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Title: The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States - May - September 1787 Volume I
Author: Madison, James, 1751-1836
Language: English
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The Journal of the
Debates in the Convention
Which Framed
The Constitution of the
United States
May-September, 1787
As Recorded by
James Madison
Edited by
Gaillard Hunt
In Two Volumes
Volume I.
G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press
1908
The Knickerbocker Press, New York
[Illustration]
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
PAGE
The Records of the Constitutional Convention (Introduction
by the Editor) vii
Chronology xix
Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 1
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
LIST OF FAC-SIMILES.
FACING
PAGE
First Page of Madison's Journal, actual size 2
Charles Pinckney's Letter 20
The Pinckney Draft 22
Hamilton's Principal Speech 154
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION.
James Madison's contemporaries generally conceded that he was the
leading statesman in the convention which framed the Constitution of
the United States; but in addition to this he kept a record of the
proceedings of the convention which outranks in importance all the
other writings of the founders of the American Republic. He is thus
identified, as no other man is, with the making of the Constitution
and the correct interpretation of the intentions of the makers. His is
the only continuous record of the proceedings of the convention. He
took a seat immediately in front of the presiding officer, among the
members, and took down every speech or motion as it was made, using
abbreviations of his own and immediately afterwards transcribing his
notes when he returned to his lodgings. A few motions only escaped him
and of important speeches he omitted none. The proceedings were ordered
to be kept secret, but his self-imposed task of reporter had the
unofficial sanction of the convention. Alexander Hamilton corrected
slightly Madison's report of his great speech and handed him his plan of
government to copy. The same thing was done with Benjamin Franklin's
speeches, which were written out by Franklin and read by his colleague
Wilson, the fatigue of delivery being too great for the aged Franklin,
and Madison also copied the Patterson plan. Edmund Randolph wrote out
for him his opening speech from his notes two years after the convention
adjourned.[1]
[1] Madison to Randolph, April 21, 1789.
In the years after the convention Madison made a few alterations and
additions in his journal, with the result that in parts there is much
interlineation and erasure, but after patient study the meaning is
always perfectly clear. Three different styles of Madison's own
penmanship at different periods of his life appear in the journal,
one being that of his old age within five years of his death. In
this hand appears the following note at the end of the journal:
"The few alterations and corrections made in the debates which are
not in my handwriting were dictated by me and made in my presence
by John C. Payne."[2] The rare occasions where Payne's penmanship is
distinguishable are indicated in the notes to this edition.
[2] Mrs. Madison's brother.
The importance attached by Madison to his record is shown by the terms
of his will, dated April 15, 1835, fourteen months before his death:
"I give all my personal estate ornamental as well as useful,
except as herein after otherwise given, to my dear Wife; and
I also give to her all my manuscript papers, having entire
confidence in her discreet and proper use of them, but subject
to the qualification in the succeeding clause. Considering the
peculiarity and magnitude of the occasion which produced the
Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, the Characters who composed
it, the Constitution which resulted from their deliberations,
its effects during a trial of so many years on the prosperity of
the people living under it, and the interest it has inspired
among the friends of free Government, it is not an unreasonable
inference that a careful and extended report of the proceedings
and discussions of that body, which were with closed doors, by a
member who was constant in his attendance, will be particularly
gratifying to the people of the United States, and to all who
take an interest in the progress of political science and the
course of true liberty. It is my desire that the Report as made
by me should be published under her authority and direction."[3]
[3] Orange County, Va., MSS. records.
This desire was never consummated, for Mrs. Madison's friends advised
her that she could not herself profitably undertake the publication of
the work, and she accordingly offered it to the Government, by which it
was bought for $30,000, by act of Congress, approved March 3, 1837. On
July 9, 1838, an act was approved authorizing the Joint Committee on the
Library to cause the papers thus purchased to be published, and the
Committee intrusted the superintendence of the work to Henry D. Gilpin,
Solicitor of the Treasury. The duplicate copy of the journal which Mrs.
Madison had delivered was, under authority of Congress, withdrawn from
the State Department and placed in Mr. Gilpin's hands. In 1840
(Washington: Lantree & O'Sulivan), accordingly, appeared the three
volumes, _The Papers of James Madison Purchased by Order of Congress_,
edited by Henry D. Gilpin. Other issues of this edition, with changes of
date, came out later in New York, Boston, and Mobile. This issue
contained not only the journal of the Constitutional Convention, but
Madison's notes of the debates in the Continental Congress and in the
Congress of the Confederation from February 19 to April 25, 1787, and a
report Jefferson had written of the debates in 1776 on the Declaration
of Independence, besides a number of letters of Madison's. From the text
of Gilpin a fifth volume was added to Elliot's _Debates_ in 1845, and it
was printed in one volume in Chicago, 1893.
Mr. Gilpin's reading of the duplicate copy of the Madison journal is
thus the only one that has hitherto been published.[4] His work was both
painstaking and thorough, but many inaccuracies and omissions have been
revealed by a second reading from the original manuscript journal
written in Madison's own hand, just as he himself left it; and this
original manuscript has been followed with rigid accuracy in the text of
the present edition.
[4] Volume iii of _The Documentary History of the United States_
(Department of State, 1894) is a presentation of a literal
print of the original journal, indicating by the use
of larger and smaller type and by explanatory words the
portions which are interlined or stricken out.
The editor has compared carefully with Madison's report, as the notes
will show, the incomplete and less important records of the convention,
kept by others. Of these, the best known is that of Robert Yates, a
delegate in the convention from New York, who took notes from the time
he entered the convention, May 25, to July 5, when he went home to
oppose what he foresaw would be the result of the convention's labors.
These notes were published in 1821 (Albany), edited by Yates's colleague
in the convention, John Lansing, under the title, _Secret Proceedings
and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Philadelphia, in the Year
1787, for the Purpose of Forming the Constitution of the United States
of America_. This was afterwards reprinted in several editions and in
the three editions of _The Debates on the Federal Constitution_, by
Jonathan Elliot (Washington, 1827-1836). Madison pronounced Yates's
notes "Crude and broken." "When I looked over them some years ago," he
wrote to J. C. Cabell, February 2, 1829, "I was struck with the number
of instances in which he had totally mistaken what was said by me, or
given it in scraps and terms which, taken without the developments or
qualifications accompanying them, had an import essentially different
from what was intended." Yates's notes were colored by his prejudices,
which were strong against the leaders of the convention, but, making
allowance for this and for their incompleteness, they are of high value
and rank next to Madison's in importance.
Rufus King, a delegate from Massachusetts, kept a number of notes,
scattered and imperfect, which were not published till 1894, when they
appeared in King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_ (New York:
Putnam's).
William Pierce, a delegate from Georgia, made some memoranda of the
proceedings of the convention, and brief and interesting sketches of all
the delegates, which were first printed in _The Savannah Georgian_,
April, 18-28, 1828, and reprinted in _The American Historical Review_
for January, 1898.
The notes of Yates, King, and Pierce are the only unofficial record of
the convention extant, besides Madison's, and their chief value is in
connection with the Madison record, which in the main they support, and
which occasionally they elucidate.
December 30, 1818, Charles Pinckney wrote to John Quincy Adams that he
had made more notes of the convention than any other member except
Madison, but they were never published and have been lost or
destroyed.[5]
[5] See p. 22, n.
In 1819 (Boston) was published the _Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the
Convention_, etc., under the supervision of John Quincy Adams, Secretary
of State, by authority of a joint resolution of Congress of March 27,
1818. This was the official journal of the convention, which the
Secretary, William Jackson, had turned over to the President, George
Washington, when the convention adjourned, Jackson having previously
burned all other papers of the convention in his possession. March 16,
1796, Washington deposited the papers Jackson had given him with the
Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering. They consisted of three
volumes,--the journal of the convention, the journal of the proceedings
of the Committee of the Whole of the convention, and a list of yeas and
nays, beside a printed draft of the Constitution as reported August 6th,
showing erasures and amendments afterwards adopted, and the Virginia
plan in different stages of development.
In preparing the matter for publication Secretary Adams found that for
Friday, September 14, and Saturday, September 15, the journal was a mere
fragment, and Madison was applied to and completed it from his minutes.
From General B. Bloomfield, executor of the estate of David Brearley, a
delegate in the convention from New Jersey, Adams obtained a few
additional papers, and from Charles Pinckney a copy of what purported to
be the plan of a constitution submitted by him to the convention. All of
these papers, with some others, appeared in the edition of 1819, which
was a singularly accurate publication, as comparison by the present
editor of the printed page with the original papers has shown.
The Pinckney plan, as it appeared in this edition of the journal, was
incorporated by Madison into his record, as he had not secured a copy of
it when the convention was sitting. But the draft furnished to Secretary
Adams in 1818, and the plan presented by Pinckney to the convention in
1787 were not identical, as Madison conclusively proved in his note to
his journal, in his letter to Jared Sparks of November 25, 1831, and in
several other letters, in all of which he showed that the draft did not
agree in several important respects with Pinckney's own votes and
motions in the convention, and that there were important discrepancies
between it and Pinckney's _Observations on the Plan of Government_, a
pamphlet printed shortly after the convention adjourned.[6]
[6] See P. L. Ford's _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, 419.
It is, indeed, inconceivable that the convention should have
incorporated into the constitution so many of the provisions of the
Pinckney draft, and that at the same time so little reference should
have been made to it in the course of the debates; and it is equally
extraordinary that the contemporaries of Pinckney did not accord to him
the chief paternity of the Constitution, which honor would have belonged
to him if the draft he sent to Mr. Adams in 1818 had been the one he
actually offered the convention in the first week of its session. The
editor has made a careful examination of the original manuscripts in the
case. They consist (1) of Mr. Pinckney's letter to Mr. Adams of December
12, 1818, written from Winyaw, S. C., while Pinckney was temporarily
absent from Charleston, acknowledging Mr. Adams's request for the draft,
(2) his letter of December 30, written from Charleston, transmitting the
draft, and (3) the draft. The penmanship of all three papers is
contemporaneous, and the letter of December 30 and the draft were
written with the same pen and ink. This may possibly admit of a
difference of opinion, because the draft is in a somewhat larger
chirography than the letter, having been, as befitted its importance,
written more carefully. But the letter and the draft are written upon
the same paper, and this paper was not made when the convention sat in
1787. There are several sheets of the draft and one of the letter, and
all bear the same water-mark--"Russell & Co. 1797." The draft cannot,
therefore, claim to be the original Pinckney plan, and was palpably made
for the occasion, from Mr. Pinckney's original notes doubtless, aided
and modified by a copy of the Constitution itself. Thirty years had
elapsed since the close of the Constitutional Convention when the draft
was compiled, and its incorrectness is not a circumstance to occasion
great wonder.[7]
[7] See p. 19, n.
Correspondence on the subject of the convention, written while it was in
session, was not extensive, but some unpublished letters throwing light
upon contemporaneous opinion have been found and are quoted in the
notes.
The editor desires to record his obligation for assistance in preparing
these volumes to his friend, Montgomery Blair, Esq., of Silver Spring,
Md.
GAILLARD HUNT.
CHERRY HILL FARM, VA.,
September, 1902.
[Illustration]
CHRONOLOGY OF JAMES MADISON.
1787.
1787. Prepares the "Virginia plan" in conjunction with the
May 6-25. Virginia delegates.
May 14. Attends the first gathering of the delegates.
May 30. Moves postponement of question of representation by free
population.
Moves that congressional representation be proportioned
to the importance and size of the States.
Makes his first speech on this subject.
May 31. Advocates representation in one house by popular
election.
Opposes uniting several States into one district for
representation in Senate.
Doubts practicability of enumerating powers of national
legislature.
Suggests the impossibility of using force to coerce
individual States.
June 1. Moves that the powers of the Executive be enumerated.
June 2. Objects to giving Congress power to remove the President
upon demand of a majority of the State legislatures.
June 4. Favors giving power to more than a majority of the
national legislature to overrule an Executive negative
of a law.
June 5. Opposes election of judges by both branches of Congress.
Advocates submission of constitution to conventions of
the people.
Favors inferior judicial tribunals.
June 6. Speaks for popular representation in the House.
Seconds motion to include a portion of the Judiciary
with the Executive in revisionary power over laws.
June 7. Speaks for proportional representation in both houses
of Congress.
June 8. Seconds motion to give Congress power to negative State
laws.
Suggests temporary operation of urgent laws.
June 12. Seconds motion to make term of Representatives three
years.
Thinks the people will follow the convention.
Favors a term of seven years for Senators.
June 13. Moves defining powers of Judiciary.
Objects to appointment of judges by whole legislature.
Thinks both houses should have right to originate money
bills.
Advocates a national government and opposes the "Jersey
plan."
June 21. Speaks in favor of national supremacy.
Opposes annual or biennial elections of Representatives.
June 22. Favors fixing payment of salaries by a standard.
June 23. Proposes to debar Senators from offices created or
enhanced during their term.
Speaks for the proposition.
June 25. Wishes to take up question of right of suffrage.
June 26. Speaks for a long term for Senators.
Opposes their payment by the States.
June 28. Speaks for proportional representation.
June 29. Insists that too much stress is laid on State
sovereignty.
June 30. Contends against equal State representation in the
Senate.
Speaks again on subject, but would preserve State
rights.
July 2. Opposes submission of the question to a special
committee.
July 5. Opposes compromise report of committee.
July 6. Thinks part of report need not be postponed.
July 7. Thinks question of representation ought to be settled
before other questions.
July 9. Suggests free inhabitants as basis of representation in
one house, and all inhabitants as basis in the other
house.
July 10. Moves increase of Representatives.
July 11. Favors representation based on population.
July 14. Urges proportional representation as necessary to
protect the smaller States.
July 17. Advocates national power of negative over State laws.
Thinks the branches of government should be kept
separate.
Thinks monarchy likely to follow instability.
Thinks there should be provision for interregnum between
adoption and operation of constitution.
Moves national guarantee of States against domestic
violence.
July 18. Seconds motion forbidding a State to form any but a
republican government.
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787.
Monday May 14^{th} 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the
deputies in Convention for revising the federal System of Government. On
that day a small number only had assembled. Seven States were not
convened till,
Friday 25 of May, when the following members appeared to wit:
From _Massachusetts_, Rufus King. _N. York_, Robert Yates,[8] Alex^r
Hamilton. _N. Jersey_, David Brearly, William Churchill Houston, William
Patterson. _Pennsylvania_, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimons, James
Wilson, Governeur Morris. _Delaware_, George Read, Richard Basset,[9]
Jacob Broome. _Virginia_, George Washington, Edmund Randolph, John
Blair,[10] James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, James McClurg. _N.
Carolina_, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs
Spaight, Hugh Williamson. _S. Carolina_, John Rutlidge, Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler. _Georgia_, William
Few.[11]
[8] William Pierce, delegate from Georgia, made an estimate
of each member of the convention, the only contemporary
estimate thus far brought to light. Yates did not speak in
the Convention.
"M^r Yates is said to be an able Judge. He is a Man of great
legal abilities, but not distinguished as an Orator. Some of
his Enemies say he is an anti-federal Man, but I discovered
no such disposition in him. He is about 45 years old, and
enjoys a great share of health."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 327. For more about Pierce's Notes, see p.
45, n.
[9] "M^r Bassett is a religious enthusiast, lately turned
Methodist, and serves his Country because it is the will of
the people that he should do so. He is a Man of plain sense,
and has modesty enough to hold his Tongue. He is Gentlemanly
Man and is in high estimation among the Methodists. Mr.
Bassett is about 36 years old."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._,
iii., 330. He did not speak in the Convention.
[10] "Mr. Blair is one of the most respectable Men in Virginia,
both on account of his Family as well as fortune. He is one
of the Judges of the Supreme Court in Virginia, and
acknowledged to have a very extensive knowledge of the Laws.
M^r Blair is however, no Orator, but his good sense,
and most excellent principles, compensate for other
deficiencies. He is about 50 years of age."--Pierce's Notes,
_Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 331. He did not speak in the
Convention.
[11] "M^r Few possesses a strong natural Genius, and from
application has acquired some knowledge of legal
matters;--he practises at the bar of Georgia, and speaks
tolerably well in the Legislature. He has been twice a
Member of Congress, and served in that capacity with
fidelity to his State, and honor to himself. Mr. Few is
about 35 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 333.
He did not speak in the Convention.
The credentials of Connecticut and Maryland required but one
deputy to represent the state; of New York, South Carolina,
Georgia, and New Hampshire, two deputies; of Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, and North Carolina, three;
of Pennsylvania, four.--_Journal of the Federal Convention_,
16 _et seq._; _Documentary History of the Constitution_, i.,
10 _et seq._
M^r Robert Morris[12] informed the members assembled that by the
instruction & in behalf, of the deputation of Pen^a he proposed George
Washington, Esq^r late Commander in chief for president of the
Convention. M^r Jn^o Rutlidge seconded the motion; expressing his
confidence that the choice would be unanimous, and observing that the
presence of Gen^l Washington forbade any observations on the occasion
which might otherwise be proper.
[12] "Robert Morris is a merchant of great eminence and wealth;
an able Financier, and a worthy Patriot. He has an
understanding equal to any public object, and possesses an
energy of mind that few Men can boast of. Although he is not
learned, yet he is as great as those who are. I am told that
when he speaks in the Assembly of Pennsylvania, that he
bears down all before him. What could have been his reason
for not Speaking in the Convention I know not,--but he never
once spoke on any point. This Gentleman is about 50 years
old."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist: Rev._, iii., 328.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
General Washington[13] was accordingly unanimously elected by ballot,
and conducted to the Chair by M^r R. Morris and M^r Rutlidge; from
which in a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention for the
honor they had conferred on him, reminded them of the novelty of the
scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his want of better
qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the House towards the
involuntary errors which his inexperience might occasion.
[13] "Gen^l Washington is well known as the Commander in chief
of the late American Army. Having conducted these States to
independence and peace, he now appears to assist in framing
a Government to make the People happy. Like Gustavus Vasa,
he may be said to be the deliverer of his Country;--like
Peter the great he appears as the politician and the
States-man; and like Cincinnatus he returned to his farm
perfectly contented with being only a plain Citizen, after
enjoying the highest honor of the confederacy,--and now only
seeks for the approbation of his Country-men by being
virtuous and useful. The General was conducted to the Chair
as President of the Convention by the unanimous voice of its
Members. He is in the 52^d year of his age."--Pierce's
Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 331.
(The nomination came with particular grace from Pe[~nn]a, as Doc^r
Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doc^r was
himself to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state
of the weather and of his health confined him to his house.)
M^r Wilson[14] moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated M^r
Temple Franklin.
[14] "Mr. Wilson ranks among the foremost in legal and political
knowledge. He has joined to a fine genius all that can set
him off and show him to advantage. He is well acquainted
with Man, and understands all the passions that influence
him. Government seems to have been his peculiar Study, all
the political institutions of the World he knows in detail,
and can trace the causes and effects of every revolution
from the earliest stages of the Greecian commonwealth down
to the present time. No man is more clear, copious, and
comprehensive than Mr. Wilson, yet he is no great Orator. He
draws the attention not by the charm of his eloquence, but
by the force of his reasoning. He is about 45 years
old."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 329.
Col Hamilton[15] nominated Major Jackson.
[15] "Col^o Hamilton is deservedly celebrated for his talents.
He is a practitioner of the Law, and reputed to be a
finished Scholar. To a clear and strong judgment he unites
the ornaments of fancy, and whilst he is able, convincing,
and engaging in his eloquence the Heart and Head sympathize
in approving him. Yet there is something too feeble in his
voice to be equal to the strains of oratory;--it is my
opinion he is rather a convincing Speaker, that [than] a
blazing Orator. Col^o Hamilton requires time to think,--he
enquires into every part of his subject with the searchings
of phylosophy, and when he comes forward he comes highly
charged with interesting matter, there is no skimming over
the surface of a subject with him, he must sink to the
bottom to see what foundation it rests on.--His language is
not always equal, sometimes didactic like Bolingbroke's, at
others light and tripping like Stern's. His eloquence is not
so defusive as to trifle with the senses, but he rambles
just enough to strike and keep up the attention. He is about
33 years old, of small stature, and lean. His manners are
tinctured with stiffness, and sometimes with a degree of
vanity that is highly disagreable."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._,
iii., 327.
On the ballot Maj^r Jackson had 5 votes & M^r Franklin 2 votes.
On reading the credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those
from Delaware were prohibited from changing the Article in the
Confederation establishing an equality of votes among the States.[16]
[16] "... So also and Provided, that such Alterations or
further Provisions, or any of them, do not extend to that
part of the Fifth Article of the Confederation of the said
States, finally ratified on the first day March, in the Year
One thousand seven hundred and eighty one, which declares
that 'In determining Questions in the United States in
Congress Assembled each State shall have one
Vote.'"--_Documentary History of the Constitution_ (Dept. of
State), i., 24.
The appointment of a Committee, consisting of Mess^{rs} Wythe, Hamilton
& C. Pinckney, on the motion of Mr. Pinckney, to prepare standing rules
& orders was the only remaining step taken on this day.
MONDAY MAY 28.----
From Mass^{ts} Nat: Gorham & Caleb Strong. From Connecticut Oliver
Elseworth. From Delaware, Gunning Bedford. From Maryland James M^cHenry.
From Penn^a B. Franklin, George Clymer, Th^s Mifflin & Jared Ingersol,
took their seats.[17]
[17] "Entre nous. I believe the Eastern people have taken ground
they will not depart from respecting the Convention.--One
legislature composed of a lower-house triennially elected
and an _Executive & Senate_ for a good number of years.--I
shall see Gerry & Johnson, as they pass & may perhaps give
you a hint."--William Grayson to Madison, New York, May 24,
1787, _Mad. MSS._
M^r Wythe[18] from the Committee for preparing rules made a report which
employed the deliberations of this day.
[18] "M^r Wythe is the famous Professor of Law at the University
of William and Mary. He is confessedly one of the most
learned legal Characters of the present age. From his close
attention to the study of general learning he has acquired a
compleat knowledge of the dead languages and all the
sciences. He is remarked for his exemplary life, and
universally esteemed for his good principles. No Man it is
said understands the history of Government better than M^r
Wythe,--nor any one who understands the fluctuating
condition to which all societies are liable better than he
does, yet from his too favorable opinion of Men, he is no
great politician. He is a neat and pleasing Speaker, and a
most correct and able Writer. Mr. Wythe is about 55 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 331.
M^r King[19] objected to one of the rules in the Report authorizing any
member to call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on the minutes.
He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the
Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes;
and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of
the business & would fill the minutes with contradictions.
[19] "M^r King is a Man much distinguished for his eloquence and
great parliamentary talents. He was educated in
Massachusetts, and is said to have good classical as well as
legal knowledge. He has served for three years in the
Congress of the United States with great and deserved
applause, and is at this time high in the confidence and
approbation of his Country-men. This Gentleman is about
thirty three years of age, about five feet ten inches high,
well formed, an handsome face, with a strong expressive Eye,
and a sweet high toned voice. In his public speaking there
is something peculiarly strong and rich in his expression,
clear, and convincing in his arguments, rapid and
irresistible at times in his eloquence but he is not always
equal. His action is natural, swimming, and graceful, but
there is a rudeness of manner sometimes accompanying it. But
take him _tout en semble_, he may with propriety be ranked
among the luminaries of the present Age."--Pierce's Notes,
_Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 325.
Col. Mason[20] seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the
opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on
conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish
handles to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting.
[20] "Mr. Mason is a Gentleman of remarkable strong powers, and
possesses a clear and copious understanding. He is able and
convincing in debate, steady and firm in his principles, and
undoubtedly one of the best politicians in America. M^r
Mason is about 60 years old, with a fine strong
constitution."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 331.
The proposed rule was rejected nem. contrad certe. The standing
rules[21] agreed to were as follows:[22]
[21] Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the
rule by which they ought to vote in the Convention had been
made a subject of conversation among the members present. It
was pressed by Governeur Morris and favored by Robert Morris
and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should
unite in firmly refusing to the small states an equal vote,
as unreasonable, and as enabling the small States to
negative every good system of Government, which must, in the
nature of things, be founded on a violation of that
equality. The members from Virginia, conceiving that such an
attempt might beget fatal altercations between the large &
small States, and that it would be easier to prevail on the
latter, in the course of the deliberations, to give up their
equality for the sake of an effective Government, than on
taking the field of discussion to disarm themselves of the
right & thereby throw themselves on the mercy of the larger
States, discountenanced and stifled the project.--Madison's
Note.
[22] In the MS. Madison adds: "[See the Journal & copy here the
printed rules]," and they were copied by him from the
_Journal of the Federal Convention_ (_1819_). They have been
compared with the MS. journal and found to be correct.
Viz.
A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less than
seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater number
of these which shall be fully represented; but a less number than seven
may adjourn from day to day.
Immediately after the President shall have taken the chair, and the
members their seats, the minutes of the preceding day shall be read by
the Secretary.
Every member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and
whilst he shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold
discourse with another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed
or manuscript--and of two members rising at the same time, the
President shall name him who shall be first heard.
A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special leave, upon
the same question; and not the second time, before every other, who had
been silent, shall have been heard, if he choose to speak upon the
subject.
A motion made and seconded, shall be repeated, and if written, as it
shall be when any member shall so require, read aloud by the Secretary,
before it shall be debated; and may be withdrawn at any time, before the
vote upon it shall have been declared.
Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and either
discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be introduced.
When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other than to
amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate shall be
received.
[23]A question which is complicated, shall, at the request of any
member, be divided, and put separately on the propositions of which it
is compounded.
[23] An undecided line is drawn through the page in the MS. from
here to the end of the rules; but not, as it would appear,
to strike them out, as they were actually adopted by the
Convention.
The determination of a question, altho' fully debated, shall be
postponed, if the deputies of any State desire it until the next day.
A writing which contains any matter brought on to be considered, shall
be read once throughout for information, then by paragraphs to be
debated, and again, with the amendments, if any, made on the second
reading; and afterwards the question shall be put on the whole, amended,
or approved in its original form, as the case shall be.
Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and the members who have the
greatest number of ballots, altho' not a majority of the votes present,
shall be the Committee. When two or more members have an equal number of
votes, the member standing first on the list in the order of taking down
the ballots, shall be preferred.
A member may be called to order by any other member, as well as by the
President; and may be allowed to explain his conduct or expressions
supposed to be reprehensible. And all questions of order shall be
decided by the President without appeal or debate.
Upon a question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at any time,
if it be seconded, the question shall be put without a debate.
When the House shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his place,
until the President pass him.
A letter from sundry persons of the State of Rho. Island addressed to
the Honorable The Chairman of the General Convention was presented to
the Chair by Mr. Gov^r Morris,[24] and being read, was ordered to lie on
the table for further consideration.[25]
[24] "M^r Governeur Morris is one of those Genius's in whom
every species of talents combine to render him conspicuous
and flourishing in public debate:--He winds through all the
mazes of rhetoric, and throws around him such a glare that
he charms, captivates, and leads away the senses of all who
hear him. With an infinite streach of fancy he brings to
view things when he is engaged in deep argumentation, that
render all the labor of reasoning easy and pleasing. But
with all these powers he is fickle and inconstant,--never
pursuing one train of thinking,--nor ever regular. He has
gone through a very extensive course of reading, and is
acquainted with all the sciences. No Man has more wit,--nor
can any one engage the attention more than M^r Morris. He
was bred to the Law, but I am told he disliked the
profession, and turned Merchant. He is engaged in some great
mercantile matters with his namesake, M^r Rob^t Morris. This
Gentleman is about 38 years old, he has been unfortunate in
losing one of his Legs, and getting all the flesh taken off
his right arm by a scald, when a youth."--Pierce's Notes,
_Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 329.
[25] "NEWPORT June 18th 1787
"Sir--
"The inclosed address, of which I presume your Excellency
has received a duplicate, was returned to me from New York
after my arrival in this State. I flattered myself that our
Legislature, which convened on monday last, would have
receded from the resolution therein refer'd to, and have
complied with the recommendation of Congress in sending
deligates to the federal convention. The upper house, or
Governor, & Council, embraced the measure, but it was
negatived in the house of Assembly by a large majority,
notwithstanding the greatest exertions were made to support
it.
"Being disappointed in their expectations, the minority in
the administration and all the worthy citizens of this
State, whose minds are well informd regreting the
peculiarities of their Situation place their fullest
confidence in the wisdom & moderation of the national
council, and indulge the warmest hopes of being favorably
consider'd in their deliberations. From these deliberations
they anticipate a political System which must finally be
adopted & from which will result the Safety, the honour, &
the happiness of the United States.
"Permit me, Sir, to observe, that the measures of our
present Legislature do not exhibit the real character of the
State. They are equally reprobated, & abhored by Gentlemen
of the learned professions, by the whole mercantile body, &
by most of the respectable farmers and mechanicks. The
majority of the administration is composed of a licentious
number of men, destitute of education, and many of them,
Void of principle. From anarchy and confusion they derive
their temporary consequence, and this they endeavor to
prolong by debauching the minds of the common people, whose
attention is wholly directed to the Abolition of debts both
public & private. With these are associated the disaffected
of every description, particularly those who were unfriendly
during the war. Their paper money System, founded in
oppression & fraud, they are determined to Support at every
hazard. And rather than relinquish their favorite pursuit
they trample upon the most sacred obligations. As a proof of
this they refused to comply with a requisition of Congress
for repealing all laws repugnant to the treaty of peace with
Great Britain, and urged as their principal reason, that it
would be calling in question the propriety of their former
measures.
"These evils may be attributed, partly to the extreme
freedom of our own constitution, and partly to the want of
energy in the federal Union: And it is greatly to be
apprehended that they cannot Speedily be removed but by
uncommon and very serious exertions. It is fortunate however
that the wealth and resources of this State are chiefly in
possion of the well Affected, & that they are intirely
devoted to the public good.
"I have the honor of being Sir,
"with the greatest Veneration & esteem,
"Your excellencys very obedient &
"most humble servant--
["J. M. VARNUM.]
"His excellency
"GEN^l WASHINGTON."
The letter was inadvertently unsigned, but it was well known
to come from General Varnum. The enclosure was as follows:
"PROVIDENCE, May 11. 1787.
"GENTLEMEN:
"Since the Legislature of this State have finally declined
sending Delegates to Meet you in Convention for the purposes
mentioned in the Resolve of Congress of the 21^{st} February
1787, the Merchants Tradesmen and others of this place,
deeply affected with the evils of the present unhappy times,
have thought proper to Communicate in writing their
approbation of your Meeting, And their regret that it will
fall short of a Compleat Representation of the Federal
Union.--
"The failure of this State was owing to the Nonconcurrence
of the Upper House of Assembly with a Vote passed in the
Lower House, for appointing Delegates to attend the said
Convention, at their Session holden at Newport on the first
Wednesday of the present Month.--
"It is the general Opinion here and we believe of the well
informed throughout this State, that full power for the
Regulation of the Commerce of the United States, both
Foreign & Domestick ought to be vested in the National
Council.
"And that Effectual Arrangements should also be made for giving
Operation to the present powers of Congress in their
Requisitions upon the States for National purposes.--
"As the Object of this Letter is chiefly to prevent any
impressions unfavorable to the Commercial Interest of this
State, from taking place in our Sister States from the
Circumstance of our being unrepresented in the present
National Convention, we shall not presume to enter into any
detail of the objects we hope your deliberations will
embrace and provide for being convinced they will be such as
have a tendency to strengthen the Union, promote Commerce,
increase the power & Establish the Credit of the United
States.
"The result of your deliberations tending to these
desireable purposes we still hope may finally be Approved
and Adopted by this State, for which we pledge our Influence
and best exertions.--
"In behalf of the Merchants, Tradesmen &c.
"We have the Honour to be with perfect Consideration & Respect
"Your most Obedient &
"Most Humble Servant's
"JOHN BROWN JABEZ BOWEN }
THO^S LLOYD HALSEY NICHO^S BROWN }
JOS. NIGHTINGALE JOHN JENCKES }
LEVI HALL WELCOME ARNOLD } Comtee.
PHILIP ALLEN WILLIAM RUSSELL }
PAUL ALLEN JEREMIAH OLMY }
WILLIAM BARTON }
"The Hon^{ble} the Chairman of the General Convention
"PHILADELPHIA"
--_Const. MSS._
Both letters are printed in the _Documentary History of the
Constitution_, i., 277 and 275.
M^r Butler moved that the House provide ag^{st} interruption of business
by absence of members,[26] and against licentious publications of their
proceedings--to which was added by--M^r Spaight[27]--a motion to provide
that on the one hand the House might not be precluded by a vote upon any
question, from revising the subject matter of it, When they see cause,
nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a decision, which
was the result of mature discussion.--Whereupon it was ordered that
these motions be referred for the consideration of the Committee
appointed to draw up the standing rules and that the Committee make
report thereon.
[26] "Mr. Butler is a character much respected for the many
excellent virtues which he possesses. But as a politician or
an Orator, he has no pretensions to either. He is a
Gentleman of fortune, and takes rank among the first in
South Carolina. He has been appointed to Congress, and is
now a Member of the Legislature of South Carolina. M^r
Butler is about 40 years of age; an Irishman by
birth."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 333.
[27] "Mr. Spaight is a worthy Man, of some abilities, and
fortune. Without possessing a Genius to render him
brilliant, he is able to discharge any public trust that his
Country may repose in him. He is about 31 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 332.
Adj^j till tomorrow 10. OClock.
TUESDAY MAY 29.
John Dickenson and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter
from Mass^{ts} took their seats. The following rules were added, on the
report of M^r Wythe from the Committee--
That no member be absent from the House, so as to interrupt the
representation of the State, without leave.
That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought to
be, sitting.
That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the
sitting of the House without leave of the House.
That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.
That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise
published or communicated without leave.
That a motion to reconsider a matter which has been determined
by a majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the
same day on which the vote passed; but otherwise not without one
day's previous notice: in which last case, if the House agree to
the reconsideration, some future day shall be assigned for that
purpose.
M^r C. Pinkney[28] moved that a Committee be appointed to superintend
the Minutes.
[28] "Mr. Charles Pinckney is a young Gentleman of the most
promising talents. He is, altho' only 24 y^s of age, in
possession of a very great variety of knowledge. Government,
Law, History, and Phylosophy are his favorite studies, but
he is intimately acquainted with every species of polite
learning, and has a spirit of application and industry
beyond most Men. He speaks with great neatness and
perspicuity, and treats every subject as fully, without
running into prolixity, as it requires. He has been a Member
of Congress, and served in that Body with ability and
eclat."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 333.
M^r Gov^r Morris objected to it. The entry of the proceedings of the
Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer. A
committee might have an interest & bias in moulding the entry according
to their opinions and wishes.
The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays.
Mr. Randolph[29] then opened the main business.[30]
[29] "Mr. Randolph is Governor of Virginia,--a young Gentleman in
whom unite all the accomplishments of the Scholar, and the
Statesman. He came forward with the postulata, or first
principles, on which the Convention acted, and he supported
them with a force of eloquence and reasoning that did him
great honor. He has a most harmonious voice, a fine person
and striking manners. Mr. Randolph is about 32 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 332.
[30] In the MS. in Randolph's hand: "[here insert his speech
including his resolutions]." The speech also is in
Randolph's hand, having been furnished by him.
He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those,
who were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open
the great subject of their mission. But, as the convention had
originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed that some
proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task on him.
He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of
preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal.
He observed that in revising the foederal system we ought to inquire 1.
into the properties, which such a government ought to possess, 2. the
defects of the confederation, 3. the danger of our situation & 4. the
remedy.
1. The Character of such a government ought to secure 1. against foreign
invasion: 2. against dissensions between members of the Union, or
seditions in particular States: 3. to procure to the several States
various blessings, of which an isolated situation was incapable: 4. to
be able to defend itself against encroachment: & 5. to be paramount to
the state constitutions.
2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high
respect for its authors, and considered them as having done all that
patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions,
& of confederacies,--when the inefficiency of requisitions was
unknown--no commercial discord had arisen among any States--no rebellion
had appeared as in Mass^{ts}--foreign debts had not become urgent--the
havoc of paper money had not been foreseen--treaties had not been
violated--and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the jealousy
of the states with regard to their sovereignty.
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects. 1. that the confederation
produced no security against foreign invasion; congress not being
permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own authority--Of
this he cited many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they
could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations to be
punished: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war
without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being fit for
defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be successful, and
these could not be executed without money.
2, that the foederal government could not check the quarrels between
states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor
means to interpose according to the exigency.
3, that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might acquire, which
were not attainable under the confederation--such as a productive
impost--counteraction of the commercial regulations of other
nations--pushing of commerce ad libitum,--&c &c.
4, that the foederal government could not defend itself against
encroachments from the states.
5, that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified
as it was in many of the states.
3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation, appealed to the sense
of the best friends of the U. S. the prospect of anarchy from the laxity
of government every where; and to other considerations.
4. He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be
the republican principle.
He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which
he explained one by one.
1. Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected
& enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution;
namely, "common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare."
2. Res^d therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National
Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem
best in different cases.
3. Res^d that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
4. Res^d that the members of the first branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States
every ---- for the term of ----; to be of the age of ---- years at
least, to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for
the devotion of their time to the public service; to be ineligible to
any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of
the United States, except those peculiarly belong to the functions of
the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of ----
after its expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the space of
---- after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to
recall.
5. Resol^d that the members of the second branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper
number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the
age of ---- years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient
to ensure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they
may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service;
and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or
under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly
belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of
service; and for the space of ---- after the expiration thereof.
6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or
in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the
several States contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature
the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union ag^{st}
any member of the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the articles
thereof.
7. Res^d that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the
National Legislature for the term of ---- years, to receive punctually
at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in
which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the
Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be
ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to
execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested
in Congress by the Confederation.
8. Res^d that the Executive and a convenient number of the National
Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to
examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, &
every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be
final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a
rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed,
or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by ---- of the
members of each branch.
9. Res^d that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or
more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the
National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and
to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their
services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to
affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or
diminution. That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to
hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to
hear and determine in the dernier resort, all Piracies & felonies on the
high seas, captures from an enemy: cases in which foreigners or Citizens
of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or
which respect the collection of the National revenues; impeachments of
any national officers, and questions which may involve the national
peace and harmony.
10. Resolv^d that provision ought to be made for the admission of States
lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a
voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise, with the
consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the
whole.
11. Res^d that a Republican Government & the territory of each State,
except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government &
territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State.
12. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after
the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the
completion of all their engagements.
13. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the
assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.
14. Res^d that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the
several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of
Union.
15. Res^d that the amendments which shall be offered to the
Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after
the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies
of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be
expressly chosen by the people to consider & decide thereon.
He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity
of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the U.
S. to pass away unimproved.[31]
[31] This abstract of the speech was furnished to J. M. by
M^r Randolph and is in his handwriting. As a report of it
from him had been relied on, it was omitted by J.
M.--_Madison's Note._ The fifteen resolutions, constituting
the "Virginia Plan," are in Madison's handwriting.
It was then Resolved--That the House will tomorrow resolve itself into a
Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state of the American
Union--and that the propositions moved by M^r Randolph be referred to
the said Committee.
M^r Charles Pinkney laid before the House the draft of a federal
Government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and
independent States of America.[32]--M^r P. plan ordered that the same be
referred to the Committee of the Whole appointed to consider the state
of the American Union.[33]
[32] Robert Yates, delegate from New York, kept notes of the
proceedings of the Convention, until he left July 5th, with
his colleague, John Lansing. They wrote a joint letter to
Governor Clinton afterwards, giving their reasons: "We were
not present at the completion of the new constitution; but
before we left the convention, its principles were so well
established as to convince us, that no alteration was to be
expected to conform it to our ideas of expediency and
safety."--_Secret Proceedings of the Federal Convention_,
10. Yates's notes are quoted here, whenever they are at
variance with Madison's. He gives Pinckney's motion as
follows: "Mr. C. Pinckney, a member from South Carolina,
then added, that he had reduced his ideas of a new
government to a system, which he read, and confessed that it
was grounded on the same principle as of the above [the
Randolph] resolutions."--_Id._, 97.
[33] Charles Pinckney wrote to John Quincy Adams:
"WINGAW NEAR GEORGETOWN December 12 1818
"SIR
"I have just had the honour to receive your
favour--Being at present absent from Charleston on a
visit to my planting interest in this neighbourhood
I shall in consequence of your letter shorten my
stay here considerably & return to Town for the
purpose of complying with your request as soon as
possible--From an inspection of my old papers not
long ago I know it was then easily in my power to
have complied with your request--I still hope it is
& as soon as I return to my residence in Charleston
will again, or as quickly as I can write you on it
to prevent delay.
"The Draught of the Constitution proposed by me was
divided into a number of articles & was in complete
detail--the resolutions offered by M^r Randolph were
merely general ones & as far as I recollect they
were both referred to the same Committee.
"With great respect & esteem" &c.
--_Dept. of State MSS._, Miscellaneous Letters.
Three weeks later he wrote again:
"SIR
"On my return to this City as I promised I examined
carefully all the numerous notes & papers which I
had retained relating to the federal
Convention--among them I found several rough
draughts of the Constitution I proposed to the
Convention--although they differed in some measure
from each other in the wording & arrangement of the
articles--yet they were all substantially the
same--they all proceeded upon the idea of throwing
out of view the attempt to amend the existing
Confederation (then a very favorite idea of a
number) & proceeding de novo--of a Division of the
Powers of Government into legislative executive &
judicial & of making the Government to operate
directly upon the People & not upon the States. My
Plan was substantially adopted in the sequel except
as to the Senate & giving more power to the
Executive than I intended--the force of vote which
the small & middling states had in the Convention
prevented our obtaining a proportional
representation in more than one branch & the great
powers given to the President were never intended to
have been given to him while the Convention
continued in that patient & coolly deliberative
situation in which they had been for nearly the
whole of the preceding five months of their session
nor was it until within the last week or ten days
that almost the whole of the Executive Department
was altered--I can assure you as a fact that for
more than Four months & a half out of five the power
of exclusively making treaties, appointing for the
Ministers & judges of the Supreme Court was given to
the Senate after numerous debates & consideration of
the subject both in Committee of the whole & in the
house--this I not only aver but can prove by printed
Documents in my possession to have been the case--&
should I ever have the pleasure to see you &
converse on the subject will state to you some
things relative to this business that may be new &
perhaps surprising to you--the veil of secrecy from
the Proceedings of the Convention being removed by
Congress & but very few of the members alive would
make disclosures now of the secrets there acted less
improper than before--With the aid of the journal &
the numerous notes & memorandums I have preserved
should now be in my power to give a View of the
almost insuperable difficulties the Convention had
to encounter & of the conflicting opinions of the
members I believe should have attempted it had I not
always understood M^r Madison intended it--he alone
I believe possessed & retained more numerous &
particular notes of their proceedings than myself. I
will thank you sir to do me the honour to send me or
to get the President to direct a copy of the Journal
of the Convention to be sent me as also of the
Secret Journals of Congress should it be considered
not improper in me to make the request.
"I have already informed you I have several rough
draughts of the Constitution I proposed & that they
are all substantially the same differing only in
words & the arrangement of the Articles--at the
distance of nearly thirty two years it is impossible
for me now to say which of the 4 or 5 draughts I
have was the one but enclosed I send you the one I
believe was it--I repeat however that they are
substantially the same differing only in form &
unessentials--It may be necessary to remark that
very soon after the Convention met I changed &
avowed candidly the change of my opinion on giving
the power to Congress to revise the State Laws in
certain cases & in giving the exclusive Power to the
Senate to declare War thinking it safer to refuse
the first altogether & to vest the latter in
Congress--I will thank you to acknowledge by a line
the receipt of the Draught & this.
"With very great respect & esteem
"I have the honour to be your most
"Obedient servant
"CHARLES PINCKNEY.
"December 30 1818
"In Charleston."--_Const. MSS._
The plan is written upon paper of the same size as the
letter, and with the same ink. It is undoubtedly
contemporaneous with the letter.
Madison wrote the following note to accompany his journal:
"The length of the Document laid before the
Convention, and other circumstances having prevented
the taking of a copy at the time, that which is here
inserted was taken from the paper furnished to the
Secretary of State, and contained in the Journal of
the Convention published in 1819. On comparing the
paper with the Constitution in its final form, or in
some of its Stages; and with the propositions, and
speeches of M^r Pinckney in the Convention, it would
seem that considerable errour must have crept into
the paper; occasioned possibly by the loss of the
Document laid before the convention (neither that
nor the Resolutions offered by M^r Patterson being
among the preserved papers) and by a consequent
resort for a copy to the rough draught, in which
erasures and interlineations following what passed
in the convention, might be confounded with the
original text, and after a lapse of more than thirty
years, confounded also in the memory of the author.
"There is in the paper a similarity in some cases,
and an identity in others, with details,
expressions, and definitions, the results of
critical discussions and modifications that can not
be ascribed to accident or anticipation.
"Examples may be noticed in Article VIII of the
paper; which is remarkable also for the
circumstance, that whilst it specifies the functions
of the President, no provision is contained in the
paper for the election of such an officer, nor
indeed for the appointment of any executive
magistracy; notwithstanding the evident purpose of
the author to provide an _entire_ plan of a Federal
Government.
"Again, in several instances where the paper
corresponds with the Constitution, it is at variance
with the ideas of M^r Pinckney, as decidedly
expressed in his propositions, and in his arguments,
the former in the Journal of the Convention, the
latter in the report of its debates: Thus in Art:
VIII of the paper, provision is made for removing
the President by impeachment; when it appears that
in the convention, July 20. he was opposed to any
impeachability of the Executive magistrate: In Art:
III, it is required that all money-bills shall
originate in the first Branch of the Legislature;
which he strenuously opposed Aug: 8 and again Aug:
11: In Art: V members of each House are made
ineligible to, as well as incapable of holding, any
office under the union &c. as was the case at one
Stage of the Constitution; a disqualification highly
disapproved and opposed by him Aug: 14.
"A still more conclusive evidence of errour in the
paper is seen in Art: III, which provides, as the
Constitution does, that the first Branch of the
Legislature shall be chosen by the people of the
several States; whilst it appears that on the 6^{th}
of June, a few days only after the Draft was laid
before the convention, its author opposed that mode
of choice, urging & proposing in place of it, an
election by the Legislatures of the several States.
"The remarks here made tho' not material in
themselves, were due to the authenticity and
accuracy aimed at, in this Record of the proceedings
of a Publick Body, so much an object, sometimes, of
curious research, as at all times, of profound
interest."--_Mad. MSS._
This note, as given in Gilpin's _Madison Papers_ (_1840_),
is freely edited. The Pinckney plan is given here as
Pinckney sent it to Adams. Chief-Justice Charles C. Nott, of
the U. S. Court of Claims, informs the editor that
correspondence with Pinckney's descendants reveals the fact
that none of the notes to which he alludes in his letters
are extant.
The letter of December 30, 1818, and plan, are printed in
_The Documentary History of the Constitution_, i., 309 _et
seq._
[Illustration: CHARLES PINCKNEY'S LETTER.
(Reduced.)]
[Illustration: THE PINCKNEY DRAFT.
(Reduced.)]
We the People of the States of New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island
& Providence Plantations Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania
Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina South Carolina & Georgia do
ordain, declare & establish the following Constitution for the
government of ourselves & Posterity.
ARTICLE 1:
The Style of this Government shall be The United States of America & the
Government shall consist of supreme legislative Executive & judicial
Powers.
2
The Legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of two
separate Houses--one to be called the House of Delegates & the other the
Senate who shall meet on the ---- ---- Day of ---- in every year.
3
The members of the House of Delegates shall be chosen every ---- year by
the people of the several States & the qualification of the electors
shall be the same as those of the electors in the several States for
their legislatures--each member shall have been a citizen of the United
States for ---- years; and shall be of ---- years of age & a resident in
the State he is chosen for.----Until a census of the people shall be
taken in the manner herein after mentioned the House of Delegates shall
consist of ---- to be chosen from the different States in the following
proportions: for New Hampshire, ----; for Massachusetts, ---- for Rhode
Island, ---- for Connecticut, ---- for New York, ---- for New Jersey,
---- for Pennsylvania, ---- for Delaware, ---- for Mary^{ld}, ---- for
Virginia, ---- for North Carolina, ---- for South Carolina, ---- for
Georgia, ---- & the Legislature shall hereafter regulate the number of
delegates by the number of inhabitants according to the Provisions
herein after made, at the rate of one for every ---- thousand.--All
money bills of every kind shall originate in the house of Delegates &
shall not be altered by the Senate. The House of Delegates shall
exclusively possess the power of impeachment & shall choose it's own
officers & vacancies therein shall be supplied by the executive
authority of the State in the representation from which they shall
happen.
4
The Senate shall be elected & chosen by the House of Delegates which
House immediately after their meeting shall choose by ballot ----
Senators from among the Citizens & residents of New Hampshire ---- from
among those of Massachusetts ---- from among those of Rhode Island ----
from among those of Connecticut ---- from among those of New York ----
from among those of New Jersey ---- from among those of Pennsylvania
---- from among those of Delaware ---- from among those of Maryland ----
from among those of Virginia ---- from among those of North Carolina
---- from among those of South Carolina & ---- from among those of
Georgia ----
The Senators chosen from New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island &
Connecticut shall form one class--those from New York New Jersey
Pennsylvania & Delaware one class--& those from Maryland Virginia North
Carolina South Carolina & Georgia one class.
The House of Delegates shall number these Classes one two & three & fix
the times of their service by Lot--the first class shall serve for ----
years--the second for ---- years & the third for ---- years--as their
times of service expire the House of Delegates shall fill them up by
elections for ---- years & they shall fill all vacancies that arise from
death or resignation for the time of service remaining of the members so
dying or resigning.
Each Senator shall be ---- years of age at least--shall have been a
Citizen of the United States 4 years before his election & shall be a
resident of the State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose its own
Officers.
5
Each State shall prescribe the time & manner of holding elections by the
People for the house of Delegates & the House of Delegates shall be the
judges of the elections returns & Qualifications of their members.
In each house a Majority shall constitute a Quorum to do
business--Freedom of Speech & Debate in the legislature shall not be
impeached or Questioned in any place out of it & the Members of both
Houses shall in all cases except for Treason Felony or Breach of the
Peace be free from arrest during their attendance at Congress & in going
to & returning from it--Both Houses shall keep journals of their
Proceedings & publish them except on secret occasions & the yeas & nays
may be entered thereon at the desire of one ---- of the members present.
Neither house without the consent of the other shall adjourn for more
than ---- days nor to any Place but where they are sitting.
The members of each house shall not be eligible to or capable of holding
any office under the Union during the time for which they have been
respectively elected nor the members of the Senate for one year after.
The members of each house shall be paid for their services by the States
which they represent.
Every bill which shall have passed the Legislature shall be presented to
the President of the United States for his revision--if he approves it
he shall sign it--but if he does not approve it he shall return it with
his objections to the house it originated in which house if two thirds
of the members present, notwithstanding the President's objections agree
to pass it, shall send it to the other house with the President's
objections, where if two thirds of the members present also agree to
pass it, the same shall become a law--& all bills sent to the President
& not returned by him within ---- days shall be laws unless the
Legislature by their adjournment prevent their return in which case they
shall not be laws.
6^{th}
The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay &
collect Taxes Duties Imposts & excises
To regulate Commerce with all nations & among the several States.
To borrow money & emit bills of Credit
To establish Post offices.
To raise armies
To build & equip Fleets
To pass laws for arming organizing & disciplining the Militia of the
United States
To subdue a rebellion in any State on application of its legislature
To coin money & regulate the Value of all coins & fix the Standard of
Weights & measures
To provide such Dock Yards & arsenals & erect such fortifications as may
be necessary for the United States & to exercise exclusive Jurisdiction
therein
To appoint a Treasurer by ballot
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court
To establish Post & military Roads
To establish & provide for a national University at the Seat of the
Government of the United States
To establish uniform rules of Naturalization
To provide for the establishment of a Seat of Government for the United
States not exceeding ---- miles square in which they shall have
exclusive jurisdiction
To make rules concerning Captures from an Enemy
To declare the law & Punishment of piracies & felonies at sea & of
counterfeiting Coin & of all offences against the Laws of Nations
To call forth the aid of the Militia to execute the laws of the Union
enforce treaties suppress insurrections and repel invasions
And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing powers into execution.
The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power to declare the
Punishment of Treason which shall consist only in levying War against
the United States or any of them or in adhering to their Enemies. No
person shall be convicted of Treason but by the testimony of two
witnesses.
The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole number
of inhabitants of every description which number shall within ---- years
after the first meeting of the Legislature & within the term of every
---- year after be taken in the manner to be prescribed by the
Legislature
No Tax shall be laid on articles exported from the States--nor
capitation tax but in proportion to the Census before directed
All Laws regulating Commerce shall require the assent of two thirds of
the members present in each house--The United States shall not grant any
title of Nobility--The Legislature of the United States shall pass no
Law on the subject of Religion, nor touching or abridging the Liberty of
the Press nor shall the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus ever be
suspended except in case of Rebellion or Invasion.
All acts made by the Legislature of the United States pursuant to this
Constitution & all Treaties made under the authority of the United
States shall be the supreme Law of the land & all Judges shall be bound
to consider them as such in their decisions.
7
The Senate shall have the sole & exclusive power to declare War & to
make treaties & to appoint Ambassadors & other Ministers to foreign
nations & Judges of the Supreme Court.
They shall have the exclusive power to regulate the manner of deciding
all disputes & controversies now subsisting or which may arise between
the States respecting Jurisdiction or Territory.
8
The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America which shall be his style & his title
shall be His Excellency. He shall be elected for ---- years & shall be
reeligible.
He shall from time to time give information to the Legislature of the
state of the Union & recommend to their consideration the measures he
may think necessary--he shall take care that the laws of the United
States be duly executed: he shall commission all the officers of the
United States & except as to Ambassadors other ministers and Judges of
the Supreme Court he shall nominate & with the consent of the Senate
appoint all other officers of the United States. He shall receive public
Ministers from foreign nations & may correspond with the Executives of
the different States. He shall have power to grant pardons & reprieves
except in impeachments--He shall be Commander in chief of the army &
navy of the United States & of the Militia of the several States & shall
receive a compensation which shall not be increased or diminished during
his continuance in office. At entering on the Duties of his office he
shall take an oath faithfully to execute the duties of a President of
the United States.--He shall be removed from his office on impeachment
by the house of Delegates & Conviction in the Supreme Court of Treason
bribery or Corruption--In case of his removal death resignation or
disability the President of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his
office until another President be chosen--& in case of the death of the
President of the Senate the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do
so.
9
The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power and it shall
be their duty to establish such Courts of Law Equity & Admiralty as
shall be necessary--The Judges of the Courts shall hold their offices
during good behaviour & receive a compensation, which shall not be
increased or diminished during their continuance in office--One of
these Courts shall be termed the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction
shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States
or affecting ambassadors other public Ministers & Consuls--to the trial
of impeachment of officers of the United States--to all cases of
Admiralty & maritime jurisdiction--In cases of impeachment affecting
ambassadors and other public Ministers this Jurisdiction shall be
original & in all other cases appellate----
All criminal offences (except in cases of impeachment) shall be tried in
the State where they shall be committed--the trials shall be open &
public & shall be by Jury.
10
Immediately after the first census of the people of the United States
the House of Delegates shall apportion the Senate by electing for each
State out of the citizens resident therein one Senator for every ----
members each State shall have in the House of Delegates--Each State
shall be entitled to have at least one member in the Senate.
11
No State shall grant letters of marque & reprisal or enter into treaty
or alliance or confederation nor grant any title of nobility nor
without the Consent of the Legislature of the United States lay any
impost on imports--nor keep troops or Ships of War in time of
peace--nor enter into compacts with other States or foreign powers or
emit bills of Credit or make any thing but Gold Silver or Copper a
tender in payment of debts nor engage in War except for self defence
when actually invaded or the danger of invasion be so great as not to
admit of a delay until the Government of the United States can be
informed thereof--& to render these prohibitions effectual the
Legislature of the United States shall have the power to revise the
laws of the several States that may be supposed to infringe the Powers
exclusively delegated by this Constitution to Congress & to negative &
annul such as do.
12
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges &
immunities of Citizens in the several States--Any person charged with
Crimes in any State fleeing from justice to another shall on demand of
the Executive of the State from which he fled be delivered up & removed
to the State having jurisdiction of the offence.
13
Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislature &
to the records & judicial Proceedings of the Courts & magistrates of
every State.
14
The Legislature shall have power to admit new States into the Union on
the same terms with the original States provided two thirds of the
members present in both Houses agree.
15
On the application of the legislature of a State the United States shall
protect it against domestic insurrection.
16
If two thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the same the
Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for the
purpose of amending the Constitution--or should Congress, with the
Consent of two thirds of each house, propose to the States amendments
to the same--the agreement of two thirds of the Legislatures of the
States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments parts of the
Constitution.
The Ratification of the conventions of ---- States shall be sufficient
for organizing this Constitution.[34]
[34] "... What will be the result of their meeting I cannot with
any certainty determine, but I hardly think much good can
come of it; the people of America don't appear to me to be
ripe for any great innovations & it seems they are
ultimately to ratify or reject: the weight of Gen^l
Washington as you justly observe is very great in America,
but I hardly think it is sufficient to induce the people to
pay money or part with power.
"The delegates from the Eastw^d are for a very strong
government, & wish to prostrate all y^e State legislatures,
& form a general system out of y^e whole; but I don't learn
that the people are with them, on y^e contrary in
Massachusetts they think that government too strong, & are
about rebelling again, for the purpose of making it more
democratical: In Connecticut they have rejected the
requisition for y^e present year decidedly, & no Man there
would be elected to the office of a constable if he was to
declare that he meant to pay a copper towards the domestic
debt:--R. Island has refused to send members--the cry there
is for a good government after they have paid their debts in
depreciated paper:--first demolish the Philistines (i. e.
their creditors) then for _propiety_.
"N. Hampshire has not paid a shilling, since peace, & does
not ever mean to pay on to all eternity:--if it was
attempted to tax the people for y^e domestic debt 500 Shays
would arise in a fortnight.--In N. York they pay well
because they can do it by plundering N. Jersey &
Connecticut.--Jersey will go great lengths from motives of
revenge and Interest: Pensylvany will join provided you let
the sessions of the Executive of America be fixed in
Philad^a & give her other advantages in trade to compensate
for the loss of State power. I shall make no observations on
the Southern States, but I think they will be (perhaps from
different motives) as little disposed to part with efficient
power as any in the Union...."--William Grayson to James
Monroe, New York, May 29, 1787. _Monroe MSS._
Adjourned.
WEDNESDAY MAY 30.
Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat.
The House went into Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union.
M^r Gorham was elected to the Chair by Ballot.
The propositions of M^r Randolph which had been referred to the
Co[~m]ittee being taken up. He moved on the suggestion of M^r G. Morris,
that the first of his propositions to wit "Resolved that the articles of
Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged, as to accomplish the
objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defence, security
of liberty, and general welfare,--should be postponed, in order to
consider the 3 following:
1. that a union of the States merely federal will not accomplish
the objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely
common defence, security of liberty, & gen^l welfare.
2. that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the
States, as individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient.
3. that a _national_ Government ought to be established
consisting of a _supreme_ Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.
The motion for postponing was seconded by M^r Gov^r Morris and
unanimously agreed to.
Some verbal criticisms were raised ag^{st} the first proposition, and it
was agreed on motion of M^r Butler seconded by M^r Randolph, to pass on
to the third, which underwent a discussion, less however on its general
merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms _national &
supreme_.
M^r Charles Pinkney wished to know of M^r Randolph, whether he meant to
abolish the State Govern^{ts} altogether. M^r R. replied that he meant
by these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones
which explained the outlines of the system he had in view.
M^r Butler said he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open
to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general
observations he concluded with saying that he had opposed the grant of
powers to Cong^s heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one
body. The proposed distribution of the powers into different bodies
changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths.
Gen^l Pinkney[35] expressed a doubt whether the act of Cong^s
reco[~m]ending the Convention, or the Commissions of the Deputies to it,
could authorize a discussion of a system founded on different principles
from the federal Constitution.
[35] "M^r Ch^s Cotesworth Pinckney is a Gentleman of Family and
fortune in his own State. He has received the advantage of a
liberal education, and possesses a very extensive degree of
legal knowledge. When warm in a debate he sometimes speaks
well,--but he is generally considered an indifferent Orator.
Mr. Pinckney was an Officer of high rank in the American
Army, and served with great reputation through the War. He
is now about 40 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 333.
M^r Gerry[36] seemed to entertain the same doubt.
[36] "M. Gerry's character is marked for integrity and
perseverance. He is a hesitating and laborious
speaker;--possesses a great degree of confidence and goes
extensively into all subjects that he speaks on, without
respect to elegance or flower of diction. He is connected
and sometimes clear in his arguments, conceives well, and
cherishes as his first virtue, a love for his Country. Mr.
Gerry is very much of a Gentleman in his principles and
manners;--he has been engaged in the mercantile line and is
a Man of property. He is about 37 years of age."--Pierce's
Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 325.
M^r Gov^r Morris explained the distinction between a _federal_ and
_national_, _supreme_, Gov^t; the former being a mere compact resting on
the good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat and
_compulsive_ operation. He contended that in all Communities there must
be one supreme power, and one only.
M^r Mason observed that the present confederation was not only deficient
in not providing for coercion & punishment ag^{st} delinquent States;
but argued very cogently that punishment could not in the nature of
things be executed on the States collectively, and therefore that such a
Gov^t was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would
punish those only whose guilt required it.
M^r Sherman[37] who took his seat today, admitted that the Confederation
had not given sufficient power to Cong^s and that additional powers were
necessary; particularly that of raising money which he said would
involve many other powers. He admitted also that the General &
particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed
however not to be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing
system; intimating as one reason, that it would be wrong to lose every
amendment, by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the States.
[37] "M^r Sherman exhibits the oddest shaped character I
ever remember to have met with. He is awkward, un-meaning,
and unaccountably strange in his manner. But in his train of
thinking there is something regular, deep, and
comprehensive; yet the oddity of his address, the vulgarisms
that accompany his public speaking, and that strange new
England cant which runs through his public as well as his
private speaking make everything that is connected with him
grotesque and laughable;--and yet he deserves infinite
praise,--no Man has a better Heart or a clearer Head. If he
cannot embellish he can furnish thoughts that are wise and
useful. He is an able politician and extremely artful in
accomplishing any particular object;--it is remarked that he
seldom fails. I am told he sits on the Bench in Connecticut,
and is very correct in the discharge of his Judicial
functions. In the early part of his life he was a
Shoe-maker;--but despising the lowness of his condition, he
turned Almanack maker, and so progressed upwards to a Judge.
He has been several years a Member of Congress, and
discharged the duties of his Office with honor and credit to
himself, and advantage to the State he represented. He is
about 60."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 326.
It was moved by M^r Read,[38] 2^{ded} by M^r Ch^s Cotesworth Pinkney,
to postpone the 3^d proposition last offered by M^r Randolph viz that
a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme
Legislative Executive and Judiciary, in order to take up the
following,--viz. "Resolved that in order to carry into execution the
Design of the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the
objects proposed by the Confederation a more effective Government
consisting of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, ought to be
established." The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost:
Yeas. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S. Carolina--4.
Nays. N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina--4.
[38] "M^r Read is a Lawyer and a Judge;--his legal abilities
are said to be very great, but his powers of Oratory are
fatiguing and tiresome to the last degree;--his voice is
feeble and his articulation so bad that few can have
patience to attend to him. He is a very good Man, and bears
an amiable character with those who know him. Mr. Read is
about 50, of a low stature, and a weak
constitution."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 330.
On the question as moved by M^r Butler, on the third proposition it
was resolved in Committee of whole that a national govern^t ought to
be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive &
Judiciary,--Mass^{ts} being ay.--Connect.--no. N. York divided (Col.
Hamilton ay. M^r Yates no.) Pen^a ay. Delaware ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay.
The following Resolution, being the 2^d of those proposed by M^r
Randolph was taken up, viz.--"that the rights of suffrage in the
National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of
contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the
other rule may seem best in different cases."
M^r Madison[39] observing that the words, "_or to the number of free
inhabitants_," might occasion debates which would divert the Committee
from the general question whether the principle of representation should
be changed, moved that they might be struck out.
[39] "Mr. Madison is a character who has long been in public
life; and what is very remarkable every Person seems to
acknowledge his greatness. He blends together the profound
politician, with the Scholar. In the management of every
great question he evidently took the lead in the Convention,
and tho' he cannot be called an Orator, he is a most
agreeable, eloquent, and convincing Speaker. From a spirit
of industry and application which he possesses in a most
eminent degree, he always comes forward the best informed
Man of any point in debate. The affairs of the United
States, he perhaps, has the most correct knowledge of, of
any Man in the Union. He has been twice a Member of
Congress, and was always thought one of the ablest Members
that ever sat in that Council. Mr. Maddison is about 37
years of age, a Gentleman of great modesty,--with a
remarkable sweet temper. He is easy and unreserved among his
acquaintance, and has a most agreeable style of
conversation."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 331.
M^r King observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone
remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, because
waving every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so
collected by the General Gov^t that the sums respectively drawn from the
States would not appear, and would besides be continually varying.
M^r Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some
better rule ought to be found.
Col. Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to read "that the
rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned
to the number of free inhabitiants." M^r Spaight 2^{ded} the motion.
It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was agreed to.
M^r Randolph and M^r Madison then moved the following resolution--"that
the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be
proportioned."
It was moved and 2^{ded} to amend it by adding "and not according to the
present system"--which was agreed to.
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to alter the resolution so as to read "that
the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to be
according to the present system."
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to postpone the Resolution moved by M^r
Randolph & M^r Madison, which being agreed to:
M^r Madison, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following
resolution--"that the equality of suffrage established by the articles
of Confederation ought not to prevail in the national Legislature, and
"that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted."
This was 2^{ded} by M^r Gov^r Morris, and being generally relished,
would have been agreed to; when,
M^r Reed moved that the whole clause relating to the point of
Representation be postponed; reminding the Com^e that the deputies from
Delaware were restrained by their co[~m]ission from assenting to any
change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be
fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention.
M^r Gov^r Morris observed that the valuable assistance of those members
could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of
discord in the Convention as the secession of a State, would add much to
the regret; that the change proposed was however so fundamental an
article in a national Gov^t, that it could not be dispensed with.
M^r Madison observed that whatever reason might have existed for the
equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign
States, it must cease when a National Governm^t should be put into the
place. In the former case, the acts of Cong^s depended so much for their
efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight both
within & without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and
importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the Gen^l Gov^t would
take effect without the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote
from a small State w^d have the same efficacy & importance as a vote
from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of
representatives from different States, as from Counties of different
extents within particular States. He suggested as an expedient for at
once taking the sense of the members on this point and saving the
Delaware deputies from embarrassment, that the question should be taken
in Committee, and the clause on report to the House, be postponed
without a question there. This however did not appear to satisfy Mr.
Read.
By several it was observed that no just construction of the Act of
Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if
the resolution were to be carried thro' the House as well as the
Committee. It was finally agreed however that the clause should be
postponed: it being understood that in the event the proposed change of
representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty
being started from any other quarter than from Delaware.
The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to,
The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and the House
having resolved to resume the subject in Committee to-morrow,
Adjourned to 10 O Clock.
THURSDAY MAY 31[40]
[40] "This day the state of New Jersey was represented, so that
there were now ten states in Convention."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 99. But in the _Journal of the Federal
Convention (1819)_, as in Madison's account, New Jersey is
entered as present May 25th. On May 30 two votes are
recorded by Madison and in the _Journal_ without New Jersey.
It is probable that an error was made in the _Journal_ and
that Madison followed it.
William Pierce, from Georgia took his seat.[41]
[41] Rufus King kept a few notes of the proceedings of the
convention from May 31st to August 8th. They are meagre, but
corroborate Madison's report. See King's _Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 587.
Pierce also kept a few rough notes of the proceedings which
were printed in the _Savannah Georgian_, April 19, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, and 28, 1828, and reprinted in _The American
Historical Review_, iii., 317 _et seq._ They throw little
additional light on the debates, but wherever they do are
quoted here, as are King's.
In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.
The 3^d Resolution "that the national Legislature ought to consist of
two branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of
Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Doc^r Franklin who was
understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.
Resol: 4. first clause, "that the members of the first branch of the
National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several
States," being taken up,
M^r Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought
to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should
have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want
information and are constantly liable to be misled.
M^r Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
In Mass^{ts} it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are
daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false
reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can
refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for
those employed in the administration of Governm^t. It would seem to be a
maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the
popular clamour in Mass^{ts} for the reduction of salaries and the
attack made on that of the Gov^r though secured by the spirit of the
Constitution itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore: he
was still however republican, but had been taught by experience the
danger of the levelling spirit.
M^r Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the
people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of
the Gov^t. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons--It ought to
know & sympathize with every part of the community; and ought therefore
to be taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but
also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had in
several instances particularly in Virg^a, different interests and views
arising from difference of produce, of habits &c &c. He admitted that we
had been too democratic but was afraid we s^d incautiously run into the
opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the
people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior
classes of society to this dictate of humanity & policy, considering
that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations,
might be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would,
distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society.
Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to
recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for
the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of
Citizens.
M^r Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of
the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the
federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished
to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long
subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government
this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to
increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the
electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the
general and local Governm^{ts} should be obviated as much as possible.
On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to
federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the
States, than from the people at large.
M^r Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the
national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He
observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was
composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body
of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should
be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the
first--the Executive by the second together with the first; and other
appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the
people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy
between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an
advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by
successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He
wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the
second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary
branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be
raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid
foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on
the pillars of the Legislatures.
M^r Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from
the British Constitution were often fallacious when applied to our
situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn
that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not
always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an
election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor &
character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He
seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which
the State legislatures should be bound to choose.[42]
[42] "Mr. Strong would agree to the principle, provided it would
undergo a certain modification, but pointed out
nothing."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.
M^r Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the national
Legislature, by the people,
Mass^{ts} ay. Connec^t div^d. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pen^a ay.
Delaw^r div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georg^a ay.
The remaiñg Clauses of Resolution 4^{th} relating to the qualifications
of members of the National Legislature, being posp^d nem. con., as
entering too much into detail for general propositions.
The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. "that the second, (or
senatorial) branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."
M^r Spaight contended that the 2^d branch ought to be chosen by the
State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect.[43]
[43] "M^r King observed that the Question called for was
premature, and out of order,--that unless we go on regularly
from one principle to the other we shall draw out our
proceedings to an endless length."--Pierce's Notes, _Am.
Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.
M^r Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands
of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and
security of interests among the States which it was necessary to
preserve; and called on M^r Randolph the mover of the propositions, to
explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members
he meant to assign to this second branch.
M^r Rand^f observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions
stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required;
that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with
propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the
number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much
smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the
passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are liable. He
observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils
under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their
origin every man had found it in the turbulance and follies of
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for ag^{st} this
tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely
to answer the purpose.[44]
[44] "Butler said that until the number of the Senate could be
known it would be impossible for him to give a vote on
it."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.
M^r King reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as
proposed (by M^r Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be
impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or _the idea of
proportion_ among the States was to be disregarded. According to this
_idea_, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the
choice of one of them.--M^r Spaight withdrew his motion.
M^r Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an
election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the
second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought
both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested
the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several
election districts for one branch, in chusing members for the other
branch, as a good model.
M^r Madison observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the
smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the
latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be
found in the former. The election of Senators in Virg^a where large &
small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had
illustrated this consequence. Local partiality, would often prefer a
resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit
residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known
throughout his own State.[45]
[45] "M^r Butler moved to have the proposition relating to the
first branch postponed, in order to take up another,--which
was that the second branch of the Legislature consist of
blank.
"M^r King objected to the postponement for the reasons which he had
offered before."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 319.
M^r Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State
Legislatures.[46]
[46] According to Pierce, Mason spoke after Sherman, and
Pinckney's motion is given more fully by Pierce than by
Madison.
"M^r Mason was of opinion that it would be highly improper to draw the
Senate out of the first branch; that it would occasion vacancies which
would cost much time, trouble, and expense to have filled up,--besides
which it would make the members too dependent on the first branch.
"M^r Ch^s Pinckney said he meant to propose to divide the Continent into
four Divisions, out of which a certain number of persons sh^d be
nominated, and out of that nomination to appoint a senate."--Pierce's
Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._, iii., 319.
M^r Pinkney moved to strike out the "nomination by the State
Legislatures;" on this question.
[47]Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pen^a no. Del.
div^d V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no.
[47] This question is omitted in the printed Journal,
& the votes applied to the succeeding one, instead
of the votes as here stated.--Madison's Note.
On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of
nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no.
N. Jersey, no. Pen^a no. Del. no. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. G^a no.
So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan.
The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature
ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question
whether each branch sh^d originate laws, there was an unanimous
affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the
Legislative power of the existing Cong^s to this Assembly, there was
also a silent affirmative nem. con.
On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which
the State Legislatures were individually incompetent,"
M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutledge[48] objected to the vagueness of the term
_incompetent_, and said they could not well decide how to vote until
they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this
definition.[49]
[48] "Mr. Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly
mounted at the commencement of the late revolution;--his
reputation in the first Congress gave him a distinguished
rank among the American Worthies. He was bred to the Law,
and now acts as one of the Chancellors of South Carolina.
This Gentleman is much famed in his own State as an Orator,
but in my opinion he is too rapid in his public speaking to
be denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undobotedly a man
of abilities, and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune.
Mr. Rutledge was once Governor of South Carolina. He is
about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 333.
[49] According to Pierce: "M^r Sherman was of opinion that
it would be too indefinitely expressed,--and yet it would be
hard to define all the powers by detail. It appeared to him
that it would be improper for the national Legislature to
negative all the Laws that were connected with the States
themselves.
"M^r Madison said it was necessary to adopt some general
principles on which we should act,--that we were wandering
from one thing to another without seeming to be settled in
any one principle.
"M^r Wythe observed that it would be right to establish
general principles before we go into detail, or very shortly
Gentlemen would find themselves in confusion, and would be
obliged to have recurrence to the point from whence they sat
out.
"M^r King was of opinion that the principles ought first to
be established before we proceed to the framing of the Act.
He apprehends that the principles only go so far as to
embrace all the power that is given up by the people to the
Legislature, and to the federal Government, but no farther.
"M^r Randolph was of opinion that it would be impossible to
define the powers and the length to which the federal
Legislature ought to extend just at this time.
"M^r Wilson observed that it would be impossible to
enumerate the powers which the federal Legislature ought to
have."--Pierce's Notes, _Id._, iii., 319, 320.
M^r Butler repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in
taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the
extent of his meaning.
M^r Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the
national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an
inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any
considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion
was fixed on this point.
M^r Madison said that he had brought with him into the Convention a
strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers
necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also
brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained
unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might
ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing
which should be found essential to such a form of Gov^t as would
provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This
being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for
attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.
On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not
competent--Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t div^d. (Sherman no. Elseworth ay.)
N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay.
Georg^a ay.
The other clauses giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the
States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the
Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or
any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added
after the words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion
of D^r Franklin) were agreed to with^t debate or dissent.
The last clause of Resolution 6, authorizing an exertion of the force of
the whole ag^{st} a delinquent State came next into consideration.
M^r Madison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force,
the more he doubted, the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of
it when applied to people collectively and not individually.--A union of
the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own
destruction. The use of force ag^{st} a State, would look more like a
declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably
be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous
compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would
be framed as might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the
clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con.
The Committee then rose & the House
Adjourned.[50]
[50] "When the Convention first opened at Philadelphia,
there were a number of propositions brought forward as great
leading principles for the new Government to be established
for the United States. A copy of these propositions was
given to each Member with an injunction to keep everything a
profound secret. One morning, by accident, one of the
Members dropt his copy of the propositions, which being
luckily picked up by General Mifflin was presented to
General Washington, our President, who put it in his pocket.
After the debates of the Day were over, and the question for
adjournment was called for, the General arose from his seat,
and previous to his putting the question addressed the
Convention in the following manner,--
"'Gentlemen
"'I am sorry to find that some one Member of this Body, has
been so neglectful of the secrets of the Convention as to
drop in the State House, a copy of their proceedings, which
by accident was picked up and delivered to me this Morning.
I must entreat Gentlemen to be more careful, lest our
transactions get into the News Papers, and disturb the
public repose by premature speculations. I know not whose
Paper it is, but there it is [throwing it down on the
table,] let him who owns it take it.' At the same time he
bowed, picked up his Hat, and quitted the room with a
dignity so severe that every Person seemed alarmed; for my
part I was extremely so, for putting my hand in my pocket I
missed my copy of the same Paper, but advancing up to the
Table my fears soon dissipated; I found it to be in the hand
writing of another Person. When I went to my lodgings at the
Indian Queen, I found my copy in a coat pocket which I had
pulled off that Morning. It is something remarkable that no
Person ever owned the Paper."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 324.
FRIDAY JUNE 1^{ST} 1787
William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. "that a national
Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature for
the term of ---- years &c. to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the
Executive powers of Congress &c."
M^r Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive
powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c. which
would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an
elective one.
M^r Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person. M^r C.
Pinkney seconded the motion, so as to read "that a National Ex. to
consist of a single person, be instituted."
A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put
the question, Doc^r Franklin[51] observed that it was a point of great
importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments
on it before the question was put.
[51] "D^r Franklin is well known to be the greatest phylosopher
of the present age;--all the operations of nature he seems
to understand,--the very heavens obey him, and the Clouds
yield up their Lightning to be imprisoned in his rod. But
what claim he has to the politician, posterity must
determine. It is certain that he does not shine much in
public Council,--he is no Speaker, nor does he seem to let
politics engage his attention. He is, however, a most
extraordinary Man, and he tells a story in a style more
engaging than anything I ever heard. Let his Biographer
finish his character. He is 82 years old, and possesses an
activity of mind equal to a youth of 25 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._, iii., 328.
M^r Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other
subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by
having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them,
which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting
the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him
the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest
responsibility and administer the public affairs best.
M^r Sherman said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more
than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into
effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and
accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depository of the
supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the
business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and
consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he
wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature should be
at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.
M^r Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch
and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives
of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among
others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he considered strictly
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not
appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.[52]
[52] According to King, Madison followed Wilson: "Madison agreed
with Wilson in the Definition of Executive power. _Ex vi
termini._ Executive power does not include the Power of War
and Peace. Executive Power shd. be limited and defined. If
large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies.
Perhaps the best plan will be a single Executive of long
duration, with a Council and with Liberty to dissent on his
personal Responsibility."--King's _Life and Correspondence
of Rufus King_, i., 588.
According to Pierce:
"M^r Madison was of opinion that an Executive formed of one
Man would answer the purpose when aided by a Council, who
should have the right to advise and record their
proceedings, but not to control his authority."--Pierce's
Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 320.
M^r Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in
order to give weight & inspire confidence.[53]
[53] King gives Gerry's remarks: "_Gerry._ I am in favor of a
Council to advise the Executive: they will be organs of
information respecting Persons qualified for various
offices. Their opinions may be recorded, so as to be liable
to be called to account & impeached--in this way, their
Responsibility will be certain, and for misconduct their
Punishment sure."
Dickinson followed Gerry: "_Dickinson._ A limited yet
vigorous Executive is not republican, but peculiar to
monarchy--the royal Executive has vigour, not only by power,
but by popular Attachment & Report--an Equivalent to popular
Attachment may be derived from the Veto on the Legislative
acts. We cannot have a limited monarchy--our condition does
not permit it. Republics are in the beginning and for a time
industrious, but they finally destroy themselves because
they are badly constituted. I dread the consolidation of the
States, & hope for a good national Govt. from the present
Division of the States with a feeble Executive.
"We are to have a Legislature of two branches, or two
Legislatures, as the sovereign of the nation--this will work
a change unless you provide that the judiciary shall aid and
correct the Executive. The first Branch of the Legislature,
the H. of Representatives, must be on another plan. The
second Branch or Senate may be on the present scheme of
representing _the States_--the Representatives to be
apportioned according to the Quotas of the States paid into
the general Treasury. The Executive to be removed from
office by the national Legislature, on the Petition of seven
States."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_,
i., 588 _et seq._
M^r Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He
regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be
governed by the British Govenm^t as our prototype. He did not mean
however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a
situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it;
but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form
of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the
Executive department, vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be
found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be
independent. It ought therefore in order to support its independence to
consist of more than one.
M^r Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus
of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated
that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to
the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the
manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic
would do for it.
M^r Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common
consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and
the first part of the clause agreed to, viz--"that a National Executive
be instituted."[54]
[54] Williamson followed Wilson, according to King:
"_Williamson_--There is no true difference between an
Executive composed of a single person, with a Council, and
an Executive composed of three or more persons."--King's
_Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 590.
M^r Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice sh^d be made
between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of
the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature
Executive, and must be given to that departm^t whether administered by
one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the
judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a
single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before
the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive sh^d be struck
out & that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be
instituted" there be inserted the words following viz. "with power to
carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases
not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not
Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be
delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor
judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment, in
consequence of a suggestion by Gen^l Pinkney that improper powers might
otherwise be delegated.
M^r Wilson seconded this motion.
M^r Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member
of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor
Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He
said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the
"power to carry into effect the national laws."
M^r Randolph seconded the motion.
M^r Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or
even the preceding words, "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being
perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not
however see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen
in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.
In consequence of the motion of M^r Pinkney, the question on M^r
Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by M^r Pinkney
struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pen^a, Del.,
N. C., & Geo. ag^{st} Mass., Virg^a & S. Carolina the preceding part of
the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided all the other
States in the affirmative.
The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, &
the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,
M^r Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which
he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear
chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an
election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Mass^{ts},
shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large,
was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such
cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.
M^r Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making
him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which
was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme
Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was
any such thing.
M^r Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be
filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred
this short period, on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be
provided for.
M^r Pinkney moves for seven years.
M^r Sherman was for three years, and ag^{st} the doctrine of rotation as
throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties.
M^r Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a
re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a
false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit
characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue
with the Legislature for a re-appointment.
M^r Bedford[55] was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years.
He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the Country
would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for
such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess
the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his
appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as
an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for
a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine
years.
[55] "Mr. Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his
profession I am told, has merit. He is a bold and nervous
Speaker, and has a very commanding and striking manner;--but
he is warm and impetuous in his temper, and precipitate in
his judgment. Mr. Bedford is about 32 years old, and very
corpulent."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 330.
On the question for seven years,
Mass^{ts} divid^{d.} Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay.
Del. ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.
There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 div^d, a question was asked whether a
majority had voted in the Affirmative? The President decided that it was
an affirmative vote.
The _mode of appointing_ the Executive was the next question.
M^r Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the
people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature
from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but
the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of
each other, as well as of the States;
Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes
however that M^r Wilson might have time to digest it into his own
form.--the clause, "to be chosen by the National Legislature"--was
accordingly postponed.--
M^r Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch
only of the national Legislature.
The Committee then rose and the House
Adjourned.
SATURDAY JUNE 2^D IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE
William Sam^l Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer,
from Mary^d, & John Lansing J^r from N. York, took their seats.
It was mov^d & 2^{ded} to postpone ye Resol: of M^r Randolph respecting
the Executive, in order to take up the 2^d branch of the Legislature;
which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: ag^{st}
N. Y. Pen^a Mary^d. The mode of appointing the Executive was resumed.
M^r Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode
proposed by Mr. Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy
shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided
into ---- districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each
district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature
elect ---- members for their respective districts to be electors of the
Executive Magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy
meet at ---- and they or any ---- of them so met shall proceed to elect
by ballot, but not out of their own body ---- person-- in whom the
Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested."
M^r Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the
intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce
more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an
election by the national Legislature.
M^r Gerry, opposed the election by the National legislature. There would
be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature &
the candidates w^d bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would
be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter,
of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to
their friends. He liked the principle of M^r Wilson's motion, but fears
it would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to
supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not
yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might
not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till the people
should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking
the suffrages of the States, instead of Electors, or letting the
Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that
the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being
too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and
liable to deceptions.
M^r Williamson[56] could see no advantage in the introduction of
Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to
them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended
with great trouble and expence.
[56] "Mr. Williamson is a Gentleman of education and talents. He
enters freely into public debate from his close attention to
most subjects, but he is no Orator. There is a great degree
of good humour and pleasantry in his character; and in his
manners there is a strong trait of the Gentleman. He is
about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 332.
On the question for agreeing to M^r Wilson's substitute, it was
negatived: Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y.[57] no. P^a ay. Del. no.
Mar^d ay. Virg^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo^a no.
[57] New York, in the printed Journal, divided.--Madison's Note.
On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature
for the term of seven years, it was agreed to, Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay.
N. Y. ay. Pen^a no. Del. ay. Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.
Doc^r Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the
services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute--"whose
necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary,
stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services." He said that being
very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling
to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion
and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of
the Committee read instead of speaking them. M^r Wilson made an offer to
read the paper, which was accepted. The following is a literal copy of
the paper:
Sir,
It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of
any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to
the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first
reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it
success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch
I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and
chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and
from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will judge
of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may
possibly change mine.--I think I see inconveniences in the
appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the
contrary, great advantages.
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on
the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of
power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great
force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the
same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects.
Place before the eyes of such men, a post of _honour_ that shall
be at the same time a place of _profit_, and they will move
heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it
is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The
struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions
which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its
Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars,
and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of
peace.
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this
profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the
heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties,
tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the
wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men
fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the
men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their
selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your
Government and be your rulers.--And these too will be mistaken
in the expected happiness of their situation: For their
vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same
motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their
administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to
the people.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning
with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of
long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed
augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more
to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give
more to them. Hence as all history informs us, there has been in
every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the
Governing & Governed; the one striving to obtain more for its
support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone
occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either
in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people.
Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the
revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they
are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the
people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the
greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his
partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all
resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is
scarce a king in an hundred who would not, if he could, follow
the example of Pharoah, get first all the people's money, then
all their lands, and then make them and their children servants
for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to establish
Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind
to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from
Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than
five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among
Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore,
perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States,
may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I
think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not
sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our
posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we
do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number
will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a
King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly
expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.
It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and
that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive
department, without paying them well for their services. I
conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present
themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The
high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but
it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore
not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and
usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In
France, the office of Counsellor, or Member of their Judiciary
Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a
high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which
are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more
than three Per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as
legal interest is there at five PerC^t they in fact pay two
PerC^t for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the
Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the
burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not
however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our
Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the
pleasure of doing good & serving their Country and the respect
such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some
minds to give up a great portion of their time to the Public,
without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.
Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made
the experiment, and practised it with success more than one
hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule
with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their
controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and
yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear
the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences.
In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the
respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed,
but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees or
perquisites. And indeed in all cases of Public service the less
the profit the greater the honor.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and
most important of our offices, that of General of our armies
executed for eight years together without the smallest salary,
by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and
this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other
brave men his military friends & companions, and the constant
anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding
three or four men in all the U. States, with public spirit
enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal
term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that
our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our
Country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number
of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and
faithfully the office in question.
Sir. The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is
not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing
them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the
amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented
with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and
done my duty.
The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with the view he said merely
of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and
which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of
weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the
consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but
rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its
expediency or practicability.
M^r Dickinson moved,[58] "that the Executive be made removable by the
National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of
individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of
removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great
officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for
removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had
no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed
inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required
considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.
[58] "Mr. Dickinson has been famed through all America for his
Farmers Letters; he is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of
very extensive information. When I saw him in the Convention
I was induced to pay the greatest attention to him whenever
he spoke. I had often heard that he was a great Orator, but
I found him an indifferent Speaker. With an affected air of
wisdom he labors to produce a trifle,--his language is
irregular and incorrect,--his flourishes, (for he sometimes
attempts them,) are like expiring flames, they just shew
themselves and go out;--no traces of them are left on the
mind to chear or animate it. He is, however, a good writer
and will be ever considered one of the most important
characters in the United States. He is about 55 years old,
and was bred a Quaker."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._,
iii., 329.
M^r Bedford seconded the motion.
M^r Sherman contended that the national Legislature should have power to
remove the Executive at pleasure.
M^r Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered
indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the
corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the
Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the
fundamental principle of good Government.
M^r Madison & M^r Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of
agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a
minority of the people to prevent y^e removal of an officer who had
rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it
would open a door for intrigues ag^{st} him in States where his
administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay
court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or
wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to
introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency
could be otherwise supplied.
M^r Dickinson considered the business as so important that no man ought
to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the
sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary
departments ought to be made as independ^t as possible; but that such an
Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent
with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited
monarchy. In the British Gov^t itself the weight of the Executive arises
from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from
the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must
look out for something else. One source of stability is the double
branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct
States formed the other principal source of stability. This division
ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left
with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future
fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the
States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of
smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as _one_ of the best
Governments in the world. It was not _certain_ that the same blessings
were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings
had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited
Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times--the
state of our affairs forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was
it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if
these obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential
to such a Gov^t could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of
the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a
complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But
though a form the most perfect _perhaps_ in itself be unattainable, we
must not despair. If antient republics have been found to flourish for a
moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves that they were badly
constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their
diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky
division of this Country into distinct States; a division which some
seemed desirous to abolish altogether.
As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as it
might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in
mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice
at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the
sums paid within each State would form a better ratio for the other
branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of
property.[59]
[59] According to Pierce: "M^r Madison said it was far from being
his wish that every executive Officer should remain in
Office, without being amenable to some Body for his
conduct."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 321.
A motion being made to strike out, "on request by a majority of the
Legislatures of the individual States," and rejected, Connecticut, S.
Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question on M^r Dickinson's
motion for making Executive removable by Nat^l Legislature at request of
majority of State Legislatures was also rejected all the States being in
the negative Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote.
The Question for making y^e Executive ineligible after seven years, was
next taken and agreed to: Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. P^a div^d.
Del. ay. Mary^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.[60]
[60] In printed Journal Geo. ay.--Madison's Note.
M^r Williamson 2^{ded} by M^r Davie[61] moved to add to the last clause,
the words--"and to be removable on impeachment & conviction of
mal-practice or neglect of duty"--which was agreed to.
[61] "Mr. Davey is a Lawyer of some eminence in his State. He is
said to have a good classical education, and is a Gentleman
of considerable literary talents. He was silent in the
Convention, but his opinion was always respected. Mr. Davy
is about 30 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 332.
M^r Rutlidge & M^r C. Pinkney moved that the blank for the n^o of
persons in the Executive be filled with the words "one person." He
supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that
no member would oppose the motion.
M^r Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should
not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to
suffer the establishm^t of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt
an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long
as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was
adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2. that a unity was
unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of
the department. 3. that the necessary confidence would never be reposed
in a single Magistrate. 4. that the appointments would generally be in
favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and
consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. He was
in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different
portions of the country.
M^r Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to
answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed
he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its
interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts,
there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military
matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on
this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing
the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland
when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for
directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of
the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.
The motion was then postp^d, the Committee rose & the House Adj^d.
MONDAY JUNE 4. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
The Question was resumed on motion of M^r Pinkney, 2^{ded} by M^r
Wilson, "shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with
a single person?"
M^r Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the
gentleman from Virg^a (Mr. Randolph) but the arguments used had not
convinced him. He observed that the objections of M^r R. were levelled
not so much ag^st the measure itself, as ag^{st} its unpopularity. If he
could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it
should form a part, though the part were an important one, yet he would
give it up rather than lose the whole. On examination he could see no
evidence of the alledged antipathy of the people. On the contrary he was
persuaded that it does not exist. All know that a single magistrate is
not a King. One fact has great weight with him. All the 13 States tho
agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single
magistrate at the head of the Govern^t. The idea of three heads has
taken place in none. The degree of power is indeed different; but there
are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former reasons for
preferring a Unity, he would mention another. The _tranquillity_ not
less than the vigor of the Gov^t he thought would be favored by it.
Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled,
continued, & violent animosities; which would not only interrupt the
public administration; but diffuse their poison thro' the other branches
of Gov^t, thro' the States, and at length thro' the people at large. If
the members were to be unequal in power the principle of opposition to
the Unity was given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would
not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a
question. In the Legislative & Executive departm^{ts} questions have
commonly many sides. Each member therefore might espouse a separate one
& no two agree.[62]
[62] According to Pierce, King followed Wilson:
"Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial ought not to join
in the negative of a Law, because the Judges will have the
expounding of those Laws when they come before them; and
they will no doubt stop the operation of such as shall
appear repugnant to the Constitution."--Pierce's Notes, _Am.
Hist. Rev._, iii., 322.
M^r Sherman. This matter is of great importance and ought to be well
considered before it is determined. M^r Wilson he said had observed that
in each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of the Gov^t.
It was so he admitted, and properly so, and he wished the same policy to
prevail in the federal Gov^t. But then it should be also remarked that
in all the States there was a Council of advice, without which the first
magistrate could not act. A council he thought necessary to make the
establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G. B. the King has a
Council; and though he appoints it himself, its advice has its weight
with him, and attracts the Confidence of the people.
M^r Williamson asks M^r Wilson whether he means to annex a Council.
M^r Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than
prevent malpractices.
M^r Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the
Executive. It w^d be extremely inconvenient in many instances,
particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an
army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads.
On the question for a single Executive it was agreed to Mass^{ts} ay.
Con^t ay. N. Y. no. Pen^a ay. Del. no. Mary^d no. Virg^a ay. (M^r R. &
M^r Blair no--Doc^r McC^g M^r M. & Gen. W. ay. Col. Mason being no, but
not in the house, M^r Wythe ay. but gone home). N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Georg^a ay.
First Clause of Proposition 8^{th} relating _to a Council of Revision_
taken into consideration.
M^r Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as
they will have a sufficient check ag^{st} encroachments on their own
department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of
deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had
actually set aside laws as being ag^{st} the Constitution. This was done
too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of
y^e office to make them judges of the policy of public measures. He
moves to postpone the clause in order to propose "that the National
Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall
not be afterwards passed by ---- parts of each branch of the national
Legislature."
M^r King seconds the motion, observing that the Judges ought to be able
to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of
having participated in its formation.
M^r Wilson thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment
goes far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to be
distinct & independent, The Executive ought to have an absolute
negative. Without such a self-defence the Legislature can at any moment
sink it into non-existence. He was for varying the proposition in such a
manner as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute
negative.
On the question to postpone in order to take M^r Gerry's proposition
into consideration it was agreed to, Mass^s ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay.
P^a ay. Del. no. Mary^d no. Virg^a no. N. C ay. S. C. ay. G^a ay.
Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before Committee, M^r Wilson & M^r
Hamilton move that the last part of it (viz. "w^{ch} s^l not be
afterw^{ds} passed "unless by ---- parts of each branch of the National
legislature") be struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute
negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought of such a power
being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col: Hamilton that the
King of G. B. had not exerted his negative since the Revolution.
M^r Gerry sees no necessity for so great a controul over the legislature
as the best men in the Community would be comprised in the two branches
of it.
Doc^r Franklin, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague for whom
he had a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could not help it
on this. He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on
the Legislature, under the proprietary Government of Pen^a. The negative
of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law
whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase
of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at
last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the
Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might
actually receive the former before he should sign the latter. When the
Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the
concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could not be
got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from
taxation: so that the people were to fight for the security of his
property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. This was a
mischevous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council, such a
power would be less objectionable. It was true, the King of G. B. had
not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution; but that
matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to the
members of parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done
according to the will of the Ministers. He was afraid, if a negative
should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be
demanded, till at last eno' would be gotten to influence & bribe the
Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will of the Executive.
M^r Sherman was ag^{st} enabling any one man to stop the will of the
whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He
thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws,
but not permit him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the
Legislature.
M^r Madison supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should
be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer
the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen
that the Executive constituted as ours is proposed to be, would have
firmness eno' to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain part
of the body itself. The King of G. B. with all his splendid attributes
would not be able to withstand y^e unanimous and eager wishes of both
houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would certainly be
obnoxious to the temper of this Country; its present temper at least.
M^r Wilson believed as others did that this power would seldom be used.
The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain
from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation
would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pen^a
formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not
then as now to be appointed by the people. It will not in this case as
in the one cited be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated by
a different & sometimes opposite interest. The salary too is now
proposed to be fixed by the Constitution, or if D^r F.'s idea should be
adopted all salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large
proportion of each House to overrule the Executive check might do in
peaceable times; but there might be tempestuous moments in which
animosities may run high between the Executive and Legislative branches,
and in which the former ought to be able to defend itself.
M^r Butler had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate; but could
he have entertained an idea that a compleat negative on the laws was to
be given him he certainly should have acted very differently. It had
been observed that in all countries the Executive power is in a constant
course of increase. This was certainly the case in G. B. Gentlemen
seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the
Executive power. But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in
this Country as well as in others.
M^r Bedford was opposed to every check on the Legislature, even the
Council of Revision first proposed. He thought it would be sufficient to
mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative
Authority, which would give all the requisite security to the rights of
the other departments. The Representatives of the people were the best
Judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external
controul whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient controul
within the Legislature itself.
Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed he found [he was out
at the time] for vesting the executive powers in a single person. Among
these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases. The
probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by D^r F. as
proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be
opened here. The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures
till new appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees
engrossed these into all his own hands, the American Executive, like the
British, will by bribery & influence, save himself the trouble & odium
of exerting his negative afterwards. We are M^r Chairman going very far
in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British Government,
but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a new
principle into our system, and not necessary as in the British Gov^t
where the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to
pave the way to hereditary Monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the
people will ever consent to such an innovation? If they do I venture to
tell them, they are mistaken. The people never will consent. And do
gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater danger of
a rejection, not for a moment but forever, of the plan which shall be
proposed to them. Notwithstanding the oppression & injustice experienced
among us from democracy; the genius of the people is in favor of it, and
the genius of the people must be consulted. He could not but consider
the federal system as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this
Convention to devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the
dangerous interval between extinction of an old, and the establishment
of a new Governm^t and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue. He
hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in this
Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the
late Revolution. Will it not be eno' to enable the Executive to suspend
offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to
them overruled by a greater majority than was required in the first
instance. He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people
to a single magistrate: If more than one had been fixed on, greater
powers might have been entrusted to the Executive. He hoped this attempt
to give such powers would have its weight hereafter as an argument for
increasing the number of the Executive.
Doc^r Franklin. A Gentleman from S. C., (M^r Butler) a day or two ago
called our attention to the case of the U. Netherlands. He wished the
gentleman had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original of
that Gov^t. The people being under great obligations to the Prince of
Orange whose wisdom and bravery had saved them, chose him for the
Stadtholder. He did very well. Inconveniences however were felt from his
powers; which growing more & more oppressive, they were at length set
aside. Still however there was a party for the P. of Orange, which
descended to his son who excited insurrections, spilt a great deal of
blood, murdered the de Witts, and got the powers revested in the
Stadtholder. Afterwards another Prince had power to excite insurrections
& make the Stadtholdership hereditary. And the present Stadth^{der} is
ready to wade thro' a bloody civil war to the establishment of a
monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned the circumstance of appointing
officers. He knew how that point would be managed. No new appointment
would be suffered as heretofore in Pens^a unless it be referred to the
Executive; so that all profitable offices will be at his disposal. The
first man put at the helm will be a good one. No body knows what sort
may come afterwards. The Executive will be always increasing here, as
elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy.
On the question for striking out so as to give Executive an absolute
negative,--Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg^a no.
M^r Butler moved that the Resol^n be altered so as to read--"Resolved
that the National Executive have a power to suspend any Legislative act
for the term of ----."
Doct^r Franklin seconds the motion.
M^r Gerry observed that a power of suspending might do all the mischief
dreaded from the negative of useful laws; without answering the salutary
purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones.
On question "for giving this suspending power" all the States, to wit
Mass^{ts} Con^t N. Y. P^a Del. Mary^d Virg^a N. C. S. C. Georgia, were
_No_.
On a question for enabling _two thirds_ of each branch of the
Legislature to overrule the revisionary check, it passed in the
affirmative sub silentio; and was inserted in the blank of M^r Gerry's
motion.
On the question on M^r Gerry's motion which gave the Executive alone
without the Judiciary the revisionary controul on the laws unless
overruled by 2/3 of each branch; Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay.
P^a ay. Del. ay. Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
It was moved by M^r Wilson 2^{ded} by M^r Madison--that the following
amendment be made to the last resolution--after the words "National Ex."
to add "& a convenient number of the National Judiciary."[63]
[63] Before the motion, according to King's notes:
"_Madison_--The judiciary ought to be introduced in the
business of Legislation--they will protect their department,
and united with the Executive make its negatives more
strong. There is weight in the objections to this
measure--but a check on the Legislature is necessary,
Experience proves it to be so, and teaches us that what has
been thought a calumny on a republican Govt. is nevertheless
true--In all Countries are diversity of Interests, the Rich
& the Poor, the Dr. & Cr., the followers of different
Demagogues, the Diversity of religious Sects--the Effects of
these Divisions in Ancient Govts. are well known, and the
like causes will now produce like effects. We must therefore
introduce in our system Provisions against the measures of
an interested majority--a check is not only necessary to
protect the Executive power, but the minority in the
Legislature. The independence of the Executive, having the
Eyes of all upon him will make him an impartial judge--add
the Judiciary, and you greatly increase his respectability."
After the motion: "Dickinson opposed--You shd. separate the
Departments--you have given the Executive a share in
Legislation; and it is asked why not give a share to the
judicial power. Because the Judges are to interpret the
Laws, and therefore shd. have no share in making them--not
so with the Executive whose causing the Laws to be Executed
is a ministerial office only. Besides we have experienced in
the Br. Constitution which confers the Power of a negative
on the Executive."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus
King_, i., 592.
An Objection of order being taken by M^r Hamilton to the introduction of
the last amendment at this time, notice was given by M^r W. & M^r M.,
that the same w^d be moved to-morrow,--whereupon Wednesday (the day
after) was assigned to reconsider the amendment of M^r Gerry.
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to proceed to the consideration of the
9^{th} resolution submitted by M^r Randolph--when on motion to agree to
the first clause namely "Resolved, that a National Judiciary be
established," It passed in the affirmative nem. con.
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to add these words to the first clause of
the ninth resolution namely--"to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of
one or more inferior tribunals," which passed in the affirmative.
The Comm^e then rose and the House
Adjourned.
TUESDAY JUNE 5. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Governor Livingston from New Jersey, took his seat.
The words, "one or more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals" as
an amendment to the last clause of Resol^n 9^{th}. The Clause--"that the
National Judiciary be chosen by the National Legislature," being under
consideration.
M^r Wilson opposed the appointm^t of Judges by the National Legisl:
Experience shewed the impropriety of such appointm^{ts} by numerous
bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary
consequences. A principal reason for unity in the Executive was that
officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.
M^r Rutlidge was by no means disposed to grant so great a power to any
single person. The people will think we are leaning too much towards
Monarchy. He was against establishing any national tribunal except a
single supreme one. The State tribunals are most proper to decide in all
cases in the first instance.
Doc^r Franklin observed that two modes of chusing the Judges had
been mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature and by the Executive. He
wished such other modes to be suggested as might occur to other
gentlemen; it being a point of great moment. He would mention one
which he had understood was practised in Scotland. He then in a brief
and entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which the nomination
proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the
profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among
themselves. It was here he said the interest of the electors to make the
best choice, which should always be made the case if possible.
Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or
any numerous body. Besides the danger of intrigue and partiality, many
of the members were not judges of the requisite qualifications. The
Legislative talents which were very different from those of a Judge,
commonly recommended men to the favor of Legislative Assemblies. It was
known too that the accidental circumstances of presence and absence, of
being a member or not a member, had a very undue influence on the
appointment. On the other hand He was not satisfied with referring the
appointment to the Executive, He rather inclined to give it to the
Senatorial branch, as numerous eno' to be confided in--as not so
numerous as to be governed by the motives of the other branch; and as
being sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate
judgments. He hinted this only and moved that the _appointment by the
Legislature_ might be struck out, & a blank left to be hereafter filled
on maturer reflection. M^r Wilson second it. On the question for
striking out, Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr. Wilson gave notice that he should at a future day move for a
reconsideration of that clause which respects "inferior tribunals."
M^r Pinkney gave notice that when the clause respecting the appointment
of the Judiciary should again come before the Committee he should move
to restore the "appointment by the national Legislature."
The following clauses of Resol: 9. were agreed to viz "to hold their
offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually at stated
times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or
diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office
at the time of such increase or diminution."
The remaining clause of Resolution 9. was postponed.
Resolution 10 was agreed to,--viz--that provision ought to be made for
the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the U.
States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory, or
otherwise with the consent of a number of voices in the National
Legislature less than the whole.
The 11. Propos: "_for guaranteeing to States Republican Gov^t &
territory_" &c. being read M^r Patterson[64] wished the point of
representation could be decided before this clause should be considered,
and moved to postpone it, which was not opposed, and agreed
to,--Connecticut & S. Carolina only voting ag^{st} it.
[64] "M^r Patterson is one of those kind of Men whose powers
break in upon you, and create wonder and astonishment. He is
a Man of great modesty, with looks that bespeak talents of
no great extent,--but he is a Classic, a Lawyer, and an
Orator;--and of a disposition so favorable to his
advancement that every one seemed ready to exalt him with
their praises. He is very happy in the choice of time and
manner of engaging in a debate, and never speaks but when he
understands his subject well. This Gentleman is about 43 Y.
of age, of a very low stature."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer.
Hist. Rev._, iii., 328.
Propos. 12 "_for continuing Cong^s till a given day and for fulfilling
their engagements_," produced no debate.
On the question, Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J.[65] ay. Pa.
ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. G. ay.
[65] Note in Madison's writing: New Jersey omitted in
printed Journal.
Propos: 13. "that _provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the
system now to be established, without requiring the assent of the Nat^l
Legislature_", being taken up,
M^r Pinkney doubted the propriety or necessity of it.
M^r Gerry favored it. The novelty & difficulty of the experiment
requires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would also
give intermediate stability to the Gov^t. Nothing had yet happened in
the States where this provision existed to prove its impropriety.--The
proposition was postponed for further consideration: the votes being,
Mas: Con. N. Y. P^a Del. Ma. N. C. ay. Virg^a S. C. Geo. no.
Propos. 14. "_requiring oath from the State officers to support National
Gov^t_" was postponed after a short uninteresting conversation: the
votes.
Con. N. Jersey M^d Virg. S. C. Geo. ay. N. Y. P^a Del. N. C. no.
Massachusetts divided.
Propos. 15. for "_recommending Conventions under appointment of the
people to ratify the new Constitution_" &c. being taken up,
M^r Sherman thought such a popular ratification unnecessary: the
articles of Confederation providing for changes and alterations with the
assent of Cong^s and ratification of State Legislatures.
M^r Madison thought this provision essential. The articles of Confed^n
themselves were defective in this respect, resting in many of the States
on the Legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts of the
States, and of Cong^s especially where the former are of posterior date,
and the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must
necessarily prevail, or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of
the State authority. He suggested also that as far as the articles of
Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among
the Governments of Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that
a breach of any one article, by any of the parties, absolved the other
parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons as well as others
he thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified
in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the
people themselves.
M^r Gerry observed that in the Eastern States the Confed^n had been
sanctioned by the people themselves. He seemed afraid of referring the
new system to them. The people in that quarter have at this time the
wildest ideas of Government in the world. They were for abolishing the
Senate in Mass^{ts} and giving all the other powers of Gov^t to the
other branch of the Legislature.
M^r King supposed that the last article of y^e Confed^n Rendered the
legislature competent to the ratification. The people of the Southern
States where the federal articles had been ratified by the Legislatures
only, had since _impliedly_ given their sanction to it. He thought
notwithstanding that there might be policy in varying the mode. A
Convention being a single house, the adoption may more easily be carried
thro' it, than thro' the Legislatures where there are several branches.
The Legislatures also being to lose power, will be most likely to raise
objections. The people having already parted with the necessary powers
it is immaterial to them, by which Government they are possessed,
provided they be well employed.
M^r Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee by a train of
observations to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality
of States to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated by
the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the
provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of
such a partial union, with a door open for the accession of the
rest.[66]
[66] (This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller
States of N. Jersey & Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to
it.)--Madison's Note.
M^r Pinkney hoped that in case the experiment should not unanimously
take place, nine States might be authorized to unite under the same
Governm^t.
The propos. 15. was postponed nem. con^t.
M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutlidge moved that to-morrow be assigned to
reconsider that clause of Propos: 4: which respects the election of
the first branch of the National Legislature--which passed in
affirmative,--Con.: N. Y., P^a Del. M^d, V^a, ay.--6 Mas.: N. J.: N. C.:
S. C.: Geo.: no. 5.
Mr. Rutlidge hav^g obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for
establishing _inferior_ tribunals under the national authority, now
moved that that part of the clause in the propos. 9. should be expunged:
arguing that the State tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases
to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme
national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights &
uniformity of Judgm^{ts}: that it was making an unnecessary encroachment
on the jurisdiction of the States and creating unnecessary obstacles to
their adoption of the new system. Mr. Sherman 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r Madison observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed
throughout the Republic with _final_ jurisdiction in _many_ cases,
appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides,
an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after
improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed
directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an
undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no
purpose. To order a new trial at the Supreme bar would oblige the
parties to bring up their witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the seat
of the Court. An effective Judiciary establishment commensurate to the
legislative authority, was essential. A Government without a proper
Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or
legs to act or move.
M^r Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds. He said the admiralty
jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Government, as it
related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular states, & to
a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to
happen.
M^r Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the supposed
expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing State
Courts would answer the same purpose.
M^r Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a National
Legislature, there ought to be a national Judiciary, and that the former
ought to have authority to institute the latter.
On the question for M^r Rutlidge's motion to strike out "inferior
tribunals"
Mass^{ts} divided. Con^t ay. N. Y. div^d. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Wilson & M^r Madison then moved, in pursuance of the idea expressed
above by Mr. Dickinson, to add to the Resol: 9. the words following
"that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior
tribunals." They observed that there was a distinction between
establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the
Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated the
necessity of some such provision.
M^r Butler. The people will not bear such innovations. The States will
revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an establishment to be
useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon
who gave the Athenians not the best Gov^t he could devise, but the best
they w^d receive.
M^r King remarked as to the comparative expence, that the establishment
of inferior tribunals w^d cost infinitely less than the appeals that
would be prevented by them.
On this question as moved by M^r W. & M^r M.
Mass. ay. C^t no. N. Y. div^d. N. J.[67] ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
[67] In printed Journals N. Jersey, no.--Madison's Note.
The Committee then rose & the House adjourned to 11 OC tom^w.
WEDNESDAY JUNE 6^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE.
M^r Pinkney according to previous notice & rule obtained, moved "that
the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State
Legislatures, and not by the people;" contending that the people were
less fit Judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less
likely to promote the adoption of the new Government, if they were to be
excluded from all share in it.
M^r Rutlidge 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r Gerry.[68] Much depends on the mode of election. In England the
people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the
proportion having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the
opposite extreme: hence in Mass^{ts} the worst men get into the
Legislature. Several members of that Body had lately been convicted of
infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance & baseness, spare no pains,
however dirty to carry their point ag^{st} men who are superior to the
artifices practised. He was not disposed to run into extremes. He was as
much principled as ever ag^{st} aristocracy and monarchy. It was
necessary on the one hand that the people should appoint one branch of
the Gov^t in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence. But he
wished the election on the other to be so modified as to secure more
effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was that the people
should nominate certain persons in certain districts, out of whom the
State Legislatures sh^d make the appointment.
[68] "Mr. Gerry.--If the national legislature are appointed by
the state legislatures, demagogues and corrupt members will
creep in."--Yates's _Secret Debates in Forming the
Constitution_, 105.
M^r Wilson. He wished for vigor in the Gov^t, but he wished that
vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all
authority. The Gov^t ought to possess not only 1^{st} the _force_, but
2^{dly} the _mind or sense_ of the people at large. The Legislature
ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole Society.
Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the
people to act collectively. The opposition was to be expected he said
from the _Governments_, not from the Citizens of the States. The latter
had parted as was observed (by M^r King) with all the necessary powers;
and it was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised, if well
exercised. The State officers were to be the losers of power. The people
he supposed would be rather more attached to the national Gov^t than to
the State Gov^{ts} as being more important in itself, and more
flattering to their pride. There is no danger of improper elections if
made by _large_ districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of
the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue
themselves into office.
M^r Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the State Gov^{ts} the
elections ought to be by the people. If the State Gov^{ts} are to be
continued, it is necessary in order to preserve harmony between the
National & State Gov^{ts} that the elections to the former sh^d be made
by the latter. The right of participating in the National Gov^t would be
sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State
Legislatures. The objects of the Union, he thought were few, 1. defence
ag^{st} foreign danger, 2. ag^{st} internal disputes & a resort to
force, 3. Treaties with foreign nations 4. regulating foreign commerce,
& drawing revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser objects alone
rendered a Confederation of the States necessary. All other matters
civil & criminal would be much better in the hands of the States. The
people are more happy in small than in large States. States may indeed
be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby be too subject to faction. Some
others were perhaps too large, the powers of Gov^t not being able to
pervade them. He was for giving the General Gov^t power to legislate and
execute within a defined province.
Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, Cong^s represent the
_States_ and not the _people_ of the States: their acts operate on the
_States_, not on the individuals. The case will be changed in the new
plan of Gov^t. The people will be represented; they ought therefore to
choose the Representatives. The requisites in actual representation are
that the Rep^s should sympathize with their constituents; sh^d think as
they think, & feel as they feel; and that for these purposes sh^d even
be residents among them. Much he s^d had been alledged ag^{st}
democratic elections. He admitted that much might be said; but it was to
be considered that no Gov^t was free from imperfections & evils; and
that improper elections in many instances were inseparable from
Republican Gov^{ts}. But compare these with the advantage of this Form
in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human nature. He was
persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people,
if divided into large districts, than by the State Legislatures. Paper
money had been issued by the latter when the former were against it. Was
it to be supposed that the State Legislatures then w^d not send to the
Nat^l legislature patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on
them.
M^r Madison considered an election of one branch at least of the
Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free
Gov^t and that this mode under proper regulations had the additional
advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too
great an agency of the State Governments in the General one. He differed
from the member from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman) in thinking the objects
mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a National Gov^t.
Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined
with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the security
of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences
with these were evils which had more perhaps than anything else,
produced this convention. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty
could long exist under the abuses of it practised in some of the States.
The gentleman (M^r Sherman) had admitted that in a very small State,
faction & oppression w^d prevail. It was to be inferred then that
wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed
in the largest as well as the smallest tho' less than in the smallest;
and were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the
nature of the Gov^t would Admit. This was the only defence ag^{st} the
inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of
Gov^t. All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects,
Factions, & interests, as they happened to consist of rich & poor,
debtors & creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial
interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the
followers of this political leader or that political leader--the
disciples of this religious Sect or that religious Sect. In all cases
where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights
of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A
prudent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by
experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals.
Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number
among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only
remaining tie is known to be inadequate in individuals: In large
numbers, little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion itself may
become a motive to persecution & oppression. These observations are
verified by the Histories of every country antient & modern. In Greece &
Rome the rich & poor, the Creditors & debtors, as well as the patricians
& plebeians alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness.
What a source of oppression was the relation between the parent cities
of Rome, Athens & Carthage, & their respective provinces; the former
possessing the power, & the latter being sufficiently distinguished to
be separate objects of it? Why was America so justly apprehensive of
Parliamentary injustice? Because G. Britain had a separate interest real
or supposed, & if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued
that interest at our expence. We have seen the mere distinction of
colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most
oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man. What has been the
source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves? Has it not
been the real or supposed interest of the major number? Debtors have
defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the
mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of property have thrown
a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species. The lesson
we are to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by a
common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party
become insecure. In a Republican Gov^t the majority if united have
always an opportunity. The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, &
thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests &
parties, that in the 1^{st} place a majority will not be likely at the
same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or
of the minority; and in the 2^d place that in case they sh^d have such
an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It was
incumbent on us then to try this remedy, and with that view to frame a
republican system on such a scale & in such a form as will controul all
the evils w^{ch} have been experienced.
M^r Dickinson considered it essential that one branch of the Legislature
sh^d be drawn immediately from the people; and as expedient that the
other sh^d be chosen by the Legislatures of the States. This combination
of the State Gov^{ts} with the national Gov^t was as politic as it was
unavoidable. In the formation of the Senate we ought to carry it through
such a refining process as will assimilate it as nearly as may be to the
House of Lords in England. He repeated his warm eulogiums on the British
Constitution. He was for a strong National Gov^t but for leaving the
States a considerable agency in the System. The objection ag^{st} making
the former dependent on the latter might be obviated by giving to the
Senate an authority permanent & irrevocable for three, five or seven
years. Being thus independent they will check & decide with becoming
freedom.
M^r Read. Too much attachment is betrayed to the State Govern^{ts}. We
must look beyond their continuance. A national Gov^t must soon of
necessity swallow all of them up. They will soon be reduced to the mere
office of electing the National Senate. He was ag^{st} patching up the
old federal System: he hoped the idea w^d be dismissed. It would be like
putting new cloth on an old garment. The confederation was founded on
temporary principles. It cannot last: it can not be amended. If we do
not establish a good Gov^t on new principles, we must either go to ruin,
or have the work to do over again. The people at large are wrongly
suspected of being averse to a Gen^l Gov^t. The aversion lies among
interested men who possess their confidence.
M^r Pierce[69] was for an election by the people as to the 1^{st} branch
& by the States as to the 2^d branch; by which means the Citizens of the
States w^d be represented both _individually_ & _collectively_.
[69] "My own character I shall not attempt to draw, but leave
those who may choose to speculate on it, to consider it in
any light that their fancy or imagination may depict. I am
conscious of having discharged my duty as a Soldier through
the course of the late revolution with honor and propriety;
and my services in Congress and the Convention were bestowed
with the best intention towards the interest of Georgia, and
towards the general welfare of the Confederacy. I possess
ambition, and it was that, and the flattering opinion which
some of my Friends had of me, that gave me a seat in the
wisest Council in the World, and furnished me with an
opportunity of giving these short Sketches of the Characters
who composed it."--Pierce's Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._, iii.,
334.
General Pinkney wished to have a good National Gov^t & at the same time
to leave a considerable share of power in the States. An election of
either branch by the people scattered as they are in many States,
particularly in S. Carolina was totally impracticable. He differed from
gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people w^d be a better guard
ag^{st} bad measures, than by the Legislatures. A majority of the people
in S. Carolina were notoriously for paper-money as a legal tender; the
Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was that
the latter had some sense of character and were restrained by that
consideration. The State Legislatures also he said would be more
jealous, & more ready to thwart the National Gov^t, if excluded from a
participation in it. The Idea of abolishing these Legislatures w^d never
go down.
M^r Wilson would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen from Mr.
Read; namely, that the idea of preserving the State Gov^{ts} ought to be
abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the national & State
Gov^{ts} provided the latter were restrained to certain local purposes;
nor any probability of their being devoured by the former. In all
confederated Systems antient & modern the reverse had happened; the
Generality being destroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts
composing it.
On the question for electing the 1^{st} branch by the State Legislatures
as moved by M^r Pinkney: it was negatived:
Mass. no. C^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
M^r Wilson moved to reconsider the vote excluding the Judiciary from a
share in the revision of the laws, and to add after "National Executive"
the words "with a convenient number of the national Judiciary;"
remarking the expediency of reinforcing the Executive with the influence
of that Department.
M^r Madison 2^{ded} the motion. He observed that the great difficulty in
rendering the Executive competent to its own defence arose from the
nature of Republican Gov^t which could not give to an individual citizen
that settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest, that weight of
property, that personal interest ag^{st} betraying the national
interest, which appertain to an hereditary magistrate. In a Republic
personal merit alone could be the ground of political exaltation, but it
would rarely happen that this merit would be so pre-eminent as to
produce universal acquiescence. The Executive Magistrate would be envied
& assailed by disappointed competitors: His firmness therefore w^d need
support. He would not possess those great emoluments from his station,
nor that permanent stake in the public interest which w^d place him out
of the reach of foreign corruption. He would stand in need therefore of
being controuled as well as supported. An association of the Judges in
his revisionary function w^d both double the advantage and diminish the
danger. It w^d also enable the Judiciary Department the better to defend
itself ag^{st} Legislative encroachments. Two objections had been made
1^{st} that the Judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a
participation in the making of laws might give in the exposition of
them. 2^{dly} that the Judiciary Departm^t ought to be separate &
distinct from the other great Departments. The 1^{st} objection had some
weight; but it was much diminished by reflecting that a small proportion
of the laws coming in question before a Judge w^d be such wherein he had
been consulted; that a small part of this proportion w^d be so ambiguous
as to leave room for his prepossessions; and that but a few cases w^d
probably arise in the life of a Judge under such ambiguous passages. How
much good on the other hand w^d proceed from the perspicuity, the
conciseness, and the systematic character w^{ch} the Code of laws w^d
receive from the Judiciary talents. As to the 2^d objection, it either
had no weight, or it applied with equal weight to the Executive & to the
Judiciary revision of the laws. The maxim on which the objection was
founded required a separation of the Executive as well as the Judiciary
from the Legislature & from each other. There w^d in truth however be no
improper mixture of these distinct powers in the present case. In
England, whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive had an
absolute negative on the laws; and the Supreme tribunal of Justice (the
House of Lords) formed one of the other branches of the Legislature. In
short whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the
Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate Departments, or on
the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws unwise in their
principle, or incorrect in their form, the utility of annexing the
wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed
incontestable.
M^r Gerry thought the Executive, whilst standing alone w^d be more
impartial than when he c^d be covered by the sanction & seduced by the
sophistry of the Judges.
M^r King. If the Unity of the Executive was preferred for the sake of
responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the revisionary as
to the executive power.
M^r Pinkney had been at first in favor of joining the heads of the
principal departm^{ts} the Secretary at War, of foreign affairs &c.--in
the council of revision. He had however relinquished the idea from a
consideration that these could be called on by the Executive Magistrate
whenever he pleased to consult them. He was opposed to the introduction
of the Judges into the business.
Col. Mason was for giving all possible weight to the revisionary
institution. The Executive power ought to be well secured ag^{st}
Legislative usurpations on it. The purse & the sword ought never to get
into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive.
M^r Dickinson. Secrecy, vigor & despatch are not the principal
properties req^d in the Executive. Important as these are, that of
responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved; by leaving it
singly to discharge its functions. He thought too a junction of the
Judiciary to it, involved an improper mixture of powers.
M^r Wilson remarked, that the responsibility required belonged to his
Executive duties. The revisionary duty was an extraneous one, calculated
for collateral purposes.
M^r Williamson, was for substituting a clause requiring 2/3 for every
effective act of the Legislature, in place of the revisionary provision.
On the question for joining the Judges to the Executive in the
revisionary business,
Mass. no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Pinkney gave notice that tomorrow he should move for the
reconsideration of that clause in the sixth Resolution adopted by the
Comm^e which vests a negative in the National Legislature on the laws of
the several States.
The Com^e rose & the House adj^d to 11 OC.
THURSDAY JUNE 7^{TH} 1787--IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE
M^r Pinkney according to notice moved to reconsider the clause
respecting the negative on State laws, which was agreed to, and tomorrow
for fixed the purpose.
The Clause providing for y^e appointment of the 2^d branch of the
national Legislature, having lain blank since the last vote on the mode
of electing it, to wit, by the 1^{st} branch, M^r Dickinson now moved
"that the members of the 2^d branch ought to be chosen by the individual
Legislatures."
M^r Sherman seconded the motion; observing that the particular States
would thus become interested in supporting the National Govenm^t and
that a due harmony between the two Governments would be maintained. He
admitted that the two ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions,
but that they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting each other.
M^r Pinkney. If the small States should be allowed one Senator only, the
number will be too great, there will be 80 at least.
M^r Dickinson had two reasons for his motion. 1, because the sense of
the States would be better collected through their Governments; than
immediately from the people at large; 2. because he wished the Senate to
consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their
rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a
likeness to the British House of Lords as possible; and he thought such
characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in
any other mode. The greatness of the number was no objection with him.
He hoped there would be 80 and twice 80. of them. If their number should
be small, the popular branch could not be balanced by them. The
legislature of a numerous people ought to be a numerous body.
M^r Williamson, preferred a small number of Senators, but wished that
each State should have at least one. He suggested 25 as a convenient
number. The different modes of representation in the different branches,
will serve as a mutual check.
M^r Butler was anxious to know the ratio of representation before he
gave any opinion.
M^r Wilson. If we are to establish a national Government, that
Government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch of it
should be chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the people, the
two branches will rest on different foundations, and dissensions will
naturally arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the
people as well as the other branch, the people might be divided into
proper districts for the purpose & moved to postpone the motion of M^r
Dickinson, in order to take up one of that import.
M^r Morris 2^{ded} him.
M^r Read proposed "that the Senate should be appointed by the Executive
Magistrate out of a proper number of persons to be nominated by the
individual legislatures." He said he thought it his duty, to speak his
mind frankly. Gentlemen he hoped would not be alarmed at the idea.
Nothing short of this approach towards a proper model of Government
would answer the purpose, and he thought it best to come directly to the
point at once.--His proposition was not seconded nor supported.
M^r Madison, if the motion (of Mr. Dickinson) should be agreed to, we
must either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation;
or admit into the Senate a very large number of members. The first is
inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The
use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness,
with more system, & with more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge
their number and you communicate to them the vices which they are meant
to correct. He differed from M^r D. who thought that the additional
number would give additional weight to the body. On the contrary it
appeared to him that their weight would be in an inverse ratio to their
number. The example of the Roman Tribunes, was applicable. They lost
their influence and power, in proportion as their number was augmented.
The reason seemed to be obvious: They were appointed to take care of the
popular interests & pretensions at Rome, because the people by reason of
their numbers could not act in concert; were liable to fall into
factions among themselves, and to become a prey to their aristocratic
adversaries. The more the representatives of the people therefore
were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their
constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves
either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the opposite
faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust. When
the weight of a set of men depends merely on their personal characters;
the greater the number the greater the weight. When it depends on the
degree of political authority lodged in them the smaller the number the
greater the weight. These considerations might perhaps be combined in
the intended Senate; but the latter was the material one.
M^r Gerry. 4 modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. 1. by
the 1^{st} branch of the National Legislature. This would create a
dependance contrary to the end proposed. 2. by the National Executive.
This is a stride towards monarchy that few will think of. 3. by the
people. The people have two great interests, the landed interest, and
the commercial including the stockholders. To draw both branches from
the people will leave no security to the latter interest; the people
being Chiefly composed of the landed interest, and erroneously
supposing, that the other interests are adverse to it. 4. by the
Individual Legislatures. The elections being carried thro' this
refinement, will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the
Commercial interest ag^{st} the landed; without which oppression will
take place, and no free Gov^t can last long where that is the case. He
was therefore in favor of this last.
M^r Dickenson.[70] The preservation of the States in a certain degree of
agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision between the
different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each
other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the
Councils of our Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He
compared the proposed National System to the Solar System, in which the
States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their
proper orbits. The Gentleman from P^a (M^r Wilson) wished he said to
extinguish these planets. If the State Governments were excluded from
all agency in the national one, and all power drawn from the people at
large, the consequence would be that the national Gov^t would move in
the same direction as the State Gov^{ts} now do, and would run into all
the same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the 13 small streams
into one great current pursuing the same course without any opposition
whatever. He adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed
of a large number, and that their influence from family weight & other
causes would be increased thereby. He did not admit that the Tribunes
lost their weight in proportion as their n^o was augmented and gave a
historical sketch of this institution. If the reasoning of (M^r Madison)
was good it would prove that the number of the Senate ought to be
reduced below ten, the highest n^o of the Tribunitial corps.
[70] It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an
election by the State Legislatures involved a surrender of
the principle insisted on by the large States & dreaded by
the small ones, namely that of a proportional representation
in the Senate. Such a rule w^d make the body too numerous,
as the smallest State must elect one member at
least.--Madison's Note.
M^r Wilson. The subject it must be owned is surrounded with doubts and
difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British Governm^t cannot be
our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our
laws, the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of
the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the States
being devoured by the Nation^l Gov^t. On the contrary, he wished to keep
them from devouring the national Gov^t. He was not however for
extinguishing these planets as was supposed by Mr. D.--neither did he on
the other hand, believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun.
Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for
subordinate purposes, for which their existence is made essential by the
great extent of our Country. He could not comprehend in what manner the
landed interest w^d be rendered less predominant in the Senate, by an
election through the medium of the Legislatures than by the people
themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained, sacrificed the
commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such
a choice from them as would defeat their own views. He was for an
election by the people in large districts which w^d be most likely to
obtain men of intelligence & uprightness; subdividing the districts only
for the accommodation of voters.
M^r Madison could as little comprehend in what manner family weight, as
desired by M^r D. would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate
through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some other modes.
The true question was in what mode the best choice w^d be made? If an
election by the people, or thro' any other channel than the State
Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a preference of merit,
there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those
Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would be
derived thro' that channel than from the people thro' some other. The
great evils complained of were that the State Legislatures run into
schemes of paper money &c. whenever solicited by the people, & sometimes
without even the sanction of the people. Their influence then, instead
of checking a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be
expected to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory than to say
that the Nat^l Legislature with^t a proper check, will follow the
example of the State Legislatures, & in the same breath, that the State
Legislatures are the only proper check.
M^r Sherman opposed elections by the people in districts, as not likely
to produce such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.
M^r Gerry insisted that the commercial & monied interest w^d be more
secure in the hands of the State Legislatures, than of the people at
large. The former have more sense of character, and will be restrained
by that from injustice. The people are for paper money when the
Legislatures are ag^{st} it. In Mass^{ts} the County Conventions had
declared a wish for a _depreciating_ paper that w^d sink itself.
Besides, in some States there are two Branches in the Legislature, one
of which is somewhat aristocratic. There w^d therefore be so far a
better chance of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he thought to
be three powerful objections ag^{st} elections by districts, 1. it is
impracticable; the people cannot be brought to one place for the
purpose; and whether brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds
w^d be unavoidable. 2. small States forming part of the same district
with a large one, or large part of a large one, w^d have no chance of
gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit. 3 a new source of
discord w^d be opened between different parts of the same district.
M^r Pinkney thought the 2^d branch ought to be permanent & independent;
& that the members of it w^d be rendered more so by receiving their
appointment from the State Legislatures. This mode w^d avoid the
rivalships & discontents incident to the election by districts. He was
for dividing the States into three classes according to their respective
sizes, & for allowing to the 1^{st} class three members, to the 2^d two,
& to the 3^d one.
On the question for postponing M^r Dickinson's motion referring the
appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, in order to
consider M^r Wilson's for referring it to the people.
Mass. no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary for the Nat^l Gov^t a
certain portion must necessarily be left in the States. It is impossible
for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so as to carry
equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought to have some
means of defending themselves ag^{st} encroachments of the Nat^l Gov^t.
In every other department we have studiously endeavoured to provide for
its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the
means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than the
giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of,
the Nat^l Establishment. There is danger on both sides no doubt; but we
have only seen the evils arising on the side of the State Gov^{ts}.
Those on the other side remain to be displayed. The example of Cong^s
does not apply. Cong^s had no power to carry their acts into execution,
as the Nat^l Gov^t will have.
On M^r Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the State
Legislatures,
Mass. ay. C^t ay. N. Y. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Gerry gave notice that he w^d tomorrow move for a reconsideration of
the mode of appointing the Nat^l Executive in order to substitute an
appointm^t by the State Executives.
The Committee rose & The House adj^d.
FRIDAY JUNE 8^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.
On a reconsideration of the clause giving the Nat^l Legislature a
negative on such laws of the States as might be contrary to the articles
of Union, or Treaties with foreign nations,
M^r Pinkney moved "that the National Legislature sh^d have authority to
negative all laws which they sh^d judge to be improper." He urged that
such a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render
it effectual; that the States must be kept in due subordination to the
nation; that if the States were left to act of themselves in any case,
it w^d be impossible to defend the national prerogatives, however
extensive they might be on paper; that the acts of Congress had been
defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated
violations: that this universal negative was in fact the corner stone of
an efficient national Gov^t; that under the British Gov^t the negative
of the Crown had been found beneficial, and the _States_ are more one
nation now, than the _Colonies_ were then.
M^r Madison seconded the motion. He could not but regard an indefinite
power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely
necessary to a perfect System. Experience had evinced a constant
tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority; to violate
national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other; to
oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A
negative was the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing
these mischiefs. The existence of such a check would prevent attempts to
commit them. Should no such precaution be engrafted, the only remedy w^d
lie in an appeal to coercion. Was such a remedy eligible? was it
practicable? Could the national resources, if exerted to the utmost
enforce a national decree ag^{st} Mass^{ts} abetted perhaps by several
of her neighbours? It w^d not be possible. A small proportion of the
Community, in a compact situation acting on the defensive, and at
one of its extremities, might at any time bid defiance to the National
authority. Any Gov^t for the U. States formed on the supposed
practicability of using force ag^{st} the unconstitutional proceedings
of the States, w^d prove as visionary & fallacious as the Gov^t of
Cong^s. The negative w^d render the use of force unnecessary. The States
c^d of themselves pass no operative act, any more than one branch of a
Legislature where there are two branches, can proceed without the other.
But in order to give the negative this efficacy, it must extend to all
cases. A discrimination w^d only be a fresh source of contention between
the two authorities. In a word, to recur to the illustrations borrowed
from the planetary system. This prerogative of the General Gov^t, is the
great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of
the States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper
orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the political System.
M^r Williamson was ag^{st} giving a power that might restrain the States
from regulating their internal police.
M^r Gerry c^d not see the extent of such a power, and was ag^{st} every
power that was not necessary. He thought a remonstrance ag^{st}
unreasonable acts of the States w^d reclaim them. If it sh^d not force
might be resorted to. He had no objection to authorize a negative to
paper money and similar measures. When the confederation was depending
before Congress, Massachusetts was then for inserting the power of
emitting paper money am^g the exclusive powers of Congress. He observed
that the proposed negative w^d extend to the regulations of the Militia,
a matter on which the existence of a State might depend. The Nat^l
Legislature with such a power may enslave the States. Such an idea as
this will never be acceded to. It has never been suggested or conceived
among the people. No speculative projector, and there are eno' of that
character among us, in politics as well as in other things, has in any
pamphlet or newspaper thrown out the idea. The States too have different
interests and are ignorant of each other's interests. The Negative
therefore will be abused. New States too having separate views from the
old States will never come into the Union. They may even be under some
foreign influence; are they in such case to participate in the negative
on the will of the other States?
M^r Sherman thought the cases in which the negative ought to be
exercised, might be defined. He wished the point might not be decided
till a trial at least sh^d be made for that purpose.
M^r Wilson would not say what modifications of the proposed power might
be practicable or expedient. But however novel it might appear the
principle of it when viewed with a close & steady eye, is right. There
is no instance in which the laws say that the individual sh^d be bound
in one case, & at liberty to judge whether he will obey or disobey in
another. The cases are parallel. Abuses of the power over the individual
person may happen as well as over the individual States. Federal liberty
is to the States, what civil liberty, is to private individuals, and
States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary
concession of their political sovereignty, than the savage is to
purchase Civil liberty by the surrender of the personal sovereignty,
which he enjoys in a State of nature. A definition of the cases in which
the Negative should be exercised, is impracticable. A discretion must be
left on one side or the other? will it not be most safely lodged on the
side of the Nat^l Gov^t? Among the first sentiments expressed in the
first Cong^s one was that Virg^a is no more, that Mass^{ts} is no
[more], that P^a is no more &c. We are now one nation of brethren. We
must bury all local interests & distinctions. This language continued
for some time. The tables at length began to turn. No sooner were the
State Gov^{ts} formed than their jealousy & ambition began to display
themselves. Each endeavoured to cut a slice from the common loaf, to add
to its own morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered
down to the impotent condition in which it now stands. Review the
progress of the articles of Confederation thro' Congress & compare the
first & last draught of it. To correct its vices is the business of this
convention. One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the
whole over its parts. What danger is there that the whole will
unnecessarily sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the
whole at the mercy of each part, and will not the general interest be
continually sacrificed to local interests?
M^r Dickenson deemed it impossible to draw a line between the cases
proper & improper for the exercise of the negative. We must take our
choice of two things. We must either subject the States to the danger of
being injured by the power of the Nat^l Gov^t or the latter to the
danger of being injured by that of the States. He thought the danger
greater from the States. To leave the power doubtful, would be opening
another spring of discord, and he was for shutting as many of them as
possible.
M^r Bedford. In answer to his colleague's question, where w^d be the
danger to the States from this power, would refer him to the smallness
of his own State which may be injured at pleasure without redress. It
was meant he found to strip the small States of their equal right of
suffrage. In this case Delaware would have about 1/90 for its share in
the General Councils, whilst P^a & V^a would possess 1/3 of the whole.
Is there no difference of interests, no rivalship of commerce, of
manufactures? Will not these large States crush the small ones whenever
they stand in the way of their ambitious or interested views. This shews
the impossibility of adopting such a system as that on the table, or any
other founded on a change in the priñple of representation. And after
all, if a State does not obey the law of the new System, must not force
be resorted to as the only ultimate remedy, in this as in any other
system. It seems as if P^a & V^a by the conduct of their deputies wished
to provide a system in which they would have an enormous & monstrous
influence. Besides, How can it be thought that the proposed negative can
be exercised? Are the laws of the States to be suspended in the most
urgent cases until they can be sent seven or eight hundred miles, and
undergo the deliberation of a body who may be incapable of Judging of
them? Is the National Legislature too to sit continually in order to
revise the laws of the States?
M^r Madison observed that the difficulties which had been started were
worthy of attention and ought to be answered before the question was
put. The case of laws of urgent necessity must be provided for by some
emanation of the power from the Nat^l Gov^t into each State so far as to
give a temporary assent at least. This was the practice in the Royal
Colonies before the Revolution and would not have been inconvenient if
the supreme power of negativing had been faithful to the American
interest, and had possessed the necessary information. He supposed that
the negative might be very properly lodged in the senate alone, and that
the more numerous & expensive branch therefore might not be obliged to
sit constantly. He asked M^r B. what would be the consequence to the
small States of a dissolution of the Union w^{ch} seemed likely to
happen if no effectual substitute was made for the defective System
existing, and he did not conceive any effectual system could be
substituted on any other basis than that of a proportional suffrage? If
the large States possessed the Avarice & ambition with which they were
charged, would the small ones in their neighbourhood, be more secure
when all controul of a Gen^l Gov^t was withdrawn.
M^r Butler was vehement ag^{st} the Negative in the proposed extent, as
cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant States. The people
there would not he was sure give it a hearing.
On the question for extending the negative power to all cases as
proposed by (M^r P. & M^r M.) Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no.
P^a ay. Del. div^d. M^r Read & M^r Dickenson ay. M^r Bedford & M^r
Basset no. Mary^d no. V^a ay. M^r R. M^r Mason no. M^r Blair, Doc^r
M^c C^g M^r M. ay. Gen^l W. not consulted. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo no.
On motion of M^r Gerry and M^r King tomorrow was assigned for
reconsidering the mode of appointing the National Executive: the
reconsideration being voted for by all the States except Connecticut &
N. Carolina.
M^r Pinkney and M^r Rutlidge moved to add to the Resol^n 4. agreed to by
the Com^e the following, viz. "that the States be divided into three
classes, the 1^{st} class to have 3 members, the 2^d two, & the 3^d one
member each, that an estimate be taken of the comparative importance of
each State at fixed periods, so as to ascertain the number of members
they may from time to time be entitled to." The Committee then rose and
the House adjourned.
SATURDAY JUNE 9^{TH}[71] MR. LUTHER MARTIN FROM
MARYLAND TOOK HIS SEAT. IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE.
[71] Edward Carrington wrote to Jefferson from New York,
June 9, 1787:
"The debates and proceedings of the Convention are kept in
profound secrecy--opinions of the probable result of their
deliberations can only be formed from the prevailing
impressions of men of reflection and understanding--these
are reducible to two schemes--the first, a consolidation of
the whole Empire into one republic, leaving in the States
nothing more than subordinate courts for facilitating the
administration of the Laws--the second an investiture of the
foederal sovereignty with full and independent authority as
to the Trade, Revenues, and forces of the union, and the
rights of peace and war, together with a negative upon all
the acts of the State legislatures.
The first idea, I apprehend, would be impracticable, and
therefore do not suppose it can be adopted--general Laws
through a Country embracing so many climates, productions,
and manners as the United States, would operate many
oppressions & a general legislature would be found
incompetent to the formation of local ones, as a majority
would in every instance, be ignorant of, and unaffected by
the objects of legislation.... Something like the second
will probably be formed--indeed I am certain that nothing
less than what will give the foederal sovereignty a compleat
controul over the state Governments, will be thought worthy
of discussion--such a scheme constructed upon well adjusted
principles would certainly give us stability and importance
as a nation, and if the Executive powers can be sufficiently
checked, must be eligible--unless the whole has a decided
influence over the parts, the constant effort will be to
resume the delegated powers, and there cannot be an
inducement in the foederal sovereignty to refuse its assent
to an innocent act of a State.... The Eastern opinions are
for a total surrender of the state Sovereignties, and indeed
some amongst them go to a monarchy at once--they have verged
to anarchy, while to the southward we have only felt an
inconvenience, and their proportionate disposition to an
opposite extreme is a natural consequence."--_Jeff. MSS._
M^r Gerry, according to previous notice given by him, moved "that the
national Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States
whose proportion of votes should be the same with that allowed to the
States in the election of the Senate." If the appointm^t should be made
by the Nat^l Legislature, it would lessen that independence of the
Executive which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue and
corruption between the Executive & Legislature previous to the election,
and to partiality in the Executive afterwards to the friends who
promoted him. Some other mode therefore appeared to him necessary. He
proposed that of appointing by the State Executives as most analogous to
the principle observed in electing the other branches of the Nat^l
Gov^t; the first branch being chosen by the _people_ of the States, &
the 2^d by the Legislatures of the States, he did not see any objection
ag^{st} letting the Executive be appointed by the Executives of the
States. He supposed the Executives would be most likely to select the
fittest men, and that it would be their interest to support the man of
their own choice.
M^r Randolph urged strongly the inexpediency of M^r Gerry's mode of
appointing the Nat^l Executive. The confidence of the people would not
be secured by it to the Nat^l magistrate. The small States would lose
all chance of an appointm^t from within themselves. Bad appointments
would be made; the Executives of the States being little conversant with
characters not within their own small spheres. The State Executives too
notwithstanding their constitutional independence, being in fact
dependent on the State Legislatures will generally be guided by the
views of the latter, and prefer either favorites within the States, or
such as it may be expected will be most partial to the interests of the
State. A Nat^l Executive thus chosen will not be likely to defend with
becoming vigilance & firmness the National rights ag^{st} State
encroachments. Vacancies also must happen. How can these be filled? He
could not suppose either that the Executives would feel the interest in
supporting the Nat^l Executive which had been imagined. They will not
cherish the great Oak which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs.
On the question for referring the appointment of the Nat^l Executive to
the State Executives as prop^d by M^r Gerry Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no.
N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. div^d. M^d no. V^a no. S. C. no.
Geo. no.[72]
[72] "Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware
divided."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 111. The
Journal also includes North Carolina among the
noes.--_Journal of the Federal Convention_, 110.
M^r Patterson moves that the Committee resume the clause relating to the
rule of suffrage in the Nat^l Legislature.
M^r Brearly[73] seconds him. He was sorry he said that any question on
this point was brought into view. It had been much agitated in Cong^s at
the time of forming the Confederation, and was then rightly settled by
allowing to each sovereign State an equal vote. Otherwise the smaller
States must have been destroyed instead of being saved. The substitution
of a ratio, he admitted carried fairness on the face of it; but on a
deeper examination was unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of
the States by the quota of Cong^s, Virg^a would have 16 votes, and
Georgia but one. A like proportion to the others will make the whole
number ninety. There will be 3 large states, and 10 small ones. The
large States by which he meant Mass^{ts} Pen^a & Virg^a will carry every
thing before them. It had been admitted, and was known to him from facts
within N. Jersey that where large & small counties were united into a
district for electing representatives for the district, the large
counties always carried their point, and Consequently that the large
States would do so. Virg^a with her sixteen votes will be a solid column
indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgia with her Solitary vote, and
the other little States will be obliged to throw themselves constantly
into the scale of some large one, in order to have any weight at all. He
had come to the convention with a view of being as useful as he could in
giving energy and stability to the federal Government. When the
proposition for destroying the equality of votes came forward, he was
astonished, he was alarmed. Is it fair then it will be asked that
Georgia should have an equal vote with Virg^a. He would not say it was.
What remedy then? One only, that a map of the U. S. be spread out, that
all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the
whole be made into 13 equal parts.
[73] "Mr. Brearly is a man of good, rather than of brilliant
parts. He is a Judge of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and
is very much in the esteem of the people. As an Orator he
has little to boast of, but as a Man he has every virtue to
recommend him. Mr. Brearly is about 40 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 327.
M^r Patterson considered the proposition for a proportional
representation as striking at the existence of the lesser States. He w^d
premise however to an investigation of this question some remarks on the
nature structure and powers of the Convention. The Convention he said
was formed in pursuance of an Act of Cong^s that this act was recited in
several of the Commissions, particularly that of Mass^{ts} which he
required to be read: that the amendment of the Confederacy was the
object of all the laws and Commissions on the subject: that the articles
of the Confederation were therefore the proper basis of all the
proceedings of the Convention. We ought to keep within its limits, or we
should be charged by our Constituents with usurpation, that the people
of America were sharpsighted and not to be deceived. But the Commissions
under which we acted were not only the measure of our power, they
denoted also the sentiments of the States on the subject of our
deliberation. The idea of a National Gov^t as contradistinguished from a
federal one, never entered into the mind of any of them, and to the
public mind we must accommodate ourselves. We have no power to go beyond
the federal Scheme, and if we had the people are not ripe for any other.
We must follow the people; the people will not follow us.--The
_proposition_ could not be maintained whether considered in reference to
us as a nation, or as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sovereignty
in the members composing it & sovereignty supposes equality. If we are
to be considered as a nation, all State distinctions must be abolished,
the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division is
made, then there may be fairly an equality of representation. He held up
Virg^a Mass^{ts} & P^a as the three large States, and the other ten as
small ones; repeating the calculations of M^r Brearly, as to the
disparity of votes which w^d take place, and affirming that the small
States would never agree to it. He said there was no more reason that a
great individual State contributing much, should have more votes than a
small one contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen
should have more votes than an indigent one. If the rateable property of
A was to that of B as 40 to 1, ought A for that reason to have 40 times
as many votes as B. Such a principle would never be admitted, and if it
were admitted would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A has more to
be protected than B so he ought to contribute more for the common
protection. The same may be said of a large State w^{ch} has more to be
protected than a small one. Give the large States an influence in
proportion to their magnitude, and what will be the consequence? Their
ambition will be proportionally increased, and the small States will
have every thing to fear. It was once proposed by Galloway & some others
that America should be represented in the British Parl^t and then be
bound by its laws. America could not have been entitled to more than 1/3
of the n^o of Representatives which would fall to the share of G. B.
Would American rights & interests have been safe under an authority thus
constituted? It has been said that if a Nat^l Gov^t is to be formed so
as to operate on the people, and not on the States, the representatives
ought to be drawn from the people. But why so? May not a Legislature
filled by the State Legislatures operate on the people who chuse the
State Legislatures? or may not a practicable coercion be found. He
admitted that there was none such in the existing System.--He was
attached strongly to the plan of the existing Confederacy, in which the
people chuse their Legislative representatives; and the Legislatures
their federal representatives. No other amendments were wanting than to
mark the orbits of the States with due precision, and provide for the
use of coercion, which was the great point. He alluded to the hint
thrown out heretofore by M^r Wilson of the necessity to which the large
States might be reduced of confederating among themselves, by a refusal
of the others to concur. Let them unite if they please, but let them
remember that they have no authority to compel the others to unite. N.
Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Committee. She
would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot,
than to such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan here but on his
return home do every thing in his power to defeat it there.
M^r Wilson, hoped if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that a
_majority_, that a _minority_ of the States would unite for their
safety. He entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional
representation, stating for his first position that as all authority was
derived from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal
n^o of representatives, and different numbers of people different
numbers of representatives. This principle had been improperly violated
in the Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time. As
to the case of A. & B. stated by M^r Patterson, he observed that in
districts as large as the States, the number of people was the best
measure of their comparative wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers
were to form the ratio it would be the same. M^r P. admitted persons,
not property to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the Citizens of
Pen^a equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the former
to balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different districts
ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their
respective Constituents hold to each other. If the small States will not
confederate on this plan, Pen^a & he presumed some other States, would
not confederate on any other. We have been told that each State being
sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign over
himself, and all men are therefore naturally equal. Can he retain this
equality when he becomes a member of Civil Government. He can not. As
little can a Sovereign State, when it becomes a member of a federal
govern^t. If N. J. will not part with her sovereignty it is vain to talk
of Gov^t. A new partition of the States is desirable, but evidently &
totally impracticable.
M^r Williamson illustrated the cases by a comparison of the different
States, to Counties of different sizes within the same State; observing
that proportional representation was admitted to be just in the latter
case, and could not therefore be fairly contested in the former.
The Question being about to be put M^r Patterson hoped that as so much
depended on it, it might be thought best to postpone the decision till
tomorrow, which was done, nem. con.
The Com^e rose & the House adjourned.
MONDAY, JUNE 11^{TH} M^R ABRAHAM BALDWIN FROM
GEORGIA TOOK HIS SEAT. IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE.
The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the Nat^l Legislature
postponed on Saturday was resumed.
M^r Sherman proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1^{st}
branch should be according to the respective numbers of free
inhabitants; and that in the second branch or Senate, each State should
have one vote and no more. He said as the States would remain possessed
of certain individual rights, each State ought to be able to protect
itself: otherwise a few large States will rule the rest. The House of
Lords in England he observed had certain particular rights under the
Constitution, and hence they have an equal vote with the House of
Commons that they may be able to defend their rights.
M^r Rutlidge proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1^{st}
branch should be according to the quotas of contribution. The justice of
this rule he said could not be contested. M^r Butler urged the same
idea: adding that money was power; and that the States ought to have
weight in the Gov^t in proportion to their wealth.
M^r King & M^r Wilson,[74] in order to bring the question to a point
moved "that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national
Legislature ought not to be according [to] the rule established in the
articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of
representation." The clause so far as it related to suffrage in the
first branch was postponed in order to consider this motion.
[74] In the printed Journal Mr. Rutlidge is named as the
seconder of the motion.--Madison's Note.
M^r Dickenson contended for the _actual_ contributions of the States as
the rule of their representation & suffrage in the first branch. By thus
connecting the interests of the States with their duty, the latter would
be sure to be performed.
M^r King remarked that it was uncertain what mode might be used in
levying a National revenue; but that it was probable, imposts would be
one source of it. If the _actual_ contributions were to be the rule the
non-importing States, as Con^t & N. Jersey, w^d be in a bad situation
indeed. It might so happen that they w^d have no representation. This
situation of particular States had been always one powerful argument in
favor of the 5 Per C^t impost.
The question being ab^t to be put Doc^r Franklin s^d he had thrown his
ideas of the matter on a paper w^{ch} Mr. Wilson read to the Committee
in the words following--Mr. Chairman
It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point,
the proportion of representation, came before us, our debates
were carried on with great coolness & temper. If any thing of a
contrary kind, has on this occasion appeared. I hope it will not
be repeated; for we are sent here to _consult_, not to
_contend_, with each other; and declarations of a fixed opinion,
and of determined resolution, never to change it, neither
enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one side,
naturally beget their like on the other; and tend to create and
augment discord & division in a great concern, wherein harmony &
Union are extremely necessary to give weight to our Councils,
and render them effectual in promoting & securing the common
good.
I must own that I was originally of opinion it would be better
if every member of Congress, or our national Council, were to
consider himself rather as a representative of the whole, than
as an Agent for the interests of a particular State; in which
case the proportion of members for each State would be of less
consequence, & it would not be very material whether they voted
by States or individually. But as I find this is not to be
expected, I now think the number of Representatives should bear
some proportion to the number of the Represented; and that the
decisions sh^d be by the majority of members, not by the
majority of the States. This is objected to from an apprehension
that the greater States would then swallow up the smaller. I do
not at present clearly see what advantage the greater States
could propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller, and
therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect
that in the beginning of this Century, When the Union was
proposed of the two Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch
Patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal
number of Representatives in Parliament, they should be ruined
by the superiority of the English. They finally agreed however
that the different proportions of importance in the Union, of
the two Nations should be attended to, whereby they were to have
only forty members in the House of Commons, and only sixteen in
the House of Lords; A very great inferiority of numbers! And yet
to this day I do not recollect that any thing has been done in
the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland;
and whoever looks over the lists of Public officers, Civil &
Military of that nation will find I believe that the North
Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument.
But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is equally
in the power of the lesser States to swallow up the greater; and
this is mathematically demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7
smaller States had each 3 members in the House, and the 6 larger
to have one with another 6 members; and that upon a question,
two members of each smaller State should be in the affirmative
and one in the Negative, they would make
Affirmatives 14 Negatives 7
And that all the larger States
should be unanimously in
the Negative, they would
make Negatives 36
---
In all 43
It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question against the
43, and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the
common practice of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages.
The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to have their
property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller
are to have theirs in the disposition of the greater. An
honorable gentleman has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a
proposition of equalizing the States. It appears to me an
equitable one, and I should, for my own part, not be against
such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly,
indeed, when almost every province had a different Constitution,
some with greater others with fewer privileges, it was of
importance to the borderers when their boundaries were
contested, whether by running the division lines, they were
placed on one side or the other. At present when such
differences are done away, it is less material. The Interest of
a State is made up of the interests of its individual members.
If they are not injured, the State is not injured. Small States
are more easily well & happily governed than large ones. If
therefore in such an equal division, it should be found
necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to
the giving a part of it to N. Jersey, and another to Delaware.
But as there would probably be considerable difficulties in
adjusting such a division; and however equally made at first, it
would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants
in some States, and their fixed proportion in others; and thence
frequent occasion for new divisions, I beg leave to propose for
the consideration of the Committee another mode, which appears
to me to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and
more permanent in its nature.
Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force it
is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the
Union.
Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal
proportion.
The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the
disposition of Congress.
The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of
Delegates from each State.
And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual members
voting.
If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occasions
not be sufficient, Let Congress make requisitions on the richer
and more powerful States for further aids, to be voluntarily
afforded, leaving to each State the right of considering the
necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or
less as it should be found proper.
This mode is not new. It was formerly practised with success by
the British Government with respect to Ireland and the Colonies.
We sometimes gave even more than they expected, or thought just
to accept; and in the last war carried on while we were united,
they gave us back in 5 years a million Sterling. We should
probably have continued such voluntary contributions, whenever
the occasions appeared to require them for the common good of
the Empire. It was not till they chose to force us, and to
deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary contributions
that we refused & resisted. Those contributions however were to
be disposed of at the pleasure of a Government in which we had
no representative. I am therefore persuaded, that they will not
be refused to one in which the Representation shall be equal.
My learned colleague (M^r Wilson) has already mentioned that the
present method of voting by States, was submitted to originally
by Congress, under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality,
and injustice. This appears in the words of their Resolution. It
is of Sep^r 6. 1774. The words are
"Resolved that in determining questions in this Cong^s each
Colony or province shall have one vote: The Cong^s not being
possessed of or at present able to procure materials for
ascertaining the importance of each Colony."
On the question for agreeing to M^r King's and M^r Wilson's motion it
passed in the affirmative.
Mass^{ts} ay. C^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
It was then moved by M^r Rutlidge, 2^{ded} by M^r Butler to add to the
words "equitable ratio of representation" at the end of the motion just
agreed to, the words "according to the quotas of contribution." On
motion of M^r Wilson seconded by M^r Pinkney, this was postponed; in
order to add, after the words "equitable ratio of representation" the
words following: "in proportion to the whole number of white & other
free Citizens & inhabitants of every age sex & condition including those
bound to servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all other
persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians
not paying taxes, in each State," this being the rule in the Act of
Congress agreed to by eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue
on the States, and requiring a Census only every 5, 7, or 10 years.
M^r Gerry thought property not the rule of representation. Why then
sh^d the blacks, who were property in the South, be in the rule of
representation more than the Cattle & horses of the North.[75]
[75] After Gerry spoke, according to Yates, "Mr. Madison was of
opinion at present, to fix the standard of representation,
and let the detail be the business of a
sub-committee."--_Secret Proceedings_, p. 116.
On the question,--Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Mary^d Virg^a N. C. S. C. &
Geo: were in the affirmative: N. J. & Del: in the negative.
M^r Sherman moved that a question be taken whether each State shall have
one vote in the 2^d branch. Every thing he said depended on this. The
smaller States would never agree to the plan on any other principle than
an equality of suffrage in this branch. M^r Elsworth[76] seconded the
motion.
[76] "M^r Elsworth is a Judge of the Supreme Court in
Connecticut;--he is Gentleman of a clear, deep, and copius
understanding; eloquent, and connected in public debate; and
always attentive to his duty. He is very happy in a reply,
and choice in selecting such parts of his adversary's
arguments as he finds make the strongest impressions,--in
order to take off the force of them, so as to admit the
power of his own. M^r Elsworth is about 37 years of age, a
Man much respected for his integrity, and venerated for his
abilities."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 326.
On the question for allowing each State one vote in the 2^d branch,
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Wilson & M^r Hamilton moved that the right of suffrage in the 2^d
branch ought to be according to the same rule as in the 1^{st} branch.
On this question for making the ratio of representation the same in the
2^d as in the 1^{st} branch it passed in the affirmative;
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Resol: 11, for guarantying Republican Gov^t & territory to each State,
being considered--the words "or partition," were, on motion of M^r
Madison added, after the words "voluntary junction;"
Mas. N. Y. P. V^a N. C. S. C. G. ay. Con: N. J. Del: M^d no.
M^r Read disliked the idea of guarantying territory. It abetted the idea
of distinct States w^{ch} would be a perpetual source of discord. There
can be no cure for this evil but in doing away States altogether and
uniting them all into one great Society.
Alterations having been made in the Resolution, making it read, "that a
Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to
each State by the U. States," the whole was agreed to nem. con.[77]
[77] Yates attributes this amendment to Madison. "Mr.
Madison moved an amendment, to add to or alter the
resolution as follows: The republican constitutions and the
existing laws of each state, to be guaranteed by the United
States."--_Secret Proceedings_, etc., 116.
Resolution 13. for amending the national Constitution hereafter without
consent of the Nat^l Legislature being considered, Several members did
not see the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the propriety of
making the consent of the Nat^l Legisl. unnecessary.
Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan now to be
formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found
on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be
better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way
than to trust to chance and violence. It would be improper to require
the consent of the Nat^l Legislature, because they may abuse their
power, and refuse their consent on that very account. The opportunity
for such an abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for
amendm^t.
M^r Randolph enforced these arguments.
The words, "without requiring the consent of the Nat^l Legislature" were
postponed. The other provision in the clause passed nem. con.
Resolution 14. requiring oaths from the members of the State Gov^{ts} to
observe the Nat^l Constitution & laws, being considered,[78]
[78] "Mr. Williamson. This resolve will be unnecessary, as the
union will become the law of the land."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 117.
M^r Sherman opposed it as unnecessarily intruding into the State
jurisdictions.
M^r Randolph considered it necessary to prevent that competition between
the National Constitution & laws & those of the particular States, which
had already been felt. The officers of the States are already under oath
to the States. To preserve a due impartiality they ought to be equally
bound to the Nat^l Gov^t. The Nat^l authority needs every support we can
give it. The Executive & Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding their
nominal independence on the State Legislatures are in fact, so dependent
on them, that unless they be brought under some tie to the Nat^l System,
they will always lean too much to the State systems, whenever a contest
arises between the two.
M^r Gerry did not like the clause. He thought there was as much reason
for requiring an oath of fidelity to the States from Nat^l officers, as
vice versa.
M^r Luther Martin moved to strike out the words requiring such an oath
from the State officers, viz "within the several States," observing that
if the new oath should be contrary to that already taken by them it
would be improper; if coincident the oaths already taken will be
sufficient.
On the question for striking out as proposed by Mr. L. Martin
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Question on whole Resolution as proposed by M^r Randolph;
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Com^e rose & House Adj^d.
TUESDAY JUNE 12^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE
The Question taken on the Resolution 15, to wit, referring the new
system to the people of the States for ratification it passed in the
affirmative Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a[79] ay. Del.
div^d. M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
[79] Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is
there entered as of June 11th.--Madison's Note.
M^r Sherman & M^r Elseworth moved to fill the blank left in the 4^{th}
Resolution for the periods of electing the members of the first branch
with the words, "every year;" Mr. Sherman observing that he did it in
order to bring on some question.
M^r Rutlidge proposed "every two years."
M^r Jennifer[80] prop^d, "every three years," observing that the too
great frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them,
and made the best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a service.
[80] "M^r Jenifer is a Gentleman of fortune in Maryland;--he is
always in good humour, and never fails to make his company
pleased with him. He sits silent in the Senate, and seems to
be conscious that he is no politician. From his long
continuance in single life, no doubt but he has made the vow
of celibacy. He speaks warmly of the Ladies notwithstanding.
M^r Jenifer is about 55 years of Age, and once served as Aid
de Camp to Major Gen^l Lee."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist.
Rev._, iii., 330.
M^r Madison seconded the motion for three years. Instability is one of
the great vices of our republics, to be remedied. Three years will be
necessary, in a Government so extensive, for members to form any
knowledge of the various interests of the States to which they do not
belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and
affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for
and travelling to & from the seat of national business.
M^r Gerry. The people of New England will never give up the point of
annual elections, they know of the transition made in England from
triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation
here as the prelude to a like usurpation. He considered annual elections
as the only defence of the people ag^{st} tyranny. He was as much
ag^{st} a triennial House as ag^{st} a hereditary Executive.
M^r Madison, observed that if the opinions of the people were to be our
guide, it w^d be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No
member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents
were at this time; much less could he say what they would think if
possessed of the information & lights possessed by the members here; &
still less what would be their way of thinking 6 or 12 months hence. We
ought to consider what was right & necessary in itself for the
attainment of a proper Governm^t. A plan adjusted to this idea will
recommend itself--The respectability of this convention will give weight
to their recommendation of it. Experience will be constantly urging the
adoption of it, and all the most enlightened & respectable citizens will
be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary & proper point,
this influential class of Citizens, will be turned against the plan, and
little support in opposition to them can be gained to it from the
unreflecting multitude.
M^r Gerry repeated his opinion that it was necessary to consider what
the people would approve. This had been the policy of all Legislators.
If the reasoning of Mr. Madison were just, and we supposed a limited
Monarchy the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, tho' the
genius of the people was decidedly adverse to it, and having no
hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute of the essential
materials for such an innovation.
On the question for the triennial election of the 1^{st} branch
Mass. no. (M^r King ay.) M^r Ghorum wavering. Con^t no.
N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The words requiring members of y^e 1^{st} branch to be of the age of
---- years were struck out Maryland alone no. The words "_liberal
compensation for members_," being consid^d M^r Madison moves to insert
the words, "_& fixt_." He observed that it would be improper to leave
the members of the Nat^l legislature to be provided for by the State
Legisl^s, because it would create an improper dependence; and to leave
them to regulate their own wages, was an indecent thing, and might in
time prove a dangerous one. He thought wheat or some other article of
which the average price throughout a reasonable period preceding might
be settled in some convenient mode, would form a proper standard.
Col. Mason seconded the motion; adding that it would be improper for
other reasons to leave the wages to be regulated by the States. 1.
the different States would make different provision for their
representatives, and an inequality would be felt among them, whereas he
thought they ought to be in all respects equal. 2. the parsimony of the
States might reduce the provision so low that as had already happened in
choosing delegates to Congress, the question would be not who were most
fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.
On the question for inserting the words, "and fixt"
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Doc^r Franklyn said he approved of the amendment just made for rendering
the salaries as fixed as possible; but disliked the word "_liberal_." He
would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary to substitute any
other. He remarked the tendency of abuses in every case, to grow of
themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression
in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from the
gratuitous provision for the Apostles, to the establishment of the papal
system. The word "liberal" was struck out nem con.
On the motion of M^r Pierce, that the wages should be paid out of the
National Treasury,
Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. G. ay.
Question on the clause relating to term of service & compensation of
1^{st} branch,
Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
On a question for striking out the "_ineligibility_ of members of the
Nat^l Legis: to _State offices_,"
Mass^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended,
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On a question for making members of the Nat^l Legislature _ineligible_
to any office under the Nat^l Gov^t for the term of 3 years after
ceasing to be members,
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for such ineligibility for one year,
Mass^{ts} ay. C^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for striking out "incapable of
re-election into 1^{st} branch of the Nat^l Legisl. for ---- years, and
subject to recall" ag^d to nem. con.
On question for striking out from the Resol: 5 the words requiring
members of the Senatorial branch to be of the age of ---- years at least
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. div^d. S. C. no. Geo. div^d.
On the question for filling the blank with 30 years as the
qualification; it was agreed to,
Mass^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
M^r Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration of the
appointm^{ts} to the 2^d branch of the National Legislature with the
words "7 years."
M^r Sherman, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposition he
said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they would be
reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be
allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years which w^d be
between the terms of the 1^{st} branch & of the executive.
M^r Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm. Great
mischiefs had arisen in England from their septennial Act which was
reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.
M^r Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The democratic licentiousness
of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The
object of this 2^d branch is to controul the democratic branch of the
Nat^l Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch being
more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm
it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like principles had been
scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be
apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some
measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness
& independence may be the more necessary also in this branch, as it
ought to guard the Constitution ag^{st} encroachments of the Executive
who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular
branch.
M^r Madison, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long. What we
wished was to give to the Gov^t that stability which was every where
called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form alledged to be
inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much
stability by the term of Seven years. His fear was that the popular
branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much
lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The
Constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this
part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Mary^d created just
suspicions of danger from it. In some instances perhaps it may have
erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In every instance of their
opposition to the measures of the H. of D. they had had with them the
suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other
States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates, were
chosen in the same manner as the other branches, of the Legislature, and
held their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to be no check
whatever ag^{st} the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived
it to be of great importance that a stable & firm Gov^t, organized in
the republican form should be held out to the people. If this be not
done, and the people be left to judge of this species of Gov^t by y^e
operations of the defective systems under which they now live, it is
much to be feared the time is not distant when, in universal disgust,
they will renounce the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a
rate, and be ready for any change that may be proposed to them.
On the question for "seven years" as the term for the 2^d branch
Mass^{ts} divided. (M^r King, M^r Ghorum ay, M^r Gerry, M^r
Strong, no) Con^t no. N. Y. div^d N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Butler and M^r Rutlidge proposed that the members of the 2^d branch
should be entitled to no salary or compensation for their services. On
the question,[81]--
Mass^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P. no. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
[81] (It is probable y^e votes here turned chiefly on the idea
that if the salaries were not here provided for, the members
would be paid by their respective States) This note for the
bottom margin.--Madison's Note.
It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting the stipends
& ineligibility of the 2^d branch be the same as, of the 1^{st}
branch:--Con: disagreeing to the ineligibility.
It was moved & 2^{ded} to alter the Resol: 9. so as to read "that the
jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be to hear & determine in the
dernier resort, all piracies, felonies, &c."
It was moved & 2^{ded} to strike out "all piracies & felonies on the
high seas," which was agreed to.
It was moved & agreed to strike out "all captures from an enemy."
It was moved & agreed to strike out "other States" and insert "two
distinct States of the Union."
It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration of the Resolution 9,
relating to the Judiciary:
The Com^e then rose & the House Adjourned.
WEDNESDAY JUNE 13.[82] IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE
[82] Edward Carrington wrote to Madison from New York, June 13,
1787:
"The public mind is now on the point of a favourable turn to
the objects of your meeting, and, being fairly met with the
result, will, I am persuaded, eventually embrace it--being
calculated for the permanent fitness, and not the momentary
habits of the country, it may at first be viewed with
hesitation, but derived and patronized as it will be, its
influence must extend into an adoption as the present fabric
gives way--the work once well done will be done forever, but
patched up in accommodation to the whim of the day, it will
soon require the hand of the cobbler again, and in every
unfortunate experiment the materials are rendered the less
fit for that monument of civil liberty which we wish to
erect.--Constitute a federal Government, invigorate & check
it well--give it then independent powers over the Trade the
Revenues, and force of the Union, and all things that
involve any relationship to foreign powers--give it also the
revisal of all State acts--unless it possesses a compleat
controul over the State Governments, the constant effort
will be to resume the delegated powers,--nor do I see what
inducement the federal sovereignty can have to negative an
innocent act of a State--Constitute it in such shape that,
its first principles being preserved, it will be a good
republic--I wish to see that system have a fair
experiment--but let the liability to encroachment be rather
from the federal, than the State, governments--in the first
case we shall insensibly glide into a monarchy: in the
latter nothing but anarchy can be the consequence.
"Some Gentlemen think of a total surrender of the State
Sovereignty--I see not the necessity of that measure for
giving us national stability in consequence--the negative of
the federal sovereignty will effectually prevent the
existence of any licentious or inconsiderate act--and I
believe that even under a new monarchy it would be found
necessary thus to continue the local administration--general
Laws would operate many particular [undecipherable] and a
general legislature would be found incompetent to the
formation of local ones--the interest of the United States
may be well combined for the common good--but the affairs of
so extensive a country are not to be thrown into one
mass--an attempt to confederate upon terms materially
opposed to the particular Interests would in all probability
occasion a dismemberment, and in that event, within a long
time yet to come, the prospects of commerce will be at an
end as to any degree of national importance, let her fate be
what it may as to freedom or vassalage."--_Mad. MSS._
Resol: 9 being resumed
The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the Nat^l
tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room for their
organization.
M^r Randolph & M^r Madison, then moved the following resolution
respecting a National Judiciary,viz "that the jurisdiction of the
National Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection
of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and
questions which involve the national peace and harmony" which was agreed
to.
M^r Pinkney & M^r Sherman moved to insert after the words "one supreme
tribunal" the words "the Judges of which to be appointed by the National
Legislature."
M^r Madison, objected to an app^t by the whole Legislature. Many of them
were incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too
much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was present,
who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who
had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of
their Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of
the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a
competitor not having these recommendations, but possessed of every
necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be
made by the Senate, which as a less numerous & more select body, would
be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify
such a confidence in them.
M^r Sherman & M^r Pinkney withdrew their motion, and the app^t by the
Senate was ag^d to nem. con.
M^r Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating
money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representatives
of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the
Purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills,
they w^d repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a sett of
representatives in the other branch who will fall into their snares.
M^r Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were always
following the British Constitution when the reason of it did not
apply. There was no analogy between the H. of Lords and the body
proposed to be established. If the Senate should be degraded by any
such discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline serving in it
in favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter into the
practice of tacking other clauses to money bills.
M^r Madison observed that the Comentators on the Brit: Const: had not
yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in money
bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case
before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as
well as the 1^{st} branch. If they s^d have any dangerous influence
over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to
originate the bill they wished to be passed. As the Senate would be
generally a more capable sett of men, it w^d be wrong to disable them
from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was most
important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other. The
Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to
the _amendment_, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an
addition of a given sum w^d be equivalent to a distinct proposition of
it.
M^r King differed from M^r Gerry, and concurred in the objections to the
proposition.
M^r Read favored the proposition, but would not extend the restraint to
the case of amendments.
M^r Pinkney thinks the question premature. If the Senate sh^d be formed
on the _same_ proportional representation as it stands at present, they
s^d have equal power, otherwise if a different principle s^d be
introduced.
M^r Sherman. As both branches must concur, there can be no danger
whichever way the Senate be formed. We establish two branches in order
to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed in the finance
business--The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the
representatives of the people. What a man does by another, he does by
himself is a maxim. In Con^t both branches can originate in all cases,
and it has been found safe & convenient. Whatever might have been the
reason of the rule as to The H. of Lords, it is clear that no good
arises from it now even there.
Gen^l Pinkney. This distinction prevails in S. C. and has been a source
of pernicious disputes between y^e 2 branches. The Constitution is now
evaded, by informal schedules of amendments handed from y^e Senate to
the other House.
M^r Williamson wishes for a question chiefly to prevent re-discussion.
The restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige some member in
the lower branch to move, & people can then mark him.
On the question for excepting money bills, as prop^d by M^r
Gerry, Mass. no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. ay. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.[83]
[83] According to the Journal (121) Pennsylvania was
among the noes.
Committee rose & M^r Ghorum made report, which was postponed till
tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed. The
report was in the words following:
Report of the Committee of Whole on M^r Randolph's propositions.
1. Res^d that it is the opinion of this Committee that a
National Governm^t ought to be established, consisting of a
supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.
2. Resol^d that the National Legislature ought to consist of two
branches.
3. Res^d that the members of the first branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several
States for the term of three years, to receive fixed Stipends by
which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to
public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury: to be
ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or
under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly
belonging to the functions of the first branch), during the term
of service, and under the national Government for the Space of
one year after its expiration.
4. Res^d that the members of the second branch of the Nat^l
Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures,
to be of the age of 30 years at least, to hold their offices for
a term sufficient to ensure their independency, namely, seven
years, to receive fixed stipends by which they may be
compensated for the devotion of their time to public service to
be paid out of the National Treasury; to be ineligible to any
office established by a particular State, or under the authority
of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the
functions of the second branch) during the term of service, and
under the Nat^l Gov^t for the space of one year after its
expiration.
5. Res^d that each branch ought to possess the right of
originating Acts.
6. Res^d that the Nat^l Legislature ought to be empowered to
enjoy the Legislative rights vested in Cong^s by the
Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to which
the separate States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of
the U. S. may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the
articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the
authority of the Union.
7. Res^d that the rights of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch of the
National Legislature, ought not to be according to the rule
established in the articles of confederation but according to
some equitable ratio of representation, namely, in proportion to
the whole number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants,
of every age sex and condition, including those bound to
servitude for a term of years, & three fifths of all other
persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except
Indians not paying taxes in each State.
8. Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2^d branch of the
National Legislature ought to be according to the rule
established for the first.
9. Resolved that a National Executive be instituted to consist
of a single person, to be chosen by the Nat^l Legislature for
the term of seven years, with power to carry into execution the
national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise
provided for--to be ineligible a second time, & to be removeable
on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or neglect of
duty--to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated
for the devotion of his time to public service to be paid out of
the national Treasury.
10. Resol^d that the Nat^l Executive shall have a right to
negative any Legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards
passed unless by two thirds of each branch of the National
Legislature.
11. Resol^d that a Nat^l Judiciary be established, to consist of
one supreme tribunal, the Judges of which to be appointed by the
2^d branch of the Nat^l Legislature, to hold their offices
during good behaviour, & to receive punctually at stated times a
fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or
diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually
in office at the time of such increase or diminution.
12. Resol^d that the Nat^l Legislature be empowered to appoint
inferior Tribunals.
13. Res^d that the jurisdiction of the Nat^l Judiciary shall
extend to all cases which respect the collection of the Nat^l
revenue, impeachments of any Nat^l Officers, and questions which
involve the national peace & harmony.
14. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the admission of
States lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States,
whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory or
otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the Nat^l
Legislature less than the whole.
15. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges untill a given day
after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted and
for the completion of all their engagements.
16. Res^d that a Republican Constitution & its existing laws
ought to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States.
17. Res^d that provision ought to be made for the amendment of
the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary.
18. Res^d that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers
within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support
the articles of Union.
19. Res^d that the amendments which shall be offered to the
confederation by the Convention ought at a proper time or times
after the approbation of Cong^s to be submitted to an Assembly
or Assemblies recommended by the several Legislatures to be
expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.
THURSDAY JUNE 14. IN CONVENTION.
M^r Patterson, observed to the Convention that it was the wish of
several deputations, particularly that of N. Jersey, that further
time might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the
Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and
contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said they hoped to have
such an one ready by tomorrow to be laid before the Convention: And the
Convention adjourned that leisure might be given for the purpose.
FRIDAY JUNE 15^{TH} 1787
M^r Patterson, laid before the Convention the plan which he said several
of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by
M^r Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper mode of
giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it should be referred
to a Committee of the Whole, and that in order to place the two plans in
due comparison, the other should be recommitted. At the earnest request
of M^r Lansing[84] & some other gentlemen, it was also agreed that the
Convention should not go into Co[~m]ittee of the whole on the subject
till tomorrow, by which delay the friends of the plan proposed by M^r
Patterson w^d be better prepared to explain & support it, and all would
have an opportu^y of taking copies.[85]
[84] "Mr. Lansing is a practising Attorney at Albany, and Mayor
of that Corporation. He has a hisitation in his speech, that
will prevent his being an Orator of any eminence;--his legal
knowledge I am told is not extensive, nor his education a
good one. He is however a Man of good sense, plain in his
manners, and sincere in his friendships. He is about 32
years of age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 327.
[85] (This plan had been concerted among the deputations or
members thereof, from Con^t N. Y. N. J. Del. and perhaps M^r
Martin from Mary^d who made with them a common cause though
on different principles. Con^t & N. Y. were ag^{st} a
departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing
rather to add a few new powers to Cong^s than to substitute,
a National Gov^t. The States of N. J. & Del. were opposed to
a National Gov^t because its patrons considered a
proportional representation of the States as the basis of
it. The eagerness displayed by the members opposed to a
Nat^l Gov^t from these different motives began now to
produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention.
M^r Dickenson said to M^r Madison You see the consequence of
pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small
States wish for two branches in the General Legislature, and
are friends to a good National Government; but we would
sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to be deprived
of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the
legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of
the large States.)--Madison Note.
"Mr. Madison moved for the report of the committee, and the
question may then come on whether the convention will
postpone it in order to take into consideration the system
now offered.
"Mr. Lansing is of opinion that the two systems are fairly
contrasted. The one now offered is on the basis of amending
the federal government, and the other to be reported as a
national government, on propositions which exclude the
propriety of amendment. Considering therefore its
importance, and that justice may be done to its weighty
consideration, he is for postponing it a day.
"Col. Hamilton cannot say he is in sentiment with either
plan--supposes both might again be considered as federal
plans, and by this means they will be fairly in committee,
and be contrasted so as to make a comparative estimate of
the two."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 121, 122.
The propositions from N. Jersey moved by M^r Patterson were in the words
following.
1. Res^d that the articles of Confederation ought to be so
revised, corrected, & enlarged, as to render the federal
Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government, & the
preservation of the Union.
2. Res^d that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States
in Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation,
they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by
levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign
growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the U. States,
by Stamps on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all
letters or packages passing through the general post-office, to
be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper &
expedient; to make rules & regulations for the collection
thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter & amend in
such manner as they shall think proper, to pass Acts for the
regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign Nations as
with each other: provided that all punishments, fines,
forfeitures & penalties to be incurred for contravening such
acts rules and regulations shall be adjudged by the Common law
Judiciaries of the State in which any Offence contrary to the
true intent & meaning of such Acts rules & regulations shall
have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing
in the first instance all suits & prosecutions for that purpose
in the Superior Common law Judiciary in such State, subject
nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law &
fact in rendering Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the
U. States.
3. Res^d that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead
of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of
Confederation, the United States in Cong^s be authorized to make
such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white &
other free citizens & inhabitants of every age Sex and condition
including those bound to servitude for a term of years & three
fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing
description, except Indians not paying taxes; that if such
requisitions be not complied with, in the time specified
therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non complying
States & for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing &
authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers hereby
vested in the U. States in Cong^s shall be exercised without the
consent of at least ---- States, and in that proportion if the
number of Confederated States should hereafter be increased or
diminished.
4. Res^d that the U. States in Cong^s be authorized to elect a
federal Executive to consist of ---- persons, to continue in
office for the term of ---- years, to receive punctually at
stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which
no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect the
persons composing the Executive at the time of such increase or
diminution, to be paid out of the federal treasury; to be
incapable of holding any other office or appointment during
their time of service and for ---- years thereafter: to be
ineligible a second time, & removeable by Cong^s on application
by a majority of the Executives of the several States; that the
Executives besides their general authority to execute the
federal acts ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise
provided for, & to direct all military operations; provided that
none of the persons composing the federal Executive shall on any
occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct
any enterprise as General or in any other capacity.
5. Res^d that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a
supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the
Executive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour, to
receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for
their services in which no increase nor diminution shall be
made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time
of such increase or diminution: that the Judiciary so
established shall have authority to hear & determine in the
first instance on all impeachments of federal Officers, & by way
of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights
of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all
cases of piracies & felonies on the high Seas, in all cases in
which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any
treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for
the regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal
Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they
remain in office be capable of receiving or holding any other
office or appointment during their term of service, or for ----
thereafter.
6. Res^d that all Acts of the U. States in Cong^s made by virtue
& in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the Articles of
Confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified
under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of
the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties
shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the
Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their
decisions any thing in the respective laws of the Individual
States to the Contrary notwithstanding: and that if any State,
or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent y^e
carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal
Executive shall be authorized to call forth y^e power of the
Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to
enforce and compel an Obedience to such Acts, or an observance
of such Treaties.
7. Res^d that provision be made for the admission of new States
into the Union.
8. Res^d that the rule for naturalization ought to be same in
every State.
9. Res^d that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in
another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same
offence as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in
which the offence was committed.[86]
[86] This copy of M^r Patterson's propositions varies in
a few clauses from that in the printed Journal
furnished from the papers of M^r Brearley a
colleague of M^r Patterson. A confidence is felt,
notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in
the Journal is not entirely correct is shewn by the
ensuing speech of M^r Wilson (June 16) in which he
refers to the mode of removing the Executive by
impeachment & conviction as a feature in the Virg^a
plan forming one of its contrasts to that of M^r
Patterson, which proposed a removal on the
application of a majority of the Executives of the
States. In the copy printed in the Journal, the two
modes are combined in the same clause; whether
through inadvertence, or as a contemplated
amendment, does not appear.--Madison's Note.
The Journal contains: "6. Resolved, that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within
the several states, ought to be bound, by oath, to
support the articles of union," and "9. Resolved,
that provision ought to be made for hearing and
deciding upon all disputes arising between the
United States and an individual state, respecting
territory."--_Journal of the Federal Convention_,
126.
Adjourned.
SATURDAY JUNE 16. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
on Resolutions propos^d by M^r P. & M^r R.
M^r Lansing called for the reading of the 1^{st} resolution of each
plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast;
that of M^r Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective
States, that of M^r Randolph destroys it: the latter requires a negative
on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain
general powers for the general good. The plan of M^r R. in short absorbs
all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of
the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He
grounded his preference of M^r P's plan, chiefly on two objections
ag^{st} that of M^r R. 1. want of power in the Convention to discuss &
propose it. 2. the improbability of its being adopted, 1. He was
decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained
to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the
Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts of the
States, the Co[~m]issions produced by the several deputations all
proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the
Confederacy, marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary &
improper to go farther. He was sure that this was the case with his
State. N. York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the
Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a
consolidation of the States, and a National Government.
2. was it probable that the States would adopt & ratify a scheme, which
they had never authorized us to propose? and which so far exceeded what
they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several Acts particularly
in relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Cong. in 1783, not
authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they
then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed to have already
taken place. To rely on any change which is hereafter to take place in
the sentiments of the people would be trusting to too great an
uncertainty. We know only what their present sentiments are. And it is
in vain to propose what will not accord with these. The States will
never feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government to give it a
negative on their laws. The Scheme is itself totally novel. There is no
parallel to it to be found. The Authority of Congress is familiar to the
people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily
approved by them.
M^r Patterson, said as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments
on the plan proposed by M^r R. he would now avoiding repetition as much
as possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He
preferred it because it accorded 1. with the powers of the Convention, 2
with the sentiments of the people. If the confederacy was radically
wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume
them ourselves. I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the
sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a Governm^t as
may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents have
authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. If we argue the
matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at present exists, it can
not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of equal
sovereignty. All therefore must concur before any can be bound. If a
proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we
argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult
the articles of it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of
it. He reads the 5^{th} art: of Confederation giving each State a
vote--& the 13^{th} declaring that no alteration shall be made without
unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is
unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was observed (by M^r
Wilson) that the larger State gave up the point, not because it was
right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the concession.
Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the
donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine
may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser
States. The larger States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the
small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland
were the two last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress
over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant
territory to the benefit of the whole.--If the sovereignty of the States
is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn immediately from
the States, not from the people: and we have no power to vary the idea
of equal sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure the difficulty,
is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot. To say that this is
impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see
whether the Citizens of Mass^{ts} Pen^a & V^a accede to it. It will be
objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so in
one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of
power collected, not on its being drawn from the States, or from the
individuals; and according to his plan it may be exerted on individuals
as well as according that of M^r R. A distinct executive & Judiciary
also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged that two branches in
the Legislature are necessary. Why? for the purpose of a check. But the
reason of the precaution is not applicable to this case. Within a
particular State, where party heats prevail, such a check may be
necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less necessary, and besides,
the delegations of the different States are checks on each other. Do the
people at large complain of Cong^s? No, what they wish is that Cong^s
may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno', the people
hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers Cong^s will act
with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Nat^l Legislature; being
fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by the mode of election.
The plan of M^r R. will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia &
Del. two representatives each in the popular branch the aggregate number
of that branch will be 180. Add to it half as many for the other branch
and you have 270, coming once at least a year from the most distant as
well as the most central parts of the republic. In the present deranged
State of our finances can so expensive a System be seriously thought of?
By enlarging the powers of Cong^s the greatest part of this expence will
be saved, and all purposes will be answered. At least a trial ought to
be made.
M^r Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two
plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last
proposed. These points were 1. in the Virg^a plan there are 2 & in some
degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from N. J. there is to
be a _single_ legislature only--2. Representation of the people at large
is the basis of one: the State Legislatures, the pillars of the
other--3. proportional representation prevails in one;--equality of
suffrage in the other--4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the head
of the one:--a plurality is held out in the other.--5. in the one the
majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail:--in the other a
minority may prevail. 6. the Nat^l Legislature is to make laws in all
cases to which the separate States are incompetent &:--in place of
this Cong^s are to have additional power in a few cases only--7. A
negative on the laws of the States:--in place of this coertion to be
substituted--8. The Executive to be removable on impeachment &
conviction;--in one plan: in the other to be removable at the instance
of a majority of the Executives of the States--9. Revision of the laws
provided for in one:--no such check in the other--10. inferior national
tribunals in one:--none such in the other. 11. In one y^e jurisdiction
of Nat^l tribunals to extend &c.--; an appellate jurisdiction only
allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to all
cases affecting the Nation^l peace & harmony; _there_ a few cases only
are marked out. 13. finally y^e ratification is in this to be by the
people themselves:--in that by the legislative authorities according to
the 13 art: of the Confederation.
With regard to the _power of the Convention_, he conceived himself
authorized to _conclude nothing_, but to be at liberty to _propose any
thing_. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the
two plans.
With _regard to the sentiments of the people_, he conceived it difficult
to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which
one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not
persuade himself that the State Gov^{ts} & Sovereignties were so much
the idols of the people, nor a Nat^l Gov^t so obnoxious to them, as some
supposed. Why s^d a Nat^l Gov^t be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will
each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen
of _Deleware_ be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the _United States_?
Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which
they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their Gov^{ts}? no, Sir.
It is from the Nat^l Councils that relief is expected. For these reasons
he did not fear, that the people would not follow us into a National
Gov^t and it will be a further recommendation of M^r R'^s plan that it
is to be submitted to _them_, and not to the _Legislatures_, for
ratification.
Proceeding now to the 1^{st} point on which he had contrasted the two
plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the
federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could
ever consent to give powers to Cong^s he had two reasons either of
w^{ch} was sufficient, 1. Cong^s as a Legislative body does not stand on
the people. 2. it is a _single_ body. 1. He would not repeat the remarks
he had formerly made on the principles of Representation, he would only
say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating every
branch of Gov^t. In G. Britain where this poison has had a full
operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely to the
purity of her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which are neither
appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty of that
Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the mercy of its
rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any parallel between the
situation of that Country & ours at present. But it is a lesson we ought
not to disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the
most corrupt. Every other source of influence must also be stronger in
small than large bodies of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that
one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he
need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of the _smallest_
of them. There are facts among ourselves which are known to all. Passing
over others, he will only remark that the _Impost_, so anxiously wished
for by the public was defeated not by any of the _larger_ States in the
Union. 2. _Congress is a single Legislature._ Despotism comes on Mankind
in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military,
one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice
both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there
can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by
dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a
single House there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue &
good sense of those who compose it.
On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan
reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers
in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a
plurality. In order to controul the Legislative authority, you must
divide it. In order to controul the Executive you must unite it. One man
will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves
till one becomes the master of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of
Rome first Cæsar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings
of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of
dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time
he w^d not he s^d, proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he
had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves; and on the decision of them,
the fate of the others will depend.
M^r Pinkney,[87] the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N.
Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in
the Nat^l system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length
in recommending; which they found necessary to remedy the evils which
produced this Convention.
[87] Yates states it was C. C. Pinckney who said this.--_Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 123.
M^r Elseworth proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind
of the Committee on the subject, "that the Legislative power of the
U.S. should remain in Cong^s" This was not seconded, though it seemed
better calculated for the purpose than the 1^{st} proposition of M^r
Patterson in place of which Mr. E. wished to substitute it.
M^r Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When the
Salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to our
trust, not to propose what we found necessary. He painted in strong
colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the danger of
delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the
sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts relating to the
Convention and the objects of their deliberation, he observed that as
each State acted separately in the case, it would have been indecent for
it to have charged the existing Constitution with all the vices which it
might have perceived in it. The first State that set on foot this
experiment would not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it
was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must have been of the
uncertainty of a successful issue to the experiment. There are certainly
reasons of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must be
dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them. He w^d not as far as
depended on him leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The
present moment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.
The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or
introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been
fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by
which the end of a Gen^l Gov^t can be attained: the 1^{st} is by
coercion as proposed by M^r P's plan 2. by real legislation as prop^d
by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be _impracticable_,
_expensive_, _cruel to individuals_. It tended also to habituate the
instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in the Spoils of their fellow
Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of Ambition.
We must resort therefore to a National _Legislation over individuals_,
for which Cong^s are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be
blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the rec^d maxim
on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Cong^s has
been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body.
Cong^s are moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures
who retain even a power of recall. They have therefore no will of their
own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the
views of the States, who are always encroaching on the authority of the
U. States. A provision for harmony among the States, as in trade,
naturalization &.--for crushing rebellion whenever it may rear its
crest--and for certain other general benefits, must be made. The powers
for these purposes can never be given to a body, inadequate as Congress
are in point of representation, elected in the mode in which they are,
and possessing no more confidence than they do: for notwithstanding what
has been said to the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that a
rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A Nat^l Gov^t
alone, properly constituted, will answer the purpose; and he begged it
to be considered that the present is the last moment for establing one.
After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair.
The Committee rose & the House adjourned.
MONDAY JUNE 18. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
on the propositions of M^r Patterson & M^r Randolph.
On motion of M^r Dickinson to postpone the 1^{st} Resolution in M^r
Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following viz--"that the
Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to
render the Government of the U. S. adequate to the exigencies, the
preservation and the prosperity of the Union" the postponement was
agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.
Mr. Hamilton,[88] had been hitherto silent on the business before the
Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age &
experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to
theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own
State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleages, he could by no
means accede. This crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too
serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed
on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety &
happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to
both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being
fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the
States in possession of their Sovereignty could possibly answer the
purpose. On the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the
amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired blessings from any
general sovereignty that could be substituted.--As to the powers of the
Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen
from distinctions & reasonings too subtle. A _federal_ Gov^t he
conceived to mean an association of independent Communities into one.
Different Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in
different ways. In some instances the powers are exercised over
collective bodies; in others over individuals, as in the German Diet--&
among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be
given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs
itself from the _federal_ idea, as understood by some, since it is to
operate eventually on individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble
gentleman from V^a (M^r R.) that we owed it to our Country, to do on
this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The
States sent us here to provide for the exigencies of the Union. To rely
on & propose any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely because
it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means
to the end. It may be said that the _States_ cannot _ratify_ a plan
not within the purview of the article of the Confederation providing
for alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in
which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the
Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In
the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the
Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the
people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the
reason assigned ag^{st} it being, that it might possibly be found an
inconvenient shackle.
[88] Hamilton happened to call upon Madison while the latter was
putting the last touches to this speech and "acknowledged
its fidelity, without suggesting more than a few verbal
alterations which were made."--(Cf. _Madison's Writings_,
vol. ii.). A brief of the speech from the Hamilton Papers is
given in Lodge's _Works of Hamilton_, i., 353, where (i.,
375) Yates's report also is quoted.
[Illustration: HAMILTON'S PRINCIPAL SPEECH.
(Reduced.)]
The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of
our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two
plans--prove that there were essential defects in both--and point out
such changes as might render a _national one_, efficacious.--The great &
essential principles necessary for the support of Government are 1. an
active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not
exist in the States in favor of the federal Gov^t. They have evidently
in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal
interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular
debts--their particular plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to,
invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of Congress. 2. The
love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this
principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to
regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give
effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is
known to hate the controul of the Gen^l Government. It may be remarked
too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of
the Gen^l Gov^t as of the particular Gov^{ts}. A dissolution of the
latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of
Gov^t attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as
Virg^a will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations.
How strongly will it feel its importance and self-sufficiency? 3. An
habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on
the side of the State Gov^t. Its sovereignty is immediately before
the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by
them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which
familiarize & endear a Gov^t to a people, are dispensed to them. 4.
_Force_ by which may be understood a _coercion of laws_ or _coercion of
arms_. Cong^s have not the former except in few cases. In particular
States, this Coercion is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most
cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is
absolutely necessary in large communities. Mass^{ts} is now feeling this
necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted
on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war
between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators.
They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of
the Union will ensue. 5. _Influence._ he did not mean corruption, but a
dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an
attachment to the Gov^t. Almost all the weight of these is on the side
of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to
exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest,
which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the
current of the States, and do not flow into the stream of the Gen^l
Gov^t. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Gen^l
Gov^t and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious. Theory
is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council
had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in
particular the power of fining and using force ag^{st} delinquent
members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of
war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length
taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their
councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy
affords another lesson. The Authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as
great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising
their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of,
encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal
sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho' aided by a Prince at its
head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a
striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other
examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce
any union at all, and have been more than once at war with one
another.--How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a
compleat sovereignty in the General Goverm^t as will turn all the strong
principles & passions abovementioned on its side. Does the scheme of N.
Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy
whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect
of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives
a direct revenue to Cong^s but this will not be sufficient. The balance
can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves cannot be
relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also
deliberate on the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant as
they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and
countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so
unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort?
Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia; France or Eng^d
with other countries of Europe, Pen^a with N. Carol^a will the relative
pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative
value of land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like
comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally
unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different
Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much
depends too on _situation_. Con^t N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being
commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the Commercial ones,
can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They
will & must fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the
union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be
drawn? from Commerce; even from exports which notwithstanding the
co[~m]on opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &c
&c. These tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another
destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which
is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that
V^a & the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they
sh^d long abide by it. It shocks too much all ideas of Justice, and
every human feeling. Bad principles in a Gov^t tho slow are sure in
their operation, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised
whether Cong^s at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time
of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr. P'^s plan provides no
remedy.--If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of
Cong^s is such that they could never be properly & effectually
exercised. The members of Cong^s being chosen by the States & subject to
recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be found
effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a
tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever be its
form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise
it will be swallowed up by them. It is ag^{st} all the principles of a
good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a body as Cong^s.
Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers
to Cong^s must eventuate in a bad Gov^t or in no Gov^t. The plan of N.
Jersey therefore will not do. What then is to be done? Here he was
embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged him.
The expence of a general Gov^t was also formidable; unless there were
such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Gov^{ts} as the
case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great
oeconomy might be obtained by substituting a general Gov^t. He did not
mean however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On
the other hand he saw no _other_ necessity for declining it. They are
not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or
agriculture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary.
There must be district tribunals; corporations for local purposes. But
cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States.
The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that
of drawing representatives from the extremes to the centre of the
Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The
moderate wages for the 1^{st} branch would only be a bait to little
demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed would be the
utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by
certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Gov^t.
This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a Republican
Gov^t could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at
the same time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form.
In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he
was by the opinion of so many of the wise & good, that the British Gov^t
was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing
short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different
opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the
change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was still
going on. It was once thought that the power of Cong^s was amply
sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now
seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he
observed, were as loud as any in declaiming ag^{st} the vices of
democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the
time, when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed
by M^r Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only
Gov^t in the world "which unites public strength with individual
security."--In every Co[~m]unity where industry is encouraged, there
will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate
interests will arise. There will be debtors & Creditors &c. Give all
power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few,
they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have the power, that
each may defend itself ag^{st} the other. To the want of this check we
owe our paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it
the British owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of
Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a
change, and a sufficient interest by means of their property, in being
faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier ag^{st}
every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown
or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness eno' to answer
the purpose. The Senate (of Maryland) which seems to be so much appealed
to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous &
eager in the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission they
would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal
is a proof of it.--Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the
necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human
passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the
senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing
violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of
Gov^t is pursued, which seizes the popular passions, they spread like
wild fire, and become irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from
the N. England States whether experience had not there verified the
remark.--As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one
could be established on Republican Principles. Was not this giving up
the merits of the question; for can there be a good Gov^t without a good
Executive. The English Model was the only good one on this subject. The
Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the
Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above
the danger of being corrupted from abroad--and at the same time was both
sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the
purpose of the institution at home, one of the weak sides of Republics
was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little
character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of
intermeddling Neibours. Sweden was a striking instance. The French &
English had each their parties during the late Revolution which was
effected by the predominant influence of the former.--What is the
inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far in
order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will
admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or
at least during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He
appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a term of seven
years, would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an
acceptance of public trust would require, so as to ensure the services
of the best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a
permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential
purposes. But is this a Republican Gov^t, it will be asked? Yes if all
the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people,
or a process of election originating with the people. He was sensible
that an Executive constituted as he proposed would have in fact but
little of the power and independence that might be necessary. On the
other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought
to have but little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of
making creatures, and as the object of his ambition w^d be to _prolong_
his power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself
of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An
Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and
will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected
probably, that such an Executive will be an _elective Monarch_, and will
give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Gov^t. He w^d
reply that _Monarch_ is an indefinite term. It marks not either the
degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate w^d be a
monarch for life--the other prop^d by the Report from the Co[~m]ittee of
the whole, w^d be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being
elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious
writers that elective monarchies w^d be the best if they could be
guarded ag^{st} the _tumults_ excited by the ambition and intrigues of
competitors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He
rather thought this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken
rather from particular cases than from general principles. The election
of Roman Emperors was made by the _Army_. In _Poland_ the election is
made by great rival _princes_ with independent power, and ample means,
of raising commotions. In the German Empire, The appointment is made by
the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting
cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among
ourselves as will defend the community ag^{st} these effects in any
dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the
Committee a sketch of a plan which he sh^d prefer to either of those
under consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most
members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he
would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will
adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved--he
sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of
their fondness for democracies--he sees that a great progress has been
already made & is still going on in the public mind. He thinks therefore
that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and
whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping
where the plan of M^r R. w^d place them, but be ready to go as far at
least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched
as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more
correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should
probably propose to the plan of M^r R. in the proper stages of its
future discussion. He read his sketch in the words following; to wit
I. The supreme Legislative power of the United States of America
to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be
called the Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall
form the Legislature of the United States with power to pass all
laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.
II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to
serve for three years.
III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during
good behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for
that purpose by the people: in order to this the States to be
divided into election districts. On the death, removal or
resignation of any Senator his place to be filled out of the
district from which he came.
IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be
vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good
behaviour--the election to be made by Electors chosen by the
people in the Election Districts aforesaid--The authorities &
functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a negative
on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws
passed; to have the direction of war when authorized or begun;
to have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power
of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the
heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and
Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers
(Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the
approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have the power of
pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon
without the approbation of the Senate.
V. On the death resignation or removal of the Governour his
authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till
a Successor be appointed.
VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the
power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of
approving or rejecting all appointments of officers except the
heads or chiefs of the departments of Finance War and foreign
affairs.
VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in ---- Judges
to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and
permanent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in
all causes of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all
causes in which the revenues of the General Government or the
Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.
VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to
institute Courts in each State for the determination of all
matters of general concern.
IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States
to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and
upon conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for
holding any place of trust or profit--All impeachments to be
tried by a Court to consist of the Chief ---- or Judge of the
Superior Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall
hold his place during good behavior, and have a permanent
salary.
X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the
Constitution or laws of the United States to be utterly void;
and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Governour
or president of each State shall be appointed by the General
Government and shall have a Negative upon the laws about to be
passed in the State of which he is the Governour or President.
XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the militia
of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction
of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and
commissioned by them.
On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations
corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.[89]
[89] COPY OF A PAPER COMMUNICATED TO J. M. BY COL. HAMILTON,
ABOUT THE CLOSE OF THE CONVENTION IN PHILAD^A, 1787, WHICH
HE SAID DELINEATED THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HE WOULD HAVE
WISHED TO BE PROPOSED BY THE CONVENTION. HE HAD STATED THE
PRINCIPLES OF IT IN THE COURSE OF THE DELIBERATIONS.
The people of the United States of America do ordain &
establish this Constitution for the government of themselves
and their posterity.
ARTICLE I
§ 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct
bodies of men, one to be called the Assembly, the other the
Senate, subject to the negative hereinafter mentioned.
§ 2. The Executive power, with the qualifications
hereinafter specified, shall be vested in a President of the
United States.
§ 3. The Supreme Judicial authority, except in the cases
otherwise provided for in this Constitution, shall be vested
in a Court to be called the SUPREME COURT, to consist of not
less than six nor more than twelve Judges.
ARTICLE II
§ 1. The Assembly shall consist of persons to be called
representatives, who shall be chosen, except in the first
instance, by the free male citizens & inhabitants of the
several States comprehended in the Union, all of whom of the
age of twenty one years & upwards shall be entitled to an
equal vote.
§ 2. But the first Assembly shall be chosen in the manner
prescribed in the last article and shall consist of one
hundred members of whom N. Hampshire shall have five,
Massachusetts thirteen, Rhode Island two, Connecticut seven,
N. York nine, N. Jersey six, Pennsylvania twelve, Delaware
two, Maryland eight, Virginia sixteen, N. Carolina eight, S.
Carolina eight, Georgia four.
§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections
of Representatives, apportioning them in each State, from
time to time, as nearly as may be to the number of persons
described in the 4§ of the VII article, so as that the whole
number of Representatives shall never be less than one
hundred, nor more than ---- hundred. There shall be a Census
taken for this purpose within three years after the first
meeting of the Legislature, and within every successive
period of ten years. The term for which Representatives
shall be elected shall be determined by the Legislature but
shall not exceed three years. There shall be a general
election at least once in three years; and the time of
service of all the members in each Assembly shall begin,
(except in filling vacancies) on the same day, and shall
always end on the same day.
§ 4. Forty members shall make a House sufficient to proceed
to business; but their number may be increased by the
Legislature, yet so as never to exceed a majority of the
whole number of Representatives.
§ 5. The Assembly shall choose its President and other
officers, shall judge of the qualifications & elections of
its own members, punish them for improper conduct in their
capacity of Representatives not extending to life or limb;
and shall exclusively possess the power of impeachment
except in the case of the President of the United States;
but no impeachment of a member of the Senate shall be by
less than two thirds of the Representatives present.
§ 6. Representatives may vote by proxy; but no
Representative present shall be proxy for more than one who
is absent.[A]
[A] Quere, ? (to provide for distant States).--Note
in Madison's hand.
§ 7. Bills for raising revenue, and bills for appropriating
monies for the support of fleets and armies, and for paying
the salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate
in the Assembly; but may be altered and amended by the
Senate.
§ 8. The acceptance of an office under the United States by
a Representative shall vacate his seat in the Assembly.
ARTICLE III
§ 1. The Senate shall consist of persons to be chosen,
except in the first instance, by Electors elected for that
purpose by the Citizens and inhabitants of the several
States comprehended in the Union who shall have in their own
right, or in the right of their wifes, an Estate in land for
not less than life, or a term of years, whereof at the time
of giving their votes there shall be at least fourteen years
unexpired.
§ 2. But the first Senate shall be chosen in the manner
prescribed in the last Article and shall consist of forty
members to be called Senators, of whom N. Hampshire shall
have ---- Mass^{ts} ---- R. Island ---- Connecticut ---- N.
York ---- N. Jersey ---- Pen^a ---- Delaware ---- Mary^d
---- Virg^a ---- N. Carol. ---- S. Carol. ---- Geo. ----.
§ 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections
of Senators, for which purpose the States respectively,
which have more than one Senator, shall be divided into
convenient districts to which the Senators shall be
apportioned. A State having but one Senator shall be itself
a district. On the death, resignation or removal from office
of a Senator his place shall be supplied by a new election
in the district from which he came. Upon each election there
shall be not less than six nor more than twelve electors
chosen in a district.
§ 4. The number of Senators shall never be less than forty,
nor shall any State, if the same shall not hereafter be
divided, ever have less than the number allotted to it in
the second section of this article; but the Legislature may
increase the whole number of Senators, in the same
proportion to the whole number of Representatives as forty
is to one hundred; and such increase beyond the present
number, shall be apportioned to the respective States in a
ratio to the respective numbers of their representatives.
§ 5. If States shall be divided, or if a new arrangement of
the boundaries of two or more States shall take place, the
Legislature shall apportion the number of Senators (in
elections succeeding such division or new arrangement) to
which the constituent parts were entitled according to the
change of situation, having regard to the number of persons
described in the 4 §. of the VII article.
§ 6. The Senators shall hold their places during good
behaviour, removable only by conviction on impeachment for
some crime or misdemeanor. They shall continue to exercise
their offices when impeached untill a conviction shall take
place. Sixteen Senators attending in person shall be
sufficient to make a House to transact business; but the
Legislature may increase this number, yet so as never to
exceed a majority of the whole number of Senators. The
Senators may vote by proxy, but no Senator who is present
shall be proxy for more than two who are absent.
§ 7. The Senate shall choose its President and other
officers; shall judge of the qualifications and elections of
its members, and shall punish them for improper conduct in
their capacity of Senators; but such punishment shall not
extend to life or limb, nor to expulsion. In the absence of
their President they may choose a temporary President. The
President shall only have a casting vote when the House is
equally divided.
§ 8. The Senate shall exclusively possess the power of
declaring war. No treaty shall be made without their advice
and consent; which shall also be necessary to the
appointment of all officers, except such for which a
different provision is made in this Constitution.
ARTICLE IV
§ 1. The President of the United States of America, (except
in the first instance) shall be elected in the manner
following--The Judges of the Supreme Court shall within
sixty days after a vacancy shall happen, cause public notice
to be given in each State, of such vacancy, appointing
therein three several days for the several purposes
following, to wit, a day for commencing the election of
electors for the purposes hereinafter specified, to be
called the first electors, which day shall not be less than
forty, nor more than sixty days, after the day of the
publication of the notice in each State--another day for
the meeting of the electors not less [than] forty nor
more than ninety days from the day for commencing their
election--another day for the meeting of electors to be
chosen by the first electors, for the purpose hereinafter
specified, and to be called the second Electors, which day
shall be not less than forty nor more than sixty days after
the day for the meeting of the first electors.
§ 2. After notice of a vacancy shall have been given there
shall be chosen in each State a number of persons, as the
first electors in the preceding section mentioned, equal to
the whole number of the Representatives and Senators of such
State in the Legislature of the United States; which
electors shall be chosen by the Citizens of such State
having an estate of inheritance or for three lives in land,
or a clear personal estate of the value of one thousand
Spanish milled dollars of the present standard.
§ 3. These first electors shall meet in their respective
States at the time appointed, at one place; and shall
proceed to vote by ballot for a President, who shall not be
one of their own number, unless the Legislature upon
experiment should hereafter direct otherwise. They shall
cause two lists to be made of the name or names of the
person or persons voted for, which they or the major part of
them shall sign & certify. They shall then proceed each to
nominate openly in the presence of the others, two persons
as for second electors, and out of the persons who shall
have the four highest numbers of nominations, they shall
afterwards by ballot by plurality of votes choose two who
shall be the second electors, to each of whom shall be
delivered one of the lists before mentioned. These second
electors shall not be any of the persons voted for as
President. A copy of the same list signed and certified in
like manner shall be transmitted by the first electors to
the Seat of the Government of the United States, under a
sealed cover directed to the President of the Assembly,
which after the meeting of the Second electors shall be
opened for the inspection of the two Houses of the
Legislature.
§ 4. The second electors shall meet precisely on the day
appointed and not on another day, at one place. The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, or if there be no Chief
Justice, the Judge senior in office in such Court, or if
there be no one Judge senior in office, some other Judge of
that Court, by the choice of the rest of the Judges or of a
majority of them, shall attend at the same place and shall
preside at the meeting, but shall have no vote. Two thirds
of the whole number of the Electors shall constitute a
sufficient meeting for the execution of their trust. At this
meeting the lists delivered to the respective electors shall
be produced and inspected, and if there be any person who
has a majority of the whole number of votes given by the
first electors, he shall be the President of the United
States; but if there be no such person, the second electors
so met shall proceed to vote, by ballot for one of the
persons named in the lists who shall have the three highest
numbers of the votes of the first electors; and if upon the
first or any succeeding ballot on the day of their meeting,
either of those persons shall have a number of votes equal
to a majority of the whole number of second electors chosen,
he shall be the President. But if no such choice be made on
the day appointed for the meeting either by reason of the
non-attendance of the second electors, or their not
agreeing, or any other matter, the person having the
greatest number of votes of the first electors shall be the
President.
§ 5. If it should happen that the Chief Justice or some
other Judge of the Supreme Court should not attend in due
time, the second electors shall proceed to the execution of
their trust without him.
§ 6. If the Judges should neglect to cause the notice
required by the first section of this article to be given
within the time therein limited, they may nevertheless cause
it to be afterwards given; but their neglect if wilful, is
hereby declared to be an offence for which they may be
impeached, and if convicted they shall be punished as in
other cases of conviction on impeachment.
§ 7. The Legislature shall by permanent laws provide such
further regulations as may be necessary for the more orderly
election of the President; not contravening the provisions
herein contained.
§ 8. The President before he shall enter upon the execution
of his office shall take an oath or affirmation, faithfully
to execute the same, and to the utmost of his Judgment &
power to protect the rights of the people, and preserve the
Constitution inviolate. This oath or affirmation shall be
administered by the President of the Senate for the time
being in the presence of both Houses of the Legislature.
§ 9. The Senate and the Assembly shall always convene in
Session on the day appointed for the meeting of the second
electors and shall continue sitting till the President take
the oath or affirmation of office. He shall hold his place
during good behavior, removeable only by conviction upon
impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor.
§ 10. The President at the beginning of every meeting of the
Legislature as soon as they shall be ready to proceed to
business, shall convene them together at the place where the
Senate shall sit, and shall communicate to them all such
matters as may be necessary for their information, or as may
require their consideration. He may by message during the
Session communicate all other matters which may appear to
him proper. He may, whenever in his opinion the public
business shall require it, convene the Senate and Assembly,
or either of them, and may prorogue them for a time not
exceeding forty days at one prorogation; and if they should
disagree about their adjournment, he may adjourn them to
such time as he shall think proper. He shall have a right to
negative all bills, Resolutions or acts of the two Houses of
the Legislature about to be passed into laws. He shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. He shall be the
commander in chief of the army and Navy of the United States
and of the Militia within the several States, and shall have
the direction of war when commenced, but he shall not take
the actual command in the field of an army without the
consent of the Senate and Assembly. All treaties,
conventions and agreements with foreign nations shall be
made by him, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. He shall have the appointment of the Principal or
Chief officer of each of the departments of war, naval
Affairs, Finance and Foreign Affairs; and shall have the
nomination; and by and with the consent of the Senate, the
appointment of all other officers to be appointed under the
authority of the United States, except such for whom
different provision is made by this Constitution; and
provided that this shall not be construed to prevent the
Legislature, from appointing by name, in their laws, persons
to special and particular trusts created in such laws; nor
shall be construed to prevent principals in offices merely
ministerial, from constituting deputies.--In the recess of
the Senate he may fill vacancies in offices by appointments
to continue in force until the end of the next Session of
the Senate, and he shall commission all officers. He shall
have power to pardon all offences except treason, for which
he may grant reprieves, untill the opinion of the Senate &
Assembly can be had, and with their concurrence may pardon
the same.
§ 11. He shall receive a fixed compensation for his services
to be paid to him at stated times, and not to be increased
nor diminished during his continuance in office.
§ 12. If he depart out of the United States without the
Consent of the Senate and Assembly, he shall thereby
abdicate his office.
§ 13. He may be impeached for any crime or misdemeanor by
the two Houses of the Legislature, two thirds of each House
concurring, and if convicted shall be removed from office.
He may be afterwards tried & punished in the ordinary course
of law. His impeachment shall operate as a suspension from
office until the determination thereof.
§ 14. The President of the Senate shall be vice President of
the United States. On the death, resignation, impeachment,
removal from office, or absence from the United States, of
the President thereof, the Vice President shall exercise all
the powers by this Constitution vested in the President,
until another shall be appointed, or untill he shall return
within the United States, if his absence was with the
consent of the Senate and Assembly.
ARTICLE V
§ 1. There shall be a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
who together with the other Judges thereof, shall hold the
office during good behaviour, removable only by conviction
on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor. Each Judge
shall have a competent salary to be paid to him at stated
times, and not to be diminished during his continuance in
office.
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all
causes in which the United States shall be a party, in all
controversies between the United States, and a particular
State, or between two or more States, except such as relate
to a claim of territory between the United States, and one
or more States, which shall be determined in the mode
prescribed in the VI article; in all cases affecting foreign
Ministers, Consuls and Agents; and an appellate jurisdiction
both as to law and fact in all cases which shall concern the
Citizens of foreign nations, in all questions between the
Citizens of different States, and in all others in which the
fundamental rights of this Constitution are involved,
subject to such exceptions as are herein contained and to
such regulations as the Legislature shall provide.
The Judges of all Courts which may be constituted by the
Legislature shall also hold their places during good
behaviour, removeable only by conviction on impeachment for
some crime or misdemeanor, and shall have competent salaries
to be paid at stated times and not to be diminished during
their continuance in office; but nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the Legislature from
abolishing such Courts themselves.
All crimes, except upon impeachment, shall be tried by a
Jury of twelve men; and if they shall have been committed
within any State, shall be tried within such State; and all
civil causes arising under this constitution of the like
kind with those which have been heretofore triable by Jury
in the respective States, shall in like manner be tried by
jury; unless in special cases the Legislature shall think
proper to make different provision, to which provision the
concurrence of two thirds of both Houses shall be necessary.
§ 2. Impeachments of the President and Vice President of the
U. States, members of the Senate, the Governours and
Presidents of the several States, the Principal or Chief
Officers of the Departments enumerated in the 10 §. of the
4^{th} Article, Ambassadors and other like Public Ministers,
the Judges of the Supreme Court, Generals, and Admirals of
the Navy shall be tried by a Court to consist of the Judges
of the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice or first or
Senior Judge of the superior Court of law in each State, of
whom twelve shall constitute a Court. A majority of the
Judges present may convict. All other persons shall be tried
on impeachment by a court to consist of the Judges of the
Supreme Court and six Senators drawn by lot, a majority of
whom may convict.
Impeachments shall clearly specify the particular offence
for which the party accused is to be tried, and judgment
on conviction upon the trial thereof shall be either
removal from office singly, or removal from office and
disqualification for holding any future office or place
of trust; but no Judgment on impeachment shall prevent
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law;
provided that no Judge concerned in such conviction shall
sit as Judge on the second trial. The Legislature may remove
the disabilities incurred by conviction on impeachment.
ARTICLE VI
Controversies about the right of territory between the
United States and particular States shall be determined by a
Court to be constituted in manner following. The State or
States claiming in opposition to the United States as
parties shall nominate a number of persons, equal to double
the number of the Judges of the Supreme Court for the time
being, of whom none shall be citizens by birth of the States
which are parties, nor inhabitants thereof when nominated,
and of whom not more than two shall have their actual
residence in one State. Out of the persons so nominated the
Senate shall elect one half, who together with the Judges of
the Supreme Court, shall form the Court. Two thirds of the
whole number may hear and determine the controversy, by
plurality of voices. The States concerned may at their
option claim a decision by the Supreme Court only. All of
the members of the Court hereby instituted shall, prior to
the hearing of the Cause take an oath impartially and
according to the best of their judgments and consciences, to
hear and determine the controversy.
ARTICLE VII
§ 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have power
to pass all laws which they shall judge necessary to the
common defence and general welfare of the Union: But no
Bill, Resolution, or act of the Senate and assembly shall
have the force of a law until it shall have received the
assent of the President, or of the vice-President when
exercising the powers of the President; and if such assent
shall not have been given within ten days, after such bill,
resolution or other act shall have been presented to him
for that purpose, the same shall not be a law. No bill,
resolution or other act not assented to shall be revived in
the same Session of the Legislature. The mode of signifying
such assent, shall be by signing the bill act of [r]
resolution, and returning it so signed to either House of
the Legislature.
§ 2. The enacting stile of all laws shall be "Be it enacted
by the people of the United States of America."
§ 3. No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post
facto law; nor shall any title of nobility be granted by
the United States, or by either of them; nor shall any
person holding an office or place of trust under the United
States without the permission of the Legislature accept any
present, emolument office or title from a foreign prince or
State. Nor shall any Religious Sect, or denomination, or
religious test for any office or place, be ever established
by law.
§ 4. Taxes on lands, houses and other real estate, and
capitation taxes shall be proportioned in each State by the
whole number of free persons, except Indians not taxed, and
by three fifths of all other persons.
§ 5. The two Houses of the Legislature may by joint ballot
appoint a Treasurer of the United States. Neither House in
the Session of both Houses, without the consent of the other
shall adjourn for more than three days at a time. The
Senators and Representatives, in attending, going to and
coming from the Session of their respective houses shall be
privileged from arrest, except for crimes and breaches of
the peace. The place of meeting shall always be at the seat
of Government which shall be fixed by law.
§ 6. The laws of the United States, and the treaties which
have been made under the articles of the confederation, and
which shall be made under this Constitution shall be the
supreme law of the Land, and shall be so construed by the
Courts of the several States.
§ 7. The Legislature shall convene at least once in each
year, which unless otherwise provided for by law, shall be
on the first Monday in December.
§ 8. The members of the two Houses of the Legislature shall
receive a reasonable compensation for their services, to
be paid out of the Treasury of the United States and
ascertained by law. The law for making such provision shall
be passed with the concurrence of the first Assembly and
shall extend to succeeding Assemblies; and no succeeding
assembly shall concur in an alteration of such provision, so
as to increase its own compensation; but there shall be
always a law in existence for making such provision.
ARTICLE VIII
§ 1. The Governour or President of each State shall be
appointed under the authority of the United States, and
shall have a right to negative all laws about to be passed
in the State of which he shall be Governour or President,
subject to such qualifications and regulations, as the
Legislature of the United States shall prescribe. He shall
in other respects have the same powers only which the
Constitution of the State does or shall allow to its
Governour or President, except as to the appointment of
Officers of the Militia.
§ 2. Each Governour or President of a State shall hold his
office until a successor be actually appointed, unless he
die, or resign or be removed from office by conviction on
impeachment. There shall be no appointment of such Governor
or President in the Recess of the Senate.
The Governours and Presidents of the several States at the
time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue
in office in the same manner and with the same powers as if
they had been appointed pursuant to the first section of
this article.
The officers of the Militia in the several States may be
appointed under the authority of the U. States; the
Legislature whereof may authorize the Governors or
Presidents of States to make such appointments with such
restrictions as they shall think proper.
ARTICLE IX
§ 1. No person shall be eligible to the office of President
of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of
the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United
States.
§ 2. No person shall be eligible as a Senator or
Representative unless at the time of his election he be a
Citizen and inhabitant of the State in which he is chosen;
provided that he shall not be deemed to be disqualified by a
temporary absence from the State.
§ 3. No person entitled by this Constitution to elect or to
be elected President of the United States, or a Senator
or Representative in the Legislature thereof, shall be
disqualified but by the conviction of some offence for which
the law shall have previously ordained the punishment of
disqualification. But the Legislature may by law provide
that persons holding offices under the United States or
either of them shall not be eligible to a place in the
Assembly or Senate, and shall be during their continuance in
office suspended from sitting in the Senate.
§ 4. No person having an office or place of trust under the
United States shall without permission of the Legislature
accept any present emolument office or title from any
foreign Prince or State.
§ 5. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to the
rights privileges and immunities of Citizens in every other
State; and full faith and credit shall be given in each
State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings
of another.
§ 6. Fugitives from justice from one State who shall be
found in another shall be delivered up on the application of
the State from which they fled.
§ 7. No new State shall be erected within the limits of
another, or by the junction of two or more States, without
the concurrent consent of the Legislatures of the United
States and of the States concerned. The Legislature of the
United States may admit new States into the Union.
§ 8. The United States are hereby declared to be bound to
guarantee to each State a Republican form of Government, and
to protect each State as well against domestic violence as
foreign invasion.
§ 9. All Treaties, Contracts and engagements of the United
States of America under the articles of Confederation and
perpetual Union, shall have equal validity under this
Constitution.
§ 10. No State shall enter into a Treaty, Alliance, or
contract with another, or with a foreign power without the
consent of the United States.
§ 11. The members of the Legislature of the United States
and of each State, and all officers Executive & Judicial of
the one and of the other shall take an oath or affirmation
to support the Constitution of the United States.
§ 12. This Constitution may receive such alterations and
amendments as may be proposed by the Legislature of the
United States, with the concurrence of two thirds of the
members of both Houses, and ratified by the Legislatures of,
or by Conventions of deputies chosen by the people in, two
thirds of the States composing the Union.
ARTICLE X
This Constitution shall be submitted to the consideration of
Conventions in the several States, the members whereof shall
be chosen by the people of such States respectively under
the direction of their respective Legislatures. Each
Convention which shall ratify the same, shall appoint the
first representatives and Senators from such State according
to the rule prescribed in the ---- § of the ---- article.
The representatives so appointed shall continue in office
for one year only. Each Convention so ratifying shall give
notice thereof to the Congress of the United States,
transmitting at the same time a list of the Representatives
and Senators chosen. When the Constitution shall have been
duly ratified, Congress shall give notice of a day and place
for the meeting of the Senators and Representatives from the
several States; and when these or a majority of them shall
have assembled according to such notice, they shall by joint
ballot, by plurality of votes, elect a President of the
United States; and the Constitution thus organized shall be
carried into effect.--_Mad. MSS._
"Col: Hamilton did not propose in the Convention any plan of
a Constitution. He had sketched an outline which he read as
part of a speech; observing that he did not mean it as a
proposition, but only to give a more correct view of his
ideas.
"Mr. Patterson regularly proposed a plan which was discussed
& voted on."--Madison to John Quincy Adams, Montpellier,
Nov. 2, 1818, _Dept. of State MSS._, Miscellaneous Letters.
Committee rose & the House Adjourned.
TUESDAY JUNE 19^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE ON
THE PROPOSITIONS OF M^R PATTERSON,--[90]
[90] This was the last session of the Convention in Committee of the
Whole.
The substitute offered yesterday by M^r Dickenson being rejected by a
vote now taken on it; Con. N. Y. N. J. Del. ay. Mass. P^a V. N. C. S. C.
Geo. no. Mary^d divided M^r Patterson's plan was again at large before
the Committee.
M^r Madison. Much stress has been laid by some gentlemen on the want of
power in the Convention to propose any other than a _federal_ plan. To
what had been answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the
characteristics attached to a _federal_ plan would support this
objection. One characteristic, was that in a _federal_ Government, the
power was exercised not on the people individually; but on the people
_collectively_, on the _States_. Yet in some instances as in piracies,
captures &c. the existing Confederacy, and in many instances the
amendments to it proposed by M^r Patterson, must operate immediately on
individuals. The other characteristic was, that a _federal_ Gov^t
derived its appointments not immediately from the people, but from the
States which they respectively composed. Here too were facts on the
other side. In two of the States, Connect^t & Rh. Island, the delegates
to Cong^s were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the people at
large; and the plan of M^r P. intended no change in this particular.
It had been alledged (by M^r Patterson), that the Confederation having
been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous
Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts?
does it arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of
Confederation? If we consider the federal Union as analagous to the
fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which
must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of
the component members, it cannot be said that no dissolution of the
compact can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the
fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society would
certainly absolve the other part from their obligations to it. If the
breach of _any_ article by _any_ of the parties, does not set the others
at liberty, it is because, the contrary is _implied_ in the compact
itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives an indefinite
authority to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This latter
circumstance shews that we are not to consider the federal Union as
analagous to the social compact of individuals: for if it were so, a
Majority would have a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new
Constitution for the whole, which the Gentl^n from N. Jersey would be
among the last to admit. If we consider the federal Union as analagous
not to the Social compacts among individual men: but to the conventions
among individual States, What is the doctrine resulting from these
conventions? Clearly, according to the Expositors of the law of Nations,
that a breach of any one article by any one party, leaves all the other
parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention as dissolved,
unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent party to repair the
breach. In some treaties indeed it is expressly stipulated that a
violation of particular articles shall not have this consequence, and
even that particular articles shall remain in force during war, which
in general is understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are
there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles of Confederation? So
far from it that there is not even an express stipulation that force
shall be used to compell an offending member of the Union to discharge
its duty. He observed that the violations of the federal articles had
been numerous & notorious. Among the most notorious was an act of N.
Jersey herself; by which she _expressly refused_ to comply with a
Constitutional requisition of Cong^s and yielded no farther to the
expostulations of their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of
refusal without passing any positive act of compliance. He did not wish
to draw any rigid inferences from these observations. He thought it
proper however that the true nature of the existing confederacy should
be investigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on
which it now stands.
Proceeding to the consideration of M^r Patterson's plan, he stated the
object of a proper plan to be twofold. 1. to preserve the Union. 2. to
provide a Governm^t that will remedy the evils felt by the States both
in their united and individual capacities. Examine M^r P'^s plan, & say
whether it promises satisfaction in these respects.
1. Will it prevent the violations of the law of nations & of Treaties
which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign
wars? The tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested
in sundry instances. The files of Cong^s contain complaints already,
from almost every Nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto
indulgence has been shewn to us. This cannot be the permanent
disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among the
greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually
provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring
them on the whole. The existing Confederacy does not sufficiently
provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it does not supply
the omission. It leaves the will of the States as uncontrouled as ever.
2. Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A tendency to
such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified, among ourselves,
as well as in every other confederated republic antient and modern. By
the federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Cong^s.
Yet in several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars
with them. In like manner no two or more States can form among
themselves any treaties &c. without the consent of Cong^s. Yet Virg^a &
Mary^d in one instance--Pen^a & N. Jersey in another, have entered into
compacts, without previous application or subsequent apology. No State
again can of right raise troops in time of peace without the like
consent. Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the most
scrupulous observance. Has not Mass^{ts}, notwithstanding, the most
powerful member of the Union, already raised a body of troops? Is she
not now augmenting them, without having even deigned to apprise Cong^s
of Her intention? In fine--Have we not seen the public land dealt out to
Con^t to bribe her acquiescence in the decree constitutionally awarded
ag^{st} her claim on the territory of Pen^a: for no other possible
motive can account for the policy of Cong^s in that measure?--If we
recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find in all of
them the same tendency of the parts to encroach on the authority of the
whole. He then reviewed the Amphyctionic & Achæan confederacies among
the antients, and the Helvetic, Germanic & Belgic among the moderns,
tracing their analogy to the U. States in the constitution and extent of
their federal authorities--in the tendency of the particular members to
usurp on these authorities, and to bring confusion & ruin on the
whole.--He observed that the plan of Mr. Pat[er]son, besides omitting a
controul over the States as a general defence of the federal
prerogatives was particularly defective in two of its provisions. 1. Its
ratification was not to be by the people at large, but by the
_legislatures_. It could not therefore render the acts of Cong^s in
pursuance of their powers, even legally _paramount_ to the acts of the
States. 2. It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction
only--even in the criminal cases enumerated. The necessity of any such
provision supposed a danger of undue acquittals in the State tribunals,
of what avail c^d an appellate tribunal be, after an acquittal? Besides
in most if not all of the States, the Executives have by their
respective _Constitutions_, the right of pard^g. How could this be taken
from them by a _legislative_ ratification only?
3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other? Of these
enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virg^a & Maryland
which gave a preference to their own Citizens in cases where the
Citizens of other States are entitled to equality of privileges by the
Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of paper money &
other kindred measures as also aggressions. The States relatively to one
another being each of them either Debtor or Creditor; The creditor
States must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor States. We
have seen retaliating Acts on the subject which threatened danger not to
the harmony only, but the tranquillity of the Union. The plan of M^r
Paterson, not giving even a negative on the Acts of the States, left
them as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous projects
ag^{st} each other.
4. Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the States themselves?
The insurrections in Mass^{ts} admonished all the States of the danger
to which they were exposed. Yet the plan of M^r P. contained no
provisions for supplying the defect of the Confederation on this point.
According to the Republican theory indeed, Right & power being both
vested in the majority, are held to be synonymous. According to fact &
experience, a minority may in an appeal to force be an overmatch for the
majority. 1. If the minority happen to include all such as possess the
skill & habits of military life, with such as possess the great
pecuniary resources, one third may conquer the remaining two thirds. 2.
one third of those who participate in the choice of rulers may be
rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty disqualifies
them from a suffrage, & who for obvious reasons may be more ready to
join the standard of sedition than that of established Government. 3.
where slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more
fallacious.
5. Will it secure a good internal legislation & administration to the
particular States? In developing the evils which vitiate the political
system of the U. S. it is proper to take into view those which prevail
within the States individually as well as those which affect them
collectively: Since the former indirectly affect the whole; and there is
great reason to believe that the pressure of them had a full share in
the motives which produced the present Convention. Under this head he
enumerated and animadverted on 1. the multiplicity of the laws passed by
the several States. 2. the mutability of their laws. 3. the injustice of
them. 4. the impotence of them: observing that M^r Patterson's plan
contained no remedy for this dreadful class of evils, and could not
therefore be received as an adequate provision for the exigencies of the
Community.
6. Will it secure the Union ag^{st} the influence of foreign powers over
its members. He pretended not to say that any such influence had yet
been tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions would
produce it. As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the
intrigues practised among the Amphyctionic Confederates first by the
Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon: Among the
Achæans, first by Macedon & afterwards no less fatally by Rome: among
the Swiss by Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring powers: among the
members of the Germanic Body by France, England, Spain & Russia--And in
the Belgic Republic, by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan of
M^r Patterson, not giving to the general Councils any negative on the
will of the particular States, left the door open for the like
pernicious Machinations among ourselves.
7. He begged the smaller States which were most attached to M^r
Patterson's plan to consider the situation in which it would leave them.
In the first place they would continue to bear the whole expence of
maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought not to be said that if
they were willing to bear this burthen, no others had a right to
complain. As far as it led the small States to forbear keeping up a
representation, by which the public business was delayed, it was
evidently a matter of common concern. An examination of the minutes of
Congress would satisfy every one that the public business had been
frequently delayed by this cause; and that the States most frequently
unrepresented in Cong^s were not the larger States. He reminded the
Convention of another consequence of leaving on a small State the burden
of maintaining a Representation in Cong^s. During a considerable period
of the War, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in whom alone before
the signing of the Confederation the entire vote of that State and after
that event one half of its vote, frequently resided, was a Citizen &
Resident of Pen^a and held an office in his own State incompatible with
an appointment from it to Cong^s. During another period, the same State
was represented by three delegates two of whom were citizens of Penn^a
and the third a Citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must have been
intended to avoid the burden of supporting Delegates from their own
State. But whatever might have been y^e cause, was not in effect the
vote of one State doubled, and the influence of another increased by it?
In the 2^d place the coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan
depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will
be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it. He
illustrated the position by the history of the Amphyctionic
confederates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the cobweb w^{ch}
could entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.
8. He begged them to consider the situation in which they would remain
in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissible plan, should
prevent the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such an event was
painful; but it would be prudent to submit to the task of examining it
at a distance, that the means of escaping it might be the more readily
embraced. Let the Union of the States be dissolved, and one of two
consequences must happen. Either the States must remain individually
independent & sovereign; or two or more Confederacies must be formed
among them. In the first event would the small States be more secure
ag^{st} the ambition & power of their larger neighbours, than they would
be under a General Government pervading with equal energy every part of
the Empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part
ag^{st} every other part? In the second, can the smaller expect that
their larger neighbours would confederate with them on the principle of
the present Confederacy, which gives to each member, an equal suffrage;
or that they would exact less severe concessions from the smaller
States, than are proposed in the scheme of M^r Randolph?
The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation; and if this
could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was admitted by
both the gentlemen from N. Jersey, (M^r Brearly and M^r Patterson) that
it would not be _just to allow Virg^a_ which was 16 times as large as
Delaware an equal vote only. Their language was that it would not be
_safe for Delaware_ to allow Virg^a 16 times as many votes. The
expedient proposed by them was that all the States should be thrown into
one mass and a new partition be made into 13 equal parts. Would such a
scheme be practicable? The dissimilarities existing in the rules of
property, as well as in the manners, habits and prejudices of the
different States, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt. It had been
found impossible for the power of one of the most absolute princes in
Europe (K. of France) directed by the wisdom of one of the most
enlightened and patriotic Ministers (M^r Neckar) that any age has
produced, to equalize in some points only the different usages &
regulations of the different provinces. But admitting a general
amalgamation and repartition of the States to be practicable, and the
danger apprehended by the smaller States from a proportional
representation to be real; would not a particular and voluntary
coalition of these with their neighbours, be less inconvenient to the
whole community, and equally effectual for their own safety. If N.
Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage would accrue to them from
an equalization of the States, in which case they would necessarily form
a junction with their neighbours, why might not this end be attained by
leaving them at liberty by the Constitution to form such a junction
whenever they pleased? And why should they wish to obtrude a like
arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the least, extremely
difficult, would be obnoxious to many of the States, and when neither
the inconveniency, nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves, would
be lessened by confining it to themselves.--The prospect of many new
States to the Westward was another consideration of importance. If they
should come into the Union at all, they would come when they contained
but few inhabitants. If they sh^d be entitled to vote according to their
proportions of inhabitants, all would be right & safe. Let them have an
equal vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever might give law
to the whole.[91]
[91] "Mr. Dickinson supposed that there were good regulations in
both. Let us therefore contrast the one with the other, and
consolidate such parts of them as the committee
approve."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 140.
On a question for postponing generally the 1^{st} proposition of M^r
Patterson's plan, it was agreed to: N. Y. & N. J. only being no.
On the question moved by M^r King whether the Co[~m]itee should rise &
M^r Randolph's proposition be reported without alteration, which was in
fact a question whether M^r R's should be adhered to as preferable to
those of M^r Patterson;
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Copy of the Resol^{ns} of Mr. R. as altered in Com^e and reported to the
House.
(Of M^r Randolph's plan as reported from the Co[~m]ittee)--the 1.
propos: "that a Nat^l Gov^t ought to be established consisting &c."
being taken up in the House.
M^r Wilson observed that by a Nat^l Gov^t he did not mean one that
would swallow up the State Gov^{ts} as seemed to be wished by some
gentlemen. He was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter. He
thought, contrary to the opinion of (Col. Hamilton) that they might
not only subsist but subsist on friendly terms with the former. They
were absolutely necessary for certain purposes which the former could
not reach. All large Governments must be subdivided into lesser
jurisdictions. As Examples he mentioned Persia, Rome, and particularly
the divisions & subdivisions of England by Alfred.
Col. Hamilton coincided with the proposition as it stood in the Report.
He had not been understood yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he
meant that no boundary could be drawn between the National & State
Legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority.
If it were limited at all, the rivalship of the States would gradually
subvert it. Even as Corporations the extent of some of them as V^a
Mass^{ts} &c. would be formidable. _As States_, he thought they ought to
be abolished. But he admitted the necessity of leaving in them,
subordinate jurisdictions. The examples of Persia & the Roman Empire,
cited by (M^r Wilson) were he thought in favor of his doctrine: the
great powers delegated to the Satraps & proconsuls having frequently
produced revolts, and schemes of independence.
M^r King wished as every thing depended on this proposition, that no
objections might be improperly indulged ag^{st} the phraseology of it.
He conceived that the import of the term "States" "Sovereignty"
"_national_" "federal," had been often used & applied in the discussions
inaccurately & delusively. The States were not "Sovereigns" in the sense
contended for by some. They did not possess the peculiar features of
sovereignty, they could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances nor
treaties. Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they
could not speak to any for[~e]gn Sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for
they could not hear any propositions from such Sovereign. They had not
even the organs or faculties of defence or offence, for they could not
of themselves raise troops, or equip vessels, for war. On the other
side, if the Union of the States comprises the idea of a confederation,
it comprises that also of consolidation. A Union of the States is a
Union of the men composing them, from whence a _national_ character
results to the whole. Cong^s can act alone without the States--they can
act & their acts will be binding ag^{st} the Instructions of the States.
If they declare war: war is de jure declared--captures made in pursuance
of it are lawful--no Acts of the States can vary the situation, or
prevent the judicial consequences. If the States therefore retained some
portion of their sovereignty, they had certainly divested themselves of
essential portions of it. If they formed a confederacy in some
respects--they formed a Nation in others. The Convention could clearly
deliberate on & propose any alterations that Cong^s could have done
under y^e federal articles, and Could not Cong^s propose by virtue of
the last article, a change in any article whatever; and as well that
relating to the equality of suffrage, as any other. He made these
remarks to obviate some scruples which had been expressed. He doubted
much the practicability of annihilating the States; but thought that
much of their power ought to be taken from them.[92]
[92] King, in his notes, gives a résumé of his speech. It
illustrates the accuracy of Madison's reporting:
"Answer (R. King) The States under the confed. are
not sovereign States they can do no act but such as
are of a subordinate nature or such as terminate in
themselves--and even these are restrained--coinage,
P. office &c. they are wholly incompetent to the
exercise of any of the gt. & distinguishing acts of
sovereignty--They can neither make nor receive
(embassies) to or from any other sovereign--they
have not the powers of injuring another or of
defending themselves from an Injury offered from one
another--they are deaf, dumb and impotent--these
Faculties are yielded up and the U. S. in C. Assd.
hold and possess them, and they alone can exercise
them--they are so far out of the controul of the
separate States yt. if every State in the Union was
to instruct yr. Deleg., and those Delegates within
ye powers of the Arts. of Union shd. do an act in
violation of their Instructions it wd. nevertheless
be valid. If they declared a war, any giving aid or
comfort to the enemy wd. be Treason; if peace, any
capture on the high seas wd. be piracy. This remark
proves yt. the States are now subordinate
corporations or societies and not sovereigns--these
imperfect States are the confederates and they are
the electors of the magistrates who exercise the
national sovereignty. The Articles of Confedr. and
perpetual Union, are partly federal & partly of the
nature of a constitution or form of Govt. arising
from and applying to the Citizens of the U. S. & not
from the individual States.
"The only criterion of determining what is federal &
what is national is this, those acts which are for
the government of the States only are purely
federal, those which are for the government of the
Citizens of the individual States are national and
not federal.
"If then the articles of Confedr. & perpetual union
have this twofold capacity, and if they provide for
an alteration in a certain mode, why may not they be
so altered as that the federal article may be
changed to a national one, and the national to a
federal? I see no argument that can be objected to
the authority. The 5th article regulates the
influence of the several States and makes them
equal--does not the confed. authorize this
alteration, that instead of this Equality, one state
may have double the Influence of another--I conceive
it does--and so of every Article except that wh.
destroys the Idea of a confedy. I think it may be
proved that every article may be totally altered
provided you have one guarantying to each State the
right of regulating its private & internal affairs
in the manner of a subordinate corporation.
"But admitting that the Arts, of Confed. & perpet.
Union, or the powers of the Legis. did not extend to
the proposed Reform; yet the public Deputations &
the public Danger require it--the system proposed to
be adopted is no scheme of a day, calculated to
postpone the hour of Danger, & thus leave it to fall
with double ruin on our successors--It is no crude
and undigested plan; the child of narrow and
unextensive views, brought forward under the
Auspices of Cowardice & Irresolution--It is a
measure of Decision, it is the foundation of Freedom
& of national Glory. It will draw on itself and be
able to support the severest scrutiny & Examination.
It is no idle experiment, no romantic
speculation--the measure forces itself upon wise
men, and if they have not firmness to look it in the
face and protect it--Farewell to the Freedom of our
Government--our military glory will be tarnished and
our boasts of Freedom will be the scorn of the
Enemies of Liberty."--_Life and Correspondence of
Rufus King_, i., 602, n.
M^r Martin.[93] said he considered that the separation from G. B. placed
the 13 States in a state of Nature towards each other; that they would
have remained in that state till this time, but for the confederation;
that they entered into the Confederation on the footing of equality;
that they met now to amend it on the same footing; and that he could
never accede to a plan that would introduce an inequality and lay 10
States at the mercy of V^a Mass^{ts} and Penn^a.
[93] "Mr. Martin was educated for the Bar, and is Attorney
general for the State of Maryland. This Gentleman possesses
a good deal of information, but he has a very bad delivery,
and so extremely prolix, that he never speaks without tiring
the patience of all who hear him. He is about 34 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 330.
M^r Wilson, could not admit the doctrine that when the Colonies became
independent of G. Britain, they became independent also of each other.
He read the declaration of Independence, observing thereon that the
_United Colonies_ were declared to be free & independent States; and
inferring that they were independent, not _individually_ but _Unitedly_
and that they were confederated as they were independent, States.
Col. Hamilton assented to the doctrine of M^r Wilson. He denied the
doctrine that the States were thrown into a State of Nature. He was not
yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy, could be
dissolved by partial infractions of it. He admitted that the States met
now on an equal footing but could see no inference from that against
concerting a change of the system in this particular. He took this
occasion of observing for the purpose of appeasing the fears of the
small States, that two circumstances would render them secure under a
National Gov^t in which they might lose the equality of rank they now
held: one was the local situation of the 3 largest States Virg^a
Mass^{ts} & P^a. They were separated from each other by distance of
place, and equally so, by all the peculiarities which distinguish the
interests of one State from those of another. No combination therefore
could be dreaded. In the second place, as there was a gradation in the
States from V^a the largest down to Delaware the smallest, it would
always happen that ambitious combinations among a few States might & w^d
be counteracted by defensive combinations of greater extent among the
rest. No combination has been seen among the large Counties merely as
such, ag^{st} lesser Counties. The more close the Union of the States,
and the more compleat the authority of the whole: the less opportunity
will be allowed to the stronger States to injure the weaker.
Adj^d.
WEDNESDAY JUNE 20. 1897. IN CONVENTION.
M^r William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.
1^{st} propos: of the Report of Com^e of the whole, before the House.
M^r Elseworth 2^{ded} by M^r Gorham, moves to alter it so as to run
"that the Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme
legislative, Executive and Judiciary." This alteration he said would
drop the word _national_, and retain the proper title "the United
States." He could not admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the
federal articles could dissolve the whole. It would be highly dangerous
not to consider the Confederation as still subsisting. He wished also
the plan of the Convention to go forth as an amendment of the articles
of the Confederation, since under this idea the authority of the
Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people will be
so too. If the plan goes forth to the people for ratification several
succeeding Conventions within the States would be unavoidable. He did
not like these conventions. They were better fitted to pull down than to
build up Constitutions.
M^r Randolph. did not object to the change of expression, but apprised
the gentleman who wished for it that he did not admit it for the reasons
assigned; particularly that of getting rid of a reference to the people
for ratification. The motion of M^r Elsew^{th} was acquiesced in nem:
con:
The 2^d Resol: "that the National Legislature ought to consist of two
branches" taken up, the word "national" struck out as of course.
_M^r Lansing._ observed that the true question here was, whether the
Convention would adhere to or depart from the foundation of the present
Confederacy; and moved instead of the 2^d Resolution, "that the powers
of Legislation be vested in the U. States in Congress." He had already
assigned two reasons ag^{st} such an innovation as was proposed: 1. the
want of competent powers in the Convention.--2. the state of the public
mind. It had been observed by (M^r Madison) in discussing the first
point, that in two States the Delegates to Cong^s were chosen by the
people. Notwithstanding the first appearance of this remark, it had in
fact no weight, as the Delegates however chosen, did not represent the
people merely as so many individuals; but as forming a Sovereign State.
(Mr. Randolph) put it, he said, on its true footing namely that the
public safety superseded the scruple arising from the review of our
powers. But in order to feel the force of this consideration, the same
impression must be had of the public danger. He had not himself the same
impression, and could not therefore dismiss his scruple. (M^r Wilson)
contended that as the Convention were only to recommend, they might
recommend what they pleased. He differed much from him. Any act whatever
of so respectable a body must have a great effect, and if it does not
succeed, will be a source of great dissentions. He admitted that there
was no certain criterion of the Public mind on the subject. He therefore
recurred to the evidence of it given by the opposition in the States to
the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected that those possessing
Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was not to be
expected from any one State, much less from thirteen. He proceeded to
make some observations on the plan itself and the argum^{ts} urged in
support of it. The point of Representation could receive no elucidation
from the case of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed
from their comparative smallness; but from the actual fewness of the
inhabitants, some of them not having more than one or two. A great
inequality existed in the Counties of England. Yet the like complaint of
peculiar corruption in the small ones had not been made. It had been
said that Congress represent the State Prejudices: will not any other
body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of the States, also
represent their prejudices? It had been asserted by his colleague (Col.
Hamilton) that there was no coincidence of interests among the large
States that ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it
were true that such a uniformity of interests existed among the States,
there was equal safety for all of them, whether the representation
remained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed. It is
proposed that the Gen^l Legislature shall have a negative on the laws of
the States. Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a
task? There will on the most moderate calculation, be as many Acts sent
up from the States as there are days in the year. Will the members of
the General Legislature be competent Judges? Will a gentleman from
Georgia be a judge of the expediency of a law which is to operate in N.
Hampshire. Such a Negative would be more injurious than that of Great
Britain heretofore was. It is said that the National Gov^t must have the
influence arising from the grant of offices and honors. In order to
render such a Government effectual he believed such an influence to be
necessary. But if the States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse
than in vain to make the proposition. If this influence is to be
attained, the States must be entirely abolished. Will any one say this
would ever be agreed to? He doubted whether any Gen^l Government equally
beneficial to all can be attained. That now under consideration he is
sure, must be utterly unattainable. He had another objection. The system
was too novel & complex. No man could foresee what its operation will be
either with respect to the Gen^l Gov^t or the State Gov^{ts}. One or
other it has been surmised must absorb the whole.
Col. Mason. did not expect this point would have been reagitated. The
essential differences between the two plans, had been clearly stated.
The principal objections ag^{st} that of M^r R. were the _want of
power_ & the _want of practicability_. There can be no weight in the
first as the fiat is not to be _here_, but in the people. He thought
with his colleague M^r R. that there were besides certain crisises, in
which all the ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity. He gave
as an example, the eventual Treaty with G. B. in forming which the
Co[~m]^{srs} of the U. S. had boldly disregarded the improvident
shackles of Cong^s had given to their Country an honorable & happy
peace, and instead of being censured for the transgression of their
powers, had raised to themselves a monument more durable than brass. The
_impracticability_ of gaining the public concurrence he thought was
still more groundless. (M^r Lansing) had cited the attempts of Congress
to gain an enlargement of their powers, and had inferred from the
miscarriage of these attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which he
(M^r L) opposed. He thought a very different inference ought to have
been drawn; viz that the plan which (M^r L) espoused, and which proposed
to augment the powers of Congress, never could be expected to succeed.
He meant not to throw any reflections on Cong^s as a body, much less on
any particular members of it. He meant however to speak his sentiments
without reserve on this subject; it was a privilege of age, and perhaps
the only compensation which nature had given for, the privation of so
many other enjoyments: and he should not scruple to exercise it freely.
Is it to be thought that the people of America, so watchful over their
interests; so jealous of their liberties, will give up their all, will
surrender both the sword and the purse, to the same body, and that too
not chosen immediately by themselves? They never will. They never ought.
Will they trust such a body, with the regulation of their trade, with
the regulation of their taxes; with all the other great powers, which
are in contemplation? Will they give unbounded confidence to a secret
Journal--to the intrigues--to the factions which in the nature of
things appertain to such an Assembly? If any man doubts the existence
of these characters of Congress, let him consult their Journals for
the years 78, 79, & 80.--It will be said, that if the people are
averse to parting with power, why is it hoped that they will part with
it to a National Legislature. The proper answer is that in this case
they do not part with power: they only transfer it from one sett of
immediate Representatives to another sett.--Much has been said of the
unsettled state of the mind of the people, he believed the mind of the
people of America, as elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points; but
settled as to others. In two points he was sure it was well settled. 1.
in an attachment to Republican Government. 2. in an attachment to more
than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so
generally in both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have
been preconcerted. This must either have been a miracle, or have
resulted from the genius of the people. The only exceptions to the
establishm^t of two branches in the Legislatures are the State of P^a &
Cong^s and the latter the only single one not chosen by the people
themselves. What has been the consequence? The people have been
constantly averse to giving that Body further powers--It was
acknowledged by (M^r Patterson) that his plan could not be enforced
without military coercion. Does he consider the force of this
concession. The most jarring elements of Nature; fire & water themselves
are not more incompatible that[n] such a mixture of civil liberty and
military execution. Will the militia march from one State to another, in
order to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the
Republic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the
Citizens of the invaded State assist one another till they rise as one
Man, and shake off the Union altogether. Rebellion is the only case, in
which the military force of the State can be properly exerted ag^{st}
its Citizens. In one point of view he was struck with horror at the
prospect of recurring to this expedient. To punish the non-payment of
taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by despotism itself:
yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a military
collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no discrimination
between the innocent and the guilty. He took this occasion to repeat,
that notwithstanding his solicitude to establish a national Government,
he never would agree to abolish the State Gov^{ts} or render them
absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as the Gen^l Gov^t and
he would be equally careful to preserve them. He was aware of the
difficulty of drawing the line between them, but hoped it was not
insurmountable. The Convention, tho' comprising so many distinguished
characters, could not be expected to make a faultless Gov^t. And he
would prefer trusting to Posterity the amendment of its defects, rather
than to push the experiment too far.
M^r Luther Martin agreed with (Col Mason) as to the importance of the
State Gov^{ts} he would support them at the expence of the Gen^l Gov^t
which was instituted for the purpose of that support. He saw no
necessity for two branches, and if it existed Congress might be
organized into two. He considered Cong^s as representing the people,
being chosen by the Legislatures who were chosen by the people. At any
rate, Congress represented the Legislatures; and it was the Legislatures
not the people who refused to enlarge their powers. Nor could the rule
of voting have been the ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States
must always have been ready, to place further confidence in Cong^s. The
causes of repugnance must therefore be looked for elsewhere.--At the
separation from the British Empire, the people of America preferred the
establishment of themselves into thirteen separate sovereignties instead
of incorporating themselves into one: to these they look up for the
security of their lives, liberties & properties: to these they must look
up. The federal Gov^t they formed, to defend the whole ag^{st} foreign
nations, in case of war, and to defend the lesser States ag^{st} the
ambition of the larger: they are afraid of granting power unnecessarily,
lest they should defeat the original end of the Union; lest the powers
should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular States
which the Union was meant to support; and expose the lesser to being
swallowed up by the larger. He conceived also that the people of the
States having already vested their powers in their respective
Legislatures, could not resume them without a dissolution of their
Governments. He was ag^{st} Conventions in the States: was not ag^{st}
assisting States ag^{st} rebellious subjects; thought the _federal_ plan
of M^r Patterson did not require coercion more than the _National one_,
as the latter must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on
requisitions & quotas, and that a national Judiciary extended into the
States would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy
inconsistent with its usefulness.
M^r Sherman 2^{ded} & supported M^r Lansings motion. He admitted two
branches to be necessary in the State Legislatures, but saw no necessity
for them in a Confederacy of States. The examples were all, of a single
Council. Cong^s carried us thro' the war, and perhaps as well as any
Gov^t could have done. The complaints at present are not that the views
of Cong^s are unwise or unfaithful; but that their powers are
insufficient for the execution of their views. The national debt & the
want of power somewhere to draw forth the National resources, are the
great matters that press. All the States were sensible of the defect of
power in Cong^s. He thought much might be said in apology for the
failure of the State Legislatures to comply with the Confederation. They
were afraid of leaning too hard on the people, by accumulating taxes; no
_constitutional_ rule had been or could be observed in the quotas--the
Accounts also were unsettled & every State supposed itself in advance,
rather than in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to a due
amount had not been drawn from trade which was the most convenient
resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the recommendation of
Cong^s on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly that they were
willing to trust Cong^s with power to draw a revenue from Trade. There
is no weight therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust of Cong^s
for money matters being the most important of all, if the people will
trust them with power as to them, they will trust them with any other
necessary powers. Cong^s indeed by the confederation have in fact the
right of saying how much the people shall pay, and to what purpose it
shall be applied: and this right was granted to them in the expectation
that it would in all cases have its effect. If another branch were to be
added to Cong^s to be chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass.
The people would not much interest themselves in the elections, a few
designing men in the large districts would carry their points, and the
people would have no more confidence in their new representatives than
in Cong^s. He saw no reason why the State Legislatures should be
unfriendly as had been suggested, to Cong^s. If they appoint Cong^s and
approve of their measures, they would be rather favourable and partial
to them. The disparity of the States in point of size he perceived was
the main difficulty. But the large States had not yet suffered from the
equality of votes enjoyed by the small ones. In all great and general
points, the interests of all the States were the same. The State of
Virg^a notwithstanding the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation
without, or even proposing, any alteration. Mass^{ts} also ratified
without any material difficulty &c. In none of the ratifications is the
want of two branches noticed or complained of. To consolidate the States
as some had proposed would dissolve our Treaties with foreign Nations,
which had been formed with us, as _Confederated_ States. He did not
however suppose that the creation of two branches in the Legislature
would have such an effect. If the difficulty on the subject of
representation can not be otherwise got over, he would agree to have two
branches, and a proportional representation in one of them, provided
each State had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary to secure
the rights of the lesser States; otherwise three or four of the large
States would rule the others as they please. Each State like each
individual had its peculiar habits usages and manners, which constituted
its happiness. It would not therefore give to others a power over this
happiness, any more than an individual would do, when he could avoid it.
M^r Wilson. urged the necessity of two branches; observed that if a
proper model were not to be found in other Confederacies it was not to
be wondered at. The number of them was small & the duration of some at
least short. The Amphyctionic and Achæan were formed in the infancy of
political Science; and appear by their History & fate, to have contained
radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic Confederacies were held together not
by any vital principle of energy but by the incumbent pressure of
formidable neighbouring nations: The German owed its continuance to the
influence of the H. of Austria. He appealed to our own experience for
the defects of our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in the 12 since the
commencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all
its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others whether on
many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by
the small members of the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing
to other causes, than the Constitution of Congress. In many instances it
went on even ag^{st} the difficulties arising from Cong^s themselves. He
admitted that the large States did accede as had been stated, to the
Confederation in its present form. But it was the effect of necessity
not of choice. There are other instances of their yielding from the same
motive to the unreasonable measures of the small States. The situation
of things is now a little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would
exist between the State Legislatures & the General Legislature:
observing that the members of the former would have views & feelings
very distinct in this respect from their constituents. A private Citizen
of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the Gen^l or
State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His
representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to
which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legisl: with the
eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Cong^s to the
people at large, had always been better received & produced greater
effect, than those made to the Legislatures.
On the question for postponing in order to take up M^r Lansing's
proposition "to vest the powers of legislation in Cong^s"
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the 2^d
Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the whole was postponed
till tomorrow.
Adj^d.
THURSDAY JUNE 21. IN CONVENTION.
M^r Jonathan Dayton from N. Jersey took his seat.[94]
[94] From June 21 to July 18 inclusive not copied by M^r
Eppes.--Madison's Note. This applies evidently to notes he
permitted Hon. George W. Eppes, Jefferson's son-in-law, to
take.
Doc^r Johnson.[95] On a comparison of the two plans which had been
proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity
which characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the
individuality of the States. The plan from V^a did not profess to
destroy this individuality altogether, but was charged with such a
tendency. One Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton) in his animadversions on
the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition
of the State Gov^{ts}. M^r Wilson & the gentleman from Virg^a who also
were adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey held a different language.
They wished to leave the States in possession of a considerable, tho' a
subordinate jurisdiction. They had not yet however shewn how this c^d
consist with, or be secured ag^{st} the general sovereignty &
jurisdiction, which they proposed to give to the National Government. If
this could be shewn in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N.
Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the States would not be
endangered, many of their objections would no doubt be removed. If this
could not be shewn their objections would have their full force. He
wished it therefore to be well considered whether in case the States, as
was proposed, sh^d retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this
portion could be preserved, without allowing them to participate
effectually in the Gen^l Gov^t, without giving them each a distinct and
equal vote for the purpose of defending themselves in the general
Councils.
[95] "D^r Johnson is a character much celebrated for his
legal knowledge; he is said to be one of the first classics
in America, and certainly possesses a very strong and
enlightened understanding.
"As an Orator in my opinion, there is nothing in him that
warrants the high reputation which he has for public
speaking. There is something in the tone of his voice not
pleasing to the Ear,--but he is eloquent and clear,--always
abounding with information and instruction. He was once
employed as an Agent for the State of Connecticut to state
her claims to certain landed territory before the British
House of Commons; this Office he discharged with so much
dignity, and made such an ingenious display of his powers,
that he laid the foundation of a reputation which will
probably last much longer than his own life. D^r Johnson is
about sixty years of age, possesses the manners of a
Gentleman, and engages the Hearts of Men by the sweetness of
his temper, and that affectionate style of address with
which he accosts his acquaintance."--Pierce's Notes, _Am.
Hist. Rev._, iii., 326.
M^r Wilson's respect for Doc^r Johnson, added to the importance of the
subject led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve the
difficulty which had been started. It was asked how the Gen^l Gov^t and
individuality of the particular States could be reconciled to each
other; and how the latter could be secured ag^{st} the former? Might it
not, on the other side be asked how the former was to be secured ag^{st}
the latter? It was generally admitted that a jealousy & rivalship would
be felt between the Gen^l & particular Gov^{ts}. As the plan now stood,
tho' indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the Gen^l Gov^t (the
Senate or second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legislatures.
The State Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the Gen^l
Gov^t would have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought not a
reciprocal opportunity to be given to the Gen^l Gov^t of defending
itself by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the
State Gov^{ts}. If a security be necessary on one side, it w^d seem
reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more
general view, he saw no danger to the States from the Gen^l Gov^t. In
case a combination should be made by the large ones it w^d produce a
general alarm among the rest; and the project w^d be frustrated. But
there was no temptation to such a project. The States having in general
a similar interest, in case of any propositions in the National
Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, he conceived a
general alarm w^d take place in the National Legislature itself, that it
would communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and w^d finally
spread among the people at large. The Gen^l Gov^t will be as ready to
preserve the rights of the States as the latter are to preserve the
rights of individuals; all the members of the former, having a common
interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave
the State Gov^{ts} in possession of what the people wish them to retain.
He could not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the side from
which it was apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived that in spite of
every precaution the General Gov^t would be in perpetual danger of
encroachments from the State Gov^{ts}.
M^r Madison was of opinion that there was 1. less danger of encroachment
from the Gen^l Gov^t than from the State Gov^{ts} 2. that the mischief
from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if
made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the
greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than to tyranny; to a
disobedience of the members than usurpations of the federal head. Our
own experience had fully illustrated this tendency.--But it will be said
that the proposed change in the principles & form of the Union will vary
the tendency; that the Gen^l Gov^t will have real & greater powers, and
will be derived in one branch at least from the people, not from the
Gov^{ts} of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be
supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the Gen^l
Legislature, and the States reduced to Corporations dependent on the
Gen^l Legislature; Why sh^d it follow that the Gen^l Gov^t w^d take from
the States any branch of their power as far as its operation was
beneficial, and its continuance desireable to the people? In some of the
States, particularly in Connecticut, all the Townships are incorporated,
and have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the
people of the Townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavoured
to despoil the Townships of any part of their local authority? As far as
this local authority is convenient to the people they are attached to
it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them, naturally
respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any
other right or interest. The relation of a General Gov^t to State
Gov^{ts} is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary ag^{st}
encroachments of the State Gov^{ts} on the Gen^l Gov^t than of the
latter on the former. The great objection made ag^{st} an abolition of
the State Gov^{ts} was that the Gen^l Gov^t could not extend its care to
all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local
jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not ag^{st} the probable
abuse of the general power, but ag^{st} the imperfect use that could be
made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a
variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable it
could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable,
the conveniency of the Gen^l Gov^t itself would concur with that of the
people in the maintenance of subordinate Governments. Were it
practicable for the Gen^l Gov^t to extend its care to every requisite
object without the cooperation of the State Gov^{ts} the people would
not be less free as members of one great Republic than as members of
thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware was not more free than a
Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more free than a Citizen of
America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the Gen^l Government to
absorb the State Gov^{ts} no fatal consequence could result. Taking the
reverse as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State
Gov^{ts} towards an independence on the General Gov^t and the gloomy
consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them, must have
suggested to the States the experiment we are now making to prevent the
calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to
undertake the arduous task.
On the question for resolving "that the Legislature ought to consist of
two Branches"
Mass. ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. P^a ay.
Del. no. M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The _third_ resolution of the Report taken into consideration.
Gen^l Pinkney moved "that the 1^{st} branch, instead of being elected by
the people, sh^d be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each
State should direct." He urged 1. that this liberty would give more
satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accommodate the mode to the
conveniency & opinions of the people. 2. that it would avoid the undue
influence of large Counties which would prevail if the elections were to
be made in districts as must be the mode intended by the Report of the
Committee. 3. that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the
General Legislature which would be attended with intolerable expence and
trouble to the distant parts of the Republic.
M^r L. Martin seconded the Motion.[96]
[96] After Martin's second, according to Yates:
"M^r Madison. I oppose the motion--there are no
difficulties, but they may be obviated in the details
connected with the subject."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_,
etc., 149.
Col. Hamilton considered the Motion as intended manifestly to transfer
the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would
essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence
which could not be too watchfully guarded ag^{st}. All too must admit
the possibility, in case the Gen^l Gov^t sh^d maintain itself, that the
State Gov^{ts} might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system
therefore sh^d not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.
M^r Mason urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people.
Whatever inconveniency may attend the democratic principle, it must
actuate one part of the Gov^t. It is the only security for the rights of
the people.
M^r Sherman, would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is
content with the plan as it stands.
M^r Rutlidge could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a
mediate & immediate election by the people. It was the same thing to act
by oneself, and to act by another. An election by the Legislature would
be more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be
more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community. If this
Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be
supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred. The
Delegates to Cong^s he thought had also been fitter men than would have
been appointed by the people at large.
M^r Wilson considered the election of the 1^{st} branch by the people
not only as the Corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and
that the difference between a mediate & immediate election was immense.
The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that
the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people;
but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the Gen^l Gov^t and
perhaps to that of the people themselves.
M^r King enlarged on the same distinction. He supposed the Legislatures
w^d constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted
to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of
election that w^d be subversive of the end in view. He remarked several
instances in which the views of a State might be at variance with those
of the Gen^l Gov^t: and mentioned particularly a competition between the
National & State debts, for the most certain & productive funds.
Gen^l Pinkney was for making the State Gov^{ts} a part of the General
System. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina
& other States would have but a small share of the benefits of Gov^t.
On the question for Gen^l Pinkney motion to substitute election of the
1^{st} branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, in stead
of its being elected by the people"
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
General Pinkney then moved that the 1^{st} branch be elected _by the
people_ in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waived it on
its being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in
the detail of the plan.
On the question for y^e election of the 1^{st} branch by the _people_"
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Election of the 1^{st} branch "for the term of three years," considered.
M^r Randolph moved to strike out, "three years" and insert "two
years"--he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great
mischiefs in the States, yet it was the want of such checks ag^{st} the
popular intemperence as were now proposed, that rendered them so
mischievous. He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the
extent of the U. S. and the inconveniency which would result from them
to the representatives of the extreme parts of the Empire. The people
were attached to frequency of elections. All the Constitutions of the
States except that of S. Carolina, had established annual elections.
M^r Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the
antient Usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He
supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial, and in
order to prevent the inconveniency of an entire change of the whole
number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election
of one third.
M^r Elseworth was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year
was preferable to two years. The people were fond of frequent elections
and might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature. He moved
for 1 year.
M^r Strong[97] seconded & supported the motion.
[97] "M^r Strong is a Lawyer of some eminence,--he has
received a liberal education, and has good connections to
recommend him. As a speaker he is feeble, and without
confidence. This Gent^n is about thirty five years of age,
and greatly in the esteem of his Colleagues."--Pierce's
Notes, _Amer. Hist. Rev._ iii., 326.
M^r Wilson being for making the 1^{st} branch an effectual
representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of
it. This frequency was most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would
not be more inconvenient to them, than triennial elections, as the
people in all the States have annual meetings with which the election of
the National representatives might be made to co-incide. He did not
conceive that it would be necessary for the Nat^l Leigsl: to sit
constantly; perhaps not half--perhaps not one fourth of the year.
M^r Madison was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely
inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so; he did
not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives. They
would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts
of the Union; and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of
their expences. Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would
remain at the seat of Governm^t; confiding that their absence would not
affect them. The members of Cong^s had done this with few instances of
disappointment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people
themselves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much
more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a Rival candidate,
it must be supposed that the members from the most distant States would
travel backwards & forwards at least as often as the elections should be
repeated. Much was to be said also on the time requisite for new Members
who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of
the affairs of the States in general without which their trust could not
be usefully discharged.
M^r Sherman preferred annual elections, but would be content with
biennial. He thought the Representatives ought to return home and mix
with the people. By remaining at the seat of Gov^t they would acquire
the habits of the place which might differ from those of their
Constituents.
Col. Mason observed that the States being differently situated such a
rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a
level. If elections were annual the middle States would have a great
advantage over the extreme ones. He wished them to be biennial; and the
rather as in that case they would coincide with the periodical elections
of S. Carolina as well of the other States.
Col. Hamilton urged the necessity of 3 years, there ought to be neither
too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments. The
checks in the other branches of the Govern^t would be but feeble, and
would need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The
British House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic
spirit of y^e Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended
to make the people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of
little cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virg^a
it had been lately found necessary to force the attendance & voting of
the people by severe regulations.
On the question for striking out "three years"
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. div^d. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The motion for "two years" was then inserted nem. con.
Adj^d.
FRIDAY JUNE 22. IN CONVENTION
The clause in Resol. 3 "to receive fixed stipends to be paid out of the
Nation^l Treasury" considered.
M^r Elseworth, moved to substitute payment by the States out of their
own Treasurys: observing that the manners of different States were very
different in the stile of living and in the profits accruing from the
exercise of like talents. What would be deemed therefore a reasonable
compensation in some States, in others would be very unpopular, and
might impede the system of which it made a part.
M^r Williamson favored the idea. He reminded the House of the prospect
of new States to the Westward. They would be too poor--would pay little
into the common Treasury--and would have a different interest from the
old States. He did not think therefore that the latter ought to pay the
expences of men who would be employed in thwarting their measures &
interests.
M^r Ghorum[98] wished not to refer the matter to the State Legislatures
who were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of
offices men most capable of executing the functions of them. He thought
also it would be wrong to fix the compensations by the constitution,
because we could not venture to make it as liberal as it ought to be
without exciting an enmity ag^{st} the whole plan. Let the Nat^l Legisl:
provide for their own wages from time to time; as the State Legislatures
do. He had not seen this part of their power abused, nor did he
apprehend an abuse of it.
[98] "M^r Gorham is a merchant in Boston, high in reputation,
and much in the esteem of his country-men. He is a man of
very good sense, but not much improved in his education. He
is eloquent and easy in public debate, but has nothing
fashionable or elegant in his style;--all he aims at is to
convince, and where he fails it never is from his auditory
not understanding him, for no man is more perspicuous and
full. He has been President of Congress, and three years a
Member of that Body. M^r Gorham is about 46 years of age,
rather lusty, and has an agreeable and pleasing
manner."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 325.
M^r Randolph said he feared we were going too far, in consulting popular
prejudices. Whatever respect might be due to them, in lesser matters, or
in cases where they formed the permanent character of the people, he
thought it neither incumbent on nor honorable for the Convention, to
sacrifice right & justice to that consideration. If the States were to
pay the members of the Nat^l Legislature, a dependence would be created
that would vitiate the whole System. The whole nation has an interest in
the attendance & services of the members. The Nation^l Treasury
therefore is the proper fund for supporting them.
M^r King, urged the danger of creating a dependence on the States by
leav^g to them the payment of the members of the Nat^l Legislature. He
supposed it w^d be best to be explicit as to the compensation to be
allowed. A reserve on that point, or a reference to the Nat^l
Legislature of the quantum, would excite greater opposition than any sum
that would be actually necessary or proper.
M^r Sherman contended for referring both the quantum and the payment of
it to the State Legislatures.
M^r Wilson was ag^{st} _fixing_ the compensation as circumstances would
change and call for a change of the amount. He thought it of great
moment that the members of the Nat^l Gov^t should be left as independent
as possible of the State Gov^{ts} in all respects.
M^r Madison concurred in the necessity of preserving the compensations
for the Nat^l Gov^t independent on the State Gov^{ts} but at the same
time approved of _fixing_ them by the Constitution, which might be done
by taking a standard which w^d not vary with circumstances. He disliked
particularly the policy suggested by M^r Williamson of leaving the
members from the poor States beyond the Mountains, to the precarious &
parsimonious support of their constituents. If the Western States
hereafter arising should be admitted into the Union, they ought to be
considered as equals & as brethren. If their representatives were to be
associated in the Common Councils, it was of common concern that such
provisions should be made as would invite the most capable and
respectable characters into the service.
M^r Hamilton apprehended inconveniency from _fixing_ the wages. He was
strenuous ag^{st} making the National Council dependent on the
Legislative rewards of the States. Those who pay are the masters of
those who are paid. Payment by the States would be unequal as the
distant States would have to pay for the same term of attendance and
more days in travelling to & from the seat of the Gov^t. He expatiated
emphatically on the difference between the feelings & views of the
_people_--& the _Governments_ of the States arising from the personal
interest & official inducements which must render the latter unfriendly
to the Gen^l Gov^t.
M^r Wilson moved that the Salaries of the 1^{st} branch "_be ascertained
by the National Legislature_," and be paid out of the Nat^l Treasury.
M^r Madison, thought the members of the Legis^l too much interested to
ascertain their own compensation. It w^d be indecent to put their hands
into the public purse for the sake of their own pockets.
On this question Mass. no. Con^t no. N. Y. div^d N. J. ay.
P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. div^d.
On the question for striking out "Nat^l Treasury" as moved by M^r
Elseworth.
M^r Hamilton renewed his opposition to it. He pressed the distinction
between the State Gov^{ts} & the people. The former w^d be the rivals of
the Gen^l Gov^t. The State legislatures ought not therefore to be the
paymasters of the latter.
M^r Elseworth. If we are jealous of the State Gov^{ts} they will be so
of us. If on going home I tell them we gave the Gen: Gov^t such powers
because we c^d not trust you. Will they adopt it, and with^t y^r
approbation it is a nullity.[99]
[99] According to Yates, Wilson followed Ellsworth:
"Mr. Wilson. I am not for submitting the national government
to the approbation of the state legislatures. I know that
they and the state officers will oppose it. I am for
carrying it to the people of each state."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 153.
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. div^d. N. J. no. Pen^a no.
Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. div^d.[100]
[100] (It appeared that Mass^{ts} concurred, not because they
thought the State Treas^y ought to be substituted; but
because they thought nothing should be said on the subject,
in which case it w^d silently devolve on the Nat^l Treasury
to support the National Legislature.)--Madison's Note.
On a question for substituting "adequate compensation" in place of "fixt
stipends" it was agreed to nem. con. the friends of the latter being
willing that the practicability of _fixing_ the compensation should be
considered hereafter in forming the details.
It was then moved by M^r Butler that a question be taken on both points
jointly; to wit "adequate compensation to be paid out of the Nat^l
Treasury." It was objected to as out of order, the parts having been
separately decided on. The Presid^t refer^d the question of order to the
House, and it was determined to be in order. Con. N. J. Del. M^d N. C.
S. C.--ay.--N. Y. P^a V^a Geo. no.--Mass. divided. The question on the
sentence was then postponed by S. Carolina in right of the State.
Col. Mason moved to insert "twenty-five years of age as a qualification
for the members of the 1^{st} branch." He thought it absurd that a man
today should not be permitted by the law to make a bargain for himself,
and tomorrow should be authorized to manage the affairs of a great
nation. It was more extraordinary as every man carried with him in his
own experience a scale for measuring the deficiency of young
politicians; since he would if interrogated be obliged to declare that
his political opinions at the age of 21. were too crude & erroneous to
merit an influence on public measures. It had been said that Cong^s had
proved a good school for our young men. It might be so for any thing he
knew but if it were, he chose that they should bear the expence of their
own education.
M^r Wilson was ag^{st} abridging the rights of election in any shape. It
was the same thing whether this were done by disqualifying the objects
of choice, or the persons chusing. The motion tended to damp the efforts
of genius, and of laudable ambition. There was no more reason for
incapacitating _youth_ than _age_, where the requisite qualifications
were found. Many instances might be mentioned of signal services
rendered in high stations to the public before the age of 25: The
present M^r Pitt and Lord Bolingbroke were striking instances.
On the question for inserting "25 years of age"
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. div^d. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
M^r Ghorum moved to strike out the last member of the 3 Resol:
concerning ineligibility of members of the 1^{st} branch to office
during the term of their membership & for one year after. He considered
it as unnecessary & injurious. It was true abuses had been displayed in
G. B. but no one c^d say how far they might have contributed to preserve
the due influence of the Gov^t nor what might have ensued in case the
contrary theory had been tried.
M^r Butler opposed it. This precaution ag^{st} intrigue was necessary.
He appealed to the example of G. B. where men got into Parl^t that they
might get offices for themselves or their friends. This was the source
of the corruption that ruined their Gov^t.
M^r King, thought we were refining too much. Such a restriction on the
members would discourage merit. It would also give a pretext to the
Executive for bad appointments, as he might always plead this as a bar
to the choice he wished to have made.
M^r Wilson was ag^{st} fettering elections, and discouraging merit. He
suggested also the fatal consequence in time of war, of rendering
perhaps the best Commanders ineligible; appealing to our situation
during the late war, and indirectly leading to a recollection of the
appointment of the Co[~m]ander in Chief out of Congress.[101]
[101] According to Yates, Madison followed Wilson:
"Mr. Madison. Some gentlemen give too much weight and others
too little to this subject. If you have no exclusive clause,
there may be danger of creating offices or augmenting the
stipends of those already created, in order to gratify some
members if they were not excluded. Such an instance has
fallen within my own observation. I am therefore of opinion,
that no office ought to be open to a member, which may be
created or augmented while he is in the
legislature."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 155. Yates
gives the rest of the debate as follows:
"Mr. Mason. It seems as if it was taken for granted,
that all offices will be filled by the executive,
while I think many will remain in the gift of the
legislature. In either case, it is necessary to shut
the door against corruption. If otherwise, they may
make or multiply offices, in order to fill them. Are
gentlemen in earnest when they suppose that this
exclusion will prevent the first characters from
coming forward? Are we not struck at seeing the
luxury and venality which has already crept in among
us? If not checked we shall have ambassadors to
every petty state in Europe--the little republic of
_St. Marino_ not excepted. We must in the present
system remove the temptation. I admire many parts of
the British constitution and government, but I
detest their corruption.--Why has the power of the
crown so remarkably increased the last century? A
stranger, by reading their laws, would suppose it
considerably diminished; and yet, by the sole power
of appointing the increased officers of government,
corruption pervades every town and village in the
kingdom. If such a restriction should abridge the
right of election, it is still necessary, as it will
prevent the people from ruining themselves; and will
not the same causes here produce the same effects? I
consider this clause as the corner-stone on which
our liberties depend--and if we strike it out we are
erecting a fabric for our destruction.
"Mr. Gorham. The corruption of the English
government cannot be applied to America. This evil
exists there in the venality of their boroughs; but
even this corruption has its advantage, as it gives
stability to their government. We do not know what
the effect would be if members of parliament were
excluded from offices. The great bulwark of our
liberty is the frequency of elections, and the great
danger is the septennial parliaments.
"Mr. Hamilton. In all general questions which become
the subjects of discussion, there are always some
truths mixed with falsehoods. I confess there is
danger where men are capable of holding two offices.
Take mankind in general, they are vicious--their
passions may be operated upon. We have been taught
to reprobate the danger of influence in the British
government, without duly reflecting how far it was
necessary to support a good government. We have
taken up many ideas on trust, and at last, pleased
with their own opinions, establish them as undoubted
truths. Hume's opinion of the British constitution
confirms the remark, that there is always a body of
firm patriots, who often shake a corrupt
administration. Take mankind as they are, and what
are they governed by? Their passions. There may be
in every government a few choice spirits, who may
act from more worthy motives. One great error is
that we suppose mankind more honest than they are.
Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest;
and it will ever be the duty of a wise government to
avail itself of those passions, in order to make
them subservient to the public good--for these ever
induce us to action. Perhaps a few men in a state,
may, from patriotic motives, or to display their
talents, or to reap the advantage of public
applause, step forward; but if we adopt the clause,
we destroy the motive. I am therefore against all
exclusions and refinements, except only in this
case; that when a member takes his seat, he should
vacate every other office. It is difficult to put
any exclusive regulation into effect. We must in
some degree submit to the inconvenience."--Yates,
_Secret Proceedings_, etc., 155, 156.
Col. Mason was for shutting the door at all events ag^{st} corruption.
He enlarged on the venality and abuses in this particular in G. Britain:
and alluded to the multiplicity of foreign Embassies by Cong^s. The
disqualification he regarded as a corner stone in the fabric.
Col. Hamilton, there are inconveniences on both sides. We must take man
as we find him, and if we expect him to serve the public must interest
his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had been the
source of many of our errors. He thought the remark of M^r Ghorum a just
one. It was impossible to say what w^d be the effect in G. B. of such a
reform as had been urged. It was known that one of the ablest
politicians (M^r Hume) had pronounced all that influence on the side of
the crown, which went under the name of corruption, an essential part of
the weight which maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution.
On M^r Ghorum's Motion for striking out "ineligibility,"
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. div^d. N. J. ay. P^a div^d.
Del. div^d. Mar^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. G^a ay.
Adj^d.
SATURDAY JUNE 23. IN CONVENTION
The 3^d Resol: resumed.
On Question yesterday postponed by S. Carol: for agreeing to the whole
sentence "for allowing an adequate compensation to be paid out of the
_Treasury of the U. States_"
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divided. So the question
was lost, & the sentence not inserted:
Gen^l Pinkney moves to strike out the ineligibility of members of the
1^{st} branch to offices established "by a particular State." He argued
from the inconveniency to which such a restriction would expose both the
members of the 1^{st} branch, and the States wishing for their services;
& from the smallness of the object to be attained by the restriction.
It w^d seem from the ideas of some that we are erecting a Kingdom to be
divided ag^{st} itself,[102] he disapproved such a fetter on the
Legislature.
[102] According to Yates Wilson followed Pinckney:
"Mr. Wilson. I perceive that some gentlemen are of opinion
to give a bias in favor of state governments. This question
ought to stand on the same footing."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 157.
M^r Sherman seconds the motion. It w^d seem that we are erecting a
Kingdom at war with itself. The Legislature ought not to [be] fettered
in such a case. On the question
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. M^d div^d.
Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Madison renewed his motion yesterday made & waved to render the
members of the 1^{st} branch "ineligible during their term of service, &
for one year after--to such offices only as should be established, or
the emoluments thereof augmented, by the Legislature of the U. States
during the time of their being members." He supposed that the
unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the
evils most experienced, & that if the door was shut ag^{st} them: it
might properly be left open for the appoint^t of members to other
offices as an encouragem^t to the Legislative service.
M^r Alex: Martin[103] seconded the Motion.
[103] "Mr. Martin was lately Governor of North Carolina, which
office he filled with credit. He is a man of sense, and
undoubtedly is a good politician, but he is not formed to
shine in public debate, being no speaker. Mr. Martin was
once a Colonel in the American Army, but proved unfit for
the field. He is about 40 years of age."--Pierce's Notes,
_Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 332.
M^r Butler. The amend^t does not go far eno. & w^d be easily evaded.
M^r Rutlidge, was for preserving the Legislature as pure as possible, by
shutting the door against appointments of its own members to offices,
which was one source of its corruption.
M^r Mason.[104] The motion of my colleague is but a partial remedy for
the evil. He appealed to him as a witness of the shameful partiality of
the Legislature of Virginia to its own members. He enlarged on the
abuses & corruption in the British Parliament, connected with the
appointment of its members. He c^d not suppose that a sufficient number
of Citizens could not be found who would be ready, without the
inducement of eligibility to offices, to undertake the Legislative
service. Genius & virtue it may be said, ought to be encouraged. Genius,
for aught he knew, might, but that virtue should be encouraged by such a
species of venality, was an idea, that at least had the merit of being
new.
[104] Yates gives Mason's speech more fully and a speech by
Madison omitted here:
"Mr. Mason. I differ from my colleague in his proposed
amendment. Let me state the practice in the state where we
came from. There, all officers are appointed by the
legislature. Need I add, that many of their appointments are
most shameful. Nor will the check proposed by this amendment
be sufficient. It will soon cease to be any check at all. It
is asserted that it will be very difficult to find men
sufficiently qualified as legislators without the inducement
of emolument. I do believe that men of genius will be
deterred unless possessed of great virtues. We may well
dispense with the first characters when destitute of
virtue--I should wish them never to come forward--But if we
do not provide against corruption, our government will soon
be at an end; nor would I wish to put a man of virtue in the
way of temptation. Evasions and caballing would evade the
amendment. Nor would the danger be less, if the executive
has the appointment of officers. The first three or four
years we might go on well enough; but what would be the case
afterwards? I will add, that such a government ought to be
refused by the people--and it will be refused.
"Mr. Madison. My wish is that the national legislature be as
uncorrupt as possible. I believe all public bodies are
inclined, from various motives, to support its members; but
it is not always done from the base motives of venality.
Friendship, and a knowledge of the abilities of those with
whom they associate, may produce it. If you bar the door
against such attachments, you deprive the government of its
greatest strength and support. Can you always rely on the
patriotism of the members? If this be the only inducement,
you will find a great indifferency in filling your
legislative body. If we expect to call forth useful
characters, we must hold out allurements; nor can any great
inconveniency arise from such inducements. The legislative
body must be the road to public honor; and the advantage
will be greater to adopt my motion, than any possible
inconvenience."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 158.
M^r King remarked that we were refining too much in this business; and
that the idea of preventing intrigue and solicitation of offices was
chimerical. You say that no member shall himself be eligible to any
office. Will this restrain him from availing himself of the same means
which would gain appointments for himself, to gain them for his son, his
brother, or any other object of his partiality. We were losing therefore
the advantages on one side, without avoiding the evils on the other.
M^r Wilson supported the motion. The proper cure he said for corruption
in the Legislature was to take from it the power of appointing to
offices. One branch of corruption would indeed remain, that of creating
unnecessary offices, or granting unnecessary salaries, and for that the
amendment would be a proper remedy. He animadverted on the impropriety
of stigmatizing with the name of venality the laudable ambition of
rising into the honorable offices of the Government; an ambition most
likely to be felt in the early & most incorrupt period of life, & which
all wise & free Gov^{ts} had deemed it sound policy, to cherish, not to
check. The members of the Legislature have perhaps the hardest & least
profitable task of any who engage in the service of the state. Ought
this merit to be made a disqualification?
M^r Sherman observed that the motion did not go far enough. It might be
evaded by the creation of a new office, the translation to it of a
person from another office, and the appointment of a member of the
Legislature to the latter. A new Embassy might be established to a new
Court, & an ambassador taken from another, in order to _create_ a
vacancy for a favorite member. He admitted that inconveniences lay on
both sides. He hoped there w^d be sufficient inducements to the public
service without resorting to the prospect of desirable offices, and on
the whole was rather ag^{st} the motion of M^r Madison.
M^r Gerry thought there was great weight in the objection of M^r
Sherman. He added as another objection ag^{st} admitting the eligibility
of members in any case that it would produce intrigues of ambitious men
for displacing proper officers, in order to create vacancies for
themselves.[105] In answer to M^r King he observed that although
members, if disqualified themselves might still intrigue & cabal for
their sons, brothers &c., yet as their own interests would be dearer to
them, than those of their nearest connections, it might be expected they
would go greater lengths to promote it.
[105] Yates gives Gerry's remarks:
"This amendment is of great weight, and its consequences
ought to be well considered. At the beginning of the war, we
possessed more than Roman virtue. It appears to me it is now
the reverse. We have more land and stock-jobbers than any
place on earth. It appears to me that we have constantly
endeavored to keep distinct the three great branches of
government; but if we agree to this motion, it must be
destroyed by admitting the legislators to share in the
executive, or to be too much influenced by the executive, in
looking up to them for offices."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 160.
M^r Madison had been led to this motion as a middle ground between an
eligibility in all cases, and an absolute disqualification. He admitted
the probable abuses of an eligibility of the members, to offices
particularly within the gift of the Legislature. He had witnessed the
partiality of such bodies to their own members, as had been remarked of
the Virginia Assembly by his colleague (Col. Mason). He appealed however
to him, in turn to vouch another fact not less notorious in Virginia,
that the backwardness of the best citizens to engage in the Legislative
service gave but too great success to unfit characters. The question was
not to be viewed on one side only. The advantages & disadvantages on
both ought to be fairly compared. The objects to be aimed at were to
fill all offices with the fittest characters, & to draw the wisest &
most worthy citizens into the Legislative service. If on one hand,
public bodies were partial to their own members; on the other they were
as apt to be misled by taking characters on report, or the authority of
patrons and dependents.
All who had been concerned in the appointment of strangers on those
recommendations must be sensible of this truth. Nor w^d the partialities
of such Bodies be obviated by disqualifying their own members.
Candidates for office would hover round the seat of Gov^t or be found
among the residents there, and practise all the means of counting the
favor of the members. A great proportion of the appointments made by the
States were evidently brought about in this way. In the General Gov^t
the evil must be still greater, the characters of distant states, being
much less known throughout the U. States than those of the distant parts
of the same State. The elections by Congress had generally turned on men
living at the seat of the fed^l Gov^t or in its neighbourhood.--As to
the next object, the impulse to the Legislative service, was evinced by
experience to be in general too feeble with those best qualified for it.
This inconveniency w^d also be more felt in the Nat^l Gov^t than in the
State Gov^{ts} as the Sacrifices req^d from the distant members, w^d be
much greater, and the pecuniary provisions, probably, more
disproportionate. It w^d therefore be impolitic to add fresh objections
to the Legislative service by an absolute disqualification of its
members. The point in question was whether this would be an objection
with the most capable citizens. Arguing from experience he concluded
that it would. The Legislature of Virg^a would probably have been
without many of its best members, if in that situation, they had been
ineligible to Cong^s to the Gov^t & other honorable offices of the
State.
M^r Butler thought Characters fit for office w^d never be unknown.
Col. Mason. If the members of the Legislature are disqualified, still
the honors of the State will induce those who aspire to them to enter
that service, as the field in which they can best display & improve
their talents, & lay the train for their subsequent advancement.
M^r Jenifer remarked that in Maryland, the Senators chosen for five
years, c^d hold no other office & that this circumstance gained them the
greatest confidence of the people.
On the question for agreeing to the motion of M^r Madison,
Mass^{ts} div^d. C^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Sherman mov^d to insert the words "and incapable of holding" after
the words "eligible to offices" w^{ch} was agreed to without opposition.
The word "established" & the words "Nat^l Gov^t" were struck out of the
Resolution 3^d.
M^r Spaight called for a division of the question, in consequence of
which it was so put, as that it turned in the first member of it, "on
the ineligibility of members _during the term for which they were
elected_"--whereon the States were,
Mass^{ts} div^d. C^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On the 2^d member of the sentence extending ineligibility of members to
one year after the term for which they were elected Col. Mason thought
this essential to guard ag^{st} evasions by resignations, and
stipulations for office to be filled at the expiration of the
legislative term. M^r Gerry, had known such a case. M^r Hamilton.
Evasions c^d not be prevented--as by proxies--by friends holding for a
year, & then opening the way &c. M^r Rutlidge admitted the possibility
of evasions, but was for contracting them as possible.
Mass. no. C^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a div^d. Del. ay.
Mar^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Adj^d.
MONDAY, JUNE 25. IN CONVENTION.
Resolution 4. being taken up.
M^r Pinkney spoke as follows--[106] The efficacy of the System will
depend on this article. In order to form a right judgm^t in the case, it
will be proper to examine the situation of this Country more accurately
than it has yet been done. The people of the U. States are perhaps the
most singular of any we are acquainted with. Among them there are fewer
distinctions of fortune & less of rank, than among the inhabitants of
any other nation. Every freeman has a right to the same protection &
security; and a very moderate share of property entitles them to the
possession of all the honors and privileges the Public can bestow: hence
arises a greater equality, than is to be found among the people of any
other Country, and an equality which is more likely to continue--I say
this equality is likely to continue, because in a new Country,
possessing immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every temptation
is offered to emigration & where industry must be rewarded with
competency, there will be few poor, and few dependent--Every member of
the Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving at the supreme
offices & consequently of directing the strength & sentiments of the
whole Community. None will be excluded by birth, & few by fortune, from
voting for proper persons to fill the offices of Government--the whole
community will enjoy in the fullest sense that kind of political liberty
which consists in the power the members of the State reserve to
themselves, of arriving at the Public offices, or at least, of having
votes in the nomination of those who fill them.
[106] Pinckney furnished Madison with a copy of this speech
which he transcribed, but apparently not with the whole of
it, as Madison's note at the end indicates. The original
Pinckney draft is among the Madison papers, and shows
Madison's copying to have been accurate.
If this State of things is true & the prospect of its continuing
probable, it is perhaps not politic to endeavour too close an imitation
of a Government calculated for a people whose situation is, & whose
views ought to be extremely different.
Much has been said of the Constitution of G. Britain. I will confess
that I believe it to be the best Constitution in existence; but at the
same time I am confident it is one that will not or cannot be introduced
into this Country, for many centuries.--If it were proper to go here
into a historical dissertation on the British Constitution, it might
easily be shewn that the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing feature
of that Governm^t cannot possibly be introduced into our System--that
its balance between the Crown & the people cannot be made a part of our
Constitution,--that we neither have nor can have the members to compose
it, nor the rights, privileges & properties of so distinct a class of
Citizens to guard,--that the materials for forming this balance or check
do not exist, nor is there a necessity for having so permanent a part of
our Legislative, until the Executive power is so constituted as to have
something fixed & dangerous in its principle--By this I mean a sole,
hereditary, though limited Executive.
That we cannot have a proper body for forming a Legislative balance
between the inordinate power of the Executive and the people, is evident
from a review of the accidents & circumstances which gave rise to the
peerage of Great Britain--I believe it is well ascertained that the
parts which compose the British Constitution arose immediately from the
forests of Germany; but the antiquity of the establishment of Nobility
is by no means clearly defined. Some authors are of opinion that the
dignity denoted by the titles of dux et comes, was derived from the old
Roman to the German Empire; while others are of the opinion that they
existed among the Germans long before the Romans were acquainted with
them. The institution however of Nobility is immemorial among the
Nations who may properly be termed the ancestors of Britain.--At the
time they were summoned in England to become a part of the National
Council, the circumstances which contributed to make them a Constituent
part of that constitution, must be well known to all gentlemen who have
had industry & curiosity enough to investigate the subject--The Nobles
with their possessions & dependents composed a body permanent in their
nature and formidable in point of power. They had a distinct interest
both from the King and the people; an interest which could only be
represented by themselves, and the guardianship could not be safely
intrusted to others.--At the time they were originally called to form a
part of the National Council, necessity perhaps as much as other cause,
induced the Monarch to look up to them. It was necessary to demand the
aid of his subjects in personal & pecuniary services. The power and
possessions of the Nobility would not permit taxation from any Assembly
of which they were not a part: & the blending the Deputies of the
Commons with them, & thus forming what they called their parlerment was
perhaps as much the effect of chance as of any thing else. The Commons
were at that time compleatly subordinate to the nobles, whose
consequence & influence seem to have been the only reasons for their
superiority; a superiority so degrading to the Commons that in the first
summons we find the peers are called upon to consult the commons to
consent. From this time the peers have composed a part of the British
Legislature, and notwithstanding their power and influence have
diminished & those of the Commons have increased, yet still they have
always formed an excellent balance ag^{st} either the encroachments of
the Crown or the people.
I have said that such a body cannot exist in this Country for ages, and
that untill the situation of our people is exceedingly changed no
necessity will exist for so permanent a part of the Legislature. To
illustrate this I have remarked that the people of the United States are
more equal in their circumstances than the people of any other
Country--that they have very few rich men among them,--by rich men I
mean those whose riches may have a dangerous influence, or such as are
esteemed rich in Europe--perhaps there are not one hundred such on the
Continent; that it is not probable this number will be greatly
increased; that the genius of the people their mediocrity of situation &
the prospects which are afforded their industry in a Country which must
be a new one for centuries are unfavorable to the rapid distinction of
ranks. The destruction of the right of primogeniture & the equal
division of the property of Intestates will also have an effect to
preserve this mediocrity; for laws invariably affect the manners of a
people. On the other hand that vast extent of unpeopled territory which
opens to the frugal & industrious a sure road to competency &
independence will effectually prevent for a considerable time the
increase of the poor or discontented, and be the means of preserving
that equality of condition which so eminently distinguishes us.
If equality is as I contend the leading feature of the U. States, where
then are the riches & wealth whose representation & protection is the
peculiar province of this Permanent body. Are they in the hands of the
few who may be called rich; in the possession of less than a hundred
citizens? Certainly not. They are in the great body of the people, among
whom there are no men of wealth, and very few of real poverty.--Is it
probable that a change will be created, and that a new order of men will
arise? If under the British Government, for a century no such change was
probable, I think it may be fairly concluded it will not take place
while even the semblance of Republicanism remains.--How is this change
to be effected? Where are the sources from whence it is to flow? From
the landed interest? No. That is too unproductive & too much divided in
most of the States. From the Monied interest? If such exists at present,
little is to be apprehended from that source. Is it to spring from
commerce? I believe it would be the first instance in which a nobility
sprang from merchants. Besides, Sir, I apprehend that on this point the
policy of the U. States has been much mistaken. We have unwisely
considered ourselves as the inhabitants of an old instead of a new
country. We have adopted the maxims of a State full of people &
manufactures & established in credit. We have deserted our true
interest, and instead of applying closely to those improvements in
domestic policy which would have ensured the future importance of our
commerce, we have rashly & prematurely engaged in schemes as extensive
as they are imprudent. This however is an error which daily corrects
itself & I have no doubt that a few more severe trials will convince us,
that very different commercial principles ought to govern the conduct of
these States.
The people of this Country are not only very different from the
inhabitants of any State we are acquainted with in the modern world; but
I assert that their situation is distinct from either the people of
Greece or Rome, or of any State we are acquainted with among the
antients.--Can the orders introduced by the institution of Solon, can
they be found in the United States? Can the military habits & manners of
Sparta be resembled to our habits & manners? Are the distinction of
Patrician & Plebeian known among us? Can the Helvetic or Belgic
confederacies, or can the unwieldy, unmeaning body called the Germanic
Empire, can they be said to possess either the same or a situation like
ours? I apprehend not.--They are perfectly different, in their
distinctions of rank, their Constitutions, their manners & their policy.
Our true situation appears to me to be this,--a new extensive Country
containing within itself the materials for forming a Government capable
of extending to its Citizens all the blessings of Civil & religious
liberty--capable of making them happy at home. This is the great end of
Republican Establishments. We mistake the object of our Government, if
we hope or wish that it is to make us respectable abroad. Conquest or
superiority among other powers is not or ought not ever to be the object
of republican Systems. If they are sufficiently active & energetic to
rescue us from contempt & preserve our domestic happiness & security, it
is all we can expect from them,--it is more than almost any other
Government ensures to its citizens.
I believe this observation will be found generally true:--that no two
people are so exactly alike in their situation or circumstances as to
admit the exercise of the same Government with equal benefit; that a
system must be suited to the habits & genius of the People it is to
govern, and must grow out of them.
The people of the U. S. may be divided into three classes--_Professional
men_ who must from their particular pursuits always have a considerable
weight in the Government while it remains popular--_Commercial men_, who
may or may not have weight as a wise or injudicious commercial policy is
pursued.--If that commercial policy is pursued which I conceive to be
the true one, the merchants of this Country will not or ought not for a
considerable time to have much weight in the political scale.--The third
is the _landed interest_, the owners and cultivators of the soil, who
are and ought ever to be the governing spring in the system.--These
three classes, however distinct in their pursuits are individually equal
in the political scale, and may be easily proved to have but one
interest. The dependence of each on the other is mutual. The merchant
depends on the planter. Both must in private as well as public affairs
be connected with the professional men; who in their turn must in some
measure depend on them. Hence it is clear from this manifest connection,
& the equality which I before stated exists, & must for the reasons then
assign, continue, that after all there is one, but one great & equal
body of Citizens composing the inhabitants of this Country among whom
there are no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of fortune.
For a people thus circumstanced are we then to form a Government & the
question is what sort of Government is best suited to them.
Will it be the British Gov^t? No. Why? Because G. Britain contains three
orders of people distinct in their situation, their possessions & their
principles.--These orders combined form the great body of the Nation.
And as in national expences the wealth of the whole community must
contribute, so ought each component part to be properly & duly
represented.--No other combination of power could form this due
representation, but the one that exists.--Neither the peers or the
people could represent the royalty, nor could the Royalty & the people
form a proper representation for the Peers.--Each therefore must of
necessity be represented by itself, or the sign of itself; and this
accidental mixture has certainly formed a Government admirably well
balanced.
But the U. States contain but one order that can be assimilated to the
British Nation,--this is the order of Commons. They will not surely then
attempt to form a Government consisting of three branches, two of which
shall have nothing to represent. They will not have an Executive &
Senate (hereditary) because the King & Lords of England are so. The same
reasons do not exist and therefore the same provisions are not
necessary.
We must as has been observed suit our Governm^t to the people it is to
direct. These are I believe as active, intelligent & susceptible of good
Governm^t as any people in the world. The Confusion which has produced
the present relaxed State is not owing to them. It is owing to the
weakness & (defects) of a Gov^t incapable of combining the various
interests it is intended to unite, and destitute of energy.--All that we
have to do then is to distribute the powers of Gov^t in such a manner,
and for such limited periods, as while it gives a proper degree of
permanency to the Magistrate, will reserve to the people, the right of
election they will not or ought not frequently to part with.--I am of
opinion that this may easily be done; and that with some amendments the
propositions before the Committee will fully answer this end.
No position appears to me more true than this; that the General Gov^t
cannot effectually exist without reserving to the States the possession
of their local rights. They are the instruments upon which the Union
must frequently depend for the support & execution of their powers,
however immediately operating upon the people, and not upon the States.
Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing the distinction of
State Governments, & having but one general System. Suffer me for a
moment to examine this question.[107]
[107] The residue of this speech was not furnished, like the
above, by Mr. Pinckney.--Madison's Note.
Yates' report of the speech is meagre. The closing
paragraph, apparently the part lacking in Madison's report,
is:
"While we were dependent on the crown of Great Britain, it
was in contemplation to form the whole into one; but it was
found impracticable. No legislature could make good laws for
the whole, nor can it now be done. It would necessarily
place the power in the hands of the few nearest the seat of
government. State governments must therefore remain, if you
mean to prevent confusion. The general negative powers will
support the general government. Upon these considerations, I
am led to form the second branch differently from the
report. These powers are important, and the number not too
large, upon the principle of proportion. I have considered
the subject with great attention; and I propose this plan
(reads it), and if no better plan is proposed, I will then
move its adoption."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 163.
The mode of constituting the 2^d branch being under consideration.
The word "national" was struck out, and "United States" inserted.
M^r Ghorum, inclined to a compromise as to the rule of proportion. He
thought there was some weight in the objections of the small States. If
V^a should have 16. votes & Del^{re} with several other States together
16, those from Virg^a would be more likely to unite than the others, and
would therefore have an undue influence. This remark was applicable not
only to States, but to Counties or other districts of the same State.
Accordingly the Constitution of Mass^{ts} had provided that the
representatives of the larger districts should not be in an exact ratio
to their numbers, and experience he thought had shewn the provision to
be expedient.
M^r Read. The States have heretofore been in a sort of partnership. They
ought to adjust their old affairs before they open a new account. He
brought into view the appropriation of the co[~m]on interest in the
Western lands, to the use of particular States. Let justice be done on
this head; let the fund be applied fairly & equally to the discharge of
the general debt, and the smaller States who had been injured; would
listen then perhaps to those ideas of just representation which had been
held out.
M^r Ghorum, did not see how the Convention could interpose in the case.
Errors he allowed had been committed on the subject. But Cong^s were now
using their endeavours to rectify them. The best remedy would be such a
Government as would have vigor enough to do justice throughout. This was
certainly the best chance that could be afforded to the smaller States.
M^r Wilson, the question is shall the members of the 2^d branch be
chosen by the Legislatures of the States? When he considered the amazing
extent of Country--the immense population which is to fill it, the
influence which the Gov^t we are to form will have, not only on the
present generation of our people & their multiplied posterity, but on
the whole Globe, he was lost in the magnitude of the object. The project
of Henry the 4^{th} & his Statesmen was but the picture in miniature of
the great portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to an election by the
State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it was necessary to
observe the twofold relation in which the people would stand, 1. as
Citizens of the Gen^l Gov^t 2. as Citizens of their particular State.
The Gen^l Gov^t was meant for them in the first capacity: the State
Gov^{ts} in the second. Both Gov^{ts} were derived from the people--both
meant for the people--both therefore ought to be regulated on the same
principles. The same train of ideas which belonged to the relation of
the Citizens to their State Gov^{ts} were applicable to their relation
to the Gen^l Gov^t and in forming the latter, we ought to proceed, by
abstracting as much as possible from the idea of the State Gov^{ts}.
With respect to the province & object of the Gen^l Gov^t they should be
considered as having no existence. The election of the 2^d branch by the
Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests & local
prejudices. The Gen^l Gov^t is not an assemblage of States, but of
individuals for certain political purposes--it is not meant for the
States, but for the individuals composing them; the _individuals_
therefore not the _States_, ought to be represented in it: A proportion
in this representation can be preserved in the 2^d as well as in the
1^{st} branch; and the election can be made by electors chosen by the
people for that purpose. He moved an amendment to that effect which was
not seconded.
M^r Elseworth saw no reason for departing from the mode contained in the
Report. Whoever chooses the member, he will be a Citizen of the State he
is to represent & will feel the same spirit & act the same part whether
he be appointed by the people or the Legislature. Every State has its
particular views & prejudices, which will find their way into the
general Councils, through whatever channel they may flow. Wisdom was one
of the characteristics which it was in contemplation to give the second
branch. Would not more of it issue from the Legislatures; than from an
immediate election by the people. He urged the necessity of maintaining
the existence, & agency of the States. Without their co-operation it
would be impossible to support a Republican Gov^t over so great an
extent of Country. An army could scarcely render it practicable. The
largest States are the worst Governed. Virg^a is obliged to acknowledge
her incapacity to extend her Gov^t to Kentuckey. Mass^{ts} cannot keep
the peace one hundred miles from her capitol and is now forming an army
for its support. How long Pen^a may be free from a like situation cannot
be foreseen. If the principles & materials of our Gov^t are not adequate
to the extent of these single States; how can it be imagined that they
can support a single Gov^t throughout the U. States. The only chance of
supporting a Gen^l Gov^t lies in grafting it on that of the individual
States.
Doc^r Johnson urged the necessity of preserving the State Gov^{ts} which
would be at the mercy of the Gen^l Gov^t on M^r Wilson's plan.
M^r Madison thought it w^d obviate difficulty if the present resol: were
postponed, & the 8{th} taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage
in the 2^d branch.
Doc^r Williamson professed himself a friend to such a system as would
secure the existence of the State Gov^{ts}. The happiness of the people
depended on it. He was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate
untill he knew the number of its members. In order to ascertain this, he
moved to insert these words after "2^d branch of the Nat^l
Legislature"--"who shall bear such proportion to the n^o of the 1^{st}
branch as 1 to ----." He was not seconded.
M^r Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that an efficient Gov^t is
necessary that to render it such it ought to have the faculty of self
defence, that to render its different branches effectual each of them
ought to have the same power of self defence. He did not wonder that
such an agreement should have prevailed in these points. He only
wondered that there should be any disagreement about the necessity of
allowing the State Gov^{ts} the same self-defence. If they are to be
preserved as he conceived to be essential, they certainly ought to have
this power. And the only mode left of giving it to them, was by allowing
them to appoint the 2^d branch of the Nat^l Legislature.
M^r Butler observing that we were put to difficulties at every step by
the uncertainty whether an equality or a ratio of representation w^d
prevail finally in the 2^d branch, moved to postpone the 4^{th} Resol: &
to proceed to the Resol: on that point. M^r Madison seconded him.
On the question
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no.
Del. no. M{d.} no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On a question to postpone the 4 and take up the 7 Resol: ays, Mary^d V^a
N. C. S. C. Geo;--Noes, Mass. C^t N. Y. N. J. P^a Del:
On the question to agree "that the members of the 2^d branch be chosen
by the indiv^l Legislatures" Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.[108]
[108] Madison's Note:
It must be kept in view that the largest States particularly
Pennsylvania & Virginia always considered the choice of the
2^d Branch by the State Legislatures as opposed to a
proportional representation to which they were attached as a
fundamental principle of just Government. The smaller States
who had opposite views, were reinforced by the members from
the large States most anxious to secure the importance of
the State Governments.
On a question on the clause requiring the age of 30 years at least,--it
was agreed to unanimously:
On a question to strike out the words, "sufficient to ensure their
independency" after the word "term" it was agreed to.
That the 2^d branch hold their offices for a term of seven years,
considered.
M^r Ghorum suggests a term of "4 years," 1/4 to be elected every year.
M^r Randolph, supported the idea of rotation, as favorable to the wisdom
& stability of the Corps, which might possibly be always sitting, and
aiding the Executive.
And moves after "7 years," to add, "to go out in fixt proportion" which
was agreed to.
M^r Williamson suggests "6 years," as more convenient for Rotation than
7 years.
M^r Sherman seconds him.
M^r Reed proposed that they s^d hold their offices "during good
behaviour." Mr. R. Morris seconds him.
Gen^l Pinkney, proposed "4 years." A longer term w^d fix them at the
seat of Gov^t. They w^d acquire an interest there, perhaps transfer
their property & lose sight of the States they represent. Under these
circumstances the distant States w^d labour under great
disadvantages.[109]
[109] According to Yates, Madison followed Pinckney:
"Mr. Madison. We are proceeding in the same manner that was
done when the Confederation was first formed. Its original
draft was excellent, but in its progress and completion it
became so insufficient as to give rise to the present
Convention. By the vote already taken, will not the temper
of the state legislatures transfuse itself into the Senate?
Do we create a free government?"--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 168.
M^r Sherman moved to strike out "7 years" in order to take questions on
the several propositions.
On the question to strike out "seven"
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the question to insert "6 years", which failed 5 St^s being ay. 5 no,
& 1 divided
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On a motion to adjourn, the votes were 5 for 5 ag^{st} it & 1
divided,--Con. N. J. P^a Del. V^a ay. Mass^{ts} N. Y. N. C. S. C. Geo:
no. Mary^d divided.
On the question for "5 years" it was lost.
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Adj^d.
TUESDAY, JUNE 26. IN CONVENTION
The duration of the 2^d branch under consideration.
M^r Ghorum moved to fill the blank with "six years," one third of the
members to go out every second year.
M^r Wilson 2^{ded} the motion.
Gen^l Pinkney opposed six years in favor of four years. The States he
said had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of S. Carolina
in particular were different from the Northern. If the Senators should
be appointed for a long term, they w^d settle in the State where they
exercised their functions; and would in a little time be rather the
representatives of that than of the State appoint^g them.
M^r Reed mov^d that the term be nine years. This w^d admit of a very
convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He w^d still
prefer "during good behaviour," but being little supported in that idea,
he was willing to take the longest term that could be obtained.
M^r Broome 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this
institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served
by it. These were first to protect the people ag^{st} their rulers;
secondly to protect the people ag^{st} the transient impressions into
which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate
moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the
plan of Gov^t most likely to secure their happiness, would first be
aware, that those charg^d with the public happiness might betray their
trust. An obvious precaution ag^{st} this danger w^d be to divide the
trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check each
other. In this they w^d be governed by the same prudence which has
prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Gov^t, where all
business liable to abuses is made to pass thro' separate hands, the one
being a check on the other. It w^d next occur to such people, that they
themselves were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of information as
to their true interest, and that men chosen for a short term, & employed
but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same
cause. This reflection w^d naturally suggest that the Gov^t be so
constituted as that one of its branches might have an opp^y of acquiring
a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection
equally becoming a people on such an occasion, w^d be that they
themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were liable
to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence ag^{st} this
danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose
limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose ag^{st}
impetuous councils. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating
on a Gov^t for themselves, that as different interests necessarily
result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might
under sudden impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In
all civilized Countries the people fall into different classes hav^g a
real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors &
debtors; farmers, merch^{ts} & manufacturers. There will be particularly
the distinction of rich & poor. It was true as had been observ^d (by M^r
Pinkney) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank
which were a great source of the contests in the ancient Gov^{ts} as
well as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or
poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot however be regarded
even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every thing that
affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a
system which we wish to last for ages, we sh^d not lose sight of the
changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of
necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the
hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its
blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the
feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the
power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have
yet been made in this Country, but symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as
we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in certain quarters, to
give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded
ag^{st} on the republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of
interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded ag^{st}?
Among other means by the establishment of a body in the Gov^t
sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such
emergencies, the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into
that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed
Gov^t he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did
not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger;
but in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require
that the long term allowed to the 2^d branch should not commence till
such a period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification to
be re-elected little inconvenient either in a public or private view. He
observed that as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan
which in its operation w^d decide for ever the fate of Republican Gov^t
we ought not only to provide every guard to liberty that its
preservation c^d require, but be equally careful to supply the defects
which our own experience had particularly pointed out.
M^r Sherman. Gov^t is instituted for those who live under it. It ought
therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their
liberties. The more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Gov^t.
Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of
rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the Government, by
preserving that good behavior, because it ensures their re-election. In
Connecticut elections have been very frequent, yet great stability &
uniformity both as to persons & measures have been experienced from its
original establishm^t to the present time; a period of more than a 130
years. He wished to have provision made for steadiness & wisdom in the
system to be adopted; but he thought six or four years would be
sufficient. He sh^d be content with either.
M^r Read wished it to be considered by the small States that it was
their interest that we should become one people as much as possible;
that State attachments sh^d be extinguished as much as possible; that
the Senate, sh^d be so constituted as to have the feelings of Citizens
of the whole.
M^r Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He
concurred with M^r Madison in thinking we were now to decide forever the
fate of Republican Government; and that if we did not give to that form
due stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced & lost among ourselves,
disgraced & lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged himself not to
think favorably of Republican Government; but addressed his remarks to
those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone
their Government as high as possible. He professed himself to be as
zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he
should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed as to the form in
which it was most eligible.--He concurred also in the general
observations of (M^r Madison) on the subject, which might be supported
by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true that nothing like
an equality of property existed; that an inequality would exist as long
as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very
liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted the great &
fundamental distinction in Society. When the Tribunitial power had
levelled the boundary between the _patricians_ & _plebeians_, what
followed? The distinction between rich & poor was substituted. He meant
not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark
that (M^r Sherman) seemed not to recollect that one branch of the
proposed Gov^t was so formed, as to render it particularly the guardians
of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to have adverted to the true
causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Con^t. Under the
British system as well as the federal, many of the great powers
appertaining to Gov^t particularly all those relating to foreign Nations
were not in the hands of the Gov^t there. Their internal affairs also
were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes many of which were
peculiar to that Country. Of late the Governm^t had entirely given way
to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions
in order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere.
He asks M^r S. whether the State at this time dare impose & collect a
tax on y^e people? To these causes & not to the frequency of elections,
the effect as far as it existed ought to be chiefly ascribed.
M^r Gerry, wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a permanent
Gov^t. All aim at the same end, but there are great differences as to
the means. One circumstance He thought should be carefully attended to.
There was not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not ag^{st}
every approach towards Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which
seems to make such an approach. The Convention ought to be extremely
cautious in what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may be
proposed will be espoused with warmth by many out of respect to the
quarter it proceeds from as well as from an approbation of the plan
itself. And if the plan should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent
opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord & confusion will ensue,
and it is even possible that we may become a prey to foreign powers. He
did not deny the position of M^r Madison, that the majority will
generally violate justice when they have an interest in so doing: But
did not think there was any such temptation in this Country. Our
situation was different from that of G. Britain; and the great body of
lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very much prolong the
difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of injustice which had marked
many of our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to
leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient sense of justice & virtue
for the purpose of Gov^t. He admitted the evils arising from a frequency
of elections; and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or
five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted
by the people.
M^r Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but w^d
add an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested.
Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its own citizens. 2
to foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny
within, but has wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The
Senate will probably be the depository of the powers concerning the
latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of
foreign Nations. The true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened to
a commercial treaty with us has been, because she had no confidence in
the stability or efficacy of our Government. 9 years with a rotation,
will provide these desirable qualities; and give our Gov^t an advantage
in this respect over Monarchy itself. In a Monarchy much must always
depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the personal character
will be lost in the political. He w^d add another observation. The
popular objection ag^{st} appointing any public body for a long term was
that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a body
for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It would be a
satisfactory answer to this objection that as 1/3 would go out
triennially, there would be always three divisions holding their places
for unequal times, and consequently acting under the influence of
different views, and different impulses.--On the question for 9 years,
1/3 to go out triennially,
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t, no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for 6 years,[110] 1/3 to go out biennially
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
[110] Yates has the question on _five_ years, but this is
obviously a mistake.--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 172.
"To receive fixt stipends by which they may be compensated for their
services" considered.
General Pinkney proposed "that no Salary should be allowed." As this
(the Senatorial) branch was meant to represent the wealth of the
Country, it ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if no
allowance was to be made the wealthy alone would undertake the service.
He moved to strike out the clause.
Doct^r Franklin seconded the motion. He wished the Convention to stand
fair with the people. There were in it a number of young men who would
probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments should be
recommended we might be chargeable with having carved out places for
ourselves. On the question,--Mas^{ts} Connecticut[111] P^a M^d S.
Carolina ay. N. Y. N. J. Del. Virg^a N. C. Geo. no.
[111] Quer. whether Connecticut should not be, no. & Delaware,
ay.--Madison's Note.
M^r Williamson moved to change the expression into these words to wit
"to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public
service." The motion was seconded by M^r Elseworth, and agreed to by all
the States except S. Carol^a. It seemed to be meant only to get rid of
the word "fixt" and leave greater room for modifying the provision on
this point.
M^r Elseworth moved to strike out "to be paid out of the Nat^l Treasury"
and insert "to be paid by their respective States." If the Senate was
meant to strengthen the Gov^t it ought to have the confidence of the
States. The States will have an interest in keeping up a representation,
and will make such provision for supporting the members as will ensure
their attendance.
M^r Madison considered this as a departure from a fundamental principle,
and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a duration of 6
years. They would if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places
during pleasure; during the pleasure of the State Legislatures. One
great end of the institution was, that being a firm, wise and impartial
body, it might not only give stability to the Gen^l Gov^t in its
operations on individuals, but hold an even balance among different
States. The motion would make the Senate like Congress, the mere Agents
& Advocates of State interests & views, instead of being the impartial
umpires & Guardians of justice and the general Good. Cong^s had lately
by the establishment of a board with full powers to decide on the mutual
claims between the U. States & the individual States, fairly
acknowledged themselves to be unfit for discharging this part of the
business referred to them by the Confederation.
M^r Dayton[112] considered the payment of the Senate by the States as
fatal to their independence, he was decided for paying them out of the
Nat^l Treasury.
[112] "Cap. Dayton is a young Gentleman of talents, with
ambition to exert them. He possesses a good education and
some reading; he speaks well, and seems desirous of
improving himself in Oratory. There is an impetuosity in his
temper that is injurious to him; but there is an honest
rectitude about him that makes him a valuable Member of
Society, and secures to him the esteem of all good Men. He
is about 30 years old, served with me a Brother Aid to
General Sullivan in the Western Expedition of
'79."--Pierce's Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 328.
On the question for payment of the Senate to be left to the States as
moved by M^r Elseworth.
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion, but to hint an idea
which seemed to be proper for consideration. One important object in
constituting the Senate was to secure the rights of property. To give
them weight & firmness for this purpose, a considerable duration in
office was thought necess[~a]y. But a longer term than 6 years, would be of
no avail in this respect, if needy persons should be appointed. He
suggested therefore the propriety of annexing to the office a
qualification of property. He thought this would be very practicable; as
the rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring the degree of
wealth possessed by every man.
A question was then taken whether the words "to be paid out of the
public treasury," should stand.
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of Senators to _State
offices_.
Mr. Williamson seconded the motion.[113]
[113] According to Yates, before Wilson spoke:
"Mr. Madison. Congress heretofore depended on state
interests; we are now going to pursue the same
plan."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 173.
M^r Wilson remarked the additional dependance this w^d create in the
Senators on the States. The longer the time he observed allotted to the
Officer, the more compleat will be the dependance if it exists at
all.[114]
[114] After Wilson, according to Yates:
"Mr. Butler. This second branch I consider as the
aristocratic part of our government; and they must be
controlled by the states, or they will be too
independent."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 173.
Gen^l Pinkney was for making the States as much as could be conveniently
done, a part of the Gen^l Gov^t. If the Senate was to be appointed by
the States, it ought in pursuance of the same idea to be paid by the
States: and the States ought not to be barred from the opportunity of
calling members of it into offices at home. Such a restriction would
also discourage the ablest men from going into the Senate.
M^r Williamson moved a resolution so penned as to admit of the two
following questions. 1. whether the members of the Senate should be
ineligible to & incapable of holding offices _under the U. States_
2. Whether &c. under the _particular States_.
On the Question to postpone in order to consider Williamson's
Resol^n Mas^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Gerry & M^r Madison move to add to M^r Williamson's 1. Quest: "and
for 1 year thereafter." On this amend^t
Mas^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On M^r Will[iam]son's 1 Question as amend^{ed} vz, inelig: & incapable
&c. &c. for 1 year &c. ag^d to un[~a]mously.
On the 2. question as to ineligibility &c. to State offices,
Mass. ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The 5. Resol: "that each branch have the right of originating acts," was
agreed to nem. con.
Adj^d.
WEDNESDAY JUNE 27. IN CONVENTION.
M^r Rutlidge moved to postpone the 6^{th} Resolution, defining the
powers of Cong^s in order to take up the 7 & 8 which involved the most
fundamental points; the rules of suffrage in the 2 branches which was
agreed to nem. con.
A question being proposed on the Resol: 7; declaring that the suffrage
in the first branch sh^d be according to an equitable ratio.
M^r L. Martin[115] contended at great length and with great eagerness
that the General Gov^t was meant merely to preserve the State
Govern^{ts} not to govern individuals: that its powers ought to be kept
within narrow limits: that if too little power was given to it, more
might be added; but that if too much, it could never be resumed: that
individuals as such have little to do but with their own States; that
the Gen^l Gov^t has no more to apprehend from the States composing the
Union, while it pursues proper measures, that Gov^t over individuals has
to apprehend from its subjects: that to resort to the Citizens at large
for their sanction to a new Govern^t will be throwing them back into a
state of Nature; that the dissolution of the State Gov^{ts} is involved
in the nature of the process; that the people have no right to do this
without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for
State purposes: through their tongues only they can speak, through their
ears, only can hear: that the States have shewn a good disposition to
comply with the Acts of Cong^s, weak, contemptibly weak as that body has
been; and have failed through inability alone to comply: that the
heaviness of the private debts, and the waste of property during the
war, were the chief causes of this inability; that he did not conceive
the instances mentioned by M^r Madison of compacts between V^a & M^d
between P^a & N. J. or of troops raised by Mass^{ts} for defence against
the Rebels, to be violations of the articles of confederation--that an
equal vote in each State was essential to the federal idea, and was
founded in justice & freedom, not merely in policy: that tho' the States
may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not:
that the States like individuals were in a State of nature equally
sovereign & free. In order to prove that individuals in a State of
Nature are equally free & independent he read passages from Locke,
Vattel, Lord Summers--Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with
States till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other
passages in Locke & Vattel, and also Rutherford: that the States being
equal cannot treat or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes
without giving up their liberty: that the propositions on the table were
a system of slavery for 10 States: that as V^a Mass^{ts} & P^a have
42/90 of the votes they can do as they please without a miraculous Union
of the other ten: that they will have nothing to do, but to gain over
one of the ten to make them compleat masters of the rest; that they can
then appoint an Execut^e & Judiciary & legislate for them as they
please: that there was & would continue a natural predilection &
partiality in men for their own States; that the States, particularly
the smaller, would never allow a negative to be exercised over their
laws: that no State in Ratifying the Confederation had objected to the
equality of votes; that the complaints at present run not ag^{st} this
equality but the want of power: that 16 members from V^a would be more
likely to act in concert than a like number formed of members from
different States: that instead of a junction of the small States as a
remedy, he thought a division of the large States would be more
eligible.--This was the substance of a speech which was continued more
than three hours. He was too much exhausted he said to finish his
remarks, and reminded the House that he should tomorrow, resume them.
[115] "Mr. Martin, the Attorney-General from Maryland, spoke
on this subject upwards of three hours. As his arguments
were too diffuse, and in many instances desultory, it was
not possible to trace him through the whole, or to methodize
his ideas into a systematic or argumentative
arrangement."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 174.
Adj^d.
THURSDAY JUNE 28TH. IN CONVENTION
M^r L. Martin resumed his discourse,[116] contending that the Gen^l
Gov^t ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals: that if
the States were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people,
it would be the same thing whether their representatives were chosen by
the Legislatures or the people; the smaller States would be equally
enslaved; that if the large States have the same interest with the
smaller as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal
vote; they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the
large ones on that supposition without injuring themselves and if the
interests, were not the same, the inequality of suffrage w^d be
dangerous to the smaller States: that it will be in vain to propose any
plan offensive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the
people will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the large States
were weak at present in proportion to their extent; & could only be made
formidable to the small ones, by the weight of their votes: that in case
a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small States would
have nothing to fear from their power; that if in such a case the three
great States should league themselves together, the other ten could do
so too; & that he had rather see partial Confederacies take place, than
the plan on the table. This was the substance of the residue of his
discourse which was delivered with much diffuseness & considerable
vehemence.
[116] Yates gives Martin's speech more fully:
"On federal grounds, it is said, that a minority will govern
a majority--but on the Virginia plan a minority would tax a
majority. In a federal government, a majority of states must
and ought to tax. In the local government of states,
counties may be unequal--still numbers, not property,
govern. What is the government now forming, over states or
persons? As to the latter, their rights cannot be the object
of a general government. These are already secured by their
guardians, the state governments. The general government is
therefore intended only to protect and guard the rights of
the states as states.
"This general government, I believe, is the first upon earth
which gives checks against democracies or aristocracies. The
only necessary check in a general government ought to be a
restraint to prevent its absorbing the powers of the state
governments. Representation on federal principles can only
flow from state societies. Representation and taxation are
ever inseparable--not according to the quantum of property,
but the quantum of freedom.
"Will the representatives of a state forget state interests?
The mode of election cannot change it. These prejudices
cannot be eradicated--Your general government cannot be just
or equal upon the Virginia plan, unless you abolish state
interests. If this cannot be done, you must go back to
principles purely federal.
"On this latter ground, the state legislatures and their
constituents will have no interests to pursue different from
the general government, and both will be interested to
support each other. Under these ideas can it be expected
that the people can approve the Virginia plan? But it is
said, the people, not the state legislatures, will be called
upon for approbation--with an evident design to separate the
interests of the governors from the governed. What must be
the consequence? Anarchy and confusion. We lose the ideas of
the powers with which we are intrusted. The legislatures
must approve. By them it must, on your own plan, be laid
before the people. How will such a government, over so many
great states, operate. Wherever new settlements have been
formed in large states, they immediately want to shake off
their independency. Why? Because the government is too
remote for their good. The people want it nearer home.
"The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the
freedom and the independency of the states composing it. The
states forming the amphictionic council were equal, though
Lacedemon, one of the greatest states, attempted the
exclusion of three of the lesser states from this right. The
plan reported, it is true, only intends to diminish those
rights, not to annihilate them--It was the ambition and
power of the great Grecian states which at last ruined this
respectable council. The states as societies are ever
respectful. Has Holland or Switzerland ever complained of
the equality of the states which compose their respective
confederacies? Bern and Zurich are larger than the remaining
eleven cantons--so of many of the states of Germany; and yet
their governments are not complained of. Bern alone might
usurp the whole power of the Helvetic confederacy, but she
is contented still with being equal.
"The admission of the larger states into the confederation,
on the principle of equality, is dangerous--But on the
Virginia system it is ruinous and destructive. Still it is
the true interest of all the states to confederate--It is
their joint efforts which must protect and secure us from
foreign danger, and give us peace and harmony at home.
"(Here Mr. Martin entered into a detail of the comparative
powers of each state, and stated their probable weakness and
strength.)
"At the beginning of our troubles with Great Britain, the
smaller states were attempted to be cajoled to submit to the
views of that nation, lest the larger states should usurp
their rights. We then answered them--your present plan is
slavery, which on the remote prospect of a distant evil, we
will not submit to.
"I would rather confederate with any single state, than
submit to the Virginia plan. But we are already
confederated, and no power on earth can dissolve it but by
the consent of _all_ the contracting powers--and four
states, on this floor, have already declared their
opposition to annihilate it. Is the old confederation
dissolved, because some of the states wish a new
confederation?"--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 177.
M^r Lansing & M^r Dayton moved to strike out "not," so that the 7 art.
might read that the rights of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch ought to be
according to the rule established by the Confederation."
M^r Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put
till tomorrow; Govern^r Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and
the representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.
M^r Williamson, thought that if any political truth could be grounded on
mathematical demonstration, it was that if the States were equally
sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that
they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the
smaller States would be injured in the case, and wished some Gentleman
would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if
they had a plurality of votes would have an interest in throwing the
burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged
that the expected addition of new States from the Westward might be kept
in view. They would be small States, they would be poor States, they
would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers; their distance
from market rendering the produce of their labour less valuable; they
would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying
burdens on com[~m]erce & consumption which would fall with greatest
weight on the old States.
M^r Madison, s^d he was much disposed to concur in any expedient not
inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the
difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither
be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor necessary for the
safety of the small States ag^{st} the large States. That it was not
just, had been conceded by M^r Breerly & M^r Paterson themselves. The
expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory of the
U. States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of
Sovereign States in the formation of compacts, lay in confounding
together mere Treaties, in which were specified certain duties to which
the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects
were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by
which an authority was created paramount to the parties, & making laws
for the government of them. If France, England & Spain were to enter
into a Treaty for the regulation of commerce &c. with the Prince of
Monacho & 4 or 5 other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would
not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly
reciprocal. W^d the case be the same, if a Council were to be formed of
deputies from each with authority and discretion, to raise money, levy
troops, determine the value of coin &c.? Would 30 or 40, million of
people submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands? If they
did it would only prove that they expected more from the terror of their
superior force, than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble
associates. Why are Counties of the Same States represented in
proportion to their numbers? Is it because the representatives are
chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in the
Nation^l Legislature. Is it because, the larger have more at stake than
the smaller? The Case will be the same with the larger & smaller States.
Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on their persons &
properties? The same is the case in some degree as the articles of
confederation stand; the same will be the case in a far greater degree,
under the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures, of
piracies, and of offences in a federal army, the property & persons of
individuals depend on the laws of Cong^s. By the plan proposed a
compleat power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy is
proposed to be vested in the National Gov^t. Many other powers are added
which assimilate it to the Gov^t of individual States. The negative
proposed on the State laws, will make it an essential branch of the
State Legislatures & of course will require that it should be exercised
by a body established on like principles with the other branches of
those Legislatures.--That it is not necess[~a]y to secure the small States
ag^{st} the large ones he conceived to be equally obvious: Was a
combination of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either from some
interest common to V^a Mass^{ts} & P^a & distinguishing them from the
other States, or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did
any such common interest exist? In point of situation they could not
have been more effectually separated from each other by the most jealous
citizen of the most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and
the other circumstances which sometimes beget affection between
different communities, they were not more assimilated than the other
States--In point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as
any three other States in the Union. The Staple of Mass^{ts} was _fish_,
of P^a _flower_, of V^a _Tob^o_. Was a Combination to be apprehended
from the mere circumstance of equality of size? Experience suggested no
such danger. The journals of Cong^s did not present any peculiar
association of these States in the votes recorded. It had never been
seen that different Counties in the same State, conformable in extent,
but disagreeing in other circumstances, betrayed a propensity to such
combinations. Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among
individuals of superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships were
much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent Nations,
pre-eminent over their neighbours, the same remark was verified.
Carthage & Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting their
forces to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The Houses of Austria
& France were hostile as long as they remained the greatest powers of
Europe. England & France have succeeded to the pre-eminence & to the
enmity. To this principle we owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition
between those powers would have been fatal to us. Among the principal
members of antient & Modern confederacies, we find the same effect from
the same cause. The contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens &
Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of the Amphyctionic
Confederacy. The contentions, not the combinations of Prussia & Austria,
have distracted & oppressed the German empire. Were the large States
formidable _singly_ to their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the
latter ought to wish for such a General Gov^t as will operate with equal
energy on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band, the more
liberty the larger will have to avail themselves of their superior
force. Here again Experience was an instructive monitor. What is y^e
situation of the weak compared with the strong in those stages of
civilization in which the violence of individuals is least controuled by
an efficient Government? The Heroic period of Antient Greece, the feudal
licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the existing condition of
the American Savages, answer this question. What is the situation of the
minor sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which
the more powerful are under no controul but the nominal authority of the
law of Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in proportion to
their weakness. But there are cases still more in point. What was the
condition of the weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy.
Plutarch (life of Themistocles) will inform us that it happened but too
often that the strongest cities corrupted & awed the weaker, and that
Judgment went in favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition
of the lesser states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they
are exceedingly trampled upon: and that they owe their safety as far as
they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves, under the rival
banners of the pre-eminent members, partly to alliances with
neighbouring Princes which the Constitution of the Empire does not
prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax system of the Dutch
Confederacy? Holland contains about 1/2 the People, supplies about 1/2
of the money, and by her influence, silently & indirectly governs the
whole republic. In a word; the two extremes before us are a perfect
separation & a perfect incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first
case they would be independent nations subject to no law, but the law of
nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire
republic, subject to one common law. In the first case the smaller
States would have every thing to fear from the larger. In the last they
would have nothing to fear. The true policy of the small States
therefore lies in promoting those principles & that form of Gov^t which
will most approximate the States to the condition of counties. Another
consideration may be added. If the Gen^l Gov^t be feeble, the large
States distrusting its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance
& security may depend on their own size & strength, will never submit to
a partition. Give to the Gen^l Gov^t sufficient energy & permanency, &
you remove the objection. Gradual partitions of the large, & junctions
of the small States will be facilitated, and time may effect that
equalization, which is wished for by the small States now, but can never
be accomplished at once.
M^r Wilson. The leading argument of those who contend for equality of
votes among the States is that the States as such being equal, and being
represented not as districts of individuals, but in their political &
corporate capacities, are entitled to an equality of suffrage. According
to this mode of reasoning the representation of the boroughs in Engl[~d]
which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten part of the
Constitution, is perfectly right & proper. They are like the States
represented in their corporate capacity like the States therefore they
are entitled to equal voices, old Sarum to as many as London. And
instead of the injury supposed hitherto to be done to London, the true
ground of Complaint lies with old Sarum: for London instead of two which
is her proper share, sends four representatives to Parliament.[117]
[117] According to King's Notes, Charles Pinckney spoke after
Madison: "_Charles Pinckney._ The Honors & offices may
become the objects of strong desire and of combination to
acquire them. If Representatives be apportioned among the
States in the Ratio of numbers, the Citizens will be free
and equal but the States will be unequal, and their
sovereignty will be degraded."--King's _Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 610.
M^r Sherman. The question is not what rights naturally belong to man;
but how they may be most equally & effectually guarded in Society. And
if some give up more than others in order to obtain this end, there can
be no room for complaint. To do otherwise, to require an equal
concession from all, if it would create danger to the rights of some,
would be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man who enters into
Society along with the poor man, gives up more than the poor man, yet
with an equal vote he is equally safe. Were he to have more votes than
the poor man in proportion to his superior stake the rights of the poor
man would immediately cease to be secure. This consideration prevailed
when the articles of Confederation were formed.[118]
[118] According to Yates, Madison followed Sherman: "Mr.
Madison. There is danger in the idea of the gentleman from
Connecticut. Unjust representation will ever produce it. In
the United Netherlands, Holland governs the whole, although
she has only one vote. The counties in Virginia are
exceedingly disproportionate, and yet the smaller has an
equal vote with the greater, and no inconvenience
arises."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 182.
The determination of the question from striking out the word "not" was
put off till tomorrow at the request of the Deputies of N. York.
Doc^r Franklin. M^r President.
The small progress we have made after 4 or five weeks close attendance &
continual reasonings with each other--our different sentiments on almost
every question, several of the last producing as many noes as ays, is
methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection of the Human
Understanding. We indeed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom,
since we have been running about in search of it. We have gone back to
ancient history for models of Government, and examined the different
forms of those Republics which having been formed with the seeds of
their own dissolution now no longer exist. And we have viewed Modern
States all round Europe, but find none of their Constitutions suitable
to our circumstances.
In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it were in the dark to
find political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented
to us, how has it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought
of humbly applying to the Father of lights to illuminate our
understandings? In the beginning of the Contest with G. Britain, when we
were sensible of danger we had daily prayer in this room for the divine
protection.--Our prayers, Sir, were heard, & they were graciously
answered. All of us who were engaged in the struggle must have observed
frequent instances of a superintending providence in our favor. To that
kind providence we owe this happy opportunity of consulting in peace on
the means of establishing our future national felicity. And have we now
forgotten that powerful friend? or do we imagine that we no longer need
his assistance? I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live,
the more convincing proofs I see of this truth--_that God Governs in the
affairs of men_. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his
notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have
been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings that "except the Lord build
the House they labour in vain that build it." I firmly believe this; and
I also believe that without his concurring aid we shall succeed in this
political building no better than the Builders of Babel: We shall be
divided by our little partial local interests; our projects will be
confounded, and we ourselves shall become a reproach and bye word down
to future ages. And what is worse, mankind may hereafter from this
unfortunate instance, despair of establishing Governments by Human
wisdom and leave it to chance, war and conquest.
I therefore beg leave to move--that henceforth prayers imploring the
assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in
this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and that one
or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in that
Service--
M^r Sherman seconded the motion.
M^r Hamilton & several others expressed their apprehensions that however
proper such a resolution might have been at the beginning of the
convention, it might at this late day, 1. bring on it some disagreeable
animadversions, & 2. lead the public to believe that the embarrassments
and dissensions within the Convention, had suggested this measure. It
was answered by Doc^r F. M^r Sherman & others, that the past omission of
a duty could not justify a further omission--that the rejection of such
a proposition would expose the Convention to more unpleasant
animadversions than the adoption of it: and that the alarm out of doors
that might be excited for the state of things within, would at least be
as likely to do good as ill.
M^r Williamson, observed that the true cause of the omission could not
be mistaken. The Convention had no funds.
M^r Randolph proposed in order to give a favorable aspect to y^e
measure, that a sermon be preached at the request of the convention on
4^{th} of July, the anniversary of Independence; & thenceforward prayers
be used in y^e Convention every morning. D^r Frank^n 2^{ded} this
motion. After several unsuccessful attempts for silently postponing this
matter by adjourn^g the adjournment was at length carried, without any
vote on the motion.
FRIDAY JUNE 29^{TH} IN CONVENTION.
Doc^r Johnson. The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ
in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the
States as districts of people composing one political Society; those on
the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is
that the States do exist as political Societies, and a Gov^t is to be
formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the
individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the
States as such are to exist they must be armed with some power of
self-defence. This is the idea of (Col. Mason) who appears to have
looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the aristocratic and other
interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves, the
States have their interests as such, and are equally entitled to like
means. On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are
to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts
of individual citizens the two ideas embraced on different sides,
instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in
_one_ branch the _people_, ought to be represented, in the _other_ the
_States_.
M^r Ghoram. The States as now confederated have no doubt a right to
refuse to be consolidated, or to be formed into any new system. But he
wished the small States which seemed most ready to object, to consider
which are to give up most, they or the larger ones. He conceived that a
rupture of the Union w^d be an event unhappy for all, but surely the
large States would be least unable to take care of themselves, and to
make connections with one another. The weak therefore were most
interested in establishing some general system for maintaining order. If
among individuals, composed partly of weak, and partly of strong, the
former most need the protection of law & Government, the case is exactly
the same with weak & powerful States. What would be the situation of
Delaware (for these things he found must be spoken out, & it might as
well be done at first as last) what w^d be the situation of Delaware in
case of a separation of the States? Would she not be at the mercy of
Pennsylvania? would not her true interest lie in being consolidated with
her, and ought she not now to wish for such a union with P^a under one
Gov^t as will put it out of the power of Pen^a to oppress her? Nothing
can be more ideal than the danger apprehended by the States from their
being formed into one nation. Mass^{ts} was originally three colonies,
viz old Mass^{ts} Plymouth--& the province of Mayne. These apprehensions
existed then. An incorporation took place; all parties were safe &
satisfied; and every distinction is now forgotten. The case was similar
with Connecticut & New haven. The dread of Union was reciprocal; the
consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory. In like manner N.
Jersey has been made one society out of two parts. Should a separation
of the States take place, the fate of N. Jersey w^d be worst of all. She
has no foreign commerce & can have but little. P^a & N. York will
continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If she consults her interest
she w^d beg of all things to be annihilated. The apprehensions of the
small States ought to be appeased by another reflection Mass^{ts} will
be divided. The province of Maine is already considered as approaching
the term of its annexation to it; and P^a will probably not increase,
considering the present state of her population, & other events that may
happen. On the whole he considered a Union of the States as necessary to
their happiness, & a firm Gen^l Gov^t as necessary to their Union. He
sh^d consider it as his duty if his colleagues viewed the matter in the
same light he did to stay here as long as any other State would remain
with them, in order to agree on some plan that could with propriety be
recommended to the people.
M^r Elseworth, did not despair. He still trusted that some good plan of
Gov^t w^d be devised & adopted.
M^r Read. He sh^d have no objection to the system if it were truly
national, but it has too much of a federal mixture in it. The little
States he thought had not much to fear. He suspected that the large
States felt their want of energy, & wished for a Gen^l Gov^t to supply
the defect. Mass^{ts} was evidently labouring under her weakness and he
believed Delaware w^d not be in much danger if in her neighbourhood.
Delaware had enjoyed tranquillity & he flattered himself w^d continue to
do so. He was not however so selfish as not to wish for a good Gen^l
Gov^t. In order to obtain one the whole States must be incorporated. If
the States remain, the representatives of the large ones will stick
together, and carry everything before them. The Executive also will be
chosen under the influence of this partiality, and will betray it in his
administration. These jealousies are inseparable from the scheme of
leaving the States in existence. They must be done away. The ungranted
lands also which have been assumed by particular States must also be
given up. He repeated his approbation of the plan of M^r Hamilton, &
wished it to be substituted in the place of that on the table.
M^r Madison agreed with Doc^r Johnson, that the mixed nature of the
Gov^t ought to be kept in view; but thought too much stress was laid on
the rank of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he
observed from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to
the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the
limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their
laws in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy were analagous
to that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State. Under the
proposed Gov^t the powers of the States will be much farther reduced.
According to the views of every member, the Gen^l Gov^t will have powers
far beyond those exercised by the British Parliament, when the States
were part of the British Empire. It will in particular have the power,
without the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly on
the people themselves; and therefore not to divest such _unequal_
portions of the people as composed the several States, of an _equal_
voice, would subject the system to the reproaches & evils which have
resulted from the vicious representation in G. B.
He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a
principle w^{ch} was confessedly unjust, which c^d never be admitted, &
if admitted must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we wished to
last forever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences of
suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been s^d that the want
of energy in the large states w^d be a security to the small. It was
forgotten that this want of energy proceeded from the supposed security
of the States ag^{st} all external danger. Let each state depend on
itself for its security, & let apprehensions arise of danger, from
distant powers or from neighbouring States, & the languishing condition
of all the States, large as well as small, w^d soon be transformed into
vigorous & high toned Gov^{ts}. His great fear was that their Gov^{ts}
w^d then have too much energy, that these might not only be formidable
in the large to the small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of
all. The same causes which have rendered the old world the Theatre of
incessant wars, & have banished liberty from the face of it, w^d soon
produce the same effects here. The weakness & jealousy of the small
States w^d quickly introduce some regular military force ag^{st} sudden
danger from their powerful neighbours. The example w^d be followed by
others, and w^d soon become universal. In time of actual war, great
discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate.
Constant apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head
too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown
Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of
defence ag^{st} foreign danger, have been always the instruments of
tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a
war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the
armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.
It is perhaps questionable, whether the best concerted system of
absolute power in Europe c^d maintain itself, in a situation, where no
alarms of external danger c^d tame the people to the domestic yoke. The
insular situation of G. Britain was the principal cause of her being an
exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less defence
necessary, and admitted a kind of defence w^{ch} c^d not be used for the
purpose of oppression.--These consequences he conceived ought to be
apprehended whether the States should run into a total separation from
each other, or sh^d enter into partial confederacies. Either event w^d
be truly deplorable; & those who might be accessary to either, could
never be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.
[119]M^r Hamilton observed that individuals forming political Societies
modify their rights differently with regard to suffrage. Examples of it
are found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are
deprived of the right altogether, not having the requisite qualification
of property. In some of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in
some cases and refused in others. To vote for a member in one branch, a
certain quantum of property, to vote for a member in another branch of
the Legislature, a higher quantum of property is required. In like
manner States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger
exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States
are a collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the
rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings
resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous or
absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been s^d that
if the smaller States renounce their _equality_, they renounce at the
same time their _liberty_. The truth is it is a contest for power, not
for liberty. Will the men composing the small States be less free than
those composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 40,000 souls
will _lose power_, if she has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to P^a
having 400,000: but will the people of Del: _be less free_, if each
citizen has an equal vote with each citizen of P^a He admitted that
common residence within the same State would produce a certain degree of
attachment; and that this principle might have a certain influence in
public affairs. He thought however that this might by some precautions
be in a great measure excluded: and that no material inconvenience could
result from it, as there could not be any ground for combination among
the States whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable
distinction of interests, lay between the carrying & non-carrying
States, which divides instead of uniting the largest States. No
considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State
of N. York into different districts of different sizes.
[119] From this date he was absent till the ---- of
----.--Madison's Note.
Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the
establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He would
add another of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately be
formed with different rival & hostile nations of Europes, who will
foment disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all their
own quarrels. Foreign Nations having American dominion are & must be
jealous of us. Their representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our
fate, & for the result of this meeting, which must have an essential
influence on it.--It had been said that respectability in the eyes of
foreign Nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper
object of republican Government was domestic tranquillity & happiness.
This was an ideal distinction. No Government could give us tranquillity
& happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and
strength to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical moment for
forming such a Government. We should run every risk in trusting to
future amendments. As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak &
sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the motives will become feebler,
and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were now here
exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the subject. It would be
madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct a
reproduction of them.
M^r Pierce considered the equality of votes under the Confederation as
the great source of the public difficulties. The members of Cong^s were
advocates for local advantages. State distinctions must be sacrificed as
far as the general good required, but without destroying the States.
Tho' from a small State he felt himself a Citizen of the U. S.
M^r Gerry, urged that we never were independent States, were not such
now, & never could be even on the principles of the Confederation. The
States & the advocates for them were intoxicated with the idea of their
_sovereignty_. He was a member of Congress at the time the federal
articles were formed. The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote
was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it was ag^{st} his Judgment,
and under the pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser
States. The present Confederation he considered as dissolving. The fate
of the Union will be decided by the Convention. If they do not agree on
something, few delegates will probably be appointed to Cong^s. If they
do Cong^s will probably be kept up till the new System should be
adopted. He lamented that instead of coming here like a band of
brothers, belonging to the same family, we seemed to have brought with
us the spirit of political negotiators.
M^r L. Martin remarked that the language of the States being _sovereign
& independent_, was once familiar & understood; though it seemed now so
strange & obscure. He read those passages in the articles of
Confederation, which describe them in that language.
On the question as moved by M^r Lansing. Shall the word "not" be struck
out.
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d div^d. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, "that the rule of
suffrage in the 1^{st} branch ought not to be according to that
established by the Articles of the Confederation
Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Doc^r Johnson & M^r Elseworth moved to postpone the residue of the
clause, & take up y^e 8 Resol:
On question
Mas. no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay.
V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Elseworth moved that the rule of suffrage in the 2^d branch be the
same with that established by the articles of Confederation. "He was not
sorry on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had determined
against this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground
of compromise with regard to the 2^d branch. We were partly national;
partly federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was
conformable to the national principle & would secure the large States
ag^{st} the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the federal
principle and was necessary to secure the Small States ag^{st} the
large. He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take
place. He did not see that it could on any other. And if no compromise
should take place, our meeting would not only be in vain but worse than
in vain. To the Eastward he was sure Mass^{ts} was the only State that
would listen to a proposition for excluding the States as equal
political Societies, from an equal voice in both branches. The others
would risk every consequence rather than part with so dear a right. An
attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting the body of America
in two, and as he supposed would be the case, somewhere about this part
of it. The large States he conceived would notwithstanding the equality
of votes, have an influence that would maintain their superiority.
Holland, as had been admitted (by M^r Madison) had, notwithstanding a
like equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing influence in the
public measures. The power of self defence was essential to the small
States. Nature had given it to the smallest insect of the creation. He
could never admit that there was no danger of combinations among the
large States. They will like individuals find out and avail themselves
of the advantage to be gained by it. It was true the danger would be
greater if they were contiguous and had a more immediate common
interest. A defensive combination of the small States was rendered more
difficult by their great number. He would mention another consideration
of great weight. The existing confederation was founded on the equality
of the States in the article of suffrage: was it meant to pay no regard
to this antecedent plighted faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary &
Legislative power be created, but Let not too much be attempted; by
which all may be lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he
preferred doing half the good we could, rather than do nothing at all.
The other half may be added, when the necessity shall be more fully
experienced.[120]
[120] In King's Notes another speech of Madison's is given
after Ellsworth's:
"_Madison._ One Gentleman from Connecticut has proposed
doing as much as is prudent now, leaving future amendments
to Posterity,--this is a dangerous doctrine. The Defects of
the Amphictionic League were acknowledged, but were
reformed. The Netherlands have four times attempted to make
amendments in their Confederation, but have failed in each
attempt. The Fear of innovation, the hue & Cry in favour of
the Liberty of the People will as they have done prevent the
necessary Reforms. If the States have equal Votes &
influence in the Senate we shall be in the utmost danger,
the minority of the People will govern the majority.
Delaware during the late war opposed and defeated an
Embargo, to which twelve States had agreed, and continued to
supply the enemy with Provisions in time of war."--King's
_Life and Times of Rufus King_, i., 612.
M^r Baldwin[121] could have wished that the powers of the General
Legislature had been defined, before the mode of constituting it had
been agitated. He should vote against the motion of M^r Elseworth, tho.
he did not like the Resolution as it stood in the Report of the
Committee of the whole. He thought the second branch ought to be the
representation of property, and that in forming it therefore some
reference ought to be had to the relative wealth of their Constituents,
and to the principles on which the Senate of Mass^{ts} was constituted.
He concurred with those who thought it w^d be impossible for the Gen^l
Legislature to extend its cares to the local matters of the States.[122]
Adj^d.
[121] "Mr. Baldwin is a Gentleman of superior abilities, and
joins in a public debate with great art and eloquence.
Having laid the foundation of a compleat classical education
at Harvard College, he pursues every other study with ease.
He is well acquainted with Books and Characters, and has an
accommodating turn of mind, which enables him to gain the
confidence of Men, and to understand them. He is a
practising Attorney in Georgia, and has been twice a Member
of Congress. Mr. Baldwin is about 38 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 333.
[122] According to Yates, after Baldwin spoke: "Mr. Madison.
I would always exclude inconsistent principles in framing a
system of government. The difficulty of getting its defects
amended are great and sometimes insurmountable. The Virginia
state government was the first which was made, and though
its defects are evident to every person, we cannot get it
amended. The Dutch have made four several attempts to amend
their system without success. The few alterations made in it
were by tumult and faction, and for the worse. If there was
real danger, I would give the smaller states the defensive
weapons--But there is none from that quarter. The great
danger to our general government is the great southern and
northern interests of the continent, being opposed to each
other. Look to the votes in congress, and most of them stand
divided by the geography of the country, not according to
the size of the states.
"Suppose the first branch granted money, may not the second
branch, from state views, counteract the first? In congress,
the single state of Delaware prevented an embargo, at the
time that all the other states thought it absolutely
necessary for the support of the army. Other powers, and
those very essential, besides the legislative, will be given
to the second branch--such as the negativing all state laws.
I would compromise on this question, if I could do it on
correct principles, but otherwise not--if the old fabric of
the confederation must be the groundwork of the new, we must
fall."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 189.
SATURDAY JUNE 30. 1787. IN CONVENTION
M^r Brearly moved that the Presid^t write to the Executive of N.
Hampshire, informing it that the business depending before the
Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance
of the deputies of that State. In support of his motion he observed that
the difficulties of the subject and the diversity of opinions called for
all the assistance we could possibly obtain, (it was well understood
that the object was to add N. Hampshire to the n^o of States opposed to
the doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed from
her relative size she must be adverse to).
M^r Patterson seconded the motion.
M^r Rutlidge could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a
measure. They are not unapprized of the meeting, and can attend if they
choose. Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint & send deputies.
Are we to suspend the business until the deputies arrive? if we proceed
he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could
produce its effect.
M^r King, said he had written more than once as a private correspondent,
& the answers gave him every reason to expect that State would be
represented very shortly, if it sh^d be so at all. Circumstances of a
personal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter c^d have no effect.
M^r Wilson wished to know whether it would be consistent with the rule
or reason of secrecy, to communicate to N. Hampshire that the business
was of such a nature as the motion described. It w^d spread a great
alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the
subject; the meeting being merely voluntary--on motion of M^r Brearly
Mas^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a not on y^e floor. Del.
not on floor. M^d div^d V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.
The motion of M^r Elseworth resumed for allowing each State an equal
vote in y^e 2^d branch.
M^r Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of y^e
contrary principle in the 1^{st} branch; and considering the reasons
which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the
1^{st} branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut (M^r Elseworth) had
pronounced that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the
States North of Pen^a one only would agree to any Gen^l Government. He
entertained more favorable hopes of Conn^t and of the other Northern
States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would
not abandon a Country to which they were bound by so many strong and
endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither
stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of
America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper
principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on
better grounds. The votes of yesterday ag^{st} the just principle of
representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people of America. Taking the
opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there was any
room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the
question will be shall less than 1/4 of the U. States withdraw
themselves from the Union; or shall more than 3/4 renounce the inherent,
indisputable and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial
systems of States. If issue must be joined, it was on this point he
would chuse to join it. The Gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that
the preponderancy secured to the majority in the 1^{st} branch had
removed the objections to an equality of votes in the 2^d branch for the
security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality
will enable the minority to controul in all cases whatsoever, the
sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will controul
six: Seven States, according to the estimates that had been used,
composed 24/90 of the whole people. It would be in the power then of
less than 1/3 to overrule 2/3 whenever a question should happen to
divide the States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming
a Government? Is it for _men_, or for the imaginary beings called
_States_? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical
distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with being told,
that the one-third compose the greater number of States? The rule of
suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2^d as in the
1^{st} branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can
be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local,
confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion, and grow with
the growth of the U. States.--Much has been said of an imaginary
combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes
of aristocracy has been charged on it. No explanation however of the
danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from reason &
history that rivalships would be more probable than coalitions; and that
there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No
answer has yet been given to the observations of (M^r Madison) on this
subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large
States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the
other States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the
three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones?
Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is all a
mere illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what they are
composed of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed of
aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of Gov^t or
rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. It is
true that a majority of States in the 2^d branch cannot carry a law
ag^{st} a majority of the people in the 1^{st}. But this removes half
only of the objection. Bad Govern^{ts} are of two sorts. 1. that which
does too little. 2. that which does too much: that which fails thro'
weakness; and that which destroys thro' oppression. Under which of these
evils do the U. States at present groan? Under the weakness and
inefficiency of its Govern^t. To remedy this weakness we have been sent
to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave
the U. S. fettered precisely as heretofore; with the additional
mortification of seeing the good purposes of y^e fair representation of
the people in the 1^{st} branch, defeated in the 2^d. Twenty four will
still controul sixty six. He lamented that such a disagreement should
prevail on the point of representation, as he did not foresee that it
would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the
Gen^l & the local authorities. He thought the States necessary &
valuable parts of a good system.
M^r Elseworth. The capital objection of M^r Wilson, "that the minority
will rule the majority" is not true. The power is given to the few to
save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had
been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had
weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the
many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution the wisdom of which
so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of
Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation a negative on the
laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights ag^{st} the
encroachm^{ts} of the Commons. No instance of a Confederacy has existed
in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of
it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the
foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No
salutary measure has been lost for want of _a majority of the States_,
to favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for the
1^{st} branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not
imaginary. Altho' no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the
possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could
easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations.
Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement,
three or four free ports & no more were to be established would not
combinations be formed in favor of Boston--Philad^a & some port of the
Chesapeak? A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the
Great officers. He appealed again to the obligations of the federal pact
which was still in force, and which had been entered into with so much
solemnity; persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to
the plighted faith under which each State small as well as great, held
an equal right of suffrage in the general Councils. His remarks were not
the result of partial or local views. The State he represented
(Connecticut) held a middle rank.
M^r Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning of M^r E. but
must observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another
occasion, the large States were described by him as the Aristocratic
States, ready to oppress the small. Now the Small are the House of Lords
requiring a negative to defend them ag^{st} the more numerous Commons.
M^r E. had also erred in saying that no instance had existed in which
confederated States had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of
suffrage. Passing over the German system in which the K. of Prussia has
nine voices, he reminded M^r E. of the Lycian Confederacy, in which the
component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which
Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government.
Had the fact been as stated by M^r E. it would have been of little avail
to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments ag^{st} him; the
History & fate of the several confederacies modern as well as Antient,
demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the
appeal of M^r E. to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact,
he remarked that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common
engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all
the States however Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea.
Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts from which
no State was free, the Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent
vote, _positively refused_ to pass a law for complying with the
Requisitions of Cong^s, and had transmitted a copy of the vote to
Cong^s. It was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes in
the 2^d branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be
perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the 1^{st} branch was
an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the
majority of States might still injure the majority of people. 1. they
could _obstruct_ the wishes and interests of the majority. 2. they could
_extort_ measures repugnant to the wishes & interest of the Majority. 3.
they could _impose_ measures adverse thereto; as the 2^d branch will
prob[~l]y exercise some great powers, in which the 1^{st} will not
participate. He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any
class of Citizens, or any description of States, ought to be secured as
far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there ought to be
given a Constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the
States were divided into different interests not by their difference of
size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted
partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or
not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great
division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie between the large
& small States: It lay between the Northern & Southern. And if any
defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these
two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth
that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would
answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was that instead of
proportioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their
respective numbers of inhabitants computing the slaves in the ratio of 5
to 3, they should be represented in one branch according to the number
of free inhabitants only; and in the other according to the whole n^o
counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement the Southern Scale
would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other. He
had been restrained from proposing this expedient by two considerations:
one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an
occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself--the other was, the
inequality of powers that must be vested in the two branches, and which
w^d destroy the equilibrium of interests.
M^r Elseworth assured the House that whatever might be thought of the
Representatives of Connecticut the State was entirely federal in her
disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in
supplying both men & money. The muster rolls would show she had more
troops in the field than Virg^a. If she had been Delinquent, it had been
from inability, and not more so than other States.
M^r Sherman. M^r Madison had animadverted on the delinquency of the
States, when his object required him to prove that the Constitution of
Cong^s was faulty. Cong^s is not to blame for the faults of the States.
Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been, a
further power in Cong^s to render them effectual.
M^r Davy was much embarrassed and wished for explanations. The Report of
the Committee allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and
establishing a proportional representation in it, seemed to be
impracticable. There will according to this rule be ninety members in
the outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was
impossible that so numerous a body could possess the activity and other
qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of
the report as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to
prefer the latter. The appointment of the Senate by electors chosen by
the people for that purpose was he conceived liable to an insuperable
difficulty. The larger Counties or districts thrown into a general
district, would certainly prevail over the smaller Counties or
Districts, and merit in the latter would be excluded altogether. The
report therefore seemed to be right in referring the appointment to the
Legislatures, whose agency in the general System did not appear to him
objectionable as it did to some others. The fact was that the local
prejudices & interests which could not be denied to exist, would find
their way into the national Councils whether the Representatives should
be chosen by the Legislatures or by the people themselves. On the other
hand if a proportional representation was attended with insuperable
difficulties, the making the Senate the Representative of the States,
looked like bringing us back to Cong^s again, and shutting out all the
advantages expected from it. Under this view of the subject he could not
vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that in
general there were extremes on both sides. We were partly federal,
partly national in our Union, and he did not see why the Gov^t might not
in some respects operate on the States, in others on the people.
M^r Wilson admitted the question concerning the number of Senators, to
be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others
in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked
forward to the time when the smallest States will contain 100,000 souls
at least. Let there be then one Senator in each for every 100,000 souls
and let the States not having that n^o of inhabitants be allowed one. He
was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small
States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise.
Doc^r Franklin. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a
proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that
their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put
in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger. When a
broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the
artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner
here both sides must part with some of their demands, in order that they
may join in some accommodating proposition. He had prepared one which he
would read, that it might lie on the table for consideration. The
proposition was in the words following
"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose & send
an equal number of Delegates, namely ---- who are to compose the
2^d branch of the General Legislature--
That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty of
individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority
over their own Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of
the General Government within the several States augmented, each
State shall have equal suffrage.
That in the appointment of all Civil officers of y^e Gen^l Gov^t
in the election of whom the 2^d branch may by the Constitution
have part, each State shall have equal suffrage.
That in fixing the Salaries of such Officers, and in all
allowances for public services, and generally in all
appropriations & dispositions of money to be drawn out of the
general Treasury; and in all laws for supplying that Treasury,
the Delegates of the several States shall have suffrage in
proportion to the Sums which their respective States do actually
contribute to the Treasury."
Where a ship had many owners this was the rule of deciding on her
expedition. He had been one of the Ministers from this Country to France
during the joint war and w^d have been very glad if allowed a vote in
distributing the money to carry it on.
M^r King observed that the simple question was whether each State should
have an equal vote in the 2^d branch; that it must be apparent to those
Gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this equality, nor the report
as it stood, that the report was as susceptible of melioration as the
motion; that a reform would be nugatory & nominal only if we should make
another Congress of the proposed Senate: that if the adherence to an
equality of votes was fixed & unalterable, there could not be less
obstinacy on the other side, & that we were in fact cut asunder already,
and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it: that he was however
filled with astonishment that if we were convinced that every _man_ in
America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice
this substantial good to the Phantom of _State_ sovereignty: that his
feelings were more harrowed & his fears more agitated for his Country
than he could express, that he conceived this to be the last opportunity
of providing for its liberty & happiness: that he could not therefore
but repeat his amazement that when a just govern^t founded on a fair
representation of the _people_ of America was within our reach, we
should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom &
importance of _States_: that should this wonderful illusion continue to
prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than to sit down
under a Gov^t founded in a vicious principle of representation, and
which must be as short lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail on
himself to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted by M^r
Wilson; but he never could listen to an equality of votes as proposed in
the motion.
M^r Dayton. When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted
for argument, he presumed they would have no effect however eloquently
spoken. It should have been shewn that the evils we have experienced
have proceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds of
dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the Gen^l
Government. He considered the system on the table as a novelty, an
amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be rec^d by
the people. M^r Martin w^d never confederate if it could not be done on
just principles.
M^r Madison would acquiesce in the concession hinted by M^r Wilson, on
condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The
plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the
States. The Senate therefore is only another edition of Cong^s. He knew
the faults of that Body & had used a bold language ag^{st} it. Still he
would preserve the State rights, as carefully as the trials by jury.
M^r Bedford, contended that there was no middle way between a perfect
consolidation and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of
the question, and in the latter they must continue if not perfectly, yet
equally sovereign. If political Societies possess ambition avarice, and
all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought
we not to view them in this light here? Will not the same motives
operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him look
at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are
not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of the small? They think no doubt that they have right on their
side, but interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a
small State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a
great one. S. Carolina is actuated both by present interest & future
prospects. She hopes too to see the other States cut down to her own
dimensions. N. Carolina has the same motives of present & future
interest. Virg^a follows. Mary^d is not on that side of the Question.
Pen^a has a direct and future interest. Mass^{ts} has a decided and
palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the
small States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look at G. Britain.
Is the Representation there less unequal? But we shall be told again
that that is the rotten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs
however held fast their constitutional rights? And are we to act with
greater purity than the rest of mankind. An exact proportion in the
Representation is not preserved in any one of the States. Will it be
said that an inequality of power will not result from an inequality of
votes. Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The
whole History of mankind proves it. The three large States have a common
interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether a combination as
we suppose, or a competition as others suppose, shall take place among
them, in either case, the small States must be ruined. We must like
Solon make such a Govern^t as the people will approve. Will the smaller
States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them. It is not true
that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present
Cong^s. The language of the people has been that Cong^s ought to have
the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States where it
may be necessary. On The first point they have been explicit &, in a
manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this
& similar measures if they ever mean to discharge their engagements. The
little States are willing to observe their engagements, but will meet
the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. We have been
told with a dictatorial air that this is the last moment for a fair
trial in favor of a Good Governm^t. It will be the last indeed if the
propositions reported from the Committee go forth to the people. He was
under no apprehensions. The Large States dare not dissolve the
Confederation. If they do the small ones will find some foreign ally of
more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them
justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or alarm. It was a
natural consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal
powers not annihilating the federal system. This is what the people
expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient Gov^t and why not
make such an one as they desire.
M^r Elseworth. Under a National Gov^t he should participate in the
National Security, as remarked by (M^r King) but that was all. What he
wanted was domestic happiness. The Nat^l Gov^t could not descend to the
local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a
general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation of his
rights to the State Gov^{ts}. From these alone he could derive the
greatest happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on
their existence, as much as a new born infant on its mother for
nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing to
add that could be so.
M^r King was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as
far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by M^r Elseworth.
He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a
dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be
devised as he conceived that would give them all the security the nature
of things would admit of. In the establish^t of Societies the
Constitution was to the Legislature what the laws were to individuals.
As the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by express
provisions in the State Constitutions; why may not a like security be
provided for the Rights of States in the National Constitution. The
articles of Union between Engl^d & Scotland furnish an example of such a
provision in favor of sundry rights of Scotland. When that Union was in
agitation, the same language of apprehension which has been heard from
the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The
articles however have not been violated and the Scotch have found an
increase of prosperity & happiness. He was aware that this will be
called a mere _paper security_. He thought it a sufficient answer to say
that if fundamental articles of compact, are no sufficient defence
against physical power, neither will there be any safety ag^{st} it if
there be no compact. He could not sit down, without taking some notice
of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware (M^r Bedford).
It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance
had marked the honorable Gentleman himself. It was not he who with a
vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to
turn his hopes from our common Country, and court the protection of some
foreign hand. This too was the language of the Honbl member himself. He
was grieved that such a thought had entered into his heart. He was more
grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman
c^d only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself
whatever might be his distress, he w^d never court relief from a foreign
power.
Adjourned.
MONDAY JULY 2^D IN CONVENTION.
On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch as
moved by M^r Elseworth, Mass^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a
no. Del. ay. M^d ay. M^r Jenifer being not present M^r Martin alone
voted V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. div^d. M^r Houston no. M^r
Baldwin ay.
M^r Pinkney thought an equality of votes in the 2^d branch inadmissible.
At the same time candor obliged him to admit that the large States would
feel a partiality for their own Citizens & give them a preference, in
appointments: that they might also find some common points in their
Commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a
real distinction [between] the Northern & South^n interests. N. Carol^a
S. Carol: & Geo. in their Rice & Indigo had a peculiar interest which
might be sacrificed. How then shall the larger States be prevented from
administering the Gen^l Gov^t as they please, without being themselves
unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some but
not a full, proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should
be done, considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment.
Cong^s have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the
federal System. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it, but the
appointm^t of this Convention; & he could not express his alarms for the
consequence of such an event. He read his motion, to form the States
into classes, with an apportionment of Senators among them (see Art: 4,
of his plan).
General Pinkney was willing the motion might be considered. He did not
entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Doc^r Franklin (which
see Saturday June 30). Some Compromise seemed to be necessary, the
States being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in
the 2^d branch. He proposed that a Committee consisting of a member from
each State should be appointed to devise & report some compromise.
M^r L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, but no modifications
whatever could reconcile the Smaller States to the least diminution of
their equal Sovereignty.
M^r Sherman. We are now at a full stop, and nobody he supposed meant
that we sh^d break up without doing something. A committee he thought
most likely to hit on some expedient.
[123]Mr. Gov^r Morris. thought a Com^e adviseable as the Convention had
been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of
appointing the 2^d branch tended he was sure to defeat the object of it.
What is this object? To check the precipitation, changeableness, and
excesses of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the
democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation--in
Congress changeableness, in every department excesses ag^{st} personal
liberty private property & personal safety. What qualities are necessary
to constitute a check in this case? _Abilities_ and _virtue_, are
equally necessary in both branches. Something more then is now wanted,
1. the checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the
other branch, one interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices as
they exist, must be turned ag^{st} each other. 2. It must have great
personal property, it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to
lord it thro' pride. Pride is indeed the great principle that actuates
both the poor & the rich. It is this principle which in the former
resists, in the latter abuses authority. 3. It should be independent. In
Religion the Creature is apt to forget its Creator. That it is otherwise
in Political Affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The
aristocratic body, should be as independent & as firm as the democratic.
If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic
choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All the guards contrived
by America have not restrained the Senatorial branches of the
Legislatures from a servile complaisance to the democratic. If the 2^d
branch is to be dependent we are better without it. To make it
independent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be
said. He believed so; He hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish
their dominion & enslave the rest. They always did. They always will.
The proper security ag^{st} them is to form them into a separate
interest. The two forces will then controul each other. Let the rich mix
with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish an
Oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it
has been all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we
are but men: and we are not to expect any particular interference of
Heaven in our favor. By thus combining & setting apart, the aristocratic
interest, the popular interest will be combined ag^{st} it. There will
be a mutual check and mutual security. 4. An independence for life,
involves the necessary permanency. If we change our measures nobody will
trust us: and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change
of men. Ask any man if he confides in Cong^s if he confides in the State
of Pen^a if he will lend his money or enter into contract? He will tell
you no. He sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If G. B. were
to explain her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be
employed.--He disliked the exclusion of the 2^d branch from holding
offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of the
military officers during the war, from civil appointments. It deprives
the Executive of the principal source of influence. If danger be
apprehended from the Executive what a left-handed way is this of
obviating it? If the son, the brother or the friend can be appointed,
the danger may be even increased, as the disqualified father &c. can
then boast of a disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides
shall the best, the most able, the most virtuous citizens not be
permitted to hold offices? Who then are to hold them? He was also
ag^{st} paying the Senators. They will pay themselves if they can. If
they can not they will be rich and can do without it. Of such the 2^d
branch ought to consist; and none but such can compose it if they are
not to be paid--He contended that the Executive should appoint the
Senate & fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the
present question. You may begin with any ratio you please; it will come
to the same thing. The members being independ^t & for life, may be taken
as well from one place as from another.--It should be considered too how
the scheme could be carried through the States. He hoped there was
strength of mind eno' in this House to look truth in the face. He did
not hesitate therefore to say that loaves & fishes must bribe the
Demagogues. They must be made to expect higher offices under the general
than the State Gov^{ts}. A Senate for life will be a noble bait. Without
such captivating prospects, the popular leaders will oppose & defeat the
plan. He perceived that the 1^{st} branch was to be chosen by the people
of the States; the 2^d by those chosen by the people. Is not here a
Gov^t by the States, a Govern^t by Compact between Virg^a in the 1^{st}
& 2^d branch, Mass^{ts} in the 1^{st} & 2^d branch &c. This is going
back to mere treaty. It it no Gov^t at all. It is altogether dependent
on the States, and will act over again the part which Cong^s has acted.
A firm Govern^t alone can protect our liberties. He fears the influence
of the rich. They will have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do
not by such a Gov^t keep them within their proper sphere. We should
remember that the people never act from reason alone. The Rich will take
the advantage of their passions & make these the instruments for
oppressing them. The Result of the Contest will be a violent
aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The schemes of the Rich will
be favored by the extent of the Country. The people in such distant
parts cannot communicate & act in concert. They will be the dupes of
those who have more knowledge & intercourse. The only security ag^{st}
encroachments will be a select & sagacious body of men, instituted to
watch ag^{st} them on all sides. He meant only to hint these
observations, without grounding any motion on them.
[123] He had just returned from N. Y. hav^g left y^e Convention
a few days after it commenced business.--Madison's Note.
M^r Randolph favored the commitment though he did not expect much
benefit from the expedient. He animadverted on the warm & rash language
of M^r Bedford on Saturday; reminded the small States that if the large
States should combine some danger of which he did not deny there would
be a check in the revisionary power of the Executive, and intimated that
in order to render this still more effectual, he would agree that in the
choice of an Executive each State should have an equal vote. He was
persuaded that two such opposite bodies as M^r Morris had planned, could
never long co-exist. Dissentions would arise, as has been seen even
between the Senate and H. of Delegates in Maryland, appeals would be
made to the people; and in a little time commotions would be the
result--He was far from thinking the large States could subsist of
themselves any more than the small; an avulsion would involve the whole
in ruin, and he was determined to pursue such a scheme of Government as
would secure us ag^{st} such a calamity.
M^r Strong was for the co[~m]itment; and hoped the mode of constituting
both branches would be referred. If they should be established on
different principles, contentions would prevail, and there would never
be a concurrence in necessary measures.
Doc^r Williamson. If we do not concede on both sides, our business must
soon be at an end. He approved of the co[~m]itment, supposing that as
the Com^e w^d be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued with more
coolness.
M^r Wilson objected to the Committee, because it would decide according
to that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side. Experience in
Cong^s had also proved the inutility of Committees consisting of members
from each State.
M^r Lansing w^d not oppose the commitment, though expecting little
advantage from it.
M^r Madison opposed the Co[~m]itment. He had rarely seen any other
effect than delay from _such_ Committees in Cong^s. Any scheme of
compromise that could be proposed in the Committee might as easily be
proposed in the House; and the report of the Committee where it
contained merely the _opinion_ of the Com^e would neither shorten the
discussion, nor influence the decision of the House.
M^r Gerry was for the commitm^t. Something must be done, or we shall
disappoint not only America, but the whole world. He suggested a
consideration of the State we should be thrown into by the failure of
the Union. We should be without an Umpire to decide controversies and
must be at the mercy of events. What too is to become of our
treaties--what of our foreign debts, what of our domestic? We must make
concessions on both sides. Without these the Constitutions of the
several States would never have been formed.
On the question "for co[~m]iting," generally:
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. ay.
Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the question for co[~m]iting it "to a member from each State,"
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The Co[~m]ittee elected by ballot, were M^r Gerry, M^r Elseworth, M^r
Yates, M^r Patterson, D^r Franklin, M^r Bedford, M^r Martin, M^r Mason,
M^r Davy, M^r Rutlidge, Mr. Baldwin.
That time might be given to the Co[~m]ittee, and to such as chose to
attend to the celebrations on the anniversary of Independence, the
Convention adjourned till Thursday.[124]
[124] "TUESDAY, _July 3, 1787_.
"The _grand committee_ met. Mr. Gerry was chosen chairman.
"The committee proceeded to consider in what manner they
should discharge the business with which they were
intrusted. By the proceedings in the Convention, they were
so equally divided on the important question of
_representation in the two branches_, that the idea of a
conciliatory adjustment must have been in contemplation of
the house in the appointment of this committee. But still,
how to effect this salutory purpose was the question. Many
of the members, impressed with the utility of a general
government, connected with it the indispensable necessity of
a representation from the states according to their numbers
and wealth; while others, equally tenacious of the rights of
the states, would admit of no other representation but such
as _was strictly federal_, or, in other words, _equality of
suffrage_. This brought on a discussion of the principles on
which the house had divided, and a lengthy recapitulation of
the arguments advanced in the house in support of these
opposite propositions. As I had not openly explained my
sentiments on any former occasion on this question, but
constantly, in giving my vote, _showed my attachment to the
national government on federal principles, I took this
occasion to explain my motives_.
"These remarks gave rise to a motion of Dr. Franklin, which
after some modification was agreed to, and made the basis of
the following report of the Committee."--Yates, _Secret
Proceedings_, etc., 205. The report is given by Madison.
* * * * *
Hamilton, who had gone to New York, wrote to Washington
under date of July 3d:
"In my passage through the Jerseys, and since my arrival
here, I have taken particular pains to discover the public
sentiment, and I am more and more convinced that this is the
critical opportunity for establishing the prosperity of this
country on a solid foundation. I have conversed with men of
information, not only in this city, but from different parts
of the State, and they agree that there has been an
astonishing revolution for the better in the minds of the
people.
"The prevailing apprehension among thinking men is, that the
Convention, from the fear of shocking the popular opinion,
will not go far enough. They seem to be convinced that a
strong, well-mounted government will better suit the popular
palate than one of a different complexion. Men in office are
indeed taking all possible pains to give an unfavorable
impression of the Convention, but the current seems to be
moving strongly the other way.
"A plain but sensible man, in a conversation I had with him
yesterday, expressed himself nearly in this manner: The
people begin to be convinced that 'their excellent form of
government,' as they have been used to call it, will not
answer their purpose, and that they must substitute
something not very remote from that which they have lately
quitted.
"These appearances, though they will not warrant a
conclusion that the people are yet ripe for such a plan as I
advocate, yet serve to prove that there is no reason to
despair of their adopting one equally energetic, if the
Convention should think proper to propose it. They serve to
prove that we ought not to allow too much weight to
objections drawn from the supposed repugnance of the people
to an efficient constitution. I confess I am more and more
inclined to believe that former habits of thinking are
regaining their influence with more rapidity than is
generally imagined.
"Not having compared ideas with you, sir, I cannot judge how
far our sentiments agree; but, as I persuade myself the
genuineness of my representations will receive credit with
you, my anxiety for the event of the deliberations of the
Convention induces me to make this communication of what
appears to be the tendency of the public mind.
"I own to you, sir, that I am seriously and deeply
distressed at the aspect of the counsels which prevailed
when I left Philadelphia. I fear we shall let slip the
golden opportunity of rescuing the American empire from
disunion, anarchy, and misery.
"No motley or feeble measure can answer the end, or will
finally receive the public support. Decision is true wisdom,
and will not be less reputable to the Convention than
salutary to the community.
"I shall of necessity remain here ten or twelve days. If I
have reason to believe that my attendance at Philadelphia
will not be mere waste of time, I shall, after that period,
rejoin the Convention."--_Hamilton's Works_ (Lodge).
THURSDAY JULY 5^{TH} IN CONVENTION
M^r Gerry delivered in from the Committee appointed on Monday last the
following Report.
"The Committee to whom was referred the 8^{th} Resol. of the
Report from the Committee of the Whole House, and so much of the
7^{th} as has not been decided on, submit the following Report:
That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the
Convention on condition that both shall be generally adopted. I.
that in the 1^{st} branch of the Legislature each of the States
now in the Union shall be allowed 1 member for every 40,000
inhabitants of the description reported in the 7^{th} Resolution
of the Com^e of the whole House: that each State not containing
that number shall be allowed 1 member: that all bills for
raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of
the officers of the Govern^t of the U. States shall originate in
the 1^{st} branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered
or amended by the 2^d branch; and that no money shall be drawn
from the public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to
be originated in the 1^{st} branch. "II. That in the 2^d branch
each State shall have an equal vote."[125]
[125] This report was founded on a motion in the
Co[~m]itte made by D^r Franklin. It was barely
acquiesced in by the members from the States opposed
to an equity of votes in the 2^d branch and was
evidently considered by the members on the other
side, as a gaining of their point. A motion was made
by M^r Sherman. He acted in the place of M^r
Elseworth who was kept away by indisposition, in the
Committee to the following effect "that each State
should have an equal vote in the 2^d branch;
provided that no decision therein should prevail
unless the majority of States concurring should also
comprise a majority of the inhabitants of the U.
States." This motion was not much deliberated on nor
approved in the Committee. A similar proviso had
been proposed in the debates on the articles of
Confederation in 1777, to the articles giving
certain powers to "nine States." See Journals of
Cong^s for 1777, p. 462.--Madison Note.
M^r Ghoram observed that as the report consisted of propositions
mutually conditional he wished to hear some explanations touching the
grounds on which the conditions were estimated.
M^r Gerry. The Committee were of different opinions as well as the
Deputations from which the Com^e were taken, and agreed to the Report
merely in order that some ground of accommodation might be proposed.
Those opposed to the equality of votes have only assented conditionally;
and if the other side do not generally agree will not be under any
obligation to support the Report.
Mr. Wilson thought the Committee had exceeded their powers.
M^r Martin was for taking the question on the whole report.
M^r Wilson was for a division of the question; otherwise it w^d be a
leap in the dark.
M^r Madison could not regard the privilege of originating money bills as
any concession on the side of the small States. Experience proved that
it had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to
be originated, they might surely find some member from some of the same
States in the lower branch who would originate it. The restriction as to
amendments was of as little consequence. Amendments could be handed
privately by the Senate to members in the other house. Bills could be
negatived that they might be sent up in the desired shape. If the Senate
should yield to the obstinacy of the 1^{st} branch the use of that body
as a check would be lost. If the 1^{st} branch should yield to that of
the Senate, the privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shewn
both in G. B. and the States having a similar regulation that it was a
source of frequent & obstinate altercations. These considerations had
produced a rejection of a like motion on a former occasion when judged
by its own merits. It could not therefore be deemed any concession on
the present, and left in force all the objections which had prevailed
ag^{st} allowing each State an equal voice. He conceived that the
Convention was reduced to the alternative of either departing from
justice in order to conciliate the smaller States, and the minority of
the people of the U. S. or of displeasing these by justly gratifying the
larger States and the majority of the people. He could not himself
hesitate as to the option he ought to make. The Convention with justice
& the majority of the people on their side, had nothing to fear. With
injustice and the minority on their side they had every thing to fear.
It was in vain to purchase concord in the Convention on terms which
would perpetuate discord among their Constituents. The Convention ought
to pursue a plan which would bear the test of examination, which would
be espoused & supported by the enlightened and impartial part of
America, & which they could themselves vindicate and urge. It should be
considered that altho' at first many may judge of the system
reco[~m]ended, by their opinion of the Convention, yet finally all will
judge of the Convention by the System. The merits of the System alone
can finally & effectually obtain the public suffrage. He was not
apprehensive that the people of the small States would obstinately
refuse to accede to a Gov^t founded on just principles, and promising
them substantial protection. He could not suspect that Delaware would
brave the consequences of seeking her fortunes apart from the other
States, rather than submit to such a Gov^t; much less could he suspect
that she would pursue the rash policy of courting foreign support, which
the warmth of one of her representatives (M^r Bedford) had suggested, or
if she sh^d, that any foreign nation w^d be so rash as to hearken to the
overture. As little could he suspect that the people of N. Jersey
notwithstanding the decided tone of the gentlemen from that State, would
choose rather to stand on their own legs, and bid defiance to events,
than to acquiesce under an establishment founded on principles the
justice of which they could not dispute, and absolutely necessary to
redeem them from the exactions levied on them by the co[~m]erce of the
neighbouring States. A review of other States would prove that there was
as little reason to apprehend an inflexible opposition elsewhere.
Harmony in the Convention was no doubt much to be desired. Satisfaction
to all the States, in the first instance still more so. But if the
principal States comprehending a majority of the people of the U. S.
should concur in a just & judicious plan, he had the firmest hopes, that
all the other States would by degrees accede to it.[126]
[126] Yates, and his colleague, Lansing, left the Convention
July 5, despairing of the result of its labors being
satisfactory to them. Madison's speech is the last one
reported by Yates.--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc.
M^r Butler said he could not let down his idea of the people, of America
so far as to believe they would from mere respect to the Convention
adopt a plan evidently unjust. He did not consider the privilege
concerning money bills as of any consequence. He urged that the 2^d
branch ought to represent the States according to their property.
M^r Gov^r Morris, thought the form as well as the matter of the Report
objectionable. It seemed in the first place to render amendments
impracticable. In the next place, it seemed to involve a pledge to agree
to the 2^d part if the 1^{st} sh^d be agreed to. He conceived the whole
aspect of it to be wrong. He came here as a Representative of America;
he flattered himself he came here in some degree as a Representative of
the whole human race; for the whole human race will be affected by the
proceedings of this Convention. He wished gentlemen to extend their
views beyond the present moment of time; beyond the narrow limits of
place from which they derive their political origin. If he were to
believe some things which he had heard, he should suppose that we were
assembled to truck and bargain for our particular States. He can not
descend to think that any gentlemen are really actuated by these views.
We must look forward to the effects of what we do. These alone ought to
guide us. Much has been said of the sentiments of the people. They were
unknown. They could not be known. All that we can infer is that if the
plan we recommend be reasonable & right; all Who have reasonable minds
and sound intentions will embrace it, notwithstanding what had been said
by some gentlemen. Let us suppose that the larger States shall agree;
and that the smaller refuse; and let us trace the consequences. The
opponents of the system in the smaller States will no doubt make a
party, and a noise for a time, but the ties of interest, of kindred & of
common habits which connect them with other States will be too strong to
be easily broken. In N. Jersey particularly he was sure a great many
would follow the sentiments of Pen^a & N. York. This Country must be
united. If persuasion does not unite it, the sword will. He begged that
this consideration might have its due weight. The scenes of horror
attending Civil commotion cannot be described, and the conclusion of
them will be worse than the term of their continuance. The stronger
party will then make traytors of the weaker; and the Gallows & Halter
will finish the work of the sword. How far foreign powers would be ready
to take part in the confusions he would not say. Threats that they will
be invited have it seems been thrown out. He drew the melancholy picture
of foreign intrusions as exhibited in the History of Germany, & urged it
as a standing lesson to other nations. He trusted that the Gentlemen who
may have hazarded such expressions, did not entertain them till they
reached their own lips. But returning to the Report he could not think
it in any respect calculated for the Public good. As the 2^d branch is
now constituted, there will be constant disputes & appeals to the States
which will undermine the Gen^l Government & controul & annihilate the
1^{st} branch. Suppose that the delegates from Mass^{ts} & Rho I. in the
Upper House disagree, and that the former are outvoted. What Results?
they will immediately declare that their State will not abide by the
decision, and make such representations as will produce that effect. The
same may happen as to Virg^a & other States. Of what avail then will be
what is on paper. State attachments, and State importance have been the
bane of this Country. We cannot annihilate; but we may perhaps take out
the teeth of the serpents. He wished our ideas to be enlarged to the
true interest of man, instead of being circumscribed within the narrow
compass of a particular Spot. And after all how little can be the motive
yielded by selfishness for such a policy. Who can say whether he
himself, much less whether his children, will the next year be an
inhabitant of this or that State.
M^r Bedford. He found that what he had said as to the small States being
taken by the hand, had been misunderstood; and he rose to explain. He
did not mean that the small States would court the aid & interposition
of foreign powers. He meant that they would not consider the federal
compact as dissolved untill it should be so by the Acts of the large
States. In this case The consequences of the breach of faith on their
part, and the readiness of the small States to fulfill their
engagements, would be that foreign Nations having demands on this
Country would find it their interest to take the small States by the
hand, in order to do themselves justice. This was what he meant. But no
man can foresee to what extremities the small States may be driven by
oppression. He observed also in apology that some allowance ought to be
made for the habits of his profession in which warmth was natural &
sometimes necessary. But is there not an apology in what was said by
(M^r Gov^r Morris) that the sword is to unite: by M^r Ghorum that
Delaware must be annexed to Penn^a and N. Jersey divided between Pen^a
and N. York. To hear such language without emotion, would be to renounce
the feelings of a man and the duty of a Citizen--As to the propositions
of the Committee, the lesser States have thought it necessary to have a
security somewhere. This has been thought necessary for the Executive
Magistrate of the proposed Gov^t who has a sort of negative on the laws;
and is it not of more importance that the States should be protected,
than that the Executive branch of the Gov^t sh^d be protected. In order
to obtain this, the smaller States have conceded as to the constitution
of the first branch, and as to money bills. If they be not gratified by
correspondent concessions as to the 2^d branch is it to be supposed they
will ever accede to the plan; and what will be the consequence if
nothing should be done? The condition of the U. States requires that
something should be immediately done. It will be better that a defective
plan should be adopted, than that none should be recommended. He saw no
reason why defects might not be supplied with meetings 10, 15, or 20
years hence.
M^r Elseworth said he had not attended the proceedings of the Committee,
but was ready to accede to the compromise they had reported. Some
compromise was necessary; and he saw none more convenient or reasonable.
M^r Williamson hoped that the expressions of individuals would not be
taken for the sense of their colleagues, much less of their States which
was not & could not be known. He hoped also that the meaning of those
expressions would not be misconstrued or exaggerated. He did not
conceive that (M^r Gov^r Morris) meant that the sword ought to be drawn
ag^{st} the smaller States. He only pointed out the probable
consequences of anarchy in the U. S. A similar exposition ought to be
given of the expressions of (M^r Ghorum). He was ready to hear the
Report discussed; but thought the propositions contained in it, the most
objectionable of any he had yet heard.
M^r Patterson said that he had when the Report was agreed to in the
Com^e reserved to himself the right of freely discussing it. He
acknowledged that the warmth complained of was improper; but he thought
the Sword & the Gallows little calculated to produce conviction. He
complained of the manner in which M^r M and M^r Gov^r Morris had treated
the small States.
M^r Gerry. Tho' he had assented to the Report in the Committee, he had
very material objections to it. We were however in a peculiar situation.
We were neither the same Nation nor different Nations. We ought not
therefore to pursue the one or the other of these ideas too closely. If
no compromise should take place what will be the consequence. A
secession he foresaw would take place; for some gentlemen seem decided
on it: two different plans will be proposed; and the result no man could
foresee. If we do not come to some agreement among ourselves some
foreign sword will probably do the work for us.
M^r Mason. The Report was meant not as specific propositions to be
adopted; but merely as a general ground of accommodation. There must be
some accommodation on this point, or we shall make little further
progress in the work. Accommodation was the object of the House in the
appointment of the Committee; and of the Committee in the Report they
had made. And however liable the Report might be to objections, he
thought it preferable to an appeal to the world by the different sides,
as had been talked of by some Gentlemen. It could not be more
inconvenient to any gentleman to remain absent from his private affairs,
than it was for him; but he would bury his bones in this City rather
than expose his Country to the Consequences of a dissolution of the
Convention without any thing being done.
The 1^{st} proposition in the report for fixing the representation in
the 1^{st} branch, "one member for every 40,000 inhabitants," being
taken up.
M^r Gov^r Morris objected to that scale of apportionment. He thought
property ought to be taken into the estimate as well as the number of
inhabitants. Life & liberty were generally said to be of more value than
property. An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless prove that
property was the main object of Society. The Savage State was more
favorable to liberty than the Civilized; and sufficiently so to life. It
was preferred by all men who had not acquired a taste for property; it
was only renounced for the sake of property which could only be secured
by the restraints of regular Government. These ideas might appear to
some new, but they were nevertheless just. If property then was the main
object of Gov^t certainly it ought to be one measure of the influence
due to those who were to be affected by the Govern^t. He looked forward
also to that range of New States which w^d soon be formed in the West.
He thought the rule of representation ought to be so fixed as to secure
to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the National Councils. The new
States will know less of the public interest than these, will have an
interest in many respects different, in particular will be little
scrupulous of involving the Community in wars the burdens & operations
of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States. Provision ought
therefore to be made to prevent the maritime States from being hereafter
outvoted by them. He thought this might be easily done by irrevocably
fixing the number of representatives which the Atlantic States should
respectively have, and the number which each new State will have. This
w^d not be unjust, as the Western settlers w^d previously know the
conditions on which they were to possess their lands. It would be
politic as it would reco[~m]end the plan to the present as well as
future interest of the States which must decide the fate of it.
M^r Rutlidge. The gentleman last up had spoken some of his sentiments
precisely. Property was certainly the principal object of Society. If
numbers should be made the rule of representation, the Atlantic States
will be subjected to the Western. He moved that the first proposition in
the report be postponed in order to take up the following viz "that the
suffrages of the several States be regulated and proportioned according
to the sums to be paid towards the general revenue by the inhabitants of
each State respectively: that an apportionment of suffrages, according
to the ratio aforesaid shall be made and regulated at the end of ----
years from the 1^{st} meeting of the Legislature of the U. S., and at
the end of every ---- years but that for the present, and until the
period above mentioned, the suffrages shall be for N. Hampshire ---- for
Massach^{ts} ---- &c.
Col. Mason said the case of new States was not unnoticed in the
Committee; but it was thought and he was himself decidedly of opinion
that if they made a part of the Union, they ought to be subject to no
unfavorable discriminations. Obvious considerations required it.
M^r Randolph concurred with Col. Mason.
On Question on M^r Rutlidges motion,
Mas^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.
Mary^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. not on floor.
FRIDAY JULY 6^{TH} IN CONVENTION
M^r Gov^r Morris moved to commit so much of the Report as relates to "1
member for every 40,000 inhabitants." His view was that they might
absolutely fix the number for each State in the first instance; leaving
the Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in the relative
importance of the States, and for the case of new States.
M^r Wilson 2^{ded} the motion; but with a view of leaving the Committee
under no implied shackles.
M^r Ghorum apprehended great inconveniency from fixing directly the
number of Representatives to be allowed to each State. He thought the
number of Inhabitants the true guide; tho' perhaps some departure might
be expedient from the full proportion. The States also would vary in
their relative extent by separations of parts of the largest States. A
part of Virg^a is now on the point of a separation. In the province of
Mayne a Convention is at this time deliberating on a separation from
Mas^{ts}. In such events the number of representatives ought certainly
to be reduced. He hoped to see all the States made small by proper
divisions, instead of their becoming formidable as was apprehended, to
the Small States. He conceived that let the Gen^l Government be modified
as it might, there would be a constant tendency in the State
Governm^{ts} to encroach upon it: it was of importance therefore that
the extent of the States sh^d be reduced as much & as fast as possible.
The stronger the Gov^t shall be made in the first instance the more
easily will these divisions be effected; as it will be of less
consequence in the opinion of the States whether they be of great or
small extent.
M^r Gerry did not think with his Colleague that the large States ought
to be cut up. This policy has been inculcated by the middling and
smaller States, ungenerously & contrary to the spirit of the
Confederation. Ambitious men will be apt to solicit needless divisions,
till the States be reduced to the size of Counties. If this policy
should still actuate the small States, the large ones cou'd not
confederate safely with them; but would be obliged to consult their
safety by confederating only with one another. He favored the commitment
and thought that Representation ought to be in the Combined ratio of
numbers of Inhabitants and of wealth, and not of either singly.
M^r King wished the clause to be committed, chiefly in order to detach
it from the Report with which it had no connection. He thought also that
the Ratio of Representation proposed could not be safely fixed, since in
a century & a half our computed increase of population would carry the
number of representatives to an enormous excess; that y^e number of
inhabitants was not the proper index of ability & wealth; that property
was the primary object of Society; and that in fixing a ratio this ought
not to be excluded from the estimate.--With regard to new States, he
observed that there was something peculiar in the business which had not
been noticed. The U. S. were now admitted to be proprietors of the
Country N. West of the Ohio. Cong^s by one of their ordinances have
impoliticly laid it out into ten States, and have made it a fundamental
article of compact with those who may become settlers, that as soon as
the number in any one state shall equal that of the smallest of the 13
original States, it may claim admission into the Union. Delaware does
not contain it is computed more than 35,000 souls, and for obvious
reasons will not increase much for a considerable time. It is possible
then that if this plan be persisted in by Cong^s 10 new votes may be
added, without a greater addition of inhabitants than are represented by
the single vote of Pen^a. The plan as it respects one of the new States
is already irrevocable, the sale of the lands having commenced, and the
purchasers & settlers will immediately become entitled to all the
privileges of the compact.
M^r Butler agreed to the Commitment if the Committee were to be left at
liberty. He was persuaded that the more the subject was examined, the
less it would appear that the number of inhabitants would be a proper
rule of proportion. If there were no other objection the changeableness
of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred with those who thought
some balance was necessary between the old & the new States. He
contended strenuously that property was the only just measure of
representation. This was the great object of Govern^t; the great cause
of war; the great means of carrying it on.
M^r Pinkney saw no good reason for committing. The value of land had
been found on full investigation to be an impracticable rule. The
contributions of revenue including imports & exports must be too
changeable in their amount; too difficult to be adjusted; and too
injurious to the non-commercial States. The number of inhabitants
appeared to him the only just & practicable rule. He thought the blacks
ought to stand on an equality with the whites: But w^d agree to the
ratio settled by Cong^s. He contended that Cong^s had no right under the
articles of Confederation to authorize the admission of new States; no
such case having been provided for.
M^r Davy was for committing the clause in order to get at the merits of
the question arising on the Report. He seemed to think that wealth or
property ought to be represented in the 2^d branch; and numbers in the
1^{st} branch.
On the Motion for committing as made by M^r Gov^r Morris,
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The members app^d by Ballot were M^r Gov^r Morris, M^r Gorham, M^r
Randolph, M^r Rutlidge, M^r King.
M^r Wilson signified that his view in agreeing to the co[~m]itm^t was
that the Com^e might consider the propriety of adopting a scale similar
to that established by the Constitution of Mass^{ts} which w^d give an
advantage to y^e small States without substantially departing from the
rule of proportion.
M^r Wilson & M^r Mason moved to postpone the clause relating to money
bills in order to take up the clause relating to an equality of votes in
the Second branch.
On the question Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
The clause relating to equality of votes being under consideration,
Doc^r Franklin observed that this question could not be properly put by
itself, the Co[~m]ittee having reported several propositions as mutual
conditions of each other. He could not vote for it if separately taken,
but should vote for the whole together.
Col. Mason perceived the difficulty & suggested a reference of the rest
of the Report to y^e Committee just appointed, that the whole might be
brought into one view.
M^r Randolph disliked y^e reference to that Committee, as it consisted
of members from States opposed to the wishes of the smaller States, and
could not therefore be acceptable to the latter.
M^r Martin & M^r Jenifer moved to postpone the clause till the Com^e
last appointed sh^d report.
M^r Madison observed that if the uncommitted part of the Report was
connected with the part just committed, it ought also to be committed;
if not connected, it need not be postponed till report should be made.
On the question for postponing, moved by M^r Martin & M^r
Jenifer,--Con^t N. J. Del. M^d V^a Geo. ay. P^a N. C. S. C. no.
Mass. N. Y. divided.
The 1^{st} clause relating to the originating of money bills was then
resumed.
M^r Govern^r Morris was opposed to a restriction of this right in either
branch, considered merely in itself and as unconnected with the point of
representation in the 2^d branch. It will disable the 2^d branch from
proposing its own money plans, and giving the people an opportunity of
judging by comparison of the merits of those proposed by the 1^{st}
branch.
M^r Wilson could see nothing like a concession here on the part of the
smaller States. If both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little
consequence which should say yes or no first, which last. If either was
indiscriminately to have the right of originating, the reverse of the
Report, would he thought be most proper; since it was a maxim that the
least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation; the most numerous
for decision. He observed that this discrimination had been transcribed
from the British into several American constitutions. But he was
persuaded that on examination of the American experiments it would be
found to be a trifle light as air. Nor could he ever discover the
advantage of it in the Parliamentary history of G. Britain. He hoped if
there was any advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed out.
M^r Williamson thought that if the privilege were not common to both
branches it ought rather to be confined to the 2^d as the bills in that
case would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated with the
branch having most of the popular confidence.
M^r Mason. The consideration which weighed with the Committee was that
the 1^{st} branch would be the immediate representatives of the people,
the 2^d would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the
people's money, they might soon forget the source from whence they
received it. We might soon have an aristocracy. He had been much
concerned at the principles which had been advanced by some gentlemen,
but had the satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was
a friend to proportional representation in both branches; but supposed
that some points must be yielded for the sake of accomodation.
M^r Wilson. If he had proposed that the 2^d branch should have an
independent disposal of public money, the observations of (Col. Mason)
would have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther from
what he had said. His question was how is the power of the 1^{st} branch
increased or that of the 2^d diminished by giving the proposed privilege
to the former? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins, if
both must concur, in the end?
M^r Gerry would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the
part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in the light of
a concession. It w^d make it a constitutional principle that the 2^d
branch were not possessed of the Confidence of the people in money
matters, which w^d lessen their weight & influence. In the next place if
the 2^d branch were dispossessed of the privilege, they w^d be deprived
of the opportunity which their continuance in office 3 times as long as
the 1^{st} branch would give them of making three successive essays in
favor of a particular point.
M^r Pinkney thought it evident that the Concession was wholly on one
side, that of the large States, the privilege of originating money bills
being of no account.
M^r Gov^r Morris had waited to hear the good effects of the restriction.
As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there
never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy.
His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief. The
restriction if it has any real operation, will deprive us of the
services of the 2^d branch in digesting & proposing money bills of which
it will be more capable than the 1^{st} branch. It will take away the
responsibility of the 2^d branch, the great security for good behavior.
It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious money bill that it was
disliked, but could not be constitutionally amended; nor safely
rejected. It will be a dangerous source of disputes between the two
Houses. We should either take the British Constitution altogether or
make one for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two Houses as
the only cure for such disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply
such a remedy? Every law directly or indirectly takes money out of the
pockets of the people. Again What use may be made of such a privilege in
case of great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door, and money
instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling him, may not the popular
branch avail itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the
Senate destructive of the Constitution itself. He illustrated this
danger by the example of the Long Parliament's exped^{ts} for subverting
the H. of Lords; concluding on the whole that the restriction would be
either useless or pernicious.
Doc^r Franklin did not mean to go into a justification of the Report,
but as it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the 2^d
branch from medling with money bills, he could not but remark that it
was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of
their money, & how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that those
who feel, can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained,
if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of
the people. This was his inducement to concur in the report. As to the
danger or difficulty that might arise from a Negative in the 2^d where
the people w^d not be proportionately represented, it might easily be
got over by declaring that there should be no such negative; or if that
will not do, by declaring that there shall be no such branch at all.
M^r Martin said that it was understood in the Committee that the
difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be guarded
ag^{st} in the detailing of the plan.
M^r Wilson. The difficulties & disputes will increase with the attempts
to define & obviate them. Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her
Parliam^t in order to terminate one of these obstinate disputes between
the two Houses. Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one
can say what the result would have been. The point is still sub judice
in England. He approved of the principles laid down by the Honble
President (Doct^r Franklin) his Colleague, as to the expediency of
keeping the people informed of their money affairs. But thought they
would know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way as in the
other.
Gen^l Pinkney was astonished that this point should have been considered
as a concession. He remarked that the restriction to money bills had
been rejected on the merits singly considered, by 8 States ag^{st} 3.
and that the very States which now called it a concession, were then
ag^{st} it as nugatory or improper in itself.
On the Question whether the clause relating to money bills in the Report
of the Com^e consisting of a member from each State, sh^d stand as part
of the Report
Mass^{ts} divid^d Con^t ay. N. Y. div^d. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. div^d
A Question was then raised whether the question was carried in the
affirmative; there being but 5 ays out of 11. States present. The words
of the rule are (see May 28).
On this question: Mas. Con^t N. J. P^a Del. M^d N. C. S. C. Geo.
ay. N. Y. V^a no
(In several preceding instances like votes had sub silentio been entered
as decided in the affirmative.)
Adjourned
SATURDAY, JULY 7. IN CONVENTION.
"Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in the 2^d branch, stand
as part of the Report,"? being taken up--
M^r Gerry. This is the critical question. He had rather agree to it than
have no accommodation. A Govern^t short of a proper national plan, if
generally acceptable, would be preferable to a proper one which if it
could be carried at all, would operate on discontented States. He
thought it would be best to suspend the question till the Comm^e
yesterday appointed, should make report.
M^r Sherman Supposed that it was the wish of every one that some Gen^l
Gov^t should be established. An equal vote in the 2^d branch would, he
thought, be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The small States
have more vigor in their Gov^{ts} than the large ones, the more
influence therefore the large ones have, the weaker will be the Gov^t.
In the large States it will be most difficult to collect the real & fair
sense of the people. Fallacy & undue influence will be practised with
most success; and improper men will most easily get into office. If they
vote by States in the 2^d branch, and each State has an equal vote,
there must be always a majority of States as well as a majority of the
people on the side of public measures, & the Gov^t will have decision
and efficacy. If this be not the case in the 2^d branch there may be a
majority of States ag^{st} public measures, and the difficulty of
compelling them to abide by the public determination, will render the
Government feebler than it has ever yet been.
M^r Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating temper, but firmness was
sometimes a duty of higher obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied
in this instance. It was pursued here rather among the Representatives,
than among the Constituents; and it w^d be of little consequence if not
established among the latter; and there could be little hope of its
being established among them if the foundation should not be laid in
justice and right.
On Question shall the words stand as part of the Report?
Mass^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J, ay. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. div^d
(Note. several votes were given here in the affirmative or were div^d
because another final question was to be taken on the whole report.)
M^r Gerry[127] thought it would be proper to proceed to enumerate &
define the powers to be vested in the Gen^l Gov^t before a question on
the report should be taken as to the rule of representation in the 2^d
branch.
[127] King gives the three speeches of Gerry, Madison and
Patterson as follows:
"_Gerry._ I agree to the measure, provided that the first
Br. (H. of Reps.) shall originate money bills and money
appropriations. The prejudices as well as the interest of
our Constituents must be regarded--two or three thousand men
are in office in the States--their influence will be in
favor of an Equality of votes among the States.
"_Madison._ Equality in the Senate will enable a minority to
hold a majority, and to oblige them to submit to their
interests, or they will withdraw their assent to measures
essential and necessary to the general Good. I have known
one man, when the State was represented by only two, and
they were divided, oppose six States in Congress on an
important occasion for three days, and finally compel them
to gratify his caprice in order to obtain his suffrage. The
Senate will possess certain exclusive Powers, such as the
appointments to office, if the States have equal votes; a
minority of People will appoint the Great Offices. Besides
the small States may be near the Seat of Govt.--a bare
Quorum of the H. of R. may be easily assembled, and carry a
bill against the sense of a majority if all were present,
and the Senate, tho' all were present, might confirm such
Bill. Virginia has objected to every addition of the powers
of Congress, because she has only 1/13 of the Power when she
ought to have one sixth.
"_Paterson._ I hope the question will be taken: if we do not
give equal votes in the Senate to the States, the small
States agreeing that money Bills and appropriations shall
originate in the H. of Reps., elected according to numbers,
it must not be expected that the small States will agree to
the amendments of the Confederation. Let us decide this
question and lose no more time. I think that I shall vote
against the provision, because I think that the exclusive
originating of money Bills & appropriations by the H. of
Reps. is giving up too much on the part of the small
States."--King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_,
I., 613.
M^r Madison, observed that it w^d be impossible to say what powers could
be safely & properly vested in the Gov^t before it was known, in what
manner the States were to be represented in it. He was apprehensive that
if a just representation were not the basis of the Gov^t it would
happen, as it did when the Articles of Confederation were depending,
that every effectual prerogative would be withdrawn or withheld, and the
New Gov^t w^d be rendered as impotent and as shortlived as the old.
M^r Patterson would not decide whether the privilege concerning money
bills were a valuable consideration or not: But he considered the mode &
rule of representation in the 1^{st} branch as fully so; and that after
the establishment of that point, the small States would never be able to
defend themselves without an equality of votes in the 2^d branch. There
was no other ground of accommodation. His resolution was fixt. He would
meet the large States on that ground and no other. For himself he should
vote ag^{st} the Report, because it yielded too much.
M^r Gov^r Morris. He had no resolution unalterably fixed except to do
what should finally appear to him right. He was ag^{st} the Report
because it maintained the improper constitution of the 2^d branch. It
made it another Congress, a mere whisp of straw. It had been s^d (by M^r
Gerry) that the new Govern^t would be partly national, partly federal;
that it ought in the first quality to protect individuals; in the
second, the States. But in what quality was it to protect the aggregate
interest of the whole. Among the many provisions which had been urged,
he had seen none for supporting the dignity and splendor of the American
Empire. It had been one of our greatest misfortunes that the great
objects of the nation had been sacrificed constantly to local views; in
like manner as the general interests of States had been sacrificed to
those of the Counties. What is to be the check in the Senate? none;
unless it be to keep the majority of the people from injuring particular
States. But particular States ought to be injured for the sake of a
majority of the people, in case their conduct should deserve it. Suppose
they should insist on claims evidently unjust, and pursue them in a
manner detrimental to the whole body. Suppose they should give
themselves up to foreign influence. Ought they to be protected in such
cases. They were originally nothing more than colonial corporations. On
the declaration of Independence, a Governm^t was to be formed. The small
States aware of the necessity of preventing anarchy, and taking
advantage of the moment, extorted from the large ones an equality of
votes. Standing now on that ground, they demand under the new system
greater rights as men, than their fellow Citizens of the large States.
The proper answer to them is that the same necessity of which they
formerly took advantage, does not now exist, and that the large States
are at liberty now to consider what is right, rather than what may be
expedient. We must have an efficient Gov^t and if there be an efficiency
in the local Gov^{ts} the former is impossible. Germany alone proves it.
Notwithstanding their common diet, notwithstanding the great
prerogatives of the Emperor as head of the Empire, and his vast
resources, as sovereign of his particular dominions, no union is
maintained; foreign influence disturbs every internal operation, & there
is no energy whatever in the General Governm^t. Whence does this
proceed? From the energy of the local authorities; from its being
considered of more consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, than the
Happiness of the people of Germany. Do Gentlemen wish this to be y^e
case here. Good God, Sir, is it possible they can so delude themselves.
What if all the Charters & Constitutions of the States were thrown into
the fire, and all their demagogues into the Ocean. What would it be to
the happiness of America. And will not this be the case here if we
pursue the train in w^{ch} the business lies. We shall establish an
Aulic Council without an Emperor to execute its decrees. The same
circumstances which unite the people here, unite them in Germany. They
have there a common language, a common law, common usages and manners,
and a common interest in being united; Yet their local jurisdictions
destroy every tie. The case was the same in the Grecian States. The
United Netherlands are at this time torn in factions. With these
examples before our eyes shall we form establishments which must
necessarily produce the same effects. It is of no consequence from what
districts the 2^d branch shall be drawn, if it be so constituted as to
yield an asylum ag^{st} these evils. As it is now constituted he must be
ag^{st} its being drawn from the States in equal portions. But still he
was ready to join in devising such an amendment of the plan, as will be
most likely to secure our liberty & happiness.
M^r Sherman & M^r Elseworth moved to postpone the Question on the Report
from the Committee of a member from each State, in order to wait for the
Report from the Com^e of 5 last appointed.
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
Maryland ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Adj^d.
MONDAY JULY 9^{TH} IN CONVENTION.
M^r Daniel Carroll, from Maryland took his seat.
M^r Gov^r Morris delivered a report from the Com^e of 5 members to whom
was committed the clause in the Report of the Com^e consisting of a
member from each State, stating the proper ratio of Representatives in
the 1^{st} branch, to be as 1 to every 40,000 inhabitants, as follows
viz
"The Committee to whom was referred the 1^{st} clause of the 1^{st}
proposition reported from the grand Committee, beg leave to report:
I. that in the 1^{st} meeting of the Legislature the 1^{st} branch
thereof consist of 56. members of which Number N. Hampshire shall have
2, Mass^{ts} 7, R. I^d 1, Con^t 4, N. Y. 5, N. J. 3, P^a 8, Del. 1, M^d
4, V^a 9, N. C. 5, S. C. 5, Geo. 2.
II. But as the present situation of the States may probably alter as
well in point of wealth as in the number of their inhabitants, that the
Legislature be authorized from time to time to augment y^e number of
Representatives. And in case any of the States shall hereafter be
divided, or any two or more States united, or any new States created
within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall possess
authority to regulate the number of Representatives in any of the
foregoing cases, upon the principles of their wealth and number of
inhabitants."
M^r Sherman wished to know on what principles or calculations the Report
was founded. It did not appear to correspond with any rule of numbers,
or of any requisition hitherto adopted by Cong^s
M^r Gorham. Some provision of this sort was necessary in the outset. The
number of blacks & whites with some regard to supposed wealth was the
general guide. Fractions could not be observed. The Legisl^{re} is to
make alterations from time to time as justice & propriety may require.
Two objections prevailed ag^{st} the rate of 1 member for every 40,000
inh^{ts}. The 1^{st} was that the Representation would soon be too
numerous: the 2^d that the West^n States who may have a different
interest, might if admitted on that principle by degrees, outvote the
Atlantic. Both these objections are removed. The number will be small in
the first instance and may be continued so. And the Atlantic States
having y^e Gov^t in their own hands, may take care of their own
interest, by dealing out the right of Representation in safe proportions
to the Western States. These were the views of the Committee.
M^r L. Martin wished to know whether the Com^e were guided in the ratio,
by the wealth or number of inhabitants, of the States, or by both;
noting its variations from former apportionments by Cong^s
M^r Gov^r Morris & M^r Rutlidge moved to postpone the 1^{st} paragraph
relating to the number of members to be allowed each State in the first
instance, and to take up the 2^d paragraph authorizing the Legisl^{re}
to alter the number from time to time according to wealth & inhabitants.
The motion was agreed to nem. con.
On Question on the 2^d parag^h taken without any debate
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Sherman moved to refer the 1^{st} part apportioning the
Representatives, to a Comm^e of a member from each State.
M^r Gov^r Morris seconded the motion; observing that this was the only
case in which such committees were useful.
M^r Williamson thought it would be necessary to return to the rule of
numbers, but that the Western States stood on different footing. If
their property shall be rated as high as that of the Atlantic States,
then their representation ought to hold a like proportion. Otherwise if
their property was not to be equally rated.
M^r Gov^r Morris. The Report is little more than a guess. Wealth was not
altogether disregarded by the Com^e. Where it was apparently in favor of
one State, whose n^{os} were superior to the numbers of another, by a
fraction only, a member extraordinary was allowed to the former: and so
vice versa. The Committee meant little more than to bring the matter to
a point for the consideration of the House.
M^r Reed asked why Georgia was allowed 2 members, when her number of
inhabitants had stood below that of Delaware.
M^r Gov^r Morris. Such is the rapidity of the population of that State,
that before the plan takes effect, it will probably be entitled to 2
Representatives.
M^r Randolph, disliked the Report of the Com^e but had been unwilling to
object to it. He was apprehensive that as the number was not be changed,
till the Nat^l Legislature should please, a pretext would never be
wanting to postpone alterations, and keep the power in the hands of
those possessed of it. He was in favor of the Commitm^t to a member from
each State.
M^r Patterson considered the proposed estimate for the future according
to the combined rules of numbers and wealth, as too vague. For this
reason N. Jersey was ag^{st} it. He could regard negroes slaves in no
light but as property. They are no free agents, have no personal
liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the contrary are
themselves property, & like other property entirely at the will of the
Master. Has a man in Virg^a a number of votes in proportion to the
number of his slaves? And if negroes are not represented in the States
to which they belong, why should they be represented in the Gen^l Gov^t.
What is the true principle of Representation? It is an expedient by
which an assembly of certain individ^{ls} chosen by the people is
substituted in place of the inconvenient meeting of the people
themselves. If such a meeting of the people was actually to take place,
would the slaves vote? They would not. Why then sh^d they be
represented. He was also ag^{st} such an indirect encouragem^t of the
slave trade; observing that Cong^s in their act relating to the change
of the 8 art: of Confed^n had been ashamed to use the term "slaves" &
had substituted a description.
M^r Madison reminded M^r Patterson that his doctrine of Representation
which was in its principle the genuine one, must forever silence the
pretensions of the small States to an equality of votes with the large
ones. They ought to vote in the same proportion in which their Citizens
would do, if the people of all the States were collectively met. He
suggested as a proper ground of compromise, that in the first branch the
States should be represented according to their number of free
inhabitants; And in the 2^d which had for one of its primary objects the
guardianship of property, according to the whole number, including
slaves.
M^r Butler urged warmly the justice & necessity of regarding wealth in
the apportionment of Representation.
M^r King had always expected that as the Southern States are the
richest, they would not league themselves with the North^n unless some
respect were paid to their superior wealth. If the latter expect those
preferential distinctions in Commerce, & other advantages which they
will derive from the connexion they must not expect to receive them
without allowing some advantages in return. Eleven out of 13 of the
States had agreed to consider Slaves in the apportionment of taxation;
and taxation and Representation ought to go together.
On the question for committing the first paragraph of the Report to a
member from each State
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The Com^e appointed were M^r King, M^r Sherman, M^r Yates, M^r Brearly,
M^r Gov^r Morris, M^r Reed, M^r Carrol, M^r Madison, M^r Williamson, M^r
Rutlidge, M^r Houston.
Adj^d.
TUESDAY JULY 10. IN CONVENTION.
M^r King reported from the Com^e yesterday appointed that the States at
the 1^{st} meeting of the General Legislature, should be represented by
65 members, in the following proportions, to wit N. Hampshire by 3,
Mass^{ts} 8, R. Is^d 1, Con^t 5, N. Y. 6, N. J. 4, P^a 8, Del. 1, M^d 6,
V^a 10, N. C. 5, S. C. 5, Georgia 3.
M^r Rutlidge moved that N. Hampshire be reduced from 3 to 2. members.
Her numbers did not entitle her to 3 and it was a poor State.
Gen^l Pinkney seconds the motion.
M^r King. N. Hampshire has probably more than 120,000 Inhab^{ts} and has
an extensive Country of tolerable fertility. Its inhab^{ts} therefore
may be expected to increase fast. He remarked that the four Eastern
States, having 800,000 souls, have 1/3 fewer representatives than the
four Southern States, having not more than 700,000 souls, rating the
blacks as 5 for 3. The Eastern people will advert to these
circumstances, and be dissatisfied. He believed them to be very desirous
of uniting with their Southern brethren, but did not think it prudent to
rely so far on that disposition as to subject them to any gross
inequality. He was fully convinced that the question concerning a
difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been
discussed, between the great & small States; but between the Southern &
Eastern. For this reason he had been ready to yield something in the
proportion of representatives for the security of the Southern. No
principle would justify the giving them a majority. They were brought as
near an equality as was possible. He was not averse to giving them a
still greater security, but did not see how it could be done.
Gen^l Pinkney. The Report before it was committed was more favorable to
the S. States than as it now stands. If they are to form so considerable
a minority, and the regulation of trade is to be given to the Gen^l
Government, they will be nothing more than overseers for the Northern
States. He did not expect the S. States to be raised to a majority of
representatives, but wished them to have something like an equality. At
present by the alterations of the Com^e in favor of the N. States they
are removed farther from it than they were before. One member indeed had
been added to Virg^a which he was glad of as he considered her as a
Southern State. He was glad also that the members of Georgia were
increased.
M^r Williamson was not for reducing N. Hampshire from 3 to 2, but for
reducing some others. The South^n Interest must be extremely endangered
by the present arrangement. The North^n States are to have a majority in
the first instance and the means of perpetuating it.
M^r Dayton observed that the line between North^n & Southern interest
had been improperly drawn; that P^a was the dividing State, there being
six on each side of her.
Gen^l Pinkney urged the reduction, dwelt on the superior wealth of the
Southern States, and insisted on its having its due weight in the
Government.
M^r Gov^r Morris regretted the turn of the debate. The States he found
had many Representatives on the floor. Few he fears were to be deemed
the Representatives of America. He thought the Southern States have by
the report more than their share of representation. Property ought to
have its weight, but not all the weight. If the South^n States are to
supply money. The North^n States are to spill their blood. Besides, the
probable Revenue to be expected from the S. States has been greatly
overrated. He was ag^{st} reducing N. Hampshire.
M^r Randolph was opposed to a reduction of N. Hampshire, not because she
had a full title to three members; but because it was in his
contemplation 1. to make it the duty instead of leaving it in the
discretion of the Legislature to regulate the representation by a
periodical census. 2. to require more than a bare majority of votes in
the Legislature in certain cases & particularly in commercial cases.
On the question for reducing N. Hampshire from 3 to 2 Represent^s it
passed in the negative
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.[128]
[128] In printed Journal. N. C. no. Geo. ay. Note in Madison's
hand.
Gen^l Pinkney and M^r Alex^r Martin moved that 6 Rep^s instead of 5 be
allowed to N. Carolina.
On the Question, it passed in the negative
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Gen^l Pinkney & M^r Butler made the same motion in favor of S. Carolina
On the Question it passed in the negative
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Gen^l Pinckney & M^r Houston moved that Georgia be allowed 4 instead of
3 Rep^s urging the unexampled celerity of its population. On the
Question, it passed in the Negative
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Madison, moved that the number allowed to each State be doubled. A
_majority_ of a _Quorum_ of _65_ members, was too small a number to
represent the whole inhabitants of the U. States; They would not possess
enough of the confidence of the people, and w^d be too sparsely taken
from the people, to bring with them all the local information which
would be frequently wanted. Double the number will not be too great,
even with the future additions from New States. The additional expence
was too inconsiderable to be regarded in so important a case. And as far
as the augmentation might be unpopular on that score, the objection was
overbalanced by its effect on the hopes of a greater number of the
popular candidates.
M^r Elseworth urged the objection of expence, & that the greater the
number, the more slowly would the business proceed; and the less
probably be decided as it ought, at last. He thought the number of
Representatives too great in most of the State Legislatures; and that a
large number was less necessary in the Gen^l Legislature than in those
of the States, as its business would relate to a few great national
Objects only.
M^r Sherman would have preferred 50 to 65. The great distance they will
have to travel will render their attendance precarious and will make it
difficult to prevail on a sufficient number of fit men to undertake the
service. He observed that the expected increase from new States also
deserved consideration.
M^r Gerry was for increasing the number beyond 65. The larger the
number, the less the danger of their being corrupted. The people are
accustomed to & fond of a numerous representation, and will consider
their rights as better secured by it. The danger of excess in the number
may be guarded ag^{st} by fixing a point within which the number shall
always be kept.
Col. Mason admitted that the objection drawn from the consideration of
expence, had weight both in itself, and as the people might be affected
by it. But he thought it outweighed by the objections ag^{st} the
smallness of the number. 38, will he supposes, as being a majority of
65. form a quorum. 20 will be a majority of 38. This was certainly too
small a number to make laws for America. They would neither bring with
them all the necessary information relative to various local interests,
nor possess the necessary confidence of the people. After doubling the
number, the laws might still be made by so few as almost to be
objectionable on that account.
M^r Read was in favor of the Motion. Two of the States (Del. & R. I.)
would have but a single member if the aggregate number should remain at
65. and in case of accident to either of these one State w^d have no
representative present to give explanations or informations of its
interests or wishes. The people would not place their confidence in so
small a number. He hoped the objects of the Gen^l Gov^t would be much
more numerous than seemed to be expected by some gentlemen, and that
they would become more & more so. As to New States the highest number of
Rep^s for the whole might be limited, and all danger of excess thereby
prevented.
M^r Rutlidge opposed the motion. The Representatives were too numerous
in all the States. The full number allotted to the States may be
expected to attend, & the lowest possible quorum sh^d not therefore be
considered. The interests of their Constituents will urge their
attendance too strongly for it to be omitted: and he supposed the Gen^l
Legislature would not sit more than 6 or 8 weeks in the year.
On the Question for doubling the number, it passed in the negative
Mas^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for agreeing to the apportionment of Rep^s as amended by
the last committee, it passed in the affirmative
Mas. ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay.
V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Broom gave notice to the House that he had concurred with a reserve
to himself of an intention to claim for his State an equal voice in the
2^d branch; which he thought could not be denied after this concession
of the small States as to the first branch.
M^r Randolph moved as an amendment to the report of the Comm^e of five
"that in order to ascertain the alterations in the population & wealth
of the several States the Legislature should be required to cause a
census, and estimate to be taken within one year after its first
meeting; and every ---- years thereafter, and that the Legisl^{re}
arrange the Representation accordingly."
M^r Gov^r Morris opposed it as fettering the Legislature too much.
Advantage may be taken of it in time of war or the apprehension of it,
by new States to extort particular favors. If the mode was to be fixed
for taking a Census, it might certainly be extremely inconvenient: if
unfixt the Legislature may use such a mode as will defeat the object:
and perpetuate the inequality. He was always ag^{st} such shackles on
the Legisl^{re}. They had been found very pernicious in most of the
State Constitutions. He dwelt much on the danger of throwing such a
preponderancy into the Western Scale, suggesting that in time the
Western people w^d outnumber the Atlantic States. He wished therefore to
put it in the power of the latter to keep a majority of votes in their
own hands. It was objected he said that if the Legisl^{re} are left at
liberty, they will never readjust the Representation. He admitted that
this was possible; but he did not think it probable unless the reasons
ag^{st} a revision of it were very urgent & in this case, it ought not
to be done.
It was moved to postpone the proposition of M^r Randolph in order to
take up the following, viz. "that the Committee of Eleven, to whom was
referred the report of the Committee of five on the subject of
Representation, be requested to furnish the Convention with the
principles on which they grounded the Report," which was disagreed to;
S. C. alone voting in the affirmative.
Adjourned
WEDNESDAY JULY 11. IN CONVENTION.
M^r Randolph's motion requiring the Legisl^{re} to take a periodical
census for the purpose of redressing inequalities in the Representation
was resumed.
M^r Sherman was ag^{st}. Shackling the Legislature too much. We ought to
choose wise & good men, and then confide in them.
M^r Mason. The greater the difficulty we find in fixing a proper rule of
Representation, the more unwilling ought we to be, to throw the task
from ourselves on the Gen^l Legisl^{re}. He did not object to the
conjectural ratio which was to prevail in the outset; but considered a
Revision from time to time according to some permanent & precise
standard as essential to y^e fair representation required in the 1^{st}
branch. According to the present population of America, the North^n part
of it had a right to preponderate, and he could not deny it. But he
wished it not to preponderate hereafter when the reason no longer
continued. From the nature of man we may be sure that those who have
power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it. On
the contrary we know that they will always when they can rather increase
it. If the S. States therefore should have 3/4 of the people of America
within their limits, the Northern will hold fast the majority of
Representatives. 1/4 will govern the 3/4. The S. States will complain;
but they may complain from generation to generation without redress.
Unless some principle therefore which will do justice to them hereafter
shall be inserted in the Constitution, disagreable as the declaration
was to him, he must declare he could neither vote for the system here,
nor support it, in his State. Strong objections had been drawn from the
danger to the Atlantic interests from new Western States. Ought we to
sacrifice what we know to be right in itself, lest it should prove
favorable to States which are not yet in existence. If the Western
States are to be admitted into the Union, as they arise, they must, he
w^d repeat, be treated as equals, and subjected to no degrading
discriminations. They will have the same pride & other passions which we
have and will either not unite with or will speedily revolt from the
Union, if they are not in all respects placed on an equal footing with
their brethren. It has been said they will be poor, and unable to make
equal contributions to the general Treasury. He did not know but that in
time they would be both more numerous & more wealthy than their Atlantic
brethren. The extent & fertility of their soil, made this probable; and
though Spain might for a time deprive them of the natural outlet for
their productions, yet she will, because she must, finally yield to
their demands. He urged that numbers of inhabitants; though not always a
precise standard of wealth was sufficiently so for every substantial
purpose.
M^r Williamson was for making it a duty of the Legislature to do what
was right & not leaving it at liberty to do or not to do it. He moved
that M^r Randolph's propositions be postpon^d in order to consider the
following "that in order to ascertain the alterations that may happen in
the population & wealth of the several States, a census shall be taken
of the free white inhabitants and 3/5^{ths} of those of other
descriptions on the 1^{st} year after this Government shall have been
adopted and every ---- year thereafter; and that the Representation be
regulated accordingly."
M^r Randolph agreed that M^r Williamson's proposition should stand in
the place of his. He observed that the ratio fixt for the 1^{st} meeting
was a mere conjecture, that it placed the power in the hands of that
part of America, which could not always be entitled to it, that this
power would not be voluntarily renounced; and that it was consequently
the duty of the Convention to secure its renunciation when justice might
so require; by some constitutional provisions. If equality between great
& small States be inadmissible, because in that case unequal numbers of
Constituents w^d be represented by equal number of votes; was it not
equally inadmissible that a larger & more populous district of America
should hereafter have less representation, than a smaller & less
populous district. If a fair representation of the people be not
secured, the injustice of the Gov^t will shake it to its foundations.
What relates to suffrage is justly stated by the celebrated Montesquieu,
as a fundamental article in Republican Gov^t. If the danger suggested by
M^r Gov^r Morris be real, of advantage being taken of the Legislature in
pressing moments, it was an additional reason, for tying their hands in
such a manner that they could not sacrifice their trust to momentary
considerations. Cong^s have pledged the public faith to New States, that
they shall be admitted on equal terms. They never would or ought to
accede on any other. The census must be taken under the direction of the
General Legislature. The States will be too much interested to take an
impartial one for themselves.
M^r Butler & Gen^l Pinkney insisted that blacks be included in the rule
of Representation _equally_ with the whites; and for that purpose moved
that the words "three-fifths" be struck out.
M^r Gerry thought that 3/5 of them was to say the least the full
proportion that could be admitted.
M^r Ghorum. This ratio was fixed by Cong^s as a rule of taxation. Then
it was urged by the Delegates representing the States having slaves that
the blacks were still more inferior to freemen. At present when the
ratio of representation is to be established, we are assured that they
are equal to freemen. The arguments on y^e former occasion convinced him
that 3/5 was pretty near the just proportion and he should vote
according to the same opinion now.
M^r Butler insisted that the labour of a slave in S. Carol^a was as
productive & valuable as that of a freeman in Mass^{ts}, that as wealth
was the great means of defence and utility to the Nation they were
equally valuable to it with freemen; and that consequently an equal
representation ought to be allowed for them in a Government which was
instituted principally for the protection of property, and was itself to
be supported by property.
M^r Mason could not agree to the motion, notwithstanding it was
favorable to Virg^a because he thought it unjust. It was certain that
the slaves were valuable, as they raised the value of land, increased
the exports & imports, and of course the revenue, would supply the means
of feeding & supporting an army, and might in cases of emergency become
themselves soldiers. As in these important respects they were useful to
the Community at large, they ought not to be excluded from the estimate
of Representation. He could not however regard them as equal to freemen
and could not vote for them as such. He added as worthy of remark, that
the Southern States have this peculiar species of property over & above
the other species of property common to all the States.
M^r Williamson reminded M^r Ghorum that if the South^n States contended
for the inferiority of blacks to whites when taxation was in view, the
Eastern States on the same occasion contended for their equality. He did
not however either then or now concur in either extreme, but approved of
the ratio of 3/5.
On M^r Butler's motion for considering blacks as equal to Whites in the
apportionm^t of Representation
Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. (N. Y. not on floor). N. J. no. P^a no.
Del. ay. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Gov^r Morris said he had several objections to the proposition of
M^r Williamson. 1. It fettered the Legislature too much. 2. it would
exclude some States altogether who would not have a sufficient number to
entitle them to a single Representative. 3. it will not consist with the
Resolution passed on Saturday last authorizing the Legislature to adjust
the Representation from time to time on the principles of population &
wealth or with the principles of equity. If slaves were to be considered
as inhabitants, not as wealth then the s^d Resolution would not be
pursued. If as wealth, then why is no other wealth but slaves included?
These objections may perhaps be removed by amendments. His great
objection was that the number of inhabitants was not a proper standard
of wealth. The amazing difference between the comparative numbers &
wealth of different countries, rendered all reasoning superfluous on the
subject. Numbers might with greater propriety be deemed a measure of
strength, than of wealth, yet the late defence made by G. Britain,
ag^{st} her numerous enemies proved in the clearest manner, that it is
entirely fallacious even in this respect.
M^r King thought there was great force in the objections of M^r Gov^r
Morris: he would however accede to the proposition for the sake of doing
something.
M^r Rutlidge contended for the admission of wealth in the estimate by
which Representation should be regulated. The Western States will not be
able to contribute in proportion to their numbers; they sh^d not
therefore be represented in that proportion. The Atlantic States will
not concur in such a plan. He moved that "at the end of ---- years after
the 1^{st} meeting of the Legislature, and of every ---- years
thereafter, the Legislature shall proportion the Representation
according to the principles of wealth & population."
M^r Sherman thought the number of people alone the best rule for
measuring wealth as well as representation; and that if the Legislature
were to be governed by wealth, they would be obliged to estimate it by
numbers. He was at first for leaving the matter wholly to the discretion
of the Legislature; but he had been convinced by the observation of (M^r
Randolph & M^r Mason), that the _periods_ & the _rule_, of revising the
Representation ought to be fixt by the Constitution.
M^r Reed thought the Legislature ought not to be too much shackled. It
would make the Constitution like Religious Creeds, embarrassing to those
bound to conform to them & more likely to produce dissatisfaction and
scism, than harmony and union.
M^r Mason objected to M^r Rutlidge's motion, as requiring of the
Legislature something too indefinite & impracticable, and leaving them a
pretext for doing nothing.
M^r Wilson had himself no objection to leaving the Legislature entirely
at liberty. But considered wealth as an impracticable rule.
M^r Ghorum. If the Convention who are comparatively so little biassed by
local views are so much perplexed, How can it be expected that the
Legislature hereafter under the full biass of those views, will be able
to settle a standard. He was convinced by the arguments of others & his
own reflections, that the Convention ought to fix some standard or
other.
M^r Gov^r Morris. The arg^{ts} of others & his own reflections had led
him to a very different conclusion. If we can't agree on a rule that
will be just at this time, how can we expect to find one that will be
just in all times to come. Surely those who come after us will judge
better of things present, than we can of things future. He could not
persuade himself that numbers would be a just rule at any time. The
remarks of (M^r Mason) relative to the Western Country had not changed
his opinion on that head. Among other objections it must be apparent
they would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened, to share in
the administration of our common interests. The Busy haunts of men not
the remote wilderness, was the proper school of political Talents. If
the Western people get the power into their hands they will ruin the
Atlantic interests. The Back members are always most averse to the best
measures. He mentioned the case of Pen^a formerly. The lower part of the
State had y^e power in the first instance. They kept it in y^r own hands
& the country was y^e better for it. Another objection with him ag^{st}
admitting the blacks into the census, was that the people of Pen^a would
revolt at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves. They would
reject any plan that was to have such an effect. Two objections had been
raised ag^{st} leaving the adjustment of the Representation from time,
to time, to the discretion of the Legislature. The 1. was, they would be
unwilling to revise it at all. The 2 that by referring to _wealth_ they
would be bound by a rule which if willing, they would be unable to
execute. The 1^{st} obj^n distrusts their fidelity. But if their duty,
their honor & their oaths will not bind them, let us not put into their
hands our liberty, and all our other great interests; let us have no
Gov^t at all. 2. If these ties will bind them, we need not distrust the
practicability of the rule. It was followed in part by the Com^e in the
apportionment of Representatives yesterday reported to the House. The
best course that could be taken would be to leave the interests of the
people to the Representatives of the people.
M^r Madison was not a little surprised to hear this implicit confidence
urged by a member who on all occasions, had inculcated so strongly, the
political depravity of men, and the necessity of checking one vice and
interest by opposing to them another vice & interest. If the
Representatives of the people would be bound by the ties he had
mentioned, what need was there of a Senate? What of a Revisionary power?
But his reasoning was not only inconsistent with his former reasoning,
but with itself. At the same time that he recommended this implicit
confidence to the Southern States in the Northern majority, he was still
more zealous in exhorting all to a jealousy of a Western Majority. To
reconcile the gentl^n with himself, it must be imagined that he
determined the human character by the points of the compass. The truth
was that all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain
degree. The case of Pen^a had been mentioned where it was admitted that
those who were possessed of the power in the original settlement, never
admitted the new settlem^{ts} to a due share of it. England was a still
more striking example. The power there had long been in the hands of the
boroughs, of the minority; who had opposed & defeated every reform which
had been attempted. Virg^a was in a lesser degree another example. With
regard to the Western States, he was clear & firm in opinion, that no
unfavorable distinctions were admissible either in point of justice or
policy. He thought also that the hope of contributions to the Treas^y
from them had been much underrated. Future contributions it seemed to be
understood on all hands would be principally levied on imports &
exports. The extent and fertility of the Western Soil would for a long
time give to agriculture a preference over manufactures. Trials would be
repeated till some articles could be raised from it that would bear a
transportation to places where they could be exchanged for imported
manufactures. Whenever the Mississippi should be opened to them, which
would of necessity be y^e case as soon as their population would subject
them to any considerable share of the Public burden, imposts on their
trade could be collected with less expence & greater certainty, than on
that of the Atlantic States. In the mean time, as their supplies must
pass through the _Atlantic States_, their contributions would be levied
in the same manner with those of the Atlantic States. He could not agree
that any substantial objection lay ag^{st} fix^g numbers for the
perpetual standard of Representation. It was said that Representation &
taxation were to go together; that taxation and wealth ought to go
together, that population & wealth were not measures of each other. He
admitted that in different climates, under different forms of Gov^t and
in different stages of civilization the inference was perfectly just. He
would admit that in no situation, numbers of inhabitants were an
accurate measure of wealth. He contended however that in the U. States
it was sufficiently so for the object in contemplation. Altho' their
climate varied considerably, yet as the Gov^{ts} the laws, and the
manners of all were nearly the same, and the intercourse between
different parts perfectly free, population, industry, arts, and the
value of labour, would constantly tend to equalize themselves. The value
of labour might be considered as the principal criterion of wealth and
ability to support taxes; and this would find its level in different
places where the intercourse should be easy & free, with as much
certainty as the value of money or any other thing. Wherever labour
would yield most, people would resort, till the competition should
destroy the inequality. Hence it is that the people are constantly
swarming from the more to the less populous places--from Europe to
Am^a--from the North^n & Middle parts of the U. S. to the Southern &
Western. They go where land is cheaper, because there labour is dearer.
If it be true that the same quantity of produce raised on the banks of
the Ohio is of less value, than on the Delaware, it is also true that
the same labor will raise twice or thrice, the quantity in the former,
that it will raise in the latter situation.
Col. Mason. Agreed with M^r Gov^r Morris that we ought to leave the
interests of the people to the Representatives of the people; but the
objection was that the Legislature would cease to be the Representatives
of the people. It would continue so no longer than the States now
containing a majority of the people should retain that majority. As soon
as the Southern & Western population should predominate, which must
happen in a few years, the power w^d be in the hands of the minority,
and would never be yielded to the majority, unless provided for by the
Constitution.
On the Question for postponing M^r Williamson's motion, in order
to consider that of M^r Rutlidge, it passed in the negative,
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the question on the first clause of M^r Williamson's motion
as to taking a census of the free inhabitants, it passed in the
affirmative; Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
the next clause as to 3/5 of the negroes considered.
M^r King being much opposed to fixing numbers as the rule of
representation, was particularly so on account of the blacks. He thought
the admission of them along with Whites at all, would excite great
discontents among the States having no slaves. He had never said as to
any particular point that he would in no event acquiesce in & support
it; but he w^d say that if any in case such a declaration was to be made
by him, it would be in this. He remarked that in the temporary allotment
of Representatives made by the Committee, the Southern States had
received more than the number of their white & Three fifths of their
black inhabitants entitled them to.
M^r Sherman. S. Carol^a had not more beyond her proportion than N. York
& N. Hampshire, nor either of them more than was necessary in order to
avoid fractions or reducing them below their proportions. Georgia had
more; but the rapid growth of that State seemed to justify it. In
general the allotment might not be just, but considering all
circumstances, he was satisfied with it.
M^r Ghorum. supported the propriety of establishing numbers as the rule.
He said that in Mass^{ts} estimates had been taken in the different
towns, and that persons had been curious enough to compare these
estimates with the respective numbers of people; and it had been found
even including Boston, that the most exact proportion prevailed between
numbers & property. He was aware that there might be some weight in what
had fallen from his colleague, as to the umbrage which might be taken by
the people of the Eastern States. But he recollected that when the
proposition of Cong^s for changing the 8^{th} art: of the Confed^n was
before the Legislature of Mass^{ts} the only difficulty then was to
satisfy them that the negroes ought not to have been counted equally
with whites instead of being counted in ratio of three-fifths only.[129]
[129] They were then to have been a rule of taxation only.
Note in Madison's handwriting.
M^r Wilson did not well see on what principle the admission of blacks in
the proportion of three fifths could be explained. Are they admitted as
Citizens? then why are they not admitted on an equality with White
Citizens? are they admitted as property? then why is not other property
admitted into the computation? These were difficulties however which he
thought must be overruled by the necessity of compromise. He had some
apprehensions also from the tendency of the blending of the blacks with
the whites, to give disgust to the people of Pen^a, as had been
intimated by his Colleague (M^r Gov^r Morris). But he differed from him
in thinking numbers of inhab^{ts} so incorrect a measure of wealth. He
had seen the Western settlem^{ts} of P^a and on a comparison of them
with the City of Philad^a could discover little other difference, than
that property was more unequally divided among individuals here than
there. Taking the same number in the aggregate in the two situations he
believed there would be little difference in their wealth and ability to
contribute to the public wants.
M^r Gov^r Morris was compelled to declare himself reduced to the dilemma
of doing injustice to the Southern States or to human nature, and he
must therefore do it to the former. For he could never agree to give
such encouragement to the Slave Trade as would be given by allowing them
a representation for their negroes, and he did not believe those States
would ever confederate on terms that would deprive them of that trade.
On Question for agreeing to include 3/5 of the blacks Mass^{ts}
no. Con^t ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d[130] no. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
[130] (M^r Carrol s^d in explanation of the vote of
M^d that he wished the phraseology to be so altered
as to obviate if possible the danger which had been
expressed of giving umbrage to the Eastern & Middle
States.) Note in Madison's hand.
On the question as to taking census "the first year after the meeting of
the Legislature"
Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On filling the blank for the periodical census, with 15 years. Agreed to
nem. con.
M^r Madison moved to add, after "15 years," the words "at least" that
the Legislature might anticipate when circumstances were likely to
render a particular year inconvenient.
On this motion for adding "at least," it passed in the negative the
States being equally divided.
Mas. ay. Con^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
A Change of the phraseology of the other clause so as to read, "and the
Legislature shall alter or augment the representation accordingly," was
agreed to nem. con.
On the question on the whole resolution of M^r Williamson as amended,
Mas. no. Con^t no. N. J. no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
THURSDAY, JULY 12. IN CONVENTION.
M^r Gov^r Morris moved to add to the clause empowering the Legislature
to vary the Representation according to the principles of wealth &
numbers of inhab^{ts} a "proviso that taxation shall be in proportion to
Representation."
M^r Butler contended again that Representation s^d be according to the
full number of inhab^{ts} including all the blacks; admitting the
justice of M^r Gov^r Morris's motion.
M^r Mason also admitted the justice of the principle, but was afraid
embarrassments might be occasioned to the Legislature by it. It might
drive the Legislature to the plan of Requisitions.
M^r Gov^r Morris, admitted that some objections lay ag^{st} his Motion,
but supposed they would be removed by restraining the rule to _direct_
taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on _exports_ & imports & on
consumption the rule would be inapplicable. Notwithstanding what had
been said to the contrary he was persuaded that the imports &
consumption were pretty nearly equal throughout the Union.
General Pinkney liked the idea. He thought it so just that it could not
be objected to. But foresaw that if the revision of the census was left
to the discretion of the Legislature, it would never be carried into
execution. The rule must be fixed, and the execution of it enforced by
the Constitution. He was alarmed at what was said[131] yesterday,
concerning the Negroes. He was now again alarmed at what had been thrown
out concerning the taxing of exports. S. Carol^a has in one year
exported to the amount of £600,000 Sterling all which was the fruit of
the labor of her blacks. Will she be represented in proportion to this
amount? She will not. Neither ought she then to be subject to a tax on
it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in the system, restraining the
Legislature from taxing Exports.
[131] By M^r Gov^r Morris. Note in Madison's handwriting.
M^r Wilson approved the principle, but could not see how it could be
carried into execution; unless restrained to direct taxation.
M^r Gov^r Morris having so varied his Motion by inserting the word
"direct." It pass^d nem. con. as follows--"provided always that direct
taxation ought to be proportioned to representation."
M^r Davie said it was high time now to speak out. He saw that it was
meant by some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any share of
Representation for their blacks. He was sure that N. Carol^a would never
confederate on any terms that did not rate them at least as 3/5. If the
Eastern States meant therefore to exclude them altogether the business
was at an end.
D^r Johnson, thought that wealth and population were the true, equitable
rule of representation; but he conceived that these two principles
resolved themselves into one; population being the best measure of
wealth. He concluded therefore that y^e number of people ought to be
established as the rule, and that all descriptions including blacks
_equally_ with the Whites, ought to fall within the computation. As
various opinions had been expressed on the subject, he would move that a
Committee might be appointed to take them into consideration and report
thereon.
M^r Gov^r Morris. It has been said that it is high time to speak out, as
one member, he would candidly do so. He came here to form a compact for
the good of America. He was ready to do so with all the States. He hoped
& believed that all would enter into such a Compact. If they would not
he was ready to join with any States that would. But as the Compact was
to be voluntary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on what
the South^n States will never agree to. It is equally vain for the
latter to require what the other States can never admit; and he verily
believed the people of Pen^a will never agree to a representation of
Negroes. What can be desired by these States more than has been already
proposed; that the Legislature shall from time to time regulate
Representation according to population & wealth.
Gen^l Pinkney desired that the rule of wealth should be ascertained and
not left to the pleasure of the Legislature; and that property in slaves
should not be exposed to danger under a Gov^t instituted for the
protection of property.
The first clause in the Report of the first Grand Committee was
postponed.
M^r Elseworth. In order to carry into effect the principle established,
moved that to add to the last clause adopted by the House the words
following, "and that the rule of contribution by direct taxation for the
support of the Government of the U. States shall be the number of white
inhabitants, and three fifths of every other description in the several
States, until some other rule that shall more accurately ascertain the
wealth of the several States can be devised and adopted by the
Legislature."
M^r Butler seconded the motion in order that it might be committed.
M^r Randolph was not satisfied with the motion. The danger will be
revived that the ingenuity of the Legislature may evade or pervert the
rule so as to perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged in the first
instance. He proposed in lieu of M^r Elseworth's motion, "that in order
to ascertain the alterations in Representation that may be required from
time to time by changes in the relative circumstances of the States, a
Census shall be taken within two years from the 1^{st} meeting of the
Gen^l Legislature of the U.S. and once within the term of every ----
year afterwards, of all the inhabitants in the manner & according to the
ratio recommended by Congress in their resolution of the 18^{th} day of
Ap^l 1783, (rating the blacks at 3/5 of their number) and that the
Legislature of the U. S. shall arrange the Representation accordingly."
He urged strenuously that express security ought to be provided for
including slaves in the ratio of Representation. He lamented that such a
species of property existed. But as it did exist the holders of it would
require this security. It was perceived that the design was entertained
by some of excluding slaves altogether; the Legislature therefore ought
not to be left at liberty.
M^r Elseworth withdraws his motion & seconds that of M^r Randolph.
M^r Wilson observed that less umbrage would perhaps be taken ag^{st} an
admission of the slaves into the Rule of representation, if it should be
so expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient in the rule,
by saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation; and as
representation was to be according to taxation, the end would be equally
attained. He accordingly moved & was 2^{ded} so to alter the last clause
adopted by the House, that together with the amendment proposed the
whole should read as follows--provided always that the representation
ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation, and in order to
ascertain the alterations in the direct taxation which may be required
from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the
States, Resolved that a census be taken within two years from the first
meeting of the Legislature of the U. States, and once within the term of
every ---- years afterwards of all the inhabitants of the U.S. in the
manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their
Resolution of April 18. 1783; and that the Legislature of the U.S. shall
proportion the direct taxation accordingly.
M^r King. Altho' this amendment varies the aspect somewhat, he had still
two powerful objections ag^{st} tying down the Legislature to the rule
of numbers. 1. they were at this time an uncertain index of the relative
wealth of the States. 2. if they were a just index at this time it can
not be supposed always to continue so. He was far from wishing to retain
any unjust advantage whatever in one part of the Republic. If justice
was not the basis of the connection it could not be of long duration. He
must be shortsighted indeed who does not foresee that whenever the
Southern States shall be more numerous than the Northern, they can &
will hold a language that will awe them into justice. If they threaten
to separate now in case injury shall be done them, will their threats be
less urgent or effectual, when force shall back their demands. Even in
the intervening period, there will be no point of time at which they
will not be able to say, do us justice or we will separate. He urged the
necessity of placing confidence to a certain degree in every Gov^t and
did not conceive that the proposed confidence as to a periodical
readjustment of the representation exceeded that degree.
M^r Pinkney moved to amend M^r Randolph's motion so as to make "blacks
equal to the whites in the ratio of representation." This he urged was
nothing more than justice. The blacks are the labourers, the peasants of
the Southern States: they are as productive of pecuniary resources as
those of the Northern States. They add equally to the wealth, and
considering money as the sinew of war, to the strength of the nation. It
will also be politic with regard to the Northern States, as taxation is
to keep pace with Representation.
Gen^l Pinkney moves to insert 6 years instead of two, as the period
computing from the 1^{st} meeting of y^e Legis^e within which the first
census should be taken. On this question for inserting six, instead of
"two" in the proposition of M^r Wilson, it passed in the affirmative
Mass^{ts} no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. div^d. May^d ay.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On a question for filling the blank for y^e periodical census with 20
years, it passed in the negative
Mass^{ts} no. C^t ay. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On a question for 10 years, it passed in the affirmative.
Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On M^r Pinkney's motion for rating blacks as equal to Whites instead of
as 3/5.
Mass. no. Con^t no. (D^r Johnson ay) N. J. no. P^a no. (3 ag^{st}
2.) Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo--ay.
M^r Randolph's proposition as varied by M^r Wilson being read for
question on the whole--
M^r Gerry, urged that the principle of it could not be carried into
execution as the States were not to be taxed as States. With regard to
taxes in imposts, he conceived they would be more productive Where there
were no slaves than where there were; the consumption being greater--
M^r Elseworth. In case of a poll tax there w^d be no difficulty. But
there w^d probably be none. The sum allotted to a State may be levied
without difficulty according to the plan used by the State in raising
its own supplies. On the question of y^e whole proposition; as
proportioning representation to direct taxation & both to the white &
3/5 of black inhabitants, & requiring a Census within six years--&
within every ten years afterwards.
Mass. div^d. Con^t ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. div^d. Geo. ay.
FRIDAY, JULY 13. IN CONVENTION.
It being moved to postpone the clause in the Report of the Committee of
Eleven as to the originating of money bills in _the first_ branch, in
order to take up the following--"that in the 2^d branch each State shall
have an equal voice,"
M^r Gerry, moved to add as an amendment to the last clause agreed to by
the House, "that from the first meeting of the Legislature of the U.S.
till a census shall be taken all monies to be raised for supplying the
public Treasury by direct taxation shall be assessed on the inhabitants
of the several States according to the number of their Representatives
respectively in the 1^{st} branch." He said this would be as just before
as after the Census; according to the general principle that taxation &
Representation ought to go together.
M^r Williamson feared that N. Hampshire will have reason to complain. 3
members were allotted to her as a liberal allowance, for this reason
among others, that she might not suppose any advantage to have been
taken of her absence. As she was still absent, and had no opportunity of
deciding whether she would chuse to retain the number on the condition,
of her being taxed in proportion to it, he thought the number ought to
be reduced from three to two, before the question was taken on M^r G's
motion.
M^r Read could not approve of the proposition. He had observed he said
in the Committee a backwardness in some of the members from the large
States, to take their full proportion of Representatives. He did not
then see the motive. He now suspects it was to avoid their due share of
taxation. He had no objection to a just & accurate adjustment of
Representation & taxation to each other.
M^r Gov^r Morris & M^r Madison answered that the charge itself involved
an acquittal; since notwithstanding the augmentation of the number of
members allotted to Mass^{ts} & V^a the motion for proportioning the
burdens thereto was made by a member from the former State & was
approved by M^r M. from the latter who was on the Com^e. M^r Gov^r
Morris said that he thought P^a had her due share in 8 members; and he
could not in candor ask for more. M^r M. said that having always
conceived that the difference of interest in the U. States lay not
between the large & small, but the N. & South^n States, and finding that
the number of members allotted to the N. States was greatly superior, he
should have preferred, an addition of two members to the S. States, to
wit one to N. & 1 to S. Carl^a rather than of one member to Virg^a. He
liked the present motion, because it tended to moderate the views both
of the opponents & advocates for rating very high, the negroes.
M^r Elseworth hoped the proposition would be withdrawn. It entered too
much into detail. The general principle was already sufficiently
settled. As fractions can not be regarded in apportioning the _N^o of
representatives_, the rule will be unjust, until an actual census shall
be made. After that taxation may be precisely proportioned according to
the principle established, to the _number of inhabitants_.
M^r Wilson hoped the motion would not be withdrawn. If it sh^d it will
be made from another quarter. The rule will be as reasonable & just
before, as after a Census. As to fractional numbers, the Census will not
destroy, but ascertain them. And they will have the same effect after as
before the Census; for as he understands the rule, it is to be adjusted
not to the number of _inhabitants_, but of _Representatives_.
M^r Sherman opposed the motion. He thought the Legislature ought to be
left at liberty: in which case they would probably conform to the
principles observed by Cong^s.
M^r Mason did not know that Virg^a would be a loser by the proposed
regulation, but had some scruple as to the justice of it. He doubted
much whether the conjectural rule which was to precede the Census, would
be as just, as it would be rendered by an actual census.
M^r Elseworth & M^r Sherman moved to postpone the motion of M^r Gerry.
On y^e question, it passed in the negative. Mass. no. Con^t ay. N. J.
ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Question on M^r Gerry's motion, it passed in the negative, the States
being equally divided.
Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. J. no. _P^a ay._ Del. no. M^d no.
_V^a no._ N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Gerry finding that the loss of the question had proceeded from an
objection with some, to the proposed assessment of direct taxes on the
_inhabitants_ of the States, which might restrain the Legislature to a
poll tax, moved his proposition again, but so varied as to authorize the
assessment on the _States_, which leaves the mode to the Legislature,
viz "that from the 1^{st} meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. untill
a census shall be taken, all monies for supplying the public Treasury by
direct taxation shall be raised from the said several States according
to the number of their representatives respectively in the 1^{st}
branch."
On this varied question, it passed in the affirmative
Mas. ay. Con^t no. N. J. no. _P^a div^d_ Del. no. M^d no.
_V^a ay._ N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On the motion of M^r Randolph, the vote of saturday last authorizing the
Legisl^{re} to adjust from time to time, the representation upon the
principles of _wealth_ & numbers of inhabitants, was reconsidered by
common consent in order to strike out "Wealth" and adjust the resolution
to that requiring periodical revisions, according to the number of
whites & three fifths of the blacks: the motion was in the words
following:--"But as the present situation of the States may probably
alter in the number of their inhabitants, that the Legislature of the U.
S. be authorized from time to time to apportion the number of
representatives; and in case any of the States shall hereafter be
divided or any two or more States united or new States created within
the limits of the U. S. the Legislature of U. S. shall possess authority
to regulate the number of Representatives in any of the foregoing cases,
upon the principle of their number of inhabitants; according to the
provisions hereafter mentioned."
M^r Gov^r Morris opposed the alteration as leaving still incoherence. If
Negroes were to be viewed as inhabitants, and the revision was to
proceed on the principle of numbers of inhab^{ts} they ought to be added
in their entire number, and not in the proportion of 3/5. If as
property, the word wealth was right, and striking it out would produce
the very inconsistency which it was meant to get rid of.--The train of
business & the late turn which it had taken, had led him he said, into
deep meditation on it, and He w^d candidly state the result. A
distinction had been set up & urged, between the N^n and South^n States.
He had hitherto considered this doctrine as heretical. He still thought
the distinction groundless. He sees however that it is persisted in, and
the South^n Gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way open
to their gaining a majority in the public Councils. The consequence of
such a transfer of power from the maritime to the interior & landed
interest will he foresees be such an oppression of commerce that he
shall be obliged to vote for y^e vicious principle of equality in the
2^d branch in order to provide some defence for the N. States ag^{st}
it. But to come more to the point; either this distinction is fictitious
or real; if fictitious let it be dismissed & let us proceed with due
confidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to blend incompatible
things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other. There can be
no end of demands for security if every particular interest is to be
entitled to it. The Eastern States may claim it for their fishery, and
for other objects, as the South^n States claim it for their peculiar
objects. In this struggle between the two ends of the Union, what part
ought the middle States in point of policy to take: to join their
Eastern brethren according to his ideas. If the South^n States get the
power into their hands, and be joined as they will be with the interior
Country, they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the
Mississippi. This language is already held. The interior Country having
no property nor interest exposed on the sea, will be little affected by
such a war. He wished to know what security the North^n & middle States
will have ag^{st} this danger. It has been said that N. C. S. C., and
Georgia only will in a little time have a majority of the people of
America. They must in that case include the great interior Country, and
every thing was to be apprehended from their getting the power into
their hands.
M^r Butler. The security the South^n States want is that their negroes
may not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within or without
doors, have a very good mind to do. It was not supposed that N. C. S. C.
& Geo. would have more people than all the other States, but many more
relatively to the other States than they now have. The people & strength
of America are evidently bearing Southwardly & S. westw^{dly}.
M^r Wilson. If a general declaration would satisfy any gentleman he had
no indisposition to declare his sentiments. Conceiving that all men
wherever placed have equal rights and are equally entitled to
confidence, he viewed without apprehension the period when a few States
should contain the superior number of people. The majority of people
wherever found ought in all questions to govern the minority. If the
interior Country should acquire this majority, it will not only have the
right, but will avail itself of it whether we will or no. This jealousy
misled the policy of G. Britain with regard to America. The fatal maxims
espoused by her were that the Colonies were growing too fast, and that
their growth must be stinted in time. What were the consequences?,
first, enmity on our part, then actual separation. Like consequences
will result on the part of the interior settlements, if like jealousy &
policy be pursued on ours. Further, if numbers be not a proper rule, why
is not some better rule pointed out. No one has yet ventured to attempt
it. Cong^s have never been able to discover a better. No State as far as
he had heard, had suggested any other. In 1783, after elaborate
discussion of a measure of wealth all were satisfied then as they are
now that the rule of numbers, does not differ much from the combined
rule of numbers & wealth. Again he could not agree that property was the
sole or primary object of Gov^t & society. The cultivation & improvement
of the human mind was the most noble object. With respect to this
object, as well as to other _personal_ rights, numbers were surely the
natural & precise measure of Representation. And with respect to
property, they could not vary much from the precise measure. In no point
of view however could the establishm^t of numbers as the rule of
representation in the 1^{st} branch vary his opinion as to the
impropriety of letting a vicious principle into the 2^d branch.--On the
Question to strike out _Wealth_, & to make the change as moved by M^r
Randolph, it passed in the affirmative.
Mas. ay. Con^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del div^d. M^d ay. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Reed moved to insert after the word "divided," "or enlarged by
addition of territory" which was agreed to nem con. (his object probably
was to provide for such cases as an enlargem^t of Delaware by annexing
to it the Peninsula on the East side of the Chesapeak.)
Adjourned.
SATURDAY, JULY 14. IN CONVENTION.
M^r L. Martin called for the question on the whole report, including the
parts relating to the origination of money bills, and the equality of
votes in the 2^d branch.
M^r Gerry, wished before the question should be put, that the attention
of the House might be turned to the dangers apprehended from Western
States. He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not for putting
ourselves in their hands. They will if they acquire power like all men,
abuse it. They will oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the
Western Country. To guard ag^{st} these consequences, he thought it
necessary to limit the number of new States to be admitted into the
Union, in such a manner, that they should never be able to outnumber the
Atlantic States. He accordingly moved "that in order to secure the
liberties of the States already confederated, the number of
Representatives in the 1^{st} branch, of the States which shall
hereafter be established, shall never exceed in number, the
Representatives from such of the States as shall accede to this
Confederation.
M^r King, seconded the motion.
M^r Sherman, thought there was no probability that the number of future
States would exceed that of the Existing States. If the event should
ever happen, it was too remote to be taken into consideration at this
time. Besides We are providing for our posterity, for our children & our
grand Children; who would be as likely to be citizens of new Western
States, as of the old States. On this consideration alone, we ought to
make no such discrimination as was proposed by the motion.
M^r Gerry. If some of our children should remove, others will stay
behind, and he thought it incumbent on us to provide for their
interests. There was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States to
the Western Country, and he did not wish those remaining behind to be at
the mercy of the emigrants. Besides foreigners are resorting to that
Country, and it is uncertain what turn things may take there.--On the
question for agreeing to the Motion of M^r Gerry, it passed in the
negative.
Mass. ay. Con^t ay. N. J. no. P^a div^d. Del. ay. M^d ay.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Rutlidge proposed to reconsider the two propositions touching the
originating of money bills in the first & the equality of votes in the
second branch.
M^r Sherman was for the question on the whole at once. It was he said a
conciliatory plan, it had been considered in all its parts, a great deal
of time had been spent upon it, and if any part should now be altered,
it would be necessary to go over the whole ground again.
M^r L. Martin urged the question on the whole. He did not like many
parts of it. He did not like having two branches, nor the inequality of
votes in the 1^{st} branch. He was willing however to make trial of the
plan, rather than do nothing.
M^r Wilson traced the progress of the report through its several stages,
remarking y^t when on the question concerning an equality of votes, the
House was divided, our Constituents had they voted as their
representatives did, would have stood as 2/3 ag^{st} the equality, and
1/3 only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known, and it will
appear that this fundamental point has been carried by 1/3 ag^{st} 2/3.
What hopes will our Constituents entertain when they find that the
essential principles of justice have been violated in the outset of the
Governm^t. As to the privilege of originating money bills, it was not
considered by any as of much moment, and by many as improper in itself.
He hoped both clauses w^d be reconsidered. The equality of votes was a
point of such critical importance, that every opportunity ought to be
allowed, for discussing and collecting the mind of the Convention upon
it.
M^r L. Martin denies that there were 2/3 ag^{st} the equality of votes.
The States that please to call themselves large, are the weakest in the
Union. Look at Mas^{ts}. Look at Virg^a. Are they efficient States? He
was for letting a separation take place if they desired it. He had
rather there should be two Confederacies, than one founded on any other
principle than an equality of votes in the 2^d branch at least.
M^r Wilson was not surprised that those who say that a minority is more
than a majority should say the minority is stronger than the majority.
He supposed the next assertion will be that they are richer also; though
he hardly expected it would be persisted in when the States shall be
called on for taxes & troops.
M^r Gerry also animadverted on M^r L. Martins remarks on the weakness of
Mas^{ts}. He favored the reconsideration with a view not of destroying
the equality of votes; but of providing that the States should vote per
Capita, which he said would prevent the delays & inconveniences that had
been experienced in Cong^s and would give a national aspect & Spirit to
the management of business. He did not approve of a reconsideration of
the clause relating to money bills. It was of great consequence. It was
the corner stone of the accommodation. If any member of the Convention
had the exclusive privilege of making propositions, would any one say
that it would give him no advantage over other members. The Report was
not altogether to his mind. But he would agree to it as it stood rather
than throw it out altogether.
The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to
M^r Pinkney moved that instead of an equality of votes, the States
should be represented in the 2^d branch as follows: N. H. by 2 members.
Mass. 4. R. I. 1. Con^t 3. N. Y. 3. N. J. 2. P^a 4. Del. 1; M^d 3.
Virg^a 5. N. C. 3. S. C. 3. Geo. 2. making in the whole 36.
M^r Wilson seconds the motion
M^r Dayton. The smaller States can never give up their equality. For
himself he would in no event yield that security for their rights.
M^r Sherman, urged the equality of votes not so much as a Security for
the small States; as for the State Gov^{ts} which could not be preserved
unless they were represented & had a negative in the Gen^l Government.
He had no objection to the members in the 2^d b. voting per capita, as
had been suggested by (M^r Gerry).
M^r Madison concurred in this motion of M^r Pinkney as a reasonable
compromise.
M^r Gerry said he should like the motion, but could see no hope of
success. An accommodation must take place, and it was apparent from what
had been seen that it could not do so on the ground of the motion. He
was utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving other States to
accede or not accede, as had been intimated.
M^r King said it was always with regret that he differed from his
colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from (M^r Gerry) on this
occasion. He considered the proposed Government as substantially and
formally, a General and National Government over the people of America.
There never will be a case in which it will act as a federal Government
on the States and not on the individual Citizens. And is it not a clear
principle that in a free Gov^t those who are to be the objects of a
Gov^t ought to influence the operations of it? What reason can be
assigned why the same rule of representation s^d not prevail in the 2^d
branch as in the 1^{st}.? He could conceive none. On the contrary, every
view of the subject that presented itself, seemed to require it. Two
objections had been raised ag^{st} it, drawn 1. from the terms of the
existing compact. 2. from a supposed danger to the smaller States.--As
to the first objection he thought it inapplicable. According to the
existing Confederation, the rule by which the public burdens is to be
apportioned is _fixed_, and must be pursued. In the proposed Govern^t it
cannot be fixed, because indirect taxation is to be substituted. The
Legislature therefore will have full discretion to impose taxes in such
modes & proportions as they may judge expedient. As to the 2^d
objection, he thought it of as little weight. The Gen^l Govern^t can
never wish to intrude on the State Govern^{ts}. There could be no
temptation. None had been pointed out. In order to prevent the
interference of measures which seemed most likely to happen, he would
have no objection to throwing all the State debts into the federal debt,
making one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 of dollars, and leaving it
to be discharged by the Gen^l Gov^t. According to the idea of securing
the State Gov^{ts} there ought to be three distinct legislative
branches. The 2^d was admitted to be necessary, and was actually meant,
to check the 1^{st} branch, to give more wisdom, system, & stability to
the Gov^t and ought clearly as it was to operate on the people, to be
proportioned to them. For the third purpose of securing the States,
there ought then to be a 3^d branch, representing the States as such,
and guarding by equal votes their rights & dignities. He would not
pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his immediate Constituents
as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief that Mas^{ts} would never
be prevailed on to yield to an equality of votes. In N. York, (he was
sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that State in the
absence of its representatives, but the occasion required it), in N.
York he had seen that the most powerful argument used by the considerate
opponents to the grant of the Impost to Congress, was pointed ag^{st}
the vicious constitution of Cong^s with regard to representation &
suffrage. He was sure that no Gov^t could last that was not founded on
just principles. He preferred the doing of nothing, to an allowance of
an equal vote to all the States. It would be better he thought to submit
to a little more confusion & convulsion, than to submit to such an evil.
It was difficult to say what the views of different Gentlemen might be.
Perhaps there might be some who thought no Governm^t co-extensive with
the U. States could be established with a hope of its answering the
purpose. Perhaps there might be other fixed opinions incompatible with
the object we are pursuing. If there were, he thought it but candid that
Gentlemen should speak out that we might understand one another.
M^r Strong. The Convention had been much divided in opinion. In order to
avoid the consequences of it, an accommodation had been proposed. A
Committee had been appointed: and though some of the members of it were
averse to an equality of votes, a Report had been made in favor of it.
It is agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an end. If no
Accommodation takes place, the Union itself must soon be dissolved. It
has been suggested that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the
principal States may form & recommend a Scheme of Government. But will
the small States in that case ever accede it. Is it probable that the
large States themselves will under such circumstances embrace and ratify
it. He thought the small States had made a considerable concession in
the article of money bills, and that they might naturally expect some
concessions on the other side. From this view of the matter he was
compelled to give his vote for the Report taken altogether.
M^r Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of
Governm^t was destroyed, by substituting an equality in place of a
proportional Representation, no proper superstructure would be raised.
If the small States really wish for a Government armed with the powers
necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the
larger members as well as themselves he could not help thinking them
extremely mistaken in their means. He reminded them of the consequences
of laying the existing Confederation on improper principles. All the
principal parties to its compilation joined immediately in mutilating &
fettering the Governm^t in such a manner that it has disappointed every
hope placed in it. He appealed to the doctrine & arguments used by
themselves on a former occasion. It had been very properly observed by
(M^r Patterson) that Representation was an expedient by which the
meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnecessary; And that the
representatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to the votes which
their constituents if convened would respectively have. Was not this
remark as applicable to one branch of the Representation as to the
other? But it had been said that the Govern^t would in its operation be
partly federal, partly national; that altho' in the latter respect the
Representatives of the people ought to be in proportion to the people;
yet in the former it ought to be according to the number of States. If
there was any solidity in this distinction he was ready to abide by it,
if there was none it ought to be abandoned. In all cases where the Gen^l
Governm^t is to act on the people, let the people be represented and the
votes be proportional. In all cases where the Govern^t is to act on the
States as such in like manner as Cong^s now acts on them, let the States
be represented & the votes be equal. This was the true ground of
compromise if there was any ground at all. But he denied that there was
any ground. He called for a single instance in which the Gen^l Gov^t was
not to operate on the people individually. The practicability of making
laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had
been exploded on all hands. He observed that the people of the large
States would in some way or other secure to themselves a weight
proportioned to the importance accruing from their superior numbers. If
they could not effect it by a proportional representation in the Gov^t
they would probably accede to no Gov^t which did not in a great measure
depend for its efficacy on their voluntary cooperation; in which case
they would indirectly secure their object. The existing confederacy
proved that where the Acts of the Gen^l Gov^t were to be executed by the
particular Gov^{ts} the latter had a weight in proportion to their
importance. No one would say that either in Cong^s or out of Cong^s.
Delaware had equal weight with Pennsylv^a. If the latter was to supply
ten times as much money as the former, and no compulsion could be used,
it was of ten times more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish
the supply. In the Dutch confederacy the votes of the Provinces were
equal. But Holland which supplies about half the money, governed the
whole republic. He enumerated the objections ag^{st} an equality of
votes in the 2^d branch, notwithstanding the proportional representation
in the first. 1. the minority could negative the will of the majority of
the people. 2. they could extort measures by making them a condition of
their assent to other necessary measures. 3. they could obtrude measures
on the majority by virtue of the peculiar powers which would be vested
in the Senate. 4. the evil instead of being cured by time, would
increase with every new State that should be admitted, as they must all
be admitted on the principle of equality. 5. the perpetuity it would
give to the preponderance of the North^n ag^{st} the South^n Scale was a
serious consideration. It seemed now to be pretty well understood that
the real difference of interests lay, not between the large & small but
between the N. & South^n States. The institution of slavery & its
consequences formed the line of discrimination. There were 5 States on
the South, 8 on the North^n side of this line. Should a proport^l
representation take place it was true, the N. side would still outnumber
the other; but not in the same degree, at this time; and every day would
tend towards an equilibrium.
M^r Wilson would add a few words only. If equality in the 2^d branch was
an error that time would correct, he should be less anxious to exclude
it being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan; but
being a fundamental and a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be
avoided. A vice in the Representation, like an error in the first
concoction, must be followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death
itself. The justice of the general principle of proportional
representation has not in argument at least been yet contradicted. But
it is said that a departure from it so far as to give the States an
equal vote in one branch of the Legislature is essential to their
preservation. He had considered this position maturely, but could not
see its application. That the States ought to be preserved he admitted.
But does it follow that an equality of votes is necessary for the
purpose? Is there any reason to suppose that if their preservation
should depend more on the large than on the small States the security of
the States ag^{st} the Gen^l Government would be diminished? Are the
large States less attached to their existence more likely to commit
suicide, than the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as far as
he can conceive: and is liable among other objections to this
insuperable one: The great fault of the existing confederacy is its
inactivity. It has never been a complaint ag^{st} Cong^s that they
governed over much. The complaint has been that they have governed too
little. To remedy this defect we were sent here. Shall we effect the
cure by establishing an equality of votes as is proposed? no: this very
equality carries us directly to Congress; to the system which it is our
duty to rectify. The small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this
equality, but they may controul the Gov^t as they have done in Cong^s.
This very measure is here prosecuted by a minority of the people of
America. Is then the object of the Convention likely to be accomplished
in this way? Will not our Constituents say? we sent you to form an
efficient Gov^t and you have given us one more complex indeed, but
having all the weakness of the former govern^t. He was anxious for
uniting all the States under one Govern^t. He knew there were some
respectable men who preferred three confederacies, united by offensive &
defensive alliances. Many things may be plausibly said, some things may
be justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not however concur
in it himself; but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad first
principles.
M^r Elseworth asked two questions, one of M^r Wilson, whether he had
ever seen a good measure fail in Cong^s for want of a majority of States
in its favor? He had himself never known such an instance: the other of
M^r Madison whether a negative lodged with the majority of the States
even the smallest, could be more dangerous than the qualified negative
proposed to be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate, who must be
taken from some one State?
M^r Sherman, signified that his expectation was that the Gen^l
Legislature would in some cases act on the _federal principle_, of
requiring quotas. But he thought it ought to be empowered to carry their
own plans into execution, if the States should fail to supply their
respective quotas.
On the question for agreeing to M^r Pinkney's motion for allowing N. H.
2. Mas. 4. &c.--it passed in the negative,
Mass. no. M^r King ay. M^r Ghorum absent. Con^t no. N. J. no.
P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
Adjourned.[132]
[132] "Memorandum.
"July 15, '87.
"About twelve days since the Convention appointed a Grand
Comee, consisting of Gerry, Ellsworth, Yates, Paterson,
Franklin, Bedford, Martin, Mason, Rutledge & Baldwin to
adjust the Representation in the two Brs. of the Legislature
of the U. S. They reported yt. every 40,000 Inhabs. taken
agreeably to the Resolution of Cong. of ye 18 Ap. 1783, shd.
send one member to the first Br. of the Legislature, yt.
this Br. shd. originate exclusively Money Bills, & also
originate ye appropriations of money; and that in ye Senate
or upper Br. each State shd. have one vote & no more. The
Representation as to the first Br. was twice recommitted
altho' not to the same Committee; finally it was agreed yt
Taxation of the direct sort & Representation shd. be in
direct proportion with each other--that the first Br. shd.
consist of 65 members, viz. N. H. 3, M. 8, R. I. 1, C. 5,
N. Y. 6, N. J. 4, P. 8, D. 1, M. 6, V. 10, N. C. 5, S. C. 5,
G. 3,--and that the origination of money Bills and the
Appropriations of money shd. belong in the first instance to
yt. Br., but yt in the Senate or 2nd Br. each State shd.
have an equal Vote. In this situation of the Report it was
moved by S. Car. that in the formation of the 2nd Br.,
instead of an equality of Votes among the States, that N. H.
shd. have 2, M. 4, R. I. 1, C. 3, N. Y. 3, N. J. 2, P. 4, D.
1, M. 3, V. 5, N. C. 3, S. C. 3, G. 2 = total 36.
"On the question to agree to this apportionment, instead of
the equality (Mr. Gorham being absent) Mass., Con., N. Jer.,
Del., N. Car., & Georg--No. Penn., Mar., Virg. & S. Car.
Aye.
"This Question was taken and to my mortification by the vote
of Mass. lost on the 14th July.
"(endorsed 'inequality lost by vote of Mass.')"--King's
Note, King's _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, I.,
615.
MONDAY, JULY 16. IN CONVENTION.
On the question for agreeing to the whole Report as amended & including
the equality of votes in the 2^d branch, it passed in the affirmative.
Mass. divided M^r Gerry, M^r Strong. ay. M^r King, M^r Ghorum
no. Con^t ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no.
N. C. ay. M^r Spraight no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The whole thus passed is in the words following, viz. "Resolved, that in
the original formation of the Legislature of the U. S. the first branch
thereof shall consist of sixty five members, of which number N.
Hampshire shall send 3. Mass^{ts} 8. Rh. I. 1. Conn^t 5. N. Y. 6. N. J.
4. Pen^a 8. Del. 1. Mary^d 6. Virg^a 10. N. C. 5. S. C. 5. Geo. 3.--But
as the present situation of the States may probably alter in the number
of their inhabitants, the Legislature of the U. S. shall be authorized
from time to time to apportion the number of Rep^s and in case any of
the States shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by addition of
territory, or any two or more States united, or any new States created
within the limits of the U. S. the Legislature of the U. S. shall
possess authority to regulate the number of Rep^s in any of the
foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants,
according to the provisions hereafter mentioned. namely--provided always
that representation ought to be proportioned according to direct
taxation; and in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct
taxation, which may be required from time to time by the changes in the
relative circumstances of the States--
Resolved, that a Census be taken within six years from the 1^{st}
meeting of the Legislature of the U. S., and once within the term of
every 10 years afterwards of all the inhabitants of the U. S. in the
manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their
Resolution of April 18. 1783, and that the Legislature of the U. S.
shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly--
Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for
fixing the salaries of officers of the Gov^t of the U. S. shall
originate in the first branch of the Legislature of the U. S. and shall
not be altered or amended in the 2^d branch: and that no money shall be
drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be
originated in the 1^{st} branch.
_Resolv^d_, that in the 2^d branch of the Legislature of the U. S., each
State shall have an equal vote.
The 6^{th} Resol: in the Report from the Com^e of the whole House, which
had been postponed in order to consider the 7 & 8^{th} Resol^{ns}.; was
now resumed. see the Resol^n:
The 1^{st} member "That the Nat^l Legislature ought to possess the
Legislative Rights vested in Cong^s by the Confederation" was agreed to
nem. con.
The next, "And moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate
States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of the U. S. may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation," being read for a
question.
M^r Butler calls for some explanation of the extent of this power;
particularly of the word _incompetent_. The vagueness of the terms
rendered it impossible for any precise judgment to be formed.
M^r Ghorum. The vagueness of the terms constitutes the propriety of
them. We are now establishing general principles, to be extended
hereafter into details which will be precise & explicit.
M^r Rutlidge, urged the objection started by M^r Butler and moved that
the clause should be committed to the end that a specification of the
powers comprised in the general terms, might be reported.
On the question for commitment, the States were equally divided
Mas. no. Con^t ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay: So it was lost.
M^r Randolph. The vote of this morning (involving an equality of
suffrage in 2^d branch) had embarrassed the business extremely. All the
powers given in the Report from the Com^e of the whole, were founded on
the supposition that a Proportional representation was to prevail in
both branches of the Legislature. When he came here this morning his
purpose was to have offered some propositions that might if possible
have united a great majority of votes, and particularly might provide
ag^{st} the danger suspected on the part of the smaller States, by
enumerating the cases in which it might lie, and allowing an equality of
votes in such cases.[133] But finding from the Preceding vote that they
persist in demanding an equal vote in all cases, that they have
succeeded in obtaining it, and that N. York, if present would probably
be on the same side, he could not but think we were unprepared to
discuss this subject further. It will probably be in vain to come to any
final decision with a bare majority on either side. For these reasons he
wished the Convention might adjourn, that the large States might
consider the steps proper to be taken in the present solemn crisis of
the business, and that the small States might also deliberate on the
means of conciliation.
[133] See the paper, in the appendix, co[~m]unicated by M^r R.
to J. M. July 10.--Note in Madison's hand.
M^r Patterson, thought with M^r R. that it was high time for the
Convention to adjourn that the rule of secrecy ought to be rescinded,
and that our Constituents should be consulted. No conciliation could be
admissible on the part of the smaller States on any other ground than
that of an equality of votes in the 2^d branch. If M^r Randolph would
reduce to form his motion for an adjournment sine die, he would second
it with all his heart.
Gen^l Pinkney wished to know of M^r R. whether he meant an adjournment
sine die, or only an adjournment for the day. If the former was meant,
it differed much from his idea. He could not think of going to S.
Carolina and returning again to this place. Besides it was chimerical to
suppose that the States if consulted would ever accord separately, and
beforehand.
M^r Randolph, had never entertained an idea of an adjournment sine die;
& was sorry that his meaning had been so readily & strangely
misinterpreted. He had in view merely an adjournment till to-morrow, in
order that some conciliatory experiment might if possible be devised,
and that in case the smaller States should continue to hold back, the
larger might then take such measures, he would not say what, as might be
necessary.
M^r Patterson seconded the adjournment till to-morrow, as an opportunity
seemed to be wished by the larger States to deliberate further on
conciliatory expedients.
On the question for adjourning till tomorrow, the States were equally
divided,
Mas. no. Con^t no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no, so it was lost.
M^r Broome thought it his duty to declare his opinion ag^{st} an
adjournment sine die, as had been urged by M^r Patterson. Such a measure
he thought would be fatal. Something must be done by the Convention,
tho' it should be by a bare majority.
M^r Gerry observed that Mas^{ts} was opposed to an adjournment, because
they saw no new ground of compromise. But as it seemed to be the opinion
of so many States that a trial sh^d be made, the State would now concur
in the adjournm^t.
M^r Rutlidge could see no need of an adjourn^t because he could see no
chance of a compromise. The little States were fixt. They had repeatedly
& solemnly declared themselves to be so. All that the large States then
had to do was to decide whether they would yield or not. For his part he
conceived that altho' we could not do what we thought best, in itself,
we ought to do something. Had we not better keep the Gov^t up a little
longer, hoping that another Convention will supply our omissions, than
abandon every thing to hazard. Our Constituents will be very little
satisfied with us if we take the latter course.
M^r Randolph & M^r King renewed the motion to adjourn till tomorrow.
On the question. Mas. ay. Con^t no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. div^d.
Adjourned
* * * * *
On the morning following before the hour of the Convention a number of
the members from the larger States, by common agreement met for the
purpose of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of
the vote in favor of an equal Representation in the 2^d branch, and the
apparent inflexibility of the smaller States on that point. Several
members from the latter States also attended. The time was wasted in
vague conversation on the subject, without any specific proposition or
agreement. It appeared indeed that the opinions of the members who
disliked the equality of votes differed much as to the importance of
that point, and as to the policy of risking a failure of any general act
of the Convention by inflexibly opposing it. Several of them supposing
that no good Governm^t could or would be built on that foundation, and
that as a division of the convention into two opinions was unavoidable;
it would be better that the side comprising the principal States, and a
majority of the people of America, should propose a scheme of Gov^t to
the States, than that a scheme should be proposed on the other side,
would have concurred in a firm opposition to the smaller States, and in
a separate recommendation, if eventually necessary. Others seemed
inclined to yield to the smaller States, and to concur in such an Act
however imperfect & exceptionable, as might be agreed on by the
Convention as a body, tho' decided by a bare majority of States and by a
minority of the people of the U. States. It is probable that the result
of this consultation satisfied the smaller States that they had nothing
to apprehend from a Union of the larger, in any plan whatever ag^{st}
the equality of votes in the 2^d branch.
TUESDAY JULY 17. IN CONVENTION.
M^r Govern^r Morris, moved to reconsider the whole Resolution agreed to
yesterday concerning the constitution of the 2 branches of the
Legislature. His object was to bring the House to a consideration in the
abstract of the powers necessary to be vested in the general Government.
It had been said, Let us know how the Gov^t is to be modelled, and then
we can determine what powers can be properly given to it. He thought the
most eligible course was, first to determine on the necessary powers,
and then so to modify the Govern^t as that it might be justly & properly
enabled to administer them. He feared if we proceeded to a consideration
of the powers, whilst the vote of yesterday including an equality of the
States in the 2^d branch, remained in force, a reference to it, either
mental or expressed, would mix itself with the merits of every question
concerning the powers.--This motion was not seconded. (It was probably
approved by several members who either despaired of success, or were
apprehensive that the attempt would inflame the jealousies of the
smaller States.)
The 6^{th} Resol^n in the Report of the Com^e of the Whole relating to
the powers, which had been postponed in order to consider the 7 & 8^{th}
relating to the constitution of the Nat^l Legislature, was now resumed.
M^r Sherman observed that it would be difficult to draw the line between
the powers of the Gen^l Legislature, and those to be left with the
States; that he did not like the definition contained in the Resolution,
and proposed in place of the words "individual legislation" line 4.
inclusive, to insert "to make laws binding on the people of the United
States in all cases which may concern the common interests of the Union;
but not to interfere with the Government of the individual States in any
matters of internal police which respect the Gov^t of such States only,
and wherein the general welfare of the U. States is not concerned."
M^r Wilson 2^{ded} the amendment as better expressing the general
principle.
M^r Gov^r Morris opposed it. The internal police, as it would be called
& understood by the States ought to be infringed in many cases, as in
the case of paper money & other tricks by which Citizens of other States
may be affected.
M^r Sherman, in explanation of his idea read an enumeration of powers,
including the power of levying taxes on trade, but not the power of
_direct taxation_.
M^r Gov^r Morris remarked the omission, and inferred that for the
deficiencies of taxes on consumption, it must have been the meaning of
Mr. Sherman, that the Gen^l Gov^t should recur to quotas & requisitions,
which are subversive of the idea of Gov^t.
M^r Sherman acknowledged that his enumeration did not include direct
taxation. Some provision he supposed must be made for supplying the
deficiency of other taxation, but he had not formed any.
On Question on M^r Sherman's motion it passed in the negative
Mas. no. Con^t ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Bedford moved that the 2^d member of Resolution 6. be so altered as
to read, "and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general
interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are
severally incompetent, or in which the harmony of the U. States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation."
M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ds} the motion.
M^r Randolph. This is a formidable idea indeed. It involves the power of
violating all the laws and constitutions of the States, and of
intermeddling with their police. The last member of the sentence is also
superfluous, being included in the first.
M^r Bedford. It is not more extensive or formidable than the clause as
it stands: _no State_ being _separately_ competent to legislate for the
_general interest_ of the Union.
On question for agreeing to M^r Bedford's motion it passed in the
affirmative.
Mas. ay. Con^t no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the sentence as amended, it passed in the affirmative.
Mas. ay. Con^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
The next. "To negative all laws passed by the several States
contravening in the opinion of the Nat: Legislature the articles of
Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of y^e Union."
M^r Gov^r Morris opposed this power as likely to be terrible to the
States, and not necessary, if sufficient Legislative authority should be
given to the Gen^l Government.
M^r Sherman thought it unnecessary; as the Courts of the States would
not consider as valid any law contravening the Authority of the Union,
and which the legislature would wish to be negatived.
M^r L. Martin considered the power as improper & inadmissible. Shall all
the laws of the States be sent up to the Gen^l Legislature before they
shall be permitted to operate?
M^r Madison, considered the negative on the laws of the States as
essential to the efficacy & security of the Gen^l Gov^t. The necessity
of a general Gov^t proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue
their particular interests in opposition to the general interest. This
propensity will continue to disturb the system, unless effectually
controuled. Nothing short of a negative on their laws will controul it.
They will pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before
they can be repealed by the Gen^l Legisl^{re} or be set aside by the
National Tribunals. Confidence can not be put in the State Tribunals as
guardians of the National authority and interests. In all the States
these are more or less depend^t on the Legislatures. In Georgia they are
appointed annually by the Legislature. In R. Island the Judges who
refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced, and others
substituted, by the Legislature who would be the willing instruments of
the wicked & arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of negativing the
improper laws of the States is at once the most mild & certain means of
preserving the harmony of the system. Its utility is sufficiently
displayed in the British system. Nothing could maintain the harmony &
subordination of the various parts of the empire, but the prerogative by
which the Crown, stifles in the birth every Act of every part tending to
discord or encroachment. It is true the prerogative is sometimes
misapplied thro' ignorance or a partiality to one particular part of y^e
empire; but we have not the same reason to fear such misapplications in
our System. As to the sending all laws up to the Nat^l Legisl: that
might be rendered unnecessary by some emanation of the power into the
States, so far at least as to give a temporary effect to laws of
immediate necessity.
M^r Gov^r Morris was more & more opposed to the negative. The proposal
of it would disgust all the States. A law that ought to be negatived
will be set aside in the Judiciary departm^t and if that security should
fail; may be repealed by a Nation^l law.
M^r Sherman. Such a power involves a wrong principle, to wit, that a law
of a State contrary to the articles of the Union would if not negatived,
be valid & operative.
M^r Pinkney urged the necessity of the Negative.
On the question for agreeing to the power of negativing laws of States
&c. it passed in the negative.
Mas. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Luther Martin moved the following resolution "that the Legislative
acts of the U. S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the articles of Union
and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U. S. shall
be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or
treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and
inhabitants--& that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the
individual States to the contrary notwithstanding" which was agreed to
nem: con:
9^{th} Resol: "that Nat^l Executive consist of a single person," Ag^d to
nem. con.
"To be chosen by the National Legisl:"
M^r Govern^r Morris was pointedly ag^{st} his being so chosen. He will
be the mere creature of the Legisl: if appointed & impeachable by that
body. He ought to be elected by the people at large, by the freeholders
of the Country. That difficulties attend this mode, he admits. But they
have been found superable in N. Y. & in Con^t and would he believed be
found so, in the case of an Executive for the U. States. If the people
should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished
character, or services; some man, if he might so speak, of continental
reputation. If the Legislature elect, it will be the work of intrigue,
of cabal, and of faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a
conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the
appointment. He moved to strike out "National Legislature," & insert
"citizens of the U. S."
M^r Sherman thought that the sense of the Nation would be better
expressed by the Legislature, than by the people at large. The latter
will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and besides will
never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will generally vote
for some man in their own State, and the largest State will have the
best chance for the appointment. If the choice be made by the
Legisl^{re} a majority of voices may be made necessary to constitute an
election.
M^r Wilson. Two arguments have been urged ag^{st} an election of the
Executive Magistrate by the people. 1 the example of Poland where an
Election of the supreme Magistrate is attended with the most dangerous
commotions. The cases he observed were totally dissimilar. The Polish
nobles have resources & dependants which enable them to appear in force,
and to threaten the Republic as well as each other. In the next place
the electors all assemble in one place; which would not be the case with
us. The 2^d arg^t is that a _majority_ of the people would never concur.
It might be answered that the concurrence of a majority of the people is
not a necessary principle of election, nor required as such in any of
the States. But allowing the objection all its force, it may be obviated
by the expedient used in Mass^{ts}, where the Legislature by majority
of voices, decide in case a majority of people do not concur in favor of
one of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good
nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue & cabal. A
particular objection with him ag^{st} an absolute election by the
Legisl^{re} was that the Exec: in that case would be too dependent to
stand the mediator between the intrigues & sinister views of the
Representatives and the general liberties & interests of the people.
M^r Pinkney did not expect this question would again have been brought
forward: An Election by the people being liable to the most obvious &
striking objections. They will be led by a few active & designing men.
The most populous States by combining in favor of the same individual
will be able to carry their points. The Nat^l Legislature being most
immediately interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most
attentive to the choice of a fit man to carry them properly into
execution.
M^r Gov^r Morris. It is said that in case of an election by the people
the populous States will combine & elect whom they please. Just the
reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If there be any
combination it must be among their representatives in the Legislature.
It is said the people will be led by a few designing men. This might
happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the
continent. In the election of a Gov^r of N. York, it sometimes is the
case in particular spots, that the activity & intrigues of little
partizans are successful, but the general voice of the State is never
influenced by such artifices. It is said the multitude will be
uninformed. It is true they would be uninformed of what passed in the
Legislative Conclave, if the election were to be made there; but they
will not be uninformed of those great & illustrious characters which
have merited their esteem & confidence. If the Executive be chosen by
the Nat^l Legislature, he will not be independent on it; and if not
independent, usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be
the consequence. This was the case in England in the last Century. It
has been the case in Holland, where their Senates have engrossed all
power. It has been the case every where. He was surprised that an
election by the people at large should ever have been likened to the
polish election of the first Magistrate. An election by the Legislature
will bear a real likeness to the election by the Diet of Poland. The
great must be the electors in both cases, and the corruption & cabal
w^{ch} are known to characterize the one would soon find their way into
the other. Appointments made by numerous bodies, are always worse than
those made by single responsible individuals, or by the people at large.
Col. Mason. It is curious to remark the different language held at
different times. At one moment we are told that the Legislature is
entitled to thorough confidence, and to indefinite power. At another,
that it will be governed by intrigue & corruption, and cannot be trusted
at all. But not to dwell on this inconsistency he would observe that a
Government which is to last ought at least to be practicable. Would this
be the case if the proposed election should be left to the people at
large. He conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a
proper character for Chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to
refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent of the Country
renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to
judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.
M^r Wilson, could not see the contrariety stated (by Col. Mason.) The
Legisl^{re} might deserve confidence in some respects, and distrust in
others. In acts which were to affect them & y^r Constituents precisely
alike confidence was due. In others jealousy was warranted. The
appointment to great offices, where the Legisl^{re} might feel many
motives, not common to the public confidence was surely misplaced. This
branch of business it was notorious, was the most corruptly managed of
any that had been committed to legislative bodies.
M^r Williamson, conceived that there was the same difference between an
election in this case, by the people and by the legislature, as between
an app^t by lot, and by choice. There are at present distinguished
characters, who are known perhaps to almost every man. This will not
always be the case. The people will be sure to vote for some man in
their own State, and the largest State will be sure to succeed. This
will not be Virg^a however. Her slaves will have no suffrage. As the
Salary of the Executive will be fixed, and he will not be eligible a 2^d
time, there will not be such a dependence on the Legislature as has been
imagined.
Question on an election by the people instead of the Legislature, which
passed in the negative.
Mas. no. Con^t no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r L. Martin moved that the Executive be chosen by Electors appointed
by the several Legislatures of the individual States.
M^r Broome 2^{ds}. On the Question, it passed in the negative.
Mas. no. Con^t no. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question on the words, "to be chosen by the Nation^l Legislature"
it passed unanimously in the affirmative
"For the term of seven years"--postponed nem. con. on motion of M^r
Houston and Gov. Morris
"to carry into execution the nation^l laws"--agreed to nem. con.
"to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for,"--agreed to
nem. con.
"to be ineligible a second time"--M^r Houston moved to strike out this
clause.
M^r Sherman 2^{ds} the motion.
M^r Gov^r Morris espoused the motion. The ineligibility proposed by the
clause as it stood tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior,
the hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment. It was saying to him,
make hay while the sun shines.
On the question for striking out, as moved by M^r Houston, it passed in
the affirmative
Mas. ay. Con^t ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
"For the term of 7 years," resumed.
M^r Broom was for a shorter term since the Executive Magistrate was now
to be re-eligible. Had he remained ineligible a 2^d time, he should have
preferred a longer term.
Doc^r M^cClurg moved[134] to strike out 7 years, and insert "during good
behavior." By striking out the words declaring him not re-eligible, he
was put into a situation that would keep him dependent forever on the
Legislature; and he conceived the independence of the Executive to be
equally essential with that of the Judiciary department.
[134] The probable object of this motion was merely to
enforce the argument against the re-eligibility of the
Executive magistrate by holding out a tenure during good
behaviour as the alternate for keeping him independent of
the legislature.--Note in Madison's handwriting.
M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ded} the motion. He expressed great pleasure in
hearing it. This was the way to get a good Government. His fear that so
valuable an ingredient would not be attained had led him to take the
part he had done. He was indifferent how the Executive should be chosen,
provided he held his place by this tenure.
M^r Broome highly approved the motion. It obviated all his difficulties
M^r Sherman considered such a tenure as by no means safe or admissible.
As the Executive Magistrate is now re-eligible, he will be on good
behavior as far as will be necessary. If he behaves well he will be
continued; if otherwise, displaced, on a succeeding election.
M^r Madison.[135] If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that
the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each
other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislure, if
dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment. Why was
it determined that the Judges should not hold their places by such a
tenure? Because they might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by
an undue complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the virtual
expositor, as well as the maker of the laws. In like manner a dependence
of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as
well as the maker of laws; & then according to the observation of
Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a
tyrannical manner. There was an analogy between the Executive &
Judiciary departments in several respects. The latter executed the laws
in certain cases as the former did in others. The former expounded &
applied them for certain purposes, as the latter did for others. The
difference between them seemed to consist chiefly in two
circumstances--1. the collective interest & security were much more in
the power belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary department.
2. in the administration of the former much greater latitude is left to
opinion and discretion than in the administration of the latter. But if
the 2^d consideration proves that it will be more difficult to establish
a rule sufficiently precise for trying the Execut: than the Judges, &
forms an objection to the same tenure of office, both considerations
prove that it might be more dangerous to suffer a Union between the
Executive & Legisl: powers, than between the Judiciary & Legislative
powers. He conceived it to be absolutely necessary to a well constituted
Republic that the two first sh^d be kept distinct & independent of each
other. Whether the plan proposed by the motion was a proper one was
another question, as it depended on the practicability of instituting a
tribunal for impeachm^{ts} as certain & as adequate in the one case as
in the other. On the other hand, respect for the mover entitled his
proposition to a fair hearing & discussion, until a less objectionable
expedient should be applied for guarding ag^{st} a dangerous union of
the Legislative & Executive departments.
[135] The view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in
parrying the animadversions likely to fall on the motion of
D^r M^cClurg, for whom J. M. had a particular regard. The
Doc^r though possessing talents of the highest order was
modest & unaccustomed to exert them in public debate.--Note
in Madison's handwriting.
Col. Mason. This motion was made some time ago & negatived by a very
large majority. He trusted that it w^d be again negatived. It w^d be
impossible to define the misbehaviour in such a manner as to subject it
to a proper trial; and perhaps still more impossible to compel so high
an offender holding his office by such a tenure to submit to a trial. He
considered an Executive during good behavior as a softer name only for
an Executive for life. And that the next would be an easy step to
hereditary Monarchy. If the motion should finally succeed, he might
himself live to see such a Revolution. If he did not it was probable his
children or grand children would. He trusted there were few men in that
House who wished for it. No state he was sure had so far revolted from
Republican principles as to have the least bias in its favor.
M^r Madison, was not apprehensive of being thought to favor any step
towards monarchy. The real object with him was to prevent its
introduction. Experience had proved a tendency in our governments to
throw all power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the
States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures
omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the
instability & encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or
other would be inevitable. The preservation of Republican Gov^t
therefore required some expedient for the purpose, but required
evidently at the same time that in devising it, the genuine principles
of that form should be kept in view.
M^r Gov^r Morris was as little a friend to monarchy as any gentleman. He
concurred in the opinion that the way to keep out monarchical Gov^t was
to establish such a Repub. Gov^t as w^d make the people happy and
prevent a desire of change.
Doc^r McClurg was not so much afraid of the shadow of monarchy as to be
unwilling to approach it; nor so wedded to Republican Gov^t as not to be
sensible of the tyrannies that had been & may be exercised under that
form. It was an essential object with him to make the Executive
independent of the Legislature; and the only mode left for effecting it,
after the vote destroying his ineligibility a second time, was to
appoint him during good behavior.
On the question for inserting "during good behavior" in place of '7
years (with a re-eligibility)' it passed in the negative,
Mas. no. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.[136]
[136] (This vote is not considered as any certain index of
opinion, as a number in the affirmative probably had it
chiefly in view to alarm those attached to a dependence of
the Executive on the Legislature, & thereby facilitate some
final arrangement of a contrary tendency. The avowed friends
of an Executive, during good behaviour were not more than
three or four, nor is it certain they would finally have
adhered to such a tenure, an independence of the three great
departments of each other, as far as possible, and the
responsibility of all to the will of the community seemed to
be generally admitted as the true basis of a well
constructed government.)--Note in Madison's hand, except
from the words "nor is it certain" etc., which is in the
hand of his wife's brother, John C. Payne.
On the motion "to strike out seven years" it passed in the negative,
Mas. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.[137]
[137] (There was no debate on this motion. The apparent
object of many in the affirmative was to secure the
re-eligibility by shortening the term, and of many in the
negative to embarrass the plan of referring the appointment
and dependence of the Executive to the Legislature.)--Note
in Madison's hand.
It was now unanimously agreed that the vote which had struck out the
words "to be ineligible a second time" should be reconsidered to-morrow.
Adj^d.
WEDNESDAY JULY 18. IN CONVENTION.
On motion of M^r L. Martin to fix tomorrow for reconsidering the vote
concerning "eligibility of the Exec^{tive} a 2^d time" it passed in the
affirmative.
Mas. ay. Con^t ay. N. J. absent. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay.
V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. absent.
The residue of the Resol. 9. concerning the Executive was postp^d till
tomorrow.
Resol. 10. that Executive sh^l have a right to negative legislative acts
not afterwards passed by 2/3 of each branch, agreed to nem. con.
Resol. 11. "that a Nat^l Judiciary shall be estab^d to consist of one
supreme tribunal", ag^d to nem. con.
"The judges of which to be appoint^d by the 2^d branch of the Nat^l
Legislature,"
M^r Ghorum, w^d prefer an appointment by the 2^d branch to an appointm^t
by the whole Legislature; but he thought even that branch too numerous,
and too little personally responsible, to ensure a good choice. He
suggested that the Judges be appointed by the Execu^{ve} with the advice
& consent of the 2^d branch, in the mode prescribed by the constitution
of Mas^{ts}. This mode had been long practised in that country, & was
found to answer perfectly well.
M^r Wilson, still w^d prefer an appointm^t by the Executive; but if that
could not be attained, w^d prefer in the next place, the mode suggested
by M^r Ghorum. He thought it his duty however to move in the first
instance "that the Judges be appointed by the Executive." M^r Gov^r
Morris 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r L. Martin was strenuous for an app^t by the 2^d branch. Being taken
from all the States it w^d be best informed of characters & most capable
of making a fit choice.
M^r Sherman concurred in the observations of M^r Martin, adding that the
Judges ought to be diffused, which would be more likely to be attended
to by the 2^d branch, than by the Executive.
M^r Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges may depend in some degree
on the mode of trying impeachments of the Executive. If the Judges were
to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely ought not to be
appointed by the Executive. There were insuperable objections besides
ag^{st} referring the appointment to the Executive. He mentioned as one,
that as the Seat of Gov^t must be in some one State, and as the
Executive would remain in office for a considerable time, for 4. 5. or 6
years at least, he would insensibly form local & personal attachments
within the particular State that would deprive equal merit elsewhere, of
an equal chance of promotion.
M^r Ghorum. As the Executive will be responsible in point of character
at least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will
be careful to look through all the States for proper characters. The
Senators will be as likely to form their attachments at the seat of
Gov^t where they reside, as the Executive. If they cannot get the man of
the particular State to which they may respectively belong, they will be
indifferent to the rest. Public bodies feel no personal responsibility,
and give full play to intrigue & cabal. Rh. Island is a full
illustration of the insensibility to character produced by a
participation of numbers in dishonorable measures, and of the length to
which a Public body may carry wickedness & cabal.
M^r Gov^r Morris supposed it would be improper for an impeachm^t of the
Executive to be tried before the Judges. The latter would in such case
be drawn into intrigues with the Legislature and an impartial trial
would be frustrated. As they w^d be much about the Seat of Gov^t they
might even be previously consulted & arrangements might be made for a
prosecution of the Executive. He thought therefore that no argument
could be drawn from the probability of such a plan of impeachments
ag^{st} the motion before the House.
M^r Madison suggested that the Judges might be appointed by the
Executive, with the concurrence of 1/3 at least, of the 2^d branch. This
would unite the advantage of responsibility in the Executive with the
security afforded in the 2^d branch ag^{st} any incautious or corrupt
nomination by the Executive.
M^r Sherman, was clearly for an election by the Senate. It would be
composed of men nearly equal to the Executive, and would of course have
on the whole more wisdom. They would bring into their deliberations a
more diffusive knowledge of characters. It would be less easy for
candidates to intrigue with them, than with the Executive Magistrate.
For these reasons he thought there would be a better security for a
proper choice in the Senate than in the Executive.
M^r Randolph. It is true that when the app^t of the Judges was vested in
the 2^d branch an equality of votes had not been given to it. Yet he had
rather leave the appointm^t there than give it to the Executive. He
thought the advantage of personal responsibility might be gained in the
Senate by requiring the respective votes of the members to be entered on
the Journal. He thought too that the hope of receiving app^{ts} would be
more diffusive if they depended on the Senate, the members of which w^d
be diffusively known, than if they depended on a single man who could
not be personally known to a very great extent; and consequently that
opposition to the System, would be so far weakened.
M^r Bedford thought there were solid reasons ag^{st} leaving the
appointment to the Executive. He must trust more to information than the
Senate. It would put it in his power to gain over the larger States, by
gratifying them with a preference of their Citizens. The responsibility
of the Executive so much talked of was chimerical. He could not be
punished for mistakes.
M^r Ghorum remarked that the Senate could have no better information
than the Executive. They must like him, trust to information from the
members belonging to the particular State where the candidate resided.
The Executive would certainly be more answerable for a good appointment,
as the whole blame of a bad one would fall on him alone. He did not mean
that he would be answerable under any other penalty than that of public
censure, which with honorable minds was a sufficient one.
On the question for referring the appointment of the Judges to the
Executive, instead of the 2^d branch
Mas. ay. Con^t no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. absent.
M^r Ghorum moved "that the Judges be nominated and appointed by the
Executive, by & with the advice & consent of the 2^d branch & every such
nomination shall be made at least ---- days prior to such appointment."
This mode he said had been ratified by the experience of a 140 years in
Massachus^{ts}. If the app^t should be left to either branch of the
Legislature, it will be a mere piece of jobbing.
M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ded} & supported the motion.
M^r Sherman thought it less objectionable than an absolute appointment
by the Executive; but disliked it, as too much fettering the Senate.
Question on M^r Ghorum's motion
Mas. ay. Con^t no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. absent.
M^r Madison moved that the Judges should be nominated by the Executive &
such nomination should become an appointment if not disagreed to within
---- days by 2/3 of the 2^d branch.
M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ded} the motion. By co[~m]on consent the
consideration of it was postponed till tomorrow.
"To hold their offices during good behavior" & "to receive fixed
salaries" agreed to nem: con:.
"In which (salaries of Judges) no increase or diminution shall be made
so as to affect the persons at the time in office."
M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out "or increase." He thought the
Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as circumstances
might require, and that this would not create any improper dependence in
the Judges.
Doc^r Franklin was in favor of the motion. Money may not only become
plentier, but the business of the department may increase as the Country
becomes more populous.
M^r Madison. The dependence will be less if the _increase alone_ should
be permitted, but it will be improper even so far to permit a
dependence. Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be in
agitation in the legislature, an undue complaisance in the former may be
felt towards the latter. If at such a crisis there should be in Court
suits to which leading members of the Legislature may be parties, the
Judges will be in a situation which ought not to be suffered, if it can
be prevented. The variations in the value of money, may be guarded
ag^{st} by taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of permanent
value. The increase of business will be provided for by an increase of
the number who are to do it. An increase of salaries may easily be so
contrived as not to affect persons in office.
M^r Gov^r Morris. The value of money may not only alter but the State of
Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of wheat, the same
value would not be the same compensation. The Amount of salaries must
always be regulated by the manners & the style of living in a Country.
The increase of business can not be provided for in the supreme tribunal
in the way that has been mentioned. All the business of a certain
description whether more or less must be done in that single tribunal.
Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for additional
business. Additional compensation therefore ought not to be prohibited.
On the question for striking out "or increase"
Mas. ay. Con^t ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a no. N. C. no.
S. C. ay. Geo. absent
The whole clause as amended was then agreed to nem: con:
12. Resol: "that Nat^l Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior
tribunals"
M^r Butler could see no necessity for such tribunals. The State
Tribunals might do the business.
M^r L. Martin concurred. They will create jealousies & oppositions in
the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere.
M^r Ghorum. There are in the States already federal Courts with
jurisdiction for trial of piracies &c. committed on the Seas. No
complaints have been made by the States or the Courts of the States.
Inferior tribunals are essential to render the authority of the Nat^l
Legislature effectual.
M^r Randolph observed that the Courts of the States can not be trusted
with the administration of the National laws. The objects of
jurisdiction are such as will often place the General & local policy at
variance.
M^r Gov^r Morris urged also the necessity of such a provision.
M^r Sherman was willing to give the power to the Legislature but wished
them to make use of the State Tribunals whenever it could be done with
safety to the general interest.
Col. Mason thought many circumstances might arise not now to be
foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary.
On question for agreeing to 12. Resol: empowering the National
Legislature to appoint "inferior tribunals," Ag^d to nem. con.
"Impeachments of national officers," were struck out on motion for the
purpose.
13. Resol: "The jurisdiction of the Nat^l Judiciary." Several criticisms
having been made on the definition; it was proposed by M^r Madison so to
alter it as to read thus--"that the jurisdiction shall extend to all
cases arising under the Nat^l laws; And to such other questions as may
involve the Nat^l peace & harmony," which was agreed to, nem. con.
Resol. 14. providing for the admission of new States agreed to, nem.
con.
Resol. 15. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Cong^s
&c. & for the completion of their engagements."
M^r Gov^r Morris thought the assumption of their engagements might as
well be omitted; and that Cong^s ought not to be continued till all the
States should adopt the reform; since it may become expedient to give
effect to it whenever a certain number of States shall adopt it.
M^r Madison the clause can mean nothing more than that provision ought
to be made for preventing an interregnum; which must exist in the
interval between the adoption of the New Gov^t and the commencement of
its operation, if the old Gov^t should cease on the first of these
events.
M^r Wilson did not entirely approve of the manner in which the clause
relating to the engagements of Cong^s was expressed; but he thought some
provision on the subject would be proper in order to prevent any
suspicion that the obligations of the Confederacy might be dissolved
along with the Govern^t under which they were contracted.
On the question on the 1^{st} part--relating to the continuance of
Cong^s.
Mas. no. Con^t no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay.
S. C.[138] ay. Geo. no.
[138] In the printed Journal, S. Carolina--no. Note in Madison's
hand.
The 2^d part as to completion of their engagements, disag^d to, nem.
con.
Resol. 16. "That a Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to
be guaranteed to each State by the U. States."
M^r Gov^r Morris, thought the Resol: very objectionable. He should be
very unwilling that such laws as exist in R. Island should be
guaranteed.
M^r Wilson. The object is merely to secure the States ag^{st} dangerous
commotions, insurrections and rebellions.
Col. Mason. If the Gen^l Gov^t should have no right to suppress
rebellions ag^{st} particular States, it will be in a bad situation
indeed. As Rebellions ag^{st} itself originate in & ag^{st} individual
States, it must remain a passive Spectator of its own subversion.
M^r Randolph. The Resol^n has 2. objects. 1. to secure a Republican
Government. 2. to suppress domestic commotions. He urged the necessity
of both these provisions.
M^r Madison moved to substitute "that the Constitutional authority of
the States shall be guaranteed to them respectively ag^{st} domestic as
well as foreign violence."
Doc^r McClurg seconded the motion.
M^r Houston was afraid of perpetuating the existing Constitutions of the
States. That of Georgia was a very bad one, and he hoped would be
revised & amended. It may also be difficult for the Gen^l Gov^t to
decide between contending parties each of which claim the sanction of
the Constitution.
M^r L. Martin was for leaving the States to suppress Rebellions
themselves.
M^r Ghorum thought it strange that a Rebellion should be known to exist
in the Empire, and the Gen^l Gov^t sh^d be restrained from interposing
to subdue it. At this rate an enterprising Citizen might erect the
standard of Monarchy in a particular State, might gather together
partizans from all quarters, might extend his views from State to State,
and threaten to establish a tyranny over the whole & the Gen^l Gov^t be
compelled to remain an inactive witness of its own destruction. With
regard to different parties in a State; as long as they confine their
disputes to words, they will be harmless to the Gen^l Gov^t & to each
other. If they appeal to the sword, it will then be necessary for the
Gen^l Gov^t, however difficult it may be to decide on the merits of
their contest, to interpose & put an end to it.
M^r Carrol. Some such provision is essential. Every State ought to wish
for it. It has been doubted whether it is a casus federis at the
present. And no room ought to be left for such a doubt hereafter.
M^r Randolph moved to add as an amend^t to the motion; "and that no
State be at liberty to form any other than a Republican Gov^t." M^r
Madison seconded the motion.
M^r Rutlidge thought it unnecessary to insert any guarantee. No doubt
could be entertained but that Cong^s had the authority if they had the
means to co-operate with any State in subduing a rebellion. It was &
would be involved in the nature of the thing.
M^r Wilson moved as a better expression of the idea, "that a Republican
form of Governm^t shall be guaranteed to each State & that each State
shall be protected ag^{st} foreign & domestic violence.
This seeming to be well received, M^r Madison & M^r Randolph withdrew
their propositions & on the Question for agreeing to M^r Wilson's
motion, it passed nem. con.
Adj^d.
END OF VOL. 1.
Transcriber Notes:
Passages in italics were indicated by _underscores_.
Small caps were replaced with ALL CAPS.
Throughout the document, the oe ligature was replaced with "oe".
Throughout the document, a tilded m is represented by [~m], and a
tilded nn is represented by [~nn].
Throughout the document, a single superscripted letter is represented by
that single letter preceded by a caret, and more than one superscripted
letters are represented by the letters enclosed by curly brackets. Thus,
the word "y^e" represents a word where the "y" is normal and the "e" is
superscripted; and the word "2^{dnd}" represents a word where the "2" is
normal and the "dnd" is superscripted. In both conventions, it is
assumed that a dot appeared below the superscripted letters, since in
the original text a dot was often (but not always) present under the
superscripted letters. Thus, "2^{dnd}" in the present text would
represent a normal digit "2" followed directly by the superscripted
letters "dnd" with a single dot below the set of three letters.
The Contents of Volume I. page incorrectly lists the Chronology as
starting on page xix, where it starts on page xv.
The illustrations have been moved so that they do not break up
paragraphs and so that they are next to the text they illustrate. Thus
the page number of the illustration might not match the page number in
the List of Fac-Similes, and the order of illustrations may not be the
same in the List of Fac-Similes and in the book.
This document was filled with errors and inconsistencies in punctuations
and hyphenation. For example, usually the word re-eligible is
hyphenated, but sometimes it is not; sometimes; reinstated is hyphenated
but sometimes it is not; and usually the comma is used as a thousand
mark, but sometimes a period is used for that purpose. Also, the
abbreviations were not uniform (e.g., Mas. v. Mass.), which were only
corrected when it was clear which abbreviation was considered correct
at the time printed. Another example is the abbreviation for Resolution,
which was sometimes Resol:^n, sometimes Resol^n, and sometimes Resol.^n
Sometimes "nem: con." was used, and sometimes "nem. con." was used. The
only time errors were corrected was when it was very clear that an error
was made, and it was clear how the error should be corrected, and those
corrections are listed below. Two exceptions are the case where a period
is missing at the end of a sentence or missing at the end of an
abbreviation, both of which happened so often that those corrections
were made but were not listed below.
Similarly, since the English language has changed so much in the past
two hundred years, variations in spelling were only corrected was when
it was very clear that an error was made, and it was clear how the error
should be corrected. Those corrections are listed below.
In Footnote 25, two instances of "thier" was replaced with "their".
On page 23, a comma was added after "Massachusetts".
On page 23, a comma was added after "New York".
On page 39, a comma was added after "Savannah Georgian".
On page 42, the semicolon after "for general propositions" was replaced
with a period.
On page 49, a quotation mark was added after "be instituted.".
On page 67, "tranquility" was replaced with "tranquillity".
On page 80, "is to to be" was replaced with "is to be".
On page 85, a period was added after "2".
On page 85, a period was added after "4".
On page 87, a comma was added after "the landed".
On page 104, "that" was replaced with "than".
On page 105, "M^r Bedford In" was replaced with "M^r Bedford, in".
On page 109, "M^r Randolph, urged" was replaced with "M^r Randolph
urged".
On page 117, "against the 43." was replaced with "against the 43,".
On page 119, "it was formerly practised" was replaced with "It was
formerly practised".
On page 119, "Wilsons" was replaced with "Wilson's".
On page 128, a closing quotation mark was placed after "7 years."
On page 143, a period was added after "2".
On page 159, "unamimous" was replaced with "unanimous".
On page 162, the quotation mark was removed before "The supreme
Legislative power".
In Footnote 89, "conpensation" was replaced with "compensation".
In Footnote 89, "misdemesnor" was replaced with "misdemeanor".
In Footnote 89, "Where shall be" was replaced with "There shall be".
In Footnote 89, "§[2]" was replaced with "§ 2.".
On page 164, "Comittee" was replaced with "Committee".
On page 180, "tranquility" was replaced with "tranquillity".
On page 184, "necessaryly" was replaced with "necessarily".
In Footnote 95, "posseses" was replaced with "possesses".
On page 211, "Wiliamson" was replaced with "Williamson".
On page 217, in two instances, "Masst^s" was replaced with "Mass^{ts}".
On page 220, a comma was deleted after "M^r Sherman".
On page 233, a period was placed after "1".
On page 236, a quotation mark was placed after "behaviour".
On page 256, a comma was placed after "Antient Greece".
On page 264, a semicolon was replaced with a period.
On page 271, "Comittee" was replaced with "Committee".
On page 274, "prepondenancy" was replaced with "preponderancy".
On page 285, "Elsewth" was replaced with "Elseworth".
On page 285, "Contstitution" was replaced with "Constitution".
On page 286, "honorabl" was replaced with "honorable".
On page 292, "occcasion" was replaced with "occasion".
On page 293, "N J." was replaced with "N. J.".
On page 322, "Teusday" was replaced with "Tuesday".
On page 322, "Hamshire" was replaced with "Hampshire".
On page 323, "Hamshire" was replaced with "Hampshire".
On page 323, "inhabts" was replaced with "inhab^{ts}".
On page 323, "brethern" was replaced with "brethren".
On page 330, "brethern" was replaced with "brethren".
On page 336, "Mississpi" was replaced with "Mississippi".
On page 340, "Mard" was replaced with "M^d".
On page 340, "S." was replaced with "S. C.".
On page 348, "Hamshire" was replaced with "Hampshire".
On page 356, "weekest" was replaced with "weakest".
On page 365, "orginal" was replaced with "original".
On page 372, the quotation mark was removed before "or in which the
harmony".
Throughout the document, there are instances of missing quotation marks,
but it is unclear where quotation marks should be added. In those cases,
the quotation marks were left as-is.
Throughout the document, "Maddison" was replaced with "Madison", and
"Sharman" was replaced with "Sherman".
Although the document refers more often to a Mr. Patterson, instead of
Mr. Paterson, some external sources indicate that the delegate's name
was Mr. Paterson. Both spellings were retained as-is.
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