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Title: The History of Cuba, vol. 3
Author: Johnson, Willis Fletcher, 1857-1931
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.
*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The History of Cuba, vol. 3" ***
Etext transcriber's note:
Obvious typographical errors have been corrected; the original
orthography, including variation in the spelling of names, has been
retained.
The Index included at the end of this etext (which includes volumes 1
thru 4) appears at the end of volume four of The History of Cuba. It is
provided here for the convenience of the reader.
[Illustration: JOSÉ CIPRIANO DE LA LUZ
"The Socrates of Cuban youth," as he has often been called, José
Cipriano de la Luz y Caballero was born in Havana on July 11, 1799, and
was educated at the Convent of San Francisco, the University of Havana,
and the San Carlos Seminary where he was a pupil of his uncle, José
Agustin Caballero, and of Felix Varela. Later he travelled and studied
in the United States and Europe. In Germany he became intimately
associated with Baron Humboldt. Returning to Cuba in 1831, he gave
himself to the task of improving and promoting the educational interests
of his country. In 1843 he revisited Europe, but was recalled the
following year to answer an absurdly false charge of being implicated in
the Negro Conspiracy. He then founded and until his death conducted his
famous school of El Salvador, in which for a generation many of the
foremost Cubans were educated, and in which manhood and patriotism were
ever the foremost items of the curriculum. He was the author of a number
of standard educational works. He died on June 22, 1862.]
THE
HISTORY OF CUBA
BY
WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON
A.M., L.H.D.
Author of "A Century of Expansion," "Four Centuries of
the Panama Canal," "America's Foreign Relations"
Honorary Professor of the History of American Foreign
Relations in New York University
_WITH ILLUSTRATIONS_
VOLUME THREE
NEW YORK
B. F. BUCK & COMPANY, INC.
156 FIFTH AVENUE
1920
Copyright, 1920,
BY CENTURY HISTORY CO.
_All rights reserved_
ENTERED AT STATIONERS HALL
London, England.
PRINTED IN U. S. A.
CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I--1
Conditions at the Beginning of the Era of Revolution--Cuba's Commercial
Backwardness--Resources Unappreciated--Statistics of Imports and
Exports--The Sugar Trade--Burdensome Taxes and Tariffs--Restrictions on
Personal Liberty--Obstacles to Travel--Titles of Nobility--The Intendent
and His Powers--Authority and Functions of the Captain-General--District
Governments--Municipal Organization--The Courts--Control of the
Navy--Censorship of the Press--Adversion to Foreigners, Particularly to
Americans.
CHAPTER II--23
Narciso Lopez and His Career--His Valor in the Venezuelan Wars--A
Soldier of Spain--Some Daring Exploits--With the Spanish Army in
Cuba--His Distinguished Career in Spain--A Leader Against the
Carlists--General and Senator--Important Office in Cuba--Alienation from
Spain--First Plans for Cuban Revolution.
CHAPTER III--37
Betrayal of Lopez's First Revolutionary Venture--His Flight to New
York--Cuban Juntas in the United States--Lopez's Negotiations with
Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee--Unofficial American Aid--Strained
American Relations with Spain--Official Warnings Against
Filibustering--An Elaborate Expedition Prepared by Lopez in the United
States for the Freeing of Cuba--His Proclamation to His Followers--The
Voyage to Cuba.
CHAPTER IV--49
The Landing of Lopez at Cardenas--The Flag of Cuba Libre for the First
Time Unfurled on Cuban Soil--Parleying and Fighting at Cardenas--Spanish
Treachery--Failure of the Cuban People to Rally to the Support of
Lopez--Retreat and Reembarcation of the Expedition--Mutiny of the
Crew--Landing at Key West--Spanish Wrath Against the United
States--Arrest of Lopez and His Comrades--Their Release.
CHAPTER V--62
Administration of Concha and His Recall--Second Expedition of Lopez
Recruited in the United States--Men and Money Provided in the
South--Betrayal of the Scheme--Proclamation of the
Captain-General--Disturbances in Cuba--Third Expedition of Lopez
Organized--Aguero's Attempt at Revolution at Puerto Principe--His
Proclamation--Initial Victories Over the Spaniards--A Fatal
Mistake--Suppression of the Revolution by Overwhelming
Numbers--Execution of the Leaders--Suppression of Other Uprisings.
CHAPTER VI--91
Another Expedition Organized by Lopez--Its Roster--Departure from New
Orleans--Colonel Crittenden--Arrival at Key West--The Landing in
Cuba--Lack of Cuban Support--Fatal Division of Forces--Desperate
Fighting with Spaniards--Crittenden's Mistake--Capture of the
Revolutionists by the Spaniards--Indignities and Tortures--Fifty-Two Put
to Death--Heroism of Crittenden--Ill Fortune of Lopez--Betrayal and
Capture of Lopez and His Comrades--His Death on the Scaffold.
CHAPTER VII--116
Failure and Success of Lopez--Irrepressible Determination of Cuba to Be
Free--Crisis in the Affairs of Spain--Animosity Between Creoles and
Spaniards--Expressions of Cuban Sentiment and Determination--Profound
Impression Produced in the United States--Opposing Views of Pro-Slavery
and Anti-Slavery Men--Attitude of Great Britain and France--Anti-Spanish
Outbreak in New Orleans--Webster's Diplomacy--England and France Warned
Not to Meddle in Cuba--Spain's Appeal to England Against
America--Tripartite Pact Refused.
CHAPTER VIII--132
American Overtures for the Purchase of Cuba--Some Early
Diplomacy--Change of Policy Under President Polk--Spain's Refusal to
Consider Sale--Pierre Soule's Extraordinary Negotiations--The Black
Warrior Controversy--Soule's Humiliation--The Ostend Manifesto--Marcy's
Shrewd Disposition of It--Buchanan's Futile Persistence.
CHAPTER IX--145
Revolution in Peninsular Spain--General Prim's Proclamations--General
Response Throughout the Kingdom--Serrano's Entry Into Madrid--Flight of
the Queen--Republican Government Established--Downfall of Maximilian in
Mexico--Change in American Attitude Toward Cuba Because of the Civil War
and Abolition of Slavery--Organization of the Spanish "Volunteers" in
Cuba--The Moret Anti-Slavery Law--Cuban Interest in the Spanish
Revolution.
CHAPTER X--155
Cuban Independence Proclaimed at the Outbreak of the Ten Years'
War--Provisional Government Organized--Carlos Manuel
Cespedes--Proclamation of Emancipation--Representative Government
Formed--Cespedes's Address--The First Cuban Constitution--The House of
Representatives--Presidential Proclamation--Proclamation of General
Quesada--Proclamation of Count Valmaseda--Request for Recognition--The
"Juntas of the Laborers"--Cuban Government and Laws--Organization of the
Cuban Army.
CHAPTER XI--180
Beginning of Hostilities--Comparative Strengths of the Cuban and Spanish
Armies--The Spanish Navy--Pacific Measures First Tried by
Captain-General Dulce--Their Rejection by the Cubans--The First
Engagements--Cuban Victories--Destruction of Bayamo--Revolts in Many
Places--Murder of Cespedes's Messenger by Volunteers--Guerilla
Warfare--Havana in a State of Siege--Progress of the Insurrection
Throughout the Island--Dulce's Change of Policy--Sympathy and Aid for
the Revolution from the United States.
CHAPTER XII--200
An Appeal to the United States for Recognition--President Grant
Overruled by His Secretary of State--Americans Stirred by News of
Spanish Cruelties--Cuban Disappointment at Non-Recognition--Progress of
the War--Spanish Reenforcements--Liberation of Slaves--Spanish
Successes--Controversies with the United States--Destruction of
Property--Arrival of General Jordan with Supplies--Dulce Forced Out of
Office by the Volunteers--Accession of Rodas and His Decrees--The
"Butcher of Cadiz"--American Protests Against Interference with
Commerce--Proposals of Mediation--More Aid from the United States.
CHAPTER XIII--225
Great Increase of Revolutionary Strength--Spain's Enormous Force--The
Case of Napoleon Arango--His Extraordinary Manifesto--An Elaborate
Appeal for Betrayal of the Revolution--Designing Decrees of
Rodas--Emancipation Decree of the Spanish Government--Its Practical
Effects--Atrocities Practised by the Spanish--Downfall of Rodas and
Appointment of Valmaseda as Captain-General--Spanish Overtures to the
United States--Murder of Zenea by the Volunteers--Address by
Cespedes--Treachery in the Ranks.
CHAPTER XIV--259
Counter-Revolution in Spain--Amadeus Made King--Increased Malignity of
the Volunteers--The Massacre of the Cuban Students--Death of General
Quesada--Reorganization of the Cuban Army--Campaign of Maximo
Gomez--Progress of the War with Varying Fortunes--Calixto Garcia at
Jiguani--Gradual Reduction of Cuban Strength--Valmaseda's Savage
Threats.
CHAPTER XV--271
Spain's Desperate Efforts to Suppress the Revolution--Stubborn
Resistance of the Cubans--Valmaseda Opposed and Overthrown by the
Volunteers--Accession of Jovellar--Increasing Interest in Cuban Affairs
in the United States--Spain a Republic Again--Retirement of
Cespedes--The Seizure of the _Virginius_--Massacre of Many of Her
Passengers and Crew--Strenuous Intervention--Settlement of the
Affair--"The Book of Blood"--Spanish Confessions of Brutality.
CHAPTER XVI--289
Renewed Cuban Successes--The Island in a State of Siege--Concha Again
Captain-General--Record of the Cost of the War--The United States
Threatens Intervention--Spanish Anger--A Protest to England Against
America--American Peace Proposals--Strength of the Spanish Army--A War
of Extermination--Martinez Campos Becomes Captain-General--His
Conciliatory Decrees--Surrender of Cuban Leaders--The Treaty of
Zanjon--End of the War--Campos's Explanation of His Course.
CHAPTER XVII--305
Results of the Ten Years' War--Political Parties in Cuba--The Liberals,
Who Were Conservative--The Union Constitutionalists--A Third Party
Platform--Cubans in the Cortes--Failure to Fulfill the Treaty of
Zanjon--The Little War--Calixto Garcia's Campaign--Cuban Fugitives
Protected by England--Revolt of 1885--Custom House Frauds at Havana--A
Reign of Lawlessness--Tariff Troubles--The Roster of Rulers.
CHAPTER XVIII--315
The Intellectual and Spiritual Development of Cuba--Some Famous Cuban
Authors--José Maria Heredia--Felix Varela y Morales--José de la Luz y
Caballero, "The Father of the Cuban Revolution"--Domingo del Monte and
the "Friends of Peace"--José Antonio Saco--Joaquin Lorenzo Luaces--Dona
Luisa Perez--Dona Gertrudis Gomez de Avellaneda--Nicolas Azcarate--Juan
Clemente Zenea--Rafael Merchan--The Distinguished Intellectual Status of
Cuba Among the Nations.
ILLUSTRATIONS
FULL PAGE PLATES
_José_ Cipriano de la Luz y Caballero _Frontispiece_
FACING
PAGE
The Old Presidential Palace 14
Falls of the Hanebanilla 110
Carlos Manuel de Cespedes 158
Ignacio Agramonte 258
Calixto Garcia 268
A Santiago Sunset 280
José Silverio Jorrin 308
José Maria Heredia 318
Gertrudis Gomez de Avellaneda 332
TEXT EMBELLISHMENTS
PAGE
Narciso Lopez 23
Ramon Pinto 62
Manuel Quesada 167
Francisco V. Aguilera 173
Bernabe de Varona 178
Miguel de Aldama 204
Domingo Goicouria 234
Nicolas Azcarate 251
Juan Clemente Zenea 252
Salvador Cisneros Betancourt 276
Felipe Poey 315
Antonio Bachiller 317
Felix Varela 320
José Agustin Caballero 321
Domingo del Monte 323
José Jacinto Milanes 324
José Manuel Mestre 326
Luisa Perez de Zambrana 328
Joaquin Lorenzo Luaces 330
Enrique Piñeyro 334
THE HISTORY OF CUBA
CHAPTER I
The revolutionary era in Cuban history had its rise amid circumstances
of both political and commercial dissatisfaction and protest, and it is
by no means impossible nor even improbable that the latter form of
discontent was the more potent of the two. The commercial and industrial
development of the island, despite its almost incredibly opulent
resources, had been very slow, because handicapped by selfish and sordid
misgovernment. The typical attitude of the Peninsular government and its
agents in Cuba had been to use and to exploit the island for the sole
benefit of Spain, and not to permit other nations to enter in
competition. Other countries, in fact, so great was the secrecy
maintained with regard to Cuba, knew but little of the vast wealth
contained in this small space of land. Consequently the island was
developed in accordance with the wishes, needs, and potentialities of
Spain and with one other point of view. Cuba was never exploited by
Spain for all its worth, and indeed there seems to be doubt as to
whether Spain ever grasped in full the future possibilities of the
island. Certain it is that she never actually realized them. And the
loss was in consequence as great to Spain as it was to Cuba. For had
Spain allowed herself to lose sight of the richness of present
extortions and aided Cuba to develop her resources for the future, the
whole story would have been far different. But the people of the United
States were beginning to recognize Cuba's possibilities. American
merchants began to flock thither. American money and American
resourcefulness opened new doors for Cuba's rich products. American
trade and enterprise contributed a great deal which made for Cuban
expansion and industrial development. In proof of this there is the fact
that the island towns on the north side, which is nearest the United
States, increased both in population and commercially, in striking
contrast to the slow growth of the towns on the south side of the
island. In 1850 these latter towns, with Santiago de Cuba as the chief
city, did not maintain more than twenty-five per cent. of the trade of
the island.
In further proof of America's hand in the development of Cuba, we may
cite the following tables, in every one of which it is easy to see that
Cuba's trade was largely with the United States. Taking the records of
Cuban trade in 1828 as typical of the commerce of the early part of the
century, we get the following contrasts with the figures of the years
immediately preceding 1850:
Cuban imports in 1828, $19,534,922; exports, $13,414,362; revenue,
$9,086,406.
Cuban imports in 1847, $32,389,117; exports, $27,998,770; revenues,
$12,808,713.
Cuban imports in 1848, $20,346,516; exports, $20,461,934; revenue,
$11,635,052.
These statistics of the imports and exports of Cuba are divided
according to the chief countries concerned:
1847 Imports Exports
United States $10,892,335 $8,880,040
Spain 7,088,750 6,780,058
England 6,389,936 7,240,880
France 1,349,683 1,940,535
1848
United States $6,933,538 $8,285,928
Spain 7,088,750 3,927,007
England 4,974,545 1,184,201
Entries and clearings of vessels from Cuba were as follows:
1847 1848
Entries Clearances Entries Clearances
United States 2,012 1722 1733 1611
Spain 819 751 875 747
England 563 489 670 348
France 99 81 85 63
Copper was at this time greatly exported from Cuba. Since its discovery
in 1530 comparatively little had been done until three centuries later.
In 1830 an English company commenced operating the copper mines and from
that time to 1870 had extracted this ore to the value of $50,000,000.
Sugar had long been the greatest source of Cuban wealth. It was always
the sugar planter who had social as well as financial prestige on the
island. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century even the poorest and
smallest of sugar plantations had yielded a profit of $100,000 a year
while the larger and more prosperous ones had cleared even as high as
$200,000 annually. And all this had been accomplished with a minimum of
effort. Vast areas of Cuba at this period were given over to these
plantations. Some estates devoted themselves exclusively to raising the
cane, while others ran mills which ground the cane and prepared the
product for sale as sugar. Particularly with the soil as it was then,
unravished by revolution, with its original fertility unimpaired, it was
rarely necessary to replant the sugar cane. The old sprouts came up year
after year, yielding at least two crops a year without any necessity for
disturbing or enriching the soil. In 1800 Cuba exported 41,000 tons of
sugar; and in 1850 no less than 223,000 tons.
From 1836 Cuba had no representation in the Cortes. Although Spain had
promised Cuba "special laws," these were not enacted, and such laws as
were put on the books were inimical to Cuban interests. Without
representation, Cubans were also denied free speech. To speak one's mind
against Spain meant to be thrown into a dungeon. If two or more persons
signed a petition to secure some slight betterment in conditions, it was
termed treason, and they were promptly apprehended. Business was under
control of the Captain-General. It had to pay him large sums to be
allowed to live, and it was compelled to conduct its affairs in
accordance with his ideas. The "Junta de Fomento" established by Arango
was no longer a factor in the improvement of Cuban affairs, but was
packed with creatures of the Captain-General, with favorites of the
court, and was used as a means of obtaining information and extorting
money from Cubans who were suspected of disloyalty to Spain. The public
offices were used to support additional taxation, and to strengthen the
despotic rule of the Captain-General.
Under the decree of 1825 the Captains-General had taken unto themselves
the most autocratic power. Creoles were not allowed to serve in the
army, or in the treasury, customs or judicial departments. From these
last three they were excluded because such positions were lucrative, and
were desired by court favorites. The Captains-General financed and
fostered all kinds of nefarious schemes for extracting wealth from the
Cubans to pour it into their own pockets. The poor people were obliged
to police the rural districts, and to give up their own occupations to
work on the roads making repairs. The control of education in Cuba was
given--it hardly seems credible--into the hands of the military
functionaries to administer. The Spanish military authorities had a
well-organized system of blackmailing well to do citizens by threatening
to denounce them for sedition unless they paid hush money, which was
put at as large a sum as possible. Of course it did not matter whether
the victim was guilty or innocent. If the latter he would have no
opportunity of clearing himself. The only thing which the robbers took
into consideration was how much he could pay. Money was the open sesame
for prison doors, and the barrier which prevented their closing on the
unfortunate Cuban.
Yet one would think he would have little left for bribery when he had
paid his taxes, for the subject of taxation was after all the most
grievous one, and was a direct cause of the various filibustering
expeditions which attempted to gain freedom for Cuba, and finally led to
the war of independence.
The revenues from all sources, including export and import duties,
license fees, and the government lottery, for the year 1851 were
$12,248,712.06, which amounted to a tax of $20 for each free citizen.
The excess duties had a very deleterious effect on the commerce of Cuba.
The duty on goods shipped direct from Spain to Cuba was so much less
than the duty on goods shipped from other countries that it became the
custom to ship materials from the United States to Spain and from Spain
back to Cuba, since this cost less than a direct shipment. The direct
shipments of flour from the United States to Cuba decreased from 113,245
barrels in 1826 to 100 barrels in 1852, while the imports of flour from
Spain, who could hardly produce enough for her own needs, increased from
31,749 barrels to 257,451 barrels in the same time. Of course, this was
the golden opportunity for the smuggler, who could slip across from
Florida and run his boat into one of the hundreds of little coves with
which the coast of Cuba is lined.
Cubans might have more cheerfully rendered their tribute in taxes, but
unfortunately the huge sums were not expended for the good of their
country. An extravagant government had to be supported. In 1850 the cost
of maintaining the army and all expenses in connection with it were over
$5,000,000 and the navy cost more than $2,000,000, while the Spanish
legation in the United States was maintained from Cuban coffers. Writing
of such a state of affairs, José Antonio Saco said in 1835:
"Enormous is the load of taxation which weighs upon us--perhaps there is
no people in the world which in proportion to its resources and
population pays as much as the island of Cuba, nor a country, perhaps,
where less care is taken to use on its own soil some part of its great
sacrifices."
In 1851 the duty on sugar was raised from 50 cents a box to 87-1/2
cents. Flour and hogs were more heavily taxed than any other imports.
Hogs carried a duty of six dollars each, while the tax on flour was so
enormous as to prevent its use by any but the very wealthiest
inhabitants. Foreign flour was discriminated against in favor of Spanish
flour; on the former the duty was $10 a barrel while on the latter it
was increased from $2.50 to $6 a barrel. The records show there
importations of flour to Cuba:
1847 1848
From Spain 175,870 bbls. 212,944 bbls.
From America 59,373 bbls. 18,175 bbls.
------- -------
Total 235,243 bbls. 231,119 bbls.
Spain was favored in other ways in these taxes. Spanish vessels were
taxed only one-seventh of one per cent. on imports, while foreign
vessels were taxed 1.1 per cent, on the same goods. Nor were these taxes
the only ones which the people had to undergo. One of the most
pernicious of all taxes was the 1/10 of all farm produce which was
given to the church. The result of this tax was indirectly bad as well
as unjust, for it fostered a kind of priest in Cuba who could do little
for the moral and spiritual welfare of the people.
The following table shows the revenue of the island in 1849-51:
Import Export Other
Duties Duties Revenues Total
1849 $5,844,783 $ 584,477 $4,782,226 $11,211,526
1850 5,639,225 757,071 3,655,149 10,051,443
1851 6,364,825 1,793,992 4,821,195 12,180,012
The currency of Cuba was gold and silver; and in 1842 she had a total
amount in her treasury of $12,000,000 in coin.
An official statement compiled in 1844 lists a few of the taxes, and
gives some interesting figures as to the amounts collected. The Cubans
were taxed six per cent. of the selling price, on all sales of real
estate, or slaves, and on sales at auction and in shop. They were also
taxed on Papal Bulls, and there were brokers' taxes, cattle taxes,
shopkeepers' taxes, tax on mortgages, tax on donations, tax on
cockfighting, taxes on grants of crosses, insignia or use of uniforms;
taxes on promissory notes or bills of exchange, taxes on municipal
taxes, taxes on the death of all non-insolvent persons, taxes on
investments in favor of the clergy; the church did not escape, for there
were taxes on the property of the Jesuits. There were also taxes on
sales of public lands, taxes on the establishments of auctioneers, and
taxes on everything sold, water canal taxes, and customhouse duties on
imports and exports and the tonnage of vessels. Cubans were not only
taxed on the sale of lands, but of course on the land itself, and there
were state and municipal taxes, and they were taxed on their cattle and
all animals whether they kept them or sold them. Passports were taxed,
and as Cuba had a large transient population this tax brought in a
goodly sum. Public offices were privately sold to the highest bidder.
There were taxes on the sale of archives to notaries for the recording
of deeds. Small fines were being constantly imposed by grafting
officials, and the Captain-General's tribunal exacted a special fee,
which brought in large sums. Fees were demanded for marriages, both by
the church and the state. There was an inheritance tax; there were tolls
imposed on bridges; and large amounts were extorted for the nomination
to office of captains of districts, city ward commissaries, and
watchmen; gambling was licensed; and there were the taxes on sugar, on
pastures, on coffee and tobacco, and on minerals exported. The tax on
all crops, except sugar, when gathered was ten per cent. There was a tax
of $1.25 on every hundred weight of salt. Government documents were
required to be written on special paper, furnished by the government at
a high price.
Worse than all this were the restrictions placed on personal liberty. No
private individual of a hospitable nature was allowed to give an
entertainment to his friends, even a small evening gathering, without
obtaining a license, for which he paid. If he neglected to do this he
was fined, and sometimes the license was declared invalid on some
pretext and he was fined anyway.
No Cuban could move from place to place, or go on even a short journey,
without obtaining a license. If a man wanted to make an evening call on
a friend, he could not do so unless he carried a lantern, and obtained
from each watchman whom he passed permission to proceed. If he failed to
comply, he was arrested and fined $8. He could not entertain a guest in
his house over night, not even a neighbor, without informing the
authorities, under penalty of a heavy fine. The household goods of a
Cuban could not be moved from one house to another in the same town
without the consent of the authorities, and the penalty for failure in
this case was a fine.
The cost of a passport, which was necessary before a foreigner could
enter any port in Cuba, and the proceeds of which went into the
treasury, was $2. The traveller was also obliged to give security for
good conduct, and his baggage was thoroughly searched. Particular care
was taken to see that he did not have any incendiary literature, and if
he had a Bible, which must have been considered a dangerous book, and
which, at any rate, came under the ban of both the church and the
government, it was promptly separated from his other effects and seized.
Unless he desired to remain in the seaport where he entered, he was
required to pay twenty-five cents more for a passport permitting him to
visit the interior. It seems to have been difficult enough to get into
Cuba, but like the proverbial church fair, it was even more expensive to
get out, for the privilege cost $7.50.
Some authorities estimate that the taxes of Cuba averaged in 1850 $38 a
head, while in the United States, a republic and the nearest neighbor,
they amounted to only about $2. But then the people of the United States
were free, and were not paying tribute for the privilege of being
governed by royalty. The greater part of these taxes were exacted from
the Creoles, for the Spaniards made up only about 35,000 of the
population and there were estimated to be 520,000 Creoles at this
period.
A large number of families came to Cuba from the Spanish colonies of
South America and Mexico, which had gained their independence from
Spain, and from Florida and Louisiana when they came into the
possession of the United States. These families were, of course, all
intensely loyal to Spain, and of the arrogant disposition which
naturally prevailed among men of such tendencies as led them to prefer
the autocracy of Spain to American democracy. In spite of this increase
in their number, the native white or Creole population of Cuba
outnumbered the Spanish by more than 10 to 1.
In 1850 among the Cubans themselves there were 50 marquises and 30
counts. These men were in the main wealthy planters who had bought their
titles from Spain for sums varying between twenty and fifty thousand
dollars. The fundamental reason for this expenditure on their part was
not wholly for social prestige but rather to enjoy the greater personal
freedom accorded to nobles. These latter could never be tried by
ordinary courts but only by tribunals, and they could not be arrested
for debt.
Those Cubans who were hoping for better days for Cuba were eager that
their children should have opportunities not accorded them. They desired
to send them to the United States for education, in the hope perhaps
that they might imbibe some of the principles of liberty. But this did
not find favor with the Spanish authorities, and it was only by swearing
that the children were ill, that the climate did not agree with them,
and that they were being sent away for their health, that passports
could be obtained to get them out of the country.
Many Cubans were persecuted by officials, high and low, falsely accused,
condemned without a hearing; shut up in fortresses without adequate
food, without the ordinary comforts of life, in solitary confinement,
often in dungeons; and frequently their own people were denied knowledge
of their whereabouts. They simply dropped out of sight and were gone. No
man knew when he opened his eyes in the morning whether that day might
be his last as a free human being--free so far as he might be with the
thousand and one restrictions imposed upon him. He was not sure that
some enemy, unwittingly made, might not inform upon him for some
imaginary action of disloyalty, or that he might not be falsely
denounced by hired spies. It was then no wonder that those who loved
their country, who had self-respect and affection for their families,
longed for freedom from Spain, and lived in the hope of emancipation
from what was virtual slavery.
Under the Spanish rule the chief officer of government in Cuba was the
Captain-General, who after the promulgation of the decree of May 25,
1825, had absolute authority. Even prior to that time, because of the
long distance between Cuba and the mother country, the time consumed for
information and instructions to travel back and forth, and the fact that
Spain was more or less concerned with her own none too quiet domestic
affairs, the Captain-General was very powerful.
There was another office under the crown which was much sought after,
that of Intendant. He controlled the financial affairs of the island,
and received his orders not from the Captain-General but direct from the
crown. In his own realm his power was equal to that of the
Captain-General, but he had no authority outside his own particular
domain. The title of Intendant was changed to Superintendent, in 1812,
at which time the financial business of Cuba had become so important
that it was impossible for it to be handled from one place, and
subordinate officers were placed in command at Santiago and Puerto
Principe, subject of course to the direction of the Superintendent.
It is needless to say that the arrogant Spanish Captains-General did
not relish having anyone on the island who equalled them in rank, and
after much controversy at home and abroad the Captain-General in 1844
was declared to be the superior officer, and later on, in 1853, the two
offices were united, under the title of Captain-General. The
Superintendent was head or chief of a "Tribunal de Cuentas" which had
judicial control over the treasury and its officers, was auditor in
chief of all accounts, and voted on all expenditures. Its rulings were
reviewed only by the Minister of Finance in Madrid, to whose direction
it was subject.
The Captain-General was the presiding officer of the City Council which
had charge of the civic administration of Havana, but he had only one
vote, exactly as had every other member, and officially he had no power
except to carry out the resolutions of the juntas. Unofficially, he
controlled the city affairs absolutely. If occasion demanded he could
act as the presiding officer of any city council. This power was
exercised whenever he felt that the councils were growing too liberal in
their ideas and actions, and enabled him to exercise a despotic power
and coerce public opinion.
Cuban leaders had no conception of the democratic form of government
which in the United States gave separate powers to the national, state
or province and city administrations. The national government was
closely linked with the provincial and with the city, and the functions
were so intertwined that it was hard to say where one left off and the
other began. The Captain-General always encouraged this close
amalgamation of governmental functions because it enabled him to keep in
close touch with all the branches of the government and to discover and
put down any movements which would tend to diminish the power of the
supreme officer. The Captain-General's power was civic, provincial,
national and indeed international. This enabled him very easily to line
his coffers, for he spent a great deal of time in signing papers of no
especial significance, except that to obtain his signature it was
necessary that he be paid a big fee. It was said that any
Captain-General who remained four years in Cuba, and did not take away
from the island with him when he departed at least a million dollars,
was a poor manager.
The Captain-General had all prisons under his control; and the fate of
all prisoners, either those imprisoned for petty or state offenses, lay
in his hands. This did not mean that he personally supervised the
prisons, but that his creatures and officers were subject to his orders,
and the offices were within his gift. Thus he was able to extort fees
for various functions, as well as to demand largess for leniency
extended to state prisoners. Under Tacon's administration this power was
exercised to such an extent that it became a public scandal.
The postal service also fell under the supervision of the
Captain-General, and there were many ways in which he could make this
office line his pockets. He acted as a police magistrate in the city of
Havana, another fruitful source of revenue, particularly as the office
was connected with that of president of the city council.
Cuba was divided into three districts, the western, central and eastern.
Havana was the capital of the western district, Santiago de Cuba of the
eastern and Puerto Principe of the central district. Each district had
its governor who was directly under the Captain-General, and under the
governor, in charge of the affairs of the larger towns and their
out-lying districts, was a lieutenant-governor, who was president of the
local council and had control of military affairs for his district.
Under the lieutenant-governors were captains, who were located in
regions which were not very thickly settled, and who had absolute
military power--subject of course to commands emanating higher up--over
the affairs, lives and property of the people under their jurisdiction.
Each of these officers received his appointment from the Spanish crown,
but he was obliged to receive his nomination from the Captain-General,
so that these offices too were a source of revenue to that gentleman,
and his nominees, when appointed, were subject to his control. The
functions of the governors and lieutenant-governors were supposed to be
primarily military, and they received the salary which would naturally
attach to their rank, but since they also presided in civil and criminal
cases in their jurisdictions, as did the Captain-General in Havana, the
fees from these proceedings made very fat picking. Now the captains had
no salary at all, and the style in which they were able to live depended
on the number of fines they were able to impose, and therefore it is not
difficult to imagine that they were not easy on any Cubans who came
under suspicion of any offense. They received one-third of all fines
imposed by them.
Each city in Cuba had its Ayuntamiento or council. In Puerto Principe
there seem to have been elections for membership to this body, but in
most cases seats were bought at enormous prices, and the receipts from
such sale went into the Spanish treasury, although the Captain-General
received his perquisite for allowing the transfer to be made. He also
seems to have had some power of appointment, which was seldom made
without pecuniary consideration, and there were some cases where members
had hereditary rights to their seats. Not every town had its
Ayuntamiento, but in most of the older towns they existed. The
Ayuntamiento elected its own mayor from among its members, but they were
all subject to the control of the Governor or Lieutenant Governor, who
was in line of course subject to the Captain-General.
[Illustration: THE OLD PRESIDENTIAL PALACE
The official residence of a long line of Spanish Governors and
Captains-General is a large and handsome building of stone, tinted white
and yellow, facing the Plaza de Armas from the east, and standing on the
site of the original parish church of Havana. Within its walls occurred
the memorable scene of the final abdication of Spanish sovereignty in
Cuba. It has now been replaced by the new Presidential Palace.]
Early in the reign of the Spaniards in Cuba, courts called Audiencias
with both judicial and administrative functions had been established.
They were not at all pleasing to the more arbitrary of the
Captains-General for while they were subordinate to him, and their only
restriction on his power was in a kind of advisory capacity, yet they
often reflected public opinion, and too, if their conclusions differed
from that of the Captain-General, they were a moral curb upon his
actions which he resented. The most ancient and honorable of these
Audiencias was the one at Puerto Principe. It was the oldest in the
island, and it strove to uphold its dignity by conducting its
proceedings in the most formal and impressive manner, by adhering to the
most ancient customs. It was greatly reverenced by the people of the
district, and the Captain-General felt that somehow it detracted from
his glory, and from the respect which he felt should be accorded the
commands of his inferior officers. Various Captains-General strove to
abolish this court, and to turn its revenues into their own pockets.
The judicial functions in criminal and civil suits were divided among
many bodies, and there must have been great confusion, overlapping of
authority, and consequent wrangling. Judicial powers were accorded to
the Alcaldes Mayors, to the Captains, Lieutenant Governors, Governors,
Captains-General, Audiencias, in some cases to juntas, and even to naval
officers. Judges could condemn, but they could not themselves be
condemned. There was no way of curbing a wrongful exercise of their
power, and even when their offenses were heinous they could not be
disciplined through any democratic measures. Civil prisoners were often
taken from the jurisdiction of the civil courts and tried by military
tribunals. In the last resort, the Captain-General could always
interfere, when he chose.
The courts in Cuba at the middle of the nineteenth century were
notoriously corrupt, and while the people feared them, in their
gatherings in their homes they did not hesitate to condemn them. Justice
was almost a dead letter. When a well known offender against the laws
had influence with the Captain-General, or with some subordinate
official, the prosecuting attorneys would refuse to try him. The very
source of the pay of the captains made it impossible for them to make a
living without corruption, and an honest one would have been hard to
find, while the governors and lieutenant-governors were of opinion that
the only way to keep the people in subjection was to oppress and terrify
them, and the only way for governors and lieutenant-governors to return
to Spain with the proper amount of spoil was to exact it from the
unfortunate Cubans.
While the Captain-General was the supreme military authority, he was not
the supreme commander of the naval forces, the latter being a separate
office. This was due principally at least to the fact that all the naval
forces of Spain in America were commanded from Havana, and all naval
expeditions for the defense of Spain in South America were commanded and
directed from that port. Therefore, it was necessary not only that the
naval officer should be a person of importance and ability, but also
that he should not be subordinate to the chief officer of any one of the
Spanish colonies. When Spain lost her large possessions in America, and
only Cuba remained to her, then the office of naval commander was
greatly curtailed in scope, and it was a matter of much irritation to
the Captain-General that there should be stationed in Cuba, or in Cuban
waters, an official of equal rank with himself.
Over the army the Captain-General held undisputed sway. There were
quartered in Cuba in 1825 three regular army battalions, a brigade of
artillery and one cavalry regiment. This army was supposed to be
augmented by the local militia. In 1850 there were in the regular army
sixteen battalions, two picked companies of veterans, twelve squadrons
of cavalry, two brigades of artillery, and two light batteries.
Cuba had reason to fear the success of an attack made from the southern
coast of Florida, from Hayti or from Yucatan. The island lies in the
midst of the gulf waters, long and narrow in outline, and with miles of
sea coast all out of proportion to its area. It was almost impossible
adequately to patrol the coast and it would have been easy for an enemy
to make a landing, provided the leader of an expedition was familiar
with the coasts. Means of communication were slow in those days, and
particularly slow in Cuba because of her geographical formation. If the
attackers once entrenched themselves in the mountains, they were in a
position to carry on an interminable guerrilla warfare. For these
reasons, Spain would have felt that Cuba should be heavily garrisoned,
even were it not also for the fact that the Cubans were growing so
restless and crying so vociferously for liberty that Spain had reason to
fear dangers both from within and without.
People did not lightly express their opinions publicly in Cuba,
particularly if those opinions were unfavorable to the government.
Expressions unfavorable to the government were never allowed to leak
into print, for except for a short period in 1812, and another from 1820
to 1823, the press was securely censored. The Captains-General who
reigned during the nineteenth century were particularly careful that
this censorship should be rigid and unbending. An American editor, Mr.
Thrasher, was more daring than the native Cubans and his paper, _El Faro
Industrial_, frequently contained matter which provoked the displeasure
of the Captain-General. He had powerful connections and he was therefore
unmolested until it was deemed that his comment on the death of General
Ena, during the Lopez uprising, was too offensive, and the paper was
suppressed. The Spanish interests conducted the largest newspaper in
Havana, _El Diario de la Marina_, which had a list of 6,000 subscribers.
Although this paper was avowedly Spanish in its sympathies and was
conducted with Spanish money, it too was carefully watched by the
censor. One day, it unguardedly, or through a misjudgment, accepted for
publication an article implying that the interests of Cuba and the
interests of Spain were not one and identical, and the entire edition
was promptly suppressed by the censor.
Not only was the local press carefully muzzled, but a watch was kept
lest anything creep in from the United States, or from any other source,
which might put notions in the heads of the Cubans that would divert
their allegiance from Spain. The work of the censor was not an
acceptable one for the United States, and the American residents in Cuba
did not take pleasantly to the suppression of the American papers, and
friction on this score was constant.
A paper called _La Verdad_, published in New York by Cuban sympathizers,
came under the especial displeasure of the Captain-General and of the
Spanish government in Madrid. Regarding it, the Spanish Secretary of
Foreign Affairs wrote as follows to Calderon de la Barca, the Spanish
minister at Washington, on January 2, 1848:
"Your excellency knows that the paper called _La Verdad_, published in
New York, is printed with the specific object of awakening among the
inhabitants of Cuba and Porto Rico the sentiment of rebellion, and to
propagate the idea of annexation to the United States. The
Captain-General of the island, in fulfilment of his duty, prohibited the
entrance and circulation of this newspaper in the island, and tried to
investigate the ramifications in the island of this conspiracy against
the rights of Spain, and against the peace of the country. As a result
of the efforts made with this object, it was discovered that although
not numerous, there were in Havana some wicked Spaniards charged with
the task of collecting money to sustain the subversive publication, and
to distribute its copies to those who should care to read them."
The Spanish government in Cuba did not look with favor upon foreigners.
It thought that other countries, especially those adjacent to Cuba, were
too tainted with liberal notions to render their inhabitants safe
associates for the already restless Cubans. It therefore preferred that
persons wishing to visit Cuba either remain quietly at home, or become
Spanish citizens, subject to Spanish rule, if they insisted on remaining
on the island. On October 21, 1817, a Royal Order was issued dividing
foreigners into three classes. First, transients, composed of those who
were merely enjoying the unwilling hospitality of Spain in Cuba. A
person could be regarded as a transient for a period of only five years.
After that he must either declare his intention of remaining in Cuba
permanently or depart. Second, domiciled foreigners, who must declare
their intention of remaining permanently in Cuba, must embrace the
church by becoming Roman Catholics, must forswear allegiance to their
native country in favor of allegiance to Spain, and must agree to be
subject to Spanish law exactly as native Cubans and Spaniards were
subject to it. Third, citizens by naturalization, who were regarded as
Spanish citizens in every sense of the word, and could be sure of the
same unjust treatment which Spain accorded all subjects in her
possessions.
Now this subject of foreigners in Cuba was a complex one, because,
beside the tendency among Americans to settle on the island, now that
its rich resources were becoming recognized, there were, in the middle
of the nineteenth century, many Americans rushing to California to seek
their fortunes in the gold fields. The favorite route was via Havana and
Panama, and they naturally left their mark on the thought of the people
with whom they came in contact. Beside this each year during the sugar
harvest skilled mechanics came to work on the plantations. This did not
meet with the approval of those in command of the finances of the
island, because each of these visitors carried home with him every year
from $1,000 to $1,500 on which he had paid no taxes. Such conduct was
reprehensible, and it was entirely foreign to the policy or intent of
any Captain-General that anyone should get away with any money without
being either taxed or fined for it. Besides, these adventurers, as they
were contemptuously termed, were regular mouthpieces of treason, and
were said to talk of nothing else but freedom from Spain by annexation.
Naturally their coming was unpleasant to the high powers in Cuba. Now
under the treaty of 1795, between Spain and the United States, provision
was made that "in all cases of seizure, detention or arrest, for debts
contracted, or offenses committed by any citizen or subject of the one
party, within the jurisdiction of the other, the same shall be made and
prosecuted by order of the law only, and according to the regular course
of proceedings in such cases. The citizens and subjects of both parties
shall be allowed to employ such advocates, solicitors, notaries, agents
and factors as they may judge proper in all their affairs and in all
their trials at law in which they may be concerned before the tribunals
of the other party, and such agents shall have free access to be present
at the proceedings in such cases and at the taking of all examinations
and evidence which may be exhibited in the said trials."
Americans charged with offenses against the Spanish government should
have had the benefits of the rights given them under this treaty, but
the government took refuge behind the fact that the Captain-General had
no diplomatic functions, and Americans were frequently thrust into
prison and allowed to remain there subject to much discomfort and to
financial loss until Washington and Madrid got the facts, and took the
time to arrange the matter. The Spanish Secretary for Foreign Affairs
wrote to Calderon de la Barca, on this matter, as follows:
"Your Excellency knows that the government of Her Majesty has always
maintained the position with all foreign powers that its colonies are
outside of all the promises and obligations undertaken by Spain in
international agreements. With regard to Cuba, the discussions with
England to this effect are well known, in which the Spanish Government
has declared that the treaties which form the positive law of Spain had
been adjusted in times when the Spanish colonies were closed to all
foreign trade and commerce, and that when in 1824, these colonies were
opened to commerce of all other nations, they were not placed on equal
footing with the home country, but were kept in the exceptional position
of colonies. Of this exceptional position of that part of the Spanish
dominions, no one has more proof than the foreign consuls, since it is
evident to them that the Spanish government has only endured their
presence on the condition that they should not exercise other functions
than those of mere commercial agents. Thus in 1845 the English
government accepted formally the agreement that its consul should not
demand the fulfillment of treaties, not even of those which refer to the
slave trade."
The natural inference to be drawn from this was that Spain considered
that foreigners who desired to live in Cuba must do so at their own
peril, and that the Captain-General was above the trammeling bonds of
international agreements in his dealing with interlopers who came to the
island. But it must be borne in mind that the government of Cuba was
administered not for the development of the island or the best good of
its inhabitants, but according to the short sighted and stupid policies
which seemed to Spain best calculated to prevent Cuba from slipping from
her grasp as had her other colonies. Therefore, the main solicitude of
each of the Captains-General was the subduing of the inhabitants by
force, if necessary, the defense of the island from an enemy who might
come by sea, and the lining of his own pockets while opportunity
offered.
CHAPTER II
Venezuela gave the struggling Spanish American colonies Bolivar, who was
their liberator and their savior. In the same country was born, at the
end of the eighteenth century, in 1798 or 1799, a child who fifty years
later was to lay down his life on the altar of freedom for Cuba. This
boy, like Bolivar, was of a wealthy and respected family. His father was
the proprietor of a large estate which was stocked with cattle and
horses and live stock of every kind. His mother had gentle and even
aristocratic blood in her veins and she endeavored to bring up her
children with high ideals of truth and honor. Narciso Lopez, who was to
fight so valiantly for enslaved Cuba, is reported to have been a boy who
was born to command. He roamed the plains with the men from his father's
ranch and they recognised him as a leader. He was a fine shot, a
fearless rider, brave, energetic, resolute and tireless.
[Illustration: NARCISO LOPEZ]
When he was a boy of fourteen or fifteen his family moved to Caracas.
His father had been stripped of his property by the wars by which
Venezuela was torn at that time, and consequently entered into
commercial life, and soon established a business with many nourishing
branches. Narciso must have been a lad of exceptional perspicuity and
judgment, for his father placed him in charge of a branch establishment
at Valencia. But a quiet commercial life, as quiet as the times would
permit, did not please a boy who had the instincts and tastes of a
soldier. Besides it probably would have been difficult for anyone with
any spirit to keep out of the turmoil which was threatening to engulf
Valencia at that time. For the place was armed and garrisoned against
the Spaniards, who under General Boves were advancing to attempt to take
it. The natural leader of the Venezuelans was Bolivar, and although he
had been routed, and had retired to reorganize his forces, he succeeded
in getting word through to Valencia to hold the town at any cost. The
Valencians were only too eager to obey these instructions, because they
well knew the devastation that inevitably followed in the wake of the
Spanish army. They could not view with equanimity the picture of their
town destroyed, their women ravished, little children killed, and men
massacred or led away into captivity, and so they laid plans for a brave
resistance. All of the valuable property was collected from the houses
into the public square. The town had no walls, so that the best that
could be done was to barricade the approaches to this square and strive
to defend it.
The house where Lopez lived was situated in one corner of the square,
and he soon found himself not only in the centre of the preparations,
but, because of his resourcefulness and initiative, a recognized leader
in the defensive operations. The elder Lopez was in town at the time,
but while he did his part in preparing for the siege, it was the son who
took command and who issued the orders to the father. For three weeks
the little band of patriots held off the Spanish forces, sending runners
through, whenever this could be done, with messages asking Bolivar to
hasten to their aid, and each day praying that help might reach them.
But Bolivar was unable to do anything for them. Indeed his army was in
such straits that it was a relief to him to have the Spanish leader turn
his attention to the attack on Valencia and give an opportunity to rally
his own forces. At the end of the third week the victorious Spaniards
entered the town in triumph. The men were separated from the women, and
were marked for a general slaughter that night while the decree went
forth that the women were to be allowed to remain alive a little longer
so that they might serve the pleasure of their conquerors. Narciso was
not taken prisoner, because he was clever enough to hide himself with
some negroes, who it was expected would be taken away into captivity by
the Spaniards. Narciso was separated from his father, and was much
concerned for the latter's safety, for the son readily pictured the
horrible fate that might befall him; and finally his fears grew so
unbearable that he felt that anything rather than uncertainty would be
welcome. He therefore stole forth to reconnoiter and to see what he
could discover. With him he took two old colored men who had been family
servants. All night he searched, crawling from house to house, under
cover of the darkness, taking advantage of every bit of cover, lying
close to some friendly shelter to listen to the conversation of passing
soldiers in the hope that he might gather some news. He was later to
learn that his father had effected his escape, and that his own
fruitless search through the dark watches of that interminable night was
after all his own salvation. The next morning, when, worn out with
exhaustion and half dead with fatigue, he and his companions dragged
themselves back to the place where the slaves had been huddled, a
ghastly sight met their eyes. The Spaniards for once had been false to
their traditions. Perhaps they knew that these slaves had imbibed from
their masters too much of the spirit of liberty to make good Spanish
servants. At any rate there they lay upon the ground, eighty-seven of
them, each with his throat slit from ear to ear.
Now we come to a period of Lopez's career which it is difficult to
harmonize with the whole story of his after life. The only plausible
explanation seems to be that he was only a boy, and that Bolivar's army
was suffering such reverses that the only way in which Lopez could save
his own life was by joining forces with the Spaniards, which he did. One
would have thought that after the valiant part he played in the defense
of Valencia, he would cast his lot with the insurgents. No writer of the
period gives us any real explanation of his course. But whatever the
motive, Lopez became a Spanish soldier, a fact which later was to be of
tremendous value to him, because it enabled him to visit Spain, to rise
high in the service, to hold exalted positions in the Spanish court, and
to obtain an insight into the cruelties and injustices perpetrated by
the men who were the oppressors of the country which he was to adopt as
his own, and the salvation of which he was to make his life work, which
he could have gained in no other way. His action may have been
precipitated by the fact that the people of Valencia did not understand
the straits in which Bolivar found himself, but felt that he had
deliberately deserted them.
Through the long struggle which ended in the evacuation of Caracas by
Spain in 1823, Lopez fought with the Spaniards. So brilliant was his
service that he was at the age of twenty-three given the rank of major.
The story is told that early in the war, when he was a mere private, in
an attack against a position which was defended by field works, the
Spanish forces were divided, in an effort to take two bastions upon the
capture of which victory depended. But there was not sufficient
ammunition, and that of one of the divisions became exhausted, so that
it was necessary to obtain a fresh supply from the other division. This
information was signaled, and the leader of that portion of the
attackers which must now supply the other, called for volunteers. In
order to get the relief through it was necessary to lead three mules,
which were tied together Spanish fashion, the head of the second mule to
the tail of the first one, and the head of the third to the tail of the
second, past a position where they were exposed to the hot fire of the
opposing army. Lopez volunteered. When he reached the most dangerous
part of his course, the mule in the center was struck by the enemy's
fire and fell dead. Lopez did not hesitate, but with the bullets singing
about him--the insurgents in that party must have been singularly bad
marksmen, or perhaps their guns were not of an efficient pattern--he cut
out the dead animal and, tying the two remaining mules together, safely
reached his destination and delivered the ammunition to the commander.
He was not injured, but his gun had been broken by a chance shot, his
clothes were riddled with bullets, one of which had passed through his
hat within an inch of his head, and both of his mules were so severely
wounded that they had to be shot. His action gave the victory to the
Spanish. This exploit won for Lopez the offer of an officer's
commission, but he was modest in his estimate of his own ability, and he
felt that he was too young for the honor, and so he refused, with the
request that he might be taken from the infantry and placed in the
cavalry. So, in spite of his disposition to make light of his own
achievements, and almost against his own will, he found himself at
nineteen the commander of a squadron of horsemen. It was a force of
picked men, most of them older than Lopez, and it had the reputation of
never having shown its back to the enemy. From the command of this
company, Lopez was elevated to the rank of major.
Now Lopez had made many friends in the Spanish army. All through his
career he had the ability to make men believe in him, love him and be
ready to follow wherever he led. The high honors which had fallen to his
lot seemed not to have incited jealousy among his companions; indeed on
the other hand he was urged by his friends to apply for the cross of San
Fernando, to which they believed he was entitled. Again that curious
quality in Lopez which did not make him shrink from deeds of bravery,
but which did make him draw back from demanding their reward, asserted
itself. The cross of San Fernando was a very great honor, and it was not
bestowed as a free gift, but when a man performed some action of unusual
courage he might publicly demand it, and anyone in the army who cared to
do so was free to enter their opposition, by proving, or trying to
prove, that the deed for which the cross was demanded was not of such a
character as to merit such a reward. In the whole Spanish army in Cuba
at that time, only one individual had succeeded in obtaining the cross
of San Fernando. While Lopez hesitated, his commander in chief, General
Morillo, had the application drawn up and personally insisted that Lopez
sign it. After a rigid inquiry into the merits of this petition, which
was backed up by the endorsement of his comrades and of Morillo himself,
the cross was granted.
But it was no more than common justice that Morillo should take this
stand, for far better than anyone else had he cause to be grateful for
the bravery of this twenty-three year old boy. The larger part of the
Spanish army at this time was infantry, while the army of the insurgents
was largely cavalry. The natives knew the country, and were able to
carry on a successful guerrilla warfare, without allowing the Spaniards
to engage them in open battle. This harassed the Spaniards, wore down
their morale, and slowly but surely decimated their forces. Morillo,
well knowing this, was pursuing the insurgents, in a vain attempt to
join them in conflict. Lopez at this time was in charge of his cavalry
company, which had been almost exterminated in a conflict that morning.
Only a little band of thirty-eight men remained. Morillo was not aware
of the catastrophe which had overtaken Lopez's command, and did not know
how greatly it had been reduced in numbers. He therefore issued orders
that it gallop forward to attack the enemy in the rear, with an idea of
forcing them to face about and give battle. The engagement took place on
the plains, and the handful of men could be plainly discerned by the
enemy as they rode to obey their commanding officer. General Paez, who
was in command of the Venezuelans, sent a corps of 300 men to repel the
thirty-eight cavalrymen. Neither Lopez nor his men faltered, for they
must live up to their traditions. Lopez ordered them to dismount and
engage the advancing enemy on foot, using lances and carbines in the
attack. Morillo soon discovered what was in progress and sent
reinforcements, and Lopez's men held their position until aid reached
them.
When this war was over and freedom had been won an extraordinary thing
happened. The patriot government invited this young man, who had fought
against them, to enter their service with the same rank which he had
held in the Spanish army. This he declined, and when evacuation took
place he retired with the Spanish army to Cuba, in 1823.
Lopez married a very charming Cuban, adopted Cuba as his native land,
and gave up his position in the army. Perhaps the cruelty of the Spanish
government in Cuba may have awakened him to the nature of the
organization which he was serving. He was at heart a man who loved
freedom, who was impatient of unjust restraint, who loved his fellow men
and could not bear to see them suffer injustice. Spain was afraid that
her officers might be led away by the spirit of democracy which was
creating such havoc in her possessions in America. When absolutism was
again restored in Spain, and the constitution of 1812 was for the second
time overthrown, she required her officers in Cuba publicly to adjure
liberalism, and to take an oath to stand by the Spanish rule in the
colony. This Lopez could not bring himself to do, and so he remained in
retirement.
Affairs in Spain underwent a change, for King Ferdinand died and
immediately a contest for the control of the government was on between
his widow, Maria Cristina, as regent for her infant daughter, Isabel,
and Don Carlos, who was the brother of the deceased king, and who
declared that under the Salic law the crown belonged to him. War between
the two factions seemed imminent, and the Spanish people were war weary,
when the Queen regent conceived a brilliant plan. She felt sure that the
will of the people was with her, since she represented the liberal party
as against Don Carlos who was at the head of the absolutists and whose
accession of power would mean new oppressions. Maria Cristina therefore
issued a proclamation calling on the people, if they loved their country
and wished to save her from civil war, to join in disarming the
absolutists. This movement was well organized and a day was set for the
disarmament to take place all over the kingdom. It seems almost
incredible, but it was successful, and from one end of Spain to the
other there were over six hundred thousand stacks of arms taken from the
Carlists by the people of the liberal party.
Now while this action was being planned and executed, Lopez happened to
be in Spain. He had gone to the court at Madrid with his wife to
endeavor to have restitution made to her of large sums of money which
the government of Cuba had unjustly taken from her family. Unfortunately
there are no records which disclose whether his diplomacy was great
enough to persuade Spain to return any money which had once gotten into
her coffers. However, Lopez had grown to understand Cuban affairs by
this time well enough to know that if the liberals were successful it
might mean the reestablishment of the constitution of 1812, and the dawn
of better days for Cuba; but on the other hand, should the Carlists
triumph, Cuba was bound to be more fiercely ground beneath the heel of
tyranny and oppressions. Lopez loved his adopted country, and so he at
once took command of a body of liberals who were being hard pressed by a
company of the national guard, part of which had sided with Don Carlos.
He rallied the little band, filled them with new courage and enthusiasm,
and all day he worked with them, sometimes in company with other men and
often alone, driving before him companies of Carlists, forcing them to
go to the guardhouse of the liberals and surrender their weapons. When
news of this conduct reached royal ears, Lopez was made first
aide-de-camp to General Valdez, who was commander in chief of the
liberal forces, that same Valdez who was destined later to become
Captain-General of Cuba. A strong friendship sprang up between the two
men, a bond which was never broken, and which Lopez respected so much
that he later deferred action against the Spanish government in Cuba
until after Valdez had relinquished the office of Captain-General.
Indeed, it was through the influence of Lopez at the court of Spain that
Valdez became Captain-General.
Valdez had many reasons for being grateful to Lopez, for during the war
which followed between the forces of the queen and those of Carlos, at
one crisis--a surprise attack when the troops were about to flee--Lopez
placed himself in command and led them to victory. On another occasion
Valdez, who had his headquarters in the little village of Durango, had
dispatched the main portion of his army against the forces of the enemy,
retaining with him only a few picked men. Suddenly he found himself
almost surrounded by the Carlists, who had seized the hills by which the
village was enclosed. It was necessary that someone carry news of the
situation to the main army and obtain relief. Lopez, who was then a
colonel, signified his willingness to undertake the task, and indeed
claimed that it was his right as first aide-de-camp to command the
rescuing party which he intended to bring back with him. Valdez was
loath to let him go, for he felt that success was problematic, and that
the expedition meant almost certain death for his friend. But there was
no alternative, and so at last he consented. Lopez set forth on
horseback with one servant attending him. When they approached the
enemy, they signalled that they were deserters, with valuable
information to impart. They were allowed to approach without being fired
on, and when they came abreast of the opposing forces, they set spurs to
their horses, ran the gauntlet of a shower of bullets, and escaped
unhurt, bearing the news of Valdez's perilous position to his main army.
So great was Lopez's valor and fearlessness, and so high a reputation
had he for honor and fair dealing, that he was respected by the Carlists
as well as by his own party. At the end of this struggle he was accorded
the rank of General in the Spanish army, and was loaded with honors,
having the crosses of Isabella Catolica and St. Hermengilda bestowed
upon him, and being appointed commander in chief of the National Guard
of Spain. He stood high in the regard of the Queen Regent, but he grew
to know her as she was, a cold, selfish plotter, and when she was
finally expelled from the regency Lopez regarded it as a cause for
rejoicing, even though his own career might be expected to suffer. But
the regard in which he was held was too great for this to come to pass,
and after the insurrection which deposed Maria Cristina he was offered
and accepted the post of Governor of Madrid.
Lopez also served Spain as a senator from the city of Seville. He was
present in the Cortes when the Cuban delegates who were elected during
the conflict of wills between General Lorenzo and Captain-General Tacon,
and who escaped to Spain and attempted to claim their seats in the
Cortes, were rejected. Perhaps more than anything else in his career,
Lopez's service as senator opened his eyes to the vile condition of
Spanish politics, and the methods which were used in ruling the
colonies. He was always on the side of the oppressed, he hated
injustice, and so, then and there, the love of liberty which had always
been a part of his character took concrete form in a resolve to be the
liberator of Cuba.
When Valdez set forth to take over the command in Cuba, he had
earnestly requested that Lopez be allowed to accompany him, but on the
plea that there was important work for him to do in Spain, Lopez was not
allowed to depart. It may be that in spite of the fight which he had
made to maintain the unity of the Spanish kingdom, the astute and crafty
Spanish statesmen suspected his loyalty, for it was reported that during
Tacon's administration in Cuba, Lopez had entered into a conspiracy to
obtain freedom for the island, and had publicly toasted "free Cuba" at a
banquet. This seems more like a story which might have been born of
Tacon's mean jealousy and fear for his own power, and nurtured by his
vivid imagination when he sought to harm an enemy. It does not seem
credible that Lopez, who had not yet openly thrown in his fortunes with
the liberals in Cuba, would have been so foolish as to expose himself to
the vengeance of a Captain-General who he had good reason to know would
let nothing stand in his way when he sought to tear a rival in court
favor from a high place. Be this as it may, the story was current in
Spain, and while it seems not to have harmed Lopez's popularity with the
people or with the court, it did prevent his accompanying Valdez to Cuba
at this time. Lopez's ability to make friends, however, a little later
stood him in good stead. He had won the liking and indeed the warm
affection of Espartero, the leader at this time of the liberal party in
Spain, and the influence of Espartero finally made it possible for Lopez
to return to Havana, in 1839.
The friendship between Valdez and Lopez remained warm, and Valdez
appointed Lopez President of the Military Commission, Governor of
Trinidad, and Commander-in-chief of the Central Department of the
Island. Now rumors that a revolution was imminent began to be generally
circulated. No one could tell the source from which they sprang, but
they seemed to be in the atmosphere, and were the constant subject of
whispered conversations in the cafés and restaurants and in the houses
of the liberals.
When Valdez relinquished the Captain-Generalship, and O'Donnell began
his infamous rule, Lopez felt himself released from all obligations to
the government. Every particle of Spanish sympathy had long since been
purged from his heart, and his honors from such a source had become
irksome. He had refrained from actively plotting against Spain while
Valdez was ruling over Cuba, his friendship for Valdez making him
unwilling to embarrass him. This curb removed, Lopez gladly relinquished
his offices and retired to his own estates. He was not nearly so
successful as a business man as he was as a soldier, and the business
enterprises which he undertook proved to be failures. But he took over
the management of some copper mines and these were used as bases for the
organization of the attempt to free Cuba which was now beginning to take
form and shape in his mind. He mingled with the people quietly and
endeavored, successfully, to win their esteem and liking. The district
in which the mines were located was settled mainly by men who were
always in the saddle. Now Lopez was a fine horseman. There were no deeds
of horsemanship which they might perform which he could not duplicate or
improve upon. He thus soon won a popular following, and this curiously
enough without attracting the particular attention of the
Captain-General or his spies, and became a hero to the men among whom he
dwelt. They were all indebted to him for deeds of kindness, for no man
in difficulties ever appealed to Lopez's purse in vain. Thus he
acquired an influence which made him confident that should he speak the
word the countryside would rally with him under the banner of revolt
against Spain.
Now Lopez was not particularly interested in the emancipation of the
slaves. He thought that they were necessary for the successful
cultivation of the island, and he could not successfully visualize a
free black population. He felt that a Cuba unbound by any ties to any
other nation meant free blacks. He therefore favored annexation to the
United States. He took the American Consul at Havana, Robert Campbell,
into his confidence, and asked his advice. Campbell was in favor of
annexation by the United States and expressed his opinion that the
majority of the American people, especially those in the southern
states, were heartily in favor of the United States taking over Cuba;
but he also called Lopez's attention to the numerous treaty obligations
binding the United States and Spain together, and assured him that
whatever secret support he might hope to gain from that country, he
(Campbell) certainly would not officially come out and sanction any
movement to free Cuba from Spain. He felt that if Lopez by revolution
could perform the operation and sever the bonds which bound Cuba to
Spain, the United States might reasonably be expected not to refuse the
gift of the island were it offered to her.
Lopez at once began actively to outline his plans for a revolution, and
secret headquarters were established at Cienfuegos, while the
organization was extended to other parts of the island.
CHAPTER III
Lopez planned to begin the uprising for the freedom of Cuba on June 24,
1848. He had enlisted the sympathy and secret cooperation of many men in
the United States, chiefly in the southern part of that country, and
looked to them to provide him with the needed arms and ammunition. There
was no lack of readiness on their part to respond to his needs in this
respect, but there was much difficulty in transporting such supplies
from the United States to Cuba. Whatever the personal sentiments of the
officers of the American government, they were required publicly to do
all in their power to prevent illicit traffic; while of course the
Spanish officials in Cuba were vigilant to prevent the landing of any
such cargoes. The result was that sufficient supplies did not reach Cuba
in time for an uprising on the appointed date.
The delay was fatal. It afforded opportunity for betrayal. Among the
followers of Lopez in Cuba was one José Sanchez Yznaga, a mere lad of
tender years. He could not resist the temptation to boast to his mother
of the great enterprise in which he was to take part, and she, drawing
from him all the details of the conspiracy, repeated the story to her
husband. Forthwith he gave information of it to the authorities;
reputedly in order to prevent his son from getting into mischief. Lopez,
unconscious of what had happened, was "invited" by the Governor of
Cienfuegos to call upon him, on a matter of important business, and was
actually on his way to keep the engagement when he learned of the
betrayal. Instantly he changed his course, and instead of going to
Cienfuegos he took train for Cardenas and thence a coasting vessel for
Matanzas. At the latter port he was so fortunate as to find the steamer
_Neptune_ just starting for New York. She had room for another passenger
and he got aboard without detection by the Spanish officers who were in
quest of him. The boy Yznaga also escaped arrest. Apparently the names
of the other conspirators were not disclosed, or else there was no
convincing evidence against them. At any rate, none of them were
imprisoned or punished in any way. But Lopez himself was tried _in
absentia_ and was condemned to death, on March 2, 1849; and Yznaga, also
absent, was condemned to six years' imprisonment.
It was in July, 1848, that Narciso Lopez reached New York, a fugitive
from Spanish wrath. There he found that various Cuban Juntas had been
formed in the United States, and that a well-organized campaign for the
annexation of Cuba was being pushed. This movement was not, of course,
approved officially by the United States government; but neither were
any extraordinary efforts made to suppress or to discourage it. Several
Senators of the United States did not hesitate to make speeches in the
Senate in favor of annexation; some of them advocating its forcible
achievement if Spain declined to make the cession peacefully. Several of
the foremost newspapers also openly espoused the cause. Improving the
opportunity presented to him by these circumstances, Lopez sought some
prominent American, politician or soldier, who would identify himself
with the Cuban revolution and would place himself at its head. Some of
his first and strongest efforts were directed toward getting Jefferson
Davis, then a Senator and afterward President of the Confederate States,
to take command of the expedition which he purposed to fit out; and he
offered to place the sum of $100,000 in a New York bank to the credit
of Mrs. Davis as an inducement. Davis considered the offer and then
declined it; sending Lopez, however, to Major Robert Edward Lee, of the
United States army, afterward of the Confederate army, as a more likely
candidate. Lee, however, also refused the invitation, for reasons which
Jefferson Davis afterward set forth as follows:
"He came from Mexico crowned with honors, covered by brevets and
recognized, young as he was, as one of the ablest of his country's
soldiers, and to prove that he was estimated then as such, I may mention
that when he was a Captain of engineers, stationed at Baltimore, the
Cuban Junta in New York selected him to be their leader in the
revolutionary effort on that island. They were anxious to secure his
services, and offered him every temptation that ambition could desire,
and pecuniary emoluments far beyond any which he could hope otherwise to
acquire. He thought the matter over, and, I remember, came to Washington
to consult me as to what he should do. After a brief discussion of the
complex character of the military problem which was presented he turned
from the consideration of that view of the question by stating that the
point on which he wished particularly to consult me, was as to the
propriety of entertaining the proposition which had been made to him. He
had been educated in the service of the United States, and felt it wrong
to accept place in the army of a foreign power while he held a
commission."
Contributions to the amount of $70,000 were made in the United States to
help to finance the expedition, and $30,000 more was sent from Cuba.
Lopez had long interviews with many men who stood high in American
affairs, and he was assured by them that if the semblance of a real
revolution was created, the United States might be expected to
intervene and to annex the island. Recruiting was quietly going on in
several parts of the United States. There was little concealment about
the methods or plans, and Spanish spies who were closely following the
leaders in the movement were able to report very accurately to the
Captain-General in Cuba and to the Spanish minister at Washington, Señor
Calderon de la Barca, exactly what was going on. These two gentlemen
organized a small counter movement and expended large sums of money
extracted from the Cuban treasury to balk the plans of the
revolutionists. Promises of generous pay, however, lured large numbers
of adventurers into the ranks of Lopez's party. Those who enlisted were
promised $1,000, and five acres of land, if the expedition was
triumphant, and pay equal to that of a private in the United States army
in any event.
Headquarters for the recruits were established at Cat Island, but the
little army was dispersed by the United States authorities, and then the
gathering place was changed to Round Island, near the city of New
Orleans, where Col. G. W. White, a veteran of the Mexican war, was in
charge. The number of men who were assembled under Col. White, ready to
sail for Cuba, was reported to be from 550 to 800.
While all these preparations were going on, there was an incident in
Havana which threatened seriously to embroil Spain with the United
States. The prison at Havana was holding two men, Villaverde, who was
under arrest for sedition against Spain, and Fernandez, who had been
condemned to imprisonment for fraudulent acts in connection with a
bankruptcy proceeding. One of the jailors was Juan Francisco Garcia Rey,
an American citizen, and he aided these prisoners to escape, Villaverde
going to Savannah, while Fernandez went with Rey to New Orleans. Rey
was soon trailed by Spanish spies and he was either tricked into going
on board a Spanish sailing vessel or else he was forced to do so, and
hurried off to Cuba with no property but the clothes which he wore. When
the vessel reached Cuba, the United States consul went on board, but the
men who were guarding Rey forced him to state that he had arrived in
Cuba voluntarily. The vessel was held in quarantine for some time, and
immediately after it was released, Rey was placed in solitary
confinement; from which however he managed to get a letter through to
the American consul, which read as follows:
"My name is Juan Garcia Rey; I was forced by the Spanish consul to leave
New Orleans. I demand the protection of the American flag and I desire
to return to the United States.
"P.S. I came here by force, the Spanish consul having seized me under a
supposed order of the Second Municipality and having had me carried by
main force on board a ship at nine in the evening.
"P.S.--I did not speak frankly to you because the Captain of the port
was present."
The request which the American consul promptly made for an interview
with Rey was denied, and at this point the United States government
interested itself in the case and made an official demand for the return
of Rey. Relations between the United States and Spain were growing very
much strained and it looked as if the United States were soon to have an
excuse to fight Spain and to annex Cuba, when the Spanish government
suddenly suffered a change of heart, and Rey was pardoned and released.
Meanwhile the plans for the invasion of Cuba were being carried out so
openly that the Spanish minister protested, and Zachary Taylor, then
President of the United States, being unwilling openly to affront
Spain, through his Secretary of State, John M. Clayton, issued on August
11, 1849, a proclamation which ran as follows:
"There is reason to believe that an armed expedition is about to be
fitted out in the United States with an intention to invade the Island
of Cuba, or some of the provinces of Mexico. The best information which
the executive has been able to obtain, points to the Island of Cuba as
the object of this expedition. It is the duty of this government to
observe the faith of treaties, and to prevent any aggression by our
citizens upon the territories of friendly nations. I have, therefore,
thought it necessary and proper to issue this proclamation, to warn all
citizens of the United States who shall connect themselves with an
enterprise so grossly in violation of our laws and treaty obligations,
that they will thereby subject themselves to the heavy penalties
denounced against them by our Acts of Congress, and will forfeit their
claim to the protection of their country. No such persons must expect
the interference of this government in any form on their behalf, no
matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their
conduct. An enterprise to invade the territories of a friendly nation,
set on foot and prosecuted within the limits of the United States, is in
the highest degree criminal, as tending to endanger the peace and
compromise the honor of this nation, and therefore I exhort all good
citizens, as they regard our national reputation, as they respect their
own laws and the laws of nations, as they value the blessings of peace
and the welfare of their country, to discountenance and prevent, by all
lawful means, any such enterprise; and I call upon every officer of this
government, civil or military, to use all efforts in his power to arrest
for trial and punishment every such offender against the laws providing
for the performance of our sacred obligations to friendly powers."
This proclamation did not find favor in the Southern States, where
sentiment was strongly in favor of the annexation of Cuba as a bar
against the freeing of the slaves. All the while the United States
government was officially discountenancing the expedition, private
citizens were aiding it, and again Spain protested and the American
government dispatched the steamer _Albany_ with officers to investigate
the state of matters at Round Island, to see that no supplies reached
the island, and to prevent the expedition from starting. Two ships, the
_Sea Gull_ and the _New Orleans_, had been purchased in New York to take
the expedition to Cuba, and these were promptly seized, but the fifty
men on one of them were not prosecuted, and while warrants were issued
for the five leaders they were never apprehended, and the ships were
simply returned to their owners. Public opinion was too much in favor of
aid for Cuba to make it feasible for the United States government to
place itself in the position of being inimical to Cuban interests, while
on the other hand that Government felt that it could not afford openly
to antagonize Spain.
The Cuban organization in New York presently showed signs of
discouragement and disintegration, and Lopez in consequence transferred
his operations to the south, principally to New Orleans, where sentiment
was warmly in favor of his plans. There the next year he renewed his
efforts to organize an expedition to Cuba. Even more generous offers of
bounty were made than in the previous case. Recruits were promised
$4,000, and when they had served a year they were to be rewarded by a
grant of land in Cuba; this in addition to their regular pay. Those who
should attain the rank of officers were promised up to $10,000, and also
high rank in the new government which the revolutionists were to
organize in Cuba. Lopez was always conscious of the advantage of having
men of prominence connected with his enterprises, and he endeavored to
persuade Governor Quitman of Mississippi to take command, but that
gentleman expressed himself as believing that only an internal
revolution could be effective in Cuba and that any invasion from without
must fail, and, accordingly, he declined the invitation.
Numerous recruits were obtained in various parts of the United States.
While interest in it was strongest in the South, many men in the North
and West were ready, for one reason or another, to cast in their lot
with Lopez. An important rallying point was Cincinnati, Ohio, and from
that city a party of 120 men started southward on April 4, 1850, on the
river steamer _Martha Washington_, which had been chartered for the
purpose. A stop was made at a point on the Kentucky shore, and more men
were there taken aboard. The trip down to New Orleans consumed a week,
which time was spent by the men in card-playing, carousing and indeed
almost everything save serious reflection upon the momentous undertaking
before them. There were a few among them of earnest purpose; and when
the expedition was completed at New Orleans it comprised a number of men
of high character and standing, members of some of the foremost families
of that part of the United States. But the majority of the recruits were
adventurers of the type familiar in most such undertakings. To them the
enterprise meant not so much the freeing of Cuba from Spanish oppression
as it meant getting "easy money," the fun of seeing a new country, good
food, and if the worst happened ... it was on the knees of the gods.
It was April 11 when the boat reached Freeport, a town a few miles up
the river from New Orleans, where the men were hidden; or supposed to be
hidden, for little secrecy was attained, Spanish spies and United States
citizens being equally aware of their presence. There were two hundred
and fifty men in the party, and on April 25 they set sail for Cuba on
the Steamer _Georgiana_, with a supply of muskets and 10,000 rounds of
ammunition, which however did not come on board until after the mouth of
the Mississippi was passed. Lopez himself was not with this company, for
his work of organization was not completed, and he remained behind to
join them later.
A second company of about 160 men was organized in New Orleans, and set
sail on May 2, on the _Susan Loud_, and a third company was to follow on
the _Creole_. On May 6 the _Susan Loud_ reached the place where she was
to meet the _Creole_, and she raised the new flag of Cuba for the first
time on the Gulf of Mexico. Here she was joined the next day by the
_Creole_ and another day was taken up in transferring the men from one
vessel to the other, the _Creole_ being much the faster of the two; the
idea being that the slower boat could follow at leisure. On the _Creole_
there were only 130, making 290 men in this portion of the expedition.
The newcomers on the _Creole_ were for the first time introduced to
their commander, Lopez, and it is recorded that he promptly won all
hearts by his pleasing personality.
A light-hearted spirit of adventure at first prevailed among the crews
and the men, until a storm arose on May 12, and the company began to be
less cheerful; many were sick, and the wind and clouds had a depressing
effect on the others. To add to the general dismay and discomfort, a gun
was accidentally discharged, and one of the company was killed. An
unpleasant foreboding began to cast a blight over the gay company. Evil
days had also attended the _Georgiana_. She met with foul weather, and
had great difficulty in reaching the island of Contoy, about ten miles
off the coast of Yucatan. This island was uninhabited and without
vegetation, a blank waste of sand, with no water for drinking purposes.
The men were discontented and mutiny seemed imminent. An unsuccessful
attempt was made to reach Mujeres, and then mutiny in earnest broke out,
led by Captain Benson, one of the leaders of the company. He instigated
the circulation of a petition for a return to New Orleans, and between
fifty and sixty signatures were obtained. Fortunately Lopez had one
faithful follower in the company, an eloquent and brave man. This was
Colonel Theodore O'Hara, a veteran of the Mexican War and author of the
classic poem, "The Bivouac of the Dead." He assembled the men and asked
them to agree to wait eight days longer, and spoke so feelingly that
finally the promise was given with cheers for Lopez, for Cuba, and for
the annexation of the island. Before further trouble could come to pass,
the _Creole_ was sighted. When she reached the island it was thought
best that she should proceed to Mujeres, obtain water, and return the
next day. This was done, and when he returned, Lopez issued the
following proclamation to his men:
"Soldiers of the liberating expedition of Cuba! Our first act on
arriving shall be the establishment of a provisional constitution,
founded on American principles, and adopted to the emergencies of the
occasion. This constitution you will unite with your brethren of Cuba in
swearing to support in its principles as well as on the field of battle.
You have been chosen by your officers as men individually worthy of so
honorable an undertaking. I rely implicitly on your presenting Cuba to
the world, a signal example of all the virtues, as well as the valor of
the American citizen soldiers; and I cannot be deceived in my confidence
that by our discipline, good order, moderation in victory, and sacred
respect for all private rights, you will put to shame every insolent
calumny of your enemies. And when the hour arrives for repose on the
laurels which await your grasp, you will all, I trust, establish
permanent and happy homes in the beautiful soil of the island you go to
free, and there long enjoy the gratitude which Cuba will never fail
generously to bestow on those to whom she will owe the sacred and
immeasurable debt of her liberty."
Now the _Creole_ was not a new vessel, and was sadly in need of repairs.
When the nearly six hundred men from the three boats were all on board
her--for the plan was that only one ship should be actively engaged in
the invasion--she took water, and some of the men were afraid. There
were desertions at Mujeres and Contoy which reduced the force to five
hundred and twenty-one. The men were packed in all parts of the ship, on
deck, in the cabin, in the hold, in every available corner. It was
impossible to keep discipline, to say nothing of holding drill practice.
The _Creole_ was fortunate enough to be driven by adverse winds far
north of the course which she had planned, because she thus escaped two
Spanish war ships which had been sent out to apprehend and sink her.
Thus from near the shore of Yucatan the adventurers sailed over
practically the same course which in the days of Cortez had been
traversed by the Spanish treasure ships from Mexico to Cuba and to
Spain. The plan was to land at Cardenas, and march at once to Matanzas,
thirty miles distant, which it was believed could be reached in 24 hours
and where the railroad was to be seized. It was here that it was
expected that the recruiting would be heaviest, for Lopez believed that
the Cubans would recognize them as liberators, welcome them with
rejoicing, and at once enlist under the new banner of freedom. One
hundred picked men would promptly be despatched to blow up an important
bridge, nine miles from Havana, and meanwhile Lopez expected his force
of five hundred to be swelled to five thousand. Indeed he dreamed of
attacking the city of Havana with an armed force of 30,000. He had
plenty of ammunition and guns and he anticipated no difficulty in
enlisting an army from among the Cubans who desired freedom from Spain.
CHAPTER IV
Cardenas was chosen as the place of landing probably for two reasons.
First, because the Cubans of this district were supposed to be
exceedingly dissatisfied with Spanish rule--more disgruntled than the
inhabitants of the other parts of the island, because the people of
Cardenas had been given their own particular grievances by the Spanish
garrison; and in the second place, the garrison at this point was
exceedingly small, and the town was situated on a bay the entrance to
which, like the coast for many miles, was undefended by fortifications.
Lopez therefore believed that he could penetrate the harbor with little
difficulty and no opposition.
It was half past two in the morning when the _Creole_ entered the bay of
Cardenas, and her progress was not altogether free from difficulties.
The captain of the _Creole_ was unfamiliar with the waters of the bay,
and found it difficult to steer a safe course. As a matter of fact, the
vessel was grounded, and delayed for nearly an hour, during which time
her presence was observed by Spanish patrols, and the alarm given. Dawn
was breaking in the east when the landing was made. It bade fair to be a
beautiful morning. The air was soft and clear, and the first rays of
sunshine, brightening the roofs of the houses, sent a note of cheer into
the hearts of the little army of those who were seeking to deliver Cuba,
and seemed an omen of good fortune.
Reports differ as to their reception. One account tells of a large
Spanish force drawn up on the shore, through which they had to fight
their way, but which they quickly dispersed. It is more in accord with
the events which followed to give credence to another story, which has
it that the Spanish troops took refuge in the barracks, while a smaller
number were quartered in the Governor's palace.
The Kentuckians, soldiers of fortune, descendants of pioneers, whose
valor had been tested and not found wanting in the warfare which had
taken place from time to time in their own state, were the first to
land. There were sixty of them, under the command of Lieut. Col.
Pickett, and their instructions were to proceed at once to the railroad
station. Lopez knew that large bodies of Spanish troops were quartered
at Matanzas, which was connected by railroad with Cardenas, and his
purpose was to destroy the station, and if possible the line of the
railroad for some distance, to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to
the Spaniards, should the news of the coming of the filibusters be sent
to Matanzas. This action would also necessitate communications by
courier, which, of course, would be productive of a delay which would be
advantageous to Lopez's plan.
The station was captured without any difficulty, indeed without
opposition, and the little body of Kentucky soldiers began their work of
destruction. That because of lack of numbers, or lack of equipment, they
did not accomplish this efficiently enough to prevent the arrival of
Spanish troops at Cardenas, we shall see later. But at any rate, they
proceeded with zeal and enthusiasm to the work which was allotted to
them, and held the station against the few Spanish troops from the
Cardenas garrison which later attempted to wrest it from them, and when
they relinquished it they did so voluntarily, to join their comrades in
retreating to the _Creole_. Indeed they manfully held their positions,
long after many of the other regiments had been withdrawn, in order to
cover the retreat.
The moment Lieutenant Colonel Pickett and his Kentuckians were clear of
the vessel, General Lopez and his staff, and Colonel O'Hara, with the
remainder of the Kentucky regiment, disembarked, and with great
ceremony, for the first time, the flag of Cuba Libre was unfurled on
Cuban soil. General Lopez remained with his ship, to oversee the landing
of the remainder of his little army, while Colonel O'Hara, under orders,
advanced to take the barracks where four hundred Spanish troops were
garrisoned. The Kentuckians under Colonel O'Hara numbered one hundred
and eighty, and in addition he was reinforced by the Louisiana regiment
of one hundred and thirty, and the Mississippi regiment of one hundred
and forty-five, so that he had in all, for the business in hand, four
hundred and fifty-five men, thus outnumbering the Spanish force which
they were to oppose, by about fifty-five men. They advanced rapidly and
charged the garrison, which promptly opened fire, and Colonel O'Hara was
wounded, not seriously, but sufficiently so that he was obliged to
surrender his command to Major Hawkins. The engagement was resumed, but
only for a short time, when General Lopez came up and at once directed
the firing to cease. He then proceeded to do a thing which plainly
showed the spirit of the man, his resourcefulness and his undaunted
courage. He marched up to the barracks and demanded its unconditional
surrender.
The Spanish soldiers evidently were not altogether whole hearted in
their defence, but their leaders were crafty. A long parley ensued,
during which the Spanish troops were hastily and quietly withdrawn
through a side door, with the intention of making their escape to the
Governor's palace. When the barracks had been in this manner all but
abandoned, the Spanish commander agreed to surrender, and it can be
imagined that he enjoyed the chagrin of Lopez when he discovered that
his prize was an almost empty building.
But the Spanish troops were not destined to escape so easily. Colonel
Wheat, with the Louisiana regiment, had been the last to leave the
_Creole_. As he approached the barracks he heard the firing, but
supposing that Lopez had only to put in an appearance to be greeted with
loud acclaim as a deliverer, he decided that the Spanish troops had laid
down their arms to join the revolutionists and that the sound of guns
marked a salute to Lopez. He went around the barracks, toward the
square, and was just in time to intercept the flying Spaniards.
Instantly he grasped the situation, and a skirmish ensued. The Spaniards
at length made good their retreat to the Governor's palace, but not
without leaving some dead and wounded behind them.
Lopez and his men at once advanced on the palace, where the Governor had
taken refuge with his forces, now reinforced by those who had made good
their escape from the barracks. Soon Lopez distinguished a white flag of
truce floating from one of the windows, and as he approached nearer
received word that the Governor was ready to surrender. Overjoyed, the
revolutionists rushed up to the palace only to be greeted in a manner
quite in keeping with Spanish treachery, for they were promptly fired
upon by the Spaniards, and before they could rally several of the
attacking party were wounded, including General Gonzales. Lopez's anger
at this violation of the rules of decent fighting was at white heat.
While the main division of his troops were returning the fire from the
palace, he took a small body of men to reconnoiter, and finding an
unguarded portion of the building, he set fire to it; indeed, with his
own hand he applied the torch. All this had taken much more time than
does its relating, and the forces in the palace were enabled to hold out
until between eight and nine o'clock in the morning, when they
surrendered, driven out by the flames and smoke, and the Governor and
the commander of the garrison were taken prisoners, while such troops as
had not found refuge in the palace fled to the outlying country, and
couriers hurried to carry the news of the Spanish disaster to Matanzas.
Lopez was now in possession of the town. There was the work of caring
for the dead and wounded to be done, and besides this he wished to make
an appeal to Cuban residents who sympathized with the cause of freedom
to aid him. This was not so easy as it seemed. Lopez to his chagrin
found that reports which had reached him in the United States of the
willingness of the Cubans to join a revolution had been grossly
exaggerated. That there were a great many who sympathized with Lopez's
purpose there can be no doubt. But they had to deter them the memory of
other uprisings, in which the attempt to throw off the Spanish yoke had
utterly failed. They had also before them the courage-shaking memories
of the horrors which had befallen those who had participated in the
rebellions. It is ever a fact that while oppression always creates
leaders whose valor and daring will not stop at any obstacles, it also
makes the masses of the people timid, afraid of the punishment which is
bound to follow defeat. Spain had long held the Cubans in bondage. She
had meted out to them the most cruel injustices, and had taken
unspeakable revenge not only on those who had opposed her, but even on
those who were under suspicion of such opposition. Besides this, on this
May morning, things had been happening very fast. Lopez's little
victories had been won in whirlwind succession. This should have
inspired sympathizers with confidence, but there were in that town some
private persons who were in sympathy and in league with the Spanish
rulers. They now resorted to propaganda. They spread the report that
Lopez's band had no real intention of trying to free Cuba, that their
real object was plunder, that when they had subdued the garrison, they
intended to put the patriotic Cubans to new sufferings for their own
aggrandisement. Long years of injustice had made the Creoles wary of
asserting themselves openly against their Spanish tyrants. While those
who had been leaders in the town in the organization on Cuban soil of
the revolution tried to reassure the frightened people, they were far
from successful. A mob spirit of fear is not easily conquered.
Aside from this Lopez's force, worn out with their efforts, tired and
hungry, and for the time idle, while the leaders were planning the next
move, dispersed through the town. It seemed necessary and expedient in
any event that they should be quartered on the citizens, and now they
sought the homes of the Creoles in search of food. They were met by a
frightened hospitality. Food and wine were set before them, with the
result that those of them who were merely adventurers lost sight of
their purpose and seized the opportunity to court intoxication. This
conduct did not increase the confidence of the Creoles, and so hopes of
support from the native Cubans proved delusive.
To make matters worse, disquieting rumors were circulated that in spite
of the efforts of Pickett's men to disable the railroad, a large body of
Spanish troops was on its way from Matanzas. There seemed to be no doubt
as to the truth of these reports; indeed a message reached Lopez late
in the afternoon, containing unmistakable confirmation to the effect
that couriers had carried the news to Matanzas and that three thousand
Spanish troops were on their way to Cardenas. Lopez was now in a triple
quandary. He could advance against this huge force, which would of
course be joined by those of the Cardenas garrison who had escaped into
the country, and give battle against frightful odds. His own forces had
been depleted by losses and had failed to be swelled by the enlistment
of sympathizing Creoles. He would leave behind him a frightened and
almost hostile city, and a port unguarded against the landing of Spanish
troops from ships cruising in nearby waters, in the event of which he
would be subject to attack from both front and rear, and would be not
only in great danger, but almost in certainty of being surrounded. He
might remain where he was and entrench himself against the impending
attack, but this offered no better possibilities than the former plan,
for he had not enough men to defend both the town and the harbor and he
was in constant danger of betrayal by Spanish sympathizers, who were of
course cognizant of his every move. He had been told that at Mantua
large bodies of Creoles stood ready to revolt and join him. Of course,
he had no more accurate confirmation of the truth of this rumor than he
had had of the verity of the assurances which, before he had set out on
his expedition, he had received of the willingness of the inhabitants of
Cardenas to join him; and yet this plan last outlined seemed to hold
better possibilities than either of the others. He decided, therefore,
to adopt it, and while making a show of resistance, he began quietly to
assemble his baggage and equipment on board the _Creole_, and to make
ready for the re-embarkation of his men.
Although the forces at the station, and indeed other small bodies of
his troops who had not been demoralized by the delights of the table,
sought to cover his retreat, and the former did render effective service
against the Spaniards, yet his movements did not escape observation, and
were hailed with delight and with renewed aggressions by the Spanish
troops. The retreat was not easy to effect, and when he had assembled
his scattered forces, his movements were halted from time to time by the
necessity of erecting temporary barricades, from which to cover the safe
return to the _Creole_. This was finally effected, and at nine in the
evening the vessel once more set out to sea. On board her, besides Lopez
and his men, were the Spanish governor and the commander of the
garrison, and they were retained as hostages until the ship cleared the
harbor. This was not accomplished without mishap, for the captain, again
hampered by navigating in what to him were uncharted waters, once more
grounded the ship, which caused some delay. At length they were on the
high seas, and just before they quit the shores of Cuba, they landed the
discomfited governor and the garrison chief. What would have happened,
had Lopez been in the governor's predicament, indeed what did happen,
when Lopez and his men finally fell into the hands of the Spaniards, is
another story. But Lopez was too high a type of gentleman to mete out to
the Spanish high commanders the fate to which they would too gladly have
consigned him.
Lopez has in many quarters been most severely censured for his quick
abandonment of his plans and his hasty retreat from Cuba, but in the
cold light of reason, we hardly see how he could have pursued any other
course. Had his expectation of aid from the Creoles been realized, he
might then, as he had planned, have left Cardenas in their hands, and
with his little band strengthened by a large body of revolutionary
sympathizers he might have advanced against the Spanish army at Matanzas
with some hope of success. As it was, he could only make the best of a
bad situation, and depart, with the faint hope of better fortune at
Mantua, and at least with the nucleus of an organization which later
might be more effective in another expedition of greater scope for the
freeing of Cuba. Thus, when we review his action, after the passage of
many years, he seems to have taken the only sane course that lay open to
him. Any other would have meant even greater disaster. Lopez had lost,
in this short time, of his Louisiana regiment, twenty killed and
wounded, including those basely slaughtered through the Spanish
treachery before the Governor's palace; of his Kentucky regiment, forty
killed and wounded, including such men of high standing as Captain John
A. Logan, Lieutenant James J. Garrett, the Rev. Louis McCann and
Sergeant Harry Cruse, besides ten privates; while his Mississippi
regiment suffered five or six killed. The Spanish losses were greater
than those of the revolutionists and numbered over one hundred.
But an even greater misfortune had overtaken Lopez. When the _Creole_
had grounded, near the entrance to the harbor, while he was making his
hasty departure from Cardenas, it had been impossible to float her free
without lightening her, and to do this not only were provisions thrown
overboard, but large quantities of precious arms and ammunitions, and so
his men now found themselves insufficiently armed for any stubborn
resistance to Spanish troops, particularly should the odds be heavy.
Lopez was still bent on his purpose of making a landing at Mantua, but
while his gallant officers in the main supported him, he found himself
surrounded by a dissatisfied, angry, mutinous crew, who were for
abandoning the whole matter, and steaming for the United States with
all possible speed. Lopez addressed them, and tried to stir within them
a realization of what such action meant, and how fatal it might be to
the cause of Cuban liberty to abandon so easily an expedition so
propitiously and even gaily undertaken, but they were deaf to his
entreaties. At the suggestion of one of his officers the matter was put
to vote, and to his dismay Lopez found that only fifteen stood with him
on the Mantua project. He would not consent to abandon it, however, even
against such odds, and declared that he would himself make the landing,
taking with him the loyal few who were willing to stay with him. This,
however, he was prevented from doing by the fact that the majority saw
to it that the captain did not approach Mantua, but steered a course
which had as its object the port of Key West, Florida.
Evidence soon was not lacking that theirs had been the part of wisdom if
not of valor, and indeed that there were some odds against their
reaching any port at all, for news of the expedition had not only been
carried to Matanzas, but it had somehow reached the Spanish ship
_Pizarro_, and she was soon in hot pursuit of the _Creole_. This soon
became a most serious situation; again and again it seemed as if the
_Creole_ were about to be overhauled, with the probable result that her
men would be taken prisoners and executed, and she would be sunk, or
taken to port a prize of war. Fate, however, intervened in favor of
Lopez, for the pilot on board the Spanish vessel was in sympathy with
the filibusters, and when, on nearing Key West, the _Pizarro_ seemed
about to overtake the _Creole_, at the peril of his own life he steered
such an eccentric course that the _Creole_ escaped, and made a landing
at Key West, while the Spanish ship put out to sea once more.
Lopez and his men were welcomed at Key West with shouts of applause.
Sympathizers with his expedition refused to consider it a failure. They
declared that it had served to open the eyes of the Cubans to the fact
that their deliverance was near, and that when Lopez once more set out
with a larger force--as they assured him, with the assistance of the
people of the south in the United States, he would--victory would be
certain to spread her wings over his banner. So great was the popular
clamor in favor of Lopez, that the United States authorities did not
deem it prudent to arouse the ire of the mob, and therefore no attempts
at arrest were then made. Indeed, little chance was given before
debarkation, because in hardly more than ten minutes after the vessel
had docked, the work of removing the wounded had been completed, and her
decks were cleared of all men but seamen. The vessel was, however,
seized by the authorities.
When news of Lopez's exploits reached Madrid, the government was thrown
into a great state of indignation, and promptly urged upon the United
States the punishment of the offenders, stating:
"If contrary to our expectations the authors of this last expedition
should go unpunished, as did those who last year planned the Round
Island expedition, the government of Her Majesty will find itself
obliged to appeal to the sentiments of morality and good faith of the
nations of Europe to oppose the entrance of a system of politics and of
doctrines which would put an end to the foundations on which rests the
peace of the civilized world. If Europe should sanction by her silence
and acquiescence the scandalous state of affairs by which the citizens
of the United States (or those of any power whatever) might freely make
war from their territory against Spain, when the latter is at perfect
peace officially with the Union; if it should be tolerated or looked on
with indifference that the solemn stipulations which bind the two states
should be with impunity made hollow by mobs and that the laws of nations
and public morality should be violated without other motive than the
selfishness of the aggressors, and with no other reliance than force,
then civilized nations ought to renounce that peace which is based on
the laws of nations and the terms of treaties and make ready for a new
era in which might will be right, and in which popular passions of the
worst kind will be substituted for the reason of states."
Even with the government in Washington practically controlled by the
pro-slavery interests, and with feeling in that quarter running high in
favor of the filibusters, the United States, for the sake of
preservation of peaceable relations with Spain, could hardly afford to
ignore this protest. Hence, Lopez was arrested at Savannah, whence he
had gone immediately upon his arrival on American soil, and a number of
the leaders of his expedition were apprehended.
Indictments were returned against Lopez, Theodore O'Hara, John F.
Pickett, R. Hayden, Chatham R. Wheat, Thomas T. Hawkins, W. H. Bell, N.
J. Bunce, Peter Smith, A. J. Gonzales, L. J. Sigur, Donahen Augusten,
John Quitman, Cotesworth Pinckney Smith (a Judge of the Supreme Court of
Mississippi), John Henderson (a former United States Senator), and J. L.
O'Sullivan (a former editor of the _Democratic Review_, which had been
loud in its support of the filibustering expeditions). But great
difficulty was experienced in obtaining evidence against the prisoners.
This might seem extraordinary, in the light of the fact that there could
be no denial that the expedition had taken place, and that these men
had been prominent in its organization. But at the trial all the
witnesses by common agreement refused to answer any but the simplest and
least important questions, on the ground that they might thus
incriminate themselves. Three men were tried and three juries disagreed.
The matter seemed so hopeless of solution that the indictments were
allowed to languish without prosecution, and were finally dismissed and
the prisoners released. Everywhere the filibusters were received with
acclamations, and all the South joined in declaring Lopez a hero.
The New Orleans _Bee_ at this time thus described Lopez:
"General Lopez has an exceedingly prepossessing appearance. He is
apparently about fifty years of age. His figure is compact and well set.
His face which is dark olive, and of the Spanish cast, is strikingly
handsome, expressive of both intelligence and energy. His full dark
eyes, firm, well-formed mouth, and erect head, crowned with iron grey
hair, fix the attention and convince you that he is no ordinary man.
Unless we are greatly mistaken in the impression we have formed of him,
he will again be heard of in some new attempt to revolutionize Cuba. He
certainly does not look like a man easily disheartened."
The _Bee_ was a true prophet; it was far from being "greatly mistaken"
about Lopez. The after events proved that it had judged him justly. No
sooner was he released than he began to lay his plans for a new
expedition, and since New Orleans had long been the stronghold of his
sympathizers, he went to that place to complete his organization.
CHAPTER V
[Illustration: Ramon Pinto]
Spain was now thoroughly alive to the danger which threatened her future
retention of Cuba, and in the face of an emergency she vacillated. Her
high officials began to wonder if after all their policy of extreme
oppression and suppression had not been in a measure the wrong one to
pursue with the Cubans. Roncali, who had been so pleasing to the
Peninsulars, or Spanish party in Cuba, and so unpopular with the
patriots, was recalled and Don José Gutierrez de la Concha was
dispatched to take his place as Captain-General. He took over the
affairs of the island on November 10, 1850. Concha was as unwelcome to
the Peninsulars as his predecessor had been to their liking. He was a
man who had at least some regard for justice, and who, if given a free
hand, might have governed Cuba with a degree of wisdom and fairness. He
was not a believer in liberty for the Cubans, but at least he had some
conception of what constituted equity. He publicly stated his ideal of
his office, as "a government of justice" and might have worked out
something like a solution of Spain's problems in Cuba, unless, as we
think it fair to believe, it was now much too late to quell the
revolutionary spirit which had grown to such great proportions; with "a
government of force," no matter what its purpose, the Cubans were all
too familiar, and they had plainly shown how much they hated it and
despised its administrators.
RAMON PINTO
An early martyr to the cause of Cuban freedom, Ramon Pinto, was
born in Cataluna, Spain, in 1802, and engaged in the revolution of
1820-23 in that country. Then he fled to Cuba and became a
brilliant writer in behalf of philanthropic works. In 1853 he
became director of the Havana Lyceum, and later was a close friend
and adviser of Captain-General Concha. In 1855 he was charged with
being engaged in a revolutionary conspiracy, was convicted on
dubious testimony, and died on the scaffold in March of that year.
One evil this new Captain-General did earnestly try to overcome. He
endeavored to do away with the fee system which had caused so much
unjust imprisonment and suffering. He made an effort to obtain fixed
salaries for all government officials instead of fees, but at every turn
he was balked by the Peninsulars. There is some reason to believe that
he was not altogether sincere; that he was a fair spokesman, but an evil
performer; that he did not allow his right hand to know the injustice he
was planning to do with his left. At any rate, at the very time when he
was offering such cheering words of hope to the Cubans, he was putting
into operation a regular line of vessels from Cadiz, Spain, to Havana.
He offered various excuses--of course, expansion, and many others--for
this action, but thinking Cubans well knew that his real purpose was
that communications might be more easy and frequent with the Spanish
court, and that news of uprisings, and the dispatching of troops to
suppress them, might be less delayed. He also--but, of course, this was
done under orders of the Spanish government, induced, we are told, by
his recommendations--increased and strengthened the fortifications of
the island, and asked for and received a greater number of troops to man
them.
However, there must have been some ground for the belief that Concha in
some ways favored the Cubans for in no other manner could he have
raised such a storm of dislike among the Peninsulars as constantly
whistled about his head, and finally resulted in his recall.
While these events were taking place in Cuba, Lopez, in the United
States, was far from idle, and he was not lacking in friends who sought
to aid him. Singularly enough those in the South who were numbered among
his supporters seemed not to be disheartened by the failure of the
Cardenas expedition, and, of course, the juntas were active in stirring
up popular opinion in favor of filibustering, and in obtaining both
moral and financial support for another enterprise. But with it all
money was woefully lacking.
General Henderson, who had been a member of the first expedition, and
had been one of those indicted and tried, at this time wrote to a
friend:
"I need not tell you how much I desire to see him (Lopez) move again,
and it is more useless to tell you how wholly unable I am to assist him
to make this move. With my limited means, I am under the extremest
burdens from my endeavors on the former occasion. Indeed I find my cash
advanced for the first experience were over half the cash advanced to
the enterprise, and all my present means and energies are exhausted in
bringing up the arrearages. Yet I still believe in the importance, the
morality and the probability of the enterprise; and I believe it is one
the South should steadfastly cherish and promote. I feel it is more
especially incumbent on us who have once failed to retrieve ourselves
from so much of the opprobrium and reproach as the defeat has cast upon
us. For we know that, could we succeed, we should win all those triumphs
which success in such enterprises never fails to command. And would not
such triumph be glorious! I believe you yield equal consideration to
the importance of this subject as I do; and as a Southern question, I do
not think, when properly viewed, its magnitude can be overestimated."
When a leader is able to enlist the sympathies, and drain the purse, of
a man so intelligent and of such high standing as John Henderson, former
Senator of the United States, and when he can bind such a man to him by
even stronger ties in defeat than in victory, the personality of that
leader must be one of extraordinary strength, courage and probity. It
speaks well for Lopez that all through his career he gathered around him
men of the finest families in the South, and indeed some of equally high
standing from the North which was not particularly in favor of his
venture, and those men fought for him and with him, and remained loyal
until the greater portion of them paid the penalty of their lives for
their devotion.
Now recruiting began in earnest. Everywhere in the South agents of Lopez
were busy, but the headquarters of this new movement seem to have been
at Savannah. Spain, of course, was not unaware of what was taking place
and was on the alert. Spanish spies were everywhere watching the
plotters against Spanish dominion in Cuba, and reporting their findings
to the Spanish legation at Washington. The Spanish minister had in his
employ a man who called himself at times Burtnett. (He had many
aliases.) He was more clever than the rank and file of the Spanish
agents, and by associating himself with the filibusters, he was able to
learn their plans. Lopez's followers were not rash; they tried very hard
to cover their activities; but in any undertaking in which a number of
people are concerned, anything like complete secrecy is absolutely out
of the question. Burtnett represented himself as a sympathizer; he
joined the filibusters and wormed himself into the confidence of the
leaders. He learned that the plan was to assemble on the coast of
Florida, and from there to set sail for Cuba. The filibusters would
themselves circulate rumors that the attack would be made on the south
coast of Cuba, but Burtnett discovered that in reality the forces would
be divided, and while the Spanish troops were mustered to repel an
attack in the south, several small bands would land, organize the
friendly Cubans, and give battle if necessary to what depleted Spanish
forces might be located on the north coast. This would preclude the
chance of such a disaster as the Cardenas expedition, and the Cubans,
uncowed by the presence of large bodies of governmental soldiery, would
hasten to the aid of Lopez. Even the Spanish troops, some of whom were
supposed to be in sympathy with the revolution, might be hoped to mutiny
and join the Cubans. Thus this time there could be no thought of
failure.
Meanwhile Southern gentlemen of wealth and family were eagerly supplying
funds to the enterprise. It is even said that some planters mortgaged
their estates to obtain funds to give to the expedition, in the
expectation that when rich Cuba was once acquired for the United States,
they would receive back a reward far greater than the amount which they
were contributing. Bonds of the proposed revolutionary government were
printed, and sold; arms and ammunition were purchased and stored in
readiness for the expedition. It was planned that the first consignment
of arms was to be conveyed to the steamer _Cleopatra_, which had been
purchased to carry the filibusters, by means of two small vessels, the
sloop _William Roe_, and the steamer _Nahantee_, which were to steal
respectively from the ports of New York and South Amboy, New Jersey, and
meet the _Cleopatra_ just beyond quarantine. When the details were
completed, Burtnett revealed the whole plan to the Spanish minister,
who lost no time in laying it before the United States government at
Washington. Now no matter what the sympathies of this government might
be, it could not be placed under the odium of giving its official
sanction to such an enterprise; indeed that would probably have resulted
in war with Spain. Its action was slightly delayed, and the expedition
might even yet have gotten off without interference had it not been that
the _William Roe_ was detained on account of a flaw in her papers, and
the _Cleopatra_, on which provisions were already stored, was delayed in
putting to sea to wait for the _William Roe_ and the _Nahantee_ because
at the last moment some of her crew went on shore and became
intoxicated. This slight postponement of her sailing gave an opportunity
for her attachment--at whose instigation it is not clear--for a writ for
$3,000, to cover repairs made by a former owner, and for which the
filibusters could hardly be held responsible. Nevertheless, they raised
the money, but before its transfer could be completed and the
_Cleopatra_ cleared on April 26, 1851, the leaders were arrested.
Things looked black for Lopez and his followers, but they still had the
influence of the South behind them, and for this reason or some equally
effective one, again the courts failed to convict them, and to add to
their good fortune the government did not confiscate the _Cleopatra_ and
the provisions with which she was loaded, and she was afterward sold and
the proceeds used as a nest-egg toward financing another expedition.
Spain was now thoroughly aroused to her danger, and determined to put
down the threatened revolution at any cost. Through her mouthpiece, the
Captain-General of Cuba, she issued a proclamation to the Governors and
Lieutenant Governors on the island:
"It has come to the knowledge of the Government that a new incursion of
pirates is preparing, similar to the one which took place at Cardenas
during the past year. It is proposed, without doubt, as it was then, to
sack defenseless towns and to disturb the order which reigns in this
beautiful part of the Spanish monarchy. But the loyalty of its
inhabitants, the valor and discipline of the troops, and the measures
taken by the government, are the surest guaranty that its destruction
will follow immediately the news of its disembarkation. You must, then,
above all else see to it that the news of this invasion produces no
alarm in the district which you command.
"To exterminate the pirates, whatever be their number, it is not
necessary to have recourse to extraordinary means; the ordinary means on
which the government can count are enough and even more than enough. Any
act, on the other hand, which is unusual would produce anxiety and
uneasiness among the peaceful inhabitants; it might cause, perhaps, an
interruption of business, and would thus occasion a real and important
loss for public and private interests. It is necessary, therefore, to
avoid any measures which may remove from the towns of that district the
confidence and sense of security which the government inspires. The
actual situation, however, imposes on the authorities the double duty to
cause order to reign, and not to appear to obtain it by unaccustomed
means which are only expedient when circumstances are really dangerous.
And this double object will be achieved if that vigilance, activity and
prudence are in evidence on which I should be able to count from you.
But you must not forget that in these circumstances, one of the most
important duties of the authorities is to quiet minds, and hush
suspicions, to take care, finally, that in not a single instance there
should be disturbed that harmony which now more than ever ought to
reign among the inhabitants of the island. Working to this end, I have
the most confidence that this event will end fortunately, making certain
the peace which the island needs to continue on the path of prosperity
which it has so far followed."
The foregoing gives a very adequate idea, cleverly cloaked under soft
and reassuring words, of the panic under which the authorities were
laboring. Only too well they knew the danger of "any unusual
disturbance," and of the exciting of the populace, for in it dwelt the
menace that that same excited mob might turn and rend their masters.
The Captain-General soon had another circumstance brought to his
attention which was a tremendous shock to his sensibilities, seeming as
it were a bomb placed at the very bulwarks of his authority. Puerto
Principe had been more or less a danger point, and harsh measures had
been used to put down the incipient rebellion there. The people had an
inkling that it was the intention of the Captain-General to deprive them
of their Audiencia. This would eliminate the cost of its maintenance,
and also keep the legislative or advisory power more closely
concentrated in Havana, where the Captain-General could keep a watchful
eye on proceedings. A petition was received by Concha requesting that
they be not deprived of their Audiencia, but when he examined it closely
he was shocked to observe that it was dated a month previous, and that
it had evidently been sent directly to the Spanish government at Madrid,
without the official sanction and endorsement of the Captain-General,
and this circumstance was aggravated by the fact that the Petition bore
the signature of the Commanding General. Things were coming to a pretty
pass if the Captain-General, the highest official in the land, was to
be ignored by his subjects. Concha made a great to-do about the matter,
and obtained the dismissal from office of the offending Commanding
General, at the same time securing the appointment of a close friend,
Don José Lemery, on whom he could depend to do his bidding. Lemery began
his tenure of office by using the most harsh and unwarranted methods of
suppressing what he termed an impending uprising, and by ordering the
arrest of a large number of the members of old Creole families--persons
who were known to have revolutionary sympathies--on suspicion of being
about to incite a rebellion. Among these were many members of the city
council under the old Commanding General, and one of the number, Don
Joaquin de Aguero, was later to figure as the leader of the most
successful revolution which Cuba had yet known.
Meanwhile Lopez, not disheartened, was once more planning an invasion of
Cuba, with belief unshaken, in spite of his discouraging experiences, in
the real desire of the Cubans for liberty and in their purpose to join
the revolutionary movement, if they could only be brought to emerge from
the deadening stupor of acquiescence into which fear of Spanish
vengeance seemed to have plunged them. This belief was strengthened by
the correspondence, which by an underground method he was carrying on
with Cuban patriots--men who he expected would be leaders in future
revolutions. They all assured him that if he could only start a real
movement for revolt, which promised actual deliverance, the Cubans would
no longer hesitate but would rush to his support. The fact that a price
had now been set on his head, should he set his foot on Cuban soil, and
be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of the Spaniards, had no
deterring power on Lopez's purposes. He was above suspicion of a
personal axe to grind, and there was never any question of his courage
and perseverance.
Lopez was emboldened by the support which the Cuban juntas promised him,
but he did not find all of the men who had accompanied him on the
Cardenas expedition as confident as he was himself. Some of the less
daring spirits prepared a statement to their leader, setting forth their
viewpoint, in substantially the following language:
"The people of Cuba charge us with endeavoring to create a revolution
for the sake of pillage; they state that the Cubans do not desire
freedom; if they did they would strike for themselves. We will not waste
any more time, nor take another step until we see something more on the
part of the Creoles besides promises. We took the first step at
Cardenas, and gave them an opportunity to show their hands, which they
did not. They must take the next, and then we will go to their
assistance; otherwise we shall not budge an inch."
Naturally enough, upon consideration, this impressed Lopez and his more
loyal followers as embodying some pretty sound common sense. It seemed
to be logical that the Cubans themselves should make the next move, and
back up their assertions by action. This ultimatum was conveyed to them,
by the same devious ways in which their promises had gotten by the
Spanish spies, and the effect was miraculous. They rose to the
situation, and announced that they would bring about a revolution, and
that the first steps would be taken sometime between July 1 and 4. That
Lopez and his friends were astonished at this show of spirit in those
who had so sadly demonstrated their lack of grit at Cardenas a short
time before, is not beyond the realm of belief, nor is it necessary to
relate how delighted they were that at last the Cubans were about to
move in their own behalf. The time was then so near, and Lopez's own
preparations had made so little practical progress, that there was not a
sufficient period between the date on which he received this information
and the day set for the revolutionary movement to enable him to send any
aid, except cheering words.
On the morning of July 3, 1851, Don Joaquin de Aguero led a small band
of patriots to the public square at Puerto Principe, all of them
shouting in loud tones: "Liberty! Freedom for Cuba! Death to the
Spaniards!" Now Aguero had been promised that at least four hundred
patriots would join him on this occasion, at the place appointed, and
give battle to the Spanish troops, which they well knew would be called
upon to put down the demonstration. But the Cubans had not yet found
themselves; it was still difficult for them to shake off the spell which
the Spaniards seemed to have cast upon them, and to come out into the
open and fight for their freedom. The promised four hundred were
represented by a pitiful fifteen, and the little band naturally had
small chance against the overwhelming forces which were sent against
them immediately the alarm was given. They fought bravely, but there
could be only one result, against such odds. They were routed and their
leader was captured. Aguero succeeded, however, in escaping from the
Spaniards, and went into hiding until the next day, when the patriots
again made a demonstration for freedom at Najassa. Here, for the second
time, the flag of Cuba Libre was flung to the breeze, and with shouts
and cheers, the following Declaration of Independence for Cuba was read
to a great multitude which had assembled in the square:
"To the inhabitants of the Island of Cuba, Manifesto and Proclamation of
their independence by the Liberating Society of Puerto Principe.
"Human reason revolts against the idea that the social and political
condition of a people can be indefinitely prolonged, in which man,
stripped of all rights and guarantees, with no security of person or
property, no enjoyment in the present, no hope in the future, lives only
by the will, and under the conditions imposed by the pleasure of his
tyrants; where a vile calumny, a prisoner's denunciation, a despot's
suspicion, a word caught up by surprise in the sanctuary of home, or
from the violated privacy of a letter, furnishes ample grounds for
tearing a man from his hearth, and casting him forth to die of
destitution or despair in a foreign soil, if he escapes being subjected
to the insulting forms of a barbarous and arbitrary tribunal, where his
persecutors are themselves the judges who condemn him, and where,
instead of their proving his offence, he is required to prove his
innocence.
"A situation so violent as this, Cuba has been for many years enduring;
and, far from any promise of remedy appearing, every day adds new proof
that the policy of the mother-country and the ferocity of her rulers
will grant neither truce nor rest till she is reduced to the condition
of an immense prison, where every Cuban will be watched by a guard, and
will have to pay that guard for watching him. In vain have this people
exhibited a mildness, a prudence, and even a submission and loyalty,
which have been proverbial.
"When the iniquity of the government has not been able to find any
ostensible grounds for persecution, it has had recourse to cowardly arts
and snares to tempt its victims into some offence. Thus were various
individuals of Matanzas entrapped into an ambuscade of the soldiery, by
the pretext of selling them some arms, under circumstances which made
them believe those arms were necessary for self-defence, against
threatened attacks from the Peninsulars. Thus have sergeants and even
officers been seen to mingle among the country people, and pass
themselves off as enemies of the government, for the purpose of
betraying them into avowals of their sentiments to the ruin of many
persons so informed against as well as to the disgrace of military honor
on the part of those who have lent themselves to so villainous a
service.
"If the sons of Cuba, moved by the dread of greater evils, have ever
determined to employ legitimate means of imposing some law, or some
restraint upon the unbridled excesses of their rulers, these latter have
always found the way to distort such acts into attempts at rebellion.
"For having dared to give utterances to principles and opinions, which,
to other nations, constitute the foundation of their moral progress and
glory, the Cubans most distinguished for their virtues and talents have
found themselves wanderers and exiles. For the offence of having
exhibited their opposition to the unlawful and perilous slave trade,
from which the avarice of General O'Donnell promised itself so rich a
harvest of lucre, the latter satiated his resentment with the monstrous
vengeance of involving them in a charge of conspiracy with the free
colored people and the slaves of the estates; endeavoring, as the last
outrage that an immoral government could offer to law, to reason, or to
nature, to prove the object of that conspiracy, in which they implicated
whites of the most eminent virtue, knowledge, and patriotism, to have
been no other than the destruction of their own race.
"All the laws of society and nature trampled under foot--all races and
conditions confounded together--the island of Cuba then presented to the
civilized world a spectacle worthy of the rejoicings of hell. The
wretched slaves saw their flesh torn from them under the lash, and
bespattered with blood the faces of their executioners, who did not
cease exacting from their tortures denunciation against accomplices.
Others were shot in platoons without form of trial, and without even
coming to understand the pretext under which they were massacred. The
free colored people, after having been first lacerated by the lash, were
then hurried to the scaffold and those only escaped with life who had
gold enough to appease the fury of their executioners. And nevertheless,
when the government or its followers has come to fear some rising of the
Cubans their first threat has been that of arming the colored people
against them for their extermination. We abstain for very shame from
repeating the senseless pretences to which they have had recourse to
terrify the timid wretches! How have they been able to image that the
victims of their fury, with whom the whites of Cuba had shared in common
the horrors of misery and persecution, will turn against their own
friends at the call of the very tyrant who has torn them in pieces? If
the free colored people, who know their interests as well as the whites,
take any part in the movement of Cuba, it certainly will not be to the
injury of the mother who shelters them in her bosom, nor of those other
sons of hers who have never made them feel the difference of their race
and condition, and who, far from plundering them, have taken pride in
being their defenders and in meriting the title of their benefactors.
"The world would refuse to believe the history of the horrid crimes
which have been perpetrated in Cuba, and would reasonably consider that
if there have been monsters to commit, it is inconceivable that there
could so long have been men to endure them. But if there are few able to
penetrate to the truth of particular facts, through all the means
employed by the government to obscure and distort them, no one will
resist the evidence of public and official facts.
"Publicly and with arms in his hands, did General Tacon despoil Cuba of
the constitution of Spain, proclaimed by all the powers of the monarchy,
and sent to be sworn to in Cuba, as the fundamental law of the whole
kingdom.
"Publicly and by legislative act, was Cuba declared to be deprived of
all the rights enjoyed by all Spaniards, and conceded by nature and the
laws of nations the least advanced in civilization.
"Publicly have the sons of Cuba been cut off from all admission to the
commands and lucrative employments of the State.
"Publicly are unlimited powers of every description granted to the
Captains-General of Cuba who can refuse to those whom they condemn even
the right of a trial and the privilege of being sentenced by a tribunal.
"Public and permanent in the island of Cuba, are those courts martial
which the laws permit only in extraordinary cases of war, for offences
against the State.
"Publicly has the Spanish press hurled against Cuba the threat
converting the island into ruin and ashes by liberating the slaves and
unchaining against her the hordes of barbarian Africans.
"Publicly are impediments and difficulties imposed upon every
individual, to restrain him from moving from place to place, and from
exercising any branch of industry--no one being safe from arrest and
fine, for some deficiency of authority or license, at every step he may
take.
"Public are the taxes which have wasted away the substance of the island
and the project of other new ones, which threaten to abolish all the
products of its riches--nothing being left for the opinions and
interests of the country.
"Outrages so great and so frequent, reasons so many and so strong,
suffice not merely to justify, but to sanctify, in the eyes of the whole
world, the cause of the independence of Cuba, and any effort of her
people, by their own exertions, or with friendly aid from abroad, to put
an end to the evils they suffer, and secure the rights with which God
and nature have invested man.
"Who will in Cuba oppose this indefeasible instinct, this imperative
necessity of defending our property, and of seeking in the institutions
of a just, free and regulated government conditions on which alone
civilized society can exist?
"The Peninsulars (natives of Spain) perhaps, who have come to Cuba to
marry our daughters, who have here their children, their affections and
their property, will they disregard the laws of nature to range
themselves on the side of a government which oppresses them as it
oppresses us, and which will neither thank them for the service nor be
able, with all their help, to prevent the triumph of the independence of
Cuba?
"Are not they as intimately bound up with happiness and interest of Cuba
as those blood-natives of her soil, who will never be able to deny the
name of their fathers, and who, in rising up today against the despotism
of the government would wish to count upon their co-operation as the
best guaranty of their new social organization and the strongest proof
of the justice of their cause?
"Have they not fought in the Peninsula itself, for their national
independence, for the support of the same principles for which we, the
sons of Cuba proclaim, and which, being the same for men in all
countries, cannot be admitted in one and rejected in another without
doing treason to nature and to the light of reason, from which they
spring?
"No, no--it cannot be that they should carry submissiveness to the point
of preferring their own ruin, and the spilling of the blood of their
sons and brothers, to be triumph of the holiest cause ever embraced by
man--a cause which aims to promote their own happiness and to protect
their rights and properties. The Peninsulars who adorn and enrich our
soil, and to whom the title of labor gives as high a right as our own to
its preservation, know very well that the sons of Cuba regard them with
personal affection--have never failed to recognize the interest and
reciprocal wants which unite the two--nor have ever held them
responsible for the perversenesses of the few, and for the iniquities of
a government whose infernal policy alone has labored to separate them,
on the tyrant's familiar maxim--to divide and conquer.
"We, who proceed in good faith and with the noble ambition of earning
the applause of the world for the justice of our acts--we surely cannot
aim at the destruction of our brothers, nor at the usurpation of their
properties; and far from meriting that vile calumny which the government
will endeavor to fasten upon us, we do not hesitate to swear in the
sight of God and of man that nothing would better accord with the wishes
of our hearts, or with the glory and happiness of our country, than the
co-operation of the Peninsulars, in the sacred work of liberation.
United with them, we could realize that idea of entire independence
which is a pleasing one to our minds; but if they present themselves in
our way as enemies, we shall not be able to answer for the security of
their persons and properties, nor when adventuring all for the main
object of the liberty of Cuba, shall we be able to renounce any means of
effecting it.
"But if we have all these reasons to expect that the Peninsulars, who
are in nowise dependent on the government and who are so bound up with
the fate of Cuba, will at least remain neutral, it will not be supposed
that we can promise ourselves the same conduct on the part of the army,
the individuals composing which, without ties or affections, know no
other law nor consideration than the will of their commander. We pity
the lot of those unfortunate men, subject to a tyranny as hard as our
own, who, torn from their homes in the flower of their youth, have been
brought to Cuba to oppress us on condition of themselves renouncing the
dignity of men and all the enjoyments and hopes of life. If they shall
appreciate the difference between a free and happy citizen and a
dependent and hireling soldier, and choose to accept the benefits of
liberty and prosperity, which we tender them, we will admit them into
our ranks as brethren. But if they shall disregard the dictates of
reason and of their own interests and allow themselves to be controlled
by the insidious representations of their tyrants, so as to regard it as
their duty to oppose themselves to us on the field of battle as enemies,
we will then accept the combat, alike without hate and without fear and
always willing, whenever they may lay down their arms, to welcome them
to our embrace.
"To employ the language of moderation and justice--to seek for means of
peace and conciliation--to invoke the sentiments of love and
brotherhood--befits a cultivated and Christian people, which finds
itself forced to appeal to the violent recourse of arms, not for the
purpose of attacking the social order and the loves of fellow beings,
but to recover the condition and the rights of man, usurped from them by
an unjust and tyrannical power. But let not the expression of our
progress and wishes encourage in our opponents the idea that we are
ignorant of our resources, or distrustful of our strength. All the means
united, at the disposal of the Peninsulars in Cuba against us, could
only make the struggle more protracted and disastrous; but the issue in
our favor could not be any the less sure and decisive.
"In the ranks of independence we have to count all the free sons of
Cuba, whatever may be the color of their race--the brave nations of
South America, who inhabit our soil and who have already made trial of
the strength and conduct of our tyrants--the sturdy islanders of the
Canaries, who love Cuba as their country, and who have already had an
Hernandez and a Monies de Oca, to seal with the proof of martyrdom, the
heroic decision of their compatriots for our cause.
"The ranks of the government would find themselves constantly thinned by
desertion, by the climate, by death, which from all quarters would
spring up among them in a thousand forms. Cut short of means to pay and
maintain their army, dependent on recruits from Spain to fill up their
vacancies without an inch of friendly ground on which to plant their
feet, or an individual on whom to rely with security, war in the field
would be for them one of extermination; while, if they shut themselves
within the defences of their fortresses, hunger and want would soon
compel them to abandon them, if they were not carried by force of arms.
The example of the whole continent of Spanish America, under
circumstances more favorable for them, when they had Cuba as their
arsenal, the benefit of her coffers, and native aid in those countries
themselves, ought to serve them as a lesson not to undertake an
exterminating and fratricidal struggle, which could not fail to be
attended with the same or worse results.
"We, on the other hand, besides our own resources, have in the
neighboring States of the Union, and in all the republics of America,
the encampments of our troops, the depots of our supplies, and the
arsenals of our arms. All the sons of this vast New World, whose bosom
shelters the island of Cuba, and who have had, like us, to shake off by
force the yoke of tyranny, will enthusiastically applaud our resolve,
will fly by hundreds to place themselves beneath the flag of liberty in
our ranks, and there trained to experienced valor will aid us in
annihilating, once and for always, the last badge of ignominy that still
disgraces the free and independent soil of America.
"If we have hitherto hoped, with patience and resignation, that justice
and their own interests would change the mind of our tyrants; if we have
trusted to external efforts to bring the mother country to a negotiation
which should avoid the disasters of war, we are resolved to prove by
deeds that inaction and endurance have not been the results of impotence
and cowardice. Let the government undeceive itself in regard to the
power of its bayonets and the efficiency of all the means it has
invented to oppress and watch us. In the face of its very
authorities--in the sight of the spies at our side--on the day when we
have resolved to demand back our rights, the cry of liberty and
independence will rise from the Cape of San Antonio to the Point of
Maysi.
"We, then, as provisional representatives of the people of Cuba, and in
exercise of the rights which God and Nature have bestowed upon every
freeman, to secure his welfare and establish himself under the form of
government that suits him do solemnly declare, taking God to witness the
ends we propose, and invoking the favor of the people of America, who
have preceded us with their example, that the Island of Cuba is, and, by
the laws of nature ought to be, independent of Spain; and that
henceforth the inhabitants of Cuba are free from all obedience or
subjection to the Spanish government and the individuals composing it;
owing submission only to the authority and direction of those who, while
awaiting the action of the general suffrage of the people, are charged,
or may provisionally charge themselves with the command and government
of each locality, and of the military forces.
"By virtue of this declaration, the free sons of Cuba, and the
inhabitants of the Island who adhere to her cause, are authorized to
take up arms, to unite into corps, to name officers and juntas of
government, for their organization and direction, for the purpose of
putting themselves in communication with the juntas constituted for the
proclamation of the independence of Cuba, and which have given the
initiative to this movement. Placed in the imposing attitude of making
themselves respected, our compatriots will prefer all the means of
persuasion to those of force; they will protect the property of
neutrals, whatever may be their origin; they will welcome the
Peninsulars into their ranks as brothers and will respect all property.
"If, notwithstanding our purposes and fraternal intentions, the Spanish
government should find partizan obstruction bent upon sustaining it, and
we have to owe our liberty to the force of arms, sons of Cuba, let us
prove to the republics of America, which are contemplating us, that we
having been the last to follow their example does not make us unworthy
of them, nor incapable of receiving our liberty and achieving our
independence.
JOAQUIN DE AGUERO AGNEW,
FRANCISCO AGNERO ESTRADA,
WALDO ARETEACA PINA.
"July 4, 1851."
Immediately upon the reading of this the wildest excitement ensued. The
Cubans began to believe that at last deliverance was near. They flung
their hats into the air, while tears streamed down their faces, and they
shouted "Cuba Libre! Down with the Spaniards!" until hoarseness
compelled them to stop. Then an ominous noise, low at first, but growing
nearer and nearer, broke in upon their rapturous demonstrations. Well
they knew that sound, for they had heard it only too often. The Spanish
soldiers were approaching, and turning, those on the outskirts of the
crowd beheld column after column of infantry advancing from one
direction, while a troop of cavalry was apparently about to charge the
crowd from the opposite side of the square. Aguero knew that a crisis
had been reached and that on the work done in the next few moments
depended victory or defeat. He called upon those closest in his
confidence to organize the crowd. Plans for this action had previously
been completed, and the assembled people were quickly grouped into
divisions each containing one hundred men. By this time the Spanish
troops were only about a hundred yards distant, and they at once opened
fire on the revolutionists. Aguero's company was armed, and they had
brought with them extra equipment, which had been distributed among the
people. The revolutionists were by no means poor marksmen; they had long
been practicing in private for this very hour. They proved that they
were more skilled than the picked troops of Spain, and for a time they
showed astonishing efficiency in thinning the ranks of the Spanish
infantry. But the cavalry now charged the crowd, and this was more
serious than an infantry attack because the revolutionists were not
prepared to return it in kind. They stood their ground bravely, firing
at the horses, thus seeking to dismount and confuse the enemy, and
strange as it may seem they were successful. The cavalry commander
ordered a retreat, which was accomplished in great disorder, and under a
withering fire from the revolutionists, while the infantry, amazed and
alarmed to find themselves no longer able to rely on the support of the
cavalry, broke and fled toward Puerto Principe, from which place they
had come. The little army at Najassa well knew that no help could be
expected from their comrades at Puerto Principe, and therefore it seemed
the part of discretion to allow the Spanish army to retreat unmolested,
and for the revolutionists to take refuge in the interior of the island,
where it would be more difficult to apprehend them, and where they hoped
to find sympathy and support. They made their way to Guanamaquilla,
where they decided to make a stand, and where, after effecting a better
organization, they entrenched themselves.
On July 6 at this place they were attacked by six hundred Spaniards
under General Lemery, and the Spanish troops were again routed, again
retired in disorder, and once more the revolutionists celebrated a
victory. Not only did the Spanish troops beat a hasty retreat, but they
left behind them, on the field of battle, forty dead and dying.
It can be imagined with what elation the patriots celebrated this second
victory. They could hardly believe in their good fortune. It was
incredible that they should have prevailed against the trained forces of
Spain. It was not for them, at such close contact with events, to
realize that while they were fighting for their homes, for freedom, for
their families, for their very lives,--for capture meant as sure death
as any bullet of the enemy could bring,--after all the Spanish troops
were only hirelings, fighting for pay and not for a principle, and that
it has been the history of the world, since its beginning, that when
the home is at stake sooner or later victory comes to its defenders.
Now the little bands of one hundred separated, and the mistake was made
which proved fatal to the cause for which they had already sacrificed so
much, and which seemed about to triumph. They should have waited until
news of their triumph penetrated to other patriots, and until their
forces had been greatly swelled in volume, before any division was made.
Meanwhile, immediately after their first victory, they had sent a
courier to bear word to Lopez, through their mysterious channels of
communication, of their success, urging him to communicate the good news
to the junta in New York, and to hasten to their aid with a new
expedition, and promising that meanwhile they would spread the
revolution to all parts of the island, so that when he came again he
would have no cause to complain of lack of support.
The companies of one hundred each went in a separate direction, each
bent on conquest and propaganda among timid sympathizers. One party,
which was led by Aguero himself, made its way to Las Tunas, and arrived
there late in the evening. Aguero divided his little band into two parts
and approached the town from opposite directions, sounding the cry of
the revolution, "Cuba Libre!" and calling upon all good patriots to join
their forces. But Spanish spies, always active, had preceded them and
the garrison of five hundred soldiers was already alert. Then a
catastrophe happened. The two bands of patriots, in the midst of the
great confusion which their arrival occasioned, met in a dark, unpaved
street, and not recognizing one another, each believed the other to be
the Spaniards, and each opened fire upon the other. Too late the error
was rectified. Some of the patriots had been injured by their own
comrades, and the organization was in confusion; before order could be
educed from this chaos, the Spanish troops were upon them, and this time
it was the patriots who were put to rout.
Another of the bands of one hundred had proceeded, meanwhile, to the
plains of Santa Isabel. Large numbers of patriots rallied to their
assistance, but the attacking Spanish force, nearly a thousand strong,
and consisting of both cavalry and infantry, cast far too great odds
against them. The patriots again suffered defeat, and their losses were
twenty killed and forty captured by the enemy, while the Spanish
casualties were one hundred and thirty, fifty of whom were killed
outright.
A third band of one hundred, which had as its commander Don Serapin
Recio, made its way to Santa Cruz. They were more fortunate than had
been their comrades, for when they were attacked by four companies of
Spanish infantry, under Colonel Conti, they not only were victorious,
but they took Colonel Conti prisoner. This triumph, however, was short
lived, for Spanish reinforcements, consisting of four hundred
cavalrymen, were rushed to the scene of battle, and the tide turned
against the patriots. Recio was captured, fifty six revolutionists soon
lay dead or dying, and as the others sought to escape a large proportion
of them were taken captive.
Still a fourth band, advancing on Punta de Grandao, met with disaster,
as did the fifth division which had gone toward La Siguanea in the hope
of taking that place.
Only one little division of patriots, one hundred strong, remained
unconquered. Aguero, who had made his escape after the defeat at Las
Tunas, took command of this company. The city of Nuevitas was entered in
triumph, amid shouts of welcome from the people, who in large numbers
threw in their fortunes with the revolution. Don Carlos Comus led the
Spanish forces against the city, and a desperate battle which raged for
over three hours was fought. The ammunition of the patriots was
exhausted, and fighting against frightful odds, they were almost
exterminated; fewer than the original one hundred remained alive. They
fled, and were speedily captured by the pursuing Spaniards.
Complete defeat had now overtaken the revolutionists, who so boldly on
July 3 had declared their independence of Spain, and thrown a defiant
gauntlet before the Spanish power. By the end of July not a single one
of the original army remained at large to tell the story; they had all
been killed, captured, or frightened into cowed and silent obedience to
Spanish rule. Of those who had fallen into the hands of the Spaniards,
every one was tried by military tribunal, and sentence passed upon them.
Two courts sat in judgment on the offenders, one at Puerto Principe and
the other at Trinidad, at which latter the Captain-General, José de la
Concha, presided. Under his dictation sentence of death was pronounced
upon José Isidore Armenteros, Fernando Hernandez and Rafael Arcis, all
recognized as prime movers in the revolution. Ignacio Belen Perez,
Nestor Cadalso, Juan O'Bourke, Abeja Iznaga Miranda and Jose Maria
Rodriguez were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, which was to be
suffered abroad, and they were forever banished from Cuba, while the
same terms were imposed on Juan Hevia and Avelind Porada, whose
sentences, however, were shortened to eight years each, and Pedro José
Pomarcz, Foribio Garcia, Cruz Birba and Fernando Medinilla were also
banished, and condemned to two years' imprisonment. All sentences went
into effect on August 18. It is interesting to note in passing a fact
which seems quite in keeping with the Spanish character as demonstrated
by the administration of the island; the men who were condemned to death
were led out into a field by the name of Del Negro, near the city of
Trinidad, and _shot in the back_.
The court which sat in judgment at Puerto Principe tried the leader of
the revolutionists, and brave Joaquin Aguero was condemned to die by the
garrote. The same sentence was imposed on José Thomas Betancourt,
Fernando de Zayas and Miguel Benavides; while Miguel Castellanos and
Adolfo Pierre Aguero were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, which
sentences were all decreed to take effect on August 12.
It was impossible, even with the strict censorship which the Spanish
Captain-General maintained over the island, to keep reports of the
stirring events which were taking place from leaking forth into the
outer world. Of course, Lopez and the junta at New York learned of them
through the channels known only to themselves, and the news, spreading
to all parts of the United States, caused tremendous excitement. Great
interest was manifested, particularly in the southern states, and in New
York City, where the members of the Cuban junta had begun to stir up a
considerable amount of interest in and sympathy for the Cubans. The New
York papers dispatched correspondents to obtain the true story of the
rebellion, but the reporters had difficulty in getting into the country,
and encountered still greater obstacles in dispatching what news they
could gather to their respective sheets. They were hampered in their
efforts by Spanish officials and Spanish spies were always at their
heels.
While the main uprising had been in the vicinity of Puerto Principe,
incipient rebellions and sympathetic insurrections occurred in other
parts of the island, which were quickly quelled by overwhelming forces
of Spaniards, and the news of which was confined as much as possible to
the immediate vicinity of the uprisings. At Trinidad a mob assembled on
horseback, crying vengeance on the Spanish oppressors, but they were
soon driven from the city and obliged to take to cover on a densely
wooded hill, where their movements were so hampered by underbrush that
they were perforce compelled to abandon their mounts, and soon
surrendered to superior numbers. It was suspected that the inhabitants
of Havana, or rather the revolutionary sympathizers in that place, were
about to revolt, but the guard was redoubled, the crowd was overawed by
numbers of well armed troops, and the movement, if it ever had been
contemplated, never materialized. However, many of the wealthy
inhabitants, fearing that they might be seized on suspicion of
complicity with the revolutionists, hastily fled to their estates in the
country.
The New York _Herald_, which for a long time had been sympathetically
inclined toward the revolutionary party in Cuba, on July 16, 1851,
printed the following report, which was based on facts gathered by its
correspondent:
"I consider that, in a political point of view, this island was never in
a more critical state than it is at this present moment. The Creoles of
Cuba have at length thrown down the gauntlet of defiance to the
authority of Spain."
This statement was followed by a long account of the engagements between
the revolutionists and the forces of Spain. On July 22 the same paper,
under the guise of reporting conditions, issued what was really a call
of "The United States to the rescue," which in part read as follows:
"The revolution of Cuba has changed from chrysalis to full grown fly.
The first blood has been spilled. Cuba, some seem to think, has had her
Lexington.... The revolution having begun, it cannot go backward and it
is more than probable that the days of Spain's rule are at least to be
much embarrassed. The government counts 14,000 troops, and no more, in
all the island, and may, perhaps, be able to raise as many more from the
Spanish population; but their fleet is a good one, comprising some
twenty vessels, of which six are steamers. _Whether the struggle be a
long one or a short one, will depend on the 'aid and comfort' the Cubans
receive from the United States, in the shape of guns, pistols, powder,
ball and men that can teach them to organize and manoeuvre._"
CHAPTER VI
It will be recalled that the Cubans, in the first flush of victory, had
dispatched the good tidings to the Cuban Junta in New York City. These
reports were so sanguine of victory that even though later rumors of
defeat at the hands of the Spaniards did reach that body, they were
regarded as Spanish propaganda and suppressed. These adverse rumors were
vague, and unsupported by confirming data, and Spanish spies had been
for some time active in dispensing unreliable news favorable to their
country, so it is not strange that little credence was given to such
advices as came to the Junta from Spanish sources. Lopez himself was
overjoyed at the tidings from the patriots and began eagerly to organize
another expedition. The greatest enthusiasm prevailed among Cuban
sympathizers in the United States. In some places, particularly in the
south, public meetings were held, and proclamations of the liberty of
Cuba were read to the assembled crowds. Men crowded to enlist and
$50,000 was quickly raised to finance the expedition. The new recruits
to the ranks were of by far the best character yet enlisted. They seem
to have been, for the most part, actuated by the highest motives, and
aflame with zeal for the cause of Cuban liberty. Garibaldi, who was then
in the United States, is reported to have been approached to be the
leader of the new expedition, but because he had his own Italian matters
to attend to, he declined with regret.
The United States Government, of course, gave no official sanction to
the project, but it was deterred by the preponderance of favorable
public opinion from putting more than nominal obstacles in its way;
avoiding on the one hand the storm of protest which was bound to be
raised by Cuban sympathizers at any marked interference with their
plans, and on the other the anger of Spain and thus an international
complication. Spanish spies were as heretofore dogging the steps of the
conspirators and reporting their findings to the Spanish minister at
Washington, so that the United States Government found itself in an
exceedingly difficult position. However, preparations went on apace. A
steamer, the _Pampero_, was purchased by the Junta, and well stocked
with provisions. Arms and ammunitions were also procured, but these
were, as was usual, to be delivered to the steamer on the high seas.
At daybreak, on the morning of April 3, the _Pampero_ slipped from its
dock at the foot of Lafayette Street in New Orleans, and made its way
down the river. At the mouth of the harbor the difficulties of the
filibusters began. The vessel was overloaded, and Captain Lewis in the
interests of safety declined to proceed further until some of the party
had been sent ashore. A landing was made that night, and one hundred men
were detailed to be left behind. They protested vigorously against this
action. The plan was that the _Pampero_ was to be only one of many
vessels to be sent within the next month to the relief of the Cubans,
and that she was to return, immediately her company had been landed in
Cuba, for reinforcements which would be assembled and be in waiting to
sail. However, none of the company on the _Pampero_ desired to await
another sailing, and when she once more put out to sea it was discovered
that the number on board her had not been perceptibly lessened, since
many of those put on shore had, in the confusion, and under the cover of
darkness, stolen back on board and hidden themselves securely until she
was once more on her way.
The expedition thus auspiciously started was made up of the following
men and officers:
6 Companies of Infantry, including officers--219 men
3 " " Artillery, " " --114 men
1 Company " Cuban patriots (domiciled
in the United States) -- 49 men
1 " " Hungarian recruits -- 9 men
1 " " German recruits -- 9 men
The command of this little army was distributed as follows:
General-in-Chief Narciso Lopez
Second-in-Command and Chief-of-Staff John Pragay
_Officers of Staff_
Captain Emmerich Radwitch.
" Ludwig Schlessinger.
Lieutenant Joseph Lewohl.
" Jigys Rodendorf.
" Ludwig.
" Miller.
Adjutant Colengen.
" Blumenthal.
Surgeon Hega Lemmgue.
Commissary G. A. Cook.
_Staff of the Regiment of Infantry_
Colonel R. L. Dorman.
Lieutenant Colonel W. Scott Harkness.
Adjutant George A. Graham.
Commissary Joseph Bell.
Adjutant of Regiment George Parr.
_Company A._
Captain Robert Ellis.
Lieutenant E. McDonald.
Sub-Lieutenant J. L. LaHascan.
" R. H. Breckinridge.
_Company B._
Captain John Johnson.
First Lieutenant James Dunn.
Second " J. F. Williams.
Third " James O'Reilly.
_Company C._
Captain J. C. Bridgham.
First Lieutenant Richard Vowden.
Second " J. A. Gray.
Third " J. N. Baker.
_Company D._
Captain Philip Golday.
First Lieutenant David Rassan.
Second " James H. Landingham.
Third " James H. Vowden.
_Company E._
Captain Henry Jackson.
First Lieutenant William Hobbs.
Second " J. A. Simpson.
Third " James Crangh.
_Company F._
Captain William Stewart.
First Lieutenant James L. Down.
Second " John L. Bass.
Third " Thomas Hudwall.
_Regiment of Artillery--Officers of Staff._
Chief--William S. Crittenden.
Adjutant R. L. Stanford.
Second Master of Commissariat Felix Hustin.
Surgeon Ludovic Vinks.
_Company A._
Captain W. A. Kelly.
First Lieutenant N. O. James.
Second " James A. Nowens.
Third " J. O. Bryce.
_Company B._
Captain James Saunders.
First Lieutenant Philip VanVechten.
Second " Beverly A. Hunter.
Third " William H. Craft.
_Company C._
Captain Victor Kerr.
First Lieutenant James Brandt.
Second " William T. Vienne.
_Regiment of Cuban Patriots._
_Company A._
Captain Ilde Foussee Overto.
First Lieutenant De Jiga Hernandez.
Second " Miguel Lopez.
Third " José A. Plands.
Fourth " Henry Lopez.
_Regiment of Hungarians._
Major George Botilla.
Captain Ladislaus Polank.
Lieutenant Semerby.
" Johan Petroce.
" Adambert Kerskes.
" Conrad Richner.
_German Regiment._
Captain Pietra Muller.
" Hugo Schlyct.
Lieutenant Paul Michael.
" Biro Cambeas.
" Giovana Placasee.
This seems perhaps an elaborate organization for so small a force, but
it must be borne in mind that Lopez and his followers firmly believed
that this time there was to be no repetition of the former lack of
enthusiasm on the part of the Cubans, but that they had only to land to
be greeted with rejoicing, and to have flock to their assistance a great
number of Cuban patriots. This impression was increased by forged
letters--which Lopez, however, accepted as genuine--which were waiting
for them at Key West and which are now believed to have been written by
a follower of Lopez in Havana, under duress and intimidating threats of
Captain-General Concha, for the latter having learned of the expedition
resorted to treachery to thwart the plans of the filibusters. These
letters intimated that Pinar del Rio and many cities in that vicinity
were in open revolt against Spanish rule, and prayed that Lopez come
quickly to the aid of the rebels, who were eager to join him.
Colonel Crittenden, in command of the artillery regiment, was a man of
the highest connections in the United States. He was a seasoned soldier,
being a veteran of the Mexican war, and having received his training at
West Point. In Lopez's band were also several officers from the United
States Custom House at New Orleans, and many men from the best families
of the South.
On April 7 the smoke of a steamer was seen in the distance, and it soon
seemed to indicate that the _Pampero_ was being pursued. Her course was
changed, and she either succeeded in outdistancing her pursuer, or the
latter decided that a mistake had been made in the identity of the
vessel, and abandoned the chase. The expedition neared Key West, and
they expected to find there United States vessels of war, and a strong
garrison. Therefore an attempt was made to disguise the character of the
_Pampero_ and her purpose, and the men were all ordered below. Lopez was
delighted to find that his anticipations were wrong, for there were no
men of war in the harbor and the barracks were empty. As the _Pampero_
docked, and the men came on deck, they were greeted by a shouting mob of
enthusiastic people. They were welcomed as heroes, and the inhabitants
came on board bearing food of the most tempting variety and cases of
champagne. A feast followed, at which the health of the filibusters and
the success of the expedition was drunk with shouts of approval.
Now the expectation had been to go up the St. John's River, where a
quantity of artillery for Colonel Crittenden's regiment had been hidden,
but the false reports in the forged letters made Lopez anxious to be on
his way to Cuba, and it was argued that the artillery would be
ineffective in the first engagements, for the roads were very bad, and
Lopez hoped to take to the mountains and conduct a sort of guerrilla
warfare. The St. John's River was some distance away, and there was
always fear of interference from the United States Government; and
besides, since this was merely a vanguard for a much greater invasion of
Cuba, and was intended to pave the way for the coming forces, why not
proceed to the rescue of the Cuban insurgents and let those who would
follow bring the artillery? Consequently, after consultation with his
officers, Lopez decided to sail for Cuba by the shortest route.
On nine o'clock of the morning of August 11, the filibusters found
themselves about ten miles from the harbor of Havana. Off Bahia Honda
they took on a pilot. Meanwhile, two vessels were sighted, and were
believed to be Spanish ships lying in wait for the expedition. A contest
of wits ensued, in which Lopez was victorious, and the _Pampero_
successfully evaded her pursuers. At eight o'clock that night they
neared Morillo, and Lopez decided there to make his landing. At eleven
o'clock this was accomplished, and while the provisions, arms and
ammunition were being brought ashore, the men were given permission to
lie down on their arms and rest for two hours. It can be imagined that
they were in the highest state of excitement and in no condition to
sleep, even if the attacks of mosquitoes had not made this impossible.
Now the information which Captain-General Concha had received concerning
the expedition had led him to believe that the landing would be made at
Mantua, and he was delighted when information reached him, as it
speedily did, that the filibusters had gone ashore at Morillo. He
quickly dispatched Colonel Morales by rail to Guanajay, where he
collected a Spanish force of about four hundred men, who were instructed
to attack from the front; while General Ena from Bahia Honda and Colonel
Elezalde from Pinar del Rio were to join forces to cut off retreat, if
the filibusters attempted to escape by sea, and thus Concha hoped to
surround and destroy the army of invasion.
Meanwhile, the _Pampero_ had been cleared, and under orders from Lopez
set out on a return trip to Key West to bring reinforcements, and Lopez
decided to march his forces to Las Pozas, ten miles away. Contrary to
their expectations, the filibusters had found the town of Morillo
practically deserted, and there were no enthusiastic patriots to welcome
their would-be deliverers. Now difficulty arose as to transportation of
the provisions, and the main portions of the military supplies. There
was no practical means of conveying them to Las Pozas, and in
consequence Lopez made a mistake which afterward proved his undoing. He
concluded to divide his forces, leaving Crittenden, with a hundred and
twenty men, to guard the supplies, and himself, with the remainder of
his army, to push on to Las Pozas.
He reached this objective without mishap, but again found conditions
very different from what he had been led to expect. This town, too, was
almost deserted, and there was the same disheartening lack of support,
and failure of the Cubans to join his expedition. Lopez determined that
on this occasion there should be no occasion to bring against his army
the accusations which the Spaniards had made at Matanzas. He therefore
ordered his men to accept nothing in the way of food for which they did
not pay, and he stationed guards at places where liquor was sold to
prevent any drunkenness on the part of his men. In consequence the best
of order prevailed.
An attack from the Spaniards was momentarily expected, and Lopez
maintained a careful watch for the approach of the enemy. This was
delayed until the next morning, when, in spite of his precautions, he
was taken virtually by surprise. A portion of his forces were eating
their breakfast, while others were bathing in a nearby stream, when word
came that the Spanish had overpowered the outposts, were then within two
hundred yards of the village, and that the attacking force was estimated
to be twelve hundred strong. Lopez hastily issued the call to arms, and
his men were arrayed to meet the on-coming Spaniards. A hot battle
ensued, in which, in spite of the fact that they were so largely
outnumbered, the filibusters were victorious and forced the Spaniards to
retire. However, Lopez suffered a very great blow in the death of
Colonel Dorman, who was the best disciplinarian and most efficient
organizer and drill-master in the army, while Colonel Pragay, Lopez's
chief adviser--who, however, had been responsible for persuading Lopez
to make the mistake of leaving Crittenden behind--was also killed, as
was Captain Overto. The other casualties amounted to fifty killed and
wounded. Even the fact that the Spanish losses were far heavier did not
compensate for the loss to Lopez of his three brave commanders.
Lopez's army had been increased by only a few stray Cubans, whom they
had encountered on their march to Las Pozas, and who had joined fortunes
with them. He now had fifty-three less men that at first, and besides he
was separated from his stores. Unless they were promptly brought
forward, or unless he returned to Morillo and Crittenden, he would be in
a serious situation, since help from the natives was not materializing.
While he was contemplating this situation, a messenger arrived from
Crittenden, asking permission to join Lopez, and the messenger was
promptly ordered to return with orders to Crittenden to march his forces
to Pinar del Rio to join Lopez there, and Lopez headed his men toward
the mountains, with the intention of pushing on to Pinar del Rio.
Promptly on receipt of the desired permission from Lopez, Crittenden,
with his one hundred and twenty men, set out to join him. They had
proceeded only three miles when the little band was attacked by a body
of five hundred Spaniards. Crittenden's men quickly took to cover, and
fought so desperately that in spite of the fact that they were so
greatly outnumbered, they killed a large number of the Spanish forces,
and put the others to rout. But Crittenden, it would seem, had not
learned the proper lesson from the earlier division of Lopez's forces,
and his own plight in consequence, for he now decided to make the
mistake a second time. The little band had made slow progress, because
of the necessity for transporting the supplies in carts, and Crittenden
made up his mind to leave Captain Kelly for the time with forty men to
defend the supplies, and with the remaining eighty himself to lead an
attack against the Spaniards who were now rallying. But the Spanish
soldiers were better trained than were Crittenden's men, and the Spanish
leader was cleverer in manoeuvres and had a greater knowledge of the
country. He had no difficulty in effecting a separation between the two
bodies of Crittenden's men, and he forced those under Crittenden to flee
for their lives. They took refuge in a wooded ravine, where they
remained for two days and nights without food and without water, in
constant terror of a Spanish attack. Realizing that if they stayed where
they were they faced no better fate than slow starvation, they finally,
under cover of the night, emerged from their hiding-place and made their
way to the coast, where they took possession of four small boats and set
out to sea, in the hope of reaching Key West, or of being picked up by
some other expedition, since they had no doubt that several were already
on their way from the United States. Two days later, starving, and
almost mad for want of fresh water, driven by the tides back to the
shore and aground on the rocks, they were captured and taken to Havana.
The Spanish General Bustillos, gives the following account of their
apprehension:
"Your Excellency: I started yesterday from Bahia Honda, in the steamer
_Habanera_, with a view to reconnoiter the coast of Playitas and
Morillo, in order to remove all the means by which the pirates could
possibly escape; or in case of more expeditions to these points, to
remove the means of disembarkation. At seven o'clock in the morning, I
communicated with the inhabitants of Morillo, and was informed by the
inhabitants that, at 10 o'clock on the preceding night, one part of
them embarked in four boats. Having calculated the hour of their sailing
and distance probably made in 10 hours and supposing they had taken the
direction of New Orleans--I proceeded in that direction 18 miles, with
full steam, but after having accomplished that distance, I could not
discover any of those I pursued. Believing the road they had followed
was within the rocks, I directed my steamer to that point, and made the
greatest exertions to encounter the fugitive pirates. At 10 o'clock I
detected the 4 boats navigating along the coast and I could only seize
one. Two others were upon the rocks of the island, the fourth upon the
rocks of Cargo Levisa. When I seized the men of the first boat, I armed
the boats of the ship in order to pursue the second and third, which
were on the rocks, but the officers of the army who were in the boats,
as well as the troops and sailors, the commander of the boat, Don
Ignacio de Arrellano and the captain of the steamer _Cardenas_, Don
Francisco Estolt threw themselves in the water to pursue the pirates of
whom two only escaped. Having left their arms we did not pursue them in
order to occupy ourselves with the boat in Cargo Levisa, for it was one
of the largest and contained more men. These, twenty-four in number,
were hidden within a small neck, having the boat drawn up among the
rocks; and here the pirates were seized. The number of prisoners was
fifty well armed men, headed by a chief and five officers."
When the captives reached Havana, they were brought up on deck, stripped
except for their undershirts and trousers, and before the people who had
assembled at the dock they were made to undergo the greatest
indignities. Not only were they grossly insulted by word of mouth; they
were spit upon, and railed at, kicked and assaulted; nothing seemed too
harsh or vile for their captors to do in venting their spleen.
Meanwhile, when the Captain-General was apprised of their arrival, he
sent spies to them to take down their statements and farewell messages,
promising to transmit these to their families, but in reality his agents
were instructed to use every effort to influence each man to inform on
the others. In this, however, they were entirely unsuccessful. Concha
announced his intention of dealing summarily with the offenders, as a
warning to others who might contemplate an invasion of Cuba. Therefore,
without even the pretense of a trial, the following decree was issued
against them:
"It having been decreed by the general order of April 20 last, and
subsequently reproduced, what was to be the fate of the pirates who
should dare to profane the soil of this island, and in view of the
declarations of the fifty individuals who have been taken by his
Excellency the Commander-General of this naval station, and placed at my
disposal, which declarations establish the identity of their persons, as
pertaining to the horde commanded by the traitor Lopez, I have resolved
in accordance with the provisions of the Royal Ordinances, General Laws
of the Kingdom, and particularly in the Royal Order of the 12th of June
of the past year, issued for this particular case, that the said
individuals, whose names and designations are set forth in the following
statement, suffer this day the pain of death, by being shot, the
execution being committed to the Señor Teniente de Rey, Brigadier of the
Plaza.
"JOSE DE LA CONCHA."
Attached to this document was the following list of names. Since it is
known that fifty-two men were shot, the list is accordingly incomplete:
"Colonel W. S. Crittenden; Captains F. S. Sewer, Victor Kerr, and T. B.
Veacey; Lieutenants James Brandt, J. O. Bryce, Thomas C. James, and M.
H. Homes; Doctors John Fisher and R. A. Tourniquet; Sergeants J.
Whiterous and A. M. Cotchett; Adjutant B. C. Stanford; Privates Samuel
Mills, Edward Bulman, George A. Arnold, B. J. Wregy, William Niseman,
Anselmo Torres, Hernandez, Robert Cantley, John G. Sanka, James Stanton,
Thomas Harnett, Alexander McIllger, Patrick Dillon, Thomas Hearsey,
Samuel Reed, H. T. Vinne, M. Philips, James L. Manville, G. M. Green, J.
Salmon, Napoleon Collins, N. H. Fisher, William Chilling, G. A. Cook, S.
O. Jones, M. H. Ball, James Buxet, Robert Caldwell, C. C. William Smith,
A. Ross, P. Brouke, John Christides, William B. Little, John Stibbs,
James Ellis, William Hogan, Charles A. Robinson."
On August 16, early in the morning, the prisoners were taken from the
vessel and brought to the Castle of Atares for execution. An appeal was
made to the American Consul at Havana, F. A. Owens, to use his influence
with the Captain-General to obtain some clemency for the condemned men,
but he not only declined on the ground that they had been declared
outlaws by the American Government, but he seemed to be utterly lacking
in kindness of heart or compassion, for he refused to see the men, or to
make any attempt to transmit their last messages to their friends and
families.
An eye witness thus describes the execution:
"Havana, August 16, 4-1/2 P. M.
"I have this day been witness to one of the most brutal acts of
wanton inhumanity ever perpetrated in the annals of history. Not
content was this government in revenging themselves in the death of
those unfortunate and perhaps misguided men, and which, it may even
be said, was brought upon themselves; but these Spanish
authorities deserve to be most severely chastised for their
exceedingly reprehensible conduct in permitting the desecration, as
they have done, of the senseless clay of our brave countrymen. This
morning forty Americans, four Irish, one Scotch, one Italian, one
Philippine Islander, two Habaneros and two Germans or Hungarians,
were shot at 11 o'clock; after which the troops were ordered to
retire and some hundreds of the violent rabble, hired for the
purpose commenced mutilating the dead bodies. Oh! the very
remembrance of the sight is frightful.
"I never saw men--and could scarcely have supposed it
possible--conduct themselves at such an awful moment with the
fortitude these men displayed under such trying circumstances. They
were shot, six at a time, i.e., twelve men were brought to the
place of execution, six made to kneel down and receive the fire of
the soldiers, after which the remaining six were made to walk
around their dead comrades and kneel opposite to them, when they
were also shot. They died bravely, those gallant and unfortunate
young gentlemen. When the moment of execution came, many, Colonel
Crittenden and Captain Victor Kerr among them, refused to kneel
with their backs to the executioners. 'No,' said the chivalrous
Crittenden, 'an American kneels only to his God, and always faces
his enemy!' They stood up, faced their executioners, were shot down
and their brains then knocked out by clubbed muskets. After being
stripped and their bodies mutilated, they were shoved, six or seven
together, bound as they were, into hearses, which were used last
year for cholera cases. No coffins were allowed them.
"A finer looking set of young men I never saw; they made not a
single complaint, not a murmur, against their sentence, and
decency should have been shown their dead bodies in admiration for
the heroism they displayed when brought out for execution. Not a
muscle was seen to move, and they proved to the miserable rabble
congregated to witness the horrible spectacle that it being the
fortunes of war that they fell into the power of this government,
they were not afraid to die. It would have been a great consolation
to these poor fellows, as they repeatedly asked, to see their
consul, and through him to have sent their last adieus, and such
little remembrances as they had, to their beloved relations in the
States. But Mr. Owens, the American Consul, did not even make
application to the Captain-General to see these unfortunate
countrymen in their distress, and their sacred wishes in their last
moments have been unattended to. Lastly, at the very hour of
triumph, when the people of the Spanish steamer _Habanero_ knew
that the execution of the American prisoners, whom they had taken
to Havana, had taken place, two shots were fired across or at the
steamer _Falcon_ off Bahia Honda; and notwithstanding that this
vessel was well known to them, having as she had the American flag
hoisted, etc., she was detained and overhauled by these Spanish
officers."
Another reliable source, the report of an American naval officer,
furnished the information, that after the prisoners had been shot, their
bodies were mutilated; they were dragged by the heels, and outraged in a
manner which would make the most unenlightened savage shudder; their
ears and fingers were cut off, and portions of these, together with
pieces of skull, were distributed to the Spanish officers as souvenirs,
while some of these grim relics were afterward nailed up in public
places as a warning against attempts to revolt against the Spanish
Government. Ten of the bodies were placed in coffins, and the rest were
merely thrown into a pit.
When Captain Kelly and his forty followers had been separated from
Crittenden, they managed in some manner--the details of which have not
come down to us--to evade the Spaniards and to escape with such supplies
as they could carry. They took to the cover of the woods, and being
unfamiliar with the country wandered around, until they fell in with a
loyal negro who undertook to act as guide for them. He led them to a
dense wood, in sight of Las Pozas, and they sent him on ahead to report
conditions. He returned, stating that Lopez was in possession of the
town, and so they joined him, just as he was about to lead his men into
the mountains. Captain Kelly's men had been so engrossed with their own
predicament that they had remained in ignorance of the fate of
Crittenden's force, and they were therefore unable to give Lopez any
definite information concerning them, and he treasured the hope that
they too had escaped the Spaniards, and would be able to join him at
Pinar del Rio, in accordance with the original plan.
Lopez's forces were now reduced to about three hundred men, and they
found themselves obliged to leave their wounded behind them. They pushed
forward all night, and until about nine in the morning, covering a
distance of twelve miles. They shot a cow, and roasting the meat on the
points of their bayonets, ate it without bread or salt. They then
continued their march until eight in the evening, when, utterly worn
out, they lay down and slept on their arms until midnight.
The moon was now shining brightly, and Lopez awakened his tired army,
and again they were on their way. Shortly after dawn, they reached a
plantation, where they were received with kindness by the owner, who
was in sympathy with the cause of Cuban freedom. Two cows were killed,
and some corn roasted, and once more the little band was refreshed. But
now Lopez discovered that in the absence of a guide or a compass they
had been traveling almost in a circle, and instead of going southwest
toward San Cristobal and Pinar del Rio, they were within only three
miles of their original landing place, where there was a large Spanish
force. He immediately assembled his footsore companions, who were now
almost barefoot because the rough and stony passes had worn the shoes
from their feet, and led them on a forced march. Many had already
dropped out by fatigue, and the others were almost exhausted, but Lopez
realized that safety could only be assured by putting many miles between
his men and the Spanish garrison, and reaching, before they were
overtaken, some place of strong vantage.
The Spaniards seem, however, to have been thoroughly puzzled by Lopez's
circuitous course, and they sent word to the Captain-General that since
they despaired of capturing him, they felt the best measure to take was
an effort to induce his men to desert him. Concha, therefore, issued the
following proclamation, which was posted in conspicuous places all over
the vicinity where Lopez was supposed to be hiding:
"Proclamation!
"The Most Excellent Señor, the Captain-General, has seen proper to
direct, under this date, to the chiefs of columns in the field and to
the Lieutenant-Governors of Bahia Honda, Mariel, San Cristobal and Pinar
del Rio, the following circular:
"The greater part of the pirates who dared to invade the island have
been destroyed by the valiant troops of that army to whom the lot fell
of being destined to pursue them, as well as by the not less decided and
active cooperation of all the loyal inhabitants of the district they had
sought to make their den. Considering, at once, the unanimous confession
of all those who have been taken and executed, that they had been
brought here into a foreign territory through a complete deception,
having been made to believe that the country called them, that the army
would make common cause with them, and that triumph would be as easy as
it was certain, such being the promise of the traitor who led them; and
that the directors of such a foolish and disorderly enterprise could not
in any other way have got together the multitude connected herewith, and
also that public vengeance has already been satisfied by the severe
chastisement inflicted on those individuals hitherto captured, as well
as those that have perished by the balls or the bayonets of our gallant
troops; and that finally, the time has arrived to make use of clemency,
according to the dictates of humanity, I have determined:
"I. That quarter shall be given to every individual belonging to the
band under command of the traitor Lopez who shall surrender or be taken
by the troops of His Majesty within four days from the publication of
this resolution in the respective districts; it being well understood
that after the expiration of that period the general army order of April
20 last will remain in full force as it has up to now.
"II. The individual or individuals belonging to said band who shall
surrender said leader, Lopez, shall be free from all punishment, and if
he be a foreigner, shall be restored to his own country.
"This I communicate to you for your exact observance, ordering that it
be immediately published in all the district under your command. God
guard your Excellency many years!
"JOSE DE LA CONCHA.
"Havana, Aug. 24, 1851."
Meanwhile stragglers who fell by the wayside, and afterward fell into
the hands of the Spaniards, were brutally treated, and murdered in the
most revolting manner, their bowels being ripped open by bayonets after
they had been practically flogged to death.
A native guide who offered his services to Lopez, now led him to a
coffee plantation near Las Frias. He represented to Lopez that the owner
was a sympathizer, and that the wanderers would be given rest and
shelter, and a place to hide until the arrival of reinforcements from
the United States. This guide is believed to have been a Spanish spy,
for while Lopez and his men were received with the greatest courtesy,
and entertained for two days by the planter, their host secretly
dispatched a courier to the Spanish leaders, and presently a Spanish
army arrived to attack the filibusters. Lopez dispersed his men, who hid
themselves behind the trunks of mango trees, and picked off the Spanish
soldiers, with the result that the Spaniards were put to flight, and
when word presently came that General Eno was advancing to the rescue of
his compatriots with a force of two thousand men Lopez retreated to a
high hill, with the remainder of his army, now reduced to two hundred
and twenty men, many of these disabled by wounds. Lopez was in a
position of vantage, and small parties of his men fired on the advancing
Spaniards, wounding their commander, and several of their number.
[Illustration: FALLS OF THE HANEBANILLA
Each of the Provinces of Cuba has its own characteristic charms of
scenery; among which it would be rash to attempt to choose. Santa Clara
boasts the great falls of the Hanebanilla River, a scene of majestic
splendor. This is one of numerous cataracts on the rivers of Cuba,
enriching the scenic attractions of the island, and at the same time
suggesting immense value as sources of industrial power.]
Lopez now endeavored to reach a plain near San Cristobal, but his men
were worn out, their clothes torn, their flesh bruised and
bleeding, and their feet lacerated so that they could hardly walk.
Dissatisfaction and dismay was rife among them, and presently they sent
a committee to Lopez, asking him to advise them just what he intended to
do, and what he expected to accomplish, and stating that unless he had
some good plan, they were unwilling to proceed further. Lopez listened
to them attentively, and asked for suggestions. They were all for hiding
in the mountains, until relief should be sent to them from the country
which they all now sorely regretted leaving. While putting this project
into execution, they were again attacked by the Spaniards, three or four
of them were killed, and a number taken prisoners, and immediately
executed. One hundred and forty men escaped with Lopez through the
woods. Many of them had lost their arms; only sixty-nine guns remained,
while on most of these the bayonets were broken. They had no food and
they killed Lopez's horse and ate it. Open dissension broke out among
them. Lopez was, as will be recalled, under sentence of death, having
been condemned, after the betrayal of the first plans to free Cuba, to
be killed should he ever again be apprehended on the island. A price had
been set on his head, and now, with characteristic self-abnegation, he
besought his men to deliver him up to the enemy, securing clemency for
themselves in return for such action. To do them justice, they were
heartily ashamed, and repudiated the suggestion. Finally after a long
discussion it was decided to stake all on one attempt against the
Spaniards, and consequently they made their way again to the plain near
San Cristobal and there attacked a force of five hundred Spanish troops.
They were charged by the Spanish cavalry, and all but six were taken
prisoners. Lopez and his remaining six followers took refuge upon a
plantation. They were received with cordiality and assured of the
sympathy of their owner, Señor Castenada, who offered to hide them until
their friends, whom they believed to be even then on the ocean, or
perhaps making a landing on the island, should rescue them. He gave them
good food and drugged wine, and took them to the upper part of the
house, to his bedrooms, that they might sleep. They were utterly
exhausted, and soon fell into deep slumber, whereupon Castenada notified
the Spanish authorities, who at once sent troops to take the little
company prisoners. So profound was their sleep that they were securely
bound before they realized what had happened. They were at once taken to
Havana, where the Captain-General was so delighted at the turn events
had taken that he issued a proclamation complimenting his brave officers
on their capture "of this dangerous traitor."
Concha did not accord Lopez a trial, but at once issued a proclamation
ordering his execution. It was dated October 31, 1851, and ran as
follows:
"By a superior decree of the Most Excellent Señor, the Governor and
Captain-General, Don Narciso Lopez, who commanded the band of pirates
that disembarked at the place called Playitas, to the leeward of the
capital on the morning of the 12th instant, has been condemned to the
infamous punishment of the garrote. The execution is to take place at
seven o'clock in the morning of September 1st. The troops of all arms
composing the garrison of the town, and the forces from elsewhere, will
assemble at sufficient time beforehand, at the camp of the Punta, where
the scaffold is placed, around which they will form a square. The
regiment of Galicia will take its station in front with a banner
displayed. The other corps will be present with all their disposable
force. The artillery will take the right, with the engineers next them;
the other forces without distinction will occupy the places assigned to
them. The cavalry will be stationed according to the direction of the
Brigadier, the Royal Lieutenant commanding the town, who will command
the troops, having under his orders the staff officers of the army, and
an equal number of town adjustants. A true copy.
"ZURITA."
The Spanish archives contain the following names of members of the Lopez
expedition who were taken prisoners about this time and who witnessed
the execution of their leader. Most of these men after a long
imprisonment were finally pardoned, through the intervention of powerful
friends, and returned to their homes:
Elias Otis, Michael O'Keenan, John Danton, First Lieutenant P. S.
VanVechten, M. L. Hefren, Captain Robert Ellis, W. Wilson, W. Miller, P.
Lacoste, M. Lieger, P. Coleman, Henry Smith, Thomas Hilton, First
Lieutenant E. H. McDonald, D. D. Waif, H. D. Thomason, Charles A.
Conunea, Emanuel R. Wier, First Lieutenant J. G. Bush, Conrad Taylor,
Thomas Denton, C. A. McMurray, J. Patan, Conrad Arghalir, Jose Chiceri,
G. Richardson, John B. Brown, Thomas S. Lee, Captain James Aquelli,
Franklin Boyd, Thomas Little, Commissary J. A. Simpson, George Wilson,
First Lieutenant D. D. Rousseau, First Lieutenant Robert McGrier, J. D.
Hughes, William H. Vaugale, Francis B. Holmes, Malbone H. Scott, First
Lieutenant W. H. Craft, J. D. Prenit, Julio Chasagne, John Cline, George
Forster, C. Knoll, Nicholas Port, Patrick McGrath, Charles S. Daily,
James Fiddes, S. H. Prenell, W. L. Wilkinson, C. Cook, James Chapman,
James Brady, Henry B. Hart, Jacob Fonts, Preston Esces, William
Cameron, Thomas Mourou, Isaac Fresborn, Cornelius Derby, Peter Falbos,
Benjamin Harrer;
_From England_: William Caussans, John Nowes;
_From Ireland_: Henry B. Metcalfe, George Metcalfe, James Porter, Thomas
McDellans;
_From Cuba_: Bernardo Allen, Francisco Curbiay Garcia, Ramon J. Arnau,
José Dovren, Manuel Martinez, Antonio Hernandez, Martin Milesimo;
_From Germany_: Johannes Sucit, Edward Wisse, Wilhelm Losner, Robert
Seelust, Ciriac Senelpi;
_From Matanzas_: Ramon Ignacio Amaso;
_From Hungary_: George Baptista;
_From New Granada_: Andres Gonzales;
_From Alquizar_: Francisco A. Leve;
_From Bayamo_: Manuel Diaz;
_From Navarre_: Antonio Romero;
_From Spain_: Francisco J. Zamaro;
_Nationality not Stated_: Antonio L. Alfonso, Manuel Aragon, Jose
Bojanoti y Rubina, Joaquin Casanova, Miguel Guerra, William MacKinney,
Dandrig Seay, Leonardo Sugliorti, J. D. Baker and Luis Bander.
In accordance with the Captain-General's proclamation, the execution of
Lopez took place on the morning of September 1. The scaffold was erected
on a platform ten feet high, in a flat space opposite Morro. The garrote
consists of a post, and a stool on which sits the prisoner, while a
metal collar is passed around his neck and fastens him securely to the
post. A screw having long arms is attached to the post, by means of
which, at one turn, metal points are thrust into the victim's neck,
causing dislocation and death.
There were present on this occasion, three thousand infantry, two
hundred cavalry and twenty thousand witnesses. Lopez presented a calm
and dignified appearance. With his hands tightly bound he walked to the
front of the platform and said in a strong, clear voice:
"I pray the persons who have compromised me to pardon me, as I pardon
them. My death will not change the destinies of Cuba."
Then as the executioner bade him be quick, he exclaimed:
"Adieu, my comrades! Adieu, my beloved Cuba, adieu!"
Thus died a man, as brave in his last hours as he had been during all
the strange fortunes and vicissitudes of his adventurous life, who had
sacrificed everything for a principle which seemed to him dearer than
all the material benefits which the world might have conferred upon him.
The Spanish leaders destroyed his body, but they could never destroy
that far more precious thing, the spirit of freedom which he had
instilled in the minds and the hearts of the Cubans, and which was to
live after him and at last lead Cuba to victory.
CHAPTER VII
Lopez had failed. Such was the obvious judgment of the world. Upon the
face of the matter, his expedition had ended in disaster and utter
tragedy. The first serious attempt to achieve the separation of Cuba
from Spain had come to naught. It had been completely suppressed and its
promoters had been destroyed.
In a broader, deeper and more significant sense, however, the enterprise
and sacrifice of Lopez and his comrades had splendidly succeeded. That
valiant pioneer of Cuban liberation had indeed "builded better than he
knew." For his enterprise marked an epoch in Cuban history; the most
important since Columbus's discovery of the island. The abortive
attempts at emancipation, which had been sporadically but feebly active
since the days of the emulators of Bolivar, had by Lopez's efforts been
marvelously and effectively resuscitated. The movement which had been
nurtured by the "Soles de Bolivar," but which its members had been
unable, because of smallness of numbers and lack of funds and of
leadership, to make much more than a cherished ideal--for the attempts
at revolt had been still-born, choked almost on their conception--had
under Lopez been imbued with lusty life, and was never again to
languish. A force had been set in operation which could not and did not
cease its action until, though many weary years afterward, the end which
Lopez had foreseen was attained, and Cuba was securely placed among the
independent nations of the world. We say that Lopez "builded better than
he knew." That was literally true because his plans were merely for the
transfer of Cuban sovereignty from oppressive and reactionary Spain to
liberal and progressive America; building upon the foundation thus
outlined by him, subsequent bolder spirits constructed the triumphant
edifice of complete independence of which he had not so much as dreamed.
The immediate results of the Lopez expedition were prodigious. It is not
easy, at this time and distance, to appreciate fully the tremendous
sensation which was caused, not only in Cuba and in Spain, but, to a
considerable extent, throughout the world, or at least, throughout that
most important portion of the world which had its frontage upon the
Atlantic Ocean, and which possessed more or less direct interests in the
countries of the Caribbean Sea. For a full appreciation of this, it is
necessary to take into consideration certain circumstances which are now
almost forgotten.
We must remember that down to this time the world at large had been
profoundly ignorant of Cuba, save in the most general and external
manner. Spain, as we have already indicated in these pages, had long
pursued a persistent policy of secrecy and isolation. Cuba was not
allowed to know much of the outside world, and the outside world was not
allowed to know much of Cuba. A strict censorship was maintained over
information both entering and leaving the island. Marked inhospitality
was shown to travelers and visitors to discourage them from penetrating
the island or acquainting themselves with the real condition of its
affairs. Practically Cuba remained, so far as its social, economic and
political conditions were concerned, a _terra incognita_. The world knew
almost nothing of its natural wealth and its inestimable resources, its
potentialities of greatness.
Now, in the baleful light of a great tragedy, the island was suddenly
thrust forward into the world's most intense publicity. From being a
minor colonial possession of a decadent power, it was transformed into
one of the foremost international issues. The eyes of two continents
were fixed upon it, while the hands of those continents involuntarily
reached for sword hilts in preparation for a decisive conflict which
might shake the foundations of the civilized world.
Let us consider first the interests and sentiments of Spain at this
great crisis in her affairs. Hitherto she had regarded Cuba as a
helpless province, politically negligible, although economically of
immense value as the "milch cow of the Peninsula." The several
insurrections which had occurred had indeed been annoying, and, at
times, costly, but they had been suppressed with little difficulty, and
there had never been a thought of their really menacing Spain's
sovereignty over the island. Nor had there been any fear of losing the
island through alien aggression or intervention. Spain's title to Cuba
had been repeatedly underwritten by the United States of America, at the
hands of John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay and John Forsyth; as we have
hitherto seen. For a full generation Spain had confidently depended upon
both the purpose and the power of the United States to protect her in
her ownership of Cuba. But now came a revolt which in itself was
immeasurably more formidable than all the slave insurrections put
together, and which was, most ominous of all, operated from the United
States, with the obvious sympathy, if not with the actual aid, of the
people of that country. This powerful protector of Spain in Cuba was
assuming the character of a possible conqueror. The troubles of Cuba
were, therefore, no longer merely local, nor even national; they had
risen to international proportions. They menaced not only the domestic
tranquillity of Spain, but also her international relations with that
power from which, of all in the world, she had cause most to fear.
No less marked was the effect of these events upon the Cubans. They were
made to feel that at last "the die was cast." An irrevocable step had
been taken. The dreamer had awakened; plans and conspiracies had been
transmuted into militant action. It is true that comparatively few of
the Cubans had been directly concerned or, at least, could be proved to
have been directly concerned in the undertakings of Lopez, but it was
quite certain that thereafter they would all be regarded as having
sympathized, and as being potential insurgents, with arms as well as
with ideas. Nothing thereafter could ever be as it had been before. The
Cuban people were vicariously committed to the policy of forcible
separation from Spain. War was begun and it would be war to the knife,
and the knife to the hilt.
In Cuba, the Spanish authorities realized this change in Cuban
sentiment, and kept a sharp outlook for any signs of uprising. They also
"made examples" of any and everyone who came under suspicion of having
been in sympathy with Lopez, or of having any plans for starting a
similar movement. Thus some boys, who were outspoken in their
expressions of sympathy with the cause of freedom from Spain, were
seized and summarily executed without trial. Feeling ran high; native
born Cubans refused to associate with those of Spanish birth, and in
many cases even to speak of them. A carnival was about to be celebrated
in Santiago de Cuba, but it was abandoned, and the city went into
mourning.
To retaliate some Spaniards sent out invitations for a ball at the
Filarmonia, the famous theatre in Santiago where, years afterward,
Adelina Patti made her début. This was resented as an insult by the
native Cubans of the city. Some hot-blooded young men forced an entrance
into the hall where the ball was being held, and rushing forward
destroyed a picture of Queen Isabella which hung at one end of the room.
Immediately everything was in an uproar, men were shouting and fighting,
and women were fainting. In the mêlée the disturbers escaped, and the
matter was hushed up, for the Spanish authorities feared that the
trouble might be made the occasion of another uprising, and so made no
attempt to secure the names of the culprits.
But this was just the prelude for worse disaster. A wealthy Cuban woman,
with more money than judgment, decided to act as mediator and bring the
enraged parties together. She took a strange means for accomplishing her
object, issuing invitations for a party to both prominent Spaniards and
Cubans of the best families. When the ball took place it is difficult to
say who were the more dismayed and astonished, the Cubans when they saw
who had been invited to meet them, or the haughty Spanish grandees, who
hated the Cubans. An even wilder scene than that at the Filarmonia took
place. Women were thrown to the floor, their clothing torn, and their
bodies trampled on. The chandeliers were torn from the ceiling, many
windows were broken, men fought in hand to hand combat, and when it was
all over the injured had been removed, the hall which had been intended
for a scene of pleasure was wrecked and rent beyond description. Six
people were killed on this occasion, including one Spanish woman of high
rank, and over a hundred were more or less seriously injured. Arrests
were promptly made, but it was the Cubans who suffered, for no Spaniards
were apprehended. Several boys from the best Creole families were thrust
without trial into the dungeons of Morro Castle, from whence they were
transported to the Spanish penal institution at Ceuta, and never again
heard of. Those who were quick enough made their escape to the United
States, and the woman who was so foolish as to give the party hastily
left the island, without heralding her going.
The Cubans were thoroughly aroused against Spain, and more and more
there began to grow within them the desire not for annexation to the
United States but for complete independence, and a government of their
own making. At last the people were finding themselves, and higher
aspirations and new longings were stirring in their souls.
The Captain General, fearing new uprisings, began to get the island in
better shape for defense from aggression from within. He strengthened
the fortifications, and established a more central control over the army
and navy, so that from headquarters all army posts and the movement of
all vessels might be more easily governed. To further this end he built
new roads, and improved old ones, and he took into his own hands as
Captain-General a closer control and supervision of matters military.
Perhaps nothing could be more indicative of the Cuban feeling and of the
conditions on the Island at this time than are contained in the
following letter written by a prominent Cuban--a man of the highest
intelligence and from one of the best known families--to a friend:
"The cause of the liberty of nations has always perished in its cradle
because its defenders have never sought to deviate from legal
paths,--because they have followed the principles sanctioned by the laws
of nations, while despots, always the first to exact obedience to them
when it suited their convenience, have been the first to infringe them
when they came into collision with their interests.
"Their alliances to suppress liberty are called _holy_ and the crimes
they commit by invading foreign territories and summoning foreign troops
to their aid to oppress their own vessels, are sacred duties,
compliances with secret compacts; and, if the congresses, parliaments
and Cortes of other nations, raise the cry to Heaven, they answer, the
government has protested--acts have been performed without their
sanction--there is no remedy--they are acts accomplished.
"An act accomplished will shortly be the abolition of slavery in Cuba,
and the tardy intervention of the United States will only have taken
place when its brilliant constellation lights up the vast sepulchre
which will cover the bodies of her sons, sacrificed to the black race as
a regard for their sympathies with American institutions, and the vast
carnage it will cost to punish the African victors. What can be done
today, without great sacrifice, to help the Cubans, tomorrow cannot be
achieved without the effusion of rivers of blood, and when the few
surviving Cubans will curse an intervention which, deaf to their cries,
will only be produced by the cold calculations of egotism. Then the
struggle will not be with the Spaniards alone. The latter will now
accede to all the claims of the cabinet at Washington, by the advice of
the ambassadors of France and England, to advance, meanwhile, with surer
step to the end--to give time for the solution of the Eastern question,
and for France and England to send their squadrons into these waters.
Well may they deny the existence of secret treaties; this is very easy
for such beings, as it will be when the case of the present treaty comes
up, asserting that the treaty was posterior to their negative, or
refusing explanations as inconsistent with their dignity. But we witness
the realization of our fears, we see the Spanish government
imperturbably setting on foot plans which were thought to be the
delirium of excited imaginations doing at once what promised to be
gradual work; and hear it declared, by distinguished persons who
possessed the confidence of General Pezuela, that the existence of the
treaty is certain, and that the United States will be told that they
should have accepted the offer made to become a party to it, in which
case the other two powers could not have adopted the abolition scheme.
But supposing this treaty to have no existence, the fact of the
abolition of slavery is no less certain. It is only necessary to read
the proclamation of the Captain-General, if the last acts of the
Government be not sufficiently convincing. The result to the Island of
Cuba and the United States is the same, either way. If the latter do not
hasten to avert the blow, they will soon find it impossible to remedy
the evil. In the Island there is not a reflecting man--foreigner or
native, Creole or European--who does not tremble for the future that
awaits us, at a period certainly not far remote."
Thus did the Cubans look forward with hope to, and at the same time
fear, the future. And meanwhile the tragedy of Lopez was having a
wide-spread effect on the feeling of the people, and on political
conditions in other countries.
In the United States a profound impression was produced of a triple
character. There was, in the first place, the international point of
view. It was realized that the United States was being brought
uncomfortably near the possibility of a serious controversy, if not of
actual war with Spain. The neutrality laws had been evaded, and there
was every prospect that such evasions would thereafter be repeated. The
whole question of American relations with Cuba was acutely reopened, and
both those who favored and those who opposed the acquisition of that
island by the United States were made to realize that a momentous
decision might be called for at any moment.
There was, in the second place, the point of view of the pro-slavery
states of the South, and their leaders, who were generally in control of
the national government at Washington. The South strongly favored Cuban
annexation, either voluntary or forcible. The island was wanted as Texas
and other Mexican territories had been wanted, to provide for the
extension of slave territory and for the addition of new slave states to
the union to counter-balance the new free states which were about to
seek admission at the north. There was also a passionate desire to avoid
the calamity of having Cuba made, as the other Spanish-American
countries had been made, free soil, thus encircling the slave states
with an unbroken ring of anti-slavery territory. Moreover, at this time
the spirit of conquest and of expansion was very much abroad in the
land. The lust for territory which had prevailed in the Mexican War was
by no means satisfied. Men still regarded it as the manifest destiny of
the United States to "lick all creation." In the geography of the
popular mind, the United States was, or was destined to be, "bounded on
the north by the aurora borealis, on the south by the precession of the
equinoxes, on the east by primeval chaos, and on the west by the day of
judgment." Under such circumstances, the attitude of the people of the
United States south of Mason and Dixon's line was unmistakable.
There was also the point of view of the increasingly anti-slavery north.
During the Mexican war a strong aversion to territorial expansion by
conquest for the sake of slave soil had been manifested, and this
feeling was steadily increasing in extent and in influence. It
manifested itself by opposition to Cuban annexation. At the same time,
the commercial instinct was strong in the great cities of the north, and
there was an earnest desire to do nothing which might interfere with the
profitable trade which already existed between this country and Cuba,
and which it was hoped greatly to expand.
The interest of Great Britain in Cuban affairs was scarcely less than
that of Spain or the United States. That country had once, for a time,
possessed Cuba, and had never forgotten that fact nor ceased to
entertain the desire to renew that possession as a permanent state of
affairs. That country also had very important colonial holdings in the
West Indies, and on the adjacent mainland; being, indeed, an American
power second only to the United States itself. It owned the Bahamas,
Jamaica and other islands, and colonies on the South and Central
American coast, which latter it was at that very time seeking greatly to
extend. It was keenly desirous of enlarging its possessions and forming
a great colonial empire in tropical America, and it realized that
nothing could conduce to that end more than the acquisition of Cuba. In
the prosecution of this policy, a certain "jingo" faction actually went
so far as to pretend that upon the acquisition of Cuba depended Great
Britain's retention of Canada, if not, indeed, of her entire American
holdings. It was represented that if Great Britain did not intervene to
prevent it, the slave-holding South was certain to annex Cuba, and that
this would provoke the abolitionist North into seizing Canada, in order
to provide in that direction free soil to counter-balance the slave soil
of Cuba. Thus, with Canada gone, and Cuba in the hands of the United
States, the remainder of the British holdings in the western hemisphere
would be in deadly jeopardy. Such visions seem at this time fantastic,
and it may be that they were then thus regarded by serious statesmen;
yet they were cherished and were not without their influence.
Nor was France less deeply and directly interested in Cuba. She, too,
had colonies in the West Indies and on the South American coast. She had
never forgotten her former vast empire in North America, nor ceased to
regret its loss. She was soon to enter upon a campaign of conquest in
Mexico. She had at various times, both during and since the Napoleonic
era, entertained designs upon peninsular Spain itself, and she had
repeatedly made direct overtures for a protectorate over Cuba.
These circumstances caused international relations to be ominously
strained in more than one direction, and as soon as news reached the
United States of the execution of those companions of Lopez who were
members of prominent families in the southern states, there arose a
widespread and furious storm of wrath. The center of this was,
naturally, at New Orleans, where the majority of Lopez's followers had
been recruited and where their families resided, and in that city an
infuriated mob stormed and destroyed the Spanish consulate, publicly
defaced a portrait of the Spanish queen, and, in some respects worst of
all, looted a number of shops owned by Spanish merchants. This was most
unfortunate from more than one point of view. It was not only
indefensible and inexcusable in itself, but it put the United States so
much in the wrong as to deter it from taking any action, or indeed
making any protest to Spain on account of the putting to death of the
American prisoners.
The American Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, made, however, the best
of an unfortunate situation. He took a straightforward course by
immediately apologizing to the Spanish government for the New Orleans
outrages, and recommended to Congress the voting of an adequate
indemnity for the damage which had been done. Having done this, he was
enabled to secure the release of some American members of Lopez's
expedition who had not yet suffered the death penalty.
Despite this settlement, the Spanish government continued to cherish
much resentment against the United States, partly for the participation
of so many of that country's citizens in the expeditions of Lopez, and
partly because of the outrages in New Orleans, and its Cuban
administration thereafter exhibited an increasing degree of animosity
against Americans. Numerous harsh impositions were put upon American
citizens, for which no redress could be had; and this caused resentment
throughout the United States, in the commercial North as well as in the
slaveholding and expansionist South, and relations between the two
countries steadily drifted from bad to worse.
Candor compels the frank statement that there was much fault on both
sides. Spain was tremendously at fault because of her misgovernment of
Cuba, and indeed her whole policy in relation to that island, which was
quite unworthy of a civilized power in an enlightened age. A generation
before Spain had practically sacrificed her right to continued
possession of Florida by her maladministration of that territory, which
had made it an intolerable nuisance to the neighboring United States.
She was now making of Cuba a scarcely less international nuisance and
scandal.
On the other hand, the United States, or some of its people, undoubtedly
gave Spain cause for grievance. The intentions and the conduct of the
United States government were beyond reproach. At the same time, they
were entirely insufficient for the prevention of serious wrongs to
Spain. Webster himself confessed that the United States government had
no power to protect Spanish subjects from such outrages as those which
had just been committed in New Orleans. There was no doubt that the
intentions and conduct of a large portion of the American people were
not only hostile to Spain, but were quite lawless in the manifestation
of that feeling. Among the offenders, moreover, were some men who stood
high in official life and who exerted much political influence. Nor
could these things be so well understood in Spain as in the United
States. Spain could scarcely be expected to distinguish between the case
of a man in his private capacity as a citizen and in his public capacity
as a member of Congress or other official of the government. When she
saw public officials participating in the organization and operations of
the "Order of the Lone Star," the confessed purpose of which was to take
Cuba from Spain by force, and without compensation, she very naturally
assumed that such things were being done with the permission and
sanction of the United States government, if not at its direct
instigation.
At this point, moreover, a serious complication was injected into the
problem of Spanish-American relations by the attempted intervention of
Great Britain and France. Both these powers sought to persuade Spain
that they were better friends to her, especially in relation to Cuba,
than the United States. They impressed upon her the idea that the United
States intended to take Cuba away from her, while they were willing to
respect her title to it, and to protect her in possession of it.
These suggestions were followed by the menace of overt acts which, if
committed, would have had very serious results. In 1851, the British and
French governments let it be known that instructions had been given to
their naval commanders to increase their forces in the waters adjacent
to Cuba, and to exercise guardianship over the shores of that island to
prevent the landing of any more filibustering expeditions from the
United States or elsewhere, such as those of Lopez. It does not appear
that this was done at the request of Spain. It was probably an entirely
gratuitous performance intended partly to ingratiate the Spanish
government, and partly to prevent the possibility of the seizure by the
United States of Cuba. But it was certainly a most unwarrantable
meddling in affairs which concerned only the United States and Spain. No
possible justification for it could be found in international law. In
the absence of a state of war, it was intolerable that vessels under the
United States flag should be subjected to search upon the high seas,
while, when they reached Cuban territorial waters, no other power than
Spain had any right to interfere with them.
Daniel Webster was at that time ill and unable to perform the duties of
his office, but J. J. Crittenden, who was acting as Secretary of State,
made a forcible protest against any such action by Great Britain and
France, and gave warning in the plainest terms that it would not be
tolerated by the United States, and that any interference with American
shipping between the United States and Cuba would be resented in the
most vigorous manner. The result was that the British and French navies
refrained from the contemplated meddling.
Following this, however, Spain made a direct appeal to the British
government for protection against American aggression. The request was
not so much for immediate military intervention as for securing treaty
guarantees. The British government was in a receptive mood, and, in
consequence, in April, 1852, it proposed to the United States that that
country should join it and France in a tripartite convention,
guaranteeing to Spain continued and unmolested possession of Cuba, and
explicitly renouncing any designs of their own for the acquisition of
that island. It may be recalled that a similar proposal had been made by
Great Britain and France in 1825, and that its acceptance had been
favored by no less an American statesman than Thomas Jefferson,
although, under the wiser counsels of John Quincy Adams, it had been
rejected.
At this renewal of the proposal, in 1852, rejection was prompt and
emphatic. Edward Everett was then the Secretary of State, under the
Presidency of Millard Fillmore, and he refused positively to enter into
any such compact. His ground was that American interests in Cuba and
American relations toward that island were radically different, in kind
as well as in degree, from those of any other power. That was of course
a perfectly logical and sincere application of the principles of the
Monroe Doctrine, and of the traditional policy of the United States in
refusing to permit European intervention in the affairs of the United
States or in affairs exclusively concerning the United States and a
single European power.
It may be assumed that Everett had in mind at the time, also, the
exceedingly unsatisfactory results of an attempt to establish just such
a tripartite protectorate guarantee over the Hawaiian Islands.
There was still another reason for the refusal of the United States to
enter into such a compact. That country had already and repeatedly
guaranteed the Spanish possession of Cuba as against the aggressions of
any other power, but it had not guaranteed and would not guarantee her
possession of Cuba against the self-assertion of the Cuban people. It
recognized the right of revolution. It knew that the Cubans were
dissatisfied, and that with good reason, with Spanish rule, and that
sooner or later they would successfully revolt and establish their
independence, and it had no thought of making itself the accomplice of
Spain in repressing their aspirations for liberty.
CHAPTER VIII
The United States government, both before and immediately after the
expeditions of Lopez, exhibited an increasing desire to acquire
possession of Cuba by purchase or otherwise. We have already referred to
the historic expression of John Quincy Adams upon this subject. It is
also to be recalled that in 1823, in commenting upon the prospective
results of the Monroe Doctrine, Thomas Jefferson looked upon Cuba as the
most interesting addition that could be made to the United States. The
control which, with Florida, this island would give the United States
over the Gulf of Mexico, and all the countries bordering thereon, as
well as all those whose waters flowed into the Gulf, would well be, he
thought, the measure of American well-being. Such an end could be
attained, he added, by no other means than that of war, and that was
something to which he was reluctant to resort. He was, therefore,
willing to accept the next best thing, to wit, the independence of Cuba,
and especially its independence of England. James Madison, at the same
time, and discussing the same general subject, expressed much curiosity
to know what England's attitude toward Cuba would be, and what the
rights of the United States toward that island would be, under the
Monroe Doctrine. John C. Calhoun was willing to pledge the United States
not to take Cuba, although he had already expressed a desire for such
acquisition, and Monroe himself would have adopted Calhoun's policy, had
it not been for the resolute opposition of John Quincy Adams. That
strenuous patriot was for reserving the plenary rights and powers of
the United States, and for permitting Europe to have nothing whatever to
do in the matter, and his counsel fortunately prevailed.
A little later, after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and in the
course of Congressional discussion of the Panama Congress, it was
emphatically stated in the Senate that, because of the great interest in
the United States in Cuba, there ought to be no discussion with other
powers concerning the destiny of that island, particularly with Colombia
and Mexico, which were then contemplating the invasion of Cuba in order
to take her forcibly from Spain. The British government, in August,
1825, proposed to the United States government, through its minister in
London, that the United States, Great Britain and France should unite in
a treaty engagement that none of them would take Cuba for itself or
permit of the taking of it by either of the others. This proposal was
promptly rejected by the United States. One of the grounds for her
rejection of it was that such action guaranteeing Spain her possession
of Cuba would encourage her to prolong indefinitely her struggle with
her other American colonies. Another was that this country had already
declared that it did not mean to seize Cuba for itself, and that it
would not permit its seizure by any other power. The United States
apparently did not fear that Great Britain would attempt to seize the
island, since for her to do so would mean a rupture with the United
States, which was at that time the last thing that the British
government desired. There was much more cause to fear that France might
attempt to take forcible possession of Cuba, and the suspicion that she
might do so was strengthened by the fact that while, at first, she
indicated a willingness to enter into the arrangement proposed by Great
Britain, she suddenly changed her attitude, and refused to do so. As a
result of this change of front on the part of France, the United States
government, in September, 1825, instructed its minister at Paris to
inform the French government that under no contingency, either with or
without the consent of Spain, would the United States permit France to
occupy Cuba.
Scarcely less marked was the opposition of the United States to any
scheme for the acquirement of Cuba by any of the American republics. It
was notorious that both Colombia and Mexico had designs upon Cuba. These
were not so much that either of these countries should acquire the
island for itself, but that Cuba and Porto Rico should, nilly willy, be
taken away from Spain and made independent, and that thus Spain should
be deprived of her last foothold in the Western hemisphere. This purpose
was cherished, not only as a matter of sentiment, but as one of
prudence. Spain was still trying to reconquer her revolted American
provinces, and her possession of Cuba, of course, afforded her an
admirable base for such operations. But the United States government
took the ground that any such intervention in Cuba would make it much
more difficult to secure Spanish recognition of the independence of the
Central and South American States. In addition, there was
undoubtedly--indeed it was very openly, emphatically and repeatedly
expressed--the unwillingness of the slaveholding southern states of the
United States to see Cuba made free soil, as the other Spanish colonies
had been. It was because of the former consideration, however, that the
American Secretary of State, Henry Clay, immediately after the rejection
of the British proposal for a tripartite guarantee, addressed a note to
the governments of Colombia and Mexico, urging them to refrain from
sending the expeditions which they were fitting out against the Spanish
power in Cuba. To this request, the Colombian government promptly
acceded, and so informed not only the United States, but also the
government of Russia, which was, at that time, endeavoring to mediate
between Spain and her late American colonies. The Mexican government did
not receive the request so favorably, though it did withhold the
threatened expedition.
With such antecedents set forth, we can more perfectly understand the
attitude of the United States toward Cuba at the time of which we are
now writing. In 1848 a change of policy occurred, and the United States
entered upon a new attitude. At that time James K. Polk was President of
the United States, and James Buchanan was his Secretary of State; both
men of southern, proslavery and expansionist proclivities. The American
minister to Spain was Romulus M. Saunders, of North Carolina, also a
proslavery expansionist. He was instructed by Polk and Buchanan to sound
the Spanish government as to the terms on which it would sell Cuba to
the United States. The response to his overtures was immediate and left
no room for doubt as to Spain's position. It was to the effect that Cuba
was not for sale. Under no circumstances would the Spanish government so
much as consider the sale of the island at any price whatever. No
Spanish Minister of State would venture for a moment to entertain such a
proposal. Such was the feeling of the Spanish government and of the
Spanish nation, that they would rather see Cuba sunk in the depths of
the sea, if it were possible, than transferred to the sovereignty of any
other power. Cuba was the "Ever-Faithful Isle." She was the last
remnant, the priceless memento of Spain's once vast empire in America,
and as such she would be forever retained and treasured. Although not
openly expressed, there was undoubtedly the additional feeling that
Spain had already suffered too much spoliation at the hands of the
United States. The United States, under Jefferson, had practically
compelled Spain to sacrifice her vast Louisiana territory by nominally
selling, but really giving it outright, to France. It had next taken
West Florida from her without compensation. Following this, under the
Monroe Doctrine, it had compelled her to sell it East Florida for a
pitifully inadequate sum, not one dollar of which had ever found its way
into the Spanish treasury. It had aided, abetted, and protected the
Central and South American provinces in their revolt. Certainly, after
such a record, it would be unthinkable to permit the United States to
proceed with the acquisition of the last remaining portion of the
Spanish American empire. The overtures for the United States purchase of
Cuba were, therefore, for the time being, abruptly abandoned, but it was
significant that they were promptly followed by the expeditions of Lopez
and the widespread and intense manifestations of American interest
therein.
There next occurred one of the most noteworthy and it must be confessed
least creditable episodes in the whole story of the relations between
the United States, Cuba and Spain. Franklin Pierce became President of
the United States, and the active and aggressive William L. Marcy was
his Secretary of State. Because of the strained relations between Spain
and the United States, growing out of the Lopez expeditions, there was a
well defined expectation that Marcy would pursue a vigorous policy
leading to the annexation of Cuba, even at the cost of war with Spain.
Marcy was an expansionist, and would doubtless have been glad to have
annexed Cuba, but he was something more than an expansionist. He was a
statesman. He therefore considered the subject from its various aspects
with a prudence and conservatism which were probably not at all pleasing
to the impetuous proslavery propagandists of the south, but which were
in the highest degree creditable to his good sense and to the honor of
the United States. Unfortunately not even Marcy could remain entirely
exempt from political and partizan considerations. He was practically
compelled to acquiesce in the appointment as his minister to Spain of
one of the more egregious misfits that ever disgraced American
diplomacy. This man was Pierre Soule. He was of French origin, and had
been a political conspirator and prisoner in that country. He had come
to the United States as a refugee, but had continued there his political
intrigues and revolutionary designs. Settling in New Orleans, he had
been in active sympathy with the filibustering enterprises of Lopez and
others against the Spanish rule in Cuba; he was suspected of having
incited the anti-Spanish mob in that city; and he was known to be an
ardent advocate of the annexation of Cuba by any means which might prove
effective. The choice of such a man as American minister to Spain was
certainly extraordinary. It must be assumed that Marcy agreed to it only
with great reluctance and under protest; while it is plausible, and
indeed permissible, to suspect that some ulterior influence dictated it
for the deliberate purpose of provoking trouble with Spain.
In these circumstances, Marcy did his best. He instructed Soule to
repress his anti-Spanish zeal, to do nothing which would irritate
Spanish susceptibilities, and especially to be particularly cautious in
making any suggestions or overtures concerning a change of relations in
Cuba. He instructed him, however, to seek reparation for the gross
injuries which Americans had undoubtedly suffered in Cuba, and to
suggest to the Spanish government that it would greatly facilitate the
friendly conduct of affairs for it to invest the Captain-General or
other governor of Cuba with a degree of diplomatic authority and
functions so that complaint could be addressed to him, and indeed all
such matters could be negotiated with him directly, instead of their
being referred to the government at Madrid. He did not urge Soule to
seek the purchase of Cuba, but he did authorize him to enter into
negotiations to that end, if the Spanish government should manifest a
favorable inclination.
Despite these wise instructions and admonitions, Soule promptly entered
upon a career of the wildest indiscretion. He went to Spain by way of
France, where he was under political proscription, and this gave offence
to the government of that country. On arriving at Madrid, he immediately
quarreled with the French party there, and fought a duel with the French
ambassador in which the latter was crippled for life.
Then word came to him that the Spanish authorities at Havana had seized
an American steamer, the _Black Warrior_. That steamer had, for a long
time, been plying regularly between the United States and Cuba in a
perfectly legitimate way. There was not the slightest proof or
suggestion that she had ever engaged in filibustering or in any
illegitimate commerce. Indeed she was not accused of it. But she was
seized and her cargo was condemned simply for alleged disregard of some
insignificant port regulation which, as a matter of fact, had not been
enforced or observed by any vessel for many years. The master of the
vessel resented and protested against the seizure and when the Spanish
authorities arbitrarily persisted in it, he abandoned the vessel
altogether, and reported the circumstances to the United States
government. The President promptly laid the matter before Congress at
Washington, stating that a demand for redress and indemnity was being
made. Passions flamed high in Congress, and southern members made
speeches demanding war and the conquest of Cuba. Marcy, however,
retained his sanity of judgment, and contented himself with instructing
Soule at Madrid to demand an indemnity of $300,000 and to express the
hope that the Spanish government would disavow and rebuke the act which
it was confidently assumed had not been authorized and could not be
approved. This gave Soule a fine opportunity to show himself a capable
diplomat and to do a good stroke of work, for Spain was manifestly wrong
and a proper presentation of the case would doubtless have caused her to
accede pretty promptly to Marcy's reasonable demands.
Soule began well. He followed Marcy's instructions closely at the
outset, and had a friendly and temperate interview with the Spanish
Minister for Foreign Affairs; but when three days thereafter had passed
without a complete settlement, he seemed altogether to lose his head. He
sent to the minister a peremptory note, demanding payment of the
indemnity, and the immediate dismissal from the Spanish service of all
persons in any way responsible for the seizure of the _Black Warrior_.
If this was not done within forty-eight hours, he added, he would
immediately demand his passports and sever diplomatic relations between
the two countries. With customary arrogance, he instructed the messenger
by whom he transmitted the note to call the attention of the Spanish
minister to the exact hour and minute at which the messenger should
deliver the note into his hands, and to remind him that an answer would
be expected, under penalty, within forty-eight hours after that precise
moment of time. Worst of all, perhaps, this occurred during Holy Week,
when it was not customary for the Spanish government to transact any
business which could possibly be deferred.
The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs was Calderon de la Barca, who
had formerly been Spanish minister to the United States, and with whom
Soule had personally very violently quarrelled at Washington. With
characteristic Spanish courtesy, he very promptly, within twenty-four
hours, replied to Soule that the matter would be most carefully
considered at the earliest possible moment, but that it manifestly would
not be practicable, and indeed would not be just, to dispose of so
important a matter so hastily, and upon the hearing of only one side of
it. He also added, quite properly, that the Spanish government was not
accustomed to being addressed in so harsh and imperious a manner, and
that he could not regard such a mode of procedure as calculated to
facilitate the amicable settlement which both parties undoubtedly
desired.
Thus placed, through his own folly, at a hopeless disadvantage, Soule
abandoned the case. He sent to Marcy his own absurd and unauthorized
ultimatum, together with Calderon's dignified and statesmanlike reply,
possibly in the vain hope that Marcy would back him up in the impossible
attitude which he had assumed. Of course, Marcy did nothing of the sort.
As a matter of fact, it was not necessary for Marcy to pay any attention
whatever to Soule's report, since, before it reached Washington, the
Spanish authorities in Cuba had restored the _Black Warrior_ to her
owners, with the amplest possible amends for their improper seizure of
her, and the whole incident was thus happily ended.
The project of acquiring Cuba for the United States continued to be
cherished by the American government. It must be supposed that the
Secretary of State appreciated the immense value of Cuba, both in its
resources and in its strategic position and so, for that reason, was
desirous of acquiring the island. It must also be believed that he was
to a degree moved by a desire to get rid of what he plainly saw would be
a perennial cause of annoyance and even of danger. Since the beginning
of the nineteenth century, Cuba had been a cause of anxiety to the
United States, and since the beginning of insurrections in that island,
and especially insurrections looking to the United States for sympathy
and aid, there was a constantly increasing danger of unpleasant and
possibly hostile complications with Spain. There is no indication,
however, that Marcy ever had any other thought than that of the peaceful
acquisition of the island through friendly negotiations. It was most
unfortunate that because of the political conditions which prevailed
during that administration, he was compelled to act through unfit and
indeed unworthy agents.
At the beginning of 1854, Mr. Marcy directed the United States ministers
to Spain, France and Great Britain to confer among themselves as to the
best means, if indeed any were practicable, to persuade Spain to sell
Cuba to the United States, and at the same time to avoid or to overcome
objections which France and Great Britain might make to such a
transaction. That was a perfectly legitimate proposal, and indeed, under
the circumstances, was desirable and should have been productive of
excellent results. Its fatal defect lay in the personality of the men
who were called upon to put it into execution. The minister to Spain was
Soule, of whom we have already heard enough to indicate his very
conspicuous unfitness for the task assigned to him. The minister to
France was James M. Mason, a Virginian, and one of the most aggressive
and extreme Southern advocates of the extension of slavery. The
minister to Great Britain was James Buchanan, who was afterward
President of the United States, a northern man with strong southern
sympathies and in complete subservience to the slaveholding interests of
the south. The result of a conference among these three was practically
a foregone conclusion.
They came together at Ostend in the summer of 1854, and a little later
concluded their deliberations at Aix-la-Chapelle, and the result of
their conference was embodied in that extraordinary document known to
history as the Ostend Manifesto.
That document, which was drawn up in October, 1854, and was signed by
these three ministers and sent by them to Mr. Marcy, was written chiefly
by Soule. It set forth the various reasons why, in the opinion of Soule
and his colleagues, Cuba ought to belong to the United States. A variety
of reasons was set forth, but chief among them was this, that such
acquisition of Cuba was necessary for the security and perpetuity of the
slave system in the United States. Then Soule went on to tell why Spain
ought to be willing to sell the island, and why Britain and France ought
to be willing for her to sell it to the United States. The price to be
paid for Cuba was not stated. It ought not, however, Soule said, to
exceed a certain maximum sum to be prescribed by the United States; and
there are reasons for believing that the price which Soule had in mind
was $120,000,000. All this was bad enough. It was far removed from what
Marcy had intended. But the worst was to come. With astounding
effrontery and cynicism, the manifesto proceeded to say that if Spain
should be so swayed by the voice of her own interest and actuated by a
false sense of honor as to refuse to sell Cuba, then, by every law,
human and divine, the United States would be justified in taking Cuba
forcibly from her, on the ground that such seizure was necessary for the
protection of the domestic peace of the United States. This Manifesto
was sent by the three ministers to Marcy, with a memorandum written by
Soule, suggesting that that would be a good time to start a war with
Spain for the seizure of Cuba, because France and Great Britain were
just then engaged in fighting Russia in the Crimea, and therefore would
not be able to interfere with Spain's behalf.
Marcy never for a moment, of course, thought of acting upon these
abominable recommendations. The overwhelming sentiment of this nation
would have been against it. Even in the South, the majority of
thoughtful men held that Soule and his colleagues had gone too far,
while throughout the North, the Manifesto was scathingly denounced as a
proposal of international brigandage. Not only in Spain, but almost
equally in France and Great Britain, American diplomacy and the honor of
the American government were regarded as seriously compromised. In these
circumstances Marcy, to whom the Manifesto must have been revolting,
very adroitly declined to recognize its real purport, but insisted upon
interpreting it in an entirely different way from that which its authors
had intended. The result was that the note was practically pigeonholed.
Soule was so chagrined and enraged at this disposition of a favorite
child of his mind that he resigned his office as Minister to Spain, to
the unmistakable relief both of Marcy and of the Spanish government.
Buchanan, another of the signers, became President of the United States
a couple of years later, and in his second annual message, in December,
1858, sought to revive the Manifesto, referring to the possibility of
its sometime being necessary for the United States to seize Cuba under
the law of self-preservation. He also requested Congress to appropriate
$30,000,000 for the purchase of the island, and a bill to that effect
was introduced, but it was never pressed to final passage. Again in 1859
he referred to the subject, being still apparently obsessed with the
idea that the conquest of Cuba was necessary for the preservation of the
United States, but on this occasion his reference to the subject was
entirely ignored by Congress. Then came the Civil War in the United
States, which, for a number of years, debarred that country from paying
any attention to the affairs of its southern neighbor.
CHAPTER IX
The years following the close of the Civil War in the United States were
marked with momentous occurrences in various other countries,
particularly in Cuba, and the two nations with which she had long been
intimately connected, Mexico and Spain.
The beginning of the year 1866 in Peninsular Spain saw General Prim
heading a revolutionary body of troops at Aranjuez and at Ocana. These
operations caused great excitement, and feeling ran high throughout the
kingdom, for they were generally regarded as indicative and provocative
of a radical change of government. Martial law was, however, promptly
proclaimed at Madrid, and thus countless sympathizers with the
revolution were restrained from taking an active part in it. The army of
the government, under General Zabala, hastened to the scene of the
insurrection, and pursued the revolutionary troops with such vigor that
the latter, including General Prim himself, were compelled to retreat
across the Portuguese frontier near Barracas, since they were, in fact,
only about six hundred strong and were not prepared to make a resolute
stand. In the same month, January, 1866, other revolutionary bodies were
dispersed in Catalonia and Valencia.
So confident was the royal government of its security, and of the
completeness with which the incipient revolution had been quelled, that
on March 17 it repealed the decree of martial law at the capital. It
was, however, cherishing a fool's paradise. The spirit of revolution was
at work, and was bound soon to reassert itself. Its next manifestation
occurred in June, when two regiments of soldiers in Madrid itself
mutinied and repudiated their officers, who had refused to join them in
their action. These troops were well armed, having twenty-six cannon,
and were soon reinforced by large numbers of volunteers from the
populace, so that it was only by a supreme effort that the government
troops were able to defeat and disperse them.
At the same time, a corresponding movement took place in the garrison at
Gerona, where a considerable body of troops revolted and, when attacked
by government forces, conducted a successful retreat across the French
frontier. Having crossed the boundary, they laid down their arms, but
the larger proportion of them soon found their way back into Spain to
join the impending revolution. Other outbreaks occurred at other points,
all of which were suppressed with difficulty, but with great severity,
many of the leaders being summarily shot as a deterrent example. But
this action instead of being deterrent was provocative. The next
revolutionary manifestation was the formation of a junta at Madrid,
which issued a proclamation setting forth the complaints of the
insurgents against the government, in part as follows:
"Savage courts have led hundreds of victims to sacrifice, and a woman
has contemplated passively and even with complacency, the scaffold which
has been erected.
"The Cortes have abjectly sold to the government the safety of the
individual, the civil rights and the well-being of the commonwealth. The
government has overthrown the press and rostrum, and has entrusted the
administration of the provinces to rapacious mandarins and sanguinary
generals; military tribunals have despoiled the rich and transported the
poor to Fernando Po and to the Philippines.
"The laws of the Cortes have been replaced by decrees squandering the
resources of the country by means of obscure and ruinous laws, trampling
under foot right and virtue, violating homes, property and family; and
during all this time, Isabella II, at Zuranz, and Madrid, meditating a
plot against Italy, our sister, for the benefit of the Roman curia,
participating meanwhile in the depredations of violence of the pachas in
Cuba, who tolerating the fraudulent introduction of slaves, are
outraging public sentiment both in the Old and in the New World, and
causing an estrangement between Spain and the great and glorious
Republic of the United States."
Thereafter, a reasonable degree of quiet prevailed throughout the
Kingdom, which was merely a lull before the renewal of the storm. On New
Year's day of 1867, the Junta at Madrid issued another proclamation,
announcing to the people of Spain that another revolutionary movement
was about to begin, and inviting them to join it, and share its success.
To this there was not apparently a sufficient response to seem to
warrant action, and it was not until the following August that anything
more was heard of the revolution. The revolutionists, however, were
merely outwardly quiet. Propaganda and organization were being
systematically carried on, and the way was being paved for a really
effective revolt, which would have widespread and far-reaching results
in purging Spain of a tyrannous rule and substituting in its place
republican justice. When the time seemed propitious, in August, General
Prim issued a third proclamation, calling the people to arms, the chief
result of which was an increased degree of vigilance and severity on the
part of the government. Many of the revolutionary leaders were
apprehended and expelled from Spain on suspicion of sympathy and
complicity with the revolution. Among this number were Generals
Serrano, Cordova, Duke, Bedoya, and Zebula, and persons of no less high
standing than the Duke and Duchess of Montpensier.
It is curious that all through history, movements like that which had
gained such force and impetus in Spain have been met with the high hand
of oppression. Instead of endeavoring to get at the root of the evil, to
realize that since there was so persistent a dissatisfaction there must
be real causes for grievance the removal of which would work toward a
harmonious solution, it has seemed to be impossible for those born in
the purple to understand the problems of the common people, and so when
the latter have risen in revolt, cruelty and injustice, if not actual
outrages, have marked the attempts to extinguish the trouble. The result
has ever been the same. The story of the attempts to suppress the revolt
in Spain differs not at all from the same story written on the pages of
the history of other nations. The increased oppression on the part of
the government only served to fan the smouldering fire into flame. The
popular wrath and indignation against the queen and her underlings bade
fair to burst into a huge conflagration.
In consequence, when the next overt act of insurrection occurred, at
Cadiz, on September 17, there was a very general response throughout the
Kingdom. General Prim was again at the head of the movement, supported
by General Serrano and the other officers, to whom the sentence of
banishment had not proved effective, since they had found their way back
into Spain. Revolutionary Juntas were formed in almost all of the
provinces, and in a number of the most important cities, and in the
course of a few days the insurgents were in control of a considerable
part of the Kingdom.
The City of Santander was seized for the revolution on September 21, but
they were obliged to relinquish it to superior forces on September 24.
However, the revolutionists were far from discouraged by this momentary
reverse, and four days later they rallied for their first important
victory, which was followed by a general revolt of the troops in and
about Madrid, and General Concha, the commander of the royal forces, was
compelled to resign. The revolution was now in full swing and gaining
impetus and strength every hour. General Serrano at the head of a
revolutionary army entered Madrid in triumph, followed four days later
by General Prim. Their reception exceeded their wildest expectations.
The city was on fire with revolt. The people greeted them with the
warmest fervor, with shouts of welcome and rejoicing. They were hailed
as the saviors of the nation, as the embodiment of Spain's hope for the
future, and hourly their forces were increased by the addition of
volunteers from all walks of life.
It is evident that Queen Isabella had not found Madrid a comfortable
abiding place. There is no doubt that she entertained fears for her
personal safety long before it was actually in jeopardy. Some time
previous to these happenings she had, on some pretext, removed the court
from Madrid to San Sebastian, in the Pyrenees, near the French frontier,
and when news of the capture of the Spanish capital reached her, she
lost no time in making her escape across the frontier into France, where
she was met and welcomed by Emperor Napoleon III, at Hendye. Queen
Isabella had good reason to fear the vengeance of the Spanish mob, for
she had long been unpopular, an object of widespread hatred. She
therefore had no intention of returning to Spain while matters were in
such a turbulent condition, and shortly after her arrival in France,
she proceeded to Paris, where she decided to make her home.
The Juntas which had been established throughout the Kingdom of Spain
were amalgamated by the formation of a National Junta, on October 8, at
Madrid, and a ministry was organized with General Serrano as Prime
Minister, General Prim as Minister of War, Admiral Topete as Minister of
Marine, Señor Figueroa as Minister of Finance, Señor Lorensano as
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Señor Ortiz as Minister of Justice, Señor
Sagasta as Minister of the Interior, Señor Ayala as Minister for the
Colonies and Señor Zorilla as Minister of Public Works.
The next day, the United States Minister at Madrid, Mr. Hill, notified
General Serrano that his government has given official recognition to
the new order of affairs in Spain, being the first in the world to take
this action. Such was the state of affairs in Spain at the beginning of
the great struggle in Cuba known as the Ten Years' War.
Conditions in Mexico likewise deserve passing attention. For a number of
years that country had been in a greatly troubled state. Years of
successive revolutions had been followed by the military intervention of
France, and the creation, under the protection of the French army, of a
pinchbeck "empire," with the Archduke Maximilian of Austria as Emperor.
The Mexican people, under the leadership of one of their greatest
statesmen, Benito Juarez, never gave their allegiance to this usurping
government, but maintained a more or less open resistance to it, and it
was sustained for a few years only by the presence of a considerable
French army.
The United States of America, at this time, was engaged in its great
Civil War, and was therefore unable to do more than to register a formal
protest against French aggressions, which were recognized as a great
violation of the Monroe Doctrine. But when, in the spring of 1865, the
Civil War ended, the triumphant federal armies were moved toward the
Mexican frontier, and the United States Government sent to the French
Government what was practically an ultimatum, requiring it to withdraw
its forces from Mexico. Napoleon III demurred, temporized, and at length
offered to withdraw if the United States would recognize Maximilian as
the lawful emperor of Mexico. This the United States, with great
promptness, refused to do, and the French army was thereupon
unconditionally withdrawn, and the capture and military execution of
Maximilian soon followed, the final tragedy occurring on June 19, 1867.
This left the United States with its prestige immeasurably enhanced and
free to pay such attention as might be necessary to the affairs of Cuba,
the only part of the western hemisphere in which European despotism was
still maintained.
The policy of the United States Government, and the sentiment of the
people of that country toward Cuba, had been materially modified by the
Civil War and its results. There was, of course, no longer any thought
of acquiring Cuba for the sake of expanding and fortifying the slave
power, but on the contrary, American influence was now exerted, so far
as it could properly be, toward prevailing upon the Spanish Government
to abolish slavery in Cuba. The Cuban revolutionists were almost without
exception in favor of such emancipation of the negroes, and that fact
caused them to be regarded with increased favor in the United States,
both officially and popularly. American influence was also exerted
toward the persuasion of Spain to give Cuba a more liberal and
beneficent government and to improve the commercial relations between
that island and the United States, for the benefit of both parties.
There was some expectation in both Cuba and the United States--a very
plausible belief--that the revolutionary movement in Spain, liberal and
democratic in character, and aiming at the establishment of a republic
in place of the Bourbon monarchy, would be accompanied by the grant of
liberal institutions and democratic freedom to Cuba; but such was not
the case.
During the Civil War, because of the suspension of the sugar industry in
the southern part of the United States, there had been a vast and
immensely profitable development of the sugar industry in Cuba, and this
seemed to be dependent for its success upon the continuance of slave
labor. These conditions strengthened the Spanish party in Cuba, which
was equally devoted to the maintenance of slavery and to Spanish
domination in the Island.
The Spanish party in Cuba, at this time, as we have seen, was known as
the "Peninsulars," and it comprised a great majority of the office
holders and wealthy planters and slave-holders. It was well organized
throughout the Island for the assertion of political influence, and for
the suppression of insurgent movements. Its central authority was in a
wealthy club at Havana, called the "Casino Espagnol," and similar clubs
on a more modest scale, existed in other cities and important towns
throughout Cuba, and from these, and under their control, there arose a
body known as the "Volunteers." This was ostensibly a military
organization to whose battalions all white men in the Island were
eligible, but as a matter of fact, membership in the Volunteers was
substantially confined to conservatives, loyalists and Spanish
sympathizers. The Volunteers, except in a few special cases, did not go
into the field, but left the actual fighting with insurgents to be done
by regular Spanish troops. They gave their own attention chiefly to the
overawing of the inhabitants of the cities and towns, and to
restraining them from joining the revolutions. They also acted as spies,
discovering and reporting to the Spanish Government the doings of Cuban
patriots. The leaders of the organization formed a "Council of
Colonels," meeting at the Casino Espagnol, and forming a sort of
_imperium in imperio_.
During the progress of the Ten Years' War, however, the Volunteers were
organized and placed under the command of General Lersuno, and
thereafter exerted a much more militant power than ever before. They
were not under the direct orders of the Captain-General, but enjoyed an
independent authority, and yet they were presently entrusted with the
garrisoning of forts and cities, so that the regular Spanish troops
could go into the field. They exercised far more military, naval and
civil authority than the Captain-General and other royal officials. They
actually compelled the retirement of General Dulce from the
Captain-Generalship because they regarded him as too kindly disposed
toward the Cubans. They similarly drove Caballero de Rodas from office,
and they gave Valmaseda and Ceballos, who followed, to understand that
the success of their administration depended upon their compliance with
the demands and policies of the Volunteers.
It was due to their opposition that the so-called Moret law, which
provided for the gradual abolition of slavery in Cuba, remained a dead
letter, and was not even published in the Island for several years after
the outside world had supposed it to be in force. The Volunteers were
also responsible for the numerous cases of violence against the patriot
party, the most flagrant of which was the execution of eight Cuban
students of the University of Havana.
There is no reason to suppose that there was any complicity or
cooperation between the revolution in Spain and the outbreak of the Ten
Years' War in Cuba. Nevertheless, the former practically gave the
signal, for the result of the Spanish revolution was indeed regarded by
Cuban patriots with much satisfaction and enthusiasm. Cries of "Hurrah
for Prim!" "Hurrah for Serrano!" and "Hurrah for the Spanish
Revolution!" were mingled with cries of "Viva Cuba Libre!" and it did
not take long for the disappointed realization to dawn upon Cuba that
liberalism in Spain did not necessarily imply the granting of freedom to
Cuba, but that on the contrary the "Peninsular" revolutionists were
scarcely less intent that the Bourbons had been upon retaining Cuba as
an appanage, and especially as a source of revenue for Spain.
CHAPTER X
Cuban independence was proclaimed on October 10, 1868, at the Yara
plantation. That was the natal date and that was the natal place of the
Republic of Cuba. The event was made known to the world in a Declaration
of Independence, which was issued at Manzanillo, and which was as
follows:
"In arming ourselves against the tyrannical Government of Spain we must,
according to precedent in all civilized countries, proclaim before the
world the cause that impels us to take this step, which though liable to
entail considerable disturbances upon the present, will insure the
happiness of the future.
"It is well known that Spain governs the Island of Cuba with an iron and
blood-stained hand. The former holds the latter deprived of political,
civil, and religious liberty. Hence, the unfortunate Cubans being
illegally prosecuted and thrown into exile or executed by military
commissions in times of peace. Hence, their being kept from public
meetings, and forbidden to speak or write on affairs of state; hence,
their remonstrances against the evils that afflict them being looked
upon as the proceedings of rebels, from the fact that they are bound to
keep silence and obey. Hence, the never-ending plague of hungry
officials from Spain to devour the product of their industry and labor.
Hence, their exclusion from public stations and want of opportunity to
skill themselves in the art of government. Hence, the restrictions to
which public instructions with them is subjected, in order to keep them
so ignorant as not to be able to know and enforce their rights in any
shape or form whatever. Hence, the navy and standing army, which are
kept upon their country at an enormous expenditure from their own wealth
to make them bend their knees and submit their necks to the iron yoke
that disgraces them. Hence, the grinding taxation under which they
labor, and which would make them all perish in misery but for the
marvelous fertility of the soil.
"On the other hand, Cuba cannot prosper as she ought to, because white
immigration that suits her best is artfully kept from her shores by the
Spanish Government, and as Spain has many a time promised us Cubans to
respect our rights without having hitherto fulfilled her promise, as she
continues to tax us heavily and by so doing is likely to destroy our
wealth; as we are in danger of losing our property, our lives, and our
honor under further Spanish domination; as we have reached a depth of
degradation utterly revolting to manhood; as great nations have sprung
from revolt against a similar disgrace, after exhausted pleadings for
relief, as we despair of justice from Spain through reasoning and cannot
longer live deprived of the rights which other people enjoy, we are
constrained to appeal to arms and to assert our rights in the
battle-field, cherishing the hope that our grievances will be a
sufficient excuse for this last resort to redress them and to secure our
future welfare.
"To the God of our conscience, and to all civilized nations, we submit
the sincerity of our purpose. Vengeance does not mislead us, not is
ambition our guide. We only want to be free and to see all men with us
equally free, as the Creator intended all mankind to be. Our earnest
belief is that all men are brethren. Hence our love of toleration, order
and justice in every respect. We desire the gradual abolition of
slavery, with indemnification; we admire universal suffrage, as it
insures the sovereignty of the people; we demand a religious regard for
the inalienable rights of men as the basis of freedom and nation
greatness."
Following the Declaration of Independence, the provisional government of
the Republic of Cuba was organized at Bayamo. The most prominent figure
in the organization of the Cuban revolutionists and the first really
constructive leader of the Cuban insurrection was Carlos Manuel
Cespedes, a native of Bayamo. At this time he was in the prime of life,
being forty nine years of age, a man of brilliant intellect and of fine
culture, for he had been educated at the University of Havana, and had,
in 1842, received his degree and license in law from the University of
Barcelona, in Spain.
Cespedes's openly expressed zeal for the emancipation of the oppressed
Cubans, and the earnest efforts which he had long exerted in their
behalf, had won for him such widespread recognition as a patriot that he
was, without a dissenting voice, chosen for the head of the provisional
government. By nature and training he was admirably suited for the
position, for from boyhood he had been not only enthusiastically devoted
to the cause of Cuban independence, but he had more than once, under
circumstances where his outspoken advocacy of his principles actually
placed his life in jeopardy, proved himself a worthy champion of
freedom, not only for his fellow citizens, but for Spanish subjects
wherever they were being trodden beneath the iron heel of Spanish
oppression. His love of liberty was not a mere enthusiasm, something
superficial and acquired, but it was inborn, a fundamental part of his
character, firmly knit into the very fibre of his life and its
activities.
While a student in Spain, he had joined the forces of General Prim,
during the latter's first attempt to establish a republic in that
country, and because of his complicity in that revolt, Cespedes had been
banished from Spain. Returning to Cuba, in 1844, he settled at Bayamo,
and took up the practice of law, where his skill as an advocate soon won
him recognition as one of the foremost lawyers of the Island. But again
his hatred of tyranny thrust him forth from the peaceful occupation of
amassing a fortune in the pursuit of jurisprudence. He could not
tranquilly pursue his daily course when he saw injustice and misrule
rampant around him, and so, in 1852, he made a speech, fervidly
denouncing Spain, and calling on high Heaven to aid the independence of
Cuba, which was considered by the authorities to be so incendiary that
he was arrested as a dangerous character, and subsequently suffered a
five months' imprisonment in Morro Castle, at Havana.
Opportunity soon came to Cespedes to give actual proof that his
principles were not abstract but concrete. The acid test was to be
applied and he was not to be found wanting, for immediately upon the
declaration by the Cuban republic of its principles of freedom and equal
rights for all men, he voluntarily exemplified their operation, so far
as lay in his individual power, by emancipating all the slaves on his
own estate.
[Illustration: CARLOS MANUEL DE CESPEDES
The supreme chieftain of the Cuban patriots in the Ten Years' War was
Carlos Manuel de Cespedes y Borges, who before becoming a soldier was
eminent as an advocate, poet, and man of letters. He was born at Bayamo
on April 18, 1819, and completed his education at the University of
Barcelona, Spain. Then he settled in Madrid, became associated with
General Prim, and was implicated in his first attempt at revolution. For
that he was banished to France, and later he was imprisoned for his
Liberal utterances. Returning to Cuba, he personally started the Ten
Years' War, with the story of which as elsewhere related he was
inseparably identified as President of the Cuban Republic. On February
27, 1874, he was betrayed to the Spaniards by a servant who thus sought
to save his own life, and after desperate resistance was wounded,
captured, and put to death.]
The first decree of the provisional government was issued by General
Cespedes on December 27. It was a proclamation of emancipation, as
follows:
"The revolution of Cuba, while proclaiming this independence of the
country, has proclaimed with it all the liberties, and could not well
commit the great inconsistency, to restrict them to only one part of the
population of the country. Free Cuba is incompatible with slave
Cuba, and the abolition of the Spanish institutions must include, and by
necessity and by reason of the greatest justice does include, the
abolition of slavery as the most odious of all. Abolition of slavery
has, therefore, been maintained among the principles proclaimed in the
first manifesto issued by the revolution, and in the opinion of all
Cubans, truly liberal, its entire realization must be the first of the
acts for which the country employs its conquered rights. But as a
general measure it can only be fully effected when the country in the
full use of its conquered rights can, by means of universal suffrage,
make the most suitable provision for carrying it through to real
advantage, both for the old and the new citizens. The subject of the
present measure is not, nor can it be, the abrogation of a right which
those who are at present directing the operations of the revolution are
far from believing themselves entitled to invade; thus participating the
solution of so difficult a question. On the other hand, however, the
provisional government could not in its turn oppose the use of a right
which our slaveholders possess in virtue of our laws, and which many of
them wish to exercise, namely, to emancipate their slaves at once. It
also sees how desirable it is to employ at once in the service of the
country the freedmen, and how necessary to make haste to prevent the
evils which they and the country might receive from a failure to employ
them immediately. The government, therefore, urges the adoption of
provisional dispositions, which are to serve as a rule for the military
chiefs in the several districts of this department, in order to solve
the questions presented to them. Therefore, availing myself of the
faculties with which I am invested, I have now resolved that the
following articles be observed.
"I. Free are the slaves whom their masters at once present to the
military chief for this purpose, the owners reserving, if they choose, a
claim to the indemnification which the nation may decree.
"II. The freedom shall, for the present, be employed in the service of
the country in such a manner as may be agreed upon.
"III. To this end a committee shall be appointed to find for them
employment, in accordance with regulations to be issued.
"IV. In other cases, the slaves of loyal Cubans and of neutral Spaniards
and foreigners shall continue to work, in accordance with the principle
of respect for property proclaimed by the revolution.
"V. The slaves of those who have been convicted of being enemies of the
country and openly hostile to the revolution, shall be confiscated with
their other property and declared free without a right to indemnity,
utilizing them in the service of the country.
"VI. The owners who shall place their slaves in the service of the
revolution without freeing them for the present, shall preserve their
right as long as the slaving question in general is not decided.
"VII. The slaves of the Palisades, who may present themselves to the
Cuban authorities, shall at once be declared free, with a right either
to live among us or to remain among the mountaineers.
"VIII. The isolated refugees who may be captured, or who may, without
the consent of their masters, present themselves to the authorities or
military chiefs, shall not be received without consulting their
masters."
Now this first government, of which Cespedes was made the chief, was
merely, after all, a temporary affair, organized to provide ways and
means for creating a more permanent body. Accordingly, on October 30,
1868, less than a month after the Declaration of Independence, Cespedes
issued a proclamation declaring that his election to office had been
only to provide for the time being an acting head of the provisional
government; that he believed that the organization should at once take
on the character of permanency; that he had no thought of imposing his
will upon Cuba; that he realized that he had not been elected to his
place by the suffrage of the Cuban people, and that he had no assurance
that, had they been given an opportunity to individually express
themselves, he would have been their choice; and that, therefore, since
it was practicable for all loyal Cubans to assemble in their respective
communities and by their suffrage constitute a permanent government, he
would gladly abide by their decision, and, if they desired, relinquish
the power with which they had entrusted him.
In response to this patriotic utterance, a convention was called, on
April 10, 1869, at Guaimaro. The leaders of this first representative
body of the Cuban people were the following: Miguel Gutierrez, Eduardo
Machado, Antonio Lorda, Tranquilino Valdez and Arcadio Garcia,
representing Villa Clara; Honorato Castillo, representing Sancti
Spiritus; José Maria Izaguirre, representing Jugari; Antonio Alcada and
Jesus Rodriguez, representing Holguin; and Salvador Cisneros, Francisco
Sanchez, Ignacio Agramonte Loynaz, Miguel Betancourt Guerra and Antonio
Zambrana, representing Camaguey.
At this convention, Cespedes resigned his position as provisional head
of the government and commander-in-chief of the army, in order that some
one might be regularly elected in his place, and in doing so he
addressed his colleagues in the following memorable terms:
"Now that the House of Representatives, gathered from all parts of the
Island, has been happily inaugurated in Guaimaro, it becomes from the
moment of its organization the supreme and only authority for all
Cubans, because it constitutes the depository of the people's will,
sovereign of the present and controller of the future. All temporary
power and authority ceases to have a rightful voice in Cuba from the
very moment in which the wise democratic system, laying its solid
foundations beneath the gigantic shadow of the tree of liberty, has come
to endow us--after suffering the most iniquitous rule--with the most
beautiful and magnificent of human institutions--a republican
government.
"Unfeigned gratitude I owe to the destiny which afforded me the glory of
being the first in Yara to raise the standard of independence, and the
still greater though less merited satisfaction, to see crowded around me
my fellow-citizens in demand of liberty, thus sustaining my weak arm and
stimulating my poor efforts by their confidence. But another glory was
reserved for me, far more grateful by my sentiments and democratic
convictions--that of also being the first to render homage to the
popular sovereignty.
"This duty fulfilled, having given an account to the fatherland of its
most genuine representation of the work which with the assistance of its
own heroic sons I had the good fortune to have commenced, it still
behooves me, fellow-citizens, to fulfill another, not less imperious to
my heart, of addressing my gratitude to you--to you, without whom my
humble, isolated efforts would not have produced other fruit than that
of adding one patriot more to the number of preceding martyrs for
independence--to you, who, recognizing in me the principle rather than
the man, came to stimulate me by your recognition of myself as chief of
the provisional government and the liberating army.
"Fellow citizens of the Eastern Department, your efforts as initiators
of the struggle against tyranny, your constancy, your sufferings, your
heroic sacrifices of all descriptions, your privations, the combat
without quarters which you have sustained and continue to sustain
against an enemy far superior in armament and discipline, and who
displays, for want of the valor which a good cause inspires, all the
ferocity which is the attitude of tyranny, have been witnessed by
myself, and so will remain eternally present to my heart. You are the
vanguard of the soldiers of our liberties. I commend you to the
admiration and to the gratitude of the Cubans. Continue your abnegation
of self, your discipline, your valor, and your enthusiasm, which will
entitle you to that gratitude and that admiration.
"Fellow citizens of the Western Department, if it has not been your good
fortune to be the first in grasping arms, neither were you among the
last in listening to the voice of the fatherland that cried for
revolution. Your moral aid and assistance responded from the very outset
to the call of your brethren of the Eastern and Central Departments.
Many of you hastened to the scene of revolution to share our colors. At
this moment, despite the activity displayed by the Spanish Government in
your districts, where its resources and the number of its hosts render
more difficult the current of the revolution, that same Government
trembles before your determined attitude, from the Las Villas to Havana,
and from Havana to the western boundary, and your first deeds of arms
were the presage to you and the brave and worthy sons of the Eastern and
Central Departments of new and decisive triumphs.
"Fellow citizens of all the Island: The blood of the patriots who have
fallen during the first onset of the struggle has consecrated our
aspirations with a glorious baptism. At this moment, when destiny has
been pleased to close the mission of him who was your first leader,
swear with him by that generous blood, that in order to render fruitful
that great sacrifice you will shed your own, to the very last drop, in
furtherance of the consummation of our independence, proclaimed in Yara.
Swear with me to give up our lives a thousand times over in sustaining
the republic proclaimed in Guaimaro.
"Fellow citizens, long live our independence. Long live the popular
sovereignty! Long live the Cuban Republic! Patria and liberty!"
The convention before proceeding to the election of officers of the
Republic, drafted and adopted the first Constitution of Free Cuba, as
follows:
"Article I. The legislative power shall be vested in a House of
Representatives.
"Article II. To this body shall be delegated an equal representation
from each of the four states into which the Island of Cuba shall be
divided.
"Article III. These states are Oriente, Camaguey, Las Villas and
Occidente.
"Article IV. No one shall be eligible as representatives of any of these
states except a citizen of the Republic, who is upward of 20 years of
age.
"Article V. No representative of any state shall hold any other official
position during his representative term.
"Article VI. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the representation of any
state, the executive thereof shall have power to fill such vacancy until
the ensuing election.
"Article VII. The House of Representatives shall elect a President of
the Republic, a General-in-Chief of its Armies, a President of the
Congress and other executive officers. The General-in-Chief shall be
subordinate to the Executive, and shall render him an account of the
performance of his duties.
"Article VIII. The President of the Republic, the General-in-Chief and
the Members of the House of Representatives are amenable to charges
which may be made by any citizen to the House of Representatives, which
shall proceed to examine into the charges preferred; and if in their
judgment it be necessary the case of the accused shall be submitted to
the Judiciary.
"Article IX. The House of Representatives shall have full power to
dismiss from office any functionary whom they have convicted.
"Article X. The legislative acts and decisions of the House of
Representatives, in order to be valid and binding, must have the
sanction of the President of the Republic.
"Article XI. If the President fails to approve the acts and decisions of
the House, he shall, without delay, return the same with his objections
thereto, for the reconsideration of that body.
"Article XII. Within 10 days after their reception, the President shall
return all bills, resolutions and enactments which may be sent to him by
the House for his approval, with his sanction thereof, or with his
objections thereto.
"Article XIII. Upon the passage of any Act, Bill or Resolution, after a
reconsideration thereof, by the House, it shall be sanctioned by the
President.
"Article XIV. The House of Representatives shall legislate upon
Taxation, Public Loans, and Ratification of Treaties; and shall have
power to declare and conclude War, to authorize the President to issue
letters of marque, to raise troops and provide for their support, to
organize and maintain a Navy, and to regulate reprisals as to the
public enemy.
"Article XV. The House of Representatives shall remain in permanent
session from the time of the ratification of this fundamental law by the
People until the termination of the war with Spain.
"Article XVI. The Executive Power shall be vested in the President of
the Republic.
"Article XVII. No one shall be eligible to the Presidency, who is not a
native of the Republic, and over 30 years of age.
"Article XVIII. All treaties made by the President may be ratified by
the House of Representatives.
"Article XIX. The President shall have power to appoint Ambassadors,
Ministers-plenipotentiary, and Consuls of the Republic, to foreign
countries.
"Article XX. The President shall treat with Ambassadors, and shall see
that the laws are faithfully executed. He shall also issue commissions
to all the functionaries of the Republic.
"Article XXI. The President shall propose the names of the members of
his Cabinet to the House of Representatives for its approval.
"Article XXII. The Judiciary shall form an independent co-ordinate
department of the Government, under the organization of a special law.
"Article XXIII. Voters are required to possess the same qualifications
as to age and citizenship as the members of House of Representatives.
"Article XXIV. All the inhabitants of the Republic of Cuba are
absolutely free.
"Article XXV. All the citizens are considered as soldiers of the
Liberating Army.
"Article XXVI. The Republic shall not bestow dignities, titles, nor
special privileges.
"Article XXVII. The citizens of the Republic shall not accept honors nor
titles from foreign countries.
"Article XXVIII. The House of Representatives shall not abridge the
Freedom of Religion, nor of the Press, nor of Public Meetings, nor of
Education, nor of Petition, nor any inalienable Right of the People.
"Article XXIX. The Constitution can be amended only by the unanimous
concurrence of the House of Representatives."
[Illustration: MANUEL QUESADA]
The next day the Convention proceeded to the election of officers of the
House of Representatives. Salvador Cisneros was elected President;
Ignacio Agramonte Loynaz and Antonio Zambrana were elected Secretaries,
and Miguel Betancourt and Eduardo Machado, Vice-Secretaries.
MANUEL QUESADA
Manuel Quesada, for a time military head of the Ten Years' War, was
born in Camaguey in 1830. He was banished for political reasons and
went to Mexico, where he fought under Benito Juarez. In 1868 he
joined the patriot army and became one of its leaders; in 1870
being its commander in chief. Failing to carry the war into Pinar
del Rio, he went on a trip to Venezuela, and trying to return was
pursued by a Spanish cruiser and took refuge in Santo Domingo. On
his final return to Cuba he was deposed from his command for being
too ambitious and autocratic, whereupon he went to the United
States and thence to Venezuela, where he died in 1886.
The seventh article of the Constitution was immediately put into
practice, when the convention, constituting itself a House of
Representatives, confirmed the confidence of the Cuban peoples in
Cespedes, by appointing him President of the Republic of Cuba, while
Manuel Quesada was made Commander-in-Chief of the Army. President
Cespedes immediately assumed his office and issued this proclamation:
"To the People of Cuba:
"Compatriots: The establishment of a free government in Cuba, on
the basis of democratic principles, was the most fervent wish of my
heart. The effective realization of this wish was, therefore,
enough to satisfy my aspirations and amply repay the services
which, jointly with you, I may have been able to devote to the
cause of Cuban independence. But the will of my compatriots has
gone far beyond this, by investing me with the most honored of all
duties, the supreme magistracy of the Republic.
"I am not blind to the great labors required in the exercise of the
high functions which you have placed in my charge in these critical
moments, notwithstanding the aid that may be derived from other
powers of the state. I am not ignorant of the grave responsibility
which I assume in accepting the Presidency of our new-born
Republic. I know that my weak powers would be far from being equal
to the demand if left to themselves alone. But this will not occur
and that conviction fills me with faith in the future.
"In the act of beginning the struggle with the oppressors, Cuba has
assumed the solemn duty to consummate her independence or perish in
the attempt, and in giving herself a democratic government she
obligates herself to become Republican. This double obligation,
contracted in the presence of free America, before the liberal
world, and, what is more, before our own conscience, signifies our
determination to be heroic and to be virtuous.
"Cubans! On your heroism I rely for the consummation of our
independence, and on your virtue I count to consolidate the
Republic. You may count on my abnegation of self.
"CARLOS DE CESPEDES.
"Guaimaro, April 11, 1869."
This was followed two days later by General Quesada's proclamation:
"Citizen Chiefs, Officers and Soldiers of the Liberating Army of
Cuba: When I returned to my country to place my sword at your
service, fulfilling the most sacred of duties, realizing the most
intense aspiration of my life, the vote of the Camagueyans, to my
surprise, honored me by conferring on me the command of their army.
Notwithstanding my poor merits and capacity, I accepted the post
because I expected to find and did find in the Camagueyans civic
virtues well established, and this has rendered supportable the
charge of the responsibility which I assumed.
"Now the legislative power of the Republic has filled me with a
greater surprise, promoting me to the Command-in-Chief of the
liberating army of Cuba. The want of confidence in my own resources
naturally moves me anew upon stronger grounds, although it also
strengthens the conviction that the patriotism of my brethren will
supply the insufficiency of my capacity.
"Camagueyans! You have given me undoubted proofs of your virtues.
You are models of subordination and enthusiasm. Preserve and extend
your discipline!
"Soldiers of the East! Initiators of our sacred revolution!
Veterans of Cuba! I salute you with sincere affection, counting on
your gallant chiefs, in order that they may aid me in realizing the
eminent work which we have undertaken, and I hope that union will
strengthen our forces.
"Soldiers of the Villas! You have already struggled with the
despot. I felicitate you for the efforts made and invite you to
continue them. You are patriots. You will be victors.
"Soldiers of the West! I know your heroic exploits, and venerate
them. I am well aware of the disadvantage of the situation in which
you find yourselves, in contrast with our oppressors, and it is our
purpose to remedy this. Accept the homage of my admiration and the
succor of my arms.
"Citizen chiefs, officers, and soldiers of the Cuban Army! Union,
discipline, and perseverance!
"The rapid increase which the glorious new Cuba has taken frightens
our oppressors, who now are suffering the pangs of desperation, and
carrying on a war of vengeance, not of principles. The tyrant
Valmaseda rages with the incendiary's torch and the homicidal knife
over the fields of Cuba. He has never done otherwise, but now he
adds to his crime the still greater one of publishing it by a
proclamation, which we can only describe by pronouncing it to be a
proclamation worthy of the Spanish Government. Thereby our property
is menaced by fire and pillage. This is nothing. It threatens us
with death; and this is nothing. But even our mothers, wives,
daughters, and sisters are menaced with resort to violence.
"Ferocity is the valor of cowards.
"I implore you, sons of Cuba, to recollect at all hours the
proclamation of Valmaseda. That document will shorten the time
necessary for the triumph of our cause. That document is an
additional proof of the character of our enemies. Those beings
appear deprived even of those gifts which Nature has conceded to
the irrationals--the instinct of foresight and of warning. We have
to struggle with tyrants, always such; the very same ones of the
Inquisition, of the Conquest, and of Spanish dominion in America.
In birth and in death they live and succeed; the Torquemadas, the
Pizarros, the Boves, the Morillos, the Tacons, the Conchas, and the
Valmasedas. We have to combat with the assassins of old women and
of children, with the mutilators of the dead, with the idolaters of
gold!
"Cubans! If you would save your honor and that of your families; if
you would conquer forever your liberty, be soldiers. War leads you
to peace and to happiness. Inertia precipitates you to misfortune
and to dishonor. Viva Cuba! Viva the President of the Republic!
Viva the Liberating Army! Patria and Liberty!
"MANUEL QUESADA."
The proclamation of Count Valmaseda, to which General Quesada referred,
had been issued at Bayamo on April 4, and was as follows:
"Inhabitants of the Country--
"The forces which I expected have arrived. With them I will afford
protection to the good and summarily punish all those who still
rebel against the government of the metropolis.
"Know ye that I have pardoned those who have fought against us,
armed; know ye that your wives, mothers and sisters have in me
found the protection they admired and which you rejected; know,
also, that many of the pardoned have turned against me. After all
these excesses, after so much ingratitude and so much villainy, it
is impossible for me to be the man I was heretofore. Deceptive
neutrality is no longer possible. 'He that is not with me is
against me,' and in order that my soldiers may know how to
distinguish you, hearken to the orders given them:
"Every man from the age of 15 upward, found beyond his farm, will
be shot, unless a justification for his absence be proven.
"Every hut that is found uninhabited will be burned by the troops.
"Every hamlet where a white cloth in the shape of a flag is not
hoisted in token that its inhabitants desire peace, will be reduced
to ashes.
"The women who are not found in their respective dwellings, or in
those of their relatives, will return to the towns of Jiguani or
Bayamo, where they will be duly provided for. Those who fail to do
so will be taken by compulsion. These orders will be in force on
and after the 14th inst.!
"COUNT VALMASEDA.
"Bayamo, April 4, 1869."
General Cespedes about this time sent to the Government of the United
States, in his name and in that of the Provisional Government of Cuba, a
request for recognition, as belligerents. His letter contained these
references to the strength of the movement in Cuba:
"We now hold much more than fifty leagues of the interior of this Island
in the Eastern Department, among which are the people (or communities)
of Jiguani, Tunas, Baire, Yara, Barrancas, Datil, Cauto, Embarcadero,
Guisa, and Horno, besides the cities of Bayamo and Holguin, in all
numbering 107,853 inhabitants, who obey us, and have sworn to shed to
the last drop of blood in our cause.
"In the mentioned city of Bayamo, we have established a provisional
government, and formed our general quarters, where we hold more than
three hundred of the enemy prisoners, taken from the Spanish Army, among
whom are generals and governors of high rank. All this has been
accomplished in ten days, without other resources than those offered by
the country we have passed through, without other losses than three or
four killed and six or eight wounded."
However this impressed the Government at Washington, and notwithstanding
the marked sympathy in the United States for the cause of the Republic,
the desired recognition was not obtained.
The impression of the revolution and its leaders which was given to the
people of the United States may be judged from what was written by an
authoritative correspondent of the New York _Tribune_:
[Illustration: FRANCISCO V. AGUILERA]
FRANCISCO V. AGUILERA
One of the organizers of the Ten Years' War, Francisco V. Aguilera
was born at Bayamo in 1821, of a wealthy and distinguished family,
and was finely educated in America and Europe. Although married to
the daughter of the Spanish Governor of Santiago, General Kindelan,
he was an ardent patriot, liberating his slaves and giving his
great fortune to the cause of independence. He served in the Ten
Years' War as Secretary of War and as Commander in Chief in
Oriente; and succeeded Salvador Cisneros Betancourt as President of
the Revolutionary government. He died in New York on February 22,
1877, and though his government had not been officially recognized,
full honors as to a Chief of State were paid at his funeral.
"General Cespedes, the hero and chief of the revolt--is a man of good
appearance, fifty years of age, and has traveled in the United States.
His second in command, Arango, the Marquis of Santa Lucia, is a native
of Puerto Principe, and at taking part in the insurrection emancipated
his slaves. General Aguilera was a man of great wealth, and had once
held under the Government the office of mayor over the town of Bayamo
just burnt by the rebels. He too released his slaves. General Donato
Marmol bears the repute of having genuine military talent, as he is
said to have defeated his opponents in most of their encounters with
him, and signally at Bairi, in the Eastern District. He is admired for
the ready invention of a new weapon of defence in war, which is called
the horguetilla, and is a kind of hook to resist bayonet charges. The
hook, which can be made without much trouble, of wood, is held with the
left hand to catch the bayonet, while with the right the rebel brings
his rude machete, a kind of sword, down upon his Spanish foe. General
Quesada, the other mentionable Cuban leader, served with credit on the
side of Juarez during the intervention in Mexico. The soldiers of the
revolt are of the rawest kind. A good part of them have been recruited
from the emancipated slaves of Cespedes, Arango, and Aguilera. Many of
the weapons are of the poorest kind, but I have heard that a certain
number of Enfields have been furnished them, and lately some hand
grenades. It is told me that no help, or exceedingly little, has reached
them from the North. Among some other things of their own device, they
have been employing wooden cannon, good for one shot and no more."
The insurrection was eagerly supported by the "Juntas of the Laborers."
These societies, formed at the suggestion of Rafael Merchan, issued a
proclamation which enumerated the wrongs and insults endured by them
under the Spanish rule of Cuba, and stated the principles for which they
were willing to fight:
"The Laborers, animated by the love for their native land, aspire to the
hope of seeing Cuba happy and prosperous by virtue of her own power, and
demand the inviolability of individuals, their homes, their families,
and the fruits of their labor, which they would have guaranteed by the
liberty of conscience, of speech, of the press, and of peaceful
meetings. In fact, they demand a government of the country for and by
the country, free from an army of parasites and soldiers that only
serves to consume it and oppress it. And, as nothing of that kind can be
obtained from Spain, they intend to fight that power with all available
means, and drive and uproot its domination from the face of Cuba.
Respecting above all and before all the dignity of man, the association
declares that it will not accept slavery as a forced inheritance of the
past. However, instead of abolishing it as an arm by which to sink the
Island into barbarity, as threatened by the government of Spain, they
view abolition as a means of improving the moral and national condition
of the working men, and thereby to place property and wealth in a more
just and safe position.
"Sons of their times, baptised in the vivid stream of civilization, and,
therefore above preoccupation of nationality, the laborers will respect
the neutrality of Spaniards, but among Cubans will distinguish only
friends and foes, those that are with them or against them. To the
former they offer peace, fraternity, and concord; to the latter,
brutality and war--war and brutality that will be more implacable to the
traitors to Cuba, where they first saw the day, who turn their arms
against them, or offer any asylum or refuge to their tyrants. We, the
laborers, do not ignore the value of nationality, but at the present
moment consider it of secondary moment. Before nationality stands
liberty, the indisputable condition of existence. We must be a people
before becoming a nation. When the Cubans constitute a free people they
will receive the nationality that becomes them. Now they have none."
The Captain-General replied to this in January, 1869, with a
proclamation, full of promises which, however, were never fulfilled. It
said:
"I will brave every danger, accept every responsibility, for your
welfare. The revolution has swept away the Bourbon dynasty, tearing up
by the roots a plant so poisonous that it polluted the air we breathe.
To the citizen shall be returned his rights, to man his dignity. You
will receive all the reforms which you require. Cubans and Spaniards are
all brothers. From this day, Cuba will be considered a province of
Spain. Freedom of the press, the right of meeting in public, and
representation in the national Cortes, the three fundamental principles
of true liberty, are granted you.
"Cubans and Spaniards! Speaking in the name of our mother, Spain, I
adjure you to forget the past, hope for the future, and establish union
and fraternity."
Cuba had declared herself to be an independent state, but that was
merely the first step in establishing her independence, and a long and
bitter struggle lay before her before she could hope to accomplish in
fact that for which her loyal citizens had armed themselves and which
they were determined to achieve.
The first regularly elected House of Representatives took their seats at
Guaimaro, whereupon the members of the former convention resigned their
seats to their successors. In the new House, Jorge Milanes was elected
from the District of Manzanillo, Manuel Gomez Silva from Camaguey,
Manuel Gomez Pena from Guantanamo, Tomas Estrada from Cobre, Pio Posada
from Santiago de Cuba, Fernando Fornaris from Bayamo, and Pedro Aguero
from Las Tunas. Later sessions of the House of Representatives were held
at Cascorro and at Sibanico. These towns, held sacred by Cubans as the
birthplaces of liberty, were stoutly defended during the revolution, and
in spite of repeated efforts the Spaniards were never able to effect
their capture, although they used their most highly trained troops, and
most efficient officers in their attacks.
Beginning with August 6, 1869, the Assembly began to organize the
government along the most enlightened lines, and provided for the
administration of justice by establishing a Judiciary Department with
the following branches:
1. A Supreme Court.
2. Criminal Judges.
3. Civil Judges.
4. Prefects and sub-prefects.
5. Court Martial.
The Supreme Court was composed of a presiding officer, two judges and a
judge-advocate. Each of the states of the Republic was divided into
districts, and a civil and criminal judge as well as an attorney for the
Commonwealth were appointed for each district.
Each state was to be ruled by a Civil Governor, and each district by a
Lieutenant-Governor, while the districts were divided into prefects and
sub-prefects, each with its appropriate ruler. The officers in question
were in every case to be elected by popular suffrage.
A chronological enumeration of the laws enacted by the Congress during
1869 is not only pertinent, but it divulges their evident intention to
administer the government of the island, should they obtain the power to
do so, along the most humane and enlightened lines.
On May 11, 1869, an amnesty was granted to all political prisoners, who
had not already been sentenced.
On June 4, much needed provisions for civil marriages, and regulations
concerning the same, were enacted.
On June 7, the commerce of the Republic was declared free to all
nations.
The enactment of June 15, while a customary proceeding, would have a
touch of irony connected with it, if it were not almost pathetic, as
revealing the sturdy belief of these officials of the young Republic in
the ultimate triumph of their cause. It was an authorization of the
issue of $2,000,700 of legal tender paper money, to be redeemed by the
Republic in coin, at par, when circumstances enabled them to do so--that
is when they had conquered the enemy and established their Republic on a
lasting basis. The bills thus issued had already reached the officers of
the Republic, having been engraved in New York, and sent to Cuba by the
New York Junta.
[Illustration: BERNABE DE VARONA]
On July 9, the army was definitely organized, and this organization
remained in force until the capture and death of General Quesada. It was
as follows:
Commander-in-Chief General Manuel Quesada
Chief-of-Staff General Thomas Jordan
Chief of Artillery Major Beauvilliers
Brigadier-Major of Orders Major Bernabe Varona
Sanitary Department Adolfo Varona
_First Division_ _Army of Camaguey_
Major General Ignacio Agramonte
Commanding 1st Brigade Colonel Miguel Bosse
" 2d Brigade General Francisco Castillo
" 3d Brigade Colonel Cornelio Porro
" 4th Brigade Colonel Lope Recio
" 5th Brigade Colonel Manuel Valdes Urra
" 6th Brigade Colonel Manuel Agramonte
" 1st Battalion Colonel Pedro Recio
" 2d Battalion Colonel Jose Lino Cica
" 3d Battalion Colonel Rafael Bobadilla
_Second Division_ _Army of Oriente_
Major General Francisco Aguilera
Commanding 1st Brigade General Donate Marmol
" 2d Brigade General Luis Marcano
" 3d Brigade General Julio Peralta
_Third Division_ _Army of Las Villas_
Commanding 1st Brigade General C. Acosta
" 2d Brigade General Salome Hernandez
" 3d Brigade General Adolfo Cabada
A law was enacted providing that every citizen of the Republic, between
the ages of 18 and 50 years, must under compulsion take up arms for the
cause of liberty.
BERNABE DE VARONA
Bernabe de Varona, a brilliant writer and devoted patriot, was born
at Camaguey in 1845, a member of a distinguished family. He entered
the Ten Years War with much zeal and displayed exceptional military
skill. He went on various patriotic missions to New York, to France
and to Mexico, and was instrumental in securing much aid for the
patriot cause. His last expedition was on the ill-fated
_Virginius_, on which he was captured and shot to death at Santiago
de Cuba on November 4, 1873.
On August 7, the powers of the various officers of the Government,
including the Secretaries of State, were described and fixed.
From the foregoing it will be seen that the officers of the new Republic
had high aspirations for an orderly government, and for the just
administration of wise laws for the benefit of the people.
Unfortunately, in a large measure, the Republic of Cuba established at
that time was a government only in name, and was not destined to take
the reins in administering the affairs of the Island, except in a more
or less theoretical way.
CHAPTER XI
A revolution usually involves fighting as well as the organization of a
government. In the case of Cuba, this was especially inevitable. It was
realized by the patriots in advance that the redemption of Cuba from the
tyranny of Spain could only be accomplished by force of arms, and
consequently plans to that effect had been carefully perfected in
advance. It was highly creditable to the Cubans that they so promptly
organized a dignified and worthy government, and adopted a constitution
favorably comparable with that of any other republic in the world. It
was no less creditable to their judgment and their earnestness that they
had already prepared for extensive military operations, and that they at
once entered upon these in a vigorous and systematic manner. Plans for
the uprising had indeed been matured before the breaking out of the
revolution in Spain, but the latter event undoubtedly hastened the
execution of their designs.
At the outset, before complete organization was effected, the insurgents
at Bayamo were under the leadership of Francisco V. Aguilera, Manuel A.
Aguilera and Francisco M. Osorio; at Manzanillo the leader was Carlos
Manuel Cespedes; at Holguin, Belisario Alvarez was in command; at Las
Tunas, Vincente Garcia; at Jiguani, Donato Marmol; and at Santiago,
Manuel Fernandez.
When Cespedes issued his proclamation on October 10, the insurgents had
only 147 men in their ranks, armed with forty-five fowling pieces, four
rifles, and a few pistols and machetes--not enough arms to provide one
weapon apiece. But volunteers began to flock to their standards and in
two days the army had increased to over twenty-six times its original
strength, and numbered upwards of four thousand men, while at the end of
the month it had more than doubled, and had grown to nine thousand seven
hundred. By November 8, the revolutionary army contained twelve thousand
men, and at the end of 1868, it had grown to twenty-six thousand.
But even this growth did not give them anything like the strength of the
Spanish Army in Cuba. In October, 1868, Spain had in Cuba twelve
regiments of infantry, one corps of engineers, one regiment of
artillery, two regiments of cavalry, one section of civil guards, one
regiment of armed firemen, one regiment of prison guards, and five
regiments of infantry and cavalry militia, amounting to the following:
Regular troops of all kinds, including officers 14,300
Civil guards 640
Prison guards 120
Armed firemen 1,000
Infantry and cavalry militia 3,400
Soldiers who had served their time but had been
kept in service 300
------
19,760
These troops were distributed to the proportion of three-fifths of them
in the Western Department, and the remainder divided between the Central
and Eastern Departments. They were amply armed and munitioned, although
it must be admitted that not all of their armament was of the newest
pattern. It was, however, in excellent condition and they had six
thousand of the latest model Remington rifles.
At the end of the year, the Spanish troops had been augmented by large
reinforcements from the mother country, so that Spain had in the field a
thoroughly organized and abundantly equipped army of about 110,000 men,
which, of course, was capable of being greatly increased. She also had
in Cuban waters the following men of war, at the beginning of October,
1868:
2 Steam frigates 91 guns
2 2d class steamers 12 guns
5 3d class steamers 10 guns
5 screw steamers, schooner rigged 15 guns
--------
128 guns
Of course, she at once added to this navy, and it soon grew to
formidable proportions, while the revolutionists had no navy at all,
with which to repel Spanish attacks from the sea.
Despite the great preponderance of forces in its favor, the Spanish
government did not at first depend upon military prowess for the
suppression of the insurrection and the retention of Cuba as its colony.
This was perhaps, in a measure, because of the revolution in Spain,
which was keeping the Government well occupied with its internal
affairs, and also because of the desire of some of the liberal leaders
in Spain to avoid endless strife and bloodshed. Therefore at first,
pacific measures were contemplated. It had been thought that General
Dulce, as Captain-General of the Island for his third term, would be
able to effect a compromise with the Cubans, because of his kindly
disposition, and the good feeling which prevailed between him and the
Cubans. His good offices were greatly hampered and off-set by the
arrogance of the Volunteers, who did not hold him in high regard, since
they thought him much too gentle with the Cubans, and who were not in
sympathy with his mediations. Perhaps the flame of revolution had now
grown too hot to be quenched by soothing measures. At any rate, the hope
of the Spanish Government proved delusive. On the one hand, the patriot
leaders were outspoken in their unwillingness to accept Dulce's
proposals of an amicable settlement, based on compromise; and on the
other, the Volunteers frankly opposed making any concessions to the
Islanders, and directed all their influence against every measure which
Dulce offered as a solution. In this they had the ulterior motive of
driving Dulce from office, so that there might be placed in his position
a more arbitrary and ruthless man, one of their own kidney.
In reviewing the state of affairs in Cuba at this early stage of the Ten
Years' War, and comparing the strength and composition of the contending
forces, it should be borne in mind that the Cuban army in the field was
a mere fragment of the potential strength of the Cuban people. There
were probably 150,000 Cubans, able bodied and of military age, who were
both willing and eager to enter the war, but who were restrained from so
doing for fear of what would befall their families if they identified
themselves openly with the patriot cause. If they left their homes to
take the field, their wives and children would be at the mercy of
Spanish troops or of the still more to be dreaded and pitiless
Volunteers. If we add to this the not unnatural doubt of the possibility
of succeeding in the revolt against the formidable power of Peninsular
Spain--a doubt fostered and confirmed by the failure of the former
attempts--we cannot blame the Cubans for not more generally
participating in active operations. Their absentation from so doing is
to be charged not, certainly, to cowardice or to lack of patriotism,
but to an excess of prudence.
In these circumstances, the numerical odds were at the beginning, and
remained all through the war, tremendously against the Cubans. Besides
this their army in a large measure, particularly at the beginning,
consisted of men who had had no experience in warlike manoeuvres, and
who lacked military drilling, for while preparations for uprisings had
been as constant as had been the uprisings themselves, naturally the
revolutionists, when their revolt was in an incipient stage, did not
wish to call attention to what they were planning by putting their
sympathizers through military tactics. The Cuban Army also lacked a
tremendous stabilizer of morale, in not being properly uniformed, but
rather presenting a motley appearance on the field. In fact there were
many times when they were so hard put that they were not only
inadequately clothed, but suffered for lack of food. The fact that they
were able so frequently to defeat the highly trained and well equipped
Spanish forces, and to hold their ground as successfully, as they did
year after year, is the highest possible tribute to their valor, their
intelligence in military matters, and their patriotic devotion.
The earliest engagements between the opposing forces occurred on October
13, 1868, at three places, not widely separated; Yara, Bairi and
Jiguani; in all of which the Cuban patriots were successful. The last of
the three named was considered by the patriots to be an extremely
important victory, and was accomplished by troops under the command of
General Donato Marmol. Heartened by this good fortune, the patriots on
October 15 laid siege to Bayamo, and three days later effected its
capture; whereupon that place was made the temporary seat of the Cuban
Government. These victories were all the more creditable and encouraging
because, we must remember, while the Spanish Army numbered many
thousands--scattered it is true in various parts of the Island--the
Cuban Army was only one-fourth as large and poorly armed and equipped.
At all times during the first engagements, the patriots were
outnumbered, but they made up in courage what they lacked in numbers,
and their enthusiasm and zeal for the cause for which they were fighting
carried them safely against tremendous odds.
Late in October--on the 26th to be exact--the patriots attacked the
Spanish troops at Las Tunas, and also at Villa del Cobre at the foot of
Monte Alta Garcia, between Puerto Principe and Nuevitas, and at Moran.
In all these engagements the Cubans were greatly hampered by the serious
lack of arms and munitions, but if they were not entirely successful
they were far from routed, they lost little ground, and maintained very
complete control over those portions of the Central and Eastern
Departments which were in sympathy with them.
By the early part of November, 1868, the Cubans had thoroughly beaten
the troops under the command of the Spanish Colonel Demetrio Quiros, and
forced him to retreat, and were thus enabled to advance into the very
suburbs of Santiago de Cuba, the ancient capital of the Island, and at
this time the capital of the Eastern Department. They promptly cut the
aqueduct which supplied that city with water, and thereby caused not
only great discomfort but something resembling panic among the
inhabitants. The patriots were naturally reluctant to resort to such
measures, because of the suffering which it caused to their own friends
and sympathizers; yet if the Spanish garrison in Santiago was to be
brought to terms, any strategic advantage which the Cubans could
acquire must be used to the utmost.
The third week in November found them in possession of the towns of El
Caney and El Cobre; the latter famous as the site of the first copper
mines opened in Cuba, and the former as the scene of one of the sharpest
engagements of the United States war with Spain in 1898. The patriots
kept control of these two places for several weeks, and then deeming it
inexpedient to undertake any further operations against Santiago, which
was not only garrisoned by the Spanish Army but also protected by the
Spanish fleet, they withdrew their forces to the defense of Bayamo,
which was now being seriously threatened by the troops of Count
Valmaseda, reenforced by those under Colonel Lono, who had come thither
from Manati, under Colonel Campillo from Manzanillo, Colonel Mana from
Puerto Principe, and Colonel Quiro, who had hastened to Bayamo from
Santiago. With all these Spanish troops, well armed and abundantly
supplied with ammunition concentering upon the place, President Cespedes
realized that it would be impolitic to attempt to resist a siege. After
consultation with his associates, the result of which was a unanimous
decision, he set fire to the city and withdrew his troops. In
consequence, when Valmaseda arrived a little later, he found nothing
left of Bayamo but ruins.
This loss of their temporary capital did not perceptibly weaken the
Cuban position; indeed the patriot cause steadily grew in strength and
numbers. The entire jurisdiction of Holguin revolted against Spanish
authority, on October 28, and the inhabitants, in large numbers, rushed
to take up arms with the patriots. A week later Camaguey followed the
example of Holguin. The Spanish government both at home and in Cuba was
in the position of a man sitting on a couch under which had been stored
a quantity of bombs, all timed to go off at irregular intervals, and
from which position there was no escape. They did not know which way to
jump. The high officials in both countries lived in an uncertainty as to
events in Cuba which must have been nerve racking. Indeed--to mix our
metaphors--they never knew where the fever of revolutions was scheduled
to break out next. If they succeeded in getting it under control in one
place, and began to feel a bit secure against an epidemic, the next
morning they found what to them seemed a new eruption, and one which
they had not been able to anticipate. They conquered, or apparently
subdued, the patriots in one portion of the Island, and immediately
those in another burst forth into active opposition to what the Spanish
government would have termed law and order, but which the insurgents
called by the less pleasant terms of cruelty and unjust oppressions. And
occasionally, as we have seen, there glimmered in some Spanish
intelligence a faint doubt as to the efficacy of their usual methods,
and then for a very short time the authorities would try temporizing.
But the patriots had not suffered for generations from Spanish misrule
without having learned to mistrust the wiles of their oppressors, and
they viewed with more or less cynicism any surface indications of a less
tyrannous rule.
With the revolts of Camaguey and Holguin, the Spanish authorities came
to the conclusion that it was about time to try temporizing, and to
endeavor in some way to pacify the patriots. It may be that they would
have actually made concessions--we have it from one authority that they
were willing at this time to grant almost anything but the one thing
which was the single desire of the patriots. At any rate, on January 19,
1869, they made a formal proposal for a meeting between representatives
of the belligerents for the discussion of the issues between them, and
for a serious attempt to effect a compromise. President Cespedes felt
that the time for compromise had passed, long years before. The die had
been cast. The revolution had one aim, complete freedom, and that was
above all things the one concession which the Spaniards would not make.
But he was too clever not to realize that after all something might be
gained by compliance, if no more than a chance to feel out the mettle
and present designs of the Spaniards. It was possible that if he sent a
clever enough envoy he might learn much that would be to his advantage
in future negotiations. He was under no obligation to consent to or even
to consider seriously any terms which the Spaniards might offer, so that
he had nothing to lose by such a proceeding, and it was barely possible
that he might gain valuable information.
So he assented to the proposal, and sent his representative, Augustin
Arango, to Puerto Principe, under safe conduct issued by the Spanish
Government at Manzanillo. It is probable that the safe conduct would
have been respected by the Spanish authorities and Spanish troops. But
unfortunately, not only for the innocent envoy, and for the patriots,
but also for any hope that the Spaniards may have entertained--if indeed
their offer had been made in good faith, and there is always a measure
of doubt, in the face of their usual trickery--of an amicable
understanding, Arango fell into the hands of the Volunteers, who, in
quite characteristic manner, contemptuously disregarded the credentials
of their own government, and cruelly and brutally murdered General
Cespedes's messenger, immediately upon his entrance into Puerto
Principe.
It is not difficult to picture the rage and disgust of the patriots at
this new example of Spanish perfidy, which so clearly demonstrated the
futility of attempting any negotiations of any kind whatever with an
enemy capable of such lack of honor. The death of Arango, therefore, put
an end to the farce of Spanish pretended repentance. And this
circumstance did not pass without the news being spread all over the
island. Patriots who had been timidly balancing themselves in outward
neutrality, were so aroused with indignation that they began boldly to
plunge into the maelstrom of civil war. On February 9, 1869, the entire
district of Las Tunas revolted and cast its lot with the insurgents.
Each new act of injustice emanating from the Spaniards was like removing
the supports of a dam behind which had been restrained the waters of
patriotism. The Spaniards had killed one Cuban patriot in cold blood;
the cause of revolutions had gained thousands, each fired with
enthusiasm.
Thus far General Quesada had been waging an almost exclusively irregular
or guerrilla warfare. This was because of the smallness of his army, the
lack of arms and equipment, and the unfamiliarity of his men with
military tactics. Indeed, such methods of warfare were in a large
measure continued throughout the entire Ten Years' War. But by the time
of which we now write he was able on some occasions and at some places
to array his troops in orderly fashion and to conduct his campaign in
much the same manner as the Spaniards themselves. Thus, he was able to
carry on regular siege operations against Colonel Mena, and his garrison
of three thousand Spaniards, at Puerto Principe. Colonel Prieto with
several thousand Cubans busied himself with cutting the railroad lines
which the Spanish authorities had constructed for strategic purposes,
and destroying communications between Villa Clara and Cienfuegos. A
strong Spanish force was sent against him, and a serious engagement
occurred at San Cristobal, where the patriots were entirely successful.
The Spanish troops retreated to Guanajay, a short distance from Havana,
closely pursued by the patriots, and when forced to give battle, the
Spaniards were once more put to rout, with heavy losses.
Havana was now practically in a state of siege, with a patriot army in
possession of Guanajay, and small bands constantly harassing the Spanish
troops at different points in the vicinity of the city. The Spanish
Captain-General, Dulce, was still nursing the idea that some sort of an
agreement might be reached, and at least a truce declared, and he
therefore refused to officially declare the besieged condition of the
city, and endeavored to placate the patriots by leniency toward the
sympathizers in the city, and a conciliatory attitude toward the
revolutionists. However, his efforts had little effect on the Cubans.
Their forces pressed forward against Santiago de Cuba, and disaster for
the Spanish garrison at that city was only averted by the timely arrival
of Count Valmaseda with reinforcements. Las Tunas was still in the hands
of the revolutionists, who were divided into small parties and were
conducting a guerrilla warfare throughout practically the entire Island,
attacking whenever it seemed to be to their advantage, and dispersing
when the forces sent against them were sufficiently large to give the
odds to the Government. Trinidad was practically segregated from the
outside world so far as communications by land were concerned. The
patriots had stopped the mail service, and had cut the telegraph wires.
The city was in a turmoil of fear and apprehension, sending requests
for aid whenever they could get word through, which was not frequently,
since the patriots took a cynical delight in having so far turned the
tables on their oppressors, and in detaining and making prisoners the
couriers who tried to reach the Spanish lines with news of Trinidad's
predicament.
The patriots did not confine their efforts to any part of the Island,
although the major part of them were east of Havana, and only that small
stretch of territory embracing the province of Pinar del Rio was
comparatively free from trouble. The insurgents were insufficiently
provisioned, and so they resorted to pillage. This was particularly true
of the bands in the vicinity of Nuevitas, where attacks were constantly
being made on the plantations, and the farmers lived in a state of
alarm, never knowing when a patriot band might descend upon them
demanding food for the present and for the future, and proceeding to
take it by force, if necessary. Frequently those who were not in favor
of the cause of liberty extended a frightened hospitality, rather than
to excite the wrath of their hungry visitors, and resorted to treachery
to carry the news of the marauders to some nearby Spanish camp, only to
have the rescuing forces chagrined to find, when they arrived, that the
birds were not "in the hand," but had been fed, and had fled with their
booty. Nuevitas was well garrisoned, and therefore the patriots confined
their operations to a region sufficiently remote from the outskirts of
the town, so that reprisals would be slow and difficult.
The Cubans were strongly entrenched at San Miguel, where, on February 7,
they were attacked by the Spaniards. When other means failed, the
Spanish forces tried to "smoke out" the insurgents by burning the city,
but while this dislodged them from the city itself, it failed to drive
them from the vicinity, where they took up an advantageous position and
held it against assault.
Puerto Principe was surrounded; the aqueduct was cut, and food was
scarce and growing scarcer. The inhabitants clamored for succor, when
starvation seemed imminent. Their cries for aid became too insistent to
be disregarded, and therefore a body of troops was dispatched from
Santiago de Cuba toward Jiguani, whither the main body of the Spanish
troops under Count Valmaseda, had retired. The patriots were apprised of
this manoeuvre, and the Spanish troops were constantly harassed by bands
of Cubans, and it was only after several severe engagements, and
considerable losses, that they succeeded in joining Valmaseda at
Jiguani.
In the sort of warfare which they were now waging, the advantages were
all with the revolutionists. They were thoroughly acquainted with the
country, and knew well how to take advantage of its natural defenses,
while the Spanish forces, especially those imported from Spain for the
purpose of putting down the rebellion, lacked such knowledge, and in
strategy were always at a disadvantage. The Cuban leaders were not only
exceedingly clever in their manoeuvres, but they seemed to have a sense
of humor, and to take a grim delight in fooling the Spanish commanders,
and luring them on a fool's errand. The patriots, whenever the tide of
battle went against them, retreated to fastnesses in the interior, well
known to them, and uncharted by the enemy, from whence they would sally
forth, when opportunity presented, harass the Spaniards, and again
retire to their lair, whither the enemy feared to follow them, lest they
might fall into a trap.
The Cubans had a particularly annoying practice of spreading reports
that a large revolutionary force had assembled in a certain place, and
enticing the Spaniards to that location, when the latter would only
discover, to their chagrin, that the report had been "grossly
exaggerated," and that in reality there was only a handful of men
instead of the large number which they expected; and to this would be
added the further annoyance of having the little body of Cubans melt as
if by magic in retreat to some position unknown to the Spanish or
practically impenetrable by them, with their lack of information as to
its potentialities, and their fear that it might prove their undoing. If
this were not sufficiently annoying, the Cubans had a habit of sending
out anonymous and misleading information, to the effect that an attack
on the Cubans at a particular point would have felicitous results for
the Spaniards, since it was believed that that position was inadequately
defended, and upon acting on this information, the Spaniards would be
baffled by discovering that the supposed forces, if indeed there had
been any previously present, had long since departed, leaving the place
deserted. Again and again the Spaniards were thus decoyed and beguiled,
and yet they continued to act on the misleading advices, because failure
to do so might lose them a real victory, should one message out of the
many really prove reliable.
Thus were the patriots learning to match Spanish cunning with a new,
peculiar and ironic brand of their own, and were turning the tables on
the tormentors who had for so many years mistreated them and laughed at
their protests. It will be recalled that Bayamo had been burned by the
revolutionists, when it seemed apparent that their capital city was
about to fall in to the hands of the Spaniards, or at least, when it
seemed the part of prudence to surrender it. In spite of the fact that
this meant that the inhabitants would be rendered homeless, so strong
was the patriotic feeling in that city, that the destruction was done
with the consent of the populace. A thousand of these people now fell
into the hands of the Spaniards, and on February 14 were taken to
Manzanillo. The next day long expected reinforcements arrived from
Spain. They were small in number, it is true, only a thousand strong,
but conditions in Spain made it difficult for her to spare large numbers
of troops, and this was most fortunate for the cause of freedom, for
thus Spain was unable to send to Cuba a sufficient number of drilled
soldiers to offset the advantage which the little Cuban army had in its
acquaintance with the geography of the Island, and the physical
possibilities which it afforded for scattered and sporadic attacks in
unexpected quarters.
Captain-General Dulce, alarmed at the conditions which existed, and at
the failure of the Spanish army to subdue the revolution, and
undoubtedly spurred on by the Volunteers, who had no patience with his
conciliatory methods, changed his policy, and issued a proclamation,
thoroughly muzzling the press, to avoid the spreading of the news of the
extent of the revolution and the success of the revolutionists, and thus
endeavored to stem the influx of recruits into the Cuban Army. He also
established a military court martial, which planned to deal summarily
with the leaders of the revolution should any fall into their hands.
Next he proclaimed the expiration of the amnesty previously granted,
while he--true to type--softened this decree, probably as a bit of
insidious strategy, by offering to pardon all insurgents who would
surrender themselves, excluding the leaders, and those who had been
convicted--unrepresented at the trials, of course--of the crimes of
murder, arson and robbery. The underlying thought of this proclamation
probably was that the rank and file of the insurgents might surrender
and deliver their leaders into his hands for punishment. This was
accompanied by a demand upon the citizens of Havana for the sum of
$25,000,000 to support the government, and to aid it in carrying on its
campaign against the revolutionists.
He only too well knew that the sympathy of the people of the United
States, if not the secret sympathy of the government at Washington, was
with the Cubans, and not only Dulce himself but indeed all the leaders
of the Spanish cause lived in constant fear of private aid to the
insurgents from the United States, if not of possible governmental
intervention in their behalf. They well knew also that the Americans who
had made their homes on the Island, and who were deeply interested in
its commercial salvation, were all sympathizers in the cause of the
revolution, and felt that only through freedom from Spanish rule and a
resumption of peace could they hope to retrieve the fortunes which they
had invested, and now apparently sunk, in Cuban business ventures. That
these Americans, despite the censorship, were in communication with
their friends in their own country Dulce did not doubt, and that they
would urge the sending of relief to Cuba he felt certain. He therefore
applied to the United States Consul at Havana for the names of all
American residents of Cuba, that he might keep them under surveillance,
check up their movements, and act, if necessary, to prevent them from
either personally, or through their influence in the United States,
lending any material aid to the revolutionists.
In spite of the Captain-General's precautions, his fears were realized.
Aid did reach the revolutionists from the United States, in the shape of
guns and ammunition, accompanied by American sympathizers, who in some
fashion ran the gauntlet of the Spanish navy in Cuban waters. The Cuban
Army advanced against La Guanaja, wrested it from the Spaniards, and
proceeded to fortify it with American guns, manned by American gunners.
The town was believed by both of the belligerents to be impervious to
attack from the land, and the Spanish commanders therefore dispatched a
naval force to conquer it from the sea. The bombardment which ensued
dashed the hopes of the revolutionists, so far as the effectiveness of
their fortifications were concerned, as against a naval attack. The
Spanish shells wrought great damage, and when they had reduced the
defenses, a landing was made and the town was retaken by assault. The
Cubans were therefore forced to beat a hurried retreat to the
surrounding country, and the Spaniards were left in complete control of
the city. Now they had a decided advantage, for from this vantage-point
they were able to send aid to Puerto Principe, and, on February 23, two
battalions were hurried thither. Meanwhile, General Lesca, who had been
stationed at La Guanaja, set out to attack the Cuban Army at Colonia de
Santo Domingo and in this expedition he was reinforced by the troops
under General Puello. The Spanish army in this encounter greatly
outnumbered the patriots but the latter fought with the courage of
desperation; a wholesale slaughter ensued in which both sides suffered
enormous losses; and when, worn out, the Cubans withdrew, the result
might well be termed a draw, for neither side could justly claim
victory.
During the month of February, the revolutionists harassed the Spaniards
in the vicinity of Santa Cruz, but not with their usual success, the
odds being largely in favor of the latter. On February 25, a band of
revolutionists surprised the town of La Lujas, situated only a short
distance from Cienfuegos. Before opposition could be mustered, they took
possession of the town, and with it the uniforms of the city guards, and
all the arms, ammunition and horses which they could find, and they also
burned the police archives, thus destroying any records at that place
which might later be used against individual revolutionists, in the
event of an ultimate Spanish victory.
But, with it all, neither army was making any particular progress toward
a decisive victory. The balance of advantage swung first one way and
then the other. The Spanish found their well drilled troops unable to
match themselves with any degree of effectiveness against the
resourcefulness of the revolutionists, and their methods of warfare. The
attempts at mediation had failed; indeed had been thwarted by the
treacherous action within their own body--by the murder which was staged
by the Volunteers' faction. On the other hand, as yet Cuba had been able
to secure but little aid from the one country on the sympathy of the
citizens of which she might count. The United States had far from come
up to expectations in the assistance she had thus far unofficially
rendered. Perhaps this was because the authorities in that country had
no desire to embroil themselves with Spain, and kept a close watch on
the movements of suspected Cuban partisans. The Cubans were able to make
life exceedingly uncomfortable for the Spanish forces, and for Spaniard
sympathizers throughout the country, but with their present numbers and
equipment they had little hope of gaining a decision of the hostilities
in their favor. The best they could do was to keep the country in a
state of uproar, gaining what little advantage they could, and meanwhile
the inhabitants were facing starvation, the destruction of their
holdings, the burning of their buildings, and the devastation of a
fruitful country. The constant operations of marauders, who took
advantage of the Cuban method of warfare, to pillage and steal and lay
in ruin various portions of the country, as well as the fear of attack
from the guerrillas, were driving the farmers and their families to the
protection of the cities, and thus farms were standing idle and
uncultivated, and there was bound to be an even greater food shortage.
The Government was being aided by the church, and the neutrals,
despairing of any change in conditions for the better, were, whenever
the opportunity presented itself, emigrating from the Island to regions
less tumultuous, where living conditions were not so uncertain and
dangerous.
The Government was finding conditions intolerable, and decided to make a
strenuous effort to dislodge the revolutionists from their inland
strongholds and thus to compel them to abandon their badgering methods,
and to come forth into the open and give battle, well knowing that, if
this could be accomplished, the odds would all be in favor of the
Spaniards. Therefore, a special company of Volunteers was assembled,
with fresh reinforcements direct from Spain, and they were sent into the
fastnesses of the interior, in a strong endeavor to drive out the
Cubans. Simultaneously General Letona conducted a vigorous campaign in
relief of Cienfuegos, and General Puello organized small parties which
were sent out on marauding expeditions. But the principal result of
these efforts was to throw the Island into a still greater state of
excitement, and to encourage robbers and bandits, who, taking advantage
of the consequent uproar, seized the favorable opportunity for pillage.
Thus their devastation was added to the troubles of the already much
tried farmers in Cuba. The country around Holguin and Gibara was in a
state beyond description, and the life of every citizen, no matter what
his sympathies, was in constant danger.
Then a very serious battle took place between the forces under General
Lesca, and an army of four thousand Cubans. The Spaniards were advancing
from La Guanaja to the succor of Puerto Principe, when the two forces
met. The Cubans were well entrenched on the Sierra de Cubitas. They were
principally infantry, and they had the Spanish at a disadvantage. The
engagement might have ended in an utter defeat for that portion of the
Government Army, had it not been that they were well supplied with
artillery, which did effective work against the Cubans, and therefore
the Spaniards were able to escape, though with heavy losses.
Early in the next month, March, 1869, the Cubans obtained--from what
source is not disclosed, but it may be that their American sympathizers
were responsible--large accessions of artillery, with a goodly supply of
ammunition, which a small body of not over a hundred men, under
Cisneros, were able to convey to Mayari, where General Quesada was
stationed with seven thousand Cubans. When we consider that heretofore
the revolutionists had been much more blessed with enthusiasm and belief
in the ultimate triumph of their just cause than they had with the
material means for accomplishing that end, it is not difficult to
picture with what new hope and confidence this much needed assistance
was received. Now more than ever they began to feel the certainty of
final success, and to be imbued with a steadfast purpose to fight to the
last ditch for the cause of freedom.
CHAPTER XII
At the time of the beginning of the Cuban insurrection the United States
was undergoing one of its quadrennial political campaigns, and March 4,
1869, saw General Ulysses S. Grant inducted to the Presidency--the man
who had led the nation to victory in the Civil War and had thus
maintained the union of the United States of America; a soldier of the
highest character, and one whose sympathies were keenly enlisted in
behalf of the Cuban revolution. When this news reached the Cuban leaders
they at once addressed to him an appeal for recognition, which ran as
follows:
* * * * *
"To his Excellency, the President of the United States:
"Sir:
"The people of Cuba, by their Grand Supreme Civil Junta, and through
their General-in-Chief, Señor Cespedes, desire to submit to your
Excellency, the following among other reasons, why your Excellency, as
President of the United States, should accord to them the belligerent
rights and a recognition of their independence.
"Because from the hearts of nineteen-twentieths of the inhabitants of
the island go up prayers for the success of the armies of the republic;
and from the sole and only want of arms and ammunition these patient
people are kept under the tyrannical yoke of Spain.
"Because the republic has armies numbering over 70,000 men, actually in
the field and doing duty. These men are organized and governed on the
principles of civilized warfare. The prisoners whom they take--and so
far they have taken three times as many as their enemies have taken from
them--are treated in every respect as the prisoners of war are used and
treated by the most civilized nations of the earth. In the hope of
recognition by the United States, they have never yet in a single
instance retaliated death for death, even in cases of the most provoking
nature.
"Because the Spanish authorities have almost invariably brutally
murdered the soldiers of the armies of the republic who have surrendered
to them, and have recently issued an official order requiring their
military forces hereafter instantly to kill and murder any prisoner of
the republic who surrenders. This is due, the order cheerfully tells us,
to save trouble and vexation to the Spanish civil authorities. This is
an outrage the civilized nations of the earth ought not to allow.
"Because the United States is the nearest civilized nation to Cuba,
whose political institutions strike a responsive chord in the hearts of
all Cubans. The commercial and financial interests of the two peoples
being largely identical and reciprocal in their natures, Cuba earnestly
appeals for the unquestionable right of recognition.
"Because the arms and authority of the Republic of Cuba now extend over
two-thirds of the entire geographical area of the island, embracing a
very great majority of the population in every part of the island.
"Because she has a navy in course of construction which will excel in
point of numbers and efficiency that heretofore maintained by the
Spanish authorities in these waters.
"Because these facts plainly show to the world that this is not a
movement of a few discontents, but the grand and sublime uprising of a
people thirsty for liberty and determined with this last effort to
secure to themselves and their posterity those unquestioned
rights--liberty of conscience and freedom of the individual.
"Finally, because she is following but in the footsteps of Spain herself
in endeavoring to banish tyrannical rulers, and in their stead place
rulers of her own choice, the people of Cuba having a tenfold more
absolute and potent right than Spain had, because Cuba's rulers are sent
without her voice or consent by a foreign country, accompanied by and
with swarms of officials to fill the various offices created only for
their individual comfort, drawing their maintenance and support from the
hard earnings of the natives of the soil.
"Allow us to add, with the greatest diffidence and sensitiveness, that
the difference between the rebellion in the United States and the
present revolution in Cuba is simply that in the former a small minority
rebelled against laws which they had a voice in making, and the
privilege of repealing; while in the case of Cuba, we are resisting a
foreign power in crushing us to the earth, as they have done for
centuries, with no appeal but that of arms open to us, and appointing
without knowledge, voice, advice or consent, tyrannical citizens of
their own country to rule us and eat our substance.
"Patria y Libertad!
"Approved by the Supreme Junta and ordered approved
By SEÑOR GENERAL CESPEDES,
Commander in Chief Republican Forces in Cuba.
Headquarters in the Field, March 1, 1869."
President Grant was strongly inclined to grant this petition, and in
this he was upheld by his most trusted friend and advisor, General
Rawlins. In consequence, he prepared on August 19, 1869, a proclamation
by which he recognized the insurgents as belligerents, the result of
which would have been to legalize the shipment of arms to them.
Unfortunately for the Cuban cause, though doubtless fortunately for the
United States, there was at the head of the State Department of the
United States a man of cooler judgment than General Grant, and one whose
emotions of pity were not so easily moved. This was the Secretary of
State, Hamilton Fish. Before Grant's proclamation could become
effective, it was necessary for the Secretary of State to sign, seal and
publish it, and this Mr. Fish refused to do. He felt that to do so would
constitute a grave error in diplomacy, and one which might have
far-reaching detrimental effects for the United States. It was his
judgment that the President had been betrayed by his sympathies, and he
felt it incumbent upon himself, as chief of the Department of State, to
restrain him from making a bad mistake. There was to be taken into
consideration the fact that the United States, in the war so recently
fought for the maintenance of the Union, had made vigorous protests
against the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign powers, and
Secretary Fish felt that the proclamation in favor of the Cuban
revolutionary government would stultify the course of the United States
government in that matter. Indeed, in sound judgment, it was impossible
to deny that the Confederates of the South were more justly entitled to
recognition, under all the circumstances of both cases, than were the
Cuban revolutionists. Fish felt that the condition in Cuba, at that
time, at any rate, did not merit the official recognition of the United
States government, and he was not backward in conveying his conviction
to General Grant. Then he simply pigeon-holed the proclamation and let
it die a natural death in musty obscurity. Upon second thought, General
Grant saw the soundness of Fish's conclusions, and not only did not
register a protest, but took occasion some months later to thank Fish
for his intervention, and the suppression of the proclamation.
[Illustration: MIGUEL DE ALDAMA]
MIGUEL DE ALDAMA
A man of letters and of great wealth and social leadership, Miguel
de Aldama was a native of Havana and one of the foremost citizens
of that capital when the Ten Years' War began. He at once placed
his fortune and himself at the disposal of his country, and was
appointed by President Cespedes to be Agent of the Cuban Republic
in New York. To that place he was reappointed by President Cisneros
Betancourt. He served in that capacity throughout the war, to the
great advantage of the patriot cause.
Meanwhile, reports of the cruelties of Spanish soldiers began to
penetrate the ears of American citizens. It was reported, and pretty
well authenticated, that disgusting atrocities were the order of the
day, when the Spanish troops found in their path anyone, male or female,
who was not in a position to resist them. There were stories of the
raping of little children before the eyes of their mothers, and of
mothers in the presence of their children, of the crucifixion, and
hanging by the thumbs of old men, and even of able bodied persons, who
happened to fall defenseless into the hands of the Spaniards. Tales of
barbarity to prisoners, even to the extent of roasting them alive, fired
the rage of justice-loving American citizens, and again touched the kind
heart of their President. To these reports were added others, less
revolting, but touching the commercial sense of the nation. American
property in Cuba was being destroyed, and American citizens were being
molested and restrained from the peaceful pursuit of their business.
American commerce was impeded and losses were suffered. It was recalled
that Spain had been prompt to recognize the Confederacy as a
belligerent power, and it seemed but the irony of justice, and a fair
sort of retaliation, that now the United States should give recognition
to those who were rebelling against Spain's misrule. But Fish was deaf
to all pleas in behalf of the Cubans, and resolutely blocked all
attempts to secure recognition for them. He argued and pleaded with the
President with such eloquence that presently he seemed to have him
convinced that the cause of freedom in Cuba was not yet worthy of the
recognition of the United States. In consequence, in his annual message,
in December, 1869, President Grant, less than four months after his
unpublished proclamation of recognition, declared that "the contest has
at no time assumed the conditions which amount to a war in the sense of
international war, or which would show the existence of a political
organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recognition of
belligerency." He added that "the principle is to be maintained,
however, that this nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of
belligerency either to a people struggling to free themselves from a
government they believed to be oppressive, or to independent nations at
war with each other."
It is needless to say that this position was a great disappointment to
the Cubans, and seemed to them utterly at variance with what they might
have expected from a nation so lately torn by Civil War, and which had
shown such keen individual sympathies with the cause of the freedom of
Cuba. However, from that time on, the United States, officially, at
least, showed the greatest patience--a patience which seemed almost
unbelievably enduring--toward the hardships which the Spanish
authorities put upon innocent Americans, and was indefatigably zealous
in its efforts to prevent violations of neutrality on the part of
sympathetic United States citizens. That there was some bitterness in
the hearts of the Cuban leaders, who felt they had a right to expect the
support of their sister republic, and a country which had against such
odds won her own independence, it is easy to believe, and there were
many who felt that this was a righteous indignation.
But during the months in which the Secretary of State and the somewhat
unwilling President of the United States were shaping this policy, the
war in Cuba was continuously waged. On March 7, 1869, a few days after
the Cubans addressed their petition to the United States government, the
Spanish attacked a strong Cuban position at Macaca, and were successful
in ousting the revolutionists. This disheartening occurrence was
followed by defeats for the Cubans, first at Mayari, where Spanish
forces under General Valcosta were victorious over a small army of which
General Cespedes was in command--General Cespedes, however, effecting a
withdrawal with safety to his own person and a part of his
supporters--and again at Jiguani, where it was the Cubans who made the
attack upon a Spanish force under General Valmaseda, only to meet defeat
at the hands of the Spaniards, and to be forced to flee in disorder to
their mountain fastnesses.
Meanwhile reinforcements came from Spain; this time as before, not a
large number, being only about twelve hundred men, but enough materially
to aid the governmental army, and to strengthen its morale. The
Captain-General also endeavored to win the hearts of the timid by
issuing a proclamation which declared important concessions in tax
regulations. A fifty per cent reduction was made in the direct taxation
on plantations, on cattle and on country real estate, as well as in
those taxes only recently levied on merchants and tradesmen. As a
crowning concession the taxes due for the last quarter of the year
1868-1869 were nullified. But it was apparently impossible for Spain to
make concessions without accompanying them with demands of some sort to
offset her seeming generosity. Therefore the Captain-General took
occasion to levy some new duties: On muscovado sugar, if shipped under
the flag of Spain, a tax of 16¢ a hundred weight, while shipment under a
foreign flag called for an additional 4¢ duty; on boxed sugar shipped
under the Spanish flag, a tax of 75¢ a box, while if under a foreign
flag, 12¢ additional; on every hogshead of sugar shipped under the flag
of Spain a tax of $1, and if under a foreign flag, 75¢ additional; a tax
on molasses of 50¢ a hogshead, and on rum of $1 for an equal quantity.
It will be recalled that the Cuban patriots had by their proclamation of
December 27, 1868, granted freedom to all slaves on the island. They now
began a campaign to enforce this decree by removing, from all
plantations of which their armies were able to take possession, the
slaves for service in the Cuban army, and to make their liberation
doubly sure, burning the buildings, and laying waste to the crops. In
the districts around Sagua and Remedios there were nine thousand
insurgents engaged in this work. This action it would be hard to excuse,
if there were not taken into consideration the fact that the Cubans had
endured such grievous wrongs at the hands of the Spaniards that they
would have been much less than human if they had not had some desire to
retaliate; and, after all, the retaliation which spoke most forcefully
to the Spaniard was that which attacked his worldly goods and his
pocketbook.
But to offset these actions, the Spanish at the same time proved
themselves victorious in several engagements. On March 18, at Alvarez,
they defeated the Cuban forces; at about the same time, at Guaracabuya,
they won another victory, with Cuban losses numbering one hundred and
thirty-six killed outright; and two thousand Cubans, under Generals
Morales and Villamil, were routed by the Spaniards at Potrerillo. In
this last affair the patriots suffered severe losses; three hundred
wounded, two hundred and five killed, and twenty-one taken prisoners,
together with many horses killed or captured. They were also obliged to
retreat in such haste that they had to abandon a considerable quantity
of ammunition, which was seized by the enemy. It is only necessary to
add that the Spanish lost but one officer, one private and one of their
number taken prisoner, to demonstrate the disheartening nature of the
encounter. But the Cubans were, as has been stated, drafting large
quantities of slaves into their army, and this victory for the Spaniards
was a signal proof that the slaves were not good material for soldiers.
Besides this, the patriots who took part in this engagement suffered
severely a lack of proper equipment.
The tide seemed to be turning against the Cubans, and in the days that
followed they were to face still further losses. The quality of the
recruits which were being added to the patriot army did not increase its
valor, skill or morale. They lacked guns, and those which they had were
of antiquated pattern; there was a woeful scarcity of larger arms and
ammunition, and the troops were weary and poorly fed. Against that
portion of the Cuban army stationed in the Villa Clara district the
Spanish now began to concentrate a large army, pouring troops into that
district until they were ten thousand strong. The Cubans were
outnumbered, and lacked the weapons of warfare, they had been
outmanoeuvred, and suffered tremendous losses, and yet another crushing
defeat lay before them, for on March 20, two thousand Cubans who were,
as they fondly believed, strongly entrenched at Placitas, were put to
flight by a small body of Spanish troops, highly skilled and well armed
it is true, but numbering only three hundred regulars and a small
company of the much feared Volunteers.
Emboldened by these successes, the Captain-General again shifted his
position, and issued an order, to be made the excuse for an outrage
against American shipping, which was severely to tax the friendliness of
international relations. The Spanish government was ever haunted by the
bugbear of American intervention, and doubtless the decree in question
was issued as a preventive against such action, for the Spanish well
knew that should such intervention once take place their cause would be
irrevocably lost, and with it their dominion over Cuba. The decree
provided for the confiscation on the high seas of any and all vessels
carrying either men, arms or ammunition or all three, or indeed anything
which might be construed as intended for material aid to the
revolutionists, and further provided that "all persons captured on such
vessels without regard to their number will be immediately executed."
Viewed in the calm light of history this decree would seem bound, if
enforced, to be almost suicidal to the Spanish interests, being in
opposition to law and justice, and in express violation of existing
treaty obligations between Spain and the United States, and thus bound
to bring a storm of protest from the United States government.
As if this were not enough, Dulce followed this action by another
decree, promulgated on April 1, which prohibited the transfer of
property, except by the direct consent of the government, and this
prohibition included the sale of produce of all sorts, stocks, shares in
mercantile projects, and real estate, together with many minor
provisions; while by a third decree, which shortly followed, he ordered
the confiscation of the estates of American citizens who were suspected
of sympathy or complicity with the revolutionists. Naturally, the United
States government made a strong protest against such summary action,
rightly declaring it to be in violation of the provisions of the treaty
of 1795.
The Cuban troops now began a more or less concentrated attack on
Trinidad, and to relieve the pressure at this point, the Spanish sent a
large force toward Puerto Principe, hoping to weaken the Cuban army at
the former place, because of the necessity of withdrawing men to combat
the Spanish army at the latter. The Spanish government also sought to
offset the damage and destruction done by the insurgents to property of
loyalists by issuing a decree proclaiming their intention to confiscate
the property of all individuals who were absent from home without a
governmental excuse--which would of course include all landowners who
were fighting in the Cuban army--and providing for a detail of men to
protect against the revolutionists every estate thus taken.
On April 17 battle was again joined by the Cubans under Colonel
Francisco Rubalcava and a Spanish force under the combined leadership of
Generals Letona, Escalante and Lesca. The fighting which ensued taxed
the Cuban resources to the utmost. All day long the battle raged, and
when both sides were worn out with combat, the result was not decisive
for either army, while one hundred and eighty Spanish troops and two
hundred Cubans lay dead under the stars.
For nearly two weeks thereafter there was a period of quiet and
recuperation on the part of the Cubans, with the exception of a number
of minor skirmishes, but on May 3 the belligerents again met in battle
at Las Minas, when twelve hundred Spaniards, under the command of
General Lesca, and a large Cuban force under General Quesada, fought in
the most violent of hand to hand conflicts. Frightful butchery ensued,
for this time victory again returned to the Cuban standards, and the
Spanish were forced to retreat in disorder, leaving behind them one
hundred and sixty killed and three hundred wounded, while the Cuban
losses were two hundred killed and an equal number wounded.
To add to the rejoicing over this victory, small as it was, a few days
previous the Cubans had had a practical demonstration of the sympathy of
United States citizens for their cause, and of the ability of those
citizens to evade the drastic provisions of the government against any
display of that feeling. On May 1 there arrived at Mayari a body of
three hundred Americans, under the leadership of General Thomas Jordan,
a tried veteran of the Civil War, in which he had been an officer in the
Confederate Army. He was an experienced soldier, who had had a fine
military training and had been graduated from West Point. This in itself
might have been quite enough to put new heart into the Cuban leaders,
but General Jordan had brought with him not only reinforcements but
arms, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies and food. A detailed list
of this material included four thousand long range rifles, three hundred
new pattern Remington rifles, five hundred revolvers, twelve pieces of
artillery of various sizes including twelve, twenty-four and thirty-two
pound cannon, and a large supply of ammunition for these arms. And the
relief did not stop here, for there were a thousand pairs of shoes, and
clothing for one thousand persons, two printing-presses, medical
supplies, and quantities of rice, tinned biscuits, salt meat, flour and
salt. This meant food and arms for at least six thousand men, and there
is no wonder that there seemed to be occasion for the wildest rejoicing
on the part of those who were so manfully and against such great odds
engaged in upholding the cause of freedom in Cuba. Now the patriots
might oppose the Spanish with at least six thousand well equipped men,
and they had also acquired in the person of General Jordan an officer
whose aid in drilling raw recruits could not be overestimated.
The Cubans did not get their booty to headquarters without some
opposition from the Spaniards. That was hardly to be hoped, since their
every movement was reported to the government by Spanish spies, and it
would have been impossible for an expedition like the one in question to
land without detection. But they were able to resist all attempts to
wrest their supplies from them.
Around Trinidad and Cienfuegos fighting was constant. Each day saw its
skirmishes, and there were some violent engagements, all of which left
matters pretty much as they had been so far as any victory of a decisive
character for either side was concerned. The Cubans were, however, able
to disperse a body of Spanish troops which were advancing toward Las
Tunas in the hope of relieving the citizens of that place, which was
also in a state of siege. The Spaniards were bearing a quantity of
provisions for the city, and in their flight these were abandoned and
fell into the hands of the Cubans.
When matters were succeeding in a manner more or less favorable to the
Spanish cause, the Volunteers were quiet and inclined to discontinue
temporarily their opposition to Dulce, but when things took a turn for
the worse he was always made the scapegoat. Hence the Volunteers were
renewing their attacks on his policies, although for the time being he
had been suffering one of his periodic reversions to severity. This
time, the Volunteers were successful in obtaining the recall of Dulce as
Captain-General. They simply drove him out by mob force, on June 4, and
put into his place one Señor Espinar. This appointment was an arbitrary
act, which the Spanish government refused to confirm, and therefore
Espinar's political life was cut short almost at its inception, and
General Caballero de Rodas became Captain-General of the island. Now
Rodas should have been a man entirely to the liking of the Volunteers.
He had won for himself a reputation for cruelty toward the republican
insurgents in Spain while he was stationed at Cadiz, which had caused
him to be called "the butcher of Cadiz." He evidently felt it incumbent
to live up to his title, for now the Spanish troops were incited to
unspeakable cruelties.
Promptly on taking office, Rodas began his career with the decree of
July 7, 1869, which he fondly hoped would prevent further aid from
reaching the revolutionists from the United States or from any other
country. The proclamation was as follows:
"The custody and guardianship of the coasts of this island, of the keys
adjacent, and the waters appertaining to the territory, being of the
greatest importance, in order to suppress the insurgent bands that have
hitherto maintained themselves by outside assistance, and determined as
I am to give a vigorous impulse to the pursuit of them, and with a view
of settling the doubts entertained by our own cruisers as to the proper
interpretation of the decree promulgated by this superior political
government under dates of November 9, 1868, and February 18 and 26 and
March 24 last, I have decided to amplify and unite the aforesaid orders
and substitute for them the following, which, by virtue of the authority
vested in me by the nation, I decree:
"Article I.--All parts situated between Cayo Bahia de Cadiz and Point
Maysi on the north side, and from Point Maysi to Cienfuegos on the
south, with the exception of Sagua La Grande, Caibarien, Nuevitas,
Gibara, Baracoa, Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, Santa Cruz,
Zaza, Trinidad and Cienfuegos, where there are custom houses, will
continue closed to the import and export trade, both by foreign and
coasting vessels. Those who may attempt the entry of any closed ports,
or to open communications with their coasts, will be pursued, and, on
being captured, are to be tried as violators of the law.
"Article II.--Vessels carrying gunpowder, arms and warlike stores, will
likewise be judged in accordance with the law.
"Article III.--The transportation of individuals in the service of the
insurrection is by far more serious than that of contraband of war, and
will be deemed an act of decided hostility, and the vessel and crew
regarded as enemies to the state.
"Article IV.--Should the individuals referred to in the foregoing
article come armed, this will be regarded, _de facto_, as proof of their
intentions, and they will be regarded as pirates, as will also be the
case with the crew of the vessel.
"Article V.--In accordance with the law, vessels captured under an
unknown flag, whether armed or unarmed, will also be regarded as
pirates.
"Article VI.--In free seas adjacent to those of this island, the
cruisers will limit themselves to their treatment of denounced vessels,
or those who render themselves suspicious, to the rights given in the
treaties between Spain and the United States in 1795, Great Britain in
1835, and with other nations subsequently; and if, in the exercise of
these rights, they should encounter any vessels recognized as enemies of
the integrity of the territory, they will carry them into port for legal
investigation and judgment accordingly.
"CABALLERO DE RODAS."
Of course this action was incited and backed by the Volunteers, and met
with their heartiest approval, but if either they or their mouthpiece,
Rodas, had any real idea that such a decree would act as a deterrent
against aid being sent to the Cubans, they misjudged the temper of the
friends of the revolution in America. It simply made them aware of the
necessity of increased secrecy and caution, but did not one whit curtail
their enterprises.
To reinforce his action, Rodas promptly issued another decree against
the insurgents in the following contemptuous terms:
"The insurrection, in its impotency, being reduced to detached bands,
perverted to the watchword of desolation and daily perpetrating crimes
that have no precedent in civilized countries, personal security and the
rights of justice, the foremost guarantees of person and property,
imperiously demand that said insurrection be hastened to its end, and
without consideration toward those who have placed themselves beyond the
pale of the law. The culprit will not be deprived of the guarantee of
just impartiality in the evidence of his crime, but without delay
admissible in normal periods, which would procrastinate or paralyze the
verdict of the law and its inexorable fulfilment.
"As the guardians of the national integrity, the protection of the
upright and pacific citizen, fulfilling the duties of my office, and in
virtue of the authority conceded to me by the Government of the nation,
I hereby decree:
"Article I.--The decrees promulgated by this superior political
government under date of the 12th and 13th of February last shall be
carried out with vigor.
"Article II.--The crimes of premeditated incendiarism, assassination and
robbery, by armed force and contraband, shall be tried by a council of
war.
"Article III.--The courts of justice will continue in the exercise of
their attributes, without prejudice, however, of having submitted to me
such cases as special circumstances may require.
"CABALLERO DE RODAS."
Thus, in high-sounding phrases and treacherous hypocrisy, did the
"butcher of Cadiz" proclaim himself the guardian of persons and
property. If his pronouncements had not had too grim a significance,
they might have filled the Cuban patriots with the spirit of ironical
laughter, such a divergence was there between his character and his past
record, and the new rôle which he now announced himself as about to
play.
Naturally this action did not pass unnoticed by the United States
government. On July 16, the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, informed
the Spanish minister at Washington that Rodas's decree of July 7
interfered with the commerce of the United States in a manner which
could only be tolerated in times of war; that the United States would
maintain her right to carry contraband in times of peace, and would
permit no interference with her vessels on the high seas, except in time
of war; that if Spain was in a state of war with Cuba it was incumbent
on her to proclaim the fact; and further adding that the United States
would regard any attempt to enforce Rodas's decree as a recognition by
Spain of the existence of a state of war in Cuba, and would govern
itself accordingly. Spain was in no position and had no desire to
declare Cuba in a state of war. Such action would wrest from her certain
advantages which in her present ambiguous position she was prepared to
enjoy to the utmost. She at once recognized that Rodas's action was
entirely too arbitrary, and might be productive of a most embarrassing
situation, and therefore acting under instructions from the Spanish
government, he at once receded from his arrogant position and his decree
was materially modified.
American commerce with Cuba had been exceedingly profitable to those
engaged in it, and, under the disturbed condition of affairs in the
island, not only did it suffer, but the commercial interests of American
residents in Cuba were badly jeopardized. General Grant still nursed his
secret good will toward the cause of the revolutionists, although the
advice of his Secretary of State had put a temporary restraint on it. It
may be that this new indignity which Spain had sought to impose not only
on the insurgents but also on American interests spurred him to action.
However, that may be, when Daniel E. Sickles was appointed United States
Minister to Spain, on June 29th, 1869, he was instructed at once on his
arrival in Madrid to offer to the Spanish government the good offices of
the United States in an effort to bring about an understanding and
adjustment between the revolutionists and the governmental party and to
effect a cessation of the hostilities which were rapidly ruining both
the Creoles and the Spanish landowners alike. Sickles received the most
careful instructions to proceed in a conciliatory fashion, and in no
manner to imply any recognition by the United States of the belligerency
of Cuba. To guide him in his work, terms were drafted as a basis for the
negotiations and they embodied the following points:
1. The acknowledgment by Spain of the independence of Cuba.
2. Cuba to pay Spain an indemnity under conditions to be thereafter
agreed upon. In case such sum could not immediately be paid in full, the
unpaid portion to be secured by the pledge of export and import duties,
in a manner to be agreed upon.
3. The abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba.
4. The declaration of an armistice pending negotiations for a final
settlement.
And, furthermore, Sickles was empowered, if necessary, to suggest that
the United States would guarantee the payment by Cuba of the indemnity.
Sickles took up the negotiations with the Spanish government at Madrid
in accordance with his instructions, and after much consideration the
Spanish government agreed to accept the good offices of the United
States government, provided it was not required to treat with the
revolutionists on a basis of equality--that would be too galling to the
sensitive Spanish dignity--but that it would be allowed to take the
position of making concessions to a rebellious people, such concessions
of course to be couched in legal terms, and carried out in accordance
with constitutional forms and with all due solemnity. Above all, the
result of the negotiations was not to be regarded as a treaty between
armed powers on an equal footing. In support of her position, Spain made
the following demands, as constituting the basis of settlement to which
she would agree:
1. The revolutionists to lay down their arms and return to their homes.
2. Whereupon, Spain would grant a full and complete amnesty.
3. The question of the independence of Cuba to be submitted to vote by
their own vote whether they desired independence or not.
4. Provided a majority vote was cast for independence Spain would grant
it, the Cortes consenting, upon the payment of a satisfactory sum by
Cuba, or the partial payment and guarantee by the United States of the
remainder.
When Sickles submitted the result of his efforts to the government of
his own country, that government, well knowing that the Cubans would
never consent to the first two stipulations laid down by Spain, promptly
rejected them. Sickles again took up the matter with the Spanish
government, but they stood firm, and since there seemed no hope of an
agreement on any terms which would be acceptable to the revolutionists,
the matter was finally dropped.
Meanwhile Spain had been sending considerable reinforcements to Cuba,
and commenced an active campaign against the force under the command of
the American General Jordan. These were probably the best equipped and
best trained troops which the Cuban army had at its command, and they
were well fitted to administer a rebuff to the Spaniards, which they
did. The attacks of the Spaniards were all unsuccessful, and the Cubans
were elated by the certainty that in bravery and resources they were
more than a match for the Spanish army, and that, when they were
properly equipped they seemed to have the advantage. In these different
battles--none of them of very large scope--the Spanish lost four hundred
killed, wounded and taken prisoners. Meanwhile the Cubans attacked the
Spanish forces near Baja, a small town on the bay in the vicinity of
Nuevitas, and defeated three hundred marines under General Puello,
killing eighty of the enemy.
But the rainy season was approaching and soon caused a halt in
hostilities, while both armies were strengthening their positions
looking forward to the time when weather would permit a resumption of
the warfare. If the Spanish were obtaining reinforcements, the Cubans
also were, in spite of the Spanish blockade and the decrees of the
Captain-General, as well as the activities of the United States
officials, constantly receiving aid from the United States. This mainly
took the form of small expeditions from the southern states. However, at
the close of July there arrived a company of two hundred and
seventy-five recruits from the states of Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky,
bringing with them large stores of food, clothing, arms and ammunitions.
So it appeared that faith in the righteousness of the Cuban cause was
not confined to what were known as the southern states.
These men were placed under the direct command of General Quesada, and
thus reinforced he decided to make an effort to subdue and capture the
besieged Las Tunas. He set out to go thither with twelve hundred men.
All night long the fight raged on the outskirts of the town, and just as
the morning was breaking the Cubans made a triumphal entry. By two
o'clock the next afternoon the town was completely under their control.
When news of this victory reached the Spanish headquarters, a large
force was immediately dispatched to dislodge the Cubans, and spies
reporting to General Quesada that the Spanish troops sent against him
not only largely outnumbered his own, but also were bringing large
quantities of heavy artillery with them, he decided that to hold the
town would not be of sufficient importance--if indeed he could do so
against such odds--to risk an engagement. He, therefore, again retired.
He had been welcomed as a deliverer by the inhabitants of Las Tunas,
for they had suffered gross indignities under Spanish occupation, and
now many of them enlisted in the Cuban army, and accompanied General
Quesada on his retreat.
It may have been that the attempted intervention of the United States
government at Madrid led the Spanish government to believe that the time
had again arrived to temporize; at any rate, several concessions were
made in an attempt to pacify the insurgents, but without any perceptible
effect.
Not every attempt to bring aid from the United States to Cuba was
productive of results, and during the summer there had been a number of
efforts which were abortive, or which failed of execution. But just as
hope of a successful relief expedition was dying in the hearts of the
Cubans, a party of six hundred men with a quantity of rifles and a large
amount of ammunition arrived from that stronghold of Cuban sympathizers,
New Orleans. Meanwhile General Jordan communicated a request for aid to
his compatriots who composed the Cuban Junta in the City of New York. He
reported that the Cuban army was composed of twenty six thousand eight
hundred men, besides whom there were at least forty thousand freed
slaves, who were armed merely with machetes. He requested that seventy
five thousand stands of arms be in some manner dispatched to the Cubans,
and expressed the opinion that if this could be accomplished, in ninety
days the war would be determined in favor of the patriots.
Small bodies of Cubans were still carrying on guerrilla warfare wherever
it seemed most effective, and the plantations belonging to Spanish
sympathizers were suffering in consequence. The idea of this action was
not wanton destruction. The Cubans argued that it was from such sources
as the rich Spanish planters that Spain, by taxation, obtained revenues
which were enabling her to continue the war, and thus their own country
was being used to supply funds for her own destruction; and therefore
when they destroyed Spanish holdings, they were not only wreaking
vengeance on their tormentors, but they were also reducing the resources
which made the prosecution of the war possible. To offset these actions,
the Spanish commanders were countenancing the most scandalous
conditions, and allowing most wholesale torture and butchery of such
luckless patriots as fell into their hands, in which they could have had
no motive except to terrorize the Cubans, and to enjoy that peculiar
pleasure which they seemed to take in cruelty and murder. However, in
the month of November alone, the patriots were able to burn the
buildings on and destroy the productiveness of over a hundred and fifty
sugar plantations, which the Spanish government had confiscated under
the order which Dulce had promulgated. These were plantations which
belonged to soldiers in the Cuban army, and which had been seized by the
Spaniards in the absence of their owners, and the revenues of which had
been flowing into the Spanish treasury.
This work of destruction had the approval of General Cespedes, for he
felt that it was necessary to cut off every possible source of revenue
for Spain from the island, and so, in December, he issued a proclamation
calling on all loyal patriots to see that it was made impossible for
Spain to collect revenue from sugar and tobacco plantations on the
island, when by any action of patriots this could be avoided.
The revolutionists had been encouraged, not only by their friends in the
United States, but also by the sympathetic expressions of former Spanish
colonies in South America, who were now enjoying their own freedom. As
early as May 15, 1869, the President of the Republic of Peru expressed
to General Cespedes his good wishes, in a letter couched in the
following terms:
"The President of Peru sympathizes deeply with the noble cause of which
your Excellency constitutes himself the worthy champion, and he will do
his utmost to mark the interest that island, so worthy of taking its
place with the civilized nations of the world, inspires him with. The
Peruvian Government recognizes as belligerents the party which is
fighting for the independence of Cuba, and will strive its utmost to
secure their recognition as such by other nations; and likewise that the
war should be properly regulated in conformity with international usages
and laws."
This action on the part of Peru was followed by recognition of the
revolutionists on the part of other South American states of Spanish
origin. Action was taken on this subject in Colombia, in June, 1870,
when a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives proposing
that all the Spanish-American republics form a combination for the
active promotion of aid to Cuba, material and political, in her struggle
for independence. This bill was reported out of Committee, with the
following comments:
"1. The cause for which Cuban patriots fight is the same for which
Colombia fought incessantly from 1810 to 1824.
"2. The interests of self-preservation, and our duty as a civilized and
Christian nation, justify in the most complete manner Colombian
intervention.
"3. The aggressions of monarchial Europe against the liberty and
independence of America always have had and will have for a base Spanish
dominion in Cuba.
"4. The policy of the United States cannot serve as a guide to Colombia
on this occasion.
"5. The resources we may need for this war are not beyond our means.
"6. The time has arrived when Colombia should assume in the politics of
South America the position to which she is called by her topographical
situation, her historical traditions, her population, and her political
conquests."
In spite of this favorable report, and the fact that the bill passed the
House, the Senate rejected it.
Thus the struggle went on, the patriots fighting almost with the courage
of desperation, gaining a little here, and losing there, but always
holding before them the justice of their cause, and resolutely refusing
to admit the possibility of failure.
CHAPTER XIII
With the opening of the year 1870, the revolutionists had in the field
forty thousand well disciplined, and for the time being at least well
armed troops, who were under the command of efficient officers, and a
competent military organization. The movements of the troops were, so
far as possible, directed according to a concerted plan, and their
distribution through the island was governed in the same manner.
Spain had also increased her regular army, and her navy had been greatly
augmented, for she now had in Cuban waters, in addition to the
men-of-war which had at the beginning of the war been stationed there,
the following:
2 iron-clad vessels 48 guns
2 1st class wooden steamers 85 guns
6 2nd class wooden steamers 69 guns
1 3rd class wooden steamer 2 guns
4 steam schooners 11 guns
6 gunboats 6 guns
13 armed merchantmen 41 guns
2 sailing gunboats 2 guns
1 transport 4 guns
1 schoolship 6 guns
About the middle of April, 1870, an occurrence happened of which the
Spanish made great capital, spreading the tidings throughout the world.
Connected with it is one of the illustrious names in Cuban history--a
name which has been borne by some of the most famous Cuban patriots.
However, it has been said that there is no family which has not its
black sheep.
Augustin Arango gave his life for his country, when he was murdered by
the Spaniards, while on the way to the conference at Puerto Principe,
under safe conduct from the Spanish leaders. Two other members of the
Arango family were prominent in the support of the revolution. It
remained for Napoleon Arango to disgrace his family. He had taken an
active part in the revolution upon its inception, but had not been
accorded a high place in the revolutionary government, or the rank which
his ambition craved in the army, because his loyalty had been suspected.
Angry and disgruntled, he made an attempt to betray his friends to the
Spanish troops. His action was, however, discovered in time, and he was
arrested, tried, found guilty and sentenced to death. The high standing
of the Arango family, and the fact that his brother had given his life
for the cause of liberty, were urged as reasons for commuting his
sentence, and he was finally taken from confinement, and driven outside
the Cuban lines, with orders never to return under penalty of having the
death sentence executed. He quickly made his way to the Spanish army.
All this happened in 1869, and for almost a year Arango had been living
under Spanish protection. Suddenly, in April, 1870, the Spanish
authorities caused the report to be circulated that Arango had
surrendered himself to them, bringing with him a large force of Cubans,
who had declared their allegiance to Spain, and the Spanish Government
in Cuba cited this as an indication of the weakness of the patriots, and
as an augury of their approaching dissolution and of the ultimate
triumph of Spain. As a matter of fact, Arango had always been a trouble
maker and a potential traitor; he had been characterized by one Cuban
officer as a "poor, despised, worthless creature," and it is needless to
say that the whole story was false from beginning to end. However,
Arango issued a grandiloquent statement, in which he explained his
supposed action, and urged the Cuban revolutionists to lay down their
arms and follow his example. His open letter to Cuban patriots is to be
recalled as one of the curiosities of treason. It ran as follows:
"Cubans!"
"When Carlos Manuel de Cespedes thought of raising the cry of
Independence and expected the other cities of the Island to second him,
he received as a reply, from the jurisdiction of Holguin and Puerto
Principe, _that they would not support him_; and the Cinco Villas and
other towns maintained an attitude of expectancy. Notwithstanding this,
Cespedes said that he had no need of the _reminder_ and that he _would
pronounce_ on the 14th of October as he did in fact but somewhat in
advance of that date. Having so many reasons, as I have, to know the
country as well as the character and tendencies of its inhabitants; and
also what Spain would do and what was to be _expected of the people_ on
the Island; knowing moreover the policy of the United States and the
effects as well as the consequences that must follow a revolution
especially when it was an _extemporaneous outburst_; and being convinced
besides that owing to the heterogeneous nature of our population and to
the little _enlightenment_ of the masses, _nothing but extermination_
could be expected for Cuba, I took part in framing the reply given to
Cespedes by Puerto Principe, stating that _since he took pains to carry
out so wicked an idea, he should not be seconded by us_; and _we made
him responsible_ before posterity for the evils which he was about to
bring on Cuba.
"Cespedes and his inexperienced fellow-believers proclaimed Independence
at Yara without any supply of arms or munitions of war, without
provisions, clothing, etc., etc., with which to support their movement.
Ignorant of what revolution is, they bunched forth just like children
who heedlessly play with a wild beast, in entire ignorance of its
nature. The first movement of enthusiasm on the part of the people, and
of surprise on the part of the Government gave them the victory at
Bayamo; and they at once thought that the Independence of Cuba was
already secured. This was a fatal error, a sad illusion, which blunted
the common sense and gave _loose rein to their passions_. It was the
fatal error of those men who had not sufficient strength of will to be
able to wait. Ah! how fatal it is not to know when to wait!
"The Camagueyans were aroused at the enthusiastic shout for liberty, and
they wished to help their brethren of Bayamo, driven on by a sentiment
of fraternity and by their yet stronger love of liberty;--that noble
aspiration which God has imbued in the hearts of all men. I shared not
in these desires, although I did really in their sentiments, but I was
restrained by experience and by my knowledge of the situation. Anxious
to be of service to my country, I offered to go to Bayamo as a
representative from Puerto Principe, which I did.
"From my first steps into the Eastern Department, I was _convinced of
the error_ into which the people had fallen, and the _impossibility_ of
keeping up so unequal a contest. Moreover after studying the revolution
and sounding the feelings of the people, I discovered that they _did not
desire_ the movement but had been dragged into it; without noticing in
the beginning, owing to their blind precipitation, that they were not
prepared to receive a successful issue.
"In some private circles I spoke of the propriety of _changing_ the cry
for Independence into an acceptation of the _Cadiz programme_;--an idea
which was _well received_ and seemed so to change the course of affairs,
that I saw a great risk, being threatened by the few who persisted in
their original intention. I spoke to Cespedes and made known to him the
untimeliness of the revolution; that if he really desired the welfare of
Cuba, this latter consisted in withdrawing from a war that must be
ruinous and unsuccessful in the end; that the liberties offered in the
Cadiz programme _were perhaps even more than would suit Cuba_, etc.,
etc. Cespedes, _convinced_ by my reasoning _agreed to my proposals_; and
if he then failed to follow my advice it was, to use his own words,
because he feared that he would not be obeyed by those who had already
proclaimed for Independence. They did not understand the true policy
that should be followed in the guidance of returns. They began badly and
will end worse.
"On my return to Puerto Principe I found the country in insurrection,
_dragged on_ by two or three men who were led wrong by their
ill-digested ideas of liberty or by their own _private interest_, and
whose only wish was _revolution in whatever way it could be brought
about_. I grieved at this mistake, but without losing heart, and always
firm in advancing the prosperity of Cuba, I called a meeting which was
held at Clavellinas. There I made known the result of my observations
during my trip to Bayamo; and after some discussions, the force of my
arguments _prevailed_. With _one_ exception all agreed that we should
_adhere to the Cadiz programme_. I was afterwards appointed
General-in-Chief with _especial charge_ (thus it was set forth in the
record) _that I should have an interview with General Valmaseda for the
purpose noted above_.
"In a conversation with that gentleman he manifested the _best of
intentions_ in favor of a pacification, but stated that he was not
empowered by his government to make any concession. He offered
nevertheless to grant _effectual ones_, so soon as he could obtain the
power. He called my attention to this; that whatever the liberties which
should be granted to Cuba, the rights of the Cubans would have to be
regarded as attacked if they did not _send representatives_ to have a
hand in everything that might be done in regard to this country.
"I knew too well the _reasons_ of General Valmaseda, but fearing that my
fellow countrymen might not seize the force of his reasoning, we agreed
upon a truce for four days which I requested in order to call another
meeting more numerous and one which should decide the matter. This
meeting _took place_ at _Las Minas_; and there as well as at
Clavellinas, the majority was _not for a continuation of the war_ but
for _accepting the Cadiz programme_. Had a vote been taken, it is
certain that this choice _would have carried_; but I refrained from
calling a vote in order to be consistent with the Caunao district which
had made known through its delegate, Don Carlos L. Mola, Junior, that it
wished to have no voting; because in case thereof they would be bound to
its result; and that district was only in favor of _accepting_ whatever
the government _chose to grant them_.
"An _immense majority_ was in favor of the _programme_, and,
nevertheless, the war was kept up because those bent upon it spared no
means nor suggestion to entice away those in favor of the _Cadiz
programme_. That is to say that, taking advantage of family ties, of
friendships, and of an ill comprehended association, etc., etc., they
dragged along with them the _unwary_ and the _inexperienced_, who were
_reluctant_ enough and who now know their error, as I never wished to
force upon anyone (not even on my own brothers) my own ideas, nor to
make use of any other means than persuasion, in accordance with reason.
I confined myself to simply resigning the rank that had been conferred
on me and withdrew to my plantation. From that time forward, I busied
myself merely with enlightening the people, showing them the mistakes
into which they were led by those who were interested in the continuance
of the war.
"I have not sought to impose my notions upon anyone, but I do not any
the more accept those of others when my reason and my conscience reject
them. And I believe there is no right, nor law, nor reason to support
those who willingly, or through force, wish to force upon others their
own ideas however good or holy these may be.
"Those who are at the head of the Cuban government and guide the
revolution believe their triumph possible; they think their ideas are
correct and their way a good one. Very well; but not believing as they
do, I move aside from that government, whose _pressure and
arbitrariness_ are such, that it will not even admit neutrality in
others. I will not wage war against you; I will not take up arms against
you except in personal defence; but I separate from men who wish to
_impose_ their own notions on others _through force_. You are free to
think and act as you like, and I reserve to myself the same right and
act in accordance therewith.
"But there is more. In the position where, unfortunately and much
against my will, events have placed me, I occupy a place as a public
man, as a politician in Cuban politics; and I should not remain inactive
while I behold the destruction of Cuba and look out merely for my
personal safety under the protection of the Spanish government. No,
Gentlemen, I would then be a bad patriot, and I love my country before
liberty or rather I do not understand the former principle as divorced
from the latter. Both are intimately bound together; and in order that
the first be worthy, honorable and beneficial to humanity it cannot be
separated from the second.
"I am a Cuban, the same as yourselves, and I have consequently the same
right to busy myself with the welfare of my country. Let everyone have
his method; you pretend that you obey the popular will; that you are at
the head of government, because the will of the people and popular
choice; that you act in uniformity with ideas and sentiments of the
Cubans; and finally that you are provoking the welfare and prosperity of
Cuba. _I shall prove entirely the contrary._
"The favorable reception with which my ideas were met at Bayamo, the
meeting at Clavellinas, that at Las Minas, and the desire--almost
unanimous--to accept the _concessions_ offered by General Dulce, prove
sufficiently that the country wanted peace, nevertheless you maintain
war. Hence, popular suffrage in the country is but a chimera.
"Let us see how the actual government was formed. On the one side,
Carlos Manuel de Cespedes who, _for himself_ and in _his own name set
himself up_ as the _dictator_ of Cuba, _appointed_ a certain number of
deputies for the cast, at the famous meeting in Guaimaro. That is a fine
representation of popular will and an admirable republic, when the
deputies are not elected by the people! On the other hand, the assembly
at Puerto Principe was _illegally constituted_ and _entirely
unauthorized_; and, finally, some deputies from the Cinco Villas--the
only ones which perhaps held a legitimate representation--met together
and formed the actual government, which they should have called the
_Venetian_ rather than a _Cuban Republic_. They formed the government by
_sharing with each other the offices_, and they propose thus to shape
the destiny of Cuba. A _handful of men_ thus representing over a million
souls, who _have had no share_ in their nomination, does not assuredly
constitute popular election.
"The Cubans want the liberty of assemblage, freedom of speech, respect
of property, personal security, the liberty to leave the territory of
the Republic,--which is a right secured in all nations of the world to
every individual, they want, in fine, to be governed as the majority
choose, and not according to the will of a few. But _nothing of all this
is done_. Whoever puts forth ideas _contrary_ to those of the government
or any of its _functionaries_, is _threatened_ with four shots,
_property is a prey to the first comer_, who, with arms in hand can take
_possession_ of what suits him; the _lives_ of men are _sported_ with,
just as children sport with flies; and in fine whoever attempts to
abandon the government, even without intruding to wage war on it, is
persecuted to death. Hence the conduct of said government is not in
conformity with the ideas and sentiments of the country.
"If to all this be added the _arsons_ and the complete _destruction_ of
Cuban wealth, the _demolition of towns_ and--what must follow in the
end, can there be one sensible man who will maintain that all this
constitutes the prosperity and well-being of Cuba? Assuredly not.
"You employ _force, deceit, terror_ to _drag the masses_ on and carry
out whatever you judge beneficial for the cause of Cuba; I use only
reason, truth and the irrepressible logic of facts and of experience,
not the material argument of arms.
[Illustration: DOMINGO GOICOURIA]
"Well, then, knowing as I do that the country _does not want war_, and
that it continues therein under the _pressure_ of the Cuban government
in the one hand and on the others out of fear of the punishment which
the Spanish government might inflict, knowing as I do that nothing is to
be expected from the United States as it was attempted to make the
people believe; knowing that since the beginning of the Insurrection,
40,000 men have come from Spain, and that many more will come--a fact
generally unknown in this country; aware, as I am, that over 100,000 men
are under arms; that the coasts are well watched, and that the New York
Junta lacks resources to send material aid to the Insurrection; aware
moreover that the _Cuba_, the _Lillian_, the expedition of Goicouria and
others are lost resources; that the Insurrection is almost stifled in
the East and in the Cinco Villas; that in the Vuelta-Abajo far from
there being any secessionists, it is the country people themselves who
pursue the insurgents, as has taken place in Guines; knowing as I do
that the families to be met with in the fields are anxious to return to
the towns; and aware of the importance attached to my conduct, both in
the Island and abroad, I have made a new sacrifice for my country. I
have come forward with my family to prove by my example that I do not
believe in the triumph of the Insurrection, nor do I fear the Spanish
government; which animated as it is with the best of wishes is ready to
draw a veil over the past, provided the country can be pacified and many
tears, much blood and loss of property be spared.
DOMINGO GOICOURIA
General Domingo Goicouria, one of the pioneers of Cuban
independence was born in 1804, and was an active participant in the
Lopez expeditions and other uprisings. He was one of the leaders in
the beginning of the Ten Years' War, but was captured by the
Spaniards, at Cayo Guajaba, and was put to death at Havana on May
14, 1870.
"It is a sacrifice indeed, Gentlemen, for I expose my name to the
evil-tongued and make it the butt of false interpretations.
"I believe firmly that the happiness of Cuba and the welfare of humanity
consists in the pacification of this beautiful country, and maintain
this in the presence of the whole universe with my hand on my conscience
and head erect as becomes a man of honor.
"There is no man who is infallible, and perhaps my opinions and
determination may be wrong; but I can at least affirm that I am acting
in good faith, having for sole object in view the welfare of my country
and of humanity and making total abstraction of my own personality, as
well as of my own interests.
"I am not a time server but a man of fixed principles; I am convinced of
my opinions and feel the energy of my convictions. I now maintain what I
have maintained since the beginning of the revolution, even previous
thereto. My actual conduct is not therefore an apostasy but the
energetic continuance in my opinions and principles. These I do not mean
to impose on any one; merely make them known, inviting all to examine
them in every detail, and I am sure that they will follow my example.
But if blind to reason and unmindful of the events which for a year and
a half have supported my predictions, they persist in a struggle which I
believe hopeless, let them keep on, but without _extending the horrors
of war to families_. Let the women and children whom _government_ wishes
to _foster_ and _daily supports_ with rations of bread, rice, butter,
etc., come to the city; and let you keep on, if unfortunately you refuse
to listen to the voice of reason and patriotism, in that senseless
contest, which you must later repent having ever begun.
"Reflect a moment; examine thoroughly, and not merely the appearances of
the situation, and you will see that the existing strife is an
unqualifiable mistake, and its continuation an unparalleled
blindness.... What has become of the intelligence of Cubans? Where are
the energy and the influence of men of intelligence and character?
" ...Cubans! You have seen that I have always been a protector to the
people; that I have tried to enlighten them, that they might have a
participation in everything and know what they were doing, so as to
follow their own ideas and not be carried off by others; but what has
been the result? I was treacherously and illegally arrested, at the
request of those who wish to rule the masses; I was sentenced to death,
and over twenty times they have tried to put an end to my life....
Natural sense shows clearly that when an attempt is made to annihilate
him who speaks the _truth_, who _enlightens_ and never _deceives_; who
instead of speculating on his fellow countrymen and growing rich on the
revolution makes use of his own means to succor the masses (let all
Yaguajey speak); who never makes use of any pressure to enforce his
ideas, who allows himself to be ruined from the neglect of his own
interests, in order to give himself up solely to the welfare of his
country; does it not show clearly, I say, that the attempt is made only
because his adversaries have different pretensions and a different line
of conduct from his? Now what is this difference? It consists in
_violence, deceit_, the use of _force, spoliation_ of the neighbor for
_his own benefit_; it is despotism, based on the ignorance in which the
people are kept. I have sought to have the country governed as it is its
wish to be governed, in accordance with universal suffrage; your
government, _on the contrary_, pretend to rule it as they see fit. They
state that they want liberty for the people whilst the most _cruel
despotism_ weighs upon you....
"The people are told that from the United States will come reinforcement
and resources; that there are elements to spare for the continuation of
the war; that the Spanish soldier carries a cartridge-box and wears
shoes of rawhide and is short of provisions; that there are _no troops_
nor will _any come_ from Spain; that the _taxes are ruining_ the
country, etc., etc. Well, I ... tell you all this is _illusion, deceit_,
and a fatal chimera.
"The government of the United States does not busy itself nor can it
with the Cuban Insurrection. Look at Article 16 of the Treaty of 1797
and you will learn that they cannot favor the Cubans in the least
efficacious way without failing in national dignity and exposing
themselves to a coalition against themselves. That government is too
polished and financially shrewd to compromise itself in a war that would
entail serious mischief upon its commerce; and moreover there are other
motives that would be too lengthy to detail....
"I have just read a manifesto of Manuel Quesada, published in New York
under date of the 8th inst., in which he sets astray entirely the
opinion that should be formed of the state of insurrection. I shall tear
off the bandage. He states that the Cuban army numbers 61,000; that
there are here five powder factories; that firearms are manufactured
here as well as swords and bayonets; that there are thirteen public
schools and thirteen churches; that three thousand shoes are made every
week and four thousand hides tanned every month; that the soldier
receives for daily ration, beef, sugar, coffee, vegetables and rice at
his discretion, tobacco, etc.; that there are many sugar mills grinding
for the state; that several warehouses are filled with tobacco, sugar,
hides, etc., to the value of many millions of dollars, that the
territory which is occupied by the Cubans in insurrection is in a
cultivated and producing condition, such as has never before been
witnessed, even during years of the greatest abundance; that thousands
of percussion caps are daily made; that he (Quesada) left here under
commission of importance after having temporarily put Jordan in command
under instructions, as well as the other leaders, etc., etc., to an
endless length. I address you, fellow countrymen, who are there on the
ground of this insurrection, whence I have lately come. You all, as well
as myself, know that all these things are _false_, entirely _false_.
"Quesada states that he has gone to seek means and bring arms, with
which to end the insurrection, but for what _does he need them if he has
61,000 men_? Is it possible that it should not occur to the inhabitants
of New York to ask him _what need he has of more means when he has so
many thousand men? When he has over 20,000 arms and can make more as
well as powder and caps?_ Why has not _that soldier of fourteen years'
campaigning_ taken possession with that army of _one single town_ at
least wherein to _locate the government_ of the republic? Why has he not
_captured one single port_ through which to get aid, export the
productions of the country to the value of millions, and thus acquire a
right to recognition as belligerents? _Where are schools? Where are
those churches?_ Have those at Guaimaro and Sibarncu, which _were
burned_ by that renowned general been perchance rebuilt? Why are the
soldiers _unshod_ or wearing _strips of raw hide_ if there are three
thousand shoes made weekly and four thousand hides tanned per month?
_Where is the abundance_ for the soldier? _Where has he got coffee,
rice, tobacco, etc.? Where are those sugaring mills_ in regular running
order?... Then as to the commission of Manuel Quesada and his separation
from command, do you know as well as I do that he was _ignominiously
deposed by the Chamber_, and that _during his stay_ in Cuba, from his
first arrival his conduct has been _blameworthy under all aspects_?
"Well, then, Cubans, this is the plan followed from the beginning of the
revolution. They are deceiving you and our brethren in New York as well
as the whole world. For these reasons I say that the edifice is raised
on insecure and imaginary foundations. For these reasons have I always
tried to undeceive the country and let them see clearly, so as to
prevent Cuba from sinking into the abyss wherein she is intended to be
cast. Withal I have not been understood. There has been no lack of
someone who, out of exaltation and under pressure of some sad aberration
has qualified my conduct as treasonable. Ah! Whoever stated that knows
not even the meaning of his words! When did I ever recognize this
government? Never; but rather have I always been in opposition thereto.
For as I wish my country's welfare I could not second an _illegal,
arbitrary, despotic_ government that is _annihilating_ our land.
"They recognize their error, but they have not loyalty enough to confess
it, they are aware that they are neither statesmen nor lovers of
liberty, nor patriots and their consciences sting them; they know that I
have always seen farther than they could, and more clearly, that all my
predictions have been fulfilled; that I have been alone in maintaining
energetically my principles; bearing up against all kinds of privation
and danger; and they do not forgive me for these advantages over them;
they know that my past and my present career have been free from all
stain; and they do not forgive me for that.
"Well, if to have thus behaved, to have made entire abstraction of self
and my interests, to look after the welfare of Cuba, to have done harm
to no one, but much good; far from having taken life, to have saved the
lives of many, without distinction of nationality; to have respected
always the property of others, and never have let my hand touch the
incendiary torch, to forward pacification, when I know that the country
needs it; and that by it alone can tears, blood, and destruction be
prevented;--if to have done all this constitute treason, ah! then I am a
traitor; yes, Gentlemen, I am one and feel proud of it.
"Your government claims to favor liberty for the country; why then does
it not consent to _freedom of one's principles_? Why does it not _admit
of neutrality_? Why does it force people to take up arms without
_distinction of persons_? Why has it always been opposed to _speaking
out in public_? Why did it oppose the _country's acceptance_, when so
close, of _General Dulce's concessions_? Why does it _persecute to
death_ whoever tries to separate himself from said government without
having any intention of waging war against it? Why? I will tell you.
Because then there would _remain in the camp of the insurrection only a
dozen men; the only ones interested in the continuance of this war_
between brethren; this war of desolation and extermination.
"I agree that there was reason for the Cuban people to complain and be
resentful against the government that ruled them; but all this has
changed, not only with regard to the institution but as to the manner of
being as well. I am myself an example of what I state. I presented
myself to the Captain-General who received me in such a way as to prove
by his manner alone, his good wishes; even if these were not confirmed
by the conduct which he followed in the Villas and wherever he has been
able to make the impress of his own feelings felt. In his proclamation
he offers a pardon to all who will present themselves; but as every
medal has its reverse, so whoever fails to do so must suffer the cold
and inexorable rigor of the law.
"Fellow-countrymen, my brethren, let us throw a veil over the past. Let
us look to the future of our families and to the prosperity of our
nation.
"You know well how many persecutions, privations and even vexations I
have suffered. I forget it all and forgive from my heart all who have
sought my death and wanted my blood. I forgive all who, directly or
indirectly have offended me, of whatever nation or condition they may
be. I sacrifice all, all, on the altar of my country, and for the
welfare of humanity. Why do you not follow my example?
"Brethren! let there be no more tears, no more blood, no more ruins!
Return to your presides and let a fraternal embrace unite forever both
Spaniards and Cubans and let us all together make of this beautiful
Island--the Pearl of the Antilles--the Pearl also of the world. Cubans,
I await you, and the undeserved consideration shown to me by the first
authority of Cuba which fortunately is held by Señor Don Antonio
Caballero de Rodas I offer to use in your behalf. For myself I seek only
the satisfaction of having always forwarded the welfare of Cuba.
"NAPOLEON ARANGO.
"March 28th, 1870."
The italics are Arango's and his alone also the extraordinary sentiments
expressed in this remarkable document.
In this same year, the question of slavery came up for attention. While
the United States government had abandoned its attempt to mediate
between Spain and Cuba it had, of course, by its own action during the
Civil War, definitely arrayed itself against slavery wherever it
existed, and it now, through its Minister to Spain, Daniel E. Sickles,
entered into negotiations with the Spanish government, looking to the
actual freeing of the slaves in Cuba.
Of course news of these happenings did not fail to penetrate Cuba and to
reach the ears of the Captain-General. Indeed he seemed to have a
premonition of them, even before the United States government had
definitely taken up the matter with Spain. He was nothing if not an
opportunist, and he, therefore, on his own account, on February 24,
1870, issued a decree which had the effect of freeing two thousand
colored prisoners of war, and which read as follows:
"Superior Political Government of the Province of Cuba:
"Decree:
"By virtue of the faculties with which I am invested, and in
keeping with the royal decree of the 27th of October, 1865, I think
fit to extend by decree of the 21st of September, ultimo, declaring
exemption from dependency on the government the expeditions
entitled Puerto Escondido, Cabanas 10, Cabanas 85, Cabanas San
Diego de Minez and Trinidad.
"In consequence thereof the employers who have in their service
emancipated slaves of the referred-to expeditions, will present
them in the Secretary's office of this superior government within
the period of one month, in order that, after the usual
formalities, they may receive their letters of exemption.
"At the same time, the governors and lieutenant-governors will
publish this direction in the periodicals of their respective
jurisdictions, so that it may come to the notice of the holders of
these emancipados and they cannot allege ignorance of it.
"CABALLERO DE RODAS.
"Havana, February 24, 1870."
Rodas was crafty, and he now thought of a device which under the guise
of mercy would hamper the Cuban army. On May 26th he promulgated a
second decree freeing all slaves who had acted or would act as guides to
the Spanish army, or render any like valuable service to the government,
an effort, of course, to induce the former servants of patriots to
betray their masters and the Cuban army into the hands of the Spaniards.
To disguise the baldness of this attempt at corruption, he also included
a provision, freeing all slaves belonging to the insurgents or who had
escaped to foreign countries. This provision was for all practical
purposes meaningless and without any value, because the Cubans
themselves who were fighting for freedom from Spain had already
emancipated their slaves.
Meanwhile negotiations between Sickles and the Spanish government
resulted in the promulgation of a decree, which was known as the Moret
law, acquiring its name from the Spanish Minister of Colonies, whose
signature was one of many signed to the document, and who is reported to
have had a hand in its composition. It bore date, July 4, 1870, and was
promulgated by the Captain-General nearly two months later, as follows:
"Superior Political Government of the Province of Cuba:
"His Excellency the Regent of the kingdom communicates to me, under
date of July 4th ultimo, the following law, which has been
promulgated or sanctioned by the Congressional Cortes:
"Don Francisco Serrano of Dominguez, Regent of the kingdom, by the
will of the sovereign Cortes, to all to whom these presents shall
come, greeting:
"Know ye that the Congressional Cortes of the Spanish nation does
hereby decree and sanction the following:
"Article 1. All children of slave mothers, born after the
publication of this law, are declared free.
"Article 2. All slaves born between the 18th of September, 1868,
and the time of the publication of this law, are acquired by the
state by the payment to the owners of the sum of twenty five
dollars.
"Article 3. All slaves who have served under the Spanish flag or
who have in any way aided the troops during the present
insurrection in Cuba are declared free. All those are equally
recognized as free as shall have been so declared by the superior
government of Cuba, by virtue of its jurisdiction. The state shall
pay their value to their masters, if the latter have remained
faithful to the Spanish cause; if belonging to insurgents, they
shall receive no indemnity.
"Article 4. Slaves, who, at the time of the publication of this
law, shall have attained the age of sixty years are declared free,
without any indemnification to their owners. The same benefit shall
be enjoyed by those who shall hereafter reach this age.
"Article 5. All slaves belonging to the state, either as
emancipated, or who for any other cause are at present under the
control of the state, shall at once enter upon the full exercise of
their civil rights.
"Article 6. Those persons freed by this law who are mentioned in
articles 1 and 2, shall remain under the control of the owners of
the mother, after the payment of the indemnity prescribed in
Article 2.
"Article 7. The control referred to in the foregoing article
imposes upon the person exercising it the obligation to maintain
his wards, to clothe them, care for them in sickness, giving them
primary instruction, and the education necessary to carry on an art
or trade. The person exercising the aforesaid control acquired all
the rights of a guardian, and may, moreover, enjoy the benefit of
the labor of the freedman, without making any compensation, until
said freedman has reached the age of eighteen years.
"Article 8. When the freedman has reached the age of eighteen
years, he shall receive half the wages of a freedman. Of these
wages, one half shall be paid to him at once, and the other half
shall be reserved in order to form a capital for him, in the manner
to be determined by subsequent regulations.
"Article 9. On attaining the age of twenty-two years, the freedman
shall acquire the full control of his civil rights and his capital
shall be paid to him.
"Article 10. The control will also be annulled: first, by the
marriage of the freedman, when the same is entered into by females
over fourteen years and males over eighteen years old; second, by a
proved bad treatment on the part of the guardian or his
noncompliance with his duty, as stipulated in Article 7; third,
should the guardian prostitute or favor the prostitution of the
freedwoman.
"Article 11. The above mentioned control is transmissible by all
means known in law, and is also resignable when just motives exist.
Legitimate or illegitimate parents who are free shall be permitted
to assume the control of their children by the payment to the
guardian of the same of any expense he may have incurred for
account of the freedman. Subsequent regulations will settle the
basis of this indemnification.
"Article 12. The Superior civil government shall form, in the space
of one month from the publication of this law, lists of the slaves
comprised in articles 3 and 5.
"Article 13. The freed persons mentioned in the foregoing article
remain under the control of the state. This control is confined to
protecting them, defending them and furnishing them the means of
gaining a livelihood, without limiting their liberty in the
slightest degree. Those who prefer to return to Africa shall be
conveyed thither.
"Article 14. The slaves referred to in article 4 may remain with
their owners, who shall thus acquire control over them. When they
shall have preferred to continue with their former masters it shall
be optional with the latter to give them compensation or not, but,
in all cases, as well as in that of the freed persons being unable
to maintain themselves by reason of physical disability, it shall
be the duty of the said former masters to feed them, clothe them,
and care for them in sickness. This duty shall be a concomitant of
the right to employ them in labors suitable to their condition.
Should the freedman object to the compliance with his obligation to
labor, or should he create disturbances at the house of his
guardian, the authorities will decide the questions arising
therefrom, after having first heard the freedman.
"Article 15. If the freedman of his own free will shall leave the
control of his former master, the latter shall no longer be under
the obligations mentioned in the foregoing article.
"Article 16. The Government shall provide the means necessary for
the indemnifications made necessary by the present law, by means of
a tax upon those who shall remain in slavery, ranging from eleven
to sixty years of age.
"Article 17. Any act of cruelty, duly justified as having been
indicted by the tribunals of justice, will bring with it as a
consequence the freedom of the slave suffering such excess of
chastisement.
"Article 18. Any concealment impeding the application of the
benefits of this law shall be punished according to title 13 of the
penal code.
"Article 19. All those shall be considered free who do not appear
enrolled in the census drawn up in the Island of Porto Rico the
31st of December, 1869, and in that which will have been drawn up
in the Island of Cuba on the 31st of December of the present year,
1870.
"Article 20. The Government shall make a special regulation for the
execution of this law.
"Article 21. The Government will report to the Cortes when the
Cuban deputies shall have been admitted, a bill for the compensated
emancipation of those who remain in slavery after the establishment
of this law. Meantime this emancipation is carried into effect; the
penalty of the whip, authorized by chapter 13 of the regulations
for Porto Rico and Cuba, shall be abolished; neither can there be
sold separately from their mothers children younger than fourteen
years, nor slaves who are united in matrimony.
"By a resolution of the Congressional Cortes the foregoing is
reported to the Regent of the Kingdom for its promulgation as a
law.
"MANUEL RUIZ ZORILLA, President.
"MANUEL DE LIANOS Y PERSI, Deputy Secretary.
"JULIAN SANCHEZ RUANO, Deputy Secretary.
"FRANCISCO XAVIER CARRATALA, Deputy Secretary.
"MARIANO RUIZ, Deputy Secretary.
"Palace of the Cortes, June 23, 1870.
"Therefore I order all tribunals, justices, officers, governors and
other authorities of whatsoever class or position, to obey the same
and cause it to be obeyed, complied with and executed in all its
parts.
"FRANCISCO SERRANO, Minister of Ultramar.
"SIGISMONDO MORET Y PRENDERGAST.
"San Ildefonso, July 4, 1870.
"And, having opportunely omitted the publication of the same for
the want of the regulation referred to in Article 20, and having
received the sense in which said document is to be drawn up, I have
ordered the exact compliance of said law, in virtue of which it is
inserted in the Official Gazette for future guidance.
"CABALLERO DE RODAS."
"Havana, Sept. 28, 1870."
If these decrees were intended to fill the insurgents with gratitude,
and to have the effect of halting the revolution, they fell far short of
their mark. In the first place, the Spanish Government had too often
tricked her Cuban subjects, and they had little cause to have faith in
either her good will or her good intentions, and much more cause to
believe that her action was intended as a sop to the Government at
Washington, an attempt to "pull the wool over the eyes" of American
sympathizers, and even a very cursory glance at the provisions of the
Moret law would convince even a layman with no knowledge of
jurisprudence that there was small chance of their ever being enforced.
It is true that this law provided for the freedom of all slaves born
after a certain date, but it left them in the care of their mothers, and
under the control of their former masters, condemned to serve without
pay and virtually free only in name. It also proclaimed the freedom of
slaves who had reached the age of sixty years and who very likely had
endured years of such hard treatment that they were infirm and in no
condition to support themselves. If they were reluctant to start life
alone and either by timidity or by coercion remained with their masters,
the latter were at liberty to pay them or not, and when a Spanish
planter had the option of obtaining labor free rather than paying for
it, there was not much room for doubt as to what course he would pursue.
The whipping post was abolished, but the Cubans were too busy with other
matters to patrol the country in search of violations of this
regulation, and the masters were pretty safe to conduct themselves as
they chose. This law, which contained such fair words that it met with
the approval of the American minister, was almost ludicrous in its
paradoxical terms, and instead of impressing the patriots with the
softened hearts of their tyrannical masters, it must have filled the
intelligent ones with mirth.
Besides this, since upon the declaration of the independence of Cuba the
revolutionary government had declared the freedom of all men on the
Island, Spain's action so long afterward was like opera bouffe, or
rather a grimly amusing anti-climax. As a matter of fact the Moret law
remained a dead letter, unenforced, overlooked, violated, almost
forgotten, and the subject of slavery again fell into the background,
while the war took the front of the stage.
Spain was having constantly to reinforce her army, and she was unable to
do this in sufficient numbers to make up deficits properly. The climate
of Cuba was very hard on the new recruits who had not become accustomed
to it, and Spain lost almost as many by disease as she did in battle.
She renewed her cruelties against the unprotected Cuban planters, and
not only burned and pillaged, but subjected all captives to the most
revolting and sickening cruelties, gouging out eyes, cutting out
tongues, crucifying and hanging men by their hands. Probably the
atrocities practiced by the Spaniards in this war were never equalled,
unless we recall the barbarities which they practiced later in 1895,
until the Huns of Prussia invaded Belgium and France in the great war of
1914-18, and showed what inefficient novices in deviltry the Spanish had
been when compared with the disciples of "Kultur."
The year 1871 opened brightly for the patriots. That seasoned warrior
General Jordan led a company to victory, at Najassa, against a force of
Spaniards under General Puello. The Spanish losses were especially
gratifying, if that term may be employed, since they included thirty-six
officers.
Meanwhile Rodas, in spite of his methods, which must have been most
gratifying to them, fell into disfavor with the Volunteers, and they
exerted their power against him, finally effecting his resignation and
the elevation of Count Valmaseda in his place, in a temporary capacity,
until another Captain-General could be sent from Spain.
[Illustration: NICOLAS AZCARATE]
[Illustration: JUAN CLEMENTE ZENEA]
NICOLAS AZCARATE
Nicolas Azcarate was the founder of the New Lyceum of Havana which
for years was the centre of the intellectual life of that city, and
his home was the resort of the literary and artistic world. Papers
read at his receptions by eminent men were published in two volumes
under the title of "Literary Nights." He was born in 1826 and died
in 1894, leaving a literary influence which is still gratefully
perceptible.
Spain once more made overtures to the United States Government, asking
it to use its offices in eliciting from the revolutionary government
some statement of terms which would be satisfactory to them as a basis
of peace. Since former efforts to bring the belligerents together had
been so productive of failure, Washington demurred from officially
undertaking the matter; whereupon Don Nicolas Azcarate went to
Washington from Spain with authorization to offer to the insurgents an
amnesty, and disarmament of the Volunteers, provided the Cubans laid
down their arms. They were further to be granted the immediate and
unconditional emancipation of slaves, irrespective of age and condition
of servitude. All confiscations made by either side were to be annulled,
and the property thus seized was to be restored to the original owners.
Religious freedom, free speech, and free assembly, were to be granted
the Cubans, while Cuba was to have representation in the Spanish Cortes,
and to be governed by colonial autonomy, similar to that which Great
Britain maintained in her American provinces. Last of all, and by no
means least, all officials who were offensive to the Cubans were to be
removed from office. Of course, these instructions were confidential,
because of the offense which they would have given the powerful
Volunteers. The United States, however, did not undertake to transmit
the proposed terms to the insurgents, and finally Azcarate undertook to
do so on his own initiative. He had little faith in the fate which his
proposal might meet, should it be transmitted through Spanish sources in
Cuba and its terms be divulged to the Volunteers. He doubted whether it
would ever reach President Cespedes. He therefore decided to transmit it
by special messenger, for this purpose choosing Juan Clemente Zenea, a
man in whose discretion and resourcefulness he had the greatest faith.
To make the journey safe for his envoy, he obtained from the Spanish
minister at Washington a safe conduct for Zenea, ordering the military
and naval authorities of Cuba, as well as the Volunteers, to afford safe
passage to Don Juan Clemente Zenea "into and out of any port on the
Island of Cuba." Zenea reached President Cespedes without accident and
laid the proposition before him, which was promptly refused. The
Volunteers, meanwhile, had learned of Zenea's coming, and of the nature
of his errand. Even the greatest of secrecy could not have kept the
knowledge from them, for their spies were everywhere active, not only in
the Island, but in the United States and at the Spanish court as well.
When Zenea left the Cuban lines, he was immediately seized by the
Volunteers and imprisoned at Havana, under heavy guard. The news of this
occurrence reached Spain and immediately the Duke de la Torre, then
President of King Amadeus's Council of Ministers, protested to the
authorities at Havana, and insisted that Zenea be released and be given
safe conduct from the Island. But the will of the Volunteers was more
powerful in Cuba than were the wishes of those high in authority in
Spain, or than the common tenets of decency, right and justice. Zenea
was not released and he was not given safe conduct. After many months'
imprisonment under the most revolting conditions, he was condemned to
death without trial, and on August 15 was taken out and shot in the
back.
JUAN CLEMENTE ZENEA
Poet, patriot and martyr, Juan Clemente Zenea was born at Bayamo in
1831, and in boyhood settled in Havana. He was a teacher in La
Luz's school, El Salvador, and wrote some exquisite poems. But
politics and Cuban independence claimed his chief attention. From
his seventeenth year he was incessantly engaged in revolutionary
conspiracies, in Havana and in New Orleans and New York. In 1868,
he went to New York where he was an active member of the Junta. In
1870, he was sent on a mission to President Cespedes, which he
accomplished but soon afterward was captured by the Spaniards,
imprisoned in Cabanas, and then shot.
This action would hardly have been conducive to good feeling between the
opposing leaders, even had the Cubans had faith in Spanish promises. In
too hard a school had they learned that it was useless to expect the
Spanish authorities on the Island to keep their word to the Cubans,
either in the small matter of a safe conduct for an innocent messenger,
or the larger one of proposed concessions to an oppressed people. The
Cuban government was not to be thus easily lured from their attempts to
secure the one thing which was to them paramount, the real object for
which they had made so many sacrifices, the absolute independence of the
Island. Moreover, even were the promise made under the guarantee of the
United States Government, the Cubans could not be convinced of the good
faith of Spain, or that when once they had abandoned their struggle,
laid down their arms, and given Spain the advantage, she would act
otherwise than she had during her entire occupation of the Island. They
felt sure that if her advances were graciously met, she would, when she
again had the balance of power, simply impose upon the Island new
indignities, and cover her treachery with fair words and vague promises
whenever the United States might enter a protest.
Spain expressed indignation at the shortsighted policy of the Cuban
leaders, and then gave demonstration of how she intended to punish Cuba.
She renewed her persecution of individual Cubans, and her cruelty toward
Cuban sympathizers who while nursing their cordial feelings for the
revolution had not yet taken up arms against Spain. It was only
necessary that such persons should be suspected, and that suspicion
might be of the slightest variety. They were immediately seized and
thrown into dungeons and tortured to extract their confessions; the
right of trial was at this time almost entirely dispensed with, and
victims of Spanish wrath were put to death without an opportunity to
defend themselves, and executed in ways which are usually associated
with the most barbarous savageness. So glaring did these outrages become
that General Cespedes undertook to write a letter to the Spanish
Government at Madrid concerning them, although why, knowing the
character of his opponents as he did, he should have entertained the
idea that this mild intervention on his part would have the slightest
effect, or should have imagined that Spain was not cognizant of the
actions of her legionaries in Cuba, and that such actions were performed
without her fullest sanction, is not revealed. Cespedes certainly
displayed a childlike faith in the ultimate spark of good in depraved
human nature, when he took up his pen for such a communication. But be
that as it may, he addressed the following epistle to the "Supreme
Government of Spain."
"The respect inspired by the laws of nations, which, under the influence
of modern civilization has, as far as possible, deprived war of its
savage character, imposes on us the obligation of addressing the Spanish
Government an energetic remonstrance, in consequence of several
offensive acts, which could not be known without causing offense to the
civilized world. From the time when the standard of Independence was
raised in Cuba, unworthy motives have been attributed to our contest. We
shall not explain the justice of the Cuban Revolution, for such an
explanation would be unpleasant to that Government, and besides it is
not now necessary; but we may say, in general, a colony is justified in
severing the knot which binds it to the mother-country, if it possesses
sufficient elements to live independently.
"Colonial life is restricting, it can never entirely satisfy the
aspirations of an intelligent people, and, therefore, it cannot be
justly imposed upon them when they are in a position to maintain their
political existence.
"A vicious rule, which was dissipated in Spain by the popular rising of
September, made worse, we might say intolerable, the colonial existence
of the Cubans.
"The Cubans have decided to conquer with the sword, as they can obtain
in no other manner the exercise of their most important rights. Weighty
motives prevent their government from being more explicit in so delicate
a matter, but it is certain that only taking into consideration the
results of the war, no other relations are now possible between Cuba and
Spain, than those of a friendly spirit based on the condition of perfect
independence.
"In addition to what we have already stated, a political party armed
from commencement of the struggle, under the denomination of Spanish
Volunteers, and known by their intolerance and retrograding tendencies,
have converted a question of ideas into a question of petty personal
interest; wresting the authority from those delegates of that
government, and imposing their caprices like laws; giving an indecorous
character to official manifestations relating to the revolution; and in
entire forgetfulness of the rights of man, have perpetrated incredible
crimes, which cast a blot on the history of Spain in America.
"To relate all in detail would be very painful to us, and to the
government whom we are addressing.
"It is sufficient to say that the troops charged with preserving the
Spanish dominion occupy themselves, in preference, in persecuting the
families who reside in the territories of the Republic, by depriving
them of all they possess, burning their habitations, and have even gone
several times so far as to make use of their arms against women,
children and old people. At the very moment whilst we are writing this
remonstrance, an awful example has occurred.
"On the 6th of January of the present year, a Spanish column, commanded
by Colonel Acosta y Alvear, while marching from Camaguey to Ciego de
Avila, assassinated in its march these citizens of Juana, Mora de Mola
and Mercedes Mora de Mola; the children, Adrina Mola, aged twelve,
Agnela Mola, aged eight, and Mercedes Mola, aged two years. The horror
which is produced by crimes of such enormity, above all in the minds of
those who are far from the theatre of the events, is such as to make
them appear hardly credible, if we did not take into consideration the
demoralization of an army accustomed to pillage and violence, which
generally has no limits.
"Such excesses doubtless are not with the consent of the Supreme
Government of a nation, in which the spirit of modern times has made
very eloquent manifestations.
"If Spain will not grant to us the happy establishment of their acquired
liberties, recognizing the right of the Cubans to the separation, we
hope she will at least be disposed to guarantee the observation of human
principles in the prosecution of the struggle; and as some chiefs of the
liberating forces have on several occasions demanded in vain from the
opposing chiefs a proper method of conducting the war, we now ask the
Supreme Government of the Spanish nation to enter into arrangements to
protect the lives of the prisoners, and secure the inviolability of the
individuals who, on account of their sex, age and other personal
considerations may be exempt from liabilities protesting that we shall
not be responsible, if such Spanish chiefs will not regard what we now
offer, for the terrible consequences which will certainly follow this
barbarous system of warfare.
* * * * *
"We give publicity to the present dispatch, that it may come to the
knowledge of foreign governments.
"Headquarters of the Government.
"CARLOS MANUEL DE CESPEDES.
President of the Cuban Republic.
"January 24, 1871."
The foregoing did have the effect of acquainting the world with Spanish
atrocities, but its influence in restraining the further perpetration of
outrages, or in producing any official action by Spain looking toward
that desirable end, was absolutely nil.
It possibly did impress the United States Government, confirmed as it
was by constant complaints from citizens of the United States, resident
in Cuba. At any rate, the United States issued a rebuke to Spain for the
indignities inflicted on American citizens in Cuba, and backed up this
communication with an order to her navy to stand by and protect the
lives and property of Americans in Cuba, and to maintain the dignity of
the flag of the United States.
The Cuban forces were at this time suffering from grave disorder.
Attacks by the enemy were not so menacing to the success of the struggle
as internal disruptions and dissention among the leaders of the
Republican army. They grew so serious that an actual break occurred, and
on January 19, General Cornelio Porro proved disloyal to the cause of
freedom, and in company with some other supposed patriots, entered
Puerto Principe and surrendered to the Spanish Government, while at the
end of the month, Eduardo Machado, the Secretary of the Cuban House of
Representatives, wrote to the Captain-General, Count Valmaseda, stating
that the Cuban House of Representatives had dissolved and beseeching
clemency for the former members of that body. He added that Señor Miguel
G. Gutierrez was a fugitive, wandering about with his little son.
It naturally was a severe blow to loyal patriots to find such treachery
within their own ranks, although they may have comforted themselves with
the truism that such has always been the case in rebellions against a
powerful ruler. The weak, the fearful, and the selfish have abandoned
the cause, when its fate seemed wavering. They may also have justly
argued that, if these men were traitors, loyal supporters of the cause
of freedom were well rid of them; that the strength of an organization
is like that of the proverbial chain, and that it becomes shorter but
immeasurably stronger by the removal of the weak links. Whether they
were sustained by any such comforting philosophy or not, the defection
of Porro and Machado did not for a moment cause the loyal Cuban leaders
to falter from their purpose to secure freedom for Cuba. To strengthen
the courage of loyal Cubans, President Cespedes and Ignacio Agramonte
issued proclamations in which they expressed the greatest faith in the
Cuban cause, and its ultimate victory, and urged all loyal hearts to
maintain their support of the battle for liberty.
IGNACIO AGRAMONTE
One of the foremost heroes of the Ten Years' War was Ignacio
Agramonte y Loinaz, a member of one of the most distinguished
families in Cuban history. He was born in Camaguey in 1841, was
educated for the bar, and became an eminent advocate, writer and
orator, with intense devotion to the cause of Cuban independence.
Immediately upon the outbreak of the revolution at Yara in 1868 he
took the field and showed himself a born leader of men. He was made
Secretary of the Revolutionary government, signed the Emancipation
act and the Cuban Constitution, and then returned to active work in
the field. As Major General he participated in many battles,
including the capture of a part of Camaguey on July 20, 1869.
President Cespedes made him Chief of the Department of Camaguey,
and for a time he succeeded Quesada as commander in chief of the
Revolutionary Army. He fell in the battle of Jimaguayu on July 1,
1873.
[Illustration]
CHAPTER XIV
While these things were occurring in the "Ever Faithful Isle," there
were doings of epochal significance in Peninsular Spain. Queen Isabella
had, as we have seen, for some time been an exile, and on June 25, 1870,
the Serrano republican government forced her to sign a final manifesto
of abdication. The government itself, however, was far from strong, and
was unable to stand against strong opposition in the Cortes. It was
shortly overthrown by a vote of that body, and a monarchical form of
government was re-established. The crown was formally offered to and
accepted by Amadeus, son of King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy, on
December 4, 1870. When this news reached Cuba, the Spanish troops on the
island took formal oath of allegiance to the new king of Spain.
The reestablishment of a monarchy was, of course, exceedingly pleasing
to the Volunteers, for they had no sympathy with a republic, and the
freedom which it was supposed to entail, although in the case of the
republic in Spain, few changes or concessions had been extended to its
Cuban subjects. The Volunteers promptly took oath to support the
monarchy, and denounced the republican constitution. They embraced this
as a favorable opportunity to further an end of their own. They had long
suspected the Bishop of Havana of being in sympathy with the revolution.
He was at this time absent in attendance at the Vatican Council at Rome,
and the Volunteers were able so to manipulate matters that, upon his
return on April 13, 1871, he was refused permission to land.
Believing that the new government would give even more cordial support
to their machinations than had the previous one, the Volunteers now
began a system of persecutions against Cuban patriots. The Volunteer
corps, in 1872, numbered eighty thousand members, and in 1870 and 1871
they could not have fallen far below that number. They were so powerful
that the Captain-General must either conform to their wishes or sooner
or later give way to a successor whom they selected. Now there was
published in Havana a paper, called _La Voz de Cuba_, which was really
the "_Voice of the Volunteers_," for its editor, Gonzalo Castanon, was a
Colonel of that organization. It busied itself, among other things, with
attacks on the patriots, and took occasion to voice some derogatory
remarks concerning Cuban women. Naturally the Cuban husbands, sons,
fathers and lovers were hot with indignation against such calumny.
Castanon paid the just penalty of his scurrilous lack of chivalry, for
he was challenged by an outraged Cuban and in the duel which followed he
received a mortal wound. He was buried in a tomb in the Espada Cemetery.
Some time afterward, a party of young students--hardly more than
boys--from the University of Havana, visited the cemetery, and it was
reported to the authorities that one of them had been heard, while
standing near the tomb of Castanon, to make remarks derogatory to the
dead Colonel. This information was given by a Spanish soldier, who
claimed to have overheard the conversation, and when it was repeated to
a Spanish judge, the accusation was added that the boy's companions had
defaced the glass which closed the Castanon tomb. The Volunteers
immediately pounced upon the happening, as a delightful opportunity to
chastise and punish the members of wealthy families in Havana who were
suspected of aiding and abetting the revolution. The power of the
Captain-General was invoked, and forty-three students were arrested and
brought to trial. They were ably defended by a Spanish officer, Señor
Capdevilla, and he made such a good case for their innocence that they
were acquitted. The Volunteers, however, were not satisfied. Injustice
had in some manner miscarried, how they could not conceive, and justice
had triumphed. Such things would not do in dealing with Cubans. They
made a vigorous appeal to the Captain-General, and obtained from him an
order for assembling a second court martial, and this time they saw to
it that their own body was well represented in that body. The boys were
again apprehended, and the trial which ensued was a tragic farce, in
which they were given not the slightest chance for justice. Eight of
them were condemned to death, and the others to imprisonment at hard
labor. Consternation reigned among the best families of Cuba. One
distracted father offered a ransom of a million dollars for the life of
his son, but without avail. On November 27, 1871, the condemned
criminals, whose worst offence, if indeed there was any offense at all,
was the utterance of an indignant remark about a ruffian who had
attacked those dearest to all loyal, chivalrous and patriotic hearts,
the women of Cuba, were led out and shot in the presence of fifteen
thousand Spanish Volunteers, all under arms. In after years when the
wrong was beyond repair, justice was done to the memory of these
martyred youths, for not only did the Spanish Cortes, with admirable
fairness, investigate the matter and pronounce in favor of the innocence
of the students, but also the son of Castanon came to Cuba from Spain
with the object of removing thither his father's remains, investigated
the condition of the tomb, and made a sworn statement before a notary
that it had never been disturbed.
The murder of the students of course created intense feeling in Cuba;
Havana was in a turmoil, and the sentiment engendered by this and
similar outrages committed or incited by the Volunteers swelled the list
of those who were in sympathy with a speedy release for Cuba from
Spanish rule. The scene of the tragedy has since been marked by the
Cuban government with a tablet which bears this inscription:
"On the 27th of November, 1871, there were sacrificed in front of this
place, by the Spanish Volunteers of Havana, the eight young Cuban
students of the First Year of Medicine:
Alonzo Alvarez de la Campa,
Carlos Augusto de Latorre,
Pascual Rodriquiz Perez,
Angel Laborde,
Jose de Marcos Medina,
Eladio Gonzales Toledo,
Anacleto Bermudez,
Carlos Verdugo.
To their eternal memory, this tablet is dedicated, the 27th of November,
1899."
While these events were taking place, and in spite of the troubles which
had beset them within their own ranks, the Cuban leaders maintained a
force of fifty thousand men in the field, and gained an important
victory in the vicinity of Mayari. This was more than offset by an
occurrence which struck brutally at the very foundation of the Cuban
army. In July, 1871, the Spanish defeated at Guantanamo a force of two
hundred men, under General Quesada, but this was trivial compared with
the catastrophe which it involved. General Quesada was taken prisoner,
as was General Figueredo, and in August these two loyal patriots who had
so ably supported the revolution, and the former of whom had been the
brains of the army, were executed by the Spaniards. The deepest gloom
filled the hearts of the Cuban leaders, and their discouragement is the
only explanation which can be offered of what followed, when a force of
Cubans, who had been operating in the central part of the island, under
General Agramonte, deserted, and approaching the Spanish authorities,
agreed to lay down their arms, provided their lives would be spared. The
Spaniards accepted their offer, and promptly gave out a statement that
the Cuban army was disrupted and that all that remained was a few slaves
under General Agramonte. They were to learn, however, that the Cubans
still had some fighting spirit left in them. Although the defection of
so large a body of his command left only thirty-five men under
Agramonte, he speedily recruited a new company, and was able to harass
the Spanish for two years longer, until he was killed in battle.
The death of General Quesada left the post of Commander-in-Chief of the
Cuban army vacant, and General Modeste Diaz was elected to that office.
An official report made by the Cubans at this time shows the composition
of the army to have been:
_Army Corps of Oriente._
Commander-in-Chief, General Modeste Diaz
Division of Santiago de Cuba; Major-General Commanding, Maximo Gomez
_Regiments_ _Commander_ _Localities_ _No. of Men_
1 and 2 Col. Jesus Perez Cobre 600
3 Lt. Col. Prado Baracoa 450
4 Lt. Col. Guillermo Moncada Baracoa 550
5 Lt. Col. Pacheco Guantanamo 450
6 Brig. Calixto Garcia Jiguani 600
-----
Total 2,650
Division of Holguin--General Commanding, Jose Inclan
_Regiments_ _Commander_ _Localities_ _No. of Men_
1 Co. Fco. Herrero West 300
2 Gen. Inclan East 500
---
Total 800
Division of Bayamo--General Commanding, Luis Figueredo
_Regiments_ _Commander_ _Localities_ _No. of Men_
1 Maj. Gen. N. Garrido Manzanillo 550
2 Gen. Luis Figueredo Bayamo 450
------
Total 1,000
Grand Total Army Corps of Oriente 4,300
_Army Corps of Camaguey_
Commander-in-Chief, General Vicente Garcia
Division of Las Tunas--General Commanding, Vicente Garcia
_Regiments_ _Commander_ _Localities_ _No. of Men_
1 General Vincente Garcia Santa Rita 650
2 Brig. Francisco Vega Arenas 400
------
Total 1,050
Division of Camaguey--General Commanding, Ignacio Agramonte
_Regiments_ _Commander_ _Localities_ _No. of Men_
1 Lt. Col. La Rosa Guaican Amar 300
2 Col. Agramonte Porro Guaican Amar 400
3 Lt. Col. Espinosa Guaican Amar 250
4 Lt. Col. Manuel Suarez Guaimaro 300
5 Lt. Col. Antonio Rodriguez Cubitas 200
------
Total 1,450
Grand Total Army Corps of Camaguey 2,600
_Army Corps of Las Villas_
Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Matso Casanova
_No. of Men_
Division of Trinidad, General Commanding, Brig. Juan Villegas 700
Division of Sancti Spiritus, General Com'ding, Brig. Jose Villamie 800
Division of Villa Clara, General Commanding, Brig. Carlos Ruloff 600
Division of Cienfuegos, General Commanding, Brig. Juan Villegas 700
Division of Remedios, General Commanding, Brig. Salome Hernandez 600
------
Grand Army Total of Las Villas 3,400
Grand Total 10,300
In June, 1871, three regiments under General Maximo Gomez--that able
soldier and patriot who was to figure so largely in the final struggle
against Spain in 1895--were instructed to take up their position and
endeavor to hold the line between Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo, and
they accordingly entrenched themselves in the Loma de la Gallista, but
they were almost immediately attacked by the Spanish. The battle was
hotly contested for four hours and ended in a victory for the Cubans.
The Spanish losses included arms and ammunition which were eagerly
appropriated by the conquerors. A few days later, a Spanish force
renewed the attack, advancing fifteen hundred strong against the men
under Gomez, and again they went down to defeat, their total losses in
the two battles amounting to one hundred killed, and a large number
wounded. In addition to this, the Cubans took fifteen Spaniards
prisoners. What must have been still more gratifying was an encounter
which a small band of Cubans had about this time with a company of
Volunteers, in which twenty-five of the latter were made prisoners.
On July 3, Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Guevara with a company of Cubans
was encamped at La Cabana del Estribo, when they were attacked by a
force of three hundred Spaniards. He promptly ordered the camp
abandoned, covering his retreat by a weak fire on the enemy. The Cubans
were unable to make a more vigorous resistance, because they were
inadequately supplied with ammunition, even though, with plenty of
supplies, their position at La Cabana del Estribo might have been
considered an advantageous one. But with the odds so greatly against
them, the Cubans killed five Spaniards, and wounded forty others, among
whom was Pedro Popa, one of those who had turned traitor to the cause of
the revolution. But the Spaniards took vengeance on two practically
defenseless persons. On their retreat, with their wounded, they met
Major Baldoguin and two companions, who were on their way to see
Lieutenant-Colonel Guevara, and captured Major Baldoguin. They took him
to Bayamo, and in spite of the fact that he was severely wounded, they
executed him at once upon arrival at that city.
A few days later, the same force which had attacked Lieutenant-Colonel
Guevara at Estribo, were reported to be again advancing against him. He
sent a company of infantry to meet them, and an engagement ensued which
lasted for over an hour. The Spaniards retreated to Los Toros, leaving
behind them fifty-three killed and wounded. On this occasion Guevara's
son was wounded, and one private was killed.
A few days previous, on the evening of July 4, a small Cuban force
attacked the Spanish camp at the village of Veguita, and harassed the
enemy during the entire night, and the next day a company from the same
division of the Cuban army had an engagement with a hundred and fifty
Spanish cavalry, and put them to flight. The Cubans pursued them, and
forced them to take a stand, when a fight took place which lasted an
hour. The Cubans did not suffer a single casualty, while several of the
Spaniards were killed, and they were obliged to retreat.
On July 25, Major Dominguez with a small force, attacked the sugar
plantation of Las Ovas, and sacked it almost in the presence of the
Spaniards, who were encamped only about half a mile distant, on the
Esperanza estate. Having accomplished this feat, Major Dominguez's
soldiers raided a nearby estate, which was owned by Tomas Ramirez,
another of those who had turned traitor. All the buildings on this
plantation were set on fire, and razed to the ground, as were also those
on the estate of Antonio Lastes. Curiously enough, although the
Spaniards in much larger numbers, were near at hand, and must have been
cognizant of these happenings, they made no attempt to interfere.
A few days later, Major Noguera, with a small band, attacked forty of
the enemy on a road leading to Bayamo, and put them to rout, capturing a
considerable stock of supplies. This same band of patriots a little
later encountered a company of fifty Spaniards, who were driving a herd
of cattle toward El Huinilladero. They opened fire, and dispersed the
Spaniards, wounding an officer, and taking possession of the cattle,
together with a supply of cartridges, horses with their equipment,
blankets and provisions.
On July 30, several companies from the division of Bayamo and Manzanillo
attacked a force of a hundred Spaniards who were strongly entrenched
near La Caridad. After a fight which lasted not over half an hour, the
Spanish were dislodged from their trenches, and fled into a nearby wood.
The Cubans followed, forcing the Spaniards into the open, and, after a
brief engagement, put them to rout. One Spaniard was captured, and he
gave information that the Spanish forces had lost seventeen men killed,
and that in their flight they had thrown away their rifles, which were
afterward recovered by the Cubans, who also took possession of a large
amount of supplies of all kinds.
The estate of La Indiana had been fortified by the Spaniards, and on
August 4, General Gomez led an attack against it. The Spanish put up a
strong resistance, but the Cubans were able to take the buildings, and
capture thirty-five Spaniards. The entire district of Guantanamo was at
this time practically controlled by the insurgents. They destroyed
fourteen coffee plantations, and did other damage to the property of
Spanish sympathizers. On August 8, the Spaniards made an attack at El
Macio, but it was unsuccessful. For the next week there was one
engagement after another, with victory first with the Spaniards and then
with the Cubans, but the results were not of moment to either of the
belligerents. The Cubans were not able to marshal a sufficiently large
or well equipped force to venture a decisive battle, and so kept up an
annoying guerrilla warfare. Late in the month they advanced to the
outskirts of Santiago, destroying all plantations which lay along the
line of march, and defeated the Volunteers in an unimportant engagement.
Perhaps the most serious defeat that they inflicted on the Spanish at
this time was the destruction of the fortified camp at Miguel, in the
district of Sagua de Tanamo. Earlier in the month they had attacked and
taken a fortified camp in the neighborhood of Santa Isabel. All the
buildings were burned to the ground, twenty-six Volunteers were killed,
and a large quantity of stores was taken. There followed other
engagements in which the odds and the victory were with the Spaniards,
and the Cuban patriots were put to rout with heavy losses. But for the
most part in guerrilla warfare the Cubans had the advantage and made the
most of it.
Late in August, a force under Major Villanueva and Captain Rios
surprised some Spanish soldiers at breakfast near Malangas. The
Spaniards largely outnumbered the Cubans, but the attack was so sudden
that they fled, leaving their rice and salted beef behind them. In this
engagement eight Spaniards were killed.
On the first day of September, news reached Major Noguera that the enemy
were convoying a stock of supplies in the neighborhood where he was
stationed. He divided his men and concealed them at different points
along the road over which the Spaniards must pass. Six Volunteers and
one regular soldier were killed, and the enemy abandoned to the Cubans a
number of carts, filled with food stuffs, carbines, machetes, and other
supplies.
[Illustration: CALIXTO GARCIA
One of the most gallant figures in the patriot ranks in the Ten Years'
War and the War of Independence was that of Calixto Garcia e Iñiguez.
Born at Bayamo on August 4, 1839, he was in the prime of young manhood
when he took the field under General Marmol in 1868. Soon as a brigadier
general he was the right-hand man of Maximo Gomez, and was made by him
commander in chief in Oriente when Gomez himself marched westward. After
six years of almost incessant and victorious fighting, he was surprised
and surrounded at San Antonio de Baja, when, rather than be captured, he
placed the muzzle of a pistol in his mouth and fired. The bullet pierced
the roof of his mouth and came out at the centre of his forehead. The
Spaniards then took him to a military hospital and, respecting his
valor, nursed him back to health. After the Treaty of Zanjon he was
released, whereupon he took the lead in the Little War. He was in Spain
in 1895 and could not get into the War of Independence until March,
1896, but thereafter he was one of its chief warriors. After the close
of the war he was sent to Washington on a diplomatic mission, and died
there on December 11, 1898.]
September 18 was to be a memorable day in the year's fighting, for on
that date General Calixto Garcia with three regiments advanced against
Jiguani, where a large force of Spaniards were garrisoned. The latter
defended the town for two hours, but in the end the Cubans were
victorious, and gained control of the major portion of the town and its
fortifications. Many houses were burned, and two hundred Spaniards lay
dead in the streets. General Garcia then retreated, carrying with him a
large quantity of captured supplies, since he did not have a large
enough force to complete the occupation of Jiguani. He was pursued by
the Spaniards who had been reinforced, but the patriots made good their
escape with only slight losses.
Throughout the entire months of August and September the eastern part of
the island was in a constant state of uproar and confusion. Attack and
counter-attack followed in succession, and yet neither side was any
nearer a significant victory or a decision.
On October 23, the Spaniards gained a victory over the Cubans at El
Toro, and in November the insurgents turned the tables by defeating the
Spanish forces under Captain Ferral y Mongs. So the war continued, the
whole country witnessing the destruction of plantations, the burning of
buildings, the pillaging of villages, and loss of life as well as of
property. In the end it was the land of Cuba that suffered, for from a
once prosperous country it bade fair to be transformed into waste lands.
Meanwhile the Cuban forces were slowly degenerating. The Spaniards were
well fed, well clothed and well equipped, while the Cuban forces were
poorly armed, often hungry, and in torn and ragged garments. The
resources of Spain reinforced her army, but the patriots had to rely on
chance help that came to them from their American sympathizers. Nothing
in their existence was certain, and as the war was prolonged without
their gaining a victory which seemed to bring the end nearer, the weaker
spirits began to despair and there was dissension and an undercurrent
of revolt among the common soldiers. In vain the leaders tried to put
heart into their forces, and desertions became alarmingly common. The
reductions in numbers compelled the Cuban leaders more and more to
resort to guerrilla warfare. This involved deplorable destruction of
property, valuable holdings of both loyalists and patriots were rendered
valueless, and naturally the morale of both armies suffered from a
spirit of lawlessness. By the end of 1871, two thirds of the farms and
coffee and sugar plantations in the district of Trinidad were destroyed
or abandoned, and the entire central portion of the island had suffered
grievously.
Valmaseda on December 27, 1871, issued a proclamation to the effect that
after the first of the year every prisoner would be shot, and every
patriot who delivered himself up would suffer life imprisonment. This
applied to both negroes and white men; while all white women captured
would be banished, and all negro women would be returned to their
owners, and condemned to wear chains for a period of four years.
However, prior to that date, only if four days distant, the leaders or
any of the soldiers would lay down their arms and announce their
allegiance to Spain, they would be received with kindness and clemency.
This might have had more effect than it did but for the fact that the
Cubans were distrustful of promises of clemency, and feared that if they
escaped the vengeance of the government, they would later suffer at the
hands of the Volunteers.
CHAPTER XV
At the beginning of 1872 the storm center of the insurrection moved
eastward to Puerto Principe, Santiago and Guantanamo. Engagements in the
vicinity of these places had been frequent, and now they were almost
daily consisting chiefly of little skirmishes between small forces of
men.
It was estimated that by this time Spain had sent to the island in the
neighborhood of sixty thousand trained soldiers, but they had come few
at a time, and on no occasion in larger numbers than two or three
thousand. Evidently the Spanish Government had at no time properly
estimated the strength, if not in numbers, at least in valor and
determination of the insurgents, and had never realized that only by
investing the island with overwhelming superiority could they hope to
put down the rebellion. However, during all this time Spain had been
struggling against disturbances at home of no mean dimensions, and early
in the year 1872 she was to endure another revolution, and the
abdication of Amadeus, followed once more by a republican form of
government. Records compiled by both sides prove that the war continued
during the year 1872 with the same persistence, unchanged in character,
and apparently no nearer a decision. The Spanish government, both at
home and abroad, seems to have suffered at this time from great
apprehension that the United States government would officially
recognize the Cubans as belligerents, in which event their position
would be materially strengthened. In February Spain sent more troops to
Cuba, at the request of Captain-General Valmaseda, who accompanied his
appeal by a statement--for publication, and to impress the United
States--that the war would be over by April or May.
March found the struggle continuing, and on March 5, General Cespedes
himself, with a large body of Cuban troops, succeeded in taking Sagua de
Tanamo by storm. In this same month aid came from the United States, for
the steamer _Edgar Stewart_ arrived with arms, ammunition and supplies
for the Cuban army.
Small engagements took place all during April, and in May the Cuban
leaders issued a statement to the effect that if Valmaseda was expecting
that the war would soon be ended, he was not taking into consideration
the strong resistance which the Cubans were still able to offer, and
which they intended to continue until Spain granted them independence.
Truly the war might end at once, but Spain would end it not by force of
arms but by acceding to the frequently expressed desire of Cuba for
complete separation from her rule, by withdrawing the offensive
government, and by transporting her troops back to their native land.
Early in June the Cubans defeated the Spaniards near Las Tunas, and on
the 9th of that month, after heavy fighting, took Sama. The Cuban losses
in these engagements were heavy in comparison with the number of men
involved, but they were able to comfort themselves with the knowledge
that the Spanish killed and wounded totaled a much greater number, for
while the Cubans had only fifty killed and less than a hundred wounded,
the Spanish left dying on the battle field more than four times as many
as the Cubans, and their wounded amounted to three hundred and fifty.
But the Spanish navy was able to capture an expedition bearing relief to
the Cubans, and to defeat a band of patriots at Holguin, so that it
would seem that the honors for the month were about equal.
In July, General Garcia attacked Spanish troops under the Governor of
the Province, Colonel Huertas, and a very hot fight resulted, in which
the victory fell to the Cubans; and when Spanish reinforcements arrived,
they too were routed and put to flight. But this was offset by the fact
that General Inclan, one of the bravest and most loyal of the Cuban
commanders, as well as an expert tactician, fell into the hands of the
enemy, and was summarily executed at Puerto Principe.
Count Valmaseda, Captain-General, now ran foul of the displeasure of the
Volunteers, and suffered a downfall in consequence. On July 15 he was
recalled, and General Ceballos served in his place until the arrival of
his successor, Don Joachim Jovellar.
It now seemed time again for the Spaniards to assert themselves against
defenseless sympathizers with the revolution. Spies were busily at work
in Guira, Jiguani and Holguin, and presently they purported to discover
grave disloyalty among the members of some of the well known Cuban
families. This was the signal and the excuse for a wholesale slaughter
of innocent unoffending people, who, whatever their feelings, had taken
no active part in the uprising. As a means of reprisals the Cubans made
an attack on Guira, but it was not entirely successful.
The people of the United States were now following the insurrection with
much interest, particularly in those portions of that country in which
there were large numbers of sympathizers, and they were no longer
willing to ignore well authenticated reports of Spanish cruelty. A State
Convention of the Republican party was held at Jacksonville, Florida,
where there were many who were friendly to the Cuban patriots, and
adopted a resolution, denouncing the action of the Spanish authorities
in Cuba as cruel and inhuman, and calling upon Congress to pass the
necessary legislation to make it possible for the United States
government to extend such aid to the Cubans as "becomes a great and free
republic, whose people so ardently sympathize with the struggles and
hopes of the oppressed of all nations." However, the Government at
Washington did not look with favor upon this suggestion, and ignored it,
and it had little effect in stemming the tide of Spanish oppression in
Cuba.
The close of the year 1872 registered a splendid victory for the
patriots, when on December 20 they stormed and took Holguin, and
captured large quantities of supplies of all kinds.
Public documents compiled by the Spanish in August, 1872, estimated the
losses of the patriots up to that time as "thirteen thousand six hundred
insurgents--and a large number taken prisoner" while "sixty-nine
thousand six hundred and forty were in submission to the government; our
thousand eight hundred and forty-nine firearms, three thousand two
hundred and forty-nine swords and bayonets, and nine thousand nine
hundred and twenty-one horses were captured."
When, in 1873, Spain once more became a republic, the Cuban patriots had
high hopes that their independence would be recognized, but these were
soon dashed to the ground, when the Spanish government sent an appeal to
the Cubans to lay down their arms, and to entrust their fortunes to the
doubtful mercies of the new rulers of Spain, with the idea that Spain
needed the co-operation of her colonies to bring about the permanence of
the new government, which it was represented would result in a fair and
equitable Spanish rule in Cuba. These overtures were promptly rejected,
and the patriots made preparations to continue their struggle, adhering
with tenacity to their one goal, complete independence. The Spanish
government then appealed to the Volunteers, but that was such an
aristocratic organization that it had no sympathy with democracy, and no
desire to ally itself too closely with a republican form of government;
wherefore for once it refused to aid in coercing the patriots.
New Year's day, 1873, was doubly a gala occasion, because on that date
another relief expedition arrived from the United States, which brought
much needed supplies. The Cubans continued to harass the Spaniards, and
on the occasion of one successful engagement captured a number of horses
which were turned over to General Agramonte for his cavalry regiment.
This was one of the best organized regiments in the army, and had done
good work against the enemy, but it was soon to lose its leader, for in
May, 1873, General Agramonte was killed while charging the enemy at
Jimaguaya, and his command was taken over by Major-General Maximo Gomez.
Meantime another change was made in the head of the Spanish insular
government, and Don Candido Pieltain succeeded to the office of
Captain-General.
But there was serious trouble among the leaders of the Republic of Cuba.
No man in as high a position as that which General Cespedes occupied
could escape exciting jealousy. The Cubans were actuated by high ideals
and motives, but they were only human. Rumors derogatory to the
administration of General Cespedes began to be circulated, and on
October 27, 1873, the House of Representatives, assembled at Vijagual,
preferred charges against him of having in the administration of his
duties exceeded the powers which the Republic had conferred upon him. He
was tried and found guilty, and removed from office. By this action, a
great injustice was done to a man whose sole thought was the good of
his country, and who had given his best endeavors in its service. His
removal was a hard blow to the cause of the Republic, because it gave
the enemy notice of dissension among the patriots, placed the republican
government in a bad light in the eyes of the rest of the world, and lost
to the Cuban cause a loyal and efficient leader. General Cespedes
accepted without complaint the will of the Assembly, and took leave of
his office, after delivering a very eloquent and convincing address,
protesting his innocence of any thought of wrong. He was now in a
delicate position, for he was not in good standing with those with whom
he had cast his lot, and a price had been set on his head by the
Spaniards. He took refuge with a friend, and remained virtually in
hiding, until on February 27, 1874, he was betrayed by a negro who had
been captured by the Spaniards and who sought their clemency by
delivering Cespedes to them. He was taken prisoner and speedily executed
by the garrote.
[Illustration: SALVADOR CISNEROS BETANCOURT]
SALVADOR CISNEROS BETANCOURT
The Marquis of Santa Lucia, patriot and statesman, was born in
Camaguey on February 10, 1828, and from boyhood was an ardent
advocate of Cuban independence. In early life he joined the
Liberator Society of Camaguey, and because of his activities was
arrested and confined for a time in Morro Castle. He was one of the
leaders of the Ten Years' War from its beginning, participated in
the making of the Constitution, and succeeded Cespedes as President
of the Revolutionary government. Old as he was, he eagerly joined
in the War of Independence and took part in several battles. He was
a member of the Constitutional Assembly of 1895, and was elected
President of the Republic in Arms, which office he held until
October 10, 1898. Then he retired to private life, and died on
February 28, 1914.
The office of President was filled temporarily by Don Salvador Cisneros,
Marquis de Santa Lucia, the Chairman of the House, in the absence of the
Vice-President of the Republic, who was temporarily out of the country.
Cespedes had been the only one of the Cuban leaders who had really made
a study of civil government, and who was thus qualified for the position
of President. While Cisneros was a man of fine education, and great
intelligence, he was neither a leader of men nor a wise administrator,
and the downfall of Cespedes marked the beginning of the end of the long
struggle, and foreshadowed the final defeat of the Cubans.
But now came an incident which for a time bade fair to bring the United
States into the quarrel. There was a small side-wheel steamer called the
_Virginius_ which had for a long time been active in running the Spanish
blockade of the Cuban coast and in conveying reinforcements and
contraband supplies to the insurgents. She was under the command of
Captain Fry, an American citizen, and a veteran of the Civil War, in
which he had served on the side of the Confederates. The vessel was
manned by American and British seamen, and flew the American flag. In
October, 1873, at Port au Prince, Captain Fry took on board his vessel
five hundred Remington rifles, six hundred sabres, four hundred
revolvers, and other arms and ammunition intended for the Cuban army.
The steamer was well known to the Spanish navy, which had long been
seeking to capture her.
The end came on October 31. The _Virginius_ was hastening toward Cuba
with her questionable cargo when off the south coast she was sighted by
a Spanish cruiser, the _Tornado_, which had by curious coincidence, been
built by the same builders as had the _Virginius_. Her captain
recognized the _Virginius_ and gave chase. Captain Fry, who had been
vainly trying to effect a landing with his supplies and his men, some
of whom were going to Cuba to fight with the patriots, gave up the
endeavor and endeavored to escape to British waters at Jamaica; but the
_Tornado_ soon overhauled the _Virginius_ and took her with her
passengers and crew, numbering one hundred and seventy. When capture
seemed inevitable, an attempt was made to dump the cargo overboard, but
the _Tornado_ captured the _Virginius_ before this could be
accomplished. The vessel was taken to Santiago de Cuba, where four of
the passengers were at once recognized by the authorities as officers in
the revolutionary army, and were speedily sentenced to death. The
official Spanish report of the execution was as follows:
"Santiago de Cuba, Nov. 4, 1873.
"To His Excellency, the Captain-General:
"At six o'clock this morning, we shot in this city, for being
traitors to their country, and for being insurgent chiefs, the
following persons, styling themselves 'patriot generals': Bernabe
Varona, alias Barnbeta, General of Division; Pedro Cespedes,
Commanding General of Cienfuegos; General Jesus Del Sol; and
Brigadier-General Washington Ryan. The executions took place in the
presence of the entire corps of Volunteers, the force of regular
infantry, and the sailors from the fleet. An immense concourse of
people also witnessed the act. The best of order prevailed. The
prisoners met their death with composure."
There followed a summary court martial of the remainder of the company;
conducted according to the ruthless Spanish fashion, and under the
domination of the implacable Volunteers. The result was that Captain Fry
and forty-eight of the crew and passengers, including a number of
Americans and Englishmen, were sentenced to death. The sentence was
promptly executed, despite the earnest and urgent official protests of
the American and British consuls of Havana and their demands for at
least a decent delay of proceedings to enable them to consult their
governments and to have interviews with the condemned men. In fact, the
American consul was prevented from doing anything more than to protest
by being made a virtual prisoner in his own house, under a strong guard
of Spanish soldiers; under the pretence that in the excited state of
public feeling it would be unsafe for him to go upon the street.
The tragedy began on the afternoon of November 7, at 4 o'clock. The
scene was the chief public square of Santiago. It was ordered that the
victims should be shot in groups of four; all the others being compelled
to witness the fate of their fellows. As on the former occasion, a great
company of the Volunteers attended the butchery, together with a
multitude of the populace. In the first group of four was Captain Fry
himself. He refused to have his eyes bandaged, or to turn his back to
his slayers, and with his latest breath spoke words of comfort and cheer
to his comrades. The other victims of that day's slaughter were James
Flood, mate; J. C. Harris, John N. Boza, B. P. Chamberlain, William
Rose, Ignacio Dueñas, Antonio Deloyo, Jose Manuel Ferran, Ramon La
Wamendi, Eusebio Gariza, Edward Day, Francisco S. Trujillo, Jack
Williamson, Porfirio Corbison, Pedro Alfaro, Thomas Gregg, Frank Good,
Paul Plumer, Barney Hewals, Samuel Card, John Brown, Alfred Hosell, W.
F. Price, George Thomas, Ezekiel Durham, Thomas W. Williams, Simeon
Brown, Leopold Larose, A. Arcey, John Stewart, Henry Bond, George
Thomson, James Samuel, Henry Frank, and James Read--35 men beside the
Captain. More than two-thirds of them were obviously, judging from their
names, Americans or Englishmen. It is probable, however, that many of
these names, as also those of the passengers, were assumed, in order to
conceal the identity of their bearers in just such an emergency as this.
The next day, November 8, the massacre was continued, the victims of
that day being Arturo Mola, Francisco Mola, Louis Sanchez (who was in
fact Herminio Quesada, an active revolutionist), Jose Bortel, Augustin
Varona, Salvador Pinedo, Enrique Castellanos, Joseph Otero, Francisco
Rivera (otherwise Augustin Santa Rosa, an active patriot), Oscar Varona,
Justus Consuegra, and William S. Valls--12 in all; making with the 35
and the Captain of the day before, and the four of November 4, the total
of 52. But even this wholesale slaughter did not appease the blood-lust
of the Volunteers, or of General Burriel, the Spanish commander at
Santiago. Ninety-three more of the passengers of the _Virginius_ were
held in prison under sentence of death, which there was every reason to
fear would be executed.
But a militant Providence intervened. The British government learned of
what had been done, and of what was threatened. In consequence, as
quickly as engines under forced draught could drive her thither, the
British cruiser _Niobe_ sped to Santiago harbor. She entered the inner
harbor, rounded broadside to the city, and double-shotted her guns. Then
her captain, the intrepid Sir Lambton Lorraine, went ashore and demanded
of General Burriel that there should be no more murders. That worthy
protested that it was no affair of Sir Lambton's, since there were no
British subjects among the men. This latter statement was false, though
Sir Lambton did not know it, and may have thought it true. But Sir
Lambton knew his business. He curtly replied that the nationality of the
prisoners did not enter into his consideration of the affair; he
was there to stop the butchery, and the butchery must stop. The Spanish
general retorted hotly that he was not yet under British rule, and that
until he was he would take his orders from the Captain-General of Cuba.
To that Sir Lambton replied that as for him, he took his orders from the
Queen of England, at whose command the _Niobe_ lay in the harbor with
her guns double-shotted and trained on the city, the biggest of them,
indeed, aimed at the governor's palace; and he gave warning that the
slaying of another prisoner would be the irrevocable signal for every
gun to be put into action. It was enough. There were no more shootings;
and presently all the prisoners were released.
[Illustration: A SANTIAGO SUNSET
Cuba is world-famed for its land-locked harbors, described as
bottle-shaped, or purse-shaped, with a narrow but deep entrance leading
to a spacious inland lagoon, secure from storms and affording room for
vast fleets to ride at anchor. One of the largest and finest of these is
at the old capital, Santiago; so large that a scene upon its waters
appears like one on the open Caribbean. It was from this harbor that
Admiral Cervera's fleet emerged to be destroyed in the great sea fight
which broke the power of Spain in Cuba.]
Following is a list of the captured passengers on the _Virginius_, who
were bound to Cuba for the purpose of serving in the revolution. It does
not include those who were bound for the island on legitimate personal
business, but does include those already mentioned as having been put to
death:
Bernabe Varona (alias Benebata)
Pedro Cespedes
Arturo Mola
Jose Diaz
Francisco de Porras
Juan Merrero
Jose Medeo
Raimundo Pardo
Francisco Gonzales
Jose Palaez
Leonardo Alvarez
Julio Arango
Jose Hernandez
Nicholas Ramirez
Pedro Pajain
Manuel Padron
Alexandro Cruz Estrada
Felix Fernandez
Juan Soto
Manuel Perez
Jose Otero
Jose Antonio Ramon
Radom Barrios
Ignacio Valdes
Jose Santesteban
Felix Morejon
Francisco Pacheco
Evaristo Sungunegri
Ignacio Quentin Baltran
Perfecto Bello
Benito Glodes
Louis Sanchez
Nicholas Reriz
Juan Alvarado
Jose Boitel
Ricardo Calvo
Augustin Varona
Silverio Salas
Domingo Salazar
Justus Consuegra
Jose Ignacio Lamar
Andres Acosta
Benjamin Olazara
Enrique Castellanos
Alejandro Calvo
Jesus de Sol
Leon Bernal
Rafael Cabrera
Ignacio W. Tapia
Santiago Rivera
Andres Echeverria
Jose Maren
Pedro Saez
Severo Mendive
Enrique Ayala
Domingo Rodrigue
Arturo Rivero
William S. Valls
Manuel Menenses
General Ryan
William Curtis
S. Gray
Ramon Gonzalez
Antonio Chacon
Francisco Rivero
Sireno Otero
Carlos Pachero
Antonio Padilla
Enrico Canals
Indalecio Trujillo
Domingo Diaz
Carlos Gonzalez
Oscar Varona
Alfredo Lopez
Andres Villa
Francisco Castillo
Salvador Penedo
Rafael Pacheco
Camito Guerra
Camilo Sanz
Emilio Garcia
Amador Rosello
Manuel A. Silverio
Antonio Gomez
Luiz Martinez
Pedro Sariol
Miguel Saya
Patricio Martinez
Manuel Saumel
Luis Rebollo
Carlos Manin
Ramon R. D. Armas
Joseph A. Smith
Philip Abecaler
Samuel Hall
Sidney Robertson
George Winter
Evan Pento
Ricardo Trujillo
Leopoldo Rizo
William Marshall
George Burke
Gil Montero
These occurrences, when known, aroused tremendous excitement and wrath
in the United States, and there was much talk of war. But the
government, under the wise counsel of Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State,
kept its head and resorted to diplomacy before force. The Spanish
government, too, kept its head. It realized that its officers in Cuba
had acted outrageously, and that their deeds must be disavowed. So it
agreed, on December 8, to surrender the _Virginius_ on December 16, to
release all surviving passengers and sailors and deliver them safely to
an American warship at Santiago, and to punish all Spanish officials who
had acted illegally. There remained the supposed outrage to the American
flag, which the _Virginius_ was flying when she was fired upon and
seized. The Spanish government agreed to make amends by saluting the
American flag at Santiago on Christmas Day, provided it could be proved
that the _Virginius_ had a right to carry it. But as a matter of fact
the vessel had no such right. The Attorney-General of the United States
gave, before the day set for the salute, the opinion that the vessel was
the property of General Quesada and other Cubans, and therefore had no
right to sail under the American flag. The final settlement of the
affair occurred in February, 1875, when the Spanish government paid an
indemnity of $80,000 to the United States, and a smaller sum to Great
Britain, for their citizens who had been slaughtered. The _Virginius_
was lost at sea while being returned to the United States.
Meanwhile the patriots had not ceased fighting, and on November 9 they
met the Spaniards in a battle in which a large force was engaged on
both sides. They were equally matched, each belligerent having about
three thousand men in the field. The Cubans were victorious, and they
lost only a hundred men killed and double that number wounded, while the
Spanish losses were four times as many killed, and six hundred wounded.
Stories of Spanish cruelty to prisoners and to peaceful citizens
continued to be heard, and the Cubans were not content to allow these to
remain unsubstantiated. In 1873, Cuban sympathizers compiled a statement
which they called "The Book of Blood." In some manner they gained access
to Spanish records, and used not their own personal knowledge but the
official reports of the Spaniards themselves as a basis for their
accusations. The acts complained of were not confined to one year, but
covered the administrations as Captain-General of Lersundi, Dulce,
Rodas, Ceballos, Pieltain and Jovellar. There was almost no comment;
simply a plain statement of facts. The book commences with the names of
three thousand nine hundred and twenty-seven persons, exclusive of men
killed in battle, who had been brutally murdered by the Spaniards. The
dates and places of execution are given, so that there can be no mistake
as to the accuracy of the data. Following this is a list of four
thousand six hundred and seventy-two prisoners, captured by the
Spaniards, who had simply dropped out of sight, and whose fate had never
been determined. Next there is a record of one hundred and ninety-one
men who had been garrotted. There are the names of eighty-four men who
had been court-martialled in accordance with the decree of February 12,
1869, and under orders from the Captain-General; then the names of five
men condemned for life to hard labor in the chain gang of the penal
colony of Ceuta; the names of five others who had been given the same
sentence for a period of ten years, twenty sentenced for eight years,
and one for six years. After this is a list of men condemned to the
chain gang, place unknown, five for ten years, two for eight years,
seventeen for six years, three for four years, and one hundred and
fifty-eight from two to eight years. Then comes a list of two hundred
and fifty men from all walks of life, including superintendents of
plantations, attorneys at law, brokers, bankers, one architect,
clergymen, carpenters, druggists, engineers, farmers, masons, military
officers, notaries, Post Office clerks, railroad clerks, one British
Consul, three dentists, several police officers, surveyors, pilots,
students, shoemakers, silversmiths, physicians, an artist, seventeen
property holders, seven teachers, five tobacco manufacturers, a tailor,
fifteen sailors, musicians, boatmen, sugar makers, journeymen, and even
one schoolboy, who had been transported on May 21, 1869, to the island
of Fernando Po, off the coast of Africa. They were reported to have been
badly treated; so badly in fact that forty-seven died on the voyage or
immediately on landing. Besides this there is a report of forty-four men
transported to the penal colonies of Africa.
A defense is made against the charge that the Cubans had during the war
been no more merciful than the Spaniards. It was claimed that during the
first years of the war, when a number of officers had been captured by
the patriots, they were not executed, but were placed under parole not
to attempt to escape. They broke their parole, and in return for the
merciful conduct of their former captors they became the most violent
and brutal of all the Spanish officials in their persecution of the
Cubans. On the other hand, when men of Spanish birth approached the
patriots expressing sympathy for their cause, and a desire to fight for
independence, their services were accepted and in every instance they
proved to be spies, who furnished the Spanish leaders with valuable
information and delivered their Cuban comrades into the hands of the
enemy. It was alleged that up to August, 1869, the Cuban leaders adhered
to their policy of fair and decent treatment of their captives, and when
they learned of the brutal conduct of the Spaniards, General Quesada
addressed a message to General Lesca, and endeavored to effect a mutual
agreement on the subject. The reply received declared that the Spaniards
saw no reason to depart from their custom in the matter of this and left
the Cubans no alternative but to resort to similar measures. General
Quesada therefore ordered the execution of sixty-seven persons who had
voluntarily taken up arms under the Cuban banner, and who had later been
apprehended in a conspiracy to betray the patriots. It is stated that
the report of the affairs erroneously added an extra numeral to the
figures, which caused the number to be stated as six hundred and
seventy.
In proof of the truth of the statements contained in the "Book of
Blood," an account from the Spanish journal "Diario de la Marina," under
date of March 24, 1870, is cited:
"All the officers, sergeants and corporals who were in the hands of the
enemy have been shot. In connection with many Cubans they had planned a
counter-revolution, and had concerted the delivery of all rebel
chieftains to General Puello. Two days before the one appointed by this
gallant general to commence his march, he sent a messenger to Captain
Troyano with the news of his advance. The bearer of the news was
arrested, however, and searched, the letter was found, and on the
following day, the messenger, our officers, and the Cubans compromised
in the counter-revolution, were shot, thus sealing with their lives
their devotion to their beloved mother country."
This seems to be an ample corroboration of the fact that the men in
question were shot as traitors and not as prisoners of war. Another
Spanish officer, Don Domingo Graino, a Captain of the Volunteers, under
date of September 23, 1869, writes:
"More than three hundred spies and conspirators are shot monthly in this
jurisdiction. Myself alone with my band have already disposed of nine."
We have also this testimony from Jesus Rivacoba, an officer of the
Volunteers:
"We captured seventeen, thirteen of whom were shot outright; on dying
they shouted, 'Hurrah for Free Cuba!' A mulatto said, 'Hurrah for
Cespedes!' On the following day we killed a Cuban officer, and another
man. Among the thirteen that we shot the first day were found three sons
and their father; the father witnessed the execution of his sons without
even changing color, and when his turn came he said he died for the
independence of his country. On coming back we brought along with us
three carts filled with women and children, the families of those we had
shot; and they asked us to shoot them, because they would rather die
than live among Spaniards."
Still another officer of the Volunteers, Pedro Fardon, writes:
"Not a single Cuban will remain in this island, because we shoot all
those we find in the fields, on the farms, and in every hovel.
"We do not leave a creature alive when we pass, be it man or animal. If
we find cows we kill them; if horses, ditto; if hogs, ditto; men, women
and children, ditto; as to the houses, we burn them; so everyone
receives his due--the men in balls, the animals in bayonet-thrusts. The
island will remain a desert."
At the end of the year, the forces under General Maximo Gomez were
victorious over those under the Spanish General Bascones, in the
district of Camaguey, while the fortified town of Manzanillo was on
November 11 taken by storm and occupied by troops under General Garcia.
The Cubans lost forty-nine killed and eighty wounded, while the
Spaniards lost two hundred killed and one hundred and thirty wounded. On
December 2, the battle of Palo Seco occurred. Seven hundred patriots
under General Gomez were arrayed against a thousand Spaniards. A lively
fight took place, and the Spaniards were put to flight in such disorder
that they abandoned their wounded, their arms and their impediments.
They lost several officers and two hundred common soldiers, while the
Cubans captured seventeen officers, one of them being a
Lieutenant-Colonel. The Cuban casualties were small in comparison, being
ninety killed and one hundred and six wounded. Among the stores left
behind by the fleeing Spaniards were twelve revolvers, sixteen thousand
five hundred cartridges, two hundred and fifty Remington rifles, eighty
horses, and thirty mules, their packs containing ammunition, clothing
and a small amount of money.
CHAPTER XVI
At the beginning of the year 1874 a _coup d'etat_ placed Serrano again
at the head of the government in Spain, but in Cuba there was no change.
The struggle was still continued. The first battle of the year was on a
larger scale than the majority of those which had preceded it. At
Naranjo, on January 4, two thousand Cubans under General Gomez were
victorious over four thousand Spaniards, and the Cuban losses were
slight in comparison with those of the enemy. Again, at Corralillo, on
January 8, the Cubans scored a triumph, and on the next day a third
victory was achieved at Los Melones by the forces of General Garcia.
Don Joachim Jovellar, the Captain-General, declared the island to be in
a state of siege, and in a bold but hardly successful attempt to swell
the Spanish forces proclaimed a conscription of all men from twenty to
forty years old, and exacted the payment of a thousand dollars in gold
in lieu of compliance with this decree. He antagonized the Volunteers,
who considered themselves of much finer quality than the Spanish common
soldiers, by demanding that one-tenth of their number be allotted to and
placed under the command of the regular army. The Volunteers resisted
this order, and made an attempt to secure Jovellar's removal from
office, but were unsuccessful, and he continued to take the most
extraordinary measures, stating that he would summarily put down the
rebellion; and yet the fighting steadily continued.
General Portillo was considered one of the most able of the Spanish
officers, and it was expected that he would be able to inflict great
losses on the insurgents, hence the Spanish leaders were greatly
chagrined when he went down in defeat at the hands of General Gomez, who
then proceeded to administer a like chastisement to the forces under
General Arminan, who had taken up his position at Guasimas, and who was
forced to make his escape to Puerto Principe, abandoning his command,
all of whom were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. In all the history
of the war no such victory had ever before been won. The battle had
raged for three days and nights, and at its inception General Arminan
had been at the head of an army of three thousand men. When the
Spaniards had heard how Arminan was faring, they had sent General
Bascones to the rescue, but he never got through to aid Arminan, for he
was routed by the Cubans while on his way.
Jovellar was a little less confident, after these occurrences, that it
would be a simple matter to put down the rebellion. He seems to have
lacked the quality of resolute perseverance, and when matters were
against him he resigned his office, and again Don José de la Concha
returned to take charge of Spanish affairs in Cuba. Now Concha had been
_persona non grata_ with the Volunteers and he was not received by them
with great enthusiasm. He began at once upon assuming office to take the
force out of the decrees promulgated by Jovellar, by greatly modifying
their terms, and promising freedom to all blacks who would serve in the
army for a period of five years.
In April, 1874, Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, made public
announcement in Washington that during the five years of the war the
Spanish losses had totaled more than eighty thousand men and officers, a
large number of these casualties being due to sickness caused by
unsanitary conditions, while Spain had spent over one hundred million
dollars in her ineffective efforts to put down the revolution. He
further stated that it did not appear that she was likely to accomplish
this speedily, since the revolutionary government seemed quite as
powerful and as active as in the beginning.
The history of the year 1875 was one of unimportant engagements, small
skirmishes and guerrilla warfare, no important battle being fought until
the year had about reached its close, when Gomez suffered a severe
defeat at Puerto Principe, which is believed to have been the turning of
the tide against the Cubans. Meanwhile the United States began to
display a strong interest in Cuban affairs.
On November 5, 1875, a letter was sent by the State Department to Caleb
Cushing, then United States minister to Madrid, containing the following
information, intended, of course, as admonition to the Spanish
government:
"In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the war, or of any
change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, the
President feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of
other governments to intervene, solely with a view of bringing to an end
a disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace in the
island of Cuba. No government is more deeply interested in the order and
peaceful administration of this island than is the United States, and
none has suffered as the United States from the condition which has
obtained there during the past six or seven years. He will, therefore,
feel it his duty at an early day to submit the subject in this light,
and accompanied by an expression of the views above presented, for the
consideration of Congress."
For some strange reason, Mr. Fish seemed to have lost his usual cool
wisdom; for he went perilously near to ignoring the Monroe Doctrine, so
sacred to all the traditions of American diplomacy, when he directed
that a copy of this letter be forwarded to General Robert C. Schenck,
the United States Minister at London, directing him to ask for the
support of Great Britain in his position.
Following this action of his Secretary of State, President Grant, in his
message to Congress in December, 1875, said: "The past year has
furnished no evidence of an approaching termination of the ruinous
conflict which has been raging for seven years in the neighboring island
of Cuba. While conscious that the insurrection has shown a strength and
endurance which made it at least doubtful whether it be in the power of
Spain to subdue it, it seems unquestionable that no such civil
organization exists which may be recognized as an independent government
capable of performing its international obligations and entitled to be
treated as one of the powers of the earth."
The Spanish government was very wrathful when these facts became known
to it and at once sent a note to Great Britain claiming that the United
States had no reason to bewail the Cuban situation, for on account of it
her commerce had increased; that Spanish had had under the most jealous
and watchful care, as regards the safety of their person and property,
all American citizens who were engaged in business ventures on the
island, and that most of them were making huge fortunes. A complaint was
made that the United States gave refuge to Cuban outlaws, and it was
alleged that all past claims of the United States growing out of the
Cuban difficulty had been or were about to be settled.
However, Great Britain refused to have anything to do with an attempt,
in conjunction with the United States, to end the Cuban war, stating
that it was doubtful whether Spain would accept any terms that could be
offered, and that if she refused, Great Britain did not feel willing to
bring pressure to bear.
Spain, in a note dated February 3, 1876, intimated that the reason why a
settlement of the insurrection in Cuba had not been effected was because
the insurgents would not come out into the open and fight, but preferred
to wage a guerrilla warfare from mountain fastnesses; that could they be
lured into the open, Spain had a sufficient force in the field promptly
to defeat them. It was further intimated that the Creoles were tiring of
the insurrection and that it was now being supported mainly by negroes,
mulattoes, Chinese laborers, adventurers, and deserters from the Spanish
army. Finally the assertion was made that when Spain was finally
victorious, as it was assumed that she would be, she would at once
abolish slavery, and put into effect the most liberal of administrative
reforms.
In strange contradictions of these pretensions, Spain presently looked
to the United States Government to mediate in the affairs of Cuba, and
early in the year 1876 asked that it attempt to bring about an
understanding with the insurgents. Hamilton Fish, who was still
Secretary of State, replied, stating plainly the points which the United
States considered essential for the establishment of peace, law and
order in distressed Cuba:
"1--The mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty obligations, and a
full, friendly and liberal understanding and interpretation of all
doubtful treaty provisions, wherever doubt or question may exist.
"2--Peace, order, and good government in Cuba which involves prompt and
effective measures to restore peace, and the establishment of a
government suited to the spirit and necessities of the age, liberal in
its provisions, wherein justice can be meted out to all alike, according
to defined and well-established provisions.
"3--Gradual but effectual emancipation of slaves.
"4--Improvement of commercial facilities and the removal of the
obstructions now existing in the way of trade and commerce."
The Spanish government replied on April 16, making a specific answer to
each point made by the United States:
"1--The government of his majesty is in entire conformity as regards
complying for its part with all the stipulations of the existing
treaties, and giving to them a perfect, friendly and liberal
interpretation in all that which may be the subject of doubt or
question.
"2--The government of the king likewise proposes, because it believes it
necessary, to change in a liberal sense the régime hitherto followed in
the island of Cuba, not only in its administration but also in its
political part.
"3--Not merely gradual and genuine, but rapid emancipation of the
slaves, because the government of his majesty recognizes and
unreservedly proclaims that slavery neither can nor ought to be
maintained in any of its dominions, by reason of its being an
anti-Christian institution and opposed to present civilization.
"4--The government of the king finds itself in complete accord not only
as to increasing but as to extending to the furthest possible limit all
commercial facilities, and causing the disappearance of all the
obstacles which today exist, and which hinder the rapid and free course
of commercial negotiations."
The United States made no further attempts at intervention, and for the
time being the matter was dropped.
During the year which followed, 1877, more and more the Cuban methods of
warfare merited the description which Spain had given of them. It became
a war of extermination, rather than battle for independence. Cespedes,
Quesada, Agramonte, and many other of the original leaders had died in
battle, or had been captured and murdered by the enemy. Foreigners, who
knew nothing of early ideals, and indeed little of early struggles, had
largely replaced the great Cuban patriots, and their idea was not so
much separation from Spain and conquest of the enemy as plunder.
Property was no longer respected, the once prosperous island was fast
becoming desolate, and on every hand deserted and ruined plantations
were covered with weeds, where once had been wide cultivated fields. The
insurgents were a motley array of men, of many races, and of varied
color, yellow Chinese, and all shades of mulattoes, with only a small
proportion of Creoles. The bands were now composed principally of
marauders, who destroyed everything that they could not steal. Their
victory no longer meant a triumph for democracy, and the establishment
of a liberal government where there was now an oppressive one, but
rather it would be a menace to civilization, hostile to all ideals of
law and order.
The constitution of Spain's army at this period is reported to have been
two hundred and seventy-three superior officers; three thousand and
fifty-four subalterns; sixty-eight thousand one hundred and fifteen
privates, with an equipment of eight thousand four hundred and
seventy-eight horses; four hundred and sixty-two mules; forty-two field
guns, and plenty of small arms and ammunition. The men were properly
clothed, and well fed. Notwithstanding the confusion of the Carlist
uprising, Spain had been able to send over, during the first year of
King Alfonso's reign, twenty-four thousand, four hundred and forty-five
soldiers, while her naval force included forty-five vessels, equipped
with one hundred and thirty-two guns, and manned by two thousand four
hundred and twenty-six men. Besides this, over ten thousand men were on
the high seas to reinforce the Spanish army. The disorganized, ragged,
weary, badly fed Cuban forces, with the lawless element which now
unhappily predominated among them had small chance of victory against
such overwhelming odds. Nothing but the natural topography of the
country, so favorable to guerrilla warfare, and the knowledge which the
natives had of its mountain strongholds, had enabled the Cuban army to
prolong thus far the war. The only thing which had saved the island from
entire economic destruction was the fact that the belligerents had not
invaded the western provinces, and their inhabitants had been free to
plant and reap and conduct their lives in an orderly fashion.
The expenses of the war had made heavy inroads on the Spanish treasury,
and in August of this year, the Spanish capitalists had contributed
nearly twenty-five thousand pesetas toward the expenses of the army in
Cuba. As the season advanced, troop ships arrived at regular intervals.
In October, General Martinez Campos--one of the ablest soldiers and
statesmen in Spain--was appointed Captain-General of Cuba and commander
of the army, and he sailed from Spain to take over his command,
accompanied by fourteen thousand men. Determined that the revolution
should once for all be terminated, and not content with the sum which
Spain's bankers had placed at her disposal, the Spanish Cortes passed a
bill providing for a foreign loan, which would be devoted to the
suppression of the insurrection.
The beginning of the year 1877 thus saw the cause of liberty in a
precarious condition. The Cuban army had been so greatly weakened that
in the encounters which took place the Spaniards were constantly
victorious, and they were soon able to regain the major portion of the
territory which had previously been occupied by the revolutionists. The
time seemed favorable for a settlement of the difficulties in a manner
which, while offering a few concessions to the Cubans, might still be
greatly to the advantage of Spain. To the Captain-General this seemed
the proper occasion for some nice diplomacy, for coaxing with fair words
instead of coercing with violence. He therefore on May 5 issued a
proclamation which he felt would be effective in inducing the
revolutionists to abandon the struggle and to return to the doubtful
protection of allegiance to Spanish rule. His proclamation read as
follows:
"Article I--From the date of this decree, all orders of banishment
decreed gubernatively by this Government for political motives are
hereby rescinded, and all proceedings now under way regarding the same
are hereby overruled.
"Article II--The embargoes imposed gubernatively on insurgents who have
presented or may present themselves for pardon before the termination of
the war shall also be raised. There will, however, be excepted from the
favor of disembargo the property of backsliding insurgents and that of
the leaders of the insurrection, in respect to which this General
Government will adopt the measure it deems most convenient, according to
the special circumstances of each case.
"Article III--The property, embargoed gubernatively, of the disloyal
('infidentes') who have since died, shall also be released from embargo,
and delivered unto their lawful heirs, if these remain faithful to the
Spanish nation.
"Article IV--The property referred to in the two preceding articles once
returned, its owners or holders shall not sell, assign, transfer or
burden it in any manner until two years after the official publication
of the complete pacification of the island.
"Article V--The proceeds of property before its return shall be
considered as applied toward the expenses of the war, unless otherwise
provided for, and its owners without any right to make reclamation of
any nature whatsoever.
"Article VI--None of those whose property has been released from embargo
shall either have the right to make reclamation for any loss or injury
that may have been suffered by the property or object returned them.
"Article VII--To assist as far as possible in the return of said
property, this Government will authorize the Governors and
Lieutenant-Governors of the island to effect the same in each case, to
those comprised in this decree, whose property is situated within their
respective jurisdictions, with the due precautions which shall be
communicated to them from the office of the Secretary of the General
Government.
"Article VIII--The judicial proceedings actually under way against
_infidentes_ shall be forwarded until overruled, or judged, as may
result in law.
"Article IX--Concerning the property adjudged to the State, by sentence
of competent tribunals, his Majesty's Government will decide in due time
whatever it may deem most convenient.
"Article X--The requisite orders shall be issued through the office of
the Secretary of this General Government, that the foregoing articles
shall be duly complied with by whom it may concern."
Seven months later, on November 3, he promulgated a second decree
providing "that all estates ruined during the war, and in the way of
reconstruction, shall be free from contributions for five years, from
the date of the decree. Every new state and all new property acquired in
cities or villages of the central and oriental departments will have the
same privilege. All industries and commerce in said departments newly
established will be exempt for three years from contributions. All
female cattle, either Spanish or foreign, imported into Cuba with the
exclusive object of raising stock, will be duty free for two years."
The first decree had the desired effect. A number of the Cuban leaders
surrendered in October, 1877. It is true that when some of these men
attempted to return to the Cuban lines and persuade the other officers
to join them in submission to Spanish authority, they were tried by
court-martial and sentenced. But the tide had turned, and was now
steadily flowing favorably for the Spaniards. The war was over. Cuban
independence had once more been postponed.
Negotiations were entered into at Zanjon, in which General Maximo Gomez
represented the Cubans, and Captain-General Campos the Spanish
government. On February 15, 1878, the so-called Treaty of Zanjon was
signed; its terms being in brief as follows:
"Article I--The political, organic and administrative laws enjoyed by
Porto Rico shall be established in Cuba.
"Art. II--Free pardon for all political offenses committed from 1868 to
date, and freedom for those who are under indictment or are serving
sentences within or without the island. Amnesty to all deserters from
the Spanish army, regardless of nationality, this clause being extended
to include all those who have taken part directly or indirectly in the
revolutionary movement.
"Art. III--Freedom for the Asiatic coolies and for the slaves who may be
in the insurgent ranks.
"Art. IV--No individual who by virtue of this capitulation shall submit
to and remain under the authority of the Spanish government shall be
compelled to render any military service before peace be established
over the whole territory.
"Art. V--Every individual who by virtue of this capitulation may wish to
depart from the island shall be permitted to do so, and the Spanish
government shall provide him with the means therefor, without passing
through any town or settlement, if he so desire.
"Art. VI--The capitulation of each force shall take place in uninhabited
spots, where beforehand the arms and ammunition of war shall be
deposited.
"Art. VII--In order to further the acceptance, by the insurgents of the
other departments of these articles of capitulation, the
commander-in-chief of the Spanish army shall furnish them free
transportation, by land and sea, over all the lines within his control
of the Central Department.
"Art. VIII--This pact with the Committee of the Central Department shall
be deemed to have been made with all the departments of the island which
may accept the conditions."
In addition to this, there were reported to have been secret agreements,
which provided for "a civil governor with duties distinct from those of
a military governor; a provincial parliament in each of the three
departments; popular elections for municipal officers; the inclusion of
the war debt in the public estimates of the island; the dissolution of
the Volunteer Corps of Havana, and the organization of a new militia to
be composed alike of Cubans and Spaniards; a representation of the
island in the Cortes; a recognition of the military rank of the
insurgent chiefs and officers, and those accredited with foreign
commissions, their rank 'to be effective only in the list of the Spanish
army in Cuba,' and the complete abolition of slavery in five years, with
indemnity."
Both parties disregarded the terms of the treaty. Doubtless the Cubans
would have played with entire fairness, had it not been for the fact
that the Spaniards at once demonstrated that they did not intend to keep
their promises. General Garcia retained the title of "President of the
Republic," and the House of Representatives continued, until 1869, to
meet somewhere in the wilderness. General Campos made a bid for popular
favor, and went on record as advocating a peace which would be lasting.
The Spaniards had good cause not to desire resumption of warfare, and
the Cubans were too worn out to start any serious trouble. Campos wrote
a report to the Spanish government, couched in florid language and
breathing benevolence:
"I do not wish to make a momentary peace. I desire that this peace be
the beginning of a bond of common interests between Spain and her Cuban
provinces, and that this bond be drawn continually closer by the
identity of aspirations and the good faith of both.
"Let not the Cubans be considered as pariahs or minors, but put on an
equality with other Spaniards in everything not inconsistent with their
present condition.
"It was on the other hand impossible, according to my judgment and
conscience, not to grant the first condition; not to do it was to
postpone indefinitely the fulfilment of a promise made in our present
constitution. It was not possible that this island, richer, more
populous, and more advanced morally and materially than her sister,
Porto Rico, should remain without the advantages and liberties long ago
planted in the latter with good results; and the spirit of the age, and
the decision of the country gradually to assimilate the colonies to the
Peninsula, made it necessary to grant the promised reforms, which would
have been already established, and surely more amply, if the abnormal
state of things had not concentrated all the attention of government on
the extirpation of the evil which was devouring this rich province.
"I did not make the last constitution; I had no part in the discussion
of it. It is now the law, and as such I respect it, and as such endeavor
to apply it. But there was in it something conditional, which I think a
danger, a motive of distrust, and I have wished that it might disappear.
Nothing assures me that the present ministry will continue in power, and
I do not know whether that which replaces it would believe the fit
moment to have arrived for fulfilling the precept of the constitution.
"I desire the peace of Spain, and this will not be firm while there is
war or disturbance in the richest jewel of her crown. Perhaps the
insurgents would have accepted promises less liberal and more vague than
those set forth in this condition; but even had this been done it would
have been but a brief postponement, because those liberties are destined
to come for the reasons already given, with the difference that Spain
now shows herself generous and magnanimous, satisfying just aspirations
which she might deny, and a little later, probably very soon, would have
been obliged to grant them, compelled by the force of ideas and of the
age.
"Moreover, she has promised over and over again to enter on the path of
assimilation, and if the promises were more vague, even though the
fulfillment of this promise were begun, these people would have the
right to doubt our good faith and to show a distrust unfortunately
warranted by the failings of human nature itself.
"The not adding another one hundred thousand to the one hundred thousand
families that mourn their sons slain in this pitiless war, and the cry
of peace that will resound in the hearts of the eighty thousand mothers
who have sons in Cuba who are liable to conscription, would be a full
equivalent for the payment of a debt of justice."
February 21, 1878, saw the Cuban insurrection officially at an end. The
Cubans laid down their arms and surrendered to the Spanish forces. On
March 1, telegrams announcing this fact were received by the Cortes in
Spain with the greatest rejoicing. On the next day a royal decree was
published at Havana announcing that Cuba was to be accorded the same
treatment which had been granted to Porto Rico; and many concessions
were nominally made to the former insurgents. Cuba was to be allowed to
have her own municipal government and city councils, and was to be
granted representation in the Cortes, while a second decree was
promulgated at Puerto Principe declaring the freedom of all slaves who
had been born since the enactment of the measure of February 10, 1869,
on the condition that within a month they presented themselves to the
authorities for the proper legal procedure. Spain had so frequently gone
on record, particularly in her efforts to enlist the sympathy of the
United States Government, that she would, immediately on a determination
of the war in her favor, declare the abolition of slavery, that she
could not now very well give the lie to her assurances. The
proclamation at Puerto Principe, however, contained the extremely
unjust provision that all patriots who had taken part in the revolution
would not receive compensation for the financial loss suffered in the
freeing of their slaves, but that the loyal Spaniards would be
indemnified. It is not difficult to picture how this provision must have
impressed those patriots who had sacrificed everything in an effort to
free themselves from that very rule which was now imposing such an
unfair enactment upon them.
Official Spanish reports give the following table of their losses yearly
during the Ten Years' War:
_Year_ _Force in Field_ _Deaths_
1869 35,570 5,504
1870 47,242 9,395
1871 55,357 6,574
1872 58,708 7,780
1873 52,500 5,902
1874 62,578 5,923
1875 63,212 6,361
1876 78,099 8,482
1877 90,245 17,677
1878 81,700 7,500
------
Total 81,098
CHAPTER XVII
The Spanish government had granted concessions to the Cubans, or what on
their face seemed to be concessions, but in actual administration, the
government remained practically the same. The power remained vested in a
military government, at the head of which was the Captain-General, whose
name was subsequently changed to Governor-General, but whose nature and
functions remained in the last analysis very little different from what
they had been before the revolution. The struggle had, however, given
the Cubans less fear of their tyrant. They had demonstrated that they
were able for ten years to keep up an armed resistance against their
oppressors, and one which had occasioned Spain a great loss of life, and
of property, and had caused her rulers to have many unpleasant hours,
struggling with vexing problems. Those who had accomplished this would
never again be quite the same. They could never again be ground beneath
the heels of Spanish tyrants in the same unresisting if not
uncomplaining fashion, which had been the regular order of things before
the revolution. Had a Lopez come to Cuba, he would have found a far
different people from those who failed to rally to aid him when in 1851
he made his fruitless efforts to free the island.
During 1878 two political parties were organized in Cuba, and another
was essayed, the proposed constitution of the latter forming the basis
for the platform of the Autonomistas, then the most radical of all Cuban
political organizations.
The Liberal Party belied its name, for its platform was a most
conservative one. It followed closely the lines of the agreement with
Spain, as laid down in the Treaty of Zanjon, and the negotiations in
connection therewith, and it sought mainly to obtain the enforcement of
the promises which Spain made at that time, and in which, from long
experience, most Cubans had little faith--nor was this lack of faith
unwarranted. The party was really an organized movement to enforce the
provisions of the treaty. Its platform provided for the right to
assemble and to discuss political questions, the right of freedom in
religious worship, the removal of the restrictions which had been placed
on the press, and the right of petition. It also provided for the
protection of the homes and property of loyal Cubans, and for the right
of correspondence without censorship or interference from the Spanish
authorities. It stood for improvements in the criminal law, which would
make it impossible for the crimes which had been so prevalent to be
committed further against the persons and property of those who were in
sympathy with the liberation of Cuba. It also sought to obtain the
admission of Creoles to office on the island on the same basis as
Spanish born citizens, and above all a complete separation of the
military and civil functions of the government. It will be recalled that
one of the promises said to have been made by Spain was that there
should be a civil governor. By these means it hoped to abolish the
discrimination against the Creoles in the government of their own
country. Changes in taxation also had their part in the platform, with
an idea of obtaining a decrease of the high export duties.
An analysis of the platform of the Union Constitutionalists shows
surprisingly little difference from that of the Liberals. It also
provided for the right of petition, asked for an improvement in the
methods of administration of the laws--that is the abatement of the
perversion of those laws by unscrupulous Spanish officials, so that they
might be used as a club for protesting Creoles. The platform of the
Union Constitutionalists further stood for the enactment of special laws
for Cuba, which would be peculiarly suited to her needs, including
protection for the various industries and activities, the planters and
the tobacco raisers, and the removal of excessive export duties. It also
sought a commercial treaty with the United States, and the abolition of
slavery in accordance with the Moret law, with modifications which
seemed proper in the light of conditions in Cuba.
A third platform was formulated, but it was never completely adopted,
and the party which drafted it died at birth, without a name. It took
the bull by the horns, and flaunted its conviction in the face of Spain.
It is a matter of conjecture whether if the leaders of this movement had
prolonged the life of the potential party, it would have long survived
active Spanish opposition. This platform provided for free trade, free
banks, free shipping, free labor, none but municipal taxes, the prompt
and complete abolition of slavery, the formation of a provincial militia
and universal suffrage. Its terms must have been a severe shock to the
Spaniards.
No fewer than thirty representatives in the Spanish Cortes were allotted
to Cuba; but such representation was a farce, for pains were taken by
those who held the balance of power to see that so small a number of
Creoles were sent as representatives, and that the Spaniards so greatly
outnumbered them, that the Cuban vote counted for nothing, and Spain
still held complete power. This was the more regrettable and
exasperating, since the Cubans so far as they were permitted to do so
sent men of the highest type to the Cortes. Among them, preeminently,
was Dr. Rafael Montoro, one of the ablest scholars and statesmen in
Cuban history, who was destined subsequently to play a great part in the
administration of the free and independent Republic of Cuba.
It is self-evident that such conditions and the failure of Spain to live
up to her promises would be provocative of much dissatisfaction, and it
followed as a matter of course that those who had learned to rebel now
took that means of expressing their dissatisfaction. In fact the war had
never ceased, for soon after the signing of the treaty, as soon as Spain
had shown her hand, Calixto Garcia assembled a small band of rebels, and
continued to harass the Spanish in guerrilla warfare, taking up his
position in mountain fastnesses which were inaccessible except to those
who held the key to their labyrinthine paths, and biding his time in the
most annoying fashion possible until he felt matters were ripe for
another widespread armed rebellion.
In August, 1879, in the districts of Holguin and Santiago there was a
serious renewal of hostilities. The rebels, so termed by the Spanish,
consisted mainly of freed blacks, and were under the leadership of three
mulattoes, Maceo, Brombet and Guilleamon. This movement thoroughly
frightened the authorities, and two thousand Spanish troops were
promptly sent to repress it. The insurgents were reinforced by large
numbers of runaway slaves--those who had demanded their liberty and had
had their request denied. The insurgents took advantage of the disturbed
condition of the country and sought to turn the general situation to
their advantage. They hid in the mountains, in dense woods, and in wild
places, and descended wherever and whenever they could pillage and
burn without intervention from Spanish troops. So thoroughly did the
Spanish authorities dread a renewal of hostilities that the
Captain-General declared the province of Santiago to be in a state of
siege. Meanwhile the insurgents drew up a constitution for themselves,
and continued their activities for over six months, terrorizing the
people, destroying property and taking prisoners for ransom.
[Illustration: JOSÉ SILVERIO JORRIN
José Silverio Jorrin y Bramosio, a distinguished advocate, man of
letters and publicist, was born in Havana on June 20, 1816, and was one
of the pupils of José de la Luz at his famous school. After travelling
in the United States and Europe he became one of the leaders of the
Cuban bar and filled several judicial and other public offices. He was
at one time a Senator in the Spanish Cortes, from Camaguey. His chief
interest was in the advancement of the educational and economic welfare
of the island, and on subjects relating thereto he wrote a number of
important works. He wrote a Biography of Christopher Columbus and other
historical works, and had much repute as an orator. For some years he
was a leader of the Autonomist party, but later identified himself
actively with the cause of independence. He lived to see independence
assured if not actually yet achieved, dying in New York in 1897.]
Meantime General Garcia conducted a campaign in the neighborhood of
Santiago, which further complicated matters for the government. He had
planned a general uprising for December 15, with the expectation that
his small band would be largely reinforced by the arrival of
filibustering expeditions from the United States, with men and arms and
ammunitions. But he was disappointed, and the government retaliated by
making wholesale arrests of all persons, particularly blacks, who were
under the slightest suspicion of sympathy with the rebellion. Three
hundred and fifty blacks were arrested in Santiago alone. The rebels in
spite of their small numbers had been able to do so much damage to
property in this vicinity, that the government voted a hundred thousand
dollars for the relief of Santiago, and half that amount for the same
purpose in Puerto Principe.
The general feeling of unrest, uncertainty and suspicion among the
Creoles was enhanced by the action of the government at Madrid in
publishing a manifesto, on April 6, 1880, demanding that the Cuban
government be assimilated with that of Spain, and promising in return
enactments which would greatly increase the material prosperity of the
colony. If Spain did not keep her promises with Cuba in a position to
protest, it was a foregone conclusion that the action contemplated by
the manifesto would not be productive of leniency in the government of
the island, and it is not difficult to imagine with what wrath and
consternation the knowledge that such a plan could ever be formulated
filled the hearts of those who had struggled so long and so valiantly
and at so great personal sacrifice for the freedom of Cuba. The result
was a renewal of sporadic rebellions, and a seething turmoil of anger
and resentment on the part of the Creoles.
In April, 1881, an attempt was made by the Spanish government by
concessions to allay the storm which it had raised, and on April 7, the
constitution of 1876 was again proclaimed. This granted to the Cubans
full rights of citizenship, and the rights of free speech, free press
and assembly, and representation. This was promptly modified on the very
day of its enactment by the promulgation of the order of January 7,
1879, which had the effect of muzzling the press which had only a few
hours before been freed. The other rights granted were of course
existent only in name, and thus Spain continued her old program of
stupid treachery.
In 1882 an event occurred which for a time seemed likely to draw England
into the controversy. Three Cuban patriots, Maceo, Rodriguez, and a
third whose name is not of record, escaped from custody while they were
being transferred from one penal colony in Spain to another. They
hastened to gain English territory, and fled to Gibraltar. One of the
rights sacred to the English government was the right of asylum. This
the Spanish government proceeded to ignore. The Spanish consul notified
the English authorities that the fugitives must be returned to Spain,
and suggested as a method which would be productive of the least trouble
that at a time and place agreed upon they be sent across the border,
whereupon the Spanish authorities could apprehend them without
difficulty and the controversy would be happily ended. Through some
misapprehension on the part of the British officials, this was done. But
the end was not yet. The British government, when it learned of the
occurrence, promptly demanded the return of the men to British soil,
under the right of asylum. The Spanish government exhausted all its
arguments in vain. Great Britain stood firm, but when Spain had
surrendered two of the fugitives, the matter was finally dropped and the
fate of the third one was left to the mercies of Spain.
The history of Cuba was from this time on, until rebellion finally
flamed into the war in which, with the aid of the United States, she
gained her independence, one of petty persecutions, and retaliation by
continuous uprisings, small in character but indicative of the
smouldering fire. These were frequently aided by filibustering
expeditions sent by the Cuban Junta in New York.
In 1885 a revolt took place in the provinces of Santa Clara and
Santiago, always the hotbed of rebellion. The rebellion was quickly
suppressed, but its leaders, and a large number of other Cubans, who
were merely under suspicion of complicity, were executed without trial.
One of the leaders, General Vidal, was banished from Cuba, but, when he
was about to leave for Jamaica, under an arrangement made with the
Spanish authorities, he was brutally murdered by hired assassins.
Meanwhile the administration of justice in Cuba would have been almost
ludicrous if it had not been tragic. The Spaniards openly practiced the
most egregious frauds at the polls, and by all the chicanery known to
corrupt politics kept the Creoles from the participation in the
government which Spain had so glibly promised them. One of the
interesting methods to prevent the voting of the poor in Cuba was the
prohibition under a law passed on December 12, 1892, of bona fide
citizens from exercising the right of suffrage unless they paid the sum
of five dollars in taxes. This law applied to black and white alike, and
was prohibitive so far as the greater number of the former were
concerned.
Meanwhile those Cubans who desired better things for their children than
the nightmare in which they themselves lived were eager for education
for their families, but for the most part education was a privilege
which belonged only to the wealthy. It was not until 1883 that there
existed schools of learning similar to high schools. It was not Spain's
game to educate the masses, for if an autocracy is to survive, too much
learning is a dangerous thing to be allowed to spread among the common
people.
In 1887 the Spanish authorities decided, justly, that the treasury of
Spain was being deprived of revenues by the evasion of taxes, and that
this was being done by the connivance of the custom house officials. The
Governor-General therefore ordered the seizure of the custom house by
Spanish troops, and the wharfs and warehouses were placed under heavy
guard. After an investigation had been started a number of merchants
whose business was importing confessed that they had been doing business
in a way which deprived the government of certain revenues and asked
permission to change their entries. They were granted three days to do
this. The result was an enormous increase in revenue from the custom
house. The Governor-General proceeded from that time forth to keep a
strict watch on custom house matters, with the result that evasions of
the law were the exception.
By 1887 the country was in such condition that it was unsafe for any man
to proceed unguarded for a mile or two into the country. Neither the
person of any well-to-do planter, nor his property was safe. Outlaw
bands overran the highways, and took cover in woods and hills, from
whence they pounced on travelers, robbed and beat them, and took them
captive for ransom. The brigands were so daring and their depredations
assumed such proportions that martial law was declared in over a hundred
towns and villages. Incendiarism was rife, not only were planters robbed
and murdered, but their possessions were pillaged, their fields were
laid waste and their buildings were burned. Sanitary conditions on the
island were so bad that in the months of December, 1887, and of January
and February, 1880, two thousand cases of smallpox were reported. This,
of course, covered only a small portion of the cases actually existent,
and those who did not fall victim to smallpox were in danger of yellow
fever. Even Nature seemed to have entered into a conspiracy against the
unhappy island, for in 1887 there was an earthquake, and the following
year a violent cyclone, which went the whole length of the island, but
did its principal damage in the province of Santa Clara. Not less than a
thousand lives were lost.
For a time, indeed, there was a measure of relief. That was when under
the McKinley tariff of 1890, Cuban products, particularly sugar, gained
freer access to American markets. While this system lasted, there was an
accession of material prosperity in Cuba. But upon its repeal, due to a
change of politics in the United States government, prosperity in Cuba
waned, while discontent, dissatisfaction and disaffection waxed apace,
and undismayed and resolute patriots began preparing for another general
insurrection.
During the period between the Ten Years' War and the final War of
Independence there was a succession of Governors-General, varying
chiefly in the degree of their unacceptability to the Cuban people and
of the ineptitude with which they maladministered the affairs of the
island and thus contributed to the ultimate and inevitable catastrophe.
Martinez Campos served, with the best of intentions, until the late
summer of 1883. Then on September 28 he was succeeded by Ignacio Maria
del Castillo. His administration endured for three years, and was
replaced in 1886 by that of General Emilio Calleja y Isasi, who gave
place the next year to Saba Marin. Another change occurred on March 13,
1889, when Manuel de Salamanca y Negrete took office. He served for less
than a year, being succeeded on February 7, 1890, by General J.
Chinchilla. To the latter must be accorded the distinction of having the
shortest term of all, for on June 10 following his place was taken by
General Polavieja. He served for two years and was succeeded on May 31,
1892, by General A. R. Arias, who in turn, on August 10, 1894, was
replaced by General Emilio Calleja, who thus entered upon his second
term, in which he was to suffer the penalty of the misdeeds of a long
line of predecessors, and was to begin reaping the whirlwind harvest of
the evil wind which for four centuries Spain had been sowing with a
perverse and ruthless hand.
CHAPTER XVIII
"New occasions," sang a great American poet of freedom and of progress,
"new occasions teach new duties"; and splendidly was the truth
exemplified in Cuba in the era of which we have been writing in this
volume. There befell the island at the beginning of the Nineteenth
Century a new occasion, the greatest thus far in all its history since
the landfall of Columbus. It was perhaps only partially realized at
first, and it took many years for the complete realization to dawn upon
the universal popular mind. But even before the realization came, the
Cuban people, not yet cognizant of the tremendous force which was
working within them, began to rise to meet the new occasion, the new
opportunity which was opening before them, with a triumphant spiritual
puissance which has not often been rivalled in the annals of the
nations.
[Illustration: FELIPE POEY]
FELIPE POEY
One of Cuba's greatest natural scientists, Felipe Poey, was born in
Havana on May 26, 1799, and was educated at the San Carlos Seminary
and in France. He became a lawyer in Madrid, but in 1822 left that
city because of political conditions and returned to Cuba to devote
himself to ichthyology and entomology. He published a monumental
work on "Cuban Ichthyology," and others on "Cuban Lepidopteres,"
"Cuban Mineralogy," the "Geography of Cuba," and the "Natural
History of Cuba." He was for many years professor of zoology at the
University of Havana and Dean of the Faculty of Sciences. He died
in 1891.
Writing of that very period, in his essay on Jean Paul Richter, and
referring to the British domination of the sea which Nelson had
achieved, to the mastery of the lands of Europe which Napoleon had won,
and to the intellectual primacy which Germany--though beaten to the dust
in war--was then enjoying, Carlyle observed that "Providence has given
to the French the empire of the land, to the English that of the sea, to
the Germans that of--the air!" It was a fine conception, as true then as
it would be untrue to-day. In a significant sense the same shrewd
observation is apt to the situation of Cuba a hundred years ago. Spain
held control of the material interests of the island, on sea and on
land, but she could not restrain the Cubans from self-control, which
meant immeasurable progress, in the air--that is, in the intellectual
life. It was thus intellectually, in the only way as yet within their
power, that the people of the island met the new and transcendent
occasion.
It was, as we have seen, a period of revolution and of
counter-revolution, a time of flux, throughout the greater part of the
world. The mighty liberal impulse of the French Revolution, following in
the wake of the American revolution, was by no means annihilated by the
infatuated imperialism of Napoleon or by the reactionary movement which
prevailed for a time after his fall. It was felt, and it prevailed, in
North and Central and South America, from the Golden Gate to the Strait
of Magellan; and in the islands of the Caribbean and the Gulf. In Cuba,
as we have seen, there seemed to be at first no response, for reasons
which also we have hitherto considered. But all unconsciously the Cuban
people received and felt the impulse, and answered it.
Periods of revolution are usually periods of intellectual activity, and
such was the case in Cuba. While there was in the first quarter of the
century little thought of a revolt against Spain, or of independence,
the revolutionary spirit which was in the air inspired the minds of
Cubans, not only with activity but also, largely, with thoughts and
aspirations of freedom. There was indeed in particular a striking
likeness between Cuba and the Thirteen Colonies in North America just
before the Revolution in that country. It will be recalled that down to
a few months, perhaps even weeks, before the Declaration of Independence
in 1776, very few American leaders contemplated independence. The war
which they had begun at Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill was not a
war of secession, but a civil war intended merely to secure for British
subjects in the colonies the same rights and privileges that British
subjects in the British Isles enjoyed. But a little later it was seen
that this would not suffice, and that complete separation and
independence must be achieved. Precisely so did some of the foremost
Cuban minds at the time of which we are writing, and indeed in much
later years, incline toward reforms and autonomous freedom under the
Spanish crown.
[Illustration: ANTONIO BACHILLER]
ANTONIO BACHILLER
Patriot, economist and man of letters, Antonio Bachiller y Morales
was born in Havana on June 7, 1812, and was educated for the bar.
He wrote several volumes of poems and plays, but gave his best
attention to valuable treatises on Cuban history, industry,
agriculture, economics, administration, and law. He was one of the
foremost authorities and writers on Cuban and Antillean
archaeology. He was professor of philosophy in the University of
Havana, held various public offices, and was a patriotic orator of
great power. He died on January 10, 1889.
These men saw with exultation the enkindling of a spirit of liberty in
the Iberian Peninsula. They saw the revolt of Spain against Joseph
Bonaparte. They saw the Spanish people dictate to their Bourbon king
that Constitution of 1812 which had it been triumphantly enforced would
have marked an epoch in the history of the rights of man. They
sympathized with and exulted in these things, and hoped for their
extension in Cuba. It was only when they sadly realized that these
things, even if gained for Spain, were not for Cuba, and that Liberal
Spain was as illiberal toward Cuba as ever despotic Spain had been, that
they turned from autonomy to independence. Then the intellectual
activities which had been directed to the achievements of the Peninsula,
were turned to the interests of the island.
[Illustration: JOSÉ MARÍA HEREDIA
The bearer of one of the greatest names in the literature of Cuba and of
Spain, José María Heredia, was born at Santiago de Cuba on December 31,
1803, and died at Toluca, Mexico, on May 7, 1839. Because of his early
identification with the cause of Cuban freedom in the "Soles y Rayos de
Bolivar" he was compelled to flee to the United States, whence he
presently went to Mexico and there spent the remainder of his life,
holding places of high rank and importance. He was at once advocate,
soldier, traveller, linguist, diplomat, journalist, magistrate,
historian, poet. His "Ode to Niagara" has made him illustrious in
American literature. His general writings have given him conspicuous
rank among the world's great lyric poets of the Nineteenth Century.]
The most striking exemplar of the pro-Spanish attitude of which we have
been speaking, as well as perhaps the greatest of all Cuban poets, was
José Maria Heredia; of whom the world too often thinks as a Spanish
rather than as a Cuban genius. He was born in Cuba in 1803, the son of
parents who had fled from Santo Domingo to escape the fury of the
revolution of Toussaint l'Ouverture. His father had formerly been a
Chief Justice of the Venezuelan court at Caracas, under the Spanish
government, and was loyal to Spain, though he detested and protested
against her tyrannies and corruption and imbued his son with a
passionate love of liberty. The younger Heredia established himself in
the city of Matanzas, as a successful lawyer. But already he had written
many poems, chiefly of freedom. They were in praise of Spain, and of the
Spanish aspirations for liberty which were manifested in the
Constitution of 1812. Indeed, never did Heredia commit himself against
Spain, harshly as he was treated by her. But the poems which he had
written in glorification of the Peninsular struggles for liberty
against Napoleon and against the Bourbons were recognized by his
countrymen to be equally applicable to the Cuban struggle against Spain,
which was already impending, and they were consequently taken up
throughout the island in that sense and for that purpose. This
circumstance, though unintended by him, subjected him to grave
suspicion; and he was presently charged with complicity in an
insurrectionary movement in 1823, and was banished from Cuba for life.
After a brief visit to the United States he went to Mexico, became a
government official, married, and spent the rest of his life there, with
the exception of a few weeks in 1836, when the Spanish authorities
permitted him to revisit Cuba, though their espionage made his visit
anything but pleasant. He died in 1839.
Heredia, who has been called the Byron of Spanish literature, and who is
claimed by Spain as one of the glories of her letters, is known in Cuba
largely by his patriotic poems, and his poems on nature. In the United
States, where because of his exile from Cuba his poems were first
printed, he is chiefly known by three great compositions, two of which
were translated into English by William Cullen Bryant. These are his
"Ode to Niagara," Which ranks among the greatest poems ever written by
any poet on that theme; his "Ode to the Hurricane"; and a sonnet
addressed to his wife. It is with his political and patriotic poems,
however, that we are now most concerned, and of them it may be said that
seldom have the aspirations of a people for freedom been expressed with
more passionate eloquence. His first important poem, "The Star of Cuba,"
written while he was yet in his teens, expressed a readiness to die, if
need be, for Cuba, leaving his head upon the scaffold as a token of the
brutality of Spain. Years afterward, in exile, he apostrophized Cuba as
the "land of light and beauty," and then thus prophesied:
My Cuba! Thou shalt one day rise
From 'neath the despot's hand,
Free as the air beneath thy skies
Or waves which kiss thy strand.
In vain the traitor's noxious plots,
The tyrant's wrath is vain;
Since roll the surges of the sea
Between thy shores and Spain!
[Illustration: FELIX VARELA]
FELIX VARELA
One of Cuba's greatest philosophers and churchmen, Felix Varela,
was born in Havana on November 20, 1788, was educated at San
Carlos, and became a priest and teacher. After several years of
service at San Carlos as Professor of Philosophy, in 1823 he was
compelled to flee to New York as a political exile. In that city he
spent the rest of his life, editing several periodicals,
translating many works, and writing much on religious and
philosophical subjects. He became rector of the Church of the
Transfiguration, and in 1845 was chosen Vicar-General of New York.
A few years later he went to Florida on account of his health, and
died at St. Augustine in 1853.
Though Heredia took little active part in the physical revolt of Cuba
against Spain, his poems exerted during his lifetime a potent influence
in aid of revolution, and that influence steadily increased until,
nearly three score years after his death, his prophecy of Cuban freedom
was splendidly fulfilled. He was the first great voice of Cuban freedom,
the first great pioneer in that extraordinary intellectual development
which made Cuban history memorable in the Nineteenth Century. Truly did
the Spanish critic Menendez say of him that if his political activity
did not equal that of other conspirators against Spain, and though he
took no part in armed struggles, his intellectual influence was constant
and supremely effective, since he surpassed in talents all his
countrymen.
[Illustration: JOSÉ AGUSTIN CABALLERO]
But men might fall a little short--if indeed they did so--of Heredia's
singular genius, and yet be noteworthy figures in the intellectual
world. Well comparable with Heredia in influence, though exerted far
differently, was the brilliant Professor of Latin, philosophy and
science in the University of Havana, Felix Varela y Morales. It used to
be said, and not without reason, that it was he who first taught the
Cuban people to think as Cubans. He was sent to Spain as a Cuban Deputy
to that historic Cortes which met at Cadiz in 1823 and was dispersed by
Ferdinand VII because of its Liberalism. Varela was among its most
conspicuous members, and was among those whose arrest was ordered by the
reactionary Bourbons. He fortunately found asylum under the British flag
at Gibraltar, whence he made his way to the United States. There, at
Philadelphia, he published during the remainder of his life, a weekly
journal, _El Habanero_, which had a large though chiefly surreptitious
circulation in Cuba, and which exerted an inestimable influence for the
encouragement of patriotic endeavors. He died in Florida in 1853, and
his remains rested there for nearly half a century, when, after the
achievement of Cuban independence, they were transferred to his native
land.
JOSÉ AGUSTIN CABALLERO
One of the greatest ecclesiastics of Cuba, Father José Agustin
Caballero, uncle and preceptor of José de la Luz, was born in
Havana in February, 1771, and for many years was Director of the
San Carlos Seminary. He was a leading member of the Patriotic
Society, wrote much for the press, was the author of a number of
educational and historical works, and preached a memorable sermon
over the remains of Columbus when they were placed in the Cathedral
at Havana. He died in 1835.
A name which we are not inclined to rank below any other in intellectual
significance and influence in Nineteenth Century Cuba is that of the
illustrious José de la Luz y Caballero, who was born in 1800 and died in
1862, too soon to see the beginning of that Ten Years' War to which his
teachings had powerfully contributed. "The Father of the Cuban
Revolution" the Spaniards called him, and more perhaps than any other
man did he deserve that honorable distinction. It was as an educator of
youth that this great man's great work was done. In the world-shaking
revolution year of 1848, after O'Donnell has drowned the Cuban slave
revolts in blood, and when Narciso Lopez was just preparing for his
descents upon the island, Luz y Caballero opened in Cuba a high school
for boys. It was not a political school; certainly not seditious, unless
truth and virtue were seditious. Hundreds of Cuban patriots, including
many of the leaders in the Ten Years' War and the War of Independence,
have testified that it was his teaching that made them the aggressive,
resolute, militant patriots that they were. Yet they have all been
equally insistent that "Don Pepe" as they called him was never a
political propagandist. He never incited them to revolt, never
prejudiced them against Spain. Yet, said his Spanish critics and
enemies, he prepared his pupils to conspire and to be garrotted!
Both accounts of his teaching were true, and together they formed the
severest possible indictment of the Spanish régime. The burden of his
teaching was manhood. He and his assistants gave much attention to the
ordinary academic studies, in science and the humanities. But constantly
he impressed upon them the duty of being manly. That meant that they
were to be true, pure, resolute against injustice, respecting themselves
and respecting others as themselves, and ready if need should be to
sacrifice themselves for the sake of duty. It was the highest and best
form of practical ethical teaching. He might, it is true, have added at
the end of each of his weekly discourses to his boys the words of
Patrick Henry, "If this be treason, make the most of it." The Spaniards
did regard it as treason, and it did certainly incite and foment
insurrection against Spain. But so much the worse for Spain, if such
teaching was incompatible with her rule in Cuba.
[Illustration: DOMINGO DEL MONTE]
DOMINGO DEL MONTE
One of the greatest patrons of Cuban letters, Domingo del Monte,
was born in Venezuela on August 4, 1804, was brought to Cuba in
1810, and was educated at the University of Havana. He travelled
much in America and Europe, and then settled in Havana, where he
was secretary of the Royal Economic Society. He edited a dictionary
of Cuban provincialisms, and published a volume of "American
Rhymes." He made his house the rendezvous of Cuban men of letters
and gave to many of them invaluable encouragement and aid; and was
also active in promoting public education throughout the island. He
died at Madrid, Spain, in 1853.
An important literary influence was exerted in Cuba, beginning in the
latter part of the Eighteenth century, and reaching its height in the
first third of the Nineteenth, by the society called "Friends of Peace,"
of which Domingo del Monte was the leading spirit. It was this
organization which gave Varela his professorship in the University of
Havana. It was it that gave a prize for the best poem on the birth of
the princess who was to become Isabella II of Spain; a prize which was
won by a lad of sixteen. This was Jose Antonio Echeverria, who afterward
edited a literary journal called _El Plantel_, and still later became
one of the leaders of the strife for independence. Another protégé of
Del Monte's--for he was a wealthy patron of letters, at Havana--was
Ramon Velez y Herrera, who was born in 1808 and died in 1886. He devoted
his attention chiefly to depicting in poetry the life, manners and
customs of the common people of Cuba, and particularly of the peasantry.
Still another was José Jacinto Milanes, who was born in 1814 and died in
1863. He was preeminently the poet of "local color" in nature. No other
has quite so richly and so perfectly embodied Cuban landscapes in verse.
But both these poets also wrote in behalf of Cuban freedom.
[Illustration: JOSÉ JACINTO MILANES]
Domingo del Monte himself wrote some poetry, but much more in prose, and
he had the distinction of being practically the founder of political
tract and pamphlet writing, an art which was largely practised with
powerful results. He wrote in 1836 a notable criticism of the despotic
administration of Tacon, and an analysis of the condition in which Cuba
found herself under such government. This opened the way for a veritable
flood of political tracts.
JOSÉ JACINTO MILANES
Born in Matanzas on August 16, 1814, and because of poverty chiefly
self-educated, José Jacinto Milanes became a noted linguist and
graceful poet. Most of his writings were translated into German,
and some into English and French, and he gained international
repute as a man of letters. Mental derangement and failing physical
health afflicted him in 1843, and he died in 1863.
Conspicuous among them were the writings of José Antonio Saco, who was
born in 1797 and died in 1879. He was both a rival and a friend of
Varela, and was the latter's successor in his professorship when Varela
went to Cadiz and then fled to America. After Varela's arrival in the
United States, Saco formed a literary and patriotic partnership with
him, and together they edited the _Cuban Review_, a literary and
critical journal of high rank, which commanded international attention.
The American historian and literary critic, George Ticknor, said of it
that perusal of it greatly impressed him with the amount of literary
talent that existed in Cuba. The _Review_, he declared, far surpassed
anything of the kind in any other of the Spanish or former Spanish
colonies, and indeed "a review of such spirit, variety and power has
never been attempted even in Madrid." Of course, Saco was exiled by
Tacon, the immediate cause of offense being a pamphlet exposing and
denouncing some of the more flagrant evils of the slave trade. The
result was, however, that in exile Saco wrote one of the most elaborate
and exhaustive histories of slavery in existence in any language, beside
continuing his occasional political tracts. Nor did his influence end
with his death and the laying down of his pen, for portions of his
writings figured conspicuously and effectively in the literary
propaganda which formed the prelude to the War of Independence.
Gabriel de la Conception Valdes was another of the protégés of Del
Monte. He was born in 1809 and died in 1844. His father was a mulatto
barber and his mother was a Spanish dancer, and he himself was permitted
to remain illiterate in boyhood. While working as a maker of tortoise
shell combs he was taught to read, and soon developed a passion for
books. From reading he proceeded to the writing of poetry, adopting the
pen name of "Placido" from the name of Placido Puentes, a druggist of
Havana who encouraged his literary efforts to the extent of giving him
pen and ink and paper, and a desk in his shop at which to sit and write
whenever he felt inclined. Valdes was a voluminous writer, above most of
his contemporaries, and while much that he wrote was mediocre, many of
his poems were of high merit, and some of them deserve to rank among the
best in Cuban literature; indeed, they would be noteworthy in the
literature of any land. Especially meritorious are his poems about the
slave trade and his apostrophes to Liberty. Because of these he was
accused of complicity in an attempted negro uprising. He was hurried
through a farcical trial, in which no real proof of his guilt was
presented. Indeed, there is good reason for believing that he was
entirely innocent. But he was found guilty, and was put to death;
repeating aloud, as he walked to the place of execution, one of his
poems on liberty.
[Illustration: JOSÉ MANUEL MESTRE]
JOSÉ MANUEL MESTRE
Advocate, philosopher, journalist and revolutionist, José Manuel
Mestre was born in Havana in 1832. He was a professor of both law
and philosophy in the University until he resigned because of
governmental injustice to a colleague. For a time he taught on La
Luz's school of El Salvador, and as a lawyer he defended Abad
Torres who was charged with trying to murder the Archbishop of
Santiago. During the Ten Years' War he was in New York, a member of
the Cuban Junta, a diplomatic agent at Washington, and one of the
editors of "El Nuevo Mundo." After the Treaty of Zanjon he returned
to Cuba, and died in Havana in 1886.
Three more writers of note and of real merit must be mentioned as
members of the company gathered about him by Domingo del Monte. These
were Anselmo Suarez y Romero, who lived from 1818 to 1878, and who as a
delineator of Cuban life and customs in fiction and essays ranks among
the best Cuban writers of prose; Cirillo Villaverde, who lived from 1812
to 1894, and who also depicted in romances the life and manners of his
countrymen, dealing much, moreover, with African slavery; and Ramon de
Palma y Romay, who dates from 1812 to 1860, who assisted Echeverria in
the editing of "El Plantel," and who was an accomplished writer of verse
and of dramas, and who is said to have been the first native Cuban
dramatist to have a play of his produced upon the stage. The work of his
thus honored was "La Prueba o la Vuelta del Cruzado," in 1837. Palma
also wrote some strongly patriotic poems, which excited the suspicion
and enmity of the Spanish authorities, and in consequence in 1852 he was
arrested and imprisoned for a time on charge of complicity in the
revolutionary movements of that time. We may reckon him to have been the
last of the earlier school of Cuban writers, who had been more or less
unconsciously inspired by the revolutionary era of the beginning of the
century. Next came a new school, of the writers of the final and
triumphant revolution.
We may indeed regard José Antonio Saco, to whom we have already
referred, as one of the writers and intellectual leaders of the final
revolution. In his earlier years he was an advocate of reforms in the
Spanish administration of the island which would make continued union
acceptable. In 1848 he had written a strong pamphlet against
incorporation of Cuba in the United States, largely on the ground that
thus Cuban nationality and the individuality of the Cuban people would
be extinguished. Three years later he wrote again on "The Cuban
Situation and Its Remedy," in which he pointed out the necessity of
Spain's granting fully the just demands of the Cuban people, the
alternative being separation and independence; and he indicated pretty
clearly that he regarded the latter course as all but inevitable.
Thereafter for some years there was comparatively little political
literature put forth in Cuba, but other departments of letters greatly
flourished. A noteworthy volume of poems by four authors was published
in 1853 under the title of "Cuatro Laudes." One of the authors was Dr.
Ramon Zambrana, a physician and scientist of high attainments, whose
poems were chiefly metaphysical, speculative and imaginative. He was
married to Dona Luisa Perez, perhaps the foremost of the women poets of
Cuba; to whom he was attracted by the reading of her poems. Many critics
rate her verses more highly than his, and they were certainly more
popular.
[Illustration: LUISA PEREZ DE ZAMBRANA]
LUISA PEREZ DE ZAMBRANA
One of Cuba's greatest poets, Luisa Perez, was born near El Cobre
in 1837, and was married in 1858 to Dr. Ramon Zambrana, an eminent
man of letters of Havana. She wrote much in youth, and published a
volume of poems in 1856. In addition to her poems she wrote
"Angelica and Estrella" and other novels, and translated much from
the French and Italian. When Gertrudis Avellanda returned to Cuba,
Luisa Perez was chosen to place upon her brow a golden laurel
wreath.
The second of the four authors was José Gonzalo Roldan, whose best work
was in poems of tender sentiment. The third, Rafael Maria de Mendive,
devoted himself almost exclusively to poems of melancholy or at least
pensive sentiment. He was a passionate admirer and to some extent a
disciple if not an imitator of Byron and Moore, many of whose poems he
translated into Spanish with much success. Beside his poetical work
however, he cooperated with Quintiliano Garcia in founding and
conducting _The Havana Review_, a meritorious fortnightly literary
journal. His career in Cuba was cut short early in the Ten Years' War by
banishment for treason. He was at that time the head of a boys' school,
in Havana, and was suspected by the authorities of inculcating in his
pupils forbidden ideas of freedom and democracy. One night in January,
1869, when there was much popular indignation against the Spanish
government on account of a very drastic proclamation which had been
issued against the insurgent patriots, a number of Cuban women marched
to a theatre in Havana, wearing dresses of red, blue and white adorned
with stars, obviously representing the colors of the revolutionary Cuban
flag. Some of Mendive's boys were present, and they applauded and
cheered the women so vigorously that a riot arose, in which the
notorious Volunteers caused some bloodshed. For this Mendive was held
responsible, and he was arrested and exiled to Spain for a term of four
years. The influence of the American poet Longfellow and other literary
men, however, procured his release, on condition that he would not
reenter Cuba. He accordingly went to New York and there lived until the
general amnesty after the Ten Years' War permitted his return to Cuba.
While in New York he wrote much in behalf of the insurrection, and he
cheerfully sent his son as a member of the ill-fated _Virginius_
expedition; writing a touching poem on that occasion:
"'Tis well that thou hast done,
Most noble and most right,
To answer honor's call, my son,
For Fatherland to fight."
The fourth of the four poets of "Cuatro Laudes" was Felipe Lopez de
Brinas, who drew his best themes from nature, and who addressed his best
poems to his wife.
One of the most popular poets in the period just preceding and during
the Ten Years' War was José Fornaris, who in his "Cantos de Siboney"
related many legends of the Cuban aborigines, some of them actual
traditions but most of them invented by himself. A contemporary who
essayed similar themes with almost equal success was Juan Cristobal
Napoles Fajardo. Another, Miguel Teurbe de Tolon, devoted himself to
legends and ballads not of the aborigines but of the Cuban people of
European ancestry. Tolon was an intense patriot, and for that cause
suffered exile. For some years he lived in New York, where he was
efficiently active as the secretary of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta in
that city.
[Illustration: JOAQUIN LORENZO LUACES]
But perhaps above all others the poet--we might say, the Tyrtaeus--of
the revolution was Joaquin Lorenzo Luaces, though he did not live to see
the beginning of the war which he did so much to provoke. Luaces, who
was born in 1826 and died in 1867, was a devoted Greek scholar, and took
Greek poetry for his model. For that reason many have thought that his
writings were somewhat academic and artificial. There is however in his
poems an exquisite finish surpassed by no other Cuban writer, while many
of them reach a height of inspiration which few others have equalled.
There was in them, moreover, an irresistible call to Cuban patriotism,
which had vast effect in rousing the nation for the Ten Years' War. One
of his most stirring lyrics was on the Greek War of Independence,
entitled "The Fall of Missolonghi":
To arms, ye Greeks! Missolonghi falls!
And Ibrahim conquers her soldiers brave.
But the Moslem finds within those walls
Corpses of Greeks, but never one slave!
JOAQUIN LORENZO LUACES
Lyric, dramatic and patriotic poet, Joaquin Lorenzo Luaces was born
in Havana in 1826, and was educated at the University of that city.
His themes as a poet were largely those of the great events of the
day, or of history, such as the Fall of Missolonghi, the Death of
Lincoln, and the Laying of the Atlantic Cable. Many of his poems
were patriotic appeals disguised in classic forms. He died in 1867.
This passionate call to patriots to do battle to the death against
tyrants was addressed to the Greeks, thousands of miles away, and the
tyrants against whom it raged were Moslem Turks, hated by all true
Spaniards; wherefore the Spanish censor permitted it to be published
freely in Cuba. But every Cuban patriot read in it "Cubans" for "Greeks"
and "Spaniards" for "Moslems." Luaces was the author of a number of
meritorious dramas.
We have spoken of Doña Louisa Perez as probably the foremost of Cuba's
women poets. Her chief rival for that distinction was Doña Gertrudis
Gomez de Avellanda, a woman of real genius. But she, although born in
Camaguey, was for practically all her life so identified with Spain that
she is commonly regarded as a Spaniard rather than a Cuban. Born in
1814, she went to Spain with her mother in 1836, and there remained
until 1860. By that time she had gained world-wide reputation as a poet
and dramatist, and also as a writer of prose fiction, and on her return
to Cuba she was publicly greeted as though she were a queen or an
empress. A few months later she hastened back to Spain and there spent
the remainder of her life. Only a few of her writings were on Cuban
themes, but they indicated that she retained in her voluntary exile a
deep love for and sympathy with her native land.
The successor of Domingo Del Monte as a patron of Cuban letters was
Nicolas Azcarate, a very wealthy lawyer of Havana, himself a writer and
orator of great power, and an ardent patriot, though generally inclined
toward reforms and autonomy rather than independence. He was the leader
of that "Committee of Information" which went to Spain in 1865 to lay
before the Spanish Minister for the Colonies, Canovas del Castillo, the
grievances and the demands of Cuba; a mission which was quite fruitless,
for it was quickly followed by the outbreak of the Ten Years' War.
Azcarate also founded and conducted at his own cost a newspaper at
Havana, _La Voz del Siglo_, to advocate reforms and autonomy. But he
lost popularity with the Cubans, who were by this time almost unanimous
for independence, while he could not command the favor of the Spaniards;
and in consequence he lost his influence, his fortune and his place in
society, and ended his life in obscurity and poverty.
[Illustration: GERTRUDIS GOMEZ DE AVELLANEDA
Although most of her life was spent abroad, the name of Gertrudis Gomez
de Avellaneda y Arteaga must always be enrolled among the glories of
Cuban literature and Cuban womanhood. She was born in Camaguey on March
23, 1814, and almost literally "lisped in numbers," since she wrote an
elegy on the death of her father at the age of six, and two years later
wrote a fairy tale, "The Hundred-Headed Giant." In 1836 she bade
farewell to Cuba in a memorable sonnet, and went to France, and thence
to Spain. There she wrote poems and dramas which placed her in the
foremost rank of the world's literary artists; her poetical drama of
"Baltasar" in 1853 being one of the greatest triumphs of that
generation. In 1860 she revisited Cuba and was publicly crowned in the
Tacon Theatre before a great assemblage of the foremost men and women of
the nation. She returned to Spain a few years later and died at Seville
on February 2, 1873.]
Prominent among the poets of the Revolution was Juan Clemente Zenea, who
was a martyr as well as a poet. He was born at Bayamo in 1832, his
mother being the sister of the poet Fornaris already mentioned. He was
one of the pupils of José de la Luz y Caballero, and before leaving
school began to write patriotic poems and other articles. At the age of
twenty he had to flee from Cuba to escape arrest and prosecution for his
complicity in some revolutionary publications; whereupon he went to New
York and there continued his revolutionary writings. So extreme
were some of these that in December, 1853, a court martial at Havana
condemned him to death. Under the amnesty of 1855 he returned to Cuba
and became a teacher of modern languages and a writer for the press, and
a few years later published a volume of charming poems. After ten years
he left Cuba for New York and then for Mexico, and upon the outbreak of
the Ten Years' War he joined the Cuban Junta in New York and became
editor of its organ, _La Revolucion_. In 1870 the Spanish Minister at
Washington, wishing to negotiate secretly with Cespedes, the leader of
the Cuban revolutionists, gave Zenea a safe conduct to pass through the
Spanish lines and convey a message to Cespedes. This errand was
undertaken against the advice of his friends. It was accomplished in
safety, however, until when, on his return trip, he was just about to
pass beyond the limits of Spanish jurisdiction. Then he was seized by
order of the Volunteers and imprisoned. The Spanish government at Madrid
telegraphed orders to the Captain-General to honor the safe conduct and
to release him at once. But that officer, the notorious Count Valmaseda,
ignored these orders, kept Zenea in prison until there was a change of
Ministry at Madrid, and then, on August 25, 1871, put him to death. The
Spanish government disavowed this monstrous crime, and paid Zenea's
widow an indemnity of $25,000, though it failed to punish Valmaseda
according to his deserts.
Another pupil of Luz y Caballero, and a close friend of Zenea, was
Enrique Piñeyro, a journalist, historian, essayist and lecturer, who,
born in 1839, had the good fortune to survive until 1911 and thus to see
the work of Cuban independence triumphantly completed. José Morales
Lemus, born in 1808, established in Havana in 1863 the paper _El
Siglo_, a powerful advocate of reforms and autonomy. He went with Saco
and Azcarate on the Committee of Information to Madrid, and on his
return from that bootless errand he went to Washington as the first
Cuban Minister. He was the envoy of the Provisional Government of the
Cubans in the Ten Years' War, and as such, though the Cuban Republic did
not receive official recognition, he participated in formulating the
plan of Cuban settlement which General Daniel E. Sickles, as a special
American envoy, carried to Madrid to propose to the Spanish government.
This plan provided that Spain should grant Cuban independence in return
for a large indemnity to be paid by Cuba under the guarantee of the
United States. It was not certain that the Cuban people would have
approved that plan. Indeed, it is probable that they would not have done
so. The Spanish government would not listen to it, however, and it was
abandoned. A little later, in June, 1870, Lemus died.
[Illustration: ENRIQUE PIÑEYRO]
ENRIQUE PIÑEYRO
The son of a University professor of literature and history,
Enrique Piñeyro was born in Havana in 1839 and was educated at La
Luz's school of El Salvador. He became a successful journalist,
writer and teacher, and when the Ten Years' War began he went to
New York and there edited "La Revolucion" and "El Nuevo Mundo," and
wrote several notable histories and biographies. After the war he
returned to Cuba for a short time, then went to Paris and remained
there until his death in 1910.
[Illustration: JOSÉ MORALES LEMUS
A veteran of the Lopez insurrection and of the Ten Years' War was José
Morales Lemus, who was born at Gibara on May 2, 1808, and became a
successful advocate. Convinced of the wrong of slavery, he liberated his
own slaves, who however insisted upon voluntarily remaining in his
service. He participated in the Lopez invasion in 1851 and in the Pinto
conspiracy in 1855, on which account he was exiled to the United States.
In 1866 he returned to Cuba and became President of the Junta of
Information. At the outbreak of the Ten Years' War he went to New York
to become head of the Cuban Junta there, in consequence of which all his
property in Cuba was confiscated. At Washington he strove earnestly
though in vain to secure the recognition of Cuban belligerence. His
efficient patriotic labors were continued in New York to the day of his
death, which occurred on June 23, 1870.]
One more Cuban writer demands attention, prior to the War of
Independence; though there were indeed many others of merit whose names
might well be recalled if a bibliography of the island were to be
compiled. Rafael Merchan was born in 1844, and was thus a mere
youth when the Ten Years' War began to be planned; yet we must reckon
him to have been perhaps the foremost patriotic journalist of that
struggle. It was he who suggested the name "Laborers" which was at first
commonly applied to the Cuban revolutionists. It will be recalled that
in Cuba affairs were directed by a "Labor Committee," that in the United
States societies of "Cuban Laborers" were formed in many cities, and
that periodicals called _El Laborante_ were published. Proscribed and
sentenced to death by the Spanish authorities, he found asylum in New
York, and there edited the Cuban revolutionary journal, _La Revolucion_.
Thence a few years later he went to Bogota, Colombia, to engage in
business and also to continue his literary career. It was his good
fortune to be able to resume his patriotic writings in 1890, when the
War of Independence began to loom upon the horizon, and to write in 1895
and later several pamphlets in support of that struggle, some of which
had much influence in both America and Great Britain. He lived to see
the Cuban Republic securely established, and to go abroad as its
Minister to France and Spain in 1902. His service was brief, however,
because of ill health, which soon brought him home to die.
It would be pleasant, and not lacking in profit, to dwell at greater
length upon these and other intellectual leaders of the Cuban people.
What we have said is, however, sufficient to show how greatly and how
masterfully the intellectual side of Cuban life was developed during the
century of political stress and fitful military strife which served as
the stormy prelude to Cuba's achievement of her independent rank among
the nations of the world. It was a development admirably comparable
with any ever recorded of any other people, and one which splendidly
vindicated the claim of the Cuban people to worth as a sovereign nation.
Moreover, it was an unmistakable earnest of approaching independence.
While for a century Cuba was purely a Spanish colony, her intellectual
life was embryotic and inert. During the two centuries while she was
more or less an object of international contention, she showed little
activity. But in her fourth century, the era of revolution and of
aspirations for independence, she showed the stuff that was in her sons
and daughters. Her soldiers were valiant in battle. Her statesmen were
wise in council. Her scholars and literati commanded distinguished
attention in the most brilliant intellectual era of human history, and
demonstrated that the Cuba that was about to be would be in the culture
of the higher life a worthy member of the community of nations.
THE END OF VOLUME THREE
* * * * *
INDEX to Volumes 1 thru 4
Abarzuza, Sr. proposes reforms for Cuba, IV, 6.
Abreu. Marta and Rosalie, patriotism of, IV, 25.
Academy of Sciences, Havana, picture of, IV, 364.
Adams, John Quincy, enunciates American policy toward Cuba, II, 258;
portrait, 259;
on Cuban annexation, 327.
Aglona, Prince de. Governor, II, 363.
Agramonte, Aristide, in yellow fever campaign, IV, 172.
Agramonte, Enrique, in Cuban Junta, IV, 12.
Agramonte, Eugenio Sanchez, sketch and portrait, IV, 362.
Agramonte, Francisco, IV, 41.
Agramonte, Ignacio, portrait, facing. III, 258.
Agriculture, early attention to, I, 173, 224;
progress, 234;
II, 213;
absentee landlords, 214;
statistics, 223;
discussed in periodicals, 250;
rehabilitation of after War of Independence, IV, 147.
Aguayo, Geronimo de, I, 161.
Aguero, Joaquin de, organizes revolution, III, 72;
final defeat, 87.
Aguiar, Luis de, II, 60.
Aguiera, Jose, I, 295.
Aguila, Negra, II, 346.
Aguilera, Francisco V., sketch and portrait, III, 173.
Aguirre, Jose Maria, filibuster, IV, 55;
death, 85.
Albemarle, Earl of, expedition against Havana, II, 46;
occupies Havana, 78;
controversy with Bishop Morell, 83.
Alcala, Marcos, I, 310.
Aldama, Miguel de, sketch and portrait, III, 204.
Aleman, Manuel, French emissary, II, 305.
Algonquins, I, 7.
Allen, Robert, on "Importance of Havana," II, 81.
Almendares River, tapped for water supply, I, 266;
view on, IV, 167.
Almendariz, Alfonso Enrique, Bishop, I, 277.
Alquiza, Sancho de, Governor, I, 277.
Altamarino, Governor, I, 105;
post mortem trial of Velasquez, 107;
attacked by the Guzmans, 109;
removed, 110.
Altamirano, Juan C., Bishop, I, 273;
seized by brigands, 274.
Alvarado, Luis de, I, 147.
Alvarado, Pedro de, in Mexico, I, 86.
Amadeus, King of Spain, III, 260.
America, relation of Cuba to, I, 1;
II, 254. See UNITED STATES.
American Revolution, effect of upon Spain and her colonies, II, 138.
American Treaty, between Great Britain and Spain, I, 303.
Andrea, Juan de, II, 9.
Angulo, Francisco de, exiled, I, 193.
Angulo, Gonzales Perez de, Governor, I, 161;
emancipation proclamation, 163;
quarrel with Havana Council, 181;
flight from Sores, 186;
end of administration, 192.
Anners, Jean de Laet de, quoted, I, 353.
Annexation of Cuba to United States, first suggested, II, 257, 326;
campaign for, 380;
sought by United States, III, 132, 135;
Marcy's policy, 141;
Ostend Manifesto, 142;
Buchanan's efforts, 143;
not considered in War of Independence, IV, 19.
Antonelli, Juan Bautista, engineering works in Cuba, I, 261;
creates water supply for Havana, 266.
Apezteguia. Marquis de, Autonomist leader, IV, 94.
Apodaca, Juan Ruiz, Governor, II, 311.
Arana, Martin de, warns Prado of British approach, II, 53.
Arana, Melchior Sarto de, commander of La Fuerza, I, 237.
Arana, Pedro de, royal accountant, I, 238.
Aranda, Esquival, I, 279.
Arango, Augustin, murder of, III, 188.
Arango, Napoleon, treason of, III, 226.
Arango y Pareño, Francisco, portrait, frontispiece, Vol. II;
organizes Society of Progress, II, 178;
leadership in Cuba, 191;
attitude toward slavery, 208;
his illustrious career, 305 et seq.
Aranguren, Nestor, revolutionist, IV, 85;
death, 92.
Araoz, Juan, II, 181.
Arias, A. R., Governor, III, 314.
Arias, Gomez, I, 145.
Arignon, Villiet, quoted, II, 26, 94.
Armona, José de, II, 108.
Army, Cuban, organization of, III, 178;
reorganized, 263;
under Jose Miguel Gomez, IV, 301.
Army, Spanish, in Cuba, III, 181, 295.
Aroztegui, Martin de, II, 20.
Arrate, José Martin Felix, historian, II, 17, 179.
Arredondo, Nicolas, Governor at Santiago, II, 165.
Asbert, Gen. Ernesto, amnesty case, IV, 326.
"Assiento" compact on slavery, II, 2.
Assumption, Our Lady of the, I, 61.
Astor, John Jacob, aids War of Independence, IV, 14.
Asylums for Insane, II, 317.
Atares fortress, picture, II, 103.
Atkins, John, book on West Indies, II, 36.
Atrocities, committed by Spanish, III, 250;
Cespedes's protest against, 254;
"Book of Blood," 284;
Spanish confession of, 286;
war of destruction,
295;
Weyler's "concentration" policy, IV, 85.
Attwood's Cay. See GUANAHANI.
Autonomist party, III, 305;
IV, 34;
attitude toward Campos in War of Independence, 59;
Cabinet under Blanco, 94;
earnest efforts for peace, 101;
record of its government, 102.
Avellanda, Gertrudis Gomez de, III, 331;
portrait, facing, 332.
Avila, Alfonso de, I, 154.
Avila, Juan de, Governor, I, 151;
marries rich widow, 154;
charges against him, 157;
convicted and imprisoned, 158.
Avila. See DAVILA.
Aviles, Pedro Menendez de, See MENENDEZ.
Ayala, Francisco P. de, I, 291.
Ayilon, Lucas V. de, strives to make peace between Velasquez
and Cortez, I, 98.
Azcarata, José Luis, Secretary of Justice, sketch and portrait,
IV, 341.
Azcarate, Nicolas, sketch and portrait, III, 251, 332.
Azcarraga, Gen., Spanish Premier, IV, 88.
"Barbeque" sought by Columbus, I, 18.
Bachiller, Antonio, sketch and portrait, III, 317.
Bacon, Robert, Assistant Secretary of State of U. S., intervenes
in revolution, IV, 272.
Bahia Honda, selected as U. S. naval station, IV, 256.
Balboa, Vasco Nuñez de, I, 55, 91.
Bancroft, George, quoted, I, 269;
II, 1, 24, 41, 117, 120, 159.
Banderas, Quintin, revolutionist, IV, 34;
raid, 57;
death, 84.
Baracoa, Columbus at, I, 18;
Velasquez at, 60;
picture, 60;
first capital of Cuba, 61, 168.
Barreda, Baltazar, I, 201.
Barreiro, Juan Bautista, Secretary of Education, IV, 160.
Barrieres, Manuel Garcia, II, 165.
Barrionuevo, Juan Maldonado, Governor, I, 263.
Barsicourt, Juan Procopio. See SANTA CLARA, Conde.
Bayamo, founded by Velasquez, I, 68, 168;
Cuban Republic organized there, III, 157.
Bayoa, Pedro de, I, 300.
Bay of Cortez, reached by Columbus, I, 25.
Bees, introduced by Bishop Morell, II, 104;
increase of industry, 132.
"Beggars of the Sea," raid Cuban coasts, I, 208.
Bells, church, controversy over, II, 82.
Bembrilla, Alonzo, I, 111.
Benavides, Juan de, I, 280.
Berrea, Esteban S. de, II, 6.
Betancourt, Pedro, Civil Governor of Matanzas, IV, 179;
loyal to Palma, 271.
Betancourt. See CISNEROS.
"Bimini," Island of, I, 139.
Bishops of Roman Catholic Church in Cuba, I, 122.
"Black Eagle," II, 346.
_Black Warrior_ affair, III, 138.
Blanchet, Emilio, historian, quoted, II, 9, 15, 24;
on siege of Havana, 57, 87.
Blanco, Ramon, Governor, IV, 88;
undertakes reforms, 89;
plans Cuban autonomy, 93;
on destruction of _Maine_, 99;
resigns, 121.
Blue, Victor, observations at Santiago, IV, 110.
Bobadilla, F. de, I, 54.
Boca de la Yana, I, 18.
"Bohio" sought by Columbus, I, 18.
Bolivar, Simon, II, 333;
portrait, 334;
"Liberator," 334 et seq.;
influence on Cuba, 341;
"Soles de Bolivar," 341.
Bonel, Juan Bautista, II, 133.
"Book of Blood," III, 284.
Bourne, Edward Gaylord, quoted, on slavery, II, 209;
on Spanish in America, 226.
Brinas, Felipe, III, 330.
British policy toward Spain and Cuba, I, 270;
aggressions in West Indies, 293;
slave trade, II, 2;
war of 1639, 22;
designs upon Cuba, 41;
expedition against Havana, 1762, 46;
conquest of Cuba, 78;
relinquishment to Spain, 92. See GREAT BRITAIN.
Broa Bay, I, 22.
Brooke, Gen. John R., receives Spanish surrender of Cuba, IV, 122;
proclamation to Cuban people, 145;
retired, 157.
Brooks, Henry, revolutionist, IV, 30.
Buccaneers, origin of, I, 269.
Buccarelli, Antonio Maria, Governor, II, 110;
retires, 115.
Buchanan, James, on U. S. relations to Cuba, II, 263;
III, 135;
Minister to Great Britain, 142;
as President seeks annexation of Cuba to U. S., 143.
Bull-fighting, II, 233.
Burgos, Juan de, Bishop, I, 225.
Burtnett, Spanish spy against Lopez, III, 65.
Bustamente, Antonio Sanchez de, jurist, sketch and portrait, IV, 165.
Caballero, José Agustin, sketch and portrait, III, 321.
Caballo, Domingo, II, 173.
Cabanas, defences constructed, II, 58;
Laurel Ditch, view, facing, 58.
Caballero, Diego de, I, 111.
Cabezas, Bishop, I, 277.
Cabrera, Diego de, I, 206.
Cabrera, Luis, I, 198.
Cabrera, Lorenzo de, Governor, I, 279;
removed, 282.
Cabrera, Rafael, filibuster, IV, 70.
Cabrera, Raimundo, conspirator in New York, IV, 334;
warned, 339.
Cadreyta, Marquis de, I, 279.
Cagigal, Juan Manuel de, Governor, II, 154;
defence of Havana, 155;
removed and imprisoned, 157.
Cagigal, Juan Manuel, Governor, II, 313;
successful administration, 315.
Cagigal de la Vega, Francisco, defends Santiago, II, 29;
Governor, 32;
Viceroy of Mexico, 34.
Caguax, Cuban chief, I, 63.
Calderon, Gabriel, Bishop, I, 315.
Calderon, Garcia, quoted, II, 164, 172.
Calderon de la Barca, Spanish Minister,
on _La Verdad_, III, 19;
on colonial status, 21;
negotiations with Soulé, 140.
Calhoun, John C., on Cuba, III, 132.
Calleja y Isisi, Emilio, Governor, III, 313;
proclaims martial law, IV, 30;
resigns, 35.
Camaguey. See PUERTO PRINCIPE, I, 168.
Campbell, John, description of Havana, II, 14.
Campillo, Jose de, II, 19.
Campos, Martinez de, Governor, III, 296;
proclamations to Cuba, 297, 299;
makes Treaty of Zanjon and ends Ten Years War, 299;
in Spanish crisis, IV, 36;
Governor again, 37;
establishes Trocha, 44;
defeated by Maceo, 46;
conferences with party leaders, 59, 63;
removed, 63.
Cancio, Leopoldo, Secretary of Treasury, IV, 161, 320.
Canizares, Santiago J., Minister of Interior, IV, 48.
Canning, George, policy toward Cuba, II, 257;
portrait, 258.
Canoe, of Cuban origin, I, 10.
Canon, Rodrigo, I, 111.
Canovas del Castillo, Spanish Premier, IV, 36;
assassinated, 88.
Cape Cruz, Columbus at, I, 20.
Cape Maysi, I, 4.
Cape of Palms, I, 17.
Capote, Domingo Menendez. Vice-President, IV, 90;
Secretary of State, 146;
President of Constitutional Convention. 189.
Carajaval, Lucas, defies Dutch, I, 290.
Cardenas, Lopez lands at, III, 49.
Caribs, I, 8.
Carillo, Francisco, filibuster, IV, 55.
Carleton, Sir Guy, at Havana, II, 47.
Carranza, Domingo Gonzales, book on West Indies, II, 37.
Carrascesa, Alfonso, II, 6.
Carreño, Francisco, Governor, I, 219;
conditions at his accession, 228;
dies in office, 229;
work in rebuilding Havana, 231.
Carroll, James, in yellow fever campaign, IV, 172.
Casa de Beneficienca, founded, I, 335;
II, 177.
Casa de Resorgiamento, founded, II, 31.
Casares, Alfonso, codifies municipal ordinances, I, 207.
Castellanos, Jovellar, last Spanish Governor of Cuba, IV, 121;
surrenders Spanish sovereignty, 123.
Castillo, Demetrio, Civil Governor of Oriente, IV, 180.
Castillo, Ignacio Maria del, Governor, III, 314.
Castillo, Loinaz, revolutionist. IV, 269.
Castillo, Pedro del, Bishop, I, 226.
Castro, Hernando de, royal treasurer, I, 115.
Cathcart Lord, expedition to West Indies, II, 28.
Cathedral of Havana, picture, facing I, 36;
begun, I, 310.
Cat Island. See GUANAHANI.
Cayo, San Juan de los Remedios del, removal of, I, 319.
Cazones, Gulf of, I, 21.
Cemi, Cuban worship of, I, 55.
Census, of Cuba, first taken, by Torre, II, 131;
by Las Casas, 176;
of slaves, 205;
of 1775, 276;
of 1791, 277;
Humboldt on, 277;
of 1811, 280;
of 1817, 281;
of 1827, 283;
of 1846, 283;
of 1899, IV, 154;
of 1907, 287.
Cespedes, Carlos Manuel, III, 157;
portrait, facing 158;
in Spain, 158;
leads Cuban revolution, 158;
President of Republic, 158;
proclamation, 168;
negotiations with Spain, 187;
removed from office, 275.
Cespedes, Carlos Manuel, filibuster, IV, 55.
Cespedes, Enrique, revolutionist, IV, 30.
Cervera, Admiral, brings Spanish fleet to Cuba, IV, 110;
portrait, 110;
surrenders, 114.
Chacon, José Bayoma, II, 13.
Chacon, Luis, I, 331, 333.
Chalons, Sr., Secretary of Public Works, IV, 297.
Chamber of Commerce founded, II, 307.
Charles I, King, I, 74;
denounces oppression of Indians, 128.
Chaves, Antonio, Governor, I, 157;
prosecutes Avila, 157;
ruthless policy toward natives, 159;
controversy with King, 160;
dismissed from office, 161.
Chaves, Juan Baton de, I, 331.
Chilton, John, describes Havana, I, 349.
Chinchilla, José, Governor, III, 314.
Chinese, colonies in America, I, 7;
laborers imported into Cuba, II, 295.
Chorrera, expected to be Drake's landing place, I, 248.
Chorrera River, dam built by Antonelli, I, 262.
Christianity, introduced into Cuba by Ojeda, I, 55;
urged by King Ferdinand, 73.
Church, Roman Catholic, organized and influential in Cuba, I, 122;
cathedral removed from Baracoa to Santiago, 123;
conflict with civil power, 227;
controversy with British during British occupation, II, 84;
division of island into two dioceses, 173;
attitude toward War of Independence, IV, 26;
controversy over property, 294.
Cienfuegos, José, Governor, II, 311.
Cimmarones, "wild Indians," I, 126;
revolt against De Soto, 148.
Cipango, Cuba identified with, by Columbus, I, 5.
Cisneros, Gaspar Betancourt, sketch and portrait, II, 379.
Cisneros, Pascal Jiminez de, II, 110, 127.
Cisneros, Salvador, III, 167;
sketch and portrait, 276;
President of Cuban Republic, 277;
President of Council of Ministers, IV, 48;
in Constitutional Convention, 190.
Civil Service, law, IV, 325;
respected by President Menocal, 325.
Clay, Henry, policy toward Cuba, II, 261.
Clayton, John M., U. S. Secretary of State, issues proclamation
against filibustering, III, 42.
Cleaveland, Samuel, controversy over church bells, II, 83.
Cleveland, Grover. President of United States, issues warning against
breaches of neutrality, IV, 70;
reference to Cuba
in message of 1896, 79;
its significance, 80.
Coat of Arms of Cuba, picture, IV, 251;
significance, 251.
Cobre, copper mines, I, 173, 259.
"Cockfighting and Idleness" campaign, IV, 291.
Coffee, cultivation begun, II, 33, 113.
Coinage, reformed, II, 142;
statistics of, 158.
Collazo, Enrique, filibuster, IV, 55.
Coloma, Antonio Lopez, revolutionist, IV, 30.
Colombia, designs upon Cuba, II, 262;
III, 134;
attitude toward Cuban revolution, 223.
Columbus, Bartholomew, recalled to Spain, I, 57.
Columbus, Christopher, portrait, frontispiece, Vol. I;
discoverer of America, I;
i;
first landing in America, 2;
monument on Watling's Island, picture, 3;
arrival in Cuba, 11;
question as to first landing place, 12;
first impressions of Cuba and intercourse with natives, 14;
exploration of north coast, 16;
end of first visit, 18;
second visit, 19;
exploration of south coast, 21;
at Bay of Cortez, 25;
turns back from circumnavigation, 26;
at Isle of Pines, 26;
final departure from Cuba, 27;
diary and narrative, 28 et seq.;
death and burial, 33;
tomb in Havana cathedral, 34;
removal to Seville, 36;
removal from Santo Domingo to Havana, II, 181;
epitaph, 182.
Columbus, Diego, plans exploration and colonization of Cuba, I, 57;
attempts mediation between Velasquez and Cortez, 97;
replaces Velasquez with Zuazo, 100;
rebuked by King, 100.
Comendador, Cacique, I, 55.
Commerce, begun by Velasquez, I, 68;
rise of corporations, II, 19;
after British occupation, 98;
under Torre, 132;
reduction of duties, 141;
extension of trade, 163;
Tribunal of Commerce founded, 177;
Real Compania de Havana, 199;
restrictive measures, 200;
Chamber of Commerce founded, 307;
commerce with United States, III, 2;
during American occupation, IV, 184;
present, 358.
Compostela, Diego E. de, Bishop, I, 318;
death, 332.
Concepcion, Columbus's landing place, I, 3.
Concessions, forbidden under American occupation, IV, 153.
Concha, José Gutierrez de la, Governor, III, 62, 290.
Conchillos, royal secretary, I, 59.
Congress, Cuban, welcomed by Gen. Wood, IV, 246;
turns against Palma, 269;
friendly to Gomez, 303;
hostile to Menocal, 323;
protects the lottery, 324.
Constitution: Cuban Republic of 1868, III, 157;
of 1895, IV, 47;
call for Constitutional Convention, 185;
meeting of Convention, 187;
draft completed, 192;
salient provisions, 193;
Elihu Root's comments, 194;
Convention discusses relations with United States, 197;
Platt
Amendment, 199;
amendment adopted, 203;
text of Constitution, 304 et seq.;
The Nation, 205;
Cubans, 205;
Foreigners, 207;
Individual Rights, 208;
Suffrage, 211;
Suspension of Guarantees, 212;
Sovereignty, 213;
Legislative Bodies, 214;
Senate, 214;
House of Representatives, 216;
Congress, 218;
Legislation, 221;
Executive, 222;
President, 222;
Vice-President, 225;
Secretaries of State, 226;
Judiciary, 227;
Supreme Court, 227;
Administration of Justice, 228;
Provincial Governments, 229;
Provincial Councils, 230;
Provincial Governors, 231;
Municipal Government, 233;
Municipal Councils, 233;
Mayors, 235;
National Treasury, 235;
Amendments, 236;
Transient Provisions, 237;
Appendix (Platt Amendment), 238.
"Constitutional Army," IV, 268.
Contreras, Andres Manso de, I, 288.
Contreras, Damien, I, 278.
Convents, founded, I, 276;
Nuns of Santa Clara, 286.
Conyedo, Juan de, Bishop, II, 35.
Copper, discovered near Santiago, I, 173;
wealth of mines, 259;
reopened, II, 13;
exports, III, 3.
Corbalon, Francisco R., I, 286.
Cordova de Vega, Diego de, Governor, I, 239.
Cordova, Francisco H., expedition to Yucatan, I, 84.
Cordova Ponce de Leon, José Fernandez, Governor, I, 316.
Coreal, Francois, account of West Indies, quoted, I, 355.
Coronado, Manuel, gift for air planes, IV, 352.
Cortes, Spanish, Cuban representation in, II, 308;
excluded, 351;
lack of representation, III, 3;
after Ten Years' War, 307.
Cortez, Hernando, Alcalde of Santiago de Cuba, I, 72;
sent to Mexico by King, 74;
agent of Velasquez, 86;
early career, 90;
portrait, 90;
quarrel with Velasquez, 91;
marriage, 92;
commissioned by Velasquez to explore Mexico, 92;
sails for Mexico, 94;
final breach with Velasquez, 96;
denounced as rebel, 97;
escapes murder, 99.
Cosa, Juan de la, geographer, I, 6, 53.
Councillors, appointed for life, I, 111;
conflict with Procurators, 113.
Creoles, origin of name, II, 204.
Crittenden, J. J., protests against European intervention in Cuba,
III, 129.
Crittenden, William S., with Lopez, III, 96;
captured, 101;
death, 105.
Crombet, Flor, revolutionist, IV, 41, 42.
Crooked Island. See ISABELLA.
Crowder, Gen. Enoch H., head of Consulting Board, IV, 284.
Cuba: Relation to America, I, 1;
Columbus's first landing, 3;
identified with Mangi or Cathay, 4;
with Cipango, 5;
earliest maps, 6;
physical history, 7, 37 et seq.;
Columbus's discovery, 11 et seq.;
named Juana, 13;
other names, 14;
Columbus's account of, 28;
geological history, 37-42;
topography, 42-51;
climate, 51-52;
first circumnavigation, 54;
colonization, 54;
Velasquez at Baracoa, 60;
commerce begun, 68;
government organized, 69;
named Ferdinandina, 73;
policy of Spain toward, 175;
slow economic progress, 215;
land legislation, 232;
Spanish discrimination against, 266;
divided into two districts, 275;
British description in 1665, 306;
various accounts, 346;
turning point in history, 363;
close of first era, 366;
British conquest, II, 78;
relinquished to Spain, 92;
great changes effected, 94;
economic condition, 98;
reoccupied by Spain, 102;
untouched by early revolutions, 165;
effect of revolution in Santo Domingo, 190;
first suggestion of annexation to United States, 257;
"Ever Faithful Isle," 268;
rise of independence, 268;
censuses, 276 et seq.;
representation in Cortes, 308;
"Soles de Bolivar," 341;
representatives rejected from Cortes, 351;
transformation of popular spirit, 383;
independence proclaimed, III, 145;
Republic organized, 157;
War of Independence, IV, 15;
Spanish elections held during war, 67;
Blanco's plan of autonomy, 93;
sovereignty surrendered by Spain, 123;
list of Spanish Governors, 123. See REPUBLIC OF CUBA.
Cuban Aborigines;
I, 8;
manners, customs and religion, 8 et seq.;
Columbus's first intercourse, 15, 24;
priest's address to Columbus, 26;
Columbus's observations of them, 29;
hostilities begun by Velasquez, 61;
subjected to Repartimiento system, 70;
practical slavery, 71;
Key Indians, 125;
Cimmarones, 126;
new laws in their favor, 129;
Rojas's endeavor to save them, 130;
final doom, 133;
efforts at reform, 153;
oppression by Chaves, 159;
Angulo's emancipation proclamation, 163.
"Cuba-nacan," I, 5.
"Cuba and the Cubans," quoted, II, 313.
"Cuba y Su Gobierno," quoted, II, 354.
Cuellar, Cristobal de, royal accountant, I, 59.
Cushing, Caleb, Minister to Spain, III, 291.
Custom House, first at Havana, I, 231.
Dady, Michael J., & Co., contract dispute, IV, 169.
Davila, Pedrarias, I, 140.
Davis, Jefferson, declines to join Lopez, III, 38.
Del Casal, Julian, sketch and portrait, IV, 6.
Del Cueta, José A., President of Supreme Court, portrait, IV, 359.
Delgado, Moru, Liberal leader, IV, 267.
Del Monte, Domingo, sketch, portrait, and work, II, 323.
Del Monte, Ricardo, sketch and portrait, IV, 2.
Demobilization of Cuban army, IV, 135.
Desvernine, Pablo, Secretary of Finance, IV, 146.
Diaz, Bernal, at Sancti Spiritus, I, 72;
in Mexico, 86.
Diaz, Manuel, I, 239.
Diaz, Manuel Luciano, Secretary of Public Works, IV, 254.
Diaz, Modeste, III, 263.
Divino, Sr., Secretary of Justice, IV, 297.
Dockyard at Havana, established, II, 8.
Dolz, Eduardo, in Autonomist Cabinet, IV, 96.
Dominguez, Fermin V., Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs, IV, 50.
Dorst, J. H., mission to Pinar del Rio, IV, 107.
"Dragado" deal, IV, 310.
Drake, Sir Francis, menaces Havana, I, 243;
in Hispaniola, 246;
leaves Havana unassailed, 252;
departs for Virginia, 255.
Duany, Joaquin Castillo, in Cuban Junta, IV, 12;
Assistant Secretary of Treasury, 50;
filibuster, 70.
Dubois, Carlos, Assistant Secretary of Interior, IV, 50.
Duero, Andres de, I, 93, 115.
Dulce y Garay, Domingo, Governor, III, 190, 194;
decree of confiscation, 209;
recalled, 213.
Dupuy de Lome, Sr., Spanish Minister at Washington, IV, 40;
writes offensive letter, 98;
recalled, 98.
Duque, Sr., Secretary of Sanitation and Charity, IV, 297.
Durango, Bishop, I, 225.
Dutch hostilities, I, 208, 279;
activities in West Indies, 283 et seq.
Earthquakes, in 1765, I, 315;
II, 114.
Echeverria, Esteban B., Superintendent of Schools, IV, 162.
Echeverria, José, Bishop, II, 113.
Echeverria, José Antonio, III, 324.
Echeverria, Juan Maria, Governor, II, 312.
Education, backward state of, II, 244;
progress under American occupation, IV, 156;
A. E. Frye, Superintendent, 156;
reorganization of system, 162;
Harvard University's entertainment of teachers, 163;
achievements under President Menocal, 357.
Elections: for municipal officers under American occupation, IV, 180;
law for regulation of, 180;
result, 181;
for Constitutional Convention, 186;
for general officers, 240;
result, 244;
Presidential, 1906, 265;
new law, 287;
local elections under Second Intervention, 289;
Presidential, 290;
for Congress in 1908, 303;
Presidential, 1912, 309;
Presidential, 1916, disputed, 330, result confirmed, 341.
Enciso, Martin F. de, first Spanish writer about America, I, 54.
Epidemics: putrid fever, 1649, I, 290;
vaccination introduced, II, 192;
small pox and yellow fever, III, 313;
at Santiago, IV, 142;
Gen. Wood applies Dr. Finlay's theory of yellow fever, 171;
success, 176;
malaria, 177.
Escudero, Antonio, de, II, 10.
Espada, Juan José Diaz, portrait, facing II, 272.
Espagnola. See HISPANIOLA.
Espeleta, Joaquin de, Governor, II, 362.
Espinosa, Alonzo de Campos, Governor, I, 316.
Espoleto, José de, Governor, II, 169.
Estenoz, Negro insurgent, IV, 307.
Estevez, Luis, Secretary of Justice, IV, 160;
Vice-President, 245.
Evangelista. See ISLE OF PINES.
Everett, Edward, policy toward Cuba, III, 130.
"Ever Faithful Isle," II, 268, 304.
Exquemeling, Alexander, author and pirate, I, 302.
"Family Pact," of Bourbons, effect upon Cuba, II, 42.
Felin, Antonio, Bishop, II, 172.
Fels, Cornelius, defeated by Spanish, I, 288.
Ferdinand, King, policy toward Cuba, I, 56;
esteem for Velasquez, 73.
Ferdinandina, Columbus's landing place, I, 3;
name for Cuba, 73.
Ferrara, Orestes, Liberal leader, IV, 260;
revolutionist, 269;
deprecates factional strife, 306;
revolutionary conspirator in New York, 334;
warned by U. S. Government, I, 239.
Ferrer, Juan de, commander of La Fuerza, I, 239.
Figueroa, Vasco Porcallo de, I, 72;
De Soto's lieutenant, 142;
returns from Florida in disgust, 145.
Figuerosa, Rojas de, captures Tortuga, I, 292.
Filarmonia, riot at ball, III, 119.
Filibustering, proclamation of United States against, III, 42;
after Ten Years' War, 311, in War of Independence, IV, 20;
expeditions intercepted, 52;
many successful expeditions, 69;
warnings, 70.
Fine Arts, II, 240.
Finlay, Carlos G., theory of yellow fever successfully applied
under General Wood, IV, 171;
portrait, facing, 172.
Fish, Hamilton, U. S. Secretary of State, prevents premature
recognition of Cuban Republic, III, 203;
protests against Rodas's decree, 216;
on losses in Ten Years' War, 290;
seeks British support, 292;
states terms of proposed mediation, 293.
Fish market at Havana, founder for pirate, II, 357.
Fiske, John, historian, quoted, I, 270.
Flag, Cuban, first raised, III, 31;
replaces American, IV, 249;
picture, 250;
history and significance, 250.
Flores y Aldama, Rodrigo de, Governor, I, 301.
Florida, attempted colonization by Ponce de Leon, I, 139;
De Soto's expedition, 145. See MENENDEZ.
Fonseca, Juan Rodriguez de, Bishop of Seville, I, 59.
Fonts-Sterling, Ernesto, Secretary of Finance, IV, 90;
urges resistance to revolution, 270.
Fornaris, José, III, 230.
Forestry, attention paid by Montalvo, I, 223;
efforts to check waste, II, 166.
Foyo, Sr., Secretary of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor, IV, 297.
France, first foe of Spanish in Cuba, I, 177;
"Family Pact," II, 42;
interest in Cuban revolution, III, 126.
Franquinay, pirate, at Santiago, I, 310.
French refugees, in Cuba, II, 189;
expelled, 302.
French Revolution, effects of, II, 184.
Freyre y Andrade, Fernando, filibuster,
IV, 70;
negotiations with Pino Guerra, 267.
Frye, Alexis, Superintendent of Schools, IV, 156;
controversy with General Wood, 162.
Fuerza, La: picture, facing I, 146;
building begun by De Soto, I, 147;
scene of Lady Isabel's tragic vigil, 147, 179;
planned and built by Sanchez, 194;
work by Menendez, and Ribera, 209;
slave labor sought, 211;
bad construction, 222;
Montalvo's recommendations, 223;
Luzan-Arana quarrel, 237;
practical completion, 240;
decorated by Cagigal, II, 33.
Galvano, Antony, historian, quoted, I, 4.
Galvez, Bernardo, seeks Cuban aid for Pensacola, II, 146;
Governor, 168;
death, 170.
Galvez, José Maria, head of Autonomist Cabinet, IV, 95.
Garaondo, José, I, 317.
Garay, Francisco de, Governor of Jamaica, I, 102.
Garcia, Calixto, portrait, facing III, 268;
President of Cuban Republic, III, 301;
joins War of Independence, IV, 69;
his notable career, 76 et seq.;
joins with Shafter at Santiago, 111;
death, 241.
Garcia, Carlos, revolutionist, IV, 269.
Garcia, Esequiel, Secretary of Education, IV, 320.
Garcia, Marcos, IV, 44.
Garcia, Quintiliano, III, 329.
Garvey, José N. P., II, 222.
Gastaneta, Antonio, II, 9.
Gelder, Francisco, Governor, I, 292.
Gener y Rincon, Miguel, Secretary of Justice, IV, 161.
Geraldini, Felipe, I, 310.
Germany, malicious course of in 1898, IV, 104;
Cuba declares war against, 348;
property in Cuba seized, 349;
aid to Gomez, 350.
Gibson. Hugh S., U. S. Chargé d'Affaires, assaulted, IV, 308.
Giron. Garcia, Governor, I, 279.
Godoy, Captain, arrested at Santiago, and put to death, I, 203.
Godoy, Manuel, II, 172.
Goicouria, Domingo, sketch and portrait, III, 234.
Gold, Columbus's quest for, I, 19;
Velasquez's search, 61;
the "Spaniards' God," 62;
early mining, 81;
value of mines, 173.
Gomez, José Antonio, II, 18.
Gomez, José Miguel, Civil Governor of Santa Clara, IV, 179;
aspires to Presidency, 260, 264;
turns from Conservative to Liberal party, 265;
compact with Zayas, 265;
starts revolution, 269;
elected President, 290;
becomes President, 297;
Cabinet, 297;
sketch and portrait, 298;
acts of his administration, 301;
charged with corruption, 304;
conflict with Veterans' Association, 304;
quarrel with Zayas, 306;
suppresses Negro revolt, 307;
amnesty bill, 309;
National Lottery, 310;
"Dragado" deal, 310;
railroad deal, 310;
estimate of his administration, 311;
double treason in 1916, 332;
defeated and captured, 337;
his orders for devastation, 337;
aided by Germany, 350.
Gomez, Juan Gualberto, revolutionist, IV, 30;
captured and imprisoned, 52;
insurgent, 269.
Gomez, Maximo, III, 264;
succeeds Gen. Agramonte, 275;
makes Treaty of Zanjon with Campos, 299;
in War of Independence, IV, 15;
commander in chief, 16, 43;
portrait, facing 44;
plans great campaign of war, 53;
controversy with Lacret, 84;
opposed to American invasion, 109;
appeals to Cubans to accept American occupation, 136;
impeachment by National Assembly ignored, 137;
influence during Government of Intervention, 149;
considered by Constitutional Convention, 191;
proposed for Presidency, 240;
declines, 241.
Gonzalez, Aurelia Castillo de, author, sketch and portrait, IV, 192.
Gonzales, William E., U. S. Minister to Cuba, IV, 335;
watches Gomez's insurrection, 336.
Gorgas, William C., work for sanitation, IV, 175.
Government of Cuba: organized by Velasquez, I, 69;
developed at Santiago, 81;
radical changes made, 111;
revolution in political status of island, 138;
codification of ordinances, 207;
Ordinances of 1542, 317;
land tenure, II, 12;
reforms by Governor Guemez, 17;
reorganization after British occupation, 104;
great reforms by Torre, 132;
budget and tax reforms, 197;
authority of Captain-General, III, 11;
administrative and judicial functions, 13 et seq.;
military and naval command, 16;
attempted reforms, 63;
concessions after Ten Years' War, 310.
Governors of Cuba, Spanish, list of, IV, 123.
Govin, Antonio, in Autonomist Cabinet, IV, 95;
sketch and portrait, 95.
Grammont, buccaneer, I, 311.
Gran Caico, I, 4.
Grand Turk Island. See GUANAHANI.
Grant, U. S., President of United States, III, 200;
inclined to recognize Cuban Republic, 202;
prevented by his Secretary of State, 203;
comments in messages, 205, 292.
Great Britain, interest in Cuban revolution, III, 125;
protection sought by Spain, 129;
declines cooperation with United States, 294;
requires return of fugitives, 310.
Great Exuma. See FERDINANDINA.
Great Inagua, I, 4.
Great War, Cuba enters, IV, 348;
offers 10,000 troops, 348;
German intrigues and propaganda, 349;
attitude of Roman Catholic clergy, 349;
ships seized, 350;
cooperation with Food Commission, 351;
military activities, 352;
liberal subscriptions to loans, 352;
Red Cross work, 352;
Señora Menocal's inspiring leadership, 353.
Grijalva, Juan de, I, 65;
expedition to Mexico, 66;
names Mexico New Spain, 97;
unjustly recalled and discredited, 88.
Guajaba Island, I, 18.
Guama, Cimmarron chief, I, 127.
Guanabacoa founded, II, 21.
Guanahani, Columbus's landing place, I, 2.
Guanajes Islands, source of slave trade, I, 83.
Guantanamo, Columbus at, I, 19;
U. S. Naval Station, IV, 256.
Guardia, Cristobal de la, Secretary of Justice, IV, 320.
Guazo, Gregorio, de la Vega, Governor, I, 340;
stops tobacco war, 341;
warnings to Great Britain and France, 342;
military activity and efficiency, II, 5.
Guemez y Horcasitas, Juan F., Governor, II, 17;
reforms, 17;
close of administration, 26.
Guerra, Amador, revolutionist, IV, 30.
Guerra, Benjamin, treasurer of Junta, IV, 3.
Guerro, Pino, starts insurrection, IV, 267, 269;
commander of Cuban army, 301;
attempt to assassinate him, 303.
Guevara, Francisco, III, 265.
Guiteras, Juan, physician and scientist, sketch and portrait, IV, 321.
Guiteras, Pedro J., quoted, I, 269;
II, 6;
42;
207.
Guzman, Gonzalez de, mission from Velasquez to King Charles I, I, 85;
vindicates Velasquez, 108;
Governor of Cuba, 110;
marries rich sister-in-law, 116;
litigation over estate, 117;
tremendous indictment by Vadillo, 120;
appeals to King and Council for Indies, 120;
seeks to oppress natives, 128;
second time Governor, 137;
makes more trouble, 148;
trouble with French privateers, 178.
Guzman, Nuñez de, royal treasurer, I, 109;
death and fortune, 115.
Guzman, Santos, spokesman of Constitutionalists, IV, 59.
Hammock, of Cuban origin, I, 10.
Hanebanilla, falls of, view, facing III, 110.
Harponville, Viscount Gustave, quoted, II, 189.
Harvard University, entertains Cuban teachers, IV, 163.
Hatuey, Cuban chief, leader against Spaniards, I, 62;
death, 63.
Havana: founded by Narvaez, I, 69;
De Soto's home and capital, 144;
rise in importance, 166;
Governor's permanent residence, 180;
inadequate defences, 183;
captured by Sores, 186;
protected by Mazariegos, 194;
sea wall proposed by Osorio, 202;
fortified by Menendez, 209;
"Key of the New World," 210;
commercial metropolis of West Indies, 216;
first hospital founded, 226;
San Francisco church, picture, facing 226;
building in Carreño's time, 231;
custom house, 231;
threatened by Drake, 243;
preparations for defence, 250;
officially called "city," 262;
coat of arms, 202;
primitive conditions, 264;
first theatrical performance, 264;
capital of western district, 275;
great fire, 277;
attacked by Pit Hein, 280;
described by John Chilton, 349;
first dockyard established, II, 8;
attacked by British under Admiral
Hosier, 9;
University founded, 11;
described by John Campbell, 14;
British expedition against in 1762, 46;
journal of siege, 54;
American troops engaged, 66;
surrender, 69;
terms, 71;
British occupation, 78;
great changes, 94;
description, 94;
view from Cabanas, facing, 96;
reoccupied by Spanish, 102;
hurricane, 115;
improvements in streets and buildings, 129;
view in Old Havana, facing 130;
street cleaning, and market, 169;
slaughter house removed, 194;
shopping, 242;
cafés, 243;
Tacon's public works, 365;
view of old Presidential Palace, facing III, 14;
view of the Prado, facing IV, 16;
besieged in War of Independence, 62;
view of bay and harbor, facing, 98;
old City Wall, picture, 122;
view of old and new buildings, facing 134;
General Ludlow's administration, 146;
Police reorganized, 150;
view of University, facing 164;
view of the new capitol, facing 204;
view of the President's home, facing 268;
view of the Academy of Arts and Crafts, facing 288;
new railroad terminal, 311.
Hay, John, epigram on revolutions, IV, 343
Hayti. See HISPANIOLA.
Hein, Pit, Dutch raider, I, 279.
Henderson, John, on Lopez's expedition, III, 64.
_Herald_, New York, on Cuban revolution, III, 89.
Heredia, José Maria. II, 274;
exiled, 344;
life and works, III, 318;
portrait, facing 318.
Hernani, Domingo, II, 170.
Herrera, historian, on Columbus's first landing, I, 12;
on Hatuey, 62;
description of West Indies, 345.
Herrera, Geronimo Bustamente de, I, 194.
Hevea, Aurelio, Secretary of Interior, IV, 320.
Hispaniola, Columbus at, I, 19;
revolution in, II, 173;
186;
effect upon Cuba, 189.
Hobson, Richmond P., exploit at Santiago, IV, 110.
Holleben, Dr. von, German Ambassador at Washington, intrigues of,
IV, 104.
Home Rule, proposed by Spain, IV, 6;
adopted, 8.
Horses introduced into Cuba, I, 63.
Hosier, Admiral, attacks Havana, I, 312;
II, 9.
Hospital, first in Havana, I, 226;
Belen founded, 318;
San Paula and San Francisco, 195.
"House of Fear," Governor's home, I, 156.
Humboldt, Alexander von, on slavery, II, 206;
on census, 277;
282;
on slave trade, 288.
Hurricanes, II, 115, 176, 310.
Hurtado, Lopez, royal treasurer, I, 116;
has Chaves removed, 162.
Ibarra, Carlos, defeats Dutch raiders, I, 288.
Incas, I, 7.
Independence, first conceived, II, 268;
326;
first revolts for, 343;
sentiment fostered by slave trade, 377;
proclaimed by Aguero, III, 72;
proclaimed by Cespedes at Yara, 155;
proposed by United States to Spain, 217;
War of Independence, IV, 1;
recognized by Spain, 119. See WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Intellectual life of Cuba, I, 360;
lack of productiveness in Sixteenth Century, 362;
Cuban backwardness, II, 235;
first important progress, 273;
great arising and splendid achievements, III, 317.
Insurrections. See REVOLUTIONS, and SLAVERY.
Intervention, Government of: First, established, IV, 132;
organized, 145;
Cuban Cabinet, 145;
saves island from famine, 146;
works of rehabilitation and reform, 148;
marriage law, 152;
concessions forbidden, 153;
census, 154;
civil governments of provinces, 179;
municipal elections ordered, 180;
electoral law 180;
final transactions, 246;
Second Government of Intervention, 281;
C. E. Magoon, Governor, 281;
Consulting Board, 284;
elections held, 289, 290;
commission for revising laws, 294;
controversy over church property, 294.
Intervention sought by Great Britain and France, III, 128;
by United States, IV, 106.
Iroquois, I, 7.
Irving, Washington, on Columbus's landing place, I, 12.
Isabella, Columbus's landing place, I, 3.
Isabella, Queen, portrait, I, 13.
Isidore of Seville, quoted, I, 4.
Islas de Arena, I, 11.
Isle of Pines, I, 26;
recognized as part of Cuba, 224;
status under Platt Amendment, IV, 255.
Italian settlers in Cuba, I, 169.
Ivonnet, Negro insurgent, IV, 307.
Jamaica, Columbus at, I, 20.
Japan. See CIPANGO.
Jaruco, founded, II, 131.
Jefferson, Thomas, on Cuban annexation, II, 260;
III, 132.
Jeronimite Order, made guardian of Indians, I, 78;
becomes their oppressor, 127.
Jesuits, controversy over, II, 86;
expulsion of, 111.
Jordan, Thomas, joins Cuban revolution, III, 211.
Jorrin, José Silverio, portrait, facing III, 308.
Jovellar, Joachim, Governor, III, 273;
proclaims state of siege, 289;
resigns, 290.
Juana, Columbus's first name for Cuba, I, 13.
Juan Luis Keys, I, 21.
Judiciary, reforms in, II, 110;
under Navarro, 142;
under Unzaga, 165;
under Leonard Wood, IV, 177.
Junta, Cuban, in United States, III, 91;
New York, IV, 2;
branches elsewhere, 3;
policy in enlisting men, 19.
Junta de Fomento, II, 178.
Juntas of the Laborers, III, 174.
Keppel, Gen. See ALBEMARLE.
Key Indians, I, 125;
expedition against, 126.
"Key of the New World and Bulwark of the Indies," I, 210.
Kindelan, Sebastian de, II, 197, 315.
Lacoste, Perfecto, Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce,
IV, 160.
Land tenure, II, 12;
absentee landlords, 214.
Lanuza, Gonzalez, Secretary of Justice, IV, 146;
portrait, 146.
Lares, Amador de, I, 93.
La Salle, in Cuba, I, 73.
Las Casas, Bartholomew, Apostle to the Indies, arrival in Cuba, I, 63;
portrait, 64;
denounces Narvaez, 66;
begins campaign against slavery, 75;
mission to Spain, 77;
before Ximenes, 77.
Las Casas, Luis de, Governor, II, 175;
portrait, 175;
death, 182.
Lasso de la Vega, Juan, Bishop, II, 17.
Lawton, Gen. Henry W., leads advance against Spanish, IV, 112;
Military Governor of Oriente, 139.
Lazear, Camp, established, IV, 172.
Lazear, Jesse W., hero and martyr in yellow fever campaign, IV, 172.
Ledesma, Francisco Rodriguez, Governor, I, 310.
Lee, Fitzhugh, Consul General at Havana, IV, 72;
reports on "concentration" policy of Weyler, 86;
asks for warship to protect Americans at Havana, 97;
_Maine_ sent, 98;
commands troops at Havana, 121.
Lee, Robert Edward, declines to join Lopez, III, 39.
Legrand, Pedro, invades Cuba, I, 302.
Leiva, Lopez, Secretary of Government, IV, 297.
Lemus, Jose Morales, III, 333.
Lendian, Evelio Rodriguez, educator, sketch and portrait, IV, 162.
Liberal Party, III, 306;
triumphant through revolution, IV, 285;
dissensions, 303;
conspiracy against election, 329.
Liberty Loans, Cuban subscriptions to, IV, 352.
Lighthouse service, under Mario G. Menocal, IV, 168.
Linares, Tomas de, first Rector of University of Havana, II, 11.
Lindsay, Forbes, quoted, II, 217.
Linschoten, Jan H. van, historian, quoted, I, 351.
Liquor, intoxicating, prohibited in 1780, II, 150.
Literary periodicals: _El Habanero_, III, 321;
_El Plantel_, 324;
_Cuban Review_, 325;
_Havana Review_, 329.
Literature, II, 245;
early works, 252;
poets, 274;
great development of activity, III, 315 et seq.
Little Inagua, I, 4.
Llorente, Pedro, in Constitutional Convention, IV, 188, 190.
Lobera, Juan de, commander of La Fuerza, I, 182;
desperate defence against Sores, 185.
Lolonois, pirate, I, 296.
Long Island. See FERDINANDINA.
Lopez, Narciso, sketch and portrait, III, 23;
in Venezuela, 24;
joins the Spanish
army, 26;
marries and settles in Cuba, 30;
against the Carlists in Spain, 31;
friend of Valdez, 31;
offices and honors, 33;
plans Cuban revolution, 36;
betrayed and fugitive, 37;
consults Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, 38;
first American expedition, 39;
members of the party, 40;
activity in Southern States, 43;
expedition starts, 45;
proclamation to his men, 46;
lands at Cardenas, 49;
lack of Cuban support, 54;
reembarks, 56;
lands at Key West, 58;
arrested and tried, 60;
second expedition organized, 65;
betrayed, 67;
third expedition, 70;
final expedition organized, 91;
lands in Cuba, 98;
defeated and captured, 112;
death, 114;
results of his works, 116.
Lorenzo, Gen., Governor at Santiago, II, 347.
Lorraine, Sir Lambton, III, 280.
Los Rios, J. B. A. de, I, 310.
Lottery, National, established by José Miguel Gomez, IV, 310.
Louisiana, Franco-Spanish contest over, II, 117;
Ulloa sent from Cuba to take possession, 118;
O'Reilly sent, 123;
Uznaga sent, 126.
Louverture, Toussaint, II, 186.
Luaces, Joaquin Lorenzo, sketch and portrait, III, 330.
Ludlow, Gen. William, command and work at Havana, IV, 144.
Lugo, Pedro Benitez de, Governor, I, 331.
Luna y Sarmiento, Alvaro de, Governor, I, 290.
Luz y Caballero, José de la, "Father of the Cuban Revolution,"
III, 322;
great work for patriotic education, 323;
Portrait, frontispiece, Vol III.
Luzan, Gabriel de, Governor, I, 236;
controversy over La Fuerza, 237;
feud with Quiñones, 241;
unites with Quiñones to resist Drake, 243;
energetic action, 246;
tenure of office prolonged, 250;
end of term, 260.
Macaca, province of, I, 20.
Maceo, José Antonio, proclaims Provisional Government, IV, 15;
leader in War of Independence, 41;
commands Division of Oriente, 43;
defeats Campos, 46;
plans great campaign, 53;
invades Pinar del Rio, 61;
successful campaign, 73;
death, 74;
portrait, facing 74.
Maceo, José, IV, 41;
marches through Cuba, 76.
Machado, Eduard, treason of, III, 258.
Machete, used in battle, IV, 57.
Madison, James, on status of Cuba, III, 132.
Madriaga, Juan Ignacio, II, 59.
Magoon, Charles E., Provisional Governor, IV, 281;
his administration, 283;
promotes public works, 286;
takes census, 287;
election law, 287;
retires, 295.
Mahy, Nicolas, Governor, II, 315.
Mail service established, II, 107;
under American occupation, IV, 168.
Maine sent to Havana, IV, 98;
destruction of, 98;
investigation, 100.
Maldonado, Diego, I, 146.
Mandeville, Sir John, I, 20.
Mangon, identified with Mangi, I, 20.
Manners and Customs, II, 229 et seq.;
balls, 239;
shopping, 242;
relations of black and white races, 242;
cafés, 243;
early society, 248.
Monosca, Juan Saenz, Bishop, I, 301.
Manrique, Diego, Governor, II, 109.
Manzaneda y Salines, Severino de, Governor, I, 320.
Manzanillo, Declaration of Independence issued, III, 155.
Maraveo Ponce de Leon, Gomez de, I, 339.
Marco Polo, I, 4, 20.
Marcy, William L., policy toward Cuba, III, 136.
Mar de la Nuestra Señora, I, 18.
Mariguana. See GUANAHANI.
Marin, Sabas, succeeds Campos in command, IV, 63.
Markham, Sir Clements, on Columbus's first landing, I, 12.
Marmol, Donato, III, 173, 184.
Marquez, Pedro Menendez, I, 206.
Marriage law, reformed under American occupation, IV, 152;
controversy over, 153.
Marti, José, portrait, frontispiece, Vol IV;
leader of War of Independence, IV, 2;
his career, 9;
in New York, 11;
organizes Junta, 11;
goes to Cuba, 15;
death, 16;
his war manifesto, 17;
fulfilment of his ideals, 355.
Marti, José, secretary of War, portrait, IV, 360.
Marti, the pirate, II, 357.
Martinez Campos. See Campos.
Martinez, Dionisio de la Vega, Governor, II, 8;
inscription on La Punta, 14.
Martinez, Juan, I, 192.
Martyr, Peter, I, 53.
Maso, Bartolome, revolutionist, IV, 34;
rebukes Spotorno, 35;
President of Cuban Republic, 43;
Vice President of Council, 48;
President of Republic, 90;
candidate for Vice President, 242;
seeks Presidency, 243.
Mason, James M., U. S. Minister to France, III, 141.
Masse, E. M., describes slave trade, II, 202;
rural life, 216;
on Spanish policy toward Cuba, 227;
social morals, 230.
Matanzas, founded, I, 321;
meaning of name, 321.
Maura, Sr., proposes Cuban reforms, IV, 5.
McCullagh, John B., reorganizes Havana Police, IV, 150.
McKinley, William, President of United States, message of 1897
on Cuba, IV, 87;
declines European mediation, 103;
message for war, 104.
Maza, Enrique, assaults Hugh S. Gibson, IV, 308.
Mazariegos, Diego de, Governor, I, 191;
a scandalous moralist, 193;
defences against privateering, 193;
takes charge of La Fuerza, 195;
controversy with Governor of Florida, 196;
replaced by Sandoval, 197.
Medina, Fernando de, I, 111.
Mendez-Capote, Fernando, Secretary of Sanitation, portrait, IV, 360.
Mendieta, Carlos, candidate for Vice President, IV, 328;
rebels, 338.
Mendive, Rafael Maria de, III, 328.
Mendoza, Martin de, I, 204.
Menendez, Pedro de Aviles, I, 199;
commander of Spanish fleet, 200;
clash with Osorio, 201;
Governor of Cuba, 205;
dealing with increasing enemies, 208;
fortifies Havana, 209;
recalled to Spain, 213;
conflict with Bishop Castillo, 226.
Menocal, Aniceto G., portrait, IV, 50.
Menocal, Mario G., Assistant Secretary of War, IV, 49;
Chief of Police at Havana, 144, 150;
in charge of Lighthouse Service, 168;
candidate for President, 290;
slandered by Liberals, 291;
elected President, 312;
biography, 312;
portrait, facing 312;
view of birthplace, 313;
Cabinet, 320;
opinion of Cuba's needs, 321;
first message, 322;
conflict with Congress, 323;
important reforms, 324;
suppresses rebellion, 327;
candidate for reelection, 328;
vigorous action against Gomez's rebellion, 335;
declines American aid, 337;
escapes assassination, 339;
reelection confirmed, 341;
clemency to traitors, 342;
message on entering Great War, 346;
fulfilment of Marti's ideals, 355;
estimate of his administration, 356;
achievements for education, 357;
health, 357;
industry and commerce, 358;
finance, 359;
"from Velasquez to Menocal," 365.
Menocal, Señora, leadership of Cuban womanhood in Red Cross and
other work, IV, 354;
portrait, facing 352.
Mercedes, Maria de las, quoted, II, 174;
on slave insurrection, 368.
Merchan, Rafael, III, 174;
patriotic works, 335.
Merlin, Countess de. See MERCEDES.
_Merrimac_, sunk at Santiago, IV, 111.
Mesa, Hernando de, first Bishop, I, 122.
Mestre, José Manuel, sketch and portrait, III, 326.
Meza, Sr., Secretary of Public Instruction and Arts, IV, 297.
Mexico, discovered and explored from Cuba, I, 87;
designs upon Cuba, II, 262;
Cuban expedition against, 346;
warned off by United States, III, 134;
fall of Maximilian, 150.
Milanes, José Jacinto, sketch, portrait and works, III, 324.
Miles, Gen. Nelson A., prepares for invasion of Cuba, IV, 111.
Miranda, Francisco, II, 156;
with Bolivar, 335.
Miscegenation, II, 204.
Molina, Francisco, I, 290.
Monastic orders, I, 276.
Monroe Doctrine, foreshadowed, II, 256;
promulgated, 328.
Monroe, James, interest in Cuba, II, 257;
promulgates Doctrine, 328;
portrait, 329.
Monserrate Gate, Havana, picture, II, 241.
Montalvo, Gabriel, Governor, I, 215;
feud with Rojas family, 218;
investigated and retired, 219;
pleads for naval protection for Cuba, 220.
Montalvo, Lorenzo, II, 89.
Montalvo, Rafael, Secretary of Public Works, urges resistance
to revolutionists, IV, 270.
Montanes, Pedro Garcia, I, 292.
Montano See VELASQUEZ, J. M.
Montes, Garcia, Secretary of Treasury, IV, 254.
Montesino, Antonio, I, 78.
Montiel, Vasquez de, naval commander, I, 278.
Montoro, Rafael, Representative in Cortes, III, 308;
spokesman of Autonomists, IV, 59;
in Autonomist Cabinet, 95;
candidate for Vice President, 290;
attacked by Liberals, 291;
biography, 317;
portrait, facing 320.
Morales case, IV, 92.
Morales. Pedro de, commands at Santiago, I, 299.
Morals, strangely mixed with piety and vice, II, 229.
Morell, Pedro Augustino, Bishop, II, 53;
controversy with Albemarle, 83;
exiled, 87;
death, 113.
Moreno, Andres, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, IV, 90.
Moret law, abolishing slavery, III, 243.
Morgan, Henry, plans raid on Havana, I, 297;
later career, 303.
Morro Castle, Havana, picture, facing I, 180;
site of battery, 180;
tower built by Mazariegos, 196;
fortified against Drake, 249;
planned by Antonelli, 261;
besieged by British, II, 55.
Morro Castle, Santiago, built, I, 289;
picture, facing 298.
Mucaras, I, 11.
Muenster, geographer, I, 6.
Mugeres Islands, I, 84.
Munive, Andres de, I, 317.
Murgina y Mena, A. M., I, 317.
Music, early concerts at Havana, II, 239.
Nabia, Juan Alfonso de, I, 207.
Nancy Globe, I. 6.
Napoleon's designs upon Cuba, II, 203.
Naranjo, probable landing place of Columbus, I, 12.
Narvaez, Panfilo de, portrait, I, 63;
arrival in Cuba, 63;
campaign against natives, 65;
explores the island, 67;
errand to Spain, 77;
sent to Mexico to oppose Cortez, 98;
secures appointment of Councillors for life, 111.
Naval stations, U. S., in Cuba, IV, 255.
Navarrete, quoted, I, 3, 12.
Navarro, Diego Jose, Governor, II, 141, 150.
Navy, Spanish, in Cuban waters, III, 182, 225.
Negroes, imported as slaves, I, 170;
treatment of, 171;
slaves and free, increasing numbers of, 229. See SLAVERY.
New Orleans, anti-Spanish outbreak, III, 126.
New Spain. See MEXICO.
Newspapers: _Gazeta_, 1780, II, 157;
_Papel Periodico_, 179;
246;
publications in Paris, Madrid and New York, 354;
El Faro Industrial, III, 18;
Diario de la Marina, 18;
La Verdad, 18;
La Vos de Cuba, 260;
La Vos del Siglo, 232;
La Revolucion, 333;
El Siglo, 334;
El Laborante, 335.
Norsemen, American colonists, I, 7.
Nougaret, Jean Baptiste, quoted, II, 26.
Nuñez, Emilio, in Cuban Junta, IV, 12;
in war, 57;
Civil Governor of Havana, 179;
head of Veterans' Association, 305;
Secretary of Agriculture, 320;
candidate for Vice President, 328;
election confirmed, 341.
Nuñez, Enrique, Secretary of Health and Charities, IV, 320.
Ocampo, Sebastian de, circumnavigates Cuba, I, 54.
O'Donnell, George Leopold, Governor, II, 365;
his wife's sordid intrigues, 365.
Oglethorpe, Governor of Georgia, hostile to Spain, II, 24, 30.
O'Hara, Theodore, with Lopez, III, 46.
Ojeda, Alonzo de, I, 54;
introduces Christianity to Cuba, 55.
Olid, Christopher de, sent to Mexico, I, 88.
Olney, Richard. U. S. Secretary of State, attitude toward War
of Independence, IV, 71.
Oquendo, Antonio de, I, 281.
Orejon y Gaston, Francisco Davila de, Governor, I, 301, 310.
O'Reilly, Alexandre, sent to occupy Louisiana, II, 123;
ruthless rule, 125.
Orellano, Diego de, I, 86.
Ornofay, province of, I, 20.
Ortiz, Bartholomew, alcalde mayor, I, 146;
retires, 151.
Osorio, Garcia de Sandoval, Governor, I, 197;
conflict with Menendez, 199, 201;
retired, 205;
tried, 206.
Osorio, Sancho Pardo, I, 207.
Ostend Manifesto, III, 142.
Ovando, Alfonso de Caceres, I, 214;
revises law system, 233.
Ovando, Nicolas de, I, 54.
Palma, Tomas Estrada, head of Cuban Junta in New York, IV, 3;
Provisional President of Cuban Republic, 15;
Delegate at Large, 43;
rejects anything short of independence, 71;
candidate for Presidency, 241;
his career, 241;
elected President, 245;
arrival in Cuba, 247;
portrait, facing 248;
receives transfer of government from General Wood, 248;
Cabinet, 254;
first message, 254;
prosperous administration, 259;
non-partisan at first, 264;
forced toward Conservative party, 264;
reelected, 266;
refuses to believe insurrection impending, 266;
refuses to submit to blackmail, 268;
betrayed by Congress, 269;
acts too late, 270;
seeks American aid, 271;
interview with W. H. Taft, 276;
resigns Presidency, 280;
estimate of character and work, 282;
death, 284.
Palma y Romay, Ramon, III, 327.
Parra, Antonio, scientist, II, 252.
Parra, Maso, revolutionist, IV, 30.
Parties, political, in Cuba, IV, 59;
origin and characteristics of Conservative and Liberal, 181, 261.
Pasalodos, Damaso, Secretary to President, IV, 297
Pasamonte, Miguel, intrigues against Columbus, I, 58.
Paz, Doña de, marries Juan de Avila, I, 154.
Paz, Pedro de, I, 109.
Penalosa, Diego de, Governor, II, 31.
Penalver. See PENALOSA.
Penalver, Luis, Bishop of New Orleans, II, 179.
"Peninsulars," III, 152.
Pensacola, settlement of, I, 328;
seized by French, 342;
recovered by Spanish, II, 7;
defended by Galvez, 146.
Pereda, Gaspar Luis, Governor, I, 276.
Perez, Diego, repels privateers, I, 179.
Perez, Perico, revolutionist, IV, 15, 30, 78.
Perez de Zambrana, Luisa, sketch and portrait, III, 328.
Personal liberty restricted, III, 8.
Peru, good wishes for Cuban revolution, III, 223.
Philip II, King, appreciation of Cuba, I, 260.
Pieltain, Candido, Governor, III, 275.
Pierce, Franklin, President of United States, policy toward
Cuba, III, 136.
Pina, Severo, Secretary of Finance, IV, 48.
Pinar del Rio, city founded, II, 131;
Maceo invades province, IV, 61;
war in, 73.
Pineyro, Enrique, III, 333;
sketch and portrait, 334.
Pinto, Ramon, sketch and portrait, III, 62.
"Pirates of America," I, 296.
Pizarro, Francisco de, I, 54, 91.
Platt, Orville H., Senator, on relations of United States
and Cuba, IV, 198;
Amendment to Cuban Constitution, 199;
Amendment adopted, 203;
text of Amendment, 238.
Pococke, Sir George, expedition against Havana, II, 46.
Poey, Felipe, sketch and portrait, III, 315.
Point Lucrecia, I, 18.
Polavieja, Gen., Governor, III, 314.
Police, reorganized, II, 312;
under American occupation, IV, 150;
police courts established, 171.
Polk, James K., President of the United States, policy toward
Cuba, III, 135.
Polo y Bernabe, Spanish Minister at Washington, IV, 98.
Ponce de Leon, in Cuba, I, 73;
death, 139.
Ponce de Leon, of New York, in Cuban Junta, IV, 13.
Pope, efforts to maintain peace, between United States and
Spain, IV, 104.
Porro, Cornelio, treason of, III, 257.
Port Banes, I, 18.
Port Nipe, I, 18.
Port Nuevitas, I, 3.
Portuguese settlers, I, 168.
Portuondo, Rafael, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, IV, 48;
filibuster, 70.
Prado y Portocasso, Juan, Governor, II, 49;
neglect of duty, 52;
sentenced to degradation, 108.
Praga, Francisco de, I, 282.
Presidency, first candidates for, IV, 240;
Tomas Estrada Palma elected, 245;
José Miguel Gomez aspires to, 260;
candidates in 1906, 265;
Palma's resignation, 280;
Jose Miguel Gomez elected, 290;
fourth campaign, 312;
Mario G. Menocal elected, 312;
fifth campaign, 328;
General Menocal reelected, 341.
Prim, Gen., Spanish revolutionist, III, 145.
Printing, first press in Cuba, II, 245.
Privateers, French ravage Cuba, I, 177;
Havana and Santiago attacked, 178;
Havana looted, 179;
Jacques Sores, 183;
Havana captured, 186;
Santiago looted, 193;
French raids, 220, et seq.
Proctor, Redfield, Senator, investigates and reports on condition
of Cuba in War of Independence, IV, 87.
Procurators, appointment of, I, 112.
Protectorate, tripartite, refused by United States, II, 261;
III, 130, 133.
Provincial governments organized, IV, 179, confusion in, 292.
Public Works, promoted by General Wood, IV, 166;
by Magoon, 286.
Puerto Grande. See GUANTANAMO.
Puerto Principe, I, 18, 167.
Punta, La, first fortification, I, 203;
strengthened against Drake, 249;
fortress planned by Antonelli, 261;
picture, IV, 33.
Punta Lucrecia, I, 3.
Punta Serafina, I, 22.
Queen's Gardens, I, 20.
Quero, Geronimo, I, 277.
Quesada, Gonzalo de, Secretary of Cuban Junta, IV, 3;
Minister to United States, 275.
Quesada, Manuel, sketch and portrait, III, 167;
proclamation, 169;
death, 262.
Quezo, Juan de, I, 113.
Quilez, J. M., Civil Governor of Pinar del Rio, IV, 179.
Quiñones, Diego Hernandez de, commander of fortifications at
Havana, I, 240;
feud with Luzan, 241;
unites with Luzan to resist Drake, 243.
Quiñones, Doña Leonora de, I, 117.
Rabi, Jesus, revolutionist, IV, 34, 42.
Railroads, first in Cuba, II, 343.
Raja, Vicente, Governor, I, 337.
Ramirez, Alejandro, sketch and portrait, II, 311.
Ramirez, Miguel, Bishop, partisan of Guzman, I, 120;
political activities and greed, 124.
Ramos, Gregorio, I, 274.
Ranzel, Diego, I, 295.
Recio, R. Lopez, Civil Governor of Camaguey, IV, 180.
Recio, Serafin, III, 86.
Reciprocity, secured by Roosevelt for Cuba, IV, 256.
"Reconcentrados," mortality among, IV, 86.
Red Cross, Cuban activities, IV, 353.
Redroban, Pedro de, I, 201.
Reed, Walter, in yellow fever campaign, IV, 172.
Reformists, Spanish, support Blanco's Autonomist policy, IV, 97.
Reggio, Andreas, II, 32.
Reno, George, in War of Independence, IV, 12;
running blockade, 21;
portrait, 21;
services in Great War, 351.
Renteria, Pedro de, partner of Las Casas, I, 75;
opposes slavery, 76.
Repartimiento, I, 70.
Republic of Cuba: proclaimed and organized, III, 157;
first representative Assembly, 161;
Constitution of 1868, 164;
first House of Representatives, 176;
Judiciary, 177;
legislation, 177;
army, 178;
fails to secure recognition, 203;
Government reorganized, 275;
after Treaty of Zanjon, 301;
reorganized in War of Independence, IV, 15;
Maso chosen President, 43;
Conventions of Yara and Najasa, 47;
Constitution adopted, 47;
Government reorganized, Cisneros President, 48;
capital at Las Tunas, 56;
removes to Cubitas, 72;
exercises functions of government, 72;
reorganized in 1897, 90;
after Spanish evacuation of island, 134;
disbanded, 135;
Constitutional Convention called, 185;
Constitution completed, 192;
relations with United States, 195;
Platt Amendment, 203;
enters Great War, 346.
Revolutions: Rise of spirit, II, 268;
in South America, 333;
"Soles de Bolivar," 341;
attempts to revolt, 344;
"Black Eagle," 346;
plans of Lopez, III, 36;
Lopez's first invasion, 49;
Aguero's insurrection, 72;
comments of New York _Herald_, 89;
Lopez's last expedition, 91;
results of his work, 116;
European interest, 125;
beginning of Ten Years' War. 155;
end of Ten Years' War, 299;
insurrection renewed, 308, 318;
War of Independence, IV, 1;
Sartorius Brothers, 4;
end of War of Independence, 116;
revolt against President Palma, 266;
ultimatum, 278;
government overthrown, 280;
Negro insurrection, 307;
conspiracy against President Menocal, 327;
great treason of José Miguel Gomez, 332;
Gomez captured, 337;
warnings from United States Government, 338;
revolutions denounced by United States, 343.
Revolutionary party, Cuban, IV, 1, 11.
Rey, Juan F. G., III, 40.
Riano y Gamboa, Francisco, Governor, I, 287.
Ribera, Diego de, I, 206;
work on La Fuerza, 209.
Ricafort, Mariano, Governor, II, 347.
Ricla, Conde de, Governor, II, 102;
retires, 109.
Rio de la Luna, I, 16.
Rio de Mares, I, 16.
Riva-Martiz, I, 279.
Rivera, Juan Ruiz, filibuster, IV, 70;
succeeds Maceo, 79.
Rivera, Ruiz, Secretary of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, IV, 160.
Roa, feud with Villalobos, I, 323.
Rodas, Caballero de, Governor, III, 213;
emancipation decree, 242.
Rodney, Sir George, expedition to West Indies, II, 153.
Rodriguez, Alejandro, suppresses revolt, IV, 266.
Rodriguez, Laureano, in Autonomist Cabinet, IV, 95.
Rojas, Alfonso de, I, 181.
Rojas, Gomez de, banished, I, 193;
Governor of La Fuerza, 217;
rebuilds Santiago, 258.
Rojas, Hernando de, expedition to Florida, I, 196.
Rojas, Juan Bautista de, royal treasurer, I, 218.
Rojas, Juan de, aid to Lady Isabel de Soto, I, 145;
commander at Havana, 183.
Rojas, Manuel de, Governor, I, 105;
adopts policy of "Cuba for the Cubans," 106;
second Governorship, 121;
dealings with Indians, 126;
noble endeavors frustrated, 130;
resigns, 135;
the King's unique tribute to him, 135.
Roldan, Francisco Dominguez, Secretary of Public Instruction,
sketch and portrait, IV, 357.
Roldan, José Gonzalo, III, 328.
Roloff, Carlos, revolutionist, IV, 45;
Secretary of War, 48;
filibuster, 70.
Romano Key, I, 18.
Romay, Tomas, introduces vaccination, II, 192;
portrait, facing 192.
Roncali, Federico, Governor, II, 366;
on Spanish interests in Cuba, 381.
Roosevelt, Theodore, at San Juan Hill, IV, 113;
portrait, 113;
President of United States, on relations with Cuba, 245;
estimate of General Wood's work in Cuba, 251;
fight with Congress for Cuban reciprocity, 256;
seeks to aid President Palma against revolutionists, 275;
letter to Quesada, 275.
Root, Elihu, Secretary of War, on Cuban Constitution, IV, 194;
on Cuban relations with United States, 197;
explains Platt Amendment, 201.
Rowan, A. S., messenger to Oriente, IV. 107.
Rubalcava, Manuel Justo, II, 274.
Rubens, Horatio, Counsel of Cuban Junta, IV, 3.
Rubios, Palacios, I, 78.
Ruiz, Joaquin, spy, IV, 91;
death, 92. See ARANGUREN.
Ruiz, Juan Fernandez, filibuster, IV, 70.
Rum Cay. See CONCEPTION.
Rural Guards, organized by General Wood, IV, 144;
efficiency of, 301.
Ruysch, geographer, I, 6.
Saavedra, Juan Esquiro, I, 278.
Sabinal Key, I, 18.
Saco, José Antonio, pioneer of Independence, II, 378;
portrait, facing 378;
literary and patriotic work, III, 325, 327.
Sagasta, Praxedes, Spanish Premier, proposes Cuban reforms, IV, 6;
resigns, 36.
Saint Augustine, expedition against, I, 332.
Saint Mery, M. de, search for tomb of Columbus, I, 34.
Salamanca, Juan de, Governor, I, 295;
promotes industries, 300.
Salamanca y Negrete, Manuel, Governor, III, 314.
Salaries, some early, I, 263.
Salas, Indalacio, IV, 21.
Salazar. See SOMERUELOS.
Salcedo, Bishop, controversy with Governor Tejada, I, 262.
Sama Point, I, 4.
Samana. See GUANAHANI.
Sampson, William T., Admiral, in Spanish-American War, IV, 110;
at Santiago, 114;
portrait, 115.
Sanchez, Bartolome, makes plans for La
Fuerza, I, 194;
begins building, 195;
feud with Mazariegos, 197.
Sanchez, Bernabe, II, 345.
Sancti Spiritus, founded by Velasquez, I, 68, 168.
Sandoval, Garcia Osorio, Governor, I, 197. See OSARIO.
Sanitation, undertaken by Guemez, II, 18;
vaccination introduced by Dr. Romay. 192;
bad conditions, III, 313;
General Wood at Santiago, IV, 142;
achievements under President Menocal, 357.
Sanguilly, Julio, falls in leading revolution, IV, 29, 55.
Sanguilly, Manuel, in Constitutional Convention, IV, 190.
San Lazaro watchtower, picture, I, 155;
fortified against Drake, 248.
San Salvador. See GUANAHANI.
Santa Clara, Conde de, Governor, II, 194, 300.
Santa Crux del Sur, I, 20.
Santa Cruz, Francisco, I, 111.
Santiago de Cuba, Columbus at, I, 19;
founded by Velasquez, 68;
second capital of island, 69;
seat of gold refining, 80;
site of cathedral, 123;
condition in Angulo's time, 166;
looted by privateers, 193;
fortified by Menendez, 203;
raided and destroyed by French, 256;
rebuilt by Gomez de Rojas, 258;
capital of Eastern District, 275;
Morro Castle built, 289;
captured by British, 299;
attacked by Franquinay, 310;
attacked by Admiral Vernon, II, 29;
literary activities, 169;
great improvements made, 180;
battles near in War of Independence, IV, 112;
naval battle, 114;
General Wood's administration, 135;
great work for sanitation, 142.
Santiago, battle of, IV, 114.
Santiago, sunset scene, facing III, 280.
Santillan, Diego, Governor, I, 205.
Santo Domingo See HISPANIOLA.
Sanudo, Luis, Governor, I, 336.
Sarmiento. Diego de, Bishop, makes trouble, I, 149, 152.
Saunders, Romulus M., sounds Spain on purchase of Cuba, III, 135.
Sartorius, Manuel and Ricardo, revolutionists, IV, 4.
Savine, Albert, on British designs on Cuba, II, 40.
Schley, Winfield S., Admiral, in Spanish-American War, IV, 110;
portrait, 110;
at Santiago, 114.
Schoener's globe, I, 5.
Schools, backward condition of, II, 174, 244, 312. See EDUCATION.
Shafter, W. R., General, leads American army into Cuba, IV, 111.
Shipbuilding at Havana, II, 8, 33, 113, 300.
Sickles, Daniel E., Minister to Spain, offers mediation, III, 217.
Silva, Manuel, Secretary of Interior, IV, 90.
Slave Insurrection, II, 13;
III, 367, et seq.
Slavery, begun in Repartimiento system, I, 70;
not sanctioned by King, 82;
slave trading begun, 83;
growth and regulation, 170;
oppressive policy of Spain, 266;
the "Assiento," II, 2;
great growth
of trade, 22;
gross abuses, 202;
described by Masse, 202;
census of slaves, 204;
rise of emancipation movement, 206;
rights of slaves defined by King, 210;
African trade forbidden, 285;
Negro census, 286;
early records of trade, 288;
Humboldt on, 288;
statistics of trade, 289 et seq.;
domestic relations of slaves, 292;
dangers of system denounced, 320;
official complicity in illegal trade, 366;
slave insurrection, 367;
inhuman suppression by government, 374 et seq.;
emancipation by revolution of 1868, 159;
United States urges Spain to abolish slavery, 242;
Rodas's decrees, 242;
Moret law, 243.
Smith, Caleb. publishes book on West Indies, II, 37.
Smuggling, II, 133.
"Sociedad de Amigos," II, 169.
"Sociedad Patriotica," II, 166.
"Sociedad Patriotica y Economica," II, 178.
Society of Progress, II, 78.
Solano, José de, naval commander, II, 147.
"Soles de Bolivar," II, 341;
attempts to suppress, 343.
Solorzano, Juan del Hoya, I, 337;
II, 10.
Someruelos, Marquis of, Governor, II, 196, 301.
Sores, Jacques, French raider, II, 183;
attacks Havana, 184;
captures city, 186.
Soto, Antonio de, I, 292.
Soto, Diego de, I, 109, 217.
Soto, Hernando de, Governor and Adelantado, I, 140;
portrait, 140;
arrival in Cuba, 141;
tour of island, 142;
makes Havana his home, 144;
chiefly interested in Florida, 144;
sails for Florida, 145;
his fate in Mississippi, 147;
trouble with Indians, 148.
Soto, Lady Isabel de, I, 141;
her vigil at La Fuerza, 147;
death, 149.
Soto, Luis de, I, 141.
Soulé, Pierre, Minister to Spain, III, 137;
Indiscretions, 138;
Ostend Manifesto, 142.
South Sea Company, II, 21, 201.
Spain: Fiscal policy toward Cuba, I, 175;
wars with France, 177;
discriminations against Cuba, 266, 267;
protests against South Sea Company, II, 22;
course in American Revolution, 143;
war with Great Britain, 151;
attitude toward America, 159;
peace with Great Britain, 162;
restrictive laws, 224;
policy under Godoy, 265;
decline of power, 273;
seeks to pawn Cuba to Great Britain for loan, 330;
protests to United States against Lopez's expedition, III, 59;
seeks British protection, 129;
refuses to sell Cuba, 135;
revolution against Bourbon dynasty, 145 et seq.;
rejects suggestion of American mediation in Cuba, 219;
seeks American mediation, 293;
strives to placate Cuba, IV, 5;
crisis over Cuban affairs, 35;
attitude toward War of Independence, 40;
considers Autonomy, 71;
Cabinet crisis of 1897, 88;
proposes joint investigation of Maine disaster, 100;
at war with United States, 106;
makes Treaty of Paris, relinquishing Cuba, 118.
Spanish-American War: causes of, IV, 105;
declared, 106;
blockade of Cuban coast, 110;
landing of American army in Cuba, 111;
fighting near Santiago, 112;
fort at El Caney, picture, 112;
San Juan Hill, battle, 113;
San Juan Hill, picture of monument, 114;
naval battle of Santiago, 115;
peace negotiations, 116;
"Peace Tree," picture, 116;
treaty of peace, 118.
Spanish literature in XVI century, I, 360.
Spotorno, Juan Bautista, seeks peace, rebuked by Maso, IV, 35.
Steinhart, Frank, American consul, advises President Palma to
ask for American aid, IV, 271;
correspondence with State Department, 272.
Stock raising, early attention to, I, 173, 224;
development of, 220.
Stokes, W. E. D., aids War of Independence, IV, 14.
Students, murder of by Volunteers, III, 260.
Suarez y Romero, Anselmo, III, 326.
Sugar, Industry begun under Velasquez, I, 175, 224;
growth of industry, 265;
primitive methods, II, 222;
growth, III, 3;
great development under President Menocal, IV, 358.
"Suma de Geografia," of Enciso, I, 54.
Sumana, Diego de, I, 111.
Tacon, Miguel, Governor, II, 347;
despotic fury, 348;
conflict with Lorenzo, 349;
public works, 355;
fish market, 357;
melodramatic administration of justice, 359.
Taft, William H., Secretary of War of United States, intervenes
in revolution, IV, 272;
arrives at Havana, 275;
negotiates with President Palma and the revolutionists, 276;
portrait, 276;
conveys ultimatum of revolutionists to President Palma, 279;
accepts President Palma's resignation, 280;
pardons revolutionists, 280;
unfortunate policy, 283.
Tainan, Antillan stock, I, 8.
Tamayo, Diego, Secretary of State, IV, 159;
Secretary of Government, 254.
Tamayo, Rodrigo de, I, 126.
Tariff, after British occupation, II, 106;
reduction, 141;
oppressive duties. III, 5;
under American occupation, IV, 183.
Taxation, revolt against, II, 197;
"reforms," 342;
oppressive burdens, III, 6;
increase in Ten Years' War, 207;
evasion of, 312;
under American intervention, IV, 151.
Taylor, Hannis, American Minister at Madrid, IV, 33.
Tejada, Juan de, Governor, I, 261;
great works for Cuba, 262;
resigns, 263.
Teneza, Dr. Francisco, Protomedico, I, 336.
Ten Years' War, III, 155 et seq.;
first battles, 184;
aid from United States, 211;
offers of American mediation, 217;
rejected, 219;
campaigns of destruction, 222;
losses reported, 290;
end in Treaty of Zanjon, 299;
losses, 304.
Terry, Emilio, Secretary of Agriculture, IV, 254.
Theatres, first performance in Cuba, I, 264;
first theatre built, II, 130, 236.
Thrasher, J. S., on census, II, 283.
Tines y Fuertes, Juan Antonio, Governor, II, 31.
Tobacco, early use, I, 9;
culture promoted, 300;
monopoly, 334;
"Tobacco War," 338;
effects of monopoly, II, 221.
Tobar, Nuñez, I, 141, 143.
Tolon, Miguel de, III, 330.
Toltecs, I, 7.
Tomayo, Esteban, revolutionist, IV, 34.
Torquemada, Garcia de, I, 239;
investigates Luzan, 241.
Torre, Marquis de la, Governor, II, 127;
work for Havana, 129;
death, 133.
Torres Ayala, Laureano de, Governor, I, 334;
reappointed, 337.
Torres, Gaspar de, Governor, I, 234;
conflict with Rojas family, 235;
absconds, 235.
Torres, Rodrigo de, naval commander, II, 34.
Torriente, Cosimo de la, Secretary of Government, IV, 320.
Toscanelli, I, 4.
Treaty of Paris, IV, 118.
Tres Palacios, Felipe Jose de, Bishop, II, 174.
Tribune, New York, describes revolutionary leaders, III, 173.
Trinidad, founded by Velasquez, I, 68, 168;
great fire, II, 177.
Trocha, begun by Campos, IV, 44;
Weyler's, 73.
Troncoso, Bernardo, Governor, II, 168.
Turnbull, David, British consul, II, 364;
complicity in slave insurrection, 372.
Ubite, Juan de, Bishop, I, 123.
Ulloa, Antonio de, sent to take possession of Louisiana, II, 118;
arbitrary conduct, 120.
Union Constitutionalists, III, 306.
United States, early relations with Cuba, II, 254;
first suggestion of annexation, 257;
John Quincy Adams's policy, 258;
Jefferson's policy, 260;
Clay's policy, 261;
representations to Colombia and Mexico, 262;
Buchanan's policy, 263;
Monroe Doctrine, 328;
consuls not admitted to Cuba, 330;
Van Buren's policy, 331;
growth of commerce with Cuba, III, 22;
President Taylor's proclamation against filibustering, 41;
course toward Lopez, 60;
attitude toward Cuban revolutionists, 123;
division of sentiment between North and South, 124;
policy of Edward Everett, 130;
overtures for purchase of Cuba, 135;
end of Civil War, 151;
new policy toward Cuba, 151;
recognition denied to revolution, 172;
aid and sympathy given secretly, 195;
Cuban appeals for recognition, 200;
recognition denied, 203;
protests against Rodas's decrees, 216;
offers of mediation, 217;
rejected by Spain, 219;
increasing interest and sympathy with revolutionists, 273;
warning to Spanish Government, 291;
effect of reciprocity upon Cuba, 313;
attitude toward War of Independence, IV, 27, 70;
Congress favors recognition, 70;
tender of good
offices, 71;
President Cleveland's message of 1896, 79;
appropriation for relief of victims of "concentration" policy, 86;
President McKinley's message of 1897, 87;
sensation at destruction of _Maine_, 99;
declaration of war against Spain, 106;
Treaty of Paris, 118;
establishment of first Government of Intervention, 132;
relations with Republic of Cuba, 195;
protectorate to be retained, 196;
Platt Amendment, 199;
mischief-making intrigues, 200;
naval stations in Cuba, 255;
reciprocity, 256;
second Intervention, 281;
warning to José Miguel Gomez, 305;
asks settlement of claims, 308;
Chargé d'Affaires assaulted, 308;
supervision of Cuban legislation, 326;
warning to revolutionists, 339;
attitude toward Gomez revolution, 343.
University of Havana, founded, II, 11.
Unzaga, Luis de, Governor, II, 157.
Urrutia, historian, quoted, I, 300.
Urrutia, Sancho de, I, 111.
Utrecht, Treaty of, I, 326;
begins new era, II, 1.
Uznaga, Luis de, sent to rule Louisiana, II, 126;
reforms, 165.
Vaca, Cabeza de, I, 140.
Vadillo, Juan, declines to investigate Guzman, I, 118;
temporary Governor, 119;
tremendous indictment of Guzman, 120;
retires after good work, 121;
clash with Bishop Ramirez, 124.
Valdes, historian, quoted, II, 175.
Valdes, Gabriel de la Conception, III, 325.
Valdes, Jeronimo, Bishop, I, 335.
Valdes, Pedro de, Governor, I, 202, 272;
retires, 276.
Valdes, Geronimo, Governor, II, 364.
Valdueza, Marquis de, I, 281.
Valiente, José Pablo, II, 170, 180.
Valiente, Juan Bautista, Governor of Santiago, II, 180.
Vallizo, Diego, I, 277.
Valmaseda, Count, Governor, proclamation against revolution, III,
171, 270;
recalled for barbarities, 273.
Van Buren, Martin, on United States and Cuba, II, 331.
Vandeval, Nicolas C., I, 331, 333.
Varela, Felix, sketch and portrait, III, 320;
works, 321.
Varnhagen, F. A. de, quoted, I, 2.
Varona, Bernabe de, sketch and portrait, III, 178.
Varona, José Enrique, Secretary of Treasury, IV, 159;
Vice President, 312;
biography, 316;
portrait, facing 316.
Varona, Pepe Jerez, chief of secret service, IV, 268.
Vasquez, Juan, I, 330.
Vedado, view in, IV, 176.
Vega, Pedro Guerra de la, I, 243;
asks fugitives to aid in defence against Drake, 248.
Velasco, Francisco de Aguero, II, 345.
Velasco, Luis Vicente, defender of Morro against British, II, 58;
signal valor, 61;
death, 67.
Velasquez, Antonio, errand to Spain, I, 77
Velasquez, Bernardino, I, 115.
Velasquez, Diego, first Governor of Cuba, I, 59;
portrait, 59;
colonizes Cuba, 60;
hostilities with natives, 61, explores the island, 67;
marriage and bereavement, 68;
founds various towns, 68;
begins Cuban commerce, 68;
organizes government, 69;
favored by King Ferdinand, 73;
appointed Adelantado, 74;
seeks to rule Yucatan and Mexico, 85;
recalls Grijalva, 88;
quarrels with Cortez, 91;
sends Cortez to explore Mexico, 92, 94;
seeks to intercept and recall Cortez, 97;
sends Narvaez to Mexico, 98;
removed from office by Diego Columbus, 100;
restored by King, 102;
death and epitaph, 103;
posthumous arraignment by Altamarino, 107;
convicted and condemned, 108.
Velasquez, Juan Montano, Governor, I, 293.
Velez Garcia, Secretary of State, IV, 297.
Velez y Herrera, Ramon, III, 324.
Venegas, Francisco, Governor, I, 278.
Vernon, Edward, Admiral, expedition to Darien, II 27;
Invasion of Cuba, 29.
Viamonte, Bitrian, Governor, I, 286.
Viana y Hinojosa, Diego de, Governor, I, 317.
Victory loan, Cuban subscriptions to, IV, 353.
Villa Clara, founded, I, 321.
Villafana, attempts to assassinate Cortez, I, 99.
Villafana, Angelo de, Governor of Florida, controversy with
Mazariegos, I, 196.
Villalba y Toledo, Diego de, Governor, I, 290.
Villalobos, Governor, feud with Roa, I, 323.
Villalon, José Ramon, in Cuban Junta, IV, 13;
Secretary of Public Works, 160, 330.
Villalon Park, scene in, IV, 247.
Villanueva, Count de, II, 342.
Villapando, Bernardino de, Bishop, I, 225.
Villarin, Pedro Alvarez de, Governor, I, 333.
Villaverde, Cirillo, III, 327.
Villaverde, Juan de, Governor of Santiago, I, 276.
Villegas, Diaz de, Secretary of Treasury, IV, 297;
resigns, 302.
Villuendas, Enrique, in Constitutional Convention, IV, 188;
secretary, 189.
Virginius, capture of, III, 277;
butchery of officers and crew, 278 et seq.;
British intervention, 280;
list of passengers, 281;
diplomatic negotiations over, 283.
Vives, Francisco, Governor, II, 317;
despotism, 317;
expedition against Mexico, 346.
Viyuri, Luis, II, 197.
Volunteers, organized, III, 152;
murder Arango, 188;
have Dulce recalled, 213;
cause murder of Zenea, 252;
increased activities, 260;
murder of students, 261.
War of Independence, IV, i, 8;
circumstances of beginning, 9;
finances, 14;
Republic of Cuba proclaimed, 15;
attitude of Cuban people, 22;
actual outbreak, 29;
martial law proclaimed, 30;
Spanish forces in Cuba, 31;
arrival and policy of Martinez Campos, 38;
Gomez and Maceo begin great campaign, 53;
Spanish defeated, and reenforced, 55;
campaign of devastation, 60;
entire island involved, 61;
fall of Campos, 63;
Weyler in command, 66;
destruction by both sides, 68;
losses, 90;
entry of United States, 107;
attitude of Cubans toward American intervention, 108;
end of war, 116.
Watling's Island. See GUANAHANI.
Wax, development of Industry, II, 132.
Webster, Daniel, negotiations with Spain, III, 126.
Weyler y Nicolau, Valeriano, Governor, IV, 65;
portrait, 66;
harsh decree, 66;
conquers Pinar del Rio. 83;
"concentration" policy, 85;
recalled, 88.
Wheeler, Gen. Joseph, at Santiago, IV, 113, 115.
White, Col. G. W., with Lopez, III, 40.
Whitney, Henry, messenger to Gomez, IV, 107.
Williams, Ramon O., United States consul at Havana, IV, 32;
acts in behalf of Americans in Cuba, 72;
opposes sending _Maine_ to Havana, 100.
Wittemeyer, Major, reports on Gomez revolution to Washington
government, IV, 336;
offers President Menocal aid of United States, 337.
Wood, General Leonard, at San Juan Hill, IV, 113;
Military Governor of Santiago, 135;
his previous career, 140;
unique responsibility and power, 141;
dealing with pestilence, 142;
organizes Rural Guards, 144;
portrait, facing 158;
Military Governor of Cuba, 158;
well received by Cubans, 158;
estimate of _La Lucha_, 158;
his Cabinet, 159;
comments on his appointments, 160;
reorganization of school system, 161;
promotes public works, 166;
Dady contract dispute, 171;
applies Finlay's yellow fever theory with great success, 171;
reform of jurisprudence, 177;
organizes Provincial governments, 179;
holds municipal elections, 180;
promulgates election law, 181;
calls Constitutional Convention, 185;
calls for general election, 240;
his comments on election, 245;
announces end of American occupation, 246;
surrenders government of Cuba to
Cubans, 249;
President Roosevelt's estimate of his work, 251;
view of one of his mountain roads, facing 358.
Woodford, Stewart L., United States Minister to Spain, IV, 103;
presents ultimatum and departs, 106.
Xagua, Gulf of, I, 21.
Ximenes, Cardinal and Regent, gives Las Casas hearing on Cuba, I, 77.
Yanez, Adolfo Saenz, Secretary of Agriculture and Public Works,
IV, 146.
Yellow Fever, first invasion, II, 51;
Dr. Finlay's theory applied by General Wood, IV, 171;
disease eliminated from island, 176.
Yero, Eduardo, Secretary of Public Instruction, IV, 254.
Ynestrosa, Juan de, I, 207.
Yniguez, Bernardino, I, 111.
Yucatan, islands source of slave trade, I, 83;
explored by Cordova, 84.
Yznaga, Jose Sanchez, III, 37.
Zaldo, Carlos, Secretary of State, IV, 254.
Zambrana, Ramon, III, 328.
Zanjon, Treaty of, III, 299.
Zapata, Peninsula of, visited by Columbus, I, 22.
Zarraga, Julian, filibuster, IV, 70.
Zayas, Alfredo, secretary of Constitutional Convention, IV, 189;
compact with José Miguel Gomez, 265;
spokesman of revolutionists against President Palma, 277;
elected Vice President, 290;
becomes Vice President, 297;
sketch and portrait, 300;
quarrel with Gomez, 306;
candidate for President, 328;
hints at revolution, 330.
Zayas, Francisco, Lieutenant Governor, I, 205;
resigns, 206.
Zayas, Francisco, in Autonomist Cabinet, IV, 95.
Zayas, Juan B., killed in battle, IV, 78.
Zayas, Lincoln de, in Cuban Junta, IV, 12;
Superintendent of Schools, 162.
Zenea, Juan Clemente, sketch and portrait, III, 252;
murdered, 253;
his works, 332.
Zequiera y Arango, Manuel, II, 274.
Zipangu. See CIPANOO.
Zuazo, Alfonso de, appointed second Governor of Cuba, I, 100;
dismissed by King, 102.
* * * * *
The following typographical errors were corrected by the etext
transcriber:
whereupon Castanada=>whereupon Castenada
General Caballere de Rodas=>General Caballero de Rodas
He had taken an active part in the revolution upon its inception=>He had
taken an active part in the resolution upon its inception
wtih which to support their movement=>with which to support their
movement
deserted and, approaching the Spanish=>deserted, and approaching the
Spanish
their govermnents and to have interviews=>their governments and to have
interviews
Talon was an intense patriot=>Tolon was an intense patriot
quantiy of provisions=>quantity of provisions
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The History of Cuba, vol. 3" ***
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