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Title: The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte - Vol. IV. (of IV.)
Author: Sloane, William Milligan, 1850-1928
Language: English
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[Illustration: From a photograph by Braun, Clement & Co.
EMPRESS MARIE LOUISE
By Pierre Paul Prod'hon.]
THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
BY
WILLIAM MILLIGAN SLOANE
PH.D., L.H.D., LL.D.
_Professor of History in Columbia University_
Revised and Enlarged
With Portraits
VOLUME IV
NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1916
Copyright, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1910
BY
THE CENTURY CO.
_Published, October, 1910_
CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
I. The Last Imperial Victory............................... 1
II. Politics and Strategy.................................. 11
III. The End of the Grand Army.............................. 23
IV. The Frankfort Proposals................................ 37
V. The Invasion of France................................. 47
VI. Napoleon's Supreme Effort.............................. 59
VII. The Great Captain at Bay............................... 71
VIII. The Struggles of Exhaustion............................ 84
IX. The Beginning of the End.............................. 101
X. The Fall of Paris..................................... 111
XI. Napoleon's First Abdication........................... 123
XII. The Emperor of Elba................................... 137
XIII. Napoleon the Liberator................................ 151
XIV. The Dynasties Implacable.............................. 164
XV. Ligny and Quatre Bras................................. 175
XVI. The Eve of Waterloo................................... 189
XVII. Waterloo.............................................. 199
XVIII. The Surrender......................................... 212
XIX. St. Helena............................................ 224
XX. Soldier, Statesman, Despot............................ 247
XXI. Napoleon and the United States........................ 268
XXII. Napoleon's Place in History........................... 285
Historical Sources.................................... 303
General Bibliography.................................. 307
Index................................................. 355
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Empress Marie Louise _Frontispiece_
Facing Page
Napoleon in 1813................................................. 50
Napoleon, François Charles Joseph, Prince Imperial;
King of Rome; Duke of Reichstadt............................... 98
Map of the Field of Operations in 1814.......................... 104
The King of Rome................................................ 148
Map of the Campaign of 1815..................................... 194
Napoleon, François Charles Joseph, Duke of Reichstadt,
etc., etc., son of Napoleon Bonaparte......................... 200
Napoleon sleeping by Las Cases on board the _Bellerophon_....... 224
Napoleon at St. Helena.......................................... 230
Napoleon I...................................................... 274
LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
CHAPTER I
THE LAST IMPERIAL VICTORY[1]
[Footnote 1: References: Pierron: Napoléon, de Dresde à
Leipzig. Pelet: Des principales opérations de la campagne de
1813. York von Wartenburg: Précis militaire de la campagne de
1813 en Allemagne. Clément: Campagne de 1813. Lüdtke: Die
strategische Bedeutung der Schlacht bei Dresden. Sorel:
L'Europe et la révolution française, Vol. VIII.]
Napoleon's Prospects -- The Preparations and Plans of the
Coalition -- Cross-purposes of the Combatants -- Condition of
Napoleon's Mind -- Strength and Weakness of the Allies -- Renewal
of Hostilities -- The Feint in Silesia -- Napoleon at Dresden --
First Day's Fighting -- The Victory Won on the Second Day.
[Sidenote: 1813]
In later years Napoleon confessed that during the interval between the
first and second Saxon campaigns he had been outwitted. His
antagonists had, in his own language, "changed for the better"; at
least they secured the war they so earnestly desired under conditions
vastly more favorable to themselves than to their opponent. Both
parties had been arming with might and main during the prolonged
truce, but each member of the dynastic coalition now had the backing
of a growing national enthusiasm, while Napoleon had to deal with
waning zeal and an exhausted people. Thus, then, at the opening of the
second campaign in Saxony, the allies had four hundred and thirty-five
thousand men, and Napoleon but three hundred and fifty thousand. With
this inferiority, it behooved the Emperor to use all his strategic
powers, and he did so with a brilliancy never surpassed by him.
Choosing the Elbe as his natural defensive line, Hamburg stood almost
impregnable at one end, flanked to the southward by Magdeburg,
Wittenberg, and Torgau, three mighty fortresses. Dresden, which was
necessarily the focal point, was intrenched and palisaded for the
protection of the army which was to be its main bulwark. Davout and
Oudinot, with seventy thousand men, were to threaten Berlin, and,
thereby drawing off as many as possible of the enemy, liberate the
garrisons of Stettin and Küstrin; they were then to beleaguer Spandau,
push the foe across the Oder, and stand ready to fall on the flank of
the coalition army. Napoleon himself, with the remaining two hundred
and eighty thousand, was to await the onset of the combined Russian,
Prussian, and Austrian forces.
The allies now had in their camp two mighty strategists--Jomini, the
well-known Swiss adventurer and military historian, and Moreau, who
had returned from the United States. The former, pleading that he had
lost a merited promotion by Berthier's ill-will, and that as a
foreigner he had the right of choice, had gone over to the enemies of
his employer; the latter, yielding to the specious pleas of his silly
and ambitious wife that he might fight Napoleon without fighting
France, had taken service with the Czar. The arrow which penetrated
Napoleon's vitals was indeed feathered from his own pinions, since
these two, with another of Napoleon's pupils--Bernadotte, the Crown
Prince of Sweden--were virtually the council of war. Two of them, the
latter and Moreau, saw the specter of French sovereignty beckoning
them on. They dreamed of the chief magistracy in some shape,
imperial, monarchical, consular, or presidential, and were more
devoted to their personal interests than to those of the coalition. In
the service of their ambition was formed the plan by which not only
was Napoleon overwhelmed, but the fields of France were drenched with
blood. Under their advice, three great armies were arrayed: that of
the North, in Brandenburg, was composed of Prussians, Swedes, and a
few Russians, its generals being Bülow, Bernadotte, and Tchernicheff;
that of the East was the Prusso-Russian army in Silesia, now under
Blücher, that astounding young cavalryman of seventy, and
Wittgenstein; finally, that of the South was the new Austrian force
under Schwarzenberg, with an adjunct force of Russian troops under
Barclay, and the Russian guard under the Grand Duke Constantine. Bülow
was in and near Berlin with about a hundred and fifty-six thousand
men; Blücher had ninety-five thousand, and, having violated the
armistice, was on August fourteenth already within the neutral zone at
Striegau, before Breslau; the Austro-Russian force of almost two
hundred and fifty thousand was in northern Bohemia, near Melnik;
Bennigsen was in Poland building up a strong reserve. Schwarzenberg,
though commander of the main army, was reduced to virtual impotence by
the presence at his headquarters of all the sovereigns and of Moreau.
Divided counsels spring from diverse interests; there was at the
outset a pitiful caution and inefficiency on the part of the allies,
while at Napoleon's headquarters there was unity of design at least.
Both contestants were apparently under serious misapprehensions. The
allies certainly were, because Francis believed that, as so often
before, Napoleon's goal would be Vienna. The plan adopted by them was
therefore very simple: each division of the allied army was to stand
expectant; if assailed it was to yield, draw on the French columns,
and expose their flank or rear to the attacks of the other two allied
armies; then by superior force the invaders were to be surrounded. The
allies divined, or believed they divined, that Napoleon would hold his
guard in reserve, throw it behind any portion of his line opposite
which they were vulnerable, break through, and defeat them in
detachments. Their idea was keen, and displayed a thorough grasp both
of the principles on which their opponent had hitherto acted and of
his normal character. But nevertheless they were deceived. Napoleon
discarded all his old principles, and behaved most abnormally. In his
conduct there are evidences of a curious self-deception, and his
decisions contradicted his language. Perpetually minimizing in
conversation the disparity between the two forces, and sometimes even
asserting his own superiority, he nevertheless almost for the first
time assumed the defensive. This unheard-of course may have been due
to misapprehension and exaggeration, but it produced for the moment a
powerful moral effect on his generals, who, without exception, had
hitherto been clamorous for peace, and likewise upon his new boy
recruits; both classes began to have a realizing sense that they were
now fighting, not for aggression, but for life. If the Emperor had any
such confidence as he expressed, it must have been due to the fact
that boys had fought like veterans at Lützen and Bautzen, and that at
last there were cavalry and artillery in fair proportion. Possibly,
likewise, he may have been desperate; fully aware that he was about to
cast the dice for a last stake, he may have been at once braggart and
timid. If he should win in a common defensive battle, he believed, as
his subsequent conduct goes to show, that he was safe indefinitely;
and if he lost--the vision must have been too dreadful, enough to
distract the sanest mind: an exhausted treasury, an exhausted nation,
an empty throne, vanished hopes, ruin!
Yet at the time no one remarked any trace of nervousness in Napoleon.
Long afterward the traitorous Marmont, whose name, like that of
Moreau, was to be execrated by succeeding generations of honorable
Frenchmen, recalled that the Emperor had contemptuously designated the
enemy as a rabble, and that he had likewise overestimated the
strategic value of Berlin. The malignant annalist asserted, too, that
Napoleon's motive was personal spite against Prussia. It has also been
studiously emphasized by others that the "children" of Napoleon's army
were perishing like flowers under an untimely frost, forty thousand
French and German boys being in the hospitals; that corruption was
rife in every department of administration; and that the soldiers' pay
was shamefully in arrears. An eye-witness saw Peyrusse, the paymaster,
to whom Napoleon had just handed four thousand francs for a monument
to Duroc, coolly pocket a quarter of the sum, with the remark that
such was the custom. He would be rash indeed who dared to assert that
there was no basis for this criticism. It is true that the
instructions to Davout and Oudinot made light of Bülow's army, and
that Berlin had vastly less strategic value than those instructions
seemed to indicate. But, on the other hand, both generals and men were
sadly in need of self-reliance, and to see their capitals occupied or
endangered had still a tremendous moral effect upon dynastic
sovereigns. As to the defects in his army, Napoleon could not have
been blind; but in all these directions matters had been nearly, if
not quite, as bad in 1809, and a victory had set them all in order.
What nervousness there was existed rather among the allies. Never
before in her history, not even under the great Frederick, had Prussia
possessed such an army; the Austrians were well drilled and well
equipped; the Russians were of fair quality, numerous, and with the
reserves from Poland would be a powerful army in themselves. Yet in
spite of their strength, the allies were not really able. Austria was
the head, but her commander, Schwarzenberg, was not even mediocre, and
among her generals there was only one who was first-rate, namely,
Radetzky. Frederick William and Alexander were of incongruous natures;
their alliance was artificial, and in such plans as they evolved there
was an indefiniteness which left to the generals in their respective
forces a large margin for independence. The latter were quick to take
advantage of the chance, and this fact accounts for the generally lame
and feeble beginning of hostilities.
For example, it was through Blücher's wilfulness that the moral
advantage lay with Napoleon in the opening of the struggle. On July
ninth Bernadotte, Frederick William, and the Czar had met at
Trachenberg to lay out a plan of campaign. In this conference, which
first opened Napoleon's eyes to the determination of the allies,
Blücher had secured for himself an independent command. The accession
of Austria rendered the agreement of Trachenberg null, but Blücher did
not abandon his ambition. Impatient of orders or good faith, he broke
into the neutral zone at Striegau on August fourteenth, apparently
without any very definite plan. Napoleon, hearing that forty thousand
Russians from this army were marching toward Bohemia, advanced from
Dresden on August fifteenth, to be within reach of the passes of the
Iser Mountains on the Upper Elbe, and halted at Zittau as a central
point, where he could easily collect about a hundred and eighty
thousand men, and whence, according to circumstances, he could either
strike Blücher, cut off the Russians, or return to Dresden in case of
need. That city was to be held by Saint-Cyr. On August twentieth
Blücher reached the banks of the Bober at Bunzlau; owing to Napoleon's
nice calculation, Ney, Marmont, Lauriston, and Macdonald were
assembled on the other side to check the advance, he himself being at
Lauban with the guard. Had Blücher stood, the Russo-Prussians would
have been annihilated, for their inferiority was as two to one. But
the headstrong general did not stand; on the contrary, retreating by
preconcerted arrangement behind the Deichsel, he led his antagonist to
the false conclusion that he lacked confidence in his army.
Napoleon was not generally over-credulous, but this mistake was
probably engendered in his mind by the steady stream of uneasy reports
he was receiving from his own generals. On the twenty-third he wrote
to Maret that his division commanders seemed to have no self-reliance
except in his presence; "the enemy's strength seems great to them
wherever I am not." Marmont was the chief offender, having severely
criticized a plan of operations which would require one or more of the
marshals to act independently in Brandenburg or Silesia or both,
expressing the fear that on the day when the Emperor believed himself
to have won a decisive battle he would discover that he had lost two.
Seventeen years of campaigning had apparently turned the great
generals of Napoleon's army into puppets, capable of acting only on
their leader's impulse. Whatever the cause, Napoleon was set in his
idea, and pressed on in pursuit. On the twenty-second Blücher was
beyond the Katzbach, with the French van close behind, when word
arrived at Napoleon's headquarters that the Austro-Russians had
entered Saxony and were menacing Dresden. How alert and sane the
Emperor was, how thoroughly he foresaw every contingency, appears
from the minute directions he wrote for Macdonald, who was left to
block the road for Blücher into Saxony, while Lauriston was to
outflank and shut off the perfervid veteran from both Berlin and
Zittau.
These instructions having been written, Napoleon at first contemplated
crossing the Elbe above Dresden to take Schwarzenberg on the flank and
rear in the passes of the Ore Mountains. This would not only cut off
the Austrian general from the Saxon capital, but prevent his swerving
to the left for an advance on Leipsic. But finding that his enemy was
moving swiftly, the Emperor resolved to meet him before Dresden. It
would never do to lose his ally's capital at the outset, or to suffer
defeat at the very head of his defensive line. Giving orders,
therefore, for the corps of Marmont, Vandamme, and Victor, together
with Latour-Maubourg's cavalry and the guard, to wheel, he hastened
back to reinforce Saint-Cyr at Dresden. On the twenty-fifth, as he
passed Bautzen, he learned that Oudinot had been defeated at Luckau;
but he gave no heed to the report, and next day reached Dresden at
nine in the morning. An hour later the guard came up, having performed
the almost incredible feat of marching seventy-six miles in three
days. Vandamme, with forty thousand men, had arrived at Pirna, a few
miles above, and Saint-Cyr was drawing in behind the temporary
fortifications of the city itself.
The enemy, too, was at hand, but he had no plan. In a council of war
held by him the same morning there was protracted debate, and finally
Moreau's advice to advance in six columns was taken. He refused "to
fight against his country," but explained that the French could never
be conquered in mass, and that if one assailing column were crushed,
the rest could still push on. This long deliberation cost the allies
their opportunity; for at four in the afternoon, when they attacked,
the mass of the French army had crossed the Elbe and had thus
completed the garrison of the city. For two hours the fighting was
fierce and stubborn; from three different sides Russians, Austrians,
and Prussians each made substantial gains; at six Napoleon determined
to make a general sally and throw in his guard. With fine promptness.
Mortier, at the head of two divisions of the young guard, attacked the
Russians, and, fighting until midnight, drove them beyond the hamlet
of Striefen. Saint-Cyr dislodged the Prussians, and pushed them to
Strehla; while Ney, with two divisions of the young guard, threw a
portion of the Austrians into Plauen, and Murat, with two divisions of
infantry and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, cleared the suburb
Friedrichstadt of the rest. Napoleon, alert and ubiquitous, then made
his usual round, and knew when he retired to rest in the royal palace
that with seventy thousand men, or rather boys, he had repulsed a
hundred and fifty thousand of his foe. His inspiriting personal work
might be calculated as worth eighty thousand of his opponents' best
men. That night both Marmont and Victor, with their corps, entered the
city; and Vandamme in the early dawn began to bombard Pirna, thus
threatening the allies' connection with Bohemia and drawing away
forces from them to hold that outpost.
The second day's fighting was more disastrous to the allies than the
first. The morning opened in a tempest, but at six both sides were
arrayed. On the French right were Victor and Latour-Maubourg; then
Marmont; then the old guard and Ney with two divisions of the young
guard; next Saint-Cyr, with Mortier on the left. Opposite stood
Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, in the same relative positions, on
higher ground, encircling the French all the way westward and around
by the south to Plauen; but between their center and left was reserved
a gap for Klenau's Austrians, who were coming up from Tharandt in the
blinding storm, and were overdue. At seven began the artillery fire of
the young guard; but before long it ceased for an instant, since the
gunners found the enemy's line too high for the elevation of their
guns. "Continue," came swiftly the Emperor's order; "we must occupy
the attention of the enemy on that spot." The ruse succeeded, and the
gap was left open; at ten Murat dashed through it, and turning
westward, killed or captured all who composed the enemy's extreme
left. The garrison of Pirna then retreated toward Peterswald.
Elsewhere the French merely held their own. Napoleon lounged all day
in a curious apathy before his camp-fire, his condition being
apparently due to the incipient stages of a digestive disorder. Early
in the afternoon Schwarzenberg heard of Murat's great charge, but he
held firm until at five the flight from Pirna was announced, when he
abandoned the conflict. By six Napoleon was aware that the battle was
over, and, mounting his horse, he trotted listlessly to the palace,
his old gray overcoat and hood streaming with rain.
CHAPTER II
POLITICS AND STRATEGY[2]
[Footnote 2: References: Luckwaldt: Österreich und die
Anfänge des Befreiungskrieges von 1813: Vom Abschluss der
Allianz mit Frankreich, bis zum Eintritt in die Koalition.
Aster: Die Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterswalde, Pirna,
Königstein und Priesten im August, 1813, und die Schlacht bei
Kulm. Wagner: Die Tage v. Dresden u. Kulm. Heft: Der
Waffenstillstand und die Schlacht bei Gross-Beeren nebst fünf
Beilagen.]
Napoleon's Conduct after Dresden -- Military Considerations
Overruled by Political Schemes -- Probable Explanation of
Napoleon's Failure -- Prussian Victories at Grossbeeren and on
the Katzbach -- Vandamme Overwhelmed at Kulm -- Napoleon's
Responsibility -- Political Considerations again Ascendant -- The
System of "Hither and Thither" -- The Battle of Dennewitz -- Its
Disastrous Consequences -- Napoleon's Vacillation -- Strategy
Thwarted by Diplomacy.
Throughout the night after the victory at Dresden, Napoleon believed
that the enemy would return again to battle on the morrow. This is
conclusively shown by the notes which he made for Berthier during the
evening. These were based on the stated hypothesis that the enemy was
not really in retreat, but would on the morrow by a great battle
strive to retrieve his failure. But the Emperor was altogether
mistaken. To be sure, the council of the disheartened allies debated
far into the small hours whether an advantageous stand could not still
be made on the heights of Dippoldiswalde, but the decision was adverse
because the coalition army was sadly shattered, having lost a third of
its numbers. Crippled on its left and threatened on its rear, it
began next morning to retreat in fair order toward the Ore Mountains,
and so continued until it became known that Vandamme was directly in
the path, when a large proportion of the troops literally took to the
hills, and retreat became flight. Then first, at four in the
afternoon, Napoleon began to realize what had actually occurred. And
what did he do? Having ridden almost to Pirna before taking measures
of any kind to reap the fruits of victory, he there issued orders for
the single corps of Vandamme, slightly reinforced, to begin the
pursuit! Thereupon, leaving directions for Mortier to hold Pirna, he
entered a carriage and drove quietly back to Dresden!
These are the almost incredible facts: no terrific onslaught after the
first night, no well-ordered pursuit after the second, a mere pretense
of seizing the advantage on the third day! In fact, Napoleon, having
set his plan in operation at the very beginning of the battle, sank,
to all outward appearances, into a state of lassitude, the only sign
of alert interest he displayed throughout the conflict being shown
when he was told that Moreau had been mortally wounded. The cause may
have been physical or it may have been moral, but it was probably a
political miscalculation. If we may believe Captain Coignet, the talk
of the staff on the night of the twenty-seventh revealed a perfect
knowledge of the enemy's rout; they knew that the retreat of their
opponents had been precipitate, and they had credible information of
disordered bands seen hurrying through byways or rushing headlong
through mountain defiles. Yet for all this, they were thoroughly
discontented, and the burden of their conversation was execration of
the Emperor. "He's a -------- who will ruin us all," was the repeated
malediction. If we may believe Napoleon himself, he had a violent
attack of vomiting near Pirna, and was compelled to leave everything
on that fateful day to others. This is possible, but unlikely; the day
before, though listless, he was well enough to chat and take snuff as
he stood in a redoubt observing the course of events through his
field-glass; the day after he was perfectly well, and exercised
unusual self-control when tidings of serious import were brought from
the north. The sequel goes to show that neither his own sickness nor
the bad temper of the army sufficiently accounts for Napoleon's
unmilitary conduct on the twenty-eighth; it appears, on the contrary,
as if he refrained of set purpose from annihilating the Austrian army
in order to reknit the Austrian alliance and destroy the coalition.
This he never was willing to admit; but no man likes to confess
himself a dupe.
Had Oudinot and Macdonald succeeded in their offensive operations
against Berlin, and had Napoleon himself done nothing more than hold
Dresden, a place which we must remember he considered from the outset
as a defensive point, it would have sufficed, in order to obtain the
most favorable terms of peace, to throw back the main army of the
coalition, humiliated and dispirited, through Bohemia to Prague. But,
as we have repeatedly seen, long service under the Empire had
destroyed all initiative in the French marshals: in Spain one mighty
general after another had been brought low; those who were serving in
Germany seemed stricken with the same palsy. It is true that in the
days of their greatness they had commanded choice troops, and that now
the flower of the army was reserved for the Emperor; but it is
likewise true that then they had fought for wealth, advancement, and
power. Now they yearned to enjoy their gains, and were embittered
because Napoleon had not accepted Austria's terms of mediation until
it was too late. Moreover, Bernadotte, one of their opponents, had
been trained in their own school, and was fighting for a crown. To
Blücher, untamed and untrustworthy in temper, had been given in the
person of Gneisenau an efficient check on all headlong impulses, and
Bülow was a commander far above mediocrity. Such considerations go far
to account for three disasters--those, namely, of Grossbeeren,
Katzbach, and Kulm--which made it insufficient for Napoleon to hold
Dresden and throw back the main army of the allies, and which thwarted
all his strategy, military and political.
The first of these affairs was scarcely a defeat. Oudinot, advancing
with seventy thousand men by way of Wittenberg to seize Berlin, found
himself confronted by Bernadotte with eighty thousand. The latter,
with his eye on the crown of France, naturally feared to defeat a
French army; at first he thought of retreating across the Spree and
abandoning the Prussian capital. But the Prussians were outraged at
the possibility of such conduct, and the schemer was convinced that a
show of resistance was imperative. On August twenty-second a few
skirmishes occurred, and the next day Bülow, disobeying his orders,
brought on a pitched battle at Grossbeeren, which was waged, with
varying success, until nightfall left the village in French hands.
Oudinot, however, discouraged alike by the superior force of the
enemy, by the obstinate courage of the Prussians, and by the dismal
weather, lost heart, and retreated to Wittenberg. The heavy rains
prevented an effective pursuit, but the Prussians followed as far as
Treuenbrietzen. On August twenty-first, Blücher, aware of the
circumstances which kept Napoleon at Dresden, had finally determined
to attack Macdonald. The French marshal, by a strange coincidence,
almost simultaneously abandoned the defensive position he had been
ordered to hold, and advanced to give battle. It was therefore a mere
chance when on the twenty-fifth the two armies came together, amid
rain and fog, at the Katzbach. After a bitter struggle the French were
routed with frightful loss. A terrific rain-storm set in, and the
whole country was turned into a marsh. For five days Blücher continued
the pursuit, until he reached Naumburg, on the right bank of the
Queiss, where he halted, having captured eighteen thousand prisoners
and a hundred and three guns.
To these misfortunes the affair at Kulm was a fitting climax. No worse
leader for a delicate independent movement could have been selected
than the reckless Vandamme. He was so rash, conceited, and brutish
that Napoleon once exclaimed in sheer desperation: "If there were two
Vandammes in my army, nothing could be done until one had killed the
other." As might have been expected, the headlong general far
outstripped the columns of Marmont, Saint-Cyr, and Murat, which had
been tardily sent to support him. Descending without circumspection
into the plain of Kulm, he found himself, on the twenty-ninth,
confronted by the Russian guard; and next morning, when attacked by
them in superior force, he was compelled to retreat through a mountain
defile toward Peterswald, whence he had come. At the mouth of the
gorge he was unexpectedly met by the Prussian corps of Kleist. Each
side thought the other moving to cut it off. They therefore rushed one
upon the other in despair, with no other hope than that of breaking
through to rejoin their respective armies. The shock was terrible, and
for a time the confusion seemed inextricable. But the Russians soon
came up, and Vandamme, with seven thousand men, was captured, the loss
in slain and wounded being about five thousand. Saint-Cyr, Marmont,
and Murat halted and held the mountain passes.
This was the climax of disaster in Napoleon's great strategic plan. In
no way responsible for Grossbeeren, nor for Macdonald's defeat on the
Katzbach, he was culpable both for the selection of Vandamme and for
failure to support him in the pursuit of Schwarzenberg. At St. Helena
the Emperor strove in three ways to account for the crash under which
he was buried after Dresden: by the sickness which made him unable to
give attention to the situation, by the inundation which rendered
Macdonald helpless at the crossing of the Bober, and by the arrival of
a notification from the King of Bavaria that, after a certain date, he
too would join the coalition. This was not history, but an appeal to
public sentiment, carefully calculated for untrained readers.
The fact was that at Dresden the gradual transformation of the
strategist into the politician, which had long been going on, was
complete. The latter misapprehended the moment for diplomatic
negotiations, conceiving the former's victory to have been
determinative, when in reality it was rendered partial and contingent
by failure to follow it up. Great as Napoleon was in other respects,
he was supremely great as a strategist; it is therefore his
psychological development and decline in this respect which are
essential to the determination of the moment in which he became
bankrupt in ability. This instant was that of course in which his
strategic failures became no longer intermittent, but regular; and
after Dresden such was the case. As to conception and tactics there
never was a failure--the year 1814 is the wonder-year of his
theoretical genius; but after Dresden there is continuous failure in
the practical combination of concept and means, in other words, of
strategic mastery. This contention as to the clouding of Napoleon's
vision by the interference of political and military considerations
is proved by his next step. Hitherto his basal principle had been to
mass all his force for a determinative blow, his combinations all
turning about hostile armies and their annihilation, or at least about
producing situations which would make annihilation possible. Now he
was concerned, not with armies, but with capital cities. Claiming that
to extend his line toward Prague would weaken it, in order to resume a
strong defensive he chose the old plan of an advance to Berlin, and
Ney was sent to supersede Oudinot, Schwarzenberg being left to
recuperate unmolested. The inchoate idea of political victory which
turned him back from Pirna was fully developed; by a blow at Berlin
and a general northward movement he could not merely punish Prussia,
but alarm Russia, separate the latter's army from that of the other
allies, and then plead with Austria his consideration in not invading
her territories. In spite of all that has been written to the
contrary, there was some strength in this idea, unworthy as it was of
the author's strategic ability. Ney was to advance immediately, while
he himself pressed on to Hoyerswerda, where he hoped to establish
connections for a common advance.
Such a concentration would have been possible if for a fortnight
Macdonald had been able to hold Blücher, and Murat had succeeded in
checking Schwarzenberg. But the news of Macdonald's plight compelled
Napoleon to march first toward Bautzen, in order to prevent Blücher
from annihilating the army in Silesia. Exasperated by this unexpected
diversion, the Emperor started in a reckless, embittered temper. On
September fifth it became evident that Blücher would not stand, and
Napoleon prepared to wheel in the direction of Berlin; but the orders
were almost immediately recalled, for news arrived that Schwarzenberg
was marching to Dresden. At once Napoleon returned to the Saxon
capital. By September tenth he had drawn in his forces, ready for a
second defense of the city; but learning that sixty thousand Austrians
had been sent over the Elbe to take on its flank any French army sent
after Blücher, he ordered the young guard to Bautzen for the
reinforcement of Macdonald. Thereupon Schwarzenberg, on the
fourteenth, made a feint to advance. On the fifteenth Napoleon replied
by a countermove on Pirna, where pontoons were thrown over the river
to establish connection with Macdonald. On the sixteenth Napoleon
reconnoitered, on the seventeenth there was a skirmish, and on the
eighteenth there were again a push and counterpush. These movements
convinced Napoleon that Schwarzenberg was really on the defensive, and
he returned to Dresden, determined to let feint and counter-feint, the
"system of hither and thither," as he called it, go on until the
golden opportunity for a crushing blow should be offered. Blücher
meantime had turned again on Macdonald, who was now on the heights of
Fischbach with Poniatowski on his right. Mortier was again at Pirna;
Victor, Saint-Cyr, and Lobau were guarding the mountain passes from
Bohemia.
This was virtually the situation of a month previous to the battle.
Schwarzenberg might feel that he had prevented the invasion of
Austria; Napoleon, that he had regained his strong defensive. While
the victory of Dresden had gone for nothing, yet this situation was
nevertheless a double triumph for Napoleon. Ney, in obedience to
orders, had advanced on the fifth. Bernadotte lay at Jüterbog, his
right being westerly at Dennewitz, under Tauenzien. Bertrand was to
make a demonstration on the sixth against the latter, so that behind
this movement the rest of the army should pass by unnoticed. But Ney
started three hours late, so that the skirmish between Tauenzien and
Bertrand lasted long enough to give the alarm to Bülow, who hurried
in, attacked Reynier's division, and turned the affair into a general
engagement. At first the advantage was with the Prussians; then Ney,
at an opportune moment, began to throw in Oudinot's corps--a move
which seemed likely to decide the struggle in favor of the French. But
Borstell, who had been Bülow's lieutenant at Grossbeeren, brought up
his men in disobedience to Bernadotte's orders, and threw them into
the thickest of the conflict. Hitherto the Saxons had been fighting
gallantly on the French side; soon they began to waver, and now,
falling back, they took up many of Oudinot's men in their flight. The
Prussians poured into the gap left by the Saxons, and when Bernadotte
came up with his Swedes and Russians the battle was over. Ney was
driven into Torgau, with a loss of fifteen thousand men, besides
eighty guns and four hundred train-wagons. The Prussians lost about
nine thousand killed and wounded.
This affair concentrated into one movement the moral effects of all
the minor defeats, an influence which far outweighed the importance
of Dresden. The French still fought superbly in Napoleon's presence,
but only then, for they were heartily sick of the war. Nor was this
all: the Bavarians and Saxons were coming to feel that their
obligations to France had been fully discharged. They were infected
with the same national spirit which made heroes of the Prussians.
These, to be sure, were defending their homes and firesides; but
seeing the great French generals successively defeated, and that
largely by their own efforts, they were animated to fresh exertions
by their victories; even the reserves and the home guard displayed
the heroism of veterans. On September seventh Ney wrote to Napoleon:
"Your left flank is exhausted--take heed; I think it is time to
leave the Elbe and withdraw to the Saale"; and his opinion was that
of all the division commanders. Throughout the country-side
partizans were seizing the supply-trains; Davout had found his Dutch
and Flemings to be mediocre soldiers, unfit at crucial moments to
take the offensive; the army had shrunk to about two hundred and
fifty thousand men all told; straggling was increasing, and the
country was virtually devastated. To this last fact the plain
people, sufferers as they were, remained in their larger patriotism
amazingly indifferent: the "hither-and-thither" system tickled their
fancy, and they dubbed Napoleon the "Bautzen Messenger-boy."
Uneasiness pervaded every French encampment; on the other side
timidity was replaced by courage, dissension by unity.
This transformation of German society seemed further to entangle the
political threads which had already debased the quality of Napoleon's
strategy. Technically no fault can be found with his prompt changes of
plan to meet emergencies, or with the details of movements which led
to his prolonged inaction. Yet, largely considered, the result was
disastrous. The great medical specialist refrains from the immediate
treatment of a sickly organ until the general health is sufficiently
recuperated to assure success; the medicaster makes a direct attack on
evident disease. Napoleon conceived a great general plan for
concentrating about Dresden to recuperate his forces; but when Blücher
prepared to advance he grew impatient, saw only his immediate trouble,
and ordered Macdonald to make a grand dash. Driving in the hostile
outposts to Förstgen, he then spent a whole day hesitating whether to
go on or to turn westward and disperse another detachment of his
ubiquitous foe, which, as he heard from Ney, had bridged the Elbe at
the mouth of the Black Elster. It was the twenty-third before he
turned back to do neither, but to secure needed rest on the left bank
of the Elbe. But if Napoleon's own definition of a truly great man be
accurate,--namely, one who can command the situations he creates,--he
was himself no longer great. The enemy not only had bridges over the
Elbe at the mouth of the Elster, but at Acken and Rosslau. The left
bank was as untenable for the French as the right, and it was of stern
necessity that the various detachments of the army were called in to
hold a line far westward, to the north of Leipsic. Oudinot, restored
to partial favor, was left to keep the rear at Dresden with part of
the young guard. On October first it was learned that Schwarzenberg
was manoeuvering on the left to surround the invaders if possible
by the south, and that Blücher, with like aim, was moving to the
north. It was evident that the allies had formed a great resolution,
and Napoleon confessed to Marmont that his "game of chess was becoming
confused."
The fact was, the Emperor's diplomacy had far outstripped the
general's strategy. It was blazoned abroad that on September
twenty-seventh a hundred and sixty thousand new conscripts from the
class of 1815, with a hundred and twenty thousand from the arrears of
the seven previous classes, would be assembled at the military depots
in France. Boys like these had won Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden, and a
large minority would be able-bodied men, late in maturing, perhaps,
but strong. With this preliminary blare of trumpets, a letter for the
Emperor Francis was sent to General Bubna. The bearer was instructed
to say that Napoleon would make great sacrifices both for Austria and
Prussia if only he could get a hearing. It was too late: already, on
September ninth, the three powers had concluded an offensive and
defensive alliance for the purpose of liberating the Rhenish princes,
of making sovereign and independent the states of southern and
western Germany, and of restoring both Prussia and Austria to their
limits of 1805. This was the treaty which beguiled Bavaria from the
French alliance, and made the German contingents in the French armies,
the Saxons among the rest, wild for emancipation from a hated service.
It explained the notification previously received from the King of
Bavaria, who, in return for the recognition of his complete autonomy,
formally joined the coalition on October eighth, with an army of
thirty-six thousand men. How much of all this the French spies and
emissaries made known to Napoleon does not appear. One thing only is
certain, that Napoleon's flag of truce was sent back with his message
undelivered. This ominous fact had to be considered in connection with
the movements of the enemy. They had learned one of Napoleon's own
secrets. In a bulletin of 1805 are the words: "It rains hard, but that
does not stop the march of the grand army." In 1806 he boasted
concerning Prussia: "While people are deliberating, the French army is
marching." In 1813, while he himself was vacillating, his foes were
stirring. On October third, Blücher, having accomplished a superb
strategic march, drove Bertrand to Bitterfeld, and stood before
Kemberg, west of the Elbe, with sixty-four thousand men; Bernadotte,
with eighty thousand, was crossing at Acken and Rosslau; and
Schwarzenberg, with a hundred and seventy thousand, was already south
of Leipsic; Bennigsen, with fifty thousand reserves, had reached
Teplitz. The enemy would clearly concentrate at Leipsic and cut off
Napoleon's base unless he retreated. But it was October fifth before
the bitter resolution to do so was taken, and then the movement began
under compulsion. Murat was sent, with three infantry corps and one of
cavalry, to hold Schwarzenberg until the necessary manoeuvers could
be completed.
CHAPTER III
THE END OF THE GRAND ARMY[3]
[Footnote 3: References: Wuttke: Die Völkerschlacht bei
Leipzig. Aster: Die Schlachten bei Leipzig. Also see works of
Hofmann, Naumann, and Dörr.]
Plans for Conducting the Retreat -- Napoleon's Health --
Blücher's Brilliant Idea -- Napoleon under Compulsion -- His
Skilful Concentration -- The Battle-field around Leipsic -- The
Attack -- Results of the First Day's Fighting -- Attempt to
Negotiate -- Napoleon's Apathy -- The Positions of the Third Day
-- The Grand Army Defeated -- The Disaster at the Elster Bridge
-- Dissolution of the Grand Army.
But how should the retreat be conducted? Napoleon's habit of reducing
his thoughts to writing for the sake of clearness remained strong upon
him to the last, and in the painstaking notes which he made with
regard to this important move he outlined two alternatives: to
garrison Dresden with two corps, send three to reconnoiter about
Chemnitz, and then march, with five and the guard, to attack
Schwarzenberg; or else to strengthen Murat, place him between
Schwarzenberg and Leipsic, and then advance to drive Bernadotte and
Blücher behind the Elbe. But in winter the frozen Elbe with its flat
shores would be no rampart. Both plans were abandoned, and on the
seventh orders were issued for a retreat behind the Saale, the
precipitous banks of which were a natural fortification. Behind this
line of defense he could rest in safety during the winter, with his
right at Erfurt and his left at Magdeburg. Dresden must, he
concluded, be evacuated. This would deprive the allies of the easy
refuge behind the Saxon and Bohemian mountains which they had sought
at every onset, but it might leave them complete masters of Saxony. To
avoid this he must take one of three courses: either halt behind the
Mulde for one blow at the armies of the North and of Silesia, or join
Murat for a decisive battle with the Austrian general, or else
concentrate at Leipsic, and meet the onset of the united allies, now
much stronger than he was.
The night of the seventh was spent in indecision as to any one or all
of these ideas, but in active preparation for the actual movements of
the retreat, however it should be conducted; any contingency might be
met or a resolve taken when the necessity arose. During that night the
Emperor took two warm baths. The habit of drinking strong coffee to
prevent drowsiness had induced attacks of nervousness, and these were
not diminished by his load of care. To allay these and other ailments,
he had had recourse for some time to frequent tepid baths. Much has
been written about a mysterious malady which had been steadily
increasing, but the burden of testimony from the Emperor's closest
associates at this time indicates that in the main he had enjoyed
excellent health throughout the second Saxon campaign. He was, on the
whole, calm and self-reliant, exhibiting signs of profound emotion
only in connection with important decisions. He was certainly capable
of clear insight and of severe application in a crisis; he could still
endure exhausting physical exertion, and rode without discomfort,
sitting his horse in the same stiff, awkward manner as of old. There
were certainly intervals of self-indulgence and of lassitude, of
excessive emotion and depressing self-examination, which seemed to
require the offset of a physical stimulus; but on the whole there do
not appear to have been such sharp attacks of illness, or even of
morbid depression, as amount to providential interference; natural
causes, complex but not inexplicable, sufficiently account for the
subsequent disasters.
For instance, considerations of personal friendship having in earlier
days often led him to unwise decisions, a like cause may be said to
have brought on his coming disaster. It was the affection of the Saxon
king for his beautiful capital which at the very last instant, on
October eighth, induced Napoleon to cast all his well-weighed scheme
to the winds, and--fatal decision!--leave Saint-Cyr and Lobau, with
three corps, in Dresden. A decisive battle was imminent; the commander
was untrue to his maxim that every division should be under the
colors. But with or without his full force, the master-strategist was
outwitted: the expected meeting did not take place as he finally
reckoned. On the tenth his headquarters were at Düben, and his
divisions well forward on the Elbe, ready for Bernadotte and Blücher;
but there was no foe. Both these generals had been disconcerted by the
unexpected swiftness of the French movements; the former actually
contemplated recrossing the river to avoid a pitched battle with those
whom he hoped before long to secure as his subjects. But the
enthusiastic old Prussian shamed his ally into action, persuading him
at least to march south from Acken, effect a junction with the army of
Silesia, and cross the Saale to threaten Napoleon from the rear. This
was a brilliant and daring plan, for if successful both armies might
possibly unite with Schwarzenberg's; but even if unsuccessful in that,
they would at least reproduce the situation in Silesia, and reduce the
French to the "hither-and-thither" system, which, rendering a decisive
battle impossible, had thwarted the Napoleonic strategy.
Napoleon spent a weary day of waiting in Düben, yawning and
scribbling, but keeping his geographer and secretary in readiness. It
was said at the time, and has since been repeated, that throughout
this portion of the campaign Napoleon was not recognizable as himself:
that he ruminated long when he should have been active; that he
consulted when he should have given orders; that he was no longer
ubiquitous as of old, but sluggish, and rooted to one spot. But it is
hard to see what he left undone, his judgment being mistaken as it
was. When rumors of Bernadotte's movements began to arrive, he
dismissed the idea suggested by them as preposterous; when finally, on
the twelfth, he heard that Blücher was actually advancing to Halle,
and no possible doubt remained, he gave instant orders for a march on
Leipsic. Critics have suggested that again delay had been his ruin;
but this is not true. An advance over the Elbe toward Berlin in search
of the enemy would merely have enabled Blücher and Bernadotte to join
forces sooner, and have rendered their union with Schwarzenberg
easier. No stricture is just but one: that Napoleon, knowing how
impossible it was to obtain such exact information as he seemed
determined to have, should have divined the enemy's plan, and acted
sooner. The accurate information necessary for such foresight was not
obtainable; in fact, it seldom is, and some allowance may be made if
the general lingered before rushing into the "tube of a funnel," as
Marmont expressed it. On the morning of the thirteenth, while the
final arrangements for marching to Leipsic were making, came the news
of Bavaria's defection. It spread throughout the army like wildfire,
but its effect was less than might be imagined, and it served for the
priming of a bulletin, issued on the fifteenth, announcing the
approaching battle.
On the fifteenth, Murat, who had been steadily withdrawing before the
allied army of the South, was overtaken at Wachau by Schwarzenberg's
van. He fought all day with magnificent courage, and successfully,
hurling the hostile cavalry skirmishers back on the main column.
Within sound of his guns, Napoleon was reconnoitering his chosen
battle-field in and about Leipsic; and when, after nightfall, the
brothers-in-law met, the necessary arrangements were virtually
complete. Those who were present at the council thought the Emperor
inexplicably calm and composed--they said indifferent or stolid. But
he had reasons to be confident rather than desperate, for by a touch
of his old energy he had concentrated more swiftly than his foe,
having a hundred and seventy thousand men in array. Reynier, with
fourteen thousand more, was near; if Saint-Cyr and Lobau, with their
thirty thousand, had been present instead of sitting idly in Dresden,
the French would actually have outnumbered any army the coalition
could have assembled for battle. The allies could hope at best to
produce two hundred thousand men; Bernadotte was still near Merseburg;
Blücher, though coming in from Halle, was not within striking
distance. In spite of his vacillation and final failure to evacuate
Dresden, Napoleon had an excellent fighting chance.
The city of Leipsic, engirdled by numerous villages, lies in a low
plain watered by the Parthe, Pleisse, and Elster, the last of which to
the westward has several arms, with swampy banks. Across these runs
the highway to Frankfort, elevated on a dike, and spanning the deep,
central stream of the Elster by a single bridge. Eastward by Connewitz
the land is higher, there being considerable swells, and even hills,
to the south and southeast. This rolling country was that chosen by
Napoleon for the main battle against Schwarzenberg; Marmont was
stationed north of the city, near Möckern, to observe Blücher;
Bernadotte, the cautious, was still at Oppin with his Swedes. On the
evening of the fifteenth, his dispositions being complete, Napoleon
made the tour of all his posts. At dusk three white rockets were seen
to rise in the southern sky; they were promptly answered by four red
ones in the north. These were probably signals between Schwarzenberg
and Blücher. Napoleon's watch-fire was kindled behind the old guard,
between Reudnitz and Crottendorf.
The battle began early next morning. Napoleon waited until nine, and
then advanced at the head of his guards to Liebertwolkwitz, near
Wachau, on the right bank of the Pleisse, where the decisive struggle
was sure to occur, since the mass of the enemy, under Barclay, with
Wittgenstein as second in command, had attacked in four columns at
that point. Between the Pleisse and the Elster, near Connewitz, stood
Poniatowski, opposed to Schwarzenberg and Meerveldt; westward of the
Elster, near Lindenau, stood Bertrand, covering the single line of
retreat, the Frankfort highway, and his antagonist was Gyulay. Thus
there were four divisions in the mighty conflict, which began by an
onset of the allies along the entire front. The main engagement was
stubborn and bloody, the allies attacking with little skill, but great
bravery. Until near midday Napoleon more than held his own. Victor at
Wachau, and Lauriston at Liebertwolkwitz, had each successfully
resisted six desperate assaults; between them were massed the
artillery, a hundred and fifty guns, under Drouot, and behind, all the
cavalry except that of Sebastiani. The great artillery captain was
about to give the last splendid exhibition of what his arm can do
under favorable circumstances--that is, when strongly posted in the
right position and powerfully supported by cavalry. He intended, with
an awful shock and swift pursuit, to break through the enemy's center
at Güldengossa and surround his right. So great was his genius for
combinations that while the allies were that moment using three
hundred and twenty-five thousand effective men all told to his two
hundred and fourteen thousand, yet in the decisive spot he had
actually concentrated a hundred and fifteen thousand to their hundred
and fourteen thousand. This was because Schwarzenberg, having
attempted to outflank the French, was floundering to no avail in the
swampy meadows between the Pleisse and the Elster, and was no longer a
factor in the contest.
When, at midday, all was in readiness and the order was given, the
artillery fire was so rapid that the successive shots were heard, not
separately, but in a long, sullen note. By two, Victor and Oudinot on
the right, with Mortier and Macdonald on the left, were well forward
of Güldengossa, but the place itself still held out. At three the
cavalry, under Murat, Latour-Maubourg, and Kellermann, were sped
direct upon it. With awful effort they broke through, and the bells of
Leipsic began to ring in triumph--prematurely. The Czar had
peremptorily summoned from Schwarzenberg's command the Austro-Russian
reserve, and at four these, with the Cossack guard, charged the French
cavalry, hurling them back to Markkleeberg. Nightfall found Victor
again at Wachau, and Macdonald holding Liebertwolkwitz. Simultaneously
with the great charge of the allies Meerveldt had dashed out from
Connewitz toward Dölitz, but his force was nearly annihilated, and he
himself was captured. At Möckern, Marmont, after gallant work with
inferior numbers, had been beaten on his left, and then compelled for
safety to draw in his right. While he still held Gohlis and
Eutritzsch, the mass of his army had been thrown back into Leipsic.
Throughout the day Bertrand made a gallant and successful resistance
to superior numbers, and drove that portion of the allied forces
opposed to him away from Lindenau as far as Plagwitz. At nightfall
three blank shots announced the cessation of hostilities all around.
In the face of superior numbers, the French had not lost a single
important position, and whatever military science had been displayed
was all theirs; Blücher made the solitary advance move of the allies,
the seizure of Möckern by York's corps; Schwarzenberg had been
literally mired in his attempt to outflank his enemy, and but for
Alexander's peremptory recall of the reserves destined for the same
task, the day would have been one of irretrievable disaster to the
coalition. Yet Napoleon knew that he was lost unless he could retreat.
Clearly he had expected a triumph, for in the city nothing was ready,
and over the Elster was but one crossing, the solitary bridge on the
Frankfort road. The seventeenth was the first day of the week; both
sides were exhausted, and the Emperor of the French seems to have felt
that at all hazards he must gain time. During the previous night long
consultations had been held, and the French divisions to the south had
been slightly compacted. In the morning Meerveldt, the captured
Austrian general, the same man who after Austerlitz had solicited and
obtained on the part of Francis an interview from Napoleon, was
paroled, and sent into his own lines to ask an armistice, together
with the intervention of Francis on the terms of Prague: renunciation
of Poland and Illyria by Napoleon, the absolute independence of
Holland, of the Hanse towns, of Spain, and of a united Italy. When we
remember that England was paymaster to the coalition, and was fighting
for her influence in Holland, and that Austria's ambition was for
predominance in a disunited Italy, we feel that apparently Napoleon
wanted time rather than hoped for a successful plea to his
father-in-law.
This would be the inevitable conclusion except for the fact that he
withdrew quietly to his tent and there remained; the resourceful
general was completely apathetic, being either over-confident in his
diplomatic mission or stunned by calamity. The day passed without
incident except a momentary attack on Marmont, and the arrival of
Bernadotte, who had been spurred to movement by a hint from Gneisenau
concerning the terms on which Great Britain was to pay her subsidies.
It was asserted at the time that Napoleon gave orders early in the
morning for building numerous bridges over the western streams. If so,
they were not executed, only a single flimsy structure being built,
and that on the road leading from the town, not on the lines westward
from his positions in the suburbs. His subordinates should have acted
in so serious a matter even without orders; but, like the drivers of
trains which run at lightning speed, they had, after years of
high-pressure service, lost their nerve. Marmont asserts that even
Napoleon was nerveless. "We were occupied," he wrote, "in restoring
order among our troops; we should either have commenced our retreat,
or at least have prepared the means to commence it at nightfall. But a
certain carelessness on the part of Napoleon, which it is impossible
to explain and difficult to describe, filled the cup of our sorrows."
Considering who wrote these words, they must be taken with allowance;
but they indicate a truth, that in his decadence this hitherto
many-sided man could not be both general and emperor. No answer from
Francis was received; the allies agreed on this course, and
determined, according to their agreement with England, not to cease
fighting till the last French soldier was over the Rhine. It was
midnight when Napoleon finally drew in his posts and gave preliminary
orders to dispose his troops in readiness either to fight or to
retreat.
When day dawned on October eighteenth the French army occupied an
entirely new position: the right wing, under Murat, lying between
Connewitz and Dölitz; the center at Probstheida in a salient angle;
the left, under Ney, with front toward the north between Paunsdorf and
Gohlis. Within this arc, and close about the city, stood all the
well-tried corps, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, under their
various leaders of renown--Poniatowski, Augereau, Victor, Drouot,
Kellermann, Oudinot, Latour-Maubourg, Macdonald, Marmont, Reynier, and
Souham; Napoleon was on a hillock at Thonberg, with the old guard in
reserve. His chief concern was the line of retreat, which was still
open when, at seven, the fighting began. Schwarzenberg, with the left,
could get no farther than Connewitz. Bennigsen, with the right,
started to feel Bernadotte and complete the investment. Neither was
entirely successful, but Marmont withdrew from before Blücher, and Ney
from before Bernadotte and Bennigsen, in order to avoid being
surrounded; so that the two French armies were united before nightfall
on the western outskirts of the town, where Bertrand had routed
Gyulay, and had kept open the all-important line of retreat, over
which, since noon, trains of wagons had been passing. But magnificent
as was the work of all these doughty champions on both sides, it was
far surpassed in the center, where during the entire day, under
Napoleon's eye, advance and resistance had been desperate. Men fell
like grass before the scythe, and surging lines of their comrades
moved on from behind. Such were the numbers and such the carnage that
men have compared the conflict to that of the nations at Armageddon.
At Victor's stand, near Probstheida, the fighting was fiercer than the
fiercest. The allied troops charged with fixed bayonets, rank after
rank, column following on column; cannon roared while grape-shot and
shells sped to meet the assailants; men said the air was full of human
limbs; ten times Russians and Prussians came on, only to be ten times
driven back. The very soil on which the assailants trod was human
flesh. Hour after hour the slaughter continued. Occasionally the
French attempted a rally, but only to be thrown back by musket fire
and cavalry charge. It was the same at Stötteritz, where no one seemed
to pause for breath. Woe to him who fell in fatigue: he was soon but
another corpse in the piles over which new reinforcements came on to
the assault or countercharge. At last there was scarcely a semblance
of order; in hand-to-hand conflict men shouted, struggled, wrestled,
thrust, advanced, and withdrew, and in neither combatants nor
onlookers was there any sense of reality. By dusk the heated cannon
were almost useless, the muskets entirely so, and, as darkness came
down, the survivors fell asleep where they stood, riders in their
saddles, horses in their tracks. Napoleon learned that thirty-five
thousand Saxons on the left had gone over to the enemy, and some one
of his staff handing him a wooden chair, he dropped into it and sank
into a stupor almost as he touched it. For half an hour he sat in
oblivion, while in the thickening darkness the marshals and generals
gathered about the watch-fires, and stood with sullen mien to abide
his awakening. The moon came slowly up, Napoleon awoke, orders were
given to complete the dispositions for retreat already taken, and,
there being nothing left to do, the Emperor, with inscrutable
emotions, passed inside the walls of Leipsic to take shelter in an inn
on the creaking sign-board of which were depicted the arms of Prussia!
Throughout the night French troops streamed over the stone bridge
across the Elster; in the early morning the enemy began to advance,
and ever-increasing numbers hurried away to gain the single avenue of
retreat. Until midday Napoleon wandered aimlessly about the inner
town, giving unimportant commands to stem the ever-growing confusion
and disorder. Haggard, and with his clothing in disarray, he was not
recognized by his own men, being sometimes rudely jostled. After an
affecting farewell to the King of Saxony, in which his unhappy ally
was instructed to make the best terms he could for himself, the
Emperor finally fell into the throng and moved with it toward
Lindenau. Halting near the Elster, a French general began to seek
information from the roughly clad onlooker who, without a suite or
even a single attendant, stood apparently indifferent, softly
whistling, "Malbrook s'en va t'en guerre." Of course the officer
started as he recognized the Emperor, but the conquered sovereign took
no notice. Bystanders thought his heart was turned to stone. Still the
rush of retreat went on, successfully also, in spite of some
confusion, until at two some one blundered. By the incredible mistake
of a French subaltern, as is now proven, the permanent Elster bridge
was blown up, and the temporary one had long since fallen. Almost
simultaneously with this irreparable disaster the allies had stormed
the city, and the French rear-guard came thundering on, hoping to find
safety in flight. Plunging into the deep stream, many, like
Poniatowski, were drowned; some, like the wounded Macdonald, swam
safely across. The scene was heartrending as horses, riders, and
footmen rolled senseless in the dark flood, while others scrambled
over their writhing forms in mad despair. Reynier and Lauriston, with
twenty thousand men, were captured, the King of Saxony was sent a
prisoner to Berlin, and Stein prepared to govern his domains by
commission from the allies. By ten in the evening Bertrand was in
possession of Weissenfels; Oudinot wheeled at Lindenau, and held the
unready pursuers in check.
Next morning, the twentieth, Napoleon was alert and active; retreat
began again, but only in tolerable order. Although he could not
control the great attendant rabble of camp-followers and stragglers,
he had nevertheless about a hundred and twenty thousand men under his
standards; as many more, and those his finest veterans, were besieged
and held in the fortresses of the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula by local
militia. These places, he knew, would no longer be tenable; in fact,
they began to surrender almost immediately, and the survivors of
Leipsic were soon in a desperate plight from hunger and fatigue. Yet
the commander gave no sign of sensibility. "'T was thus he left
Russia," said the surly men in the ranks. Hunger-typhus appeared, and
spread with awful rapidity; the country swarmed with partizans; the
columns of the allies were behind and on each flank; fifty-six
thousand Bavarians were approaching from Ansbach, under Wrede; at
Erfurt all the Saxons and Bavarians still remaining under the French
eagles marched away. The only foreign troops who kept true were those
who had no country and no refuge, the unhappy Poles, who, though
disappointed in their hopes, were yet faithful to him whom they
wrongly believed to have been their sincere friend. Though stricken by
all his woes, the Emperor was undaunted; the retreat from Germany was
indeed perilous, but it was marked by splendid courage and unsurpassed
skill. At Kösen and at Eisenach the allies were outwitted, and at
Hanau, on the twenty-ninth, the Bavarians were overwhelmed in a
pitched fight by an exhibition of personal pluck and calmness on
Napoleon's part paralleled only by his similar conduct at Krasnoi in
the previous year. At the head of less than six thousand men, he held
in check nearly fifty thousand until the rest of his columns came up,
when he fell with the old fire upon a hostile line posted with the
river Kinzig in its rear, and not only disorganized it utterly, but
inflicted on it a loss of ten thousand men, more than double the
number which fell in his own ranks. But in spite of this brilliant
success, the ravages of disease continued, and only seventy thousand
men of the imperial army crossed the Rhine to Mainz. Soon the houses
of that city were packed, and the streets were strewn with victims of
the terrible hunger-typhus. They died by hundreds, and corpses lay for
days unburied; before the plague was stayed thousands found an
inglorious grave.
CHAPTER IV
THE FRANKFORT PROPOSALS[4]
[Footnote 4: References: Fain: Manuscrit de 1814. Rothenburg:
Die Schlacht bei Leipzig im Jahre 1813.]
Importance of the Battle of Leipsic -- Decline of Napoleon's
Powers -- His Gentler Side -- Disintegration of Napoleon's Empire
-- The Coalition and the Sentiment of Nationality -- Reasons for
the Parley at Frankfort -- Insincerity of the Proposal --
Napoleon and France -- The Revolution and the Empire -- Hollow
Diplomacy.
The battle of Leipsic is one of the most important in general history.
Apparently it was only the offset to Austerlitz, as the Beresina had
been to Friedland. In reality it was far more, because it gave the
hegemony of continental Europe to Prussia. French imperialism in its
death-throes wiped out the score of royal France against the
Hapsburgs; Austria was not yet banished from central Europe to the
lower courses of the Danube, but, what was much the same thing,
Prussia was launched upon her career of military aggrandizement. Three
dynasties seemed in that battle to have celebrated a joint triumph; as
a matter of fact, the free national spirit of Germany, having narrowly
escaped being smothered by Napoleonic imperialism, had chosen a
national dynasty as its refuge. The conflict is well designated by
German historians as "the battle of the nations," but the language has
a different sense from that which is generally attributed to it. The
seeds of Italian unity had been sown, but they were not yet to
germinate. The battle of Leipsic seemed to check them, yet it was the
process there begun under which they sprang up and bore fruit. France
was destined to become for a time the sport of an antiquated dynastic
system. The liberties which men of English blood had been painfully
developing for a century she sought to seize in an instant; she was to
see them still elude her grasp for sixty years, until her democratic
life, having assumed consistency, should find expression in
institutions essentially and peculiarly her own. Though the conquering
monarchs believed that revolutionary liberalism had been quenched at
Leipsic, its ultimate triumph was really assured, since it was
consigned to its natural guardianship, that of national commonwealths.
The imperial agglomeration of races and nationalities was altogether
amorphous and had been found impossible; that form of union was not
again attempted after Leipsic, while another--that, namely, of
constitutional organic nationalities--was made operative. The
successive stages of advance are marked by 1813, 1848, and 1870.
The Saxon campaigns display the completion of the process in which the
great strategist, stifled by political anxieties, became the creature
of circumstances both as general and statesman. The Russian campaign
was nicely calculated, but its proportions and aim were those of the
Oriental theocrat, not of the prosaic European soldier. With the aid
of the railroad and the electric telegraph, they might possibly have
been wrought into a workable problem, but that does not excuse the
errors of premature and misplaced ambition. The Saxon campaigns,
again, are marked by a boldness of design and a skill in combination
characteristic of the best strategy; but again the proportions are
monstrous, and, what is worse, the execution is intermittent and
feeble. As in Russia, the war organism was insufficient for the
numbers and distances involved, while the subordinates of every grade,
though supple instruments, seemed mercenary, self-seeking, and
destitute of devotion. Bonaparte had ruled men's hearts by his use of
a cause, securing devotion to it and to himself by rude bonhomie, by
success, and by sufficient rewards; Napoleon, on the other hand,
quenched devotion by a lavishness which sated the greediest, and lost
the affections of his associates by the demands of his gigantic plans.
As the world-conqueror felt the foundations of his greatness
quivering, he became less callous and more human. Early in 1813 he
said: "I have a sympathetic heart, like another, but since earliest
childhood I have accustomed myself to keep that string silent, and now
it is altogether dumb." His judgment of himself was mistaken:
throughout the entire season he was strangely and exceptionally moved
by the horrors of war; his purse was ever open for the suffering; he
released the King of Saxony from his entangling engagements; in spite
of his hard-set expression on the retreat from Leipsic, he forbade his
men to fire the suburbs of the city in order to retard the pursuit of
their foes, and before he left Mainz for St. Cloud he showed the
deepest concern, and put forth the strongest effort, in behalf of the
dying soldiery.
The immediate effects of Leipsic were the full display of that
national spirit which had been refined, if not created, in the fires
of Napoleon's imperious career. An Austrian army under Hiller drove
Eugène over the Adige. The Italians, not unsusceptible to the power in
the air, felt their humiliation, and, turning on their imperial King
in bitter hate, determined, under the influence of feelings most
powerfully expressed by Alfieri, that they would emulate northern
Europe. But though they had for years been subject to the new
influences, enjoying the equal administration of the Code Napoléon,
and freed from the interference of petty local tyrants, they were
neither united nor enlightened in sufficient degree. After an outburst
of hatred to France, they were crushed by their old despots, and the
land relapsed into the direst confusion. The Confederation of the
Rhine was, however, resolved into its elements: the Mecklenburgs
reasserted their independence; King Jerome fled to France; Würtemberg,
Hesse-Darmstadt, and Baden followed Bavaria's example; Cassel,
Brunswick, Hanover, and Oldenburg were craftily restored to their
former rulers before Stein's bureau could establish an administration.
Holland recalled the Prince of Orange, Spain rose to support
Wellington, and Soult was not merely driven over the Pyrenees--he was
defeated on French soil, and shut up in Bayonne.
Even the three monarchs, as they sedately moved across Germany with
their exhausted and battered armies, were aware of nationality as a
controlling force in the future. In a direct movement on Paris they
could, as Ney said, "have marked out their days in advance," but they
halted at Frankfort for a parley. There were several reasons why they
should pause. They had seen France rise in her might; they did not
care to assist at the spectacle again. Moreover, the coalition had
accomplished its task and earned its pay; not a Frenchman, except real
or virtual prisoners, was left east of the Rhine. From that point the
interests of the three monarchs were divergent. As Gentz, the Austrian
statesman, said, "The war for the emancipation of states bids fair to
become one for the emancipation of the people." Alexander, Frederick
William, and Francis were each and all anxious for the future of
absolutism, but otherwise there was mutual distrust. Austria was
suspicious of Prussia, and desired immediate peace. In the restoration
of Holland under English auspices, Russia saw the perpetuation of
British maritime and commercial supremacy, to the disadvantage of her
Oriental aspirations, and the old Russian party demanded peace. On the
other hand, Alexander wished to avenge Napoleon's march to Moscow by
an advance to Paris; and though Frederick William distrusted what he
called the Czar's Jacobinism, his own soldiers, thirsting for further
revenge, also desired to prosecute the war; even the most enlightened
Prussian statesmen believed that nothing short of a complete cataclysm
in France could shake Napoleon's hold on that people and destroy his
power. Offsetting these conflicting tendencies against one another,
Metternich was able to secure military inaction for a time, while the
coalition formulated a series of proposals calculated to woo the
French people, and thus to bring Napoleon at once to terms.
Ostensibly the Frankfort proposals, adopted on November ninth, were
only a slight advance on the ultimatum of Prague: Austria was to have
enough Italian territory to secure her preponderance in that
peninsula; France was to keep Savoy, with Nice; the rest of Italy was
to be independent. Holland and Spain liberated, France was to have her
"natural" boundaries, the Alps, the Pyrenees, the ocean, and the
Rhine. Napoleon was to retain a slight preponderance in Germany, and
the hope was held out that in a congress to settle details for a
general pacification, Great Britain, content with the "maritime
rights" which had caused the war, would hand back the captured French
colonies. The various ministers present at Frankfort assented to these
proposals for Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia
respectively; but Alexander and Frederick William were dissatisfied
with them, and when Castlereagh heard them, he was as furious as his
cold blood would permit at the thought of France retaining control of
the Netherlands, Antwerp being the commercial key to central Europe.
Such a humor in three of the high contracting parties makes it
doubtful whether the Frankfort proposals had any reality, and this
doubt is further increased by the circumstances of the so-called
negotiation. St. Aignan, the French envoy to the Saxon duchies, had in
violation of international law and courtesy been seized at Gotha and
held as a prisoner. He was now set free and instructed to urge upon
Napoleon the necessity of an immediate settlement. To his
brother-in-law, the pacific Caulaincourt, who was soon to displace
Maret as minister of foreign affairs, he was to hand a private and
personal letter from Metternich. In the course of this epistle the
writer expresses his conviction that any effort to conclude a peace
would come to nothing. Not only, therefore, were the pretended
negotiations entirely destitute of form, they were prejudged from the
outset. Still further, the allies refused what Napoleon had granted
after Bautzen, an armistice, and insisted that hostilities were to
proceed during negotiation. All possible doubt as to the sincerity of
the proposals is turned into assurance by Metternich's admission in
his memoirs that they were intended to divorce Napoleon from the
French nation, and in particular to work on the feelings of the army.
He says that neither Alexander nor Frederick William would have
assented to them had they not been convinced that Napoleon would
"never in the world of his own accord" resolve to accept them. Yet the
world has long believed that Napoleon, as he himself expressed it,
lost his crown for Antwerp; that had he believed the honeyed words of
the Austrian minister, and opened negotiations on an indefinite basis
without delay, he might have kept France with its revolutionary
boundaries intact for himself and his dynasty, and by the sacrifice of
his imperial ambitions have retained for her, if not preponderance, at
least importance in the councils of Europe.
Neither Napoleon nor the French nation was deceived; a peace made
under such circumstances could result only in a dishonorable tutelage
to the allied sovereigns. France abhorred the dynasties and all their
works, believing that dynastic rule could never mean anything except
absolutism and feudalism. The experiment of popular sovereignty
wielded by a democracy had been a failure; but the liberal French,
like men of the same intelligence throughout Europe, did not, for all
that, lose faith in popular sovereignty; they knew there must be some
channel for its exercise. Outside of France, as in it, the most
enlightened opinion of the time regarded Napoleon as the savior of
society. The Queen of Saxony bitterly reproached Metternich for having
deserted Napoleon's "sacred cause." This was because the Emperor of
the French seemed to have used the people's power for the people's
good. His giant arm alone could wield the popular majesty. It is said
that the great mass of the French nation, on hearing of the Frankfort
proposals, groaned and laughed by turns. Being profoundly, devotedly
imperialist and therefore idealistic, they were outraged at the
thought of Hapsburgs, Romanoffs, or Hohenzollerns, the very
incarnations of German feudality, as leaders of the new Europe. It
seemed the irony of fate that civil and political rights on the basis,
not of privilege, but of manhood, the prize for which the world had
been turned upside down, should be intrusted to such keepers. Welded
into a homogeneous nationality themselves, the French could not
understand that the inchoate nationalities in other states had as yet
nothing but dynastic forms of expression, or foresee that during a
century to come the old dynasties would find safety only in adapting
royalty to national needs.
Napoleon seems to have been fully aware of French sentiment. In
addition, he understood that not merely for this sufficient reason
could he never be king of France in name or fact, but also that,
having elsewhere harried and humiliated both peoples and dynasties in
the name of revolutionary ideals, the masses had found him out, and
were as much embittered as their rulers, believing him to be a
charlatan using dazzling principles as a cloak for personal ambition.
In May, 1813, the Emperor Francis, anxious to salve the lacerated
pride of the Hapsburgs, produced a bundle of papers purporting to
prove that the Bonapartes had once been ruling princes at Treviso. "My
nobility," was Napoleon's stinging reply, "dates only from Marengo."
He well knew that when the battle should be fought that would undo
Marengo, his nobility would end. In other words, without solid French
support he was nothing, and that support he was fully aware he could
never have as king of France. If the influence of what France
improperly believed to be solely the French Revolution were to be
confined to her boundaries, revolutionary or otherwise, not only was
Napoleon's prestige destroyed, but along with it would go French
leadership in Europe. An imperial throne there must be, exerting
French influence far abroad. What happened at Paris, therefore, may be
regarded as a counter-feint to Metternich's effort at securing an
advantageous peace from the French nation when it should have
renounced Napoleon. It was merely an attempt to collect the remaining
national strength, not now for aggressive warfare, but for the
expulsion of hated invaders.
Having received no formulated proposition for acceptance or rejection,
and desiring to force one, the Emperor of the French virtually
disregarded the letter of Metternich's communication, and sent a
carefully considered message to the allies. Making no mention in this
of the terms brought by St. Aignan, he suggested Caulaincourt as
plenipotentiary to an international congress, which should meet
somewhere on the Rhine, say at Mannheim. Further, he declared that his
object had always been the independence of all the nations, "from the
continental as well as from the maritime point of view." This
communication reached Frankfort on November sixteenth, and, whether
wilfully or not, was misinterpreted to mean that the writer would
persist in questioning England's maritime rights. Thereupon Metternich
replied by accepting Mannheim as the place for the proposed
conference, and promised to communicate the language of Napoleon's
letter to his co-allies. How far these co-allies were from a sincere
desire for peace is proven by their next step, taken almost on the
date of Metternich's reply. A proclamation was widely posted in the
cities of France, which stated, in a cant borrowed from Napoleon's own
practice, that the allies desired France "to be great, strong, and
prosperous"; they were making war, it was asserted, not "on France,
but on that preponderance which Napoleon had too long exercised, to
the misfortune of Europe and of France herself, to which they
guaranteed in advance an extent of territory such as she never had
under her kings." Napoleon's riposte was to despatch a swarm of trusty
emissaries throughout France in order to compose all quarrels of the
people with the government, to strengthen popular devotion in every
possible way--in short, to counteract the possible effects of this
call. The messengers found public opinion thoroughly imperial, but
profoundly embittered against Maret as the supposed instigator of
disastrous wars. Maret was transferred to the department of state, and
the pacific Caulaincourt was made minister of foreign affairs. On
December second, at the earliest possible moment, the new minister
addressed a note to Metternich, accepting the terms of the "general
and summary basis." This, said the despatch, would involve great
sacrifices; but Napoleon would feel no regret if only by a similar
abnegation England would provide the means for a general, honorable
peace. Metternich replied that nothing now stood in the way of
convening a congress, and that he would notify England to send a
plenipotentiary. There, however, the matter ended, and Metternich's
record of those Frankfort days scarcely notices the subject, so
interested is he in the squabbles of the sovereigns over the opening
of a new campaign. It was the end of the year when they reached an
agreement.
CHAPTER V
THE INVASION OF FRANCE[5]
[Footnote 5: Correspondance, Vol. XVII. Mémoires du roi
Joseph. Beauchamp: Histoire des campagnes de 1814 et 1815.
Danitz: Geschichte d. Feldzugs v. 1814. Danilewsky: Der
Feldzug in Frankreich. Houssaye: 1814.]
Amazing Schemes of Napoleon for New Levies -- Attitude of the
People toward the Empire -- The Disaffected Elements --
Napoleon's Armament -- Activity of the Imperialists -- Release of
Ferdinand and the Pope -- Napoleon's Farewell to Paris -- His
Strategic Plan -- France against Europe -- The Conduct of
Bernadotte -- Murat's Defection -- Conflicting Interests of the
Allies -- Positions of the Opponents at the Outbreak of
Hostilities.
[Sidenote: 1813-14]
What happened in France between the first days of November, 1813, when
Napoleon reached St. Cloud, and the close of the year, is so
incredible that it scarcely seems to belong in the pages of sober
history. Of five hundred and seventy-five thousand Frenchmen, strictly
excluding Germans and Poles, who had been sent to war during 1812 and
1813, about three hundred thousand were prisoners or shut up in
distant garrisons, and a hundred and seventy-five thousand were dead
or missing; therefore a hundred thousand or thereabouts remained under
arms and ready for active service. By various decrees of the Emperor
and the senate, nine hundred and thirty-six thousand more were called
to arms: a hundred and sixty thousand from the classes between 1804
and 1814, whether they had once served or not; a hundred and sixty
thousand from the class of 1815; a hundred and seventy-six thousand
five hundred were to be enrolled in the regular national guard, and a
hundred and forty thousand in a home guard; finally, in a
comprehensive sweep from all the classes between 1804 and 1814
inclusive, every possible man was to be drawn. This, it was estimated,
would produce three hundred thousand more.
It is easy to exaggerate the significance of these enormous figures,
for to the layman they would seem to mean that every male capable of
bearing arms was to be taken. But this was far from being the case;
contrary to the general impression, the population of France had been
and was steadily increasing. In spite of all the butcheries of foreign
and civil wars, the number of inhabitants was growing at the rate of
half a million yearly, and the country could probably have furnished
three times the number called out. Moreover, less than a third of the
nine hundred and thirty-six thousand were ever organized, and not more
than an eighth of them fought. This disproportion between plan and
fulfilment was due partly to official incapacity or worse, partly to a
popular resistance which was not due to disaffection. It speaks
volumes for the state of the country that even the hated flying
columns, with their thorough procedure, could not find the men,
especially the fathers, husbands, and only sons, who were the solitary
supports of many families. The fields were tilled by the spades of
women and children, for there were neither horses to draw nor men to
hold the plows. Government pawn-shops were gorged, and the government
storehouses were bursting with manufactured wares for which there was
no market; government securities were worth less than half their face,
the currency had disappeared, and usury was rampant. Yet it seems
certain that four fifths of the people associated none of these
miseries with Napoleonic empire. The generation which had grown to
maturity under Napoleon saw only one side of his activities: the
majestic public works he had inaugurated, the glories of France and
the splendors of empire during the intervals of peace, the exhaustion
and abasement of her foes in a long series of splendid campaigns--all
this they associated with the imperial rule, and desired what they
supposed was a simple thing, the Empire and peace.
The other fifth was, however, thoroughly aroused. When the legislature
convened on December nineteenth, and the diplomatic correspondence was
so cleverly arranged and presented as to make the allies appear
implacable, an address to the throne was passed, amid thunderous
applause and by a large majority, which virtually called for a return
to constitutional government as the price of additional war supplies.
In sober moments even the most ardent liberals were ashamed, feeling
that this was not an opportune moment for disorganizing such
administration as there was by calls for the reform of the
constitution. Only one question was imperative, the awful
responsibility they had for the national identity. The general public
was so outraged by the spectacle that the deputies reconsidered their
action, and by a vote of two hundred and fifty-four to two hundred and
twenty-three struck out the obnoxious clause. But this did not appease
Napoleon, who made no attempt to conceal his rage, and prorogued the
chamber in scorn. His support was ample in the almost universal
conviction that at such a moment there was no time for parleying about
abstract questions of political rights; but every cavilling deputy had
some friends at home, and in a crisis where the very existence of
France was jeopardized there were agitations by the reactionary
radicals. The royalists kept silent then, and for months later,
contenting themselves with biting innuendos or witty double meanings;
drinking, for instance, to "the Emperor's last victory," when the
newspapers announced "the last victory of the Emperor."
The first conscription from the classes of 1808-1814 was thoroughly
successful, the second attempt to glean from them was an utter
failure; the effort to forestall the draft of 1815 met with
resistance, and was abandoned. It was impossible to organize the home
guards and reserves, for they rebelled or escaped, and local danger
had to be averted by local volunteers who were designated as
"sedentary" because they could not be ordered away. By the end of
January not more than twenty thousand men had been secured for general
service from all classes other than the first--at least that was
approximately the number in the various camps of instruction. In order
to arm and equip the recruits, Napoleon had recourse to his private
treasure, drawing fifty-five million francs from the vaults of the
Tuileries for that purpose. The remaining ten were transferred at
intervals to Blois. But all his treasure could not buy what did not
exist. The best military stores were in the heart of Europe; the
French arsenals could afford only antiquated and almost useless
supplies. The recruits were armed, some with shot-guns and knives,
some with old muskets, the use of which they did not know; they were
for the most part without uniforms, and wore bonnets, blouses, and
sabots. There were not half enough horses for the scanty artillery and
cavalry. Worse than all, there was no time for instruction in the
manual and tactics. On one occasion a boy conscript was found standing
inactive under a fierce musketry fire; with artless intrepidity he
remarked that he believed he could aim as well as anybody if he only
knew how to load his gun!
[Illustration: NAPOLEON IN 1813
From a painting by Aimable-Louis-Claude Pagnest.]
The disaffected, though few, were powerful and active, suborning the
prefects and civic authorities by every device, issuing proclamations
which promised anything and everything, and procuring plans of
fortified places for the allies. Talleyrand began to utter oracular
innuendos about the vindictiveness of the allies, the desertion of
Murat, the sack of Paris, and various half-truths more dangerous even
than lies. The air was so full of rumors that, although there was no
widespread revolutionary movement, there were now and then serious
panics; the town of Chaumont surrendered to a solitary Würtemberg
horseman. But when the populace of the country at large began to
wonder who the coming Bourbon might be, and what he would take back
from the present possessors of royal and ecclesiastical estates, they
were staggered. People in the cities heard with some satisfaction the
strains of the "Marseillaise," which by order of imperial agents were
once again ground out around the streets by the hand-organs. Napoleon
walked the avenues of Paris without escort, and was wildly cheered;
the Empress and her little son were produced on public occasions with
dramatic success, and popular wit dubbed the boy conscripts by the
name of "Marie Louises." The little men showed a grim determination
and eventually a sublime courage, but they never could acquire the
veteran steadfastness which wins battles. Journals, theaters,
music-halls, and public balls were all managed in the interest of
imperial patriotism; imperial tyranny dealt ruthlessly with suspicious
characters. Yet the imperialists had their doubts, and many, like
Savary, threw an anchor to windward by storing treasure at distant
points, and sending their families to safe retreats. On the whole, the
balance of public opinion at the opening of 1814 was overwhelmingly
imperialist both in the cities and in the country. Men ardently
desired peace, but they wanted it with honor and under the Empire.
That the Empire desired peace seemed to be proved by steps for the
release of its two most important prisoners, the King of Spain and the
Pope. Wellington thought that if the former had been despatched
directly into his kingdom on December eighth, the day on which the
conditions between himself and the Emperor were signed, England would
have found the further conduct of the war impossible. Talleyrand,
already deep in royalist plots, must have been of the same opinion,
for he did not advise haste, but craftily suggested to his prisoner
that the provisional government of Spain might refuse to accept him as
king unless the treaty of release had been previously ratified by the
Cortes. Accordingly it was referred to them, and, since the liberals
desired the assent to their new constitution of a king not under
duress, by their influence it was rejected. It was not until March,
1814, that Ferdinand was unconditionally released, and this delay
proved fatal to Napoleon's interests in Spain. The liberals could no
longer fight for free institutions, because it was then clear that the
dynastic conservatism of Europe was to win a temporary victory. In
about six months King Ferdinand undid the progressive work of six
years, and Spain relapsed into absolutism and ecclesiasticism, with
all their attendant evils. Nevertheless, France interpreted the
conduct of the Emperor as indicating an earnest desire for peace, and
this feeling had been strengthened by the absolutely unconditional
release of the Pope on January twenty-second. This apparently gracious
concession was effective among the masses, who did not know, as the
Emperor did, that the allies were already on French soil.
The very next day Napoleon performed his last official act, which was
one of great courage both physical and moral. The national guard in
Paris had been reorganized, but its leaders had never been thoroughly
loyal, many of them being royalists, some radical republicans, and the
disaffection of both classes had been heightened by recent events. But
the officers were nevertheless summoned to the Tuileries; the risk was
doubled by the fact that they came armed. Drawn up in the vast chamber
known as that of the marshals, they stood expectant; the great doors
were thrown open, and there entered the Emperor, accompanied only by
his consort and their child in the arms of his governess, Mme. de
Montesquiou. Napoleon announced simply that he was about to put
himself at the head of his army, hoping, by the aid of God and the
valor of his troops, to drive the enemy beyond the frontiers. There
was silence. Then, taking in one hand that of the Empress, and leading
forward his child by the other, he continued, "I intrust the Empress
and the King of Rome to the courage of the national guard." Still
silence. After a moment, with suppressed emotion, he concluded, "My
wife and my son." No generous-hearted Frenchman could withstand such
an appeal; breaking ranks by a spontaneous impulse, the listeners
started forward in a mass, and shook the very walls with their cry,
"Long live the Emperor!" Many shed tears, and felt, as they withdrew
in respectful silence, a new sense of devotion welling up in their
hearts. On the eve of his departure, the Emperor received a numerously
signed address from the very men whose loyalty he had hitherto had
just reason to suspect.
It was four in the morning of January twenty-fifth when Napoleon left
for Châlons. From that moment he was no longer Emperor. During the
long winter nights just past he had wrought with an intensity and a
feverish activity which he had never surpassed, sparing neither
himself nor others, displaying no consideration for prejudice or
honest opposition, calling on every Frenchman to sacrifice everything
for France, to which, as he vehemently asserted, he himself was more
necessary than she to him. If he had come honestly to believe what
millions of others believed, it was little wonder; he had thenceforth
but one aim--to prove that he was, as of yore, the first general of
France, the only one able to save the country in an hour when all her
glories were falling in wreck about her. His strategic plans, immense
and intricate as was his task, were complete and excellent. The first
was intended to prevent invasion by way of Liège, the most direct line
and that which Prussia preferred. The second, which was partly
defensive, was the one eventually used against the clumsy form of
advance actually chosen by the invaders. Of the two, the former was
the more brilliant, but the second was almost as clever. By it the
Rhine bank was divided into three parts for purposes of defense.
Macdonald was stationed at Cologne to protect the lower course;
Marmont was to guard the central stretch, and they two divided between
them the remnants of the army which had been swept out of Germany;
Victor was stationed on the upper course to command the garrisons of
the great frontier fortifications and strengthen himself by the new
levies; Bertrand remained as a sort of rear post on the right bank of
the river at Kastel, opposite Mainz. All told, these generals had at
first only fifty thousand men.
The allies no sooner obtained possession of central Europe than they
outdid its recent master in every species of exaction. The countries
which had formed the Confederacy of the Rhine were compelled almost to
double the number of the contingents they had raised for France, and
to organize every fencible man into either the first or second line of
reserves, called by the old feudal terms of ban and arrière-ban. At
the same time the allies demanded and obtained new subsidies both of
money and arms from Great Britain. In the three armies of Austria,
Prussia, and Russia, as they stood on the Rhine, there were ready by
January first about two hundred and eighty-five thousand men. By the
end of February the army-lists of France, excluding the national
guards, displayed a total of six hundred and fifty thousand men; the
coalition, including England, had registered nearly a million.
Deducting forty per cent. as ample to cover all shortcomings, we may
say that France, with three hundred and ninety thousand in the ranks,
men and boys, faced Europe with six hundred thousand full-grown men.
These figures include the French armies of Catalonia, of the Pyrenees,
of Italy, and of the Netherlands, together with the garrisons in all
the strong places then held by France on both sides of the Rhine; they
also include the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian reserves, with the
national armies of Holland, Spain, and Italy.
Aside from the centrifugal forces inherent in the coalition, there was
one which threatened its disintegration: the erratic character of the
great Gascon who represented Sweden. Bernadotte's first care, after
the battle of Leipsic, was to move north and secure the long-coveted
prize of Norway. Ever mindful of the hint about a French crown, which
Alexander had thrown out as still another bait at Abo, he gave as his
parting admonition the transparent advice that the coming campaign
should be confined to a frontier invasion of France, and at Hamburg he
actually offered Davout, as the price of surrender, a safe return for
himself and his army to their native land! This was too much;
Alexander was furious, and the schemer was peremptorily ordered to
leave a sufficient investing force before the city and return with the
rest of his army to the lower Rhine. There he was suffered to remain
in idleness, the task assigned to him being that of watching the
Netherlands; two of his best corps were withdrawn from him and
assigned to Blücher.
Nor was Napoleon free from his thorn in the flesh. In a bulletin
published by him after the retreat from Moscow was a passage which
implied some censure of Murat for his lack of stability. This both the
King of Naples and his spouse bitterly resented, the latter roundly
abusing her brother in their correspondence. This was an excellent
pretext for desertion when the general crash appeared imminent, and at
Erfurt the dashing and gallant, but weak and testy, monarch decamped.
Hastening south, he entered at once into alliance with Austria, and
then, putting himself at the head of eighty thousand Neapolitans, set
out for Rome, waging a terrific warfare of proclamations. Eugène,
too,--and this was an elemental disaster,--was virtually checkmated by
the defection of his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, which opened
the Tyrol to the allies. All Italy was consequently lost. Augereau,
whose feeble loyalty to Napoleon was already at the vanishing-point,
had been appointed to take forty thousand conscripts, collect any
straggling soldiers he could find in southeastern France, and keep
open the door out of Italy for some or all of Eugène's veterans, with
whose assistance it was hoped the marshal could form an army for the
defense of the Vosges Mountains. But Eugène, having fought the
indecisive battle of Roverbello, and finding himself in a sorry plight
from both the military and political points of view, could send no
reinforcements until April, when finally he concluded an armistice
releasing his army. Augereau therefore found himself opposite Bubna at
Geneva with an ineffective force, and with very little heart to wield
what he had. This ended Napoleon's grand scheme for uniting the forces
of Italy, Naples, Switzerland, and France.
Prussia was now the ablest as well as the bitterest of Napoleon's
foes, Stein, Blücher, Gneisenau, and their friends aiming at nothing
short of annihilating the Napoleonic power. This was, no doubt, due in
part to a thirst for revenge; but in the main it was due to the
longing for such a leadership in Germany as would spread abroad the
new doctrines of liberal and constitutional monarchy, in order to
restrain Austria's ever-increasing influence. The councils of the
allies presented an amusing spectacle. The Prussians urged an
immediate advance by the best line for invasion, that, namely, from
Liège and Brussels; but the Austrians, except Radetzky, drew back,
fearing Prussia almost equally with France. The Czar held the balance,
but his scales were very sensitive, inclining often toward Prussia,
but settling in the end to a compromise suggested by Schwarzenberg and
Metternich. Having imitated Napoleon in his practice of war
requisitions, the allies now determined to imitate him in contempt for
international law, and to violate Swiss neutrality. The plan which
they adopted was to throw their main army into France by way of Basel,
and thus turn the line of frowning fortresses behind the Rhine, as
well as the Vosges Mountains. Blücher was to cross the middle Rhine,
and Bülow, with thirty thousand men, was to coöperate with the English
troops under Graham in the Netherlands. The whole scheme was
unmilitary, but it exactly suited Metternich, who, having on January
thirteenth first learned of Bernadotte's understanding with the Czar
about the crown of France, was very uneasy. Both he and Schwarzenberg
desired to end the war on the frontier, if possible; Prussia's power
and Alexander's ambitions for European preponderance were far more
dangerous to Austria than a Napoleonic empire confined to France.
Blücher, leaving twenty-eight thousand men before Mainz, crossed the
Saar on January ninth with forty-seven thousand; Schwarzenberg, with
the main army arrayed in four columns, two hundred and nine thousand
strong, crossed the Rhine at or near Basel and moved toward Langres.
The thin, straggling French columns began to retreat concentrically
toward Châlons on the Marne. At the opening of the second stage in the
campaign Blücher had invested the Mosel fortresses, and was advancing,
with less than thirty thousand men, toward Arcis on the Aube;
Schwarzenberg was in and about Langres; and the French were
concentrated on a line from Vitry-le-François to St. Dizier. Napoleon
reached Châlons on the twenty-sixth, having left Joseph to represent
him in Paris. The wily strategist, feeble as was his strength, had
momentarily secured the advantage over his unwieldy foe, having wedged
himself between the invading armies, and being quite strong enough,
with the forty thousand soldiers in his ranks, to cope with Blücher.
CHAPTER VI
NAPOLEON'S SUPREME EFFORT[6]
[Footnote 6: References: Fournier, Der Congress von
Châtillon. Die Politik im Kriege von 1814. Eine historische
Studie. Koch, Mémoires p. s. à l'histoire de la campagne de
1814. Sorel, L'Europe et la révolution française, Vol. VIII.]
The Fertility of Genius -- The Battles of Brienne and La Rothière
-- The French Retreat -- Victory at Champaubert -- Victory at
Montmirail -- Victory at Vauchamps -- Success Engenders Delusion
-- Insincerity of the Allies -- Their Clashing Interests -- The
Congress of Châtillon -- Napoleon's Procrastination -- French
Victory and French Diplomacy.
[Sidenote: 1814]
The year 1814 is the most astonishing of Napoleon's military life. He
first conceived a plan for combining the resources of Italy,
Switzerland, Naples, and France. This failed by Augereau's sloth and
Murat's ingratitude. Nothing daunted, the fertile brain then outlined
schemes for meeting the quick advance of the allies through the
Netherlands, for defending the Rhine frontier, and for a levy _en
masse_ of the French people to hurl back invasion under the walls of
Paris. After taking the field, the daring of his conceptions, the
rapidity of his movements, the surprises he prepared for his enemy,
the support he wrung from an exhausted land, the devotion he received
from a panting, ill-clothed army at bay--all are so remarkable that by
contrast the allies appear to be a lumbering, stupid mass. With
another antagonist they would have appeared in a very different light;
Gneisenau's clear head, Blücher's daring, Radetzky's good sense and
courage, together with the valor of the forces at their back, would
have won the goal far more easily with an ordinary, or even an
extraordinary, combatant in Napoleon's plight. The Emperor of the
French had not merely a prestige worth a hundred thousand men, as he
was fond of reckoning: he had an activity of mind and body, a
reservoir of resources, which made his single blade cover the whole
circumference of defense like the whirling spokes of a fiery wheel.
After a skirmish for the possession of St. Dizier, the campaign opened
at Brienne, where Blücher, hurrying to gain touch with the main army
of the allies, was caught on January twenty-ninth. The conflict
probably did not recall to Napoleon his mock conflicts when a
schoolboy near the same spot. The terrific struggle began late in the
afternoon, and lasted in full fury until midnight, when the Prussian
general, narrowly escaping capture, abandoned the town and hurried
toward Trannes. Thoroughly beaten, he needed not touch alone, but
actual union with the Austrians, and this he gained near Bar on the
Aube, whence Schwarzenberg was passing on toward Auxerre. Ignorant of
this success, Napoleon now drew up his line with its center at La
Rothière, hoping in the first place to hold the bridge over the Aube
at Lesmont, and thus secure the moral effect of his victory at
Brienne, and in the second to bring on another engagement with
Blücher, whom he believed to be still isolated. Marmont was at
Montierender, Mortier was summoned from before Troyes. This stand of
Napoleon's was a desperate attempt to overawe the allied sovereigns,
for strategically it was fatal, since in the case of either victory or
defeat the French army was in danger of being outflanked by
Schwarzenberg's advance, and thus cut off from Paris. On February
first, Blücher, reinforced by twelve thousand of the Russian guard,
attacked. The battle lasted, with fluctuating success for the allies,
during two days, and at its close Napoleon safely retreated over the
Aube to make another stand at Troyes. The various conflicts were
terrific; in the end Blücher lost six thousand dead and wounded, the
French about four thousand. The odds against the latter were never
less than two to one, sometimes more. Had the allies first thrown
their full strength into the contest, and had they then followed up
their victory by a well-organized pursuit, the campaign would have
ended there. As it was, they paused, permitted a disorganized, feeble
enemy to escape, and gained nothing from the bloody conflict except an
ill-founded self-confidence. Blücher wrote on the evening of the
battle that they would be in Paris within eight days. To General
Reynier, who was to be liberated by an exchange of prisoners, the Czar
said: "We shall be in Paris before you." A council of war was called
which decided for an advance on the French capital in two columns; to
Blücher, as the conqueror of La Rothière, was assigned the shortest
line, that down the Marne.
For several days the allied lines moved onward, slowly, widely
scattered, and carelessly. Napoleon was as calm and undaunted as if he
had been the victor. Retreating on the defensive with careful
deliberation, he strengthened his forces by well-chosen periods of
rest, and by hurrying in reinforcements from the various depots about
and beyond Paris. On the afternoon of February ninth, when leaving
Nogent for Sézanne, he wrote to his brother Joseph, whom he had left
to represent his interests at Paris, that he could now reckon, all
told, on between sixty and seventy thousand men, including engineers
and artillery; that he estimated the Silesian army under Blücher at
forty-five thousand, and the main army under Schwarzenberg at a
hundred and fifty thousand, including Bubna and the Cossacks. "If I
gain a victory over the Silesian army, and put it out of account for
some days, I can turn against Schwarzenberg, reckoning on the
reinforcements you will send, with from seventy to eighty thousand
men, and I think he cannot oppose me at once with more than from a
hundred and ten to a hundred and twenty thousand. If I find myself too
weak to attack, I shall be at least strong enough to hold him in check
for a fortnight or three weeks, and this would give me the opportunity
for new combinations." To hold Schwarzenberg temporarily, Oudinot with
twenty-five thousand men was stationed on the line from Provins to
Sens, and Victor with fourteen thousand was sent to Nogent. The
Emperor himself, with the old guard, about eight thousand strong, with
Ney and Marmont each commanding six thousand infantry, and with ten
thousand cavalry under Nansouty and Doumerc, set out from Sézanne to
try his fortunes with Blücher.
This was the last of Napoleon's great strategic schemes which was
destined to be crowned with success. It had but a single drawback.
While Napoleon was still the boldest man in war that ever lived, as at
St. Helena he declared himself to be, his marshals were uneasy and
depressed; Marmont, in this moment of infinite chance, as it seemed to
him, fell into a panic. The marshal's fears were not justified, for
his Emperor's daring was not foolhardy. It was calculated on the
myriad chances of his enemy's opportunity and his enemy's ability, and
in this case it was perfectly calculated. Blücher, in spite of
Gneisenau's continuous warnings, was over-confident. Having dispersed
his detachments more than ever, he had for two days been moving
swiftly in the hope of cutting off Macdonald by a dashing feat of
arms. In his haste he had not taken up two Russian corps which had
been separated from his main line, but on the contrary he had left
them so far out that they were beyond support. By a blunder of the
Czar's, reinforcements which had been promised were still a long
distance in the rear. Schwarzenberg's movements were marked by an
over-confident deliberation as characteristic of him as overhaste was
of Blücher. Accordingly when on the tenth Marmont advanced from
Sézanne, he found the corps of Olsusieff, about forty-five hundred
strong, virtually isolated at Champaubert. His own numbers were
slightly superior, and with a swift rush he annihilated the unready
Russians. Napoleon was beside himself with joy, and began to talk of
the Vistula once more; but he stopped when he saw how sour the visages
of Marmont and the other marshals grew at the very mention of such an
idea. Nevertheless, if the process begun at Champaubert could be
continued, victory and ultimate recovery of something more than French
empire were assured. He therefore hurried Nansouty and Macdonald on
toward Montmirail for a second stroke of the same kind.
The affair at Montmirail was more of a battle than that at
Champaubert, for Blücher had been able to gather in the divisions of
Sacken, York, Kleist, and Kapzewitch. The battle opened about an hour
before noon on the eleventh by a fierce artillery fire from the
French, behind which Napoleon manoeuvered so as to concentrate his own
force against the Russians, and separate them from York with his
Prussians. At two o'clock Napoleon attacked the Russians, Mortier
engaging the Prussians separately. The plan succeeded, and by
nightfall the enemy was in full retreat for Château-Thierry, where was
the nearest bridge over the Marne. Napoleon had hoped that Macdonald
would arrive from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre in time to seize the bridge,
cut off the retreat, and make the victory decisive. But in spite of
heroic exertion, that marshal could not or did not move with
sufficient rapidity over the heavy dirt roads. The flying allies
sacked the town with awful cruelty, and destroyed the bridge without
any molestation except from the inhabitants, who wreaked their
vengeance on numerous stragglers. On the thirteenth the French
occupied the place, repaired the bridge, and crossed to the right
bank. Next morning Marmont started in pursuit of Blücher.
Somewhat flushed by such success, Napoleon deliberated whether he
should not now turn and attack Schwarzenberg. The Emperor thought
these victories might give pause to a mediocre Austrian, ever mindful
of the terrific blows his country had received once and again from
France. He was mistaken; Schwarzenberg had moved, though slowly, yet
steadily forward. On the twelfth Victor abandoned the bridge at
Nogent, and Napoleon sent Macdonald with twelve thousand men to join
Victor at Montereau. Early on the fourteenth came news that Blücher
had driven Marmont back to Fromentières. By noon Napoleon had effected
a junction with this marshal near Étoges, making a famous and
successful flank march over a marshy country, a manoeuver which is
justly considered worthy of his great genius. Advancing then to the
neighborhood of Vauchamps, his infantry attacked in front, while the
cavalry, under Grouchy, outflanked the enemy's line and fell on the
rear. Blücher was apparently doomed, for he had only three regiments
of cavalry, and while facing one powerful enemy he would be forced to
break the ranks of another in order to open a line of retreat. He
solved the problem, but at enormous cost. Forming his troops into a
line of solid squares, one stood to support the artillery and receive
the onset in front, while the others dashed at Grouchy's horsemen,
each square standing and retreating behind the next alternately as the
bloody retreat went on. At last the butchery ceased, and Blücher fled
to Bergères. The French pursued only as far as Étoges. Napoleon had
hoped to follow all the way to Châlons, annihilate what was left of
Blücher's army, and then to return and throw himself on Schwarzenberg.
He was arrested by the news that the Seine valley, as far as
Montereau, was in the hands of the Austro-Russians; that Oudinot and
Victor had been driven back to Nangis; in short, that Paris was
seriously menaced.
It was long asserted that in the three actions just recorded the
French far outnumbered their opponents, and that Napoleon's
generalship was consequently inferior to his high average. The
sufficient answer to this is in the facts now universally accepted. At
Champaubert there were four thousand eight hundred and fifty French
against four thousand seven hundred Russians; at Montmirail there were
twenty-two thousand seven hundred Russians and Prussians against
twelve thousand eight hundred French; and in the third engagement,
near Étoges, Blücher had twenty-one thousand five hundred to ten
thousand three hundred. It is therefore natural to compare these three
victories with those at Montenotte, Millesimo, and Dego. But they were
far greater. At forty-four Napoleon displayed exactly the same
boldness, steadfastness, and skill which he had displayed in youth;
but in addition he overcame the stolid enmity of winter, of variable
weather, of roads almost impassable, of swampy fields that were almost
impassable by reason of overflowing ditches and half-frozen morasses.
He overcame, too, the resisting power created by his own example; for
here were the choicest soldiers of the Continent, commanded by men
inured for eighteen years to the hardships, the shifts, the rapidity
of warfare as he himself had taught the art. Momentarily Napoleon
seems to have wondered whether allied and co-allied Europe had learned
nothing in half a generation, and whether an army twice and a half
larger than his own, under veteran generals, was to withdraw again
behind the Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder, perhaps the Vistula. It is hard
to believe that he dreamed such dreams as we read the prosaic,
scientific, hard common sense of his military correspondence between
January twenty-sixth and February fourteenth. Yet there is certainly
an appearance of self-deception and vacillation in his political and
diplomatic plans, due apparently to the intoxication of success, as
when he spoke of the Vistula to Marmont after Champaubert.
The innermost thoughts of Metternich, and of the diplomats associated
with him, are very hard to fathom. For two generations the world
believed that after Leipsic, Napoleon, in his sanguine conceit,
rejected offer after offer from the allies, and finally perished
utterly because of a folly which made him believe he could recover his
predominance. There is now every reason to believe the contrary, and
to suppose that Napoleon clearly understood the situation. The war was
one of extermination on the part of the allies; in the interest of
their dynasties they intended not only to destroy Napoleon, but also
thereby to root out the ideas for which he was supposed to stand. By
the light of recent memoirs, especially those of Metternich himself,
we seem forced to the conclusion that in all the offers after Leipsic
there was, if anything, far less of reality and sincerity than in
those between the armistice of Poischwitz and the battle. When
Castlereagh arrived at the allied headquarters early in January, 1814,
he found them established in Basel. Schwarzenberg had found no
difficulty in crossing Switzerland. Geneva surrendered its keys
without a struggle, and generally the Swiss seemed indifferent to the
violation of their neutrality. As the advance continued, it appeared
that the French were equally apathetic. Bubna was driven from before
Lyons by Augereau, but Dijon surrendered to a squad of cavalrymen
which, at the request of the conscientious mayor, made a show of force
to oblige him. It was not difficult under such circumstances for the
sovereigns and their ministers to convince themselves that any peace
with Napoleon would be nothing but a "ridiculous armistice," and that
the Emperor of the French must, in any case, be utterly overthrown.
In response to the Frankfort proposals, the pacific Caulaincourt had
promptly arrived to conduct negotiations. The invaders had almost at
once suggested that they must abandon the Frankfort proposals, and
confine France to her royal limits; that is, refuse her Belgium with
the great port of Antwerp. So far they were agreed, but there the
unanimity ceased. The Czar desired first to conquer France, and then
leave her to choose her own government; he intended to take the whole
of Poland, and give Alsace to Francis in return for Galicia, thus
checking Austria by both Prussia and France, so that he could work his
will in the Orient. Metternich wished the old balance of power, and
had determined on the restoration of the Bourbons. Francis was writing
to his daughter that he would never separate her cause and that of her
son from France. The Prussian king and ministers desired only such an
arrangement as would secure to their country what she had regained.
Stein and his associates wished the utter humiliation of their foe.
Castlereagh spoke with the authority of a paymaster; he was determined
to keep the Netherlands from falling under French influence, to
restore the Bourbons, and to establish so nice an equilibrium in
Europe that Great Britain would be unhampered elsewhere in the world.
There was to be no mention of colonial restitution or neutral rights.
Being a second-rate statesman, he was much influenced by Metternich,
and the two sought to form an impossible alliance between
constitutional liberty and feudal absolutism.
A so-called congress was opened at Châtillon on February fifth.[7] It
must be remembered that the treaty of Reichenbach was still a secret.
That agreement was the reality behind the congress of Prague, the
Frankfort proposals, and the meeting at Mannheim. None of those
gatherings consequently was serious; that at Châtillon was even less
so. The memoirs of Metternich explain all the facts: Swiss neutrality
was violated by Austrian influence in order to restore the
aristocratic constitution of Bern and the ascendancy of that canton;
Alexander, posing still as a liberal, was angry at this violation of
international law, and forbade the restoration of Vaud to its old
master. Schwarzenberg's deliberate movements were due primarily to
timidity, but they stood in good stead Metternich's desire to restore
the Bourbons. It has been asserted, and there is much probability in
the conjecture, that not only the plan adopted for invading France,
but the slowness of the Austrians in advancing toward Langres, toward
Troyes, across into the Seine valley, together with the spurious
activity they displayed before Montereau, Sens, and Fontainebleau, was
part of a scheme to wear out but not to exhaust France, and then
compel her to take back her dynastic rulers. Blücher, who wanted glory
and revenge, and the Prussian liberals, who desired so to crush France
that Prussia might be free to slough off her militarism and build up
a constitutional government, were alike furious at being chained to
the frontier. All these cross-purposes and bitterness were mirrored in
the ostentatious proceedings of the congress of Châtillon. Napoleon,
either divining the facts, or, more probably, informed by spies,
seemed indifferent, and refused at first to give full powers to
Caulaincourt; finally the marshals, terrified at the prospect of
indefinite war opened by the unlucky mention of the Vistula, made
their influence so felt that the Emperor yielded.
[Footnote 7: Fournier: Der Congress von Châtillon.]
Maret's name was long held up to detestation as the instigator of
Napoleon's procrastinating policy at Dresden, the line of conduct
which seemed to have made it possible for Austria to join the
coalition. Among the papers of that minister is an account of his
relations with Napoleon during the congress at Châtillon, which
displays the evident motive of an attempt to prove how pacific his
nature really was. He declares that after the defeat at La Rothière,
Caulaincourt wrote a panic-stricken letter demanding full authority to
treat. Maret handed it to the Emperor, beseeching him to yield.
Napoleon seemed scarcely to heed, but indicated a passage in
Montesquieu's "Grandeur and Fall of the Romans," which he happened to
be reading: "I know nothing more magnanimous than the resolution taken
by a monarch who ruled in our time, to bury himself under the ruins of
the throne rather than to accept proposals which a king may not
entertain. He had a soul too lofty to descend lower than his
misfortunes had hurled him." "But I, sire," rejoined the secretary--"I
know something more magnanimous--to cast aside your glory in order to
close the abyss into which France would fall along with you." "Well,
then, gentlemen, make your peace," came the reply. "Let Caulaincourt
make it; let him sign everything necessary to obtain it. I can
support the disgrace, but do not expect me to dictate my own
humiliation." Maret informed Caulaincourt, but the latter recoiled
before the responsibility, and asked for particular instructions. The
Emperor persistently refused, but wrote giving the minister "carte
blanche" to take any measure which would save the capital. Again
Caulaincourt begged for details, and again Napoleon refused,
persisting until Bertrand joined his supplications to those of Maret,
whereupon he consented to abandon Belgium, and even the left bank of
the Rhine.
The formal despatch containing these concessions was to be signed next
morning, on February eighth, but in the interval came news of
Blücher's movements. Maret found the Emperor buried in the study of
his map. "I have an entirely different matter in hand," was the
greeting; "I am at present occupied in dealing Blücher a blow in the
eye." The signature was indefinitely postponed. On the tenth Alexander
suspended the congress on the plea of Caulaincourt's refusal to state
his own or accept the offered terms. Then followed the three
victories, and Napoleon, on the night of the twelfth, wrote to
Châtillon demanding the Frankfort proposals. Caulaincourt urgently
besought the allies for an armistice, and begged Napoleon to be less
exacting. Prussia and Austria were eager for the armistice, but
Alexander obstinately refused to reopen the congress until the
eighteenth, when everything seemed changed, and all the allies really
desired peace. Caulaincourt, warned by Napoleon's letter of the
twelfth, refused to treat without full instructions, and as he had
none he began to procrastinate. In the end he bore the blame for not
having used the carte blanche when he had it in order to save his
country, for subsequently he had no opportunity.
CHAPTER VII
THE GREAT CAPTAIN AT BAY[8]
[Footnote 8: References: Houssaye: 1814. Jensen: Napoleons
Feldzug, 1814. Weil: La campagne de 1814, d'après les
documents des archives impériales et royales de la guerre à
Vienne. La cavalerie des armées alliées pendant la campagne
de 1814.]
Victor's Failure at Montereau -- Schwarzenberg's Ruse -- The
French Advance and the Austrian Retreat -- Napoleon's Effort to
Divide the Coalition -- Vain Negotiations -- The Treaty of
Chaumont -- Blücher's Narrow Escape -- The Prussians Defeated at
Craonne -- Napoleon's Determination to Fight -- His Misfortunes
at Laon -- Dissensions at Blücher's Headquarters -- Napoleon at
Soissons -- Rheims Recaptured -- Another Phase in Napoleon's
Eclipse.
The eagerness of the Prussians and the Austrians to grant an armistice
was at first due to the belief that Caulaincourt's request was a
confession of exhaustion; the Czar's assent to reopening the congress
on the eighteenth was wrung from him by the military operations
between the fourteenth and that date. Convinced that Paris was
menaced, Napoleon left Marmont to hold Blücher, and starting for La
Ferté-sous-Jouarre on the fifteenth, covered fifty miles with his army
in a marvelous march of thirty-six hours, arriving on the evening of
the sixteenth with his men comparatively fresh. Next morning the
French began to advance, and the Austrians to withdraw toward the
Seine. Victor was to seize Montereau that same day and hold the
bridge. Compelled to drive an Austrian corps out of Valjouan, the
marshal did not reach his goal until six or seven in the evening, and
finding it beset by the Crown Prince of Würtemberg with fourteen
thousand Germans, he merely drove in the outposts and then halted for
the night. His ardor was far from intense, and though, like Macdonald
at Château-Thierry, he might feel that he had done all that could be
demanded, yet he lost the opportunity of annihilating a considerable
portion of the enemy's force. Simultaneously Macdonald had now
advanced until he stood before Bray, while Oudinot on the left was
before Provins. Thus far Napoleon's advance had been a front movement
to cover Paris, but that same day, the seventeenth, he drove
Wittgenstein from Nangis, and then expected by a rush over the bridge
at Montereau to prevent Schwarzenberg from extending his flank to
Fontainebleau, a move which would surround the French right. As a
matter of fact, strange riders speaking curious outlandish tongues,
Cossack scouts in other words, had appeared for the first time that
very day in Nemours and Fontainebleau, terrifying the inhabitants. It
seems highly probable that if Napoleon's force could have made a quick
push from Montereau early on the eighteenth, it would have cut off a
considerable portion of Schwarzenberg's left. In any case the Emperor
was deeply incensed by what he considered Victor's slackness, and
degraded him. The humbled marshal confessed his fault, displaying
profound contrition, and was speedily restored to partial favor, being
intrusted with the command, under Ney, of a portion of the young
guard.
This was the third of the marshals--Augereau, Macdonald, Victor, each
in turn--who since the opening of the campaign had shown a physical
and moral exhaustion disabling them from rising to the heights of
Napoleon's expectation. "We must pull on the boots and the resolution
of '93," wrote the Emperor to Augereau; he was quite right: nothing
short of the unsapped revolutionary vigor of France could have saved
his cause. On the eighteenth, after a six hours' struggle, the French
under Gérard and Pajol seized Montereau. Napoleon had halted at
Nangis, and there Berthier received by a flag of truce a letter from
Schwarzenberg, declaring that he had ceased his offensive march in
consequence of news that preliminaries of peace had been signed the
day previous at Châtillon. This was probably as base a ruse as any
ever practised by Napoleon's generals. It is likely that all the
Austrian marches and countermarches for ten days past had been but a
bustling semblance calculated for diplomatic effect. Be that as it
may, before Napoleon's advance the Austrian commander had quailed,
and, with the French at Montereau, his columns were already moving
back to Troyes, where they were drawn up in battle array. Napoleon
wrote indignantly to Joseph that the ruse was probably preliminary to
a request for an armistice, and that he would now accept nothing short
of the Frankfort proposals. "At the first check the wretched creatures
fall on their knees." Meanwhile he led his army over the river to
Nogent, and prepared to attack Schwarzenberg.
But Blücher had not been idle; by superhuman exertions he had
collected and strengthened his army at Châlons, and on the
twenty-first he appeared at Méry on the Seine, threatening Napoleon's
left flank in case of an advance toward Troyes. By this time the
flames of French patriotism were rekindled in town and country, and,
the soldiers being flushed with victory, it was clearly the hour to
strike at any hazard. Oudinot was despatched with ten thousand men to
hold Blücher, and this task he actually accomplished, capturing that
portion of Méry which lay on the left bank of the river, and
fortifying the bridge-head against all comers. Marmont being at
Sézanne with eight thousand men to cover Paris, and Mortier at
Soissons with ten thousand to prevent the advance of York and Sacken,
Napoleon marched on Troyes. It was late in the evening when his main
army was drawn up, and in order to leave time for his rear to come in,
he postponed operations until the morning. Schwarzenberg had seventy
thousand in line, but at four in the early dawn of the twenty-second,
leaving in place a front formation sufficient to mask his movements,
he decamped with his main force and withdrew behind the Aube.
Arrived at Bar, the Austrian commander wrote on the twenty-sixth an
admirable letter of justification for the course he had taken. Defeat
would have meant a retreat, not behind the Aube, but the Rhine. "To
offer a decisive battle to an army fighting with all the confidence
gained in small affairs, manoeuvering on its own territory, with
provisions and munitions within reach, and with the aid of a peasantry
in arms, would be an undertaking to which nothing but extreme
necessity could drive me." This retreat put a new aspect on the
diplomacy of Châtillon. On the nineteenth Caulaincourt received a
despatch from Napoleon revoking the carte blanche entirely; the same
day Napoleon received an ultimatum from the congress, written several
days before, to the effect that he was to renounce all the
acquisitions of France since 1792, and take no share in the
arrangements subsequent to the peace. This last clause being a covert
suggestion of abdication, the recipient flew into a passion; when
finally he was soothed by the pleadings of Berthier and Maret, he gave
such a meaningless reply as would enable negotiations to proceed, but
his counter-project he addressed directly to the Emperor Francis. It
was a refusal to give up Antwerp and Belgium, and an emphatic
recurrence to the Frankfort proposals. "If we are not to lay down our
arms except on the offensive conditions proposed at the congress, the
genius of France and Providence will be on our side."
Napoleon's missive suggested to his father-in-law, as was its
intention, that a continental peace on the Frankfort basis would leave
France free to recuperate her sea power and continue the war with
England alone. This was the wedge which for some time past the writer
had been proposing to drive into the coalition so as to separate
Austria from Russia. Castlereagh was very uneasy as to the possible
effect of the message, and there was much anxiety among all the
diplomats. Their first step was to send a pacific reply and renew
their request for an armistice. Napoleon consented, but stipulated
that hostilities should proceed during the preliminary pourparlers,
and that in the protocol a clause should be inserted declaring that
the plenipotentiaries were reassembled at Châtillon to discuss a peace
on the basis proposed at Frankfort. A commission to arrange the terms
of the armistice met on the twenty-fourth. That they were not in
earnest is shown by Frederick William's despatch of the twenty-sixth
to Blücher, saying, "The suspension of arms will not take place." That
very day, also, in a council of war held by the allied generals, it
was determined to form an invading army of the south. Blücher was
authorized to make a diversion in favor of the main army--a move which
he had really begun the day before by a march to the right. Napoleon,
leaving Macdonald and Oudinot, with forty thousand men, to follow
Schwarzenberg, hurried after Blücher with his remaining force. On the
twenty-eighth the commission adjourned its sessions with a formal
reiteration of the ultimatum already made by the allied powers.
The reason was that by that time its members believed Napoleon to be
elsewhere engaged. Schwarzenberg's army had checked Oudinot, and as
his troops recuperated their strength the leader recovered partial
confidence. Blücher being off for Paris, with Napoleon on his heels,
the main army of the allies had then turned on the forces of Macdonald
and Oudinot, and had driven them westward until in the pursuit it
reached Troyes, where it halted, ready, in case of Blücher's defeat,
to recross the Rhine. The congress of Châtillon was formally reopened
on March first, and continued its useless sessions until the
nineteenth, when it closed. During this second period none of the
important dignitaries, except Schwarzenberg and the King of Prussia,
attended; the rest withdrew to Chaumont, where, on March ninth, the
three powers signed a treaty with England, dated back to March first,
binding themselves, in return for an annual subsidy of five million
pounds sterling equally divided, that each would keep a hundred and
fifty thousand men in the field, for twenty years if necessary,
provided Napoleon would not accept the boundaries of royal France--a
futile stipulation. This treaty was the precursor of that iniquitous
triple alliance between Russia, Austria, and Prussia which was
destined not merely to hamper England herself so seriously in the
subsequent period of history, but to stop for some time the progress
of liberal ideas throughout Europe.
Blücher crossed the Marne on February twenty-seventh with half his
force, and then attempted to cross the Ourcq in order to attack Meaux
from the north. But he was checked by Marmont and Mortier, with the
sixteen thousand men they already had, and then, after six thousand
new recruits came in from Paris, he was forced to retreat. Should
Napoleon arrive in time he would be annihilated. Accordingly he
hastened up the valley of the Ourcq with his entire force. Napoleon
arrived on the Marne too late to attack Blücher's rear, and after
some hesitation as to whether he should not return to complete his
work with Schwarzenberg, he finally determined that, inasmuch as the
fortress of Soissons was secure, and Blücher must therefore retreat to
the eastward, he could himself deliver an easy but staggering blow on
the Prussian flank when they should cross the Aisne at Fismes.
Accordingly, on March third the worn-out columns of the French passed
over the Marne. Unfortunately, Soissons had been left by Marmont in
charge of an inexperienced commander, who had surrendered almost
without resistance when, on March second, Bülow and Wintzengerode,
having come in from the Netherlands, suddenly appeared before the
place. This stroke of good fortune enabled Blücher not merely to find
a city of refuge for his exhausted and disorganized force, but to
recruit it by the two victorious and elated corps which thenceforth
served him as an invaluable rear-guard. Napoleon, thwarted again, gave
no outward sign of the despair he must have felt, but crossed the
Aisne on March fifth, and occupied Rheims, in order at least to cut
Blücher off from any connection with Schwarzenberg. He then turned to
join Marmont and Mortier in order to drive Blücher still farther
north, so that, as he wrote to Joseph, he might gain time sufficient
to return by Châlons and attack Schwarzenberg.
In spite of all his discouragements, Blücher had no intention of
retreating without a blow. There was constant friction between the
Prussian commander and his subordinates, so that dissension prevented
prompt action. Nevertheless, after much delay the army was got in
motion to resume the offensive, the general plan being to move
eastward instead of withdrawing due north, to cross the plateau of
Craonne, and, descending into the plain north of Berry, to attack the
French in force as they advanced to Laon. Napoleon had expected to
meet his foe under the walls of that city; his quick advance was as
much of a surprise to Blücher as Blücher's was to him. The first shock
of battle, therefore, occurred at Craonne on the sixth, when neither
army was in readiness. But Blücher secured the advantage of position.
Though he had only a portion of his force, the troops he did have were
on a commanding plateau above the enemy when the action began. The
skirmishes of the first day, however, were indecisive. Napoleon's
knowledge of the district being defective, he sought to secure the
best possible information from the inhabitants. Some one mentioning
incidentally that the mayor of a neighboring town was named de Bussy,
Napoleon recalled, with his astounding memory, that in the regiment of
La Fère he had had a comrade so named. The mayor turned out to be the
sometime lieutenant, and, with superserviceable zeal, the former
friend poured out worthless information which led the Emperor to
believe that on the morrow there would be only Blücher's rear-guard to
disperse. But it was not so. Blücher struggled with his utmost might
to gather in his cavalry and artillery, while Sacken, with the
Russians, stood like a wall, repelling the successive surges of Ney
and Victor the whole day through. At nightfall the Prussian commander,
finding it impossible to assemble guns or horsemen over the icy
fields, gave orders for retreat, and his army passed on to Laon.
Though Craonne was a victory, the losses of the French were
proportionately greater than those of the enemy, and the pursuit,
though spirited, gained no advantage. "The young guard melts like
snow; the old guard stands; my mounted guards likewise are much
reduced," were the words of Napoleon's private letter. Yet he pressed
on. The night of the seventh he spent in a roadside inn under the sign
of "The Guardian Angel." There Caulaincourt's last messenger from
Châtillon found him. The congress was still sitting, but the warrior
knew the fact meant and could mean nothing to him; though the allies
had increased their demands in proportion to their victories, they had
not lessened them in proportion to their defeats. Whatever terms he
might accept, and whatever Metternich might say, this war he felt sure
was one for his extermination. As he said then and there, it was a
bottomless chasm, and he added, "I am determined to be the last it
shall swallow up." So he made no answer, and spent the night
completing his plans for battle at Laon.
That place stands on a terraced hill rising somewhat abruptly from the
plain, and throughout the eighth Blücher arrayed his army in and on
both sides of the city, which itself was of course the key. Napoleon,
being a firm believer in such movements when on friendly soil, made a
long night march. He reached the enemy's fore-posts early on the
ninth, and drove them in. At seven Ney and Mortier began the battle
under cover of a mist, and captured two hamlets at the foot of the
hill. Marmont was on the right, and had already been cut off from the
center by a body of Cossacks; but he attacked the village of Athies.
After a long day's hard fighting, he succeeded in capturing a portion
of it. Further exertion being impossible, his men bivouacked, while he
himself withdrew to the comforts of Eppes, a château three miles
distant. It was noon when Napoleon learned that Marmont had been
severed from the line; at once he renewed his attack on Laon, but
though he gained Clacy on his left, he lost Ardon, and was thus more
completely cut off from Marmont. That night York fell upon Marmont's
men unawares, and routed them utterly.
Napoleon heard of this disaster shortly after midnight. He was, of
course, deeply agitated--did he dare risk being infolded on both
sides, or should he brave his fate in order to mislead the enemy? He
chose the desperate course, and when day broke stood apparently
undismayed. Even when two fugitive dragoons arrived and confirmed in
all its details the terrible news from Athies, he issued orders as
bold as if his army were still entire. This was a desperate ruse, but
it succeeded, for the pursuit of Marmont's men was stayed. At four the
main French army began its retreat, and the next morning saw it at
Soissons; six thousand had been killed and wounded. Again Napoleon's
name had stiffened the allies into inactive horror, for they did not
pursue. York was so disgusted with the dissensions at Blücher's
headquarters that he threw up his command and left for Brussels.
Blücher was literally at the end of his powers. "For heaven's sake,"
said Langeron, a French refugee in the Russian service, on whom the
command would have devolved, "whatever happens, let us take the corpse
along." "The corpse," with dimmed eyes and trembling hands, traced in
great rude letters an epistle beseeching York to return, and this,
indorsed by another from the Prince Royal of Prussia, brought back the
able but testy refugee.
Meantime Rheims, intrusted to a feeble garrison, had been taken by
Langeron's rear-guard under St. Priest, another French emigrant in the
service of the allies. By this disaster communication between
Schwarzenberg and Blücher had been reëstablished. In the short day
Napoleon could spend at Soissons, he took up twenty-five hundred new
cavalrymen, a new line regiment of infantry, a veteran regiment of the
same, and some artillery detachments. It is not easy to conceive of
recuperative power more remarkable than that which was thus exhibited
both by France and her Emperor. These men had been sent forward from
Paris in spite of the profound gloom now prevalent there. The truth
was at last known in the capital; Joseph was hopeless; the Empress and
her court were preparing for extremities. News had come that in the
south Soult had been thrown back on Toulouse; that in the southwest
royalist plots were thickening; that in the southeast Augereau had
been forced back to Lyons; Macdonald was ready to abandon Provins at
the first sign of advance by Schwarzenberg; and the sorry tale of Laon
was early unfolded. Yet the administrative machinery was still
running, and soldiers were being manufactured from the available
materials. Those who had been sent to Soissons had been hastily
gathered, equipped, and drilled almost without hope, but they were
precious since they enabled Napoleon to refit his shattered
battalions.
Marmont had unwisely abandoned Berry-au-Bac, and that in disregard of
orders. But otherwise he had done his best to make good a temporary
lapse, and had got together about eight thousand men at Fismes. His
narratives give a graphic picture of the situation--of disorder,
confusion, chaos among his troops, of artillery served by
inexperienced sailors, of undrilled companies whose members had
neither hats, clothes, nor shoes. There were plenty of captured
uniforms and head-coverings, but they were so infested with vermin
that the French, sorry as was their plight, refused to wear them, and
clung to their old tatters. Marmont's men were heroes, he himself was
not yet a traitor. Though overborne by a sense of Napoleon's
recklessness, and therefore unfit for the desperate self-sacrifice
which would have made him a fit coadjutor for his chief, he was
prepared to atone for his disgrace at Athies. Early in the morning of
the thirteenth the main French army moved from Soissons; at four in
the afternoon Marmont opened the attack on Rheims. Napoleon himself
had arrived, but his troops were slow in coming up, and there was no
heavy artillery wherewith to batter in the gates. The struggle went on
with desperate courage and gallantry on both sides. St. Priest was
killed by the same gunner whose aim had been fatal to Moreau. "We may
well say, O Providence! O Providence!" wrote Napoleon to his brother.
At ten the beleaguered garrison began to sally and flee. Napoleon rose
from the bearskin on which he had been resting before a bivouac fire,
and storming with rage lest his prey should escape, hurried in the
guns, which were finally within reach. Amid awful tumult and carnage
the place fell; three thousand of the enemy were slain, and about the
same number were captured. The burghers were frenzied with delight as
the Emperor marched in, and the whole city burst into an illumination.
Next morning Napoleon and Marmont met. The culprit was loaded with
reproaches for the affair at Athies, and treated as a stern father
might treat a careless child. No better evidence of the Emperor's low
state is needed. Marmont was now the hero of the hour; his peccadillos
might well have been forgotten for the sake of securing his continued
faithfulness. With Napoleon at his best, this would surely have been
the case; but aware that at most the war could be a matter of only a
few weeks, the desperate man overdid his rôle of self-confidence,
being too rash, too severe, too haughty. Not that he was without some
hope. Although for two years the shadow had been declining on the dial
of Napoleon's fortunes, and although under adverse conditions one
brilliant combination after another had crumbled, yet his ideas were
as great as ever, the adjustment of plans to changing conditions was
never more admirable. The trouble was that effort and result did not
correspond, and this being so, what would have been trifling
misdemeanors in prosperity seemed to him in adversity to be dangerous
faults. The great officers of state and army, imitating their master's
ambitions, had acquired his weaknesses, but had failed in securing
either his strength or his adroitness. With him they had lost that
fire of youth which had carried them and him always just over the line
of human expectation, and so his nice adjustments failed in
exasperating ways at the very turn of necessity. Hard words and
stinging reproofs are soon forgotten in generous youth; they rankle in
middle life; and even the invigorating address or inspiring word, when
heard too often for twenty years, fails of effect. The beginning of
the end was the loss of Soissons at the critical instant. Napoleon was
uncertain and touchy; his marshals were honeycombed with disaffection;
the populations, though flashing like powder at his touch, had nowhere
risen _en masse_. Thereafter the great captain was no longer waging a
well-ordered warfare. Like an exhausted swordsman, he lunged here and
there in the grand style; but his brain was troubled, his blade
broken. Some untapped reservoirs of strength were yet to be opened,
some untried expedients were to be essayed, but the end was
inevitable. The movement on Rheims was the spasmodic stroke of the
dying gladiator.
CHAPTER VIII
THE STRUGGLES OF EXHAUSTION[9]
[Footnote 9: References: Houssaye, Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe,
in Revue historique, tom. 51, pp. 1-25. Metternich's
Memoirs.]
The Allies Demoralized -- Napoleon's Desperate Choice -- The
Battle at Arcis -- The Correspondence of Caulaincourt and
Napoleon -- Panic at Schwarzenberg's Headquarters --
Cross-purposes of the Allies -- Napoleon's Determination
Confirmed -- His Over-confidence -- The Resolution to Abandon
Paris -- The French Brought to a Stand -- Their Masked Retreat --
Inefficiency of Marmont and Augereau -- Napoleon's March toward
St. Dizier -- His Terrible Disenchantment -- How the Allies had
Discovered Napoleon's Plans -- Their Determination to Pursue --
The Czar's Resolution to March on Paris -- Successful Return of
the Invaders.
Though unscientific as a military move and futile as to the ultimate
result of the war, the capture of Rheims was, nevertheless, a telling
thrust. On receipt of the news from Laon, Schwarzenberg had
immediately set his army in motion against Macdonald, and Blücher,
after waiting two days to restore order among his worried troops and
insubordinate lieutenants, had advanced and laid siege to Compiègne.
The capture of Rheims checked the movements of both Austrians and
Prussians; dismay prevailed in both camps, and both armies began to
draw back. The French halted at Nangis in their retreat before
Schwarzenberg, and the people of Compiègne were released from the
terrors of a siege. "This terrible Napoleon," wrote Langeron in his
memoirs--"they thought they saw him everywhere. He had beaten us all,
one after the other; we were always frightened by the daring of his
enterprises, the swiftness of his movements, and his clever
combinations. Scarcely had we formed a plan when it was disconcerted
by him." Besides this, in obedience to Napoleon's call, the peasantry
began an organized guerrilla warfare, avenging the pillage,
incendiarism, and military executions of the allies by a brutal
retaliation in kind which made the marauding invaders quake. Finally
the momentary consternation of the latter verged on panic when the
report reached headquarters that Bernadotte, lying inactive at Liège
with twenty-three thousand Swedes, had permitted a flag of truce from
Joseph to enter his presence. Could it be that the sly schemer, for
the furtherance of his ambition to govern France, was about to turn
traitor and betray the coalition?
But the consternation of the allies was the least important effect of
the capture of Rheims by Napoleon.[10] It initiated certain ideas and
purposes in his own mind about which there has been endless
discussion. Many see in them the immediate cause of his ruin, a few
consider them the most splendid offspring of his mind. Reinforcements
from Paris, slender as they were, flowed steadily into his camp; and
when he learned that both Schwarzenberg and Blücher had virtually
retreated, he believed himself able to cope once more with the former.
Accordingly he dictated to his secretary an outline of three possible
movements: to Arcis on the Aube, by way of Sézanne to Provins, and to
Meaux for the defense of Paris. The first was the most daring; the
second would cut the enemy off from the right bank of the Seine, but
it had the disadvantage of keeping the troops on miry cross-roads; the
third was the safest. Of course he chose the way of desperation--all
or nothing. Leaving Marmont with seven thousand men at Berry-au-Bac,
and Mortier with ten thousand at Rheims and Soissons, he enjoined them
both to hold the line toward Paris against Blücher at all hazards, and
himself set out, on March seventeenth, for Arcis on the Aube. This he
did, instead of marching direct to Meaux for the defense of Paris,
because it would, in his own words, "give the enemy a great shock, and
result in unforeseen circumstances."
[Footnote 10: See Houssaye, 1814, pp. 258 _et seq._]
Schwarzenberg's movements during the next three days awakened in
Napoleon the suspicion, which he was only too glad to accept as a
certainty, that the Austro-Russian army was on the point of retreating
into the Vosges or beyond; and on the twentieth he announced his
decision of marching farther eastward, past Troyes, toward the
frontier forts still in French hands. This idea of a final stand on
the confines of France and Germany haunted him to the end, and was the
"will-o'-the-wisp" which intermittently tempted him to folly. But for
the present its execution was necessarily postponed. That very day
news was received within the lines he had established about Arcis that
the enemy, far from retreating, was advancing. Soon the French cavalry
skirmishers appeared galloping in flight, and were brought to a halt
only when the Emperor, with drawn sword, threw himself across their
path. A short, sharp struggle ensued--sixteen thousand French with
twenty-four thousand five hundred of their foe. It was irregular and
indecisive, but Napoleon held his own. The neighboring hamlet of Torcy
had also been attacked by the allies, and before their onset the
French had at first yielded. But the defenders were rallied, and at
nightfall the position was recaptured. This sudden exhibition by
Schwarzenberg of what looked like courage puzzled Napoleon; after long
deliberation he concluded that the hostile troops were in all
probability only a rear-guard covering the enemy's retreat. He was not
very far wrong, but far enough to make all the difference to him. The
circumstances require a full explanation.
Thanks to Caulaincourt's sturdy persistence, the congress at Châtillon
was still sitting, and on the thirteenth the French delegate wrote a
last despairing appeal to the Emperor. His messenger was delayed three
days by the military operations; but when he arrived, on the
sixteenth, Maret wrung from Napoleon concessions which included
Antwerp, Mainz, and even Alessandria. In the despatch announcing this,
and written on the seventeenth to Caulaincourt, Maret made no
reservation except one: that Napoleon intended, after signing the
treaty, to secure for himself whatever the military situation at the
close of the war might entitle him to retain. The return of the
messenger was likewise delayed for three days, and it was the
twenty-first before he reached the outskirts of Châtillon. He arrived
to find Caulaincourt departing; the second "carte blanche" had arrived
too late. With all his skill, the persistent and adroit minister had
been unable to protract negotiations longer than the eighteenth. His
appeal having brought no immediate response, he had, several days
earlier, despatched a faithful warning, and this reached Napoleon at
Fère-Champenoise simultaneously with the departure of the messenger
for Châtillon. The day previous the Emperor had received bad news from
southern France: that Bordeaux had opened its gates to a small
detachment of English under Hill, and that the Duke of Angoulême had
been cheered by the people as he publicly proclaimed Louis XVIII King
of France. Apparently neither this information nor Caulaincourt's
warning profoundly impressed Napoleon; he knew his Gascons well, his
"carte blanche" he must have believed to be in Châtillon, and it had
been in high spirits that he hastened on to Arcis, determined to make
the most of the time intervening until the close of negotiations.
When news of Napoleon's advance reached Schwarzenberg's headquarters
in Troyes, there had at first been nothing short of panic; the
commander himself was on a sick-bed, having entirely succumbed to the
hardships of winter warfare. No sooner had he ordered the first
backward step than his army had displayed a feverish anxiety for
farther retreat. As things were going, it appeared as if the different
corps would, for lack of judicious leadership, be permitted to
withdraw still farther in such a way as to separate the various
divisions ever more widely, and expose them successively to
annihilating blows from Napoleon, like those which had overwhelmed the
scattered segments of the Silesian army. The Czar and many others
immediately perceived the danger. With faculties unnerved by fear, the
officers foreboded a repetition with the Bohemian army of Montmirail,
Champaubert, and Vauchamps. Rumors filled the air: the peasantry of
the Vosges were rising, the Swiss were ready to follow their example;
the army must withdraw before it was utterly surrounded and cut off.
There was even a report--and so firmly was it believed that it long
passed for history--of Alexander's having expressed a desire to reopen
the congress.
Schwarzenberg's strange hesitancy in the initial stages of the
invasion has been explained. Beyond his natural timidity, it was
almost certainly due to Metternich's politics, which displayed a
desire to ruin Napoleon's imperial power, but to save France either
for the Bourbons or possibly for his Emperor's son-in-law. If the
Austrian minister could accomplish this, he could thereby checkmate
Prussian ambitions for leadership in Germany. But during the
movements of February and March the actions of the Austrian general
appear to have been due almost exclusively to cowardice. The papers of
Castlereagh, of Metternich, and of Schwarzenberg himself aim to give
the impression that during all the events which had occurred since the
congress of Prague, everything had been straightforward, and that
Austria had no thought of sparing Napoleon or acting otherwise than
she did in the end. Yet the indications of the time are quite the
other way: the Russians in Schwarzenberg's army were furious, and, as
one of them wrote, suspicious "of what we are doing and what we are
not doing." Alexander, in this crisis, was deeply concerned, not for
peace, but for an orderly, concentrated retreat. With stubborn
fatalism, he never doubted the final outcome; and during his stay in
Châtillon he had spent his leisure hours in excogitating a careful
plan for the grand entry into Paris, whereby the honors were to be his
own.
Consequently, when on the nineteenth he hastened to Schwarzenberg's
bedside, it was with the object of persuading the Austrian commander
to make a stand long enough to secure concentration in retreat. This
idea originated with the Russian general Toll, and the place he
suggested for concentration was the line between Troyes and Pougy. But
the council was terror-stricken, and though willing to heed
Alexander's urgent warning, they at first selected a position farther
in the rear, on the heights of Trannes. With this the Czar was
content, but on second thought such a course appeared to the more
daring among the Austrian staff as if it smacked of pusillanimity.
Schwarzenberg felt the force of this opinion, and by the influence of
some one, probably Radetzky, it was determined, without consulting the
Czar, to concentrate near Arcis on the left bank of the Aube, in
order to assume the offensive at Plancy. This independent resolution
of Schwarzenberg's staff explains the presence of allied troops near
Arcis and at Torcy. Alexander was much incensed by the news of the
meeting, and declared that Napoleon's real purpose was to hold them
while cutting off their connections on the extreme right at Bar and
Chaumont. This was in fact a close conjecture. Napoleon, though
surprised into action, was naturally confirmed in his surmise that the
hostile troops were a retreating rear-guard; and in consequence he had
definitely adopted the most desperate scheme of his life--the plan of
hurrying toward the Vosges, of summoning the peasantry to rise _en
masse_, and of calling out the garrison troops from the frontier
fortresses to reinforce his army and enable him to strike the invaders
from behind.
By his retreat to Troyes on February twenty-second, Schwarzenberg had
avoided a decisive conflict, saving his own army, and leaving Napoleon
to exhaust himself against the army of Silesia; by his decision of
March nineteenth he had confirmed Napoleon in the conviction that the
allies were overawed, and had thus led his desperate foe into the
greatest blunder conceivable--this chimerical scheme of concentrating
his slender, scattered force on the confines of France, and leaving
open a way for the great army of invaders to march direct on Paris. Of
such stuff are contemporary reputations sometimes constructed. But
this was not enough: a third time the Austrian general was to stumble
on greatness. Napoleon's movements of concentration had thus far met
with no resistance, in spite of their temerity; and throughout the
nineteenth the enemy's outposts, wherever found, fled incontinently.
It appeared a certainty that the allies were abandoning the line of
the Seine in order to avoid a blow on their flank. That evening
Napoleon began to vacillate, gradually abandoning his notion of an
offensive move near Troyes, and deliberating how best to reach Vitry
for a further advance toward his eastern fortresses. To avoid any
appearance of retreat, he rejected the safer route by way of
Fère-Champenoise to Sommesous, and determined to follow the course of
the Aube for a while before turning northward to Sommepuis. He might
run across the enemy's rear-guard, but he counted on their
pusillanimity for the probable retreat of the very last man to Troyes.
When Ney and Sebastiani began on the twentieth to push up the south
bank of the Aube, they expected no opposition. That very morning
Napoleon had announced to his minister of war, "I shall neglect
Troyes, and betake myself in all haste to my fortresses."
So far the Emperor had made no exhibition of the temerity about which
so much was later to be said. But he had deceived himself and had
taken a wild resolution. Moreover, it is amazing that he should have
felt a baseless confidence in Blücher's remaining inert. This
hallucination is, however, clearly expressed in a despatch to Marmont
of the very same date. Yet, nevertheless, the alternative is not left
out of consideration, for he ordered that marshal, in case Blücher
should resume the offensive, to abandon Paris and hasten to Châlons.
This fatal decision was not taken suddenly: the contingency had been
mentioned in a letter of February eighth to Joseph, and again from
Rheims emphatic injunctions to keep the Empress and the King of Rome
from falling into Austrian hands were issued to the same
correspondent. "Do not abandon my son," the Emperor pleaded; "and
remember that I would rather see him in the Seine than in the hands of
the enemies of France. The fate of Astyanax, prisoner to the Greeks,
has always seemed to me the unhappiest in history." The messenger had
been gone but a few hours when word was brought that Blücher had
resumed the offensive, and a swift courier was despatched summoning
Marmont to Châlons. In this ultimate decision Napoleon showed how
cosmopolitan he had grown: he had forgotten, if he had ever
understood, the extreme centralization of France; he should have known
that, Paris lost, the head of the country was gone, and that the
dwarfed limbs could develop little or no national vitality.
This bitter lesson he was soon to learn. On the momentous afternoon of
the twentieth, as has been related, about sixteen thousand French
confronted nearly twenty-five thousand of the allies in the sharp but
indecisive skirmishes before Arcis; the loss of the former was
eighteen hundred, that of the allies twenty-seven hundred. In spite of
the dimensions which these conflicts had assumed, Napoleon remained
firm in the belief that he had to do with his retreating enemy's
rear-guard; Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, was convinced that the
French had a strength far beyond the reality. During the night both
armies were strongly reinforced, and in the early morning Napoleon had
twenty-seven thousand five hundred men--quite enough, he believed, to
demoralize the retreating Austrians. It was ten o'clock when he
ordered the attack, Ney and Sebastiani being directed to the plateau
behind the town. What was their surprise and dismay to find
Schwarzenberg's entire army, which numbered not less than a hundred
thousand, drawn up in battle array on the plain to the eastward, the
infantry in three dense columns, cavalry to right and left, with three
hundred and seventy pieces of artillery on the central front! The
spectacle would have been dazzling to any but a soldier: the bright
array of gay accoutrements, the glittering bayonets, the waving
banners, and the serried ranks. As it was, the audacious French
skirmishers instinctively felt the incapacity of a general who could
thus assemble an army as if on purpose to display its numbers and
expose it to destruction. Without a thought they began a sort of
challenging rencounter with horse-artillery and cavalry.
But the Emperor's hopes were dashed when he learned the truth; with
equal numbers he would have been exultant; a battle with odds of four
to one he dared not risk. Sebastiani was kept on the heights to mask
the retreat which was instantly determined upon, and at half-past one
it began. This ruse was so successful, by reason of the alarms and
crossings incident to the withdrawal of the French, that the allies
were again terror-stricken; even the Czar rejected every suggestion of
attack; again force was demoralized by genius. At last, however,
scouts brought word that columns of French soldiers were debouching
beyond the Aube, and the facts were plain. Even then the paralyzed
invaders feared to attack, and it was not until two thirds of
Napoleon's force was behind the stream that, after fierce fighting,
the French rear was driven from the town. Oudinot's corps was the last
to cross the river, and, standing until sappers had destroyed the
bridge, it hurried away to follow the main column toward Vitry. The
divisions of Gérard and Macdonald joined the march, and there were
then forty-five thousand men in line.
While Napoleon was thus neutralizing the efforts of armies and
generals by the renown of his name, two of his marshals were finally
discredited. Enfeebled as Blücher appeared to be, he was no sooner
freed from the awe of Napoleon's proximity than he began to move. On
the eighteenth he passed the Aisne, and Marmont, disobeying the
explicit instructions of Napoleon to keep open a line of retreat
toward Châlons, began to withdraw toward Fismes, where he effected a
junction with Mortier. His intention was to keep Blücher from Paris
by false manoeuvers. Rheims and Épernay at once fell into hostile
hands; there was no way left open toward Châlons except the long
detour by Château-Thierry and Étoges; and Blücher, it was found, was
hurrying to effect a connection with Schwarzenberg. This was an
assured checkmate. Meantime Augereau had displayed a similar
incapacity. On the eighth he had begun a number of feeble, futile
movements intended to prevent the allies from forming their Army of
the South. But after a few aimless marches he returned to Lyons, and
stood there in idleness until his opponents had completed their
organization. On the twentieth the place was assaulted. The French
general had twenty-one thousand five hundred men under his immediate
command, six thousand eight hundred Catalonian veterans were on their
way from Perpignan, and at Chambèry were seven thousand more from the
armies of Tuscany and Piedmont. The assailants had thirty-two
thousand, mostly raw troops. With a stout heart in its commander,
Lyons could have been held until the reinforcements arrived, when the
army of the allies would probably have been annihilated. But there was
no stout heart in any of the authorities; not a spade had been used to
throw up fortifications; the siege-guns ready at Avignon had not been
brought up. Augereau, at the very height of the battle, summoned the
civil authorities to a consultation, and the unwarlike burghers
assented without a murmur to his suggestion of evacuation. The great
capital of eastern France was delivered as a prize to those who had
not earned it. Had Suchet been substituted for Augereau some weeks
earlier, the course of history might have been diverted. But although
Napoleon had contemplated such a change, he shrank from disgracing an
old servant, and again, as before Leipsic, displayed a kindly spirit
destructive to his cause.
The night after his retreat from Arcis, Napoleon sent out a
reconnaissance to Vitry, and finding it garrisoned by Prussians,
swerved toward St. Dizier, which, after a smart combat, he entered on
the twenty-third. This placed him midway between the lines of his
enemy's communication both from Strasburg and from Basel; which of the
two, he asked himself, would Schwarzenberg return to defend? Thinking
only how best to bait his foe, he set his army in motion northward;
the anxious Austrian would certainly struggle to retain the line in
greatest danger. This illusion continued, French cavalry scoured the
country, some of the Châtillon diplomats were captured, and the
Emperor of Austria had a narrow escape at Bar. It seemed strange that
the country-side as far as Langres was deserted, but the fact was
apparently explained when the news came that the enemy were in force
at Vitry; probably they had abandoned Troyes and had disregarded
Brienne in order to divert him from his purpose.
Alas for the self-deception of a ruined man! The enemy at Vitry were a
body of eight thousand Russian cavalry from the Silesian army, sent,
under Wintzengerode, to dog Napoleon's heels and deceive him, just as
they actually did. Having left Vitry on the twenty-eighth, they were
moving toward St. Dizier when Napoleon, believing that they formed the
head of a powerful hostile column, fell upon them with needless fury,
and all too easily put them to flight; two thousand were captured and
five hundred killed. Thanks to Marmont's disobedience and bad
judgment, Blücher had opened communications with Schwarzenberg, and
both were marching as swiftly as possible direct to Paris. Of this
Napoleon remained ignorant until the twenty-eighth. From his prisoners
the Emperor first gained a hint of the appalling truth. It was
impossible to believe such reports. Orders were issued for an
immediate return to Vitry in order to secure reliable information.
Arrived before the place, Napoleon called a council of war to decide
whether an attempt to storm it should be made. In the moment of
deliberation news began to arrive in abundance: captured despatches
and bulletins of the enemy, confirmed by definite information from the
inhabitants of the surrounding country. There could no longer be any
doubt: the enemy, with an advantage of three days' march, was on his
way to Paris. The futility of his eastward movement appears to have
struck Napoleon like a thunderbolt. Paris abandoned in theory was one
thing; France virtually decapitated by the actual loss of its capital
was quite another. The thought was unendurable. Mounting his horse,
the unhappy man spurred back to St. Dizier, and closeted himself in
silent communing with his maps.
The allies had not at first divined Napoleon's purpose. Indeed, their
movements in passing the Aube and on the day following were little
better than random efforts to fathom it. But on the morning of the
twenty-third two important messengers were captured--one a courier
from Berthier to Macdonald with despatches stating exactly where
Napoleon was; the other a rider with a short note from Napoleon to his
Empress, containing a statement of its writer's plans. This famous
paper was lost, for Blücher, after having read it, let the rider go.
But the extant German translation is doubtless accurate. It runs: "My
friend, I have been all day in the saddle. On the twentieth I took
Arcis on the Aube. The enemy attacked at eight in the evening. I beat
him, killed four thousand men, and captured four cannon. On the
twenty-first the enemy engaged in order to protect the march of his
columns toward Brienne and Bar on the Aube. I have resolved to betake
myself to the Marne in order to draw off the enemy from Paris and to
approach my fortifications. I shall be this evening in St. Dizier.
Adieu, my friend; kiss my boy." Savary declares that there was a final
phrase: "This movement makes or mars me."
The menace to their lines of communication at first produced
consternation in the council of the allies. The first proposition laid
before them was that they should return on parallel lines and recover
their old bases. Had this scheme been adopted, Napoleon's strategy
would have been justified completely instead of partially as it was;
nothing but a miracle could have prevented the evacuation of France by
the invaders. But a second, calmer thought determined the invaders to
abandon both the old lines, and, opening a new one by way of Châlons
into the Netherlands, to make the necessary detour and fall on
Napoleon's rear. Francis, for the sake of keeping close touch with his
own domains, was to join the Army of the South at Lyons. Although
there is no proof to support the conjecture, it seems as if the Czar
and the King of Prussia had suggested this so that both Francis and
Metternich might be removed from the military councils of the allies
in order that the more warlike party might in their absence take
decisive measures. That night a package of letters to Napoleon from
the imperial dignitaries at Paris fell into the hands of the invaders.
The writers, each and all, expressed a profound despondency, Savary in
particular asserting that everything was to be feared should the enemy
approach the capital. Next morning, the twenty-fourth, the junction
between Blücher and Schwarzenberg was completed. Francis and
Metternich being absent, Schwarzenberg, listening to warlike advice,
determined to start immediately in pursuit of Napoleon and seek a
battle. The march was begun, and it seemed as if Napoleon's wild
scheme was to be completely justified. He had certainly displayed
profound insight.
Alexander, however, had been steadily hardening his purpose to
annihilate Napoleon. For a week past Vitrolles, the well-known
royalist agent, had been at his headquarters; the accounts of a steady
growth in royalist strength, the efforts of Napoleon's lifelong foe,
Pozzo di Borgo, and the budget of despondent letters from the Paris
officials, combined to temper the Czar's mystical humor into a
determination of steel. Accordingly, on the same day he summoned his
personal military advisers, Barclay, Wolkonsky, Diebitsch, and Toll;
then, pointing out on a map the various positions of the troops
engaged in the campaign, he asked, significantly and impressively,
whether it were best to pursue Napoleon or march on Paris. Barclay
supported the former alternative; Diebitsch advised dividing the army
and doing both; but Toll, with powerful emphasis, declared himself for
the second course. The Czar listened enthusiastically to what was near
his own heart, and expressed himself strongly as favoring it; the
others yielded with the eagerness of courtiers, and Alexander,
mounting his horse, spurred after Frederick William and Schwarzenberg.
The new plan was unfolded; the Prussian king supported it;
Schwarzenberg hesitated, but yielded. That night orders were issued
for an about-face, a long explanatory despatch was sent to Blücher,
and on the twenty-fifth the combined armies of Bohemia and Silesia
were hurrying with measured tramp toward Paris. For the first time
there was general enthusiasm in their ranks. Blücher, who from his
unremitted ardor had won the name of "Marshal Forward," was
transported with joy.
[Illustration: In the collection of the Marquis of Bassano
NAPOLEON-FRANÇOIS-CHARLES-JOSEPH, PRINCE IMPERIAL; KING OF ROME; DUKE
OF REICHSTADT.
_From the painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence_.]
The two armies marched on parallel lines, and met with no resistance
of any importance, except as the various skirmishes enabled the
irregular French soldiers to display a desperate courage, not only the
untried "Marie Louises" coming out from Paris, but various bodies of
the national guard convoying provision-trains. It was the twenty-fifth
before Marmont and Mortier effected their junction, and then, although
about sixteen thousand strong, they were steadily forced back through
Fère-Champenoise and Allemant toward Charenton, which was under the
very walls of Paris. Marmont displayed neither energy nor common sense
on the retreat: his outlying companies were cut off, and strategic
points which might have been held were utterly neglected. The army
with which he reached Paris on the twenty-ninth should have formed an
invaluable nucleus for the formation and incorporation of the numerous
volunteers and irregular companies which were available; but, like its
leader, it was entirely demoralized. Ledru des Essarts, commander of
Meaux, was obliged on the twenty-seventh to abandon his charge, a
military depot full of ammunition and supplies, which was essential to
the safety of Paris. The garrison consisted of six thousand men, but
among them were not more than eight hundred veterans, hastily
collected from Marmont's stragglers, and the new conscripts were
ill-conditioned and badly commanded. Although the generals drew up
their men with a bold front to defend the passage of the Marne, the
undisciplined columns were overwhelmed with terror at the sight of
Blücher's army, and, standing only long enough to blow up the
magazines, fled. They fought gallantly, however, on their retreat
throughout the twenty-eighth, but to no avail; one position after
another was lost, and they too bivouacked on the evening of the
twenty-ninth before the gates of the capital. It is a weak curiosity,
possibly, but we must wonder what would have occurred had Marmont,
instead of retreating to Fismes on the eighteenth, withdrawn to
Rheims, where he and Mortier could at least have checked Blücher's
unauthorized advance, and perhaps have held the army of Silesia for a
time, when the moral effect would probably have been to justify
Schwarzenberg and confirm his project for the pursuit of Napoleon. In
that case, moreover, the precious information of Napoleon's letter to
his consort would not have fallen into his enemies' hands. Would
destiny have paused in its career?
CHAPTER IX
THE BEGINNING OF THE END[11]
[Footnote 11: References: Napoleon, King of Elba. Pons de
l'Hérault, Mémoire aux puissances alliées; publ. pour la
"société d'histoire contemporaine." Houssaye, Napoléon à
l'île d'Elbe. Sorel, Essais d'histoire et de critique.
Talleyrand, Metternich. Sorel, Le Congrès de Vienne. Rose,
Napoleonic Studies. Campbell, Napoleon at Fontainebleau and
Elba. Foresi, Napoleone I all' isola dell' Elba.]
Napoleon's Problem -- The Military Situation -- A Council of War
and State -- The Return to Paris -- Prostrating News -- The
Empress-Regent and her Advisers -- Traitors Within -- Talleyrand
-- The Defenders of the Capital -- The Flight of the Court -- The
Allies before the City.
The pallid, silent Emperor at St. Dizier was closeted with
considerations like these. He knew of the defeat which forced Marmont
and Mortier back on Paris; the loss of the capital was imminent;
parties were in a dangerous state; his marshals were growing more and
more slack; he had failed in transferring the seat of war to Lorraine;
the information he had so far received was almost certainly colored by
the medium of scheming followers through which it came. What single
mind could grapple with such affairs? It was not because the thwarted
man had lost his nerve, but because he was calm and clear-minded, that
he felt the need of frank, dispassionate advice on all these matters.
On the other hand, there stood forth in the clearest light a single
fact about which there could be no doubt, and it alone might
counterbalance all the rest: the peoples of northern and eastern
France were at last aroused in behalf of his cause. For years all
Europe had rung with outcries against the outrages of Napoleon's
soldiery; the allied armies no sooner became invaders in their turn
than they began to outstrip their foe in every deed of shame; in
particular, the savage bands from Russian Asia indulged their inhuman
passions to the full, while the French peasantry, rigid with horror,
looked on for the moment in paralysis. Now they had begun to rise in
mass, and from the twenty-fifth to the twenty-eighth their volunteer
companies brought in a thousand prisoners. The depots, trains, and
impedimenta of every sort which the allies abandoned on turning
westward fell into the hands of a peasant soldiery, many of whom were
armed with shot-guns. The rising for Napoleon was comparable only to
that which earlier years had seen in the Vendée on behalf of the
Bourbons.
Besides, all the chief cities of the district were now in the hands of
more or less regular troops; Dunette was marching from Metz with four
thousand men; Broussier, from Strasburg with five thousand; Verdun
could furnish two thousand, and several other fortresses a like
number. Souham was at Nogent with his division, Allix at Auxerre with
his; the army at the Emperor's disposal could easily be reckoned at
seventy thousand. Assisted by the partizan bands which now hung in a
passion of hatred on the skirts of the invaders, and by the national
uprising now fairly under way, could not the Emperor-general hope for
another successful stand? He well knew that the fear of what had
happened was the specter of his enemy's council-board; they would, he
reckoned, be rendered over-cautious, and give him at least a fortnight
in which to manoeuver before the fall of Paris could be expected.
Counting the men about Vitry and the garrison reinforcements at only
sixty thousand, the combined armies of Suchet, Soult, and Augereau at
the same number, that of Marmont at fourteen thousand, and the men in
the various depots at sixteen thousand, he would have a total of a
hundred and fifty thousand, from which he could easily spare fifty
thousand to cut off every line of retreat from his foe, and still have
left a hundred thousand wherewith to meet their concentrated force on
a basis of something like equality. From the purely strategic point of
view, the march of the allies to Paris was sheer madness unless they
could count on the exhaustion of the population right, left, and
behind. If the national uprising could be organized, they would be cut
off from all reinforcement and entrapped. Already their numbers had
been reduced to a hundred and ten thousand men. Napoleon with a
hundred thousand, and the nation to support him, had a fair chance of
annihilating them.
It was, therefore, not a mere hallucination which led him to hope that
once again the tangled web of affairs might be severed by a sweep of
the soldier's saber. But of course in the crisis of his great decision
he could not stand alone; he must be sure of his lieutenants.
Accordingly, after a few hours of secret communing, he summoned a
council, and laid before it his considerations substantially as
enumerated. Those present were Berthier, Ney, Lefebvre, Caulaincourt,
and Maret; Oudinot and Macdonald, at Bar on the Ornain and Perthes
respectively, were too distant to arrive in time, but he believed that
he knew their opinion, which was that the war should be continued
either in Lorraine or from a center of operations to be established at
Sens. From this conclusion Macdonald did not once waver; Oudinot had
begun to hedge; their absence, therefore, was unimportant. Berthier
was verging on desperation, and so was Caulaincourt, who, since
leaving Châtillon, had been vainly struggling to reopen negotiations
for peace on any terms; Ney, though physically brave, was not the
stuff from which martyrs are made, and Lefebvre, naturally weak, was
laboring under a momentary attack of senility. The council was
imperative for peace at any price; the Emperor, having foreseen its
temper, had little difficulty in taking the military steps for
carrying out its behests.
Early in the morning of March twenty-eighth the army was set in motion
toward Paris. The line of march was to be through Bar on the Aube,
Troyes, and Fontainebleau, a somewhat circuitous route, chosen
apparently for three reasons: because the region to be traversed would
still afford sustenance to the men, because the Seine would protect
its right flank, and because the dangerous point of Meaux was thus
avoided. Such a conclusion is significant of the clearest judgment and
the nicest calculation. Pages have been written about Napoleon's
hallucinations at the close of his career; neither here nor in any of
the courses he adopted is there aught to sustain the charge. At
breakfast-time a squad of jubilant peasants brought in a prisoner whom
they believed to be no less a person than the Comte d'Artois. In
reality it was Weissenberg, an Austrian ambassador on his way to
London. He was promptly liberated on parole and despatched with
letters to Francis and Metternich. By a curious adventure, Vitrolles
was in the minister's suite disguised as a serving-man, but he was not
detected.
[Illustration: Map of the field of operations in 1814.]
At Doulevant Napoleon received cipher despatches from La Valette, the
postmaster-general in Paris, a trusted friend. These were the first
communications since the twenty-second; the writer said not a moment
must be wasted, the Emperor must come quickly or all would be lost.
His decision once taken, Napoleon had grown more feverish with every
hour; this message gave wings to his impatience. With some regard
for such measures as would preclude his capture by wandering bands of
Cossacks, he began almost to fly. New couriers were met at
Doulaincourt with despatches which contained a full history of the
past few days; in consequence the troops were spurred to fresh
exertions, their marches were doubled, and at nightfall of the
twenty-ninth Troyes was reached. Snatching a few brief hours of sleep,
Napoleon at dawn next morning threw discretion to the winds, and
started with an insufficient escort, determined to reach Villeneuve on
the Vanne before night. The task was performed, but no sooner had he
arrived than at once he flung himself into a post-chaise, and, with
Caulaincourt at his side, sped toward Paris; a second vehicle, with
three adjutants, followed as best it might; and a third, containing
Gourgaud and Lefebvre, brought up the rear. It will be remembered that
Gourgaud was an able artillerist; Lefebvre, it was hoped, could rouse
the suburban populations for the defense of Paris. At Sens Napoleon
heard that the enemy was ready to attack; at Fontainebleau that the
Empress had fled toward the Loire; at Essonnes he was told that the
decisive battle was raging; and about ten miles from the capital, at
the wretched posting-station of La Cour de France, deep in the night,
fell the fatal blow. Paris had surrendered. The terrible certainty was
assured by the bearer of the tidings, Belliard, a cavalry officer
despatched with his troop by Mortier to prepare quarters for his own
and Marmont's men.
Maria Louisa had played her rôle of Empress-regent as well as might be
expected from a woman of twenty-three with slender abilities; only
once in his letters did the Emperor chide her, and that was for a
fault at that time venial in European royalty: receiving a high
official, in this case the arch-chancellor, in her bedchamber. On the
whole, she had been dignified and conciliatory; once she rose to a
considerable height, pronouncing before the senate with great effect a
stirring speech composed by her husband and forwarded from his
headquarters. About her were grouped a motley council: Joseph, gentle
but efficient; Savary, underhanded and unwarlike; Clarke, working in
the war ministry like a machine; Talleyrand, secretly plotting against
Napoleon, whose title of vice-grand elector he wore with outward
suavity; Cambacérès, wise but unready; Montalivet, adroit but
cautious. Yet, while there was no one combining ability, enthusiasm,
and energy, the equipment of troops had gone on with great regularity,
and each day regiments of half-drilled, half-equipped recruits had
departed for the seat of war. The national guards who garrisoned the
city, some twelve thousand in all, had forgotten their imperialism,
having grown very sensitive to the shafts of royalist wit; yet they
held their peace and had performed the round of their duties.
Everything had outwardly been so quiet and regular that Napoleon
actually contemplated a new levy, but the emptiness of the arsenals
compelled him to dismiss the idea. Theoretically a fortified military
depot, Paris was really an antiquated fortress with arsenals of
useless weapons. Spasmodic efforts had been made to throw up redoubts
before the walls, but they had failed from lack of energy in the
military administration.
A close examination of what lay beneath the surface of Parisian
society revealed much that was dangerous. Talleyrand's house was a
nest of intrigue. Imperial prefects like Pasquier and Chabrol were
calm but perfunctory. The Talleyrand circle grew larger and bolder
every day. Moreover, it had influential members--de Pradt, Louis,
Vitrolles, Royer-Collard, Lambrecht, Grégoire, and Garat, together
with other high functionaries in all departments. Bourrienne
developed great activity as an extortioner and briber; the great
royalist irreconcilables, Montmorency, Noailles, Denfort, Fitz-James,
and Montesquiou, were less and less careful to conceal their activity.
Jaucourt, one of Joseph's chamberlains, was a spy carrying the latest
news from headquarters to the plotters. "If the Emperor were killed,"
he wrote on March seventeenth, "we should then have the King of Rome
and the regency of his mother.... The Emperor dead, we could appoint a
council which would satisfy all opinions. Burn this letter." The
program is clear when we recall that the little King of Rome was not
three years old. Napoleon was well aware of the increasing chaos, and
smartly reproved Savary from Rheims.
But Talleyrand was undaunted. At first he appears to have desired a
violent death for Napoleon, in the hope of furthering his own schemes
during a long imperial regency. At all events, he ardently opposed the
departure of the Empress and the King of Rome from Paris. Nevertheless
it was he who despatched Vitrolles, the passionate royalist, to
Nesselrode with a letter in invisible ink which, when deciphered,
turned out to be an inscrutable riddle capable of two interpretations.
"The bearer of this deserves all confidence. Hear him and know me. It
is time to be plain. You are walking on crutches; use your legs and
will to do what you can." Lannes had long before stigmatized the
unfrocked bishop as a mess of filth in a silk stocking; Murat said he
could take a kick from behind without showing it in his face; in the
last meeting of the council of state before the renewal of
hostilities, Napoleon fixed his eyes on the sphinx-like cripple and
said: "I know I am leaving in Paris other enemies than those I am
going to fight." His fellow-conspirators were scarcely less bitter in
their dislike than his avowed enemies. "You don't know the monkey,"
said Dalberg to Vitrolles; "he would not risk burning the tip of his
paw even if all the chestnuts were for himself." Yet, master of
intrigue, he pursued the even tenor of his course, scattering
innuendos, distributing showers of anonymous pamphlets, smuggling
English newspapers into the city, in fact working every wire of
conspiracy. Surprised by the minister of police in an equivocal
meeting with de Pradt, he burst out into hollow laughter, his
companion joined in the peal, and even Savary himself found the
merriment infectious.
Toward the close of March the populace displayed a perilous
sensitiveness to all these influences. The London "Times" of March
fifteenth, which was read by many in the capital, asked what pity
Blücher and the Cossacks would show to Paris on the day of their
vengeance, the editor suggesting that possibly as he wrote the famous
town was already in ashes. Such suggestions created something very
like a panic, and a week later the climax was reached. When the
fugitive peasants from the surrounding country began to take refuge in
the capital they found business at a standstill, the shops closed, the
streets deserted, the householders preparing for flight. From the
twenty-third to the twenty-eighth there was no news from Napoleon; the
Empress and council heard only of Marmont's defeat. They felt that a
decision must be taken, and finally on the twenty-eighth the imperial
officials held a council. The facts were plainly stated by Clarke; he
had but forty-three thousand men, all told, wherewith to defend the
capital, and in consequence it was determined to send the Empress and
her son to Rambouillet on the very next day. This fatal decision was
taken partly through fear, but largely in deference to Napoleon's
letter containing the classical allusion to Astyanax. The very men who
took it believed that the Parisian masses would have died for the
young Napoleon, and deplored the decision they had reached. "Behold
what a fall in history!" said Talleyrand to Savary on parting. "To
attach one's name to a few adventures instead of affixing it to an
age.... But it is not for everybody to be engulfed in the ruins of
this edifice." From that hour the restoration of the Bourbons was a
certainty.
It was a mournful procession of imperial carriages which next morning
filed slowly through the city, attracting slight attention from a few
silent onlookers, and passed on toward Rambouillet. The baby king had
shrieked and clutched at the doors as he was torn away from his
apartments in the Tuileries, and would not be appeased; his mother and
attendants were in consternation at the omen, and all thoughtful
persons who considered the situation were convinced that the
dissolution of the Empire was at hand. A deputation from the national
guard had sought in vain to dissuade the Empress from her course;
their failure and the distant booming of cannon produced widespread
depression throughout the city, which was not removed by a spirited
proclamation from Joseph declaring that his brother was on the heels
of the invaders. All the public functionaries seemed inert, and
everybody knew that, even though the populace should rise, there was
no adequate means of resistance either in men or in arms or in proper
fortifications.
Clarke alone began to display energy; with Joseph's assistance, what
preparations were possible at so late an hour were made: six companies
were formed from the recruits at hand, the national guard was put
under arms, the students of the polytechnic school were called out for
service, communication with Marmont was secured, and by late afternoon
Montmartre, Belleville, and St. Denis were feebly fortified. The
allies had been well aware that what was to be done must be done
before the dreaded Emperor should arrive, and on that same morning
their vanguard had summoned the town; but during the parley their
generals began to feel the need of greater strength, and further asked
an armistice of four hours. This was granted on the usual condition
that within its duration no troops should be moved; but the implied
promise was perfidiously broken, and at nightfall both Alexander and
Frederick William, accompanied by their forces, were in sight of the
far-famed city. Dangers, hardships, bygone insults and humiliations,
all were forgotten in a general tumult of joy, wrote Danilevsky, a
Russian officer. Alexander alone was pensive, well knowing that,
should the city hold out two days, reinforcements from the west might
make its capture impossible until Napoleon should arrive. Accordingly
he took virtual command, and issued stringent orders preparatory for
the assault early next morning.
CHAPTER X
THE FALL OF PARIS[12]
[Footnote 12: References: Müffling (genannt Weiss),
Geschichte des Feldzugs der
englisch-hannoversch-niederlandischen und braunschweigischen
Armee unter dem Fürsten Blücher im Jahre 1815. Houssaye,
1814. Mémoires of Bourrienne. Haussonville, Souvenirs.
Gervinus, Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts seit den Wien
Verträgen.]
The Battle before Paris -- The Armistice -- The Position of
Marmont -- Legitimacy and the Bourbons -- The Provisional
Government -- Napoleon's Fury -- Suggestions of Abdication --
Napoleon's New Policy Foreshadowed -- His Troops and Officers --
The Treason of Marmont -- The Marshals at Fontainebleau --
Napoleon's Despair.
From early dawn until midday on March thirtieth the fighting before
Paris was almost continuous, the assailants displaying an assurance of
victory, the defenders showing the courage of despair. Marmont and
Mortier kept their ranks in order, and the soldiers fought gallantly;
elsewhere the militia and the boys emulated each other and the
regulars in steadfastness. But when, shortly after noon, it became
evident that Paris was doomed to fall before superior force, Joseph,
as deputy emperor, issued to Marmont full powers to treat, and
followed the Empress, whom he overtook at Chartres, far beyond
Rambouillet, where she had expected to halt. She had determined, for
greater safety, to cross the Loire. At four in the afternoon the
Prussians captured Montmartre, and prepared to bombard from that
height; at the same moment the last ranks of the allied armies came
up.
Marmont felt further resistance to be useless; his line of retreat
was endangered, and he had special directions not to expose the city
to a sack. There was still abundant courage in the citizens, who stood
behind the barricades within the gates clamorous for arms and
ammunition. A messenger came galloping in with the news that Napoleon
was but half a day distant. The lookouts now and then espied some
general riding a white horse, and called, "'Tis he!" But for all the
enthusiasm, the expected "he" did not appear. Further carnage seemed
useless, since French honor had been vindicated, and when the war-worn
Marmont withdrew into the town he was received as one who had done
what man could do. Negotiations once fairly begun, the allies
abandoned the hard conditions with which they opened the parley, and
displayed a sense of great relief. Their chief representative, Count
Orloff, behaved with much consideration. Recognizing the force of the
French plea that their army was quite strong enough, if not to defend
the city another twenty-four hours, at least to contest it street by
street until, arrived at last on the left bank of the Seine, they
could regain Fontainebleau in safety, Orloff assented to what were
virtually the stipulations of Marmont and Mortier. The terms adopted
made provision for an armistice, assured kind treatment to the city,
and permitted the withdrawal of the troops.
Throughout the afternoon and evening Marmont's house was the
rendezvous of the negotiators and of the few political personages left
in the city. There was the freest talk: "Bonaparte" was conquered; the
Bourbons would be restored; what a splendid man was this Marmont! Some
weeks earlier the marshal had been significantly informed by his
brother-in-law Perregaux, a chamberlain of Napoleon's, that in case of
a restoration he and Macdonald would be spared, whatever happened to
the other great imperial leaders. Talleyrand had ostensibly taken
flight with his colleagues, but by an interesting coincidence his
coachman had sought the wrong exit from the city, and had been turned
back. That night he appeared in Marmont's presence with direct
overtures from the Bourbons. His interview was short, and he seemed to
have gained nothing; but he had an air of victory as he withdrew. He
saw that Marmont was consumed with vanity, feeling that the destinies
of France, of Napoleon, of all Europe, perhaps, were in his hands
alone. This was much. Passing through the corridors, the sly
diplomatist respectfully greeted Prince Orloff, and begged to lay his
profound respects at the feet of the Czar. "I shall not forget to lay
this blank check before his majesty," was the stinging retort.
Talleyrand smiled almost imperceptibly with his lips, and went his
way. But Alexander said on hearing the facts: "As yet this is but
anecdote; it may become history."
The triumphal entry of the allies into Paris began next morning, March
thirty-first, 1814, at seven o'clock. It was headed by Alexander and
Frederick William, now universally regarded as the Czar's satellite
king. Francis was in Dijon; he was represented by Schwarzenberg. The
three leaders, with their respective staff officers, were solemnly
received by a deputation of the municipal authorities. Their soldiers
were orderly, and there was no pillage or license. Crowds of royalists
thronged the streets acclaiming the conquerors and shouting for Louis
XVIII. Throughout the afternoon Talleyrand and Nesselrode were
closeted in the former's palace; and when, toward evening, they were
joined by the Czar and the King, both of whom had devoted the day to
ceremony, the diplomats had already agreed that France must have the
Bourbons. The sovereigns had actually been deceived by the noisy
royalist manifestations into believing that France welcomed her
invaders, and they assented to the conclusion of the ministers. A
formal meeting was instantly arranged; there were present, besides the
monarchs and their ministers, Schwarzenberg, Lichtenstein, Dalberg,
and Pozzo di Borgo. Alexander assumed the presidency, but Talleyrand,
with consummate skill, monopolized the deliberations. The Czar
suggested, as various bases for peace, Napoleon under all guaranties,
Maria Louisa as regent for the King of Rome, the Bourbons, and, it is
believed, hinted at Bernadotte or the republic as possibilities. Of
all these courses there was but one which represented the notion of
legitimacy with which Alexander had in the coalition identified
himself, and by which alone he, with his shady title, could hope to
assert authority in western Europe. This was expounded and emphasized
by the wily Talleyrand with tremendous effect. The idea of the
republic was of course relegated to oblivion; of Bernadotte there
could not well be a serious question. If France wanted a mere soldier,
she already had the foremost in the world. Napoleon still alive, the
regency would be only another name for his continued rule; the
Bourbons, and they alone, represented a principle. There was little
difficulty, therefore, in reaching the decision not to treat with
Napoleon Bonaparte or with any member of his family.
This was the great schemer's first stroke; his second was equally
brilliant: the servile senate was appointed to create a provisional
government and to construct a new constitution, to be guaranteed by
the allies. That body, however obsequious, was still French; even the
extreme radicals, as represented by Lainé of Bordeaux, had to
acknowledge this. The new and subservient administration was at work
within twenty-four hours; Talleyrand, with his two creatures, Dalberg
and Jaucourt; Montesquiou, the royalist; and Beurnonville, a
recalcitrant imperialist, constituting the executive commission. Two
days later the legislature was summoned, and seventy-nine deputies
responded. After considerable debate they pronounced Napoleon
overthrown for having violated the constitution. The municipal council
and the great imperial offices, with their magistrates, gave their
assent. The heart of the city appeared to have been transformed: on
the street, at the theater, everywhere the white Bourbon cockades and
ribbons burst forth like blossoms in a premature spring. But outside
the focus of agitation, and in the suburbs, the populace murmured, and
sometimes exhibited open discontent. In proportion to the distance
west and south, the country was correspondingly imperial, obeying the
imperial regency now established at Blois, which was summoning
recruits, issuing stirring proclamations, and keeping up a brave show.
In a way, therefore, France for the moment had three governments, that
of the allies, that of the regency, and that of Napoleon himself.
When, in the latest hours of March thirtieth, Napoleon met Belliard,
and heard the disastrous report of what had happened, he gave full
vent to a frightful outburst of wrath. As he said himself in calmer
moments, such was his anger at that time, that he never seemed to have
known anger before. Forgetful of all his own shortcomings, he raged
against others with a fury bordering on insanity, and could find no
language vile or blasphemous enough wherewith to stigmatize Joseph and
Clarke. In utter self-abandonment, he demanded a carriage. There were
noise and bustle in the stable. With a choked, hoarse voice the
seeming maniac called peremptorily for haste. No vehicle appeared.
Probably Caulaincourt had dared to cross his Emperor's command for the
sake of his Emperor's safety. Finally Napoleon strode forth into the
darkness toward Paris. Questioning and storming as he walked, he
denounced his two marshals for their haste in surrendering. His
attendants reasoned in vain until, a mile beyond La Cour de France,
Mortier's vanguard was met marching away under the terms of the
convention, and Napoleon knew that he was face to face with doom; to
advance farther would mean imprisonment or worse. General Flahaut was
therefore sent to seek Marmont's advice, and Caulaincourt hurried away
to secure an audience with the Czar. There were still wild hopes which
would not die. Perhaps the capitulation was not yet signed, perhaps
Caulaincourt could gain time if nothing else, perhaps by sounding the
tocsin and illuminating the town the populace and national guard would
be led to rise and aid the army. The reply from Marmont came as
swiftly as only discouraging news can come; the situation, he said,
was hopeless, the public depressed by the flight of the court, the
national guard worthless; he was coming in with the twenty thousand
troops still left to himself and Mortier. Napoleon, now calm and
collected, issued careful orders for the two marshals to take position
between the Essonne and the Seine, their left on the former stream,
their right on the latter, the whole position protected by these
rivers on the flanks, and by the Yonne in the rear. It was clear there
was to be a great battle under the walls of Paris. Macdonald was the
only general who advised it; Berthier, Drouot, Belliard, Flahaut, and
Gourgaud all wished to return into Lorraine; but the divisions were
coming in swiftly, and in the short midnight hour before returning to
Fontainebleau, Napoleon's decision was taken.
On the afternoon of April first the Emperor rode from Fontainebleau to
Marmont's headquarters. While he was in the very act of
congratulating Marmont on his gallantry, the commissioners who had
signed the capitulation arrived and opened their budget of news. They
told of the formal entry by the allies, of their resolution not to
treat with Napoleon, and declared that the white cockade of the
Bourbons was everywhere visible. Napoleon grew pensive and somber as
he listened, and then, almost without speaking, rode sadly back to
Fontainebleau. Next morning he was cheerful again, and as he stepped
into the White Horse court of the palace at the hour of guard-mounting
two battalions cheered him enthusiastically. His step was elastic, his
countenance lighted with the old fire; the onlookers said, "It is the
Napoleon of Potsdam and Schönbrunn." But in the afternoon Caulaincourt
returned, and the sky seemed darkened; the Czar had listened to the
envoy's eloquence only so far as to take into consideration once again
the question of peace with the Empire under a regency; as a condition
antecedent, Napoleon must abdicate.
The stricken man could not hear his faithful servant's report with
equanimity. He restrained his violent impulses, but used harsh words.
Soon it seemed as if ideas of a strange and awful form were mastering
him, the gloomy interview was ended, and the Emperor dismissed his
minister. For such a disease as his there was no remedy but action;
next morning two divisions, one each of the old and young guard,
arrived, and they were drawn up for review. Napoleon, in splendid garb
and with a brilliant suite, in which were two marshals, Ney and
Moncey, went through the ceremony. At its close he gathered the
officers present into a group, and explained the situation in his old
incisive phrase and vibrating tones, closing with the words: "In a few
days I am going to attack Paris; can I count on you?" There was dead
silence. "Am I right?" rang out, in a final exhausting effort, the
moving call of the great actor. Then at last came the hearty, ringing
response so breathlessly expected. "They were silent," said General
Petit in gentle tones, "because it seemed needless to reply." Napoleon
continued: "We will show them if the French nation be master in their
own house, that if we have long been masters in the dwellings of
others we will always be so in our own." As the officers scattered to
their posts and repeated the "little corporal's" words, the old
"growlers," as men had come to call the veterans of the Empire, gave
another cheer. The bands played the two great hymns of victory, the
"Marseillaise" and the "Chant du Départ," as the ranks moved away.
Napoleon must now have certain clear conceptions. Except Mortier,
Drouot, and Gérard, his great officers were disaffected; but the
ambitious minor generals were still his devoted slaves. The army was
thoroughly imperialist, partly because they represented the nation as
a whole, partly because they were under the Emperor's spell. Of such
troops he appeared to have at hand sixty thousand, distributed as
follows: Marmont, twelve thousand five hundred; Mortier, six thousand;
Macdonald, two thousand seven hundred; Oudinot, five thousand five
hundred; Gérard, three thousand; Ney, two thousand three hundred;
Drouot, nine thousand; and about eleven thousand six hundred guard and
other cavalry. Besides these, there were sixteen hundred Poles, two
thousand two hundred and fifty recruits, and fifteen hundred men in
the garrisons of Fontainebleau and Mélun. Farther away were
considerable forces in Sens, Tours, Blois, and Orléans, eight thousand
in all; and still farther the armies of Soult, Suchet, Augereau, and
Maison. Although the allies had lost nine thousand men before Paris,
they had quickly called up reinforcements, and had about a hundred and
forty thousand men in readiness to fight. This situation may not have
been entirely discouraging to the devotee of a dark destiny, to which
as a hapless worshiper he had lately commenced to give the name of
Providence. Be that as it may, when Macdonald arrived on the morning
of the fourth the dispositions for battle had been carefully studied
and arranged; every corps was ordered to its station. As usual,
Napoleon appeared about noon for the ceremony of guard-mounting, and
the troops acclaimed him as usual. But a few paces distant from him
stood the marshals and higher generals in a little knot, their heads
close bunched, their tongues running, their glances averted. From out
of this group rang the thunderous voice of Ney: "Nothing but the
abdication can draw us out of this." Napoleon started, regained his
self-control, pretended not to hear the crushing menace, and withdrew
to his work-room.
Concurrent with the resolve of the marshals at Fontainebleau ran the
actual treason of one who alone was more important to Napoleon's cause
than all of them. "I am ready to leave, with my troops, the army of
the Emperor Napoleon on the following conditions, of which I demand
from you a written guaranty," are the startling words from a letter of
Marmont to the Czar, dated the previous day. On April first agents of
the provisional government had made arrangements with a discredited
nobleman named Maubreuil for the assassination of Napoleon; the next
day Schwarzenberg introduced into the French lines newspapers and
copies of a proclamation explaining that the action of the senate and
of all France had released the soldiers from their oaths. Marmont
forwarded the documents he received to Berthier, and while most of the
officers flung their copies away in contemptuous scorn, some read and
pondered. On April third an emissary from Schwarzenberg appeared at
Marmont's headquarters, and what he said was spoken to willing ears.
Still under the influence of the homage he had received in Paris, the
vain marshal saw himself repeating the rôle of Monk; he beheld France
at peace, prosperity restored, social order reëstablished, and himself
extolled as a true patriot--all this if only he pursued the easy line
of self-interest, whereby he would not merely retain his duchy, but
also secure the new honors and emoluments which would be showered on
him. So he yielded on condition that his troops should withdraw
honorably into Normandy, and that Napoleon should be allowed to enjoy
life and liberty within circumscribed limits fixed by the allied
powers and France. Next morning, the fourth, came Schwarzenberg's
assent, and Marmont at once set about suborning his officers; at four
in the afternoon arrived an embassy from Fontainebleau on its way to
Paris. The officers composing it desired to see Marmont.
The informal meeting held in the courtyard at Fontainebleau was a
historical event. Its members chatted about the course taken by the
senate, about Caulaincourt's mission, and discussed in particular the
suggestion of abdication. The marshals and great generals, long since
disgusted with campaigning, wounded in their dignity by the Emperor's
rebukes, and attributing their recent failures to the wretched quality
of the troops assigned to them, were eager for peace, and yearned to
enjoy their hard-earned fortunes. They caught at the seductive idea
presented by Caulaincourt. The abdication of Napoleon would mean the
perpetuation of the Empire. The Empire would be not merely peace, but
peace with what war had gained; to wit, the imperial court and
society, the preservation and enjoyment of estates, the continuity of
processes which had done so much to regenerate France and make her a
modern nation. The prospect was irresistible, and Ney only expressed
the grim determination of his colleagues when he gave the watchword so
unexpectedly at the mounting of the guard. When Napoleon entered his
cabinet he found there Berthier, Maret, Caulaincourt, and Bertrand.
Concealing his agitation, he began the routine of such familiar labors
as impend on the eve of battle. Almost instantly hurrying footsteps
were heard in the corridor, the door was burst open, and on the
threshold stood Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot, and Macdonald. The leader of
the company quailed an instant under the Emperor's gaze, and then
gruffly demanded if there were news from Paris. No, was the reply--a
deliberate falsehood, since the decree of the senate had arrived the
night before. "Well, then, I have some," roared Ney, and told the
familiar facts.
At Nogent, six weeks earlier, Ney and Oudinot had endeavored to bully
Napoleon in a similar way; then they were easily cowed. But now
Napoleon's manner was conciliatory and his speech argumentative. Long
and eloquently he set forth his situation. Enumerating all the forces
immediately and remotely at his disposal, describing minutely the plan
of attack which Macdonald had stamped with his approval, explaining
the folly of the course pursued by the allies, contrasting the perils
of their situation with the advantages of his own, he sought to
justify his assurance of victory. The eloquence of a Napoleon, calm,
collected, clear, but pleading for the power which was dearer to him
than life, can only be imagined. But his arguments fell on deaf ears;
not one of his audience gave any sign of emotion. Macdonald was the
only one present not openly committed, and he too was sullen; during
the last twenty-four hours he had received, through Marmont, a letter
from Beurnonville, the contents of which, though read to Napoleon
then and there, have not been transmitted to posterity. What happened
or what was said thereafter is far from certain, so conflicting and so
biased are the accounts of those present. Contemporaries thought that
in this crisis, when Ney declared the army would obey its officers and
would not march to Paris in obedience to the Emperor, there were
menacing gestures which betrayed a more or less complete purpose of
assassination on the part of some. If so, Napoleon was never greater;
for, commanding a calm by his dignified self-restraint, he dismissed
the faithless officers one and all. They went, and he was left alone
with Caulaincourt to draw up the form of his abdication.
CHAPTER XI
NAPOLEON'S FIRST ABDICATION[13]
[Footnote 13: References: Campbell, Sir Neil, Napoleon at
Fontainebleau and Elba, being a journal of occurrences in
1814-1815, with notes of conversations. Laborde, Napoléon et
sa garde, ou relation du voyage de Fontainebleau à l'île
d'Elbe en 1814, etc. Ussher, A narrative of events connected
with the first abdication of Napoleon, his embarkation at
Fréjus and voyage to Elba on board his majesty's ship
_Undaunted_; his embarkation at Elba on board the Elbese brig
of war _l'Inconstant_; and a journal of his extraordinary
march to Paris, narrated by Colonel Laborde, who accompanied
the Emperor on that occasion. Waldburg, L. F. Graf Truchsess
von, Napoleon Bonaparte's Reise von Fontainebleau nach Fréjus
vom 17-29 April, 1814.]
The Meaning of Napoleon's Abdication -- The Paper and its Bearers
-- Progress of Marmont's Conspiracy -- Alexander Influenced by
Napoleon's Embassy -- Marmont's Soldiers Betrayed -- Marmont's
Reputation and Fate -- Napoleon's Scheme for a Last Stroke --
Revolt of the Marshals -- Napoleon's First Attempt at Suicide --
Unconditional Abdication -- Restoration of the Bourbons --
Napoleon's New Realm -- Flight of the Napoleons -- Good-by to
France, but not Farewell.
There is no doubt that Napoleon sincerely and dearly loved his
"growlers"; there is no doubt that with grim humor he constantly
circumvented and used them for his own ends; even in his agony he
contemplated a course which, leaving them convinced of their success,
would yet render their action of no effect. After a short conference
with his minister he took a pen and wrote: "The allied powers having
declared the Emperor Napoleon to be the sole obstacle to the
establishment of peace in Europe, and since the Emperor cannot
assuredly, without violating his oath, surrender any one of the
departments which were united with France when he ascended the throne,
the Emperor Napoleon declares himself ready to abdicate and leave
France, even to lay down his life for the welfare of his country and
for the preservation of the rights of his son the King, of the
Empress-regent, and of the laws and institutions, which shall be
subject to no change until the definite conclusion of peace and while
foreign armies stand upon our soil."
But these words carried too plainly a meaning which was not intended
to be conspicuous, and the paper, as finally written and executed,
runs as follows: "The allied powers having declared the Emperor
Napoleon to be the sole obstacle to the reëstablishment of peace in
Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he
is ready to descend from the throne, to leave France, and even to lay
down his life for the good of the country, [which is] inseparable from
the rights of his son, from those of the Empress's regency, and from
the laws of the Empire." Who should constitute the embassy to present
the document to the Czar? Caulaincourt, of course, would necessarily
be one; Ney, dangerous if thwarted, must be the second; and the third?
Marmont certainly, was Napoleon's first thought, and he ordered full
powers to be made out for him. But on second thought he felt that his
aide-de-camp in Egypt, his trusted friend from then onward, his
confidential adviser, "brought up in his tent," as he said, might
injure the cause as being too certainly influenced by personal
considerations. Macdonald, therefore, was named in his stead. The
embassy should, however, pass by Essonnes, and if Marmont desired to
go he might send back for his credentials.
This was the company which, arriving about four in the afternoon at
Marmont's headquarters, presented Napoleon's message. The busy
conspirator was stunned, but he had already won at least five of his
generals--Souham, Merlin, Digeon, Ledru des Essarts, and Megnadier,
his chief of staff; the tide of treason was in full flow, and could
not be stemmed. Should the Czar assent to the regency, where would
Marmont be? Or, on the other hand, should Napoleon learn the truth,
there was no question but that a few hours might see the emulator of
Monk a corpse. In quick decision, the traitorous marshal confessed the
steps already taken, and then at the loud cry of reprobation with
which his statement was met, he falsely asserted that he was not yet
committed, and demanded to join the embassy. The others, willing to
remove their colleague from further temptation, assented; and Souham
was left in command, with strict injunctions to inform the troops of
Napoleon's abdication, but to take no further steps. At
Schwarzenberg's headquarters Marmont found means to betray the
situation to that general. The Austrian, by Marmont's own account,
absolved his fellow-intriguer from all engagements so far made; but
somehow that very evening about nine Talleyrand knew the whole story,
and hastening, pale with terror, to Alexander's presence, poured out a
bitter remonstrance against the regency. The Czar listened, but
contemptuously dismissed the petitioner with the non-committal remark
that no one would repent having trusted him.
It was almost midnight when Alexander gave audience to the embassy.
Marmont was not of the number, having slunk away in guilty uneasiness
to await the event at Ney's house. To Caulaincourt, as the spokesman
of the Empire, the Czar listened attentively and sympathetically. He
now felt himself to have taken a false step when, five days earlier,
he had virtually assented to the restoration of the Bourbons. In the
interval their cause had steadily grown more and more unpopular;
neither people nor soldiers, not even the national guard, would give
any declaration of adherence to the acts of the provisional
government; the imperial army, on the other hand, stood firm. His own
and Russia's honor having been redeemed, the earlier instincts of
hatred for absolutism had returned; the feeling that the Empire was
better for his purposes than any dynasty welled up as he listened to
Caulaincourt's powerful argument that France as a nation, and her
undivided army, alike desired the regency. In fact, the listener
wavered so much that, two days later, Ney and Macdonald asserted their
belief that at a certain instant their cause had been won.
But at two in the morning an aide-de-camp entered and spoke a few
words in Russian. The Czar gave a startled attention, and the officer
repeated his words. "Gentlemen," said the monarch, "you base your
claim on the unshaken attachment of the army to the imperial
government. The vanguard of Napoleon's army has just deserted. It is
at this moment within our lines." The news was true. The announcement
of Napoleon's abdication had spread consternation among Marmont's men,
and they were seriously demoralized. When a routine message came from
Fontainebleau requiring Souham's presence there, his guilty conscience
made him tremble; and when Gourgaud requested an interview the uneasy
general foresaw his own arrest and was terror-stricken. Summoning the
others who, like himself, were partly committed, he told his fears,
and the soldiers were ordered under arms. Toward midnight the march
began. Ignorant at first of whither they were going, the men were
silent; but finding themselves before long between two Austrian lines,
they hooted their officers. Thereupon they were told that they were
to fight beside these same Austrians in defense of the Empire, and,
believing the lie, were reconciled.
Arriving finally at Versailles, and learning the truth, they mutinied;
but Marmont soon appeared, and partly cowed them, partly persuaded
them to bend before necessity. After learning of Souham's deed he had
hurried to the Czar's antechamber. In an adjoining room were assembled
the members of the provisional government. Like Marmont, they had
learned the result of Souham's efforts and had regained their
equanimity. After grasping the appalling fact that twelve thousand
men, the whole sixth corps, with arms and baggage, were prisoners
within the Austrian lines, of course there had been nothing left for
Caulaincourt and the marshals but to withdraw. With much embarrassment
the Czar promised an answer to their request on the following
afternoon. All knew that the knell of the Empire had struck. To the
waiting royalists it seemed a fit moment for pleasantry as the members
of the embassy came filing out with stony gaze. The thwarted
imperialists sternly repulsed their tormentors. Marmont breathed hard
as his colleagues passed without a glimpse of recognition, and
murmured: "I would give an arm if this had not happened." "An arm?
Sir, say your head," rejoined Macdonald, bitterly. For some time after
the first Restoration Marmont was a hero, but soon his vanity and true
character combined to bring out his conduct into clear view, and from
his title of Ragusa was coined the word "ragusade" as a synonym for
treason. During the "Hundred Days" his name was of course stricken
from the list of marshals. Loaded with honors in the second
Restoration, he proved a second time faithless, and in 1830 betrayed
his trust to the republicans. The people called him "Judas," and he
died in exile, honored by nobody.
There can be little doubt of Napoleon's conviction that his offer to
abdicate would be rejected by Alexander. No sooner was it signed than,
with his characteristic astuteness, he set about preparing an
alternative course. At once he despatched a messenger requesting the
Empress to send Champagny immediately to Dijon as an ambassador to
intercede with her father. Then, on April fourth, he summoned a
conclave of his officers to secure their assent to the battle which he
believed inevitable. It was the call to this meeting which had
stampeded Souham and his colleagues in desertion. The greater officers
being absent from Fontainebleau, the minor ones were unanimous and
hearty in their support of Napoleon's plans. But at the very close of
the session came the news of what had happened at Essonnes. When
finally assured of every detail, Napoleon took measures at once to
repair as best he could the breaches in his defense, saying of Marmont
quietly and without a sign of panic: "Unhappy man, he will be more
unhappy than I." Only a few days before he had declared to
Caulaincourt: "There are no longer any who play fair except my poor
soldiers and their officers that are neither princes nor dukes nor
counts. It is an awful thing to say, but it is true. Do you know what
I ought to do? Send all these noble lords of yesterday to sleep in
their beds of down, to strut about in their castles. I ought to rid
myself of these frondeurs, and begin the war once more with men of
youthful, unsullied courage." He was partly prepared, therefore, even
for the defection of Marmont. Next morning, on the fifth, was issued
the ablest proclamation ever penned by him; at noon the veterans from
Spain were reviewed, and in the afternoon began the movements
necessary to array beyond the Loire what remained of the army and
rally it about the seat of imperial government. But at nine the
embassy returned from Paris with its news--the Czar had refused to
accept the abdication; the senate was about to proclaim Louis XVIII;
Napoleon was to reign thereafter over the little isle of Elba. To this
the undaunted Emperor calmly rejoined that war henceforth offered
nothing worse than peace, and began at once to explain his plans.
But he was interrupted--exactly how we cannot tell; for, though the
embassy returned as it left, in a body, the memoirs of each member
strive to convey the impression that it was he alone who said and did
everything. If only the narrative attributed to Caulaincourt were of
undoubted authenticity, cumulative evidence might create certitude;
but it is not. The sorry tale of what probably occurred makes clear
that all three were now royalists more or less ardent, for in passing
they had concluded a truce with Schwarzenberg on that basis. Macdonald
asserts that his was the short and brutal response to Napoleon's
exhibition of his plans; to wit, that they must have an abdication
without conditions. Ney was quite as savage, declaring that the
confidence of the army was gone. Napoleon at first denounced such
mutiny, but then, with seeming resignation, promised an answer next
day. He did not yet know that in secret convention the generals were
resolving not to obey the orders issued for the morrow; but as the
door closed behind the marshals the mind so far clear seemed suddenly
eclipsed, and murmuring, "These men have neither heart nor bowels; I
am conquered less by fortune than by the egotism and ingratitude of my
companions in arms," the great, homeless citizen of the world sank
into utter dejection.
It appears to have been a fixed purpose with Napoleon never to fall
alive into his enemy's hands. Although they acted under legal forms,
yet some European monarchs of the eighteenth century were no more
trustworthy in dealing with foes than their great prototype Julius
Cæsar in his faithlessness to a certain canton of the Helvetians. They
did not display sufficient surprise when enemies were assassinated.
Since 1808 the European colossus had worn about his neck as a kind of
amulet a little bag which was said to contain a deadly poison, one of
the salts of prussic acid. During the night, when the terrors of a
shaken reason overpowered him, he swallowed the drug. Whether it had
lost its efficacy, or whether the agitated victim of melancholy did
not take the entire dose, in either case the effects were imperfect.
Instead of oblivion came agony, and his valet, rushing to his master's
bedside at the sound of a bitter cry, claimed to catch the words:
"Marmont has struck me the final blow! Unhappy man, I loved him!
Berthier's desertion has broken my heart! My old friends, my comrades
in arms!" Ivan, the Emperor's body physician, was summoned, and
administered an antidote; the spasm was allayed, and after a short
sleep reason resumed her seat. It is related in the memoirs of
Caulaincourt, and probably with a sort of Homeric truth, that when the
minister was admitted in the early morning, Napoleon's "wan and sunken
eyes seemed struggling to recall the objects round about; a universe
of torture was revealed in the vaguely desolate look." Napoleon is
reported as saying: "God did not will it. I could not die. Why did
they not let me die? It is not the loss of the throne that makes
existence unendurable; my military career suffices for the glory of a
single man. Do you know what is more difficult to bear than the
reverses of fortune? It is the baseness, the horrible ingratitude, of
men. Before such acts of cowardice, before the shamelessness of their
egotism, I have turned away my head in disgust and have come to
regard my life with horror.... Death is rest.... Rest at last.... What
I have suffered for twenty days no one can understand."
What throws some shadow on this account is the fact that on the
following morning Napoleon appeared outwardly well and perfectly calm
when he assembled his marshals and made a final appeal. It is certain,
from the testimony of his secretary and his physician, that he had
been violently ill, but the sobriety of the remaining chronicle is to
be doubted. Possibly, too, the empty sachet had contained a
preparation of opium intended to relieve sharp attacks like that at
Pirna; but in view of the second attempt at suicide made after
Waterloo, this is not likely. Yet the circumstances may easily have
been exaggerated; for the evident motive of what has been called the
imperial legend is to heighten all the effects in the Napoleonic
picture. Whatever was the truth as to that gloomy night, Napoleon's
appeal next morning, though eloquent, was in vain; the marshals were
unshaken in their determination, though less bitter and violent in
their language. "You deserve repose," were the Emperor's last words to
them; "well, then, take it." Thereupon the act of unconditional
abdication was written in these words: "The allied powers having
declared the Emperor Napoleon to be the sole obstacle to the
reëstablishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to
his oath, declares that for himself and his heirs he renounces the
thrones of France and of Italy, because there is no personal sacrifice
which he is not ready to make for the welfare of the nation." These
last words were, after some consideration, erased, and the phrase "in
the interest of France" was substituted for them. Some think, and it
may well be true, that this change of form, taken in connection with
Napoleon's calmness, was another proof of his deep purpose. Unable to
thwart his "growlers," he may have recollected that once before he had
crossed the Mediterranean to give a feeble government full scope for
its own destruction. France might easily recall her favorite son in
her own interest. He was scarcely more than forty-four, a young man
still, and this he probably recalled as he made ready to play a new
rôle.
Armed with the document necessary to secure his pardon, Ney hurried
back to the capital. The elderly, well-meaning, but obtuse Louis XVIII
was immediately proclaimed king by the senate. Having "learned
nothing, and forgotten nothing," he accepted the throne, making
certain concessions to the new France, sufficient, as he hoped, to
secure at least the momentary support of the people. The haste to join
the white standard made by men on whom Napoleon's adventurous career
had heaped honor and wealth is unparalleled in history. Jourdan,
Augereau, Maison, Lagrange, Nansouty, Oudinot, Kellermann, Lefebvre,
Hulin, Milhaud, Latour-Maubourg, Ségur, Berthier, Belliard--such were
the earliest names. Among the soldiers near by some bowed to the new
order, but among the garrisons there was such widespread mutiny that
royalist hate was kindled again and fanned to white heat by the scoffs
and jeers of the outraged men. Their behavior was the outward sign of
a temper not universal, of course, but very common among the people.
At Paris both the King and the King's brother were cheered on their
formal entry, but many discriminating onlookers prophesied that the
Bourbons could not remain long.
Fully aware that Napoleon was yet a power in France, and challenged by
the marshals to display a chivalric spirit in providing for the
welfare of their former monarch, Alexander gave full play to his
generous impulses. His first suggestion was that his fallen foe
should accept a home and complete establishment in Russia; but this
would have been to ignore the other members of the coalition. It was
determined finally to provide the semblance of an empire, the forms of
state, and an imperial income, and to make the former Emperor the
guest of all Europe. The idea was quixotic, but Napoleon was not a
prisoner; he had done nothing worthy of degradation, and throughout
the civilized world he was still regarded by vast numbers as the
savior of European society, who had fallen into the hands of cruel
oppressors. The paper which was finally drawn up was a treaty between
Napoleon, for the time and purposes of the instrument a private
citizen, as one party, and the four sovereign states of Austria,
Prussia, Russia, and England as the other. It had, therefore, no
sanction except the public opinion of France and the good faith of
those who executed it, the former being bound by her allies to a
contract made by them. It was France which was to pay Napoleon two
millions of francs a year, and leave him to reign undisturbed over
Elba; the allies granted Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla as a realm in
perpetuity to Maria Louisa and her heirs, through the King of Rome, as
her successors. The agreement was unique, but so were the
circumstances which brought it to pass. There was but one important
protest, and that was made by Castlereagh in regard to the word
Napoleon and the imperial style! His protest was vain, but to this day
many among the greatest of his countrymen persistently employ
"Bonaparte" in speaking of the greater, and "Napoleon" in designating
the lesser, of the two men who have ruled France as emperors.
Four commissioners, one from each of the powers, proceeded to
Fontainebleau. They were careful to treat Napoleon with the
consideration due to an emperor. To all he was courteous, except
to the representative of Prussia, Count Truchsess-Waldburg, whose
presence he declared unnecessary, since there were to be no
Prussian troops on the southern road toward Elba. With Colonel
Campbell, the British commissioner, he was most friendly,
conversing enthusiastically with the Scotch officer about the
Scotch poet known as Ossian. What was particularly admired in his
remarkable outpourings was their warlike tone. As the preparations
for departure went forward, it became clear that of all the
imperial dignitaries only Bertrand and Drouot would accompany the
exile. The others he dismissed with characteristic and appropriate
farewells: to Caulaincourt he assigned a gift of five hundred
thousand francs from the treasure at Blois; Constant, the valet,
and Rustan, the Mameluke, were dismissed at their own desire, but
not empty-handed. For his line of travel, and for a hundred
baggage-wagons loaded with books, furniture, and objects of art,
Napoleon stipulated with the utmost nicety and persistence. With
every hour he showed greater and greater anxiety for his personal
safety. Indifferent to life but a few short days before, he was now
timid and over-anxious. If he had been playing a part and pondering
what in a few years, perhaps months, his life and person might
again be worth in European politics, he could not have been more
painstaking as to measures for his personal safety. The stoic could
have recourse to the bowl, the eighteenth-century enthusiast must
live and hope to the last. Napoleon seems to have struggled for the
union of both characters. "They blame me that I can outlive my
fall," he remarked. "Wrongfully.... It is much more courageous to
survive unmerited bad fortune." Only once he seemed overpowered,
being observed, as he sat at table, to strike his forehead and
murmur: "God, is it possible?" Sometimes, too, he appeared to be
lost in reverie, and when addressed started like one awakened from
a dream. All was ready on the twentieth; but the Empress, who by
the terms of the "treaty" was to accompany her consort as far as
the harbor of St. Tropez, did not appear. Napoleon declared that
she had been kidnapped, and refused to stir, threatening to
withdraw his abdication. Koller, the Austrian commissioner, assured
him of the truth, that she had resolved of her free will not to be
present. In the certainty that all was over, the Empress had
determined to take refuge with her father, and the imperial
government at Blois had dispersed, Joseph and Jerome flying to
Switzerland.
The announcement staggered Napoleon, but he replied with words
destined to have great significance: "Very well; I shall remain
faithful to my promise; but if I have new reasons to complain, I shall
consider myself absolved." Further, he touched on various topics as if
seeking to talk against time, remarking that Francis had impiously
sought the dissolution of his daughter's marriage; that Russia and
Prussia had made Austria's position dangerous; that the Czar and
Frederick William had shown little delicacy in visiting Maria Louisa
at Rambouillet; that he himself was no usurper; and that he had been
wrong not to make peace at Prague or Dresden. Then, suddenly changing
tone and topic, he asked with interest what would occur if Elba
refused to accept him. Koller thought he might still take refuge in
England. Napoleon rejoined that he had thought of that; but, having
always sought to do England harm, would the English make him welcome?
Koller replied that, as all the projects against her welfare had come
to naught, England would feel no bitterness. Finally, about noon
Napoleon descended into the courtyard, where the few grenadiers of the
old guard were drawn up. The officers, commissioned and
non-commissioned, were called forward, and in a few touching words
their former leader thanked all who had remained true for their
loyalty. With their aid he could have continued the war beyond the
Loire, but he had preferred to sacrifice his personal interests to
those of France. "Continue to serve France," runs the Napoleonic text
of this fine address: but the commissioners thought they heard "to
serve the sovereign which the nation has chosen." He could have ended
his life, he went on to say, but he wished to live and record for
posterity the great deeds of his warriors. Then he embraced Petit, the
commanding officer, and, snatching to his breast the imperial eagle,
his standard in so many glorious battles, he pressed it to his lips,
and entered the waiting carriage. A swelling sob burst from the ranks,
and tears bedewed the weather-beaten cheeks of men who had not wept
for years.
CHAPTER XII
THE EMPEROR OF ELBA[14]
[Footnote 14: References: Czartoryski, Memoirs, Vol. II.
Houssaye, Napoléon à l'île d'Elbe, in Revue historique, tom.
51, pp. 1-25, Paris, 1893. Ussher, Napoleon's Last Voyage.
Peyrusse: Mémorial.]
Napoleon and the Popular Frenzy -- Serious Dangers Incurred --
The Exile under the British Flag -- The Voyage to Elba -- The
Napoleonic Court at Porto Ferrajo -- Mysterious Visitors --
Estrangement of Maria Louisa -- Napoleon's "Isle of Repose" --
The Congress of Vienna -- Its Violation of Treaty Agreement --
Discontent in France -- Revival of Imperialism -- Bitterness of
the Army -- Intrigues against the Bourbons -- Napoleon's Behavior
-- His Fears of Assassination.
[Sidenote: 1814-15]
Napoleon's journey to Elba was a series of disenchantments. As has
been said, he had stipulated in his "treaty" that the Empress should
accompany him to St. Tropez, where he was to embark. Her absence, he
persisted in declaring, was explicable only by forced detention; and
he again talked of withdrawing his abdication at this breach of the
engagements made by the allies. But he grew more composed, and the
journey was sufficiently comfortable as far as Lyons. Occasionally
during that portion of it there were outbursts of good feeling from
those who stopped to see his train pass by. But in descending the
Rhone there was a marked change. As the Provençals had been the
radicals of the Revolution, so now they were the devotees of the
Restoration. The flood of disreputable calumny had broken loose: men
said the Emperor's mother was a loose woman, his father a butcher, he
himself but a bastard, his true name Nicholas. "Down with Bonaparte!
down with Nicholas!" was too often the derisive shout as he traversed
the villages. Maubreuil, the hired assassin, was hurrying from Paris
with a desperate band, ostensibly to recover crown jewels or
government funds which might be among Napoleon's effects. Recalling
Alexander's boast that his best servants had been found among the
assassins of his father, and recollecting that Francis sighed to
Metternich for Napoleon's exile to a far-distant land, Elba being too
near to France and to Europe, it is conceivable that Talleyrand might
reckon on the moral support of the dynasties in conniving at
Napoleon's assassination. Had he forgotten the murder of Enghien?
Probably not; but his conscience was not over-tender. Near Valence, on
April twenty-fourth, the imperial procession met Augereau's carriage.
The arch-republican of Napoleon's earlier career had given his
adhesion to the new government, and had been retained in office. He
alighted, the ex-Emperor likewise: the latter exhibited all the
ordinary forms of politeness, the former studiously disdained them.
Napoleon, with nice irony, asked if the general were on his way to
court. The thrust went home, but in a gruff retort Augereau, using the
insulting "thou," declared with considerable embarrassment that he
cared no more for the Bourbons than for Napoleon; that he had no
motive for his conduct except love for his country.
Partly by good fortune, partly by good management, the cortège avoided
the infuriated bands who, in various places, had sworn to take the
fallen Emperor's life. At Avignon his escape was almost miraculous.
Near Orgon a mob of royalists beset the carriage, and Napoleon shrank
in pallid terror behind Bertrand, cowering there until the immediate
danger was removed by his Russian escort. A few miles out he donned a
postilion's uniform and rode post through the town. At Saint-Cannat he
would not touch a morsel of food for fear of poison. Rumors of the
bitter feeling prevalent at Aix led him for further protection to
clothe one of his aides in his own too familiar garb. In that town he
was violently ill, somewhat as he had been at Fontainebleau. The
attack yielded easily to remedies, and the Prussian commissioner
asserted that it was due to a loathsome disease. Thereafter the
hounded fugitive wore an Austrian uniform, and sat in the Austrian
commissioner's carriage; thus disguised, the Emperor of Elba seemed to
feel secure. From Luc onward the company was protected by Austrian
hussars; but in spite of these military jailers, mob violence became
stronger from day to day in each successive town. Napoleon grew
morbid, and the line of travel was changed from the direction of St.
Tropez to that of Fréjus in order to avoid the ever-increasing danger.
The only alleviation in the long line of ills was a visit from his
light and giddy but affectionate sister Pauline, the Princess
Borghese, who comforted him and promised to share his exile. At length
Fréjus was reached, and Napoleon resumed his composure as he saw an
English frigate and a French brig lying in the harbor. Perhaps the
beautiful view recalled to an outcast monarch the return, in 1799, of
one General Bonaparte, who had landed on the same shore to overthrow
the Directory. If not, it must have been due to unwonted dejection or
dark despair.
Again Napoleon remarked a breach of his treaty. He was to have
sailed from St. Tropez in a corvette; here was only a brig.
Accordingly, as if to mark an intentional slight, in reality for his
safety and comfort, he asked and obtained permission to embark on
the English frigate, the _Undaunted_, as the guest of her captain.
The promised corvette was at St. Tropez awaiting its passenger, but
the hasty change of plan had made it impossible to bring her around
in time. Possibly for this reason, too, the baggage of Napoleon had
been much diminished in quantity; and of this he complained also, as
being a breach of his treaty. His farewell to the Russian and
Prussian commissioners was brief and dignified; the Austrian hussars
paid full military honors to the party; and as the Emperor,
accompanied by the English and Austrian commissioners, embarked, a
salvo of twenty-four guns rang out from the _Undaunted_. Already he
had begun to eulogize England and her civilization, and to behave as
if throwing himself on the good faith of an English gentleman,
exactly as a defeated knight would throw himself on the chivalric
courtesy of his conqueror. This appearance of distinguished
treatment heightened his self-satisfaction. His attendants said that
once again he was "all emperor."
It was a serious blow when, on passing aboard ship, he discovered that
the salutes had been in recognition of the commissioners, and that the
polite but decided Captain Ussher was determined to treat his
illustrious guest with the courtesy due to a private gentleman, and
with that alone. Although chafing at times during the voyage against
the restrictions of naval discipline, Napoleon submitted gracefully,
and wore a subdued air. This was his first contact with English
customs: sometimes they interested him; frequently, as in the matter
of after-dinner amusements and Sunday observance, they irritated him,
and then with a contemptuous petulance he withdrew to his cabin. In
conversation with Koller, the Austrian commissioner, he once referred
to his conduct in disguising himself on the road to Fréjus as
pusillanimous, and admitted in vulgar language that he had made an
indecent display of himself. He was convinced that all the dreadful
scenes through which he had passed were the work of Bourbon
emissaries. In general his talk was a running commentary on the past,
a well-calculated prattle in which, with apparent spontaneity and
ingenuousness, interpretations were placed on his conduct which were
thoroughly novel. This was the beginning of a series of historical
commentaries lasting, with interruptions, to the end of his life.
There is throughout a unity of purpose in the explication and
embellishment of history which will be considered later. On May fourth
the _Undaunted_ cast anchor in the harbor of Porto Ferrajo.
Elba was an island divided against itself, there being both
imperialists and royalists among its inhabitants, and a considerable
party which desired independence. By representing that Napoleon had
brought with him fabulous sums, the Austrian and English commissioners
easily won the Elbans to a fervor of loyalty for their new emperor.
Before nightfall of the fourth the court was established, and the new
administration began its labors. After mastering the resources and
needs of his pygmy realm, the Emperor began at once to deploy all his
powers, mending the highways, fortifying the strategic points, and
creating about the nucleus of four hundred guards which were sent from
Fontainebleau an efficient little army of sixteen hundred men. His
expenses were regulated to the minutest detail, the salt-works and
iron-mines, which were the bulwarks of Elban prosperity, began at once
to increase their output, and taxation was regulated with scrupulous
nicety. By that supereminent virtue of the French burgher, good
management, the island was made almost independent of the remnants of
the Tuileries treasure, the sum of about five million francs, which
Napoleon had brought from France. The same powers which had swayed a
world operated with equal success in a sphere almost microscopic by
comparison. To many this appeared a sorry commentary on human
grandeur, but the great exile did not intend to sink into a
contemptible lethargy. If the future had aught in store for him, his
capacities must have exercise and their bearings be kept smooth by
use. The Princess Borghese had been separated from her second husband
soon after the marriage, and since 1810 she had lived an exile from
Paris, having been banished for impertinent conduct to the Empress.
But she cherished no malice, and before long, according to promise,
she arrived and took up her abode as her brother's companion. Madame
Mère, though distant in prosperity, came likewise to soothe her son in
adversity. The intercepted letters of the former prove her to have
been at least as loose in her life at Elba as ever before, but they do
not afford a sufficient basis for the scandals concerning her
relations with Napoleon which were founded upon them and industriously
circulated at the court of Louis XVIII. The shameful charge, though
recently revived and ingeniously supported, appears to have no
adequate foundation.
Napoleon's economies were rendered not merely expedient, but
imperative, by the fact that none of the moneys from France were
forthcoming which had been promised in his treaty with the powers.
After a short stay Koller frankly stated that in his opinion they
never would be paid, and departed. The island swarmed with Bourbon
spies, and the only conversation in which Napoleon could indulge
himself unguardedly was with Sir Neil Campbell, the English
representative, or with the titled English gentlemen who gratified
their curiosity by visiting him. During the summer heat, when the
court was encamped on the heights at Marciana for refreshment, there
appeared a mysterious lady with her child. Both were well received and
kindly treated, but they withdrew themselves entirely from the public
gaze. Common rumor said it was the Empress, but this was not true; it
was the Countess Walewska, with one of the two sons she bore her host,
whom she still adored. They remained but a few days, and departed as
mysteriously as they had come. Base females thronged the precincts of
the imperial residence, openly struggling for Napoleon's favor as they
had so far never dared to do; success too frequently attended their
efforts.
But the one woman who should have been at his side was absent.[15] It
is certain that she made an honest effort to come, and apartments were
prepared for her reception in the little palace at Porto Ferrajo. Her
father, however, thwarted her at every turn, and finally she was a
virtual prisoner at Schönbrunn. So manifest was the restraint that her
grandmother Caroline, Queen of the Two Sicilies, cried out in
indignation: "If I were in the place of Maria Louisa, I would tie the
sheets of my bed to the window-frame and flee." Committed to the
charge of the elegant and subtle Neipperg, a favorite chamberlain whom
she had first seen at Dresden, she was plied with such insidious wiles
that at last her slender moral fibre was entirely broken down, and she
fell a victim to his charms. As late as August, Napoleon received
impassioned letters from her; then she grew formal and cold; at last,
under Metternich's urgency, she ceased to write at all. Her French
attendant, Méneval, managed to convey the whole sad story to her
husband; but the Emperor was incredulous, and hoped against hope until
December. Then only he ceased from his incessant and urgent appeals.
[Footnote 15: See Welschinger: Le roi de Rome, ch. vi, p.
17.]
The number of visitors to Elba was sometimes as high as three hundred
in a single day. Among these were a few English, fewer French, but
many Italians. As time passed the heaviness of the Austrian yoke had
begun to gall the people of Napoleon's former kingdom, and
considerable numbers from among them, remembering the mild Eugène with
longing, joined in an extensive though feeble conspiracy to restore
Napoleon to the throne of Italy. Lucien returned to Rome in order to
foster the movement, and Murat, observing with unease the general
faithlessness of the great powers in small matters, began to tremble
for the security of his own seat. With them and others Napoleon
appears to have corresponded regularly. He felt himself entirely freed
from the obligations he had taken at Fontainebleau, for he was sure
the people of southern France had been instigated to take his life by
royalist agents, and while one term after another passed, not a cent
was paid of the promised pension; his own fortune, therefore, was
steadily melting away. For months he behaved as if really determined
to make Elba his "isle of repose," as he designated it just before
landing; but under such provocations his temper changed. The
corner-stone of his treaty was his complete sovereignty; otherwise the
paper was merely a promise without any sanction, not even that of
international law. This perfect sovereignty had been recognized by the
withdrawal of all the commissioners as such, Campbell insisting that
he remained merely as an ambassador.
In a treaty concluded on May thirtieth between Louis XVIII and the
powers of the coalition, the boundaries of France were fixed
substantially as they had been in 1792, and the destiny of the lands
brought under her sway by the Revolution and by Napoleon was to be
determined by a European congress. This body met on November first,
1814, at Vienna. It was soon evident that the four powers of the
coalition were to outdo Napoleon's extreme endeavors in their reckless
disposition of European territories. Before the close of the month,
however, Talleyrand, by his adroit manipulations and his conjurings
with the sacrosanct word "legitimacy," had made himself the moving
spirit of the congress, and had so inflamed the temper of both
Metternich and Castlereagh against the dictatorial attitude of Russia
and Prussia as to induce Austria and Great Britain to sign, on January
third, 1815, a secret treaty with France whereby the parties of the
first part bound themselves to resist the aggressiveness of the
Northern powers, and that by force if necessary. This restored France
to the position of a great power. By the middle of February the
Northern allies were brought to terms, and in return for their
concessions it was agreed that Murat was to be deposed. This spirit of
compromise menaced, or rather finally destroyed, the sovereignty of
Napoleon, petty as it was. On the charge of conspiring with Murat, he
could easily be removed from Elba, and deported to some more remote
spot from which he could exert no influence on European politics.
From the opening sessions of the congress there had been a general
consensus of opinion as to this course. As to the place opinions
varied. Castlereagh favored the Azores, but others the Cape Verde
islands; St. Helena, then well known as a place of call on the long
voyage to the Cape, had been suggested much earlier, even before Elba
was chosen, but when or by whom is not known. It is quite possible
that Wellington, who succeeded Castlereagh as English plenipotentiary
in February, may have mentioned the name; he had been there, and knew
it as almost the remotest spot of land in the world. The formal
proposition to that effect appears to have been made by the Prussian
cabinet. The congress took no definite action in the matter, but the
understanding was so clear and general that a proclamation to the
national guard was printed in the "Moniteur" of March eighth, 1815,
stating that measures had been taken at the Congress of Vienna to
remove Napoleon farther away. It was easy for everybody, including the
captive himself, to believe that, all the other articles of the
agreement at Fontainebleau having been violated, that which guaranteed
the sovereignty of Elba was equally worthless.
It cannot be doubted that Napoleon was fully aware of whatever was
proposed at Vienna, and it is absolutely certain that he was
thoroughly informed as to the changed state of public opinion in
France. Having promised a fairly liberal constitution as the price of
his throne, Louis XVIII, with colossal stupidity, undertook to ignore
the past and promulgated the charter as his own gracious act, done in
the nineteenth year of his reign! The upper chamber, or House of
Peers, was his creature, since he could create members at will. Feeble
in mind and body, he was unable to check the reactionary assumptions
of his family, who, having deserted their country, had returned to it
by the aid of invaders despised and feared by the nation. These and
the returning emigrants were provided with rich sinecures, and began
to talk of restoring estates to their rightful owners; in some cases
the possessors, on their death-beds, were intimidated into making such
restitution. The extreme clerical party began even to hamper the
ministry in its efforts to grant the freedom of worship guaranteed by
the constitution. Secular business was forbidden on certain holy days,
and funeral masses were celebrated for Pichegru, Moreau, and Cadoudal,
that for the latter at the King's expense. When, finally, Christian
burial was refused to an actress, there were riots in Paris.
But the government continued its suicidal course; even the Vendée grew
disaffected, and, the suffrage having been greatly restricted, there
were murmurings about oligarchies and tyrants. At Nîmes the
Protestants feared another St. Bartholomew, and said so. Even moderate
royalists grew troubled, and could not retort when they heard the new
order stigmatized by the fitting name of "paternal anarchy." Both
veterans and conscripts deserted in great numbers from the army as
they saw their officers discharged by the score to make places for the
young aristocracy, or their comrades retired, nominally on half-pay,
in reality to eke out a subsistence as best they could. It was not
long before men showed each other pocket-pieces bearing Napoleon's
effigy, whispering as watchwords, "Courage and hope," or "He has been
and will be," or "Frenchmen, awake; the Emperor is waking." As early
as July, 1814, rumors of his return were rife in country districts,
and by autumn the longing for it was outspoken and general. In Paris
there was greater caution, but as Marmont was called "Judas" for
having betrayed his master, so Berthier was known as "Peter" in that
he had denied him, and it was a common joke to tie a white cockade to
the tail of a dog. Before the Chamber met the various factions openly
avowed themselves as either royalists, Bonapartists, liberals, or
Jacobins. The money estimates presented made it clear that a king was
more expensive than an emperor, and when the peers not only voted to
indemnify the emigrants for the lands held by their families, but
likewise passed a bill establishing the censorship of the press, it
was common talk that the present state of things could not last.
The number of French prisoners of war and of soldiers released from
the besieged fortresses in central Europe was about three hundred
thousand, of whom a third were veterans of the Empire. To these must
be added the army which Soult, ignorant of Napoleon's abdication, had
led to defeat at Toulouse, and the soldiers who had served in Italy.
These men, long accustomed to much consideration, found themselves on
their return to be persons of no consequence. They learned that the
great officers of the Empire were everywhere treated with scant
courtesy, and that the great ladies of the imperial court were now
virtually driven from the Tuileries by the significant questions and
loud asides of the royal personages who had supplanted them. It was
told in all public resorts how Ney had resented the rude affronts put
on his wife by the Duchess of Angoulême. The well-trained subordinate
officers of these contingents were turned adrift by thousands on the
same terms as those of Napoleon's own army, half-pay if they showed
themselves good Catholics, otherwise nothing. For the most part,
again, this promise was empty; young royalists were put in their
places, the pay of the old guard was reduced, a new noble guard was
organized, promotion was refused to those who had received commissions
during the operations of war, and the asylums established for the
orphans of those who had belonged to the Legion of Honor were
abolished. So bitter was the outcry that the King felt compelled to
dismiss his minister of war, and, not daring to substitute Marmont,
who demanded the place, appointed Soult. He too was speedily
discredited for harshness to Exelmans, a subordinate who was
discovered to have been in correspondence with Napoleon; and by the
middle of February, 1815, nearly all the soldiers were at heart
Bonapartists, their friends for the most part abetting them.
[Illustration: Napoleon Exposition, 1895
THE KING OF ROME
Painted by Marie Louise under direction of Isabey belonging to Messrs.
Marquis and Comte de Las Cases.]
In less than two months after Louis XVIII took his seat, Talleyrand
and Fouché were deep in their element of plot and intrigue. They
thought of the son of Philippe Égalité as a possible constitutional
ruler; they talked of reëstablishing the imperial regency; with
Napoleon placed beyond the possibility of returning, the latter
course would be safe. During the succeeding months they continued to
juggle with this double intrigue, and around their plots clustered
minor ones in mass. Lord Liverpool actually called Wellington to
London for fear the duke should be seized, and Marmont put the Paris
garrison under arms. On January twenty-first, 1815, the death of Louis
XVI was commemorated by the royalists with the wildest talk; and such
was the general fury over Exelmans's treatment that Fouché at last
stepped forward to give his conspiracy some form. Carnot and Davout
were both expected to coöperate; but although they refused, enough
officers of influence were secured to make a plan for an extended
insurrection entirely feasible. For this all parties were willing to
unite; no one knew or cared what was to supplant the existing
government--anything was better than "paternal anarchy."
How accurate the information was which reached Napoleon at Elba we
cannot ascertain, for his feelings were masked and his conduct was
non-committal. He had entirely recovered his health, and though old in
experience, he was only forty-five years of age, and still appeared
like one in the prime of life. He was apparently vigorous, being
short, thick-necked, and inclined to corpulence. His cheeks were
somewhat heavy and sensuous, his hair receded far back on the temples,
his limbs were powerful, his hands and feet were delicately formed and
noticeably small. His movements were nervous and well controlled, his
eye was clear and bright, his passions were strong, his self-control
was apparent, and the coördination of his powers was easy. To the
Elban peasant he was gracious; with his subordinates he was dignified;
among his many visitors he moved with good humor and tact; his
kindness to his mother and sister made both of them devoted and
happy.
The only anxiety he displayed was in regard to assassination and
kidnapping: the former he said he could meet like a soldier; of the
latter he spoke with anxious foreboding. He had reason to fear both.
Every week either in France or Italy or both, there was a plot among
fanatical royalists and priests to kill him; and though the Barbary
pirates were eager to seize him and win a great ransom, they were
excelled in their zeal both by Mariotte, Talleyrand's agent in
Leghorn, and by Bruslart, a bitter and ancient enemy, who had been
appointed governor of Corsica for the purpose. For these reasons,
probably, the Emperor of Elba lived as far as possible in seclusion.
As time passed he grew less intimate with Campbell, but the Scotch
gentleman did not attribute the fact to discontent. Before leaving
Elba, on February sixteenth, to reside for a time in Florence and
perform the duties of English envoy in that place, he gave it as his
opinion that if Napoleon received the pension stipulated for in the
treaty he would remain tranquilly where he was.
CHAPTER XIII
NAPOLEON THE LIBERATOR[16]
[Footnote 16: References: Sorel, A.: Le traité de Paris du 20
novembre, 1815. I. Les cent jours. Lacretelle: Histoire de
France depuis la restauration. Nettement: Histoire de la
littérature française sous la restauration. Constant:
Mémoires sur les cent jours en forme de lettres. Lucien
Bonaparte: La vérité sur les cent jours.]
Napoleon Ready to Reappear -- Reasons for his Determination --
The Return to France -- The Northward March -- Grenoble Opens its
Gates -- The Lyons Proclamations -- The Emperor in the Tuileries
-- The Emperor of the French -- The Additional Act -- Effects of
the Return in France and Elsewhere -- The Congress of Vienna
Denounces Napoleon.
It has lately been recalled that as early as July, 1814, the Emperor
of Elba remarked to an English visitor that Louis XVIII, being
surrounded by those who had betrayed the Empire, would in turn
probably be himself betrayed by them. For the ensuing four months,
however, the exile gave no sign of any deep purpose; to those who
wished to leave him, he gave a hearty good-by. In December, however,
he remarked to one of his old soldiers, pointedly, as the man thought:
"Well, grenadier, you are bored; ... take the weather as it comes."
Slipping a gold piece into the veteran's hand, he then turned away,
humming to a simple air the words, "This will not last forever."
Thereafter he dissuaded all who sought to depart, saying: "Be patient.
We'll pass these few winter days as best we may; then we'll try to
spend the spring in another fashion." This vague language may
possibly have referred to the Italian scheme, but on February tenth he
received a clear account of what had happened at Vienna, and on the
evening of the twelfth Fleury de Chaboulon, a confidential friend of
Maret, arrived in the disguise of a sailor, and revealed in the
fullest and most authentic way the state of France. When he heard of
the plan to reëstablish the regency, Napoleon burst out hotly: "A
regency! What for? Am I, then, dead?" Two days later, after long
conferences, the emissary was despatched to do what he could at
Naples, and the Emperor began his preparations.
This was soon known on the mainland, and three days later a personage
whose identity has never been revealed arrived in the guise of a
Marseilles merchant, declaring that, except the rich and the
emigrants, every human being in France longed for the Emperor's
return. If he would but set up his hat on the shores of Provence, it
would draw all men toward it. When Napoleon turned pseudo-historian he
declared in one place that the breaches of the Fontainebleau treaty
and his fears of deportation had nothing to do with his return from
Elba; in another he states the reverse. Since the legend he was then
studiously constructing required the unbroken devotion of the French
to the standard-bearer of the Revolution for the sake of consistency,
he probably recalled only the feelings awakened by Fleury's report
that opportunity was ripe, and that, too, earlier than had been
expected. But there were other motives at the time, for Peyrusse,
keeper of Napoleon's purse during the Elban sojourn, heard his master
asseverate that it would be more dangerous to remain in Porto Ferrajo
than to return to France. In any case, so far as France and the world
at large were concerned, the contemptuous indifference of Louis and
his ministers to their obligations under the treaty powerfully
justified Napoleon's course. Even Alexander and Castlereagh had early
made an indignant protest to Talleyrand; but the latter, already deep
in conspiracy, turned them off with a flippant rejoinder.
With great adroitness and secrecy Napoleon collected and fitted out
his little flotilla, which consisted of the _Inconstant_, a stout brig
assigned to him at Fontainebleau, and seven smaller craft. During the
preparations the French and English war-vessels patrolling the
neighboring waters came and went, but their captains suspected
nothing. Campbell's departure created a false rumor among the
islanders that England was favoring some expedition on which the
Emperor was about to embark, thus allaying all suspicion. When, on the
twenty-sixth, a little army of eleven hundred men found itself afloat,
with eighty horses and a number of cannon, no one seemed to realize
what had happened; except Drouot, who pleaded against Napoleon's
rashness, all were enthusiastic. To avoid suspicion, each captain
steered his own course, and the various craft dotting the sea at
irregular intervals looked no way unlike the other boats which plied
those waters. Several men-of-war were sighted, but they kept their
course. As one danger after another was averted, the great
adventurer's spirits rose until he was exuberant with joy, and talked
of Austerlitz. It was March first when land was finally sighted from
the _Inconstant_; as if by magic, the other vessels hove in sight
immediately, and by four the men were all ashore on the strand of the
Gulf of Jouan. Cambronne, a colonel of the imperial guards, was sent
to requisition horses at Cannes, with the strict injunction that not a
drop of blood be shed. As the great actor had theatrically said on
board his brig, he was "about to produce a great novelty," and he
counted upon dazzling the beholders into an enthusiasm they had
ceased to feel for the old plays. Among others brought to Napoleon's
bivouac that night was the Prince of Monaco, who had been found by
Cambronne at St. Pierre traveling in a four-horse carriage, and had
been taken as a prisoner into Napoleon's presence. "Where are you
going?" was, according to tradition, the greeting of Napoleon. "I am
returning to my domains," came the reply. "Indeed! and I too," was the
merry retort.
Recalling the mortal agony he had endured on the highway through Aix
but a short year before, and its causes, and having been informed how
bitter was the anti-royalist feeling in the Dauphiné, Napoleon set his
little army in march direct toward Grenoble. At Cannes there was
general indifference; at Grasse it was found that the division general
in command had fled, and there were a few timid shouts of "Long live
the Emperor!" Thence to Digne on the Grenoble highway was a mountain
track over a ridge twelve thousand feet above the sea. In twenty hours
the slender column marched thirty-five miles. The "growlers" joked
about the "little corporal" who trudged at their side, the Alpine
hamlets provided abundant rations, and the government officials
furnished blank passports which enabled Napoleon to send emissaries
both to Grenoble and to Marseilles, where Masséna was in command. The
little garrison of Digne was Bonapartist in feeling, but it was not
yet ready to join Napoleon, and withdrew; that at Sisteron was kept
from meddling by a body of troops which had been despatched as a corps
of observation from Marseilles, while the populace shouted heartily
for the Emperor. At Gap the officials strove to organize resistance,
but they desisted before the menaces of the people. By this time the
peasantry were coming in by hundreds. So far Napoleon's enterprise
had received but four recruits: two soldiers from Antibes, a tanner
from Grasse, and a gendarme. Now he was so confident that he dismissed
the peasantry, assuring them that the soldiers in front would join his
standards.
On March seventh the head of the column of imperial adventurers
reached La Mure, a short day's march from Grenoble. They were received
with enthusiasm, and a bucket of the poor native wine was brought for
the refreshment of the men. When all had been served Napoleon reached
out for the cheap little glass, and swallowed his ration like the
rest. There was wild delight among both his men and the onlookers as
the "army" set out for Laffray, the next hamlet, where was a small
detachment sent from Grenoble to destroy a bridge over the Drac. With
inscrutable faces they stood across the highway, lances set and
muskets charged, under orders to fire on Napoleon the moment he should
appear. At length the critical moment arrived. "There he is! Fire!"
cried a royalist officer. The soldiers clutched their arms, their
faces blanched, their knees shook, and they--disobeyed! Napoleon,
walking slowly, advanced within pistol-shot. He wore the old familiar
gray surtout, the well-known cocked hat, and a tricolor cockade.
"Soldiers of the Fifth," he said in a strong, calm voice, "behold me!"
Then advancing a few paces farther, he threw open his coat and
displaying the familiar uniform, he called: "If there be one soldier
among you who wishes to kill his Emperor, he can. I come to offer
myself to your assaults." In an instant the opposing ranks melted into
a mob of sobbing, cheering men, kissing Napoleon's shoes, struggling
to touch the skirts of his shabby garments. The surrounding throng
crowded near in sympathy. "Soldiers," cried the magician, "I come
with a handful of brave men because I count on you and the people. The
throne of the Bourbons is illegitimate because it was not erected by
the nation. Your fathers are threatened by a restoration of titles, of
privilege, and of feudal rights; is it not so?" "Yes, yes," shouted
the multitude. At that instant appeared a rider arrayed in the uniform
of the national guard, but wearing a huge tricolor cockade. Alighting
at Napoleon's feet, he said: "Sire, I am Jean Dumoulin the
glove-maker; I bring to your majesty a hundred thousand francs and my
arm." At that instant likewise an imperial proclamation denouncing
traitors, and promising that under the old standards victory would
return like the storm-wind, was passing from hand to hand in the
garrison of Grenoble. Labédoyère, the colonel, of the Seventh of the
line, first announced his purpose to support his Emperor, and the
royalist officers saw the imperialist feeling spread with dismay. They
arranged to evacuate the place next morning. At seven in the evening
Napoleon summoned the town; the commandant, unable to resist the
pressure of both soldiers and populace, fled with a few adherents, and
at ten the gates were opened. The reception of the returning exile was
hearty and impressive. It was with an army of seven thousand men that,
after a rest of thirty-six hours, he started for Lyons.
"As far as Grenoble I was an adventurer; at Grenoble I was a prince,"
wrote Napoleon at St. Helena. If this were true, at Lyons he was an
Emperor in fact as well as in name, that great city receiving him with
plaudits as energetic as were the execrations with which they
dismissed Artois and Macdonald. Recalling the lessons of his youth,
some learned in Corsica, some in the Rhone valley, the returning
Emperor carefully felt the pulse of public opinion as he journeyed. He
found the longing for peace to be universal, and even before entering
Lyons he began to promise peace with honor. But this he quickly found
was not enough: it must be peace with liberty as well. The sole task
before him, therefore, he declared to be that of protecting the
interests and principles of the Revolution against the returning
emigrants. France, restored to her glory, was to live in harmony with
other European powers as long as they minded their own affairs.
Napoleon, the liberator of France! To terrify foreign invaders and
intestine foes a great united nation was to speak in trumpet notes.
From Lyons, therefore, second city of the Empire, was summoned a
popular assembly to revise the constitution. To convey the impression
that Austria was in secret accord with the Emperor's course, three
delegates from the eastern capital were summoned to assist at a
significant ceremony which was to occur almost immediately, the
coronation of the Empress and the King of Rome. Still further, a
decree was issued which banished the returned emigrants and swept away
the pretensions of the arrogant nobles. Talleyrand, Marmont, Augereau,
and Dalberg were attainted, and the noble guard of the King was
abolished. Under these influences Bonapartist feeling grew so intense
and spread so widely that the army of Soult, which had been assembled
in the southeast to oppose Murat, turned imperialist almost to a man.
Masséna, who seems to have followed the lead of Fouché, waited to see
what was coming, and remained neutral. Ney fell in with the general
movement, and joined Napoleon at Auxerre. "Embrace me, my dear
general," were the Emperor's words of greeting. "I am glad to see you;
and I want neither explanations nor justifications."
All resistance disappeared before Napoleon's advance as he passed
Autun and descended the Yonne valley toward Paris. Everywhere there
were dissensions among the populace, but the enthusiasm of the
soldiers and their sympathizers triumphed. The troops despatched by
the King's government to overpower the "usurper" sooner or later went
over to the "usurper's" standards. One morning a placard was found on
the railing around the Vendôme column: "Napoleon to Louis XVIII. My
good brother, it is useless to send me any more troops; I have
enough." Paris was in a storm of suppressed excitement. The measures
of resistance were half-hearted; the King made lavish concessions and
the chambers passed excellent laws without attracting any attention or
sympathy; volunteers were raised, but there was no energy in their
organization. When Napoleon reached Fontainebleau on the eighteenth,
the reserves stationed in and near Paris on the south came over to him
in a body. On the nineteenth Louis issued a despairing address to the
army, and fled to Lille; on the morning of the twentieth the capital
found itself without any vestige of government. The streets were
thronged with people, but there was no disorder until a band of
royalists attacked a half-pay officer wearing the imperial cockade. At
once the city guard formed and intervened to quell the disturbance.
Thereupon the imperialists endeavored to seize the Tuileries; they,
too, were checked, and a double force, royalist and imperial, was set
to defend that important spot. Over other public buildings the
imperial colors waved alone and undisturbed. During the afternoon the
crowds dispersed and the imperial officials quietly resumed their
places. At nine in the evening a post-chaise rolled up to the
Tuileries gate, Napoleon alighted, and the observers thought his smile
was like that of one walking in a dream. At once he was caught in the
brawny arms of his admirers, and handed upward from step to step, from
landing to landing. So fierce was the affection of his friends that
his life seemed to be in danger from their embraces, and it was with
relief that he entered his cabinet and closed the door, to find
himself among a few of his old stanch and tried servants, with
Caulaincourt at their head. This reception had been in sharp contrast
to the apathy displayed on the streets, where the people were few in
number, unenthusiastic, and indifferent. "They let me come," said
Napoleon to Mollien, "as they let the other go." Finding himself
unable to endure the loneliness of the Tuileries, and depressed by the
associations of the familiar scenes, he withdrew in a few days to the
comparative seclusion of the Élysée, then a suburban mansion dubbed by
courtesy a palace.
Some portion of Napoleon's leisure in Elba had been devoted, as was
mentioned in another connection, to sketching the outline of a
treatise intended to prove that his dynasty was quite as legitimate as
any other which had ruled over France. His illusions of European
empire were dismissed either permanently or temporarily, and for the
moment he was the apostle of nationality and popular sovereignty in
France. Before laying his head on his pillow in the Tuileries he
displayed this fact to the world in the constitution of his cabinet,
which would in our day be designated as a cabinet of concentration,
representative of various shades of opinion. Maret, Davout,
Cambacérès, Gaudin, Mollien, Decrès, Caulaincourt, Fouché, and Carnot
accepted the various portfolios; most surprising of all, Benjamin
Constant, the constitutional republican, became president of a
reconstructed council of state. In connection with the announcement of
these names, the nation was informed that the constitution was to be
revised, and that the censorship of the press was abolished. In
reference to the latter, Napoleon remarked that, since everything
possible had been said about him during the past year, he could
himself be no worse off than he was, but the editors could still find
much to say about his enemies. To Constant he frankly explained what
he meant by revision. The common people had welcomed his return
because he was one of themselves, and at a signal he could have the
nobles murdered. But he wanted no peasants' war, and, as the taste had
returned for unrestricted discussion, public trials, emancipated
elections, responsible ministers, and all the paraphernalia of
constitutional government, the public must be gratified. For all this
he was ready, and with it for peace. But peace he could win only by
victory, for, although in his conduct, in the Lyons decrees, and in
casual talk, he hinted at negotiations with foreign powers, those
negotiations were purely imaginary.
With a clear comprehension of the situation, the ministers went to
work. On April twenty-third was promulgated the Additional Act,
whereby the franchise was extended, the state church abolished,
liberty of worship guaranteed, and every wretched remnant of privilege
or divine right expunged. The two chambers were retained, many
imperial dignitaries being assigned to the House of Peers, the
Bonaparte brothers, Lucien, Joseph, and Jerome, among the number. It
was, as Chateaubriand sarcastically said, a revised and improved
edition of Louis's constitution. The preamble, however, was new; it
set forth that Napoleon, having been long engaged in constructing a
great European federal system suited to the spirit of the time and
favorable to the spirit of civilization, had now abandoned it, and
would henceforth devote himself to a single aim, the perfect security
of public liberty. This specious representation, half true and half
false, awakened no enthusiasm in France; it was accepted, along with
the Additional Act, by a plebiscite, but by only a million three
hundred thousand votes--less than half the number cast for the
Consulate and the Empire. This was largely due to a curious apathy,
induced by a still more curious but firm conviction that at last
France had secured peace with honor. Reference has been made to a
military conspiracy fomented by Fouché in the North; before the
hostile public feeling thus engendered in that quarter Louis fled to
Ghent within five days after Napoleon reached Paris, and, though the
royal princes were able to carry on civil war in the South a little
longer, it was generally felt that the nation now had a ruler of its
own choosing, and that if they attended strictly to their own affairs
they would be left in peace. For considerable time there was little
news from abroad, and so swift was the rush of internal affairs that
no heed was given to what there was.
This was suddenly changed in April, when it was brought home to the
nation that the specter of war had again been raised, and that the
dynasties were finally a unit in their determination to extirpate the
Napoleonic régime as a measure of self-defense. Every man with any
means saw himself beggared, and every mother felt her son slipping
from her arms to swim once more that sea of blood in which for a
generation the hope of the nation had been submerged. The depression
was general and terrible, for the prospect was appalling. England,
entangled with dynastic alliances in order to preserve her prosperity
and dignity, had lost most of her serious and trusted leaders, and the
few who survived were so panic-stricken as to have little
perspicacity. The King's illness having at last removed him from
public life, he had been succeeded by the most profligate and
frivolous of all the line of English kings, the Prince Regent, who was
later George IV. Percival and Liverpool were not merely conservative
from principle; they were negative from the love of negatives. Already
they had laid the basis, in their mismanagement of domestic affairs,
for the social turbulence which within a short time was to compel the
most sweeping reforms. Castlereagh had not even an inkling of what the
treaty of Chaumont might mean to Great Britain in the end. To destroy
Napoleon he was perfectly content that his own free country should
support a system of dynastic politics destructive of every principle
of liberty.
The Congress of Vienna represented, not a confederation of states, but
a league of dynasties posing as nations and banded for mutual
self-preservation. To them the permanent restoration of Napoleon could
mean only one thing, the recognition of a nation's right to choose its
own rulers, and that would be the end of absolutism in Europe. To
Great Britain it would mean the destruction of her prosperity, or at
least a serious diminution of both power and prestige. The late
coalition, therefore, was re-cemented without difficulty, but on a
basis entirely new. The account of Napoleon's escape reached Vienna on
March sixth. Within the week Maria Louisa, now entirely under
Neipperg's influence, wrote declaring herself a stranger to all
Napoleon's schemes, and a few days later the French attendants of the
little King of Rome were dismissed; the child's last words to Méneval
were a message of affection to his father.[17] At that time
negotiations among the powers were progressing famously, each having
secured its main object; on March thirteenth the Congress, under
Castlereagh's instigation, publicly denounced Napoleon as the "enemy
and disturber of the world's peace," and proclaimed him an outlaw. The
Whigs stigmatized the paper in parliament as provocative of
assassination and a disgrace to the English character, but, of all
the important journals, the "Morning Chronicle" alone was courageous
enough to sustain them, asserting that it was a matter of complete
indifference to England whether a Bourbon or a Bonaparte reigned in
France. These manly protests were unheeded, and by the twenty-fifth
all Europe, except Naples, was united against France alone.
[Footnote 17: See Welschinger: Le roi de Rome, ch. vii.]
CHAPTER XIV
THE DYNASTIES IMPLACABLE[18]
[Footnote 18: References: for this and the following chapters
see d'Angeberg: Le congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815,
précédé et suivi des actes diplomatiques qui s'y rattachent,
avec introduction historique par Capefigue; Castlereagh's
Correspondence; Capefigue: Le congrès de Vienne dans ses
rapports avec la circonstance actuelle de l'Europe; Davout:
Correspondance, Vol. IV.; de Pradt: Du congrès de Vienne;
Flassan: Histoire du congrès de Vienne; Hardenberg's Memoirs;
Humboldt's Memoirs; Villemain: Souvenirs contemporains
d'histoire et de littérature; Gérard: Quelques documents sur
la bataille de Waterloo; Gourgaud: La campagne de 1815;
Grouchy: Observations sur la relation de la campagne de 1815,
publ. par le G{én.} Gourgaud, et réfutation de quelques-unes
des assertions et écrits relatifs à la bataille de Waterloo.]
The Vienna Coalition -- Its Purpose -- Napoleon as a Liberal --
The Fiasco -- France on the Defensive -- Napoleon's Health -- War
Preparations of the Combatants -- Their Respective Forces --
Qualities and Achievements of the French -- The Armies of Blücher
and Wellington -- The French Strategy -- Napoleon's First
Misfortune.
[Sidenote: 1815]
The supreme effort of the dynasties to outlaw Napoleon, and restore
France to the Bourbons, was made by what was nominally an alliance of
eight members--Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, France, Spain,
Portugal, and Sweden. The last was, however, absorbed in her struggle
with Norway, and, though Spain and Portugal were signatories, the real
strength of the coalition arranged at Vienna lay in a virtual renewal
of the treaty of Chaumont: Austria, Prussia, and Russia were each to
put a hundred and eighty thousand men in the field, and Great Britain
was to continue her subsidies.
On April fourth, the sovereigns of Europe were notified that the
Empire meant peace; they retorted by the mobilization of their forces,
and by denouncing in a joint protocol the treaty of Paris. In his
extremity Napoleon appealed to Talleyrand, but that minister knew too
well the temper of the Congress at Vienna, and refused to coöperate.
The versatile Fouché thereupon initiated a new plot, this time against
Napoleon, and sounded Metternich; but Metternich was dumb. The other
diplomats asseverated that they did not wish to interfere with the
domestic affairs of France; but they prevaricated, intending nothing
less than the complete restoration of the Bourbons.
Under the shadow of this storm-cloud Napoleon regulated his domestic
affairs of state with intrepid calmness. He had no easy task. It was
the revived hatred of the masses for priests and nobles to which he
had appealed on his progress from Grenoble, and, observing the wild
outbursts of the populace at Lyons, he had whispered, "This is
madness." It was with studied deliberation, therefore, that in Paris
he cast himself completely upon the moderate liberals. This alienated
the Jacobin elements throughout the country, and they, in turn,
stirred up the royalists. When it became clear that neither Maria
Louisa nor the King of Rome was to be crowned, and that there was no
help in Austria, even the imperialists displayed a dangerous temper.
Such was the general uneasiness about war that the first measures of
army reorganization were taken almost stealthily. It was easy enough
to establish the skeleton of formation, and not very difficult to find
trustworthy officers, commissioned and non-commissioned; but to summon
recruits was to announce the coming war. Of the three hundred thousand
veterans now returned home, less than one fifth responded to the call
for volunteers; the Emperor had reckoned on four fifths at least. The
National Guard was so surly that many felt it would be bravado for
Napoleon to review them. But he was determined to do so, and on April
sixteenth the hazardous ceremony took place. Until at least half the
companies had been reviewed not a cheer was heard; then there were a
few scattering shouts here and there in the ranks; finally there was
some genuine enthusiasm.
By the middle of May the national deputies summoned at Lyons began to
arrive. They were to meet, after the fashion of Charles the Great's
assemblies, in the open field. Their task was to be the making of a
new constitution. It was not reassuring news that they brought from
their various homes, and their accounts disturbed public opinion in
Paris sadly. Before long it was known that civil war had again broken
out in Vendée; the consequences would have been most disastrous had
not La Rochejacquelein, the insurgent leader, been killed on June
fourth. As it was, the ignoble slaughter of one of their order
intensified the bitterness of the nobles. Worse still, it had been
found that of the six hundred and twenty-nine deputies five hundred
were ardent constitutionalists indifferent to Napoleon, and that only
fifty were his devoted personal friends; there were even between
thirty and forty who were Jacobins, and at Fouché's command. Under
these circumstances the Emperor dared not hold the promised national
congress. What could be substituted for it? The great dramatic artist
was not long at a loss. He determined to summon the electoral deputies
to a gorgeous open-air ceremony on June first, and have them stamp
with their approval the Additional Act. A truly impressive spectacle
would pass muster for the promised "field of May," and profoundly
affect the minds of all present. But, unfortunately, though Ségur
made the plan, and though every detail was carefully studied by
Napoleon, the affair was not impressive. About eighteen thousand
persons assembled on the benches, and there was a vast crowd in the
field. The cannon roared their welcome, and the people cheered the
imperial carriage, the marshals, the body-guard, and the procession.
But when Napoleon and his brothers stepped forth, clad like actors in
theatrical costumes of white velvet, wearing Spanish cloaks
embroidered with the imperial device of golden bees, and with great
plumed hats on their heads, there was a hush of disappointment. The
populace had expected a soldier in a soldier's uniform; many had felt
sure "he" would wear that of the National Guard.
There was, however, no sign of disrespect while the ministers and the
reconstituted corps of marshals filed to their places. Among the
latter were familiar faces--Ney, Moncey, Kellermann, Sérurier,
Lefebvre, Grouchy, Oudinot, Jourdan, Soult, and Masséna. A committee
of the deputies then stood forth, and their chairman read an address
declaring that France desired a ruler of her own selection, and
promising loyalty in the coming war. Napoleon arose, and in spite of
his absurd clothes commanded attention while he set forth his reasons
for offering a ready-made constitution instead of risking interminable
debate. Although he declared that what was offered could, of course,
be amended, there was no applause, except from a few soldiers. When
the chambers met, a week later, Lanjuinais, one of Napoleon's lifelong
opponents, was chosen president of the House of Deputies. The speech
from the throne was clever and conciliatory, and in spite of evident
distrust both houses promised all the strength of France for
defense--but for defense only. The peers declared that under her new
institutions France could never be swept away by the temptations of
victory; the deputies asserted that nothing could carry the nation
beyond the bounds of its own defense, not even the will of a
victorious prince.
The anxieties and exertions of two months were manifest in Napoleon's
appearance. His features, though impressive, were drawn, and his long
jaw grew prominent. He lost flesh everywhere except around the waist,
so that his belly, hitherto inconspicuous, looked almost pendulous.
When standing, he folded his hands sometimes in front, sometimes
behind, but separated them frequently to take snuff or rub his nose.
Sometimes he heaved a mechanical sigh, swallowing as if to calm inward
agitation. Often he scowled, and looked out through half-closed lids
as if growing far-sighted; the twitching of his eye and ear on the
left side grew more frequent. With thickening difficulties and
increasing annoyance, serious urinary and stomach troubles set in;
there was also a persistent hacking cough. Recourse was again had to
protracted warm baths in order to alleviate the accompanying
nervousness; but as the ailments were refractory, a mystery soon
attached to the malady, and his enemies said it was a loathsome
disease. In spite of the statements both of the Prussian commissioner
at Fontainebleau, Count Truchsess-Waldburg, and of Sir Hudson Lowe, it
is highly improbable that Napoleon's health was undermined by sexual
infection. He was surrounded all his life by malignant attendants, and
among the sweepings of their minds, which in recent years have been
scattered before the public, there would be some proof of the fact. In
the utter absence of any reliable information, some have guessed that
the trouble was the preliminary stage in the disease of which he died;
and others, again, in view of his quick changes of mood, his
depressions, exaltations, sharpened sensibilities, and abrupt
rudeness, have explained all his peculiarities in disease and health
by attributing them to a recondite form of epilepsy. Exhausted and
nervous, the sufferer might well, as was the case, be found in tears
before the portrait of his son; he might well lift up his voice, as he
was heard to do, against the destiny which had played him false. But
he was quite shrewd enough to see that during his absence no regency
could be trusted, and he arranged to conduct affairs by special
messengers. Joseph was to preside and give the casting-vote in the
council of state; to Lucien was given a seat in the same body; but the
supreme power rested in Napoleon.
When Wellington replaced Castlereagh at the Congress of Vienna, it was
quickly apparent that he was greater in the field than at the
council-board. Both he and Blücher desired to assume the offensive
quickly; but inasmuch as Alexander was determined to retain his
ascendancy in the coalition, and as each power insisted on its due
share in the struggle, it was arranged to begin hostilities on June
twenty-seventh, the earliest date at which the Russian troops could
reach the confines of France. There were to be three armies.
Schwarzenberg, with two hundred and fifty thousand men, comprising the
Austrian, Russian, and Bavarian contingents, was to attack across the
upper Rhine; Blücher, with one hundred and fifty thousand Prussians,
was to advance across the lower Rhine; and Wellington in the
Netherlands was to collect an army of one hundred and fifty thousand,
compounded of Dutch, Belgians, Hanoverians, and some thirty-eight
thousand British, who could be there assembled. The two latter armies
were in existence by the first of June, but Wellington was
dissatisfied with the quality of his motley force; even the English
contingent was not the best possible, for his Peninsular veterans had
been sent to find their match in Jackson's riflemen at the battle of
New Orleans.
On the eve of hostilities Napoleon had one hundred and twenty-four
thousand effective men, and three thousand five hundred more in his
camp train; Wellington had one hundred and six thousand, but of these
four thousand Hanoverians were left in garrison; Blücher had about one
hundred and seventeen thousand. Neither of the two allied generals
dreamed that Napoleon would choose the daring form of attack upon
which he decided--that of a wedge driven into the broken line nearly a
hundred miles in length upon which his enemy lay--for to do so he must
pass the Ardennes. But he did choose it, and selected for the purpose
the valleys of the Sambre and the Meuse. Allowing for the differences
in topography, the idea was identical with that which, nineteen years
before, he had executed splendidly in Piedmont and repeated in
Germany. The twin enemy seemed unaware that its long and straggling
line must, in case of activity, either be broken to maintain the
respective bases or else abandon one base for concentration and be cut
off from supplies. Wellington's base was westward at Antwerp,
Blücher's eastward through Liège toward the Rhine. Vacillation would
ensue, Napoleon felt, on a central attack, and in that vacillation he
intended to repeat with Blücher what he had done with Brunswick at
Jena.
The opening of the campaign was sufficiently auspicious. By a superb
march during the night of June thirteenth, Napoleon's army had gained
a most advantageous position. The first corps under d'Erlon was at
Solre on the Sambre, the second under Reille was at Leers. The guard,
the sixth corps under Lobau, the line cavalry and the third corps
under Vandamme, stood in that order on a line northeasterly from
Beaumont, and due east of that place were four cavalry corps; the
fourth corps under the young and dashing Gérard had marched from Metz
and were at Philippeville; to the south lay the guard cavalry and the
reserve artillery under Grouchy. In front was Charleroi, whence a
broad turnpike led almost direct to Brussels, thirty-four miles due
north; another turned eastward toward Liège. Thirteen miles distant on
this was Sombreffe; somewhat farther on that, Quatre Bras, both on the
highway running east and west between Namur and Nivelles. To have
accomplished such marches as it did, the French army must have been
fine; to have secured such a brilliant strategic position its general
must have been almost inspired. He commanded the operating lines of
both Wellington and Blücher, while they were far distant from each
other, separated by serious obstacles, both alike instinct with
centrifugal rather than centripetal tendency. The same high qualities
which shone in their general distinguished the subordinate French
commanders. Though many of the famous names are absent from the
list,--Mortier, for instance, having fallen ill on the frontier,--yet
Soult was present as chief of staff, and Ney was coming up to take
command of the left wing. Reille, d'Erlon, and Foy were veterans of
the Peninsular war; what twenty-two years of service had done for the
"wild Hun," Vandamme, is known. Kellermann was made famous by Marengo,
Lobau was noted for daring, Gérard had earned distinction in Russia,
and though Grouchy's merit has been the theme of much discussion, yet
he had been famous under Jourdan and Moreau, and nothing had occurred
in the long interval to tarnish his reputation.
Nearly half of Blücher's troops were irregular reserves, and many of
the regulars were recruits, but all were thoroughly drilled and well
equipped. The passion of hatred which animated them was comparable
only to the "French fury" with which Napoleon's army would fight for
national existence. Such was the reverence for routine among the
Prussian officers, and so bitter were the jealousies of the petty
aristocracy from which they sprang, that the King dared not promote on
any basis except that of seniority. In order to make Gneisenau second
in command, York, Kleist, and Tauenzien were stationed elsewhere, and
Bülow was put in command of a reserve to hold Belgium when Blücher
should advance to Paris. The aged but fiery marshal had not mended his
health by the self-indulgence of a year; the three division generals,
Ziethen, Pirch, and Thielemann were capable men of local renown.
Gneisenau and Bülow were the only first-rate men among the Prussian
commanders, but for rousing enthusiasm Blücher's name was a word to
conjure with. Wellington was felt by his officers and soldiers to be a
man of real power; his British recruits were well drilled, and his
veterans were good. His associate generals were no more famous than
those of Gneisenau, but they were, for the most part, English
gentlemen with a high sense of duty and much executive ability. One of
his corps was commanded by the Prince of Orange, a respectable
soldier, whose name, however, was more valuable than the experience he
had gained in the Peninsula as aide-de-camp; the other corps was under
Lord Hill, an admirable subordinate and an excellent commander. The
only English general whose name is a familiar one abroad was Picton,
who died on the field. As to the quality of the respective armies, it
has become the fashion of each nation to decry that of its own and
overrate that of the other two. Thus they condone their own blunders,
and yet heighten the renown of victory. Napoleon was superior in
organization, in cavalry, and in artillery to either Wellington or
Blücher, but he was inferior to both in infantry. He was in wretched
health, and he had a desperate cause. Taking fully into account his
consummate ability and personal prestige, it yet remains true that the
odds against him were high, certainly eight to five.
Ziethen's posts before Charleroi saw the French camp-fires in the
early hours of June fourteenth; that evening they began to withdraw
toward Fleurus, whither the remainder of the Prussian army was
gradually set in motion. It seems incredible that this should have
been the first move of the allies toward concentrating their widely
scattered forces, for neither Wellington nor Blücher was completely
surprised. Both commanders had for two days been aware, in a general
way, of Napoleon's movements, but they were awaiting developments. It
was Wellington's opinion, carefully set forth in his old age, that it
would have been better strategy for the French to advance so as to
turn his right, seize his munitions, and cut off his base; but as this
would have rolled up the entire allied force, ready to deliver battle
with odds of two to one, the statement may perhaps be accepted as an
explanation, but certainly not as a justification.
In the dawn of the fifteenth a ringing, rousing proclamation, like
those of the olden time, and written the day before on the anniversary
of Marengo, was read to the French soldiers. It was in high spirits
that the army, in three columns, began to march. The left, under
Reille, dislodged the Prussian outposts from Thuin, and, forcing them
back through Marchiennes, seized the bridge at that place, and crossed
to the left bank of the Sambre. The movement was complete by ten in
the morning. The center under Napoleon comprised the mass of the army:
Pajol, Vandamme, Lobau, the Guard, Exelmans, Kellermann, and Milhaud.
Soult despatched his orders by a solitary aide, who broke his leg by a
fall from his horse, and failed to deliver them. Though at equally
critical moments before both Eylau and Wagram, Berthier had done as
Soult did, with identical results, yet the latter was justly and
severely blamed. Had Vandamme been found, the movements of the center
would have been greatly accelerated, the speedy capture of Charleroi
would have enabled the third corps to reach Fleurus in time to
intercept Ziethen, and thus the whole course of events would have been
changed. The marshal's ill success was, therefore, as Napoleon called
it, a "deplorable mischance," and it was high noon before Pajol, with
the van, reached Charleroi and, after a smart engagement, drove out
the Prussians. The right wing, under Gérard, was in motion at five in
the morning, but it also was detained by a serious disaster. Shortly
after starting it was found that Bourmont, the commander of its best
division, a man who had been Chouan, imperialist, and royalist by
turns, had deserted with his chief of staff and eight soldiers. Having
been at the council of war, he had the latest information of
Napoleon's secret plans, and his treason demoralized the troops he so
basely abandoned. It was long before confidence could be restored; the
crossing at Charleroi had been delayed too long, and it was nightfall
when Gérard at last reached Châtelet, four miles below, secured the
bridge, and crossed with only half his men. The campaign opened, if
not in disaster, at least with only partial success.
CHAPTER XV
LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS[19]
[Footnote 19: The most important works dealing with the
military side of the Waterloo campaign are those of Müffling,
Berton, Gourgaud, Clausewitz, Siborne, Charras, Chesney,
Hooper, Maurice, Mercer, Morris, Jomini, Ollech, Vaudoncourt,
Ropes, and Houssaye. Further, there are controversial
discussions of importance by Grouchy, Gérard, Heymès, Knoop,
Loben-Sels, and Bornstedt. The most complete bibliography is,
as usual, that of Kircheisen.]
Napoleon's Orders -- Ney's Failure to Seize Quatre Bras --
Wellington Surprised -- Napoleon's Fine Strategy -- The Meeting
at Ligny -- Blücher's Defeat -- The Hostile Forces at Quatre Bras
-- Wellington Withdraws -- Napoleon's Over-confidence -- His
Instructions to Grouchy -- His Advance from Quatre Bras.
For four hours after his arrival at Charleroi, Napoleon, uneasy as to
the whereabouts of his detachments, stood in idleness waiting for
news. During this interval the first Prussian corps under Ziethen,
retreating from Charleroi, reached Fleurus unmolested, all except a
small body, which gathered at Gosselies, on the Brussels road, but was
easily dispersed by Reille. It seemed as if the road to Quatre Bras
was open, and when, at half-past four, Ney appeared, he was put in
command of the left, with verbal instructions, as Napoleon asserted
some years later, to seize that strategic point. Within these limits
he was to act independently. If Quatre Bras were surprised and held,
the second move could be attempted: the seizure of Sombreffe. Since
the highway between the two was the only line by which the allied
armies could quickly unite, the possibility of attacking them
separately would be assured even if the successive attacks should
follow each other so closely as to be substantially one battle. Either
Ney misunderstood, or Napoleon recorded what he intended to say, not
what he actually said. Colonel Heymès, Ney's chief of staff, declared
that the Emperor's final words were, "Go, and drive back the enemy";
the Emperor asserted that his orders to go and hold Quatre Bras were
positive.
It is also a matter of dispute whether or not Napoleon had hoped,
after seizing the bridges and crossing the Sambre, to complete his
movement by surprising both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on that same
day, the fifteenth. Had he done so, Blücher might possibly have
withdrawn to effect a junction with Wellington for the decisive
conflict, and thus have thwarted Napoleon's strategy; but it is not
likely, for that move, as finally executed, was the work not of
Blücher but of Gneisenau; at this stage of the campaign the Prussians
would probably have retreated toward Namur. Whatever may have been
Napoleon's intention, Ney hurried to Gosselies, stationed Reille to
hold the place, and then, despatching one division to pursue the
Prussians, and another, with Piré's cavalry, toward Quatre Bras, put
himself at the head of the cavalry of the guard to help in seizing
this latter important point. But at seven his force, to their
astonishment, was confronted by a strong body of Nassauers from
Wellington's army, who, having passed Quatre Bras, had seized Frasnes,
a village two and a half miles in advance. These made no stand, but
Ney, instead of proceeding immediately to attack Quatre Bras itself,
left his men to hold the position at Frasnes, and hurried away to
consult his superior. For this he had excellent reasons: his staff was
not yet organized, and d'Erlon's corps was not within call; he was
therefore too weak for the movement contemplated by his orders. At the
same moment Napoleon, who had been in the saddle since three in the
morning, and who had become convinced that the retreating Prussians
would not halt at Fleurus, but would rejoin their main army, turned
back to Charleroi, and, on reaching his quarters an hour later, flung
himself in utter exhaustion upon his couch. In fact, he was in
exquisite torture from the complication of urinary, hemorrhoidal, and
other troubles which his long day's ride had aggravated, and, as he
declared at St. Helena,--probably the truth,--he had lost his
assurance of final success. The day had been fairly successful, but at
what a cost of energy! No one, he least of all, could feel that there
had been any buoyancy in the movements or favoring fate in the
combinations of his armies.
Throughout the day Blücher had displayed a fiery zeal. Since early in
May he had had no serious consultation with Wellington, and in a
general conversation held at that time there had been merely a vague
understanding as to a union at some point south of Sombreffe. That
town was accordingly selected by him for concentration, and in general
his orders had been well executed. Why the bridges of Marchiennes and
Châtelet were not undermined and blown up by the Prussians has never
been explained. Moreover, the language of Gneisenau's orders to Bülow
being vague, the latter misinterpreted it, and his much-needed force
was not brought in, as expected. Wellington's conduct is a riddle. He
displayed little anxiety and found time for social enjoyment as well
as for the activities of military command in a supreme crisis. About
the middle of the afternoon he was informed, through the Prince of
Orange, as to his enemy's movements. With perfect calm, he commanded
that his troops should be ready in their cantonments; at five he
issued orders for the divisions to march with a view to concentration
at Nivelles, the easternmost point which he intended to occupy; at
ten, just as he was setting out for the noted ball which the Duchess
of Richmond was giving on the eve of decision, he gave definite
instructions for the concentration to begin. These were his very first
steps toward concentration, although twenty-seven years later he made
the assertion, supported only by his despatch to Bathurst of the
nineteenth, that he had ordered the Anglo-allied army to concentrate
to the left, as Blücher had ordered the Prussians to concentrate to
the right. As a matter of fact, he was twenty-four hours behind
Blücher in ordering his first defensive movements. This is not excused
by the fact that his movement of concentration was completed somewhat
earlier than Blücher's. About twenty minutes after the Prince of
Orange had reached the ball-room, Wellington sent him away quietly,
and then, summoning the Duke of Richmond, who, it is doubtfully said,
was to have command of the reserve when completely formed, he asked
for a map. The two withdrew to an adjoining room. Wellington closed
the door, and said, with an oath, "Napoleon has humbugged me." He then
explained that he had ordered his army to concentrate at Quatre Bras,
adding, "But we shall not stop him there; and if so, I must fight him
here," marking Waterloo with his thumb-nail on the map as he spoke. It
was not until the next morning that he left for the front. Though
Napoleon, on the evening of the fifteenth, had neither Quatre Bras nor
Sombreffe, he held all the debatable ground; and if, next morning, he
could seize the two towns simultaneously, the first move in his great
game would be won. It seems as if he must risk everything to that end.
What passed between Napoleon and Ney from midnight until two in the
morning is unknown. There is no evidence that the Emperor expressed
serious dissatisfaction, although he may have been exasperated. He was
not exactly in a position to give vent to his feelings. Whatever was
the nature of their conversation, Ney was again at his post long
before dawn, and not a soldier moved from Charleroi until nearly noon!
It seems that Napoleon, or Ney, or both, must have been stubbornly
convinced that Wellington could not concentrate within twenty-four
hours. That Napoleon was not incapacitated by prostration is proved by
his acts: about five he sent a preliminary order to Ney; very early,
also, he took measures to complete Gérard's crossing at Châtelet; and
then, having considered at length the alternatives of pushing straight
on to Brussels or of taking the course he did, he had reached a
decision as early as seven o'clock. It seems almost certain that he
delayed chiefly to get his troops well in hand, partly to give them a
much-needed rest. They had been seventeen hours afoot the previous
day. Toward nine, believing that more of Ney's command was assembled
than was yet the case, he sent a fretful order commanding the marshal
to seize Quatre Bras, and stating that a semi-independent command,
under Grouchy, would stand at Sombreffe, while he himself would hold
Gembloux. This done, he settled into apparent lethargy. To Grouchy he
wrote that he intended to attack the enemy at Sombreffe, and "even at
Gembloux," and then to operate immediately with Ney "against the
English." His scheme was able, for if at either salient angle, Quatre
Bras or Sombreffe, his presence should be necessary, he could, at
need, quickly join either Ney or Grouchy; but his senses must have
been dulled. When informed that the enemy was at Fleurus in force, he
hesitated long before resolving to move, being crippled by the
inability of his left to move on Quatre Bras and behaving as if sure
that the soldiers before him were only a single corps of Blücher's
army, which he could sweep away at his convenience. Meanwhile Vandamme
had advanced. The Prussians withdrew from Fleurus, and deployed at the
foot of the hillock on which the village of Ligny stands. When, about
midday, Napoleon arrived at Fleurus, he had to experience the
unpleasant surprise of finding a strong force ready to oppose him.
Eighty-seven thousand men, all Blücher's army, except Bülow's corps
and a portion of Ziethen's which had been dispersed by the right wing
and cavalry of the French near Gilly, were drawn up in battle array to
oppose him. This was a loss to the foe of possibly two thousand men, a
serious weakening at a fateful moment. But the Emperor was not yet
ready to meet them, much as he had desired just such a contingency. He
was not aware of the full strength of his enemy, but he was not sure
of annihilating even those he believed to be in presence, for he had
left ten thousand men at Charleroi, under Lobau, as a reserve, and the
troops most available for strengthening his line were moving toward
Quatre Bras.
By the independent action of their own generals a substantial force of
several thousand Dutch-Belgians, virtually the whole of Perponcher's
division, was concentrated at Quatre Bras early that same morning. To
be sure, Wellington had simultaneously determined on the same step,
but it was taken long before his orders arrived. Indeed, he seems to
have reached Quatre Bras before his orderly. Scarcely halting, he
rapidly surveyed the situation and, leaving the troops in command of
the Prince of Orange, rode away to visit Blücher. The two commanders
met at about one o'clock in the windmill of Bry. They parted in the
firm conviction that the mass of the French army was at Ligny, and
with the verbal understanding that Wellington, if not himself
attacked, would come to Blücher's support. On leaving, the English
commander sharply criticized the tactical disposition of his ally's
army; but Blücher, with the fixed idea that, in any case, the duke was
coming to his aid, determined to stand as he was. With similar
obstinacy, Napoleon, still certain that what he had before him,
although a great force, was only a screen for the retreat of the main
army of the allies, now despatched an order (the second) for Ney to
combine Reille, d'Erlon, and Kellermann in order to destroy whatever
force was in opposition at Quatre Bras. This was at two. The French
attack was opened at half-past two by Gérard and Vandamme; the
resistance was such as to leave no doubt of the real Prussian
strength. This being clear, Napoleon immediately wrote two despatches
of the same tenor--one he sent to Ney by an aide, and one to d'Erlon
by a subofficer of the guard.[20] The former (the third for the same
destination) urged Ney to come for the sake of France; the other
summoned d'Erlon from Ney's command to the Emperor's own immediate
assistance: "You will save France, and cover yourself with glory,"
were its closing words. This last order, the original of which has but
lately been revealed, came nigh to ruining the whole day's work.
Before Wellington could return to Quatre Bras, Ney's force was engaged
with the Prince of Orange, and before three o'clock a fierce conflict
was raging at that place. D'Erlon appears to have been in a frightful
quandary as to his duty. He marched away toward St. Amand and in his
dilemma detached his best division, that of Durutte, toward Bry.
Neither superior nor subordinate did anything to the purpose. Ney was
without the support of an entire corps and did not therefore literally
obey his orders. Napoleon was unassisted by the wandering force and
even confused by their unexpected appearance at a critical moment.
They were mistaken at Ligny for enemies; d'Erlon's vacillation had so
detained them.
[Footnote 20: For the text of the order to d'Erlon and a full
discussion of the whole subject, see Houssaye, 1815, p. 201.]
Blücher, who was determined to fight, come what would, had held in as
long as his impatient temper permitted; but when no reinforcement from
Wellington appeared, he first fumed, and then about six gave his fatal
orders to prepare for the offensive. The nature of the ground was such
as necessarily to weaken his center by the initial movements. Napoleon
marked this at once, and summoned his guard in order to break through.
For a moment the Emperor hesitated; a mysterious force had appeared on
the left; perhaps they were foes. But when once assured that they were
d'Erlon's men, he waited not an instant longer; at eight the crash
came, and the Prussian line was shattered. Retreat was turned into a
momentary rout so quickly that Blücher could not even exchange his
wounded horse for another, and in the first mad rush he was so stunned
and overwhelmed that his staff gave him up for lost. The few moments
before he was found were the most precious for the allies of the whole
campaign, since Gneisenau directed the flight northward on the line to
Wavre, a route parallel with that on which Wellington, whatever his
success, must now necessarily withdraw. This move, which abandoned
the line to Namur, is Gneisenau's title to fame.[21] The lines were
quickly formed to carry it out, and the rest of the retrograde march
went on with great steadiness. Napoleon did not wait until d'Erlon
arrived and thereupon order an immediate, annihilating pursuit, but
came to the conclusion that the Prussians were sufficiently
disorganized, and would seek to reorganize on the old line to the
eastward. They were thus, he thought, completely and finally cut off
from Wellington. It was not until early next morning that he
despatched Pajol, with his single cavalry corps, to follow the foe,
for he was confirmed in his fatal conjecture by the false report of
five thousand Prussians having been seen on the Namur road, and
exerting themselves to hold it. The Prussians seen were merely a horde
of stragglers. The truth was not known until next day.
[Footnote 21: Long regarded as a more or less haphazard
decision, it has been established at last that the officers
of the Prussian general staff were able by the light of a
horn lantern so to exhibit their maps, explain their study of
the ground, and develop the necessary strategy as to
determine with considerable accuracy where they were and what
the scientific move should be. When this was duly set forth
in the history of the general staff, the exultation of the
Emperor William II was expressed in his public speeches, and
the Germans of the empire were convinced that by this
decision the result of the Waterloo campaign was determined.]
Almost simultaneously with the battle of Ligny was fought that of
Quatre Bras. At eleven Ney received orders outlining a general plan
for the day; about half an hour later came the specific command to
unite the forces of d'Erlon, Reille, and Kellermann, and carry Quatre
Bras; at five arrived in hot haste the messenger with the third order.
At two o'clock there were not quite seven thousand Anglo-Belgians in
Quatre Bras, but, successive bodies arriving in swift succession, by
half-past six o'clock there were over thirty thousand. At two Ney had
seventeen thousand men, and though he sought to recall d'Erlon, yet,
owing to the withdrawal of Durutte, and to d'Erlon's indecision, he
had at half-past six not more than twenty thousand. Not one of
d'Erlon's men had reached him: Girard's division of Reille's corps was
with Vandamme before St. Amand. Gérard's corps had been kept at
Ligny. Had he advanced on the position the previous evening, or had he
attacked between eleven and two on the sixteenth, the event of the
campaign might have been different from what it was. But if he really
believed, as Heymès afterward asseverated was the case, that his
orders were merely to push and hold the enemy, then his conduct
throughout was gallant and correct.[22] The weight of evidence favors
the claim of Napoleon that the marshal was perverse in his refusal to
take Quatre Bras according to verbal orders. Whatever the truth, the
behavior of Ney's men was admirable when they did advance, but they
were forced back to Frasnes before superior numbers.
[Footnote 22: Ropes: The Campaign of Waterloo, p. 191.]
Next morning Wellington was conversing with Colonel Bowles when a
staff officer drew up, his horse flecked with foam, and whispered the
news of Ligny. Without a change of countenance, the commander said to
his companion: "Old Blücher has had a ---- good licking, and gone back
to Wavre, eighteen miles. As he has gone back, we must go, too. I
suppose in England they will say we have been licked. I can't help it;
as they have gone back, we must go, too." Accordingly, he issued his
orders, and his army began to march at ten. On the whole, therefore,
the events of June sixteenth seemed favorable to Napoleon, since,
fighting at two points with inferior numbers, he had been victorious
at one, and had thereby secured the other also. We, of course, know
that by Gneisenau's move this apparent success was rendered nugatory.
It is useless to surmise what would have happened had Bülow been with
Blücher, and d'Erlon and Lobau with Napoleon, or if either of these
possibilities had happened without the other; as it was, Napoleon's
strategy gained both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe.
The Prussians had lost twenty thousand men, missing, wounded, and
dead, and it required vigorous treatment to restore Blücher. But all
night the army marched, and in the morning Bülow, having found his
direction, was near Beauderet and Sauvinières, within easy reach at
Gembloux. The retreat continued throughout the seventeenth. It was a
move of the greatest daring, since the line was over a broken country
almost destitute of roads, and, the old base of supplies having been
abandoned, the men had to starve until Gneisenau could secure another
by way of Louvain. The army bore its hardships well; there was no
straggling or demoralization, and the splendor of success makes doubly
brilliant the move which confounded Napoleon's plans. Never dreaming
at first that his foe had withdrawn elsewhere than along his natural
line of supply toward Liège, the Emperor considered the separation of
the two allies as complete, and after carefully deliberating
throughout the long interval he allowed for collecting his troops and
giving them a thorough rest, he determined to wheel, join Ney, and
attack Wellington, wherever found. It was serious and inexplicable
slackness which he showed in not taking effective measures to
determine immediately where his defeated enemy was. Being,
nevertheless, well aware of the Prussian resources and character, he
made up his mind to detail Grouchy, with thirty-three thousand men,
for the purpose of scouring the country toward Liège at least as far
as Namur. Then, to provide for what he considered a possible
contingency,--namely, that which had actually occurred,--this adjunct
army was to turn north, and hasten to Gembloux, in order to assure
absolutely the isolation of Wellington; in any and every case the
general was to keep his communications with Napoleon open.
It was eight in the morning of the seventeenth when Napoleon issued
from his quarters at Fleurus. Flahaut was waiting for the reply to an
inquiry which he had just brought from Ney concerning the details of
Ligny. The Emperor at once dictated a despatch, the most famous in the
controversial literature of Waterloo, in which his own achievements
were told and Ney was blamed for the disconnected action of his
subordinates the previous day; in particular the marshal was
instructed to take position at Quatre Bras, "as you were ordered," and
d'Erlon was criticized for his failure to move on St. Amand. The
wording of the hastily scribbled order to the latter he had probably
forgotten; it was: "Portez-vous ... à la hauteur de Ligny, et fondez
sur St. Amand--ou vice versa; c'est ce que je ne sais bien." ("Betake
yourself ... to the heights of Ligny, pounce on St. Amand--or the
reverse; I am not quite sure which.") Further, the Emperor now
declared that, had Ney kept d'Erlon and Reille together, not an
Englishman would have escaped, and that, had d'Erlon obeyed his
orders, the Prussian army would have been destroyed. In case it were
still impossible to seize Quatre Bras with the force at hand, Napoleon
would himself move thither. Then, entering a carriage, he drove to
Ligny; Lobau was ordered at once to Marbais, on the road to Quatre
Bras. After haranguing the troops and prisoners, Napoleon was
informed, about noon, that Wellington was still in position. At once a
second order was sent, commanding Ney to attack; the Emperor, it ran,
was already under way to Marbais. This was not quite true, for while
he was giving detailed instructions to Grouchy before parting, that
general had seemed uneasy, and had finally pleaded that it would be
impossible further to disorganize the Prussians, since they had so
long a start. These scruples were peremptorily put down, and the chief
parted amicably from his subordinate, but with a sense of uneasiness,
lest he had left nice and difficult work in unwilling hands. Scouts
soon overtook him, and expressed doubt as to the Prussians having gone
to Namur. In case they had not, Grouchy must act cautiously.
Accordingly, positive instructions were then dictated to Bertrand, and
sent to Grouchy, whose movements were now doubly important. The latter
general was to reconnoiter toward Namur, but march direct to Gembloux;
his chief task was to discover whether Blücher was seeking to join
Wellington or not. For the rest, he was free to act on his own
discretion.
Napoleon then entered his carriage, and drove to Quatre Bras. Mounting
his horse, he led the pursuit of the English rear. Indignant that Ney
had lost the opportunity to overwhelm at least a portion of
Wellington's force, he exclaimed to d'Erlon, "They have ruined
France!" But he said nothing to Ney himself. So active and energetic
was the Emperor that he actually exposed himself to the artillery fire
with which the English gunners sought to retard the pursuit. It was
not an easy matter for Grouchy to carry out his instructions; at two
o'clock began a steady downpour, which lasted well into the next
morning; the roads to Gembloux were lanes, and the rain turned them
into sticky mud. Not until that night was Grouchy's command assembled
at Gembloux; it was ten o'clock before the leader gained an inkling of
where the Prussians were, and then, though uncertain as to their exact
movements, he immediately despatched a letter, received by Napoleon at
two in the morning. The marshal explained that he would pursue as far
as Wavre, so as to cut off Blücher from Brussels, and to separate him
from Wellington. Some hours later, about seven in the morning, when
finally convinced that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, Grouchy
set his columns in motion in a straight line toward that place by
Sart-à-Walhain, choosing, with very poor judgment, to advance by the
right bank of the Dyle, and thus jeopardizing the precious connections
he had been repeatedly and urgently instructed to keep open.
CHAPTER XVI
THE EVE OF WATERLOO[23]
[Footnote 23: References for this and the following two
chapters: Houssaye: 1815, Waterloo; Ussher: Napoleon's last
voyage; Ropes: Waterloo; Bustelli: L'Enigma di Ligny e di
Waterloo; York: Napoleon als Feldherr; Gardner: Quatre Bras,
Ligny, Waterloo; Gourgaud: La Campagne de 1815; Siborne:
History of the War in France and Belgium, 1815; Cotton, A
Voice from Waterloo; Loben-Sels: Précis de la campagne 1815
dans les Pays-Bas.]
Wellington's Choice of Position -- State of the Two Armies -- The
Orders of Napoleon to Grouchy -- Grouchy's Interpretation of Them
-- Napoleon Surprised by the Prussian Movements -- His Inactivity
-- The Battle-field -- Wellington's Position -- Napoleon's Battle
Array -- His Personal Health -- His Plan.
On the night of June seventeenth Wellington's army reached the heights
at Mont St. Jean, on the northern edge of what was destined to be the
most talked of battle-field in modern times. His retreat, masked by a
strong body of cavalry, with some horse-artillery and a single
infantry division, had been slow and regular, being retarded somewhat
by the heavy rain. Ney had held his position at Frasnes, well aware
that what was before him was far more than a rear-guard--in fact,
owing to the arrival of strong reinforcements during the night, it was
the larger portion of the Anglo-Belgian army. But the instant the
French marshal was informed of his enemy's retrograde movements he
threw forward a strong force of cavalry to coöperate with Napoleon.
When reunited, the French army numbered seventy-one thousand five
hundred men, with two hundred and forty guns, excluding of course, the
whole of Gérard's corps, which had been left at Ligny to coöperate
with Grouchy. That Wellington was far on his way to the defensive
position chosen by himself was probably in accord with Napoleon's
calculations; his only fear was lest his foe should have withdrawn
behind the forest of Soignes, where free communication with Blücher
and the junction of the two allied armies would be assured, as would
not be the case at Mont St. Jean.
This anxiety was set at rest by a cavalry reconnaissance, and at dusk
the French van bivouacked at Belle Alliance, separated by a broad,
shallow vale from their foe. The rest of the army followed with great
difficulty, some by the road; some through plowed or swampy fields,
wading the swollen tributaries of the Dyle, and floundering through
the meadows on their banks. The army of Wellington had seized, in
passing, what provisions and forage they found, and they had
camp-fires to comfort them in the steady rain. The French had scanty
or no rations, and lay throughout the night in the grain-fields,
without fire or shelter. All told, Wellington had sixty-eight thousand
men; ten miles on his right, at Hal, lay eighteen thousand more; ten
miles on his left, twelve from his headquarters at Waterloo, was
Blücher. Wellington, who had informed the Prussian commander that
unless support reached him he would fall back to Brussels, at two
o'clock in the morning had assurance of Blücher's coöperation. There
is an unsupported statement of Napoleon's that he twice sent to
Grouchy on the night of the seventeenth, by two separate officers, a
definite order to detach seven thousand men from his camp at Wavre
(where the Emperor affected to believe that Grouchy was), and make
connection by St. Lambert with the right of the main army. This would
entirely cut off Blücher from Wellington. The motive of this statement
is transparent--with the allies separated, they were outmanoeuvered;
with the possibility of their union, and an understanding between them
to that effect, he was himself outmanoeuvered.
Grouchy denied having received this order; neither of the officers
intrusted with it ever revealed himself; the original of it has never
been found; and in subsequent orders issued next day there is no
mention of, or reference to, any such message. Either the declaration,
twice made at St. Helena, was due to forgetfulness, being an account
of intentions not carried out, or else it was put forward to explain
the result of the campaign as due to his lieutenant's inefficiency.
Grouchy must have had an uneasy conscience, since for thirty years he
suppressed the text of the Bertrand order, which was not on the
order-book because it had not been dictated to Soult; and when, after
falsely claiming for the duration of an entire generation that he had
acted under verbal instructions, he did publish it, he gave, at the
same time, a mutilated version of his own report from Gembloux, sent
on the night of the seventeenth, changing his original language so as
to show that he had never looked upon the separation of the allies as
his chief task, but that what was uppermost in his mind was an attack
on the Prussians.
It was two in the morning of the eighteenth when the letter of
Grouchy, written about four hours earlier, arrived at Napoleon's
headquarters. Both the Emperor and Soult knew by that time that the
whole of Blücher's army was moving to Wavre; yet they did not give
this information, nor any minute directions, to the returning
messenger. Grouchy, therefore, was left to act on his own discretion,
his superior doubtless believing that the inferior would by that time
himself be fully informed, and would hasten to throw himself, like an
impenetrable wall, between the Prussians and the Anglo-Belgian army.
By the defenders of Napoleon Grouchy is severely criticized for not
having marched early in the morning of the eighteenth to Moustier,
where, if energetic, he could have carried over his army to the left
bank of the river by eleven o'clock, thus placing his force within the
sphere of Napoleon's operations. Perhaps he would have been able to
prevent the union of the opposing armies, or, if not that, to
strengthen Napoleon in his struggle. It is proved by Marbot's memoirs
that this is what Napoleon expected. On the other hand, excellent
critics present other very important considerations: the line to
Moustier was over a country so rough and miry that after a torrential
rain the artillery would have been seriously delayed, and Prussian
scouts might well have brought down a strong Prussian column in time
to oppose the crossing there or elsewhere. Grouchy, moreover, could
not know that Wellington would offer battle in front of the forest of
Soignes--a resolution which, in the opinion of Napoleon and many
lesser experts, was a serious blunder. He appears to have been
positive that the two armies were aiming to combine for the defense of
Brussels; finally, when from Walhain the sound of the firing at
Waterloo was distinctly heard, and Gérard fiercely urged an immediate
march toward the field of battle, Grouchy was acting strictly within
the limits of the Bertrand order, and according to what he then held
to be explicit instructions, when he pressed on to concentrate at
Wavre, and thus, if Napoleon had already defeated Wellington, to
prevent any union between Wellington and the Prussian army. It is
almost certain that Grouchy would in no way have changed the event by
marching direct to Mont St. Jean, for the cross-roads were soaked, his
troops were already exhausted, and the distance was approximately
fourteen and a half miles as the crow flies: the previous day he had
been able to make somewhat less than half that distance in nine hours.
Napoleon himself did not apparently expect the Prussians to rally as
they did. He spent the hours from dawn, when the rain ceased, in
careful reconnoitering. The mud was so thick in places that he
required help to draw his feet out of his own tracks. At breakfast,
according to a contemporary anecdote, he expressed himself as having
never been more favored by fortune; and when reminded that Blücher
might effect a union with the English, he replied that the Prussians
would need three days to form again. This opinion is in accord with
his exaggerated but reiterated estimates of the disaster produced in
Blücher's ranks after Ligny, and taken in connection with the
difficulty of moving artillery, which is not a sufficient explanation
in itself, affords the only conceivable reason for his delay in
attacking on the eighteenth. It also explains his remissness in
leaving Grouchy to exercise full discretion as to his movements. At
eight the plan of battle was sketched; at nine the orders for the day
were despatched throughout the lines; about ten the weary but
self-confident Emperor threw himself down and slept for an hour; at
eleven he mounted, and rode by the Brussels highway to the farm of
Belle Alliance. It was probably during the Emperor's nap that Soult
forwarded to Grouchy a despatch, marked ten in the morning,
instructing that general to manoeuver toward the main army by way of
Wavre. Although, according to Marbot, Napoleon expected Grouchy in the
afternoon by way of Moustier, at one o'clock a second despatch, of
which the Emperor certainly had cognizance, was forwarded to Grouchy,
expressing approval of his intention to move on Wavre by
Sart-à-Walhain, but instructing him "always to manoeuver in our
direction." The postscript of this second order enjoins haste, since
it was thought Bülow was already on the heights of St. Lambert.
The one central idea of Napoleon and Soult was clearly to leave a wide
discretion for Grouchy, provided always that he kept his
communications with the main army open, and that his general direction
was one which would insure easy connection, in order either to cut off
or check the Prussians. But, however this may be, the hours of
Napoleon's inactivity were precious to his enemies; by twelve Bülow
was at St. Lambert, and at the same hour two other Prussian corps were
leaving Wavre. These movements were apparently tardy, but Gneisenau,
feeling that Wellington had been a poor reliance at Ligny, and very
much doubting whether he really intended to stand at Waterloo, was
unwilling that Blücher should despatch his troops until it was certain
that the Prussian army would not again be left in the lurch. Should
the Anglo-Dutch retreat to Brussels, the Prussians must either retreat
by Louvain, or be again defeated. Anxiety was not dispelled until the
roar of cannon was heard between eleven and twelve. Then the Prussians
first exerted themselves to the utmost; it was about four when they
were within striking distance, ready to take Napoleon's army on its
flank. When Grouchy reached Wavre, at the same hour, he found there
but one of Blücher's corps, the rear under Thielemann.
[Illustration: Campaign of 1815.
June 15th to 19th.]
From Belle Alliance Napoleon returned, and took his station on the
height of Rossomme. In front was a vale something less than a mile in
width. The highway stretched before him in a straight line until it
skirted the large farmstead of La Haye Sainte on the opposite side;
then, ascending by a slant to the first crest, it passed the hamlet
of Mont St. Jean, only to ascend still higher to the top of the ridge
before falling again into a second depression. At Mont St. Jean was
Wellington's center. The road from Nivelles to Brussels crosses the
valley about a quarter of a mile westward, and on it, midway between
the two slopes, lay another farm-house, with its barns, that of
Hougomont. More than half a mile eastward, in the direction from which
the Prussians were expected, lay scattered the farm buildings of
Papelotte, La Haye, Smohain, and Frischermont. The valley was covered
with rich crops. Unobstructed by ditches or hedges, it was cut
longitudinally about the middle by a cruciform ridge, with spurs
reaching toward Belle Alliance on one side, and past Hougomont on the
other; the road passed by a cut through the longitudinal arm.
Hougomont was almost a fortress, having strong brick walls and a moat;
it stood in a large orchard, which was surrounded by a thick hedge.
The house at La Haye Sainte was brick also, and formed one side of a
quadrangle, inclosed further by two brick barns and a strong wall of
the same material; though not as large or solid as Hougomont, it was a
strong advance redoubt for Mont St. Jean.
The right and center of Wellington were thus well protected, the left
was admirably screened by the places already enumerated. His army was
deployed in three lines, the front plainly visible to the French, the
second partly concealed by the crest of the hill, and the third
entirely so. His headquarters were two miles north, at Waterloo; his
lines of retreat, though broken by the forest of Soignes, were open
either toward Wavre or toward the sea. The latter line was well
protected by the troops at Hal. Uneasy about the character of his
Dutch-Belgian troops, the duke had carefully disposed them among the
reliable English and Germans, in order to preclude the possibility of
a panic.
In the foreground of Napoleon's position was the French army, also
deployed in three lines. The front, extending from the mansion of
Frischermont to the Nivelles road, consisted of two infantry corps,
one on each side of Belle Alliance, and of two corps of cavalry, one
on the extreme right wing, one on the left; of this line Ney had
command. The second was shorter, its wings being cavalry, and its
center in two divisions, of cavalry and infantry respectively. The
third, or reserve, was the guard. Each of the lines had its due
proportion of artillery, stationed in all three along the road. This
disposition gave the French array, as seen from beyond, a fan-like
appearance, the sticks, or columns, converging toward the rear. The
array was brilliant; every man and horse was in sight; the number was
superior by about four thousand to that of the enemy; the ground was,
by eleven, almost dry enough to secure the fullest advantage from
superiority in artillery; deserters from the foe came in from time to
time. Surely the moral effect of such a scene upon the somewhat motley
throng across the valley must be very powerful. Yet the road to
Charleroi was the single available line of retreat, and it passed
through a deep cut; the soldiers were tired and not really first-rate,
fifty per cent. of the line being recruits, and nearly a quarter of
the guard untrained men; the tried officers had all been promoted, and
those who replaced them needed such careful watching that deep
formations had been adopted, and these must not merely diminish the
volume of fire, but present vulnerable targets; the cavalry had been
hastily gathered, and was far from being as efficient as the British
veterans of the German legion.
For some moments after reaching his position Napoleon stood impassive.
He was clad in his familiar costume of cocked hat and gray surtout.
Throughout his lines he had been received with enthusiasm, and his
presence was clearly magnetic, as of old. The direction of affairs in
this momentous crisis was his, and he dreamed of two implacable
enemies routed, of appeasing the two who were less directly
interested, of glory won, of empire regained. Reason must have told
him how empty was such a vision; for, since the armistice of
Poischwitz, Austria and Russia had been quite as bitter, and more
tortuous, than the other powers. His expression mirrored pain, both
physical and intellectual; his over-confidence and consequent delay
were signs of degenerate power; his exertions for three days past had
been beyond any human strength, especially when the faculties of body
and mind had previously been harassed for more than two months, as his
had been.
It was the first day of the week, but there was a calm more profound
than that of the Sabbath; the sky was dull, the misty air was heavy
with summer heat; but there was the expectant silence of a great host,
the deep determination of two grim and obstinate armies. Wellington,
with his western lines protected, would be safe when the Prussian army
should appear where he knew its van already was, and he must manoeuver
eastward to keep in touch. Napoleon must crush the British center and
left, and roll up the line to its right, in order to separate the
parts of his dual foe. To this end he had determined to make a feint
against Hougomont; should Wellington throw in his reserves at that
point on his right, one strong push might create confusion among the
rest, and hurl the whole force westward, away from Brussels. It was a
simple plan, great in its simplicity, as had been every strategic
conception of Napoleon from the opening of the campaign. But its
execution was like that of every other movement attempted since the
first great march of concentration--tardy, slack, and feeble.
Personal bravery was abundant among the French, but the orderly
coöperation of regiment, division, and corps in all the arms, the
courage of self-restraint, and the self-sacrifice of individuals in
organized movement, with the invigorating ubiquity of a master
mind--these were lacking from the first.
CHAPTER XVII
WATERLOO[24]
[Footnote 24: Further references for this and the following
chapter: Batty: Historical Sketch; Baudus: Études sur
Napoléon; Bullock: Diary; Cotton: Voice from Waterloo;
Damitz: Campagne de 1815; A. S. Fraser: Letters; W. Fraser:
Words, etc.; Gomm: Letters and Journals; Kennedy: Notes on
Waterloo; Vaulabelle: Campagne de Waterloo; Gurwood:
Wellington's Despatches; likewise the lives and memoirs of
Davout, Drouot, Gneisenau, Wellington, Hill, Grouchy (par
Pascallet), and Vandamme; Waterloo Letters, edited by
Siborne; Waterloo Roll-call, compiled by Dalton.]
Hougomont -- La Haye Sainte -- d'Erlon Repulsed -- Ney's Cavalry
Attack -- Napoleon's One Chance Lost -- Plancenoit -- Union of
Wellington and Blücher -- Napoleon's Convulsive Effort -- Charge
of the Guard -- The Rout -- Napoleon's Flight.
Napoleon's salute to Wellington was a cannonade from a hundred and
twenty guns. The fire was directed toward the enemy's center and left,
but it was ineffectual, except as the smoke partially masked the first
French movement, which was the attack on Hougomont by their left, the
corps of Reille. This was in three divisions, commanded respectively
by Bachelu, Foy, and the Emperor's brother Jerome, whose director was
Guillemenot. Preceded by skirmishers, the column of Jerome gained
partial shelter in a wood to the southwest of their goal, but the
resistance to their advance was vigorous; on the skirts of the grove
were Nassauers, Hanoverians, and a detachment of the English guards,
all picked men, and behind, on higher ground, was an English battery.
The two other divisions pressed on behind, and for a time their gains
were apparently substantial. But, checked in front by artillery fire,
and by a murderous fusillade from loopholes cut in the walls of
Hougomont, the besiegers hesitated. Their fiery energy was not
scientifically directed; but such was their zeal, and so great were
their numbers, that one brigade doubled on the rear of the fortalice,
drove back the English guards from before the entrance to the
courtyard on the north, and charged for the opening. Some of the
French actually forced a passage, and the success of Napoleon's first
move was in sight when five gallant Englishmen, by sheer physical
strength, shut the stout gate in the face of the assailants. A
fearless French grenadier scaled the wall, but he and his comrades
within were killed. A second assault on the same spot failed; so, too,
a third from the west, and still another from the east, all of which
were repelled by the English guards, who moved down from above, and
drove the French into the wood, where they held their own. These close
and bloody encounters were contrary to Reille's orders, but in the
thick of combat his various detachments could not be restrained.
[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane
NAPOLEON FRANCIS CHARLES JOSEPH, DUKE OF REICHSTADT, ETC., ETC., SON
OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.]
The second division of the battle was the main attack on Wellington's
left by d'Erlon's corps. Between twelve and one a Prussian hussar was
captured with a message from Blücher to Wellington announcing the
Prussian advance. At once the postscript was added to the second
despatch to Grouchy, already mentioned, and Napoleon made ready for
his great effort. Unable to sit his horse, he had dismounted, and,
seated at the table on which his map was spread, had been frequently
seen to nod and doze. Ney and d'Erlon, left to their own judgment, had
evolved a scheme of formation so complex that when tried, as it now
was, it proved unworkable. The confusion was veiled by a terrific,
continuous, and destructive artillery fire. After some delay, and a
readjustment involving preparations against the possible flank attack
of the Prussians, d'Erlon's corps advanced in four columns, under
Donzelot, Allix, Marcognet, and Durutte respectively. Opposed was
Picton's decimated corps, with Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian brigade, which
had been all along a target for the strongest French battery, one of
seventy-eight guns,[25] and was now to bear the first onset of the
French troops. Bylandt's men had stood firm under the awful artillery
fire, but their uniforms were like those of the French, and in a mêlée
this fact might draw upon them the fire of their own associates, as
later in the day at Hougomont it actually did, and they grew very
uneasy. Durutte, on the extreme right, seized Papelotte, but lost it
almost immediately. The conflict then focused about La Haye Sainte,
where the garden and orchard were seized by an overwhelming force. The
buildings had been inadequately fortified, but Major Baring, with his
garrison, displayed prodigies of valor, and held them.
[Footnote 25: Houssaye says eighty (1815, p. 338). See also
Ropes, p. 305.]
The assailants, supported hitherto by batteries firing over their
heads, now charged up the hill; as they reached the crest, their own
guns were silenced, but their yells of defiance rent the air. The
Dutch-Belgians of the first rank harkened an instant, and, followed by
the jeers and menaces of the British grenadiers and Royal Scots, fled
incontinently until they reached a place of safety, when they reformed
and stood. Picton was thus left unsupported, but at that decisive
moment Donzelot tried the new tactics again, and his ranks fell into
momentary confusion. Picton charged, the British artillery opened, and
though the English general fell, mortally wounded, his men hurled back
the French. This first success enabled Wellington to bring in more of
his infantry, with the Scots Greys, and to throw in his cavalry, the
First Royal Dragoons and the Enniskillens, for action against a body
of French riders, under Roussel, which, having swept the fields around
La Haye Sainte, was now coming on. His order was for Somerset and
Ponsonby to charge. The shock was terrific, the French cavalry
yielded, and the whole of d'Erlon's line rolled back in disorder.
Efforts were made by the daring Englishmen to create complete
confusion, but they were not entirely successful, for Durutte's column
maintained its formation, while the French lancers and dragoons
wrought fearful havoc among the British infantry somewhat disorganized
by victory. Ponsonby fell among his men, and it was due to Vandeleur's
horse that the French advance was checked. This ended the effort upon
which Napoleon had based his hope of success; there was still
desultory fighting at Hougomont, and the Prussians, though not
visible, were forming behind the forest of Paris.
There was a long and ominous pause before the next renewal of
conflict. Wellington used it to repair his shattered left and brought
in Lambert's Peninsular veterans, twenty-two hundred strong. Napoleon
quickly formed a corps, under Lobau, intended to repel the flank
attack of the Prussians. Ney was determined to redeem his repulse by a
second front attack, and Napoleon, either by word or silence, gave
consent. While the batteries kept up their fire, the marshal gathered
in the center the largest mass of horsemen which had ever charged on a
European battle-field--twelve thousand men, light and heavy cavalry.
His aim was to supplement Reille, still engaged at Hougomont, and dash
in upon the allied right center. Donzelot's column, now reformed, was
hurled directly against La Haye Sainte, and the mass of the cavalry
surged up the hill. The gunners of Wellington's artillery,
unprotected even by breastworks, stood to their pieces until the
attacking line was within forty yards; then they delivered their final
salvo, and fled. Wavering for an instant, the French advanced with a
cheer. Before them stood the enemy in hollow squares, four ranks deep,
the front kneeling, the second at the charge, the two others ready to
fire. The horsemen dared not rush on those bristling lines. In and out
among the serried ranks they flowed and foamed, discharging their
pistols and slashing with their sabers, until, discouraged by losses
and exhausted by useless exertion, their efforts grew feeble. Dubois's
brigade, according to a doubtful tradition, dashed in ignorance over
the brow of a certain shallow ravine, men and horses rolling in horrid
confusion into the unsuspected pit. The hollow was undoubtedly there
at the time, although it has since been filled up, and, it is
believed, was likewise the grave of the fifteen hundred men and two
thousand horses that were eventually collected from round about. The
British reserve cavalry, supported by the infantry fire and a few
hastily collected batteries, completed the defeat of Ney's first
charge. A second was repulsed in the same way. The undaunted marshal
then waited for reinforcements. No fewer than thirty-seven squadrons
came in, Napoleon sending Kellermann's heavy dragoons as a last
resort. Guyot's division of the heavy cavalry of the guard was also
there--some say they had been summoned by Ney, others that they came
of their own accord; the question arises because, in the next stage of
the battle, their absence from the station assigned to them was a
serious matter. Another time, and still another, this mighty force
moved against the foe. Pouring in and out, backward and forward, among
the squares, they lost cohesion and force until, in the very moment of
Wellington's extremity, they withdrew, as before, exhausted and
spent.
The energy and zeal of the English commander had been in strange
contrast to Napoleon's growing apathy; Wellington had further
strengthened his line by two Brunswick regiments and Mercer's battery,
and at the last by Adam's brigade with the King's Germans under
Dupont. This done, his stand had been superb to the last. Yet he was
now at the end of his resources. It was six, and to his repeated
messages calling for Blücher's aid there had been no response.
Although a portion of Bülow's men had been fighting for more than an
hour, yet the Prussian army was not yet fully engaged and he himself,
having no reinforcement nor relief, seemed face to face with defeat.
Baring had held La Haye Sainte with unsurpassed gallantry; his calls
for men had been answered, but his requisitions for ammunition were
strangely neglected. Ney, seeing how vain his cavalry charges were,
withdrew before the last one took place, arrayed Bachelu's division,
collected a number of field-pieces, and fell furiously, with cannonade
and bayonet charge, upon the farm-house. His success was complete; the
garrison fled, his pursuit was hot, and, leading in person, he broke
through the opposing line at its very heart. Had he been supported by
a strong reserve, the battle would have been won. Müffling,
Wellington's Prussian aide, dashed away to the Prussian lines, and, as
he drew near the head of Ziethen's division, shouted: "The battle is
lost if the corps do not press on and at once support the English
army." Ney's adjutant, demanding infantry to complete the breach he
had made, was received by Napoleon with petulance. One brigade from
Bülow's corps had attacked at about half-past four; repulsed at first,
their onset was growing fiercer, for two other brigades had come in.
Soult had opposed Ney's waste of cavalry. But the latter was
desperate, and with the other generals was displaying a wilfulness
bordering on insubordination. A portion of the guard had just been
detached for Lobau's support. To Ney's demand for infantry the Emperor
replied: "Where do you expect me to get them from? Am I to make them?"
In truth, his mind and energies were now more concerned with Blücher
than with Wellington, and he was already fighting the advance of Bülow
in his plans. But had the old Bonaparte spirit moved the chieftain to
put himself at the head of what remained of the guard infantry, and to
make a desperate dash for Ney's support, a temporary advantage would
almost certainly have been won; then, with a remnant flushed by
victory, he could have turned to Lobau's assistance before the main
Prussian army came in. Thus was lost Napoleon's one chance to deal
Wellington a decisive blow.
It was to prevent a dangerous flank movement of the enemy--the
advance, namely, of Bülow, with the cavalry corps of Prince William,
upon Plancenoit--that Napoleon had detached the young guard, under
Duhesme, a third of his precious reserve, for the support of Lobau's
right; Durutte being in the rear of his left, that portion was already
as strong as it could be made. Nevertheless the Prussians seized
Plancenoit; at once the French rallied, and drove them out; Blücher
threw in eight fresh battalions, and these, with the six already
engaged, dashed for the ravine leading to the village. The passage was
lined with French, and for a time it was like the valley of Hinnom;
but the Prussians pressed on, and the young guard reeled. Napoleon
sent in two battalions of the old guard, under Morand and Pelet; their
firmness restored that of their comrades, and the place was cleared,
two thousand dead remaining as the victims of that furious charge and
countercharge. At seven Bülow was back again in his first position,
awaiting the arrival of Pirch's corps to restore his riddled ranks.
Napoleon had now left only twelve of the twenty-three battalions of
the guard reserve, less than six thousand men. Wellington had repaired
the breach made by Ney, and, though still hard pressed on his right,
Ziethen had made good the strength of his left, whence some of his
cavalry, the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur, had been detached to
repair other weak spots in the line. At this moment Ziethen conceived
that Bülow was further giving way, and hesitated in his advance. The
brief interval was noted by Durutte, and with a last desperate effort
he carried Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain, hoping to prevent the
fatal juncture. It was half an hour before Ziethen retrieved his loss,
and thus probably saved Wellington's left. By that time Pirch had come
up, and with this reinforcement Bülow, behind the heavy fire of his
powerful batteries, charged Lobau, and advanced on the guard at
Plancenoit. Lobau, the hero of Aspern, stood like a rock until
Durutte's men and the remnants of d'Erlon's corps, flying past his
flank, induced a panic in his ranks. Thereupon the whole French right
fell into confusion: all except the guard, who stood in the churchyard
of Plancenoit until surrounded and reduced in number to about two
hundred and fifty men; then, under Pelet's command, they formed a
square, placed their eagle in the midst, drove off the cavalry which
blocked their path, and reached the main line of retreat with scarcely
enough men to keep their formation. The name of Ziethen must stand in
equal renown with that of Colborne among the annals of Waterloo. The
rout of the French left was the beginning of Napoleon's calamity, as
that of his right under Colborne was its consummation.
Before the combined armies of Wellington and Blücher the French could
not stand; but, in spite of inferior numbers and the manifest signs
of defeat, General Bonaparte might have conducted an orderly retreat.
The case was different with Napoleon the Emperor, even though he were
now a liberator; to retreat would have been merely a postponement of
the day of reckoning. Accordingly, the great adventurer, facing his
destiny on the height at Rossomme, determined, in a last desperate
effort, to retrieve the day, and stake all on a last cast of the dice.
For an instant he appears to have contemplated a change of front,
wheeling for that purpose by Hougomont, where his resistance was still
strong; but he finally decided to crush the Anglo-Belgian right, if
possible; roll up both armies into a confused mass, so that,
perchance, they might weaken rather than strengthen each other; and
then, with Grouchy's aid, strike for victory. Though indifferent to
Ney's demands, he had set in array against Bülow the very choicest
troops of his army; surely they might stand firm while his blow
elsewhere was delivered. But he did not reckon in this with
Wellington's reserve power; though the dramatic stories of the duke's
mortal anxiety rest on slight foundation, there is no doubt that he
felt a great relief when the Prussians entered the combat, for
immediately he turned his attention, not to rest, but to the reforming
of his line. Officers and men, English or German, knew nothing of
Bülow's or Blücher's whereabouts when Napoleon took his resolution;
but, sensible of having been strengthened, they displayed at half-past
seven that evening the same grim determination they had shown at
eleven in the morning. Though Wellington's task of standing firm until
Blücher's arrival was accomplished, and though, perhaps, his soldiers
heard the distant firing of the Prussian guns, yet nothing could be
seen across the long interval, the noise attracted little attention,
and neither he nor they could know what was yet before them. It was,
therefore, splendid courage in general and army which kept them ever
ready for any exertion, however desperate.
Against this army, in this temper, Napoleon despatched what was left
of that force which was the peculiar product of his life and genius,
the old and middle guard. Most of its members were the children of
peasants, and had been born in ante-Revolution days. Neither
intelligent in appearance nor graceful in bearing, they nevertheless
had the look of perfect fighting-machines. Their huge bearskin caps
and long mustaches did not diminish the fierceness of their aspect.
They had been selected for size, docility, and strength; they had been
well paid, well fed, and well drilled; they had, therefore, no ties
but those to their Emperor, no homes but their barracks, and no
enthusiasm but their passion for imperial France. They would have
followed no leader unless he were distinguished in their system of
life; accordingly, Ney was selected for that honor; and as they came
in proud confidence up the Charleroi road, their Emperor passed them
in review. Like every other division, they had been told that the
distant roar was from Grouchy's guns; when informed that all was ready
for the finishing-stroke, that there was to be a general advance along
the whole line, and that no man was to be denied his share in certain
victory, even the sick, it is said, rose up, and hurried into the
ranks. The air seemed rent with their hoarse cheers as their columns
swung in measured tread diagonally across the northern spur of the
cruciform elevation which divided the surface of the valley.
Wellington, informed of the French movement, as it is thought by a
deserter, issued hurried orders to the center, ordered Maitland's
brigade to where the charge must be met, and posted himself, with
Napier's battery, somewhat to its right. While yet his words of
warning were scarcely uttered, the head of the French column
appeared. The English batteries belched forth a welcome; but although
Ney's horse, the fifth that day, was shot, the men he led suffered
little, and with him on foot at their side they came steadily onward.
The British guards were lying behind the hill-crest, and the French
could discern no foe--only a few mounted officers, of whom Wellington
was one. Astonished and incredulous, the assailants pressed steadily
on until within twenty yards of the English line. "Up, guards! make
ready!" rang out the duke's well-known call. The British jumped up and
fired; about three hundred of Ney's gallant soldiers fell. But there
was no confusion; on both sides volley succeeded volley, and this
lasted until the British charged. Then, and then only, the French
withdrew. Simultaneously Donzelot had fallen upon Alten's division;
but he was leading a forlorn hope, and making no impression.
As Ney fell back, a body of French cuirassiers advanced upon the
English batteries. Their success was partial, and behind them a second
column of the guard was formed. Again the assault was renewed; but the
second attempt fared worse than the first. To the right of Maitland,
Adam's brigade, with the Fifty-second regiment, had taken stand;
wheeling now, these drove a deadly flank fire into the advancing
French, while the others poured in a devastating hail of bullets from
the front. The front ranks of the French replied with spirit, but when
the British had completed their manoeuver, Colborne gave the order,
his men cheered in response, and the countercharge began. "Vive
l'Empereur!" came the responsive cheer from the thinning ranks of the
assailants, and still they came on. But in the awful crash they
reeled, confusion followed, and almost in the twinkling of an eye the
rout began. A division of the old guard, the two battalions under
Cambronne, retreated in fair order to the center of the valley, where
they made their last gallant stand against the overwhelming numbers of
Hugh Halkett's German brigade. They fought until but a hundred and
fifty survived. From far away the despairing cry of "Sauve qui peut!"
seemed to ring on their ears. To the first summons of surrender the
leader had replied with dogged defiance; the second was made soon
after, about three in the afternoon, and to this he yielded. He and
his men filed to the English rear without a murmur, but in deep
dejection. This occurrence has passed into tradition as an epic event;
what Cambronne might well have said, "The guard dies, but never
surrenders," was not uttered by him, but it epitomizes their
character, and in the phrase which seems to have been shouted by the
men themselves in their last desperate struggle, they and their leader
have found immortality.
The last charge of what remained of the guard took place almost at the
moment when Durutte was finally routed. Wellington then sent in the
fresh cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur against the column of
Donzelot and the remnants of the French cavalry. These swept all
before them, and then the duke gave the order for a general advance.
The French left fell into panic, and fled toward Belle Alliance.
Before La Haye Sainte stood two squares of French soldiers, the
favored legion chosen to protect the imperial headquarters. In the
fatal hour it splendidly vindicated the choice, and amid the chaos
stood in perfect order. Throughout the famous charge of his devoted
men Napoleon rode hither and thither, from Rossomme to Belle Alliance.
His looks grew dark, but at the very last he called hoarsely to the
masses of disorganized troops that came whirling by, bidding them to
stand fast. All in vain; and as the last square came on he pressed
inside its serried wall. It was not too soon, for the Prussians had
now joined the forward movement, and in the supreme disorder
consequent the other square dissolved. Napoleon's convoy withstood the
shock of a charge from the Twelfth British light dragoons, and again
of a Prussian charge at Rossomme, where Gneisenau took up the fierce
pursuit. Though assaulted, and hard beset by musketry, the square
moved silently on. There were no words except an occasional remark
addressed by Napoleon to his brother Jerome, or to one of the
officers. At eleven Genappe was reached; there, such was the activity
of the pursuers, all hope of an orderly retreat vanished, and the
square melted away. Napoleon had become an object of pity--his eyes
set, his frame collapsed, his great head rolling in a drowsy stupor.
Monthyon and Bertrand set him as best they could upon a horse, and,
one on each side, supported him as they rode. They had an escort of
forty men. At Quatre Bras they despatched a messenger to summon
Grouchy, bidding him to retire on Namur. The Prussians were only one
hour behind. At daybreak the hunted Emperor reached Charleroi, but his
attendants dared not delay; two rickety carriages were secured, and it
was not until the wretched caravan reached Philippeville that the
fugitives obtained a few hours' repose.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE SURRENDER[26]
[Footnote 26: References: Ernouf: Histoire de la dernière
capitulation de Paris, 1815. Rédigée sur des documents
officiels et inédits. Houssaye: 1815, La seconde abdication.
La terreur blanche.]
Nature of Napoleon's Defeat -- Its Political Consequences --
Napoleon's Fatal Resolution -- The State of Paris -- Napoleon at
the Élysée -- His Departure for Rochefort -- Thoughts of Return
-- Procrastination -- Wild Schemes of Flight -- A Refuge in
England -- His Only Resource -- The White Terror and the Allies.
The battle of Waterloo is so called because Wellington's despatch to
England was dated from his headquarters at that place. The world-wide
celebrity of the fight was due to the failure of a tremendous cause
and the extinction of a tremendous genius. That genius had been so
colossal as to confuse human judgment. Even yet mankind forgets that
its possessor was a finite being and attributes his fall to any cause
except the true one. Western Europe had paid dearly for the education,
but it had been educated, learning his novel and original methods in
both war and diplomacy. We have followed the gradual decline of the
master's ability, physical, mental, and moral; we have noted the rise
of the forces opposed to him, military, diplomatic, and national.
Waterloo is a name of the highest import because it marks the final
collapse of personal genius, the beginning of reaction toward an order
old in name but new in spirit. Waterloo was not great by reason of the
numbers engaged, for on the side of the allies were about a hundred
and thirty thousand men, on the other seventy-two thousand
approximately; nor was there any special brilliancy in its conduct.
Wellington defended a strong position well and carefully selected. But
he wilfully left himself with inferior numbers; he did not heartily
coöperate with Blücher; both were unready; Gneisenau was suspicious;
and the battle of Ligny was a Prussian blunder. Napoleon committed,
between dawn and dusk of June eighteenth, a series of petty mistakes,
each of which can be explained, but not excused. He began too late; he
did not follow up his assaults; he did not retreat when beaten; he
could attend to only one thing at a time; he failed in control of his
subordinates; he was neither calm nor alert. His return from Elba had
made him the idol of the majority in France, but his conduct
throughout the Hundred Days was that of a broken man. His genius
seemed bright at the opening of his last campaign, but every day saw
the day's task delayed. His great lieutenants grew uneasy and
untrustworthy, though, like his patient, enduring, and gallant men,
they displayed prodigies of personal valor. Ney and Grouchy used their
discretion, but it was the discretion of caution most unlike that of
Desaix at Marengo, or of Ney himself at Eylau. Their ignorance cannot
be condoned; Grouchy's decision at Walhain, though justified in a
measure by Soult's later order, was possibly the immediate cause of
final disaster. But such considerations do not excuse Napoleon's
failure to give explicit orders, nor his nervous interference with
Ney's formation before Quatre Bras, nor his deliberate iterations
during his captivity that he had expected Grouchy throughout the
battle. Moreover, the interest of Waterloo is connected with its
immediate and dramatic consequences rather than with its decisive
character. If Napoleon had won on that day, the allies would have
been far from annihilation; both Wellington and Blücher had kept open
their respective lines of retreat. The national uprising of Europe
would have been more determined than ever; 1815 would have been but a
repetition of 1814. Finally, the losses, though terrible, were not
unparalleled. Grouchy won at Wavre, and, hearing of the disaster at
Mont St. Jean, first contemplated falling on the Prussian rear as they
swept onward in pursuit. But he quickly abandoned this chimerical
idea, and on receipt of Napoleon's order from Quatre Bras, withdrew to
Namur, and thence, by a masterly retreat, conducted his army back into
France. Including those who fell at Wavre, the allies lost about
twenty-two thousand five hundred men, of whom seven thousand were
British and a like number Prussians. The records at Paris are very
imperfect, but they indicate that the French losses were about
thirty-one thousand.
The booty captured after Waterloo was unimportant; but the political
spoils were immense, and they belonged to the Prussians. Their high
expectation of seizing Napoleon's person was disappointed; but the one
great result--the realization, namely, of all the tyrannical plans
formed at Vienna for the humiliation of liberal France--that they
secured by their instant, hot pursuit. It is hard to discern the facts
in the dust of controversy. Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Great
Britain have each the national conviction of having laid the Corsican
specter; France has long been busy explaining the facts of her defeat,
but seems to have at last completed the task; the most conspicuous
monument on the battle-field is that to the Dutch-Belgians!
Napoleon was fully aware that at Waterloo he had made the last cast of
the dice and that he had lost. It cannot be proven, but the charge is
made, that far earlier he had ceased to reckon with facts and had
begun to juggle with unrealities. The return from Elba has all the
elements of romance, but events proved that it was based on a sound
judgment. Had the allied powers been willing to give France the
privilege of choosing her own government, which in spite of all that
had occurred was hers by every principle known to international law,
Europe would have enjoyed some years of repose, at any rate;
considering Napoleon's shattered health and premature old age, France
might for a long period have ceased to be a disturber of the public
peace, working out then as now, perhaps in equal tribulation, the
enduring principles of the Revolution; forty years of turmoil might
have been spared to the Continent and the gory floods poured on the
ground at Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo might have coursed
unmolested in the veins of the innocent men from which they welled
out. The responsibility for all the blood which was shed after the
first treaty of Paris must be shared with Napoleon by dynastic Europe,
in particular by the diplomatists who represented the hate of Russia,
Austria, and Prussia and suffered it to find an outlet in a war of
revenge; a portion too belongs to the factious bitterness which
reigned supreme in the various French parties, awakening civil strife
and endangering French nationality. From first to last there had been
little consistency or continuity in Napoleon's character--it is by no
means certain that he might not well have played, and perhaps
magisterially, the rôle of a national ruler; it is of course also
possible that he might have remained the same untamed, cosmopolitan
adventurer to the end. In view of the political history of France
during the Hundred Days, the former is more probable. But after
Waterloo he was clearly aware that he could no longer be either the
one or the other. It was not to be expected that every instinct would
disappear at once, that he would resign himself to obscurity without
an effort.
After a short rest at Philippeville, Napoleon composed the customary
bulletins concerning his campaign, and despatched them to the capital,
together with a letter counseling Joseph to stand firm and keep the
legislature in hand. If Grouchy had escaped, he wrote, he could
already array fifty thousand men on the spot; with the means at hand,
he could soon organize a hundred and fifty thousand; the troops in
regimental depots, together with the national guard, would raise the
number to three hundred thousand. These representations were based on
a habit of mind, and not on genuine conviction. He believed Grouchy's
force to have been annihilated, and though he paused at Laon as if to
reorganize an army, he went through the form of consulting such
officers as he could collect, and then, under their advice, pressed on
to Paris. The officers urged that the army and the majority of the
people were loyal, but that the aristocracy, the royalists, and the
liberal deputies were utterly untrustworthy. "My real place is here,"
was the response. "I shall go to Paris, but you drive me to a foolish
course." This was the voice of reason, but he obeyed the behest of
inclination. Yet he halted at the threshold, and, entering the city on
the night of June twenty-first, made no public announcement of his
presence. On the contrary, he almost slunk into the silent halls of
the Élysée, where a sleepy attendant or two received the unexpected
guest without realizing what had happened. He must have felt that the
moral effect of Waterloo had been his undoing; unlike any other of his
defeats, it had not ruined him as general alone, nor as ruler alone:
his prestige as both monarch and soldier was gone.
The news of Ligny had been received in the city with jubilations; at
the instant of Napoleon's arrival the truth about Mont St. Jean was
passing all too swiftly on the thousand tongues of rumor from quarter
to quarter throughout the town, creating consternation everywhere.
Early in the morning, Davout, fully aware of public sentiment, and
true to his instincts, advised the shrinking Emperor to prorogue the
chambers, and throw himself on the army; Carnot believed the public
safety required a dictatorship, and urged it; Lucien was strongly of
the same opinion. But the old Napoleon was no more; vacillating almost
as if in partial catalepsy, murmuring empty phrases in quick,
indistinct utterance, he refused to decide. Members of the council
began to gain admittance, and, waxing bolder as Napoleon grew more
silent, the word "abdication" was soon on every tongue. At last a
decision was taken, and such a one! Lucien was sent to parley with the
chambers, and Fouché was summoned. The latter, with insidious
eloquence, argued that in the legislature alone could Napoleon find a
support to his throne. The talk was reported, as if by magic, in the
assembly halls, and Lafayette, supported by Constant, put through a
motion that any attempt to dissolve the chambers would be considered
treason. Lucien pleaded in vain for a commission to treat with the
invaders in his brother's name; the deputies appointed a committee of
public safety, and adjourned.
Broken in spirit, Napoleon spent the evening in moody speculation,
weighing and balancing, but never deciding. Should he appear at dawn
before the Tuileries, summon the troops already in Paris, and prorogue
the hated chambers, or should he not? The notion remained a dream.
Early in June the court apothecary, Cadet de Gassicourt, had been
ordered by the Emperor to prepare an infallible poison. This was done,
and during this night of terrible vacillation the dose was swallowed
by the desperate fugitive. But, as before at Fontainebleau, the
theory of the philosopher was weaker than his instincts. In dreadful
physical and mental agony, the would-be suicide summoned his
pharmacist, and was furnished with the necessary antidotes. But the
morning brought no courage, and when the chambers met at their
accustomed hour, on the motion of an obscure member they demanded the
Emperor's abdication. The message was borne by the military commander
of the Palais Bourbon, where the legislature, which had now usurped
the supreme power, was sitting, and he asserted of his own motion
that, if compliance were refused, the chambers would declare Napoleon
outlawed. The Emperor at first made a show of fierce wrath, but in the
afternoon he dictated his final abdication to Lucien. No sooner was
this paper received than the wild excitement of the deputies and peers
subsided, and at once a new Directory, consisting of Carnot, Fouché,
Caulaincourt, and Quinette, took up the reins of government. The city
acquiesced, and hour after hour nothing interrupted the deep seclusion
of the Élysée, except occasional shouts from passing groups of
working-men, calling for Napoleon as dictator.
But there was a change as the stragglers from Waterloo began to
arrive, vowing that they still had an arm for the Emperor, and
denouncing those whom they believed to have betrayed him. The notion
of sustaining Napoleon by force began to spread, and when the soldiers
who were coming in, after suppressing the insurrection in Vendée,
added their voices to those of their comrades from Waterloo, the new
authorities feared Napoleon's presence as a menace to their power.
Davout had been the first to suggest an appeal to force, but when
Napoleon recurred at last to the idea, the marshal opposed it. On June
twenty-fifth, therefore, the fallen man withdrew to Malmaison; where,
in the society of Queen Hortense and a few faithful friends, during
three days he abandoned himself for long intervals to the sad memories
of the place. But he also wrote a farewell address to the army, and,
in constant communication with a committee of the government,
completed a plan for escaping to the United States, "there to fulfil
his destiny," as he himself said. For this purpose two frigates were
put at the disposal of "him who had lately been Emperor." All was
ready on the twenty-ninth. That day a passing regiment shouted, "Long
life to the Emperor," and, in a last despairing effort, Napoleon sent
an offer of his services, as a simple general, to save Paris, and
defeat the allies, who, though approaching the capital, were now
separated. Fouché returned an insulting answer to the effect that the
government could no longer be responsible for the petitioner's safety.
Then, at last, Napoleon knew that all was over in that quarter. Clad
in civilian's clothing, and accompanied by Bertrand, Savary, and
Gourgaud, he immediately set out for Rochefort. General Becker led the
party as commissioner for the provisional government.
It was the exile's intention to hurry onward, but at Rambouillet he
halted, and spent the evening composing two requests, one for a supply
of furniture from Paris, the other for the library in the Petit
Trianon, together with copies of Visconti's "Greek Iconography" and
the great work on Egypt compiled from materials gathered during his
ill-starred sojourn in that country. Next morning a courier arrived
from Paris with news. "It is all up with France," he exclaimed, and
set out once more. Crowds lined the highways; sometimes they cheered,
and they were always respectful. Such was the enthusiasm of two
cavalry regiments at Niort that Becker was induced to send a despatch
to the government, pleading that an army, rallied in Napoleon's name,
might still exert an important influence in public affairs. Just as
the general was closing the document there arrived the news of the
cannonade heard before the capital on the thirtieth. Napoleon dictated
a postscript: "We hope the enemy will give you time to cover Paris and
bring your negotiations to an issue. If, in that case, an English
cruiser stops the Emperor's departure, you can dispose of him as a
common soldier."
By a strange coincidence, English cruisers had, as a matter of fact,
appeared within a few days in the offing before Rochefort. Whatever
the relation between this circumstance and his suggestion, Napoleon
studied every possible means of delaying his journey, and actually
opened a correspondence with the commanders in Bordeaux and the
Vendée, with a view to overthrowing the "traitorous" government. It
was July third when he finally reached Rochefort. Again for five days
he procrastinated. But the allies were entering Paris; Wellington was
bringing Louis XVIII back to his throne; in forty-eight hours the
monarchs of the coalition would arrive. Blücher had commissioned a
Prussian detachment to seize and shoot his hated opponent, wherever
found. On the eighth, therefore, the outcast Emperor embarked; but for
two days the frigates were detained by unfavorable winds. On the
tenth, English cruisers hove in sight, and on the eleventh Las Cases,
who had been appointed Napoleon's private secretary, was sent to
interview Captain Maitland, of the _Bellerophon_, concerning his
instructions from the British government. The envoy returned, and
stated that the English commander would always be ready to receive
Napoleon, and conduct him to England, but he could not guarantee that
the ex-Emperor could settle there, or be free to betake himself to
America.
This language was almost fatal to the notion of a final refuge in
England, which Napoleon had begun to discuss and consider during the
days spent in Rochefort; so Las Cases sought a second interview.
According to his account, Maitland then changed his tone, remarking
that in England the monarch and his ministers had no arbitrary power;
that the generosity of the English people, and their liberal views,
were superior to those entertained by sovereigns. To the speaker this
was a platitude; to the listeners it was a weighty remark. A prey to
uncertainty, Napoleon entertained various schemes. He bought two
small, half-decked fishing-boats, with a view to boarding a Danish
ship that lay outside, but the project was quickly dropped. Two young
officers of the French frigate suggested sailing all the way to New
York in the little craft. Napoleon seriously considered the
possibility, but recalling that such vessels must get their final
supplies on the coasts of Spain or Portugal, rejected the plan, for he
dared not risk falling into the hands of embittered foes. Word was
brought that an American ship lay near by, in the Gironde. General
Lallemand galloped in hot haste to see whether an asylum for the
outlawed party could be secured under her flag. He returned with a
reply that the captain would be "proud and happy to grant it."
But in the interim Napoleon had determined to throw himself on the
"generosity of England." On the thirteenth Gourgaud was sent to
London, with a request to the Prince Regent that the Emperor should be
permitted to live unknown in some provincial English place, under the
name of General Duroc. On the fifteenth Napoleon embarked on the
_Bellerophon_, where he was received with all honors; next day the
vessel sailed, and on the twenty-fourth she cast anchor in Torbay.
During the voyage the passenger was often somnolent, and seemed
exhausted; but he was affable in his intercourse with the officers,
and to Maitland, who unwisely yielded the expected precedence. To his
kindly keeper, in a sort of beseeching confidence, the prisoner showed
portraits of his wife and child, lamenting with tender sensibility his
enforced separation from them. The scenes in Torbay were curious.
Crowds from far and near lined the shores, and boats of all
descriptions thronged the waters; the sight-seers dared everything to
catch a glimpse of the awful monster under the terrors of whose power
a generation had reached manhood. If, perchance, they succeeded, the
air was rent with cheers. After two days the ship was ordered round
into Plymouth Sound, but the reckless sensation-seekers gathered there
in still greater numbers.
Many have wondered at Napoleon's surrender of his person to the
English. There was no other course open which seemed feasible to a
broken-spirited man in his position. His admirers are correct in
thinking that it was more noble for him to have survived his greatness
than to have taken his own life. To have entered on a series of
romantic adventures such as were suggested--concealment on the Danish
vessel, flight in open boats, concealment in a water-cask on an
American merchantman, and the like--would have been merely the
addition of ignominy to his capture; for his presence under the
American flag would have been reported by spies, and at that day the
standard of the United States would have afforded him little immunity.
It is possible that on the morrow of Waterloo Napoleon might, with
Grouchy's army, the other survivors, and the men from Vendée, have
reassembled an army in Paris, but it is doubtful. Nothing in
Revolutionary annals can surpass the horror of royalist frenzy, known
as the White Terror, which broke out in Provence and southern France
on receipt of the news from Waterloo. The ghastly distemper spread
swiftly, and when Napoleon embarked the tricolor was floating only at
Rochefort, Nantes, and Bordeaux; his family was proscribed, Ney and
Labédoyère were imprisoned and doomed to execution. To have
surrendered either to Wellington or Blücher would have been seeking
instant death; to have collected such desperate soldiers as could be
got together would have been an attempt at guerrilla warfare. To take
refuge with the officers of England's navy was the only dignified
course with any element of safety in it, since Great Britain was the
only land in Europe which afforded the privileges of asylum to certain
classes of political offenders. Naturally, the negotiators did not
proclaim their extremity. Considering the date of Gourgaud's embassy,
it is clear they were in no position to demand formal terms, and
Maitland's character forbids the conclusion that he made them. It is
unfortunate that he did not commit to writing all his transactions
with Lallemand, Savary, and Las Cases; perhaps he was injudiciously
polite, but it is certain that, contrary to their representations, he
made no promise, even by implication, that under England's flag
Napoleon should find a refuge, and not a prison.
CHAPTER XIX
ST. HELENA[27]
[Footnote 27: References: Abell, Mrs. L. E. (late Miss
Balcombe), Recollections of the Emperor Napoleon; Cockburn:
Diary of Buonaparte's voyage to St. Helena in 1815; Lowe,
Mémorial relatif à la captivité de Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène;
Maitland: Narrative of the surrender of Buonaparte and his
residence on board the _Bellerophon_ between May 24th and
August 8th, 1815; O'Meara, Napoleon in Exile; or, a Voice
from St. Helena: being the opinions and reflections of
Napoleon on the most important events of his life and
government in his own words; Rosebery: Napoleon, the Last
Phase; Silvestre: De Waterloo à Sainte-Hélène; Gourgaud:
Sainte-Hélène, journal inédit de 1815 à 1818; Masson: Autour
de Sainte-Hélène; Las Cases: Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène;
Antommarchi: Les derniers moments de Napoléon; Henry: Events
of a Military Life; Montholon: Récits de la captivité de
l'empereur Napoléon; Montholon: Souvenirs de la comtesse;
Montholon: Lettres du comte et de la comtesse (ed. P.
Gonnard); Frémaux: Napoléon prisonnier; Planat de la Faye:
Souvenirs; Gonnard: Origines de la légende napoléonienne.]
Embarrassment of the English Ministry -- A Strange Embassy --
Napoleon's Attitude -- The Transportation -- The Prison and its
Governor -- Occupations of the Prisoner -- Napoleon's Historical
Writings -- Failing Health and Preparations for Death -- His Last
Will and Testament -- The End -- Imprisoned Genius -- The St.
Helena Period -- The Insatiate Curiosity of Europe -- First
Communications from the Island -- Napoleon's Appeal -- Gourgaud
in Europe -- His Undeserved Notoriety -- Futile Efforts of Las
Cases -- O'Meara's Activities -- Confusion During the Last Years
-- Documentary Evidence -- The Legend as a Historical Force.
[Illustration: NAPOLEON SLEEPING BY LAS CASES ON BOARD THE BELLEROPHON
In red chalk by Lépicié.]
[Sidenote: 1815-21]
The ministry of Lord Liverpool, though ultra-Tory, was nevertheless
embarrassed by the course of affairs. On June twentieth the premier
wrote to Castlereagh that he wished Napoleon had been captured by
Louis XVIII, and executed as a rebel. This amazing suggestion was the
result of the progress made within a year by the doctrine of
legitimacy. Although Talleyrand had observed the Hundred Days from the
safe seclusion of Carlsbad, and was coldly received by his
"legitimate" sovereign when he returned to Paris under Wellington's
ægis, yet there was no one equally able to restore a "legitimate"
government, and, with the aid of Wellington, who assumed without
question the chief place in reconstructing France, he was soon in full
activity. In strict logic, the allies reasoned that Napoleon was their
common prisoner, and, as the chief malefactor, he should meet the fate
which was to be Ney's, and later that of Murat. By long familiarity
with such notions, the Czar had finally been converted to the once
abhorrent idea of legitimacy, and was hatching the scheme of the Holy
Alliance; even he would have made no objection. But English opinion,
however irritated, would not tolerate the idea of death as a penalty
for political offenses. Whatever ministers felt or said, they dared
consider no alternative in dealing with Napoleon except that of
imprisonment. Accordingly, St. Helena, the spot suggested at Vienna as
being the most remote in the habitable world, was designated and the
island was borrowed from the East India Company. Acts of Parliament
were passed which established a special government for it, and cut it
off from all outside communication, "for the better detaining in
custody Napoleon Bonaparte." The Continental allies, therefore, on
August second, declared the sometime Emperor to be their common
prisoner. To England they yielded the right to determine his place of
detention, but to each of themselves--Austria, Russia, and
Prussia--was reserved the right of sending thither a commissioner who
should determine the fact of actual imprisonment.
It was in Torbay that the newspapers brought on board the
_Bellerophon_ first announced what was under consideration. On July
thirty-first, with inconsistent ceremony, the determination was
formally announced by an embassy consisting of Lord Keith, the
admiral; Sir Henry Bunbury, an under-secretary of state; and Mr.
Meike, secretary to the admiral. To whom did this highest official
authority address itself? To General Bonaparte, a private citizen!
Their message was read in French, and Napoleon displayed perfect
self-control. Asked if he had anything to say, the ex-Emperor, without
temper or bitterness, appealed against the judgment of governments
both to posterity and to the British people. He was, he said, a
voluntary guest; he wished to be received as such under the law of
nations, and to be domiciled as an English citizen (_sic_). During the
interval before naturalization he would dwell under superintendence
anywhere in England, thirty leagues from any seaport. He could not
live in St. Helena; he was accustomed to ride twenty miles a day; what
could he do on that little rock at the end of the world? He could have
gone to his father-in-law, or to the Czar, but while the tricolor was
still flying he had confided in British hospitality. Though defeated,
he was still a sovereign, and deserved to be treated as such. With
emphasis he declared that he preferred death to St. Helena.
The embassy withdrew in silence from the moving scene. Lord Keith had
previously expressed gratitude to Napoleon for personal attentions to
a young relative who had been captured at Waterloo. Him, therefore,
the imperial prisoner now recalled, and asked if there were any
tribunal to which appeal might be made. The answer was a polite
negative, with the assurance that the British government would
mitigate the situation as far as prudence would permit. "How so?" said
Napoleon. "Surely St. Helena is preferable to a smaller space in
England," answered Keith, "or being sent to France, or perhaps to
Russia." "Russia!" exclaimed Napoleon, taken off his guard. "God
preserve me from it!" This was the only moment of excitement; the
witnesses of the long and trying scene have left on record the
profound impression made on them by Napoleon's dignity and admirable
conduct throughout. Subsequently the prisoner composed a written
protest appealing to history. An enemy who for twenty years had waged
war against the English people had come voluntarily to seek an asylum
under English laws; how did England respond to such magnanimity? In
his own mind, at least, he instituted and therefore wrote a comparison
between-himself and Themistocles, who took refuge with the Persians,
and was kindly treated. The parallel broke down in that the great
Greek had never forced his enemy into entangling alliances, as
Napoleon had forced England into successive coalitions for
self-preservation. Moreover, his surrender was not voluntary: his life
would not have been worth a moment's purchase either in France or
elsewhere on the Continent, to have fled by sea would have been to
invite capture. "Wherever," as he himself repeatedly said--"wherever
there was water to float a ship, there was to be found a British
standard." Still there were many in England who took his view; much
sympathy was aroused, and some futile efforts for his release were
made.
For the journey to St. Helena, Napoleon was transferred to Admiral
Cockburn's ship, the _Northumberland_. The suite numbered thirty, and
was chosen by Napoleon himself. Its members were Bertrand, Montholon,
and Las Cases, with their families, together with Gourgaud and,
following in a later ship, a Pole of doubtful duty and dubious
personality, the self-styled Colonel Piontkowski. There were sixteen
servants, of whom twelve were Napoleon's. The voyage was tedious and
uneventful. The admiral adhered to English customs, and discarded the
etiquette observed toward crowned heads; but he remained on the best
of terms with his illustrious prisoner. There were occasional
misunderstandings, and sometimes ill-natured gossip, in which the
admiral was denounced behind his back as a "shark"; but such little
gusts of temper passed without permanent consequences. Napoleon had
secured the excellent library he desired, and every day read or wrote
during most of the morning; the evenings he devoted to games of hazard
for low stakes, or to chess, which he played very badly. He was
careful as to his diet, took abundant regular exercise, and, since his
health was excellent, he appeared in the main cheerful and resigned.
The island of St. Helena is the craggy summit of an ancient volcano,
rising two thousand seven hundred feet above the sea, and contains
forty-five square miles. Its shores are precipitous, but it has an
excellent harbor, that of Jamestown, which was then a port of call on
the voyage from England, by the Cape of Good Hope, to India. It lies
four thousand miles from London, one thousand one hundred and forty
from the coast of Africa, one thousand one hundred and eighty from the
nearest point in South America. There were a few thousand inhabitants
of mixed race, and the tropical climate, though moist and enervating,
is fairly salubrious. Under the act passed by Parliament, England
increased the territorial waters around the island to a ring three
times the usual size, and policed them by "hovering" vessels, which
made the approach of suspicious craft virtually impossible. This,
with numerous other precautionary measures of minor importance, made
St. Helena an impenetrable jail. It was October sixteenth, 1815, when
Napoleon landed on its shores.
The residence provided for the imperial captive was a rather ordinary
farm-house in the center of the island, on a plateau two thousand feet
high. The grounds were level, and bounded by natural limits, so that
they were easy to guard, and could be observed in all their extent by
sentries; eventually a circuit of twelve miles was marked out, and
within this the prisoner might move at will; if he wished to pass the
line, he must be attended by an English officer. Considering the
conceptions of state and chivalry then prevalent, the place was mean;
long after, when enlarged and repaired, the house was thought not
unsuitable for the entertainment of an imprisoned Zulu chieftain.
Longwood, for this is the familiar name, might at a pinch have
sufficed for the lodging of General Bonaparte; it was certainly better
than a dungeon; but its modest comfort was far from the luxurious
elegance which had become a second nature to the Emperor Napoleon.
Such as it was to be, however, it was still uninhabitable in October,
and its destined occupant was, until December ninth, the guest of a
hospitable merchant, Mr. Balcombe, at his villa known as The Briars.
The sentinels and patrols remained six hundred paces from the door
during the day; at night the cordon of guards was drawn close around
the house; twice in twenty-four hours the orderly must assure himself
of the prisoner's actual presence, and human ingenuity could devise no
precaution which was not taken by land and sea to make impossible any
secret communication, inward or outward. Cockburn's serene good-nature
rendered it out of the question for the captive to do more than
declare his policy of protest and exasperation, until April, 1816,
when the admiral departed, and was replaced by Sir Hudson Lowe. The
latter was a vulnerable foe. A creature of routine, and fresh from a
two years' residence as English commissioner in Blücher's camp, he had
thoroughly absorbed the temper both of the Tory ministry and of the
Continental reactionaries. Neither irascible, severe, nor ill-natured,
he was yet punctilious, and in no sense a match for the brilliant
genius of his antagonist. With the arrival of this unfortunate
official properly begins the St. Helena period of Napoleon's life--a
period considered by many to be instructive; but, as regards the talk
and futile calculations in which he indulged, comparable only to that
of his ineffectual agitations in Corsica.
[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane. Engraved by
S. W. Reynolds.
NAPOLEON AT ST. HELENA.
Painted by Horace Vernet.]
Napoleon, the prisoner, had a double object--release and
self-justification. The former he hoped to gain by working on the
feelings of the English Liberals; the latter by writing an
autobiography which, in order to win back the lost confidence of
France, should emphasize the democratic, progressive, and beneficent
side of his career, and consign to oblivion his tyrannies and
inordinate personal ambitions. The dreary chronicle of the quarrel
between a disarmed giant and a potent pygmy is uninteresting in
detail, but very illuminating in its large outlines. The routine of a
court was instituted and for a time was rigidly observed at Longwood.
The powerless monarch so successfully simulated the wisdom and
judgment of a chastened soul that the accounts which reached the
distant world awakened a great pity among the disinterested. As on
shipboard and at The Briars, he gave his mornings to literature, clad
in a studied, picturesque dishabille. The afternoon he devoted to
amusement and exercise; but a distaste for more physical exertion than
was actually essential to health grew steadily, until he became
sluggish and corpulent. At table he was always abstemious; his sleep
was irregular and disturbed. The evenings he spent with favorite
authors, Voltaire, Corneille, and Ossian; frequently, also, in reading
the Bible. The opinions he expressed were in the main those of his
pseudoscientific days; among other questions discussed was that of
polygamy, which he upheld as an excellent institution theoretically.
Much time was spent by the household in abusing Longwood, and so
effectually that a wooden house was constructed in England, and
erected near by; but the prisoner made difficulties about every
particular, and never occupied it. There were continuous schemings for
direct intercourse with friends in France, and partial success ended
in the dismissal of Las Cases. Gourgaud, too, departed, ostensibly
because of a quarrel with Montholon, really, as he represented, to
agitate with Alexander, Francis, and Maria Louisa for Napoleon's
release. The exile confessed, in an unguarded moment, that no man
alive could have satisfied him in the relation of governor of St.
Helena, but yet he was adroit and indefatigable in his efforts to
discredit Lowe. The "Letters from the Cape of Good Hope," published in
England anonymously, but now incorporated in the official edition of
Napoleon's works as the thirty-first volume, abuse the climate of St.
Helena, depict the injustice of the imprisonment, and heap scorn on
the governor. The book was widely read, and furnished the Whigs in
Parliament with many shafts of criticism. This success emboldened the
author, and further compositions by his hand were mysteriously
published in Europe.
For three years Napoleon's self-appointed task as a historian was
unremittingly pursued, and the results, while he had the assistance of
Las Cases and Gourgaud, were voluminous; thereafter the output was a
slender rill. Most of the volumes which record his observations and
opinions bear the names of the respective memorialists, Montholon, Las
Cases, Gourgaud, O'Meara, and Antommarchi, the two latter his
attendant physicians. The period he took pains to elucidate most fully
in these writings was that between Toulon and Marengo. Over his own
name appeared monographs on Elba, the Hundred Days, and Waterloo. His
professional ability is shown by short studies on the "Art and History
of War," on "Army Organization," and on "Fortification"; likewise by
his full analyses of the wars waged by Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick
the Great. These are not unworthy of the author's reputation; his
versatility is displayed in a few commonplace notes--some on
Voltaire's "Mahomet," some on suicide, and others on the second book
of the Æneid. A widely circulated treatise, the "Manuscript from St.
Helena," was long attributed to him, but was a clever forgery. As will
be explained, its effect on history was important.
For nearly four years Napoleon's health was fair. O'Meara, the
physician appointed to attend him, was assiduous and skilful, but when
he became his patient's devoted slave he was dismissed by Lowe.
Thereupon certain disquieting symptoms, which had been noted from time
to time, became more pronounced, and the prisoner began to brood and
mope in seclusion. In the autumn of 1819, Dr. Antommarchi, a Corsican
physician chosen by Fesch, was installed at Longwood. For a time, as
he claimed, he had some success in ameliorating the ex-Emperor's
condition, and to what the writer records as their confidential talks
we owe our knowledge of Napoleon's infancy. But from month to month
the patient's strength diminished, and the ravages of his mysterious
disease at length became very apparent. The obstinacy of Lowe in
carrying out the letter of his instructions, by intruding on the
sufferer to secure material for a daily report, seriously aggravated
Napoleon's miseries. Two priests accompanied Antommarchi: one only
remained for some time, and after his arrival mass was celebrated
almost every morning in the chapel adjoining the sick-room. "Not every
man is an atheist who would like to be," was a remark Napoleon dropped
to Montholon. Yet, though preparing for death, he was making ready
simultaneously to speed his Parthian arrow.
His testament displays his qualities in their entirety. The language
sounds simple and sincere; there is a hidden meaning in almost every
line. His religion had been outwardly that of a deist; he now
professed a piety which he always felt but rarely practised. During
his life France had been caressed and used as a skilful artificer
caresses and uses his tools; the last words of his will suggest a
passionate devotion. To his son he recommended the "love of right,
which alone can incite to the performance of great deeds"; for his
faithless wife he expressed the tenderest sentiments, and probably
felt them. It was his hope that the English people would avenge itself
on the English oligarchy, and that France would forgive the traitors
who betrayed her--Marmont, Augereau, Talleyrand, and Lafayette--as he
forgave them. Louis he pardoned in the same spirit for the "libel
published in 1820; it is full of falsehoods and falsified documents."
The blame for Enghien's murder he took to himself. The second portion
of the document is a series of munificent-sounding bequests to a list
of legatees which includes every one who had done the testator any
important service since his earliest childhood. France under the
Bourbons confiscated the imperial domain of about a hundred and eighty
millions, which Napoleon had estimated at over two hundred and twenty.
When the nation passed again under the Bonapartes it appropriated
eight millions toward the unpaid legacies. In the end his executors
collected three and a half millions of francs wherewith to pay
bequests amounting on their face to over nine and a half. In a codicil
he remembers a certain Cautillon, who had undergone trial for an
alleged attempt to assassinate Wellington. "Cautillon had as much
right to assassinate that oligarch as he [Wellington] to send me to
the rock of St. Helena to perish there." Such was the nature and
substance of an appeal to a generous, forgiving nation, and to
posterity, by one who wrote in the same document that he wished to die
in the bosom of the Christian church, whose central doctrine is love,
and whose ethic is forgiveness of enemies.
"I closed the abyss of anarchy and brought order out of chaos. I
cleansed the Revolution, ennobled the people, and made the kings
strong. I have awakened all ambitions, rewarded all merit, and
enlarged the borders of glory." These were the words of Napoleon in
1816; he Lived in this hallucination to the end. In the autumn of 1820
he realized his condition, and throughout the winter he was feeble and
depressed. In February, 1821, he began to fail rapidly, and the
symptoms of his disease, cancer in the stomach, multiplied; but, in
spite of feebleness, he faced death with courage. On May third two
English physicians, recently arrived, came in for consultation; they
could only recommend palliatives, and under the influence of that
treatment the imperial patient kept an uncertain hold on his
faculties. Two days later a violent storm of wind and rain set in. A
spreading willow, under which Napoleon had spent many hours, was
overturned; the trees planted by his hands were uprooted; and a
whirlwind devastated the garden in which he had worked for exercise.
The death of the sufferer was coincident, and scarcely less violent.
The last words uttered were caught by listening ears as the sun rose;
they were "Tête ... armée." Mme. Bertrand and her children were
present; at the sight of their friend's suffering the boy fainted and
the little girls broke into loud lamentation. At eleven in the morning
the supreme agonies began; a little before six in the evening the
heart put forth its last convulsive effort, and ceased to beat. The
mournful band of watchers within bowed their heads. Without the door
another watch was set--that of the orderly. During the first outburst
of grief among those at the bedside two officers entered silently,
felt the cold limbs, marked the absence of life, and left without a
word. England's prisoner had escaped.
* * * * *
It requires a complex environment to develop a man of any sort; for
the exhibition of his personality and identity he must live in family,
church, and state, and beyond all these surroundings even the meanest
of mankind is subject to some cosmopolitan influence. How much more
true is this of a historical and political personage, who is and can
be himself only under the conditions which permit the play of his
powers. Removed from these, his soul and spirit sicken, his character
becomes morbid, his capacities are crippled, his identity is
distorted. Nothing could be more fatuous and simple than the effort to
read the true character of Napoleon Bonaparte from his talk and
behavior when an exile; a prisoner of time and space, as world
communications then were; an exhausted body; a crippled, outraged
spirit, reduced for attack and defense to the weapons of the pen and
the tongue wielded on and over an immensity of apartness. Yet exactly
this has been the self-imposed task of many investigators and writers.
The literature of his prison-house has grown to vast dimensions, and
readers feel cheated when the bald outline of all that may even be
considered history is offered for their consideration. The narrative
of the St. Helena epoch in his life just given is probably accurate,
and there are portions of it that rest on historical evidence both
objective and internal, as trustworthy as most of what passes for
history.
But when this is said the statement must be carefully guarded, for the
reason that substantially all our evidence is virtually such as would
be given about himself by a convict behind the bars, his sympathizing
accomplices, his jailer, and his prosecutors. The simile is not
strained. The surgeon of the _Northumberland_, ignorant of French,
gathered from those of Napoleon's attendants who spoke English such
scraps regarding the prisoner as he could, published them, and lost
his government employment. The book was widely read and proved a very
lucrative enterprise. Outside its pages there was profound silence and
complete ignorance in Europe regarding the now mysterious convict,
buried to the world. Craving for information was universal and
insatiate; if only Napoleon himself would speak! It appeared as if the
longing were satisfied in a published "Manuscript arrived from St.
Helena by unknown means." The volume was difficult to procure,
although edition followed edition in swift succession; many a precious
copy was used in reading circles and there are still in existence a
considerable number of the very numerous reproductions made at the
time with pen and ink. One of these was actually sold not long ago to
an unsuspecting editor in the United States and published in his
magazine as a rarity. It fell flat because so many knew the truth:
that it was apocryphal, the merry jest of a Genevese gentleman, Lullin
de Châteauvieux, who lived to see his sport a dangerous element in
the falsification of history. It was not only Napoleonic in style, but
too Napoleonic; and, considered as an imperialist pamphlet, an
anti-royalist pronunciamento, brought into being the embryo of a
legend such as men crave and which the loyal efforts of many
historians have utterly failed to destroy. Its contents, of course,
are utterly worthless except as a comedy, a mask of literature which
influenced public opinion.
The first known opportunity of the Napoleon court for communication
with the outside world was afforded by the British government. The
guarding and maintenance of Napoleon proved a source of great
expenditure. The garrison and military staff, the hovering vessels of
the navy, the entertainment of the continental commissioners, and
especially the allowance for the establishment of Longwood, miserable
as it was--the total cost appeared to the London authorities
exorbitant. Prices of supplies at St. Helena were enormous because of
its remoteness. So the subordinates of the ministry, with the assent
of their superiors, determined upon reductions, and they began with
the household of the Emperor, issuing orders that four of its members
should be dismissed. These were, first, the Polish adventurer
Piontkowski, part gentleman, part domestic, and wholly emissary and
spy, who had been sent out by the English government in a vessel which
followed the _Northumberland_, for reasons best known to themselves.
He appears to have accepted a charge from Napoleon; that, namely, of
laying before the Czar a formal protest against the treaties which
made Napoleon the joint prisoner of the allies, entrusted to the
charge of Great Britain. The next to leave were Archambaud and
Rousseau, one a huntsman, one a chief butler; they were to visit
Joseph Bonaparte in the United States and give him the fullest
information. The fourth was the chamberlain Santini, a Corsican, and,
though a soldier, utterly illiterate. To him was confided a protest
for use either in London or in Italy, as the event should determine. A
copy was made in Chinese ink on white satin ribbon for concealment
about his person, but the chief reliance was, that "verbally and
literally" he was drilled in its repetition until he could neither
forget nor mistake in its recital. The faithful servants reached
Joseph's home in America, the Pole on arrival in England styled
himself Count and Colonel, became the hero of a social season in
London, and vanished from history as mysteriously as he entered it.
But Santini with Italian adroitness gained not only the presence of
Lord Holland but his attentive ear; his recital was translated into
English and published, the matter was brought before Parliament by
interpellation of the great Whig statesman and caused great excitement
throughout the world.
Napoleon's "Appeal to the English Nation," as printed from Santini's
copy, recited the stupidity of his jailer, the unhealthiness of the
climate, the expense and difficulty of living. His statements were not
merely confirmed, the conditions of life on St. Helena were
monstrously exaggerated by Montchenu, the French commissioner, in a
private letter which was published soon after the arrival of Santini
in London. This, too, was circulated all abroad. Public opinion was
further agitated. The allied dynasties were made to feel ashamed by
their subjects, and in Great Britain there was a fierce surge of
reprobation, the resonance of which has not yet died away. The exile
was chained to a horrid rock, in a climate Europeans could not endure,
his miserable existence in hovels overrun with vermin must be eked out
by loans from friends and the sale of his silver tableware, he was
put to needless shame by the stupid regulations of a stupid
government, stupidly enforced by a stupid governor, he was sick of
body and heart, very sick and might die. Whose was the responsibility
for this disgrace to civilization? Somewhat in this way men talked and
questioned; soon his faults were forgotten in the pitiful recital of
his woes; the legend was further advanced, once more the glory of
Napoleon's epoch became a powerful force in Europe.
On the fourteenth of March, 1818, there arrived in England a member of
the St. Helena court, whose name and fame bid fair to rival if not to
obliterate those of all his companions in exile, though most
undeservedly. This was General Gourgaud, styled Master of Ordinance.
He was thirty-five years old and had been a soldier for sixteen,
winning promotion for intelligence and intrepidity, securing
Napoleon's affection by personal charm and by services which once at
least, and probably twice, directly saved the Emperor's life, until at
last he was a baron, a general at Waterloo, and a companion in St.
Helena. This all seems passing strange because he was a high officer
of Louis XVIII before Napoleon's return from Elba; made obeisance to
established authority as soon as he returned from captivity, and
during the successive governments of France to his death in 1852 found
favor with each in turn. Whatever he was before and after, his life in
St. Helena was that of a sentimental, jealous, sensitive child,
scarcely a male at that. Every word and every act of every one gave
him such pangs of wounded vanity that at last his presence was
intolerable and by the influence of the Montholons it was arranged
that he should leave. No sooner was the dust of Longwood shaken from
his feet than within sight of its doors he accepted the kindly
attentions of his former jailers with eagerness, and no sooner were
those feet ashore in England than he began to woo the ministry, to
make advances to the Bourbons, and to fawn on the Holy Alliance
itself. It was not until he experienced certain chills and got his
groping finger on the pulse of public opinion that he found himself
utterly mistaken and in danger of mortal error. He then wrote, and
gave to the public prints, a curious letter, addressed to Marie
Louise, asserting that Napoleon was dying in the torments of a
frightful agony. This amounted to a recantation. In consequence he was
banished from England under the Alien Bill. At once he hurried away to
Prince Eugène (Napoleon's treasurer) and from him reclaimed and
received, for four years certainly, his arrears of imperial pay and
pension. In 1822 he was permitted to return to France.
The notoriety of his name is due to two sets of circumstances. Sir
Walter Scott told the truth about his conduct, just when the noble
general was beginning to swim in the refulgence of the Napoleonic
legend. There ensued a wordy warfare. The weapons on one side were
official papers; on the other denials, insinuations, and finally the
assertion of some vague commission or another given by the great
captive, impossible of fulfilment in any way other than by the
mysterious course of the plenipotentiary. This mystery is still
unsolved and the commission undiscovered, but in France at least the
conflict still rages. As late as 1908 a caustic critic was challenged
to a duel by the testy and furious family head of the Gourgauds. The
other set of circumstances is equally curious. Gourgaud left behind
him a journal of his St. Helena life. Its contents are certainly
authentic evidence of the writer's character, and as there is no means
of checking the authenticity of what is recorded about Napoleon and
his Longwood household, the record may possibly be and probably is
accurate. The sore spirit of the writer required a confidant, and
since there was no congenial soul to receive his outpourings he
relieved himself as other sentimental egoists have done in the pages
of a journal. From these the most conscientious efforts have been made
to construct a psychology of the Emperor. The result is a morbid
psychology of a caged falcon, the revival of bitter controversy as to
the treatment of the great prisoner by a Tory ministry, and generally
of a rather abstracted but intense interest in the Napoleonic legend.
Hence the prolonged vogue of a celebrity which should have been
ephemeral. The general is in no proper sense a historical factor
except as the influence of his behavior in Europe served to quicken
the existing lively interest in Napoleon. As far as his earliest
testimony went, and many inclined to heed it, the master he had served
was in excellent health, was kindly treated, and in general was better
off than could have been expected. This of course lashed the
imperialists to fury; their information was to the diametrically
opposite effect.
Antecedent to Gourgaud's departure was that of Las Cases, but his
journey was so impeded, his health so shaken, and his devotion so
discounted, that whatever he accomplished in molding public opinion
was logically subsequent to the work of the general. Spanish by
origin, French by six centuries of devotion, his family was of the
higher nobility. He himself had been an emigrant, but had returned to
become a member of the Council of State. As a great civil official he
had learned to love Napoleon and deliberately chose exile with him
rather than honors and service under the restored Bourbons. In 1816 he
wrote, and endeavored to forward secretly, letters containing his
views as to the disgraceful treatment of Napoleon. These were
intercepted and the writer was condemned in Lowe's first fury to
depart. On second thought the governor begged him to remain under
certain restrictions; these Las Cases would not accept, possibly
because he saw himself of greater use in Europe than in St. Helena. He
reached the Cape of Good Hope in January, 1817, was there detained
eight months, was then forwarded to England, where he was forbidden to
land, thence to Belgium, and finally, in December, a physical
derelict, he found shelter in Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he lived
for a time under the strictest surveillance. His faculties were soon
restored to a certain rather impaired activity, and in 1818 he laid a
powerful protest against the treatment of Napoleon before the Congress
of Aix-la-Chapelle. No less a person than the Emperor's mother was his
agent and intermediary. A meeting of reactionary sovereigns and their
ministers, terrified by the throes of a revolutionary spirit more and
more personified in Bonaparte, could in no case be receptive to such a
remonstrance, and was utterly cold and scornful in the face of
Gourgaud's evidence to the well-being and kind treatment of Napoleon,
already published. Even with the most enlightened and liberal public
of Europe, that of Great Britain, Las Cases' controversial
publications fell rather flat. Readers were weary of the theme, since
O'Meara was now and had been for some time past in possession of the
Napoleonic field.
Dr. O'Meara, the Emperor's body-physician, was a warm-hearted
Irishman, faithful, able, and devoted. That he received substantial
gratuities from his patient is no longer questioned, and these
transfers of money have been called by a harsh name; yet it is easy
for a loyal but illogical devotee to confuse salary, gifts, fees,
bribes, each with each, and one with the other; the crime was not
quite so heinous with a man of his character as it would have been in
persons of severer quality and mold. It seems equally certain that
the stern pedant acting as governor would gladly have employed the
same inducements to secure him as a spy. At least he did not qualify
as the channel of a double espionage, and for that reason fell under
the grave suspicion of authority. The diagnosis of Napoleon's malady
as very grave, which he had made, was confirmed in January, 1819, by
Stokoe, the ship's surgeon of the _Conqueror_, the British flag vessel
then in the harbor. But from O'Meara it was not accepted; he was
dismissed from service and on July twenty-fifth, 1818, sailed
homeward. On August seventeenth the London "Morning Post" began to
print communications sent from St. Helena by him, and shortly after he
landed, in October, there appeared a pamphlet by him attacking Sir
Hudson Lowe. His voluminous "Voice from St. Helena" was not published
until after Napoleon's death. Like the rest of the contemporary
memoirs and memorials, the value of his writings lies in their effect
on the liberal sentiment of the world. The Metternich system of
repression and intervention, which worked its will in dynastic
government for a generation after Napoleon, engendered a newer
liberalism which forgot the tyranny of Napoleonic imperialism and
remembered the Consulate as expressing a well-organized form of
government, adapted superbly for crushing systems, dynastic or
aristocratic or plutocratic, which oppressed mankind by denying the
only possible equality, equality of opportunity, the Napoleonic
"carrière ouverte aux talents." By all sympathetic nationalists,
constitutionalists, and radicals these books were literally devoured,
and in France particularly their effect was lasting. There could never
have been a second Napoleon except as he was thought likely to
reproduce the Consulate; when his rule had proved to be imperialistic
the country was disenchanted. Liberty with order is so ardently
desired! but too often the devices to secure it beget license with
chaos. The literal correctness of O'Meara's reporting, like that of
the rest, cannot be controverted by any rebutting testimony, but the
nature portrayed is the same morbid, sensational, notoriety-seeking,
unwholesome, and pathological specimen as that furnished by the
others.
Dr. Stokoe was speedily disgraced because it was now certain that any
bulletin of serious illness was evidence of conspiracy by the Emperor
and his friends for his escape. It is still affirmed that this second
physician yielded to the Emperor's blandishments and disobeyed Lowe's
orders. His successor, Dr. Verling, was Lowe's man, and, finding his
position intolerable, resigned with the insinuation that he could not
accept bribes. The party strife demanded either that Napoleon must be
entirely well and well treated, or else utterly moribund and
abominably used. Neither was the case, but a mortal disease had
declared itself, his grand marshal was seriously alarmed, and the
members of the Bonaparte family in Europe were dreaming of Napoleon's
escape or planning the renewal of his household by fresh blood. The
Bertrands and the Montholons, though faithful and devoted, were simply
worn out. A Corsican physician, Dr. Antommarchi, and an Italian
priest, Buonavita, were added to the household in September, 1819.
Mme. Montholon with her child was already at home seeking substitutes,
having departed from St. Helena in July. Neither event had any special
consequences. Mme. Montholon found a possible successor to the grand
marshal in the person of Planat, an officer of the Hundred Days.
Negotiations for his sailing were protracted; such was Napoleon's
condition before they were concluded that Montholon would not consider
deserting his post, though Bertrand was quite willing to see Planat
supplant himself. Buonavita was ill and returned to Europe.
Antommarchi was detested by his patient, a new priest and a new doctor
were found, and the faithful Pauline desired to join her exiled
brother. By this time the year 1820 had passed and the fateful spring
of 1821 was well advanced. All preparations for relieving the
household and the guard at St. Helena were now, of course, futile.
Three years of suffering had culminated in the death of the exile.
The documentary material for the St. Helena epoch is very scanty. The
"Mémorial" of Las Cases and the "Voice" of O'Meara are both valuable
as works but not as transcripts. Of Gourgaud's "Journal" the value is
greater, but the medium of transmission most abnormal. The volumes of
Mrs. Abell and Lady Malcolm furnish very slight material; the papers
of the outsiders like Montchenu, Balmain, and Sturmer, like even Lowe
himself, furnish side-lights only; the souvenirs of Mme. Montholon are
trifling and cannot bear critical examination. The recitals of
Montholon were thought of importance until careful scrutiny showed how
he had drawn on Las Cases and O'Meara, how scanty, scrappy, and
confused his own notes were, and finally, when his letters to his wife
were printed, how completely these unfalsified documents contradicted
the other publications in the few interesting points on which they
touch, both in the English edition of Colburn and the carefully edited
and reedited French edition. The more the slight authentic material is
examined the more certain it appears that it is hopeless to read from
it Napoleon's character, even in the unnatural environment of St.
Helena, least of all for the years of real life. Conduct is the only
test of belief, not the invalid lamentations or cynical banter of
dreary, hopeless imprisonment. And when all this talk of a man in
anguish is dubiously reported, distorted by the medium of a
heart-sick listener, or by the transcription of men bored to
extinction, its value is obviously still further diminished. The story
has been briefly narrated of how the legend was engendered, of how it
was planted and watered on the continent of Europe, and its influence
on subsequent generations has been indicated. This is the sum total of
what history finds as its material during the closing years of
Napoleon's life. The souvenirs of Bertrand and Marchand are as yet
inaccessible, if indeed they exist. Some day their possible
publication may shed a few rays of new light on minor points: they
cannot greatly enlarge or substantively reconstruct the slight
historical material we have been able to discover. For valuable
generalizations we must fall back on the many abundant facts of
Napoleon's long career, on the very few facts of his conduct when
mewed and exasperated at St. Helena, on the effects which these in sum
have produced in history. The world at large marvels at the general,
the statesman, the conqueror, the emperor; it is apt to pass unnoticed
the judge and tamer of two epochs, the mediator between a ruined past,
a chaotic present, and a future, orderly at least, though streaked
with the stains of tyranny.
CHAPTER XX
SOLDIER, STATESMAN, DESPOT
Questionings -- The Industrious Burgher -- The Industrious
Sovereign -- End of the Marvelous -- Public Virtue and Private
Weakness -- The Man and The Age -- Latin and German -- First
Struggles -- Usurpation of Power -- Political Theories -- The
Napoleonic System -- Its Foundation -- Stimulus to Despotism --
The Surrender of France -- The Master Soldier.
[Sidenote: Review]
The tomb of Erasmus in Basel is marked by a stone slab on which are an
epitaph, an effigy, and then the pathetic word "Terminus." Should
these fateful syllables be written over the mortal remains of Napoleon
Bonaparte? No. Beyond his death there was more, far more than the work
he wrought during his life. Men ever love a seeming mystery, and while
they do, a favorite theme of speculation will be the career of the
great Corsican in its historical aspect. Before our long study can be
brought to a close, two questions must be considered, or rather two
sides of one question must be viewed. Why did he rise, and what did he
accomplish? The answers will be as various as the investigators who
give them. But the man as seen in the preceding pages certainly
displays these recognizable characteristics: he was a man of the
people, he had a transcendent military genius, he was indefatigable,
and he had unsurpassed energy.
No mere man, even the most remarkable, can climb without supports of
some kind, however unstable they may be. Napoleon Bonaparte did not
soar, he rose on the ladder of power by stages easily traceable: first
by the protection of the Robespierres; then by the necessities and
velleities of Barras and the Directory; afterward by the encouragement
of all France, which was sick of the inefficient Directory; and still
later by the army, which adored a leader who frankly repaid devotion
in the hard cash of booty, and bravery in the splendid rewards of that
glory which was a national passion. With such opportunities, Bonaparte
unfolded what was certainly his supereminent quality--the quality
which endeared him to the French masses as did no other, the quality
which above all others distinguished him from the hated tyrants under
whom they had so long suffered, the quality which even the meanest
intellect could mark as distinctively middle-class, in opposition to
its negation in the upper class--the quality, namely, of untiring
industry; laborious, self-initiated, self-guided, self-improving
industry. This burgher quality Napoleon possessed as no burgher ever
did. It was no exaggeration, but the simple truth, when he said to
Roederer: "I am always working. I think much. If I appear always ready
to meet every emergency, to confront every problem, it is because,
before undertaking any enterprise, I have long considered it, and have
thus foreseen what could possibly occur. It is no genius which
suddenly and secretly reveals to me what I have to say or do in some
circumstance unforeseen by others: it is my own meditation and
reflection. I am always working--when dining, when at the theater; I
waken at night in order to work." How profoundly this was impressed
upon those intimately associated with Napoleon can be traced in their
memoirs on many a page. It was Soult who said, most sapiently: "What
we call an inspiration is nothing but a calculation made with
rapidity."
Generally there is no mystery in the power of domination: he rules
who is indispensable. The Jacobins needed a man, they found him in the
unscrupulous Bonaparte; the Directory needed a man, they found him in
the expert artillerist; France needed a man, she found him in the
conqueror of Italy. And having risen, he did not intermit his industry
for a moment. Rehearsing his coronation by means of puppets, or
studying with painful care the complicated accounts of his fiscal
officers, or absorbing himself in whatever else it might be, he was
always the man who knew more about everything than any one else.
Throughout his reign he was the fountainhead of every governmental
activity: the council of state sharpened not their own, but his
thoughts; his secretaries were his pocket note-book; his ministers
were the executors of his personal designs; pensions and presents were
given by him to his friends, and not to those who served the state as
they themselves thought best; every French community received his
personal attention, and every Frenchman who came to his general
receptions was treated with rude jocularity. In all this he was
perfectly natural. At times, however, he felt compelled to
attitudinize; perhaps, in the theatrical poses which he assumed for
self-protection or for the sake of representing a personified,
unapproachable imperial majesty, he copied Talma, with whom he
cultivated a sort of intimacy. Possibly, too, his violent sallies were
considered dramatic by himself. "Otherwise," he once said, "they would
have slapped me on the shoulder every day." "It is sad," remarked
Roederer, apropos of a certain event. "Yes, like greatness," was
Napoleon's rejoinder.
Napoleon's preëminence lasted just as long as this effective personal
supremacy continued. When his faculties refused to perform their
continuous, unceasing task, he began to decline; when the material of
his calculations transcended all human power, even his own, the
descent grew swifter; and the crash came when his abilities worked
either intermittently or not at all. Ruin was the consequence of
feebleness; the imagination of the world had clothed him with demoniac
qualities, but it ceased so to do just in proportion as his
superiority to others in plan and execution began to diminish. "There
is no empire not founded on the marvelous, and here the marvelous is
the truth." These were the words of Talleyrand, addressed to the First
Consul on June twenty-first, 1800, just after the news of Marengo had
reached Paris. The marvel of the absolute monarchy was the divine
right of kings: when men ceased to hold the doctrine, the days of
absolutism were numbered. The marvel of Napoleon was his unquestioned
human supremacy: when that declined his empire fell.
In the truest sense of that word so dear to modern times, Napoleon was
a self-made man. By his extraordinary energy he made a deficient
education do double duty; and those of his natural gifts which in a
sluggish man would have been mediocre, he paraded so often, and in
such swift succession, that they appeared miraculous. This fiery
energy, it cannot too often be repeated, was the man's most
distinctive characteristic; when it failed he was undone. Was
consistency, as generally understood, to be expected in this
personage; is it, indeed, found in most great men? Nowhere does the
theory of evolution writhe to sustain itself more than in psychology;
nowhere does it discover a greater complexity--a complexity which
makes doubtful its sufficiency. Admitting that Napoleon was selfish;
that he was lustful; that once, at least, he was criminal; that at
various times--yes, even frequently--he was unpopular, and dared not
in extremity call for a national uprising to sustain his cause; that
he had pitiful limitations in dealing with religion, politics, and
finance; supposing him to have displayed on occasion the qualities of
a resurrected medieval free-lance, or of the Borgias, or of other
historical monsters; confessing that he was launched upon the fiery
lake of revolution by the madness of extreme Jacobinism; sustaining
the awful indictment in each detail--was there no reverse to the
medal, no light to the shadow, no general result except negations? Was
the work of Alexander the Great worthless because of his debaucheries?
Was Catharine II of Russia a mere damned soul because of her
harlotries? Did Talleyrand's duplicity and meanness render less
valuable or permanent the work he did in thwarting the coalition at
Vienna? The answer of history is plain: what the great of the earth
have wrought for others or against them is to be recorded and judged
with impartiality; how they sinned against themselves is to be told as
an awful warning, and then to be left for the decision of the Great
Tribunal. Modern philosophy requires such complicated and yet such
minute knowledge in every department of science that the specialist
has supplanted the general scholar and the system-maker; the man who
aspires to create a plan displaying the unity of either the objective
or the subjective world, or any harmony of one with the other, is
generally regarded as either an antiquated imbecile or a charlatan.
Yet in the examination of historical characters a symmetrical
consistency capable of being grasped by the meanest intellect is
imperiously demanded by all readers and critics. This is natural, but
not altogether reasonable: symmetry cannot be found in the commonest
human being on our globe, much less in those who rise supereminent.
The greater the man, the more impossible to connect in a mathematical
diagram the different phases of his conduct. The search for mediocre
consistency in the character of Napoleon is like the Cynic
philosopher's quest for a man.
This personage strove, and with considerable success, to think and act
for an entire nation--ay, more, for western Europe. In order to render
this conceivable, he first took command of his own body--sleeping at
will, and never more than six hours; eating when and what he would,
but always with extreme moderation; waking from profound slumber and
rousing his mind instantaneously to the highest pitch, so that he then
composed as incisively as in the midst of active ratiocination. He was
able to train his secretaries and servants into instruments destitute
of personal volition--even his great generals, who were taught to act
for themselves within certain limits, never transcended the fixed
boundary, and grew inefficient when deprived of his impulse. He never
failed to reward merit or to gratify ambition for the sake of securing
an able lieutenant, and nascent devotion he quickened into passion by
the display of suitable familiarity. A thoughtful, self-contained,
self-sufficient worker, he was sometimes a trifle uneasy in social
intercourse, perhaps always so beneath his mask of good breeding, when
he wore one; but he played his various rôles in public with consummate
skill, except that he made nervous movements with his eyes, hands, and
ears. His little tricks of rolling his right shoulder, tugging at his
cuffs, and the like; his inability to write, and his generally clumsy
movements when irritated, were due to deficient training in early
childhood. Forbidding in his intercourse with ambitious women and
other self-seekers, he was considerate with the suffering, and found
it difficult, if not impossible, to refuse the petitions of the needy.
Loving rough and ready ways in those busied about his person,--as, for
instance, when his valet rubbed him down in the morning with a coarse
towel,--he was yet so sensitive that he had to have his hats worn by
others before he could set them on his own head. It is useless to seek
even homely physical consistency in a man thus constituted.
It is equally useless to ask whether Napoleon could have been as great
a man in another epoch as he was in his own. In any epoch of warfare
he would have been great; it is likely that in any epoch of peace he
would have reached eminence as a legislator and administrator. The
real historical question is this: How did he, being what he was, and
his age, being what it was, interact one upon the other; and what was
the resultant? There was as little consistency in his age as in
himself; the sinuosities of each fitted strangely into those of the
other, and the result was a period of twenty years on which common
consent fixes the name of the Napoleonic age. Does his personality
throw any light on the antecedent period--does his career influence
the succeeding years?
The age of the Revolution has such intimate connection with the
movements of French society that it is very generally called in other
countries the French Revolution. But while the movement developed
itself more easily and took more radical forms in France than
elsewhere, it was due to the condition of civilization the world
around. France has been in a peculiar sense the teacher of Europe; for
in language, literature, laws, and institutions she is the heir of
Rome. In spite of Roman Catholicism, or perhaps in consequence of the
Roman hierarchy, her inheritance has been pagan rather than Christian;
her ethics have been Hellenic, her literature Augustan, her laws
imperial, her temperament a combination of the Stoic and Epicurean
which is essentially Latin, her language elegant, elliptical, and
precise like that of Livy or Tacitus. The Teuton in general, the
Anglo-Saxon in particular, may give his days and nights to classical
studies: he is never so imbued with their spirit as the Gaul. "It is
with his Bible in one pocket and his Shakspere in another," said an
eminent Frenchman not long since, "that the Anglo-Saxon goes forth to
reduce the world in the interests of his commerce, his civilization,
and his religion. The most enlightened has neither the cold
worldliness of Horace nor the calculating zeal of Cæsar, but he has
the persistency of faith in himself and his nation which, whatever may
be his personal belief, is a constituent element in his blood, or,
better still, the controlling member of that complex organism to which
he belongs." I venture to believe, on the other hand, that the
Frenchman espouses his cause from an unselfish impulse begotten of
pure reason, an ethereal ichor percolating through society by channels
of sympathy, which diminishes the historic pressure for continuous
national consistency and natural unity, but emphasizes the great
uplifting movements of society. The French armies of the Revolution
went forth to scour Europe for its deliverance from feudalism,
absolutism, and ecclesiasticism, because the French people had renewed
their youthful and pristine vigor in their enthusiasm for pure
principle without regard to experience or expediency. Napoleon
Bonaparte had all their doctrine, with something more: a consuming
ardor unconscious of any physical limitations to the nervous strength
of himself or others, and a readiness for any fate which would
transmute his dull, unsuccessful, commonplace existence into
excitement. When he found his opportunity to heap Pelion upon Ossa, to
supplement himself by the splendors of French devotion, he did indeed
come near to transcending even the Olympians and storming the seat of
Kronos.
It was a long, discouraging, heartbreaking struggle by which he gained
his first vantage-ground. This was no exceptional experience; for
every adventurer knows that it is more troublesome to make the start
than to continue the advance. It is harder to save the first small
capital than to conduct a prosperous business. It is more difficult,
apparently, in human life to overcome the inertia of immobility than
that of motion; at least psychological laws seem in this respect to
contravene those of physics. It is not true that the armies of the
Republic were those of the Bourbons: the transition may have been
gradual, but it was radical. It is also untrue that the armies of
Napoleon were those of the Revolution: they differed as the zenith
from the nadir, being recruited on a new principle, animated by new
motives, and led by an entirely different class of men. A supreme
command having been attained by means curiously compounded of
chivalric romance and base scheming, the man of action did not
hesitate a moment to put every power in motion. Throwing off all
superior control, he set himself to every task in the revolution of
Italy--conquest, political and religious; constructive politics and
administration; social and financial transformation. Winning the
devotion of his troops by intoxicating successes, as a leveler he was
permanently successful; but this typical burgher had no permanent
success in building up a democratic-imperial society out of the royal,
princely, and aristocratic elements which had so long monopolized the
ability of the peninsula; what he wrought outlasted his time, but the
country had to undergo another revolution before its middle classes
were ready for the heavy burden of independence and self-government.
Yet the struggle for what was accomplished appears to have created a
climacteric in the doer. Before the days of Italy his ambitions were
petty enough: employment in the service of Russia or England,
supremacy in Corsica or military promotion in France; but afterward
they enlarged by leaps and bounds: Italian principalities, Austrian
dukedoms, Lombard confederations, the primacy of France in some form,
Oriental dominion--one such concept took form in the morning, to be
swept away at night and replaced by ever more luxurious growths of
fantasy. The realization of these dreams was still more amazing than
their misty formation. The Revolutionary doctrines of the passing age
had stimulated France to over-exertion; her leaders were discredited,
her people exhausted. The same agitation had stupefied the Italians;
but whatever their political disintegration may have been, the Roman
chair and throne retained its moral influence as the bond and
mainspring of society throughout the whole peninsula; and now the
successor of St. Peter was humbled to the dust, willing to escape with
the mere semblance of either secular or ecclesiastical independence.
It was an exceptional moment, a vacillating, retrogressive hour in the
history of Austria, of France, and of Italy. The exceptional man, the
vigorous citizen of a new political epoch, the inspired strategist of
a new military epoch, the unscrupulous doubter of a new religious
epoch--this typical personage was at hand to take advantage of the
situation; and he did so, hastening the disintegrating processes
already at work, seizing every advantage revealed by the crumbling of
old systems, and reaping the harvest of French heedlessness. The
opportunity gave the man his chance, but the chance once seized, the
man enlarged his sphere with each successive year.
This he did by means which were as remarkable as the personage who
devised them--and remarkable, too, not for their negative, but for
their constructive quality. Broadly stated, the Revolution utterly
expunged all the governmental and social guarantees of the preceding
monarchy, destroying not merely the absolute power of one man with
its sanction of divine right, but all the checks upon it to be found
either in the ancient traditions of the people or in their ancient
institution of parliaments. It will be clear to the careful student of
the Revolutionary governments that while there was a gradual
clarifying of opinion antecedent to the Consulate, and a vague longing
for guarantees of individual rights higher than the acts of any
assembly, however representative it claimed to be, nevertheless great
ideas, great conceptions, great outlines, had all remained in their
inchoate state, and that of the several succeeding constitutions each
had been more worthless than the one before. Almost any kind of a
constitution will serve an enlightened nation which has confirmed
political habits, if it chooses to support a fundamental law not
hostile to them; and none, however ingenious, can stand before
recalcitrant populations. The Revolutionary constitutions of France,
excepting perhaps that of 1791, were alike feeble; and in the stress
applied to the one democratic land of Europe by her dynastic enemies
all around, they were not worth the paper and ink used to record them.
Under each had developed a pure despotism of one kind or another, on
the plea that in war there must be a single head, either an executive
committee or an executive man. These persons or person had, on pleas
of necessity or expediency, gradually arrogated to the executive all
the powers of government, befooling the people more or less completely
by the specious formalities of various kinds through which the popular
will was supposed to find expression. No one understood this fact
better than Napoleon Bonaparte; and since it seemed that the supreme
power had to be in the hands of some one man or clique, he was easily
tempted to grasp it for himself when it became clear that the
profligate and dishonest Directory had run its course. He did not
make the situation, but he used it. History does not record that the
French nation was shocked or discouraged by the events of the
eighteenth of Brumaire; on the contrary, the occurrences in Paris and
at St. Cloud seemed commonplace to a storm-tossed people, and the
results were welcomed by the majority in every class.
The reasons for this general satisfaction varied, of course; for the
conservative and progressive royalists, the conservative and radical
republicans of every stripe, had widely different expectations as to
the next act in the drama. But the chief actor was concerned only for
himself and the nation; partizans he neither honored nor feared,
except as he was anxious not to be identified with them. To him, as a
man of the people, it seemed that in the Revolution the third estate
had asserted itself; that the third estate must be pacified; that the
third estate must be prosperous; that the third estate, for all these
purposes, needed only to be confirmed in their simple theory of
government, which was that the power could be delegated by them to any
one fit to wield it, and this once done, the delegate might without
harm to the state be left undisturbed to manage the public business,
while the people should give their undivided attention to their
private affairs. How successful the Consulate was in this respect is
universally known and admitted. With consummate cleverness the First
Consul summoned to his assistance all the giants of his time, whether
they were scholars with their theories and knowledge, administrators
with their tact and experience, political managers with their easy
consciences and oiled feathers, or skilful demagogues with their
greedy followers and insatiate self-interest. These he either enticed
or bullied into his service, according as he read their characters; a
few--a very few--like Barère, he found obdurate, and drove into
provincial exile. At no time did he make a finer display of his
astounding capacity for molding strong men by his still stronger will
than during the early days of the Consulate; and the manifest reason
for his success was that he had a fine instinct for character and for
putting the right man in the right place.
What he thus accomplished has been told. The foundations he then laid
rest solid to-day; the now antiquated edifice he erected on them,
though altered and repaired, still retains its identity. The
Revolution had overthrown the old régime completely, and the ruins of
society were without form and void. From this chaos Napoleon painfully
gathered the substantial materials of a new structure, and out of
these reconstructed the family, the state, and the church. He revived
the domestic spirit, made marriage a solid institution, and
reëstablished parental authority while destroying parental despotism.
In civil society he restored the right of property and fixed the
sanctity of contract, thus assuring respect for the individual and the
ascendancy of the law. The finances he reformed by an equitable system
of taxation, and by the establishment of an ingenious treasury system
comparable to that devised by Alexander Hamilton for the United
States. In the Concordat he went as far, probably, as France could
then go in emancipating religion and the church; Protestantism has
prospered under the regulations he laid down, and by his treatment of
the Jews they have been changed from despised and down-trodden social
freebooters into prosperous and patriotic citizens. Upon every class
of men then living he imposed by an iron will a system of his own. The
leading survivors of Jacobinism, extreme royalists, moderate
republicans, proscribers and proscribed, men of the bourgeoisie--all
bowed to his sway and accepted his rewards. It is said that they
yielded to the superior force of his police and his pretorians. Be it
so. The fivefold police system he established was a system of checks
and counter-checks within itself, within the administration, and even
within the army--a body without which, as he firmly believed, the
beginnings of social transformation could not be made. He professed,
and no doubt honestly, that he would divest himself of this police
service as opportunity served, and deluded both himself and his
followers into the belief that the process was almost complete before
the close of his era. Through the perspective of a century we can see
the faults of Napoleon's plan. The Gallic Church is still Roman, in
spite of his intention that the Roman Church should become French; the
extreme centralization of his administrative system still throttles
local free government and makes both oligarchic rule and political
revolution easier in France than in any other free land; the
educational scheme which he formed, although more fully changed than
any other of his institutions, and but recently embarked, let us hope,
on a course for ultimate independence, nevertheless suffers in its
present complete dependence on state support, and in the consequent
absence of private personal enthusiasm which might make its separate
universities and schools rich in opportunities and strong in the
loyalty of their sons. But we must remember that the Consulate was a
hundred years since, and that for its day it wrought so beneficently
that Bonaparte, First Consul, remains one of the foremost among all
lawgivers and statesmen. And that, too, precisely for the reasons
which some cite as condemning him. He took the revolutionary ideas of
political, civil, and religious emancipation: with these he commingled
both his own sound sense and the experience of advisers from every
class, realizing as much of civil liberty and good order as appears
to have been practical at the moment.
But in one respect he failed miserably, and that failure vitiated much
of the substantial gain which seemed to have been made. He failed in
curbing his own ambition. The majestic ridge of his achievement was
the verge of the precipice over which he fell. In the first place, his
signal success as a lawgiver was due entirely to the dazzling
splendors of his victories. Marengo was the climax to a series of such
achievements as had not so far been wrought on the tented field within
the bounds of French history. It is easy to assert that the French
were intoxicated because they were French: there is not the slightest
reason to suppose that any other nation under similar circumstances
would have behaved differently. The Seven Years' War turned the heads
of the English people completely, and they lost their American
colonies in consequence; Rome lost her political liberty when she
became mistress not only of the Latin, but of the Greek and Oriental
shores of the Mediterranean; the distant military expeditions of
Alexander the Great prepared the fall of his ill-assorted empire. In
each case the careful student will admit that social exaltation was
the forerunner of division and of subsequent despotism in some form.
Even in the little states of Greece and southern Italy the tyrants
always arose from the disintegration of legal government, and by the
assertion of some form of power--mind, money, or military force.
It was, therefore, as a military despot that the First Consul
promulgated beneficent codes, founded an enduring jurisprudence,
created an efficient magistracy, and established social order. In this
process he completed the work of the Revolution by exalting the third
estate to ascendancy in the nation. The whole work, therefore, was not
only recognized as his in the house of every French burgher: he was
considered at every fireside to be the consummator of the Revolution
for which France had so long suffered in an agony of bloody sweat. Was
it therefore any wonder that not only he himself, but even the most
enlightened leaders of European thought, considered the safety and
renovation of European society to depend upon the extension of his
work? It is hard for us to appreciate this, because in France
Napoleon's institutions have remained almost as he left them, and
well-nigh stationary, while for a century the processes of ruthless
reform have been continuously working in other European lands, and
some neighboring peoples have outstripped the French in the matter of
a national unity consistent with local freedom. The First Consul felt
that in order to become great he had been forced to become strong; we
can understand that he could easily deceive himself into concluding
that in order to be greater he must become stronger. It was in these
days that he exclaimed, in the intimacy of familiar intercourse: "I
feel the infinite in me." Thereafter democracy in any form, even the
mildest, was offensive. Such men as Roederer were sent to Naples,
Berg--anywhere out of France. The times were not far removed from
those of the beneficent despots, except that this one ruled, not by
hereditary divine right, but by military force. Bonaparte's imperfect
training in politics and history made it possible for such visions as
those which now arose to haunt his brain. The beneficence he had
displayed already; for despotism he had had the finest conceivable
training, first among the sluggish populations of the Italian states
which he had reorganized, then in the myth of Egyptian conquest which
he had created and felt bound to maintain, and lastly in the national
disorders of a France shuddering at the possibility of a return either
to the hideous excesses of the Terror or to the intolerable abuses of
ecclesiasticism and absolute monarchy.
Among other dreadful curses incident to revolution and civil war is
the stimulation of fanaticism. In his seizure of the supreme power the
purpose of the First Consul was justified to himself, and his
procedure was rendered tolerable to the nation at large by the
scandalous intrigues and complots which were hatched like cockatrices'
eggs in every foul cranny of the land. The conspirators stopped at
nothing: bad faith, subornation, murder of every variety, from the
dagger to the bowl. This gave the First Consul his chance to become
himself the arch-intriguer, and as such he overmatched all his
opponents, ultramontanes, radicals, and royalists. Finally only a few
unreconstructed reactionaries were left from each of these classes,
who, though exhausted and panting, still had the strength to be noisy,
and occasionally to make a feint of activity. But in the various
localities and classes of France each of the factions had numerous
silent and inactive sympathizers who had surrendered only as they felt
unable to keep up the uneven conflict. The flames of the volcano were
quenched, and the gulf of the crater was bridged by a crust, but the
lava of sedition boiled and seethed below. It is a well-known nostrum
for civil dissension to stir up foreign conflict, and then to call
upon the patriotism of men from all parties. To this the First Consul
dared not openly resort. In fact, the indications are that if his
enemies in France and his foes abroad had consented peaceably to the
fulfilment of his now manifest ambitions, he would himself have been
glad enough to secure without further fighting what he had gained by
war, and to extend the influence of a Bonapartist France by steady
encroachments rather than by exhausting hostilities. The word of every
man has exactly the value which his character gives it, and treaties
are worth the good faith of those who make them, not a tittle more.
Neither of the parties to the general peace was exhausted, neither was
really earnest. It was a bellicose age: war was then in the air, as
peace is now. The rupture of the treaty made at Amiens was quite as
much the work of George III as it was of Bonaparte the First Consul,
and the two nations over which they ruled were easily led to renew the
struggle. Nothing goes to prove that there was long premeditation on
the part of either; but at the time and since, were it not for the
widespread distrust in Bonaparte's character, popular opinion would
have put the blame of renewed war more upon his opponent than on him.
Thus far the angel and the devil which struggle for possession of
every man had waged a fairly even conflict, and the blame and praise
of what is stigmatized as Bonaparte's conduct must be meted out to his
foes in even measure. He and his times had interacted one upon the
other to a remarkably even degree. But once launched on the career of
personal aggrandizement, every hindrance to consuming ambition was
ruthlessly cast aside. Until 1812 the responsibility for inordinate
bloodshed is all his own.
It is needless to dwell upon the period of the Empire in order to
study Napoleon's character. It shines forth effulgent, but noxious. He
remained personally what he had always been--imperious, laborious,
unprincipled; but, on the other hand, kindly, generous, sensitive to
the popular movements. His thirst for power became predominant; his
lavish contempt for men and money displayed the recklessness of a
desperate parvenu; his passion for war burst all its bounds. Personal
ambition eclipsed principle, expediency, shrewdness--in short, every
quality which makes for self-preservation. The reason was not
conscious despair, but unconscious desperation. Politically he had
fought and won an easy but a decisive battle. Imperialism was firmly
seated. The behavior of the French people was natural enough, but they
lent themselves to his purposes with complete surrender. In this the
world learned a lesson which should never be forgotten: that democracy
is an excellent workhorse, but a poor charger; a good hack, but an
untrustworthy racer. The interest of the plain man is in his daily
life, his family, his business, his advancement. He cannot be an
expert in foreign or domestic politics, in public law, or in warfare;
expertness requires the exclusive devotion of a lifetime. Make the
common person a theorist, and he is an ardent democrat, but a poor
administrator. Hence the necessity in transition epochs for a wise
constitution. It was not difficult to convince the French burgher
that, all other forms of democratic administration having had a chance
and having failed in times of war, the only one so far untried--that
of delegating power to a single superior man--should have a fair
trial, the more as the excellent man was at hand. Even in times of
peace the hard-worked citizen either neglects his political duties
altogether, or, performing them in a thoughtless routine, longs for
some one he can trust to do his thinking and acting: in war, as far as
we have had the opportunity to observe in ancient and modern times,
his imperialism is avowed, and he demands a dictator. We have no
reason to suppose that there is any democracy which could outlast
twenty years of a herculean struggle for national life or death, and
such the Franco-English wars which introduced the last century seemed
to the Frenchman of that time to be.
From the soldier's point of view, Napoleon had likewise such an easy
triumph as has fallen to the lot of few commanders. His opponents were
so conservative that their ideas were antiquated, his own strategy was
so new and revolutionary that it dumfounded them. A favorite method
of detraction is illustrated by the familiar story of Columbus's egg.
What is once done, anybody can do. The strategic reputation of
Frederick the Great is in our day first attacked by the so-called
comparative method--that is, by comparing it with the achievements and
system, not of his contemporaries, but of Napoleon, his successor; and
then the strategic reputation of Napoleon is diminished by sneering at
that of Frederick, with whose antiquated method the new one came into
comparison and contact, to the complete disaster of the former. This
vicious circle may be dismissed with contempt. Napoleon's strategic
genius was, unlike any other talent he possessed, constructive and
original. No doubt he studied Cæsar; no doubt he studied Maillebois;
no doubt he studied the work of Turenne and of the great Frederick; no
doubt he was a pupil of the giant soldiers who inaugurated and carried
on the wars of the Revolution; but while others had pursued the same
studies, it remained for him to devise and put into operation a
strategy based upon past experience, but subversive of accepted
dogmas, new, adapted to its ends, and founded on theories which,
though modified in practice by the discoveries of an intervening
century, have, when properly understood, never, not even to-day, been
shaken in principle. His triumphs as a soldier, therefore, are his
own; and it was not until all Europe had learned the lessons which he
taught her generals by a series of object demonstrations lasting
twenty years, that the teacher began to diminish in success and
splendor. The persistent critics of Frederick have been asking and
reiterating questions such as these: Why did not the king begin early
in July, 1756? Why did he not storm the camp of Pirna? Why did he not
continue the war in October? Why did he not renew hostilities the
following year until forced to it? And so on, and so on. By this
method they have shrunk the horizon to their own dimensions, and have
imprisoned their victim within the pale of his faults; but a wider
view and the historic background display his strategy in large
outline, as illuminated by the light of his age; and thus the defeats
of Kolin and Kunersdorf, as well as the victories of Leuthen,
Rossbach, Zorndorf, and Torgau, exhibit the Prussian general as the
great genius which he was. It was not until Napoleon had taught his
rivals what fighting ought to be that men could also pick and nag at
him by asking why Waterloo did not begin four hours earlier, why more
explicit directions were not given to Grouchy, why in 1814 the
desperate man chose to cut off the line of his enemies' communications
rather than withdraw into Paris and call the nation to arms; and so on
to infinity. Judged either historically or theoretically, the strategy
of Napoleon is original, unique, and unexcelled. It is his greatest
achievement, because his most creative.
CHAPTER XXI
NAPOLEON AND THE UNITED STATES
A Decisive Epoch -- Britain Dominates the Sea -- Napoleon's
Policy -- Trade and Western Empire -- To the West Indies -- Needs
of the Empire -- Great Britain's Sea Rival -- The Imperial Policy
Revealed -- Tempestuous Times in the United States -- Party
Government -- Livingston's Efforts -- Louisiana Purchased --
Effect on American Life -- Change in Constitutional Attitude --
The Kaleidoscope of Party Politics -- Preponderance of the South
and West -- The Louisiana Purchase and the Nation.
A decisive epoch was that of the eighteenth-century revolutions, a
crisis reached after long, slow preparation, precipitated by social
and religious bigotry, dizzy in its consummation, wild and headlong in
its flight, precipitous in its crash. Of this important time the
results have been so permanent that they are the commonplaces of
contemporary history; in what Carlyle called the revolutionary loom
the warp and woof were spun from the past, and the fabric is that from
which our working-clothes are cut. Within those years appeared the
great dominating soul of modern humanity, who displayed first and last
every weakness and every sordid meanness of mankind, but in such giant
dimensions that even his depravity inspires awe. His virtues were
equally portentous because they worked on the grand scale, with
materials that had been threshed and winnowed in the theory and
experience of five generations of mankind. It was well within this
stupendous age and by the act of this representative man that
Louisiana was redeemed from Spanish misrule and incorporated with the
territories of the United States. Nor was this all. A careful
examination of the general political situation at that time will
exhibit the elemental and almost ultimate fact that the sale of
Louisiana was coincident with the turn of the age.
The substance of the treaty of Amiens was that Great Britain
ostensibly abandoned all concern with the continent of Europe, and
that France, ostensibly too, should strictly mind her own affairs in
her colonies and the remoter quarters of the globe. George III removed
from his escutcheon the fleur-de-lis, and from his ceremonial title
the style of king of France. Events narrated in another connection
proved the whole negotiation to have been on both sides purely
diplomatic, an exchange of public and hollow courtesies in order to
gain time for the realities in the struggle for supremacy between the
world powers of the period, a struggle begun with modern history,
renewed in 1688, and destined to last until the exhaustion of one of
the contestants in 1815. Neither party to the treaty had the slightest
intention of observing either its spirit or its letter. While the
paper was in process of negotiation Bonaparte was consolidating French
empire on the Continent, and after its signature he did not pause for
a single instant to show even a formal respect for his obligations.
The reorganization of Holland in preparation for its incorporation
into the French system, the annexation of Piedmont and the defiance to
Russia in the matter of her Italian protégés, the Act of Moderation in
Switzerland, and finally, the contemptuous rearrangement of Germany,
were successive steps which reduced England to despair for her
continental trade. To her it seemed as if there could be no question
about two things: first, that the old order must be restored, in
order to safeguard her commerce; and second, that her colonial policy
must be more aggressive than ever.
It was Samuel Adams who first sneered at his fatherland as a people of
shopkeepers. The winged word soon became a commonplace to all
outsiders, but as it flew every nation that used the gibe girded
itself to enter the struggle for the same goal. France above all was
determined to be a nation of shopkeepers, and the First Consul of what
was still a shaky experiment in government knew well that rather than
abandon that ambition, he must sacrifice every other. After all, a
colonial empire has value only as the home nation has accessible
ports, manufactories for colonial products, and wares to exchange with
the producers. France had neither factories nor manufactures, and was
destitute of nearly the whole machinery of exchange. Her merchant
vessels sailed only by grace of the British fleet. Her home market was
dependent on British traders even in times of war. Bonaparte's
foremost thought, therefore, was for concentration of energy. The
sea-power of the world was Britain's, and her tyranny of the seas
without a real check; even the United States could only spit out
defiant and revengeful threats when her merchantmen were treated with
contempt on the high seas by British men-of-war. Therefore with swift
and comprehensive grasp he framed and announced a new policy. The
French envoy in London was informed that France was now forced to the
conquest of Europe--this of course for the stimulating of French
industries--and to the restoration of her Occidental empire. This was
most adroit. The embers of French patriotism could be fanned into a
white heat by these well-worn but never exhausted expedients--a blast
against perfidious Albion and a sentimental passion for the New France
beyond the Atlantic. The motions were a feint against England by the
formation of a second camp at Boulogne, where a force really destined
for Austria was assembled, and the wresting of Louisiana from the weak
Spanish hands which held it. As an incident of the agitation it seemed
best that the French democracy should have an imperial rather than a
republican title, and the style of emperor and empire was exhumed from
the garbage heap of the Terror for use in the pageantry of a court.
In Europe thus, as in the neighboring continents, the rearrangement of
politics, territorial boundaries, social, economic, and diplomatic
relations, a change which has made possible the modern system, was
really dependent on the events which led to the adoption of the policy
just described. But this policy involved a reversal of every sound
historical principle in Bonaparte's plans. For twelve years longer he
was to commit blunder upon blunder; to trample on national pride; to
elevate a false system of political economy into a fetish; to conduct,
as in the Moscow campaign, great migrations to the eastward in
defiance of nature's laws; to launch his plain, not to say vulgar and
weak, family on an enterprise of monarchical alliances for which they
had no capacity; to undo, in short, as far as in him lay, every
beneficent and well-conceived piece of statesmanship with which he had
so far been concerned. It has been well said that had he died in
midsummer, 1802, his glory would have been immaculate and there would
have been no spots on his sun. The Napoleonic work in Europe was
destined to have its far-reaching and permanent results, but the man
was ere long almost entirely eliminated from control over them. The
very last of his great constructions was the sale of Louisiana. He
needed the purchase-money, he selected his purchaser and forced it on
him, with a view to upbuilding a giant rival to the gigantic power of
Great Britain.
When we turn therefore to America, we shall at once observe on how
slender a thread a great event may depend, how great a fire may be
kindled by a spark adroitly placed. While yet other matters were
hanging in the balance, he selected his own brother-in-law, General
Leclerc, such was his deep concern, to conduct an expedition to the
West Indies. There were embarked 35,000 men, and these the very flower
of the republican armies, superb fighters, but a possible thorn in the
side of a budding emperor at home. Their goal was San Domingo, where a
wonderful negro, Toussaint Louverture, noting the attractive example
of the benevolent despots in Europe, had, under republican forms, not
only abolished slavery, but had made himself a beneficent dictator.
The fine but delicate structure of his negro state was easily crushed
to the earth, but the fighting was fierce and prolonged, the climate
and the pest were enabled to inaugurate and complete a work of
slaughter more baleful than that of war, and two-thirds of the French
invaders, including the commander and fifteen of his generals, fell
victims to the yellow fever. The French were utterly routed, the sorry
remnant sailed away, and the blacks fell into the hands of the
worthless tyrant Dessalines, whose misrule killed the germs of order
planted by Toussaint. One of our historians thinks this check of
France by black soldiers to have been a determinative factor in
American history, for thereafter there could be no question of a Gulf
and Caribbean empire for France. Louisiana, he indicates, became at
once a superfluous dependency, costly and annoying. This is a
far-fetched contention: great as have been the services of the negro
to the United States since he first fought on the battle-field of
Monmouth under Washington, the failure of France in San Domingo was
not through the sword of the blacks, but was an act of God through
pestilence.
The circumstances that forced Louisiana upon the United States, then a
petty power with revenues and expenditures less than those of many
among the single states which now compose the federation, arose from
Napoleon's European necessities. The cession from Spain included all
that Spain had received from France, the whole Gulf coast from St.
Mary's to the Rio Grande, and the French pretensions not only
northwestward to the Rockies but even to the Pacific. The return made
to Spain was the insignificant kingdom of Etruria and a solemn pledge
that, should the First Consul fail in his promise, Louisiana in its
fullest extent was to be restored to Spain. France therefore might not
otherwise alienate it to any power whatever. The exacting and
suspicious spirit shown both by Charles IV and his contemptible
minister Godoy, Prince of the Peace, had exasperated Bonaparte beyond
endurance. The Spanish Bourbons were doomed by him to the fate of
their kinsfolk in France; a pledge to a vanishing phantom of royalty
was of small account. It was during the delay created by the punctilio
of Godoy that the failure of the San Domingo expedition extinguished
all hope of making Louisiana the sole entrepôt and staple of supplies
for the West Indies. And simultaneously it grew evident that the truce
negotiated at Amiens as a treaty could not last much longer, that
either France must endure the humiliation of seeing her profits
therefrom utterly withheld, or herself declare war, or goad Great
Britain into a renewal of hostilities. This last, as is well known,
was the alternative chosen by Napoleon.
Our government had been in despair. The establishment of French empire
in the West Indies would have destroyed our lucrative trade with the
islands. It was trying enough that a feeble power like Spain should
command the outlet of the Mississippi basin, but intolerable that
such a mastery of the continent should fall into the hands of a strong
and magisterial power like France. We were in dismay, even after the
departure of the French from San Domingo. Bonaparte, however, was
scarcely less disturbed; for Jefferson, despite his avowed Gallicism,
spiritedly declared both to the First Consul and to Livingston, our
minister to Paris, that the occupation of Louisiana by the great
French force organized to that end could only result in an alliance of
the two English-speaking nations which would utterly banish the French
flag from the high seas. Bonaparte preserved an outward calm for those
about him and went his way apparently unperturbed. But inwardly his
mind seethed, and without long delay he took his choice between the
courses open to him. It was the first exhibition to himself and his
family of the imperial despot soon to be known as Napoleon I, Emperor
of the French. If Britain was the tyrant of the seas, he would be
despot of the land. To French empire he would reduce Germany, Italy,
and Spain in subjection, and with all the maritime resources of the
Continent at his back he would first shut every important port to
English commerce, and then with allied and dependent fleets at his
disposal try conclusions with the British Behemoth for liberty of the
seas and a new colonial empire. By the second camp at Boulogne and the
occupation of Hanover, Napoleon threw England into panic, while
simultaneously he began the creation of his grand imperial army and
thereby menaced Austria, the greatest German power, in her coalition
with Russia, Sweden, Naples, and Great Britain. The latter, he was
well aware, could face a hostile demonstration on her front with
courage, if not with equanimity; and he determined to add a double
stroke--to gain a harvest of gold and on her rear to strengthen her
exasperated transatlantic sea rival by selling Louisiana to the
United States.
[Illustration: Photograph in the collection of Dr. Charles J. Cooper
NAPOLEON I
From the bust by Chaudet, after the death-mask. The bust marks the
place where stood the bed on which Napoleon died.]
That determination was the turning-point in his career, just as the
sudden wheel and about-face of the splendid force at Boulogne, when he
hurled it across Europe at Vienna, displayed at last the turning-point
in his policy. His brother Lucien had been an influential negotiator
with Spain and plumed himself on the acquisition of the great domain
which had been for long the brightest jewel in the crown of France.
His brother Joseph had negotiated the treaty of Amiens as a step
preparatory to regaining a magnificent colonial empire for his
country, an empire of which an old and splendid French possession was
to be the corner-stone. Both were stunned and then infuriated when
they learned their brother's resolution, sensations which were
intensified to fury when they heard him announce that he would work
his will in spite of all constitutional checks and balances. There is
no historic scene more grotesque than that depicted by Lucien in his
memoirs when he and Joseph undertook to oppose Napoleon. The latter
was luxuriating in his morning bath on April seventh, 1803, in the
Tuileries when the brothers were admitted. After a long and intimate
talk on general politics the fateful subject was finally broached by
Napoleon, as he turned from side to side and wallowed in the perfumed
water. Neither of the brothers could control his feelings, and the
controversy grew hot and furious from minute to minute until Joseph,
leaning over the tub, roared threats of opposition and words of
denunciation. Brother Napoleon, lifting himself half-way to the top,
suddenly fell back and clenched his arguments by splashing a full
flood in the face and over the body of Joseph, drenching him to the
skin. A valet was summoned, entered, and, paralyzed by the fury of the
scene, fell in a dead faint. New aid was called and, the fires of
passion being quenched for the time, the conflict ended until
Napoleon and Joseph were decently clothed, when it was renewed in the
office of the secretary Bourrienne. Ere long hot words were again
spoken, violent language was succeeded by violent gestures, until at
last Napoleon in a theatrical rage dashed his snuff-box on the floor,
and the contestants separated. Disjointed and fierce as was the stormy
argument, it revealed the whole of the imperial policy.
Meanwhile events in America, if not so picturesque and majestic, were
equally tempestuous. The peace policy of Jefferson was rapidly going
to pieces in the face of a westward menace, the Federalists were
jubilant, and in the Senate James Ross, of Pennsylvania, called for
war. When the intendant of Spain at New Orleans denied Americans the
storage rights they had enjoyed in that city since 1795, the French
politics of the President fell into general disrepute and contempt,
for men reasoned _a fortiori_, if such things be done in the green
tree, what shall be done in the dry? It mattered not that Spain's
highest official, the governor, disavowed the act, the fire was in the
stubble. The intendant was stubborn and the fighting temper waxed hot.
Both the governor and the Spanish envoy at Washington disavowed the
act again and rebuked the subordinate. Congress was soothed, but not
so the people of the West and South. They were fully aware, as have
been all our frontiersmen and pioneers from the beginning, that the
Mississippi and all the lands it waters are the organic structure of
unity and successful settlement on this continent. The Pacific and
Atlantic coast strips, even the great but bleak valley of the St.
Lawrence, are mere incidents of territorial unity and political
control when compared with the great alluvion of the Mississippi. This
was unknown, utterly unknown, and worse yet, entirely indifferent to
our statesmen. Madison certainly, and possibly Jefferson, believed
that western immigration would pause and end on the east bank of the
Father of Waters.
Yet party government was a necessity under the American system, and
Jefferson's ladder, the Republican party, would be knocked into its
component parts should the West and South, noisy, exacting, and
turbulent, desert and go over to the expiring faction of the
Federalists; nay, worse, it might be forced into almost complete
negation of its own existence by a forced adoption of the
Federalist policy, alliance with Great Britain--monarchic and
aristocratic--rather than with radical and democratic France. What
could a distracted partizan do? Jefferson was adroit and inventive.
He sent James Monroe to negotiate with Bonaparte for the purchase
of New Orleans and both Floridas at the price of two millions, or
upward to ten, for all or part, whatever he could get; he was not
even to disdain the deposit or storage right, if nothing else could
be had, and if he could get nothing, he was to await instructions.
With such credentials he sailed on March eighth, 1803. A
peace-lover must sometimes speak low and small, even as cowards
sometimes do. Three weeks later appeared in New Orleans Laussat,
the advance agent of French occupation; Victor and his troops were
to follow. It is not possible to conceive that a foreign policy
could be more perplexing, confused, or uncertain than that of the
philosophic theorist who is the hero of the strict-constructionist
party in these United States.
Robert R. Livingston, the regular American envoy at Paris, had, under
his instructions from home, worked with skill and zeal on the
spoliation claims and incidentally on the question of the Mississippi
and the Floridas. While the colonization schemes of Bonaparte seemed
feasible, Livingston made no headway whatever, except to extort an
admission that the spoliation claims were just. Neither Talleyrand nor
Livingston was much concerned about the great Northwest. The American
was clear that the importance of any control lay in the possession of
New Orleans, and on April eleventh, 1803, he said so to the French
minister, vigorously and squarely declaring further that a persistent
refusal of our request would unite us with Great Britain to the
serious discomfiture of France in her colonial aspirations. This was
said with some asperity, for Livingston had been aware that the First
Consul wanted all negotiation transferred to Washington under the
guidance of a special envoy, the wilful Bernadotte, sent for the
purpose; and now, worse yet, he himself was to be superseded by
Monroe. He had been a diligent and even importunate negotiator; it was
a ray of comfort in later days to recall that the first suggestion for
the sale of all Louisiana was made to him in that momentous interview.
What had occurred Livingston could not know. It was this. On the
morning of that very day there reached the Tuileries despatches giving
in full detail an account of the tremendous preparations making in
England for the renewal of war both by land and sea. Bonaparte's
impatience knew no bounds. Hitherto he had concealed his true policy
of sale behind a scheme to spend the purchase-money on internal
improvements in France, and he had on his work-table map-outlines for
five great canals. Now, at daybreak, he summoned Barbé-Marbois,
sometime French consul-general in the United States, an official of
state with a thorough knowledge of our affairs, and ordered that a
negotiation for the sale, not of the Floridas and New Orleans, but of
all Louisiana, should immediately be opened with Livingston. He fixed
the price at fifty million francs. The envoy could of course do
nothing, but he thought thirty millions enough. Next day Monroe
arrived at Havre, and reaching Paris on the thirteenth, that very same
day Barbé-Marbois and our two great statesmen began to treat. Upon
Monroe and Livingston devolved a momentous responsibility. To Monroe
by a most indefinite implication was left a certain liberty, for under
no circumstances whatsoever was he to end a negotiation if once it was
begun. And here, instead of minimizing terms, was, so to speak, a
great universe of land tender. But we had not so easily thrown off the
bright and glistening garment of righteousness as had Napoleon
Bonaparte, and in the minds of both Americans was the question,
non-existent for the First Consul, as he himself squarely said, of
whether the inhabitants of the district, men and women, human souls,
could be dealt in as chattels are.
Livingston had already seen darkly as in a glass what possession of
the west might do for the United States. Bonaparte's contributions to
the discussion were terse and trenchant. If he did not transfer the
title right speedily, a British fleet would take possession almost in
a twinkling; the transfer, he said, might in three centuries make
America the rival of Europe; why not? it was a long way ahead; but, on
the other hand, there never had been an enduring confederation, and
this one in America was unlikely to begin the series; finally, he
wanted the cash, as the United States wanted the land. Let there be no
delay. And there was none. The terms of the sale and the facts of the
transfer do not concern us here. In Bonaparte the United States had no
friend; but what the ancient régime began in helping to establish
American independence, the First Consul completed; for, thanks to him,
the war of 1812 was fought for commercial liberty, while the
exploitation of Louisiana has made the nation what it is to-day. The
great territory, with all its responsibilities and possibilities, made
the United States a world power; a puny enough power at first, but it
has grown. Jefferson and his agents were primarily statesmen for the
purpose of existing conditions, and in Monroe's mission desired a
remedy solely and entirely for party evils. They had, however, the
courage to accept the fortune forced upon them, even though in their
case, as in that of Bonaparte, it entailed, we repeat, a complete
reversal of all the political and party principles of the platform on
which they had hitherto stood.
The change wrought by the Louisiana purchase in American life and
culture was simply revolutionary. Hitherto in our weakness we had
faced backward, varying between two ideas of European alliance. We
virtually had British and French parties. Jefferson, who represented
the latter, thought of no other alternative in his trouble than to
strike hands with England. With Louisiana on our hands, we turned our
faces to our own front door. The Louisiana we bought had no Pacific
outlet in reality, but the Lewis and Clark expedition gave it one, and
that we have broadened by war and by purchase until we control the
western shore of the continent. Under such engrossing cares we ceased
to think of either French or British ties, except as exasperating, and
became not merely Americans, but, realizing Washington's aspirations,
turned into real continentals, with a scorn of all entanglements
whatever. In the occupation and settlement of Louisiana the slavery
question became acute, and the struggle to expand that system over
Louisiana soil precipitated the Civil War.
But if the change in national outlook was radical, that in
constitutional attitude was even more so. The constitutions of our
original states were the expression of political habits in a
community, the Federal Constitution was in the main a transcript of
those elements which were common in some degree to all the British
colonies. It was an age of written constitutions, because the flux of
institutions was so rapid that men needed a mooring for the
substantial gains they had made. The past was so recent that statesmen
were timid, and they wanted their metes and bounds to be fixed by a
monument. Nothing was more natural than to pause and fall back on the
record thus made permanent, and strict construction was and long
continued to be a political fetish. The Louisiana purchase was a
circumstance of the first importance in party struggle. Yet neither
Federalist nor Republican dared, after mature deliberation, to urge
the question of constitutional amendment as essential to meet the
crisis thus precipitated. The enormous price entailed what was felt to
be an intolerable burden of taxation, and in the uproar of spoken and
printed debate played no small part. But the vital question was
whether the adjustment of new relations was constitutional.
Never did the kaleidoscope of politics display a more surprising
reversal of effect. The loose-construction party lost its wits
entirely, while the strict constructionists suddenly became the
apostles not of verbal but of logical construction. Jefferson violated
his principles in signing the treaty, but he was easily persuaded that
amendment was not necessary, that on the contrary the treaty-making
power covered the case completely. This was not conquest, which would
have been covered by the war power, but purchase, which is covered by
the treaty power, surrendered, like the other, by the states to the
federal government. The Federalists were represented in the House by
Gaylord Griswold; in the Senate by Ross and Pickering. Their
resistance was identical in both factious to the highest degree. They
contended that the executive had usurped the powers of Congress by
regulating commerce with foreign powers and by incorporating foreign
soil and foreign people with the United States, this last being a
power which it was doubtful whether Congress possessed. Supposing,
however, that New Orleans became American, how could a treaty be valid
which gave preferential treatment to that single port in admitting
French and Spanish ships on equal terms with those owned by Americans?
The treaty, they asseverated, was therefore unconstitutional and, even
worse, impolitic, because we were unfitted and did not desire to
incorporate into our delicately balanced system peoples different in
speech, faith, and customs from ourselves. They were, however, only
mildly opposed to expansion; they were determined and captious in the
interpretation of the Constitution. The party in power were avowedly
expansionist; their retort was equally dialectic and vapid. The whole
discussion would have been empty except for Pickering's contention
that there existed no power to incorporate foreign territory into the
United States, as was stipulated by the treaty. The House had
resolved, ninety to twenty-five, to provide the money and had
appointed a committee on provisional government; the Senate ratified
the treaty, twenty-six to five.
What made the debates and action of Congress epochal was the
Federalist contention that Thomas Jefferson as provisional and interim
governor was nothing more or less than an American despot in
succession to a Spanish tyrant. Where was the Constitution now; where
would it be when in appointing the necessary officials--executive,
judicial, and legislative--he would usurp not merely Spanish despotism
but the powers of both the other branches of the federal government?
The Republicans quibbled, too; to appoint these three classes of
officials was not to exercise their powers. But they confirmed in
unanswerable logic a distinction thus far only mooted in our political
history--that between states and territories. Already presidential
appointees were exercising all three powers in Mississippi and
Indiana. This clenched the contentions of the Republicans, and the
bill for provisional government passed by an overwhelming vote on
October thirty-first. Both parties throughout the struggle had tacitly
abandoned the position that Congress possessed merely delegated powers
and nothing further except the ability to carry them into effect. Both
therefore admitted the possible interpretation of the Constitution
under stress of necessity, and the Federalists in their quibbling
contentions lost hold everywhere except in New England. That section
saw its influence eclipsed by the preponderance of Southern and
Western power and ere long was ripe for secession.
Volumes have been written and more will be on the romance of the
Louisiana purchase; Josiah Quincy threatened the dismemberment of the
Union when the present state of Louisiana was admitted in 1812; but
for Jefferson's wisdom in exploration it might have remained a
wilderness long after settlement began; Great Britain coveted it in
1815 when Jackson saved it; Aaron Burr probably coveted an empire
within it; Napoleon III had dreams of its return to the new France he
was to found in Mexico. Excluding the Floridas, which Spain would not
concede as a part of it, and the Oregon country, the territory thus
acquired was greater than that of Great Britain, Germany, France,
Spain, Portugal, and Italy combined. Its agricultural and mineral
resources were, humanly speaking, inexhaustible. No wonder it excited
the cupidity as it stirred the imagination of mankind; no wonder if
men avid to retain their power were dismayed at the preponderance it
was sure to exert eventually in a federal union of states. At the
present moment fourteen of our commonwealths, with a population of
about sixteen millions and a taxable wealth of seven billions, occupy
its soil. By the time we are fifty years older, at the present rate of
settlement, these will contain about a third of the power in the Union
as determined by numbers and prosperity. All of them, however, were
from the first administrative districts, never states, and by the
retroactive influence of this fact state sovereignty has thus been
made an empty phrase.
And this leads us to remember that, if the Louisiana purchase
revolutionized our national outlook, our constitutional attitude, and
our sectional control, it quite as radically changed our national
texture. From that hour to this we have called to the masses of Europe
for help to develop the wilderness, and they have come by millions,
until now the men and women of Revolutionary stock probably number
less than fifteen millions in the entire country. These later
Americans have, like the migrations of the Norsemen in central and
southern Europe, proved so conservative in their Americanism that they
outrun their predecessors in loyalty to its essentials. They made the
Union as it now is, in a very high sense, and there is no question
that in the throes of civil war it was their blood which flowed at
least as freely as ours in its defense. It is they who have kept us
from developing on colonial lines and have made us a nation separate
and apart. This it is which has prevented the powerful influence of
Great Britain from inundating us, while simultaneously two
English-speaking peoples have reacted one upon the other in their
radical differences to keep aflame the zeal for exploration,
beneficent occupation, and general exploitation of the globe in the
interests of a high civilization. The localities of the Union have
been stimulated into such activities that manufactures and agriculture
have run a mighty race; commerce alone lags, and no wonder, for
Louisiana gave us a land world of our own, a home market more valuable
than both the Indies or the continental mass of the Far East.
CHAPTER XXII
NAPOLEON'S PLACE IN HISTORY
Exhaustion -- The Change in Napoleon's Views -- Intermitting
Powers -- Their Extinction -- Common Sense and Idealism -- The
Man and the World -- The Philosophy of Expediency -- A Mediating
Work -- French Institutions -- Transformation of France --
Napoleon and English Policy -- His Work in Germany -- French
Influence in Italy and Eastern Europe -- Napoleon and the Western
World.
[Sidenote: Summary]
If Napoleon's qualities as usurper, statesman, and warrior be as
remarkable as they appear, why was his time so short, what were the
causes of his decline, and what is his place in history? The causes of
his decline may be summed up in a single word--exhaustion. There
exists no record of human activity more complete than is that of
Napoleon Bonaparte's life. In its beginnings we can see this worshiper
of power stimulating his immature abilities in vain until, with
reckless desperation, he closed the period of training and made his
scandalous bargain with Barras; then, grown suddenly, inexplicably
rich, becoming with better clothing, food, and lodging physically more
vigorous, he seems mercilessly to drive the rowels into his own flanks
until initiative, ingenuity, and ruthlessness are displayed with
apparently superhuman dimensions. The period of achievement is short,
but glorious in politics; the age of domination is long and exciting.
Throughout both there is the same wanton physical excess and
intellectual dissipation. Then comes the turn. Every human age has in
it the germs of the next; we begin to die at birth, and the
characteristic qualities and powers of one period diminish as those of
the next increase. So it was with Napoleon. He compressed so much,
both as regards the number and importance of events, into so short a
space that his times are like those wrinkled Japanese pictures which
are made by shriveling a large print into a small compass--intense and
deep, but unreal. To change the metaphor, he found the ship of state
dashing onward, with her helm lashed and no one daring to take the
task of the steersman in hand. He cut the lashings and laid hold. His
unassisted efforts as a pilot gave the vessel a new course; but he had
no steam or other mechanical power, no _deus ex machinâ_, to aid him;
and, as the storm increased, exhaustion followed; he seemed to be
steering when, in reality, his actions were under the compulsion of
events he was not controlling; and this continued until the wreck.
But the inertia of his powers resembled their rise so perfectly as to
represent continuous growth, and thus to deceive observers: in a few
years he had ordered the Revolutionary chaos of western Europe to his
liking, and the resultant organization worked by the principles he had
infused into it. As he saw his imperfect and shallow theories of
society successively confounded, he had no vigor left to reconstruct
them and adapt himself to new situations. His efforts at the rôle of
liberator throughout the Hundred Days deserve careful study. He simply
could not yield or adapt himself, except in non-essentials. The shifts
to which he had resort would have been ridiculous had they not been
pathetic. The governmental forms attempted by the Revolution had been
successively destroyed by the furious energy of Jacobinism: the
Directory was but a compromise, and when it took refuge for safety in
the army its performances seemed to the masses sure to bring back the
Terror; the Consulate was only a disguised monarchy founded on
military force; and as royalism was impossible, there seemed to vast
numbers no other alternative than the Empire. That there was no other
alternative was due to Napoleon's imperious character, now developed
to its utmost extent. He was selfish, hardened, and, though active
like his symbolic bee, without capacity for further development. His
mother knew that he could not hold out; she said it, and saved money
for a rainy day. He himself had haunting premonitions of this truth.
His passion to perpetuate himself by founding a dynasty was the real
basis for his warlike ardor. Profoundly moved, in fact awe-stricken,
by the imperishable hatred of the older dynasties, and yet reveling in
his military genius, he waged war ruthlessly and with zest, enjoying
the discomfiture of his foes, and delighting in the exercise of his
powers. But, after all, war was but a means. He frequently dwelt on
the advantages of hereditary succession; he lingered with suspicious
frequency over the satisfaction a dynastic ruler must feel in the
devotion or, if not that, in the submissiveness of his people; he was
hypersensitive to the slightest popular disturbance; and he must have
foreboded his own fall, since he was accustomed to wear poison in an
amulet around his neck, so that when the great crisis should arrive he
might take his own life. "Ah! why am I not my grandson?" he longingly
ejaculated.
This single cause of Napoleon's fall can be better seen in the record
of his second captivity than in any other portion of his life. There
is no such thing as absolute exhaustion short of death. But
intermittent and flickering exertion is symptomatic of failing powers
in a jaded horse; it forebodes the end in a worn-out man. Cheerful and
busy at first, because recruited by a long and favorable sea-voyage,
he set out in St. Helena at a racing gait to write history and mold
the public opinion of Europe. Playful and energetic, he caught
together the scanty remnants of his momentary grandeur, and emulated
the masters of ceremony at the Tuileries in organizing a court and
issuing edicts for the conduct of its little affairs. His life was to
be that of a caged lion--caged, but yet a lion. The plan would not
work. In the affairs of Longwood there were, as everywhere, hitches
and irregularities. To Napoleon these soon became not the incidents,
but the substance of life. With the departure of his secretaries the
business of biographical composition became first irksome, then
impossible, and the poor muse of history was finally turned out of
doors. To regular exercise succeeded spasmodic over-exertion;
complaint became the subject-matter for the exercise of both mind and
tongue; daily association with kindly but second-rate persons checked
the flow of great ideas; the combinations of Austerlitz and Wagram
gave place to the small moves in a game of spite with a bureaucratic
British governor. From the days of his boyhood until his alliance with
Barras the exile had been a dreamy, vague, indefinite, unsuccessful
fellow; his powers were not quickly developed. While he had France and
Europe to work upon, he showed the extraordinary qualities repeatedly
outlined, mind and hand, thought and deed, working together. Already
jaded, his stupendous capacity became intermittent after the fatal
armistice of Poischwitz; but it worked, for it still had the raw
material of grand strategy and great politics to work on. This
continued until after Waterloo. That battle, not a great one in
itself, was nevertheless epic, both in its effects upon the world and
in its ruin of the brains which had swayed the destinies of Europe for
twenty years. Between the flight to Charleroi and the escape to the
_Bellerophon_, Napoleon shows no pluck and no brains.
In actual captivity his mind was without a sufficient task and under
no pressure from necessity. It consequently, though somewhat
invigorated at first, intermitted more and more toward the close,
working, when it did work, awkwardly and with friction, until the
physical collapse came, and the end was reached. The attempts to
remodel history, the efforts to delineate his own and others' motives,
the specious summaries of his career and its epochs, the fragmentary
expositions of his philosophy in ethics, politics, and psychology--all
the stately volumes which bear his name, his literary remains, in
fact, present a pitiful sight when closely examined. They are but the
scoriæ of a burnt-out mind, but dust and ashes; a splendid mass, but
an extinct volcano. It was only natural that his successors and
admirers should seek to erect a more enduring foundation for his fame
by collecting and carefully editing what he had written when at his
best, when acting according to his momentary, normal impulse, and
when, therefore, he had the least pose and the greatest sincerity. But
it is a proof of their shrewdness that they selected and published
less and less after Erfurt, and that out of the voluminous pen-product
of St. Helena they chose a hundred and fifty pages which the
"Correspondence," intended to be the most splendid monument to the
Emperor's glory, could present as authentic biographical material.
If, then, Napoleon was after all but a plain man, how did he become a
personage? Simply because he was the typical man of his day, less the
personal mediocrity; the typical burgher in personal character, the
typical soldier in war, the typical despot in peace, and the typical
idealist in politics; capable in all these qualities of analysis;
capable, consequently, of being understood; capable of exhaustion and
of being overwhelmed by combinations. In other words, he was really
great because he was the shrewd common-sense personage of his age,
considering the ideal social structure as a level of comfort in money,
in shelter, in food, in clothes, in religion, in morality, in decency,
in domestic good-nature, in the commonplace good things fairly divided
as far as they would go round. This was the side of his nature which
in a period of social exhaustion planted him four-square as a social
force, presented him to France as the rock against which the "red
fool-fury" of Jacobinism had dashed itself to pieces, and gave him for
a time command of all hearts. Thus established, he at once fell heir
to French tradition--that is, to the continuous policy of the nation
in foreign and domestic affairs; which was that France should be the
Jupiter in the Olympus of European nations by reason of her excellence
both in beauty and in strength. Here was a temptation not to be
resisted, the superlative temptation like that of the serpent and the
woman, the chance to transcend by knowledge, the opportunity to "hitch
his wagon to a star," to commingle the glory of France with his own
until the elements were no longer separable. Into this snare, great as
he was in his representative plainness, he fell, and in the ensuing
confusion he not only destroyed himself, but brought the proud and
splendid nation which had cherished him to the very verge of
destruction. He could not sway one emancipated people without swaying
an emancipated Europe, and this after Austerlitz he determined to do.
Then he lost his head: his wisdom turned out to be nothing but
adoration of mere expediency; his strength proved weakness when, with
his imperial idealism, he braved in Spain the idealism of a true
nation; his vaunted physical endurance disappeared with
self-indulgence, the golden head and brazen loins fell in a crash as
the feet of clay disintegrated before the storm of national
uprisings.
This being true, we have in his career every element of epic
greatness: a colossal man, a chaotic age, the triumph of principle,
the reëstablishment of historical equilibrium by means of a giant cast
away when no longer needed. And this epic quality, which is not in the
man alone nor in the age alone, appears when the two are combined, and
then only. Looking at him in our cold light, he has every attribute of
the commonplace adventurer; looking at the France of 1786 with our
perspective, the people and the times appear almost mad in their
frantic efforts to accomplish the work of ages in the moments of a
single lifetime. Yet combine the two, and behold the man of the third
estate rising, advancing, reflecting, and then planting himself in the
foreground as the most dramatic figure of public life, and you have a
scene, a stage, and actors which cannot be surpassed in the range of
history. To the end of the Consulate the action is powerful, because
it represents reality: a nation unified, a people restored to
wholesome influences, peace inaugurated, constitutional government
established. There is so far no tawdry decoration, no fine clothes, no
posing, no ranting. But with the next scene, that of the Empire, the
spectator becomes aware of all these annoyances, and more. The leading
actor grows self-conscious, identifies himself with the public
interest for personal ends and to the detriment of the nation,
displays no moral or artistic self-restraint, and soon arranges every
element so as to make his studied personal ambitions appear like the
resultants of ominous forces which act from without, and against which
he is donning the armor of despotism for the public good. The play
becomes a human tragicomedy, and, verging to its close, ends, like the
tragedies of the Greeks, with a people betrayed and the force of the
age chained to a torrid rock as the sport of the elements.
Was this the end, and did Napoleon have no place in history, as many
historians have lately been contending? Far from it. From his couch of
porphyry beneath the gilded dome on the banks of the Seine, the
Emperor, though "dead and turned to clay," still exercises a powerful
sway. The actual Napoleonic Empire had, as we have before remarked, a
striking resemblance to those of Alexander and Charlemagne. Based, as
were these, upon conquest, and continued for a little life by the
idealism of a single person, it seemed like a brilliant bubble on the
stream of time. But Alexander hellenized the civilization of his day,
and prepared the world for Christianity; Charlemagne plowed, harrowed,
and sowed the soil of barbaric Europe, making it receptive for the
most superb of all secular ideals, that of nationality; Napoleon tore
up the system of absolutism by the roots, propagated in the most
distant lands of Europe the modern conception of individual rights,
overthrew the rotten structure of the German-Roman empire, and in
spite of himself regenerated the long-abused ideas of nationality and
fatherland. It must be confessed that his own shallow political
science, the second-hand Rousseauism he had learned from his desultory
reading, had little to do with this, except negatively. One by one he
saw his faiths made ridiculous by the violent phases of Jacobinism
after it took control of the Revolutionary movement. His heart, his
conscience, his intellect, all undisciplined, then revolted against
the metaphysic which had misled him, and "ideologist" became his most
contemptuous epithet. Controlled by instinct and ambition, he
nevertheless remained throughout his period the one thorough idealist
among the men of action, Goethe being the superlative, transcendent
genius of idealism among the thinkers. Each successive day saw his
scorn of physical limitations increase, his impatience of language,
customs, laws, of local attachment, personal fidelity, and national
patriotism grow. The result was a fixed conviction that for humanity
at large all these were naught. At last he planted himself upon the
burgher philosophy of utility and expediency, putting his faith in the
loyalty of his family, in homely dependence upon matrimonial alliance,
in the passion of humanity for physical ease and earthly well-being.
This was the concert by which he sought to create a federation of
beneficent kingdoms that would win all men to the prime mover. Space
and time rebelled; the lofty ideals of humanity and philosophy would
not down; selfishness proved impotent as a support; the dreamer
recognized that again he had been deceived. Haggard and exhausted, he
finally turned, in the rôle of Napoleon Liberator, to the notion of
nationality and of government swayed by popular will in all its
phases. But it was too late. Instead of being the leader of a van, he
had forgotten, in his own phrase, to keep pace with the march of
ideas, and was a straggler in the rear, without a moral status or a
devoted following.
All this is true; but it is equally true that much of his work endured
both in France and in the civilized world. In France, indeed, the work
he did has been in some details only too enduring. History is there to
tell us that the test of high civilization is not necessarily in great
dimensions. Those histories of the ancient world in which humanity
seems strange and distasteful, of Egypt, Phenicia, Babylon, and
Assyria, were wide in extent and long in duration: those of Greece and
Rome, whose poets, statesmen, legislators, and warriors are our
despair, were small in proportion and comparatively short in duration,
while they were normal and healthy; the world-empires of both were
neither natural nor admirable. It will not do, therefore, to judge
Napoleon by the length of his career, nor by the standards of other
times and different circumstances. The centralization of
administration in the commonwealth which he rescued from the clutches
of anarchy was probably essential to the rescue; the expediency which
he deliberately cultivated in the Concordat, in the laws of the family
and inheritance, and in the fatal Continental System, was possibly a
statesman's palliative for momentary political disease. His artificial
aristocracy, his system of great fiefs, his financial shifts--who
dares to say that these institutions did not meet a temporary want?
Moreover, it is worth considering whether a direct reaction to
moderate, sane republicanism from extreme and furious Jacobinism was
possible at all, and whether a reaction from Napoleon's imperial
democracy was not easier and the results more permanent. In other
words, is it likely that the third French republic could have been the
direct successor of the first? The question is certainly debatable. No
pen can so delineate the sufferings of France under Napoleonic
institutions as that of Taine has so ably and scathingly done; his
wonderful etching powerfully exhibits painful truths. But who is to
blame if a nation is hampered by its administration, by a
centralization it no longer needs, by social regulations which it has
outgrown, by political habits which do not suit the age? Not alone the
man who inaugurated them, for ends partly selfish but also partly
statesmanlike; the people who timidly endure are responsible for the
doom which will certainly overtake any nation living in a social and
political structure antiquated and unsuitable.
One thing at least the new France has done with magisterial style: she
has introduced into her political machinery respect for political
habit. The French government of to-day is distinctly an outgrowth of
conditions, and not of theories. Its constitution has none of the
fatal marks of completeness which her other republican constitutions
have borne; on the contrary, there never was a period in modern times
when to the outsider French institutions seemed as crescive as they do
to-day. And they have abundant material on which to work. There are
signs that the system of nations as armed camps, for which Napoleon
set the example, is breaking by its own weight; modern armies are
mostly national schools controlled by scientific inquisitiveness and
permeated by a civic spirit; the pacific federal system of the great
European powers sometimes seems feeble and rickety, but it is in
existence. Alliances are now federations for peace; the Triple
Alliance continues to be a federation for peace; so too the Sextuple
Alliance, so energetic and persistent in its support of Turkey, has
been a federation for peace. Perhaps the day is nearer than we think
when the Hague tribunal shall develop a vigorous, practical working
system of international understandings, without appeal to war. Then
certainly, but long before, let us hope, France may anchor her
liberties in a bill of rights, destroy judicial inquisition, begin to
slacken the bonds of her prefectoral system, emancipate her
universities and academies, regenerate public feeling as to the
increase of population by modifying her laws of the family, and go on
not only to populate her own fertile fields, but to make the
magnificent colonies which she has acquired the future homes of
countless children, a field for exerting her superfluous energy--in
short, when she may slough off her now superfluous Napoleonic
institutions.
It would be utterly unjust, however, to plead a justification of
Napoleon solely by such a monumental fact as that he was in all
likelihood the forerunner of modern France. Even when the country
adopted him, his positive, direct influence for good was great. The
Concordat whatever its faults, partly secured a free church and a free
state, separating thus what God had never joined together in holy
wedlock; his splendid codes--for no matter who pondered and shaped
them, they were his in execution--have guaranteed the perpetuity of
civil equality not only in France, but, as the sequel has shown,
throughout great expanses of Europe; the questions of a nation's right
to its chosen ruler and government, agitated in a new form during the
Hundred Days, were those with which succeeding generations were
concerned until they were answered in the affirmative. The difference
between the France of 1802 and that of 1815 is on one side painful,
but on another side it is remarkably significant. The former was
transitional and chaotic; the latter had that amazing but completed
social union, stronger than any ever known in history, which has saved
the country in succeeding storm-periods. In it there was respect for
persons, for contract, for property; the administration was unitary,
homogeneous, and active; the finances, though not regulated, were
restored to vigor; and the processes were inaugurated by which the
great cities of France have become healthful and beautiful, while at
the same time the internal improvements of the country have been
systematized and rendered splendid in their efficiency. Revolutionary
concepts were so modified and assimilated that the efforts of the
dynasties, when put to the test of public opinion, failed because they
were felt to be absurd by the masses. It was one of Napoleon's
aphorisms that "to have the right of using nations, you must begin by
serving them well." Like a good burgher, he made his servants
comfortable and happy. His example, moreover, was reflected abroad
throughout Europe; and to the millions of plain and not very shrewd
inhabitants of other lands, the Revolution, as Napoleon had shaped it,
lost many of the horrors with which Jacobinism, to the everlasting
damnation of both the thing and its name, had clothed it. It is a
question whether there was in existence a strong liberal France, such
as idealists depict, that could pacifically have done this wonderful
work. Examining and duly weighing the desperation of dynastic
absolutism, it looks as if nothing but the counter-poison of
Napoleon's militarism could have prevented its annihilating French
liberalism. Without Napoleon the conservative liberalism of to-day
would have been impossible.
Turning to the field of general history, there are certain facts,
admittedly Napoleon's doing, which quite as certainly are among the
most important factors of contemporary politics. Of themselves
these would suffice to give him a high place in constructive
history. In the first place, he deprived England of the monopoly in
what had long been essentially and peculiarly her political ideal.
What was the basis of the long conflict between England and France
to which Napoleon fell heir? Was the struggle of these two glorious
and enlightened sister nations a struggle for territorial
ascendancy in Europe? Not entirely. Was it a life-and-death
struggle for ascendancy in the western world? No. The Seven Years'
War had decided that question against France, and the American war
for independence had in a sense evened the score in its decision
against England; for the prize had been awarded to a new people.
No; the conflict did not rage over this. What, then, was the cause?
Nothing less than a passion for the ascendancy of one of these
highest forms of civilization throughout the globe, including both
Europe and America. This Anglo-Saxon political, commercial,
religious, and social conception was, after the Napoleonic wars, no
longer confined to Great Britain. Thence onward the great powers
of Europe have been chiefly concerned, aside from their care for
self-preservation, in partitioning Africa and Asia among
themselves; and this process is no sooner complete than they begin
to murmur about the Monroe doctrine and to cast longing eyes toward
Central and South America. The state system which was once European
has become coextensive with the sphere on which we live, and this
notion of world-domination, so denounced when held by Napoleon, has
become the motive-power of every great modern civilization.
If we consider the national politics of Europe beyond the boundaries
of France, history again becomes a record of influences started by
Napoleon's works, either of commission or of omission. Russia's
grandeur as a European power appears to be largely due to the
temporary extinction of Poland's hope for national resurrection. Had
Napoleon, instead of playing his doubtful game with the grand duchy of
Warsaw, turned into an autonomous permanency the scarcely known
provisional government of Poland, which he actually inaugurated and
which worked for a considerable time, and had he restored to its sway
both the Prussian and Austrian shares in the shameless partition, we
might have seen quite another result to the military migration of
1812. We can scarcely doubt, moreover, that Poland, restored under
French protection, would have been a buffer state between Russia,
Prussia, and Austria, rendering the crushing coalition an
impossibility in 1813, while in 1814 the allies could probably never
have crossed the French frontier, if indeed they had dared to go even
so far in their march across Europe. But his positive achievement was
quite as important. The Germany of to-day is a great federal state
guided, but not dominated, by Prussia. What are its other important
members? Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden--all three in their present
extent and influence the creations of Napoleon; the nice balance of
powers in the German Empire is due to his arrangement of the map.
There is even a sense in which all Germany, as we know it, sprang full
armed from his head. He not merely taught the peoples of central
Europe their strategy, tactics, and military organization: it was he
who carried the standard of enlightenment (in his own interest, of
course, but still he carried it) through the length and breadth of
their territories, and made its significance clear to the meanest
intellect of their teeming millions. Thereafter the longings for
German unity, for German fatherland, for the organization of German
strength into one movement, could never be checked. The swarm of petty
tyrants who had modeled their life and conduct on the example of Louis
XIV, and who in struggling to vie with his villainies had debauched
themselves and their peoples, was swept away by Napoleon's
ruthlessness, to give place to the larger, more wholesome nationality
of the nineteenth century, which was destined in the end to inspire
the surrounding nations with the new concept of respect, not alone for
one's own nationality, but for that of others.
What French influence effected in Italy is a topic so recondite as to
require separate discussion; for the results were not so immediate or
so dramatic as they were in Germany. But the destruction of petty
governments was as ruthless as in the north; the ideas which marched
in Bonaparte's ranks found at least a large minority of intelligent
admirers among the invaded; and Italian unity, though won by a family
he feared and abused, is in no doubtful sense indebted for its
existence, not merely to Napoleon's age, but to the ideas he
disseminated and to the efforts at a practical beginning which he
made. As to Austria-Hungary, the new historical epoch which makes her
essentially the empire of the lower Danube takes its rise from
Napoleon's time and influence. The relaxation of her grasp on Italy
has thrown her across the Adriatic for the territorial expansion
essential to her position as a great power. It has been her mission to
rescue by moral influence some of the fairest lands in the Balkan
peninsula from waste and anarchy. Mere proximity is a powerful factor;
the turbulence of Austrian local patriotism has been the seed of
wholesome discontent among the Christian populations of Turkey, whose
first awakening was largely due to the emissaries sent by Napoleon to
fire the hearts of the oppressed and suffering subjects of that
distracted land. Servia is one example of this; and in a sense the
national awakening of Greece began with the hopes similarly aroused.
The astounding magic of his name in the United States is partly due to
a quality of the American mind which makes its possessor the
passionate and indiscriminating adorer of greatness in every form. The
Americans are more French than the French in their admiration of
power. But, after all, this is not the main reason for their interest
in Napoleon. They are, dimly at least, aware of certain facts which
have determined their history and made them an independent nation;
though already stated and discussed, we may be pardoned for
recapitulating them in this connection. Their first war for
independence left them tributary to the mother-country both
industrially and commercially. It was Napoleon who pitilessly, though
slyly and indirectly, launched them into the second war with Great
Britain, from which they emerged with some glory and some sense of
defeat, but, after all, with the tremendous and permanent gain of
absolute commercial independence. In the second place, their purchase
of Louisiana, though understood by only a few at the moment,
revolutionized their national system both inside and outside. That
momentous step destroyed the literal interpretation of the
constitution, hitherto enslaving a congeries of jarring little
commonwealths in the bondage of verbalism, because, though manifestly
beneficent and necessary, it could be justified before the law only by
an appeal to the spirit and not to the letter. Thenceforward Americans
have steadily been enlarging their constitutional law by
interpretation, and the apparent timidity of amendment which they
display is simply due to the absence of necessity for revision as long
as expansion by interpretation continues. But certainly quite as
important as this was also the displacement, by the acquisition of
that vast territory, of what may be called the national center of
gravity. Until then the aspirations of Americans had been toward
Europe; the public opinion of the country had, until then, demanded
the largest possible intercourse with that continent compatible with
freedom from political entanglement. Thereafter there was a change in
their spirit: a continent of their own was open to their energies. For
two generations their history has been concerned with exploration,
with mechanical invention, and with solving the great problem of how
to prevent an extension of slavery corresponding to the extension of
territory. But nevertheless, steadily and vigorously two correlated
concepts were propagating themselves: neglect of Europe, in order to
expand and assimilate their recent acquisition; industrial
exclusiveness, for the sake of this great home market which
immigration, settlement, and the formation of new commonwealths were
creating, not at the front door, but in the rear of the states
stretching along the Atlantic. This resulted in a temporary
"about-face" of the nation; and it is only now, when the prize of
material greatness and of territorial unity has been secured, that the
people turn once more toward the rising sun, in order to get from
older lands everything germane to its own civilization, and to
assimilate these acquisitions, if possible, in realizing its own
ideals of moral grandeur.
HISTORICAL SOURCES
In making this book I had access to the following original sources:
I. Unpublished Documents: _a_, The papers of the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs during the years of Napoleon's life, including those
of the "Fonds Napoléon." _b_, The unpublished correspondence of
Napoleon kept in the French Ministry of War, including the "Volumes
Rouges" and the "Dossier de l'Empereur." This is as voluminous at
least as the published correspondence, but of personal and technical
rather than political interest. I have also consulted the archives of
the General Staff in the same building concerning many events
connected with Napoleon's career. _c_, The papers of Napoleon's youth
known as the Ashburnham papers, but now owned by the Italian
government, and kept in the Laurentian Library at Florence. Since I
used them they have been published by Masson and Biagi, but the
editors have corrected the text to an extent which is in our day not
considered scientific. _d_, The despatches of American diplomatists
resident abroad during Napoleon's career. _e_, Certain papers from the
Record Office in London relating to Napoleon's surrender and his life
in St. Helena. _f_, Certain papers of Henri Beyle containing
characterizations of Napoleon and contemporary anecdotes concerning
him. These were translated by Jean de Mitty from a cipher manuscript
in the public library at Grenoble. _g_, A considerable number of
Napoleon's letters, kindly put at my disposal by various collectors.
II. Published Official Papers. Within the last few years original
documents concerning the Napoleonic epoch have been printed very
extensively. Nearly all the important books are based on archival
research, and the respective authors generally print a certain number
of despatches or reports in justification of their conclusions. The
following collections are the most important: _a_, The Correspondence
of Napoleon. _b_, Official Papers of the Helvetic Republic. _c_,
Diplomatic Correspondence between Prussia and France, 1795-97. _d_,
Lord Whitworth's despatches. _e_, Ducasse's Supplement to Napoleon's
Correspondence. _f_, The Papers of Gentz and Schwarzenberg. _g_, The
Papers of Metternich. _h_, Napoleon's Letters to Caulaincourt. _i_,
Napoleon's Letters to King Joseph. _j_, The Letters of King Jerome,
Queen Catharine, and King Frederick of Würtemberg. _k_, The Papers of
Castlereagh, Banks, Jackson, and other English statesmen of the time.
_l_, Diplomatic Correspondence between Russia and France. _m_, The
Archives of Count Woronzoff. _n_, Diplomatic Correspondence of the
Sardinian ambassadors at St. Petersburg. _o_, Diplomatic
Correspondence of the ministers of the republic and kingdom of Italy.
_p_, Lecestre's Unpublished Letters of Napoleon. This list might be
extended almost indefinitely by adding such collections as Ducasse's
Memoirs of King Joseph, Napoleon's Letters to Josephine, the
Correspondence of Eugène, etc., etc.; but these older books are too
well known to require enumeration, and, though authentic, are only
semi-official or personal publications.
III. Contemporary Memoirs. Those titles given in the bibliography are,
with a few exceptions, the most valuable. The positive, literal truth
of the so-called memoirs attributed to Bourrienne, Constant,
Caulaincourt, Barras, Fouché, and Avrillon is very slender. They are
all made by skilful patchwork and must be read with the utmost
caution. In fact, it is doubtful whether, with the exception of
Barras's scandalous record, they have, strictly speaking, any right to
the names they bear. This much negative value they have: that they
show how history can be falsified in one interest or another.
During the fourteen years which have elapsed since the book was
completed for magazine publication, and the twelve since it was
revised to the form of four volumes, great numbers of what were then
manuscript journals, memoirs, or letters have been printed and
published; of these proper use has been made in this edition, and
their titles are given in the bibliography. The author may be pardoned
for remarking that few details of importance have been found
incorrect, wherever experts agree, and that his many critics have made
no demand for the reconstruction of his characterization in its broad
outlines, however opposed they may be to his portrayals or
discussions.
This list of books makes no pretense to completeness. It is a
conservative estimate that there are two hundred thousand titles of
books relating to Napoleon and his age. What is here given is
sufficient to assure the reader a complete view of Napoleon and his
times from the best sources.
WM. M. SLOANE.
_New York, August 1, 1910._
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
=Brière, G.=; =Caron, P.=; et =Maistre, H.= Répertoire Méthodique de
l'histoire moderne et contemporaine de la France. Paris, 1898 (one
vol. yearly).
=Cambridge Modern History=. New York and London, 1906. Vol. IX,
Napoleon.
=Catalogue de l'Histoire de France=. 15 v.
=Dahlmann, E. C.=, and =Waitz, G.= Quellenkunde der deutschen
Geschichte.
=Fournier, A.=, ed. Bourne, E. G. New York, 1903.
=Gardiner, S. R.=, and =Mullinger, J. B.= Introduction to English
History. London, 1894.
=Kircheisen, F.= Bibliography of Napoleon. Leipzig, 1902.
=Kircheisen, F.= Bibliographie du temps de Napoléon. Paris, Geneva,
London, 1908.
=Lumbroso, A.= Saggio di una bibliografia ragionata per servire alla
storia dell' epoca Napoleonica. Modena, 1894-96. Parts 1-5.
EUROPE
=Alison, Sir A.= History of Europe from the commencement of the French
Revolution in 1789 to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. London,
1841-42. 10 v. 8{o}.
=Bredow, G. G.= Chronik des XIXten Jahrhunderts. 2 v. Altona, 1801.
Continued by C. Venturini. 20 v. Altona, 1809-28.
=Delbrück, H.= Historische u. politische Aufsätze. Berlin, 1887. 8{o}.
=Faguet, E.= Politiques et moralistes du 19e siècle. Paris, 1891.
12{o}.
=Froidevaux, H.= La politique coloniale de Napoléon Ier. In Revue des
questions historiques, tom. 68, pp. 608-620. Paris, Ier avril, 1901.
=Heeren, A. H. L.= Handbuch der Geschichte des europäischen
Staatensystems und seiner Colonieen. Göttingen, 1819.
=Houssaye, H.= 1814. 7 éd. Paris, 1888. 16{o}.
=Houssaye, H.= 1815. Paris, 1899.
=Houssaye, H.= 1815. Waterloo et la Terreur Blanche. Paris, 1899.
=Lavisse, E.=, et =Rambaud, A.= Histoire générale du IVme siècle à nos
jours. 12 v. Paris, 1893-1901. (Vol. IX, 1800-15. Bibliography.)
=Mahan, A. T.= Influence of Sea Power upon History. London, 1889.
8{o}.
=Mahan, A. T.= The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution
and Empire. 2 v. London, 1893.
=Montgaillard, J. G. M. Rocques de=. De la France et de l'Europe sous
le gouvernement de Bonaparte. Paris et Lyon, an XII (1804).
=Plotho, C.= v. Der Krieg des Verbündet. Europa gegen Frankreich im
Jahre 1815. Berlin, 1818. 8{o}.
=Pölitz, K. H. L.= D. Europäischen Verfassungen seit d. Jahre 1789 bis
auf die neueste Zeit. Mit geschichtl. Einleit. u. Erläuter. 2te neu
geordn., berichtigte u. ergänzte Aufl. Leipzig, 1833. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Rambaud, A.=, et =Lavisse, E.= Histoire générale. v. Lavisse.
=Rocke, P.= Die Kontinentalsperre. Naumb., 1894. 8{o}.
=Schlegel, A. W.= Über d. Continentalsystem u. d. Einfluss desselben
auf Schweden. Leipzig, 1814. 8{o}.
=Schulz, K. G.= Geschichte d. Kriege in Europa seit dem Jahre 1792.
Berlin, 1827-53. 15 Bände in 23 Theilen.
=Sorel, A.= L'Europe et la Révolution française (1789-1815). 8 v.
Paris, 1885-1904.
=Sorel, A.= Essais historiques et critiques. Paris, 1894.
TREATIES
=Angeberg, d'=. Le Congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815, précédé
et suivi des actes diplomatiques, avec intr. hist. par M. Capefigue.
Paris, 1864. 2 v.
=Barral-Montferrat, Marquis de=. Dix ans de paix armée entre la France
et l'Angleterre, 1783-1793. Ier v. Paris, 1893. 8{o}.
=Bowman, H. M.= Die englisch-französische Friedensverhandlung (Dez.,
1799, bis Jan., 1800). Leipzig, 1899.
=Garden, G. de=. Histoire générale des traités de paix et autres
transactions principales entre les puissances de l'Europe depuis la
paix de Westphalie. Paris, 1848-59. 14 v. 8{o}.
=Laperouse, A.= Le Congrès de Châtillon. Châtillon-sur-Seine, 1865.
8{o}.
=Leclercq, A.= Recueil des traités de la France. Publ. sous les
auspices du ministre des affaires étrangères. Paris, 1864-72. 10 v.
8{o}.
=Martens, G. F. de=. Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de
paix, de trève, etc., conclus par les puissances de l'Europe, tant
entre elles qu'avec les puissances et états dans d'autres parties du
monde depuis 1761 jusqu'à présent (1801). Paris, 1791-1801. 7 v. 8{o}.
Suppl. to 1807. Paris, 1802-08. 2 éd. Paris, 1817-35. 8 v. 8{o}.
(Continued by his nephew to the present time.)
=Pons, André, Comte de Rio=. Known as Pons de l'Hérault. Le Congrès de
Châtillon. Paris, 1825. 8{o}.
=Weiss, J. B. von=. Weltgeschichte (vols. XIX-XXII, 1795-1815).
Leipzig, 1896-98.
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Bailleu, P. Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807: diplomatische
Correspondenzen. Leipzig, 1881-87. 2 v. 8{o}. (Publ. a. d. K. preuss.
Staatsarchiv. Bde. 8, 29.)
Bignon, L. P. Souvenirs d'un diplomate (La Pologne, 1811-13),
précédés d'une notice hist. sur la vie de l'auteur par M. Mignet.
Paris, 1864.
=Buchez, P. J. B.= Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française.
2 éd., revisée et entièrement remaniée par l'auteur, en collaboration
avec MM. Jules Bastide, E. S. de Bois-le-Comte et Q. Ott. Paris,
1845-47. 6 v. 12{o}.
=Constant de Rebecque, H. B.= Cours de politique const.; ou, Coll. des
ouvrages publ. sur le gouvernement représentatif, avec une intr. et
des notes par Éd. Laboulaye. Paris, 1861. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Du Casse, P. E. A.= Histoire des négociations diplomatiques relatives
aux traités de Mortfontaine, de Lunéville et d'Amiens. Paris, 1855. 3
v. 8{o}.
=Dufraisse, M.= Histoire du droit de guerre et de paix (1789-1815).
Paris, 1867.
=Fournier, A.= Der Congress von Châtillon. Die Politik im Kriege von
1814. Eine historische Studie. 8{o}. Wien u. Prag, 1900. Tempsky.
=Fournier, A.= Gentz u. Cobenzl. Geschichte d. österreich. Diplomatie
in den Jahre 1801-05. Nach neuen Quellen. Wien, 1880. 8{o}.
=Gardane, A. de=. Mission du Gén. Gardane en Perse sous le premier
Empire. Documents historiques. Paris, 1865. 8{o}.
=Gardane, Comte G.= De histoire générale des traités de paix depuis la
paix de Westphalie (to 1813). 14 v. Paris, 1849-59.
=Goldsmith, L.= Secret history of the cabinet of Bonaparte. London,
1810. 8{o}.
=Greppi=. Révélations diplomatiques sur les relations de la Sardaigne
avec l'Autriche et la Russie. Paris, 1859. 8{o}.
=Kiesselbach, W. D.= Continentalsperre in ihrer Oekonomisch-Polit.
Bedeutung. Ein Beitrag z. Handelsgeschichte. Stuttgart, 1850. 8{o}.
=Kleist, Heinr. v.= Politische Schriften und andere Nachträge zu
seinen Werken. Mit einer Einleitung zum ersten Male herausg. von R.
Kopke. Berlin, 1862. 8{o}.
=Klinkowström, Clem. v.= Aus d. alten Registratur d. Staatskanzlei.
Briefe Polit. Inhalts von u. an Frdr. v. Gentz aus den Jahren
1799-1827. Wien, 1870. 8{o}.
=Lefebvre, A.= Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe pendant le consulat
et l'Empire. Paris, 1866-69.
=Léouzon-le-Duc, L. A.=, Éd. Correspondance diplomatique du baron de
Staël Holstein et de son successeur le baron Brinkman: documents inéd.
sur la Révolution (1783-99), recueillis aux archives royales de Suède
et publiés avec une introduction par L. Léouzon-le-Duc. Paris, 1881.
8{o}.
=Maistre, J. de=. Correspondance diplomatique, 1811-17. Éd. par A.
Blanc. Paris, 1860. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Masson, F.= Le département des affaires étrangères pendant la
Révolution (1787-1804). Paris, 1877.
=Montgaillard, J. G. M. Roques=, known as Comte de. Mémoires
diplomatiques 1805-1819, extraits du ministère de l'intérieur et
publiés, avec une introduction et des notes, par Clément de Lacroise.
Paris, 1896. 8{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Collection générale et complète de lettres,
proclamations, discours, rédigée d'après le Moniteur, classée suivant
l'ordre du temps 1796-1807, accompagnée de notes historiques, publiée
par C. A. Fischer. Leipzig, 1808-13. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Pingaud, L.= Un agent secret sous la Révolution et l'Empire: le comte
d'Antraigues. Paris, 1893. 8{o}.
=Pozzo di Borgo, Comte=. Correspondance diplomatique du C{te} Pozzo di
Borgo et du C{te} de Nesselrode depuis la Restauration.
=Pradt, D. D. de=. Histoire de l'ambassade dans le grand duché de
Varsovie en 1812. 5 éd. rev. et corr. Paris, 1815. 8{o}.
=Stewarton=. Secret history of the court and cabinet of St. Cloud. In
a series of letters. Anon. 4th American ed. New York, 1807. 12{o}.
=Tratchefski, A.= Relations diplomatiques de la Russie avec la France
à l'époque de Napoléon I. Saint-Pétersbourg, 1890-93. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Ulmann, H.= Russisch-preussische Politik unter Alexander I und
Friedrich Wilhelm III bis 1806, urkundlich dargestellt. 8{o}. Leipzig,
1899. Duncker.
=Vandal, A.= Négociations avec la Russie relatives au second mariage
de Napoléon. In Revue historique, tom. 44, pp. 1-42. Paris, 1900.
MILITARY HISTORY
=Aster, K. H.= D. Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterswalde, Pirna,
Königstein u. Priesten im Aug., 1813, u. die Schlacht bei Kulm.
Dresden, 1845. 8{o}.
=Aster, K. H.= Gefechte u. Schlachten bei Leipzig im October, 1813. 2
Ausg. Dresden, 1852-53. 2 Bde. 8{o}.
=Aster, K. H.= Schilderung d. Kriegsereignisse in und vor Dresden, vom
7 März bis 28 August, 1813. 2 Ausg. Leipzig, 1856. 8{o}.
=Barral, Georges=. L'épopée de Waterloo: narration nouvelle des cent
jours et de la campagne de Belgique en 1815. Paris, 1895. 8{o}.
=Beauchamp, A. de=. Histoire des campagnes de 1814-15. Paris, 1815-17.
4 v. 8{o}.
=Beauharnais, le Prince Eugène de=. Mémoires et correspondance
politique et militaire. Publ., annotés et mis en ordre par A. du
Casse. Paris, 1858-60. 10 v. 8{o}.
=Beiträge= zur Geschichte d. Krieges von 1806-07, oder Bemerk.
Berichtigungen u. Zusätze zu d. in Theile des Werkes: Geschichte d.
Kriege in Europa seit d. Jahre 1792 als Folgen d. Staatsveränderung in
Frankreich unter Ludwig XVI, etc. Berlin, 1834. Breslau, 1836.
=Beiträge= zur Geschichte d. Krieges vom Jahre 1806 u. 1807, oder
Bemerk. Berichtigungen u. Zusätze zu d. in Theile des Werkes, etc.
Breslau, 1836. (Contains the memoirs of Oginski, Eugen's von
Würtemberg, and Bennigsen.)
=Beiträge= zur Geschichte d. Französ.-russ. Feldzügs im Jahre 1812.
Breslau, 1814. 8{o}.
=Beiträge= zur Geschichte d. Feldzüge 1814-15 in Frankreich, in
besond. Beziehung auf d. Commando d. Kronprinzen v. Würtemberg,
herausg. v. d. Offizieren d. Würtemb. Gen. Quart. Staabs. Stuttgart,
1818. 3 Hefte, mit 12 Plänen.
=Beiträge= zur Geschichte d. Feldzüge v. 1813-14, von e. Offizier d.
alliirten Armee. Berlin, 1815. 8{o}.
=Bernays, Guillaume=. Schicksale d. Grossherzogth. Frankfurt u. seiner
Truppen. Eine kulturhistor. u. militär. Studie aus der Zeit d.
Rheinbundes. Berlin, 1882. 8{o}.
=Berthezène, P.= Souvenirs militaires de la République et de l'Empire
[1798-1815]; publ. par son fils. Paris, 1855. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Bertin, G.= La campagne de 1814, d'après des témoins oculaires. 8{o}.
Paris, 1897. Flammarion.
=Bertrand, E.= Les marins de la garde (1803-1815). 8{o}. Paris, 1895.
Baudin.
=Bleibtreu, K.= Geschichte und Geist der europäischen Kriege unter
Friedrich dem Grossen und Napoleon. Leipzig, 1893.
=Borcke, J. v.= Kriegerleben. 1806-15. Nach dessen Aufzeichng. bearb.
von Leszczynski. Berlin, 1888. 8{o}.
=Bourgeois, R.= Relation fidèle et détaillée de la dernière campagne
de Bonaparte terminée par la bataille de Mont Saint-Jean, dite de
Waterloo ou de la Belle Alliance, par un témoin oculaire. Paris, 1815.
8{o}.
=Bourgoing, P. de=. Itinéraire de Napoléon I de Smorgoni à Paris,
épisode de la guerre de 1812. Premier extrait des mém. militaires et
politiques inédits. Paris, 1862.
=Bustelli, G.= L'Enigma di Ligny e di Waterloo (15-18 giugno, 1815)
studiato e sciolto. 3 v. 8{o}. Viterbo, 1897. Agnesotti.
=Buturlin=. Hist. militaire de la campagne de Russie en 1812. Paris,
1824. 2 v. 8{o}. Atlas 4{o}.
=Chabot-Arnault=. Histoire des flottes militaires. Paris, 1889. 8{o}.
=Charras, J. B. A.= Histoire de la campagne de 1815. Waterloo. Avec un
atlas. 6 éd. Paris, 1869. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Chesney, C. C.= Étude de la campagne de 1815: Waterloo. Bruxelles,
1870. 8{o}.
=Chesney, C. C.= Waterloo lectures. 2 ed. London, 1869. 8{o}.
=Chevalier, Éd.= Histoire de la marine française sous le Consulat et
l'Empire. Paris, 1886. 8{o}.
=Clausewitz, C.= v. Hinterlassene Werke ü. Krieg u. Kriegführung.
Berlin, 1862-89. 10 v. 8{o}.
=Colin, J.= Études sur la campagne de 1796-97 en Italie. 8{o}. Av.
carte et croquis. Paris, 1897. Baudoin.
=Colomb, E.= v. Blücher in Briefen aus den Feldzügen 1813-15.
Stuttgart, 1876. 8{o}.
=Corte=. Battaglie di S. Michele e Mondovi. Torino, 1846.
=Damitz, K. von=. Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 in den Niederlanden
u. Frankreich. Berlin, 1837-38. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Danielson, J. R.= Finska kriget och Finlands krigare (1808-1809).
Stockholm, 1898. Wahlstrom.
=Danilewsky, M.= Darstellung d. Feldzuges in Frankreich im Jahre 1814.
In's deutsche übertr. v. C. v. Kotzebue. Riga, 1837-38. 2 Bde.
=Danilewsky, M.= Geschichte des Krieges im Jahre 1812. Mit 33 Plänen.
Riga, 1840. 8{o}.
=Danilewsky, M.= Geschichte des Vaterland. Krieges im Jahre 1812, auf
Allerhöchsten befehl des Kaisers von Russland verfasst. Aus d. Russ.
übersetzt von C. R. Goldhammer. Riga, 1840. 4 Thle.
=Danilewsky, M.= Relation de la campagne de 1805 (Austerlitz). Tr. du
russe par le gén. L. Narischkine. Paris, 1846. 8{o}. 1 carte et 1
plan.
=Davout, L.=, Prince d'Eckmühl. Opérations du 3e corps, 1806-07.
Rapport publié par son neveu le général Davout, duc d'Auerstädt.
Paris, 1896. 8{o}.
=Dechent=. Beiträge z. Gesch. des Feldzuges von 1806, nach Quellen des
Archivs Marburg. Berlin, 1887. 8{o}.
=De Cugnac=. Campagnes de l'armée de réserve en 1800. Tom. I: Passage
du grand Saint-Bernard. Tom. II: Marengo. Av. 21 cartes et croquis.
Paris, 1900-01. Chapelot.
=Delauney=. Napoléon et la défense des côtes. Extrait du "Mémorial de
l'artillerie de la marine." Paris, 1895. 8{o}.
=Denniée=, Baron. Itinéraire de l'Empereur Napoléon pendant la
campagne de 1812. Paris, 1842. 8{o}.
=Desbrière, E.= 1793-1805. Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux
îles britanniques. Av. 60 cartes et croquis. 3 v. 8{o}. Paris,
1901-02. Chapelot.
=Ditfurth, M.= D. Schlacht bei Borodino am 7 Sept., 1812. Mit besond.
Rücksicht auf die Theilnahme d. deutschen Reitercontingente. Marburg,
1887.
=Doisy de Villargennes, A. J.= Reminiscences of Army Life under
Napoleon Bonaparte. Cin., 1884. 12{o}.
=Dörr, J. D.= Schlacht von Hanau am 30 Oktbr., 1813. Cassel, 1851.
8{o}.
=Doublet, P. J. L. O.= Mémoires historiques sur l'invasion et
l'occupation de Malte par une armée française en 1798. Publ. pour la
première fois par le comte de Panisse-Passis. Paris, 1883. 12{o}.
=Dumas, M.= Précis des événements militaires; ou, Essai historique sur
les campagnes de 1799 à 1814. Paris, 1816-26. 19 v. 8{o}.
=Durdent, R. J.= Campagne de Moscou en 1812. Paris, 1814. 8{o}.
=Duruy, A.= Études d'histoire militaire sur la Révolution et l'Empire.
Paris, 1888. 8{o}. (First chapter is La conspiration du Gén. Malet.)
=Du Teil, B{on} J.= Napoléon Bonaparte et les généraux du Teil
(1788-94). L'École d'artillerie d'Auxonne et le siège de Toulon. Une
famille militaire au XVIIIe siècle.
=Eniden, F.= Erinnerungen eines österreichischen Ordonnanzoffiziers
aus dem Feldzuge 1812. 8{o}. Wien, 1898. Seidel.
=Fabvier, C. N.= Journal des opérations du sixième corps pendant la
campagne de 1814 en France. Paris, 1819. 8{o}.
=Fezensac, R. E. P. J. de Montesquiou, duc de=. Souvenirs militaires
de 1804 à 1814. 4 éd. Paris, 1870. 12{o}.
=Foucart, P.= Bautzen (une bataille de 2 jours), 20-21 mai, 1813.
Paris, 1897. 8{o}.
=Foucart, P.= Campagne de Prusse (1806), d'après les archives de la
guerre: Jena. Paris, 1887. 8{o}.
=Französische= Armee im Jahre 1813, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte d.
Befreiungs Kriege. Berlin, 1889. 8{o}.
=Friant Comte=. Vie militaire du lieutenant-général comte Friant.
Paris, 1857. 8{o}.
=Gachot, E.= Histoire militaire de Masséna. Paris, 1901.
=Gamot=. Réfutation en ce qui concerne le M{al} Ney de l'ouvrage ayant
pour titre "Campagne de 1815 ... par le G{al} Gourgaud." Paris, 1818.
8{o}.
=Gardner, D.= Quatre-Bras, Ligny, Waterloo: Narrative of the campaign
in Belgium, 1815. London, 1882. 8{o}.
=Gérard, E. M., Comte=. Quelques documents sur la bataille de
Waterloo, propres à éclairer la question portée devant le public par
M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Paris, 1829. 8{o}.
=Giraud, P. F. F. J.= Campagne de Paris en 1814, précédée d'un coup
d'oeil sur celle de 1813; ou, Précis historique et impartial des
événements depuis l'invasion de la France par les armées étrangères
jusqu'à la capitulation de Paris, la déchéance et l'abdication de
Buonaparte inclusivement. Paris, 1814. 8{o}.
=Gleig, G. R.= Story of the battle of Waterloo. New York, 1847.
=Gouvion Saint-Cyr, L., Marquis de=. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire
militaire sous le Directoire, le Consulat et l'Empire, 1798-1813.
Paris, 1831. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Grenier, P.= Étude sur 1807 Manoeuvres d'Eylau et Friedland. Av.
croquis. Paris, 1901. 8{o}.
=Grouchy, Gen.= Observations sur la relation de la campagne de 1815,
pub. par le Gén. Gourgaud; et réfutation de quelques-unes des
assertions d'autres écrits relatifs à la bataille de Waterloo. Paris,
1819. 8{o}.
=Grouchy, Marquis de=. Mémoires du M{al} de Grouchy. Paris, 1873-74. 5
v. 8{o}.
=Guillaume, F., dit Guillaume de Vaudoncourt=. Histoire des campagnes
de 1814 et 1815 en France. Paris, 1826. 5 v. 8{o}.
=Guillon, E.= Les complots militaires sous le consulat et l'empire,
d'après les documents inédits des archives. 12{o}. Paris, 1894. Plon.
=Guillon, E.= Nos écrivains militaires. Études de littérature et
d'histoire militaire. 2e sér. Depuis la Révolution jusqu'à nos jours.
12{o}. Paris. Plon.
=Hamilton, Captain Thomas=. Annals of the Peninsular campaigns from
1808 to 1816. Edinburgh, 1829. 3 v. 18{o}.
=Helfert=. D. Schlacht bei Kulm, 1813. Wien, 1863. Gr. 8{o}.
=Helldorff=. Zur Geschichte d. Schlacht bei Kulm. Aufklärung
verschiedener bis jetzt unrichtig darg. Thatsachen über die Tage vom
25-30 August, 1813. Berlin, 1856. 8{o}.
=Heymès=. Relation de la campagne de 1815, dite de Waterloo, pour
servir à l'histoire du Maréchal Ney. Paris, no date. 8{o}.
=Histoire= des sociétés secrètes de l'armée et des conspirations
militaires qui ont eu pour objet la destruction du gouvernement de
Bonaparte. Paris, 1815. [Anon.]
=Hofmann, G. W. v.= Die Schlacht bei Borodino mit einer Uebersicht des
Feldzugs von 1812. Koblenz, 1846. 8{o}.
=Hooper, G.= Waterloo, the downfall of the first Napoleon. London,
1890. 16{o}.
=Höpfner, Ed. v.= D. Krieg von 1806 u. 1807. Beiträge zur Geschichte
d. preuss. Armee nach d. Quellen d. Kriegs-Archivs bearb. Berlin,
1850-51. 4 v. 8{o}. Mit Schlacht u. Gefechts Plänen u. Beilagen.
=Houssaye, H.= 1815. Waterloo. 8{o}. Paris, 1898. Perrin. Trad. en
allem. par A. Ostermeyer. 8{o}. London, 1900. Grant Richards.
=Jomini, H. de=. Portable atlas of the fields of Waterloo and Ligny.
Brussels, 1851. 8{o}.
=Jomini, H. de=. Histoire crit. et militaire des guerres de la
Révolution, 1792-1803. Nouv. éd. Paris, 1820-24. 15 v. 8{o} and atlas
fol.
=Jomini, H. de=. Précis politique et militaire des campagnes de 1812 à
1814, extr. des souvenirs inéd., avec une notice biog. et des cartes,
plans et légendes, publ. F. Lecomte. Lausanne, 1886. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Jomini, H. de=. Précis politique et militaire de la campagne de 1815,
pour servir de supplément et de rectification à la vie politique et
militaire de Napoléon, racontée par lui-même. Paris, 1839. 8{o}.
=Jurien de la Gravière, J. B. E.= Guerres maritimes sous la République
et l'Empire, avec les plans des batailles navales ... et une carte du
Sund ... 3e éd. Paris, no date. 2 v. 12{o}.
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1812, contenant des détails puisés dans des sources officielles ou
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Kavallerie-corps unter d. Anführung d. Gen. Latour-Maubourg. Münster,
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=Sauzey=. Iconographie du costume militaire de la Révolution et de
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cent corps de troupes, et huit mille références à plus de cinq mille
planches d'uniformes coloriés. Av. preface par H. Bouchot. 16{o}.
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NAPOLEON
_a._ MEMOIRS
=Abell, Mrs. L. E. B.= Recollections of the Emperor Napoleon on the
Island of St. Helena. 3d ed., rev. by her daughter, Mrs. C. Johnston.
London, 1873. 12{o}.
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=Anglemont, E. d'=. Le Duc d'Enghien, histoire-drame. Paris, 1832.
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=Arnault, A. V.= Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire. Paris, 1833. 4 v. 8{o}.
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by the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, tr. by C. E. Roche. The Revolution,
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=Avrillon, Mme.= Mémoires sur la vie privée de l'Imp. Joséphine, sa
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=Barante, A. G. P. Brugière de=. Études historiques et biographiques.
Nouv. éd. Paris, 1858. 2 v. 18{o}.
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=Barras, P. F. J. N., Comte de=. Mémoires. Pub. avec une introduction
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=Baudouin, A.= Anecdotes historiques du temps de la Restauration,
suivies de recherches sur l'origine de la presse, son développement,
son influence sur les esprits, ses rapports avec l'opinion publique,
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=Bellune, Claude Victor Perrin=, duc de, pair et maréchal de France.
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=Béranger, P. J. de=. Ma biographie, suivie d'un appendice. 3 éd.
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=Bertin, G. La= campagne de 1812, d'après des témoins oculaires. Paris
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Beugnot, son petit-fils. 3 éd. Paris, 1889. 8{o}.
=Bigarré, Général=. Mémoires, 1775-1813. Paris, 1893. 8{o}.
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Paris, 1882. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Bonaparte, Lucien=. Réponse aux mémoires du général Lamarque sur les
faits relatifs à 1815. London, 1835. 8{o}.
=Bourrienne, L. A. F. de=. Mémoires sur Napoléon, le Directoire, le
Consulat, l'Empire et la Restauration. 1829.
=Broglie, A. C. L. V., Duc de=. Souvenirs. 1785-1870. Paris, 1886-87.
4 v. 8{o}.
=Buloz, A., Éd.= Bourrienne et ses erreurs volontaires et
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d'Aure, de Survilliers, Méneval, Bonacossi, d'Eckmühl, Massias, Boulay
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=Carnot, S. H.= Mémoires, par son fils. Paris, 1861-64. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Castellane, B. E. V. E., le Maréchal de=. Journal ... 1804-62. 2 éd.
Paris, 1895-97. 5 v. 8{o}.
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Charlotte de Sor (Mme. Oilleaux-Désormeaux). 4 éd. Paris, 1837. 2 v.
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=Chaptal, J. A., Comte de Chanteloup=. Mes souvenirs sur Napoléon.
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=Chastenay, Mme. de=. Mémoires. Publiés par Roserot. Paris, 1896.
=Chateaubriand, M. le Vicomte de=. Mémoires d'outre-tombe. Paris, n.
d. 6 v. 8{o}. (Oeuvres.)
=Chateaubriand, F. A. de=. Mémoires de Bonaparte. Paris, 1860. 8{o}.
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=Consalvi, H., Cardinal=. Mémoires, avec une intr. et des notes par J.
Crétineau-Joly. Ces mém. publ. pour la première fois sont enrichis du
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=Constant de Rebecque, B.= Mémoires sur les Cent Jours. Paris,
1820-22. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Courier, P. L.= Collection des lettres et articles publ. jusqu'à ce
jour. Paris, 1824. 8{o}.
=Davout=. Life. By Count Vigier. 2 v. Paris, 1898.
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=Dufort, J. N.= Mémoires sur les règnes de Louis XV et Louis XVI et
sur la Révolution. Publ. avec une intr. et des notes par R. de
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=Dumas, C.= Memoirs of his own time, including the Revolution, the
Empire, and the Restoration. Philadelphia, 1839. 2 v. 12{o}.
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=Ernouf, A. A.= Le Gén. Kléber: Mayence et Vendée, Allemagne,
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de cette année pour servir à l'histoire de Napoléon. Paris, 1827. 2 v.
8{o}.
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l'empereur Napoléon. 3 éd. Paris, 1829. 2 v. 8{o}.
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the abdication of Napoleon. London, 1823. 8{o}.
=Fleury de Chaboulon, P. A. E., Baron=. Mémoires pour servir à l'hist.
de la vie privée, du retour, et du règne de Napoléon en 1815. London,
1820. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Fouché, F.= Memoirs of his public life, comprising letters to
Napoleon, Wellington, Blücher, etc. London, 1818. 8{o}.
=Gaëte, Duc de=. Mémoires, souvenirs, opinions et écrits. Paris, 1826.
2 v. 8{o}.
=Garat=. Éloge funèbre des généraux Kléber et Desaix, prononcé le 1er
vendémiaire an IX à la Place des Victoires. Paris, an IX. 8{o}.
=Geffroy, A.= Notices et extraits des manuscrits concernant l'histoire
ou la littérature de France qui sont conservés dans les archives ou
bibliothèques de Suède, Danemark et Norvège. Paris, 1856. 8{o}.
=Gentz, F. de=. Mémoires et lettres inédits. Publ. par G. Schlesier.
Stuttgart, 1841.
=Gérando, M. A. de Rathsamhausen, baronne de=. Lettres, suivies de
fragments d'un journal écrit par elle de 1800 à 1804. Paris, 1880.
12{o}.
=Grouchy, Marquis de=. Le M{al} de Grouchy du 16 au 19 juin, 1815,
avec documents historiques inédits et réfutation de M. Thiers. Paris,
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=Hobhouse, J. C.= Letters by an Englishman at Paris during the last
reign of the Emperor Napoleon I. Philadelphia, 1816. 8{o}.
=Home, G.= Memoirs of an Aristocrat and Reminiscences of the Emperor
Napoleon. London, 1838. 8{o}.
=Junot, L. P., Duchesse d'Abrantès=. Memoirs. London, 1831-35. 8 v.
8{o}.
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historiques sur Napoléon et la Révolution, le Directoire, le Consulat,
l'Empire et la Restauration. 2 éd. Paris, 1835. 12 v. 8{o}.
=Kotzebue, A. F. F. v.= Erinnerungen aus Paris im Jahre 1804. Berlin,
1804. 2 v.
=Kotzebue, A. F. F. v.= Souvenirs de Paris en 1804. Trad. de l'all.
avec des notes. Paris, 1805. 2 v. 12{o}.
=Lafayette, G. M. de=. Memoirs, correspondence and manuscripts. Publ.
by his family. London, 1837. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Lafayette, G. M. de=. Mes rapports avec le Premier Consul
(1797-1805). (V. 5 of his Mémoires.)
=Lamarque, M.= Mémoires et souvenirs. Paris, 1835-36. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Lamothe-Langon, Baron E. L. de=. Mémoires et souvenirs d'une femme de
qualité sur le Consulat et l'Empire. Paris, 1830. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Landrieux, J.= Mémoires, 1795-97, avec une intr. biog. et hist. par
L. Grasilier. Tome 1er. Paris, 1893. 8{o}.
=Larévellière-Lepeaux, L. M.= Mémoires. Publ. par son fils, sur le MS.
autographe de l'auteur, et suivis des pièces justificatives et de
corresp. inédites. Paris, 1895. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Laskey, J. C.= Description of the series of medals struck by order of
Napoleon Bonaparte. London, 1818. 8{o}.
=Lavalette, Comte de=. Mémoires et souvenirs. Publ. par sa famille et
sur ses manuscrits, 1789-1829. Paris, 1831. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Lejeune, L. F., Baron, Général=. Mémoires publiés par M. G. Bapst.
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2me partie: Son organisation (1806-1815). 8{o}. Lyon, 1894, Vitte;
Paris, Lecoffre.
=Libri-Carrucci=. Souvenirs de la jeunesse de Napoléon. Paris, 1842.
8{o}.
=Macdonald, E. J. J. A., Duc de Tarente=. Souvenirs, avec une
introduction par M. C. Rousset. Paris, 1892. 8{o}.
=Mahon, Patrice= (Art Roë, Papa Felix). Trois Grenadiers de l'an VIII.
Paris, 1897. 8{o}.
=Maistre, J. de=. Mémoires politiques et correspondance diplomatique.
Avec explications et commentaires historiques, par A. Blanc. 2e éd.
1859. 8{o}.
=Malouet, P. V.= Mémoires. Publ. par son petit-fils. 2 éd. augm. de
lettres inédites. Paris, 1874. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Marbot, Baron M. de=. Mémoires. Paris, 1891. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Marmont, A. F. L. Viesse de, Duc de Raguse=. Mémoires. 1792-1841.
Paris, 1857. 9 v. 8{o}.
=Masséna, A., Duc de Rivoli, Prince d'Essling, Maréchal de France=.
Mémoires, rédigés d'après les documents qu'il a laissés et sur ceux du
dépôt de la guerre et du dépôt des fortifications, par le général
Koch. Paris, 1848-50. 7 v. and atlas.
=Masson, F.= Napoléon chez lui. Paris, 1894.
=Melzi, d'Eril F., Duca di Lodi=. Memoire, documenti e lettere inedite
di Napoleone 1º e Beauharnais. Ed. G. Melzi. Milano, 1865. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Mémoires= et souvenirs d'un pair de France, ex-membre du Sénat
conservateur. Paris, 1829-30. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Mémoires= tirés des papiers d'un homme d'état, sur les causes
secrètes qui ont déterminé la politique des cabinets dans la guerre
de la Révolution, depuis 1792 jusqu'en 1815. Paris, 1828-38. 13 v.
8{o}. (Par le comte A. F. d'Allonville, A. de Beauchamp et A.
Schubart.)
=Méneval, C. F., Baron de=. Memoirs illustrating the history of
Napoleon I from 1802 to 1815. Ed. by his grandson, Napoleon Joseph de
Méneval (tr. by Robert H. Sherard). New York, 1894. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Miot de Melito=. Mémoires (1788-1815). 2 éd. Paris, 1873. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Mollien, N. F., Comte=. Mémoires d'un ministre du trésor public,
1780-1815. Paris, 1845. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Montégut, E.= Le Maréchal Davout, son caractère et son génie. Paris,
1882. 12{o}.
=Muralt, C. v.= Hans v. Reinhard, Bürgermeister d. Eidgenossischen
Standes Zürich u. Landammann d. Schweiz. Beitrag z. Gesch. d. Schweiz
während d. letzten Jahrzehnte; bearb. nach Reinhards nachgelassenen
Denkschriften, Tagebüchern u. Briefwechsel. Zürich, 1838.
=Napoléon I.= Memoirs of the history of France. Hist. miscellanies.
London, 1823. 3 v. 8{o}. (Dictated to the Count de Montholon.)
=Napoléon I.= Memoirs of the history of France during the reign of
Napoleon, dictated by him at St. Helena. London, 1823-4. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Nasica, T.= Mémoires sur l'enfance et la jeunesse de Napoléon I
jusqu'à l'âge de 23 ans. Paris, 1852. 8{o}. 2e édit., 1865. 12{o}.
=Neuville, J. G. Hyde de=. Mémoires et souvenirs. Paris, 1890. 2 v.
8{o}.
=Ney, M. L. F., Duc d'Elchingen=. Mémoires. Publiés par sa famille.
Paris, 1833. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Nodier, C. E.= Souvenirs, Portraits, Épisodes de la Révolution et de
l'Empire. 7 éd. doublée par l'adjonction de morceaux nouveaux et
accompagnée de notes. Paris, 1863. 2 v. 12{o}.
=Nougarède de Fayet, A.= Notice sur la vie et les travaux de M. le
comte Bigot de Préameneu, ministre des cultes sous l'Empire, l'un des
trois rédacteurs du Projet de Code Civil. Paris, 1843. 8{o}.
=Odeleben, E. O. I., Freiherr von=. Napoleon's Feldzug in Sachsen im
Jahre 1813. 3 Aufl. Dresden, 1840. 8{o}.
=Pajol, C. P. V., C{te}=. Kléber, sa vie, sa correspondance. Paris,
1877. 8{o}.
=Pelet, J. J. G.= Mém. sur la guerre de 1809 en Allemagne, avec les
opérations particulières des corps d'Italie, de Pologne, de Saxe, de
Naples et de Walcheren. Paris, 1824-26. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Peyrusse, G. J. R., Baron=. 1809-15: Mémorial et archives de M. le
B{on} Peyrusse, trésorier-général de la couronne pendant les Cent
Jours. Vienne, Moscou, Île d'Elbe. Carcassonne, 1869. 8{o}.
=Pontécoulant, L. G. D., Comte de=. Souvenirs historiques et
parlementaires, extraits de ses papiers et de sa correspondance,
1764-1848. Paris, 1861-65. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Rapp, Gén.= Mémoires des contemporains pour servir à l'histoire de la
République et de l'Empire. Ière livraison. Mémoires du gén. Rapp.
Publiés par sa famille. Paris, 1823. 8{o}.
=Récamier, Mme J. F. J. A. B.= Souvenirs et correspondance tirés des
papiers de Mme Récamier (par Mme Lenormant). 3e éd. Paris, 1860. 2 v.
8{o}.
=Récamier, J. F. J. A. B.= Memoirs and correspondence. Tr. and ed. by
I. M. Luyster. London, 1867. 12{o}.
=Rémusat, C. E. J. G. de V. de=. Mémoires, 1802-08. Publiés par Paul
de Rémusat. Paris, 1880. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Rémusat, C. E. J. G. de V. de=. Lettres, 1804-14. Publiées par Paul
de Rémusat. Paris, 1881. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Rieu, J. L.= Mémoires. Genève, 1871. 18{o}.
=Roederer, P. L., Comte=. Oeuvres, publ. par son fils, A. M. Roederer.
Paris, 1853-59. 8 v. 4{o}.
=Saint-Elme, Ida=. Mémoires d'une contemporaine; ou, Souvenirs d'une
femme sur les principaux personnages de la République, du Consulat, de
l'Empire, etc. (1792-1824). Paris, 1827-28. 8 v.
=Savary, A. J. M. R., Duc de Rovigo=. Mémoires pour servir à l'hist.
de l'Empereur Napoléon. Paris, 1828. 8 v. 8{o}.
=Ségur, P. P., Comte de=. Histoire et mémoires. Paris, 1873. 7 v.
8{o}.
=Ségur, P. P., Comte de=. Mélanges. Paris, 1873. 8{o}.
=Staël-Holstein, Madame de=. Considérations sur la Révolution
française: Ouvrage posthume publ. en 1818 par M. de Broglie et M. de
Staël. Nouv. éd. Paris, 1861. 2 v. 12{o}.
=Stedingk, C. B. L. C., Comte de=. Mémoires posthumes: rédigés sur des
lettres, dépêches et autres pièces authentiques, laissées à sa
famille, par le Gén. de Bjornstjerna. Paris, 1845-48. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Talleyrand-Périgord, C. M. de, Prince de Bénévent=. Extraits des
Mémoires de. Recueillis et mis en ordre par Madame la comtesse O ...
du C ... (le baron Lamothe-Langon), auteur des Mémoires d'une femme de
qualité. Paris, 1838. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Talleyrand-Périgord, C. M. de, Prince de Bénévent=. Mémoires, publ.
avec une préf. et des notes par le Duc de Broglie. Paris, 1891. 4 v.
8{o}.
=Talleyrand-Périgord, C. M. de, Prince de Bénévent=. Correspondance
diplomatique: le ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire. Avec
intr. et notes par G. Pallain. Paris, 1891. 8{o}.
=Thibaudeau, A. C.= Mémoires sur la Convention et le Directoire. 2e
éd. Paris, 1827. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Thibaudeau, A. C.= Mémoires sur le Consulat de 1799 à 1804, par un
ancien conseiller d'état. Paris, 1827. 8{o}.
=Thiébault, P. C. F. A. H. D., Baron=. Mémoires, publ. sous les
auspices de sa fille, Mlle C. Thiébault, d'après le MS. orig. par F.
Calmettes, 1769-1813. Paris, 1893-95. 5 v. 8{o}.
=Vauthier, G.= Essai sur la vie et les oeuvres de Népomucène
Lemercier. Toulon, 1886. 8{o}.
=Villèle, Comte de=. Mémoires et correspondance. Paris, 1888-90. 5 v.
8{o}.
=Vitrolles, E. d'Arnaud, Baron de=. Mémoires et relations politiques:
publ. par E. Forgues, 1814-1830. Paris, 1884. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Waldburg, G. T. v.= Nouvelle relation de l'itinéraire de Napoléon de
Fontainebleau à l'île d'Elbe. Trad. de l'allemand. Paris, 1815. 8{o}.
=Welschinger, H.= Le Duc d'Enghien, 1772-1804. Paris, 1888. 8{o}.
=Wiehr, E.= Napoleon und Bernadotte in Herbstfeldzuge 1813. Berlin,
1893. 8{o}.
=Wilson, Sir R. T.= Private diary during the campaigns of 1812-14;
from the invasion of Russia to the capture of Paris; ed. by H.
Randolph. London, 1861. 2 v.
NAPOLEON
_b._ HIS CORRESPONDENCE
=Davout, L., Prince d'Eckmühl=. Correspondance: ses commandements, son
ministère, 1801-1815. Avec intr. et notes par Ch. de Mazade. Paris,
1885. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Driault, E.= Napoléon à Finkenstein (avril-mai, 1807), d'après la
correspondance de l'empereur, les archives du ministère des affaires
étrangères, les archives nationales. In Revue d'histoire diplomatique,
tom. XIII, pp. 404-462. Paris, 1899.
=Du Casse, P. E. A.= Supplément à la correspondance de Napoléon I:
lettres curieuses omises par le comité de publication, rectifications.
Paris, 1887. 12{o}.
=Fiévée, J.= Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte. Paris, 1837.
3 v. 8{o}.
=Fournier, A.= Zur Textkritik der Korrespondenz Napoleons I. (Archiv.
für Österr. Gesch., vol. 93.) Vienna.
=Guillois, A.= Napoléon: l'homme, le politique, l'orateur, d'après sa
corresp. et ses oeuvres. Paris, 1889. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Lecestre, Léon=. Lettres inédites sur Napoléon Ier (an VIII-1815).
Paris, 1897. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Le Vasseur=. Commentaires de Napoléon; suivis d'un résumé des
principes de stratégie du Prince Charles. Paris, 1851-52. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Livre IX=. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France en 1815, avec
le plan de la bataille de Mont Saint-Jean. Paris, 1820. 8{o}. This is
the "Second manuscrit venu de Sainte-Hélène." It was attributed to
Napoleon and not repudiated by him.
=Marmottan, P.= Bonaparte et la république de Lucques. Paris, 1896.
12{o}.
=Mauduit, H. de=. Les derniers jours de la grande armée; ou,
Souvenirs, documents, et correspondance inédite de Napoléon en 1814 et
1815. 2 éd. Paris, 1847-48. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Commentaires. Paris, 1867. 6 v. 4{o}.
=Napoleon I=. Confidential correspondence with his brother Joseph.
Sel. and tr. with notes from the "Mém. du roi Joseph." New York, 1856.
2 v. 12{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Correspondance. Publ. par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon
III. Paris, 1858-1870. 32 v. 8{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Correspondance militaire, extrait de la corresp.
générale. Paris, 1876-77. 10 v. 12{o}.
=Napoléon I=. Lettres à Joséphine et lettres de Joséphine à Napoléon
et à sa fille. Paris, 1833. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Lettres inédites de. (An VII-1815.) Paris, 1897. 2 v.
8{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Letters to Caulaincourt. Published by A. Vandal in the
"Revue bleue," mars--avril, 1895.
=Napoleon I.= New letters omitted from the edition publ. under the
auspices of Napoleon III. Transl. by Lady M. Lloyd. London, 1897.
Heinemann.
=Napoléon I.= Oeuvres littéraires. Publ. d'après les originaux et les
meilleurs textes, avec une intr., des notes historiques et littéraires
et un index par T. Martel. Paris, 1888. 4 v. 12{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Oeuvres litt. et politiques. Nouvelle éd. (Ed. par P.
Lacroix.) Paris, 1840. 18{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Recueil, par ordre chronologique, de ses lettres,
proclamations, bulletins, discours sur les matières civiles et
politiques, etc., formant une histoire de son règne, écrite par
lui-même et accompagnée de notes historiques par M. Kermoysan. Paris,
1853-1865. 4 v. 12{o}.
=Napoleon I.= Selection from his letters and despatches. With explan.
notes by D. A. Bingham. London, 1884. 3 v. 8{o}.
=Napoléon I.= Opinions sur divers sujets de politique et
d'administration recueillies par un membre de son conseil d'état
(B{on} Pelet) et récit de quelques événements de l'époque. Paris,
1833. 8{o}.
=Pelet de la Lozère, J.= Opinions de Napoléon sur divers sujets de
politique et d'administration, recueillies par un membre de son
conseil d'état et récit de quelques événements de l'époque. Paris,
1833. 8{o}.
=Sassenay, Marquis de=. Napoléon I et la fondation de la République
Argentine. Jacques de Liniers et le marquis de Sassenay (1808-1810).
Paris, 1892. 12{o}.
=Talleyrand-Périgord, C. M. de, Prince de Bénévent=. Correspondance
avec le Premier Consul pendant la campagne de Marengo. Publiée par le
Comte Boulay de la Meurthe. Extrait de la "Revue d'histoire
diplomatique." Laval, 1892. 8{o}.
=Talleyrand-Périgord, C. M. de, Prince de Bénévent=. Lettres inédites
à Napoléon (1800-1809), publ. d'après les originaux conservés aux
archives des affaires étrangères. Avec une intr. et des notes par P.
Bertrand. 2e éd. Paris, 1889. 8{o}.
NAPOLEON
_c._ HIS FAMILY
=d'Arzuzon, C.= Hortense de Beauharnais. 12{o}. Paris, 1897. Lévy.
=d'Arzuzon, C.= Mme Louis Bonaparte. 8{o}. Paris, 1901. Lévy.
=Aubenas, J. A.= Histoire de l'Impératrice Joséphine. Paris, 1857-58.
2 v. 8{o}.
=Beauharnais, Eugène de=. Mémoires et correspondance politique et
militaire. Edited by A. du Casse. 10 v. Paris, 1858-60.
=Becker, A.= Der Plan der zweiten Heirat Napoleons. In Mittheilungen
des Instituts für oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung, tom. 19, pp.
92-156. Innsbruck, 1898.
=Du Casse, P. E. A.= Les rois frères de Napoléon I; documents inédits
relatifs au premier Empire. Paris, 1883. 8{o}.
=Ducrest=. Mémoires sur l'Impératrice Joséphine. Paris, 1828. 2 v.
8{o}.
=Durand, Madame=. Napoleon and Marie-Louise (1810-14). A memoir.
London, 1886. 12{o}.
=Herisson, M., Comte de=. Le cabinet noir: Louis XVII, Napoléon,
Marie-Louise. 14 éd. Paris, 1887. 12{o}.
=Lamothe-Langon, B{on} E.L. de=. Napoléon, sa famille, ses amis, ses
généraux, ses ministres et ses contemporains; ou, Soirées secrètes du
Luxembourg, des Tuileries, de Saint-Cloud, de la Malmaison, de
Fontainebleau, etc., par M. le ... ex-ministre de S.M. Impériale et
Royale. Paris, 1840. 5 v. 8{o}.
=Marie-Louise=. Correspondance, 1799-1847. Lettres intimes et inédites
à la comtesse de Colloredo et à Mlle de Poutet, depuis 1810 comtesse
de Crenneville. Paris, 1887. 18{o}.
=Marmottan, P.= Elisa Bonaparte. 12{o}. Paris, 1898. Champion.
=Masson, F.= Napoléon et sa famille. (1769-1802.) Paris, 1896. 8{o}.
=Mémoires= sur l'Impératrice Joséphine, ses contemporains, la cour de
Navarre et de la Malmaison (par Mme G.D. Bochsa, nièce de Mme de
Genlis). Paris, 1828. 3 v. 8{o}. (Attribués par M. Delacourt à Mme
Durand.)
=Méneval, C.F., Baron de=. Napoléon et Marie-Louise: souvenirs
historiques. 2 éd., cor. et augm. Paris, 1844-45. 3 v. 12{o}.
=Montesquiou, Abbé de=. Le divorce de Napoléon et l'abbé de
Montesquiou. Auch., 1895. 8{o}.
=Turquan, J.= Souveraines et grandes dames. L'Impératrice Joséphine
d'après les témoignages des contemporains. Paris, 1896. 16{o}.
=Welschinger, H.= Le divorce de Napoléon. Paris, 1889. 12{o}.
=Wertheimer, E.= Die Heirat der Erzherzogin Marie Louise mit Napoleon
I. Wien, 1882.
NAPOLEON
_d._ HIS MARSHALS AND GENERALS. See also MEMOIRS
=Berthier, Marshal=. Life. by Gen. Derrécagaix (Part I, to 1804).
Paris, 1894.
=Bessières, Marshal=. By A. Rabel. Paris, 1903.
=Blocqueville, A.L. d'Eckmühl=. Le Maréchal Davout, Prince d'Eckmühl,
raconté par les siens et par lui-même. Paris, 1879-80. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Davout, Marshal=. Correspondance (1801-05). Edited by C. de Mazade. 4
v. Paris, 1885.
=Desaix, General=. By J. Desaix and La Folliot. Paris, 1879.
=Dumas, Général Comte M.= Souvenirs (1770-1836). Edited by his son. 3
v. Paris, 1839.
=Goecke, R.= Das Grossherzogth. Berg unter Joachim Murat, Napoleon I
u. Louis Napoleon, 1806-1813. Ein Beitrag zur gesch. der französ.
Fremdherrschaft auf dem rechten Rheinufer. Meist nach den Acten d.
Düsseldorfer Staats-Archivs. Köln, 1877. 8{o}.
=Grouchy, Marshal=. Mémoires. Edited by the Marquis de Grouchy. 5 v.
Paris, 1873-74.
=Jourdan, Marshal=. Mémoires militaires. 2 v. Paris, 1899.
=Lefebvre, Marshal=. By J. Wirth. Paris, 1904.
=Kläber, H.= Leben und Thaten des französischen Generals J.B. Kléber.
Dresden, 1900.
=Maret, Marshal=. Life, by A. A. Ernouf. Paris, 1891.
=Moreau, J. V.=, Vie politique, militaire et privée du Général. By A.
de Beauchamp. Paris, 1814.
=Martha-Beker, F., Comte de Mons=. Études historiques sur le général
Desaix. Clermont-Ferrand, 1852. 8{o}.
NAPOLEON
_e_. HIS BIOGRAPHY
=Ashton, J.= English caricature and satire on Napoleon I. London,
1884. 2 v. New ed., 1888.
=Barni, J.= Napoléon I et son historien M. Thiers. Paris, 1865. 12{o}.
=Batjin, N.= Histoire de l'Empereur Napoléon Ier. London, 1867. 2 v.
8{o}.
=Baudus=. Études sur Napoléon. Paris, 1841. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Belloc, Mme. L. Swanton=. Bonaparte et les Grecs. Paris, 1826. 8{o}.
=Beyle, H.= (=Stendhal=, _pseud._). Vie de Napoléon: fragments. 2 éd.
Paris, 1877. 12{o}.
=Böhtlingk, A.= Napoléon Bonaparte: seine Jugend und sein Emporkommen
(1769-1801). 2 Ausg. Leipzig, 1883. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Bois, M.= Napoléon Bonaparte, lieutenant d'artillerie à Auxonne; vie
militaire et privée. 12{o}. Paris, 1898. Flammarion.
=Bonaparte, N. Joseph C. P., Prince=. Napoleon and his Detractors. Tr.
and ed. with a biog. sketch and notes by R. S. de Beaufort. London,
1888. 8{o}.
=Bondois, P.= Napoléon et la société de son temps (1793-1821). 8{o}.
Paris, 1895. Alcan.
=Bonnal de Ganges=. La génie de Napoléon. Paris, 1896. 2 v. 12{o}.
=Bourrienne, L. A. F. de=. Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte. Ed. with
pref. and notes by R. W. Phipps. New York, 1889. 4 v. 8{o}.
=Chalamet, A.= Guerres de Napoléon, 1800-07, racontées par des témoins
oculaires. Paris, 1895. 8{o}.
=Channing, W. E.= Remarks on the life and character of Napoleon
Bonaparte. Edinburgh, 1837. 16{o}.
=Chuquet, A.= La jeunesse de Napoléon. 3 v. 8{o}. Paris, 1897-99.
Colin. I. Brienne. II. La Révolution. III. Toulon.
=Colin, J.= L'Éducation militaire de Napoléon. Paris, 1900. Chapelot.
=Coquelle, P.= Napoléon et l'Angleterre, 1803-15. Paris, 1904.
=Coston, F. G., Baron de=. Biographie des premières années de Napoléon
Bonaparte, c'est-à-dire depuis sa naissance jusqu'à l'époque de son
commandement-en-chef de l'armée d'Italie, avec un appendice renfermant
des documents inédits ou peu connus postérieurs à cette époque. Paris,
1840. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Dayot, A.= Napoléon raconté par l'image. Paris, 1894. 4{o}.
=Des Armoises, O.= Avant la gloire. Napoléon enfant. Napoléon et ses
compatriotes. 18{o}. Paris, 1898. Librairie illustrée.
=Ducéré, E.= Napoléon à Bayonne. Bayonne, 1897. 8{o}.
=Dumouriez, C. F. D.= Jugement sur Bonaparte. (In his Mémoires, v. 4.)
=Fischer, A.= Goethe und Napoleon. Eine Studie. 8{o}. Frauenfeld,
1899. Huber. Aufl. mit Anhang: Weimar und Napoleon. 8{o}. Ibid. 1900.
Ibid.
=Fournier, A.= Napoleon I. Eine Biographie. Leipzig, 1888-89. 3 v.
8{o}. (Das Wissen d. Gegenwart. v. 67, 71, 72.) Eng. trans. New York,
1903. (Bibliography.)
=Gadobert, B.= La jeunesse de Napoléon I. De 1786 au siège de Toulon.
(Relation inédite.) 12{o}. Paris, 1897. Chamuel.
=Gallois, Léon=. Histoire de Napoléon d'après lui-même. 5e éd. Paris,
1829. 8{o}.
=Garsou, J.= Béranger et la légende napoléonienne. 8{o}. Bruxelles,
1897. Weissenbruch.
=Garsou, J.= Les créateurs de la légende napoléonienne. Barthélemy et
Méry. Bruxelles, 1899.
=Gautier, Paul=. Madame de Staël et Napoléon. Paris, 1903.
=Geoffroy de Grandmaison, C. A.= Napoléon et ses historiens. 12{o}.
Paris, 1896. Perrin.
=Germond de Lavigne, L. A. G.= Les pamphlets de la fin de l'Empire,
des Cent Jours et de la Restauration. Catalogue raisonné. Paris, 1879.
12{o}.
=Grand-Cartaret, J.= Napoléon en images. Estampes anglaises.
(Portraits et caricatures.) 4{o}. Avec 130 reproductions. Paris, 1895.
Firmin-Didot.
=Hazlitt, W.= Life of Napoleon Buonaparte. 2 ed. London, 1852. 4 v.
8{o}.
=Holzhausen, P.= Der erste Konsul Bonaparte und seine deutschen
Besucher. 8{o}. Bonn, 1900. Holzhausen.
=Jorissen, T.= Napoléon I et le roi de Hollande, 1806-1813, d'après
des documents authentiques et inédits. (La Haye, M. Nighoff.) Paris,
1868. 8{o}.
=Jung, Th.= Bonaparte et son temps (1769-1799), d'après les documents
inédits. Paris, 1880-81. 3 v. 12{o}.
=Lanfrent=. Histoire de Napoléon I. Paris, 1867-75. 5 v. 12{o}.
=Laurent, P. M.= History of Napoleon. London, 1840. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Laurent de l'Ardèche, P. M.= Histoire de l'Empereur Napoléon.
Illustrée par H. Vernet. Paris, 1849. Gr. 8{o}.
=Lemoine, A.= Napoléon Ier et les Juifs. 18{o}. Paris, 1900. Fayard.
=Lettow-Vorbeck, O. von=. Napoleons Untergang, 1815. Berlin, 1904.
=Lévy, M.= Bonaparte à Valence. 8{o}. Tournon, 1898. Boyer.
=Lévy, A.= Napoléon intime. 5 éd. Paris, 1893. 8{o}.
=Lockhart, J. G.= History of Napoleon Bonaparte. 3 ed. London, 1835. 2
v. 16{o}.
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=Paris= zur Zeit d. Kaiserkrönung. Nebst e Schilderung d.
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view of the French Revolution. Edinburgh, 1827. 9 v. 12{o}.
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NAPOLEON
IN ELBA
=Campbell, Sir N.= Napoleon at Fontainebleau and Elba. 1814-1815.
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=Waldburg, G. T. v.=, Ed. Napoleon Buonaparte's Reise von Fontainebleau
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FRANCE
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gouvernement consulaire et de la déportation qui eut lieu dans la
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qui out eu lieu en France et en Belgique pendant les Cent Jours.
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et à la bataille de Waterloo. Paris, 1829. 8{o}.
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magistrature, aux élections, à la liberté de la presse, de réunion et
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Cambacérès, second consul, ou révélations de plusieurs grands
personages sur l'ancien régime, le Directoire, l'Empire et la
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THE CODE
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GREAT BRITAIN
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King George III. London, 1840-45. 7 v. 8{o}.
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the Countess of Minto. London, 1874. 3 v. 8{o}.
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ITALY
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1835. 8{o}.
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=Graham, Colonel T.= Despatches on the Italian campaign of 1796-97.
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extraits des archives du Vatican et de celles de France. Paris,
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SWITZERLAND
=Amtliche Sammlung= der Acten aus d. Zeit d. Helvetischen Republik
(1798-1803) in Anschluss an d. Sammlung d. ältern. eidg. Abschiede.
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SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
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GERMANY, INCLUDING RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA
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der Rheinbundszeit. 8{o}. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1900. Baer.
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=Fichte=. Der geschlossene Handelstadt. Wien, 1801. 16{o}.
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=Förster, F.= Geschichte d. Befreiungskriege, 1813-15. Nach Theilweise
ungedruckten Quellen u. mündlichen Aufschlussen bedeutender
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guerre. Prenzlow-Lübeck. Paris, 1890. 8{o}.
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besond. Rücksicht auf Ostpreussen u. d. Königsberg'sche
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unter d. Gen. Reynier im Jahre 1812, aus Papieren d. Verstorbenen.
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im Herzen Deutschlands, 1807-1813. Nach den Quellen dargestellt
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=Goltz-Colmar, Frhr. v.= Rossbach u. Jena: Studien üb. die Zustände u.
das geistige Leben in der preuss. Armee während der Übergangszeit vom
XVIII zum XIX Jahrh. Berlin, 1883.
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u. nördlichen Frankreich bis z. Einnahme v. Paris, als Beitrage z.
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Ulanen-Regiments (Kaiser v. Russland) vom Jahre 1809-1859. Berlin,
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zur Gründung des deutschen Bundes. Berlin, 1854-57. 4 Thle. 2
veränderte u. vermehrte Aufl. Berlin, 1858.
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Sicilien. Anklagen u. Vertheidigg., mit Benützg. v. Schriftstücken d.
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Franzosen. Mit Benützg. v. Briefen an ihre Æltern u. v. Schriftstücken
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Tidsrummet, 1800-14. Kiobenhavn, 1873. 8{o}.
=Touchard-Lafosse, G.= Histoire de Charles XIV (Jean Bernadotte), roi
de Suède et de Norvège. Paris, 1838. 3 v. 8{o}.
EGYPT
=Abdurrahman Gabarti=. Journal pendant l'occupation française en
Égypte, suivi d'un précis de la même campagne par Mou'allem
Nicolas-el-Turki, tr. de l'arabe par A. Cardin. Paris, 1838. 8{o}.
=Bertrand, Général H. G.=, Ed. Guerre d'Orient. Campagnes d'Égypte et
de Syrie. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Napoléon dictés par
lui-même à Sainte-Hélène et publiés par le Gén. Bertrand. Paris, 1847.
2 v. 8{o}. Atlas fol.
=Boulay de la Meurthe, Comte=. Le directoire et l'expédition d'Égypte:
Étude sur les tentatives du directoire pour communiquer avec
Bonaparte, le secourir et le ramener. Paris, 1885. 12{o}.
=Copies= of original letters from the army of Gen. Bonaparte in Egypt,
with an Eng. tr. London, 1798-1800. 3 parts. 12{o}.
=La Jonquière, C.= L'Expédition d'Égypte (1798-1801). 2 v. 8{o}. Av.
cartes. Paris, 1900-1901. Charles Lavauzelle.
=Nakoula-el-Turk=. Histoire de l'expédition des Français en Égypte.
Tr. et publ. par Desgranges. Paris, 1839. 8{o}.
=Pièces= officielles de l'armée d'Égypte. 2e partie. Par., an IX.
8{o}.
=Simon, E. T.= Correspondance de l'armée française en Égypte,
interceptée par l'escadre de Nelson. Trad. en franç. Paris, an VII.
8{o}.
=Richardot, C.= Nouveaux mémoires sur l'armée française en Égypte et
en Syrie, ou la vérité mise au jour sur les principaux faites et
événements de cette armée, la statistique du pays, les usages et les
moeurs des habitants, avec le plan de la côte d'Aboukir à Alexandrie
et à la tour des Arabes. Paris, 1848. 8{o}.
=Villiers du Terrage, E. de=. Journal et souvenirs sur l'expédition
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8{o}. Av. cartes et gravures. Paris, 1899. Plon.
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THE BALKAN STATES
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1883. 8{o}.
=Boppe, A.= Documents inédits sur les relations de la Serbie avec
Napoléon I, 1809-14. Extrait de l'Otatchbina, livres XIX et XX.
Belgrade, 1888. 8{o}.
=Zinkeisen=. Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches. Gotha, 1859. 8{o}.
SAINT HELENA
=Abell, Mrs. L. E. B.= Recollections of the emperor Napoleon during
the first three years of his captivity. London, 1845. 12{o}.
=A Diary of St. Helena= (1816-1817). The journal of Lady Malcolm,
containing the conversations of Napoleon with Sir P. Malcolm, ed. by
Sir A. Wilson. 16{o}. London, 1899. Innes.
=Antommarchi, F.= Mémoires; ou, Les derniers moments de Napoléon.
Bruxelles, 1825. 2 v. 8{o}.
=Bingham, Gen. G. R.= Diary of Napoleon's Voyage to St. Helena.
Blackwood's Magazine, Oct., 1896.
=Forsyth, W.= History of the captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena: from
the letters and journals of Sir H. Lowe. London, 1853 3 v. 8{o}.
=Gourgaud, Gén. G. de=. Sainte-Hélène: Journal inédit de 1815 à 1818.
2 v. 8{o}. Paris, 1899. Flammarion. Trad. en allem. par H. Conrad.
8{o}. Stuttgart, 1901. Lutz. Coll. Memoiren-Bibliothek.
=Las Cases, E. A. D. M. J., Marquis de=. Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène;
ou, Jour. où se trouve consigné, jour par jour, ce qui a dit et fait
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=Lullin de Châteauvieux, J. F.= Manuscripts transmitted from St.
Helena by an unknown channel. New York, 1817. 12{o}.
=Lullin de Châteauvieux, J. F.= Manuscrit venu de Sainte-Hélène d'une
manière inconnue. 4 éd. Lond., 1817. 8{o}.
=Maitland, Sir F. L.= Narrative of the surrender of Buonaparte and of
his residence on board the _Bellerophon_. 2 ed. London, 1826. 8{o}.
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the island, incl. its geology, fauna, flora, and meteorology. London,
1875. 4{o}.
=Montchenu, Marquis de=. La captivité de Sainte-Hélène, d'après les
rapports inédits, par G. Firmin-Didot. Paris, 1894. 8{o}.
=Montholon, C{tesse} de=. Souvenirs de Sainte-Hélène (1815-1816);
publ. sous les auspices du V{te} du Couedic de Kergoualer, son
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Paul.
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at St. Helena. London, 1846-47. 4 v. 8{o}. American ed., Philadelphia,
1847. 8{o}.
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mémoires et documents écrits ou dictés par l'Empereur Napoléon, suivis
de lettres de MM. le grand maréchal C{te} Bertrand, le C{te} de Las
Cases, le Gén. B{on} Gourgaud, le Gén. C{te} Montholon. Paris,
1821-25. 12 v. 8{o}.
=Schlitter, H.= D. Berichte d. K. K. Commissars Bartholomäus v.
Stürmer aus St. Helena zur Zeit d. dortigen Internirung Napoleon
Bonapartes, 1816-18. 8{o}. Wien, 1886. 8{o}.
=Warden, W.= Conduct and conversations of Napoleon Buonaparte and his
suite during the voyage to St. Helena, and some months there. Albany,
1817. 12{o}.
INDEX
A
=Aachen=, _N.'s_ court at, ii. 329, 339, 350.
=Aalen=, the French position at, ii. 365.
=Abdullah Pasha=, routed at Esdraelon, ii. 71, 72.
=Aben, River=, military operations on the, iii. 207.
=Abensberg=, Lefebvre defeats the Austrians at, iii. 207;
Oudinot ordered to, 208;
battle of, 211.
=Aberdeen, Lord=, English envoy at Vienna, iii. 422.
=Abo=, Alexander's hint to Bernadotte at, iv. 55.
=Aboukir=, battle of, ii. 77-80, 97;
trophies from, deposited at the Invalides, 147.
=Aboukir Bay=, battle of, ii. 62, 63.
=Abrantès=, Junot at, iii. 121.
=Abrantès, Duchesse d'=, friendship with _N._, i. 178, 283.
=Absolutism=, its growth in Europe, i. 67;
its decline and abolition, 106-110, 119, 151;
iv. 162, 250, 292.
=Academy, The=, ordered to occupy itself with literary criticism,
iii. 26.
=Acken=, military operations near, iv. 21, 22, 25.
=Acqui=, military operations at, i. 354.
=Acre=, Phélippeaux at, i. 65;
siege of, ii. 47, 70-76;
the key of Palestine, 73;
relief expedition from Constantinople to, 73-75;
parley between Phélippeaux and _N._ at, 79;
compared with Smolensk, iii. 340.
=Act of Mediation, the=, ii. 234.
=Acton, Sir J. F. E.=, rule of, in Naples, ii. 357.
=Adam, Albrecht=, on the French advance into Russia, iii. 337.
=Adam, Sir F.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 209.
=Adda, River=, military operations on the, i. 359, 381;
ii. 172.
=Addington, Henry=, succeeds Pitt in the ministry, ii. 208;
negotiates for peace, 210;
belief in the peace of Amiens, 213;
holds England to be arbiter of the Continent, 263;
Continental policy, 263, 266, 267;
appoints Lord Whitworth ambassador to Paris, 266;
his influence undermined by Pitt, 292;
driven from power, 337.
=Addison, Joseph=, on England's insular position, ii. 263.
=Additional Act, the=, iv. 160, 161, 166.
=Aderklaa=, Austrian advance through, iii. 219.
=Adige, River=, military operations on, i. 371, 379, 383-391,
406-414, 434, 442;
ii. 87, 91, 193, 368;
iii. 201;
iv. 39;
cession to Austria of lands on, ii. 21;
boundary of the Cisalpine Republic, 21;
boundary of Austria in Italy, 193;
Eugène to collect troops on, 362.
=Adrial, M.=, member of the council of state, ii. 222;
reviser of the Code, 222.
=Adriatic Sea=, _N._ threatens to seize, i. 404;
French fleet in, ii. 18;
cession to Austria of lands on, 21;
marriage of, 24;
_N.'s_ control of, iii. 110;
the highway to India, 111.
=Æetes=, _N._ likened to, iv. 387.
=Æneid=, _N.'s_ notes on the, iv. 232.
=Afghanistan=, projected rising against England in, iii. 21.
=Africa=, proposed military operations in northern, iii. 114;
the partition of, iv. 298.
="Agamemnon," the=, at siege of Bastia, i. 260; ii. 62.
"=Agathon=," iii. 175.
=Agricultural laborers=, condition at outbreak of the Revolution,
i. 102, 105, 109.
=Agriculture=, encouragement of, ii. 220.
=Aigues-Mortes=, the canal of, ii. 349.
=Aisne, River=, military movements on the, iv. 77, 93.
=Aix=, Fesch at, i. 44;
_N._ at, 141; iv. 139, 154;
arrest of Corsican commissioners at, i. 204;
_N.'s_ sickness at, iv. 139;
bitter feeling against _N._ at, 138, 154.
=Ajaccio= made a seat of government, i. 25;
the Bonaparte family in, 26-35;
_N._ at, 81-90, 118, 128, 135, 159, 193, 203 prepares plans for
its defense, 91;
political parties in, 116;
patriotic schemes, 118;
_N._ assumes leadership in, 118;
the democratic club at, 118, 123, 127, 128, 145, 184;
withdrawal of French troops from, 121;
reorganizing the municipal government, 123, 127;
attack on _N._ in, 128;
disorders in, 128-130, 166-172, 180, 191;
claims to be capital of Corsica, 134;
political movements in, 163-170;
election of officers in, 165, 166;
popular feeling against _N._ in, 170, 171;
embarkation of Sardinian expedition at, 191;
_N._ demands allegiance to France from, 199;
_N.'s_ plot against the citadel at, 201-209;
expedition from St. Florent against, 204-207;
outburst against the Bonapartes in, 205;
_N.'s_ cave at, 210;
weakness of, 257;
_N.'s_ last visit to, ii. 82.
=Albania=, _N._ offers the country to England, ii. 404.
=Albuera=, battle of, iii. 289.
=Albufera, Duke of=. _See_ =Suchet=.
=Alessandria=, opening of the road to, i. 257;
military operations near, 352;
in French hands, 373;
Melas rallies his army at, ii. 174, 177;
topography of the country, 177, 178;
Melas retires to, 180;
_N._ concedes to the allies at Châtillon, iv. 87.
=Alexander I=, succeeds Paul I, ii. 210;
waives claim to Malta, 210;
liberates English ships, 210;
his bloody title to the throne, ii. 210, 317; iii. 36, 37; iv. 114;
abandons the neutrality policy, ii. 263;
personal relations between _N._ and, 263; iii. 34, 37, 40, 43,
52-53, 64, 73, 97, 105, 107, 116, 118, 248, 255, 310, 408, 411;
pacification of, ii. 265;
ruptures diplomatic relations with France, 311;
animus toward France, 330;
greed for Oriental empire, 330, 331, 347, 348, 357, 406, 418;
iii. 33, 176, 236, 245; iv. 67;
attitude on the death of Enghien, ii. 330, 348;
demands indemnity for King of Sardinia, 330;
_N.'s_ words of warning to, 347;
demands indemnity for Piedmont, 348;
undertakes peace negotiations, 356;
his scheme of redistribution of Europe, 355;
England's negotiations with, 355;
character and personality, 356; iii. 41-43, 117, 171, 310, 351,
420; iv. 6, 68, 132;
recalls his peace envoy, ii. 357;
brings Prussia into the coalition, 376, 377;
at Berlin, 376, 377;
relations with Frederick William III, 377; iii. 57, 107, 195;
prefers one of Paul I's assassins, ii. 380;
at Olmütz, 380;
_N._ opens negotiations with, 380;
forces the battle of Austerlitz, 382;
after the battle, 389;
deserts Francis I, 390;
interview with _N._, 391;
retreats to Poland, 391;
evacuates Naples, 405;
conscienceless concerning territories of others, 405;
breaks off negotiations with _N._, 418;
rejects the Oubril treaty, 421;
uncertain attitude, 420;
_N.'s_ insinuations concerning Queen Louisa and, iii. 57;
_N.'s_ doubts about his movements, 1;
activity after Jéna, 1;
offers rewards for French prisoners, 9;
devotion of the army to, 9, 10;
interest in Constantinople, 28;
meeting with _N._ at Tilsit, 34 et seq., 49, 53;
_N.'s_ proposals to, 36;
reminded of Paul I's death, 36;
invited to make a separate peace, 36;
accepts _N.'s_ terms, 37;
promises to aid France against England, 41;
deserts Prussia, 42;
proposed visit to Paris, 51;
proposes a treaty with Turkey, 51;
on European politics, 51;
opinion of Louis XVIII, 52;
claims concessions from _N._, 55;
saves Silesia to Prussia, 56;
acquires Bielostok, 56;
refuses to seize Prussian territory, 62;
parting from _N._ at Tilsit, 63;
Savary's influence over, 64;
hostility of Russian society to, 64, 109, 118, 336;
enmity to England, 70;
_N._ proposes matrimonial unions to, 93, 179, 181, 247, 248;
coquets with English agents, 97;
effect of the treaty of Tilsit on, 99;
apprehensions at England's actions, 99;
seeks to abolish serfdom, 99;
difficulties of his position, 99;
demands reparation for Denmark, 100;
declares war on England, 102;
repudiates the agreement of Slobozia, 105;
keeps faith with _N._, 105;
holds _N._ to his promises, 106;
ambition to acquire the Danubian principalities, 105, 116, 117,
176, 248;
appoints Tolstoi to negotiate with _N._, 107;
declines _N.'s_ offers, 108;
essays to effect the liberation of Prussia, 108, 168;
continues his demands on _N._, 110;
_N._ seeks further interviews with, 113, 116;
court intrigue around, 115;
receives presents from _N._, 116;
seeks to acquire Finland, 115, 168, 176;
breaks off negotiations for interview with _N._, 116;
"stalemated," 117;
humiliation of, 117, 310;
Joseph seeks his consent to acceptance of the Spanish crown, 131;
uncertainty concerning _N.'s_ plans, 165;
approves _N.'s_ course at Bayonne, 166;
friendship with Caulaincourt, 165, 168, 248;
proposed second meeting with _N._, 166, 168, 169;
informed of the capitulation of Baylen, 166;
influence on Emperor Francis, 167;
rewon by _N.'s_ promises, 166;
remonstrates with Austria, 166, 168;
determines to exact the fruits of Tilsit, 168;
intellectual pretensions, 171;
meeting with _N._ at Erfurt, 172 et seq.;
dramatic incident at performance of "Oedipe," 172;
apparent success of his demands at Erfurt, 177;
hot words with _N._ at Erfurt, 177;
approves of _N.'s_ contemplated divorce, 181;
relies on _N._ to gratify his ambitions, 194;
at Königsberg, 193, 194;
modifies his tone to Vienna, 194;
neutrality of, 225;
gives no support to Francis, 236;
orders invasion of Galicia, 236;
his observance of Franco-Russian treaties, 238, 244;
advises peace, 239;
_N._ explains the treaty of Schönbrunn to, 245;
hesitates to betroth his sister to _N._, 247, 248;
fears the loss of Moldavia and Wallachia, 248;
chagrined at the Austrian war and its results, 249;
anxiety for a French alliance, 248;
attitude concerning _N.'s_ second marriage, 255, 316;
offers Norway to Sweden, 281, 314, 321;
discriminates against France in customs duties, 288;
action on _N.'s_ occupation of the North Sea coast, 287;
reserves his family rights over Oldenburg, 288;
refuses to accept Erfurt, 288;
liberal tendencies, 309;
friendship with Czartoryski, 309, 311, 383;
ambition for equality with _N._, iii. 310;
essays the rôle of European mediator, 309;
disgusted with the old dynasties, 309;
outwitted by _N._ in the Polish negotiations, 310 et seq.;
impending rupture with _N._, 310 et seq.;
rupture with _N._ over the Polish question, 311 et seq.;
refuses to restore the integrity of Poland, 312;
proposes to accept the crown of Warsaw, 311;
virtual declaration of war against France, 311;
hopes of the Poles in, 313;
_N._ offers the use of the "Moniteur" to, 315;
_N._ threatens action against, 314;
prepares for war, 315;
proves an untrustworthy ally, 316;
determines on defensive warfare, 316;
position as to the Continental System, 316, 328;
_N._ warns him of his military preparations, 318;
hints an offer of the French crown to Bernadotte, 321;
makes qualified alliance with Prussia, 320;
effect of his policy on Prussia, 320;
makes terms with Turkey, 321;
personal connection with the war of 1812, 328;
concessions by, 328;
ultimatum to France, 328, 329;
proposes counter-terms to _N._, 329;
demands better terms for Sweden, 330;
invited to Dresden, 331;
demands the evacuation of Prussia, 330;
ukase of December, 1810, 329;
his German advisers blamed, 336;
allays trouble at St. Petersburg, 326;
financial difficulties, 336;
military policy, 341;
replaces Barclay de Tolly by Kutusoff, 343;
his advisers, 351-352;
silent steadfastness, 351-352;
religious spirit, 351;
conduct after the capture of Moscow, 352;
determines to continue the war, 351;
friendship with Galitzin, 351;
treatment of French prisoners, 367;
makes terms with Prussia, 382;
goes to Vilna, 383;
project to become king of Poland, 384;
seeks alliances with Prussia and Austria, 384;
abandons the Polish idea, 384;
ambition to pose as liberator of Europe, 383;
relations with Stein, 385, 396;
in correspondence with York, 384;
negotiates treaty with Spain, July, 1812, 391;
Metternich seeks to embroil him with Bernadotte, 394;
advances against Eugène, 395;
favors annexation of Saxony by Prussia, 399;
importance of keeping him hostile to France, 415;
_N.'s_ attempt to negotiate with, 415;
secret meeting with Metternich, 415;
fatalism of, 420;
Francis seeks alliance with, 420;
jealousy of Austria, 424;
mediocrity in military affairs, iv. 6;
in military council at Trachenberg, 6;
battle of Leipsic, 28-34;
anxiety for the future of absolutism, 40;
distrust of his allies, 40;
Jacobinism of, 40;
dissatisfied with Frankfort terms, 40;
desires revenge for Moscow, 40;
checks Bernadotte's ambitions, 55;
encourages Bernadotte's ambition, 55, 57;
holds the balances in the coalition, 57;
ambition for European supremacy, 58;
predicts speedy entry into Paris, 61;
military blunder, 63;
designs to acquire Galicia, 67;
poses as a liberal, 68;
designs regarding Poland, 67;
desires to conquer France, 67;
forbids the restoration of Vaud to Bern, 68;
suspends the Congress of Châtillon, 70;
consents to re-opening the Congress, 72;
activity of, 88, 89;
prepares for the entry into Paris, 90;
terror-stricken at Arcis, 92;
attitude toward Austria, 98;
holds a military council, 98;
intrigues with Vitrolles, 98;
eagerness to annihilate _N._, 98;
violates armistice before Paris, 110;
orders an assault, 110;
fears _N.'s_ arrival at Paris, 110;
Talleyrand sends a "blank check" to, 113;
leads the allies into Paris, 113;
schemes for French government, 114;
the representative of legitimacy, 114;
presides at the council for peace, 114;
deceived by the Parisians' reception, 113;
approves the Bourbon restoration, 114;
Caulaincourt seeks audience of, 116;
Marmont's offer to, 119;
hears Talleyrand's remonstrance against the regency, 125;
presentation of _N.'s_ abdication to, 124, 125;
hatred for absolutism, 126;
hears of the defection of _N.'s_ army, 126;
revulsion of feeling in favor of the Empire, 126;
refuses to accept the abdication, 129;
generous impulses, 132;
proposes a home for _N._ in Russia, 133;
alleged indelicacy of his visit to the Empress at Rambouillet, 135;
boast as to his servants, 138;
protests to Talleyrand against violations of treaty obligations, 153;
determines to retain ascendancy in the coalition, 169;
converted to the legitimacy idea, 224;
besought for _N.'s_ release, 231;
correspondence with:
Galitzin, Prince, iii. 311;
George III, iii. 181;
Marmont, iv. 119;
Napoleon, iii. 111, 113, 165, 315, 350.
=Alexander the Great=, _N._ likened to, i. 423; iii. 319; iv. 292;
_N.'s_ admiration for, ii. 15, 47, 147, 157;
his work for civilization, 157; iv. 251, 292;
his ideal, iii. 319;
the cause of his undoing, iv. 261.
=Alexandria=, _N.'s_ views concerning, ii. 47;
Nelson seeks the Egyptian expedition at, 57;
_N.'s_ arrival at, 57;
capture of, 58;
the march to Cairo from, 59;
Adm. Brueys ordered to, 61;
_N._ at, 66;
arrival of the Rhodes expedition at, 77;
English fleet at, 79;
_N._ sails from, 81;
England's occupation of, 280.
=Alfieri, Vittorio=, sings of Italian freedom, ii. 232; iv. 39.
=Alien Act=, England's position with regard to, ii. 271.
=Alkmaar=, capitulation of the Duke of York at, ii. 93;
capitulation of, 141.
=Alle, River=, military operations on the, iii. 29, 30.
=Allemand=, retreat of the French through, iv. 99.
=Allenburg=, Bennigsen collects his troops at, iii. 31.
=Allix, J. A. F.=, at Auxerre, iv. 102;
battle of Waterloo, 201.
"=All the Talents=," the ministry of, iii. 46.
=Almeida=, siege and capture of, iii. 284;
retaken by the English, 289.
=Alpon, River=, military operations on the, i. 389, 391.
=Alps, the=, military operations in, i. 213, 412, 426, 433;
ii. 160-173, 186, 187;
the keys of, i. 342, 355;
French supremacy in, ii. 96;
Suvaroff's disasters in, 141;
Hannibal's passage of, 169;
road across the Simplon, 233;
France's "natural boundary," iv. 41.
=Alsace=, Austria driven out of, i. 273;
royalists in, ii. 301;
Duc d'Enghien's conspiracy in, 301, 305;
regulations for Jews in, iii. 77;
proposed cession of, to Austria, iv. 67.
=Alten, K. A. von=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 209.
=Altenburg=, peace negotiations at, iii. 237.
=Altenkirchen=, battle of, i. 385.
=Alvinczy, Gen. Joseph=, _N.'s_ operations against, i. 350;
commanding Austrian forces for relief of Mantua, 386-392;
defeats Masséna at Bassano and Caldiero, 389;
operations against Verona, 389-392;
retreats from Caldiero, 390;
operations on the Adige, 406-414;
the Rivoli campaign, 406 et seq.;
defeat at Rivoli, 414;
flees to the Tyrol, 414.
=America=, disquiet of the English colonies in, i. 22;
precedent for France's aid to English colonies in, 23;
English measures against colonies in, 24;
Raynal's question concerning the discovery of, 137;
Marquis de Beauharnais in, 314;
collapse of French schemes of colonization in, ii. 237;
France looks to her possessions in, 280;
scheme for a Bourbon monarchy in, iii. 134, 141.
=American Embargo Act of 1807=, iii. 101-102, 274-275.
=Americas, Emperor of the Two=, iii. 120.
=Amiens=, the treaty of, ii. 211, 230-236, 243, 262-264, 266-274,
280, 284, 332, 351, 400; iii. 47; iv. 264.
=Amsterdam=, asked for loan of ten millions, ii. 154;
smuggled commerce of, iii. 265, 267;
Louis permitted to return to, 271;
removal of the capital to, 277;
march of French troops to, 276;
sends deputation to Paris, 380.
=Amurrio=, Gen. Victor at, iii. 183.
=Anarchists=, in France, ii. 134;
assassination schemes among, 239.
=Anarchy=, the seed of "a pure democracy," i. 397.
=Ancients, Council of the=, represent public sentiment, ii. 2;
members of, proscribed, 8;
Sieyès president of, 35;
join the Bonapartist ranks, 100;
give banquet to _N._ in St. Sulpice, 100;
share in Bonapartist plots, 101;
plots of the 18th Brumaire, 102 et seq.;
endeavor to postpone _N.'s_ dictatorship, 112;
pass vote of confidence in _N._, 114;
adopts the Consulate, 123.
=Ancona=, capture of, i. 422;
importance of, 423;
_N._ at, 423;
_N._ proposes to seize, 447;
rise of, 447;
fall of, ii. 142;
Austrian occupation of, 182;
seized by French troops, 396;
annexed to Italy, iii. 69, 118.
=Andalusia=, Dupont advances toward, iii. 156;
withdrawal of troops from, 188;
Soult ordered to, 286.
=Andernach=, alteration of boundary at, ii. 21.
=Andréossy, Gen. A. F.=, service in Egypt, ii. 53;
accompanies _N._ on his return from Alexandria, 81;
action on the 18th Brumaire, 105;
ambassador to London, 277;
despatch from _N._ to, 284;
reports Austrian activity, iii. 21;
influence in Vienna, 23.
=Angély, Regnault de St. Jean d'=, dreads a new Terror, ii. 94;
member of the council of state, 152;
prophesies the undoing of France, iii. 325.
=Angerburg=, Lestocq at, iii. 8.
=Anghiari=, Provera crosses the Adige at, i. 410, 414.
=Anglas, Boissy d'=, quells riot at the National Convention, i. 283.
=Anglo-Saxon= spirit of civilization, iv. 254.
=Angoulême, Duchess of=, affronts Madame Ney, iv. 148.
=Angoulême, Duke of=, proclaims Louis XVIII, at Bordeaux, iv. 87.
=Anne, Grand Duchess=, mentioned for marriage with _N._, iii. 179, 181;
_N._ seeks her hand in marriage, 248, 250.
=Ansbach=, Bernadotte's movements in, ii. 365, 376;
ceded to Bavaria, 390;
Augereau commanding in, 416;
French violation of territory, iii. 59;
military movements near, iv. 35.
=Anselme, Gen.=, i. 191.
=Antibes=, recruits for _N.'s_ army from, iv. 155.
=Antilles=, scheme for population of the, ii. 236.
=Antommarchi, Dr. F.=, assists _N._ on his history, iv. 232;
_N.'s_ physician, 232.
=Antonelli, Cardinal=, diplomatic duel with Portails, ii. 346.
=Antraigues, Comte d'=, exposes Pichegru's treachery, ii. 5, 6;
furnishes pen portrait of _N._, 28, 29.
=Antwerp=, commercial key to central Europe, iv. 42;
_N._ "loses his crown for," 42;
refused to France by the allies, 67;
_N._ refuses to give up, 74;
_N._ concedes, to the allies, 87.
=Aosta=, arrival of Lannes at, ii. 171.
=Apennines=, military operations in the, i. 243, 352, 374; ii. 93.
=Apolda=, military movements near, ii. 432.
=Apollonius of Tyana=, _N._ compares Jesus Christ with, ii. 206.
=Aqua tofana=, plot to poison _N._ with, i. 418.
=Arabia=, _N.'s_ attention turned toward, i. 78, 95.
=Aragon=, French occupation of, iii. 155;
military government of, 279;
captured by Suchet, 289;
French possession of, 377.
=Aranjuez=, the revolution at, iii. 135-144;
Charles IV's court at, 135, 136, 138.
=Arc de Triomphe=, erection of the, iii. 74.
=Arch-Chancellor of State=, creation of the office of, ii. 322.
=Arch-Chancellor of the Empire=, creation of the office of, ii. 322.
"=Archive Russe=," cited, i. 216.
=Arch-Treasurer=, creation of the office of, ii. 322.
=Arcis-sur-Aube=, Blücher advances on, iv. 58;
_N._ moves to, 85-88;
battle of, 86, 92, 93;
proposed concentration of the allies at, 89;
retreat of the French from, 93;
_N.'s_ retreat from, 95;
French capture of, 96.
=Arcole=, _N._ at, i. 393;
the lessons of, 394;
battle of, 389, 390, 399; ii. 140.
=Ardennes Mountains=, proposed boundaries for Germany, iii. 320;
military operations in the, iv. 170.
=Ardon=, loss of, iv. 79.
=Aremberg, Duke of=, marries Mlle. Tascher de la Pagerie, iii. 132.
=Arena, Joseph=, success of, in Isola Rossa, i. 119;
member of the National Assembly, 133;
banished to Italy, 162;
influence of, 233;
charged with conspiracy, ii. 235;
execution of, 241.
=Arenberg=, member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403.
=Argenson, Comte d'=, suggests the Suez Canal, ii. 46.
=Argenteau, Gen.=, defeated at Dego and Montenotte, i. 353.
=Aristocrats=, guillotining the, i. 251;
under the régime of the First Consul, ii. 258.
=Arles=, the canal of, ii. 349.
=Armed neutrality=, the, ii. 209-212;
Russia abandons the, 263.
=Army= (French), its relation to the throne, i. 67;
demoralization and discontent in, and desertions from, 67-69, 96,
112, 142, 173; iii. 4, 5, 224, 290, 291, 323, 326, 342, 360,
365, 372, 383, 402-404, 411, 412; iv. 4, 7, 12, 13, 19, 20, 22,
36, 62, 63, 69, 73, 83, 99, 101, 118, 122, 146, 147;
changes in the, i. 141-143;
compulsory service, 142, 143, 213;
reorganization of the, 149, 158, 159, 164;
regulations, 287;
political sentiments in, and influence of, 305, 347, 348, 426;
ii. 4, 5, 102, 103, 235; iv. 118, 126;
_N.'s_ relations with, care for, and reliance on, i. 362, 365,
366; ii. 29, 140, 153, 196, 248, 318, 361, 408; iii. 50, 325,
379, 380, 386, 387; iv. 50, 59, 123, 131, 137; 219, 248, 249,
255, 259, 260;
its prestige weakened by 18th Fructidor, ii. 22;
its mainsprings of action, 37;
importance of _N.'s_ securing its adhesion, 102;
_N.'s_ manifestos to, 159, 160;
contempt for the Concordat, 217;
quartered in foreign countries, 141;
disappearance of discontent in the, 318;
creation of marshals of France, 321;
conciliating the, 323;
its leaders, 364;
effect of Trafalgar on, 376;
effect of Austerlitz on, 394;
the army chest, 409, 410; iii. 295;
change in the personnel of the, 3;
venality of contractors, 4, 5;
improving the commissary, 7;
strengthening the, 22;
censorship of correspondence from the, 25;
founding of military factories, 25;
morale after Eylau, 45;
_N.'s_ exhibitions of, to the Czar, 50;
pension system, 87;
military schools, 91;
its lust for sack and booty, 155, 224;
over-confidence in, 231;
the cantinière of Busaco, 291;
discipline in Spain, 292;
"Marshal Stockpot's" deserters, 291;
expense of maintenance, 295, 305;
its equipment for the Russian campaign of 1812, 333;
_N.'s_ address to, before the Russian campaign, 334;
sufferings in Russia, 337, 357 et seq.;
vitality, 374;
wrath at _N.'s_ desertion, 375;
scheme for supporting, 388;
quality of the new (1813), 401;
juvenile soldiers in, iv. 4, 5, 21;
corruption in the, 5;
lack of pay for, 5;
effect of long campaigning on the generals, 7;
dwindling numbers of, 20;
dearth of military supplies, 50;
ambition among the minor generals, 118;
revival of Bonapartist feeling among the, 148;
returns to _N.'s_ standard, 158;
reorganization of, 165;
its morale at Waterloo, 198;
_N.'s_ farewell address to the, 219. _See also_ =Conscription=.
=Army of Catalonia=, service on the Rhine, iv. 55.
=Army of Egypt=, advances on Syria, ii. 68, 69;
abandoned by _N._ in Egypt, 80;
Adm. Bruix sent to relieve the, 79;
its desolate plight, 80, 81.
=Army of England, the=, creation of, ii. 24;
_N._ general of, 24, 35;
on the watch at Boulogne, 48;
the right wing of, 51;
strength, 290, 291;
ordered to march to the eastward, 362.
=Army of Helvetia=, incorporated into the Army of the Rhine, ii. 140.
=Army of Holland=, freed for active service, ii. 146.
=Army of Italy=, equipment of the, i. 196;
campaign in the Alps, 213;
_N.'s_ service with and command of, 216, 224, 237, 255, 318-22, 342;
question of its sustenance, 239;
strength and organization, 240, 241;
_N.'s_ plans for the, 245;
Corsicans in the, 252;
_N.'s_ monograph on, 288;
promised booty, 339, 340, 344;
the question of its employment, 342, 343;
joined to that of the Pyrenees, 343;
destitution of, 344;
strength (1796), 346;
pillage in the, 351;
reinforced from Vendée, 387;
popularity of, 419;
growing arrogance of the, ii. 4;
reinforced by the Army of the Alps, 9;
speculations as to further employment, 32;
restrained from pillage, 42;
Moreau's service with, 72;
division of, and disaster, 87;
frauds in, 91;
commanded by Masséna, 140, 186;
scheme for raising money for, 154;
_N.'s_ manifesto to, 159, 160;
its line of operations, 160;
service on the Rhine, iv. 55.
=Army of Silesia=, contemplated movement against, iv. 24;
contemplated movement of, 25.
=Army of the Alps=, Napoleon's plans for the, i. 245;
combined with Army of Italy, ii. 9.
=Army of the Danube=, under command of Jourdan, ii. 72.
=Army of the East= (Allies), iv. 3.
=Army of the Elbe=, formation of, iii. 393.
=Army of the Interior=, the, i. 298;
_N._ made second in command, 305;
_N._ reorganizes, 308;
1796, 345;
commanded by Augereau, ii. 7.
=Army of the Main=, formation of the, iii. 393.
=Army of the Netherlands=, service on the Rhine, iv. 55.
=Army of the North=, conquers the Austrian Netherlands, i. 273;
in 1796, 347;
operations on the Rhine, 434;
Barras's schemes in regard to, ii. 6.
=Army of the North= (Allies), in Brandenburg, iv. 3;
contemplated movement against the, 24.
=Army of the Pyrenees=, transferred to Maritime Alps, i. 342;
joined to that of Italy, 344;
service on the Rhine, iv. 55.
=Army of the Reserve=, ordered to Italy, ii. 163, 164;
expected to attack Melas, 170;
crosses the Alps, 169-173.
=Army of the Rhine, the= (French), _N._ seeks to join, i. 216;
_N._ fails of admission, 224;
commanded by Citizen Beauharnais, 314;
the question of its employment, 342;
fails to support _N._ in Italy, 435;
destitution of, ii. 6;
Augereau commander of, 7;
disbanded, 35;
Moreau commanding, 140;
_N.'s_ manifesto to, 159;
contempt for the Concordat in, 235;
the San Domingo expedition selected from, 236;
_N.'s_ method of quelling opposition in, 235-237;
weakened to ensure success in Italy, 296.
=Army of the Rhine= (Archduke Charles's), i. 425.
=Army of the Sambre and Meuse=, wins battle of Fleurus, i. 273;
campaigning in the Alps, 425;
brought to Paris, ii. 7.
=Army of the South= (Allies), iv. 3;
pursues Murat, 26;
Augereau attempts to hinder, 94;
Francis joins, at Lyons, 97.
=Army of the Tyrol= (Austrian), retreats to head waters of the Enns,
iii. 216;
Archduke John ordered to join, 216.
=Army of the Var=, i. 191.
=Army of the West, the=, _N._ ordered to join, i. 263;
_N._ refuses to serve in, 279, 296;
under Hoche, 346;
reinforces the Army of Italy, 387;
freed for active service, ii. 146.
"=Army Organization=," _N.'s_ essay on, iv. 232.
=Arnault, A. V.=, reports _N.'s_ speech to Barras, ii. 107;
"Memoirs" of, iii. 298;
records interview between Mme. de Staël and _N._, 298.
=Arndt, E. M.=, member of the reform party in Prussia, ii. 416;
his war-cry of "Freedom and Austria," iii. 195;
inspires to German unity, 397.
=Arrighi=, Gen. J. T., wounded at Acre, ii. 76.
=Art=, _N.'s_ plunder of works of, i. 368, 423, 446;
revival of, ii. 259;
_N._ advises encouragement of, 347.
"=Art and History of War=," _N.'s_ essay on, ii. 340.
=Artillery=, _N.'s_ study and use of, i. 48; ii. 178;
condition in 1796, 329;
its use at Wagram, iii. 229;
use of, at Leipsic, iv. 28, 33.
=Artisan class=, at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 102.
=Artois, Count of=, leads emigrant royalists against France, i. 298;
returns to England, 304;
schemes for the restoration of, ii. 239;
complicity in the Cadoudal conspiracy, 298;
refrains from entering France, 301;
doubtful courage of, 301-303;
suspected of plotting in Paris, 303;
_N._ determines to seize, 302;
his plots in Paris, 311;
supposed capture of, iv. 104;
enters Paris, 132;
reception in Lyons, 156.
=Asia=, France's interest in, ii. 16;
_N.'s_ schemes of conquest in, 61;
Russia's ambition in, 154, 193;
England's vulnerability in, iii. 112;
proposed invasion of, 113;
_N.'s_ scheme to drive Russia into, 332;
the partition of, iv. 298.
=Asia Minor=, proposed military operations in, iii. 114.
=Aspern=, the advantage of position at, ii. 179;
battle of, iii. 218-225, 231, 232;
monument in churchyard of, 223;
losses at, 224;
military operations near, 226;
captured by the Austrians, 228.
=Assembly of Notables=, i. 105.
=Assyria=, the history of, iv. 293.
=Asti=, topography of country near, ii. 178.
=Astorga=, British troops at, iii. 186, 188;
_N._ at, 188, 196;
Ney at, 188.
=Astrakhan=, proposed Indian expeditions via, ii. 209.
=Asturias=, rebellion in, iii. 154;
flight of Blake into, 185.
=Asturias, Prince of=, leads revolt against Godoy, iii. 70;
conspiracy of his father against his succession, 71, 127;
arrest of, 72, 126;
proposed French matrimonial alliance for, 71, 125, 133, 144;
character, popularity, and following, 124;
seeks _N.'s_ aid, 125, 126;
mentions his mother's shame, 126;
commissions the Duke del Infantado, 126;
trial and release, 127;
pardoned by his father, 127;
Charles IV, abdicates in favor of, 136.
_See also_ =Ferdinand VII=.
=Astyanax=, the King of Rome likened to, iv. 91, 108.
=Atheists=, in the National Convention, i. 250.
=Athies=, capture and recapture of, iv. 80, 81.
=Atlantic=, _N.'s_ mastery of ports on the, iii. 264.
=Attila=, _N._ likened to, i. 443.
=Aube, River=, military operations on the, iv. 58, 60, 74, 85, 86,
91, 93, 96.
=Aubry, François=, royalist intrigues by, i. 278;
_N.'s_ vindictiveness toward, 287, 289.
=Auerstädt=, battle of, ii. 430-434;
Prussia's humiliation at, iii. 57;
Davout created Duke of, 86. _See also_ =Davout=.
=Augereau, Gen. P. C. F.=, a product of Carnot's system, i. 332;
general of division, Army of Italy, 345;
defeats Austrians at Millesimo, 353, 354;
at Lonato, 381;
battle of Bassano, 388;
at Verona, 388;
battle of Arcole, 380-391;
battle of Lonato, 393;
driven into Porto Legnago, 409;
the Rivoli campaign, 410, 414;
commanding Army of the Interior, ii. 7;
takes command in Paris, 7;
events of the 18th of Fructidor, 8;
commanding Army of the Rhine, 9;
opposes _N._, 35;
blunders in south-western Germany, 37;
commanding in the Pyrenees, 37, 44;
Jacobin candidate for supreme command, 94;
fails to attend banquet at St. Sulpice, 101;
offers services to _N._, 109;
position on the Main, 190;
dangerous position after Hohenlinden, 191;
at Concordat celebration at Notre Dame, 215;
victory at Castiglione, 323;
created marshal, 323;
plan of naval expedition for, 333;
commanding in Germany, 364;
exasperates the people of Ansbach, 416;
near Coburg, 428;
battle of Jéna, 429-431;
at Golynim, iii. 4;
strength in Poland, 7;
in the Eylau campaign, 13, 14-17;
wounded at Eylau, 17;
created Duke of Castiglione, 86;
income, 87;
service in Spain, 283;
in campaign of 1813, 402;
battle of Leipsic, iv. 32;
confronting Bubna at Geneva, 56;
sent to Eugène's assistance, 56;
waning loyalty of, 56, 59;
repulses Bubna from Lyons, 67;
moral exhaustion of, 72;
letter from _N._, 72;
driven back to Lyons, 81;
strength, 94;
incapacity, 94;
evacuates Lyons, 94;
_N.'s_ kindness toward, 94;
contrasted with Suchet, 94;
strength, March, 1814, 102;
available forces, 118;
transfers allegiance to Louis XVIII, 133, 138;
meeting with _N._ near Valence, 138;
alleges patriotism as cause of his desertion, 138;
attainted, 157;
_N.'s_ forgiveness for, 233.
=Augsburg=, military movements near, iii. 203, 205.
=Augusta of Bavaria=, marries Eugène de Beauharnais, ii. 399.
=Aujezd=, military operations at, ii. 388.
=Aulic Council=, i. 426, 430; ii. 160, 367.
=Austerlitz=, battle of, ii. 379 et seq., 423;
the lessons of, 391, 392; iii. 341;
"the sun of," ii. 392; iii. 343;
reception of the news in England, ii. 393;
meeting of the sovereigns after, iii. 38;
fruits of the battle, 109;
Talleyrand's policy after, 125;
_N.'s_ terms after, 164;
Alexander's pliableness after, 351;
the battle compared with that at Leipsic, iv. 37;
interview between Francis and _N._ at, 30.
=Austerlitz, Bridge of=, in Paris, iii. 74.
=Austin, John=, on the Napoleonic Code, ii. 223.
=Austria=, hampered by alliances, i. 22;
campaign against France, 65;
France declares war against, 172, 187;
relations (alliances and negotiations for mutual support) with
Prussia, 174; ii. 389, 414; iii. 225, 235, 320, 331;
captures Lafayette, i. 179;
effect of military successes, 194;
military operations against, in Piedmont, 213;
partition of Poland, 220, 425;
Masséna's campaign against, 243;
opening of hostilities against, 243;
enters Genoese territory, 245;
cessation of operations against, 261;
defeated at Weissenburg and Fleurus, 273;
driven out of Alsace, 273;
relations with England (alliances and negotiations with, and
subsidies from), 277, 434; ii. 156, 160, 187, 188, 351, 358,
369; iii. 104, 165, 194, 195, 198, 225, 422; iv. 76, 145, 164;
armistice between France and, i. 278;
French schemes against, 293;
defeated by Prussia, 325;
hostility to France, 325;
relations (alliances and negotiations for mutual support) with
Russia, 325, 425; ii. 45, 61, 72, 312, 355, 357, 360, 363;
iii. 178, 311, 328, 331, 385, 419;
question of military operations against, i. 342;
operations in Piedmont in 1794, 341;
plans for overthrow of, 346;
forces of, separated from Sardinians, 350;
_N._ dictates terms to, at Leoben, 350;
military operations in Lombardy, 352-362;
defeated at Montenotte, 353;
army separated from Piedmontese, 354;
crushed at Lodi, 360, 361;
violates Venetian neutrality, 361, 371;
treaty with Venice, 371;
outgeneraled by _N._ at Mantua, 372;
the system of cabinet campaigning in vogue in, 378;
interest in possession of Mantua, 379;
losses in campaign before Mantua, 383;
temporary cessation of hostilities between France and, 392;
France's interest in the humiliation of, 398;
military enthusiasm in, 406;
fourth attempt to retrieve position in Italy, 406;
Spain allied with France against, 421;
precarious condition of foreign relations, 424;
magnificence of her opposition to France, 426;
covets Venetian territory, 428;
reoccupies Triest and Fiume, 435;
England blamed for trouble between France and, 435;
treaty of Leoben, 436-441;
seeks to retain Modena, 270;
secures possession of Venetia, 437-442; ii. 38;
proposes to recognize the French republic, i. 439;
defeated by Hoche on the Rhine, 439, 440;
rupture of the coalition with England, 441;
_N._ offers Venice to, 446;
influence of _N._ in, 448;
desires restoration of the Milanese, 451;
schemes of European reorganization, 451; iii. 22, 41, 50, 109, 195;
Gen. Clarke's mission to, i. 451;
releases Lafayette, 457;
_N._ has free hand in negotiations with, ii. 7;
final negotiations with, 10;
activity of, 9;
treaty of Campo Formio, 19-21;
Carnot's desire for peace with, 19;
Venice seeks to continue war with, 24;
Congress of Rastatt, 27, 89, 191, 264;
humiliation of, 37, 265, 440; iii. 104, 211, 213, 251, 254-256;
attitude of Frederick the Great toward, ii. 41;
acquisition of Swiss territory, 40;
to be restrained from interference in Rome, 42;
declines reciprocity with France, 42;
favors secularization of ecclesiastical principalities, 41;
disturbed feeling in, 42, 43;
Bernadotte's embassy to, 42, 43, 51;
France's demands on, concerning the Bourbons, 43;
strained relations between France and, 43;
alliance with Turkey, 72;
violates the Helvetian Republic, 72;
relations (strained or hostile) with Prussia, 86, 264, 361;
iii. 21, 44; iv. 41, 57, 58;
scheme to dismember Bavaria, ii. 88;
military operations on the Adige, 91;
military operations on the Rhine, 91, 93;
joins the second coalition, 90, 136, 142, 143;
defeats Masséna at Zürich, and Joubert at Novi, 93;
incurs the ill-will of Paul I, 142, 193, 209;
holdings in Italy, 145;
duplicity with Russia, 145;
Russia incensed at, 154;
France's services to Prussia against, 154;
military situation at beginning of 1800, 160;
Moreau ordered to move against, 164;
system of tactics pursued by, 165;
defeated at Engen, 166;
successes in Italy, 170;
quality of her troops, 178;
battle of Marengo, 178-185;
negotiates for peace, 182, 187;
agrees to evacuate northern Italy, 182;
armistice between France and, 182, 188;
interest to abandon England, 187;
_N._ proposes general armistice to, 187;
seeks concessions in Italy, 189;
raises new troops, 188;
_N._ determines to prosecute the war with, 189;
position behind the Inn, 190;
signs peace of Lunéville, 192;
her line in Italy, as fixed at Lunéville, 193;
armistice of Steyer, 192;
battle of Hohenlinden, 192;
signs separate peace, 192;
loss of power, 194;
the spiritual principalities in, 193;
Russia's jealousy of, 194;
aspirations concerning Bavaria, 194;
ecclesiastical influence in, 264;
share in redistributions of 1802, 265, 266;
Ney's check on, 272;
proposed occupation of Malta by, 285;
_N.'s_ preparations for striking, 291;
truckles to France, 311;
withdraws troops from Swabia, 311;
acquiesces in creation of French empire, 320;
represented at _N.'s_ court at Aachen, 329;
_N.'s_ designs against, 334, 336, 347;
recuperating, 347;
pretext for war between France and, 352;
Francis's title and powers curtailed, 352;
the sanitary cordon, 355;
popular dislike of Russia in, 355;
Alexander's scheme for compensating, 355;
apprehensions of losing Venice, 357;
falls into _N.'s_ trap, 358;
army reforms, 358;
mobilizes troops, 358;
her ambitions, 358;
her disarmament demanded, 361;
_N._ threatens to march to Vienna, 361;
abused in Paris newspapers, 361;
declaration of war against, 362;
declares war against France, Sept. 3, 1805, 363;
strength, 363;
her line of defense, 365;
popular opinion of _N._ in, 366;
capitulation of Ulm, 367;
junction of troops at Marburg, 367;
outgeneraled by _N._, 377;
drives the Elector of Bavaria from Munich, 377;
battle of Austerlitz, 381 et seq.;
ill feeling between Russia and, 381;
threatened with loss of Venetia and the Tyrol, 389;
accepts _N.'s_ terms for an armistice, 389;
_N.'s_ scheme to crush, 390;
suspected bribery of Talleyrand by, 390;
pays war indemnity to France, 390;
cessions by, 390;
acquires Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, 391;
surrenders Venice to France, 390;
losses at Austerlitz, 392;
stripped of leadership, 394;
neutralization of her power, 402;
Francis I declares himself hereditary emperor, 404;
protector of Ragusa, 405;
demoralization of the army, 419;
rehabilitation of, 440;
neutrality between Russia and Turkey, 441;
anxiety concerning Polish lands, 444;
offer of Silesia to, 445; iii. 22;
resolves on neutrality, ii. 445;
Turko-Persian alliance against, iii. 20;
_N._ proposes alliance with, 21, 22;
hostile preparations, 21;
proposal for a new coalition, 21;
proposes to act as mediator, 22;
shrewd attitude of, 23;
throws troops on frontier of Galicia, 23;
omitted from the Continental Olympus, 41;
_N.'s_ object to humiliate, 44;
interest in Poland, 45;
partition of, 49, 55;
her position after Tilsit, 56;
proposed commercial war against England, 55;
offended dignity of, 65;
treaty of Fontainebleau, Oct. 10, 1807, 104;
outward subserviency to France, 104;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 104;
military reorganization of, 103, 164, 166, 198, 199;
proposed neutralization of, 113;
the situation in, 117;
awakening of the national spirit in, 137;
encouraged to revolt, 159, 163-165, 178;
effect of the Bayonne negotiations on, 163 et seq.;
hereditary rivalry with France, 164;
belligerent tone in, 165, 178, 193, 195;
necessity for her repression, 167;
_N._ and Alexander remonstrate with, 167-169;
_N._ proposes alliance with, 169;
to be held in check by Russia, 169;
compact between Russia and France against, 169;
Russia urged to occupy part of, 177;
transformation of, 192 et seq.;
the German movement in, 193;
opportunity to lead a revolt against _N._, 195;
failure of negotiations with France, 198;
change of plan of campaign, 198, 204;
Napoleonic ideas in, 200;
Archduke Charles's proclamations, 200;
intoxicated with success, 201;
the fifth war with, 202 et seq.;
her aggressions, 213;
extinguishment of her hopes in Italy, 215;
claims the battle of Aspern, 223;
losses at Wagram, 230;
plague in her army, 237;
to reduce her army, 238;
cession of territory, 239;
_N.'s_ terms of peace, 239;
_N._ contemplates alliance with, 238, 245, 249;
reduced to a second-class power, 239, 251, 254, 255;
desire to assassinate _N._ in, 240;
recognizes _N.'s_ acquisitions in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, 239;
joins the Continental System, 239;
_N._ chooses a matrimonial alliance with the House of, 246;
necessity of placating, 254;
good feeling toward France, 254;
democratic tendencies in, 256;
distribution of the lands taken from, 266;
brought into the Napoleonic system, 268;
bankruptcy of, 304;
alliance with France, 310, 311;
interest in stirring up strife between France and Russia, 313;
pro-Russian party in, 313, 314;
_N.'s_ reply to Francis's request for assistance, 314;
Alexander seeks the favor of, 316;
foments hostile feeling between Russia and France, 316;
seeks territorial aggrandizement at expense of Turkey, 316;
contemplates neutrality, 320;
overawed by _N.'s_ preparations, 320;
contributes troops to the French army, 320;
stipulates for territorial enlargement, 320;
furnishes troops for Russian campaign of 1812, 320;
agricultural distress in, 328;
acquires Galicia, 331;
attitude of her troops toward Russia, 342;
_N._ suspicious of, 382;
narrow escape at Essling, 383;
Alexander seeks alliance with, 384;
value of her alliance to France, 390;
Roman Catholic influence in, 390;
proposed surrender of Illyria to, 392, 407, 415;
hostility to _N._ in, 394, 395;
Saxony turns toward, 394, 399;
Metternich's diplomatic schemes for, 395;
refuses to enter coalition against France, 396;
_N._ offers to subsidize, 395;
_N._ seeks aid from, to check Kutusoff, 395;
proposes to act as mediator, 395, 407-411, 415, 416, 419, 420;
wooed for the coalition, 398;
secret agreement with Saxony, 399;
rejects _N.'s_ offer of Silesia, 400;
hostile neutrality of, 403;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 403;
pivotal in European politics, 403, 409, 411;
growing strength, 403, 419-423;
abandoned by Saxony, 407;
proposed surrender of Dalmatia to, 407;
proposed rectification of her western frontier, 407;
outwits _N._, 412, 424; iv. i, 13;
gathers troops in Bohemia, iii. 413-414;
the allies' reliance on, 415;
fear of _N._, 415;
Nesselrode demands her adherence to the coalition, 415;
aggrandizement by royal marriages, 416;
to be pledged never to side with France, 415;
proposed enlargement of, 416;
secret treaty of Reichenbach, 415, 418, 422;
throws off the mask of mediator, 419;
duplicity of, 419;
regeneration of, 419;
seeks to regain ascendancy in Germany and Italy, 423;
_N.'s_ agents in, 422;
_N._ attempts to bribe, 423, 424;
declares war, 423;
Hamburg and Triest offered to, 424;
takes the lead among the allies, iv. 6;
strength, 6;
_N._ seeks alliance with, 13, 17;
saved by Schwarzenberg from invasion, 18;
_N._ offers terms to, 21;
scheme to restore status of 1805, 22;
concludes alliance of Sept. 9, 1813, 22;
seeks to regain predominance in Italy, 30;
rise of her Prussian rival, 37;
desires peace, 41;
demands Italian territory, 41;
at the Congress at Frankfort, 41;
troops on the Rhine, 54-56;
forms alliance with Murat, 56;
the Czar's designs to check, 67;
violates Swiss neutrality, 68;
suspicious slowness of her movements, 68;
eager for an armistice, 70, 71, 75;
_N._ endeavors to separate Russia from, 75;
treaty of Chaumont, 76;
the triple alliance, 76;
attitude toward _N._, 89;
_N.'s_ dread of capture of the Empress by, 91;
party to the treaty of Fontainebleau (April, 1814), 133;
weight of her yoke in Italy, 143;
negotiates secret treaty with England and France, 145;
invited to take part in the coronation of the King of Rome, 157;
member of the Vienna Coalition, 164;
quota of troops, 164;
refuses help to France, 165;
the campaign of the Hundred Days, 170 et seq.;
claims the glory of annihilating _N._, 214;
claims the right of overseeing the imprisonment of _N._, 215;
loss of Italian territory, 300.
=Austria-Hungary=, the rise of, iv, 299, 300.
=Austrian Netherlands, the=, defeat of the French in, i. 172;
the revolutionary spirit in, 187;
Dumouriez's successes in, 194;
French conquest, of, 273;
surrendered to France, ii. 21.
_See also_ =Belgium=.
=Autun=, _N._ at, i. 30, 46, 48-50; iv. 157;
the Buonapartes at, i. 46;
Talleyrand bishop of, ii. 33.
=Auxerre=, military movements near, iv. 60;
Imperial forces at, 102;
Ney rejoins _N._ at, 157.
=Auxonne=, _N._ at, i. 94, 96, 111, 112, 141, 144-147, 223;
disturbances in, 111, 112, 152;
_N._ seeks to be retained at, 149.
=Avignon=, the Girondists at, i. 214;
_N._ arrives before, 214;
Jacobin siege of, 214;
_N.'s_ life at, 214, 215;
annexed to France, 422;
the Pope asks compensation for the loss of, ii. 216;
lost to the Pope at the peace of Tolentino, 326;
residence of Pius VII at, 391;
Augereau's neglected guns at, iv. 94;
plots to assassinate _N._ at, 138.
=Azanza, M. J. de=, King Joseph's Spanish minister at Paris, iii. 282;
=Azara, Chevalier J. N. de=, represents Spain at Amiens, ii. 262;
at the Tuileries, March 13, 1803, 283.
=Azores=, proposition to deport the Emperor to, iv. 145.
B
=Babylon=, the history of, iv. 293.
=Bacciocchi, Mme.=, literary coterie, ii. 258;
acquires the duchy of Lucca, 354.
_See also_ =Buonaparte, Marie-Anne-Elisa=.
=Bacciocchi, Pasquale=, marries Elisa Buonaparte, i. 322.
=Bachelu= in battle of Waterloo, iv. 199, 204.
=Bacon, Francis=, _N.'s_ study of, ii. 53.
=Badajoz=, Soult's capture of, iii. 286;
English siege and storming of, 289-291, 319.
=Baden=, violation of her neutrality, i. 179; ii. 331, 363;
makes peace with France (1796), i. 385, 450;
relations with Russia, ii. 266;
strengthening of, 266;
residence of the Duc d'Enghien in, 301;
French expedition to, 304;
news of the Duc d'Enghien's arrest in, 305;
friendly relations with France, 377;
acquires territory after Austerlitz, 391;
subservience to France, 394, 402;
created a separate kingdom, 398;
member of the Confederation of the Rhine, 403;
supplies contingent for _N.'s_ army, ii. 404; iii. 322;
allotment of Austrian lands to, 266;
turns from _N._ to the allies, iv. 40;
position in Germany, 298.
=Bagration, Gen. Peter=, holds Murat at Hollabrunn, ii. 379;
in battle of Austerlitz, 387;
in campaign of Eylau, iii. 14;
called in by Barclay de Tolly, 335;
movements on the Dnieper and Pripet, 336;
contemplated junction with Barclay, 336;
establishes communication with Drissa, 336;
driven east by Davout, 338;
junction with Barclay at Smolensk, 336, 338;
plan of junction with Barclay at Vitebsk, 338;
battle of Smolensk, 339.
=Bailly, Jean Sylvain=, mayor of Paris, i. 109.
=Balcombe, Mr.=, entertains _N._ at St. Helena, iv. 229.
=Balearic Isles=, _N._ offers them to England, ii. 404, 405.
=Balkan Peninsula=, Russia's ambitions in, iii. 310;
rescue of the people of, iv. 300.
=Baltic Sea, the=, England's operations in and on, ii. 209, 210;
iii. 24, 35, 36, 98, 117;
gateway of, 69;
Spanish military movements on, 149;
_N.'s_ mastery of ports on, 266;
efficient blockade of, impossible, 280.
=Baltimore=, Jerome Bonaparte's residence in, ii. 257.
=Bamberg=, Austrian troops at, ii. 365;
_N.'s_ military route through, 422;
concentration of troops in, iii. 203.
=Bank of England=, suspends specie payments, i. 456;
scarcity of money in, iii. 304.
=Bank of France=, organization of, ii. 135, 219;
the Récamiers and the, 411, 412;
compelled to lower its rate, iii. 74;
plethora of silver in, 304.
=Barbary=, plots of the pirates to seize _N._, iv. 150.
=Barbé-Marbois, F.=, proscribed, ii. 8;
minister of finance, 214;
state treasurer, 220;
minister of the treasury, 410.
=Barbets=, guerrilla bands of, i. 373.
=Barcelona=, French troops at, iii. 132;
Duhesme besieged in, 183;
besieged by Vives, 184.
=Barclay de Tolly, M. A.=, proposed movement against, iii. 335;
calls in Bagration, 335;
retreats to Drissa, 336;
junction with Bagration at Smolensk, 336-338;
plans to meet Bagration at Vitebsk, 338;
battle of Smolensk, 338-340;
takes stand behind the Uscha, 340;
retreats toward Moscow, 339;
charged with German bias, 342;
succeeded by Kutusoff, 343;
retained as military adviser, 343;
restored to chief command, 399, 410;
battle of Bautzen, 411;
with the Army of the South, iv. 3;
battle of Leipsic, 28;
advises pursuit of _N._, 98.
=Barère, Bertrand=, exiled, ii. 356.
="Bargain of Famine,"= the, i. 96, 101.
=Barham, Adm.=, naval administration of, ii. 370.
=Baring, Major=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 201, 204.
=Barnabe=, declares Brumaire illegal, ii. 235.
=Barras, Jean-Paul-François-Nicolas=, relations with _N._ and
influence on his career, i. 225, 236, 289, 293, 296, 299, 319,
329; ii. 22, 31, 35; iv. 220, 285, 288;
in siege of Toulon, i. 231;
opposes Robespierre, 251;
influence among the Thermidorians, 254;
leader of military committee of the Convention, 272;
a Dantonist, 289;
in social life, 290, 329;
commander-in-chief of Convention forces, 299;
claims the honors of the 13th Vendémiaire, 301, 303;
resigns his command, 305;
member of the Directory, 309, 332;
character, 309, 329; ii. 35, 91;
intimacy with Josephine Beauharnais, i. 315;
connection with _N.'s_ marriage, 317;
bribed by Venetian ambassador, 440;
dissatisfied with treaty of Leoben, 441;
learns of Pichegru's treachery, ii. 6;
plan to bring troops to Paris, 6;
clamors for peace, 19;
derides Carnot's suggestions, 19;
responsibility for the 18th Fructidor, 22;
responsibility for the 13th Vendémiaire, 22;
approves the treaty of Campo Formio, 24;
charged with tampering with Bernadotte, 43;
intrigue with _N._, Talleyrand, and Sieyès for a new constitution, 49;
suggests that _N._ assume a dictatorship, 49;
warns _N._ to leave France for Egypt, 52;
resignation and fall of, 101, 107, 115, 119;
_N.'s_ charges against, before the Ancients, 113.
=Barry, Mme. du=, relations with Talleyrand, ii. 33.
=Bar-sur-Aube=, military movements near, iv. 60, 74, 90, 96, 104;
narrow escape of Francis at, 95;
_N.'s_ march through, 104.
=Bar-sur-Ornain=, Oudinot at, iv. 103.
=Bartenstein=, French occupation of, iii. 12;
military movements near, 15;
treaty of, iii. 22, 23, 36.
=Barthélemy, F.=, member of the Directory, ii. 1;
imprisonment of, 8.
=Basel=, treaty of, i. 276; ii. 204; iii. 124;
alteration of boundary at, ii. 21;
republican propaganda in, 40;
invasion of France via, iv. 57, 58;
headquarters of the allies at, 66;
Schwarzenberg's communications with, threatened, 95;
tomb of Erasmus in, 247.
=Bassano=, defeat of Wurmser at, i. 384;
Alvinczy defeats Masséna at, 386, 387;
battle of, 386, 387;
creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396;
Maret created Duke of, iii. 87.
_See also_ =Maret=.
=Basseville, N. J. H.=, killed in Rome, i. 261, 375, 422.
=Bastia=, made a seat of government, i. 25;
_N._ at, 90;
radical influences in, 116;
patriot success in, 120;
tradition concerning _N.'s_ connection with events at, 120;
share in annexation of Corsica to France 122;
Paoli's return to, 125;
revolutionary movements in, 131;
declared the capital of Corsica, 134;
disorders in, 162;
_N._ sails from, May 2, 1792, 171;
_N._ flees to, 202;
under domination of Salicetti, 204;
French power in, 207;
imprisonment of Corsicans in, 252;
English capture of, 260;
Nelson at, ii. 62.
=Bastille, the=, destruction of, i. 108, 109, 158;
celebrations of the storming of, 174; ii. 195.
=Batavian Republic, the=, formation of, i. 276;
an appanage of France, 325;
naval defeat at Camperdown, ii. 38;
dependence on France, 38;
levy of troops and war material on, 38;
Anglo-Russian force forced to evacuate, 93;
loyalty to _N._, 146;
a new constitution for, 233;
regains colonies, 233, 262;
English efforts to discredit France in, 264.
_See also_ =Holland=; =Netherlands=.
="Battle of Dorking,"= ii. 290.
=Battle of Five Days=, iii. 210.
="Battle of the Nations,"= iv. 37.
=Bautzen=, battle of, iii. 410, 411; iv. 4;
fatal results of the French victory at, iii. 411;
_N._ moves toward, iv. 17;
the Young Guard ordered to, 17;
_N._ nicknamed from, 20;
boy soldiers at, 21;
the armistice after, 42.
="Bautzen Messenger-Boy,"= the, iv. 20.
=Bavaria=, treaty with France (1796), i. 450;
Austria's gaze on, 325; ii. 194, 358, 363;
Austria's scheme to dismember, 88;
Suvaroff driven from Italy to, 142;
Moreau ordered to drive the Austrians into, 164;
the campaign in, 190 et seq.;
negotiations with France, 211;
acquires Passau, 266;
relations with Russia, 266;
Alexander I's scheme of giving to Austria, 356;
_N._ threatens to enlarge, 361, 390;
Austrian troops in, 365;
the Elector driven from Munich by Austria, 377;
friendly relations with, subservience and military support to
France, 377, 394, 402, 404, 422; iii. 3, 195, 203, 279, 322,
387;
acquires Ansbach, ii. 390;
created a separate kingdom, 389, 391, 398;
acquires territory after Austerlitz, 390;
member of the Confederation of the Rhine, 403;
joins in the war against Prussia, 422;
defeated at Innsbruck, iii. 201;
_N.'s_ success in, 225;
Maria Louisa's progress through, 256;
allotment of Austrian lands to, 266;
losses of her soldiers in Russia, 337;
Roman Catholic influence in, 390;
hesitates to furnish new levies, 394;
Augereau commanding troops of, 402;
national spirit in, iv. 19;
revulsion of feeling against France, 19, 22, 26, 40, 56;
part in the campaign at Leipsic, 35;
position in Germany, 298, 299;
battle of Hanau, 35;
the campaign of Waterloo 69, et seq.
=Bayanne, Cardinal=, at Paris, iii. 68;
his demands on behalf of the Pope, 118.
=Baylen=, capitulation of, Dupont at, iii. 157, 159, 166.
=Bayonne=, formation of new French army at, iii. 120, 126, 132;
_N._ goes to, 142;
Ferdinand VII at, 144;
trial of Ferdinand at, 145;
end of negotiations at, 147;
convocation of Spanish notables at, 149;
ultimate failure of _N.'s_ work at, 151;
_N._ at, Nov. 3, 1808, 184;
effect of negotiations at, 185;
the decree of 1808, 274;
Soult shut up in, iv. 40.
=Bayreuth=, _N._ at, ii. 422;
Ney at, 428;
Davout's force in, iii. 202.
="Beaucaire, the Supper of,"= i. 216, 219.
=Beauderet=, military movements near, iv. 185.
=Beauharnais, Marquis Alexandre de=, marriage to Josephine de la
Pagerie, i. 313;
service in America, 314;
separated from his wife, 314;
commander of the Army of the Rhine, 314;
partial reconciliation with Josephine, 314;
elected to States-General, 314;
president of National Assembly, 314;
denunciation, imprisonment, and execution, 314.
=Beauharnais, Eugène de=, birth of, i. 313;
early life, 315;
interposes to reconcile Josephine and _N._, ii. 85;
viceroy at Milan, 258;
ordered to organize troops on the Adige, 362;
marries Augusta of Bavaria, 399;
expels the English from Leghorn, iii. 67;
letter from _N._ to, 68;
presents ultimatum to Pius VII, 68;
formally adopted by _N._, 130;
viceroy of Italy, 130;
defeated by Archduke John, 201;
letter from _N._ to, 208;
commanding in Italy, 211;
character, 211;
at Villach, 217;
at Bruck, 225;
drives Archduke John into Hungary, 226;
battle of Wagram, 228;
guards the Marchfeld, 235;
executes Hofer's sentence, 241;
offers amnesty to the Tyroleans, 241;
informs Josephine of the impending divorce, 246;
share in the Austrian marriage negotiations, 253;
acquires principality of Frankfort, 266;
viceroy of Italy, 279;
a grand duchy created for, 322;
strength of his corps, March, 1812, 324;
contemplated movement by, 336;
battle of Borodino, 344;
defeats Kutusoff at Malojaroslavetz, 355;
battle of Wiazma, 360;
the hero of the retreat from Moscow, 362, 363;
at Krasnoi, 364;
junction with Ney, 364;
succeeds Murat in command, 385, 393;
reorganizes the army, 393;
withdraws to Berlin, 393;
retires behind the Elbe, 393;
establishes headquarters at Leipsic, 393;
_N.'s_ instructions to, 393;
to guard Holland, 393;
Alexander advances against, 395;
strength in the Saxon campaign of 1813, 402;
junction with _N._, 404;
ordered to raise a new army in Italy, 407, 414;
driven over the Adige by Hiller, iv. 39;
checkmated in Italy, 56;
battle of Roverbello, 56;
concludes armistice, 56.
=Beauharnais, François de=, French minister at Madrid, connection
with Ferdinand's conspiracy, iii. 127;
conducts intrigues for the Portuguese throne, 129;
opens the eyes of Godoy, 132;
advises Ferdinand to go to Bayonne, 142.
=Beauharnais, Hortense=, birth of, i. 313;
early life, 315;
interposes to reconcile Josephine and _N._, ii. 85;
marries Louis Bonaparte, 257; iii. 269.
_See also_ =Buonaparte, Hortense=.
=Beauharnais, Josephine=, social life in Paris, i. 290;
_N.'s_ infatuation for, and marriage, 312-323; ii. 341;
birth and early life, i. 313-315;
characteristics, 313-320;
imprisonment, 315;
returns to Martinique, 313;
returns to France, 314;
intimacy with Barras, 315.
_See also_ =Bonaparte, Josephine=.
=Beauharnais family=, proposed alliance between Ferdinand VII and,
iii, 125-128;
share in the Austrian marriage negotiations, 253.
=Beaulieu, J. P.=, commanding Austrian army in Lombardy, i. 352-361;
attacks Laharpe at Voltri, 352, 353;
falls back on Acqui, 354;
_N.'s_ operations against, 355-366;
military genius, 358;
defense of Milan, 358-361;
outflanked at Piacenza, 359;
retreats to the Mincio, 361;
seizes Peschiera, 361, 372;
thwarts _N.'s_ plan, 361;
violates Venetian neutrality, 372;
his army scattered, 378.
=Beaumont=, military operations near, iv. 170.
=Becker, Gen.=, accompanies _N._ to Rochefort, iv. 219;
urges _N.'s_ value as a general, 219.
=Beet-root sugar=, production encouraged, iii, 79;
_N.'s_ interest in, 304.
=Belce, Canon=, vice-president of the Directory of Corsica, i. 133.
=Belgium=, proposals to establish a republic in, i. 194;
plunder of works of art from, 369;
_N.'s_ policy concerning, 429;
ceded to France by treaty of Leoben, 438;
England's efforts to release, 450;
France's interest in, 450;
England's concessions as to, ii. 12;
incorporated with France, 153;
the Code Napoléon in, 223;
public works in, 349;
visit of _N._ and Maria Louisa to, iii. 269;
mediocrity of soldiers of, iv. 20;
the allies refuse to give the country to France, 67;
_N._ entreated to abandon, 70;
_N._ refuses to give up, 74;
campaign of Waterloo, 169 et seq.;
provisions for defense of, 172;
weakness of her troops, 195, 201.
_See also_ =Austrian Netherlands=.
=Belle Alliance=, French van at, iv. 190;
_N._ at, 193, 194, 196;
topography, 195;
the French position at, 196;
fighting at, 210.
=Bellegarde, Gen. H. de=, supersedes Melas, ii. 188;
on the Mincio, 188.
="Bellerophon," the=, Napoleon embarks on, iv. 220, 221, 222, 287;
sails for Torbay, 221;
goes to Plymouth Sound, 222;
in Torbay, 227.
=Bellesca=, organizes rebellion in favor of Don John, iii. 122.
=Belleville=, defense of, iv. 109, 110.
=Belliard, Gen. A. D.=, carries the news of surrender of Paris to
the Emperor, iv. 105, 115;
advises a return to Lorraine, 116;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, 132.
=Bellingham, John=, assassinates Mr. Perceval, iii. 378.
=Bellinzona=, Austrian force at, ii. 170;
Moncey arrives at, 172.
=Bellowitz=, military operations near, ii. 386.
=Belluno=, Lusignan driven beyond, i. 432;
creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 395;
Victor created Duke of, iii. 86.
_See also_ =Victor=.
=Belt, the=, difficulties of Bernadotte's crossing the, iii. 117.
=Belbedere, Gen.=, forces near Burgos, iii. 184.
=Benevento=, Talleyrand created Prince of, ii. 396 (_see also_
=Talleyrand=);
destruction of magazines at, iii. 188.
=Bennigsen, Gen. L. A. T.=, assassin of Paul I, ii. 380;
commanding Russian forces at Breslau, 380;
battle of Pultusk, iii. 4, 8;
general-in-chief of the Russian army, 8, 9;
position at Szuczyn, 8;
turns back Ney from Königsberg, 8;
attempts to reach Dantzic, 9;
attempts to destroy Ney, 10;
defeated at Mohrungen, 10;
military genius, 9, 27;
campaign of Eylau, 13 et seq.;
captures French courier at Eylau, 14;
retreats to Königsberg, 18;
hampered for men and funds, 20;
moves against Ney on the Passarge, 28;
retires behind the Alle, 29;
strength, summer of 1807, 28;
battle of Heilsberg, 29;
injurious delays by, 30;
battle of Friedland, 31;
abandons Heilsberg, 32;
confesses defeat, 32;
retreats across the Niemen, 31;
reinforcements for, 32;
proposes an armistice, 34, 36;
commanding in Poland, iv. 3;
reaches Teplitz, 22;
in battle of Leipsic, 32.
=Berchtesgaden=, apportioned to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, ii. 266;
ceded to Austria, 391;
embodied in the Confederation of the Rhine, iii. 239.
=Beresina=, battle of, compared with that of Friedland, iv. 37.
=Beresina, River=, the crossing of the, iii. 363, 366, 374.
=Berg, Grand Duchy of=, quota of men, ii. 404;
French seizure of lands near, 420;
vassalage to France recognized at Tilsit, iii. 54;
the Grand Duchess quarrels with Queen Hortense, 179;
scheme to incorporate it with France, 266;
Louis Napoleon created Grand Duke, 279;
the French regency of, 421;
French influence in, 423.
=Bergamo=, the revolutionary movement in, i. 428, 436, 437.
=Bergen=, battle of, ii. 93.
=Bergères=, Blücher retreats to, iv. 65.
=Berlier, M.=, assists in preparation of the Code, ii. 222.
=Berlin=, consternation in (1797-98), ii. 41;
Sieyès' mission to, 41;
French party in, 155;
the visits of Alexander I to, 376, 438;
war feeling in, ii. 417;
_N._ refuses to treat outside of, 435;
_N.'s_ entry into, 438;
_N._ receives Polish deputation in, 444;
French occupation of, iii. 12;
centralization in, 374;
Eugène at, 393;
the Prussian court removed to Breslau from, 396;
patriotism in the university, 398;
defense of, 399;
proposed allotment of, to Jerome, 409;
threatened by Oudinot, 413;
England's diplomacy in, 417;
French demonstrations against, iv. 2;
Bülow commanding at, 3;
overestimate of its strategical value, 5;
Blücher's road to, blocked by Lauriston, 8;
failure of Oudinot and Macdonald in movements against, 13-20;
_N._ determines to march on, 17, 18;
possible movement toward, 26.
=Berlin Decree=, the, ii. 441; iii. 45, 48, 49, 101, 119, 273, 321.
=Berlin University=, iii. 103.
=Bern=, treaty of Leoben to be ratified at, i. 439;
proposed congress at, ii. 19, 20;
capture of the city, 40;
French intervention in, 40;
the plundering of, 40;
French military arrogance in, 41;
attempt to restore the constitution of, iv. 68.
=Bernadotte, Gen. J. B. J.=, military successes of, i. 273;
a product of Carnot's system, 332;
commanding Army of the Sambre and Meuse, 426;
storms Gradisca, 433;
communicates Pichegru's treachery to Barras, ii. 6;
ambassador to Austria, 42, 51;
charges of venality concerning his mission, 43;
recalled, 43;
characteristics, 43, 93; iii. 317; iv. 2, 3, 55;
marries Désirée Clary, ii. 43; iii. 280;
ordered to the middle Rhine, ii. 87;
develops the conscription schemes of Carnot, 93;
secretary of war, 93;
counterplots on the 18th Brumaire, 109;
plans to head a force at St. Cloud, 109;
created marshal, 323;
ordered to Göttingen, 362;
commanding in Germany, 365;
marches to Ingolstadt, 365;
watches the Russian army, 366;
violates Prussian neutrality at Ansbach, 376;
in battle of Austerlitz, 383-385;
Prince of Ponte Corvo, 396; iii. 86;
at Lobenstein, ii. 428;
defeats Hohenlohe at Schleiz, 428;
at Naumburg, 429;
absence from Jéna and Auerstädt, 432;
relations with _N._, 432; iii. 280, 317;
at Apolda, ii. 434;
defeats Prussians at Halle, ii. 436;
sacks Lübeck, ii, 440;
strength in Poland, iii. 7;
position at Elbing, 8;
action at Mohrungen, 10;
escapes to Gilgenburg, 10;
threatens Königsberg, 10;
in campaign of Eylau, 13;
threatens Denmark, 69;
Denmark yields to, 70;
income, 87;
fails to join the Russian forces in Finland, 117;
restrains Spanish operations on the Baltic, 149;
his advance-guard of Spanish troops, 159;
troops in Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck, 202;
to concentrate in Dresden, 203;
ordered to Linz, 216, 225;
relieved by Lefebvre at Linz, 225;
in battle of Wagram, 228, 230;
disgraced at Wagram, 228, 237;
heads troops for service in the Netherlands, 237;
kindly treatment of Pomerania, 280;
failure on the Marchfeld, 281;
chosen as successor to Charles XIII, 280;
installation at Stockholm, 281;
assumes title of Prince Charles John, 280;
popularity in Sweden, 280;
republicanism of, 281;
ambition to acquire Norway, 281, 399; iv. 55;
changes from Roman Catholic to Lutheran, iii. 317;
character of his rule, 317;
eager to escape from French protection, 317;
varied character of his life, 317;
virtual king of Sweden, 317;
unwillingly grants a liberal constitution, 317;
ambition to acquire the French crown, 321; iv. 2, 3, 14, 15, 26,
55, 57, 85, 114;
temporizes with France and Russia, iii. 321;
assists Russia against _N._, 350;
Metternich seeks to embroil him with Alexander, 394;
_N._ attempts to win over, 399;
Pomerania offered to, 399;
joins the coalition, 399; iv. 2, 3;
his troops evacuate Hamburg, 407;
commanding Army of the North, 3;
in military council at Trachenberg, 6;
battle of Grossbeeren, 14;
at Jüterbog, 18;
battle of Dennewitz, 18, 19;
crosses the Elbe, 22;
contemplated movement against, 23;
_N._ seeks to engage, 25, 26;
proposed junction with Schwarzenberg, 26;
at Merseburg, 27;
at Oppin, 28;
offers terms to Davout, 55;
ordered to the lower Rhine, 56;
at Liège, 85;
receives flag of truce from Joseph, 85;
the allies dread betrayal by, 85.
=Bernadotte, Mme.=, i. 294.
=Bernburg=, French forces at, iii. 393.
=Berneck=, defeat of Junot by the Black Legion at, iii. 234.
=Berner Klause=, the, i. 412.
=Berry=, military movements near, iv. 77, 78.
=Berry, Charles Ferdinand, Duc de=, doubtful courage of, ii. 301;
refrains from entering France, 301;
suspected of plotting in Brittany, 303.
=Berry-au-Bac=, abandoned by Marmont, iv. 81;
Marmont at, 85.
=Berthier, Gen. Alexandre=, a product of Carnot's system, i. 332;
service in the Alps, 346;
at Lodi, 361;
in the Rivoli campaign, 413;
carries treaty of Campo Formio to the Directory, ii. 24;
plunders Venetia, 38;
proclaims the Roman Republic, 39;
ordered to kill hostile tribesmen, 70;
ordered to prepare for triumphal entry into Cairo, 76;
accompanies _N._ on his return from Alexandria, 81;
action on the 18th Brumaire, 104;
forms the army of reserve, 140;
sent to Geneva, 140;
method of computing his army, 169;
plans for crossing the Alps, 169;
urges capture of Fort Bard, 171;
created marshal, 323;
Master of the Hounds, 324;
muzzles the press in Prussia, 417;
letter from _N._, Aug. 25, 1806, 420;
personal attendance on _N._, 425;
in battle of Eylau, iii. 16; iv. 174;
at Tilsit, iii. 52, 59;
income, 87, 296;
created Prince of Neufchâtel, 86, 96, 279;
appointed vice-constable, 96;
at Bayonne, 144;
chief of staff, 203, 323, 402;
orders to, iii. 203;
deficiency of military knowledge, 204;
fails in execution of his orders, 205;
charged with treachery, 206;
on _N.'s_ habit of work, 210;
discovers attempt to assassinate _N._, 240;
_N.'s_ proxy to marry Maria Louisa, 254-256;
created Prince of Wagram, 256;
letter from Ney to, Nov. 5, 1812, 360, 361;
informs Macdonald of the Russian disasters, 384;
alleged hostility to Jomini, iv. 2;
battle of Dresden, 11;
at Nangis, 73;
receives flag of truce from Schwarzenberg, 73;
persuades _N._ to resume negotiations, 74;
capture of one of his couriers, 96;
at council at St. Dizier, 103;
advises a return to Lorraine, 116;
Marmont sends treasonable documents to, 119;
at the abdication scene, 121;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, 132;
nicknamed "Peter," 147;
faults at Eylau and Wagram, 173.
=Berthollet, C. L.=, plunders Italian scientific collections, i. 369;
accompanies _N._ on his return from Alexandria, ii. 81;
member of the senate, 151.
=Berton, L. S.=, i. 61.
=Bertrand, Gen. H. G.=, base conduct at Vienna, ii. 369;
in campaign of 1813, iii. 402;
in battle of Bautzen, 410;
beleaguers Schweidnitz, 413;
battle of Dennewitz, iv. 18;
driven by Blücher to Bitterfeld, 22;
battle of Leipsic, 28, 29, 30, 32, 35;
takes Weissenfels, 35;
defends the Rhine at Kastel, 54;
begs _N._ to abandon Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, 70;
at the abdication scene, 121;
accompanies _N._ to Elba, 134, 138;
sends positive instructions to Grouchy, 187, 191;
escorts _N._ from the field of Waterloo, 211;
accompanies _N._ to Rochefort, 219;
accompanies _N._ to St. Helena, 227.
=Bertrand, Mme.=, present at _N.'s_ death-bed, iv. 235.
=Bessarabia=, alleged concession of, to Russia, iii. 55.
=Bessières, Gen. J. B.=, service in Egypt, ii. 53;
created marshal, 323;
in battle of Austerlitz, 387;
in Eylau campaign, iii. 15, 16;
created Duke of Istria, 86;
income, 87;
character, 93;
_N.'s_ opinion of, 93;
invades Spain, 132, 134, 143;
instructions to, concerning Spanish policy, 140;
ordered to arrest Ferdinand, 144;
besieges Santander, 156;
defeats the Spaniards at Medina de Rio Seco, 156;
occupies Old Castile and Aragon, 155;
ordered to connect with Junot, 157;
at Miranda, 183;
pursues Hiller, 209;
battle of Essling, 220;
commanding the Young Guard, 324;
killed at Rippach, 404, 406;
importance of his loss to _N._, 404.
=Bethencourt, Gen.=, crosses the Simplon, ii. 172;
near Domo d'Ossola, 172.
=Beugnot=, regent of Berg, iii. 421;
anecdote concerning, 421, 422.
=Beurnonville, Marquis de=, _N.'s_ envoy to Prussia, ii. 156;
royalist intrigues of, iv. 115, 140.
=Beys=, the Egyptian, ii. 58.
=Biberach=, battle of, ii. 167.
=Biberich=, anecdote of _N._ at the castle of, iii. 422.
=Bible=, _N.'s_ study of the, iv. 231.
=Bicêtre, prison of=, imprisonment of a milliner in, iii. 92.
=Bielostok=, united to Russia, iii. 56, 62.
=Bilbao=, Lefebvre near, iii. 183.
=Bisamberg=, junction of Archduke Charles and Hiller at, iii. 212, 216;
military operations near, 228, 229.
=Biscay=, _N.'s_ contemplated movements in, iii. 184;
military government of, 279.
=Bismarck, Prince Otto von=, policy in, 1875, ii. 269.
=Bitterfeld=, Bertrand driven by Blücher to, iv. 22.
=Biville=, landing of the Cadoudal conspirators at, ii. 298.
=Black Elster, River=, military movements on the, iv. 20.
=Black Forest, the=, Dessaix defeats the Austrians in, i. 440;
military operations in, ii. 166, 365.
=Black Legion, the=, organization of, iii. 234;
defeats Junot at Berneck, 234;
defeats the Saxons at Nossen, 234.
=Black Sea=, proposed Indian expeditions via, ii. 209.
=Blake, Gen.=, defeated at Medina de Rio Seco, iii. 156;
advances from Durango, 184;
concerted French movement against, 185;
driven back to Valmaseda, 184;
_N.'s_ scheme to annihilate, 184;
defeated at Espinosa, 185;
joins La Romana, in Asturias, 185;
annihilation of his army by Suchet, 289.
=Blankenburg=, Louis XVIII retreats to, ii. 5.
=Blankenhain=, Prince Hohenlohe at, ii. 428.
=Blasowitz=, military operations near, ii. 385.
=Blois=, _N.'s_ private treasure at, iv. 50, 134;
imperial regency established at, 115;
French garrison at, 118;
dissolution of the imperial government at, 135.
=Blücher, Marshal G. L. von=, member of Prussian reform party, ii. 415;
Prussian commander, 419;
military movements near Eisenach, 427;
battle of Auerstädt, 433;
reaches Lübeck, 437;
duplicity to Klein, 436;
surrender of, 437;
in campaign of 1813, iii. 399;
at Striegau, iv. 3, 6;
violates the armistice, 3, 6;
commanding the army of the East, 6;
gives _N._ an advantage, 6, 7;
secures an independent command, 6;
pursued by _N._, 7;
at Bunzlau, 7;
retreats behind the Deichsel, 7;
crosses the Katzbach, 8;
battle of Katzbach, 15;
pursues Macdonald, 15;
Macdonald fails to hold, 17;
operations in Silesia, 17;
attacks Macdonald at Fischbach, 18;
Macdonald ordered to check his advance, 20;
advances on Dresden, 20;
northward movement, 21;
marches to Kemberg, 22;
drives Bertrand to Bitterfeld, 22;
contemplated movement against, 23;
_N._ seeks to engage, 25, 26;
joint movements with Bernadotte and Schwarzenberg, 26;
advances to Halle, 26;
battle of Leipsic, 28, 30, 33;
acquires two Swedish corps, 56;
crosses the Rhine, 57;
aims to annihilate _N._, 57;
crosses the Saar, 58;
invests the Mosel fortresses, 58;
advances on Arcis, 58;
effects union with Schwarzenberg, 60;
defeated at Brienne, 60;
battles of La Rothière and Troyes, 60;
predicts a speedy entry into Paris, 61;
leads the advance down the Marne, 62;
attempts to cut off Macdonald, 61;
strength, Feb. 9, 1814, 61;
French movement from Sézanne against, 62, 63;
battle of Montmirail, 63;
retreat across the Marne, 63;
defeated at Vauchamps, 64;
retreats to Bergères, 65;
drives Marmont to Fromentières, 64;
_N._ deals him "a blow in the eye," 70;
Marmont ordered to hold, 71;
at Méry, 73;
collects his army at Châlons, 73;
Oudinot sent against, 73;
pursued by _N._, 75;
makes diversion in favor of main army, 75;
advances on Paris, 76;
letter from Frederick William III, Feb. 26, 1814, 75;
_N._ in pursuit of, 76;
moves on Meaux, 76;
recruits his forces at Soissons, 77;
retreats up the Ourcq, 76;
checked by Marmont and Mortier, 76;
crosses the Marne, 76;
cut off from Schwarzenberg, 77;
driven north, 77;
battle of Craonne, 78;
retreats from Craonne to Laon, 78;
dissensions in his army, 77-80, 84;
battle of Laon, 79;
recalls York, 80;
regains communication with Schwarzenberg, 80;
dismayed at the capture of Rheims, 84, 85;
besieges Compiègne, 84;
resumes the offensive, 92, 93;
Marmont's plan of operations against, 93;
crosses the Aisne, 93;
effects junction with Schwarzenberg, 94, 95, 97;
captures a courier to the Empress, 96;
advised of the movement on Paris, 98;
"Marshal Forward," 98;
crosses the Marne, 99;
fears of, in Paris, 108;
captures Montmartre, 111;
desires to take the field, 169;
plan of the campaign of Waterloo, 169;
quality of his troops, 171;
_N.'s_ position with regard to Wellington and, 171;
relative strength in Waterloo campaign, 172;
awaits developments, 173;
relations with Wellington, 176, 177;
possible change of strategy, 176;
defensive movements, 178;
at Fleurus, 179;
retires from Fleurus, 180;
his tactics criticized by Wellington, 181;
meeting with Wellington at Bry, 180;
battle of Ligny, 181, 182;
gets "a ---- good licking," 183, 184;
wounded at Ligny, 185;
Grouchy's pursuit of, 187;
apprehended movement to join Wellington, 187;
promises support to Wellington, 190;
Grouchy aims to prevent union between Wellington and, 191;
movement to Wavre, 191-194;
disaster at Ligny, 193;
possible retreat via Louvain, 194;
fails to come to Wellington's assistance, 204;
Wellington's faint-hearted coöperation with, 213;
his lines of retreat, 214;
determination to kill _N._, 220, 223;
_character_: ambition, iv. 7;
ardor and courage, 59, 98, 177, 181, 182;
desire for glory and revenge, 68, 220, 223;
duplicity, ii. 436;
head-strong temper, iv. 6, 7, 14;
influence over troops, 171, 172;
over-confidence, 62, 63;
self-indulgence, 172.
=Bober, River=, military movements on the, iv. 7, 16.
=Bocognano=, _N._ in hiding near, i. 202, 203.
=Bohemia=, Archduke Ferdinand escapes into, ii. 366;
Archduke Ferdinand commanding in, 380;
_N.'s_ line of retreat through, 392;
plan of Austrian operations in, iii. 199;
_N.'s_ reasons for not pursuing Archduke Charles into, 210;
gathering of Austrian troops in, 414;
boundary of a neutral zone, 414;
beacons flash the declaration of war through, 423;
Austro-Russian troops in, iv. 3;
advance of Russian troops toward, 6;
the allies' communication with, threatened, 9;
guarding the passes from, 18;
refuge of the allies in, 24;
army of, moves on Paris, 98.
=Bohemian Forest=, military movements in the, iii. 204, 210, 216.
=Bois, Pierre du=, proposes French seizure of Egypt, ii. 46.
=Bologna=, seizure and ransom of, i. 374, 375;
the Pope prepares to recover, 398;
armistice of, 401;
new scheme of government for, 402;
_N._ at, 409, 419;
military operations at, 409, 419;
surrendered to France, 421;
ceded to Venice at Leoben, 438;
corporated in the Cisalpine Republic, ii. 21.
=Bonaparte=. _See_ =Buonaparte=.
=Boniface, Pope=, crowns Pepin, ii. 325.
=Bonifacio=, _N._ at, i. 193.
=Bonnier, M.=, member of the Congress of Rastatt, ii. 89;
killed at Rastatt, 89.
=Bontemps, M.=, arrest of, ii. 27.
=Bordeaux=, condition in 1793, i. 222;
exempt from legislation concerning Jews, iii. 78;
opens its gates to English troops, iv. 87;
proclamation of Louis XVIII., 87;
_N._ seeks to rouse imperial feeling in, 220;
immunity from the White Terror, 223.
=Borghese, Prince=, marries Pauline (Buonaparte) Leclerc, ii. 258;
separates from Pauline, iv. 142.
=Borghese, Princess Pauline (Buonaparte)=, looseness of her life,
iv. 142;
acquires the duchy of Lucca, ii. 354;
dismissed from Paris, iv. 142;
accompanies _N._ to Elba, 139-142;
alleged scandalous relations with _N._, 142.
_See also_ =Buonaparte, Pauline=.
=Borghetto=, battle of, i. 372.
=Borgo, Pozzo di=. _See_ =Pozzo di Borgo=.
=Bormida, River=, road to Italy opened through the valley of, i. 257;
the country of, ii. 177;
Melas crosses, 178;
military operations on the, 181.
=Borodino=, Bonaparte at, ii. 392;
battle of, iii. 343, 344, 346-348;
rescuing the wounded from the field of, 358.
=Borrissoff=, the French retreat through, iii. 363, 366, 370;
Russian plan of operation at, 366;
captured by Tchitchagoff, 367, 368;
battles at, 369-372.
=Borstell, Gen.=, battle of Dennewitz, iv. 19.
=Bosporus=, proposed expedition to the, iii. 113.
=Botanical Garden=, lecture system of the, i. 281.
=Bothnia=, repulse of the Russians from, iii. 116.
=Bou, Mme.=, i. 184.
=Boudet, Gen. Jean=, in battle of Essling, iii. 219, 220.
=Bouillé, Marquis F. C. A. de=, i. 314.
=Boulay de la Meurthe, Antoine=, presents temporary plan of the
Consulate, ii, 123;
member of the council of state, 152;
reviser of the Code, 222.
=Boulogne=, the Army of England, flotilla, and military
preparations at, ii. 48, 290, 291, 331, 358;
_N._ at, 48;
_N.'s_ ceremonial at, July, 1804, 328;
real purpose of the flotilla, 334;
distribution of Legion of Honor crosses at, 360;
the army ordered east from, 362.
=Bourbon-Condé, Louis-Antoine-Henri de=. _See_ =Enghien, Duc d'=.
=Bourbon-Hapsburg alliance=, Corsica joins the, i. 21.
=Bourbons, the=, influence of, i. 22;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 177; ii. 29, 194, 205, 271, 301, 312, 356;
iv. 156;
discredit royalty, i. 268;
their motto, 297;
France's demands on Austria concerning, ii. 43;
hopes and rumors of restoration of, and plots therefore, 94, 122,
158, 194, 255, 317; iv. 51, 67, 68, 113, 114, 164, 165;
Talleyrand's predilection for, ii. 122;
England's attitude toward, 143, 144, 271, 356; iv. 68;
a blow at the, ii. 207;
_N._ complains of England's protection of, 271, 356;
foster the Jacobin spirit of insurrection, 300;
responsibility for the execution of Ney, 300;
the Duc d'Enghien, 301;
intrigues against _N.'s_ life, 304; iv. 141, 144;
_N.'s_ attempt to fix death of Duc d'Enghien on, ii. 312;
causes of the French dislike for, 317;
their "divine right," 317;
their founder, 350;
scheme to establish a monarchy in America, iii. 134, 141;
Metternich's desire to restore the, iv. 67, 68;
rising in Vendée, 102;
restoration of, 109, 113-115, 132, 146;
enthusiasm for, in Paris, 115;
revulsion of feeling in France and by Alexander against, 125, 126;
fickle imperialists support Louis XVIII, 132;
maintain spies in Elba, 142;
_N._ on the illegitimacy of their throne, 156.
=The Neapolitan=, impending downfall, ii. 357;
banished, 390, 395, 401; iii. 214;
proposal that they retain power in Sicily, ii. 401.
=The Spanish=, scheme to emancipate Spain from rule of, ii. 44;
incapacity and degradation, iii. 70;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 142;
deposed, 145-148, 150, 164;
proposals to restore the throne to, 271, 416.
=Bourgeoisie=, the, at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 101, 107;
_N._ seeks the support of, ii. 278.
=Bourmont, Gen.=, deserts before Charleroi, iv. 174.
=Bourrienne, L. A. F. de=, on the question of _N.'s_ birth, i. 37;
shares mathematical honors with _N._, 56;
shares _N.'s_ poverty in Paris, 174;
obtains diplomatic position at Stuttgart, 174;
anecdotes of _N._ by, 175;
describes _N.'s_ personality, 284;
_N.'s_ friendship for, 295;
improved fortunes of, 295;
_N.'s_ confidences with, ii. 51;
on _N.'s_ plans of escaping from Egypt, 83;
_N._ expresses his satisfaction to, concerning the 18th Brumaire, 110;
rebukes _N._ at St. Cloud, 113;
character, 277;
dismissed, 277;
on Mme. de Staël, iii. 298;
venality of, iv. 106.
=Bourse=, _N.'s_ failure to govern the, ii. 410;
rise in values after the Austrian marriage, iii. 264.
=Bowles, Col. Geo.=, conversation with Wellington, iv. 184.
=Boyer, Gen. J. P.=, prepares a "triumphal" return to Cairo, ii. 76.
=Brabant=, visit of _N._ and Maria Louisa to, iii. 269;
French occupation of, 270;
_N.'s_ offer to exchange it for Hanseatic towns, 270.
=Braganza, House of=, decline of, iii. 119;
flight to Brazil, 134;
_N._ proposes to restore Portugal to, 319.
=Brandenburg=, proposed allotment of, to Jerome, iii. 409;
the Army of the North in, iv. 2;
contemplated operations in, 7.
=Brandenburg, House of=, the imperial crown for the, ii. 420;
owes its safety to the Czar, iii. 73.
=Braunau=, the Austrian camp at, ii. 365;
captured by Lannes, 367;
Russian troops at, 368;
French occupation of, 405.
=Bray=, Macdonald before, iv. 72.
=Brazi=, Don John embarks for, iii. 121.
=Breisgau=, grant to Grand Duke of Tuscany in, ii. 193;
Duc d'Enghien prepares to retire to the, 302, 303;
part of, acquired by Baden, 391;
Würtemberg acquires part of, 391.
=Breitenlee=, Austrian advance through, iii. 220.
=Bremen=, closed to British commerce, ii. 287;
laid under contribution, 287;
proposal to give it to Prussia, 400;
Bernadotte's force in, iii. 202;
scheme to incorporate with France, 266;
position in the French empire, 279;
French forces at, 393.
=Brenta, River=, military operations on the, i. 384, 390-392, 406.
=Brescia=, seized by France, i. 371;
the French position at, 379;
captured by Quasdanowich, 380;
evacuated by the enemy, 381;
the revolutionary movement in, 428, 435.
=Breslau=, Russian troops at, ii. 380;
the Prussian court moves from Berlin to, iii. 396;
patriotism in the university, 398;
French occupation of, 413;
pursuit of the allies to, 413;
French evacuation of, 414, 415;
military movements near, iv. 3.
=Brest=, naval preparations at, ii. 48, 68, 333, 359, 360, 441;
blockade of, iii. 48;
junction of Nelson and Cornwallis before, ii. 359;
the fleet ordered to the English Channel from, 359;
Villeneuve's mission to relieve, 360;
the squadron ordered to the Mediterranean, iii. 111;
imprisonment of Schill's followers in, 233;
naval station at, 380.
=Brest-Litovski=, military operations near, iii. 353.
="Briars, The,"= _N._ a guest at, iv. 229, 230.
=Bribery=, _N.'s_ first lesson in, i. 203.
=Bridge of Arts=, the, iii. 74.
=Brienne=, _N._ at, i. 37, 46-59, 146, 210; iv. 60;
_N.'s_ mock battles at, i. 53; iv. 60;
Lucien Buonaparte at, i. 81;
Lucien quits, and Louis remains at, 88;
Louis fails of admission to, 96;
_N.'s_ garden at, 210;
_N.'s_ contemporaries at, 216;
battle of, iv. 60, 61;
military movements near, 95, 96.
=Brienne, Mme. Loménie de=, _N.'s_ early friend, i. 52, 105.
=Brigandage=, suppression of, in Corsica, i. 14, 15.
=Brigido, Col.=, at battle of Arcole, i. 390.
=Brindisi=, embargo on, ii. 287.
=Brinkmann=, on _N.'s_ influence in France, ii. 133.
=Brissot, J. P.=, leader of the Girondists, i. 189.
=Brittany=, foundation of the Jacobin Club in, i. 107;
violence and civil war in, 207, 222, 277, 305; ii. 91, 146;
_N._ conciliates, 146;
suspected plot of the Duc de Berry in, 303.
=Brixen=, Joubert at, i. 434;
apportioned to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, ii. 266;
ceded to Bavaria, 391.
=Broglie, Duc de=, on the Emperor's court at Fontainebleau, iii. 245.
=Broussier, Gen.=, marches to relief of Paris, iv. 102.
=Bruck=, Prince Eugène at, iii. 225.
=Brueys d'Aigalliers, Vice-Adm. François-Paul=, commanding French
fleet in the Adriatic, ii, 18;
ordered to Corfu, 62;
ordered to Alexandria, 62;
in the battle of the Nile, 62-66.
=Bruix, Adm. E.=, sent to conquer the Mediterranean ii. 79;
interview with Barras, 107;
argument in favor of the slave-trade, 236.
=Brumaire=, the plot of the 18th of, ii. 102 et seq., 119 et seq.,
315; iv. 258.
=Brune, Gen. G. M. A.=, plunders Bern, ii. 40;
military genius, 88;
campaign in Holland, 87, 93, 96, 323;
battle of Bergen, 93;
supersedes Masséna in Italy, 190;
advances to Trent, 192;
created marshal, 323;
venality of, iii. 81.
=Brunet, Gen.=, commanding the Army of Italy, i. 213.
=Brünn=, military operations near, ii. 367, 369, 379, 383-386; iii. 229;
_N._ establishes headquarters at, ii. 379.
=Brunswick=, French occupation of, ii. 443;
organization of the Black Legion, iii. 234;
the Black Legion's escape through, 234;
restored to its former ruler, iv. 40.
=Brunswick, Charles F. W., Duke of=, commander-in-chief of the
Prussian army, ii. 419, 424, 427;
at Naumberg, 424;
decline of his influence, 428;
at Erfurt, 427;
plan of opposition to the French, 428;
in battle of Jena, 429-433;
death of, 433, 443;
proclamation against the French republic, 443;
appeals to _N.'s_ mercy, 443.
=Brunswick, Frederick W., Duke of=, deprived of his throne, iii. 234;
organizes the Black Legion, 234;
exploits with the Black Legion, 234;
escapes to England, 234.
=Brunswick, House of=, Sieyès suspected of plotting with the, ii. 95.
=Bruslart=, governor of Corsica, plots against _N._, iv. 150.
=Brussels=, proposed invasion of France via, iv. 57;
York retires to, 80;
military operations near, 170, 179, 180, 190, 192, 194, 195;
topography of, 195.
=Brutus=, statue at the Tuileries, ii. 147.
=Bruyères=, killed at Reichenbach, iii. 410.
=Bry=, meeting of Wellington and Blücher at, iv. 180.
=Bubna, Gen.=, emissary from Francis to _N._, iii. 238, 395; iv. 21;
suggests an armistice, iii. 408;
procrastinates, 417;
confronting Augereau at Geneva, iv. 57;
in the campaign of 1814, 62;
driven from Lyons by Augereau, 67.
="Bucentaur," the=, destruction of, ii. 24.
="Bucentaure," the=, at Trafalgar, ii. 374.
=Budberg=, Russian councilor, iii. 52.
=Budweis=, Archduke Charles at, iii. 216.
=Buenos Ayres=, English expedition against, iii. 100.
="Buffer" states=, ii. 402; iii. 55.
=Bug, River=, proposed French occupation to the, ii. 442;
military operations on the, iii. 2, 117, 358.
=Bulgaria=, alleged concession of, to Russia, iii. 55.
=Bull-fights=, _N._ proposes to introduce them into Paris, ii. 409.
=Bülow, Gen. F. W. von=, junction of Bernadotte with, iii. 399;
commanding Army of the North, iv. 3;
holding Berlin, iv. 3;
strength, 3;
belittled by _N._, 5;
military ability, 14;
battle of Grossbeeren, 14;
battle of Dennewitz, 18;
coöperates with Graham in the Netherlands, 57;
captures Soissons, 77;
commanding reserve forces, 177;
in Waterloo campaign, 177;
near Beauderet, 185;
at St. Lambert, 194;
battle of Waterloo, 204-207.
=Bunbury, Sir Henry=, on commission to notify _N._ of his sentence,
iv. 226.
=Bunzlau=, Blücher at, iv. 7.
=Buonaparte, Carlo Maria di= (father of _N._), early life of, i. 29, 30;
ennobled, 29;
marriage, 30;
submission and French naturalization, 32;
character, 22, 44;
death, 34, 63;
ambitions and advancements, 43-47, 57, 63;
mission to Versailles, 44-47;
claim against the Jesuits, 47, 63;
breaks down, 57;
his "infamy," 97;
_N._ renounces the royalist principles of, 136;
his paternity of _N._ denied, iv. 137.
=Buonaparte, Caroline= (sister of _N._), birth, i. 33;
at Nice, 244;
early life, 322;
gift to her brother on departure for Egypt, ii. 53;
married to Murat, 195, 258;
resents _N.'s_ abuse of Murat, iv. 56.
_See also_ =Murat, Mme=.
=Buonaparte, Princess Charlotte=, proposal to marry her to the
Prince of Asturias, iii. 129;
sent to Madame Mère, 130.
=Buonaparte, Hortense=, life in Holland, iii. 26;
death of her eldest son, 52;
quarrels with the Grand Duchess of Berg, 179;
share in the Austrian marriage negotiations, 253;
Louis complains of, 270;
criticized by Mme. de Staël, 298.
_See also_ =Beauharnais, Hortense=.
=Buonaparte, Jerome= (brother of _N._), birth, i. 33, 64;
sent to school in Paris, 309;
marriage to Elizabeth Patterson, ii. 257;
residence in the United States, 257;
deserts his wife Elizabeth, 257;
service in the West Indies, 257;
fails to secure divorce from his American wife, 396;
marries Catherine of Würtemberg, 399; iii. 93, 94;
assists in the sack of Poland, ii. 440;
commanding corps of Würtembergers and Bavarians, iii. 3;
King of Westphalia, 56, 279;
Pius VII refuses to annul his marriage, 68;
assumes the title of Napoleon, 82;
relations with _N._, 82;
ordered to raise levies in Westphalia, 132;
at the Erfurt conference, 171;
defeated by the Black Legion, 234;
deprived of part of Hanover, 278;
supplies quota to _N.'s_ army, 322;
in the Russian campaign, 336;
at Grodno, 336;
military blunders and incompetence, 336;
proposed allotment of Brandenburg and Berlin to, 409;
flees to France, iv. 40;
takes refuge in Switzerland, 135;
assigned to the House of Peers, 160;
battle of Waterloo, 199, 211.
=Buonaparte, Joseph= (grandfather of _N._), ennobled, i. 28.
=Buonaparte, Joseph= (brother of _N._), childish relations with
_N._, i. 40;
educated for the priesthood, 44, 55;
goes to Autun, 44;
character, 49; iii. 130, 131; iv. 106;
desire for military service, i. 55;
search for a career, 55, 57, 79, 83, 89, 96, 134, 140, 288, 292-295;
attends his father in his last illness, 58, 63;
his politics, 83;
studies law at Pisa, 89;
early struggles, 96;
claims share in framing Corsican appeal to National Assembly, 118;
appointed mayor's secretary at Ajaccio, 123;
at Marseilles, 127;
member of the Constituent Assembly at Orezza, 131, 134;
represents Ajaccio in district Directory, 134;
disappointments to, 134;
political offices and schemes, 140, 144;
member of Corsican Directory, 161;
reminiscences of, conversations, confidences, and relations with
_N._, 178; iii. 45, 82, 109, 140, 148, 149, 190;
leaves Corsica for Toulon, i. 207;
trades on his brother's commission in the National Guard, 208;
made commissary-general, 238;
marriage of, 254;
deprived of employment, 284, 287;
settles in Genoa, 288, 291;
proposed land speculation for, 288;
_N.'s_ correspondence with, 290-297, 312; ii. 66; iii. 18, 184,
299; iv. 61, 73, 77, 91, 216;
plans for diplomatic appointment, i. 292, 294;
marriage, 295;
enamoured of Désirée Clary, 312;
receives diplomatic appointment, 309;
French minister at Rome, ii. 28, 39;
demands Provera's dismissal from Rome, 39;
demands his passports, 39;
sends information to _N._ in Egypt, 80;
political and social preferment, 96;
member of the Five Hundred, 95;
plenipotentiary to negotiate with Cobenzl, 188;
France's representative at Lunéville, 193;
his skilful diplomacy, 256;
negotiates the treaty of Amiens, 263;
_N._ confides the Duc d'Enghien's case to, 307;
at Malmaison, 308;
seeks clemency for the Duc d'Enghien, 308;
coolness between _N._ and, 308;
the right of imperial succession in his family, 322;
created Elector and imperial prince, 322;
on his brother's strength with the army, 334;
at _N.'s_ coronation, 342;
declines the crown of Italy, 352;
in battle of Austerlitz, 387;
made king of Naples, 395;
dominion over Sicily, 401;
advised to show himself terrible at first, 439;
reports _N.'s_ Indian scheme, 442;
Pius VII refuses to recognize his sovereignty, iii. 68;
assumes the title of Napoleon, 82;
residence at Naples, 129;
interview with _N._ at Venice, 129-131;
the crown of Spain offered to, 131;
reform of Neapolitan politics, 130;
ambition, 131;
ordered to Bayonne, 149;
king of Spain, 150, 169, 142, 279, 382, 421;
assumes government at Madrid, iii. 154;
entreats _N._ assistance in Spain, 158;
lacks male descendants, 160;
asserts his sovereignty, 190;
driven from Madrid, 190;
the Spaniards swear allegiance to, 191, 192;
accompanies _N._ on his second marriage journey, 258;
his Spanish territory contracted, 278;
signs a conditional abdication, 282;
bickerings with Soult, 287;
Wellington moves to Madrid against, 290;
temporary government at Valencia, 377;
acting regent in Paris, iv. 58, 61;
gives up hope, 81;
sends flag of truce to Bernadotte, 85;
enjoined to save the Empress and her son from Austrian capture, 91;
member of the Empress-Regent's council, 106;
proclaims his brother's approach to Paris, 109;
prepares for defense of Paris, 109;
deputy emperor, 111;
overtakes the Empress at Chartres, 111;
empowers Marmont to treat for surrender, 111;
Napoleon's rage at, 115;
takes refuge in Switzerland, 135;
assigned to the House of Peers, 160;
president of the council of state, 169;
advised to hold the legislature in hand, 216.
=Buonaparte, Josephine=, marital relations with _N._, i. 452-455;
ii. 66, 84, 198, 256, 328; iii. 11, 26, 27, 160, 161, 179-181,
246, 247, 252-253;
character, licentious conduct, jealousy, etc., i. 452-455;
ii. 55, 84; iii. 11, 27, 92, 246, 247;
domestic and social life, the imperial court, etc., i. 452-455;
ii. 254-257, 279; iii. 91-94, 145;
the divorce, its causes and decretal, i. 453, 454; ii. 66, 84,
256, 328; iii. 99, 160, 161, 179-181, 245-247, 252, 253;
letters from _N._, i. 320, 452, 455; iii. 43, 60, 110;
visits Rome, ii. 28;
joins _N._ in Paris, Dec., 1797, 28;
royalist intrigues with, 36;
bids farewell to _N._ at Toulon, 55;
influence over Gohier, 97;
in pecuniary straits, 122;
brings about marriage between Hortense and Louis Bonaparte, 257;
fear of Talleyrand, 308;
attitude in the Duc d'Enghien's case, 308;
accompanies _N._ to Boulogne, 328;
ecclesiastically married to _N._, 341;
the coronation, 342-346;
forbidden to follow her husband to Poland, iii. 27;
reproaches _N._ with his amours, 27;
travels through France, 74;
accompanies _N._ to Bayonne, 142;
_N.'s_ harsh treatment at Fontainebleau, 179;
self-abasement of, 246;
withdraws to Malmaison, 247;
conducts negotiations for _N.'s_ Austrian marriage, 253;
_N._ visits, after the divorce, 257;
never preferred to power, 327.
=Buonaparte, Letizia=, death of, i. 34;
tradition concerning birth of _N._, 39, 40;
character, 40; iv. 137, 287;
letter from _N._ to, i. 64;
vicissitudes of fortune, 64, 65, 80, 96, 225, 291; ii. 95; iv. 287;
her opinion of _N._, i. 84;
settles near Toulon, 262;
disapproves _N.'s_ marriage, 321;
social influence, ii. 96;
remark of Mme. Permon to, 130;
distrusts _N.'s_ elevation, 258;
residence in Corsica, 258;
refuses to attend the coronation, 342;
Princess Charlotte's sojourn with, iii. 130;
attacks on her good name, iv. 137;
visits _N._ at Elba, 142;
thrift, 287;
knowledge of _N.'s_ limitations, 287.
=Buonaparte, Louis= (brother of _N._), birth, i. 33;
prospects, 80;
loses appointment to artillery school, 88;
remains at Brienne, 88;
_N._ aids and protects, 89, 96, 140, 144, 147, 149, 150;
fails to secure admission to Brienne, 96;
certificate to his republicanism, 136;
confirmed, 147;
follows his brother's fortunes, 159, 263;
idle career, 184;
promoted adjutant-general of artillery, 238;
ordered to Châlons as a cadet, 238;
officer of home guard at Nice, 254;
falls from favor, 254;
lieutenant of artillery, 262;
deprived of employment, 284;
ordered to Châlons, 288, 291;
promoted, 309;
marries Hortense Beauharnais, ii. 257; iii. 269;
his son Napoleon, ii. 282;
created Constable of France, 323; iii. 96;
at _N.'s_ coronation, ii. 342;
declines the crown of Italy for his son, 352;
made king of Holland, 397; iii. 25, 96, 269;
ordered to hold the Rhine, ii. 424;
character, iii. 25;
reprimanded by _N._ for economy, 25;
character of his reign, 25, 148, 270, 271, 276-278;
letters from _N._, 140, 148, 276;
relations with _N._, 82;
assumes title of Louis Napoleon, 82;
the Spanish crown offered to, 140;
refuses the crown, 140, 207;
loyalty to the Dutch, 140;
violates the Continental System, 266;
_N.'s_ affection for, 269;
promoted general, 269;
made councilor of state, 269;
share in the Italian and Egyptian campaigns, 269;
arrogates the royal dignity to himself, 270;
_N.'s_ quarrel with, 269-277;
_N._ offers to exchange the Hanseatic towns for Brabant and
Zealand, 270;
contemplates resistance to _N._, 270;
reduced to the position of a French governor, 270, 271;
prepares to defend Holland, 271;
summoned to Paris, 270;
complains of his queen Hortense, 270;
virtually a prisoner in France, 270;
submits to _N._, 271;
permitted to return to Amsterdam, 271;
opens negotiations with England, 271;
continues to oppose _N._, 275, 276;
flight to Teplitz, 276.
=Buonaparte, Louis Napoleon= (nephew of _N._, son of Louis; crown
prince of Holland), created Grand Duke of Berg, iii. 279.
=Buonaparte, Lucien= (great-uncle of _N._), condition, i. 40;
affection for his family, 65;
illness of, 79, 84-89;
political opinions, 115;
death, 161.
=Buonaparte, Lucien= (brother of _N._), birth, i. 33;
goes to Autun, 43;
relations with _N._, 55, 89, 115;
advancement for, 57;
at Brienne, 81;
turns toward the priesthood, 81;
leaves Brienne, 88, 115;
efforts to enter at Aix, 96;
memoirs of _N._, 97, 98, 207, 316-319; ii. 265;
independence of, i. 140;
radical leader at Ajaccio, 184;
letter to Costa, 187;
in diplomatic service, 197;
denounces Paoli, 197;
at Toulon, 207;
appropriates _N.'s_ birth certificate, 208;
in commissary department, 208, 225;
"the little Robespierre," 238;
marriage, 254;
deprived of employment, 284;
destitution of, 288, 289;
imprisoned at Aix, 291;
liberated, 309;
foments quarrels in Italy, ii. 87;
political and social preferment, 95;
member and president of the Five Hundred, 97, 105, 114-118;
on the 19th Brumaire, 115-118;
makes a dramatic scene at St. Cloud, 116;
summons Bonapartist members of the Five Hundred to meet, 118;
harangues the mutilated chambers, 123;
minister of the interior, 131;
suggests plebiscite on the question of life consulship, 245;
declines to marry the queen of Etruria, 257;
exiled, 257;
second marriage, 257;
democracy of, 257;
in literary society, 257;
at summit of his career, 257;
French minister to Madrid, 257;
dispute between _N._ and Joseph concerning marriage of, 308;
the savior of _N.'s_ fortunes on the 18th Brumaire, 315;
the right of imperial succession in his family, 322;
created an imperial prince, 322;
at Rome during _N.'s_ coronation, 342;
proposal that he take the crown of Etruria, iii. 129;
opposes hereditary consulate for _N._, 129;
residence at Rome, 129;
marries Mme. de Jauberthon, 129;
refuses kingly honors, 129, 130;
refuses to divorce his wife, 129, 130;
character, 129, 135;
interview with _N._ at Mantua, 129, 130;
sails to the United States, 277;
captured by the English, 277;
Mme. de Staëls complaint of _N._ to, 298, 299;
fosters revolution in Rome, iv. 144;
assigned to the House of Peers, 160;
member of the council of state, 169;
advises a dictatorship after Waterloo, 217;
endeavors to solve the difficulties after Waterloo, 217;
_N._ dictates his abdication to, 218.
=Buonaparte, Maria-Anna= (sister of _N._), i. 33.
=Buonaparte, Marie-Anne-Elisa= (sister of _N._), birth, i. 33;
educated at Saint-Cyr, 55, 60, 62, 71;
defective education, 71, 182;
_N._ visits at St. Cyr, 176;
quits St. Cyr and returns to Corsica, 182, 184;
at Nice, 244;
suitor for, 291;
marriage to Felice Bacciocchi, 322;
ii. 258;
acquires Massa-e-Carrara and Garfagnana, 395;
created Grand Duchess of Tuscany and Princess of Lucca and
Piombino, iii. 279.
_See also_ =Bacciocchi, Princess=.
=Buonaparte, Nabulione=, i. 33, 36;
forms of the name, 38, 39.
=Buonaparte, Napoleon=.
_See_ =Napoleon=.
=Buonaparte, Napoleon Louis Charles= (nephew of _N._, son of Louis),
_N.'s_ partiality for, ii. 282; iii. 269;
proposal to create him king of Italy, ii. 352;
death of, iii. 52, 160, 269.
=Buonaparte, Pauline= (sister of _N._), birth of, i. 33;
at Nice, 244;
suitor for, 291;
flirtation with Fréron, 322;
marries Gen. Leclerc, ii. 236;
marries Prince Borghese, 258;
acquires Guastalla, 395;
adviser to Maria Louisa, iii. 257;
created Duchess of Guastalla, 279.
_See also_ =Leclerc, Mme.=; =Borghese Princess=.
=Buonaparte family, the=, i. 8, 20-34;
ennobling and coat armor of, 28;
vicissitudes of fortune, 35, 58, 63, 65, 80, 83-90, 96, 114, 115,
134, 161, 164, 184, 185, 205, 215, 236, 284, 288, 291, 322;
_N._ regards himself as head of, 88, 161, 211, 309, 322;
claim against the government, 89, 115;
the "infamy" of, 97;
Salicetti's influence over, 116;
influence in Corsica, 139, 202;
_N.'s_ devotion to, 140, 161, 244;
outburst against, in Ajaccio, 205;
driven from their estates, 205;
leave Corsica for Toulon, 208;
residence in Toulon, 208, 212;
flight to Marseilles, 212;
driven from Toulon, 216;
social diplomacy of, 262;
news of _N.'s_ return from Egypt brought to, ii. 83;
political preferment among members of, 95;
meeting to consider the hereditary consulship, 244;
the women of, 258;
domestic life, 279;
relations with the First Consul, 279;
social triumph of, iii. 93;
urge divorce from Josephine, 125;
allotment of crowns among, 133, 139;
consolidation of Italy under, 167;
agree on the Austrian marriage, 254;
arrogance of its members, 270, 278;
fraternal instincts, 322;
Austrian discovery of their royal descent, iv. 44;
proscribed, 223;
France again under, 233.
=Burgau=, ceded to Bavaria, ii. 391.
=Burgos=, Murat assumes command at, iii. 134;
Ferdinand VII at, 143;
siege and fall of, 183, 185;
French movement toward, 185;
failure of Marmont to capture, 290.
=Burgundy=, _N._ visits, i. 146.
=Burke, Edmund=, influence of his oratory, i. 195;
on Malmesbury's mission to Paris, 449.
=Burrard, Gen. H.=, defeats Wellesley's plans at Vimeiro, iii. 157;
retired from active service, 186.
=Busaco=, battle of, iii, 284, 285;
the _cantinière_ of, 291.
=Buttafuoco, Matteo=, treachery of, i. 17, 22;
invites Rousseau to Corsica, 19;
relations with Choiseul, 21;
represents Corsica at Versailles, 115;
attitude toward Corsican patriots, 117;
popular hatred of, 121, 133, 135;
succeeded by Salicetti, 133, 136;
_N.'s_ diatribe against, 133, 136;
_N.'s_ "Letters" to, 145;
his marriage condemned by _N._, 311.
=Buxhöwden, Gen.=, advance of Russian troops under, ii. 367;
joins Kutusoff at Wischau, 379.
=Bylandt, Count de=, advises Holland to defy France, iii. 271;
in battle of Waterloo, iv. 201.
C
=Cabanis=, influence on the Consulate, ii. 195.
=Cabarrus, Jeanne M. I. T.=, i. 315.
_See also_ =Fontenaye, Mme. de=; =Tallien, Mme.=
=Cadiz=, Nelson loses an eye at, ii. 62;
Villeneuve makes for, 359, 371;
Collingwood blockades, 371;
Nelson's fleet off, 373;
threatened invasion by England, iii. 133, 155;
seizure of a French fleet at, 155;
Soult before, 286, 289;
Soult abandons, 290;
becomes the capital of the nationalists, 290.
=Cadore=, creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 395;
Champagny created Duke of, iii. 87.
_See_ =Champagny=.
=Cadoudal, Georges=, complaints of England's harboring of, ii. 271;
conspiracy to seize _N._, 297 et seq.;
leader of the Chouans, 297;
arrest and execution, 299, 303;
_N.'s_ clemency toward his co-conspirators, 328;
funeral mass celebrated for, iv. 146.
=Cæsar, Augustus=, _N._ likened to, iii. 43.
=Cæsar, Julius=, _N.'s_ study of and admiration for, resemblances
between _N._ and, i. 161, 395, 423;
ii. 147, 158, 159, 230;
iii. 319; iv. 130, 232, 266;
_N._ disclaims the rôle of, ii. 112, 117;
his work for civilization, 157; iii. 319.
=Caffarelli, Gen.=, bearer of _N.'s_ letter to Pius VII, ii. 339;
in battle of Austerlitz, 387.
=Cagliari=, expedition against, i. 191.
=Cahors=, birthplace of Murat, ii. 195.
"=Caia=," and "=Caius=," ii. 329.
"=Ça Ira=," i. 244, 266.
=Cairo=, military operations at, i. 352;
ii. 60;
Magallon consul at, 47;
the march from Alexandria to, 59;
capture of, 61;
failure of the promised plunder at, 61;
fortification of, 67;
_N._ at, 69, 76;
retreat of the army from Acre to, 75;
_N.'s_ "triumphal" return to, 76;
surrender of, 211.
=Calahorra=, the Spanish forces near, iii. 184, 185.
=Calais=, parallel between Magdeburg and, iii. 62.
=Calder, Adm. Sir Robert=, encounters Villeneuve off Cape
Finisterre, ii. 359;
reinforces blockade of Brest, 359;
encounter with Villeneuve, 371.
=Caldiero=, occupied by Alvinczy, i. 388;
Alvinczy retreats from, 390.
=Calendar, the Republican=, i. 248.
=Calonne, C. A. de=, taxation problems of, i. 105.
=Calotte=, the constitution of the, i. 94.
=Calvi=, French influence and power in, i. 116, 207;
the Buonapartes seek asylum in, 205;
_N._ at, 205;
imprisonment of Corsicans in, 252;
English capture of, 261.
=Cambacérès, J. J. R.=, dreads a new Terror, ii. 93;
appointed consul, 130;
minister of justice, 130;
organizer of the Code Napoléon, 222, 226;
scheme for reform of the tribunate, 242;
suggests plebiscite on question of life consulship, 244;
Chancellor of France, 323;
at _N.'s_ coronation, 342;
demurs to action against the Duc d'Enghien, 304;
created Duke of Parma, iii. 86;
salary, 96;
arch-chancellor, 96;
on _N.'s_ appearance after the treaty of Schönbrunn, 245;
member of extraordinary council on _N.'s_ second marriage, 253;
member of the Empress-Regent's council, iv. 106;
character, 106;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, 159.
=Cambronne, Gen. P. J. E.=, aids in _N.'s_ escape from Elba, iv. 153;
in battle of Waterloo, 209.
=Campan, Mme.=, appointment in the imperial court, ii. 324.
=Campbell, Sir Neil=, British commissioner at Fontainebleau, iv. 134;
_N.'s_ relations with, 134, 142, 150;
accompanies _N._ to Elba, 140;
ambassador to _N.'s_ court at Elba, 144;
leaves Elba for Florence, 150, 153.
=Camperdown=, battle of, ii. 38.
=Campo Formio=, treaty of, i. 456;
ii. 18-22, 24, 31, 37, 42, 145, 148, 187;
iii. 329.
=Canada=, lost to France, i. 17, 22.
=Canals=, Bonaparte's scheme of, ii, 279.
=Canino, Prince of=.
_See_ =Buonaparte, Lucien=.
=Cannes=, _N.'s_ march through, on return from Elba, iv. 153, 154.
=Canning, George=, denounces _N._, ii, 144;
foreign secretary in Portland cabinet, iii. 69;
responsibility for the bombardment of Copenhagen, 70, 97;
despatches the fleet to the Baltic, 98;
demands the secret articles of Tilsit, 98;
fall of, 272;
policy of action against _N._, 284;
enforces Orders in Council, 378.
=Canonical institution=, the question of, iv. 390.
=Canova, Antonio=, makes statue of Empress Maria Louisa, iii. 300.
=Cantonal assemblies=, ii. 247.
=Cape of Good Hope=, taken by England from the Dutch, ii. 12, 38;
ceded to the Batavian Republic by treaty of Amiens, 233;
England's rights in, 262;
_N.'s_ ambitions concerning, 289; iii. 308.
=Cape St. Vincent=, battle of, i. 456; ii. 62.
=Cape Verd Islands=, proposition to deport _N._ to, iv. 145.
=Caprera=, expedition against, i. 192.
=Caprino=, battle at, i. 412, 413.
"=Captain=," Nelson's ship in battle of Cape St. Vincent, ii, 62.
=Capuchins=, attempt to oust them from Corsican domains, i. 168.
=Caraccioli, Adm. F. C.=, execution of, ii. 300.
=Cardinals, the College of=, transplanted to France, iii. 258, 263.
=Carinthia=, _N._ in, i. 434;
revolutionary sentiment in, ii. 42;
part of, ceded to France, iii. 239.
=Carinthian Mountains=, pursuit of Archduke John across the, iii. 212.
=Carlsbad=, Talleyrand at, iv. 224.
"=Carmagnole=," the, i. 244, 266.
=Carniola=, Charles guards road into, i. 432;
ceded to France, iii. 239.
=Carnot, Lazare N. M.=, minister of war, i. 233, 279;
favors _N._, 299, 320;
reorganizes the French army, 240, 325, 332, 333, 379;
military policy of, 249;
removal of, 279;
escape of, 285; ii. 8, 27;
member of the Directory, i. 186, 330-333;
character, 330-333;
at battle of Maubeuge, 332;
plans the Italian campaign (1795), 346;
_N.'s_ correspondence with, May, 1796, 364;
advises restoring the Milanese to Austria, 451;
relations with _N._, ii. 8;
desire for peace with Austria, 19;
Barras derides his suggestions, 19;
writes a justificatory pamphlet, 91;
development of his conscription scheme, 93;
reappointed minister of war, 130, 153;
influence on the fall of the Directory, 130;
military genius, 153;
detaches Lecourbe's force from Moreau's army, 168;
possible successor to _N._, 186;
influence on the Consulate, 195;
member of the tribunate, 243;
remonstrates against adulation of _N._, 295;
opposes the creation of the Empire, 321;
pensioned, iii. 297;
commissioned to write on fortification, 297;
invited to join in insurrection, iv. 149;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, 159;
advises a dictatorship for France after Waterloo, 217;
member of the new Directory, 218.
=Caroline, Queen of Naples=, iii. 124;
on Maria Louisa's imprisonment at Schönbrunn, iv. 143.
=Carpentras=, lost to the Pope at peace of Tolentino, ii. 326.
=Carrier, J. B.=, crimes of, i. 234;
opposes Robespierre, 251.
=Carrion-Nisas, A. H.=, "Peter the Great," ii. 350.
=Cartagena=, Villeneuve ordered to, ii. 371;
rebellion in, iii. 154.
=Carteaux, Gen.=, seizes Valence, i. 214;
besieges Avignon, 214;
takes Marseilles, 220;
captures Ollioules, 225;
besieges Toulon, 224, 225;
ignorance of military affairs, 227;
removed from command, 228.
=Cassel=, Blücher's military movements in, ii. 427;
restored to its former ruler, iv. 40.
=Castaños, Gen. F. X. de=, causes Dupont's surrender at Baylen, iii. 156;
position on the Ebro, 184, 185;
concerted French movement against, 185;
collects his troops at Siguenza, 185.
=Casteggio=, battle of, ii. 176.
=Castellane=, journal of, iii. 361.
=Castelnuovo=, disarmament of, i. 442.
=Castiglione=, battle of, i. 382; ii. 140;
Augereau's victory at, 323;
celebration of the battle of, 228;
Augereau created Duke of, iii. 86.
_See also_ =Augereau=.
=Castile=, French occupation of, iii. 286;
weakness of French forces in, 289;
reinforcements for Masséna ordered from, 289.
=Castlereagh, Lord=, secretary for war in Portland cabinet, iii. 69;
policy of action and bitterness against _N._, 284; iv. 145, 162;
prime minister of England, iii. 328;
inspires action by Bernadotte, 350;
becomes foreign secretary, 378, 417, 422;
dissatisfied with the Frankfort terms, iv. 42;
character, 42, 67;
at headquarters of the allies at Basel, 66;
influence in European councils, 67, 68;
under Metternich's influence, 68;
uneasiness at _N.'s_ message to Francis, 75;
on the European policy of 1814, 89;
protests against the use of the imperial style by _N._, 133;
negotiates secret treaty between England, Austria, and France, 145;
protests to Talleyrand against violation of treaty obligations, 153;
retires from Congress of Vienna, 173;
letter from Lord Liverpool, June 20, 1815, 224.
=Catalonia=, French occupation of, iii. 156;
Duhesme evacuates, 157;
military government of, 279;
French possession of, 377.
=Catharine of Würtemberg=, marries Jerome Bonaparte, ii. 399;
iii. 93, 94.
=Cathcart, Gen. W. S.=, besieges Copenhagen, iii. 70;
heads English embassy to Russia, 351;
influences the armistice of Poischwitz, 417;
English minister at St. Petersburg, 417;
at Congress of Prague, 423.
=Catherine II=, policy of, i. 22; iii. 51, 309;
death of, i. 425, 452;
_N._ shatters a gift of, ii. 20;
_N.'s_ admiration for, 347;
share in partition of Poland, iii. 309;
her life and work, iv. 251.
=Catherine, Grand Duchess= (of Russia), mentioned for marriage
with _N._, iii. 180, 181;
marries the Duke of Oldenburg, 181, 278, 310.
=Catholic emancipation=, the question of, ii. 208.
=Cato=, statue at the Tuileries, ii. 147.
=Cattaro=, Alexander I's scheme for acquiring, ii. 356;
Russian occupation of, 405;
compensation for, iii. 56.
=Caulaincourt, A. A. L. de=, leads expedition to Offenburg, ii. 304;
Master of the Horse, 324, 425;
relations with _N._, 425; iii. 107; iv. 87, 105, 115, 134, 159;
conducts negotiations with Russia, iii. 87, 107-110, 113, 116-118,
165, 168, 169, 244, 310, 315, 318, 408-411;
connection with the d'Enghien murder, iii. 107;
_N.'s_ instructions to, 115;
discusses partition of Turkey, 116;
explains Bernadotte's dilatoriness, 117;
reproved by _N._, 165;
friendship with the Czar, 165, 168;
ordered to ventilate the divorce question, 181;
conducts _N.'s_ matrimonial negotiations in Russia, 247, 248;
explains the Austrian marriage to Alexander, 255;
recalled, 318, 326;
knowledge of Russia, 325, 326;
French commissioner at Poischwitz, 414;
at Congress of Prague, 423;
letter from Metternich, November, 1813, iv. 42, 45;
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 42;
letter to Metternich, Dec. 2, 1813, 46;
conducts negotiations at Châtillon, 67-71, 74, 78, 87;
demands authority to treat after La Rothière, 69, 70;
blamed for not saving his country at Châtillon, 70;
letter from Maret, 87;
at council at St. Dizier, 103;
seeks peace at any price, 103;
seeks audience with Alexander, 116, 117;
at the abdication scene, 121, 122;
on commission to present abdication to Alexander, 124, 125, 126;
urges the regency, 126;
transfers his allegiance, 129;
_N.'s_ declaration to, concerning his generals, 128;
memoirs of, 130;
records _N.'s_ first attempt at suicide, 130;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, 159;
member of the new Directory, 218.
=Cautillon=, attempt to assassinate Wellington, iv. 234;
_N.'s_ bequest to, 234.
=Cavallos=, defends Ferdinand's position, iii. 143.
=Cavalry=, _N.'s_ views on, and use of, i. 59; ii. 178.
=Cayenne=, wholesale deportations to, ii. 8.
=Celibacy=, _N._ on, i. 138.
=Ceracchi=, charged with conspiracy, ii. 235;
execution of, 241.
=Ceraino=, military operations near, i. 412.
=Cerbeau, Du=, i. 143.
=Cervoni=, i. 220, 233.
=Ceva=, battle of, i. 352-335.
=Ceylon=, retained by England, ii. 211, 262;
France guarantees its return to Holland, 289.
=Chaboulon, Fleury de=, sent to Naples, iv. 152;
reveals the state of France to _N._, 152.
=Chabran, Gen.=, forces in Savoy, ii. 169;
crosses the Little St. Bernard, 171.
=Chabrol=, imperial prefect, iv. 106.
=Chaillot=, suspected plot of royalists at, ii. 303.
=Châlons=, _N._ leaves Paris for, iv. 53;
French concentration at, 58;
_N._ reaches, 58;
_N._ plans pursuing Blücher to, 65;
Blücher collects his army at, 73;
_N._ plans to attack Schwarzenberg at, 77;
Marmont ordered to, 91, 93;
the allies open new communications via, 97.
=Cham=, Archduke Charles makes a stand at, iii. 210, 216.
=Chamartin=, the French troops at, iii. 187, 189.
=Chambers of Commerce=, establishment of, ii. 220.
=Chambéry=, _N._ at, ii. 27, 30;
reinforcements for Augereau at, iv. 94.
=Champagny, L. A.=, created Duke of Cadore, iii. 87;
appointed Minister of External Relations, 96, 132;
plenipotentiary at Altenburg, 238, 239;
succeeded in the Foreign Office by Maret, 318;
mission to Francis at Dijon, iv. 128.
=Champaubert=, battle of, iv. 63, 66.
=Championnet, Gen.=, overthrows the Neapolitan throne, ii. 87;
disgraceful conduct at Naples, 92.
=Channel tunnel=, the, ii. 290.
"=Chant du Départ=," the, iv. 118.
=Chaptal, J. A.=, member of the council of state, ii. 152.
=Chardon, Abbé=, on _N.'s_ boyhood, i. 45.
=Charenton=, Marmont and Mortier driven back to, iv. 99.
=Charette=, institutes royalist retaliation on republican
prisoners, i. 277.
=Charleroi=, military operations near, iv. 171, 173-177, 179, 180,
196, 208;
_N._ at, 175, 177, 211, 239.
=Charles, Archduke=, defeats Jourdan, i. 385;
defeated by Moreau, 385;
campaign in the Tyrol, 425, 428;
ordered into Friuli, 426, 430;
military genius, 426; iii. 215;
guards Carniola, i. 432;
battle on the Tagliamento, 432;
on the river Mur, 434;
cut off from succor, 436;
letter from _N._, 435;
defeats Jourdan at Ostrach and Stockach, ii. 88;
effect of his successes, 89;
defeats Masséna at Zürich, 93;
defeated by Masséna at Zürich, 141;
withdraws temporarily from service, 160;
resumes command after Hohenlinden, 192, 358;
commanding Austrian army in Italy, 363;
reaches Marburg, 367;
position on the Adige, 367;
commanding Austrian troops from Italy, 380;
the throne of Spain offered to, iii. 166;
reorganizes the Austrian army, 198;
declares war against France, 199;
to operate in Bohemia, 199;
plans to rouse the German people, 199;
procrastinates, 199;
offensive movement in the Danube valley, 204;
_N.'s_ plan for meeting, 203;
mistakes in the campaign of Eckmühl, 204-207;
crosses the Isar, 205;
a lost opportunity, 204;
plan of offense, 205;
marches against Davout, 205;
marches on Ratisbon, 205, 208;
force at Ludmannsdorf and Rohr, 207;
force at Moosburg, 207;
retires to Ratisbon, 209;
in battle of Eckmühl, 209;
retires before Davout, 209;
_N.'s_ reasons for not pursuing after Eckmühl, 210;
crosses the Danube, 210;
makes a stand at Cham, 210, 216;
sues for peace, 211, 216;
junction with Hiller at Bisamberg, 212, 216;
seizes Ratisbon, 216;
at Budweis, 216;
indecision of, 216;
his line on the Danube, 216;
advance toward Wagram, 218;
attempts to break _N.'s_ bridges, 219;
in battles of Aspern and Essling, 219-223;
conduct after Aspern, 223-225;
seeks the offices of diplomacy, 224;
battle of Wagram, 226-232;
withdraws toward Znaim, 230;
orders Archduke John to attack, 230;
pursued by _N._ and Marmont, 235;
asks an armistice, 235;
quarrels with the Emperor and John, 235;
resigns his command, 235;
at marriage of Maria Louisa, 256.
=Charles Emmanuel=, succeeds Victor Amadeus, i. 356;
retires to Sardinia, ii. 39, 87, 141.
=Charles Emmanuel IV=, invited by Russia to return to Turin, ii. 141.
=Charles Ludwig Frederic, of Baden=, marries Stephanie Napoleone,
ii. 399.
=Charles the Great=, his work for civilization, ii. 157;
_N.'s_ emulation of, 157; iii. 304, 306;
French longings for a modern, ii. 214;
restoring the empire of, 233;
reversion to state and titles of the reign of, 323;
coronation of, 325;
gift to the Papacy, 346;
his system of "marches," iii. 55;
_N._ resumes the grant of, 118;
magnificence of his empire, 131;
Spanish territory of, 133, 134;
his donation to Hadrian I revoked by _N._, 215;
his ideal, 319;
_N._ compared with, 319; iv. 292;
the second, iii. 330;
imitation of his times, iv. 165;
influence on Europe, 292.
=Charles IV= (of Spain), attachment to Godoy, ii. 204;
king of Spain, 289;
subserviency to France, and relations with _N._, iii. 71, 126-128, 141;
conspires against his son's succession, 71;
unites with _N._ in coercing Portugal, 119;
scheme to acquire Portugal, 120;
character, 124;
announces his son's conspiracy, 127;
blames the French minister at Madrid, 127;
correspondence with _N._, 128, 131, 133;
pardons Ferdinand, 127;
proposes to cut off Ferdinand's succession, 127;
_N._ reveals his policy to, 133;
panic-stricken at the French invasion, 133;
deposes Godoy, 135;
last days of his kingdom, 135;
abdicates, 136;
repudiates his abdication, 138, 145;
seeks Murat's protection, 138;
virtual prisoner in the Escorial, 142;
deposed, 144-148;
summoned to Bayonne, 145;
refuses Ferdinand's offer to surrender the crown, 145;
pensioned, 147;
restrains Gen. Solano's movements, 149;
at Compiègne, 148;
goes to Marseilles, 149;
weakness of, 150;
goes to Italy, 149.
=Charles V=, magnificence of his empire, iii. 131.
=Charles X.=
_See_ =Artois, Count of=.
=Charles XII of Sweden=, military despotism of, ii. 118.
=Charles XIII=, king of Sweden, ii. 416;
succeeds Gustavus IV, iii. 280;
makes Bernadette his successor, 280;
under _N.'s_ protection, 280;
feebleness of his rule, 317.
=Charters=, destruction of feudal, i. 109, 110.
=Chartres=, flight of the Empress and Joseph through, iv. 111.
=Chartres, Duc de= (Louis Philippe), scheme to place him on the
French throne, iv. 148.
=Chateaubriand, F. A.=, friendship with Mme. Bacciocchi, ii. 258;
literary works, 259;
envoy to Valais, 260;
a disciple of Rousseau, 259;
envoy to Rome, 260;
supposed sponsor for the Concordat, 260;
influence, 260;
his name omitted from the honor list of 1810, iii. 300;
on the new constitution, iv. 160.
=Château-Thierry=, French occupation of, iv. 63;
Blücher's retreat through, and sack of, 63, 64;
Macdonald's failure at, 72;
military movements near, 94.
=Châtelet=, military operations near, iv. 174, 177, 179.
=Chatham, Earl of=, compared with Carnot, i. 331;
policy toward France, ii. 208.
=Châtillon, Congress of=, iv. 68-75, 79, 87, 88;
Caulaincourt's carte blanche at, 69, 70, 88;
rumored preliminaries of peace at, 73;
sends ultimatum to _N._, 74, 76;
closes, 76;
capture of some of the diplomats of, 95.
=Chaumont=, surrenders to one Würtemberg horseman, iv. 51;
treaty of, 76, 164;
military operations near, 90.
=Chemnitz=, the Saxon army at, ii. 424;
contemplated movements at, iv. 23.
=Chénier, André=, ii. 350.
=Chénier, M. J.=, driven from the tribunate, ii. 243;
"Cyrus," 350;
suppresses his writings, iii. 88;
rewards for his literary work, 297;
opposes the empire, 300;
made inspector-general of the university, 301.
=Cheops, Pyramid of=, _N._, in the, ii. 66.
=Cherasco=, capture of, i. 354, 355.
=Chevreuse, Mme. de=, pert remark to _N._, and banishment, iii. 94.
=Chimay, Princess de=, i. 315.
_See also_ =Tallien, Mme.=
=China=, _N.'s_ attention turned toward, i. 78.
=Chiusa Veneta=, capture of fort at, i, 433.
=Choiseul, C. A. G.=, refuses protectorate to Corsica, i. 16;
his policy toward Corsica, 20-22;
disgrace of, 43;
_N.'s_ hatred for, 50;
scheme of Egyptian conquest, ii. 46.
=Chouans, the=, rebellion of, i. 277, 325, 449;
legislation against, ii. 94;
the Cadoudal conspiracy, 297 et seq.
=Christian VII=, imbecility of, iii. 70.
=Christianity=, _N.'s_ confusion of ideas concerning, i. 76, 77.
=Church, the=, _N.'s_ attitude toward, and relations with, i. 76,
77, 146, 147, 264; ii. 159, 173, 205, 206, 215, 246, 258, 265,
398, 407; iii. 68, 69, 85, 89, 118, 119, 154, 190, 215, 242,
243, 249, 258, 259, 262-264, 305, 306, 315, 377, 390;
demands for reform of, in Corsica, i. 116, 117;
enforced contributions by, at Ajaccio, 127;
attitude of the French governments toward, and relations with
the nation, 244; ii. 91, 131, 216, 258, 325 et seq.;
_N.'s_ study of the Gallican, i. 150;
reorganization of its property, 152;
changes in, 162;
sequestration of lands of, 161, 268, 269;
Louis XVI's support of, 268;
_N.'s_ speculation in sequestered lands of, 288;
plotting in, 297;
question of allegiance of the clergy, 401;
relation to education, ii. 226-228;
influence in Austria and Germany, 264;
reconstruction in France, 318;
scheme for unity of, in Germany, 402;
archbishops created counts, iii. 87;
degradation in Spain, 123;
pillaged in Spain, 158;
repressed in the Tyrol, 201;
the bishops' court pronounces _N.'s_ first marriage null, 253;
attitude toward _N.'s_ second marriage, 258, 259;
the College of Cardinals transplanted from Rome to Paris, 258, 264.
=Cicero=, statue at the Tuileries, ii. 147.
=Cintra=, Junot surrenders at, iii. 157, 159, 186.
=Cisalpine Republic, the=, formation of, ii. 10, 21;
pillage of, 38;
treaty with France, March, 1798, 38;
the Valtellina incorporated with, 40;
recognized by Prussia, 43;
dissolution of, 83;
picks a quarrel with Sardinia, 87;
reëstablishment of, 173, 186, 231;
tribute levied on, 186;
question of a president for, 230;
English efforts to discredit France in, 264.
=Cispadane Republic, the=, i. 401, 402;
question of a constitution for, ii. 10.
=Citadella=, battle of, i. 388.
"=Citizen=," use of the term in France, ii. 194.
=Citizenship=, liberty, equality, and fraternity in, i. 110;
the primary duty of, 306.
=Ciudad Rodrigo=, Spanish defense of, iii. 284;
storming of, 290, 319.
=Civil Code=, introduced into Warsaw, iii. 67.
_See also_ =Code=.
=Civil liberty=, developed in inverse ratio to political liberty,
ii. 223.
"=Civism=," i. 170, 180, 315.
=Clacy=, captured by _N._, iv. 79.
=Clanship=, i. 10.
=Clarke, Gen.=, letter from _N._, Nov. 19, 1796, i. 399, 400;
at Montebello, 452;
meeting with _N._, 451;
mission to Vienna, 451;
French agent in treaty of Campo Formio, ii. 20;
recalled to Paris, 20, 23;
forbidden to enter Vienna, 42;
guardian to King Louis's widow, 233;
drives British ships from Tuscan harbors, 287;
created Duke of Feltre, iii. 86;
ordered to fortify the Spanish frontier, 126;
minister of war, iv. 106;
member of the Empress-Regent's council, 106, 108;
advises the flight of the Empress, 108;
prepares for defense of Paris, 109;
_N.'s_ rage at, 115.
=Clary, Eugénie Bernardine Désirée=, proposal to wed _N._ to,
i. 295, 312;
affianced to Duphot, ii. 39, 43;
marries Bernadotte, 43.
=Clergy, the=, position at outbreak of the revolution, i. 100, 101, 107;
attitude in Corsica, 115, 116;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, and relations with, 124, 146, 147, 422,
423; ii. 11;
revolution among the clergy of Dauphiny, i. 143, 152;
constitutional reforms for, 153;
upheaval among, 162;
attitude of the Directory toward, ii. 2, 36;
transported to Cayenne, 8;
Talleyrand a leader among, 33;
released from the Jacobin ban, 131;
abolition of celibacy of, 206;
conformists and nonconformists to the civil constitution, 205, 215;
a "consecrated constabulary," 217;
restoration to the ecclesiastical fold, 346;
encourage rebellion in Spain, iii. 154.
_See also_ =Church=; =Papacy=; =Pius VII=; =Rome=.
=Cleves=, Prussia's price for, ii. 266;
ceded to France, 390.
=Cleves and Berg=, the Grand Duchy of, ii. 404;
French garrison in, 404.
=Clichy Club, the=, ii. 3, 5, 7, 23.
=Coalition of 1813=, centrifugal forces in, iv. 55-58.
=Cobenzl, Count L.=, Austrian plenipotentiary at Campo Formio, ii. 20;
at Congress of Rastatt, 28;
negotiates with France after Marengo, 189;
on universal conquest, iii. 43.
=Coblentz=, headquarters of French royalists, ii. 121.
=Coburg=, military operations near, ii. 428.
=Cockburn, Adm. Sir George=, conveys _N._ to St. Helena, iv. 227, 230.
=Code Civil=, its contravention by Jewish legislation, iii. 76.
=Code Napoléon, the=, ii. 221-225; iv. 296;
introduced into Parma and Piacenza, ii. 354;
abolition of the law of entail and primogeniture, iii. 85;
_N.'s_ excuse for overruling, 85;
introduced into Holland, 277;
in Italy, iv. 40.
=Code of Commerce=, the, ii. 224; iii. 74.
=Code of Criminal Procedure, the=, iii. 224.
=Coignet, Private=, _N.'s_ friendly familiarity with, ii. 196.
=Coignet=, writes of the entry into Berlin, ii. 438;
on the march to Russia, iii. 326;
reports demoralization after Dresden, iv. 12.
=Coigny, Mlle. de=, married to Savary, ii. 412.
=Coimbra=, military movements near, iii. 285.
=Colborne, Sir J.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 209.
=Col di Tenda=, the French line at, ii. 160.
=College of Cardinals=, increased French representation in the, iii. 118.
=College of France, the=, ii. 226.
=Colli, Gen.=, commanding Piedmontese troops, i. 353, 354;
reinforcements for, defeated, 354.
=Collingwood, Adm. Cuthbert=, his knowledge of the enemy's
movements, ii. 370;
blockades Cadiz, 371;
at Trafalgar, 373.
=Cologne=, Macdonald entrusted with defense of, iv. 54.
=Colombier, Caroline du=, _N.'s_ first love, i. 77, 149.
=Colombier, Mme. du=, i. 75, 149.
=Colonization=, Talleyrand's views on, ii. 33.
=Colonna=, represents Corsica in the National Assembly, i. 117, 118;
member of the Directory of Corsica, 133.
=Colonna-Cesari=, leads Corsican expedition against Sardinia,
i. 192, 193.
=Column of Vendôme=, erection of the, iii. 74.
=Comédie Française=, members accompany _N._ to Erfurt, iii. 174.
=Commerce=, condition of, at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 102;
influence on the social life of the world, ii. 46;
encouragement of, 220;
revived by the peace of Amiens, 236;
improved condition of, 259;
the scope of British, 270.
=Committee of Public Safety=, usurps supreme power, i. 207;
aided by Carnot, 223;
Corsicans denounced in, 252;
keeps _N._ under surveillance, 255, 256;
plans expedition against Rome, 261;
abolished, 279, 289;
the new, 291, 292, 297;
appoints _N._ on military commission, 292;
proposes to transfer _N._ to Constantinople, 297;
considers policy of excluding English goods from the Continent,
ii. 441;
difficulties with Mme. de Staël, iii. 297.
=Communal list, the=, ii. 126.
=Compiègne=, Spanish royal exiles at, iii. 148;
meeting of the Emperor with his Austrian bride at, 257, 258, 261, 268;
Blücher besieges, iv. 84.
=Compignano, Countess of=.
_See_ =Buonaparte, Marie-Anne-Elisa=.
=Compulsory loans=, ii. 134.
=Compulsory military service=, i. 213.
=Concordat, the=, ii. 207, 215, 301, 326 et seq., 402; iv. 259, 294, 296;
service in honor of, ii. 215;
its effect in France, 216;
"the vaccine of religion," 216;
contempt of the Army of the Rhine for, 235;
the supposed sponsor for, 260;
effect in Germany, 264;
extension to Venice refused by Pius VII, iii. 68;
Venetia admitted to, 118;
undoing the work of, 119;
rupture of, 306.
=Concordat of Fontainebleau=, the, iii. 391, 392.
=Condé=, evacuation of, i. 222.
=Condé, the Great=, ii. 301.
=Condé, Prince of=, ii. 308.
=Condorcet, J. A. N. de C.=, believer in equality of the sexes, ii. 226.
=Conegliano=, creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396;
Moncey created Duke of, iii. 86.
_See also_ =Moncey=.
=Confederation of the Rhine, the=, organization of, ii. 401-406, 417;
Hesse-Cassel refused admission to, 442;
levies of troops for France in, iii. 21, 196, 203, 322, 387, 394;
recognized at Tilsit, 54;
Saxony united with, 56;
relations with France, 73, 74, 279, 382;
additions to, 239;
called to arms by Prussia, 398;
proposed abandonment of French protectorate over, 407;
proposed dissolution of, 415;
proposed dynastic independence for sovereigns of, 422;
purpose of the allies to free, iv. 21;
resolved into its elements, 40;
forced by allies to raise military contingents, 54.
=Confiscation=, opposition to the reintroduction of, ii. 242;
principle of punishment by, iii. 295, 296.
=Coni=, surrendered to France, i. 355.
=Connewitz=, military operations near, iv. 27, 28.
=Consalvi, Cardinal=, negotiates the Concordat, ii. 207;
memorialist of Pius VII, 347;
dismissed from the papal service, 397.
=Conscription, the=, i. 275, 379; ii. 87, 93, 248, 306, 362, 409,
422; iii. 3, 21, 24, 25, 76, 77, 126, 132, 198, 291, 323, 326,
386, 387, 390, 414; iv. 21, 47-51, 99, 165;
development of Carnot's scheme, ii. 93;
_N.'s_ influence on the laws of, 248;
how enforced, 306;
Jewish evasions of the, iii. 76;
Jews made subject to, 77.
=Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers=, founded, i. 281.
=Conservatory of Music=, reorganization of, i. 281.
=Constable=, creation of the office of, ii. 322.
=Constabulary=, abolition of the, i. 142.
=Constance, city of=, ceded to Baden, ii. 391.
=Constance, Lake=, the Austrian camp on, ii. 365.
=Constant=, _N.'s_ valet, iv. 134.
=Constant de Rebecque, Henri-Benjamin=, dreads a new Terror, ii. 94;
member of the tribunate, 151, 242;
driven from the tribunate, 243;
president of the council of state, iv. 159;
supports the chambers, 217.
=Constantine, Grand Duke=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 386, 387;
Bennigsen writes to, after Friedland, iii. 32;
leader of the peace party, 35;
at Tilsit, 52;
with the Army of the South, iv. 3.
=Constantine the Great=, _N._ likened to, ii. 329.
=Constantinople=, proposal to send _N._ to, i. 296;
_N.'s_ eye on, 423;
proposed mission for Talleyrand to, ii. 66;
Russia to aid in defense of, 73;
_N._ given leave to march on, 72, 73;
fleet sent to relief of Acre from, 73, 74;
Russian ambition to acquire, 356; iii. 28, 64, 108, 113;
a British fleet at, 20;
French influence at, 33, 99;
proposed disposition of, after Tilsit, 55;
revolution in, 162;
England threatens to bombard, 321.
=Constitutional checks=, i. 106.
=Constitution of 1799=, prohibition against First Consul's military
leadership, ii. 162.
=Consular Guard, the=, at Marengo, ii. 179, 180;
strengthening of, 277.
=Consulate=, proposed formation of a, ii. 102;
a disguised monarchy, iv. 287.
=Continental System, the=, ii. 288, 375, 400; iii. 98, 101, 160,
165, 197, 239, 249, 255, 262-281, 283, 287, 294, 303, 304, 310,
316, 323, 328-330, 377, 409, 420, 425; iv. 294;
England's policy against, iii. 100-102.
=Copenhagen=, battle of, ii. 209;
bombardment of, iii. 70, 97-100, 280.
=Coppet=, Mme. de Staël's residence at, ii. 411; iii. 298.
=Corday, Charlotte=, assassination of Marat, i. 234.
=Cordova=, French capture and abandonment of, iii. 156.
=Corfu=, _N._ proposes to seize, i. 447;
France's jealous care of, ii. 32;
Adm. Brueys ordered to, 62;
blockade of, 67;
Russian occupation of, 353, 356, 357, 405;
French occupation of, iii. 99, 109, 111;
English naval watch on, 111;
proposed expedition to Egypt from, 114.
=Corizier=, wounded at Acre, ii. 76.
=Corneille, Pierre=, _N.'s_ study of, iii. 173; iv. 231.
=Cornet=, starts the proceedings of the 18th Brumaire, ii. 103.
=Cornwallis, Lord Charles=, character, ii. 263;
negotiates the treaty of Amiens, 263.
=Cornwallis, Adm. William=, junction of Nelson and, before Brest,
ii. 359.
=Corona=, military operations at, i. 410, 414.
=Correggio, A. A.=, plunder of the works of, i. 369, 374.
=Corsica=, external relations, i. 8-16, 24, 26;
physical features and population, 8-16, 39, 263;
Rousseau's views on, 9, 19;
the Buonaparte family in, 8, 27 et seq.;
feudalism in, 9, 18;
Paoli's share in history of, 15 et seq., 117-125, 127, 130, 132,
196-198, 204-207;
national heroes and patriotism in, 14, 42, 115, 117;
Jews in, 16;
French schemes concerning, expeditions against, and occupations
of, 16-25, 79, 120, 122, 125, 154, 165, 201-208, 261, 342, 403,
421;
_N.'s_ love for, residences in, schemes concerning, and peculiar
relations to, 17-19, 50-53, 58, 81, 82, 87-92, 96, 112, 116,
117, 122-124, 133, 160-170, 183-187, 209-211, 233, 253, 254,
257, 340, 341; ii. 158, 250;
Montesquieu's views on, i. 19;
joins the Bourbon-Hapsburg alliance, 21;
ceded by Genoa to France, 22;
England's interests in, protectorate over, conquest and
abandonment of, 23, 119, 124, 196, 205-208, 256-262, 402, 421;
disaffection, riots, and rebellion in, 25, 42, 83, 111-122, 139,
147, 166-170, 198, 254, 403;
compared with Sardinia, 25;
_N.'s_ history of, 76, 86, 91-98;
introduction of silkworm culture into, 80;
the betrayal of, 98;
the Revolution in, 111-122;
scheme of liberation, 112 et seq.;
plan for elective council in, 114;
rival parties and classes, schemes and intrigues in, 114-122,
162, 163, 166, 169-170, 185, 190, 199-210;
desired reforms for, 116;
representation in the National Assembly, 116-122;
the council of twelve nobles in, 118;
Genoa's claims to, 120, 121, 126;
ecclesiastical and religious troubles, 128, 162, 168;
democracy in, 131;
meeting of the constituent assembly at Orezza, 131-134;
Bastia declared the capital, 134;
the National Guard in, 133, 139, 157-159, 185, 192;
_N._ leaves for Auxonne, 141;
_N._ mobbed in, 147;
customs in, 158;
_N._ leaves, 170;
expedition against Sardinia from, 189-193;
enforcement of the Convention's decrees in, 197;
Salicetti deserts the cause of, 201;
_N._ appointed inspector-general of artillery for, 202;
new commissioners sent to, 204;
the Buonapartes leave, 207;
success of revolt against the Convention, 216;
Convention commission for, 219;
_N.'s_ expedition against, 233, 256-258, 262;
employment of refugees from, 252;
Salicetti blamed for insurrection in, 254;
wretched internal plight, 260;
charges against refugees from, 263;
_N.'s_ last visit to, ii. 82.
=Corsican Feuillants, the=, i. 163.
=Corsican Jacobins, the=, i. 163.
=Corso, Cape=, Paoli's landing at, i. 125.
=Corte=, the town of, i. 15;
removal of seat of government from, 25;
Carlo Buonaparte at, 29-32;
a Paolist center, 116;
Joseph Buonaparte at, 161;
_N._ ordered to, 186, 203;
meeting between Paoli and _N._ at, 190;
_N._ a suspect at, 202.
=Corunna=, the junta of, iii. 158;
Moore's retreat to, and death at, 189;
England's tardiness at, 192.
=Cossacks=, military achievements of, iii. 9, 10, 13, 20;
harass the retreating French army, 362, 364;
relieve Hamburg, 402;
in battle of Leipsic, iv. 29;
in the campaign of 1814, 62;
advance to Nemours and Fontainebleau, 72;
at the battle of Laon, 79;
fears of, in Paris, 108.
=Costa=, letter from _N._ to, i. 186;
letter from Lucien to, 186.
=Council of Ancients=, the, i. 270.
=Council of Juniors=, the, i. 270.
=Council of State, the=, ii. 127, 149-152;
stripped of its supremacy, 247;
approves _N.'s_ action against the Duc d'Enghien, 305;
its functions, iii. 83.
="Count of Essex," the=, i. 86.
="Courier," the London=, publishes Spanish manifesto of _N._, iii. 283.
=Coustou, Abbé=, attends Carlo Buonaparte's death-bed, i. 64.
=Coxe's "Travels in Switzerland,"= _N.'s_ study of, i. 150.
=Cracow=, ceded to the grand duchy of Warsaw, iii. 239;
Schwarzenberg seeks shelter in, 393.
=Crancé, Dubois de=, i. 223;
reorganization of the French armies by, 325;
organizes national conscription, 379.
=Craonne=, battle of, iv. 78.
=Crema=, withdrawal of the Austrians from Milan to, ii. 173.
=Croatia=, Austrian recruiting in, i. 386;
part of, ceded to France, iii. 239.
=Cromwell, Oliver=, _N._ disclaims the rôle of, ii. 112, 117;
the need of a second, in France, 119;
_N._ compared with, 230.
=Cronstadt=, Alexander fears for, iii. 98.
=Crôsne=, Sieyès accepts the estate of, ii. 130.
=Crottendorf=, military operations near, iv. 28.
=Crusades, the=, ii. 46.
=Cuneo=, associated with _N._ in Corsica, i. 117.
=Custine, Gen. A. P.=, occupies Frankfort, i. 194;
defeat of, 194.
=Cyprus=, Sir Sidney Smith puts into, ii. 82.
="Cyrus,"= by Chénier, ii. 350.
=Czartoryski, A. G.=, memoirs of, ii. 356;
Russian minister of foreign affairs, 356;
on the Russian policy in 1805, 381;
friendship with Alexander I, ii. 445; iii. 309, 383;
on the hereditary disease of the Romanoffs, iii. 50;
retirement of, 309;
schemes in regard to restoration of Poland, 309, 315, 383;
transfers faith from Alexander to _N._, iii. 315.
=Czernicheff, Count=, aide-de-camp to Alexander I, iii. 329;
_N._ offers terms to, 329.
D
=Dagobert=, _N._ in the iron chair of, ii. 328.
=Dalberg, Archbishop=, scheme to unify the German Church, ii. 402;
Prince-Primate, 402;
at the Erfurt conference, iii. 171;
receives Ratisbon in exchange for Frankfort principality, 266;
his territory erected into a grand duchy for Eugène, 322;
estimate of _N.'s_ influence, 322;
characterization of Talleyrand, iv. 107;
at peace council in Paris, 114;
member of the executive commission, 114, 115;
attainted, 157.
=Dalmatia=, ceded to Austria at Leoben, i. 438;
alterations of boundaries near, ii. 21;
ceded by Austria to Italy, 391;
creation of hereditary duchy of, 395;
assigned by _N._ to Italy, 405;
_N._ offers to exchange, iii. 22;
French dominion recognized at Tilsit, 54;
Soult created duke of, 86 (_see also_ =Soult=);
French strength in, 113;
proposed surrender of, to Austria, iv. 407.
=Dalrymple, Sir H. W.=, retired from active service, iii. 186.
=Damascus=, garrison of El Arish ordered to, ii. 69;
reinforcements for Acre from, 71.
=Danican, Auguste=, royalist leader, i. 298;
the 13th Vendémiaire, 302.
=Danilevsky=, on the allies reaching Paris, iv. 110.
=Danton, G. J.=, becomes head of the Jacobin commune, i. 187;
member of the National Convention, 188;
dictator of France, 194;
overawes the Girondists, 234;
murder of, 250.
=Dantzic=, military movements near, iii. 7, 10, 13;
siege of, 12, 19;
surrender of, 22, 28;
freedom restored to, 56;
independence of, 73;
Lefebvre created Duke of, 86 (_see also_ =Lefebvre=);
Davout ordered to hold, 266;
French military stores in, 333;
Murat's position at, untenable, 385;
measures for the relief of, 393;
held by the French, 402;
Rapp commanding at, 402;
proposed new capital for Prussia, 409;
proposed division of the domain, 409;
proposed cession of, to Prussia, 415, 423.
=Danube River, the=, rebellion against Turkey on, ii. 48;
Kray retreats toward, 166;
proposed Indian expeditions via, 209;
military operations on, 363, 366, 367, 441; iii. 105, 113, 117,
163, 202-204, 206, 210, 212, 213, 216-221, 226, 227, 314;
Mack essays to cross at Günzburg, ii. 366;
the French march from the Rhine to, 376;
annihilation of Mortier on, 378;
_N.'s_ line of retreat to, 425;
Russian successes on the lower, iii. 20;
_N._ plans redistribution of territories on, 50;
proposed Russian acquisitions on, 55;
topographical features, 217;
the crossing at Lobau, 217, 218, 221, 226, 227;
defeat of Russians by Turks on, 248;
Russia warned not to cross, 314;
Russian successes on, 320;
withdrawal of Russian troops from, 321;
effect of the rising of, at Essling, 383.
=Danubian Principalities=, proposed partition of, iii. 50;
Alexander's ambition to acquire, 105, 108, 116, 117;
_N._ offers to exchange them for Silesia, 106, 108, 112.
_See also_ =Moldavia=; =Wallachia=.
=Dardanelles, the=, Alexander I's scheme for seizing, ii. 356.
=Darmagnac, Gen.=, invades Navarre, iii. 132;
seizes Pamplona, 132.
=Darmstadt=, relations with Russia, ii. 266;
strengthening of, 266;
quota of men, 404.
=Daru, P. A. N.=, advises wintering in Moscow, iii. 352.
=Daunou, P. C. F.=, dreads a new Terror, ii. 94;
ideas of government, 127;
named as consul, 130;
member of the tribunate, 151;
influence on the Consulate, 195;
driven from the tribunate, 243;
attempt to admit him to the senate, 243;
upholds Machiavelli's theses concerning the Church of Rome, iii. 262.
=Dauphiny=, the peasantry of, i. 143;
_N._ travels in, 143;
revolutionary feeling among the clergy of, 143, 152;
anti-royalist feeling in, iv. 154.
=David, Abbé=, arrest of, ii. 296.
=David, Jacques L.=, painter, ii. 351.
=Davidowich, Gen. P.=, defeated at Roveredo, i. 384, 385;
strength in the Tyrol, 387;
defeats Vaubois, 387, 388, 392;
retreats to the Tyrol, 392.
=Davout, Gen. L. N.=, service in Egypt, ii. 53, 323;
service in the Army of England, 291;
created marshal, 323;
character, 364; iii. 93;
watches the Russian army, ii. 366;
in battle of Austerlitz, 380, 382, 386, 387;
at Nordhalben, 428;
at Naumburg, 429;
in battle of Jena, 430-434;
captures Wittenberg, 436;
sacks Poland, 440;
at Golynim, iii. 5;
strength in Poland, 7;
in the Eylau campaign, 13, 15-17;
in battle of Heilsberg, 29;
pursues Lestocq from Friedland, 31-33;
created Duke of Auerstädt, 86;
income, 87;
_N.'s_ opinion of, 93;
recalled from Poland to Silesia, 165;
commanding in Saxony, 198;
Archduke Charles plans to attack, 198;
his command in the fifth Austrian war, 202;
forces in Stettin, Bayreuth, Hanover, and Magdeburg, 202;
to concentrate at Bamberg, 203;
commanding on the Isar, 204;
Archduke Charles marches against, 205;
to concentrate at Ingolstadt, 204-207;
movements before Ratisbon, 205;
on the Laber, 207;
in battle of Eckmühl, 208;
forces back Archduke Charles, 208;
battles of Aspern and Essling, 220-222;
battle of Wagram, 230, 231;
ordered to hold Baltic positions, 266;
revenue of, 296;
occupies Swedish Pomerania, 321;
letter from _N._, 324;
strength, March, 1812, 324;
reproved for his reports of Prussia, 326;
slowness of action at opening of the Russian campaign, 336;
drives Bagration eastward, 338;
battle of Borodino, 344;
on the retreat from Moscow, 357-359, 363;
battle of Wiazma, 359;
at Krasnoi, 365;
division commander under Eugène, 393;
in campaign of 1813, 402;
occupies Hamburg, 407, 413;
Vandamme goes to his assistance, 413;
to threaten Berlin, iv. 2;
_N.'s_ instructions to, 5;
mediocrity of his troops, 20;
besieged in Hamburg, 55;
invited to join in insurrection, 149;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, 159;
advises _N._ after Waterloo, 217;
suggests _N.'s_ use of force, 218.
="Day of the Paris sections, the,"= i. 302-312.
=Debry, J. A. J.=, _N.'s_ friendship with, i. 293; ii. 88, 89;
member of Congress of Rastatt, 88;
wounded at Rastatt, 88, 89;
accusations against, 89.
=De Bussy=, in the La Fère regiment, iv. 78;
gives _N._ worthless information at Craonne, 78.
=Décadi=, decadence of the festival, ii. 258.
=Decrès, Adm.=, French minister of marine, ii. 291;
letter from _N._, Sept. 13, 1805, 291;
warns _N._ against his career of conquest, iii. 325;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, iv. 159.
=Defermon, J.=, ii. 214.
=Dego=, battle of, i. 352, 353, 355; iv. 65.
=Deichsel River=, Blücher retreats behind the, iv. 7.
=Delacroix=, French minister of foreign affairs, i. 449;
French agent in the Netherlands, ii. 38.
=Demagogues=, disgust with, in France, ii. 134.
=De Maistre=, _N._ refutes his theory of social order, iii. 89;
on the supineness of Pius VII, 264.
=Democracy=, a pure, i. 131, 397;
Germany's opposition to, 247;
its good and bad qualities, iv. 265.
=Denfort=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 107.
=Denmark=, joins the "armed neutrality," ii. 194; iii. 46, 66;
proposed commercial war against England, 55;
_N._ calls for alliance with, 66;
importance of her sea power, 69;
ordered to declare war against England, 69;
England offers to seize her fleet, 69;
refuses England's offer, 69;
yields to Bernadotte, 70;
losses of Norway, Schleswig, and Holstein, 70;
yields to England, 70;
humiliation of, 70;
vassalage to France, 70, 279;
England seeks to conciliate, 98;
bombardment of Copenhagen, 97-100, 280;
Alexander I demands reparation for, 100;
_N._ urges England's restoration of her fleet, 104;
Spanish troops in, 159;
seizure of American ships by, 275;
hostility to England, 280;
holds Norway, 280;
friendly to France, 281;
despatches troops to Hamburg, 407;
shifts her assistance from Russia to France, 407;
strengthening the alliance between France and, 421.
=Dennewitz=, battle of, iv. 18, 19.
=Denon, D. V.=, accompanies _N._ on his return from Alexandria, ii. 81.
=Departmental list, the=, ii. 126.
=De Pradt=, in charge of Polish affairs, iii. 375;
interview between _N._ and, at Warsaw, 375, 382;
royalist intrigues of, iv. 106, 108.
=Desaix, Louis-Charles-Antoine=, a product of Carnot's system, i. 332;
crosses the Rhine near Strasburg, 440;
defeats the Austrians in the Black Forest, 440;
service in Egypt, ii. 53, 60, 78, 81;
battle of the Pyramids, 60;
ordered to leave Egypt, 81, 177;
reaches Stradella, 177;
battle of Marengo, 176-186;
killed, 181, 187;
contrasted with Ney, iv. 213.
=Desenzano=, military operations near, i. 411.
=Desgenettes, Dr.=, heroism at Jaffa, ii. 75.
=Des Mazis=, _N.'s_ friendship for, i. 62, 65;
appointed to the regiment of La Fère, 66.
=Dessau=, captured by Lannes, ii. 436.
=Dessolles, Gen.=, ii. 164.
"=Destiny=," _N.'s_, i. 79.
=Deutsch-Wagram=, Archduke Charles advances to, iii. 218.
_See also_ =Wagram=.
=D'Hilliers, Gen.=, service in Egypt, ii. 53.
="Dialogue on Love,"= by _N._, i. 77, 145.
=Diderot, Denis=, co-author with Raynal, i. 75.
=Diebitsch, Gen. H. K. F. A.=, encounters a Prussian force, iii. 384;
military adviser to Alexander, iv. 98.
=Dieppe=, landing of the Cadoudal conspirators near, ii. 298.
=Diet, the=, reduction of Austria's power in, ii. 193.
=Digeon, Gen. A. E. M.=, seduced by Marmont, iv. 125.
=Digne=, _N.'s_ march through, on return from Elba, iv. 154.
=Dijon=, _N._ visits, i. 146;
formation of an army of reserve at, ii. 140;
surrenders to the allies, iv. 67;
Francis in, 113, 128.
=Diodorus Siculus=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 78.
=Diplomacy=, the language of, i. 21.
=Dippoldiswalde=, military movements near, iv. 11.
=Directory, the=, establishment of, i. 270, 305, 309, 329-331;
social life under, 280, 281;
Europe and, 324-338;
financial war policy, 340;
assumes to dictate military plans, 348, 354;
plans to belittle _N._, 363, 372;
entrusts _N._ with diplomatic powers, 364;
yields to _N.'s_ plans, 364, 373;
contributions sent to, 366, 367;
plans for campaign in Germany, 384;
attitude toward Italy, 397-405;
_N.'s_ relations with, 363-373, 397-405, 419, 422-427, 439, 441, 451;
ii. 7, 26, 30, 34-37, 42, 49-52, 67, 72, 80, 88-99, 108;
iv. 248, 249;
ratifies the treaty of Leoben, i. 441;
letters from _N._, April 19, 1792, 441;
May 27, 1797, 447;
Pitt's negotiations for peace with, 449;
refuses to treat with England, 450;
antagonism to the, ii. 2;
plot of Louis XVIII and Pichegru against, 5, 6, 7;
Moreau's relations with, 6;
gains complete control on the 18th of Fructidor, 8;
reliance on the army, 8;
effects of the 18th Fructidor on, 22;
attitude toward Italy and Venice, 23;
approves the treaty of Campo Formio, 24, 30;
relations with Talleyrand, 34;
members of, 35;
attitude toward emigrants, 36;
attitude toward clergy, 36, 41;
attitude toward royalists, 36, 205;
attitude toward the German ecclesiastical principalities, 41;
Eastern policy, 47;
Jacobinism in, 49, 94;
fails to secure alliance with Turkey, 67;
misunderstanding between the United Irishmen and, 67;
weakness, 68, 91;
desires the escape of the army in Egypt, 79;
reconstruction of, 83, 91, 92;
blunders in Italy, 87, 89;
corruption in, 91, 92;
Gohier president of, 97;
_N._ pays official visit to, on return from Egypt, 97;
relations with Moreau, 100;
last days and downfall, 103 et seq.; iv. 257, 258, 286;
Carnot's influence on its fall, ii. 130;
suppresses freedom of the press, 145;
incorporates Belgium with France, 153;
attitude toward Prussia, 155;
relations with Sieyès, 155;
liberty of conscience under the, 206;
suspends diplomatic relations with the United States, 212;
pretensions toward the United States, 211;
financial maladministration, 219;
recourse to forced contributions, 219;
plans for invading England, 290;
system of licenses for English goods, iii. 280;
difficulties with Mme. de Staël, 297;
organization of a new, iv. 218.
=Divine right=, kings by, ii. 407;
abolition of, in France, iv. 257.
=Divorce=, _N.'s_ share in codifying the law of, ii. 222;
under the Code, 224;
_N.'s_ advocacy of easy, 237.
=Dnieper River=, military operations on the, iii. 315, 336, 338,
339, 342, 364.
=Dniester River=, Turkish movements on the, ii. 441.
=Doctoroff, Gen.=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 388;
in battle of Eylau, iii. 15.
=Dôle=, publications of _N.'s_ literary work at, i. 145.
=Dolgoruki, Prince=, mission from Alexander I to _N._, ii. 382.
=Dolgoruki, Princess=, on _N.'s_ receptions, ii. 196.
=Dölitz=, military operations near, iv. 29, 32.
=Domination=, the power of, iv. 248, 249.
=Domo d'Ossola=, Bethencourt near, ii. 172.
=Don, River=, proposed Indian expeditions via, ii. 209;
the Cossacks of the, iii. 13.
=Donaueschingen=, the Austrian headquarters at, ii. 160;
abandoned by Kray, 166.
=Donauwörth=, military movements near, iii. 203;
_N._ reaches, 205.
=Donzelot, Gen F. X.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 201, 202, 203,
209, 210.
=Dora Baltea River=, Austrian force on the, ii. 170.
=Dora Ridaria River=, Austrian force on the, ii. 170.
=Dornburg=, military movements near, ii. 432, 434.
=Dorothea, Empress-Dowager of Russia=, disapproves _N.'s_ proposed
marriage to Anne, iii. 248;
hatred of _N._, 248.
=Douay=, _N._ ordered to, i. 79, 80.
=Doulaincourt=, _N._ at, iv. 105.
=Doulevant=, _N._ at, iv. 104.
=Doumerc, Gen. J. P.=, moves from Sézanne against Blücher, iv. 62.
=Dover=, scheme of naval demonstration off, ii. 332.
=Drac, River=, iv. 155.
=Draft=, use of, in France, ii. 93.
=Drave, River=, military movements on the, i. 435; iii. 217.
=Dresden=, death of Moreau before, ii. 299;
_N._ at, iii. 65, 66, 67, 375, 389, 394, 409, 416, 417, 423;
iv. 7-10, 12, 13, 17-21;
Bernadotte to concentrate in, iii. 203;
Saxon troops in, 203;
_N.'s_ strategy at, 216;
seized by the Duke of Brunswick, 234;
meeting of the allied sovereigns at, 330;
the climax of the Napoleonic drama, 330; iv. 16;
_N.'s_ incognito journey through, iii. 375;
interview between _N._ and Metternich at, 389;
interview between _N._ and Frederick Augustus at, 394;
French forces at, 393;
Eugène to hold, 393-394;
welcomes Alexander and Frederick William III, 399;
discontent at military occupation, 399;
retreat of the allies behind, 406;
destruction and rebuilding of the bridges at, 406, 407;
French occupation of, 408, 409;
defense of, iv. 2, 13, 17, 18;
held by Saint-Cyr, 7;
French advance to Zittau from, 6;
menaced by the allies, 7;
battle of, 8-13, 17-19;
demoralization of the army after, 12;
_N.'s_ mistakes after, 14-16;
_N.'s_ physical ailments at, 12, 16;
_N.'s_ successes at, 20, 21;
Schwarzenberg moves on, 18;
Oudinot at, 21;
Blücher advances on, 20;
boy soldiers at, 21;
_N.'s_ retreat from, 22-24;
_N.'s_ scheme to hold, 23;
Frederick's love for, 25;
French garrison in, 25-27;
Maret's influence over _N._ at, 69;
_N._ acknowledges his mistake in not making peace at, 135.
=Drissa=, weakness of, iii. 336;
Bagration establishes communication with, 336.
=Drouot, Gen. A.=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 387;
battle of Leipsic, iv. 28, 32;
advises a return to Lorraine, 116;
attachment to _N._, 118;
strength after the surrender of Paris, 118;
accompanies _N._ to Elba, 134;
advises against the escape from Elba, 153.
=Düben=, _N._ at, iv. 25.
=Dubois, Gen.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 203.
=Duclos's "Memoirs of the Reigns of Louis XIV and Louis XV,"=
_N.'s_ study of, i. 150.
=Duero, River=, military movements on the, iii. 157, 159, 290.
=Dufresne=, ii. 214.
=Dugommier, Gen. J. F.=, appointed commander-in-chief before
Toulon, i. 229;
influence at Toulon, 232.
=Dugua, Gen. C. F. J.=, service in Egypt, ii. 53;
in battle of the Pyramids, 60.
=Duhesme, Gen. P. G.=, invades Spain, iii. 132;
at Barcelona, 132;
occupies Catalonia, 155, 156;
evacuates Catalonia, 157;
besieged in Barcelona, 183;
in battle of Waterloo, iv. 205.
=Dulaure's "History of the Nobility,"= _N.'s_ study of, i. 150.
=Dumanoir, Adm.=, at Trafalgar, ii. 374.
=Dumolard, J. V.=, interpellates the government as to _N.'s_
independence, ii. 3.
=Dumoulin, Jean=, comes to _N.'s_ aid at Laffray, iv. 156.
=Dumouriez, Charles F.=, takes part in the conquest of Corsica, i. 120;
on the northeastern frontier, 184;
wins battle of Jemmapes, 194;
defection of, 198;
correspondence with Nelson, ii. 303;
suspected of royalist plots, 303, 305.
=Dünaburg=, preparations for the siege of, iii. 333;
Ney advances toward, 336.
=Duncan, Adm. Adam=, wins the battle of Camperdown, ii. 38.
=Dunette, Gen.=, marches to relief of Paris, iv. 102.
=Dunkirk=, besieged by Duke of York, i. 222.
=Duphot, Gen. L.=, affianced to Désirée Clary, ii. 39, 43;
killed at Rome, 39.
=Dupont, Gen. Pierre=, in battle of Friedland, iii. 31;
ordered to invade Spain, 128;
invades Spain, 132;
advances on Andalusia, 156;
holds the Tagus, 156;
capitulates at Baylen, 156, 157, 159, 167.
=Durango=, Blake advances from, iii. 184.
=Duroc, Gen. G. C. M.=, wounded at Acre, ii. 76;
_N.'s_ aide-de-camp, 101;
_N.'s_ envoy to Prussia, 156, 282;
Grand Marshal of the Palace, 324;
offers Hanover to Prussia, 362;
personal attendance on _N._, 425;
proposes terms after Tilsit, iii. 36;
blamed for Queen Louisa's failure, 62;
proposes indemnity for Maria Louisa, 67;
created Duke of Friuli, 86;
at Bayonne, 144;
foresees France's discontent, 326;
killed at Reichenbach, 410-411;
_N.'s_ grief for, 411;
_N._ contributes to monument to, iv. 5;
_N._ proposes to take the name of, 221.
=Dürrenstein=, destruction of Mortier's division at, ii. 368, 378.
=Durutte, Gen. J. F.=, sent to Ligny, iv. 181;
battle of Waterloo, 201, 202, 205, 206, 210.
=Düsseldorf=, Jourdan's army at, i. 347;
Jourdan crosses the Rhine at, 385.
=Dutch Flanders=, ceded to France, i. 276.
=Duteil=, _N.'s_ acquaintance with, i. 95;
_N._ seeks aid from, 157;
grants _N._ permission to sail for Corsica, 180.
=Duteil, Gen. J.=, general of artillery before Toulon, i. 229;
on _N.'s_ ability, 232.
=Dutheil, N. F.=, devises plan of campaign for Austria and England,
i. 342.
=Dutot=, takes _N.'s_ place in the West, i. 293.
=Duval's "William the Conqueror,"= ii. 350.
=Duvernet's "History of the Sorbonne,"= _N.'s_ study of, i. 150.
=Dwina, River=, fortifications on the, iii. 315;
military movements on the, 337, 341, 359. 361.
=Dyle, River=, military movements on the, iv. 188, 190.
E
=East, the=, _N.'s_ attention turned toward, i. 78;
_N.'s_ comparison of Europe with, ii. 46;
_N.'s_ dreams of empire in.
_See also_ =Napoleon=.
=East Friesland=, scheme to incorporate it with France, iii. 266.
=East Galicia=, part of, ceded to Warsaw, iii. 239.
=East India Company=, lends the island of St. Helena to the
government, iv. 225.
=East Indies=, England watches French policy concerning, ii. 267.
=East Prussia=, Ney moves on, iii. 8.
=Ebelsberg=, battle of, iii. 211.
=Ebrington, Lord=, _N.'s_ characterization of Cornwallis to, ii. 263;
_N.'s_ declaration to, concerning the Duc d'Enghien, 311.
=Ebro, River=, military movements on, iii. 133, 157, 159, 183;
proposed exchange of territory on, 133;
boundary of French annexed territory, 278.
=Ecclesiastical princes=, _N._ on the status of, ii. 27.
=Ecclesiastical principalities=, secularization of, on the Rhine,
ii. 193.
=Ecclesiasticism=, _N.'s_ confusion of ideas concerning, i. 76.
=Eckmühl=, the campaign of, iii. 202 et seq.
=Education=, demands for, in Corsica, i. 117;
_N.'s_ interest in, system and reforms of, 176; ii. 225-228, 318,
408; iii. 26, 89-91; iv. 260.
=Égalité, Philip=, member of the National Convention, i. 188.
=Eglé, Mme.=, guardian of the Beauharnais children, i. 314.
=Egypt=, _N.'s_ plans of conquest of, i. 424; ii. 17, 33, 46-54,
289; iii. 106;
scandals of Mameluke administration in, ii. 17, 47;
French schemes of conquest, 16, 46-54; iii. 112, 114;
importance of, ii. 46;
rebellion in, 47;
the expeditionary forces, 48-54;
scholastic branch of the expedition, 53;
plunder of, 55-57, 67;
departure of expedition from Toulon, 55;
character of the population, 57;
the Mamelukes, 58;
terrors of the campaign, 59;
the army disheartened, 61;
Nelson follows the French fleet to, 62;
_N.'s_ rule in, 65-67;
_N.'s_ religious masquerading in, 65-67;
establishment of printing-presses in, 66;
insurrection suppressed in, 67;
establishment of an Institute in, 66;
dearth of news from France, 67, 78;
rumors of _N.'s_ death in, 68;
despatches from France, Feb., 1799, 72;
_N._ given leave to remain in, 73;
importance of _N.'s_ conquering, 73;
Turkish preparations for the relief of, 74;
attempted risings in, 76;
Adm. Bruix sent to relieve the army in, 79;
_N._ returns from, 80-85;
the colonial idea, 81;
the turning-point of success in, 81;
Kléber prepares to evacuate, 143;
Desaix recalled from, 177;
desperate situation of the French in, 181;
Kléber's administration in, 181;
assassination of Kléber, 181;
French disasters in, 210;
restored to Turkey, 211;
England to evacuate, 262;
Turkey's suzerainty over, 262;
question of reëstablishing French colonies in, 273;
_N._ disclaims designs on, 280;
_N.'s_ irritation at England's occupation of, 280;
Davout's campaign in, 323;
_N.'s_ immoralities in, 328;
plan to allure Nelson to, 331;
the object of the expedition against, 337;
English commerce with, iii. 48;
English expedition to seize, 100;
French expedition against, in 1811, 308;
the tactics of the army in, adopted in Russia, 359;
_N.'s_ desertion of the army in, likened to his conduct at
Smorgoni, 375;
work on, compiled by _N.'s_ order, iv. 219;
history of, 293.
=Eichstädt=, portion of, acquired by Grand Duke of Tuscany, ii. 266;
ceded to Bavaria, 391.
=Eisdorf=, fighting at, iii. 406.
=Eisenach=, military movements near, ii. 425, 427;
the allies outwitted at, iv. 35.
=El Arish=, siege and surrender of, ii. 69;
massacre of the garrison, 70;
treaty between Sir Sidney Smith and Kléber at, 181.
=Elba=, _N.'s_ literary labors at, i. 177; iv. 159, 230-232;
secured to France, ii. 204;
France to evacuate, 262;
Countess Walewska follows _N._ to, iii. 11; iv. 143;
the sentence of exile to, iv. 129;
the monarch of, 129, 133, 151;
_N.'s_ journey to, 134-141;
possibility of her not receiving the imperial exile, 135;
imperialist and royalist sentiment in, 141;
_N._ begins his new administration, 141;
_N.'s_ life in, 141 et seq.;
Bourbon spies in, 142;
visitors to, 143;
scheme to deport _N._ from, 145;
_N.'s_ escape from, 152-154;
the naval patrol at, 153;
_N.'s_ monograph on, 232.
=Elbe, River, the=, the Prussian base on, ii. 428;
key to the valley of, 437;
English blockade of, 441; iii. 48;
western boundary of Prussia, 56;
commanded by fortress of Magdeburg, 56, 57;
the kingdom of Westphalia created on, 56, 73;
preparations to oppose English landing on, 72;
French occupation of the coast near, 266;
military movements on, 393, 396, 406, 407; iv. 2, 6-9, 18, 20-26;
scheme of Hanoverian extension on, 399;
territory on, offered to Sweden, 399;
French recovery of the lower part, 407;
boundary of a neutral zone, 414;
exhaustion of the French on, iv. 19;
French garrisons on, 35.
=Elbing=, military movements near, iii. 8, 13.
=Elchingen=, Ney created Duke of, iii. 86. _See also_ =Ney=.
="Elective Affinities,"= iii. 172.
=Electoral Colleges=, ii. 247.
=Eliot, Sir Gilbert=, viceroy of Corsica, i. 261.
=Elliott=, killed at Arcole, i. 399.
=Elsfleth=, escape of the Black Legion to, iii. 234.
=Elster, River, the=, military operations on, iii. 404, 405;
iv. 20-21, 27-30, 33-34.
=Élysée, the=, _N._ takes up residence at, iv. 159;
_N._ returns from Waterloo to, 216, 218.
=Embabeh=, battle of, ii. 59.
=Embargo=, the, ii. 287, 389, 400, 441.
=Emigrants=, plots by, i. 172, 277, 325; ii. 303;
confiscation of property of, and harsh legislation against,
i. 172, 305, 316; ii. 94, 219;
the aristocrats of the, i. 213;
_N.'s_ speculation in lands of, 288;
attitude of the Directory toward, ii. 2, 36;
_N.'s_ secret dealings with, 9;
Talleyrand among the, 33;
encouraged to return, amnesty to, and indemnity for, 130, 245,
324; 411;
_N._ complains of England harboring, 271;
_N._ demands their expulsion from Naples, 357;
return to France under Louis XVIII, iv. 146;
banished again from France, 157.
=Emigration, the=, i. 109, 152, 155, 268.
=Emperor of the Two Americas=, the, iii. 120.
=Empire=, the French use of the term, ii. 248.
=Empire of the West=, _N._ threatens to resuscitate the, ii. 272.
=Engen=, battle of, ii. 166.
=Enghien, Duc d'=, arrest and murder of, i. 179; ii. 241, 304-309,
312, 316, 331, 412; iii. 107; iv. 138;
monarchical schemes and plots of, ii. 239, 240, 301-305;
character, 301;
married to Princess Rohan-Rochefort, 301;
seeks service with England, 302;
residence at Ettenheim, 302-306;
prepares to retire to Freiburg, 302;
_N._ examines papers of, 305;
_N._ defends the execution of, 310;
_N._ blames Talleyrand for his murder, 311; iii. 197;
statements concerning _N.'s_ connection with his murder, 196, 197;
_N.'s_ self-blame for murder of, iv. 233.
=England=, France's emulation of, i. 22;
hampered by parliamentary opposition and American disquiet, 22;
the American uprising against, 23, 24;
Paoli's relations with, asylum in, and aid from, 23, 124, 169,
196-198, 205-207, 260;
gives aid to, establishes protectorate over, and takes possession
of Corsica, 23, 119, 190, 205-207, 256-262;
transformation of parties in, 24;
_N.'s_ study of history of, 78, 95, 114, 156;
sympathy with France in, 142;
French admirers of the constitution of, 143;
constitutional government in, 152;
closes the Scheldt, 194;
republican ideas in, 195;
effect of execution of Louis XVI in, 195;
hostility between France and, 195, 324; ii. 32, 35, 144, 208,
269, 273-285, 400, 401, 441; iii. 64, 110, 378;
_N.'s_ ideas of serving, i. 207, 216, 317; ii. 15; iv. 255;
subsidizes European powers, i. 221; ii. 146, 187, 208, 263, 351,
358, 360, 375, 401, 421; iii. 284, 294, 398, 399, 417, 422-425;
iv. 30, 31, 55, 67, 76, 164;
naval establishment, expenses, and activity, i. 221, 421;
ii. 209, 290; iii. 236, 237;
captures Ollioules, i. 225;
in the defense and occupation of Toulon, 230, 239;
naval operations and power on the Mediterranean (other than
specifically mentioned items), 239, 257; ii. 15-19, 56, 262;
iii. 111, 112;
influence in Genoa, i. 243;
prints counterfeit French money in Genoa, 246;
fails to help the allies in Piedmont, 257;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, Sept., 1794, 257;
naval supremacy, 257; ii. 15-17, 48, 63, 209, 290, 371, 375;
iii. 47-49, 109-112, 267-268; iv. 41;
alliances with Austria, i. 276; ii. 156, 160, 188;
sends fleet to northern coast of France, i. 298;
subsidizes French royalists, 325;
the fleet driven from Leghorn, 373;
seizes Porto Ferrajo, 398;
insurrection in Corsica against rule of, 402;
blamed by _N._ for embroiling France and Austria, 435;
rupture of the coalition with Austria, 441;
military condition in 1796, 449;
desire for peace with France, and negotiations leading thereto,
449, 456; ii. 12, 86; iii. 271, 415;
interest in the Netherlands and Belgium, i. 450;
prestige, magnificence of empire, influence, independence, etc.,
of, 456; ii. 45, 55, 73, 209, 264, 297, 394, 401; iii. 45-49,
110-112, 189, 318, 420; iv. 38, 140;
defeats Spain at Cape St. Vincent, i. 456;
price of consols, March, 1797, 456;
effect of the treaty of Leoben in, ii. 12;
conquest of Dutch colonies, 12, 38;
_N.'s_ personal hostility to, 14, 16, 188, 280-285, 330, 441-444;
iii. 49, 65, 66, 88, 109-114, 308-309, 329, 352, 408; iv. 75;
speculations in Paris as to operations against, ii. 32;
financial condition, 32, 208;
Talleyrand expelled from, 33;
defeats Holland at Camperdown, 38;
acquires the Cape of Good Hope, 38;
protects Sardinia, 39;
_N.'s_ schemes of invasion of, 48, 290-294, 328, 330-338, 358-362;
_N.'s_ views on political history of, 50;
her Indian possessions, and French and Russian schemes to strike
her through them, 52, 194, 209, 263, 273; iii. 110, 112-114;
naval operations at Acre, ii. 71, 73;
fleet at Alexandria, 79;
joins the second coalition, 90, 136, 143;
military operations in Holland, 91, 92; iii. 236, 272, 284, 294;
completion of the work of the Revolution in, ii. 139;
relations, negotiations, and alliances with Russia, 141, 210,
356, 357, 401, 406, 420; iii. 41, 49, 55, 71, 98-100, 102, 105,
117, 315, 321, 351, 392, 417;
reception of Russian soldiers in, after Alkmaar, ii. 141;
siege, capture, and occupation of Malta, and negotiations
concerning its cession and tenure, 141, 193, 210, 262, 267,
273, 280, 284, 289, 351, 352, 356, 401;
attitude toward the Bourbons, 143;
declines to negotiate with _N._, 143;
prepares to invade France, 143;
denounced by _N._ as author of the war of 1799, 143;
debate in Parliament on _N.'s_ accession as First Consul, 143;
hatred of revolutionary excesses, 143;
alliance with Portugal, 154;
opposes spread of revolutionary ideas, 157;
blockades Genoa, 165;
formation of the "armed neutrality" against, 194;
accused by Paul I of treachery, 193;
the Continental System and the embargo, _N.'s_ commercial warfare
against, 203, 205, 269, 287, 288, 347, 375, 389, 399, 441;
iii. 45-49, 55, 64-65, 67, 71, 99, 102, 109, 165, 239, 265,
268, 280, 284, 293-294, 303, 304, 307, 328, 420 (_see also_
=Berlin Decree=; =Continental System=; =Milan Decree=);
Portugal forced to withdraw from alliance with, ii, 205;
reply to the "armed neutrality," 209;
_N.'s_ demands for colonial cessions, 210;
concludes peace with France, Oct. 1, 1801, 211;
retains Ceylon and Trinidad, 211;
treaty of Amiens, 210, 263, 266, 270, 273 et seq.; iv. 264;
treaty of commerce with the United States, 1794, ii. 212;
recognizes neutrality of United States, 212;
attempts to put down San Domingo insurrection, 237;
surrender of Rochambeau to, 237;
schemes for restoration of Charles X in, 240;
to evacuate Egypt, 262;
Paul I's antipathy to, 263;
efforts to discredit France in Europe, 264 et seq.;
disapproves _N.'s_ reconstruction of Europe, 266;
appoints Lord Whitworth ambassador to Paris, 267;
refuses to admit French consuls, 270;
protests against the slave-trade, 269;
commerce of, 269, 276; iii. 46, 49, 120, 265-268, 280, 288, 294,
309, 316, 424; iv. 41;
position with regard to the Alien Act, ii. 171;
freedom of the press in, 270;
complaints against, of harboring emigrants and Bourbons, 271;
attacks of the French press on, 271, 294;
_N._ attempts to muzzle the press in, 270, 356;
_N.'s_ answer to remonstrances from, 272;
occupation of Alexandria, 280;
suspects France's war preparations, 280, 282;
_N.'s_ treatment of her representative, 280;
the royal message of March 8, 1803, 282;
the militia called out, March 10, 1803, 282;
diplomatic rupture with France, 285;
publication of Lord Whitworth's despatches in, 284;
declares war against France, May 18, 1803, 285;
declares embargo on French ships, 287;
commencement of hostilities, 287;
attacks Spanish commerce, 289;
panic in, 290;
plans for defense, 291, 329;
puts Caraccioli to death, 300;
interest in Jacobin insurrection, 300;
active diplomacy in, 301;
the Duc d'Enghien seeks to enter the service of, 302;
_N.'s_ attempt to fix the death of Duc d'Enghien on, 311;
Pitt's return to power, 329;
nature of the war with, 329;
expulsion of her envoys from Stuttgart and Munich, 330;
naval aid from Portugal, 332;
war with Spain, Dec., 1804, 332;
acquires Trinidad, 332;
blockades Brest, 333;
Addington succeeded by Pitt, 337;
justice of the war with, 352;
European alliances, 351;
bad faith of, 351;
_N._ insists on no asylum for the Bourbons in, 356;
fails to secure Prussia's alliance, 358;
_N.'s_ policy toward, 360;
author of the Third Coalition, 360;
Mack's ideas of her invading France, 365;
naval shortcomings, 370;
battle of Trafalgar, 373-376;
reception of the news of Austerlitz in, 393;
lethargy after Trafalgar, 399;
declares war against Prussia, 400;
Fox assumes power, 400;
_N._ considers peace with, 400;
Lord Yarmouth's negotiations, 404;
_N._ offers European territory to, 404, 405;
end of negotiations with, 405;
alliance with Prussia and Russia, 406;
demands the surrender of Sicily, 405;
proposal to give Hanover to, 418, 420;
state of war with Prussia, 422;
her vulnerable point, iii. 441;
"enemy's ships make enemy's goods," 441;
the soul of continental coalitions, 441;
right of search and impressment, ii. 441; iii. 48, 100;
Orders in Council, ii. 441; iii. 48, 100, 101, 265, 267, 272, 321, 378;
Turkey declares war against, iii. 20;
sends fleet to Constantinople, 20;
refuses subsidy to Russia, 20;
Afghanistan incited against, 21;
Persia stirred up against, 21;
proposal for a new coalition, 22;
naval operations in the Baltic, 24, 35, 36, 97, 98, 117;
withholds subsidies, 35;
troops in Pomerania, 36;
Alexander promises to oppose, 41;
opposed to Prussia's neutrality, 44;
necessity for _N.'s_ humbling, 44-49;
France declares war against (1793), 47;
"All the Talents" ministry, 46;
Duke of Portland's ministry, 46;
commercial rivalry with the United States, 46;
the "rule of 1736," 46;
understanding with the United States, 47;
declares blockade from Brest to the Elbe, 42;
war with France (1803), 47;
decline of manufactures, 47;
failure of commercial negotiations with Sweden and Russia, 48;
French demands on, 55;
Russia to mediate between France and, 55;
seizes the Portuguese fleet, 67;
gains entrance to and is expelled from Leghorn, 67;
offers to seize Denmark's fleet, 69;
Denmark ordered to declare war against, 69;
threatens to make Spanish South American colonies independent, 71;
bombards Copenhagen, 70;
enmity of Alexander I to, 70;
Parliament compared with the French tribunate, 83;
decadence of primogeniture in, 84;
seeks to conciliate Denmark, 98;
Egyptian expedition, 100;
expedition to Buenos Ayres, 100;
Russia declares war against, 100, 102, 105;
retaliates on Russia by Orders in Council, 100;
announces blockade of European ports, 100, 101;
decline of trade with the United States, 101;
the war of 1812, 102, 322;
Austria's secret sympathy with, 104;
_N._ urges her restoration of the Danish fleet, 104;
_N.'s_ desire for peace with, 104, 112, 159, 271, 392; iv. 46;
contempt for the blockade, iii. 109;
withdraws troops from Sicily, 111;
sends troops to Portugal, 111, 120, 122, 157, 283, 284;
supposed assistance to Sweden, 114;
proposed menace to, 113;
blockades the Russian fleet, 117;
promised coöperation of the Papal States against, 118;
Portugal enforces the Berlin and Milan decrees against, 119;
fate of her allies, 121;
supports the House of Braganza, 121;
outbreak of the Peninsular war, 123;
benefits accruing from the troubles in Spain, 131;
scheme to capture Cadiz, 133, 155;
negotiations with Austria, 163;
proposed humiliation of, 170;
plans of _N._ and Alexander at Erfurt concerning, 177;
_N._ fears an alliance between Turkey and, 177;
exasperated at the capitulation of Cintra, 186;
supposed plan to abandon Portugal, 187;
tardiness at Corunna, 192;
offers to subsidize Austria, 194;
Austria appeals for assistance to, 225;
escape of the Duke of Brunswick to, 234;
expedition to Flushing, 236-237;
necessity of bringing her to terms, 249;
_N.'s_ allegations against, 260;
the lesson of Trafalgar, 264;
paper blockade by, 268;
the neutralization system, 267;
licenses violations of the Orders in Council, 267;
Louis opens negotiations with, 271;
rejects Fouché's agent, 271;
loss of trade with Portugal, Spain, and Triest, 272;
threatened with loss of trade with Hanseatic towns and Holland, 272;
United States prohibition of commercial intercourse with, 274;
the Walcheren expedition, 272, 284, 294;
_N._ proposes that she withdraw the Orders in Council of 1807, 272;
proposal that she send joint expedition with France to establish
Louis XVIII in America, 271;
seizure of American ships by, 273;
Fouché's English-Dutch conspiracy, 273;
destruction of her wares on the French borders, 279;
Denmark's hostility to, 280;
divided councils in, 284;
expedition to Sicily, 284, 294;
finds support in Spanish popular feeling, 283;
strength of forces in the Peninsula, 284;
attitude toward affairs in the Peninsula, 288;
depreciation of the currency, 294;
expedition to Spain, 294;
Mme. de Staël in, 299;
_N._ hopes to meet her on the sea, 304;
threatened with bankruptcy, 304;
exchange of prisoners with, 307;
her colonial interests, 309;
Russia opens her ports to, 316;
refuses _N.'s_ offer of peace in Spain, 319;
armistice with Russia, 321;
threatens to bombard Constantinople, 321;
under Castlereagh's leadership, 328;
to be driven from Spain, 328;
arouses Sweden against France, 350;
negotiates peace between Turkey and Russia, 350;
distracted condition of politics in, 377;
naval defeats, 378, 379;
United States declares war against, 378;
assassination of Mr. Perceval, 378;
negotiates treaty between Russia and Spain, July, 1812, 392-393;
in grand European coalition against _N._, 392;
Metternich's negotiations with, 395;
returns to Pitt's policy, 399;
abandons Hanoverian schemes, 399;
proposal to bleed her colonies, 408;
proposed isolation of, 408;
the allies' reliance on, 422;
guarantees a war loan, 417;
treaty with Prussia, June 14, 1813, 417;
treaty with Russia, June 15, 1813, 417;
issues paper money, 417;
to be kept out of the continental peace, 419;
Metternich proposes that she continue the war, 419, 420;
commercial agreement with Sweden, 424;
influence in Holland, iv. 30, 41;
determination to crush France, 31;
at the Congress of Frankfort, 41;
proposal that she hand back French colonies, 41;
"maritime rights," 41, 45;
prolongation of the war in Spain, 51, 52;
desire to establish equilibrium in Europe, 67;
signs treaty of Chaumont, 76;
effect of the triple alliance on, 76;
troops occupy Bordeaux, 87;
party to the treaty of Fontainebleau (April, 1814), 133;
distinction in, between the two Napoleons, 133;
_N._ contemplates taking refuge in, 135;
_N.'s_ eulogy of her civilization and chivalry, 140;
negotiates secret treaty with Austria and France, 145;
regency in, 161;
lack of suitable leaders in, 161;
her dynastic alliances, 161, 162;
effects of _N.'s_ restoration on, 162;
member of the Vienna Coalition, 164;
campaign of Waterloo, 170-173;
losses at Waterloo, 214;
claims the glory of annihilating _N._, 214;
watches the harbor of Rochefort, 220;
_N._ throws himself on the generosity of, 221;
reasons for _N.'s_ surrender to, 222-223, 227;
asylum for political refugees, 223;
intolerance of death penalty for political offenses, 225;
resolves to banish _N._, 225-229;
_N._ desires to acquire citizenship in, 226;
sympathy for _N._ in, 227, 230;
passes special acts for government of St. Helena, 228;
_N.'s_ last wishes for, 233;
the Seven Years' War, 261, 297;
character of the wars with France, 265;
_N.'s_ struggles with, 297;
wars with the United States, 300.
=English Channel, the=, marching French troops to, ii. 24;
naval operations in, 52;
obstacles to _N.'s_ crossing, 291;
_N.'s_ hope to hold, 332;
French plans for seizing, 334;
Villeneuve ordered to, 359;
Villeneuve's attempt to enter, 371.
=Enns, River=, military operations on the, ii. 367; iii. 216.
=Entail=, restoration of the right of, iii. 82;
abolition of the law of, 84.
=Enzersdorf=, military operations near, iii. 219, 220, 227.
=Enzersfeld=, military movements near, iii. 217.
=Épernay=, captured by the allies, iv. 94.
="Epochs of My Life,"= i. 82.
=Eppes=, Marmont at, iv. 79.
=Equality=, _N.'s_ affectation of love for, ii. 30;
one of the meanings of the word, 221.
=Equality of citizenship=, decreed, i, 110.
=Erasmus=, tomb of, iv. 247.
=Erding=, battle of, iii. 211.
=Erfurt=, military movements near, ii. 425;
the Duke of Brunswick at, 427;
fall of, 436;
meeting of _N._ and Alexander at, iii. 170 et seq.;
treaty of, 177, 236, 244, 248, 315;
_N.'s_ maladroitness at, 177, 178;
_N.'s_ vacillation at, 180, 181;
the conference at, 193, 194;
Alexander redeems his promise made at, 236;
offered to Alexander and refused by him, 288;
the throne of, offered to the Duke of Oldenburg, 307;
Alexander offers to exchange Oldenburg for, 328;
French troops ordered to, 328;
French forces at, 393;
_N._ goes to, 401;
plan of winter quarters at, iv. 23;
Saxon and Bavarian troops at, 35;
Murat deserts at, 56.
=Erlon, Gen. d.=, in the Waterloo campaign, iv. 170, 176, 186;
battle of Quatre Bras, 181-187;
_N.'s_ expression of indignation at Ney to, 187;
battle of Waterloo, 200, 202, 206.
=Erskine, Lord=, on England's attitude with regard to France, ii. 144.
=Escoiquiz, Canon=, tutor to Ferdinand VII, iii. 124;
letter to _N._, Oct. 12, 1808, 124, 127;
defends Ferdinand's position, 143;
notified by _N._ of Ferdinand's deposition, 145;
infamy of, 150.
=Escorial=, Godoy's intrigues at the, iii. 127;
Charles IV a virtual prisoner in, 142.
=Escudier, J. F.=, commissioner of the National Convention, i. 219.
=Esdraelon=, battle on the plains of, ii. 72.
=Esla, River=, military movements on the, iii. 188.
=Espagne, Gen. J. L. B.=, in battle of Aspern, iii. 220.
=Espinosa=, defeat of Blake at, iii. 185.
=Essarts, Ledru des=, evacuates Meaux, iv. 99;
seduced by Marmont, 125.
="Essay on Revolutions"= (Chateaubriand's), ii. 259.
=Essen, Gen. H. H.=, in campaign of Eylau, iii. 13.
=Essenbach=, military operations near, iii. 206.
=Essling=, battle of, iii. 219-222, 225-228, 232;
_N._ exposes himself at, 240-241;
effect of rising of the river at, 383.
=Essling, Prince of=. _See_ =Masséna=.
=Essonne, River=, military operations on the, iv. 116.
=Essonnes=, _N._ at, iv. 105;
Marmont at, 124;
Marmont's defection at, 128.
=Establishment of St. Louis=, the female academy at St. Cyr,
i. 182. _See also_ =St. Cyr=.
=Estates, the=, meetings at Versailles, i. 96, 107.
=Estates, the three=, i. 44;
in the seventeenth century, 107.
=Estates-General=, meetings of the, i. 86, 106, 107;
fusion of the three bodies, 108;
troops ordered to control the, 108.
=Esterhazy, Prince=, at the marriage of Maria Louisa, iii. 256.
=Étoges=, battle of, iv. 65;
military movements near, 64, 94.
=Etruria=, creation of the kingdom of, ii. 205;
death of King Louis, 233; iii. 67;
exchanged for Louisiana, ii. 272;
under French protection, 357;
_N._ calls for alliance with, iii. 66;
neutrality of, 66;
scheme to incorporate in Italy, 120;
proposal that Lucien take the crown of, 129;
abdication of the Queen Regent, 128;
incorporated into the kingdom of Italy, 129;
the crown offered to Ferdinand VII, 145;
_N.'s_ disposition of, 164.
=Ettenheim=, residence of the Duc d'Enghien at, ii. 302;
reputed emigrant conspiracy at, 303;
Ordener's expedition to, 304;
arrest of the Duc d'Enghien at, 305;
Caulaincourt's mission to, iii. 107.
=Eulen Mountains=, military movements near, iv. 413.
=Euphrates=, proposed military operations on the, iii. 113.
=Europe=, movement of civilization in, i. 2;
the revolutionary epoch and spread of revolutionary ideas in,
2, 100 et seq.; ii. 44, 86, 156;
absolutism, its decay and abolition, i. 67; iii. 278; iv. 162,
254, 292;
aroused feelings, concerted movements, and coalitions against
France, i. 142, 325, 441; ii. 51, 67, 86, 90, 136, 142, 145,
194, 209, 330, 348; iii. 72, 106, 377, 382, 394, 396, 400, 417;
iv. 145, 146, 161-163;
_N._ on the sovereigns of, i. 156;
the Directory and, 324-338;
neutrality of northern, 341;
conditions of civilization and warfare in (1796), 349;
the destinies of, dependent on fate of Italy, 351, 385;
_N._ a citizen of, 404;
schemes of reconstruction of the map of, 425; ii. 265, 355, 402;
iii. 51, 55, 56, 72, 73, 199, 399, 422; iv. 3, 6, 144, 145;
schemes of pacification of, i. 447; ii. 203, 213, 356; iii. 307,
382, 408, 414, 415, 419-421; iv. 75;
France's foreign policy, in, ii. 2;
schemes of Napoleonic and French empire over, 10, 29, 214, 272,
336, 354; iii. 108, 114, 408;
_N._ on the freedom of, ii. 31; iii. 82;
_N.'s_ relations to, and influence on, ii. 37, 137, 213, 272;
iii. 179; iv. 133, 298;
upheavals in the politics of, ii. 40-45, 255;
compared by _N._ with the Orient, 46;
general armament of (1798), 68;
_N.'s_ visions of military domination in, 73;
situation of affairs at close of 1799, 86;
jealousy in, concerning the Mediterranean, 136;
_N._ the destroyer of, 144;
influence of England in, and her subsidies to the powers of, 145,
187, 209, 263, 351, 359, 360, 374, 400, 421; iii. 284, 294, 398,
417-425; iv. 30, 31, 55, 68, 76, 164;
situation of affairs at beginning of 1800, ii. 152 et seq.;
efforts of the Directory to extend the French system in, 155;
Prussia's place in, 155; iii. 18;
military situation in (1800), ii. 160;
the "armed neutrality," 194;
reduction of Austria as a power in, 194;
the old dynasties and the dynastic idea in, 194, 269, 317;
iii. 65, 153, 162, 199, 200, 416; iv. 44;
anxiety in, as to permanency of peace of Amiens, ii. 261;
destruction of the balance of power, 266;
_N.'s_ warning to, March 13, 1803, 284;
_N.'s_ views on continental conquest, 290;
_N.'s_ notification to, in the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, 316;
the embargo, blockades, and other commercial warfare in, 334, 347,
376, 441, 442; iii. 48, 49, 55, 98-102, 109, 140, 279, 280, 307,
328 (_see also_ =Berlin Decree=; =Continental System=; =Milan
Decree=);
outbreak of war in 1805, ii. 348;
_N._ arrayed against, 351;
the price of the hegemony of, 392;
Fox upholds existing sovereignties in, 404;
necessity of colonial produce to, 441;
Russia's ambition to be included in, iii. 45;
general warfare in, 47;
English monopoly of commerce, 46;
law of colonial trade, 46;
Alexander I on politics of, 52;
St. Petersburg holds the peace of, 65;
_N.'s_ hopes of a coalition in, against England, 65;
general Sanhedrim of, 76;
influence of the peace of Tilsit on, 95;
a moment of universal anarchy for, 104;
the situation in, 117, 118;
power of the word "legitimacy" in, 148;
growth of the national idea in, 154, 162, 200, 268; iv. 292
(_see also_ =Germany=; =Prussia=);
the right of force in, iii. 164;
the French idea of their great cause in, 214;
views on _N.'s_ second marriage, 256;
publicity of _N.'s_ domestic concerns throughout, 277;
system of private confiscations, 296;
rejoicings over the birth of the king of Rome, 301, 302;
the condition of, set forth in _N.'s_ reply to the Paris Chamber
of Commerce, 303-305;
_N.'s_ coast system of protection 307;
apprehensions of war in, 315, 318;
tendency toward rupture of the peace of, 317;
the Russian march of French troops over, 330;
_N.'s_ scheme for two powers in, 329;
responsibility of Kutusoff for bloodshed in, 374;
Austria a pivotal state in, 403, 409, 411;
_N._ desires to avoid the reprobation of, 414;
a neutral zone for, 414;
peace congress of, 415;
nervousness among the allies, iv. 5;
Prussia acquires the hegemony of continental, 37;
distrust among the allies, 40, 41;
the commercial key to central, 42;
struggle for manhood suffrage in, 43;
exactions of the allies in central, 54, 55;
the armed forces of, Jan. 1, 1814, 55;
jealousies among the powers, 57, 58;
England's desire to establish equilibrium in, 68;
military outrages in, 102;
mobilization of troops, 165;
notified that the Empire means peace, 165;
possible consequences of _N.'s_ success at Waterloo, 213;
the doctrine of legitimacy, 224;
France the teacher of, 253;
abolition of feudalism and ecclesiasticism, 254;
progress of reform in, 263;
a bellicose age in, 264;
influence of Charles the Great on, 292;
the armies of modern, 295;
the alliances of, 295;
the national politics of, 298.
=Eutritzsch=, military operations near, iv. 29.
=Exagérés=, the, i. 234.
=Executive Council=, establishment of the, i. 188;
military preparations by, 194.
=Exelmans, Gen. R. J. I.=, corresponds with the Emperor, iv. 148;
in Waterloo campaign, 173.
=Extravagance=, at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 105.
=Eylau=, the campaign of, iii. 12 et seq.; iv. 173;
the causes of _N.'s_ weakness at, iii. 26;
the grand army after, 45;
the lessons of, 341.
F
=Family relations=, under the Code, ii. 223.
=Fanaticism=, iv. 263.
=Fauvelet=, _N.'s_ school friend, i. 178.
=Faypoult, G. C.=, French political agent in Genoa, ii. 10.
=Feltre=, creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396;
Clarke created Duke of, iii. 86. _See also_ =Clarke=.
=Feraud=, murder of, 284.
=Ferdinand, Archduke=, commanding Austrian army in Germany, ii. 363;
escapes into Bohemia, 366;
at Ulm, 366;
commanding in Bohemia, 380;
invades Poland and captures Warsaw, iii. 199, 201;
vicissitudes in Poland, 212;
evacuates Warsaw, 212;
on the way to Charles's assistance, 225.
=Ferdinand of Parma=, ii. 205.
=Ferdinand I=, King of Naples, ii. 357; iii. 319. _See also_
=Ferdinand IV=.
=Ferdinand III=, flees to Vienna, ii. 87.
=Ferdinand IV=, position in 1797, i. 421;
evacuates the Papal States, ii. 204;
compelled to restore plunder, 204.
=Ferdinand VII= (_see also_ =Asturias, Prince of=), letters to _N._,
iii. 137, 143, 149;
seeks _N.'s_ favor, 137, 150;
enters Madrid, 138;
doubtful recognition of his throne, 140;
hinted order that he go to Bayonne, 142;
at Vitoria, 143;
revulsion of Spanish feeling against, 143;
goes to Bayonne, 143, 144, 145;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 142-151;
orders for his arrest, 144;
deposed, 144-148;
character, 146, 149, 150;
offers to surrender his crown, 146;
the crown of Etruria offered to, 145;
trial at Bayonne, 146;
popularity in Spain, 146, 154;
pension and grant to, 147;
in virtual custody of Talleyrand, 148;
cowed into submission, 147, 151;
asks _N.'s_ adoption and permission to appear at court, 261;
release of, iv. 52;
relapses into absolutism and ecclesiasticism, 52.
=Fère-Champenoise=, the Emperor at, iv. 87;
military movements near, 91;
retreat of the French through, 99.
=Fermo=, consolidated with the kingdom of Italy, iii. 118.
=Ferrara=, the Pope prepares to recover, i. 398;
new scheme of government for, 402;
surrendered to France, 422;
ceded to Venice at Leoben, 438;
incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic, ii. 21.
=Ferrol=, reported junction of French and Spanish fleets at, ii. 359;
blockade of, 359;
Villeneuve's retreat to, 371;
supposed English schemes at, iii. 187, 188.
=Fersen, Count=, essays to represent Sweden at Congress of Rastatt,
ii. 27.
=Fesch, Joseph=, i. 32;
childhood with _N._, 40;
appointed to seminary at Aix, 44;
_N.'s_ correspondence with, 55, 79, 141;
enters the priesthood, 64;
returns to Corsica, 112;
literary collaborator with _N._, 124, 147;
member of the constituent assembly at Orezza, 131;
custodian of _N.'s_ papers, 139;
supplanted as head of family by _N._, 161;
radical leader at Ajaccio, 184;
leaves Corsica for Toulon, 207;
in commissary department at Toulon, 208;
storekeeper in commissary department, 225;
escapes arrest, 254;
at Aix, 291;
conforms to the civil constitution, ii. 206;
archbishop of Lyons and cardinal, 258;
reënters the church, 258;
Grand Almoner, 324;
selects a physician for _N._, iv. 232.
=Feudal System=, in Corsica, i. 9, 18;
remnants of the, 67;
absorption of its power in the French crown, 100;
abolition of, 110, 152, 193; ii. 224; iii. 85, 189, 190; iv. 254;
the oath of the Legion of Honor concerning, ii. 246;
_N.'s_ influence on, iii. 322;
French hatred of, iv. 43.
=Feuillants, the=, i. 153;
form a ministry, 174;
fall of the ministry, 179.
=Fichte, J. G.=, member of the reform party in Prussia, ii. 416;
influence on Prussian regeneration, iii. 103.
=Fifth Regiment= (French), _N._ offers himself to the bullets of
the, iv, 155.
=Fifty-second Regiment= (English), in battle of Waterloo, iv. 209.
=Figueras=, captured by the French, iii. 132.
=Filangieri, Gaëtano=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 78.
=Finance=, an occult doctrine of, iii, 390.
=Finisterre, Cape=, Calder encounters Villeneuve off, ii. 359.
=Finkenstein=, _N._ at, iii. 18, 24, 25;
Persian envoy at, 18.
=Finland=, Russian ambition to acquire, iii. 37, 98, 113, 168, 176;
Russia's claims to, recognized at Tilsit, 55;
acquired by Russia, 64, 236, 248, 268, 310, 316;
Russian invasion of, 115, 116;
Russia threatened with the loss of, 314;
offered to Sweden by _N._, 321.
=Fioravente, Gen.=, captured at Verona, i. 443.
=First Consul=, the office of the, ii. 127.
=Fischbach=, military movements near, iv. 18.
=Fismes=, _N._ aims to strike the Prussians at, iv. 77;
Marmont rallies his troops at, 81, 82;
junction of Marmont and Mortier at, 93;
Marmont retreats to, 100.
=Fitz-James, Edward=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 107.
=Fiume=, reoccupied by Austria, i. 435;
seized by _N._, 434;
_N._ proposes to cede, iv. 423.
=Five Hundred, the=, i. 270;
their representation of public sentiment, ii. 1;
inquiry in, as to _N.'s_ independence, 3;
its members proscribed, 8;
Jacobin majority in, 94, 97;
Bonapartes among, 95;
Lucien Bonaparte elected president, 97, 105;
_N._ at the meetings of, 18th and 19th Brumaire, 106, 111-120;
counterplots against _N._ among, 109;
opposition by, 110-120;
meeting of Bonapartist members of, 118;
adopts the Consulate, 123;
deposition of members, 125;
rewards among, for complacency, 125.
=Flahaut, Gen. A. C. J.=, sent to seek Marmont's advice, iv. 116;
advises a return to Lorraine, 116;
bearer of despatch from _N._ to Ney, 186.
=Flanders=, _N._ in, i. 79;
_N._ journey to, iii. 312.
_See also_ =Austrian Netherlands=; =Batavian Republic=; =Dutch
Flanders=; =Holland=; =Netherlands=.
=Fleurus=, battle of, i. 273;
Jourdan's victory at, ii. 323;
military operations near, iv. 173, 175, 180;
_N._ at, 180, 185.
=Florence=, the Buonaparte family in, i. 27, 30, 44, 45;
position in the French empire, iii. 279;
sends deputation to Paris, iii. 380.
=Flushing=, Holland's indemnity for, ii. 154;
English capture of, iii. 237;
_N._ builds ships at, 237.
=Fombio=, battle of, i. 359.
=Fontainebleau=, Pius VII, at, ii. 340;
treaty of, iii. 70;
social vices at, 92;
treaty of (Oct. 10, 1807), 104;
_N.'s_ court at, 108, 245, 301;
diplomatic negotiations at, 118;
treaty of (Oct. 28, 1807), for partition of Portugal, 119, 120,
121, 133, 149, 151;
_N.'s_ harsh treatment of Josephine at, 179;
imprisonment of Pius VII at, 243, 377, 390, 391;
the decree (of Oct. 18, 1810), iii. 279;
the Concordat of, 391, 392;
military movements near, iv. 68, 72, 104;
_N._ at, 105, 116, 158;
_N._ reviews the Guard at, 116, 117;
treasonable utterances of the marshals at, 119;
scene of _N.'s_ abdication, 120-122;
council of war at, 128;
treaty of (April, 1814), 133-136, 137, 139, 144-146, 152;
_N._ leaves, for Elba, 139.
=Fontanes, Marquis de=, oration on Washington by, ii. 148;
retires from presidency of the senate, iii. 294;
grand master of the university, 294.
=Fontenaye, Mme. de=, i. 315.
_See also_ =Tallien, Mme=.
=Forchheim=, _N.'s_ base, ii. 424.
=Forez Regiment=, the, i. 143.
=Forfait, P. A. L.=, Secretary of the Navy, ii. 130.
=Förstgen=, military operations near, iv. 20.
=Fort Bard=, ii. 171.
=Fort Carré=, _N.'s_ confinement in, i. 253-255.
=Fortification=, _N.'s_ essay on, iv. 232.
=Fort Luco=, fires on French ship at Porto di Lido, i. 443, 446.
=Fort Mulgrave=, capture of, i. 230.
=Fouché, Joseph=, describes atrocities at Toulon, i. 233;
opposes Robespierre, 251;
Minister of Police, ii. 92, 323, 412;
joins the Bonapartist ranks, 106;
detection of plots by, 110;
_N.'s_ confidence in, 149;
attitude toward the conspirators of Nivôse, 241;
suspected of Jacobinism, 241;
disgraced, degraded, and banished, 241, 277; iii. 180, 275;
character, ii. 277; iii. 193, 253, 267, 271; iv. 148;
instigates Moreau's letter to _N._, ii. 299;
urges action against Bourbon plotters, 304;
ordered to supervise correspondence from the army, iii. 25;
created Duke of Otranto, 87;
licenses vice in Paris, 92;
whips in the nobility to the imperial court, 93;
favors Ferdinand VII, 125, 126;
share in the matter of Josephine's divorce, 179, 180;
raises national guards for service in the Netherlands, 237;
on the second marriage of _N._, 253;
advocates alliance with Russia, 253;
member of extraordinary council on _N.'s_ second marriage, 253;
raises troops to repel the Walcheren expedition, 253;
the superserviceable Mephistopheles of the empire, 271;
intervenes in Holland's negotiations with England, 271;
English-Dutch conspiracy, 275;
returns from exile in Italy, 326;
memorializes against war, 326;
warns _N._ of the fate of Charles XII, 326;
recalled to active service, 421;
double intrigues of, iv. 149;
neutrality of, 157;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, 159;
military conspiracy of, 161;
plots against _N._, 165, 166;
attitude after Waterloo, 217, 218;
member of the new Directory, 218;
refuses responsibility for _N.'s_ safety, 219.
=Fougé, Mme.=, _N.'s_ relations with, ii. 329.
=Fouquier-Tinville, A. Q.=, execution of, i. 272.
=Fourcroy, A. F.=, member of the council of state, ii. 152, 214;
organizer of the educational system of France, 227, 228.
=Fourth Artillery=, treason in the, i. 173.
=Fourth Regiment=, _N.'s_ service in the, i. 149, 159.
=Fox, Charles James=, on French military successes, i. 275;
reports _N._ as favorable to peace, ii. 273;
defends France in Parliament, 273;
visits _N._ at Paris, 273;
bias toward France, 282;
lays aside French sympathies, 292;
secretary of state, 394;
becomes prime minister, 399;
declares war against Prussia, 400;
negotiations with _N._, 400, 404;
supposed peace policy of, 401;
upholds the claims of existing sovereignties in Europe, 404;
compelled to adopt Pitt's program, 405;
death, 405; iii. 46.
=Foy, Gen. M. S.=, Masséna's envoy to Paris, iii. 287, 289;
brings orders for reinforcements, 289;
in the Waterloo campaign, iv. 171;
battle of Waterloo, 199.
=France=, convention with Genoa regarding Corsica, i. 17, 21;
emulation of England, 22;
her colonial ambitions, possessions, and losses, 21, 450;
ii. 4, 237, 271, 281; iii. 55, 85; iv. 295, 296;
precedent for her aid to American colonies, i. 23;
relation of the army to the throne, 67;
_N._ studies her history and politics, 78, 95, 176;
_N.'s_ bitterness against, 80, 81, 92, 122, 136;
outbreak of the Revolution of 1789 in, 100 et seq.;
social conditions and customs, the domestic relations, etc.,
100-110, 193, 266, 290; ii. 45, 194-198, 200, 213, 223, 318;
iii. 75-79, 87-90, 159-161, 388-390, 392; iv. 48, 49, 259-262,
295-296;
financial troubles, issues of paper money, financial policies and
reforms, i. 105, 289, 327; ii. 48, 134, 186, 219, 229, 318,
409-411; iii. 25, 74, 78, 79, 197, 294, 295, 304-305, 388-390;
iv. 259;
declared a limited monarchy, i. 106;
the rise of popular government, 109;
destruction of feudalism, 110; iii. 85, 322;
adoption of the tricolor, i. 109;
the end of absolutism, 119;
the title and position of the king, 119, 151, 158;
Corsica and Navarre joined to, 120;
disorganization of the army, 140;
changes in, 140-144;
patriotism, spirit of national unity, military enthusiasm, etc.,
140, 155, 158, 195, 266-270, 326; ii. 146, 156, 225, 319;
iii. 6, 7, 198, 323, 324, 386, 387; iv. 73, 171;
the first stage of transformation in, i. 150;
famine, 151;
the problem of government, 151-154, 158;
geographical reconstruction, 152;
failure of reform, 153;
split on the subject of monarchy, 153;
the national oath, 155;
fear of war, 155;
vicissitudes of royalism in;
Bourbon and anti-Bourbon sentiment and intrigues, 155, 268, 278,
297; ii. 8, 22, 95, 130, 235, 301; iv. 49, 50, 81, 113-115, 126;
desertion of troops to Austria, i. 173;
anarchy, 173, 234;
outbreak of insurrection, June 20, 1792, 174;
the republic, 176;
expected coalition against, 187;
efforts at and failures of constitutional government, 187, 268;
ii. 92, 101, 112, 121, 245; iii. 294, 295; iv. 157, 159, 166,
257 (_see also_ specific constitutions mentioned infra);
abolition of the monarchy, i. 189, 194, 267; ii. 317;
declaration of the republic, i. 189;
establishment of an executive council, 189;
political parties, 188;
the republican calendar, 188; ii. 258, 346, 406;
the dictatorship, i. 194;
preparing for foreign war, 194;
declares war against England, 195;
_N.'s_ personal relations with and influence on;
the likes and dislikes of the French people for _N._, 209-211,
323, 369; ii. 29, 97, 133, 142, 152, 185, 199, 215, 218, 272,
293, 329; iii. 1, 2, 25, 65, 73-75, 79, 80, 160, 168, 315, 316,
379, 380, 386, 387; iv. 41-45, 48-50, 53, 54, 101, 102, 123,
124, 131-133, 146, 147, 150, 152, 233, 255, 256, 259, 260, 263,
293, 298;
civil war, i. 212 et seq.; ii. 142, 145;
massacres, i. 234;
militarism, 249-251, 306; ii. 73; iii. 160;
difficulties of a new political program, i. 267-271;
confiscation of lands, 268;
adoption of ancient Roman governmental systems, 270;
the Directory, 270, et seq.;
land and labor troubles, 272;
purging of the army, 275;
military successes, 275;
territorial ambitions, 276;
suspected influences in the army, 278;
the constitution of 1795, 278, 293, 297, 299, 304-308, 309,
330-333; ii. 1, 92, 96;
reaction in, i. 280;
condition of the press, 281; ii. 145, 254, 271, 294;
growth of science, literature, and the arts, i. 281; iii. 26,
88-91, 297, 300;
woman in, i. 290;
British views of affairs in, 297;
English fleet on northern coast, 298;
military dictatorship, 305;
parties, 305;
the regicides in, 309;
coalitions against, 324; ii. 40, 86, 90, 136;
cursed by absolutism, i. 327;
the popular conception of its boundaries, 327;
struggle for and achievement of liberty and civil rights, 326-329;
ii. 126, 136, 261, 293, 317; iii. 82, 83; iv. 38, 160, 295;
the 13th Vendémiaire, i. 328;
foreign policy, 329;
intestinal troubles, 329;
military dictator of Europe, 333;
condition at opening of 1796, 333;
a new lease of national life for, 340;
military strength and recuperative power, 344-349; ii. 9, 13, 14,
160; iii. 27, 28, 323, 324, 387-389; iv. 47, 48, 50, 59, 60,
102, 103, 105, 148;
vicissitudes of her naval power, i. 345-349; ii. 331, 334, 359,
360, 370, 375; iii. 314, 315; iv. 75;
apex of revolutionary greatness, i. 351;
preëminence in Europe, 351;
rejoicings over Lodi, 361;
foreign populations well disposed toward, 387;
Eastern policy, 423; ii. 47;
dissatisfaction with treaty of Leoben, i. 441;
desire for peace, ii. 1, 140, 187, 243, 394; iii. 112, 197;
iv. 19, 52, 157;
suicide among naval officers, ii. 3;
internal administration, offices and office-holders, and public
works, 3, 127, 149-159, 217-228, 271, 273; iii. 74, 91, 160,
249, 296, 297, 301; iv. 48, 296;
the 18th of Fructidor, ii. 8;
martial law in, 8;
punctiliousness in exacting war indemnities, 13;
exasperation at England's mastery of the seas, 16;
aspirations toward "liberty of the seas," 16;
educational methods and reforms, 34, 225-228; iii. 26, 89-91;
iv. 261, 296;
_N._ constructive commander-in-chief, ii. 36;
makes war only against tyrannical dynasties, 42;
schemes of world-conquest, 46;
popular ideas concerning the Egyptian campaign, 67;
_N._ summoned to take supreme command, 80;
elections, May, 1799, 91;
relations between Church and state, religious sentiment,
the clergy, etc., 91, 131, 205, 206, 215, 224, 227, 258, 318,
398; iii. 67, 90, 119, 306, 388, 391; iv. 147, 160, 253, 259,
296;
fears of a revival of the Terror, ii. 92;
the draft in, 93; iii. 387 (_see also_ =Conscription=);
arbitrary tariff in, ii. 93;
thirst for glory and booty in, 93, 105, 268, 361; iii. 6, 82, 323;
iv. 49, 248;
the constitution of 1799, ii. 96, 100, 118, 126, 136, 148, 149,
150, 162, 242, 246, 261;
"the pear is ripe," 98, 103;
need of a Cromwell, 119;
feelings of the various parties, 122;
adoption of the Roman consular system, 123;
the plebiscite of Dec. 15, 1799, 128, 136;
the new charter, 129;
compulsory loans, 134;
disgust at demagogues, 134;
results of the upheaval of Brumaire, 133;
taxation methods and reforms, 135, 153, 220, 349; iii. 78, 305, 389;
end of the provisional Consulate, ii. 137;
two policies open to _N._, 137;
confidence in the new administration, 140;
English preparations to invade, 143;
the inveterate foe of England, 146;
salaries of the First Consul, consuls, and other officers, 150;
the legislative system, 149-153, 242; iii. 83 (_see also_ titles
of its various branches);
the judicial system, and legal abuses and reforms, ii. 149-153,
222-224, 306, 319; iv. 260, 295;
isolation against England and Austria, ii. 156;
_N.'s_ scheme of leadership among nations, 156;
her fate identified with that of _N._, 158;
inefficiency of the department of war, 165;
use of the term "citizen," 194;
public festivals, 195;
use of the term "empire," 194, 248;
the center of a system of republics, 205;
characteristics and temperaments of her people, 205, 254, 261,
315; iii. 260; iv. 44, 171, 254;
satisfaction with the peace of Amiens, ii. 213;
_N.'s_ reorganization of, 213 et seq.;
aspirations toward a European empire, 214;
position in Europe in 1801, 214;
political centralization, 218, 293; iii. 160; iv. 92, 97, 260, 294;
usury in, ii. 219; iii. 75, 77; iv. 48;
speculation in, ii. 219;
the Ministry of the Interior, 218;
crime in, 218;
confiscation of crown and emigrants' lands, 219;
levy of forced contributions by, 220;
revival of the public credit, 220;
commerce, agriculture, and industries in, 220, 272, 349; iii. 75,
76, 160, 249, 265, 295, 303, 304, 377; iv. 48;
compared with the Roman empire, ii. 222;
tendency toward one-man government, 229;
discontent of the republicans, 230;
tendency toward a paternal government, 235;
the Consulate compared with the Roman empire, 235;
plebiscite on question of hereditary consulship, 245, 247;
prerogatives of the government, 248;
her cup of satisfaction full, 248;
_N._ the personification of, 251;
autocratic power of the government, 254;
restoration of public confidence, 259;
sanctions _N.'s_ schemes of European reorganization, 265;
arbitrary shipping regulation, 270;
protective policy, 270;
restores the slave-trade, 270;
sequestrations of English property in, 270;
influence of the bourgeoisie, 278;
prepares naval armaments, 280;
importation of English goods into, forbidden, 288;
disregard for treaty stipulations, 288;
seizure of English prisoners of war in, 288;
declares embargo on British ships, 287;
failure of the Revolution to give political freedom to, 293;
effect of Moreau's fate on the moderate republicans, 300;
police system, 300, 412; iv. 260;
law of treason in, ii. 306;
indignation over the death of the Duc d'Enghien, 311;
the days before the empire, 317 et seq.;
_N.'s_ conception of the empire, 317, 318;
question of consular heredity, 317;
reforms in, 318;
creation of the empire, 322 et seq.;
the constitution of 1804, 322;
the question of hereditary empire, 322;
imperial titles in, 322;
creation of marshals, 323;
_N.'s_ civil list, 323;
the imperial heraldic device, 323;
_N.'s_ distinction between the state and the empire, 324, 396, 404;
scheme of a great empire, 330;
her generals and admirals contrasted, 334;
blockades European ports, 334;
destruction of the Pope's hopes for ecclesiastical matters in, 346;
restoration of the Gregorian calendar, 346;
European apprehensions as to her assumptions, 348;
decline in government bonds, 349; iii. 24; iv. 48;
union of the crowns of Italy and, ii. 352;
position in the European balance, 354; iii. 46;
military commanders, ii. 364;
naval power shattered at Trafalgar, 375;
preëminence of, 393;
the court of (1806), 406, 411;
the imperial catechism, 408;
venality of officials, 410; iii. 295;
continental conquests, ii. 441;
right of search and impressment, 441;
the supports of the empire, iii. 24;
likened to a cephalopod, 24;
founding of military factories, 25;
declares war against England (1793), 47;
colonial trade, rule of 1756. 47;
closes harbors to English ships, 47;
to mediate between Russia and Turkey, 55;
desire for naval allies, 66;
effect of the treaty of Tilsit in, 72;
her European relations, 73;
lays other countries under commercial tribute, 74;
journeys of the Emperor and Empress through, 74;
the Semitic question in, 75-77; iv. 259;
panic of 1805, iii. 78;
appreciation of government bonds, 79;
prosperity, 80;
creation of hereditary legislators, 82;
the right of entail, 82, 85;
the aristocracy, 85-87;
creation of a noble class, 86, 87;
salaries of ministers and ambassadors, 87;
the prefecture, 89;
restriction of commerce with the United States, 102;
lack of an heir to the throne, 112;
proposed supremacy in Europe, 114;
secret compact with Spain for partition of Portugal, 119;
negotiates for rights in Spanish colonies, 133;
welcome to the grand army in, 182;
rival schools of history in, 196;
the army and nation exhausted, 224;
discontent in, 233, 249, 325; iv. 49-52;
cession of Austrian territory to, iii. 239;
growing independence of the nobility, 250;
absolutist tendency, 256;
enthusiasm over _N.'s_ second marriage, 258-261;
transplantation of the ecclesiastical establishments from Rome to,
258, 263;
creation of the papal departments of Rome and Trasimenus, 262, 263;
overpowered by England at sea, 264;
monopolies in, 267;
violations of the Continental System in, 266;
scheme to incorporate new lands into, 266;
seizure of American vessels by, 275, 321;
part of the North Sea coast incorporated into the empire, 278, 287;
enlargement of the empire, 279;
vassal states, 279;
a central bureaucracy in, 279;
proposal to incorporate Spain into, 282;
the natural extensions of, 282;
principle of punishment by confiscation, 295;
Russian discrimination against goods from, 288;
enthusiasm in, over birth of the King of Rome, 302;
the successor to the Frankish dominion of Charles the Great, 304;
military expenses, 305;
revenue from contributions, 304;
the war method of replenishing the treasury, 305, 308;
exchange of prisoners with England, 307;
expeditions against Sicily, Egypt, and Ireland, 308;
Russia's virtual declaration of war against, 312;
effect of the Continental System on industry, 323;
"flying columns," 323;
admiration for the empire in, 323;
general confidence in, 326;
intrigues leading to the Russian campaign of 1812, 328-332;
scarcity of provisions in, 329;
Malet's conspiracy, 361, 376;
revolutionary spirit in, 375, 376;
effect of the Russian failure in, 377;
civil officials whipped into line, 379;
relief for soldiers' families, 379;
plan of regency for, 380;
reception of stragglers from Russia in, 386;
the stimulus of bad news in, 386;
seizure of communal domains, 389;
proposed "guard of honor," 390;
_N._ threatens to abolish the legislature, 390;
value of the Austrian alliance to, 390;
possibility of _N.'s_ becoming king of, 400;
proposed territorial concessions by, 408;
scheme to confine her to the west bank of the Rhine, 423;
exhaustion of, iv. 1;
demoralization of the marshals, 13;
military reverses, 19;
revulsion of feeling of Bavaria and Saxony regarding, 19;
England's determination to crush, 31;
death throes of the empire, 37;
her "natural boundaries," 41;
the Frankfort proposals as to territorial changes, 42-45;
hatred of dynastic rule, 43;
failure of popular sovereignty, 43;
hatred of feudalism, 43;
movement for the expulsion of the invaders, 44;
publication of the allies' proclamation in, 45;
losses of the wars of 1812-1813, 47;
the home guard, 50;
radical agitation in, 49;
"sedentary" volunteers, 50;
panics, 51;
imperialist sentiment in, 52-55;
invaded by the allies, 53 et seq.;
disaffection in the National Guard, 53;
schemes of the allies for invasion of, 54, 57, 68;
the allies determine to confine her to her royal limits, 68;
the Czar's determination to conquer, 68;
proposal that she continue the war with England, 75;
attempt to confine _N._ to the boundaries of royal, 77;
marauding excesses of the allies, 85;
irregular warfare in, 99;
empty arsenals in, 106;
the dissolution of the empire, 110;
proposed forms of government for, 114;
under three forms of government, 115;
the provisional government seeks the Emperor's death by
assassination, 119;
regeneration of, 121;
proposed perpetuation of the empire, 120;
_N._ renounces the throne of, 131;
pensions _N._, 131;
the virtue of the French burgher, 141;
fails to pay _N.'s_ pension, 142, 144, 150;
formation of the new upper chamber, 146;
restored to position of a great power, 146;
Louis XVIII's constitution, 146;
change of public opinion, 146-150;
comparative expenses of the kingdom and the empire, 147;
return of the emigrants to, 147;
restriction of the suffrage, 147;
release of prisoners of war, 147;
"paternal anarchy" in, 147, 149;
abolition of orphan asylums, 148;
_N.'s_ march through, on his return from Elba, 158-162;
visions of a reunited, 157;
_N.'s_ plans for, on returning from Elba, 157;
returned emigrants banished from, 157;
_N._ the "liberator" of, 157;
the apostle of popular sovereignty in, 159;
abolition of privilege and divine right, 160, 257;
the new cabinet, 159;
reconstruction of the House of Peers, 160;
promulgation of the Additional Act, 160;
plebiscite in, 160;
the specter of war in, 161, 166;
bitterness of the nobles, 166;
pledged to self-defense only, 168;
reconstituted corps of marshals, 167;
the "French fury," 171;
Austrian and Prussian schemes for the humiliation of, 214;
Carnot advises a dictatorship for, 217;
organization of a new Directory, 218;
demands for _N.'s_ abdication, 218;
appointment of committee of public safety, 218;
the allies in, 219;
the White Terror, 222;
reconstruction, 224;
confiscation of the imperial domain, 233;
the Revolution in, 253-255;
the teacher of Europe, 254;
the heir of Rome, 253;
enthusiasm for principle, 254;
the Third Estate, 259, 261;
overthrow of the old régime, 260;
Protestantism in, 259;
the new régime, 260;
tendency toward revolution, 261;
the Terror, 262;
conspiracies in, 263;
rupture of the treaty of Amiens, 264;
trial of a single-headed government, 265;
abandonment of the people to _N.'s_ purposes, 265;
character of the wars with England, 265;
the French tradition, 290;
present conditions of government, 295;
hopes for the future, 295;
progress between 1802 and 1815, 296;
_N._ the forerunner of modern, 295;
the Seven Years' War, 297.
See also names of persons or places connected with events in, passim.
=Francis I= (Emperor of Austria), scheme of territorial
aggrandizement, i. 325;
opposes the army of the Rhine, 342;
greed for Italian territory, 425, 438; ii. 141;
prepares for flight into Hungary, i. 437;
offers _N._ a principality and settled income, ii. 19;
declines to send diplomatic agent to Paris, 42;
_N._ writes personal letter to, 142;
military plans for 1800, 160;
letter from _N._ to, June, 1800, 187;
his claims of empire, 329;
dismemberment of his empire, 352;
advised of _N.'s_ seizure of the crown of Italy, 352;
declares war against France, Sept. 3, 1805, 363;
attempts negotiations with _N._, 368;
inaugurates peace negotiations, 381;
secures an armistice, 389;
interview with _N._ after Austerlitz, 389; iii. 38; iv. 30;
proposes to continue the war, ii. 390;
abandons his Germanic crown, 404;
outwitted by Andréossy, 444;
resolves on neutrality, 445;
attitude during the Eylau campaign, iii. 21;
_N._ offers Silesia to, 22;
his "divine right," 38;
character, 38;
the Czar's influence with, 166;
_N._ demands that he disarm, 169;
compact between Russia and France against, 176;
reproached by _N._ from Erfurt, 178;
decides to strike _N._ during his Spanish difficulties, 194;
abused by _N._, 213, 251;
treatment of Hungary, 214;
seeks aid of Frederick William, 225;
fails to secure advantage after Aspern, 225;
obstinacy of, 225;
his position after Wagram, 232;
hopes of continuing the war, 235;
assumes command of the army, 235;
trusts to dilatory negotiations, 236;
concedes _N.'s_ demands, 236;
gets no support from Alexander, 236;
proposal that he abdicate, 238, 251;
peace negotiations between _N._ and, 238;
angered at the treaty of Schönbrunn, 244;
at marriage of Maria Louisa, 256;
asks aid against Russian aggression, 314;
alarmed at Russian successes on the Danube, 320;
acquires Galicia, 331;
dean of the sovereigns at Dresden, 330;
_N._ seeks to hold his adhesion, 375;
lukewarmness toward _N._, 385;
dread of _N._, 394;
letter from _N._, 395;
_N.'s_ reply to his peace proposals, 408;
_N.'s_ dread of, 413;
at Gitschin, 415;
conference with Nesselrode, 415;
political use of his daughter, 416;
seeks alliance with Alexander, 419;
letter from Metternich, June 29, 1813, 420;
ratifies the treaty of Reichenbach, 422;
reception of _N.'s_ attempts to bribe Austria, 423;
fears French invasion of Vienna, iv. 3;
letter from _N._, Sept., 1813, 21;
declines to treat after Leipsic, 31;
anxiety for the future of absolutism, 40;
distrust of his allies, 40;
discovers the royal ancestry of the Buonapartes, 44;
proposed cession of Alsace to, 67;
to Maria Louisa on the situation, 68;
_N._ demands the Frankfort proposals from, 74;
narrow escape from capture at Bar-sur-Aube, 95;
joins the Army of the South at Lyons, 97;
relations with his allies, 97;
letter from _N._ to, March 28, 1814, 104;
at Dijon, 113, 128;
_N._ seeks the aid of, through Maria Louisa, 128;
Maria Louisa takes refuge with, 135, 143;
seeks the dissolution of his daughter's marriage, 135;
desires _N.'s_ exile, 138;
keeps his daughter a virtual prisoner, 143;
besought for _N.'s_ release, 231.
=Francisco, Don= (Infante of Spain), ordered to Bayonne, iii. 146.
=Franconia=, treaty with France, 1796, i. 450;
French occupation of, ii. 405; iii. 165;
the campaign in, 13;
exploits of the Black Legion in, 234.
=Frankfort-on-the-Main=, occupied by Custine, i. 194;
member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403;
French demonstrations near, 424;
the principality transferred from Dalberg to Prince Eugène, iii. 266;
furnishes new levies, 394;
parley of the allies at, iv. 40-46; 67, 70;
_N._ adheres to the proposals of, 70, 73, 75.
=Frasnes=, military operations at, iv. 176, 184, 189.
=Fraternity=, decreed, i. 110.
=Frederick VI=, signs treaty of Fontainebleau, iii. 70;
hopes to acquire Sweden, 280;
assists in the Continental System, 280.
=Frederick August I=, Elector of Saxony, accepts French terms after
Jena, ii. 443;
proposed exchange of Poland for Saxony, iii. 50;
made king of Saxony, 56;
acquires the grand duchy of Warsaw, 56;
interview with _N._ at Dresden, 394;
peculiar relations toward _N._, 375, 394, 408;
offers his troops to Austria, 399;
difficult position of, 399;
declares himself favorable to France, 407;
love for his capital, iv. 25;
sent prisoner to Berlin, 34;
released by _N._ from his engagements, 39.
=Frederick the Great=, opinion of Paoli, i. 18;
defeats Austria, 324;
his military genius and principles of warfare, 348, 379, 394;
ii. 419; iv. 266, 267;
contrasted with _N._, i. 348, 394; ii. 163;
attitude toward Austria, 41;
statue at the Tuileries, 147;
territorial acquisitions, 413;
_N.'s_ visit to, and spoliation of the tomb of, 438;
self-coronation, iii. 37;
end of his system, 103;
_N._ repudiates the military ideas of, 154;
_N.'s_ analysis of the wars of, iv. 232;
_N.'s_ study of, 266.
=Frederick William I=, his civil and military administration, ii. 414;
school system of, 414.
=Frederick William II=, reign of, ii. 414.
=Frederick William III=, Sieyès's mission to, ii. 41;
_N._ offers the friendship of France to, 155;
character and personality, 155, 400, 414, 422, 442; iii. 44, 45,
52, 57, 62; iv. 6;
refuses to make alliance with _N._, ii. 194;
neutrality of, 194, 311, 361, 414;
motive in joining the "armed neutrality," 194;
_N.'s_ threatening message to, 282;
friendly to France, 347;
letter to _N._, May, 1805, 356;
swears friendship with Alexander I, 377;
joins the third coalition, 376;
signs away Prussian independence, 400;
threatens to abdicate, 417;
proposes the organization of a North German Confederation, 418;
mobilizes the army, 420;
demands the French evacuation of Germany, 421;
declares war, 422;
at Naumburg, 424;
reluctance for war, 427, 428;
military blunders, 429;
in battle of Auerstädt, 433, 434;
sues for peace, 435;
flight from Jena, 436;
refuses to accept an armistice, 442;
desperation of, 442;
precarious situation at Königsberg, iii. 9;
_N._ opens negotiations with, 18;
refuses _N.'s_ overtures, 18;
refuses to negotiate separate peace, 36;
desperate situation, 37;
his "divine right," 38;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 42, 44, 104;
armistice arranged with, 42;
meeting with the Emperors at Tilsit, 42-45, 49-52;
humiliation of, 57;
calls on his queen for aid, 57;
spoils interview between _N._ and his Queen, 59;
death of, 63;
residence at Memel, 107;
in need of comforts, 107;
sequestration of his Westphalian estates, 162;
friendship with Alexander, 194;
at St. Petersburg, 194;
proposes alliance with Austria, 225;
refuses aid to Francis, 225;
secret armament by, 225;
denounces Schill, 233;
withdraws from offer of alliance, 236;
sounds Austria, 320;
offers alliance to Alexander, 320;
at Dresden, 330;
_N._ seeks to hold his adhesion, 375;
Prussian disregard of, 382;
nominally degrades York, 384;
forced to a decision, 395;
negotiates with _N._, 396;
removes the court to Breslau, 396;
grief at death of the Queen, 397;
mobilizes the army, 397;
declares war, 398;
proposed allotment of territory to, 409;
mediocrity in military affairs, iv. 6;
in military council at Trachenberg, 6;
anxiety for the future of absolutism, 40;
distrust of his allies, 40;
dissatisfied with the Frankfort terms, 41;
seeks the retention of Prussian acquisitions, 67;
letter to Blücher, Feb. 26, 1814, 75;
at Congress of Châtillon, 76;
attitude toward Francis, 98;
favors movement on Paris, 98;
violates armistice before Paris, 110;
his relations with Alexander, 113;
enters Paris, 113;
at the peace council in Paris, 114;
approves the Bourbon restoration, 114;
deceived by the Parisians' reception, 114;
alleged indelicacy of his visit to the Empress at Rambouillet, 135;
system of promotion in the army, 171.
=Frederick William IV= (crown prince), a suitor for a Napoleonic
princess, iii. 331;
persuades York to rejoin Blücher, iv. 80.
=Frederick, king of Würtemberg=, at the Erfurt conference, iii. 172;
marries his daughter to Jerome Buonaparte, ii. 399.
=Free trade=, demand for, in Corsica, i. 116.
=Freiburg=, Duc d'Enghien prepares to retire to, ii. 302;
military movements near, ii. 430.
=Fréjus=, _N._ lands at, ii. 83; iv. 139;
_N.'s_ triumphant progress to Paris from, ii. 84;
place of _N.'s_ embarkation changed from St. Tropez to, iv. 139;
arrival of _N._ at, 139.
="French Citizen," the=, change of name to "French Courier," iii. 88.
="French Courier," the=, iii. 88.
=French Empire, the=, the Emperor the head of, ii. 395;
distinguished from France, 404.
=French language=, _N.'s_ use of the, i. 86.
=Frère, Gen.=, success at Segovia, iii. 156.
=Fréron, Louis S.=, in siege of Toulon, i. 232, 233;
bloodthirsty character, 233;
_N.'s_ friendship with, 236;
opposes Robespierre, 251;
influence among the Thermidorians, 254;
social life in Paris, 289;
a Dantonist, 289;
uses influence in _N.'s_ behalf, 292, 296;
flirtation with Pauline Buonaparte, 322;
commissioner at Marseilles, 322.
=Friant, Gen.=, marches toward Ingolstadt, iii. 207;
in battle of Borodino, 344.
=Fribourg=, the plundering of, ii. 40.
=Frick Valley=, to be ceded to Austria, ii. 40.
=Friedland=, battle of, iii. 30-33;
the campaign reviewed, 32-37;
Alexander's pliableness after, 351;
battle of, compares with that at Beresina, iv. 37.
=Friedrichshamn=, treaty of, iii. 248.
=Friedrichstadt=, fighting at, iv. 9.
=Friends of the Constitution, the=, i. 154.
=Frischermont=, the farms of, iv. 195;
the French position at, 196.
=Friuli=, retreat of Wurmser's troops through, i. 384;
Quasdanowich's strength in, 386;
Archduke Charles in, 425;
campaign in, 430 et seq.;
ceded by Austria to Italy, ii. 390;
creation of hereditary duchy of, 395;
Duroc created Duke of, iii. 86.
_See also_ =Duroc=.
=Fromentières=, military operations near, iv. 64.
=Fructidor, the 18th of=, ii. 8;
_N.'s_ responsibility for, 22, 31, 144;
Talleyrand's views of, 34;
counterstroke to, 92;
amnesty for the victims of, 130;
ruptures negotiations at Lille, 144.
=Fructidorians=, attitude toward _N._, ii. 22;
the radical wing of the, 42.
=Fuenterrabia=, _N._ seeks information concerning, iii. 128.
=Fulton, Robert=, tries to interest _N._ in steam, ii. 335.
=Fuentes de Onoro=, battle of, iii. 289.
=Fusina=, the French army at, i. 443.
G
=Gaëta=, creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396.
=Gaffori=, i. 116;
fails to arouse enthusiasm in Ajaccio, 118.
=Galicia=, Russian troops in, ii. 363;
Austria's forces on the frontier of, iii. 23;
Russian invasion of, 236;
_N._ demands cession of, 239;
part of, ceded to Russia, 239;
territory of, ceded to grand duchy of Warsaw, 239, 310, 311;
Austria stipulates for acquisition of, 320;
ceded to Austria, 331;
Poniatowski commanding in, 402;
Alexander proposes to exchange Alsace for, iv. 67.
=Galitzin, Prince=, in battle of Eylau, iii. 15;
invades Galicia, 236;
letter from Alexander I, 311;
Alexander's friendship with, 351;
character, 351.
=Gallican Church, the=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 150;
a voluntary, ii. 206;
_N.'s_ threat to liberate it from Rome, iii. 68;
regulation of its relations with Rome, 262, 263;
_N.'s_ failure to change, iv. 260.
=Gallo=, Austrian plenipotentiary at Leoben, i. 437;
Austrian plenipotentiary in treaty of Campo Formio, ii. 19;
bribed by _N._, 19.
=Gambling=, suppression of, iii. 92.
=Ganteaume, Adm.=, member of the council of state, ii. 152;
commanding at Brest, 333;
plan of naval operations for, 334;
fails to run the blockade of Brest, 333.
=Gap=, _N.'s_ welcome at, on return from Elba, iv. 154.
=Garat, D. J.=, Bonapartist agent in Naples, ii. 89;
royalist intrigues of, iv. 106.
=Garda, Lake=, military operations near, i. 372, 379-383, 412-414.
=Gareau=, rapacity of, i. 376.
=Garfagnana=, given to Elisa (Buonaparte), ii. 395.
=Gasparin, A. E.=, member of Convention commission for Corsica, i. 219.
=Gassendi=, _N.'s_ host in Nuits, i. 146.
=Gassicourt, Cadet de=, story of Lannes's death-bed, iii. 224;
prepares poison for _N._, iv. 218.
=Gaudin, M. M. C.=, appointed to the treasury, ii. 130, 220;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, iv. 159.
=Gaza=, capture of, ii. 69.
=Gembloux=, _N._ at, iv. 179;
military movements near, 185;
Grouchy ordered to, 185, 187, 191.
=Genappe=, _N.'s_ flight through, iv. 211.
=Gendarmerie=, formation of the system of, i. 142.
=Geneva=, _N._ in, ii. 27;
to be ceded to France, 40;
Berthier sent to, 140;
Mme. de Staël's exile in, iii. 26;
Augereau confronting Bubna at, iv. 57;
surrenders to the allies, 67.
=Geneva, Lake of=, French forces on the, ii. 169.
="Genius of Christianity"= (Chateaubriand's), ii. 259.
=Genoa=, relation of Corsica to, i. 10;
loses its hold on Corsica, 15;
convention with France regarding Corsica, 17, 20;
cedes Corsica to France, 22;
the Buonaparte family in, 28;
Paoli's fears concerning, 116;
claims to Corsica, 120, 126;
_N.'s_ relations with and attitude toward, 122, 246-248, 253, 346;
ii. 10, 15;
relations with France, i. 239, 243-244;
English influence in, 243;
seizure of French vessel in harbor of, 243;
counterfeit French money in, 246;
her neutrality violated, 245;
preparations for war with, 246-248, 253;
_N.'s_ scheme of operations against Sardinia and, 247;
neutrality, 248;
the road opened to, 257;
reopening of commerce with Marseilles, 257;
political status in 1796, 345;
levy of enforced contributions from, 345; ii. 153;
military operations against (1796), i, 357;
French proposition to revolutionize, 373;
guerrillas from, 373;
coercive measures against, 373;
makes alliance with the Directory, 403;
disposition by treaty of Leoben, 439;
French intervention in, ii. 10;
sends an embassy to Montebello, 11;
revolution in, 11;
disappearance of Genoa the Superb, 11;
commercial greatness, 15;
plunder of, 16;
transformed into the Ligurian Republic, 21;
trampled under foot by _N._, 144;
the French line at, 160;
Austria's plans against, 160;
English expedition against, 160, 164;
Masséna forced back into, 165;
siege of, 165, 169, 172, 175;
the key of, 172;
surrender of, 175;
_N._ learns of Masséna's disaster at, 176;
accepts a consular constitution, 233;
contributes men to France in war of, 1803, 289;
Masséna's defense of, 323;
French acquisition of, 355, 357;
position in the French Empire, iii. 279.
=Gentili=, member of the Directory of Corsica, i. 133;
delegate to the National Assembly, 133;
places Ionian Islands under French protection, ii. 16.
=Gentz, Friedrich von=, manifesto against _N._, iii. 200;
on the campaign of 1813, iv. 40.
=George III=, recalls Paoli to England, i. 261;
incurs the ill will of Paul I, ii. 141;
receives personal letter from _N._, 142;
pasquinades on, 146;
quarrel with Pitt over Catholic emancipation, 208;
character, 270;
fears for absolutism, 270;
on treaty of Amiens, 276;
message to Parliament, March 8, 1803, 282;
Elector of Hanover, 287;
effect of his imbecility, 329;
letter from _N._, Jan. 2, 1805, 351;
negotiations for the return of Hanover to, 400, 418, 420;
use of German troops in the American colonies, 419;
ousts the "All the Talents" ministry, iii. 46;
joint letter from _N._ and Alexander to (1808), 181;
retirement of, iv. 161;
rupture of the treaty of Amiens, 264.
=George IV= (Prince Regent), attitude toward France (1795), i. 297;
regency of, iv. 161;
character, 161;
besought for asylum for _N._, 221.
=Georgia=, France undertakes to drive the Russians from, iii. 21.
=Gera=, military movements near, ii. 432.
=Gérard, Gen. E. M.=, created baron, iii. 297;
battle of Borodino, 344;
seizes Montereau, iv. 73;
moves toward Vitry, 93;
attachment to _N._, 118;
strength after the surrender of Paris, 118;
in the Waterloo campaign, 171 et seq.;
at Châtelet, 174;
crosses the Sambre, 174, 179;
battle of Ligny, 181, 183, 190;
at Walhain, 192.
=Gerasdorf=, military operations near, iii. 228;
Archduke Charles advances to, 218.
=German Church=, _N.'s_ threat to liberate it from Rome, iii. 68.
=Germanic Diet=, Prussia's growing ascendancy in the, i. 425.
=German Empire=, _N.'s_ scheme to rival the, ii. 337;
abolished, 391.
=German-Roman Empire=, decadence of, ii. 41.
=Germany=, honors to Paoli in, i. 23;
_N.'s_ study of, 78;
opposition of, to democracy, 247;
cedes the left bank of the Rhine to France, 276;
growth of liberal ideas in southern, 276;
neutrality of northern, 276;
secularization of Church lands in, 276; ii. 264;
republican schemes for, i. 329;
to be forced to yield the Rhine frontier, 334;
military operations in (1795), 342;
Jourdan's disasters in, 385;
_N._ enters, 434;
_N.'s_ influence in, 448;
claim to Malta, ii. 18;
Augereau's blundering in, 37;
plundering in, 38;
French military arrogance in, 40;
attitude of the Directory toward the ecclesiastical
principalities of, 41;
anti-revolutionary sentiment in, 43;
Jourdan ordered to command in, 87;
Archduke Charles commanding in central, 141;
the seat of liberalism in, 155;
billeting of French troops in, 156;
France's pecuniary demands upon, 156;
_N.'s_ plan for a campaign in central, 164;
Moreau levies contributions on, 186;
adjustment of the temporal and spiritual principalities of, 193, 264;
reduction of Austria's ascendancy in, 193;
France's rights in, according to Peace of Lunéville, 193;
Franco-Russian agreement concerning, 211;
the Code Napoléon in, 223;
effect of the Concordat in, 264;
question of indemnifying displaced princes, 264;
England's active diplomacy in, 264 et seq.; 301;
_N.'s_ policy of reorganization in, 265;
rearrangement of territories, 265, 352, 391;
development of national spirit, regeneration, and unification in,
265, 352; iii. 95, 161, 200, 213, 320, 330, 383, 385, 394, 397,
423; iv. 1, 19, 37, 40, 57, 298;
strength of the military party and anti-French sentiment in 1875,
ii. 269;
_N.'s_ eye to invasion of, 291;
Moreau's levies on, 296;
homage to _N._ by the princes of, 329;
_N.'s_ claim to, 354;
Alexander I's scheme for partition of, 356;
_N._ threatens to invade, 361;
Archduke Ferdinand commanding in, 363;
high-handed proceedings of the French army in, 376;
extension of the French empire in, 398;
humiliation of, 398 et seq.;
state of religion and morality in, 398;
scheme for unity of the Church in, 402;
good-will to _N._ in western, 402;
the Germanic empire abolished, 404;
French occupation of southern, 405, 418;
Russia's pretensions in, 418;
_N.'s_ intention to evacuate, 421;
Frederick William demands the evacuation of, 422;
Austria asks for rearrangement of, iii. 22;
its composite character, 56;
French nobility endowed with lands in, 87;
liberal movement in, 103;
Austria looks for indemnities in, 195;
hopes of the Hapsburgs to regain lost territory in, 199;
Archduke Charles's address to, 199;
insurrections in, 233;
hatred of _N._ in, 240;
French occupation of the coast, 266;
French evacuation of southern, 266;
confiscation in, 296;
Mme. de Staël's book on, 300;
withdrawal of French troops from, 307;
influence of Prussia in, 320;
proposed new boundaries for, 320;
feelings toward _N._ in, 322;
withdrawal of the Hapsburgs from the leadership of, 330;
conspiracies in, 375;
revolutionary feeling in, 382;
Russian proclamation to, 398;
Sweden sends troops to, 399;
Austria aims at recovering ascendancy in, 423;
purpose of the allies to restore states in, iv. 21;
the retreat from, 35;
proposed influence for _N._ in, 41;
Prussia's ambition for leadership in, 88;
_N.'s_ influence in the creation of modern, 299;
the federation of, 298.
="Germany in her Deepest Humiliation,"= ii. 417.
=Gernstädt=, military operations near, ii. 433.
=Gerry, Elbridge=, Talleyrand attempts to corrupt, ii. 34.
=Ghent=, flight of Louis XVIII to, iv. 161.
=Giacominetta=, _N.'s_ childish love, i. 41.
=Gibraltar=, i. 22;
Nelson sails for, ii. 359;
Nelson waters his ships at, 372;
importance of, iii. 111.
=Gibraltar, Straits of=, Villeneuve ordered to, ii. 371.
="Gilded Youth," the=, i. 271.
=Gilgenburg=, Ney and Bernadotte escape to, iii. 10;
military movements near, 13, 14.
=Ginguené, P. L.=, Bonapartist agent in Turin, ii. 89.
=Gironde, Department of the=, exempt from legislation concerning
Jews, iii. 77.
=Gironde, River=, _N._ proposes to seek asylum on American ship in
the, iv. 221.
=Girondists, the=, form a ministry, i. 172;
the fall from the ministry, 174;
leaders of, 189;
position in the National Convention, 188;
struggle between the Jacobins and, 189;
favor Louis XVI, 194;
failure of their policy, 212;
defeat the Jacobins in Marseilles, 213;
movement of Marseillais on Paris, 213;
retreat from Avignon, 216;
their cause discussed in the "Supper of Beaucaire," 216, 219;
prepare Toulon for siege, 221;
deliver the fleet at Toulon to Lord Hood, 221;
murders of, at Toulon, 233;
overawed by Danton and Marat, 234;
effects of their policy, 249;
failure of, 266, 267;
their part in organizing the Directory, 271;
influence on the new constitution, 278;
royalism among, 309.
=Girzikowitz=, military operations near, ii. 386.
=Gitschin=, Francis I. at, iii. 415.
=Glatz=, siege of, iii. 20.
=Glogau=, held by the French, iii. 402;
relieved by Victor, 413.
=Glory=, the French passion for, ii. 249, 361; iii. 6.
=Gneisenau, Gen. August=, institutes military reforms in Prussia,
iii. 103;
military ability, iv. 14, 59, 183;
spurs up Bernadotte at Leipsic, 31;
aims to annihilate _N._, 57;
warns Blücher against over-confidence, 62;
in Waterloo campaign, 172, 177;
orders the Prussian retreat to Wavre, 183, 184;
his title to fame, 182, 183;
holds Blücher's troops, 194;
doubts Wellington's ability to stand at Waterloo, 194;
in battle of Waterloo, 211, 212.
=Godoy, Manuel de=, prime minister of Spain, ii. 204, 289;
relations with Queen Louisa, 204, 289, 332; iii. 71, 124, 144, 150;
the "Prince of the Peace," ii. 289; iii. 124;
proposed kingdom for, in Portugal, 67, 120;
Spanish revolt against, 71;
treachery to _N._, 71;
ill-gotten wealth, 124;
relations with _N._, 124, 131;
waning power and downfall of, 124, 128, 134, 135, 146;
causes arrest of Ferdinand, 126;
Ferdinand's charges against, 126;
becomes aware of _N.'s_ policy, 132;
skill in diplomacy, 131;
refuses to assent to French seizure of Portugal, 133;
appalled at the French invasion, 133;
contemplates a Bourbon monarchy in America, 134;
clamor for his death, 135;
capture of, 135;
seeks protection of Ferdinand, 136;
destruction of his property, 135;
proposed trial of, 135, 136, 144;
hinted order that he come to France, 140, 141;
summoned to Bayonne, 145;
popular hatred of, 146;
at Compiègne, 148;
infamy of, 150.
=Goethe, Johann W. von=, meetings with _N._, iii. 172;
decorated at Erfurt, 176;
on _N._, 319, 322;
the idealist among thinkers, iv. 242.
=Gohier, M.=, member of the Directory, ii. 92;
represents Jacobin element in the Directory, 94;
falls under Josephine's influence, 97;
president of the Directory, 97;
joins the Bonapartist ranks, 97;
proposed resignation of, 101;
seeks counsel with Barras, 106;
refuses to resign, 108;
imprisonment of, 108, 115.
=Gohlis=, military operations near, iv. 29-32.
=Goldbach, River=, military operations on the, ii. 385-388, 392.
=Golden Book, the=. _See_ =Venice=.
=Goltz=, at Tilsit, iii. 49, 57;
interview with _N._, 60.
=Golynim=, military operations near, iii. 4.
=Görz=, ceded to France, iii. 239.
=Göss=, castle of, treaty of Leoben signed in, i. 437.
=Gosselies=, military operations near, iv. 175, 176.
=Gotha=, imprisonment of St. Aignan at, iv. 42.
=Göttingen=, Bernadotte ordered to, ii. 362;
patriotism in the university, iii. 398.
=Gourgaud, Gen.=, accompanies _N._ to Paris, iv. 105;
advises a return to Lorraine, 116;
requests interview with Souham, 126;
accompanies _N._ to Rochefort, 219;
goes to London to seek English asylum for _N._, 223;
accompanies _N._ to St. Helena, 227;
mission to secure _N.'s_ release, 231;
assists _N._ on his history, 232.
=Government=, Rousseau's views on, i. 8;
the centralization of, ii. 218;
the mystery of, iii. 389.
=Gradisca=, storming of, i. 433.
=Graham, Gen.=, commanding English troops in the Netherlands, iv. 57.
=Grain=, monopoly of trade in, i. 105.
=Grand army, the=, _N.'s_ distrust of, iii. 45;
passes from Prussia to Spain, 182;
Murat commanding the remnants of, 373;
demoralization of, 373;
crosses the Niemen, 384.
=Grandmaison=, charges plots among the Five Hundred, ii. 115.
=Granville, Lord=, on affairs in France, i. 297.
=Grasse=, _N.'s_ march through, on return from Elba, iv. 154.
=Graudenz=, precarious situation of the garrison of, iii. 10;
Bennigsen attempts to succor, 10;
demanded by _N._ as a pledge, 36.
=Gravina, Adm.=, escapes from Trafalgar, ii. 374.
=Great Britain=, the modern empire of, ii. 55.
_See also_ =England=.
="Great Elector,"= the office of, ii. 126, 322.
=Great Görschen=, fighting at, iii. 405.
=Great Raigern=, military operations near, ii. 382.
=Great St. Bernard Pass=, the passage of the, ii. 169-171.
="Great Terror," the=, i. 250.
=Greece= (=ancient=), influence on French art, iii. 88;
effects of ambition in, iv. 261;
the history of, 293.
=Greece=, Nelson seeks the French fleet at, ii. 61;
proposal that France take, iii. 50;
_N._ plans the liberation of, 51;
the national awakening of, iv. 300.
=Grégoire, Henri=, influence on the Consulate, ii. 195;
royalist intrigues of, 195.
=Gregorian calendar=, restoration of the, ii. 346.
=Gregory VII=, ii. 340.
=Grenadier Guards=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 201.
=Grenier, Gen.=, in battle of Hohenlinden, ii. 191;
division commander under Eugène, iii. 393.
=Grenoble=, Pius VII a prisoner at, iii. 119, 242;
_N.'s_ march to, on return from Elba, iv. 154;
imperial proclamation at, 156;
obeys _N.'s_ summons to surrender, 156;
_N.'s_ welcome at, 156;
_N._ at, 165.
=Grenville, Lord=, letter to Talleyrand from, ii. 143;
on _N.'s_ wickedness, 144.
=Grisons, the=, quarrel between the Valtellina and, ii. 11;
Austrian violation of neutrality in, 72;
Kray's communications via, to be cut, 164.
=Grodno=, Jerome at, iii. 336.
=Gros, A. J.=, painter, ii. 351;
created a baron, 354.
=Grosbois=, residence of Barras, ii. 119.
=Grossbeeren=, battle of, iv. 14, 16, 19.
=Gross-Ebersdorf=, military operations near, iii. 217.
=Grouchy, Gen. E.=, in battle of Hohenlinden, ii. 191;
at Tilsit, iii. 52;
commanding cavalry in Russian campaign of 1812, 324;
in battle of Vauchamps, iv. 64;
recreated marshal, 167;
movements and orders in the Waterloo campaign, 170 et seq., 179,
186, 191-194, 200, 213, 267;
letter to _N._, June 17, 1815, 187, 191;
suspected unwillingness of, 187;
Gérard to coöperate with, 190;
uneasy conscience of, 191;
garbled account of Waterloo by, 191;
at Walhain, 192, 213;
criticism of, 192;
at Wavre, 194;
_N.'s_ reliance on, 207, 213;
ordered to retire on Namur, 211, 214;
responsibility for disaster at Waterloo, 213;
victory at Wavre, 214;
leads his army back to France, 214.
=Guadarrama Mountains=, _N._ crosses the, iii. 186-188.
=Guadeloupe=, French plans to strengthen, ii. 333.
"=Guardian Angel, The=," near Craonne, the Emperor's night at,
iv. 78, 79.
"=Guard of honor=," the proposed, iii. 390.
=Guards= (=English=), in battle of Waterloo, iv. 209.
=Guastalla=, given to Pauline (Buonaparte), ii. 395;
granted to Maria Louisa, iv. 133.
=Guastalla, Duchess of=, Pauline created, iii. 279.
=Gudin, Gen.=, in battle of Pultusk, iii. 4;
in the Eckmühl campaign, 208.
=Guérin, Pierre N.=, created baron, iii. 297.
=Guernsey=, Russian soldiers transported to, ii. 141.
=Guiana=, Pichegru escapes from, ii. 161.
=Guidai=, engaged in Malet's conspiracy, iii. 376.
=Guieu, Gen.=, in the Rivoli campaign, i. 410, 414.
=Guilleminot, Gen.=, mediator between Russia and Turkey, iii. 105;
in battle of Waterloo, iv. 199.
=Guillotine, the=, work of, i. 251.
=Güldengossa=, military operations near, iv. 28.
=Günzburg=, Mack essays to cross the Danube at, ii. 366.
=Gustavus Adolphus=, scene of his defeat of Wallenstein, iii. 404.
=Gustavus IV=, king of Sweden, hated by his subjects, iii. 35;
in Pomerania, 36;
weakness of, 36;
gives place to Charles XIII, 280.
=Guyot=, battle of Waterloo, iv. 203.
=Gyuläi=, Austrian diplomatic agent, ii. 381.
=Gyulay, Gen.=, battle of Leipsic, iv. 28, 32.
H
=Hadrian I=, Charles the Great's donation to, revoked by _N._, iii. 215.
=Hague, The=, removal of the capital to Amsterdam from, iii. 277.
=Hal=, Wellington's troops at, iv. 190, 195.
=Halberstadt=, the Black Legion's escape through, iii. 234.
=Halkett, Hugh=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 210.
=Halle=, Bernadotte's victory at, ii. 436;
the Black Legion's escape through, iii. 234;
patriotism in the university, 398;
Blücher's advance to, iv. 26, 27.
=Hamburg=, negotiations between France and Prussia concerning, ii. 154;
laid under contribution, 286, 287;
closed to British commerce, 287;
seizure of Rumbold at, 330;
proposal to give it to Prussia, 400;
French occupation of, 443;
Spanish troops in, iii. 159;
Bernadotte's force in, 202;
smuggled commerce of, 265;
scheme to incorporate with France, 266;
position in the French Empire 279;
sends deputation to Paris, 380;
rising against the French garrison, 402;
captured by Vandamme, 407;
Danish troops sent to, 407;
occupied by Davout, 413;
the status quo to be maintained in, 414;
_N._ offers the city to Austria, 424;
end of _N.'s_ defensive line, iv. 1;
Davout besieged at, 55.
=Hameln=, attempt to besiege, ii. 416;
capitulation of, 436.
=Hamilton, Alexander=, U. S. treasury system, iv. 259.
=Hanau=, Oudinot's command in, iii. 203;
battle of, iv. 35;
compared to Krasnoi, 36.
=Hannibal=, _N.'s_ allusion to, i. 357;
his passage of the Alps, ii. 169, 186.
=Hanover=, _N._ threatens to seize, ii. 282;
George III, Elector of, 287;
French occupations of, 287, 331, 418, 443, iii. 202, 266;
Prussia negotiates with France for, ii. 356, 362;
the French garrison replaced by Prussians, 362;
ceded to Prussia, 390, 400, 405;
negotiations for its return to George III, 400, 418, 420;
attempt to drive the French from, 416;
troops in Pomerania, iii. 36;
allotted to Jerome, 266;
Jerome deprived of part of, 278;
excepted from the scheme of Prussian aggrandizement, 398;
England abandons scheme for extension of, 399;
Prussia promises to cede part of Saxony to, 417;
proposed cession of Hildesheim to, 417;
restored to its former ruler, iv. 40;
campaign of the Hundred Days, 170 et seq.
=Hanover, the House of=, ii. 317.
=Hanseatic towns=, free cities, ii. 405;
Joachim I's aspirations concerning, 416;
proposal to include in North German Confederation, 418;
hesitate to reply to Prussia, 420;
neutrality of, iii. 46;
virtual dependence on France, 66;
smuggled commerce of, 265;
scheme to incorporate them with France, 266;
_N._ offers to evacuate, 272;
offered to Louis for Brabant and Zealand, 270;
England threatened with loss of trade with, 272;
_N._ refuses to cede points concerning, 392;
proposal that France evacuate the, 407;
proposed independence of the, 415; iv. 30.
=Happiness=, _N._ on, i. 137.
=Hapsburg, House of=, end of its policy of territorial expansion,
ii, 193;
effect of the Bayonne negotiations on, iii. 163 et seq.;
seeks indemnity for lost domains, 195;
hopes of regaining lost territory, 199;
demoralization in, 215;
matrimonial alliance with _N._, 249, 251; iv. 43;
democratic blows at the dignity of, iii. 256; iv. 37;
withdraws from the leadership of Germany, iii. 330.
=Harcourt=, on affairs in France, i. 297.
=Hardenberg, Prince K. A. von=, aims at consolidation of Prussia,
ii. 358;
dismissal of, 400; iii. 42, 49, 50;
Prussian minister, ii. 415. iii; 37;
at Tilsit, 50;
proposes the partition of Turkey, 50;
seeks refuge in Vienna, 178;
effect of his reforms, 319;
Metternich's negotiations with, 394;
hostility to _N._, 396.
=Harel=, share in the execution of d'Enghien, ii. 310.
=Hassenhausen=, engagement at, ii. 433.
=Hatzfeldt, Prince=, court-martialed and sentenced to death, ii. 439;
the sentence commuted, 439.
=Haugwitz, Count=, Prussian envoy to France, ii. 381, 399;
policy after Austerlitz, 389;
concludes treaty with France, 399;
demand for the disgrace of, 417.
=Hauterive, Duhoux d'=, royalist leader, i. 298;
reviews French situation in 1801, ii. 214.
=Havelburg=, French troops at, iii. 393.
=Havre=, France's alleged naval preparations at, ii. 284.
=Hébert, J. R.=, leader of the Exagérés, i. 234;
terrorist, 250.
=Heddersdorf=, defeat of the Austrian, by Hoche at, i. 440.
=Heidenheim=, the French position at, ii. 365.
=Heilsberg=, Ney retreats from, iii. 10;
Bennigsen reaches, 10, 14;
battle of, 29;
_N._ concentrates his army at, 29;
the Russians abandon, 32;
_N.'s_ peril at, 33.
=Heinrichsdorf=, engagement near, iii. 30.
=Heliopolis=, battle of, ii. 181.
=Helvetian Republic, the=, alliance with France, ii. 40;
formation of, 40, 86;
neutrality violated by Austria, 72;
_N._ Grand Mediator of the, 234;
English efforts to discredit France in, 264;
in vassalage to France, iii. 279.
=Henry, Prince of Prussia=, ii. 415.
=Henry III=, _N._ likened to, ii. 340.
=Henry IV=, heads the Bourbon dynasty, i. 176;
_N._ discerns likeness to himself, ii. 350;
_N._ emulates in uxoriousness, iii. 258.
=Herat=, proposed Franco-Russian expedition via, ii. 194.
=Herbois, Collet d'=, member of the National Convention, i. 188, 233.
=Hercules, Pillars of=, "the new," iii. 308.
=Hereditary nobility=, abolished, ii. 223.
=Heredity=, _N._ on, i. 137.
=Herodotus=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 78.
=Hesse=, French march through, ii. 362;
furnishes contingent to _N.'s_ army, iii. 324.
=Hesse-Cassel=, excluded from the Confederation of the Rhine,
ii. 403, 442;
proposal to include in the Confederation, 418;
hesitates to reply to Prussia, 420;
French occupation of, 443;
neutrality of, 443;
organized into the kingdom of Westphalia, iii. 56.
=Hesse-Cassel, House of=, extinction of, ii. 443.
=Hesse-Darmstadt=, member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403;
quota of men, 404;
turns from _N._ to the allies, iv. 40.
=Heymès, Col.=, records _N.'s_ orders to Ney at Quatre Bras,
iv. 176, 184.
=High Admiral=, creation of the office of, ii. 322.
=Highways=, _N.'s_ scheme of, ii. 279.
=Hildesheim=, apportioned to Prussia, ii. 265;
proposed cession of, to Hanover, iii. 417.
=Hill, Lord=, joins Wellington in the Peninsula, iii. 283;
occupies Bordeaux, iv. 87;
in Waterloo campaign, 172.
=Hiller, Gen.=, military operations on the inn, iii. 199;
movements to support, 204;
movements before Ratisbon, 208;
driven back to Landshut, 208;
flees to Neumarkt, 208;
Bessières pursues, 209;
crosses the Danube at Mautern, 212;
battle of Ebelsberg, 211;
defeats Wrede at Erding, 211;
effects junction with Charles at Bisamberg, 212, 216;
drives Eugène over the Adige, iv. 39.
=Hilliers, Baraguey d'=, capture of his command in Russia, iii. 359.
=History=, the functions and study of, i. 1, 2; iv. 251;
_N.'s_ study and theory of, i. 78, 127, 150.
"=History of Corsica=," i. 91, 93, 123, 126.
=Hoche, Gen. Lazare=, defeats Wurmser at Weissenburg, i. 273;
commanding Army of the West, 346;
military genius, 350; ii. 181;
campaign in the Netherlands, i. 427;
defeats Austria on the Rhine, 439;
expedition to Ireland, 449;
considered for minister of war, ii. 6;
distrusted by the people, 6;
death of, 9.
=Hofer, Andreas=, exploits in the Tyrol, iii. 234;
capture, trial, and death of, 241;
his family ennobled, 241, 242;
his patriotism and fame, 241;
compared to Tell, 242.
=Hohenems=, acquired by Würtemberg, ii. 391.
=Hohenlinden=, battle of, ii. 190-194.
=Hohenlohe, Prince of=, commanding at Chemnitz, ii. 424;
at Blankenhain, 427;
defeated by Bernadotte at Schleiz, 428;
in battle of Jéna, 433, 434;
retreats to Prenzlau, 434;
surrender of, 436.
=Hohen-Thann=, military movements near, iii. 206.
=Hohenzollern=, member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403.
=Hohenzollern, House of=, ii. 317;
_N._ in the palace of the, 437;
its territories, 442;
_N._ contemplates its extinction, 442;
provisions for French evacuation of its lands, iii. 62;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 106, 319;
humiliation of, 163.
=Holitsch=, interview between Francis I and _N._ near, ii. 389.
=Hollabrunn=, Bagration's stand at, ii. 379;
Soult at, 379.
=Holland=, honors to Paoli in, i. 23;
_N.'s_ study of the history of, 156;
expected enmity of, 187;
closes the Scheldt, 194;
becomes the Batavian Republic, 276;
conquest and occupation by France, 324; ii. 5, 233;
republican schemes for, i. 329;
plunder of works of art from, 369;
organization of the Orange party in, 499;
efforts to check democracy in, 499;
English conquests of colonies from, ii. 12;
proposal to make her a dependency of France, 12;
loss of colonies by, 38;
compulsory enrolment in the republican system, 38;
Brune's campaign in, 87, 93, 323;
loyalty to _N._, 146;
indemnity for Flushing, 154;
the Code Napoléon in, 223; iii. 277;
a new constitution imposed on, ii. 233;
indemnity to House of Orange, 262;
French guarantees to, 289;
share in the war of 1803, 290;
independence of, 354;
_N.'s_ claim to, 354;
Prussia bound to secure the liberties of, 377;
Louis made king, 397; iii. 96, 269;
enlistments from, under the French eagles, 3;
Louis's reign in, 25, 270, 277;
vassalage to France recognized at Tilsit, 54;
relations of France with, 73;
smuggled commerce of, 140, 265;
Louis's loyalty to the Dutch, 148, 149;
Oudinot ordered to coerce, 266;
England's paper blockade of, 267;
visit of _N._ to, 268;
violates the Continental System, 269-271;
_N._ reduces Louis to the position of a French governor, 271;
geographically a part of France, 270, 282;
_N.'s_ scheme for the annexation of, 271;
England threatened with loss of trade with, 272;
_N._ offers to evacuate, 272;
opposition to _N._ in, 275;
seizures of American ships in, 275;
Fouché's English-Dutch conspiracy, 275;
Louis abdicates, 276;
removal of the capital to Amsterdam, 277;
annexed to France, 277;
popularity of Louis in, 277;
prosperity under French rule, 277;
the national movement in, 278;
"the alluvium of France," 282;
English expedition to, 294;
incorporated into the French Empire, 294;
_N._ refuses to cede any part of, 392;
riots in, 392;
Eugène to guard, 393;
proposal that France evacuate, 407;
mediocrity of soldiers of, iv. 20;
_N._ offers to restore independence of, 30;
English influence in, 30, 41;
recalls the Prince of Orange, 40;
proposed independence of, 41.
=Holland, Lord=, advocates _N.'s_ cause in Parliament, ii. 143.
=Holstein=, threatened French invasion of, iii. 69;
Denmark's loss of, 70.
=Holy Alliance, the=, iii. 425; iv. 225.
=Holy Inquisition=, abolished in Spain, iii. 189.
=Holy League, the=, i. 177.
=Holy Roman Empire=, dismemberment of the, ii. 266;
abolition of, 418;
desire to substitute a Western empire for, 395;
title of the heir to, iii. 261.
=Hood, Lord=, seizure at Toulon, i. 221.
=Hortense, Queen=, at Malmaison, iv. 218.
_See also_ =Beauharnais, Hortense de=.
=Hostage Law=, the, ii. 94, 134.
=Hougomont=, the farm-house of, iv. 195, 197;
fighting at, 199-202, 207.
=Hoyerswerda=, _N._ moves toward, iv. 17.
=Hugo, Victor=, on _N._, i. 377;
at school in Madrid, iii. 292.
=Humanity=, the cause of, i. 266.
=Hyères=, retreat of the Corsican expedition to, i. 262.
=Hulin, Gen. P. A.=, presides at trial of Duc d'Enghien, ii. 307-310;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, iv. 132.
=Humboldt, William von=, member of Prussian reform party, ii. 415;
reorganizes the educational system of Prussia, iii. 103;
at Congress of Prague, iii. 422.
=Hundred Days=, the campaign of the, iv. 171 et seq.;
_N.'s_ monograph on, 232;
the political question of the, 296.
=Hungary=, Francis I prepares for flight into, i. 437;
French machinations in, ii. 42;
importance of securing to the allies, 381;
Archduke John in, iii. 213, 217, 225, 226, 230;
_N.'s_ policy of winning the people of, 214;
Leopold II's reign, 214;
Francis I's treatment of, 214.
I
=Iberian Peninsula=, proposed appropriation of, iii. 111.
=Ibrahim Bey=, in the battle of the Pyramids, ii. 60;
fails to assist the Rhodes expedition, 77.
=Île Dieu=, landing of Count of Artois on, i. 304.
=Iller, Gen.=, commanding in the Tyrol, ii. 188.
=Iller, River=, Austrian forces on the, ii. 363.
=Illyria=, Austrian recruiting in, i. 386;
Marmont in, iii. 225;
constitution of, 239;
military government of, 279;
proposed surrender of, to Austria, iii. 320, 392, 407, 415, iv. 30.
=Imagination=, _N's_ prophetic utterance on a disordered, i. 138.
=Imperial Guard=, at Kronach, ii. 428;
discontent among the, iii. 5;
strength in Poland, 6, 7;
at Eylau, 15;
battle of Heilsberg, 29;
battle of Friedland, 30;
exclusiveness of, 87;
service in Spain, 133, 265, 283;
accompanies _N._ from Spain to Paris, 189;
strength in March, 1812, 323;
omission of _N._ to use them at Borodino, 346;
at Smolensk, 362;
at Krasnoi, 363;
on march from Smolensk to Lithuania, 5;
_N.'s_ address to, near Orcha, 366;
demoralization of, 365;
jealousy of the proposed "guard of honor," 390;
at Rippach, 404;
in battle of Lützen, 404;
the allies' belief in _N.'s_ use of, iv. 4;
at Lauban, 7;
feat of marching, 8;
battle of Dresden, 8, 9;
its losses, 78;
_N._ reviews the, 117, 118;
in Waterloo campaign, 171-211;
battle of Ligny, 183;
battle of Waterloo, 196, 207, 208;
personnel and morale, 208;
"dies but never surrenders," 210.
=Imperial University=, founding of the, iii. 89.
=Imposts=, the regulation of, i. 44.
="Inconstant," the=, _N.'s_ escape from Elba in, iv. 153.
=India=, _N.'s_ attention turned toward, i. 78;
_N.'s_ aspirations for a career in, 207, 216, 317; ii. 15;
_N._ given leave to march on, 73;
importance of _N.'s_ conquering, 73;
Russia's ambition in, 154, 194, 263;
Franco-Russian plans for invasion of, 194, 209;
_N.'s_ dreams of empire in, 289; iii. 308, 352; iv. 256;
_N.'s_ plans for attacking England in, ii. 334;
proposed French expedition to, 441;
proposed Franco-Persian invasion of, iii. 21;
England's vulnerable heel, 109, 112-114;
the highway to, 111.
=Indus, River=, the, proposed Indian expeditions via, ii. 209.
=Industry=, improved condition of, ii. 259;
_N._ advises encouragement of, 347.
=Infantado, Duke del=, leader of Ferdinand VII's party, iii. 124;
commissioned governor of New Castile, 126.
=Infantry=, _N.'s_ early views concerning, i. 56, 59.
="Influence of the Passions,"= _N.'s_ study of Mme. de Staël's, ii. 53.
=Ingolstadt=, Bernadotte marches to, ii. 365;
Davout to concentrate at, iii. 204-208.
=Inn Quarter=, ceded to Austria, ii. 40;
embodied in the Confederation of the Rhine, iii. 239.
=Inn, River, the=, military movements on, ii. 190, 363, 367;
iii. 199, 204, 211, 234.
=Innocent II=, contrasted with =Pius VII=, iii. 264.
=Innsbruck=, seized by the Tyrolese, iii. 201;
garrisoned by Austrians, 201;
Lefebvre drives Tyroleans from, 213.
=Inquisition, the Holy=, blamed for disorders in Spain, iii. 158.
=Institute of France=, reorganization of, i. 281;
Talleyrand a member of, ii. 33, 47;
elects _N._ a member, 98, 335;
part of the educational system of France, 226.
=Institutions=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 78.
=International law=, the law of colonial trade, iii. 46, 47, 48;
neutral ships and neutral goods, 46-49;
the "rule of 1756," 46, 47;
right of search, 47, 100;
contraband of war, 47;
sanctity of all flags on high seas, 55;
the law of neutrals, 264, 267, 280;
use of "simulated papers," 267, 274.
=International understandings=, a hoped-for system of, iv. 295.
=Invalides, Hospital of the=, trophies from Aboukir deposited at,
ii. 147;
inauguration of the empire at, 327;
distribution of Legion of Honor crosses at, 361;
relics of Frederick the Great sent to, 437.
=Ionian Islands=, taken under French protection, ii. 16;
worship of _N._ in, 16;
France retains, 21;
suzerainty of Turkey over, 262;
occupied by Russia, 330;
compensation for, iii. 56;
England's naval watchfulness over, 112;
military government of, 278.
=Ireland=, Hoche's expedition to, i. 449;
plans of French invasion of, ii. 49, 67, 354, 371;
arrest and dismissal of French consuls in, 270;
_N._ foments disturbance in, 272;
volunteer forces in, 291;
English troops sent to Portugal from, iii. 122;
French expedition against (1811), 308.
=Iron Mask, the Man in the=, i. 27.
=Isar, River=, military movements on the, ii. 190; iii. 205-209.
=Isenburg=, member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403.
=Iser Mountains=, military movements near, iv. 7.
=Islam=, _N._ professes the religion of, ii. 66.
=Isola Rossa=, patriot success at, i. 119.
=Isonzo, River=, military operations on the, i. 433;
proposed boundary for Italy, ii. 23.
=Istria=, ceded to Austria at Leoben, i. 438;
Austrian forces in, ii. 170;
ceded by Austria to Italy, 391;
creation of hereditary duchy of, 396;
Bessières created Duke of, iii. 86.
_See_ also =Bessières=.
=Italian Church=, _N._ threat to liberate it from Rome, iii. 68.
=Italian Republic=, _N._ president of the, 252.
=Italy=, affinity with Corsica, i. 9, 10, 24, 25;
the root of the Buonaparte family in, 27;
expected enmity of, 187;
movements of the French fleet against, 191;
_N.'s_ plan of campaign in, 239, 244-246;
suspension of offensive operations in, 256;
opening the roads into, 257, 344;
uneasiness in, at English proximity, 261;
French schemes against English influence in, 261;
growth of liberal ideas in, 276;
_N._ claims the honors of the campaign in, 292;
adoption of _N.'s_ plan of campaign against (1795), 293;
Austria's gaze on, 325;
_N.'s_ peculiar relations to, and knowledge of, 340-345, 368;
the battle-field of rival dynasties, 345;
status in 1796, 345;
revolutionary spirit in, 345;
wealth, 345, 368, 375;
cost of the war in, 351;
_N.'s_ successes in (1796), 351;
French pillage in, 351, 423, 446; ii. 13, 17, 32;
the destinies of Europe dependent on fate of, i. 351;
"an artichoke," 352;
the garden of, 357;
crushed at Lodi, 361;
levying contributions in, 361, 366-369, 374, 375;
the fate of Europe dependent on campaign in, 385;
_N.'s_ personal views of his campaign in, 394;
_N.'s_ negotiations with, 397-404;
relations with France, 397-404;
the campaign in, 406 et seq.;
Austria's fourth attempt to retrieve position in, 406;
the key of, 411;
Spain's mastery of, 421;
Austria's greed for territory in, 425;
Austria's determination to fight in, 425;
spread of the revolutionary movement in, 428;
_N.'s_ organization of native forces in, 431;
scheme of a central republic for, 438;
general disarmament of, 442;
_N._ has free hand in rearrangement of, ii. 7;
_N.'s_ schemes to master, 9;
lands in, ceded to Austria, 21;
attitude of the Directory toward, 23;
_N.'s_ reports on the people of, 23;
_N._ the deliverer of, 26;
the enlightenment of, 37;
France's policy toward, 38;
keeping open gateways into, 40;
Polish troops in, 42;
_N.'s_ forces in, 42;
reasons for success of revolutionary propaganda in, 44;
proposed movements of the allies in, 72;
Joubert's command in, 72;
French disasters in, 80, 140;
dissolution of the republics in, 83;
France foments quarrels in, 87;
Schérer's blunders in, 88;
Russian military operations in, 90, 92;
Francis I determined to hold northern, 141;
_N.'s_ bad faith with the states of, 144;
French and Austrian troops in, 160;
_N.'s_ plan of campaign in, (1800), 162 et seq.;
the reserve army ordered to, 164;
Lecourbe ordered to, 168;
Austrian successes and forces in, 170;
open to _N.'s_ armies, 170;
Austria agrees to evacuate northern, 182;
Austria seeks concessions in, 189;
Masséna's maladministration in, 190;
Murat commanding in central, 190;
Brune's and Macdonald's movements in, 192;
Austria's line in, as fixed at Lunéville, 193;
alleged plans of _N._ to secure principality in, 194;
_N.'s_ problems in, 203 et seq.;
influence of France in, 207;
Franco-Russian agreement concerning, 211;
the Code Napoléon in, 223; iv. 40;
reorganization of the Cisalpine Republic, ii. 233;
_N.'s_ grip on, 263;
Austria's share in, 265;
Moreau's soldiers drafted into, 295;
the second campaign in, 295;
restriction of the temporal power in, 325;
necessity for reorganization, 347;
union of the crowns of France and, 352;
coronation of _N._ as king, 353;
_N.'s_ scheme of independence for, 355;
_N._ ignores Russian interference in, 356;
Prince Eugène Beauharnais viceroy of, 358;
_N.'s_ sojourn in, 357;
Austria's ambition concerning, 358;
Eugène Beauharnais to organize troops in, 362;
Austria's interest in, 363;
Archduke Charles commanding in, 363;
Prussia bound to secure the independence of, 377;
Austrian troops withdrawn to Vienna from, 380;
_N._ proposes to add Venetia to, 389;
acquires Friuli and Istria, 391;
acquires Dalmatia, 391, 405;
_N._ exacts tribute from, 396;
Venetia incorporated into, 395, 405;
enlistments from, under the French eagles, iii. 3;
French dominion recognized at Tilsit, 54;
temporal appointment of bishops in, 68;
ecclesiastical difficulties in, 67, 305;
relations of France with, 73;
proposal to lay under commercial tribute to France, 74;
French nobility endowed with lands in, 87;
_N.'s_ royal progress through, 109;
_N.'s_ firm hold on, 109;
as a highway to India, 111;
lack of an heir to the throne, 112;
abolition of the hostile strip between Naples and, 118;
annexation of Papal States, to, 68, 118;
Etruria incorporated with kingdom, 120, 129;
_N._ visits (Nov., 1808), 128;
_N._ offers the crown to Lucien, 129;
Austria looks for indemnities in, 195;
hopes of the Hapsburgs to regain territory in, 199;
defeat of Prince Eugène by Archduke John in, 201;
Archduke John in, 211;
consolidation of, under the Napoleon family, 215;
extinguishment of Austria's hopes in, 215;
the city of Rome incorporated with, 242;
Machiavelli and Daunou on the attitude of the Church of Rome
toward, 262;
breaking the chains of ecclesiastical oppression in, 264;
substitution of military despotism, 264;
allotment of Austrian lands to, 266;
England's paper blockade of, 267;
Eugène made viceroy of, 279;
"the flank of France," 282;
confiscation in, 296;
furnishes contingent to _N.'s_ army, 324;
_N._ ruler of, 382;
Roman Catholic influence in, 391;
_N._ refuses to cede any part of, 392;
Eugène ordered to raise a new army in, 408, 414;
proposal to liberate her from France, 416;
Austria seeks to regain ascendancy in, 423; iv. 30, 41;
_N._ offers to guarantee the unity of, 30;
sowing the seeds of unity for, 37;
effect of the battle of Leipsic on, 37;
confusion in, 39;
Alfieri's work in, 39;
humiliation of, 39;
proposed independence of, 41;
fails to support _N._, 56, 59;
lost to France, 56;
_N._ renounces the throne of, 131;
feels the Austrian yoke, 144;
revulsion of feeling toward _N._ in, 144;
plots against _N._, 150;
social reforms in, 255;
after-effects of the Revolution, 255;
_N.'s_ task in, 255;
French influences in, 299;
Austria driven from, 300.
=Ivan=, body physician to the Emperor, iv. 130.
=Ivrea=, attacked by Lannes, ii. 171;
capture of, 172.
=Izquierdo=, Spanish minister to France, iii. 120;
conducts negotiations between Spain and France, 133;
reports failure of his mission, 133.
J
=Jackson, Andrew=, at New Orleans, iv. 169.
=Jacobin Club, the=, foundation of, i. 107;
influence, 151, 153, 157;
letter from _N._ to,176;
closing of, 271.
=Jacobinism=, in _N.'s_ early life, i. 148;
_N._ renounces, 253;
its decline in France, ii. 2;
French hatred of, 36;
rising tide of (1799), 94;
Pitt's delusion concerning _N._ and, 143;
decadence and obliteration of, 195, 235, 258, 261;
effect on _N._, iv. 251.
=Jacobins, the=, declare open hostility to Louis XVI, i. 171, 194;
Danton's leadership in, 187;
struggle between the Girondists and, 188;
position in the National Convention, 188, 266;
connection of the Buonapartes with, 212;
supremacy of, 212, 236;
defeated by the Girondists in Marseilles, 213;
intensity of their movement, 220;
disorders of their rule, 248;
decline of their power, 266, 268, 297; ii. 2;
military successes, i. 268;
influence among the Thermidorians, 271;
tyranny of, 273;
strive for the mastery, 278;
reaction in favor of, 283;
_N.'s_ relations with, 183, 304;
influence in the Directory, ii. 49;
activity in May elections (1799), 91;
political faith, 94;
influence in the Five Hundred, 97;
suppression of their section of the press, 96;
attitude on the 19th Brumaire, 115;
end of the party, 120, 125;
financial effects of their rule, 134;
legislation against, 134;
attitude toward the Church, 205;
assassination schemes among, 239, 241;
reputed rising in France, 298;
England fosters the spirit of insurrection among the, 300;
alienated from _N._, iv. 166;
subservient to _N.'s_ will, 259.
=Jaffa=, bombardment of, ii. 69;
massacre and license at, 70;
the French hospitals at, 74, 75;
stories of _N.'s_ inhumanity at, 75;
the retreat from, 76.
=Jamestown, St. Helena=, iv. 228.
=Janina, Pasha of=, rebellious spirit of, ii. 17.
=Janizaries=, rebellion of the, iii. 33, 163.
=Jason=, _N._ likened to, iii. 387.
=Jauberthon, Mme. de=, marries Lucien Buonaparte, iii. 129.
=Jaucourt, ----=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 107;
letter of, March 17, 1814, 107;
member of the executive commission, 115.
=Jay treaty, the=, ii. 212.
=Jemmapes=, battle of, i. 194.
=Jefferson, Thomas=, his embargo policy, iii. 101, 102.
=Jena=, battle of, ii. 429-434;
moral effect upon Prussia, 435;
practical results to the French, 437;
Prussia's humiliation at, iii. 57;
a royal hare-hunt on the field of, 178;
immediate effects of the battle, 190;
patriotism in the university, 398;
the strategy of, 404.
=Jena, the bridge of=, in Paris, iii. 74.
=Jerome= (king of Westphalia), violates the Continental System, iii. 266;
acquires Hanover and Magdeburg, 266;
hesitates about furnishing new levies, iv. 394.
_See also_ =Buonaparte, Jerome=.
=Jesuits=, Carlo Buonaparte's claims against the, i. 32, 43, 63;
Alexander seeks their influence in Poland, iii. 384.
=Jesus Christ=, _N._ compares Apollonius of Tyana with, ii. 206.
=Jews=, in Corsica, i. 16;
Paoli's relations with the, 16;
rights and duties under the Code, ii. 224;
the Semitic question in France, iii. 75-78;
general Sanhedrim of, 76;
_N.'s_ legislation concerning, 85;
liable to military service, 77;
regulations for Alsace, 77;
present standing in France, 77; iv. 259.
=Jezzar=, commanding Turkish troops in Syria, ii. 68-71;
N. reports his massacres to, 70;
reinforcements from Damascus for, 71.
=Joachim I=, grand duke of Cleves and Berg, ii. 403.
_See also_ =Murat=.
=John, Archduke=, succeeds Kray in command, ii. 188;
forces of, 188;
position on the Inn, 191;
battle of Hohenlinden, 191;
reaches Marburg, 367;
to excite revolt in the Tyrol, iii. 199;
defeats Prince Eugène, 201;
abandons the Tyrol, 211;
escapes from Macdonald into Hungary, 212;
ordered to Linz, 216;
at Völkermarkt, 217;
in Hungary, 225;
driven into Hungary by Eugène, 226;
preparations to oppose, 226;
advances toward Raab, 226;
in Presburg, 227, 228, 230;
turns to guard Hungary, 231;
ordered to attack, 230;
accused of criminal negligence, 230;
banished to Styria, 230;
proposes to continue the war, 235;
quarrels with Charles, 235.
=John, Don=, regent of Portugal, iii. 119;
character, 119;
yields to demands of France, 120;
plan to capture, 121;
Bellesca organizes rebellion in favor of, 122.
=Jomini, Henri=, on the Eckmühl campaign, iii. 210;
records _N.'s_ warlike spirit, 326;
_N.'s_ military confidences and conversations with, 333, 338;
alleged hostility of Berthier to, iv. 2;
goes over to the allies, 2;
military genius, 2.
=Jouan, Gulf of=, landing of _N._ on shores of, iv. 153.
=Joubert, Gen. B. C.=, in Rivoli campaign, i. 410-415;
occupies Rivoli, 410;
military operations in the Tyrol, 431, 435;
joins _N._, 435;
withdraws from the Tyrol, 436, 442;
French agent in the Netherlands, ii. 38;
to succeed _N._ in Italy, 73;
defeated and killed at Novi, 83, 92, 96;
succeeds Moreau, 92;
relations with Sieyès, 92;
statue at the Tuileries, 147.
=Jourdan, Gen. J. B.=, defeats the Austrians at Fleurus, i. 273;
suspected of intrigue, 278;
a product of Carnot's system, 332;
saved from defeat at Maubeuge, 332;
commanding forces at Düsseldorf, 347;
military genius, 350;
seizes Würzburg, 385;
meets with disaster in Germany, 385;
defeated near Ratisbon, 385;
wins battle of Altenkirchen, 385;
disgraced, 450;
member of the Five Hundred, ii. 72;
commanding Army of the Danube, 72;
ordered to central Germany, 87;
defeated at Ostrach and Stockach, 88;
succeeded by Lenouf, 88;
carries out conscription measures, 93;
Jacobin candidate for supreme command, 94;
demands a vote of "public danger," 96;
fails to attend banquet at St. Sulpice, 100;
warned to keep the peace, 109;
legislation aimed against, 134;
annexes Piedmont, 233;
victory at Fleurus, 323;
pacification of Piedmont, 323;
created marshal, 323;
military adviser to Joseph, iii. 183;
goes over to Louis XVIII, iv. 132;
recreated marshal, 167.
"=Journal of Debates=," the, iii. 88.
"=Journal of the Empire=," the, iii. 88.
=Joux=, imprisonment and death of Toussaint Louverture in castle of,
ii. 237.
=Judicial administration, the=, ii. 149-153.
=Judiciary=, reform of the, i. 152.
=July 14=, celebration of, ii. 195.
=Junot, Gen. Andoche=, _N._ wins the admiration of, i. 237;
letters from _N._, 255; iii. 356, 357;
accompanies _N._ to Paris, i. 263;
delivers _N.'s_ terms to Venice, 437;
escorts Josephine to Montebello, 455;
formulates demand on the Venetian senate, ii. 11;
service in Egypt, 53;
in battle of Esdraelon, 72;
ordered to leave Egypt, 81;
ordered with "corps of observation" to Portugal, iii. 67;
his venality and greed, 81, 122;
ordered to invade Portugal, 120;
reaches Abrantès, 121;
garrisons Portuguese fortresses, 121;
prepares for invasion of Spain, 121;
reaches Lisbon, 121;
military administration in Portugal, 122;
goes to Oporto, 122;
aspires to the crown of Portugal, 122, 287;
revulsion of feeling in Portugal against, 122;
appointed governor of Portugal, 132;
strength in Portugal, 156;
Bessières ordered to connect with, 157;
precarious situation, 157;
escapes to Cintra, 157;
defeated at Vimeiro, 158;
surrenders at Cintra, 158, 159, 186;
returns to France, 157;
forces in Spain, 183;
defeated by the Black Legion at Berneck, 234;
in Leon, 283;
battle of Borodino, 344.
=Junot, Mme.=, i. 283;
opinions of _N._, ii. 197;
ancient lineage of, iii. 122.
=Jura Mountains=, proposed boundary for Germany, iii. 320.
=Jüterbog=, Bernadotte at, iv. 18.
K
=Kaja=, fighting at, iii. 405.
=Kalatscha, River=, military operations on the, iii. 343-344.
=Kalish, treaty of=, Feb. 28, 1813, iii. 385, 398.
=Kalkreuth, Gen.=, Prussian commander, ii. 419;
defense of Dantzic, iii. 22;
at Tilsit, 49;
agreement to evacuate Prussia, 99.
=Kaluga=, extension of the Russian lines toward, iii. 351;
French retreat toward, 353.
=Kamenski, Gen.=, Russian general-in-chief, iii. 8;
mistake at battle of Pultusk, 9;
retired, 9.
=Kandahar=, projected rising against England in, iii. 21.
=Kapzewitch, Gen.=, reinforces Blücher at Montmirail, iv. 63.
=Karl August=, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, accepts French terms after Jena,
ii. 443.
=Karlings, the=, the legitimacy of, ii. 325.
=Kastel=, Bertrand stationed at, iv. 54.
=Katzbach, River=, Blücher crosses the, iv. 7;
battle of, 15.
=Kehl=, Moreau crosses the Rhine at, i. 385.
=Keith, Adm. G. K. E.=, expedition against Genoa, ii. 160;
gratitude to _N._ for favors, iv. 226;
announces the sentence of imprisonment to _N._, 226.
=Kellermann, Gen. F. C.=, defeats the allies at Valmy, i. 194;
commanding forces in the Alps, 213, 347;
plans of the Directory regarding, 363;
in Savoy, 365;
receives subsidy from _N._, 365;
proposition that he organize republics in Italy, 372.
=Kellermann, Gen. F. E.=, in battle of Marengo, ii. 180, 272;
battle of Leipsic, iv. 29, 32;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, 132;
recreated marshal, 132;
in the Waterloo campaign, 172, 173, 182, 203;
battle of Quatre Bras, 182.
=Kemberg=, Blücher's march to, iv. 22.
=Keralio, M. de=, commends _N.'s_ ability, i. 56, 57.
=Khiva=, proposed Franco-Russian expedition via, ii. 194.
=Kienmayer, Gen.=, Austrian commandant in Franconia, iii. 234.
=Kilmaine, Gen. C. J.=, watches Venice, i. 431.
="King of the French," or "King of France,"= i. 119.
=Kings=, divine right of, iv. 250.
=Kinzig=, the Austrian line at, ii. 160.
=Kinzig, River=, military operations on the, iv. 36.
=Kirchener, Gen.=, killed at Reichenbach, iii. 411.
=Klagenfurt=, capture of, i. 434;
_N._ in, 435;
invasion of the Tyrol from, iii. 234.
=Kléber, Gen. J. B.=, military successes of, i. 274;
a product of Carnot's system, 332;
service in Egypt, ii. 53 et seq.;
marches on Syria, 69;
in battle of Esdraelon, 71, 72;
at the siege of Acre, 74;
in the battle of Aboukir, 78;
appointed to chief command of army in Egypt, 80;
instructions for evacuating Egypt, 81;
protests against _N.'s_ conduct, 81;
deceived by _N._, 81;
prepares to evacuate Egypt, 143;
military genius, 189;
concludes treaty of El Arish, 189;
his admirable administration, 181;
assassination of, 181, 211;
succeeded by Menou, 181.
=Klein, Gen.=, in the Austerlitz campaign, ii. 380;
Blücher's duplicity to, 436.
=Kleist, Gen.=, in battle of Bautzen, iii. 410;
Prussian commissioner at Poischwitz, 415, 417;
battle of Kulm, iv. 15;
reinforces Blücher at Montmirail, 63;
displaced, 172.
=Klenau, Gen.=, at surrender of Mantua, i. 417;
threatens Augereau, ii. 192;
commanding under Archduke John, 188;
battle of Wagram, iii. 228;
march from Tharandt to Dresden, iv. 10.
=Knight of Malta, the=, letters from the Czar to, i. 424;
death of, ii. 18.
=Knights of St. John of Malta, the=, corruption among, ii. 56;
wars against the Turks, 58;
Paul I seeks to head, 154;
Malta restored to, 262, 267.
=Kobelnitz=, military operations near, ii. 385.
=Kolberg=, Bennigsen attempts to succor, iii. 10;
siege abandoned, 20;
_N._ demands, as a pledge, 36.
=Kolin=, battle of, iv. 267.
=Koller, Gen.=, Austrian commissioner at Fontainebleau, iv. 135;
suggests an asylum for _N._ in England, 135;
accompanies _N._ to Elba, 140;
quits Elba, 142.
=Kollowrath, Gen.=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 386;
ordered to seize Linz, iii. 216.
=Königsberg=, Lestocq's retreat to, ii. 435;
Ney's false move toward, iii. 8;
Frederick William shut up in, 9;
Bennigsen's defense of, 14;
Bennigsen retreats to, 18;
Russian retreat toward, 30;
Lestocq driven into, 31;
reinforcements for Bennigsen from, 31;
_N._ leaves Tilsit for, 65;
the League of Virtue in, 103;
popularity of Stein's measures at, 193;
Alexander I at, 194;
Murat enters, 384;
patriotism in the university, 398;
proposed new capital for Prussia, 409.
=Korner, Theodor=, incites Prussian patriotism, iii. 397.
=Korneuburg=, military operations near, iii. 217.
=Korsakoff, Gen.=, defeated by Masséna at Zürich, ii. 93, 142.
=Kosciusko, Tadeusz=, lack of faith in _N._, ii. 444, 445.
=Kösen=, the allies outwitted at, iv. 35.
=Kossuth, Louis=, charges treachery against Maria Louisa, iii. 418.
=Kottbus=, ceded to Saxony, iii. 62.
=Kourakine, Count=, at Tilsit, iii. 49;
Russian ambassador to France, 314;
injured by fire, 314;
leaves Paris for St. Petersburg, 315;
takes _N.'s_ messages to Alexander, 315.
=Krasnoi=, the French retreat through, iii. 363-366;
_N.'s_ coolness at, 365;
compared to Hanau, iv. 35.
=Kray, Gen. Paul=, commanding Austrian troops on the Rhine, ii. 161;
_N.'s_ plans to defeat, 163;
abandons Donaueschingen, 166;
outwitted by Moreau, 166;
defeated by Moreau at Engen, 167;
retreats toward the Danube, 166;
defeated at Messkirch, 167;
superseded by Archkude John, 188.
=Kremlin, the=, iii. 345, 348;
French occupation of, 345, 349;
pillaged, 349;
failure to destroy, 335, 356.
=Krems=, Kutusoff crosses the Danube at, ii. 367.
=Kronach=, the Imperial Guard at, ii. 428.
=Krossen=, proposed allotment of, to Saxony, iii. 409.
=Kulm=, battle of, iv. 14, 15.
=Kunersdorf=, battle of, iv. 267.
=Küstrin=, capitulation of, ii. 436;
held by the French, iii. 402;
relief of the French garrison in, iv. 2.
=Kutusoff, Gen. M. L. G.=, moves toward Brünn, ii. 367;
crosses the Danube at Krems, 367;
escapes from Murat, 378;
pursued by the French, 379;
at Schrattenthal, 379;
outwits Murat at Hollabrunn, 379;
joins Austrian and Russian troops' at Brünn, 379, 380;
battle of Austerlitz, 386-390;
succeeds Barclay de Tolly, iii. 343;
battle of Borodino, 343, 344;
flight from Borodino, 345;
claims the victory, 345, 347;
reinforcements for, 350;
takes position at Tarutino, 350;
menaces the French in Moscow, 350;
refers Lauriston to St. Petersburg, 351;
extends his line toward Kaluga, 351;
feigned movement against, 353-356;
defeated at Malojaroslavetz, 355;
Russian failure to reinforce, 359;
_N._ plans an ambush for, 360;
battle of Wiazma, 359;
his allies Want and Winter, 360, 372;
at Krasnoi, 364;
pursuit of the French army, 366;
mistake as to _N.'s_ movements, 370;
responsibility for further bloodshed, 374;
"the plain gentleman of Pskoff," 375;
bad generalship of, 374, 384;
losses in the campaign, 383;
enters Vilna, 383;
desires peace, 383;
advance through Poland, 395;
_N._ seeks Austrian aid to check, 396;
issues proclamation to German princes, 398;
death, 399.
L
=Labanoff, Prince=, comes to Bennigsen's aid after Friedland, iii. 32;
conducts negotiations with _N._, 37;
at Tilsit, 49.
=Labédoyère, Gen. C. A. H.=, determines to support _N._, iv. 156;
imprisoned and condemned to death, 223.
=Laber, River=, military operations on the, iii. 207, 208.
=Laborde, Alexandre de=, _N.'s_ confidential agent in the treaty of
Schönbrunn, iii. 252;
suggests the marriage of _N._ and Maria Louisa, 252.
=Labouchere, Henry=, mission from Holland to England, iii. 271.
=La Carolina=, defeat of Dupont at, iii. 156.
=Lacombe-Saint-Michel, J. P.=, secures _N.'s_ appointment to the
Army of the West, i. 263;
member of Committee of Safety, 263.
=La Cour de France=, _N._ at, iv. 105, 116.
=La Cuesta, Gen.=, defeated at Medina de Rio Seco, iii. 156.
=La Favorita=, battle of, i. 415, 416.
=Lafayette, Marquis de=, commands the National Guard, i. 110;
endeavors to calm the National Assembly, 174, 176;
_N._ on, 176;
commanding armies in the North, 179;
pronounces against popular excesses, 179;
flight, and capture by the Austrians, 179;
released from Austrian prison, 456; ii. 148, 247;
possible successor to _N._, 186;
influence on the Consulate, 195;
remonstrates against _N.'s_ life consulship, 247;
supports the chambers, iv. 217;
_N.'s_ forgiveness for, 233.
=La Fère=, the regiment of, i. 66;
the regiment at Douay, 81;
ordered on special service, 86;
_N.'s_ service in, 94, 144;
mutiny in, 112;
transformed into the First Regiment, 149.
=La Ferté-sous-Jouarre=, military movements near, iv. 63;
_N.'s_ rapid march to, 71.
=Laffont=, royalist leader, i. 298;
on the 13th Vendémiaire, 303;
executed, 304.
=Laffray=, dramatic welcome to the returned Emperor at, iv. 156;
_N._ offers himself to the bullets of the Fifth Regiment at, 155.
=La Flèche=, the military school at, i. 48.
=La Force=, imprisonment of Malet in, iii. 376.
=Lagrange, Gen.=, moves against Castaños, iii. 185;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, iv. 132.
=Lagrange, J. L.=, created baron, iii. 297.
=Laharpe, Gen.=, general of division, Army of Italy, i. 345;
attacked by Beaulieu at Voltri, 353, 354;
retreats to Savona, 353;
killed at Fombio, 359;
tutor to Alexander I, iii. 118.
=La Haye=, the farms of, iv. 194;
fighting at, 206.
=La Haye Sainte=, the farm-house of, iv. 194;
fighting at, 201-204, 210.
=Lahorie, Gen. V.=, engaged in Malet's conspiracy, iii. 376.
=Laine, J. H. J.=, radical member of the senate, iv. 114.
=Lajolais, Gen. F.=, plots of, in the Cadoudal conspiracy, ii. 298;
implicates Moreau, 298.
=La Junquera=, Saint-Cyr at, iii. 183.
=Lakanal, Joseph=, provides for mixed schools, ii. 226.
=Lake Constance=, Kray's communications via, to be cut, ii. 164.
=Lallemand, Gen. C. F. A.=, proposes asylum for _N._ on an American
ship, iv. 221;
negotiations with Capt. Maitland, 223.
=Lallemant, M.=, French republican agent in Venice, i. 445; ii. 10.
"=L'Ambigu=," published in London, ii. 270;
_N._ lampooned in, 270.
=Lambrecht=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 106.
=La Mortilla=, _N._ prepares plans for its defense, i. 91.
=La Mure=, _N.'s_ welcome at, on return from Elba, iv. 155.
=Land=, tenure at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 16, 102, 105, 109.
=Landes, Department of the=, exempt from legislation concerning
Jews, iii. 77.
=Landgrafenberg=, military operations at, ii. 429.
=Landsberg=, engagement at, iii. 14.
=Landshut=, military movements near, iii. 206-209, 216;
_N._ at, 208;
battle of, 210;
Archduke Charles's military mistake at, 216.
=Langeron, Gen. Andrault=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 388;
captures Rheims, iv. 80;
on the dissensions in Blücher's army, 80;
on the terror of _N.'s_ name, 84.
=Langres=, military movements near, iv. 58, 68, 95.
=Lanjuinais, Jean D.=, president of House of Deputies, iv. 167.
=Lannes, Gen. Jean=, recommended for promotion, i. 357;
threatens Genoa, 373;
service in Egypt, ii. 53;
wounded at Acre, 76;
battle of Aboukir, 79;
accompanies _N._ on his return from Alexandria, 81;
action on the 18th Brumaire, 105;
commanding at the Tuileries, 108;
crosses the St. Bernard, 169-171;
attacks Ivrea, 171;
hesitates at Fort Bard, 171;
reaches Aosta, 171;
defeats Ott at Casteggio, 177;
commanding corps at Marengo, 176-180;
battle of Montebello, 196;
restored to favor, 277;
created marshal, 323;
character, 364; iii. 208, 223;
captures Braunau, ii. 367;
pursues the Russians, 378;
in battle of Austerlitz, 386, 388;
at Coburg, 427;
in battle of Jena, 429;
seizes Dessau, 436;
pursues Hohenlohe, 436;
ordered to the Narew, iii. 3;
battle of Pultusk, 4;
strength in Poland, 7;
sickness, 13;
battle of Heilsberg, 29;
battle of Friedland, 30;
created Duke of Montebello, 86;
familiarity with _N._, 93;
moves against Castaños, 185;
movements before Ratisbon, 208;
in battle of Eckmühl, 209;
at the crossing of the Danube at Lobau, 217;
battle of Essling, 220, 223;
mortally wounded, 223;
_N.'s_ grief at loss of, 223;
reproaches _N._ for his ambition, 223;
_N._ saves him from drowning, 241;
warns _N._ against treachery, 325;
characterization of Talleyrand, iv. 107.
=Lanusse, Gen. F.=, recommended for promotion, i. 357.
=Laon=, battle of, iv. 76-81, 84;
_N._ at, 216.
=Laplace, P. S.=, Minister of the Interior, ii. 131;
succeeded by Lucien Buonaparte, 131;
created baron, iii. 297.
=Lapoype, Gen. J. F.=, feeling against in Marseilles, i. 239;
acquitted by the Convention, 240.
=Larevellière-Lépeaux, Louis-Marie de=, member of the Directory,
i. 309, 330, 331; ii. 35;
character, i. 310;
dissatisfied with treaty of Leoben, 441;
_N.'s_ relations with, ii. 23;
resigns from the Directory, 92.
=La Rochejaquelein, Gen. L. du V.=, killed, iv. 166.
=La Romana, Gen. P. C.=, revolts in Denmark, iii. 159;
at Valmaseda, 184;
at Santander, 184;
joined by Blake, 185.
=La Rothière=, battle at, iv. 60, 69.
=Lasalle Gen. A. C.=, captures Stettin, ii. 436;
success near Valladolid, iii. 156;
in battle of Aspern, 220;
killed at Wagram, 230.
=Las Cases, E. A. D.=, _N.'s_ intimacy with, i. 146;
memoirs of _N._, 232;
recounts the story of the "day of the sections," 307;
_N.'s_ conversations with, ii. 292;
_N.'s_ declaration to, concerning the Duc d'Enghien, 311;
appointed private secretary to _N._, iv. 220;
negotiates with Capt. Maitland for _N.'s_ passage to England, 221, 223;
accompanies _N._ to St. Helena, 227;
assists _N._ on his history, 231;
dismissed, 232.
=Latouche-Tréville, Adm. L.=, scheme of naval operations for, ii. 331;
death of, 332.
=Latour-Maubourg, Gen. M.=, commanding cavalry in Russian campaign
of 1812, iii. 324;
battle of Dresden, iv. 8, 9;
battle of Leipsic, 29, 32;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, 132.
=Lauban=, _N._ at, iv. 6.
=Lauderdale, Lord=, British envoy to France, ii. 404, 405;
demands his passports, 420;
reopens negotiations, 421.
=Laudon, Gen. G. E.=, commanding forces in the Tyrol, i. 434;
at Verona, 442.
=Lauriston, Gen. A. J.=, splendid artillery work at Wagram, iii. 229;
replaces Caulaincourt at St. Petersburg, 318;
mission to Kutusoff's camp, 351;
commanding division under Eugène, 393;
in campaign of 1813, 402;
occupies Leipsic, 405;
battle of Lützen, 405;
battle of Bautzen, 405;
beleaguers Schweidnitz, 413;
confronts Blücher at the Bober, iv. 6;
detailed to block Blücher's road to Berlin, 8;
battle of Leipsic, 28, 33;
captured at Leipsic, 34.
=Lausanne=, ovation to _N._ at, ii. 27;
French forces near, 169;
_N._ at, May 10, 1800, 169.
=La Valette, Gen.=, formulates demands on the Genoese senate, ii. 11;
postmaster-general at Paris, letter to _N._, March, 1814, iv. 104.
=Lawyers=, status at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 101.
=Lazaref=, Russian grenadier, decorated by _N._ at Tilsit, iii. 63.
=League of Virtue=, the, iii. 103, 397.
=Lebrun, Charles F.=, appointed third consul, ii. 130, 222;
revises the Code, 222;
evades responsibility concerning the Duc d'Enghien, 304;
Treasurer of France, 323;
at _N.'s_ coronation, 343;
created Duke of Piacenza, iii. 86;
Arch-Treasurer, 96;
salary of, 96;
at Krasnoi, 364.
=Lech, River=, military operations on the, ii. 164; iii. 204.
=Leclerc, Victor-Emmanuel=, conducts expedition against San Domingo,
ii. 237;
marries Pauline Buonaparte, 236;
death of, 237.
=Leclerc, Mme.=, accompanies her husband to San Domingo, ii. 236;
marries Prince Borghese, 258.
=Lecourbe, Gen. C. J.=, commanding in the Alps, ii. 164;
captures Memmingen, 167;
captures Stockach, 166;
ordered to Italy, 169.
=Leers=, Gen. Reille at, iv. 170.
=Lefebvre, Gen. F. G.=, commander of the Paris garrison, ii. 104;
joins the Bonapartist ranks, 104;
in battle of Jena, 429, 431;
strength in Poland, iii. 8;
besieges Dantzic, 20, 21;
created Duke of Dantzic, 86;
besieges Saragossa, 156;
success at Tudela, 156;
near Bilbao, 183;
rash movements by, 184;
in movement against Madrid, 186;
commanding Bavarian troops at Münich, 203;
in campaign of Eckmühl, 206;
defeats the Austrians at Abensberg, 207;
at Salzburg, 211;
drives Tyroleans from Innsbruck, 213;
relieves Vandamme at Linz, 225;
withdrawn from the Tyrol, 234;
commanding the Old Guard, 324;
a momentary attack of senility, iv. 104;
at council at St. Dizier, 104;
accompanies the Emperor to Paris, 105;
at the abdication scene, 121;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, 132;
recreated marshal, 167.
=Lefebvre-Desnouettes, Col. Charles=, service in Egypt, ii. 53.
=Leghorn=, _N._ plans to meet Joseph at, i. 292;
the English fleet driven from, 373;
levy of enforced contributions from, 375;
England gains entrance into, iii. 67;
expulsion of the English from, 67;
position in the French Empire, 279;
plots against _N._ in, iv. 150.
=Legion of Honor=, establishment of the, ii. 245, 246;
distribution of crosses, 360;
first Russian member of the, iii. 63;
French pride in, 86;
new members of, 297;
abolition of the orphan asylums of the, iv. 148.
=Legislature, the=, ii. 126, 149-153;
constitution of, 241;
new methods of electing to, 247;
_N._ opens, Aug. 16, 1807, iii. 73;
its functions, 83;
distribution of titles among heads of, 87;
_N._ contemplates its abolition, 389;
demands constitutional government, iv. 49;
prorogued, 50;
overthrows _N._, 115.
=Legnago=, French occupation of, i. 372, 379;
military operations near, 409.
=Legrand, Gen. C. J.=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 386;
in battle of Aspern, iii. 220.
=Leibnitz, G. W. von=, advocates French conquest of Egypt, ii. 46.
=Leipsic=, seized by the Duke of Brunswick, iii. 234;
Eugène establishes headquarters at, 393;
French forces at, 393, 405;
military movements near, 405; iv. 8, 21, 22, 25, 26;
battle of, 27 et seq.;
topography, 28;
_N._ in, 34;
importance of the battle in history, 37;
triumph of revolutionary liberalism at, 38;
_N._ spares the city from fire, 39;
effects of the battle of, 39;
mistaken ideas concerning _N.'s_ attitude after, 66.
=Le Noble's "Spirit of Gerson,"= _N.'s_ study of, i. 150.
=Lenouf, Gen.=, succeeds Jourdan in command, ii. 88;
retreats behind the Rhine, 88.
=Leo III=, crowns Charles the Great, ii. 325.
=Leoben=, the French at, i. 350;
seized by Masséna, 436;
_N.'s_ position at, 436;
treaty of, 436-441, 443, 446, 452, 456; ii. 12, 14, 19;
alleged duplicity by _N._ at, i. 437-439;
French march to, ii. 42;
Ney's victory at, 368.
=Leon=, French troops in, iii. 283.
=Leonetti=, denounced by N., i. 206.
=Leopold II=, acknowledges Hungarian rights, iii. 214.
=Lepelletier=, the section of, i. 300.
=Lesmont=, military operations at, iv. 60.
=Lesseps, J. B. B.=, French consul-general at St. Petersburg, iii. 98.
=Lestocq, Gen.=, retreats to Königsberg, ii. 436;
joins the Prussian army, iii. 1;
at Neidenburg, 4;
at Angerburg, 8;
opposes Ney's march to Königsberg, 8;
relieves the garrison of Graudenz, 10;
in campaign of Eylau, 14, 15;
in battle of Heilsberg, 29-31;
in Friedland campaign, 31, 35;
pursued by Davout, 32.
=Leszcynski, Maria=, _N.'s_ imitation of her marriage to Louis XV,
iii. 256.
=Letourneur, C. L.=, member of the Directory, i. 330, 333;
character, 330;
retires from the Directory, ii. 1.
="Letters from the Cape of Good Hope,"= iv. 231.
="Letters of Buonaparte to Buttafuoco,"= i. 145.
=Leuthen=, battle of, iv. 284.
=Levant, the=, France occupies Venetian possessions in, i. 446;
Genoa's commerce with, ii. 15;
French plots for disturbances in, 17;
France's jealous care for possessions in, 32, 280;
England aspires to control, 143;
Sebastiani's mission to, 272-274;
question of establishing French colonies in, 273;
Portuguese naval operations in, 332;
plans for redistribution of lands on, iii. 51;
the control of, 111;
efficient blockade of, impossible, 280.
=Leveson-Gower, Lord=, English ambassador at St. Petersburg, iii. 100.
=Leyen, Von der=, member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403.
=Liberty=, Paoli on, i. 16;
the recognized colors of, 109.
=Liberty, fraternity, and equality=, i. 109.
"=Liberty of the Seas=," ii. 16.
=Lichtenstein=, member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403.
=Lichtenstein, Prince John of=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 386-389;
negotiates for an armistice, 389;
in battle of Aspern, iii. 223;
Austrian peace commissioner, 239-242;
at peace council in Paris, iv. 114.
=Lido, Porto di=, Venetians fire on French vessel in, i. 442.
=Liebertwolkwitz=, military operations near, iv. 27-30.
=Liège=, flight of Lafayette to, i. 179;
military operations near, 194; iv. 54, 85, 171, 185.
=Ligny=, battle of, iv. 180-186;
Gérard at, 190;
Blücher's disaster at, 193;
a Prussian blunder, 213;
the news of, in Paris, 216.
=Liguria=, ecclesiastical reforms and confiscations in, iii. 263.
=Ligurian Alps=, guerrillas in the, i. 373.
=Ligurian Republic=, the formation of, ii. 11, 21;
French control over, 39;
Piedmont added to, 39;
reorganized, 186;
tribute levied on, 186;
English efforts to discredit France in, 264;
incorporated with France, 354.
=Lille=, peace negotiations at, ii. 12, 86, 144;
flight of Louis XVIII to, iv. 158.
=Lindau=, ceded to Bavaria, ii. 391.
=Lindenau=, seized by the Duke of Brunswick, iii. 234;
military operations near, iv. 28, 29, 35.
=Linz=, military movements near, iii. 204-207; 216, 222.
=Lisbon=, recall of the French envoy from, iii. 120;
democracy in, 121;
Junot's march to, 120, 122;
fraternization of the people with Junot's army, 120;
Russian squadron sent to, 167;
French scheme to seize, 265;
Masséna's march to, 285;
Masséna's precarious situation before, 286, 287;
Wellington's difficult position at, 288;
filled with fugitives, 288.
=Lisle, Rouget de=, composes the "Marseillaise," i. 175.
=Literature=, revival of, ii. 259;
censorship of, iii. 88.
=Lithuania=, Poniatowski's doubts of, iii. 326;
impassivity of its people, 331;
the march from Smolensk toward, 363;
Maret in charge of affairs in, 375.
=Littawa, River=, military operations on the, ii. 383.
="Little Corporal," the=, i. 362; iv. 118, 154.
=Little Gibraltar=, capture of, i. 230.
=Little Görschen=, fighting at, iii. 405.
="Little Napoleon,"= iii. 52.
=Little St. Bernard Pass=, the crossing of the, ii. 169, 171.
=Liverpool, Lord=, attacks Wellington, iii. 288;
recalls Wellington, iv. 149;
mismanagement of English affairs, 161, 162;
embarrassment of, 224;
views as to the disposition of _N._, 224;
letter to Castlereagh, June 20, 1815, 224.
=Loano=, battle of, i. 344.
=Lobau=, crossing the Danube at, iii. 217, 218, 223, 227.
=Lobau, Gen.=, guarding roads from Bohemia, iv. 18;
holds Dresden, 25, 28;
in the Waterloo campaign, 170-173;
at Charleroi, 180;
ordered to Marbais, 186;
battle of Waterloo, 202, 205, 206;
=Lobau, River=, military movements on the, iii. 218, 223, 227.
=Lobenstein=, Bernadotte at, ii. 428.
=Lodi=, battle of, 359-362; ii. 140;
_N.'s_ narrow escape at, i. 393;
withdrawal of the Austrians from Milan to, ii. 173.
=Logroño=, French success at, iii. 156;
Ney at, 183.
=Loire, River=, the Empress flees across the, iv. 105;
military movements on the, 128.
=Loison, Gen. L. H.=, at Piacenza, ii. 177.
=Lombardy=, French troops in, i. 128;
military operations against, 213, 243, 346, 352, 354;
favors the French Revolution, 261;
the military gate to, 342;
_N.'s_ successes in, 350;
expected partition of, 352;
richness of the country, 356, 357; ii. 179;
_N.'s_ influence in, i. 401;
revolutionary movement in, 428;
France's interest in, 451;
incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic, ii. 21;
held by Austria, 145;
_N._ aims to secure, 172;
the iron crown of, 353;
_N.'s_ royal progress through, iii. 109.
=Lonato=, battle of, i. 380-383, 393;
_N.'s_ narrow escape at, 382, 393.
=London=, Talleyrand diplomatic agent in, ii. 33;
Talleyrand expelled from, 33;
publication of "L'Ambigu" in, 270;
Irish radical paper, in, subsidized by _N._, 271;
reception of the Duke of Brunswick in, iii. 234.
=Longwood=, _N.'s_ residence at, i. 40; iv. 229-235, 288.
=Longwy=, garrison of, capitulates to Prussia, i. 179;
abandoned by the enemy, 186.
=Loretto=, capture of, i. 421, 423;
the image of the Lady of, 423.
=L'Orient=, the squadron ordered to the Mediterranean from, iii. 111.
=Lorraine=, proposal to continue the war in, iv. 101, 104, 116.
=Lothair=, _N._ contrasted with, iii. 264.
=Louis=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 106.
=Louis=, king of Etruria, attendant in _N.'s_ antechamber, ii. 205;
death of, 233; iii. 67.
=Louis=, king of Etruria (son of the preceding), proposed kingdom
in Portugal for, iii. 120.
=Louis=, prince of Prussia, ii. 415;
killed at Saalfeld, 428.
="Louis Capet,"= i. 194.
=Louis Philippe.= _See_ =Chartres, Duc de=.
=Louis XIV=, disgraces Vauban, i. 332;
schemes of world-conquest, ii. 46;
"abolishes" the Pyrenees, iii. 70;
_N._ not the successor of, 304;
influence of his villainies, iv. 299.
=Louis XV=, refuses protectorate to Corsica, i. 16;
death of, 43;
_N.'s_ imitation of his marriage to Maria Leszcynski, iii. 256;
_N._ not the successor of, 304.
=Louis XVI=, accession of, i. 43;
character, 101, 102, 108, 109;
contest with the Parliament of Paris, 106;
alienation of, from the people, 106-108;
attempted reforms by, 105-109;
abandoned by the nobles, 109;
curtailment of his hunting-grounds, 109;
takes up residence in Paris, 109;
title under the new constitution, 119;
honors Paoli, 124;
betrayal of, 151;
accepts the Constitution, 153;
flight and recapture, 154;
clamor for his trial, 156;
refuses to sanction secularization of estates of the Church and
nobility, 172;
negotiates with foreign powers, 172, 194, 269;
celebrates the fall of the Bastille, 174;
takes refuge in the National Assembly, 175;
the National Assembly dismisses his body-guard, 174;
Marseilles demands dethronement of, 174;
imprisoned in the Temple, 175;
_N.'s_ views concerning, 177;
condemnation and execution, 195;
causes of his downfall, 268;
the regicides of, 309;
celebrations of his death, ii. 195; iv. 149.
=Louis XVII=, i. 268.
=Louis XVIII=, recognized by the powers, i. 297;
relationship to Victor Amadeus, 355;
retires to Blankenburg, ii. 5;
purchases Pichegru's adhesion, 5;
_N.'s_ negotiations with, 9, 239;
banished, 209;
hopes for restoration of, 240;
residence in Warsaw, 240, 297, 301;
the Cadoudal conspiracy, 297;
promises constitutional government, 298;
manifesto of, 302;
Alexander I's opinion of, iii. 52;
at Mittau, 52;
offered a kingdom in the United States, 272;
proclaimed king at Bordeaux, iv. 87;
acclaimed in Paris, 113;
proclaimed king by the senate, 129, 132;
imperial generals transfer their allegiance to, 132;
character, 132, 146;
his feeble tenure, 133;
scandals circulated at the court of, 142;
treaty with the powers, May 30, 1814, 144;
power to create peers, 146;
blunders of, 146-149;
appoints Soult minister of war, 147;
_N._ prophesies the betrayal of, 151;
indifference to treaty obligations, 152;
sends troops against _N._, 158;
makes concessions, 158;
flees to Lille, 158;
flees to Ghent, 161;
_N.'s_ forgiveness for, 233.
=Louisa, Queen= (of Prussia), brings about the treaty of Potsdam,
ii. 376;
character and influence, 415, 427;
_N.'s_ abuse of, 438;
at Memel, iii. 37, 107;
at Tilsit, 44;
scandal concerning the Czar, 57;
interviews with _N._ concerning Magdeburg, 57-63;
the incident of the rose, 61;
sarcastic speech to Talleyrand, 62;
compared with Queen Mary of England, 62;
death of, 63, 330, 397;
in need of comforts, iii. 107.
=Louisa, Queen= (of Spain), relations with Godoy, ii. 204, 289, 332;
iii. 71, 124, 126, 144, 150;
friendship for _N._, ii. 332;
admits England to Leghorn, iii. 68;
supposed poisoning of her daughter-in-law, 124;
examines Ferdinand's papers, 126;
her son reveals her shame, 126;
suspected of intrigue in Spain, 128;
panic-stricken at the French invasion, 133;
advocates the scheme of monarchy in America, 134;
repents her abdication, 137, 138;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 140;
virtual prisoner in the Escorial, 142;
summoned to Bayonne, 145.
=Louisiana=, ceded to France, ii. 204, 272;
collapse of French rule in, 238;
expedition to, 272;
Spain's exasperation over loss of, 289;
_N.'s_ dream of empire in, 289;
sold by France to the United States, 289, 332; iv. 300.
=Louvain=, Gneisenau opens fresh communications via, iv. 185;
possible retreat of the Prussians via, 194.
=Louverture, Toussaint=, defense of San Domingo, ii. 237;
organizes a consular government, 237;
capture and death of, 237.
=Louvre, the=, _N.'s_ second marriage in, iii. 259-261.
=Love=, _N._ on, i. 77.
=Low Countries=. _See_ =Austrian Netherlands=; =Batavian Republic=;
=Belgium=; =Dutch Flanders=; =Holland=; =Netherlands=.
=Lowe, Sir Hudson=, allegations about _N.'s_ physical ailments, iv. 168;
character, 230;
his custody of _N._, 230-233;
_N.'s_ disputes with, 288.
=Lübeck=, proposal to give it to Prussia, ii. 400;
surrender of, 437;
sack of, 440;
Bernadotte's force in, iii. 202;
extension of the French Empire, to, 278.
=Luc=, _N._ at, iv. 139.
=Lucca=, given to Pauline (Buonaparte) Borghese, ii. 354, 356;
given to Elisa, 395;
creation of hereditary duchy of, 396.
=Lucca and Piombino=, Prince of. _See_ =Bacciocchi, F. P.=
=Lucca and Piombino=, Princess of. _See_ =Buonaparte, Marie-Anne-Elisa=.
=Luckau=, defeat of Oudinot at, iv. 8.
=Ludmannsdorf=, Archduke Charles's force at, iii. 206.
=Lunéville=, negotiations between Cobenzl and Joseph Bonaparte at,
ii. 189, 192;
the Peace of, 192, 193, 203, 204, 263, 266, 302, 358, 402.
=Lusha, River=, military movements on the, iii. 355.
=Lusignan, Gen.=, military operations on the Piave, i. 430-433.
=Lützen=, battle of, iii. 404-408; iv. 4, 21.
=Lützow, Baron L. A. W.=, raises the "black troop," iii. 397.
=Luxembourg, the=, Barras's social life in, i. 290;
Gohier and Moulins withdraw to, ii. 108;
Moreau commanding guard at, 108;
the First Consul installed at, 124;
residence of the Bonapartes at, 195.
=Lyceums, the=, ii. 227; iii. 90.
=Lyons=, _N.'s_ memoir to the Academy at, i. 78;
the "Two-cent Revolt" in, 79;
_N._ at, 79, 183; ii. 83; iv. 137, 156, 165;
honors to Paoli in, i. 124;
massacres and anarchy in, 188, 207, 213;
Girondist success at, 214;
siege of, 222;
fall of, 229;
recapture of, 249;
reorganization of the Cisalpine Republic at, ii. 231;
Fesch becomes archbishop of, 258;
repulse of Bubna from before, iv. 67;
Augereau driven back to, 81;
assaulted by the allies, 94;
evacuated by Augereau, 94;
Francis I, at, 97;
constitutional assembly summoned to, 156;
reception of Artois and Macdonald at, 156;
national assembly at, 166.
=Lyons Academy, the=, _N.'s_ essay before, i. 137-140;
_N.'s_ competition for prize of, 164.
M
=Macdonald, Gen. E. J. J. A.=, commanding Army of the North, i. 347;
a product of Carnot's system, 332;
ordered to command in Naples, ii. 87;
succeeds Championnet, 92;
defeated on the Trebbia, 92;
action on the 18th Brumaire, 105;
commanding guard at Versailles, 108;
commanding in the Grisons, 190;
crosses the Splugen, 192;
created Duke of Tarante, iii. 86;
commanding in Italy, 211;
pursues Archduke John into Hungary, 213;
at Villach, 217;
battle of Wagram, 229;
strength, March, 1812, 324;
in Russian campaign, 338;
reaches Tilsit, 384;
campaign of 1813, 402;
battle of Lützen, 404;
battle of Bautzen, 409;
beleaguers Schweidnitz, 413;
confronts Blücher at the Bober, iv. 7, 15;
detailed to block Blücher's road into Saxony, 8;
fails in his movement against Berlin, 13-19;
battle of Katzbach, 14, 15;
reinforcements for, 18;
attacked by Blücher at Fischbach, 18;
ordered to check Blücher's advance, 20;
battle of Leipsic, 29-32, 34;
at crossing of the Elster, 34;
defends the Rhine at Cologne, 54;
Blücher attempts to cut off, 62;
fails to check Blücher's retreat, 64;
ordered toward Montmirail, 63;
ordered to join Victor at Montereau, 64;
his failure at Château-Thierry, 72;
before Bray, 72;
moral exhaustion of, 72;
opposed to Schwarzenberg, 76, 84;
driven beyond Troyes, 76;
demoralized at Provins, 81;
moves toward Vitry, 93;
at Perthes, 103;
Bourbon intrigues with, 113;
advises endeavor to recover Paris, 117;
strength after the surrender of Paris, 118;
at Fontainebleau, 119;
approves plan of attack on Paris, 120;
at the abdication scene, 121;
on commission to present abdication to the Czar, 125, 126;
rebuke to Marmont, 127;
transfers his allegiance, 129;
reception in Lyons, 157.
=Macedonia=, _N.'s_ eye on, i. 424.
=Macerata=, annexed to Italy, iii. 69, 118.
=Machiavelli, his "History of Florence,"= _N.'s_ study of, i. 150;
on friendships, ii. 256;
theses concerning the Church of Rome, iii. 262.
=Mack, Gen. K.=, leads Neapolitan army against Rome, ii. 72;
mobilizes the Austrian army, 358;
quartermaster-general with Archduke Ferdinand in Germany, 363;
_N.'s_ opinion of, 363;
essays to cross the Danube at Günzburg, 366;
misled concerning _N.'s_ movements, 366;
interview with _N._, 367;
result of his capitulation, 367.
="Madame Mère,"= i. 34. _See also_ =Buonaparte, Letizia=.
=Madeleine Islands=, _N._ writes of their strategic importance, i. 91.
=Madison, James=, policy of nonintervention, iii. 102;
declares war against England, 321.
=Madrid=, effect of Marengo at, ii. 204;
Lucien Buonaparte minister at, 257;
the land-owning class in, iii. 123;
culmination of intrigues at, 126;
the queen regent of Etruria sent to, 129;
irritation against France in, 132;
Murat advances on, 134;
rioting in, 135;
entry of Ferdinand VII into, 139;
Murat enters, 139-142;
proposed visit of _N._ to, 141-143;
_N._ disapproves the seizure of, 141;
Charles IV a virtual prisoner at, 142;
placed under administration of a junta, 143;
announcement of the Bourbons' deposition in, 146;
revolt against Murat's tyranny in, 146;
Joseph assumes the government at, 149, 154;
Murat commanding at, 155;
the French possession of, in danger, 156;
the French evacuate, 158;
Sir John Moore's supposed movement on, 186;
the French army before the gates of, 187;
capitulation of, 187;
_N._ makes officers prisoners of war, 187;
French troops leave, 188;
chilly reception of _N._ in, 189;
French evacuation of, 191;
Wellington moves against, 290;
Victor Hugo at school in, 292;
George Sand in, 292.
=Magallon, Charles=, French consul at Cairo, ii. 47;
advocates seizure of Egypt, 47.
=Magdalena=, bombardment of, i. 192;
capture of, 237.
=Magdalena Islands=, expedition against the, i. 192.
=Magdeburg=, Hohenlohe's retreat to, ii. 434;
siege of, 436;
Frederick William's hard struggle to retain, iii. 56;
Queen Louisa's efforts to save, 57-63;
passes to Jerome with Westphalia, 57, 266;
parallel between Calais and, 62;
French occupation of, 202, 266, 328, 333, 393; iv. 2, 23.
=Maginajo=, Paoli's landing at, i. 125.
=Magnano=, battle of, ii. 88.
=Mahmud II=, proclaimed sultan, iii. 163;
makes treaty with Russia, 321.
="Mahomet"= (Voltaire's), _N.'s_ notes on, iv. 232.
=Maillebois=, _N.'s_ study of, iv. 266.
=Main, River=, Augereau's force on the, ii. 190.
=Main, Army of the=. _See_ =Army of the Main=.
=Mainau=, ceded to Baden, ii. 391.
=Maintenon, Mme. de=, patron of the St. Cyr Academy, i. 176.
=Mainz=, evacuation of, i. 222;
ceded to France, ii. 21, 28, 38;
Marmont ordered to, 362;
_N._ leaves Paris for, 422;
occupied by Mortier, 424, 443;
sends deputation to Paris, iii. 380;
_N._ at, 401, 420, 421; iv. 39;
meeting of _N._ and Maria Louisa at, iii. 421;
French retreat to, iv. 36;
disease in, 36;
_N.'s_ humanity at, 39;
defense of the Rhine at, 54;
Prussian forces at, 58;
_N._ concedes to the allies at Châtillon, 87.
=Mainz, Bishop of=, _N.'s_ sarcasm to agent of, ii. 28.
=Mainz, the Elector of=, ii. 402.
_See also_ =Dalberg, Archbishop=.
=Maison, Gen.=, available forces of, iv. 118;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, 132.
=Maistre, Joseph de=, on social order, iii. 89.
=Maitland, Sir P.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 208, 209.
=Maitland, Capt. F. L.=, takes _N._ on board the Bellerophon iv. 220;
relations with _N._, 220-223.
="Malbrook s'en va t'en guerre,"= iv. 34.
=Malet, C. F. de=, conspiracy to overthrow the empire, iii. 361, 376;
his career and execution, 376.
=Malmaison=, _N._ at, ii. 206, 256, 306; iii. 196; iv. 218;
social vices at, iii. 92;
Josephine withdraws to, 247;
_N._ visits Josephine at, 257.
=Malmesbury, Earl of=, mission to Paris (1796), i. 449;
views concerning France, 449;
resumes peace negotiations at Lille, ii. 12.
=Malojaroslavetz=, battle of, iii. 355, 360.
=Malta=, _N._ plans seizure of, i. 424; ii. 16, 18, 33;
rival claimants of, 18;
French intrigues in, 56;
the citadel of the Mediterranean, 57;
_N.'s_ expedition against, 56, 57;
capture of, 56, 57;
the Knights of St. John, 56, 59;
blockade of, 67;
besieged by England, 141;
Paul I seeks control of, 141, 154, 193;
French capture of, 154;
captured by England, 193;
proposed cession of, to Russia, 193;
England withdraws from, 211, 262;
Russia waives claim to, 210;
restored to the Knights of St. John, 262;
proposed cession by England, 267;
France pushes England for declaration concerning, 273;
England's occupation of, 280, 284, 289, 351, 352, 356;
England refuses to admit the Neapolitan garrison, 285;
_N._ suggests Austrian or Russian occupation, 285;
England insists on ten years' occupancy of, 285;
_N.'s_ ambition concerning, 289;
proposal that England keep, 401;
importance of, iii. 111.
=Mamelukes=, scandals concerning, ii, 17, 58;
usurpation of Egypt by, 47;
foundation of the military organization of, 58;
attack the French at Shebreket, 59;
in the battle of the Pyramids, 60;
enlisted in French army, 66;
the last of the, 77.
=Manche, Letourneaux de la=, member of the Directory, i. 309.
=Manhood suffrage=, i. 188.
=Manin=, last doge of Venice, death of, ii. 24.
=Mann, Admiral=, driven from the Mediterranean, i. 421.
=Mannheim=, _N.'s_ line of retreat via, ii. 424;
proposed conference at, iv. 45, 68.
="Man of destiny," the=, i. 321.
="Man on horseback," the=, i. 301, 304.
=Mansilla=, Soult ordered to, iii. 188.
=Mantua=, capture of, i. 350;
military operations around, 359-361, 370-373, 378;
siege of, 372 et seq.;
garrison, 378;
importance, 379;
the siege raised, 380;
re-blockaded by the French, 383;
Wurmser relieves, 384;
Austria's efforts to relieve, 386, 406-418 et seq.;
_N.'s_ critical position before, 389;
Wurmser's ineffectual sally from, 392;
bids defiance to France, 401;
Wurmser's defense and surrender of, 415-418;
disposition by treaty of Leoben, 439;
capture of, 451;
incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic, ii. 21;
lost to France, 92;
interview between _N._ and Lucien at, iii. 129;
trial and execution of Hofer at, 241.
=Manufactures=, condition of, at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 102;
encouragement of, ii. 220; iii. 25, 307.
="Manuscrit de l'Île d'Elbe," the=, i. 177.
="Manuscrit de Ste. Hélène,"= repudiated by _N._, iv. 232.
=Marat, J. P.=, head of the committee of surveillance, i. 188;
crimes and assassination of, 234.
=Marbais=, military movements near, iv. 186.
=Marbeuf, Marquis de=, tradition concerning his paternity of _N._, i. 31;
influences _N.'s_ education, 43, 45, 52;
marriage of, 64;
death, 80, 115.
=Marbeuf, Mgr. Y. A. de=, bishop of Autun, social influence of, i. 69;
disgrace of, 93;
literary patron of _N._, 92.
=Marbot, Gen.=, denies the story of Lannes's death-bed, iii. 224;
relates anecdote of the cantinière of Busaco, 291;
memoirs of, iv. 192, 193;
on Grouchy's blunders, 192, 193.
=Marburg=, junction of Austrian troops at, ii. 367.
=Marceau, Gen. F. S.=, in battle of Fleurus, i. 273;
statue at the Tuileries, ii. 147.
=March, River=, military operations on the, iii. 230.
=Marchfeld, the=, fighting in, iii. 218;
military operations on, 224;
Prince Eugène left to guard, 235;
Bernadotte's failure on, 280.
=Marchiennes=, military operations near, iv. 173, 177.
=Marciana=, _N._ at, iv. 142.
=Marcognet, Gen.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 201.
=Marengo=, _N.'s_ over-confidence at, ii. 177;
topography of country near, 178, 179;
battle of, 176-186; iii. 196, 299;
_N.'s_ triumphant return from, ii. 186;
_N.'s_ desire for peace after, 189;
effect of the battle at Madrid, 204;
Moreau's troops employed at, 295;
celebration on the field of, 355;
statements concerning _N.'s_ movements after, iii. 196;
_N.'s_ narrow escape at, 382;
a nobility dating from, iv. 44;
its place in French history, 261.
=Maret, H. B.=, secretary to _N._, ii. 215; iii. 19;
recovery of, 27;
influence of, 27;
increased activity of, 27;
created Duke of Bassano, 86;
report from Laborde to, 252;
member of extraordinary council on _N.'s_ second marriage, 254;
succeeds Champagny in the Foreign Office, 318;
warlike zeal of, 326;
letter from _N._, Sept. 10, 1812, 347;
letter from _N._, Nov. 29, 1812, 372;
in charge of affairs in Lithuania, 375;
meeting with Metternich, 416;
on the Austrian marriage, 416;
letter from _N._, Aug. 23, 1813, iv. 7;
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 42, 46;
succeeded by Caulaincourt, 42, 46;
transferred to the Department of State, 46;
French dislike of, 46;
influence over _N._ at Dresden, 69;
on the Congress of Châtillon, 69, 70;
records anecdote of Caulaincourt after La Rothière, 69, 70;
persuades _N._ to resume negotiations, 74;
wrings concessions from _N._, 87;
letter to Caulaincourt, March 17, 1814, 87;
at council at St. Dizier, 104;
at the abdication scene, 121;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, 159.
=Maria, Queen of Portugal=, mental alienation of, iii. 119;
embarks for Brazil, 121.
=Maria, Amelia=, princess of Saxony, mentioned for marriage with _N._,
iii. 179.
=Maria Amelia=, queen of Saxony, reproaches Metternich for deserting
_N._, iv. 43.
=Maria Antoinetta Theresa=, wife of Ferdinand VII, death of, iii. 124.
=Maria Carolina=, queen of Naples, alleged intrigues of, ii. 357;
approaching downfall, 337;
breaks her compact with _N._, 395.
=Maria Louisa=, of Austria, at Compiègne, iii. 148;
proposed marriage with _N._, 180, 252, 253;
preparations for her marriage, 253-257;
marriage in Vienna, 254-257;
progress from Vienna to Paris, 257;
meeting with _N._ at Compiègne, 258;
civil marriage, 258;
induction into her imperial court, 259-261;
personality and character, 260, 327, 330, 381;
visit to Holland, 269;
statue by Canova, 300;
birth of the King of Rome, 302;
abandonment of _N._, 302; iv. 135, 143, 162;
_N.'s_ affection for, iii. 302, 323, 327, 381; iv. 233;
accompanies _N._ to Dresden, iii. 330;
married to Neipperg, 330;
returns from Dresden to Paris, 331;
at Prague, 331;
lack of affection for, in France, 377;
plan of regency for, 381, 421; iv. 114, 124;
visits Pius VII, iii. 390;
Metternich on her marriage, 416;
political ends subserved through, 416;
her marriage "a piece of stupidity," 418;
charged with treachery, 418;
meets _N._ at Mainz, 421;
dramatic appearances before the people, iv. 51, 52;
entrusted to the care of the National Guard, 53;
Francis I to, on the situation, 67;
prepares for extremities, 81;
Joseph enjoined to preserve her from Austrian capture, 91;
letter from _N._, March 23, 1814, 96, 100;
character as Empress-regent, 105;
her council, 106;
rebuked by _N._, 105;
flight from Paris, 106-112;
establishes a regency at Blois, 115;
flight of, 117;
_N._ seeks her intervention with her father, 128;
declines to accompany _N._ to Elba, 135;
_N.'s_ anxiety for, 135-138;
takes refuge with her father, 135, 143;
at Rambouillet, 135;
_N._ breaks off relations with, 143;
succumbs to Neipperg's wiles, 143;
proposed coronation of, 157;
relations with Neipperg, 162;
disclaims connection with her husband, 162;
failure of the attempt to crown, 165;
besought for _N.'s_ release, 231;
_N.'s_ sentiments toward, 233.
=Marie Louise=, queen of Etruria, Lucien refuses to marry, ii. 257;
abdicates and goes to Madrid, iii. 129;
interview with _N._, 129;
supports Charles IV, 137;
ordered to Bayonne, 147.
=Maria Theresa=, character, iii. 37.
=Marie Antoinette=, tradition concerning, i. 44.
"=Marie Louises=," in the defense of Paris, iv, 99.
=Mariotte=, Talleyrand's agent in Leghorn, iv. 150;
plots to seize _N._, 150.
=Maritime Alps=, war in the, i. 196, 342, 345.
=Markgrafneusiedl=, military operations near, iii. 227-229.
=Markkleeberg=, fighting near, iv. 29.
=Markoff, Count=, Russian ambassador at Paris, ii. 263, 330;
at the Tuileries, March 13, 1803, 282, 283.
=Marlborough, Duke of=, military genius, i. 348;
_N._ compared with, 348.
=Marmont, Gen. A. F. L.=, _N._ visits, i. 146;
records _N.'s_ mercy, 233;
admiration for _N._, 237, 245;
accompanies _N._ to Paris, May 2, 1795, 263;
at Milan, 366;
records utterances of _N._ at Milan, 366;
service in Egypt, ii. 53;
_N._ tells him of intention to return from Egypt, 79;
reports declaration of Sir Sidney Smith, 79;
accompanies _N._ on his return from Alexandria, 81;
commanding at the military school, 108;
passes Fort Bard, 171;
in battle of Marengo, 120;
ordered from the Texel to Mainz, 362;
at Neuburg, 365;
character, 364; iv. 127;
letter from _N._ to, Nov. 15, 1805, ii. 378;
created Duke of Ragusa, iii. 86;
called to Vienna from Illyria, 225;
pursues Archduke Charles, 231, 235;
repulsed at Znaim, 235;
replaces Masséna, 289;
withdraws for concentration, 290;
move against Burgois, 290;
advances on Wellington, 290;
battle of Salamanca, 290, 343, 377;
campaign of 1813, 402;
the Saxon campaign, 404;
battle of Bautzen, 409, 410;
treachery, iv. 5;
recollections of _N._, 5;
confronts Blücher at the Bober, 7;
criticizes _N.'s_ plans, 7;
battle of Dresden, 8, 9;
sent to support of Vandamme at Kulm, 15;
_N._ confesses failure to, 21;
characterization of the march to Leipsic, 26;
battle of Leipsic, 27-30, 33;
on _N.'s_ conduct after Leipsic, 31;
assigned to defense of the Rhine, 54;
at Montierender, 60;
falls into panic, 62;
moves from Sézanne against Blücher, 62;
annihilates Olsusieff's corps, 63;
demoralization of, 64;
pursues Blücher, 64;
driven by Blücher to Fromentières, 64;
junction of _N._ and, near Étoges, 65;
battle of Champaubert, 66;
ordered to hold Blücher, 71;
at Sézanne, 74;
checks Blücher at the Ourcq, 76;
loses Soissons, 77;
junction with _N._, 77;
battle of Laon, 79;
routed by York, 79;
at Eppes, 79;
disaster at Athies, 80, 82;
abandons Berry-au-Bac, 81;
rallies his troops at Fismes, 81;
captures Rheims, 81;
reproached by _N._, 82;
at Berry-au-Bac, 85;
defends the Paris line against Blücher, 86;
letter from _N._, March 20, 1814, 91;
ordered to Châlons, 91-94;
joins Mortier at Fismes, 93;
plan of operations against Blücher, 94;
disobedience and incapacity of, 81, 93, 95, 99;
retreats to Fismes, 100;
junction with Mortier, 100;
supposed advantages of a retreat to Rheims, 100;
driven back to Charenton, 99;
driven back on Paris, 101, 105, 109, 110;
strength, 102;
empowered to treat for surrender, 111;
defense of Paris, 112, 113;
vanity, 113, 120;
concludes terms of surrender, 113;
approached by Bourbon intriguers, 113;
homage of Paris to, 113, 120;
denounced by _N._, 115;
receives the Emperor's congratulations, 116;
reveals the worst to the Emperor, 117;
ordered to take position under the walls of Paris, 116;
strength after the surrender of Paris, 118;
the treason of, 120;
terms of his secession, 120;
letter to Alexander, April 3, 1814, 119;
repeats the rôle of Monk, 120, 125;
sends treasonable documents to Berthier, 119;
seduces five of his generals, 125;
reveals his plot to Schwarzenberg, 125;
at Essonnes, 124;
attempts to explain away his action, 124;
demands to join the embassy to the Czar, 125;
"brought up in _N.'s_ tent," 124;
aids in delivering up Souham's troops, 126, 127;
fails to face Alexander, 126;
demoralization among his troops, 126;
seeks audience with the Czar, 126, 127;
his subsequent career of treason, and death, 127;
despised by the imperial generals, 127;
coining of the word "ragusade," 127;
Macdonald's rebuke to, 127;
nicknamed Judas, 127, 147;
stricken from the list of marshals, 127;
_N._ on his desertion, 128;
_N.'s_ charge against, 130;
puts the Paris garrison under arms, 149;
applies for post of minister of war, 148;
attainted, 157;
_N.'s_ forgiveness for, 233.
=Marne, River=, military operations on the, iv. 58, 61, 63, 76, 97, 99.
=Marriage=, under the Code, ii. 222, 224.
=Marseillais=, the, in the riots of August 10, 1792, i. 178, 179.
="Marseillaise," the=, sung in Paris, i. 175;
permitted by imperial order, iv. 51;
played at Fontainebleau, 118.
=Marseilles=, _N._ at, i. 81, 115, 141, 184, 263, 307, 322;
sends deputation to Paris, 174;
demands abolition of monarchy, 174;
equipment of Sardinian expedition from, 191;
anarchy and massacres in, 207, 212, 214, 220, 234;
the Buonapartes in, 212, 263, 309;
defeat of the Jacobins in, 213;
movement of Marseillais on Paris, 214;
captured by Carteaux, 220;
refugees from, at Toulon, 221;
the "Bastille" of, 239;
_N.'s_ views of the fortifications, 239;
feeling against _N._ in, 239;
circulation of counterfeit money in, 246;
news of the Terror in, 252;
reopening of commerce with Genoa, 257;
forced military loans in, 344;
Masséna commanding at, iv. 154;
_N._ sends emissaries to, 154.
="Marsh," the=, position in the National Convention, i. 188.
="Marshal Forward,"= iv. 98. _See also_ =Blücher=.
=Marshall, John=, Talleyrand attempts to corrupt, ii. 34.
=Martial law=, reforms of, i. 142.
=Martinique=, birthplace of Josephine Beauharnais, i. 313;
French squadron at, ii. 333;
French plans to strengthen, 333.
=Mary, Queen= (of England), likened to Queen Louisa, iii. 62.
="Masked Prophet," the=, i. 86, 93.
=Massa-e-Carrara=, incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic, ii. 21;
given to Elisa (Buonaparte), 395.
=Masséna, Gen. André=, general in Army of Italy, i. 241, 345;
seizes Ventimiglia, 243;
plan of campaign in the Apennines, 243;
on the courage of his troops, 244;
defeats Austrians at Millesimo, 353;
at Lodi, 361;
defeated at Bassano, 388;
battle of Citadella, 388;
defeated by Alvinczy at Caldiero, 388;
military operations on the Piave, 388, 432;
attacked at St. Michel, 410;
in the Rivoli campaign, 413, 414, 416; ii. 323;
operations in the Italian Alps, i. 433;
captures Chiusa Veneta, 433;
seizes St. Michael and Leoben, 436;
operations on the river Mur, 436;
ordered to Switzerland, ii, 87;
military genius, 87; 440, iii. 283;
defeated at Zürich, ii. 93;
defeats Korsakoff at Zürich, 93; 142, 323;
fitted for rôle of General Monk, 94;
victories in Italy, 96;
supreme commander of the Army of Italy, 140, 160, 186, 362;
puts Suvaroff to flight, 142;
defeats Archduke Charles at Zürich, 141;
makes a forced levy in Switzerland, 153;
brings Switzerland into French hands, 164;
defense and surrender of Genoa, 165, 170, 172, 323;
plans for the relief of, 170, 172;
superseded by Brune, 190;
republicanism of, 190;
created marshal, 323;
leaves Italy for Austria, 380;
ordered to Naples, 395;
avarice of, 440;
venality of, iii. 81;
created Duke of Rivoli, 86;
yearly income and enormous fortune, 87, 224, 296;
to concentrate at Ulm, 203;
to concentrate on the Lech, 204;
movements on the Isar, 205, 208;
in campaign of Eckmühl, 206;
ordered from Augsburg to Ingolstadt, 206-208;
at Moosburg, 207;
in the Enns valley, 216;
crosses the Danube, 217;
in battle of Aspern, 219;
character, 224;
battle of Wagram, 227, 228;
commanding in Spain, 283;
disasters in the Peninsula, 284;
insubordination in his army, 285;
battle of Busaco, 284;
in Coimbra, 285;
march toward Lisbon, 285;
enters Portugal, 284;
Soult's jealousy of, 286;
Soult fails to relieve, 286;
withdraws toward Santarem, 286;
awaits reinforcements, 287;
failure in Spain, 287;
precarious situation before Lisbon, 288;
joined by Soult, 289;
defeated at Fuentes de Onoro, 289;
reinforcements ordered from Castile to, 289;
disgraced by _N._, 289;
succeeded by Marmont, 289;
holds his position, 289;
insubordination among his officers, 289;
punishes desertion, 291;
commanding at Marseilles, iv. 154;
neutrality of, 157;
recreated marshal, 167.
=Masseria, Joseph=, associated with _N._ in Corsica, i. 117;
success of his agitation, 119.
=Massias, Baron N.=, French minister at Karlsruhe, ii. 305.
=Matra, M. E.=, a rival of Paoli, i. 16.
=Maubeuge=, battle of, i. 332.
=Maubreuil, Comte de=, arranges for the assassination of the Emperor,
iv. 119, 138.
=Mautern=, Hiller crosses the Danube at, iii. 212.
=Maximilian, Archduke=, evacuates Vienna, iii. 212.
=Maximilian, Joseph=, king of Bavaria, gives his daughter to Eugène
de Beauharnais, ii. 399;
at the Erfurt conference, iii. 171;
his reforms in the Tyrol, 201;
threatens to join the coalition, iv. 16;
joins the allies, 22;
grant of autonomy to, 22;
defection of, 56.
=Meaux=, prison massacres in, i. 188;
Blücher moves on, iv. 77;
_N.'s_ plan of movement via, 85;
evacuation of, 99.
=Mecklenburg=, territory restored to the reigning house, iii. 49.
=Mecklenburg-Schwerin=, proposal to include in North German
Confederation, ii. 418.
=Mecklenburg-Schwerin=, Duke of, refuses to furnish levies, iii. 394.
=Mecklenburg-Strelitz=, proposal to include in North German
Confederation, ii. 418.
=Mecklenburgs=, the, assert their independence, iv. 40.
=Medical School=, lecture system of the, i. 281.
=Medina de Rio Seco=, French success at, iii. 156.
=Mediterranean, the=, English naval operations in, and power on,
i. 207, 221, 257; ii. 15, 16, 56, 83; iii. 111;
naval operations in the, i. 421, 424;
departure of the English fleet from, 424;
_N._ a child of, ii. 15;
France's ambition for conquest of, 16;
the citadel of the, 18, 56;
_N.'s_ schemes on, 18, 157; iii. 111, 112;
elaboration of plans for operations in, ii. 33;
importance, 46;
_N._ calls for ships in, 68;
Adm. Bruix sent to conquer, 79;
European jealousy regarding control of, 136;
English cessions in, 211, 262;
Villeneuve's orders for operation in, 372;
attempt to unite French fleets in, iii. 111;
_N.'s_ mastery of, 264;
English trade with, 280;
Roman dominion of, 302.
=Meerveldt, Gen.=, Austrian plenipotentiary at Leoben, i. 437;
Austrian plenipotentiary in treaty of Campo Formio, ii. 19;
defeated at Leoben, 368;
battle of Leipsic, iv. 28, 30;
at Austerlitz, 30;
sent to ask an armistice, 30;
captured at Leipsic, 30.
=Megnadier, Gen.=, seduced by Marmont, iv. 125.
=Mehemet Ali=, accession to power, ii. 77.
=Meike=, on commission to notify _N._ of his sentence, iv. 226.
=Meissen=, French forces at, iii. 393.
=Melas, Gen.=, commanding Austrian army in Italy, ii. 160;
drives Suchet across the Var, 165;
forces Masséna back into Genoa, 165;
military tactics, 165;
cuts off communication with Masséna, 169;
position on the Var, 169;
hurries to Turin, 169, 174;
_N.'s_ plans for the defeat of, 169, 172;
reinforcements for, 170;
rallies his army at Alessandria, 174, 177;
capture of one of his couriers, 175;
military characteristics, 178;
crosses the Bormida, 178;
in battle of Marengo, 178-185;
retires to Alessandria, 180;
superseded by Bellegarde, 188.
=Melnik=, Austro-Russian troops near, iv. 3.
=Mélun=, the garrison at, iv. 118.
=Melzi, Comte F.=, nominated for president of the Cisalpine
Republic, ii. 231;
letter from _N._ to, March 6, 1804, 299.
=Memel=, Queen Louisa at, iii. 37;
proposal that Russia seize, 62;
Tolstoi visits Frederick William and Louisa at, 108.
=Memmingen=, captured by Lecourbe, ii. 168;
seized by Soult, 366.
=Méneval, Claude F. de=, statement of _N._ to, concerning the Duc
d'Enghien, ii. 312;
reveals Maria Louisa's defection to _N._, iv. 143;
dismissed from the service of the King of Rome, 162.
=Menou, Gen. J. F. de=, commanding the Army of the Interior, i. 298;
ordered to disarm the insurgents, 299;
pusillanimity of, 301, 307;
service in Egypt, ii. 53;
professes Islamism, 65;
succeeds Kléber, 181;
surrenders in Egypt, 181;
disasters in Egypt, 211.
=Mentone=, _N._ in, i. 238.
=Mercier, L. S.=, _N.'s_ study of his "Philosophic Visions," ii. 54.
=Merlin, P. A.=, member of the Directory, ii. 8, 35, 52;
interferes to prevent _N.'s_ resignation as commander of Egyptian
expedition, 52;
resigns from the Directory, 92;
seduced by Marmont, iv. 125.
=Merseburg=, Bernadotte at, iv. 27.
=Méry=, Blücher at, iv. 73;
captured by Oudinot, 73.
=Messkirch=, battle of, ii. 167.
=Mettenberg=, engagement on the, ii. 168.
=Metternich, Prince von=, character, ii. 131; iii. 417-420;
on _N.'s_ designs of 1804-5, ii. 338;
on the treaty of Tilsit, iii. 72;
allusions to _N.'s_ tenure of power, 104;
letter to Stadion, July 26, 1807, 104;
_N.'s_ conversations and confidences with, 110, 278, 311, 333,
389, 418;
at St. Cloud levee, Aug. 15, 1808, 169;
deceived by the clique of Talleyrand and Fouché, 193;
goes to Vienna, 193;
plenipotentiary at Altenburg, 237;
suggests a union between _N._ and Maria Louisa, 252;
succeeds Stadion as foreign minister, 253;
reports France's financial condition, 305;
stirs up strife between France and Russia, 313;
reports the Russian army on the Danube, 314;
character of his negotiations with France, 317;
on the Russian war of 1812, 328;
interview with _N._ at Dresden, 389;
holds back Schwarzenberg, 395;
negotiations with England, 395;
prepares to desert _N._, 395;
seeks to embroil Russia and Sweden, 395;
negotiations with Hardenberg, 395;
negotiations with _N._, 395;
foresees the aims of the new coalition, 400;
triumph in the Saxon affair, 399;
_N._ fears the intrigues of, 409;
arranges a basis of mediation with Nesselrode, 415;
meeting with Maret, 416;
on the Franco-Austrian marriage, 416;
secret meeting with Alexander, 415;
double-dealing of, 418;
interview with _N._, 418-420;
demands suspension of the Franco-Austrian treaty of 1811, 419;
charged by _N._ with venality, 419;
poses as armed mediator, 420;
interview with _N._, June 27, 1813, 418-420;
letter to Francis, June 29, 1813, 419;
advocates a continental peace, 420;
encourages rivalries of petty potentates, 423;
at Congress of Prague, 422;
his policy exposed, 423;
diplomacy during the Frankfort parley, iv. 41-44;
reproached for deserting _N._, 43;
letter to Caulaincourt, Nov. 9, 1813, 42;
letter from Caulaincourt, Dec. 2, 1813, 46;
suggests compromise plan of invasion of France, 57;
his memoirs, 66, 67;
position in European diplomacy, 66-69;
influence over Castlereagh, 67;
desires to restore the Bourbons, 68;
his policy concerning France, 88;
strives to check Prussian ambition, 88;
on the European policy of 1814, 88;
relations with the allies, 97;
letter from _N._, March 28, 1814, 104;
besought to encompass _N.'s_ exile, 138;
urges Maria Louisa to break relations with her husband, 143;
negotiates secret treaty between Austria, England, and France,
144, 145;
Fouché attempts intrigue with, 165.
=Metternich, Countess=, share in the Austrian marriage negotiations,
iii. 253.
=Metz=, imprisonment of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel in, ii. 443;
sends men to relief of Paris, iv. 102.
=Meuse, River=, a French river, iii. 270;
military movements on the, iv. 166.
=Mexico=, scheme of a Bourbon monarchy in, iii. 134, 142.
=Middle Guard=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 208.
=Milan=, under foreign yoke, i. 345;
_N.'s_ entry into and subsequent visits to, 351, 362, 367, 400;
ii. 175, 186; iii. 109; 129, 132;
defense of, by Beaulieu, i. 352-362;
flight of the Archduke from, 359;
coercion applied to, 361;
provisional government for, 367;
plundered of works of art, 368;
levy of enforced contributions from, 375;
_N.'s_ influence in, 427;
_N.'s_ residence at Montebello, 447, 452, 455, 456;
Gen. Clarke at, 451;
celebration of July 14, in (1797), ii. 4;
troops moved to Picardy from, 24;
Moreau ordered to cut Kray's communication with, 164;
plan of march to, abandoned, 169;
festival at, 173;
French entry into (June 2, 1800), 173;
_N.'s_ care for the cathedral, 173;
Austrian evacuation of, 173;
Count of St. Julien sent to, 187;
coronation of _N._ at, 353, 354;
Prince Eugène Beauharnais viceroy at, 358;
sends deputation to Paris, iii. 380.
=Milan decree, the=, iii. 101, 109, 119, 321.
=Milanese, the=, provisional government for, i. 367;
scheme to organize republic in, 373;
disposition by treaty of Leoben, 439;
question of restoring to Austria, 452.
=Milhaud, Gen. J. B.=, transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, iv. 132;
in Waterloo campaign, 173.
=Military courts=, reconstitution of, i. 142.
=Military discipline=, reforms in, i. 142-145.
=Military schools in France=, i. 48; iii. 91;
_N.'s_ criticisms of, i. 61.
=Military strategy=, _N.'s_ skill in, ii. 153;
the art of, 182.
=Milleli=, _N.'s_ summer house and grotto, i. 135, 210.
=Millesimo=, military operations at, i. 352, 354, 355;
battle of, iv. 65.
=Mincio, River, the=, military operations on, i. 361, 371, 379, 381;
ii. 88, 188;
boundary of Austrian holdings in Italy, ii. 181.
=Minsk=, _N.'s_ scheme to seize, iii. 333;
the French retreat through, 363, 370.
=Miollis, Gen. S. A. F.=, occupies the city of Rome, iii. 242.
=Miot de Melito=, i. 367;
conversations with _N._, ii. 162;
on the demonstration against England, 337;
"Memoirs" of, quoted, iii. 131.
=Mirabeau, H. G. R.=, activity at the meeting of the Estates-General,
i. 108;
on position of the Navarrese, 120;
plea for Corsica in the National Assembly, 120;
share in the conquest of Corsica, 120;
inspires amnesty to Paoli, 120, 124;
leads the National Assembly against Buttafuoco, 135;
military reforms of, 142;
succeeds Necker, 153;
death, 153;
opinion of Talleyrand, ii. 33;
statue at the Tuileries, 147;
his politics to be ignored, iii. 27.
=Miranda=, Bessières at, iii. 183.
=Mississippi, River, the=, the United States acquires control of,
ii. 289.
=Mittau=, Louis XVIII at, iii. 52.
=Mlawa=, military operations near, iii. 13.
=Möckern=, military operations near, iv. 27, 30.
=Modena=, intrigue in the court of, i. 345;
held to ransom, 374, 375;
the armistice with, broken, 401;
Austria's protectorate over, 425;
Austria seeks to retain, 438;
disposition by treaty of Leoben, 438;
incorporated into the Cisalpine Republic, ii. 21;
_N.'s_ bad faith with, 144.
=Modena, Duke of=, attempts to bribe _N._, i. 366, 445;
destruction of his government, 374;
driven from his throne, 401.
=Modlin=, French military stores in, iii. 333;
held by the French, 402.
=Mohileff=, French garrison in, iii. 341.
=Mohrungen=, skirmish at, iii. 10.
=Moldavia=, Russian ambition to possess, ii. 356; iii. 98, 105,
116, 176, 248, 310;
dismissal of the Turkish viceroy of, ii. 441;
alleged concession of, to Russia, iii. 55;
Russian evacuation of, 64;
_N._ offers to offset Silesia against Wallachia and, 107, 108, 113;
Russia threatened with the loss of, 314.
=Molière, J. B.=, scene from "Tartufe," iii. 380.
=Molitor, Gen. G. J. J.=, in battle of Aspern, iii. 220.
=Möllendorf, Gen. R. J. H.=, Prussian commander, ii. 419.
=Mollien, N. F.=, director of public debt, ii. 220;
keeper of the army-chest, 409, 410;
minister of the treasury, 410;
advises against war, iii. 308;
protests against issue of paper money, 389;
remark of _N._ to, iv. 159;
member of _N.'s_ new cabinet, 159.
=Monaco, Prince of=, brought as prisoner to _N._, iv. 154.
=Moncey, Gen.=, crosses the St. Gotthard, ii. 170, 172;
created marshal, 323;
created Duke of Conegliano, iii. 86;
invades Spain, 132;
defeated at Valencia, 154;
advances on Valencia, 156;
at Madrid, 156;
at Tafalla, 183;
moves against Castaños, 185;
besieges Saragossa, 186;
at review of the Guard at Fontainebleau, iv. 118;
recreated marshal, 167.
=Mondego, River=, Wellington retreats down the, iii. 284.
=Mondovi=, battle of, i. 354, 355.
=Money-lenders=, _N.'s_ hatred for, ii. 122.
=Monfalcone=, ceded to France, iii. 239.
=Monge, Gaspard=, _N.'s_ mathematical teacher, i. 181;
minister of the navy, 181;
founds the Polytechnic School, 281;
plunders Italian scientific collections, 369;
carries treaty of Campo Formio to the Directory, ii. 24;
warlike declaration against England, 32;
elaborates plan for operations, in the Mediterranean, 33;
accompanies _N._ on his return from Alexandria, 81;
member of the senate, 151;
_N.'s_ friendship with, 335;
created baron, iii. 297.
="Moniteur," the=, records "Buona Parte's" action at Toulon, i. 230;
records _N.'s_ daily life, ii. 30;
on the events of the 18th Brumaire, 106;
excites warlike feeling in France (1800), 146;
attacks England, 271, 294;
publishes Sebastiani's report, 273;
on the imperial court at Aachen, 339;
threatens Austria, 361;
on the field of Austerlitz, 391;
insults Prussia, 400;
announces the position of the Napoleonic princes, iii. 82;
announces the fall of the House of Braganza, 121;
justifies French invasion of Spain, 133;
publishes "authorized" reports of the Spanish failure, 197;
on Austrian aggressions, 213;
announces the annexation of Holland, 277;
_N._ offers Alexander the use of, 315;
proclamation to the National Guard, March 8, 1815, iv. 145.
=Monk, Gen. George=, _N._ is offered the rôle of, ii. 9;
Masséna fitted for the rôle, 94;
_N._ compared with, 230;
Marmont emulates the rôle, iv. 120, 125.
=Monnier, Gen. J. C.=, in battle of Marengo, ii. 119.
=Monroe, James=, President of United States, understanding with
England, iii. 48.
=Monroe Doctrine, the=, iv. 298.
=Montalivet, Comte J. P. B.=, member of the Empress-regent's
council, iv. 106.
=Mont Blanc, Department of=, i. 222.
=Montbrun, Gen. L. P.=, commanding cavalry in Russian campaign of,
1812, iii. 324.
=Mont Cenis pass=, the, crossed by _N._, ii. 27;
crossed by Turreau, 170, 172;
Austrian watch on, 170;
the road over, 349; iii. 74.
=Monte Albaredo=, the French pass over, ii. 171.
=Monte Baldo=, military operations near, i. 380, 388, 410-414.
=Montebello=, the Austrian retreat toward, i. 392;
_N.'s_ residence at, 447, 452, 455, 456;
Josephine at, 455;
Genoese embassy to, ii. 11;
engagements near, 176;
battle of, 196;
Lannes created Duke of, iii. 86. _See also_ =Lannes=.
=Monte Legino=, Rampon's stand at, i. 356, 393.
=Montenotte=, battle of, i. 353; iv. 65.
=Montereau=, military movements near, iv. 65, 68;
Victor ordered to seize, 71;
besieged by the Crown Prince of Würtemberg, 72;
battle of, 72, 73;
captured by the French, 72, 73.
=Monte Rotondo=, Carlo Buonaparte at, i. 31.
=Montesquieu, C. de S.=, views on Corsica, i. 19;
_N.'s_ views on his political speculations, ii. 49, 51;
_N.'s_ study of, 54;
on human ambition, iii. 82;
_N.'s_ admiration for, 176;
"Grandeur and Fall of the Romans," iv. 69.
=Montesquiou, A. A. A.=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 107;
member of the executive commission, 115.
=Montesquiou, Mme. de=, governess to the King of Rome, iv, 53.
=Montgelas, M. J. G.=, Bavarian minister of state, iii. 179.
=Mont Genèvre=, building a road over, ii. 349.
=Montholon, Charles=, the "Manuscrit de l'Île d'Elbe" attributed to,
i. 177;
_N.'s_ declaration to, concerning the Duc d'Enghien, ii. 311;
accompanies _N._ to St. Helena, iv. 214;
residence on the island, 231;
assists _N._ on his history, 232;
remark of _N._ to, 233.
=Monthyon, Gen.=, escorts _N._ from the field of Waterloo, iv. 211.
=Montierender=, military movements at, iv. 61.
=Montmartre=, defense of, iv. 109;
captured by the Prussians, 111.
=Montmirail=, battle of, iv. 63, 64.
=Montmorency=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 107.
=Montpellier=, death of Carlo Buonaparte, at i. 63.
=Mont St. Jean=, Wellington's retreat to, iv. 184, 190;
possibility of Grouchy reaching, 192;
topography of, 195;
Wellington's center at, 195;
fighting at, 214.
=Moore, Sir John=, commanding English troops in the Peninsula, iii. 186;
at Salamanca, 186;
at Astorga, 186, 187;
French search for, 187;
prepares to attack Soult, 188;
crosses the Esla, 188;
destroys magazines at Benevento, 188;
reaches Corunna, 188;
his retreat, death, and example, 189;
defeat of Soult, 286.
=Moosburg=, Archduke Charles's force at, iii. 207;
Masséna at, 207.
=Morand, Gen. L. C. A.=, in the Eckmühl campaign, iii. 208;
battle of Borodino, 344;
in battle of Waterloo, iv. 205.
=Moravia=, Kutusoff's advance into, ii. 367.
=Moreau, Gen. J. V.=, a product of Carnot's system, i. 332;
commanding forces at Strasburg, 347;
at Munich, 384;
defeats Archduke Charles, 385;
crosses the Rhine at Kehl, 385;
operations on the Rhine, 435;
military genius, 350; ii. 163, 164, 300; iv. 2;
fails to reinforce _N._, i. 438-443;
crosses the Rhine near Strasburg, 440;
declines to aid the Directors, ii. 6;
serves in the Army of Italy, 72;
suspected of complicity with Pichegru, 72, 164, 298;
last stand in Piedmont, 83;
succeeds Schérer in command, 88;
military operations in the Apennines, 93;
succeeded by Joubert, 92;
tempted with a dictatorship, 94;
tainted with royalism, 94;
joins the Bonapartist ranks, 97;
a banquet at St. Sulpice, 100;
relations with the Directory, 100;
commanding guard at the Luxembourg, 108;
blamed for imprisoning Moulins and Gohier, 108;
appointed to command the Army of the Rhine, 140, 160;
personal ambition, 140, 163; iv. 3;
a military rival of _N._, ii. 140, 163, 192;
_N.'s_ scheme to strengthen, 163;
letter from _N._, March 16, 1800, 163;
ordered to take the offensive, 163;
participation in the revolution of Brumaire, 164;
lack of supplies for, 165;
crosses the Rhine, April 25, 1800, 166;
outwits Kray, 166;
passes the Black Forest, 166;
defeats Kray at Messkirch and Engen, 167;
troops detached from, 170;
levies contributions on South Germany, 186;
effect of his victories, 186;
occupies Munich, 186;
fortresses ceded to, 188, 189;
representative of Revolutionary traditions in warfare, 181;
position near Munich, 190;
battle of Hohenlinden, 191;
eclipses _N._ in military glory, 192;
advances toward Vienna, 192;
republican sentiment in his army, 235;
fall of, 241, 295-299, 302;
implicated in the Cadoudal conspiracy, 296 et seq.;
arrest and imprisonment of, 298;
popular denunciation of, 299;
banishment of, 299;
takes up arms against _N._, 299;
mortally wounded at Dresden, 299; iv. 12;
effect of his disgrace, ii. 318;
movements at Munich, iii. 203;
summoned from America for European service, 407; iv. 3;
goes over to the allies, 3;
with Schwarzenberg's army, 3;
character, 3;
enters the Russian service, 3;
ambition to acquire the French crown, 3;
treachery of, 5;
plans the battle of Dresden, 7, 8;
refuses to fight against his country, 8;
death, 82;
funeral mass celebrated for, 146.
=Moreau, Mme.=, ambition of, ii. 299.
=Morlaix=, Villeneuve at, ii. 375.
"=Morning Chronicle=," on England's indifference to French affairs,
iv. 163.
=Morsbach=, military movements near, iii. 206.
=Mortier, Gen. E. A.=, a product of Carnot's system, i. 332;
occupies Hanover, ii. 287;
created marshal, 323;
destruction of his division, 368;
annihilated at Dürrenstein, 378;
in the Austerlitz campaign, 380;
occupies Mainz, 424, 443;
seizes the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, 443;
threatens Stralsund, iii. 19;
battle of Heilsberg, 29;
battle of Friedland, 30;
created Duke of Treviso, 86;
yearly income, 87;
reinforcements for, 165;
occupies Franconia, 165;
forces in Spain, 191;
ordered to blow up the Kremlin, 355;
in the retreat from Moscow, 357;
commanding the Guard, campaign of 1813, 402;
battle of Dresden, iv. 9;
holds Pirna, 12, 18;
battle of Leipsic, 29;
at Troyes, 60;
battle of Montmirail, 63;
at Soissons, 74;
junction with _N._, 77;
checks Blücher at the Ourcq, 76;
battle of Laon, 79;
defends the Paris line against Blücher, 86;
at Rheims, 86;
at Soissons, 86;
junction with Marmont at Fismes, 93;
driven back to Charenton, 99;
junction with Marmont, 99;
driven back on Paris, 101, 105;
defense of Paris, 112, 113;
concludes terms of surrender, 113;
denounced by _N._, 115, 116;
ordered to take position under the walls of Paris, 116;
strength after surrender of Paris, 118;
attachment to _N._, 117;
absent from the Waterloo campaign, 171.
=Moscow=, _N._ threatens to march to, iii. 304;
military enthusiasm in, 336;
Russian retreat from Smolensk toward, 339;
_N.'s_ line from the Niemen to, 340;
defense of, 343-345;
agreement of the opposing generals as to its capture, 345;
the Kremlin, 345, 347;
capture and burning, 345-349;
_N._ expects Alexander to save, 347;
_N.'s_ political and military blunders at, 343, 348;
fountain of Russian inspiration, 347;
topography, buildings, monuments, etc., 348;
Russian abandonment of, 349;
disputed honor of the conflagration, 349;
pillage of, 350;
the French army in, 349-352;
_N.'s_ dissipation in, 352;
_N.'s_ intention to be crowned in, 352;
French retreat from, 352-356, 357 et seq.;
throwing away the spoils of, 358;
destruction of, 382;
Alexander's desire to avenge the French seizure of, iv. 41.
=Mosel, River=, military operations on the, iv. 58.
=Moskwa, River=, military movements on the, iii. 344, 348.
=Moulins, J. F. A.=, member of the Directory, ii. 92;
represents Jacobin element in the Directory, 94;
proposed resignation of, 101;
refuses to resign, 108;
imprisonment of, 108, 115;
_N.'s_ charges against, before the Ancients, 113.
="Mountain," the=, position in the National Convention, i. 188;
suspects an English party in Corsica, 196;
action discussed in the "Supper of Beaucaire," 218;
_N.'s_ affiliation with, 242;
fall of, 248;
factions in, 250;
status in the provinces, 268;
annihilation of, 284.
=Moustier=, question of Grouchy's moving to, iv. 192, 193.
=Mozhaisk=, military operations at, iii, 347, 356;
depot of the French army at, 357.
=Müffling, Gen.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 204.
=Muiron=, killed at Arcole, i. 400.
=Mulde, River=, contemplated movements on the, iv. 24.
=Müller, W.=, member of Prussian reform party, ii. 415.
=Multedo=, member of Directory of Corsica, i. 133;
denounces _N._, 254;
letter from _N._, 257.
=Münchberg=, Soult at, ii. 428.
=Munich=, Moreau at, i. 384; ii. 186, 190; iii. 203;
military operations near, ii. 191;
Méhée de la Touche's machinations in, 297;
expulsion of the English envoy at, 330;
the Elector of Bavaria reoccupies, 377;
_N.'s_ plan to reach, iii. 204.
=Münster=, position in the French Empire, iii. 279.
=Mur, River=, military operations on the, i. 434.
=Murad Bey=, attacks the French at Shebreket, ii. 59;
battle of the Pyramids, 60;
worries _N._ with mysterious intrigues, 76;
fails to assist the Rhodes expedition, 77;
death, 77.
=Murat, Gen. Joachim=, at Borghetto, i. 372;
threatens Genoa, 373;
in Rivoli campaign, 415;
service in Egypt, ii. 53;
ordered to kill hostile tribesmen, 70;
battle of Aboukir, 78;
accompanies _N._ on return from Alexandria, 81;
action on the 18th Brumaire, 105;
commanding guard at St. Cloud, 108;
proposes to clear the Orangery, 117;
pursues the Austrians from Milan, 173;
battle of Marengo, 179;
commanding in central Italy, 190;
watches Naples, 190;
his plebeian birth, 195;
marries Caroline Buonaparte, 195, 258;
guardian to King Louis's widow, 233;
military commandant at Paris, 308;
share in trial of d'Enghien, 310;
created marshal, 323;
at _N.'s_ coronation, 342;
captures Werneck's division at Nördlingen, 367;
enters Vienna, 368;
reproached by _N._, 368;
crosses the Tabor bridge, 368;
base conduct at Vienna, 369;
vanity of, 378;
permits Kutusoff's escape, 378;
"destroys the fruits of a campaign," 379;
pursues the Russian force, 378;
checked by Bagration at Hollabrunn, 379;
outwitted by Kutusoff at Hollabrunn, 379;
battle of Austerlitz, 386, 388;
Grand Duke of Cleves and Berg, 403;
takes title of Joachim I, 403;
his ambitions, 416;
Prussian campaign of 1806, 422, 428, 429;
personal attendance on _N._, 425;
at Saalburg, 428;
in battle of Jena, 429;
character, 436; iii. 139, 141;
invests Magdeburg, ii. 436;
pursues Hohenlohe, 436;
at Golymin, iii. 4;
strength in Poland, 7;
in campaign of Eylau, 15-17;
pursues Bennigsen, 18;
battle of Heilsberg, 29;
pursues Lestocq from Friedland, 32;
at Tilsit, 52;
interview with Queen Louisa, 61;
assumes title of Napoleon, 82;
advances on Madrid, 134;
at Burgos, 134;
assumes command in Spain, 134;
his dilemma, 139;
his protection sought by Charles IV, 138;
letter to _N._, March 25, 1808, 139;
enters Madrid, 139-142;
ambition to secure the Spanish throne, 139, 146, 150;
letters from _N._, March, 1808, 141;
designated Protector of Spain, 141;
relations with _N._, 141;
attitude of Spanish people toward, 141;
his policy in Spain, 141, 142;
refuses to recognize Ferdinand, 143;
trouble with his prisoner Godoy, 145;
appointed dictator of Spain, 146;
Madrid revolts against, 146;
_N._ offers him the crown of Naples or of Portugal, 147;
executes patriots in Madrid, 147;
becomes king of Naples, 149, 278, 319;
_N.'s_ control over, 151;
butchery in the Madrid riots, 151;
strength at Madrid, 155;
commander-in-chief at Madrid, 155;
executes decree depriving the Pope of secular power, 242;
member of extraordinary council on _N.'s_ second marriage, 253;
violates the Continental System, 266;
strength, March 12, 1812, 323;
cavalry command in the Russian campaign of 1812, 324;
urges action at Vitebsk, 338;
battle of Smolensk, 340;
remonstrates against fighting at Smolensk, 340;
enters Moscow, 345;
reports the temper of the Russian peasantry, 350;
sudden attack on, 352, 355;
desperate fighting on the retreat from Moscow, 362;
ordered to form behind the Niemen, 373;
commanding the remnants of the grand army, 373;
deserts the army and returns to Naples, 373, 385, 393; iv. 51;
crosses the Niemen, iii. 384;
enters Königsberg, 384;
held to his allegiance, 421;
battle of Dresden, iv. 10;
sent to support Vandamme at Kulm, 15;
fails to check Schwarzenberg or hold Blücher, 17;
ordered to hold Schwarzenberg, 22, 23;
battle of Wachau, 27, 28;
battle of Leipsic, 27, 28, 32;
forms alliance with Austria, 55;
marches on Rome, 56;
censured by _N._, 56;
deserts _N._, 56, 59;
characterization of Talleyrand, 107;
uneasy for his throne, 144;
deposed, 145;
Soult opposed to, 157;
condemned to death, 225.
=Murat, Mme.=, marital relations, ii. 258.
=Murati=, success of, at Bastia, i. 119.
=Museum of Arts and Crafts=, founded, i. 281.
=Mustapha IV=, seeks the friendship of France, iii. 106;
overthrows Selim III, 106;
weak reign of, 163;
murders Selim III, 162.
N
=N=, Napoleon's monogram, iii. 40.
=Namur=, military operations near, iv. 171, 176, 182, 186, 211.
=Nangis=, Victor and Oudinot driven back to, iv. 65;
Wittgenstein driven from, 72;
_N._ at, 72;
Berthier at, 72;
French retreat stopped at, 84.
=Nansouty, Gen.=, in the Eckmühl campaign, iii. 208;
commanding cavalry in Russian campaign of 1812, 324;
moves from Sézanne against Blücher, iv. 62;
ordered toward Montmirail, 63;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, 132.
=Nantes=, immunity from the White Terror, iv. 222.
=Napier, Gen.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 208.
=Naples=, Bourbon influence in, i. 21;
humiliation of, 192, 374;
aids in defense of Toulon, 221;
under foreign yoke, 345;
French proposition to revolutionize, 373;
becomes refractory, 401;
makes peace with France, 402;
_N.'s_ leniency to, 421;
_N.'s_ influence in, 448;
plunder of, ii. 17, 18;
arrogance of, 17, 18;
diplomatic offset of Spain against, 18;
claims Malta, 18;
neutralization of, 33;
dread of French spoliation in, 39;
makes war on Rome, 68, 72, 86, 87;
spread of revolutionary ideas to, 86;
joins the second coalition, 86, 91;
Macdonald ordered to, 87;
Bonapartist agency in, 89;
capture of, by Championnet, 87, 93;
unbridled license at, 92;
watched by Murat, 190;
Russia intercedes for, 203, 204;
English ships forbidden to enter, 204;
forced contributions from, 204;
France withdraws from, 211, 262, 287;
not allowed to garrison Malta, 284;
seized by Saint-Cyr, 287;
fate of her admiral, Caraccioli, 300;
Russia demands France's evacuation of, 330, 347;
independence of, 357;
a focus of anti-French conspiracies, 357;
_N._ demands expulsion of emigrants from, 357;
_N._ threatens to seize, 362;
Villeneuve ordered to, 371;
Prussia bound to secure the liberties of, 377;
banishment of the Bourbons from, 391, 395, 401; iii. 214;
Russian occupation of, ii. 395, 418;
Joseph Bonaparte made king of, 395, 439; iii. 148;
Masséna ordered to, ii. 395;
rupture of the Queen's engagement with _N._, 395;
opened to English ships, 395;
_N._ exacts tribute from, 396;
Russia evacuates, 405;
vassalage to France recognized at Tilsit, iii. 54;
trouble concerning the Papal States, 67;
abolition of the hostile strip between Italy and, 118;
financial and political reform in, 130;
Murat becomes king of, 147, 150, 279, 319;
England's loss of trade with, 272;
seizure of American ships by, 275;
Murat returns to 373, 385;
fails to support _N._, iv. 57, 59;
insecurity of Murat's throne, 144;
refrains from joining the European coalition against _N._, 162.
=Naples, King of=.
_See_ =Buonaparte, Joseph=.
"=Napoladron=," iii. 292.
=Napoleon Buonaparte=.
(_Note._--Items concerning Napoleon's relations with persons or
places will be found under the respective names of such subjects.
For a conspectus of events in his career, _see_ the Tables of
Contents in each volume.
For aphorisms by or concerning Napoleon, _see_ =Phrases=.
For details of his character _see_ paragraph below,--_Analysis
of character_.)
Birth and infancy, i. 33-47;
brothers and sisters, 33, 34;
forms of his name, 38;
nicknames, 39;
his personal recollections of childhood, 40, 45;
development of military genius at the snow forts, 53;
challenges a schoolmate, 51;
letter to his father, 58;
conceptions of the state, 78;
aptitude for the navy, 57;
two enemies of, 65;
views on and first lessons in revolution, 123-134, 156, 190;
hatred of France, 92, 122;
improvement in financial condition, 127;
a Corsican revolutionist, 130;
first appearance as an orator, 132;
political schemes, 137;
certificates as to his republicanism, 136, 140;
prepared for confirmation, 146;
his detractors, 148;
his desire concerning his biographies, 148;
course of life from 1791 to 1795, 148 et seq.;
payment of debts, 149;
growing notoriety, 156;
a starting-point of his career, 159;
addresses the Minister of War on the National Guard, 159;
debts of, 159;
a Corsican Jacobin, 160-179;
strained relations with the Ministry of War, 160, 295;
purchases sequestrated church lands, 161;
election methods, 166;
his "civism," 170, 180;
with the mob at the Tuileries, 176;
on riots, 176;
relations with the Marseilles deputation, 178;
on the conflict of August 10, 1792, 178;
seeks commission in naval artillery, 182;
aims at Corsican leadership, 202;
failure in politics, 211;
general of brigade, 232, 236-242, 287;
his own record of his life, 237;
influential friends, 236, 240, 244;
a Jacobin general, 236-246;
denies his nobility, 237;
refuses to obey the Convention's summons, 240;
a Montagnard, 242;
the "plan-maker" of the Robespierres, 245;
the germ of his military system, 247;
vicissitudes in war and diplomacy, 247, 259;
suspension and arrest, 254-259;
appeal to the "representatives of the people" (1794), 255;
release, 257;
the end of apprenticeship, 260-271;
degraded from artillery to infantry, 278;
Jacobin proclivities, 284, 286;
renounces Jacobinism, 286;
the General of the Convention, 287-301;
plans marriage and settled life, 294;
jealousy directed against, 310;
his police services, 310;
courtship and marriage, 310, 323;
a typical Corsican, 311;
views on love and marriage, 311;
adopts new spelling of his name, 321;
a product of Carnot's system, 332;
the Oedipus of France, 339;
on a great stage, 339-351;
demands reinforcements, 347;
insists on unity of command, 348;
keynote of military policy, 348;
secret of his military success, 351;
"the Little Corporal," 362; iv. 154;
an insubordinate conqueror and diplomatist, i. 363-377;
entrusted with diplomatic powers, 364;
threats against, 364;
prostitution of his subordinates, 366, 376;
scheme of art plunder, 368;
views concerning arts and sciences, 369;
plans succeeding the capture of Milan, 372-377;
refuses bribes, 376;
a prophecy fulfilled, 385;
narrow escapes, 393;
extinction of the Corsican in, 404;
memoirs, 417;
military jealousy directed against, 426;
independent attitude of, ii. 4;
attitude toward royalty, 4;
"a personage in Europe," 9;
plans for building up sea power, 18;
bribery of and by, 19;
constructive commander-in-chief of French forces, 36;
represses pillage, 42;
supplanter of the Revolution, 46;
his "complete code of politics," 49;
theories of government, 49, 50;
doubtful points in connection with the Egyptian campaign, 49-52;
on English political history, 50;
"the pear is not yet ripe," 52;
assumes the rôle of a prophet, 66;
el Kebir, the Exalted, 67;
receives secret information from his brothers, 79;
summoned to take supreme command, 80;
death at St. Helena, 82; iv. 234;
gives toast: "the harmony of all the French," ii. 101;
scheme to make him consul, 102;
secret meeting of his friends, 15th of Brumaire, 102;
critical moment in Talleyrand's house, 103;
temporary dictator, 106;
speech to Barras's messenger, 19th Brumaire, 107;
dangerous confidence of, 109;
"traitor and outlaw," 113, 115, 122;
the arbiter of French destiny, 121;
reports of his wealth, 122;
First Consul, 124, 125, 130;
royalist predilections for, 134;
his choice of two policies, 138;
the epoch of, 139;
importance in universal history, 139;
apparent loss of military ambition, 140;
choice of administrators, 140, 149-153;
English views of, 143, 144;
salary as First Consul, 150;
the personality of the council of state his, 152;
aims at centralization of government, 153;
beneficent effects of his régime on the world, 153;
controls foreign relations, 153;
foreign policy, 157, 158;
makes enemies as First Consul, 158;
the fate of France identified with his, 158;
contrasts administrative with military glory, 164;
on the art of war, 165;
expansion of his schemes, 172;
his favorite tactics, 177;
distinction between the statesman and the general, 183-185;
violation of the constitution in assuming command, 186;
undisputed mastery of France, 185;
sportive tricks with old dynasties of Europe, 194;
period of his greatest renown, 198;
married life, 198, 199, 256;
malicious libels on, 199;
as kingmaker, 205;
urged by Russia to declare himself king, 209;
codification of the laws, 222;
regenerates feudal society, 224;
study of law, 227;
his interest in education, 227;
the new era, 229;
method of deporting opposition, 235-238;
apparent summit of his power, 239;
plots and attempts to assassinate, 239, 240; iv. 122, 138, 144;
policy toward his enemies, ii. 241;
popularity, 244-249;
proposal to make him king, 248;
the tool of fate and architect of his own fortunes, 250;
his first marriage, 250;
a soldier of fortune, 250;
at maturity, 250 et seq.;
a man of all ages, 253;
the personification of France, 253;
effect of conspiracies on, 255;
safeguards for, 256;
on friendships, 256;
on the forces by which kings rule, 256;
effect of his married life on the Code, 257;
war a necessity to, 268;
French admiration for, 377;
expansion of the revolutionary system, 278;
relations with the diplomatic corps, 279, 280;
consular levee of March 13, 1803, 280;
reception of diplomatic corps, Apr. 4, 1803, 284;
remonstrances against adulation of, 295;
mortification of, 312;
on the pinnacle of revolutionary power, 314;
brief review of his career, 314-318;
creates a virtual tyranny, 315;
"consul, stadholder, or emperor?" 321;
his imperial title, 323;
his civil list, 323;
heraldic device of the empire, 323;
secures the imperial succession to his family, 324;
inauguration of the empire, 326;
coronation, 327, 339 et seq.; iv. 249;
his naval plans of 1805, ii. 334;
reception of the news of Trafalgar, 334;
as a man of science, 335;
his strength with the army, 334;
forms of his strategy, 337;
fear of poison, 341;
encourages arts and sciences, 347-351;
first speech from the imperial throne, 347;
germs of the national uprising against, 348;
the spell of his name, 349;
deprecates war, 351;
backed by the nation, 352;
"moderation" of, 355;
anger at naval failures, 360;
rapidity and perfection of his movements, 363;
his military commanders, 364;
sinks the emperor in the general, 364, 423; iii. 112, 404;
the head of the French Empire, ii. 395;
demands recognition as Emperor of Rome, 396;
violation of dynastic ties, 404;
ideas about territorial sanctity, 404;
"Napoleon the Great," 407;
the imperial catechism, 408;
traveling arrangements, 425;
distrust of his suite, 426;
simplicity of his military dress, 438;
likened to an octopus, 445;
political methods and policies, iii. 1, 76, 115, 196, 316;
a new seat of war for, 3;
determined to "conquer the sea by land," 3;
new experience in campaigning 5;
his first child, 11;
the center of his administration, 24;
the supports of his empire, 24;
centralization of government in, 25;
nameless charges against, 26;
his excuses for his license, 26;
his monogram (N) 39, 40;
commercial policy, 46, 137;
attitude toward the Russo-Prussian alliance, 54;
preference for action before words, 66;
recognizes the power of decorations, 81;
drafts on his associates, 81;
the surname of Napoleon, 82;
on the ambitions of the French people, 83;
on paternal government, 83;
personal decrees, 86;
recognizes popular fickleness, 86;
creates a titled class, 86;
art under, 88;
system of imperial patronage, 91;
discourages gambling, 92;
relations with his friends and generals, 93;
imprisons a milliner, 92;
pert remarks addressed to, 94;
supposed cause of the turn of his fortunes, 96;
ignorance concerning American affairs, 101;
realizes the limitations of his power, 110;
his "master," 110;
ill luck at sea, 112;
political system of, 115;
the height of his power, 115;
crushes a watch in passion, 130;
his determination to crush opposition, 130;
intercepts suspected correspondence, 130, 162;
his "cabinet noir," 130;
turn of his fortunes, 137, 151;
justifies pillage, 159;
crushing blows, 159, 161 et seq.;
the embodiment of power, 160;
divorce impending, 160;
system of territorial expansion, 165;
his extinctions of ruling dynasties, 165;
diplomatic exhibit of his political scheme at St. Cloud, 169;
dramatic incident at performance of "Oedipe," 172;
appreciation of the drama, 173;
familiarity with ancient history, 174, 175;
thickening of the divorce plot, 179;
the character of his civilization, 179;
orders list of marriageable princesses to be prepared, 179;
a gang of self-seeking traitors to, 193;
well informed on the European situation, 195;
system of spies, 196;
skilful historians on, 196;
shifts responsibility for wars onto the enemy, 198;
his plan of campaigns, 202;
policy of wooing people and abusing their rulers, 213;
Bonaparte distinguished from Napoleon, 231; iv. 39, 133;
ultimate terms of peace, iii. 239;
sick of war, 238;
dread of assassination, 240;
excommunicated, 242;
change in his manner, 245;
his "harem," 246;
declining popularity, 249;
basis of his power, 250;
alleges the reasons for his divorce, 253;
decides on the Austrian marriage, 254;
second marriage, 259;
banishes the cardinals, 259;
renounces title of Roman Emperor, 261;
consolidation of his power, 262;
fills vacant bishoprics, 263;
extent of his empire, 264, 278;
change of naval policy, 264;
the national uprisings against, 269;
causes leading to his overthrow, 269;
mistaken policy of providing thrones for relatives, 278;
his perquisites in English sugar and coffee, 279;
Spanish schoolboys' nickname for, 292;
deals with state property for personal benefit, 295;
policy of personal attachments, 295;
his "extraordinary domain," 295, 305;
imperial residences, 301;
endows maternity hospital, 301;
chooses between lives of child and mother, 302;
aspirations for sea power, 304;
flood-tide of success, 305;
method of replenishing an empty treasury, 305, 309;
the man and the embodied political force of Europe, distinguished,
306-309;
"Emperor of the Continent," 308;
an incident that changed the course of history, 314;
new naval schemes, 315;
belief in the devotion of France, 316;
policy of territorial aggrandizement, 316;
his ideal, 319;
beginning of his decline, 319;
considered the anti-christ, 322;
secret funds, 323;
studies Roman history, 325;
warned against war by ministers and friends, 326;
warned of the fate of Charles XII, 326;
moral reforms, 327;
the climax of his drama, 331;
physical characteristics at opening of the Russian campaign of
1812, 332;
afflicted with dysuria, 332;
address to his army before the Russian campaign, 334;
plans of action, 335, 336;
longing for a great battle, 337;
desperate military straits of, 341;
deplores the barbarity of war, 343;
contracts a loathsome disease, 352;
weakness and indecision on the retreat from Moscow, 355;
shares the hardships of the army, 357, 362, 365;
commands a division of the army, 363;
bulletin of Dec. 3, 1812, 372;
false report of his death, 376;
wrath of the army against, 376;
"robbed the cradle and the grave," 386;
revolutionary training, 388;
his "library," 388;
on credit, 389;
faces a European coalition, 391, 392;
refuses to cede European holdings, 392;
conciliatory attitude, 393;
fallacies of his military schemes of 1813, 394;
aims of the new coalition against, 399;
belief in cavalry, 402;
attitude toward Austria, 404;
his blunder of 1813, 411;
the beginning of the final disaster, 411;
a tyro in dynastic politics, 416;
alleged turning-point in his career, 418;
suspects treachery, 418;
isolation of, 417, 423;
characterizes his Austrian marriage as stupidity, 418;
his first fatal blunder, 420;
tries to bribe Austria, 424;
former friends turn against, iv. 2;
advantage over the allies, 3;
the hazard of the die, 4;
characterization of the allies, 5;
value of his presence in the field, 10;
climax of disaster, 16;
appeals to sentiment rather than history, 16;
the wonder-year of his theoretical genius, 16;
transformed from strategist into politician, 17;
the diplomat outstrips the strategist, 16;
definition of a great man, 21;
outwitted by the allies, 25, 26;
the savior of society, 43;
found out by the masses, 44;
newness of his nobility, 44;
his aim the independence of the nations, 45;
spends his private treasure on the army, 50;
his last official act, 53;
no longer Emperor, 53;
leaves Paris for Châlons, 53;
value of his prestige, 60;
his supreme military effort, 59;
a famous march by, 64;
the allies' determination to exterminate the Napoleonic idea, 66, 67;
his military correspondence, 1814, 66;
yields to his marshals, 69;
estrangement and desertion of his marshals, 72, 121, 129-132;
suggestion that he abdicate, 74;
realizes the war is for his extermination, 80;
"the spasmodic stroke of the dying gladiator," 83;
rouses the peasantry to guerrilla warfare, 85;
desperate scheme of, 90;
"this movement makes or mars me," 97;
capture of a bundle of letters from Paris for, 98;
chances for a last stand, 102;
contemplates a new levy, 106;
the allies refuse to treat with, 114;
proposal that he govern France under guarantees, 114;
overthrown by the legislature, 115;
regains his equilibrium, 117;
rage at learning of the surrender, 116;
the allies refuse to negotiate with, 117;
his first abdication, 117, 123-125, 128;
influence over the troops, 118;
desertion of the army, 126;
the knell of the empire, 127;
proclamation of April 5, 1814, 129;
a homeless citizen of the world, 129;
determination never to be taken alive, 129;
final form of his declaration of abdication, 131;
use of the imperial style, 133;
the savior of European society, 133;
treatment accorded to, by the allies, 133-142;
parting gifts to old acquaintances, 134;
treasure at Blois, 134;
denies the charge of usurpation, 135;
alleged to be a bastard, 137;
alleged theft of crown jewels, 138;
his true name said to be Nicholas, 138;
calumnies heaped on, 138, 143;
plots for the exile of, 138;
adopts disguise, 139;
farewell to the allies' commissioners, 140;
effect of English customs on, 140;
begins the administration of his island realm, 141;
treasure at the Tuileries, 141;
his historical commentaries, 141;
forced to practise economy, 142;
diminution of his private fortune, 144;
scheme to deport him still further, 145;
keeps informed as to course of European events, 146, 149;
scouts the idea of a regency, 152;
prepares for his escape, 152;
alleged fears of deportation, 152;
his escape justified, 152;
dismisses the peasantry from his column, 155;
troops flock to, 158;
forms his new cabinet, 159;
acquiesces in popular demand for constitutional government, 159;
the apostle of popular sovereignty, 160;
views on abolition of censorship of press, 160;
devotion to the cause of public liberty, 161;
resolution of the European dynasties to extirpate his régime, 161;
"the enemy and disturber of the world's peace," 162;
proclaimed an outlaw, 162, 164;
turns toward the moderate liberals, 165;
call for volunteers, 165;
his reconstituted corps of marshals, 167;
proclamation to the army, June 15, 1815, 173;
apparent successes of June 16, 1815, 184;
effects of his inactivity, 194;
his last dream of glory, 196, 197;
loss of the last chance, 205;
the emperor contrasted with the general, 207;
demand for his abdication, 217;
calls for him as dictator, 218;
idea of regaining the government by force, 218;
abdicates for the second time, 218;
adopts civilian's clothing, 219;
the government refuses responsibility for his safety, 219;
romantic schemes for his escape, 222;
desire for his execution, 224;
regarded as the common prisoner of the allies, 225;
General Bonaparte, a private citizen, 226;
appeals against his sentence, 226, 227;
upholds polygamy, 231;
his autobiography, 230, 231;
efforts for his release, 230, 231;
as a prisoner, 230-235;
attempts intercourse with friends in France, 231;
farewell message to his son, 231;
his testament, 233;
bequests and their settlements, 233;
last sickness and death, 234;
a possible epitaph, 247;
his rise to power, 247 et seq.;
questionings as to his life and work, 247 et seq.;
his love of artillery, 248;
lack of education, 250;
on greatness, 249;
influence on history, 253 et seq.;
early struggles, 254 et seq.;
methods of acquiring supreme power, 258, 262, 263;
lasting character of his work, 259;
legal reforms, 260;
police system of, 260;
centralization of his administrative system, 260, 261, 264;
social reforms, 260, 261, 264;
educational system, 260;
the secret of his downfall, 261;
position among lawgivers and statesmen, 260;
rule by military force, 261;
attitude toward democracy, 261;
deficient education in politics and history, 262;
influence on modern times, 262, 292;
popular distrust of his character, 263;
meets intrigue with intrigue, 263;
responsibility for bloodshed, 265;
causes of his downfall, 285-288, 290;
his place in history, 285-292;
essays the rôle of liberator, 286, 290, 293;
in captivity, 289;
his "Correspondence," 289;
roots out absolutism, 292;
his artificial aristocracy, 294.
_Analysis of character_.
Ability to mold men, ii. 4, 5, 9, 33-36, 56, 97, 98, 102-105,
126, 132, 142, 149-153, 159, 164, 194, 196, 234, 361; iv. 39,
258, 259;
as an adventurer, iv. 291;
ambition, i. 55; 65, 71, 113, 117, 136, 161, 191, 199, 203, 206,
209, 258, 263, 310, 311, 341, 346, 362, 405; ii. 14, 29-32, 48,
73, 157, 314, 437; iii. 19, 21, 46, 83, 109, 110 114, 164, 245,
306, 308, 329; iv. 255, 261-265, 292;
amusements, iv. 228, 230;
anxiety for his safety and comfort, iv. 134;
asceticism, i. 111;
autocracy, ii. 275;
bravado, iii. 18;
use of bribery, acceptance and rejection of bribes, i. 203; ii. 34;
as a burgher, ii. 279; iv. 248;
calmness under stress, ii. 334; iv. 165;
use of cant, iv. 45;
capacity for work, energy, industry, and attention to detail,
i. 210, 225, 245, 261, 263, 367; ii. 10, 29, 153, 197, 215, 222,
426; iii. 19, 24-26, 29, 53, 74, 77, 92, 171, 182-184, 209, 210,
216, 268, 269, 325, 333, 336-338; iv. 23, 54, 248-252, 265, 286;
casuistry, i. 144;
caustic, sarcastic or vigorous tongue or pen, i. 66, 118, 205;
ii. 56, 58, 107, 108, 113, 159, 268, 391; iii. 34, 35, 61, 62,
65, 81, 213-215, 275, 327, 332, 343;
caution, i. 211, 253; ii. 122, 315, 384;
(lack of), ii. 315; iii. 3;
change in temperament, iii. 232;
character at Brienne, i. 58;
cheerfulness and good humor, ii. 197, 279; iii. 19, 52;
clemency, ii. 439;
coffee-drinking habit, iv. 24;
contempt for ideals, ii. 199; iii. 26; 88, 148, 315, 316;
contempt for men and money, iv. 264;
cosmopolitanism, 92;
courage, i. 265-390, 393, 405; ii. 385; iii. 16, 19, 188, 240;
iv. 62, 77;
charge of cowardice against, ii. 384;
a criminal, iv. 250;
cruelty, ii. 70, 417, 439;
decay of physical and intellectual powers, neglect of details,
vacillation, etc., iii. 27, 93, 181; 209, 239-241, 246, 332,
347, 355; iv. 21, 31, 91, 197, 205, 214-218; 249, 285-291, 293;
desire for peace, ii. 142, 420; iii. 238, 382, 407, 414, 418, 424;
iv. 52, 160;
desperation, iii. 91;
despondency and pessimism, i. 80, 89, 98, 215; iii. 357; iv. 129;
despotism, iii. 80, 83, 86, 88, 121, 316; iv. 261;
the man of destiny and of the hour, the representative man of his
epoch, a fatalist and opportunist, i. 1, 80, 143, 166, 171,
219, 237, 272-286, 321; ii. 97-110, 139, 381; iii. 61, 325;
iv. 119, 168, 219, 256, 265, 289;
determination to rule or ruin, iii. 399;
his "divine character," ii. 407;
domestic virtues--filial, parental, and connubial affection,
i. 58, 64, 81, 141, 145, 161, 264, 285, 291, 309, 452-455;
iii. 181, 224, 246, 252, 269, 276, 302, 306, 323, 327, 381,
392, 416; iv. 134-138, 169;
love of dramatic effect; ability as an actor, i. 210, 341;
ii. 31; iii. 112; iv. 153, 166, 249;
dread of assassination and kidnapping, ii. 101; iii. 240, 368;
iv. 139, 150;
dreams of universal and European empire, i. 323; ii. 269, 272,
331, 336, 395; iii. 46, 73, 111, 328, 408, 432, 433; iv. 42,
159;
dreams of Oriental conquest and empire, i. 78, 114, 293, 296,
317, 424; ii. 15-19, 47, 51-56, 61, 66, 73, 289, 440; iii. 20,
21, 33, 36, 51, 65, 106, 110-113, 117, 129, 159, 163, 166, 167,
309, 332, 352; iv. 256;
dress, i. 376; ii. 30, 438; iii. 40, 63, 93. 257;
duplicity, shiftiness, and versatility, i. 210, 234, 253, 265,
296, 299, 309, 396, 397, 447;
dynastic ambitions and longings for an heir, ii. 233, 244-249,
256, 308, 317, 322, 328, 341; iii. 82, 104, 112, 147, 160, 246,
249, 252, 255, 260, 301, 307, 381, 416; iv. 159, 287;
early education and later studies, i. 39-67, 71-82, 93, 114,
140-144, 151, 176, 182, 210, 265;
early military irregularities and inaptitude, i. 94, 96, 115, 157,
160-174, 210;
organizes educational system, ii. 409; iii. 26, 90;
egoism, vanity, and self-assertiveness, ii. 80, 113, 118, 344, 437;
iii. 26, 73, 93, 191, 202, 245, 304, 316;
elasticity of spirits, iv. 117;
elements of his failure, iii. 401, 402;
endurance of privation, iii. 7, 18, 188, 209, 365;
equestrianism, sporting instincts, etc., iii. 52, 257;
exaggeration and disregard of truth, i. 233, 306;
as a financier, ii. 134, 219, 410; iii. 25, 78, 295-300, 315, 389;
iv. 249, 251, 259, 295;
foresight and insight, ii. 44, 314, 437; iii. 318, 424;
generosity, hospitality, and charity, i. 134, 417; ii. 30, 82;
iii. 171, 176, 295, 297, 300, 301, 330;
his all-embracing genius, ii. 203, 365;
habit of reducing thoughts to writing, iv. 23;
hallucinations and self-delusions, iii. 307, 332; iv. 91, 95, 104, 234;
hatred and vindictiveness, i. 287; ii. 29;
as a historian, iv. 152, 231, 288;
humanity, iv. 39;
his human supremacy, iv. 249;
an iconoclast, ii. 28;
imperious character, iv. 287;
inconsistency, iii. 165, 231, 238, 267; iv. 250-253;
inelegance of manner, lack of breeding and delicacy, ii. 197-202,
255, 279, 411; iii. 42, 80, 179;
influenced by personal friendships, iv. 25;
intellectual powers, iii. 43;
intolerance of criticism, 88;
invincibility, ii. 78; iii. 392;
knowledge of human nature, ii. 227, 245;
qualities of leadership, i. 55, 59, 60, 113, 119, 129, 132, 134,
186, 211, 221, 242, 310, 339-341;
liberalism, ii. 443;
literary tastes, studies, style, and work, i. 53, 54, 60, 63, 71,
76-98, 114, 118, 123, 126-131, 135-147, 150, 163, 176, 199, 206,
211, 216-219, 225, 265, 289, 307, 364-368, 400; ii. 15, 54, 408;
iii. 25, 26, 173-176, 300, 325; iv. 69, 134, 159, 228, 231, 289;
magnanimity (assumed), ii. 445;
magnificence, lavishness, and love of display, iii. 50, 91, 256,
295, 301, 330-332, 352;
a man of the people, 288 et seq.;
views on marriage, 300;
mathematical ability, i. 56, 66, 265;
military blunders, iii. 4, 336, 341, 354-356, 374; iv. 186;
military education, and early service in the army, i. 59, 60, 68,
73-82, 87, 94, 95, 126, 141, 144, 148, 157, 159-165, 180, 227,
232, 236-240, 245, 256, 265, 287, 292-297;
military genius and strategy, i. 53, 217, 226, 239, 247, 264, 295,
301, 304, 342, 345-351, 354-362, 368-373, 378-385, 387, 395, 412,
416-418; ii. 32, 163, 169, 172, 182-185, 363-366, 369, 380, 402,
419, 423-428, 435, 436; iii. 1, 2, 6, 13, 18, 29-35, 156, 184,
192, 204-207, 210, 217, 219, 222, 229, 235, 333-335, 341-343,
346, 353, 356, 363, 368, 382, 401, 402, 413; iv. 4, 8, 16, 19-22,
29, 38, 54, 58, 59, 62, 65, 81, 92, 97, 146, 149, 154, 160,
170-174, 180, 184, 197, 212, 231, 253, 256, 267, 287, 288, 289,
299;
denies moral responsibility, ii. 408;
nerve, iii. 365;
nervousness, 403;
over-credulousness, iv. 7;
patriotism, i. 155, 164, 165, 199, 201, 399; ii. 158, 159;
persistence, i. 210, 211; ii. 62, 65, 72;
personal appearance, i. 46, 56, 113; ii. 29, 30, 406; iii. 43, 92;
iv. 197, 230;
physical condition and vigor, i. 215; iii. 19, 43, 209, 302;
iv. 149, 168, 169, 250-253;
physical peculiarities, conditions, ailments, etc., i. 80, 85,
126; iv. 12, 15, 25, 168, 177, 179, 197, 200, 211-217, 222,
231-235;
plain-spokenness, iii. 418;
his political acumen, ii. 136;
poverty, i. 52, 65, 66, 89, 111, 157, 174, 262, 279, 284, 288;
powers of analysis and calculation, i. 55, 56;
secret of his preëminence, iv. 249, 291;
ready wit, iii. 94;
recklessness, i. 236;
as a reformer, iii. 189;
reliance on public opinion, iv. 157;
attitude toward religion and relations with the church, i. 76,
146, 209, 264, 422; ii. 41, 131, 173, 205, 206, 215, 224, 227,
258, 264, 265, 325, 340, 396, 398, 407; iii. 26, 68, 85, 88,
89, 118, 154, 174, 175, 190, 215, 242, 249, 258, 259, 263, 305,
315, 377, 390; iv. 165, 230-235, 251, 259, 296;
resolution, iii. 28, 209;
restlessness, i. 156, 223, 227, 284;
review of his character, iv. 264;
sanguine temperament, iii. 21;
self-assertion, self-confidence, self-interest, and selfishness,
i. 59, 60, 66, 84, 113, 263, 309, 340, 363-366, 395; iii. 1,
33, 82, 109, 208, 231, 304, 309, 328; iv. 140, 250, 287;
a self-made man, iv. 250;
self-restraint, i. 376, 395;
sensuality, i. 113, 452; ii. 66; iii. 10, 27, 108, 246, 257, 327,
352; iv. 142, 250;
sensitiveness, ii. 197;
slow development, iv. 288;
social life, manners, and reforms, his court, public receptions,
etc., i. 69, 137, 151, 262, 265, 284, 290, 291, 295, 309-312,
448; ii. 131 197, 200, 224, 255, 279, 406, 411; iii. 43, 58-61,
64, 80-89, 91-94, 169, 174, 179, 224, 301, 390; iv. 352;
as soldier, statesman, and despot, iv. 247 et seq.;
speculative mania, 172, 173, 185;
statecraft and diplomacy, i. 265, 363, 431; ii. 20, 37, 125-131,
137, 146, 149, 242-249, 261, 264-269, 271, 279, 314-324,
329-332, 336, 346, 353, 354, 400-412, 426, 427; iii. 33, 64,
95, 128, 190, 310, 315, 322, 328, 343, 401, 408, 423;
his strong will, ii. 224, 356, 357;
views concerning suicide, and his attempts thereat, i. 80;
ii. 75; iv. 130, 131, 218, 232, 287;
superstition, ii. 76;
temper, ii. 281; iii. 418;
the terror of his name, 359; iv. 80, 84, 88, 93;
theocratic assumptions, ii. 407;
thirst for conquest and warlike zeal, ii. 331, 351, 380, 381, 437;
iii. 326, 337; iv. 264, 287;
thirst for power, 264;
unscrupulousness, i. 87, 88, 126, 144, 160, 166, 201, 211, 237,
265, 295, 300 308; ii. 67, 144, 251, 314, 377, 439; iii. 82,
115, 316, 331; iv. 264;
attitude toward and relations with women, i. 256, 265, 290, 291,
311, 312, 448; ii. 197, 438; iii. 26, 57-61, 298, 327; iv. 143,
252.
=Napoleon II=, king of Rome, _N.'s_ affection for, iii. 323, 381;
Malet's conspiracy, 361;
insignificance of, 377;
possibility of a regency for, 422.
=Napoleone, Stéphanie=, marries Prince Charles of Baden, ii. 399;
_N.'s_ liaison with, 399.
=Napoleon's Mount=, ii. 383, 386.
=Narbonne, Comte de=, mission from Dresden to Russia, iii. 331.
=Narew, River=, military movements on the, iii. 2, 13, 19.
=Nassau=, member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403.
=Nassau, Prince= of, anecdote of, iii. 422.
=National Assembly, the=, Corsican affairs in, i. 117-122;
persuades Paoli to return to Corsica, 125;
condemns Buttafuoco, 135;
refuses to create Corsican National Guard, 140;
debates on the military power, 142;
difficulties of its work, 151-154, 158, 159;
self-effacement of, 153;
ecclesiastical legislation by, 168;
the King takes refuge in, 175;
dismisses the King's body-guard, 174;
abolishes the kingship, 175;
Lafayette endeavors to calm, 174, 176;
disperses, 188.
=National Convention, the=, election of a, i. 188;
meeting of, Sept. 21, 1792, 188;
the King summoned before, 194;
enforces its decrees in Corsica, 198;
Paoli summoned to appear before, 198, 204;
appeal to, by _N._, in Paoli's behalf, 199;
denounces Paoli, 201;
sends new commissioners to Corsica, 204;
promises indemnity to Corsican sufferers, 208;
supremacy of, 208;
Corsica's successful revolt against, 216;
popular support of, 219;
effect of the "Treason of Toulon" on, 222;
receives news of capture of Toulon, 233;
vengeance on Toulon, 233;
overthrow of the Girondists, 234;
_N._ and Gen. Lapoype summoned before, 240;
terrorists in, 250;
turns on Robespierre, 251;
downfall, 251, 266;
Jacobins in, 266;
question of reelection of members, 271, 282, 298;
rebellion and riots against, 272, 283, 299;
proclaims amnesty, 277;
royalist intrigues in, 278;
popular hatred of, 282;
prepares for conflict, 282, 299;
adopts _N.'s_ plan for Italian campaign, 293;
distrusts _N._, 299;
triumph on the 13th Vendémiaire, 304-309;
its plans thwarted by violence, 306;
_N.'s_ peculiar relations to, 341;
financial maladministration, ii. 219;
plans for invading England, 290;
scheme of revolutionary extension, iii. 328;
=National Guard, the=, organization and reorganization of, i. 109,
143, 159, 272, 304, 308;
calling in officers of, 164;
_N._ adjutant-major in, 164;
feeling against the Convention among, 283, 299;
defense of the Tuileries, 299;
oppose the Convention forces, 301-305;
the 13th Vendémiaire, 301-305;
_N._ appointed commander of, ii. 104;
drafts for the imperial army from, iii. 387;
in defense of Paris, iv. 99, 105;
decay of imperialism among, 105;
fails to persuade the Empress to stay, 109;
_N._ hopes to raise, 116;
refuses to obey the provisional government, 126;
proclamation to, March 8, 1815, 146;
reviewed by _N._, 166;
surly spirit among, 165.
=National Guard of Corsica=, _N.'s_ schemes to form, i. 122;
_N._ appointed adjutant-major in, 164.
=National Library=, lecture system of the, i. 281.
=National List, the=, ii. 126.
=Naudin=, letter of _N._ to, July 27, 1791, i. 156.
=Naumburg=, Prussian headquarters at, ii. 422, 424;
Davout and Bernadette at, 429;
Blücher pursues Macdonald to, iv. 15.
=Navarre=, question of the sovereignty of, i. 120;
incorporated with France, 120;
French invasion of, iii, 132;
the château of, granted to Ferdinand VII, 147;
_N.'s_ contemplated movements in, 184;
military government of, 278.
=Navy=, _N.'s_ aptitude for the, i. 57;
suicide among officers of the French, ii. 3;
preparations at Toulon, 40.
=Nazareth=, skirmish at, ii. 71.
=Necker, Jacques=, schemes of, i. 44;
_N.'s_ study of, 78;
minister of finance, 98;
problems of taxation, 98, 105;
flight from France, 98;
banishment, 108;
fall, 154;
Mme. de Staël's inheritance from, iii. 299.
=Negroes=, arguments in favor of enslaving, ii. 236.
=Neidenburg=, military operations near, iii. 4, 8.
=Neipperg, Count A. A.=, relations with Maria Louisa, iii. 330;
iv. 143, 162.
=Neisse=, siege of, iii. 20.
=Nelson, Adm. Horatio=, captures Bastia, i. 260; ii. 62;
expected coöperation with Austria at Savona, i. 353;
sails from Cadiz in chase of the Egyptian expedition, ii. 57;
returns to Sicily, 61;
seeks the French fleet in Greece, 61;
follows to Egypt, 61;
loses an eye at Cadiz, 62;
battle of Cape St. Vincent, 62;
battle of the Nile, 62, 63, 81;
battle of Copenhagen, ii. 209;
sanctions the execution of Caraccioli, 300;
correspondence with Dumouriez, 303;
aided by Portugal, 332;
plan to allure him to Egypt, 331;
Villeneuve avoids, 334;
enticed to the West Indies, 358;
joins Cornwallis before Brest, 359;
sails for Portsmouth, 359;
pursues Villeneuve to Gibraltar, 358;
chases Villeneuve to the West Indies and back, 370;
arrives off Cadiz, 371;
his ambition, 372;
battle of Trafalgar, 373-376;
his death, 374.
=Nemours=, Cossacks advance to, iv. 72.
=Nesselrode, Count=, appearance in Russian diplomacy, iii. 409;
refuses to treat with France, 410;
conference with Francis, 415;
demands Austria's adherence to the coalition, 415;
agrees to basis of Austrian mediation, 415;
letter from Talleyrand to, iv. 107;
approves the restoration of the Bourbons, 114;
negotiates with Talleyrand, 113.
=Netherlands=, French defeats in, i. 172;
Hoche's campaign in, 427;
England's interest in, 450; iv. 67;
the enlightenment of, ii. 37;
course of affairs (1797-98), 37, 38;
French agents in the, 39;
English expedition to destroy the dockyards of, iii. 237;
French influence in, iv. 41;
Bernadotte assigned to watch, 55;
English troops in the, 57;
the allies' invasion of France via, 59, 97;
campaign of the Hundred Days, 169 et seq.;
weakness of the troops of, 195, 202.
_See also_ =Austrian Netherlands=; =Belgium=; =Dutch Flanders=;
=Holland=.
=Neuburg=, Marmont at, ii. 365.
=Neufchâteau=, member of the Directory, ii. 8, 35;
mission to Congress of Rastatt, 52.
=Neufchâtel=, ceded to France, ii. 390;
Berthier created Prince of, iii. 86.
_See also_ =Berthier=.
=Neumarkt=, Jourdan's defeat near, i. 385;
Masséna's movements at, 436;
flight of Hiller to, iii. 208;
_N._ at, 413.
=Neu-Reppin=, military movements near, ii. 434.
=Neutrality=, the principle of the agreement of 1780, ii. 212.
=Neuwied=, Hoche crosses the Rhine at, i. 440.
=New Castile=, Duke del Infantado commissioned governor of, iii. 127.
=New England=, commercial greed, iii. 102.
=Newfoundland=, proposed French expedition to, ii. 333.
=New Galicia=, annexed to the grand duchy of Warsaw, iii. 239.
=New Orleans=, battle of, iv. 169.
=New York=, proposal that _N._ sail to, iv. 221.
=Ney, Marshal Michel=, a product of Carnot's system, i. 332;
in battle of Hohenlinden, ii. 191;
occupies Switzerland, 234, 272;
service in the Army of England, 291;
execution of, 300;
joins _N._ at Waterloo, 300;
created marshal, 323;
plan for his invasion of Ireland, 335;
character, 364; iii. 93;
holds the bridge at Günzenburg, ii. 366;
victory at Leoben, 368;
clears the enemy from the Tyrol, 380;
at Bayreuth, 428;
in battle of Jena, 430-432;
invests Magdeburg, 436;
at Neidenburg, iii. 4;
strength in Poland, 7;
threatens Königsberg, 9;
reprimanded by _N._, 8;
retreats from Heilsberg, 10;
pursued by Bennigsen, 10;
escapes to Gilgenburg, 10;
in Eylau campaign, 15;
battle of Heilsberg, 29;
movements on the Passarge, 28;
battle of Friedland, 30;
created Duke of Elchingen, 86;
yearly income, 87, 296;
_N.'s_ opinion of, 93;
quarrel with Tolstoi, 108;
at Logroño, 183;
moves against Castaños, 185;
lack of vigor of movement, 185;
movement against Madrid, 186;
stationed at Astorga, 188;
in Leon, 283;
strength, March, 1812, 324;
advances on Dünaburg, 336;
battle of Smolensk, 339;
reckless pursuit after Smolensk, 339;
battle of Borodino, 343;
"the bravest of the brave," 359;
hero of the retreat from Moscow, 359, 363;
letter to Berthier, Nov. 5, 1812, 361;
junction with Eugène, 364;
"A marshal of the Empire has never surrendered," 364;
perilous retreat from Smolensk, 364;
his most brilliant deed of arms, 364;
crosses the Dnieper, 364;
at the crossing of the Beresina, 366, 370;
reaches Vilna, 373;
in campaign of 1813, 403;
battle of Lützen, 404;
battle of Bautzen, 411;
beleaguers Schweidnitz, 413;
confronts Blücher at the Bober, iv. 7;
battle of Dresden, 9;
supersedes Oudinot, 17;
battle of Dennewitz, 18, 19;
driven into Torgau, 19;
letter to _N._, Sept. 7, 1813, 20;
battle of Leipsic, 32;
on the allies' march on Paris, 40;
moves from Sézanne against Blücher, 62;
commanding the Young Guard, 72;
battle of Craonne, 78;
battle of Laon, 79;
moves up the Aube, 91;
battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, 92;
courage, 104;
at council at St. Dizier, 104;
strength after the surrender of Paris, 118;
at review of the Guard at Fontainebleau, 117;
treasonable utterance at Fontainebleau, 119;
demands the Emperor's abdication, 120;
voices the disaffection of the army, 122;
on commission to present abdication to the Czar, 123, 124;
transfers his allegiance, 129;
returns to Paris, 131;
resents royalist affronts to his wife, 148;
rejoins Napoleon at Auxerre, 157;
recreated marshal, 167;
in the Waterloo campaign, 172;
dispute concerning his orders, 176;
ordered to Quatre Bras, 176, 180, 185;
moves to Gosselies, 176;
interview with _N._, 179;
battle of Quatre Bras, 180-188;
at Frasnes, 184, 189;
_N._ determines to join, 186;
_N.'s_ despatch to, June 17, 1815, 186;
_N.'s_ indignation at, 187;
moves to coöperate with _N._, 189;
battle of Waterloo, 196, 200-210;
insubordinate spirit, 205;
commanding the Guard, 208;
at Quatre Bras, 213;
contrasted with Desaix, 213;
at Eylau, 213;
imprisoned and condemned to death, 223.
=Nice=, _N._ at, i. 209, 240, 244, 248, 253, 307, 339;
inadequate works at, 214;
the Buonapartes at, 244;
news of the Terror in, 252;
France's ambition to gain, 276, 327;
lost to Sardinia, 352;
proposal that France should keep, iv. 41.
=Niemen, River, the=, military movements on, iii. 31, 336, 341, 373, 384;
meeting of the sovereigns on, iii. 39 et seq.;
Prussian territory on, 63;
French advance from the Vistula to, 337;
French advance to the Dwina from, 337.
=Nile, River, the=, the campaign on, ii. 59 et seq.;
Mamelukes drowned in, 60;
battle of, 61-66, 81, 370.
=Nîmes=, alarm among the Protestants of, iv. 147.
=Niort=, enthusiasm for the fallen Emperor at, iv. 218.
=Nivelles=, military operations near, iv. 171, 178;
topography of, 195, 196.
=Nivôse=, the Plot of, ii. 239-241.
=Nobilles, Comte de=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 107.
=Nobility of France, the=, loss of its feudal power, i. 100;
privileges, and assumptions of privileges of, 105, 109;
yielding of privileges by, 109;
flight of, 109, 142 (_see also_ =Emigrants=).
=Noble Guard=, institution of a, iv. 148;
abolition of the, 137.
=Nogara=, military operation near, i. 410.
=Nogent=, Victor ordered to, iv. 62;
_N._ at, 62, 74;
abandoned by Victor, 64;
Souham's forces at, 102;
abdication proposed to the Emperor at, 120.
=Non-intercourse Act of March 1, 1809=, iii. 274.
=Non-intervention Act, the=, iii. 102.
=Nordhalben=, Davout at, ii. 428.
=Nordhausen=, military movements near, ii. 434.
=Nördlingen=, the French position at, ii. 365;
capture of Werneck's division at, 367.
=Normandy=, unrest in, i. 222;
Marmont's troops to withdraw into, iv. 120.
=North=, proposed League of the, ii. 418.
=North Cape=, a boundary of the Continental System, iii. 280.
=North German Confederation=, proposed organization of, ii. 418-421, 422.
_See also_ =Confederation of the Rhine=.
=North Sea=, proposed French expedition to, ii. 334;
part of the coast incorporated into the French Empire, iii. 278,
287, 294.
="Northumberland,"= the, conveys _N._ to St. Helena, iv. 227.
=Norway=, lost to Denmark, iii. 70;
subordination to Denmark, 280;
in vassalage to France, 280;
offered by Alexander to Sweden, 281, 314, 320, 324;
Bernadotte's ambition to acquire, 281, 399;
in possession of Denmark, iii. 282;
Russian troops for the conquest of, 350;
struggle with Sweden, iv. 164.
=Nossen=, defeat of the Saxons by the Black Legion at, iii. 234.
=Notables of France=, ii. 126;
abolition of the list of, 247.
=Notre Dame Cathedral=, service in honor of the Concordat at, ii. 215;
_N.'s_ coronation in, 341-345.
=Novi=, battle of, ii. 83, 92, 96;
military operations near, ii. 178.
=Nuits=, _N._ visits, i. 146;
society in, 146.
=Nyon=, Carnot's concealment at, ii. 27.
O
"=Oberon=," iii. 175.
=Ocana=, battle of, iii. 287, 288.
=Ochs, Peter=, republican propagandist in Switzerland, ii. 40.
=Oder, River, the=, proposed surrender to _N._ of forts on, iii. 178;
threatened expulsion of the French from, 416;
military movements on, iv. 3;
French garrisons on, 35.
"=Oedipe=," performed at Erfurt, iii. 172.
=Offenburg=, reputed emigrant conspirators in, ii. 302;
Caulaincourt's expedition to, 304.
=Officialdom=, popular hatred of, i. 105.
=Offingen=, the French position at, ii. 365.
=Oglio, River, the=, Beaulieu retreats behind, i. 361;
Austria's boundary in Venetia, 438;
Schérer driven behind, ii. 88.
=O'Hara, Gen.=, captured before Toulon, i. 229.
=Old Castile=, French occupation of, iii. 155.
=Oldenburg=, proposal to include in North German Confederation, ii. 418;
scheme to incorporate with France, iii. 266;
Alexander I reserves his family rights over, 288;
Alexander offers to exchange, for Erfurt, 288;
incorporated in the French Empire, 310, 328;
proposal that France evacuate, 407;
restored to its former ruler, iv. 40.
=Oldenburg, Duke of=, marries Grand Duchess Catherine, iii. 181, 278;
dethroned, 278, 307;
proposed allotment of territory to, 409.
=Old Guard, the=, battle of Leipsic, iv. 27, 33;
moves against Blücher from Sézanne, 61;
_N._ reviews them at Fontainebleau, 117;
_N._ takes leave of, 135;
reduction of the pay of, 148;
in battle of Waterloo, 205, 208.
_See also_ =Imperial Guard=.
=Ollioules=, capture and recapture of, i. 225.
=Olmütz=, military operations near, ii. 379, 382.
=Olsusieff, Gen.=, annihilated by Marmont at Champaubert, iv. 63.
=O'Meara, Edward=, publisher of an Elban MS., i. 177;
_N.'s_ declaration to, concerning the Duc d'Enghien, ii. 311;
_N.'s_ conversations with, 441;
physician to _N._, iv. 232;
assists _N._ on his history, 232;
dismissed by Lowe, 232.
=Oneglia=, Masséna's advance through, i. 243;
French troops in the valley of, 244;
_N.'s_ service at, 245, 255.
=Oporto=, seizure of the French governor of, iii. 122;
bishop of, applies to England for help, 122;
occupied by Soult, 286.
=Oppin=, Bernadotte at, iv. 28.
=Orange, House of=, indemnity to, for loss of power, ii. 262.
=Orange, the Prince of=, recalled to Holland, iv. 40;
in Waterloo campaign, 172, 176;
at the Duchess of Richmond's ball, 178;
battle of Quatre Bras, 180.
=Orcha=, military movements near, iii. 364.
=Ordener, Gen.=, leads expedition to Ettenheim, and arrests the Duc
d'Enghien, ii. 304.
=Ore Mountains=, contemplated operations in the, iv. 8;
retreat of the allies toward, 12.
=Orezza=, _N._ at, i. 126, 160;
meeting of the constituent assembly at, 131-134.
=Orgon=, attempt to assassinate _N._ at, iv. 138.
=Oriani, Comte B.=, _N.'s_ statement to, i. 369.
="Orient," the=, sunk in Aboukir Bay, ii. 63.
=Oriental question, the=, ii. 262.
=Orleans=, prison massacres in, i. 188;
French garrison at, iv. 118.
=Orloff, Count=, conducts negotiations for surrender of Paris, iv. 112.
=Ormea=, Masséna's advance through, i. 243.
=Orscha=, French garrison in, iii. 341.
=Ortenau=, ceded to Baden, ii. 391.
=Osnabrück=, position in the French Empire, iii. 279.
=Ossian=, _N.'s_ acquaintance with and study of, ii. 53; iv. 134, 231.
=Ostermann-Tolstoi, Gen.=, in battle of Eylau, iii. 15;
character, 107;
conducts negotiations with _N._, 107, 112, 113;
reception at Paris, 108;
quarrel with Ney, 108;
_N.'s_ opinion of, 113;
at St. Cloud levee, Aug. 15, 1808, 169.
=Osterode=, _N.'s_ headquarters at, iii. 18, 25.
=Ostrach=, battle of, ii. 88.
=Ostrolenka=, Russian retreat to, iii. 5;
Russians driven out of, 19.
=Othman=, the royal line of, iii. 163.
=Otranto=, embargo on, ii. 287;
creation of hereditary duchy of, 396;
Fouché created Duke of, iii. 86.
_See also_ =Fouché=.
=Ott, Gen.=, besieges Genoa, ii. 165, 170, 173, 175;
defeated by Lannes at Casteggio, 176;
reaches Alessandria, 177;
in battle of Marengo, 180.
=Otto, Comte L. G.=, ambassador to England, ii. 273;
letter from _N._, Oct. 23, 1802, 272, 290;
recalled from London, 277.
=Otto the Great=, _N._ likened to, ii. 340.
=Ottoman Empire=, proposed partition of, ii. 47. _See also_
=Egypt=; =Turkey=.
=Oubril=, his treaty rejected by Alexander I, ii. 418, 421;
Russian envoy to Paris, 401, 405, 418.
=Oudinot, Gen. C. N.=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 386;
created Duke of Reggio, iii. 86;
_N.'s_ opinion of, 93;
character, 93;
commanding in Hanau, 203;
ordered to Augsburg, 204;
ordered to Abensberg, 208;
battle of Wagram, 228;
ordered to coerce Holland, 266;
strength, March, 1812, 324;
at the crossing of the Beresina, 367-370;
in campaign of 1813, 402;
threatens Berlin, 413;
_N.'s_ instructions to, iv. 5;
defeated at Luckau, 8;
fails in his movement against Berlin, 12-16;
battle of Grossbeeren, 14;
retreats to Wittenberg, 14;
superseded by Ney, 17;
battle of Dennewitz, 18, 19;
at Dresden, 20;
battle of Leipsic, 29, 31;
checks pursuits at Lindenau, 35;
opposes Schwarzenberg, 61;
driven back to Nangis, 65;
before Provins, 72;
captures Méry, 73;
ordered to hold Blücher, 73;
checked by Schwarzenberg, 75;
driven beyond Troyes, 76;
retreats from Arcis, 94;
at Bar-sur-Ornain, 103;
strength after the surrender of Paris, 118;
at the abdication scene, 120;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, 132;
recreated marshal, 167.
=Ourcq, River=, military operations on the, iv. 76.
=Ouvrard, G. J.=, sent by Fouché on mission to England, iii. 272.
P
=Pachra, River=, French crossing of the, iii. 355.
=Pacific Ocean=, influence of the United States on the, ii. 288.
=Paderborn=, apportioned to Prussia, ii. 265.
=Padua=, military operations near, i. 410;
creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396.
=Pagerie, Marie-Josephe-Rose Tascher de la=. _See_ =Beauharnais,
Josephine=.
=Pagerie, Mlle. Tascher de la=, sought in marriage by Ferdinand VII,
iii. 125;
marries the Duke of Aremberg, 132.
=Pagerie, Tascher de la=, father of Josephine Beauharnais, i. 313;
death of, 314.
=Paine, Thomas=, on financial condition of England, ii. 32.
=Pajol, Gen.=, seizes Montereau, iv. 73;
in the Waterloo campaign, 173;
engagement at Charleroi, 174;
battle of Ligny, 183.
=Palace of the Government, the=, ii. 147.
=Palafox, Gen. José de=, military ability, iii. 156;
at Saragossa, 184, 185.
=Palais Royal=, headquarters of the tribunate, ii. 151;
a refuge for the disreputable, 151.
=Palestine=, the key of, ii. 73;
importance of _N.'s_ conquering, 73.
=Palm, J. P.=, bookseller of Nuremberg, execution of, ii. 417.
=Palma=, _N._ advances to, i. 443.
=Pamplona=, _N._ seeks information concerning, iii. 128;
seized by Darmagnac, 132.
=Pan, Mallet du=, criticizes Mme. de Staël, iii. 298.
=Panatheri=, secretary of Directory of Corsica, i. 133.
=Pantheon Club=, closing of the, i. 310.
=Paoli, Pascal=, his share in the history of Corsica, i. 15 et seq.;
relations with the Jews and with the Vatican, 16;
compared with Washington, 18;
his character and renown, 17, 18;
offers asylum to Rousseau, 19;
hoodwinked by Choiseul, 20, 21;
defeat and escape, 23;
appeals to the Powers, 23;
aspirations for Corsica, 26, 28, 116;
_N.'s_ address to, 40;
his conciliation sought by France, 42;
_N._ a supporter and admirer of, 53, 93, 137, 199, 210;
the "History of Corsica," dedicated to, 93;
_N.'s_ correspondence with, 96-98;
his return to Corsica, 117-125, 127, 131;
activity of his agents, 118;
directs Corsican agitation, 120;
amnesty granted to, 120, 124;
quits England, 124;
honored by Louis XVI and the National Assembly, 124;
misrepresented in Paris, 125;
popularity in Corsica, 126, 198;
meeting with _N._ at Rostino, 132;
virtual dictator of Corsica, 133;
agitation in his behalf in Corsica, 162, 170;
interferes in riots in Ajaccio, 169;
difficulties of his situation, 169;
displeasure at _N._, 170;
despair of, 185;
commander-in-chief in Corsica, 185;
_N._ seeks reconciliation with, 186;
lieutenant-general in the French army, 187;
opposes Sardinian invasion scheme, 189, 192, 196;
_N.'s_ insubordination to, 190;
suspected of intrigue with England, 190, 201;
position on declaration of war against England, 196;
denounced by Lucien Buonaparte, 197;
summoned to appear before the National Convention, 197, 204;
_N._ antagonizes, 199-203, 205, 210, 242;
denounced by the National Convention, 201;
summons _N._ to Corte, 203;
offers to leave Corsica, 204;
seeks English protection for Corsica, 205-208;
views of condition of France, 206;
declared an outlaw, 207;
fails to fortify Ajaccio, 257;
seeks aid from England, 257;
recalled to England, 261.
=Paolists, the=, i. 116.
=Papacy, the=, French feeling against the, i. 375;
the Directory desires its overthrow, 419, 422;
_N.'s_ alliance with, 422;
_N._ proposes negotiations with the, ii. 11;
relations of _N._ and France with, 205, 206, 216.
_See also_ =Church=; =Pius VII=; =Rome=.
=Papal States, the=, French proposition to revolutionize, i. 373;
French seizures and ransom in, 374;
_N._ protects clergy in, 422;
under French influence, 439;
scheme to conquer, ii. 18;
held by Austria, 145, 160;
evacuated by Ferdinand IV, 203;
_N._ demands expulsion of Russians, English, and Sardinians from, 396;
_N.'s_ influence over, recognized at Tilsit, iii. 55;
_N._ demands banishment of hostile agents from, and closing of
ports to England, 67;
French invasion of, 118;
demands for the inviolability of, 118;
annexed to France, 262.
=Papelotte=, the farms of, iv. 195;
fighting at, 201, 206.
=Paradomania=, iii. 50.
"=Parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, and Bonaparte=," ii. 230.
=Parbasdorf=, military operations near, iii. 226, 229.
=Paris=, the military school at, i. 48, 59, 60;
_N.'s_ sojourn in (1787), 86;
the Parliament banished from, 106;
base elements of population flock to, 108;
encounter in the Place Vendôme, 108;
burning of the barriers, 108;
destruction of the Bastille, 108, 109;
Louis XVI takes up residence in, 109;
famine, 151;
return of the court to, 151;
municipal reform, 153;
_N._ returns to (May 28, 1792), 173;
_N.'s_ impoverished condition in, 173;
great outburst of sedition, 174;
Marseilles sends a deputation to, 174;
the barricades on August 10, 1792, 177;
_N._ and Elisa in, 182;
_N.'s_ residences in (Holland Patriots' Hotel), 183;
(Fossés Montmartre), 264;
(Michodière Street), 295;
(Chantereine Street), ii. 28;
(Victory Street), 84;
massacres of royalist prisoners, i. 183;
overturn of municipal government, 187;
committee of surveillance, 188, 189;
prison massacres in (Sept. 2-6, 1792), 188;
representation in the National Convention, 188;
condemnation and execution of Louis XVI, 195;
establishment of the revolutionary tribunal, 207;
_N._ at (1793), 223;
scenes of the Terror, 251;
_N.'s_ sojourn in (1795), 264, 280 et seq.; 289, 295;
influence in political movements, 266;
bread riots, 273;
Jacobin plots, 273;
critical condition of affairs, 273, 277, 280;
social life (1795, 1796), 280-285, 290, 291, 316;
hatred of the National Convention in, 282;
military preparations, 283, 298, 299;
royalist plots against, 298;
critical condition of affairs, 298-301;
rebellion against the Convention, 299 et seq.;
the 13th Vendémiaire, 301-305;
restoration of order, 305;
_N._ cows the low elements in, 308;
rejoicings in, over Piedmontese successes, 363;
glorification of _N._ in (1796), 365;
receptacle for plundered works of art, 369;
"the capital of European liberties," 369;
spring elections of 1797, ii. 2;
critical condition of affairs, 3;
royalist intrigues, the Clichy faction, 3, 5, 7;
necessity for a powerful general in, 5, 7;
Barras schemes to bring troops to, 6;
the 18th of Fructidor, 8;
_N.'s_ remittances to, 13;
feeling in, over the treaty of Campo Formio, 22;
return of _N._ to (1797), 26-31;
the "Street of Victory," 28;
plot and counterplot in, 36;
distrust of _N._ in (1798), 49;
popular ideas in, concerning the Egyptian campaign, 68;
_N.'s_ triumphant progress from Fréjus to, 83;
hatred of the Terror, 94, 95;
_N.'s_ reception in (from Egypt), 95-102;
banquet to _N._ in St. Sulpice, 100, 101;
_N._ appointed commander of the troops, 102 et seq.;
the 18th Brumaire, 103 et seq.; iv. 258;
Fouché closes the barriers, ii. 109;
apportionment of the guards in, 109;
_N._ reopens the barriers, 109;
the 19th Brumaire, 111 et seq.;
weeding out old republican politicians from, 125;
warlike feeling in (1800), 145;
welcomes _N._ from Marengo, 185;
_N.'s_ relations with polite society in, 199;
service in honor of the Concordat, 216;
schemes of the Duc d'Enghien's supporters in, 240;
explosion of infernal machine in Rue St. Nicaise, 240;
Mme. de Staël exiled from, 259;
restoration of street names, 258;
improved social conditions, 259;
the press of, attacks England, 271;
center of the government, 279;
feeling in, concerning _N.'s_ court at Aachen, 339;
coronation of _N._, 339, 340, 342-345;
prospects of coming war in, 312;
fickleness of society in, 312;
abuse of Austria and Russia by press, 361;
_N._ returns to (Jan. 27, 1806), 406;
affection for N. in, 407;
_N._ proposes to introduce bull-fights, 409;
_N._ leaves for Mainz, 422;
relics of Frederick the Great sent to, 437;
official reports from Eylau in, iii. 17;
the situation in (1807), 24 et seq.;
the head and body of France, 24;
sensitiveness of the Bourse, 24;
Mme. de Staël returns to, and again expelled from, 26;
the situation in, after Friedland, 36;
proposal that Alexander visit, 50;
question of the cardinal at, 69;
return of _N._ from Tilsit to, 72;
public works, 74, 380;
Jewish Sanhedrim in, iii. 76;
social vices in, 92;
Tolstoi's reception at, 108;
the soul of France, 151, 160; iv. 92, 99;
the divorce scandal in, iii. 180;
_N._ returns from Spain to (Jan. 6, 1809), 188;
_N._ returns from Vienna to, 241, 245;
_N.'s_ second marriage, 258-261;
the College of Cardinals transplanted from Rome to, 258, 264;
rejoicings in, over birth of the king of Rome, 302, 303;
a rival to Rome as capital of the Western empire, 307;
remembrance of the Terror, 323;
monarchical sentiment in, 323;
importance of _N.'s_ presence in, 372;
the Malet conspiracy in, 375; 376;
treachery in, 412;
the allies, advance on, iv. 40, 41, 61, 65, 71, 90, 96-103, 110,
113, 219;
gloom and panic in, 51, 81, 98, 104, 108, 109, 117, 166;
_N.'s_ public appearances in, 51, 52;
the national-guard, 53;
defense of, 59, 73, 85, 96, 97, 99, 105-112;
Joseph acting regent in, 61;
Blücher's advance toward, 76;
sends reinforcements to _N._, 80, 86;
_N.'s_ resolution to abandon, 91;
_N.'s_ march toward, 104, 105, 157;
surrender of, 105, 113;
the Empress's flight from, 106-112, 117;
intrigue in, 107;
royalist influences in, 108;
in communication with Marmont, 109;
summoned to surrender, 109;
armistice before, 109;
looking for _N._ in, 112;
fighting before, 111;
not to be sacked, 112, 113;
entrance of the allies, 113, 117, 118, 221;
council of the allies and French diplomats, 114;
royalist enthusiasm in, 113-117;
assents to the overthrow of _N._, 115;
the white cockade in, 115, 147;
plans for the recovery of, 117;
reception of Louis XVIII in, 133;
riots in, at burial of an actress, 146;
secret longings for _N.'s_ return in, 147;
the garrison put under arms, 149;
disappearance of the government, 158;
raising the imperialist standard in, 158;
placard on the Vendôme column, 158;
excitement in, 158;
arrival of _N._ in, 159;
treaty of, 165;
the news of Waterloo and Ligny in, 215, 216;
_N._ returns from Waterloo to, 217;
formation of a new Directory, 218;
appointment of a committee of public safety, 218;
_N._ offers to defend, 220;
possibility of reassembling an army in, 222.
=Paris, Forest of=, formation of the Prussians behind, iv. 202.
=Paris, Marquis de=, leads the Parisian mob, i. 151.
=Paris sections=, the day of the, i. 302-312.
=Parker, Sir Hyde=, at battle of Copenhagen, ii. 209.
=Parliament of Paris=, reconstitution of the, i. 106;
contest with Louis XVI, 106;
banished from the capital, 106.
=Parma=, intrigue in the court of, i. 345;
plundered of works of art, 369;
_N.'s_ leniency to, 421;
_N.'s_ influence in, 448;
_N.'s_ violation of neutrality of, ii. 144;
secured to France, 204;
adopts the French Code, 354;
creation of hereditary duchy of, 395;
Cambacérès created Duke of, iii. 86 (_see also_ =Cambacérès=);
ecclesiastical reforms and confiscations in, 263;
position in the French Empire, 279;
granted to Maria Louisa, iv. 133.
=Parma, Duke of=, submission of, i. 359;
plan to give the Papal States to, ii. 18;
_N.'s_ promises to, 332.
=Parthe, River=, military movements on the, iv. 27.
=Parthenopean Republic, the=, proclaimed, ii. 87;
abandonment of, 203-205;
fate of its admiral Caraccioli, 300.
=Parthians=, Roman campaigns against the, iii. 325.
=Pasquier=, Baron de, attitude toward _N._, ii. 95;
prefect of police, iii. 376;
episode of the Malet conspiracy, 377;
imperial prefect, iv. 106.
=Passarge, River=, military operations on the, iii. 19, 22, 26, 28.
=Passariano=, _N.'s_ headquarters at, ii. 20, 23, 24.
=Passau=, apportioned to Bavaria, ii. 266, 391;
_N.'s_ line of retreat to, 392.
=Passeyr=, the estates of, conferred upon Hofer's family, iii. 242.
=Patterson=, Elizabeth, married to Jerome Buonaparte, ii. 257.
=Paul I=, succeeds Catherine II, i. 425;
institutes the second coalition, ii. 86;
incensed at George III, 141;
demands Thugut's dismissal, 142;
incensed at Austria, 142, 154;
withdraws from the coalition, 142;
seeks control of Malta, 141, 154, 193;
friendship with _N._ and France, 142, 154, 193, 263;
plan for invasion of India and partition of Asia, 154;
receives the sword of Valetta from _N._, 154;
aims to destroy Austria's power, 194;
accuses England and Austria of treachery, 194;
concludes alliance with _N._, 209;
assassinated, 210, 330, 380; iii. 37;
effect of his death on France, ii. 210;
antipathy to Great Britain, 263;
supports the House of Savoy, 332.
_See also_ =Russia=.
"=Paul and Virginia=," iii. 297.
=Paunsdorf=, military operations near, iv. 32.
=Pavia=, the sack of, i. 361;
military operations near, ii. 175.
=Pawnbrokerage in France=, iii. 77.
=Peasant proprietors=, at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 102, 104.
=Peccadeuc, Picot de=, _N.'s_ enemy, i. 65.
=Pelet, Gen.=, charges Berthier with treachery, iii. 206;
on the battle of Aspern, 219;
denies the story of Lannes's death-bed, 224;
in battle of Waterloo, iv. 207.
=Pelham, Thomas=, employs Méhée de la Touche, ii. 297.
=Peltier, J. G.=, publishes "L'Ambigu," ii. 270;
prosecuted for libeling _N._, 271.
=Penal Code, the=, iii. 295.
=Peninsula, Peninsular War=. _See_ =Portugal=; =Spain=.
=Pensions=, reforms in French, i. 142.
=Pension system=, iii. 87.
=Pepin the Short=, coronation of, ii. 325.
=Peraldi=, associated with _N._ in Corsica, i. 117;
becomes an enemy of _N._, 165, 170;
seeks election in National Guard of Corsica, 166;
ordered to prepare fleet at Toulon, 187;
seeks to arrest _N._, 202.
=Perceval, Spencer=, assassination of, iii. 378;
mismanagement of English affairs, iv. 161, 162.
=Peretti=, his name reprobated in Corsica, i. 121;
vote of censure on, 133;
seeks election in National Guard of Corsica, 165.
=Permon, Mme.=, _N.'s_ friendship with, i. 62, 178, 284-286;
friendship with Salicetti, 284-286;
correspondence with _N._, 285;
declines _N.'s_ matrimonial offer, 312;
notable saying of, ii. 130.
=Perpignan=, reinforcements for Augereau from, iv. 94.
=Perponcher, Gen. G. H.=, in battle of Quatre Bras, iv, 180.
=Perregaux, Comte de=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 112.
=Persia=, proposed Indian expeditions via, ii. 209;
Sebastiani's mission to, 272-274;
treaty with France, iii. 20, 21;
_N._ arranges treaty between Turkey and, 20, 21;
incited to invade India, 21;
proposed rupture with England, 21;
_N._ studies the history of, 166;
_N.'s_ intercourse with, 314;
Themistocles's refuge in, iv. 227.
=Perthes=, Macdonald at, iv. 103.
=Peru=, scheme of a Bourbon monarchy in, iii. 134, 142.
=Peschiera=, seized by Beaulieu, i. 361, 371;
French occupation of, 372, 379;
the revolutionary movement in, 428;
disarmament of, 442.
"=Peter the Great=," by Carrion-Nisas, ii. 350.
=Peterswald=, military movements near, iv. 10, 15.
=Petit, Gen.=, at review of the Guard at Fontainebleau, iv. 118;
_N.'s_ farewell to, 136.
=Petit Trianon=, _N._ secures the library from, iv. 219, 227.
=Peyrusse=, corruption of, iv. 5;
keeper of _N.'s_ purse at Elba, 152.
=Pfaffenhofen=, military movements near, iii. 206.
=Phélippeaux, A. de=, _N.'s_ enemy, i. 65;
superintends the defense of Acre, ii. 71, 73;
parley with _N._ at Acre, 79.
=Phenicia=, the history of, iv. 293.
=Philip, Don=, of Spain, ii. 205.
=Philip le Bel=, schemes of world-conquest, ii. 46.
=Philippe "Égalité,"= despicable actions of, i. 151;
scheme for his son, 331.
=Philippeville=, _N._ at, iv. 211, 216.
="Philosophical and Political History of the Two Indies,"= _N.'s_
study of, ii. 47.
="Philosophic Visions" (Mercier)=, _N.'s_ study of, ii. 53.
=Phrases=:
_Alfieri:_
"Italia virtuosa, magnanima, libera, et una," ii. 232.
_Anonymous or unassigned_ (see also _Popular_, infra):
[A lady] "fond of men when they are polite," iii. 179.
"A mystery in the soul of state," iii. 389.
"Democracy an excellent workhorse, but a poor charger; a good
hack, but an untrustworthy racer," iv. 265.
"Everything has been restored except the two million Frenchmen
who died for liberty," ii. 216.
"Freedom of the seas and the invasion of England," ii. 360.
[Bonaparte] "his consular majesty," ii. 293.
_A Paris actor:_
"J'ai fait des rois madame, et n'ai pas voulu l'être," ii. 205.
"Legislative eunuchs," ii. 151.
[Louis XVIII] "learned nothing and forgot nothing," iv. 132.
[The army chest] "a French Providence, which made the laurel a
fertile tree, the fruits of which had nourished the brave
whom its branches covered," iii. 296.
_Arndt:_
"Freedom and Austria," iii. 195.
_Berthier:_
"By general's reckoning, not that of the office," ii. 169.
_Cambronne:_
"The guard dies but never surrenders," iv. 210.
_Charles IV:_
A king "who had nothing further to live for than his Louise and
his Emmanuel," iii. 166.
_Coignet:_
"Providence and courage never abandon the good soldier," iii. 326.
_Congress of Vienna:_
[Napoleon] "the enemy and disturber of the world's peace," iv. 162.
_Czartoryski:_
"Paradomania," iii. 50.
_Dalberg:_
"The monkey [Talleyrand] would not risk burning the tip of his
paw even if all the chestnuts were for himself," iv. 108.
_Princess Dolgoruki:_
[The First Consul's residence] "is not exactly a court, but it
is no longer a camp," ii. 196.
_Gentz:_
"The war for the emancipation of states bids fair to become one
for the emancipation of the people," iv. 40.
_Goethe:_
"A great man can be recognized only by his peers," iii. 173.
_Kutusoff:_
"The plain gentleman of Pskoff," iii. 383.
_Machiavelli:_
"Friends must be treated as if one day they might be enemies,"
ii. 256.
_Marmont:_
"The tube of a funnel," iv. 26.
_Napoleon:_
"About to produce a great novelty," iv. 153.
"A great man--one who can command the situations he creates," iv. 21.
"A kind of vermin which I have in my clothes," ii. 242.
"A lion's advice," iii. 352.
"A man like me troubles himself little about a million men,"
iii. 418.
"A thing must needs be done before the announcement of your plan,"
iii. 66.
"Bullets have been flying about our legs these twenty years,"
iii. 364.
"Credit is but a dispensation from paying cash," iii. 389.
"Emperor of the Continent," iii. 308.
"Enemy's lands make enemy's goods," ii. 441.
[England a] "nation of traders," ii. 292.
"Everything to-morrow," iii. 411.
"Fortune is a woman; the more she does for me, the more I shall
exact from her," i. 366.
"Forty centuries look down upon you from ... the Pyramids," ii. 60.
"Gathered to strike; separated to live," ii. 367. _See also_ p. 378.
"Generals who save troops for the next day are always beaten,"
iii. 347.
"God hath given it [the crown of Italy] to me; let him beware
who touches it," ii. 353.
"Great battles are won with artillery," iii. 403.
"I am conquered less by fortune than by the egotism and
ingratitude of my companions in arms," iv. 129.
"I am determined to be the last [the bottomless chasm] shall
swallow up," iv. 79.
"I am driven onward to a goal which I know not," iii. 325.
"I am the god of the day," ii. 117.
"I cannot be everywhere," ii. 376. (_Cf._ "The enemy's strength,"
infra.)
"Ideologist," iv. 292.
"I feel the infinite in me," iv. 262.
"If there be one soldier among you who wishes to kill his
Emperor, he can. I come to offer myself to your assaults,"
iv. 155.
"I have destroyed the enemy merely by marches," ii. 366.
"I have never found the limit of my capacity for work," iii. 210.
"I have often slept two in a bed, but never three," iii. 41.
"I leave my army to come and share the national perils," ii. 97.
"I may find in Spain the Pillar of Hercules, but not the limits
of my power," iii. 158.
"In our day no one has conceived anything great; it falls to me
to give the example," i. 366.
"In war the moral element and public opinion are half the battle,"
iii. 393.
"In war you see your own troubles; those of the enemy you cannot
see. You must show confidence," iii. 208.
"I pray God to have you in his holy keeping," ii. 407.
"I shall conduct this war [Saxon campaign] as General Bonaparte,"
iii. 403.
"It is ... courageous to survive unmerited bad fortune," iv. 134.
"It rains hard, but that does not stop the march of the grand
army," iv. 22. (_Cf._ "While others," etc., infra.)
"I walk with the goddess of fortune, accompanied by the god of
war," ii. 113.
"Liberty and equality ... put beyond caprice of chance and
uncertainty of the future," ii. 247.
"Masters of the channel for six hours, we are masters of the
world," ii. 332.
"My generals are a parcel of post inspectors," iii. 158.
"Metaphysicians ... fit only to be drowned," ii. 242.
"My enemies make appointments at my tomb," iii. 246.
"My master has no bowels, and that master is the nature of
things," iii. 110.
[Napoleon determined to] "conquer the sea by land," iii. 3.
[Napoleon] "shows himself terrible at the first moment," ii. 439.
[Napoleon] "the minister of the power of God, and his image on
earth," ii. 408.
[Napoleon's] "library," iii. 388.
[Ney] "the bravest of the brave," iii. 359.
"Perfidious and tyrannical Great Britain," iii. 150.
[Singing the tune of Tilsit] "according to the written score,"
iii. 65.
"Spurred and booted ruler," ii. 145.
"Tête ... armée," iv. 235.
"The art of war is to gain time when your strength is inferior,"
ii. 165.
[The Concordat] "the vaccine of religion," ii. 216.
"The Ebro is nothing but a line," iii. 158.
"The enemy's strength seems great [to the division commanders]
wherever I am not," iv. 7. (_Cf._ "I cannot," etc., supra.)
"The finances are falling into disorder, and ... need war," iii. 308.
"The game of chess is becoming confused," iv. 21.
"The genius of France and Providence will be on our side," iv. 75.
"The growlers," iv. 118, 123, 132.
"The new Pillars of Hercules," iii. 308.
"The pear is not yet ripe," ii. 52. (For the ripening of the
pear, _see_ ii. 99, 229.)
"The Revolution is planted on the principles from which it
proceeded. It is ended," ii. 137.
"The Spanish ulcer," iii. 265.
"The sun of Austerlitz," ii. 392.
"The system of hither and thither," iv. 18, 19, 25.
"The worse the troops the greater the need of artillery," iii. 403.
"This is the moment when characters of a superior sort assert
themselves," ii. 65.
"This movement makes or mars me," iv. 97.
"Three years more, and I am lord of the universe," iii. 308.
"To have the right of using nations, you must begin by serving
them well," iv. 296.
"To honor and serve the Emperor is to honor and serve God," ii. 408.
"To strike a salutary terror into others," ii. 311.
"Victor of Austerlitz," ii. 392.
"Vous êtes un homme," iii. 173.
"War is like government, a matter of tact," i. 364.
[War with Russia] "a scene in an opera," iii. 318.
"We'll pass these few winter days as best we may; then we'll try
to spend the spring in another fashion," iv. 151
"We must pull on the boots and the resolution of 93," iv. 72.
"Wherever ... water to float a ship, there ... a British
standard," iv. 227.
"Which has been the happiest age of humanity?" iii. 175.
"While others were taking counsel the French army was marching,"
ii. 434. (_Cf._ "It rains hard," supra.)
"Why am I not my grandson?" iv. 287.
"You manage men with toys," ii. 246.
_Nelson:_
"England expects every man to do his duty," ii. 373.
"In case signals cannot be seen or clearly understood, no
captain can do wrong if he places his ship alongside that of
an enemy," ii. 373.
"Westminster Abbey or victory," ii. 63.
_Ney:_
"A marshal of the Empire has never surrendered," iii. 364.
_Mme. Permon:_
"The pike is eating the other two fish," ii. 130.
_Pitt_ (concerning):
The "Austerlitz look," ii. 393.
_Pius VII:_
[Bonaparte the Pope's] "son in Christ Jesus," ii. 339.
_Popular_:
"Armed men spring up at the stamp of his foot," iii. 386.
"Ban," and "arrière ban" (feudal terms), iv. 55.
"Bautzen Messenger-boy," the, iv. 20.
[Blücher] "Marshal Forward," iv. 98.
"Emperor of the Gauls," ii. 319.
"Enemy's ships make enemy's goods," ii. 441.
"Equality," ii. 221.
"Fighting with the legs instead of with the bayonets," ii. 429.
"France the most beautiful land next to the kingdom of heaven,"
iii. 7.
"French fury," iv. 171. (_Cf._ "Furia francesca," ii. 391.)
"Frenchmen, awake; the Emperor is waking," iv. 147.
"He has been and will be," iv. 158.
"His sacred Majesty," ii. 407.
"Liberty of the seas," ii. 236, 263.
"Marie Louises," the, iv. 51.
"Mother Moscow," "the holy city," iii. 347.
"Napoladron," iii. 292.
"Napoleon, by the grace of God Emperor," ii. 407.
[Napoleon] "perhaps an angel, perhaps a devil,--certainly not a
man," iii. 415.
"Napoleon the Great," ii. 407.
"Neutral flag, neutral goods," ii. 263.
"Neutral ships make neutral goods; free ships, free goods," ii. 212.
"Paternal anarchy," iv. 147, 149.
"Ragusade," iv. 127.
"Robbing the cradle and the grave," iii. 386.
"Sauve qui peut," iv, 210.
"The Emperor's last victory," iv. 50.
"The fountain of honor," ii. 246.
"The liberator of Poland," ii. 444.
"The little corporal," i. 362; iv. 118, 154.
"The man of God, the anointed of the Lord," ii. 407.
"The Napoleon of Potsdam and Schönbrunn," iv. 117.
"The return of the hero," ii. 97.
_Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely:_
"The unhappy man [Napoleon] will undo himself, undo us all, undo
everything," iii. 325.
_Revolution, Motto of the:_
France, "one and indivisible," ii. 344.
_St. André:_
"The fate of the world depends on a kick or two," iii. 422.
_Savigny:_
[The Code Napoléon] "a political malady," ii. 223.
_Sieyès:_
"Une poire pour la soif," ii. 130.
_Soult:_
"An inspiration is nothing but a calculation made with rapidity,"
iv. 248.
_Talleyrand:_
"Italy the flank of France; Spain its natural continuation; and
Holland its alluvium," iii. 282.
"Napoleon's civilization that of Roman history," iii. 179.
"Pleasure will not move at the drum-tap," iii. 94.
"Society will pardon much to a man of the world, but cheating at
cards never," iii. 151.
"There is no empire not founded on the marvelous, and here the
marvelous is the truth," iv. 250.
_Vandamme:_
"That devil of a man," iii. 93.
_Villeneuve:_
"Any captain not under fire is not at his post, and a signal to
recall him would be a disgrace," ii. 273.
_Wellington:_
"I must fight him here [Waterloo]," iv. 178.
"Old Blücher has had a ---- good licking," iv. 184.
"Up, Guards! make ready!" iv. 209.
_Zacharias, Pope:_
"He is king who has the power," ii. 325.
=Piacenza=, military operations near, i. 358, 359; ii. 175;
Loison at, 177;
adopts the French Code, 354;
creation of hereditary duchy of, 396;
Lebrun created Duke of, iii. 86.
_See also_ =Lebrun=.
=Piacenza, Duke of=, submission of, i. 359.
=Piave River=, military operations on the, i. 387, 388, 430, 432.
=Picardy=, movement of troops to, ii. 24.
=Pichegru, Gen. Charles=, _N.'s_ early acquaintance with, i. 216;
called to command Paris troops, 272;
conquers the Austrian Netherlands, 273, 275;
suspected of intrigue, 278;
royalist schemes of, 298; ii. 161, 298;
a product of Carnot's system, i. 332;
conquest of Holland, ii. 6;
plans a coup d'état, 5;
exposure of his treachery in 1795, 5, 6;
proscribed, 8;
implicated with Moreau, 72, 164, 299;
escapes from Guiana, 161;
heads royalist rising in Provence, 161;
fall and death, 298, 299;
leads royalist plot, 298;
Savary suspected of complicity in death of, 412;
funeral mass celebrated for, iv. 146.
=Picton, Sir T.=, in Waterloo campaign, iv. 173;
battle of Waterloo, 201;
killed, 201.
=Piedmont=, military operations in, i. 213, 256, 347, 352 et seq.;
troops of, enter Savoy, 222;
French movement against, 246;
_N._ advises against advancing into, 247;
Austro-Sardinian operations in (1794), 341;
revolutionary spirit in, 345;
conquest of, 352-362, 373;
army separated from Austrians, 354;
successes in, 363;
French propositions to organize republic in, 363, 373;
loses island of St. Peter, ii. 13;
incorporated with the Ligurian Republic, 38;
Moreau's last stand in, 83;
held by Suvaroff, 141;
held by Austria, 145, 160;
tribute levied on, 186;
incorporated with France, 232, 267, 272, 281;
Jourdan's pacification of, 323;
Alexander I demands indemnity for, 348;
ecclesiastical reforms and confiscations in, iii. 263;
parallel between the Waterloo campaign and that in, iv. 170.
=Piedmontese=, in French service, ii. 14.
=Piktupönen=, Frederick William and Hardenberg at, iii. 42;
Frederick William's stay at, 60.
"=Pillars of Hercules, the new=," iii 308.
=Pillau=, Napoleon demands, as a pledge, iii. 36.
French military stores in, 333.
=Pinckney, C. C.=, Talleyrand attempts to corrupt, ii. 34.
=Piombino=, given to Elisa (Buonaparte) Bacciocchi, ii. 354, 356.
_See also_ =Lucca and Piombino=.
=Pirch, Gen.=, in Waterloo campaign, iv. 172, 205.
=Piré, Gen.=, ordered to Quatre Bras, iv. 176.
=Pirna=, Vandamme at, iv. 8-11;
Mortier at, 12, 18;
sickness of _N._ at, 12, 131;
_N._ abandons, 17;
_N._ moves on, 18.
=Pisa=, Carlo Buonaparte at, i. 29.
=Pitt, William, Jr.=, prime minister of England, i. 195;
takes active measures against France, 221;
difficulties of his administration, 448, 449;
anxiety for peace after Leoben, ii. 12;
declines to negotiate with _N._, 143;
delusion concerning _N._ and France, 143;
denounces _N._ as the destroyer of Europe, 144;
advocates restoration of the Bourbons, 144;
policy toward France, 208, 329-331, 360, 405; iii. 399;
British confidence in, ii. 208;
falls from power on the Catholic Emancipation question, 208;
calls for defense of the kingdom, 292;
raises volunteers, 292;
returns to power, 329;
his policy of European coalitions, 329-331;
becomes prime minister, 337;
on France's designs against England, 337;
success of his efforts, 356;
reception of the news of Austerlitz, 393;
death, 393;
Fox compelled to adopt his program, 405;
England returns to his policy, iii. 399.
=Pius VI=, signs treaty of Tolentino, i. 350;
ransoms Bologna, 374;
prepares to recover lost territory, 398;
quarrel with France, 401;
_N.'s_ problem concerning, 405;
hostilities by, 409;
campaign against, 419-423;
his army dispersed, 421;
expresses gratitude to _N._, 423;
_N.'s_ conquest of, ii. 9;
ill health, ii, persecution of, 39;
withdraws to Siena, 39;
stripped of his possessions, 39;
death, burial, and memorial services, 39, 131, 206, 216.
=Pius VII=, election of, ii. 206;
resumes temporal power, 207;
removes the ban from Talleyrand, 216;
relations with _N._, 216, 339 et seq.;
iii. 68, 118, 391;
the matter of _N.'s_ coronation, ii. 325, 339-346 et seq.;
refuses to receive Mme. Talleyrand, 326;
his demands for the Church, 326;
at Fontainebleau, 340;
his humiliation and return to Rome, 344-347;
refuses a divorce to Jerome Buonaparte, 396;
neutrality in the Austerlitz campaign, ii. 396;
desires unity of the German Church, 402;
refuses to recognize Joseph's sovereignty, iii. 68;
_N.'s_ ultimatum to, 68;
refuses to join the French federation against England, 118;
his demands on _N._, 118;
concessions to _N.'s_ demands, 118;
prisoner at Grenoble, 119, 242;
disbandment of the Noble Guard, 118;
a _fainéant_ prince in the Quirinal, 119;
issues bull, June 10, 1809, 119;
wearing effect of _N.'s_ quarrel with, 119;
indemnity for, 215;
deposed from the temporal power, 215, 242, 249;
retains his ecclesiastical position, 242;
excommunicates _N._ and his adherents, 242;
imprisoned at Savona, 243, 306;
removed from Rome to Fontainebleau, 243;
refuses to renounce the secular power, 242;
in Florence, 242;
does not recognize _N.'s_ divorce, 259;
provision of residence and revenue for, 263;
the second quarrel of investitures, 263;
relations with the Gallican Church, 263, 264;
inflexibility of, 263;
De Maistre on the supineness of, 264;
contrasted with Innocent II, 264;
partial submission of, 305;
refuses to institute _N.'s_ nominees as bishops, 306;
prisoner at Fontainebleau, 377, 390;
hostility of the French ecclesiastics to, 391;
the Concordat of Fontainebleau, 391;
interviews with _N._ at Fontainebleau, 391;
restoration of Roman domains to, 391;
residence at Avignon, 391;
retracts his assent, 391;
release of, iv. 52;
humiliation of, 256.
=Pizzighettone=, French occupation of, i. 372.
=Placentia=, ecclesiastical reforms and confiscations in, iii. 263;
granted to Maria Louisa, iv. 133.
=Plagwitz=, fighting near, iv. 30.
="Plain," the=, position in the National Convention, i. 188.
=Plancenoit=, fighting at, iv. 205.
=Plancy=, military movements near, iv. 89.
=Plato=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 95.
=Platoff, Count M. I.=, harasses the French retreat from Moscow,
iii. 359, 364.
=Plauen=, fighting near, iv. 10;
Austrians driven into, 10.
=Plebiscites=, of Dec. 15, 1799, ii. 129, 136;
of May, 1802, 245-247;
of 1804, 324.
=Pleisse, River=, military operations on the, iv. 27, 28.
=Plombières=, Josephine's coterie at, ii. 85.
=Plutarch=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 78; ii. 47.
=Plymouth Sound=, the "Bellerophon" in, iv. 222.
=Po, River=, the country of the, i. 356; ii. 175-178;
military operations on the, i. 358, 359, 381, 441; ii. 172-174,
175, 176, 185.
=Point-du-Jour=, Sérurier's guard at the, ii. 108.
=Poischwitz=, armistice of, iii. 414-418, 420; iv. 66, 197, 288.
=Poland=, partition of, i. 220, 420, 425; ii. 354, 414, 444; iii. 22, 50;
Austria's gaze on, i. 325;
French schemes for the reconstruction of, ii. 42-44;
Alexander I's designs concerning, 356; iii. 45, 309, 316, 384; iv. 67;
Alexander retreats to, ii. 391;
extension of the French empire in, 396;
sack of, 440;
_N.'s_ opportunity to save, 445;
pro-Napoleon enthusiasm in, 445; iii. 17, 331;
dissensions in, ii. 445;
_N.'s_ policy concerning, iii. 1, 8, 18, 45, 56, 214, 244, 314,
331; iv. 30;
French occupation of, iii. 4, 7;
enlistments from, under the French eagles, 3, 202, 324;
_N._ organizes government for, 8;
_N._ "the liberator of," 10;
horrors of the winter campaign in, 18;
a new field of warfare for _N._, 18;
new levies ordered in, 20;
morale of the French army in, 45;
proposed transfer to the King of Saxony, 50;
proposed new kingdom of, 56;
Prussian provinces ceded to Warsaw, 62;
possible restoration of, 65, 108, 244, 312-315, 322; iv. 298;
war indemnity exacted from, iii. 78;
French nobility endowed with lands in, 87;
strengthening the French forces in, 117;
dangers of withdrawing Russian troops from, 117;
Davout recalled from, 165;
reliance on _N._, 196, 316;
invaded by Archduke Ferdinand, 201;
concentration of troops at Warsaw, 203;
Archduke Ferdinand's vicissitudes in, 212;
enlargement of, 248;
second partition of, 309;
schemes of Alexander and Czartoryski in regard to, 309, 316;
rupture between Alexander and _N._ over, 310 et seq.;
Alexander refuses to restore the integrity of, 311;
the patriots of, in Warsaw, 313;
movement of Russian troops toward, 317;
factor in the Russian war of, 1812, 328;
_N.'s_ mistake in not restoring, 331;
Abbé de Pradt's mission from Dresden to, 331;
the Diet of Warsaw begs for the reconstruction of, 331;
possible schemes of French annexation of, 331;
Czartoryski's ambitions in, 383;
Kutusoff's advance through, 395;
Prussia seeks to recover part of, 395-400;
Bennigsen in, iv. 3;
_N._ offers to renounce, 30;
the extinction of, 298.
=Poles=, seek alliance with France, i. 420;
in French service, 437; ii. 14;
military service in Italy, 42;
_N.'s_ policy of winning, iii. 214;
loyalty to _N._, 315; iv. 35;
_N.'s_ waning prestige among, iii. 335.
=Polish Church=, _N.'s_ threat to liberate it from Rome, iii. 68.
=Politics, the art of=, i. 72;
_N.'s_ passion for, and study of, 94, 114, 126, 150, 199.
=Polygamy=, forbidden by the French Sanhedrim, iii. 76;
_N._ upholds, iv. 231.
=Polytechnic School=, founding of the, i. 281; ii. 225-227;
calling out of students of, iv. 109.
=Pomerania=, Prussia recommended to seize, ii. 420;
Gustavus IV commanding in, iii. 36;
Prussia retains her strongholds in, 42;
_N._ promises to restore to Sweden, 268;
Bernadotte's kindly treatment of, 280;
Davout occupies Swedish, 321;
offered to Bernadotte, 399.
=Pomerania, Duke of=, seeks representation at Congress of Rastatt,
ii. 27.
=Pompei=, member of the directory of Corsica, i. 133.
=Poniatowski, Prince J. A.=, relies on _N.'s_ good will, ii. 445;
Archduke Ferdinand's pursuit of, iii. 211;
reoccupies Warsaw, 212;
strength of his corps, March, 1812, 323;
doubts Lithuania's rising, 326;
battle of Borodino, 344;
battle of Wiazma, 359;
claims to the Polish throne, 383;
fails to keep Russia out of Warsaw, 385;
commanding in Galicia, 402;
at Fischbach, iv. 18;
battle of Leipsic, 29, 32, 34;
drowned in the Elster, 34.
=Ponsonby, Sir W.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 202.
=Pont d'Austerlitz=, iii. 74.
=Pont des Arts=, iii. 74.
=Pont d'Jena=, iii. 74.
=Pontebba Pass=, battles in, i. 433.
=Ponte Corvo=, Bernadotte created Prince of, ii. 396; iii. 86.
_See also_ =Bernadotte=.
=Pontécoulant, Doulcet de=, uses influence on _N.'s_ behalf, i. 292;
retired from the central committee, 295;
_N.'s_ relations with, ii. 3.
=Ponte-Nuovo=, battle of, i. 23;
_N._ visits the battle-ground at, 132.
=Pont Royal=, the mêlée at the, i. 303.
=Popular government=, the rise of, i. 109.
=Popular representation without eyes, ears, or power=, ii. 126.
=Porcil=, military operations near, i, 391.
=Portalis, J. E. M.=, councilor of state, ii. 214;
on committee to draft the Code, 222;
minister of public worship, 346.
=Portland, Duke of=, prime minister of England, iii. 46, 69.
=Port Mahon=, i. 22.
=Porto Ferrajo=, seized by England, i. 398;
arrival of the exile at, iv. 141;
_N.'s_ residence at, 143;
danger of _N.'s_ remaining in, 152.
=Porto Legnago=, Augereau driven into, i. 409.
=Port Royal=, education of Josephine de la Pagerie at, i. 313.
=Portsmouth=, Nelson sails for, ii. 359.
=Portugal=, growth of liberal ideas in, i. 276;
war with Spain, ii. 18;
joins the second coalition, 90;
France offers peace to, 154;
alliances with England, 154, 332;
_N.'s_ problems in, 203 et seq.;
forced contribution levied on, 205; iii. 119;
abandons English alliance, ii. 205;
compelled to close her harbors to English ships, 205; iii. 67;
France guarantees integrity of, ii. 211;
neutrality of, 289, 332; iii. 67, 120;
Spanish invasion of, ii. 332;
proposed commercial war against England, iii. 55;
_N._ calls for alliance with, 66;
seizure of her fleet by England, 67;
Junot's army on the borders of, 67;
proposed acquisition by Spain, 67, 121;
movement of English troops into, 111, 121;
the situation in, 118;
French invasion of, 120 et seq.; 151;
obeys the Berlin and Milan decrees, 119;
closing of the harbors, 119;
rupture of diplomatic relations between France and, 119;
dynastic troubles in, 119;
democracy in, 119, 120;
proposed partition of, 120;
commerce with England, 120;
Spain coöperates with France against, 121;
seizure of fortresses by France, 121;
flight of Don John from, 121;
escape of the fleet from the Tagus, 121;
revulsion of feeling against Junot in, 122;
fraternization of the people with Junot's army, 122;
appointment of a council of regency, 122;
Junot's military administration in, 122;
applies to England for help, 122;
insurrections against French rule, 122;
_N._ offers the crown to Lucien, 129;
intrigues for the throne of, 129;
Junot appointed governor of, 132;
to be given to a Bonaparte prince, 133;
France proposes an exchange for, 133;
the crown offered to Murat, 147;
destruction of her commerce, 151;
Junot's occupation of, 156;
French evacuation of, 157;
Lord Wellesley enters, 157;
intensity of the rebellion in, 185;
sympathy with Spain, 186;
supposed English scheme to abandon, 187;
Wellesley expels the French from, 236;
England's loss of trade with, 272;
reinforcements for the English army in, 284;
English failures in, 283;
held by Wellington, 283;
Masséna invades, 284;
Junot aspires to the crown of, 287;
Soult aspires to the crown of, 287, 296;
Soult's invasion of (1809), 286;
Wellington retreats to, 289, 290;
_N._ proposes to restore, to the House of Braganza, 319;
member of the Vienna coalition, iv. 164;
_N.'s_ dread of capture in, 220.
=Posen=, _N._ in, ii. 444; iii. 331;
expected scene of operations, 1;
French occupation of, 12;
incorporated into the grand duchy of Warsaw, 56;
Eugène assumes command at, 385;
Murat abandons the army at, 393.
=Potemkin, Prince=, _N._ seeks service with, i. 216.
=Potsdam=, treaty of, ii. 377, 390;
_N._ at, 437.
=Pougy=, military operations near, iv. 89.
=Pozzo di Borgo, Count C. A.=, the Corsican victory of, i. 22;
associated with _N._ in Corsica, 117;
member of the Directory of Corsica, 133;
delegate to the National Assembly, 133;
_N.'s_ lifelong foe, 165; iii. 314; iv. 98;
attorney-general of Corsica, i. 185;
suspected of intrigue with England, 190;
denounced by _N._, 206;
ordered to trial, 403;
Russian envoy at Vienna, ii. 445; iii. 178, 314;
on the humiliation of Prussia, 63;
influence at St. Petersburg, 165;
at peace council in Paris, iv. 114.
=Pradt, Abbé de=, mission from Dresden to Poland, iii. 331.
=Prague=, Maria Louisa at, iii. 331;
_N._ acknowledges his mistake in not making peace at, iv. 135.
=Prague, Congress of=, iii. 417-420; 423; iv. 30, 41, 68.
=Prairial=, the 30th of, ii. 92.
=Pratzen=, fighting on the heights of, ii. 383-387.
=Preameneu, Bigot de=, on committee to draft the Code, ii. 222.
=Prefects=, the system of, ii. 127.
=Pregel, River=, military movements on the, iii. 30.
=Prenzlau=, Hohenlohe's retreat to, ii. 434;
Hohenlohe driven from, 436.
=Presburg=, treaty of, ii. 391, 405; iii. 55, 109, 195, 200;
military operations near, 226, 230;
Archduke John at, 227, 230.
=Press, the=, freedom of, decreed, i. 110;
demand for freedom of in Corsica, 116;
condition in France, 281;
members of, proscribed, ii. 8;
abolition of liberty of, 8, 145;
_N._ and the liberty of, 23;
muzzling of, 36, 254, 271;
suppression of Jacobin papers, 97;
_N.'s_ use of, 186; iii. 25;
servility to _N._, ii. 232-235;
censorship of, 234, 235, 296, 350, 362, 397, 417; iii. 25, 88, 160,
297, 300; iv. 146;
in modern France, ii. 254;
_N.'s_ reason for repression of, 254;
liberty of, in England, 271;
_N._ attempts to muzzle the English, 356;
supervision of the, iv. 51;
abolition of censorship promised, 159.
=Press-gang=, employment of, in France, ii. 332.
=Pretender, the=. _See_ =Louis XVIII=.
=Preussisch-Eylau=. _See_ =Eylau=.
=Préval, Gen.=, refuses service on d'Enghien courtmartial, ii, 307.
=Primary Assembly, the=, i. 305.
=Primogeniture=, _N._ on, i. 137;
abolished, ii. 223; iii. 84;
its advantages and decay, 84.
=Primolano=, capture of Wurmser's advance-guard at, i. 384.
="Prince of the Peace," the=. _See_ =Godoy=.
=Pripet, River=, Bagration's stand on the, iii. 335.
=Privilege=, the overthrow of, i. 158.
=Privy council=, creation of a, ii. 247.
=Probstheida=, military movements near, iv. 32.
=Property rights=, _N.'s_ share in codifying the law concerning, ii. 223.
=Prossnitz=, junction of Russian and Austrian troops at, ii. 379.
=Protestants=, demand of civil rights, for the, i. 106.
=Provence=, a tempestuous time in, i. 212;
royalist rising in, ii. 161;
royalist sentiment in, iv. 137;
_N.'s_ reception in, 138, 144;
longing in, for the Emperor's return, 152;
the White Terror in, 222.
=Provera, Gen.=, in Rivoli campaign, i. 406-414;
called to reorganize the Roman army, ii. 39.
=Provins=, military movements near, iv. 62, 72, 81, 85.
=Prowtowski, Gen.=, accompanies _N._ to St. Helena, iv. 228.
=Prud'hon, Pierre=, painter, ii. 351.
=Prussia=, relations, alliances, etc., with Austria, i. 174, 324;
ii. 86, 155, 264, 389, 413; iii. 22, 225, 234, 330; iv. 41,
57;
captures Longwy, i. 179;
expected enmity of, 187;
effect of military successes of, 194;
partition of Poland, 220, 425;
abandons the coalition, 276, 324;
defeats Austria, 325;
uplifting of, and growth of the national spirit in, 325, 350, 425;
ii. 41, 154, 415, 417; iii. 37, 44, 62, 95, 103, 106, 137,
159, 161, 193, 213, 225, 319, 327, 382, 385, 391-394, 397,
420, 423;
makes peace with France (1795), i. 341, (1796), 349;
neutrality of, 385; ii. 43, 90, 154-157, 311, 414; iii. 44;
treaty with France (1796), i. 450;
attitude toward France (1797-98), ii. 41-44;
favors secularization of ecclesiastical principalities, 41;
supposed mistaken policy of, 43;
recognizes the Cisalpine Republic, 43;
the center of gravity of Europe, 155;
negotiates with France for Hamburg, 154;
refuses to join the second coalition, 154;
France's assistance to, against Austria, 154;
_N._ negotiates with, 156;
supremacy in the German Diet, 193;
joins the "armed neutrality," 194;
territories acquired by (1802), 265;
strengthening of, 266;
Ney's check on, 272;
_N._ dictates her attitude, 1803, 282;
acquiesces in the creation of the empire, 320;
protests against Rumbold's seizure, 331;
negotiates for Hanover, 356-358;
relations with Russia, negotiations and treaties between the two
countries, and attitudes of their rulers, 355, 356, 405, 406,
417, 418; iii. 1, 18, 22, 37, 41, 54, 108, 168, 178, 225, 316,
320, 329, 330, 382, 385, 398, 424; iv. 67;
Hardenberg's aim at consolidation, ii. 358;
refuses alliance with England, 358;
to receive Hanover for assistance to France, 361;
garrisons Hanover, 361;
strength compared with France, 361;
violation of her neutrality, 365;
resents Bernadotte's violation of Ansbach, 376;
renounces her neutrality, 377;
decline of her influence, 377;
negotiates for peace, 381;
to close her ports to England, 390;
_N._ demands offensive and defensive alliance with, 390;
subservience to France, 394;
proposal to give Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck to, 400;
alliance with France, 400;
England declares war against, 400;
acquires Hanover, 400, 405;
humiliation of, 400, 406, 443; iii. 22, 37, 44, 56, 62, 65, 161-165;
neutralization of her power, ii. 402;
joins England and Russia, 406;
territorial aggrandizement, 413;
the reigns of the Fredericks, 413, 414;
her army, 413, 414, 418-422, 424, 427, 434, 437; iii. 397, 417;
iv. 171;
education in, ii. 415;
condition in 1806, 415;
feudalism in, 414-417;
influence of Queen Louisa in, 415;
the reform party in, 414-417;
exasperation at _N._ in, 416, 417, 420;
_N._ demands the disarmament of, 418;
ill effects of aristocratic pride in, 418-420;
advised by _N._ to seize Pomerania, 420;
_N.'s_ necessity for quick action with, 420-422;
the war party, 420, 427, 428;
hesitation about mobilization, 421;
declares war, 421;
state of war with England, 421;
weakness of, 422;
plan of the campaign, 423, 424, 427;
alliance with Saxony, 429;
moral effect of Jéna upon, 434, 435;
advance of the French through, 435-439;
total defeat of, 436-440;
_N.'s_ treatment of, 436, 441;
plundered of works of art, 439;
sack and rapine in, 439;
unconscionable demands on, 442;
peace negotiations, 442;
abandoned by Saxony, 443;
enlistments from, under the French eagles, iii. 3;
retreat from Pultusk, 4;
_N.'s_ proffered terms to, after Eylau, 18;
proposed rehabilitation of, 18;
_N.'s_ reserve forces in central, 22;
treaty with Russia at Bartenstein, 22;
proposal for a new coalition, 22;
weakness of, 23, 35;
numbers in the field, summer of 1807, 28;
severity of _N.'s_ terms for, 37;
_N._ grants concessions at Tilsit, 42;
armistice with, 42;
retains strongholds in Silesia and Pomerania, 42;
_N.'s_ attempts to secure alliance with, 44;
interest in Poland, 45;
French liberal idea of France's affinity with, 45;
representatives at Tilsit, 49;
acquisitions of territory, 50;
proposed transfer of Saxony to, 50;
responsibility for her belligerency, 50;
new boundaries, 55;
retains Silesia, 55, 56;
reorganization at Tilsit, 56;
the kingdom of Westphalia carved out of, 56;
treaty of Tilsit, 63 (_see also_ =Tilsit=);
feeling toward Frederick William in, 62;
mutilation of, 62;
war indemnity exacted from, 62, 78;
French occupation of, 63, 99, 104, 108, 116, 166, 307;
effect of the peace of Tilsit on, 95;
fails to raise war indemnity, 99;
closes and fortifies her harbors, 102;
abolition of old land tenures in, 102;
responsibility for the war with France, 102;
the patriotic writers of, 103;
reorganization of the educational system, 103;
abolition of the privy council, 103;
municipal autonomy, 103;
freeing the serfs in, 103;
the "yunker" class, 103;
military reforms in, 103, 104, 162;
the League of Virtue, 103, 161;
subserviency to France, 104;
hostility to France, 106;
pleads bankruptcy, 106;
_N._ proposes further humiliation of, 107;
_N._ offers to evacuate, 108, 112, 167;
encouraged to revolt, 159, 161, 163;
civil reforms in, 164;
death of military reforms in, 164;
death of militarism in, 164;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 178;
endeavors to secure mitigation of _N.'s_ demands, 178;
proposes to reduce her army, 178;
French evacuation of, 178, 182;
effect of battle of Jena on, 190;
military centralization of, 190;
warlike temper in, 195;
the pursuit after Waterloo, 210;
secret armament in, 225;
offer of Warsaw to, 225;
French occupation of the coast, 266;
Mme. de Staël in, 300;
pecuniary demands upon, 307;
treaty with France, Feb. 24, 1812, 320, 330;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 321;
influence in Germany, 320;
threatened dismemberment of, 320;
renders military aid to France, 320;
furnishes contingent to _N.'s_ army, 324;
_N._ belittles, 327;
coalition with Austria and Russia, 331;
religious aspect of the European situation in, 382;
_N._ hints at territorial cessions to, 392;
in grand coalition against _N._, 393;
forced to a decision, 395;
_N._ demands more troops from, 395;
advised by Metternich to join Russia, 395;
entry of Russian troops into, 393, 398;
aims to recover Prussian Poland, 396-400;
popular detestation of _N._ in, 397;
death of the Queen, 397;
mobilization of the army, 397;
condition at opening of 1813, 397-399;
declares war, 398;
scheme for territorial aggrandizement of, 398;
seeks subsidy from England, 398;
designs on Saxony, 399;
_N._ determines to dismember, 399;
subsidized by England, 399, 417; iv. 76, 164;
strenuous endeavors of, iii. 403;
proposed restoration of, 407;
proposed new capital for, 409;
_N.'s_ new schemes for, 409;
proposed enlargement of, 415;
proposed rectification of the western boundary, 415;
secret treaty of Reichenbach, 416, 417, 422;
guarantees a war loan, 417;
treaty with England, June 14, 1813, 417;
strength of, iv. 5;
_N.'s_ personal spite against, 5, 17;
_N.'s_ attempts to separate Russia from, 17;
heroism in, 19;
losses at Dennewitz, 19;
_N._ offers terms to, 21;
scheme to restore her status of 1805, 22;
concludes alliance of Sept. 9, 1813, 22;
beginning of her military aggrandizement, 37;
acquires the hegemony of continental Europe, 37;
eagerness for war in, 41;
at the Congress of Frankfort, 41;
proposes to invade France via Liège, 54, 57;
troops on the Rhine, 55;
_N.'s_ implacable foe, 57;
seeks the retention of her acquisitions, 67;
desire for constitutional government in, 68;
eager for an armistice, 70, 71, 75;
treaty of Chaumont, 76;
the triple alliance, 76;
Metternich strives to check ambition of, 88;
party to the treaty of Fontainebleau (April, 1814), 133;
attitude at Congress of Vienna, 144, 145;
quota of troops, 164;
member of the Vienna coalition, 164;
campaign of Waterloo, 169 et seq.;
reaps harvest of political spoils at Waterloo, 214;
claims the glory of annihilating _N._, 214;
losses at Waterloo, 214;
claims the right of overseeing the imprisonment of _N._, 225;
influence in Germany, 298.
=Pruth, River=, Russia acquires a boundary on the, iii. 321.
=Przasnysz=, military operations near, iii. 13.
=Public works=, _N.'s_ scheme of, ii. 279.
=Pultusk=, battle of, iii. 1-10.
=Puntowitz=, military operations near, ii. 385, 386.
=Puster Valley=, military operations in the, i. 433.
=Pyramids=, battle of the, ii. 60.
=Pyrenees, the=, French troops in ii. 37, 44, 48; iii. 133, 134;
Louis XIV "abolishes," 70;
a boundary of the Continental System, 280;
plans for the defense of, 421;
Soult driven over, iv. 40;
France's "natural boundary," 41.
Q
=Quasdanowich, Gen.=, _N.'s_ operations against, i. 350;
captures Brescia, 380;
battle of Lonato, 380, 383;
strength in Friuli, 386.
=Quatre Bras=, military operations near, iv. 171, 175, 178;
battle of, 180-188;
_N.'s_ flight through, 211;
Ney at, 214.
=Quedlinburg=, apportioned to Prussia, ii. 263.
=Queiss, River=, military operations on the, iv. 15.
=Quenza, Col.=, elected lieutenant-colonel in National Guard of
Corsica, i. 166;
commanding Corsican volunteers, 170;
conduct at Ajaccio condemned, 172;
his command under Dumouriez, 184.
=Quiberon=, English expedition to, i. 277.
=Quinette, N. M.=, member of the new Directory, iv. 218.
=Quirinal, the=, Pius VII a _fainéant_ prince in, iii. 119;
forcible entry into, 242.
R
=Raab=, Archduke John advances toward, iii. 226.
=Radetsky, Count J. J. W.=, military genius, 6;
favors invasion of France, 57;
courage, 59;
advises concentration of the allies at Arcis, 89.
=Radziwill, Princess=, member of Prussian reform party, ii. 415.
=Ragusa=, creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396;
_N._ offers the territory to England, 404, 405;
Marmont created Duke of, iii. 86. _See also_ =Marmont=.
"=Ragusade=," the word, iv. 127.
=Rahmaniyeh=, Mameluke retreat toward, ii. 69.
=Raigern=, military operations near, ii. 385, 386.
=Rambouillet=, the imperial court at, iii. 301;
flight of the Empress to, iv. 108-112, 135;
_N._ at, 219.
=Rambouillet decree, the=, March 23, 1810, iii. 274.
=Ramolini=, associated with _N._ in Corsica, i. 117.
=Ramolino, Letizia= (mother of _N._), marriage, i. 30;
character, 30-34.
_See also_ =Buonaparte, Letizia=.
=Rampon, Gen.=, holds Argenteau in check, i. 353, 356;
his stand at Monte Legino, 356, 393.
=Rapinat=, frauds of, ii. 91.
=Rapp, Count Jean=, on _N.'s_ desire for peace, ii. 268;
in battle of Austerlitz, 387;
seizes a would-be assassin of _N._, iii. 240;
recounts the horrors of the Russian campaign, 340;
begs _N._ to desist at Smolensk, 340;
commanding at Dantzic, 402.
=Rastatt=, Congress of, ii. 19, 22, 27, 38, 41, 51, 52, 69, 88, 89, 264;
neutralization of, 22;
the murders at, 89, 300.
=Ratisbon=, Jourdan's defeat near, i. 385;
selected as _N.'s_ headquarters, iii. 202;
military movements near, 203, 204, 205, 209, 216;
battle of, 211;
seized by Archduke Charles, 216;
_N._ wounded at, 240;
given to Dalberg, 266;
Saxon troops offered to Austria at, 399.
=Raynal, Abbé G. T. F.=, _N._ a disciple of, i. 71, 75-78, 81, 114,
115, 127, 137; ii. 46, 139;
his works and opinions, i. 75-78;
the "History of Corsica" addressed to, 92, 124, 127;
founds prize for essay on America, 137.
=Raynouard, F. J. M.=, "The Templars," ii. 350.
=Réal, P. F.=, urges action against Bourbon plotters, ii. 304;
police-agent, 306;
share in the trial of d'Enghien, 306-310.
=Reason=, the party of, i. 250.
=Récamier, Mme.=, social life in Paris, i. 290; ii. 411, 412;
instigates Moreau's letter to _N._, 290;
_N.'s_ differences with, 411, 412;
relations with Mme. de Staël, 411;
exiled, 412.
=Récamier, M.=, bankruptcy of, ii. 411.
=Recco, Abbé=, _N.'s_ early tutor, i. 41.
="Redoubtable," the=, at Trafalgar, ii. 374.
=Red Sea=, its importance, ii. 46.
"=Reflections on the State of Nature=," i. 145.
=Reform=, the French nobility and, i. 142.
=Regensburg=, seat of the German Diet, ii. 404.
_See also_ =Ratisbon=.
=Reggio=, new scheme of government for, i. 402;
disposition by treaty of Leoben, 439;
creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396;
Oudinot created Duke of, iii. 86.
_See also_ =Oudinot=.
=Regnaud, M. L. E.=, ii. 214.
=Regnier, C. A.=, moves the appointment of _N._ as commander of the
Paris garrison, ii. 104;
in Leon, iii. 283;
strength, March, 1812, 324.
=Reich, Baronne de=, imprisonment of, ii. 304.
=Reichenbach=, French generals killed at, iii. 410;
secret treaty of, 416, 418, 422, 423; iv. 68.
=Reille, Gen.=, service in Spain, iii. 283;
at Leers, iv. 171;
in the Waterloo campaign, 171;
seizes Marchiennes, 173;
crosses the Sambre, 173;
at Thuin, 173;
disperses the Prussians at Gosselies, 175, 177;
battle of Quatre Bras, 181, 183, 186;
battle of Waterloo, 199-203.
=Religion=, _N.'s_ attitude toward, i. 146; ii. 205-208, 215-218,
224, 226, 227, 245, 256, 258, 259; iii. 174, 175;
influence on the social life of the world, ii. 47.
=Religious opinion=, freedom of, decreed, i. 110.
=Rémusat, Mme. de=, _N.'s_ relations with, i. 77; ii. 9, 55, 118,
197, 198, 255, 421; iii. 19, 27, 80;
confidences with Josephine, ii. 308;
reports _N.'s_ answers to Josephine's charges, iii. 27;
conversations with Talleyrand, 80.
=Réné=, exploit at Lake Garda, i. 414.
=Rennes=, interview between _N._ and Villeneuve at, ii. 375.
=Republican calendar=, ceases to exist, ii. 406.
=Restoration, the=, revulsion of feeling against _N._ at the, ii. 199.
=Reudnitz=, military operations near, iv. 28.
=Revolution, the=, its germ, i. 74;
_N.'s_ views concerning, 78;
first mutterings and opening of, 96-98 et seq.;
excesses of, 108-111;
federation for, 141;
European antagonism to, 142;
in the Rhone Valley, 148-159;
becomes a national movement, 240;
favored in Lombardy and Tuscany, 261;
propagating the ideas of, 276; ii. 38;
failure to give political freedom to France, 293;
effect on the French people, 319;
its humanitarian mission, 348;
the art of, iii. 88;
treatment in French literature, 88;
completion of its program to close the continent to English
commerce, 279;
the work of, 422;
_N._ the standard-bearer of, 424; iv. 152, 261;
its principles and effect, 253-257;
shorn of its horrors, 297.
=Rewbell, J. F.=, member of the Directory, i. 309, 329, 332; ii. 35;
character, i. 329;
dissatisfied with treaty of Leoben, 441;
_N.'s_ relations with, ii. 23;
advocates _N.'s_ resignation, 52;
suspected of peculation, 92;
fails of reelection to the Directory, 91.
=Rey, Gen.=, in the battle of Rivoli, i. 414.
=Reynier, Gen.=, service in Egypt, ii. 53;
battle of the Pyramids, 60;
fails to keep Russia out of Warsaw, iii. 385;
division commander under Eugène, 393;
in campaign of 1813, 402;
beleaguers Schweidnitz, 413;
battle of Dennewitz, iv. 18;
battle of Leipsic, 27, 32, 34;
captured at Leipsic, 34;
exchanged, 61.
=Rheims=, prison massacres in, i. 188;
occupied by _N._, iv. 77;
captured by St. Priest, 80;
_N.'s_ low physical and moral condition at, 82;
captured by the French, 82, 84, 85;
_N._ at, 91, 107;
captured by the allies, 94;
possible advantages of a supposititious retreat by Marmont to, 99.
=Rhine, River, the=, the boundary question and struggles for, i. 276,
327, 334, 446, 450; ii. 22, 38, 41, 51, 193, 264, 356; iii. 416,
422; iv. 31, 41;
royalist plots on, i. 297;
military operations on, 341, 347, 358, 435, 439, 440; ii. 48, 87,
88, 160, 166, 304, 362-364, 404; iv. 36, 40, 54-60, 70, 169;
plundering on, ii. 38; iii. 75;
French supremacy on, ii. 96;
_N.'s_ scheme of petty states on, 265;
French march to the Danube from, 376;
Louis ordered to hold, 424;
a French river, iii. 270;
_N.'s_ excursion on, 421.
=Rhodes=, Turkish naval preparations at, ii. 75;
expedition to Egypt from, 75-79.
=Rhone, River, the=, French acquisitions on, i. 422;
_N.'s_ reception on, iv. 137.
=Rhone, Valley, the=, the Revolution in, i. 148-159;
_N.'s_ influence in, 178;
civil war in, 213;
to be ceded to France, ii. 40.
=Richelieu, Cardinal=, scheme of intervention in Germany, ii. 211;
policy at close of the Thirty Years' War, 264.
=Richepanse, Gen.=, success on the Mettenberg, ii. 168;
in battle of Hohenlinden, 191.
=Richmond, Duchess of=, ball on the eve of Waterloo, iv. 178.
=Richmond, Duke of=, interview between Wellington and, at the ball,
iv. 178.
=Ricord=, commissioner of the National Convention, i. 219;
in siege of Toulon, 231;
in charge of movements against Genoa, 248.
=Ricord, Mme.=, _N.'s_ attentions to, i. 256.
=Riga=, _N._ threatens to march to, iii. 304;
preparations for the siege of, 333;
Prussian troops at, 338;
military operations near, 353.
=Rights of man=, the, i. 326.
=Rippach=, skirmish at, iii. 404;
death of Bessières at, 404.
=Riviera=, Austrian garrison for the, ii. 170.
=Rivoli=, the starting-point of _N.'s_ public career, i. 148;
battle of, 380, 388, 410-416; ii. 140, 323;
_N.'s_ estimate of, i. 416, 420;
effect of the campaign on European history, 416;
Masséna created Duke of, iii. 86. _See also_ =Masséna=.
=Road-work=, French popular hatred of, i. 105.
=Roberjot=, member of Congress of Rastatt, ii. 88;
killed at Rastatt, 89.
=Roberjot, Mme.=, accuses Debry of murder, ii. 89.
=Robespierre, Augustin=, commissioner of the National Convention, i. 219;
in siege of Toulon, 231;
_N.'s_ friendship with, 236, 241, 247, 253, 289;
leadership of, 241;
describes the French campaign in Lombardy, 244;
execution, 251;
influence on _N.'s_ life, iv. 248.
=Robespierre, Charlotte=, _N.'s_ attentions to, i. 256.
=Robespierre, Mme.=, pension for, ii. 293.
=Robespierre, Maximilien=, member of the National Convention, i. 188;
dictator of France, 194;
fall and execution, 247-252, 266;
religious decrees, 250;
_N.'s_ characterization of, 251;
hatred of the Church, 330;
dread of Carnot, 333;
influence on _N.'s_ life, iv. 248.
"=Robespierre, the Little=," i. 238.
=Rochambeau, Gen.=, succeeds Leclerc in San Domingo, ii. 237;
surrenders to an English fleet, 237.
=Rochefort=, naval expedition from, ii. 331, 333;
the fleet ordered to the English Channel from, 359;
Villeneuve's mission to relieve, 359;
the squadron ordered to the Mediterranean, iii. 111;
_N._ journeys to Rochefort, iv. 220;
English cruisers at, 220;
immunity from the White Terror, 223.
=Roederer=, ii. 51, 214;
dreads a new Terror, 94;
joins the Bonapartist ranks, 96;
an opportunist, 98;
on the necessity of renewing the constitution, 106;
the 18th Brumaire, 107;
member of the council of state, 152;
on Fourcroy's educational measures, 227;
advocates the Legion of Honor, 246;
suggests hereditary consulship, 245;
dismissed, 277;
character, 277;
reforms Neapolitan finance, iii. 130;
interviews and conversations with _N._, 197; iv. 248, 249;
sent out of France, 262.
=Roger-Ducos=, member of the Directory, ii. 92;
scheme to make him consul, 102;
proposed resignation of, 102;
resigns from the Directory, 106, 115, 118;
consul of France, 123.
=Rohan, Cardinal=, retirement at Ettenheim, ii. 301.
=Rohan-Rochefort, Princess Charlotte of=, married to Duc d'Enghien,
ii. 301;
the Duc d'Enghien's last message to, 310.
=Rohr=, Archduke Charles's force at, iii. 207.
=Roland, J. N.=, forms a ministry, i. 172;
leader of the Girondists, 189.
=Romagna=, surrendered to France, i. 422;
ceded to Venice at Leoben, 439;
incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic, ii. 21;
Austrian forces in, 170.
=Roman Catholic Church=, _N.'s_ views concerning the, i. 76;
influence in Corsica, 128;
opposition to the French Republic, 276;
the Pope shorn of his temporal power, iii. 242;
influence on France, iv. 253.
=Roman Catholics=, disturbances among, in Corsica, i. 167, 168.
=Roman Church=, _N.'s_ failure to Gallicize, iv. 260.
=Roman Empire, the=, ii. 329;
compared with Napoleonic France, ii. 222, 235.
=Roman Republic, the=, organization and proclamation of, ii. 30, 86;
Neapolitan invasion of, 87;
abandonment of, 205.
=Romanoff, House of=, _N._ proposes matrimonial alliances with, iii. 93.
=Rome=, maritime expedition against, i. 257, 261;
difficulties of an attack on, 262;
murder of French minister (Basseville) in, 261, 375, 422;
_N.'s_ hostility toward the central power at, 264;
temporal power of the Pope, 345;
plunder of, 369; ii. 39;
plan to capture, i. 375;
_N.'s_ plans concerning, 401, 405, 422, 423;
quarrel between France and, 401, 420;
influence of, 404;
proposition to hand her over to Spain, 420;
campaign against Pius VI, 420-423;
dispersal of the papal army, 422;
Victor's military watch on, 431;
_N.'s_ influence in, 448;
_N.'s_ operations against, ii. 9;
Joseph Buonaparte minister at, 28;
Berthier proclaims the Roman Republic in, 39;
calls Provera to reorganize her army, 39;
liberal rising in, 39;
Austria to be restrained from interference in, 42;
Neapolitan invasion of, 68, 72, 87;
recognition of the Pope's temporal power in, 207;
restrictions on residence in, 216;
remains of Pius VI sent to, 216;
Chateaubriand French representative at, 260;
France to evacuate, 262;
Madame Mère and Lucien at, 342;
_N._ demands recognition as Emperor of, 396;
ports of, closed to enemies of France, 396;
French occupation of, iii. 118;
excommunication for the invaders of, 119;
disbandment of the Noble Guard, 119;
Pius VII's idle state in, 119;
severing of the spiritual and temporal powers, 215, 242;
the city incorporated with Italy, 242;
occupied by Gen. Miollis, 242;
the College of Cardinals and ecclesiastical courts transported to
France, 258, 263;
the department of, created, 262, 263, 279;
secularization of the convents, 263;
dispersal of foreign prelates, 264;
Paris a rival to, as capital of the Western empire, 307;
sends deputation to Paris, 380;
restoration of the Pope's domains, 391;
Murat marches on, iv. 56;
Lucien fosters revolution in, 144;
France the heir of, 253;
influence throughout Italy, 256.
=Rome= (ancient), governmental systems of, adopted in France, i. 269,
270; ii. 123;
influence on French art, iii. 88;
the territorial expansion of, 164;
loss of her political liberty, iv. 260;
the history of, 294.
=Rome, the King of=, Schwarzenberg's toast to, iii. 261;
the title, 262;
birth of, 302, 328;
brilliancy of his future, 302;
address of the Paris Chamber of Commerce on the birth of, 303;
his portrait at Borodino, 343;
entrusted to care of the National Guard, iv. 53;
Joseph enjoined to preserve him from Austrian capture, 91;
likened to Astyanax, 91, 108;
chances of his succession, 107;
flight from Paris, 107-110;
an ill omen for, 109;
proposed regency for, 114;
_N._ declares for his succession, 124;
territory granted to, 133;
proposed coronation of, 157;
dismissal of his French attendants, 162;
sends message to his father, 162;
failure of the attempt to crown, 165;
_N.'s_ farewell message to, 233.
=Roncesvalles=, French military movements at, iii. 132.
=Ronco=, military operations at, i. 389-391.
=Rosily, Adm.=, ordered to supersede Villeneuve, ii. 372.
=Rositten=, military operations near, iii. 14.
=Rossbach=, battle of, iv. 267.
=Rosslau=, military operations near, iv. 21, 22.
=Rossomme=, _N._ at, iv. 195, 207, 210;
fighting at, 211.
=Rostino=, meeting of _N._ and Paoli at, i. 132.
=Rousseau, Jean Jacques=, views on Corsica, i. 18, 19;
offered asylum by Paoli, 19;
_N.'s_ study of, and admiration for, 65, 70-78, 114, 145, 264;
ii. 139, 256; iv. 292;
_N.'s_ style compared with that of, i. 136;
on man in a state of nature, 145;
influence of, in France, 266, 267;
theory of natural boundaries, 326;
Chateaubriand a disciple of, ii. 259.
=Roussel, Gen.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 202.
=Roustan=, reply to Rousseau, i. 76.
=Roverbello=, battle of, iv. 56.
=Roveredo=, battle of, i. 384;
abandoned by Vaubois, 387.
=Rovigo=, creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396;
Savary created Duke of, iii. 86. _See also_ =Savary=.
=Royal Corsican Regiment=, refuses to fight against its native
island, i. 22.
=Royal family=, imprisoned in the Temple, i. 175.
=Royalism=, hatred of the French for, ii. 194;
its evils abolished from France, 224.
=Royalists=, institute the "White Terror," i. 277, 278;
plots and intrigues of, 277, 298, 328; ii. 3-6, 8, 36, 241,
297-301; iv. 81;
English subsidies for, i. 325;
banished from Sardinia, 353;
the Clichy faction, ii. 3-5, 7, 8;
relations and negotiations between _N._ and, ii. 3-6, 36, 124,
134, 195, 229, 239, 259; iv. 259;
extended influence in 1798, ii. 5;
events of the 18th of Fructidor, 7, 8, 22, 23;
Austria seeks their triumph in Paris, 19;
proscription of, 8, 22, 23;
attitude of the Directory toward, 36;
claims concerning the murders at Rastatt, 89;
Moreau's tendency toward, 94;
sigh for a second Richelieu, 120;
views of the results of the 18th Brumaire, 121;
encouraged to return to France, 130;
dissensions among, 239-241;
publish "L'Ambigu," 270;
the Cadoudal conspiracy, 297 et seq.;
in Alsace, 301;
argument in their favor, 348;
growing strength of, iv. 98;
display their enthusiasm in Paris, 114;
their hour of triumph, 127;
opposition to, by the army, 132;
supported in Provence, 137;
plots against _N.'s_ life, 138, 144;
commemorate the death of Louis XVI, 149;
defend the Tuileries, 158;
stirred up by Jacobin enmity to _N._, 166.
=Royal power=, _N._ on, i. 93.
=Royal Scots Fusileers=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 201.
="Royal Sovereign," the=, at Trafalgar, ii. 373.
=Royer-Collard, P. P.=, Royalist intrigues of, iv. 106.
=Rüchel, Gen.=, his military command, ii. 425;
at Eisenach, 427;
ordered to concentrate at Weimar, 430;
in battle of Jena, 430, 431.
=Rue de Paix, the=, iii. 74.
=Rue Rivoli, the=, iii. 74.
=Rully, Gen.=, commands expedition to Corsica, i. 125;
killed at St. Florent, 126.
=Rumanizoff, Count=, Russian minister, iii. 100, 113;
discusses partition of Turkey, 116;
at the Erfurt conference, 171;
foresees danger to the Franco-Russian alliance, 244;
adviser to Alexander I, 351;
leads the peace party of Russia, 351.
=Rumbold=, seized by French agents at Hamburg, ii. 330.
=Rumelia=, proposed disposition of, after Tilsit, iii. 55.
=Russbach, River=, military operations on the, iii. 219, 226, 230.
=Russia=, aggrandizement of, i. 22;
_N.'s_ ambition to serve, 216, 319; ii. 15; iv. 256;
share in the partition of, and relations with Poland, i. 220, 425;
iii. 45, 316, 318;
relations and alliances with Austria, i. 325, 425; ii. 44, 61, 72,
145, 154, 209, 312, 355, 360, 363, 381; iii. 169, 178, 311-316,
328, 331, 342, 419; iv. 75, 76;
death of Catherine II, i. 425;
foreign policy (1797), 425;
_N._ intercepts despatches from the Czar to Malta, 424;
weakness of revolutionary sentiment in, ii. 45;
alliances and relations with, schemes of conquest of, and wars
with Turkey, 67, 72, 418; iii. 20, 51, 52, 55, 64, 99, 106-114,
162, 176, 236, 248, 309, 310, 321, 350;
plans military operations in Italy, ii. 72;
the second coalition, 86, 90, 136, 142;
military operations in Holland, 90;
military operations in Switzerland and Italy, 91;
successes on the Trebbia, 92;
defeats Joubert at Novi, 92;
defeated at Zürich by Masséna, 93;
withdraws from the second coalition, 142;
interest in, and activity concerning Malta, 141, 154, 193, 210, 285;
alliances and general friendly relations with France, 154, 203,
209-211, 263, 266, 347, 394, 401; iii. 36, 38, 43-46, 49, 65,
73, 107, 115, 166, 176, 178, 244, 255, 329;
organizes the "armed neutrality," ii. 194, 209, 210;
schemes of Oriental extension and conquest, 194, 209, 262, 330,
347, 348, 401; iii. 50, 55, 64, 108, 167, 236; iv. 41, 67;
intercedes for Naples, ii. 203;
_N.'s_ relations with and attitudes toward, 203, 293, 356, 361;
ii. 440-442; iii. 45, 103, 115, 280, 304, 306, 313-318, 392;
relations with, subsidies from, and wars with England, ii. 209,
210, 263, 357, 401, 406, 421; iii. 49, 55, 64, 99, 100, 102,
105, 117, 265, 266, 287, 288, 316, 321, 351, 398, 417; iv. 41,
76, 164;
assassination of Paul I and accession of Alexander I, ii. 210;
abandons the "armed neutrality," 263;
hostile and general unfriendly relations with France, 293, 312,
330, 347-349; 355, 356, 361; iii. 287, 288, 305, 309-318, 329,
392, 408;
mourns the death of the Duc d'Enghien, ii. 311;
stains on reigning houses of, 317;
protests against seizure of Enghien, 331;
occupies Ionian Islands, 330, 353, 357, 405;
demands indemnity for the king of Sardinia, 330, 348, 418;
attitude in 1805, 352;
relations (friendly and hostile) with Prussia, 353, 376-378, 417,
418; iii. 1, 18, 21-23, 55, 225, 316, 320, 331, 382, 385, 397,
424;
her troops in Galicia, ii. 363;
Bernadotte and Davout watch her army, 366;
military position on the Inn, 367;
defeat of Mortier at Dürrenstein, 368;
military position on the Enns, 367;
outgeneraled by _N._, 376;
the battle of Austerlitz, 382 et seq.;
Czartoryski's view of her policy in 1803, 381;
occupies Naples, 395;
excluded from councils of Western Europe, 402;
occupies Bocche di Cattaro, 405;
strengthens Corfu, 405;
pretensions in Germany, 419;
military operations on the Danube, ii. 441;
military operations against, iii. 1;
concentrates troops at Pultusk, 1;
driven from Warsaw, 2;
character of the population, 3;
a new seat of war for _N._, 3;
battle of Pultusk, 4;
retreat to Ostrolenka, 5;
_N.'s_ new experience in campaigning in, 5;
defects in the army, 9;
devotion of the army to the Czar, 9;
the Cossacks, 9;
defeat at Mohrungen, 10;
condition of troops at Eylau, 14;
financial difficulties, 20, 35, 304, 305;
Turko-Persian alliance against, 20;
successes on the lower Danube, 20;
weakness of, 22, 23;
requests Francis's adherence to convention of Bartenstein, 22;
proposal for a new coalition, 22;
bravery of her soldiers, 27;
dissensions in the court, 28;
forces engaged at Friedland, 31, 32;
military sacrifices, 35;
peace party in, 35;
fighting the battles of others, 34, 35;
destitution in the army, 35;
schemes of territorial aggrandizement, 34, 35;
_N._ demands pledges from, 36;
proposed Baltic boundary line, 36;
ambition to be regarded as a European power, 45;
_N._ a foil to her ambition, 45;
representatives at Tilsit, 49;
schemes for the partition or acquisition of the Danubian
principalities, 50, 55, 98, 99, 105, 310, 314;
to mediate between England and France, 55;
acquires Bielostok, 56, 62;
refuses to seize Memel, 62;
dislike of Savary in, 64;
court and social manners and customs, 64;
discontent with the Czar, 64, 109, 117;
intrigues to acquire, and the invasion and acquisition of Finland,
64, 98, 113-116, 236, 248, 268, 281, 310, 316;
attempts to bring Spain into the coalition, 71;
effect of the treaty of Tilsit, 72;
diplomatic intrigues in, 98;
her good offices sought with Denmark, 98;
frontier menaced by France, 99;
Alexander seeks to abolish serfdom in, 99;
commerce of, 99;
effects of the peace of Tilsit on, 99;
_N._ intervenes between Turkey and, 99;
terms of the agreement at Slobozia, 105;
Tolstoi defends, 105;
diplomatic crisis in, 108-110;
sends a fresh mission to _N._, 110;
proposed invasion of Sweden, 113;
court intrigue in, 115;
Caulaincourt conducts negotiations with, 116;
blockade of the fleet by England, 117;
outwitted by _N._, 129;
the Spanish question discussed with, 158;
_N.'s_ proposed naval coöperation with, 166;
the anti-French party in, 167, 195;
urged to occupy Warsaw, and parts of Prussia and Austria, 177;
_N._ makes technical call for the aid of, 198;
invades Galicia, 236;
acquires part of Galicia, 239;
menaced by the treaty of Schönbrunn, 244;
news of the Austrian marriage in, 255;
treaty with Sweden, Sept. 17, 1809, 268;
evades the Continental System, 280;
Mme. de Staël in, 299;
rivalry of France, 309;
effects of the Continental System on, 310;
an incident that changed the course of history, 314, 315;
advances an army to the Danube, 314;
prepares for war, 314;
opens negotiations with England and Sweden, 316;
war with France inevitable, 317;
acquires a boundary on the Pruth, 321;
treaty with Sweden, April 12, 1812, 321;
withdraws troops from the Danube, 321;
thoroughness of _N.'s_ preparations for war with, 323-325;
Caulaincourt's knowledge of, 326;
agricultural distress in, 328;
concentration of troops in, 328;
intrigues leading to the war of 1812, 328-333;
ukase of Dec., 1810, 329;
the neutral trade of, 329;
Narbonne's mission from Dresden to, 331;
_N.'s_ scheme to expel her from Europe, 332;
_N.'s_ military knowledge of, 333, 334, 340;
menacing outlook for, 334;
_N.'s_ plan of campaign in, 333, 338;
disposition of her army, 335;
_N._ strikes the first blow at, 335;
military weakness, 336;
military enthusiasm in, 337;
sufferings of both armies in, 337, 357 et seq.;
battle of Smolensk, iii. 339;
"the Ney of," 339, 340;
despotic character of her government, 340;
lack of centralization in, 340, 374;
horrors of the campaign in, 340, 341;
_N._ fails to pass counterfeit money in, 341;
the lessons of Eylau and Austerlitz, 341;
_N.'s_ ignorance of the strength of feeling in, 342;
speculation on the Czar's military policy, 342;
battle of Borodino, 343-345, 346;
the Kremlin, 345, 347;
claims the honor of burning Moscow, 349;
temper of the peasantry, 350;
the Old Russian party for peace, 351;
Alexander's advisers, 351;
founding of the Russian Bible Society, 351;
English military mission to reorganize the army, 351;
causes of the French disasters in, 353;
_N.'s_ retreat from Moscow, 353-356;
partizan warfare in, 359;
adopting the tactics of Egypt in, 359;
the terror of _N.'s_ name in, 360, 363, 365;
her allies, Want and Winter, 360, 373;
massacre of French stragglers in, 362;
_N.'s_ contempt for, 363;
treatment of French prisoners in, 367;
hopes in, of capturing _N._, 367;
_N.'s_ excuse for defeat in, 372;
compared with Spain, 374;
poor generalship in, 374;
diminishing strength of, 382;
invades the grand duchy of Warsaw, 385;
treaty with Spain, July, 1812, 391;
Metternich seeks to embroil Sweden and, 395;
possession of Warsaw, 399;
apathy of, 403;
Nesselrode's appearance in, 409;
secret treaty of Reichenbach, 416, 421;
issues paper money, 417;
treaty with England, 417;
to maintain a standing army, 417;
guarantees a war loan, 417;
inaugurates the coalition of 1813, 424;
strength, iv. 6;
_N._ attempts to separate Prussia from, 17;
concludes alliance of Sept. 9, 1813, 22;
the campaign of 1813, 39;
at the Congress of Frankfort, 41;
anxiety for peace, 41;
troops on the Rhine, 55;
_N._ endeavors to separate Austria from, 75;
the triple alliance, 76;
treaty of Chaumont, 76;
suspicious of Schwarzenberg's attitude, 89;
barbarity of her troops, 102;
party to the treaty of Fontainebleau (April, 1814), 133;
Alexander proposes a home for _N._ in, 133;
attitude at Congress of Vienna, 144, 145;
quota of troops, 164;
member of the Vienna coalition, 164;
the campaign of the Hundred Days, 167 et seq.;
claims the glory of annihilating _N._, 214;
claims the right of overseeing the imprisonment of _N._, 225;
_N.'s_ horror of being sent to, 227;
expansion of, 298.
_See also_ =Alexander I=; =Paul I=; =St. Petersburg=.
=Rustan=, _N.'s_ body-servant, ii. 426; iii. 74; 410; iv. 134;
Queen Louisa's allusion to, at Tilsit, iii. 61.
=Rustchuk, Pasha of=, appointed grand vizir, iii. 162;
attempts to restore Selim III, 162.
S
=Saalburg=, military operations at, ii. 428.
=Saale, River=, military operations on the, ii. 429-433; iv. 19, 23, 25.
=Saar, River=, military operations on the, iv. 58.
=Sachsen, Gen.=, leads Neapolitan army against Rome, ii. 72.
=Sacken, Gen.=, in battle of Eylau, iii. 15;
checks Schwarzenberg, 369;
reinforces Blücher at Montmirail, iv. 63;
held by Mortier, 74;
battle of Craonne, 78.
=St. Aignan=, French envoy to Saxon duchies, iv. 42;
imprisoned at Gotha, 42;
conducts negotiations with _N._, 42, 43, 45.
=St. Amand=, d'Erlon ordered to move on, iv. 186.
=St. André=, mayor of Mainz, anecdote concerning _N._ and, iii. 421.
=St. Bartholomew's Day=, fears of a repetition of the massacre of,
iv. 147.
="St. Bartholomew of privilege," the=, i. 110.
=St. Bernard range=, Austrian watch on the, ii. 170, 171.
_See also_ =Great St. Bernard=; =Little St. Bernard=.
=Saint-Cannat=, _N._ at, iv. 139.
=St. Cloud=, proposed councils at, ii. 101-104, 106, 109 et seq.;
Bernadotte plans to head a force at, 109;
Murat commanding guard at, 109;
the 18th and 19th Brumaire at, 111 et seq.; iv. 258;
_N._ declines a gift of, ii. 244;
promulgation of the decree creating the empire from, 322;
return of _N._ from Tilsit to, iii. 72;
social vices at, 92;
important levee at, Aug. 15, 1808, 169;
_N._ and Maria Louisa at, 258;
the imperial court at, 258;
_N._ returns to, iv. 39, 47.
=Saint-Cyr=, Elisa Buonaparte educated at, i. 55, 176, 182;
the Academy at, 176, 182.
=Saint-Cyr, Carra=, in battle of Aspern, iii. 220, 221.
=Saint-Cyr, Gen.=, military successes of, i. 274;
at battle of Biberach, ii. 167;
engagement on the Mettenberg, 168;
fails to come up at Messkirch, 167;
reinforces Moreau at Engen, 167;
enters Naples, 287;
ordered to occupy Naples, 362;
Villeneuve ordered to coöperate with, 371;
at La Junquera, iii. 183.
=Saint-Cyr, Gouvion=, strength of his corps, March, 1812, iii. 324;
losses of his Bavarian corps in Russia, 337;
Wittgenstein resumes offensive against, 359;
junction with Victor, 360;
checks Wittgenstein, 361;
holds Dresden, iv. 7, 8, 25, 27;
battle of Dresden, 9;
sent to support Vandamme at Kulm, 15;
guarding roads from Bohemia, 18.
=St. Denis=, tumults at, i. 86;
restoration of the cathedral at, iii. 74;
defense of, iv. 109.
=St. Dizier=, military movements near, iv. 58, 60, 95;
_N._ at, 95, 96, 101;
military council at, 103.
=St. Florent=, _N._ prepares plans for its defense, i. 91;
French fleet at, 125;
disorders at, 126, 191;
expedition against Ajaccio from, 203-208;
French power in, 207;
English capture of, 260.
=St. George=, Provera at, i. 414.
=St. Gotthard Pass=, Suvaroff's disasters in, ii. 141;
French passage of, 169, 172-174;
Austrian watch on, 170.
=St. Helena=, _N.'s_ will made at, i. 127;
_N.'s_ reminiscent statements made at, 146, 232, 289, 306; ii. 47,
75, 79, 81, 118, 145, 208, 292; 311; iii. 85, 210, 277; iv. 16,
62, 153, 156, 177, 191;
_N.'s_ death at, ii. 82; iv. 234;
_N.'s_ ambition concerning, ii. 289;
early proposition to deport _N._ to, iv. 145;
chosen as the place of exile, 224-229;
_N.'s_ objections to the rock, 226;
special form of government for, 227, 229;
the voyage to, 227, 287;
landing of _N._ at, 229;
topography, climate, etc., 228, 232;
_N.'s_ life on, 229-235;
violent storm in, 234;
the exile's court at, 288.
=Saint-Hilaire, Gen.=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 386, 388;
in Eylau campaign, iii. 15.
=St. Ildefonso=, the treaties of, ii. 204.
=St. Jean d'Acre=.
_See_ =Acre=.
"=St. Jerome=," Correggio's, i. 374.
=St. Julien, Count=, blundering negotiations by, ii. 187, 188;
imprisonment of, 188.
=St. Lambert=, Grouchy ordered to, iv. 190;
Bülow at, 193.
=St. Leu=, proposal that Louis withdraw to, iii. 276.
=St. Mark=, actions at, i. 410, 412, 413.
=St. Maximin=, Lucien Buonaparte in, i. 238.
=St. Michael=, seizure of, by Masséna, i. 436.
=St. Michel=, battle of, i. 410.
=St. Napoleon=, i. 39.
=St. Peter, island of=, capture, ii. 13.
=St. Peter's, Rome=, _N._ claims coronation in, ii. 396.
=St. Petersburg=, the French envoy dismissed from, ii. 348;
return of the Czar from Tilsit to, iii. 64;
the peace of Europe in, 65;
the French ambassador at, 87;
diplomatic intrigues at, 97;
Alexander fears for, 98;
diplomatic crisis in, 108, 109;
court intrigue in, 115;
terror of the British fleet in, 117;
situation at, 118;
social and diplomatic life in, 166;
Caulaincourt's mission to, 165, 168, 169;
Frederick William III at, 194;
news of the Austrian marriage at, 255;
_N._ threatens to march to, 304;
Lauriston sent to replace Caulaincourt at, 318;
defense of, 336;
demoralization at, 336;
military enthusiasm in, 337;
founding of the Russian Bible Society in, 351;
England's diplomacy in, 417.
_See also_ =Alexander I=; =Paul I=; =Russia=.
=St. Pierre=, arrest of the Prince of Monaco at, iv. 154.
=Saint-Pierre, Bernardin de=, rewards to, for literary work, iii. 297.
=St. Priest, Gen.=, captures Rheims, iv. 80;
killed at Rheims, 82.
=St. Quentin=, the canal of, ii. 349.
=St. Roch=, the mêlée at the church of, i. 301-303.
=Saint-Ruff, Abbé de=, _N.'s_ social relations with, i. 69, 81;
death of, 149.
=St. Stephen=, attack on, i. 192.
=St. Sulpice=, banquet to _N._ in church of, ii. 100, 101.
=St. Tropez=, _N.'s_ embarkation from, iv. 135, 137, 139;
place of _N.'s_ embarkation changed to Fréjus, 139.
=Saladin=, founds the military organization of Mamelukes, ii. 58.
=Salamanca=, Sir John Moore at, iii. 186;
battle of, 290, 377;
defeat of Marmont at, iii. 343.
=Salicetti, Christopher=, represents Corsica in the National
Assembly, i. 116-121;
succeeds Buttafuoco, 133;
influence in Corsica, 185, 197, 204;
plans invasion of Sardinia, 187-189;
arrives in Corsica, 201;
relations with _N._ and influence on his career, 201, 202, 205-209,
219, 225, 228, 252-257;
adheres to France, 202;
defends the Corsican commission, 205;
arrives in Paris, 207;
heads a commission to Corsica, 219;
in siege of Toulon, 232, 233;
influence in France, 233;
plans expedition to Corsica, 233;
ambition, 238;
blamed for insurrection in Corsica, 254;
seeks his own safety, 254;
influence among the Thermidorians, 254, 255;
friendship with Mme. Permon, 285;
concealed by Mme. Permon, 285, 286;
_N.'s_ address to, 285, 286;
levies forced contributions in Genoa, 345;
plans of the Directory concerning, 364;
rapacity, 376;
duplicity, ii. 109, 110;
gives Genoa a consular constitution, 233.
=Salm=, member of the Confederation of the Rhine, ii. 403.
=Salo=, the revolutionary movement in, i. 436;
engagement at, 437, 441.
=Salzburg=, apportioned to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, ii. 266;
ceded to Austria, 391;
Lefebvre at, iii. 211;
embodied in the Confederation of the Rhine, 239.
=Sambre, River=, military movements on the, iv. 170, 173-175, 181.
=Sampiero=, i. 14;
resemblance to _N._, 26;
_N.'s_ sketch of, 92.
=Sand, George=, in Madrid during the war, iii. 292.
=San Domingo=, influence of Louverture in, ii. 237;
declares its independence, 237;
unsuccessful attempt to conquer, 237;
failure of _N.'s_ ambition concerning, 289;
plan for French recovery of, 333.
=Sandoz-Rollin=, Prussian minister in Paris, ii. 31.
=San Giuliano=, military operations at, ii. 178, 179.
=San Miniato=, the Buonaparte family in, i. 30.
=Sansculottes, the=, i. 249.
=Sansculottides, the=, i. 249.
=San Sebastian=, captured by the French, iii. 132.
=Santa Lucia=, French plans to strengthen, ii. 333.
=Santander=, besieged by Bessières, iii. 156.
=Santarem=, Masséna withdraws toward, iii. 286;
"Marshal Stockpots" deserters at, 291.
=Santerre, A. J.=, leader of the mob of Aug. 10, 1792, i. 178;
favored by _N._, 178;
_N.'s_ threat against, ii. 108.
="Santissima Trinidad," the=, at Trafalgar, ii. 374.
=Santon, Mount= (Austerlitz), ii. 386, 387.
=Saorgio=, _N._ at taking of, i. 255.
=Saragossa=, siege of, iii. 154-159, 184-186.
=Sardinia=, weakness of, i. 22;
compared with Corsica, 25;
hostilities between France and, 187-193, 196, 206, 214, 243, 247,
261, 262;
goes to defense of Toulon, 221;
operations in Piedmont, in 1794, 341;
revolutionary spirit in, 345;
signs armistice, 350, 354, 356;
Victor Amadeus, king of, 352;
conclusion of peace with France (1796), 363, 364, 400;
_N._ opens negotiations with, ii. 11;
provoked by France into Italian quarrels, 87;
_N.'s_ bad faith with, 144;
Russia demands indemnity for the king of, 330, 417-418;
Prussia bound to secure indemnity for king of, 377.
=Sardinia, island of=, Charles Emmanuel king of, i. 356;
Charles Emmanuel retires to, ii. 39, 141;
Nelson seeks shelter at, 57.
=Sart-â-Walhain=, Grouchy's movements via, iv. 188, 193.
=Sarzana=, the Buonaparte family in, i. 27.
=Satschan Lake=, Russian disasters at, ii. 388.
=Saumarez, Sir James=, blockades the Russian fleet, iii. 117.
=Sauvinières=, military movements near, iv. 185.
=Savary, Gen.=, aide-de-camp to _N._, ii. 306;
share in Duc d'Enghien's trial and execution, 306, 308-310;
mission to Alexander I at Austerlitz, 382, 383;
reports interview of Alexander I with _N._, 389;
unsavory career, 412;
marries Mlle. de Coigny, 412;
in Eylau campaign, iii. 13;
on _N.'s_ mental and personal vigor, 19;
expels the Russians from the Narew and Ostrolenka, 19;
in battle of Heilsberg, 29;
report of the meeting at Tilsit, 41;
accompanies the Czar to St. Petersburg, 64;
French ambassador to Russia, 98, 105;
influence over the Czar, 64;
disliked in Russia, 64;
created Duke of Rovigo, 86;
mission to Madrid, 142, 143;
recognizes Ferdinand as king, 143;
reproached by Ferdinand, 143;
encourages Ferdinand to rely on _N._, 143, 144;
accompanies Ferdinand toward Bayonne, 143, 144;
notifies Ferdinand of his deposition, 145;
hatred of, in Paris, 275;
minister of police, 275, 376;
episode of the Malet conspiracy, 376;
provides for time of danger, 51;
records _N._ correspondence, 97;
alarm for the safety of Paris, 97;
member of the Empress-regent's council, 105;
character, 105;
reproved by _N._, 107;
Talleyrand to, on the flight of the Empress, 109;
surprises Talleyrand and De Pradt together, 109;
accompanies _N._ to Rochefort, 219;
negotiations with Capt. Maitland, 223.
=Save, River=, territory on, ceded to France, iii. 239.
=Savigny, F. K. von=, characterization of the Code, ii. 223.
=Savona=, military operations at, i. 253, 352, 353; ii. 160;
imprisonment of Pius VII at, iii. 243, 306.
=Savoy=, military operations against, in Piedmont, i. 213;
captured by France, 222;
France's ambition to conquer, 276;
France's claims to, 327;
lost to Sardinia, 352;
Kellermann in, 365;
Chabran's forces in, ii. 169;
proposal that France should keep, iv. 41.
=Savoy, House of, the=, French schemes against, i. 187;
importance of France gaining over, 342;
its system of government, 345;
vicissitudes, 352;
Francis I's hostility to, ii. 141;
loses the support of Paul I, 232;
lineage, 317.
=Saxe-Gotha=, accepts French terms after Jena, ii. 443;
spread of liberal ideas in, 443.
=Saxe-Weimar=, accepts French terms after Jena, ii. 443;
spread of liberal ideas in, 443.
=Saxony=, withdraws from the coalition, i. 385;
neutrality of, 1796, 385;
seizure of the English minister to, ii. 330;
excluded from the Confederation of the Rhine, 403;
proposal to include her in North German Confederation, 418;
reported French advance on, 420;
proposed independence for, 420;
military movements in, 424-425;
alliance with Prussia, 429;
takes part in the Jena campaign, 443;
spread of liberal ideas in, 443;
abandons Prussia and adopts neutrality, 443;
proposed exchange of territories, iii. 50;
united with the Rhine Confederation, 56;
acquires Kottbus, 62;
independence, 73;
the Archduke Charles proposes to march into, 198;
furnishes troops to France, 202;
troops in Dresden, 203, 324;
defeated at Nossen by the Black Legion, 234;
in vassalage to France, 279;
supports _N._, 322;
the levies in, 387;
peculiar relations toward _N._, 394;
turns to Austria, 394;
threatened war in, 394;
secret agreement with Austria, 399;
Prussian designs on, 399;
the campaign of 1813 in, 401 et seq.; iv. 1;
strategy of the campaign in, iii. 404;
abandons Austria, 407;
declares in favor of France, 407;
proposed allotment of territory to, 409;
Prussia promises to cede part of, to Hanover, 417;
invaded by Austro-Russian troops, iv. 8;
national spirit in, 19;
revulsion of feeling against France, 20, 22;
refuge of the allies in, 24;
defection of troops at Leipsic, 33;
character of the campaigns in, 38.
=Say, J. B.=, member of the tribunate, ii. 151.
=Scandinavia=, effort to bring her into the coalition, iii. 22.
=Schaffhausen=, _N._ plans operations at, ii. 163.
=Scharnhorst, Gen.=, plan of the Prussian campaign, ii. 427-429;
in battle of Eylau, iii. 16;
institutes military reforms in Prussia, 103, 161;
mission to Vienna, 320;
hostility to _N._, 396;
limits to his means, 403;
killed at Lützen, 406.
=Scheldt, River, the=, reopening of, i. 194;
closing the navigation of, 450;
a French river, iii. 270;
scheme of Hanoverian extension on, 399.
=Schérer, Gen.=, commanding the Army of Italy, i. 344;
ordered to upper Italy, ii. 88;
driven behind the Mincio and Oglio, 88;
defeated at Magnano, 88;
succeeded by Moreau, 88;
incompetency, 88, 91.
=Schill, F. von=, _N.'s_ abuse of, iii. 213;
attempts to rouse the German spirit, 213;
final stand and death at Stralsund, 213, 233;
helps insurrection in Westphalia, 225;
denounced by Frederick William, 233.
=Schimmelpenninck, R. J.=, Grand Pensionary of the Batavian Republic,
ii. 233;
represents the Batavian Republic at Amiens, 262;
intrigues to make Louis Buonaparte king of Holland, 397.
=Schlapanitz=, military operations near, ii. 385.
=Schleiermacher, F. E. D.=, member of the reform party in Prussia,
ii. 416;
influence on Prussian regeneration, iii. 103.
=Schleiz=, engagement at, ii. 428.
=Schleswig=, Denmark's loss of, iii. 70.
=Schloditten=, military operations near, iii. 14.
=Schönbrunn=, _N._ establishes headquarters in palace at (1805),
ii. 369, 378; (1809) iii. 212;
interview between _N._ and Haugwitz at, ii. 399;
treaties of, 417; iii. 241, 244, 252;
_N.'s_ proclamations from, 215;
_N._ leaves for the Lobau, 226;
Prince Liechtenstein at, 239;
accident to _N._ near, 240;
attempt to assassinate _N._ at, 240;
_N._ returns to Paris from, 245;
virtual imprisonment of Maria Louisa at, iv. 143.
=Schrattenthal=, Kutusoff at, ii. 379.
=Schwarzenberg, Prince=, reliance on Peccadeuc, i. 65;
Austrian minister to France, iii. 253;
suggests the marriage of _N._ and Maria Louisa, 253;
toasts the King of Rome, 261;
commands Austrian contingent in Russian campaign of 1812, 324;
in Volhynia, 338;
holds back Tormassoff, 341;
opposed by Tormassoff and Tchitchagoff, 350;
retreats behind the Bug, 358;
expected to cover the crossing of the Beresina, 363;
driven back, 366;
checked by Sacken, 369;
lukewarmness, 382;
retreats across the Vistula, 385;
evacuates Warsaw, 385;
seeks shelter in Cracow, 393;
held back by Metternich, 395;
commanding the Army of the South, iv. 3;
hampered by presence of the allied sovereigns, 3;
military incapacity, cowardice, and reputation, 6, 64, 69, 89, 90-94;
_N._ moves against, 8;
battle of Dresden, 9;
Vandamme's pursuit of, 15;
Murat fails to check, 17;
protects Austria from invasion, 18;
moves on Dresden, 18;
southern movement by, 21;
gets to southward of Leipsic, 22;
Murat ordered to hold, 23;
contemplated attack on, 23;
proposed junction of Blücher and Bernadotte with, 26;
battle of Wachau, 28;
battle of Leipsic, 27-32;
suggests compromise plan of invasion of France, 57, 58;
at Langres, 58;
crosses the Rhine at Basel, 58;
movement toward Auxerre, 60;
junction with Blücher, 60;
strength, Feb. 9, 1814, 62;
_N.'s_ contemplated movement against, 62-65;
steady advance of, 65;
crosses Switzerland, 67;
danger of his advancing to Fontainebleau, 72;
sends flag of truce to Berthier, 73;
retreats to Troyes, 73;
quails before _N.'s_ advance, 73;
Macdonald and Oudinot in pursuit of, 73;
checks Oudinot, 73;
strength at Troyes, 74;
withdraws behind the Aube, 74;
justifies his course, 74;
at Bar-sur-Aube, 74;
_N._ prepares to attack, 74;
at Congress of Châtillon, 77;
Blücher cut off from, 77, 78;
_N._ plans to attack him at Châlons, 77;
regains communications with Blücher, 80;
moves against Macdonald, 84;
dismayed at the capture of Rheims, 85;
supposed retreat to the Vosges, 86;
engagements at Arcis and Torcy, 87;
sickness, 89, 90;
on the European policy of 1814, 88;
retreats to Troyes, 90;
_N._ misled by his actions, 90;
apprehensions of _N.'s_ strength, 92;
strength, 92;
battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, 93;
Blücher seeks a junction with, 94;
his communications threatened, 95, 96;
junction with Blücher, 95, 97;
favors movement on Paris, 98;
determines to seek a battle, 98;
proposes to pursue _N._, 100;
at peace council in Paris, 114;
enters Paris with the allies, 114;
seduces Marmont, 119;
sows treason in the French army, 120;
Marmont reveals his plot to, 125;
plan for the campaign of the Hundred Days, 169.
=Schweidnitz=, the allied forces near, iii. 413;
_N.'s_ strategy at, 413.
=Science=, _N._ advises encouragement of, ii. 347.
=Scrivia, River, the=, Ott driven back to, ii. 176;
the country of, 176-178.
=Sebastiani, Gen. F. H. B.=, mission to Persia and the Levant,
ii. 272-274;
obtains thorough knowledge of the East, ii. 440;
strategy and diplomacy at Constantinople, 20;
end of his influence in Turkey, 33;
defeats a Spanish division, 237;
moves up the Aube, iv. 91;
battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, 92.
=Secret police=, license vice, iii. 92.
=Segovia=, French success at, iii. 156.
=Ségur, Count=, minister to Russia, ii. 324;
appointed master of ceremonies at the Tuileries, 324, 328;
foresees France's discontent, iii. 326;
transfers his allegiance to Louis XVIII, iv. 132;
plans the ratification of the Additional Act, 166.
=Seine, River, the=, the quays of, iii. 74;
military movements on the, iv. 65, 69, 71, 73, 85, 90, 104, 112, 116.
=Selim III=, dismisses viceroys of Moldavia and Wallachia, ii. 441;
moves against Russia, 441;
declares war against England, iii. 20;
overthrow of, 33, 51, 106, 162;
held prisoner in the Seraglio, 162;
murdered by Mustapha IV, 162.
=Semaphore=, use of, in warfare, iii. 205.
=Semlino=, disposition of the spoils of Moscow at, iii. 358.
=Semonville, Huguet de=, envoy to Constantinople, i. 197;
dreads a new Terror, ii. 94.
=Sénancour, S. P. de=, "Obermann," ii. 351.
=Senarmont, Gen.=, in battle of Friedland, iii. 31.
=Senate, the=, in 1799; ii. 126, 127, 150-153;
orders deportation of suspects, 241;
subservience to _N._, 242-244;
new methods of electing to, 247;
enlargement of its powers, 247;
the tool of the First Consul, 320;
steps toward creating the empire, 319-322;
changes in, under the constitution of 1804, 322;
announces the result of the plebiscite, 341;
substitution of a hereditary house for the elective, iii. 82;
its members ennobled, 87;
confirms the divorce, 247;
decrees the annexation of the Papal States, 262;
decadence of constitutional forms in, 295;
speech of Maria Louisa before the, iv. 106;
ordered to draft a new constitution, 114;
absolves the army from allegiance to _N._, 119;
proclaims Louis XVIII, 129, 132.
=Sens=, military movements near, iv. 62, 68;
proposal to continue the war from a center at, 103;
_N._ at, 105;
the French garrison at, 118.
"=Sentimental Journey to Nuits,"= _N.'s_, i. 146.
=September 22=, celebration of, ii. 195.
=Serfdom=, at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 102;
abolished in Warsaw, iii. 67.
=Serpalten=, military operations near, iii. 14.
=Sérurier, Gen.=, general of division, Army of Italy, i. 345;
at siege of Mantua, 415, 418;
storms Gradisca, 433;
delivers Venice to Austria, ii. 24;
action on the 18th Brumaire, 105;
commanding at the Point-du-Jour, 108;
excites the soldiery at St. Cloud, 116;
recreated marshal, iv. 167.
=Serves=, _N._ visits, i. 141.
=Servia=, the rise of, iv. 300.
=Seurre=, disorders in, i. 96.
=Seventh Regiment of the Line=, supports _N._ on his return from
Elba, iv. 156.
=Seven Years' War, the=, i. 17, 22; iv. 261, 296.
=Sextuple Alliance, the=, iv. 295.
=Seychelles=, deportation of suspects to the, ii. 241.
=Sézanne=, _N._ at, iv. 61;
Marmont at, 74;
_N.'s_ plan of movement via, 85.
=Shebreket=, Mameluke attack on the French at, ii. 59;
action at, 61.
=Shipping=, harassing regulations by France, ii. 269.
=Shuvaloff, Count=, Russian commissioner at Poischwitz, iii. 414, 417.
=Sicily=, Ferdinand IV king of, i. 421; iii. 319;
Nelson seeks the Egyptian expedition at, ii. 57;
Nelson returns to, 61;
Joseph made king of, 395, 401;
proposal that the Bourbons retain power in, 401;
_N._ offers England territory as substitute for, 404, 405;
England demands the surrender of, 405;
withdrawal of English troops from, iii. 111;
proposed French seizure of, 111, 112;
English troops sent to Portugal from, 122;
England threatened with loss of trade with, 272;
English expedition to, 284, 294;
French expedition against, 308.
=Siena=, Pius VI withdraws to, ii. 39;
position in the French Empire, iii. 279.
=Sierra Moreña=, defeat of Dupont in, iii. 156.
=Sieyès, Abbé=, pamphlet of the Third Estate, i. 107, 330;
character, 330, 331; ii. 92;
declines service in the Directory, i. 330, 331;
relations with _N._, 330, 331; ii. 35, 49, 94, 100-102;
president of the Ancients, 35;
venality, 35;
mission to Berlin, 41;
checkmates Prussia, 43;
charged with tampering with Bernadotte, 43;
theories of government, constitution-building, etc., 49, 96,
100-102, 117, 118, 125, 126, 149, 322;
member of the Directory, 83, 92;
relations with Joubert, 92;
schemes for a dictatorship, 94, 95;
suspected of plotting with the House of Brunswick, 95;
brought into the Bonapartist ranks, 96-98;
surrenders his leadership, 100;
proposed resignation of, 101;
scheme to make him consul, 102;
difficulty of holding him in the traces, 102, 103;
resigns from the Directory, 106, 115;
at St. Cloud, 19th Brumaire, 111;
consul of France, 123;
proceedings for election of First Consul, 129;
accepts the estate of Crôsne, 130;
chief of the Senate, 129, 130;
keeper of the Directory's secret funds, 129;
negotiations and intrigues in Prussia, 155, 156;
relations with the Directory, 155;
monarchical schemes for France, 155, 156.
=Siguenza=, Castaños collects his troops at, iii. 185.
=Silesia=, wrested from Austria by Prussia, i. 325;
Austria seeks compensation for, 325;
Austria's ambition concerning, ii. 358;
offer of part of, to Austria, ii. 445;
military operations in, iii. 20; iv. 17;
_N._ offers it to Austria, iii. 22;
_N.'s_ reserve forces in, 22;
Prussia retains her strongholds in, 42;
position in Europe, 55;
remains Prussian, 55, 56;
_N._ offers to offset the Danubian principalities against, 106-108,
112;
French occupation, 116;
Alexander demands relinquishment of designs on, 116;
Davout ordered to, 165;
Austria stipulates for acquisition of, 320;
to be connected with Old Prussia, 398;
Austria rejects _N.'s_ offer of, 400;
the Army of the East in, iv. 3;
contemplated operations in, 7;
military operations in, 17;
strength of her forces under Blücher, 62;
army of, moves on Paris, 98.
=Silk culture=, introduced into Corsica, i. 80.
=Simplon=, creation of the department of the, iii. 278.
=Simplon Pass=, to pass under French control, ii. 40;
the crossing of the, 169, 172;
military road through, 233, 349; iii 74.
=Sisteron=, _N.'s_ welcome at, on return from Elba, iv. 154.
=Slave-trade=, revival of the, ii. 236, 237, 245, 269, 270;
England protests against, 270.
=Slobozia=, armistice concluded at, iii. 105;
treaty of, 163.
=Smith, Adam=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 78.
=Smith, Sir Sidney=, captures French transports, ii. 71;
at the siege of Acre, 71, 73;
occupies Jaffa, 75;
watching _N._ at Alexandria, 79;
allows _N._ to slip through his fingers, 82;
puts into Cyprus, 82;
concludes treaty at El Arish, 181;
commanding British fleet at Lisbon, iii. 121;
urges Don John to embark for Brazil, 121.
=Smohain=, the farms of, iv. 195;
fighting at, 206.
=Smolensk=, _N.'s_ plan to seize, iii. 333;
military movements near, 333, 336-340, 350, 355, 356, 362;
enthusiasm among the Russians at, iii. 338;
strategical position, 338;
battle of, 338-341;
_N.'s_ military blunder at, 340-343;
the shrine at, 339, 343;
compared with Acre, 340;
French garrison in, 342, 358;
concentration of French troops at, iii. 347;
guerrilla warfare around, 350;
arrival of the French army at, in its retreat, 362;
massacre of French stragglers in, 362;
shameful scenes in, 362;
abandonment of wounded at, 363;
the march to Lithuania from, 363;
reorganization of the army at, 363;
destruction of the fortifications of, 363;
Ney's perilous retreat from, 364.
=Smorgoni=, _N.'s_ desertion of his army at, iii. 373, 375.
=Social contract=, _N.'s_ views concerning the, i. 77, 267.
=Social customs, privileges=, etc., i. 100-103;
_N.'s_ study of, 137, 138, 145, 150.
=Södermannland, Duke of=, attempts the siege of Hameln, ii. 416.
=Soignes=, fears of Wellington's withdrawal behind, iv. 190;
Wellington's position in front of, 192, 195.
=Soissons=, Maria Louisa's progress through, iii. 257;
Mortier at, iv. 74, 86;
Blücher recruits his forces at, 76;
surrenders to the allies, 77, 83;
French retreat to, 80;
_N._ at, 80;
the French army leaves, 81.
=Sokolnitz=, fighting at, ii. 385-388.
=Solano, Gen.=, makes ineffectual movement against the French, iii. 149.
=Solothurn=, the plundering of, ii. 40.
=Solre=, Gen. d'Erlon at, iv. 170.
=Sombreffe=, military movements near, iv. 171, 175-180.
=Somerset, Gen. F. J. H.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 202.
=Sommepuis=, military movements near, iv. 91.
=Sommesous=, military movements near, iv. 91.
=Somosierra=, crossing the pass of, iii. 186.
=Sophia Dorothea=, wife of Jerome, iii. 322.
=Sortlack, Forest of=, military movements in the, iii. 30.
=Souham, Gen.=, in battle of Leipsic, iv. 32;
at Nogent, 102;
left in command at Essonnes, 124;
seduced by Marmont, 125;
summoned to Fontainebleau, 126;
delivers his army prisoners to the Austrians, 126, 127.
=Soult, Marshal=, commanding force at Tarentum, ii. 204;
service in the Army of England, 291;
created marshal, 323;
character, 364; iii. 286;
seizes Memmingen, ii. 366;
reaches Hollabrunn, 379;
battle of Austerlitz, 384-388;
at Münchberg, 428;
battle of Jena, 429-432;
invests Magdeburg, 436;
battle of Pultusk, iii. 4;
strength in Poland, 7;
campaign of Eylau, 15;
at Osterode, 18;
battle of Heilsberg, 28;
pursues Lestocq from Friedland, 31;
created Duke of Dalmatia, 86;
yearly income, 87, 296;
movement against Blake, 185;
lack of vigor of movement, 185;
ordered to Mansilla, 188;
entrusted with the pursuit of Moore, 189;
battle of Corunna, 188;
crosses the Esla, 188;
defeated by Wellesley in Portugal, 236;
causes Wellesley to withdraw, 237;
service in Spain, 284;
ordered to Andalusia, 286;
ordered to join Masséna in Portugal, 286;
jealousy of Masséna, 286;
before Cadiz, 286;
fails to relieve Masséna, 286;
defeated in attack on Sir John Moore, 286;
captures Badajoz, 287;
invasion of Portugal (1809), 287;
occupies Oporto, 287;
expelled from Portugal, 287;
failure in Spain, 287;
battle of Talavera, 287;
made commander-in-chief, 287;
bickerings with Joseph, 287;
battle of Ocaña, 287, 288;
aims to win the crown of Portugal, 287, 296;
retreats toward the south coast, 289;
returns to Cadiz, 289;
defeated at Albuera, 289;
marches to relief of Badajoz, 289;
joins Masséna, 289;
marches to Joseph's aid, 290;
abandons Cadiz, 290;
despatched on Pyrenean campaign, 421;
shut up in Bayonne, iv. 40;
thrown back on Toulouse, 81;
strength, March, 1814, 102;
available forces of, 118;
defeat at Toulouse, 148;
appointed minister of war, 148;
revival of imperial sentiment in his army, 157;
opposed to Murat, 157;
recreated marshal, 167;
chief of staff in the Waterloo campaign, 171, 190;
blunder before Charleroi, 173, 174;
cognizant of Blücher's movement to Wavre, 191;
orders to Grouchy, 194, 214;
battle of Waterloo, 204;
on inspiration, 248.
=Sound, the=, threats to close it to English commerce, iii. 69.
=South America=, Spanish concessions to France in, ii. 205;
England's commerce with, iii. 55;
England threatens to make Spanish colonies independent, 71.
=Spain=, affinity with Corsica, i. 9;
Bourbon influence in, 22;
expected enmity of, i. 187;
goes to defense of Toulon, 221;
blockades Mediterranean ports, 239;
_N.'s_ relations with, and attitude toward, 247; ii. 18, 203,
et seq., 289, 332, 405; iii. 54, 71, 127, 131, 139, 149, 151,
157, 178, 190, 280 et seq., 293, 307, 319; iv. 30, 52;
growth of liberal ideas in, i. 276;
withdraws from the coalition (1795), 324;
relations and alliances with France, 341, 421; ii. 203-206,
288-290, 332, 349, 358, 359, 371; iii. 78, 120, 132, 190;
_N._ proposes to hand Rome over to, i. 420;
drives Admiral Mann from the Mediterranean, 421;
destruction of fleet off Cape St. Vincent, 456;
diplomatic offset of Naples against, ii. 18;
war with Portugal, 18;
preparations for action in, 37;
schemes of revolutionary propaganda for, 44;
naval inaction, 67;
low intrigues in, 204;
effect of Marengo in, 204;
Godoy prime minister, 204;
proposed incorporation of Portugal with, 211;
recovers colonies under the peace of Amiens, 262;
exchanges Louisiana for Etruria, 272;
England attacks her commerce, 289;
exasperated over sale of Louisiana, 289;
treaties with France, 289, 332;
loses Trinidad and Louisiana, 332;
war with England, Dec., 1804, 332;
her maritime forces controlled by France, 332;
humiliates Portugal, 332;
naval power shattered at Trafalgar, 374;
_N._ offers part of her territory to England, 405;
called on for troops by France, iii. 22;
proposal that she acquire Portugal, 67;
attempt to bring her into the coalition, 71;
incapacity of the Bourbons in, 70;
_N._ encourages dissensions in, 71;
decay and humiliation, 71, 123, 126, 134, 150;
revolt against Godoy, 70;
embargo on English commerce, 72;
the fleet ordered to Toulon, 71;
necessity for the "regulation" of her affairs, 111;
the situation in, 118;
secret compact with France for partition of Portugal, 120;
new title for the king, 120;
plans for invasion of, 120;
scheme to acquire Portugal, 120;
depletion of the army, 123;
depopulation, 124;
corruption, 124;
social life, 124;
degradation of the Church in, 124;
primogeniture and land tenure, 124;
factions of the crown prince and of the prime minister, 125;
_N._ tempted by her colonies, 127, 133;
arrest of the crown prince, 126;
fortifying the French frontier, 126;
announcement of the crown prince's conspiracy, 127;
the "secret hand" in, 128;
expected regeneration by France, 127;
Dupont ordered to invade, 128;
benefits accruing to England from troubles in, 131;
_N._ on the intestinal troubles in, 131;
the crown given to Joseph, 131, 150, 169, 280, 318;
French invasion and occupation of, 132-135, 149, 151;
deposition of Godoy from office, 134;
Murat assumes command in, 135;
popular outbreaks, 135, 140;
abdication of Charles IV, 136;
patriotic and national spirit in, 137-141, 151-156, 284, 288, 290;
iv. 290;
enthusiasm for Ferdinand VII, iii. 138;
political intrigues in, 139-141;
Murat Protector of, 140;
attitude of the people toward Murat, 141;
deposition of the Bourbons, 145;
Murat appointed dictator, 146;
_N._ assumes the royal and hereditary rights of the throne of, 148;
Louis refuses the crown of, 148;
military movements in western Spain and on the Baltic, 149;
character of the people, 149-152, 153, 154, 190, 288;
convocation of notables at Bayonne, 149;
adoption of a new constitution, 150, 152;
destruction of her commerce, 152;
lack of centralization in, 151, 152, 374;
guerrilla warfare, iii. 152-155, 190, 291;
influence of the clergy in the rebellion, 154;
French disasters in, 154, 290, 291;
fate of French soldiers in, 155;
French movement against southern, 156;
French pillage in, 158;
national uprising against France, 158, 192;
difficulties of the French campaign in, 157;
offer of the throne to Archduke Charles, 166;
_N._ returns to, 182;
caliber of the French army in, 183;
_N.'s_ strength in, Nov. 3, 1808, 183, 184;
regular and irregular forces, 184;
_N._ assumes command in, 184;
lack of military genius in, 185;
Sir John Moore enters, 186;
sympathy between Portugal and, 186;
abolition of the Inquisition and of the feudal system, 189;
_N._ institutes reforms in, 189;
formation of a liberal constitution for, 191;
_N._ threatens to assume the crown, 191;
question of annihilating its nationality, 191;
statements as to _N.'s_ leaving, 196;
reinforcements for, 202;
Wellesley prepares for invasion of, 236;
need of prompt action in, 238;
the war in, 249;
the crown offered to Louis and rejected, 270;
England's loss of trade with, 272;
Fouché's offer to restore the Bourbons to, 271;
seizures of American ships in, 275;
annexation of part of, to France, 278;
open warfare in, 282;
seizure of northern provinces of, 282;
"the natural continuation of France," 282;
policy of total annexation, 282;
French rapine in, 282;
policy of military administration for, 282;
quality and strength of the French armies in, 283;
Masséna in command in, 283;
Wellington's provisions for French victories in, 284;
blunders by the insurrectionary leaders, 288;
Wellington enters, 289;
French occupation, close of 1812, 290;
Soult abandons the south of, 290;
discipline of the French army in, 291;
England's expeditions to, 293;
confiscation in, 296;
troops withdrawn from Germany for service in, 307;
_N.'s_ offer of peace in, refused by England, 318;
England to be driven from, 328;
compared with Russia, 374;
French disasters in, 377;
exhaustion of, 382;
recall of commanders from, 386;
treaty with Russia, July, 1812, 391;
in grand coalition against _N._, 392;
_N._ offers peace to England in, 392;
Wellington's reverses in, 392;
proposal to restore Bourbon rule, 416;
_N._ abandons, 420;
Wellington's successes in, 423;
French defeats in, iv. 14;
_N._ offers to restore the independence of, 30;
rises in support of Wellington, 40;
proposed independence of, 41;
prolongation of the war in, 51;
restoration of the king to, 52;
relapses into absolutism and ecclesiasticism, 52;
adoption of a new constitution, 52;
member of the Vienna coalition, 164;
_N.'s_ dread of capture in, 221.
=Spandau=, capitulation of, ii. 436;
proposed siege of, iv. 2.
=Spartel, Cape=, Nelson's fleet off, ii. 372.
=Specialist=, the work of the, iv. 251.
=Speculation=, mania for, in France, i. 288, 289; ii. 219.
=Spirding, Lake=, military movements near, iii. 10.
=Splüglen Pass=, proposed movement of the reserve army via, ii. 169;
crossed by Macdonald, 192.
=Spree, River=, military movements on the, iii. 407, 409; iv. 14.
=Stadion, Count=, Austrian diplomatic agent, ii. 381;
Austrian minister of state, iii. 21, 104, 194, 199;
letter from Metternich, July 26, 1807, 104;
urges prompt action, 199;
resigns, 253;
mission to the allies' camp, 408.
=Staël, Mme. de=, relations with, enmity toward, and criticisms of
_N._, ii. 22, 119, 139, 197, 199, 259; iii. 94, 297-301;
procures revocation of Talleyrand's exile, ii. 34;
_N.'s_ study of her writings, 53;
"Influence of the Passions," 53;
on liberty in France, 119;
her salon, 199;
her character, 259; iii. 297-301;
banishments of, ii. 411;
relations with Mme. Récamier, ii. 411, 412;
returns to Paris, iii. 26;
ordered back to Geneva, 26;
at Coppet, 298;
difficulties with the Directory, 298;
criticizes Josephine Beauharnais, 298;
difficulties with the Committee of Public Safety, 298;
poverty, 299;
her book on Germany, 300.
=Stage=, censorship of the, ii. 349.
=Standing armies=, i. 67.
=Staps=, attempts to assassinate _N._, iii. 240.
=Starhemberg, Count=, Austrian ambassador to London, iii, 104;
leaves London, 104.
=Starsiedel=, fighting at, iii, 406.
=State=, _N.'s_ conceptions of the, i. 78.
=State system=, the, iv. 298.
=States of the Church=, Pius VII strives to augment the, ii. 346.
=Steffens, Prof.=, summons German students into the ranks, iii. 398.
=Stein, Baron H. F. C.=, Prussian statesman, ii. 415; iii. 103;
frees the serfs, 103;
introduces military reforms in Prussia, 162;
resigns his ministry, 162;
_N._ demands his dismissal, 162, 178;
seeks refuge in Vienna, 178;
exile from Prussia, 193;
effect of his reforms, 320;
adviser to Alexander I, 351;
reorganizes Prussian provinces, 385;
formulates the treaty of Kalish, 385;
relations with Alexander, 385, 396;
hostility to _N._, 397; iv. 57, 67;
joins Frederick William at Breslau, iii. 396;
on the unification of Germany, 397;
character, 397;
leading part in Prussia's awakening, 398;
prepares to govern the conquered territories, iv. 34.
=Sterling, Adm.=, naval operations of, ii. 359.
=Stettin=, capitulation of, ii. 436;
Davout's force in, 202;
proposed French movement on, 393;
held by the French, 402;
relief of the French in, iv. 2.
=Stewart, Sir Charles=, English minister at Berlin, iii. 417;
influences the armistice of Poischwitz, 417.
=Steyer=, armistice signed at, ii. 192.
=Stockach=, battle of, ii. 88;
captured by Lecourbe, 166.
=Stockholm=, installation of Bernadotte at, iii. 281.
"=Stockpot, Marshal=," iii. 291.
=Stötteritz=, fighting at, iv. 33.
=Strabo=, _N.'s_ study of, i. 78.
=Stradella=, Desaix commanding corps at, ii. 177;
fortified camp at, 175;
military operations near, 185.
=Stralsund=, threatened by Mortier iii., 19;
Schill's final stand at, 213, 234;
capture of, 234.
=Strasburg=, Moreau's army at, i. 347;
Moreau and Desaix cross the Rhine near, 440;
retirement of Cardinal Rohan from, ii. 301;
imprisonment of Duc d'Enghien at, 304, 305;
French expeditions to, 304; iii. 203;
Caulaincourt's mission to, 107;
Maria Louisa's progress through, 257;
Schwarzenberg's communications with, threatened, iv. 95, 96;
sends troops to relief of Paris, 102.
=Strebersdorf=, military operations near, iii. 217, 218.
=Street of Peace, the=, iii. 74.
=Street of Rivoli, the=, iii. 74.
=Strehla=, fighting near, iv. 9.
=Striefen=, fighting near, iv. 9.
=Striegau=, Blücher at, iv. 3, 6.
=Stuart=, British envoy to Vienna, ii. 302.
"=Study in Politics, A=," projected by _N._, i. 289.
=Studjenka=, the passage of the Beresina at, iii. 368-371.
=Stura, River, the=, Masséna's advance through valley of, i. 243;
Austrian force on, ii. 170.
=Stuttgart=, Bourrienne in diplomacy at, i. 174;
machinations of Méhée de la Touche in, ii. 297, 298;
expulsion of the English envoy at, 330.
=Styria=, junction of Austrian troops in. ii. 367;
Prince Eugène in, iii. 225;
Archduke John banished to, 230.
=Suchet, Marshal Louis-Gabriel=, retreat before Melas, ii. 165;
expected to attack Melas, 170;
military operations on the Var, 174;
pursues the Russians, 378;
battle of Austerlitz, 387;
service in Spain, iii. 283;
annihilates Blake's Spanish army, 289;
captures Aragon and Valencia, 289;
captures Tarragona, 377;
contrasted with Augereau, iv. 94;
strength, March, 1814, 102;
available forces of, 118.
=Sucy=, _N.'s_ letters to, i. 165;
prophesies as to _N.'s_ future, ii. 28.
=Suez, Isthmus of=, importance of, ii. 46.
=Suez Canal=, suggested by D'Argenson, ii. 46.
=Suicide=, _N.'s_ views concerning, and his attempts to commit,
i. 80, 81; ii. 75; iv. 130, 131, 217, 232, 287.
=Sunday=, resumption of its observance, ii. 258.
="Supper of Beaucaire," the=, i. 212-221, 286.
=Survilliers, Comte de=. _See_ =Buonaparte, Joseph=.
=Suvaroff, Gen. A. V.=, defeats Macdonald on the Trebbia, ii. 92;
holds Piedmont, 141;
driven by Masséna to Bavaria, 142;
disasters in the Alps, 141.
=Swabia=, treaty with France (1796), i. 450;
demonstrations of emigrants in, ii. 307;
withdrawal of Austrian troops from, 311;
French occupation of, 405.
=Sweden=, excluded from Congress of Rastatt, ii. 27;
joins the "armed neutrality," 194;
_N.'s_ hatred for the royal house of, 416;
Joachim I's aspirations to the crown of, 416;
Prussia recommended to go to war with, 420;
member of the coalition, iii. 20;
held back by Mortier, 19;
internal dissensions, 35;
neutrality of, 46;
failure of commercial negotiations with England, 49;
proposed commercial war against England, 55;
virtual dependence on France, 66;
English regulations concerning American trade with, 100, 101;
supposed assistance from England to, 113;
_N._ hints at rectification of her boundaries, 113;
proposed Russian invasion of, 113;
makes obstinate resistance in Finland, 117;
failure of the demonstration against, 159;
Alexander's uncertain position in regard to, 165;
_N._ promises to restore Pomerania to, 268;
promises to exclude British commerce, 267;
treaty with Russia, Sept. 17, 1809, 268;
cedes Finland to Russia, 268, 281;
Frederick VI hopes to acquire, 280;
_N.'s_ ambitions concerning, 280;
accession of Charles XIII, 280;
selection of Bernadotte as heir to the throne, 280;
abdication of Gustavus IV, 280;
Mme. de Staël in, 299;
Alexander offers Norway to, 314, 321, 350;
Russia opens negotiations with, 316;
demands and acquires a liberal constitution, 317;
eagerness to escape from French protection, 318;
_N._ offers Finland to, 321;
bids for her alliance by France and Russia, 320, 321;
Davout occupies Pomerania, 321;
treaty with Russia, April 12, 1812, 321;
Alexander demands better terms for, 329;
in grand coalition against _N._ (1813), 392;
Metternich seeks to embroil Russia and, 395;
subsidized by England, 399;
ambition to secure Norway, 399;
_N._ attempts to win over, 399;
evacuates Hamburg, 407;
commercial agreement with England, 424;
inaugurates the coalition of 1813, 424;
Bernadotte seeks to annex Norway to, iv. 55;
struggle with Norway, 164;
member of the Vienna coalition, 164.
=Swiss Guard=, at the Tuileries, i. 299.
=Switzerland=, republican schemes and revolutionary movements in,
i. 329; ii. 27, 40;
_N.'s_ schemes and influence in, i. 448; ii. 12, 144, 233, 234;
French plundering of, 40;
organization of the Helvetian Republic, 86;
Masséna ordered to command in, 87;
Russian military operations in, 91-93;
Berthier commanding in, 140;
Masséna's successes in, 140;
Masséna makes a forced levy in, 153;
falls into French hands, 164, 234, 281;
Kray's retreat via, cut off, 166;
jealousy of Piedmont, 233;
factions in, 234;
adoption of the name, 234;
neutrality of, 234;
the Act of Mediation, 234;
furnishes contingents to _N.'s_ armies, 234; iii. 3, 20, 323;
occupied by Ney, ii. 272;
lends aid to France in 1803, 289;
independence of, 354;
_N.'s_ claim to, 354;
Prussia bound to secure the liberties of, 377;
Mme. de Staël banished to, 411;
relations of France with, iii. 54, 73;
Valais separated from, 278;
violation of her neutrality by the allies, iv. 56, 57, 66, 67;
fails to support the Emperor, 57, 59;
reported rising in, 88;
Jerome and Joseph take refuge in, 135.
=Syria=, Nelson seeks the Egyptian expedition off the coast of, ii. 57;
_N.'s_ schemes of conquest in, 61, 62;
Turkish movements in, 68-70;
the French advance into, 68, 69.
=Szuczyn=, Russian retreat to, iii, 8.
T
=Tabor, Mount=, battle near, ii. 72.
=Tabor Bridge=, Murat crosses the, ii. 368.
=Tacticus=, _N.'s_ references to, ii. 235.
=Tactics and strategy=, the lessons of Austerlitz, ii. 391, 392.
=Tafalla=, Moncey at, iii. 183.
=Tagliamento, River=, military operations on the, i. 430-432.
=Tagus, River, the=, British fleet in, iii. 121;
French attempt to capture the fleet in, 121;
Dupont holds, 156;
the lines of Torres Vedras, 285;
military operations on, 285.
=Taine, H. A.=, on the Napoleonic régime, iv. 294.
=Talavera=, battle of, iii. 236, 284, 287.
=Talleyrand, Prince=, minister of foreign affairs, ii. 17, 34, 35,
130, 153, 323;
relations with and views on _N._, ii. 17, 23, 24, 30, 31, 33-35,
96, 97; iii. 81, 94-96, 133, 151, 168, 175, 179, 301; iv. 165,
233;
attempts to force _N.'s_ hand, ii. 23;
relations with Mme. du Barry, 33;
expelled from England, 33;
Mirabeau's opinion of, 33;
relations with the Directory, 34;
career, 33-35;
system of national education, 33, 225-227;
charged with tampering with Bernadotte, 43;
member of the Institute, 47;
advocates seizure of Egypt, 47, 48;
intrigue with _N._, Barras, and Sieyès for a new constitution, 49;
ascribes the Egyptian expedition to _N._, 51;
proposed mission to Constantinople, 66;
dreads a new Terror, 94;
critical moment in his house, before the 18th Brumaire, 103;
influence on Barras, 107;
Bourbon sympathies of, 122;
_N._ proposes a constitution to, 126;
offers peace to Portugal, 154;
monarchical views of, 158;
discusses possibility of _N.'s_ death, 186;
negotiations with Count St. Julien, 188;
negotiations with Cobenzl, 189;
demands bribes from American envoys, 212;
the Pope's ban removed from, 216;
carves up German principalities, 265;
demands to know England's intentions concerning Malta, 273;
Lord Whitworth's utterances to, 284;
his explanation of the scene of March 13, 1803, 284;
urges action against Bourbon plotters, 304;
notifies Baden of the seizure of Duc d'Enghien, 308;
charged with suppressing despatches, 306;
Josephine's dread of, 308;
blamed by _N._ for the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, 311; iii. 198;
murder of the Duc d'Enghien sits lightly on, ii. 312;
Grand Chamberlain, 324;
attitude of Pius VII toward, 326;
excommunication taken off from, 326;
replies to Russia's demands, 330;
diplomatic replies to Pius VII, 346;
at Vienna, 382;
created Prince of Benevento, 396; iii. 94, 279;
negotiations with Lord Yarmouth, ii. 400, 401;
bribed by German princes, 403;
on the proposed North German Confederation, 420;
at Tilsit, iii. 49, 53;
warns _N._ against Queen Louisa's fascinations, 60;
author of treaty of Tilsit, 60;
Queen Louisa's sarcasm to, 61;
showy character of his diplomacy, 65;
responsibility for the treaty of Tilsit, 72;
advocates support of the Emperor, 80;
conversations with Mme. de Rémusat, 80;
on the discords in the imperial court, 94;
resigns from the ministry, 94, 96;
salary, 96;
his influence on the wane, 96;
Vice-Grand Elector, 96; iv. 106;
policy after Austerlitz, iii. 125;
favors Ferdinand VII, 125;
resumes active diplomacy, 133;
negotiations with Izquierdo, 133;
at Bayonne, 145;
estimate of Ferdinand VII, 145;
constituted custodian of Ferdinand VII, 148, 169;
stinging rebuke addressed to _N._ by, 151;
prepares to return to public life, 169;
acts in the interests of Austria, 171, 178;
at the Erfurt conference, 171, 178-181;
ordered to ventilate the divorce question, 181;
his treachery read by _N._, 197;
blamed by _N._ for the Spanish failure, 197;
member of extraordinary council on _N.'s_ second marriage, 254;
on the natural extensions of France, 282;
meeting of _N._ and Mme. de Staël at house of, 298;
pecuniary losses, 301;
on the aims of the coalition of 1813, 400;
spreads alarming reports, iv. 51;
on the Spanish situation, 51, 52;
royalist intrigues of, 51, 106, 107, 113;
member of the Empress-regent's council, 106;
Murat's and Lannes's characterizations of, 107;
desires a violent death for the Emperor, 107;
opposes the departure of the Empress from Paris, 107;
_N.'s_ knowledge of his duplicity, 107, 108;
on the Empress's flight from Paris, 108;
Dalberg's characterization of, 107, 108;
simulated flight from Paris, 112;
interview with Prince Orloff, 112;
sends a "blank check" to Alexander, 113;
at peace council in Paris, 114;
gives adherence to Louis XVIII, 113;
negotiates with Nesselrode, 113;
member of the executive commission, 114;
learns of Marmont's defection, 125;
remonstrates with Alexander against the regency, 125;
suspected complicity in plots to assassinate _N._, 138;
negotiates secret treaty between France, England, and Austria, 145;
influence at the Congress of Vienna, 144, 145;
double intrigues of, 148, 149, 153;
ignores Russian and English protests, 153;
attainted, 157;
_N._ appeals to, 165;
at Carlsbad, 224;
returns to Paris, 224;
reception by Louis XVIII, 224;
resumes active functions, 224;
on the secret of empire, 250;
his value in European politics, 251;
correspondence with--French, ambassador at London, ii. 284;
Grenville, Lord, 143;
Napoleon, 34, 49, 361; iii. 18, 117;
Nesselrode, Count, iv. 106;
_character:_ ambition, iii. 96; iv. 106;
brilliancy, ii. 33; iii. 65;
capacity for intrigue, ii. 49, 130; iv. 51, 106, 108, 112, 148, 153;
diplomatic and political ability, ii. 33, 131, 346; iii. 65, 95, 133;
duplicity, ii. 33-35, 130-132; iv. 107;
gaming passion, ii. 33;
greed 131;
learning, 33;
licentiousness, 33, 131;
self-interest, iii. 193, 197, 253, 381;
treachery, 193, 197; iv. 106;
unscrupulousness, ii. 33, 35, 212; iv. 107, 138;
venality, ii. 34, 131, 265, 390, 391, 403; iii. 81, 94, 125; iv. 251;
versatility, ii. 33.
=Talleyrand, Mme.=, Pius VII refuses to receive, ii. 326.
=Tallien, J. L.=, opposes Robespierre, i. 251;
social life in Paris, 290;
influence for _N._, 296;
favors appointment of _N._ as Convention general, 299;
marriage, 315.
=Tallien, Mme.=, "the goddess of Thermidor," i. 290;
_N.'s_ social intercourse with, 291;
matrimonial experiences, 315.
=Talma, F. J.=, i. 319;
accompanies _N._ to Erfurt, iii. 174;
_N.'s_ intimacy with, iv. 250.
=Tanaro=, _N._ at taking of, i. 255.
=Tanaro, River=, the country of the, ii. 178.
=Taranto=, embargo on, ii. 287;
creation of hereditary duchy of, 396;
Macdonald created Duke of, iii. 86. _See also_ =Macdonald=.
=Tarentum=, Soult's force at, ii. 204.
=Tarragona=, captured by Suchet, iii. 377.
=Tarutino=, Kutusoff takes position at, iii. 350.
=Tarvis=, capture of, i. 433.
=Tatars=, characteristics of the, iii. 9.
=Tatary=, _N._ studies the history of, i. 95.
=Tauenzien, Gen.=, battle of Dennewitz, iv. 18;
during the Waterloo campaign, 172.
=Tauroggen=, Convention of, iii. 385, 395.
=Taxation=, Necker's problems of, i. 98;
exemption of privileged classes from, 98, 100, 105;
conditions of, at outbreak of the Revolution, 101-106;
the stamp tax, 106;
the land-tax, 105, 106;
outbreak against, at Auxonne, 111;
demand for equality of, in Corsica, 116, 117;
reform of the system of, ii. 134, 220.
=Tchitchagoff, Adm.=, joins Tormassoff, iii. 350;
pursuit of the French army by, 358, 366, 383;
hopes of capturing _N._, 367;
description of _N._, 367;
captures Borrissoff, 367, 368;
driven out of Borrissoff, 368;
at the crossing of the Beresina, 370;
blamed by Kutusoff and Wittgenstein, 374, 375;
bad generalship of, 375, 383.
=Tchernicheff, Gen.=, commanding Army of the North, iv. 2.
=Telnitz=, fighting at, ii. 385, 386.
="Templars, The,"= by Raynouard, ii. 350.
=Temple, the=, the royal family imprisoned in the, i. 175.
=Tenda Pass=, captured by the French, i. 243, 256;
_N.'s_ entertainment for Mme. Turreau at, 256.
=Teplitz=, Louis's flight to, iii. 276;
Bennigsen reaches, iv. 22.
=Terror, the=, i. 250-252, 266, 272, 314, 333; iv. 262;
fears of a revival of, ii. 92.
=Terrorists, the=, growing influence of, ii. 93;
assassination schemes among, 239.
=Testamentary rights=, under the Code, ii. 224.
=Tettenborn, Gen.=, relieves Hamburg, iii. 402.
=Texel, the=, Marmont ordered to Mainz from, ii. 362.
=Thann=, battle of, iii. 210.
=Tharandt=, Klenau's march to Dresden from, iv. 10.
=Themistocles=, his refuge with the Persians, iv. 227;
_N._ draws parallel between his case and that of, 227.
=Thermidorians, the=, i. 252;
prominent members of, 254;
adopt Roman systems, 269, 270, 271;
establish the Directory, 271;
anger the people of Paris, 273.
=Thielemann, Gen.=, in Waterloo campaign, iv. 172;
at Wavre, 194.
=Third Coalition, the=, ii. 354 et seq.;
Prussia induced to join, 376, 377;
rout of the allies at Austerlitz, 388;
destruction of its strength and morale, 388.
=Third Estate, the=, at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 101;
constitution of, 108;
assumes to represent the nation, 108;
forces a junction with the two upper Estates, 108;
Sieyès's pamphlet on the, 107;
_N.'s_ care for, iv. 258, 261.
=Third Republic=, the constitution of the, i. 267.
=Thirty Years' War=, Richelieu's policy at close of the, ii. 264.
=Thomé=, alleges attempt to stab _N._, ii. 116.
=Thonberg=, _N._ at, iv. 32.
=Thorn=, siege of, iii. 2;
French occupation of, 12;
military movements near, 13;
_N._ in, 331;
French military stores in, 333.
=Thought=, influence on the social life of the world, ii. 46.
=Thouvenot, Gen.=, service in Spain, iii. 283.
=Three Emperors, Fight of the=, ii. 391.
=Thugut, Count=, greed for territorial aggrandizement, i. 325;
determines on Italian conquest, 425, 426;
opens negotiations at Leoben, 436;
warns Gen. Clarke to keep away from Vienna, 452; ii. 42;
not deceived by treaty of Campo Formio, 22;
Paul I demands his dismissal, 142;
repudiates St. Julien's negotiations, 188;
overthrow of, 189.
=Thuin=, military operations at, iv. 173.
=Thuméry, Marquis of=, suspected of plotting against _N._, ii. 303.
=Thuringia=, military movements in, ii. 427.
=Tiber, River=, military operations on the, i. 421.
=Ticino, River=, military operations on the, i. 358; ii. 173.
=Tierney, G.=, on England's attitude toward France, ii. 144.
=Tilly, Count=, _N.'s_ letter to, Aug. 7, 1794, i. 253.
=Tilsit=, Bennigsen crosses the Niemen at, iii. 31;
meeting of the Emperors at, 34-65, 93;
treaty of, 34, 35, 54, 60, 63-66, 69, 72, 95, 97, 99, 104-110,
116-120, 132, 166-172, 177, 245, 248, 255, 265, 294, 304, 309,
313, 314, 328;
neutralization of, 42;
reasons leading to the peace of, 44 et seq.;
Queen Louisa at, 44, 57-62;
French representatives at, 49;
fraternizing of Russia and France at, 49-53;
decoration of the Russian grenadier at, 63;
_N.'s_ position at, 179;
Macdonald reaches, 384.
="Times," the= (London), on the allies' capture of Paris, iv. 108.
=Tissot, Dr.=, _N.'s_ letter to, i. 84.
=Tobacco=, establishment of state monopoly in, iii. 304.
=Toledo=, Dupont's forces near, iii. 156.
=Tolentino=, treaty of, i. 350, 421; ii. 326.
=Toll, Gen.=, meets Alexander I after Austerlitz, ii. 388;
proposes concentration of the allied forces, iv. 89;
advises movement on Paris, 98.
=Tolosa=, French forces at, iii. 183.
=Tolstoi, Gen.=, _See_ =Ostermann-Tolstoi=.
=Torbay=, the "Bellerophon" at, iv. 221, 226.
=Torcy=, battle at, iv. 86;
military operations at, 90.
=Torgau=, Saxon troops withdrawn from, iii. 407;
French occupation of, iv. 2;
Ney driven into, 19;
battle of, 267.
=Tormassoff, Gen.=, confronted by Schwarzenberg, iii. 342;
joined by Tchitchagoff, 351.
=Torres Vedras=, the lines of, iii. 285.
=Tortona=, surrendered to France, i. 355;
_N._ at, 453;
scheme to relieve Masséna via, ii. 169;
the key of Genoa, 172;
topography of the country, 177, 178;
the Consular Guard at, 178.
=Tortugas, the=, death of Leclerc in, ii. 237.
=Touche, Méhée de la=, contrives Moreau's ruin, ii. 296-298;
English plots with, 330.
=Toulon=, the recovery of, for the Convention, i. 148;
military and naval preparations at, 187, 220, 221, 261; ii. 40,
47, 57, 332;
return of the Sardinian expedition to, i. 198;
anarchy in, 207, 213;
the Buonapartes in, 212;
the Buonapartes driven from, 216;
siege of, 220, 233, 289;
Marseilles refugees at, 221;
Lord Hood's seizure at, 221;
the "treason" of, 221-223;
_N._ at, 223, 240, 255, 257, 289, 307;
_N.'s_ plans for capture of, 230;
_N._ seeks mercy for rebels at, 233;
the National Convention's vengeance on, 233, 234;
massacres in, 234;
British occupation of, 239;
recapture of, 249;
news of the Terror in, 251;
English fleet driven from, 260;
the Corsican expedition leaves, 262;
_N._ at siege of, 289;
forced military loans in, 345;
departure of Egyptian expedition from, ii. 52-56;
Nelson seeks the Egyptian expedition at, 57;
_N._ sails from Alexandria for, 82;
failure of Villeneuve's expedition from, 333;
_N._ orders the Spanish fleet to, iii. 71.
=Toulouse=, Soult thrown back on, iv. 81;
defeat of Soult at, 147.
=Tournon, the Chamberlain de=, mission to Spain, iii. 128.
=Tours=, the French garrison at, iv. 118.
=Trachenberg=, military council at, iv. 6.
=Trade=, condition at outbreak of the Revolution, i. 101.
=Trafalgar=, _N.'s_ reception of the news of, ii. 334;
battle of, 373-376; iii. 47;
effect in France, ii. 394;
_N.'s_ reply to, ii. 441;
the lesson of, 264.
=Trannes=, military movements near, iv. 60, 89.
=Transpadane Republic, the=, i. 367, 400, 402, 428;
question of a constitution for the, ii. 10.
=Trasimenus=, creation of the department of, iii. 262, 263.
=Traun, River=, military movements on the, iii. 211.
=Treaties=, the value of, iv. 263.
For specific treaties see the names of parties signatory
(countries or rulers) and of the places at which signed.
=Trebbia, River=, French disasters on the, ii. 83, 92.
=Treilhard, M.=, member of the Directory, ii. 92.
=Trent=, military operations near, i. 384, 409, 414;
abandoned by Vaubois, 387;
Brune advances to, ii. 192;
apportioned to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 266;
ceded to Bavaria, 391.
=Treuenbrietzen=, Prussian pursuit of Oudinot to, iv. 14.
=Treviso=, creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396;
Mortier created Duke of, iii. 86 (_see also_ =Mortier=);
the Buonaparte family princes of, iv. 44.
=Trianon=, _N._ retires to, after the divorce, iii, 257;
the imperial court at, 301.
=Trianon Decree, the=, iii. 279.
=Tribunate, the=, ii. 126, 150-153;
constitution of, 241;
opposition to _N._ in, 242, 243;
secret sessions of, 247;
new method of electing to, 247;
form of addressing the First Consul in, 293;
Carnot remonstrates in, against adulation of _N._, 295;
independence of, 320;
initiates the imperial movement, 321;
condition under the imperial constitution of 1804, 322;
destruction of, iii. 82;
compared with the English Parliament, 83;
its functions, 83.
=Tricolor=, Louis XVI, adopts the, i. 109;
_N.'s_ scheme to unfurl, in Corsica, 122;
insult to, in Naples, 192.
=Triest=, _N._ threatens to seize, i. 404;
seized by _N._, 434;
reoccupied by Austria, 435;
rise of, 447;
importations of English goods at, iii. 165;
ceded to France, 239;
England's loss of trade with, 272;
basis of possible Oriental operations, 331;
French occupation of, 423;
_N._ offers the city to Austria, 424.
=Trinidad=, retained by England, ii. 211, 262;
ceded to England, 332.
=Triple Alliance, the=, iv. 21, 76, 295.
=Triumphal Arch, Paris=, erection of the, iii. 74.
=Tronchet=, on committee to draft the Code, ii. 222.
=Troyes=, recall of the Parliament to Paris from, i. 106;
battle of, iv. 60;
military movements near, 60, 68, 72-76, 86, 88-91, 95, 104, 105.
=Truchsess-Waldburg, Count=, Prussian commissioner at Fontainebleau,
iv. 134;
_N.'s_ attitude toward, 134;
allegations concerning _N.'s_ physical ailments, 139, 168.
=Tudela=, French success at, iii. 156;
scheme of operations at, 158;
Spanish forces near, 184, 185.
=Tuileries, the=, the mob at, i. 176;
the carnage at, 178;
Robespierre orders the destruction of, 251;
storming of, Aug. 10, 1702, 273;
defense of, 299-303;
_N._ at, on the 18th Brumaire, ii. 105, 106;
Lannes's guard at, 108;
decoration of, 147;
rechristened "the palace of the government," 147;
_N._ takes possession of, 148;
residence of the Buonapartes at, 195, 196;
social functions at, 255, 256, 279, 327-328, 406;
consular levee of March 13, 1803, 280;
_N.'s_ interview with Lord Whitworth at, Feb. 17, 1803, 280-282;
scene between Whitworth and _N._, March 13, 1803, 281, 282;
the imperial court at, 324, 326-328;
refurnishing the, iii, 25;
social vices at, 92;
_N._ at, 110;
the divorce scandal in, 180;
the divorce decree pronounced in, 247;
imperial family life at, 323, 381;
depository of the Emperor's funds, 366, 389; iv. 50, 141;
the officers of the National Guard summoned to, 53;
flight of the Empress from, 109;
changes in the court at, 148;
_N._ reënters, 158;
struggle between royalists and imperialists at, 158;
loneliness of, 159.
=Turas=, military operations near, ii. 385.
=Turenne, Marshal=, military genius, i. 348;
_N._ compared with, 348, 349;
_N.'s_ analysis of the wars of, iv. 232, 266.
=Turin=, military operations around, i. 353, 354;
_N.'s_ influence in, 448;
Gen. Clarke's mission to, 452;
_N._ in, ii. 27;
revolutionary movements in, 39;
Bonapartist agency in, 89;
Charles Emmanuel IV invited to return to, 141;
Melas hastens to, 170, 174;
topography of country near, 178;
sends deputation to Paris, iii. 380.
=Turkey=, _N._ studies the history of, i. 95;
seeks to organize its armies, 292;
France seeks alliance with, 293;
_N.'s_ plans for service in, 292, 296-298;
Austria's gaze on, 325;
_N.'s_ eye on, 424;
France's influence on, 424;
disaffection in, ii. 17;
schemes for the dismemberment of, 16, 18, 33, 42, 44, 382, 405;
iii. 37, 51, 55, 99, 105-114, 165, 169, 176, 245, 311, 313, 316;
France's justification of Egyptian schemes to, ii. 47;
_N._ seeks alliance with, 48;
refuses alliance with France, 67;
negotiations and alliances with Russia, 67, 72; iii. 51, 56, 99,
105, 322; 350;
alliance with Russia and Austria, 56;
military activity, 1799, 74;
joins the second coalition, ii. 90, 93;
checked by Franco-Russian treaty of peace (1800), 154;
defeat of, at Heliopolis, 181;
Egypt restored to, 211;
treaty between France and (1801), 211;
integrity of her boundaries, 262;
suzerainty over Ionia and Egypt, 262;
_N._ on her policy, 347;
source of discord between France and Russia, 417;
Oubril undertakes to guarantee her integrity, 417;
_N._ resolves to assert supremacy over, ii. 441;
military operations on the Dniester, 441;
_N.'s_ scheme of protectorate over, 441;
hostilities with Russia, iii. 1, 163, 236, 248, 310;
declares war against England, 20;
_N._ arranges a treaty between Persia and, 20, 21;
Austria espouses the cause of, 22;
overthrow of Selim III, 33, 51, 106, 163;
revolt of the Janizaries, 33;
alliance with France, 33;
end of Sebastiani's influence in, 33;
Russian acquisitions in, 64;
French influence in, 99;
_N._ intervenes between Russia and, 100;
terms of the agreement at Slobozia, 105;
Russia's ambition to acquire territory of, 108;
usurpation of Mustapha, iv, 162;
threatened anarchy in, 163;
reform in, 163;
threatened loss of French prestige in, 163;
accession of Mahmud II, 163;
Alexander's uncertain position in regard to, 166;
_N._ fears her alliance with Russia or England, 177;
England's trade under the flag of, 280;
Russian designs against, 309;
Austria seeks territorial aggrandizement at expense of, 316;
pivotal in European politics, 318;
_N._ endeavors to form alliance with, 322;
in grand coalition against _N._ (1813), 392;
European support of, iv. 295;
_N.'s_ influence on modern, 300.
=Turreau, Gen.=, at Mont Cenis Pass, ii. 170;
crosses Mont Cenis, 172.
=Turreau, Mme.=, _N.'s_ ghastly entertainment for, i. 256.
=Tuscany=, the Buonaparte family in, i. 27-29;
favors the French Revolution, 262;
peace between France and, 262;
withdraws from the coalition (1795), 324;
military operations against, 357-421;
French proposition to revolutionize, 373;
treaty with France, Jan. 11, 1797, 410;
plunder of, ii. 16;
involved in Italian quarrels, 87;
France acquires temporary possession of, 87;
_N.'s_ bad faith with, 144;
Austrian occupation of, 160, 170, 182;
reinforcements for Melas from, 170;
creation of kingdom of, 205;
British ships driven from harbors of, 287;
the situation in, iii. 118;
ecclesiastical reforms and confiscations in, 264;
Elisa created Grand Duchess of, 279.
_See also_ =Buonaparte, Marie-Anne-Elisa=.
=Tuscany, the Grand Duke of=, i. 345;
flees to Vienna, ii, 87;
loses his territory, 193;
territories acquired by, 266.
=Tutschkoff, Gen.=, in battle of Eylau, iii. 15.
=Twelfth Light Dragoons=, at the battle of Waterloo, iv. 211.
=Two-Cent Revolt, the=, i. 79.
=Two Sicilies, the=, i. 421.
=Tyrol, the=, the road to Vienna through, i. 342;
military operations in, 371-373, 383-387, 392, 414, 431, 433-436;
ii. 367, 380; iii. 201, 212, 213, 234;
_N.'s_ unsuccessful attempt to conciliate its people, i. 385;
loyalty to Austria, 409;
the insurrection in, 436;
Kray's retreat to, cut off, ii. 166;
Iller commanding in the, 188;
Soult cuts off the Austrian retreat to, 366;
Ney sweeps the Austrians from, 380;
_N._ threatens to seize, 389;
ceded by Austria to Bavaria, 391;
insurrection ripe in, iii. 195;
Archduke John to excite revolt in, 199;
rising against Bavarian rule, 201;
repression of priestly tyranny in, 201;
revolution against bondage in, 201;
characteristics of its people, 201;
Maximilian's reforms in, 201;
guerrilla warfare in, 210, 234;
abandoned by Archduke John, 211;
its people abused by _N._, 213;
French evacuation of, 225;
rising in, 234;
French invasion of, 241;
effects of the armistice of Znaim, 241;
reduced to submission, 241;
amnesty offered by Prince Eugène, 241;
opened to the allies, iv. 56.
U
=Ucciani=, _N.'s_ escape to, i. 203.
=Udine=, congress at, ii. 20.
=Ulm=, Austrian retreat to, ii. 168;
Austrian troops in sight of, 363;
the French at, 363-365;
the capitulation at, 366, 367;
concentration of troops in, iii. 203.
="Undaunted," the=, _N._ sails for Elba on, iv. 140.
=United Irishmen=, misunderstanding between the Directory and the,
ii. 67.
=United States, the=, constitutional government in, i. 152;
the French idea of the system of government in, 269;
Talleyrand's residence in, ii. 33;
Talleyrand's views on, 33, 34;
mission concerning protection of commerce, 34;
treaty of commerce with England, 1794, 212;
arrogance of the Directory toward, 211, 212;
imbroglio with France, 212;
suspension of diplomatic relations with France, 212;
commercial convention with France, 212;
neutrality declaration, 1793, 212;
Jerome Buonaparte's residence in, 257;
events leading to the war of 1812, 288, 289; iii. 274;
purchases Louisiana, ii. 289, 332; iv. 300;
_N.'s_ relations with, and influence on, ii. 289; iii. 101, 275;
iv. 300;
Carnot's comparison of France with, ii. 321;
Moreau's banishment to, 299;
commercial rivalry with England, iii. 46;
British claim of right of search, 47, 48;
effect of British "orders in council" upon, 47;
ocean commerce, 48;
authorizes reprisals, 48;
French attacks on commerce of, seizures of vessels, etc., 49, 273,
274, 296, 321, 322;
rising naval power, 49;
liberty of testamentary disposition in, 85;
English provisions concerning the carrying trade of, 100-102;
permitted to trade direct with Sweden, 100, 101;
_N._ attempts to force them into the French system, 101, 102;
decline of trade with England, 102;
Jefferson's administration, 101, 102;
agricultural policy of the Democrats, 101, 102;
the embargo, 102, 274, 275;
the war of 1812, 102, 322;
policy of the Federalists, 102;
the Non-intervention Act, 102;
indispensability of cotton in Europe, 266;
"neutralized" commerce of, 267;
proposal that Louis XVIII acquire a kingdom in, 271;
alleged seizure of French vessels by, 274;
the Non-intercourse Act of March 1, 1809, 274;
prohibition of commercial intercourse with England and France, 274;
seizure of ships by England, 275;
Lucien attempts to escape to, 277;
chafing under restrictions of commerce, 318;
crippled commerce of, 321;
declares war against England, 378;
naval successes of, 378;
Moreau summoned from, 407; iv. 2;
_N._ plans escape to, 219, 220;
Hamilton's treasury system, 259;
the independence of, 261;
the war for independence, 297;
wars with England, 300, 301;
popular interest in _N._ in, 300, 301;
expansion of constitutional law, 301;
growth of, 301;
_N.'s_ influence in, 301;
the slavery question in, 301.
_See also_ =America=.
=University of Berlin=, iii. 103.
=University of France=, ii. 228; iii. 89.
=Ural Mountains=, proposed Indian expeditions via, ii. 209.
=Urbino=, annexed to Italy, iii. 68, 118.
=Uscha, River=, military operations on the, iii. 340.
=Ussher, Capt.=, conveys _N._ to Elba in the "Undaunted," iv. 140, 141.
=Usury=, the curse and its cure in France, ii. 219; iii. 76, 77.
=Utizy=, military movements near, iii. 344.
V
=Valais=, declared an independent commonwealth, ii. 233;
Chateaubriand French representative in, 260;
scheme to incorporate it with France, iii. 266;
separated from Switzerland, 278;
independence of, 278;
annexed to the French empire, 278.
=Valeggio=, _N.'s_ narrow escape at, i. 393.
=Valençay=, the Spanish captives at, iii. 148, 168, 261.
=Valence=, _N._ joins his regiment at, i. 67;
_N.'s_ life at, and visits to, i. 66-82, 125, 134, 141, 145, 149,
150, 154-158, 184, 223;
the garrison at, and people of, 143;
obsequies of Mirabeau at, 153, 154;
friends of the Constitution in, 155;
reception of _N._ and Elisa at, 184;
occupied by Carteaux, 215;
death of Pius VI at, ii. 39;
burial of Pius VI at, 216;
meeting of _N._ and Augereau near, iv. 138.
=Valencia=, massacre of the French at, iii. 154;
Moncey advances on, 156;
French defeat before, 159;
captured by Suchet, 289;
temporary French government at, 377.
=Valenciennes=, evacuation of, i. 222.
=Valenza=, military operations near, i. 358.
=Valetta=, French plot to seize, ii. 18;
the sword of, given to Paul I, 154.
=Valjouan=, Victor drives the Austrians from, iv. 71.
=Valladolid=, captured by the French, iii. 132;
French success near, 156;
French communications at, 157;
_N._ at, Jan. 6, 1809, 189.
=Valmaseda=, Blake driven back to, iii. 184.
=Valmy=, defeat of the allies at, i. 194.
=Valtellina, the=, quarrel between the Grisons and, ii. 11;
incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic, 40.
=Vandamme, Gen.=, in battle of Austerlitz, ii. 386-388;
dread of _N._, iii. 93;
in battle of Eckmühl, 209;
at Linz, 216, 225;
relieved by Lefebvre, 225;
strength of his corps, March, 1812, 324;
commanding division in Eugène's army, 393;
junction of Danish troops with, 407;
captures Hamburg, 407;
goes to Davout's assistance, 413;
in battle of Dresden, iv. 8-10;
at Pirna, 8-10;
pursues the allies, 10;
battle of Kulm, 15;
captured at Kulm, 15;
character, 15;
in the Waterloo campaign, 169-173;
advances toward Fleurus, 180;
battle of Ligny, 181.
=Vandeleur, Gen.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 210.
=Vanne, River=, iv. 105.
=Var, River=, military operations on the, ii. 160, 165, 170, 171, 174.
=Vatican=, relations of Paoli with the, i. 16.
=Vauban=, disgrace of, i. 332;
eulogized by Carnot, 333.
=Vaubois, Gen.=, service in the Alps, i. 347;
defeated by Davidowich, 387, 388, 392;
service in Egypt, ii. 53.
=Vauchamps=, battle of, iv. 64.
=Vaud=, revolutionary outbreak in, ii. 27, 40;
French intervention in, 40;
Alexander forbids the restoration of, iv. 68.
=Vaux=, submission of Carlo Buonaparte to, i. 31.
=Venaissin, the=, annexed to France, i. 422.
=Vendée, la=, civil war, massacres, and royalist plots in, i. 207,
213, 222, 234, 249, 276, 305, 325, 449; ii. 91, 143, 146, 240,
241; iv. 102, 166, 218;
reinforcements for the Army of Italy from, i. 387;
_N._ conciliates, ii. 146;
revulsion of feeling against the Bourbons in, iv. 146;
_N._ seeks to rouse imperial feeling in, 220.
=Vendémiaire=, the 13th of, 301-305; ii. 22.
=Vendetta, the=, i. 10-15.
=Vendôme, Column of=, erection of the, iii. 74;
placard on the, iv. 158.
=Venetia=, neutrality violated by Beaulieu, i. 361;
jealousy between Venice and other towns of, 427;
coveted by Austria, 428;
the revolutionary movement in, 436;
the mainland ceded to Austria, 438;
the oligarchy of, 444;
French military operations in, ii. 13;
France's acquisitions in, 21;
incorporated in the Cisalpine Republic, 21;
plunder of, 38;
surrender to Austria, 38;
_N._ threatens to seize, 389;
incorporated with Italy, 395, 405;
admitted to the Concordat, iii. 118.
_See also_ =Venice=.
=Venetian Alps=, road to Vienna through the, i. 342.
=Venetian Republic=, political status in 1796, i. 345.
=Venice=, _N._ studies the history of, i. 95;
Austria's ambitions in, 325, 424; ii. 357, 363;
military operations against (1796), i. 357;
Beaulieu violates neutrality of, 371-373;
treaty with Austria, 371;
decadence and downfall of, 371, 451;
at _N.'s_ mercy, 373;
resents violations of territory, 401;
_N.'s_ violation of neutrality of, 427;
the humiliation of, 427-429;
the Golden Book of, 428, 429, 436;
pillage in, 427, 445; ii. 16;
Kilmaine's military watch on, i. 431;
revolution in, 435, 445-447;
concludes negotiations with _N._, 436-438;
acquires Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, 438;
_N._ forbidden to interfere with, 441;
loss of independence, 441-446;
fires on French ship, 443;
_N._ "an Attila to," 443;
_N._ declares war against, 443;
the oligarchy of, 444;
attempts to bribe _N._, 445;
treaty between France and (1797), 446;
the new republic of, 446;
loses independence, 446, 447;
French occupation of, 445-447;
letter from _N._ to the provisional government, 447;
_N.'s_ characterization of the Venetians, 447;
_N._ offers the republic to Austria, 446;
_N._ reproached for the overthrow of, ii. 5;
Lallemant's propaganda in, 10, 11;
Junot's demands on the senate, 11;
dismemberment of, 16;
the Directory's ambition for the conquest of, 16;
ceded to Austria, 21;
the last doge of, 24;
destruction of the "Bucentaur" at, 24;
destruction of naval stores at, 24;
seeks to continue war with Austria, 24;
dragged into war by _N._, 144;
election of Pius VII at, 206;
_N._ threatens to seize, 361;
surrendered to France, 391;
Pius VII refuses to extend the Concordat to, iii. 68;
ceded to France, 109;
appropriations for the harbor, 109;
_N._ at, Nov., 1808, 128;
interview between Joseph and _N._ at, 129-132;
basis of possible Oriental operations, 332.
_See also_ =Venetia=; =Venetian Republic=.
=Ventimiglia=, seized by Masséna, i. 243.
=Vercelli=, Melas proposes to attack _N._ via, ii. 174.
=Verdier=, success at Logroño, iii. 156;
occupies Aragon, 155.
=Verdun=, abandoned by the enemy, i. 186;
imperial troops at, iv. 102.
=Verhuel=, Dutch commissioner to Paris, ii. 397.
=Verona=, _N._ at, i. 399;
French occupation of, 372;
military operations near, 379, 380, 388-392, 410-414;
insurrection in, 436, 442, 443;
disarmament of, 442.
=Veronese Vespers, the=, i. 436, 442.
=Versailles=, meetings of the Estates at, i. 96, 107;
luxury in, 151;
the Parisian mob at, 151;
prison massacres in, 188;
Macdonald's guard at, ii. 108;
_N._ retires to, after his divorce, iii. 257;
Souham delivers his army prisoners at, iv. 126, 127.
=Vicenza=, military operations before, i. 387;
creation of hereditary duchy of, ii. 396.
=Victor, Gen. C. P.=, attacks Provera at La Favorita, i. 415;
watches Rome, 431;
reinforces Lannes at Casteggio, ii. 176;
commanding corps at Marengo, 176-182;
service in the Army of England, 291;
battle of Heilsberg, iii. 29;
battle of Friedland, 30-32;
created Duke of Belluno, 86;
yearly income, 87;
character, 93;
_N.'s_ opinion of, 93;
at Amurrio, 183;
defeated by Wellesley at Talavera, 236;
strength of his corps, March, 1812, 324;
ordered to advance east from the Niemen, 347;
in retreat from Moscow, 359 et seq.;
effects junction with Saint-Cyr, 361;
checks Wittgenstein, 361;
abandons Vitebsk, 361;
driven back, 366;
at the crossing of the Beresina, 366-372;
ordered to hold back Wittgenstein, 369;
defeated by Wittgenstein at Borrissoff, 369;
division commander under Eugène, 393;
in campaign of 1813, 402;
relieves Glogau, 413;
battle of Dresden, iv. 8-10;
guarding roads from Bohemia, 18;
battle of Leipsic, 28, 31, 32;
assigned to defense of the Rhine, 54;
ordered to Nogent, 62;
junction with Macdonald at Montereau, 64;
abandons Nogent, 64;
driven back to Nangis, 65;
drives the Austrians from Valjouan, 71;
fails to capture Montereau, 71-73;
moral exhaustion of, 71-73;
degraded, but restored to favor, 72;
commanding portion of the Young Guard, 72;
battle of Craonne, 78.
=Victor Amadeus=, king of Sardinia, i. 244, 352;
guards Lombardy, 342;
checkmated by _N._, 355;
death of, 336;
relationship to Louis XVIII, 355, 356.
="Victory," the=, at Trafalgar, ii. 373, 374.
=Vienna=, plans for French advance on, i. 385;
Austria opposes _N.'s_ advance to, 426;
combined movements on, 430 et seq.;
the peace party in, 437;
rejoicing in, at treaty of Leoben, 439;
Gen. Clarke's mission to, 451;
rejoicings in, over treaty of Campo Formio, ii. 22;
Gen. Clarke forbidden to enter, 42;
dread of revolutionary sentiment in, 42;
attack on the French embassy (1798), 43;
flight of Ferdinand III to, 87;
_N.'s_ plans to subdue, 163;
_N._ sends peace commissioner to, 186;
court intrigues at, 189;
Moreau advances toward, 192;
Stuart British envoy to, 302;
_N._ threatens, 361, 378;
French treachery at, 369;
the French enter, 367-369, 378;
Talleyrand at, 382;
Pozzo di Borgo's mission at, ii. 445;
Andréossy's mission at, 443;
French influence in, iii. 22;
decree of, May 17, 1809, 118;
belligerent tone at, 165, 178, 193, 195;
effect of _N.'s_ and Alexander's remonstrances at, 167, 168;
Metternich goes to, 193;
defensive measures for, 203;
_N.'s_ march on, after Eckmühl, 212;
capitulation of, 212;
_N.'s_ characterization of its inhabitants, 213;
Charles's plan to free, 216;
proposed French retreat toward, 222;
_N.'s_ army around, 226;
consternation at rumored Franco-Russian marriage, 251;
French soldiers nursed in, 254;
marriage of Maria Louisa at, 254-257;
pro-Russian party in, 313, 314;
characterization of _N._ in, 415;
England's diplomacy in, 417;
Francis fears a French invasion of, iv. 3;
Congress of, 144, 145, 162, 164;
news of _N.'s_ escape in, 162.
=Vienna Coalition, the=, iv. 164, 251.
=Vigo=, Villeneuve at, ii. 359.
=Villach=, _N._ enters Germany at, i, 434;
Eugène and Macdonald at, iii. 217.
=Villanova=, military operations at, i. 389.
=Villefranche=, expedition against Corsica from, i. 189.
=Villeneuve=, _N._ at, iv. 105.
=Villeneuve, Adm.=, in the battle of the Nile, ii. 63;
commanding at Toulon, 332;
proposed naval expedition for, 333;
escapes from Toulon, and returns, 333;
ordered to the West Indies, 334;
character, 333, 358, 371-375;
returns to European waters, 358;
his combined fleet at Ferrol and Corunna, 359;
at Vigo, 359;
disheartened, 359;
dissatisfied with his fleet, 359, 371, 372;
encounter with Calder, 359, 371;
ordered to relieve Rochefort and Brest, 359;
retreats to Cadiz, 359, 370, 371;
fails to appear in the Channel, 362;
chased by Nelson to the West Indies and back, 370;
retreat to Ferrol, 371;
orders for Mediterranean cruise, 372;
remonstrates against his orders, 372;
_N._ prepares to supersede, 372;
tries to evade disgrace, 372;
battle of Trafalgar, 373-375;
interview with _N._, 375;
his suicide, 375.
=Villetard=, French republican agent in Venice, i. 445.
=Vilna=, _N._ in, iii. 331-335;
Barclay de Tolly's army confronting, 335;
the French retreat through, 370, 372;
_N.'s_ incognito journey through, 375;
Kutusoff enters, 383;
Alexander goes to, 383.
=Vimeiro=, defeat of Junot at, iii. 157-159.
=Vincennes=, the trial and execution of the Duc d'Enghien at,
ii. 305, 306, 308-310; iii. 196.
=Vincent, Gen.=, Austrian representative at Erfurt, iii. 178, 193.
=Visconti=, "Greek Iconography," iv. 219.
=Vistula, River, the=, _N.'s_ conquests west of, ii. 437;
plan of campaign on, 441;
bridging of, iii. 2, 3;
French positions on, 7;
attempt to drive the French across, 28;
proposed boundary line on, 36;
military operations on, 117, 393, 396;
Alexander promises assistance to Prussia on, iii. 320;
the French army reaches, 330;
French advance to the Niemen from, 337;
Murat's position on, untenable, 385;
Schwarzenberg retreats across, 385;
threatened expulsion of the French from, 416;
French garrisons on, iv. 35;
_N._ entertains hopes of returning to, 63, 66, 69.
=Vitebsk=, its strategical position, iii. 338;
_N._ at, 338;
military movements near, 339, 364;
French garrison in, 341;
the French abandon, 361.
=Vitoria=, Dupont ordered to, iii. 128;
Ferdinand VII at, 143;
French forces at, 183;
battle of, 420.
=Vitrolles=, royalist intrigues of, iv. 98, 106, 108;
captured with Weissenberg at St. Dizier, 104.
=Vitry=, military movements near, iv. 58, 91, 93, 94;
Prussian occupation of, 95;
French troops at, 102.
=Vives, Gen.=, besieges Barcelona, iii. 184.
=Vivian, Gen.=, in battle of Waterloo, iv. 210.
=Volga, River, the=, proposed Indian expeditions via, ii. 209;
Cossacks of, iii. 9.
=Volhynia=, Austrian troops in, iii. 331, 338;
Bagration's position in, 335.
=Völkermarkt=, Archduke John at, iii. 317.
=Volney, Constantin F. C.=, espouses the Corsican cause, i. 120, 121;
_N.'s_ friendship with, 163; ii. 97, 335;
member of the senate, 151.
=Voltaire=, on the character of Paoli, i. 18;
_N.'s_ study of, 78; ii. 256; iv. 231;
his "Essay on Manners," i. 150;
on the Hohenzollern territories, ii. 442;
performance of his "Oedipe" at Erfurt, iii. 172.
=Voltri=, military operations at, i. 353.
=Vorarlberg=, Kray's retreat via, cut off, ii. 166;
ceded to Bavaria, 391.
=Vosges Mountains, the=, proposed boundary for Germany, iii. 320;
the allies turn the line of, iv. 57, 58;
supposed retreat of Schwarzenberg to, 86;
reported rising in, 88;
_N._ urges guerrilla risings in, 90.
=Voss, Countess=, attendant on Queen Louisa, iii. 60.
W
=Wachau=, battle of, iv. 27-30.
=Wagram=, Charles's advance toward, iii. 218;
battle of, 225-232; iv. 173;
French demoralization after, iii. 231;
doubtful honors of, 231, 232;
_N.'s_ position after, 232;
position of Francis after, 232;
Berthier created Prince of, 256.
_See also_ =Berthier=.
=Walcheren=, the English expedition to, iii. 237, 253, 270, 272, 284.
=Walewska, Countess=, _N.'s_ amours with, iii. 11;
visits _N._ at Elba, iv. 142.
=Walhain=, Gérard at, iv. 192;
Grouchy at, 192, 213.
=Wallachia=, dismissal of the Turkish viceroy of, ii. 440, 441;
alleged concession of, to Russia, iii. 55;
Russian evacuation of, 64;
Russian ambition to possess, 98, 115, 116, 176, 310;
Russian occupation of, 99, 105;
Alexander demands possession of, 105;
_N._ offers to offset Moldavia and, against Silesia, 106, 108, 113;
proposed evacuation of Prussia for that of, 108;
Alexander's fear of losing, 248;
Russia threatened with the loss of, 314.
=Wallenstein=, scene of his overthrow by Gustavus Adolphus, iii. 404.
=War=, _N.'s_ aphorisms, theories, and plans of, i. 346-349;
ii. 268; iii. 202;
barbarity in, ii. 70;
thirst for, in France, 93;
the art of, 180.
=Warens, Mme. de=, memoirs of, i. 76.
=Warfare=, progress in methods of, i. 394, 395;
in Napoleonic times, ii. 178-180.
=Warsaw= (city), Louis XVIII living in, ii. 239;
Polish national movement in, ii. 444;
the Russians driven from, iii. 1, 2;
French occupation of, 6-11;
frivolity in, 10;
_N.'s_ amours in, 11;
_N._ offers to evacuate, 167;
proposition that Russia occupy, 177, 178;
Archduke Ferdinand to march against, 199;
captured by Archduke Ferdinand, 201;
Polish troops at, 203;
reoccupied by Poniatowski, 212;
offered to Prussia, 225;
attitude of the Poles in, 313;
Jesuit influence in, 31;
proposition to make it capital of a Saxon province, 328;
_N._ in, 331;
the Diet begs the restoration of Poland, 331;
Schwarzenberg evacuates, 385;
Russian occupation of, 385;
proposed new capital for Prussia, 409.
=Warsaw, Grand Duchy of=, creation of, iii. 56, 64, 73;
acquires Prussian territory, 62;
new constitution for, 67;
_N._ seeks to add Silesia to, 106, 108, 113;
Alexander's jealousy of, 108;
_N._ promises to evacuate, 113;
fortification of, 117, 165;
acquires New Galicia, 239;
territorial acquisitions, 244, 310;
pro-Russian party in, 311;
Alexander proposes to accept the crown of, 311;
military operations in, 322;
open to invasion, 329;
_N.'s_ incognito journey through, 375;
interview between _N._ and De Pradt at, 375, 382;
Russian invasion of, 385;
_N._ refuses to give up, 392;
reft from Saxony, 394;
in Russian possession, 399;
threatened dismemberment of, 409, 423;
proposed extinction of, 415;
_N.'s_ scheme in, 298.
=Washington, George=, comparison of Paoli with, i. 18;
death of, ii. 147;
admiration of France for, 147;
statue at the Tuileries, 147;
festival in honor of, 147, 148;
compared with _N._, 148;
declares the neutrality of the United States (1793), 212.
=Waterloo=, the advantage of position at, ii. 179;
the Prussian pursuit after, iii. 210;
_N.'s_ attempt at suicide after, iv. 131;
_N.'s_ reminiscences of, 175;
Wellington indicates the battle-ground, 178;
the controversial literature of, 186;
the battle-field, 189 et seq.;
character of the French troops at, 196;
Wellington's headquarters at, 195;
the plans of battle, 197;
the battle, 199 et seq.;
application of the name to the battle, 212;
review of the battle, 212 et seq.;
political spoils, 214;
moral effect on the Emperor, 216;
the news in Paris, 216;
_N.'s_ monograph on, 232;
_N.'s_ delay at, 267;
epic character of, 288;
effect on the world, 289.
=Waterloo Campaign=, parallel between campaign in Piedmont and, iv. 170.
=Wavre=, military operations at, iv. 182, 184, 187, 191-195, 214.
=Wealth=, _N._ on, i. 137.
=Weapons of war in 1796=, i. 349.
=Wehlau=, military movements near, iii. 30.
=Weimar=, dissension in the Prussian camp at, ii. 429;
fighting at, 431;
meetings of _N._ with Goethe and Wieland at, iii. 72, 73, 176.
=Weimar, Grand Duchess of=, entertains _N._, iii. 174.
=Weirother, Col.=, at Austerlitz, ii. 381.
=Weissenberg, Gen.=, captured near St. Dizier, iv. 104.
=Weissenburg=, battle of, i. 273;
the French position at, ii. 365.
=Weissenfels=, taken by Bertrand, iv. 35.
=Weissensee=, narrow escape of Frederick William III at, ii. 436.
=Wellenburg=, acquired by Würtemberg, ii. 391.
=Wellesley, Sir Arthur=, takes command of operations in Portugal,
iii. 122;
enters Portugal, 157;
defeats Junot at Vimeiro, 157;
recalled to England and vindicated, 186;
expels the French from Portugal, 236;
prepares for invasion of Spain, 236;
battle of Talavera, 236;
withdraws before Soult, 237;
created Duke of Wellington, 265;
_See also_ =Wellington, Duke of=.
=Wellesley, Lord=, succeeds Canning as prime minister, iii. 272;
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 284;
reinforces the army in Portugal, 284;
succeeded by Castlereagh, 378.
=Wellington, Duke of= (_see also_ =Wellesley, Sir Arthur=), effect
of Moore's spirit on, iii. 189;
holds Portugal, 283;
reinforced by Lord Hill, 283;
battle of Talavera, 284, 287;
battle of Busaco, 284;
retreat down the Mondego, 284;
constructs the lines of Torres Vedras, 285, 286;
battle of Ocaña, 287, 288;
difficult position at Lisbon, 288;
character, 288, 289;
summons famine to his aid, 289;
advances into Spain, 289;
battles of Albuera and Fuentes de Onoro, 289;
retreats to Portugal, 289;
recaptures Almeida, 289;
attacked by Lord Liverpool, 288;
on Masséna's stand, 289;
battle of Salamanca, 290;
storming of Badajoz, 290, 319;
captures Ciudad Rodrigo, 290, 319;
advances on the Duero, 290;
period of inactivity, 290;
returns to Portugal, 290;
resumes the offensive, 290;
between two fires, 290;
demoralization of his army, 291;
moves against Madrid, 290;
defeats Marmont at Salamanca, 377;
withdraws to the Portuguese frontier, 377;
hampered by English political situation, 377, 378;
reverses in the Peninsula, 392;
battle of Vitoria, 420;
threatens France, 420;
successes in Spain, 420, 423;
Spain rises to support, iv. 40;
on the war in Spain, 52;
signs conditions with _N._, 52;
succeeds Castlereagh at Congress of Vienna, 145, 169;
proposes to deport _N._ to St. Helena, 145;
recalled by Lord Liverpool, 149;
desires to take the field, 169;
military genius, 169;
plan of campaign of the Hundred Days, 169;
dissatisfaction with his troops, 169;
_N.'s_ position with regard to Blücher and, 171;
influence over troops, 172;
relative strength in Waterloo campaign, 172;
awaits developments, 172;
reminiscences of Waterloo, 173, 178;
relations with Blücher, 176;
interview between the Duke of Richmond and, at the ball, 178;
indicates the battle-ground at Waterloo, 178;
concentration of his troops, 178, 179;
criticizes Blücher's tactics, 181;
meeting with Blücher at Bry, 180;
battle of Quatre Bras, 181-188;
conversation with Col. Bowles, 184;
retreat to Mont St. Jean, 185, 189;
_N._ determines to attack, 185;
apprehended junction of Blücher and, 187, 190;
his choice of position, 189 et seq., 193, 196, 213;
proposes to fall back to Brussels, 190;
strength at Waterloo, 190;
Blücher promises support, 190;
Grouchy aims to prevent union between Blücher and, 192;
his resolution to give battle in front of Soignes, 192;
his center at Mont St. Jean, 195;
Gneisenau's doubt of his standing at Waterloo, 194;
lack of confidence in the Dutch-Belgian troops, 195;
headquarters at Waterloo, 195;
lines of retreat, 195, 214;
the plan of Waterloo, 197;
battle of Waterloo, 199 et seq.;
repeated calls for Blücher, 204;
stories of his anxiety, 207;
his conduct of the Waterloo campaign, 213;
faint-hearted coöperation with Blücher, 213;
restores Louis XVIII, 220;
danger of _N.'s_ surrender to, 323;
share in the reconstruction of France, 225;
alleged attempt to assassinate, 234.
=Wels=, Russian troops at, ii. 367.
=Wereja=, capture of the French garrison of, iii. 350.
=Werneck, Gen.=, capture of his division at Nördlingen, ii. 367.
=Werther=, _N._ compared to, i. 81.
=Wesel=, ceded to France, ii. 390;
French garrison at, 404, 416, 424;
demand for its restoration to Prussia, 422.
=Weser, River=, French occupation of the coast near, iii. 266;
territory on, offered to Sweden, 399.
=Western Empire=, accomplishment of _N.'s_ dream of, iii. 73;
an end to the dreams of, 422.
=West Indies, the=, scheme for populating, ii. 236;
English blockade of the French fleet in, 257;
Jerome Buonaparte in, 257;
England watches French policy concerning, 267;
France looks to her power in, 280;
_N.'s_ ambitions in, 289;
French squadrons ordered to, 333;
Nelson enticed to, 358;
_N.'s_ ambitions in, iii. 308.
=Westphalia=, military movements in, ii. 425;
organization of the kingdom of, iii. 56, 62;
Jerome king of, 73, 279;
war indemnity exacted from, 78;
levy of troops in, 132, 322-324;
sequestration of Frederick William's estates in, 162;
insurrection in, 225;
Schill's failure in, 233;
scheme to incorporate part with France, 266;
French occupation of, 307;
French influence in, 423;
flight of Jerome to France, iv. 40.
=West Prussia=, Lestocq's retreat through, ii. 435.
=Whitbread, Samuel=, on the French Revolution, ii. 144.
="White Terror," the=, i. 277; iv. 222.
=Whitworth, Lord=, character, ii. 267;
ambassador to Paris, 266, 276;
evades declaration of England's Maltese policy, 273;
summoned to the Tuileries, Feb. 17, 1803, 280-282;
at consular levee of March 13, 1803, 280-282;
his attitude, 284, 285;
on _N.'s_ reception of April 4, 284;
reports on France's naval preparations, 284;
publication of his despatches in England, 284;
_N.'s_ declarations to, on subject of invading England, 290;
a diplomatic method of, iii. 418.
=Wiazma=, battle of, iii. 350.
=Wieland, C. M.=, interview with _N._ at Wiemar, iii. 174;
decorated at Erfurt, 176;
estimate of _N.'s_ influence, 322.
=Wilberforce, William=, deprecates war with France, ii. 285.
=Willach= (Carinthia), ceded to France, iii. 239.
=Willenberg=, military movements near, iii. 13.
=William, Prince= (of Prussia), mission to Paris, iii. 178;
in battle of Waterloo, iv. 205.
="William the Conqueror," by Duval=, ii. 350.
=Willot, Gen.=, proposes to destroy the Directory, ii. 78;
suspected of plotting against _N._, 303.
=Wilson, Sir Robert=, endeavors to reorganize the Russian army, iii. 351.
=Wintzengerode=, captures Soissons, iv. 77;
defeated near St. Dizier, 95.
=Wischau=, junction of Austrian and Russian troops at, ii. 379.
=Wittau=, military operations near, iii. 227.
=Wittenberg=, captured by Davout, ii. 436;
French forces at, iii. 393;
French occupation of, iv. 2;
military movements near, 14.
=Wittgenstein, Gen.=, in the Russian campaign, iii. 341;
menaces the French left, 350;
resumes offensive against Saint-Cyr, 359;
checked by Victor and Saint-Cyr, 361;
pursuit of the French army, 366, 383;
Victor ordered to hold back, 368;
at the passage of the Beresina, 370;
defeats Victor at Borrissoff, 370;
bad generalship of, 374, 383, 384;
losses in the Russian campaign, 383;
fails to cut off Macdonald's retreat, 384;
commanding the allied army, 403;
the battle of Lützen, 405;
loses his command, 411;
commanding Army of the East, iv. 3;
battle of Leipsic, 29;
driven from Nangis, 72.
=Wkra, River=, bridging of the, iii. 2.
=Wolkousky, Prince P. M.=, in military council with Alexander I, iv. 98.
=Women=, _N.'s_ attitude toward, and ideas concerning, i. 138, 143,
256, 311, 317, 448; ii. 197, 198, 255; iii. 326, 327;
education of, ii. 225, 226;
demands of German social custom on, iii. 259, 260.
=Wrede, Gen.=, in campaign of Eckmühl, iii. 206;
movements before Ratisbon, 209;
defeated by Hiller at Erding, 212;
battle of Wagram, 229;
reaches Vilna, 373;
commanding Bavarian troops, iv. 35.
=Wright, Capt.=, lands the Cadoudal conspirators in France, ii. 297, 298;
Savary suspected of complicity in death of, 412.
=Wurmser, Gen.=, _N.'s_ operations against, i. 350;
sent to reinforce Beaulieu, 357;
military genius, 378;
marches to relief of Mantua, 378 et seq.;
operations on Lake Garda, 381-383;
attempts to succor Mantua, 383, 384;
operations on the Brenta, 384;
advance-guard captured at Primolano, 384;
defeated at Bassano, 384;
demoralization of his army, 384;
makes ineffectual sally from Mantua, 392;
besieged in Mantua, his defense and surrender, 406-418;
_N.'s_ generosity to, 417, 418.
=Würtemberg=, makes peace with France (1796), i. 385, 450;
grants to the Grand Duke of, ii. 265;
relations with Russia, 266;
French march through, 363;
friendly relations with and subservience to France, 377, 402; iii. 279;
created an independent kingdom, ii. 391, 398;
acquires territory after Austerlitz, 391;
member of the Confederation of the Rhine, 402, 403;
supplies contingents to _N.'s_ armies, ii. 404; iii. 3, 322, 324, 394;
Maria Louisa's progress through, iii. 256;
allotment of Austrian lands to, 266;
turns from _N._ to the allies, iv. 40;
position in Germany, 298.
=Würtemberg, Princess Catherine of=, marries Jerome Napoleon,
iii. 93, 94.
=Würzburg=, seized by Jourdan, i. 385;
reported French occupation of, ii. 420;
_N.'s_ base, 424;
French forces at, iii. 393.
Y
="Yamacks," the=, iii. 162.
=Yarmouth, Lord=, negotiates for peace, ii. 400, 401, 404.
=Yelin=, author of "Germany in her Deepest Humiliation," ii. 417.
=Yermoloff, Gen.=, pursuit of the French army by, iii. 383.
=Yonne, River=, military operations on the, iv. 116, 157.
=York, Duke of=, besieges Dunkirk, i. 222;
defeated by Brune at Bergen, ii. 93, 323;
capitulates at Alkmaar, 93.
=York, Gen.=, in correspondence with Alexander I, iii. 384;
concludes convention of Tauroggen, 385, 392, 395;
nominally degraded, 385;
desertion of the French cause, 393;
his action approved by the Estates of eastern Prussia, 397;
battle of Bautzen, 410;
battle of Leipsic, iv. 30;
reinforces Blücher at Montmirail, 63;
held by Mortier, 74;
routs Marmont at Athies, 79;
quits Blücher's army, but returns, 80.
="Young Guard,"= the, iii. 222;
battle of Lützen, 405;
battle of Dresden, iv. 9;
ordered to Bautzen, 18;
at Dresden, 21;
under command of Ney, 72;
Victor commanding portion of, 72;
"melts like snow," 78;
_N._ reviews, 117;
battle of Waterloo, 205.
Z
=Zaborowski=, _N._ seeks service with, i. 217.
=Zach, Gen.=, in battle of Marengo, ii. 180.
=Zacharias, Pope=, on kingly power, ii. 325.
=Zamosc=, held by the French, iii. 402.
=Zampaglini=, Corsican patriot brigand, i. 139.
=Zante=, France's jealous care of, ii. 32.
=Zealand=, French occupation of, iii. 270;
_N.'s_ offer to exchange it for Hanseatic towns, 270.
=Zembin=, the Emperor's retreat through, iii. 370.
=Ziethen, Gen. J. J.=, in Waterloo campaign, iv. 172;
at Charleroi, 173;
at Fleurus, 173, 174;
battle of Waterloo, 204, 205.
=Zittau=, French advance from Dresden to, iv. 6;
Blücher's road to, blocked by Lauriston, 8.
=Znaim=, military operations near, ii. 367;
Kutusoff's retreat to, 379;
Charles withdraws toward, iii. 230;
fighting at, 230;
French repulse at, 235;
the armistice of, 241, 251.
=Zorndorf=, battle of, iv. 267.
=Zürich=, the plundering of, ii. 40;
battles of, 93, 141;
Army of the Reserve ordered to, 164, 169;
Masséna's victory at, 323.
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte - Vol. IV. (of IV.)" ***
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