Title: A Journal of the Expedition to Carthagena - With Notes: In Answer to a Late Pamphlet Entitled, An - account of the Expedition to Carthagena
Author: Anonymous
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.


*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "A Journal of the Expedition to Carthagena - With Notes: In Answer to a Late Pamphlet Entitled, An - account of the Expedition to Carthagena" ***


A JOURNAL OF THE EXPEDITION TO _CARTHAGENA_,

With NOTES.

In ANSWER to a late PAMPHLET;

ENTITLED,

_An_ ACCOUNT _of the_ EXPEDITION _to CARTHAGENA_.

_Qui statuit aliquid, parte inaudita altera,
Æquum licet statuerit, haud æquus suit._

_Senec. Med._

The SECOND EDITION.

_LONDON_:
Printed for J. ROBERTS, in _Warwick-Lane_.
M.DCC.XLIV.



THE INTRODUCTION.


_The following Sheets contain an Answer to a Pamphlet, which appeared on
the Close of the last Session of Parliament, and is entitled,_ An
Account of the Expedition to _Carthagena._

_To set that whole Transaction in the most clear Light, the Author has
laid before the Publick an exact and faithful _Journal_ of the most
material Occurrences, not only during the Troops being on Shore in the
Neighbourhood of _Carthagena_, but from the Time of the Fleet's sailing
from _Jamaica_; the Period from which the Author of the Pamphlet begins
his Relation._

_The Notes are (as far as it was practicable) placed in the same Order
with those in the Pamphlet; to which References are made, that the
Reader may (if he pleases to take that Trouble) compare each Note with
the Answer to it._

_Several Facts will be here found to be placed in a very different Light
from the same Facts, as they are described in the Pamphlet, and others
to be rejected, as absolutely false and groundless; but the Author
flatters himself, that he has advanced nothing which is not founded upon
Truth, and such as can be supported by living Evidences, or by
authentick Records, whenever his Antagonist shall be pleased to lay
aside his Mask; otherwise, no Notice will be taken of any Reply, which
may hereafter be published._



January _the 10th, 1740_.


It was resolved in the principal Council of War[1] held at _Spanish
Town_ in _Jamaica_, that the whole Fleet should proceed to Windward, to
observe the Motions of the Squadron under the Command of the Marquis
_d'Antin_; and that Capt. _Dandridge_ should be sent before in the
_Wolf_ Sloop to get Intelligence.

No Time having been lost in preparing to put to Sea; _January_ the 22d,
Sir _Chaloner Ogle_ sailed with his Division out of _Port-Royal_
Harbour; Commodore _Lestock_ the 26th, and Vice-Admiral _Vernon_ the
28th: The three Squadrons, having join'd _January_ the 31st, made Cape
_Tiberon_, on the Coast of _Hispaniola_, _February_ the 7th; the same
Day Captain _Dandridge_ came into the Fleet. _February_ the 8th, the
Admiral made a Signal for General and Flag Officers, and communicated to
them the Report he had received from Captain _Dandridge_,[2] _viz._
"_That he had_, January _the 30th, look'd into_ Port-Lewis, _where he
had seen nineteen Ships of War; that one of them carried a Flag at the
Main-top-mast Head, and another a broad Pendant_;" which Report being
taken into Consideration, it was resolved to steer directly to the Isle
of _Vache_; where the Fleet arrived _February_ the 12th, and cast Anchor
at about two Leagues to the Westward of _Port-Lewis_.

The same Day Captain _Laws_ was sent in the _Spence_ Sloop a-fresh to
reconnoitre the Harbour of _Port-Lewis_, who return'd in a few Hours
with a Report, "_That he had there counted sixteen Ships of War, and
that one of them carried a broad Pendant_."

_February_ the 13th, the Admiral, accompany'd by the General, went in
his Barge into the Bay between the Isle of _Vache_ and _Hispaniola_,
where there was found sufficient Depth of Water for the large Ships, and
good Anchorage for the Transports. _February_ the 14th, a _French_
Officer came off with a Message; but the Admiral declining to see him
'till late in the Evening, he return'd without having deliver'd it.

The Admiral went further up the Bay to a small _Kay_ (Island) with an
Intention to reconnoitre the _French_ Fleet, and was there join'd by the
General, who perceiving it to be impossible thence to look into the
Harbour, desired, that he might in Person go in with the _Spence_ Sloop,
and that Captain _Knowles_, being a good Draughts-Man, might accompany
him; to which the Admiral consented.

As soon as the Sloop open'd the Harbour, Capt. _Laws_ declared, that the
Ships there lying at Anchor were _French_ Men of War, and pointed to
one, as having a white Flag at the Main-top-mast-Head; but the General,
not being fully satisfied, order'd the Sloop to stand within Gun-shot,
when it appeared, that the Ships in View were Merchant-men, most of them
unrig'd; excepting one Frigate of forty Guns, whose Main-top-mast-Head
lying in a Line with the white Gable-End of an House, occasioned the
Mistake about the Flag.

_February_ the 15th, Captain _Boscawen_ and Captain _Knowles_ were sent
with a Message to the _French_ Governor; the Purport of which was, that
the Admiral not being on board his Ship, when an Officer came off to
speak to him, he had not seen him, but now sends to know what he had to
offer; that the Fleet was forced by strong Breezes into the Bay; that he
desires Leave to Wood and Water: They return'd with a very polite
Answer, and brought an Account of the Marquiss _d'Antin_'s being sail'd
for _Europe_.

Capt. _Renton_ came into the Fleet, and confirm'd the Report, "_That the
Marquis_ d'Antin _sail'd with his Squadron for_ Europe, _January_ the
26th."

_February_ the 16th, the principal Council of War being assembled, it
was resolved, that the Fleet, after having taken in Wood and Water at
_Iros_, _Tiberon_ and _Donna-Maria_ Bays, should thence proceed directly
to _Carthagena_.

_February_ the 17th, the Fleet sailed from the Isle of _Vache_, and the
Day following came to an Anchor in _Iros_, _Tiberon_ and _Donna-Maria_
Bays.

Seven Days having been employ'd in taking in Wood and Water; Detachments
from the _American_ Regiment, and from the Negroes, were daily sent on
Shore to cut Fascines and Pickets.

_February_ the 25th, the _Weymouth_, the _Experiment_, and the _Spence_
Sloop, were order'd a-head, under the Command of Capt. _Knowles_, to
sound _Punto-Canoa_ Bay, which lies about two Leagues to the Windward of
_Carthagena_.

_February_ the 26th, the whole Fleet got under Sail, and came to an
Anchor in _Punto-Canoa_ Bay, _March_ the 4th.

_March_ the 5th, a general Council of War composed of the four principal
Officers of the Army, and of the four principal Officers of the Navy,
was held for settling the Shares of Plunder; but no Scheme could be then
formed for attacking the Town, "from the Want of proper
Intelligence."[3]

_March_ the 6th, the General, accompany'd by some of the principal Land
Officers, went on Board the _Lyon_ Man of War to reconnoitre the Town,
the Coast adjoining, the Forts on _Tierra Bomba_, &c. but did not return
to the Fleet before the 8th in the Morning: The _Lyon_ having lost her
Main-Mast by the great Swell of the Sea. The _Weymouth_, the _Dunkirk_,
the _Experiment_, and the _Spence_ Sloop, were order'd to the Mouth of
the Harbour, for taking the Soundings, and for getting Information how
near the large Ships could approach for battering the Forts on _Tierra
Bomba_.

_March_ the 8th, a general Council of War being assembled, and having
received, and carefully weighed, the Reports of the General Officers,
and of the Captains of the _Dunkirk_ and _Weymouth_, it was unanimously
resolved, that Sir _Chaloner Ogle_ should the next Morning fall down
with his Division to the Mouth of the Harbour, and batter the Forts, St.
_Philip_, St. _Jago_, &c.

The General afterwards assembled a Council of War, composed of Land
Officers; when a Disposition was made for landing the Troops.

_March_ the 9th, in the Morning, Sir _Chaloner Ogle_, accompany'd by the
General, proceeded, with his Division, to the Attack of the Forts: Three
eighty Gun Ships; the _Norfolk_, Capt. _Graves_; the _Shrewsbury_, Capt.
_Townshend_; and the _Russel_, Capt. _Norris_, were order'd to batter
those of St. _Philip_ and St. _Jago_: Which Service they perform'd very
gallantly, having, before the Evening, drove the Enemy from their Guns,
and forced there, to retire out of the Forts.

About Two, the General and Sir _Chaloner Ogle_ went on board the
_Norfolk_, and afterwards the _Russel_, for the better reconnoitring the
Enemy, and viewing the Ground where the Troops were proposed to be
landed.

The Loss on board the _Norfolk_ and the _Russel_ was not very
considerable, but the _Shrewsbury_ suffered much more; for having
received a Shot in her Cable, she drove so far, as to open the whole
Fire of the Castle of _Boca-Chica_, &c. to which she lay exposed till
the Night gave her an Opportunity of removing to a safer Birth. As there
were no Guns either in _Fort Chambra_, or on what was called the Fascine
Battery, the _Princess-Amelia_, and the _Litchfield_ met with no
Opposition.

About Five, Sir _Chaloner Ogle_ made a Signal for landing the Troops,
which was repeated by the Admiral, who lay then with his Squadron at
about a League's Distance.

As soon as the Grenadiers appeared, the General joined them, with an
Intention to have landed immediately; but the three principal Officers,
and two of the Companies, being still wanting, he order'd the Boats to
lie under the Cover of the _Russel_ and the _Norfolk_, there to wait
their Arrival: They were in a short Time joined by the Lieutenant
Colonel and Major, and one Company; but Col. _Wynyard_, "who was
detain'd with his Company of Grenadiers, on board the _Strumbulo
Fire-Ship_, _from the want of Boats_," being still absent, the Landing
was further post-pon'd to about Seven, when they were, without
Opposition, put on Shore on the Strand, to the Left of Fort St.
_Philip_, under the Command of Lieutenant Col. _Cochrane_: After having
seen them in Possession of the Forts, the General returned and went on
board a Vessel, which lay near the Shore, and there passed the rest of
the Night.

In the Disposition for Landing, the Grenadiers were to have been
sustained by a Brigade, commanded by Brig. _Guise_, and Col. _Wolfe_,
who themselves join'd the General; but the Brigade did not come down
till the Day following, being prevented by the strong Breezes.[4]

The same Evening the Bomb Ketches began to fire upon the Castle.

_March_ the 10th, as soon as the Day appeared, the General went on
Shore, and gave Orders for forming the Grenadiers upon the Beach, for
covering the landing of the rest of the Troops; which not being
compleated till late in the Evening, the whole lay that Night upon their
Arms.

_March_ the 11th, the Negroes, Tools, and Tents being put on Shore; the
Ground was clear'd, the Tents pitch'd, and the Troops under cover the
same Evening.[5]

Two Coupures or Lines were begun into the Woods; one for cutting off the
Communication of the Castle of _Boca-Chica_ with the City, the other for
opening a way to the Skirts of the Wood, for the erecting a Battery;
which last was this Day advanced 500 Yards.

Mr. _Moor_, the principal Engineer, landed in the Night; the Ordnance
Ship, on which he was embarked, having been drove to _Leeward_.

_March_ the 12th, a Mortar Battery was begun, between the Forts St.
_Phillip_ and St. _Jago_; and the Coupure leading to the Castle, was
carried on to the Skirts of the Wood, but that for cutting off the
Communication, was discontinued by the Advice of the principal
Engineer.[6]

All the Negroes, and as many Soldiers as could be spared, from their
other Duty, were employed in cutting Fascines and Pickets. A Traverse
was raised in the Coupure leading to _Boca-Chica_, and an Epaulement was
thrown up for the covering the Workmen, which were to be employed in
raising the great Gun-Battery.

_March_ the 13th, A Defence was made of Casks filled with Sand, to cover
the Mortar Battery from the Enemy's Fire; this Evening, (not the 17th,
as the Author is pleased to alledge, Page the 10th,) it was finished,
and began to play upon the Castle.[7]

The Bomb-Ketches likewise continued to throw their Shells, and it was
observed that _several_ of them did not take place in the Castle. The
Ground was traced out for the great Gun-Battery.[8]

The Coupure leading to the Castle of _Boca-Chica_, was enlarged. A
Lieutenant Colonel's Guard was mounted to cover the Workmen to be
employed on the great Gun-Battery.

The Enemy fired very smartly, both Yesterday and this Day, and killed
several Men in the Camp.[9]

_March_ the 14th, the Works were carried on with all the Expedition our
Circumstances would admit of; but were much retarded, not only from the
Heat of the Climate, which renders _Europeans_ almost unable to support
the least Fatigue, but from the Negroes throwing down their Loads, and
working Tools, whenever a Shot came near them. These Difficulties having
been represented to a Council of War by the principal Engineer,
signifying at the same time, that an Addition of 1600 Men to the Forces
then on Shore was wanting, to enable him to push on his Works with
Vigour, a Demand was made of that Number of Soldiers to be landed from
the Fleet, which the Admiral was pleased to refuse, alledging, that we
could have no Occasion for them.

_March_ the 15th, the General, accompany'd by Mr. _Moor_ and Capt.
_Knowles_ view'd the Works at the great Gun Battery, and passed the
Skirts of the Wood to reconnoitre the Castle, which had then received
little or no visible Damage from the Shells.

_March_ the 16th, all possible Diligence was used in cutting Fascines,
sharpening Pickets, preparing Planks and timbers _&c._ for the Battery.
The Artillery, and the greatest Part of the Stores, were by this Time
landed,[10] of which Part was carried to the great Gun Battery.

_March_ the 17th, the Parapet of the great Gun Battery was very near
raised to the Embrasures.

A Representation was made to the Admiral from a Council of War of Land
Officers, of the Necessity of driving the Enemy from their Fascine
Battery, which, as it was seated on the other Side the Entry into the
Harbour, could not be done without the Assistance of the Fleet,
otherwise the Attack upon it would have been made by a Detachment from
the Land Forces on Shore.

The same Day, it was resolved in a Council of War, composed of Sea
Officers, to make an Attempt on the Fascine Battery with three hundred
Sailors, and _two hundred Soldiers_, detach'd from those remaining on
board the Fleet.

_March_ the 18th, several of the Cannon were drawn up to the Battery,
and mounted upon their Carriages.

The Enemy, having discovered our Workmen, began to fire briskly upon
them from the Castle, with Stones, _&c._ A Party of the Enemy fired upon
the Negroes, who were employed in the Woods in cutting Fascines; but did
no other Damage than the interrupting their Work.

During the Night, the Fascine Battery was attack'd by 300 Sailors, and
200 Soldiers, who possessed themselves of it, with very little
Opposition.[11]

_March_ the 19th, an Epaulement was raised to the left of the great Gun
Battery, to cover it from the Fire of the Enemy's Ships of War; twelve
of the Platforms were finished. The Enemy were perceived to be at Work
in repairing the _Barradera_ Battery.[12]

_March_ the 20th, the Wood began to be clear'd away before the great Gun
Battery, and seven Pieces of Cannon were brought upon the Platforms.

_March_ the 21st, nineteen Embrasures were finish'd, all the Cannon
placed upon the Platforms, and the Wood was cut away, which cover'd the
Battery from the View of the Castle.

_March_ the 22d,[13] the Battery being finished, began early in the
Morning to play upon the Castle, not only with the great Guns, but with
forty small Mortars and Cohorns, which fired alternatively; the Enemy
return'd the Fire very briskly from the Castle, the Fascine Battery, and
the Shipping; but with no great Effect, excepting, that the Balls which
miss'd the Battery, did some Damage in the Camp.

_March_ the 23d, A Squadron of Men of War,[14] under the Command of
Commodore _Lestock_, were order'd to cannonade the Castle of
_Boca-Chica_, and the Enemy's Ships, which guarded the Mouth of the
Harbour; but were obliged to drop their Anchors at so great a Distance,
that their Shot had little or no Effect. After having suffer'd
considerably from the Enemy's Fire, the Admiral sent them Orders to
retire; tho' it was upon this Occasion enter'd in the Journals, and by
Order, that the Breach was enlarg'd by the Fire from our Men of War;
yet, in Fact, the Breach was not touch'd by one single Ball; such of the
Shot as reach'd the Curtain, and the Face of the western Bastion, made
little more than a slight Impression, and fell into the Ditch.

A continual Fire, and with good Effect, was kept from the great Gun
Battery, which the Enemy return'd very briskly, and but with too much
Success: Mr. _Moor_, the principal Engineer, having been mortally
wounded, as he was attentively considering the Effect of the Shot from
his Battery.

_March_ the 24th, a Detachment from the Fleet, composed of Sailors and
Soldiers, commanded by Capt. _Watson_, made a second Attempt on the
Fascine Battery, and enter'd it without the least Opposition; destroy'd
the Carriages, Platforms, _&c._ Early in the Morning the General visited
all the advanced Guards and Batteries, and towards the Evening
reconnoitred the Breach, which he not thinking to be yet practicable,
signify'd the same by Letter to the Admiral, who had vehemently pressed
the Attack. The great Gun Battery fired during the whole Night
alternatively with round and Grape Shot.[15]

_March_ the 25th, the Breach being enlarged, and reported practicable by
an Engineer, who had been sent to reconnoitre: It was resolved in a
Council of War to make the Attack the same Evening.

A Disposition having been prepared for that Purpose, and approved by the
Council of War; at about half an Hour after five the Troops advanced
towards the Fort. The Forlorn-Hope consisted of a Serjeant, and twelve
Grenadiers, who were immediately followed by thirty Voluntiers; next
march'd 260 Grenadiers (the whole then remaining) under the Command of
Lieutenant-Colonel _Macloud_, and afterwards Colonel _Daniel_ at the
Head of a Detachment of 500 Men, who had under his Direction some small
Parties, carrying Scaling Ladders, broad Axes, Pick-axes and Spades, to
be in Readiness in case of need: The whole was sustained by 500 Men,
under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel _Cochrane_; and Brigadier
_Blakeney_, the Brigadier of the Day, had the Direction of the Attack.
Upon a Signal, which was, the Firing of three Bombs from the Mortar
Battery, a Volley of round Shot was pour'd in upon the Breach, from the
great Gun Battery, and was immediately followed by a second of Grape
Shot, which obliging the Centinels upon the Walls to put themselves
under Cover, probably occasioned their not having perceived the Troops,
when they first began to move to the Attack; but some time before they
reach'd the Foot of the Walls, the Drums in the Fort beat to Arms, the
Top of the Breach was man'd, the Ships began to fire with Grape Shot,
and several Shots were made from Fort St. _Joseph_, tho' without doing
any other Execution, than the killing of one Man. The Commandant of the
Fort being at that time on board one of the Ships, the Garrison fell
into Confusion, and fled with Precipitation out of the Gate, as soon as
the Grenadiers began to mount the Breach.[16]

Soon after our Troops were in Possession of the Castle, the _Africa_ and
St. _Carlos_ were sunk; and the St. _Philip_ being set on Fire (whether
by the Enemy, or the red-hot Balls from the great Gun Battery, is
uncertain) blew up very near to the Walls of the Castle; but without
doing any Damage. When the Troops were moving towards the Breach, some
arm'd Boats from the Fleet, commanded by Capt. _Knowles_, were perceived
rowing towards the Mangroves; on what Design[17] was altogether a
Secret to the General, he having not received the least Intimation of
it. They had on board a Party of Soldiers and Sailors, who being landed
on the _Barradera_ Side, marched (the former leading the Way) to the
Shore, the nearest to Fort St. _Joseph_; when it was resolved to pass
thro' the Water, and to make an Attempt upon it; but the Men, who were
sent in to sound, not finding it practicable, and being discovered, the
Enemy began to fire upon the Party with Grape Shot, which obliged them
to retire under the Cover of the Bushes. The Commandant then proposed,
that the Centinel should be civilly desired to admit them into the Fort;
but the rest of the Officers not much depending on his Complaisance,
advised the making a general Attack upon it with all the Boats; in
Answer to which, it was alledged, that as three of the Enemy's Ships of
War were already destroyed, and as Fort St. _Joseph_ lay under the Fire
of the Castle, of which our Troops were then in Possession, such an
Attempt would be quite unnecessary, as that Fort must on Course fall
into our Hands: It was therefore resolved to go on board the nearest
Ships, and there to wait for fresh Orders from the Admiral, which being
come, the Commandant, in a short time, row'd towards the Fort, which he
found abandoned, and enter'd it without the least Opposition.

As soon as we had possessed ourselves of the Gate of the Castle, and
that the Guards were posted, the General ordered out a Party of
_Harrison_'s Grenadiers, with the proper Tools, under the Command of Mr.
_Blane_ the Engineer, and of Mr. _Bennett_ (who first enter'd the
Breach) to cut the End of the Boom adjoining to the Castle, which they
did effectually about nine; and it was the Want of a Boat only that
prevented the Landmen's seizing the _Galicia_, on board of which Capt.
_Knowles_ rowed about twelve, and afterwards order'd a Party of Sailors
to cut the other End of the Boom.

_March_ the 26th, the General issued out the proper Orders, for
reimbarking the Troops, Artillery, _&c._ in which Commodore _Lestock_,
who remained with his Squadron at the Entrance into the _Lagoon_, was
directed to be assisting.

_March_ the 27th, the great Surf of the Sea prevented the Boats from
coming into Shore, and retarded the Imbarkation of the Troops, _&c._ A
Road was made from the grand Battery to _Boca-Chica_, for the more
commodious Conveyance of the large Cannon. The Admiral's Ship, and some
other Ships of War, having warped thro' the Channel, began to move up
the Harbour.

_March_ the 28th, _Harrison_'s and _Wentworth_'s Regiments, being
order'd to strike their Tents, and to go on board their Transports, were
prevented by the Surge of the Sea, and obliged to pitch them again near
the Walls of the Castle. The _Weymouth_, and the _Cruizer_ Sloop, were
sent to demolish two little Batteries on the _Passa-Cavallos_,[18]
which they performed without Opposition, and likewise seized or
destroyed such small Craft, as they found upon the _Lagoon_.

_March_ the 29th, the two old Regiments, and some of the Stores, were
put on board. All the Artillery and the Materials, which had been
employed for erecting the great Battery, were placed upon the Shore in
Readiness for Embarkation.

_March_ the 30th, Colonels _Wolfe_ and _Robinson_'s Regiments embark'd,
and all possible Diligence was used in getting on board the Stores and
Artillery.

A general Council of War was held on board the Admiral's Ship, wherein
it was resolved to land the troops as soon as should be practicable,
"_for the cutting off the Communication of the Town with the Country on
the Land Side; and that the Artillery should be embark'd with all
possible Expedition to proceed after them_." It was also resolved,
"_that such Numbers of Soldiers, as the General should judge would be
wanting for that Service, should be landed from the Fleet_."

The Council of War, on this Occasion, might probably think it
unnecessary to make any mention of what Share the King's Ships were to
take in the Attack of the City, as it is believed, that not one of the
Members could have the least Room to doubt of the Admiral's ordering in
some large Men of War to batter the Town, as soon as the Channel should
be laid open for their Admittance into the _Surgidero_; a Circumstance
so much taken for granted, before we were in Possession of _Boca-Chica_
Castle, that it was confidently affirmed (and by no inconsiderable
Persons in the Navy) "that, after a Way should be laid open for the
Ships into the Harbour, the Assistance of the Land Forces would be no
longer wanted." The _Russel_, which had on board Sir _Chaloner Ogle_;
the _Weymouth_, &c. turn'd up the Harbour, and cast Anchor not far from
_Castillo Grande_.

_March_ the 31st, Colonels _Lowther_ and _Wynyard_'s Regiments embark'd.
The Cannon and Stores continued to be put on board.

The Enemy seem'd to prepare for a vigorous Defence, by their having sunk
the seven Galleons in the Channel leading to the _Surgidero_, and moor'd
two large Men of War at the Entrance of it, which last having been
likewise sunk during the Night, and _Castillo Grande_ in all Appearance
abandoned; Sir _Chaloner Ogle_ order'd Captain _Knowles_, in the
_Weymouth_, to stand in within Gun-shot, and to fire upon it; which
being done for some time, without any Return, Boats were sent ashore,
and the Castle was enter'd without Opposition; of which the Admiral
having Notice, he order'd one hundred of the Soldiers, who were on board
the King's Ships to remain there in Garrison.[19]

Capt. _Laws_ was dispatched to _England_ in the _Spence_ Sloop, with an
Account of the taking of _Boca-Chica_ Castle; notwithstanding the
Instances used by both the General, and Sir _Chaloner Ogle_, to postpone
sending, till it should be known, what would be the Success against the
City; which, considering the Strength of the Enemy, that our Troops
began to sicken, and that the rainy Season was then begun; could by no
thinking Man be look'd upon to be otherwise, than doubtful.

_April_ the 1st, Colonels _Moreton_, and _Grant_'s Regiments embarked.
Captains _Griffin_ and _Renton_ being sent to reconnoitre the Channel;
and observing that the Stern of the _Conquestador_ was afloat, they
found Means to heave her round, and thereby opened a Passage for the
Bomb-Vessels, and two twenty Gun-Ships. The Transports got through the
Channel, and began to move up the _Lagoon_, but the Ordnance Ships still
remained at the Entrance into the Harbour, the Artillery and the Stores
being not yet all put on board.

_April_ the 2nd, The General, with the greatest Part of the Transports,
came to an Anchor near _Castillo Grande_. The Bomb Ketches began early
in the Morning to play upon the Town, but were placed at too great a
Distance, for the Shells to do much Damage.

The Enemy set Fire to a _French_ Ship, which lay at Anchor near the
Walls.[20]

_April_ the 3d, all the Cannon and Mortars were got on board; but the
Carriages, _&c._ still remained upon the Shore. The _Weymouth_ Man of
War having passed the Channel, the Enemy fired upon her some random
Shot; but she lay at too great a Distance to receive any Damage. Such
_Americans_, as had served on Shore, as likewise the Negroes, imbarked
this Day on their Transports.

_April_ the 4th, a Council of War of Land Officers was held on board the
_Dorsetshire_ Transport, wherein it was resolved, that the Troops should
be landed the 5th at Break of Day; for which a Disposition having been
prepared by the General, and then laid before the Members, was by them
unanimously approved of. The _Weymouth_, the _Cruizer_ Sloop, and two or
three Fireships, kept firing, during the Night, with Grapeshot into the
Woods adjoining to where the Troops were to land.

_April_ the 5th, the Troops, which were appointed first to land,
amounting to about 1400 Men, under the Command of Brigadier _Blakeney_,
rendezvous'd along Side of the _Weymouth_: At about five in the Morning,
the General ordered Colonel _Grant_ to move towards the Shore with the
Grenadiers, who having landed[21] without Opposition, and being
immediately followed by the rest of the Troops, the whole was formed in
the Order for marching against the Enemy. After having waited a short
time, in Expectation of the 200 _American_ Soldiers, who were by the
Disposition to have joined us with the working Tools; as likewise of the
Negroes, and a Party of Matrosses, designed to attend eight Pattereroes;
the General ordered the Grenadiers to enter the Wood, and Brigadier
_Blakeney_ to sustain them at the Head of the old Regiments. Having
reach'd the End of the Defillée, with the Loss of only one Man, by the
Fire of a straggling Party, they halted, and signify'd to the General,
that the Enemy appeared; who immediately advanced to the Head of the
Grenadiers, and passed the Defillée: Where having carefully reconnoitred
the Disposition of the Enemy, he ordered The Grenadiers to march, and to
dislodge them. The Enemy, (as it was afterwards reported by Deserters)
consisted of about 700 Men, and were drawn up on the Strand, in such a
manner, as to cover the Road leading to the City, where they seem'd
determined to expect us; the Ground over which the Troops were to march,
did not admit of much more than one large Plattoon in front; the
_Lagoon_ lying upon the left, and a thick Copse upon our right, into
which the General ordered a Party of _American_ Soldiers, to fall upon
the Rear of any small Parties, which might be lodged there, to flank us
upon our March. The Grenadiers moved forward with great Alacrity, and
having, with very little Loss, received two Fires from the Enemy, the
front Plattoon gave their Fire at about the distance of half musquet
Shot, and immediately wheel'd to the Right and Left to make room for the
next to advance, whence the Enemy judging that the whole Body gave way,
expressed their Joy by a loud Huzza; but being soon convinced of their
Mistake, by the Fire of the following Plattoons, they fell into
Confusion and fled towards the City.

As soon as the proper Guards were posted, and the Troops put under Cover
in the best manner which was practicable, in some Houses and Sheds
adjoining to _La Quinta_; a Party was sent up the Hill to reconnoitre
the Convent on _La Popa_, which they entered without Opposition, and
made some Prisoners; an Officer's Guard was immediately ordered to take
Possession of it.

_April_ the 6th, the General accompany'd by Brigadier _Guise_, and the
principal Engineer reconnoitred the City from the Convent of _La Popa_;
and having at his Return assembled a Council of War, it was debated,
whether the Fort should not be attacked the following Night, before the
Enemy should have finished some Works upon the Hill, "which they were
then carrying on with the utmost Diligence;" but as no Stores were yet
landed from the Ordnance Ships, it was found necessary to postpone the
Attack. Two twelve Pounders, Three three Pounders with fifty rounds of
Powder and Ball, and five rounds of Grape-Shot, were put on Shore in the
Evening[22]. Some _American_ Soldiers being landed from the Fleet, as
likewise the Negroes and some working Tools, the Ground was begun to be
cleared for the Encampment; but the excessive Heat not only retarded the
Work, but proved fatal to most of the _Europeans_ who were there
employed.

_April_ the 7th, The Council of War being reassembled, and having
received the Report of the principal Engineer, and likewise taken into
Consideration, the Intelligence given by Deserters and Prisoners; they
were of Opinion, that the Fort ought not to be attempted without having
first raised a Battery, for which the principal Engineer was ordered to
pitch upon the proper Ground, to draw a Scheme for putting that Design
in Execution; and, as soon as should be practicable, to lay it before
the Council. This their Resolution was the same Day communicated to the
Admiral, to which was added as their Opinion, that the Success would be
much facilitated, "if the Bomb-Vessels were ordered to Fire upon Fort
St. _Lazar_, and likewise if one of the large Ships of War was brought
in to batter it." The Admiral returned an Answer the same Evening, in
which "he strongly expressed his Dislike to our waiting for a Battery",
and declared, "that if the Council of War still persisted in their
Resolution to raise one against so paltry a Fort, he would answer for
it, that if the Engineer did but compleat it, the Enemy would not wait a
minute for the Cannon;" but to that part of their Resolution, wherein is
represented the Expediency of bombarding the Fort, and of sending in a
large Ship to fire upon it, the Admiral "was not pleased to give any
direct Answer."

The Enemy continued to carry on their Works[23] upon the Hill, and
brought some Pieces of Cannon to bear upon our advanced Guard, and upon
the General's Quarters, but with very little Effect. The General
signified to the Admiral by Letter, that he had endeavoured to cut off
the Communication[24] of the City of _Carthagena_ with the Country, by
the neck of Land lying upon the Sea, but found that any Detachment sent
thither, would be intirely in the Enemy's Power, as being at too great a
distance from the Camp to be sustained, nor had he any Boats on the
Lake, for the supplying them with Provisions and Water; and proposed
that some small Man of War, should be sent for that Purpose to lie near
the Shore: The Admiral signified in his Answer, that he would order in a
Ship and a Sloop.

The Admiral was this Day pleased to put on Shore from the Men of War a
further Detachment from the _Americans_;[25] but excepting 30 or 40,
all that he would spare of Lord _James Cavendish_'s, and Colonel
_Bland_'s Regiments, were already landed: Nor were these People sent on
Shore, as the Author affirms in his Pamphlet, (Page 37) in consequence
of any Representation made of the increasing Sickness, but of a demand
of a Reinforcement from the Fleet; first made by the General, and
afterwards by the Council of War, which was never fully complied with.

_April_ the 8th, the Council of War being reassembled, it appear'd from
the Report of the principal Engineer[26] that so large a Number of Men,
and so much time would be wanting to cut thro' the Wood, and to raise a
Battery, as in our Circumstances rendered it impracticable; the sickly
Season was now come in, and the Water in the Cisterns began to grow low:
There seeming therefore to be no Choice left, but either to make a bold
Push for the surprising Fort St. _Lazar_, or to return on Board; it was
resolved[27] to attempt it the next Morning, the scaling Ladders having
been this Day put on Shore, and not before. What further determined the
Council to come to this Resolution, was fresh Intelligence received from
Deserters and Prisoners, confirm'd by the Observations of some of the
Engineers, who had viewed the Fort very near, viz. _That the Walls were
not too high for our Ladders; nor was there any Ditch at the foot of
them_; (as had been before represented) _that the Road leading up the
Hill on the right was broad, and of an easy Ascent; and that there was a
wooden Door on the left of the Fort, which might be forced without much
Difficulty_, and to which a Deserter offered himself as a Guide.

A further Motive, perhaps might be of Weight with some of the Members,
_viz._ the Admiral's vehemently pressing the Attack "without a Breach,"
and his insisting that it was scarcely possible to miscarry in the
Attempt. And in all probability, if the Attack had not been made, it
might have been alledged and possibly credited at Home, that had the
Experiment been tried, the City must have infallibly fallen into our
Hands.

The rest of the Day was employed in preparing for the Attack: In the
Evening the Council of War being reassembled, a Disposition for it was
laid before them, which having been examined and approved, was by the
Brigade Majors immediately communicated to all the principal Officers.

_April_ the 9th, the Troops appointed for the Attack, were order'd to
parade on the Strand, at two in the Morning;[28] where having formed,
they advanced towards the Fort, and a little before Break of Day, began
to mount the Hill. But that Division, which was, by Order, to have gone
up an open, accessible Road, which lay upon the Right of the Fort, was
in the dark, by a fatal Mistake (as it was said of the Guide) led up the
Center, where the Ascent is very steep, and the Ground broken: Some of
the most forward gained the Top, and pushed on to the Enemy's
Entrenchments; but not being immediately sustained, by Reason of the
great Difficulty found in mounting the Hill, and that the rest of the
Plattoons advanced slowly with the Street firing, they were most of them
killed or wounded.

Colonel _Grant_ very gallantly mounted the Hill upon the Left; but
having immediately received a mortal Wound, and the Guide, with several
others, being kill'd; the Officer, the next in Command, advanced no
further, but continued on the Side of the Hill, till they were ordered
to retire.

As soon as the Day broke, and gave the General an Opportunity of viewing
the Posture of the Assailants, and that of the Enemy, he sent a Message
to Brigadier _Guise_, who commanded the Attack, signifying, that, if he
could push forward, he should be sustained by 500 Men, who were
accordingly ordered to advance; but it was then too late. The Troops
were disheartened, and the Enemy's Numbers encreased every Instant, by
pouring in fresh Men from the City, who had by that time assembled a
Force upon the Hill equal, if not superior, to the Assailants. It was
therefore found necessary to order a Retreat, which was made without
further Loss, the five hundred Men abovementioned bringing up the Rear.
The principal Engineer having proposed the raising a Breast-work at the
advanced Guard, it was without Delay begun upon, and was in so great
Forwardness by the next Morning, as to put the Men under Cover. A
Cessation of Arms was agreed upon for a few Hours to bury the Dead.

_April_ the 10th, The Sick and Wounded were sent on board; the
Intrenchment at the advanced Guard was inlarged for the Reception of two
Mortars, which were this Day conveyed thither.

The Troops were under great Difficulties, not only from the Sickness,
which hourly encreased, but from their Provisions not being regularly
landed.

_April_ the 11th, the two Mortars began to fire from the advanced Guard
upon the Castle of St. _Lazar_, and with very good Effect.

A Council of War was assembled, composed of Land Officers, who having
carefully inquired into the State of the Forces on Shore, found them to
be so much diminished by Sickness, and by the late Loss; and those, who
were return'd, as fit for Duty, so much exhausted by the excessive Heat,
and by Fatigue, that without a considerable Reinforcement from the
Fleet, it would not be possible to go on with the Enterprize: This their
Resolution was immediately communicated to the Admiral.

_April_ the 12th, the Sickness amongst the Troops still encreasing,
several of the principal Officers were seized with it, and the Water in
the Cisterns began to be very low. The Admiral return'd an Answer to the
Resolution of the Council of War of yesterday; which having been taken
into Consideration by the principal Land Officers, assembled for that
Purpose, they observed with great Surprize, that no mention was made of
any Reinforcement to be sent from the Fleet; of which, having taken the
proper Notice in their Answer, they desired, that the Admiral would
issue out his Directions for imbarking the Cannon, _&c._ concluding from
his Silence in so material a Point, that no Reinforcement was to be
expected. But no mention was at that time made of bringing in Ships to
cannonade the Town; as the Manner, in which a former Proposal of that
Nature had been answered, gave little Room to hope for Success in
repeating of it: Tho' perhaps it may not be difficult to make appear,
that our great Ships lying unactive at a time when they might have been
usefully employ'd,[29] was the principal Occasion of our not possessing
ourselves of the City of _Carthagena_, and not the Miscarriage of the
Attack of St. _Lazar_. For had we got Possession of it (as would
probably have been the Case, if the Scheme for the Attack had been
punctually executed) it does not follow, that the Town would have on
Course surrender'd, or that they could have been compelled to it,
without the Admirals assisting us with his whole Force; except we are to
suppose, that the _Spaniards_, with a Garrison not inferior in Numbers
to the Besiegers, would have tamely given it up into our Hands: for it
is morally certain, that the Corps of Troops, which were then on Shore,
must, by Sickness only, in a few Days have been reduced so low, as not
to be able to bring off their Cannon.

_April_ the 13th, great Numbers of Sick, both Officers and Soldiers,
were sent on board the Transports.

A Council of War was assembled on Shore, who took into Consideration a
Letter from the Admiral, in Answer to their late Representation, and
resolved, to desire without Delay to meet the Sea Officers in a general
Council of War; which being signified to the Admiral, it was agreed to
assemble the Day following on board the Admiral's Ship.

_April_ the 14th, the Council of War being assembled, the General laid
before the Members the real State of the Troops,[30] and declared, that
he deemed it to be impracticable to go on with the Enterprize, without
Assistance from the Fleet. The principal Engineer being called in, and
examined, signify'd to the Council of War, the Places which he thought
would be the most proper for erecting Batteries; to which he added, that
no less than a Fortnight would be required for raising them, considering
the many interruptions which must be expected from the Enemy, and the
Sickness hourly increasing amongst the Troops; and that 1500 Men would
be wanting for the proper Reliefs for that Service only; he further
declared it to be his Opinion, that with the Troops now on Shore, the
Siege could not be undertaken with any Probability of Success.

The Admiral, without further Deliberation, going to put the Question,
whether the Troops should be reimbark'd or not, Mr. _Wentworth_
declared, that he could not give his Vote, till he should be informed
what Assistance they were to expect from the Fleet; who, being
interrupted by the Admiral with great Heat and Passion, and not with the
most polite Language, made a proper Reply; to which the Admiral not
being pleased to return any Answer, immediately left the Cabbin.

The Debate was afterwards decently carry'd on, and the General having
repeated his Question, Sir _Chaloner Ogle_, and the other Sea Officers,
who were Members of the Council of War, unanimously declared, that it
would by no means, be adviseable to trust the Sailors on Shore, as they
could be kept under no Command, and would soon disperse themselves in
the Woods; to which Mr. _Vernon_ (who sat in the Gallery within hearing)
added aloud, that some of them would soon ramble into _Carthagena_.

The Admiral being returned to his Place at the Board, it was unanimously
resolved to reimbark the Cannon and Land Forces with all possible
Expedition.

The Admiral, as President, drew up the Resolution of the Council of War,
when it was observable, that he carefully avoided making the least
mention of Assistance having been demanded from the Fleet.

The Battery[31] of two ten inch Mortars, which was raised by Captain
_Knowles_ on the Shore near to his Ship, began this Morning to Fire upon
Fort St. _Lazar_, but was placed at so great a Distance as to have
little or no Effect.

_April_ the 15th, the Cannon, Stores and heavy Baggage, were put on
Board.

A Council of War of Land Officers being assembled, a Disposition was
laid before them, for the Retreat,[32] which was approved of.

_April_ the 16th, About Five in the Morning, the _Galicia_, commanded by
Captain _Hoare_, began to canonade the Town with tolerable good Success;
but he being exposed to a superior Fire, was obliged to cut her Cable;
after having received several Shots in her Hull, had six Men killed, and
56 wounded, she drove upon a Shoal, and was there burnt by the Admiral's
Order.

At Seven in the Evening, the Tents were struck, at Eight the Troops
march'd from their Ground, and embarked in three Divisions on the Boats
prepared to receive them. The Sickness amongst the Troops increased to
so great a Degree, that any longer Continuance in that unhealthy
Situation, seemed to threaten no less than their total Ruin; the General
therefore, and the principal Land Officers, agreed to the Admiral's
Proposal, for demolishing the Forts, _&c._ which commanded the Harbour;
that being done, and Water taken in for the Voyage, the whole Fleet set
sail for _Jamaica_.



THE APPENDIX.


I Shall only here remark some Mistakes, which the Author of the Pamphlet
has been guilty of in his Appendix, both with regard to the
Circumstances of the City of _Carthagena_, and to the Conduct of the
Officers of the Army, whom he has been pleased basely to asperse,
without any Grounds whatsoever. And I do appeal to the Gentlemen of the
Navy, for the Truth of what I have advanced; which must be so evident to
every impartial Person, who was there present, and gave the least
Attention to what passed, that I should not have employed one Moment's
Time, in replying to a Pamphlet, made up of glaring Falsehoods, Facts
misrepresented, and mean personal Reflections, to which the Author does
not put his Name; was I not in Hopes, that by laying before the Publick
an exact Account of the Transactions before _Carthagena_, in some
Measure to remove (from those who cannot otherwise be informed of the
Truth) the Prejudices which are so industriously propagated in that
scurrilous Libel; not solely with a View to calumniate a few brave Men,
who after many Hazards are return'd home to their native Country; but by
invidious Distinctions, to set at variance the Army and the Navy, which
can have no other End but to obstruct his Majesty's Service, whenever
the Fleet and Land Forces shall act in Conjunction.

As for the City itself (says the Author) Nature has fortified it against
any Attempt by Sea, the Water shoaling near a League off, and being
plentifully bounded with Rocks; besides the Sea is very seldom smooth,
so that it is difficult at all times landing.

There are Pilots, who have been long accustomed to that Coast, who
affirm that there is depth of Water sufficient for large Ships to anchor
(even on that Side) near enough to batter the Town: The only Difficulty
arises from the Swell of the Sea; but that much abates, whenever the
Wind blows for any Time off Shore.

The Ravelin here mention'd can only subsist in the Author's Imagination;
there is no other Defence between the two Bastions, (which are very
distant from each other,) excepting a low Wall not flank'd; a
Circumstance of which very good Use might be made, if upon the Swell's
being abated, Boats could be sent in there to put Troops on Shore.

There were two large Men of War moored to defend the Entrance of
_Boca-grande_, but that there was a Fascine Battery begun upon each
Point, seems to be a Secret only known to the Author; for no Mention was
made of any such during our Stay upon that Coast, nor upon reconnoitring
that Entrance into the Harbour, could the least Traces of them be
perceiv'd.

The little _Fort de Chamba_ was not finish'd, nor had upon it one Gun;
nor was there the least Appearance of one, on what the Author is pleased
(Page 49.) to call a Fascine Battery of twelve Guns: From same Fascines
being placed in order upon the Shore, it was believed that the Enemy had
Thoughts of erecting a Battery on that Place.

The Author's Description of _Boca-Chica_ Castle, _&c._ seems to be
tolerably exact, and I cannot omit to remark the justness of his
Expression, when he mentions the Bomb Vessels being got near enough to
divert the Town; for in Truth they were posted at so great a Distance,
that they seem'd to be sent in with no other Intention.

That the City of _Carthagena_ is to the Land-side, fortify'd by double
Walls, and double Ditches, flank'd by strong Bastions, is an undoubted
Truth; but I must dissent from what the Author alledges, of the Water at
the Head of the Harbour, being shoal so far off, that Ships cannot come
near enough to do Execution with their Guns. Experienced Pilots, and
Masters of trading Vessels, who have been much conversant in that
Harbour, do (and will when Occasion requires it) testify the contrary;
but nothing can be a stronger Proof of there being sufficient depth of
Water for our largest Ships, than that the Station of the _Spanish_
Galleons, is very near the Walls, for the Convenience of taking in their
Lading. It is well known, that Monsieur _Ponti_ sent in his Men of War
(amongst which was the _Sceptre_ of eighty-four Guns) to batter the
City, and with so good an Effect, as in a short Time to oblige them to
surrender.

But a still more recent Proof of there being sufficient depth of Water,
is the celebrated Admiral _Vernon_'s having ordered in the _Galicia_, a
_Spanish_ Man of War of sixty-six Guns: This Vessel was fitted up for
battering in a very extraordinary Manner: _Merlons, or Cases, six Feet
thick, rammed with Earth, or Sand, were formed between the Port-holes_,
which occasioned her drawing more Water, than any of our eighty Gun
Ships; notwithstanding, with her sixteen Guns mounted, _only_, she did
considerable damage to the City, before she could be demolished.

That the _Spaniards_ have no great Dependance upon this supposed
Shoalness of the Water, is very evident from their having lately erected
a Battery of forty large Pieces of Cannon, for the defence of the Town
on the Side towards the Harbour; a very unnecessary Expence, if the
Water is there so shoal as to prevent the near Approach of our large Men
of War.

From the Author's own Description, the Fort of St. _Lazar_ appears to be
no such trifling Redoubt, as he would insinuate; had he approached near
enough to take an exact View of it (which probably he did not) he must
have observed that the Hill is near double the Height he mentions, and
that the Eminence opposite to it (which, if Cannon could have been
convey'd thither, was certainly a very proper Place for the erecting a
Battery) is pretty much upon a Level with the Ground upon which the
Castle stands.

That the Enemy began their Works upon the Hill, immediately after we
were in Possession of _Boca-Chica_ (if not upon the first Appearance of
the Fleet,) is a Fact well known, both to the Army and to the Navy; nor
was it in the power of the Former to interrupt their Progress till the
proper Materials were landed; but how far that might have been done, by
sending in two or three of his Majesty's large Ships, the Gentlemen of
the Sea are the most proper Judges.

That the Side of the Castle of _St. Lazar_, which is next the Town,
could not be defenceless, must be evident to every Reader, from the
Circumstance of its being next the Town, and consequently defended by
all the Works on that Quarter, particularly by an Half-moon, which is
erected about half Musket-Shot from it.

If the Enemy's Numbers (as the Author alledges, page 54.) amounted to
4000 Men, the Troops which were landed, and never exceeded 4350 Rank and
File, could but have little Prospect of forcing them amidst their strong
Fortifications; nor did the General and Principal Officers ever propose
it to themselves, otherwise than by the help of the whole Force on board
the Fleet, which was actually promised, as soon as a Passage should be
opened for the Ships into the Harbour; how performed, the unhappy Issue
but too plainly makes appear.

The Enemy's Engineers, Cannoniers, _&c._ acquitted themselves very well,
and ours did the same, nor was there amongst them one single instance of
Cowardice or Desertion; would the Author be pleased to put his Name to
so base an Aspersion cast upon them, there are of the few surviving, who
are well able to convince him of his Mistake.

It is roundly alledged, that excepting two Regiments, the whole body of
Troops which came from _England_, were quite raw and undisciplined; how
far this is a Fact known to every one, will appear, by minutely entering
into their Circumstances.

As a Foundation for forming a Corps of Troops fit for immediate Service,
his Majesty was pleased to direct a Draught to be made from the Foot
Guards, of the best disciplined Corporals and private Men, to be
appointed Marine Serjeants, as likewise 300 private Centinels well
instructed in the Use of their Arms, to be placed to every Marine
Regiment, who were for that Purpose draughted from all the old Corps in
_Britain_; by which Means each of the Marine Regiments was actually
supply'd with a Number of well-disciplin'd Men, not much short of the
_Irish_ Corps before the Augmentation.

The Colonels of the six Regiments of Marines were old Officers, who had
all (excepting one) served abroad in the last War.

Such were the greatest Part of the Lieutenant Colonels and Majors. The
Captains were either Gentlemen of Service taken from the Half-Pay, or
from the Independent Companies at _Jamaica_; such as had been long
inured to the Climate of the _West-Indies_, or Subaltern Officers of
long standing in the old Corps, whom his Majesty honour'd with the
Command of Marine Companies. The first and second Lieutenants were
either Ensigns taken out of the old Corps, Cadets, who had for some time
carry'd Arms, or young Gentlemen, whose Quality and Interest very justly
entituled them to Preferment. To these the Author has added a third
imaginary Class, of _abandoned Wretches of the Town, whose Prostitution
had made them useful on some dirty Occasion, and by Way of Reward were
provided for in the Army_. I call upon the _Author_ to point out one
single Man, who was sent out in those Corps, deserving of that
Character; if he does not (as I am well assured he cannot) what
Character he himself richly deserves, will easily occur to the Reader.

That few of the Inferior Officers had ever before served against an
Enemy, is undoubtedly Fact, nor after thirty Years Peace, could it
possibly be otherwise; but their Behaviour during the Incampment in the
Isle of _Wight_, evidently made it appear that they were not deficient
in Discipline; nor when they came to face the Enemy, could the oldest,
and most experienced Officers expose their Persons with greater
Gallantry and Chearfulness.

That most of the Officers, who had served long and well, got themselves
knock'd on the Head by teaching a young and raw Army, is in Fact false;
for both old and young equally shared the Hazard and Fatigue; nor did
one single Officer or Soldier loose his Life, excepting in the
Performance of his own Duty.

What an Heap of _Billingsgate_ does the Author employ (pag. 56.) to
vilify the _American_ Regiment? _The Officers_ (he affirms) _were in
particular composed of Blacksmiths, Taylors, and all the Banditti that
the Country affords_. Had he been so candid as to have informed himself
of those Gentlemens true Characters, he would have known, that the Field
Officers were all Men of long Service, named by his Majesty, and sent
from _Britain_: That the Companies were chiefly raised by the Interest,
and at the Charge of their respective Captains; of whom some were
Members of the Assemblies in the Provinces where they resided; others
liv'd upon their own Plantations, and had Commands in the Militia; and
some few of them had been concerned in Traffick. His Majesty was pleased
to send to _North-America_ thirty young Gentlemen, under the Direction
of Brigadier _Blakeney_, who were to serve in that Corps as Lieutenants;
they had carried Arms either in the old Corps at home, or in the
_Scotish_ Regiments in the _Dutch_ Service, and were most of them
Cadets of good Families in _North Britain_.

The rest of the Subaltern Officers were recommended by the Governors,
and by the Gentlemen of the first Rank in the Provinces where the
Companies were raised; and were either younger Sons of the principal
Families, bred to no particular Profession, or such of them as had been
brought up to the Law, to Merchandize, or who had served at Sea.

It is certain, that the greatest Part of the private Soldiers, who were
inlisted in _North-America_, were either _Irish_ (and many of those
suspected to be Papists) or _English_, who had been under a Necessity of
quitting their Native Country. As the Levy was made in Haste, there was
neither Time for strictly examining into their respective Circumstances,
nor for their being well-disciplin'd before they joined the Army; whence
it became in a great Measure, necessary to employ them chiefly on board
the Fleet.

Tho' this infamous Libel appears to be levell'd against that Corps of
_Land Forces in general_, yet the Author is pleased more eminently to
distinguish the Engineers, _&c._ belonging to the Train; he very roundly
affirms, that _worse never bore the Name, nor could be pick'd out of
all_ Europe.

The principal Engineer (Mr. _Moor_) was deservedly esteemed for his
Bravery, his Capacity and Skill in his Profession; the Battery, on which
he was killed, viewing the Effects of the Shot thro' an Embrasure, was
well constructed, and fully answered the End for which it was raised: He
had served with Applause in the Defence of _Gibraltar_, one of the
principal Fortresses in _Europe_, which was attacked by an Army of
40,000 Men, composed of the best Troops in _Spain_, and batter'd by 100
Pieces of large Cannon; yet this Army was by the gallant Defence of the
Garrison obliged to retire, after having been almost totally ruin'd at
this _simple_ Siege, as the Author of the Pamphlet is pleased to stile
it.

Mr. _Armstrong_, the Gentleman who succeeded as principal Engineer on
the Death of Mr. _Moor_, had all the Experience, which could possibly be
acquired in Time of Peace, having been continually employ'd during
sixteen Years in the different Works about this Kingdom; nor could any
Person whatsoever perform his Duty, with greater Attention, or more
chearfully expose his Person, whenever he thought his Presence could in
any wise contribute to the publick Service.

It is certain, that no more than two of the Sub-Engineers had ever
served in the Face of an Enemy; which surely ought not to be imputed to
them as a Fault, when, after so long a Peace, few or none so qualified
were remaining: But nothing had been omitted by those Gentlemen to
repair their Want of Experience both by their Application to the Study
of their Profession at home, and by visiting the Fortifications in
Foreign Parts; and when on real Service, it was very evident that they
spared no Endeavours to make up that Deficiency by their Diligence and
gallant Behaviour: Nor is there the least Room to doubt, but that the
few who have returned from that fatal Expedition, will, whenever they
shall be called upon, be found qualified to do effectual Service to
their Country.

Colonel _Watson_'s Merit and long Services very justly entituled him to
the Command of the Train on the late Expedition; nor did his Age (as the
Author insinuates) ever prevent his Attendance upon his Duty; in the
Performance of which he lost his Life by a Shot which glanced from a
Tree, at some Distance from the Battery.

His Successor, a brave blunt Soldier (who can never be pardoned for
boldly speaking the Truth) was so far from being rendered unfit for his
Duty, that no Man attended it with more Diligence; from the first
Opening the Battery before _Boca-Chica_, he scarcely ever left it, even
for necessary Refreshment, till the Castle was taken.

Who could be so proper to be inlisted for Cannoniers, Bombardiers, _&c._
as Country Fellows? but those Country Fellows (as the Author is pleased
to call them) were disciplin'd Men, capable of doing their Duty; in
which they wanted no Aid, till Death and Sickness had reduced them so
low, that it was necessary they should be reinforced both from the Army
and the Fleet. The extraordinary Conference mentioned by the Author
(page 56.) to have been held between the General and them, I can safely
affirm, has not the least Foundation.

That many of the Bomb-Shells broke in the Air, from some Defect in their
Fusees, or never broke at all, is undoubtedly Fact; which probably was
occasioned by Damage they had received at Sea, and which could not be
repaired, as we had neither Time nor Convenience for it, before their
being wanted for Service. The Grenado-Shells were of the same Sort, of
the very same Dimensions with those usually issued out from the Office
of Ordnance; nor was there ever before the least mention made of their
having been deficient. The Reason given for their not breaking is no
great Proof of the Author's Skill, as an Engineer; for it is well known,
that one single Ounce of Gunpowder is sufficient (if properly confined)
to rend in Pieces a Stone weighting several Tuns.

The eight twenty-four Pounders, put on board for the Use of the
Expedition, were all landed at _Boca-Chica_ fit for Service, and were
there actually made use of upon the Battery, where two of them were
rendered unserviceable.

One hundred Baulks, and three hundred Battery Planks, were by an Order
from the Board of Ordnance, bearing date, _May_ 1740, issued out of the
Stores, and imbark'd for the Use of the Expedition; but Lord _Cathcart_,
having after the Imbarkation of the Troops, been informed that no
further Supply could be had in the _West-Indies_, tho' the contrary had
been represented to the Board of Ordnance; He applied for an Addition of
one hundred Baulks, and 300 Planks, which were put on board before the
Fleet sailed; as were likewise 4050 Hand-bills, his Lordship deeming the
1000 already provided not to be sufficient.

Upon the whole, nothing could more demonstrate the Goodness of this
Army, than the Service they performed, not only amidst the almost
insuperable Difficulties, which arose from the Climate, but labouring
under the utmost Distresses and Discouragements from a Quarter, whence
the Reverse ought justly to have been expected. Were the Instruments
imploy'd on the late Expedition such as the Author of the Pamphlet is
pleased to describe, there would be no great Difficulty in accounting
for its Miscarriage; the which, Lord _Cathcart_ (had he lived) could
probably not have prevented: but as it does, I think, evidently appear,
that what the Author has advanced to the Prejudice of the Land Forces,
is false and groundless, and that they performed whatever was possible
for them to do in their Situation, our Misfortunes are to be ascribed to
some other Cause; they were, without Doubt, principally occasioned by
the Climate. What further may have contributed, nothing would set in a
more clear Light, than an exact and faithful Account of every
Transaction, not only during the Time of the Troops lying before
_Carthagena_, but to that of their being recalled. Such an Account
cannot but be very acceptable to all those who had a Share in that
unfortunate Expedition, and had no other End in View but the publick
Service. And, I am well assured, to none more than to the Gentleman, on
whom the Command devolved by the Death of Lord _Cathcart_, who has all
possible Reason to desire, that his whole Conduct may undergo the
strictest Scrutiny.

I cannot conclude without remarking, as something extraordinary, the
Justice done by the Author in his last Paragraph to the common Soldiers;
but which is surely no less due to the Officers, who led them on, and by
following whose brave Example, they gave evident Proofs, that they
wanted not for Courage and Resolution becoming _Englishmen_.


_FINIS._

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: The principal Council of War, consisted of the two eldest
Officers of the Army, of the two eldest Officers of the Navy, and of the
Governor of _Jamaica_, whenever he could be present. It was the Province
of this Council to determine what Enterprizes should be undertaken.]

[Footnote 2: _Vide_ Note (_a_) in the late Pamphlet, entituled, _An
Account of the Expedition to_ Carthagena.]

[Footnote 3: Upon its being first debated, whether an Attempt should be
made on _Carthagena_, the General declared, that, as he was a Stranger
in those Seas, he had no Knowledge of the then present State of that
City; and that he should join with the Admiral in his Opinion; not
doubting of his being well inform'd of every Circumstance relating to
the Entry into the Harbour, the Strength of the Garrison, _&c._]

[Footnote 4: In relating this Transaction (_vide_ P. 7. note Letter _c_)
the very candid Author of the Account of the Siege of _Carthagena_, is
pleas'd to affirm, that _the General landed with a Body of 800
Grenadiers, but not thinking them sufficient, reimbark'd, and sent for
more_: There was not the least Step taken, which could give Colour for
such an Assertion; excepting that Capt. _Dennet_, who commanded General
_Harrison_'s Grenadiers, being apprehensive, that the General would give
those of his own Regiment the Honour of landing first, push'd forward
without Orders, and leaped on Shore with five or six Men: which the
General perceiving, and that the rest of the Boats began to move in
Confusion towards the Beach; he order'd those who had landed, (who were
only _Dennet_, and the few Men abovementioned) to reimbark, and with the
rest of the Boats to lay along-side of the _Norfolk_ and _Russel_, there
to wait for the Arrival of the Companies, which were still wanting: Nor,
had all the Companies of Grenadiers, been compleat to a Man, could they
have exceeded 648 Officers included: but that was far from being the
Case; for not only _Robinson_'s Grenadiers were then absent, having been
separated from the Fleet, but the rest were at that Time so far reduced
by Sickness, as not to amount to 400 Men, as it will appear from the
Adjutant's Books.]

[Footnote 5: Had the Author of the Account, (_vide_ Note _d_,) been
present on Shore, where probably he was not, he might have observed that
all possible Diligence was used, to put the Men under Cover; and if he
is in any wise capable of judging of military Operations at Land, he
must have known that the Camp could not have been so properly formed in
any other Place, for carrying on the Attack on the Castle of
_Boca-Chica_; nor, if advanced higher into the Woods, could it have been
supplied with Water, or the Tents pitch'd on that rocky Soil, which will
not admit of the driving down a Tent Pin; but setting aside that
Difficulty, how the Tents could have been pitch'd without cutting down
the Trees, from whose Shade, as the Author alledges, the Soldiers would
have been so much benefited, I really do not comprehend; nor would they
have been less exposed to the Enemy's Shot, excepting they had incamped
out of the Reach of it, which could not have answered the End proposed
by their Landing.]

[Footnote 6: Mr. _Moor_ was of Opinion, that if an Opening should be
made through the Wood from the Camp to the _Lagoon_, where the Enemy's
Ships of War lay at Anchor, it might be a means of directing their fire:
That the Admiral sollicited the General to continue this Coupure, is, I
believe, true; but that it would have answer'd the Purposes mention'd in
the latter part of the Note (_f_) in the Pamphlet, is not so evident. As
the Enemy was in Possession of the _Lagoon_, they would not surely send
Succours cross the _Boca-Grande_, (where Ships were posted to observe
their Motions) thence with Hazard to pass the _Tierra Bomba_; which
Succours could be conveyed by the way of the Harbour, without Danger or
Interruption: nor could that Coupure be of the least Use to enable us to
observe what passed in the Harbour, of which we daily received Accounts
from the abovementioned Ships, or from our small Parties; nor, if there
was Danger to be apprehended from the Enemy's Incursions, (which there
was not) could this Coupure have prevented them, as it was not much less
than 1000 Paces from the Castle of _Boca-Chica_.]

[Footnote 7: The Communication between the Mortar-Battery and the Camp
(_vide_ Letter _g_ in the Pamphlet) was covered from the Shot of the
Castle by a rising Ground, nor was one Man killed during the whole Time
in passing between that and the Camp, nor did one single Shot take Place
in it from the Fascine Battery, from which it was in great Measure
secured by its natural Situation, which was help'd by a Parapet. Several
of the Bombs most certainly broke in the Air, without any Effect; which
was possibly occasioned by the splitting of the Fuzees, in driving them
into the Shells. Nor (notwithstanding what the Author is pleased to
advance) did we suffer much from those thrown by the Enemy; one of which
fell near the Mortar-Battery, and killed 6 or 7 Men; a few took Place in
the Artillery-Park, (whither they were chiefly directed) damaged some
Casks of working Tools, and two or three Carriages; but the greatest
Part of them were either extinguished by falling into the Water, or
buried themselves so deep in the Sand, as to break without any ill
Effect whatsoever.]

[Footnote 8: Fascines and Pickets (_vide_ the beginning of the Note _f_)
had not only been cut during the Fleet's watering at _Hispaniola_, but
after our landing on _Tierra Bomba_, all possible Diligence was daily
used, to compleat the Number required for erecting the Batteries.
Nothing can be more absurd than to imagine that so skilful an Engineer,
as was Mr. _Moor_, could be so widely mistaken as to the Quantity. As
soon as the Ground was cleared, and proper Works thrown up to cover the
Workmen, he began with such Materials as were ready, and had from the
Fleet no other Assistance than 18 Carpenters for laying the Platforms;
the Seamen were employed, (and that was properly their Province) in
landing the Stores and Cannon; in getting the latter up to the Battery,
and they afterwards assisted in firing of it; (most of the Gunners being
at that time either Dead, or disabled by Sickness) besides 150 of them
were for one or two Days employed to cut Fascines, but were so
ungovernable as to be of little Service.

How far the Author may be qualified to judge of the Knowledge of the
Sub-Engineers, Time may discover; was Mr. _Moor_ still living, he could
well answer for the Construction of his Battery. He rais'd it not
exactly parallel to the Face where the Breach was made, for a very
powerful Reason: to prevent its being flank'd from the _Barradera_
Battery, and by that means preserved the Lives of a great many Men, who
must otherwise have been lost. It is not improbable, that the Author
believ'd the Line of Communication, between the great Gun-Battery and
the Camp, to have been expos'd to the Enemy's Shot, and therefore never
came near it; or he must have known that it was neither enfiladed from
the Castle, nor the Shipping, and that the few Men who were killed
there, fell by Shot which glanced from the Trees, and did not exceed 7
or 8 during the whole Time the Troops lay before the Castle. (_vide_
Note _b_)]

[Footnote 9: The Troops were certainly annoyed in their Camp by the
Enemy's Cannon, and particularly by the Fascine Battery: an
Inconvenience which, in their Circumstances, was absolutely necessary to
be supported, as by their removing to so great a Distance, as to be out
of the reach of their Shot, the great Gun-Battery must have been expos'd
to be insulted, which would at least have for some Time retarded the
taking of the Castle, if not oblig'd us to retire.

The base Insinuation relating to the Troops being moved without regular
Orders, is absolutely groundless: The Independants from _Jamaica_, not
arriving till after the Camp was formed, they were ordered to clear the
Ground upon the Left, and there to pitch their Tents; where 200
_Americans_, and part of Lord _James Cavendish_'s and of Col. _Bland_'s
Regiments, joined them from the Fleet. To make the more Room for the
Artillery-Park, _Harrison_'s Regiment was, by Order, removed to the same
Ground; as afterwards were those Regiments, which were the most exposed
to the Fire from the Fascine Battery, and had suffered greatly in their
Tents, Arms, _&c._ Nor, till then, did any of the General Officers
remove to the new Encampment; which was indeed in some Measure covered
by a Rock from the Fire of the Fascine Battery, but was not the less
exposed to that from the Shipping and the Castle, by which Lieutenant
Col. _Sandford_ and several others there lost their Lives.]

[Footnote 10: Nothing can be more false than what the Author of the
Pamphlet asserts in his Note (_e_) of no Application having been made,
nor any particular Scheme form'd for landing the Cannon and Stores.
_March_ the 10th, the Day after the Grenadiers had taken Possession of
the two Forts, the General went in Person on board the Admiral to
concert Measures with him for putting on Shore the Cannon, Ammunition,
_&c._ and was by him, the Admiral, informed, that a Captain of a Man of
War appointed for that Service, was gone on board the Ordnance Ships to
give the proper Directions; the General, without Delay, order'd his
Barge to row thither, and signify'd to the said Captain (who is since
dead) both the Quantity and Species of Stores proper to be landed; and
at the same time particularly mentioned to him the Inconvenience which
would attend the putting on Shore more than were necessary for present
Service. Notwithstanding (probably from the Want of Time and Means for
sorting the Stores, _&c._) whatever first came to hand, was thrown into
the Boats, sent to Shore, and confusedly cast upon the Beach. Whence
they were removed by Matrosses and Soldiers appointed for that Service,
and secured in the best Manner our Circumstances would admit of; but
(excepting that some of the Powder received Damage from its having been
placed by the Sailors upon the Shore within the Reach of the Surf of the
Sea) none of the Stores were wash'd away, which indeed might possibly
have happen'd, if timely Care had not been taken to prevent it.]

[Footnote 11: This bold and surprising Enterprize (as the Author of the
Pamphlet is pleased to stile it in his Note _i_) seems to be celebrated
with all the Rhetorick he is Master of: It is observable, that he makes
no mention of the two hundred Soldiers, who were detached on the same
Occasion, which possibly he may have forgot; as likewise, that, tho' by
the Admiral's Disposition, the Soldiers were posted in the Rear; when
landed, they were called for to advance, and a Lane made for their
passing towards the Front, which probably might be occasioned by their
being armed more properly than the Sailors, for returning the Fire of
the Enemy's small Arms. I cannot, without doing Injustice to Capt.
_Washington_, the Honourable Mr. _Murray_, and to the rest of the Land
Officers, who were detach'd on this Occasion, join with the Author in
passing over their gallant Behaviour in Silence; nor would I be wanting
in the Praises due to Capt. _Boscawen_, Capt. _Watson_, Capt. _Coates_,
&c. who commanded the Sailors, who, as they have ever done, performed
their Duty with great Bravery and Resolution, and particularly
Lieutenant, now Captain _Forrest_, who, with the foremost, enter'd the
Battery Sword in Hand; the Enemy having fled with Precipitation into the
Woods, and the Soldiers being posted upon the Avenues, the Seamen set
about spiking the Guns, destroying the Carriages, and tearing up the
Platforms; but one of them having imprudently put Fire to the Guard
House, they were discovered by the Enemy, and consequently exposed to
the Fire from the Castle, _&c._ the Commandant therefore thought it
advisable to retire, before the Battery could be effectually
demolish'd.]

[Footnote 12: Two or three Boats were observed to pass between the
Castle and the _Barradera_ Battery (not hundreds of Men as the Author
alledges in Note _l_) who carry'd People sufficient so far to repair the
Damage, which had been done, as in a short time to renew the Fire; an
evident Proof both to the Army, and to the Navy, that the Battery had
not been effectually demolish'd.

That the Army had work'd to some purpose (tho' the Author insinuates the
contrary) plainly appears from their having made two Coupures thro' the
Woods, cut the Fascines and Pickets, raised the Battery, and conveyed
thither the Stores and Ammunition; in which last they had some
Assistance from the Sailors, and not a great deal from the Negroes. Had
the Army the least Room for Resentment before, the sixty Gun Ship was
sent in to interrupt the Enemy's repairing the Fascine Battery, any
Thing she perform'd, could by no Means cool it; for the fired at so
great a Distance, as to give the Enemy very little Disturbance.]

[Footnote 13: The Author of the Pamphlet, in his extraordinary Note,
Letter (_m_) mentions, _five hundred Sailors to have been employed in
erecting the Battery_, tho' in Fact the Navy contributed to it, only 18
Carpenters. He adds, that, "_as more Time and Men were employed in it
than were necessary, much Execution may be expected therefrom_." What
more could be expected from it, than forcing the Enemy to abandon the
Castle? "_but the Engineers could not out-do themselves; they erected
the Battery in a Wood_." They might not out-do themselves, but they
certainly did perfectly well; for by erecting their Battery under the
Cover of the Wood, many Mens Lives were saved, and the Work was carried
on without the Enemy's being able to interrupt their Progress.

He is likewise pleased to condemn them _for not clearing more Ground
than was necessary_; a Circumstance, which, I should think, rather
deserves his Approbation, as they avoided, improperly, to fatigue the
Workmen, but this Caution, it seems was used, that the Enemy might not
see the Army; if such a Sight would have given the Enemy any
Satisfaction, I much doubt; or whether it would have answer'd to have
obliged them at the Expence of cutting down 600 or 700 Paces of thick
Wood, which intercepted their View of the Camp; but that the Army did
not decline either then, or on any other Occasion, to look the Enemy in
the Face, there have been too evident Proofs. No Man, who saw the
Position of the Battery, could have the least Room to doubt of its
bearing upon the Castle, as soon as a narrow Screen of Wood, which
cover'd it, should be cut away. What is alledged, that no Guns could be
brought to bear upon the Enemies Shipping, is absolutely false; there
were no less than seven, of which two were thought sufficient for that
Purpose, which fir'd red hot Balls, and did good Execution. It is most
certain, that if no Epaulment had been thrown up, the Battery might have
been rak'd, which was easily foreseen, and timely prevented. The Sailors
behaved well, and would have done better, had they been more under
Direction; but they did no more than their Duty, either in assisting to
erect the Battery, in which they had but a very small Share, or in
firing of it, as they were expressly order'd so to do by his Majesty.
Without all Doubt it was Mr. _Moor_'s Intention to batter the western
Face of the Bastion, and to beat down its Defences, which was evident,
not only from the Construction, but from the Effect of the Battery. I
must own I cannot but admire at the Author's Conclusion, that the
Success was owing to Chance, because, if the Enemy had cleared more
Ground round the Castle, the Undertaking would have been more difficult.
I readily join with him, that it would have been so; tho' in the
Beginning of this Note, the Engineers are condemn'd for making the best
Advantage of the Wood, which the Enemy had so imprudently left standing.
"The Engineers could by no Means out-do themselves; the Battery was
constructed in a Wood."]

[Footnote 14: In the Note, Letter (_o_), it is alledged, that the
Admiral sent in these Ships to oblige the General; The Truth of the Fact
is this; The Ground over which the Troops were to march to attack the
Breach, being flank'd both from Fort St. _Joseph_, and from the Fascine
Battery, it was, _March_ the 22d, resolved in a Council of War, composed
of Land Officers, to represent that Circumstance to the Admiral, and
that they deem'd the Breach could not be attempted, without great Loss,
from the Fire of Fort St. _Joseph_, and the Fascine Battery, if some
Means could not be used by the Fleet to divert their Fire. The Day
following, the Admiral signify'd to the General by Letter, "_That he had
formed a Plan for bringing in the Men of War to make a general Attack on
the Enemy's Forts and Batteries_"; to which he adds, "_that nothing but
the Necessity of the Case can justify us in these Resolutions, as it is
against our Judgment, as Seamen_." After the Opening of the great Gun
Battery, the Castle Guns, which bore upon the Camp, were soon silenced;
but it was apparent, even to Land-Men, that our Men of War could do
little or no Damage to those of the Enemy's Shipping, which, at that
time, began to be made very uneasy by the red-hot Balls from the great
Gun Battery.]

[Footnote 15: It may be remark'd (_Vide n. q._) though perhaps not as a
Thing very extraordinary, that either the Author of the Pamphlet was, at
that time on board, securely asleep in his Bed, or that he knowingly
avers what is absolutely false; for that Night the Battery was, by
particular Order, fired, both with Grape and round Shot, alternatively,
and without any other Intermission, than was necessary to cool the Guns;
for, it having been observed, that the Enemy was raising a Fascine Work
behind the Breach, all possible Care was taken to retard its Progress
during the Night.]

[Footnote 16: The Author's being mistaken as to some Circumstances
relating to the Attack, (_Vide_ his Note _r_) is easily to be excused;
for, if he saw it at all, it must probably have been at a great Distance
through a Spying Glass; but, as he is pleased in the latter Part of his
Note to reassume his favourite Topick, the throwing out scurrilous
Reflections upon the Land Forces, I cannot pass them over unobserved.
This Success was undoubtedly, neither disagreeable to the Army, nor to
the Navy; the former having undergone Hardships, such as no modern
Soldiers, or Sailors, had been accustomed to, nor perhaps many in former
Times; nor did the Army propose any Advantage in being possessed of an
Island (as the Author insinuates) but imbarked on board their Transports
with all possible Expedition, in order to proceed to the Attack of the
City.

That so formidable a Fleet was employ'd to little other Purpose, but to
attend upon the Army, and to convoy their Transports, was with Regret
observed, both by the Officers of the Army, and of the Navy; but surely
so ridiculous a Thought could never enter into any Man's Imagination, as
that the Soldiers should march along the Shore, the Fleet within Call,
crying out to them for Help, or that they could not find their Way into
the Castle without a Sea Pilot to conduct them: A Story, which has not
the least Foundation; Lieutenant _Bennett_, the Gentleman, who led the
Forlorn-Hope, and Mr. _Watson_, the Engineer, who accompanied him, are
still living, and can testify, that no Sea Pilot, no _Spaniard_, no
Prisoner, was upon that Attack; and I am well assured, that no such
Person was ever thought of by the General to be employ'd on that
Occasion.]

[Footnote 17: This Scheme (_Vide_ Note _s_) if there was any, seems to
have been contrived chiefly for a Pretext to give the Sailors the Credit
of whatsoever should be performed by the Land Forces; the Troops were
certainly moving to the Attack, if not in Possession of the Castle, at
the time, when Capt. _Knowles_'s Detachment could be first discovered by
the Enemy; when it is not very probable, that they should lessen their
Force by sending away large Boats full of Men (which I do not find were
perceived by any body excepting the Author) to Fort St. _Joseph_; or
give any Attention, but to the most pressing Danger: It is really true,
that both the Ships and Fort St. _Joseph_ fired, but at the Troops, not
at the Boats from the Fleet, which, when they came to Land, were both
out of the Enemy's Sight, and out of the Reach of their Guns.]

[Footnote 18: The _Passa-Cavallos_ is the only Creek, thro' which
Provisions can be conveyed into the _Lagoon_, and from thence to the
City, with which all Communication was effectually cut off, as soon as
the Fleet was in Possession of the Harbour.]

[Footnote 19: Capt. _Knowles_ was appointed Governor of _Castillo
Grande_; and to do him the more Honour (there could be no other End
proposed, as there was no Possibility of the Enemies retaking of it)
near 100 very useful Men of Lord _James Cavendish_'s, and Colonel
_Bland_'s Regiments, were left in Garrison, and there continued till
after the Troops reimbark'd, tho' of the Number required by the General
to be landed (_Vide_ Notes in the Pamphlet _v_, and _w_).]

[Footnote 20: The most apparent Reason for the Enemy's burning the
_French_ Ship, was their concluding, that she must otherwise fall into
our Hands, when our Men of War advanced to the Head of the Harbour; for
they could apprehend little Danger to her from the Fire of _Castillo
Grande_, as it lies only within a large random Shot from the Place,
where she lay at Anchor.]

[Footnote 21: The Author of the Pamphlet in his Note (_y_) is pleased to
affirm, "_That things were on this Occasion (as they had been throughout
the whole) done without Order or Method; for notwithstanding the Army
had been apprized of the Enemy's having made Lodgments along the Road;
yet they landed without a Grenado Shell, or Field-Piece; and were
likewise told the Road was even able to sustain the Weight of the
heaviest Cannon_." Here the Author, as has been his Method thro' his
whole Pamphlet, boldly asserts, without the least Foundation; for, it is
evident, both from the Resolutions of Councils of War, and from publick
Orders, that no Step was taken here, nor indeed upon any other Occasion,
without a Plan first laid down; and (where Time would admit of it) well
consider'd, and approved by a Council of War.

It is very certain, that when Mr. _Macpherson_, the Guide, was
conducting the Troops thro' the Defillée, he expressed no little
Uneasiness on the Account of Lodgments, which he apprehended we should
find upon our Route; but nothing of that Sort appeared, excepting, that
a few Bushes were placed, in Order, in an Opening upon our right Flank,
possibly with a Design to cover some small Party, who had retired into
the Wood. But had our Landing been postponed, till the Arrival of
Ordnance Ships from the Mouth of the Harbour, the Field-Pieces,
Granado-Shells, _&c._ which were then on board them, might indeed have
been wanting to force such Works, as the Enemy would probably have
finished during that Delay; which was prevented by boldly pushing thro'
the Defillées to _La Quinta_; the Post of which, the Army was to possess
themselves, "_for cutting off the Communication of the City with the
Country, and for covering the Landing of the Artillery_". As Loss of
Time might, on this Occasion, have been attended with the worst
Consequences, the General found it necessary to advance without the
_American_ Soldiers, Negroes, _&c._ which Disappointment cannot in any
wise be attributed to the Officers of the Army, as the providing Boats
for Landing the Forces was intirely under the Direction of the Navy.

Both our Motions, and those of the Enemy, might probably be seen from
the Ships, their Masts being at that time crouded with Spectators; but
what the Author alledges of the Execution they did upon the Enemy is not
Fact. Whilst the Troops were moving along the Strand, some random Shots
were made by the _Weymouth_, which killed one single _Spanish_ Negro,
and were very near taking Place amongst our most advanced People; but
were so far from obliging the Enemy to disperse, that they did not make
the least Movement, till after being push'd by our Grenadiers.

That it was the general Opinion, that the City would have fallen into
our Hands the first Day we landed, had the Troops push'd forward, is so
far from being true, that had they been suffer'd to advance further, not
an Officer but must, and would have condemn'd the General for exposing
them without the least Probability of Success.

The Object proposed on our first Landing was the taking Post at _La
Quinta_; "there to cut off the City's Communication with the Country, to
cover the Landing of the rest of the Forces, and of the Artillery; and
to clear Ground for the Encampment," which was mark'd out that very Day;
but the Tents could not be pitched without first cutting down a thick
Copse Wood; which, as soon as the Negroes and Tools were landed, was
done with all possible Expedition. To have advanced further, in our
Circumstances, would have been not only acting inconsistently with the
Rules of War, but of common Sense, for we were entirely Strangers to the
Road leading to _Carthagena_; the Guide, Mr. _Macpherson_, having, as
soon as the Enemy appeared, gone on board a Ship to view their Posture
from the Main-top-mast-Head and did not return till the Affair was
ended; we had neither Tools to throw up a Lodgment, nor Negroes to
reconnoitre the Woods on our Flanks; besides, the Day advancing, the
Heat was become so violent, that great Numbers must have fainted under
the Fatigue.

From the Author's own Description of the Fort St. _Lazar_ (Page 53.) it
is far from appearing to be so despicable a Redoubt, as with any
Prospect of Success, to be attempted in the open Day, without
Scaling-Ladders, _&c._ nor can I conceive how a Body of 1400 Men, with
only their Firelocks in their hands, could (supposing the Fort to be
taken) afterwards force their Way cross a Draw-bridge, commanded by
Cannon, into a City fortify'd with double Walls, and two broad Ditches
filled with Water, flanked by regular Bastions, and defended by a
Garrison more than double the Number of the Assailants; for the Body,
which was drawn up on the Strand, was scarcely a fifth Part of the
Garrison, and they fled thro' the Woods, where they could not be
pursued, directly towards the City.]

[Footnote 22: The Stores and Ammunition which were landed at _La
Quinta_, were carefully lodged in an House out of the Line of Fire, and
a Guard put over them, (_vide_ Note in the Pamphlet (_a_) page 34.) The
brave Officer, there so unjustly reflected upon, wants no Advocate, and
will be easily able to clear himself of the Aspersions cast upon him,
whenever the Author of them shall be pleased to declare himself.]

[Footnote 23: It is certain (Note _b_.) that the Enemy were very
diligent in preparing for their Defence, nor was it in the power of the
Army to interrupt them one Instant sooner than the Attack was made, from
the want of Scaling Ladders, _&c._ being landed: What Time they employed
in compleating their Works, or whether they did ever compleat them, it
is not possible for the Author of the Pamphlet to judge, tho' 'tis well
known they were begun upon, from the Time of our being possessed of
_Boca-Chica_, if not before; but if he had been pleased candidly to have
informed himself, he would have observed that our Mortar Battery at the
Advanced Guard (_vide_ page 35.) play'd in 48 Hours after it was first
begun upon; and that the Intrenchment there was finished in 18 Hours. I
cannot but observe, that what the Author of the Pamphlet here affirms
(_vide_ Note _b_, page 36) seems quite contradictory to what he advances
(page 54) in the Appendix; in the one Place, _'tis declared that the
Enemy had thrown up Intrenchments round about the Foot of the Castle,
stronger and of more Importance than the Castle it self_: In the other,
_that the Castle on the Side of the Town was quite defenseless_.]

[Footnote 24: The Communication of the city (_vide_ Note 6 page 36) with
the Country on that Side, where the Army was incamp'd, was effectually
cut off the very Day they landed; nor did the General (as the Author
alledges) want to be prevail'd upon to do the same on the Side next to
the Sea, but found it impracticable without the Assistance of the Fleet,
which was promised, and comply'd with, when it was too late.

The Author seems very careful to celebrate the great Attention given, to
the preventing Supplies from entering the Town to Sea-ward; which was to
be done without the least Difficulty or Hazard, particularly after the
Fleet had got Admittance into the _Lagoon_: But passes over in Silence,
that no less Attention was given to prevent Refreshments being conveyed
to the Army; it was even refused to the General to admit of sending out
two or three small Vessels, to catch Turtle for the use of the Sick and
Wounded: If the Army complain'd heavily, it was not without Reason; for
during our Stay before _Carthagena_, the Fleet was supplied with Turtle,
fresh Beef, _&c._ which the Land Forces on Shore laboured under the
greatest Difficulties, even from the want of their Salt Provisions,
which were not regularly conveyed to them.

The Author, with his usual Regard to Truth, affirms that a drove of
Cattle was thro' neglect suffered to pass into the City. The Instant,
the General was apprised from the Officer at the Convent, that a drove
of Cattle was seen moving towards the City, he ordered out a Party to
intercept them, who march'd with all the Expedition which was possible
in that hot Climate, but were not so fortunate as to come up with them;
of which some Part had probably dispersed in the Woods, and others, (as
we were afterwards informed,) got into the Town. 'Tis not to be imagined
that Men so distressed from the want of fresh Provisions, (even by the
Author's own Account,) would have omitted any thing in their Power, to
get such a Prey into their Hands; nor was due Encouragement wanting, a
Reward of a Pistole for each Beeve, being promis'd to the Captors. Two
or three small Islands lie in the Lake at about 500 Paces from the
Shore, upon the right of the Ground where we encamped; which being
observed to be sometimes frequented by the Spaniards, Application was
made for a Boat, to know for what End these People came there, and to
search for Goods, Provisions, _&c._ which might be lodged there; this I
presume gave occasion for the pretty Story form'd by the Author. What
idle Tales might be propagated in the Camp (perhaps by the Author
himself) relating to raising Batteries, I cannot say; but I am well
assur'd no Man in his Senses believ'd them.]

[Footnote 25: As many of the _American_ Soldiers were suspected to be
_Irish_ Papists (_vide_ Note in the Pamphlet Letter (_d_) page 39) it
was though adviseable both by the General and the Admiral, to employ
them principally on Board the Fleet; but the Regiments which came from
Europe, being now reduced low in their Numbers, made it absolutely
necessary, that the _Americans_ should be included in the Corps design'd
for the Attempt on _Carthagena_.

This Reinforcement (as the Author stiles it) was only some Part of those
Soldiers, which the General had required to be landed from the Fleet,
and did not in Fact compleat the Troops on Shore, to numbers sufficient
for proper Reliefs for the ordinary and extraordinary Duty;
notwithstanding, had it been practicable to have victualled and
sustained them, a Detachment had without doubt been made, even from the
Numbers which were landed, to cut off the Communication on the _Eastern_
Side of the City; the General having great Reason to expect a further
Supply from the Admiral.

That the Author should be ignorant of what Guards were necessary,
perhaps may not be look'd upon as a Thing very extraordinary; I shall,
however, give here a Detail of them.

The City being garrison'd by at least 3500 Men; it was found necessary
to post an advanc'd Guard of 500 Men at a large House upon the Road
leading to it. The Picket-Guard consisted of 500 more, from whence was
detached a Captain's Guard to the right of the Camp, where there was a
Path leading towards the City. There were the Quarter-Guards, the
Generals-Guard, those on the Ammunition, Provisions, and a Captain and
fifty Men at the Convent; amounting in the whole to about 1300 Men,
besides extraordinary Parties; and 600 _American_ Soldiers, who were set
apart to be ready to assist in landing Stores, cutting Fascines, or in
any other Work, as occasion should require. Whether fewer Guards could
have been employed in our Circumstances, or if 4350 Men, (the most which
were landed, and those hourly diminishing by Death and Sickness) could
afford sufficient Reliefs for the Guards abovementioned, I submit to any
Judge of military Operations at Land to determine.

Had the Author's Curiosity led him to reconnoitre the Enemy's Guards, he
might have observed a Body of 300 Men posted at the Foot of the Hill, on
which is the Fort St. _Lazar_, and another of about fifty Men, advanced
300 Paces further, under some Cocoa-trees, which might easily have been
sustained by the whole Garrison.]

[Footnote 26: The principal Engineer Mr. _Armstrong_, (_vide_ Note in
the Pamphlet Letter (_f_) page 40) made a judicious and clear Report, of
the Number of Men, and of the Time which would be wanting to erect a
Battery: An Undertaking which he, and every intelligent Person, who was
acquainted with the then Circumstances of the Troops on Shore, must
foresee would be attended with insuperable Difficulties; he could not
therefore honestly advise it.]

[Footnote 27: Of the nine Officers on the Council of War (_vide_ note
(_c_) in the Pamphlet page 39.) only two were against the Attack,
without having first erected a Battery; nor was the least Objection made
to it, on the Account of its not having been well reconnoitred, the
contrary being very apparent; the Guides were Deserters (and no other
could be had) who for their Security had been sent on Board the
Admiral's Ships, and were by him, at the General's Desire, ordered on
Shore, the Evening before the Attack.]

[Footnote 28: After having taken into Consideration (_vide_ Pamphlet
Note (_g_) page 40) what Hour would be the most proper for surprising
the Enemy, and carefully weighed the Reports of Deserters, _&c._ it was
resolved by the Council of War, that the Attack should be made a little
before break of Day, a Time which has ever been look'd upon as the most
proper for Surprizes, the Guards being then fatigued by their Watching,
during the Night, and then most likely to be fallen asleep.

The Author of the Pamphlet, is here pleased to condemn the General for
not attacking at two in the Morning; _because the Guards at that Hour
returned to their respective Homes, and went to Bed, where having
composed themselves to Sleep, they could not easily be rouz'd to Fight_.
These extraordinary Guards being therefore (as the Author supposes)
safely lodged in their Beds; with regard to them, it must have been
matter of Indifference, whether the Attack was made at two, or five in
the Morning. That these Arguments (if any such were used) were of no
force with the General, I entirely agree with the Author: For surely no
Man in his right Senses could imagine that the Patrols round an advanced
Post, hourly in Danger of being insulted, should be suffered to retire
at two in the Morning.

Colonel _Grant_ was so far from having enter'd the Enemy's Trenches at
the Foot of the Castle (as the Author alledges) with a Party of
Grenadiers, and being there cut off from the Want of being sustained,
that he received his Wound the Instant he reach'd the Top of the Hill.
The Guide having been killed about the same time, was probably the
Occasion, that Lieutenant-Colonel _Hamon_ (who was the next in Command)
advanced no farther, but remained on the Side of the Hill; where (when
the Day broke) the Troops were exposed both to the Enemy's great and
small Shot; which Misfortune ought not surely to be attributed to any
Defect in the Disposition, but to unavoidable Accidents, by which in War
the best concerted Schemes are frequently disappointed.

That the Grenado Shells were carried in Boxes in the Rear, and no
lighted Match provided, will appear to be a palpable Falsehood from the
Testimony of the Gentlemen of the Train, who delivered them out, and are
still living. What might possibly give some Colour for this Assertion,
was, the Grenadiers not carrying their Pouches in that excessive hot
Climate; it was found necessary, that a Party of _American_ Soldiers
should receive the Grenados in Bags, and attend the Grenadiers with them
to the Foot of the Hill; which was accordingly ordered, but in the dark,
the Party, which had the Charge of the Shells, fell back into the Rear,
and did not come up with them till after the Attack was begun.

As the Scaling Ladders could not be brought to the Foot of the Walls,
nor the Wool Packs and working Tools be made use of, till we were in
Possession of the Breast-work, they were carried in the Rear of the
Troops, who were ordered to force it.

The Scaling Ladders were called for on the Right, and some of them got
up the Hill; but Colonel _Grant_ met his Fate too soon to be able to
advance so far as to have the least Occasion for them on the Left; nor
could the Officer the next in Command even have tried to make use of
them, as the _American_ Soldiers, who had the Charge of them
(notwithstanding the utmost Endeavours of their Officers to prevent it)
call them down, and either took up Firelocks, or put themselves under
Cover from the Shot of the Enemy.

I cannot but add in Justice to the _American_ Soldiers, who were
commanded with Arms on that Occasion, that they were in no wise wanting
to their Duty.

That the Admiral was neither by Letter, nor Message (as the Author
boldly asserts) acquainted of the Resolution of the Council of War to
attack the Fort the next Morning; the Admiral himself (to whom I appeal)
knows to be absolutely false: It is certain, that the General was that
Day too much employ'd to write a Letter in Form; but several Messages
were carry'd by Capt. _Knowles_, and Mr. _Macpherson_, in Consequence of
which Messages, two Guides were sent by the Admiral's own Order, and
from his own Ship, to conduct the Forces to the Attack of the Fort the
next Morning.

The Admiral had actually pressed the Attack, without making the least
Offer of any Assistance from the Fleet, and appeared to be so far from
thinking any such Assistance necessary, that he had not only declared
the Troops on Shore to be more than sufficient for the Service they were
upon; but had sent from the Fleet a Number of Soldiers, less by 650 than
were required to be landed by the Council of War. Whence to me it is
evident (contrary to what the Author affirms) that there was never any
real Intention to sustain the Attack by a Body of Sailors: Otherwise so
experienced a Commander, as is Admiral _Vernon_, could not have failed
of giving timely Notice of such his Intention to the General. It is
true, that at Break of Day, when the Troops were mounting the Hill, a
Signal was made for manning the Boats, and for landing, which could at
that time have answered no other End, but giving a Pretext for ascribing
to the Sailors, a Share in the Honour of the Success, in Case the Castle
had been taken.

There were kill'd at the Attack of Fort St. _Lazar_ 179, (commissioned,
Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers) and 459 wounded, of whom many
afterwards died; 16 were taken Prisoners, of which all (excepting six)
had fallen wounded on the Top of the Hill; amongst whom were three
Officers, who, tho' treated by the _Spaniards_ with great Humanity, died
in two or three Days.

I cannot but observe, what a pompous (but false) Account, the Author
gives of our Loss; he roundly affirms, "_That Numbers of Drums and
Colours were left behind in the Retreat_," of which there was not in
Fact One; some few Firelocks belonging to the Soldiers, who fell upon
the Top of the Hill, could not be brought off; and most of the Scaling
Ladders, _&c._ which had been intrusted to the Care of the _American_
Soldiers, remained upon the Ground. What Use the Enemy might make of
them, I cannot say; but we, who could distinctly see with the naked Eye,
what passed on the Hill of St. _Lazar_, could perceive nothing of what
the Author mentions. It was never before alledged, that the Guide, who
return'd, complained of his not having been followed by the Troops the
Way he would have led them; but it is certain, that both the Officers
and the Engineer, who were in the Front, complained of their having been
mislead by the Guide. Had the contrary appeared, the Offenders could
scarcely have escaped Censure; for the Instant before the Troops
advanced to the Attack, the General in Person gave Directions to two of
the principal Officers, who were to lead on the Grenadiers, to mount the
Hill upon the Right, and to push at once into the Enemy's Works.

What the Author insinuates, that the Retreat was too long delayed, is
without any Grounds whatsoever. The Moment it appeared there was no room
to hope for Success, the Troops were directed to retire, which was done
in so good Order, that the Enemy did not think it adviseable to advance
one Step to give them the least Disturbance.

I cannot finish my Observations upon this long Note (_g_) without
remarking that what palpable Falsehoods, and gross Misrepresentations,
the Author herein aggravates our Loss at St. _Lazar_; such as the
generous _Spaniard_ (tho' as an Enemy authorized to do it by Custom)
would be ashamed of; but in an _Englishman_ it is a Crime, for which
Language has not yet found a Name, and which nothing but the highest
innate Malevolence, and the strongest Inveteracy against his Majesty's
Land Forces, _there employed_, could have produced.]

[Footnote 29: I do not know what might be the Opinion of the Officers
employed by the Admiral (_Vide_ Note (_h_) page 44) to sound: But I am
well assured, that experienced Pilots, who have sounded the whole
Harbour of _Carthagena_ in open Day-Light, do affirm, that large Ships
can approach so near to the Walls, as easily to batter the Town; of
which the _Spaniards_ seem very sensible, from their having lately
erected a Battery of forty Pieces of large Cannon, which commands the
Bason, where the Galleons usually lie at Anchor.

The _Galicia_'s being sent in had a quite contrary Effect from what the
Author suggests; for not only the General, but every unprejudiced Man,
both in the Army, and in the Fleet, was thereby convinced, that our
large Ships could have got in near enough to batter the Town. For the
_Galicia_ being deeply loaden, by the Cases filled with Sand (which
served no other End, but to blind the Men, when the Enemy's Shot took
place) drew some Feet more Water, than our eighty Gun Ships, and yet lay
near enough to the Walls of the Town to fire with very good Effect, tho'
she had no more Guns mounted, than twelve eighteen Pounders, and four
twelve Pounders.

I submit it to the Reader, tho' he be neither Soldier nor Sailor, to
judge with what Prospect of Success a Vessel so armed, could be sent in
singly to stand the Fire of all the Guns on that Side of the Town, of
which the Event sufficiently proved to Absurdity, "For the enemy had
demolished her so in two or three Hours, that she would have sunk in
half an Hour more, if she had not been drawn off:" But if, instead of
_Galicia_, some of his Majesty's eighty Gun Ships had been ordered in;
there are (and those very good Judges) who affirm, that they could have
approach'd near enough to have done effectual Service.]

[Footnote 30: The Author of the Pamphlet (in his Note _i_, page 45.)
affirms, that from _Thursday_ Morning to _Friday_ Night, by the Accounts
delivered in, and by the General's Report, the Troops on Shore had
dwindled from 6645, to 3200. A base and palpable Falsehood! as it will
evidently appear by the Return given in (_April_ the 12th) by Mr.
_Wallis_, Agent to the Transports, to Vice-Admiral _Vernon_, of the
whole Number then victualled on Board, and on Shore, amounting at that
time to 6645, in which Number were included all the Sick, the Women, the
Negroes, and Men left in _Boca-Chica_ and _Castillo Grande_, the
Officers, with their Servants, and People of all Denominations belonging
to the Land Forces, who received the King's Provisions, whether they
were on Board, or on Shore.

The Adjutant's Books will shew, that the highest Number of Men landed at
_La Quinta_ never exceeded 4340 Rank and File, tho' repeated Demands
were made from the General, and from the Council of War, for their
Troops on Shore being compleated from the Fleet to 5000 Men, Rank and
File. At the time of holding the General Council of War, they were, by
Sickness, and the late Loss, reduced to 3569, feeble, and scarcely fit
for the ordinary Duty; including 1140 _American_ Soldiers, of whom 600
were employed upon no other Service, but on working Parties.]

[Footnote 31: It was raised 2600 Yards from the Fort, which is the
utmost Distance those Mortars can throw a Shell, when their Chambers are
quite filled with Powder; an Allowance only given for Proof, and never
upon Service. Tho' appriz'd of this Circumstance by the Colonel of the
Train, the Captain could not be prevailed upon to advance his Battery
nearer, but (as it was expected) wasted above two hundred Shells, to
little or no Purpose whatsoever.

_N.B._ This Battery was begun upon the 8th, but did not Fire before the
14th.]

[Footnote 32: The imbarking the Troops, (_vide k_) in the cool of the
Evening, was not only approved by the General, but by the Council of
War; who had but too justly deserved Censure, should they have
unnecessarily exposed the Men, not only to the violent Heat of the Sun,
but to the Enemy's Cannon, which commanded one of the Places of
Imbarkation.

Had the Author's Apprehensions suffered him to go on Shore at the time
of the Retreat, he might have observed that it was made without any
Precipitation, and that neither Tents, Arms, working Tools, nor Baggage
were left behind.

The General in Person brought up the Rear with his Guard, and having
perceived, after the Troops had begun their March, that five Tents
belonging to one of the _American_ Battalions were left standing (for
which their Lieutenant Colonel had undergone a severe Censure, if his
Death had not prevented it) and likewise that some Arms and working
Tools remained upon the Ground, he ordered them to be carried off by the
Serjeant's Guard which came from _La Popa_, to which Lieutenant
_Forest_, at the General's Request, added some Sailors, so that the
whole Ground might be carefully searched to prevent any thing whatsoever
from falling into the Hands of the Enemy. We having lost no Tents, none
could (as the Author alledges) be pitched by the Enemy on the top of the
Hill.

The Admiral having, (when a Flag of Truce was to be sent into the
Vice-Roy) refused to admit of a particular Messenger from the General, I
cannot say what idle Expressions might be then made use of to the
Disadvantage of the Land Forces. If there were any such, possibly they
did not loose in the Report; but if what the Enemy might throw out
deserves repeating, it is well known that they frequently expressed
their Astonishment, that so fine a Fleet should lie unactive within
their very Harbour; and it was affirmed by Persons of Credit, that a
_Spanish_ Officer of Rank, who served in _Carthagena_, declared that
they only waited for the coming in of our great Ships, to have
surrendered.]





*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "A Journal of the Expedition to Carthagena - With Notes: In Answer to a Late Pamphlet Entitled, An - account of the Expedition to Carthagena" ***

Copyright 2023 LibraryBlog. All rights reserved.