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Title: From Manassas to Appomattox - Memoirs of The Civil War in America
Author: Longstreet, James
Language: English
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[Illustration: James Longstreet]







  _All Rights reserved._




  In Memory of



Immediately after the surrender of the Confederate armies engaged in the
war between the States, General Lee undertook to write of the campaigns of
the Army of Northern Virginia while under his command, and asked such
assistance as I could give in supplying reports, despatches, and letters
of his, the originals of which had been lost or destroyed. Under the
impression that they could not be put to better use, such as were then in
hand were packed and sent him. He gave up the work, and after a few years
his death made it impossible that the world should ever receive the
complete story of the Confederate campaigns in Virginia from the noble
mind that projected and controlled them.

Possibly, had I not expected our commander to write the history of those
campaigns, I should have written it myself a decade or so earlier than I
have done. But, personally, I am not sorry that I write of the war thirty
years after its close, instead of ten or twenty.

While I am so constituted, temperamentally, that I could view then almost
exactly as I do now the great struggle in which I bore a part, I do not
know that others, in any considerable number, might have so regarded it at
the earlier periods to which I refer.

I believe that now, more fully than then, the public is ready to receive,
in the spirit in which it is written, the story which I present.

It is not my purpose to philosophize upon the war, but I cannot refrain
from expressing my profound thankfulness that Providence has spared me to
such time as I can see the asperities of the great conflict softened, its
passions entering upon the sleep of oblivion, only its nobler--if less
immediate--results springing into virile and vast life. I believe there is
to-day, _because of the war_, a broader and deeper patriotism in all
Americans; that patriotism throbs the heart and pulses the being as
ardently of the South Carolinian as of the Massachusetts Puritan; that the
Liberty Bell, even now, as I write, on its Southern pilgrimage, will be as
reverently received and as devotedly loved in Atlanta and Charleston as in
Philadelphia and Boston. And to stimulate and evolve this noble sentiment
all the more, what we need is the resumption of fraternity, the hearty
restoration and cordial cultivation of neighborly, brotherly relations,
faith in Jehovah, and respect for each other; and God grant that the happy
vision that delighted the soul of the sweet singer of Israel may rest like
a benediction upon the North and the South, upon the Blue and the Gray.

The spirit in which this work has been conceived, and in which I have
conscientiously labored to carry it out, is one of sincerity and fairness.
As an actor in, and an eyewitness of, the events of 1861-65, I have
endeavored to perform my humble share of duty in passing the materials of
history to those who may give them place in the records of the
nation,--not of the South nor of the North,--but in the history of the
United Nation. It is with such magnified view of the responsibility of
saying the truth that I have written.

I yield to no one as a champion of the Southern soldier wherever he may
have fought and in whatever army, and I do not think I shall be charged
more now than in war-time with "underestimating the enemy." Honor to all!
If I speak with some particularity of the First Corps of the Army of
Northern Virginia, it must be ascribed in part to the affection of a
commander, and in part to my desire to relieve its brave officers and men
in the ranks from unjust aspersions. After General Lee's death, various
writers on the Southern cause combined with one accord to hold the First
Corps and its commander responsible for all adversity that befell the
army. I being under the political ban, and the political passions and
prejudices of the times running high, they had no difficulty in spreading
their misrepresentations South and North until some people, through their
mere reiteration, came to accept them as facts. I simply present the facts
concerning the First Corps in all fulness and fairness, attested by
indisputable authorities, that the public may judge between it and its

In the accounts of battles and movements, the official War Records supply
in a measure the place of lost papers, and afford a great mass of most
trustworthy statistics. I am under obligations to General E. P. Alexander,
General G. M. Sorrel, Colonel Osman Latrobe, Colonel J. W. Fairfax,
Colonel T. J. Goree, Colonel Erasmus Taylor, and Colonel J. C. Haskell for
many interesting suggestions.

To Major George B. Davis and Mr. L. J. Perry, of the War Records office, I
am under obligations for invaluable assistance; as also to Mr. Alfred
Matthews, of Philadelphia, for material aid in revising the manuscript of
these memoirs.






  Birth--Ancestry--School-Boy Days--Appointment as Cadet at the
  United States Military Academy--Graduates of Historic Classes--
  Assignment as Brevet Lieutenant--Gay Life of Garrison at
  Jefferson Barracks--Lieutenant Grant's Courtship--Annexation
  of Texas--Army of Observation--Army of Occupation--Camp Life in
  Texas--March to the Rio Grande--Mexican War                           13



  The War-Cloud--The Journey Northward--Appointed
  Brigadier-General--Report to General Beauregard--Assigned to
  Command at the Scene of the First Conflict--Personnel of the
  Confronting Forces--Description of the Field of Manassas, or
  Bull Run--Beauregard and McDowell of the same West Point
  Class--Battle of Blackburn's Ford--Early's Mistake--Under Fire
  of Friend and Foe                                                     29



  Commanders on both Sides generally Veterans of the Mexican
  War--General Irvin McDowell's Preconceived Plan--Johnston
  reinforces Beauregard and approves his Plans--General Bernard
  E. Bee--Analysis of the Fight--Superb Work of the Federal
  Artillery--Christening of "Stonewall Jackson"--McDowell's
  Gallant Effort to recover Lost Power--Before he was shorn of
  his Artillery he was the Samson of the Field--The Rout--
  Criticism of McDowell--Tyler's Reconnoissance--Ability of the
  Commanding Generals tested                                            42



  An Early War-Time Amenity--The Author invited to dine with the
  Enemy--"Stove-pipe Batteries"--J. E. B. Stuart, the Famous
  Cavalryman--His Bold Dash on the Federals at Lewinsville--
  Major-General G. W. Smith associated with Johnston and
  Beauregard in a Council--Longstreet promoted Major-General--
  Fierce Struggle at Ball's Bluff--Dranesville a Success for the
  Union Arms--McClellan given the Sobriquet of "The Young
  Napoleon"                                                             59



  The Defences of the Confederate Capital--Army of Northern
  Virginia at Centreville--Aggressive Action--Council with the
  President and Secretary of War--Mr. Davis's High Opinion of
  McClellan--Operations on the Peninsula--Engagements about
  Yorktown and Williamsburg--Severe Toil added to the Soldiers'
  Usual Labors by a Saturated Soil                                      64



  The Attack on Fort Magruder--Hancock occupies Two Redoubts--The
  Slaughter in Early's Brigade--The Fifth North Carolina Regiment
  and Twenty-Fourth Virginia mercilessly exposed--A Hard-Fought
  Engagement--A Confederate Victory--McClellan not on the Field
  the Greater Part of the Day--Hancock called "The Superb" by
  McClellan--Johnston pays High Tribute to Longstreet                   72



  A New Line of Defence--Positions of the Confronting Armies--
  Fitz-John Porter--Terrific Storm on the Eve of Battle--General
  Johnston's Orders to Longstreet, Smith, and Huger--Lack of
  Co-operation on the Confederate Side, and Ensuing Confusion--
  Fatalities among Confederate Officers--Kearny's Action--Serious
  Wounding of General Johnston at the Close of the Battle--
  Summary and Analysis of Losses                                        81



  The Forces under Command of G. W. Smith after Johnston was
  wounded--The Battle of the 1st--Longstreet requests
  Reinforcements and a Diversion--Council held--McLaws alone
  sustains Longstreet's Opposition to retiring--Severe Fighting--
  Pickett's Brave Stand--General Lee assigned to Command--He
  orders the withdrawal of the Army--Criticism of General Smith--
  Confederates should not have lost the Battle--Keyes's
  Corroboration                                                        103



  The Great General's Assignment not at first assuring to the
  Army--Able as an Engineer but limited as to Field Service--He
  makes the Acquaintance of his Lieutenants--Calls a Council--
  Gains Confidence by saying Nothing--"A Little Humor now and
  then"--Lee Plans a Simultaneous Attack on McClellan's Front and
  Rear--J. E. B. Stuart's Daring Reconnoissance around the Union
  Army                                                                 112



  Retreat--Lee's Bold Initiative--Lee and his Lieutenants
  planning Battle--The Confederates' Loss at Mechanicsville--
  Gaines's Mill--A. P. Hill's Fight--Longstreet's Reserve
  Division put in--McClellan's Change of Base--Savage Station--
  Longstreet engages McClellan's Main Force at Frayser's Farm (or
  Glendale)--President Davis on the Field--Testimony of Federal
  Generals--Fierce Bayonet Charges--"Greek meets Greek"--Capture
  of General McCall--McClellan's Masterly Retreat                      120



  Last Stand in the Great Retreat--Strength of McClellan's
  Position--The Confederates make Poor Use of their Artillery--A
  Mistake and Defeat for Lee's Army--The Campaign as a Whole a
  Great Success, but it should have been far greater--McClellan's
  Retreat showed him well equipped in the Science of War--Review
  of the Campaign--Jackson's and Magruder's Misunderstanding--
  Moral Effect of the Gunboats on the James River--"There should
  be a Gunboat in Every Family"                                        141



  Centres of Activity gravitate towards Orange and Culpeper
  Counties--Pope's Unsoldierly Preliminary Orders--Jackson's and
  Pope's Encounter at Cedar Mountain--Confidence in and Esteem
  for General Lee--The Confederate Commander's Plans for cutting
  off Pope miscarry--Capture of Captain Fitzhugh with Important
  Orders--Longstreet puts General Toombs under Arrest--General
  Pope withdraws                                                       153



  General Lee modifies his Order of March--Continuous
  Skirmishing--Cavalry Commander Stuart gets into General Pope's
  Head-quarters and captures his Personal Equipment--His Uniform
  Coat and Hat shown along the Confederate Lines--Jackson's
  Superb Flank Movement--Confederates capture Trains, Supplies,
  Munitions, and Prisoners--Hooker and Ewell at Bristoe Station--
  Jackson first on the Old Field of Bull Run--Longstreet's
  Command joins passing Thoroughfare Gap--Pope practically throws
  Responsibility for Aggressive Action on McDowell--Preliminary
  Fighting--General Pope surprised by Jackson--Pope's Orders to
  Fitz-John Porter                                                     163



  Battle opened by the Federals on Jackson's Right, followed by
  Kearny--Longstreet's Reconnoissance--Stuart, the Cavalry
  Leader, sleeps on the Field of Battle--Pope thought at the
  Close of the 29th that the Confederates were retreating--Second
  Day--Fitz-John Porter struck in Flank--Longstreet takes a Hand
  in the Fight late in the Day--Lee under Fire--The Federal
  Retreat to Centreville--That Point turned--Pope again
  dislodged--"Stonewall" Jackson's Appearance and Peculiarities--
  Killing of "Fighting Phil" Kearny--Losses--Review of the
  Campaign                                                             180



  General Lee continues Aggressive Work--From Foraged Fields of
  Virginia into a Bounteous Land--Longstreet objected to the
  Movement on Harper's Ferry--Lee thinks the Occasion Timely for
  Proposal of Peace and Independence--Confederates singing
  through the Streets of Fredericktown--McClellan's Movements--
  Cautious Marches--Lee's Lost Order handed to the Federal Chief
  at Frederick                                                         199



  How the Federals found the Despatch--With every Advantage
  McClellan "made haste slowly"--Lee turns back to meet him at
  South Mountain--Longstreet preferred that the Stand should be
  made at Sharpsburg--The Battle at the Pass--Many killed--
  General Garland of the Confederate and General Reno of the
  Union Side--A Future President among the Wounded--Estimate of
  Forces engaged                                                       212



  Confederates retreat from South Mountain--Federals follow and
  harass them--Franklin and Cobb at Crampton's Pass--A Spirited
  Action--Fighting around Harper's Ferry--Its Capitulation--The
  Confederates take Eleven Thousand Prisoners--Jackson rejoins
  Lee--Description of the Field of Antietam--McClellan posts his
  Corps--Lee's Lines advantageously placed--Hooker's Advance on
  the Eve of Battle should have been resisted                          227



  Bloodiest Single Day of the War--Comparison of Casualties--
  Hooker opens the Fight against Jackson's Centre--Many Officers
  among the Fallen early in the Day--McLaws and Walker in time to
  meet Sumner's Advance under Sedgwick--Around Dunker Chapel--
  Richardson's Splendid Advance against the Confederate Centre
  the Signal of the Bursting of another Storm--Longstreet's and
  D. H. Hill's Troops stood before it--Fall of General G. B.
  Anderson--General Richardson mortally wounded--Aggressive
  Spirit of his Command broken--Wonderful Cannon-shot--General
   D. H. Hill's Third Horse killed under him                           239



  Closing Events of the Great Struggle--Burnside crosses the
  Bridge he made famous--Toombs made Gallant Defence, but was
  outnumbered and dislodged--The Confederate Brigades from
  Harper's Ferry under A. P. Hill in Time for the Final Crisis--
  Burnside's Advance arrested by them--The Battle against
  Burnside "appeared to spring from the Earth"--"Lee's old War
  Horse"--The Killing of a Kinsman at the Bridge seriously
  affects General D. R. Jones--The Sharp Fight at Shepherdstown--
  Confederates retreat--Casualties of the Battle--Confederate
  Losses in the Campaign--Neither McClellan's Plan nor Execution
  was strong                                                           256



  Confederate Expectations--General Lee's Salutatory to the
  People of Maryland--The "Lost Despatch"--McClellan's
  Movements--Turn in the Tide of War--A Miracle great as the
  throwing down of the Walls of Jericho--In Contempt of the Enemy
  the Confederate Army was dispersed--Harper's Ferry a
  "Man-Trap"--It diverted the Army from the Main Issue--Lee and
  McClellan compared and contrasted--Tribute to the Confederate
  Private Soldier                                                      279



  The Confederates appoint Seven Lieutenant-Generals--The Army of
  Northern Virginia organized in Corps--General McClellan
  relieved, and General Burnside appointed Commander of the Army
  of the Potomac--A Lift for the South--McClellan was growing--
  Burnside's "Three Grand Divisions"--The Campaign of the
  Rappahannock--Getting Ready for Fredericksburg--Longstreet
  occupies Fredericksburg--The Town called to surrender by
  General Sumner--Exodus of the Inhabitants under a Threat to
  shell the Town                                                       290



  Description of the Field--Marye's Heights--Position of the
  Troops of Longstreet's Command--General Jackson called down
  from Orange Court-House, and Preparations made for a Determined
  Stand--Signal Guns at Three o'clock in the Morning announce the
  Long-Expected Battle--Burnside's Bridge-Builders thrice driven
  back from their Work--The Crossing finally made by Boats--
  Federals under Hot Fire enter Fredericksburg--How they obtained
  their Foothold on the West Bank of the Rappahannock--Gallant
  Officers and Men--Ninety-seven killed or wounded in the Space
  of Fifty Yards--General Burnside's Plan of Battle--Strength of
  the Contending Forces                                                297



  The Battle-field veiled by a Heavy Fog--Terrific Fighting of
  the 13th of December--Forlorn Hope of the Federals--General
  Meade's Division of Franklin's Command makes the First
  Advance--General French leads against the Confederate Left--
  Hancock follows--General Cobb killed--The Sunken Road and Stone
  Wall below Marye's Hill--Desperate Advances and Determined
  Repulses--Humphreys's Heroic Assault--The Stone Wall "a Sheet
  of Flame"--General Jackson loses his Opportunity to advance--
  The Charge of Meade's Divisions compared with that of Pickett,
  Pettigrew, and Trimble's Columns at Gettysburg--Forty Per Cent.
  killed in charging Lines here, and Sixty Per Cent. at
  Gettysburg--Total Losses--Peace to be declared because Gold had
  gone to 200--Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia           306



  Burnside's Abortive Moves--The "Mud March"--General Hooker
  supersedes Burnside--The Confederates strengthen their Position
  for the Winter--Longstreet ordered to Petersburg--Secretary of
  War Seddon and the Author talk of General Grant and the
  Confederate Situation on the Mississippi and in the West--
  Longstreet makes a Radical Proposition for Confederate
  Concentration in Tennessee, thus to compel Grant to abandon
  Vicksburg--The Skilful Use of Interior Lines the Only Way of
  equalizing the Contest--Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee's
  Brilliant Achievement--Criticism--Death of "Stonewall"
  Jackson--The Resolve to march Northward--The Army reorganized
  in Three Corps--Ewell and A. P. Hill appointed
  Lieutenant-Generals                                                  322



  Plan of the Confederate March North--General Lee hoped to draw
  Troops from the South and develop Important Results North of
  the Potomac--He wanted Beauregard sent to support the
  Movement--The Authorities in Richmond failed to comprehend--The
  Value of the "Interior Lines" not appreciated--Spirited Cavalry
  Fight at Brandy Station between Stuart's and Pleasonton's
  Commands--Engagement of Ewell and Milroy at Winchester--The
  Question of Authority for the Cavalry Movements--
  Lieutenant-Colonel Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards, British
  Army, as a Guest and Observer--The Confederate Advance reaches
  Pennsylvania Soil--General Lee issues Orders for a March on
  Harrisburg--Municipal Authorities of York and Gettysburg
  surrender to General John B. Gordon                                  334



  Information of Federal Force and Positions brought by the Scout
  Harrison--General Lee declines to credit it--General Longstreet
  suggests a Change of Direction in Conformance with the
  Revelation--General Meade had succeeded Hooker in Command Five
  Days before Battle--Positions on the Eve of the First Day--
  Confederate Cavalry "not in sight"--"The Eyes of the Army"
  sadly needed--A Description of the Famous Battle-field--
  Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill engage the Federals--Death of
  General John F. Reynolds--The Fight on Seminary Ridge--General
  Hancock in Federal Command on the Field--Concerning the Absent
  Cavalry and Information given by the Scout--Conditions at the
  Close of the First Day's Fight                                       346



  The Confederate Commander reviews the Field and decides on Plan
  of Battle--Positions on the Morning of July 2--Night March of
  the Federal Sixth Corps--It was excelled by Law's Brigade of
  Confederates--The Battle was opened after Mid-day--General Hood
  appeals for Permission to turn the Federal Left--Failure to
  make the Flanking Movement by the Confederate Right was a
  Serious Mistake--Hood, in his usual Gallant Style, led his
  Troops forward among the Rocks--Desperate Charges against an
  Earnest Adversary--Hood wounded--General Law succeeds him in
  command of the Division--"Little Round Top" an Important
  Point--"The Citadel of the Field"--It was a Fight of Seventeen
  Thousand Confederates against twice their Number--Quiet along
  the Lines of other Confederate Commands--"A Man on the Left who
  didn't care to make the Battle win"--Evidence against the
  Alleged Order for "Battle at Sunrise"--The "Order" to Ewell was
  Discretionary--Lee had lost his Balance                              362



  The Stroke of Arms that shook the Continent--Longstreet opposed
  the Attack as planned and made--The Confederate Column of
  Assault--It was weak in Numbers but strong in Spirit--
  Tremendous Artillery Combat begins the Day's Fighting--Charge
  of Generals Pickett, Trimble, and Pettigrew--Armistead falls by
  the Side of the Federal Guns--The Federal Cavalry Charge of
  General Farnsworth--The Commander falls with Five Mortal
  Wounds--Could the Assaulting Column have been safely augmented
  from Longstreet's Right?--Testimony as to that Point--Where
  rested the Responsibility for Disaster?--Criticism of the
  Battle as a Whole--Cemetery Hill stronger than Marye's Hill at
  Fredericksburg--Controverted Points--Casualties of the Three
  Days' Fight--Organization of the Forces engaged                      385



  Confederates retreat from Gettysburg--The Federals pursue--
  Crossing the Potomac under Difficulties--Kilpatrick's Cavalry
  Dash on Pettigrew's Command--General Lee thought to rest his
  Army in the Valley of Virginia, but Meade followed too fast--
  Engagements that harassed the Retreat--General Lee wished to be
  relieved of Command, but President Davis would not consent to
  the Appointment of Joseph E. Johnston or General Beauregard          426



  The Author reverts to the Perils and Opportunities in the
  West--Proposes to the Secretary of War to reinforce against
  Rosecrans from the Army of Northern Virginia--Makes Plan known
  to General Lee--The Move finally effected--Difficulties of
  Transportation--A Roundabout Route--General Longstreet narrowly
  escapes capture when seeking Bragg's Head-quarters--General
  Bragg assigns Longstreet to Command of the Left--Instructions
  for the Battle of Chickamauga--The Armies in Position--Federals
  in Command of Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden, McCook, and
  George H. Thomas                                                     433



  Tactical Features--The Battle opened by Direct Attack on the
  Federals in the Early Morning of September 20--Repeated and
  Determined Front Assaults--Brigadiers Helm killed and Adams
  wounded--The Union Commands lay behind Defences--Hood's
  Brigades surged through the Forest against the Covered Infantry
  and Artillery--Hood wounded--Longstreet suggests a Plan for
  Progressive Action--Halting Tactics at High Tide of Success--
  The Confederate Left fought a Separate Battle--General Thomas
  retreats--First Confederate Victory in the West, and one of the
  Bloodiest Battles of the War--Forces engaged--Losses                 445



  Longstreet differs with General Bragg as to Movements of
  Pursuit--The Confederates on Lookout Mountain--Federals gain
  Comfortable Positions around it--Superior Officers of Bragg's
  Command call for his Removal--Bragg seeks Scapegoats--President
  Davis visits the Army--Tests the Temper of the Officers towards
  Bragg--He offers the Command to Longstreet--He declines--His
  Reasons--General Bragg ignores Signal-Service Reports and is
  surprised--General Joe Hooker's Advance--Night Attack on
  Lookout Mountain--Colonel Bratton's Clever Work--Review of the
  Western Movement and Combination--It should have been effected
  in May instead of September--Inference as to Results had the
  First Proposition been promptly acted upon                           461



  General Bragg's Infatuation--General Grant in Command of the
  Federal Forces--Longstreet ordered into East Tennessee--His
  Plans for the Campaign--Poorly supported by his Superior--
  Foraging for Daily Rations--General Burnside's Forces--Advance
  upon Knoxville--Affairs at Lenoir's and Campbell's Stations--
  Engagement near Knoxville an Artillery Combat--Reprehensible
  Conduct of Officers--Allegement that One was actuated by
  Jealousy--Federals retire behind their Works--Laying the
  Confederate Lines about Knoxville                                    480



  Closing on the Enemy's Lines--A Gallant Dash--The Federal
  Positions--Fort Loudon, later called Fort Sanders--Assault of
  the Fort carefully planned--General McLaws advises Delay--The
  Order reiterated and emphasized--Gallant Effort by the Brigades
  of Generals Wofford, Humphreys, and Bryan at the Appointed
  Time--A Recall ordered, because carrying the Works was reported
  impossible--General Longstreet is ordered by the President to
  General Bragg's Relief--Losses during the Assault and the
  Campaign                                                             497



  Impracticability of joining General Bragg--Wintering in East
  Tennessee--General Longstreet given Discretionary Authority
  over the Department by President Davis--Short Rations--Minor
  Movements of Hide-and-Seek in the Mountains--Longstreet's
  Position was of Strategic Importance--That Fact fully
  appreciated by President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton, and
  Generals Halleck and Grant--"Drive Longstreet out of East
  Tennessee and keep him out"--Generals Robertson and McLaws--The
  Charges against them and Action taken--Honorable Mention for
  Courage and Endurance--The Army finally fares sumptuously on
  the Fat Lands of the French Broad                                    509



  Longstreet again considers Relief from Service--General Grant
  at Knoxville--Shoeless Soldiers leave Bloody Trails on Frozen
  Roads--A Confederate Advance--Affair at Dandridge--Federals
  retreat--Succession of Small Engagements--General Grant urges
  General Foster's Army to the Offensive--General Foster
  relieved--General Schofield in Command of Federals--General
  Grant's Orders--General Halleck's Estimate of East Tennessee as
  a Strategic Field--Affair of Cavalry--Advance towards
  Knoxville--Longstreet's Command called back to Defensive for
  Want of Cavalry                                                      524



  Longstreet's Army at Bull's Gap--U. S. Grant made
  Lieutenant-General--Richmond Authorities awake to the Gravity
  of the Situation--Longstreet's Proposition for Campaign--
  Approved by General Lee--Richmond Authorities fail to adopt
  it--General Bragg's Plan--A Memorable and Unpleasant Council at
  the Capital--Orders from President Davis--The Case of General
  Law--Longstreet ordered to the Army of Northern Virginia--
  Resolutions of Thanks from Confederate Congress                      542



  Campaign of 1864--General Grant in the Field--Strength of the
  Armies--Their Positions--Description of the Wilderness--The
  Battle opened--A Brisk Day's Fighting--Longstreet's Command
  faces Hancock's on the Morning of the Second Day--An
  Effective Flank Movement--General Wadsworth mortally wounded--
  General Jenkins falls under Fire of Friends, and Longstreet is
  seriously wounded--Carried from the Field on a Litter--Tribute
  to General Jenkins--Criticism and Controversy                        551



  Longstreet absent on Leave, nursing his Wounds--Hears of the
  Death of Cavalry Leader J. E. B. Stuart--Returns to Virginia--
  Assigned to Command on the North Side of James River--Affair on
  the Williamsburg Road--Lee's Apprehension of Grant's March into
  Richmond--Closing Scenes of the Campaign of 1864 about the
  Confederate Capital--General Benjamin F. Butler's Move against
  Fort Fisher--Remote Effects on the Situation in Virginia             572



  Second Federal Move against Fort Fisher and Wilmington Harbor--
  Confederate Disaffection--Act of Congress appointing a Supreme
  Commander of the Armies--Montgomery Blair's Peace Conference--
  Longstreet has a Meeting with General Ord, Commander of the
  Army of the James--Military Convention proposed--Correspondence
  between General Grant and General Lee--Longstreet's Suggestions
  for Measures in the Critical Juncture near the Close of the War      582



  Various Affairs of the Closing Campaign--The Massing of Grant's
  Forces--Sortie against Fort Steadman--Captured but quickly
  retaken--General Grant's Move around the Confederate Right--
  General Lee anticipates with Aggressive Work--Sheridan makes
  Battle with his Whole Force at Five Forks--Desperate Situation
  of the Confederates--Disparity of Numbers--Splendid Stand and
  Battle of Generals Pickett and Ransom--Colonel Pegram mortally
  wounded--W. H. F. Lee, the "Noble Son of a Noble Sire"--Corse's
  Division--Pickett's Generalship--Casualties                          590



  The Fierce Concerted Assault by the Federals--Death of A. P.
  Hill--General Lee announces to Richmond Authorities that he
  must retreat--Reception of the News by President Davis at
  Church Service--Federals take Forts Gregg and Whitworth--The
  Retreat harassed by Continuous Fighting--Longstreet saves High
  Bridge, a Vital Point--Ewell and Others compelled to
  surrender--General Mahone's Account of Interesting Scenes--
  Magnitude of the Disaster--"Is the Army dissolving?"--General
  Reed mortally wounded--Panic occurs, but Order is restored--
  General Gregg and Part of his Cavalry Command captured by
  Rosser and Mumford                                                   603



  Some of General Lee's Officers say to him that "Further
  Resistance is Hopeless"--Longstreet does not approve--General
  Grant calls for Surrender--"Not yet"--The Confederate Chieftain
  asks Terms--His Response to his Officers as represented by
  General Pendleton--Correspondence of Generals Lee and Grant--
  Morning of April 9--General Lee rides to meet the Federal
  Commander, while Longstreet forms the Last Line of Battle--
  Longstreet endeavors to recall his Chief, hearing of a Break
  where the Confederate Troops could pass--Custer demands
  Surrender of Longstreet--Reminded of Irregularity, and that he
  was "in the Enemy's Lines"--Meeting with General Grant--
  Capitulation--Last Scenes                                            618



  Old Friends and their Kindness--General Grant--His
  Characteristic Letter of Introduction to President Johnson--In
  Business in New Orleans--Political Unfriendliness--Cause of
  Criticism of Military Career--Appointed Surveyor of Customs--
  The Old Nurse                                                        632


  Letters of General Robert E. Lee and General Longstreet              639



  General James Longstreet (1895)                          _Frontispiece._

  Colonel John B. Richardson                                            37

  Colonel T. J. Goree                                                   47

  General J. E. B. Stuart                                               60

  General R. E. Lee                                                    112

  General Thomas J. Jackson                                            166

  Battle at Thoroughfare Gap                                           174

  Defeat of the Federal Troops by Longstreet's Corps (Second
  Manassas)                                                            188

  General Lafayette McLaws                                             231

  Colonel John W. Fairfax                                              250

  The Battle of Antietam (Burnside's Bridge)                           263

  General James Longstreet (1862)                                      290

  The Battle of Fredericksburg (from the Battery on Lee's Hill)        308

  Colonel Osmun Latrobe                                                316

  Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Lyon Fremantle                             343

  The Confederate Scout Harrison                                       346

  Gettysburg (Second Day's Battle)                                     374

  General E. P. Alexander                                              388

  General George E. Pickett                                            392

  William Blake                                                        408

  Retreat from Gettysburg (Accident during the Night-Crossing of the
  Potomac on a Pontoon Bridge)                                         430

  Colonel R. J. Moses                                                  451

  Battle of Chickamauga (Confederates flanking the Union Forces)       454

  The Assault on Fort Sanders, Knoxville                               506

  General G. M. Sorrel                                                 518

  The Wounding of General Longstreet (Battle of the Wilderness)        564

  Colonel Erasmus Taylor                                               572

  General Charles W. Field                                             577

  The Last Line of Battle (Appomattox)                                 624

  Fac-simile of Letter from General R. E. Lee                          638



  First Battle of Bull Run                                          42

  Battle of Seven Pines                                             96

  Battle of Mechanicsville                                         124

  Battle of Malvern Hill                                           142

  Second Battle of Bull Run (Opening)                              186

  Second Battle of Bull Run (Nightfall)                            196

  Battle of Sharpsburg                                             246

  Battle of Fredericksburg                                         298

  Strategic Map of the Theatre of War, May, 1863                   328

  Battle of Gettysburg                                             362

  Position of Confederate First Corps, Gettysburg, Third Day       399

  Battle of Chickamauga                                            446

  Confederates around Chattanooga                                  462

  Siege of Knoxville                                               498

  Battle of the Wilderness                                         556

  Battle of Five Forks                                             601




    Birth--Ancestry--School-Boy Days--Appointment as Cadet at the United
    States Military Academy--Graduates of Historic Classes--Assignment as
    Brevet Lieutenant--Gay Life of Garrison at Jefferson
    Barracks--Lieutenant Grant's Courtship--Annexation of Texas--Army of
    Observation--Army of Occupation--Camp Life in Texas--March to the Rio
    Grande--Mexican War.

I was born in Edgefield District, South Carolina, on the 8th of January,
1821. On the paternal side the family was from New Jersey; on my mother's
side, from Maryland. My earliest recollections were of the Georgia side of
Savannah River, and my school-days were passed there, but the appointment
to West Point Academy was from North Alabama. My father, James Longstreet,
the oldest child of William Longstreet and Hannah Fitzrandolph, was born
in New Jersey. Other children of the marriage, Rebecca, Gilbert, Augustus
B., and William, were born in Augusta, Georgia, the adopted home. Richard
Longstreet, who came to America in 1657 and settled in Monmouth County,
New Jersey, was the progenitor of the name on this continent. It is
difficult to determine whether the name sprang from France, Germany, or
Holland. On the maternal side, Grandfather Marshall Dent was first cousin
of John Marshall, of the Supreme Court. That branch claimed to trace their
line back to the Conqueror. Marshall Dent married a Magruder, when they
migrated to Augusta, Georgia. Father married the eldest daughter, Mary

Grandfather William Longstreet first applied steam as a motive power, in
1787, to a small boat on the Savannah River at Augusta, and spent all of
his private means upon that idea, asked aid of his friends in Augusta and
elsewhere, had no encouragement, but, on the contrary, ridicule of his
proposition to move a boat without a pulling or other external power, and
especially did they ridicule the thought of expensive steam-boilers to be
made of iron. To obviate costly outlay for this item, he built boilers of
heavy oak timbers and strong iron bands, but the Augusta marines were
incredulous, as the following from the city papers of the times will

  "Can you row the boat ashore,
      Billy boy, Billy boy;
   Can you row the boat ashore,
      Gentle Billy?
   Can you row the boat ashore,
   Without paddle or an oar,
      Billy boy?"

Full of confidence, the inventor thought to appeal to the governor, and
his letter is still preserved in the State archives:

    "AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, September 26, 1790.

    "SIR,--I make no doubt but you have often heard of my steamboat, and
    as often heard it laughed at, but in this I have only shared the fate
    of other projectors, for it has uniformly been the custom of every
    country to ridicule the greatest inventions until they had proved
    their utility. In not reducing my scheme to active use it has been
    unfortunate for me, I confess, and perhaps the people in general; but,
    until very lately, I did not think that artists or material could be
    had in the place sufficient. However, necessity, that grand mother of
    invention, has furnished me with an idea of perfecting my plan almost
    entirely of wooden material, and by such workmen as may be had here;
    and, from a thorough confidence of its success, I have presumed to ask
    your assistance and patronage. Should it succeed agreeably to my
    expectations, I hope I shall discover that sense of duty which such
    favors always merit; and should it not succeed, your reward must lay
    with other unlucky adventures.

    "For me to mention all of the advantages arising from such a machine
    would be tedious, and, indeed, quite unnecessary. Therefore I have
    taken the liberty to state, in this plain and humble manner, my wish
    and opinion, which I hope you will excuse, and I shall remain, either
    with or without your approbation,

    "Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servant,

          "WM. LONGSTREET.


He failed to secure the necessary aid, and the discovery passed into the
possession of certain New Yorkers, who found the means for practicable
application, and now steam is the goddess that enlightens the world.

My father was a planter. From my early boyhood he conceived that he would
send me to West Point for army service, but in my twelfth year he passed
away during the cholera epidemic at Augusta. Mother moved to North Alabama
with her children, whence in my sixteenth year I made application through
a kinsman, Congressman Reuben Chapman, for appointment as cadet, received
the coveted favor, and entered with the class that was admitted in 1838.

As cadet I had more interest in the school of the soldier, horsemanship,
sword exercise, and the outside game of foot-ball than in the academic
courses. The studies were successfully passed, however, until the third
year, when I failed in mechanics. When I came to the problem of the
pulleys, it seemed to my mind that a soldier could not find use for such
appliances, and the pulleys were passed by. At the January examination I
was called to the blackboard and given the problem of the pulleys. The
drawing from memory of recitation of classmates was good enough, but the
demonstration failed to satisfy the sages of the Academic Board. It was
the custom, however, to give those who failed in the general examination
a second hearing, after all of the classes were examined. This gave me two
days to "cram" mechanics, and particularly on pulleys. But the professors
were too wily to introduce them a second time, and took me through a
searching examination of the six months' course. The bridge was safely
passed, however, and mechanics left behind. At the June examination, the
end of the academic year, I was called to demonstrate the pulleys. The
professor thought that I had forgotten my old friend the enemy, but I
smiled, for he had become dear to me,--in waking hours and in dreams,--and
the cadet passed easily enough for a maximum mark.

The cadets had their small joys and sometimes little troubles. On one
occasion a cadet officer reported me for disobedience of orders. As the
report was not true, I denied it and sent up witnesses of the occasion.
Dick Garnett, who fell in the assault of the 3d, at Gettysburg, was one
witness, and Cadet Baker, so handsome and lovable that he was called
Betsy, was the other. Upon overlooking the records I found the report
still there, and went to ask the superintendent if other evidence was
necessary to show that the report was not true. He was satisfied of that,
but said that the officer complained that I smiled contemptuously. As that
could only be rated as a single demerit, I asked the benefit of the smile;
but the report stands to this day, Disobedience of orders and _three_
demerits. The cadet had his revenge, however, for the superintendent was
afterwards known as _The Punster_.

There were sixty-two graduating members of the class of 1842, my number
being sixty. I was assigned to the Fourth United States Infantry as brevet
lieutenant, and found my company with seven others of the regiment at
Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, in the autumn of 1842.

Of the class graduating the year that we entered were G. T. Beauregard and
Irvin McDowell, who, twenty-three years later, commanded the hostile
armies on the plains of Manassas, in Virginia. Braxton Bragg and W. J.
Hardee were of the same class.

The head man of the next class (1839) was I. I. Stevens, who resigned from
the army, and, after being the first governor of Washington Territory,
returned to military service, and fell on the sanguinary field of
Chantilly on the 1st of September, 1862. Next on the class roll was Henry
Wager Halleck, who was commander-in-chief of the United States armies from
July, 1862, to March, 1864. W. T. Sherman and George H. Thomas, of the
Union army, and R. S. Ewell, of the Confederate army, were of the same
class (1840). The class of 1841 had the largest list of officers killed in
action. Irons, Ayers, Ernst, Gantt, Morris, and Burbank were killed in the
Mexican War. N. Lyon, R. S. Garnett, J. F. Reynolds, R. B. Garnett, A. W.
Whipple, J. M. Jones, I. B. Richardson, and J. P. Garesché fell on the
fields of the late war.

Of the class of 1842 few were killed in action, but several rose to
distinguished positions,--Newton, Eustis, Rosecrans, Lovell, Van Dorn,
Pope, Sykes, G. W. Smith, M. L. Smith, R. H. Anderson, L. McLaws, D. H.
Hill, A. P. Stewart, B. S. Alexander, N. J. T. Dana, and others.

But the class next after us (1843) was destined to furnish the man who was
to eclipse all,--to rise to the rank of general, an office made by
Congress to honor his services; who became President of the United States,
and for a second term; who received the salutations of all the powers of
the world in his travels as a private citizen around the earth; of noble,
generous heart, a lovable character, a valued friend,--Ulysses S. Grant.

I was fortunate in the assignment to Jefferson Barracks, for in those days
the young officers were usually sent off among the Indians or as near the
borders as they could find habitable places. In the autumn of 1842 I
reported to the company commander, Captain Bradford R. Alden, a most
exemplary man, who proved a lasting, valued friend. Eight companies of the
Third Infantry were added to the garrison during the spring of 1843, which
made garrison life and society gay for the young people and interesting
for the older classes. All of the troops were recently from service in the
swamps and Everglades of Florida, well prepared to enjoy the change from
the war-dance of the braves to the hospitable city of St. Louis; and the
graceful step of its charming belles became a joy forever.

Of the class of 1843, Ulysses S. Grant joined the Fourth Regiment as
brevet lieutenant, and I had the pleasure to ride with him on our first
visit to Mr. Frederick Dent's home, a few miles from the garrison, where
we first met Miss Julia Dent, the charming woman who, five years later,
became Mrs. Grant. Miss Dent was a frequent visitor at the garrison balls
and hops, where Lieutenant Hoskins, who was something of a tease, would
inquire of her if she could tell where he might find "the small lieutenant
with the large epaulettes."

In May, 1844, all of our pleasures were broken by orders sending both
regiments to Louisiana, near Fort Jessup, where with other troops we were
organized as "The Army of Observation," under General Zachary Taylor.

In March, 1845, I was assigned as lieutenant in the Eighth Regiment, and
joined my company at St. Augustine, Florida. The soldier's life of those
days was not encouraging to those of active aspirations; but influences
were then at work that were beginning to brighten the horizon a little.
The new republic of Texas was seeking annexation with the United States,
which would endanger the peace between them and the republic of Mexico.
Annexation of Texas became the supreme question of the canvass of 1844.
James K. Polk was the nominee of the Democratic and annexation party, and
Henry Clay was on the other side as the Whig nominee. Polk was elected,
and his party prepared to signalize its triumph by annexation as soon as
it came into power; but in the last days of President Tyler's
administration, through skilful management of Secretary of State John C.
Calhoun, joint resolutions of annexation were passed by both houses of
Congress, subject to concurrence of the Congress of the new republic.
Strange as it may seem, the resolutions that added to the territory of the
United States more than the New England and Middle States combined, and
which eventually led to extension to the Pacific coast and hundreds of
miles north, only passed the lower house by twenty-two majority, and the
Senate by a majority of two.

When the resolution was passed, the minister from Mexico to our
government, General Almonte, demanded his passports, and diplomatic
relations between the governments ceased. On July 4, 1845, the Texas
Congress accepted and ratified the resolutions of annexation by unanimous
vote, and Texas was a State of the Union.

General Taylor's little army of observation was ordered to Corpus Christi,
Texas, and became "The Army of Occupation." All other available forces
were ordered to join him, including General Worth and his forces in
Florida. At the time there were in the line of the army eight regiments of
infantry, four of artillery, and two of dragoons, stationed along the
northern frontier from Fort Kent in the northeast of Maine to the west end
of Lake Superior, and along the western frontier from Fort Snelling to
Fort Leavenworth, and southward to Fort Jessup in Louisiana.

By the middle of October, 1846, three thousand eight hundred and sixty men
of all arms had concentrated at Corpus Christi. Seven companies of the
Second Dragoons had marched from Fort Jessup to San Patricio on the Nueces
River, about twenty-eight miles up from Corpus Christi; the other three
companies were halted at San Antonio, Texas. Near our camps were extensive
plains well adapted to military manoeuvres, which were put to prompt use
for drill and professional instruction. There were many advantages too in
the way of amusement, game on the wild prairies and fish in the broad gulf
were plentiful, and there was the salt water for bathing. On one occasion
during the winter a violent north wind forced the waters over the beach,
in some places far enough to disturb our camps, and when they receded,
quantities of fish were found in the little puddles left behind, and
turtles more than enough to supply the army.

The officers built a theatre, depending upon their own efforts to
reimburse them. As there was no one outside the army except two rancheros
within a hundred miles, our dramatic company was organized from among the
officers, who took both male and female characters. In farce and comedy we
did well enough, and soon collected funds to pay for the building and
incidental expenses. The house was filled every night. General Worth
always encouraging us, General Taylor sometimes, and General Twiggs
occasionally, we found ourselves in funds sufficient to send over to New
Orleans for costumes, and concluded to try tragedy. The "Moor of Venice"
was chosen, Lieutenant Theoderic Porter[1] to be the Moor, and Lieutenant
U. S. Grant to be the daughter of Brabantio. But after rehearsal Porter
protested that male heroines could not support the character nor give
sentiment to the hero, so we sent over to New Orleans and secured Mrs.
Hart, who was popular with the garrisons in Florida. Then all went well,
and life through the winter was gay.

Formal diplomatic relations between the republics were suspended, but
quasi negotiations were continued, seeking a course by which war might be
averted. The authorities of Mexico were not averse to the settlement
according to the claims of Texas,--the Rio Grande frontier,--but the
political affairs of the country were such that they could not agree.
Excitement in the United States increased as the suspense continued. But
the authorities, having confidence in their negotiations or wishing to
precipitate matters, ordered General Taylor to march across to the Rio
Grande at Matamoras in the spring of 1846. The execution of the order
precipitated war.

The move from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande made necessary a change of
base from St. Joseph's Island to Point Isabel and Brazos Santiago, near
the mouth of the Rio Grande. Supplies were sent by sea, under charge of
Major Munroe, with a siege train and field battery, and the army took up
its march on the 9th of March, 1846, the advance under General Twiggs,
consisting of the dragoons and Ringgold's field battery. The army was well
instructed, under good discipline, and fully prepared for field work, the
weather was fine, and the firm turf of the undulating prairies made the
march easy. Wild horses and cattle, and deer and antelope, were often seen
in the distance as they scampered away to hide themselves. On the 19th the
head of the column approached Arroyo Colorado, one hundred and thirty
miles from Corpus Christi. The arroyo was about three feet deep, of salt
water. Mexican lancers were on the southern side, and gave notice that
they had orders to resist our further advance. On the 21st the army was up
and deployed along the high banks of the arroyo, the field batteries in
position. General Worth was ordered to make the crossing, and rode at the
head of the column. We looked with confidence for a fight and the flow of
blood down the salt water before we could cross, but the Mexicans had no
artillery, and could not expose their cavalry to the fire of our
batteries; they made their formal protest, however, that the crossing
would be regarded as a declaration of war.

On the 24th of March the column reached the road leading from Point Isabel
to Matamoras. General Taylor ordered Worth to march the greater part of
the army towards Matamoras and halt at the first good camping-ground, and
rode towards Point Isabel to meet the detachment ordered there under Major
Munroe. He found them already landed, and the Mexicans fired their little
hamlets and fled. After ordering construction of protection for his
supplies and defensive works for the troops, General Taylor returned to
the army, and rode with General Worth towards the Rio Grande. As the army
approached the river the Mexicans on the Matamoras side made some display
of forces, manned their works on that side, and prepared to resist us,
under the impression that we would cross at once. General Worth was sent
over, and was met by General La Vega, on the part of General Mejia,
commanding on that side. He was told that Mexico had not declared war,
that the American consul was in the exercise of his functions; but Worth's
request to see the consul was refused, which was denounced as a
belligerent act, and he cautioned General La Vega against passing Mexicans
to the north side of the river.

Camps were pitched in range of the Mexican works about Matamoras, grounds
staked for constructing defensive works, and large details put out to work
on them. The Mexican forces at this time were three thousand, and they
were soon joined by two thousand more.

Political affairs with them were confused. President Herrera was thought
to favor the claims of Texas to the Rio Grande border. General Paredes
made pronunciamento, overthrew the president's government, and had
authority as war president. He sent General Ampudia to the frontier to
take charge, but the appointment was not satisfactory on the border, and
General Arista was assigned. There was discord over there between the
authorities and the generals, while General Taylor was too far from his
government to be bothered. His army was all that he could wish, except in

Marauding parties came over occasionally and made trouble about the
ranches on the American side. One party killed Colonel Cross, our chief
quartermaster, on the 10th of April. Scouting parties were sent out to
look for the intruders. Lieutenant Theoderic Porter, in command of one
party, and one of his men were caught in ambush and killed. Captain
Walker, of the Texan Rangers, while out on a scout lost his camp guard of
five men, surprised and killed, and later Captains Thornton and Hardee, of
the dragoons, were met at Rancho Carricitos by a large cavalry force and
some infantry under General Torrijon, who took captive or killed the
entire party. Captains Thornton and Hardee and Lieutenant Kane were made
prisoners. The other commissioned officer of the command, George T. Mason,
of my class, refused to surrender; being a superior swordsman, he tried to
cut his way out, and was killed. This affair was taken as open war, and
General Taylor called on the governors of Texas and Louisiana--under his
authority from Washington--for volunteers of infantry and cavalry.

The capture of Thornton and Hardee created great excitement with the
people at home. Fanning's massacre and the Alamo at San Antonio were
remembered, and it was reported of General Ampudia, who on a recent
occasion had captured a general in Yucatan, that he boiled his head in
oil. So it was thought he would give no quarter; but in a day or two we
heard from the officers that they received great kindness from their
captors, and that General Ampudia had ordered that his government should
allow them their full pay and every liberty consistent with their
safe-keeping. They declined, however, to accept pay, and were held as the
guests of Generals Arista and Ampudia.

On the 1st of May our tents were struck, wagons parked, assembly sounded,
and the troops were under arms at three A.M., marched at four o'clock, and
bivouacked within ten miles of Point Isabel. No one was advised of the
cause of movements, but all knew that our general understood his business.
He had been informed that General Arista, with his movable forces, had
marched to Rancho de Longoreno, some leagues below us on the river,
intending to cross and cut us off from the base at Point Isabel. Major
Jacob Brown was left in charge of the works opposite Matamoras with the
Seventh Regiment of Infantry, Captain Sands's company of artillery, and
Bragg's field battery.

By some accident provision was not made complete for Arista to make prompt
crossing of the river, and that gave General Taylor time to reach his
base, reinforce it, and draw sufficient supplies. Advised of our move by
General Mejia, at Matamoras, General Arista was thrown into doubt as to
whether our move was intended for Matamoras, and sent back part of his
forces for its defence. Finding, however, that Taylor had gone to Point
Isabel, Arista crossed the river and put his line athwart our return march
at Palo Alto. To hasten Taylor's return, he ordered General Mejia, at
Matamoras, to open his batteries on our troops at Fort Brown, and make
serious demonstrations against them.

General Taylor started on his return on the 7th of May. We had heard the
artillery-fire upon comrades left at the forts, and were anxiously looking
for the order. It was received with cheers, and a good march was made, but
the night was awful. The mosquitoes seemed as thick as the blades of grass
on the prairie, and swarmed and buzzed in clouds, and packs of
half-famished wolves prowled and howled about us. There was no need for
the sound of reveille. The wolves and mosquitoes, and perhaps some solemn
thoughts, kept us on the _qui vive_. Arista's army was known to be in line
of battle only a few miles off. About one o'clock we halted to fill the
canteens, and marched to meet the enemy. The columns were
deployed,--Fifth Infantry on the right, Ringgold's battery, Third
Infantry, a two-gun battery of eighteen-pounders, the Fourth Infantry,
battalion of artillery acting as infantry, Duncan's field battery and
Eighth Infantry, Captains Charles May and Croghan Ker, with squadrons of
dragoons, looking to the trains; the Third and Fourth Infantry, the Third
Brigade, under Colonel John Garland. That brigade, with the Fifth
Regiment, the heavy guns, and Ringgold's, were of the right wing, General
Twiggs commanding. Other forces of the left were under Colonel William G.
Belknap, Eighth Infantry, and Duncan's Battery.

As the lines deployed, Lieutenant J. E. Blake, of the Topographical
Engineers, dashed forward alone, made a close inspection of the enemy's
line with such lightning speed that his work was accomplished before the
enemy could comprehend his purpose, rode back and reported to the
commanding general. He was one of the heroes of the day, but his laurels
were enjoyed only a few hours. As he took his pistol off at night he threw
it upon the ground, and an accidental explosion of one of the charges gave
him a mortal wound.

The line advanced until the puff of smoke from one of the enemy's guns
rose, and the ball bounded over the prairie, passed over our heads, and
wounded a teamster far in our rear. Our infantry was ordered down and our
artillery into practice. It was an artillery combat more than a battle,
and held until night. The Mexican cavalry made a charge against the Fifth
Regiment, and finding our front of square too strong repeated on another
front, but were repulsed. Presently the grass took fire, and the winds so
far favored us as to sweep the smoke in the enemy's faces, and when it
passed we found the Mexican line had been drawn back a little. May's
squadron was sent there, and General Taylor advanced the right of his
line, but night closed in before decisive work could be done. The armies
were near enough during the night to hear the moans of the wounded. Major
Ringgold was mortally wounded, also Captain John Page, of the Fourth
Infantry, but less than fifty of our troops were lost.

Early the next morning a few of the Mexican troops could be seen, but when
the sun rose to light the field it was found vacant. A careful
reconnoissance revealed that the enemy was in retreat, and the dragoons
reported them in march towards our comrades at Fort Brown.

General Taylor remained on the field a few hours to have the killed and
wounded of both sides cared for, but sent the dragoons, light infantry,
and Ringgold's battery in pursuit, the latter under Lieutenant Randolph
Ridgely. The light infantry was of two battalions, under Captain George A.
McCall and Captain C. F. Smith. The route of march was through a dense
chaparral on both sides of the road, the infantry finding their way as
best they could through the chaparral, the dragoons and Texas Rangers
moving on the road, and far off from our flanks, wherever they could find
ways of passage. The company to which I was attached was of Smith's
battalion, on the right of the road. After a considerable march the
battalion came to the body of a young Mexican woman. She had ceased to
breathe, but blood heat was still in her body, and her expression
life-like. A profusion of black hair covered her shoulders and person, the
only covering to her waist. This sad spectacle, so unlike our thoughts of
battle, unnerved us a little, but the crush through the thorny bushes soon
brought us back to thoughts of heavy work, and then came reports of
several guns and of grapeshot flying over our heads and tearing through
the wood. A reconnoissance found General Arista's army on the south bank
of a stream, Resaca de la Palma, which at this season had dried into
lagoons with intervening passes. The road crossed at a wide gap between
two extensive lagoons. The most of the enemy's artillery was near the
road, the infantry behind the lagoons, with improvised breast defences of
pack-saddles and other articles that could be found to stop musket-balls.
The lagoons were about a hundred feet wide and from two to three feet

The position was so strong that General Arista thought it would not be
attacked. He left General La Vega in command at the road, and made his
head-quarters some distance in rear, holding his cavalry in hand to look
for any flank move, unpacked his mule-train, and turned the animals out to
graze. General Taylor received reports of our adventures and
reconnoissance when he rode up, deployed his army for battle, and ordered
it forward. In the dense chaparral it was not possible to hold the
regiments to their lines, and in places the companies were obliged to
break files to get along. All of the enemy's artillery opened, and soon
his musketry. The lines closed in to short work, even to bayonet work at
places. Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh had a bayonet thrust through his mouth
and neck.[2] Lieutenant R. M. Cochran, Fourth Regiment, and T. L.
Chadbourne, of the Eighth, were killed; C. R. Gates and C. D. Jordan, of
the Eighth, were severely wounded. The latter, a classmate, was
overpowered and about to be slaughtered when rescued by Lieutenant George
Lincoln, of the Eighth, who slew with his sword one of the assailants.

Finding the enemy's strong fight, in defence, by his artillery, General
Taylor ordered Captain May to charge and capture the principal battery.
The squadron was of his own and S. P. Graham's troops. The road was only
wide enough to form the dragoons in column of fours. When in the act of
springing to their work, Ridgely called, "Hold on, Charlie, till I draw
their fire," and loosed his six guns upon the battery at the road.

The return was prompt, but General Taylor, not noting the cause of delay,
repeated the order. Ridgely's work, however, was done, and May's spurs
pressing his horses had them on the leap before the order reached his
ears. In a minute he was at the guns sabring the gunners, and wheeling
right and left got possession of the batteries. General La Vega was found
at one of his batteries trying to defend it with his sword against one of
May's dragoons, but was forced to get in between the wheels of his guns to
avoid the horse's heels as they pressed him, when his rank was recognized
and he was called to surrender.

As May made his dash the infantry on our right was wading the lagoon. A
pause was made to dip our cups for water, which gave a moment for other
thoughts; mine went back to her whom I had left behind. I drew her
daguerreotype from my breast-pocket, had a glint of her charming smile,
and with quickened spirit mounted the bank in time to send some of the
mixed infantry troops to relieve May of his charge of the captive knight.

As a dragoon and soldier May was splendid. He stood six feet four without
boots, wore his beard full and flowing, his dark-brown locks falling well
over his shoulders. His appearance as he sat on his black horse Tom, his
heavy sabre over General La Vega, was grand and picturesque. He was
amiable of disposition, lovable and genial in character.

Not so grand of stature, or beard, or flowing locks, Randolph Ridgely was
as accomplished a soldier and as charming a companion,--a fitting
counterpart in spirit and dash.

I have gone thus far into the Mexican War for the opportunity to mention
two valued friends, whose memory returning refreshes itself. Many gallant,
courageous deeds have since been witnessed, but none more interesting than
Ridgely's call for the privilege to draw upon himself the fire that was
waiting for May.



    The War-Cloud--The Journey Northward--Appointed
    Brigadier-General--Report to General Beauregard--Assigned to Command
    at the Scene of the First Conflict--Personnel of the Confronting
    Forces--Description of the Field of Manassas, or Bull Run--Beauregard
    and McDowell of the same West Point Class--Battle of Blackburn's
    Ford--Early's Mistake--Under Fire of Friend and Foe.

I was stationed at Albuquerque, New Mexico, as paymaster in the United
States army when the war-cloud appeared in the East. Officers of the
Northern and Southern States were anxious to see the portending storm pass
by or disperse, and on many occasions we, too, were assured, by those who
claimed to look into the future, that the statesman would yet show himself
equal to the occasion, and restore confidence among the people. Our mails
were due semi-monthly, but during winter seasons we were glad to have them
once a month, and occasionally had to be content with once in six weeks.
When mail-day came the officers usually assembled on the flat roof of the
quartermaster's office to look for the dust that in that arid climate
announced the coming mail-wagon when five or ten miles away; but affairs
continued to grow gloomy, and eventually came information of the attack
upon and capture of Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces, which put down
speculation and drew the long-dreaded line.

A number of officers of the post called to persuade me to remain in the
Union service. Captain Gibbs, of the Mounted Rifles, was the principal
talker, and after a long but pleasant discussion, I asked him what course
he would pursue if his State should pass ordinances of secession and call
him to its defence. He confessed that he would obey the call.

It was a sad day when we took leave of lifetime comrades and gave up a
service of twenty years. Neither Union officers nor their families made
efforts to conceal feelings of deepest regret. When we drove out from the
post, a number of officers rode with us, which only made the last farewell
more trying.

Passing Fort Craig, on the opposite side of the Rio Grande, we pitched our
camp for the night. A sergeant of the Mounted Rifle Regiment came over to
see me, and stated that he was from Virginia, and thought that he could go
with us to his native State, and at the same time asked that several other
soldiers who wished to return to their States might go as my escort. I
explained that private soldiers could not go without authority from the
War Department; that it was different with commissioned officers, in that
the latter could resign their commissions, and when the resignations were
accepted they were independent of military authority, and could, as other
citizens, take such action as they might choose, but that he and his
comrades had enlisted for a specified term of years, and by their oaths
were bound to the term of enlistment; that I could not entertain the

We stayed overnight at Fort Fillmore, in pleasant meeting with old
comrades, saddened by the reflection that it was the last, and a prelude
to occurrences that must compel the ignoring of former friendships with
the acceptance of opposing service.

Speaking of the impending struggle, I was asked as to the length of the
war, and said, "At least three years, and if it holds for five you may
begin to look for a dictator," at which Lieutenant Ryan, of the Seventh
Infantry, said, "If we are to have a dictator, I hope that you may be the

My mind was relieved by information that my resignation was accepted, to
take effect on the 1st of June. In our travel next day we crossed the line
into the State of Texas. From the gloomy forebodings of old friends, it
seemed at El Paso that we had entered into a different world. All was
enthusiasm and excitement, and songs of "Dixie and the South" were borne
upon the balmy air. But the Texas girl did not ascend to a state of
incandescent charm until the sound of the first notes of "The Bonny Blue
Flag" reached her ear. Then her feet rose in gleeful springs, her limbs
danced, her hands patted, her eyes glowed, her lips moved, though she did
not care to speak, or listen to any one. She seemed lifted in the air,
thrilled and afloat, holding to the "Single Star" in joyful hope of
Southern rights.

Friends at El Paso persuaded me to leave my family with them to go by a
train that was to start in a few days for San Antonio, and to take the
faster route by stage for myself.

Our travelling companions were two young men, returning to their Northern
homes. The ride of our party of four (including the driver) through the
Indian country was attended with some risk, and required vigilance, to be
assured against surprise. The constant watchfulness and possible danger
over a five-hundred-miles travel drew us near together, and in closer
communion as to our identity and future movements, and suggested to the
young men that it would be best to put themselves under my care, trusting
that I would see them safely through the Confederate lines. They were of
the laboring class, and had gone South to find employment. They were
advised to be careful, and talk but little when among strangers. Nothing
occurred to cause apprehension until we reached Richmond, Texas, where, at
supper, I asked for a glass of milk, and was told there was none.

"What!" said one of my companions, "haven't the keows come up?"

Signal was telegraphed under the table to be on guard. The _nom de plume_
of the Texas bovine escaped attention, and it passed as an enjoyable
_lapsus linguæ_.

At Galveston we took a small inland sailing-craft, but were a little
apprehensive, as United States ships were reported cruising outside in
search of all vessels not flying the Stars and Stripes. Our vessel,
however, was only boarded once, and that by a large Spanish mackerel that
made a misleap, fell amidships, and served our little company with a
pleasant dinner. Aboard this little vessel I first met T. J. Goree, an
intelligent, clever Texan, who afterwards joined me at Richmond, and
served in faithful duty as my aide-de-camp from Bull Run to Appomattox

At New Orleans, my companions found safe-conduct to their Northern lines,
and I journeyed on to Richmond. Relatives along the route, who heard of my
approach, met me at the stations, though none suggested a stop overnight,
or for the next train, but after affectionate salutations waved me on to
join "Jeff Davis, for Dixie and for Southern rights."

At every station old men, women, and children assembled, clapping hands
and waving handkerchiefs to cheer the passengers on to Richmond. On
crossing the Virginia line, the feeling seemed to culminate. The windows
and doors of every farm-house and hamlet were occupied, and from them came
hearty salutations that cheered us on to Richmond. The spirit electrified
the air, and the laborers of the fields, white and black, stopped their
ploughs to lift their hats and wave us on to speedy travel. At stations
where meals were served, the proprietors, in response to offers to settle,
said, "Meals for those going on to join Jeff Davis are paid."

On the 29th of June, 1861, I reported at the War Department at Richmond,
and asked to be assigned for service in the pay department, in which I had
recently served (for when I left the line service, under appointment as
paymaster, I had given up all aspirations of military honor, and thought
to settle down into more peaceful pursuits). On the 1st of July I
received notice of my appointment as brigadier-general, with orders to
report at Manassas Junction, to General Beauregard.

I reported on the 2d, and was assigned to command of the First, Eleventh,
and Seventeenth Regiments of Virginia Volunteers, to be organized as a
brigade. The regiments were commanded respectively by Colonels ---- Moore,
Samuel Garland, and M. D. Corse, all active, energetic, and intelligent
officers, anxious to acquire skill in the new service in which they found
themselves. Lieutenant Frank Armstead was assigned to duty at brigade
head-quarters, as acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Peyton
T. Manning as aide-de-camp. Dr. J. S. D. Cullen, surgeon of the First
Virginia Regiment, became medical director. The regiments were stationed
at Manassas Junction.

On the 6th they were marched out, formed as a brigade, and put through the
first lessons in evolutions of the line, and from that day to McDowell's
advance had other opportunities to learn more of the drill and of each
other. General Beauregard had previously settled upon the stream of Bull
Run as his defensive-aggressive line, and assigned his forces accordingly.
A brigade under Brigadier-General R. S. Ewell was posted at Union Mills
Ford, on the right of the Confederate lines; one under Brigadier-General
D. R. Jones at McLean's Ford; Brigadier-General Bonham's brigade was
placed on outpost duty at Fairfax Court-House with orders to retire, at
the enemy's approach, to Mitchell's Ford, and Brigadier-General P. St.
George Cocke was to hold the fords between Mitchell's and the Stone
Bridge, the latter point to be defended by a regiment and a battalion of
infantry, and a battery, under Brigadier-General N. G. Evans.

Between Mitchell's and McLean's Fords, and about half a mile from each, is
Blackburn's Ford. The guard at that point was assigned to my command,--the
Fourth Brigade,--which was ordered to be ready, at a moment's warning, to
march to position, and prepare for battle. In the mean time I was to study
the ground and familiarize myself with the surroundings and avenues of
approach and retreat. Bull Run rises from the foot-hills of the Blue Ridge
and flows southeast through deeps and shallows into the Potomac, about
forty miles south of Alexandria. The swell of the tide-waters up to Union
Mills gives it the depth and volume of water of a river. Blackburn's Ford
is in a great bend of the river, the north bank holding the concave of the
turn. On the convex side was a strip of alluvial soil about seventy feet
wide, covered by large forest-trees and some tangled undergrowth. Outside
and extending some three hundred yards from the edge of the woodland was
an arable field upon a pretty ascending plain, beyond which was a second
growth of pine and oak. On the north bank stood a bluff of fifteen feet,
overhanging the south side and ascending towards the heights of
Centreville. Below Blackburn's Ford the bluff extended, in more or less
ragged features, far down to the southeast. Just above my position the
bluff graded down in even decline to Mitchell's Ford, the position
assigned for Bonham's brigade, the latter being on the concave of the
river, six hundred yards retired from my left and at the crossing of the
direct road between Centreville and Manassas Junction. At the Junction
well-constructed battery epaulements were prepared for defence.

The bluff of the north bank was first designated as my most suitable
ground, and I was ordered to open the front, lay out and construct
trenches, to be concealed by green pine-boughs. The regiments were from
Richmond, Lynchburg, and Alexandria,--more familiar with the amenities of
city life than with the axe, pick, spade, or shovel. They managed,
however, to bring down as many as half a dozen spreading second-growth
pines in the course of two days' work, when General Beauregard concluded
that the advanced position of the brigade would mar his general plan, and
ordered the line to be taken along the river bank of the south side, under
the woodland, and close under the bluff, a position only approvable as
temporary under accepted rules of warfare, but this proved a favorable
exception between the raw forces of the contending armies. In addition to
the two brigades on my right, the Sixth Brigade, under Colonel Jubal A.
Early, was posted (with artillery) near the fords. As proximate but
separate commands, stood General Theo. Holmes, thirty miles off to the
right, with a brigade, a battery, and cavalry, at and about Acquia Creek,
and General J. E. Johnston, sixty miles away, over the Blue Ridge
Mountains. Holmes's should have been an outpost, but he had ranked
Beauregard in the old service, and as a point of etiquette was given a
separate command. Johnston's command should have been an outlying
contingent, but he had been assigned to the Shenandoah Valley when,
because threatened with immediate invasion, it was of first importance.
Beauregard was subsequently assigned to Manassas Junction, which, under
later developments, became the strategic point. As Johnston was his
senior, another delicate question arose, that was not solved until the
tramp of McDowell's army was heard on the Warrenton Turnpike.

The armies preparing for the first grand conflict were commanded by West
Point graduates, both of the class of 1838,--Beauregard and McDowell. The
latter had been assigned to command of the Federal forces at Washington,
south of the Potomac, in the latter part of May, 1861. The former had
assumed command of the Confederates at Manassas Junction about the 1st of

McDowell marched on the afternoon of the 16th of July at the head of an
army of five divisions of infantry, supplemented by nine field batteries
of the regular service, one of volunteers, besides two guns operating
separately, and seven companies of regular cavalry. In his infantry
columns were eight companies of regulars and a battalion of marines, an
aggregate of thirty-five thousand men.

Beauregard stood behind Bull Run with seven brigades, including Holmes,
who joined on the 19th, twenty-nine guns, fourteen hundred cavalry,--an
aggregate of twenty-one thousand nine hundred men, all volunteers. To this
should be added, for the battle of the 21st, reinforcements aggregating
eight thousand five hundred men, under General Johnston, making the sum of
the aggregate, thirty thousand four hundred.

The line behind Bull Run was the best between Washington and the Rapidan
for strategy, tactics, and army supplies.

General Beauregard gave minute instructions to his brigade commanders of
his position and general plan, which in itself was admirable. Bonham was
to retire from Fairfax Court-House, as the enemy advanced, and take his
place behind Mitchell's Ford on the Centreville and Manassas Junction
road. It was proposed that he should engage his rear-guard so as to try to
bring on the battle against him, as he approached his crossing of Bull
Run, when the brigades along the Run on his right should cross, wheel to
the left and attack on the enemy's left and rear.

We had occasional glimpses behind the lines about Washington, through
parties who managed to evade the eyes of guards and sentinels, which told
of McDowell's work since May, and heard on the 10th of July that he was
ready to march. Most of us knew him and of his attainments, as well as of
those of Beauregard, to the credit of the latter, so that on that point we
were quite satisfied. But the backing of an organized government, and an
army led by the foremost American war-chief, that consummate
strategist, tactician, and organizer, General Scott, together with the
splendid equipment of the field batteries, and the presence of the force
of regulars of infantry, gave serious apprehension.

[Illustration: John B. Richardson. Captain Washington Artillery of New
Orleans; whose battery fired the first gun at Manassas, July, 1861, and
claims the last gun at Appomattox.]

On the 16th of July notice came that the advance of McDowell's army was
under definite orders for the next day. My brigade was at once ordered
into position at Blackburn's Ford, and all others were ordered on the
alert. Cocke's detachments were recalled from the fords between Mitchell's
and Stone Bridge, and Evans was left to hold the bridge. Bonham withdrew
from Fairfax Court-House as McDowell advanced. He retired behind the Run
at Mitchell's Ford, his vedettes following after exchanging shots with the
enemy's advance on the 18th. Early that morning a section of the
Washington Artillery was posted on a rear line behind Blackburn's Ford,
and trailed across towards the left, so as to flank fire against the
direct advance upon Bonham at Mitchell's Ford.

At eight o'clock A.M. on the 18th, McDowell's army concentrated about
Centreville, his immediate objective being Manassas Junction. From
Centreville the Warrenton Turnpike bears off a little south of west,
crossing Bull Run at Stone Bridge (four miles). The Manassas Junction road
due south crosses at Mitchell's Ford (three miles). Other farm roads
turned to the fords above and below Mitchell's. His orders to General
Tyler, commanding the advance division, were to look well to the roads on
the direct route to Manassas Junction and _via_ the Stone Bridge, to
impress an advance upon the former, but to have care not to bring on a
general engagement. At the same time he rode towards his left to know of
the feasibility of a turning move around the Confederates' right. There
were three moves by which it was supposed he could destroy the
Confederates,--first, by turning their right; second, by direct and
forcible march to the Junction; third, by turning their left. McDowell's
orders to his leading divisions indicated that he had settled down to a
choice as to the two opposite flanking moves; but to justify either he
must first test the feasibility of the direct route. The ride to his left
disclosed rough ground, rocky heights cut by streamlets, and covered by
heavy forest tangle, as formidable to military manoeuvres of raw troops as
armed battlements. According to preconceived plans, this eliminated the
question of the flanking move by the Confederate right.

Under the instructions, as General Tyler construed them, he followed the
Confederates to the heights of Centreville, overlooking the valley of Bull
Run, with a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry. From the
heights to the Run, a mile away, the field was open, and partially
disclosed the Confederate position on his right. On the left the view was
limited by a sparse growth of spreading pines. On the right was Mitchell's
Ford, on the left Blackburn's. To have a better knowledge of the latter,
he called up a brigade of infantry under General Richardson, Ayres's
battery of six field-guns, and two twenty-pound rifle guns under Benjamin.
The artillery was brought into action by the twenty-pound rifle guns, the
first shot aimed at the section of the Washington Artillery six-pounders
in rear of Blackburn's Ford, showing superior marksmanship, the ball
striking close beside the guns, and throwing the dust over the caissons
and gunners.

It was noticed that the enemy was far beyond our range, his position
commanding, as well as his metal, so I ordered the guns withdrawn to a
place of safety, till a fairer opportunity was offered them. The guns were
limbered and off before a second shot reached them. Artillery practice of
thirty minutes was followed by an advance of infantry. The march was made
quite up to the bluff overlooking the ford, when both sides opened fire.

The first pouring-down volleys were most startling to the new troops.
Part of my line broke and started at a run. To stop the alarm I rode with
sabre in hand for the leading files, determined to give them all that was
in the sword and my horse's heels, or stop the break. They seemed to see
as much danger in their rear as in front, and soon turned and marched back
to their places, to the evident surprise of the enemy. Heavy firing was
renewed in ten or fifteen minutes, when the Federals retired. After about
twenty minutes a second advance was made to the top of the bluff, when
another rousing fusillade followed, and continued about as long as the
first, with like result. I reinforced the front line with part of my
reserve, and, thinking to follow up my next success, called for one of the
regiments of the reserve brigade.

Colonel Hays, of the Seventh Louisiana Regiment, was sent, but was not in
time for the next attack. He was in position for the fourth, and did his
share in that fight. After the fourth repulse I ordered the advance, and
called for the balance of the reserve brigade. The Fourth Brigade, in
their drills in evolution, had not progressed as far as the passage of
defiles. The pass at the ford was narrow, unused, and boggy. The lagoons
above and below were deep, so that the crossing was intricate and slow.
Colonel Early came in with his other regiments, formed his line behind my
front, and was asked to hurry his troops to the front line, lest the next
attack should catch him behind us, when his raw men would be sure to fire
on the line in front of them. He failed to comprehend, however, and
delayed till the next attack, when his men promptly returned fire at
anything and everything before them. I thought to stop the fire by riding
in front of his line, but found it necessary to dismount and lie under it
till the loads were discharged. With the Federals on the bluff pouring
down their fire, and Early's tremendous fire in our rear, soldiers and
officers became mixed and a little confused. Part of my men got across the
Run and partially up the bluff of the enemy's side; a body of the Union
soldiers were met at the crest, where shots were exchanged, but passing
the Run, encountering the enemy in front, and receiving fire from our
friends in rear were not reassuring, even in handling veterans. The recall
was ordered as the few of the enemy's most advanced parties joined issue
with Captain Marye of my advance. Federal prisoners were brought in with
marks of burnt powder on their faces, and Captain Marye and some of his
men of the Seventeenth, who brought them in, had their faces and clothing
soiled by like marks. At the first moment of this confusion it seemed that
a vigorous pressure by the enemy would force us back to the farther edge
of the open field, and, to reach that stronger ground, preparations were
considered, but with the aid of Colonels Garland and Corse order was
restored, the Federals were driven off, and the troops better distributed.
This was the last effort on the part of the infantry, and was followed by
the Federal batteries throwing shot and shell through the trees above our
heads. As we were under the bluff, the fire was not annoying, except
occasionally when some of the branches of the trees were torn off and
dropped among us. One shot passed far over, and dropped in the house in
which General Beauregard was about to sit down to his dinner. The
interruption so annoyed him that he sent us four six-pound and three rifle
guns of the Washington Artillery, under Captain Eshleman, to return fire
and avenge the loss of his dinner. The guns had good cover under the
bluff, by pushing them as close up as would admit of effective fire over
it; but under tactical formation the limbers and caissons were so far in
rear as to bring them under destructive fire. The men, thinking it
unsoldier-like to flinch, or complain of their exposure, worked away very
courageously till the limbers and caissons were ordered forward, on the
right and left of the guns, to safer cover. The combat lasted about an
hour, when the Federals withdrew to their ground about Centreville, to
the delight of the Confederates. After this lively affair the report came
of a threatened advance off to our right. General Beauregard recalled
Early's command to its position in that quarter. He was ordered to march
to the right, under the bluff, so that his men could not come within range
of the batteries, but he chose to march back on the road leading directly
to the rear, when the dust of his columns drew fire of a battery, and
several damaging shots were thrown among his troops. The Confederate
losses were sixty-eight; Federal, eighty-three. The effect of this little
affair was encouraging to the Confederates, and as damaging to the
Federals. By the double action of success and failure the Confederate
infantry felt themselves christened veterans. The Washington Artillery was
equally proud of its even combat against the famed batteries of United
States regulars.

McDowell was disposed to ignore this fight as unwarranted under his
instructions, and not a necessary adjunct of his plans. His course and
that of the officers about him reduced the aggressive spirit of the
division commander to its minimum, and had some influence upon the troops
of the division. For battle at this time McDowell had 37,300[3] men and
forty-nine guns. Beauregard had 20,500[4] men and twenty-nine guns.



    Commanders on both Sides generally Veterans of the Mexican
    War--General Irvin McDowell's Preconceived Plan--Johnston reinforces
    Beauregard and approves his Plans--General Bernard E. Bee--Analysis of
    the Fight--Superb Work of the Federal Artillery--Christening of
    "Stonewall Jackson"--McDowell's Gallant Effort to recover Lost
    Power--Before he was shorn of his Artillery he was the Samson of the
    Field--The Rout--Criticism of McDowell--Tyler's
    Reconnoissance--Ability of the Commanding Generals tested.

Before treating of future operations, I should note the situation of the
Confederate contingents in the Shenandoah Valley and at Acquia Creek. The
latter was ordered up to reinforce Beauregard as soon as the advance from
Washington took definite shape, and arrived as a supporting brigade to his
right on the 19th of July. At the same time orders were sent authorizing
Johnston's withdrawal from the Valley, to join with Beauregard for the
approaching conflict. The use of these contingents was duly considered by
both sides some days before the campaign was put on foot.

Opposing Johnston in the Valley was General Robert Patterson, of
Philadelphia, a veteran of the war of 1812 and of the Mexican War,
especially distinguished in the latter by the prestige of the former
service. Johnston was a veteran of the Mexican War, who had won
distinction by progressive service and was well equipped in the science of
war. Beauregard and McDowell were also veterans of the Mexican War, of
staff service, and distinguished for intelligent action and attainments,
both remarkable for physical as well as mental power.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF BULL RUN July 21st, 1861]

Between Johnston and Beauregard the Blue Ridge stretched out from the
Potomac southwest far below the southern line of Virginia, cut
occasionally by narrow passes, quite defensible by small bodies of
infantry and artillery. Patterson was ordered to hold Johnston in the
Valley, while McDowell should direct his strength against Beauregard.
McDowell seems to have accepted that order as not only possible, but sure
of success, while the Confederates viewed the question from the other
side, in a reverse light, and, as will presently appear, with better

So far as it is possible to project a battle before reaching the field, it
seems that McDowell had concluded upon the move finally made before
setting out on his march from Washington. It was to give him an open
field, with superior numbers and appointments, and when successful was to
give him the approach to the base line of his adversary with fine
prospects of cutting off retreat. His ride to view the approaches of the
Confederate right on the morning of the 18th was made to confirm his
preconceived plan. The reconnoissance made by Tyler on the same morning
reinforced his judgment, so that the strategic part of the campaign was
concluded on that morning, except as to the means to be adopted to secrete
or mislead in his movement as long as possible, leaving, we may say, the
result to tactical operations. But tactics is time, and more decisive of
results than strategy when wisely adjusted.

Johnston was sixty miles away from Beauregard, but the delay of three
days, for McDowell's march _via_ Sudley Springs, so reduced the distance
in time and space as to make the consolidation easy under well-organized
transportation facilities. Holmes's brigade and six-gun battery were
posted in rear of Ewell's brigade.

General McDowell's order for battle on the 21st of July was issued on the
afternoon of the 20th, directing his First Division to march by the
Warrenton Turnpike, and make a diversion against the crossing of Bull Run
at the Stone Bridge, while the Second and Third Divisions, following on
the turnpike, were to file to the right, along the farm road, about
half-way between Centreville and the bridge, cross Bull Run at Sudley
Springs, and bear down against the Confederate rear and left; the First
Division, under Tyler, to march at two o'clock in the morning, to be
closely followed by the others under Hunter and Heintzelman; the turning
divisions, after crossing, to march down, clear the bridge, and lift Tyler
over the Run, bringing the three into compact battle order.

General Johnston came in from the Shenandoah Valley on the 20th with the
brigades of Bee, Bartow, and Jackson. The brigades were assigned by
Beauregard, the former two in reserve near the right of Blackburn's Ford,
the latter near its left.

Beauregard's order for battle, approved by General Johnston, was issued at
five A.M. on the 21st,--the brigades at Union Mills Ford to cross and
march by the road leading towards Centreville, and in rear of the Federal
reserve at that point; the brigades at McLean's Ford to follow the move of
those on their right, and march on a converging road towards Centreville;
those at and near Blackburn's to march in co-operative action with the
brigades on the right; the reserve brigades and troops at Mitchell's Ford
to be used as emergency called, but in the absence of special orders to
seek the most active point of battle.

This order was only preliminary, coupled with the condition that the
troops were to be held ready to move, but to wait for the special order
for action. The brigade at Blackburn's Ford had been reinforced by the
Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones and Colonel Kemper. I crossed the Run under the
five o'clock order, adjusted the regiments to position for favorable
action, and gave instructions for their movements on the opening of the

While waiting for the order to attack, a clever reconnoissance was made by
Colonels Terry and Lubbock, Texans, on the brigade staff, which disclosed
the march of the heavy columns of the Federals towards our left. Their
report was sent promptly to head-quarters, and after a short delay the
brigade was ordered back to its position behind the Run.

Tyler's division moved early on the 21st towards the Stone Bridge. The
march was not rapid, but timely. His first shells went tearing through the
elements over the heads of the Confederates before six o'clock. The Second
and Third Divisions followed his column till its rear cleared the road
leading up to the ford at Sudley Springs, when they filed off on that
route. McDowell was with them, and saw them file off on their course, and
followed their march. His Fifth Division and Richardson's brigade of the
First were left in reserve at Centreville, and the Fourth Division was
left in a position rearward of them. The march of the columns over the
single track of the farm road leading up to Sudley Springs was not only
fatiguing, but so prolonged the diversion of Tyler's division at the
bridge as to expose its real intent, and cause his adversary to look
elsewhere for the important work. Viewing the zone of operations as far as
covered by the eye, Evans discovered a column of dust rising above the
forest in the vicinity of Sudley Springs. This, with the busy delay of
Tyler in front of the bridge, exposed the plans, and told of another
quarter for the approaching battle; when Evans, leaving four companies of
infantry and two pieces of artillery to defend the bridge, moved with the
rest of his command to meet the approaching columns off his left. Bearing
in mind his care of the bridge, it was necessary to occupy grounds north
of the pike. The position chosen was the plateau near the Matthews House,
about a thousand yards north of the pike, and about the same distance from
Bull Run, commanding the road by which the turning divisions of the enemy
were to approach. His artillery (two six-pound guns) was posted to his
right and left, somewhat retired. Meanwhile, Tyler's batteries maintained
their position at and below the Stone Bridge, as did those near the lower
fords. McDowell's column crossed at Sudley's Ford at nine o'clock, and
approached Evans a few minutes before ten. The leading division under
Hunter, finding Evans's command across its route, advanced the Second
Rhode Island Regiment and battery of six guns of Burnside's brigade to
open the way. Evans's infantry and artillery met the advance, and after a
severe fight drove it back[5] to the line of woodland, when Burnside,
reinforced by his other three regiments, with them advanced eight guns.
This attack was much more formidable, and pressed an hour or more before
our forces retired to the woodland. The fight, though slackened,
continued, while the brigade under Porter advanced to Burnside's support.

Waiting some time to witness the opening of his aggressive fight towards
Centreville, Beauregard found at last that his battle order had
miscarried. While yet in doubt as to the cause of delay, his attention was
drawn to the fight opened by McDowell against Evans. This affair,
increasing in volume, drew him away from his original point and object of
observation. He reconsidered the order to attack at Centreville, and rode
for the field just opening to severe work. The brigades of Bee and
Bartow,--commanded by Bee,--and Jackson's, had been drawn towards the
left, the former two near Cocke's position, and Jackson from the right to
the left of Mitchell's Ford. They were to await orders, but were
instructed, and intrusted, in the absence of orders, to seek the place
where the fight was thickest. About twelve o'clock that splendid soldier,
Bernard E. Bee, under orders to find the point of danger, construed it
as calling him to Evans's support, and marched, without other notice than
the noise of increasing battle, with his own and Bartow's brigades and
Imboden's battery. The move against the enemy's reserve at Centreville
suspended, Colonels Terry and Lubbock, volunteer aides, crossed the Run to
make another reconnoissance of the positions about Centreville. Captain
Goree, of Texas, and Captain Sorrel, of Georgia, had also joined the
brigade staff. As Bee approached Evans he formed line upon the plateau at
the Henry House, suggesting to Evans to withdraw to that as a better field
than the advance ground held by the latter; but in deference to Evans's
care for the bridge, which involved care for the turnpike, Bee yielded,
and ordered his troops to join Evans's advance. Imboden's artillery,
however, failed to respond, remaining on the Henry plateau; leaving Bee
and Evans with two six-pounder smoothbore guns to combat the enemy's
formidable batteries of eight to twelve guns of superior metal, as well as
the accumulating superior infantry forces, Imboden's battery making a show
of practice with six-pounders at great range. The infantry crossed Young's
Branch under severe fire, and were posted on the line of Evans's battle.

[Illustration: Thos. J. Goree. Captain and Aide-de-Camp.]

Burnside was reinforced by Porter's brigade, and afterwards by a part of
Heintzelman's division. Ricketts's battery, and subsequently the battery
under Griffin, pressed their fight with renewed vigor. The batteries,
particularly active and aggressive, poured incessant fire upon the
Confederate ranks, who had no artillery to engage against them except
Imboden's, far off to the rear, and the section of Latham's howitzers. The
efforts of the Federal infantry were cleverly met and resisted, but the
havoc of those splendid batteries was too severe, particularly Griffin's,
that had an oblique fire upon the Confederates. It was the fire of this
battery that first disturbed our ranks on their left, and the increasing
pounding of that and Ricketts's eventually unsettled the line. At this
juncture two brigades of Tyler's division, with General W. T. Sherman and
General Keyes, crossed the Run at a ford some distance above the bridge
and approached the Confederate right, making more unsettled their
position. At the same time the attacking artillery and infantry followed
up their opportunity in admirable style, pushed the Confederates back, and
pursued down to the valley of Young's Branch.

At one P.M., Colonels Terry and Lubbock returned from their reconnoissance
of the ground in front of Centreville, with a diagram showing points of
the Union lines and troops there posted. I sent it up to head-quarters,
suggesting that the brigades at the lower fords be put across the Run, and
advance against the reserves as designed by the order of the morning.
Colonel Terry returned with the suggestion approved, and we communicated
the same to the brigades at McLean's and Union Mills Fords, commanded by
officers of senior dates to myself. The brigades were prepared, however,
for concert of action. Bee, Bartow, and Evans made valorous efforts, while
withdrawing from their struggle on the Matthews plateau, to maintain the
integrity of their lines, and with some success, when General Wade Hampton
came with his brigade to their aid, checked the progress of pursuit, and
helped to lift their broken ranks to the plateau at the Henry House. The
fight assumed proportions which called for the care of both General
Johnston and General Beauregard, who, with the movements of their right
too late to relieve the pressure of the left, found it necessary to draw
their forces to the point at which the battle had been forced by the
enemy. At the same time the reserve brigades of their right were called to
the left. General Thomas J. Jackson also moved to that quarter, and
reached the rear crest of the plateau at the Henry House while yet Bee,
Bartow, Evans, and Hampton were climbing to the forward crest. Quick to
note a proper ground, Jackson deployed on the crest at the height, leaving
the open of the plateau in front. He was in time to secure the Imboden
battery before it got off the field, and put it into action. Stanard's
battery, Pendleton's, and Pelham's, and part of the Washington Artillery
were up in time to aid Jackson in his new formation and relieve our
discomfited troops rallying on his flank. As they rose on the forward
crest, Bee saw, on the farther side, Jackson's line, serene as if in
repose, affording a haven so promising of cover that he gave the
christening of "Stonewall" for the immortal Jackson.

"There," said he, "is Jackson, standing like a stone wall."

General Johnston and General Beauregard reached the field, and busied
themselves in getting the troops together and in lines of defence. Other
reinforcements were ordered from the right, including the reserve brigades
at McLean's and Union Mills Fords, and a number of batteries. Bee and
Evans reformed their lines upon Jackson's. After permitting Burnside's
brigade to retire for rest, McDowell pushed his battle by his strong
artillery arm, advancing against and turning the Confederate left, only
giving some little time to select positions for his batteries to plunge
more effective fire into the Confederate ranks. This time, so necessary
for McDowell's renewal, was as important to the Confederates in getting
their reinforcements of infantry and artillery in position, and proved of
even greater value in lengthening out the fight, so as to give Kirby Smith
and Elzey, just off the train from the Shenandoah Valley, time to appear
at the last moment.

After arranging the new position of the troops about Jackson, General
Johnston rode back to the Lewis House, where he could better comprehend
the entire field, leaving Beauregard in charge of the troops engaged on
his left. McDowell gave especial care to preparing his batteries for
renewal against the Confederate left. He massed Ricketts's and Griffin's
batteries, and made their practice grand. So well executed was it that the
Confederate left was again in peril, and, seeing reinforcements
approaching towards their rear, General Johnston sent orders to the
brigades at the lower fords revoking authority given them to advance
against Centreville, and ordering their return to the south side, and the
brigade at Union Mills was ordered to reinforce the Confederate left. The
brigade at Blackburn's Ford received the recall order in ample time, but
that at McLean's,--Jones's,--being a little farther away, became partially
engaged before the recall reached it. The brigades resumed their former
position, however, without serious trouble.

With this order came a message to me, saying that the Federals were
pressing severely on our left, and to the limit of its tension, that
reinforcements were in sight, approaching their right, which might prove
too heavy for our brave men, and force us back, for which emergency our
brigades should be held ready to cover retreat. These anxious moments were
soon relieved by the approach of General Kirby Smith's command, that had
been mistaken as reinforcements for the enemy. General Smith was wounded,
but was succeeded in command by the gallant Elzey, who by a well-timed
attack approached the rear of the massed batteries. At the same time a
brave charge on the part of Beauregard, in co-operation with this
fortunate attack of Smith and Elzey, captured the greater part of the
batteries and turned some of the guns upon the brave men who had handled
them so well.

McDowell made a gallant effort to recover his lost power, riding with his
troops and urging them to brave efforts, but our convex line, that he was
just now pressing back upon itself, was changed. Though attenuated, it had
become concave by reinforcement, and in elliptical curve was delivering a
concentrated fire upon its adversary. Before the loss of his artillery he
was the Samson of the field; now he was not only shorn of his power, but
some of his mighty strength was transferred to his adversary, leaving him
in desperate plight and exposed to blows increasing in force and
effectiveness. Although his renewed efforts were brave, his men seemed to
have given confidence over to despair. Still a show of battle was made
until General Johnston directed the brigades of Holmes and Early to good
positions for attack, when fight was abandoned and flight ensued.

The regulars under Sykes maintained order, and with the regular cavalry
covered the confused retreat. The Confederates in the field and
approaching at the moment were ordered in pursuit. At the same time
another order was sent the brigades at the lower fords, explaining that
the reinforcements, supposed to be Federals, proved to be Confederates,
and that the former were not only forced back, but were then in full
retreat, directing our brigades to cross again and strike the retreating
line on the turnpike. All of D. R. Jones's brigade that had crossed at
McLean's Ford under the former order had not yet returned to its position
under the order to that effect, and Ewell had gone from Union Mills Ford
to the battle on the extreme left, so that neither of them came in
position ready to take part in the pursuit. Those at Mitchell's and
Blackburn's Fords advanced, the former, under General Bonham, with orders
to strike at Cub Run, the latter at Centreville. Finding some obstruction
to his march, General Bonham kept the Centreville road, and joined the
brigade from Blackburn's, taking the lead as the ranking officer.

Through the abandoned camps of the Federals we found their pots and
kettles over the fire, with food cooking; quarters of beef hanging on the
trees, and wagons by the roadside loaded, some with bread and general
provisions, others with ammunition. When within artillery range of the
retreating column passing through Centreville, the infantry was deployed
on the sides of the road, under cover of the forest, so as to give room
for the batteries ordered into action in the open, Bonham's brigade on the
left, the other on the right.

As the guns were about to open, there came a message that the enemy,
instead of being in precipitate retreat, was marching around to attack the
Confederate right. With this report came orders, or reports of orders, for
the brigades to return to their positions behind the Run. I denounced the
report as absurd, claimed to know a retreat, such as was before me, and
ordered that the batteries open fire, when Major Whiting, of General
Johnston's staff, rising in his stirrups, said,--

"In the name of General Johnston, I order that the batteries shall not

I inquired, "Did General Johnston send you to communicate that order?"

Whiting replied, "No; but I take the responsibility to give it."

I claimed the privilege of responsibility under the circumstances, and
when in the act of renewing the order to fire, General Bonham rode to my
side and asked that the batteries should not open. As the ranking officer
present, this settled the question. By that time, too, it was near night.
Colonel G. W. Lay, of Johnston's staff, supported my views,
notwithstanding the protest of Major Whiting.

Soon there came an order for the brigades to withdraw and return to their
positions behind the Run. General Bonham marched his brigade back, but,
thinking that there was a mistake somewhere, I remained in position until
the order was renewed, about ten o'clock. My brigade crossed and recrossed
the Run six times during the day and night.

It was afterwards found that some excitable person, seeing Jones's
brigade recrossing the Run, from its advance, under previous orders, took
them for Federal troops crossing at McLean's Ford, and, rushing to
head-quarters at the Junction, reported that the Federals were crossing
below and preparing for attack against our right. And upon this report one
of the staff-officers sent orders, in the names of the Confederate chiefs,
revoking the orders for pursuit.

From the effective service of the two guns of Latham's battery, _at short
range_, against the odds brought against them, the inference seems fair
that the Imboden battery, had it moved under Bee's orders, could have so
strengthened the position on the Matthews plateau as to hold it and give
time for them to retire and meet General Jackson on the Henry plateau.
Glorious Victory spread her generous wings alike over heroes and

The losses of the Confederates in all arms were 1982. Federal losses in
all arms, 3333[6] officers and soldiers, twenty-five cannon.[7]

On the 22d the cavalry troop of Captain Whitehead was sent forward with
Colonel Terry, volunteer aide, on a ride of observation. They picked up a
number of prisoners, and Colonel Terry cut the lanyards of the Federal
flag over the court-house at Fairfax by a shot from his six-shooter, and
sent the bunting to head-quarters.

The plan of the Union campaign was that their army in the Valley of the
Shenandoah, under General Patterson, should stand so surely against the
Confederates in that field, under General Johnston, as to prevent the
withdrawal of the latter through the Blue Ridge, which goes to show that
the concentration was considered, and thought possible, and that McDowell
was, therefore, under some pressure to act in time to gain his battle
before Johnston could have time for his swoop from the mountains. At
Centreville on the 18th, McDowell was within five miles of his immediate
objective,--Manassas Junction,--by the route of Tyler's reconnoissance.
The Sudley Ford route involved a march of twenty miles and drew him nearer
the reach of Johnston's forces. So, if Tyler's reconnoissance proved the
route by Blackburn's Ford practicable, it was imperative on McDowell to
adopt it. If it was proved impracticable, the route by Sudley's Ford was
necessary and justified the delay. But it has been claimed that the Union
commander did not intend to have the reconnoissance, and that he could
have made his move a success by that route if he had adopted it; which, if
true, would put him in a more awkward position than his defeat. He was
right in his conclusion that the Confederates were prepared for him on
that route, but it would have been a grave error to leave the shorter,
more direct line for the circuitous route without first so testing the
former as to know if it were practicable, knowing as he did that the
Confederate left was in the air, because of leaven looked for from over
the Blue Ridge. After the trial of General Tyler on the 18th, and finding
the route closed against him, he should have given credit to the division
commander and his troops for their courageous work, but instead he
disparaged their efforts and put them under criticism. The experiment and
subsequent events go to show that the route was not practicable except for
seasoned troops.

McDowell's first mistake was his display, and march for a grand military
picnic. The leading proverb impressed upon the minds of young soldiers of
the line by old commanders is, "Never despise your enemy." So important a
part of the soldier's creed is it, that it is enjoined upon subalterns
pursuing marauding parties of half a dozen of the aborigines. His
over-confidence led him to treat with levity the reconnoissance of General
Tyler on the 18th, as not called for under his orders, nor necessary to
justify his plans, although they involved a delay of three days, and a
circuitous march around the Confederate left. Then, he put upon his
division commander the odium of error and uncalled-for exposure of the
troops. This broke the confidence between them, and worked more or less
evil through the ranks in the after-part of the campaign. Had he
recognized the importance of the service, and encouraged the conduct of
the division commander, he would have drawn the hearts of his officers and
soldiers towards him, and toned up the war spirit and _morale_ of his men.
Tyler was right in principle, in the construction of duty, under the
orders, and in his more comprehensive view of the military zodiac. In no
other way than by testing the strength along the direct route could
McDowell justify delay, when time was power, and a long march with raw
troops in July weather was pending.

The delay gave Beauregard greater confidence in his preconceived plan, and
brought out his order of the 21st for advance towards McDowell's reserve
at Centreville, but this miscarried, and turned to advantage for the plans
of the latter.

Had a prompt, energetic general been in command when, on the 20th, his
order of battle was settled upon, the division under Tyler would have been
deployed in front of Stone Bridge, as soon after nightfall as darkness
could veil the march, and the divisions under Hunter and Heintzelman
following would have been stretched along the lateral road in bivouac, so
as to be prepared to cross Sudley's Ford and put in a good day's work on
the morrow. Had General Tyler's action of the 18th received proper
recognition, he would have been confident instead of doubting in his
service. McDowell's army posted as it should have been, a march at
daylight would have brought the columns to the Henry House before seven
o'clock, dislodged Evans, busied by Tyler's display at the bridge, without
a chance to fight, and brought the three divisions, reunited in gallant
style, along the turnpike with little burning of powder. Thus prepared and
organized, the compact battle-order of twenty thousand men would have been
a fearful array against Beauregard's fragmentary left, and by the events
as they passed, would have assured McDowell of victory hours before Kirby
Smith and Elzey, of the Army of the Shenandoah, came upon the field.

Beauregard's mistake was in failing to ride promptly after his
five-o'clock order, and handling his columns while in action. As events
actually occurred, he would have been in overwhelming numbers against
McDowell's reserve and supply depot. His adversary so taken by surprise,
his raw troops would not have been difficult to conquer.

As the experience of both commanders was limited to staff service, it is
not surprising that they failed to appreciate the importance of prompt and
vigorous manoeuvre in the hour of battle. Beauregard gave indications of a
comprehensive military mind and reserve powers that might, with experience
and thorough encouragement from the superior authorities, have developed
him into eminence as a field-marshal. His adversary seemed untoward, not
adapted to military organization or combinations. Most of his men got back
to Washington under the sheltering wings of the small bands of regulars.

The mistake of supposing Kirby Smith's and Elzey's approaching troops to
be Union reinforcements for McDowell's right was caused by the
resemblance, at a distance, of the original Confederate flag to the colors
of Federal regiments. This mishap caused the Confederates to cast about
for a new ensign, brought out our battle-flag, led to its adoption by
General Beauregard, and afterwards by higher authority as the union shield
of the Confederate national flag.

The supplies of subsistence, ammunition, and forage passed as we marched
through the enemy's camps towards Centreville seemed ample to carry the
Confederate army on to Washington. Had the fight been continued to that
point, the troops, in their high hopes, would have marched in terrible
effectiveness against the demoralized Federals. Gaining confidence and
vigor in their march, they could well have reached the capital with the
ranks of McDowell's men. The brigade at Blackburn's Ford (five regiments),
those at McLean's and Mitchell's Fords, all quite fresh, could have been
reinforced by all the cavalry and most of the artillery, comparatively
fresh, and later by the brigades of Holmes, Ewell, and Early. This
favorable aspect for fruitful results was all sacrificed through the
assumed authority of staff-officers who, upon false reports, gave
countermand to the orders of their chiefs.

On the 21st a regiment and battery were discharged from the Union army,
reducing its aggregate to about 34,000. The Confederates had 31,860.
McDowell crossed Bull Run with 18,500 of his men, and engaged in battle
18,053 Confederates.

There seem to be no data from which the precise figures can be had. These
estimates, though not strictly accurate, are justified by returns so far
as they have been officially rendered.

The CONFEDERATE ARMY in this battle was organized as follows:

    Beauregard:--_Infantry_: _First Brigade_, under Brig.-Gen. M. S.
    Bonham, 11th N. C., 2d, 3d, 7th, and 8th S. C.; _Second Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. R. S. Ewell, 5th and 6th Ala., 6th La.; _Third Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones, 17th and 18th Miss., 5th S. C.; _Fourth
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. James Longstreet, 5th N. C., 1st, 11th, and 17th
    Va.; _Fifth Brigade_, Col. P. St. George Cocke, 1st La. Battn., 8th
    Va. (seven companies), 18th, 19th, 28th, and 49th Va. (latter, three
    companies); _Sixth Brigade_, Col. J. A. Early, 13th Miss., 4th S. C.,
    7th and 24th Va.; _Troops not brigaded_: 7th and 8th La., Hampton
    Legion, S. C., 30th Va. (cav.), Harrison's Battn. (cav.); _Independent
    companies_: 10th Cav., Washington (La.) Cav.; _Artillery_: Kemper's,
    Latham's, Loudoun, and Shield's batteries, Camp Pickens companies.

    Johnston:--_First Brigade_, Col. T. J. Jackson, 2d, 4th, 5th, and 27th
    Va., Pendleton's Batt.; _Second Brigade_, Col. F. S. Bartow, 7th, 8th,
    and 9th Ga., Duncan's and Pope's Ky. Battns., Alburti's Batt.; _Third
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Barnard E. Bee, 4th Ala., 2d and 11th Miss., 1st
    Tenn., Imboden's Batt.; _Fourth Brigade_, Col. A. Elzey, 1st Md.
    Battn., 3d Tenn., 10th and 13th Va., Grane's Batt.; _Not brigaded_:
    1st Va. Cav., 33d Va. Inf.

The FEDERAL ARMY, commanded by Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell, was
organized as follows:

    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler:--_First Brigade_, Col. E. D.
    Keyes, 2d Me., 1st, 2d, and 3d Conn.; _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. R.
    C. Schenck, 2d N. Y., 1st and 2d Ohio, Batt. E, 2d U. S. Art.; _Third
    Brigade_, Col. W. T. Sherman, 13th, 69th, and 79th N. Y., 2d Wis.,
    Batt. E, 3d U. S. Art.; _Fourth Brigade_, Col. I. B. Richardson, 1st
    Mass., 12th N. Y., 2d and 3d Mich., Batt. G, 1st U. S. Art., Batt. M,
    2d U. S. Art.

    SECOND DIVISION, (1) Col. David Hunter (wounded); (2) Col. Andrew
    Porter:--_First Brigade_, Col. Andrew Porter, 8th (militia), 14th, and
    27th N. Y., Battn. U. S. Inf., Battn. U. S. Marines, Battn. U. S.
    Cav., Batt. D, 5th U. S. Art.; _Second Brigade_, Col. A. E. Burnside,
    2d N. H., 1st and 2d R. I., 71st N. Y.

    THIRD DIVISION, Col. S. P. Heintzelman (wounded):--_First Brigade_,
    Col. W. B. Franklin, 5th and 11th Mass., 1st Minn., Batt. I, 1st U. S.
    Art.; _Second Brigade_, Col. O. B. Wilcox (wounded and captured), 11th
    N. Y. (Fire Zouaves), 38th N. Y., 1st and 4th Mich., Batt. D, 2d U. S.
    Art.; _Third Brigade_, Col. O. O. Howard, 3d, 4th, and 5th Me., 2d Vt.

    FOURTH (RESERVE) DIVISION,[8] Brig.-Gen. Theodore Runyon, 1st, 2d, 3d,
    and 4th N. J. (three months), 1st, 2d, and 3d N. J., 41st N. Y. (three

    FIFTH DIVISION, Col. Dixon S. Miles:--_First Brigade_,[9] Col. Louis
    Blenker, 8th N. Y. (Vols.), 29th and 39th N. Y., 27th Penn., Batt. A,
    2d U. S. Art., Rookwood's N. Y. Batt.; _Second Brigade_, Col. Thomas
    A. Davies, 16th, 18th, 31st, and 32d N. Y., Batt. G, 2d U. S. Art.



    An Early War-Time Amenity--The Author invited to dine with the
    Enemy--"Stove-pipe Batteries"--J. E. B. Stuart, the Famous
    Cavalryman--His Bold Dash on the Federals at
    Lewinsville--Major-General G. W. Smith associated with Johnston and
    Beauregard in a Council--Longstreet promoted Major-General--Fierce
    Struggle at Ball's Bluff--Dranesville a Success for the Union
    Arms--McClellan given the Sobriquet of "The Young Napoleon."

After General McDowell reached Washington my brigade was thrown forward,
first to Centreville, then to Fairfax Court-House, and later still to
Falls Church and Munson's and Mason's Hills; the cavalry, under Colonel J.
E. B. Stuart, constituting part of the command.

We were provokingly near Washington, with orders not to attempt to advance
even to Alexandria. Well-chosen and fortified positions, with soldiers to
man them, soon guarded all approaches to the capital. We had frequent
little brushes with parties pushed out to reconnoitre. Nevertheless, we
were neither so busy nor so hostile as to prevent the reception of a
cordial invitation to a dinner-party on the other side, to be given to me
at the head-quarters of General Richardson. He was disappointed when I
refused to accept this amenity, and advised him to be more careful lest
the politicians should have him arrested for giving aid and comfort to the
enemy. He was my singularly devoted friend and admirer before the war, and
had not ceased to be conscious of old-time ties.

The service at Falls Church, Munson's and Mason's Hills was first by my
brigade of infantry, a battery, and Stuart's cavalry. During that service
the infantry and batteries were relieved every few days, but the cavalry
was kept at the front with me. As the authorities allowed me but one
battery, and that was needed from time to time to strike out at anything
and everything that came outside the fortified lines, we collected a
number of old wagon-wheels and mounted on them stove-pipes of different
calibre, till we had formidable-looking batteries, some large enough of
calibre to threaten Alexandria, and even the National Capitol and
Executive Mansion. It is needless to add that Munson's Hill was so safe as
not to disturb our profound slumbers. This was before the Federals began
to realize all of their advantages by floating balloons above our heads.

One of the most conspicuous and successful of our affairs occurred on the
11th of September. A brigade of the enemy's infantry, with eight pieces of
artillery and a detachment of cavalry, escorting a reconnoitring party,
advanced to Lewinsville. If they had secured and fortified a position
there they would have greatly annoyed us. Colonel Stuart, who from the
start had manifested those qualities of daring courage, tempered by
sagacity, which so admirably fitted him for outpost service, had his
pickets so far to the front that he was promptly informed of the presence
of the enemy. He was ordered, with about eight hundred infantry, a section
of Rosser's battery, and Captain Patrick's troop of cavalry, to give
battle, and so adroitly approached the enemy as to surprise him, and by a
bold dash drove him off in confusion, with some loss.

We had a number of small affairs which served to season the troops and
teach the importance of discipline and vigilance. It was while at Falls
Church that Major-General G. W. Smith reported for duty with the Army of
Northern Virginia, and was associated with General Johnston and General
Beauregard, the three forming a council for the general direction of the
operations of the army. General McClellan had by this time been appointed
to superior command on the Federal side.

[Illustration: GENERAL J. E. B. STUART]

Despairing of receiving reinforcement to enable him to assume the
offensive, General Johnston regarded it as hazardous to hold longer the
advanced post of Munson's and Mason's Hills, drew the troops back to and
near Fairfax Court-House, and later, about the 19th of October, still
farther to Centreville, and prepared for winter quarters by strengthening
his positions and constructing huts, the line extending to Union Mills on
the right. These points were regarded as stronger in themselves and less
liable to be turned than the positions at and in advance of Fairfax
Court-House. We expected that McClellan would advance against us, but were
not disturbed. I was promoted major-general, which relieved me of the
outpost service, to which Colonel Stuart was assigned.

The autumn and early winter were not permitted to pass without some
stirring incidents in our front. Soon after the battle of July 21, Colonel
Eppa Hunton was ordered to reoccupy Leesburg with his regiment, the Eighth
Virginia. Later, the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Mississippi
Regiments were sent to the same vicinity, and with the regiment already
there and a battery constituted the Seventh Brigade, Brigadier-General N.
G. Evans commanding. To cover a reconnoissance and an expedition to gather
supplies made by General McCall's division to Dranesville, General
McClellan ordered General C. P. Stone, commanding at Poolesville,
Maryland, to make a demonstration in force against Leesburg, and, if
practicable, to dislodge the Confederates at that place. Early in the
morning of the 21st of October four of General Stone's regiments crossed
the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry, and about the same time five other
regiments, under the immediate command of Colonel Baker, late United
States Senator from Oregon, crossed the river above at Ball's Bluff.
Leaving Colonel Barksdale with his Thirteenth Mississippi, with six pieces
of artillery as a reserve, to hold in check the force that had crossed at
Edwards's Ferry, Evans with his main force assailed the force under
Colonel Baker, and after a long and fierce struggle, under a heavy fire of
batteries on both sides of the river, drove them down the bluff to the
river, many surrendering, others plunging into the river to recross,
overcrowding and sinking the boats that had brought them over; some
drowning in the Potomac.

Two months later, December 20, there was an affair at Dranesville which
for us was by no means so satisfactory as Evans's at Leesburg and Ball's
Bluff. It was known that food for men and horses could be found in the
vicinity of Dranesville. All of the available wagons of the army were sent
to gather and bring it in, and Colonel Stuart, with one hundred and fifty
of his cavalry, the Sumter Flying Artillery (Captain A. S. Cutts), and
four regiments of infantry detailed from different brigades, was charged
with the command of the foraging party. The infantry regiments were the
Eleventh Virginia, Colonel Samuel Garland; Tenth Alabama, Colonel Forney;
Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Secrest; and First Kentucky,
Colonel Thomas Taylor; the cavalry, Ransom's and Bradford's.

General McCall, commanding the nearest Union division, happened just then
to want those supplies, or, as seems more probable, had information
through a spy of Stuart's expedition.

He took measures to gather the supplies, or surprise and perhaps capture
or destroy Stuart's party. However that may be, when Stuart reached the
vicinity of Dranesville he found himself in the presence of General Ord,
who had under him his own brigade of five regiments of infantry, Easton's
battery, two twenty-four-pound howitzers and two twelve-pound guns, and
two squadrons of cavalry. Finding that he was anticipated, and that his
only way of saving the train was to order it back to Centreville in all
haste, Stuart decided to attack, in order to give it time to get to a
place of safety, and despatched a detachment of cavalry on the turnpike
towards Leesburg to warn the wagons to hasten back to Centreville, the
cavalry to march between them and the enemy. He ordered his artillery and
infantry to hasten to the front, and as soon as they came up assailed the
enemy vigorously, continuing the engagement until he judged that his
wagon-train had passed beyond danger; then he extricated his infantry and
artillery from the contest, with a much heavier loss than he had inflicted
on the enemy, leaving the killed and some of the wounded. It was the first
success that had attended the Union arms in that quarter, and was
magnified and enjoyed on that side. This action advanced McClellan
considerably in popular estimation and led to the bestowal upon him, by
some enthusiast, of the sobriquet "the Young Napoleon."

During the autumn and early winter the weather had been unusually fine.
The roads and fields in that section were generally firm and in fine
condition for marching and manoeuvring armies. With the beginning of the
new year winter set in with rain and snow, alternate freezing and thawing,
until the roads and fields became seas of red mud.

As no effort of general advance was made during the season of firm roads,
we had little apprehension of trouble after the winter rains came to make
them too heavy for artillery service.



    The Defences of the Confederate Capital--Army of Northern Virginia at
    Centreville--Aggressive Action--Council with the President and
    Secretary of War--Mr. Davis's High Opinion of McClellan--Operations on
    the Peninsula--Engagements about Yorktown and Williamsburg--Severe
    Toil added to the Soldiers' Usual Labors by a Saturated Soil.

Apropos of the attack upon Richmond, apprehended in the winter of 1861-62,
it should be borne in mind that there were four routes supposed to be
practicable for the advance of the enemy:

1. The original route by Manassas Junction and the Orange and Alexandria

2. By crossing the Potomac near Potomac Creek, thence by Fredericksburg to

3. By land,--the shortest,--to go down the Potomac to the Lower
Rappahannock, landing at or near Urbana, and thence march for the
Confederate capital.

4. By transports to Fortress Monroe, thence by the Peninsula, between the
James and York Rivers.

General McClellan's long delay to march against General Johnston, when he
was so near and accessible at Centreville, indicated that he had no
serious thought of advancing by that route. To prepare to meet him on
either of the other routes, a line behind the Rapidan was the chosen

General Beauregard had been relieved of duty in Virginia and ordered West
with General A. S. Johnston.

The withdrawal from Centreville was delayed some weeks, waiting for roads
that could be travelled, but was started on the 9th of March, 1862, and on
the 11th the troops were south of the Rappahannock.

General Whiting's command from Occoquan joined General Holmes at
Fredericksburg. Generals Ewell and Early crossed by the railroad bridge
and took positions near it. General G. W. Smith's division and mine
marched by the turnpike to near Culpeper Court-House. General Stuart, with
the cavalry, remained on Bull Run until the 10th, then withdrew to
Warrenton Junction.

During the last week of March our scouts on the Potomac reported a large
number of steamers, loaded with troops, carrying, it was estimated, about
one hundred and forty thousand men, passing down and out of the Potomac,
destined, it was supposed, for Fortress Monroe, or possibly for the coast
of North Carolina. We were not left long in doubt. By the 4th of April,
McClellan had concentrated three _corps d'armée_ between Fortress Monroe
and Newport News, on the James River. The Confederate left crossed the
Rapidan, and from Orange Court-House made connection with the troops on
the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. About the 1st of April, Generals
Johnston and G. W. Smith were called to Richmond for conference with the
War Department, leaving me in command. On the 3d I wrote General Jackson,
in the Shenandoah Valley, proposing to join him with sufficient
reinforcements to strike the Federal force in front of him a sudden,
severe blow, and thus compel a change in the movements of McClellan's
army. I explained that the responsibility of the move could not be taken
unless I was with the detachment to give it vigor and action to meet my
views, or give time to get back behind the Rapidan in case the authorities
discovered the move and ordered its recall.

I had been left in command on the Rapidan, but was not authorized to
assume command of the Valley district. As the commander of the district
did not care to have an officer there of higher rank, the subject was

General Johnston, assigned to the Department of the Peninsula and
Norfolk, made an inspection of his new lines, and on his return
recommended that they should be abandoned. Meanwhile, his army had been
ordered to Richmond. He was invited to meet the President to discuss
military affairs, and asked General G. W. Smith and myself to go with him.
The Secretary of War and General R. E. Lee were with the President when we

It was the first time that I had been called to such august presence, to
deliberate on momentous matters, so I had nothing to say till called on.
The views intended to be offered were prefaced by saying that I knew
General McClellan; that he was a military engineer, and would move his
army by careful measurement and preparation; that he would not be ready to
advance before the 1st of May. The President interrupted, and spoke of
McClellan's high attainments and capacity in a style indicating that he
did not care to hear any one talk who did not have the same appreciation
of our great adversary. McClellan had been a special favorite with Mr.
Davis when he was Secretary of War in the Pierce administration, and he
seemed to take such reflections upon his favorites as somewhat personal.
From the hasty interruption I concluded that my opinion had only been
asked through polite recognition of my presence, not that it was wanted,
and said no more. My intention was to suggest that we leave Magruder to
look after McClellan, and march, as proposed to Jackson a few days before,
through the Valley of Virginia, cross the Potomac, threaten Washington,
and call McClellan to his own capital.

At the time of McClellan's landing on the peninsula, the Confederate army
on that line was commanded by Major-General J. Bankhead Magruder, and
consisted of eleven thousand men of all arms. The defensive line was
pitched behind the Warwick River, a sluggish stream that rises about a
mile south of Yorktown, and flows south to its confluence with James
River. The Warwick was dammed at different points, thus flooding the
intervening low lands as far as Lee's Mills, where the river spreads into
marsh lands. The dams were defended by batteries and rifle-trenches. The
left rested at Yorktown, which was fortified by continuous earthworks,
strong water and land batteries, and rifle-trenches reaching to the right,
connecting with those behind the Warwick. Yorktown is on the right bank of
York River, which narrows at that point, with Gloucester Point on the
opposite bank. This point was also fortified, and held by a strong
garrison. On the south side of the James, General Huger held Norfolk, near
its mouth, fortified and garrisoned by about ten thousand men, while the
James River floated the Confederate vessels "Virginia" ("Merrimac"),
"Yorktown," "Jamestown," and "Teaser."

McClellan's army, embarked from Alexandria and moved by transports to the
vicinity of Fortress Monroe, as first collected, numbered one hundred and
eight thousand of all arms, including the garrison at Fortress Monroe.

Magruder was speedily reinforced by a detachment from Huger's army, and
afterwards by Early's brigade of Johnston's army, and after a few days by
the balance of Johnston's army, the divisions of G. W. Smith, D. H. Hill,
and Longstreet, with Stuart's cavalry, General Johnston in command.

General McClellan advanced towards the Confederate line and made some
efforts at the dams, but it was generally understood that his plan was to
break the position by regular approaches. After allowing due time for the
completion of his battering arrangements, Johnston abandoned his line the
night of May 3 and marched back towards Richmond, ordering a corresponding
move by the troops at Norfolk; but the Confederate authorities interfered
in favor of Norfolk, giving that garrison time to withdraw its army
supplies. The divisions of G. W. Smith and D. H. Hill were ordered by the
Yorktown and Williamsburg road, Magruder's and Longstreet's by the Hampton
and Lee's Mill road, Stuart's cavalry to cover both routes.

Anticipating this move as the possible result of operations against his
lower line, General Magruder had constructed a series of earthworks about
two miles in front of Williamsburg. The main work, Fort Magruder, was a
bastion. On either side redoubts were thrown up reaching out towards the
James and York Rivers. The peninsula is about eight miles wide at that
point. College Creek on the right flows into James River, and Queen's
Creek on the left into the York, both giving some defensive strength,
except at mill-dams, which were passable by vehicles. The redoubts on the
left of Fort Magruder commanded the dam in Queen's Creek at Sanders's
Pond, but the dam in College Creek was beyond protection from the

The four redoubts on the right of Fort Magruder had commanding positions
of the fort.

Finding the entire line of intrenchments at Yorktown empty on the morning
of May 4, McClellan ordered pursuit by his cavalry under its chief,
General Stoneman, with four batteries of horse artillery, supported by
Hooker's division on the Yorktown road and W. F. Smith's on the Hampton

They were followed on the Hampton road by General Heintzelman (Kearny's
division), Third Corps, and Couch's and Casey's divisions of Keyes's
(Fourth) Corps, Sumner's (Second) Corps on the Yorktown road. Nearing
Williamsburg, the roads converge and come together in range of field
batteries at Fort Magruder. About eight miles out from Yorktown, on the
Hampton road, Stuart, hearing of severe cavalry fight by the part of his
command on the Yorktown road, thought to ride across to the enemy's rear
and confuse his operations, but presently found a part of the enemy's
cavalry and a battery under General Emory marching in his rear by a
cross-road from the Yorktown road. He formed and charged in column of
fours, gaining temporary success, but fell upon the enemy's battery, and
found Benson prompt in getting into action, and in turn, with dismounted
troopers, drove him back, cutting his line of retreat and forcing him off
to the beach road along the James River. The march of Emory's cavalry
across to the Hampton road misled Hooker's division to the same march, and
that division, crowding the highway, caused Smith's division to diverge by
a cross-road, which led it over into the Yorktown road. These misleadings
delayed the advance on both roads. Emory followed Stuart until the latter
in turn came upon strong grounds, where pursuit became isolated and

The removal of the Confederate cavalry from the Hampton road left Hooker's
march free of molestation. But not advised of the opportunity, he took the
precautions usual on such occasions. His early approach, however, hurried
the movements of the Confederate cavalry on the Yorktown road, and let the
enemy in upon us on that road before we were advised of his approach.

General Johnston rode near the rear of his army to receive despatches from
his cavalry commander. General Stuart wrote and sent them, but his
couriers found the enemy's cavalry in the way and returned to him. The
cavalry fight on the Yorktown road was also damaging to the Confederates,
and not reported to the commanding general.

About four P.M., General Cook's cavalry and the horse artillery under
Gibson debouched from the woodlands on the Yorktown road and began to
examine the open ground in front of the Confederate field-works. General
Johnston, who was at the rear, hurried Semmes's brigade of McLaws's
division into the nearest redoubts, and ordered McLaws to call back
another brigade. Kershaw was ordered, and Manly's battery. The battery had
to go at a run to be sure of their cover in the redoubts. Another battery
was ordered by McLaws, who rode and took command. When Kershaw got to the
fort, part of his men were deployed in the wood beyond, to his left.

Meanwhile, the Federal cavalry was advancing, Gibson's horse artillery and
Manly's Confederate battery were in severe combat, the latter having the
benefit of gun-proof parapets. Observing the approach of cavalry near his
left, McLaws ordered two of Manly's guns into Fort Magruder, which, with
the assistance of Kershaw's infantry, drove off that column. Some cavalry,
riding near the left redoubt with little concern, were first taken for
Confederates, but the next moment were identified as Federals, when the
artillery was turned upon them, and, with the Confederate cavalry, pushed
them quite away. When the left redoubt, commanding the dam at Sanders's
Pond, was occupied by a part of Kershaw's men, McCarthy's battery came
into action, and, with the assistance of others, gave Gibson's battery, in
the open, serious trouble. McLaws ordered an advance of part of Semmes's
brigade, led by Colonel Cummings. This, with the severe artillery fire
from the redoubts and guns afield, cleared the open, leaving one of
Gibson's guns in the mud, which was secured by McCarthy's men as a trophy
of the day's work. Ten horses had been sent back to haul the piece off,
but the mud was too heavy for them. Stuart, with the troopers of his
immediate following and his section of horse artillery, crossed College
Creek near James River, and came in after the action at the redoubts.
Emory abandoned the pursuit as not feasible, and bivouacked on the route.
Cavalry rencounters of the day were reported, in which both sides claimed
success. Stuart reported Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham and four men wounded.
Of the other side, Cooke reported thirty-five killed, wounded, and
missing. Gibson reported one officer and four men wounded, and one gun
abandoned. Emory reported two killed and four wounded, and Sanders one
officer wounded. But most of the Federal losses were in the encounters at
the redoubts with the artillery and infantry.

The enemy's cavalry reported the redoubt on the Confederate left
unoccupied, and Hancock's brigade (Smith's division) was ordered forward
to take it, but the woods through which he marched were tangled and
swampy, and delayed him until night brought him to bivouac. Meanwhile, the
Confederates who drove the cavalry from its reconnoissance had occupied
the redoubt.

The corps commanders Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes and the cavalry leader
Stoneman were together that night in conference. The highways, over flats
but little above tide-water, were saturated by the spring rains, cut into
deep ruts by the haul of heavy trains, and puddled by the tramp of
infantry and cavalry. The wood and fallow lands were bogs, with occasional
quicksands, adding severest labor to the usual toils of battle. So no
plans were formed, further than to feel the way forward when there was
light to see.

The enemy got some of our men who were worn out by the fatigue of the
siege and the heavy march of the night and day.



    The Attack on Fort Magruder--Hancock occupies two Redoubts--The
    Slaughter in Early's Brigade--The Fifth North Carolina Regiment and
    Twenty-Fourth Virginia mercilessly exposed--A Hard-Fought
    Engagement--A Confederate Victory--McClellan not on the Field the
    Greater Part of the Day--Hancock called "The Superb" by
    McClellan--Johnston pays High Tribute to Longstreet.

Before quitting his trenches at Yorktown, Johnston anticipated a move of
part of McClellan's army by transports to the head of York River, to cut
his line of march towards Richmond, and conceived it important to have a
strong force at that point in time to meet and check the move. To that end
he ordered Magruder to march at two A.M. on the 5th of May with D. R.
Jones's and McLaws's divisions, to be followed by the divisions of G. W.
Smith and D. H. Hill; Longstreet's division to cover the movement of his
trains and defend Stuart's cavalry in case of severe pressure. Late in the
afternoon of the 4th I was ordered to send a brigade to the redoubts to
relieve McLaws's division. The brigades being small, I sent two, R. H.
Anderson's and Pryor's, with Macon's battery, under Lieutenant Clopton,
two guns under Captain Garrett, and two under Captain McCarthy, to report
to General Anderson, the senior brigadier. At the time it was thought that
the army would be on the march by daylight in the morning, and that the
rear-guard would closely follow; but after nightfall a down-pour of rain
came, flooding thoroughfares and by-ways, woodlands and fields, so that
parts of our trains were stalled on the ground, where they stood during
the night. It was dark when Anderson joined McLaws, who had drawn his men
together in readiness to join the advance march. Anticipating an early
march himself, Anderson occupied Fort Magruder and advanced his pickets so
as to cover with their fire the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton
roads. Heavy clouds and darkness settling down upon him, he made no effort
at a critical survey of the surroundings; while the steady rain through
the night gave signs of serious delay in the movements of the army, but he
little thought that by the delay he could be called into battle. In the
morning when time grew heavier he was advised to call in the brigades near
him, in case he should need them, and instructions were sent them to
answer his call.

At daylight he occupied the redoubts on the right of Fort Magruder, and
two of those on the left. Two others farther on the left were not seen
through the rain, and no one had been left to tell him of them or of the
grounds. The field in his front and far off on his right was open. That in
the immediate front had been opened by felling trees. On his left were
woodland and the swampy creek. General Hooker's division of the Third
Corps came to the open on the Hampton road at seven A.M. of the 5th, and
engaged by regiments,--the First Massachusetts on his left, preceded by a
battalion of skirmishers; the Second New Hampshire on the right, in the
same order; Hancock's brigade of W. F. Smith's division of the Fourth
Corps threatening on the Yorktown road; supported by part of Davidson's
brigade and artillery. After the advance of his infantry in the slashes,
General Hooker, with the Eleventh Massachusetts and Thirty-sixth
Pennsylvania Regiments of Grover's brigade, cleared the way for
communication with the troops on the Yorktown road, and ordered Webber's
six-gun battery into action towards the front of the fallen timber. As it
burst from the wood our infantry and every gun in reach opened upon it a
fire so destructive that it was unmanned before it came into practice.
Volunteers to man the battery were called, and with the assistance of men
of Osborn's battery the guns were opened. Bramhall's battery was advanced
and put into action on the right of Webber's, when the two poured an
unceasing fire against our troops about the fort and redoubts. It was not
very destructive, however, and they thought to reserve their ammunition.

The Fifth New Jersey Regiment, of Patterson's brigade, was added to the
guard of the batteries, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth were deployed
on the left in the woodland. Anderson called up Wilcox's brigade, and
ordered it to his right, reinforced it by the men of Pryor's brigade not
needed at the forts, and presently called for the brigades of A. P. Hill
and Pickett, to further support his right.

From the swelling noise of battle I concluded that it would be well to
ride to the front, and ordered the remaining brigade (Colston's) and the
batteries of Dearing and Stribling to follow. Stuart sent his horse
artillery under Pelham into the action on the open field.

Viewing the ground on the left, I thought it not so well protected as
Anderson conceived, and sent to D. H. Hill, who was but little advanced on
his march, for one of his brigades. Early's was sent, to whose brigade
were temporarily attached the Florida regiment and a Mississippi
battalion. Anderson had left the fort, and was busy handling the brigades
engaged in the woods on the right. Colston's was put in with the other
brigades under Anderson, who afterwards called for another regiment. The
Florida regiment and the Mississippi battalion were sent. Early, with his
brigade, was posted on the field in rear of our left.

When it became evident that the fight was for the day, D. H. Hill was
asked to return with the balance of his division. Meanwhile, Hooker was
bracing the fight on his left. Emory reported to him with his cavalry and
light battery, but as his fight was in the wood, Emory was asked to
reconnoitre on his extreme left. The fight growing in the wood, Grover
drew off part of his brigade to reinforce against it. The Seventy-second
and Seventeenth New York Regiments of Taylor's brigade were also sent;
then the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth New York Regiments of the same
brigade; but the Confederates gained ground gradually. They were, however,
getting short of ammunition. While holding their line, some of the
regiments were permitted to retire a little to fill their cartridge-boxes
from those of the fallen of the enemy and of their comrades. This move was
misconstrued into an order to withdraw, and the line fell back a little.
But the mistake was rectified, and the ground that had been abandoned was

Hooker ordered the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania
Regiments to the support of the batteries, and the Second New Hampshire
Regiment to his left. Anderson, drawing his troops together near the
batteries, made a concentrated move upon them, and cleared them of the
gunners, securing four of Webber's guns and forty horses. Just then he was
reinforced by Colston's brigade, the Florida regiment, and the Mississippi
battalion. General Stuart taking it that the enemy was badly broken and in
retreat, rode up with his cavalry, insisting upon a charge and pursuit. As
he did not recognize authority except of the commander-in-chief, he was
only cautioned that the break was only of the enemy's front, that he would
find reinforcements coming up, and this he began to realize by the clearer
ring of their muskets. He speedily encountered them, but in time to get
away before meeting serious trouble. About three o'clock Kearny's division
arrived, and only a few minutes later D. H. Hill's, of the Confederates.
On the approach of Kearny's leading brigades, one regiment was detached
from Berry's to reinforce Emory's Cavalry detachment on their left. The
other regiments were deployed, the Fifth Michigan on the left of the
road, the Thirty-seventh New York on its left, along the road, one company
of the New York regiment from left to rear. Six companies of the Michigan
regiment were broken off to the rear of its right as reserve, leaving its
forward battalion partly across the road, while that in rear had two
companies on the right and two on the left of the road. Two regiments of
Birney's brigade were deployed, the Thirty-eighth on the right of, and the
Fortieth across, the road, to relieve some of Hooker's regiments. Then
Peck's brigade of Couch's division came, and was put in on the right, the
One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania and the Fifty-fifth New York on the
left, the Sixty-second New York in the wood, the Ninety-third Pennsylvania
on the left, and after a little the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania.

Before the reinforcements arrived for Hooker's relief, Anderson had
established his advance line of skirmishers, so as to cover with their
fire Webber's guns that were abandoned. The Federal reinforcing columns
drove back his advance line, when, in turn, he reinforced, recovered the
ground, and met General Peck, who led the last reinforcing brigade. This
advance was so firm that General Peck found it necessary to put in his
last regiment, the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania, but neither our force nor
our condition of march could warrant further aggressive work of our right.
General Couch, left in command on the Federal left, posted his troops for
the night,--General Devens with the Seventh Massachusetts Regiment and
Second Rhode Island, General Palmer with two, and General Keim with three
other regiments, supporting General Peck. General Peck's ammunition being
exhausted, his brigade was relieved by six of the new regiments, and
reported that "Every preparation was made to resist a night attack."[10]
On the Confederate side, General Anderson reported his position safe to
hold until the time to withdraw for the march. About noon, General
Hancock, in command of his own and Davidson's brigades in front of our
left, started with three of his own regiments and two of Davidson's and
the six-gun battery under Lieutenant Carson in search of the unoccupied
redoubts in that quarter. He approached by the dam at Sanders's Pond,
passed the dam, and occupied one of the redoubts, leaving three companies
to guard a road crossing on the right of his line of march. He put three
companies of infantry in the redoubt and advanced his regiments and
battery to the field in front. He then found another redoubt not occupied,
and posted three other companies in it. He was reinforced by a four-gun
battery under Captain Wheeler, which he posted in rear of his line of
battle and awaited developments. When the last engagement on our right had
calmed down to exchange of desultory shots, D. H. Hill's division was
waiting to know if Anderson would need further support. Meanwhile, some of
his officers had made a reconnoissance in front of his ground, and
reported a route by which favorable attack could be made upon the Federals
at the redoubt under Hancock.

General Johnston had arrived at my head-quarters, near Fort Magruder, when
General Hill sent to report the reconnoissance, and to ask that he be
allowed to make a move against Hancock, by Early's brigade. General
Johnston received the message, and referred the officer to me. I ordered
that the move should not be made, explaining that we were only fighting
for time to draw off our trains, that aggressive battle was necessary on
our right in order to keep the enemy back in the woodland from the open,
where, by his superior artillery and numbers, he might deploy beyond our
limits, and turn us out of position; that on our left there was no cause
for apprehension of such action, and we could not risk being drawn into
serious delay by starting new work so late in the day. Very soon General
Hill rode over to report of the opportunity: that he thought he could get
through before night, and would not be likely to involve delay of our
night march. General Johnston referred him to me. I said,--

    "The brigade you propose to use is not in safe hands. If you will go
    with it, and see that the troops are properly handled, you can make
    the attack, but don't involve us so as to delay the march after

In a letter from General Hill, after the war, he wrote of the fight by
this brigade,--

    "I cannot think of it, till this day, without horror. The slaughter of
    the Fifth North Carolina Regiment was one of the most awful things I
    ever saw, and it was caused by a blunder. At your request, I think, I
    followed Early's brigade, following the right wing."

General Hill was in advance of the brigade with the Fifth and Twenty-third
North Carolina Regiments, General Early in rear with the Twenty-fourth and
Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiments. General Hill ordered the advance
regiments to halt after crossing a streamlet and get under cover of the
wood till the brigade could form; but General Early, not waiting for
orders or the brigade, rode to the front of the Twenty-fourth Virginia,
and with it made the attack. The gallant McRae, of the Fifth North
Carolina, seeing the Twenty-fourth Virginia hotly engaged, dashed forward,
_nolens volens_, to its relief. The other regiments, seeing the confusion
of movements and of orders, failed to go forward. Part of my troops, on
Early's right, seeing that a fight was open on that part of the field,
started without orders to go to his relief, but found the fight lost
before they were engaged. After the brigade was collected on its first
position, General Johnston rode to his head-quarters. At dark the
Confederates were withdrawn and took up the line of march, the division
of D. H. Hill taking the rear of the column, Rains's brigade the rear of
the division. On his march, General Rains found, in a broken-down
ammunition-wagon, several loaded shells, four of them with sensitive fuse
primers, which he placed near some fallen trees, cut down as obstructions.
He afterwards heard that some of them were tramped upon by the Federal
cavalry and exploded.

The pursuit was not active, hardly annoying. The roads were cut into deep
mud by the trains, and the side-ways by troops far out on either side,
making puddles ankle-deep in all directions, so that the march was slow
and trying, but giving almost absolute safe-conduct against pursuit, and
our men were allowed to spread their ranks in search of ground strong
enough to bear them.

My estimate, made on the field, of the troops engaged was, Confederate,
9000; Union, 12,000. The casualties of the engagement were, Confederate,
1565 aggregate;[11] Federal, 2288 aggregate.[12]

General McClellan was at Yorktown during the greater part of the day to
see Franklin's, Sedgwick's, and Richardson's divisions aboard the
transports for his proposed flanking and rear move up York River, but upon
receiving reports that the engagement at Williamsburg was growing serious
and not satisfactory, he rode to the battle, and called the divisions of
Sedgwick and Richardson to follow him.

The object of the battle was to gain time to haul our trains to places of
safety. The effect, besides, was to call two of the divisions from their
flanking move to support the battle, and this so crippled that expedition
that it gave us no serious trouble. The trophies of the battle were with
the Confederates, and they claim the honor to inscribe Williamsburg upon
their battle-flags.

The success of General Hancock in holding his position in and about the
forts with five regiments and two batteries against the assault of the
Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments was given heroic
proportions by his chief, who christened him "The Superb," to relieve, it
is supposed, by the picturesque figure on his right, the discomfiture of
his left. But, reading between the lines, the highest compliment was for
the two Confederate regiments.

In his official account, General Johnston said,--

    "The action gradually increased in magnitude until about three
    o'clock, when General Longstreet, commanding the rear, requested that
    a part of Major-General Hill's troops might be sent to his aid. Upon
    this I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a
    spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and brave heart left no
    apology for interference."

Franklin's division was taken by transports to the mouth of Pamunkey
River, and was supported by the navy. On the 7th a brigade of Sedgwick's
division joined Franklin. On the same day, Johnston's army was collected
near Barhamville. General Whiting, with Hood's brigade and part of
Hampton's, engaged the advance of Franklin's command and forced it back.
This cleared our route of march towards Richmond, Smith's and Magruder's
divisions by the road to New Kent Court-House, Hill's and Longstreet's
nearer the Chickahominy.

General McClellan's plans were laid according to strict rules of strategy,
but he was not quick or forcible in handling his troops.



    A New Line of Defence--Positions of the Confronting Armies--Fitz-John
    Porter--Terrific Storm on the Eve of Battle--General Johnston's Orders
    to Longstreet, Smith, and Huger--Lack of Co-operation on the
    Confederate Side, and Ensuing Confusion--Fatalities among Confederate
    Officers--Kearny's Action--Serious Wounding of General Johnston at the
    Close of the Battle--Summary and Analysis of Losses.

On the 9th of May the Confederate army was halted, its right near Long
Bridge of the Chickahominy River; its left and cavalry extending towards
the Pamunkey through New Kent Court-House. On the 11th the commander of
the Confederate ram "Virginia" ("Merrimac"), finding the water of James
River not sufficient to float her to the works near Richmond, scuttled and
sank the ship where she lay.

On the 15th the Federal navy attacked our works at Chapin's and Drury's
Bluffs, but found them too strong for water batteries. That attack
suggested to General Johnston that he move nearer Richmond to be in
position to lend the batteries assistance in case of need. He crossed the
Chickahominy, his right wing at Long Bridge, his left by Bottom's Bridge,
and took position from Drury's Bluff on his right, to the Mechanicsville
turnpike, with his infantry, the cavalry extending on the left and front
to the lower Rappahannock and Fredericksburg. The right wing, D. H. Hill's
and Longstreet's divisions, under Longstreet, from James River to White
Oak Swamp; the left under G. W. Smith. Smith's division and Magruder's
command from White Oak Swamp, extending thence to the Mechanicsville pike,
with Jackson a hundred miles away in the Shenandoah Valley.

After careful study of the works and armaments at Drury's Bluff, I
ventured the suggestion that we recross the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville
and stand behind Beaver Dam Creek, prepared against McClellan's right when
he should be ready to march towards Richmond, and call him to relieve his
flank before crossing the river.

Although the country between McClellan's landing on the Pamunkey to the
Chickahominy was free of all obstacles on the 15th of May, the head of his
advance did not reach the banks of the latter river till the 21st. On the
16th he established his permanent depot at the White House, on the
Pamunkey, and organized two provisional army corps,--the Fifth, of
Fitz-John Porter's division, and Sykes's, under command of Porter; the
Sixth, of Franklin's and W. F. Smith's divisions, under Franklin. On the
26th the York River Railroad as far as the bridge across the Chickahominy
was repaired and in use. This, with other bridges, was speedily repaired,
and new bridges ordered built at such points as should be found necessary
to make free communication between the posts of the army.

On the 24th parties were advanced on the Williamsburg road as far as Seven
Pines, where a spirited affair occurred between General Naglee's forces
and General Hatton's brigade, the latter withdrawing a mile and a half on
the Williamsburg road. At the same time two other parties of Federals were
sent up the left bank, one under General Davidson, of the cavalry, with
artillery and infantry supports, as far as Mechanicsville, where he
encountered and dislodged a Confederate cavalry force under Colonel B. H.
Robertson and occupied the position. The third party, under Colonel
Woodbury, the Fourth Michigan Infantry and a squadron of the Second United
States Cavalry, moved up to New Bridge, where the Fifth Louisiana, Colonel
Hunt, of Semmes's brigade, was on picket. Finding the bridge well guarded,
a party, conducted by Lieutenant Bowen, Topographical Engineers, marched
up the river, concealing their movements, crossed to the west bank, and,
passing down, surprised the Fifth Louisiana, threw it into disorder, and
gained position on the west side.

Pleased at these successes, General McClellan sent a sensational despatch
to the President. His position thus masked, rested his right upon Beaver
Dam Creek, a stream that flows from the height between the Chickahominy
and Pamunkey Rivers south to its confluence with the former a few hundred
yards below Mechanicsville Bridge. Its banks are scarped, about six feet
high, and eight feet apart, making a strong natural ditch for defensive

On commanding ground south of the creek admirably planned field-works were
soon constructed, which made that flank unassailable. Two miles out from
the river the creek loses its value as a defensive line. From Beaver Dam
the line was extended down the river to New Bridge, where it crossed and
reached its left out to White Oak Swamp, and there found as defensible
guard as the right at Beaver Dam Creek. The swamp is about a quarter of a
mile wide at the left, and down to the Chickahominy studded with heavy
forest-trees, always wet and boggy, but readily forded by infantry, and at
places by cavalry.

Near the middle of the line, back from New Bridge, was Stoneman's cavalry.
Fitz-John Porter's corps (Fifth) was posted at Beaver Dam Creek,
Franklin's (Sixth) two miles lower down, Sumner's (Second) near the middle
of the line, about three miles from the river. The Third and Fourth Corps
were on the south side, Kearny's division of the Third at Savage Station
of the York River Railroad, Hooker's division at White Oak Swamp Bridge,
with entrenched lines. The Fourth Corps was posted on the Williamsburg
road, Couch's division about a mile in advance of Hooker's, of the Third,
at the junction of the Nine Miles road, entrenched, and field of abatis;
Casey's division of the Third half a mile in advance of Couch's,
entrenched, and field of abatis. The point occupied by Couch's division is
known as Seven Pines. His advanced picket-guard on the Nine Miles road was
at Fair Oaks Station of the York River Railroad.

The line, which was somewhat concave towards Richmond, was strengthened at
vulnerable points by field-works. General Sumner was senior of the corps
commanders, and in command of the right wing; General Heintzelman, the
senior of the south side, was in command of the left wing. The
Chickahominy is a hundred feet wide as far up as Mechanicsville Bridge,
but narrows above to forty and thirty. Along the line of McClellan's
deployment its course was through lowlands of tangled woods that fringe
its banks, the valley seldom more than a hundred yards wide. Artillery was
posted to command all bridges and those ordered for construction. On the
26th, General McClellan ordered General Fitz-John Porter to organize a
force to march against a Confederate outpost near Hanover Court-House.
Porter took of Morell's division three brigades,--Martindale's,
Butterfield's, and McQuade's,--Berdan's Sharp-shooters and three
batteries, two regiments of cavalry under General Emory, and Benson's
horse battery; Warren's brigade to march up the right bank of the Pamunkey
in connection with operations projected for the fighting column. Porter
was the most skilful tactician and strongest fighter in the Federal army,
thoroughly trained in his profession from boyhood, and of some experience
in field work.

The Confederate outpost was commanded by Brigadier-General L. O'B. Branch,
six regiments of infantry, one battery, under Captain Latham, and a
cavalry regiment, under Colonel Robertson. General Branch was a brigadier
from civil life. The result of the affair was the discomfiture of General
Branch, with the loss of one gun and about seven hundred prisoners.
Losses in action, not including prisoners: Confederates, 265; Federals,

A. P. Hill was promoted to major-general, and assigned to command of a
division at that outpost and stationed at Ashland.

On the 27th, General Johnston received information that General McDowell's
corps was at Fredericksburg, and on the march to reinforce McClellan's
right at Mechanicsville. He prepared to attack McClellan before McDowell
could reach him. To this end he withdrew Smith's division from the
Williamsburg road, relieving it by the division of D. H. Hill; withdrew
Longstreet's division from its position, and A. P. Hill's from Ashland.
The fighting column was to be under General G. W. Smith, his next in rank,
and General Whiting was assigned command of Smith's division,--the column
to consist of A. P. Hill's, Whiting's, and D. R. Jones's divisions. The
latter was posted between the Mechanicsville pike and Meadow Bridge road.
A. P. Hill was to march direct against McClellan's outpost at
Mechanicsville, Whiting to cross the river at Meadow Bridge, and D. R.
Jones at Mechanicsville, thus completing the column of attack on the east

I was to march by the Mechanicsville road to the vicinity of the bridge,
and to strike down against the Federal right, west of the river, the march
to be made during the night; D. H. Hill to post a brigade on his right on
the Charles City road to guard the field to be left by his division, as
well as the line left vacant by Longstreet's division.

At nightfall the troops took up the march for their several assigned
positions. Before dark General Johnston called a number of his officers
together for instructions,--viz., Smith, Magruder, Stuart, and Longstreet.
When we were assembled, General Johnston announced later information: that
McDowell's line of march had been changed,--that he was going north.
Following the report of this information, General Smith proposed that the
plan for battle should be given up, in view of the very strong ground at
Beaver Dam Creek.[13] I urged that the plan laid against the concentrating
columns was made stronger by the change of direction of McDowell's column,
and should suggest more prompt and vigorous prosecution. In this Magruder
and Stuart joined me. The _pros_ and _cons_ were talked over till a late
hour, when at last General Johnston, weary of it, walked aside to a
separate seat. I took the opportunity to draw near him, and suggested that
the Federal position behind Beaver Dam Creek, so seriously objected to by
General Smith, could be turned by marching to and along the high ground
between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey Rivers; that the position of the
enemy when turned would be abandoned without a severe struggle, and give a
fair field for battle; that we should not lose the opportunity to await
another possible one.

General Johnston replied that he was aware of all that, but found that he
had selected the wrong officer for the work. This ended the talk, and I
asked to be allowed to halt my columns as soon as possible. The other
movements were arrested, except that of A. P. Hill's division, which was
ordered to continue its march, cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge,
and take position between the Meadow Bridge road and the Brooke turnpike.
The counter-order reinstated my command of the right wing, including D. H.
Hill's division on the Williamsburg road and extending to the York River
Railroad. Before leaving the conference, I announced that we would fight
on the Williamsburg road if we had to find the enemy through bayous.

The order to halt the columns found Smith's division between the
Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridge roads, Longstreet's near the city at the
Nine Miles road; D. R. Jones had not moved.

On the 29th and 30th, General D. H. Hill sent out reconnoitring parties on
the Williamsburg and Charles City roads. On the 30th he received a fair
report of Casey's intrenched camp, and the probable strength and extent of
the line of his skirmishers reaching out his left front to White Oak
Swamp. On the 29th, General Johnston wrote General Whiting, commanding
Smith's division, giving notice of a reconnoissance ordered by General
Hill, cautioning the former that his division should be drawn towards the
right, to be in better position for support of a battle of his right, and

    "Who knows but that in the course of the morning Longstreet's scheme
    may accomplish itself? If we get into a fight here, you will have to
    hurry to help us."

The report of General D. H. Hill's reconnoissance of the 30th was
forwarded to head-quarters. I followed it, and found General Johnston
ready to talk over plans for battle. General Huger had reported with three
of his brigades, and was in camp near the outskirts of Richmond on Gillis
Creek. The plan settled upon was that the attack should be made by General
D. H. Hill's division on the Williamsburg road, supported by Longstreet's
division. Huger's division, just out of garrison duty at Norfolk, was to
march between Hill's right and the swamp against the enemy's line of
skirmishers, and move abreast of the battle; G. W. Smith's division, under
Whiting, to march by the Gaines road to Old Tavern, and move abreast of
the battle on its left. The field before Old Tavern was not carefully
covered by the enemy's skirmishers north of Fair Oaks, nor by parties in

Experience during the discussion of the battle ordered for the 28th caused
me to doubt of effective work from the troops ordered for the left flank,
but the plan seemed so simple that it was thought impossible for any one
to go dangerously wrong; and General Johnston stated that he would be on
that road, the better to receive from his troops along the crest of the
Chickahominy information of movements of the enemy on the farther side of
the river, and to look to the co-operation of the troops on the Nine Miles

To facilitate marches, Huger's division was to have the Charles City road
to the head of White Oak Swamp, file across it and march down its northern
margin; D. H. Hill to have the Williamsburg road to the enemy's front;
Longstreet's division to march by the Nine Miles road and a lateral road
leading across the rear of General Hill on the Williamsburg road; G. W.
Smith by the Gaines road to Old Tavern on the Nine Miles road.

The tactical handling of the battle on the Williamsburg road was left to
my care, as well as the general conduct of affairs south of the York River
Railroad, the latter line being the left of the field to which I had been
assigned, the right wing.

While yet affairs were under consideration, a terrific storm of vivid
lightning, thunderbolts, and rain, as severe as ever known to any climate,
burst upon us, and continued through the night more or less severe. In the
first lull I rode from General Johnston's to my head-quarters, and sent
orders for early march.

For a more comprehensive view of affairs as ordered, it may be well to
explain that General Johnston ordered Smith's division by the Gaines road,
so that, in case of delay of its march, McLaws's division, on that road
and nearer the field of proposed action, could be brought in to the left
of the battle, leaving the place of his division to be occupied by
Smith's, when the latter reached McLaws's vacated line. There was,
therefore, no reason why the orders for march should be misconstrued or
misapplied. I was with General Johnston all of the time that he was
engaged in planning and ordering the battle, heard every word and thought
expressed by him of it, and received his verbal orders; Generals Huger and
Smith his written orders.

General Johnston's order to General Smith was:

        "May 30, 9.15 P.M.


    "GENERAL,--If nothing prevents, we will fall upon the enemy in front
    of Major-General Hill (who occupies the position on the Williamsburg
    road from which your troops moved to the neighborhood of Meadow
    Bridge) early in the morning, as early as practicable. The
    Chickahominy will be passable only at the bridge, a great advantage to
    us. Please be ready to move by the Gaines road, coming as early as
    possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off.
    Should there be cause for haste, Major-General McLaws, on your
    approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may
    reinforce General Longstreet.

          "Most respectfully your obedient servant,
            "J. E. JOHNSTON."[14]

General Johnston's order for General Huger read:

        "May 30, 1862, 8.30 P.M.


    "GENERAL,--The reports of Major-General D. H. Hill give me the
    impression that the enemy is in considerable strength in his front. It
    seems to me necessary that we should increase our force also; for that
    object I wish to concentrate the troops of your division on the
    Charles City road, and to concentrate the troops of Major-General Hill
    on the Williamsburg road. To do this it will be necessary for you to
    move, as early in the morning as possible, to relieve the brigade of
    General Hill's division now on the Charles City road. I have desired
    General Hill to send you a guide. The road is the second large one
    diverging to the right from the Williamsburg road. The first turns
    off near the toll-gate. On reaching your position on the Charles City
    road, learn at once the route to the main roads, to Richmond on your
    right and left, especially those to the left, and try to find guides.
    Be ready, if an action should begin on your left, to fall upon the
    enemy's left flank.

          "Most respectfully your obedient servant,
            "J. E. JOHNSTON.

    "P.S.--It is necessary to move very early."[15]

The Nine Miles road takes the name from the distance by that road from
Richmond to Seven Pines. The Williamsburg road to the same point was
sometimes called the Seven Miles road, because of the distance by that
road to Seven Pines.

As expressed and repeated in his orders, General Johnston's wish was to
have the battle pitched as early as practicable. When his orders were
issued, he was under the impression that I would be the ranking officer on
the right of the York Railroad, and would give detailed instructions to
govern the later operations of Huger's troops.

Subsequent events seem to call for mention just here that General Smith,
instead of moving the troops by the route assigned them, marched back to
the Nine Miles road near the city, rode to Johnston's head-quarters about
six in the morning, and reported that he was with the division, but not
for the purpose of taking command from General Whiting. As General
Johnston did not care to order him back to his position as commander of
the left wing, he set himself to work to make trouble, complained that my
troops were on the Nine Miles road in the way of his march, and presently
complained that they had left that road and were over on the Williamsburg
road, and induced General Johnston to so far modify the plans as to order
three of my brigades down the Nine Miles road to the New Bridge fork.

The order was sent by Lieutenant Washington, of Johnston's staff, who,
unused to campaigning, failed to notice that he was not riding on my line
of march, and rode into the enemy's lines. This accident gave the enemy
the first warning of approaching danger; it was misleading, however, as it
caused General Keyes to look for the attack by the Nine Miles road.

The storms had flooded the flat lands, and the waters as they fell seemed
weary of the battle of the elements, and inclined to have a good rest on
the soft bed of sand which let them gently down to the substratum of clay;
or it may have been the purpose of kind Providence to so intermix the
upper and lower strata as to interpose serious barriers to the passing of
artillery, and thus break up the battle of men.

My march by the Nine Miles and lateral roads leading across to the
Williamsburg road was interrupted by the flooded grounds about the head of
Gillis Creek. At the same time this creek was bank full, where it found a
channel for its flow into the James. The delay of an hour to construct a
bridge was preferred to the encounter of more serious obstacles along the
narrow lateral road, flooded by the storm. As we were earlier at the
creek, it gave us precedence over Huger's division, which had to cross
after us. The division was prepared with cooked rations, had wagons packed
at six o'clock, and rested in the rear of General Hill's at nine A.M.

Meanwhile, General G. W. Smith's division had marched by the Nine Miles
road and was resting near the fork of the New Bridge road at Old Tavern.
Upon meeting General Huger in the morning, I gave him a succinct account
of General Johnston's plans and wishes; after which he inquired as to the
dates of our commissions, which revealed that he was the ranking officer,
when I suggested that it was only necessary for him to take command and
execute the orders. This he declined. Then it was proposed that he should
send two of his brigades across to join on the right of the column of
attack, while he could remain with his other brigade, which was to relieve
that of General Hill on the Charles City road. Though he expressed himself
satisfied with this, his manner was eloquent of discontent. The better to
harmonize, I proposed to reinforce his column by three of my brigades, to
be sent under General Wilcox, to lead or follow his division, as he might
order. Under this arrangement it seemed that concert of action was
assured. I gave especial orders to General Wilcox to have care that the
head of his column was abreast the battle when it opened, and rode forward
to join General Hill, my other three brigades advancing along the
Williamsburg road.

Opposing and in the immediate front of General Hill was the division of
General Casey, of the Fourth (Keyes's) Corps. The division stood in an
intrenched camp across the Williamsburg road, with a pentagonal redoubt
(unfinished) on the left of his line. Half a mile in rear of Casey's
division was that of Couch, of the same corps, behind a second trenched
line, at its junction of the Nine Miles road, part of Couch's extending
along the latter road to Fair Oaks Station of the York River Railroad, and
intrenched; farther forward he had a guarded picket station. Between Couch
and Casey a skirt of wood stretched from the swamp on their left across
the Williamsburg and Nine Miles roads and the railroad. Between the
stretch of forest and Couch was an open; spreading across the roads, and
at Casey's front, was another open, though more limited, some abatis being
arranged along their front lines. These were the only cleared fields on
the south side of the railroad within two miles of Casey's picket line,
our line of march and attack.

General D. H. Hill stood ready for battle at an early hour, waiting for
his brigade on the Charles City road. Under the delay to relieve that
brigade by one of Huger's divisions, I sent orders to General Wilcox to
pull off from column on that road and march for the position assigned him
near the head of White Oak Swamp.

The detailed instructions for battle were that the advance should be made
in columns of brigades two on each side the Williamsburg road, preceded by
strong lines of skirmishers; the advance, approaching an open or abatis or
trench line, should reinforce the skirmish line to strong engagement,
while the lines of battle turned those obstacles by flank or oblique march
when the general advance should be resumed. As the wooded field was not
convenient for artillery use, we only held the batteries of Bondurant and
Carter ready for call. At eleven o'clock, weary of delay, General Hill
asked to let loose his signal-gun and engage, but was ordered to wait for
his absent brigade.

The reports of the hour of opening battle are more conflicting in this
than in most battles, owing possibly to the fact that many are fixed by
the beginning of the hot battle about the trenched camp, while others are
based on the actual firing of the signal-guns. The weight of evidence
seems conclusive of the former attack at one P.M., and this would place
the firing of the signal-guns back to noon or a little after. As events
occurred, however, the hour is not of especial interest, as it is shown
that the battle was in time for a finish before night if it had been
promptly followed up. I will say, therefore, that General Hill's second
appeal to open the signal-gun was made a little before noon, and that he
stated in this appeal that his brigade from the Charles City road was
approaching, and would be with him. He was then authorized to march, but
to give instructions that the advance should be carefully conducted until
all the troops were in place, to give full force to his battle. He had
four brigades, and was ordered to advance in columns of brigades, two on
each side of the road. Garland's and G. B. Anderson's brigades in columns,
preceded by skirmishers, advanced on the left of the road at the sound of
the guns, and engaged after a short march from the starting. As Rodes's
brigade was not yet in position, some little time elapsed before the
columns on the right moved, so that Garland's column encountered more than
its share of early fight, but Rodes, supported by Rains's brigade, came
promptly to his relief, which steadied the advance. The enemy's front was
reinforced and arrested progress of our skirmishers, but a way was found
by which the enemy was turned out of position, and by and by the open
before the intrenched camp was reached. In the redoubt was a six-gun
battery, and on the right another section of two pieces. General Hill
ordered Bondurant's battery to the open into action, and presently the
battery of Captain Carter.

Garland and G. B. Anderson had severe contention at one o'clock, but by
pushing front and flank movements got to the enemy's strong line. R. H.
Anderson's brigade was pushed up in support of their left, when a bold
move gave us the section of artillery and that end of the line. At the
same time Carter's battery was in close practice with five guns within
four hundred yards of the redoubt, and the enemy was seriously disturbed;
but General Hill was disposed to wait a little for Huger, thought to be
between him and the swamp, to get farther in; then, fearing that longer
wait might be hazardous of his opportunity, he ordered Rains's brigade
past the enemy's left, when Rodes seized the moment, rushed in, and gained
the redoubt and the battery. The officers at the battery made a brave
effort to spike their guns, but were killed in the act. So Rodes, who had
some artillerists acting as infantry, turned them with some effect upon
the troops as they retired.

When General Hill reported that he must use Rains's brigade to march
around the redoubt, other orders were sent General Wilcox to leave General
Huger's column and march to his position on the right of General Hill's
battle, directing, in case there were serious obstacles to his march by
the Charles City road, to march over to and down the Williamsburg road. A
slip of paper was sent General Johnston reporting progress and asking
co-operation on our left.

The battle moved bravely on. R. H. Anderson's brigade was ordered to
support its left at Fair Oaks, and Pickett's, on the railroad, was drawn
near. Hill met Casey's troops rallying, and reinforcements with them
coming to recover the lost ground, but they were forced back to the second
intrenched line (Couch's), where severe fighting ensued, but the line was
carried at two o'clock, cutting Couch with four regiments and two
companies of infantry, and Brady's six-gun battery, off at Fair Oaks
Station. Finding that he could not cut his way back to his command, Couch
stood back from the railroad and presently opened his battery fire across
our advancing lines. As he was standing directly in front of Smith's
division, we thought that he would soon be attacked and driven off.
Nevertheless, it was not prudent to leave that point on our flank
unguarded until we found Smith's division in action. The force was shut
off from our view by the thick pine wood, so that we could know nothing of
its strength, and only knew of its position from its artillery fire. We
could not attack it lest we should fall under the fire of the division in
position for that attack. Anderson's other regiments, under the gallant
Colonel M. Jenkins, were ordered into Hill's forward battle, as his troops
were worn. Jenkins soon found himself in the van, and so swiftly led on
that the discomfited troops found no opportunity to rally. Reinforcements
from the Third Corps came, but in the swampy wood Jenkins was prompt
enough to strike their heads as their retreating comrades passed. Right
and left and front he applied his beautiful tactics and pushed his battle.

General Kearny, finding that he could not arrest the march, put Berry's
brigade off to the swamp to flank and strike it, and took part of
Jamison's brigade to follow. They got into the swamp and followed it up to
the open near the Couch intrenchment,[16] but Jenkins knew that there was
some one there to meet them, and pushed his onward battle. General Hill
ordered Rains's brigade to turn this new force, while Rodes attacked, but
the latter's men were worn, and some of them were with the advance.
Kemper's brigade was sent to support the forward battle, but General Hill
directed it to his right against Berry, in front of Rains, and it seems
that the heavy, swampy ground so obstructed operations on both sides as to
limit their work to infantry fusillades until six o'clock.

Our battle on the Williamsburg road was in a sack. We were strong enough
to guard our flanks and push straight on, but the front was growing heavy.
It was time for Wilcox's brigades under his last order, but nothing was
heard of them. I asked General Stuart, who had joined me, if there were
obstacles to Wilcox's march between the Charles City and Williamsburg
roads. He reported that there was nothing more than swamp lands, hardly
knee-deep. He was asked for a guide, who was sent with a courier bearing
orders for them to remain with General Wilcox until he reported at my

Again I reported the cramped condition of our work, owing to the artillery
practice from beyond the railroad, and asked General Johnston to have the
division that was with him drive that force away and loose our left. This
note was ordered to be put into General Johnston's hands. He gave
peremptory commands to that effect, but the movements were so slow that he
lost patience and rode with Hood's leading brigade, pulled it on, and
ordered communication opened with my left.

31st, Morning; May 31st, Night; June 1st]

At one o'clock, General McClellan, at his head-quarters beyond the river,
six miles away, heard the noise of battle and ordered Sumner's (Second)
corps under arms to await orders. General Sumner ordered the command under
arms, marched the divisions to their separate bridges, and put the columns
on the bridges, partly submerged, to hold them to their moorings,
anxiously awaiting authority from his chief to march to the relief of his
comrades. The bridge where Sedgwick's division stood was passable, but
Richardson's was under water waist-deep, and the flooding river rising.
Richardson waded one brigade through, but thought that he could save time
by marching up to the Sedgwick bridge, which so delayed him that he did
not reach the field until after night.

As General Johnston rode with Hood's brigade, he saw the detachment under
General Couch marching north to find at the Adams House the road to
Grapevine Bridge, his open way of retreat. Directly he heard firing where
Couch was marching, but thought that Smith's other brigades were equal to
work that could open up there, and rode on, ordering Hood to find
communication with my left. Smith's other brigades were: Whiting's,
commanded by Colonel Law; Hampton's, Pettigrew's, and Hatton's; Whiting
commanding the division, Smith commanding the left wing. Smith quotes
Colonel Frobel, who was with him at the time,--viz.:

    "Whiting's brigade was gone; it had been ordered forward to charge the
    batteries which were firing upon us. The brigade was repulsed, and in
    a few minutes came streaming back through the little skirt of woods to
    the left of the Nine Miles road, near the crossing. There was only a
    part of a brigade in this charge. Pender soon rallied and reformed
    them on the edge of the woods. General Whiting sent an order to him
    to reconnoitre the batteries, and if he thought they could be taken,
    to try it again. Before he could do so, some one galloped up,
    shouting, 'Charge that battery!' The men hurried forward at
    double-quick, but were repulsed as before."[17]

It seems that at that moment General Sumner reached the field. He

    "On arriving on the field, I found General Couch, with four regiments
    and two companies of infantry and Brady's battery. These troops were
    drawn up in line near Adams's House, and there was a pause in the

He received his orders at 2.30 P.M. and marched with Sedgwick's
division--three brigades--and Kirby's battery, and reached the ground of
Couch's work at 4.30. In less than an hour he had surveyed the ground and
placed his troops to receive battle.

General Smith attacked with Hampton's, Pettigrew's, and Hatton's brigades.
It seems he made no use of artillery, though on the field right and left
the opportunity was fair. The troops fought bravely, as did all
Confederate soldiers. We heard the steady, rolling fire of musketry and
the boom of cannon that told of deadly work as far as the Williamsburg
road, but it did not last. General Hatton was killed, General Pettigrew
wounded and a prisoner, and General Hampton wounded. General Smith was

General Sumner reported:

    "I ordered the following regiments, Eighty-second New York,
    Thirty-fourth New York, Fifteenth Massachusetts, Twentieth
    Massachusetts, and Seventh Michigan, to move to the front and charge
    bayonets. There were two fences between us and the enemy, but our men
    gallantly rushed over them, and the enemy broke and fled, and this
    closed the battle of Saturday."[18]

General Smith sent to call Hood's brigade from his right, and posted it,
about dark, near Fair Oaks Station. At parting, General Hood said, "Our
people over yonder are whipped."

General Wilcox filed his three brigades into the Williamsburg road,
followed by two of Huger's division at five o'clock. He was reminded of
his orders to be abreast of the battle, and that he was only four hours
behind it; but reported that while marching by the first order by the
Charles City road, he received orders to try the Williamsburg road; that,
marching for that road, he was called by orders to follow a guide, who
brought him back to the Charles City road. He confessed that his orders to
march with the front of battle were plain and well understood, but his
marches did not quite agree with the comprehensive view of his orders.

Two of his regiments--the Eleventh Alabama, under Colonel Sydenham Moore,
and the Nineteenth Mississippi, under Major Mullens--were ordered to join
Kemper, turn the position of the enemy at that point, and capture or
dislodge them. With the other regiments, General Wilcox was ordered by the
Williamsburg road to report to General Hill, Pryor's brigade to follow
him, Colston's brigade to support the move under Colonel Moore.

Armistead's and Mahone's brigades, of Huger's division, were sent to R. H.
Anderson, who was ordered to put them in his position and move his other
regiments to the front.

Colonel Moore hurried his leading companies into the turning move against
Berry's brigade before his regiment was up, and before the Mississippi
regiment was in supporting distance, and fell mortally wounded. General
Kearny, seeing the move and other troops marching towards it, ordered his
troops out and in retreat through the swamp. He reported of it:

    "Although so critically placed, and despite the masses that gathered
    on and had passed us, checked the enemy in his intent of cutting off
    against the White Oak Swamp. This enabled the advanced regiments,
    arrested by orders and this contest in the rear, to return from their
    hitherto victorious career and retire by a remaining wood-path known
    to our scouts (the saw-mill road), until they once more arrived at and
    remained in the impregnable position we had left at noon at our own
    fortified division camp."[19]

He states the hour as six P.M.

Birney's brigade of Kearny's division was ordered along the north side of
the railroad a little before night, and had several encounters with parts
of R. H. Anderson's brigade and some regiments of G. B. Anderson's.
Jenkins, nothing daunted, pushed his brave battle forward until the shades
of night settled about the wood, and flashes of dark-lanterns began to
creep through the pines in search of wounded, friend and foe.

At seven o'clock, General Johnston ordered his troops on the field to
sleep on their lines, and be ready to renew operations in the morning, and
ordered General Smith to call up other troops of the left wing. At half
after seven he was hit by a rifle-ball, then a fragment of shell unhorsed
him, and he was borne from the field, so severely wounded that he was for
a considerable time incapacitated for duty. The command devolved
temporarily upon General G. W. Smith. General Johnston was skilled in the
art and science of war, gifted in his quick, penetrating mind and
soldierly bearing, genial and affectionate in nature, honorable and
winning in person, and confiding in his love. He drew the hearts of those
about him so close that his comrades felt that they could die for him.
Until his recovery the Confederacy experienced a serious deprivation, and
when that occurred he was no longer commander-in-chief, for General Lee
was promptly called to the post of honor.

The brigades were so mixed up through the pines when the battle closed
that there was some delay in getting the regiments to their proper
commands, getting up supplies, and arranging for the morning. D. H. Hill's
was put in good order and in bivouac near the Casey intrenchment; those of
Longstreet between the Williamsburg road and railroad. Wilcox's brigade
took position on the right, in place of the detachment under Jenkins;
Pryor's brigade next on the left; Kemper, Anderson, and Colston near the
stage road (Williamsburg). They made blazing fires of pine-knots to dry
their clothing and blankets, and these lighted reinforcing Union troops to
their lines behind the railroad.

The brigades of Huger's division (Armistead's and Mahone's) were near the
left. Pickett was ordered to report to General Hill at daylight, also the
batteries of Maurin, Stribling, and Watson. It was past eleven o'clock
when all things were made ready and the killed and wounded cared for; then
I rode to find the head-quarters of our new commander.


    Union troops engaged on the Williamsburg road,
    reported by General Heintzelman, commanding
    Casey's, Couch's, and Kearny's divisions                        18,500

    Hooker's division was at hand, but no part of it engaged.

    Confederates engaged on the Williamsburg road, of
    D. H. Hill's division                                   8900[20]

    Two brigades and two regiments of Longstreet's
    division                                                5700
                                                            ----    14,600

    Two lines of intrenchments were attacked and carried, six pieces of
    artillery and several thousand small-arms were captured, and the enemy
    was forced back to his third line of intrenchments by night, a mile
    and a half from the point of his opening.

    Sedgwick's division is not separately accounted
    for, but an average of the divisions reported by
    General Heintzelman will give him                       6080

    Estimate of Couch's command                             2000

    Union force against General Smith                                 8080

    Smith's division, five brigades                       10,500

    But Hood's brigade was not engaged                     2,100

    Of Smith's division in action                                    8,400

    Union losses on the Williamsburg road                             4563

    Confederate losses on the Williamsburg road                       3515

    Union losses on the Nine Miles road                                468

    Confederate losses on the Nine Miles road                         1283



    The Forces under Command of G. W. Smith after Johnston was
    wounded--The Battle of the 1st--Longstreet requests Reinforcements and
    a Diversion--Council held--McLaws alone sustains Longstreet's
    Opposition to retiring--Severe Fighting--Pickett's Brave
    Stand--General Lee assigned to Command--He orders the withdrawal of
    the Army--Criticism of General Smith--Confederates should not have
    lost the Battle--Keyes's Corroboration.

Major-General G. W. Smith was of the highest standing of the West Point
classes, and, like others of the Engineers, had a big name to help him in
the position to which he had been suddenly called by the incapacitation of
the Confederate commander.

I found his head-quarters at one o'clock in the morning, reported the work
of the commands on the Williamsburg road on the 31st, and asked for part
of the troops ordered up by General Johnston, that we might resume battle
at daylight. He was disturbed by reports of pontoon bridges, said to be
under construction for the use of other reinforcements to join the enemy
from the east side, and was anxious lest the enemy might march his two
corps on the east side by the upper river and occupy Richmond. But after a
time these notions gave way, and he suggested that we could renew the
battle on the Williamsburg road, provided we would send him one of our
brigades to help hold his position and make the battle by a wheel on his
right as a pivot.

As the commands stood, Smith's division on our left was at right angles to
the York River Railroad, facing east, his right near Fair Oaks Station.
Besides his division of ten thousand, he had Magruder's and other commands
of fresh troops near him,--twenty thousand. My left lay near Smith's
right, the line extending parallel to the railroad for a mile, facing
north; thence it broke to the rear, and covered the ground from that point
to the swamp, the return front facing the enemy's third intrenched line.
Smith's part of the field was open and fine for artillery practice. The
field fronting on the railroad was so shut in by heavy pine forest and
tangled swamp that we had no place for a single gun. D. H. Hill's division
was in reserve near the Casey encampment.

The enemy stood: Sedgwick's division in front of Smith; Richardson's
division in column of three brigades parallel to the railroad and behind
it, prepared to attack my left; on Richardson's left was Birney's brigade
behind the railroad, and under the enemy's third intrenched line were the
balance of the Third and all of the Fourth Corps. So the plan to wheel on
Smith's right as a pivot, my right stepping out on the wheel, would have
left the Third and Fourth Corps to attack our rear as soon as we moved.

Besides, it was evident that our new commander would do nothing, and we
must look to accident for such aid as might be drawn to us during the

The plan proposed could only be considered under the hypothesis that
Magruder would come in as the pivotal point, and, upon having the enemy's
line fully exposed, would find the field fine for his batteries, and put
them in practice without orders from his commander, and, breaking the
enemy's line by an enfilade fire from his artillery, would come into
battle and give it cohesive power.

I left head-quarters at three o'clock, and after an hour's repose rode to
the front to find General Hill. Wilcox's brigade was on my right on the
return front, Pryor's brigade on his left, and R. H. Anderson, Kemper,
Colston, Armistead, and Mahone occupied the line between the Williamsburg
road and the railroad. Pickett's brigade was ordered to be with General
Hill at daylight, and Maurin's, Stribling's, and Watson's batteries, of
Pickett's brigade, to take position on the right of Armistead's.

I found General Hill before he had his breakfast, enjoying the comforts of
Casey's camp. Pickett had passed and was in search of his position, which
was soon disclosed by a fusillade from the front of Richardson's division.
A party of "bummers" from Richmond had found their way into the camp at
Fair Oaks, and were getting such things as they could put their hands on.
They were taken in the gray of the morning for Confederate troops and
fired upon. This made some confusion with our new troops, and part of them
opened fire in the wrong direction, putting two or three bullets through
General Hill's tent before he got out of it. Hood's brigade of Smith's
division, the pivotal point, came under this fire, and was immediately
withdrawn. Hood reported his position good, but his orders were to retire.

Our cavalry had established communication with head-quarters, and gave
prompt notice of movements as they occurred. The pivot was moving to the
rear, but battle on the Williamsburg road steadily advanced, with orders
to develop the enemy's battle front through its extent along the railroad;
not to make the fancied wheel, but to expose his line to the practice of
our batteries on the Nine Miles road.

Our infantry moved steadily, engaging French's brigade of Richardson's
division, which was led by one of Howard's regiments. French was supported
by Howard's brigade, and Howard by Meagher's, and the firing extended
along my line as far as the return front of my right. But Magruder was not
on the field to seize the opportunity for his artillery. He was nowhere
near the battle,--had not been called. General Whiting, however, saw the
opportunity so inviting, and reported to his commander at half after six

    "I am going to try a diversion for Longstreet, and have found, as
    reported, a position for artillery. The enemy are in full view and in
    heavy masses. I have ordered up Lee with four pieces. The musketry
    firing in advance is tremendous."[21]

General Smith had parties posted along the heights of the Chickahominy in
close observation of the movements of the enemy's forces on the east bank.
These parties reported from time to time that the enemy was moving his
forces down the east bank and crossing them over to take part in the
fight. The accounts proved false, but they continued to come to
head-quarters, and were forwarded to my command on the Williamsburg road
and gave us some concern. Failing to receive approval of his chief,
General Whiting reported at nine o'clock,--

    "If I don't receive an answer in half an hour, I shall commence
    withdrawing my forces."[22]

The answer he received was to throw back his right and take position a
_little_ nearer to the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road,[23] thus
swinging the pivot farther back. General Smith complained that the enemy
was getting into the interval between our lines, but position between two
fires was not the place the enemy wanted; he could not know that Smith
wouldn't shoot. Under this long and severe infantry fight there was no
point on my part of the field upon which we could post a single gun. Part
of Armistead's new troops gave way, but the gallant brigadier maintained
his ground and soon collected his other regiments. Before this I had
reported ready, and awaiting a guide, the brigade that was to be sent over
to the Nine Miles road. At half after ten o'clock, General Smith sent word
that he had heard nothing of the brigade expected to come to his support,
and renewed his reports of the enemy crossing over and concentrating
against us on the Williamsburg road. He repeated, too, his wish to have
his cavalry keep close communication between the wings of the army. This
close communication had been established early in the morning and was
maintained through the day, and the reports of the enemy's crossing were
all false, but our new commander seemed to forget. At the same time he
wrote me,--

    "I have directed Whiting to take close defensive relations with
    Magruder. At any rate, that was absolutely necessary to enable a good
    defence to be made whilst you are pivoting on Whiting's position."[24]

Whiting's position, instead of being pivotal, began its rearward move at
the opening fire at daybreak, and continued in that line of conduct until
it reached a point of quiet. General Smith was informed that the brigade
called for by him would not be sent over; that his troops were doing
nothing, while all of mine were in severe battle, except a single brigade,
and the enemy was massing his fighting force against me; that the grounds
were so flooded that it was difficult to keep up our supply of ammunition;
that with the aid of his troops the battle would be ours.

But just then he held a council with Generals McLaws and Whiting and Chief
Engineer Stevens, and submitted the question, "Must the troops be
withdrawn, or the attack continued?"

All voted in favor of the former except McLaws. In a letter, since
written, he has said,--

    "I alone urged that you be reinforced and the attack continued, and
    the question was reconsidered, and I was sent to learn your

Before General McLaws found me, I wrote General Smith,--

    "Can you reinforce me? The entire enemy seems to be opposed to me. We
    cannot hold out unless we get help. If we can fight together, we can
    finish the work to-day, and Mac's time will be up. If I cannot get
    help, I fear that I must fall back."

General McLaws reported of his ride to my lines,--

    "I went and found you with J. E. B. Stuart. You were in favor of
    resuming the assault, and wanted five thousand men."[26]

Nothing was sent in reply to McLaws's report, but we soon learned that the
left wing of the army was quiet and serene in defensive positions about
the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road.

At the first quiet of our battle, after the left wing quit the field, I
ordered the brigades withdrawn to defensive position about the trenches at
Seven Pines, but before the order reached the front the fight was renewed
by Hooker's division upon Wilcox and Pryor, and reached out to our left
near Fair Oaks. In the heat of this, General Wilcox received the order to
retire, and in undue haste pulled his command out, assumed authority over
Pryor, and ordered him off. Pickett, the true soldier, knowing that the
order was not intended for such emergency, stood and resisted the attack.
Colston was sent to his aid, and the attack was repulsed. Immediately
after this repulse was a quiet advance upon Pickett's right. The commander
asked, "What troops are these?" "Virginians!" "Don't fire!" he ordered;
"we will capture the last one of these Virginians." Just then the
Virginians rose and opened a fearful fire that drove him back to his bushy
cover, which ended the battle of Seven Pines. Pickett was withdrawn to
position assigned for his brigade, our line of skirmishers remaining near
the enemy's during the day and night. General Wilcox reported of his
battle, when he pulled off from it, that he was doing as well as he could
wish, but General Hooker reported, "Pursuit was hopeless."

The failure of the enemy to push the opportunity made by the precipitate
retreat of General Wilcox, and Pickett's successful resistance, told that
there was nothing in the reports of troops coming over from the east side
to take part in the battle, and we were convinced that the river was not
passable. I made an appeal for ten thousand men, that we might renew our
battle without regard to General Smith and those about him. It received no
more consideration than the appeal made through General McLaws.

Then General Lee, having been assigned to command, came upon the field
after noon by the Nine Miles road, and, with General Smith, came over to
the Williamsburg road. A similar proposition was made General Lee, but
General Smith protested that the enemy was strongly fortified. At the time
the enemy's main battle front was behind the railroad, fronting against me
but exposed to easy enfilade fire of batteries to be posted on his right
flank on the Nine Miles road, while his front against me was covered by
the railway embankment. It is needless to add that under the fire of
batteries so posted his lines would have been broken to confusion in
twenty minutes. General Holmes marched down the Williamsburg road and
rested in wait for General Lee. Like General Huger, he held rank over me.
General Lee ordered the troops back to their former lines. Those on the
Williamsburg road were drawn back during the night, the rear-guard,
Pickett's brigade, passing the Casey works at sunrise on the 2d
unmolested. Part of Richardson's division mistook the camp at Fair Oaks
for the Casey camp, and claimed to have recovered it on the afternoon of
the 1st, but it was not until the morning of the 2d that the Casey camp
was abandoned.

The Confederate losses in the two days' fight were 6134; the Union losses,

It seems from Union accounts that all of our dead were not found and
buried on the afternoon of the 1st. It is possible, as our battle was in
the heavy forest and swamp tangles.

General Smith has written a great deal about the battle of Seven Pines
during the past twenty or thirty years, in efforts to show that the
failure of success was due to want of conduct on the part of the forces on
the Williamsburg road. He claims that he was only out as a party of
observation, to prevent reinforcement of the enemy from the east side of
the river, and that he kept Sumner off of us. But he waited three hours
after the enemy's ranks and lines had been broken, instead of moving with
and finishing the battle, thus giving Sumner time to march from the east
of the river, and strike him and beat him to disorder, and change the lost
battle to success. He shows that Hill's and Longstreet's divisions could
have gained the battle unaided,--which may be true enough, but it would
have been a fruitless success, for the enemy got forces over to protect
those of the west side; whereas, the stronger battle, ordered by the four
divisions, could and would have made a complete success of it but for the
balky conduct of the divisions ordered to guard the flanks. Instead of six
hours' hard work to reach the enemy's third line, we could have captured
it in the second hour and had the field cleaned up before Sumner crossed
the river.

General Keyes, the commander of the Fourth Corps, in his "Fifty Years'
Observations," says,--

    "The left of my lines were all protected by the White Oak Swamp, but
    the right was on ground so favorable to the approach of the enemy, and
    so far from the Chickahominy, that if Johnston had attacked them an
    hour or two earlier than he did, I could have made but a feeble
    defence comparatively, and every man of us would have been killed,
    captured, or driven into the swamp or river before assistance could
    have reached us."

General Smith lay in wait three hours after the enemy's positions were
broken and carried, giving ample time for the march of the succoring
forces. The hour of the attack was not so important as prompt and vigorous
work. If the battle had opened at sunrise, Smith would have made the same
wait, and Sumner's march would have been in time to beat him. All elements
of success were in the plan, but balky troops will mar the strongest
plans. He tries to persuade himself that he intended to join our battle on
the Williamsburg road, but there was no fight in his heart after his
maladroit encounter with Sedgwick's division on the afternoon of the 31st.
The opportunity for enfilade fire of his artillery along the enemy's
battle front, at the morning opening and all of the forenoon, was waiting
him; while reports of the enemy crossing the river, reinforcing against my
single contest, were demanding relief and aid.

He reported sick on the 2d and left the army. When ready for duty he was
assigned about Richmond and the seaboard of North Carolina. He applied to
be restored to command of his division in the field, but the authorities
thought his services could be used better elsewhere. He resigned his
commission in the Confederate service, went to Georgia, and joined Joe
Brown's militia, where he found congenial service, better suited to his
ideas of vigorous warfare.



    The Great General's Assignment not at first assuring to the Army--Able
    as an Engineer but limited as to Field Service--He makes the
    Acquaintance of his Lieutenants--Calls a Council--Gains Confidence by
    saying Nothing--"A Little Humor now and then"--Lee plans a
    Simultaneous Attack on McClellan's Front and Rear--J. E. B. Stuart's
    Daring Reconnoissance around the Union Army.

The assignment of General Lee to command the army of Northern Virginia was
far from reconciling the troops to the loss of our beloved chief, Joseph
E. Johnston, with whom the army had been closely connected since its
earliest active life. All hearts had learned to lean upon him with
confidence, and to love him dearly. General Lee's experience in active
field work was limited to his West Virginia campaign against General
Rosecrans, which was not successful. His services on our coast defences
were known as able, and those who knew him in Mexico as one of the
principal engineers of General Scott's column, marching for the capture of
the capital of that great republic, knew that as military engineer he was
especially distinguished; but officers of the line are not apt to look to
the staff in choosing leaders of soldiers, either in tactics or strategy.
There were, therefore, some misgivings as to the power and skill for field
service of the new commander. The change was accepted, however, as a happy
relief from the existing halting policy of the late temporary commander.

[Illustration: R. E. Lee]

During the first week of his authority he called his general officers to
meet him on the Nine Miles road for a general talk. This novelty was not
reassuring, as experience had told that secrecy in war was an essential
element of success; that public discussion and secrecy were incompatible.
As he disclosed nothing, those of serious thought became hopeful, and
followed his wise example. The brigadiers talked freely, but only of the
parts of the line occupied by their brigades; and the meeting finally took
a playful turn. General Toombs's brigade was before some formidable works
under construction by General Franklin. He suggested an elevation a few
hundred yards in his rear, as a better defensive line and more comfortable
position for his men; a very good military point. This seemed strange in
General Toombs, however, as he was known to have frequent talks with his
troops, complaining of West Point men holding the army from battle,
digging and throwing up lines of sand instead of showing lines of battle,
where all could have fair fight.

Referring to his suggestion to retire and construct a new line, General D.
H. Hill, who behind the austere presence of a major-general had a fund of
dry humor, said,--

    "I think it may be better to advance General Toombs's brigade, till he
    can bring Franklin's working parties under the fire of his short-range
    arms, so that the working parties may be broken up."

General Whiting, who was apprehensive of bayous and parallels, complained
of sickness in his command, and asked a change of position from the unfair
Fair Oaks. Though of brilliant, highly cultivated mind, the dark side of
the picture was always more imposing with him. Several of the
major-generals failed to join us till the conference was about to
disperse. All rode back to their camps little wiser than when they went,
except that they found General Lee's object was to learn of the temper of
those of his officers whom he did not know, and of the condition and tone
among their troops. He ordered his engineers over the line occupied by the
army, to rearrange its defensive construction, and to put working parties
on all points needing reinforcing. Whiting's division was broken up.
Three of the brigades were ordered to A. P. Hill's division. He was
permitted to choose two brigades that were to constitute his own command.
Besides his own, he selected Hood's brigade. With these two he was ordered
by way of Lynchburg to report to General Jackson, in the Valley district.

General Lee was seen almost daily riding over his lines, making
suggestions to working parties and encouraging their efforts to put
sand-banks between their persons and the enemy's batteries, and they were
beginning to appreciate the value of such adjuncts. Above all, they soon
began to look eagerly for his daily rides, his pleasing yet commanding
presence, and the energy he displayed in speeding their labors.

The day after the conference on the Nine Miles road, availing myself of
General Lee's invitation to free interchange of ideas, I rode over to his
head-quarters, and renewed my suggestion of a move against General
McClellan's right flank, which rested behind Beaver Dam Creek. The
strength of the position was explained, and mention made that, in
consequence of that strong ground, a move somewhat similar, ordered by
General Johnston for the 28th of May, was abandoned. At the same time he
was assured that a march of an hour could turn the head of the creek and
dislodge the force behind it. He received me pleasantly and gave a patient
hearing to the suggestions, without indicating approval or disapproval. A
few days after he wrote General Jackson:[27]

        "June 11, 1862.

        "_Commanding Valley District_:

    "GENERAL,--Your recent successes have been the cause of the liveliest
    joy in this army as well as in the country. The admiration excited by
    your skill and boldness has been constantly mingled with solicitude
    for your situation. The practicability of reinforcing you has been the
    subject of earnest consideration. It has been determined to do so at
    the expense of weakening this army. Brigadier-General Lawton, with six
    regiments from Georgia, is on the way to you, and Brigadier-General
    Whiting, with eight veteran regiments, leaves here to-day. The object
    is to enable you to crush the forces opposed to you. Leave your
    enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes covered by
    your cavalry and artillery, and with your main body, including Ewell's
    division and Lawton's and Whiting's commands, move rapidly to Ashland
    by rail or otherwise, as you may find most advantageous, and sweep
    down between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's
    communications, etc., while this army attacks General McClellan in
    front. He will thus, I think, be forced to come out of his
    intrenchments, where he is strongly posted on the Chickahominy, and
    apparently preparing to move by gradual approaches on Richmond. Keep
    me advised of your movements, and, if practicable, precede your
    troops, that we may confer and arrange for simultaneous attack.

          "I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
            "R. E. LEE, _General_."

The brigades under Generals Lawton and Whiting were transported as above

As indicated in his letter to General Jackson, General Lee's plan was a
simultaneous attack on General McClellan's army front and rear. Following
his instructions for General Jackson, on the same day he ordered his
cavalry, under General Stuart, upon a forced reconnoissance around General
McClellan's army to learn if the ground behind his army was open.

These plans and the promptness with which they were conceived and put in
operation ought to be a sufficient refutation of the silly report that the
Confederacy had any idea of withdrawing from their capital,--a report
which, notwithstanding its unreasonable nature, was given a degree of
credence in some quarters.[28]

Upon nearing Richmond, after leaving Yorktown, General Johnston's first
thought had been to stand on the table-lands between the Pamunkey and the
Chickahominy Rivers, on the flank of McClellan's march for Richmond, and
force him into battle. He selected ground with that view and posted his
army, where it remained some eight days, giving general and engineer
officers opportunity to ride over and learn the topographical features of
the surroundings. A prominent point was Beaver Dam Creek, which was so
noted by the officers. When Johnston proposed to recross the Chickahominy
and make battle on the 28th of May, in anticipation of McDowell's
approach, the strong ground at Beaver Dam Creek again came under
discussion and was common talk between the generals, so that the position
and its approaches became a familiar subject. Then Stuart's famous ride
had correlative relation to the same, and drew us to careful study of the

For the execution of his orders General Stuart took twelve hundred cavalry
and a section of Stuart's horse artillery. The command was composed of
parts of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Virginia Cavalry. The Fourth,
having no field officer on duty with it, was distributed for the
expedition between the First, Colonel Fitzhugh Lee, and the Ninth, Colonel
W. H. F. Lee commanding; also two squadrons of the Jeff Davis Legion,
Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Martin commanding. The section of artillery was
under First Lieutenant James Breathed.

On the night of the 12th of June he gathered his squadrons beyond the
Chickahominy, and the next day marched by the road west of the Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad towards Louisa Court-House, to
produce the impression, should the march be discovered, that he was going
to join General Jackson. After a march of fifteen miles, he bivouacked in
the pine forests of Hanover, near the South Anna Bridge, without light or
sound of bugle, and, throwing aside the cares of the day and thoughts of
the morrow, sunk to repose such as the soldier knows how to enjoy. An hour
before daylight he was up in readiness to move as soon as the first light
of morning revealed the line of march. Up to that moment no one of the
expedition, except the commander, knew the direction or the purpose of the
march. He called his principal officers about him and told of the object
of the ride, and impressed the necessity for secrecy, prompt and
intelligent attention to orders. At the mute signal the twelve hundred men
swung into their saddles and took the road leading to the right and rear
of McClellan's army. At Hanover Court-House a small force of the enemy's
cavalry was discovered, but they retired towards their camp, out of the
line of Stuart's ride. At Hawes's Shop a picket was driven off and several
vedettes captured. They proved to be of the Fifth United States Cavalry,
General Lee's old regiment. Between Hawes's Shop and Old Church the
advance-guard, well to the front, reported the presence of the enemy,
apparently in some force. The column pressed forward, expecting a fierce
encounter of Southern volunteers with United States regulars, but the
latter was a single troop and retreated beyond Totopotomy Creek to Old
Church, where there was a camp of four companies of the Fifth Cavalry
under Captain Royal, which made a brave stand. Captain Latane led the
first squadron, and Captain Royal received the first shock, and furiously
the combat went on, both leaders falling, Latane dead and Royal severely
wounded. The enemy fled and scattered through the woods. A number of
prisoners were taken, including several officers, and there were captured
horses, arms, equipments, and four guidons. In the enemy's camp, near Old
Church, several officers and privates were captured, a number of horses
and arms taken, and the stores and tents were burned. Here it became a
question whether to attempt to return by way of Hanover Court-House or to
press on and try to make a circuit around the entire army, and take the
chance of fording or swimming the Chickahominy beyond the enemy's extreme
left. Stuart decided that the bolder ride "was the quintessence of

Arriving opposite Garlick's, on the Pamunkey,--one of the enemy's supply
stations,--a squadron was sent out and burned two transports with army
stores and a number of wagons. Near Tunstall's Station a wagon-train was
discovered guarded by five companies of cavalry, which manifested a
determination to stand and defend it, but they abandoned it and rode away,
leaving the train in possession of Stuart, who burned it, and, night
coming on, the country was brilliantly lighted up by its flames. After
resting a few hours at Talleysville, the ride was resumed, and the party
reached the Chickahominy at Forges Bridge at daylight. The stream was not
fordable, but, by exercise of great energy and industry, a rude
foot-bridge was laid. That part of the command near it dismounted and
walked over, swimming their horses. In a few hours the bridge was made
strong and the artillery and other mounts were passed safely over to the
Richmond side, and resumed the march for their old camp-grounds.

This was one of the most graceful and daring rides known to military
history, and revealed valuable facts concerning the situation of the Union
forces, their operations, communications, etc. When congratulated upon his
success, General Stuart replied, with a lurking twinkle in his eye, that
he had left a general behind him. Asked as to the identity of the
unfortunate person, he said, with his joyful laugh, "General



    Retreat--Lee's Bold Initiative--Lee and his Lieutenants planning
    Battle--The Confederates' Loss at Mechanicsville--Gaines's Mill--A. P.
    Hill's Fight--Longstreet's Reserve Division put in--McClellan's Change
    of Base--Savage Station--Longstreet engages McClellan's Main Force at
    Frayser's Farm (or Glendale)--President Davis on the Field--Testimony
    of Federal Generals--Fierce Bayonet Charges--"Greek meets
    Greek"--Capture of General McCall--McClellan's Masterly Retreat.

The day after Stuart's return I rode over to General Lee's head-quarters
and suggested that General Jackson be withdrawn from the Valley to take
position on our left, to march against McClellan's right, and was informed
that the order for Jackson was sent when Whiting's division was detached
and sent to join him.

Then it was that General Lee revealed the plan indicated in his
instructions of the 11th, for General Jackson to march down and attack
McClellan's rear, while he made a simultaneous attack upon his front. The
suggestion was offered that the enemy had probably destroyed the bridges
and ferries on the Pamunkey along the line of his rear, which might leave
Jackson in perilous condition if the front attack should be delayed; that
that attack must be hazardous, as the enemy was in well-fortified
positions with four army corps. After deliberation, he changed the plan
and accepted the suggestion in favor of combining his fighting columns on
the north side of the Chickahominy in echelon march against McClellan's
right flank, leaving troops in the trenches in front of McClellan to
defend in case of a move towards Richmond.

At the first mention of this march before this conference a change of base
was spoken of by General D. H. Hill, but with our troops to be left in
the trenches, so near the flank of such a move, and our columns afield,
pressing close upon its rear, it was thought impracticable. General D. H.
Hill, in view of the possibility, preferred that our attack should be made
against the enemy's left by crossing White Oak Swamp below the enemy's

Jackson was called in advance of his command to meet the Hills and myself
at General Lee's head-quarters for conference on the execution. On the
forenoon of the 23d of June we were advised of his approach, and called to
head-quarters to meet him. He was there before us, having ridden fifty
miles by relay of horses since midnight. We were together in a few minutes
after his arrival, in General Lee's private office. The general explained
the plan briefly: Jackson to march from Ashland by heights between the
Chickahominy and Pamunkey, turning and dislodging the Federal right, thus
clearing the way for the march of troops to move on his right; A. P. Hill
to cross the upper Chickahominy and march for Mechanicsville, in echelon
to Jackson; the Mechanicsville Bridge being clear, D. H. Hill's division
and mine to cross, the former to reinforce Jackson's column, the latter to
file to the right and march down the river in right echelon to A. P.
Hill's direct march through Mechanicsville to Gaines's Mill.

General Lee then excused himself to attend to office business, asking that
we talk the matter over for our better comprehension.

Turning to Jackson, I said,--

    "You have distance to overcome, and in all probability obstacles will
    be thrown in the way of your march by the enemy. As your move is the
    key of the campaign, you should appoint the hour at which the
    connection may be made co-operative."

He promptly responded,--

    "The morning of the 25th."

I expressed doubt of his meeting that hour, and suggested that it would be
better to take a little more time, as the movements of our columns could
be readily adjusted to those of his. He then appointed the morning of the

Upon his return, report was made General Lee that the officers understood,
and would be prepared to execute the plans; that General Jackson had
appointed the morning of the 26th, when he would lead the march. Verbal
instructions were given, followed by written orders, embodying in minute
detail the plan already given in general.

The topographical features of the ground about Beaver Dam Creek have been
given in a former chapter. Behind it battery epaulements had been
skilfully laid and constructed, as well as rifle-trenches. These were
occupied by the troops of the Fifth Corps, commanded by General Fitz-John
Porter. McCall's division had joined the Army of the Potomac, and was
assigned as part of the Fifth Corps, with the divisions of Sykes and
Morell. Two of McCall's brigades, J. F. Reynolds's and Seymour's, with
thoroughly-equipped artillery, were especially charged with the defences,
the Third Brigade, Meade's, in reserve, the other divisions in supporting
distance. McCall's advanced brigades had guards at the bridges as far as
Meadow Bridge, and a strong outpost at Mechanicsville, under orders to
retire when the strength of the enemy's advance was so developed as to
warrant their doing so.

Three batteries, two of six guns each and one of four, manned the
epaulements at the opening of the fight.

Before sunrise on the 26th of June the division of A. P. Hill was in
position at Meadow Bridge; his brigade, under General Branch, and
Johnson's battery, seven miles above, at Brook Turnpike Bridge; my
division and that of D. H. Hill on the heights overlooking the
Mechanicsville Bridge,--all awaiting the approach of the initial column.
Not anticipating delay, the divisions had no special cause to conceal
their presence, nor did the lay of the ground offer good cover. Morning
came, and noon passed.

A few minutes after ten A.M., General Branch received a note informing him
that, at the hour of its writing, General Jackson's column was crossing
the Central Railroad. He assembled his command, crossed the Chickahominy,
and marched down along the route designated for his column, without
sending information to the division commander. Of his march he reported,--

    "Interruption by the enemy, but with no other effect than to retard
    without checking our march.

    "Near Crenshaw's the road on which the column commanded by
    Major-General Ewell" (of Jackson's) "was advancing and that on which I
    was advancing approach within one-fourth of a mile of each other. The
    heads of our columns reached this point simultaneously, and, after a
    short personal interview between General Ewell and myself, we
    proceeded on our respective routes.

    "After dislodging the enemy from several ambuscades with only a small
    loss to my command, I reached the Meadow Bridge road, when I learned
    from stragglers that Major-General Hill had crossed the Chickahominy,
    without opposition, with the remainder of the division and gone on to
    Mechanicsville, then distant about one and a half miles. A courier
    from the general soon assured me of the correctness of the
    information, and, closing in my skirmishers, I made all haste to join
    him at Mechanicsville. The brigade reached the field almost an hour
    before sunset."[30]

At three o'clock, General A. P. Hill, hearing nothing from Jackson or his
brigade under Branch, decided to cross the river and make his move without
reference to Jackson or Branch. He crossed and moved down against
Mechanicsville, attacked by Field's brigade, Anderson and Archer on
Field's left, Pender and Gregg on his right, and six field batteries (four
guns each). The outpost was driven in, and Hill prepared and attacked
against the front at Beaver Dam Creek. Meanwhile the Mechanicsville Bridge
had been cleared, and, after a little delay repairing breaks, D. H.
Hill's and Longstreet's divisions crossed.

A. P. Hill's battle soon became firm, but he waited a little for Jackson
before giving it full force. Jackson came up, marched by the fight without
giving attention, and went into camp at Hundley's Corner, half a mile in
rear of the enemy's position of contention. A. P. Hill put his force in
severe battle and was repulsed. As D. H. Hill approached, he was called
into the fray by the commanding general, then by the President. He sent
Ripley's brigade and five batteries, which made the battle strong and hot
along the line.

The most determined efforts were against the enemy's right, where General
McCall, reinforced by Kern's battery and Griffin's and Martindale's
brigades (Morell's division), Edwards's battery, and the Third Regiment of
Meade's brigade, beat off the repeated and formidable efforts of A. P.
Hill, when he essayed a column against the crossing at Ellerson's Mill,
which McCall reinforced by the Seventh Regiment of Meade's, Eastman's
battery, and before night the Fourth Michigan, Twelfth New York, and
Berdan's Sharp-shooters came in to reinforce the line and relieve
regiments exhausted of ammunition. The battle was in close conflict till
nine o'clock at night, when Hill was obliged to give over till morning.
The Federal reinforcements were not all engaged, and some that were
suffered but little; none very severely. McCall replenished ammunition and
prepared to renew the fight the next morning.

The Federal loss in the engagement was 361 aggregate.[31]

No especial account of the Confederate loss was made in separate report,
but it could not have been less than two thousand, and may have reached
three thousand. General D. H. Hill reported of his Forty-fourth Georgia
Regiment, the lieutenant-colonel, Estes (J. B.), wounded, and others,
aggregating 334 killed and wounded. Of his First North Carolina Regiment,
Colonel Stokes, Major Skinner, six captains, and the adjutant killed, and
133 privates killed and wounded.


During the night General McClellan ordered his troops withdrawn. They
retired at daylight on the 27th, leaving a line of skirmishers to cover
their march. The skirmishers were not seriously molested, the Confederates
being satisfied that the direct assault had failed, and the flanking march
non-aggressive. Early in the morning, D. H. Hill was ordered to march to
the left to turn the position, and was on the Federal right before their
lines were well out of their trenches. He came up with Jackson and led the
march of that column from Hundley's Corner. A. P. Hill marched by the
direct route to Gaines's Mill, and Longstreet, in reserve, moved by the
route nearer the river and Dr. Gaines's house.

D. H. Hill marched by Bethesda Church to Old Cold Harbor. He understood
the plan of campaign and promptly engaged the new position along the
Chickahominy Heights, on the enemy's right, where he found a well-posted
battery of ten guns near swamp lands commanding the only road of approach.
He ordered Bondurant's battery into action, but the combat was unequal;
the latter was forced to retire, and General Jackson ordered the division
back to selected ground parallel to a road over which he supposed that the
Federals would presently retreat.

As my division was in reserve, it could only be used in the last
extremity. So the driving could only be made by the division of A. P.
Hill, while Jackson, with his own, Ewell's, D. H. Hill's, and Whiting's
divisions, had more than half of our moving column, organized as our
leading battle force, held in ambush for the enemy.

The enemy was found strongly posted upon high ground over the Grapevine
Bridge, forming a semicircle, his flanks near the river. A deep and steep
chasm in front of his left divided the height upon which he stood from an
open plateau over which he must be attacked, if at all, on his left. The
side slope leading up to that position was covered by open forest,
obstructed and defended by fallen trees. On the crest were felled trees,
occasional sand-bags, piles of rails, and knapsacks. Behind these lines
were the divisions of Sykes and Morell, with bristling artillery for the
first defence, with McCall's division of infantry and a tremendous array
of artillery in reserve. Further strength was given to the position by a
stream which cut in between the two heights with deep scarped banks. His
right was covered to some extent by swamp lands and forest tangles almost
as formidable as the approach towards his left. General Fitz-John Porter
was the commander on the field.

A. P. Hill came upon a detachment at Gaines's Mill, forced his way across
the creek, and followed to the enemy's strong position, where he promptly
engaged about the time of D. H. Hill's withdrawal. He found himself
fighting not only strong numbers, but against a very strong defensive
ground. As General D. H. Hill withdrew, General Porter prepared to follow,
but the fierce assaults of A. P. Hill told him that he must hold his
concentration. It was a little after two P.M. when A. P. Hill put all of
his force into action and pressed his battle with great zeal and courage,
but he was alone. Jackson, finding the fire of the enemy steady and
accumulating against A. P. Hill, ordered his troops forward into action.
D. H. Hill engaged again at the swamp land, and found that he must capture
the battery firing across his advance. With the aid of some of Elzey's
brigade he succeeded in this, temporarily, but Sykes doubled on him,
recovered it, and put it again into action. Parts of Ewell and Lawton, of
Jackson's, came in on D. H. Hill's right. Meanwhile, A. P. Hill had
fought to exhaustion, and found himself obliged to put his troops down to
hold his line. The enemy putting in his reserves, spliced his thinned
ranks with artillery and infantry, and fought a desperate and very gallant
battle, calling for troops from across the river.

My division came up near A. P. Hill's rear, being the reserve, and awaited
orders. About five o'clock a messenger came from General Lee asking a
diversion by part of my troops against the enemy's left to draw off troops
from his right, so as to let our left in through his weakening lines.
Three brigades were sent to open fire and threaten their left from the
forest edge, with orders not to cross the open. These brigades engaged
steadily, and parts of them essayed to pass the field in front as their
blood grew hot, but were recalled, with orders repeated to engage
steadily, only threatening assault. The army all the while engaged in
efforts to find a point that could be forced.

Finally, a little before sunset, General Lee sent to me to say that "all
other efforts had failed, and unless I could do something, the day was
lost."[32] Pickett's brigade and part of R. H. Anderson's had been drawn
up under the crest in rear of A. P. Hill's right, and Kemper's brigade was
near, also under cover. Upon the receipt of the last message, Pickett and
Anderson were ordered into action as assaulting columns, and Kemper called
up. Just as the brigades advanced, General Whiting burst through the woods
with his own and Hood's brigades, reported to me that he had lost sight of
his commander, General Jackson, in the forest, and asked me to put him
into battle. He was ordered to form for assault, and to follow on the left
of Pickett's and Anderson's columns, then in motion, as the columns of
direction. As my troops reached the crest under which they had rested
they came under the full blaze of the battle, but Pickett and Anderson
were comparatively fresh, and dashed through the open and down the slope
before the fire had time to thin their ranks. The steep descent of the
hither slope from its crest soon took them below the fire of the
batteries, and A. P. Hill's severe fight had so thinned the enemy's
infantry lines of men and ammunition that their fire grew weaker.
Whiting's brigade, sore under its recent disastrous effort in the battle
of Seven Pines, drifted from my left towards the woodland, but Hood, with
his Fourth Texas Regiment and Eighteenth Georgia, obliqued to the right
behind that brigade and closed the interval towards Anderson's left,
leaving his other regiments, the First and Fifth Texas, on Whiting's left.
Hood clambered over the deep ravine with his two regiments and maintained
position with the assaulting columns, while the balance of Whiting's
division followed in close echelon. As the advanced lines of Pickett,
Anderson, and Hood reached and crowned the stronghold of the enemy,
Anderson and Pickett moved up in pursuit of the broken lines, and were
almost in possession of their massed reserve artillery--had it under easy
musketry range--when a dash of cavalry admonished them that their ranks,
while in order for following the infantry lines, were not in proper form
to receive a charge of cavalry. They concentrated well enough to pour a
repelling fire into the troopers, but the delay had made time for the
retreating infantry to open the field for the reserve batteries, and,
night growing apace, they returned to the line of their trophies and used
the captured guns against their late owners.

General Whiting asked for another brigade of Jackson's that had reported
to me, and turned his forces against the enemy's line on our left. The
divisions of Ewell and D. H. Hill advancing at the same time, the general
break seemed almost simultaneous, and was claimed by all.

The messages from General Lee were so marked by their prompt and
successful execution that, in reporting of the battle, it occurred to me
that they could be better noted in his report than in mine, but he adopted
the claim of a general and simultaneous break along the line.

A letter from General Porter, written since the war, assures the writer
that his guns had become so foul from steady protracted fire that his men
had difficulty in ramming their cartridges to the gun-chambers, and that
in some instances it could only be accomplished by putting the rammers
against trees and hammering them down.

The position was too strong to leave room to doubt that it was only the
thinning fire, as the battle progressed, that made it assailable; besides,
the repulse of A. P. Hill's repeated, desperate assaults forcibly
testified to the fact. It was, nevertheless, a splendid charge, by
peerless soldiers. When the cavalry came upon us our lines were just thin
enough for a splendid charge upon artillery, but too thin to venture
against a formidable cavalry. Five thousand prisoners were turned over to
General Lee's provost-guard, a number of batteries and many thousand
small-arms to the Ordnance Department, by my command. The Confederate
commanders, except A. P. Hill, claimed credit for the first breach in
General Porter's lines, but the solid ranks of prisoners delivered to the
general provost-guard, and the several batteries captured and turned in to
the Ordnance Department, show the breach to have been made by the columns
of Anderson, Pickett, and Hood's two regiments. The troops of the gallant
A. P. Hill, that did as much and effective fighting as any, received
little of the credit properly due them. It was their long and steady fight
that thinned the Federal ranks and caused them to so foul their guns that
they were out of order when the final struggle came.

Early on the 28th my advance, reaching the river, found the bridges
destroyed and the enemy concentrating on the other side. Under the
impression that the enemy must reopen connection with his base on the
Pamunkey, General Lee sent Stuart's cavalry and part of Jackson's command
(Ewell's) to interpose on that line. They cut the line at Despatch
Station, where Ewell's division was halted. Stuart, following down towards
the depot on the Pamunkey till he approached the White House, cut off a
large detachment of cavalry and horse artillery under General Stoneman
that retreated down the Peninsula. At night Stuart rested his command,
finding supplies of forage and provisions abandoned by the enemy. At the
same time fires were seen along the line of supplies, and houses in
flames. On the 29th he followed towards the depot, still in flames.

    "The command was now entirely out of rations and the horses without
    forage. I had relied on the enemy at the White House to supply me with
    those essentials, and I was not disappointed, in spite of their
    efforts to destroy everything. Provisions and delicacies of every
    description lay in heaps, and men regaled themselves on fruits of the
    tropics as well as the substantials of the land. Large quantities of
    forage were left also."[33]

On the 28th, Major Meade and Lieutenant Johnson's engineers were sent from
my head-quarters to learn of the enemy's operations or movements. Early on
the 29th they made their way across the Chickahominy, into the grounds and
works of the enemy just left vacant, and sent the first account of the
enemy's move on his change of base. The conflagrations of the day before
told of speedy change of position in some direction, but this was the
first information we had from a reliable source. Their report was sent to
General Lee. While planning and ordering pursuit, he received a similar
report from General Magruder, coupled with the statement that he was
preparing to attack one of the enemy's forts.

General Jackson was ordered to follow on the enemy's rear with his column,
including the division of D. H. Hill, crossing the river at Grapevine
Bridge, Magruder to join pursuit along the direct line of retreat, Huger
to strike at the enemy's flank; meanwhile, Ransom's brigade had joined
Huger's division. My division was to cross with A. P. Hill's at New
Bridge, march back near Richmond, across to and down the Darbytown road to
interpose between the enemy and James River. Stuart was directed to
operate against the enemy's left or rear, or front, as best he could.

All the commands, being in waiting, marched at the first moment of their

Jackson was long delayed repairing Grapevine Bridge. He probably knew that
the river was fordable at that season, but preferred to pass his men over

General D. H. Hill, of that column, reported,--

    "Scouts from Hood's brigade and the Third Alabama (Rodes's brigade)
    succeeded in crossing, and my pioneer corps under Captain Smith, of
    the Engineers, repaired Grapevine Bridge on the 29th, and we crossed
    over at three o'clock that night."[34]

On the 28th the Seventh and Eighth Georgia Regiments were sent out a
little before night to ascertain the probable movements of the enemy, and
encountered part of W. F. Smith's division, Sixth Corps, meeting the
Forty-ninth Pennsylvania and Thirty-third New York Regiments. Colonel
Lamar and Lieutenant-Colonel Towers and Adjutant Harper, of the Eighth
Georgia Regiment, fell into the enemy's hands, and twenty-nine others of
the Seventh and Eighth Regiments were taken prisoners. Just as this affair
was well begun a recall of the regiments was ordered; hence the number of
casualties. About the same hour a cavalry affair at Despatch Station
occurred which resulted to the credit of the Confederates.

At night General McClellan called his corps commanders to head-quarters
and announced his plan for change of base to the James River. The Fourth
Corps had been ordered to prepare the route of crossing at White Oak
Swamp, and pass over to defend it. The Fifth and Slocum's division of the
Sixth were to follow at night of the 28th. The Second, Third, and Smith's
division of the Sixth Corps were to defend the crossing against pursuit;
the Fourth, continuing its move, was to stand at Turkey Bridge, defending
the approach from Richmond by the river road; the Fifth to stand at
Malvern Hill, with McCall's division across the Long Bridge road, and
Slocum's across the Charles City road, defending the avenues of approach
from Richmond. On the 29th, Magruder in pursuit came upon Sumner's
(Second) corps at Allen's Farm, and, after a spirited affair, found Sumner
too strong for him. After his success, Sumner retired to Savage Station,
where he joined Franklin with his division under Smith. The Third Corps
(Heintzelman's), under misconception of orders, or misleading of
staff-officers, followed the marching corps across the swamp, leaving the
Second and Smith's division of the Sixth as the only defending forces. At
Savage Station, Magruder came upon them and again joined battle, but his
force was not equal to the occasion. The commander of his left (D. R.
Jones), realizing the importance of action and the necessity for
additional troops, called upon General Jackson to co-operate on his left,
but Jackson reported that he had other important duties to perform. The
affair, therefore, against odds was too strong for Magruder, so that he
was forced back without important results for the Confederates, the
Federals making safe passage of the crossing and gaining position to
defend against pursuit in that quarter.

On the 29th, General Holmes marched down the James River road to New
Market with part of Colonel Daniel's brigade and two batteries, and
General J. G. Walker's brigade and two batteries, and was there reinforced
by part of General Wise's brigade and two batteries, in co-operative
position to my division and that of A. P. Hill, on the Darbytown and Long
Bridge roads.

On his night march along the Long Bridge road, Fitz-John Porter got on the
wrong end and rubbed up against my outpost, but recognized his adversary
in time to recover his route and avert a night collision. He posted
McCall's division in front of Charles City cross-roads; his divisions
under Morell and Sykes at Malvern Hill, and Warren's brigade, near the
Fourth Corps, on the river routes from Richmond. As the divisions of the
Third Corps arrived they were posted,--Kearny between the Charles City and
Long Bridge roads, on McCall's right; Hooker in front of the Quaker road,
on McCall's left; Sedgwick's division, Sumner's corps, behind McCall.

Before noon of the 30th, Jackson's column encountered Franklin, defending
the principal crossing of White Oak Swamp by the divisions of Richardson
and W. F. Smith and Naglee's brigade. About the same time my command
marched down the Long Bridge road and encountered the main force of
McClellan's army posted at the Charles City cross-roads (Frayser's Farm,
or Glendale). My division was deployed across the Long Bridge road in
front of the divisions of McCall and Kearny, holding the division of A. P.
Hill at rest in the rear, except the brigade under Branch, which was
posted off to my right and rear to guard against Hooker's division,
standing behind the Quaker road, in threatening position on my right
flank. The ground along the front of McCall and Kearny was a dark forest,
with occasional heavy tangles, as was the ground in front of Hooker. The
front of Slocum, along the Charles City road, was something similar, but
offering some better opportunities for artillery practice and infantry

As Jackson and Franklin engaged in artillery combat, my division advanced
under desultory fire of skirmishers to close position for battle, awaiting
nearer approach of Jackson and signal of approach of our troops on the
Charles City road. In the wait the skirmish-lines were more or less
active, and an occasional shot came from one of the Federal batteries.

During the combat between Jackson and Franklin, Sedgwick's brigades under
Dana and Sully were sent back to reinforce at the crossing, but upon the
opening of the engagement at Frayser's Farm they were brought back on the

After a time reports of cannon fire came from the direction of Charles
City road, signalling, as we supposed, the approach of Huger's column. To
this I ordered one of our batteries to return salutation. The senior
brigadier of the division, R. H. Anderson, was assigned to immediate
supervision of my front line, leaving his brigade under Colonel M.
Jenkins. While awaiting the nearer approach of Jackson or the swelling
volume of Huger's fire, the President, General Lee, and General A. P.
Hill, with their staffs and followers, rode forward near my line and
joined me in a little clearing of about three acres, curtained by dense
pine forests. All parties engaged in pleasant talk and anticipations of
the result of a combination supposed to be complete and prepared for
concentrating battle,--Jackson attacking in the rear, Huger on the right
flank, A. P. Hill and myself standing in front. Very soon we were
disturbed by a few shells tearing and screaming through the forests over
our heads, and presently one or two burst in our midst, wounding a courier
and killing and wounding several horses. The little opening was speedily
cleared of the distinguished group that graced its meagre soil, and it was
left to more humble, active combatants.

Near the battery from which the shots came was R. H. Anderson's brigade,
in which Colonel Jenkins had a battalion of practised sharp-shooters. I
sent orders for Jenkins to silence the battery, under the impression that
our wait was understood, and that the sharp-shooters would be pushed
forward till they could pick off the gunners, thus ridding us of that
annoyance; but the gallant Jenkins, only too anxious for a dash at a
battery, charged and captured it, thus precipitating battle. The troops
right and left going in, in the same spirit, McCall's fire and the forest
tangle thinned our ranks as the lines neared each other, and the battle
staggered both sides, but, after a formidable struggle, the Confederates
won the ground, and Randol's gallant battery. Sedgwick's division
reinforced the front and crowded back the Confederate right, while
Kearny's, reinforced by Slocum, pushed severely against my left, and then
part of Hooker's division came against my right. Thus the aggressive
battle became defensive, but we held most of the ground gained from

In his official account, General Heintzelman said,--

    "In less than an hour General McCall's division gave way. General
    Hooker, being on his left, by moving to the right repulsed the rebels
    in the handsomest manner and with great slaughter. General Sumner, who
    was with General Sedgwick, in McCall's rear, also greatly aided with
    his artillery and infantry in driving back the enemy. They now renewed
    the attack with vigor on Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with
    heavy loss. The attack continued until some time after night.

    "This attack commenced at four P.M. and was pushed by heavy masses
    with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery,
    directed with great skill, firing double charges, swept them back. The
    whole open space, two hundred paces wide, was filled with the enemy.
    Each repulse brought fresh troops.

    "Seeing that the enemy was giving way, I returned to the forks of the
    road, where I received a call from General Kearny for aid. Knowing
    that all of General Sedgwick's troops were unavailable, I was glad to
    avail myself of the kind offer of General Slocum to send the New
    Jersey brigade of his division to General Kearny's aid. I rode out
    far enough on the Charles City road to see that we had nothing to fear
    from that direction."[35]

General McCall reported,--

    "I had ridden into the regiment to endeavor to check them, but with
    only partial success. It was my fortune to witness one of the fiercest
    bayonet charges that ever occurred on this continent. Bayonet wounds,
    mortal and slight, were given and received. I saw skulls smashed by
    the butts of muskets, and every effort made by either party in this
    life-and-death struggle proving indeed that here Greek had met Greek.
    The Seventh Regiment was at this time on the right of the Fourth, and
    was too closely engaged with a force also of great superiority in
    numbers to lend any assistance to the gallant few of the Fourth who
    were struggling at their side. In fine, these few men, some seventy or
    eighty, were borne bodily off among the rebels, and when they reached
    a gap in the fence walked through it, while the enemy, intent on
    pursuing those in front of them, passed on without noticing them.

    "It was at this moment, on witnessing this scene, I keenly felt the
    want of reinforcements. I had not a single regiment left to send to
    the support of those so overpowered. There was no running, but my
    division, reduced by the furious battles to less than six thousand,
    had to contend with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill
    (considered two of the strongest and best among many of the
    Confederate army, numbering that day eighteen or twenty thousand men),
    and it was reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force
    accumulated upon them. My right was, as I say, literally forced off
    the ground by the weight simply of the enemy's column."

His account is incorrect in the estimate of numbers and the two divisions.
Hill was not put in until a later hour, and encountered the troops of
Kearny and Slocum. Hill's orders were to hold the line gained until
Jackson and Huger approached, to warrant more aggressive battle.

Magruder's march had been directed to succor Holmes. In his official
account, General Holmes wrote of parts of his cavalry and artillery,
"whose conduct was shameful in the extreme." He reported his casualties:

    "Daniel's brigade, 2 killed, 22 wounded; Walker's brigade, 12 wounded;
    artillery, 15 wounded.

    "The strength of the enemy's position and their imposing numbers were
    such that to attempt an attack upon them with my small force,
    unsupported, would have been perfect madness; for to have done this
    would have required a march of over three-quarters of a mile up a
    steep hill destitute of cover. I accordingly withdrew about nine P.M.
    to a position somewhat in advance of that occupied in the

In his account of the fight, General Kearny wrote,--

    "At four P.M. the attack commenced on my line with a determination and
    vigor, and in such masses, as I had never witnessed. Thompson's
    battery, directed with great skill, literally swept the slightly
    falling open space with the completest execution, and, mowing them
    down by ranks, would cause the survivors to momentarily halt; but,
    almost instantly after, increased masses came up, and the wave bore

    "In concluding my report of this battle, one of the most desperate of
    the war, the one most fatal, if lost, I am proud to give my thanks and
    to include in the glory of my own division the First New Jersey
    Brigade, General Taylor, who held McCall's deserted ground, and
    General Caldwell."[37]

A. P. Hill's division was held at rest several hours after the battle was
pitched (Branch's brigade on guard on my right retired, and Gregg's on my
left). Under our plan, that Huger was to assault the Federal right and
Jackson the rear, the battle joined; Hill was to be put in fresh to crown
it. As night approached without indications of attack from either of those
columns, Hill was advanced to relieve the pressure against my worn troops.
At the first dash he again grasped and held Randol's battery, that had
been the source of contention from the first onset. Field's brigade pushed
on through the enemy's line, and, supported by Pender's and Branch's,
drove back reinforcements coming to their succor from one of Sedgwick's
brigades; pushed Caldwell's off to Kearny's position, where, with the
additional aid of part of Slocum's division, Kearny succeeded in
recovering his own ground and in putting Caldwell's brigade into part of
McCall's original right, leaving the Confederates holding part of McCall's
first line, Field's brigade some little distance in advance of it. Archer
and Branch, on Field's right, made strong that part of it. Gregg's brigade
on the left made little progress beyond holding most of the ground taken
by the first assault. The battle thus braced held its full and swelling
volume on both sides. My right, thinned by the heavy fighting and tangled
forest, found a way around the left of the contention, then gravitating
towards its centre. In this effort Hooker's division came against its
right flank. By change of front a clever fight was made, but Branch's
brigade, ordered for service at that point, had been withdrawn by General
Hill to support his centre, so that Hooker pushed us off into closed ranks
along our line in rear and back; but his gallant onset was checked and
failed of progress. General Hooker claimed that he threw Longstreet over
on Kearny, but General McCall said that by a little stretch of the
hyperbole he could have said that he threw Longstreet over the moon. To
establish his centre, Hill sent in J. R. Anderson's brigade astride the
Long Bridge road, which held the battle till the near approach of night,
when McCall, in his last desperate effort to reinforce and recover his
lost ground, was caught in the dark of twilight and invited to ride to my
head-quarters. Friends near him discovered his dilemma in time to avert
their own capture, and aggressive battle ceased. The artillery combat,
with occasional exchanges of shots, held till an hour after the beat of

It was the Forty-seventh Virginia Regiment that caught and invited General
McCall to quarter with the Confederates. Although his gallant division had
been forced from the fight, the brave head and heart of the general were
not fallen till he found himself on his lonely ride. He was more tenacious
of his battle than any one who came within my experience during the war,
if I except D. H. Hill at Sharpsburg.

In years gone by I had known him in pleasant army service, part of the
time as a brevet lieutenant of his company. When the name was announced,
and as he dismounted, I approached to offer my hand and such amenities as
were admissible under the circumstances, but he drew up with haughty mien,
which forbade nearer approach, so that the courtesies were concluded by
the offer of staff-officers to escort him to the city of Richmond.

It was during this affair that General Holmes's division advanced against
the Federals at Turkey Bridge with a six-gun field battery and engaged,
and was met by the fire of thirty field guns and the gunboat batteries,
which drove him to confusion, abandoning two guns. Earlier in the day,
Magruder's column had been ordered by a long détour to support the fight
at Frayser's Farm, but the trouble encountered by Holmes's division seemed
serious, and caused the Confederate commander to divert Magruder's march
to support that point, through which a resolute advance might endanger our
rear at Frayser's Farm. After night Magruder was called to relieve the
troops on the front of my line. His march during the day was delayed by
his mistaken guide.

The Confederates claimed as trophies of the battle ten pieces of
artillery, some prisoners, and most of the field from which McCall's
division had been dislodged. Holmes's division lost two guns in the affair
at Turkey Bridge, but other Confederates secured and afterwards made
better use of them.

During this eventful day the Federals were anxiously pushing their trains
to cover on the river, and before noon of July 1 all, except those of
ammunition necessary for immediate use, had safely passed the field
selected for their Malvern Hill battle.



    Last Stand in the Great Retreat--Strength of McClellan's Position--The
    Confederates make Poor Use of their Artillery--A Mistake and Defeat
    for Lee's Army--The Campaign as a Whole a Great Success, but it should
    have been far greater--McClellan's Retreat showed him well equipped in
    the Science of War--Review of the Campaign--Jackson's and Magruder's
    Misunderstanding--Moral Effect of the Gunboats on the James
    River--"There should be a Gunboat in Every Family."

At Malvern Hill, hardly a league away from Frayser's, now left to silence
save for the moans of the unfortunate fallen, and standing south of the
line to Turkey Bridge, was Fitz-John Porter with the reserve artillery
massed, supported by the divisions of Sykes and Morell on the left and
Couch's on the right, from the Crew House to J. W. Binford's. The field
had been carefully selected and as judiciously guarded by well-posted
commands, holding the only way left which gave hope of successful passage
to cover under the gunboats. During the night of the 30th of June and
early morn of the 1st of July this position was reinforced by the
retreating Federals,--first by the Second and Third Corps, McCall's
division of the Fifth, and W. F. Smith's of the Sixth, and later by other
troops. Among the trains moving for the river was one of ten siege guns
under Colonel Tyler. These were dropped in Porter's rear and put in
battery, giving them a sweep of the avenues of approach and extensive rake
of the woodlands, and a great number of lighter batteries bristled upon
the brow and down the slopes of the hill. On either flank the plateau was
somewhat guarded by ravines and tangled marsh lands, while the front
approach was over ascending slopes, so broken as to make advancing
artillery combat slow and hazardous.

Early on the 1st, the columns under Huger, Jackson, and Magruder met at
the Charles City cross-roads, but the enemy had given up that position and
marched away, leaving to them the abandoned forest land. The
disappointment of the Confederate commander in the failure of combination
ordered for the 30th was noted by those who were near him, while the
composure with which it was borne indicated the grander elements of his
character, and drew those who knew his plans and purposes closer to him.

Jackson was ordered to follow on the direct line of the enemy's retreat;
Huger and Magruder marched to co-operate on his right; Longstreet's and A.
P. Hill's divisions were held in reserve. General Lee rode near Jackson's
column to view the army on that front. Feeling unwell and much fatigued,
he called me to temporary service near him. As he rode to the left, he
ordered me, with the columns of Huger and Magruder, to make reconnoissance
of the enemy's new position in that quarter, and to report of the
feasibility of aggressive battle.

I found some difference between General Lee's maps and General Magruder's
guides, but my authority was only for a reconnoissance, and posting the
divisions. An elevated point was found off the enemy's left front, as high
as the plateau upon which his army stood, from which a fair view was had
of his position and down along his front and the open as far as Jackson's
field, the latter just filing in by his batteries on much lower but open

Profound silence rested upon the field. Jackson's batteries, yet a little
beyond the point of range, marched to their places as quietly as if taking
positions for review. Porter's field seemed as little concerned at the
developments along his flank and front, indicating that there was to be no
waste of ammunition on that July day. His guns could not be counted, but
blocking them off by batteries there seemed to be eighty on his front,
besides the siege battery in rear. His guns were all trailed to
Jackson's front, thus presenting a flank towards the high point upon which
I stood. From the crest at this little ridge the ground dropped off
sharply some eighteen inches or two feet to a lower terrace, forming a
natural parapet and terre-plein for forty or sixty guns, massed. The
spacious open along Jackson's front appeared to offer a field for play of
a hundred or more guns, and although his lower ground was not inviting of
combat even by a hundred guns, it was yet judged that advancing combat by
eighty or a hundred guns, in combination with the forty-gun battery of
position, might justify assault, and the tremendous game at issue called
for adventure.


I thought it probable that Porter's batteries, under the cross-fire of the
Confederates thus posted on his left and front, could be thrown into
disorder, and thus make way for combined assaults of the infantry. I so
reported, and General Lee ordered disposition accordingly, sending the
pioneer corps out to cut a road for the right batteries of position.

I suggested position to Magruder for his division, but he insisted that
the Quaker road was not correctly located on General Lee's maps, so I left
that part of the order to be looked after by General Lee's recognized
staff. General Chilton, chief of staff, was then sent by General Lee to
assist General Magruder in posting the troops, and I was ordered back to
locate the batteries.

But eight guns came in proper time and were posted. These General Magruder
proposed to supplement by thirty of his own under Colonel S. D. Lee, to be
reinforced by the others as they came up. With this understanding I
returned to head-quarters, made my report, and was permitted to go back to
my command proper.

The most convenient point for observing the effect of the artillery fire
was occupied by General Armistead's brigade. That officer was designated
by General Lee to give notice, if the combat was successful, by advancing
his brigade, under the shouts of infantry charge, as the signal for
general assault.

The eight guns for the right battery were all that got into position on
time, and Jackson failed to open fire by advancing all of the batteries
along his front, so that the practice from those quarters was not forcibly
executed. When the eight guns finally opened, Porter shifted his aim from
his proper front, which Jackson failed to combat, and put in the fire of
forty guns against the eight-gun battery of our right. The gunboat
batteries also came into that practice, but it was found that they damaged
friends almost as much as the enemy, and were ordered to discontinue.
Jackson's cross-fire, feeble at best and at long range, was finally drawn
off by other batteries far on the enemy's right, so that the eight guns
were soon piled a heterogeneous mass of caissons, guns, limbers, and
horses. Some other batteries got into action at the same point, eight or
ten at a time, but suffered like disaster.

So the plan for battle and order of the day were given over by the
Confederate commander, who sent for me to ride with him over to his left
in search of a route by which the enemy's right might be turned. This
seemed feasible under the hasty reconnoissance, and he ordered the
reserves on that move. As we started on the march the noise of battle
reached us and the march was arrested. Under the impression that his
officers realized the failure and abandonment of his original plan,
General Lee failed to issue orders specifically recalling the appointed

It seems that just as the troops marched to the left under the last order,
information was received by some of the officers at the front that the
enemy was getting away from us.

To ascertain as to this matter, and anxious to atone for lost
opportunities of the day before, part of the troops near our right moved
forward, and soon encountered the enemy's infantry, as well as the
formidable artillery. This impact burst into the noise of battle, and was
taken as the signal for assault under the original order of the day. From
the right to the left, as far as and including D. H. Hill's division, the
Confederates attacked in splendid style, making repeated brave charges,
but they were as firmly met by the enemy, and their dead and wounded were
mingled on the same lines. The Confederate ranks thinning rapidly,
Magruder called on me for reinforcements, and Jackson was sent to
reinforce D. H. Hill's left, but night closed in upon us before the
reinforcements could get into action.

As the order for battle had been given about noon, and had been abandoned
some hours before the opening, upon receiving Magruder's call, I supposed
the conflict had been brought on by the enemy to force our right back and
better clear the route of his retreat. I ordered A. P. Hill direct to
Magruder, and my own division for support on our extreme right. The result
of the battle was a repulse of the Confederates along the entire line and
the sacrifice of several thousand brave officers and men, though some of
our troops held ground nearer the enemy than at the onset of the battle.
During the night the enemy resumed his march for the river, leaving his
dead, some of his wounded, and exhibiting other marks of the precipitate
character of his retreat.

Stuart's cavalry had been recalled from north of the Chickahominy on the
30th to join us on the south side, and reached Jackson's left Tuesday
night after the battle.

The morning of the 2d opened heavy and oppressive. The storm front of
bursting cannon and bristling bayonets was changed to a wide sweep of
heavy clouds that covered the dead that had grappled and fallen together
on Malvern Hill. The enemy was gone, and reached his lodgement at
Harrison's Landing on James River, the old seat of that family which has
given our country two Presidents. Jackson stood on the direct route of
the enemy's retreat, and was ordered to follow it; Magruder's and Huger's
commands to follow Jackson. General Lee rode with them. D. H. Hill's
division was left to care for the wounded and dead of Malvern Hill. To
obviate pressure upon a single track, the reserve divisions were ordered
by Nance's Store, but the heavy clouds soon began to let down a pelting
rain that became more severe and delayed all movements.

The reports of Jackson and Stuart of the operations of the 3d are
conflicting. The former claimed that he was near the landing on the
morning of the 3d, and advanced his line of skirmishers. The latter
reported that he found during the night of the 2d a fine position on
Erlington Heights, from which the enemy could be shelled out of his new
position by artillery; that he occupied and held that position by a
squadron and howitzer until driven from it by the enemy at two o'clock in
the afternoon of the 3d; that he reported of that position to Generals Lee
and Jackson during the night of the 2d. Other accounts go with that of
Stuart. It seems that the "foot cavalry"[38] and the reserve divisions met
at the landing late in the afternoon of the 3d. The troops from the Valley
district had not been engaged in the battles of the march except that of
Gaines's Mill.

At daylight of the 4th I rode to the front, and ordered General Jackson to
drive in the enemy's skirmishers and prepare to attack. D. R. Jones's
division of Magruder's command, coming up, was ordered on Jackson's left,
A. P. Hill's on his right; my own division to support Jackson's direct
move for Erlington Heights. After pushing the skirmish line back, Jackson
reported his troops not in condition for the work, and asked delay until
the commanding general was up. As General Lee was reported near, attack
was delayed, and a note was sent asking him to ride forward as soon as
convenient. He rode up in about half an hour, and, after mature
deliberation, decided that the attack should not be made. He reinforced
his cavalry and horse artillery by a number of his choicest field
batteries, and ordered General Stuart to use them against the enemy's
transports on the lower James. This expedition did some damage, but the
superior batteries of the gun-boats, convoys of the transports, enabled
them to maintain safe-conduct along the line of supplies and
reinforcements. On the 8th he withdrew his army to points more convenient
to supplies, and towards the open highway to Washington City.

Passing in critical review the events of the campaign, they fail to
disclose a flaw as it was projected by the Confederate chief. It even
opened up grander possibilities than came within his most hopeful
anticipations at the period of projection.

The Union commander left his Fifth Corps engaged at Beaver Dam Creek while
Jackson's column marched by it as far as Hundley's Corner and went into
camp. The object and instructions of Jackson's advanced echelon were to
have him file in against any force that he might pass and attack it in
flank and rear. If, instead of going into camp at Hundley's Corner on the
afternoon of the 26th of June, he had filed to his right behind the Fifth
Corps, he would have had it surrounded by fifty thousand men beyond the
reach of succor.

He was troubled by conflicting orders. The general order for the campaign
and verbal instructions were intended to supersede all others, but General
Lee's letter of the 11th was not recalled, so he marched with the two
orders in his pocket, which made not a little trouble.

Before Jackson's army was called from the Valley, it was reinforced and
organized for our working column. On the morning of the 27th of June it
was further augmented by the division under D. H. Hill and Stuart's
cavalry. His line of march during the day led him around Porter's position
near Gaines's Mill to the enemy's right, the most favorable point for
attack. He partially engaged by D. H. Hill's division, then withdrew it,
and posted his troops in a position selected to catch the Federals in
their flight from A. P. Hill's division. Finally, when Porter's defence
developed too much strength for A. P. Hill, he deployed into line of
battle from left to right, overspreading the enemy's entire front.

On the morning of the 28th of June, General Lee thought to draw McClellan
out from his works, force him to defend his base on the Pamunkey, and to
so cripple him on his retreat as to warrant strong detachments from his
army in the direction of Washington, and thus force him to defend his own

Before marching to the opening of the campaign, he ordered a detachment of
cavalry to the south side of White Oak Swamp, under careful watch for the
enemy's movements by vedettes, even as far as Chickahominy River, so that
on the night of the 27th he had a cordon of troops and vedettes extending
completely around McClellan's army. Notwithstanding precautions so
carefully laid, McClellan started to march for his new base on the night
of the 27th, continued his preparations and movements through the day and
night of the 28th, and the first reliable information of the move towards
James River came from Major Meade and Lieutenant Johnson, engineers. The
information, though coming from a source least looked for, was more than
gratifying to General Lee, for he thought the enemy had essayed a move not
practicable; that General McClellan's army was in his power and must be
our prize, never to reach the new base.

Just as he was mapping out orders of pursuit, a staff-officer of General
Magruder's came from the other side of the river to report the Federal
army in retreat, and that General Magruder was preparing to assault the
fort in his immediate front. General Lee said,--

    "My compliments to General Magruder, and ask him not to hurt my young
    friends, Major Meade and Lieutenant Johnson, who are occupying that

Uniformly military, but courteous in his bearing, it was very rare that he
became facetious when on parade service, but anticipations that General
McClellan was soon to be his prisoner excused the giving way to impulse
born of this unexpected adventure.

Within an hour his troops on the east side were on the march for their
crossings of the Chickahominy. He then rode across, gave orders to General
Magruder, rode with him some distance, and repeated the orders before
leaving him.

Following up the rear-guard, General Magruder came upon it in force at
Savage Station. The Second Corps and Franklin's division under W. F. Smith
of the Sixth, under General Sumner, were posted there to cover the
retreat. Magruder planned battling with his own six brigades against their
front, two brigades of Huger's division to come on the enemy's left down
the Williamsburg road, Jackson's twelve or fifteen brigades to attack
their right. But when Magruder thought his arrangements complete, he
received a message from General Huger "that his brigades would be

Then other information not anticipated came to him,--viz., that General
Jones, commanding on Magruder's left, called for co-operation in that
quarter. General Jackson sent word in reply that "he had other important
duty to perform."

Referring to Jackson's orders of the 29th, General Lee wrote General

        "June 29, 1862.

        "_Commanding Division_:

    "GENERAL,--I regret much that you have made so little progress to-day
    in pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory
    the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must urge you, then, again to
    press on his rear rapidly and steadily. We must lose no time, or he
    will escape us entirely.

          "Very respectfully yours, etc.,
            "R. E. LEE,

    "P.S.--Since the order was written, I learn from Major Taylor that you
    are under the impression that General Jackson has been ordered not to
    support you. On the contrary, he has been directed to do so, and to
    push the pursuit vigorously."[40]

Sumner, besides his greater force, having some advantage from the
earthworks previously constructed, repulsed Magruder's attack, and the
affair of cross-purposes failed of effect.

If Jackson could have joined against the right of Sumner with his
brigades, the latter could have been dislodged, the Confederates passing
the swamp with him, which would have marked the beginning of the end. The
occasion was especially propitious, for Heintzelman's corps, that had been
designated as part of the rear-guard with Sumner and Franklin, through
some misconception had marched over the swamp, to camp near Charles City
cross-roads, leaving easy work for Jackson and Magruder.

When, on the forenoon of the 30th, Jackson found his way across the swamp
blocked by Franklin, he had time to march to the head of and across it to
the Charles City road in season for the engagement contemplated at
Frayser's Farm, the distance being about four miles. General Wright, of
Huger's division, marched his brigade from the head of the swamp to
Jackson's line at the bridge, and returned, making several halts and
crossings to reconnoitre.

But little remains to be said of the engagements at Frayser's Farm and
Malvern Hill. The former was a halting failure of combination of forces;
the latter an accident resulting from the armies standing close abreast
many hours. Malvern Hill left out, the two armies would have mingled their
lines between that and Westover during the 3d and 4th of July.

The failure of concert of action by the Confederates should not discount
the conduct of McClellan's masterly retreat. In the emergency he showed
himself well equipped in the science of war, and prepared to cross swords
with his able adversary. At the opening of the campaign he had in hand one
hundred and five thousand men. General Lee's returns were not accurately
made, but a fair estimate puts his numbers between eighty and eighty-five

The losses of the campaign were, on the Union side, 15,249; on the
Confederate side, greater; in the absence of complete returns, it is fair
to say that they were from 18,000 to 19,000. Up to the time of Malvern
Hill the casualties were about equally divided between the two armies, but
in that battle the Confederates lost not far from 5000 men, and the
Federals not more than one-third that number.

Upon reaching the gunboats, General McClellan's power was about doubled.
Although fire from the gun-boats was not very effective against a land
battle, the moral effect of fighting batteries that could not be reached
was most powerful. It was reported on the Confederate side that General
McClellan, on boarding one of the boats, where he spent most of the day of
battle, said, "There should be a gunboat in every family."

Some critics say that McClellan should have taken Richmond during the
campaign. The great Napoleon would have done so after the disaster at
Malvern Hill with his regularly organized army of veterans. They say, too,
that Lee should have captured McClellan and his army. So thought General
Lee, but some of his leaders were working at cross-purposes, and did not
have that close attention that the times called for.

We may now consider the probable result of the plan mapped out and ordered
by General Lee in his letter of June 11th to General Jackson had it been
followed,--_i.e._, Jackson to march down the right bank of the Pamunkey
with his troops from the Valley district and attack McClellan's rear east
of the Chickahominy, while Lee attacked from the Richmond side with his
army. On the Richmond side, McClellan had four army corps, well fortified,
supported by his powerful artillery. The battle of Gaines's Mill, where
the troops from the Valley were reinforced by four of Lee's choice
divisions and most of his cavalry,--more than doubling Jackson's
column,--may be significant of the result of Jackson's attack on that side
if it had been made as ordered. The battle of Malvern Hill, from an open
field, may tell the result of an attack upon the four corps in their
fortified position had the attack been made upon them from the Richmond



    Centres of Activity gravitate towards Orange and Culpeper
    Counties--Pope's Unsoldierly Preliminary Orders--Jackson's and Pope's
    Encounter at Cedar Mountain--Confidence in and Esteem for General
    Lee--The Confederate Commander's Plans for cutting off Pope
    miscarry--Capture of Captain Fitzhugh with Important
    Orders--Longstreet puts General Toombs under Arrest--General Pope

The Federals had by this time organized the "Army of Virginia" from the
independent forces in the State,--the First Corps under General Sigel, the
Second under General Banks, the Third under General McDowell, commanded by
Major-General John Pope, brought from the West for that object and
appointed June 26. This army reported July 31, 46,858 strong, for field

On the 23d of July, General H. W. Halleck assumed command of the Federal
armies as general-in-chief, by order of the President of July 11.

The quiet of General McClellan's army at Harrison's Landing assured
General Lee of his opportunity for attention to the movements of the army
under General Pope, working towards Richmond by the Orange and Alexandria
Railway. On the 13th of July he ordered General Jackson, with his own and
Ewell's division, to Gordonsville, to have a watch upon the Federal force
operating in that quarter, promising reinforcements as soon as occasion
should call for them. Stuart was at Hanover Court-House, in observation
towards Fredericksburg, and Robertson's cavalry was ordered to Jackson, to
reinforce his cavalry under Colonel Munford.

To engage attention pending these movements, General D. H. Hill, in
command on the south side of the James, was ordered to have all of his
artillery on that side available put in battery on the banks of the river
against McClellan's camps on the north side and his transports on the

General Pope immediately displayed bold front as a diversion, seeking to
draw General Lee away from McClellan.

So General Lee sent General A. P. Hill with his division to reinforce
Jackson, with orders to the latter to strike out for the enemy in his

The threatening attitude of the Confederates at Gordonsville caused
apprehension at Washington, and induced the authorities to consider the
withdrawal of McClellan's army to reinforce the army under Pope.

Upon receipt of an intimation to that effect, General McClellan ordered a
strong force under General Hooker to advance in threatening move against
General Lee on the 4th of August. Hooker marched on the 5th, and occupied
the ground of the battle of Malvern Hill. General Lee ordered the
divisions of McLaws, D. R. Jones, that under Ripley (D. H. Hill's), and my
own to march against Hooker. It was night when our troops were posted, and
before daylight of the next morning Hooker had marched back to his camp at
Harrison's Landing.

Just here, as a digression from following the operations of the armies of
Lee and Pope, it should be remarked that the latter, by injudicious and
unsoldierly attitude assumed at the outstart of his campaign, intensely
incensed the people of Virginia and the South generally, the Confederate
army to a man, and probably to a considerable degree discomfited the most
considerate and thoughtful of his own officers and the authorities behind
him. The exigencies of war did not demand some of the harsh measures that
he promulgated,--such, for instance, as his notorious "General Orders No.
11" and several other of his pronunciamentos:

        "WASHINGTON, JULY 23, 1862.

    "GENERAL ORDERS NO. 11.[41]

    "Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and detached commands
    will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within
    their lines or within their reach in rear of their respective

    "Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United
    States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall
    be permitted to remain at their homes and pursue in good faith their
    accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall be conducted south
    beyond the extreme pickets of this army, and be notified that if found
    again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be
    considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law.

    "If any person, having taken the oath of allegiance as above
    specified, be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his
    property seized and applied to the public use.

    "All communication with any person whatever living within the lines of
    the enemy is positively prohibited, except through the military
    authorities and in the manner specified by military law; and any
    person concerned in writing or in carrying letters or messages in any
    other way will be considered and treated as a spy within the lines of
    the United States army.

    "By command of Major-General Pope.

          "GEO. D. RUGGLES,
            "_Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff_."

This was a measure of unnecessary severity towards non-combatants, and had
an unsalutary effect. When men volunteer to fight in their country's cause
they should be credited with faith in its righteousness, and with
expectations of meeting soldiers worthy of their mettle. Appeals to turn
their strength against women and children and non-combatants are offensive
to manhood, demoralizing in influence, and more likely to aggravate and
prolong war spirit than to open ways of order and amity. Besides, such
orders indicate a flaw in the armor of the author.

General Scott set an example worthy of eternal emulation. In his march
through Mexico he was as strict in the requirement of order and protection
for non-combatants as he could have been in marching through his own civil
communities. The result was speedy peace, respect from all the people,
admiration and affection from many.

When A. P. Hill's division joined General Jackson at Gordonsville, General
Pope's army was posted,--the First Corps (Sigel's) at Sperryville, the
Second (Banks's) at Culpeper Court-House, the Third (McDowell's), one
division near Culpeper Court-House, and one at Fredericksburg--these two
under Ricketts and King respectively; his cavalry under Buford, Bayard,
and Hatch along the Rapidan from the Blue Ridge to Fredericksburg.

The point held by his left was thought essential by the Washington
authorities as holding the way for reinforcements from McClellan's army on
the James to join in the contemplated march by General Pope's route to

On the 2d of August, Jackson sent part of his cavalry forward as far as
Orange Court-House, under Colonel W. E. Jones, who encountered at that
point a formidable cavalry guard of the enemy, when a spirited affair
occurred, creditable alike to both sides. This was followed up, on the
8th, by the advance of Jackson's entire force, his own division under
Winder leading, Ewell's and A. P. Hill's following.

General Pope's outpost at Cedar Run, held by cavalry and Crawford's
brigade of infantry, had meantime been reinforced by the balance of the
Second Corps under Banks, and Ricketts's division put in supporting
position of the advance post.

On the 9th, Jackson advanced and found the enemy in strong position at
Cedar Run. His division under Ewell was posted on the northeast slope of
Slaughter Mountain, his own division under Winder formed to the left. The
engagement was pitched and soon became severe. While yet posting his
troops, Winder was mortally struck by a fragment of shell. Banks, gaining
confidence in his battle, moved forward to closer and severe fight and
held it an hour, at points putting Jackson's troops in disorder. Jackson,
reinforced by A. P. Hill's brigades, recovered his lost ground, advanced
and renewed attack, drove the enemy back, engaged against reinforcements
of Ricketts's division, continued the fight till near midnight, then
reorganized for battle away from the immediate front of the enemy, where
he awaited next day. During the evening of the 9th, Pope received his
First Corps under Sigel and called up McDowell's division, under King,
from Fredericksburg. On the 10th both armies remained quiet. On the 11th a
flag of truce was sent in asking for time to bury the dead, which Jackson
granted, and extended to a late hour of the day. King's division coming
up, Pope decided to engage again on the 12th, but Jackson, having
information of the extent of reinforcements, decided to withdraw during
the night.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF SLAUGHTER MOUNTAIN. August 9th, 1862]

The loss was severe on both sides,--Jackson's, 1276, including his most
promising brigadier, Winder; Pope's, 2381, including three brigadiers, two
wounded and one taken prisoner.

After drawing King's division to his field, General Pope had about
thirty-six thousand present for service. Jackson's reports as to these
forces were such that he accepted the advice of prudence and retired to
stronger ground on the right bank of the Rapidan.

In the battle of the 9th the troops engaged were, according to official
return of July 31,[42]--

  Second Corps (Banks's), artillery and infantry           14,567

  Ricketts's division, half of Third Corps, artillery
  and infantry                                              9,287
        Total                                              23,854

The absence of Lawton's brigade and one from Jackson's division reduced
his force to something less than eighteen thousand. The troops engaged in
battle, however, were not far from equal, Jackson probably the stronger.

That this was only a partial success--coming on the heels of the cruel
orders of the Federal commander--was gratifying to the Confederates, and
encouraging as well.

Inaction of the Army of the Potomac gave General Lee opportunity for
movement of his troops towards Washington and the army under General Pope.
On the 15th I was ordered to Gordonsville by the Central Railroad with ten
brigades. Two others under Hood at Hanover Junction were ordered to join

Before despatching my corps, General Lee expressed his thought to advance
the right column and cavalry by the lower fords of the Rapidan, the left
by the fords above the railroad bridge, but left the question open, with
orders to me to work on it.

The brigades that moved with me were D. R. Jones's, Kemper's, Pickett's,
Pryor's, Jenkins's, Featherston's, Wilcox's, Toombs's, Evans's, and
Drayton's. Hood's and Whiting's joined us near Gordonsville, Hood
commanding the demi-division,--his own and Whiting's brigades.

It may be well to write just here that experience during the seven days
about Richmond established between General Lee and his first lieutenant
relations of confidence and esteem, official and personal, which ripened
into stronger ties as the mutations of war bore heavier upon us. He always
invited the views of the latter in moves of strategy and general policy,
not so much for the purpose of having his own views approved and confirmed
as to get new light, or channels for new thought, and was more pleased
when he found something that gave him new strength than with efforts to
evade his questions by compliments. When oppressed by severe study, he
sometimes sent for me to say that he had applied himself so closely to a
matter that he found his ideas running around in a circle, and was in need
of help to find a tangent. Our personal relations remained as sincere
after the war until politics came between us in 1867.

General Pope was industriously increasing his strength. The Ninth Corps,
General Burnside, had been ordered to Fredericksburg _via_ Acquia Creek,
and a division under General Reno of eight thousand of that corps reported
to the commander at Culpeper Court-House on the 14th. Besides
reinforcements called to support him from General McClellan's army, Pope
was authorized to call to his aid the greater part of the army in West
Virginia under General Cox.

After reaching Gordonsville and learning something of the position of the
armies, and more of the features of the country, it occurred to me that a
move against General Pope's right would give us vantage-ground for battle
and pursuit, besides the inviting foot-hills of the Blue Ridge for
strategy, and this preference was expressed to General Lee.[43] He joined
us on the 15th, and the brigades, including those under Hood, were
advanced to position for a general march. He thought it better to strike
in between General Pope's left and the reinforcements that could join him
from Fredericksburg than to adopt the proposition to move his army by the
upper fords of the Rapidan and strike down upon the enemy's right, and
decided to throw his right wing forward by the Raccoon Ford, and his left
by the Somerville Ford, the latter above the railroad,--Fitzhugh Lee and
Robertson's cavalry with his right, and T. T. Munford's with the left
wing; General Stuart with the column on the right.

My command marched on the 16th to position for crossing by the lower
fords. Jackson was in position for the upper crossings. As all of the
cavalry was not up, General Lee ordered his march for the 18th, to give
time for the arrival of General Stuart and his marching troopers.

Leaving the cavalry on the march, under General Fitzhugh Lee, with
instructions to camp on the plank-road opposite Raccoon Ford on the 17th,
General Stuart rode on the cars to General Lee's head-quarters, received
his orders, and rode out on the plank-road to join his command under
Fitzhugh Lee, then due. The latter, however, "by failure to comply with
instructions," as his commander expressed it subsequently, lost a day in a
roundabout ride, which so jaded his horses that another day was sacrificed
to give them rest. As if this were not sufficient misfortune, Captain
Fitzhugh (General J. E. B. Stuart's adjutant) was captured, and, as a
crowning disaster, the despatch of the Confederate commander giving
instructions for the march of his army as ordered for the 18th was lost.
The despatch was taken to General Pope, who, thus advised by accident,
immediately set about retiring from Culpeper to the east bank of the
Rappahannock. General Pope reported that

    "The cavalry expedition sent out on the 16th in the direction of
    Louisa Court-House captured the adjutant-general of General Stuart,
    and was very near capturing that officer himself. Among the papers
    taken was an autograph letter of General Robert E. Lee to General
    Stuart, dated Gordonsville, August 15, which made manifest to me the
    position and force of the army, and their determination to overwhelm
    the army under my command before it could be reinforced by any portion
    of the Army of the Potomac."[44]

Thus on that day Pope put his army in retreat by the several crossings of
the Rappahannock to its strong camps of the north side, leaving his
cavalry in observation.

As Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry failed to get to position on my right on the
17th, I ordered two regiments of infantry to be posted as guard on the
road to Raccoon Ford until the cavalry could relieve them. The detail fell
upon Toombs's brigade. As we were to be in wait during the 17th, General
Toombs rode off that morning to visit an old Congressional friend, and was
absent when the order was received at his brigade head-quarters. The
detail was filled by his next in rank, Colonel H. L. Benning, and duly
posted. On his return, General Toombs rode upon his picket, claimed that
his troops should not have been moved except by orders through himself,
and ordered the detail back to their camps. Upon learning of General
Stuart's mishap, and the ride of the Federal cavalry by Raccoon Ford, I
sent to inquire how the cavalry happened to escape my picket-guard.
Finding that the troops had been ordered off by General Toombs, the chief
of staff was directed to put on his sword and sash and order him under
arrest. Afterwards he was ordered to the rear, to confine himself to the
limits of Gordonsville.

In addition to Reno's command, Stevens's division of the Ninth Corps
joined General Pope on the 15th. On the 17th, Reno sent out a party of two
hundred and fifty men and captured Jackson's signal-station on Clarke's
Mountain; and it appears from the official report of this occurrence that
the Federals were misinformed as to our position, and that up to the
receipt of the captured despatch, General Pope knew nothing of the arrival
of the troops of my command.

On the 18th report came from Clarke's Mountain of unusual stir in the
Federal commands about Culpeper Court-House, and General Lee sent for me
to ride with him to the mountain to observe the movements. From the summit
we had a fair view of many points, and the camp-flags, as they opened
their folds to the fitful breezes, seemed to mark places of rest. Changing
our glasses to the right and left and rear, the white tops of army wagons
were seen moving. Half an hour's close watch revealed that the move was
for the Rappahannock River. Changing the field of view to the bivouacs,
they seemed serenely quiet, under cover from the noonday August sun. As we
were there to learn from personal observation, our vigilance was prolonged
until the wagons rolled down the declivities of the Rappahannock. Then,
turning again to view the bivouacs, a stir was seen at all points. Little
clouds of dust arose which marked the tramp of soldiers, and these
presently began to swell into dense columns along the rearward lines.
Watching without comment till the clouds grew thinner and thinner as they
approached the river and melted into the bright haze of the afternoon sun,
General Lee finally put away his glasses, and with a deeply-drawn breath,
expressive at once of disappointment and resignation, said, "General, we
little thought that the enemy would turn his back upon us thus early in
the campaign."



    General Lee modifies his Order of March--Continuous
    Skirmishing--Cavalry Commander Stuart gets into General Pope's
    Head-quarters and captures his Personal Equipment--His Uniform Coat
    and Hat shown along the Confederate Lines--Jackson's Superb Flank
    Movement--Confederates capture Trains, Supplies, Munitions, and
    Prisoners--Hooker and Ewell at Bristoe Station--Jackson first on the
    Old Field of Bull Run--Longstreet's Command joins passing Thoroughfare
    Gap--Pope practically throws Responsibility for Aggressive Action on
    McDowell--Preliminary Fighting--General Pope surprised by
    Jackson--Pope's Orders to Fitz-John Porter.

Under the retrograde of the Union army, General Lee so modified his order
of march as to meet the new conditions. On the 20th of August the march
was made, the right wing to the vicinity of Kelly's Ford on the
Rappahannock River, the left to the railroad bridge and fords above. At
Kelly's Ford it seemed possible to force a crossing. As we were preparing
for it, an order came reporting the upper crossings too well defended, and
calling for the right wing to march to that point, while the left marched
up in search of more favorable points. As we were leaving Kelly's the
enemy made a dash to cross, and engaged some of the brigades in a sharp
fight, intending to delay our movements, but the main column marched on,
while this affair was still in progress. By mutual consent the fight
subsided, both parties joined their proper commands and proceeded on their
upward march, each on its own side of the stream. At Beverley's Ford,
Stuart's cavalry under Rosser crossed and made a lodgement on the east
bank, but the near approach of the enemy's column threatening, before the
infantry could get up in support, made necessary the abandonment of the
ground, and the left wing continued to feel along higher up for a
crossing. Passing up, Trimble's brigade was left at Beverley's as guard to
Jackson's rear. The enemy, conceiving an opportunity, crossed at Freeman's
Ford and attacked Trimble. Meanwhile, a detachment had been called for
from the right wing. Hood, with his own and Whiting's brigade, was
ordered, and was in time to join in Trimble's fight, which ended in
repulse of the adventurous force.

The east banks of the Rappahannock lifted quite above those occupied by
the Confederates, giving advantageous position to the Union artillery
fire, and offering no point above Kelly's Ford to force a crossing.

When the left wing marched from Rappahannock Bridge, the enemy crossed a
considerable force to the west bank, and covered it with a number of
superior batteries well posted on the east side. To dislodge that force I
put a number of batteries into action, including the Washington Artillery,
and, later, part of the reserved battalion under Colonel S. D. Lee. The
combat consumed much of the day of the 23d, when the enemy withdrew from
that bank and burned some of the dwellings as he left.

Riding along the line of batteries during the combat, we passed a
soldier-lad weeping over his brother, who had just been killed; just then
a shell came screaming by, exploded, and dashed its fragments into the
ground near enough to dust us a little. "Dad drat those Yankees!" he said;
"if I had known that they were going to throw such things as that at a
fellow, I would have stayed in Texas." He had travelled a thousand miles
to volunteer in the same company with his brother.

Assured of the transfer of McClellan's forces from the James, General Lee
called up the divisions of Generals D. H. Hill, McLaws, the half division
under J. G. Walker, and Hampton's cavalry from Richmond. Anderson's
division was marching from Orange Court-House as our reserve force.

On the 22d, Munford's cavalry reported the Warrenton road open as far as
the vicinity of General Pope's head-quarters. General Stuart was ordered
over, with parts of his brigades, to investigate and make trouble in the
enemy's rear. He crossed at Waterloo and Hunt's Mill with fifteen hundred
troopers and Pelham's horse artillery, and rode to Warrenton. Passing
through, he directed his ride towards Catlett's Station to first burn the
bridge over Cedar Creek.

Before reaching Catlett's a severe storm burst upon him, bogging the roads
and flooding the streams behind him. The heavy roads delayed his artillery
so that it was after night when he approached Catlett's. He caught a
picket-guard and got into a camp about General Pope's head-quarters, took
a number of prisoners, some camp property, and, meeting an old
acquaintance and friend in a colored man, who conducted him to General
Pope's tents, he found one of the general's uniform coats, a hat, a number
of official despatches, a large amount of United States currency, much of
the general's personal equipments, and one of the members of his staff,
Major Goulding. He made several attempts to fire the bridge near
Catlett's, but the heavy rains put out all fires that could be started,
when he sought axes to cut it away. By this time the troops about the
camps rallied and opened severe fire against him, but with little damage.
The heavy rainfall admonished him to forego further operations and return
to the army while yet there was a chance to cross Cedar Creek and the
Rappahannock before the tides came down. On the night of the 23d he
reached Sulphur Springs, where he met General Jackson's troops trying to
make comfortable lodgement on the east bank, passed over, and resumed
position outside General Lee's left. The despatch-book of General Pope
gave information of his troops and his anxiety for reinforcements, besides
mention of those that had joined him, but General Stuart's especial
pleasure and pride were manifested over the possession of the uniform coat
and hat of General Pope. Stuart rode along the line showing them, and
proclaiming that he was satisfied with the exchange that made even his
loss at Verdierville before the march; but the despatch lost at
Verdierville was the tremendous blow that could not be overestimated.

All of the 23d was spent in severe artillery combat. General Jackson had
gained the east bank at Warrenton (Sulphur Springs) crossing, and there
seemed a fair prospect of making a permanent lodgement, but the tides from
the severe storm of the day and night previous were coming down in
torrents, threatening floods at all of the fords.

On the 22d, Pope had formed a plan of concentrating his forces to cross
and attack Lee's right by the lower fords, but the freshet had shut him
off in that quarter; so he turned to the detachment of Jackson, on the
east side, just cut off from support. Marching up the river bank, Jackson
succeeded in so reinforcing his detachment as to defend it to an upper
crossing till it found safe footing on the west bank. The high water cut
off all operations by direct moves on the 24th. Meanwhile, General Pope
had received the divisions of Kearny and Reynolds from McClellan's army,
forty-five hundred and twenty-five hundred respectively.

About this time a letter came to head-quarters of the right wing from
General Toombs, expressing regret at his unfortunate mistake in relieving
his troops from picket service, and asking to be released from arrest,
that he might have the opportunity to show in the approaching conflicts
his deep interest in the cause. The adjutant-general was instructed to say
in reply that the chief of corps was pleased to know that the malefeasance
was from want of experience, not intentional breach of authority, and that
he would be more than welcome back by the general and the troops of his


On the 25th, Jackson was ordered to pull away from our main force with the
left wing, march by the crossings of the upper tributaries through
Thoroughfare Gap, and strike the railway in the enemy's rear at Manassas
Junction, his supply depot. Stuart's cavalry was ordered to follow during
the night.

By a rapid march Jackson crossed the fords of the upper streams and made
his bivouac near Salem. Forcing his march on the 26th, he passed
Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville, where Stuart joined him with all of his
cavalry. From Gainesville he inclined to the right for Bristoe Station,
the cavalry holding the curtain between his column and Pope's. A little
after sunset he reached the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, a march of
thirty miles. Approaching the station, trains were heard on the rails.
General Ewell divided his force and took two points on the rails, so as to
cut off the trains. Munford's cavalry assisted in the job. Two trains and
a number of prisoners were taken, the greater part of the detachment at
the station making safe retreat. His plans against General Lee's right cut
off by the high water, General Pope extended his right, under Sigel,
Banks, and Reno, in search of Jackson up the river, who meanwhile had
spirited himself away looking towards Pope's rear. I was left on the river
bank in front, the reserve infantry, R. H. Anderson's division, and
artillery near at hand.

Although the night of the 26th was very dark, and his troops were severely
worn, to be sure of his opportunity, Jackson sent a detachment to Manassas
Junction (seven miles). The gallant Trimble, with five hundred of his men,
volunteered for the service, and set out at once on the march. Stuart was
afterwards ordered to join Trimble with his cavalry, and as ranking
officer to command the operations of the entire force. The infantry
advanced and attacked the enemy as soon as it could be formed for work,
captured three hundred prisoners, an eight-gun battery complete, and
immense quantities of army supplies.

Feeling the main force of his adversary in his front awaiting opportunity,
General Pope became anxious about his left and rear, and was further
hampered by instructions from the Washington authorities to hold his
Fredericksburg connections and "fight like the devil." (It may have been
fortunate for the Confederates that he was not instructed to _fight like
Jackson_.) On the 23d he was informed of strong reinforcements to reach
him at Warrenton Junction on the next day, and that larger forces would be
shipped him on the 24th, to join him on the 25th.

Nevertheless, he began to realize, as he felt Jackson's march to his
right, that he must abandon the line of the Rappahannock and attend on the
movements of that command gone astray by the mountains. He concentrated
the Army of Virginia, to which Reynolds's division had been assigned, at
and near Warrenton under McDowell; Reno east of Warrenton about three
miles, on the turnpike; Porter's (Fifth) corps near Bealton, ordered to
join Reno, and Heintzelman's (Third) corps, ten thousand strong, at
Warrenton Junction. The Sixth (Franklin's) Corps, ten thousand strong,
Army of the Potomac, was at Alexandria awaiting transportation, as were
the divisions of Sturgis, ten thousand, and Cox, seven thousand,--the
latter from West Virginia. General Pope asked to have Franklin's corps
march by the Warrenton turnpike to join him, and sent instructions to
different parties to see that the guards in his rear were strengthened;
that at Manassas Junction by a division.

Under assurances from Washington of the prompt arrival of forces from that
quarter, he looked for the approach of Franklin as far as Gainesville,
marching by the Warrenton turnpike, and a division to reinforce the
command at Manassas Junction, so that when Jackson cut in on his rear and
captured the detachment at the Junction, he was not a little surprised. He
was in position for grand tactics, however, midway between the right and
left wings of his adversary's forces, that in his rear worn by severe
marches and some fighting, that in his front behind a river, the crossings
of which were difficult, and the lines of march to bring the distant wings
to co-operation over routes that could be defended by small commands.

Communication with Washington being severed, the forces at and near
Alexandria were thrown in the dark. To move by rail they were liable to
run into the wrong camps, and the rapid change by water to the new
position left them short of land transportation.

Pope stood on the evening of the 27th: McDowell's corps, including
Reynolds's division, 15,500; Sigel's corps, 9000; Banks's, 5000; Reno's,
7000; Heintzelman's and Porter's corps, 18,000,--in all 54,500 men, with
4000 cavalry; Platt's brigade, Sturgis's division, which joined him on the
26th, not included. In his rear was Jackson, 20,000; in front on the
Rappahannock was my 25,000; R. H. Anderson's reserve division, 5000;
total, 50,000, with 3000 of cavalry under Stuart.

On the 26th I moved up to and crossed at Hinson's Mill Ford, leaving
Anderson's division on the Warrenton Sulphur Springs route.

On the 27th, Jackson marched at daylight to Manassas Junction with his own
division, under Taliaferro, and A. P. Hill's, leaving Ewell's at Bristoe
Station, with orders to withdraw if severely pressed. Approaching the
Junction, a cavalry regiment came in, threatening attack, and was driven
off by Colonel Baylor's regiment. A field battery came from the direction
of Centreville, and tried to make trouble at long range, but was driven
off by superior numbers. Then a brigade of infantry under General Taylor,
of New Jersey, just landed from the cars from Alexandria, advanced and
made a desperate effort to recover the lost position and equipage at
Manassas Junction. Field's, Archer's, Pender's, and Thomas's brigades,
moving towards the railroad bridge, met Taylor's command and engaged it,
at the same time moving towards its rear, threatening to cut off its
retreat. It was driven back after a fierce struggle, General Taylor,
commanding, mortally wounded. Part of the Kanawha division under General
Scammon was ordered to its support, but was only in time to assist in its
retreat. Reporting this affair, General Jackson said,--

    "The advance was made with great spirit and determination, and under a
    leader worthy of a better cause."

The spoils were then quietly divided, such as could be consumed or hauled
off, and the balance given to the torch.

I marched from the Rappahannock, following on Jackson's trail, and camped
at White Plains. The march during the day was delayed about an hour by a
large force of cavalry which showed itself on my right front. As I had no
cavalry, a little time was spent in learning of its import and following.

General Pope ordered McDowell, with his own corps, including Reynolds's
division and Sigel's corps, to march so as to be at Gainesville at
nightfall; Reno's corps and Kearny's division of the Third to Greenwich to
support McDowell. He rode with Hooker's division of the Third along the
route by the railroad for Bristoe Station, ordered Porter's Fifth Corps to
remain at Warrenton Junction till relieved by Banks's corps, then to push
on towards Gainesville, Banks to follow by the railroad route.

In the afternoon, Hooker encountered Ewell at Bristoe Station, where the
divisions engaged in a severe fight, which was handsomely maintained till
after night. Ewell, under his orders, withdrew to join Jackson. The
conduct of the affair was about equally creditable to the commands.

After this affair, General Pope so far modified his order of the day as to
call Porter to him by direct route, to march at one A.M. and join him at
daylight. Kearny's division was ordered for Bristoe Station, Reno's corps
for Manassas Junction, and McDowell, from Gainesville, was ordered to
swing around to his right and march, guided by the Manassas Gap Railroad,
to Manassas Junction.

Ewell made his way along the railroad to Jackson in time to refresh his
men on the good things of the captures and for several hours of sleep.
Fitzhugh Lee, with three regiments of cavalry, was ordered on to Fairfax
Court-House and along the railroad towards Alexandria to cut off rail

General McClellan reached Alexandria, Virginia, on the 27th. On the 28th,
Jackson was first to move at 12.20 A.M. He applied the torch to the stores
of provisions, and marched with his division, under Taliaferro, by the New
Market Sudley Springs road across the Warrenton turnpike, and pitched
bivouac on a line from near Groveton, towards Sudley Mills, on the field
of first Manassas, at daylight.

At one A.M., A. P. Hill marched from Manassas Junction, crossed Bull Run,
and halted at Centreville. Ewell followed at daylight towards Centreville,
crossed Bull Run, marched up some distance, recrossed, and joined Jackson,
forming on Taliaferro's left. After the morning fires of the bivouac
burned out, Jackson's position could not be seen except upon near
approach. He was hid away under the cuts and embankments of an unfinished

The road upon which Porter marched was crowded during the night, so that
he and his officers thought that they would make better time and be in
better condition by marching at three A.M. He reached Bristoe at ten A.M.,
Kearny at eight, and Reno in due season. But it was late in the morning
when McDowell was ready to march, and later in the day when his left
swung out on the march to the Junction.

At twelve o'clock, General Pope reached Manassas Junction. Misled by the
movements of A. P. Hill and Ewell, he ordered Reno's corps and Kearny's
and Hooker's divisions of the Third to Centreville, in search of Jackson,
while the latter was little more than a league from him, resting quietly
in his hiding-place, and his detached divisions had doubled on their
courses and were marching to join him. McDowell, having information of my
approach, delayed his march, detaching Ricketts's division to hold me in
check at Thoroughfare Gap.

The first passage at arms of the day was between part of Stuart's cavalry,
supported by B. T. Johnson's infantry, and Meade's brigade of McDowell's
command. As the latter swung around for his march to the Junction, the
brigade approached Jackson's right. A detachment was pushed out against
Meade, and some artillery practice followed. The Confederates retired, but
reported no loss. Under the impression that the force encountered was some
cavalry rear-guard or reconnoitring party, McDowell resumed his march "as
soon as the killed and wounded were cared for."

The noise made by this affair caused Sigel to countermarch his corps, and
otherwise delayed the march of McDowell's entire forces, while it gave no
inconvenience to the Confederates further than a change of front of part
of Jackson's command to receive battle, not intended, by his adversary.
Jackson changed his front, but finding the direction of the enemy changed
so as to march away from him, he took the move for a general retreat, made
report of it to A. P. Hill, who was yet north of Bull Run, and ordered him
to intercept the retreat by manning the lower fords of Bull Run. The order
was received at ten A.M., but General Hill had intercepted despatches of
General Pope giving notice of his preparation for battle at Manassas the
next day, and thought it better to march on and join Jackson. He filed
into line on Jackson's left about noon.

General Jackson was right. If General Hill had moved as ordered, he would
have met detachments ordered by General Pope to Centreville, and held them
back to the south side until Jackson could join him to hold the line. The
natural sequence of Confederate operations was position to intercept
General Pope's return to Washington. The scenes were shifting and inviting
of adventure, and the marches should have followed them. General Hill was
justified by the circumstances that influenced his march.

When General Pope reached the Junction with Heintzelman's and Reno's
corps, the game was on other fields. As the last of the Confederate
columns had hied away towards Centreville, he ordered thither those corps,
and called up the Fifth to join him. He then changed the orders of
McDowell's column, directing it towards Centreville, to mass his cavalry,
and find Jackson, and presently (at two P.M.) so far modified these as to
direct McDowell to use his own judgment, and give him the benefit of his
views, as he knew the country better, but ordered that he should not go
farther towards Manassas Junction. These instructions were urgent, with
assurances that McDowell's moves should be supported by other columns. Had
these been promptly executed, McDowell's entire force should have
encountered Jackson before four o'clock, but McDowell did not find
Jackson. As his division, under King, marched along the turnpike a little
before night, Jackson saw and engaged it in battle, as we shall see.

The head of my column reached Thoroughfare Gap early in the afternoon.
Reports from General Jackson were that he was resting quietly on the flank
of the enemy, and between him and Washington. Parties from the Gap
reported it clear, and the Confederate commander called a rest for the
night, but D. R. Jones's division was ordered on to occupy the Gap.

As we approached it, officers riding to the front returned reporting the
enemy coming in heavy columns on the other side. Jones was ordered to halt
his division till he could advance his skirmishers. The Ninth Georgia
Regiment, G. T. Anderson's brigade, was sent and followed at proper
distance by the division. The skirmishers met the enemy's pickets in the
Gap, drove them off, and followed till they in turn were met by a strong
force and pushed back. The enemy's leading brigade reached the plateau
running along the eastern side of the mountain, which, with his batteries
and infantry, gave him command at that end. Anderson reinforced his Ninth
by the First, then by his other regiments on the mountain-side, to the
left of the Gap, and advanced till arrested by the impenetrable tangle of
the mountain undergrowth.

The Gap is a pass cut through Bull Run Mountain for the flow of a
streamlet, through Occoquan Creek, to the waters of the Potomac. Its mean
width is eighty yards. Its faces of basaltic rock rise in vertical ascent
from one hundred to three hundred feet, relieved hither and thither by
wild ivy, creeping through their fissures and from the tops of boulders in
picturesque drapery. It was in the midst of this bold and beautiful
scenery, in this narrow gorge where the Indians had doubtless often
contested ages ago, that the seasoned soldiers of our civilized armies now
battled for right of way.

Finding his passage over the mountain by the left side of the Gap blocked
by the mountain tangle, Jones called up Toombs's brigade, under command of
Colonel Benning, and ordered it over the mountain obstacle by the south
side. Drayton's brigade was held in rear. By the time the troops were so
disposed, Ricketts's division was well deployed along the plateau on the

Benning put Major Waddell, with the Twentieth Georgia, on the
mountain-side as skirmishers, and strengthened it by another under Colonel
Holmes, in double time, to gain the crest on that side. The Twentieth
gained the crest while the Federals were yet about eighty yards below on
their side. The Georgians knew how to maintain their advantage, and their
fire arrested farther advance of the enemy, when, after a spirited
fusillade, reinforcements joined them in good season, and extended the
line and held it, driving back the second assaulting force and following
down the eastern slope.


As soon as the fire of the Federal batteries opened, Hood was ordered with
his two brigades to cross the mountain on the north side of the Gap away
by a cattle-trail, and three other brigades were despatched under General
Wilcox to Hopewell Pass, about three miles north of Thoroughfare Gap.

Advancing his men, selected for their long-range rifles, Benning drove off
a battery seeking position to play upon the mountain slope and eastern end
of the gorge, and moved forward under cover of a ravine until he gained a
flank fire upon the enemy's batteries. This, with the march of Wilcox
through Hopewell Pass and the crossing of one of Hood's brigades, gave the
Confederates commanding position, and Ricketts withdrew in time to escape

About six o'clock McDowell put his troops on the countermarch, Sigel's
corps and Reynolds's division back by the New Market road for its crossing
of the Warrenton turnpike, and King's division of his own corps down the
turnpike. A. P. Hill's and Ewell's divisions, returning from the north of
Bull Run, hardly had time for rest, when the march of King's division was
reported. About the same time the divisions that had been ordered by Pope
to Centreville reached that point, driving off some Confederate cavalry
loitering along the way.

As King's division was marching by, Jackson thought to come out from his
lurking-place to learn the meaning of the march. The direction of the move
again impressed him that Pope was retreating, and that his escape to the
north side of Bull Run would put his army in a position of safety before
General Lee could join him. It was late, the sun had set, but Jackson was
moved to prompt action, as the only means of arresting and holding Pope
for General Lee's arrival. He was in plain view of the white smoke of the
rifles of my infantry as they climbed over Bull Run Mountain, seven miles
away, and in hearing of our artillery as the boom of the big guns,
resounding along the rock-faced cliffs, gathered volume to offer
salutations and greetings for the union of comrades and commands. He
changed the front of his right division, and, noting the movement of
Sigel's troops along the New Market road, called out Ewell with his
brigades under Lawton and Trimble, and in addition to the artillery of
these commands used the horse artillery under Pelham. As formed, this new
line was broadside against the turnpike, his left a little way from

The ground upon which the action occurred had been passed an hour before
by the division commander, General Hatch, who saw no indication of the
presence of a foe. As the division marched, the column was made up of the
brigades of Hatch, Gibbon, Doubleday, and Patrick. The action fell against
the brigade commanded by General Gibbon, who, taking it for a cavalry
annoyance to cover retreat, opened against it, and essayed aggressive
fight, till he found himself engaged against a formidable force of
infantry and artillery. He was assisted by part of Doubleday's brigade,
and asked for other assistance, which failed to reach him, till night came
and ended the contest. His fight was desperate and courageous against
odds, but he held it and his line till dark. His loss was seven hundred
and fifty-one, including Colonel O'Connor and Major May, mortally wounded,
with many other officers with lighter hurts.[45]

General Doubleday joined the fight with his brigade, and reported his loss
nearly half of the troops engaged. General Gibbon called it "a
surprise."[46] And well he might, after his division commander had just
passed over the route and failed to find any indication of the lurking

General Jackson reported, "The conflict here was firm and sanguinary." He
fails to give his number lost, but acknowledges his severe loss in the
division commanders, General Ewell losing a leg, and Taliaferro severely

During the night the Federal commander reported to his subordinates that
McDowell had "intercepted the retreat of Jackson, and ordered
concentration of the army against him,"[47] whereas it was, of course,
Jackson who had intercepted McDowell's march. He seems to have been under
the impression that he was about to capture Jackson, and inclined to lead
his subordinates to the same opinion.

Of the time, Major Edward Pye reported,--

    "We were sent forward towards evening to pursue the enemy, who were
    said to be retreating. Found the enemy, but did not see them retreat.
    A deadly fire from three sides welcomed and drove us back."[48]

After night Gibbon held his front by a line of skirmishers, and withdrew
his command to a place of rest. At one A.M. the division was withdrawn and
marched back to Manassas. Ricketts, finding himself in isolated position
at Gainesville, left at daylight and marched to Bristoe. Jackson moved his
forces at daylight, and re-established his line behind the unfinished
railroad, his own division under General Stark, Ewell's under General
Lawton, with A. P. Hill on his left.

General Pope's orders for the night directed the march of Kearny's
division from Centreville by the turnpike at one A.M., to reinforce the
troops against Jackson; the other division of Heintzelman's corps
(Hooker's) to march by the same route at daylight, and to be followed by
the corps under Reno. These orders were urgent, and directed that the
commands should move promptly, leaving fragments behind if all could not
be got together in time; Kearny to attack at daylight, to be supported by

McDowell's operations of the afternoon left Sigel's corps and Reynolds's
division in the vicinity of the field of King's fight. General Pope's
orders were given under the impression that King's division was still
occupying the ground of the late conflict, and that Ricketts's division
was not far away; but these divisions had been removed to points before
mentioned, though special instructions had been sent McDowell and King to
hold the position "at all hazards, to prevent the retreat of Jackson,"
with assurances that at daylight in the morning the entire force from
Centreville and Manassas Junction should be up and in prompt co-operation.

But McDowell had probably learned that Jackson had no thought of
retreating, and King had found that his ground was not tenable. The order
intended for King failed to reach him.

Before he was advised of the withdrawal of King's division, General Pope
sent orders to General Porter directing movements for the 29th, informing
him of the orders of Kearny and Hooker, and directing Porter to move at
daylight towards Centreville, for position in co-operation of the
projected battle, and ordering Reno to march for the battle by the
Warrenton turnpike. Under the orders, Porter marched towards Centreville,
and Reno towards the field for battle. Kearny deferred his march till
daylight, and was followed by Hooker's division at convenient marching
distance. Reno's column followed the march of the latter.

As soon as advised of the withdrawal of King's division from the ground of
the 28th, General Pope sent as substitutes for his orders of the early
morning that General Porter should push forward with his corps and King's
division of McDowell's command to Gainesville, to co-operate with his
movements along the Warrenton turnpike.[49] This order was received by
Porter at 9.30 A.M.,[50] but General McDowell joined this column, and as
ranking officer objected to the transfer of his division under King to
other authority, which brought out the joint order to McDowell and Porter
to have their joint commands execute the move towards Gainesville.



    Battle opened by the Federals on Jackson's Right, followed by
    Kearny--Longstreet's Reconnoissance--Stuart, the Cavalry Leader,
    sleeps on the Field of Battle--Pope thought at the Close of the 29th
    that the Confederates were retreating--Second Day--Fitz-John Porter
    struck in Flank--Longstreet takes a Hand in the Fight late in the
    Day--Lee under Fire--The Federal Retreat to Centreville--That Point
    turned--Pope again dislodged--"Stonewall" Jackson's Appearance and
    Peculiarities--Killing of "Fighting Phil" Kearny--Losses--Review of
    the Campaign.

General Pope at daylight sent orders to General Sigel's corps, with
Reynolds's division, to attack as soon as it was light enough to see, and
bring the enemy to a stand if possible. At the same time orders were sent
Heintzelman and Reno for their corps to hurry along the turnpike and join
on the right of Sigel. The batteries opened in an irregular combat on the
left, centre, and right a little after eight o'clock, and drew from
Jackson a monotonous but resolute response. And thus early upon the 29th
of August was begun the second battle upon this classic and fateful field.

I marched at daylight and filed to the left at Gainesville at nine
o'clock. As the head of the column approached Gainesville the fire of
artillery became more lively, and its volume swelled to proportions
indicating near approach to battle. The men involuntarily quickened step,
filed down the turnpike, and in twenty minutes came upon the battle as it
began to press upon Jackson's right, their left battery partially turning
his right. His battle, as before stated, stood upon its original line of
the unfinished railroad.

As my columns approached, the batteries of the leading brigades were
thrown forward to ground of superior sweep. This display and the deploy of
the infantry were so threatening to the enemy's left batteries that he
thought prudent to change the front of that end of his line more to his
left and rear. Hood's two brigades were deployed across the turnpike at
right angles, supported by the brigade under Evans. A battery advanced on
their right to good position and put in some clever work, which caused the
enemy to rectify all that end of his line. Kemper deployed two of his
brigades, supported by the third, on the right of Hood. The three brigades
under Wilcox were posted in rear of Hood and Evans, and in close
supporting distance. On Hood's left and near Jackson's right was open
field, of commanding position. This was selected by Colonel Walton, of the
Washington Artillery, for his battalion, and he brought it bounding into
position as soon as called. The division under D. R. Jones was deployed in
the order of the others, but was broken off to the rear, across the
Manassas Gap Railroad, to guard against forces of the enemy reported in
the direction of Manassas Junction and Bristoe. As formed, my line made an
obtuse angle forward of Jackson's, till it approached Manassas Gap
Railroad, where D. R. Jones's division was broken in echelon to the rear.
At twelve o'clock we were formed for battle.

About eleven o'clock, Hooker's division filed to the right from the
turnpike, to reinforce the Federal right under Kearny, who, with Sigel's
corps and Reynolds's division, were engaged in a desultory affair against
Jackson's left, chiefly of artillery.

R. H. Anderson's division marched at daylight along the Warrenton turnpike
for Gainesville.

When I reported my troops in order for battle, General Lee was inclined to
engage as soon as practicable, but did not order. All troops that he could
hope to have were up except R. H. Anderson's division, which was near
enough to come in when the battle was in progress. I asked him to be
allowed to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's ground, and along his
left. After an hour's work, mounted and afoot, under the August sun, I
returned and reported adversely as to attack, especially in view of the
easy approach of the troops reported at Manassas against my right in the
event of severe contention. We knew of Ricketts's division in that
quarter, and of a considerable force at Manassas Junction, which indicated
one corps.

At two o'clock Kearny made an earnest opening against Jackson's left, but
no information of battle reached us on the right. He made severe battle by
his division, and with some success, but was checked by Jackson's
movements to meet him. General Stevens supported his battle, but his
numbers were not equal to the occasion. General Sigel joined in the
affair, and part of General Hooker's division, making a gallant fight, but
little progress. General Grover's brigade made a gallant charge, but a
single brigade was a trifle, and it met with only partial success, and was
obliged to retire with heavy loss of killed and wounded,--four hundred and

At one time the enemy broke through the line, cutting off the extreme left
brigade, and gained position on the railroad cut; but Jackson and A. P.
Hill reinforced against that attack, and were in time to push it back and
recover the lost ground.

Their attacks were too much in detail to hold even the ground gained, but
they held firmly to the battle and their line until after night, when they
withdrew to await orders for the next day.

Though this fight opened at two o'clock, and was fiercely contested till
near night, no account of it came from head-quarters to my command, nor
did General Jackson think to send word of it. General Lee, not entirely
satisfied with the report of my reconnoissance, was thinking of sending
some of the engineers for more critical survey of his right front, when
his chief of cavalry sent to inform him of the approach of a formidable
column of infantry and artillery threatening his right. Wilcox's division
was changed to supporting position of our right, under Jones, and I rode
to look at this new force, its strength, and the ground of its approach.
It was the column of McDowell's and Porter's corps, marching under the
joint order. Porter's corps in advance deployed Morell's division, and
ordered Butterfield's brigade, preceded by a regiment of skirmishers, to
advance on their right, Sykes's division to support Morell. As this was in
process of execution, McDowell, whose corps was in rear, rode to the front
and objected to the plan and attack so far from the main force.

A few shots were exchanged, when all became quiet again. We saw nothing of
McDowell's corps, and our cavalry had not been able to get far enough
towards their rear to know of its presence or force. He afterwards drew
off from Porter's column and marched by the Sudley Springs road to join
the main force on the turnpike. I rode back and reported to General Lee
that the column was hardly strong enough to mean aggressive work from that
quarter, and at the same time reported a dust along the New Market road
which seemed to indicate movement of other troops from Manassas.

General Stuart rode up, making similar report, and asked for orders. As
our chief was not ready with his orders at the moment, Stuart was asked to
wait. The latter threw himself on the grass, put a large stone under his
head, asked the general to have him called when his orders were ready for
him, and went sound asleep.

Our chief now returned to his first plan of attack by his right down the
turnpike. Though more than anxious to meet his wishes, and anticipating
his orders, I suggested, as the day was far spent, that a reconnoissance
in force be made at nightfall to the immediate front of the enemy, and if
an opening was found for an entering wedge, that we have all things in
readiness at daylight for a good day's work. After a moment's hesitation
he assented, and orders were given for the advance at early twilight.

This gave General Stuart half an hour _siesta_. When called, he sprang to
his feet, received his orders, swung into his saddle, and at a lope,
singing, "If you want to have a good time, jine the cavalry," his
banjo-player, Sweeny, on the jump behind him, rode to his troopers.

Wilcox was recalled and ordered to march in support of Hood and Evans when
they advanced on the reconnoissance. It so happened that our advance had
been anticipated by an order to move from the enemy's side against us.
They attacked along the turnpike by King's division about sunset.

To the Confederates, who had been searching for an opportunity during the
greater part of the day, and were about to march through the approaching
darkness to find it, this was an agreeable surprise. Relieved of that
irksome toil, and ready for work, they jumped at the presence, to welcome
in countercharge the enemy's coming. A fierce struggle of thirty minutes
gave them advantage which they followed through the dark to the base of
the high ground held by bayonets and batteries innumerable as compared
with their limited ranks. Their task accomplished, they were halted at
nine o'clock to await the morrow. One cannon, a number of flags, and a few
prisoners were taken.

Generals Wilcox and Hood were ordered to carefully examine the position of
the enemy and report of the feasibility of attack at daylight. They came
to corps head-quarters a little before twelve o'clock, and made separate
reports, both against attack, with minute items of their conclusions. Hood
was ordered to have the carriage of the captured gun cut up and left, and
both were ordered to withdraw their commands to their first positions.

Meanwhile, General Pope had sent orders to General Porter, dated 4.30
P.M., to attack upon my right flank, but the order was not received until
it was too late for battle, and the force was not strong enough, and a
fight at that hour might have been more unfortunate than the fights by
detail on their right. If it had been sent to General McDowell before he
left, the two corps, if he could have been induced to go in, might have
given serious trouble. The field on their left was favorable for tactics,
but on Porter's front it was rough, and R. H. Anderson's division was in
striking distance of their left, if that effort had been made.

Anderson marched in the dark as far as Hood's front before reporting for
position, and was ordered back to Gainesville.

The 4.30 order was issued under the impression that my troops, or the
greater part of them, were still at Thoroughfare Gap, and General Pope
said, in his official report,--

    "I believe, in fact I am positive, that at five o'clock in the
    afternoon of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no considerable
    body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was
    easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson
    and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so, we should
    have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he
    could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet."[51]

After night, Porter's column marched by its right to follow the route of

The morning of the 30th broke fair, and for the Federal commander bright
with anticipations for the day. He wired the Washington authorities of
success, that "the enemy was retreating to the mountains," and told of his
preparations for pursuit. It seems that he took my reconnoissance for a
fight, and my withdrawal for retreat, also interpreting reports from the
right as very favorable. He reported,--

    "General Hooker estimated the loss of the enemy as at least two to
    one, and General Kearny as at least three to one."

He construed the operations of the night of the 29th and the reports of
the morning of the 30th as indications of retreat of the Confederates.
Prisoners captured during the night, paroled and returning to him, so
reported on the morning of the 30th, and his general officers had
impressions of the Confederate left that confirmed the other accounts, and
convinced him that we were in retreat.

The forces threatening our right the day before having marched around
towards the turnpike, D. R. Jones's division was advanced to position near
Kemper's right. Colonel S. D. Lee's artillery battalion was advanced to
relieve the Washington Artillery, making our line complete, in battle

About one o'clock in the afternoon, General Pope ordered attack against
Jackson's front by the corps under General Porter, supported by King's
division, Heintzelman and Reno to move forward and attack Jackson's left,
to turn it and strike down against the flank, Ricketts's division in
support of it; but Ricketts was recalled and put near the turnpike, to
support that part of Porter's field.

During the early part of this severe battle not a gun was fired by my
troops, except occasional shots from S. D. Lee's batteries of reserve
artillery, and less frequent shots from one or two of my other batteries.

Developments appearing unfavorable for a general engagement, General Lee
had settled upon a move by Sudley Springs, to cross Bull Run during the
night and try to again reach Pope's rear, this time with his army.

ENGAGED Aug. 30th, 1862]

About three P.M. I rode to the front to prepare to make a diversion a
little before dark, to cover the plan proposed for our night march. As I
rode, batteries resting on the sides of the turnpike thought that battle
was at hand, and called their officers and men to stand to their guns and
horses. Passing by and beyond my lines, a message came from General
Jackson reporting his lines heavily pressed, and asking to be
reinforced. Riding forward a few rods to an open, which gave a view of
Jackson's field, I came in sight of Porter's battle, piling up against
Jackson's right, centre, and left. At the same time an order came from
General Lee for a division to be sent General Jackson. Porter's masses
were in almost direct line from the point at which I stood, and in
enfilade fire. It was evident that they could not stand fifteen minutes
under the fire of batteries planted at that point, while a division
marching back and across the field to aid Jackson could not reach him in
an hour, more time probably than he could stand under the heavy weights
then bearing down upon him. Boldness was prudence! Prompt work by the wing
and batteries could relieve the battle. Reinforcements might not be in
time, so I called for my nearest batteries. Ready, anticipating call, they
sprang to their places and drove at speed, saw the opportunity before it
could be pointed out, and went into action. The first fire was by
Chapman's battery, followed in rolling practice by Boyce's and Reilly's.
Almost immediately the wounded began to drop off from Porter's ranks; the
number seemed to increase with every shot; the masses began to waver,
swinging back and forth, showing signs of discomfiture along the left and
left centre.

In ten or fifteen minutes it crumbled into disorder and turned towards the
rear. Although the batteries seemed to hasten the movements of the
discomfited, the fire was less effective upon broken ranks, which gave
them courage, and they made brave efforts to rally; but as the new lines
formed they had to breast against Jackson's standing line, and make a new
and favorable target for the batteries, which again drove them to
disruption and retreat. Not satisfied, they made a third effort to rally
and fight the battle through, but by that time they had fallen back far
enough to open the field to the fire of S. D. Lee's artillery battalion.
As the line began to take shape, this fearful fire was added to that
under which they had tried so ineffectually to fight. The combination tore
the line to pieces, and as it broke the third time the charge was ordered.
The heavy fumes of gunpowder hanging about our ranks, as stimulating as
sparkling wine, charged the atmosphere with the light and splendor of
battle. Time was culminating under a flowing tide. The noble horses took
the spirit of the riders sitting lightly in their saddles. As orders were
given, the staff, their limbs already closed to the horses' flanks,
pressed their spurs, but the electric current overleaped their speedy
strides, and twenty-five thousand braves moved in line as by a single
impulse. My old horse, appreciating the importance of corps head-quarters,
envious of the spread of his comrades as they measured the green, yet
anxious to maintain his _rôle_, moved up and down his limited space in
lofty bounds, resolved to cover in the air the space allotted his more
fortunate comrades on the plain.

Leaving the broken ranks for Jackson, our fight was made against the lines
near my front. As the plain along Hood's front was more favorable for the
tread of soldiers, he was ordered, as the column of direction, to push for
the plateau at the Henry House, in order to cut off retreat at the
crossings by Young's Branch. Wilcox was called to support and cover Hood's
left, but he lost sight of two of his brigades,--Featherston's and
Pryor's,--and only gave the aid of his single brigade. Kemper and Jones
were pushed on with Hood's right, Evans in Hood's direct support. The
batteries were advanced as rapidly as fields were opened to them,
Stribling's, J. B. Richardson's, Eshleman's, and Rogers's having fairest
field for progress.

At the first sound of the charge, General Lee sent to revoke his call in
favor of Jackson, asked me to push the battle, ordered R. H. Anderson's
division up, and rode himself to join me.


In the fulness of the battle, General Toombs rode up on his iron-gray
under sweat and spur, his hat off, and asked for his command. He was told
that a courier was about to start with an order for the division
commander, and would guide him. He asked to be the bearer of the order,
received it, and with the guide rode to find his post in the battle. The
meeting of the brigade and its commander was more than joyful.

Jackson failed to pull up even on the left, which gave opportunity for
some of the enemy's batteries to turn their fire across the right wing in
enfilade, as we advanced, and the enemy strongly reinforced against us
from troops drawn from Jackson's front, but we being on the jump, the fire
of the batteries was not effective. It was severely threatening upon
General Lee, however, who would ride under it, notwithstanding appeals to
avoid it, until I thought to ride through a ravine, and thus throw a
traverse between him and the fire. He sent orders to Jackson to advance
and drive off or capture the batteries standing in his front and firing
across our line, but it was not in season to relieve us. Hood's aggressive
force was well spent when his troops approached the Chinn House, but R. H.
Anderson was up and put in to reinforce and relieve his battle.

General Pope drew Ricketts's division from his right to brace his left,
then Reno's command to aid in checking our march, but its progress,
furiously resisted, was steady, though much delayed. Piatt's brigade was
also put against us. This made time for Porter to gather his forces. His
regulars of Sykes's division, particularly, made desperate resistance,
that could only be overcome by our overreaching lines threatening their

When the last guns were fired the thickening twilight concealed the lines
of friend and foe, so that the danger of friend firing against friend
became imminent. The hill of the Henry House was reached in good time,
but darkness coming on earlier because of thickening clouds hovering over
us, and a gentle fall of rain closely following, the plateau was shut off
from view, and its ascent only found by groping through the darkening
rainfall. As long as the enemy held the plateau, he covered the line of
retreat by the turnpike and the bridge at Young's Branch. As he retired,
heavy darkness gave safe-conduct to such of his columns as could find
their way through the weird mists.

Captain William H. Powell, of the Fourth Regular Infantry, wrote of his

    "As we filed from the battle-field into the turnpike leading over the
    stone bridge, we came upon a group of mounted officers, one of whom
    wore a peculiar style of hat which had been seen on the field that
    day, and which had been the occasion of a great deal of comment in the
    ranks. As we passed these officers, the one with the peculiar hat
    called out in a loud voice,--

    "'What troops are those?'

    "'The regulars,' answered somebody.

    "'Second Division, Fifth Corps,' replied another.

    "'God bless them! they saved the army,' added the officer.

    "Subsequently we learned that he was General Irvin McDowell.

    "As we neared the bridge we came upon confusion. Men singly and in
    detachments were mingled with sutlers' wagons, artillery caissons,
    supply wagons, and ambulances, each striving to get ahead of the
    other. Vehicles rushed through organized bodies and broke the columns
    into fragments. Little detachments gathered by the road-side after
    crossing the bridge, crying out to members of their regiments as a
    guide to scattered comrades. And what a night it was! Dark, gloomy,
    and beclouded by the volumes of smoke which had risen from the

At six o'clock, General Pope received report of the Sixth Corps, that had
marched from Alexandria under General Franklin to the vicinity of
Centreville, and ordered the several commands to concentrate about that
hamlet during the night. The Second Corps from the Army of the Potomac
under General Sumner also joined him at Centreville.

But for the dropping off of two of Wilcox's brigades from close connection
with the right wing, and the deflection of Drayton's brigade, which was
taken off by some unauthorized and unknown person from my right to the
support of cavalry, it is possible that my working column could have
gained the plateau of the Henry House before it was dark. Or if Jackson
had been fresh enough to pull up even with us, he could have retained the
commands under Reno and Sykes's regulars in his front, which could have
given us safe sweep to the plateau, an hour before sundown, and in sight
of great possibilities.

By morning of the 31st everything off the turnpike was nasty and soggy.
Stuart's cavalry, followed by Pryor's brigade, were ordered across the Run
at Stone Bridge as a diversion, while we were trying another move to reach
the enemy's rear. The Confederates had worked all of the winter before,
fortifying this new position, just taken by Pope at Centreville. Direct
pursuit by the turnpike against these fortifications would therefore be

General Jackson was called to head-quarters early in the morning. Upon
receiving General Lee's orders to cross Bull Run at Sudley's and march by
Little River turnpike to intercept the enemy's march, he said, "Good!" and
away he went, without another word, or even a smile.

Though the suggestion of a smile always hung about his features, it was
commonly said that it never fully developed, with a single exception,
during his military career, though some claim there were other occasions
on which it ripened, and those very near him say that he always smiled at
the mention of the names of the Federal leaders whom he was accustomed to
encounter over in the Valley behind the Blue Ridge. Standing, he was a
graceful figure, five feet ten inches in height, with brown wavy hair,
full beard, and regular features. At first glance his gentle expression
repelled the idea of his severe piety, the full beard concealing the lower
features, which had they been revealed would have marked the character of
the man who claimed "his first duty to God, and his next to Jackson and
General Lee." Mounted, his figure was not so imposing as that of the bold
dragoon, Charley May, on Black Tom. He had a habit of raising his right
hand, riding or sitting, which some of his followers were wont to construe
into invocation for Divine aid, but they do not claim to know whether the
prayers were for the slain, or for the success of other fields. The fact
is, he received a shot in that hand at the First Bull Run, which left the
hand under partial paralysis and the circulation through it imperfect. To
relieve the pressure and assist the circulation he sometimes raised his

I was ordered to look after the dead and those whose misfortune it was to
be wounded, till Jackson could have time to stretch out on his new march,
then to follow him, leaving the work to details and to General D. H.
Hill's division, just coming in from Richmond.

After giving orders for the day, General Lee rode out towards Centreville
for personal observation, halted, and dismounted at a point which seemed
safe from danger or observation. Suddenly alarm was given of "The enemy's
cavalry!" The group dispersed in hot haste to have the heels of their
animals under them. The rush and confusion frightened the general's horse,
so that he pulled him violently to the ground, severely spraining his
right wrist, besides breaking some of the bones of the hand.

On reaching his head-quarters, Jackson ordered the assembly sounded,
mounted his horse, and marched for the Sudley Springs crossing. He cleared
the way in time for my column to reach that point at dark, the head of
his own column tapping Little River turnpike. The march was over a
single-track country road, bad enough on the south side of the river, much
worn through a post-oak forest over quicksand subsoil on the north side.
If Jackson had been followed by an enemy whose march he wished to baffle,
his gun-carriages could not have made deeper cuts through the mud and

Stuart was ordered over to the Little River turnpike, and advanced to the
vicinity of Ox Hill and Fairfax Court-House. He made some interesting
captures and reports of movements by the enemy. He slept near their lines,
north of the turnpike, east of Chantilly.

The Little River and Warrenton turnpikes converge and join as they near
Fairfax Court-House. At vulnerable points on the latter, General Pope
posted parts of his command to cover his rearward march. At Ox Hill
(Chantilly) were stationed Heintzelman's and Reno's corps, the divisions
of Hooker, Kearny, Stevens, and Reno.

Early on the 1st of September the Confederates resumed their march.
Jackson reached Ox Hill late in the afternoon, and deployed by
inversion,--A. P. Hill's division on his right, Ewell's under Lawton next,
his own under Stuart on his left, on the right of the road. On the left of
the road were Stuart's cavalry and the artillery. Two of Hill's brigades
were thrown out to find the enemy, and were soon met by his advance in
search of Jackson, which made a furious attack, driving back the
Confederate brigades in some disorder. Stevens, appreciating the crisis as
momentous, thought it necessary to follow the opportunity by aggressive
battle, in order to hold Jackson away from the Warrenton turnpike. Kearny,
always ready to second any courageous move, joined in the daring battle.
At the critical moment the rain and thunder-storm burst with great
violence upon the combatants, the high wind beating the storm in the faces
of the Confederates. So firm was the unexpected battle that part of
Jackson's line yielded to the onslaught. At one moment his artillery
seemed in danger. Stevens was killed when the storm of battle, as well as
that of the elements, began to quiet down. Stuart's cavalry drew near
Jackson's left during the progress of the battle. As I rode up and met
General Jackson, I remarked upon the number of his men going to the rear:

"General, your men don't appear to work well to-day."

"No," he replied, "but I hope it will prove a victory in the morning."

His troops were relieved as mine came up, to give them a respite till
morning. While my reliefs were going around, General Philip Kearny rode to
the line in search of his division. Finding himself in the presence of
Confederates, he wheeled his horse and put spurs, preferring the danger of
musket-balls to humiliating surrender. Several challenges called, but not
heeded, were followed by the ring of half a dozen muskets, when he fell
mortally hurt, and so perished one of the most gallant and dashing of the
Union generals.

    "September 2, 1862.

        "_United States Army_:

    "SIR,--The body of General Philip Kearny was brought from the field
    last night, and he was reported dead. I send it forward under a flag
    of truce, thinking the possession of his remains may be a consolation
    to his family.

    "I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

          "R. E. LEE,

The rain so concealed the fight in its last struggles that the troops
escaped before we were aware that it had been abandoned.

As both Federal division commanders fell, the accounts fail to do justice
to their fight. Stevens in his short career gave evidence of courage,
judgment, skill, and genius not far below his illustrious antagonist.

During the fight Stuart had parties out seeking information, and early on
the second had his troopers in the saddle in pursuit. The army, ready to
move, awaited reports of the cavalry, which came from time to time, as
they followed on the line of retreat. From Fairfax Court-House came the
report that the enemy's rear had passed in rapid retreat quite out of
reach, approaching the fortifications of Alexandria and Washington City.
Arms were ordered stacked, and a good rest was given the troops. Stuart's
cavalry pursued and engaged the retreating army.

In the afternoon the First Corps started on the march _via_ Dranesville
for Leesburg and the Potomac River, followed on the third by the Second.

The results to the Confederates of the several engagements about Manassas
Plains were seven thousand prisoners, two thousand of the enemy's wounded,
thirty pieces of artillery, many thousand small-arms picked up from the
field, and many colors, besides the captures made at Manassas Junction by
General Jackson.[54]

A fair estimate of forces engaged:

  Federal army, aggregate   63,000
  Confederates              53,500

Losses between Rappahannock River and Washington:

  Federals, aggregate.      15,000
  Confederates              10,000

The figures are given in round numbers, as the safest approximate
estimate, but the records now accessible give accurate details of losses
in each command about the same as these.

And so it came to pass that from Cedar Run and Bull Run we had the term
_All Run_. It is due to the gallant Sumner and his brave corps, however,
to say that they so covered the last as to save disgraceful retreat.

A cursory review of the campaign reveals the pleasure ride of General
Fitzhugh Lee by Louisa Court-House as most unseasonable. He lost the
fruits of our summer's work, and lost the Southern cause. Proud Troy was
laid in ashes. His orders were to meet his commander on the afternoon of
the 17th, on the plank-road near Raccoon Ford, and upon this appointment
was based General Lee's order of march for the 18th. If the march had been
made as appointed, General Lee would have encountered the army of General
Pope upon weak ground from Robertson River to near Raccoon Ford of the
Rapidan, and thus our march would have been so expedited that we could
have reached Alexandria and Washington before the landing of the first
detachment of the Army of the Potomac at Alexandria on the 24th. The
artillery and infantry were called to amend the delinquency by severe
marches and battles.

It would have been possible to make good the lost time, but the despatch
lost in the Stuart escapade was handed to General Pope that morning (the
18th), and gave him notice of our plans and orders. The delay thus brought
about gave time for him to quit his weaker ground and retire to strong
defensive heights behind the Rappahannock River, where he held us in check
five days.

Referring to the solid move proposed before opening the campaign by the
upper Rapidan to strike Pope's right, it may be said that it was not so
dependent upon the cavalry that was marching behind us. That used by
Jackson in his battle of the 9th was enough for immediate use. Jackson
could have passed the upper Rapidan on the 16th, and followed by the
right wing in time to strike Pope's right on the 17th in solid phalanx,
_when time was mightier than cannon-balls_. After losing eight days
between Orange Court-House and the Rappahannock, we found at last that we
must adopt the move by our left to get around the strong ground of the
Rappahannock, _and the move must now be made by detachments, not so
approved of the usages of war_. I was west of the Rappahannock when the
command should have been at Washington City.

Aug. 30th, 1862]

The conduct of General Pope's army after his receipt of the captured
despatch was good, especially his plans and orders for the 27th and 28th.
The error was his failure to ride with his working columns on the 28th, to
look after and conduct their operations. He left them in the hands of the
officer who lost the first battle of Manassas. His orders of the 28th for
General McDowell to change direction and march for Centreville were
received at 3.15 P.M. Had they been promptly executed, the commands,
King's division, Sigel's corps, and Reynolds's division, should have found
Jackson by four o'clock. As it was, only the brigades of Gibbon and
Doubleday were found passing by Jackson's position after sunset, when he
advanced against them in battle. He reported it "sanguinary." With the
entire division of King and that of Reynolds, with Sigel's corps, it is
possible that Pope's campaign would have brought other important results.
On the 29th he was still away from the active part of his field, and in
consequence failed to have correct advice of the time of my arrival, and
quite ignored the column under R. H. Anderson approaching on the Warrenton
turnpike. On the 30th he was misled by reports of his officers and others
to believe that the Confederates were in retreat, and planned his
movements upon false premises.

Jackson's march to Bristoe and Manassas Junction was hazardous, or seemed
so, but in view of his peculiar talent for such work (the captured
despatch of General Pope giving information of his affairs), and Lee's
skill, it seemed the only way open for progressive manoeuvre. The strength
of the move lay in the time it gave us to make issue before all of the
Army of the Potomac could unite with the army under General Pope. His game
of hide-and-seek about Bull Bun, Centreville, and Manassas Plains was
grand, but marred in completeness by the failure of General A. P. Hill to
meet his orders for the afternoon of the 28th. As a leader he was fine; as
a wheel-horse, he was not always just to himself. He was fond of the



    General Lee continues Aggressive Work--From Foraged Fields of Virginia
    into a Bounteous Land--Longstreet objected to the Movement on Harper's
    Ferry--Lee thinks the Occasion Timely for Proposal of Peace and
    Independence--Confederates singing through the Streets of
    Fredericktown--McClellan's Movements--Cautious Marches--Lee's Lost
    Order handed to the Federal Chief at Frederick.

    "There is a tide in the affairs of men,
    Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
    Omitted, all the voyage of their life
    Is bound in shallows, and in miseries.
    On such a full sea are we now afloat."

As our columns approached Leesburg, "Maryland, my Maryland" was in the
air, and on the lips of every man from General Lee down to the youngest
drummer. Our chief could have safely ordered the ranks to break in
Virginia and assemble in Fredericktown. All that they would ask was a
thirty minutes' plunge in the Potomac to remove some of the surplus dust,
before they encountered the smiles of the winsome lasses of Maryland. Yet
he expressed doubt of trusting so far from home solely to untried and
unknown resources for food-supplies. Receiving his anxious expressions
really as appeals for reinforcement of his unexpressed wish, but warm to
brave the venture, I related my Mexican War experiences with Worth's
division, marching around the city of Monterey on two days' rations of
roasting-ears and green oranges, and said that it seemed to me that we
could trust the fields of Maryland, laden with ripening corn and fruit, to
do as much as those of Mexico; that we could in fact subsist on the
bounty of the fields until we could open communication with our organized
base of supplies.

As factors in the problem, important as Lee's masterly science and
Jackson's great skill, stood the fortitude and prowess of the Confederate
soldiers, and their faith in the friendship and generosity of their
countrymen. Hungry, sparsely clad, worn with continuous bivouac and battle
since the 26th of June, proud of their record from the First to the honors
of the Second Manassas, their cheery smiles and elastic step told better
than words of anticipations of welcome from friends in Maryland, and of
new fields of honor for their solid ranks,--of the day when they should be
masters of the field and of a new-born republic.

Though a losing battle, the Union armies had made a splendid fight at
Second Manassas. The stand at Ox Hill was severe; severe till the march of
retreat, so that the Army of Northern Virginia should have held in
profound respect its formidable adversary, seasoned by many bloody fields.

The policy of the Richmond government was defensive rather than aggressive
warfare, but the situation called for action, and there was but one
opening,--across the Potomac. General Lee decided to follow his success in
its natural leading, and so reported to the Richmond authorities.

He was not so well equipped as an army of invasion should be, but the many
friends in Maryland and the fields on the north side of the Potomac were
more inviting than those of Virginia, so freely foraged. He knew from
events of the past that his army was equal to the service to which he
thought to call it, and ripe for the adventure; that he could march into
Maryland and remain until the season for the enemy's return into Virginia
for autumn or winter work had passed, improve his transportation supplies,
and the clothing of his army, and do that, if not more, for relief of our
Southern fields and limited means, besides giving his army and cause a
moral influence of great effect at home and abroad. He decided to make his
march by the most direct route from Chantilly, where he had last fought,
to the Potomac, and so crossed by the fords near Leesburg. Marching by
this route, he thought to cut off a formidable force of Union troops at
Winchester, at Martinsburg, and a strong garrison occupying the fortified
position at Harper's Ferry.

To summarize the situation, we were obliged to go into Maryland or retreat
to points more convenient to supplies and the protection of Richmond.

At Leesburg Lee learned that the Union troops in the Valley had left
Winchester, and sent back orders to have the crippled and feeble soldiers
wending their way to the army march through the Valley to join us in
Maryland. Trains of supplies were ordered to move by the same route.

On the 5th and 6th the columns crossed the Potomac by the fords near
Leesburg. Stuart's cavalry, coming up from the line near Alexandria and
the Long Bridge, passed to front and right flank of the army. General
McLaws's division, General J. G. Walker, with two brigades of his
division, and General Hampton's cavalry brigade, including Colonel Baker's
North Carolina regiment, joined us on the march. On the 7th our infantry
and artillery commands came together near Frederick City.

Riding together before we reached Frederick, the sound of artillery fire
came from the direction of Point of Rocks and Harper's Ferry, from which
General Lee inferred that the enemy was concentrating his forces from the
Valley, for defence at Harper's Ferry, and proposed to me to organize
forces to surround and capture the works and the garrison.

I thought it a venture not worth the game, and suggested, as we were in
the enemy's country and presence, that he would be advised of any move
that we made in a few hours after it was set on foot; that the Union army,
though beaten, was not disorganized; that we knew a number of their
officers who could put it in order and march against us, if they found us
exposed, and make serious trouble before the capture could be
accomplished; that our men were worn by very severe and protracted
service, and in need of repose; that as long as we had them in hand we
were masters of the situation, but dispersed into many fragments, our
strength must be greatly reduced. As the subject was not continued, I
supposed that it was a mere expression of passing thought, until, the day
after we reached Frederick, upon going over to head-quarters, I found the
front of the general's tent closed and tied. Upon inquiring of a member of
the staff, I was told that he was inside with General Jackson. As I had
not been called, I turned to go away, when General Lee, recognizing my
voice, called me in. The plan had been arranged. Jackson, with his three
divisions, was to recross the Potomac by the fords above Harper's Ferry,
march _via_ Martinsburg to Bolivar Heights; McLaws's division by
Crampton's Gap to Maryland Heights; J. G. Walker's division to recross at
Cheek's Ford and occupy Loudoun Heights, these heights overlooking the
positions of the garrison of Harper's Ferry; D. H. Hill's division to
march by the National road over South Mountain at Turner's Gap, and halt
at the western base, to guard trains, intercept fugitives from Harper's
Ferry, and support the cavalry, if needed; the cavalry to face the enemy
and embarrass his movements. I was to march over the mountain by Turner's
Gap to Hagerstown.

As their minds were settled firmly upon the enterprise, I offered no
opposition further than to ask that the order be so modified as to allow
me to send R. H. Anderson's division with McLaws and to halt my own column
near the point designated for bivouac of General D. H. Hill's command.
These suggestions were accepted, and the order[55] so framed was issued.

It may be well to digress from my narrative for a moment just here to
remark that General Lee's confidence in the strength of his army, the
situation of affairs, and the value of the moral effect upon the country,
North and South, was made fully manifest by the nature of the campaign he
had just entered upon, especially that portion of it directed against
Harper's Ferry, which, as events were soon to prove, weakened the
effectiveness of his army in the main issue, which happened to be

In another and a very different way, and with even greater plainness, his
high estimate of opportunity and favoring condition of circumstances
existing at the time was indicated to the authorities, though of course
not at that time made public. This was his deliberate and urgent advice to
President Davis to join him and be prepared to make a proposal for peace
and independence from the head of a conquering army. Fresh from the Second
Manassas, and already entered upon the fateful Maryland campaign, he wrote
the President this important letter:

        "September 8, 1862.

        "_President of the Confederate States, Richmond, Va._:

    "MR. PRESIDENT,--The present position of affairs, in my opinion,
    places it in the power of the government of the Confederate States to
    propose with propriety to that of the United States the recognition of
    our independence. For more than a year both sections of the country
    have been devastated by hostilities which have brought sorrow and
    suffering upon thousands of homes, without advancing the objects which
    our enemies proposed to themselves in beginning the contest. Such a
    proposition, coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded
    as suing for peace; but, being made when it is in our power to inflict
    injury upon our adversary, would show conclusively to the world that
    our sole object is the establishment of our independence and the
    attainment of an honorable peace. The rejection of this offer would
    prove to the country that the responsibility of the continuance of the
    war does not rest upon us, but that the party in power in the United
    States elect to prosecute it for purposes of their own. The proposal
    of peace would enable the people of the United States to determine at
    their coming elections whether they will support those who favor a
    prolongation of the war, or those who wish to bring it to a
    termination, which can but be productive of good to both parties
    without affecting the honor of either.

    "I have the honor to be, with great respect,

          "Your obedient servant,
            "R. E. LEE,

And now I return to my narrative.

General Walker's division was on detached service at the time of the
order, trying to cut the canal. He marched, however, at the appointed
time, found Cheek's Ford under the severe fire of the enemy's batteries,
and marched on up the left bank as far as the Point of Rocks, where he
crossed and rested on the 11th. On the 12th he marched to and bivouacked
at Hillsboro'; on the 13th, to the foot of the Blue Ridge and occupied
Loudoun Heights by a detachment under Colonel Cooke.

Not satisfied with the organization of McLaws's column, I asked and
obtained permission on the 10th to strengthen it by three other
brigades,--Wilcox's, under Colonel Alfred Cumming; Featherston's, and
Pryor's, which were attached to R. H. Anderson's division.

The different columns from Frederick marched as ordered, except in the
change authorized for Anderson's division. It was a rollicking march, the
Confederates playing and singing, as they marched through the streets of
Frederick, "The Girl I left behind me."

Jackson recrossed the Potomac on the 11th, at Light's Ford, ordered A. P.
Hill's division by the turnpike to Martinsburg, his own and Ewell's
northwest to North Mountain Depot to intercept troops that might retreat
in that direction from Martinsburg. General White, commanding the Union
troops, abandoned Martinsburg the night of the 11th, having timely advice
of Jackson's movements, and retreated to Harper's Ferry. On the 12th,
Jackson's troops came together at Martinsburg, found some stores of bacon
and bread rations, and marched on the 13th for Harper's Ferry, where he
found the Union troops in battle array along Bolivar Heights.

I marched across South Mountain at Turner's Pass, and bivouacked near its
western base. General Lee ordered my move continued to Hagerstown. The
plans of the Confederates, as blocked out, anticipated the surrender of
Harper's Ferry on Friday, the 12th, or Saturday, the 13th, at latest. The
change of my position from Boonsborough to Hagerstown further misled our
cavalry commander and the commanders of the divisions at Boonsborough and
Harper's Ferry into a feeling of security that there could be no
threatening by the army from Washington.

D. H. Hill's division crossed by Turner's Gap and halted near
Boonsborough. McLaws took the left-hand road, marched through
Burkittsville, and halted for the night at the east base of the mountain,
near Crampton's and Brownsville Passes.

Near Crampton's Pass on the west the mountain unfolds into two parallel
ridges, the eastern, the general range of South Mountain, the western, Elk
Ridge, opening out Pleasant Valley, about three miles from crest to crest.

Crampton's is the northern of the two passes, and about eight miles south
of Turner's. One mile south of Crampton is the Brownsville Pass, and four
miles from that the river pass, which cuts in between the Blue Ridge of
Virginia and South Mountain of Maryland. Through the river pass the
Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the canal, and the Fredericktown turnpike
reach out to the west, and at the pass is the little town of Riverton.
Between Riverton and Harper's Ferry was the hamlet Sandy Hook, occupied by
about fifteen hundred Federal troops. Two roads wind through Pleasant
Valley, one close under South Mountain, the other hugging the foot-hills
of Elk Ridge,--the latter rugged, little used.

Harper's Ferry, against which Lee's new movement was directed, nestles at
the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers, on the Virginia side,
under the towering cliffs of Maryland or Cumberland Heights. At Harper's
Ferry the river cuts in so close under Maryland Heights that they stand
almost perpendicularly over it. The crowded space between the heights and
the river, filled by the railway, canal, and turnpike, was made by
blastings from the southern extremities of Maryland Heights. Under the
precipice the railroad bridge crosses the Potomac, and a pontoon bridge
was laid a few yards above it.

McLaws marched over into Pleasant Valley on the 11th, through Brownsville
Pass, near which and over Elk Ridge a road passes through Solomon's Gap of
Elk Ridge. From the top of this gap is a rugged way along the ridge
leading down to its southern projections and limits, by which infantry
only could find foothold. That southern point is called Maryland Heights.
Two brigades--Kershaw's and Barksdale's--under General Kershaw were
ordered to ascend Elk Ridge, march along its summit, driving off
opposition, and capture the enemy's position on the heights. General
Semmes was left near the pass, over which the troops had marched with his
own and Mahone's brigades, the latter under Colonel Parham with orders to
send a brigade to the top of Solomon's Gap to cover Kershaw's rear.
General Wright, of Anderson's division, was ordered with his brigade and
two pieces of artillery along the crest ridge of South Mountain to its
projection over Riverton. General Cobb was ordered with his brigade along
the base of Elk Ridge, to be abreast of Kershaw's column. With the balance
of his command, General McLaws moved down the Valley by the South Mountain
road, connecting his march, by signal, with General Kershaw's. Kershaw
soon met a strong force of skirmishers, which was steadily pushed back
till night. General Wright, without serious opposition, reached the end of
the mountain, when R. H. Anderson sent another brigade--Pryor's--to occupy
Weverton. On the 13th, Kershaw renewed his fight against very strong
positions, forced his way across two abatis, along a rugged plateau,
dropping off on both sides, in rocky cliffs of forty or fifty feet,
encountered breastworks of logs and boulders, struggled in a severe fight,
captured the position, the enemy's signal station, and at four P.M. gained
possession of the entire hold. Cobb's brigade was advanced, and took
possession of Sandy Hook without serious opposition. The column near South
Mountain was advanced to complete the grasp against the enemy at Harper's
Ferry. Up to this hour General McLaws had heard nothing direct from
Generals Jackson and Walker, though from the direction of the former
sounds of artillery reached him, and later a courier told that Jackson
thought his leading division would approach at two o'clock that afternoon.
During the day heavy cannonading was heard towards the east and northeast,
and rumors reached McLaws of the advance of the enemy from Frederick, but
the signal-parties and cavalry failed to discover movements, so the firing
was not credited as of significance. The morning of the 14th was occupied
in cutting a road for his artillery up to the point overlooking Harper's
Ferry, and at two P.M. Captains Read and Carlton had their best guns in
position over the town. But during these progressions the Confederates on
other fields had been called to more serious work.

General McClellan, moving his columns out from the vicinity of Washington
City on the 5th, made slow and very cautious marches to save fatigue of
his men and at the same time cover the capital against unforeseen
contingency; so slow and cautious was the march that he only covered forty
or fifty miles in seven days. On the 12th his head-quarters were at
Urbana, where he received the following telegram from President Lincoln:

    "Governor Curtin telegraphs me, 'I have advices that Jackson is
    crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel
    army will be drawn from Maryland.'"

The President added,--

    "Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and
    positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates
    the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let
    him get off without being hurt."[57]

Elsewhere General McClellan has written of the 12th:

    "During these movements I had not imposed long marches on the columns.
    The absolute necessity of refitting and giving some little rest to the
    troops worn down by previous long-continued marches and severe
    fighting, together with the uncertainty as to the actual position,
    strength, and intentions of the enemy, rendered it incumbent upon me
    to move slowly and cautiously until the head-quarters reached Urbana,
    where I first obtained reliable information that the enemy's object
    was to move upon Harper's Ferry and the Cumberland Valley, and not
    upon Washington and Baltimore."

His army was organized: Right wing, under General Burnside: First and
Ninth Corps; the Kanawha Division, under General J. D. Cox, was assigned
with the Ninth Corps about the 8th instant.

Centre column: Second and Twelfth Corps, under General Sumner.

Left wing: Sixth Corps and Couch's division of the Fourth under General
Franklin; Sykes's division, Fifth Corps, independent.[58]

Besides the despatches of the 11th and 12th, his cavalry under General
Pleasonton, which was vigilant and pushing, sent frequent reports of his
steady progress. In the afternoon Pleasonton and the Ninth Corps under
General Reno entered Fredericktown. This advance, by the National road,
threatened to cut off two of Stuart's cavalry regiments left at the
Monocacy Bridge. To detain the enemy till these were withdrawn, the
outpost on that road was reinforced. Hampton retired his cavalry beyond
Frederick and posted his artillery to cover the line of march, where he
was soon attacked by a formidable force. To make safe the retreat of the
brigade, a cavalry charge was ordered, under Colonel Butler, Lieutenant
Meaghan's squadron leading. Colonel Moore, of the Twenty-eighth Ohio
Cavalry, and a number of other prisoners were captured. This so detained
the enemy as to give safe withdrawal for the brigade to Middletown,
leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Martin's cavalry and two guns on guard at the
gap of the Catoctin range of mountains.

Before withdrawing from Frederick on the 12th, General Stuart sent orders
for the brigade under General Fitzhugh Lee to move around the right of the
Union army and ascertain the meaning and strength of its march.

Following his orders of the 12th, General Pleasonton detached a cavalry
brigade on the 13th and section of artillery under Colonel McReynolds to
follow Fitzhugh Lee, and Rush's Lancers were sent to Jefferson for General
Franklin's column. With his main force he pursued the Confederates towards
Turner's Pass of South Mountain. Midway between Frederick and South
Mountain, running parallel, is a lesser range, Catoctin, where he
encountered Stuart's rear-guard. After a severe affair he secured the
pass, moved on, and encountered a second force near Middletown. Reinforced
by Gibson's battery, he attacked and forced the way to a third stand. This
in turn was forced back and into the mountain at Turner's Pass.

On that day McClellan's columns marched: Ninth Corps, to and near
Middletown, eight miles; First Corps, to the Monocacy, eight miles;
Twelfth Corps, to Frederick, nine miles; Second Corps, to Frederick, eight
miles; Sixth Corps, to Buckeystown, seven miles; Couch's division, to
Licksville, six miles; Sykes's division, to Frederick, eight miles.

At Frederick, General Lee's special order No. 191 was handed to General
McClellan at his head-quarters with his centre (Sumner's) column.

How lost and how found we shall presently see, and see that by the
mischance and accident the Federal commander came in possession of
information that gave a spur, and great advantage, to his somewhat
demoralized army.



    How the Federals found the Despatch--With every Advantage McClellan
    "made haste slowly"--Lee turns back to meet him at South
    Mountain--Longstreet preferred that the Stand should be made at
    Sharpsburg--The Battle at the Pass--Many killed--General Garland of
    the Confederate and General Reno of the Union side--A future President
    among the wounded--Estimate of Forces engaged.

The strange losing and stranger finding of Lee's "General Order No. 191,"
commonly referred to as "the lost despatch," which he had issued September
9 for the movement of his army, made a difference in our Maryland campaign
for better or for worse.

Before this tell-tale slip of paper found its way to McClellan's
head-quarters he was well advised by his cavalry, and by despatches wired
him from east and west, of the movements of Lee's army, and later, on that
eventful 13th day of September, he received more valuable information,
even to a complete revelation of his adversary's plans and purpose, such
as no other commander, in the history of war, has had at a time so
momentous. So well satisfied was he that he was master of the military
zodiac that he despatched the Washington authorities of Lee's "gross
mistake" and exposure to severe penalties. There was not a point upon
which he wanted further information nor a plea for a moment of delay. His
army was moving rapidly; all that he wished for was that the plans of the
enemy would not be changed. The only change that occurred in the plans was
the delay of their execution, which worked to his greater advantage. By
following the operations of the armies through the complications of the
campaign we may form better judgment of the work of the commanders in
finding ways through its intricacies: of the efforts of one to grasp the
envied crown so haplessly tendered; of the other in seeking refuge that
might cover catastrophe involved in the complexity of misconceived plans.

The copy of the order that was lost was sent by General Jackson to General
D. H. Hill under the impression that Hill's division was part of his
command, but the division had not been so assigned, and that copy of the
order was not delivered at Hill's head-quarters, but had been put to other
use. The order sent to General Hill from general head-quarters was
carefully preserved.

When the Federals marched into Frederick, just left by the Confederates,
General Sumner's column went into camp about noon, and it was then that
the despatch was found by Colonel Silas Colgrove, who took it to division
head-quarters, whence it was quickly sent to the Federal commander.

General McClellan reported to General Halleck that the lost order had been
handed him in the evening, but it is evident that he had it at the time of
his noonday despatch to the President, from his reference to the facts it

It is possible that it was at first suspected as a _ruse de guerre_, and
that a little time was necessary to convince McClellan of its genuineness,
which may account for the difference between the hinted information in his
despatch to General Halleck and the confident statement made at noonday to
the President.

Some of the Confederates were a little surprised that a matter of such
magnitude was intrusted to pen-and-ink despatches. The copy sent me was
carefully read, then used as some persons use a little cut of tobacco, to
be assured that others could not have the benefit of its contents.

It has been in evidence that the copy that was lost had been used as a
wrapper for three fragrant Confederate cigars in the interim between its
importance when issued by the Confederate chief and its greater importance
when found by the Federals.

General Halleck thought the capital in imminent peril before he heard from
McClellan on the 13th, as shown on that day by a despatch to General

    "The capture of this place will throw us back six months, if it should
    not destroy us."

But later, the "lost despatch" having turned up at head-quarters of
General McClellan, that commander apprised the authorities of the true
condition of affairs in the following:

    "HEAD-QUARTERS, FREDERICK, September 13, 1862, 12 M.
        ("Received 2.35 A.M., September 14.)


    "I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, and no
    time shall be lost. I have a difficult task to perform, but with God's
    blessing will accomplish it. I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and
    that he will be severely punished for it. The army is in motion as
    rapidly as possible. I hope for a great success if the plans of the
    rebels remain unchanged. We have possession of Catoctin. I have all
    the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my
    men are equal to the emergency. I now feel that I can count on them as
    of old. All forces of Pennsylvania should be placed to co-operate at
    Chambersburg. My respects to Mrs. Lincoln. Received most
    enthusiastically by the ladies. Will send you trophies. All well, and
    with God's blessing will accomplish it.

          "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN."

    "FREDERICK CITY, MD., September 13, 1862, 11 P.M.
        ("Received 1 P.M., September 14.)


    "An order from General R. E. Lee, addressed to General D. H. Hill,
    which has accidentally come into my hands this evening,--the
    authenticity of which is unquestionable,--discloses some of the plans
    of the enemy, and shows most conclusively that the main rebel army is
    now before us, including Longstreet's, Jackson's, the two Hills's,
    McLaws's, Walker's, R. H. Anderson's, and Hood's commands. That army
    was ordered to march on the 10th, and to attack and capture our forces
    at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg yesterday, by surrounding them with
    such a heavy force that they conceived it impossible they could
    escape. They were also ordered to take possession of the Baltimore and
    Ohio Railroad; afterwards to concentrate again at Boonsborough or
    Hagerstown. That this was the plan of campaign on the 9th is confirmed
    by the fact that heavy firing has been heard in the direction of
    Harper's Ferry this afternoon, and the columns took the roads
    specified in the order. It may, therefore, in my judgment, be regarded
    as certain that this rebel army, which I have good reasons for
    believing amounts to 120,000 men or more, and know to be commanded by
    Lee in person, intended to attempt penetrating Pennsylvania. The
    officers told their friends here that they were going to Harrisburg
    and Philadelphia. My advance has pushed forward to-day and overtaken
    the enemy on the Middletown and Harper's Ferry roads, and several
    slight engagements have taken place, in which our troops have driven
    the enemy from their position. A train of wagons, about three-quarters
    of a mile long, was destroyed to-day by the rebels in their flight. We
    took over fifty prisoners. This army marches forward early to-morrow
    morning, and will make forced marches, to endeavor to relieve Colonel
    Miles, but I fear, unless he makes a stout resistance, we may be too

    "A report came in just this moment that Miles was attacked to-day, and
    repulsed the enemy, but I do not know what credit to attach to the
    statement. I shall do everything in my power to save Miles if he still
    holds out. Portions of Burnside's and Franklin's corps move forward
    this evening.

    "I have received your despatch of ten A.M. You will perceive, from
    what I have stated, that there is but little probability of the enemy
    being in much force south of the Potomac. I do not, by any means, wish
    to be understood as undervaluing the importance of holding Washington.
    It is of great consequence, but upon the success of this army the fate
    of the nation depends. It was for this reason that I said everything
    else should be made subordinate to placing this army in proper
    condition to meet the large rebel force in our front. Unless General
    Lee has changed his plans, I expect a severe general engagement
    to-morrow. I feel confident that there is now no rebel force
    immediately threatening Washington or Baltimore, but that I have the
    mass of their troops to contend with, and they outnumber me when

          "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,

With the knowledge afforded by securing Lee's "lost order" the passes of
the South Mountain became important points. If he could force them,
McClellan might fall on the divided columns of the Confederates and reach
Harper's Ferry in time to save its garrison; but Lee received intelligence
of his only moderate forward movement, and, without knowing then how it
came to be made, recalled a force to make resistance, and, so
supplementing or complementing by his rapid moves the Federal commander's
slowness, saved his campaign from the disastrous failure that threatened

General McClellan claimed to have been more vigorous in pursuit after he
received the "lost despatch," but events do not support the claim. He had
time after the despatch was handed him to march his army to the foot of
South Mountain before night, but gave no orders, except his letter to
General Franklin calling for vigorous action, which was afterwards
tempered by caution to wait for developments at Turner's Pass. He gave no
intimation of the despatch to his cavalry leader, who should have been the
first to be advised of the points in his possession. General Pleasonton
had pushed the Confederate cavalry back into the mountains long before
night of the 13th under his instructions of the 12th. Had he been informed
of the points known by his chief in the afternoon, he would have occupied
South Mountain at Turner's Pass before any of the Confederate infantry was
there or apprised of his approach. General McClellan's orders for the 14th
were dated,--

    "13th, 6.45 P.M., Couch to move to Jefferson with his whole division,
    and join Franklin.

    "13th, 8.45 P.M., Sumner to move at seven A.M.

    "13th, 11.30 P.M., Hooker to march at daylight to Middletown.

    "13th, 11.30 P.M., Sykes to move at six A.M., after Hooker on the
    Middletown and Hagerstown road.

    "14th, one A.M., artillery reserve to follow Sykes closely.

    "14th, nine A.M., Sumner ordered to take the Shockstown road to

    "Franklin's corps at Buckeystown to march for Burkittsville."[60]

He wrote General Franklin at 6.20 P.M., giving the substance of
information of the despatch, but not mentioning when or how he came by it,
and ordered him to march for the mountain pass at Crampton's Gap, to seize
the pass if it was not strongly guarded, and march for Rohrersville, to
cut off the command under McLaws about Maryland Heights, capture it, and
relieve the garrison at Harper's Ferry, and return to co-operate in
capturing the balance of the Confederate army north of the Potomac; but,
in case the gap was occupied by a strong force, to await operations
against it until he heard the engagement of the army moving upon Turner's
Pass. He wrote General Franklin that General Pleasonton had cleared the
field east of the mountain of Confederate cavalry. After relieving
Harper's Ferry, Franklin was to destroy bridges and guard against crossing
of the Confederates to the north side, his idea being to cut the
Confederate army in two and capture or break it up in detail. His appeal
was urgent for the best work that a general could exercise. The division
under General Couch was ordered to General Franklin, without waiting for
all of its forces to join. This is the only order of the records that
indicates unusual action on the part of the Union commander, and General
Franklin's evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War shows
that his orders of the 13th were so modified on the 14th as to direct his
wait for Couch's division to join him, and the division joined him after

The divisions of the Ninth Corps reached Middletown on the 13th, under the
orders of the 12th, issued before the lost despatch was found, one of them
supporting Pleasonton's cavalry; but Rodman's, under misconception of
orders, marched back towards Frederick.

South Mountain range, standing between the armies, courses across Maryland
northeast and southwest. Its average height is one thousand feet; its
rugged passes give it strong military features. The pass at Turner drops
off about four hundred feet. About a mile south of this the old Sharpsburg
road crosses at a greater elevation through rugged windings; a fork of
this road, on the mountain-side, makes a second way over below Fox's Pass,
while another turns to the right and leads back into the turnpike at the
summit, or Mountain House.

On the north side of the turnpike a road leads off to the right, called
the old Hagerstown road, which winds its course through a valley between a
spur and the mountain, and courses back to the turnpike along the top. A
more rugged route than this opens a way to the mountain-top by a route
nearer the pike.

General Pleasonton, not advised of the lost despatch, did not push for a
careful reconnoissance on the 13th. At the same time, General Stuart,
forced back into the mountains, finding his cavalry unserviceable, advised
General D. H. Hill of severe pressure, called for a brigade of infantry,
ordered Hampton's cavalry down to Crampton's Pass to assist Robertson's
brigade, Colonel Munford commanding, leaving the Jeff Davis Legion, under
Colonel Martin, Colonel Rosser with another cavalry detachment, and
Stuart's horse artillery to occupy the passes by the old Sharpsburg road.
Colquitt's brigade of infantry reported to him under his call. After
posting it near the east base of the mountain to hold the pass, he rode to
join his other cavalry detachments down at Crampton's Pass. He only knew
of two brigades of infantry pressing him back, and so reported. His
cavalry, ordered around the Union right under General Fitzhugh Lee, for
information of the force in his front, had failed to make report. General
Hill ordered two brigades, Garland's and Colquitt's, into the pass to
report to Stuart, and drew his other three near the foot of the mountain.
Garland's brigade filed to the right after ascending the mountain, and
halted near the turnpike. Colquitt's brigade took its position across the
turnpike and down towards the base of the mountain, Lane's batteries at
the summit.

It seems that up to the night of the 13th most of the Confederates were
looking with confidence to the surrender at Harper's Ferry on the 13th, to
be promptly followed by a move farther west, not thinking it possible that
a great struggle at and along the range of South Mountain was impending;
that even on the 14th our cavalry leader thought to continue his
retrograde that day. General Hill's attention was given more to his
instructions to prevent the escape of fugitives from Harper's Ferry than
to trouble along his front, as the instructions covered more especially
that duty, while information from the cavalry gave no indication of
serious trouble from the front.

A little after dark of the 13th, General Lee received, through a scout,
information of the advance of the Union forces to the foot of South
Mountain in solid ranks. Later information confirmed this report, giving
the estimated strength at ninety thousand. General Lee still held to the
thought that he had ample time. He sent for me, and I found him over his
map. He told of the reports, and asked my views. I thought it too late to
march on the 14th and properly man the pass at Turner's, and expressed
preference for concentrating D. H. Hill's and my own force behind the
Antietam at Sharpsburg, where we could get together in season to make a
strong defensive fight, and at the same time check McClellan's march
towards Harper's Ferry, in case he thought to relieve the beleaguered
garrison by that route, forcing him to first remove the obstacle on his
flank. He preferred to make the stand at Turner's Pass, and ordered the
troops to march next morning, ordering a brigade left at Hagerstown to
guard the trains. No warning was sent McLaws to prepare to defend his
rear, either by the commanding general or by the chief of cavalry. The
hallucination that McClellan was not capable of serious work seemed to
pervade our army, even to this moment of dreadful threatening.

After retiring to my couch, reflecting upon affairs, my mind was so
disturbed that I could not rest. As I studied, the perils seemed to grow,
till at last I made a light and wrote to tell General Lee of my troubled
thoughts, and appealed again for immediate concentration at Sharpsburg. To
this no answer came, but it relieved my mind and gave me some rest.

At daylight in the morning the column marched (eight brigades with the
artillery), leaving Toombs's brigade. A regiment of G. T. Anderson's that
had been on guard all night was not relieved in time to join the march,
and remained with Toombs. The day was hot and the roads dry and beaten
into impalpable powder, that rose in clouds of dust from under our feet as
we marched.

Before sunrise of the 14th, General Hill rode to the top of the mountain
to view the front to which his brigade had been called the day before. As
he rode he received a message from General Stuart, informing him that he
had sent his main cavalry force to Crampton's Pass, and was then _en
route_ to join it. He found Garland's brigade at the summit, near the
Mountain House, on the right of the road, and Colquitt's well advanced
down the east side. He withdrew the latter to the summit, and posted two
regiments on the north side of the pike behind stone walls, the others on
the south side under cover of a woodland. Upon learning of the approaches
to his position, he ordered the brigade under G. B. Anderson and one of
Ripley's regiments up, leaving Rodes's brigade and the balance of Ripley's
to watch for refugees from Harper's Ferry.

While he was withdrawing and posting Colquitt's brigade, General
Pleasonton was marching by the road three-fourths of a mile south, feeling
his way towards Fox's Gap, with the brigade of infantry under Colonel
Scammon. Co-operating with this advance, Pleasonton used his cavalry along
the turnpike. His batteries were put in action near the foot of the
mountain, except one section of McMullen's under Lieutenant Crome, which
advanced with the infantry. The battle was thus opened by General
Pleasonton and General Cox without orders, and without information of the
lost despatch. The latter had the foresight to support this move with his
brigade under Colonel Crook. Batteries of twenty-pound Parrott guns were
posted near the foot of the mountain in fine position to open upon the
Confederates at the summit.

After posting Colquitt's brigade, General Hill rode off to his right to
examine the approach to Fox's Gap, near the point held by Rosser's cavalry
and horse artillery. As he passed near the gap he heard noise of troops
working their way towards him, and soon artillery opened fire across the
gap over his head. He hurried back and sent Garland's brigade, with
Bondurant's battery, to meet the approaching enemy. Garland made
connection with Rosser's detachment and engaged in severe skirmish,
arresting the progress of Scammon's brigade till the coming of Crook's,
when Cox gave new force to his fight, and after a severe contest, in which
Garland fell, the division advanced in a gallant charge, which broke the
ranks of the brigade, discomfited by the loss of its gallant leader, part
of it breaking in confusion down the mountain, the left withdrawing
towards the turnpike. G. B. Anderson's brigade was in time to check this
success and hold for reinforcements. Ripley's brigade, called up later,
came, but passed to the right and beyond the fight. General Hill had
posted two batteries on the summit north of the turnpike, which had a
destructive cross fire on Cox as he made his fight, and part of Colquitt's
right regiments were put in, in aid of G. B. Anderson's men. About two
P.M., General Cox was reinforced by the division under General Wilcox, and
a little after three o'clock by Sturgis's division, the corps commander,
General Reno, taking command with his last division under Rodman.

As Sturgis's division came into the fight, the head of my column reached
the top of the pass, where the brigades of G. T. Anderson and Drayton,
under General D. R. Jones, filed to the right to meet the battle, and soon
after General Hood with two brigades. The last reinforcement braced the
Confederate fight to a successful stand, and held it till after night in
hot contest, in which many brave soldiers and valuable officers were lost
on both sides.

The fight was between eight brigades on the Union side, with a detachment
of cavalry and superior artillery attachments, against two of D. H. Hill's
and four of my brigades, with Rosser's detachment of cavalry and
artillery. Ripley's brigade of Hill's division marched for the fight, but
lost its direction and failed to engage. The Confederate batteries made
handsome combat, but were of inferior metal and munitions. Numerically,
the Union brigades were stronger than the Confederates, mine having lost
more than half its numbers by the wayside, from exhaustion under its
forced march. It seems that several brigades failed to connect closely
with the action. Ripley's, on the Confederate side, General Hill said,
"didn't pull a trigger." G. T. Anderson claimed that some of his
skirmishers pulled a few triggers, while Harland's Union brigade of
Rodman's division seems to have had little use for its guns. Lieutenant
Crome brought a section of McMullen's battery up in close connection with
Cox's advance, put it in, and held it in gallant action till his gunners
were reduced to the minimum of working force, when he took the place of
cannoneer and fought till mortally wounded.

On the Union side the officers had their time to organize and place their
battle, and showed skill in their work. The Confederates had to meet the
battle, as it was called, after its opening, on Rosser's detachment. The
lamented Garland, equal to any emergency, was quick enough to get his fine
brigade in, and made excellent battle, till his men, discouraged by the
loss of their chief, were overcome by the gallant assault under Cox.
General Reno, on the Union side, an officer of high character and
attainments, was killed about seven o'clock P.M. Among the Union wounded
was Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes; afterwards President of the United

The pass by the lower trail, old Sharpsburg road, was opened by this
fight, but the Confederates standing so close upon it made it necessary
that they should be dislodged before it could be utilized.

The First Corps marched from the Monocacy at daylight and approached the
mountain at one P.M. General Hooker had three divisions, under Generals
Hatch, Ricketts, and Meade. General Hatch had four brigades, Generals
Ricketts and Meade three each, with full artillery appointments. At two
o'clock, General Hooker was ordered north of the turnpike to make a
diversion in favor of the troops operating on the south side under General
Reno. Meade's division was marched, followed by Hatch's and
Ricketts's,--Meade's on the right, Hatch on Meade's left, Ricketts in
reserve. Meade's division was deployed along the foot-hills. A cavalry
regiment under Colonel Williams, First Massachusetts, was sent to the far
right in observation. Meade's advance was followed by Hatch and Ricketts.

General Hill's only available force to meet this formidable move was his
brigade under General Rodes. He ordered Rodes to his left to a prominent
position about a mile off which commanded that part of the field. Cutts's
battalion of artillery had been posted on the left of the turnpike, to
cover by its fire the route just assigned for Hooker's march. The weight
of the attack fell upon Rodes's brigade, and was handsomely received.
Evans's brigade, fortunately, came up, and was sent to General Hill, who
ordered it out to connect with Rodes's right. Before making close
connection it became engaged, and operated near Rodes's right, connecting
with his fight and dropping back as the troops on his left were gradually
forced from point to point.

As the brigades under Generals Kemper, Garnett, and Colonel Walker
(Jenkins's brigade) approached the mountain, a report reached general
head-quarters that the enemy was forcing his way down the mountain by the
old Sharpsburg road. To meet this General Lee ordered those brigades to
the right, and they marched a mile and more down a rugged way along the
base of the mountain before the report was found to be erroneous, when the
brigades were ordered back to make their way to the pike and to the top of
the mountain in double time. General Rodes had five regiments, one of
which he left to partially cover the wide opening between his position and
the turnpike. In view of the great force approaching to attack him his
fight seemed almost hopeless, but he handled his troops with skill, and
delayed the enemy, with the little help that finally came, till night,
breaking from time to time as he was forced nearer our centre at the

Gibbon's brigade had been called from Hooker's corps, and was ordered up
the mountain by the direct route as the corps engaged in its fight farther
off on the right.

A spur of the mountain trends towards the east, opening a valley between
it and the mountain. Through this valley and over the rising ground
Meade's division advanced and made successful attack as he encountered the
Confederates. Cooper's battery marched, and assisted in the several
attacks as they were pushed up the mountain slope. The ground was very
rough, and the Confederates worked hard to make it too rough, but the
divisions, with their strong lines of skirmishers, made progress. Rodes
made an effort to turn the right of the advancing divisions, but Hooker
put out a brigade from Hatch's division, which pushed off the feeble
effort, and Rodes lost his first position.

It was near night when the brigades under Generals Kemper and Garnett and
Colonel Walker returned from their march down the foot of the mountain and
reached the top. They were put in as they arrived to try to cover the
right of Rodes and Evans and fill the intervening space to the turnpike.
As they marched, the men dropped along the road, as rapidly as if under
severe skirmish. So manifest was it that nature was exhausted, that no one
urged them to get up and try to keep their ranks. As the brigades were led
to places along the line, the divisions of Hatch and Ricketts were
advancing; the former, in range, caught the brigades under fire before
their lines were formed. At the same time Meade's division was forcing
Rodes and Evans from their positions, back towards the turnpike.

General McClellan claimed fifteen hundred prisoners taken by his troops,
and that our loss in killed and wounded was greater than his own, which
was fifteen hundred. He estimated the forces as about equal, thirty
thousand each. General D. H. Hill does not admit that the Confederates had
more than nine thousand.

Several efforts have been made to correctly report the numerical strength
of my column, some erroneously including the brigades detached with R. H.
Anderson's, and others the brigade of General Toombs and the regiment of
G. T. Anderson's brigade, that were left at Hagerstown. General Hill
concedes reluctantly that four thousand of my men came to his support in
detachments, but does not know how to estimate the loss. Considering the
severe forced march, the five brigades that made direct ascent of the
mountain were in good order. The three that marched south of the turnpike,
along a narrow mountain trail part of the way, through woodlands and over
boulders, returning, then up the mountain, the last march at double time,
were thinned to skeletons of three or four hundred men to a brigade when
they reached the Mountain House. That they succeeded in covering enough of
the position to conceal our retreat after night is sufficient encomium of
their valorous spirit.



    Confederates retreat from South Mountain--Federals follow and harass
    them--Franklin and Cobb at Crampton's Pass--A spirited
    Action--Fighting around Harper's Ferry--Its Capitulation--The
    Confederates take Eleven Thousand Prisoners--Jackson rejoins
    Lee--Description of the Field of Antietam--McClellan posts his
    Corps--Lee's Lines advantageously placed--Hooker's Advance on the Eve
    of Battle should have been resisted.

At first sight of the situation, as I rode up the mountain-side, it became
evident that we were not in time nor in sufficient force to secure our
holding at Turner's Gap, and a note was sent General Lee to prepare his
mind for disappointment, and give time for arrangements for retreat.

After nightfall General Hill and I rode down to head-quarters to make
report. General Lee inquired of the prospects for continuing the fight. I
called upon General Hill to demonstrate the situation, positions and
forces. He explained that the enemy was in great force with commanding
positions on both flanks, which would give a cross-fire for his batteries,
in good range on our front, making the cramped position of the
Confederates at the Mountain House untenable. His explanation was too
forcible to admit of further deliberation. General Lee ordered withdrawal
of the commands to Keedysville, and on the march changed the order, making
Sharpsburg the point of assembly. General Hill's troops were first
withdrawn, and when under way, the other brigades followed and were
relieved by General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the mountain at three
o'clock in the morning, Hood's two brigades, with G. T. Anderson's, as

General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was ordered to cover our march, but
Pleasonton pushed upon him so severely with part of the Eighth Illinois
Cavalry and Tidball's battery that he was forced off from our line through
Boonsborough and found his way to the Potomac off the rear of General
Lee's left, leaving his killed and wounded and losing two pieces of
artillery. Otherwise our march was not disturbed. In addition to his
regular complement of artillery, General D. H. Hill had the battalion
under Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Cutts. The batteries were assigned
positions near the ridge under the crest, where they could best cover the
fields on the farther side of the stream. A few minutes after our lines
were manned, information came of the capitulation of Harper's Ferry, and
of the withdrawal of the troops to the Virginia side of the Potomac.

General Toombs's brigade joined us early on the 15th, and was posted over
the Burnside Bridge. He was subsequently ordered to detach two regiments,
as guard for trains near Williamsport.

As long as the armies were linked to Harper's Ferry, the heights in front
of Sharpsburg offered a formidable defensive line, and in view of possible
operations from Harper's Ferry, through the river pass, east of South
Mountain, formed a beautiful point of strategic diversion. But when it
transpired that Harper's Ferry was surrendered and the position was not to
be utilized, that the troops there were to join us by a march on the south
side, its charms were changed to perplexities. The threatening attitude
towards the enemy's rear vanished, his line of communication was open and
free of further care, and his army, relieved of entanglements, was at
liberty to cross the Antietam by the upper fords and bridges, and approach
from vantage-ground General Lee's left. At the same time the Federal left
was reasonably secured from aggression by cramped and rugged ground along
the Confederate right. Thus the altered circumstances changed all of the
features of the position in favor of the Federals.

Approaching Crampton's Gap on the morning of the 14th, Hampton's cavalry
encountered the enemy's and made a dashing charge, which opened his way to
Munford's, both parties losing valuable officers and men. When General
Stuart rode up, he saw nothing seriously threatening, and ordered Hampton
south to the river pass; thinking that there might be something more
important at that point, he rode himself to Maryland Heights to see
General McLaws, and to witness the operations at Harper's Ferry, posting
Colonel Munford with two regiments of cavalry, two regiments of Mahone's
brigade under Colonel Parham, part of the Tenth Georgia Infantry, Chew's
battery of four guns, and a section of navy howitzers, to guard the pass.
The infantry regiments were posted behind stone walls at the base of the
mountain, the cavalry dismounted on the flanks acting as sharp-shooters.

At noon General Franklin marched through Burkittsville with his leading
division under General Slocum, holding the division under General W. F.
Smith in reserve. His orders were to wait until Couch's division joined
him, but he judged that the wait might be more favorable to the other
side. Slocum deployed his brigades, Bartlett's, Newton's, and Torbert's,
from right to left, posted Wolcott's battery of six guns on his left and
rear, and followed the advance of his skirmish line, the right brigade
leading. When the Confederate position was well developed, the skirmishers
were retired, and the order to assault followed,--the right regiments of
Newton's brigade supporting Bartlett's assault, the regiments on the left
supporting Torbert's. The Confederates made a bold effort to hold, but the
attack was too well organized and too cleverly pushed to leave the matter
long in doubt. Their flanks, being severely crowded upon, soon began to
drop off, when a sweeping charge of Slocum's line gained the position.
The brigades of General Brooks and Colonel Irwin of General Smith's
division were advanced to Slocum's left and joined in pursuit, which was
so rapid that the Confederates were not able to rally a good line; the
entire mountain was abandoned to the Federals, and the pursuit ended. Some
four hundred prisoners, seven hundred stand of arms, and one gun were
their trophies in this affair. General Franklin's total loss was five
hundred and thirty-three.[61]

General McLaws had ordered General Cobb's brigade and the other regiments
of Mahone's to reinforce the troops at the gap, but they only came up as
the Federals were making their sweeping charge, and were driven back with
their discomfited comrades. General Semmes's brigade at the Brownsville
Pass, a mile south, with five or six guns, attempted to relieve their
comrades, but the range was too great for effective work. That McLaws was
not prepared for the sudden onslaught is evident from the assurances made
him by the cavalry commander. His orders for Cobb were severe enough, but
Franklin was too prompt to allow Cobb to get to work. Upon hearing the
noise of battle, he followed his orders, riding with General Stuart, but
the game was played before he could take part in it. Night came and gave
him time to organize his forces for the next day. Had the defenders been
posted at the crest of the mountain it is probable they could have delayed
the assaulting forces until reinforced. But cavalry commanders do not
always post artillery and infantry to greatest advantage.

General Cobb made worthy effort to arrest the retreat and reorganize the
forces, but was not able to fix a rallying-point till after the pass was
lost and the troops were well out of fire of the pursuers. General Semmes
came to his aid, with his staff, but could accomplish nothing until he
drew two of his regiments from Brownsville Pass and established them with
a battery as a rallying-point. General McLaws reformed his line about a
mile and a half south of the lost gap, and drew all of his force not
necessary to the bombardment at Harper's Ferry to that line during the

[Illustration: Lafayette McLaws. Commanding First Division, First Army
Corps, Army of Northern Virginia.]

Under cover of the night, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Davis, at the head of the
Union cavalry, left Harper's Ferry, crossed the Potomac, marched up the
left bank, through Sharpsburg, and made good his escape, capturing some
forty or fifty Confederate wagons as they were moving south from

We left McLaws in possession of Maryland Heights, on the 14th, with his
best guns planted against the garrison at Harper's Ferry. The Potomac
River was between his and Jackson's and Walker's forces, and the
Shenandoah divided Jackson's and Walker's commands. Walker posted his
division to defend against the escape from Harper's Ferry, and planted
three Parrott guns of Captain French's battery and two rifle pieces of
Captain Branch's on Loudoun Heights, having effective fire along Bolivar
Heights. General Jackson sent word to McLaws and Walker that the batteries
were not to open till all were ready, but the latter, hearing the
engagement along South Mountain drawing nearer, and becoming impatient
lest delay should prove fatal, ordered his guns to open against the
batteries along Bolivar Heights, and silenced those under range.

General Jackson ordered A. P. Hill's division along the left bank of the
Shenandoah to turn the enemy's left, the division under Lawton down the
turnpike in support of Hill, and his own division to threaten against the
enemy's right. Hill's division did its work in good style, securing
eligible positions on the enemy's left and left rear of Bolivar Heights,
and planted a number of batteries upon them during the night; and Jackson
had some of his best guns passed over the Shenandoah to commanding points
near the base of Loudoun Heights. At daylight Lawton's command moved up
close to the enemy. At the same time the batteries of Hill's division
opened fire, and a little later all the batteries, including those of
McLaws and Walker. The signal ordered for the storming columns was to be
the cessation of artillery fire. In about one hour the enemy's fire
ceased, when Jackson commanded silence upon his side. Pender's brigade
started, when the enemy opened again with his artillery. The batteries of
Pegram and Crenshaw dashed forward and renewed rapid fire, when the signal
of distress was raised.

Colonel D. H. Miles, the Federal commander at Harper's Ferry, was mortally
wounded, and the actual surrender was made by General White, who gave up
eleven thousand prisoners, thirteen thousand small-arms, seventy-two
cannon, quantities of quartermaster's stores and of subsistence.[62]

General Franklin had posted his division under General Couch at
Rohrersville on the morning of the 15th, and proceeded to examine McLaws's
line established the night before across Pleasant Valley. He found the
Confederates strongly posted covering the valley, their flanks against the
mountain-side. Before he could organize for attack the firing at Harper's
Ferry ceased, indicating surrender of that garrison and leaving the troops
operating there free to march against him. He prepared, therefore, for
that eventuality.

The "lost order" directed the commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and
Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they had been detached,
to join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown. Under the
order and the changed condition of affairs, they were expected, in case of
early capitulation at Harper's Ferry, to march up the
Rohrersville-Boonsborough road against McClellan's left. There were in
those columns twenty-six of General Lee's forty brigades, equipped with a
fair apportionment of artillery and cavalry. So it seemed to be possible
that Jackson would order McLaws and Walker up the Rohrersville road, and
move with his own corps through the river pass east of South Mountain,
against McClellan's rear, as the speedier means of relief to General Lee's
forces. But prudence would have gone with the bolder move of his entire
command east of the mountain against McClellan's rear, with a fair field
for strategy and tactics. This move would have disturbed McClellan's plans
on the afternoon of the 15th, while there seemed little hope that
McClellan would delay his attack until Jackson could join us, marching by
the south side.

The field, and extreme of conditions, were more encouraging of results
than was Napoleon's work at Arcola.

General Jackson judged it better to join us by the south side, marched
promptly with two of his divisions (leaving A. P. Hill with six brigades
to receive the surrender and captured property), then ordered Walker's and
McLaws's troops to follow his march. With his report of surrender of the
garrison he sent advice of his march by the south side to join us.

At daylight on the 15th the head of General Lee's column reached the
Antietam. General D. H. Hill, in advance, crossed and filed into position
to the left of the Boonsborough turnpike, G. B. Anderson on his right,
Garland's brigade under Colonel McRae, Ripley, and Colquitt, Rodes in rear
near Sharpsburg, my command on his right. The two brigades under Hood were
on my right, Kemper, Drayton, Jenkins (under Colonel Walker), Washington
Artillery, on the ridge near the turnpike, and S. D. Lee's artillery.
Pickett's brigade (under Garnett) was in a second line, G. T. Anderson's
brigade in rear of the battalions, Evans's brigade on the north side of
the turnpike; Toombs's brigade joined and was posted at bridge No. 3
(Burnside Bridge). As the battalions of artillery attached to the
divisions were all that could find places, General Lee sent the reserve
artillery under General Pendleton across the Potomac.

As soon as advised of the surrender and Jackson's march by the south side,
my brigades under Hood were moved to the extreme left of the line, taking
the division of General D. H. Hill within my limits, while three of S. D.
Lee's batteries were sent in support of Hood's brigades. The pursuit
ordered by General McClellan was the First, Second, and Twelfth Corps by
the Boonsborough turnpike, the Ninth Corps and Sykes's division of the
Fifth by the old Sharpsburg road;[63] the Ninth and Fifth to reinforce
Franklin by the Rohrersville road, or move to Sharpsburg.

About two o'clock in the afternoon the advance of the Union army came in
sight. General Porter had passed the Ninth Corps with his division under
Sykes and joined Richardson's division of the Second. These divisions
deployed on the right and left of the turnpike and posted their batteries,
which drew on a desultory fire of artillery, continuing until night. The
morning of the 16th opened as the evening of the previous day closed,
except for the arrival of the remainder of the Union troops. The Ninth
Corps took post at the lower bridge opposite the Confederate right, the
First, the other divisions of the Second, and the Twelfth Corps resting
nearer Keedysville. The display of their finely appointed batteries was
imposing, as seen from Sharpsburg Heights.

Before maturing his plans, General McClellan had to make a careful
reconnoissance, and to know of the disposition to be made of the
Confederate forces from Harper's Ferry.

Of the latter point he was informed, if not assured, before he posted the
Ninth Corps. Four batteries of twenty-pound Parrotts were planted on the
height overlooking the Antietam on their right; on the crest near the
Burnside Bridge, Weed's three-inch guns and Benjamin's twenty-pound
Parrotts. At intervals between those were posted some ten or more
batteries, and the practice became more lively as the day wore on, till,
observing the unequal combat, I ordered the Confederates to hold their
ammunition, and the batteries of the other side, seeming to approve the
order, slackened their fire.

The Antietam, hardly worthy the name river, is a sluggish stream coming
down from Pennsylvania heights in a flow a little west of south till it
nears the Potomac, when it bends westward to its confluence. It is spanned
by four stone bridges,--at the Williamsport turnpike, the
Boonsborough-Sharpsburg turnpike, the Rohrersville turnpike, and another
near its mouth. The third was afterwards known as the Burnside Bridge.
From the north suburbs of Sharpsburg the Hagerstown turnpike leads north a
little west two miles, when it turns east of north to the vanishing point
of operations. A mile and a half from Sharpsburg on the west of this road
is the Dunker chapel, near the southern border of a woodland, which
spreads northward half a mile, then a quarter or more westward. East of
the pike were open fields of corn and fruit, with occasional woodlands of
ten or twenty acres, as far as the stream, where some heavier forests
cumbered the river banks. General Lee's line stood on the Sharpsburg
Heights, his right a mile southeast of the village, the line extending
parallel with the Hagerstown turnpike, three miles from his right, the
left curved backward towards the rear, and towards the great eastern bend
of the Potomac, near which were the cavalry and horse artillery. Along the
broken line were occasional ridges of limestone cropping out in such shape
as to give partial cover to infantry lying under them. Single batteries
were posted along the line, or under the crest of the heights, and the
battalions of the Washington Artillery, Cutts's, and S. D. Lee's.

In forming his forces for the battle, General McClellan divided his right
wing, posted the Ninth Corps on his left, at the Burnside Bridge, under
General Cox, and assigned the First Corps, under General Hooker, for his
right flank. General Burnside was retained on his left. The plan was to
make the main attack against the Confederate left, or to make that a
diversion in favor of the main attack, and to follow success by his

At two P.M. of the 16th, Hooker's First Corps crossed the Antietam at the
bridge near Keedysville and a nearby ford, and marched against my left
brigades, Generals Meade, Ricketts, and Doubleday commanding the
divisions, battalions, and batteries of field artillery. The sharp
skirmish that ensued was one of the marked preliminaries of the great
battle; but the Federals gained nothing by it except an advanced position,
which was of little benefit and disclosed their purpose.

General Jackson was up from Harper's Ferry with Ewell's division and his
own, under Generals Lawton and Jones. They were ordered out to General
Lee's left, and took post west of the Hagerstown turnpike, the right of
his line resting on my left, under Hood, Winder's and Jones's brigades on
the front, Starke's and Taliaferro's on the second line, Early's brigade
of Ewell's division on the left of Jackson's division, with Hays's brigade
for a second; Lawton's and Trimble's brigades were left at rest near the
chapel; Poague's battery on Jackson's front; five other batteries prepared
for action. Following Jackson's march to the left, General J. G. Walker
came up with his two brigades, and was posted on my extreme right in the
position left vacant by the change of Hood's brigades.

General Hooker was joined, as he marched that afternoon, by his chief, who
rode with him some little distance conversing of pending affairs. It
subsequently transpired that Hooker thought the afternoon's work ordered
for his corps (thirteen thousand) so far from support extremely
venturesome, and he was right. Jackson was up and in position with two
divisions well on the flank of the attack to be made by Hooker. Hood with
S. D. Lee's batteries received Hooker's attack, and arrested its progress
for the day. If Jackson could have been put into this fight, and also the
brigades under J. G. Walker, Hooker's command could have been fought out,
if not crushed, before the afternoon went out. He was beyond support for
the day, and the posting along the Antietam was such--we will soon see--as
to prevent effective diversion in his favor. Events that followed
authorize the claim for this combination, that it would have so disturbed
the plans of General McClellan as to give us one or two days more for
concentration, and under that preparation we could have given him more
serious trouble.

Hood's skirmish line was out to be driven, or drawn in, but throughout the
severe engagement his line of battle was not seriously disturbed. After
night General Jackson sent the brigades of Trimble and Lawton, under
General Lawton, to replace Hood's men, who were ordered to replenish
ammunition, and, after getting food, to resume their places on my right.
Preparing for battle, General Jackson sent the brigade under General Early
to support Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery, and Lawton drew his
brigade, under General Hays, to support his others on the right of
Jackson's division.

General Mansfield crossed during the night with the Twelfth Corps and took
position supporting General Hooker's command, with the divisions of
Generals A. S. Williams and George S. Greene, and field batteries.

A light rain began to fall at nine o'clock. The troops along either line
were near enough to hear voices from the other side, and several spats
occurred during the night between the pickets, increasing in one instance
to exchange of many shots; but for the most part there was silence or only
the soft, smothered sound of the summer rain over all that field on which
was to break in the morning the storm of lead and iron.



    Bloodiest Single Day of the War--Comparison of Casualties--Hooker
    opens the Fight against Jackson's Centre--Many Officers among the
    Fallen early in the Day--McLaws and Walker in time to meet Sumner's
    Advance under Sedgwick--Around Dunker Chapel--Richardson's splendid
    Advance against the Confederate Centre the Signal of the bursting of
    another Storm--Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's Troops stood before
    it--Fall of General G. B. Anderson--General Richardson mortally
    wounded--Aggressive Spirit of his Command broken--Wonderful
    Cannon-shot--General D. H. Hill's Third Horse killed under him.

The field that I have described--the field lying along the Antietam and
including in its scope the little town of Sharpsburg--was destined to pass
into history as the scene of the bloodiest single day of fighting of the
war, and that 17th of September was to become memorable as the day of
greatest carnage in the campaigns between the North and South.

Gettysburg was the greatest battle of the war, but it was for three days,
and its total of casualties on either side, terrible as it was, should be
one-third larger to make the average per diem equal to the losses at
Sharpsburg. Viewed by the measure of losses, Antietam was the fourth
battle of the war, Spottsylvania and the Wilderness, as well as
Gettysburg, exceeding it in number of killed and wounded, but each of
these dragged its tragedy through several days.

Taking Confederate losses in killed and wounded as the criterion of
magnitude in battles, the Seven Days' Battle (following McClellan's
retreat), Gettysburg, and Chickamauga exceeded Sharpsburg, but each of
these occupied several days, and on no single day in any one of them was
there such carnage as in this fierce struggle.

The Confederates lost in killed and wounded in the Seven Days' Battle
19,739,--more, it will be observed, than at Gettysburg (15,298), though
the total loss, including 5150 captured or missing, at the latter, brought
the figures up to those of the former (20,614), in which the captured or
missing were only 875. Our killed and wounded at Chickamauga were 16,986,
but that was in two days' battle, while at Chancellorsville in three days
the killed and wounded were 10,746. It is impossible to make the
comparison with absolute exactness for the Confederate side, for the
reason that our losses are given for the entire campaign in Maryland,
instead of separately for the single great battle and several minor
engagements. Thus computed they were 12,187.[64] But nearly all of these
are known to have been losses at Sharpsburg, and, making proper deductions
for the casualties in other actions of the campaign, the Confederate loss
in this single day's fighting was still in excess of that at the _three
days' fight_ at Chancellorsville (10,746), and for the single day far
larger proportionally than in the two days at Chickamauga, three days at
Gettysburg, or seven days on the bloody Chickahominy.

But the sanguinary character of this battle is most strikingly exhibited
by a comparison of the accurate figures of the Federal losses, returned
specifically for the day. These show a total killed and wounded of 11,657
(or, including the captured and missing, 12,410), as contrasted with
17,567 killed and wounded in _three_ days at Gettysburg, 16,141 in _eight_
days at Spottsylvania, and 14,283 in the _three_ days at the Wilderness,
while the _three_ and _two_ days' fighting respectively at
Chancellorsville and Chickamauga were actually productive of less loss
than this battle of _one_ day. The exceeding losses of this battle are
further shown by the fact that of the 11,657 Federals stricken on the
field, the great number of 2108 were actually slain,--more than two-thirds
of the number killed in three days at Gettysburg (3070). And this
tremendous tumult of carnage was entirely compassed in the brief hours
from dawn to four o'clock in the afternoon.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 17th firing along the picket lines
of the confronting and expectant armies became quite frequent, and before
daylight the batteries began to plough the fields in front of them,
feeling, as it were, for the ranks of men whose destruction was better
suited to their ugly purpose.

As the dawn came, the fire spread along both lines from left to right,
across the Antietam and back again, and the thunder of the big guns became
continuous and increased to mighty volume. To this was presently added the
sharper rattling of musketry, and the surge of mingling sound sweeping up
and down the field was multiplied and confused by the reverberations from
the rocks and hills. And in this great tumult of sound, which shook the
air and seemed to shatter the cliffs and ledges above the Antietam, bodies
of the facing foes were pushed forward to closer work, and soon added the
clash of steel to the thunderous crash of cannon-shots.

The first impact came from Hooker's right division under Doubleday, led by
the choice brigade under Gibbon. It was deployed across the turnpike and
struck the centre of Jackson's division, when close engagement was
strengthened by the brigades of Patrick, Phelps, and part of Hofmann's,
Ricketts's division, engaged in close connection along Lawton's front.
Hooker supported his battle by his division under Meade, which called into
action three of D. H. Hill's brigades,--Ripley's, Colquitt's, and McRae's.
Hartsuff, the leading spirit of Ricketts's division, was the first general
officer to fall severely hurt, and later fell the commander of the corps,
wounded also. General Starke, commanding Jackson's division, was killed.
At six o'clock the Twelfth Corps came in, when General Lawton called for
Hood's brigades, "and all the help he could bring." Hood's and G. T.
Anderson's brigades were put in, and the brigades from my right, under J.
G. Walker, marched promptly in response to this call.

The weight of Mansfield's fight forced Jackson back into the middle wood
at the Dunker chapel, and D. H. Hill's brigades to closer lines. Hood was
in season to brace them, and hold the line as he found it. In this fight
the corps commander, General Mansfield, fell, mortally wounded, which took
from that corps some of its aggressive power.

Jackson, worn down and exhausted of ammunition, withdrew his divisions at
seven A.M., except Early's brigade, that was with the cavalry. This he
called back to vacant ground on Hood's left. Two detachments, one under
Colonel Grigsby, of Virginia, the other under Colonel Stafford, of
Louisiana, remained on the wooded ground off from the left of Jackson's
position. One of the regiments of Early's brigade was left with the
cavalry. Stuart retired to position corresponding to the line of Jackson's
broken front. The brigade under G. T. Anderson joined on Hood's right, and
the brigades under J. G. Walker coming up took place on Hood's left,
Walker leaving two regiments to fill a vacant place between Anderson's
brigade and Hood's right. Walker, Hood, and D. H. Hill attacked against
the Twelfth Corps; worn by its fight against Jackson, it was driven back
as far as the post-and-rail fence in the east open, where they were
checked. They were outside of the line, their left in the air and exposed
to the fire of a thirty-gun battery posted at long range on the Hagerstown
road by General Doubleday. Their left was withdrawn, and the line
rectified, when Greene's brigade of the Twelfth resumed position in the
northeast angle of the wood, which it held until Sedgwick's division came
in bold march.

In these fights offensive and defensive the artillery battalions under
Lieutenant-Colonel S. D. Lee and Major Frobel were in active combat, the
former from the first shot made before daylight. They had been severely
worked, and were nearly exhausted of ammunition. The Washington Artillery
was called on for a battery to assist them, and some of the guns of that
battalion were sent for ammunition. Miller's battery of four Napoleon guns

As Jackson withdrew, General Hooker's corps retired to a point on the
Hagerstown road about three-quarters of a mile north of the battle-ground,
where General Doubleday established his thirty-gun battery. Jackson's and
Hooker's men had fought to exhaustion, and the battle of the Twelfth
Corps, taken up and continued by Mansfield, had taken defensive relations,
its chief mortally wounded.

Generals Lawton, Ripley, and J. R. Jones were severely wounded, and
Colonel Douglas, commanding Lawton's brigade, killed. A third of the men
of Lawton's, Hays's, and Trimble's brigades were reported killed or
wounded. Four of the field officers of Colquitt's brigade were killed,
five were wounded, the tenth and last contused by a shell. All of
Jackson's and D. H. Hill's troops engaged suffered proportionally. Hood's,
Walker's, and G. T. Anderson's, though longer engaged, did not lose so

General Hooker's aggregate of loss was 2590; General Mansfield's, 1746.

The Federal batteries, of position, on the east side were more or less
busy during the engagement, having occasional opportunities for a raking
fire on the troops along Jackson's line and my left. The horse artillery
under Stuart was strengthening to the Confederate left, and had
occasional opportunities for destructive fire across the Union right when
coming into action.

Although the battle along the line of contention had become defensive,
there were threatening movements on the Boonsborough pike by Sykes's
division and the horse artillery under Pleasonton, and Burnside was busy
at his bridge, working to find his way across.

At the close of the Walker-Hood-Hill affair, Hood found his line making a
large angle with the line of the latter, which was rectified, drawing in
the angle. Early's regiments were in the wood between Walker and the
cavalry, and the detachments under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford in the
wood some distance in advance of Early's left.

The line thus organized was thin and worn by severe attrition. The men
were losing strength and the ammunition getting low. Some gathered
cartridges from their fallen comrades and distributed them as far as they
would go, others went for fresh supplies.

McLaws's column came up at nine o'clock. He reported at General Lee's
head-quarters, where he was ordered at rest, and afterwards reported to
me, with General Lee's orders for his own division, and asked the
disposition to be made of R. H. Anderson's. He was ordered to send the
latter to report to General D. H. Hill.

Coincident with these arrivals, heavy columns of Federal infantry and
artillery were seen crossing the Antietam. Morell's division of the Fifth
Corps was up and relieved Richardson's of the Second, which had been in
our front since its arrival on the 15th. Richardson's following the march
of the troops by the upper crossing advised us that the next engagement
would be by the Second Corps, under General Sumner; Sedgwick's division
was in the lead as they marched. Our left centre was almost exhausted of
men and ammunition. The divisions of French and Richardson followed in
left echelon to Sedgwick. Hood's brigades had retired for fresh supply of
ammunition, leaving the guard to Walker's two brigades, G. T. Anderson's
brigade on Walker's right, part of Early's brigade on Walker's left, and
the regiments under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford off the left front.
McLaws's division was called for, and on the march under conduct of Major
Taylor of general head-quarters staff.

At sight of Sumner's march, General Early rode from the field in search,
as he reported, of reinforcements. His regiments naturally waited on the
directions of the leader.

General Sumner rode with his leading division under General Sedgwick, to
find the battle. Sedgwick marched in column of brigades, Gorman, Dana, and
Howard. There was no officer on the Union side in charge of the field, the
other corps commanders having been killed or wounded. General Sumner

    "On going upon the field I found that General Hooker's corps had been
    dispersed and routed. I passed him some distance in the rear, where he
    had been carried wounded, but I saw nothing of his corps at all, as I
    was advancing with my command on the field. There were some troops
    lying down on the left which I took to belong to Mansfield's command.
    In the mean time General Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of
    his corps (formerly Banks's) had also been thrown into confusion."[65]

He passed Greene's brigade of the Twelfth, and marched through the wood,
leaving the Dunker chapel on his left.

As McLaws approached, General Hood was sent to give him careful
instructions of the posture, of the grounds, and the impending crisis. He
marched with his brigades,--Cobb's, Kershaw's, Semmes's, and Barksdale's.
The leading brigade filed to the right, before the approaching march.
Kershaw's leading regiment filed into line as Sedgwick's column approached
the south side of the Dunker chapel wood,--the latter on a diagonal
march,--while Kershaw's regiment was in fair front against it. The
regiment opened prompt fire, and the other regiments came into line in
double time, opening fire by company as they came to the front. The other
brigades came into line by companies, and forward into line by regiments.
Armistead's brigade had been drawn from R. H. Anderson's column to
reinforce McLaws.

[Illustration: Relative positions of McLaws and other Confederates and
Sedgwick at their opening.]

Sedgwick's diagonal march exposed his left to a scattering fire from
Walker's left brigade under M. Ransom, but he kept his steady march while
Walker increased his fire. McLaws increasing his fire staggered the march
of Sedgwick, and presently arrested it. The regiments under Colonels
Stafford and Grigsby, coming from their lurking-places, opened fire on
Sedgwick's right rear. At McLaws's opening Sedgwick essayed to form line
of battle; the increasing fire on his right and left rear, with the
terrible fire in front, was confusing, but the troops were eager to return
the fire they found pouring into their lines from three-quarters of a
circle. To counter the rear fire of Walker, General Sumner ordered the
rear brigade to face about. The troops, taking this to mean a rearward
march, proceeded to execute it without awaiting further orders, which was
soon followed by the other brigades.


McLaws and Walker, pushing their success, were joined by G. T. Anderson's,
the brigades of D. H. Hill's left, and those of R. H. Anderson's division,
making strong battle through the woodland and open to the post-and-rail
fence and to the Roulette House, where they encountered Sumner's division
under French, and parts of the Twelfth Corps rallied on that part of the
field. This contention was firm and wasting on both sides, but held with
persevering courage until Richardson's reserve, under Brooke, was put
against Hill's right and broke the Confederate line back to the woodlands
south of the chapel, where Early's regiments had formed a rallying line.

When Hill's right was struck and pressed so severely, Rodes's brigade, the
reserve of his division, was ordered out to support his right. The brigade
advanced in good strong battle, but General Rodes reported that he could
not move his Sixth Alabama Regiment in time, notwithstanding his personal
efforts; that with the support of that regiment the battle line of the
Confederates could have waited other supports.

General Sumner was eager in riding with his leading division. He was
always anxious to get in in time to use all of his power, and thought
others like himself. Had he formed the corps into lines of divisions, in
close echelon, and moved as a corps, he would have marched through and
opened the way for Porter's command at bridge No. 2, and Pleasonton's
cavalry, and for Burnside at the third bridge, and forced the battle back
to the river bank.

He was criticised for his opposition to Franklin's proposed attack, but
the chances are even that he was right. The stir among Franklin's troops
was observed from a dead angle of our lines, and preparations were made to
meet it. General Jackson was marching back to us, and it is possible that
the attack might have resulted in mingling our troops with Franklin's down
on the banks of the Antietam.

After this fight the artillery battalions of S. D. Lee and Frobel, quite
out of ammunition, retired to replenish. The battery of Napoleons was
reduced to one section, that short of ammunition and working hands.

General Hill rallied the greater part of G. B. Anderson's and Rodes's
brigades in the sunken road. Some of Ripley's men came together near
Miller's guns at the Hagerstown pike. General R. H. Anderson and his next
in rank, General Wright, were wounded. The next officer, General Pryor,
not advised of his new authority, the brigades assembled at points most
suited to their convenience, in rear of D. H. Hill's brigades.

But time was up. Confederate affairs were not encouraging. Our men were
all leg-weary and heavy to handle, while McClellan, with his tens of
thousands, whom he had marched in healthful exercise the past two weeks,
was finding and pounding us from left to right under converging fire of
his batteries east and west of the Antietam.

The signal of the approaching storm was the bursting of Richardson's
command, augmented by parts of French's division, through the field of
corn, hardly ruffled by the affair at the Roulette House, spreading its
grand march against our centre. They came in brave style, in full
appreciation of the work in hand, marched better than on drill, unfolded
banners making gay their gallant step.

The Fifth Corps and Pleasonton's cavalry were in active preparation to
cross at the second bridge and join on Richardson's left, and Burnside at
the third bridge was pressing his claim for a passage against our right.

I had posted G. T. Anderson's brigade behind a stone fence near the
Hagerstown pike, about the safest spot to be found on the field of
Sharpsburg,--a dead angle, so to speak. The batteries on the field north
and the long-range thirty-gun battery of General Doubleday were playing
their fire down the pike, taking their aim by the direction of the road,
where they stood. This brought their fire into the field about one hundred
yards in rear of Anderson's line. As the fire came from an enfilade
direction, the troops assumed that they were under enfilade fire, and
General Anderson changed position without reporting. General D. H. Hill
got hold of him and moved him to the Boonsborough pike to defend against
Sykes's and Pleasonton's forces, advancing in that quarter. Thus, when
Richardson's march approached its objective, the Confederates had Boyce's
battery, well out in the corn-field, facing the march; Miller's section of
Napoleons in the centre, and a single battery at McLaws's rear, with
fragments of scattered brigades along the pike, and the Twenty-seventh
North Carolina Regiment to hold the left centre, besides the brigades in
the sunken road, and the brigades of R. H. Anderson's division awaiting
the bloody struggle. They received the severe attack in firm holding for a
long half-hour, the enemy pressing closer at intervals, until an order of
General Rodes's was misconstrued and part of his brigade under
Lieutenant-Colonel Lightfoot, of the Sixth Alabama Regiment, was forced to
the rear, and marched off, informing others that that was the order.

General G. B. Anderson fell mortally wounded. The enemy pressed in on his
outer flank and called for surrender of the forces cut off and outflanked.
Meagher's brigade was retired to replenish ammunition, and Barlow swung to
his right and came against our fragments about Miller's guns, standing
near his flank. Miller had two guns, the others off for a supply of
ammunition. Cooke's Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment was well
organized, but short of ammunition; fragments of Ripley's brigade and some
others were on the turnpike; Miller was short of hands and ammunition,
even for two guns; McLaws's division and the other part of Walker's were
in front of threatenings of parts of French's division and of troops
rallying on their front, and the Sixth Corps was up and coming against
them, so that it seemed hazardous to call them off and leave an open way.
Our line was throbbing at every point, so that I dared not call on General
Lee for help. Sergeant Ellis thought that he could bring up ammunition if
he was authorized to order it. He was authorized, and rode for and brought
it. I held the horses of some of my staff who helped to man the guns as

As the attacking forces drew nearer, Colonel Cooke reported his ammunition
exhausted. He was ordered to hold on with the bayonet, and sent in return
that he would "hold till ice forms in regions where it was never known,"
or words to that effect. As Richardson advanced through the corn he cut
off the battery under Boyce, so that it was obliged to retire to save
itself, and as Barlow came upon our centre, the battery on our left was
for a time thrown out of fire lest they might injure friend as much as
foe. Barlow marched in steady good ranks, and the remnants before him rose
to the emergency. They seemed to forget that they had known fatigue; the
guns were played with life, and the brave spirits manning them claimed
that they were there to hold or to go down with the guns.

As our shots rattled against the armored ranks, Colonel Fairfax clapped
his hands and ran for other charges. The mood of the gunners to a man was
one of quiet but unflinching resolve to stand to the last gun. Captain
Miller charged and double-charged with spherical case and canister until
his guns at the discharge leaped in the air from ten to twelve inches.

[Illustration: John W. Fairfax. Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General,
First Corps.]

When the crest was reached, the rush that was expected to sweep us away
paused,--the Confederates became hopeful. Soon the advancing ranks lay
behind the crest, and presently drew nearer Richardson's part of the line,
then mounting the crest over the Piper House. This latter point, once
established, must cut and break the Confederate position as effectually as
our centre just saved. He occupied the Piper House with two regiments
under Colonel Brooke in advance of his line along the crest, and called up
some of his batteries.

The Confederates meanwhile were collecting other batteries and infantry in
defence, when a shot from one of our batteries brought Richardson down,
mortally wounded. His taking-off broke the aggressive spirit of the
division and reduced its fight to the defensive. The regiments at the
Piper House found their position thus advanced too much exposed, and
withdrew to the stronger line of the crest. General Meagher's brigade came
up with ammunition replenished. General Hancock was despatched to take
command of the division. In the midst of the tragedy, as Richardson
approached the east crest, there was a moment of amusement when General
Hill, with about fifty men and a battle-flag, ran to gain a vantage-point
for flank fire against Richardson's left. Colonel Ross, observing the move
and appreciating the opportunity, charged with two regiments for the same
and secured it. General Hill claimed (and rightly) that it had effect in
giving the impression that there were other forces coming to support him.

Another regiment came to the relief of the Twenty-seventh, under Cooke.
The movement of troops in that quarter was construed by the enemy as a
threatened flank move against Richardson, which caused some little delay
in his march. Though the Confederates had but fragments here and there,
the enemy were kept busy and watchful lest they should come upon another
surprise move.

The Confederates were surprised but much relieved when they found this
affair reduced to the defensive, and assumed that every missile they sent
must have found one or more victims. But accounts of the other side make
clear that the result was due to accidental artillery shots that cut down
Colonel Barlow, the aggressive spirit of Richardson's right column, and
General Richardson himself at his culminating moment. Barlow fell from a
case- or canister-shot, as did Richardson. All the Union accounts refer to
a battery on their right throwing shell, and the "two brass guns in front
throwing case and canister," and this latter was the only artillery at
work against them at the time of Barlow's fall. When Barlow's command drew
nearer the division the brass guns were turned upon Richardson, but at the
moment of his taking-off another battery was in action on his left.
General D. H. Hill thought that Carter's battery was in time to divide the
honor of the last shot with the section of Napoleons under Miller.

Orders were given General Pleasonton, at the second bridge, to be ready to
enter the battle as soon as the attack by Richardson should open the way.
To meet these orders skirmishers were advanced, and Tidball's battery, by
piece, using canister, to drive back the Confederate sharp-shooters. The
Fifth Corps (General Porter's) was ordered to be ready for like service.

When Richardson swung his line up along the crest at the Piper House,
Pleasonton advanced troopers and batteries, crossed the bridge at a gallop
by the Fifth Regular Cavalry, Farnsworth's brigade, Rush's brigade, two
regiments of the Fifth Brigade under B. F. Davis, and the batteries of
Tidball, Robertson, Hains, and Gibson. The batteries were put into action
under the line of skirmishers, that were reinforced by Sykes's division of
the Fifth and Tenth Infantry under Lieutenant Poland.

General Hill seized a musket and by example speedily collected a number of
men, who joined him in reinforcing the line threatened by this heavy
display. The parts of brigades under General Pryor, Colonels Cummings,
Posey, and G. T. Anderson afterwards got up to help the brigade of Evans
already there. By these, with the batteries of Squires, Gardner, and
Richardson, this threatening demonstration was checked. Then it was
reinforced by the batteries of Randol, Kusserow, and Van Reed, and the
Fourth United States Infantry, Captain Dryer; the first battalion of the
Twelfth, Captain Blount; second battalion of the Twelfth, Captain
Anderson; first battalion of the Fourteenth, Captain Brown, and second
battalion of the Fourteenth, Captain McKibbin, of Sykes's division; the
batteries posted to command the field, right and left, to cover Sumner's
and Burnside's fronts, as soon as they could rise to the plateau. S. D.
Lee's batteries were back on the crest, replenished of ammunition, while
the Union batteries were on low ground, near the river. A very clever
well-organized advance was made, but their advantages of position and the
tenacious hold of the Confederates, even after the attack reached the
crest, enabled them to drive back the assaulting forces. The horse
batteries went back to positions on the west side after replenishing with
ammunition, except Gibson's, which was put in defensive attitude on the
east. Pleasonton, with a comprehensive view of the opportunity, called for
additional force, but two of Morell's brigades had been ordered by the
upper crossing to Sumner's relief, and a detachment had been sent to
assist Burnside, which reduced the Fifth Corps to the minimum of force
necessary to the service to which it was assigned; not equal to the
aggressive fight to which it was invited. But for the breaking up of
Richardson's aggression, this last advance could have gained the field.

The Third Brigade of the Second Division, Sixth Corps, made an erratic
march across part of the field, the Seventh Maine Regiment leading, and
retired like a meteor that loses its own fire.

A little after one o'clock this and other parts of the line, except at the
Burnside Bridge, settled down to defensive. Burnside was still hard at
work in search of a practical line of advance, Toombs standing manfully
against him.

During the lull, after the rencounter of Walker's, Hill's, and Hood's
divisions against Mansfield's last fight, General Lee and myself, riding
together under the crest of General D. H. Hill's part of the line, were
joined by the latter. We were presently called to the crest to observe
movements going on in the Union lines. The two former dismounted and
walked to the crest; General Hill, a little out of strength and thinking a
single horseman not likely to draw the enemy's fire, rode. As we reached
the crest I asked him to ride a little apart, as he would likely draw fire
upon the group. While viewing the field a puff of white smoke was seen to
burst from a cannon's mouth about a mile off. I remarked, "There is a shot
for General Hill," and, looking towards him, saw his horse drop on his
knees. Both forelegs were cut off just below the knees. The dropping
forward of the poor animal so elevated his croup that it was not an easy
matter for one not an expert horseman to dismount _à la militaire_. To add
to the dilemma, there was a rubber coat with other wraps strapped to the
cantle of the saddle. Failing in his attempt to dismount, I suggested that
he throw his leg forward over the pommel. This gave him easy and graceful
dismount. This was the third horse shot under him during the day, and the
shot was one of the best I ever witnessed. An equally good one was made by
a Confederate at Yorktown. An officer of the Topographical Engineers
walked into the open, in front of our lines, fixed his plane table and
seated himself to make a map of the Confederate works. A non-commissioned
officer, without orders, adjusted his gun, carefully aimed it, and fired.
At the report of the gun all eyes were turned to see the occasion of it,
and then to observe the object, when the shell was seen to explode as if
in the hands of the officer. It had been dropped squarely upon the
drawing-table, and Lieutenant Wagner was mortally wounded.[66] Of the
first shot, Major Alfred A. Woodhull, under date of June 8, 1886, wrote,--

    "On the 17th of September, 1862, I was standing in Weed's battery,
    whose position is correctly given in the map, when a man on, I think,
    a gray horse, appeared about a mile in front of us, and footmen were
    recognized near. Captain Weed, who was a remarkable artillerist,
    himself sighted and fired the gun at the horse, which was struck."



    Closing Events of the Great Struggle--Burnside crosses the Bridge he
    made famous--Toombs made Gallant Defence, but was outnumbered and
    dislodged--The Confederate Brigades from Harper's Ferry under A. P.
    Hill in Time for the Final Crisis--Burnside's Advance arrested by
    them--The Battle against Burnside "appeared to spring from the
    Earth"--"Lee's old War Horse"--The Killing of a Kinsman at the Bridge
    seriously affects General D. R. Jones--The Sharp Fight at
    Shepherdstown--Confederates retreat--Casualties of the
    Battle--Confederate Losses in the Campaign--Neither McClellan's Plan
    nor Execution was strong.

At one or two points near our centre were dead angles into which I rode
from time to time for closer observation of the enemy when his active
aggression was suspended. General Burnside was busy at his crossing, but
no report of progress had been sent me. One of my rides towards the Dunker
chapel revealed efforts of the enemy to renew his work on that part of the
field. Our troops were ordered to be ready to receive it. Its
non-aggression suggested an opportunity for the Confederates, and I
ordered McLaws and Walker to prepare to assault. Hood was back in position
with his brigades, and Jackson was reported on his way, all in full supply
of ammunition. It seemed probable that by concealing our movements under
cover of the wood from the massed batteries of Doubleday's artillery on
the north, and the batteries of position on the east, we could draw our
columns so near to the enemy in front before our move could be known that
we would have but a few rods to march before we could mingle our ranks
with those of the enemy; that our columns massed and in goodly numbers,
pressing severely upon a single point, would give the enemy much trouble,
and might cut him in two, and break up his battle arrangements at the
lower bridge; but just then General Jackson reported, with authority from
General Lee, that he with the cavalry was ordered to march around and turn
the entire position of the enemy by his right flank, and strike at his
rear. He found that the march would be long and extremely hazardous, and
abandoned his orders. So it appears that counsels were divided on both
sides, General McClellan disapproving the attack proposed by Franklin, and
General Lee preferring a flank move.

Of the proposed attack from the Union side, General Franklin reported,--

    "Slocum's division arrived on the field about eleven o'clock.
    Immediately after its arrival two of his brigades (Newton's and
    Torbert's) were formed in column of attack to carry the wood in the
    immediate vicinity of the White Church. The other brigade (Bartlett's)
    had been ordered by General Sumner to keep near his right. As this
    brigade was to form the reserve for the column of attack, I waited
    until it came up. About the same time General Sumner arrived on the
    spot and directed the attack to be postponed, and the enemy at once
    proceeded to fill the wood with infantry, and planted a battery there
    which opened a severe fire upon us. Shortly afterwards the commanding
    general came to the position, and decided that it would not be prudent
    to make the attack, our position on the right being then considerably
    in advance of what it had been in the morning."[67]

General McClellan claimed that his batteries on the east side dispersed a
column marching in the afternoon to reinforce against General Sumner. This
was probably Jackson's command marching to their position on the line. The
fire only hurried the march of the troops to the front, where they resumed
their position.

We left General Toombs defending the crossing at the Burnside Bridge, with
the Second, Twentieth, and Fiftieth Georgia Regiments, and a company of
Jenkins's brigade of South Carolina troops, against the Ninth Corps,
commanded by General J. D. Cox, General Burnside, the commander of the
right wing present, commanding. Toombs had in his line of infantry five
hundred and fifty men part way up the swell of Sharpsburg Heights. Behind
him he posted Eubank's battery, and overlooking were J. B. Richardson's
and Eshleman's to rake the bridge; others near. The road on the Union side
leading to the bridge runs parallel to the river about three hundred yards
before it reaches the bridge, and turns up-stream after crossing. On the
parallel to this line of march on the Confederate side Toombs posted his
infantry, the South Carolina company in a marginal woodland above the
bridge. Above and near the bridge was a fording-place for infantry; a
thousand yards below was a practicable ford for infantry and artillery, by
a country road. Toombs's orders were, when dislodged, to retire south so
as to open the field of fire to all the troops on the heights behind him,
the fire of his batteries to be concentrated upon the bridge, and his
infantry arranged for a like converging fire. The ravines cutting the
swells of the foot-hills gave him fair ground for retreat when he found
his position no longer tenable. He was to so manoeuvre as to have a flank
fire on the advancing columns, and gradually encircle so as to join his
division after passing the crest.

Early in the morning, General Burnside had been ordered to prepare the
Ninth Corps for attack at the bridge, but to await further orders. At
eight o'clock orders were sent to carry the bridge, gain possession of the
heights, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear.
The order was repeated, and, finally, losing patience, General McClellan
sent the inspector-general (Colonel Sackett)

    "To deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his
    troops without a moment's delay, and if necessary to carry the bridge
    at the point of the bayonet, and I ordered Colonel Sackett to remain
    with General Burnside and see that the order was promptly

Upon receipt of the first order General Burnside advanced his troops,
General Crook's brigade, supported by General Sturgis's division, to the
bridge and ford just above it. These were preceded by the Eleventh
Connecticut Regiment as skirmishers under Colonel Kingsbury, who essayed
crossing by the upper ford, but after severe skirmish Colonel Kingsbury
was killed and the effort failed. The division under General Rodman
supported by Scammon's brigade (commanded by Colonel Ewing) moved towards
the lower ford. Colonel Scammon, commanding the Kanawha division, moved
with this column.

Wilcox's division was in rear of Sturgis, in reserve, and near the left of
Benjamin's battery. Clark's and Durell's batteries were posted on the
right. One section of Simmonds's battery was with Crook's brigade, the
other with Benjamin's battery. Dahlgren's boat-howitzers covered the ford
at Rodman's crossing. The last order was received at ten o'clock. The line
of skirmishers advanced and engaged across the river. Crook's brigade
marched for the bridge. After a severe engagement of some hours, General
Crook posted two of Simmonds's guns in position to cover the bridge, and
after some little time General Sturgis's division approached the bridge,
led by Naglee's brigade. The Second Brigade, General Ferrero, was posted a
little in reserve. The Second Maryland, Colonel Duryea, and Sixth New
Hampshire Regiments were ordered forward in double time with bayonets
fixed to carry the bridge. They made a gallant, dashing charge, crowding
the bridge almost to its western _débouché_, but the fire concentrated a
storm that stunned their ranks, thinned and cut them down until they were
forced to retire. General Burnside repeated the order to force the way at
all hazards. Arrangements were made, and when concluded the Fifty-first
New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania Regiments were sent. They found a
route better covered from the Confederate fire than that of the first
column while marching for the bridge.

By a dashing charge on double time they passed it under exulting hurrahs
and most gallant work, and gained the west bank. The crossing by Rodman's
division at the lower ford made our position at the bridge untenable, and
General Toombs was prepared to retire the moment the west bank was gained
in his rear.

Union troops were hurried over, and organized for advance over Sharpsburg
Heights, but Sturgis's division had suffered, and, the ammunition getting
low, it was found necessary to replace it by the division under General
Wilcox, and Sturgis was ordered to hold position near the bridge in
reserve. The brigades under Rodman made their crossing sooner, and waited
a little for those at the bridge. As soon as the latter formed on the west
bank, Rodman drew nearer. He was supported by the Scammon brigade of the
Kanawha division, the brigade under General Crook to move with the troops
from the bridge.

Clark's, Durell's, Cook's, Muhlenberg's, and part of Simmonds's batteries
crossed with the infantry. About four o'clock the troops were over and
advanced under very severe fire of artillery and infantry, increasing in
force as they ascended the heights, but the march was continued in bold,
admirable style, the troops engaging in steady, brave fight as they
marched. Overreaching my right, they forced it back, breaking off Jones's
right brigades under Drayton, Kemper, and Garnett. Toombs, working his way
to the rear, managed to encircle the advancing column and join the other
brigades under D. R. Jones as they were forced back. Jones used some of
them in organizing a stand on the flank of the Union columns. Toombs was
joined in his rearward move by his regiments that had been sent off as
train guards, by a battalion of the Eleventh Georgia under Major Little,
and sent the regiments with him to replenish ammunition. Meanwhile, steady
advancing battle was made by the Federals.

Batteries from all parts of our field drove to General Lee, as well as
detachments of infantry, including some with fresh wounds from the morning
battle, but the battle moved bravely on.

When General Lee found that General Jackson had left six of his brigades
under General A. P. Hill to receive the property and garrison surrendered
at Harper's Ferry, he sent orders for them to join him, and by magic spell
had them on the field to meet the final crisis. He ordered two of them
guided by Captain Latrobe to guard against approach of other forces that
might come against him by bridge No. 4, Pender's and Brockenbrough's, and
threw Branch's, Gregg's and Archer's against the fore-front of the battle,
while Toombs's, Kemper's, and Garnett's engaged against its right.
McIntosh's battery, sent in advance by A. P. Hill, was overrun and
captured. Pegram's and Crenshaw's batteries were put in with Hill's three
brigades. The Washington Artillery, S. D. Lee's, and Frobel's found places
for parts of their batteries, ammunition replenished. D. H. Hill found
opportunity to put in parts of his artillery under Elliott, Boyce, Carter,
and Maurin. Toombs's absent regiments returned, as he made his way around
to the enemy's right, and joined the right of General D. R. Jones. The
strong battle concentrating against General Burnside seemed to spring from
the earth as his march bore him farther from the river. Outflanked and
staggered by the gallant attack of A. P. Hill's brigades, his advance was

The contention about the heights and suburbs of Sharpsburg was anxiously
held. General Cox, reinforced by his reserve under General Sturgis,
handled well his left against A. P. Hill; but, assailed in front and on
his flank by concentrating fires that were crushing, he found it necessary
to recover his lines and withdraw. A. P. Hill's brigades, Toombs and
Kemper, followed. They recovered McIntosh's battery and the ground that
had been lost on the right before the slow advancing night dropped her
mantle upon this field of seldom equalled strife.

When the Ninth Corps dropped back under the crest they had so bravely won,
the battle of Sharpsburg virtually ended, though the fire between the
lines was continued till nine o'clock. The field made classic by a
struggle of eighteen hours, too fearful to contemplate, was yet cumbered
by the dead and wounded. After the firing ceased, parties from both sides,
by mutual consent, went in search of fallen comrades.

After riding along the lines, giving instructions for the night and
morning, I rode for general head-quarters to make report, but was delayed
somewhat, finding wounded men hidden away under stone walls and in fence
corners, not yet looked after, and afterwards in assisting a family whose
home had been fired by a shell, so that all the other officers had
arrived, made their reports, and were lounging about on the sod, when I
rode up. General Lee walked up as I dismounted, threw his hands upon my
shoulders, and hailed me with, "Here is my old war-horse at last!"

One of those peculiarly painful personal experiences which are innumerable
in war, but seldom get into print (save in fiction), came under my
observation in this battle. Colonel H. W. Kingsbury, who was killed while
gallantly leading the Eleventh Connecticut Regiment at the ford near the
Burnside Bridge, was a brother-in-law of General D. R. Jones, who
commanded the Confederates immediately opposing him. His taking-off was a
severe blow to Jones, and one from which he never recovered. His health
had not been strong for some time. He asked leave of absence shortly
after this occurrence, and, gradually but hopelessly sinking, in a few
months passed over to the silent majority to join his fallen kinsman.


A few shots were exchanged early on the 18th, but a kindly feeling seemed
to take possession of the troops, as they were not ordered into action,
and excuses were passed between the lines for looking after wounded
comrades, which resulted in a _quasi_ truce for the day.

The Burnside battle may be likened to that contemplated for Fitz-John
Porter under his 4.30 order at the Second Manassas. The latter, however,
had the smaller force, while Burnside's numbers were greater.

In the afternoon General Lee was advised of new arrivals in General
McClellan's army, and, thinking the few stragglers who came up to swell
his own ranks were not sufficient to justify him in renewing the battle on
the 19th, ordered his trains back, and after night marched his troops
across the Potomac at the ford near Shepherdstown.

General Stuart was ordered to cross ahead of the general move, recross the
Potomac at Williamsport, and stand guard to the rear of the columns in
case of danger to their crossing. The road being clear at nine o'clock,
the army marched; the First Corps, in advance, crossed about two A.M. on
the 19th, awaited to guard the crossing, and at daylight was deployed on
the south side. A. P. Hill's division covered the retreat of the army, and
the cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee was to follow, relieving lines of picket
guards and helping the feeble footmen. The rear of the Confederate column
crossed into Virginia at ten A.M., unmolested. As the pursuit was not
threatening, General Lee ordered his army to continue the march to proper
points of bivouac, holding the artillery reserve under General Pendleton
and an infantry detail of the brigades of Armistead and Lawton, commanded
by Colonels Hodges and Lamar, as guard at the ford. General Pendleton
posted some thirty guns in position for converging fire at the ford, and
put a line of skirmishers near it, holding the infantry reserve and eleven
guns at the rear.

About noon the Union cavalry appeared on the other bank. The batteries of
Gibson, Tidball, and Robertson were put in action, but relieved about two
o'clock by artillery of the Fifth Corps. After a severe combat the Fourth
Michigan Regiment and parts of the One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania
and Eighteenth and Twenty-second Massachusetts were ordered over under
General Griffin. They forced the passage under artillery and infantry
fire, scaled the heights, and got possession of five guns of different
batteries and a number of small-arms, when, night approaching, the
detachment was recalled.

General Pendleton reported the result to general head-quarters, and
General Lee ordered General Jackson to send his nearest division back to
the ford early in the morning.

A. P. Hill's division was ordered. He was fortunate in approaching the
ford (Boteler's) before the Federals had crossed all of their advancing
column; formed his brigades in two lines and advanced to attack. General
Porter, upon the report of this advance, found that his troops could not
get position on the south bank in time to meet this threatening, ordered
the troops withdrawn to cover about the canal and adjacent heights, and
succeeded in getting most of his men safely back.

General Hill deployed the brigades of Gregg, Thomas, and Pender as his
front line, under command of General Gregg. Lane's (Branch's brigade),
Archer's, and Brockenbrough's brigades were of his second line, commanded
by General Archer. In this order the division advanced and engaged in a
severe struggle. Finding the fight on his front heavy, General Pender
called to General Archer for support, and the latter, moving by his left,
brought his brigade on Pender's left, when the advance was pushed to
successful issue. The One Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania Regiment was
thrown into confusion and suffered heavy loss. One of the guns lost the
day before was recovered and two hundred prisoners taken. The losses were
between two hundred and fifty and three hundred on each side, the Federals
losing about twenty more than the Confederates. The Confederate accounts
of this affair were overdrawn, but they were reassuring after the severe
experience about South Mountain and Sharpsburg.

The Army of Northern Virginia was then marched to the vicinity of
Martinsburg, where it remained in repose for several days, then retired to
the vicinity of Winchester. The Army of the Potomac concentrated about
Harper's Ferry, refitting its supplies and transportation.

We may say of the battle of Sharpsburg that the Confederates foiled every
attack that was made, and brought the Army of the Potomac to a stand at
night, yet the Federal commander scored a success that was startling.

The commander of the Army of the Potomac reported his strength as 87,164.
His estimate of the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia was 97,445.
The Confederate commander estimated his own strength for battle at 37,000,
and that of his adversary at 90,000.

The Confederates fought all of their men that were on the field, except
two brigades of A. P. Hill's division and some of their field batteries.

Of the Federals, the Fifth Corps, except about one brigade of infantry,
was not in action; and the Sixth Corps, except Irwin's brigade, seems to
have had little serious work.

It is generally conceded that the Federals, in addition to advantage of
numbers, had their organizations in hand, were better fed and clothed, and
better prepared, therefore, to muster a larger portion of their number for

The casualties of the First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, in the
engagements at South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, Maryland Heights, Harper's
Ferry, and Sharpsburg, as tabulated in the official report, were 7508.[69]
Neither General Jackson's report nor General D. H. Hill's furnishes a
detailed account of casualties. The former gives aggregate figures 2438,
the latter 3241,--making a grand aggregate of 13,187.[70] None of these
reports include the losses of the cavalry command, nor is there a report
of them found among the Records.

The Army of Northern Virginia concentrated at and near Fredericktown on
the 9th of September, 1862, numbered a trifle over 61,000, all arms.
General Lee's estimate of his troops engaged at Sharpsburg was 37,000.
This may not include his cavalry arm, conceding which, his force on the
field should have been about 41,000. Estimating the cavalry loss at 500,
our losses of battle should be 13,687, which leaves 20,000 to be accounted
for as lost by severe continuous labor and marches. This, added to the
losses in action, makes a grand total of 33,687 lost in the Maryland
campaign. The losses from overwork were only temporary. Most of them were
back in the ranks within fifteen days after the return to Virginia. But
all of these large figures are trifles compared to the lamentable loss of
the fruits of devoted service from the Chickahominy campaign to the

The casualties of the Union side, reported by official count, were 12,410.

The best tactical moves at Antietam were made by Generals McLaws, A. P.
Hill, Gibbon, and Patrick, and Colonels Barlow and Cross. Generals D. H.
Hill and Hood were like game-cocks, fighting as long as they could stand,
engaging again as soon as strong enough to rise. General Toombs and
Colonel Benning performed very clever work at the Burnside Bridge. Of
Colonel Cooke, the Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment, Captain Miller,
Sergeant Ellis, and their men of the Washington Artillery, General Lee
said, "They were heroic."

General McClellan's plan of the battle was not strong, the handling and
execution were less so. Battles by the extreme right and left, divided by
a river, gave us the benefit of interior lines, and it was that that saved
the Confederate army, for it became manifest early in the day that his
reserves were held at the bridge No. 2, which gave us freer use of our
inner lines.

Following is a condensed but accurate presentation of the organization of
the contending armies in the battle of Sharpsburg and the Maryland



    MCLAWS'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws:--_Kershaw's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. J. B. Kershaw; 2d S. C., Col. John D. Kennedy; 3d S. C.,
    Col. James D. Nance; 7th S. C., Col. D. Wyatt Aiken and Capt. John S.
    Hard; 8th S. C., Lieut.-Col. A. J. Hoole. _Cobb's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    Howell Cobb, Lieut.-Col. C. C. Sanders, Lieut.-Col. William MacRae;
    16th and 24th Ga., Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, 15th N. C. _Semmes's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Paul J. Semmes; 10th Ga., Capt. P. H. Loud; 53d Ga.,
    Lieut.-Col. Thomas Sloan and Capt. S. W. Marshborne; 15th Va., Capts.
    E. M. Morrison and E. J. Willis; 32d Va., Col. E. B. Montague.
    _Barksdale's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. William Barksdale; 13th Miss.,
    Lieut.-Col. Kennon McElroy; 17th Miss., Lieut.-Col. John C. Fiser;
    18th Miss., Maj. J. C. Campbell and Lieut.-Col. William H. Luse; 21st
    Miss., Capt. John Sims and Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys. _Artillery_,
    Maj. S. P. Hamilton, Col. H. C. Cabell; Manly's (N. C.) battery, Capt.
    B. C. Manly; Pulaski (Ga.) Art., Capt. J. P. W. Read; Richmond
    (Fayette) Art., Capt. M. C. Macon; Richmond Howitzers (1st Co.), Capt.
    E. S. McCarthy; Troup (Ga.) Art., Capt. H. H. Carlton.

    ANDERSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson:--_Wilcox's
    Brigade_, Col. Alfred Cumming; 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Ala. _Mahone's
    Brigade_, Col. William A. Parham; 6th, 12th, 16th, 41st, and 61st Va.
    _Featherston's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Featherston, Col.
    Carnot Posey; 12th Miss., 16th Miss., Capt. A. M. Feltus; 19th Miss.,
    2d Miss. Battn. _Armistead's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead,
    Col. J. G. Hodges; 9th, 14th, 38th, 53d, and 57th Va. _Pryor's
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Roger A. Pryor; 14th Ala., 2d and 8th Fla., 3d
    Va. _Wright's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright; 44th Ala., 3d, 22d,
    and 48th Ga. _Artillery_, Maj. John S. Saunders; Donaldsonville (La.)
    Art. (Maurin's battery), Huger's (Va.) battery, Moorman's (Va.)
    battery, Thompson's (Grimes's) (Va.) battery.

    JONES'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David R. Jones:--_Toombs's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Robert Toombs, Col. Henry L. Benning; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col.
    William R. Holmes and Major Skidmore Harris; 15th Ga., Col. W. T.
    Millican; 17th Ga., Capt. J. A. McGregor; 20th Ga., Col. J. B.
    Cumming. _Drayton's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Drayton; 50th Ga.,
    Lieut.-Col. F. Kearse; 51st Ga., 15th S. C., Col. W. D. De Saussure.
    _Pickett's Brigade_, Col. Eppa Hunton, Brig.-Gen. R. B. Garnett; 8th
    Va., Col. Eppa Hunton; 18th Va., Maj. George C. Cabell; 19th Va., Col.
    J. B. Strange, Lieut. W. N. Wood, and Capt. J. L. Cochran; 28th Va.,
    Capt. Wingfield; 56th Va., Col. William D. Stuart and Capt. McPhail.
    _Kemper's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. J. L. Kemper; 1st, 7th, 11th, 17th, and
    24th Va. _Jenkins's Brigade_, Col. Joseph Walker; 1st S. C. (Vols.),
    Lieut.-Col. D. Livingston; 2d S. C. Rifles, 5th S. C., Capt. T. C.
    Beckham; 6th S. C., Lieut.-Col. J. M. Steedman, Capt. E. B. Cantey;
    4th S. C. (Battn.), Palmetto (S. C.) Sharp-shooters. _Anderson's
    Brigade_, Col. George T. Anderson; 1st Ga. (Regulars), Col. W. J.
    Magill; 7th, 8th, and 9th Ga.; 11th Ga., Maj. F. H. Little.
    _Artillery_, Fauquier (Va.) Art. (Stribling's battery),[72] Loudoun
    (Va.) Art. (Rogers's battery),[72] Turner (Va.) Art. (Leake's
    battery),[72] Wise (Va.) Art. (J. S. Brown's battery).

    WALKER'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John G. Walker:--_Walker's Brigade_,
    Col. Van H. Manning, Col. E. D. Hall; 3d Ark., Capt. John W. Reedy;
    27th N. C., Col. J. R. Cooke; 46th N. C., Col. E. D. Hall; 48th N. C.,
    Col. R. C. Hill; 30th Va., French's (Va.) battery, Capt, Thomas B.
    French. _Ransom's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.; 24th N. C.,
    Lieut.-Col. John L. Harris; 25th N. C., Col. H. M. Rutledge; 35th N.
    C., Col. M. W. Ransom; 49th N. C., Lieut.-Col. Lee M. McAfee; Branch's
    Field Art. (Va.), Capt. Branch.

    HOOD'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John B. Hood:--_Hood's Brigade_, Col. W.
    T. Wofford; 18th Ga., Lieut.-Col. S. Z. Ruff; Hampton (S. C.) Legion,
    Lieut.-Col. M. W. Gary; 1st Tex., Lieut.-Col. P. A. Work; 4th Tex.,
    Lieut.-Col. B. F. Carter; 5th Tex., Capt. I. N. M. Turner. _Law's
    Brigade_, Col. E. M. Law; 4th Ala., Lieut.-Col. O. K. McLemore; 2d
    Miss., Col. J. M. Stone; 11th Miss., Col. P. F. Liddell; 6th N. C.,
    Maj. Robert F. Webb. _Artillery_, Maj. B. W. Frobel; German Art. (S.
    C.), Capt. W. K. Bachman; Palmetto Art. (S. C.), Capt. H. R. Garden;
    Rowan Art. (N. C.), Capt. James Reilly.

    EVANS'S BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. Nathan G. Evans, Col. P. F. Stevens;[73]
    17th S. C., Col. F. W. McMaster; 18th S. C., Col. W. H. Wallace; 22d
    S. C., Lieut.-Col. T. C. Watkins and Maj. M. Hilton; 23d S. C., Capt.
    S. A. Durham and Lieut. E. R. White; Holcombe (S. C.) Legion, Col. P.
    F. Stevens; Macbeth (S. C.) Art., Capt. R. Boyce.

    ARTILLERY:--_Washington (La.) Artillery_, Col. J. B. Walton; 1st Co.,
    Capt. C. W. Squires; 2d Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson; 3d Co., Capt. M.
    B. Miller; 4th Co., Capt. B. F. Eshleman. _Lee's Battalion_, Col. S.
    D. Lee; Ashland (Va.) Art., Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr.; Bedford (Va.)
    Art., Capt. T. C. Jordan; Brooks (S. C.) Art., Lieut. William Elliott;
    Eubank's (Va.) battery, Capt. J. L. Eubank; Madison (La.) Light Art.,
    Capt. G. V. Moody; Parker's (Va.) battery, Capt. W. W. Parker.


    EWELL'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. A. R. Lawton, Brig.-Gen. Jubal A.
    Early:--_Lawton's Brigade_, Col. M. Douglass, Maj. J. H. Lowe, Col.
    John H. Lamar; 13th and 26th Ga., 31st Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. T. Crowder;
    38th, 60th, and 61st Ga. _Early's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Jubal A. Early,
    Col. William Smith; 13th Va., Capt. F. V. Winston; 25th, 31st, and
    44th Va.; 49th Va., Col. William Smith; 52d Va., Col. M. G. Harman;
    58th Va. _Trimble's Brigade_, Col. James A. Walker; 15th Ala., Capt.
    I. B. Feagin; 12th Ga., Capt. Rogers; 21st Ga., Maj. Thomas C. Glover;
    21st N. C., Capt. Miller; 1st N. C. Battn.[74] _Hays's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Harry T. Hays; 5th La., 6th La., Col. H. B. Strong; 7th,
    8th, and 14th La. _Artillery_,[75] Maj. A. R. Courtney;
    Charlottesville (Va.) Art. (Carrington's battery), Chesapeake (Md.)
    Art. (Brown's battery), Courtney (Va.) Art. (Latimer's battery),
    Johnson's (Va.) battery, La. Guard Art. (D'Aquin's battery), 1st Md.
    Batt. (Dement's battery), Staunton (Va.) Art. (Balthis's battery).

    HILL'S LIGHT DIVISION, Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill:--_Branch's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. L. O'B. Branch, Col. James H. Lane; 7th N. C., 18th N. C.,
    Lieut.-Col. Purdie; 28th, 33d, and 37th N. C. _Gregg's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg; 1st S. C. (provisional army), Maj. E. McCrady,
    Jr., Col. D. H. Hamilton; 1st S. C. Rifles, Lieut.-Col. James M.
    Perrin; 12th S. C., Col. Dixon Barnes, Lieut.-Col. C. Jones, and Maj.
    W. H. McCorkle; 13th S. C., Col. O. E. Edwards; 14th S. C.,
    Lieut.-Col. W. D. Simpson. _Field's Brigade_, Col. Brockenbrough;
    40th, 47th, and 55th Va., 22d Va. Battn. _Archer's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. J. J. Archer, Col. Peter Turney; 5th Ala. Battn., Captain
    Hooper; 19th Ga., Maj. J. H. Neal and Capt. F. M. Johnston; 1st Tenn.
    (provisional army), Col. Peter Turney; 7th Tenn., Maj. S. G. Shepard
    and Lieut. G. A. Howard; 14th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Lockert.
    _Pender's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. William D. Pender, Col. R. H. Brewer;
    16th N. C., Lieut.-Col. Stowe; 22d N. C., Maj. C. C. Cole; 34th and
    38th N. C. _Thomas's Brigade_, Col. Edward L. Thomas; 14th Ga., Col.
    R. W. Folsom; 35th Ga., 45th Ga., Maj. W. L. Grice; 49th Ga.,
    Lieut.-Col. S. M. Manning. _Artillery_,[76] Maj. R. L. Walker; Branch
    (N. C.) Art. (A. C. Latham's battery), Crenshaw's (Va.) battery,
    Fredericksburg (Va.) Art. (Braxton's battery), Letcher (Va.) Art.
    (Davidson's battery), Middlesex (Va.) Art. (Fleet's battery), Pee Dee
    (S. C.) Art. (McIntosh's battery), Purcell (Va.) Art. (Pegram's

    JACKSON'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. W. E. Starke,
    Col. A. J. Grigsby:--_Winder's Brigade_, Col. A. J. Grigsby,
    Lieut.-Col. R. D. Gardner (4th Va.), Maj. H. J. Williams; 2d Va.,
    Capt. R. T. Colston; 4th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. D. Gardner; 5th Va., Maj.
    H. J. Williams; 27th Va., Capt. F. C. Wilson; 33d Va., Capt. Golladay
    and Lieut. Walton. _Taliaferro's Brigade_, Col. E. T. H. Warren, Col.
    J. W. Jackson, Col. J. L. Sheffield; 47th and 48th Ala., 10th, 23d,
    and 37th Va. _Jones's Brigade_, Col. B. T. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. J. R.
    Jones, Capt, J. E. Penn, Capt. A. C. Page, Capt. R. W. Withers; 21st
    Va., Capt. A. C. Page; 42d Va., Capt. R. W. Withers; 48th Va., Capt.
    Chandler; 1st Va. Battn., Lieut. C. A. Davidson. _Starke's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. William E. Starke, Col. L. A. Stafford, Col. E. Pendleton;
    1st La., Lieut.-Col. M. Nolan; 2d La., Col. J. M. Williams; 9th La.,
    10th La., Capt. H. D. Monier; 15th La., Coppens's (La.) battalion.
    _Artillery_, Maj. L. M. Shumaker; Alleghany (Va.) Art. (Carpenter's
    battery), Brockenbrough's (Md.) battery, Danville (Va.) Art.
    (Wooding's battery), Hampden (Va.) Art. (Caskie's battery), Lee (Va.)
    Batt. (Raines's), Rockbridge (Va.) Art. (Poague's battery).

    HILL'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Daniel H. Hill:--_Ripley's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, Col. George Doles; 4th Ga., Col. George
    Doles; 44th Ga., Capt. Key; 1st N. C., Lieut.-Col. H. A. Brown; 3d N.
    C., Col. William L. De Rosset. _Rodes's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. R. E.
    Rodes; 3d Ala., Col. C. A. Battle; 5th Ala., Maj. E. L. Hobson; 6th
    Ala., Col. J. B. Gordon; 12th Ala., Col. B. B. Gayle and Lieut.-Col.
    S. B. Pickens; 26th Ala., Col. E. A. O'Neal. _Garland's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr., Col. D. K. McRae; 5th N. C., Col. D.
    K. McRae and Capt. T. M. Garrett; 12th N. C., Capt. S. Snow; 13th N.
    C., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Ruffin, Jr.; 20th N. C., Col. Alfred Iverson;
    23d N. C., Col. D. H. Christie. _Anderson's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    George B. Anderson, Col. R. T. Bennett; 2d N. C., Col. C. C. Tew and
    Capt. G. M. Roberts; 4th N. C., Col. Bryan Grimes and Capts. W. T.
    Marsh and D. P. Latham; 14th N. C., Col. R. T. Bennett; 30th N. C.,
    Col. F. M. Parker and Maj. W. W. Sillers. _Colquitt's Brigade_, Col.
    A. H. Colquitt; 13th Ala., Col. B. D. Fry; 6th Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. M.
    Newton; 23d Ga., Col. W. P. Barclay; 27th Ga., Col. L. B. Smith; 28th
    Ga., Maj. T. Graybill and Capt. N. J. Garrison. _Artillery_,[77] Maj.
    Pierson; Hardaway's (Ala.) battery, Capt. R. A. Hardaway; Jeff Davis
    (Ala.) Art., Capt. J. W. Bondurant; Jones's (Va.) battery, Capt.
    William B. Jones; King William (Va.) Art., Capt. T. H. Carter.

    RESERVE ARTILLERY, Brig.-Gen. William N. Pendleton:--_Brown's
    Battalion_,[78] Col. J. Thompson Brown; Powhatan Art. (Dance's
    battery), Richmond Howitzers, 2d Co. (Watson's battery), Richmond
    Howitzers, 3d Co. (Smith's battery), Salem Art. (Hupp's battery),
    Williamsburg Art. (Coke's battery). _Cutts's Battalion_,[79]
    Lieut.-Col. A. S. Cutts; Blackshears's (Ga.) battery, Irwin (Ga.) Art.
    (Lane's battery), Lloyd's (N. C.) battery, Patterson's (Ga.) battery,
    Ross's (Ga.) battery. _Jones's Battalion_,[79] Maj. H. P. Jones.
    Morris (Va.) Art. (R. C. M. Page's battery), Orange (Va.) Art.
    (Peyton's battery), Turner's (Va.) battery, Wimbish's (Va.) battery.
    _Nelson's Battalion_, Maj. William Nelson; Amherst (Va.) Art.
    (Kirkpatrick's battery), Fluvanna (Va.) Art. (Ancell's battery),
    Huckstep's (Va.) battery, Johnson's (Va.) battery, Milledge (Ga.) Art.
    (Milledge's battery). _Miscellaneous_, Cutshaw's (Va.) battery, Dixie
    (Va.) Art. (Chapman's battery), Magruder (Va.) Art. (T. J. Page,
    Jr.'s, battery), Rice's (Va.) battery, Capt. W. H. Rice; Thomas's
    (Va.) Art. (E. J. Anderson's battery).[80]

    CAVALRY, Maj.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart:--_Hampton's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton; 1st N. C., Col. L. S. Baker; 2d S. C., Col.
    M. C. Butler; 10th Va., Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. P. M. B.
    Young; Jeff Davis Legion, Lieut.-Col. W. T. Martin. _Lee's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee; 1st Va., Lieut.-Col. L. Tiernan Brien; 3d
    Va., Lieut.-Col. John T. Thornton; 4th Va., Col. William C. Wickham;
    5th Va., Col. T. L. Rosser; 9th Va. _Robertson's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    B. H. Robertson, Col. Thomas T. Munford; 2d Va., Col. T. T. Munford
    and Lieut.-Col. Burks; 6th Va.; 7th Va., Capt. S. B. Myers; 12th Va.,
    Col. A. W. Harman; 17th Va. Battn.

    HORSE ARTILLERY, Capt. John Pelham:--Chew's (Va.) battery, Hart's (S.
    C.) battery, Pelham's (Va.) battery.


    GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS:--_Escort_, Capt. James B. McIntyre; Independent
    Company Oneida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Mann; 4th U. S. Cav., Co.
    A, Lieut. Thomas H. McCormick; 4th U. S. Cav., Co. E, Capt. James B.
    McIntyre. _Regular Engineer Battalion_, Capt. James C. Duane. _Provost
    Guard_, Maj. William H. Wood. 2d U. S. Cav., Cos. E, F, H, and K,
    Capt. George A. Gordon; 8th U. S. Inf., Cos. A, D, F, and G, Capt.
    Royal T. Frank; 19th U. S. Inf., Co. G, Capt. Edmund L. Smith; 19th U.
    S. Inf., Co. H, Capt. Henry S. Welton. _Head-quarters Guard_, Maj.
    Granville O. Haller; 93d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Benjamin C. Butler.
    _Quartermaster's Guard_, 1st U. S. Cav., Cos. B, C, H, and I, Capt.
    Marcus A. Reno.

    BRIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE. _Escort_, 2d N. Y. Cav., Cos. A, B,
    I, and K, Capt. John E. Naylor.

    FIRST DIVISION, (1) Brig.-Gen. Rufus King,[84] (2) Brig.-Gen. John P.
    Hatch,[85] (3) Brig.-Gen. Abner Doubleday:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    Walter Phelps, Jr.; 22d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John McKie, Jr.; 24th N.
    Y., Capt. John D. O'Brian; 30th N. Y., Col. William M. Searing; 84th
    N. Y. (14th Militia), Maj. William H. de Bovoise; 2d U. S.
    Sharp-shooters, Col. Henry A. V. Post. _Second Brigade_, (1)
    Brig.-Gen. Abner Doubleday, (2) Col. William P. Wainwright,[83] (3)
    Lieut.-Col. J. William Hofmann; 7th Ind., Maj. Ira G. Grover; 76th N.
    Y., Col. William P. Wainwright, Capt. John W. Young; 95th N. Y., Maj.
    Edward Pye; 56th Pa., Lieut.-Col. J. William Hofmann, Capt. Frederick
    Williams. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Marsena R. Patrick; 21st N. Y.,
    Col. William F. Rogers; 23d N. Y., Col. Henry C. Hoffman; 35th N. Y.,
    Col. Newton B. Lord; 80th N. Y. (20th Militia), Lieut.-Col. Theodore
    B. Gates. _Fourth Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon; 19th Ind., Col.
    Solomon Meredith, Lieut.-Col. Alois O. Bachman, Capt. William W.
    Dudley; 2d Wis., Col. Lucius Fairchild, Lieut.-Col. Thomas S. Allen;
    6th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Edward S. Bragg, Maj. Rufus R. Dawes; 7th Wis.,
    Capt. John B. Callis. _Artillery_, Capt. J. Albert Monroe; N. H.
    Light, First Batt., Lieut. Frederick M. Edgell; 1st R. I. Light, Batt.
    D, Capt. J. Albert Monroe; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. L, Capt. John A.
    Reynolds; 4th U. S., Batt. B, Capt. Joseph B. Campbell, Lieut. James

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James B. Ricketts:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Abram Duryea; 97th N. Y., Maj. Charles Northrup; 104th N.
    Y., Maj. Lewis C. Skinner; 105th N. Y., Col. Howard Carroll; 107th
    Pa., Capt. James Mac Thomson. _Second Brigade_, (1) Col. William A.
    Christian, (2) Col. Peter Lyle; 26th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Richard H.
    Richardson; 94th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Calvin Littlefield; 88th Pa.,
    Lieut.-Col. George W. Gile, Capt. Henry R. Myers; 90th Pa., Col. Peter
    Lyle, Lieut.-Col. William A. Leech. _Third Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen.
    George L. Hartsuff,[83] (2) Col. Richard Coulter; 16th Me.,[86] Col.
    Asa W. Wildes; 12th Mass., Maj. Elisha Burbank, Capt. Benjamin F.
    Cook; 13th Mass., Maj. J. Parker Gould; 83d N. Y. (9th Militia),
    Lieut.-Col. William Atterbury; 11th Pa., Col. Richard Coulter, Capt.
    David M. Cook. _Artillery_, 1st Pa. Light, Batt. F, Capt. Ezra W.
    Matthews; Pa. Light, Batt. C, Capt. James Thompson.

    THIRD DIVISION, (1) Brig.-Gen. George G. Meade, (2) Brig.-Gen. Truman
    Seymour:--_First Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour, (2) Col. R.
    Biddle Roberts; 1st Pa. Reserves, Col. R. Biddle Roberts, Capt.
    William C. Talley; 2d Pa. Reserves, Capt. James N. Byrnes; 5th Pa.
    Reserves, Col. Joseph W. Fisher; 6th Pa. Reserves, Col. William
    Sinclair; 13th Pa. Reserves (1st Rifles), Col. Hugh W. McNeil, Capt.
    Dennis McGee. _Second Brigade_, Col. Albert L. Magilton; 3d Pa.
    Reserves, Lieut.-Col. John Clark; 4th Pa. Reserves, Maj. John Nyce;
    7th Pa. Reserves, Col. Henry C. Bolinger, Major Chauncey M. Lyman; 8th
    Pa. Reserves, Maj. Silas M. Baily. _Third Brigade_, (1) Col. Thomas F.
    Gallagher,[87] (2) Lieut.-Col. Robert Anderson; 9th Pa. Reserves,
    Lieut.-Col. Robert Anderson, Capt. Samuel B. Dick; 10th Pa. Reserves,
    Lieut.-Col. Adoniram J. Warner, Capt. Jonathan P. Smith; 11th Pa.
    Reserves, Lieut.-Col. Samuel M. Jackson; 12th Pa. Reserves, Capt.
    Richard Gustin. _Artillery_, 1st Pa. Light, Batt. A, Lieut. John G.
    Simpson; 1st Pa. Light, Batt. B, Capt, James H. Cooper; 1st Pa. Light,
    Batt. G,[88] Lieut. Frank P. Amsden; 5th U. S., Batt. C, Capt. Dunbar
    R. Ransom.

    Cav., Co. D, Capt. Henry W. Lyon; 6th N. Y. Cav., Co. K, Capt. Riley

    FIRST DIVISION, (1) Maj.-Gen. Israel B. Richardson,[89] (2) Brig.-Gen.
    John C. Caldwell, (3) Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock; _First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell; 5th N. H., Col. Edward E. Cross; 7th N.
    Y., Capt. Charles Brestel; 61st and 64th N. Y., Col. Francis C.
    Barlow, Lieut.-Col. Nelson A. Miles; 81st Pa., Maj. H. Boyd McKeen.
    _Second Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Meagher, (2) Col. John
    Burke; 29th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Barnes; 63d N. Y., Col. John
    Burke, Lieut.-Col. Henry Fowler, Maj. Richard C. Bentley, Capt. Joseph
    O'Neill; 69th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James Kelly, Maj. James Cavanagh;
    88th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Patrick Kelly. _Third Brigade_, Col. John R.
    Brooke; 2d Del., Capt. David L. Stricker; 52d N. Y., Col. Paul Frank;
    57th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Philip J. Parisen, Maj. Alford B. Chapman;
    66th N. Y., Capt. Julius Wehle, Lieut.-Col. James H. Bull; 53d Pa.,
    Lieut.-Col. Richards McMichael. _Artillery_, 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. B,
    Capt. Rufus D. Pettit; 4th U. S., Batts. A and C, Lieut. Evan Thomas.

    SECOND DIVISION, (1) Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick,[89] (2) Brig.-Gen.
    Oliver O. Howard:--_First Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Willis A. Gorman; 15th
    Mass., Lieut.-Col. John W. Kimball; 1st Minn., Col. Alfred Sully; 34th
    N. Y., Col. James A. Suiter; 82d N. Y. (2d Militia), Col. Henry W.
    Hudson; Mass. Sharp-shooters, 1st Co., Capt. John Saunders; Minn.
    Sharp-shooters, 2d Co., Capt. William F. Russell. _Second Brigade_,
    (1) Brig.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard, (2) Col. Joshua T. Owen, (3) Col. De
    Witt C. Baxter; 69th Pa., Col. Joshua T. Owen; 71st Pa., Col. Isaac J.
    Wistar, Lieut. Richard P. Smith (adjutant), Capt. Enoch E. Lewis; 72d
    Pa., Col. De Witt C. Baxter; 106th Pa., Col. Turner G. Morehead.
    _Third Brigade_, (1) Brig-.Gen. Napoleon J. T. Dana,[89] (2) Col.
    Norman J. Hall; 19th Mass., Col. Edward W. Hinks, Lieut.-Col. Arthur
    F. Devereux; 20th Mass., Col. William R. Lee; 7th Mich., Col. Norman
    J. Hall, Capt. Charles J. Hunt; 42d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. George N.
    Bomford, Maj. James E. Mallon; 59th N. Y., Col. William L. Tidball.
    _Artillery_, 1st R. I. Light, Batt. A, Capt. John A. Tompkins; 1st U.
    S., Batt. I, Lieut. George A. Woodruff.

    THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William H. French:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball; 14th Ind., Col. William Harrow; 8th Ohio,
    Lieut.-Col. Franklin Sawyer; 132d Pa., Col. Richard A. Oakford,
    Lieut.-Col. Vincent M. Wilcox; 7th W. Va., Col. Joseph Snider. _Second
    Brigade_, Col. Dwight Morris; 14th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Sanford H.
    Perkins; 108th N. Y., Col. Oliver H. Palmer; 130th Pa., Col. Henry I.
    Zinn. _Third Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen. Max Weber,[90] (2) Col. John W.
    Andrews; 1st Del., Col. John W. Andrews, Lieut.-Col. Oliver H.
    Hopkinson; 5th Md., Maj. Leopold Blumenberg, Capt. E. F. M. Faehtz;
    4th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John D. McGregor. _Unattached Artillery_, 1st
    N. Y. Light, Batt. G, Capt. John D. Frank; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. B,
    Capt. John G. Hazard; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. G, Capt. Charles D. Owen.


    FIRST DIVISION,[91] Maj.-Gen. Darius N. Couch:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Charles Devens, Jr.; 7th Mass., Col. David A. Russell; 10th
    Mass., Col. Henry L. Eustis; 36th N. Y., Col. William H. Browne; 2d R.
    I., Col. Frank Wheaton. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe;
    62d N. Y., Col. David J. Nevin; 93d Pa., Col. James M. McCarter; 98th
    Pa., Col. John F. Ballier; 102d Pa., Col. Thomas A. Rowley; 139th
    Pa.,[92] Col. Frank H. Collier. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. John
    Cochrane; 65th N. Y., Col. Alexander Shaler; 67th N. Y., Col. Julius
    W. Adams; 122d N. Y., Col. Silas Titus; 23d Pa., Col. Thomas H. Neill;
    61st Pa., Col. George C. Spear; 82d Pa., Col. David H. Williams.
    _Artillery_, N. Y. Light, 3d Batt.,[93] Capt. William Stuart; 1st Pa.
    Light, Batt. C, Capt, Jeremiah McCarthy; 1st Pa. Light, Batt. D, Capt.
    Michael Hall, 2d U. S., Batt. G, Lieut. John H. Butler.

    Cavalry (detachment), Capt. George J. Summat.

    FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. George W. Morell:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    James Barnes; 2d Me., Col. Charles W. Roberts; 18th Mass., Lieut.-Col.
    Joseph Hayes; 22d Mass., Lieut.-Col. William S. Tilton; 1st Mich.,
    Capt. Emory W. Belton; 13th N. Y., Col. Elisha G. Marshall; 25th N.
    Y., Col. Charles A. Johnson; 118th Pa., Col. Charles M. Prevost; Mass.
    Sharp-shooters, 2d Co., Capt. Lewis E. Wentworth. _Second Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin; 2d D. of C., Col. Charles M. Alexander;
    9th Mass., Col. Patrick R. Guiney; 32d Mass., Col. Francis J. Parker;
    4th Mich., Col. Jonathan W. Childs; 14th N. Y., Col. James McQuade;
    62d Pa., Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. _Third Brigade_, Col. T. B. W.
    Stockton; 20th Me., Col. Adelbert Ames; 16th Mich., Lieut.-Col.
    Norval E. Welch; 12th N. Y., Capt. William Huson; 17th N. Y.,
    Lieut.-Col. Nelson B. Bartram; 44th N. Y., Maj. Freeman Conner; 83d
    Pa., Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward; Mich. Sharp-shooters, Brady's co.,
    Lieut. Jonas H. Titus, Jr. _Artillery_, Mass. Light, Batt. C, Capt,
    Augustus P. Martin; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. C, Capt. Richard Waterman;
    5th U. S., Batt. D, Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett. _Sharp-shooters_, 1st
    U. S., Capt. John B. Isler.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George Sykes:--_First Brigade_,
    Lieut.-Col. Robert C. Buchanan; 3d U. S., Capt. John D. Wilkins; 4th
    U. S., Capt. Hiram Dryer; 12th U. S., 1st Battn., Capt. Matthew M.
    Blunt; 12th U. S., 2d Battn., Capt. Thomas M. Anderson; 14th U. S.,
    1st Battn., Capt. W. Harvey Brown; 14th U. S., 2d Battn., Capt. David
    B. McKibbin. _Second Brigade_, Maj. Charles S. Lovell; 1st and 6th U.
    S., Capt. Levi C. Bootes; 2d and 10th U. S., Capt. John S. Poland;
    11th U. S., Capt. DeL. Floyd-Jones; 17th U. S., Maj. George L.
    Andrews. _Third Brigade_, Col. Gouverneur K. Warren; 5th N. Y., Capt.
    Cleveland Winslow; 19th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John W. Marshall.
    _Artillery_, 1st U. S., Batts. E and G, Lieut. Alanson M. Randol; 5th
    U. S., Batt. I, Capt. Stephen H. Weed; 5th U. S., Batt. K, Lieut.
    William E. Van Reed.

    THIRD DIVISION,[94] Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Erastus B. Tyler; 91st Pa., Col. Edgar M. Gregory; 126th
    Pa., Col. James G. Elder; 129th Pa., Col. Jacob G. Frick; 134th Pa.,
    Col. Matthew S. Quay. _Second Brigade_, Col. Peter H. Allabach; 123d
    Pa., Col. John B. Clark; 131st Pa., Lieut.-Col. William B. Shaut; 133d
    Pa., Col. Franklin B. Speakman; 155th Pa., Col. Edward J. Allen.
    _Artillery_, Capt. Lucius N. Robinson; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. C, Capt.
    Almont Barnes; 1st Ohio Light, Batt. L, Capt. Lucius N. Robinson.
    _Artillery Reserve_, Lieut.-Col. William Hays; 1st Battn. N. Y. Light,
    Batt. A, Lieut. Bernhard Wever; 1st Battn. N. Y. Light, Batt. B,
    Lieut. Alfred von Kleiser; 1st Battn. N. Y. Light, Batt. C, Capt.
    Robert Langner; 1st Battn. N. Y. Light, Batt. D, Capt. Charles
    Kusserow; N. Y. Light, 5th Batt., Capt. Elijah D. Taft; 1st U. S.,
    Batt. K, Capt. William M. Graham; 4th U. S., Batt. G, Lieut. Marcus P.

    Cav., Cos. B and G, Capt. Henry P. Muirheid.

    FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    Alfred T. A. Torbert; 1st N. J., Lieut.-Col. Mark W. Collet; 2d N. J.,
    Col. Samuel L. Buck; 3d N. J., Col. Henry W. Brown; 4th N. J., Col.
    William B. Hatch. _Second Brigade_, Col. Joseph J. Bartlett; 5th Me.,
    Col. Nathaniel J. Jackson; 16th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Joel J. Seaver;
    27th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Alexander D. Adams; 96th Pa., Col. Henry L.
    Cake. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. John Newton; 18th N. Y., Lieut.-Col.
    George R. Myers; 31st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pinto; 32d N. Y.,
    Col. Roderick Matheson; Maj. George F. Lemon; 95th Pa., Col. Gustavus
    W. Town. _Artillery_, Capt. Emory Upton; Md. Light, Batt. A, Capt.
    John W. Wolcott; Mass. Light, Batt. A, Capt. Josiah Porter; N. J.
    Light, Batt. A, Capt. William Hexamer; 2d U. S., Batt. D, Lieut.
    Edward B. Williston.

    SECOND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. William F. Smith:--_First Brigade_, (1)
    Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock,[95] (2) Col. Amasa Cobb; 6th Me., Col.
    Hiram Burnham; 43d N. Y., Maj. John Wilson; 49th Pa., Lieut.-Col.
    William Brisbane; 137th Pa., Col. Henry M. Bossert; 5th Wis., Col.
    Amasa Cobb. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. W. T. H. Brooks; 2d Vt., Maj.
    James H. Walbridge; 3d Vt., Col. Breed N. Hyde; 4th Vt., Lieut.-Col.
    Charles B. Stoughton; 5th Vt., Col. Lewis A. Grant; 6th Vt., Maj.
    Oscar L. Tuttle. _Third Brigade_, Col. William H. Irwin; 7th Me., Maj.
    Thomas W. Hyde; 20th N. Y., Col. Ernest von Vegesack; 33d N. Y.,
    Lieut.-Col. Joseph W. Corning; 49th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William C.
    Alberger, Maj. George W. Johnson; 77th N. Y., Capt. Nathan S. Babcock.
    _Artillery_, Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres; Md. Light, Batt. B, Lieut.
    Theodore J. Vanneman; N. Y. Light, 1st Batt., Capt. Andrew Cowan; 5th
    U. S., Batt. F, Lieut. Leonard Martin.

    Cav., Co. G, Capt. Zebulon B. Blethen.

    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willcox:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    Benjamin C. Christ; 28th Mass., Capt. Andrew P. Carraher; 17th Mich.,
    Col. William H. Withington; 79th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. David Morrison;
    50th Pa., Maj. Edward Overton, Capt. William H. Diehl. _Second
    Brigade_, Col. Thomas Welsh; 8th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Frank Graves, Maj.
    Ralph Ely; 46th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Joseph Gerhart; 45th Pa.,
    Lieut.-Col. John I. Curtin; 100th Pa., Col. David A. Leckey.
    _Artillery_, Mass. Light, 8th Batt., Capt. Asa M. Cook; 2d U. S.,
    Batt. E, Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. James Naglee; 2d Md., Lieut.-Col. J. Eugene Duryea; 6th N.
    H., Col. Simon G. Griffin; 9th N. H., Col. Enoch Q. Fellows; 48th Pa.,
    Lieut.-Col. Joshua K. Sigfried. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Edward
    Ferrero; 21st Mass., Col. William S. Clark; 35th Mass., Col. Edward A.
    Wild, Lieut.-Col. Sumner Carruth; 51st N. Y., Col. Robert B. Potter;
    51st Pa., Col. John F. Hartranft. _Artillery_, Pa. Light, Batt. D,
    Capt. John W. Durell; 4th U. S., Batt. E, Capt. Joseph C. Clark, Jr.

    THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Isaac P. Rodman:[98]--_First Brigade_, Col.
    Harrison S. Fairchild; 9th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Edgar A. Kimball; 89th
    N. Y., Maj. Edward Jardine; 103d N. Y., Maj. Benjamin Ringold. _Second
    Brigade_, Col. Edward Harland; 8th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Hiram Appelman,
    Maj. John E. Ward; 11th Conn., Col. Henry W. Kingsbury; 16th Conn.,
    Col. Francis Beach; 4th R. I., Col. William H. P. Steere, Lieut.-Col.
    Joseph B. Curtis. _Artillery_, 5th U. S., Batt. A, Lieut. Charles P.

    KANAWHA DIVISION, (1) Brig.-Gen. Jacob D. Cox, (2) Col. Eliakim P.
    Scammon. _First Brigade_, (1) Col. Eliakim P. Scammon, (2) Col. Hugh
    Ewing; 12th Ohio, Col. Carr B. White; 23d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Rutherford
    B. Hayes, Maj. James M. Comly; 30th Ohio, Col. Hugh Ewing, Lieut.-Col.
    Theodore Jones, Maj. George H. Hildt; Ohio Light Art., 1st Batt.,
    Capt. James R. McMullin; Gilmore's co. W. Va. Cav., Lieut. James
    Abraham; Harrison's co. W. Va. Cav., Lieut. Dennis Delaney. _Second
    Brigade_, Col. George Crook; 11th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Augustus H.
    Coleman, Maj. Lyman J. Jackson; 28th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Gottfried
    Becker; 36th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Melvin Clarke; Schambeck's co. Chicago
    Dragoons, Capt. Frederick Schambeck; Ky. Light Art., Simmonds's
    battery, Capt. Seth J. Simmonds. _Unattached_, 6th N. Y. Cav. (8
    cos.), Col. Thomas C. Devin; Ohio Cav., 3d Ind. Co., Lieut. Jonas
    Seamen; 3d U. S. Art., Batts. L and M, Capt. John Edwards, Jr.

    (2) BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS. _Escort_, 1st Mich. Cav.,
    Co. L, Capt. Melvin Brewer.

    FIRST DIVISION, (1) Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, (2) Brig.-Gen.
    Samuel W. Crawford,[101] (3) Brig.-Gen. George H. Gordon. _First
    Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, (2) Col. Joseph F. Knipe;
    5th Conn., Capt. Henry W. Daboll; 10th Me., Col. George L. Beal; 28th
    N. Y., Capt. William H. H. Mapes; 46th Pa., Col. Joseph F. Knipe,
    Lieut.-Col. James L. Selfridge; 124th Pa., Col. Joseph W. Hawley, Maj.
    Isaac L. Haldeman; 125th Pa., Col. Jacob Higgins; 128th Pa., Col.
    Samuel Croasdale, Lieut.-Col. William W. Hamersly, Maj. Joel B.
    Wanner. _Third Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen. George H. Gordon, (2) Col.
    Thomas H. Ruger; 27th Ind., Col. Silas Colgrove; 2d Mass., Col. George
    L. Andrews; 13th N. J., Col. Ezra A. Carman; 107th N. Y., Col. R. B.
    Van Valkenburgh; Zouaves d'Afrique,[102] Pa.; 3d Wis., Col. Thomas H.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George S. Greene:--_First Brigade_, (1)
    Lieut.-Col. Hector Tyndale,[99] (2) Maj. Orrin J. Crane; 5th Ohio,
    Maj. John Collins; 7th Ohio, Maj. Orrin J. Crane, Capt. Frederick A.
    Seymour; 29th Ohio,[103] Lieut. Theron S. Winship; 66th Ohio,
    Lieut.-Col. Eugene Powell; 28th Pa., Maj. Ario Pardee, Jr. _Second
    Brigade_, Col. Henry J. Stainrook; 3d Md., Lieut.-Col. Joseph M.
    Sudsburg; 102d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James C. Lane; 109th Pa.,[104]
    Capt. George E. Seymour; 111th Pa., Maj. Thomas M. Walker. _Third
    Brigade_, (1) Col. William B. Goodrich,[105] (2) Lieut.-Col. Jonathan
    Austin; 3d Del., Maj. Arthur Maginnis; Purnell Legion, Md.,
    Lieut.-Col. Benjamin L. Simpson; 60th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles R.
    Brundage; 78th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Jonathan Austin, Capt. Henry R.
    Stagg. _Artillery_, Capt. Clermont L. Best; Me. Light, 4th Batt.,
    Capt. O'Neil W. Robinson; Me. Light, 6th Batt., Capt. Freeman
    McGilvery; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. M., Capt. George W. Cothran; N. Y.
    Light, 10th Batt., Capt. John T. Bruen; Pa. Light, Batt. E, Capt.
    Joseph M. Knap; Pa. Light, Batt. F, Capt. Robert B. Hampton; 4th U.
    S., Batt. F, Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg.

    CAVALRY DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton:--_First Brigade_, Maj.
    Charles J. Whiting; 5th U. S., Capt. Joseph H. McArthur; 6th U. S.,
    Capt. William P. Sanders. _Second Brigade_, Col. John F. Farnsworth;
    8th Ill., Maj. William H. Medill; 3d Ind., Maj. George H. Chapman; 1st
    Mass., Capt. Casper Crowninshield; 8th Pa., Capt. Peter Keenan. _Third
    Brigade_, Col. Richard H. Rush; 4th Pa., Col. James H. Childs,
    Lieut.-Col. James K. Kerr; 6th Pa., Lieut.-Col. C. Ross Smith. _Fourth
    Brigade_, Col. Andrew T. McReynolds; 1st N. Y., Maj. Alonzo W. Adams;
    12th Pa., Major James A. Congdon. _Fifth Brigade_, Col. Benj. F.
    Davis; 8th N. Y., Col. Benjamin F. Davis; 3d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Samuel
    W. Owen. _Artillery_, 2d U. S., Batt. A, Capt. John C. Tidball; 2d U.
    S., Batts. B and L, Capt. James M. Robertson; 2d U. S., Batt. M,
    Lieut. Peter C. Hains; 3d U. S., Batts. C and G, Capt. Horatio G.
    Gibson. _Unattached_, 1st Me. Cav.,[106] Col. Samuel H. Allen; 15th
    Pa. Cav. (detachment), Col. William J. Palmer.



    Confederate Expectations--General Lee's Salutatory to the People of
    Maryland--The "Lost Despatch"--McClellan's Movements--Turn in the Tide
    of War--A Miracle great as the throwing down of the Walls of
    Jericho--In Contempt of the Enemy the Confederate Army was
    dispersed--Harper's Ferry a "Man-Trap"--It diverted the Army from the
    Main Issue--Lee and McClellan compared and contrasted--Tribute to the
    Confederate Private Soldier.

For conveying to the reader a comprehensive view of the military zodiac at
the time we crossed the quiet Potomac, the 5th day of September, 1862, and
an understanding of the logical sequence of the events following,
something should be added here to the plain narrative of occurrences, and
so I undertake a review of the Maryland campaign.

The Army of Northern Virginia was afield without a foe. Its once grand
adversary, discomfited under two commanders, had crept into cover of the
bulwarks about the national capital. The commercial, social, and blood
ties of Maryland inclined her people to the Southern cause. A little way
north of the Potomac were inviting fields of food and supplies more
plentiful than on the southern side; and the fields for march and
manoeuvre, strategy and tactics, were even more inviting than the broad
fields of grain and comfortable pasture-lands. Propitious also was the
prospect of swelling our ranks by Maryland recruits.

At the head of the army of sixty thousand men encouraged, matured, and
disciplined by victory stood the Confederate chief, challenging on its own
soil the army that had marched to conquer the Southern capital. On the 7th
he pitched his bivouac about Frederick City. On the 8th he made his
salutatory to the people in these words:

        "NEAR FREDERICKTOWN, MD., September 8, 1862.


    "It is right that you should know the purpose that brought the army
    under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that
    purpose concerns yourselves. The people of the Confederate States have
    long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that
    have been inflicted upon the citizens of a commonwealth allied to the
    States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial
    ties. They have seen with profound indignation their sister State
    deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered
    province. Under the pretence of supporting the Constitution, but in
    violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been
    arrested and imprisoned upon no charge and contrary to all forms of
    law. The faithful and manly protest against this outrage made by the
    venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in better days no
    citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and
    contempt; the government of your chief city has been usurped by armed
    strangers; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest
    of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been
    suppressed; words have been declared offences by an arbitrary decree
    of the Federal Executive, and citizens ordered to be tried by a
    military commission for what they may dare to speak. Believing that
    the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such
    a government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in
    throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the
    inalienable rights of freemen, and to restore independence and
    sovereignty to your State. In obedience to this wish, our army has
    come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its
    arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled.

    "This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are
    concerned. No constraint upon your free will is intended; no
    intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army, at least.
    Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and
    speech. We know no enemies among you, and will protect all, of every
    opinion. It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without
    constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be;
    and while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your
    natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come
    of your own free will.

          "R. E. LEE,
            "_General, Commanding_."

At this very time the recently displaced commander, General McClellan,
reinstated in command, was marching for an opportunity to recover his good
name, and the Union cavalry was active and aggressive in work against the
Confederates at Poolesville.

On the 9th the Confederate commander organized his plans for the
surrounding and capture of Harper's Ferry, and put his army in motion on
the 10th. Close upon the heels of the march followed the Army of the
Potomac, only twenty-five miles behind the rear of the Confederate army,
with the cavalry of the armies in contact. The march of the former was as
cautious as that of the latter was venturesome. On the 10th the Union
commander was informed of the march of J. G. Walker's brigades up the
river from Cheek's Ford. On the 11th his signal service reported the camp
across the river at Point of Rocks. On the 12th, at Urbana, he was
informed of the combination against Harper's Ferry, and the march towards
the Cumberland Valley, and ordered pressing pursuit to force the
Confederates to a stand. Under that order General Pleasonton, the Federal
cavalry leader, hurried his troops and cleared the way to South Mountain
on the 13th. From day to day the Confederates marched their dispersing
columns, from day to day the Union columns converged in easy, cautious
marches. At noon of the 13th, General Lee's order distributing his forces
and a despatch from the Governor of Pennsylvania were handed General
McClellan,--the former the celebrated "lost despatch," given on a previous
page,--the latter reading as follows:

    "HARRISBURG, PA., September 13, 1862.


    "When may we expect General Reynolds here? Services needed
    immediately. Longstreet's division is said to have reached Hagerstown
    last night. Jackson crossed the Potomac at Williamsport to capture
    Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry. We are assembling militia rapidly at
    Chambersburg. Can we do anything to aid your movements?

          "A. G. CURTIN,
            "_Governor of Pennsylvania_."

This told of the change of march of my brigades from Turner's Pass to
Hagerstown, and, with the "lost despatch," revealed that Hill's five
brigades were the only troops at the former place.

The same afternoon General McClellan's signal service despatched him that
the Union signal station on Maryland Heights had gone down. General Lee's
signals failed to connect, so that General McClellan was better informed
of the progress of the Confederate movements than was the Confederate
commander. That afternoon the Union army was in hand for battle. The
Confederates were dispersed and divided by rivers, and drifting thirty and
forty and fifty miles apart. Under similar circumstances General Scott, or
General Taylor, or General Worth would have put the columns at the base of
South Mountain before night, and would have passed the unguarded gaps
before the sun's rays of next morning could have lighted their eastern

The Union commander claims to have ordered more vigorous pursuit after the
"lost despatch" was handed him, but there is nothing to support the claim
except his call on General Franklin, and in that he only ordered
preparation at Crampton's to await events at Turner's Pass.

General Pleasonton was at Turner's Pass on the afternoon of the 13th, and
made a reconnoissance of the ways leading up the east side of the
mountain. He was not informed of the despatches received by his chief,
nor had he any information of Confederate movements except such as he had
gleaned in closely following their rear. At daylight of the 14th he led
General Cox and the Ninth Corps to attack, and in this manner the battle
was opened.

His orders to call the Confederates to a stand did not anticipate the
provocation of a general engagement, but a wait for his chief, who rode up
about one o'clock. He thought that he was battling against seventeen
brigades, while there were but five; and, had the battle been held in wait
for McClellan, his well-known habit of careful reconnoissance would have
consumed the balance of the day. His last orders for General Franklin
directed a wait for Couch's division, which joined him at eight o'clock in
the evening. It is difficult to find that a quicker move was given the
Union army in consequence of the "lost despatch;" but one may rather
concede General Hill's claim, that in consequence of that despatch the
Union army was so delayed as to give the Confederates time to make their
way back to the soil of "Old Virginia." Without it, the main column of the
Union forces could have marched through Crampton's Pass, and relieved
Harper's Ferry on the 14th, but, guided by it, their commander found it
important to first guard against the seventeen brigades that should be at
Turner's Pass, on the right rear of a column, moving against Crampton's.

The razing of the walls of Jericho by encircling marches of priests and
soldiers, at the signal of long-drawn blasts of sacred horns and shouts of
the multitude, was scarcely a greater miracle than the transformation of
the conquering army of the South into a horde of disordered fugitives
before an army that two weeks earlier was flying to cover under its
homeward ramparts.

Providence helps those who can avail themselves of His tender care, but
permits those who will to turn from Him to their own arrogance. That His
gracious hand was with the Confederates in their struggles on the
Chickahominy, and even through the errors of the Bull Run campaign, cannot
be questioned. When, however, in self-confidence, they lost sight of His
helping hand, and in contempt of the enemy dispersed the army, they were
given up to the reward of vainglory. That the disaster was not
overwhelming they have to thank the plodding methods of the Union
commander. With as much faith as Captain Joshua, his success would have
been as complete.

But for the proper solution of the campaign we must turn again to the
condition of the Confederate army when it crossed into Maryland. It was
then all that its leaders could ask, and its claim as master of the field
was established, but it was worn by severe marches and battles, and in
need of rest. Its record before and after shows that, held in hand and
refreshed by easy marchings and comfortable supplies, it would have been
prepared to maintain its supremacy. The first necessity was a little time
to refresh, while the grand object was to draw the enemy from his
intrenched lines to free and open battle. These facts carefully observed,
the Confederate army would have been assured of its claim and prestige.

In the confusion about Washington incident to the Bull Run campaign,
General McClellan was ordered to receive the retreating columns and post
them to defend and hold their fortified lines. He had not emerged from the
clouds that hung about his untoward campaign in Virginia, but, familiar
with the provisions that had been made for defence, he was most available
for the service. He had hardly posted the troops and arranged the garrison
when he found that the Confederates, instead of moving against his
fortifications, had turned the head of their columns north, and were
marching to invade Union territory. He was quick to discover his
opportunity, and, after posting guards for the works about the capital,
assumed command of the army and took the field, lest another commander
should be assigned. His clouded fame and assumption of authority committed
him to early aggressive work. He had nothing to lose, but the world to
gain, and that upon the field of battle.

All that the Confederates had to do was to hold the army in hand and draw
the enemy to a field wide enough for manoeuvre; then call him to his
battle. It is possible that ragged affairs about the mountain passes might
have given him safe retreat to his capital, leaving the army of the South
afield, a free lance.

It had been arranged that the Southern President should join the troops,
and from the head of his victorious army call for recognition. Maryland
would have put out some of her resources, and her gallant youth would have
helped swell the Southern ranks,--the twenty thousand soldiers who had
dropped from the Confederate ranks during the severe marches of the summer
would have been with us. Volunteers from all parts of the South would have
come, swimming the Potomac to find their President and his field-marshal,
while Union troops would have been called from Kentucky and Tennessee, and
would have left easy march for the Confederate armies of the West to the
Ohio River.

Even though the Confederates were not successful, the fall elections were
against the Federal administration. With the Southern armies victorious,
the results of the contest at the polls would have been so pronounced as
to have called for recognition of the Confederacy.

General McClellan wrote General Halleck of the effect, in case of defeat
of his army,--

    "But if we should be so unfortunate as to meet with defeat, our
    country is at their mercy."

So much has been said and written about Harper's Ferry and the surrender
of the garrison, that it seems difficult to pass it without notice. In
more than one report General McClellan mentioned it as a "shameful"
surrender. He had disapproved the position as false, and asked if it could
not be given up. Colonel Miles, the commander, who gave his life in its
defence, was acting under the following order from the department

    "BALTIMORE, September 5, 1862.


    "The position on the heights ought to enable you to punish the enemy
    passing up the road in the direction of Harper's Ferry. Have your wits
    about you, and do all you can to annoy the rebels should they advance
    on you. Activity, energy, and decision must be used. You will not
    abandon Harper's Ferry without defending it to the last extremity.

          "JOHN E. WOOL,

The simple truth is, it was defended to the last extremity. The nearer the
approach of the succoring army, the more imperative would have been the
demand for action on the part of the Confederate columns, and had battle
been forced it could not possibly have resulted in any save one
way,--Confederate victory, and an overwhelming one at that.

The position was denounced as a "man-trap," and so it proved to Colonel
Miles and his eleven thousand troops, but it was in fact a far more
formidable trap for the Confederates, who to seize it sacrificed the
fruits of heavy war,--victory in the main battle of the campaign,--and
were forced to draw their crippled ranks to homeward defence. General
Jackson wanted it till he got possession; then gave it up. General
McClellan wanted to give it up before it was taken. After it had been
taken and given up, he reoccupied it. It was left severely alone in the
Gettysburg campaign,--an admission by both sides of its uselessness as a
_point d'appui_.

A word in closing about the chiefs opposed in this great campaign. General
Lee and General McClellan were both graduates of the United States
Military Academy at West Point. The former took the second honor of the
class of 1829, the latter the second honor of the class of 1846. Their
service in the United States army was as military engineers. In 1854 they
were both selected by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis for promotion to
the new cavalry regiments as lieutenant-colonel and captain respectively.
Their early opportunities, social and educational, were superior. They
studiously improved them in youth, and applied them with diligence in
after-life. Aspirations leading to the higher walks of social and
professional life seem to have been alike controlling forces in the
character and career of each. They were not unmindful that physical
development was important in support of mental improvement. In moral tone
and habits they may be called exemplars. In his service, General Lee's
pride was duty to his government and to the army under his command. He
loved admiration of the outside world, but these duties better. General
McClellan's ambition was not so limited.

In stature General Lee stood five feet ten inches, was of well-developed
muscular figure, as trim as a youth, and weighed one hundred and seventy
pounds. In features he was a model of manly beauty. His teeth were of
ivory whiteness; his mouth handsome and expressive of frankness, kindness,
and generosity. His nose and chin were full, regular, strong, and gave his
face force and character. 'Twas seldom that he allowed his mind to wander
to the days of his childhood, and talk of his father and his early
associates, but when he did, he was far more charming than he thought. As
a commander he was much of the Wellington "Up-and-at-'em" style. He found
it hard, the enemy in sight, to withhold his blows. With McClellan it was
more difficult to strike than to march for the enemy.

General McClellan was of short, stout figure, but was of soldierly
presence, graceful, and handsome-featured.

In their mounts neither of the great commanders lost anything of his
admirable presence. Both were masters of the science but not of the art of
war. Lee was successful in Virginia; McClellan in Maryland.

Unjust criticism has been passed upon the Confederate soldiers in the
Maryland campaign, based principally upon the great number of absentees.
To those who have spent their lives near the ranks of soldiers and learned
from experience that there is a limit to physical endurance, explanation
is not called for; to those who look upon the soldier as a machine, not
even needing oil to facilitate motive power, I will say, try to put
yourselves in the soldiers' places. Another point to be noted was, that in
the Confederate ranks there were thousands of soldiers who had been
wounded once, twice, and in some instances three times, who in any other
service would have been on the pension-rolls at their comfortable homes.

Sickness and weakness that creep into an army from irregular food,
collected in the stress of march, were no trifling impediments to the
maintenance of our ranks in vigorous form.

When, in mature judgment, the historian builds monuments of words for the
leaders of the campaign in Maryland, there will be flowers left for the
private soldiers, and for the private soldiers' graves.

The full significance of Sharpsburg to the Federal authorities lay in the
fact that they needed a victory on which to issue the Emancipation
Proclamation, which President Lincoln had prepared two months before and
had held in abeyance under advice of members of his Cabinet until the
Union arms should win a success. Although this battle was by no means so
complete a victory as the President wished, and he was sorely vexed with
General McClellan for not pushing it to completion, it was made the most
of as a victory, and his Emancipation Proclamation was issued on the 22d
of September, five days after the battle. This was one of the decisive
political events of the war, and at once put the great struggle outwardly
and openly upon the basis where it had before only rested by tacit and
covert understanding. If the Southern army had been carefully held in
hand, refreshed by easy marches and comfortable supplies, the proclamation
could not have found its place in history. On the other hand, the Southern
President would have been in Maryland at the head of his army with his
manifesto for peace and independence.



    The Confederates appoint Seven Lieutenant-Generals--The Army of
    Northern Virginia organized in Corps--General McClellan relieved, and
    General Burnside appointed Commander of the Army of the Potomac--A
    Lift for the South--McClellan was growing--Burnside's "Three Grand
    Divisions"--The Campaign of the Rappahannock--Getting Ready for
    Fredericksburg--Longstreet occupies Fredericksburg--The Town called to
    surrender by General Sumner--Exodus of the Inhabitants under a Threat
    to shell the Town.

Under an act not long before passed by the Confederate Congress
authorizing the appointment of seven lieutenant-generals, the authorities
at Richmond about this time sent commissions to Lieutenant-Generals
Longstreet, Polk, Holmes, Hardee, E. K. Smith, Jackson, and Pemberton, and
made appointments of a number of major-generals. Under these appointments
General Lee organized the Army of Northern Virginia into corps
substantially as it subsequently fought the battle of Fredericksburg.[108]

The Confederate army rested along the lines between the Potomac and
Winchester till late in October. On the 8th, General Stuart was ordered
across to ride around the Union army, then resting about Sharpsburg and
Harper's Ferry. His ride caused some excitement among the Union troops,
and he got safely to the south side with the loss of a few men slightly
wounded, on the 12th. On the 26th, General McClellan marched south and
crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge. Jackson was assigned the duty
of guarding the passes. I marched south, corresponding with the march of
the Army of the Potomac. A division crossed at Ashby's Gap to
Upperville to look for the head of McClellan's army. He bore farther
eastward and marched for Warrenton, where he halted on the 5th of
November. The division was withdrawn from Upperville and marched for
Culpeper Court-House, arriving at that point at the same time as
McClellan's at Warrenton,--W. H. F. Lee's cavalry the day before me. Soon
after the return to Culpeper Court-House, Evans's brigade was relieved of
duty with the First Corps and ordered south. Hood had a brush with a
cavalry force at Manassas Gap, and part of McLaws's division a similar
experience at the east end of Chester Gap.


I reached Culpeper Court-House with the divisions of McLaws, R. H.
Anderson, and Pickett. Hood's division was ordered behind Robertson River,
and Ransom to Madison Court-House, General Jackson with the Second Corps
remaining in the Shenandoah Valley, except one division at Chester Gap of
the Blue Ridge.

The Washington authorities issued orders on the 5th of November relieving
General McClellan of, and assigning General Burnside to, command of the
Army of the Potomac. On the 9th the army was put under General Burnside,
in due form.

When informed of the change, General Lee expressed regret, as he thought
that McClellan could be relied upon to conform to the strictest rules of
science in the conduct of war. He had been McClellan's preceptor, they had
served together in the engineer corps, and our chief thought that he
thoroughly understood the displaced commander. The change was a good lift
for the South, however; McClellan was growing, was likely to exhibit far
greater powers than he had yet shown, and could not have given us
opportunity to recover the morale lost at Sharpsburg, as did Burnside and

General Burnside, soon after assuming command, and while waiting at
Warrenton, made a radical change in the organization of the army by
consolidating the corps into three "Grand Divisions" as follows:

    Corps, General D. W. Couch; Ninth Army Corps, General O. B. Wilcox.

    Corps, General George Stoneman; Fifth Army Corps, General Daniel

    Corps, General J. F. Reynolds; Sixth Army Corps, General W. F. Smith.

    CAVALRY DIVISION.--General Alfred Pleasonton.

    Artillery, siege, and field batteries, 370 guns, General Henry J.
    Hunt, Chief.

At the time of the change of commanders the Confederates were looking for
a Federal move north of Culpeper Court-House, and were surveying the
ground behind Robertson River for a point of concentration of the two
wings to meet that move.

General Burnside, however, promptly planned operations on other lines. He
submitted to President Lincoln his proposition to display some force in
the direction of Gordonsville as a diversion, while with his main army he
would march south, cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and reach by
a surprise march ground nearer Richmond than the holdings of the
Confederates. This was approved by the President with the suggestion that
its success depended upon prompt execution.

On the 15th light began to break upon the Confederates, revealing a move
south from Warrenton, but it was not regarded as a radical change from the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad line of advance. A battery of artillery was
sent with a regiment of infantry to reinforce the Confederate outpost at
Fredericksburg under Colonel Ball.

On the 17th information came that the Right Grand Division under General
Sumner had marched south, leaving the railroad, and General W. H. F.
Lee's cavalry was ordered to Fredericksburg.

The next morning I marched with two divisions, McLaws's and Ransom's, the
former for Fredericksburg, the latter towards the North Anna. The same
day, General Lee ordered a forced reconnoissance by his cavalry to
Warrenton, found that the Union army was all on the march towards
Fredericksburg, and ordered my other divisions to follow on the 19th.

At the first disclosure he was inclined to move for a position behind the
North Anna, as at that time the position behind Fredericksburg appeared a
little awkward for the Confederates, but, taking into careful
consideration the position of the Union army on the Stafford side, the
former appeared the less faulty of the two. Defence behind the Anna would
have been stronger, but the advantage of the enemy's attack would also
have been enhanced there. Then, too, anticipation of the effect of
surprising the enemy in their intended surprise had some influence in
favor of Fredericksburg.

The Burnside march was somewhat of the Horace Greeley "On-to-Richmond"
_nolens-volens_ style, which, if allowed to run on long enough, sometimes
gains headway that is troublesome.

General Sumner reached Falmouth on the 17th, and proposed to cross, but
his advance was met and forced back by Colonel Ball's command.

I rode with the leading division for Fredericksburg, and was on the
heights on the 19th. My head-quarters were there when General Sumner
called upon the civil authorities to surrender the city by the following

        "November 21, 1862.


    "GENTLEMEN,--Under cover of the houses of your city shots have been
    fired upon the troops of my command. Your mills and manufactories are
    furnishing provisions and the material for clothing for armed bodies
    in rebellion against the government of the United States. Your
    railroads and other means of transportation are removing supplies to
    the depots of such troops. This condition of things must terminate,
    and, by direction of General Burnside, I accordingly demand the
    surrender of the city into my hands, as the representative of the
    government of the United States, at or before five o'clock this

    "Failing an affirmative reply to this demand by the hour indicated,
    sixteen hours will be permitted to elapse for the removal from the
    city of women and children, the sick and wounded and aged, etc., which
    period having expired, I shall proceed to shell the town. Upon
    obtaining possession of the city, every necessary means will be taken
    to preserve order and secure the protective operation of the laws and
    policy of the United States government.

          "I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
            "E. V. SUMNER,
              "_Bvt. Maj.-Gen. U. S. Army, commanding Right Grand

The officers who received the call, by consent of General Patrick, who
delivered it, referred the paper to my head-quarters. I asked the civil
authorities to reply that the city would not be used for the purposes
complained of, but that neither the town nor the south side of the river
could be occupied by the Union army except by force of arms.

General Sumner ordered two batteries into position commanding the town,
but in a few hours received the following reply from the mayor:

        "FREDERICKSBURG, November 21, 1862.

        "_Commanding U. S. Army_:

    "SIR,--I have received, at 4.40 o'clock this afternoon, your
    communication of this date. In it you state that, under cover of the
    houses of this town, shots have been fired upon the troops of your
    command; that our mills and manufactories are furnishing provisions
    and the material for clothing for armed bodies in rebellion against
    the government of the United States; that our railroads and other
    means of transportation are removing supplies to the depots of such
    troops; that this condition of things must terminate; that, by command
    of Major-General Burnside, you demand the surrender of this town into
    your hands, as the representative of the government of the United
    States, at or before five o'clock this afternoon; that, failing an
    affirmative reply to this demand by the time indicated, sixteen hours
    will be permitted to elapse for the removal from the town of the women
    and children, the sick, wounded, and aged, which period having
    elapsed, you will proceed to shell the town.

    "In reply I have to say that this communication did not reach me in
    time to convene the Council for its consideration, and to furnish a
    reply by the hour indicated (five P.M.). It was sent to me through the
    hands of the commanding officer of the Confederate States near this
    town, to whom it was first delivered, by consent of General Patrick,
    who bore it from you, as I am informed, and I am authorized by the
    commander of the Confederate army to say that there was no delay in
    passing it through his hands to me.

    "In regard to the matters complained of by you, the firing of shot
    upon your troops occurred upon the northern suburbs of the town, and
    was the act of the military officer commanding the Confederate forces
    near here, for which matter (neither) the citizens nor civil
    authorities of this town are responsible. In regard to the other
    matters of complaint, I am authorized by the latter officer to say
    that the condition of things therein complained of shall no longer
    exist; that your troops shall not be fired on from this town; that the
    mills and manufactories here will not furnish any further supplies of
    provisions or material for clothing for the Confederate troops, nor
    will the railroads or other means of transportation here convey
    supplies from the town to the depots of said troops.

    "Outside of the town the civil authorities of Fredericksburg have no
    control, but I am assured by the military authorities of the
    Confederate army near here that nothing will be done by them to
    infringe the conditions herein named as to matters within the town.
    But the latter authorities inform us that, while their troops will not
    occupy the town, they will not permit yours to do so.

    "You must be aware that there will not be more than three or four
    hours of daylight within the sixteen hours given by you for the
    removal of the sick and wounded, the women and children, the aged and
    infirm, from this place; and I have to inform you that, while there is
    no railroad transportation accessible to the town, because of the
    interruption thereof by your batteries, all other means of
    transportation within the town are so limited as to render the removal
    of the classes of persons spoken of within the time indicated as an
    utter impossibility.

    "I have convened the Council, which will remain in session awaiting
    any further communications you may have to make.

          "Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
            "M. SLAUGHTER,

To this General Sumner responded the same day,--


    "Your letter of this afternoon is at hand, and, in consideration of
    your pledges that the acts complained of shall cease, and that your
    town shall not be occupied by any of the enemy's forces, and your
    assertion that a lack of transportation renders it impossible to
    remove the women, children, sick, wounded, and aged, I am authorized
    to say to you that our batteries will not open upon your town at the
    hour designated.

    "General Patrick will meet a committee or representative from your
    town to-morrow morning, at nine o'clock, at the Lacy House.

          "Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
            "E. V. SUMNER,
              "_Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding Division_."

As the inference from the correspondence was that the shelling was only
postponed, the people were advised to move with their valuables to some
place of safety as soon as possible. Without complaint, those who could,
packed their precious effects and moved beyond reach of the threatened
storm, but many preferred to remain and encounter the dangers rather than
to leave their homes and valuables. The fortitude with which they bore
their trials quickened the minds of the soldiers who were there to defend
them. One train leaving with women and children was fired upon, making
some confusion and dismay among them, but the two or three shells did no
other mischief, and the firing ceased.



    Description of the Field--Marye's Heights--Position of the Troops of
    Longstreet's Command--General Jackson called down from Orange
    Court-House, and Preparations made for a Determined Stand--Signal Guns
    at Three o'Clock in the Morning announce the Long-Expected
    Battle--Burnside's Bridge-Builders thrice driven back from their
    Work--The Crossing finally made by Boats--Federals under Hot Fire
    enter Fredericksburg--How they obtained their Foothold on the West
    Bank of the Rappahannock--Gallant Officers and Men--Ninety-seven
    killed or wounded in the Space of Fifty Yards--General Burnside's Plan
    of Battle--Strength of the Contending Forces.

McLaws's division of my corps was posted on the heights in rear of the
city, one brigade in the sunken road in front of the Marye mansion, the
others extending across the Telegraph road through the wood of Lee's Hill.
As the other divisions of the corps came up they were posted, R. H.
Anderson on Taylor's Hill; Ransom in reserve, near corps head-quarters;
Pickett in the wood, in rear of McLaws's right; Hood at Hamilton's

The Federal Grand Divisions under Franklin and Hooker marched on the 18th
of November, and on the 19th pitched their camps, the former at Stafford
Court-House, and the latter at Hartwood, each about ten miles from
Falmouth. A mile and a half above Fredericksburg the Rappahannock cuts
through a range of hills, which courses on the north side in a
southeasterly direction, nearly parallel, and close to its margin. This
range (Stafford Heights) was occupied by the enemy for his batteries of
position, one hundred and forty-seven siege guns and long-range field
batteries. These heights not only command those of the west, but the
entire field and flats opened by the spreading out of the range on the
west side. At points, however, they stand so close beside the river that
the guns on their crest could not be so depressed as to plunge their fire
to the water. The heights are cut at points by streamlets and ravines
leading into the river, and level up gradually as they approach nearer to
the Potomac on its west slope, and towards the sea on the south. The city
of Fredericksburg nestles under those heights on the opposite bank. McLaws
had a brigade on picket service, extending its guard up and down the banks
of the river, in connection with details from R. H. Anderson's division
above and Hood's below, the latter meeting Stuart's cavalry vedettes lower

At the west end of the ridge where the river cuts through is Taylor's Hill
(the Confederate left), which stands at its highest on a level with
Stafford Heights. From that point the heights on the south side spread,
unfolding a valley about a mile in width, affording a fine view of the
city, of the arable fields, and the heights as they recede to the
vanishing limits of sight. Next below Taylor's is Marye's Hill, rising to
half the elevation of the neighboring heights and dropping back, leaving a
plateau of half a mile, and then swelling to the usual altitude of the
range. On the plateau is the Marye mansion. Along its base is a sunken
road, with retaining walls on either side. That on the east is just
breast-high for a man, and just the height convenient for infantry defence
and fire. From the top of the breast-work the ground recedes gradually
till near the canal, when it drops off three or four feet, leaving space
near the canal of a rod or two of level ground. The north end of the
sunken road cuts into the plank or Gordonsville road, which is an
extension of Hanover Street from near the heart of the town. At the south
end it enters the Telegraph road, extending out from the town limits and
up over the third, or Telegraph Hill, called, in its bloody baptismal,
"Lee's Hill." An unfinished railroad lies along the Telegraph road as far
as the highlands. The Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad lies nearly
parallel with the river four miles, and then turns south through the
highlands. The old stage road from the city runs about half-way between
the river and the railroad four miles, when it turns southwest and crosses
the railroad at Hamilton's Crossing. The hamlet of Falmouth, on the north
side of the river, was in front of the right centre of the Federal
position, half a mile from Fredericksburg.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. Dec. 13th, 1862]

General Jackson, advised of General Burnside's move to Fredericksburg,
drew his corps east of the Blue Ridge as far as Orange Court-House.

Before the end of November it became evident that Fredericksburg was to be
our winter station and the scene of a severe battle before it could be
relieved. General Lee advised the citizens who still remained in the place
(and some who had returned) to remove their effects. Those who had friends
found comfortable places of rest, but many took the little that they could
get away with, and made their homes in the deep forest till the storm
could pass. Still, none complained of the severe ordeal which they were
called upon to endure.

Towards the latter part of the month General Jackson was called down and
assigned position on the right near Hamilton's Crossing and the
Massaponax. He objected to the position, preferring the North Anna, but
General Lee had already weighed the matter, and had decided in favor of
Fredericksburg. Hood's division, relieved at Hamilton's Crossing, was
drawn to my right and stretched across the valley of Deep Run, a little to
the rear of Jackson's left and McLaws's right.

Batteries of position were assigned from the reserve artillery along the
heights, with orders to cover the guns, by epaulements or pitting them.
The work was progressing while the guns were held under cover remote from
the enemy's better appointed artillery until the positions were covered by
solid banks or good pits. The small field pieces were removed for safety
to convenient points for field service in case opportunity called for
them. The Confederates had three hundred and six guns, including two
thirty-pound Parrotts of Richmond make. These were covered by epaulements
on Lee's Hill.

On the 1st of December the batteries of reserve artillery were relieved
from the First Corps by those of the Washington and Alexander's artillery.
Orders were given to examine all lines of approach, and to measure
particularly the distance of the crossings of the canal on the Plank and
Telegraph roads; to inspect and improve the parapets and pits along the
front, and to traverse all batteries not securely covered against the
batteries opposite Taylor's Hill, and others within range of our lines,
and McLaws was directed to open signal line with his brigade and guards
along the river bank.

The day after Jackson joined us several gun-boats were reported in the
lower river at Port Royal. D. H. Hill's division was detached with several
select batteries to watch and guard at that point against a crossing,
should it be attempted, and to engage and try the metal of the gun-boats.
After some little practice the boats drew off and dropped down-stream; but
Hill's division was left near the point in observation with W. H. F. Lee's
cavalry. The brigade of cavalry under General Hampton kept careful watch
of the fords of the upper Rappahannock. To guard against further
encroachments of the gun-boats, a battery was intrenched on the river bank
under direction of Major T. M. R. Talcot, of the general staff. At the
river, sharp-shooters, by concealing themselves in the ravines and pits,
could escape artillery fire and lie in secure readiness to attack parties
engaged in laying bridges. After driving off working parties they were to
seek cover till again needed. By such practice they were to delay the
bridge-builders till the commands had time to assemble at their points of
rendezvous. The narrow, deep bed of the stream, a mile away from any
point of the Confederate lines where batteries could be planted, and
covered as it was by the guns of Stafford Heights, prevented the thought
of successful resistance to laying bridges at any point from Falmouth to
the extreme left of the Federal line; but the strong ground upon which the
Confederates were to accept battle offset the uncomfortable feeling in
regard to the crossing of the river.

General Burnside made some show of disposition to cross fourteen miles
below, at Skinker's Neck, but that was under guard of D. H. Hill's
division, and he saw that his purpose could not be effected. The plan
which he finally adopted was to span the river by bridges near the centre
and lower limits of the city, and two others a mile below the latter, and
just below the mouth of Deep Run, the Right Grand Division to cross by the
upper and second bridges, the Left Grand Division by the lower bridges,
and the Centre Grand Division to be in position near the others to
reinforce their battle.

The stir and excitement about the enemy's camps on the 10th of December,
as well as the reports of scouts, gave notice that important movements
were pending. Notice was given the commands, and the batteries were
ordered to have their animals in harness an hour before daylight of the
next morning, and to continue to hitch up daily at that hour until further

At three o'clock on the morning of the 11th the deep boom of a cannon
aroused both armies, and a second gun was recognized as the signal for
battle. In a few minutes the commands were on the march for their
positions. Orders were sent to call D. H. Hill's division and all of the
Second Corps to their ground along the woodland over Hamilton's Crossing.

Barksdale's brigade of Mississippians was on picket duty in Fredericksburg
at the time; the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Regiments, with the Eighth
Florida, of R. H. Anderson's division, were on the river line; the other
regiments of the brigade and the Third Georgia, of R. H. Anderson's, in

The first noise made by the enemy's bridge-builders was understood by the
picket guards, as was all of their early work of construction, but a heavy
mist along the water concealed them from view until their work upon the
bridge was well advanced. As soon as the forms of the workmen could be
discerned the skirmishers opened fire, which was speedily answered from
the other side in efforts to draw the fire from the bridge-builders, but
the Confederates limited their attention to the builders till they were
driven off, when they ceased firing. Another effort to lay the bridge met
a like result. Then a third received the same stormy repulse, when it
seemed that all the cannon within a mile of the town turned their
concentrating fire of shot and shell upon the buildings of the devoted
city, tearing, crushing, bursting, burning their walls with angry
desperation that must have been gratifying to spirits deep down below.

Under the failures to lay the bridge, General Hunt suggested that the
pontoon-boats be filled with infantrymen, rushed across and landed on the
other bank until a sufficient force was in position to protect the
bridge-builders. Barksdale had been notified before noon that the army was
in position, and that he could withdraw his troops at any moment, but he
preferred his little fight in Fredericksburg. At four o'clock, when the
landing was made by the boats, he thought the city safe against artillery
practice, and was pleased to hold till night could cover his withdrawal.

Colonel Norman J. Hall, of the Seventh Michigan Regiment, commanded the
troops working for a foothold on the west bank. After the several attempts
to have the bridge built, he accepted General Hunt's proposition to load
the boats and have the men push across. Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter,
commanding the regiment, volunteered to lead the party. Captain Weymouth,
of the Nineteenth Massachusetts, proposed to support the move. Under
signal for artillery fire to cease, the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Baxter pushed across. Under the best fire the pickets could bring to bear
only one man was killed and Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter and several men were
wounded. The party of seventy were rushed up the bank, gained position,
captured some prisoners, and were soon reinforced. The enemy's fire over
the west bank was so sweeping that Barksdale could not reinforce at the
point of landing. The Nineteenth Massachusetts was deployed to the right,
and the Seventh Michigan to the left. The Twenty-eighth Massachusetts
reinforced them. The Twelfth and Fifty-ninth New York and One Hundred and
Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania Regiments joined the command in the city.
Colonel Hall found that he must prepare for some fighting, and speedily,
as night was coming on. He sent to the rear to ask for time to prepare and
make his fight to suit him, but was hurried on by the division pushing
forward to get across the bridge, with orders to secure the streets at all
hazards. The Seventh Michigan and Nineteenth Massachusetts had been
brought to a stand, when the Twenty-eighth Massachusetts was rushed
forward in gallant style. Colonel Hall reported, "Platoon after platoon
were swept away, but the head of the column did not falter. Ninety-seven
officers and men were killed or wounded in the space of about fifty
yards." The eastern part of the town was occupied, and at a late hour of
the night the Confederates retired.

As Barksdale's brigade withdrew, he was relieved at the sunken road by the
Eighteenth and Twenty-fourth Georgia Regiments and Cobb's Georgia Legion,
General T. R. R. Cobb in command.

The Third Grand Division had no severe work in laying the bridges below
Deep Run, and were ready for co-operation some hours in advance of the

The Federals occupied the 12th in moving the Right Grand Division into the
city by the upper bridges, and the Left Grand Division by the bridges
below Deep Creek. One hundred and four guns crossed with the right, one
hundred and twenty with the left. The Centre Grand Division was held in
reserve. Two divisions of the Third Corps were sent to the lower bridges
during the night to support the battle of the left, and were ordered over
on the 13th.

The plan of battle by the Federal commander, in brief, was to drive the
Confederate right back into the highlands and follow that success by
attacking the Confederate left by his Right Grand Division.

The _beginning_ only of this plan was carried out. The Left Grand Division
having duly crossed the river at the lower bridges on the 12th,--the Sixth
Corps and Bayard's brigade of cavalry, then the First Corps,--the Sixth
deployed two divisions, supported by the third, parallel to the old
Richmond road; the First formed at right angles to the Sixth, its right on
the left of the Sixth, its left on the river, two divisions on the front
line, one in support. The cavalry was sent out to reconnoitre. The entire
field of the command was an open plain between the highlands and the
river, traversed by the old Richmond road, which had well-formed
embankments and ditches on both sides.

The Federal troops of their left divisions were in full view of the
heights (Lee's Hill) occupied by the Confederates; those of the right were
concealed by the buildings of Fredericksburg and under the river banks,
and their bridges were under the steep also. The two brigades on the right
of the Sixth Corps were to the right of Deep Run; the others, of the First
and Sixth Corps, on the left. The batteries of the corps were under
authority of corps commanders. There were but few shots exchanged during
the 12th, and these not of great damage.

On the Confederate side the First Corps (Longstreet's) was in position
from Taylor's Hill across Deep Run Bottom. The Second Corps was in mass
about the wooded heights at Hamilton's Crossing. His cavalry and horse
artillery were on his right in the Massaponax Valley. General R. Ransom's
division was posted in rear of the left of Marye's Hill; his Twenty-fourth
North Carolina Regiment was advanced to the left of Cobb's line in the
sunken road. His brigade under Colonel Cooke was deployed as
sharp-shooters on the crest of the hill. He was especially charged with
looking after the left of Cobb's line. In front of this line and about six
hundred yards from it was a canal, or large wet ditch, about four hundred
yards out from the city limits. The crossings at the Plank and Telegraph
roads had been bridged, and the bridges were ordered wrecked, but were
only partially destroyed, the string-pieces being left in place. The corps
in position, the Confederate commander prepared to stand and receive

In concluding this account of the confronting armies on the eve of battle,
let us glance at their relative strength as expressed in numbers.

The Army of the Potomac, as reported by General Burnside, had on December
10 an "aggregate present for duty" of 132,017[110] officers and men (not
including cavalry). The Army of Northern Virginia was reported by General
Lee on the same date to have had an aggregate of 69,391[111] (not
including cavalry).



    The Battle-field veiled by a Heavy Fog--Terrific Fighting of the 13th
    of December--Forlorn Hope of the Federals--General Meade's Division of
    Franklin's Command makes the First Advance--General French leads
    against the Confederate Left--Hancock follows--General Cobb
    killed--The Sunken Road and Stone Wall below Marye's Hill--Desperate
    Advances and Determined Repulses--Humphreys's Heroic Assault--The
    Stone Wall "a Sheet of Flame"--General Jackson loses his Opportunity
    to advance--The Charge of Meade's Divisions compared with that of
    Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble's Columns at Gettysburg--Forty Per
    Cent. killed in charging Lines here, and Sixty Per Cent. at
    Gettysburg--Total Losses--Peace to be declared because Gold had gone
    to 200--Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia.

On the morning of the 13th of December the confronting armies, which were
destined that day to clash in one of the bloodiest conflicts of the war,
stood completely veiled from each other's sight by an impenetrable mist.
The entire Confederate army was now for the first time upon the field, for
General Jackson had during the night brought up his scattered divisions
from down the river.

Before daylight I rode to view my line and troops from right to left.
Hood's division on the right was found on the alert, as was the enemy near
that point. The voices of the Union officers as they gave their commands
were carried to us with almost startling clearness by the heavy fog that
covered the field and surroundings. So heavy was this fog that nothing
could be seen at a distance of ten or twelve rods, and yet so distinctly
were the voices of the officers brought to us that they seemed quite near
at hand, and General Hood was looking for assaulting columns against his
front. He was told that such move would put the enemy's column in a
_cul-de-sac_, and therefore his position was in no danger of attack; that
the attack would be aimed against Jackson's front; that in case it broke
through there he should swing around to his right and take the attacking
forces in reverse; that Pickett's division would be ordered to a
corresponding move on his left, with the batteries of the two divisions in
the plain off the left; that my front would be attacked, but it was safely
posted, and not likely to need other than the troops on that ground.
Pickett's command was under arms, expecting orders. They were given
instructions similar to those just mentioned for Hood. The divisions of
McLaws, Ransom, and R. H. Anderson were in readiness, as were all the
batteries. But the fog, nothing abated, hung so heavy that not a sight for
a cannon-shot was open till a late hour of the morning.

The front of the Second Corps was occupied by A. P. Hill's division, the
brigades of Archer, Lane, and Pender on the first line; those of Thomas,
Gregg, and Brockenbrough on the second. A third line was occupied by
Taliaferro's and Early's divisions. D. H. Hill's division was off to the
rear of the right. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker posted a fourteen-gun battery
of the division artillery on A. P. Hill's right, and two other field
batteries on the plain on his left. Stuart's horse artillery and cavalry
were on the plain on the right, in the valley of the Massaponax,
supporting the Second Corps.

About 7.45 in the morning General Hardie, of Burnside's staff, reported to
General Franklin that his orders would reach him in a few minutes by the
hands of an aide-de-camp. Hardie was ordered to remain near General
Franklin's head-quarters. At eight o'clock the order came, and at 8.30
Meade's division moved towards the general direction of Jackson's

At ten o'clock the fog lifted and revealed Meade's lines, six batteries on
his left and four on his right, Gibbon's division supporting the right and
Doubleday's covering the left. The order for the commander of the Left
Grand Division was to make the advance by at least one division. The
divisions of the First Corps were thought to fully meet the terms of the

Meade's lines advanced in handsome, solid ranks, leaving heavy reserves of
the Sixth Corps and two divisions of the Third that had been called over
from the Centre Grand Division. The fire of Stuart's horse artillery
against their left caused delay until some of the batteries of the left
engaged and drove off the fire. After half an hour's delay the advance was
resumed, the batteries thrown to the front to shell the field in search of
the Confederate batteries. The latter had been ordered, for the most part,
to reserve their fire for infantry. After an hour's heavy artillery
practice Meade's march was resumed, and with great vigor, the batteries
ploughing the way for the infantry columns. At the same time the
fourteen-gun battery of A. P. Hill's right and his left batteries replied
with equal spirit and practice, though with unequal metal.

The view of the battle of the enemy's left burst upon us at Lee's Hill, as
the mist rolled away under the bright noonday sun. We noted the thin, pale
smoke of infantry fire fading in the far away of their left, the heavy
clouds rising from the batteries on both sides of the river, the bright
armored ranks and banners, and our elevation seemed to draw them so close
to us, on their right, that we thought to turn our best guns upon that
part of the line, and General Lee authorized the test of their range. Only
a few shots were sent when the troops that had been lying concealed in the
streets of the city came flying out by both roads in swarms at double time
and rushed towards us. Every gun that we had in range opened upon the
advancing columns and ploughed their ranks by a fire that would test the
nerves of the bravest soldiers. But the battle of the Federal left had the
first opening, and calls for first notice.


Under a strong artillery combat Meade marched forward, with Gibbon's
division in close support on his right, and Doubleday's farther off on his
left. The line encountered Lane's brigade front in a steady, hard fight,
and, developing against Archer's left, broke through, forcing the brigades
back, encountered Thomas's and Gregg's brigades, threw the latter into
confusion, and killed General Gregg. Brockenbrough's and Pender's brigades
turned against the penetrating columns and were forced back. Under skilful
handling the brigades finally brought the battle to steady work, but
Meade's impetuous onward march was bravely made and pressed until three
brigades of Early's division were advanced and thrown into action,
commanded by Colonels Atkinson, Walker, and Hoke. These, with the combined
fire of Hill's broken lines, forced Meade back. Two regiments of Berry's
brigade of the Third Corps came to the relief of Meade and were driven
back, when Gibbon's division which followed was met, and after severe
battle was repulsed. The Confederates made a partial following of the
success, beyond the railroad, and until they encountered the fire of the
relieving divisions under Birney and Sickles and the reserve batteries.
Doubleday's division protected Meade's left as Jackson's right under
Taliaferro partially engaged against them; both encountered loss. Hood got
one of his brigades in in time to follow the troops as they retired
towards their reserve line. At the first moment of the break on Jackson's
lines Pickett rode to Hood and urged that the opportunity anticipated was
at hand, but Hood failed to see it in time for effective work. About two
P.M. the battle quieted into defensive practice of artillery and

The opening against the Confederate left, before referred to, was led by
French's division of the Second Corps, about 10.30. The Eighteenth and
Twenty-fourth Georgia Regiments, Cobb's Georgia Legion, and the
Twenty-fourth North Carolina Regiment were in the sunken road, the salient
point. On Marye's Hill, back and above, was the Washington Artillery, with
nine guns, Ransom's and Cooke's North Carolina brigade in open field, the
guns under partial cover, pitted. Other batteries on Taylor's and Lee's
Hills posted to this defence as many as twenty guns, holding under range
by direct and cross fire the avenues of approach and the open field along
Cobb's front.

French's division came in gallant style, but somewhat hurried. He gathered
his ranks behind the swell of ground near the canal and moved to the
assault. An intervening plank fence gave the troops some trouble in
crossing under fire, so that his ranks were not firm after passing it to
the attack. Hancock, coming speedily with his division, was better
organized and in time to take up the fight as French was obliged to
retire. This advance was handsomely maintained, but the galling fire they
encountered forced them to open fire. Under this delay their ranks were
cut up as rapidly as they had collected at the canal, and when within a
hundred yards of the stone wall they were so thinned that they could do
nothing but surrender, even if they could leap to the road-bed. But they
turned, and the fire naturally slackened, as their hurried steps took them
away to their partial cover. The troops behind the stone wall were
reinforced during this engagement by two of Cooke's regiments from the
hill-top, ordered by General Ransom, and General McLaws ordered part of
Kershaw's brigade in on their right.

After Hancock's engagement some minutes passed before arrangements were
made for the next. Howard's division had been feeling for a way to get by
Cobb's left, when he was called to the front attack, and ordered over the
same ground. He arranged his forces with care, and advanced in desperate
fight. Under the severe fire of the Confederates his troops were provoked
to return fire, and during the delay thus caused his ranks were so
speedily decimated that they in turn were obliged to return to cover. The
Confederate commander, General Cobb, was killed. General Kershaw, with the
other regiments of his brigade, was ordered to the front. The Washington
Artillery, exhausted of ammunition, was relieved by guns of Alexander's
battalion. The change of batteries seemed to give new hope to the
assaulting forces. They cheered and put in their best practice of
sharp-shooters and artillery. The greater part of Alexander's loss
occurred while galloping up to his position. General Ransom advanced the
other regiments of his brigade to the crest of the hill. At the suggestion
of General Lee the brigades of Jenkins and Kemper of Pickett's division
were called up and assigned, the former to General McLaws and the latter
to General Ransom. A supply of ammunition was sent down to the troops in
the road in time to meet the next attack, by Sturgis's division of the
Ninth Corps, which made the usual brave fight, and encountered the same
damaging results. Getty's division of the Ninth Corps came to his support
on the left, but did not engage fiercely, losing less than eight hundred
men. Carroll's brigade of Whipple's division, Third Corps, came in on
Sturgis's left, but only to brace that part of the fight.

As the troops hurried forward from the streets of the city for the
Telegraph road, they came at once under the fire of the long-range guns on
Lee's Hill. The thirty-pound Parrotts were particularly effective in
having the range and dropping their shells in the midst of the columns as
they dashed forward. Frequently commands were broken up by this fire and
that of other long-range guns, and sought shelter, as they thought, in the
railroad cut, but that point was well marked, and the shots were dropped
in, in enfilade fire, with precision, often making wide gaps in their
ranks. The siege guns of Stafford Heights gave their especial attention to
our heavy guns and put their shots over the parapets very often.

One shell buried itself close under the parapet at General Lee's side, as
he sat among the officers of his staff, but it failed to explode. Soon
after this our big Parrott gun burst into many fragments. It was closely
surrounded by General Lee and staff, officers of the First Corps
head-quarters, and officers and gunners of the battery, but the explosion
caused no other damage than the loss of the gun.

Griffin's division was next ordered to attack, and made the usual
desperate struggle. The Confederates meanwhile had accumulated such force
in the road that a single division, had it reached that point, would have
found its equal in numbers, and of greater vigor, with Ransom at the top
of the hill prepared to rush down and join in the mêlée. At that hour we
could have safely invited one division into our midst, if assured it was
to be the last.

The next attack was made by Humphreys's division. Its commander was a man
of superior attainments and accomplishments in the walks of civil as well
as military life. He measured justly the situation, and arranged his
battle in the only order by which success could have been made possible,
but he had only two brigades with which to take a position not assailable
and held by more than three brigades of superior troops. His troops were
new, so that he felt called to personal example as well as skilful
handling. He ordered the attack with empty muskets, and led with his
brigade commanders, but half-way up towards the goal his men stopped to
load and open fire, which neither he nor his officers could prevent, so
they were driven back. Then he made a like effort with his other brigade,
under special orders from Generals Burnside and Hooker that the point must
be carried before night,--and the dew was then falling. (Just then our
second big Parrott gun went into fragments, but without damage to the
men.) The troops that had been driven back from previous attacks joined in
trying to persuade Humphreys's men not to go forward. Notwithstanding the
discouraging surroundings, he led his men on, encountered the same
terrific and death-dealing opposition, and his men retired in greater
confusion, going beyond his control to the vicinity of the city before he
could get them again in ranks. His account of the last effort is

    "The stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and
    flanks of the column. Officers and men were falling rapidly, and the
    head of the column was at length brought to a stand when close up to
    the wall. Up to this time not a shot had been fired by the column, but
    now some firing began. It lasted but a minute, when, in spite of all
    our efforts, the column turned and began to retire slowly. I attempted
    to rally the brigade behind the natural embankment so often mentioned,
    but the united efforts of General Tyler, myself, our staff, and other
    officers could not arrest the retiring mass."[112]

At that time there were three brigades behind the stone wall and one
regiment of Ransom's brigade. The ranks were four or five deep,--the rear
files loading and passing their guns to the front ranks, so that the
volleys by brigade were almost incessant pourings of solid sheets of lead.

Two brigades of Sykes's division, First and Second Regulars, were sent to
the front to guard the line. It was some time after nightfall, so that
their line could only be distinguished by the blaze of their fire. Some of
the batteries and infantry engaged against their fire till night was well

General Jackson thought to advance against the enemy's left late in the
afternoon, but found it so well posted and guarded that he concluded the
venture would be too hazardous. He lost his opportunity, failing to follow
close upon the repulse of Meade's and Gibbon's divisions. His command was
massed and well in hand, with an open field for infantry and artillery. He
had, including the divisions of Hood and Pickett,--ordered to work with
him,--about fifty thousand men. Franklin had, including troops of the
Centre Grand Division, about equal force.

The charge of Meade's division has been compared with that of Pickett's,
Pettigrew's, and Trimble's at Gettysburg, giving credit of better conduct
to the former. The circumstances do not justify the comparison.

When the fog lifted over Meade's advance he was within musket-range of A.
P. Hill's division, closely supported on his right by Gibbon's, and
guarded on his left by Doubleday's division. On Hill's right was a
fourteen-gun battery, on his left eight guns. Meade broke through Hill's
division, and with the support of Gibbon forced his way till he
encountered part of Ewell's division, when he was forced back in some
confusion. Two fresh divisions of the Third Corps came to their relief,
and there were as many as fifty thousand men at hand who could have been
thrown into the fight. Meade's march to meet his adversary was half a
mile,--the troops of both sides fresh and vigorous.

Of the assaulting columns of Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble, only four
thousand seven hundred under Pickett were fresh; the entire force of these
divisions was only fifteen thousand strong. They had a mile to march over
open field before reaching the enemy's line, strengthened by field-works
and manned by thrice their numbers. The Confederates at Gettysburg had
been fought to exhaustion of men and munitions. They lost about sixty per
cent. of the assaulting forces,--Meade about forty. The latter had fresh
troops behind him, and more than two hundred guns to cover his rallying
lines. The Confederates had nothing behind them but field batteries almost
exhausted of ammunition. That Meade made a brave, good fight is beyond
question, but he had superior numbers and appointments. At Gettysburg the
Confederate assault was made against intrenched lines of artillery and
infantry, where stood fifty thousand men.

A series of braver, more desperate charges than those hurled against the
troops in the sunken road was never known, and the piles and cross-piles
of dead marked a field such as I never saw before or since.

Between 1.30 and 2.30 of the afternoon several orders and messages were
sent by General Burnside calling on General Franklin to renew the battle
of the left. Before 2.30 he received from General Burnside, through his
aide-de-camp, Captain Goddard, this despatch:

    "Tell General Franklin, with my compliments, that I wish him to make a
    vigorous attack with his whole force. Our right is hard pressed."

Under ordinary circumstances this would be regarded as a strong order, but
Franklin had gone far enough in his first battle to be convinced that an
attack by his "whole force," the other end of the army "hard pressed,"
would be extremely hazardous. If undertaken and proved disastrous, he
could have been made to shoulder the whole responsibility, for a "wish"
implies discretion. It is not just to the subordinate to use such language
if orders are intended to be imperative. Men bred as soldiers have no
fancy for orders that carry want of faith on their face.

The losses at Fredericksburg were as follows:[113]


                                |         |          | Captured |
           Organization.        | Killed. | Wounded. |    or    | Total.
                                |         |          | Missing. |
  Right Grand Division (Sumner) |   523   |   4281   |    640   |  5,444
  Centre Grand Division (Hooker)|   352   |   2501   |    502   |  3,355
  Left Grand Division (Franklin)|   401   |   2761   |    625   |  3,787
  Engineers                     |     8   |     49   |      2   |     59
  Artillery Reserve             |    ..   |      8   |     ..   |      8
    Aggregate                   |  1284   |   9600   |   1769   | 12,653


                                |         |          | Captured |
           Organization.        | Killed. | Wounded. |    or    | Total.
                                |         |          | Missing. |
  First Army Corps (Longstreet) |   251   |   1516   |   127    |  1894
  Second Army Corps (Jackson)   |   344   |   2545   |   526    |  3415
  Stuart's Cavalry              |    ..   |     13   |    ..    |    13
    Aggregate                   |   595   |   4074   |   653    |  5322

During the night, before twelve o'clock, a despatch-bearer lost his way
and was captured. He had on his person a memorandum of the purpose of
General Burnside for renewing the battle against Marye's Hill in the
morning. The information was sent up to general head-quarters, and orders
were sent General Ransom to intrench his brigade along the crest of the
hill. Orders were sent other parts of the line to improve defences and
prepare for the next day in ammunition, water, and rations, under
conviction that the battle of next day, if made as ordered, would be the
last of the Army of the Potomac.

Morning came and passed without serious demonstrations on the part of the
enemy. Orders were sent out, however, for renewed efforts to strengthen
the position. Colonel Alexander found a point at which he could pit a gun
in enfilade position to the swell of ground behind which the enemy
assembled his forces before advancing to the charge, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Latrobe sunk a gun in similar position for fire across
the field of their charges. We were so well prepared that we became
anxious before the night of the 14th lest General Burnside would not come
again. In the night he drew back to the river, and during the night of the
15th recrossed and sent his troops to their camps.

The stone wall was not thought before the battle a very important element.
We assumed that the formidable advance would be made against the troops of
McLaws's division at Lee's Hill, to turn the position at the sunken
road, dislodge my force stationed there, then to occupy the sunken road,
and afterwards ascend to the plateau upon which the Marye mansion stands;
that this would bring their forces under cross and direct fire of all of
our batteries--short- and long-range guns--in such concentration as to
beat them back in bad disorder.

[Illustration: Osmun Latrobe. Chief of Staff of the First Corps, after the
Battle of the Wilderness.]

General Hood's failure to meet his orders to make counter to the
anticipated attack upon Jackson was reported in the official accounts. As
he was high in favor with the authorities, it did not seem prudent to
attempt to push the matter, as called for under the ordinary usages of
war. "_Bis peccare in bello non licet._"

General Lee went down to Richmond soon after the battle to propose active
operations, and returned with information that gold had advanced to 200 in
New York; that the war was over and peace would be announced in sixty
days; that it was useless to harass the troops by winter service. As gold
had gone well up on the Southern side without bringing peace, it was
difficult for soldiers to see the bearing that it could have on the other
side; still, we had some trust and hope in the judgment of superiors.

The forces available for battle at Fredericksburg were: Federal (according
to General Burnside's report), 116,683; Confederate, 78,000. About fifty
thousand of the Union troops were put into battle, and less than twenty
thousand of the Confederates were engaged.

The organization of the Confederate army at this time was as follows:



    MCLAWS'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws:--_Kershaw's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw; 2d S. C., Col. John D. Kennedy; 3d S.
    C., Col. James D. Nance, Lieut.-Col. William D. Rutherford, Maj.
    Robert C. Maffett, Capt. William W. Hance, Capt. John C. Summer, Capt.
    John K. G. Nance; 7th S. C., Lieut.-Col. Elbert Bland; 8th S. C.,
    Capt. E. T. Stackhouse; 5th S. C., Col. W. D. DeSaussure; 3d S. C.
    Battn., Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice. _Barksdale's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    William Barksdale; 13th Miss., Col. J. W. Carter; 17th Miss., Col.
    John C. Fiser; 18th Miss., Lieut.-Col. W. H. Luse; 21st Miss., Col.
    Benjamin G. Humphreys. _Cobb's Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen. T. R. R. Cobb,
    (2) Col. Robert McMillan; 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan; 18th Ga.,
    Lieut.-Col. S. Z. Ruff; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan; Cobb Legion;
    Phillips's Legion, Col. B. F. Cook. _Semmes's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    Paul J. Semmes; 10th, 50th, 51st, and 53d Ga. _Artillery_, Col. H. C.
    Cabell; Manly's (N. C.) battery, Read's (Ga.) battery, Richmond
    Howitzers (1st), McCarthy's battery; Troup (Ga.) Art. (Carlton's

    ANDERSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson:--_Wilcox's
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox; 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 14th
    Ala. _Mahone's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone; 6th, 12th, 16th,
    41st, and 61st Va. _Featherston's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. W. S.
    Featherston; 12th, 16th, 19th, and 48th Miss. (5 cos.). _Wright's
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright; 3d (Col. Edward J. Walker), 22d,
    48th (Capt. M. R. Hall), and 2d Ga. Battn. (Capt. C. J. Moffett).
    _Perry's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. E. A. Perry; 2d, 5th, and 8th Fla.,
    Capt. David Lang, Capt. Thomas R. Love. _Artillery_, Donaldsonville
    (La.) Art., Capt. V. Maurin; Huger's (Va.) battery, Capt. Frank Huger;
    Lewis's (Va.) battery, Capt. John W. Lewis; Norfolk (Va.) Light Art.
    Blues, Lieut. William T. Peet.

    PICKETT'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. George E. Pickett:--_Garnett's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Richard B. Garnett; 8th, 18th, 19th, 28th, and 56th Va.
    _Armistead's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead; 9th, 14th, 38th,
    53d, and 57th Va. _Kemper's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. James L. Kemper; 1st,
    3d, 7th, 11th, and 24th Va. _Jenkins's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. M.
    Jenkins; 1st (Hagood's), 2d (Rifles), 5th, and 6th S. C.; Hampton
    Legion; Palmetto Sharp-shooters. _Corse's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    Montgomery D. Corse; 15th, 17th, 30th, and 32d Va. _Artillery_,
    Dearing's (Va.) battery, Fauquier (Va.) Art. (Stribling's battery),
    Richmond (Fayette) Art. (Macon's battery).

    HOOD'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood:--_Law's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    E. M. Law; 4th and 44th Ala.; 6th and 54th N. C. (Col. J. C. S.
    McDowell); 57th N. C., Col. A. C. Goodwin. _Robertson's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. J. B. Robertson; 3d Ark.; 1st, 4th, and 5th Tex.
    _Anderson's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. George T. Anderson; 1st (Regulars),
    7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Ga. _Toombs's Brigade_, Col. H. L. Benning;
    2d, 15th, 17th, and 20th Ga. _Artillery_, German (S. C.) Art.
    (Bachman's battery), Palmetto (S. C.) Light Art. (Garden's battery),
    Rowan (N. C.) Art. (Reilly's battery).

    RANSOM'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.:--_Ransom's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.; 24th, 25th (Lieut.-Col. Samuel C.
    Bryson), 35th, and 49th N. C.; Branch's (Va.) battery. _Cooke's
    Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen. J. R. Cooke, (2) Col. E. D. Hall; 15th N. C.;
    27th N. C., Col. John A. Gilmer, Jr.; 46th N. C., Col. E. D. Hall;
    48th N. C., Lieut.-Col. Samuel H. Walkup; Cooper's (Va.) battery.

    FIRST CORPS ARTILLERY:[114]--_Washington (La.) Artillery_, Col. J. B.
    Walton; 1st Co., Capt. C. W. Squires; 2d Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson;
    3d Co., Capt. M. B. Miller; 4th Co., Capt. B. F. Eshleman.
    _Alexander's Battalion_, Lieut.-Col. E. Porter Alexander; Bedford
    (Va.) Art., Capt. Tyler C. Jordan; Eubank's (Va.) battery, Capt. J. L.
    Eubank; Madison Light Art. (La.), Capt. Geo. V. Moody; Parker's (Va.)
    battery, Capt. William W. Parker; Rhett's (S. C.) battery, Capt. A. B.
    Rhett; Woolfolk's (Va.) battery, Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr.


    D. H. HILL'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Daniel H. Hill:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes; 3d, 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Ala. _Second
    (Ripley's) Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. George Doles; 4th Ga.; 44th Ga., Col.
    John B. Estes; 1st and 3d N. C. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. A. H.
    Colquitt; 13th Ala.; 6th, 23d, 27th, and 28th Ga. _Fourth Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Alfred Iverson; 5th, 12th, 20th, and 23d N. C. _Fifth
    (Ramseur's) Brigade_, Col. Bryan Grimes; 2d, 4th, 14th, and 30th N. C.
    _Artillery_, Maj. H. P. Jones; Hardaway's (Ala.) battery, Jeff Davis
    (Ala.) Art. (Bondurant's battery), King William (Va.) Art. (Carter's
    battery), Morris (Va.) Art. (Page's battery), Orange (Va.) Art. (Fry's

    A. P. HILL'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill:--_First (Field's)
    Brigade_, Col. J. M. Brockenbrough; 40th, 47th (Col. Robert M. Mayo),
    55th, and 22d Va. Battn., Lieut.-Col. E. P. Tayloe. _Second Brigade_,
    (1). Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg, (2) Col. D. H. Hamilton; 1st S. C. (P.
    A.), Col. D. H. Hamilton; 1st S. C. Rifles; 12th, 13th, and 14th S. C.
    (Col. Samuel McGowan). _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas; 14th,
    35th, 45th, and 49th Ga. _Fourth Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Lane; 7th
    N. C., Lieut.-Col. J. L. Hill; 18th N. C., Col. Thomas J. Purdie; 28th
    N. C., Col. S. D. Lowe; 33d N. C., Col. Clark M. Avery; 37th N. C.,
    Col. W. M. Barbour. _Fifth Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Archer; 5th Ala.
    Battn., Maj. A. S. Van de Graaff, Capt. S. D. Stewart; 19th Ga.,
    Lieut.-Col. A. J. Hutchins; 1st Tenn. (Pro. Army), Col. Peter Turney,
    Lieut.-Col. N. J. George, Capt. M. Turney, Capt. H. J. Hawkins; 7th
    Tenn., Col. John F. Goodner; 14th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Lockert.
    _Sixth Brigade_, (1) Brig.-Gen. William D. Pender, (2) Col. A. M.
    Scales; 13th N. C., Col. A. M. Scales; 16th N. C., Col. John S.
    McElroy; 22d N. C., Maj. Christopher C. Cole; 34th and 38th N. C.
    _Artillery_, Lieut.-Col. R. L. Walker; Branch (N. C.) Art., Lieut. J.
    R. Potts; Crenshaw (Va.) Batt., Lieut. J. Ellett; Fredericksburg (Va.)
    Art., Lieut. E. A. Marye; Johnson's (Va.) battery, Lieut. V. J.
    Clutter; Letcher (Va.) Art., Capt, G. Davidson; Pee Dee (S. C.) Art.,
    Capt. D. G. McIntosh; Purcell (Va.) Art., Capt. W. J. Pegram.

    EWELL'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Jubal A. Early:--_Lawton's Brigade_, (1)
    Col. E. N. Atkinson, (2) Col. C. A. Evans; 13th Ga., Col. J. M. Smith;
    26th Ga., Capt. B. F. Grace; 31st Ga., Col. C. A. Evans; 38th Ga.,
    Capt. William L. McLeod; 60th Ga., Col. W. H. Stiles; 61st Ga., Col.
    J. H. Lamar, Maj. C. W. McArthur. _Trimble's Brigade_, Col. R. F.
    Hoke; 15th Ala.; 12th Ga.; 21st Ga., Lieut.-Col. Thomas W. Hooper;
    21st N. C. and 1st N. C. Battn. _Early's Brigade_, Col. J. A. Walker;
    13th Va., Lieut.-Col. J. B. Terrill; 25th, 31st, 44th, 49th, 52d, and
    58th Va. _Hays's (1st La.) Brigade_, Gen. Harry T. Hays; 5th, 6th,
    7th, 8th, and 9th La. _Artillery_ Capt. J. W. Latimer; Charlottesville
    (Va.) Art., Capt. J. McD. Carrington; Chesapeake (Md.) Art., Lieut.
    John E. Plater; Courtney (Va.) Art., Lieut. W. A. Tanner; 1st Md.
    Batt., Capt. William F. Dement; La. Guard Art., Capt. Louis E.
    D'Aquin; Staunton (Va.) Art., Lieut. Asher W. Garber.

    JACKSON'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William B. Taliaferro:--_First
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. E. F. Paxton; 2d Va., Capt. J. Q. A. Nadenbousch;
    4th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. D. Gardner, Maj. William Terry; 5th Va.,
    Lieut.-Col. H. J. Williams; 27th Va., Lieut.-Col. J. K. Edmondson; 33d
    Va., Col. Edwin G. Lee. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. J. R. Jones;
    21st, 42d, and 48th Va.; 1st Va. Battn. _Third (Taliaferro's)
    Brigade_, Col. E. T. H. Warren; 47th Ala., Capt. James M. Campbell;
    48th Ala., Capt. C. B. St. John; 10th Va., Capt. W. B. Yancey; 23d
    Va., Capt. A. J. Richardson; 37th Va., Col. T. V. Williams. _Fourth
    (Starke's) Brigade_, Col. Edmund Pendleton; 1st La. (Vols.),
    Lieut.-Col. M. Nolan; 2d La., Maj. M. A. Grogan; 10th La., Maj. John
    M. Legett; 14th La., Capt. H. M. Verlander; 15th La., Lieut.-Col. McG.
    Goodwyn; Coppens's (La.) Battn. _Artillery_, Capt. J. B.
    Brockenbrough; Carpenter's (Va.) battery, Lieut. George McKendree;
    Danville (Va.) Art., Capt. G. W. Wooding; Hampden (Va.) Art., Capt. W.
    H. Caskie; Lee (Va.) Art., Lieut. C. W. Statham; Lusk's (Va.) battery.

    RESERVE ARTILLERY,[115] Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton:--_Brown's
    Battalion_, Col. J. Thompson Brown; Brooke's (Va.) battery, Dance's
    battery, Powhatan Art., Hupp's battery, Salem Art., Poague's (Va.)
    battery, Rockbridge Art., Smith's battery, 3d Howitzers; Watson's
    battery, 2d Howitzers. _Cutts's (Ga.) Battalion_, Lane's battery,
    Patterson's battery, Ross's battery, Capt. H. M. Ross. _Nelson's
    Battalion_, Maj. William Nelson; Kirkpatrick's (Va.) battery, Amherst
    Art.; Massie's (Va.) battery, Fluvanna Art.; Milledge's (Ga.) battery.
    _Miscellaneous Batteries_, Ells's (Ga.) battery; Nelson's (Va.)
    battery, Hanover Art., Capt. G. W. Nelson; Breathed (Va.) battery, J.
    Breathed; Chew's (Va.) battery, R. P. Chew; Hart's (S. C.) battery, J.
    F. Hart; Henry's (Va.) battery, M. W. Henry; Moorman's (Va.) battery,
    M. N. Moorman.

    CAVALRY,[116] Maj.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart:--_First Brigade_,[117]
    Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton; 1st N. C., Col. L. S. Baker; 1st S. C., Col.
    J. L. Black; 2d S. C., Col. M. C. Butler; Cobb (Ga.) Legion,
    Lieut.-Col. P. M. B. Young; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col.
    William W. Rich. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee; 1st Va.,
    Col. James H. Drake; 2d Va., Col. Thomas T. Munford; 3d Va., Col. T.
    H. Owen; 4th Va., Col. William C. Wickham; 5th Va. _Third Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee; 2d N. C., Col. S. Williams; 9th Va., Col. R.
    L. T. Beale; 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; 13th Va., Col. J. R.
    Chambliss, Jr.; 15th Va., Col. William B. Ball. _Fourth Brigade_,[118]
    Brig.-Gen. W. E. Jones; 6th Va., Col. John S. Green; 7th Va., Col. R.
    H. Dulany; 12th Va., Col. A. W. Harman; 17th (Va.) Battn., Lieut.-Col.
    O. R. Funsten; White's (Va.) Battn., Maj. E. V. White.



    Burnside's Abortive Moves--The "Mud March"--General Hooker supersedes
    Burnside--The Confederates strengthen their Position for the
    Winter--Longstreet ordered to Petersburg--Secretary of War Seddon and
    the Author talk of General Grant and the Confederate Situation on the
    Mississippi and in the West--Longstreet makes a Radical Proposition
    for Confederate Concentration in Tennessee, thus to compel Grant to
    abandon Vicksburg--The Skilful Use of Interior Lines the Only Way of
    equalizing the Contest--Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee's Brilliant
    Achievement--Criticism--Death of "Stonewall" Jackson--The Resolve to
    march Northward--The Army reorganized in Three Corps--Ewell and A. P.
    Hill appointed Lieutenant-Generals.

Before we were fully settled in our winter quarters, and when just
beginning to enjoy our camp theatricals, we heard that General Burnside
was looking for another crossing by the lower Rappahannock. We were not
greatly concerned about that, however, as we thought the quicksands along
the flats, made especially protective by the winter rains, would so delay
his march as to allow us ample time to prepare for him. But the Washington
authorities having received reports of it through some of the superior
officers of the Army of the Potomac, the march was arrested by orders of
the War Department.

Another move was set on foot a few weeks later, at a time when General Lee
happened to be in Richmond. The information was forwarded to him and the
army ordered under arms, prepared to take the field. A few weeks before,
General Burnside had ordered material to be hauled to the point below,
which he had chosen when preparing for his crossing that had been arrested
by the War Department. When we found that his army was in motion, General
Jackson insisted that the crossing would be made below, and proposed to
march his corps down to meet it. He was told that the neck of land between
the Potomac and the Rappahannock was so interlaced with wet-weather
streams and ravines that the route leading below was not practicable at
that season; that the quicksands on the flats of the west side were
formidable obstacles to the march of an army; that the only possible route
for crossing the river was by the fords of the highlands, and that he must
hold his troops ready to move accordingly. He was not satisfied with the
refusal to accept his construction of the enemy's purpose, and demurred
against authority less than General Lee's, but found that the order must
be obeyed.

Not many hours after the report came, the noise of the army working
through the mud was distinctly heard by my picket guards along the upper
river. Some of the guards called out derisively, offering help to get the
batteries through the mud if they could only be assured that the army
would cross. The bottomless roads and severe weather broke up the
campaign, and the move back to camp was reported to me before the
Confederates marched from their camps. This effort, called by Burnside's
soldiers "The Mud March," was followed by the assignment of General Hooker
to command of the Army of the Potomac.

Long and close study of the field from the Potomac to the James River, and
the experiences of former campaigns, made it clear that the Army of the
Potomac had been drawn into a false position, and it became manifest that
there were but two moves left open for its spring campaign,--first, by
crossing the upper fords of the Rappahannock; secondly, by detaching
forces to the south side of the James, and by that route moving against

To guard against the former I laid out lines for field-works and
rifle-pits covering all approaches by the upper fords as far as the road
leading from United States Ford. From that point the line broke to the
rear, crossing the Plank road and extending back half a mile to command
the road from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania Court-House. When the
lines for these works were well marked, I was ordered, with the divisions
of Hood and Pickett and Dearing's and Henry's artillery battalions, to the
south side near Petersburg, to be in position to meet the latter move,
leaving the divisions of McLaws and R. H. Anderson to finish the work on
the lines of defence.

After passing to the south side of James River, assigning the troops to
points of observation near Blackwater River, and establishing
head-quarters at Petersburg, I learned that there was a goodly supply of
produce along the east coast of Virginia and North Carolina, inside the
military lines of the Federal forces. To collect and transport this to
accessible points for the Confederates, it was necessary to advance our
divisions so as to cover the country, and to hold the Federal forces in
and about their fortified positions while our trains were at work. To that
end I moved with the troops in Virginia across the Blackwater to close
lines about the forts around Suffolk, and ordered the troops along our
line in North Carolina to a like advance. The movements were executed
without serious trouble, and the work was prosecuted up to the time of my
recall by General Lee.

While lying near Suffolk a couple of young men dressed as citizens entered
my tent one night with letters from Secretary of War Seddon, recommending
them as trustworthy and efficient scouts. They were sent off through the
swamp to find their way to Norfolk and southward to report of roads or
routes for our troops in case we should wish to make a détour for the
capture of Suffolk. One of them, Harrison, proved to be an active,
intelligent, enterprising scout, and was retained in service.

The accounts that we gained indicated that Suffolk could be turned and
captured with little loss, but as we had given it up the year before as
untenable, and were liable to be called upon at any moment to give it up
again, it appeared that the "cost of the whistle" would be too high.

The only occurrence of serious moment while we had our forces about
Suffolk was the loss of Captain Stribling's battery, which had been
inadvertently posted by the officer in charge of the artillery on a neck
running out into a bend of the Nansemond River. The Federal gun-boats,
seeing the opportunity, came into the river and took positions commanding
the ground in rear of the battery so as to sweep the field against all
succoring parties, while a direct attack was made upon the battery,
resulting in its capture.

About this time the soldiers on both sides had considerable amusement over
a Federal signal station that was inside our lines as we had laid them.
The Union troops had some time previously trimmed up a tall pine-tree and
built near the top a platform for use as a signal station, and, coming
upon this, to gratify his curiosity a Confederate soldier climbed to the
staging and seated himself for a leisurely view of the Federal forces
inside their works. An artillerist of the other side, after allowing
sufficient time to satisfy a reasonable curiosity, trained one of his
rifle guns upon the platform, and sent a shell screaming and bursting too
near for the comfort of the "man up a tree." As he did not care to be seen
in precipitate retreat, he thought to wait a little, but a second shot
admonished him that hurry, if less graceful, might be more wise than
deliberate retreat. Acting under pressure of the situation, his legs, to
the amusement of the men on both sides, soon brought him to safe cover.
When night closed in over the belligerents this soldier went to work on a
scheme by which he hoped to get even with the Yankees. He carefully
constructed and equipped a full-sized man, dressed in a new suit of
improved "butternut"[119] dry-goods, and, in due form christening him
"Julius Cæsar," took him to the platform, adjusted him to graceful
position, and made him secure to the framework by strong cords. A little
after sunrise "Julius Cæsar" was discovered by some of the Federal battery
officers, who prepared for the target,--so inviting to skilful practice.
The new soldier sat under the hot fire with irritating indifference until
the Confederates, not able to restrain their hilarity, exposed the joke by
calling for "three cheers for Julius Cæsar." The other side quickly
recognized the situation, and good-naturedly added to ours their cheers
for the old hero.

About the 28th day of April the Army of the Potomac, under General Hooker,
took up its march for the fords of the upper Rappahannock to cross against
General Lee at Fredericksburg. At the same time General Grant crossed the
Mississippi below Vicksburg, marched against General Pemberton's army in
Mississippi, and was driving it back upon its fortifications about

When General Hooker's movements were so developed as to make sure of his
purpose, repeated calls came to me over the wires to pull away from
Suffolk and return to General Lee with all speed. These came from General
Lee, and also from the Richmond authorities. In reply I despatched that
our trains were at the front along the coast collecting supplies; that
they would be hurried to our rear, and as soon as safe we would march. The
calls became so frequent and urgent, however, that I inquired if we should
abandon our trains. To this no answer came; and I was left to the exercise
of my own judgment.

As soon as the trains were safely back, we drew off, marched back to the
Blackwater, and thence _en route_ for Richmond and Fredericksburg. Before
we reached the former place a telegram came announcing the great battle
and victory of Chancellorsville.

Passing through Richmond, I called to report to Secretary of War Seddon,
who referred to affairs in Mississippi, stating that the department was
trying to collect an army at Jackson, under General Joseph E. Johnston,
sufficient to push Grant away from his circling lines about Vicksburg. He
spoke of the difficulty of feeding as well as collecting an army of that
magnitude in Mississippi, and asked my views.

The Union army under General Rosecrans was then facing the Confederate
army under General Bragg in Tennessee, at Murfreesboro' and Shelbyville.

I thought that General Grant had better facilities for collecting supplies
and reinforcements on his new lines, and suggested that the only prospect
of relieving Vicksburg that occurred to me was to send General Johnston
and his troops about Jackson to reinforce General Bragg's army; at the
same time the two divisions of my command, then marching to join General
Lee, to the same point; that the commands moving on converging lines could
have rapid transit and be thrown in overwhelming numbers on Rosecrans
before he could have help, break up his army, and march for Cincinnati and
the Ohio River; that Grant's was the only army that could be drawn to meet
this move, and that the move must, therefore, relieve Vicksburg.

It was manifest before the war was accepted that the only way to equalize
the contest was by skilful use of our interior lines, and this was so
impressed by two years' experience that it seemed time to force it upon
the Richmond authorities. But foreign intervention was the ruling idea
with the President, and he preferred that as the easiest solution of all

The only objection offered by the Secretary was that Grant was such an
obstinate fellow that he could only be induced to quit Vicksburg by
terribly hard knocks.

On the contrary, I claimed that _he was a soldier_, and would obey the
calls of his government, but was not lightly to be driven from his

My march was continued, and we joined General Lee at Fredericksburg, where
I found him in sadness, notwithstanding that he was contemplating his
great achievement and brilliant victory of Chancellorsville, for he had
met with great loss as well as great gains. The battle had cost heavily of
his army, but his grief was over the severe wounding of his great
lieutenant, General Thomas Jonathan Jackson, the head of the Second Corps
of the Army of Northern Virginia; cut off, too, at a moment so much needed
to finish his work in the battle so handsomely begun. With a brave heart,
however, General Lee was getting his ranks together, and putting them in
condition for other useful work.

At the time of the battle of Chancellorsville the Army of the Potomac,
according to its return of a few days before, consisted of officers and
men actually available for line of battle, 113,838, with 404 pieces of
artillery.[120] The return of casualties showed the enormous loss of
17,287. Returns of the Army of Northern Virginia for March, 1863, showed
an effective aggregate of 59,681;[121] batteries in action, about 160
guns. To this may possibly be added one thousand of troops returning
during April in time for the battle. The casualties reported by the
medical director numbered 10,281, but reports of the commanders showed
over 12,000, not including artillery or cavalry, or slightly wounded and
missing, which would probably add another thousand.

Chancellorsville is usually accepted as General Lee's most brilliant
achievement, and, considered as an independent affair, it was certainly
grand. As I had no part in its active conduct, it is only apropos to this
writing to consider the plan of battle as projected some four months
previous,--_i.e._, to stand behind our intrenched lines and await the
return of my troops from Suffolk.

positions of forces in the field May 4th, 1863, when the concentration
against Rosecrans' Army was first proposed.]

Under that plan General Lee would have had time to strengthen and improve
his trenches, while Hooker was intrenching at Chancellorsville. He could
have held his army solid behind his lines, where his men would have done
more work on the unfinished lines in a day than in months of idle camp

General Hooker had split his army in two, and was virtually in the
condition which President Lincoln afterwards so graphically described in
his letter addressed to him June 5 following,--viz.:

    "I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an
    ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and
    rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other."

My impression was, and is, that General Lee, standing under his trenches,
would have been stronger against Hooker than he was in December against
Burnside, and that he would have grown stronger every hour of delay, while
Hooker would have grown weaker in morale and in confidence of his plan and
the confidence of his troops. He had interior lines for defence, while his
adversary was divided by two crossings of the river, which made Lee's
sixty thousand for defence about equal to the one hundred and thirteen
thousand under General Hooker. By the time that the divisions of Pickett
and Hood could have joined General Lee, General Hooker would have found
that he must march to attack or make a retreat without battle. It seems
probable that under the original plan the battle would have given fruits
worthy of a general engagement. The Confederates would then have had
opportunity, and have been in condition to so follow Hooker as to have
compelled his retirement to Washington, and that advantage might have
drawn Grant from Vicksburg; whereas General Lee was actually so crippled
by his victory that he was a full month restoring his army to condition to
take the field. In defensive warfare he was perfect. When the hunt was up,
his combativeness was overruling.

It was probably a mistake to draw McLaws away from his position at Marye's
Hill, where he and Ransom had successfully held against six or seven
severe attacks of the Burnside battle, with three brigades, two of his own
and one of Ransom's. General Early was assigned to that position with five
brigades. He was attacked by about one-fourth the number of McLaws's
assailants, the position was carried, and Early was driven off in
confusion, losing, besides large numbers as prisoners, many pieces of
artillery. His especial assignment was to defend the Plank road against
the enemy's march to attack General Lee's rear. Instead, he retreated by
the Telegraph road, leaving the Plank road free for the enemy. After
driving Early off, the enemy marched by the Plank road, and Early marched
back to his late position at Marye's Hill. So General Lee was obliged to
take McLaws and Anderson from his battle at Chancellorsville to drive back
the force threatening his rear.

The battle as pitched and as an independent affair was brilliant, and if
the war was for glory could be called successful, but, besides putting the
cause upon the hazard of a die, it was crippling in resources and of
future progress, while the wait of a few days would have given time for
concentration and opportunities against Hooker more effective than we
experienced with Burnside at Fredericksburg. This was one of the occasions
where success was not a just criterion.

After reporting to General Lee, I offered the suggestions made to
Secretary Seddon, in regard to the means that should be adopted for the
relief of Vicksburg. I thought that honor, interest, duty, and humanity
called us to that service, and asked the aid of his counsels with the War
Department, and reinforcements from his army for the West, to that end. I
suggested that General Johnston, instead of trying to collect an army
against General Grant, should be sent to reinforce General Bragg, then
standing against the Union forces under General Rosecrans in Middle
Tennessee; that at the same time he should send my divisions, just up from
Suffolk, to join Johnston's reinforcements to Bragg's army; that the
combination once made should strike immediately in overwhelming force upon
Rosecrans, and march for the Ohio River and Cincinnati.

He recognized the suggestion as of good combination, and giving strong
assurance of success, but he was averse to having a part of his army so
far beyond his reach. He reflected over the matter one or two days, and
then fell upon the plan of invading the Northern soil, and so threatening
Washington as to bring about the same hoped-for result. To that end he
bent his energies.

His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer
suggestions leading to a different course. All that I could ask was that
the policy of the campaign should be one of defensive tactics; that we
should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position
as we might find in his own country, so well adapted to that
purpose,--which might assure us of a grand triumph. To this he readily
assented as an important and material adjunct to his general plan. His
confidence in making moves threatening Washington and the invasion of
Maryland and Pennsylvania grew out of the known anxiety of the Washington
authorities as to the safety of their capital and of quiet within the
Union lines.

In the midst of his work of preparation came the announcement that
General Jackson's trouble had taken an unfortunate turn, that he was
thought to be sinking, and not many hours after that the news came that he
had gone to rest. But the full realization of all that this meant was
delayed until, at the railroad station, the train that was to bear his
remains to their final resting-place started upon its sad journey. Then
officers and soldiers gathered to do last honors to their dead comrade and
chieftain seemed suddenly to realize that they were to see "Stonewall"
Jackson no more forever, and fully to measure the great misfortune that
had come upon them. And as we turned away, we seemed to face a future
bereft of much of its hopefulness.

General Jackson's death suggested to General Lee a reorganization of his
army into three corps, and R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill, appointed
lieutenant-generals, were assigned to the Second and Third respectively.

As the senior major-general of the army, and by reason of distinguished
services and ability, General Ewell was entitled to the command of the
Second Corps, but there were other major-generals of rank next below Ewell
whose services were such as to give them claims next after Ewell's, so
that when they found themselves neglected there was no little discontent,
and the fact that both the new lieutenant-generals were Virginians made
the trouble more grievous.[122] Afterwards, when Early, noted as the
weakest general officer of the Army of Northern Virginia, was appointed
lieutenant-general over those who held higher rank than he, there was a
more serious feeling of "too much Virginia." Longstreet and Jackson had
been assigned by General Johnston.

In our anxious hours and hopeful anticipations the little quarrel was
soon lost sight of,--displaced by affairs of greater moment. Reaction
began to show the effect of General Lee's strong hand and hard work. Hope
and confidence impaired by the failure of the Maryland campaign were
restored, and we prepared to abandon all uncomfortable thoughts with the
graves of our fallen comrades.

As soon as affairs took such shape as to assure me that the advance
northward was inevitable, I sent a requisition down to Richmond for gold
coin for my scout Harrison, gave him what he thought he would need to get
along in Washington, and sent him off with secret orders, telling him that
I did not care to see him till he could bring information of
importance,--that he should be the judge of that. He wanted to know where
he would find us, and was told that the head-quarters of the First Corps
were large enough for any intelligent man to find. With these orders he
left us, and after about three weeks was arrested in Pennsylvania and
brought under guard to my head-quarters.



    Plan of the Confederate March North--General Lee hoped to draw Troops
    from the South and develop Important Results North of the Potomac--He
    wanted Beauregard sent to support the Movement--The Authorities in
    Richmond failed to comprehend--The Value of the "Interior Lines" not
    appreciated--Spirited Cavalry Fight at Brandy Station between Stuart's
    and Pleasonton's Commands--Engagement of Ewell and Milroy at
    Winchester--The Question of Authority for the Cavalry
    Movements--Lieutenant-Colonel Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards,
    British Army, as a Guest and Observer--The Confederate Advance reaches
    Pennsylvania Soil--General Lee issues Orders for a March on
    Harrisburg--Municipal Authorities of York and Gettysburg surrender to
    General John B. Gordon.

The absorbing study now was the projected campaign into Maryland and
Pennsylvania,--the invasion of the enemy's country. The plan of defensive
tactics gave some hope of success, and, in fact, I assured General Lee
that the First Corps would receive and defend the battle if he would guard
its flanks, leaving his other corps to gather the fruits of success. The
First Corps was as solid as a rock--a great rock. It was not to be broken
of good position by direct assault, and was steady enough to work and wait
for its chosen battle.

The Valley of the Shenandoah gave us firm, broad roads for the march
north, curtained by the solid range of the Blue Ridge and South Mountains.
There were some Federal troops occupying points in the Valley of Virginia,
but not more than enough to give healthful employment to our leading
columns as they advanced. The army as reorganized in three corps had three
divisions of each corps, with four brigades to the division, except R. H.
Anderson's, Pickett's, and Rodes's, each of which had five. J. E. B.
Stuart's cavalry consisted of the brigades of Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee,
W. H. F. Lee, Beverly Robertson, and W. E. Jones. The cavalry of Jenkins
and Imboden, operating in the Valley and West Virginia near our route, was
to move, the former with Ewell, the latter on his left. Six batteries of
horse artillery under Major R. F. Beckham were of Stuart's command, and to
each army corps were attached five battalions of artillery of four guns to
a battery, and four batteries to a battalion, making of the whole
artillery organization, including batteries of reserve and the thirty guns
of horse artillery, two hundred and eighty-seven guns. In the three army
corps there were thirty-nine brigades, proper, of infantry.

In the Army of the Potomac were fifty-one brigades of infantry, eight
brigades of cavalry, and three hundred and seventy guns of artillery. The
artillery appointments were so superior that our officers sometimes felt
humiliated when posted to unequal combat with their better metal and
munitions. In small-arms also the Union troops had the most improved

Notwithstanding, we were prepared to march forward and cheerfully accept
the gage, hoping to overbalance these advantages through the morale
afforded by brave hearts and the strategic skill to throw the onus of
battle upon the enemy.

The plan of campaign as projected was by the march of the Second Corps
through the Valley of the Shenandoah to drive off or capture the Federal
forces stationed along the Valley, and continue the march to Pennsylvania
until further orders, meanwhile collecting supplies for the advance and
for those who were to follow, Jenkins's brigade of cavalry working with
the advance, and Imboden's on its left; the First Corps and main force of
cavalry to march near the east base of the Blue Ridge, threatening towards
the rear line of the Army of the Potomac, and occupy the Blue Ridge, while
the trains and other troops passed behind the mountains to follow the
advance march. Stuart's cavalry brigades were to observe between the First
Corps and the Union army. When the Third Corps had passed behind the
First, the latter and the cavalry were to withdraw and follow the general
march. Stuart, whose movements were to correspond to those of the First
Corps, was to follow its withdrawal and cross the Potomac on our right
flank at Shepherdstown. The brigades of Generals M. Jenkins and M. D.
Corse of Pickett's division, left in Virginia near Petersburg and Hanover
Junction, were to follow and join their division, as will soon appear.

General Beauregard was to be called from his post, in the South, with such
brigades as could be pulled away temporarily from their Southern service,
and thrown forward, with the two brigades of Pickett's division (Jenkins's
and Corse's) and such others as could be got together, along the Orange
and Alexandria Railroad in threatening attitude towards Washington City,
and he was to suddenly forward Pickett's brigades through the Valley to
the division, and at his pleasure march on, or back towards Richmond.

As the season of fevers along the coast of the Carolinas was approaching,
General Lee thought that active operations in the far South, especially
along the seaboard, would be suspended, that his move northward might draw
most of them towards him, and possibly troops operating in the Southwest,
the latter being really a prominent part of the object of his northern
march. He thought that Beauregard's appearance in Northern Virginia would
increase the known anxiety of the Washington authorities and cause them to
draw troops from the South, when in the progress of events other similar
movements might follow on both sides until important results could be
developed north of the Potomac.

His early experience with the Richmond authorities taught him to deal
cautiously with them in disclosing his views, and to leave for them the
privilege and credit of approving, step by step, his apparently hesitant
policy, so that his plans were disclosed little at a time; and, finding
them slow in approving them, still slower in advancing the brigades of
Pickett's division, and utterly oblivious of the effect of a grand swing
north on our interior lines, he did not mention the part left open for
Beauregard until he had their approval of the march of the part of his
command as he held it in hand. The part assigned for Beauregard became the
subject for correspondence between the authorities and the officers who
knew nothing of the general ideas and plans. The latter failed to see any
benefit to accrue by taking troops from their commands, and naturally
offered objections to their going. The authorities, not comprehending the
vast strength to be gathered by utilizing our interior lines, failed to
bring about their execution, and the great possibility was not fully

In pursuance of the plan for the northern campaign our march was taken up
on Wednesday, the 3d of June, McLaws's division of the First Corps
marching on that date from Fredericksburg, and Hood's from near Orange
Court-House on the 4th; Rodes's division of the Second Corps followed, and
on the 5th Johnson's and Early's of the Second. Pickett of the First, with
three of his brigades, followed the course of Hood's division. All were to
assemble at Culpeper Court-House, near our cavalry head-quarters. The
Third Corps, General A. P. Hill, was left in observation of the enemy at

When General Hooker discovered the thinning of our camps in rear of
Fredericksburg, he put a bridge across the Rappahannock at Deep Run,
crossed a considerable force of artillery and infantry, and constructed a
line of rifle-pits along the river bank. At the report of these movements,
General Lee thought to delay the movements of the Second Corps, though he
hurried those of the First to draw off the Federals from action against
Hill, but holding the Second ready to go back to him should there be need.
Hill made a similar demonstration against Hooker, threatening on the river
below, though not so far as to cross it, which caused the Federals to draw
their troops from the south side. The Second Corps was then hurried on to
Culpeper Court-House.

The First and Second Corps waited at the court-house to know if
indications about Fredericksburg were such as to warrant the onward march.
General Hooker, not convinced that General Lee had left him, ordered his
cavalry under General Pleasonton, supported by two brigades of infantry,
to cross the Rappahannock in search of Stuart's cavalry, and to secure
information of the Confederate plans. Pleasonton's force, including
infantry, was eleven thousand. He divided his command, sending one half by
Beverley's, the other by Kelly's Ford, to march on converging roads to
Brandy Station, near Fleetwood, the latter point the head-quarters of our
cavalry chief, five miles west of Rappahannock Bridge.

Happily for the Confederates, the cavalry brigades had been drawn together
on the 8th for review by General Lee, and rested that night not remote
from cavalry head-quarters. On the 9th, Pleasonton's columns made an
unlooked-for advance and engaged the Confederates, before notice could be
sent to the columns at their camps. The march resulted in a very severe
and strongly disputed cavalry fight, ending in heavy losses on both sides.
General Stuart called for infantry supports before the close of the
conflict, but succeeded in recovering his position before the infantry
reached him,--not, however, until some important despatches were taken by
the enemy, which gave the information they were seeking. Stuart reported
485 officers and men lost; Pleasonton, 907, and three pieces of artillery.
On the 10th, Ewell took up his march for the Valley by Chester Gap. Now,
General Milroy had a division of nine thousand Federals at Winchester, and
sought to hold it contrary to his orders to retire to the command at
Harper's Ferry. He had a brigade on outpost at Berryville under
McReynolds. General Kelly had ten thousand men at Harper's Ferry, with a
strong detachment of infantry and a battery at Martinsburg, under Colonel
B. F. Smith.

Upon entering the Valley, General Ewell detached Rodes's division and
Jenkins's cavalry to cut off and capture the force at Berryville, but
McReynolds withdrew in time to join the forces at Winchester. This
Confederate column then marched for Martinsburg, and got possession there
on the 14th, the garrison marching out and joining the troops on Maryland
Heights. The artillery trying to escape north towards Williamsport was
followed so closely that they lost some three or four guns. With his
divisions under Johnson and Early, General Ewell marched to Winchester and
attacked and carried the outworks of Milroy's fortified position, when the
latter, after calling a council, decided to retreat, leaving his artillery
and wagon-trains. Ewell had anticipated this, and sent a part of Johnson's
division, one brigade, to intercept him on the Martinsburg road. The
commands met about daylight, and there ensued a severe engagement,
successful to the Federals till reinforcements came to the Confederates,
when Milroy's command was broken up, part of his troops escaping to
Harper's Ferry and part getting over the Potomac at Hancock. The Federals
at Harper's Ferry abandoned their position in Virginia, seeking shelter on
the heights on the Maryland side.

On his march through the Valley, General Ewell took 4000 prisoners and
small-arms, 25 cannon, 11 standards, 250 wagons, 400 horses, and large
quantities of subsistence and quartermaster's stores, with a loss of 269
of all arms. He crossed the Potomac on the 15th, occupying Hagerstown and
Sharpsburg, on the Maryland side, and sent the cavalry brigade, under
Jenkins, north towards Chambersburg.

By the plan of march from the Valley of Virginia the leading corps
(Second) was to divide and cross the Potomac River at Williamsport and
Shepherdstown, the column through Williamsport to march through Hagerstown
and Chambersburg towards Harrisburg, collecting produce and supplies for
the army, Imboden's cavalry on its left flank. The eastern column was to
march through Sharpsburg, Emmitsburg, and Gettysburg towards the bridge
over the Susquehanna River at Wrightsville, Jenkins's cavalry brigade
working with the two columns. The Third Corps, passing behind the Blue
Ridge, was to cross at Shepherdstown and follow the march of the eastern
column. The First Corps was to draw back from the Blue Ridge and cross the
Potomac at Williamsport, to be followed by the cavalry, which was to cross
at Shepherdstown and ride severely towards Baltimore, to force the enemy
to eastern concentration.

The object of the march of the eastern columns, besides opening a wide
field for foraging, was to draw the enemy from the route of travel of the
supply trains, and to press him off east to give opportunity for the
western columns to file in between him and Washington.

The reconnoissance and cavalry fight made against Stuart at Fleetwood gave
General Hooker conclusive evidence of the march of the Army of Northern
Virginia, and he drew off from Stafford Heights on the 13th, and marched
towards the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the Potomac River. The
First Corps was ordered north along the east base of the Blue Ridge to
guard our line of march and cover, in a measure, the Confederate plans,
Stuart's cavalry to ride between the First Corps and the Union army. On
the 19th the divisions of the First Corps were posted along the Blue Ridge
from Ashby's Gap on the right to Snicker's Gap on the left, McLaws at the
former, Hood at the latter, Pickett's three brigades between the others.
Under the impression that the cavalry was to operate with the First Corps,
in the general plan, the commander was ordered to follow its withdrawal
west of the Blue Ridge and cross the Potomac on its right at
Shepherdstown, and make his ride towards Baltimore. He claimed that
General Lee had given him authority to cross east of the Blue Ridge.

After the First Corps was in position on the Blue Ridge, and while the
Third was passing our rear down the Valley, it seems that General Lee so
far modified the plan of march north as to authorize his cavalry chief to
cross the Potomac with part of his command east of the Blue Ridge, and to
change the march of the Third Corps by Hagerstown and Chambersburg. The
point at which the cavalry force should cross the river was not determined
between the Confederate commander and his chief of cavalry, there being
doubt whether the crossing could better be made at Point of Rocks, between
the Union army and the Blue Ridge, or between that army and Washington
City. That question was left open, and I was ordered to choose between the
two points named at the moment that my command took up its line of march.

The First Corps was withdrawn from the Blue Ridge on the 20th, forded the
Shenandoah, and camped on its left bank. On the 21st, Pleasonton came, in
full force, supported by infantry, against Stuart's cavalry brigades. The
severe part of the fight came from Upperville, and succeeded in driving
Stuart back into Ashby's Gap. Part of McLaws's division was sent back in
time to support Stuart, and in the morning McLaws ordered Wofford's
brigade down upon the plain, but Pleasonton had withdrawn. The infantry
was recalled after an exchange of a few shots at great range.

Connected with the cavalry raid and orders authorizing it are matters of
more than usual interest. On the 22d the Confederate commander sent
unsealed instructions to his cavalry chief, through head-quarters of the
First Corps, to be forwarded, provided the cavalry could be spared from my
front and could make the ride without disclosing our plans, expressing his
preference for the ride through Hopewell Gap east of the Union army. As
previously stated, I was to decide at the last moment between the two
points that had been named. As my front was changed to the rear for the
march north, the cavalry could be of no service there. The extent of
authority with me, therefore, was to decide whether the crossing should be
made at the Point of Rocks or around through Hopewell Gap east of the
Union army. The crossing at Point of Rocks was not only hazardous, but
more likely to indicate our plans than any move that could be made,
leaving the ride through Hopewell Gap the only route for the raiding
party. In my note to General Stuart enclosing General Lee's instructions
was this item:

    "P.S.--I think your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present
    moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not
    leave us, therefore, unless you can take the route in rear of the

This has been put in italics and published as evidence that the raid was
made by my orders, as well as by General Lee's. In the postscript three
points are indicated:

First, the move along my rear to the crossing at Point of Rocks.

Second, my preferred march on my flank to the Shepherdstown crossing.

Third, the route indicated by General Lee.

[Illustration: Arthur Lyon Fremantle. Lieutenant-Colonel Coldstream
Guards, Her Majesty's Service.]

All of which General Stuart understood as well as I did. Especially did he
know that _my orders were that he should ride on the right of my column,
as originally designed_, to the Shepherdstown crossing. In the body of
my note were orders that he should report to me of affairs along the
cavalry line before leaving; that he should assign General Hampton to
command of the cavalry to be left with us, with orders to report at my
head-quarters. These orders, emanating properly from the commander of the
rear column of the army, should not have been questioned, but they were
treated with contumely. He assigned General Robertson to command the
cavalry that was left on the mountain, without orders to report at my
head-quarters; and though left there to guard passes of the Blue Ridge, he
rode on a raid, so that when the cavalry was most needed it was far away
from the army. The raid and the absence of the cavalry at the critical
moment were severely criticised through the army and the country. If
General Stuart could have claimed authority of my orders for his action,
he could not have failed to do so in his official account. He offered no
such excuse, but claimed to act under the orders of his chief, and
reported that General Lee gave consent to his application for leave to
make the march. So our plans, adopted after deep study, were suddenly
given over to gratify the youthful cavalryman's wish for a nomadic ride.

About this time we entertained a distinguished visitor. An officer of the
British service, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur J. L. Fremantle, of the
Coldstream Guards, brought letters from the Secretary of War to General
Lee and myself. He was seeking opportunity to observe the campaign as a
non-combatant; he travelled with us, divided his time between general
head-quarters and head-quarters of the First Corps, cheerfully adapted his
tastes to the rough ways of Confederate soldiers, and proved to be an
interesting companion. To avoid the blockade he came to the Confederacy
through Mexico. He gave a graphic account of his experience in Texas and
travel after crossing the Rio Grande to the interior in a two-horse hack.
The drivers of his conveyance were Mr. Sargeant and Judge Hyde, two
characters whom I had met years before while in army service on the Texas
frontier. They called their team Grant and Sherman, and enjoyed their
glorious rides down the smooth slopes of the prairie roads, as they
rattled their heels upon the box of the hack and plied their team, Grant
and Sherman, with whips and oaths. But the great novelty to him was the
position of the judge. In England there are few judges comparatively, and
those of high estate. To find an American judge playing assistant to a
hack-driver was refreshing, and Colonel Fremantle thoroughly enjoyed it. I
now have the pleasure to salute our genial war-time visitor as governor at
Malta and Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, K.C.M.,
G.C.B., and to offer congratulations to Her Most Noble Majesty upon her
worthy subject.

On the 23d of June the divisions of the Third Corps passed on towards the
Potomac, followed by those of the First, the former crossing at
Shepherdstown, the latter at Williamsport. The corps came together at
Hagerstown, in Maryland, continued their march till the 27th, and rested
two days at Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania. The cavalry under General
Imboden, ordered on General Ewell's left, was due as far north as
McConnellsburg, but had halted at Hancock.

On the 28th, General Lee issued orders for the march upon Harrisburg.
General Ewell had marched his main column through Chambersburg to
Carlisle. His column, intending to move east of the mountains through
Emmitsburg and Gettysburg, had marched parallel to the main column as far
as Greenwood, when orders were renewed for it to march east through
Gettysburg. General Early, commanding, ordered Gordon's brigade and a
detachment of cavalry through Gettysburg; but his other troops marched
north through Mummasburg. The failure of the Imboden cavalry on his left
caused General Ewell to send General George H. Steuart through
McConnellsburg as guard of that flank. Steuart's command rejoined him at
Carlisle. As General Ewell marched he sent us three thousand head of beef
cattle and information of five thousand barrels of flour. He halted at
Carlisle on the 27th. The municipal authorities of Gettysburg and York
surrendered to General Gordon, who took some prisoners of the State
militia, and marched to the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville,
where he had other prisoners, but the bridge was burned before him. His
brigade returned to the vicinity of York, where the division had marched
and bivouacked on the night of the 28th.



    Information of Federal Force and Positions brought by the Scout
    Harrison--General Lee declines to credit it--General Longstreet
    suggests a Change of Direction in Conformance with the
    Revelation--General Meade had succeeded Hooker in Command Five Days
    before Battle--Positions on the Eve of the First Day--Confederate
    Cavalry "not in sight"--"The Eyes of the Army" sadly needed--A
    Description of the Famous Battle-field--Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill
    engage the Federals--Death of General John F. Reynolds--The Fight on
    Seminary Ridge--General Hancock in Federal Command on the
    Field--Concerning the Absent Cavalry and Information given by the
    Scout--Conditions at the Close of the First Day's Fight.

The eve of the great battle was crowded with events. Movements for the
concentration of the two vast armies went on in mighty force, but with a
silence in strong contrast to the swift-coming commotion of their shock in
conflict. It was the pent quiet of the gathering storm whose bursting was
to shake the continent and suddenly command the startled attention of the

After due preparation for our march of the 29th, all hands turned in early
for a good night's rest. My mind had hardly turned away from the cares and
labors of the day, when I was aroused by some one beating on the pole of
my tent. It proved to be Assistant Inspector-General Fairfax. A young man
had been arrested by our outlying pickets under suspicious circumstances.
He was looking for General Longstreet's head-quarters, but his comfortable
apparel and well-to-do, though travel-stained, appearance caused doubt in
the minds of the guards of his being a genuine Confederate who could be
trusted about head-quarters. So he was sent up under a file of men to be
identified. He proved to be Harrison, the valued scout. He had walked
through the lines of the Union army during the night of the 27th and
the 28th, secured a mount at dark of the latter day to get in as soon as
possible, and brought information of the location of two corps of Federals
at night of the 27th, and approximate positions of others. General Hooker
had crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 26th of June. On the 27th he had
posted two army corps at Frederick, and the scout reported another near
them, and two others near South Mountain, as he escaped their lines a
little after dark of the 28th. He was sent under care of Colonel Fairfax
to make report of his information at general head-quarters. General Lee
declined, however, to see him, though he asked Colonel Fairfax as to the
information that he brought, and, on hearing it, expressed want of faith
in reports of scouts, in which Fairfax generally agreed, but suggested
that in this case the information was so near General Longstreet's ideas
of the probable movements of the enemy that he gave credit to it. I also
sent up a note suggesting a change of direction of the head of our column
east. This I thought to be the first and necessary step towards bringing
the two armies to such concentration east as would enable us to find a way
to draw the enemy into battle, in keeping with the general plan of
campaign, and at the same time draw him off from the travel of our trains.

[Illustration: HARRISON. The Confederate scout who brought to General Lee
the first news of Meade's assignment to command, and the positions of the
Corps of the Army of the Potomac.]

There were seven corps of the Army of the Potomac afield. We were informed
on the 28th of the approximate positions of five of them,--three near
Frederick and two near the base of South Mountain. The others, of which we
had no definite information, we now know were the Sixth (Sedgwick's),
south of Frederick and east of the Monocacy, and the Twelfth, towards
Harper's Ferry.

On the 26th, General Hooker thought to use the Twelfth Corps and the
garrison of Harper's Ferry to strike the line of our communication, but
General Halleck forbade the use of the troops of that post, when General
Hooker asked to be relieved of the responsibility of command, and was
succeeded by General Meade on the night of the 27th.

If General Hooker had been granted the authority for which he applied, he
would have struck our trains, exposed from Chambersburg to the Potomac
without a cavalryman to ride and report the trouble. General Stuart was
riding around Hooker's army, General Robertson was in Virginia, General
Imboden at Hancock, and Jenkins's cavalry was at our front with General

By the report of the scout we found that the march of Ewell's east wing
had failed of execution and of the effect designed, and that heavy columns
of the enemy were hovering along the east base of the mountain. To remove
this pressure towards our rear, General Lee concluded to make a more
serious demonstration and force the enemy to look eastward. With this view
he changed direction of the proposed march north, by counter-orders on the
night of the 28th, calling concentration east of the mountains at
Cashtown, and his troops began their march under the last orders on the

It seems that General Hill misconstrued the orders of the day, or was
confused by the change of orders, and was under the impression that he was
to march by York and cross the Susquehanna towards Philadelphia or
Harrisburg. He ordered his leading division under Heth to Cashtown,
however, and followed with Pender's division on the 30th, leaving orders
for the division of R. H. Anderson to follow on the 1st. The purpose of
General Lee's march east was only preliminary,--a concentration about

General Ewell was ready to march for Harrisburg on the 29th, when orders
reached him of the intended concentration at Cashtown. He was at Carlisle
with Rodes's and E. Johnson's divisions and the reserve artillery; his
other division under Early was at York. On the 30th, Rodes was at
Heidlersburg, Early near by, and Johnson, with the reserve artillery, near
Green Village.

Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division, advancing towards Gettysburg on
the 30th, encountered Buford's cavalry and returned to Cashtown.

On the 29th, General Meade wired General Halleck,--

    "If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army
    and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon
    General Couch, with his force, holding him, until I can fall upon his
    rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do.... My endeavor
    will be, in my movements, to hold my force well together, with the
    hope of falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail."[123]

As the change of orders made Gettysburg prominent as the point of impact,
the positions of the commands relative thereto and their distances
therefrom are items of importance in considering the culmination of


    General Lee's head-quarters, Greenwood.

    First Corps, Chambersburg, twenty-four miles to Gettysburg; part at
    Greenwood, sixteen miles.

    Second Corps and Jenkins's cavalry, Heidlersburg, ten miles; part near
    Green Village, twenty-three miles (Johnson's division and trains).

    Third Corps, near Greenwood, sixteen miles, and Cashtown, eight miles.

    Stuart's cavalry, circling between York and Carlisle, out of sight.

    Robertson's cavalry, in Virginia, beyond reach.

    Imboden's cavalry, at Hancock, out of sight.

    The Confederates not intending to precipitate battle.


    General Meade's head-quarters, Taneytown, fourteen miles.

    General Hunt, artillery reserve, Taneytown.

    First Corps, Marsh Run, six miles.

    Second Corps, Uniontown, twenty-two miles.

    Third Corps, Bridgeport, twelve miles.

    Fifth Corps, Union Mills, fifteen miles.

    Sixth Corps, Manchester, twenty-two miles.

    Eleventh Corps, Emmitsburg, twelve miles.

    Twelfth Corps, Littletown, nine miles.

    Kilpatrick's cavalry, Hanover, thirteen miles.

    Gregg's cavalry, Manchester, twenty-two miles.

    Buford's cavalry, Gettysburg.

It should be borne in mind that the field of contention was south and east
of Gettysburg, so that the Union troops were from two to four miles nearer
their formation for battle than were the Confederates, who had to march
from two to four miles _beyond the town_.

Referring to the map, it may be seen that the Confederate corps had two
routes by which to march for concentration,--viz., from Heidlersburg to
Cashtown, part of the Second Corps; on the road from Chambersburg, the
First, Third, and part of the Second Corps (with all of the trains of the
latter), with but a single track, the Chambersburg-Gettysburg turnpike.
Some of their distances were greater than any of the columns of the enemy,
while the Army of the Potomac had almost as many routes of march as
commands, and was marching from day to day anticipating a general
engagement, which they were especially cautioned on the 30th was imminent.

General Hill decided to go beyond Cashtown on the 1st to ascertain as to
the enemy reported at Gettysburg. He gave notice of his intentions to
General Ewell, and sent back to the commanding general to have Anderson's
division sent forward. He was at Cashtown with Heth's and Pender's
divisions and their batteries; his reserve artillery with Anderson's
division at Fayetteville.

The armies on the night of June 30 stood thus:

The Confederate: First Corps, two divisions at Greenwood (except one
brigade detached under orders from head-quarters at New Guilford);
Pickett's three brigades at Chambersburg, left under orders from
head-quarters to guard trains; the Second Corps, two divisions near
Heidlersburg, one near and north of Chambersburg; the Third Corps at
Cashtown and Fayetteville; cavalry not in sight or hearing, except
Jenkins's brigade and a small detachment.

The Union army: the First Corps on Marsh Run, the Second at Uniontown, the
Third at Bridgeport, the Fifth at Union Mills, the Sixth at Manchester,
the Eleventh at Emmitsburg, the Twelfth at Littlestown, Fitzpatrick's
cavalry at Hanover, Buford's at Gettysburg (except one brigade, detached,
guarding his trains). General Meade's head-quarters and reserve artillery
were at Taneytown. His army, including cavalry, in hand.

General Lee's orders called his troops on converging lines towards
Cashtown, but he found that part of his infantry must be left at
Chambersburg to await the Imboden cavalry, not up, and one of Hood's
brigades must be detached on his right at New Guilford to guard on that
side in place of Robertson's cavalry (in Virginia). So that as he advanced
towards his adversary, the eyes and ears of his army were turned afar off,
looking towards the homes of non-combatants. It is bootless to this
writing to restate whence came this mishap. There is no doubt it greatly
disturbed General Lee's mind, and he would have called a halt under
ordinary circumstances, but his orders did not contemplate immediate
movements beyond Cashtown. In that he felt safe, depending upon his
cavalry coming up in time to meet him there.

He was in his usual cheerful spirits on the morning of the 1st, and called
me to ride with him. My column was not well stretched on the road before
it encountered the division of E. Johnson (Second Corps) cutting in on our
front, with all of Ewell's reserve and supply trains. He ordered the First
Corps halted, and directed that Johnson's division and train should pass
on to its corps, the First to wait. During the wait I dismounted to give
Hero a little respite. (The Irish groom had christened my favorite horse

After a little time General Lee proposed that we should ride on, and soon
we heard reports of cannon. The fire seemed to be beyond Cashtown, and as
it increased he left me and rode faster for the front.

The brigades of Gamble and Devin of Buford's cavalry were the force that
met Pettigrew's brigade on the afternoon of the 30th, when the latter
retired to the post of the divisions at Cashtown.

From Gettysburg roads diverge to the passes of the mountains, the borders
of the Potomac and Susquehanna, and the cities of Baltimore and
Washington; so that it was something of a strategic point. From the west
side two broad roads run, one northwest to Chambersburg _via_ Cashtown,
the other southwest through Fairfield to Hagerstown. They cross an
elevated ridge, a mile out north, and south of the Lutheran Seminary,
known to the Confederates as Seminary Ridge, covered by open forests. At
the northward, about two miles from the town, the ridge divides, a lesser
ridge putting out west, and presently taking a parallel course with the
greater. This was known as McPherson's Ridge, and was about five hundred
yards from the first, where the road crosses it. Nearly parallel with the
Chambersburg pike and about two hundred yards distant was the cut of an
unfinished railroad. Willoughby's Run flows south in a course nearly
parallel to and west of the ridge, and is bordered by timbered lands.
North of Gettysburg the grounds are open and in fair fields. Directly
south of it a bold ridge rises with rough and steep slopes. The prominent
point of the south ridge is Cemetery Hill, and east of this is Culp's
Hill, from which the ridge turns sharply south half a mile, and drops off
into low grounds. It was well wooded and its eastern ascent steep. East of
it and flowing south is Rock Creek. From Cemetery Hill the ground is
elevated, the ridge sloping south to the cropping out of Little Round Top,
Devil's Den, and the bolder Round Top, the latter about three miles south
of the town. Cemetery Hill is nearly parallel to Seminary Ridge, and is
more elevated.

At five o'clock on the morning of July 1, General A. P. Hill marched
towards Gettysburg with the divisions of Heth and Pender, and the
battalions of artillery under Pegram and McIntosh, Heth's division and
Pegram's artillery in advance. R. H. Anderson's division, with the reserve
artillery left at Fayetteville, was ordered to march and halt at Cashtown.
About ten o'clock Heth encountered Buford's cavalry. Archer's brigade,
leading, engaged, and Davis's brigade came up on his left with part of
Pegram's artillery. The cavalry was forced back till it passed
Willoughby's Run.

On the 30th of June, General John F. Reynolds had been directed to resume
command of the right wing of the Union army,--First, Third, and Eleventh
Corps. He was advised that day of the threatening movements of the
Confederates on the Cashtown and Mummasburg roads. At the same time the
indications from General Meade's head-quarters pointed to Pipe Creek as
the probable line in case of battle. Reynolds, however, prepared to
support Buford's line of cavalry, and marched at eight o'clock on the 1st
of July with Wadsworth's division and Hall's battery, leaving the other
divisions of Doubleday and Robinson with the artillery to follow under
General Doubleday, who became commander of the corps upon the assignment
of Reynolds to command of the wing.

As Reynolds approached Gettysburg, in hearing of the cavalry fight, he
turned the head of his column to the left and marched through the fields
towards the engagement. As the cavalry skirmish line retired and passed
Willoughby's Run, he approached with his reinforcements,
Brigadier-General Cutter in advance, and was put in on the north of the
Cashtown road, followed by Hall's battery. Brigadier-General Meredith
following, his brigade was put into line on the left. As fast as the
troops got into line they became severely engaged. Doubleday, in advance
of the divisions under him, put Meredith's brigade in formidable position
on a strip of woodland on the left.

As the Confederate left advanced through the railroad cut they came upon
Hall's battery, and were about to get it, when it was saved by speedy
withdrawal, which caused the Union right to retire, while Archer's brigade
of the Confederate right, in pushing to the front, came in open space
before Meredith's brigade, which in turn made a gallant advance, drove
Archer back, followed across the run, and captured General Archer and one
thousand of his men. The other two brigades of Pender's division,
Pettigrew's and Brockenbrough's, were put in on the right of Archer's men.
During the severe engagement on his right the advance of the Confederate
infantry got in so close along the railroad cut that General Reynolds, in
efforts to extricate his right, was shot, when the right, still under
severe pressure, was forced to retire towards Seminary Ridge. Hall's
battery, severely crippled, succeeded in getting away as the right

Doubleday's other divisions came up about the moment General Reynolds was
killed. The Second (Robinson's) and Third (Rowley's) Divisions deployed on
the right and left. Cooper's battery of four three-inch guns followed the
left division. At the same time Hill reinforced by his division under
Pender, Thomas's brigade on his left, Lane, Scales, and Perrin to the
right. These restored the Confederate right, overlapping the Federal left;
at the same time Thomas's brigade made successful battle on the left,
pushing off Wadsworth's right and Hall's battery, when the two brigades of
the Second Division (Robinson's) were sent to their support, but were, in
turn, forced back towards Seminary Ridge. The Confederate sharp-shooters
cut down the horses of one of Hall's guns and forced him to drop it. Hill
advanced Pegram's and McIntosh's artillery to McPherson's Ridge, forcing
the entire Union line back to Seminary Ridge. General Doubleday,
anticipating such contingency, had ordered trenches made about Seminary
Ridge, and sent his three other batteries under Colonel Wainwright to that
point. He formed his line along the ridge and occupied the trenches by
part of his infantry. At this period Ewell's divisions under Rodes
approached against Doubleday's right.

General Howard, upon his first approach to the battle, marched the
Eleventh Corps to Cemetery Hill, and there posted it until called upon by
General Doubleday for assistance. To meet the call he ordered his
divisions under Generals Barlow and Schurz to Doubleday's right, to occupy
a prominent point at the north end of Seminary Ridge, reserving his
division under Steinwehr and part of his artillery on Cemetery Hill.

As the divisions of the Eleventh Corps approached the Confederate left,
Rodes's division of Ewell's corps advanced. The Federals then stood across
the Cashtown road, their left in advance of the Seminary, their right
thrown or standing more to the rear. Rodes was in season to sweep the
field of approach to the high point intended to be occupied by the
divisions sent by Howard, and came in good position to enfilade Robinson's
division of the First Corps. As Rodes approached he was threatened by
Buford's cavalry, but, finding cover under woodland, he made advance by
three brigades in line till he came to the point of view which gave him
command of that end of the field in elevated position, and in plunging
fire down Robinson's line and in advance of the divisions sent by General
Howard to occupy that point. While posting his infantry, Rodes ordered
Carter's battery of artillery into action against Robinson's lines
stretched out and engaged against Hill's corps. At that moment the
divisions of the Eleventh Corps were not in full front of Rodes, so that
his fire upon Robinson's line was something of a surprise, as well as most
discomfiting. The divisions and artillery of the Eleventh came to the
front, however, almost simultaneously with Robinson's necessitated change
of right front rearward towards Rodes.

These changes and dispositions gave Hill opportunity to press on by his
front, when Doubleday was obliged to call for help, and Schurz called for
support on his right. Coster's brigade was sent from Steinwehr's reserve,
and Buford's cavalry was ordered to brace as far as practicable the centre
of the First Corps, and another battery was sent to Schurz's division. At
2.45 another call for help by the First Corps was received, and General
Schurz was asked to answer it if he could by a regiment or more. Calls
were sent to hurry Slocum's (Twelfth) corps, some miles away, but then
Ewell was swinging his division under Early into line nearer to
Gettysburg, Gordon's brigade and Jones's battery coming in in good time to
make strong Rodes's left, and Hill's corps had overlapped the left of the
First Corps, so that General Howard found himself forced to command a
steady, orderly retreat to Cemetery Hill.

The Confederates pushed rapidly on, particularly the fresher troops of
Ewell, cleared the field, and followed on through the streets of
Gettysburg at four o'clock. The retreat began and continued in good order
till they passed Gettysburg, when the ranks became so scattered that the
final march was little better than "_Sauve qui peut_."

As the troops retreated through Gettysburg, General Hancock rode upon the
field, and under special assignment assumed command at three o'clock. As
the retreating troops arrived, Wadsworth's division on the right, the
Eleventh Corps across the Baltimore pike, the balance of the First under
Doubleday on the left of the Eleventh, General Howard and others assisted
in forming the new line.

The total effectives of the First and Eleventh Corps, according to the
consolidated moving report of June 30, was 19,982. From the latest returns
of General Lee's army, an average estimate of his four divisions gave his
total as 25,252. Part of the reserve division of the Eleventh Corps was
not engaged, but Buford had two brigades of cavalry, and so the foregoing
may be a fair estimate of the forces engaged, less the reserve on Cemetery

At Cashtown, General Lee found that General Hill had halted his division
under R. H. Anderson and his reserve artillery. He had General Anderson
called, who subsequently wrote me of the interview as follows:

    "About twelve o'clock I received a message notifying me that General
    Lee desired to see me. I found General Lee intently listening to the
    fire of the guns, and very much disturbed and depressed. At length he
    said, more to himself than to me, 'I cannot think what has become of
    Stuart. I ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have
    met with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him,
    I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be
    the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is the
    whole Federal force, we must fight a battle here. If we do not gain a
    victory, those defiles and gorges which we passed this morning will
    shelter us from disaster.'"

He ordered Anderson forward, and rode on to Seminary Ridge in time to view
the closing operations of the engagement. The Union troops were in
disorder, climbing Cemetery Heights, the Confederates following through
the streets of Gettysburg. Two other divisions of Confederates were up
soon after, E. Johnson's of the Second and R. H. Anderson's of the Third

After a long wait I left orders for the troops to follow the trains of
the Second Corps, and rode to find General Lee. His head-quarters were on
Seminary Ridge at the crossing of the Cashtown road. Anderson's division
was then filed off along the ridge, resting. Johnson's had marched to
report to the corps commander. Dismounting and passing the usual
salutation, I drew my glasses and made a studied view of the position upon
which the enemy was rallying his forces, and of the lay of the land
surrounding. General Lee was engaged at the moment. He had announced
beforehand that he would not make aggressive battle in the enemy's
country. After the survey and in consideration of his plans,--noting
movements of detachments of the enemy on the Emmitsburg road, the relative
positions for manoeuvre, the lofty perch of the enemy, the rocky slopes
from it, all marking the position clearly defensive,--I said, "We could
not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we
have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground between him
and his capital." This, when said, was thought to be the opinion of my
commander as much as my own. I was not a little surprised, therefore, at
his impatience, as, striking the air with his closed hand, he said, "If he
is there to-morrow I will attack him."

In his official account, General Lee reported,--

    "It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our
    base unless attacked. But coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal
    army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains
    would have been difficult and dangerous."

When he rode away from me in the forenoon he made no mention of his absent
cavalry, nor did he indicate that it was not within call. So I was at a
loss to understand his nervous condition, and supported the suggestion so
far as to say, "If he is there to-morrow it will be because he wants you
to attack," and queried, "If that height has become the objective, why not
take it at once? We have forty thousand men, less the casualties of the
day; he cannot have more than twenty thousand." Then it was that I heard
of the wanderings of the cavalry and the cause of his uneven temper. So
vexed was he at the halt of the Imboden cavalry at Hancock, _in the
opening of the campaign_, that he was losing sight of Pickett's brigades
as a known quantity for battle. His manner suggested to me that a little
reflection would be better than further discussion, and right soon he
suggested to the commander of the Second Corps to take Cemetery Hill if he
thought it practicable, but the subordinate did not care to take upon
himself a fight that his chief would not venture to order.[124]

The following circular orders were sent the commanders of columns of the
First Corps:

        "NEAR GETTYSBURG, July 1, 5.30 P.M.

    "COLONEL,--The commanding general desires you to come on to-night as
    fast as you can without distressing your men and animals. Hill and
    Ewell have sharply engaged the enemy, and you will be needed for
    to-morrow's battle. Let us know where you will stop to-night.

            "G. M. SORREL,
              "_A. A. General_.

        "_Chief of Artillery_."

At 12.15 of the afternoon of the 1st, General Halleck sent a cipher
despatch to General Meade approving his tactics, but asking, as to his
strategy, "Are you not too far east, and may not Lee attempt to turn your
left and cut you off from Frederick?"

In this connection may be noted the plan that General Meade had mapped in
his own mind and given to some of his generals for battle to be formed
behind Pipe Creek, a position that would have met the views of General
Halleck, as well as his own, covering Washington and Baltimore under close
lines that could not be turned. At Gettysburg the Confederates had
comparatively an open field.

Reports coming in to head-quarters about six o'clock that the enemy was in
some force off our right towards Fairfield, General Lee ordered General
Anderson to put one of his brigades out on the right as picket-guard.
Wilcox's brigade and Boss's battery were marched and posted near Black
Horse Tavern.

Nothing coming from the _centre troops_ about Cemetery Hill, General Lee
ordered the Second Corps, _after night, from his left to his right_, for
work in that direction, but General Ewell rode over and reported that
another point--Culp's Hill--had been found on his left, which had
commanding elevation over Cemetery Hill, from which the troops on the
latter could be dislodged, by artillery, and was under the impression that
his troops were in possession there. That was accredited as reported and
approved, and the corps commander returned, and ordered the hill occupied
if it had not been done. But the officer in charge had waited for specific
orders, and when they were received he had made another reconnoissance. It
was then twelve o'clock. By the reconnoissance it was found that the enemy
was there, and it was thought that this should be reported, and further
orders waited.

General Ewell's troops and trains passed the junction of the roads at
four o'clock. The train was fourteen miles long. It was followed by the
troops of the First Corps that had been waiting all day. After night the
Washington Artillery and McLaws's division camped at Marsh Run, four miles
from Gettysburg. Here is Hood's account of his march:

    "While lying in camp near Chambersburg information was received that
    Hill and Ewell were about to come into contact with the enemy near
    Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws's division, were at once
    put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which we
    reached after a hard march at or before sunrise on July 2. So
    imperative had been our orders to hasten forward with all possible
    speed that on the march my troops were allowed to halt and rest only
    about two hours during the night from the 1st to the 2d of July."

When I left General Lee, about seven o'clock in the evening, he had formed
no plans beyond that of seizing Culp's Hill as his point from which to
engage, nor given any orders for the next day, though his desperate mood
was painfully evident, and gave rise to serious apprehensions. He had
heard nothing of the movements of the enemy since his crossing the
Potomac, except the report of the scout. His own force on the field was
the Second Corps, Rodes's, Early's, and E. Johnson's divisions from right
to left through the streets of Gettysburg around towards Culp's Hill; on
Rodes's right, Pender's division of the Third; on Seminary Ridge, R. H.
Anderson's division of the Third (except Wilcox's brigade at Black Horse
Tavern); behind Seminary Ridge, Heth's division of the Third; on the march
between Cashtown and Greenwood, the First Corps.



    The Confederate Commander reviews the Field and decides on Plan of
    Battle--Positions on the Morning of July 2--Night March of the Federal
    Sixth Corps--It was excelled by Law's Brigade of Confederates--The
    Battle was opened after Mid-day--General Hood appeals for Permission
    to turn the Federal Left--Failure to make the Flanking Movement by the
    Confederate Right was a Serious Mistake--Hood, in his usual Gallant
    Style, led his Troops forward among the Rocks--Desperate Charges
    against an Earnest Adversary--Hood wounded--General Law succeeds him
    in command of the Division--"Little Round Top" an Important
    Point--"The Citadel of the Field"--It was a Fight of Seventeen
    Thousand Confederates against twice their Number--Quiet along the
    Lines of other Confederate Commands--"A Man on the Left who didn't
    care to make the Battle win"--Evidence against the Alleged Order for
    "Battle at Sunrise"--The "Order" to Ewell was Discretionary--Lee had
    lost his Balance.

The stars were shining brightly on the morning of the 2d when I reported
at General Lee's head-quarters and asked for orders. After a time Generals
McLaws and Hood, with their staffs, rode up, and at sunrise their commands
filed off the road to the right and rested. The Washington Artillery was
with them, and about nine o'clock, after an all-night march, Alexander's
batteries were up as far as Willoughby's Run, where he parked and fed, and
rode to head-quarters to report.

As indicated by these movements, General Lee was not ready with his plans.
He had not heard from his cavalry, nor of the movements of the enemy
further than the information from a despatch captured during the night,
that the Fifth Corps was in camp about five miles from Gettysburg, and the
Twelfth Corps was reported near Culp's Hill. As soon as it was light
enough to see, however, the enemy was found in position on his formidable
heights awaiting us.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. July 2nd, 1863.]

The result of efforts during the night and early morning to secure Culp's
Hill had not been reported, and General Lee sent Colonel Venable of his
staff to confer with the commander of the Second Corps as to opportunity
to make the battle by his left. He was still in doubt whether it would be
better to move to his far-off right. About nine o'clock he rode to his
left to be assured of the position there, and of the general temper of
affairs in that quarter. After viewing the field, he held conference with
the corps and division commanders. They preferred to accept his judgment
and orders, except General Early, who claimed to have learned of the
topographical features of the country during his march towards York, and
recommended the right of the line as the point at which strong battle
should be made. About ten o'clock General Lee returned to his
head-quarters, but his engineer who had been sent to reconnoitre on his
right had not come back. To be at hand for orders, I remained with the
troops at his head-quarters. The infantry had arms stacked; the artillery
was at rest.

The enemy occupied the commanding heights of the city cemetery, from which
point, in irregular grade, the ridge slopes southward two miles and a half
to a bold outcropping height of three hundred feet called Little Round
Top, and farther south half a mile ends in the greater elevation called
Round Top. The former is covered from base to top by formidable boulders.
From the cemetery to Little Round Top was the long main front of General
Meade's position. At the cemetery his line turned to the northeast and
east and southeast in an elliptical curve, with his right on Culp's Hill.

At an early hour of the 2d the Union army was posted: the Twelfth Corps at
Culp's Hill, extending its left to Wadsworth's division of the First; on
Wadsworth's left the Eleventh Corps; on the left of the Eleventh the other
troops of the First; on their left the Second, and left of that to Little
Round Top the Third Corps; the Fifth Corps stood in reserve across the
bend from the right of the Twelfth to the left of the Second Corps. Thus
there was formed a field of tremendous power upon a convex curve, which
gave the benefit of rapid concentration at any point or points. The
natural defences had been improved during the night and early morning. The
Sixth Corps was marching from Manchester, twenty-two miles from
Gettysburg. Its first order, received near Manchester before night of the
1st, was to march for Taneytown, but after passing the Baltimore pike the
orders were changed, directing a prompt march to Gettysburg. The march has
been variously estimated from thirty to thirty-five miles, but the
distance from Manchester _via_ Taneytown to Gettysburg is only twenty-nine
miles, and as the ground for which the corps marched was three miles east
of Gettysburg, the march would have been only twenty-six miles _via_
Taneytown; as the corps marched back and took the Baltimore pike, some
distance must have been saved. It was on the field at three o'clock of the
afternoon,--the Union cavalry under General Pleasonton in reach.

The Confederate left was covering the north and east curve of the enemy's
line, Johnson's division near Culp's Hill, Early's and Rodes's extending
the line to the right through Gettysburg; Pender's division on the right
of Rodes's; the other divisions of the Third Corps resting on Seminary
Ridge, with McLaws's division and Hood's three brigades near general
head-quarters; Pickett's brigades and Law's of Hood's division at
Chambersburg and New Guilford, twenty-two and twenty-four miles away. Law
had received orders to join his division, and was on the march. The
cavalry was not yet heard from. The line so extended and twisted about the
rough ground that concentration at any point was not possible.

It was some little time after General Lee's return from his ride to the
left before he received the reports of the reconnoissance ordered from
his centre to his right. His mind, previously settled to the purpose to
fight where the enemy stood, now accepted the explicit plan of making the
opening on his right, and to have the engagement general. He ordered the
commander of the Third Corps to extend the centre by Anderson's division,
McLaws's and Hood's divisions to extend the deployment to his right.
Heth's division of the Third was drawn nearer the front, and notice of his
plans was sent the commander of the Second Corps.

At the intimation that the battle would be opened on the right by part of
the First Corps, Colonel Alexander was asked to act as director of
artillery, and sent to view the field in time to assign the batteries as
they were up. It was eleven o'clock when General Lee's order was issued,
but he had ordered Law's brigade to its division, and a wait of thirty
minutes was necessary for it to get up. Law had received his orders at
three in the morning, and had marched twenty-three miles. The
battle-ground was still five miles off by the route of march, but Law
completed his march of twenty-eight miles in eleven hours,--the best
marching done in either army to reach the field of Gettysburg.

The battle was to be opened on the right by two divisions of the First
Corps, supported on their left by four of the brigades of Anderson's
division; the opening to be promptly followed on Lee's left by the Second
Corps, and continued to real attack if the opportunity occurred; the Third
(centre) Corps to move to severe threatening and take advantage of
opportunity to attack; the movements of the Second and Third Corps to be
prompt, and in close, severe co-operation, so as to prevent concentration
against the battle of the right. The little cavalry that was with the army
was kept on the extreme left. Not so much as one trooper was sent us.

General Lee ordered his reconnoitring officer to lead the troops of the
First Corps and conduct them by a route concealed from view of the enemy.
As I was relieved for the time from the march, I rode near the middle of
the line. General Lee rode with me a mile or more. General Anderson
marched by a route nearer the enemy's line, and was discovered by General
Sickles, who commanded the Third Corps, the left of the Union line. A
little uncomfortable at his retired position, and seeing that the battle
was forming against him, General Sickles thought to put the Third Maine
Regiment and the Berdan Sharp-shooters on outpost in a bold woodland
cover, to develop somewhat of the approaching battle, and presently threw
his corps forward as far as the Peach Orchard, half a mile forward of the
position assigned to it in the general line. The Tenth Alabama Regiment
was sent against the outpost guard, and, reinforced by the Eleventh
Regiment, drove it back, and Anderson's division found its place in proper

General Birney's account of the affair at the outpost puts it at twelve
o'clock, and the signal accounts, the only papers dated on the field,

    "The enemy's skirmishers advancing from the west one mile from

And presently,--

    "The rebels are in force; our skirmishers give way--12.55."

There is no room for doubt of the accuracy of these reports, which go to
show that it was one o'clock in the afternoon when the Third Corps, upon
which the First Corps was to form, was in position.

Under the conduct of the reconnoitring officer, our march seemed
slow,--there were some halts and countermarches. To save time, I ordered
the rear division to double on the front, and we were near the affair of
Anderson's regiments with the outpost guard of Sickles. Anderson's
division deployed,--Wilcox's, Perry's, Wright's, Posey's, and Mahone's
brigades from right to left.

General Hood was ordered to send his select scouts in advance, to go
through the woodlands and act as vedettes, in the absence of cavalry, and
give information of the enemy, if there. The double line marched up the
slope and deployed,--McLaws on the right of Anderson, Hood's division on
his right, McLaws near the crest of the plateau in front of the Peach
Orchard, Hood spreading and enveloping Sickles's left. The former was
readily adjusted to ground from which to advance or defend. Hood's front
was very rugged, with no field for artillery, and very rough for advance
of infantry. As soon as he passed the Emmitsburg road, he sent to report
of the great advantage of moving on by his right around to the enemy's
rear. His scouting parties had reported that there was nothing between
them and the enemy's trains. He was told that the move to the right had
been proposed the day before and rejected; that General Lee's orders were
to guide my left by the Emmitsburg road.

In our immediate front were the divisions of the Third Corps under
Generals Humphreys and Birney, from right to left, with orders for
supports of the flanks by divisions of the Second and Fifth Corps. The
ground on the left of Birney's division was so broken and obstructed by
boulders that his left was dropped off to the rear, forming a broken line.
In rear of the enemy, and between his lines and Little Round Top, was a
very rough elevation of eighty feet formed by upheavals that left open
passage deep down Devil's Den. Smith's battery was on Birney's left,
Winslow's between the right and next brigade. Other batteries in position
were Clark's, Ames's, Randolph's, Seeley's, and Turnbull's.

As McLaws's division came up on line, Barksdale's brigade was in front of
a battery about six hundred yards off. He appealed for permission to
charge and capture it, but was told to wait. On his right was Kershaw's
brigade, the brigades of Semmes and Wofford on the second line. Hood's
division was in two lines,--Law's and Robertson's brigades in front, G. T.
Anderson's and Benning's in the second line. The batteries were with the
divisions,--four to the division. One of G. T. Anderson's regiments was
put on picket down the Emmitsburg road.

General Hood appealed again and again for the move to the right, but, to
give more confidence to his attack, he was reminded that the move to the
right had been carefully considered by our chief and rejected in favor of
his present orders.

The opportunity for our right was in the air. General Halleck saw it from
Washington. General Meade saw and was apprehensive of it. Even General
Pendleton refers to it in favorable mention in his official report.
Failing to adopt it, General Lee should have gone with us to his right. He
had seen and carefully examined the left of his line, and only gave us a
guide to show the way to the right, leaving the battle to be adjusted to
formidable and difficult grounds without his assistance. If he had been
with us, General Hood's messengers could have been referred to general
head-quarters, but to delay and send messengers five miles in favor of a
move that he had rejected would have been contumacious. The opportunity
was with the Confederates from the assembling on Cemetery Hill. It was
inviting of their preconceived plans. It was the object of and excuse for
the invasion as a substitute for more direct efforts for the relief of
Vicksburg. Confederate writers and talkers claim that General Meade could
have escaped without making aggressive battle, but that is equivalent to
confession of the inertia that failed to grasp the opportunity.

Beaten in the battle of the 1st, dislodged of position, and outgeneralled,
the Union army would have felt the want of spirit and confidence important
to aggressive battle; but the call was in the hands of the Confederates,
and these circumstances would have made their work more facile, while the
Union commander would have felt the call to save his capital most
imperative. Even as events passed it was thought helpful to the Union side
to give out the report that General McClellan was at hand and would
command the army.

Four of the brigades of Anderson's division were ordered to advance in
echelon in support of my left.

At three o'clock the artillery was ordered to open practice. General Meade
was then with General Sickles discussing the feasibility of withdrawing
his corps to the position to which it was originally assigned, but the
opening admonished him that it was too late. He had just sent a cipher
telegram to inform General Halleck, commander-in-chief, that in the event
of his having no opportunity to attack, and should he find the
Confederates moving to interpose between him and Washington, he would fall
back on his supplies at Westminster.[125] But my right division was then
nearer to Westminster, and our scouting parties of infantry were within
rifle range of the road leading to that point and to Washington. So it
would have been convenient, after holding our threatening attitude till
night, to march across his line at dark, in time to draw other troops to
close connection before the next morning.

Prompt to the order the combat opened, followed by artillery of the other
corps, and our artillerists measured up to the better metal of the enemy
by vigilant work. Hood's lines were not yet ready. After a little practice
by the artillery, he was properly adjusted and ordered to bear down upon
the enemy's left, but he was not prompt, and the order was repeated before
he would strike down.[126]

In his usual gallant style he led his troops through the rocky fastnesses
against the strong lines of his earnest adversary, and encountered battle
that called for all of his power and skill. The enemy was tenacious of his
strong ground; his skilfully-handled batteries swept through the passes
between the rocks; the more deadly fire of infantry concentrated as our
men bore upon the angle of the enemy's line and stemmed the fiercest
onset, until it became necessary to shorten their work by a desperate
charge. This pressing struggle and the cross-fire of our batteries broke
in the salient angle, but the thickening fire, as the angle was pressed
back, hurt Hood's left and held him in steady fight. His right brigade was
drawn towards Round Top by the heavy fire pouring from that quarter,
Benning's brigade was pressed to the thickening line at the angle, and G.
T. Anderson's was put in support of the battle growing against Hood's

I rode to McLaws, found him ready for his opportunity, and Barksdale
chafing in his wait for the order to seize the battery in his front.
Kershaw's brigade of his right first advanced and struck near the angle of
the enemy's line where his forces were gathering strength. After
additional caution to hold his ranks closed, McLaws ordered Barksdale in.
With glorious bearing he sprang to his work, overriding obstacles and
dangers. Without a pause to deliver a shot, he had the battery. Kershaw,
joined by Semmes's brigade, responded, and Hood's men, feeling the
impulsion of relief, resumed their bold fight, and presently the enemy's
line was broken through its length. But his well-seasoned troops knew how
to utilize the advantage of their grounds and put back their dreadful
fires from rocks, depressions, and stone fences, as they went for shelter
about Little Round Top.

That point had not been occupied by the enemy, nor marked as an important
feature of the field. The broken ranks sought shelter under its rocks and
defiles as birds fly to cover. General Hood fell seriously hurt, and
General Law succeeded to command of the division, but the well-seasoned
troops were not in need of a close guiding hand. The battle was on, and
they knew how to press its hottest contention.

General Warren, chief engineer of the Federal army, was sent at the
critical moment to Little Round Top, and found that it was the citadel of
the field. He called for troops to occupy it. The Fifth Corps (Sykes's)
was hurried to him, and General Hancock sent him Caldwell's division of
the Second Corps. At the Brick House, away from his right, General Sickles
had a detachment that had been reinforced by General Hancock. This fire
drew Anderson's brigade of direction (Wilcox) a little off from support of
Barksdale's left. General Humphreys, seeing the opportunity, rallied such
of his troops as he could, and, reinforced by Hays's division (Willard's
brigade) of Hancock's corps, came against Barksdale's flank, but the
latter moved bravely on, the guiding spirit of the battle. Wright's
Georgia and Perry's Florida brigades were drawn in behind Wilcox and
thrown against Humphreys, pushing him off and breaking him up.

The fighting had by this time become tremendous, and brave men and
officers were stricken by hundreds. Posey and Wilcox dislodged the forces
about the Brick House.

General Sickles was desperately wounded!

General Willard was dead!

General Semmes, of McLaws's division, was mortally wounded!

Our left relieved, the brigades of Anderson's division moved on with
Barksdale's, passed the swale, and moved up the slope. Caldwell's
division, and presently those of Ayres and Barnes of the Fifth Corps, met
and held our strongest battle. While thus engaged, General Sykes succeeded
in putting Vincent's and Weed's brigades and Hazlett's battery on the
summit of Little Round Top, but presently we overreached Caldwell's
division, broke it off, and pushed it from the field. Of his brigade
commanders, Zook was killed, and Brooke and Cross were wounded, the
latter mortally. General Hancock reported sixty per cent. of his men lost.
On our side, Barksdale was down dying, and G. T. Anderson wounded.

We had carried Devil's Den, were at the Round Tops and the Wheat-Field,
but Ayres's division of regulars and Barnes's division were holding us in
equal battle. The struggle throughout the field seemed at its tension. The
brigades of R. H. Anderson's division could hold off other troops of
Hancock's, but were not strong enough to step to the enemy's lines. When
Caldwell's division was pushed away, Ayres's flank and the gorge at Little
Round Top were only covered by a sharp line of picket men behind the
boulders. If we could drive in the sharp-shooters and strike Ayres's flank
to advantage, we could dislodge his and Barnes's divisions, occupy the
gorge behind Sykes's brigades on Round Top, force them to retreat, and
lift our desperate fighters to the summit. I had one
brigade--Wofford's--that had not been engaged in the hottest battle. To
urge the troops to their reserve power in the precious moments, I rode
with Wofford. The rugged field, the rough plunge of artillery fire, and
the piercing musket-shots delayed somewhat the march, but Alexander dashed
up with his batteries and gave new spirit to the worn infantry ranks. By a
fortunate strike upon Ayres's flank we broke his line and pushed him and
Barnes so closely that they were obliged to use most strenuous efforts to
get away without losing in prisoners as well as their killed and wounded.
We gained the Wheat-Field, and were so close upon the gorge that our
artillery could no longer venture their fire into it. We were on Little
Round Top grappling for the crowning point. The brigade commanders there,
Vincent and Weed, were killed, also the battery commander, Hazlett, and
others, but their troops were holding to their work as firmly as the
mighty boulders that helped them. General Meade thought that the
Confederate army was working on my part of the field. He led some
regiments of the Twelfth Corps and posted them against us, called a
division of Newton's corps (First) from beyond Hancock's, and sent
Crawford's division, the last of the Fifth Corps, splitting through the
gorge, forming solid lines, in places behind stone fences, and making
steady battle, as veterans fresh in action know so well how to make. While
Meade's lines were growing my men were dropping; we had no others to call
to their aid, and the weight against us was too heavy to carry. The
extreme left of our lines was only about a mile from us across the enemy's
concentric position, which brought us within hearing of that battle, if
engaged, and near enough to feel its swell, but nothing was heard or felt
but the clear ring of the enemy's fresh metal as he came against us. No
other part of our army had engaged! My seventeen thousand against the Army
of the Potomac! The sun was down, and with it went down the severe battle.
I ordered recall of the troops to the line of Plum Run and Devil's Den,
leaving picket lines near the foot of the Round Tops. My loss was about
six thousand, Meade's between twelve and fourteen thousand; but his loss
in general and field officers was frightful. When General Humphreys, who
succeeded to Barksdale's brigade, was called back to the new line, he
thought there was some mistake in the orders, and only withdrew as far as
a captured battery, and when the order was repeated, retired under

General Stuart came down from Carlisle with his column of cavalry late in
the afternoon of the 2d. As he approached he met a cavalry force of the
enemy moving towards the Confederate left rear, and was successful in
arresting it. He was posted with Jenkins's three thousand cavalry[127] on
the Confederate left.

Notwithstanding the supreme order of the day for general battle, and the
reinforcement of the cavalry on our left, the Second and Third Corps
remained idle during all of the severe battle of the Confederate right,
except the artillery, and the part of that on the extreme left was only in
practice long enough to feel the superior metal of the enemy, when it
retired, leaving a battery of four guns in position. General Early failed
to even form his division in battle order, leaving a brigade in position
remote from the line, and sending, later, another to be near Stuart's
cavalry. The latter returned, however, before night.

At eight o'clock in the evening the division on our extreme left, E.
Johnson's, advanced. The brigades were J. M. Jones's, Nicholls's,
Steuart's, and Walker's. Walker's was detached, as they moved, to look for
a detachment of the enemy reported threatening the far away left. When the
three brigades crossed Rock Creek it was night. The enemy's line to be
assaulted was occupied by Greene's brigade of the Twelfth Corps. It was
reinforced by three regiments of Wadsworth's division and three from the
Eleventh Corps. After brave attack and defence, part of the line was
carried, when the fight, after a severe fusillade between the infantry
lines, quieted, and Walker's brigade returned to the division. Part of the
enemy's trenches, east of the point attacked (across a swale), vacated
when the corps moved over to the left, General Johnson failed to occupy.

Before this, General Rodes discovered that the enemy, in front of his
division, was drawing off his artillery and infantry to my battle of the
right, and suggested to General Early that the moment had come for the
divisions to attack, and drew his forces from entanglements about the
streets to be ready. After E. Johnson's fight on our extreme left, General
Early ordered two brigades under General Harry T. Hays to attack. Hays had
with his Louisiana brigade Hoke's North Carolina brigade under Colonel
Avery. He made as gallant a fight as was ever made. Mounting to the top of
the hill, he captured a battery, and pushed on in brave order, taking some
prisoners and colors, until he discovered that his two brigades were
advancing in a night affair against a grand army, when he found that he
was fortunate in having night to cover his weakness, and withdrew. The
gallant Colonel Avery, mortally wounded and dying, wrote on a slip of
paper, "_Tell father that I died with my face to the enemy_." When Rodes
was prepared, Hays had retired, and the former did not see that it was
part of the order for general engagement to put his division in night
attack that could not be supported.


Thus the general engagement of the day was dwarfed into the battle of the
right at three o'clock, that on the left at eight by a single division,
and that nearer the centre at nine o'clock by two brigades.

There was a man on the left of the line who did not care to make the
battle win. He knew where it was, had viewed it from its earliest
formation, had orders for his part in it, but so withheld part of his
command from it as to make co-operative concert of action impracticable.
He had a pruriency for the honors of the field of Mars, was eloquent,
before the fires of the bivouac and his chief, of the glory of war's gory
shield; but when its envied laurels were dipping to the grasp, when the
heavy field called for bloody work, he found the placid horizon, far and
away beyond the cavalry, more lovely and inviting. He wanted command of
the Second Corps, and, succeeding to it, held the honored position until
General Lee found, at last, that he must dismiss him from field service.

General Lee ordered Johnson's division of his left, occupying part of the
enemy's trenches about Culp's Hill, to be reinforced during the night of
the 2d by two brigades of Rodes's division and one of Early's division.
Why the other brigades of those divisions were not sent does not appear,
but it does appear that there was a place for them on Johnson's left, in
the trenches that were vacated by the Federal Twelfth Corps when called
over to reinforce the battle of Meade's left. Culp's Hill bore the same
relations to the enemy's right as Little Round Top did to his left.
General Fitzhugh Lee quotes evidence from General Meade that had Culp's
Hill been occupied, in force, by Confederates, it would have compelled the
withdrawal of the Federal troops.[128]

General Meade, after the battle of his left, ordered the divisions of his
Twelfth Corps back to their trenches, to recover the parts occupied by the
Confederate left. It was night when the First Division approached. General
Ruger, commanding, thought to feel his way through the dark by a line of
skirmishers. He found the east end of his trenches, across the swale,
unoccupied, and took possession. Pressing his adventure, he found the main
line of his works occupied by the Confederates in force, and disposed his
command to wait for daylight. The Second Division came during the night,
when General Williams, commanding the corps, posted it on the left of the
First, and the division commanders ordered batteries in proper positions.

During the night, General Meade held a council, which decided to fight it
out. So it began to look as if the vicissitudes of the day had so worked
as to call General Meade from defensive to aggressive battle for Culp's
Hill. But the Confederates failed to see the opportunity and force the
issue as it was presented.

In General Meade's evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, he puts his losses of the first and second days at twenty thousand,
and assigns two-thirds of these to the battle of the 2d. As the fighting
against the three brigades of our left after night, and two brigades,
later in the night, from our centre, could not have been very severe, I
claim that his loss in the battle of his left was from twelve to fourteen

As events of the battle of the 2d passed, it seems fair to claim that with
Pickett's brigades present at the moment of Wofford's advance for the
gorge at Little Round Top, we could have had it before Crawford was there.

Under ordinary circumstances this account of the second day, made from the
records, would be complete and conclusive; but the battle of Gettysburg,
which may be called the epitome of the war, has been the subject of many
contentions of words. Knights of the quill have consumed many of their
peaceful hours in publishing, through books, periodicals, and newspapers,
their plans for the battle, endeavoring to forestall the records and to
find a scapegoat, and their representations may be given, though they do
not deserve it, a word of reply.

General W. N. Pendleton led off when making a lecturing tour through the
South for a memorial church for General Lee. He claims that he made a
reconnoissance on the afternoon of the 1st of July, and that upon his
reporting it, General Lee ordered General Longstreet to attack at sunrise
the next day. He did not venture to charge that the Second and Third
Corps, that were on the field and had had a good night's rest, were part
of the command ordered for the early battle, for the commanders, both
Virginians, and not under the political ban, could have brought confusing
evidence against him; nor did he intend to put General Lee in the
anomalous position, inferentially, of ordering part of the First
Corps--that should march through the night and all night--to make the
battle alone. The point of battle was east of the Emmitsburg road; to find
it, it was necessary to cross that road, but General Sickles was moving
part of his corps over the road during that afternoon, and rested there
the latter part of the day and during the night. So, to make the
reconnoissance, General Pendleton passed the Union troops in Confederate
uniform--he was military in his dress--and found the point of battle.
Giving him credit, for the moment, for this delicate work and the mythical
order, let us find the end to which it would lead.

The only troops that could come under the order were McLaws's division,
part of Hood's, and the artillery,--about ten thousand men. These, after a
hurried all-night's march, reached General Lee's head-quarters about
sunrise of the 2d, and by continued forced march could have reached the
point of battle, about five miles away, by seven o'clock, where they would
have encountered a division of the Third Corps (Birney's); presently the
Second and Fifth Corps under Hancock and Sykes; then the First, Eleventh,
and Twelfth under Newton, Howard, and Slocum; then the balance of the
Third coming in on our rear along the Emmitsburg road,--making sixty
thousand men and more. There was reason to be proud of the prowess of the
troops of the First Corps, but to credit a part of it with success under
the circumstances was not reasonable.

That the Confederate Second Corps did not have orders for the alleged
sunrise battle is evidenced by the report of its commander, who,
accounting for his work about Culp's Hill during the night of the 1st and
morning of the 2d, reported of the morning, "It was now daylight, and too
late," meaning that it was too late for him to attack and carry that hill,
as General Lee had authorized and expected him to do during the night
before. If he had been ordered to take part in the sunrise battle, he
would have been in the nick of time. That the Third Corps was not to be in
it is evidenced by the position of the greater part of it on Seminary
Ridge until near noon of the 2d. So General Lee must have ordered a
position carried, at sunrise, by ten thousand men, after it had gathered
strength all night,--a position that he would not assault on the afternoon
of the 1st with forty thousand men, lest they should encounter
"overwhelming numbers."[129]

As the other corps, after receiving their orders for the afternoon battle
of the 2d, failed to engage until after nightfall, it is not probable that
they would have found the sunrise battle without orders.

General Pendleton's official report is in conflict with his memorial
lecture. In the former he makes no reference to the sunrise-battle order,
but mentions a route by which the left of the enemy could be turned.

Letters from the active members of General Lee's staff and from his
military secretary, General A. L. Long, show that the sunrise battle was
not ordered, and a letter from Colonel Fairfax shows that the claim that
it was so ordered was set up after General Lee's death.[130]

In a published account, General Long mentions my suggestion on the
afternoon of the 1st for the turning march around the enemy's left, which
he says, after consideration, was rejected.[131]

Colonel Taylor claims that the attack by the Confederate right should have
been sooner, and should have met the enemy back on his first or original
line, and before Little Round Top was occupied. But Little Round Top was
not occupied in force until after my battle opened, and General Sickles's
advance to his forward lines was made in consequence of the Confederate
threatening, and would have been sooner or later according as that
threatening was made. He calls the message of General Lee to General Ewell
on the afternoon of the 1st an order. General Lee says,--

    "The strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked
    without danger of exposing the four divisions present, exhausted by a
    long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops.
    General Ewell was thereupon instructed to carry the hill occupied by
    the enemy if he found it practicable."

It is the custom of military service to accept instructions of a commander
as orders, but when they are coupled with conditions that transfer the
responsibility of battle and defeat to the subordinate, they are not
orders, and General Ewell was justifiable in not making attack that his
commander would not order, and the censure of his failure is unjust and
_very ungenerous_.

The Virginia writers have been so eager in their search for a flaw in the
conduct of the battle of the First Corps that they overlook the only point
into which they could have thrust their pens.

At the opening of the fight, General Meade was with General Sickles
discussing the feasibility of moving the Third Corps back to the line
originally assigned for it, but the discussion was cut short by the
opening of the Confederate battle. If that opening had been delayed thirty
or forty minutes the corps would have been drawn back to the general line,
and my first deployment would have enveloped Little Round Top and carried
it before it could have been strongly manned, and General Meade would have
drawn off to his line selected behind Pipe Creek. The point should have
been that the battle was opened too soon.

Another point from which they seek comfort is that Sedgwick's corps
(Sixth) was not up until a late hour of the 2d, and would not have been on
the field for an earlier battle. But Sedgwick was not engaged in the late
battle, and could have been back at Manchester, so far as the afternoon
battle was concerned. And they harp a little on the delay of thirty
minutes for Law's brigade to join its division. But General Lee called for
the two divisions, and had called for Law's brigade to join his division.
It was therefore his order for the division that delayed the march. To
have gone without it would have justified censure. As we were not strong
enough for the work with that brigade, it is not probable that we could
have accomplished more without it.

Colonel Taylor says that General Lee urged that the march of my troops
should be hastened, and was chafed at their non-appearance. Not one word
did he utter to me of their march until he gave his orders at eleven
o'clock for the move to his right. Orders for the troops to hasten their
march of the 1st were sent without even a suggestion from him, but upon
his announcement that he intended to fight the next day, if the enemy was
there.[132] That he was excited and off his balance was evident on the
afternoon of the 1st, and he labored under that oppression until enough
blood was shed to appease him.



    The Stroke of Arms that shook the Continent--Longstreet opposed the
    Attack as planned and made--The Confederate Column of Assault--It was
    weak in Numbers but strong in Spirit--Tremendous Artillery Combat
    begins the Day's Fighting--Charge of Generals Pickett, Trimble, and
    Pettigrew--Armistead falls by the Side of the Federal Guns--The
    Federal Cavalry Charge of General Farnsworth--The Commander falls with
    Five Mortal Wounds--Could the Assaulting Column have been safely
    augmented from Longstreet's Right?--Testimony as to that Point--Where
    rested the Responsibility for Disaster?--Criticism of the Battle as a
    whole--Cemetery Hill stronger than Marye's Hill at
    Fredericksburg--Controverted Points--Casualties of the Three Days'
    Fight--Organization of the Forces engaged.

General Lee has reported of arrangements for the day,--

    "The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's
    three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the
    afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and
    General Ewell was ordered to attack the enemy's right at the same
    time. The latter during the night reinforced General Johnson with two
    brigades from Rodes's and one from Early's division."[133]

This is disingenuous. He did not give or send me orders for the morning of
the third day, nor did he reinforce me by Pickett's brigades for morning
attack. As his head-quarters were about four miles from the command, I did
not ride over, but sent, to report the work of the second day. In the
absence of orders, I had scouting parties out during the night in search
of a way by which we might strike the enemy's left, and push it down
towards his centre. I found a way that gave some promise of results, and
was about to move the command, when he rode over after sunrise and gave
his orders. His plan was to assault the enemy's left centre by a column to
be composed of McLaws's and Hood's divisions reinforced by Pickett's
brigades.[134] I thought that it would not do; that the point had been
fully tested the day before, by more men, when all were fresh; that the
enemy was there looking for us, as we heard him during the night putting
up his defences; that the divisions of McLaws and Hood were holding a mile
along the right of my line against twenty thousand men, who would follow
their withdrawal, strike the flank of the assaulting column, crush it, and
get on our rear towards the Potomac River; that thirty thousand men was
the minimum of force necessary for the work; that even such force would
need close co-operation on other parts of the line; that the column as he
proposed to organize it would have only about thirteen thousand men (the
divisions having lost a third of their numbers the day before); that the
column would have to march a mile under concentrating battery fire, and a
thousand yards under long-range musketry; that the conditions were
different from those in the days of Napoleon, when field batteries had a
range of six hundred yards and musketry about sixty yards.

He said the distance was not more than fourteen hundred yards. General
Meade's estimate was a mile or a mile and a half (Captain Long, the guide
of the field of Gettysburg in 1888, stated that it was a trifle over a
mile). He then concluded that the divisions of McLaws and Hood could
remain on the defensive line; that he would reinforce by divisions of the
Third Corps and Pickett's brigades, and stated the point to which the
march should be directed. I asked the strength of the column. He stated
fifteen thousand. Opinion was then expressed that the fifteen thousand men
who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed
for battle; but he was impatient of listening, and tired of talking, and
nothing was left but to proceed. General Alexander was ordered to arrange
the batteries of the front of the First and Third Corps, those of the
Second were supposed to be in position; Colonel Walton was ordered to see
that the batteries of the First were supplied with ammunition, and to
prepare to give the signal-guns for the opening combat. The infantry of
the Third Corps to be assigned were Heth's and Pettigrew's divisions and
Wilcox's brigade.

At the time of the conversation and arrangement of the assault by the
Confederate right, artillery fire was heard on our extreme left. It seems
that General Lee had sent orders to General Ewell to renew his battle in
the morning, which was intended, and directed, as a co-operation of the
attack he intended to order on his right, but General Ruger, anticipating,
opened his batteries against Ewell at daylight. The Union
divisions--Ruger's and Gary's--were on broken lines, open towards the
trenches held by the Confederates, so that assault by our line would
expose the force to fire from the enemy's other line. Ruger had occupied
the trenches left vacant on his right, and Gary reached to his left under
Greene, who held his line against the attack of the day before. It seems
that the Confederates failed to bring artillery up to their trenches, and
must make their fight with infantry, while on the Union side there were
some fifteen or twenty guns playing, and many more at hand if needed.

As the Union batteries opened, Johnson advanced and assaulted the enemy's
works on his right towards the centre and the adjacent front of the new
line, and held to that attack with resolution, putting in fresh troops to
help it from time to time. Ruger put two regiments forward to feel the way
towards Johnson's left. They got into hot engagement and were repulsed;
Johnson tried to follow, but was in turn forced back. He renewed his main
attack again, but unsuccessfully, and finally drew back to the trenches.
Ruger threw a regiment forward from his left which gained the stone wall;
his division was then advanced, and it recovered the entire line of

While this contention was in progress the troops ordered for the column of
assault were marching and finding positions under the crest of the ridge,
where they could be covered during the artillery combat. Alexander put a
battery of nine guns under the ridge and out of the enemy's fire to be
used with the assaulting column.

General Lee said that the attack of his right was not made as early as
expected,--which he should not have said. He knew that I did not believe
that success was possible; that care and time should be taken to give the
troops the benefit of positions and the grounds; and he should have put an
officer in charge who had more confidence in his plan. Two-thirds of the
troops were of other commands, and there was no reason for putting the
assaulting forces under my charge. He had confidence in General Early, who
advised in favor of that end of the line for battle. Knowing my want of
confidence, he should have given the benefit of his presence and his
assistance in getting the troops up, posting them, and arranging the
batteries; but he gave no orders or suggestions after his early
designation of the point for which the column should march. Fitzhugh Lee
claims evidence that General Lee did not even appear on that part of the
field while the troops were being assigned to position.

As the commands reported, Pickett was assigned on the right, Kemper's and
Garnett's brigades to be supported by Armistead's; Wilcox's brigade of the
Third Corps in echelon and guarding Pickett's right; Pettigrew's division
on Pickett's left, supported by the brigades of Scales and Lane, under
command of General Trimble. The brigades of Pettigrew's division were
Archer's, Pettigrew's, Brockenbrough's, and Davis's. (General Archer
having been taken prisoner on the 1st, his brigade was under command of
Colonel Fry; General Scales being wounded on the same day, his brigade was
commanded by Colonel Lowrance.) The ridge upon which the commands were
formed was not parallel to that upon which the enemy stood, but bending
west towards our left, while the enemy's line bore northwest towards his
right, so that the left of the assaulting column formed some little
distance farther from the enemy's line than the right. To put the troops
under the best cover during the artillery combat they were thus posted for
the march, but directed to spread their steps as soon as the march opened
the field, and to gain places of correct alignment.

[Illustration: E. P. Alexander. Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery,
First Corps.]

Meanwhile, the enemy's artillery on his extreme right was in practice more
or less active, but its meaning was not known or reported, and the
sharp-shooters of the command on the right had a lively fusillade about
eleven o'clock, in which some of the artillery took part. The order was
that the right was to make the signal of battle. General Lee reported that
his left attacked before due notice to wait for the opening could be
given, which was a mistake, inasmuch as the attack on his left was begun
by the Federals, which called his left to their work. General Meade was
not apprehensive of that part of the field, and only used the two
divisions of the Twelfth Corps, Shaler's brigade of the Sixth, and six
regiments of the First and Eleventh Corps in recovering the trenches of
his right, holding the other six corps for the battle of his centre and
left. He knew by the Confederate troops on his right just where the strong
battle was to be.

The director of artillery was asked to select a position on his line from
which he could note the effect of his practice, and to advise General
Pickett when the enemy's fire was so disturbed as to call for the assault.
General Pickett's was the division of direction, and he was ordered to
have a staff-officer or courier with the artillery director to bear notice
of the moment to advance.

The little affair between the skirmish lines quieted in a short time, and
also the noise on our extreme left. The quiet filing of one or two of our
batteries into position emphasized the profound silence that prevailed
during our wait for final orders. Strong battle was in the air, and the
veterans of both sides swelled their breasts to gather nerve and strength
to meet it. Division commanders were asked to go to the crest of the ridge
and take a careful view of the field, and to have their officers there to
tell their men of it, and to prepare them for the sight that was to burst
upon them as they mounted the crest.

Just then a squadron of Union cavalry rode through detachments of infantry
posted at intervals in rear of my right division. It was called a charge,
but was probably a reconnoissance.

Colonel Black had reported with a hundred of the First South Carolina
Cavalry, not all mounted, and a battery of horse artillery, and was put
across the Emmitsburg road, supported by infantry, in front of Merritt's
brigade of cavalry.

When satisfied that the work of preparation was all that it could be with
the means at hand, I wrote Colonel Walton, of the Washington Artillery,--

    "HEAD-QUARTERS, July 3, 1863.

    "COLONEL,--Let the batteries open. Order great care and precision in
    firing. When the batteries at the Peach Orchard cannot be used against
    the point we intend to attack, let them open on the enemy's on the
    rocky hill.

          "Most respectfully,
            "JAMES LONGSTREET,
              "_Lieutenant-General, Commanding_."

At the same time a note to Alexander directed that Pickett should not be
called until the artillery practice indicated fair opportunity. Then I
rode to a woodland hard by, to lie down and study for some new thought
that might aid the assaulting column. In a few minutes report came from
Alexander that he would only be able to judge of the effect of his fire by
the return of that of the enemy, as his infantry was not exposed to view,
and the smoke of the batteries would soon cover the field. He asked, if
there was an alternative, that it be carefully considered before the
batteries opened, as there was not enough artillery ammunition for this
and another trial if this should not prove favorable.

He was informed that there was no alternative; that I could find no way
out of it; that General Lee had considered and would listen to nothing
else; that orders had gone for the guns to give signal for the batteries;
that he should call the troops at the first opportunity or lull in the
enemy's fire.

The signal-guns broke the silence, the blaze of the second gun mingling in
the smoke of the first, and salvoes rolled to the left and repeated
themselves, the enemy's fine metal spreading its fire to the converging
lines, ploughing the trembling ground, plunging through the line of
batteries, and clouding the heavy air. The two or three hundred guns
seemed proud of their undivided honors and organized confusion. The
Confederates had the benefit of converging fire into the enemy's massed
position, but the superior metal of the enemy neutralized the advantage of
position. The brave and steady work progressed.

Before this the Confederates of the left were driven from their captured
trenches, and hope of their effective co-operation with the battle of the
right was lost, but no notice of it was sent to the right of the battle.
They made some further demonstrations, but they were of little effect.
Merritt's brigade of cavalry was in rear of my right, threatening on the
Emmitsburg road. Farnsworth's brigade took position between Merritt's and
close on my right rear. Infantry regiments and batteries were broken off
from my front line and posted to guard on that flank and rear.

Not informed of the failure of the Confederates on the left and the loss
of their vantage-ground, we looked with confidence for them to follow the
orders of battle.

General Pickett rode to confer with Alexander, then to the ground upon
which I was resting, where he was soon handed a slip of paper. After
reading it he handed it to me. It read:

    "If you are coming at all, come at once, or I cannot give you proper
    support, but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all. At least
    eighteen guns are still firing from the cemetery itself.


Pickett said, "General, shall I advance?"

The effort to speak the order failed, and I could only indicate it by an
affirmative bow. He accepted the duty with seeming confidence of success,
leaped on his horse, and rode gayly to his command. I mounted and spurred
for Alexander's post. He reported that the batteries he had reserved for
the charge with the infantry had been spirited away by General Lee's chief
of artillery; that the ammunition of the batteries of position was so
reduced that he could not use them in proper support of the infantry. He
was ordered to stop the march at once and fill up his ammunition-chests.
But, alas! there was no more ammunition to be had.

The order was imperative. The Confederate commander had fixed his heart
upon the work. Just then a number of the enemy's batteries hitched up and
hauled off, which gave a glimpse of unexpected hope. Encouraging messages
were sent for the columns to hurry on,--and they were then on elastic
springing step. The officers saluted as they passed, their stern smiles
expressing confidence. General Pickett, a graceful horseman, sat
lightly in the saddle, his brown locks flowing quite over his shoulders.
Pettigrew's division spread their steps and quickly rectified the
alignment, and the grand march moved bravely on. As soon as the leading
columns opened the way, the supports sprang to their alignments. General
Trimble mounted, adjusting his seat and reins with an air and grace as if
setting out on a pleasant afternoon ride. When aligned to their places
solid march was made down the slope and past our batteries of position.

[Illustration: George E. Pickett]

Confederate batteries put their fire over the heads of the men as they
moved down the slope, and continued to draw the fire of the enemy until
the smoke lifted and drifted to the rear, when every gun was turned upon
the infantry columns. The batteries that had been drawn off were replaced
by others that were fresh. Soldiers and officers began to fall, some to
rise no more, others to find their way to the hospital tents. Single files
were cut here and there, then the gaps increased, and an occasional shot
tore wider openings, but, closing the gaps as quickly as made, the march
moved on. The divisions of McLaws and Hood were ordered to move to closer
lines for the enemy on their front, to spring to the charge as soon as the
breach at the centre could be made. The enemy's right overreached my left
and gave serious trouble. Brockenbrough's brigade went down and Davis's in
impetuous charge. The general order required further assistance from the
Third Corps if needed, but no support appeared. General Lee and the corps
commander were there, but failed to order help.

Colonel Latrobe was sent to General Trimble to have his men fill the line
of the broken brigades, and bravely they repaired the damage. The enemy
moved out against the supporting brigade in Pickett's rear. Colonel Sorrel
was sent to have that move guarded, and Pickett was drawn back to that
contention. McLaws was ordered to press his left forward, but the direct
fire of infantry and cross-fire of artillery was telling fearfully on the
front. Colonel Fremantle ran up to offer congratulations on the apparent
success, but the big gaps in the ranks grew until the lines were reduced
to half their length. I called his attention to the broken, struggling
ranks. Trimble mended the battle of the left in handsome style, but on the
right the massing of the enemy grew stronger and stronger. Brigadier
Garnett was killed, Kemper and Trimble were desperately wounded; Generals
Hancock and Gibbon were wounded. General Lane succeeded Trimble, and with
Pettigrew held the battle of the left in steady ranks.

Pickett's lines being nearer, the impact was heaviest upon them. Most of
the field officers were killed or wounded. Colonel Whittle, of Armistead's
brigade, who had been shot through the right leg at Williamsburg and lost
his left arm at Malvern Hill, was shot through the right arm, then brought
down by a shot through his left leg.

General Armistead, of the second line, spread his steps to supply the
places of fallen comrades. His colors cut down, with a volley against the
bristling line of bayonets, he put his cap on his sword to guide the
storm. The enemy's massing, enveloping numbers held the struggle until the
noble Armistead fell beside the wheels of the enemy's battery. Pettigrew
was wounded, but held his command.

General Pickett, finding the battle broken, while the enemy was still
reinforcing, called the troops off. There was no indication of panic. The
broken files marched back in steady step. The effort was nobly made, and
failed from blows that could not be fended. Some of the files were cut off
from retreat by fire that swept the field in their rear. Officers of my
staff, sent forward with orders, came back with their saddles and bridles
in their arms. Latrobe's horse was twice shot.

Looking confidently for advance of the enemy through our open field, I
rode to the line of batteries, resolved to hold it until the last gun was
lost. As I rode, the shells screaming over my head and ploughing the
ground under my horse, an involuntary appeal went up that one of them
might take me from scenes of such awful responsibility; but the storm to
be met left no time to think of one's self. The battery officers were
prepared to meet the crisis,--no move had been made for leaving the field.
My old acquaintance of Sharpsburg experience, Captain Miller, was walking
up and down behind his guns, smoking his pipe, directing his fire over the
heads of our men as fast as they were inside of the danger-line; the other
officers equally firm and ready to defend to the last. A body of
skirmishers put out from the enemy's lines and advanced some distance, but
the batteries opened severe fire and drove it back. Our men passed the
batteries in quiet walk, and would rally, I knew, when they reached the
ridge from which they started.

General Lee was soon with us, and with staff-officers and others assisted
in encouraging the men and getting them together.

As the attack failed, General Kilpatrick put his cavalry brigade under
General Farnsworth on the charge through the infantry detachment in rear
of my right division. The regiments of G. T. Anderson's brigade had been
posted at points in rear as guards against cavalry, and the First Texas,
Fourth and Fifteenth Alabama, and Bachman's and Reilly's batteries were
looking for that adventure. Farnsworth had a rough ride over rocks and
stone fences, but bore on in spite of all, cutting and slashing when he
could get at the skirmishers or detachments. He made a gallant ride along
the rear of our right, but was obliged to come under the infantry and
artillery fire at several points. He fell, pierced, it is said, by five
mortal wounds. Calls for him to surrender were made, but the cavalry were
not riding for that. The command lost heavily, but claimed captives equal
to their loss.

Kilpatrick's mistake was in not putting Farnsworth in on Merritt's left,
where he would have had an open ride, and made more trouble than was ever
made by a cavalry brigade. Had the ride been followed by prompt advance of
the enemy's infantry in line beyond our right and pushed with vigor, they
could have reached our line of retreat. General Meade ordered his left,
but delay in getting the orders and preparing to get through the rough
grounds consumed time, and the move was abandoned. The Fifth and Sixth
Corps were in convenient position, and would have had good ground for
marching after getting out of the rocky fastnesses of Round Top.

As we had no cavalry on our right, the Union cavalry was held on their
right to observe the Confederates under Stuart, except Kilpatrick's
division (and Custer's brigade of that division was retained on their
right). A little while after the repulse of our infantry column, Stuart's
cavalry advanced and was met by Gregg's, and made one of the severest and
most stubborn fights of cavalry on record. General Wade Hampton was
severely wounded. The Union forces held the field.

When affairs had quieted a little, and apprehension of immediate
counter-attack had passed, orders were sent the divisions of McLaws and
Hood to draw back and occupy the lines from which they had advanced to
engage the battle of the second. Orders sent Benning's brigade by the
division staff were not understood, and Benning, under the impression that
he was to relieve part of McLaws's division, which he thought was to be
sent on other service, ordered the Fifteenth Georgia Regiment to occupy
that position. When he received the second order he sent for his detached
regiment. Meanwhile, the enemy was feeling the way to his front, and
before Colonel DuBose received his second order, the enemy was on his
front and had passed his right and left flanks. The moment he received
the final order, Colonel DuBose made a running fight and escaped with
something more than half his men.

In regard to this, as to other battles in which the First Corps was
concerned, the knights of peaceful later days have been busy in search of
points on which to lay charges or make innuendoes of want of conduct of
that corps. General Early has been a picturesque figure in the
combination, ready to champion any reports that could throw a shadow over
its record, but the charge most pleasing to him was that of _treason_ on
the part of its commander. The subject was lasting, piquant, and so
consoling that one is almost inclined to envy the comfort it gave him in
his latter days.

Colonel Taylor and members of the staff claim that General Lee ordered
that the divisions of McLaws and Hood should be a part of the assaulting
column. Of this General Lee says,--

    "General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky
    hill on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be
    attacked from reverse as they advanced. His operations had been
    embarrassed the day previously from the same cause, and he now deemed
    it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood
    and McLaws. He was therefore reinforced by Heth's division and two
    brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble
    was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest
    of the command, to afford General Longstreet further assistance if
    required, and to avail himself of any success that might be gained."

Colonel Taylor says,--

    "As our extreme right was comparatively safe, being well posted, and
    not at all threatened, one of the divisions of Hood and McLaws, and a
    greater part of the other, could be moved out of the lines and be made
    to take part in the attack."

On this point I offer the evidence of General Warren before the Committee
of Investigation:

    "General Meade had so arranged his troops on our left during the third
    day that nearly one-half of our army was in reserve in that position.
    It was a good, sheltered position, and a convenient one from which to
    reinforce other points of the line, and when the repulse of the enemy
    took place on that day, General Meade intended to move forward all the
    forces he could get in hand and assault the enemy in line. He ordered
    the advance of the Fifth Corps, but it was carried so slowly that it
    did not amount to much, if anything."

General Hancock's evidence on that point is:

    "General Meade told me before the fight that if the enemy attacked me,
    he intended to put the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the enemy's flank."

From which it is evident that the withdrawal of the divisions of my right,
to be put in the column of assault, would have been followed by those
corps swinging around and enveloping the assaulting columns and gaining
Lee's line of retreat.

Colonel Venable thinks it a mistake to have put Heth's division in the
assaulting column. He says,--

    "They were terribly mistaken about Heth's division in this planning.
    It had not recuperated, having suffered more than was reported on the
    first day."

But to accept for the moment Colonel Taylor's premises, the two divisions
referred to would have swelled the columns of assault to twenty-three
thousand men. We were alone in the battle as on the day before. The enemy
had seventy-five thousand men on strong ground, with well-constructed
defences. The Confederates would have had to march a mile through the
blaze of direct and cross fire and break up an army of seventy-five
thousand well-seasoned troops, well defended by field-works!

A rough sketch of the positions of the forces about my right and rear will
help to show if it "was comparatively safe, and not at all threatened."

[Illustration: GETTYSBURG, PA. July 3rd, 1863]

General Gibbon's testimony in regard to the assaulting columns of the 3d:

    "I was wounded about the time I suppose the enemy's second line got
    into our batteries,--probably a little before that. As described to me
    afterwards, the result, I think, will carry out my idea in regard to
    it, because the enemy broke through, forced back my weakest brigade
    under General Webb, got into our batteries, and the men were so close
    that the officers on each side were using their pistols on each other,
    and the men frequently clubbed their muskets, and the clothes of men
    on both sides were burned by the powder of exploding cartridges. An
    officer of my staff, Lieutenant Haskell, had been sent by me, just
    previously to the attack, to General Meade with a message that the
    enemy were coming. He got back on the top of the hill hunting for me,
    and was there when this brigade was forced back, and, without waiting
    orders from me, he rode off to the left and ordered all the troops of
    the division there to the right. As they came up helter-skelter,
    everybody for himself, with their officers among them, they commenced
    firing upon these rebels as they were coming into our lines."

Had the column been augmented by the divisions of my right, it is probable
that its brave men would have penetrated far enough to reach Johnson's
Island as prisoners; hardly possible that it could have returned to
General Lee by any other route.

When engaged collecting the broken files after the repulse, General Lee
said to an officer who was assisting, "It is all my fault."

A letter from Colonel W. M. Owen assures me that General Lee repeated this
remark at a roadside fire of the Washington Artillery on the 5th of July.
A letter from General Lee during the winter of 1863-64 repeated it in

And here is what Colonel T. J. Goree, of Texas, has to say upon the

    "I was present, however, just after Pickett's repulse, when General
    Lee so magnanimously took all the blame of the disaster upon himself.
    Another important circumstance, which I distinctly remember, was in
    the winter of 1863-64, when you sent me from East Tennessee to Orange
    Court-House with some despatches to General Lee. Upon my arrival
    there, General Lee asked me into his tent, where he was alone, with
    two or three Northern papers on the table. He remarked that he had
    just been reading the Northern reports of the battle of Gettysburg;
    that he had become satisfied from reading those reports _that if he
    had permitted you to carry out your plan, instead of making the attack
    on Cemetery Hill, he would have been successful_."

Further testimony to this effect comes from another source:

    "In East Tennessee, during the winter of 1863-64, you called me into
    your quarters, and asked me to read a letter just received from
    General Lee in which he used the following words: 'Oh, general, _had I
    but followed your advice, instead of pursuing the course that I did,
    how different all would have been_!' You wished me to bear this
    language in mind as your correspondence might be lost.

          "ERASMUS TAYLOR.


A contributor to _Blackwood's Magazine_ reported,--

    "But Lee's inaction after Fredericksburg was, as we have called it, an
    unhappy or negative blunder. Undoubtedly the greatest positive blunder
    of which he was ever guilty was the unnecessary onslaught which he
    gratuitously made against the strong position into which, by accident,
    General Meade fell back at Gettysburg. We have good reason for saying
    that during the five years of calm reflection which General Lee passed
    at Lexington, after the conclusion of the American war, his maladroit
    manipulation of the Confederate army during the Gettysburg campaign
    was to him a matter of ceaseless self reproach.

    "'If,' said he, on many occasions, 'I had taken General Longstreet's
    advice on the eve of the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, and
    filed off the left corps of my army behind the right corps, in the
    direction of Washington and Baltimore, along the Emmitsburg road, the
    Confederates would to-day be a free people.'"[135]

It should be stated that kindest relations were maintained between General
Lee and myself until interrupted by politics in 1867.

It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the reports put out after
his death by members of his family and of his staff, and _post-bellum_
champions, that indicate his later efforts to find points by which to so
work up public opinion as to shift the disaster to my shoulders.

Some of the statements of the members of the staff have been referred to.
General Fitzhugh Lee claims evidence that General Lee said that he would
have gained the battle if he had had General Jackson with him. But he had
Jackson in the Sharpsburg campaign, which was more blundering than that of
Gettysburg.[136] In another account Fitzhugh Lee wrote of General Lee,--

    "He told the father of the writer, his brother, that he was controlled
    too far by the great confidence he felt in the fighting qualities of
    his people, and by assurances of most of his higher officers."

No assurances were made from officers of the First Corps, but rather
objections. The only assurances that have come to light, to be identified,
are those of General Early, who advised the battle, but _from the other
end of the line from his command_, which should have given warning that it
did not come from the heart of a true soldier.

And this is the epitome of the Confederate battle. The army when it set
out on the campaign was all that could be desired, (except that the arms
were not all of the most approved pattern), but it was despoiled of two of
its finest brigades, Jenkins's and Corse's of Pickett's division, and was
fought out by detail. The greatest number engaged at any one time was on
the first day, when twenty-six thousand engaged twenty thousand of the
First and part of the Eleventh Corps. On the afternoon of the second day
about seventeen thousand were engaged on the right, and at night about
seven thousand on the left; then later at night about three thousand near
the centre. On the third day about twelve thousand were engaged at
daylight and until near noon, and in the afternoon fifteen thousand,--all
of the work of the second and third days against an army of seventy
thousand and more of veteran troops in strong position defended by

General Lee was on the field from about three o'clock of the afternoon of
the first day. Every order given the troops of the First Corps on that
field up to its march on the forenoon of the 2d was issued in his
presence. If the movements were not satisfactory in time and speed of
moving, it was his power, duty, and privilege to apply the remedy, but it
was not a part of a commander's duty or privilege to witness things that
did not suit him, fail to apply the remedy, and go off and grumble with
his staff-officers about it. In their efforts to show culpable delay in
the movements of the First Corps on the 2d, some of the Virginia writers
endeavor to show that General Lee did not even give me a guide to lead
the way to the field from which his battle was to be opened. He certainly
failed to go and look at it, and assist in selecting the ground and
preparing for action.

Fitzhugh Lee says of the second day, "Longstreet was attacking the Marye's
Hill of the position."[137] At Fredericksburg, General Burnside attacked
at Marye's Hill in six or more successive assaults with some twenty or
thirty thousand against three brigades under McLaws and Ransom and the
artillery; he had about four hundred yards to march from his covered ways
about Fredericksburg to Marye's Hill. When his last attack was repulsed in
the evening, he arranged and gave his orders for the attack to be renewed
in the morning, giving notice that he would lead it with the Ninth Corps,
but upon reports of his officers abandoned it. General Lee's assaulting
columns of fifteen or twenty thousand had a march of a mile to attack
double their numbers, better defended than were the three brigades of
Confederates at Marye's Hill that drove back Burnside. The enemy on
Cemetery Hill was in stronger position than the Confederates at Marye's

Fitzhugh Lee writes in the volume already quoted,--

    "Over the splendid scene of human courage and human sacrifice at
    Gettysburg there arises in the South an apparition, like Banquo's
    ghost at Macbeth's banquet, which says the battle was lost to the
    Confederates because some one blundered."

Call them Banquo, but their name is Legion. Weird spirits keep midnight
watch about the great boulders, while unknown comrades stalk in ghostly
ranks through the black fastnesses of Devil's Den, wailing the lament,
"Some one blundered at Gettysburg! Woe is me, whose duty was to die!"

Fitzhugh Lee makes his plans, orders, and movements to suit his purpose,
and claims that they would have given Gettysburg to the Confederates, but
he is not likely to convince any one outside of his coterie that over the
heights of Gettysburg was to be found honor for the South.

General Meade said that the suggestion to work towards his line of
communication was sound "military sense." That utterance has been approved
by subsequent fair judgment, and it is that potent fact that draws the
spiteful fire of latter-day knights.

Forty thousand men, unsupported as we were, could not have carried the
position at Gettysburg. The enemy was there. Officers and men knew their
advantage, and were resolved to stay until the hills came down over them.
It is simply out of the question for a lesser force to march over broad,
open fields and carry a fortified front occupied by a greater force of
seasoned troops.

Referring to the proposed move around the Union left to cut the line of
communication, a parallel in the Franco-German war is appropriate. When
the manoeuvres of the campaign had pushed Marshal MacMahon's army back to
the road between Paris and Metz, the latter fortified and occupied by the
army under Marshal Bazaine, MacMahon hesitated between Paris and Metz, and
was manoeuvred out of position to a point north of the line. Von Moltke
seized the opportunity and took position on the line, which gave him
shorter routes east and west. So that MacMahon, to reach either point,
must pass the German forces under Von Moltke. He made a brave effort to
reach Metz, and Von Moltke, to maintain his advantage, was called to
skilful manoeuvre and several gallant affairs, but succeeded in holding
his advantage that must call MacMahon to general engagement or surrender.
Out-generalled, and with a demoralized army, he thought the latter his
proper alternative.

The relative conditions of the armies were similar. The Union army, beaten
at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and drawn from its aggressive
campaign to defensive work in Pennsylvania, had met disaster in its battle
of the 1st. If it had been outgeneralled, and dislodged of position
without further attack, it would have been in poor condition to come in
aggressive battle against its adversary in well-chosen defensive grounds.

Again, in our own war, when the Union army carried the Confederate works
west of Petersburg on the 2d of April, 1865, General Meade got his army
together and was about to march east to finish his work by the capture of
Petersburg. General Grant objected,--that the Confederates would retreat
during the night; at Petersburg he would be behind them; in his then
position he would be alongside of them, and have an even start, with
better prospect to strike across their march and force them to general
battle or surrender; and he ordered arrangements for the march west at

Even Napoleon Bonaparte, the first in the science and greatest in the
execution of the art of war, finally lost grasp of his grandest thought:

"In war men are nothing; a man is everything."[138]

The Confederate chief at Gettysburg looked something like Napoleon at

Fitzhugh Lee quotes evidence of Governor Carroll, of Maryland, that
General Lee said, "Longstreet is the hardest man to move in my army."

It does not look like generalship to lose a battle and a cause and then
lay the responsibility upon others. He held command and was supported by
his government. If his army did not suit him, his word could have changed
it in a minute. If he failed to apply the remedy, it was his fault. Some
claim that his only fault as a general was his tender, generous heart. But
a heart in the right place looks more to the cause intrusted to its care
than for hidden ways by which to shift its responsibility to the shoulders
of those whose lives hang upon his word.

When he set out on his first campaign (Chickahominy) with the army, the
key of the campaign was intrusted to General Jackson, who named the hour
for the opening and failed to meet his own appointment. At the time he
appointed, A. P. Hill's, D. H. Hill's, and Longstreet's commands were in
position waiting. About eight hours after his time he was up, but
deliberately marched past the engagement and went into camp, a mile or
more behind the hot battle. He remained in his camp next morning, and
permitted the enemy, dislodged of his position of the day before, to march
by him to a strong position at Gaines's Mill. When his column reached that
position, his leading division (D. H. Hill's) engaged the enemy's right
without orders. He called the division off and put his command in position
to intercept the enemy's retreat towards the Pamunkey, from which he was
afterwards called to his part in the general engagement. The next day he
had the cavalry and part of his infantry in search of the enemy's next
move. At my head-quarters were two clever young engineers who were sent to
find what the enemy was about. They were the first to report the enemy's
retreat towards James River. Orders were given for Jackson to follow on
the direct line of retreat, also Magruder and Huger. My command was
ordered around through the outskirts of Richmond by the Darbytown road to
interpose between McClellan's army and the James River, about twenty
miles; the other troops marching by routes of about nine miles. We were in
position on the evening of the 29th of June, and stood in front of the
enemy all of the 30th, fighting a severe battle in the afternoon.
Magruder and Huger got up after night, and Jackson on the morning of the
1st. After the battle of the 1st, Jackson, Magruder, and Huger were
ordered in direct pursuit along the route of retreat, my command by the
longer route of Nance's Store. Jackson's column and mine met on the
evening of the 3d near Westover, the enemy's new position.

At the Second Manassas my command relieved the pressure against Jackson.
He called on me for relief by a route that would have taken an hour or an
hour and a half. A way was found by which he was relieved in about thirty
minutes. When relieved, he left the battle on my hands. I was at
Sharpsburg all day; Jackson only about two and a half hours. At
Fredericksburg, anticipating the move against him, half of my command was
ordered to swing off from my right and join in his battle.

But General Lee's assertion seems to refer to the operations at
Gettysburg, after Jackson had found his Happy Home. Let us see how far
this assertion is supported by events. General Lee reported,--

    "The advance of the enemy to the latter place (Gettysburg) was
    unknown, and, the weather being inclement, the march was conducted
    with a view to the comfort of the troops."

When, on the forenoon of the 2d, he decided upon his plan, the Second
Corps was deployed in the immediate front of the enemy's line on our left,
except two brigades sent off by General Early. One division of the Third
was close on the right of the Second, all within thirty minutes' march of
the enemy's lines. Two divisions of the Third Corps and two of the First
were on Seminary Ridge. When the order was announced the divisions on
Seminary Ridge had to find their positions and deploy to the right. By the
route ordered for the march it was five or six miles to the point at which
the battle was to be opened. The troops of the Third had a shorter route.
The march of the First was made in time for prompt deployment on the right
of the Third.

We were left to our own resources in finding ground upon which to organize
for battle. The enemy had changed position somewhat after the march was
ordered, but as we were not informed of his position before the march, we
could not know of the change. The Confederate commander did not care to
ride near us, to give information of a change, to assist in preparing for
attack, nor to inquire if new and better combinations might be made.

Four brigades of the right of the Third Corps were assigned as part of my
command. The engagement was to be general. My artillery combat was opened
at three P.M., followed in half an hour by the infantry, and I made
progressive battle until sundown. A division of the Second Corps attacked
on our left at nightfall, and later two brigades. Other parts of the
Second and Third Corps did not move to the battle.

On the 3d I was ordered to organize the column of assault, the other corps
to co-operate and assist the battle. There was an affair on the
Confederate left before the assaulting columns were organized, brought on
by attack of the enemy. The assaulting force marched at one P.M. Its work
has been described, but it is important to note that neither of the other
corps took part in the battle while the Southern chief stood in view of
the attack and near the rear of those corps. So it looks as if the
commander of the First Corps was easier to move than any one in his army,
rather than harder, and his chief left him to fight the battles alone.

After the retreat, and when resting on the south banks of the Rapidan,
reading of the progress of the march of General Rosecrans's army towards
Georgia, it seemed sinful to lie there idle while our comrades in the
West were so in need of assistance, and I wrote the Secretary of War
suggesting that a detachment should be sent West from the idle army.
General Lee objected, but the suggestion was ordered to be executed. In
this instance the subordinate was easier to move than his chief, though
the interests of the cause depended largely on the movement of the latter.

[Illustration: WILLIAM BLAKE. Volunteered in the Eighteenth Mississippi at
the age of sixteen. Lost a leg at Gettysburg.]

The forces engaged at Gettysburg were:

CONFEDERATE.--According to the latest official accounts, the Army of
Northern Virginia, on the 31st of May, numbered 74,468. The detachments
that joined numbered 6400, making 80,868. Deducting the detachments left
in Virginia,--Jenkins's brigade, Pickett's division, 2300; Corse's
brigade, Pickett's division, 1700; detachments from Second Corps and of
cavalry, 1300, in all 5300,--leaves the actual aggregate 75,568.

UNION.--According to the reports of the 30th of June, and making allowance
for detachments that joined in the interim in time to take part in the
battle, the grand aggregate was 100,000[139] officers and men.

The Confederates lost many men after the battle, and before they recrossed
the Potomac, from the toils of the march and the continuous and severe
harassment of the enemy's cavalry, which followed closely and in great

The casualties were:


  First Corps       7,539
  Second Corps      5,937
  Third Corps       6,735
  Cavalry           1,426
    Aggregate      21,637


  First Corps       6,059
  Second Corps      4,369
  Third Corps       4,211
  Fifth Corps       2,187
  Sixth Corps         242
  Eleventh Corps    3,801
  Twelfth Corps     1,082
  Cavalry           1,094
  Staff                 4
    Aggregate      23,049

The organization of the contending armies at Gettysburg was as follows:



    MCLAWS'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws:--_Kershaw's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. J. B. Kershaw; 2d S. C., Col. J. D. Kennedy, Lieut.-Col. F.
    Gaillard; 3d S. C., Maj. R. C. Maffett, Col. J. D. Nance; 7th S. C.,
    Col. D. Wyatt Aiken; 8th S. C., Col. J. W. Henagan; 15th S. C., Col.
    W. D. De Saussure, Maj. William M. Gist; 3d S. C. Battn., Lieut.-Col.
    W. G. Rice. _Barksdale's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. William Barksdale, Col.
    B. G. Humphreys; 13th Miss., Col. J. W. Carter; 17th Miss., Col. W. D.
    Holder, Lieut.-Col. John C. Fiser; 18th Miss., Col. T. M. Griffin,
    Lieut.-Col. W. H. Luse; 21st Miss., Col. B. G. Humphreys. _Semmes's
    Brigade_,[142] Brig.-Gen. P. J. Semmes, Col. Goode Bryan; 10th Ga.,
    Col. John B. Weems; 50th Ga., Col. W. R. Manning; 51st Ga., Col. E.
    Ball; 53d Ga., Col. James P. Simms. _Wofford's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. W.
    T. Wofford; 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan; 18th Ga., Lieut.-Col. S. Z.
    Ruff; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col.
    Luther J. Glenn; Phillips (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. E. S. Barclay.
    _Artillery_, Col. H. C. Cabell; 1st N. C. Art., Batt. A, Capt. B. C.
    Manly; Pulaski (Ga.) Art., Capt. J. C. Fraser, Lieut. W. J. Furlong;
    1st Richmond Howitzers, Capt. E. S. McCarthy; Troup (Ga.) Art., Capt.
    H. H. Carlton, Lieut. C. W. Motes.

    PICKETT'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. George E. Pickett:--_Garnett's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. R. B. Garnett, Maj. C. S. Peyton; 8th Va., Col. Eppa
    Hunton; 18th Va., Lieut.-Col. H. A. Carrington; 19th Va., Col. Henry
    Gantt, Lieut.-Col. John T. Ellis; 28th Va., Col. R. C. Allen,
    Lieut.-Col. William Watts; 56th Va., Col. W. D. Stuart, Lieut.-Col. P.
    P. Slaughter. _Kemper's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. J. L. Kemper, Col. Joseph
    Mayo, Jr.; 1st Va., Col. Lewis B. Williams, Lieut.-Col. F. G. Skinner;
    3d Va., Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr., Lieut.-Col. A. D. Callcote; 7th Va.,
    Col. W. T. Patton, Lieut.-Col. C. C. Flowerree; 11th Va., Maj.
    Kirkwood Otey; 24th Va., Col. William R. Terry. _Armistead's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. L. A. Armistead, Col. W. R. Aylett; 9th Va., Maj. John C.
    Owens; 14th Va., Col. James G. Hodges, Lieut.-Col. William White; 38th
    Va., Col. E. C. Edmonds, Lieut.-Col. P. B. Whittle; 53d Va., Col. W.
    R. Aylett; 57th Va., Col. John Bowie Magruder. _Artillery_, Maj. James
    Dearing; Fauquier (Va.) Art., Capt. R. M. Stribling; Hampden (Va.)
    Art., Capt. W. H. Caskie; Richmond Fayette Art., Capt. M. C. Macon;
    Virginia Batt., Capt. Joseph G. Blount.

    HOOD'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood, Brig.-Gen. E. M. Law:--_Law's
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. E. M. Law, Col. James L. Sheffield; 4th Ala.,
    Lieut.-Col. L. H. Scruggs; 15th Ala., Col. William C. Oates, Capt. B.
    A. Hill; 44th Ala., Col. William F. Perry; 47th Ala., Col. James W.
    Jackson, Lieut.-Col. M. J. Bulger, Maj. J. M. Campbell; 48th Ala.,
    Col. James L. Sheffield, Capt. T. J. Eubanks. _Robertson's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. J. B. Robertson; 3d Ark., Col. Van H. Manning, Lieut.-Col.
    R. S. Taylor; 1st Tex., Lieut.-Col. P. A. Work; 4th Tex., Col. J. C.
    G. Key, Maj. J. P. Bane; 5th Tex., Col. R. M. Powell, Lieut.-Col. K.
    Bryan, Maj. J. C. Rogers. _Anderson's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. George T.
    Anderson, Lieut.-Col. William Luffman; 7th Ga., Col. W. W. White; 8th
    Ga., Col. John R. Towers; 9th Ga., Lieut.-Col. John C. Mounger, Maj.
    W. M. Jones, Capt. George Hillyer; 11th Ga., Col. F. H. Little,
    Lieut.-Col. William Luffman, Maj. Henry D. McDaniel, Capt. William H.
    Mitchell; 59th Ga., Col. Jack Brown, Capt. M. G. Bass. _Benning's
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Benning; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col. William T.
    Harris, Maj. W. S. Shepherd; 15th Ga., Col. D. M. DuBose; 17th Ga.,
    Col. W. C. Hodges; 20th Ga., Col. John A. Jones, Lieut.-Col. J. D.
    Waddell. _Artillery_, Maj. M. W. Henry; Branch (N. C.) Art., Capt. A.
    C. Latham; German (S. C.) Art., Capt. William K. Bachman; Palmetto (S.
    C.) Light Art., Capt. Hugh R. Garden; Rowan (N. C.) Art., Capt. James

    ARTILLERY RESERVE, Col. J. B. Walton:--_Alexander's Battalion_, Col.
    E. P. Alexander; Ashland (Va.) Art., Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr., Lieut.
    James Woolfolk; Bedford (Va.) Art., Capt. T. C. Jordan; Brooks (S. C.)
    Art., Lieut. S. C. Gilbert; Madison (La.) Light Art., Capt. George V.
    Moody; Va. Batt., Capt. W. W. Parker; Va. Batt., Capt. O. B. Taylor.
    _Washington (La.) Artillery_, Maj. B. F. Eshleman; First Co., Capt. C.
    W. Squires; Second Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson; Third Co., Capt. M. B.
    Miller; Fourth Co., Capt. Joe Norcom, Lieut. H. A. Battles.

    Randolph's Company Virginia Cavalry, Capt. William F. Randolph.

    EARLY'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Jubal A. Early:--_Hays's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Harry T. Hays; 5th La., Maj. Alexander Hart, Capt. T. H.
    Biscoe; 6th La., Lieut.-Col. Joseph Hanlon; 7th La., Col. D. B. Penn;
    8th La., Col. T. D. Lewis, Lieut.-Col. A. de Blanc, Maj. G. A.
    Lester; 9th La., Col. Leroy A. Stafford. _Smith's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    William Smith; 31st Va., Col. John S. Hoffman; 49th Va., Lieut.-Col.
    J. Catlett Gibson; 52d Va., Lieut.-Col. James H. Skinner. _Hoke's
    Brigade_, Col. Isaac E. Avery, Col. A. C. Godwin; 6th N. C., Maj. S.
    McD. Tate; 21st N. C., Col. W. W. Kirkland; 57th N. C., Col. A. C.
    Godwin. _Gordon's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. J. B. Gordon; 13th Ga., Col.
    James M. Smith; 26th Ga., Col. E. N. Atkinson; 31st Ga., Col. Clement
    A. Evans; 38th Ga., Capt. William L. McLeod; 60th Ga., Capt. W. B.
    Jones; 61st Ga., Col. John H. Lamar. _Artillery_, Lieut.-Col. H. P.
    Jones; Charlottesville (Va.) Art., Capt. James McD. Carrington;
    Courtney (Va.) Art., Capt. W. A. Tanner; Louisiana Guard Art., Capt.
    C. A. Green; Staunton (Va.) Art., Capt. A. W. Garber.

    JOHNSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson:--_Steuart's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart; 1st Md. Battn. Inf., Lieut.-Col. J. R.
    Herbert, Maj. W. W. Goldsborough, Capt. J. P. Crane; 1st N. C.,
    Lieut.-Col. H. A. Brown; 3d N. C., Maj. W. M. Parsley; 10th Va., Col.
    E. T. H. Warren; 23d Va., Lieut.-Col. S. T. Walton; 37th Va., Maj. H.
    C. Wood. _Stonewall Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. James A. Walker; 2d Va., Col.
    J. Q. A. Nadenbousch; 4th Va., Maj. William Terry; 5th Va., Col. J. H.
    S. Funk; 27th Va., Lieut.-Col. D. M. Shriver; 33d Va., Capt. J. B.
    Golladay. _Nicholls's Brigade_,[143] Col. J. M. Williams; 1st La.,
    Capt. E. D. Willett; 2d La., Lieut.-Col. R. E. Burke; 10th La., Maj.
    T. N. Powell; 14th La., Lieut.-Col. David Zable; 15th La., Maj. Andrew
    Brady. _Jones's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. John M. Jones, Lieut.-Col. R. H.
    Dungan; 21st Va., Capt. W. P. Moseley; 25th Va., Col. J. C.
    Higginbotham, Lieut.-Col. J. A. Robinson; 42d Va., Lieut.-Col. R. W.
    Withers, Capt. S. H. Saunders; 44th Va., Maj. N. Cobb, Capt. T. R.
    Buckner; 48th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. H. Dungan, Maj. Oscar White; 50th
    Va., Lieut.-Col. L. H. N. Salyer. _Artillery_, Maj. J. W. Latimer,
    Capt. C. I. Raine; 1st Md. Batt., Capt William F. Dement; Alleghany
    (Va.) Art., Capt. J. C. Carpenter; Chesapeake (Md.) Art., Capt.
    William D. Brown; Lee (Va.) Batt., Capt. C. I. Raine, Lieut. William
    W. Hardwicke.

    RODES'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. R. E. Rodes:--_Daniel's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Junius Daniel; 32d N. C., Col. E. C. Brabble; 43d N. C.,
    Col. T. S. Kenan, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Lewis; 45th N. C., Lieut.-Col. S.
    H. Boyd, Maj. John R. Winston, Capt. A. H. Gallaway, Capt. J. A.
    Hopkins; 53d N. C., Col. W. A. Owens; 2d N. C. Battn., Lieut.-Col. H.
    L. Andrews, Capt. Van Brown. _Doles's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. George
    Doles; 4th Ga., Lieut.-Col. D. R. E. Winn, Maj. W. H. Willis; 12th
    Ga., Col. Edward Willis; 21st Ga., Col. John T. Mercer; 44th Ga., Col.
    S. P. Lumpkin, Maj. W. H. Peebles. _Iverson's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    Alfred Iverson; 5th N. C.,[144] Capt. Speight B. West, Capt. Benjamin
    Robinson; 12th N. C., Lieut.-Col. W. S. Davis; 20th N. C.,[145]
    Lieut.-Col. Nelson Slough, Capt. Lewis T. Hicks; 23d N. C.,[146] Col.
    D. H. Christie, Capt. William H. Johnston. _Ramseur's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. S. D. Ramseur; 2d N. C., Maj. D. W. Hurtt, Capt. James T.
    Scales; 4th N. C., Col. Bryan Grimes; 14th N. C., Col. R. Tyler
    Bennett, Maj. Joseph H. Lambeth; 30th N. C., Col. Francis M. Parker,
    Maj. W. W. Sillers. _O'Neal's Brigade_, Col. E. A. O'Neal; 3d Ala.,
    Col. C. A. Battle; 5th Ala., Col. J. M. Hall; 6th Ala., Col. J. N.
    Lightfoot, Capt. M. L. Bowie; 12th Ala., Col. S. B. Pickens; 26th
    Ala., Lieut.-Col. John C. Goodgame. _Artillery_, Lieut.-Col. Thomas H.
    Carter; Jeff Davis (Ala.) Art., Capt. W. J. Reese; King William (Va.)
    Art., Capt. W. P. Carter; Morris (Va.) Art., Capt. R. C. M. Page;
    Orange (Va.) Art., Capt. C. W. Fry. _Artillery Reserve_, Col. J.
    Thompson Brown; 1st Va. Art., Capt. Willis J. Dance; 2d Richmond (Va.)
    Howitzers, Capt. David Watson; 3d Richmond (Va.) Howitzers, Capt. B.
    H. Smith, Jr.; Powhatan (Va.) Art., Lieut. John M. Cunningham;
    Rockbridge (Va.) Art., Capt. A. Graham; Salem (Va.) Art., Lieut. C. B.
    Griffin; Nelson's Battn., Lieut.-Col. William Nelson; Amherst (Va.)
    Art., Capt. T. J. Kirkpatrick; Fluvanna (Va.) Art., Capt. J. L.
    Massie; Ga. Batt., Capt. John Milledge, Jr.


    ANDERSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. R. H. Anderson:--_Wilcox's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox; 8th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Hilary A. Herbert;
    9th Ala., Capt. J. H. King; 10th Ala., Col. William H. Forney,
    Lieut.-Col. James E. Shelley; 11th Ala., Col. J. C. C. Sanders,
    Lieut.-Col. George E. Tayloe; 14th Ala., Col. L. Pinckard, Lieut.-Col.
    James A. Broome. _Mahone's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone; 6th
    Va., Col. George T. Rogers; 12th Va., Col. D. A. Weisiger; 16th Va.,
    Col. Joseph H. Ham; 41st Va., Col. William A. Parham; 61st Va., Col.
    V. D. Groner. _Wright's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright, Col.
    William Gibson; 3d Ga., Col. E. J. Walker; 22d Ga., Col. Joseph
    Wasden, Capt. B. C. McCurry; 48th Ga., Col. William Gibson, Capt. M.
    R. Hall; 2d Ga. Battn., Maj. George W. Ross, Capt. Charles J. Moffett.
    _Perry's Brigade_, Col. David Lang; 2d Fla., Maj. W. R. Moore; 5th
    Fla., Capt. R. N. Gardner; 8th Fla., Col. David Lang. _Posey's
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Carnot Posey; 12th Miss., Col. W. H. Taylor; 16th
    Miss., Col. Samuel E. Baker; 19th Miss., Col. N. H. Harris; 48th
    Miss., Col. Joseph M. Jayne. _Artillery_ (_Sumter Battalion_), Maj.
    John Lane; Co. A, Capt. Hugh M. Ross; Co. B, Capt. George M.
    Patterson; Co. C, Capt. John T. Wingfield.

    HETH'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Henry Heth, Brig.-Gen. J. J.
    Pettigrew:--_First Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Pettigrew, Col. J. K.
    Marshall; 11th N. C., Col. Collett Leventhorpe; 26th N. C., Col. Henry
    K. Burgwyn, Jr., Capt. H. C. Albright; 47th N. C., Col. G. H.
    Faribault; 52d N. C., Col. J. K. Marshall, Lieut.-Col. Marcus A.
    Parks. _Second Brigade_, Col. J. M. Brockenbrough; 40th Va., Capt. T.
    E. Betts, Capt. R. B. Davis; 47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo; 55th Va.,
    Col. W. S. Christian; 22d Va. Battn., Maj. John S. Bowles. _Third
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. James J. Archer, Col. B. D. Fry, Lieut.-Col. S.
    G. Shepard; 13th Ala., Col. B. D. Fry; 5th Ala. Battn., Maj. A. S. Van
    de Graaff; 1st Tenn. (provisional army), Maj. Felix G. Buchanan; 7th
    Tenn., Lieut.-Col. S. G. Shepard; 14th Tenn., Capt. B. L. Phillips.
    _Fourth Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Joseph R. Davis; 2d Miss., Col. J. M.
    Stone; 11th Miss., Col. F. M. Green; 42d Miss., Col. H. R. Miller;
    55th N. C., Col. J. K. Connally. _Artillery_, Lieut.-Col. John J.
    Garnett; Donaldsonville (La.) Art., Capt. V. Maurin; Huger (Va.) Art.,
    Capt. Joseph D. Moore; Lewis (Va.) Art., Capt. John W. Lewis; Norfolk
    Light Art. Blues, Capt. C. R. Grandy.

    PENDER'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. William D. Pender, Maj.-Gen. I. R.
    Trimble, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane:--_First Brigade_, Col. Abner
    Perrin; 1st S. C. (provisional army), Maj. C. W. McCreary; 1st S. C.
    Rifles, Capt. William M. Hadden; 12th S. C., Col. John L. Miller; 13th
    S. C., Lieut.-Col. B. T. Brockman; 14th S. C., Lieut.-Col. Joseph N.
    Brown. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane, Col. C. M. Avery;
    7th N. C., Capt. J. McLeod Turner, Capt. James G. Harris; 18th N. C.,
    Col. John D. Barry; 28th N. C., Col. S. D. Lowe, Lieut.-Col. W. H. A.
    Speer; 33d N. C., Col. C. M. Avery; 37th N. C., Col. W. M. Barbour.
    _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Edward L. Thomas; 14th, 35th, 45th, and
    49th Ga., Col. S. T. Player. _Fourth Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. A. M.
    Scales, Lieut.-Col. G. T. Gordon, Col. W. Lee J. Lowrance; 13th N. C.,
    Col. J. H. Hyman, Lieut.-Col. H. A. Rogers; 16th N. C., Capt. L. W.
    Stowe; 22d N. C., Col. James Conner; 34th N. C., Col. William Lee J.
    Lowrance, Lieut.-Col. G. T. Gordon; 38th N. C., Col. W. J. Hoke,
    Lieut.-Col. John Ashford. _Artillery_, Maj. William T. Poague;
    Albemarle (Va.) Art., Capt. James W. Wyatt; Charlotte (N. C.) Art.,
    Capt. Joseph Graham; Madison (Miss.) Light Art., Capt. George Ward;
    Virginia Batt., Capt. J. V. Brooke.

    ARTILLERY RESERVE, Col. R. Lindsay Walker:--_McIntosh's Battalion_,
    Maj. D. G. McIntosh; Danville (Va.) Art., Capt. R. S. Rice; Hardaway
    (Ala.) Art., Capt. W. B. Hurt; 2d Rockbridge (Va.) Art., Lieut. Samuel
    Wallace; Virginia Batt., Capt. M. Johnson. _Pegram's Battalion_, Maj.
    W. J. Pegram, Capt. E. B. Brunson; Crenshaw (Va.) Batt.;
    Fredericksburg (Va.) Art., Capt. E. A. Marye; Letcher (Va.) Art.,
    Capt. T. A. Brander; Pee Dee (S. C.) Art., Lieut. William E.
    Zimmerman; Purcell (Va.) Art., Capt. Joseph McGraw.


    STUART'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart:--_Hampton's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton, Col. L. S. Baker; 1st N. C., Col. L. S.
    Baker; 1st and 2d S. C.; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Jeff. Davis Legion,
    Phillips (Ga.) Legion. _Robertson's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Beverly H.
    Robertson;[147] 4th N. C., Col. D. D. Ferebee; 5th N. C. _Fitzhugh
    Lee's Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee; 1st Md. Battn.,[148] Maj.
    Harry Gilmor, Maj. Ridgely Brown; 1st Va., Col. James H. Drake; 2d
    Va., Col. T. T. Munford; 3d Va., Col. Thomas H. Owen; 4th Va., Col.
    William C. Wickham; 5th Va., Col. T. L. Rosser. _Jenkins's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. A. G. Jenkins, Col. M. J. Ferguson; 14th, 16th, and 17th
    Va.; 34th Va. Battn., Lieut.-Col. V. A. Witcher; 36th Va. Battn.;
    Jackson's (Va.) Batt., Capt. Thomas E. Jackson. _Jones's Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. William E. Jones; 6th Va., Maj. C. E. Flournoy; 7th Va.,
    Lieut.-Col. Thomas Marshall; 11th Va., Col. L. L. Lomax. _W. H. F.
    Lee's Brigade_, Col. J. R. Chambliss, Jr.; 2d N. C.; 9th Va., Col. R.
    L. T. Beale; 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; 13th Va. _Stuart's Horse
    Artillery_, Maj. R. F. Beckham; Breathed's (Va.) Batt., Capt. James
    Breathed; Chew's (Va.) Batt., Capt. R. P. Chew; Griffin's (Md.) Batt.,
    Capt. W. H. Griffin; Hart's (S. C.) Batt., Capt. J. F. Hart;
    McGregor's (Va.) Batt., Capt. W. M. McGregor; Moorman's (Va.) Batt.,
    Capt. M. N. Moorman.

    IMBODEN'S COMMAND,[149] Brig.-Gen. J. D. Imboden; 18th Va. Cav., Col.
    George W. Imboden; 62d Va. Inf. (mounted), Col. George H. Smith;
    Virginia Partisan Rangers, Capt. John H. McNeill; Virginia Batt.,
    Capt. J. H. McClanahan.

    ARTILLERY,[150] Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton.


    GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS:--_Command of the Provost-Marshal-General_,
    Brig.-General Marsena R. Patrick; 93d N. Y.,[151] Col. John S.
    Crocker; 8th U. S. (8 cos.),[151] Capt. Edwin W. H. Reed; 2d Pa. Cav.,
    Col. R. Butler Price; 6th Pa. Cav., Cos. E and I, Capt. James Starr;
    Regular Cav. (detachments from 1st, 2d, 5th, and 6th Regiments).

    SIGNAL CORPS, Capt. Lemuel B. Norton.

    GUARDS AND ORDERLIES, Oneida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Mann.

    ARTILLERY,[152] Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt.

    ENGINEER BRIGADE,[153] Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Benham:--15th N. Y. (3
    cos.), Maj. Walter L. Cassin; 50th N. Y., Col. William H. Pettes; U.
    S. Battn., Capt. George H. Mendell.

    JOHN NEWTON. _General Head-quarters_, 1st Me. Cav., Co. L, Capt.
    Constantine Taylor.

    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Solomon Meredith, Col. William W. Robinson; 19th Ind.,
    Col. Samuel J. Williams; 24th Mich., Col. Henry A. Morrow, Capt.
    Albert M. Edwards; 2d Wis., Col. Lucius Fairchild, Maj. John
    Mansfield, Capt. George H. Otis; 6th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Rufus R. Dawes;
    7th Wis., Col. William W. Robinson, Maj. Mark Finnicum. _Second
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler; 7th Ind., Col. Ira G. Grover;
    76th N. Y., Maj. Andrew J. Grover, Capt. John E. Cook; 84th N. Y.
    (14th Militia), Col. Edward B. Fowler; 95th N. Y., Col. George H.
    Biddle, Maj. Edward Pye; 147th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis C. Miller,
    Maj. George Harney; 56th Pa. (9 cos.), Col. J. William Hofmann.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Gabriel R. Paul, Col. Samuel H. Leonard, Col. Adrian R.
    Root, Col. Richard Coulter, Col. Peter Lyle; 16th Me., Col. Charles W.
    Tilden, Maj. Archibald D. Leavitt; 13th Mass., Col. Samuel H. Leonard,
    Lieut.-Col. N. Walter Batchelder; 94th N. Y., Col. Adrian R. Root,
    Maj. Samuel A. Moffett; 104th N. Y., Col. Gilbert G. Prey; 107th Pa.,
    Lieut.-Col. James MacThomson, Capt. Emanuel D. Roath. _Second
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter; 12th Mass., Col. James L. Bates,
    Lieut.-Col. David Allen, Jr.; 83d N. Y. (9th Militia), Lieut.-Col.
    Joseph A. Moesch; 97th N. Y., Col. Charles Wheelock, Maj. Charles
    Northrup; 11th Pa.,[155] Col. Richard Coulter, Capt. Benjamin F.
    Haines, Capt. John V. Overmyer; 88th Pa., Maj. Benezet F. Foust, Capt.
    Henry Whiteside; 90th Pa., Col. Peter Lyle, Maj. Alfred J. Sellers.

    THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Maj.-Gen. Abner
    Doubleday:--_First Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Col. Chapman
    Biddle; 80th N. Y. (20th Militia), Col. Theodore B. Gates; 121st Pa.,
    Maj. Alexander Biddle, Col. Chapman Biddle; 142d Pa., Col. Robert P.
    Cummins, Lieut.-Col. A. B. McCalmont; 151st Pa., Lieut.-Col. George F.
    McFarland, Capt. Walter L. Owens, Col. Harrison Allen. _Second
    Brigade_, Col. Roy Stone, Col. Langhorne Wister, Col. Edmund L. Dana;
    143d Pa., Col. Edmund L. Dana, Lieut.-Col. John D. Musser; 149th Pa.,
    Lieut.-Col. Walton Dwight, Capt. James Glenn; 150th Pa., Col.
    Langhorne Wister, Lieut.-Col. H. S. Huidekoper, Capt. Cornelius C.
    Widdis. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. George J. Stannard, Col. Francis
    V. Randall; 12th Vt.,[156] Col. Asa P. Blunt; 13th Vt., Col. Francis
    V. Randall, Maj. Joseph J. Boynton, Lieut.-Col. William D. Munson;
    14th Vt., Col. William T. Nichols; 15th Vt.,[156] Col. Redfield
    Proctor; 16th Vt., Col. Wheelock G. Veazey. _Artillery Brigade_, Col.
    Charles S. Wainwright; Me. Light, 2d Batt. B, Capt. James A. Hall; Me.
    Light, 5th Batt. E, Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens, Lieut. Edward N.
    Whittier; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. L,[157] Capt. Gilbert H. Reynolds,
    Lieut. George Breck; 1st Pa. Light, Batt. B, Capt. James H. Cooper;
    4th U. S., Batt. B, Lieut. James Stewart.

    BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN GIBBON. _General Head-quarters_, 6th N. Y.
    Cav., Cos. D and K, Capt. Riley Johnson.

    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    Edward E. Cross, Col. H. Boyd McKeen; 5th N. H., Lieut.-Col. Charles
    E. Hapgood; 61st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. K. Oscar Broady; 81st Pa., Col. H.
    Boyd McKeen, Lieut.-Col. Amos Stroh; 148th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Robert
    McFarlane. _Second Brigade_, Col. Patrick Kelly; 28th Mass., Col. R.
    Byrnes; 63d N. Y. (2 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Richard C. Bentley, Capt.
    Thomas Touhy; 69th N. Y. (2 cos.), Capt. Richard Moroney, Lieut. James
    J. Smith; 88th N. Y. (2 cos.), Capt. Denis F. Burke; 116th Pa. (4
    cos.), Maj. St. Clair A. Mulholland. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    Samuel K. Zook, Lieut.-Col. John Fraser; 52d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. C. G.
    Freudenberg, Capt. William Scherrer; 57th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Alford B.
    Chapman; 66th N. Y., Col. Orlando H. Morris, Lieut.-Col. John S.
    Hammell, Maj. Peter Nelson; 140th Pa., Col. Richard P. Roberts,
    Lieut.-Col. John Fraser. _Fourth Brigade_, Col. John R. Brooke; 27th
    Conn. (2 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Henry C. Merwin, Maj. James H. Coburn; 2d
    Del., Col. William P. Baily, Capt. Charles H. Christman; 64th N. Y.,
    Col. Daniel G. Bingham, Maj. Leman W. Bradley; 53d Pa., Lieut.-Col.
    Richards McMichael; 145th Pa. (7 cos.), Col. Hiram L. Brown, Capt.
    John W. Reynolds, Capt. Moses W. Oliver.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. William
    Harrow:--_First Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. William Harrow, Col. Francis E.
    Heath; 19th Me., Col. Francis E. Heath, Lieut.-Col. Henry W.
    Cunningham; 15th Mass., Col. George H. Ward, Lieut.-Col. George C.
    Joslin; 1st Minn.,[159] Col. William Colvill, Jr., Capt. Nathan S.
    Messick, Capt. Henry C. Coates; 82d N. Y. (2d Militia), Lieut.-Col.
    James Huston, Capt. John Darrow. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    Alexander S. Webb; 69th Pa., Col. Dennis O'Kane, Capt. William Davis;
    71st Pa., Col. Richard Penn Smith; 72d Pa., Col. DeWitt C. Baxter,
    Lieut.-Col. Theodore Hesser; 106th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William L. Curry.
    _Third Brigade_, Col. Norman J. Hall; 19th Mass., Col. Arthur F.
    Devereux; 20th Mass., Col. Paul J. Revere, Lieut.-Col. George N. Macy,
    Capt. Henry L. Abbott; 7th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Amos E. Steele, Jr.,
    Maj. Sylvanus W. Curtis; 42d N. Y., Col. James E. Mallon; 59th N. Y.
    (4 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Max A. Thoman, Capt. William McFadden.
    _Unattached_, Mass. Sharp-shooters, 1st Co., Capt. William Plumer,
    Lieut. Emerson L. Bicknall.

    THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    Samuel S. Carroll; 14th Ind., Col. John Coons; 4th Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
    Leonard W. Carpenter; 8th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Franklin Sawyer; 7th W.
    Va., Lieut.-Col. Jonathan H. Lockwood. _Second Brigade_, Col. Thomas
    A. Smyth, Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pierce; 14th Conn., Maj. Theodore G.
    Ellis; 1st Del., Lieut.-Col. Edward P. Harris, Capt. Thomas P. Hizar,
    Lieut. William Smith, Lieut. John T. Dent; 12th N. J., Maj. John T.
    Hill; 10th N. Y. (Battn.), Maj. George F. Hopper; 108th N. Y.,
    Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pierce. _Third Brigade_, Col. George L.
    Willard, Col. Eliakim Sherrill, Lieut.-Col. James M. Bull; 39th N. Y.
    (4 cos.), Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt; 111th N. Y., Col. Clinton D.
    McDougall, Lieut.-Col. Isaac M. Lusk, Capt. Aaron P. Seeley; 125th N.
    Y., Lieut.-Col. Levin Crandell; 126th N. Y., Col. Eliakim Sherrill,
    Lieut.-Col. James M. Bull. _Artillery Brigade_, Capt. John G. Hazard;
    1st N. Y. Light, Batt. B,[160] Lieut. Albert S. Sheldon, Capt. James
    McKay Rorty, Lieut. Robert E. Rogers; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. A, Capt.
    William A. Arnold; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. B, Lieut. T. Fred. Brown,
    Lieut. Walter S. Perrin; 1st U. S., Batt. I, Lieut. George A.
    Woodruff, Lieut. Tully McCrea; 4th U. S., Batt. A, Lieut. Alonzo H.
    Cushing, Sergt. Frederick Fuger.

    B. BIRNEY.

    FIRST DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Hobart
    Ward:--_First Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Charles K. Graham, Col. Andrew H.
    Tippin; 57th Pa. (8 cos.), Col. Peter Sides, Capt. Alanson H. Nelson;
    63d Pa., Maj. John A. Danks; 68th Pa., Col. Andrew H. Tippin, Capt.
    Milton S. Davis(?), 105th Pa., Col. Calvin A. Craig; 114th Pa.,
    Lieut.-Col. Frederick F. Cavada, Capt. Edward R. Bowen; 141st Pa.,
    Col. Henry J. Madill. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward,
    Col. Hiram Berdan; 20th Ind., Col. John Wheeler, Lieut.-Col. William
    C. L. Taylor; 3d Me., Col. Moses B. Lakeman; 4th Me., Col. Elijah
    Walker, Capt. Edwin Libby; 86th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Benjamin L.
    Higgins; 124th N. Y., Col. A. Van Horne Ellis, Lieut.-Col. Francis M.
    Cummins; 99th Pa., Maj. John W. Moore; 1st U. S. Sharp-shooters, Col.
    Hiram Berdan, Lieut.-Col. Caspar Trepp; 2d U. S. Sharp-shooters (8
    cos.), Maj. Homer R. Stoughton. _Third Brigade_, Col. P. Regis de
    Trobriand; 17th Me., Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Merrill; 3d Mich., Col.
    Byron R. Pierce, Lieut.-Col. Edwin S. Pierce; 5th Mich., Lieut.-Col.
    John Pulford; 40th N. Y., Col. Thomas W. Egan; 110th Pa. (6 cos.),
    Lieut.-Col. David M. Jones, Maj. Isaac Rogers.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys:--_First Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Carr; 1st Mass., Lieut.-Col. Clark B. Baldwin;
    11th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Porter D. Tripp; 16th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Waldo
    Merriam, Capt. Matthew Donovan; 12th Mass., Capt. John F. Langley;
    11th N. J., Col. Robert McAllister, Capt. Luther Martin, Lieut. John
    Schoonover, Capt. William H. Lloyd, Capt. Samuel T. Sleeper; 26th Pa.,
    Maj. Robert L. Bodine; 84th Pa.,[161] Lieut.-Col. Milton Opp. _Second
    Brigade_, Col. William R. Brewster; 70th N. Y., Col. J. Egbert Farnum;
    71st N. Y., Col. Henry L. Potter; 72d N. Y., Col. John S. Austin,
    Lieut.-Col. John Leonard; 73d N. Y., Maj. Michael W. Burns; 74th N.
    Y., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Holt; 120th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Cornelius D.
    Westbrook, Maj. John R. Tappen. _Third Brigade_, Col. George C.
    Burling; 2d N. H., Col. Edward L. Bailey; 5th N. J., Col. William J.
    Sewell, Capt. Thomas C. Godfrey, Capt. Henry H. Woolsey; 6th N. J.,
    Lieut.-Col. Stephen R. Gilkyson; 7th N. J., Col. Louis R. Francine,
    Maj. Frederick Cooper; 8th N. J., Col. John Ramsey, Capt, John G.
    Langston; 115th Pa., Maj. John P. Dunne. _Artillery Brigade_, Capt.
    George E. Randolph, Capt. A. Judson Clark; N. J. Light, 2d Batt.,
    Capt. A. Judson Clark, Lieut. Robert Sims; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. D,
    Capt. George B. Winslow; N. Y. Light, 4th Batt., Capt. James E. Smith;
    1st R. I. Light, Batt. E, Lieut. John K. Bucklyn, Lieut. Benjamin
    Freeborn; 4th U. S., Batt. K, Lieut. Francis W. Seeley, Lieut. Robert

    12th N. Y. Inf., Cos. D and E, Capt, Henry W. Rider; 17th Pa. Cav.,
    Cos. D and H, Capt. William Thompson.

    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. James Barnes:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    William S. Tilton; 18th Mass., Col. Joseph Hayes; 22d Mass.,
    Lieut.-Col. Thomas Sherwin, Jr.; 1st Mich., Col. Ira C. Abbott,
    Lieut.-Col. William A. Throop; 118th Pa., Lieut.-Col. James Gwyn.
    _Second Brigade_, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer; 9th Mass., Col. Patrick R.
    Guiney; 32d Mass., Col. G. L. Prescott; 4th Mich., Col. Harrison H.
    Jeffords, Lieut.-Col. George W. Lumbard; 62d Pa., Lieut.-Col. James C.
    Hull. _Third Brigade_, Col. Strong Vincent, Col. James C. Rice; 20th
    Me., Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain; 16th Mich., Col. Norval E. Welch;
    44th N. Y., Col. James C. Rice, Lieut.-Col. Freeman Conner; 83d Pa.,
    Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    Hannibal Day; 3d U. S. (6 cos.), Capt. Henry W. Freedley, Capt.
    Richard G. Lay; 4th U. S. (4 cos.), Capt. Julius W. Adams, Jr.; 6th U.
    S. (5 cos.), Capt. Levi C. Bootes; 12th U. S. (8 cos.), Capt. Thomas
    S. Dunn; 14th U. S. (8 cos.), Maj. Grotius R. Giddings. _Second
    Brigade_, Col. Sidney Burbank; 2d U. S. (6 cos.), Maj. Arthur T. Lee,
    Capt. Samuel A. McKee; 7th U. S. (4 cos.), Capt. David P. Hancock;
    10th U. S. (3 cos.), Capt. William Clinton; 11th U. S. (6 cos.), Maj.
    De Lancey Floyd-Jones; 17th U. S. (7 cos.), Lieut.-Col. J. Durell
    Greene. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Stephen H. Weed, Col. Kenner
    Garrard; 140th N. Y., Col. Patrick H. O'Rorke, Lieut.-Col. Louis
    Ernst; 146th N. Y., Col. Kenner Garrard, Lieut.-Col. David T. Jenkins;
    91st Pa., Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Sinex; 155th Pa., Lieut.-Col. John H.

    THIRD DIVISION,[162] Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford:--_First Brigade_,
    Col. William McCandless; 1st Pa. Reserves (9 cos.), Col. William C.
    Talley; 2d Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. George A. Woodward; 6th Pa.
    Reserves, Lieut.-Col. Wellington H. Ent; 13th Pa. Reserves, Col.
    Charles F. Taylor, Maj. William R. Hartshorne. _Third Brigade_, Col.
    Joseph W. Fisher; 5th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. George Dare; 9th Pa.
    Reserves, Lieut.-Col. James McK. Snodgrass; 10th Pa. Reserves, Col.
    Adoniram J. Warner; 11th Pa. Reserves, Col. Samuel M. Jackson; 12th
    Pa, Reserves (9 cos.), Col. Martin D. Hardin. _Artillery Brigade_,
    Capt. Augustus P. Martin; Mass. Light, 3d Batt. C, Lieut. Aaron F.
    Walcott; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. C, Capt. Almont Barnes; 1st Ohio
    Light, Batt. L, Capt, Frank C. Gibbs; 5th U. S., Batt. D, Lieut.
    Charles E. Hazlett, Lieut. Benjamin F. Rittenhouse; 5th U. S., Batt.
    I, Lieut. Malbone F. Watson, Lieut. Charles C. MacConnell.

    Head-quarters_, 1st N. J. Cav., Co. L, 1st Pa. Cav., Co. H, Capt.
    William S. Craft.

    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright:--_Provost Guard_, 4th N.
    J. (3 cos.), Capt. William R. Maxwell. _First Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. A.
    T. A. Torbert; 1st N. J., Lieut.-Col. William Henry, Jr.; 2d N. J.,
    Lieut.-Col. Charles Wiebecke; 3d N. J., Col. Edward L. Campbell; 15th
    N. J., Col. William H. Penrose. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Joseph J.
    Bartlett;[163] 5th Me., Col. Clark S. Edwards; 121st N. Y., Col. Emory
    Upton; 95th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Edward Carroll; 96th Pa., Maj. William H.
    Lessig. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. David A. Russell; 6th Me., Col.
    Hiram Burnham; 49th Pa. (4 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Hulings; 119th
    Pa., Col. Peter C. Ellmaker; 5th Wis., Col. Thomas S. Allen.

    SECOND DIVISION,[164] Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe:--_Second Brigade_,
    Col. Lewis A. Grant; 2d Vt., Col. James H. Walbridge; 3d Vt., Col.
    Thomas O. Seaver; 4th Vt., Col. Charles B. Stoughton; 5th Vt.,
    Lieut.-Col. John R. Lewis; 6th Vt., Col. Elisha L. Barney. _Third
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Neill; 7th Me. (6 cos.), Lieut.-Col.
    Selden Connor; 33d N. Y. (detachment), Capt. Henry J. Gifford; 43d N.
    Y., Lieut.-Col. John Wilson; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 77th
    N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Winsor B. French; 61st Pa., Lieut.-Col. George F.

    THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. John Newton,[165] Brig.-Gen. Frank
    Wheaton:--First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler; 65th N. Y., Col.
    Joseph E. Hamblin; 67th N. Y., Col. Nelson Cross; 122d N. Y., Col.
    Silas Titus; 23d Pa., Lieut.-Col. John F. Glenn; 82d Pa., Col. Isaac
    C. Bassett. _Second Brigade_, Col. Henry L. Eustis; 7th Mass.,
    Lieut.-Col. Franklin P. Harlow; Tenth Mass., Lieut.-Col. Joseph B.
    Parsons; 37th Mass., Col. Oliver Edwards; 2d R. I., Col. Horatio
    Rogers, Jr. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton, Col. David J.
    Nevin; 62d N. Y., Col. David J. Nevin, Lieut.-Col. Theodore B.
    Hamilton; 93d Pa., Maj. John I. Nevin; 98th Pa., Maj. John B. Kohler;
    102d Pa.,[166] Col. John W. Patterson; 139th Pa., Col. Frederick H.
    Collier, Lieut.-Col. William H. Moody. _Artillery Brigade_, Col.
    Charles H. Tompkins; Mass. Light, 1st Batt. (A), Capt. William H.
    McCartney; N. Y. Light, 1st Batt., Capt. Andrew Cowan; N. Y. Light, 3d
    Batt., Capt. William A. Harn; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. C, Capt. Richard
    Waterman; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. G, Capt. George W. Adams; 2d U. S.,
    Batt. D, Lieut. Edward B. Williston; 2d U. S., Batt. G, Lieut. John H.
    Butler; 5th U. S., Batt. F, Lieut. Leonard Martin.

    Head-quarters_, 1st Ind. Cav., Cos. I and K, Capt. Abram Sharra; 8th
    N. Y. Inf. (1 co.), Lieut. Herman Foerster.

    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow, Brig.-Gen. Adelbert
    Ames:--_First Brigade_, Col. Leopold von Gilsa; 41st N. Y. (9 cos.),
    Lieut.-Col. Detleo von Einsiedel; 54th N. Y., Maj. Stephen Kovacs,
    Lieut. Ernst Poth(?); 68th N. Y., Col. Gotthilf Bourry; 153d Pa., Maj.
    John F. Frueauff. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Adelbert Ames, Col.
    Andrew L. Harris; 17th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Douglas Fowler, Maj. Allen
    G. Brady; 25th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Jeremiah Williams; Capt. Nathaniel J.
    Manning, Lieut. William Maloney, Lieut. Israel White; 75th Ohio, Col.
    Andrew L. Harris, Capt. George B. Fox; 107th Ohio, Col. Seraphim
    Meyer, Capt. John M. Lutz.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr:--_First Brigade_,
    Col. Charles R. Coster; 134th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Allan H. Jackson;
    154th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. D. B. Allen; 27th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Lorenz
    Cantador; 73d Pa., Capt. D. F. Kelley. _Second Brigade_, Col. Orland
    Smith; 33d Mass., Col. Adin B. Underwood; 136th N. Y., Col. James
    Wood, Jr.; 55th Ohio, Col. Charles B. Gambee; 73d Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
    Richard Long.

    THIRD DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz:--_First Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    Alex. Schimmelfennig, Col. George von Amsberg; 82d Ill., Lieut.-Col.
    Edward S. Salomon; 45th N. Y., Col. George von Amsberg; Lieut.-Col.
    Adolphus Dobke; 157th N. Y., Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr.; 61st Ohio,
    Col. Stephen J. McGroarty; 74th Pa., Col. Adolph von Hartung;
    Lieut.-Col. Alexander von Mitzel, Capt. Gustav Schleiter, Capt. Henry
    Krauseneck. _Second Brigade_, Col. W. Krzyzanowski; 58th N. Y.,
    Lieut.-Col. August Otto, Capt. Emil Koenig; 119th N. Y., Col. John T.
    Lockman, Lieut.-Col. Edward F. Lloyd; 82d Ohio, Col. James S.
    Robinson, Lieut.-Col. David Thomson; 75th Pa., Col. Francis Mahler,
    Maj. August Ledig; 26th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Hans Boebel, Capt. John W.
    Fuchs. _Artillery Brigade_, Maj. Thomas W. Osborn; 1st N. Y. Light,
    Batt. I, Capt. Michael Wiedrich; N. Y. Light, 13th Batt., Lieut.
    William Wheeler; 1st Ohio Light, Batt. I., Capt, Hubert Dilger; 1st
    Ohio Light, Batt. K, Capt. Lewis Heckman; 4th U. S., Batt. G., Lieut.
    Bayard Wilkeson, Lieut. Eugene A. Bancroft.

    BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS. _Provost Guard_, 10th Me. (4
    cos.), Capt. John D. Beardsley.

    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H.
    Ruger:--_First Brigade_, Col. Archibald L. McDougall; 5th Conn., Col.
    W. W. Packer; 20th Conn., Lieut.-Col. William B. Wooster; 3d Md., Col.
    Jos. M. Sudsburg; 123d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James C. Rogers, Capt.
    Adolphus H. Tanner; 145th N. Y., Col. E. L. Price; 46th Pa., Col.
    James L. Selfridge. _Second Brigade_,[169] Brig.-Gen. Henry H.
    Lockwood; 1st Md., Potomac Home Brigade, Col. William P. Maulsby; 1st
    Md., Eastern Shore, Col. James Wallace; 150th N. Y., Col. John H.
    Ketcham. _Third Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger, Col. Silas
    Colgrove; 27th Ind., Col. Silas Colgrove, Lieut.-Col. John R. Fesler;
    2d Mass., Lieut. Col. Charles R. Mudge, Maj. Charles F. Morse; 13th N.
    J., Col. Ezra A. Carman; 107th N. Y., Col. Nirom M. Crane; 3d Wis.,
    Col. William Hawley.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John W. Geary:--_First Brigade_, Col.
    Charles Candy; 5th Ohio, Col. John H. Patrick; 7th Ohio, Col. William
    R. Creighton; 29th Ohio, Capt. Wilbur F. Stevens, Capt. Edward Hayes;
    66th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Eugene Powell; 28th Pa., Capt. John Flynn;
    147th Pa. (8 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Ario Pardee, Jr. _Second Brigade_,
    Brig.-Gen. Thomas L. Kane, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.; 29th Pa., Col.
    William Rickards, Jr.; 109th Pa., Capt. F. L. Gimber; 111th Pa.,
    Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Walker, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. _Third
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. George S. Greene; 60th N. Y., Col. Abel Godard;
    78th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Herbert von Hammerstein; 102d N. Y., Col.
    James C. Lane, Capt. Lewis R. Stegman; 137th N. Y., Col. David
    Ireland; 149th N. Y., Col. Henry A. Barnum, Lieut.-Col. Charles B.
    Randall. _Artillery Brigade_, Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg; 1st N. Y.
    Light, Batt. M, Lieut. Charles E. Winegar; Pa. Light, Batt. E, Lieut.
    Charles A. Atwell; 4th U. S., Batt. F, Lieut. Sylvanus T. Rugg; 5th U.
    S., Batt. K, Lieut. David H. Kinzie.


    FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John Buford:--_First Brigade_, Col. William
    Gamble; 8th Ill., Maj. John L. Beveridge; 12th Ill. (4 cos.), 3d Ind.
    (6 cos.), Col. George H. Chapman; 8th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William L.
    Markell. _Second Brigade_, Col. Thomas C. Devin; 6th N. Y., Maj.
    William E. Beardsley; 9th N. Y., Col. William Sackett; 17th Pa., Col.
    J. H. Kellogg; 3d W. Va. (2 cos.), Capt. Seymour B. Conger. _Reserve
    Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt; 6th Pa., Maj. James H. Haseltine;
    1st U. S., Capt. Richard S. C. Lord; 2d U. S., Capt. T. F.
    Rodenbough; 5th U. S., Capt. Julius W. Mason; 6th U. S., Maj. Samuel
    H. Starr, Lieut. Louis H. Carpenter, Lieut. Nicholas Nolan, Capt. Ira
    W. Claflin.

    SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David McM. Gregg:--_Head-quarters Guard_,
    1st Ohio, Co. A, Capt. Noah Jones. _First Brigade_, Col. John B.
    McIntosh; 1st Md. (11 cos.), Lieut.-Col. James M. Deems; Purnell (Md.)
    Legion, Co. A, Capt. Robert E. Duvall; 1st Mass.,[170] Lieut.-Col.
    Greely S. Curtis; 1st N. J., Maj. M. H. Beaumont; 1st Pa., Col. John
    P. Taylor, 3d Pa., Lieut.-Col. E. S. Jones; 3d Pa. Heavy Art., Section
    Batt. H,[171] Capt. W. D. Rank. _Second Brigade_,[172] Col. Pennock
    Huey; 2d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Otto Harhaus; 4th N. Y., Lieut.-Col.
    Augustus Pruyn; 6th Ohio (10 cos.), Maj. William Stedman; 8th Pa.,
    Capt. William A. Corrie. _Third Brigade_, Col. J. Irvin Gregg; 1st Me.
    (10 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Smith; 10th N. Y., Maj. M. Henry
    Avery; 4th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William E. Doster; 16th Pa., Lieut.-Col.
    John K. Robison.

    THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick:--_Head-quarters Guard_,
    1st Ohio, Co. C, Capt. Samuel N. Stanford. _First Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    Elon J. Farnsworth, Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond; 5th N. Y., Maj. John
    Hammond; 18th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William P. Brinton; 1st Vt.,
    Lieut.-Col. Addison W. Preston; 1st W. Va. (10 cos.), Col. Nathaniel
    P. Richmond, Maj. Charles E. Capehart. _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen.
    George A. Custer; 1st Mich., Col. George H. Town; 5th Mich., Col.
    Russell A. Alger; 6th Mich., Col. George Gray; 7th Mich. (10 cos.),
    Col. William D. Mann.

    HORSE ARTILLERY:--_First Brigade_, Capt. James M. Robertson; 9th Mich.
    Batt., Capt. Jabez J. Daniels; 6th N. Y. Batt., Capt. Joseph W.
    Martin; 2d U. S., Batts. B and L, Lieut. Edward Heaton; 2d U. S.,
    Batt. M, Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington, Jr.; 4th U. S., Batt. E, Lieut.
    Samuel S. Elder. _Second Brigade_, Capt. John C. Tidball; 1st U. S.,
    Batts. E and G, Capt. Alanson M. Randol; 1st U. S., Batt. K, Capt.
    William M. Graham; 2d U. S., Batt. A, Lieut. John H. Calef; 3d U. S.,
    Batt. C., Lieut. William D. Fuller.[173]

    ARTILLERY RESERVE, Brig.-Gen. Robert O. Tyler, Capt. James M.
    Robertson. _Head-quarters Guard_, 32d Mass. Inf., Co. C, Capt. Josiah
    C. Fuller. _First Regular Brigade_, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom; 1st U. S.,
    Batt. H, Lieut. Chandler P. Eakin, Lieut. Philip D. Mason; 3d U. S.,
    Batts. F and K, Lieut. John G. Turnbull; 4th U. S., Batt. C, Lieut.
    Evan Thomas; 5th U. S., Batt. C, Lieut. Gulian V. Weir. _First
    Volunteer Brigade_, Lieut.-Col. Freeman McGilvery; Mass. Light, 5th
    Batt. (E),[174] Capt. Charles A. Phillips; Mass. Light, 9th Batt.,
    Capt. John Bigelow, Lieut. Richard S. Milton; N. Y. Light, 15th Batt.,
    Capt. Patrick Hart; Pa. Light, Batts. C and F, Capt. James Thompson.
    _Second Volunteer Brigade_, Capt. Elijah D. Taft; 1st Conn. Heavy,
    Batt. B,[175] Capt. Albert F. Brooker; 1st Conn. Heavy, Batt. M,[175]
    Capt. Franklin A. Pratt; Conn. Light, 2d Batt., Capt. John W.
    Sterling; N. Y. Light, 5th Batt., Capt. Elijah D. Taft. _Third
    Volunteer Brigade_, Capt. James F. Huntington; N. H. Light, 1st Batt.,
    Capt. Frederick M. Edgell; 1st Ohio Light, Batt. H, Lieut. George W.
    Norton; 1st Pa. Light, Batts. F and G, Capt. R. Bruce Ricketts; W. Va.
    Light, Batt. C, Capt. Wallace Hill. _Fourth Volunteer Brigade_, Capt.
    Robert H. Fitzhugh; Me. Light, 6th Batt. (F), Lieut. Edwin B. Dow; Md.
    Light, Batt. A, Capt. James H. Rigby; N. J. Light, 1st Batt., Lieut.
    Augustus N. Parsons; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. G, Capt. Nelson Ames; 1st
    N. Y. Light, Batt. K,[176] Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh. _Train Guard_,
    4th N. J. Inf. (7 cos.), Maj. Charles Ewing.


    _Called into Service during the Gettysburg Campaign._[177]

    _Emergency Militia._--Ind. Co. Cav. (Murray Troop), Capt. Frank A.
    Murray; Ind. Co. Cav. (First Philadelphia City Troop), Capt. Samuel J.
    Randall; Ind. Co. Cav. (Luzerne Rangers), Capt. Henry H. Brown; Ind.
    Co. Cav. (Wissahickon Cav.), Capt. Samuel W. Comly; Ind. Co. Cav.
    (Continental Troop), Capt. Alban H. Myers; Ind. Co. Cav. (Curtin Horse
    Guards), Capt. John W. Jones; Ind. Batt., Capt. E. Spencer Miller;
    Ind. Batt., Capt. Henry D. Landis; 20th Inf., Col. William B. Thomas;
    26th Inf., Col. William W. Jennings; 27th Inf., Col. Jacob G. Frick;
    28th Inf., Col. James Chamberlin; 29th Inf., Col. Joseph W. Hawley;
    30th Inf., Col. William N. Monies; 31st Inf., Col. John Newkumet; 33d
    Inf. (Blue Reserves), Col. William W. Taylor; Ind. Battn. Inf.,
    Lieut.-Col. Robert Litzinger; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. John Spear; Ind.
    Co. Inf., Capt. William B. Mann; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. James B. German.

    _Ninety-Days' Militia._--1st Battn. Cav., Lieut.-Col. Richard F.
    Mason; Ind. Co. Cav., Capt. James M. Bell; Ind. Co. Cav., Capt.
    William B. Dick; Ind. Co. Cav. (Dana Troop), Capt. R. W. Hammell; Ind.
    Batt., Capt. Joseph M. Knap; Ind. Batt., Capt. Benoni Frishmuth; Ind.
    Batt., Capt. W. C. Ermentrout; Ind. Batt. (2d Keystone Batt.), Capt.
    Edward Fitzki; Ind. Batt. (Chester Co. Art.), Capt. George R. Guss;
    32d Inf. (Gray Reserves), Col. Charles S. Smith; 34th Inf., Col.
    Charles Albright; 35th Inf., Col. Henry B. McKean; 36th Inf., Col.
    Henry C. Alleman; 37th Inf., Col. John Trout; 38th Inf., Col. Melchior
    H. Horn; 39th Inf., Col. James Nagle; 40th Inf. (1st Coal Regt.), Col.
    Alfred Day; 41st Inf., Col. Edward R. Mayer; 42d Inf., Col. Charles H.
    Hunter; 43d Inf., Col. William W. Stott; 44th Inf. (Merchants' Regt.),
    Col. Enos Woodward; 45th Inf., Col. James T. Clancy; 46th Inf., Col.
    John J. Lawrence; 47th Inf., Col. James P. Wickersham; 48th Inf., Col.
    John B. Embich; 49th Inf. (2d Corn Exchange), Col. Alexander Murphy;
    50th Inf., Col. Emlen Franklin; 51st Inf. (2d Coal Regt.), Col.
    Oliver Hopkinson; 52d Inf. (2d Union League), Col. William A. Gray;
    53d Inf., Col. Henry Royer; 54th Inf., Col. Thomas F. Gallagher; 55th
    Inf., Col. Robert B. McComb; 56th Inf., Col. Samuel B. Dick; 57th
    Inf., Col. James R. Porter; 58th Inf., Col. George H. Bemus; 59th Inf.
    (3d Union League), Col. George P. McLean; 60th Inf., Col. William F.
    Small; Ind. Battn. Inf., Lieut.-Col. John McKeage; Ind. Co. Inf.,
    Capt. Joseph K. Helmbold; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. Horace A. Beale; Ind.
    Co. Inf., Capt. Benjamin T. Green; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. David Mitchel;
    Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. Osborn E. Stephens; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. William
    F. Rich.

    _Six Months' Volunteers._--20th Cav., Col. John E. Wynkoop; 21st Cav.,
    Col. William H. Boyd; 22d Cav. (Battn.), Maj. B. Mortimer Morrow; 1st
    Battn. Cav., Lieut.-Col. Richard C. Dale; Ind. Batt. (Park Batt.),
    Capt. Horatio K. Tyler; Ind. Batt., Capt. W. H. Woodward; Ind. Batt.,
    Capt. Robert J. Nevin; 1st Battn. Inf., Lieut.-Col. Joseph F. Ramsey;
    2d Battn. Inf., Lieut.-Col. John C. Lininger; 3d Battn. Inf.,
    Lieut.-Col. T. Ellwood Zell; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. Samuel T. Griffith;
    Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. William M. Schrock.



    Confederates retreat from Gettysburg--The Federals pursue--Crossing
    the Potomac under Difficulties--Kilpatrick's Cavalry Dash on
    Pettigrew's Command--General Lee thought to rest his Army in the
    Valley of Virginia, but Meade followed too fast--Engagements that
    harassed the Retreat--General Lee wished to be relieved of Command,
    but President Davis would not consent to the Appointment of Joseph E.
    Johnston or General Beauregard.

The armies rested on the "Fourth,"--one under the bright laurels secured
by the brave work of the day before, but in profound sorrow over the
silent forms of the host of comrades who had fallen during those three
fateful days, whose blood bathed the thirsty fields of Gettysburg, made
classic by the most stupendous clash of conflict of that long and
sanguinary war; while gentle rain came to mellow the sod that marked the
honored rest of friend and foe; the other, with broken spirits, turned
from fallen comrades to find safety away from the fields that had been so
promising of ennobling fruits. The enemy had cast his lines on grounds too
strong for lead and steel, and, exhausted alike of aggressive force and
means of protracted defence, there was nothing left for the vanquished but
to march for distant homeward lines.

The cavalry left on the Blue Ridge joined the Confederate left late on the
afternoon of the 3d. Orders for retreat were issued before noon of the
4th, and trains of wounded and other impedimenta were put in motion by the
Chambersburg and Fairfield routes, the army to march after night by the
latter,--the Second Corps as rear-guard, the First to follow the Third and
push on to secure the crossings of the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling
Waters. It was daylight of the 5th when the road was open for the march
of the First, and a later hour of the morning before the Second could

Pursuit was made by the enemy, led by cavalry and the Sixth Corps, and the
rear-guard had to deploy near Fairfield to check it. Rain was helping us.
Before the enemy could get through the mud and push his batteries over the
boggy fields, our trains had reached the mountain gorge, and the
rear-guard was on the march following. Direct pursuit of the solid ranks
was changed to march down the east of the mountains, but the firmer broad
road gave the Confederates easier march. Kilpatrick got his cavalry in on
the wagon-trains and destroyed a number, but did not delay the march of
the column.

On this retreat the army, already crippled of its pride, was met by the
dispiriting news of another defeat at Vicksburg, which meant that the
Mississippi was free to the Federals from its source to the Gulf.
Diverting incidents occurred, but we were in poor mood for them. As we
approached Hagerstown, two grotesque figures stepped into the road about a
hundred yards in front of us,--one a negro of six feet and a hundred and
eighty pounds, the other a white man of about five feet seven. The negro
was dressed in full uniform of the Union infantry, the white man in
travel-stained butternut dry-goods. The negro had a musket on his
shoulder. Riding up to them, it was observed that the musket was at the
cock-notch. The negro was reminded that it was unsoldier-like to have the
gun at a cock, but said that he wanted to be ready to save and deliver his
prisoner to the guard; it was his proudest capture during the march, and
he wanted credit for it. The man was a recruit lately from abroad, and did
not seem to care whether or not he was with his comrades. However, there
were doubts if he understood a word that was said. The uniform was a tight
fit, and the shoes were evidently painful, but the black man said that he
could exchange them. He was probably the only man of the army who had a
proud story to take home.

The Union cavalry came severely upon our left flank at Hagerstown, forcing
Stuart to call for infantry support. Parts of Semmes's and G. T.
Anderson's brigades were sent, crossed the Antietam, and had uncomfortable
experience with the horse artillery near Funkstown. They had dire
complaints to make of the way cavalrymen put them in columns of fours
against batteries, when they could have advanced more rapidly and
effectively in line of battle and saved half of their men lost.

Halting for rest near Falling Waters, a sudden alarm was brought down the
road by a cavalryman riding at speed, who reported all of the enemy's
cavalry on a sweeping ride against us. The troops were thrown together to
wait, but the cavalry charge proved to be a carriage-load of lady
refugees. Some of the cavalry did get over upon the trains parked at
Williamsport, but there were many wounded near there who could handle
their muskets, many infantry up from Winchester, and some of Imboden's
cavalry, besides some batteries who held the ground, and Stuart eventually
got up, when the enemy drew off.

On the 6th and 7th the commands were up, and deployed their lines from
Falling Waters to cover the bridge and ford at Williamsport. But the river
was full, past fording at Williamsport, and a raiding party from Harper's
Ferry had partially destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters. Infantry
trenches were made along the lines, batteries were put in position, and we
were ready in a day or two to receive our successful adversary. He found
some mud along his route, and was not up until the 12th, when he appeared
and spread his lines along the Confederate front, but positions were
changed,--he had the longer outer curve, while the Confederates were on
the concentrating inner lines. He made his field-works and other
arrangements, had some reinforcements since his battle, and was well

On the forenoon of the 13th, General Lee sent for me, and announced that
the river was fordable and the bridge repaired, that the trains would be
started at once, and the troops would follow when night could conceal the
move. The First and Third Corps were to cross by the bridge, the Second by
the ford. As the lines were comfortable, the roads heavy, it occurred to
me that the hurried move during a single night would be troublesome;
suggestion was offered that the trains and wounded should move over during
the night, and give us easy march the next night, but the waters on the
other side were high, and only enough mills running to supply food from
day to day, and the weather treacherous, so the general thought it better
to hurry on. The march by the Williamsport crossing over the firm, broad
turnpike was made without trouble. The route to the bridge was over a new
road; at the ends of the bridge were green willow poles to prevent the
wheels cutting through the mud, but the soil underneath was wet and soggy
under the long season of rain, and before night rain again began to fall.

General Lee, worn by the strain of the past two weeks, asked me to remain
at the bridge and look to the work of the night. And such a night is
seldom experienced even in the rough life of the soldier. The rain fell in
showers, sometimes in blinding sheets, during the entire night; the wagons
cut deep in the mud during the early hours, and began to "stall" going
down the hill, and one or two of the batteries were "stalled" before they
reached the bridge. The best standing points were ankle-deep in mud, and
the roads half-way to the knee, puddling and getting worse. We could only
keep three or four torches alight, and those were dimmed at times when
heavy rains came. Then, to crown our troubles, a load of the wounded came
down, missed the end of the bridge, and plunged the wagon into the raging
torrent. Right at the end of the bridge the water was three feet deep, and
the current swift and surging. It did not seem possible that a man could
be saved, but every one who could get through the mud and water rushed to
their relief, and Providence was there to bring tears of joy to the
sufferers. The wagon was righted and on the bridge and rolled off to
Virginia's banks. The ground under the poles became so puddled before
daylight that they would bend under the wheels and feet of the animals
until they could bend no farther, and then would occasionally slip to one
side far enough to spring up and catch a horse's foot and throw him
broadside in the puddled mud. Under the trials and vexations every one was
exhausted of patience, the general and staff were ready for a family
quarrel as the only relief for their pent-up trouble, when daylight came,
and with it General Lee to relieve and give us opportunity for a little

The division of the Third Corps under General Pettigrew formed the rear of
the infantry line, which was to be covered by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. But
the cavalry brigadier rode off and crossed the river, leaving, it is said,
a squadron for the duty, and the squadron followed the example of the
brigadier. The consequence was that when Kilpatrick's cavalry rode up it
was taken to be the Confederates ordered for their rear-guard. Instead of
friends, however, General Pettigrew found a foe. He was surprised by a
dashing cavalry charge, was wounded, and died after a few days. Some
artillery, three standards (of the Virginia infantry), and a large number
of prisoners were taken. General Meade claimed two thousand.

General Lee thought to occupy the gaps of the Blue Ridge by his cavalry,
and rest his army in the Valley of Virginia, in threatening lines against
Washington City, but found the Shenandoah River full and past fording, and
before the tide began to recede General Meade crossed the Potomac east
of the Blue Ridge and began to occupy the gaps, which called for a
southern march of the Confederates. On the 19th my command was ordered to
Millwood to secure, if possible, Ashby's Gap, but as the enemy's cavalry
was on the opposite bank, and the waters were too high for us to get over,
we marched on to Manassas, then for Chester Gap. As high up as Front Royal
the river was found past fording, but part of a pontoon bridge was at
hand. General Corse, who had joined us, hurried and succeeded in getting
his brigade over in time to occupy Chester Gap, and putting his regiment
under Colonel Arthur Herbert in the west end of Manassas Gap. The balance
of Pickett's men crossed by putting the arms and ammunition in the boats,
the men swimming, and sent reinforcements to General Corse and Colonel
Herbert, when the enemy's cavalry withdrew. One bridge was laid and
spliced, and the march southward was resumed.


The next day another demonstration was made by the enemy's cavalry at
Manassas Gap, but Hood's division was there and McLaws's was at the
Chester Gap, where another heavy body of cavalry approached. An effort was
made to get behind the latter by hidden lines of march, but the plan of
catching cavalry with infantry was not successful, though General Wofford
thought for a time that his trap was well laid. The march was continued,
and the head of the column reached Culpeper Court-House on the 24th.
Benning's brigade, left on guard at Gaines's Cross-Roads till the Third
Corps could relieve him, was attacked by a strong cavalry force. On the
approach of the Third Corps he thought to organize, with General A. P.
Hill, another plan to entrap the cavalry in a thick wood, but the riders
found little difficulty in getting away. General Ewell was detained a
little, and found, upon approaching Front Royal, that General Wright's
brigade, left there to hold the gaps for him, was engaged in skirmishing
with the enemy's infantry. He reinforced the brigade, held the enemy
back, then changed his march west, crossed the Blue Ridge at Thornton's
Gap, and ordered Early's division, that was not yet up, through the Valley
by Strasburg. He reached Madison Court-House on the 29th.

General Meade got his army together near Warrenton on the 31st of July,
and ordered a detachment of artillery, cavalry, and infantry across the
Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford and the railroad bridge. The command drove
our cavalry back till it was reinforced by infantry, when the enemy was
pushed back beyond Brandy Station.

General Ewell was called down from Madison Court-House, behind the
Rapidan, and the First and Third Corps were marched into position behind
the river on the 3d of August, leaving the cavalry at Culpeper

General Lee suffered during the campaign from his old trouble, sciatica,
and as soon as he found rest for his army applied to the authorities for a
change of commanders. The President refused, pleading that he had no one
to take his place. At the time he had two generals of his own choosing who
were not in authority adequate to their rank,--Joseph E. Johnston, the
foremost soldier of the South, who had commanded the army from its
organization until he was wounded at Seven Pines, and G. T. Beauregard,
the hero of Sumter and the first Bull Run, well equipped and qualified for
high command. But the President was jealous of Johnston, and nourished
prejudice against Beauregard.



    The Author reverts to the Perils and Opportunities in the
    West--Proposes to the Secretary of War to reinforce against Rosecrans
    from the Army of Northern Virginia--Makes Plan known to General
    Lee--The Move finally effected--Difficulties of Transportation--A
    Roundabout Route--General Longstreet narrowly escapes capture when
    seeking Bragg's Head-quarters--General Bragg assigns Longstreet to
    Command of the Left--Instructions for the Battle of Chickamauga--The
    Armies in Position--Federals in Command of Generals Rosecrans,
    Crittenden, McCook, and George H. Thomas.

While the army was lying idle on the south bank of the Rapidan my mind
reverted to affairs in the West, and especially to the progressive work of
the Union army in Tennessee towards the northern borders of Georgia. Other
armies of the South were, apparently, spectators, viewing those tremendous
threatenings without thought of turning minds or forces to arrest the
march of Rosecrans.

To me the emergency seemed so grave that I decided to write the Honorable
Secretary of War (excusing the informality under the privilege given in
his request in May) expressing my opinion of affairs in that military
zone. I said that the successful march of General Rosecrans's army through
Georgia would virtually be the finishing stroke of the war; that in the
fall of Vicksburg and the free flow of the Mississippi River the lungs of
the Confederacy were lost; that the impending march would cut through the
heart of the South, and leave but little time for the dissolution; that to
my mind the remedy was to order the Army of Northern Virginia to defensive
work, and send detachments to reinforce the army in Tennessee; to call
detachments of other commands to the same service, and strike a crushing
blow against General Rosecrans before he could receive reinforcing help;
that our interior lines gave the opportunity, and it was only by the
skilful use of them that we could reasonably hope to equalize our power to
that of the better-equipped adversary; that the subject had not been
mentioned to my commander, because like all others he was opposed to
having important detachments of his army so far beyond his reach; that all
must realize that our affairs were languishing, and that the only hope of
reviving the waning cause was through the advantage of interior lines.

A few days after the letter was despatched the subject happened up while
discussing affairs with General Lee, when I felt warranted in expressing
my views and relieving my mind of the serious apprehensions that haunted
me. He inquired if I was willing to go West and take charge there. To that
I consented, provided the change could be so arranged as to give me an
opportunity, by careful handling of the troops before accepting battle, to
gain their confidence; providing, at the same time, that means could be
arranged for further aggressive march in case of success.

At that time the railway passing our camps on the Rapidan through Virginia
and East Tennessee to Chattanooga was open and in good working order.
General Bragg's army was near Chattanooga, General Buckner's in East
Tennessee, near Knoxville, General Samuel Jones's army, or parts of an
army, in Southwest Virginia. There was but one railway,--from Cincinnati
_via_ Louisville and Nashville to Chattanooga. On that road General
Rosecrans was marching against General Bragg. On the direct route to East
Tennessee over the Cumberland Mountains General Burnside was moving into
East Tennessee against General Buckner's forces.

A few days after the conversation with General Lee, he was called down to
Richmond. In the course of a week he wrote, viz.:


    "RICHMOND, August 31, 1863.

        "_Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia_:

    "GENERAL,--I have wished for several days past to return to the army,
    but have been detained by the President. He will not listen to my
    proposition to leave to-morrow. I hope you will use every exertion to
    prepare the army for offensive operations, and improve the condition
    of our men and animals. I can see nothing better to be done than to
    endeavor to bring General Meade out and use our efforts to crush his
    army while in its present condition.

           *       *       *       *       *

          "Very respectfully and truly yours,
            "R. E. LEE,


    "HEAD-QUARTERS, September 2, 1863.


    "GENERAL,--Your letter of the 31st is received. I have expressed to
    Generals Ewell and Hill your wishes, and am doing all that can be done
    to be well prepared with my own command. Our greatest difficulty will
    be in preparing our animals. I do not see that we can reasonably hope
    to accomplish much by offensive operations, unless you are strong
    enough to cross the Potomac. If we advance to meet the enemy on this
    side he will in all probability go into one of his many fortified
    positions. These we cannot afford to attack.

    "I know but little of the condition of our affairs in the West, but am
    inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is
    in Tennessee. If we could hold the defensive here with two corps and
    send the other to operate in Tennessee with that army, I think that we
    could accomplish more than by an advance from here.

           *       *       *       *       *

          "I remain, general, very respectfully,
            "Your obedient servant,
              "JAMES LONGSTREET,

General Lee next wrote to inquire as to the time necessary for the
movement of my corps into Tennessee. As there were but two divisions,
McLaws's and Hood's, and Alexander's batteries, two days was supposed to
be ample time. The transportation was ordered by the quartermaster's
department at Richmond, and the divisions were made ready to board the
trains as soon as they could reach us.

The success of the plan was thought from the first to depend upon its
prompt and vigorous execution, and it was under those conditions that
General Lee agreed to reinforce the army in Tennessee, together with the
assurance that vigorous pursuit, even to the Ohio River, should follow
success. The onward march was repeatedly urged, not only in return for the
use of part of the army, but to relieve General Lee of apprehension from
the army in front of him; but it was not until the 9th of September that
the first train came to Orange Court-House to start with its load of
troops. Meanwhile, General Buckner had left his post in East Tennessee and
marched south to draw nearer the army under General Bragg about
Chattanooga, leaving nothing of his command in East Tennessee except two
thousand men at Cumberland Gap, under General Frazer, partially fortified.
General Burnside had crossed the mountains, and was not only in East
Tennessee, but on that very day General Frazer surrendered to him his
command at Cumberland Gap without a fight.

These facts were known to the Richmond authorities at the time of our
movements, but not to General Lee or myself until the move was so far
advanced as to prevent recall. So that we were obliged to make the circuit
through the Carolinas to Augusta, Georgia, and up by the railroad, thence
through Atlanta to Dalton and Ringgold. It was the only route of transit
left us. There were two routes between Richmond and Augusta, one _via_
Wilmington, the other through Charlotte, North Carolina, but only a single
track from Augusta to Chattanooga. The gauges of the roads were not
uniform, nor did the roads connect at the cities (except by drays and
other such conveyances). The roads had not been heavily worked before the
war, so that their rolling stock was light and limited.

Instead of two days of moving, it was not until the 25th that our
artillery joined us near Chattanooga. Hood's division was first shipped,
and three brigades, or the greater part of three, were landed at the
railroad station, and joined General Bragg's army on the 18th and 19th of
September, but that army had been manoeuvred and flanked out of
Chattanooga, Buckner's out of East Tennessee, and both were together down
below the borders of Georgia.

As I left General Lee's tent, after bidding him good-by, he walked out
with me to my horse. As my foot was in the stirrup he said again, "Now,
general, you must beat those people out in the West." Withdrawing my foot
to respectful position I promised, "If I live; but I would not give a
single man of my command for a fruitless victory." He promised again that
it should be so; said that arrangements had been made that any success
that we had would be followed; that orders to that effect had been given;
that transportation was also ordered to be prepared, and the orders would
be repeated.

While the troops were in transit, Jenkins's South Carolina brigade was
transferred to Hood's division, so that we had two South Carolina and four
Georgia brigades of the two divisions, which gave us some little trouble
in keeping our men on the cars passing by their homes. The people crowded
every station to give us their all in most acceptable rations, and to
cheer us with wishes for a happy issue.

The train upon which I rode reached Catoosa about two o'clock of the
afternoon of the 19th of September. That upon which our horses were came
up at four o'clock. Only part of the staff of the corps was with me, and
General Alexander was with his batteries far away in South Carolina. As
soon as our horses could be saddled we started, Lieutenant-Colonels Sorrel
and Manning and myself, to find the head-quarters of the commanding
general. We were told to follow the main road, and did so, though there
were many men coming into that road from our right bearing the wounded of
the day's battle; the firing was still heard off to the right, and wagons
were going and coming, indicating our nearness to the field. Nothing else
occurring to suggest a change of the directions given us, we followed the
main road.

It was a bright moonlight night, and the woodlands on the sides of the
broad highway were quite open, so that we could see and be seen. After a
time we were challenged by an outlying guard, "Who comes there?" We
answered, "Friends." The answer was not altogether satisfying to the
guard, and after a very short parley we asked what troops they were, when
the answer gave the number of the brigade and of the division. As Southern
brigades were called for their commanders more than by their numbers, we
concluded that these friends were the enemy. There were, too, some
suspicious obstructions across the road in front of us, and altogether the
situation did not look inviting. The moon was so bright that it did not
seem prudent to turn and ride back under the fire that we knew would be
opened on us, so I said, loudly, so that the guard could hear, "Let us
ride down a little way to find a better crossing." Riding a few rods
brought us under cover and protection of large trees, sufficiently shading
our retreat to enable us to ride quietly to the rear and take the road
over which we had seen so many men and vehicles passing while on our first

We reached General Bragg's head-quarters at eleven o'clock, reported, and
received orders, which he had previously given other commanders, for
attack early in the morning. Our bivouac was made near the general
head-quarters, and we rode at daylight to find the troops. Hood's
brigades that had arrived before us had been at work with the left of the
army, which was assigned as my command. Lieutenant-General Polk was
commanding the right wing.

Two brigades of McLaws's division, Kershaw's and Humphreys's, came in the
afternoon, and marched during the night and across the Chickamauga River.

The army had forced its way across the Chickamauga under severe
skirmishes, little less than a battle, during the greater part of the
19th, and some of the commands had been engaged on the 18th working on the
same plan.

The written order giving the plan was issued on the 18th. In general
terms, it was to cross the Chickamauga, strike the enemy's left, and roll
it back on his right by a wheel to the left so as to come in between the
enemy and Chattanooga. The work had been so persistent and assiduous
during part of the 18th and all of the 19th, that General Rosecrans came
to understand the plan as well as his adversary, and to arrange

With my instructions for the 20th the commanding general gave me a map
showing prominent topographical features of the grounds from the
Chickamauga River to Mission Ridge, and beyond to the Lookout Mountain

At early dawn I found the left wing. It was composed of Buckner's corps
(Stewart's and Preston's divisions), a new division under General Bushrod
R. Johnson, the division of General T. C. Hindman, and three of Hood's
brigades. Buckner's corps had been cut in two. His division on the right
of the left wing was under General Stewart, while Preston's division, on
the extreme left, on the bank of the Chickamauga, was assigned, by the
order for battle, as the pivot upon which the battle should wheel. The
commands stood: Stewart's, Johnson's, Hindman's, and Preston's divisions;
Hood's brigades in rear of Johnson's line. General Buckner reported his
artillery as amounting to about thirty guns. Three batteries were
reported, of four guns each, with Hindman's division, Johnson's and Hood's
commands being without artillery. The brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys
were ordered, with Hood's, to be used as a column of assault, by brigades,
at a hundred paces interval.

As the battle was ordered for daylight, it seemed too late to draw
Buckner's divisions into reciprocal relations, and we had yet to find the
right wing. As it was not in touch or sight, General Stewart was ordered
to find it. He marched about half a mile to his right and found that he
was nearly half a mile in advance of the right wing. His move made place
for Hood's column, which was called to the line, and General Stewart broke
his right to rear to guard that flank until the right wing could get to
the front. The divisions were formed in two lines, two brigades on the
front line, others of the second line in support, except Hood's five
brigades in column. General McLaws and two of his brigades, two of Hood's,
and Alexander's artillery were on the rails, speeding for the battle as
fast as steam could carry them, but failed to reach it. When organized for
battle the left wing stood about three hundred yards east of the
Lafayette-Chattanooga dirt road. As the battle was ordered for wheel to
the left on Preston's division as pivot, his (Trigg's) brigade was
echeloned on the left of Hindman's division. The purpose of the commander
in ordering the wheel on the left as pivot was to push in, from the start,
between the enemy and his new base at Chattanooga.

No chief of artillery for the command reported, and a brief search failed
to find one. The field, so far as it could be surveyed, however, was not a
field, proper, but a heavy woodland, not adapted to the practice of
artillery. The hour of battle was at hand, but the right wing was not yet
organized. Some of the troops were without rations, their wagons, having
lost the lines of march through the woodlands, failing to reach them until
after daylight, when they were further delayed cooking their food.

The right wing was formed of D. H. Hill's corps, Breckenridge's and
Cleburne's divisions, W. H. T. Walker's corps of Walker's and Liddell's
divisions, Cheatham's division of Polk's corps, artillery battalions of
Majors Melancthon Smith, T. R. Hotchkiss, and R. E. Groves, and batteries
of Lieutenant R. T. Beauregard, Captain E. P. Howell, Captain W. H.
Fowler, and Lieutenant Shannon.

As it formed it stood with D. H. Hill's corps on the right, Breckenridge's
and Cleburne's divisions from right to left, Cheatham's division on the
left of Cleburne's rear, and Walker's reserve corps behind Hill's corps;
but when arranged for battle it was about half a mile in rear of the line
upon which the left wing was established. The Confederate commander rode
early in the morning to hear the opening of the battle. As the sounds
failed to reach him, he became anxious, sent orders of inquiry for the
cause of delay, and repeated his orders for attack, and finally rode to
his right wing and gave peremptory orders.

Marching through the woods to line up on the left wing, the left of the
right wing was found to overlap my division on the right, yet our extreme
right was found to overreach the left of the enemy's field-works by two
brigades, and reconnoissance found the road between the enemy and
Chattanooga open and free of obstructions or troops to defend it. On the
right of Breckenridge's division was Armstrong's division of cavalry
dismounted, and beyond his right was Forrest's other division of cavalry,
Pegram's. Some miles off from our left was Wheeler's division of cavalry,
under Wharton and Martin.

The Union army from left to right was: first the Fourteenth Corps, General
George H. Thomas commanding, four divisions,--Baird's division on the
left, then Reynolds's and Brannan's, the latter retired to position of
reserve, and Negley's. (The last named had been left, on the night of the
19th, on guard near the Glen House, but was ordered early on the 20th to
join General Thomas, and one of the brigades did move promptly under the
order; the other brigades (two) failed to receive the order.) Then the
Twentieth Corps, three divisions,--Jefferson C. Davis's, R. W. Johnson's,
and P. H. Sheridan's,--on the right, General A. McD. McCook commanding the
corps. Next was the Twenty-first Corps, three divisions,--T. J. Wood's, J.
M. Palmer's, and H. P. Van Cleve's,--General T. L. Crittenden commanding
the corps. It was in position on the east slope of Mission Ridge, ordered
to be prepared to support the corps of the right or left, or both; one of
its brigades had been left to occupy Chattanooga. Wilder's mounted
infantry, on the right of the Twentieth Corps, was ordered to report to
the commander of that corps for the day's work. A reserve corps under
General Gordon Granger was off the left of the Union army to cover the gap
in Mission Ridge at Rossville and the road from the Union left to that
gap. Minty's cavalry was with this corps, and posted at Mission Mills.
General Granger had Steedman's division of two brigades and a brigade
under Colonel D. McCook. General R. B. Mitchell, commanding Union cavalry,
was on their right at Crawfish Springs, with orders to hold the crossings
of the Chickamauga against the Confederate cavalry.

It seems that parts of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps, Johnson's and
Van Cleve's divisions, were under General Thomas in the fight of his left
on the 19th, and remained with him on the 20th. The purpose of the posting
of the Union army was to hold open its routes for Chattanooga by the
Rossville and Dry Valley roads. As before stated, the Confederate
commander's design was to push in between the Union army and Chattanooga,
recover his lost ground, and cut the enemy's line of supplies.

The commanders of the armies were on the field early on the 20th. The
failure of the opening of the Confederates at daylight gave opportunity
for a reconnoissance by light of day, by which it was learned that the
road from the Union left was open, not guarded nor under close
observation; but the commander ordered direct assault under the original
plan,--his back to the river, the Union army backing on Mission Ridge. The
Chickamauga River, rising from the mountains south, flows in its general
course a little east of north to conflux with the Tennessee River. The
Ridge runs nearly parallel with the river, and opens up a valley a mile
wide. It is a bold outcropping of limestone about one hundred feet above
the valley, with occasional passes, or gaps, that are strong points of
guard for defence. Four miles northwest from the Union left was the gap at
Rossville, called for the old Cherokee chief. On its right was the pass of
the Dry Valley road, and immediately in its rear was the McFarland Gap.
The line of the Lafayette road lies about parallel with the Ridge to
within a mile of the Union left, when it bends westward and leads to the
Rossville Gap. The Dry Valley road crosses the Chickamauga at Glass's
Mills, courses along the east slope of the Ridge, crosses it, and joins on
the west the road that crosses at the McFarland Gap.

The Union left was east of the Chattanooga-Rossville road, but crossed the
road to the west and formed in broken front. The left and right of
Thomas's line was retired or broken to the rear. The Union commander rode
over his lines on the afternoon of the 19th and ordered his front covered
by such field-works as could be constructed during the night.

General Thomas covered his lines by log and rail obstructions. The corps
of Rosecrans's right formed two lines of rail defences for infantry. The
batteries had the ascending slopes of the Ridge for positions, and their
field was more favorable otherwise for artillery practice than was that
of the Confederates advancing from the valley and more densely timbered
forests. They had two hundred and forty-six guns. The records do not give
satisfactory accounts of the number of Confederate guns, but they probably
numbered not less than two hundred.



    Tactical Features--The Battle opened by Direct Attack on the Federals
    in the Early Morning of September 20--Repeated and Determined Front
    Assaults--Brigadiers Helm killed and Adams wounded--The Union Commands
    lay behind Defences--Hood's Brigades surged through the Forest against
    the Covered Infantry and Artillery--Hood wounded--Longstreet suggests
    a Plan for Progressive Action--Halting Tactics at High Tide of
    Success--The Confederate Left fought a Separate Battle--General Thomas
    retreats--First Confederate Victory in the West, and one of the
    Bloodiest Battles of the War--Forces engaged--Losses.

Satisfied that the opening of the battle was to be the attack against his
left, the Union commander ordered Negley's division out from its position
near the Glen House to report to General Thomas and assist in meeting the
attack, but only Beattie's brigade was in time for that service, the other
brigades waiting to be relieved from their positions in line. Meanwhile,
Baird's left had been extended by Dodge's brigade of Johnson's division of
the Twentieth Corps.

Before the Confederate commander engaged his battle he found the road
between the enemy's left and Chattanooga open, which gave him opportunity
to interpose or force the enemy from his works to open battle to save his
line. But he preferred his plan of direct attack as the armies stood, and
opened his battle by attack of the right wing at 9.30 A.M. of the 20th. He
was there, and put the corps under Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill to the
work. Breckenridge's and Cleburne's divisions, Breckenridge on the right,
overreached the enemy's left by two brigades, Stovall's and Adams's, but
the other brigade, Helm's, was marched through the wood into front assault
of the enemy behind his field-works. This brigade made desperate repeated
and gallant battle until the commander, Benjamin H. Helm, one of the most
promising brigadiers, was killed, when its aggressive work was suspended.

The other brigades crossed the Chattanooga road, changed front, and bore
down against the enemy's left. This gave them favorable ground and
position. They made resolute attack against Baird's left, threatening his
rear, but he had troops at hand to meet them. They had a four-gun battery
of Slocum's of the Washington Artillery,[178] and encountered Dodge's
brigade and parts of Willick's, Berry's, and Stanley's, and superior
artillery. In the severe contention General Adams fell seriously hurt, and
the brigades were eventually forced back to and across the road, leaving
General Adams on the field.

A separate attack was then made by Cleburne's division, the brigades of
Polk and Wood assaulting the breastworks held by the divisions of Johnson
and Palmer. These brigades, after severe fight, were repulsed, and their
positions were covered by Deshler's brigade. General Deshler received a
mortal wound from a fragment of shell, leaving the brigade in the hands of
the gallant Colonel Roger Q. Mills (our afterwards distinguished
statesman). General Thomas called repeatedly for reinforcements, and
received assurances that they were coming, even to include the army if
necessary to hold the left.

Johnson's brigade of Cheatham's division was ordered to support the
brigade under Colonel Mills, and the reserve corps under General W. H. T.
Walker (Gist's and Liddell's divisions) was ordered into the Breckenridge
battle, Gist's brigade against the left angle of the breastworks, and
Walthall's to the place of Cleburne's division. The other brigade of
Gist's division supported the battle of his own brigade, and General
Liddell was ordered with Govan's brigade to advance, passing beyond the
enemy's left to the Chattanooga road, and wheel to the left against his
left rear. The troops, without exception, made a brave, desperate fight,
but were unsuccessful, and forced to suspend aggressive work.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. Sept. 19th and 20th, 1863]

As the grand wheel to the left did not progress, I sent, at eleven
o'clock, to say to General Bragg that my column of attack could probably
break the enemy's line if he cared to have it go in. Before answer came,
General Stewart, commanding my right division, received a message from
General Bragg to go in and attack by his division, and reported that the
Confederate commander had sent similar orders to all division commanders.
He advanced, and by his severe battle caused the Union reserve division
under General Brannan to be drawn to the support of that front, and this
attack, with that of the divisions of our right against those of Baird,
Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, so disturbed General Thomas that other
reinforcements were called to support his defence.

General Stewart was in hot engagement before word reached me that the
battle had been put in the hands of division commanders; but my orders
reached General Hood in time to hold him and commanders on his left before
he received notice from the commanding general, and the brigades of
Kershaw and Humphreys were ordered nearer the rear of his column. The
divisions of B. R. Johnson and Hindman were ordered to follow in close
echelon on Hood's left. Buckner's pivoting division under Preston was left
to the position to which the Confederate chief had assigned it.

In our immediate front were the parts of the Twentieth and Twenty-first
Corps in two lines covered by rail defences and well-posted batteries. At
the early surging of his lines through the forest, General Hood came under
the fire of this formidable array of artillery and infantry, and found his
lines staggering under their galling missiles, and fast losing strength as
the fire thickened. His leading brigade was decimated, but his others
pushed to the front to take and pursue the assault. The divisions of B. R.
Johnson and Hindman were pressed hard on Hood's left, and the brigades of
Kershaw and Humphreys closed to his support, when a bold push gave us the
first line of the enemy and a large number of his guns; but General Hood
was fearfully wounded, supposed to be fatally; General Benning, of his
"Rock Brigade," lost his horse, and thought General Hood was killed. He
cut a horse loose from a captured gun, mounted, and using part of a rope
trace as his riding whip, rode to meet me and report disaster. He had lost
his hat in the mêlée, and the brigade disappeared under the steady
crushing fire so quickly that he was a little surprised. He reported,
"General Hood killed, my horse killed, my brigade torn to pieces, and I
haven't a man left." I asked if he didn't think he could find one man. The
question or the manner seemed to quiet somewhat his apprehensions and
brought affirmative answer, when he was told to collect his men and join
us at the front; that we had broken and carried the first line; that
Johnson's division, on his left, was then in the breach and pushing on,
with Hindman on his left, spreading battle to the enemy's limits; that
Stewart's division would hold it on our right, and the brigades of Kershaw
and Humphreys then on the quick step would be with us in a minute and help
restore the battle to good organization. Just then these two brigades
burst through the brush in cheerful, gallant march, and brought him back
to his usual courageous, hopeful confidence.

As we approached a second line, Johnson's division happened to strike it
while in the act of changing position of some of the troops, charged upon
and carried it, capturing some artillery, Hood's and Hindman's troops
pressing in close connection. This attack forced the parts of the
Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps from that part of the field, back over
Missionary Ridge, in disordered retreat, and part of Negley's division of
the Fourteenth Corps by the same impulsion. As our right wing had failed
of the progress anticipated, and had become fixed by the firm holding of
the enemy's left, we could find no practicable field for our work except
by a change of the order of battle from wheel to the left, to a swing to
the right on my division under General Stewart. The fire of the enemy off
my right readily drew Hood's brigades to that bearing. Johnson's and
Hindman's divisions were called to a similar move, and Buckner's pivotal
division under General Preston, but General Buckner objected to having his
left "in the air."

Presently a discouraging account came from General Hindman, that in the
progress of his battle his left and rear had been struck by a formidable
force of cavalry; that Manigault's brigade was forced back in disorder,
and his other brigades exposed on their open left could not be handled. I
wrote him a note commending the brave work of his division, and
encouraging renewed efforts; urged him to have his brigades in hand, and
bring them around to close connection on Johnson's left.

On the most open parts of the Confederate side of the field one's vision
could not reach farther than the length of a brigade. Trigg's brigade was
ordered to the relief of Manigault's, which had been forced back to the
Lafayette road, and the balance of Preston's division was ordered to
follow, if necessary, to support that part of the field, and our cavalry
far away from my left was called to clean it up and pursue the retreating
columns. It seems that Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry had struck
Manigault's left and put it back in disorder, and a brigade, or part of a
brigade, of cavalry coming against the rear, increased the confusion and
drove it back to the Lafayette road, when Trigg's brigade advanced to its
relief. The two put the attacking forces back until they found it
necessary to retire beyond the ridge and cover the withdrawal of trains
left exposed by the retreat of troops of the Twentieth and Twenty-first
Corps. General Hindman gathered his forces and marched for the left of
Johnson's division, and Preston's brigade under General Trigg was returned
to the point of its first holding.

Our front, cleared of opposing forces, was soon changed forward, and
formed at right angle to its first line to seek the enemy's line standing
against our right wing. Calls were repeated for the cavalry to ride in
pursuit of the retreating forces, and guard the gaps of the ridge behind
the enemy standing in front of our right wing. In the new position of the
left wing its extreme left encountered the enemy rallying in strong
position that was heavily manned by field batteries. At the same time my
left was approaching the line of fire of one of our batteries of the right

General Johnson thought that he had the key of the battle near Snodgrass
Hill. It was a key, but a rough one. He was ordered to reorganize his own
brigades and those of Hindman's division for renewed work; to advance a
line of skirmishers, and give time to the troops for refreshment, while I
rode along the line to observe the enemy and find relations with our right

It was after one o'clock, and the hot and dry and dusty day made work
fatiguing. My lunch was called up and ordered spread at some convenient
point while I rode with General Buckner and the staffs to view the changed
conditions of the battle. I could see but little of the enemy's line, and
only knew of it by the occasional exchange of fire between the lines of
skirmishers, until we approached the angle of the lines. I passed the
right of our skirmishers, and, thinking I had passed the enemy's, rode
forward to be accurately assured, when I suddenly found myself under near
fire of his sharp-shooters concealed behind the trees and under the brush.
I saw enough, however, to mark the ground line of his field-works as
they were spread along the front of the right wing, and found that I was
very fortunate in having the forest to cover the ride back until out of
reach of their fire. In the absence of a chief of artillery, General
Buckner was asked to establish a twelve-gun battery on my right to
enfilade the enemy's works and line standing before our right wing, and
then I rode away to enjoy my spread of Nassau bacon and Georgia sweet
potatoes. We were not accustomed to potatoes of any kind in Virginia, and
thought we had a luxury, but it was very dry, as the river was a mile and
more from us, and other liquids were over the border. Then, before we had
half finished, our pleasures were interrupted by a fragment of shell that
came tearing through the woods, passed through a book in the hands of a
courier who sat on his horse hard by reading, and struck down our chief of
ordnance, Colonel P. T. Manning, gasping, as was supposed, in the
struggles of death. Friends sprang forward to look for the wound and to
give some aid and relief. In his hurry to enjoy and finish his lunch he
had just taken a large bite of sweet potato, which seemed to be
suffocating him. I suggested that it would be well to first relieve him of
the potato and give him a chance to breathe. This done, he revived, his
breath came freer, and he was soon on his feet ready to be conveyed to the
hospital. In a few days he was again on duty.

[Illustration: R. J. Moses. Chief of Subsistence Department, First Corps,
Army of Northern Virginia.]

After caring for and sending him off, and before we were through with our
lunch, General Bragg sent for me. He was some little distance in rear of
our new position. The change of the order of battle was explained, and the
necessity under which it came to be made. We had taken some thirty or more
field-pieces and a large number of small-arms, and thought that we had cut
off and put to disorder the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps that had
retreated through the pass of the Ridge by the Dry Valley road. He was
informed of orders given General Johnson for my left, and General Buckner
for a battery on the right. I then offered as suggestion of the way to
finish our work that he abandon the plan for battle by our right wing, or
hold it to defence, draw off a force from that front that had rested since
the left wing took up the battle, join them with the left wing, move
swiftly down the Dry Valley road, pursue the retreating forces, occupy the
gaps of the Ridge behind the enemy standing before our right, and call
that force to its own relief.

He was disturbed by the failure of his plan and the severe repulse of his
right wing, and was little prepared to hear suggestions from subordinates
for other moves or progressive work. His words, as I recall them, were:
"There is not a man in the right wing who has any fight in him." From
accounts of his former operations I was prepared for halting work, but
this, when the battle was at its tide and in partial success, was a little
surprising. His humor, however, was such that his subordinate was at a
loss for a reopening of the discussion. He did not wait, nor did he
express approval or disapproval of the operations of the left wing, but
rode for his head-quarters at Reed's Bridge.

There was nothing for the left wing to do but work along as best it could.
The right wing ceased its active battle as the left forced the enemy's
right centre, and the account of the commanding general was such as to
give little hope of his active use of it in supporting us. After his
lunch, General Johnson was ordered to make ready his own and Hindman's
brigades, to see that those of Hood's were in just connection with his
right, and await the opening of our battery. Preston's division was pulled
away from its mooring on the river bank to reinforce our worn battle.[179]
The battery not opening as promptly as expected, General Johnson was
finally ordered into _strong_, _steady_ battle. He pushed through part of
the woodland, drove back an array of artillery and the supporting
infantry, and gained other elevated ground. The sound of battle in his
rear, its fire drawing nearer, had attracted the attention of General
Granger of the reserve corps, and warned him that it was the opportunity
for his command. He marched, without orders, towards the noise, and passed
by the front of Forrest's cavalry and the front of our right wing, but no
report of his march was sent us. Day was on the wane. Night was advancing.
The sun dipped to the palisades of Lookout Mountain, when
Lieutenant-Colonel Claiborne reported that the cavalry was not riding in
response to my calls. He was asked to repeat the order _in writing_, and
despatched as follows:

    "BATTLE-FIELD, September 20, 1863, 5.09 P.M.


    "Lieutenant-General Longstreet orders you to proceed down the road
    towards the enemy's right, and with your artillery endeavor to
    enfilade his line, with celerity.

    "By order of Lieutenant-General Longstreet.

            "_Lieutenant-Colonel Cavalry_."

Then our foot-scouts reported that there was nothing on the road taken by
the enemy's retreating columns but squads of footmen. Another written
order for the cavalry was despatched at 5.30.[180]

General Preston reinforced us by his brigade under Gracie, pushed beyond
our battle, and gained a height and intervening dell before Snodgrass
Hill, but the enemy's reserve was on the hill, and full of fight, even to
the aggressive. We were pushed back through the valley and up the slope,
until General Preston succeeded in getting his brigade under Trigg to the
support. Our battery got up at last under Major Williams and opened its
destructive fire from eleven guns, which presently convinced General
Thomas that his position was no longer tenable. He drew Reynolds's
division from its trenches near the angle, for assignment as rear-guard.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel, of the staff, reported this move, and was sent
with orders to General Stewart to strike down against the enemy's moving
forces. It seems that at the same time Liddell's division of the extreme
right of our right wing was ordered against the march of the reserves.
Stewart got into part of Reynolds's line and took several hundred
prisoners. Meanwhile, Reynolds was used in meeting the attack and driving
back the division of General Liddell. That accomplished, he was ordered to
position to cover the retreat. As no reports came to the left from the
commanding general or from the right wing, the repulse of Liddell's
division was thought to indicate the strong holding of the enemy along his
intrenched front line, and I thought that we should wait to finish the
battle on the morrow.

The direct road to Chattanooga was practically closed. McFarland Gap, the
only _débouché_, was supposed to be occupied by the cavalry. Another blind
road was at the base of the mountain on its east side. During the
artillery practice the fire of some of the guns of our battery was turned
to the contest at Snodgrass Hill, which disturbed part of our infantry
fiercely struggling for that ground, and they complained, but the fire was
effective. As the woods were full of the enemy, a shot would find a mark.

The intrenched line was crumbling faster than we supposed, and their
reserve was engaged in hot defensive battle to hold secure the Gap while
yet there were two hours of daylight. Had the four brigades of Cheatham's
division that had not been in action gone in at the same time as Liddell's
division, it is hardly possible that the Confederate commander could
have failed to find the enemy's empty lines along the front of his right
wing, and called both wings into a grand final sweep of the field to the
capture of Thomas's command; but he was not present, and the condition of
affairs was embarrassing to the subordinate commanders.


A reconnoissance made just before the first strokes of the morning
engagement discovered an open way around the enemy's left by turning his
intrenched line in reverse, which General Hill thought to utilize by
change of tactics, but General Bragg present, and advised of the
opportunity, preferred his tactics, and urged prompt execution. At the
later hour when Liddell's division was passed beyond the enemy's
intrenchments to strike at his reinforcing march under General Granger,
the subordinate of the right wing could not see how he was to be justified
in using a greater force in that direction, affairs of the wing being
similar to those of the opening, while the relations of the right and left
were in reverse of tactical orders; but a vigilant chief present and
caring for the weaker part of his battle, advised that the enemy was on
his last legs, with his reserves could well have sprung the right wing
into the opening beyond his right, securing crushing results. Earlier in
the afternoon he did send an order for renewed efforts of the right wing
under his plan of parallel assault, but the troops had tested the lines in
their first battle, and were not in condition for a third effort, at
parallel battle.

The contention by our left wing was maintained as a separate and
independent battle. The last of my reserve, Trigg's brigade, gave us new
strength, and Preston gained Snodgrass Hill. The trampled ground and bushy
woods were left to those who were too much worn to escape the rapid
strides of the heroic Confederates. The left wing swept forward, and the
right sprang to the broad Chattanooga highway. Like magic the Union army
had melted away in our presence. A few hundred prisoners were picked up
by both wings as they met, to burst their throats in loud huzzas. The Army
of Tennessee knew how to enjoy its first grand victory. The dews of
twilight hung heavy about the trees as if to hold down the voice of
victory; but the two lines nearing as they advanced joined their
continuous shouts in increasing volume, not as the burstings from the
cannon's mouth, but in a tremendous swell of heroic harmony that seemed
almost to lift from their roots the great trees of the forest.

Before greetings and congratulations upon the success had passed it was
night, and the mild beams of the quartering moon were more suggestive of
Venus than of Mars. The haversacks and ammunition supplies were ordered
replenished, and the Confederate army made its bivouac on the ground it
had gained in the first pronounced victory in the West, and one of the
most stubbornly contested battles of the war.

Our cavalry had failed to close McFarland Gap, and through that General
Thomas made his march for the stand at Rossville Gap.

It has been stated that this retreat was made under the orders of the
Union commander. General Thomas did, in fact, receive a message from his
chief a little after four o'clock, saying that he was riding to
Chattanooga to view the position there; that he, General Thomas, was left
in command of all of the organized forces, and should seek strong and
threatening position at Rossville, and send the other men back to
Chattanooga to be reorganized. This was a suggestion more than an order,
given under the conviction that the Confederates, having the Dry Valley
road, would pass the ridge to the west side, cut General Thomas off, and
strike his rear at pleasure. The order to command of the troops in action,
and the conditions referring to duties at Chattanooga, carried inferential
discretion. That General Thomas so construed it was evidenced by his
decision to hold "until nightfall if possible." But directly, under the
practice of our enfilading battery, he became convinced that it was not
possible, changed his purpose, and at 5.30 gave orders for his commanders
to prepare to retire, and called Reynolds's division from its trenches to
be posted as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

General Granger was then engaged in severe contention against my left at
Snodgrass Hill. His march along the front of our cavalry and right wing
suggested the advance of Liddell's division to the Chattanooga road to try
to check it. The withdrawal of Reynolds's division was in season to aid in
driving Liddell's division back to its former ground. Reynolds was posted
on eminent ground as rear-guard, and organized retreat followed. It was
not until after sunset that Rosecrans's _order_ for retreat was issued, as
appears from the letter written from Rossville by General James A.
Garfield, chief of staff, dated 8.40, three hours and more after the move
was taken up, viz.:

    "Your order to retire to this place was received a little after sunset
    and communicated to Generals Thomas and Granger. The troops are now
    moving back, and will be here in good shape and strong position before

So events and the evidence seem conclusive that it was our artillery
practice that made the confusion of Chickamauga forests unbearable, and
enforced retreat before Rosecrans order was issued.

The Union army and reserve had been fought, and by united efforts we held
the position at Snodgrass Hill, which covered McFarland Gap and the
retreat. There were yet five brigades of Confederates that had not been in
active battle. The Confederate commander was not present, and his next in
rank thought night pursuit without authority a heavy, unprofitable labor,
while a flank move, after a night's rest, seemed promising of more
important results. The Confederate chief did not even know of his victory
until the morning of the 21st, when, upon riding to his extreme right, he
found his commander at that point seeking the enemy in his immediate
front, and commended the officer upon his vigilance,--twelve hours after
the retreat of the enemy's forces.

The forces engaged and their respective casualties follow:

  General Bragg's returns of the 20th of August--the
  last of record--reported his aggregate of all arms            43,866

  Reinforced from J. E. Johnston's army in August                9,000

  Reinforced from J. E. Johnston's army in September
  (Gregg and McNair)                                             2,500

  Reinforced from General Lee's army, September 18
  and 19 (a large estimate)                                      5,000
      Total                                                     60,366

  Losses on the 18th and 19th                                    1,124
      Aggregate for battle on the 20th                          59,242

  General Rosecrans's return of September 20, 1863,
  showed: Aggregate of infantry, equipped                       46,561

  Aggregate of cavalry, equipped                                10,114

  Aggregate of artillery, equipped                               4,192
      Total                                                     60,867
  Confederate losses (estimated; returns imperfect)             17,800

  Union losses by returns (infantry, artillery, and cavalry)    16,550

The exceeding heaviness of these losses will be better understood, and the
desperate and bloody character of the Chickamauga battle more fully
appreciated, upon a little analysis. The battle, viewed from the
stand-point of the Union losses, was the fifth greatest of the war,
Gettysburg, Spottsylvania, the Wilderness, and Chancellorsville alone
exceeding it, but each of these battles were of much longer time. Viewed
by comparison of Confederate losses, Chickamauga occupies similar
place--fifth--in the scale of magnitude among the battles of the war.

But the sanguinary nature of the contention is best illustrated by a
simple suggestion of proportions. Official reports show that on both sides
the casualties--killed, wounded, and missing--embraced the enormous
proportion of thirty-three per cent. of the troops actually engaged.

On the Union side there were over a score of regiments in which the losses
in this single fight exceeded 49.4 per cent., which was the heaviest loss
sustained by a German regiment at any time during the Franco-German war.
The "charge of the Light Brigade" at Balaklava has been made famous in
song and history, yet there were thirty Union regiments that each lost ten
per cent. more men at Chickamauga, and many Confederate regiments whose
mortality exceeded this.

Longstreet's command in less than two hours lost nearly forty-four per
cent. of its strength, and of the troops opposed to a portion of their
splendid assaults, Steedman's and Brannan's commands lost respectively
forty-nine and thirty-eight in less than four hours, and single regiments
a far heavier percentage.

Of the Confederate regiments sustaining the heaviest percentages of loss
(in killed, wounded, and missing,--the last a scarcely appreciable
fraction) the leading ones were:

      Regiment.                           Per cent.
  Tenth Tennessee                           68.0
  Fifth Georgia                             61.1
  Second Tennessee                          60.2
  Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee    59.9
  Sixteenth Alabama                         58.6
  Sixth and Ninth Tennessee                 57.9
  Eighteenth Alabama                        56.3
  Twenty-second Alabama                     55.2
  Twenty-third Tennessee                    54.1
  Twenty-ninth Mississippi                  52.7
  Fifty-eighth Alabama                      51.7
  Thirty-seventh Georgia                    50.1
  Sixty-third Tennessee                     49.7
  Forty-first Alabama                       48.6
  Thirty-second Tennessee                   48.3
  Twentieth Tennessee                       48.0
  First Arkansas                            45.1
  Ninth Kentucky                            44.3

These are only a few of the cases in which it was possible to compute
percentages of casualties, the number of effectives taken into battle not
having been mentioned, but they serve to illustrate the sanguinary
severity of the fight and the heroism of the troops.



    Longstreet differs with General Bragg as to Movements of Pursuit--The
    Confederates on Lookout Mountain--Federals gain Comfortable Positions
    around it--Superior Officers of Bragg's Command call for his
    Removal--Bragg seeks Scapegoats--President Davis visits the
    Army--Tests the Temper of the Officers towards Bragg--He offers the
    Command to Longstreet--He declines--His Reasons--General Bragg ignores
    Signal-Service Reports and is surprised--General Joe Hooker's
    Advance--Night Attack beyond Lookout Mountain--Colonel Bratton's
    Clever Work--Review of the Western Movement and Combination--It should
    have been effected in May instead of September--Inference as to
    Results had the First Proposition been promptly acted upon.

About sunrise of the next morning, General Bragg rode to my bivouac, when
report was made to him of orders of the night before, to replenish
supplies and prepare to take up pursuit at daylight. He asked my views of
the next step to be taken, explaining that there were some defensive works
about Chattanooga to cover the enemy in that position.

I knew nothing of the country except of its general geographical features,
but the hunt was up and on the go, when any move towards his rear was
safe, and a speedy one encouraging of great results. I suggested that we
cross the Tennessee River north of Chattanooga and march against the line
of the enemy's rear; that if, after so threatening as to throw General
Rosecrans to full retreat, we found it inconvenient to pursue him, we turn
back with part of the army and capture or disperse the Union army in East
Tennessee under General Burnside. He stated that he would follow that
course, ordered the right wing to march,[182] and the left wing to follow
as soon as the way was clear,--the left to care for the dead and wounded
during the wait. As it was night when the rear of the right wing stretched
out on the road, my march was not taken up until the morning of the 22d.
General McLaws joined me on the 21st with his other brigades, and General
Jenkins joined Hood's division. Afterwards G. T. Anderson's brigade joined
the latter. When our march reached General Bragg's head-quarters and
reported on the 22d, he gave me orders to direct a division from the line
of march to follow the enemy towards Chattanooga.

When asked if he had abandoned the course upon which his march was
ordered, he said the people would be greatly gratified to know that his
army was marching through the streets of Chattanooga with bands of music
and salutations of the soldiers. I thought, and did not fail to say, that
it would give them greater pleasure to know that he had passed the
Tennessee River, turned the enemy out of Chattanooga in eager flight, to
save his rearward lines, whilst we marched hammering against the broken
flanks of his columns. But the cavalry had reported that the enemy was in
hurried and confused retreat, his trains crossing the river and passing
over the nose of Lookout Mountain in disorder.

The praise of the inhabitants of a city so recently abandoned to the
enemy, and a parade through its streets with bands of music and flaunting
banners, were more alluring to a spirit eager for applause than was the
tedious march for fruition of our heavy labors.

General Rosecrans prepared, no doubt, to continue his retreat,
anticipating our march towards his rear, but finding that we preferred
to lay our lines in front of him, concluded that it would be more
comfortable to rest at Chattanooga, reinforce, repair damages, and come to
meet us when ready for a new trial.


When General Bragg found that the enemy had changed his mind, and was not
inclined to continue his rearward march, he stretched his army in a
semicircle of six miles along the southeast front of Chattanooga, from the
base of Lookout Mountain on his left, to his right resting on the
Tennessee River, and ordered Alexander's batteries to the top of the
mountain, my command, McLaws's, Hood's, and Walker's divisions, occupying
the left of his line of investment. His plan was to shell the enemy from
his works by field batteries, but the works grew stronger from day to day
on all sides of the city. Our infantry was posted along the line, as
supports for the batteries, with orders not to assault unless especially

The northern point of Lookout Mountain, upon which Alexander's batteries
were posted, abuts upon the Tennessee River. The city lies east of the
abutment and nestles close under it. The base of the mountain has a steep,
rugged grade of five hundred feet above the plateau, and from its height
the mountain crops out into palisades of seven hundred feet. General
Alexander managed to drop an occasional shell or shot about the enemy's
lines by lifting the trails of his guns, but the fire of other batteries
was not effective.

At the end of a week's practice the Confederate commander found the enemy
getting more comfortable in his works, and thought to break him up by a
grand cavalry raid. On the 30th he ordered General Wheeler to organize a
force of his effective mounts, cross the river, and ride against the
railway and such depots and supply-trains as he could reach. The cavalry
destroyed some wagon-trains and supplies, and gave the enemy more trouble
than the artillery practice, yet failed to convince him that it was time
to abandon his position, but, on the contrary, satisfied him that he was
safe from further serious trouble.

At that time the shortest line of the enemy's haul of provisions from the
depot at Stevenson was along the road on the north bank of the river. The
Confederate chief conceived, as our cavalry ride had failed of effect,
that a line of sharp-shooters along the river on our side could break up
that line of travel, and ordered, on the 8th of October, a detail from my
command for that purpose. As the line was over the mountain about seven
miles beyond support, by a rugged road not practicable for artillery, I
ordered a brigade of infantry detailed to go over and protect the
sharp-shooters from surprise or capture. The detail fell upon Law's
brigade. The line for this practice extended from the east side of Lookout
Creek some ten miles down the river. The effect of the fire was about like
that of the cavalry raid. It simply put the enemy on shorter rations until
he could open another route for his trains.

But more to be deplored than these novel modes of investment was the
condition of the Confederate army. After moving from Virginia to try to
relieve our comrades of the Army of Tennessee, we thought that we had
cause to complain that the fruits of our labor had been lost, but it soon
became manifest that the superior officers of that army themselves felt as
much aggrieved as we at the halting policy of their chief, and were
calling in letters and petitions for his removal. A number of them came to
have me write the President for them. As he had not called for my opinion
on military affairs since the Johnston conference of 1862, I could not
take that liberty, but promised to write to the Secretary of War and to
General Lee, who I thought could excuse me under the strained condition of
affairs. About the same time they framed and forwarded to the President a
petition praying for relief.[183] It was written by General D. H. Hill (as
he informed me since the war).

While the superior officers were asking for relief, the Confederate
commander was busy looking along his lines for victims. Lieutenant-General
Polk was put under charges for failing to open the battle of the 20th at
daylight; Major-General Hindman was relieved under charges for conduct
before the battle, when his conduct of the battle with other commanders
would have relieved him of any previous misconduct, according to the
customs of war, and pursuit of others was getting warm.

On the Union side the Washington authorities thought vindication
important, and Major-Generals McCook and Crittenden, of the Twentieth and
Twenty-first Corps, were relieved and went before a Court of Inquiry; also
one of the generals of division of the Fourteenth Corps.

The President came to us on the 9th of October and called the commanders
of the army to meet him at General Bragg's office. After some talk, in the
presence of General Bragg, he made known the object of the call, and asked
the generals, in turn, their opinion of their commanding officer,
beginning with myself. It seemed rather a stretch of authority, even with
a President, and I gave an evasive answer and made an effort to turn the
channel of thought, but he would not be satisfied, and got back to his
question. The condition of the army was briefly referred to, and the
failure to make an effort to get the fruits of our success, when the
opinion was given, in substance, that our commander could be of greater
service elsewhere than at the head of the Army of Tennessee. Major-General
Buckner was called, and gave opinion somewhat similar. So did
Major-General Cheatham, who was then commanding the corps recently
commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, and General D. H. Hill, who was
called last, agreed with emphasis to the views expressed by others.

The next morning the President called me to private conference, and had an
all day talk. He thought to assign me to command, but the time had passed
for handling that army as an independent force. Regarding this question,
as considered in Virginia, it was understood that the assignment would be
made at once, and in time for opportunity to handle the army sufficiently
to gain the confidence of the officers and soldiers before offering or
accepting battle. The action was not taken, a battle had been made and
won, the army was then seriously entangled in a _quasi_ siege, the
officers and soldiers were disappointed, and disaffected in _morale_.
General Grant was moving his army to reinforce against us, and an
important part of the Union army of Virginia was moving to the same

In my judgment our last opportunity was lost when we failed to follow the
success at Chickamauga, and capture or disperse the Union army, and it
could not be just to the service or myself to call me to a position of
such responsibility. The army was part of General Joseph E. Johnston's
department, and could only be used in strong organization by him in
combining its operations with his other forces in Alabama and Mississippi.
I said that under him I could cheerfully work in any position.[184] The
suggestion of that name only served to increase his displeasure, and his
severe rebuke.

I recognized the authority of his high position, but called to his mind
that neither his words nor his manner were so impressive as the dissolving
scenes that foreshadowed the dreadful end. He referred to his worry and
troubles with politicians and non-combatants. In that connection, I
suggested that all that the people asked for was success; with that the
talk of politicians would be as spiders' webs before him. And when
restored to his usual gracious calm I asked to have my resignation
accepted, to make place for some one who could better meet his ideas of
the important service. He objected that my troops would not be satisfied
with the change. I suggested a leave of absence, as winter was near, when
I would go to the Trans-Mississippi Department, and after the troops were
accustomed to their new commander, send in my written resignation, from
Texas, but he was not minded to accept that solution of the premises.

Finally, I asked his aid in putting the divisions that were with me in
more efficient working order, by assigning a major-general to command
Hood's division. He had been so seriously crippled that he could not be in
condition to take the field again even if he recovered, and a commander
for the division was essential to its proper service. As he had no one, or
failed to name any one, for the place, I suggested the promotion of the
senior brigadier then in command of it, General M. Jenkins, who was a
bright, gallant, and efficient officer of more than two years' experience
in active warfare, loved by his troops, and all acquaintances as well. He
had been transferred, recently, by the War Department to the division,
upon application of General Hood, and in consequence there was some
feeling of rivalry between him and Brigadier-General Law, the next in
rank, who had served with the division since its organization, and had
commanded it at Gettysburg after General Hood was wounded, and after his
taking off in the battle of Chickamauga. The President referred to the
services of General Law with the division, but failed to indicate a
preference. I thought it unwise and not military to choose a junior for
assignment to command over his senior officers, and prejudicial to the
_esprit de corps_ and _morale_ of any army, except under most eminent
services, and in this instance where service, high military character, and
equipment were on the side of the senior it was more objectionable, but
consented that it would be better to have General Law promoted, and the
feeling of rivalry put at rest; General Jenkins's heart was in the
service, and could submit to anything that seemed best for its interests;
but the President was pleased to remain negative, and failed to assign a

The interview was exciting, at times warm, but continued until Lookout
Mountain lifted above the sun to excuse my taking leave. The President
walked as far as the gate, gave his hand in his usual warm grasp, and
dismissed me with his gracious smile; but a bitter look lurking about its
margin, and the ground-swell, admonished me that clouds were gathering
about head-quarters of the First Corps even faster than those that told
the doom of the Southern cause.

A day or two after this interview the President called the commanders to
meet him again at General Bragg's head-quarters. He expressed desire to
have the army pulled away from the lines around Chattanooga and put to
active work in the field, and called for suggestions and plans by which
that could be done, directing his appeal, apparently, to me as first to

I suggested a change of base to Rome, Georgia, a march of the army to the
railway bridge of the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, and the crossing of
the river as an easy move,--one that would cut the enemy's rearward line,
interrupt his supply train, put us between his army at Chattanooga and the
reinforcements moving to join him, and force him to precipitate battle or

General Bragg proposed that we march up and cross the river and swing
around towards the enemy's rear and force him out by that means. No other
plans were offered, nor did other officers express preference for either
of the plans that were submitted.

Maps were called for and demonstrations given of the two plans, when the
President ordered the move to be made by the change of base to Rome, and
in a day or two took leave of us. He had brought General Pemberton with
him to assign to the corps left by General Polk, but changed his mind.
General D. H. Hill was relieved of duty; after a time General Buckner took
a leave of absence, and General Hardee relieved General Cheatham of
command of the corps left to him by General Polk.

About this time General Lee wrote me, alluding to the presence of the
President, the questions under consideration, my proposition for him to
leave the army in Virginia in other hands and come West to grander, more
important fields, to his purpose in sending me West to be assigned to
command them, and expressing anticipation of my return to Virginia.[185]

The President left the army more despondent than he found it. General
Pemberton's misfortune at Vicksburg gave rise to severe prejudice of the
people and the army, and when the troops heard of the purpose of the
President to assign him to command of Polk's corps, parts of the army were
so near to mutiny that he concluded to call General Hardee to that
command. A few days after he left us a severe season of rain set in, and
our commander used the muddy roads to excuse his failure to execute the
campaign that the President had ordered.

Late on the 20th of September and during the 21st, General Rosecrans
reported his condition deplorable, and expressed doubt of his holding at
Chattanooga, and called to General Burnside in East Tennessee, to whom he
looked for aid; but finding only feeble efforts to follow our success he
recovered hope, prepared defensive works, and was looking to renewal of
his aggressive work when he was relieved.

From accounts made public since the war it appears that his animals were
so reduced from want of forage at the time of the October rains that
General Rosecrans could not move his artillery over the muddy roads, which
suggests mention that the campaign ordered by the President for the change
of base could have forced him from his works in his crippled condition,
and given us comfortable operations between him and his reinforcements
coming from Virginia and Mississippi.

In his official account, General Bragg said that the road on the south
side was left under my command, which is misleading. My command--three
divisions--was on his line of investment, east of the city and of the
mountain; the road was west of the mountain from six to twenty miles from
the command. We were in support of his batteries, to be ready for action
at the moment his artillery practice called for it. We held nearly as much
of his line as the other eight divisions. None of the commanders had
authority to move a man from the lines until the 8th of October, when he
gave orders for posting the sharp-shooters west of the mountain. The
exposure of this detachment was so serious that I took the liberty to send
a brigade as a rallying force for it, and the exposure of these led me to
inquire as to the assistance they could have from our cavalry force
operating on the line from the mountain to Bridgeport, some eight or ten
miles behind them. The cavalry was not found as watchful as the eyes of an
army should be, and I reported them to the general, but he thought
otherwise, assured me that his reports were regular, daily and sometimes

Nevertheless, prudence suggested more careful guard, and I ordered Captain
Manning, who brought from Virginia part of my signal force, to establish a
station in observation of Bridgeport and open its communication with my
head-quarters. General Bragg denied all reports sent him of the enemy from
my signal party, treated them with contempt, then reported that the road
was under my command.

His report is remarkable in that he failed to notice the conduct of his
officers, except of the killed and wounded and one division commander whom
he found at daylight of the 21st advancing his line of skirmishers in
careful search of the enemy who had retreated at early twilight the
evening before under shouts from the Confederate army that made the heavy
wood reverberate with resounding shouts of victory. That officer he
commended as the "ever vigilant." He gave due credit to his brave soldiers
for their gallant execution of his orders to charge and continue to charge
against the enemy's strongholds, as he knew that they would under his
orders until their efforts were successful, but the conduct of the battle
in all of its phases discredits this claim. When the right wing of his
army stepped into the Lafayette-Rossville road the enemy's forces were in
full retreat through McFarland Gap, and all fighting and charging had
ceased, except the parting blows of Preston's division with Granger's
reserve corps. A peculiar feature of the battle was the early ride of both
commanders from the field, leaving the battle to their troops. General
Rosecrans was generous enough to acknowledge that he left his battle in
other hands. General Bragg claimed everything for himself, failing to
mention that other hands were there.

While General Rosecrans was opening a route beyond reach of our
sharp-shooters, his chief engineer, General W. F. Smith, was busy upon a
plan for opening the line of railway on the south side, and his first step
was to break up the line of sharp-shooters. On the 19th he made a survey
of the river below Chattanooga. On the same day General Rosecrans was
superseded in command by General George H. Thomas. A day or two after that
my signal party reported some stir about the enemy's camps near
Bridgeport, and the cavalry reported a working force at Nicojack Cave.

The cavalry was put under my orders for a reconnoissance, and I was
ordered to send a brigade of infantry scouting for the working party.
Nothing was found at the Cave or by the reconnoissance, and the cavalry
objected to my authority. On the 25th orders came to me to hold the
mountain by a brigade of infantry. After ordering the brigade, I reported
a division necessary to make possession secure, suggesting that the
enemy's best move was from Bridgeport and along the mountain crest; that
we should assume that he would be wise enough to adopt it, unless we
prepared against it. But our commander was disturbed by suggestions from
subordinates, and thought them presumptuous when they ventured to report
of the probable movements of the enemy.

On the night of the 27th of October, General Smith moved to the execution
of his plan against our line of sharp-shooters. He put fifty pontoon-boats
and two flat-boats in the river at Chattanooga, the former to take
twenty-five men each, the latter from forty to seventy-five,--the boats to
float quietly down the river eight miles to Brown's Ferry, cross and land
the troops. At the same time a sufficient force was to march by the
highway to the same point, to be in readiness for the boats to carry them
over to their comrades. The sharp-shooters had been posted for the sole
purpose of breaking up the haul along the other bank, and not with a view
of defending the line, nor was it defensible, while the enemy had every
convenience for making a forced crossing and lodgement.

The vigilant foe knew his opportunity, and only waited for its timely
execution. It is needless to say that General Smith had little trouble in
establishing his point. He manned his boats, floated them down to the
crossing, landed his men, and soon had the boats cross back for his other
men, pushed them over, and put them at work intrenching the strong ground
selected for their holding. By daylight he was comfortably intrenched, and
had his artillery on the other side in position to sweep along the front.

The Confederate commander did not think well enough of his line when he
had it to prepare to hold it, but when he found that the enemy proposed to
use it, he thought to order his infantry down to recover the ground just
demonstrated as indefensible, and ordered me to meet him on the mountain
next morning to learn his plans and receive his instructions for the work.

That afternoon the signal party reported the enemy advancing from
Bridgeport in force,--artillery and infantry. This despatch was forwarded
to head-quarters, but was discredited. It was repeated about dark, and
again forwarded and denied.

On the morning of the 28th I reported as ordered. The general complained
of my party sending up false alarms. The only answer that I could make was
that they had been about two years in that service, and had not made such
mistakes before.

While laying his plans, sitting on the point of Lookout rock, the enemy
threw some shells at us, and succeeded in bursting one about two hundred
feet below us. That angered the general a little, and he ordered Alexander
to drop some of his shells about their heads. As this little practice went
on, a despatch messenger came bursting through the brushwood, asking for
General Longstreet, and reported the enemy marching from Bridgeport along
the base of the mountain,--artillery and infantry. General Bragg denied
the report, and rebuked the soldier for sensational alarms, but the
soldier said, "General, if you will ride to a point on the west side of
the mountain I will show them to you." We rode and saw the Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps under General Hooker, from the Army of the Potomac, marching
quietly along the valley towards Brown's Ferry. The general was surprised.
So was I. But my surprise was that he did not march along the mountain
top, instead of the valley. It could have been occupied with as little
loss as he afterwards had and less danger. He had marched by our line of
cavalry without their knowing, and General Bragg had but a brigade of
infantry to meet him if he had chosen to march down along the top of the
mountain, and that was posted twenty miles from support.

My estimate of the force was five thousand. General Bragg thought it not
so strong, and appearance from the elevation seemed to justify his
estimate. Presently the rear-guard came in sight and made its bivouac
immediately in front of the point upon which we stood. The latter force
was estimated at fifteen hundred, and halted about three miles in rear of
the main body.

A plan was laid to capture the rear-guard by night attack. He proposed to
send me McLaws's and Jenkins's divisions for the work, and ordered that it
should be done in time for the divisions to withdraw to the point of the
mountain before daylight, left me to arrange details for attack, and rode
to give orders for the divisions, but changed his mind without giving me
notice, and only ordered Jenkins's division. After marching his command,
General Jenkins rode to the top of the mountain and reported.

The route over which the enemy had marched was along the western base of a
series of lesser heights, offering strong points for our troops to find
positions of defence between his main force and his rear-guard. After
giving instructions to General Jenkins, he was asked to explain the plan
of operations to General McLaws in case the latter was not in time to view
the position from the mountain before night. A point had been selected and
ordered to be held by one of Jenkins's brigades supported by McLaws's
division, while General Jenkins was to use his other brigades against the
rear-guard, which rested in the edge of a woodland of fair field of
approach. The point at which Law's brigade rested after being forced from
its guard of the line of sharp-shooters was near the northern base of the
mountain about a mile east of the route of the enemy's line of march. As
General Law's detached service had given him opportunity to learn
something of the country, his brigade was chosen as the brigade of
position between the parts of the enemy's forces. General Law was to move
first, get into position by crossing the bridge over Lookout Creek, to be
followed by Jenkins's other brigades, when McLaws's division was to
advance to position in support of Law's brigade.

I waited on the mountain, the only point from which the operations could
be seen, until near midnight, when, seeing no indications of the
movements, I rode to the point that had been assigned for their assembly,
found the officers in wait discussing the movements, and, upon inquiry,
learned that McLaws's division had not been ordered. Under the impression
that the other division commander understood that the move had miscarried,
I rode back to my head-quarters, failing to give countermanding orders.

The gallant Jenkins, however, decided that the plan should not be
abandoned, and went to work in its execution by his single division. To
quiet the apprehensions of General Law he gave him Robertson's brigade to
be posted with his own, and Benning's brigade as their support, and
ordered his own brigade under Colonel Bratton to move cautiously against
the rear-guard, and make the attack if the opportunity was encouraging.

As soon as Colonel Bratton engaged, the alarm spread, the enemy hastened
to the relief of his rear, encountered the troops posted to receive them,
and made swift, severe battle. General Law claimed that he drove off their
fight, and, under the impression that Colonel Bratton had finished his
work and recrossed the bridge, withdrew his command, leaving Colonel
Bratton at the tide of his engagement. General Jenkins and Colonel Bratton
were left to their own cool and gallant skill to extricate the brigade
from the swoop of numbers accumulating against them, and, with the
assistance of brave Benning's Rock brigade, brought the command safely
over, Benning's brigade crossing as Bratton reached the bridge.

The conduct of Bratton's forces was one of the cleverest pieces of work of
the war, and the skill of its handling softened the blow that took so many
of our gallant officers and soldiers.

Colonel Bratton made clever disposition of his regiments, and handled them
well. He met gallant resistance, and in one instance had part of his
command forced back, but renewed the attack, making his line stronger, and
forced the enemy into crowded ranks and had him under converging circular
fire, with fair prospects, when recalled under orders to hasten to the
bridge. So urgent was the order that he left the dead and some of the
wounded on the field.

  General Law lost of his own brigade (aggregate)      43
  General Robertson (1 wounded and 8 missing)           9
  Colonel Bratton lost (aggregate)                    356
    Confederate loss                                  408
    Union loss (aggregate)                            420

It was an oversight of mine not to give definite orders for the troops to
return to their camps before leaving them.

General Jenkins was ordered to inquire into the conduct of the brigades of
position, and reported evidence that General Law had said that he did not
care to win General Jenkins's spurs as a major-general. He was ordered to
prepare charges, but presently when we were ordered into active campaign
in East Tennessee he asked to have the matter put off to more convenient

We may pause here to reflect upon the result of the combination against
Rosecrans's army in September, after our lines of transit were seriously
disturbed, and after the severe losses in Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and
Tennessee; and to consider in contrast the probable result of the
combination if effected in the early days of May, when it was first
proposed (see strategic map).

At that time General Grant was marching to lay siege upon Vicksburg. The
campaign in Virginia had been settled, for the time, by the battle of
Chancellorsville. Our railways were open and free from Virginia through
East Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, to Central Mississippi. The armies of
Rosecrans and Bragg were standing near Murfreesboro' and Shelbyville,
Tennessee. The Richmond authorities were trying to collect a force at
Jackson, Mississippi, to drive Grant's army from the siege. Two divisions
of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia were marching from
Suffolk to join General Lee at Fredericksburg. Under these circumstances,
positions, and conditions, I proposed to Secretary Seddon, and afterwards
to General Lee, as the only means of relief for Vicksburg, that Johnston
should be ordered with his troops to join Bragg's army; that the divisions
marching for Fredericksburg should be ordered to meet Johnston's, the
transit over converging lines would give speedy combination, and Johnston
should be ordered to strike Rosecrans in overwhelming numbers and march on
to the Ohio River.

As the combination of September and battle of Chickamauga drew General
Grant's army from its work in Mississippi to protect the line through
Tennessee and Kentucky, and two Federal corps from the Army of the
Potomac, the inference is fair that the earlier, more powerful combination
would have opened ways for grand results for the South, saved the eight
thousand lost in defending the march for Vicksburg, the thirty-one
thousand surrendered there, Port Hudson and its garrison of six thousand,
and the splendid Army of Northern Virginia the twenty thousand lost at
Gettysburg. And who can say that with these sixty-five thousand soldiers
saved, and in the ranks, the Southern cause would not have been on a grand
ascending grade with its bayonets and batteries bristling on the banks of
the Ohio River on the 4th day of July, 1863!

The elections of 1862 were not in support of the Emancipation
Proclamation. With the Mississippi River still closed, and the Southern
army along the banks of the Ohio, the elections of 1864 would have been
still more pronounced against the Federal policy, and a new administration
could have found a solution of the political imbroglio. "Blood is thicker
than water."



    General Bragg's Infatuation--General Grant in Command of the Federal
    Forces--Longstreet ordered into East Tennessee--His Plans for the
    Campaign--Poorly supported by his Superior--Foraging for Daily
    Rations--General Burnside's Forces--Advance upon Knoxville--Affairs at
    Lenoir's and Campbell's Stations--Engagement near Knoxville an
    Artillery Combat--Reprehensible Conduct of Officers--Allegement that
    One was actuated by Jealousy--Federals retire behind their
    Works--Laying the Confederate Lines about Knoxville.

About the 1st of November it was rumored about camp that I was to be
ordered into East Tennessee against General Burnside's army. At the moment
it seemed impossible that our commander, after rejecting a proposition for
a similar move made just after his battle, when flushed with victory and
the enemy discomfited, could now think of sending an important detachment
so far, when he knew that, in addition to the reinforcements that had
joined the Union army, another strong column was marching from Memphis
under General Sherman, and must reach Chattanooga in fifteen or twenty
days. But on second thoughts it occurred to me that it might, after all,
be in keeping with his peculiarities, and then it occurred to me that
there are many ways to compass a measure when the spirit leads. So I set
to work to try to help his plans in case the report proved true.

After a little reflection it seemed feasible that by withdrawing his army
from its lines about Chattanooga to strong concentration behind the
Chickamauga River, and recalling his detachment in East Tennessee (the
latter to give the impression of a westward move), and at the moment of
concentration sending a strong force for swift march against General
Burnside,--strong enough to crush him,--and returning to Chattanooga
before the army under General Sherman could reach there (or, if he thought
better, let the detachment strike into Kentucky against the enemy's
communications), something worth while could be effected.

Presently I was called, with Lieutenant-General Hardee and Major-General
Breckenridge, the other corps commanders, to learn his plans and receive
his orders. He announced his purpose in general terms to send me into East
Tennessee, then paused as if inviting the opinions of others, when I
stated that the move could be made, but it would be hazardous to make a
detachment strong enough for rapid work while his army was spread along a
semicircle of six miles, with the enemy concentrated at the centre, whence
he could move in two or three threatening columns, to hold his line to its
extension, and give his real attack such power that it must break through
by its weight. Then I suggested the operations herein just mentioned.

He ordered the move to be made by my two divisions, Alexander's and
Leydon's artillery, and Wheeler's cavalry and horse artillery. We had the
promise of a force, estimated from three to five thousand, that was to
come from Southwest Virginia and meet us, but that command was to start
from a point two hundred miles from our starting, march south as we
marched north, and meet us at Knoxville. General Bragg estimated General
Burnside's force south of Knoxville at fifteen thousand. I repeated the
warning that the move as ordered was not such as to give assurances of
rapid work, saying that my march and campaign against the enemy's
well-guarded positions must be made with care, and that would consume so
much time that General Grant's army would be up, when he would organize
attack that must break through the line before I could return to him. His
sardonic smile seemed to say that I knew little of his army or of himself
in assuming such a possibility. So confident was he of his position that I
ventured to ask that my column should be increased to twenty thousand
infantry and artillery, but he intimated that further talk was out of

General Grant had in the mean time joined the army and assumed command on
the 22d of October, and it was known that General Sherman was marching to
join him.

On the 20th of October General Burnside reported by letter[186] to General
Grant an army of twenty-two thousand three hundred men, with ninety-odd
guns, but his returns for November show a force of twenty-five thousand
two hundred and ninety and over one hundred guns. Eight thousand of his
men were on service north of Knoxville and about Cumberland Gap.

To march, and capture or disperse this formidable force, fortified at
points, I had McLaws's and Hood's divisions of infantry, Colonel
Alexander's and Major Leydon's artillery, and four brigades of General
Wheeler's cavalry. Kershaw's, Humphreys's, Wofford's, and Bryan's brigades
constituted McLaws's division. Hood's division, which was commanded during
the campaign by Brigadier-General M. Jenkins, was made up of Jenkins's,
Anderson's, Benning's, Law's, and Robertson's brigades. General Wheeler's
cavalry was organized into two divisions of two brigades each,--General
John T. Morgan's Alabama and Colonel Cruse's Georgia brigades, under
Major-General W. T. Martin; Colonels G. G. Dibbrell's Tennessee and Thomas
Harrison's Texas brigades, under Brigadier-General Frank Armstrong. This
made about fifteen thousand men, after deducting camp guards and foraging
parties. The remote contingent that was to come from Southwest Virginia
was an unknown quantity, not to be considered until it could report for

As soon as the conference at head-quarters adjourned orders were issued
for Alexander's artillery to be withdrawn from Lookout Mountain, and
General McLaws was ordered to withdraw his division from the general line
after night. Both commands were ordered to Tyner's Station to take the
cars for Sweetwater on the 4th.

Control of the trains was under General Bragg's quartermaster, who had
orders for the cars to be ready to transport the troops on their arrival,
but the trains were not ready until the 5th. The brigades arrived at
Sweetwater on the 6th, 7th, and 8th. Alexander's batteries were shipped as
soon as cars were ready. To expedite matters, his horses and wagons were
ordered forward by the dirt road; the batteries found cars, the last
battery getting to Sweetwater on the 10th. Jenkins's division and Leydon's
batteries were drawn from the lines on the 5th and ordered to meet the
cars at the tunnel through Missionary Ridge. They reached the station in
due season, but the cars were not there. After waiting some days, the
battery horses and horses of mounted officers were ordered by the wagon
road. Tired of the wait, I advised the troops to march along the road and
find the cars where they might have the good fortune to meet them, the
officers, whose horses had been sent forward, marching with the soldiers.

General Bragg heard of the delay and its cause, but began to urge the
importance of more rapid movements. His effort to make his paper record at
my expense was not pleasing, but I tried to endure it with patience. He
knew that trains and conductors were under his exclusive control, but _he
wanted papers that would throw the responsibility of delay upon other

On the 8th and 9th the infantry marched as far as Cleveland, about thirty
miles, where the train-masters gave notice that the trains could meet
them, but it was not until the 12th that the last of the brigades reached

While waiting for transportation, I wrote some of my friends to excuse my
failure to stop and say good-by. The letter written to General Buckner was
returned to me some months after, endorsed by him as having important
bearing upon events as they transpired,--viz.:

    "WEDNESDAY, November 5, 1863.

    "MY DEAR GENERAL,--I start to-day for Tyner's Station, and expect to
    get transportation to-morrow for Sweetwater. The weather is so bad,
    and I find myself so much occupied, that I shall not be able to see
    you to say good-by.

    "When I heard the report around camp that I was to go into East
    Tennessee, I set to work at once to try and plan the means for making
    the move with security and the hope of great results. As every other
    move had been proposed to the general and rejected or put off until
    time had made them inconvenient, I came to the conclusion, as soon as
    the report reached me, that it was to be the fate of our army to wait
    until all good opportunities had passed, and then, in desperation,
    seize upon the least favorable movement.

    "As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the general, I
    thought it possible that we might accomplish something by encouraging
    his own move, and proposed the following plan,--viz.: to withdraw from
    our present lines and our forces in East Tennessee (the latter to be
    done in order to give the impression to the enemy that we were
    retiring from East Tennessee and concentrating near him for battle or
    for some other movement) and place our army in a strong concentrated
    position behind Chickamauga River. The moment the army was together,
    to make a detachment of twenty thousand to move rapidly against
    Burnside and destroy him; and by continued rapid movements to threaten
    the enemy's rear and his communications to the extent that might be
    necessary to draw him out from his present position. This, at best, is
    but a tedious process, but I thought it gave promise of some results,
    and was, therefore, better than being here destroying ourselves. The
    move, as I proposed it, would have left this army in a strong position
    and safe, and would have made sure the capture of Burnside,--that is,
    the army could spare twenty thousand, if it were in the position that
    I proposed, better than it can spare twelve, occupying the lines that
    it now does. Twenty thousand men, well handled, could surely have
    captured Burnside and his forces. Under present arrangements,
    however, the lines are to be held as they now are and the detachment
    is to be of twelve thousand. We thus expose both to failure, and
    really take no chance to ourselves of great results. The only notice
    my plan received was a remark that General Hardee was pleased to make,
    'I don't think that that is a bad idea of Longstreet's.' I undertook
    to explain the danger of having such a long line under fire of the
    enemy's batteries, and he concentrated, as it were, right in our
    midst, and within twenty minutes' march of any portion of our line.
    But I was assured that he would not disturb us. I repeated my ideas,
    but they did not even receive notice. It was not till I had repeated
    them, however, that General Hardee noticed me. Have you any maps that
    you can give or lend me? I shall need everything of the kind. Do you
    know any reliable people, living near and east of Knoxville, from whom
    I might get information of the condition, strength, etc., of the
    enemy? I have written in such hurry and confusion of packing and
    striking camp (in the rain and on the head of an empty flour barrel)
    that I doubt if I have made myself understood. I remain

          "Sincerely your friend,
            "J. LONGSTREET,

        "_Commanding Division_."

Three months thereafter General Buckner returned the letter with the


    "MORRISTOWN, TENN., February 1, 1864.

    "GENERAL,--It seems to me, after reading this letter again, that its
    predictions are so full a vindication of your judgment of the
    movements then ordered, that it should remain in your possession, with
    a view that at some future day it may serve to 'vindicate the truth of
    history.' I place it at your disposal with that view.

          "Truly your friend,
            "S. B. BUCKNER,


I asked at general head-quarters for maps and information of the country
through which I was to operate, for a quartermaster and commissary of
subsistence who knew of the resources of the country, and for an engineer
officer who had served with General Buckner when in command of that
department. Neither of the staff-officers was sent, nor a map, except one
of the topographical outlines of the country between the Hiawassee and
Tennessee Rivers, which was much in rear of the field of our proposed
operations. General Buckner was good enough to send me a plot of the roads
and streams between Loudon and Knoxville.

We were again disappointed at Sweetwater. We were started from Chattanooga
on short rations, but comforted by the assurance that produce was abundant
at that point, and so it proved to be; but General Stevenson, commanding
the outpost, reported his orders from the commanding general were to ship
all of his supplies to his army, and to retire with his own command and
join him upon our arrival. In this connection it should be borne in mind
that we were recently from Virginia,--coming at the heated season,--where
we left most of our clothing and blankets and all of our wagon
transportation; and by this time, too, it was understood through the
command that the Richmond authorities were holding thunder-clouds over the
head of the commander, and that General Bragg was disposed to make them
more portentous by his pressing calls for urgency.

Thus we found ourselves in a strange country, not as much as a day's
rations on hand, with hardly enough land transportation for ordinary camp
equipage, the enemy in front to be captured, and our friends in rear
putting in their paper bullets. This sounds more like romance than war,
but I appeal to the records for the facts, including reports of my chiefs
of quartermaster and subsistence departments and General Alexander's
account of the condition of some of the battery horses and ammunition.

Our foraging parties were lively, and we lost but a day and part of
another in gathering in rations for a start. Anticipating proper land
transportation, plans were laid for march across the Little Tennessee
above its confluence with the greater river, through Marysville to the
heights above Knoxville on the east bank, by forced march. This would have
brought the city close under fire of our field batteries and forced the
enemy into open grounds. A guide had been secured who claimed to be
familiar with the country, and was useful in laying our plans. But when
our pontoon bridge came up it was without a train for hauling. So our plan
must be changed.

Fortunately, we found a point in a bend of the river near the railroad at
which we could force a crossing. At dark the cars were rolled up to that
point by hand, and we learned that the Little Tennessee River above us was
fordable for cavalry. General Wheeler had been ordered to have vedettes
along the river from Loudon to some distance below Kingston, where a
considerable body of Union troops occupied the north bank. He was ordered
with his other troops to prepare for orders to cross the Little Tennessee
at its fords, ride to Marysville, capture the enemy's cavalry outpost at
that point, ride up the east side of the river to Knoxville, and seize the
heights overlooking the city; or, finding that not feasible, to endeavor
to so threaten as to hold the enemy's forces there to their works, while
we marched against the troops of the west side; but when he found his
service on that side ceased to be effective or co-operative with our
movements, to cross the river and join the main column.

As just now explained, the failure of wagons for our pontoon bridge forced
us to cross at Loudon, and to make direct march upon Knoxville by that

Weary of the continual calls of General Bragg for hurried movements, it
seemed well to make cause for him to assign another commander or to move
him to discontinue his work at a paper record; so I wired to remind him
that he assured me before sending me away that he was safe in his
position, and that he was told before my leaving that the command was not
strong enough to excuse any but a careful, proper campaign; that he had
since been informed that all delays of our movements were due to his
inefficient staff corps, and that we were dependent upon foraging for our
daily rations for men and animals. It began to look more like a campaign
against Longstreet than against Burnside.

As General Burnside's orders were to hold Knoxville, he decided to act on
the defensive. Leaving the troops in the northern district of his
department in observation of that field, he withdrew his division on the
south side of Tennessee River as we marched for Loudon, took up his
pontoon bridge, and broke up the railroad bridge.

Orders were issued on the 12th for the general move of my cavalry by
Marysville, the infantry and artillery along the railroad route. Pains
were taken to have the bridge equipments carried by hand to the river, and
skirmishing parties put in the boats and drifted to the opposite bank. The
troops in rear were marched during the night to the vicinity of Loudon and
held in readiness in case the enemy came to oppose our crossing. The
bridge was laid under the supervision of General Alexander and Major
Clark, our chief engineer, at Huff's Ferry, without serious resistance.

A few miles east of Loudon the Holston[187] and Little Tennessee Rivers
come together, making the Tennessee River, which flows from the confluence
west to Kingston, where it resumes its general flow southwest. The Holston
rises in the mountains north and flows south to the junction. The Little
Tennessee rises in the mountains east and flows west to the junction. The
railroad crosses the main river at Loudon, thirty miles from Knoxville,
and runs about parallel to the Holston River, and near its west bank.
West of the railroad and parallel is a broken spur of the Clinch Mountain
range, with occasional gaps or passes for vehicles, and some other blind
wagon-roads and cattle-trails. West of this spur, and near its base, is
the main wagon-road to Knoxville, as far as Campbell Station, about
seventeen miles, where it joins the Kingston road, passes a gap, and
unites with the wagon-road that runs with the railroad east of the
mountain spur at Campbell Station. South of this gap, about eleven miles,
is another pass at Lenoir's Mill, and three miles south of that another
pass, not used.

A detail of sharp-shooters under Captain Foster, of Jenkins's brigade,
manned the first boats and made a successful lodging, after an exchange of
a few shots with the enemy's picket-guard on the north bank. They intended
to surprise and capture the picket and thus secure quick and quiet
passage, but in that they were not successful. The north bank was secured,
however, without loss, and troops were passed rapidly over to hold it,
putting out a good skirmish line in advance of the bridge-head. As we
advanced towards Loudon, the part of General White's Union division that
had been on the opposite bank of the river was withdrawn to Lenoir's

During the 13th and 14th the command was engaged in making substantial
fastenings for the bridge and constructing its defences. General Vaughn's
regiments and a battery of Major Leydon's (with broken-down horses) were
assigned to guard the bridge.

On the afternoon of the 14th the enemy appeared on our front in strong
force, drove our skirmish line back, and seemed prepared to give battle.
As we were then waiting the return of our foraging wagons, we could only
prepare to receive him. Some of the provisions looked for came in during
the night, and we advanced on the 15th, finding that the enemy had
retired. The force that came back to meet us on the 15th was part of
White's division (Chapin's brigade) sent by General Burnside, and General
Potter, commanding the Ninth Corps, sent General Ferrero with his
division. The move was intended probably to delay our march. It was
Chapin's brigade that made the advance against our skirmishers, and it
probably suffered some in the affair. We lost not a single man.

General Wheeler crossed the Little Tennessee River at Motley's Ford at
nightfall on the 13th, and marched to cut off the force at Marysville. He
came upon the command, only one regiment, the Eleventh Kentucky Cavalry,
that was advised in time to prepare for him. He attacked as soon as they
came under fire, dispersed them into small parties that made good their
escape, except one hundred and fifty taken by Dibbrell's brigade. Colonel
Wolford brought up the balance of his brigade and made strong efforts to
support his broken regiment, but was eventually forced back, and was
followed by the Eighth, and Eleventh Texas and Third Arkansas Cavalry and
General John T. Morgan's brigade. The next day he encountered Sanders's
division of cavalry and a battery, and, after a clean cavalry engagement
of skilful manoeuvres on both sides, succeeded in reaching the vicinity of
the city of Knoxville, but found it too well guarded to admit of any very
advantageous work.

On the 15th our advance was cautiously made by Hood's division and
Alexander's artillery leading; McLaws's division and Leydon's artillery
following. All along the route of the railroad the valley between the
mountain and the river is so narrow and rough that a few thousand men can
find many points at which they can make successful stands against great
odds. Our course was taken to turn all of those points by marching up the
road on the west side of the mountain. A few miles out from our bridge we
encountered a skirmishing party near the lower gap of the mountain, which,
when pressed back, passed through the gap. General Jenkins continued his
march--leaving a guard at the gap till it could be relieved by General
McLaws--to Lenoir's Station.

The enemy was looking for us to follow through the lower gaps and attack
his strong front, and was a little surprised to find us close on his right
flank. He was well guarded there, however, against precipitate battle by
the mountain range and narrow pass and the heavy, muddy roads through
which our men and animals had to pull. Arrangements were made for a good
day's work from early morning.

Our guide promised to lead part of our men through a blind route during
the night by which we could cut off the enemy's retreat, so that they
would be securely hemmed in. Generals Jenkins and McLaws came up during
the night. The former was ordered to advance part of his command to
eligible points at midnight and hold them ready for use at daylight. The
guide was sent with a brigade to the point which was to intercept the
enemy's retreat. McLaws was held on the road, ready for use east or west
of the ridge. Jenkins was ordered to have parties out during the night to
watch that the enemy did not move, and report. As no report came from
them, all things were thought to be properly adjusted, when we advanced
before daylight. In feeling our way through the weird gray of the morning,
stumps seen on the roadside were taken to be sharp-shooters, but we were
surprised that no one shot at us, when, behold! before it was yet quite
light, we came upon a park of eighty wagons, well loaded with food, camp
equipage, and ammunition, with the ground well strewn with spades, picks,
and axes.[188] The animals had been taken from the wagons to double their
teams through the mud. General Potter had sent the division under General
Hartranft back to the Campbell Station Pass to occupy the junction of his
line of retreat with the Kingston road and the road upon which we were
marching, and was well on the march with the balance of the Ninth Corps,
Ferrero's division and his cavalry, before we knew that there was an
opening by which he could escape.

Our guide, who promised to post the brigade so as to command the road in
rear of the enemy, so far missed his route as to lead the brigade out of
hearing of the enemy's march during the night.

Hart's cavalry brigade that was left in observation near Kingston had been
called up, and with McLaws's division advanced on the roads to Campbell
Station, while General Jenkins followed the direct line of retreat on
double time, and right royally did his skirmishers move. He brought the
rear to an occasional stand, but only leaving enough to require him to
form line for advance, when the enemy again sped away on their rearward
march at double time. General Jenkins made the march before noon, but the
enemy had passed the gap and the junction of the roads, and was well
posted in battle array in rear of them. General McLaws was not up. He was
not ordered on double time, as it was thought to first bring the enemy to
bay on the east road, when some of his infantry could be called over the
mountain on the enemy's flank. General Ferrero, who covered the retreat,
reported that it was necessary to attach from sixteen to twenty animals to
a piece to make the haul through the mud.

The retreat was very cleverly conducted, and was in time to cover the
roads into Campbell's Station, forming into line of battle to meet us.
Jenkins's division, being in advance, was deployed on the right with
Alexander's battalion. As soon as the line was organized the batteries
opened practice in deliberate, well-timed combat, but General Alexander
had the sympathy of his audience. His shells often exploded before they
reached the game, and at times as they passed from the muzzles of his
guns, and no remedy could be applied that improved their fire.

As General McLaws came up his division was put upon our left with the
other batteries, and Hart's brigade of cavalry was assigned in that part
to observe the enemy's, farther off. It was not yet past meridian. We had
ample time to make a battle with confident hope of success, by direct
advance and the pressing in on the enemy's right by McLaws's left, but our
severe travel and labor after leaving Virginia were not to find an
opportunity to make a simply successful battle. As the rear of the enemy
was open and could be covered, success would have been a simple victory,
and the enemy could have escaped to his trenches at Knoxville, leaving us
crippled and delayed: whereas as he stood he was ours. How we failed to
make good our claim we shall presently see.

McLaws was ordered to use one of his brigades well out on his left as a
diversion threatening the enemy's right, and to use Hart's cavalry for the
same purpose, while General Jenkins was ordered to send two of his
brigades through a well-covered way off our right to march out well past
the enemy's left and strike down against that flank and rear. General Law,
being his officer next in rank, was ordered in charge of his own and
Anderson's brigades. General Jenkins rode with the command, and put it in
such position that the left of this line would strike the left of the
enemy's, thus throwing the weight of the two brigades past the enemy's
rear. I rode near the brigades, to see that there could be no mismove or
misconception of orders. After adjusting the line of the brigades, and
giving their march the points of direction, General Jenkins rode to his
brigades on the front to handle them in direct attack. I remained near
the front of the flanking brigades for complete assurance of the
adjustment of their march, and waited until they were so near that it was
necessary to ride at speed, close under the enemy's line, to reach our
main front, to time its advance with the flanking move. The ride was made
alone, as less likely to draw the enemy's fire, the staff riding around.

As I approached the front, the men sprang forward without orders to open
the charge, but were called to await the appearance of the flanking move
of our right. But General Law had so changed direction as to bring his
entire force in front instead of in the rear of the enemy's left. This
gave him opportunity to change position to strong ground in rear, which
made other movements necessary in view of the objective of the battle.
There was yet time for successful battle, but it would have been a
fruitless victory. Before other combinations suited to our purpose could
be made it was night, and the enemy was away on his march to the fortified
grounds about Knoxville.

The demonstration of our left under General McLaws was successful in
drawing the enemy's attention, and in causing him to change front of part
of his command to meet the threatening.

In his official account General Jenkins reported,--

    "In a few minutes, greatly to my surprise, I received a message from
    General Law that in advancing his brigades he had obliqued so much to
    the left as to have gotten out of its line of attack. This careless
    and inexcusable movement lost us the few moments in which success from
    this point could be attained."[189]

Apropos of this the following memorandum of a staff-officer is interesting
and informative:

    "I know at the time it was currently reported that General Law said he
    might have made the attack successfully, but that Jenkins would have
    reaped the credit of it, and hence he delayed until the enemy got out
    of the way."

This has been called a battle, by the other side, but it was only an
artillery combat, little, very little, musket ammunition being burnt. The
next day the enemy was safely behind his works about Knoxville, except his
cavalry under General Sanders and his horse artillery left to delay our
march. McLaws's division reached the suburbs of the city a little after
noon, and was deployed from near the mouth of Third Creek as his right,
the enemy holding a line of dismounted cavalry skirmishers about a
thousand yards in advance of his line of works. Alexander's artillery was
disposed near McLaws's deployment. Jenkins got up before night and was
ordered to deploy on McLaws's left as far as the Tazewell road, preceded
by Hart's cavalry, which was to extend the line north to the Holston
River. General Wheeler came up later and was assigned to line with Colonel

The city stands on the right bank of the Holston River, on a plateau about
one and a half miles in width and extending some miles down south. At
Knoxville the plateau is one hundred and twenty feet above the river, and
there are little streams called First, Second, and Third Creeks, from the
upper to the lower suburbs of the city,--First Creek between the city and
East Knoxville, or Temperance Hill; Second Creek between the city and
College Hill; Third Creek below and outside the enemy's lines of defence.
The plateau slopes down to the valley through which the railway passes,
and west of the valley it rises to the usual elevation. The Confederates
were posted on the second plateau, with their batteries of position. The
line of the enemy's works, starting at its lower point on the west bank of
the river, was just above the mouth of Second Creek, lying at right
angles to the river. It ran to a fort constructed by the Confederates,
when occupied by them years before, called Fort Loudon, above the Kingston
road, and about a thousand yards in front of the college. East from that
point it was about parallel with the river, reaching to Temperance Hill,
to Mabry's Hill, and to the Holston, below the glass-works. An interior
line extended from Temperance Hill to Flint Hill on the east, and another
on the west, between the outer line and Second Creek. Dams were built
across First and Second Creeks, flooding and forming formidable wet
ditches over extensive parts of the line. Abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and
wire entanglements were placed where thought to be advantageous for the

The heights on the northeast across the river are much more elevated than
the plateaux of the city side, and command all points of the west bank.
These were defended at some points by earthworks well manned. From the
lower point of the enemy's line the Confederates extended to his right at
the river, conforming to his defensive lines. The part of our line
occupied by the cavalry was a mere watch-guard.

Our move was hurried, and our transportation so limited that we had only a
few tools in the hands of small pioneer parties, and our wagons were so
engaged in collecting daily rations that we found it necessary to send our
cavalry down to Lenoir's for the tools captured there for use in making
rifle-pits for our sharp-shooters.

When General Burnside rode to the front to meet us at Lenoir's he left
General Parke in command at Knoxville, and he and Captain Poe, of the
engineers, gave attention to his partially-constructed works.

Upon laying our lines about Knoxville, the enemy's forces in the northeast
of his department were withdrawn towards Cumberland Gap, but we had no
information of the troops ordered to meet us from Southwest Virginia.



    Closing on the Enemy's Lines--A Gallant Dash--The Federal
    Positions--Fort Loudon, later called Fort Sanders--Assault of the Fort
    carefully planned--General McLaws advises Delay--The Order reiterated
    and emphasized--Gallant Effort by the Brigades of Generals Wofford,
    Humphreys, and Bryan at the Appointed Time--A Recall ordered, because
    carrying the Works was reported impossible--General Longstreet is
    ordered by the President to General Bragg's Relief--Losses during the
    Assault and the Campaign.

The enemy's line of sharp-shooters and Fort Sanders stood in our direct
line of advance,--the fort manned by the heaviest and best field guns.
Benjamin's battery, an old familiar acquaintance who had given us many
hard knocks in our Eastern service, opened upon us as soon as we were in
its reach. It was not until night of the 17th that our line was well
established, and then only so as to enclose the enemy's front, leaving the
country across the river to be covered when the troops from Virginia
should join us.

When General McLaws advanced on the morning of the 18th he found the
enemy's line of skirmishers--cavalry dismounted--behind a line of heavy
rail defences. General Alexander was ordered to knock the rails about them
and drive them out, and was partially successful, but the enemy got back
before our infantry could reach them, so we had to carry the line by
assault. Part of our line drove up in fine style, and was measurably
successful, but other parts, smarting under the stiff musket fire,
hesitated and lay down under such slight shelter as they could find, but
close under fire,--so close that to remain inactive would endanger
repulse. Captain Winthrop, of Alexander's staff, appreciating the crisis,
dashed forward on his horse and led the halting lines successfully over
the works. In his gallant ride he received a very severe hurt. Neither
our numbers nor our condition were such as to warrant further aggressive
action at the moment, nor, in fact, until the column from Virginia joined
us. Our sharp-shooters were advanced from night to night and pitted before
daylight, each line being held by new forces as the advance was made. The
first line occupied was a little inside of the rail piles.

It seemed probable, upon first examination of the line along the
northwest, that we might break through, and preparations were made for
that effort, but, upon closer investigation, it was found to be too
hazardous, and that the better plan was to await the approach of the other

When within six hundred yards of the enemy's works, our lines well pitted,
it seemed safe to establish a battery on an elevated plateau on the east
(or south) side of the river. Some of our troops were sent over in
flat-boats, and the reconnoissance revealed an excellent point commanding
the city and the enemy's lines of works, though parts of his lines were
beyond our range. Some of our best guns were put in position, and our
captured pontoon bridges down at Lenoir's were sent for, to be hauled up
along the river, but impassable rapids were found, and we were obliged to
take part of our supply-train to haul them. They were brought up, and
communication between the detachment and main force was made easy. The
brigades of Law and Robertson were left on the east (or south) side as
guard for that battery.

The Union forces were posted from left to right,--the Ninth Corps, General
R. D. Potter commanding. General Ferrero's division extended from the
river to Second Creek; General Hartranft's along part of the line between
Second and First Creeks; Chapin's and Reilly's brigades over Temperance
Hill to near Bell's house, and the brigades of Hoskins and Casement to the
river. The interior line was held by regiments of loyal Tennesseeans
recently recruited. The positions on the south (or east) side of the river
were occupied by Cameron's brigade of Hascall's division and Shackelford's
cavalry (dismounted), Reilly's brigade in reserve,--two sections of
Wilder's battery and Konkle's battery of four three-inch rifle guns.


The batteries of the enemy's front before the city were Romer's four
three-inch rifles at the university, Benjamin's four twenty-pound Parrotts
and Beecher's six twelve-pound Napoleons (at the fort), Gittings's four
ten-pound Parrotts, Fifteenth Indiana Battery of six rifle guns
(three-inch), James's (Indiana) Battery of six rifle guns, Henshaw's
battery of two (James's) rifle guns and four six-pounders, Shields's
battery of six twelve-pound Napoleons, and one section of Wilder's
three-inch rifle guns, extending the line from the fort to the river on
the north.

In his official account, General Burnside reported "about twelve thousand
effective men, exclusive of the recruits and loyal Tennesseeans." He had
fifty-one guns of position, including eight on the southeast side.

Fort Loudon, afterwards called for the gallant Sanders, who fell defending
it, was a bastion earthwork, built upon an irregular quadrilateral. The
sides were, south front, one hundred and fourteen yards; west front,
ninety-five yards; north front, one hundred and twenty-five yards; east
front, eighty-five yards. The eastern front was open, intended to be
closed by a stockade. The south front was about half finished; the western
front finished, except cutting the embrasures, and the north front nearly
finished. The bastion attacked was the only one that was finished. The
ditch was twelve feet wide, and generally seven to eight feet deep. From
the fort the ground sloped in a heavy grade, from which the trees had been
cut and used as abatis, and wire net-work was stretched between the

General Burnside reported,--

    "Many citizens and persons who had been driven in by the enemy
    volunteered to work on the trenches and did good service, while those
    who were not inclined from disloyalty to volunteer were pressed into
    service. The negroes were particularly efficient in their labors
    during the siege. On the 20th of November our line was in such
    condition as to inspire the entire command with confidence."

General Poe reported,--

    "The citizens of the town and all contrabands within reach were
    pressed into service and relieved the almost exhausted soldiers, who
    had no rest for more than a hundred hours. Many of the citizens were
    Confederates and worked with a very poor grace, which blistered hands
    did not tend to improve."

On the 22d, General McLaws thought his advance near enough the works to
warrant assault. He was ordered to it with assaulting columns supported by
the division. General Jenkins was also ordered up, and General Wheeler was
ordered to push his troops and his horse artillery forward as McLaws's
attack opened, so that the entire line would engage and hold to steady
work till all the works were carried. After consulting his officers,
General McLaws reported that they preferred to have daylight for their
work. On the 23d reports came of a large force of the enemy at Kingston
advancing. General Wheeler was sent with his main force of cavalry to look
after them. He engaged the enemy on the 24th, and after a skirmish
withdrew. Soon afterwards, receiving orders from General Bragg to join
him, leaving his cavalry under command of Major-General Martin, he rode to
find his commander. General Martin brought the brigades back and resumed
position on our left. Colonel Hart, who was left at Kingston with his
brigade, reported that there were but three regiments of cavalry and a
field battery, that engaged General Wheeler on the 24th.

On the night of the 24th the enemy made a sortie against a point of
General Wofford's line which broke through, but was speedily driven back
with a loss of some prisoners and a number of killed and wounded. General
Wofford's loss was five wounded, two mortally.

Our cavalry, except a brigade left at Kingston, resumed its position on
the left of our line on the 26th. On the 23d a telegram came from General
Bragg to say that the enemy had moved out and attacked his troops at
Chattanooga. Later in the day he announced the enemy still in front of
him, but not engaging his forces.

On the 25th I had a telegram from General Bushrod R. Johnson at Loudon,
who was marching with two brigades to reinforce us, saying that the enemy
was throwing his cavalry forward towards Charleston. This, in connection
with the advance of the enemy towards General Bragg, reported by his
despatch of the 23d, I took to be an effort to prevent reinforcements
coming to us, or to cut in and delay their march.

That night General Leadbetter, chief engineer of General Bragg's army,
reported at head-quarters with orders from General Bragg that we should
attack at Knoxville, and very promptly. I asked him to make the
reconnoissance and designate the assailable points. At the same time he
was asked to consider that the troops from Virginia were on the march and
would join us in eight or ten days, when our investment could be made
complete; that the enemy was then on half rations, and would be obliged to
surrender in two weeks; also whether we should assault fortifications and
have the chance of repulse, rather than wait for a surrender. From his
first reconnoissance he pronounced Fort Sanders the assailable point, but,
after riding around the lines with General Jenkins and General Alexander,
he pronounced in favor of assault from our left at Mabry's Hill. On the
27th, after more thorough reconnoissance in company with my officers, he
came back to his conclusion in favor of assault at Fort Sanders. I agreed
with him that the field at Mabry's Hill was too wide, and the march under
fire too long, to warrant attack at that point. He admitted that the true
policy was to wait and reduce the place by complete investment, but
claimed that the crisis was on, the time imperative, and that the assault
must be tried.

Meanwhile, rumors reached us, through the telegraph operator, of a battle
at Chattanooga, but nothing official, though outside indications were
corroborative. In the afternoon Colonel Giltner, of the command from
Virginia, reported with his cavalry, and next day (28th) General W. E.
Jones, of that command, reported with his cavalry. The brigades from
Chattanooga under General B. R. Johnson were at hand, but not yet up. The
artillery and infantry coming from Virginia were five or six days' march
from us; but General Leadbetter was impatient.

General McLaws was ordered to double his force of sharp-shooters and their
reserve, advance during the night and occupy the line of the enemy's
pickets, and arrange for assault. The artillery was to open on the fort as
soon as the weather cleared the view. After ten minutes' practice the
assaulting column was to march, but the practice was to hold until the
near approach of the storming party to the Fort. The assault was to be
made by three of McLaws's brigades, his fourth, advancing on his right, to
carry the line of works in its front as soon as the fort was taken. Three
brigades of Jenkins's division were to follow in echelon on the left of
McLaws's column, G. T. Anderson's, of his right, leading at two hundred
yards' interval from McLaws's, Anderson to assault the line in his front,
and upon entering to wheel to his left and sweep up that line, followed by
Jenkins's and Benning's brigades; but, in case of delay in McLaws's
assault, Anderson was to wheel to his right and take the fort through its
rear opening, leaving the brigades of Jenkins and Benning to follow the
other move to their left.

The ditch and parapets about the fort were objects of careful observation
from the moment of placing our lines, and opinions coincided with those of
reconnoitring officers that the former could be passed without ladders.
General Alexander and I made frequent examinations of them within four
hundred yards.

After careful conference, General McLaws ordered,--

    "_First._ Wofford's Georgia and Humphreys's Mississippi brigades to
    make the assault, the first on the left, the second on the right, this
    latter followed closely by three regiments of Bryan's brigade; the
    Sixteenth Georgia Regiment to lead the first and the Thirteenth
    Mississippi the second assaulting column.

    "_Second._ The brigades to be formed for the attack in columns of

    "_Third._ The assault to be made with fixed bayonets, and without
    firing a gun.

    "_Fourth._ Should be made against the northwest angle of Fort Loudon
    or Sanders.

    "_Fifth._ The men should be urged to the work with a determination to
    succeed, and should rush to it without hallooing.

    "_Sixth._ The sharp-shooters to keep up a continuous fire into the
    embrasures of the enemy's works and along the fort, so as to prevent
    the use of the cannon, and distract, if not prevent, the fire of all

General B. R. Johnson was in time to follow the main attack by General
McLaws with his own and Gracie's brigades (two thousand six hundred and
twenty-five effectives).

The order was given for the 28th, but the weather became so heavy and
murky as to hide the fort from view of our artillery, so operations were
put off until the 29th.

On the 28th reports were brought of an advance of Union troops from the
direction of Cumberland Gap. The cavalry under General W. E. Jones was
sent to arrest their march pending operations ordered for the 29th, and
he was authorized to call the artillery and infantry marching from
Virginia to his assistance if the force proved formidable.

After arranging his command, General McLaws wrote me as follows:

        "November 28, 1863.

    "GENERAL,--It seems to be a conceded fact that there has been a
    serious engagement between General Bragg's forces and those of the
    enemy; with what result is not known so far as I have heard. General
    Bragg may have maintained his position, may have repulsed the enemy,
    or may have been driven back. If the enemy has been beaten at
    Chattanooga, do we not gain by delay at this point? If we have been
    defeated at Chattanooga, do we not risk our entire force by an assault
    here? If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, our communications must
    be made with Virginia. We cannot combine again with General Bragg,
    even if we should be successful in our assault on Knoxville. If we
    should be defeated or unsuccessful here, and at the same time General
    Bragg should have been forced to retire, would we be in condition to
    force our way to the army in Virginia? I present these considerations,
    and with the force they have on my mind I beg leave to say that I
    think we had better delay the assault until we hear the result of the
    battle of Chattanooga. The enemy may have cut our communication to
    prevent this army reinforcing General Bragg, as well as for the
    opposite reason,--viz., to prevent General Bragg from reinforcing us,
    and the attack at Chattanooga favors the first proposition.[190]

          "Very respectfully,
            "L. MCLAWS,

In reply I wrote,--

    "HEAD-QUARTERS, November 28, 1863.


    "GENERAL,--Your letter is received. I am not at all confident that
    General Bragg has had a serious battle at Chattanooga, but there is a
    report that he has, and that he has fallen back to Tunnel Hill. Under
    this report I am entirely convinced that our only safety is in making
    the assault upon the enemy's position to-morrow at daylight, and it is
    the more important that I should have the entire support and
    co-operation of the officers in this connection; and I do hope and
    trust that I may have your entire support and all the force you may be
    possessed of in the execution of my views. It is a great mistake to
    suppose that there is any safety for us in going to Virginia if
    General Bragg has been defeated, for we leave him at the mercy of his
    victors, and with his army destroyed our own had better be, for we
    will be not only destroyed, but disgraced. There is neither safety nor
    honor in any other course than the one I have chosen and ordered.

          "Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
            "JAMES LONGSTREET,
              "_Lieutenant-General Commanding_.

    "P.S.--The assault must be made at the time appointed, and must be
    made with a determination which will insure success."

After writing the letter it occurred to me to show it to General
Leadbetter, who was stopping at our head-quarters, when he suggested the
postscript which was added.

The assault was made by the brigades of Generals Wofford, Humphreys, and
Bryan at the appointed time and in admirable style. The orders were, that
not a musket should be discharged except by the sharp-shooters, who should
be vigilant and pick off every head that might appear above the parapets
until the fort was carried. The troops marched steadily and formed
regularly along the outside of the works around the ditch. I rode after
them with the brigades under General B. R. Johnson until within five
hundred yards of the fort, whence we could see our advance through the
gray of the morning. A few men were coming back wounded. Major Goggin, of
General McLaws's staff, who had been at the fort, rode back, met me, and
reported that it would be useless for us to go on; that the enemy had so
surrounded the fort with net-work of wire that it was impossible for the
men to get in without axes, and that there was not an axe in the command.
Without a second thought I ordered the recall, and ordered General Johnson
to march his brigades back to their camps. He begged to be allowed to go
on, but, giving full faith to the report, I forbade him. I had known
Major Goggin many years. He was a classmate at West Point, and had served
with us in the field in practical experience, so that I had confidence in
his judgment.

Recall was promptly sent General Jenkins and his advance brigade under
General Anderson, but the latter, seeing the delay at the fort, changed
his direction outside the enemy's works and marched along their front to
the ditch, and was there some little time before he received the order. In
his march and countermarch in front of the enemy's line he lost four
killed and thirty-three wounded.

As a diversion in favor of the assaulting columns, our troops on the south
side were ordered to a simultaneous attack, and to get in on that side if
the opportunity occurred. They were reinforced by Russell's brigade of
Morgan's division of cavalry, and Harrison's brigade of Armstrong's
division, dismounted, General Morgan commanding. This demonstration had
the effect anticipated in detaining troops to hold on that side that were
intended as reserve for the fort.

Just after the troops were ordered back it occurred to me that there must
be some mistake about the wire net-work, for some of our men had been seen
mounting and passing over the parapets, but it was too late to reorganize
and renew the attack, and I conceived that some of the regimental pioneers
should have been at hand prepared to cut the wires, but all had been armed
to help swell our ranks.

Since reading the accounts of General Poe, the engineer in charge of the
works, I am convinced that the wires were far from being the serious
obstacle reported, and that we could have gone in without the use of axes;
and from other accounts it appears that most of the troops had retired
from the fort, leaving about a hundred and fifty infantry with
Benjamin's battery. Our muskets from the outside of the parapet could have
kept the infantry down, and the artillery practice, except the few
hand-grenades, prepared at the time by the artillerists. Johnson's
brigades would have been at the ditch with me in ten minutes, when we
would have passed over the works. Hence it seems conclusive that the
failure was due to the order of recall. It is not a part of my nature to
listen to reports that always come when stunning blows are felt, but
confidence in the conduct of the war was broken, and with it the tone and
spirit for battle further impaired by the efforts of those in authority to
damage, if not prevent, the success of work ordered in their own vital
interest: a poor excuse for want of golden equipoise in one who presumes
to hold the lives of his soldiers, but better than to look for ways to
shift the responsibility of a wavering spirit that sometimes comes


After the repulse, General Burnside was so considerate as to offer a "flag
of truce" for time to remove our killed and wounded about his lines.

About half an hour after the repulse, and while yet on the slope leading
up to the fort, Major Branch, of Major-General Ransom's staff, came with a
telegram from the President informing me that General Bragg had been
forced back by superior numbers, and ordering me to proceed to co-operate
with his army.

Orders were issued at once for our trains to move south, and preparations
were begun for a move of the troops after nightfall. In the afternoon word
came from General Wheeler, authorized by General Bragg, that I should join
him, if practicable, at Ringgold. But our first step was to be relieved of
the threatening from the direction of Cumberland Gap. General Martin was
sent to reinforce General Jones, with orders to hurry his operations, and
return in time to cover anticipated movements. His brigades which had done
their clever work on the south side were withdrawn to go with him. When
he came up with Jones, the latter was severely engaged, but it was then
night, too late for other operations.

Their arrangements were made during the night and battle renewed at early
dawn and severely contested, the Union troops giving from point to point
until they crossed the ford at Walker's and were beyond further
threatening. They lost some fifty killed and wounded and one company
captured at Colonel Graham's camp.

Generals Martin and Jones joined us in good season after their affair of
the morning. Their loss was slight, but not detailed in separate reports.

  Confederate loss in the assault                822
  Union loss in the assault                      673
  Confederate losses during the campaign        1296
  Union losses during the campaign              1481



    Impracticability of joining General Bragg--Wintering in East
    Tennessee--General Longstreet given Discretionary Authority over the
    Department by President Davis--Short Rations--Minor Movements of
    Hide-and-Seek in the Mountains--Longstreet's Position was of Strategic
    Importance--That Fact fully appreciated by President Lincoln,
    Secretary Stanton, and Generals Halleck and Grant--"Drive Longstreet
    out of East Tennessee and keep him out"--Generals Robertson and
    McLaws--The Charges against them and Action taken--Honorable Mention
    for Courage and Endurance--The Army finally fares sumptuously on the
    Fat Lands of the French Broad.

As General Wheeler's note indicated doubt of the feasibility of the move
towards General Bragg, it occurred to me that our better course was to
hold our lines about Knoxville, and in that way cause General Grant to
send to its relief, and thus so reduce his force as to stop, for a time,
pursuit of General Bragg.

Under this impression, I ordered our trains back, and continued to hold
our lines. The superior officers were called together and advised of
affairs, and asked for suggestions. The impression seemed to be that it
would not be prudent to undertake to join General Bragg. At the same time
reports came from him to inform me that he had retired as far as Dalton,
and that I must depend upon my own resources.

We were cut off from communication with the army at Dalton, except by an
impracticable mountain route, and the railway to the north was broken up
by the removal of bridges and rails for a distance of a hundred miles and

Deciding to remain at Knoxville, I called on General Ransom to join us
with his main force, to aid in reinvesting it, or to hold it while we
could march against a succoring force if the numbers should warrant. On
the 1st of December, Colonel Giltner, commanding one of General Ransom's
cavalry brigades, reported that he had orders to join General Ransom with
his brigade. On the same day a courier going from General Grant to General
Burnside was captured, bearing an autograph letter for the latter, stating
that three columns were advancing for his relief,--one by the south side
under General Sherman, one by Decherd under General Elliott, the third by
Cumberland Gap under General Foster.

When General Leadbetter left us on the 29th of November, he was asked to
look after affairs at Loudon, and to order General Vaughn to destroy such
property as he could not haul off, and retire through the mountains to
General Bragg's army. Finding that General Vaughn had not been moved, he
was ordered on the 1st of December to cross the river to our side with
everything that he could move, and to be ready to destroy property that he
must leave, and march to join us as soon as the pressure from General
Sherman's force became serious. At the same time an order came from
General Bragg that his cavalry be ordered back to his army. As I had
relieved the pressure against him in his critical emergency, and affairs
were getting a little complicated about my position, I felt warranted in
retaining the cavalry for the time.

Reports coming at the same time of reinforcements for the enemy at
Kingston, pressing towards General Vaughn at Loudon, he was ordered to
join us. As he had no horses for the battery, he tumbled it from the
bridge into the middle of the Tennessee River, burned the bridge, and

Under the circumstances there seemed but one move left for us,--to march
around Knoxville to the north side, up the Holston, and try to find the
column reported to be marching down from Cumberland Gap, the mountain
ranges and valleys of that part of the State offering beautiful fields
for the manoeuvre of small armies. The order was issued December 2. Trains
were put in motion on the 3d, and ordered up the railroad route under
escort of Law's and Robertson's brigades and one of Alexander's batteries.
On the night of the 4th the troops were marched from the southwest to the
north side of the city, and took up the march along the west bank of the
Holston. General Martin, with his own and General W. E. Jones's cavalry,
was left to guard the rear of our march and pick up weak men or
stragglers. He was ordered to cross part of his cavalry to the east bank
at Strawberry Plains and march up on that side, and General W. E. Jones to
follow on our rear with his and the balance of Martin's corps. As we were
not disturbed, we reached Blain's Cross-roads on the afternoon of the 5th,
where we met General Ransom with his infantry and the balance of his
artillery. On the 6th we marched to Rutledge, halting two days to get food
and look for the succoring column by Cumberland Gap, which failed to
appear. However, it was time for us to be looking for better fields of
food for men and animals, who had not had comfortable rations for weeks.
It seemed, too, that General Bragg's call for his cavalry could not be
longer left in abeyance. To get away from convenient march of the enemy we
went up the river as far as Rogersville, where we might hope to forage
under reduced cavalry force. We marched on the 8th, ordering our cavalry,
except Giltner's brigade, across the Holston near Bean's Station, General
Ransom's command to cover our march, General Bragg's cavalry to go by an
eastern route through the mountains to Georgia. We halted at Rogersville
on the 9th, where we were encouraged to hope for full rations for a few
days, at least; but to be sure of accumulating a few days' extra supply
(the mills being only able to grind a full day's rations for us), every
man and animal was put on short rations until we could get as much as
three days' supply on hand.

On the 7th of December the Union army, under Major-General John G. Parke,
took the field along the rear of our march, and reached Rutledge on the
9th, the enemy's cavalry advancing as far as Bean's Station. The object
was supposed to be the securing of the forage and subsistence stores of
the country; but of these movements we were not fully advised until the
11th. On the 10th of December, General Morgan's brigade of cavalry was
attacked at Russellville while engaged in foraging, but got force enough,
and in time, to drive the enemy away.

On the 10th a telegram from the President gave me discretionary authority
over the movements of the troops of the department, and I ordered the
recall of General Martin, and put his command between us and the enemy. On
the 12th we had information that General Sherman had taken up his march
for return to General Grant's army with the greater part of his troops. At
the same time we had information of the force that had followed our march
as far as Rutledge and Blain's Cross-roads, under General Parke, who had
posted a large part of the force of artillery, cavalry, and infantry at
Bean's Station, a point between the Clinch Mountain and the Holston River.
The mountain there is very rugged, and was reported to be inaccessible,
except at very rough passes. The valley between it and the river is about
two miles wide, at some places less.

I thought to cut off the advance force at Bean's Station by putting our
main cavalry force east of the river, the other part west of the mountain
(except Giltner's), so as to close the mountain pass on the west, and bar
the enemy's retreat by my cavalry in his rear,--which was to cross the
Holston behind him,--then by marching the main column down the valley to
capture this advance part of the command. My column, though complaining a
little of short rations and very muddy roads, made its march in good
season. So also did Jones on the west of the mountain, and Martin on the
other side of the Holston; but the latter encountered a brigade at May's
Ford, which delayed him and gave time for the enemy to change to a
position some four miles to his rear.

As we approached the position in front of the Gap, Giltner's cavalry in
advance, General B. R. Johnson met and engaged the enemy in a severe
fight, but forced him back steadily. As we were looking for large capture
more than fight, delay was unfortunate. I called Kershaw's brigade up to
force contention till we could close the west end of the Gap. The
movements were nicely executed by Johnson and Kershaw, but General Martin
had not succeeded in gaining his position, so the rear was not closed, and
the enemy retired. At night I thought the army was in position to get the
benefit of the small force cut off at the Gap, as some reward for our very
hard work. We received reports from General Jones, west of the mountain,
that he was in position at his end of the Gap, and had captured several
wagon-loads of good things. As his orders included the capture of the
train, he had failed of full comprehension of them, and after nightfall
had withdrawn to comfortable watering-places to enjoy his large catch of
sugar and coffee, and other things seldom seen in Confederate camps in
those days. Thus the troops at the Gap got out during the night, some
running over the huge rocks and heavy wood tangles along the crest, by
torch-light, to their comrades, some going west by easier ways. So when I
sent up in the morning, looking for their doleful surrender, my men found
only empty camp-kettles, mess-pans, tents, and a few abandoned guns, and
twelve prisoners, while the Yankees were, no doubt, sitting around their
camp-fires enjoying the joke with the comrades they had rejoined.

During our march and wait at Rogersville, General Foster passed down to
Knoxville by a more southern route and relieved General Burnside of
command of the department on the 12th.

General Jenkins was ordered to follow down the valley to the new position
of the enemy. His brigades under Generals Law and Robertson had been
detached guarding trains. General Law, commanding them, had been ordered
to report to the division commander on the 13th, but at night of the 14th
he was eight miles behind. Orders were sent him to join the division at
the earliest practicable moment on the 15th. He reported to the division
commander between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. If he started at
the hour he should have marched, six A.M. at the latest, he was about
eight hours making as many miles.

Meanwhile, the enemy had been reinforced by a considerable body of
infantry, and later it appeared that he was advancing to offer battle.
General McLaws was ordered to reinforce our front by a brigade. He sent
word that his men had not yet received their bread rations. He sent
Kershaw's brigade, however, that had captured rations the day before, but
then it was night, and the appearance of General Martin's cavalry on or
near the enemy's flank caused a change of his plans. During the night he
retreated, and we occupied his trenches. I could have precipitated an
affair of some moment, both at this point and at Bean's Station Gap, but
my purpose was, when I fought, to fight for all that was on the field. The
time was then for full and glorious victory; a fruitless one we did not

The enemy retired to Blain's Cross-roads, where General Foster, after
reinforcing by the Fourth Corps, decided to accept battle. He reported his
force as twenty-six thousand, and credited the Confederates with equal
numbers, but twenty thousand would have been an overestimate for us. He
assigned the true cause of our failure to follow up and find him:

    "General Longstreet, however, did not attack, in consequence,
    probably, of the very inclement weather, which then set in with such
    severity as to paralyze for a time the efforts of both armies."

And now the weather grew very heavy, and the roads, already bad, became
soft and impracticable for trains and artillery. The men were brave,
steady, patient. Occasionally they called pretty loudly for _parched
corn_, but always in a bright, merry mood. There was never a time when we
did not have enough of corn, and plenty of wood with which to keep us warm
and parch our corn. At this distance it seems almost incredible that we
got along as we did, but all were then so healthy and strong that we did
not feel severely our really great hardships. Our serious trouble was in
the matter of clothing and shoes. As winter had broken upon us in good
earnest, it seemed necessary for us to give up the game of war for the
time, seek some good place for shelter, and repair railroads and bridges,
to open our way back towards Richmond.

General Bragg had been relieved from command of the army at Dalton by
Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee, who declined, however, the part of
permanent commander, to which, after a time, General Joseph E. Johnston
was assigned.

On his return from Knoxville, General Sherman proposed to General Grant to
strike at General Hardee and gain Rome and the line of the Oostenaula. He

    "Of course we must fight if Hardee gives us battle, but he will not.
    Longstreet is off and cannot do harm for a month. Lee, in Virginia, is
    occupied, and Hardee is alone."

But General Halleck was much concerned about the Confederate army in East
Tennessee, the only strategic field then held by Southern troops. It was
inconveniently near Kentucky and the Ohio River, and President Lincoln and
his War Secretary were as anxious as Halleck on account of its
politico-strategic bearing. General Halleck impressed his views upon
General Grant, and despatched General Foster that it was of first
importance to "drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee and keep him out."
General Grant ordered, "Drive Longstreet to the farthest point east that
you can." And he reported to the authorities,--

    "If Longstreet is not driven out of the valley entirely and the road
    destroyed east of Abingdon, I do not think it unlikely that the last
    great battle of the war will be fought in East Tennessee. Reports of
    deserters and citizens show the army of Bragg to be too much
    demoralized and reduced by desertions to do anything this winter. I
    will get everything in order here in a few days and go to Nashville
    and Louisville, and, if there is still a chance of doing anything
    against Longstreet, to the scene of operations there. I am deeply
    interested in moving the enemy beyond Saltville this winter, so as to
    be able to select my own campaign in the spring, instead of having the
    enemy dictate it to me."

Referring to his orders, General Foster reported his plan to intrench a
line of infantry along Bull's Gap and Mulberry Gap, and have his cavalry
ready for the ride against Saltville, but the Confederates turned upon
him, and he despatched General Grant on the 11th,--

    "Longstreet has taken the offensive against General Parke, who has
    fallen back to Blain's Cross-roads, where Granger is now concentrating
    his corps. I intend to fight them if Longstreet comes."

The failure to follow has been explained.

The summing up of the plans laid for General Hardee and Saltville is
brief. Hardee was not disturbed. The ride towards Saltville, made about
the last of the month, was followed by General W. E. Jones and came to
grief, as will be elsewhere explained.

Upon relinquishing command of his army, General Bragg was called to
Richmond as commander-in-chief near the President.

Before General Hood was so seriously hurt at the battle of Chickamauga, he
made repeated complaints of want of conduct on the part of
Brigadier-General J. B. Robertson. After the _fiasco_ in Lookout Valley on
the night of the 28th of October, I reported to General Bragg of the
representations made by General Hood, and of want of conduct on the part
of General Robertson in that night attack, when General Bragg ordered me
to ask for a board of officers to examine into the merits of the case. The
board was ordered, and General Robertson was relieved from duty by orders
from General Bragg's head-quarters, "while the proceedings and actions of
the examining board in his case were pending."

On the 8th, without notice to my head-quarters, General Bragg ordered,
"Brigadier-General Robertson will rejoin his command until the board can
renew its session."[191]

On the 18th of December the division commander preferred "charges and
specifications" against Brigadier-General Robertson, in which he accused
him of calling the commanders of his Texas regiments to him and saying
there were but

    "Three days' rations on hand, and God knows where more are to come
    from; that he had no confidence in the campaign; that whether we
    whipped the enemy in the immediate battle or not, we would be
    compelled to retreat, the enemy being believed by citizens and others
    to be moving around us, and that we were in danger of losing a
    considerable part of our army; that our men were in no condition for
    campaigning; that General Longstreet had promised shoes, but how could
    they be furnished? that we only had communication with Richmond, and
    could only get a mail from there in three weeks; that he was opposed
    to the movement; would require written orders, and would obey under

General Robertson was ordered to Bristol to await the action of the
Richmond authorities, who were asked for a court-martial to try the case.

On the 17th the following orders concerning General McLaws were issued:

        "December 17, 1863.


    "Major-General L. McLaws is relieved from further duty with this army,
    and will proceed to Augusta, Georgia, from which place he will report
    by letter to the adjutant- and inspector-general. He will turn over
    the command of the division to the senior brigadier present.

    "By command of Lieutenant-General Longstreet.

          MOXLEY SORREL,
            "_Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General_.

        "_Confederate States Army_."

On the same day he wrote,--

    "_Camp on Bean's Station Gap Road_,
        "December 17, 1863.

        "_Assistant Adjutant-General_:

    "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Special Orders No. 27,
    from your head-quarters, of this date, relieving me from further duty
    with this army. If there is no impropriety in making inquiry, and I
    cannot imagine there is, I respectfully request to be informed of the
    particular reason for the order.

          "Very respectfully,
            "L. MCLAWS,

In reply the following was sent:

        "December 17, 1863.

        "_Confederate States Army_:

    "GENERAL,--I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of
    to-day, asking for the particular reason for the issue of the order
    relieving you from duty with this army. In reply I am directed to say
    that throughout the campaign on which we are engaged you have
    exhibited a want of confidence in the efforts and plans which the
    commanding general has thought proper to adopt, and he is
    apprehensive that this feeling will extend more or less to the troops
    under your command. Under these circumstances the commanding general
    has felt that the interest of the public service would be advanced by
    your separation from him, and as he could not himself leave, he
    decided upon the issue of the order which you have received.

    "I have the honor to be, general, with great respect,

          "G. MOXLEY SORREL,
            "_Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General_."

[Illustration: G. M. Sorrel. Chief of Staff, First Corps; promoted to
Brigadier-General, 1864.]

On the 19th, General Law handed in his resignation at head-quarters, and
asked leave of absence on it. This was cheerfully granted. Then he asked
the privilege of taking the resignation with him to the adjutant-general
at Richmond. This was a very unusual request, but the favor he was doing
the service gave him some claim to unusual consideration, and his request
was granted.

The Law disaffection was having effect, or seemed to be, among some of the
officers, but most of them and all of the soldiers were true and brave,
even through all of the hardships of the severest winter of the four years
of war. Marching and fighting had been almost daily occupation from the
middle of January, 1863, when we left Fredericksburg to move down to
Suffolk, Virginia, until the 16th of December, when we found bleak winter
again breaking upon us, away from our friends, and dependent upon our own
efforts for food and clothing. It is difficult for a soldier to find words
that can express his high appreciation of conduct in officers and men who
endured so bravely the severe trials they were called to encounter.

Orders were given to cross the Holston River and march for the railroad,
only a few miles away. Before quitting the fields of our arduous labors
mention should be made of General Bushrod R. Johnson's clever march of
sixteen miles, through deep mud, to Bean's Station on the 13th, when he
and General Kershaw attacked and pushed the enemy back from his front at
the Gap before he could get out of it. Honorable mention is also due
General Jenkins for his equally clever pursuit of the enemy at Lenoir's
Station; Brigadier-General Humphreys and Bryan for their conduct at the
storming assault; Colonel Ruff, who led Wofford's brigade, and died in the
ditch; Colonel McElroy, of the Thirteenth Mississippi Regiment, and
Colonel Thomas, of the Sixteenth Georgia, who also died in the ditch;
Lieutenant Cumming, adjutant of the Sixteenth Georgia Regiment, who
overcame all obstacles, crowned the parapet with ten or a dozen men, and,
entering the fort through one of the embrasures, was taken prisoner; and
Colonel Fiser, of the Eighteenth Mississippi, who lost an arm while on the
parapet. Not the least of the gallant acts of the campaign was the dash of
Captain Winthrop, who led our once halting lines over the rail defences at

The transfer of the army to the east bank of the river was executed by
diligent work and the use of such flat-boats and other means of crossing
as we could collect and construct. We were over by the 20th, and before
Christmas were in our camps along the railroad, near Morristown. Blankets
and clothes were very scarce, shoes more so, but all knew how to enjoy the
beautiful country in which we found ourselves. The French Broad River and
the Holston are confluent at Knoxville. The country between and beyond
them contains as fine farming lands and has as delightful a climate as can
be found. Stock and grain were on all farms. Wheat and oats had been
hidden away by our Union friends, but the fields were full of maize, still
standing. The country about the French Broad had hardly been touched by
the hands of foragers. Our wagons immediately on entering the fields were
loaded to overflowing. Pumpkins were on the ground in places like apples
under a tree. Cattle, sheep, and swine, poultry, vegetables, maple-sugar,
honey, were all abundant for immediate wants of the troops.

When the enemy found we had moved to the east bank, his cavalry followed
to that side. They were almost as much in want of the beautiful foraging
lands as we, but we were in advance of them, and left little for them.
With all the plenitude of provisions and many things which seemed at the
time luxuries, we were not quite happy. Tattered blankets, garments, and
shoes (the latter going--many gone) opened ways, on all sides, for
piercing winter blasts. There were some hand-looms in the country from
which we occasionally picked up a piece of cloth, and here and there we
received other comforts, some from kind and some from unwilling hands,
which nevertheless could spare them. For shoes we were obliged to resort
to the raw hides of beef cattle as temporary protection from the frozen
ground. Then we began to find soldiers who could tan the hides of our
beeves, some who could make shoes, some who could make shoe-pegs, some who
could make shoe-lasts, so that it came about that the hides passed rapidly
from the beeves to the feet of the soldiers in the form of comfortable
shoes. Then came the opening of the railroad, and lo and behold! a
shipment of three thousand shoes from General Lawton,
quartermaster-general! Thus the most urgent needs were supplied, and the
soldier's life seemed passably pleasant,--that is, in the infantry and
artillery. Our cavalry were looking at the enemy all of this while, and
the enemy was looking at them, both frequently burning powder between
their lines.

General Sturgis had been assigned to the cavalry of the other side to
relieve General Shackelford, and he seemed to think that the dead of
winter was the time for cavalry work; and our General Martin's orders were
to have the enemy under his eye at all hours. Both were vigilant, active,
and persevering.

About the 20th of December a raid was made by General Averill from West
Virginia upon a supply depot of General Sam Jones's department, at Salem,
which was partially successful, when General Grant, under the impression
that the stores were for troops of East Tennessee, wired General Foster,
December 25, "This will give you great advantage," and General Foster
despatched General Parke, commanding his troops in the field, December 26,
"Longstreet will feel a little timid now, and will bear a little pushing."

Under the fierce operations of General Sturgis's cavalry against General
Martin's during the latter days of December, General W. E. Jones's cavalry
was on guard for my right and rear towards Cumberland Gap. While Sturgis
busied himself against our front and left, a raiding party rode from
Cumberland Gap against the outposts of our far-off right, under Colonel
Pridemore. As W. E. Jones was too far to support Martin's cavalry, he was
called to closer threatenings against Cumberland Gap, that he might thus
draw some of Sturgis's cavalry from our front to strengthen the forces at
the Gap. Upon receipt of orders, General Jones crossed Clinch River in
time to find the warm trail of the raiders who were following Pridemore.
He sent around to advise him of his ride in pursuit of his pursuers, and
ordered Pridemore, upon hearing his guns, to turn and join in the attack
upon them.

The very cold season and severe march through the mountain fastnesses
stretched Jones's line so that he was in poor condition for immediate
attack when he found the enemy's camp at daylight on the 3d of January;
but he found a surprise: not even a picket guard out in their rear. He
dashed in with his leading forces and got the enemy's battery, but the
enemy quickly rallied and made battle, which recovered the artillery, and
got into strong position about some farm-houses and defended with
desperate resolution. Finding the position too strong, Jones thought to so
engage as to make the enemy use his battery until his ammunition was
exhausted, and then put in all of his forces in assault. Towards night
the enemy found himself reduced to desperate straits and tried to secure
cover of the mountains, but as quick as he got away from the farm-houses
Jones put all of his forces in, capturing three pieces of artillery, three
hundred and eighty prisoners, and twenty-seven wagons and teams of the
Sixteenth Illinois Cavalry and Twenty-second Ohio Light Artillery. A
number of the men got away through the mountains.



    Longstreet again considers Relief from Service--General Grant at
    Knoxville--Shoeless Soldiers leave Bloody Trails on Frozen Roads--A
    Confederate Advance--Affair at Dandridge--Federals retreat--Succession
    of Small Engagements--General Grant urges General Foster's Army to the
    Offensive--General Foster relieved--General Schofield in Command of
    Federals--General Grant's Orders--General Halleck's Estimate of East
    Tennessee as a Strategic Field--Affair of Cavalry--Advance towards
    Knoxville--Longstreet's Command called back to Defensive for Want of

During the last few days of the year 1863 the cold of the severest winter
of the war came on, and constantly increased until the thermometer
approached zero, and on New Year's dropped below, hanging near that figure
for about two weeks. The severe season gave rest to every one. Even the
cavalry had a little quiet, but it was cold comfort, for their orders were
to keep the enemy in sight.

The season seemed an appropriate one for making another effort to be
relieved from service,--that service in which the authorities would not
support my plans or labors,--for now during the lull in war they would
have ample time to assign some one to whom they could give their
confidence and aid. But this did not suit them, and the course of affairs
prejudicial to order and discipline was continued. It was difficult under
the circumstances to find apology for remaining in service.

The President asked Congress to provide for another general officer when
he had five on his rolls,--one of whom was not in command appropriate to
his rank,--and appointed Lieutenant-General Smith, of the
Trans-Mississippi Department, of lower rank than mine, to hold rank above
me. A soldier's honor is his all, and of that they would rob him and
degrade him in the eyes of his troops. The occasion seemed to demand
resignation, but that would have been unsoldierly conduct. Dispassionate
judgment suggested, as the proper rounding of the soldier's life, to stay
and go down with faithful comrades of long and arduous service.

On the other side of the picture affairs were bright and encouraging. The
disaffected were away, and with them disappeared their influence. The
little army was bright and cheerful and ready for any work to which it
could be called.

General Grant made his visit to Knoxville about New Year's, and remained
until the 7th. He found General Foster in the condition of the
Confederates,--not properly supplied with clothing, especially in want of
shoes. So he authorized a wait for the clothing, then in transit and
looked for in a week; and that little delay was a great lift for the
Confederates. We were not timid, but were beginning to think ourselves
comfortable and happy, and were expectant of even better condition. We
were receiving a hundred pairs of shoes a day of our own make, the
hand-looms of the farmers were giving help towards clothing our men,
promises from Richmond were encouraging, and we were prepared to enjoy
rest that we had not known for a twelvemonth. The medical inspector of the
Cis-Mississippi District came to see us, and after careful inspection told
us that the army was in better health and better heart than the other
armies of the district.

Before leaving General Foster, General Grant ordered him on the receipt of
the clothing to advance and drive us "at least beyond Bull's Gap and Red
Bridge." And to prepare for that advance he ordered the Ninth and
Twenty-third Corps to Mossy Creek, the Fourth Corps to Strawberry Plains,
and the cavalry to Dandridge.

The Union army--equipped--marched on the 14th and 15th of January.

The Confederate departments were not so prompt in filling our
requisitions, but we had hopes. The bitter freeze of two weeks had made
the rough angles of mud as firm and sharp as so many freshly-quarried
rocks, and the poorly protected feet of our soldiers sometimes left bloody
marks along the roads.

General Sturgis rode in advance of the army, and occupied Dandridge by
Elliott's, Wolford's, and Garrard's divisions of cavalry and Mott's
brigade of infantry. The Fourth and Twenty-third Corps followed the
cavalry, leaving the Ninth Corps to guard at Strawberry Plains.

General Martin gave us prompt notice that the march was at Dandridge, and
in force. The move was construed as a flanking proceeding, but it was more
convenient to adopt the short march and meet it at Dandridge than to leave
our shoe factory and winter huts and take up the tedious rearward move.
The army was ordered under arms, the cavalry was ordered concentrated in
front of General Sturgis, and the divisions of Jenkins and B. R. Johnson
and Alexander's batteries were marched to join General Martin. McLaws's
division under General Wofford, and Ransom's under General Carr, with such
batteries as they could haul, were assigned to positions on the Morristown
(Strawberry Plains) road, to strike forward or reinforce at Dandridge as
plans developed. The men without shoes were ordered to remain as camp
guards, but many preferred to march with their comrades.

I rode in advance to be assured that our cavalry had not mistaken a strong
cavalry move for one by the enemy. We found General Martin on the Bull's
Gap road sharply engaged with the enemy, both sides on strong defensive
grounds and using their horse batteries, but no infantry was in sight.
General Martin was ordered to push on, gain the opposing plateau, and
force the enemy to show his infantry.

He found the enemy in strong fight, but got the plateau, when the enemy
deployed in stronger force; but his infantry did not appear. When asked
to take the next hill, he thought it could not be done without infantry,
but my idea was to save the infantry the trying march, if possible, and to
that end it was necessary to push with the cavalry. He was called to send
me a detachment of his troopers, and about six hundred came,--Harrison's
brigade, as I remember.

We rode away from the enemy's left, concealing our march under traverse of
an elevated woodland, while General Martin engaged their front attention.
At a secluded spot, a little beyond the enemy's left, the men dismounted,
leaving their animals under guards, moved under cover to good position,
deployed into single line, and marched for the second plateau. Part of the
march was over a small opening, near a farm-house. The exposure brought us
under fire of some sharp-shooters, but we hadn't time to stop and shoot.
As our line marched, a chicken, dazed by the formidable appearance,
crouched in the grass until it was kicked up, when it flew and tried to
clear the line, but one of the troopers jumped up, knocked it down with
the end of his gun, stooped, picked it up, put it in his haversack, and
marched on without losing his place or step and without looking to his
right or left, as though it was as proper and as much an every-day part of
the exercise of war as shooting at the enemy. Presently we got up the
hill, and General Martin advanced his mounts to meet us. We lost but two
men,--wounded,--an officer and a soldier. The officer was at my side, and,
hearing the thud of the blow, I turned and asked if he was much hurt. He
said it was only a flesh-wound, and remained with his command until night.
From that point we saw enough to tell that a formidable part of the army
was before us, and orders were sent for the command to speed their march
as much as they could without severe trial.

When General Martin made his bold advance General Sturgis thought to ride
around by a considerable détour and strike at his rear, but in his ride
was surprised to encounter our marching columns of infantry, and still
more surprised when he saw a thousand muskets levelled and sending
whistling bullets about his men, and our batteries preparing something
worse for him. His troopers got back faster than they came. In trying by a
rapid ride to find position for handling his men he lost a number of his
staff, captured, and narrowly escaped himself.

It was near night when the command got up skirmishers from the advance
division, reinforced the cavalry, and pushed the enemy back nearer the

Dandridge is on the right bank of the French Broad River, about thirty
miles from Knoxville. Its topographical features are bold and inviting of
military work. Its other striking characteristic is the interesting
character of its citizens. The Confederates--a unit in heart and
spirit--were prepared to do their share towards making an effective
battle, and our plans were so laid.

At the time ordered for his advance, General Foster was suffering from an
old wound, and General Parke became commander of the troops in the field.
The latter delayed at Strawberry Plains in arranging that part of his
command, and General Sheridan, marching with the advance, became
commander, until superseded by the corps commander, General Gordon

Our plans were laid before the army was all up. Our skirmish line was made
stronger and relieved the cavalry of their dismounted service. A narrow
unused road, practicable for artillery, was found, that opened a way for
us to reach the enemy's rearward line of march. Sharp-shooters were
organized and ordered forward by it, to be followed by our infantry
columns. It was thought better to move the infantry alone, as the ringing
of the iron axles of the guns might give notice of our purpose; the
artillery to be called as our sharp-shooters approached the junction of
the roads. The head of the turning force encountered a picket-guard, some
of whom escaped without firing, but speedily gave notice of our feeling
towards their rear. General Granger decided to retire, and was in time to
leave our cross-road behind him, his rear-guard passing the point of
intersection before my advance party reached it about midnight.

The weather moderated before night, and after dark a mild, gentle rain
began to fall.

When I rode into Dandridge in the gray of the morning the ground was
thawing and hardly firm enough to bear the weight of a horse. When the
cavalry came at sunrise the last crust of ice had melted, letting the
animals down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone soil. The mud and want
of a bridge to cross the Holston made pursuit by our heavy columns
useless. The cavalry was ordered on, and the troops at Morristown, on the
Strawberry Plains road, were ordered to try that route, but the latter
proved to be too heavy for progress with artillery.

While yet on the streets of Dandridge, giving directions for such pursuit
as we could make, a lady came out upon the sidewalk and invited us into
her parlors. When the orders for pursuit were given, I dismounted, and
with some members of my staff walked in. After the compliments of the
season were passed, we were asked to be seated, and she told us something
of General Granger during the night before. She had never heard a person
swear about another as General Granger did about me. Some of the officers
proposed to stop and make a battle, but General Granger swore and said it
"was no use to stop and fight Longstreet. You can't whip him. It don't
make any difference whether he has one man or a hundred thousand."
Presently she brought out a flask that General Granger had forgotten, and
thought that I should have it. It had about two refreshing inches left in
it. Though not left with compliments, it was accepted. Although the
weather had moderated, it was very wet and nasty, and as we had taken our
coffee at three o'clock, it was resolved to call it noon and divide the
spoils. Colonel Fairfax, who knew how to enjoy good things, thought the
occasion called for a sentiment, and offered, "General Granger--may his
shadow never grow less."

The cavalry found the road and its side-ways so cut up that their pursuit
was reduced to labored walk. The previous hard service and exposure had so
reduced the animals that they were not in trim for real effective cavalry
service. They found some crippled battery forges and a little of other
plunder, but the enemy passed the Holston and broke his bridges behind
him. Our army returned to their huts and winter homes.

Part of our cavalry was ordered to the south side of the French Broad, and
General Martin was ordered to press close on the enemy's rear with the
balance of his force. General Armstrong followed the line of retreat, and
by the use of flat-boats passed his cavalry over the Holston and rode to
the vicinity of Knoxville. He caught up with some stragglers, equipments,
ammunition, and remains of some caissons, and at last made a grand haul of
a herd of eight hundred beef cattle and thirty-one wagons.

Upon getting his cavalry back to Knoxville, General Foster crossed them
over the bridge at the city below the French Broad to foraging grounds
about Louisville, and called his Dandridge march a foraging excursion,
saying that he was building a bridge to cross to the south side when we
bore down against him. But the strategy of his tedious march by our front
to find a crossing point at Dandridge and build a bridge in our presence,
when he could have crossed to the south side of the French Broad by his
bridge at Knoxville and reached those foraging grounds unmolested, was not
like Napoleon. He claimed that he recovered two hundred of the lost herd
of beef cattle.