq.

_ 259 V. infra_, Sect. 2.

_ 260 V. supra_, p. 8.

_ 261 e.g._ Petavius, _De Pelag. et Semipelag._, c. 8 sq.; Wirceburg.,
_De Gratia_, n. 182; Palmieri, _De Gratia Div. Actuali_, pp. 140
sqq.

262 Among them Suarez, _Prolegom. de Gratia_, c. 3, and J. Scheeben,
_Dogmatik_, Vol. III, pp. 739 sq.

263 “_Quicunque dixerit, ideo nobis gratiam iustificationis dari, ut
quod facere per liberum iubemur arbitrium facilius possimus implere
per gratiam, tamquam etsi gratia non daretur, non quidem facile, sed
tamen possimus etiam sine illa implere divina mandata, anathema
sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 105.)

264 “_Si quis per naturae vigorem bonum aliquod, quod ad salutem
pertinet vitae aeternae, cogitare ut expedit aut eligere sive
salutari, i.e. evangelicae praedicationi consentire posse confirmat
absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti, qui dat
omnibus suavitatem in consentiendo et credendo veritati, haeretico
fallitur spiritu._” (Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180.)

265 Sess. VI, can. 2: “_Si quis dixerit, ad hoc solum divinam gratiam
per Iesum Christum dari, ut facilius homo iuste vivere ac vitam
aeternam promereri possit, quasi per liberum arbitrium sine gratia
utrumque, sed aegre tamen et difficulter possit, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 812.)

266 “_Sicut palmes non potest ferre fructum a semetipso, nisi manserit
in vite: sic nec vos, nisi in me manseritis. Ego sum vitis, vos
palmites: qui manet in me, et ego in eo, hic fert fructum multum:
quia sine me nihil potestis facere_ (ὅτι χωρὶσ ἐμοῦ οὐ δύνασθε
ποιεῖν οὐδέν).”

267 St. Augustine, _Tract. in Ioa._, 81, n. 3: “_Non ait, quia sine me
parum potestis facere, sed nihil potestis facere. Sive ergo parum
sive multum, sine illo fieri non potest, sine quo nihil fieri
potest._”

268 Cfr. John XV, 3.

269 “_Non quod sufficientes simus, cogitate aliquid a nobis quasi ex
nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est._” On this text cfr.
Cornely, _Comment. in h. l._, Paris 1892.

270 “_Moysi enim dicit: Miserebor cuius misereor et misericordiam
praestabo cuius miserebor. Igitur non volentis neque currentis_ (οὐ
τοῦ θέλοντος οὐδὲ τοῦ τρέχοντος), _sed miserentis est Dei._” (Rom.
IX, 15 sq.)

271 “_Deus est enim, qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere_ (καὶ
τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν) _pro bona voluntate._” (Phil. II, 13.)

272 “_Nemo potest dicere: Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto._” (1
Cor. XII, 3.)

273 Cfr. Matth. VII, 21; VIII, 29.

274 Others explain the passage 1 Cor. XII, 3 differently. Cfr. also Rom.
VIII, 26; Phil. I, 6; Eph. II, 5 sqq.

_ 275 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, c. 4: “_Talis est haeresis
pelagiana, non antiqua, sed ante non multum tempus exorta._”

276 “_Desinat, si res ita sunt, incessere novitas vetustatem._”

_ 277 Adv. Haer._, III, 17, 2: “_Sicut arida terra, si non percipiat
humorem, non fructificat, sic et nos lignum aridum existentes
nunquam fructificaremus vitam sine superna voluntaria pluvia.... Non
a nobis, sed a Deo est bonum salutis nostrae._”

278 “_Legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi. Quum enim sanctarum
plebium praesules madatâ sibi legatione fungantur apud divinam
clementiam, humani generis agunt causam et tota secum Ecclesia
congemiscente postulant et precantur, ut infidelibus donetur fides,
ut idololatrae ab impietatis suae liberentur erroribus, ut Iudaeis
ablato cordis velamine lux veritatis appareat, ut haeretici
catholicae fidei perceptione resipiscant, ut schismatici spiritum
redivivae caritatis accipiant, ut lapsis poenitentiae remedia
conferantur, ut denique catechumenis ad regenerationis sacramenta
perductis coelestis misericordiae aula reseretur._” (Migne, _P. L._,
XLV, 1759.)

279 For additional Patristic texts see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, thes. 26.

_ 280 Hom. in 1 Cor., 7._

_ 281 De Civitate Dei_, XII, 9: “_Istam [bonam voluntatem] quis fecerat
nisi ille, qui eos cum bona voluntate, i.e. cum amore casto quo illi
adhaererent creavit, simul eis et condens naturam et largiens
gratiam?... Confitendum est igitur cum debita laude Creatoris, non
ad solos sanctos homines pertinere, verum etiam de sanctis angelis
posse dici, quod caritas Dei diffusa sit in eis per Spiritum
Sanctum, qui datus est eis._”

_ 282 Enchiridion_, c. 106: “_Sicut mori est in hominis potestate, quum
velit, ... ad vitam vero tenendam voluntas non satis est, si
adiutoria sive alimentorum sive quorumcunque tutaminum desint, sic
homo in paradiso ad se occidendum relinquendo iustitiam idoneus erat
per voluntatem; ut autem ab eo teneretur vita iustitiae, parum erat
velle nisi ille, qui eum fecerat, adiuvaret._”

283 Can. 19: “_Natura humana, etiamsi in illa integritate in qua est
condita permaneret, nullo modo seipsam, Creatore suo non adiuvante,
servaret. Unde quum sine gratia Dei salutem non possit custodire
quae accepit, quomodo sine Dei gratia poterit reparare quod
perdidit?_” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 192.)—St. Augustine holds that
our first parents would have been able to preserve the state of
grace by the divine _adiutorium sine quo non_, and that consequently
the _adiutorium quo_ would have been superfluous to them. On this
subtle question cfr. Pesch, _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, pp.
55 sqq., and Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 472 sqq.

_ 284 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 5: “_Vita aeterna est finis
excedens proportionem naturae humanae ... et ideo homo per sua
naturalia non potest producere opera meritoria proportionata vitae
aeternae; sed ad hoc exigitur altior virtus, quae est virtus
gratiae. Et ideo sine gratia homo non potest mereri vitam aeternam.
Potest tamen facere opera perducentia ad bonum aliquod homini
connaturale, sicut laborare in agro, bibere, manducare et habere
amicum et alia huiusmodi._”

285 For the necessary Augustinian citations in proof of this assertion
see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 174 sqq.

286 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 186 sqq.

_ 287 V. supra_, pp. 20.

_ 288 V. supra_, pp. 26 sq.

_ 289 V. supra_, pp. 69 sqq.

290 On the teaching of Scotus himself with regard to this point cfr. P.
Minges, O.F.M., _Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus auf ihren
angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semipelagianismus geprüft_, Münster
1906.

291 This is true of man even in the exalted state in which he existed in
Paradise. It is true also of the angels. It is true even of the
human nature of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss,
_Christology_, pp. 221 sqq.

292 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 190 sqq.

293 Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, p. 184.

294 Suarez, _De Necessitate Gratiae_, II, 4.

295 On the whole subject of this Article cfr. S. Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 227 sqq.; Rademacher, _Natur und Gnade_, M. Gladbach
1908.

296 Died 432. On his life and works see Bardenhewer-Shahan, _Patrology_,
pp. 515 sqq.

297 Reproduced in Migne, _P. L._, XLIX, 477-1328.

298 This contention is false, but it has never been proscribed as
heretical. Prosper says in his _Ep._ 226, 5: “_Tales aiunt perdi
talesque [infantes] salvari, quales futures illos in annis
maioribus, si ad activam servarentur vitam, scientia divina
praeviderit._” On this absurd assertion see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His
Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 380 sq.

_ 299 De Praedest. Sanctorum_, c. 3, n. 7: “_... putans fidem, quâ in
Deum credimus, non esse donum Dei, sed a nobis esse in nobis et per
illam nos impetrare Dei dona, quibus temperanter et iuste et pie
vivamus in hoc saeculo._”

300 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, _Enchiridion_, n. 128 sqq.

301 Ernst (_Werke und Tugenden der Ungläubigen nach Augustinus_,
Freiburg 1871) contends that the approbation of Boniface II
comprised all the canons of this synod.

302 Cfr. F. Wörter, _Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semipelagianismus_,
Münster 1900.

_ 303 Conc. Arausic._ II, can. 5 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 178): “_Si quis
sicut augmentum, ita etiam initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis
affectum, quo in eum credimus qui iustificat impium et ad
regenerationem sacri baptismatis pervenimus, non per gratiae donum,
i.e. per inspirationem Spiritus S., ... sed naturaliter nobis inesse
dicit, apostolicis dogmatibus adversarius approbatur._” Cfr. _Conc.
Vatican._, Sess. III, cap. 3. (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1791).

304 In his treatise _De Praedestinatione Sanctorum_.

305 In his work _Adversus Collatorem_.

_ 306 Discernit_, διακρίνει.

_ 307 Per fidem_, διὰ πίστεως.

_ 308 Non ex vobis_, οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν.

_ 309 Dei donum_, θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον.

_ 310 Non ex operibus_, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων.

311 Eph. II, 8 sq.

312 Cfr. Rom. III, 20 sqq., IX, 15 sqq.

313 John VI, 44: “_Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me,
traxerit_ (ἐλκύσῃ) _eum._”

_ 314 Opus Dei_, τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ.

_ 315 Ep._, 177: “_Oratio est clarissima gratiae testificatio._”

_ 316 Dial. c. Tryph._

_ 317 De Dono Persev._, c. 19, n. 50: “_Isti tales tantique doctores
dicentes non esse aliquid, de quo tamquam de nostro quod nobis Deus
non dederit gloriemur nec ipsum cor nostrum et cogitationes nostras
in potestate nostra esse, ... haec utique gratiae Dei tribuunt, Dei
munera agnoscunt, ab ipso nobis, non a nobis esse testantur._”—For
additional Patristic texts see Palmieri, _De Gratia Div. Act._, pp.
290 sqq.

318 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 239 sqq.

_ 319 Hom. in Heb._, 12, n. 3.

_ 320 V. infra_, Ch. III, Sect. 1.

_ 321 De Praedest. Sanct._, c. 14: “_Quid opus est ut eorum scrutemur
opuscula, qui priusquam ista haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt
necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quaestione versari? Quod
procul dubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur. Unde factum
est, ut de gratia Dei quid sentirent breviter quibusdam scriptorum
suorum locis et transeunter attingerent._”

_ 322 De Gratia Div. Act._, p. 288.

323 Cfr. Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, l. I, disp. 17, sect. 11.

_ 324 Ep._, 24 (to Maximilian, Patriarch of Constantinople): “_Sequere
priorum, a quibus eruditus es et nutritus, exempla pontificum,
beatissimi Ioannis scientiam, sancti Attici in repugnandis
haeresibus vigilantiam._”

_ 325 Hom. in 1 Cor._, XII, n. 2.

_ 326 Hom. in Ep. ad Hebr._, XII, 2.

327 Αὐτὸς ἐν ἡμῖν πίστιν ἐνέθησεν, αὐτὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔδωκεν.

328 They are fully explained by Palmieri, _l.c._, pp. 295 sqq.

_ 329 Die Lehre von der Heiligung_, p. 161, Paderborn 1885.

_ 330 V. supra_, pp. 19 sqq., 27 sq.

_ 331 De Praedest. Sanct._, c. 2, p. 5: “_Attendant hic et verba
perpendant, qui putant ex nobis esse fidei coeptum et ex Deo esse
fidei supplementum. Quis enim non videat prius esse cogitare quam
credere? Nullus quippe credit aliquid nisi prius cogitaverit esse
credendum.... Quod ergo pertinet ad religionem atque pietatem, si
non sumus idonei cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, sed
sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, profecto non sumus idonei credere
aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, quod sine cogitatione non possumus,
sed sufficientia nostra, quâ credere incipiamus, ex Deo est._”—Cfr.
also the seventh canon of the Second Council of Orange
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180), and Suarez, _De Fide_, disp. 6, sect.
7 sq.; IDEM, _De Gratia_, III, 7.

_ 332 Conc. Arausic._ II, can. 7.

333 Sess. VI, can. 3: “_Si quis dixerit, sine praeveniente Spiritus
Sancti inspiratione atque eius adiutorio hominem credere, sperare,
diligere aut poenitere posse, sicut oportet, ut ei iustificationis
gratia conferatur, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 813.)

_ 334 Supra_, pp. 87 sqq.

335 John XV, 5: “_Sine me nihil potestis facere._”

_ 336 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag._, II, 8: “_Dominus ut responderet
futuro Pelagio non ait: Sine me difficile potestis facere, sed ait:
Sine me nihil potestis facere.... Non ait: sine me nihil potestis
perficere, sed facere. Hoc uno verbo initium finemque
comprehendit._”

337 Phil. II, 12 sq.: “_Cum metu et tremore vestram salutem_ (σωτηρίαν)
_operamini; Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et
perficere._”

338 Rom. XV, 13: “_Deus autem spei repleat vos omni gaudio et pace in
credendo_ (ἐν τῷ πιστεύειν), _ut abundetis in spe (ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι) et
virtute Spiritus Sancti._”

339 1 John IV, 7: “_Caritas ex Deo est_ (ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν).”
Cfr. also John VI, 44 sqq., which text is fully explained by
Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 128 sqq.

_ 340 Enchiridion_, c. 32: “_Porro si nullus dicere Christianus audebit:
Non miserentis est Dei, sed volentis est hominis, ne Apostolo
apertissime contradicat, restat ut propterea dictum intelligatur
(Rom. IX, 16): ____Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est
Dei,____ ut totum Deo detur, qui hominis voluntatem bonam et
praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam. Praecedit enim bona
voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed non omnia; quae autem non
praecedit ipsa, in iis est et ipsa. Nam utrumque legitur in sanctis
eloquiis: et (Ps. LVIII, 11): ____Misericordia eius praeveniet
me,____ et (Ps. XXII, 6): ____Misericordia eius subsequetur me.____
Nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra
velit. Cur enim admonemur orare pro inimicis nostris, utique
nolentibus pie vivere, nisi ut Deus in illis operetur et velle?
Itemque cur admonemur petere ut accipiamus, nisi ut ab illo fiat
quod volumus, a quo factum est ut velimus? Oramus ergo pro inimicis
nostris, ut misericordia Dei praeveniat eos, sicut praevenit et nos;
oramus autem pro nobis, ut misericordia eius subsequatur nos._” On
this important passage cfr. J. B. Faure, _Notae in Enchiridion S.
Augustini_, c. 32. Similar expressions will be found in _Contra Duas
Epist. Pelag._, II, 9 and _De Gratia et Lib. Arb._, c. 17.

_ 341 Ep. ad Ctesiph._, 133: “_Velle et currere meum est, sed ipsum meum
sine Dei semper auxilio non erit meum; dicit enim Apostolus (Phil.
II, 13): ____Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et
perficere.____... Non mihi sufficit, quod semel donavit, nisi semper
donaverit._”

_ 342 Serm. de Pret. Marg._

_ 343 Conc. Arausic._ II. (A. D. 529); “_Hoc etiam salubriter profitemur
et credimus, quod in omni opere bono non nos incipimus et postea per
Dei misericordiam adiuvamur, sed ipse nobis nullis praecedentibus
bonis meritis et fidem et amorem sui prius inspirat, ut et baptismi
sacramenta fideliter requiramus et post baptismum cum ipsius
adiutorio ea, quae sibi sunt placita, implere possimus._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)

344 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 192 sqq.

345 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 132 sq.

346 Perrone, _De Gratia_, n. 203: “_Quaestio haec non ad scholasticas
quaestiones pertinet, sed est dogma fidei ab Ecclesia definitum._”

347 Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_Quum enim ille ipse Christus Iesus tamquam
caput in membra et tamquam vitis in palmites in ipsos iustificatos
iugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper
antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur et sine qua nullo pacto Deo
grata et meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis iustificatis amplius
deesse credendum est._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.) Cfr. Tepe,
_Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol. III, pp. 41 sqq., Paris 1896.

348 John XV, 5.

_ 349 V. supra_, pp. 87 sq. Other pertinent Scriptural texts are: 2 Cor.
III, 5; Phil. II, 12 sq.; III, 13 sq.; Heb. XIII, 21.

_ 350 De Gratia et Lib. Arb._, c. 17: “_Sine illo vel operante vel
cooperante quum volumus ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus._”

_ 351 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 26: “_Mala nostra non ad hoc solum medicus
supernus sanat, ut illa iam non sint, sed ut de cetero recte
ambulare possimus, quod quidem etiam sani nonnisi illo adiuvante
poterimus.... Sicut oculus corporis etiam plenissime sanus, nisi
candore lucis adiutus non potest cernere, sic et homo etiam
perfectissime iustificatus, nisi aeternae luce iustitiae divinitus
adiuvetur, recte non potest vivere._”

352 “_Actiones nostras, quaesumus Domine, aspirando praeveni et
adiuvando prosequere, ut cuncta nostra oratio et operatio a te
semper incipiat et per te coepta finiatur._” (_Missale Romanum._)
The argument from Tradition is more fully developed by Palmieri, _De
Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 28.

353 Thus Molina (_Concord._, qu. 14, art. 13 disp. 8), Bellarmine (_De
Gratia et Lib. Arb._, VI, 15), and Thomassin; the question is well
treated by Ruiz, _De Providentia Divina_, disp. 41, sect. 5 sq.

354 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 399,
Mainz 1897.

355 Cfr. Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 106, sect. 3 sqq.

_ 356 Impeccantia_, ἀναμαρτησία.

357 “_Item placuit ut quicunque ipsa verba dominicae orationis, ubi
dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, ita volunt a sanctis dici, ut
humiliter hoc, non veraciter dicatur, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 108.)

358 Sess. VI, can. 23: “_Si quis hominem semel iustificatum dixerit ...
posse in tota vita peccata omnia etiam venialia vitare nisi ex
speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de beata virgine tenet
Ecclesia, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 833.)

359 On this privilege of our Blessed Lady see Pohle-Preuss, _Mariology_,
pp. 72 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

360 Sess. VI, cap. 11: “_... quantumvis sancti et iusti in levia saltem
et quotidiana, quae etiam venialia dicuntur, peccata quandoque
cadunt._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 804.)

_ 361 De Gratia Divina Actuali_, p. 236.

362 Epistle of St. James, III, 2: “_In multis enim offendimus omnes_
(πολλὰ γὰρ πταίομεν ἄπαντες).”

363 1 John III, 6: “_Omnis qui in eo [scil. Christo] manet, non
peccat._”

364 ὀφειλήματα.

365 Matth. VI, 12. Cfr. Mark XI, 25.

366 Prov. XX, 9: “_Quis potest dicere: Mundum est cor meum, purus sum a
peccato?_”

367 On this text cfr. J. V. Bainvel, _Les Contresens Bibliques des
Prédicateurs_, 2nd ed., pp. 102 sq., Paris 1906: “_... ces chutes
sont surtout les souffrances, les tribulations. Le contexte
l’indique clairement: __‹ __N’attaquez pas le juste (15); car Dieu
le defend, et s’il tombe il se relèvera; mais pour l’impie c’est la
ruine irréparable.__ ›__ Peut-on, comme on le fait d’ordinaire,
entendre le texte des chutes morales, des péchés véniels? Plusieurs
commentateurs répondent: non; et ils citent à l’appui saint
Augustin: Septies cadet iustus et resurget, id est, quotiescumque
cediderit, non peribit: quod non de iniquitatibus, sed de
tribulationibus ad humilitatem perducentibus intelligi voluit_ (Civ.
D. xi, 31).—_D’autres Pères, saint Jérôme par exemple, sont moins
exclusifs; et de fait, pourquoi la maxime, dans sa plénitude, ne
comprendrait-elle pas toutes sortes de chutes, péchés ou
afflictions? En tout cas, c’est aller trop loin que de vouloir
prouver par là la thèse catholique sur l’impossibilité morale
d’éviter pendant longtemps tout péché de fragilité. L’écrivain sacré
veut dire autre chose, et nous avons des textes meilleures_ ...”

368 Eccles. VII, 21: “_Non est enim homo iustus in terra, qui faciat
bonum et non peccet_.”

_ 369 Ibid._, v, 23: “_Scit enim conscientia tua, quia et tu crebro
maledixisti aliis_.”

370 1 John I, 8: “_Si dixerimus, quoniam peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos
seducimus et veritas in nobis non est_.”

_ 371 E.g._ 1 John I, 10, III, 4, III 8, _et passim_.

372 The Johannine text here under consideration does, however, furnish a
telling argument against the Pelagians, in so far as they denied the
necessity of the atonement. The passage is effectively employed for
this purpose by the Second Council of Mileve (can. 6, quoted in
Denzinger-Bannwart’s _Enchiridion_, n. 106). Cfr. Chr. Pesch,
_Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., p. 99 and Al. Wurm,
_Die Irrlehrer im ersten Johannesbrief_, Freiburg 1903.

_ 373 De Dono Perseverantiae_, c. 2, n. 4: “_Tria sunt, ut scitis, quae
maxime adversus eos [scil. Pelagianos] defendit Ecclesia, quorum est
unum, gratiam Dei non secundum merita nostra dari.... Alterum est,
in quantacunque iustitia sine qualibuscunque peccatis in hoc
corruptibili corpore neminem vivere. Tertium est, obnoxium nasci
hominem peccato primi hominis_.”

_ 374 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 35, n. 41: “_Ubi parum attendit, quum sit
acutissimus, non frustra etiam iustos in oratione dicere: Dimitte
nobis debita nostra.... Etiamsi hic non vivatur sine peccato, licet
mori sine peccato, dum subinde veniâ deletur, quod subinde
ignorantiâ vel infirmitate committitur_.”

_ 375 Ibid._, c. 36. “_Si omnes illos sanctos et sanctas, quum hic
viverent, congregare possemus et interrogare, utrum essent sine
peccato, ... nonne unâ voce clamassent: Si dixerimus quia peccatum
non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus et veritas in nobis non est?_”—For
other confirmatory Patristic texts see Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 8.

376 The above-quoted analogy is taken from Heinrich-Gutberlet,
_Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, p. 81.

_ 377 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 8: “_Non potest homo abstinere
ab omni peccato veniali propter corruptionem inferioris appetitus
sensualitatis, cuius motus singulos quidem ratio reprimere potest,
et ex hoc habent rationem peccati et voluntarii, non autem omnes,
quia dum uni resistere nititur, fortassis alius insurgit, et etiam
quia ratio non potest semper esse pervigil ad huiusmodi motus
vitandos_.”

378 Sardagna (_De Gratia_, n. 336) incorrectly asserts this.

379 Cfr. Tepe, _Instit. Theolog._, Vol. III. pp. 47 sq.

380 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Contra Iulian._, IV, 3, 28: “_Ideo factum est
in loco infirmitatis, ne superbe viveremus, ut sub quotidiana
peccatorum remissione vivamus_.”

381 Andr. de Vega, _De Iustificatione Doctrina Universa_, 1. XIV, cap.
ult.

382 Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 8, 14: “_quia si vel in uno homine posset
contingere, ut illa duo coniungerentur, scil. carere speciali
privilegio et nihilominus cavere omne peccatum veniale per totam
vitam, propositio Concilii esset simpliciter falsa; nam est absoluta
et universalis, ad cuius falsitatem satis est quod in uno
deficiat_.”

383 Aug., _Ep._, 181, n. 8: “_Nemo itaque dicat, se esse sine peccato,
sed non tamen ideo debemus amare peccatum. Oderimus ea, fratres;
etsi non sumus sine peccatis, oderimus tamen ea, et maxime a
criminibus nos abstineamus; abstineamus quantum possumus a levibus
peccatis._”—On the whole subject of this thesis cfr. Schiffini, _De
Gratia Divina_, pp. 181 sqq.

_ 384 V. supra_, pp. 98 sqq.

_ 385 Conc. Arausic._ II, can. 10: “_Adiutorium Dei etiam renatis ac
sanctis semper est implorandum, ut ad finem bonum pervenire vel in
bono possint opere perdurare_.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 183.)

386 Sess. VI, can. 22: “_Si quis dixerit, iustificatum vel sine speciali
auxilio Dei in accepta iustitia perseverare posse vel cum eo non
posse, anathema sit_.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 832.)

387 Sess. VI, cap. 11: “_Deus namque suâ gratiâ semel iustificatos non
deserit, nisi ab eis prius deseratur_.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
804.)

388 Cfr. Wisd. IV, 11: “_Raptus est, ne malitia mutaret intellectum
eius_.”

389 Sess. VI, can. 16: “_magnum illud usque in finem perseverantiae
donum_.” On St. Augustine’s teaching in regard to the different
heads of doctrine defined above, see Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones
Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 103 sqq.

390 John XVII, 11: “_Pater sancte, serva eos in nomine tuo_ (τήρησον
αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί σου), _quos dedisti mihi, ut sint unum, sicut
et nos_.”

391 Col. IV, 12: “_Salutat vos Epaphras ... semper sollicitus pro vobis
in orationibus, ut stetis perfecti_ (ἵνα στῆτε τέλειοι) _et pleni in
omni voluntate Dei_.”

392 Matth. XXVI, 41: “_Vigilate, et orate, ut non intretis in
tentationem_.”

393 Phil. I, 6: “... _confidens hoc ipsum, quia qui coepit in vobis opus
bonum, perficiet_ (ἐπιτελέσει) _usque in diem Christi Iesu_.”

394 1 Pet. I, 5: “..._qui in virtute Dei custodimini per fidem in
salutem, paratam revelari in tempore novissimo_.”—For Old Testament
texts in confirmation of this thesis see Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 198 sq.

_ 395 De Dono Perseverantiae_. An English translation of this treatise
may be found in _The Anti-Pelagian Works of Saint Augustine, Bishop
of Hippo_, Translated by Peter Holmes and R. E. Wallis, Vol. III,
pp. 171 sqq. (Vol. XV of Dods’ translation of the _Works of St.
Augustine_), Edinburg 1876.

_ 396 De Dono Perseverantiae_, c. 2, n. 3: “_Cur autem perseverantia ista
poscitur a Deo, si non datur a Deo? An et ista irrisoria petitio
est, quum id ab eo petitur quod scitur non ipsum dare, sed ipso non
dante esse in hominis potestate?... An ab illo perseverantia ista
forte non poscitur? Iam hoc qui dicit, non meis disputationibus
refellendus, sed sanctorum orationibus onerandus est. An vero
quisquam eorum est, qui non sibi poscat a Deo ut perseveret in eo,
quum ipsâ oratione quae dominica nuncupatur, quia eam Dominus
docuit, quando oratur a sanctis, nihil paene aliud quam
perseverantia posci intelligatur_?”

_ 397 Op. cit._, c. 7, n. 15: “_Prorsus in hac re non operosas
disputationes exspectet Ecclesia, sed attendat quotidianas orationes
suas. Orat ut increduli credant: Deus ergo convertit ad fidem. Orat
ut credentes perseverent; Deus ergo donat perseverantiam usque in
finem_.”

_ 398 Op. cit._, c. 23, n. 63: “_Quis enim veraciter gemat desiderans
accipere quod orat a Domino, si hoc a seipso se sumere existimet,
non ab illo_?”

_ 399 Op. cit._, c. 6, n. 10: “_Hoc Dei donum suppliciter emereri potest,
sed quum datum fuerit, amitti contumaciter non potest_.”

_ 400 Op. cit._, c. 16, n. 39: “... _quum constet Deum alia danda etiam
non orantibus, sicut initium fidei, alia nonnisi orantibus
praeparasse, sicut in finem perseverantiam, profecto qui ex se ipso
se hanc habere putat, non orat ut habeat_.”

_ 401 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 94, sect. 2.

402 Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 38: “_Infallibilitas non convenit merito
de congruo ratione sui, ut ita dicam, sed ratione impetrationis quae
propriae soli orationi, ut talis est, respondet. Ratio est, quia
haec infallibilitas solum fundatur in promissione divina, quae non
invenitur facta operibus iustorum quatenus meritoriis de congruo,
sed tantum orationi; quare ut fructus huius meriti certior sit,
adiungenda semper est petitio perseverantiae_.”

403 John XVI, 23.

404 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 38, n. 14: “... _quia ut oratio
habeat perseverantiam debitam, perdurare debet cum illis
circumstantiis moralibus, quas a principio habere etiam debuit, ut
congrue fieret; unde eo ipso quod novum impedimentum ponitur
[peccando] effectui orationis, deficit perseverantia in orando,
saltem debito modo._”

_ 405 Ibid._, n. 17: “_Igitur perseverantia orationis in tali materia
requisita est, ut non semel tantum aut iterum fiat, set ut toto
tempore vitae duret, et praesertim ut in occurrentibus occasionibus
servandi mandata aut vincendi tentationes cum debita fiducia
repetatur._”—For more detailed information we must refer the reader
to Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 36, n. vi sqq. The
theological argument for our thesis is convincingly set forth by
Gutberlet in Heinrich’s _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 404.
The _donum perseverantiae_ must not be confounded with the
_confirmatio in gratia_; on this point see Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 197 sqq.

_ 406 V. supra_, pp. 7 sq.

407 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1: “_Meritum
et merces ad idem referuntur. Id enim merces dicitur quod alicui
recompensatur pro retributione operis vel laboris quasi quoddam
pretium ipsius. Unde sicut reddere iustum pretium pro re accepta ab
aliquo est actus iustitiae, ita etiam recompensare mercedem operis
vel laboris est actus iustitiae._” Cfr. Taparelli, _Saggio Teoretico
del Diritto Naturale_, diss. 1, c. 6, n. 130, Palermo 1842.

408 “This word is scarcely used in modern English, except as expressing
that punishment which is fully deserved, a usage originating with
the Tudor Parliaments; but it was once commonly used in the language
in a wider sense, for whatever had been justly earned, and some
attempts to revive it have been made in recent times; certainly some
word is wanted to express the idea.” (Hunter, _Outlines of Dogmatic
Theology_, Vol. III, pp. 58 sq.) Cfr. Dr. Murray’s _New English
Dictionary_, Vol. II, p. 784, Oxford 1893.

409 Eck did not, however, approve the term _meritum de condigno_; he
preferred _meritum digni_. Cfr. J. Greving, _Johann Eck als junger
Gelehrter_, pp. 153 sqq., Münster 1906.

410 Cfr. St. Augustine, _In Ps._, 86: “_Debitorem Deus ipse fecit se,
non accipiendo, sed promittendo._” On this point consult
Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes,_ pp.
455 sqq.

_ 411 Oratio, preces._

_ 412 Capacitas, dispositio._

413 Vasquez, _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thomae Aquin._, 1a 2ae, disp.
216, c. 4.

414 Already in the fourth century the Church emphasized the proposition
“_Gratiam Christi non secundum merita dari_” against Pelagius.

415 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Ep._ 194 _ad Sixt._, n. 19: ___Vita etiam
aeterna, quam certum est bonis operibus debitam reddi, ab Apostolo
tamen gratia nuncupatur, nec ideo quia meritis non datur, sed quia
data sunt ipsa merita, quibus datur.___ The dogma was formally
defined by the Council of Trent: “... _cuius tanta est erga omnes
homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae sunt ipsius
dona._” (Sess. VI, cap. 16, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s
_Enchiridion_, n. 809.)

416 For further information on this point see Palmieri, _De Gratia
Divina Actuali,_ thes. 35.

_ 417 V. supra_, pp. 83 sqq.

418 “_Gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari._”

419 “_Debetur merces bonis operibus, si fiant; sed gratia quae non
debetur praecedit, ut fiant._” (Arausic. II, can. 18; see
Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 191.)

420 “... _ipsius iustificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Christum
Iesum praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, h. e. ab eius vocatione,
quâ nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur._” (Sess. VI, cap. 5.
Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.)

421 Rom. IX, 16: “_Igitur non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis
est Dei._”

422 Rom. IX, 18: “_Ergo cuius vult miseretur et quem vult indurat_ (ἄρα
οὖν θέλει δ᾽ δε θέλει σκληρύνει.”)

423 Rom. XI, 6: “_Si autem gratiâ, iam non ex operibus_ (ἐξ ἔργων),
_alioquin gratia iam non est gratia._”

424 Eph. II, 8-10: “_Gratiâ enim estis salvati per fidem et hoc non ex
vobis: Dei enim donum est, non ex operibus, ut ne quis glorietur.
Ipsius enim sumus factura_ (ποίημα), _creati in Christo Iesu in
operibus bonis, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in illis ambulemus._”

_ 425 E.g._, 2 Cor. V, 14; Gal. III, 22; 2 Tim. I, 9; Tit. III, 5; 1 Pet.
I, 3; 1 John IV, 10.

_ 426 Tract, in Ioa._, 86: “_Gratia non invenit, sed efficit merita._”

_ 427 Serm._, 169, c. 2: ___Gratia praecessit meritum tuum, non gratia ex
merito, sed meritum ex gratia. Nam si gratia ex merito, emisti non
gratis accepisti.___ Other Patristic texts quoted by Ripalda, _De
Ente Supernaturali,_ disp. 15 sqq.

_ 428 V. supra_, pp. 50 sqq.

429 For a more extensive treatment of this important point the reader is
referred to Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII,
§ 418, Mainz 1897.

_ 430 V. supra_, p. 98.

431 Can. 20: “_Multa Deus facit in homine bona, quae non facit homo;
nulla vero facit homo bona, quae non Deus praestat, ut faciat
homo._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 193.)

432 “_Sed ipse [Deus] nobis nullis praecedentibus bonis meritis [scil.
naturalibus] et fidem et amorem sui prius inspirat._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)

433 Matth. XXV, 15: “_Et uni dedit quinque talenta, alii autem duo, alii
vero unum, unicuique secundum propriam virtutem_ (ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὴν
ἰδίαν δύναμιν).”

434 Cfr. Maldonatus’ commentary on this text.

435 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
p. 326.

_ 436 De Praedest. Sanct._, 3, 10, 31: “_Nihil huic sensui tam contrarium
est quam de suis meritis sic quemquam gloriari, tamquam ipse sibi ea
fecerit, non Dei gratia, sed gratia quae bonos discernit a malis,
non quae communis est bonis et malis._”

_ 437 De Peccato Orig._, c. 24, n. 28: “_Non enim gratia Dei erit ullo
modo, nisi gratuita fuerit omni modo._”

438 Cyril of Jerusalem (_Catech._, I, 17), Athanasius (_C. Gent._, n.
30), Basil (_Epist._, 294: “_Divinum auxilium in nostra situm est
potestate_”), Gregory of Nazianzus (_Or._, 31), and especially
Chrysostom (_Hom. in Gen._, 12; _Hom. in Epist. ad Rom._, 2).

_ 439 Hom. in Epist. ad Ephes._, 4.

_ 440 Hom. in 1 Epist. ad Cor._, 12. Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, thes. 33.

441 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 5: “_Donum
gratiae considerari potest dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem
gratuiti doni, et sic manifestum est quod omne meritum repugnat
gratiae, quia ut Rom. XI, 9 Apostolus dicit: ____Si autem gratia,
iam non ex operibus.____ Altero modo potest considerari secundum
naturam ipsius rei, quae donatur, et sic etiam non potest cadere sub
merito non habentis gratiam, tum quia excedit proportionem naturae,
tum etiam quia ante gratiam in statu peccati homo habet impedimentum
promerendi gratiam, scil. ipsum peccatum. Postquam autem aliquis iam
habet gratiam, non potest gratia iam habita sub merito cadere, quia
merces est terminus operis, gratia autem est principium cuiuslibet
boni operis in nobis._” This is equally true of the _meritum de
condigno_ and the _meritum de congruo_.

442 John XVI, 24: “_Petite et accipietis._”

_ 443 V. supra_, theses I and II.

444 “_Si quis ad invocationem humanam [i.e. naturalem] gratiam Dei dicit
posse conferri, non autem ipsam gratiam facere, ut invocetur a
nobis, contradicit Isaiae prophetae vel Apostolo idem dicenti:
Inventus sum a non quaerentibus me, palam apparui his, qui me non
interrogabant._” (Can. 3, Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 176.)

445 Rom. VIII, 26: “_Quid oremus, sicut oportet, nescimus, sed ipse
Spiritus postulat [postulare facit] pro nobis gemitibus
inenarrabilibus._”

446 1 Cor. XII, 3: “_Nemo potest dicere Dominus Deus, nisi in Spiritu
sancto._”

447 John XV, 7: “_Si manseritis in me et verba mea in vobis manserint,
quodcunque volueritis, petetis et fiet vobis._”

_ 448 De Dono Perseverantiae_, 23, n. 63 sq.: “_Quis veraciter gemat,
desiderans accipere quod orat a Domino, si hoc a se ipso sumere
existimet, non ab illo?... Ubi intelligimus et hoc ipsum esse donum
Dei, ut veraci corde et spiritualiter clamemus ad Deum. Attendant
ergo, quomodo falluntur, qui putant esse a nobis, non dari nobis ut
petamus, quaeramus, pulsemus_, etc.”

449 Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 32.

450 On this difficult question consult Ruiz, _De Provid._, disp. 18,
sect. 3. and De Lugo, _De Fide_, disp. 12, sec. 3.

_ 451 De Praedest. Sanct._, c. 12.

452 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 226 sqq.

_ 453 Op. cit._, pp. 228 sq.

454 Further information on this head _infra_, Part II, Ch. III.

455 Cfr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 117 sqq.

_ 456 À titre de curiosité_ we may note the opinion of Ripalda (_De Ente
Supernat._, disp. 17, sect. 1) and Vasquez (_Comment. in S. Theol._,
1a, disp. 91, c. 10) that some pre-Tridentine theologians ascribed
to nature the ability of positively disposing itself for actual
graces and thereby, though in perfect good faith, entertained
Semipelagian views. Even St. Thomas has been accused of conceding
too much to Semipelagianism in two of his earlier works (_Comment.
in Quatuor Libros Sent._, II, dist. 28, qu. 1, art. 4, and _De
Veritate_, qu. 14, art. 11), though his teaching in the _Summa_ is
admittedly orthodox. On the extremely doubtful character of such a
summary indictment see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes.
34; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 495 sqq., 542 sqq.; Glossner,
_Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von der Gnade_, Mainz 1871.

457 Vasquez, _Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a, disp. 91, c. 10-11.

_ 458 Dogmatik_, Vol. II, pp. 191 sq., Ratisbon 1874.

_ 459 De Auxil._, III, 2, 3.

_ 460 De Gratia Effic._, c. 10.

461 Disproved historically by Palmieri.

462 Cfr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 119 sqq.

463 Cfr. St. Augustine, _De Praedest. Sanct._, c. 15.

464 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Tract. in Ioa._, 36, n. 4: “_Venit Christus,
sed primo salvare, postea iudicare, eos iudicando in poenam, qui
salvari noluerunt, eos perducendo ad vitam, qui credendo salutem non
respuerunt._”

465 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology_, pp. 75 sqq., St. Louis 1914.

466 Sess. VI, can. 17: “_Si quis iustificationis gratiam nonnisi
praedestinatis ad vitam contingere dixerit, reliquos vero omnes qui
vocantur, vocari quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote divinâ
potestate praedestinatos ad malum, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 827.)

467 Prop. 5, _apud_ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1096. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss,
_Soteriology_, p. 76.

468 “_Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de
coelis._” (_Credo_).

_ 469 V. infra_, Thesis II.

470 πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτόν.

471 Among them was one of our Lord’s own chosen Apostles.

472 Wisd. XI, 24 sqq.: “_Sed misereris omnium, quia omnia potes, et
dissimulas peccata hominum propter poenitentiam. Diligis enim omnia
quae sunt et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti.... Parcis autem
omnibus, quoniam tua sunt, Domine, qui amas animas._”

473 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.: “_Obsecro igitur primum omnium fieri
obsecrationes, orationes, postulationes, gratiarum actiones pro
omnibus hominibus_ (ὑπερ πάντων ἀνθρώπων).... _Hoc enim bonum est et
acceptum coram Salvatore nostro Deo, qui omnes homines vult salvos
fieri_ (ὁς πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλει σωθῆναι) _et ad agnitionem
veritatis venire: unus enim Deus_ (εἴς γὰρ Θεός), _unus et mediator_
(εἴς καὶ μεσίτης) _Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus, qui dedit
redemptionem semetipsum pro omnibus_ (ὑπὲρ πάντων).”

474 “_Unus enim Deus._” Cfr. Rom. III, 29 sq., X, 12.

475 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology_, pp. 77 sqq.

476 Cfr. Matth. XVIII, 11; 2 Cor. V, 15. That God’s will to redeem
mankind is universal has been proved in _Soteriology_, pp. 77 sqq.

477 Cfr. on this text Estius, _Comment. in Epist. S. Pauli, h. l._

478 In his work _De Partitione Voluntatis Divinae in Primam et
Secundam_, Rome 1851.

_ 479 In Ps._, 39, n. 20: “_Ille omnes suos vult esse, quos condidit et
creavit. Utinam tu homo non fugias et te abscondas! Ille etiam
fugientes requirit et absconditos non vult perire._”

_ 480 Orat._, 33, n. 9.

_ 481 Resp. ad Capitula Gallor._, c. 2: “_Sincerissime credendum est,
Deum velle ut omnes homines salvi fiant, siquidem Apostolus
sollicite praecipit, ut Deo pro omnibus supplicetur._”

_ 482 Op. cit._, c. 8: “... _qui et omnes vult salvos fieri et ad
agnitionem veritatis venire, ... ut et qui salvantur ideo salvi
sint, quia illos voluit Deus salvos fieri, et qui pereunt, ideo
pereant, quia perire meruerunt._”

483 For further information on this subject consult Ruiz, _De Voluntate
Dei_, disp. 19 sqq.; Petavius, _De Deo_, X, 4 sq.

_ 484 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 33, n. 58: “_Vult Deus omnes homines
salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis venire; non sic tamen ut iis
adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes iustissime
iudicentur._”

_ 485 Enchiridion_, c. 103.

_ 486 Contra Iulian._, IV, 8, 42: “_Nemo salvatur nisi volente Deo._”

_ 487 De Corrept. et Gratia_, c. 15, n. 47: “_Omnes homines vult Deus
salvos fieri, quoniam nos facit velle, sicut misit Spiritum Filii
sui clamantem: Abba, pater, i.e. nos clamare facientem._”

_ 488 Confessiones_, XII, 17 sqq.

489 Faure has proved this in his _Notae in Enchiridion S. Augustini_, c.
103, Naples 1847, pp. 195 sqq.

_ 490 Summa Theol._, 1a, qu. 19, art. 6, ad 1. On Augustine’s teaching
see Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 51 sq., and, less favorably,
Bardenhewer-Shahan, _Patrology_, pp. 498 sqq., Freiburg 1908.

_ 491 E.g._ Arrubal (_Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a, disp. 91, c. 3 sq.) and
Kilber (_Theol. Wirceburg., De Deo_, disp. 4, c. 2, art. 3).

492 Cfr. Albertus a Bulsano, _Theol. Dogmat._, ed. Graun, Vol. II, p.
141, Innsbruck 1894.

493 Cfr. Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, II, 12: “... _haec
responsio non videtur digna Chritianis, qui providentiam Dei erga
homines ex sacris literis et ecclesiastica traditione didicerunt.
Nam si non cadit passer in terram sine Patre nostro, qui in coelis
est, quanto magis nos apud Deum pluris sumus illis?_”

494 “_Definimus illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo
originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere._” (_Decret.
Unionis_, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693.)

495 Cfr. Pallavicini, _Hist. Conc. Trid._, IX, 8.

496 It occurs in his commentary on the _Summa_, 3a, qu. 68, art. 2, 11.

497 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, p. 295,
Mainz 1897.

498 On the probable fate of unbaptized infants cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God
the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 300 sqq.

499 Thesis II.

500 Quoted _supra_, p. 156.

501 Quoted _supra_, p. 157.

502 On the whole question consult Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 53, 3rd
ed., Rome 1883.

503 On the notion and existence of sufficient grace see _supra_, Ch. I,
Sect. 2, No. 6.

_ 504 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 18: “_Si quis dixerit, Dei
praecepta homini etiam iustificato et sub gratia constituto esse ad
observandum impossibilia, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
828). Cfr. Sess. VI, cap. 11 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 804).

505 “_Aliqua Dei praecepta hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus
secundum praesentes, quas habent vires, sunt impossibilia: deest
quoque illis gratia, quâ possibilia fiant._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
1092.)

506 On the distinction between _gratia proxime sufficiens_ and _gratia
remote sufficiens_, cfr. _supra_, pp. 43 sq.

507 1 John V, 3 sq.: “_Haec est caritas Dei, ut mandata eius custodiamus
et mandata eius gravia non sunt_ (αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ βαρεῖαι οὐκ
εἰσίν): _quoniam omne quod natum est ex Deo [= iustus] vincit
mundum._”

508 Matth. XI, 30.

509 1 Cor. X, 13: “_Fidelis autem Deus est, qui non patietur vos tentari
supra id quod potestis_ (πειραςθῆναι ὑπέρ ἡ δύνασθε), _sed faciet
etiam cum tentatione proventum_ (ἔκβασιν), _ut possitis sustinere._”

_ 510 V. supra_, pp. 65 sq.

511 1 Cor. X, 12: “_Itaque qui se existimat stare, videat ne cadat._”

_ 512 V. infra_, Thesis II. Cfr. also Ecclus. II, 11 sqq.; John VI, 37; 2
Pet I, 10 sq.

513 “_Gratiam non omnibus dari._”

514 Migne, _P. L._, XVII, 1073 sqq. Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan,
_Patrology_, p. 515.

_ 515 Benignitas Dei generalis—specialis Dei misericordia._

516 “_Deo autem placuit et hanc [gratiam efficacem] multis tribuere et
illam [sufficientem] a nemine submovere, ut ex utraque appareat, non
negatum universitati, quod collatum est portioni._” (_De Vocatione
Omnium Gentium_, II, 25.) For further information on the doctrinal
character of this work see Fr. Wörter, _Zur Dogmengeschichte des
Semipelagianismus_, Münster 1900.

517 Chrysostom, _Hom. in Matth._, 82, n. 3.

518 Augustine, _Serm._, 296: “_Plus ausus erat, quam eius capacitas
sustinebat._”

519 Matth. XXVI, 41: “Watch ye and pray that ye enter not into
temptation.”

_ 520 Lib. de Unitate Ecclesiae_, 9: “_Quis dubitaverit quod Iudas
Christum, si voluisset, non utique tradidisset, et Petrus, si
voluisset, ter Dominum non negasset?_”

521 John VI, 40.

522 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 19-21.

523 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 573 sqq.

524 Cfr. 1 Cor. X, 13.

525 1 John V, 3 sq.

526 Cfr. 1 John II, 16.

_ 527 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 43, n. 50: “_Deus impossibilia non iubet,
sed iubendo admonet, et facere quod possis et petere quod non
possis._”

528 For an explanation of certain difficult passages bearing on this
point in the writings of St. Augustine, see Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 531 sqq.

_ 529 V. supra_, pp. 104 sq.

530 Ez. XXXIII, 11: “_Vivo ego, dicit Dominus Deus, nolo mortem impii,
sed ut convertatur impius a via sua et vivat. Convertimini,
convertimini a viis vestris pessimis._”

531 2 Pet. III, 9: “_Non tardat Dominus promissionem suam, sicut quidam
existimant, sed patienter agit_ (μακροθυμεῖ) _propter vos, nolens
aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poenitentiam reverti_ (μὴ βουλόμενός
τινας ἀπολέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντας εἰς μετάνοιαν χωρῆσαι).”

532 Cfr. Is. V, 20.

533 According to Ruiz (_De Praedest._, disp. 39, sect. 1), there are but
very few divines (_valde pauci_) who hold this view.

534 Wisd. XII, 10.

535 Rom. II, 4 sq.: “_An divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et
longanimitatis contemnis? Ignoras quoniam benignitas Dei ad
poenitentiam_ (εἰς μετάνοιαν) _te adducit? Secundum autem duritiem_
(σκληρότητα) _tuam et impoenitens cor_ (ἀμετανόητον καρδίαν)
_thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae et revelationis iusti iudicii
Dei, qui reddet unicuique secundum opera eius._” Cfr. Prov. I, 20
sqq.

536 Ex. VII, 3: “_Ego indurabo cor eius._”

537 Ex. IX, 12: “_Induravitque Dominus cor Pharaonis, etc._”

538 Ex. VIII, 15.

539 For the solution of other difficulties see Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 529 sq.

540 St. Augustine, _Enarr. in Ps._, VI, n. 8: “_Dedit illos in reprobum
sensum (Rom. I, 28); nam ea est caecitas mentis. In eam quisquis
datus fuerit, ab interiore Dei luce secluditur, sed nondum penitus,
quum in hac vita est. Sunt enim tenebrae exteriores, quae magis ad
diem iudicii pertinere intelliguntur, ut penitus extra Deum sit,
quisquis, dum tempus est, corrigi noluerit._”

541 St. Augustine, _Retractationes_, 419: “_De quocunque quamvis pessimo
homine hac in vita constituto non est desperandum._”

_ 542 Tract. in Ioa._, XII, 39. Similarly _ibid._, LIII, n. 6. For a
complete exposition of St. Augustine’s teaching on this point
consult Dechamps, _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, III, 6 sqq., and
Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 40.

543 Cfr. St. Thomas, _De Veritate_, qu. 24, art. 11: “_Haec est
obstinatio imperfecta, quâ aliquis potest esse obstinatus in statu
viae, dum scilicet habet aliquis ita firmatam voluntatem in peccato,
quod non surgunt motus ad bonum nisi debiles. Quia tamen aliqui
surgunt, ex iis datur via, ut praeparentur ad gratiam._”

_ 544 Conc. Lateran._ IV (1215), cap. “_Firmiter_”: “_Et si post
susceptionem baptismi quisquam prolapsus fuerit in peccatum, per
veram potest semper poenitentiam reparari._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
430.)

545 Cfr. _Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 14; Sess. XIV, cap. 1.

546 “_Pagani, Iudaei, haeretici aliique huius generis nullum omnino
accipiunt a Iesu Christo influxum, adeoque hinc recte inferes, in
illis esse voluntatem nudam et inermem sine omni gratia
sufficienti._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1295.)

547 “_Extra ecclesiam nulla conceditur gratia._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
1379.)

548 Rom. II, 6 sqq.

549 Rom. II, 10 sq.: “_Gloria autem et honor et pax omni operanti bonum,
Iudaeo primum et Graeco (Ἔλληνι=pagano); non enim est acceptio
personarum (προσωποληψία) apud Deum._”

550 σωτὴρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, μάλιστα πιστωῶν.

551 Cfr. 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.; John I, 9.

_ 552 Ep. ad Corinth._, 1, 7.

553 ἐν γενεᾷ καὶ γενεᾷ.

554 ἀλλότριοι τοῦ Θεοῦ.

_ 555 Hom. in Ioa._, VIII, 1.

556 II, c. 31.

557 De _Arbitrii Libertate_, n. 19: “_... quotidie per tempora, per
dies, per momenta, per ἄτομα et cunctis et singulis._”

558 Heb. XI, 6.

559 “_Initium, fundamentum et radix omnis iustificationis._” Sess. VI,
cap. 8, _apud_ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 801.

560 “_Fides late dicta, ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo, ad
iustificationem sufficit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1173.)

561 “_... fides, quâ Dei aspirante et adiuvante gratiâ ab eo revelata
vera esse credimus, non propter intrinsecam rerum veritatem naturali
rationis lumine perspectam, sed propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei
revelantis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest._” (Sess. III, cap. 3;
Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1789.)

562 “_Quoniam vero sine fide impossible est placere Deo, ... ideo nemini
unquam sine illa contigit iustificatio._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
1793.)

563 Rom. X, 17.

564 Cfr. Acts X, 1 sqq.

565 Card. Toletus, _Comment. in S. Th._, I, qu. 1, art. 1.

566 Cfr. St. Thomas, _De Verit._, qu. 14, art. 11, ad 1: “_Hoc ad
divinam providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis
ad salutem, dummodo ex parte eius non impediatur. Si enim aliquis
taliter (in silvis vel inter bruta animalia) nutritus ductum
naturalis rationis sequeretur in appetitu boni et fuga mali,
certissime est tenendum quod ei Deus vel per internam inspirationem
revelaret ea, quae sunt ad credendum necessaria, vel aliquem fidei
praedicatorem ad eum dirigeret, sicut misit Petrum ad Cornelium._”

567 Gotti, _De Fide_, qu. 2, dub. 4, § 1: “_Sententia negans fidem
explicitam Christi et Trinitatis esse ita necessariam, ut sine ea
nemo iustificari vel salvari queat, valde probabilis est. Eam enim
videtur docere S. Thomas tum 2—2 p., qu. 10, art. 4, tum 3 p., qu.
69, art. 4, ubi de Cornelio Centurione ait: Ante baptismum Cornelius
et alii similes consequuntur gratiam et virtutes per fidem Christi
et desiderium baptismi implicite vel explicite._”

568 Cfr. Fr. Schmid, _Die ausserordentlichen Heilswege für die gefallene
Menschheit_, pp. 225 sqq., Brixen 1899.

569 A. Fischer, _De Salute Infidelium_, Essen 1886; Heinrich-Gutberlet,
_Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 491 sqq. On their teaching
see P. Minges, O. F. M., _Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae
Generalis_, pp. 270 sqq., Munich 1902.

570 With regard to certain other controversies on this subject consult
Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 535 sqq., and Tepe, _Instit.
Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 109 sqq., Paris 1896.

571 See Articles 1 and 2, _supra_.

_ 572 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 12: “_Arcanum divinae
praedestinationis mysterium._”

_ 573 De Dono Perseverantiae_, n. 21: “_Ex duobus parvulis originali
peccato pariter obstrictis cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur et
ex duobus aetate iam grandibus impiis, cur iste ita vocetur ut
vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur [praedicatione fidei]
aut non ita vocetur, inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei._” On this
mysterious dispensation see Scheeben, _Die Mysterien des
Christentums_, § 99-103, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1912, and Palmieri, _De
Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 62.

574 Eph. I, 3 sqq., and in other passages.

_ 575 De Dono Persev._, c. 10, n. 19: “_Praedestinatio est gratiae
praeparatio, gratia vero iam ipsa donatio._”

_ 576 V. infra_, pp. 199 sqq.

_ 577 De Dono Persev._, c. 14, n. 35: “_Praedestinatio nihil est aliud
quam praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime
liberantur [scil. salvantur] quicunque liberantur._”

_ 578 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 23, art. 2: “_Praedestinatio est praeparatio
gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro._” On the Biblical, the
Patristic, and the theological use of the term, see Chr. Pesch,
_Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 189 sqq., Freiburg 1906.

579 The Tridentine Council presupposes it as an unquestioned dogma
(Sess. VI, cap. 12).

580 Rom. VIII, 28 sqq.; “_Scimus autem quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia
cooperantur in bonum, iis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti
(κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοῖς οὔσιν). Nam quos praescivit, et
praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse
primogenitus in multis fratribus; quos autem praedestinavit, hos et
vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et iustificavit: quos autem
iustificavit, illos et glorificavit._”

581 Cfr. Eph. I, 4-11.

_ 582 De Praedestinatione Sanctorum_, c. 25: “_Praedestinationis huius
fidem, quae contra novos haereticos novâ nunc solicitudine
defenditur, nunquam Ecclesia Christi non habuit._”

_ 583 Resp. ad Obiect. Gallor._, 1: “_Praedestinationem Dei nullus
Catholicus negat._”

_ 584 Ep. ad Rufin._: “_Praedestinationem tam impium est negare quam ipsi
gratiae contraire._”

_ 585 De Correptione et Gratia_, c. 7, n. 14: “_Horum si quisquam perit,
fallitur Deus; sed nemo eorum perit, quia non fallitur Deus._” On
the question how this infallible foreknowledge is compatible with
the dogma of free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, _God, His Knowability,
Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 364 sqq.

586 Cfr. Apoc. XVII, 8: “_Liber vitae_, τὸ βιβλίον τῆς ζωῆς.” Cfr. St.
Augustine, _De Civ. Dei_, XX, 13: “_Praescientia Dei, quae non
potest falli, liber vitae est._”

587 Luke X, 20: “_Gaudete quod nomina vestra scripta sunt in coelis._”

588 Cfr. 2 Pet. I, 10: “_Satagite, ut per bona opera certam (βεβαίαν)
vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis._”

589 Apoc. III, 5: “_Non delebo nomen eius de libro vitae._” Cfr. Ex.
XXXII, 32; Ps. LXVIII, 29.

590 On the _liber vitae_, cfr. St. Thomas, _S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 24, art.
1-3; and Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, §
435.

_ 591 De Corrept. et Grat._, c. 13: “_... quorum ita certus est numerus,
ut nec addatur eis quisquam nec minuatur ex eis._”

_ 592 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 23, art. 7: “_De numero omnium praedestinatorum
hominum quis sit, dicunt quidam quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur,
quot angeli ceciderunt; quidam vero, quod tot ex hominibus
salvabuntur, quot angeli remanserunt; quidam vero, quod tot ex
hominibus salvabuntur, quot angeli ceciderunt et insuper tot quot
fuerunt angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod soli Deo est cognitus
numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus, ut habet collecta
pro vivis et defunctis._”

_ 593 De Bono Viduitatis_, n. 28: “_Quasi propter aliud retardetur hoc
saeculum, nisi ut impleatur praedestinatus numerus ille sanctorum,
quo citius impleto profecto nec terminus saeculi differetur._”

594 Dieringer, _Epistelbuch_, “Fest Allerheiligen.”

_ 595 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 23, art. 7, ad 3: “_Pauciores sunt qui
salvantur._”

596 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theol._, Vol. VIII, pp. 363 sqq.,
and W. Schneider, _Das andere Leben_, 9th ed., pp. 476 sqq.,
Paderborn 1908.

_ 597 Le Rigorisme, le Nombre des Élus et la Doctrine du Salut_, 2nd ed.,
Bruxelles 1899.

_ 598 De Paucitate Salvandorum quid Docuerunt Sancti_, 3d ed., Bruxelles
1899.

599 Cfr. 1 Tim. IV, 10: σωτὴρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, μάλιστα πιστῶν. This
opinion is convincingly defended by the Spanish theologian Genér
(_Theol. Dogmat. Scholast._, II, 342 sqq., Rome 1767.) Timid souls
may profitably ponder what Thomas à Kempis says in the _Imitation_,
I, 25.

600 Genér, _Theol. Dogmat. Scholast._, II, 342: “_... ne dici possit cum
dedecore et iniuria divinae maiestatis et clementiae, maius esse
imperium daemonis quam Christi._”

_ 601 Lect. in Ep. ad Rom._, VIII, 6: “_Unde ponere quod aliquod meritum
ex parte nostra praesupponatur, cuius praescientia sit ratio [scil.
motivum] praedestinationis, nihil est aliud quam supponere gratiam
dari ex meritis nostris [scil. naturalibus]._” _V. supra_, Ch. II,
Sect. 2.

602 “_Gratiam Dei secundum merita dari._”

_ 603 De Dono Perseverant._, n. 53: “_Quid autem coegit loca
Scripturarum, quibus praedestinatio commendata est, copiosius et
enucleatius isto nostro labore defendi, nisi quod Pelagiani dicunt,
gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra [naturalia] dari?_”

604 Charles Du Plessis d’Argentré (d. 1740), after a careful study of
all Scholastic works written between 1120 and 1708, concluded:
“_Veteres Scholastici de causa praedestinationis omnino considerate
et ad gratiam et ad gloriam praecipue agebant. Idea nolebant eam
esse ex praevisis meritis, quia gratia, quae in ea includitur, non
datur nec proin praedestinatur ob praevisa merita._” (_De
Praedest._, c. 10, § 1).

_ 605 V. infra_, Part II, Ch. III, Sect. 3.

_ 606 E.g._, Bañez, Alvarez, Lemos, Gonet, Contenson, Goudin.

_ 607 E.g._, Berti and Norisius.

_ 608 E.g._, Suarez, Ruiz, De Lugo, Bellarmine.

609 “_Nisi breviati fuissent dies illi, non fieret salva omnis caro, sed
propter electos (διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτούς) breviabuntur dies illi....
Surgent enim pseudochristi, ... ita ut in errorem inducantur, si
fieri potest, etiam electi._”

610 Cfr. Col. III, 12; 1 Pet. I, 1.

611 “_Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei ... Cuius
vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat._” On the meaning of this text
_v. supra_, pp. 137, 177.

612 Cfr. Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 65; Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat.
Theol._, Vol. VIII, pp. 345 sqq.; Chr. Pesch, _Prael. Dogmat._, Vol.
II, 3rd ed., pp. 212 sqq., Freiburg 1906; Val. Weber, _Kritische
Geschichte der Exegese des 9. Kapitels des Römerbriefes_, Würzburg
1889.

_ 613 Die Lehre von der Heiligung_, p. 242, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.

_ 614 E.g._, Petrus de Comitibus, O. S. A. (_De Praedest. et Reprobat._,
disp. 3, art. 4 sqq.), Tricassinus (_De Praedest._), and the Jesuits
Lessius, Gregory of Valentia, Franzelin, and Schrader.

_ 615 De Deo Uno_, p. 677: “_Si vero dissensus esset manifestus, ut
prudenter [cum ceteris patribus] conciliari non posset, tum sane non
dubitarem, cum Pighio, Catharino, Osorio, Camerario, Maldonato,
Toleto, Petavio, reverenter ab Augustino discedere, quum haec non
posset esse nisi privata eius sententia._”

_ 616 De Praedest._, qu. 4.

_ 617 Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thomae Aqu._, I, qu. 23, art. 5, conclus.
2.

_ 618 De Deo_, X, col. 9.

619 A careful analysis of the Augustinian texts bearing on this question
will be found in the _Theol. Wirceburg._, _De Deo Uno_, n. 231 sqq.,
and Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 53.

620 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 351
sqq.

_ 621 Clypeus Thomist._, _De Praedest._, disp. 2, § 2, n. 26: “_Qui
ordinate vult, prius vult finem quam media ad finem. Sed Deus
ordinate vult. Ergo prius vult finem quam media ad illum. Atqui
gloria est finis et merita sunt media ad illum conducentia. Ergo
prius vult gloriam quam merita, et consequenter electio ad gloriam
non potest esse ex praevisione meritorum._”

622 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theol._, Vol. VIII, p. 330.

_ 623 V._ Art. 4, No. 2, _infra_. The opposite opinion is defended by
Billuart _De Deo_, diss. 9, art. 4, § 3 (ed. Lequette, p. 386).

_ 624 Orth. Praed._, c. 1, n. 7: “_Deus primo praeparavit dona gratiae ac
deinde eos, quos praevidebat bene usuros eiusmodi donis, elegit ad
vitam aeternam._”

625 “_... sententiam illam antiquitate, suavitate ac Scripturarum nativâ
auctoritate nobilissimam de praedestinatione ad gloriam post
praevisa merita semper ut Dei misericordiae ac gratiae magis
consentaneam, veriorem ac amabiliorem existimavi._” (Cfr. _Traité de
l’Amour de Dieu_, III, 5).

_ 626 V. supra_, pp. 153 sqq.

_ 627 V. supra_, No. 4.

628 2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “_Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem
servavi; in reliquo reposita est (ἀπόκειται=praeparata ab aeterno)
mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet (ἀποδώσει) mihi Dominus in illa
die, iustus index._” Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 24 sqq.; Apoc. II, 7, 26.

629 Matth. XXV, 34 sqq.: “_Venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete
paratum vobis regnum a constitutione mundi._”

_ 630 De Deo_, ed. Lequette, p. 391.

631 For instance, John VIII, 44; 1 John III, 8; Acts XIII, 10.

632 Cfr. Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 289 sqq., Paris 1896;
Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theol._, Vol. VIII, § 430.

633 Lessius, _Antapol._, prop. 8: “_Tenent hanc sententiam omnes Patres
Graeci, adeo ut communiter dicatur esse sententia Graecorum._”

_ 634 Hom. in Matth._, 80, n. 2: “_Haereditate possidete regnum quasi
proprium, quasi paternum et vestrum, iam olim vobis debitum;
priusquam enim existeretis, haec vobis parata erant et disposita,
quia ego vos tales futuros esse praescivi._”

_ 635 In Rom._, VIII, 29 (Migne, _P. G._, LXXXII, 142): “_Non simpliciter
praedestinavit, sed quum praescivisset, praedestinavit._”

_ 636 In Ps._, 64, n. 5: “_Multi vocati sunt, sed pauci electi.... Itaque
non res indiscreti iudicii est electio, sed ex meriti delectu facta
discretio est._”

_ 637 De Fide_, V, 6, 83: “_Unde et Apostolus ait: quos praescivit, et
praedestinavit (Rom. VIII, 29); non enim ante praedestinavit quam
praescivit, sed quorum merita praescivit, eorum praemia
praedestinavit._” Cfr. Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 59; Lessius,
_De Praedest. et Reprob._, sect. 2, n. 7 sqq.

_ 638 De Gratia_, II, 11.

639 Cfr. O. Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Der Augustinismus_, München 1892; O.
Pfülf, S. J., “_Zur Prädestinationslehre des hl. Augustinus_” in the
Innsbruck _Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie_, 1893, pp. 483 sqq.

_ 640 V. supra_, pp. 200 sqq., 216 sqq.

641 Cfr. Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 64.

_ 642 Comment. in IV Libros Sent._, 1, dist. 41: “_Eligatur [ea
sententia] quae magis placet, dum tamen salvetur libertas divina
sine aliqua iniustitia et alia quae salvanda sunt circa Deum._”

643 Many Scholastic utterances bearing on this subject have been
collected by Lessius, _De Praedest. et Reprob._, sect. 2, n. 7
(_Opusc._ II, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1878).

_ 644 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, 1, dist. 41, qu. 1.

_ 645 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, 1, dist. 41, art. 2.

_ 646 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 23, disp. 3, art. 4.

647 In his treatise _De Praedestinatione_, dedicated to the Council of
Trent.

_ 648 De Deo_, disp. 9, art. 3.

_ 649 De Praedest. et Reprob._, Paris edition of the _Opuscula_, 1878, p.
412: “_... privilegia eius omnem modum superant et ad nullum alium
sunt extendenda._”

_ 650 Sent._, 1, dist. 40: “_... est praescientia iniquitatis quorundam
et praeparatio damnationis eorumdem._”

_ 651 Supra_, Art. 3, No. 4.

652 Calvin’s teaching in his _Inst._, l. III, c. 21, 24. On Arminianism
see J. F. Loughlin in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. I, pp. 740
sqq.

653 “_Aliquos vero ad malum divinâ potestate praedestinatos esse non
solum non credimus, sed etiam, si sunt qui tantum malum credere
velint, cum omni detestatione illis anathema dicimus._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)

654 Sess. VI, can. 17: “_Si quis iustificationis gratiam nonnisi
praedestinatis ad vitam contingere dixerit, reliquos vero omnes qui
vocantur, vocari quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote divinâ
potestate praedestinatos ad malum, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 827.)

_ 655 V. supra_, Art. 1.

_ 656 V. supra_, Art. 2, Thesis II.

657 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
pp. 251 sqq.

_ 658 V. supra_, pp. 201 sqq.

659 1 Pet. II, 7 sq.: “_Non credentibus autem [Christus] ... lapis
offensionis ... qui offendunt verbo nec credunt, in quo (εἰς δ) et
positi sunt._”

660 “_In hoc positi, i.e. praedestinati sunt, ut non credant._”

661 “And he shall be a sanctification to you. But for a stone of
stumbling and for a rock of offense to the two houses of Israel, for
a snare and a ruin to the inhabitants of Jerusalem.”

662 “And whosoever shall fall on this stone, shall be broken: but on
whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder.”

663 Cfr. Oecumen., _in h. l._: “_Ad quod positi sunt, non dicitur, quasi
a Deo ad hoc essent destinati; nulla enim causa perditionis
ministratur ab eo, qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri._”

_ 664 Contr. Iulian._, III, 18, 35: “_Bonus est Deus, iustus est Deus:
potest aliquos sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est; non
potest quemquam sine malis meritis damnare, quia iustus est._”

_ 665 Resp. ad XII Object. Vincent._: “_Voluntate exierunt, voluntate
ceciderunt, et quia praesciti sunt casuri, non sunt praedestinati;
essent autem praedestinati, si essent reversuri et in sanctitate
remansuri, ac per hoc praedestinatio Dei multis est causa standi,
nemini est causa labendi._”

_ 666 Ad Monim._, l. I. Cfr. Petavius, _De Deo_, X, 7 sqq.

_ 667 Clypeus Thomist._, Vol. II, tr. 5, disp. 5, art. 2, n. 23.

668 Cfr. Limbourg, S. J., in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift für kath.
Theologie_, 1879, pp. 203 sqq.

669 Cfr. Suarez, _De Praedest._, V, 4 sqq.

_ 670 Conc. Trident._, Sess. V, can. 5.

671 Which explains why both theories have the same defenders. _V.
supra_, Art. 3, No. 4.

672 Bañez, Alvarez, Gonet.

673 “_Deus non serio vult, sed vellet salvare etiam reprobos, nisi per
hoc impediretur pulchritudo universi._”

_ 674 V. supra_, Art. 1 and 2.

_ 675 De Praedest._, V, 8, 8: “_Non est in potestate hominis, cum
non-electione seu cum non-praedestinatione aut, quod idem est, cum
reprobatione negativa actu ponere seu componere suam aeternam
salutem._” Cfr. Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, p. 583, 3rd ed., Rome 1888.

676 “_Deus ex omnibus hominibus, quos infectos originali peccato
praevidit, efficaciter ex meritis Christi venturi quosdam elegit ad
gloriam, et alios in poenam eiusdem originalis peccati et ad
ostensionem suae iustitiae erga illos et maioris misericordiae erga
electos voluit permittere, ut deficerent a consecutione gloriae seu
positive eis non voluit gloriam.... Ex vi huius intentionis
efficacis excogitavit media apta ad consecutionem talis finis, et
videns in aliquibus hominibus esse aptum medium in solo originali
peccato eos relinquere, in aliis vero permittere, ut cadant in haec
vel illa peccata actualia ac in illis perseverent, has permissiones
per subsequentem electionem approbavit. Et tandem ... per actum
imperii sui intellectus haec media ad praedictum finem ordinavit._”
_Clyp. Thomist._, Vol. II, disp. 5, art. 4, n. 155.

_ 677 De Reprob._, c. 3, n. 6.

_ 678 De Praedest._, V, 7, 14: “_Electio ad finem est ratio dandi media
efficacia seu infallibilia ad illum; ergo negatio illius electionis
erit suo modo ratio non dandi media, quae cognoscuntur congrua et
infallibilia ad illum finem consequendum._”

679 2 Pet. III, 9: “_... nolens aliquos perire, sed omnes ad
poenitentiam reverti._”

_ 680 De Praedest._, sect. 2, n. 13: “_Secundum communem aestimationem
hominum paria videntur, Deum velle ut pereas et nolle te ponere in
electorum suorum numero neque gratiam congruam et perseverantiam
dare; aeque enim infallibiliter ex huiusmodi decretis sequeretur
damnatio. Et si alterutrum horum decretorum esset subeundum, quivis
censeret sibi esse indifferens, utrum eligatur, quum utrumque ante
praevisionem operum sit conceptum._” The teaching of St. Augustine
and that of St. Thomas on this point is in dispute. See Chr. Pesch,
_Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 230 sqq., and
Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theol._, Vol. VIII, § 433.

681 In his treatise _De Servo Arbitrio_.

682 Cfr. Denifle, _Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwicklung_, Vol.
I, Mainz 1904.

_ 683 Instit. Christ. Religionis_, l. II.

684 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 378 sqq.

685 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 291 sqq.

686 Sess. VI, can. 4: “_Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo
motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo vocanti ... neque
posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino
agere mereque passive se habere, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.)

687 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _op. cit._ (note 5), pp. 295 sq.

688 In support of this contention Jansenius quoted St. Augustine, _In
Gal._, n. 49: “_Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur
necesse est._”

689 J. Forget in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. VIII, pp. 288 sqq. On
Jansenism see Hergenröther, _Kirchengeschichte_, 4th ed., ed. by J.
P. Kirsch, Vol. III, pp. 386 sqq., 466 sqq., Freiburg 1909.

690 Sess. VI, cap. 5: “_Unde in sacris literis quum dicitur:
____Convertimini ad me et ego convertar ad vos,____ libertatis
nostrae admonemur; quum respondemus: ____Converte nos, Domine, ad te
et convertemur,____ Dei nos gratiâ praeveniri confitemur._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.) Cfr. Oswald, _Die Lehre von der
Heiligung_, 3rd ed., pp. 186 sq.

691 Zach. I, 3.

692 Jer. XXXI, 21.

693 Rom. IX, 19: “_Voluntati enim eius quis resistit?_”

694 1 Tim. IV, 7: “_Exerce autem teipsum (γύμναζε δέ σεαυτόν) ad
pietatem._”

695 Acts VII, 51: “_Vos semper Spiritui Sancto resistitis (ἀντιπίπτετε),
sicut patres vestri, ita et vos._”

696 Matth. XIX, 17: “_Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata._”
Cfr. Apoc. IV, 20: “_Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis audierit
vocem meam et aperuerit mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum._”

697 Cfr. the Scriptural argument for the existence of sufficient grace,
_supra_, pp. 45 sq.

_ 698 V. supra_, pp. 102 sq., 141 sq.

_ 699 Instit._, l. II, c. 3, sect. 10: “_Voluntatem movet [gratia
Christi], non qualiter multis saeculis traditum est et creditum, ut
nostrae postea sit electionis, motioni aut obtemperare aut
refragari, sed illam efficaciter afficiendo. Illud ergo toties a
Chrysostomo repetitum repudiari necesse est: ____Quem trahit,
volentem trahit.___” Many Patristic texts of similar tenor have been
gathered and explained by Cardinal Bellarmine in his treatise _De
Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, VI, 11.

700 Cfr. _De Gratia Christi_, c. 47: “_Ista quaestio, ubi de arbitrio
voluntatis et Dei gratia disputatur, ita est ad discernendum
difficilis, ut quando defenditur liberum arbitrium, negari Dei
gratia videatur; quando autem asseritur Dei gratia, liberum
arbitrium putetur auferri._”

_ 701 De Corrept. et Gratia_, XII, 38: “_Subventum est infirmitati
voluntatis humanae, ut divinâ gratiâ indeclinabiliter et
insuperabiliter ageretur._”

702 Cfr. his _Sermones_, 163, c. 11, n. 13: “_Totum ex Deo, non tamen
quasi dormientes, non quasi ut non conemur, non quasi ut non
velimus. Sine voluntate tua non erit in te iustitia Dei. Voluntas
quidem non est nisi tua, iustitia non est nisi Dei.... Sine te fecit
te Deus. Non enim adhibuisti aliquem consensum, ut te faceret Deus.
Quomodo consentiebas, qui non eras? Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non
te iustificat sine te. Ergo fecit nescientem, iustificat volentem.
Tamen ipse iustificat, ne sit iustitia tua._”

_ 703 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 34: “_Consentire vocationi Dei vel ab
ipsa dissentire propriae voluntatis est._”

_ 704 Ep._, 157, 2, 10: “_Neque enim voluntatis arbitrium ideo tollitur,
quia iuvatur; sed ideo iuvatur, quia non tollitur._” (Migne, _P.
L._, XXXIII, 677).

_ 705 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 2: “_Tolle liberum arbitrium et
non erit, quod salvetur; tolle gratiam et non erit, unde salvetur._”
On other difficult passages in the writings of St. Augustine cfr.
Mausbach, _Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus_, Vol. II, pp. 208 sqq.,
Freiburg 1909.

706 Cfr. Bañez, _Comment. in S. Theol._, 1 p., qu. 14, art. 13: “_Nulla
secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit efficaciter determinata a
prima._”

707 Cfr. Billuart, _De Deo_, diss. 8, art. 4: “_Movet nempe Deus non
solum ad substantiam actus, sed etiam ad modum eius, qui est
libertas._”

708 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 83, n. 9: “_Quando agens
infinitae virtutis movet aliquod subiectum, tale subiectum
infallibiliter movetur, quid tunc resistentia passi non superat nec
adaequat virtutem agentis. Sed Deus est agens infinitae virtutis.
Ergo motio Dei efficax respectu cuiuscumque hominis in quibuslibet
circumstantiis positi erit medium congruum et aptum, ut
infallibiliter inducat effectum, ad quem ex Dei intentione datur._”

709 Cfr. Billuart, _De Deo_, diss. 8, art. 5: “_Restat ergo tertia
sententia, scilicet Deum praemovere physice ad entitatem peccati et
sic se effecturum definivisse decreto positivo et effectivo;
operatur enim omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae._”

710 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 73 sqq.

711 Cfr. De Lemos, _Acta Congr. de Aux._, p. 1065: “_Illa praepositio
’prae’ nihil aliud denotat aut denotare potest quam Deum esse
priorem et primam causam, prius naturâ et causalitate moventem,
applicantem, inclinantem et determinantem voluntatem, quam ipsa
voluntas se determinet._”

712 Cfr. Gonet, _Clypeus Theol. Thomist._, disp. 11, art. 5: “_Haec
divina motio in creatura recepta a Thomistis ____physica____
appellatur, ... quia ex propria essentia et ab intrinseco est
efficax, independenter a quocumque creato consensu._”

713 Cfr. Graveson, _Epist. Theol. Polem._, t. I, ep. 11: “_Voluntas
creata priusquam se determinet, a Deo debet determinari, quia scil.
indifferens sit eaque indifferentia non solvatur quam per praeviam
Dei motionem._” Cfr. Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 28: “_Liberum
arbitrium, quia creatum est, licet determinet sibi actum, illum
tamen determinat praedeterminatum a Deo._”

714 Cfr. Reginald., _De Novit. Antiquit. Nominis Praedeterm. Phys._, l.
II, c. 36: “_Quum Deus hanc motionem det causis sciens et volens
atque adeo cum [aeterna] cognitione et intentione certa cuiusdam
determinati effectus, alias haec essent a casu respectu Dei:
consequitur illam praemotionem physicam esse praedeterminationem._”

715 Cfr. Nazarius, _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom._, 1 p., qu. 22, art.
4: “_Sublatâ a Deo physicae praemotionis efficacitate nulla
relinquitur alia in Deo sufficiens causalitas respectu
determinationis liberorum actuum et consequenter neque in Deo esse
poterit talium praescientia futurorum._” See also Pohle-Preuss,
_God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 383 sqq., 400
sqq.

716 Cfr. Contenson, _Theol. Mentis et Cordis_, l. VIII, diss. 2, specul.
3: “_Generalem praemotionem ideo solum adstruimus, ut per eam ad
gratiam per se efficacem uberius fortiusque stabiliendam viam
muniamus ad eamque propugnandam serviat etiam philosophia._”

717 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 92, n. 6: “_Repugnant ad invicem
auxilium efficax ad consentiendum et actualis dissensus._”

718 Cfr. Alvarez, _op. cit._, disp. 122, n. 16: “_Efficacia auxilii
praevenientis gratiae et connexio eius infallibilis cum libera
cooperatione arbitrii tota fundatur et desumitur, tamquam ex prima
radice, ex omnipotentia Dei atque ex absoluto et efficaci decreto
voluntatis eius volentis, ut homo quem movet convertatur et pie
operetur, nec huiusmodi efficacia ullo modo dependet etiam, tamquam
a conditione sine qua non, ex futura cooperatione arbitrii creati._”

719 Cfr. Alvarez, _op. cit._, disp. 19, n. 7: “_Praedictum auxilium
actuale determinat liberum arbitrium ad unam numero actionem, non
subditur libero arbitrio quantum ad usum._”

720 Cfr. Graveson, _Epist. Theol. Polem._, t. I, ep. 1: “_Gratia
thomistice sufficiens ita ex naturâ sua essentialiter distinguitur a
gratia thomistice efficaci, ut numquam et in nullo casu gratia
thomistice sufficiens evadere possit gratia efficax thomistice nec
umquam ponatur actus secundus, nisi accesserit gratia efficax
thomistice._”

_ 721 Prael. Theol._, disp. 5, c. 6: “_In gratia sufficiente totum id
continetur quod ad potentiam bene operandi exigitur, non autem totum
id quod ulterius requiritur ad actum; certum est enim in omni causa
agente aliquid plus ad actum quam ad potentiam requiri._”

_ 722 Panoplia_, t. IV, p. 2, tr. 3, c. 2: “_Auxilium sufficiens ita
sufficientiam tribuit ad operandum, si homo velit, quod defectus
operationis nullo modo provenit ex insufficientia aliqua ipsius
auxilii, sed tantum ex defectu arbitrii, quod ei resistit et
impedimentum ponit._”

723 Cfr. Limbourg, S. J., “_Selbstzeichnung der thomistischen
Gnadenlehre_” in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie_,
1877.

724 Billuart, _De Deo_, diss. 8, art. 4. § 3.

725 Cfr. Bañez, _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom._, 1 p., qu. 14, art. 13,
concl. 14: “_Nam voluntas creata infallibiliter deficiet circa
quamcumque materiam virtutis, nisi efficaciter determinetur a divina
voluntate ad bene operandum._”

726 Other evasions are treated by Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 400
sqq. On the true notion of merely sufficient grace, _v._ Ch. I,
Sect. 2, No. 6, _supra_.

727 The Molinists also regard supernatural grace as a _praemotio
physica_; cfr. Chr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp.
145 sq., Freiburg 1908.

728 Gonet, _Clypeus Theol. Thomist._, disp. 9, art 5, § 3.

729 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 22, n. 39: “_Solus Deus propter
suam infinitatem et omnipotentiam, quia est auctor voluntatis
creatae, potest illam immutare conformiter ad suam naturam et movere
efficaciter atque applicare ad producendum actum in particulari, non
solum secundum substantiam, sed etiam secundum modum libertatis,
quod tamen non potest alia causa creata._”

730 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
pp. 282 sqq.

731 Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 22, n. 19: “_Nam tamdiu manet libertas
in voluntate, quamdiu intellectus illi repraesentat obiectum cum
indifferentia._”

_ 732 De Deo_, diss. 8, art. 4, § 2.

_ 733 De Auxiliis_, disp. 92, n. 11: “_Etiam posito auxilio efficaci in
voluntate componitur cum illo potentia ad dissentiendum, quamvis
nulla sit potentia ad coniungendum actualem dissensum cum auxilio
efficaci_ [not: _cum actuali consensu_].”]

734 Sess. VI, cap. 5: “_Homo ... inspirationem illam [gratiam efficacem]
recipiens ... illam et abiicere potest._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
797). Sess. VI, can. 4: “_Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium
a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti
atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam iustificationis gratiam se disponat
ac praeparet, neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime
quoddam nihil omnino agere mereque passive se habere, anathema
sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.)

735 Thus Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 93, art. 1: “_Nunc autem dicimus
Concilium Tridentinum ... numquam usum fuisse verbo illo
____resistere,____ sed verbo ____dissentire____ et
____[abiicere],____ ut insinuaret non esse idem formaliter resistere
seu posse resistere auxilio efficaci et posse dissentire seu
abiicere gratiam vocationis.... Unde licet arbitrium motum auxilio
efficaci ad consentiendum possit dissentire, si velit, non tamen
potest Deo resistere vel auxilio eius efficaci, secundum quod est
instrumentum voluntatis divinae._”

736 Sess. III, cap. 3: “_Quare fides ipsa in se, etiamsi per caritatem
non operetur, donum Dei est et actus eius est opus ad salutem
pertinens, quo homo liberam praestet ipsi Deo obedientiam, gratiae
eius cui resistere possit consentiendo et cooperando._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1791.)

737 Cfr. Tepe, _Instit. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 74 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr.
Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 140 sqq., Freiburg
1908; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 405 sqq., Freiburg 1901. On
the teaching of St. Augustine see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, thes. 50; on that of St. Thomas, L. de San, S. J., _De Deo
Uno_, t. I: _De Mente S. Thomae circa Praedeterminationes Physicas_,
Louvain 1894.

738 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
pp. 383 sqq., 400 sqq.

739 “_Quidquid entitatis reperitur in quocumque actu peccati, etiamsi
alias sit intrinsece malus, debet reduci in Deum tamquam in primam
causam praemoventem et praedeterminantem actuali motione voluntatem
creatam ad talem actum, inquantum actus est, secundum quod est
ens._” Alvarez, _De Auxil._, disp. 24, n. 15.

740 Cfr. Bañez, _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom._, 1 p., qu. 23, art. 3,
dub. 2, conclus. 2: “_Deus cognoscit cognitione intuitivâ peccatum
quatenus Dei voluntas est causa entitatis actus peccati et simul
permittens, quod ad eundem actum concurrat liberum arbitrium
deficiendo a regula._”

741 Sess. VI, can. 6. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence,
and Attributes_, pp. 253 sqq., 442 sqq.

742 “_Voluntas Adami ante peccatum non erat tibia curva, sed omnino
recta, facta autem est curva ex promotione physica._” _Praelect.
Dogmat._, Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 137.

743 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 72 sqq.

744 Cfr. on this subject Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 41;
T. Papagni, O. P., _La Mente di S. Tommaso intorno alla Mozione
Divina nelle Creature_, p. 44, Benevento 1901.

745 The principal representatives of Augustinianism are Berti, Bellelli,
and Bertieri.

746 Published at Rome in 1739 sqq.

747 Cfr. his work _Le Bajanisme et le Jansénisme Resuscités dans les
Livres de Bellelli et Berti, s. l._, 1745.

748 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 419 sqq.

749 Cfr. Berti, _De Theol. Disciplinis_, XIV, 9, n. 6: “_Sententia est
Thomistarum et Augustinensium omnium affirmantium, gratiam efficacem
esse se ipsâ, non talem reddi aut cooperatione liberi arbitrii aut
ex circumstantiis congruis, utque certissime et infallibiliter cum
effectu coniunctam esse._”

750 Cfr. Berti, _op. cit._, XIV, 11: “_In aequali gradu concupiscentiae
et gratiae gratia concupiscentiae, non concupiscentia gratiae
succumbet, quia homo etiam cum aequali virtute maiorem habet ad
malum quam ad bonum inclinationem.... Agere et non agere in
aequilibrio virium et determinare seipsum absque efficaci Dei
praemotione est liberi arbitrii sani et robusti, non autem
infirmi._”

751 Cfr. Berti, _De Theol. Disciplinis_, XIV, 8, n. 18: “_Quamvis sit
haec efficax gratia antecedens et Deus sine nobis faciat ut velimus,
nihilo tamen minus per illam non proponitur nobis bonum sub ratione
omnis boni, quemadmodum proponitur beatis per lumen gloriae, ideoque
remanet indifferentia iudicii et vera libertas._”

752 Calvinism, Bajanism, Jansenism—Thomism, Augustinianism, Molinism,
and Congruism.

_ 753 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, c. 17.

754 Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 433 sqq.

755 On the insufficiency of the _indifferentia iudicii_ to preserve
free-will, _v. supra_, p. 242.

_ 756 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 6.

757 “_Proponitur praemium ut pecces, i.e. quod te delectat_,” he says;
“... _Terreris minis, facis propter quod times.... Si cupiditas non
valuit, forte timor valebit ut pecces.... Itaque ad omne recte
factum amor et timor ducit. Ut facias bene, amas Deum et times Deum;
ut autem facias male, amas mundum et times mundum._” _In Ps._, 79,
c. 13.

758 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 422 sqq.; Palmieri, _De
Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 54.

759 On the _Congregatio de Auxiliis_, so called because the principal
question under discussion was the help (_auxilia_) afforded by
grace, see Astrain, S. J., in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. IV,
pp. 238 sq., and Schneemann, S. J., _Die Entstehung und weitere
Entwicklung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_, Freiburg
1879; also in a Latin translation, Freiburg 1881.

760 Cfr. Molina, _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis_, qu. 14,
art. 13, dip. 38: “_Asserimus auxilia praevenientis atque adiuvantis
gratiae ... pendere a libero consensu et cooperatione liberi
arbitrii nostri cum illis atque adeo in libera potestate nostra
esse, vel illa efficacia reddere consentiendo et cooperando cum
illis ad actus, quibus ad iustificationem disponimur, vel
inefficacia illa reddere continendo consensum et cooperationem
nostram aut ettam eliciendo contrarium consensum._” _Ibid._, disp.
12: “_Quare fieri potest, ut duorum qui aequali auxilio interius a
Deo vocantur, unus pro libertate sui arbitrii convertatur et alter
infidelitate permaneat._”

761 “_Auxilium gratiae praevenientis_,” says Molina, “_est influxus Dei
in liberum arbitrium, quo illud movet et excitat potensque reddit,
ut eo pacto motum tamquam habens iam in se ipso principium efficiens
actuum supernaturalium simul influendo ulterius eos producat._”
Molina, _op. cit._, qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 41.

762 Cfr. Molina, _op. cit._, qu. 23, art. 4, disp. 1: “_Quando audis
consensum nostrum efficacia reddere auxilia gratiae, non ita id
intelligas, quasi arbitrium nostrum vim aliquam seu efficacitatem
tribuat auxiliis ipsis; arbitrium enim et influxus noster nullam vim
conferunt gratiae auxiliis, sed potius auxilia vim et propensionem
arbitrio tribuunt ad consensum eliciendum._” _Ibid._, _Appendix ad
obi._ 3 (ed. Paris., 1876, p. 595): “_Solum significare volumus,
auxilium illud liberum nobis relinquere consensum nostrum ad
conversionem, nec tale esse, ut nullam necessitatem, etiam
consequentiae, arbitrio ad talem consensum aut conversionem ponat._”

763 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
pp. 383 sqq.

764 Cfr. Molina, _op. cit._, qu. 19, art. 6, disp. 2: “_Hac ratione Deus
O. M. vult omnia bona, quae per arbitrium nostrum sunt futura, non
solum voluntate conditionali, si nos quoque ea velimus, sed etiam
voluntate absoluta, quatenus ipsi praevidenti ea futura placent
eademque divina eius ac singularis bonitas per arbitrium nostrum
intendit ac vult. Quod autem haec etiam absoluta voluntas semper
impleatur, ex eo est manifestum, quia nititur certitudine
praescientiae divinae, quod ita res futura sit per nostrum
arbitrium._”—_Ibid._, qu. 23, art. 4, disp. 3: “_Quoniam quod Deus
elegerit eum rerum ordinem, circumstantiarum et auxiliorum, sive
maiorum sive minorum, in quo praevidebat eos pro sua libertate
salvandos, qui electione eius ordinis eo ipso praedestinati sunt
vitamque aeternam pro sua libertate consequuntur, potius quam alium
ex infinitis, in quo res aliter pro eadem ipsorum libertate
habuisset, non fuit ex nobis aut pro meritorum et cooperationis
nostrae qualitate, sed ex sola misericordia Dei._” Cfr. G.
Schneemann, _Historia Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae Liberique
Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progressus_, Freiburg 1881, pp. 38 sqq.

765 Cfr. his treatise _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 12 (ed. Fèvre,
tom. V, p. 527, Paris 1873): “_Prima opinio eorum est, qui gratiam
efficacem constituunt in assensu et cooperatione humana, ita ut ab
eventu dicatur gratia efficax, quia videlicet sortitur effectum et
ideo sortitur effectum, quia voluntas humana cooperatur. Itaque
existimant hi autores, in potestate hominis esse ut gratiam faciat
esse efficacem, quae alioquin ex se non esset nisi sufficiens._”
Bellarmine treats this opinion as the extreme counterpart of Thomism
(which he also combats) and disposes of it thus: “_Haec opinio
aliena est omnino a sententia b. Augustini et, quantum ego existimo,
a sententia etiam Scripturarum divinarum._” (_l.c._) Among the
Scriptural texts which he quotes in support of this view are John
VI, 45, 1 Cor. IV, 7, Rom. IX, 11.

766 The learned Cardinal describes the difference between Congruism and
extreme Molinism (which latter, it may be remarked, was not defended
by Molina himself) as follows: “_Neque enim intelligi potest, quo
pacto gratia efficax consistat in illa interna suasione, quae per
liberum arbitrium respui potest, et tamen infallibilem effectum
habeat, nisi addamus, Deum iis quos efficaciter et infallibiliter
trahere decrevit, eam suasionem adhibere quam videt congruere
ingenio eorum et quam certo novit ab eis non contemnendam._” (_Op.
cit._, p. 531.) The objection that this explanation eventually
resolves itself into the Molinistic theory which he had censured,
Bellarmine meets as follows: “_Respondeo sententiam nostram, quam S.
Augustini esse demonstravimus, aliqua in re cum prima illa opinione
convenire, sed in multis ab illa discrepare. Convenit enim in eo
quod utraque sententia gratiam sufficentem et efficacem ponit in
auxilio excitante potissimum, non in adiuvante. Sed discrepant inter
se, quod prima opinio vult efficaciam gratiae pendere a voluntate
humana, nostra vero pendere vult a voluntate Dei._” (_l.c._, cap.
13.)

767 Further details in Schneemann, _Hist. Controv._, pp. 302 sqq.

768 Cfr. _Ad Simplician._, I, qu. 2, n. 13: “_Si vellet [Deus] etiam
ipsorum misereri, posset ita vocare, quomodo illis aptum esset, ut
et moverentur et intelligerent et sequerentur. Verum est ergo: Multi
vocati, pauci electi. Illi enim electi, qui congruenter vocati; illi
autem qui non congruebant neque contemperabantur vocationi, non
electi, quia non secuti, quamvis vocati. Item verum est: Neque
volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei, quia etiamsi
multos vocet, eorum tamen miseretur, quos ita vocat, quomodo iis
vocari aptum est ut sequantur. Falsum est autem, si quis dicit:
Igitur non miserentis Dei, sed volentis atque currentis est hominis,
quia nullius Deus frustra miseretur. Cuius autem miseretur, sic eum
vocat quomodo scit ei congruere, ut vocantem non respuat._”

769 Cfr. Suarez, _De Aux._, V, 25: “_Vocatio efficax illa est, quae ...
includit congruitatem quandam respectu personae, cui datur, ut sit
illi proportionata et accommodata, sicut oportet, ut in tali
persona, in tali tempore et occasione infallibiliter effectum
habeat, et per hoc habet illa vocatio quod congrua et efficax sit._”

770 1 Kings XVII, 38 sqq.—Cfr. Lessius, _De Praedest. et Reprob._, sect.
5, n. 106: “_Ex quibus patet, gratiam efficacem, si physice
spectetur, non semper esse maius beneficium, quum saepenumero ea,
quae effectu caret, secundum suam entitatem longe sit praestantior.
Si tamen spectetur moraliter, nimirum ut subest praescientiae
infallibili effectus, sic semper maius est beneficium, etiam ut
praecisa ab actuali effectu et gratia cooperante seu ut prior
actuali suo influxu in opus, quum Deus, qui non caeco modo operatur,
ex mero suo beneplacito et inscrutabili iudicio seligat pro
quibusdam gratias illas quas effectum habituras videt, non solum ut
gratiae quaedam sunt, sed etiam formaliter, ut effectum habiturae
sunt.... Ex quibus constat, quo sensu distinctio gratiae congruae et
non congruae admittenda sit, quam numquam reieci, sed totis animis
et sensu et praxi semper sum amplexus._”

_ 771 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, ed. Fèvre, t. V, p. 533.

_ 772 V. supra_, p. 16.

773 For the proofs of this assertion see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina
Actuali_, thes. 50.

774 Cfr. St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, V, 9, 4: “_Quod [voluntates]
facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae, quia facturas ille praescivit,
cuius praescientia falli non potest._”

775 On Congruism cfr. Chr. Pesch, _Prael. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp.
167 sqq.; Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 447.
On the various interpretations of the _praedefinitio actuum
salutarium_, within as well as without the Jesuit Order, see Tepe,
_Instit. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 93 sqq., Paris 1896, and especially
Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 458 sqq.

776 Chief among them Ysambert, Tournely, St. Alphonsus de’ Liguori,
Albert Knoll, and more recently Cardinal Katschthaler.

777 For a more detailed account see Tournely, _De Gratia Christi_, qu.
7, art. 4, concl. 5; Katschthaler, _De Gratia_, pp. 173 sqq.,
Ratisbon 1880.

778 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, V, 20, 2.

779 Rom. XI, 33. On Syncretism cfr. Alb. a Bulsano, _Inst. Theol.
Dogmat. Specialis_, ed. by Gottfried a Graun, O. M. Cap., tom. II,
pp. 193 sqq., Innsbruck 1894.

_ 780 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 5: “_De Necessitate Praeparationis_,”
and cap. 6: “_De Modo Praeparationis_.”

781 Sess. VI, cap. 8: “_Fides est humanae salutis initium, fundamentum
et radix omnis iustificationis._”

782 Sess. VI, cap. 6: “_Disponuntur autem ad ipsam iustitiam, dum
excitati divinâ gratiâ et adiuti fidem ex auditu concipientes libere
moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse quae divinitus revelata et
promissa sunt._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 798).

783 Sess. VI, can. 12: “_Si quis dixerit, fidem iustificantem nihil
aliud esse quam fiduciam divinae misericordiae peccata remittentis
propter Christum, vel eam fiduciam solam esse, quâ iustificamur,
anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 822.) Cfr. _Conc. Vatic._,
Sess. III, cap. 3, “_De Fide_” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1789).

784 κηρύξατε τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.

785 ἵνα πιστεύσητε ὅτι.

786 John XX, 31.

787 Acts VIII, 37.

788 Rom. X, 9 sq.: “_Quia si confitearis in ore tuo Dominum Iesum et in
corde tuo credideris quod Deus illum suscitaverit a mortuis, salvus
eris. Corde enim creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad
salutem._”

789 Heb. XI, 6: “_Sine fide autem impossibile est placere Deo; credere
enim oportet accedentem ad Deum [i.e. iustificandum] quia est
[=existentia Dei] et inquirentibus se remunerator sit._”

790 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
pp. 39 sq.

791 Murray, _De Gratia_, disp. 10, n. 18. Cfr. Becanus, _De Gratia
Habituali_, c. I, qu. 7, art. 6 sq.; Bellarmine, _De
Iustificatione_, I, 5 sqq.

792 Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, _Patrology_, p. 616, Freiburg and St. Louis
1908.

_ 793 Prologus: ____Gaudeo quod pro fide vera sine ullo perfidiae vitio
custodienda sollicitudinem geris, sine qua nulla potest prodesse,
imo nec esse conversio. Apostolica quippe dicit auctoritas, quia
sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. Fides namque est bonorum
omnium fundamentum. Fides est humanae salutis initium. Sine hac fide
nemo ad filiorum Dei numerum potest pervenire, quia sine ipsa nec in
hoc saeculo quisquam iustificationis gratiam consequitur nec in
futuro possidebit vitam aeternam.___

794 On the traditional concepts of “faith” and “justification” as held
in the Church before Luther’s time, see Denifle, O. P., _Die
abendländischen Schriftausleger bis Luther über die Iustitia Dei und
Iustificatio_, Mainz 1905.

795 Cfr. Mark XVI, 15 sq.; Gal. I, 6 sqq.; Tit. III, 10 sq.

796 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 7: “_Post
tempus autem gratiae revelatae tam maiores quant minores tenentur
[necessitate praecepti] habere fidem explicitam de mysteriis
Christi, praecipue quantum ad ea, quae communiter in Ecclesia
solemnizantur et publice proponuntur, sicut sunt articuli
Incarnationis.... Alias autem subtiles considerationes circa
Incarnationis articulos tenentur aliqui magis vel minus explicite
credere, secundum quod convenit statui et officio uniuscuiusque._”
This point is well developed by Ballerini, _Opus Theologicum
Morale_, ed. D. Palmieri, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 9 sqq., Prati 1898.

797 Heb. XI, 6.

798 Chiefly Andrew Vega, Ripalda, and some modern writers.

_ 799 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 6; _Conc. Vatican._, Sess. III, cap.
3, _V. supra_, pp. 182 sqq.

800 “_Nonnisi fides unius Dei necessaria videtur necessitate medii, non
autem explicita remuneratoris._” _Prop. Damn. ab Innocenti XI._,
prop. 22, in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1172.

801 Heb. XI, 6.

802 Cfr. Wirceburg, _De Gratia_, n. 120: “_Quia tamen qui credit et
sperat remuneratorem supernaturalem, satis hoc ipso etiam credit
animae perpetuitatem et necessitatem auxilii melioris ad salutem,
fides horum explicita et per distinctos conceptus non semper in re
et actualiter necessaria existimatur._”

803 Gregory of Valentia, Becanus, Thomas Sanchez, and many Thomists.

804 Suarez, De Lugo, and a large number of other theologians.

805 Cfr. Rom. III, 22.

806 Cfr. John III, 18.

807 Cfr. Acts IV, 12.

808 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 7, ad 3: “_Si
qui salvati fuerunt, quibus revelatio non fuit facta, non fuerunt
salvati absque fide mediatoris, quia, etsi non habuerunt fidem
explicitam, habuerunt tamen fidem implicitam in divina providentia,
credentes Deum esse liberatorem hominum secundum modos sibi
placitos._”

809 The practical bearing of this question on the heathens is treated
_supra_, pp. 179 sqq.

810 “_Missionarium teneri adulto etiam moribundo, qui incapax omnino non
sit, explicare fidei mysteria, quae sunt necessaria necessitate
medii, ut sunt praecipue mysteria Trinitatis et Incarnationis._”
Cfr. _Prop. Damn. ab Innocentio XI. a._ 1679, prop. 64
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1214). For a full explanation of the topics
treated in the present Section consult Suarez, _De Fide_, disp. 12,
sect. 4; De Lugo, _De Fide_, disp. 12, sect. 4 sq.; W. Liese, _Der
heilsnotwendige Glaube_, Freiburg 1902.

811 Cfr. _Solid. Declar._, art. 3: “_Neque contritio neque dilectio
neque ulla virtus, sed sola fides [=fiducia] est medium et
instrumentum, quo gratiam Dei, merita Christi et remissionem
peccatorum apprehendere possumus._”

_ 812 Instit._, III, 11, § 19: “_Dicimus hominem solâ fide iustificari._”
For a classic exposition of the Lutheran and Calvinistic views of
faith, see Möhler, _Symbolik_, § 16; English tr. by James Burton
Robertson, 5th ed., London 1906, pp. 124 sqq.

813 Sess. VI, can. 9: “_Si quis dixerit, solâ fide impium iustificari,
ita ut intelligat nihil aliud requiri quod ad iustificationis
gratiam consequendam cooperetur et nullâ ex parte necesse esse, eum
suae voluntatis motu praeparari atque disponi, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 819.)

814 Sess. VI, cap. 6. The passage is quoted _infra_, p. 296.

815 He contemptuously called it “_ein ströherne Epistel_,” a letter of
straw.

816 Matth. VII, 21: “_Non omnis, qui dicit mihi, Domine, Domine,
intrabit in regnum caelorum: sed qui facit voluntatem Patris mei,
qui in caelis est, ipse intrabit in regnum caelorum._”

817 Jas. II, 24: “_Videtis quoniam ex operibus iustificatur homo, et non
ex fide tantum (ἐξ ἔργων δικαιοῦνται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως
μόνον)._”

818 1 Cor. XIII, 2: “_Et si habuero omnem fidem (πάσαν τὴν πίστιν), ita
ut montes transferam, caritatem (ἀγάπην) autem non habuero, nihil
sum._”

819 Ecclus. I, 28: “_Qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari._”

820 Rom. VIII, 24: “_Spe enim salvi facti sumus._”

821 Luke VII, 47: “_Remittuntur ei peccata multa, quoniam (ὅτι) dilexit
multum._”

822 Luke XIII, 3: “_Nisi poenitentiam habueritis, omnes similiter
peribitis._”

823 Jac. II, 17: “_Fides, si non habet opera, mortua est in semetipso._”

824 Gal. V, 6: “_In Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque
praeputium, sed fides quae per caritatem operatur_ (πίστις δι᾽
ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη).”

825 Jac. II, 26: “_Sicut enim corpus sine spiritu mortuum est, ita et
fides sine operibus mortua est._”

826 Rom. III, 28: “_Arbitramur enim hominem iustificari per fidem sine
operibus legis._”

_ 827 De Fide et Lib. Arbitrio_, c. 7, n. 18.

828 On the misinterpretation of other Scripture texts by the Reformers
see Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, I, 19-24.

_ 829 Ep. ad Philipp._, 3.

830 Serm., XVI, c. 6: “_A fide incipit homo, sed et daemones credunt et
contremiscunt; adde ergo fidei spem speique ipsi adde caritatem._”

_ 831 De Trinit._, XXV, 18: “_Sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem
esse, sed non et prodesse._”

_ 832 Hom. in Evang._, 29: “_Fortasse unusquisque apud semetipsum dicat:
Ego iam credidi, salvus ero. Verum dicit, si fidem operibus tenet.
Vera etenim fides est, quae in hoc quod verbis dicit moribus non
contradicit._” As to the sense in which some of the Fathers speak of
faith as the only thing that can save men, cfr. Bellarmine _De
Iustificat._, I, 26.

833 Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 113, art. 5:
“_Iustificatio impii est quidam motus, quo humana mens movetur a Deo
a statu peccati in statum iustitiae.... Unde oportet quod mens
humana, dum iustificatur, per motum liberi arbitrii recedat a
peccato et accedat ad iustitiam. Recessus autem et accessus in motu
liberi arbitru accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium....
Oportet igitur quod in iustificatione impii sit motus liberi
arbitrii duplex: unus quo per desiderium tendat in Dei iustitiam, et
alius quo detestetur peccatum._”

_ 834 De Libertate Voluntatis Humanae_, Leipzig 1555.

835 “_Klotz-, Stock- und Stein-theorie._”

836 “_Das Torgische Buch_,” A. D. 1576.

837 “_Articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae._” Cfr. Newman, _Lectures
on Justification_, p. 113.

_ 838 Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie_, p. 583, München 1867.

_ 839 Die Gnadenlehre und die stille Reformation_, Christiania 1894. Not
long after writing this book Dr. Krogh-Tonning became a Catholic.

840 How Luther came to adopt the _sola fides_ theory is exhaustively
explained by H. Grisar, S. J., _Luther_, Vol. I, Freiburg 1911;
English tr., Vols. I and II, London 1913. Cfr. also F. Hettinger,
_Die Krisis des Christentums_, pp. 72 sqq., Freiburg 1881.

841 Cfr. Pohle, art. on “Tradition” in Herder’s _Kirchenlexikon_, 2nd
ed., Vol. XI, 1933 sqq., Freiburg 1899.

842 “_Pecca fortiter, crede fortius._” Cfr. Möhler, _Symbolism_ (English
tr., p. 130).

843 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, §455,
Mainz 1899. The “orthodox” Lutheran teaching is strongly stated by
the famous convert Dr. Edw. Preuss in his work, still regarded as a
classic by “orthodox” Lutherans, _Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders vor
Gott_, Berlin 1868.

844 Sess. VI, cap. 8.

845 Sess. VI, cap. 6.

846 Sess. VI, cap. 8: “_Fides est humanae salutis initium, fundamentum
et radix omnis iustificationis._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 801.)

_ 847 V. supra_, pp. 100 sq.

848 Sess. VI, cap. 6: “_Disponuntur autem ad ipsam iustitiam, dum
excitati divinâ gratiâ et adiuti, fidem ex auditu concipientes,
libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse, quae divinitus
revelata et promissa sunt, atque illud in primis, a Deo iustificari
impium per gratiam eius, per redemptionem, quae est in Christo Iesu,
et dum peccatores se esse intelligentes, a divinae iustitiae timore,
quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad considerandam Dei misericordiam se
convertendo, in spem eriguntur fidentes, Deum sibi propter Christum
propitium fore, illumque tamquam omnis iustitiae fontem diligere
incipiunt: ac propterea moventur adversus peccata per odium aliquod
et detestationem, hoc est, per eam poenitentiam, quam ante baptismum
agi oportet: denique dum proponunt suscipere baptismum, inchoare
novam vitam et servare divina mandata._”

849 “_Diligere incipiunt._” (_ibid._)

_ 850 Contritio cum proposito novae vitae._

_ 851 Contritio caritate perfecta._

_ 852 Votum sacramenti, sacramentum in voto._

853 Cfr. _Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 4 and 14.

854 Cfr. Ez. XVIII, 30; Joel II, 12; Luke XIII, 3; Acts II, 38. Cfr.
_Conc. Trid._, Sess. XIV, cap. 4: “_Contritio, quae primum locum
inter dictos poenitentis actus habet, animi dolor ac detestatio est
de peccato commisso cum proposito non peccandi de cetero. Fuit autem
quovis tempore ad impetrandam veniam peccatorum hic contritionis
motus necessarius._”

855 Cfr. _Summa Theol._, 3a, qu. 87, art. 1: “_Exigitur autem ad
remissionem peccati mortalis perfectior poenitentia, ut scil. homo
actualiter pecoatum mortale commissum detestetur, quantum in ipso
est, ut scil. diligentiam adhibeat ad memorandum singula peccata
mortalia, ut singula detestetur. Sed hoc non requiritur ad
remissionem venialium peccatorum.... Unde sequitur quod requiratur
quaedam virtualis displicentia, ... quod tamen non sufficit ad
remissionem peccati mortalis, nisi quantum ad peccata oblita post
diligentem inquisitionem._”

856 Cfr. Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 204 sqq., Paris 1896.

_ 857 Fides mortua_ in contradistinction to _fides viva_.

858 Gal. V, 6.

_ 859 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, can. 28: “_Si quis dixerit, amissâ per
peccatum gratiâ simul et fidem semper amitti aut fidem, quae
remanet, non esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva, aut eum qui fidem
sine caritate habet, non esse Christianum, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 838.) The Scriptural argument for this
thesis is developed by Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, I, 15.

_ 860 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 4: “_Iustificatio impii [est]
translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius primi Adae, in
statum gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secundum Adam Iesum
Christum Salvatorem nostrum._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 796.)

861 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 221 sq.

862 Cfr. the second on the list of Lutheran propositions condemned by
Leo X, A. D. 1520: “_In puero post baptismum negare remanens
peccatum est Paulum et Christum simul conculcare._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 742.)

_ 863 Form. Conc._, p. 2, c. 3: “_Quando autem docemus, quod per
operationem Spiritus Sancti regeneramur et iustificamur, non ita
accipiendum est quod iustificatis et renatis nulla prorsus
iniustitia substantiae ipsorum et conversationi adhaereat, sed quod
Christus perfectissimâ obedientiâ suâ omnia ipsorum peccata tegat,
quae quidem in ipsa natura infixa haerent. Nihilominus tamen per
fidem propter obedientiam Christi boni et iusti pronuntiantur et
reputantur, etiamsi ratione corruptae naturae suae sint maneantque
peccatores, dum mortale hoc corpus circumferunt._”

_ 864 Antid. Conc. Trid._, ad Sess. V: “_Manet vere peccatum in nobis
neque per baptismum statim uno die extinguitur._” Cfr. Möhler,
_Symbolik_, § 14 (Robertson’s translation, 5th ed., pp. 110 sqq.).

_ 865 Conc. Trid._, Sess. V, can. 5: “_Si quis per Iesu Christi D. N.
gratiam, quae in baptismate confertur, reatum originalis peccati
remitti negat aut etiam asserit, non tolli totum id quod veram et
propriam peccati rationem habet, sed illud dicit tantum radi aut non
imputari, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 792.)

866 Sess. VI, cap. 14; Sess. XIV, cap. 2. See Pohle-Preuss, _The
Sacraments_, Vol. II, _Penance_.

867 “_Dele iniquitatem meam._”

868 Is. XLIII, 25: “_Ego sum ipse, qui deleo iniquitates tuas._”

869 Is. XLIV, 22: “_Delevi ut nubem iniquitates tuas et quasi nebulam
peccata tua._”

870 Acts III, 19: “_Poenitemini igitur et convertimini, ut deleantur
peccata vestra._”

871 2 Kings XII, 13: “_Dominus quoque transtulit peccatum tuum._”

872 1 Paral. XXI, 8: “_Obsecro, aufer iniquitatem servi tui._”

873 Mich. VII, 18 sq.: “_Quis, Deus, similis tui, qui aufers
iniquitatem?... Deponet [Deus] iniquitates nostras et proiiciet in
profundum maris omnia peccata nostra._”

874 Ps. X, 15: “_Quaeretur peccatum illius, et non invenietur._”

875 Ps. CII, 12: “_Quantum distat ortus ab occidente, longe fecit a
nobis iniquitates nostras._”

876 Luke VII, 47: “_Remittuntur ei peccata multa._”

877 Ps. L, 4: “_Amplius lava me ab iniquitate mea et a peccato meo munda
me._”

878 Is. I, 16: “_Lavamini, mundi estote._”

879 Ez. XXXVI, 25 sq.: “_Effundam super vos aquam mundam et mundabimini
ab omnibus inquinamentis vestris.... Et dabo vobis cor novum._”

880 1 Cor. VI, 11: “_Et haec quidam [fornicarii etc.] fuistis, sed
abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis, sed iustificati estis._”

881 Ps. L, 9: “_Asperges me hyssopo et mundabor, lavabis me et super
nivem dealbabor._”

882 Is. I, 18: “_Si fuevint peccata vestra ut coccinum, quasi nix
dealbabuntur, et si fuerint rubra quasi vermiculus, velut lana alba
erunt._”

883 Apoc. I, 5: “_... dilexit nos et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in
sanguine suo._”

884 1 John I, 7: “_Sanguis Iesu Christi ... emundat nos ab omni
peccato._”

885 1 John III, 14: “_Translati sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam
diligimus fratres: qui non diligit, manet in morte._”

886 Col. II, 13: “_Et vos, quum mortui essetis in delictis, ...
convivificavit cum illo donans vobis omnia delicta._”

887 Eph. V, 8: “_Eratis enim aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in
Domino._”

888 Acts XXII, 16: “_Exsurge et baptizare et ablue peccata tua._”

889 Rom. VIII, 1: “_Nihil ergo nunc damnationis est iis, qui sunt in
Christo Iesu._” Cfr. on this point the dogmatic treatise on the
Sacrament of Baptism.

890 Cfr. Becanus, _Theol. Scholast._, P. II, tr. 5, cap. 1, qu. 1.

891 Ps. XXXI, 1 sq.: “_Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates et quorum
tecta sunt peccata; beatus vir cui non imputavit Dominus peccatum
nec est in spiritu eius dolus._”

892 Heb. IV, 13. Cfr. St. Augustine, _Enarr. in Ps._, II, 31, n. 12:
“_Deus tegat vulnera, noli tu. Nam si tu tegere volueris erubescens,
medicus non curabit. Medicus tegat et curet; emplastro enim tegit.
Sub tegmine medici curatur vulnus, sub tegmine vulnerati celatur
vulnus._”

893 Rom. VII, 17: “_Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod
habitat in me peccatum._”

_ 894 Peccatum_, ἁμαρτία.

895 Sess. V, can. 5: “_... ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat._”
Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 242 sqq., 261 sqq. On Jas. I, 14 sq., St. Augustine observes:
“_Profecto in his verbis partus a pariente discernitur. Pariens enim
est concupiscentia, partus peccatum. Sed concupiscentia non parit
nisi conceperit, nec concipit nisi illexerit, h. e. ad malum
perpetrandum obtinuerit volentis assensum. Quod ergo adversus eam
dimicamur, hoc agitur, ne concipiat pariatque peccatum._” (_Contra
Iulian._, VI, 15, 47.) For a more exhaustive discussion of this
subject see Bellarmine, _De Justif._, II, 9.

_ 896 Dial. c. Tryph._, n. 141.

_ 897 Strom._, l. II.

_ 898 Or._, 40.

_ 899 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagian._, I, 13, 26: “_Quis hoc adversus
Pelagianos nisi infidelis affirmet? Dicimus ergo baptisma dare
omnium indulgentiam peccatorum et auferre crimina, non radere; nec
ut omnium peccatorum radices in mala carne teneantur, quasi rasorum
in capite capillorum, unde crescunt iterum resecanda peccata._”

_ 900 Ep._, l. II, ep. 45: “_Si qui vero sunt qui dicunt, peccata in
baptismate superficie tenus dimitti, quid est hac praedicatione
infidelius?... Qui dicit peccata in baptismate funditus non dimitti,
dicat in mari rubro Aegyptios non veraciter mortuos. Si autem
fatetur, Aegyptios veraciter mortuos, fateatur necesse est, peccata
in baptismate funditus mori._” Other confirmatory texts _apud_ Alb.
a Bulsano, _Instit. Theol. Dogmat. Specialis_, ed. P. Gottfr. a
Graun, O. Cap., Vol. II, pp. 226 sq., Innsbruck 1894.

901 Apoc. XXI, 27: “_Non intrabit in coelum aliquod coinquinatum._”

_ 902 Privatio_, στέρησις.

903 Cfr. St. Thomas, _De Veritate_, qu. 28, art. 1 sqq.; IDEM, _Summa
Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 113, art. 2.

904 Cfr. Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, II, 1 and 6.

_ 905 Apol. Confess. August._, c. 3, art. 6: “_Iustificare veto hoc loco
(Rom. VIII, 1) forensi consuetudine significat reum absolvere et
pronuntiare iustum, sed propter alienam iustitiam, videl. Christi,
quae aliena iustitia nobis communicatur per fidem._”

_ 906 Solida Declar._, III, “_De Fide Iustif._,” § 11: “_Vocabulum
iustificationis in hoc negotio significat iustum pronuntiare, a
peccatis et aeternis peccatorum suppliciis absolvere propter
iustitiam Christi, quae a Deo fidei imputatur._”

907 The Lutheran doctrine is fully and lucidly set forth by Dr. Edward
Preuss in his work, _Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders vor Gott_
(Berlin 1868), which he retracted at his conversion, in 1872. Cfr.
also Newman’s _Lectures on Justification_, Lecture I (8th
impression, London 1900).

908 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_Iustificatio non est sola peccatorum remissio,
sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam
susceptionem gratiae et donorum...._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799.)

909 Sess. VI, cap. 11: “_Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari vel solâ
imputatione iustitiae Christi vel solâ peccatorum remissione,
exclusâ gratiâ et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum
Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat, aut etiam gratiam quâ
iustificamur esse tantum favorem Dei, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 821.)

910 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_Huius iustificationis causae sunt: formalis
quidem gloria Dei et Christi ac vita aeterna; efficiens vero
misericors Deus, qui gratuito abluit et sanctificat; ... meritoria
autem dilectissimus Unigenitus suus D. N. Iesus Christus, qui ...
suâ sanctissimâ passione in ligno crucis nobis iustificationem
meruit; ... instrumentalis item sacramentum baptismi, quod est
sacramentum fidei, sine quâ nulli unquam contigit iustificatio;
demum unica formalis causa est iustitia Dei, non quâ ipse iustus
est, sed quâ nos iustos facit, quâ videl. ab eo donati renovamur
spiritu mentis nostrae et non modo reputamur, sed vere iusti
nominamur et sumus._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799).

911 Sess. VI, can. 10: “_Si quis dixerit, homines sine Christi iustitia,
per quam nobis meruit iustificari aut per eam ipsam formaliter
iustos esse, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 820.)

_ 912 V. supra_, Article 1.

913 Cfr. Eph. II, 5; Col. II, 13; 1 John III, 14.

914 Cfr. Eph. IV, 23 sq.

915 Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 17; Gal. VI, 15; Jas. I, 18; Ps. L, 12.

916 Cfr. John III, 5; Tit. III, 5.

917 Cfr. Rom. VIII, 29; 2 Cor. III, 18; 2 Pet. I, 4.

918 John III, 5.

919 Tit. III, 5 sqq.: “_Non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed
secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit (ἔσωσεν ἡμᾶς) per
lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis (διὰ λυτροῦ παλιγγενεσίας
καὶ ἀνακαινώσεως) Spiritus Sancti, quem effudit (ἐξέχεεν) in nos
abunde per Iesum Christum Salvatorem nostrum, ut iustificati
(δικαιωθέντες) gratiâ ipsius haeredes simus secundum spem vitae
aeternae._”

920 Cfr. John I, 12 sq.; Rom. VIII, 16; Gal. III, 7; IV, 6 sq.; 1 John
III, 1.

921 Cfr. Eph. IV, 22 sqq.

922 Cfr. Col. III, 9 sq.

923 Cfr. Acts II, 38; X, 45 sqq.; Rom. V, 5.

924 Cfr. J. Pohle, article “Regeneration” in the _Catholic
Encyclopedia_, Vol. XII, and A. Rademacher, _Die übernatürliche
Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie_,
pp. 41 sqq., Freiburg 1903.

925 2 Cor. V, 17: “_Si qua ergo in Christo nova creatura (καινὴ κτίσις),
vetera transierunt; ecce facta sunt omnia nova._” Cfr. Eph. II, 10.

926 Jac. I, 18: “_Voluntarie enim genuit (ἀπεκύησεν) nos verbo
veritatis, ut simus initium aliquod creaturae eius._”

927 Gal. VI, 15: “_In Christo enim Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet
neque praeputium, sed nova creatura (καινὴ κτίσις)._”

928 Gal. V, 6: “_Nam in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet
neque praeputium, sed fides quae per caritatem operatur_ (πίστις δι᾽
ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη).”

929 On the argument from Rom. V, 15 sqq. cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the
Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 247 sqq.

_ 930 Iustificare,_ δικαιοῦν.

_ 931 E.g._, Rom. V, 15 sqq. and Gal. III, 8 sqq.

932 Ps. CXVIII, 8: “_Iustificationes tuas custodiam._”

933 Ps. CXVIII, 26: “_... doce me iustificationes tuas._”

934 Apoc. XXII, 11: “_Qui iustus est, iustificetur adhuc, et sanctus
sanctificetur adhuc_.” On the different meanings of the term
justification in Scripture see Bellarmine, _De Iustific._, I, 1; II,
3.

935 Gal. III, 27: “_Quicunque enim in Christo baptizati estis, Christum
induistis._”

936 Cfr. Eph. IV, 22 sqq.; Col. III, 8 sqq.

937 1 Cor. I, 30: “_Qui factus est nobis sapientia a Deo et iustitia
(δικαιοσύνη) et sanctificatio (ἁγιασμός) et redemptio_.”

938 Other objections are refuted by Bellarmine, _De Iustif._, II, 9 sqq.

939 Cfr. Calvin, _Instit._, III, 11, § 15: “_Ac nec Augustini quidem
sententia recipienda est, qui gratiam ad sanctificationem refert,
quâ in vitae novitatem per Spiritum Sanctum regeneramur._”

940 On the Epistle of Barnabas see Bardenhewer-Shahan, _Patrology_, p.
24. The passage quoted will be found _Ep. Barn._, VI, 11.

_ 941 Hom. ad Illumin._, I, n. 3.

942 ὡς ἄν εἰ ἄνωθεν ἐγεννήθημεν.

943 καὶ γὰρ ἄνωθεν ἡμᾶς δημιουργεῖ καὶ κατασκευάζει.

_ 944 De Myst._, c. 7: “_Accepisti post haec vestimenta candida [scil.
post baptismum], ut sint indicium quod exueris involucrum peccati,
indueris innocentiae casta velamina._”

_ 945 De Iustific._, II, 8.

_ 946 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 9, n. 15: “_Non dicit iustitia
hominis,... sed iustitia Dei, non quâ Deus iustus est, sed quâ
induit hominem, quum iustificat impium.... Iustitia autem Dei per
fidem Iesu Christi, hoc est, per fidem quâ creditur in Christum.
Sicut autem ista fides Christi dicta est, non quâ credit Christus,
sic et illa iustitia Dei, non quâ iustus est Deus. Utrumque enim
nostrum est; sed ideo Dei et Christi dicuntur, quod eius nobis
largitate donatur._”

_ 947 De Gratia Christi_, c. 13: “_Si data est nobis iustitia, non
dicitur iustitia nostra, sed Dei, quia sic fit nostra, ut sit nobis
ex Deo._”

_ 948 Serm._, 131: “_Dei gratia per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum
iustitia Dei dicitur, non quâ iustus est Dominus, sed quâ iustificat
eos, quos ex impiis iustos facit._”

_ 949 De Spir. et Lit._, c. 32, n. 56: “_Caritas Dei dicta est diffundi
in cordibus nostris, non quâ ipse nos diligit, sed quâ, nos facit
dilectores suos, sicut iustitia Dei, quâ nos iusti eius munere
efficimur._”

_ 950 De Trinit._, XV, 8, 14: “_Quod vero ait_ (2 Cor. III, 18): ___In
eandem imaginem transformamur,____ utique imaginem Dei vult
intellegi, eandem dicens istam ipsam, scil., quam speculamur ...
atque transimus de forma obscura in formam lucidam.... Quae natura
[humana] in rebus creatis excellentissima, quum a suo Creatore ab
impietate iustificatur, a deformi forma formosam transfertur in
formam._”

951 Other Patristic texts can be seen in Ripalda, _De Ente Supernal._,
disp. 132, sect. 7; Petavius, _De Trinit._, VIII, 4-7; Bellarmine,
_De Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio_, I, 4.

952 For a more detailed treatment of this point we must refer the reader
to Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 537 sqq.

953 Quoted by De Wette, II, 37.

_ 954 V. infra_, Section 3.

955 Sess. IV, cap. 7.

_ 956 V. infra_, Sect. 2, Art. 2.

957 Cfr. Bellarmine, _De Iustific._, II, 1.

958 Seripando, Albertus Pighius, Gropper, and others.

959 On the discussion referred to in the text see Pallavicini, _Hist.
Conc. Trid._, VIII, 11, 12; Aug. Theiner, _Acta Genuina Concil.
Trid._, tom. I, pp. 222 sqq., Leipzig 1874.

960 Eph. V, 8; 2 Cor. VI, 14.

961 Col. II, 13; 1 John III, 14.

962 Eph. IV, 22 sqq.; Col. III, 9.

_ 963 V. supra_, No. 2.

964 On the history of the Tridentine decree regarding justification cfr.
J. Hefner, _Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Trienter
Rechtfertigungsdekretes_, Paderborn 1909.

965 Ockam, Gabriel Biel, _et al._

966 Henno, Mastrius, _et al._

967 Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. VII, c. 20, n. 7: “... _non obstante illâ
oppositione et repugnantiâ connaturali potest Deus de suâ absolutâ
potentiâ eam vincere et conservare gratiam in eo, qui peccavit, non
remittendo illi peccatum._”

968 Vasquez, Sardagna, Antoine, Mazzella, Tepe, _et al._

969 Col. II, 13; 1 John III, 14.

970 2 Cor. VI, 14 sqq.

971 Cfr. 1 John III, 9: “_Omnis, qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non
facit, quoniam semen ipsius_ (σπέρμα αὐτοῦ) _in eo manet et non
potest peccare_ (οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν), _quoniam ex Deo natus
est._”

_ 972 V. infra_, Sect. 2, Art. 1.

973 For the solution of other difficulties consult Tepe, _Inst. Theol._,
Vol. VIII, pp. 152 sqq. On the whole subject of this subdivision
cfr. Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 7, art. 2 sq. On certain
incidental questions, _e.g._ whether justification takes place _in
instanti_, whether the infusion of sanctifying grace _in ordine
naturae_ precedes or follows the forgiveness of sins, whether
justification is the greatest of God’s works, whether it is to be
regarded as a miracle, etc., see St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae,
qu. 113, art. 7-10; cfr. also Scheeben, _Die Mysterien des
Christentums_, 3rd ed., pp. 543 sqq., Freiburg 1912.

_ 974 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_Per spiritum sanctum caritas Dei
diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui iustificantur, atque ipsis
inhaeret._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 800.)

975 Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_Quae enim iustitia nostra dicitur, quia per eam
nobis inhaerentem iustificamur, illa eadem Dei est, quia a Deo nobis
infunditur per Christi meritum._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.)

976 Sess. VI, can. 11: “_Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari ...
exclusâ gratiâ et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum
sanctum diffundatur atque in illis inhaereat, ... anathema
sit._”(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 821.)

977 Sess. VI, cap. 4: “_[Iustificatio est] translatio ... in statum
gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 796.)

978 Cfr. Pallavicini, _Hist. Conc. Trid._, VIII, 14, 3: “_Postulantibus
quibusdam, ut expressius declararetur fieri iustitiam per habitum
infusum, delecti Patres ad id responderunt, id satis explicari per
vocem ____inhaeret,____ quae stabilitatem significat et habitibus
congruit, non actibus._” It was on the same ground that Pius V
censured the forty-second proposition of Baius, _viz._: “_Iustitia
quâ iustificatur per fidem impius, consistit formaliter in
obedientia mandatorum, quae est operum iustitia; non autem in gratia
aliqua animae infusa, quâ adoptatur homo in filium Dei, et secundum
interiorem hominem renovatur ac divinae naturae consors efficitur._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1042.)

979 Cfr. the _Cap. Maiores_ of Pope Innocent III (_Decret._, l. 3, tit.
42, _De Bapt._): “_Aliis asserentibus, per virtutem baptismi
parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri; nonnullis
dicentibus, dimitti peccatum et virtutes infundi quantum ad habitum,
non quoad usum._”

_ 980 De Summa Trinit. et Fide Cath._: “_Quantum ad effectum baptismi in
parvulis reperiuntur doctores quidam theologi opiniones contrarias
habuisse, quibusdam ex ipsis dicentibus, per virtutem baptismi
parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri, aliis e
contra asserentibus, quod et culpa eisdem in baptismo remittitur et
virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum, etsi non pro
illo tempore quoad usum. Nos attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis
Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter omnibus baptizatis,
opinionem secundam tamquam probabiliorem et dictis sanctorum et
modernorum theologorum magis consonam et conformem sacro approbante
concilio duximus eligendam._”

981 Cfr. _Conc. Trid._, Sess. V, can. 4; Sess. VII, can. 13. For a
fuller treatment consult Suarez, _De Gratia_, VI, 3; Vasquez,
_Comment. in S. Th._, I, 2, disp. 203, cap. 6. The false views of
Hermes and Hirscher are refuted by Kleutgen, _Theologie der
Vorzeit_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 254-343, Münster 1872.

_ 982 Libri Quatuor Sent._, I, dist 17, § 18.

_ 983 Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 23, art. 2.

_ 984 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, can. 24.

985 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 263 sq.

986 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1; _Summa
contra Gentiles_, III, 150.

987 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
p. 193.

_ 988 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2, ad 2: “_Omnis substantia
vel est ipsa natura rei, cuius est substantia, vel est pars naturae,
secundum quem modum materia vel forma substantia dicitur. Et quia
gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit
substantia aut forma substantialis, sed est forma accidentalis
ipsius animae. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo,
accidentaliter fit in anima participante divinam bonitatem._”

989 Cfr. Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 6, art. 2.

990 This theory was based on such texts as Ps. L, 12: “_Cor mundum crea
in me._”

_ 991 Cat. Rom._, P. II, c. 2 _de Bapt._, qu. 49: “_Est autem gratia ...
divina qualitas in anima inhaerens ac veluti splendor quidam et lux,
quae animarum nostrarum maculas omnes delet ipsasque animas
pulchriores et splendidiores reddit._” On the supernatural character
of sanctifying grace see Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and
the Supernatural_, pp. 191 sqq.

_ 992 Categ._, 6.

993 “_... qualitas difficile mobilis, secundum quam res bene vel male se
habet in ordine ad suam naturam et ad operationem vel finem eius._”
Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 2; S.
Schiffini, _Principia Philosophica ad Mentem Aquinatis_, pp. 574
sqq., Turin 1886; A. Lehmen, _Lehrbuch der Philosophie auf
aristotelisch-thomistischer Grundlage_, Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 398
sqq., Freiburg 1904.

_ 994 De Veritate_, qu. 27, art. 2, ad 7: “_Gratia est in prima specie
qualitatis, quamvis non proprie possit dici habitus, quia non
immediate ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam esse spiritale, quod in
anima facit._”

_ 995 De Gratia_, VI, 4, 1: “_Abstinuimus ab hac voce, quia per habitum
solet intelligi principium actus; quamvis, si vox illa latius
sumatur, pro quacumque qualitate perficiente animam, quae non sit
actus secundus, eadem certitudine, quâ ostendimus dari gratiam
permanentem, concluditur esse qualitatem habitualem._”

_ 996 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 3.

997 Cfr. Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 30. Under these
circumstances Suarez was justified in saying, in regard to the
degree of certitude to be attributed to this teaching: “_Si quis
negaret gratiam sanctificantem esse habitum, licet esse temere
dictum, non posset tamen ut haereticum damnari._”

998 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 190 sqq.

999 Cfr. 1 John, III, 9: “σπέρμα αὐτοῦ [scil. Θεοῦ] ἐν αὐτῷ μένει.”

1000 Cfr. 2 Cor. IV, 7: “_... thesaurum in vasis fictilibus._”

1001 Cfr. John XIV, 23: “_Mansionem apud eum faciemus._”

1002 Cfr. 1 Cor. III, 16.—On the subtle question whether habitual grace
is to be regarded as a real or merely as a modal accident of the
soul, see Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 154 sqq., Paris 1896;
Chr. Pesch, _Prael. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 181 sqq.,
Freiburg 1908. An extreme and altogether unacceptable view is that
of Billuart (_De Gratia_, diss. 6, art. 2), who regards sanctifying
grace as an absolute accident, _i.e._ one which the omnipotence of
God could miraculously sustain if the soul ceased to exist. Cfr.
Suarez, _De Gratia_, VII, 15; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, p. 259;
Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 164 sqq.

_ 1003 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, II, dist. 27.

_ 1004 E.g._, Mastrius, _De Iustif._, disp. 7, qu. 6.

_ 1005 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 6.

1006 Luke VII, 47: “_Remittuntur ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit
(ἠγάπησεν) multum._”

1007 1 Pet. IV, 8: “_Caritas (ἀγάπη) operit multitudinem peccatorum._”

1008 1 John IV, 7: “_Omnis qui diligit (πᾶσ ὁ ἀγαπῶν) ex Deo natus est._”

_ 1009 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 70, n. 84: “_Caritas ergo inchoata,
inchoata iustitia est, ... caritas magna, magna iustitia est,
caritas perfecta, perfecta iustitia est._”

_ 1010 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_... dum caritas Dei diffunditur
in cordibus eorum qui iustificantur atque ipsis inhaeret._”

1011 Preëminently Suarez, Tanner, Ripalda.

_ 1012 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3 sq.; _De Veritate_, qu. 27,
art. 2.

_ 1013 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 4, ad 1: “_Sicut ab essentia
animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia, ita
etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes [theologicae] in potentias
animae, per quas [virtutes] potentiae moventur ad actus._”

_ 1014 De Dono Perseverantiae_, c. 16, n. 41: “_Gratia praevenit
caritatem._”

1015 2 Cor. XIII, 13: “_Gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi et caritas
Dei._”

1016 1 Tim. I, 14: “_Superabundavit autem gratia Domini nostri cum fide
et dilectione._”

1017 Cfr. _Conc. Viennense_, A. D. 1311: “_... gratiam informantem et
virtutes._” _Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_... per voluntariam
susceptionem gratiae et donorum._” Sess. VI, can. 11: “_... exclusâ
gratiâ et caritate._”

1018 For a fuller treatment of this topic consult Billuart, _De Gratia_,
diss. 4, art. 4.

1019 Ripalda justly observes (_De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 132, n. 132,
n. 53): “_Haec controversia olim Celebris fuit. Nunc facile
dirimitur, quum iam constiterit nullius partis argumenta plane
convincere._” On the theological aspects of Herbart’s philosophy,
which denies the existence of qualities and faculties in the soul,
see Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, p. 560,
Mainz 1897.

1020 2 Pet. I, 4: “_... per quem [i.e. Christum] maxima et pretiosa nobis
promissa donavit, ut per haec efficiamini divinae consortes naturae_
(θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως).”

1021 John I, 13: “_... qui non ex sanguinibus, ... sed ex Deo nati
sunt._”

1022 John III, 5: “_Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto,
non potest introire in regnum Dei._”

1023 Jac. I, 18: “_Voluntarie enim genuit nos verbo veritatis._”

1024 1 John III, 9: “_Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit._”

_ 1025 Or. contr. Arian._, I, 39.

1026 ἵνα μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς θεοποιήση.

_ 1027 In Psalmos_, 49, n. 2: “_Ille iustficat, qui per seipsum, non ex
alio iustus est; et ille deificat qui per seipsum non alterius
participatione Deus est. Qui autem iustificat, ipse deificat, quia
iustificando filios Dei facit.... Filii Dei facti sumus et dii facti
sumus; sed hoc gratia est adoptantis, non natura generantis. Unicum
enim Dei Filius Deus, ... ceteri qui dii fiunt, gratiâ ipsius fiunt,
non de substantia ipsius nascuntur, ut hoc sint quod ille, sed ut
per beneficium perveniant ad eum et sint cohaeredes Christi._” Many
other cognate Patristic texts in Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_,
disp. 132, sect. 7-9.

1028 See, _e.g._, the Offertory and Preface for the festival of the
Ascension of our Lord and the _Secreta_ for the fourth Sunday after
Easter.

1029 Cfr. Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 132, sect. 7: “_Per
gratiam vero habitualem fieri hominem participem divinae naturae
ideoque gratiam esse participationem deitatis, adeo frequens est et
constans theologorum assertum, ut absque temeritate negari non
possit._” On the teaching of St. Thomas and the Thomists see
Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 4, art. 3.

1030 Cfr. _Prop. Ekkardi a. 1329 damn. a Ioanne XXII_, prop. 10, quoted
in Denzinger-Bannwart’s _Enchiridion_, n. 510.

1031 Cfr. _Prop. Mich. de Molinos a. 1687 damn, ab Innocentio XI_, prop.
5, in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1225.

1032 The Fourth Council of the Lateran (A. D. 1215) calls it “_doctrina
non tam haeretica quam insana_.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 433.)

1033 St. Augustine, _De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione_, II, 8, 10:
“_Nunc ergo et similes esse iam coepimus primitias spiritus
habentes, et adhuc dissimiles sumus per reliquias vetustatis.
Proinde inquantum similes, in tantum regenerante Spiritu filii Dei;
inquantum autem dissimiles, in tantum filii carnis et saeculi._”

1034 Quoted by Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 132, sect. 9.

1035 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae qu. 112, art. 1: “_Donum
autem gratiae excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae, quum nihil
aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae excedit
omnem aliam naturam._”

1036 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
pp. 165 sqq.; _Christology_, pp. 85 sqq.

1037 Cfr. St. John of Damascus, _De Fide Orthodoxa_, II, 12 “[ἄνθρωπον]
θεούμενον δὲ μετοχῇ τῆς θείας ἐλλάμψεως καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὴν θείαν
μεθιστάμενον οὐσίαν.”

1038 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
pp. 165 sqq.

_ 1039 Clyp. Thomist._, tom. VI, disp. 2, § 10.

1040 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, VII, 1, 27: “_Eo ipso quod divinum esse
participatur, non participatur ut imparticipatum est._”

_ 1041 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 20, sect. 14.

_ 1042 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 93, art. 4.

1043 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, VII, 1, 30: “_Vera ergo excellentia
gratiae habitualis, propter quam dicitur esse singularis
participatio divinae naturae, est ... quia, quum natura divina sit
quaedam intellectualis natura altioris ordinis quam sit vel esse
possit ulla substantia intellectualis creata, ille gradus
intellectualitatis, qui est in divina natura, divino quodam et
supernaturali modo participatur per habitualem gratiam, quo quidem
modo a nulla substantia creata per se ipsam vel per potentiam sibi
connaturalem participari potest.... Divina enim essentia in ratione
obiecti intelligibilis in se et per visionem intuitivam ad ipsam Dei
essentiam immediate terminatam adeo est elevata et excellens ratione
purissimae actualitatis et immaterialitatis suae, ut a nulla
substantia intellectuali possit connaturaliter videri, nisi a
seipsa. Per gratiam vero et dona supernaturalia elevatur natura
creata intellectualis ad participationem illius gradus
intellectualitatis divinae, in quo possit obiectum illud
intelligibile divinae essentiae in se intueri._”

1044 John III, 6; cfr. 2 Cor. III, 18; Eph. V, 18.

_ 1045 De Spiritu Sancto_, c. 9, n. 23.

1046 πνευματικαί.

1047 ἡ πρὸς Θεὸν ὁμοίωσις.

1048 θεὸν γενέσθαι.

1049 1 John III, 2: “_Nunc filii Dei sumus et nondum apparuit, quid
erimus; scimus quoniam, quum apparuerit, similes ei erimus (ὅμοιοι
αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα), quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est._” On this passage
see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
pp. 96 sq. On the whole subject treated in this subdivision consult
Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 588
sqq.; A. Rademacher, _Die übernatürliche Lebensordnung nach der
paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie_, pp. 88 sqq., Freiburg
1903; A. Prumbs, _Die Stellung des Trienter Konzils zu der Frage
nach dem Wesen der heiligmachenden Gnade_, Paderborn 1910.

1050 For a fuller treatment we must refer the reader to Scheeben, _Die
Herrlichkeiten der göttlichen Gnade_, 8th ed., Freiburg 1908;
English translation by a Benedictine monk of St. Meinrad’s Abbey,
_The Glories of Divine Grace_, 3rd ed., New York _s. a._

1051 Eph. IV, 24: “_Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est
in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis._” On this text see
Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, p.
197.

1052 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_... non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et
sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam
susceptionem gratiae et donorum, unde homo ex iniusto fit iustus._”

1053 On the concept of sanctity see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability,
Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 251 sqq.

1054 Gal. II, 20: “_Vivo autem iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus._”
On the life of the soul in and through grace cfr.
Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 466.

1055 Cfr. 2 Cor. VII, 4: “_Superabundo gaudio in omni tribulatione
nostra._”

1056 Is. XLIX, 16: “_Ecce in manibus meis descripsi te._”

1057 Rom. VIII, 28: “_Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum._”

_ 1058 In Ps._, 25: “_Gratia divina pulchrificat sicut lux._”

_ 1059 Cat. Rom._, P. II, Ch. II, qu. 49: “_Est autem gratia ... splendor
quidam et lux, quae animarum maculas delet ipsasque animas
pulchriores et splendidiores reddit._” On the aptness of this simile
see Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, p. 268. Freiburg 1901.

1060 Ἄνθρωπος μέτρον πάντων.

1061 Θεὸς μέτρον πάντων.

1062 On the notion of beauty see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability,
Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 265 sqq.

_ 1063 V. supra_, Art. 1, No. 4.

1064 On the divine appropriations see Pohle-Preuss, _The Divine Trinity_,
pp. 244 sqq.

1065 Rom. VIII, 29: “_... praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii
sui._”

1066 Gal. IV, 19: “_Filioli mei, quos iterum parturio, donec formetur
Christus in vobis._”

_ 1067 V. infra_, No. 4.

_ 1068 V. infra_, Art. 3, No. 4. On the whole subject cfr.
Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 465; H.
Krug, _De Pulchritudine Divina_, pp. 53 sqq., 144 sqq., 241 sqq.,
Freiburg 1902.

1069 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_... unde homo ex iniusto fit iustus et ex
inimico amicus._”

1070 Sess. VI, cap. 10: “_Sic ergo iustificati et amici Dei ac domestici
facti...._”

1071 Wisd. VII, 14: “_Participes facti sunt amicitiae Dei._”

1072 John XV, 14 sq.: “_Iam non dicam vos servos, ... vos autem dixi
amicos._”

1073 Matth. IX, 15: “_Numquid possunt filii sponsi lugere, quamdiu cum
illis est sponsus?_”

1074 Apoc. XIX, 7: “_Venerunt nuptiae Agni et uxor eius praeparavit se._”
Cfr. John III, 29; Eph. V, 23 sqq.; 2 Cor. XI, 2; Cant. IV, 1 sqq.;
Ps. XLIV, 22 sqq. On the teaching of the Fathers see Cornelius a
Lapide, _Comment. in 2 Cor._, XI, 2.

_ 1075 Eth. ad Nichom._, VIII sq.

1076 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, III, dist. 27,
qu. 2, art. 1, ad 1: “_Amicitia vera desiderat videre amicum et
colloquiis mutuis gaudere facit, ad quem principaliter est amicitia;
non autem ita, quod delectatio ex amici visione et perfruitione,
finis amicitiae ponatur._”

1077 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 28, art. 1: “_Quum
aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum, sicut et sibi
vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scil. ei
vult bonum, sicut et sibi vult bonum. Et inde est, quod amicus
dicitur esse alter ipse. Et Augustinus dicit in l. 4 Confess.: Bene
quidam dixit de amico suo, ____dimidium animae meae____._”

1078 “_Amicitia pares aut invenit aut facit._” _In Mich._, 7.

1079 Prov. VIII, 31: “_Deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum._”

_ 1080 V. supra_, Art. 1, No. 3.

1081 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, III, dist. 37,
qu. 2, art. 1, ad 10: “_Amicitia dicitur esse non latens, non quod
per certitudinem amor amid cognoscatur, sed quia per signa
probabilia amor mutuus habentium coligitur. Et talis manifestatio
potest esse de caritate, inquantum per aliqua signa potest aliquis
probabiliter aestimare se habere caritatem._”

1082 Cfr. Ecclus. XXXIV, 14 sqq.

1083 Cfr. St. Thomas, _op. cit._, III, dist. 29, qu. 1, art. 3, ad 4:
“_Si esset possibile, quod ex nostris operibus aliquid Deo
accresceret, habens caritatem multo plura faceret propter
beatitudinem ei conservandam, quam propter eam sibi adipiscendam._”

1084 1 John III, 17: “_Qui habuerit substantiam huius mundi et viderit
fratrem suum necessitatem habere et clauserit viscera sua ab eo,
quomodo caritas Dei_ (ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ) _manet in ea?_”

_ 1085 V. supra_, Art. 1, No. 4.

1086 The singular opinion of Ripalda (_De Caritate_, disp. 33), that such
a relation would be possible even in the state of pure nature, is
rejected by Suarez as incorrect (_De Caritate_, disp. 3, sect. 5, n.
4). On the whole question cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp.
305 sqq.

_ 1087 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 4: “_... status gratiae et
adoptionis filiorum Dei._”

1088 Rom. VIII, 15 sqq.: “_Accepistis ... spiritum adoptionis filiorum,
in quo clamamus Abba, Pater; ipse enim Spiritus testimonium reddit
spiritui nostro, quod sumus filii Dei; si autem filii, et haeredes:
haeredes quidem Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi._”

1089 1 John III, 1 sq.: “_Videte, qualem caritatem dedit nobis Pater, ut
filii Dei nominemur et simus ... Carissimi, nunc filii Dei sumus._”

1090 Gal. IV, 5: “_... ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus._”

1091 John I, 12 sq.: “_... dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, qui ...
ex Deo nati sunt_ (ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα Θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς
... ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν).”

_ 1092 Summa Theol._, 3a, qu. 23, art. 1: “_Adoptio est personae extraneae
in filium et haeredem gratuita assumptio._”

1093 Cfr. Gal. IV, 7: “_Itaque iam non est servus, sed filius; quod si
filius, et haeres per Deum._”

1094 Cfr. Rom. VIII, 17; Gal. IV, 7.

1095 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 3a, qu. 23, art. 1, ad 2.

1096 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_... per voluntariam
susceptionem gratiae et donorum._”

1097 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _The Divine Trinity_, pp. 49 sqq.

1098 Cfr. John III, 5 sq.; 2 Cor. III, 18; Tit. III, 5 sqq.

1099 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 3a, qu. 23, art. 2, ad. 2: “For
He [God the Father] is Christ’s father by natural generation; and
this is proper to him: whereas He is our Father by a voluntary
operation, which is common to Him and to the Son and the Holy Ghost:
so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we are.”

1100 Cfr. St. Thomas, _l.c._, ad 2.

1101 Suarez, _De Incarnatione_, disp. 49, sect. 2, n. 5.

1102 This heresy is called Adoptionism; for a refutation of it see
Pohle-Preuss, _Christology_, pp. 196 sqq.

1103 1 John III, 1.

1104 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology_, pp. 15 sqq.

_ 1105 Or. in Is._, II, 4.

_ 1106 V. infra_, Art. 3, No. 4.

1107 Cfr. J. Scheeben, “_Kontroverse über die Formalursache der
Kindschaft Gottes_,” in the _Katholik_, of Mayence, 1883, I, pp. 142
sqq., II, pp. 561 sqq.; 1884, I, 18 sqq. II, 465 sqq., 610 sqq.;
Granderath, “_Kontroverse über die Gotteskindschaft_,” in the
Innsbruck _Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie_, 1881, pp. 283 sqq.,
1883, pp. 491 sqq., 593 sqq., 1884, pp. 545 sqq.

_ 1108 De Trinitate_, VIII, 4 sqq.

_ 1109 Comment. in S. Theol._, 3a, qu. 23, art. 3.

1110 Cfr. Gal. IV, 7. On the subject of the adoptive sonship of the just
the student may profitably consult A. Rademacher, _Die
übernatürliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen
Theologie_, pp. 97 sqq., Freiburg 1903.

_ 1111 V. supra_, p. 340.

_ 1112 Cat. Rom._, P. II, c. 1, n. 51: “_Huic [gratiae sanctificanti]
additur nobilissimus omnium virtutum comitatus, quae in animam cum
gratia divinitus infunduntur._”

_ 1113 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_Unde in ipsa iustificatione
cum remissione peccatorum haec omnia simul infusa accipit homo per
Iesum Christum, cui inseritur, fidem, spem et caritatem._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 800.) The question whether the three
theological virtues are genuine _habitus operativi_, must be
answered in the affirmative; but its denial incurs no censure so
long as the distinction existing between these habitual virtues and
actual grace is left intact. It is of faith that habitual charity is
infused simultaneously with habitual grace. Cfr. _Conc. Trident._,
Sess. VI, can. 11: “_Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari ...
exclusâ gratiâ et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum
Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat, anathema sit._” On the
bearing of this definition see Tepe, _Instit. Theol._, Vol. III, pp.
175 sq., Paris 1896; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 315 sqq.,
Freiburg 1901.

1114 Rom. V, 5: “_Caritas Dei (ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ) diffusa est (ἐκκέχυται)
in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis._”

1115 1 Cor. XIII, 2: “_Et si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes
transferam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum._”

1116 1 Cor. XIII, 13: “_Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas (πίστις,
ἐλπίς, ἀγάπη), tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas._”

_ 1117 Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus in Communi_, art. 12: “_Ad hoc
autem, quod moveamur recte in finem [scil. Deum], oportet finem esse
et cognitum et desideratum. Desiderium autem finis duo exigit, scil.
fiduciam de fine obtinendo, quia nullus sapiens movetur ad id quod
consequi non potest; et amorem finis, quia non desideratur nisi
amatum. Et ideo virtutes theologicae sunt tres, scil. fides quâ Deum
cognoscimus, spes quâ ipsum nos obtenturos esse speramus, et caritas
quâ eum diligimus._”

1118 Sess. VI, cap. 7.

1119 This thesis is not, however, so certain that it would be wrong to
contradict it, as has actually been done by Scotus, Durandus, and
others. Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, VI, 9, 12.

1120 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 57 sqq. That the
cardinal virtues are four in number, St. Thomas proves as follows:
“_[Bonum rationis] potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, prout
habet rationein consiliabilis et eligibilis, secundum quam ratio
circa illud operatur et sic est prudentia, quae est media inter
intellectuales et morales; ... alio modo, secundum quod habet
rationem boni appetibilis. Ad appetitum autem duo pertinent, scil.
actio et passio; passio autem est in irascibili et concupiscibili.
Circa actiones ergo est iustitia, circa passiones irascibiles est
fortitudo, circa passiones concupiscibiles est temperantia. Et sic
sunt quatuor virtutes cardinales._” (_Comment. in Quatuor Libros
Sent._, III, dist. 33, qu. 2, art. 1, solut. 3.)

1121 Wis. VIII, 7: “_Et si iustitiam quis diligit, labores huius magnas
habent virtutes; sobrietatem enim et prudentiam docet [Deus] et
iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus._”

1122 Ez. XI, 19 sq.: “_Et auferam cor lapideum de came eorum et dabo eis
cor carneum, ut in praeceptis meis ambulent et iudicia mea
custodiant._”

1123 Cfr. Jer. XXXI, 33; Col. I, 10 sq.; 1 John II, 27.

_ 1124 In Ps._, 83: “_Istae virtutes nunc in convalle plorationis per
gratiam Dei donantur nobis._”

_ 1125 Hom. in Ezech._, I, 5, n. 11: “_In fide enim, spe atque caritate,
et in aliis bonis, sine quibus ad coelestem patriam non potest
perveniri, ... perfectorum corda [Spiritus Sanctus] non deserit._”

_ 1126 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 63, art. 3: “_Oportet effectus esse suis
causis et principiis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam
intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur,
procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis
praeexistentibus.... Loco quorum naturalium principiorum conferuntur
nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem
supernaturalem.... Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus
theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus
causati in nobis, qui sic se habent ad virtutes theologicas sicut se
habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia
virtutum._” For further information on this subject consult
Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, § 471, Mainz
1897; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 319 sqq., Freiburg 1901;
Van Noort, _De Gratia Christi_, pp. 161 sqq., Amsterdam 1908.

1127 Cfr. Gregory of Valentia, _Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 5,
qu. 8, p. 1: “_Dona Spiritus S. potentias animae perficiunt ad
actiones quasdam heroicas, ... quâ ratione peculiariter procedunt ex
divino quodam Spiritus S. instinctu, quo mens nostra plerumque
mirabiliter solet agi et impelli ad quaedam opera praestantia et
rara.... Atque ita in usu donorum homo potius agitur, in usu autem
virtuturn se habet potius ut agens._” Cfr. Simar, _Dogmatik_, Vol.
II, 4th ed., pp. 641 sqq., Freiburg 1899; Van Noort, _De Gratia
Christi_, pp. 174 sqq.

1128 Rom. VIII, 9 sqq.

1129 Cfr. Is. XI, 1 sqq.; LXI, 1; Luke IV, 18.

1130 “_Da tuis fidelibus, in te confitentibus, sacrum septenarium._”
(_Missale Rom._, Sequence for Whit Sunday.) For a more detailed
treatment of the subject dealt with in Thesis III consult J.
Kleutgen, _Theologie der Vorzeit_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 365 sqq.,
Münster 1872; C. Weiss, _S. Thomae Aquinatis de Septem Donis
Spiritus S. Doctrina_, Vienne 1895; J. Regler, _Die sieben Gaben des
Hl. Geistes in ihrer Bedeutung für das christliche Leben_, Ratisbon
1899; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 337 sqq., Freiburg 1901. On
the connection of the gifts of the Holy Ghost with the beatitudes
(cfr. Matth. V, 3 sqq.) and the “twelve fruits of the Holy Ghost”
(cfr. Gal. V, 22 sq.), see St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu.
69 and 70. The student may also consult Suarez, _De Gratia_, VI, 10,
and Vasquez, _Comment. in S. Theol._, III, disp. 44, cap. 2.

1131 Cfr. St. Bonaventure, _Compendium Theol. Verit._, I, 9: “_In
iustificatione duplex caritas nobis datur, scil. creata et increata:
illa quâ diligimus, et illa quâ diligimur.... Ex his colligitur,
quod licet Deus sit in omnibus per essentiam, praesentiam et
potentiam, non tamen habetur ab omnibus per gratiam._”

1132 John XIV, 16 sq.: “_... alium Paraclitum dabit vobis, ut maneat
vobiscum in aeternum.... Vos autem cognoscetis eum, quia apud vos
manebit et in vobis (ἐν ὑμῖν) erit._”

1133 Rom. V, 5: “_Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per
Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis._”

1134 Rom. VIII, 11: “_Quodsi Spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum a
mortuis, habitat in vobis (οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν), qui suscitavit Iesnm
Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra propter
inhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis (διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ
πνεύματος ἐν ὑμῖν)._”

1135 “_Nescitis, quia templum Dei (ναὸς Θεοῦ) estis et Spiritus Dei
habitat in vobis (οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν)?... Templum enim Dei sanctum est,
quod estis vos._”

1136 1 Cor. 6, 19: “_An nescitis, quoniam membra vestra templum sunt
Spiritus S., qui in vobis est, quem habetis a Deo et non estis
vestri?_” Cfr. Rom. VIII, 9; Gal. IV, 6; 2 Cor. VI, 16.

_ 1137 Ep. ad Serap._, I, n. 24.

1138 θεοποιοῦνται.

_ 1139 Contra Eunom._, I, V.

_ 1140 Dialog._, VII, _per totum_.

_ 1141 De Trinitate_, XV, n. 36: “_Ita enim datur sicut donum Dei, ut
etiam seipsum det sicut Deus._”

_ 1142 Serm._, 144, c. 1: “_Gratia quippe Dei donum Dei est; donum autem
maximum ipse Spiritus Sanctus est, et ideo gratia dicitur._”

_ 1143 Enchiridion_, c. 37: “_Et utique Spiritus Sanctus Dei donum est,
quod quidem et ipsum est aequale donanti; et ideo Deus est etiam
Spiritus Sanctus, Patre Filioque non minor._” Additional Patristic
texts of like tenor in Petavius, _De Trinitate_, l. VIII, cap. 4
sq.: Franzelin, _De Deo Trino_, thes. 43; J. Kleutgen, _Theologie
der Vorseit_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 369 sqq.

1144 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _The Divine Trinity_, pp. 230 sqq.

1145 John XIV, 23: “_Si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit, et Pater
meus diliget eum, et ad eum veniemus et mansionem (μονήν) apud eum
faciemus._”

_ 1146 Ep. 1 ad Serap._, n. 30: “_Ex his una Trinitatis ἐνέργεια
ostenditur ... profecto quum Dominus ait: Veniemus ego et Pater,
simul venit Spiritus, non alio modo quam ut Filius in nobis
habitaturus._”

_ 1147 De Trinit._, XV, 18, 32: “_Dilectio igitur, quae ex Deo est et Deus
est, proprie Spiritus S. est, per quem diffunditur in cordibus
nostris Dei caritas, per quam nos tota inhabitat Trinitas._”

1148 For a more detailed treatment see Franzelin, _De Deo Trino_, thes.
43-48, Rome 1881.

1149 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionys. Areop., _De Hier. Eccl._, 1, § 3 (Migne, _P.
G._, III, 376): Ἡ δὲ θέωσις ἐστιν ἡ πρὸς Θεὸν ἀφομοίωσίς τε καὶ
ἕνωσις.

1150 Cfr. Petavius, _De Trinit._, VIII, 7, 12: “_Ostendimus enim non
semel, coniunctionem illam Spiritus S. neque φυσικήν neque
ὑποστατικήν esse, h. e. neque naturalem neque personalem, quasi una
fiat ex ambobus natura vel persona. Non enim quia et illi per
adoptionis gratiam filii Dei sunt, ait Augustinus (In Ps. 67), ideo
quisquam illorum est unigenitus. Neque enim ex personarum duarum
copulatione unum aliquid per sese, sed κατα συμβεβηκός potest
effici._”

1151 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _The Divine Trinity_, pp. 244 sqq.

1152 Cfr. Scheeben, _Die Mysterien des Christentums_, 2nd ed., p. 165,
Freiburg 1898.

1153 Cfr. John XIV, 23; XVII, 20 sqq.

1154 Gutberlet takes middle ground between the two theories and tries to
reconcile them. Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_,
Vol. VIII, § 468. See also A. Rademacher, _Die übernatürliche
Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie_,
pp. 193 sqq., Freiburg 1903.

1155 Cfr. R. F. Clarke, S. J., _Logic_, p. 174.

1156 “_Fides fiducialis_,” _v. supra_, pp. 255 sqq.

1157 Sess. VI, cap. 9; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 684.

1158 Sess. VI, can. 13-15; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 823 sqq.

1159 1 Cor. IV, 4: “_Nihil enim mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc
iustificatus sum; qui autem iudicat me, Dominus est._”

1160 1 Cor. IX, 27: “_Castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo, ne
forte, quum aliis praedicaverim, ipse reprobus (ἀδόκιμος)
efficiar._”

1161 Phil. II, 12: “_Cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini._”
Other Scriptural texts in Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, III, 4
sqq. For the solution of certain exegetical difficulties see the
same author, _op. cit._, III, 9, and Tepe, _Instit. Theol._, Vol.
III, pp. 210 sqq., Paris 1896.

_ 1162 Hom. in I. Epist. ad Cor._, 2.

1163 Eccles. IX, 1 sq.: “_Nescit homo, utrum amore an odio dignus, etc._”

_ 1164 Hieronymus in h. l._ (Migne, _P. L._, XXIII, 1080): “_In futuro
igitur scient omnia et in vultu eorum sunt omnia, i.e. antecedet
eos, quum de hac vita decesserint, notitia istius rei quia tunc est
iudicum et nunc certamen. Et quicunque adversa sustinent, utrum per
amorem Dei sustineant, ut Iob, an per odium, ut plurimi peccatores,
nunc habetur incertum._”

_ 1165 Ep._, VII, 25: “_Rem et inutilem et difficilem postulasti:
difficilem quidem, quia ego indignus sum, cui revelatio fieri
debeat; inutilem vero, quia secura de peccatis tuis fieri non debes,
nisi quum iam in die vitae tuae ultimo plangere eadem peccata minime
valebis._” The Patristic argument is more fully developed by
Bellarmine, _De Iustif._, III, 7.

_ 1166 Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. III, p. 617.

_ 1167 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 9: “_Sicut nemo pius de Dei
misericordia, de Christi merito deque sacramentorum efficacia
dubitare debet, sic quilibet, dum seipsum suamque propriam
infirmitatem et indispositionem respicit, de sua gratia formidare et
timere potest, quum nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei, cui non
potest subesse falsum, se gratiam Dei esse consecutum._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 802.)

1168 “_Peirorem sequitur semper conclusio partem._” Cfr. Clarke, _Logic_,
p. 322.

1169 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 16: “_Si quis magnum illud
usque in finem perseverantiae donum se certo habiturum absolutâ et
infallibili certitudine dixerit, nisi hoc speciali revelatione
didicerit, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 826.)

1170 In his little treatise _De Certitudine Gratiae_.

1171 Sess. VI, cap. 9: “_... iustificatos absque ulla dubitatione apud
semetipsos statuere, se esse iustificatos._”

1172 Rom. VIII, 38 sq.: “_Certus sum enim (πέπεισμαι=persuasum habeo),
quia neque mors neque vita ... poterit nos separare a caritate Dei,
quae est in Christo Iesu._”

_ 1173 Tract. in Ioa._, I, 3, 5, n. 10: “_Quid nos scimus? Quia
transivimus de morte ad vitam. Unde scimus? Quia diligimus fratres.
Nemo interroget hominem, redeat unusquisque ad cor suum; si ibi
invenerit caritatem fraternam, securus sit, quia transiit a morte ad
vitam._”

1174 Cfr. the _Imitation of Christ_ by Thomas à Kempis, III, 54 sqq. On
the whole subject of this subdivision the student may profitably
consult the _Summa Theologica_ of St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art.
5; Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 9-11, and Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss.
6, art. 4.

_ 1175 Serm. de Nativitate Mariae_: “_Omnes Christiani aeque magni sumus
sicut mater Dei, et aeque sancti sicut ipsa._”

1176 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “_Iustitiam in nobis recipientes, unusquisque suam
secundum mensuram, quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis prout
vult, et secundum propriam cuiusque dispositionem et
cooperationem._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799.)

1177 Sess. VI, cap. 10: “_Iustificati ... in ipsa iustitia per Christi
gratiam accepta, cooperante fide bonis operibus crescunt atque magis
iustificantur._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 803.)

1178 Sess. VI, can. 24: “_Si quis dixerit, iustitiam acceptam non
conservari atque etiam augeri coram Deo per bona opera, sed opera
ipsa fructus solummodo et signa esse iustificationis adeptae, non
autem ipsius augendae causam, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart,
n. 834.)

1179 Prov. IV, 18: “_Iustorum autem semita quasi lux splendens procedit
et crescit usque ad perfectam diem._”

1180 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “_Non impediaris orare semper et ne verearis
usque ad mortem iustificari, quoniam merces Dei manet in aeternum._”

1181 2 Pet. III, 18: “_Crescite vero in gratia et in cognitione Domini
nostri et Salvatoris Iesu Christi._”

1182 2 Cor. IX, 10: “_[Deus] augebit incrementa frugum iustitiae
vestrae._”

1183 Eph. IV, 7: “_Unicuique autem nostrum data est gratia secundum
mensuram donationis Christi._”

1184 Apoc. XXII, 11 sq.: “_Qui iustus est, iustificetur adhuc, et sanctus
sanctificetur adhuc. Ecce venio cito et merces mea mecum est,
reddere unicuique secundum opera sua._” Cfr. Bellarmine, _De
Iustific._, III, 16.

_ 1185 Contra Iovin._, II, n. 23: “_Unicuique nostrum data est gratia
iuxta mensuram gratiae (Eph. 4, 7); non quod mensura Christi diversa
sit, sed tantum gratiae eius infunditur, quantum valemus haurire_.”

_ 1186 Ep._, 167, n. 13: “_Induti sunt sancti iustitiâ (Job 29, 14), alius
magis, alius minus; et nemo hic vivit sine peccato et hoc alius
magis, alius minus: optimus autem est qui minimum._”

_ 1187 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 4, ad 3: “_Vita naturalis
pertinet ad substantiam hominis, et ideo non recipit magis et minus;
sed vitam gratiae participat homo accidentaliter, et ideo eam potest
homo magis vel minus habere._” On the teaching of Tradition cfr.
Alb. a Bulsano, _Instit. Theol. Dogmat._, ed. G. a Graun, O. Cap.,
Vol. II, p. 254, Innsbruck 1894.

1188 Ecclus. XVIII, 22; Apoc. XXII, 11.

1189 Cfr. Vasquez, _Comment. in Summam Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 221, cap.
9, n. 77.

1190 Ecclus. XIX, 1: “_Qui spernit modica, paulatim decidet._” For a
fuller treatment of this subject we refer the student to St. Thomas,
_Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 10.

_ 1191 V. supra_, pp. 328 sqq.

1192 Cfr. Suarez, _Disp. Metaph._, l. II, disp. 16.

1193 The authority of St. Thomas himself can be invoked by neither party
to this controversy. Cfr. Sylvius, _Comment. in S. Theol._, 2a 2ae,
qu. 24, art. 3.

1194 For a fuller treatment of this topic see Tepe, _Instit. Theol._,
Vol. III, pp. 217 sqq.

_ 1195 V. supra_, pp. 336 sqq.

1196 Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 2, 13.

1197 Suarez, _op. cit._, IX, 4, 15.

1198 Sess. VI, cap. 10: “_Hoc vero iustitiae incrementum petit sancta
Ecclesia, quum orat: Da nobis, Domine, fidei, spei et caritatis
augmentum._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 803). Cfr. De Lugo, _De Fide_,
disp. 16, sect. 2.

1199 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 7.

1200 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Christology_, pp. 231 sqq.

1201 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Mariology_, pp. 24 sqq.

1202 For a more elaborate treatment the reader is referred to Suarez, _De
Gratia_, IX, 6, 11, and Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 570 sq.,
Freiburg 1901.

1203 Sess. VI, can. 23: “_Si quis hominem semel iustificatum dixerit
amplius peccare non posse neque gratiam amittere atque ideo eum, qui
labitur et peccat, numquam vere fuisse iustificatum; ... anathema
sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 833.)

1204 Sess. VI, can. 27: “_Si quis dixerit, nullum esse mortale peccatum
nisi infidelitatis, aut nullo alio quantumvis gravi et enormi
praeterquam infidelitatis peccato semel acceptam gratiam amitti,
anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 837).

1205 Sess. VI, cap. 11: “_Licet in hac mortali vita quantumvis sancti et
iusti in levia saltem et quotidiana, quae etiam venialia dicuntur,
peccata quandoque cadant, non propterea desinunt esse iusti._”

1206 Ez. XVIII, 24: “_Si autem averterit se iustus a iustitia sua, et
fecerit iniquitatem secundum omnes abominationes, quas operari solet
impius, numquid vivet? Omnes iustitiae eius, quas fecerat, non
recordabuntur; in praevaricatione, quâ praevaricatus est, et in
peccato suo, quod peccavit, in ipsis morietur._”

1207 Matth. XXVI, 41: “_Vigilate et orate, ut non intretis in
tentationem._”

1208 1 Cor. X, 12: “_Qui se existitmat stare, videat ne cadat._”

1209 1 Cor. VI, 9 sq.: “_Nolite errare, neque fornicarii neque idolis
servientes neque adulteri neque molles neque masculorum concubitores
neque fures neque avari neque ebriosi neque maledici neque rapaces
regnum Dei possidebunt._” Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 15
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 808).

1210 1 John III, 9: “_Omnis, qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit:
quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare, quoniam ex
Deo natus est._”

_ 1211 Contra Iovin._, 1. II: “_Propterea scribo vobis, filioli mei, omnis
qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat, ut non peccetis et tamdiu sciatis
vos in generatione Domini permanere, quamdiu non peccaveritis._” On
the different interpretations of 1 John III, 9, an admittedly
difficult text, see Bellarmine, _De Iustific._, III, 15.

_ 1212 De Corrept. et Gratia_, c. VI, n. 9: “_Si iam regeneratus et
iustificatus in malam vitam suâ voluntate relabitur, certe iste non
potest dicere: Non accepti, quia acceptam gratiam Dei suo in malum
libero amisit arbitrio._”

_ 1213 Hom. in Ez._, 9, 1: “_Sicuti qui a fide recedit, apostata est, ita
qui ad perversum opus, quod deseruerit, redit, ab omnipotente Deo
apostata deputatur, etiamsi fidem tenere videatur; unum enim sine
altero nil prodesse valet, quia nec fides sine operibus nec opera
adiuvant sine fide._”

1214 For the solution of certain difficulties see Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 591 sqq. On the penitential discipline of the early
Church cfr. G. Rauschen, _Eucharist and Penance in the First Six
Centuries_, pp. 152 sqq., St. Louis 1913.

1215 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 28: “_Si quis dixerit, amissâ
per peccatum gratiâ simul et fidem semper amitti, aut fidem quae
remanet non esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva, aut eum qui fidem
sine caritate habet, non esse Christianum, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 838.)

1216 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 15: “_Non modo infidelitate,
per quam et ipsa fides amittitur, sed etiam quocunque alio mortali
peccato, quamvis non amittatur fides, acceptam iustificationis
gratiam amitti._”

1217 Cfr. _Prop. Quesnelli damn. a Clemente XI_, prop. 57: “_Totum deest
peccatori, quando ei deest spes, et non est spes in Deo, ubi non est
amor Dei._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1407.)

_ 1218 V. supra_, Section 2.

1219 The questions discussed in this subdivision of our treatise are more
fully treated by Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 128, sect.
4, and by Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 3 sqq.

1220 Sess. VI, cap. 16.

_ 1221 V. supra_, p. 131.

_ 1222 V. supra_, pp. 132 sqq.

_ 1223 Realitas sive existentia meriti._

_ 1224 Conditiones meriti._

_ 1225 Obiecta meriti._

1226 Cfr. _Conc. Viennense_, A. D. 1311 (_Clementin._, l. V, tit. 3: “De
Haereticis”) in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 471 sqq.

1227 “_In omni opere bono iustus peccat._” _Prop. Lutheri Damnatae A. D.
1520 a Leone X_, prop. 31 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 771).

1228 “_Opus bonum, optime factum est veniale peccatum_.” Prop. 32, _l.
c._, n. 772.

1229 “_Omne opus iusti damnabile est et peccatum mortale, si iudicio Dei
iudicetur._”

1230 “_Inquinamenta et sordes._” _Instit._, III, 12, 4.

1231 Quietism (Michael de Molinos _et al._) denied the meritoriousness of
good works performed in the “state of passive repose” (_quies_).

1232 “_Debetur merces bonis operibus, si fiant; sed gratia, quae non
debetur, praecedit ut fiant._” Can. 18 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 191.)

_ 1233 Cap. Firmiter_: “_Non solum autem virgines et continentes, verum
etiam coniugati per rectam fidem et operationem bonam placentes Deo
ad aeternam merentur beatitudinem pervenire._” (Denzinger-Bannwart,
n. 430.)

1234 Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_Atque ideo bene operantibus usque in finem et
in Deo sperantibus proponenda est vita aeterna et tamquam gratia
filiis Dei per Christum Iesum misericorditer promissa et tamquam
merces ex ipsius Dei promissione bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis
fideliter reddenda._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.)

1235 Sess. VI, can. 25: “_Si quis in quolibet bono opere iustum saltem
venialiter peccare dixerit, aut quod intolerabilius est, mortaliter
atque ideo poenas aeternas mereri, tantumque ob id non damnari quia
Deus ea opera non imputat ad damnationem, anathema sit._”
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 835.)

1236 Sess. VI, can. 26: “_Si quis dixerit, iustos non debere pro bonis
operibus, quae in Deo fuerint facta, exspectare et sperare aeternam
retributionem a Deo per eius misericordiam et Iesu Christi meritum,
si bene agendo et divina mandata custodiendo usque in finem
perseveraverint, anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 836.)

1237 Sess. VI, can. 32: “_Si quis dixerit, ... ipsum iustificatum bonis
operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam et Iesu Christi meritum, cuius
vivum membrum est, fiunt, non vere mereri augmentum gratiae, ...
anathema sit._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 842.)

1238 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1221 sqq.

1239 Wisd. V, 16: “_Iusti autem in perpetuum vivent et apud Dominum est
merces eorum._”

1240 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “_Ne verearis usque ad mortem iustificari,
quoniam merces Dei manet in aeternum._” Cfr. Gen. XV, 1.

1241 Matth. V, 12: “_Gaudete et exultate, quoniam merces vestra copiosa
est in caelis._”

1242 Rom. II, 6 sq.: “_... qui reddet unicuique secundum opera eius, iis
quidem, qui secundum patientiam boni operis gloriam et honorem et
incorruptionem quaerunt, vitam aeternam._”

1243 2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “_Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem
servavi. In reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet
mihi Dominus in illa die iustus iudex; non solum autem mihi, sed et
iis qui diligunt adventum eius._” Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 25.

1244 1 Cor. III, 8: “_Unusquisque autem propriam mercedem accipiet,
secundum suum laborem._”

1245 Col. III, 23 sq.: “_Quodcunque facitis, ex animo operamini sicut
Domino et non hominibus, scientes quod a Domino accipietis
retributionem haereditatis._”

1246 Iac. I, 12: “_Beatus vir, qui suffert tentationem, quoniam, quum
probatus fuerit, accipiet coronam vitae, quam repromisit Deus
diligentibus se._”

1247 Apoc. II, 10: “_Esto fidelis usque ad mortem, et dabo tibi coronam
vitae._” For additional Scripture texts see Bellarmine, _De
Iustificatione_, V, 3, 5.

_ 1248 Ep. ad Rom._, IV, 1.

_ 1249 Adv. Haer._, IV, 37.

_ 1250 De Offic._, I, 15, 57: “_Nonne evidens est, meritorum aut praemia
aut supplicia post mortem manere?_”

_ 1251 De Moribus Ecclesiae_, I, 25: “_Vita aeterna est totum praemium,
cuius promissione gaudemus, nec praemium potest praecedere merita
priusque homini dari, quam dignus est. Quid enim hoc iniustius et
quid iustius Deo? Non ergo debemus poscere praemia, antequam
mereamur accipere._”

_ 1252 Ep. ad Sixt._, 194, n. 20: “_Sicut merito peccati tamquam
stipendium redditur mors, ita merito iustitiae tamquam stipendium
vita aeterna.... Unde etiam et merces appellatur plurimis s.
Scripturarum locis._” Other Patristic texts inculcating the
meritoriousness of good works performed in the state of grace can be
found in Bellarmine, _De Iustif._, V, 4, 6. For the solution of
objections raised against the Patristic argument consult Schiffini,
_De Gratia Divina_, pp. 609 sqq.

1253 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 21, art. 4.

_ 1254 Cfr. Prop. Baii damn, a Pio V_, 13 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1013):
“_Opera bona a filiis adoptionis facta non accipiunt rationem meriti
ex eo, quod fiunt per Spiritum adoptionis inhabitantem corda
filiorum Dei, sed tantum ex eo, quod sunt conformia legi quodque per
ea praestatur obedientia legi._”

1255 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_Absit, ut Christianus
homo in se ipso vel confidat vel glorietur, et non in Domino, cuius
tanta est erga homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae
sunt ipsius dona._”

_ 1256 Conc. Florent._, A. D. 1439, (_apud_ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693):
“_... et intueri clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est, pro
meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectius._”

_ 1257 V. supra_, pp. 356 sqq.

_ 1258 Conc. Trident._, Sess. XIV, cap. 8: “_Ita non habet homo, unde
glorietur, sed omnis gloriatio nostra in Christo est, in quo
vivimus, in quo movemur, in quo satisfacimus facientes fructus
dignos poenitentiae, qui ex illo vim habent, ab illo offeruntur
Patri et per illum acceptantur a Patre._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
904.)

1259 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 33: “_Si quis dixerit, per
hanc doctrinam catholicam de iustificatione, a s. Synodo hoc
praesenti decreto expressam, aliquâ ex parte gloriae Dei vel meritis
Iesu Christi D. N. derogari, et non potius veritatem fidei nostrae,
Dei denique ac Christi Iesu gloriam illustrari, anathema sit._”

1260 Cfr. Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, V, 7. See also the article on
“Merit” in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. X.

1261 Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_vere promeruisse_;” Sess. VI, can. 32: “_vere
mereri_.”

_ 1262 Hist. Conc. Trident._, VIII, 4.

1263 “_Operibus post acceptam iustificationem peractis adeoque divinâ
gratiâ informatis redditisque ob merita Christi potentioribus, cuius
vivum membrum est is qui ea peragit, omnes concedebant rationem
meriti condigni ad conservandam augendamque eandem gratiam
aeternaeque felicitatis consequendam._” (Pallavicini, _l.c._)

_ 1264 V. infra_, Sect. 2.

1265 Heb. VI, 10: “_Non enim iniustus est Deus, ut obliviscatur operis
vestri._”

1266 2 Tim. IV, 8: “_... reposita est mihi_,” etc. See note 24, _supra_,
p. 403.

1267 Iac. I, 12: “_Beatus vir, qui suffert tentationem_,” etc. _V.
supra_, note 27, p. 403.

1268 Wisd. III, 5: “_Deus tentavit eos et invenit illos dignos se._”

1269 2 Thess. I, 4 sq.: “_In omnibus persecutionibus vestris et
tribulationibus, quas sustinetis in exemplum iusti iudicii Dei, ut
digni habeamini in regno Dei, pro quo et patimini._”

1270 Apoc. III, 4: “_Ambulabunt mecum in albis, quia digni sunt._”

1271 Matth. XXV, 34 sq.: “_Venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete
paratum vobis regnum a constitutione mundi; esurivi enim et dedistis
mihi manducare...._”

1272 1 John III, 9.

_ 1273 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 3, ad 3: “_Gratia Spiritus S.,
quam in praesenti habemus, etsi non sit aequalis gloriae in actu,
est tamen aequalis in virtute, sicut semen arboris, in quo est
virtus ad totam arborem. Et similiter per gratiam inhabitat hominem
Spiritus S., qui est sufficiens causa vitae aeternae, unde et
dicitur esse pignus hæreditatis nostrae._”

_ 1274 Summa Theol._, 1a, qu. 21, art. 4, ad 1.

1275 Luke VI, 38: “_Date, et dabitur vobis: mensuram bonam, et confectam,
et coagitatam, et supereffluentem dabunt in sinum vestrum._” Cfr.
_Prop. Baii damn. A. D. 1567 a Pio V_, 14 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
1014): “_Opera bona iustorum non accipient in die iudicii extremi
mercedem ampliorem, quam iusto Dei iudicio mereantur accipere._” For
further information on this topic consult Bellarmine, _De
Iustificatione_, V, 19; De Lugo, _De Poenitentia_, disp. 24, n. 10.
The Thomistic axiom, “_Deus punit citra condignum et remunerat ultra
condignum_” and Baius’ condemned proposition are interpreted
somewhat differently than we have explained them by Suarez, _De
Gratia_, XII, 31, 14. On the general argument of this Section the
student may profitably consult St. Bonaventure, _Breviloquium_, P.
V, § 12; Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 8, art. 3; Tepe, _Instit.
Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 226 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, _Praelect.
Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 218 sqq., Freiburg 1908; Schiffini,
_De Gratia Divina_, pp. 614 sqq., Freiburg 1901.

1276 Eph. VI, 8: “_Scientes, quoniam unusquisque, quodcunque fecerit
bonum, hoc recipiet a Domino._”

1277 2 Cor. V, 10: “_Omnes enim nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal
Christi, ut referat unusquisque propria corporis, prout gessit, sive
bonum sive malum._”

1278 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1, ad 1:
“_Homo, in quantum propriâ voluntate facit illud quod debet,
meretur; alioquin actus iustitiae, quo quis reddit debitum, non
esset meritorius._”

1279 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, X, 2, 5 sqq.

1280 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,
pp. 291 sqq.

1281 1 Cor. IX, 17: “_Si enim volens hoc ago, mercedem habeo._”

1282 Matth. XIX, 17: “_Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata._”

_ 1283 Contra Jovin._, 1. II, n. 3: “_Ubi necessitas est, nec corona nec
damnatio est._”

1284 For a more extensive treatment of this and allied questions consult
Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 74, sect. 3; De Lugo, _De
Incarnatione_, disp. 26, sect. 10, n. 126 sq.

_ 1285 V. supra_, pp. 82 sqq.

1286 Especially Bañez (_Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 6,
dub. 6). This view is also taken by the so-called Augustinians.

1287 Notably Billuart; see his treatise _De Gratia_, diss. 8, art. 4.

_ 1288 De Iustificatione_, V, 15: “_Non sufficere, si quis ad initium anni
vel mensis vel etiam diei generali quadam intentione referat omnia
sua futura opera in Deum, sed necesse esse ut illud ipsum opus
particulare referatur in Deum, quod postea faciendum est._”

_ 1289 Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 4: “_Et ideo meritum vitae
aeternae primo pertinet ad caritatem, ad alias autem virtutes
secundario, secundum quod earum actus a caritate imperantur._” And
again, _l.c._, ad 3: “_Similiter etiam actus patientiae et
fortitudinis non est meritorius, nisi aliquis ex caritate haec
operetur._” On the true sense of these passages cfr. Schiffini, _De
Gratia Divina_, pp. 647 sqq.

1290 Cfr. _Prop. damn. ab Innocentio XI_, prop. 6 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
1156): “_Probabile est, ne singulis quidem rigorose quinquenniis per
se obligare praeceptum caritatis erga Deum._”

1291 Cfr. J. Ernst, _Die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung. Untersuchungen
über die Gottesliebe als Prinzip der Sittlichkeit und
Verdienstlichkeit_, Freiburg 1905.

_ 1292 De Gratia_, IX, 3.

_ 1293 Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 220.

_ 1294 Concilium Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_Haec est enim illa corona
iustitiae, quam post suum certamen et cursum repositam sibi esse
aiebat Apostolus a iusto iudice sibi reddendam, non solum autem
sibi, sed et omnibus qui diligunt adventum eius. Quum enim ille ipse
Christus Iesus tamquam caput in membra et tamquam vitis in palmites
in ipsos iustificatos iugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus bona
eorum opera semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur et sine quâ
nullo pacto Deo grata et meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis
iustificatis amplius deesse credendum est, quominus plene illis
quidem operibus, quae in Deo_ [=_per Deum_; v. Sess. VI, can. 26,
32] _sunt facta, divinae legi pro huius vitae statu satisfecisse et
vitam aeternam suo etiam tempore, si tamen in gratia decesserint,
consequendam vere promeruisse censeantur._” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
809.)

1295 Cfr. Matth. V, 2 sqq.

1296 Matth. XIX, 16: “_Quid boni faciam, ut habeam vitam aeternam?_”

1297 Matth. XIX, 17: “_Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata._”

1298 Cfr. Matth. XIX, 18 sqq.

1299 The Scriptural argument is more fully developed by Tepe, _Inst.
Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 233 sqq.

_ 1300 V. supra_, pp. 73 sqq.

1301 On a similar controversy regarding the necessity of the motive of
faith, see Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 225
sqq., and Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 649 sqq.

1302 The Scriptural proof for this proposition will be found in the
dogmatic treatise on Eschatology. On the absurdity of the
semi-Pelagian hypothesis of _merita sub conditione futura_ see
Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp.
375 sq.

1303 Cfr. _Prop. Baii damn. 1567 a Pio V_, prop. 17 (Denzinger-Bannwart,
n. 1017): “_Sentiunt cum Pelagio, qui dicunt esse necessarium ad
rationem meriti, ut homo per gratiam adoptionis sublimetur ad statum
deificum._”

1304 John XV, 4: “_Sicut palmes non potest ferre fructum a semetipso,
nisi manserit in vite, sic nec vos, nisi in me manseritis._”

1305 Rom. VIII, 17: “_Si autem filii, et haeredes; haeredes quidem Dei,
cohaeredes autem Christi._” Additional Biblical texts in Bellarmine,
_De Iustificatione_, V, 12 sq.

_ 1306 Comment. in S. Theol._, 3a, disp. 6, cap. 4.

1307 Suarez (_De Gratia_, XII, 22), Ripalda (_De Ente Supernaturali_,
disp. 81), De Lugo (_De Incarnatione_, disp. 6, sect. 2, n. 37).

_ 1308 Comment. in Sent._, II, dist. 29, qu. 1, art. 4.

1309 Cfr. Job XLII, 8; Dan. III, 35.

1310 Cfr. Scotus, _Comment. in Sent._, I, dist. 17, qu. 2.

1311 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,
PP. 456 sq.

1312 Rom. VIII, 18: “_Non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad
futuram gloriam._”

_ 1313 De Perfect. Divin._, XIII, 2.

_ 1314 Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 214, 223.

_ 1315 De Incarnatione_, disp. 3, sect. 1 sq.

_ 1316 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1, ad 3: “_Dicendum quod, quia
actio nostra non habet rationem meriti nisi ex praesuppositione
divinae ordinationis, non sequitur quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter
debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi, inquantum debitum est, ut sua
ordinatio impleatur._”

1317 Iac. I, 12: “_Accipiet coronam vitae_ [St. Paul says: ὁ τῆς
δικαιοσύνης στέφανος], _quam repromisit (ἐπηγγείλατο) Deus
diligentibus se._”

_ 1318 Serm._, 158, c. 2, n. 2: “_Debitor factus est Deus non aliquid a
nobis accipiendo, sed quod ei placuit promittendo. Aliter enim
dicimus homini: Debes mihi, quia dedi tibi; et aliter dicimus: Debes
mihi, quia promisisti mihi. Deo autem nunquam dicimus: Redde mihi,
quia dedi tibi. Quid dedimus Deo, quando totum quod sumus et quod
habemus boni, ab illo habemus? Nihil ergo ei dedimus.... Illo ergo
modo possumus exigere Dominum nostrum ut dicamus: Redde, quod
promisisti, quia fecimus quod iussisti, et hoc tu fecisti, quia
laborantes iuvisti._”

_ 1319 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: “_In Deo sperantibus proponenda
est vita aeterna ... tamquam merces ex ipsius Dei promissione bonis
ipsorum operibus et meritis fideliter [i.e. ex fidelitate]
reddenda._” Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 416 sqq.

1320 Sess. VI, can. 32: “_Si quis dixerit, iustificatum bonis operibus
... non vere mereri augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius
vitae aeternae, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem atque
etiam gloriae augmentum, anathema sit._”

1321 See the article on “Merit” in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_.

_ 1322 V. supra_, Ch. II, Sect. 3, Thesis II.

1323 Sess. VI, cap. 8: “_Gratis autem iustificari ideo dicimur, quia
nihil eorum quae iustificationem praecedunt, sive fides, sive opera,
ipsam iustificationis gratiam promeretur; si enim gratia est, iam
non ex operibus, alioquin, ut idem Apostolus inquit, gratia iam non
est gratia._”

_ 1324 V. supra_, Sect. 2, No. 2.

_ 1325 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 4, n. 4: “_Haec Christi gratia, sine quâ
nec infantes nec aetate grandes salvi fieri possunt, non meritis
redditur, sed gratis datur, propter quod et gratia nominatur.
Iustificati, inquit (Rom. III, 24; V, 4), gratis per sanguinem
ipsius._”

1326 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 6; Sess. VI, cap. 3; Sess.
XIV, cap. 4; _supra_, pp. 286 sqq.

1327 For a more exhaustive treatment of this topic consult Tepe, _Instit.
Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 158 sqq.

1328 See, for example, Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 26: “_De auxiliis
sufficientibus et necessariis, quae post aliquod meritum de condigno
augmenti gratiae dantur, vel offeruntur, probabile est concomitanter
cadere sub idem meritum de condigno augmenti gratiae; nam qui
meretur de condigno aliquam formam, meretur quidquid connaturaliter
sequitur ex tali forma vel ei connaturaliter debetur._” On the
actual distribution of sufficient grace, v. _supra_, pp. 167 sqq.

_ 1329 V. supra_, pp. 392 sqq.

1330 For a fuller treatment cfr. Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 258
sqq., and Chr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 237
sqq.

_ 1331 V. supra_, Sect. 1.

1332 Sess. VI, cap. 16; v. _supra_, pp. 400 sq.

1333 Sess. VI, can. 32.

1334 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 29: “_Dicendum vitam aeternam et
vitae aeternae consecutionem non esse duo praemia distincta, quia
mereri mercedem et solutionem mercedis non sunt duae mercedes._”

1335 On the _reviviscentia meritorum_ see the treatise on the Sacrament
of Penance, Vol. X of this series; cfr. also Schiffini, _De Gratia
Divina_, pp. 661 sqq.

_ 1336 E.g._ Ripalda (_De Ente Supernat._, disp. 89, sect. 1) and De Lugo
(_De Incarnatione_, disp. 3, n. 59).

_ 1337 V. supra_, Sect. 2, No. 2.

1338 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 28, and Vasquez, _Comment. in S.
Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 219, c. 2.

1339 Despite Bellarmine’s contradiction (_De Iustificatione_, V, 20.)

1340 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 122, art. 2, ad 1:
“_Praeparatio hominis ad gratiam habendam quaedam est simul cum ipsa
infusione gratiae; et talis operatio est quidem meritoria, sed non
gratiae quae iam habetur, sed gloriae quae nondum habetur._”

1341 Cfr. Tepe, _Instit. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 266 sqq.

1342 Matth. XVI, 27: “_Et tunc reddet unicuique secundum opera eius_
(κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν αὐτοῦ).”

1343 1 Cor. III, 8: “_Unusquisque autem propriam mercedem (τὸν ἴδιον
μισθόν) accipiet secundum suum laborem_ (κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον κόπον).”

1344 See Eschatology.

1345 Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 8.

_ 1346 De Praed. Sanctorum_, c. 2.

_ 1347 V. supra_, Sect. 2.

1348 Prominent among the dissenters is Billuart (_De Gratia_, diss. 8,
art. 5).

_ 1349 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 6, ad 2: “_Impetratio
orationis innititur misericordiae, meritum autem condigni innititur
iustitiae. Et ideo multa orando impetrat homo ex divina
misericordia, quae tamen non meretur secundum iustitiam._”

1350 Ps. L, 19: “_Cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non despicies._”

1351 Dan. IV, 24: “_Peccata tua eleemosynis redime et iniquitates tuas
misericordiis pauperum; forsitan ignoscet delictis tuis._”

_ 1352 Ep. ad Sixt._, 194, c. 3, n. 9: “_Sed nec ipsa remissio peccatorum
sine aliquo merito est, si fides hanc impetret. Neque enim nullum
est meritum fidei, quâ fide ille dicebat: Deus propitius esto mihi
peccatori, et descendit iustificatus merito fidelis humilitatis._”
Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 7 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.
799): “_Hanc dispositionem seu praeparationem iustificatio ipsa
consequitur._” For a fuller treatment cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII,
37.

_ 1353 V. supra_, pp. 123 sqq. The student may also consult Tepe, _Instit.
Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 258 sqq., and Bellarmine, _De Iustific._, V,
22.

_ 1354 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 7: “_Respondeo dicendum quod
nullus potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum futurum neque
merito condigni neque merito congrui._”

_ 1355 Lect. in Hebr._, III, 6, 10: “_Duplex est meritum. Unum quod
innititur iustitiae et istud est meritum condigni; aliud quod soli
misericordiae innititur, quod dicitur meritum congrui. Et de isto
dicit [Paulus], quod iustum est, i.e. congruum, quod homo, qui multa
bona fecit, mereatur.... Et isto modo non obliviscitur Deus operis
nostri et dilectionis._”

_ 1356 Comment. in Sent._, IV, dist. 2, qu. 1, art. 2.

_ 1357 Comment. in Sent._, II, dist. 28, dub. 2.

_ 1358 De Gratia_, XII, 38, 6.

1359 2 Paral. XIX, 2 sq.: “_Impio praebes auxilium et his, qui oderunt
Dominum, amicitiâ iungeris et idcirco iram quidem Domini merebaris;
sed bona opera inventa sunt in te._”

1360 Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 38, 7: “_Possunt enim praecedentia merita
esse tam pauca et tot peccata postea multiplicata, ut omnino obruant
merita et efficiant, ut nullo modo Deum ad misericordiam provocent;
secus vero erit, si e contrario merita magna fuerint et peccatum
subsequens et rarum sit et excusationem aliquam ex ignorantia vel
infirmitate habeat._”

1361 Ps. LXX, 9: “_Quum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me._”

1362 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 7, ad 1:
“_Desiderium, quo quis desiderat reparationem post lapsum, iustum
dicitur; et similiter oratio, quâ petit eiusmodi reparationem,
dicitur iusta, quia tendit ad iustitiam; non tamen ita quod
iustitiae innitatur per modum meriti, sed solum misericordiae._”
Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 687 sq.

_ 1363 V. supra_, pp. 136 sqq.

_ 1364 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 6: “_Quia enim homo in gratia
constitutus implet Dei voluntatem, congruum est secundum amicitiae
proportionem ut Deus impleat hominis voluntatem in salvatione
alterius, licet quandoque possit habere impedimentum ex parte
illius, cuius aliquis sanctus iustificationem desiderat._”

1365 Iac. V, 16: “_Orate pro invicem, ut salvemini; multum enim valet
deprecatio iusti assidua._”

_ 1366 E.g._ Abraham, Job, St. Stephen.

_ 1367 E.g._ St. Augustine and his mother St. Monica.

1368 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 38, 21.

_ 1369 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 10: “_Dicendum est quod, si
temporalia bona considerentur, prout sunt utilia ad opera virtutum,
quibus perducimur in vitam aeternam, secundum hoc directe et
simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sicut et augmentum gratiae et omnia
illa, quibus homo adiuvatur ad perveniendum in beatitudinem post
primam gratiam.... Si autem considerentur huiusmodi temporalia bona
secundum se, sic non sunt simpliciter bona hominis, sed secundum
quid, et ita non simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sed secundum quid,
inquantum scil. homines moventur a Deo ad aliqua temporaliter
agenda, quibus suum propositum consequuntur Deo favente._”

1370 Gen. XV, 1: “_Ego ... merces tua magna nimis._”

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Grace, Actual and Habitual - A Dogmatic Treatise" ***

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