Title: The Two Great Republics: Rome and the United States
Author: Lewis, James Hamilton
Language: English
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Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).

Small capital text has been replaced with all capitals.

Variations in spelling, punctuation and hyphenation have been retained
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Page 106: "Another leader, Cleon, a Silician". The transcriber has
replaced "Silician" with "Sicilian".


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TWO GREAT REPUBLICS [Illustration: RUINS OF THE ROMAN FORUM]



  THE TWO GREAT REPUBLICS

  ROME AND THE
  UNITED STATES

  _By_
  JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS

  [Illustration]

  RAND McNALLY & COMPANY
  CHICAGO        NEW YORK

  _Copyright, 1913_,
  BY RAND, MCNALLY & COMPANY

  The Rand-McNally Press
  _Chicago_



PREFACE


In this book I have proposed to compare conditions recorded in Roman
history with those existing in America that should warn, by reason of
the results at Rome. It is not the purpose of this volume to offer a
mere textbook or a scholastic essay on historical events. It is not
the purpose merely to record those events which led to the destruction
of the Roman republic, and with this end our work. The main purpose of
this book is to compare events as they transpired in the one republic
and in the other.

The political history of the Roman republic is throughout its whole
course a continuous contest between radicals and conservatives. The
striking resemblances between the basis of the political controversies
of Ancient Rome and the modern political and economic problems render
it almost impossible for any historian to approach the political
history of Rome entirely free from prejudice. The bias of the
historian, whether toward the liberal or the conservative side in
politics, is sure to affect to a greater or less degree the pictures
which he paints of the events and actors in Roman history. To indicate
to some extent these varying views, and to present to the reader some
of the ideas of prominent writers on Roman history, a number of
extracts from the works of other authors have been inserted, as
occasion demanded, in this work. In the majority of cases such an
insertion should be understood as an attempt to present all sides of
some controverted historical question rather than as indicating the
approval by the author of the views expressed therein.

In arranging the perspective of this book, its main object has been
kept constantly in mind. The importance of events has been weighed
from the standpoint of their effect upon the decay and collapse of the
free political institutions of Rome; with the result that many
subjects, to which considerable space would be devoted in a general
Roman history, have been passed over with a mere notice, while other
events, perhaps of less popular interest, have been treated at length.

I would be false to the first sense of justice did I not here
acknowledge the aid I have obtained from Professor Albert H. Putney,
dean of the Webster College of Law, Chicago, and a lawyer of the state
of Illinois at the city of Chicago (my home), who has been the
principal contributor from whom I have received assistance, and much
that can be found in this book in the nature of real historical data,
and of the philosophy of reasoning from this data, is due to him, and
I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness and to give full credit for
the value of this work.

  JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS

  _United States Senate Chamber, Washington, D. C.
  September 1913._



CONTENTS


                                              PAGE

  _Preface_                                      5

   CHAP.

     I. THE TWO REPUBLICS                        9

    II. ROMAN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES            15

   III. THE FIRST GREAT MELTING POT             28

    IV. THE EARLY REPUBLIC                      35

     V. THE PERIOD OF FOREIGN CONQUEST          71

    VI. THE TRIBES, THE COLONIES, AND THE
         PROVINCES                              89

   VII. THE CRISIS--THE ATTEMPTED REFORMS
         OF THE GRACCHI                        100

  VIII. MARIUS AND SULLA                       168

    IX. POMPEY                                 218

     X. CICERO AND CATILINE                    228

    XI. JULIUS CÆSAR                           238

   XII. POST-MORTEM                            271

  XIII. THE COMPARISON                         286



  THE TWO GREAT REPUBLICS
  ROME
  AND
  THE UNITED STATES



CHAPTER I

THE TWO REPUBLICS

     "How like, how unlike, as we view them together."--_Holmes._


It is now nearly two thousand years since the curtain fell upon the
last act in the history of the Roman republic. During these twenty
centuries many other republics have flourished and passed away, while,
in turn, new republics have arisen to take the place of the earlier
ones; but no other fallen republic in the whole course of history has
attained to the same degree of importance, has possessed the same
degree of interest, or has exerted the same influence on the history
of the world, as did that of Rome. The five centuries of republican
institutions on the banks of the Tiber still remain the richest
quarry to which the student or historian of republican governments is
able to resort for his material.

"History," says Lord Macaulay, "is philosophy teaching by examples."
The most practical value of the study of history arises from the aid
which it can give us in understanding the present and in forecasting
the future. Bolingbroke, on the "Uses of History," commands its study
as a protection against the unexpected. The main purpose of any
American, who to-day studies the history of the greatest republic of
the ancient world, should be to discover whether or not the story of
the rise and fall of that government teaches any lessons which might
be of value to the American of to-day; whether the evils which were
the causes of the overthrow of the Roman republic find any counterpart
in the problems which agitate our own country.

One of the greatest of American orators, in urging Americans to draw
their historical lessons from the history of their own country, says
that "when we go back into ancient history, we are bewildered by the
differences of manners and institutions"; but sometimes it is with
the earliest of nations that the most striking comparisons may be
made, and from their history that the greatest lessons may be learned.

The truth is that the progress of mankind, during that small fragment
of the period of its existence upon this earth which we are permitted
to see by the light of history, has been very uneven in the extent of
its advances along the different lines of human progress. In the
fields of scientific discovery and of material results human
achievements, especially during the past century, have reached almost
into the realm of the marvelous; but in many other fields--those
relating to human reason, to knowledge of the human mind, to the
relation between man and man, and to the science of government--human
progress has been so slight that man's efforts in these directions
must still receive the verdict of failure.

The reason for this great discrepancy is perhaps not difficult to
discover. It is easy for the mass of mankind to accept and receive the
benefits which come to them from the struggles and mental efforts of
the few intellectual giants whom the human race from time to time
produces; but all this takes place with very little change in the
minds or emotions of the mass of humanity.

As, for example, the pages of Homer are studied, it is hard to say
whether the strongest impression left upon the mind of the reader is
that of the vast difference between the external life of that period
and of the twentieth century, or that of the striking similarity
between the qualities and emotions of the characters in these epics
and of the men and women of to-day.

In the field of the material world any comparison between the existing
conditions in the United States to-day and the conditions in any
ancient country could hardly be of any particular value; except,
perhaps, to indicate the great distance which has been traveled. In
the field of government and politics, however, the most valuable
comparison which it is possible to make with existing conditions in
the United States is not with the present conditions in any modern
country, nor is it with conditions of an earlier age in any
Anglo-Saxon or even Teutonic country. The greatest resemblance to the
existing conditions in the United States, both as to the character of
her politics and the nature of the problems which confront her, is to
be found in the great Roman republic of two thousand years ago.

In studying the decline and fall of the Roman republic it will appear
that this result was most directly brought about by the three
following causes:

1. Long before the time when Rome had attained to the height of her
power, great inequalities of wealth had arisen between the different
strata of the Roman citizens; the prosperity which came to Rome as a
result of her conquests was not distributed among her whole citizen
body. Indeed, while the wealth of the community as a whole was rapidly
increasing, the wealth of the great mass of the citizens was rapidly
decreasing, not only relatively but even absolutely. The acute stage
of the contest between the rich and the poor arose immediately after
the conclusion of the long contest between patricians and plebeians,
and at the time when, theoretically, all political distinctions and
privileges between citizens had disappeared. Yet, in fact, the
suffrage was then limited to the free citizen--the smallest class of
the humble or toiling numbers.

2. The influence of a large and constantly increasing class of
demagogues, possessed of knowledge of human nature and endowed with
skill in the management of men, yet entirely lacking in principle,
patriotism, or any sense of public obligation. These wrought upon a
mob of unqualified and reckless voters, who had nothing to lose and
were more anxious for immediate personal benefit than for the gradual
but permanent amelioration of the hardships of the class to which they
belonged.

3. The absence of any system of representative organization in the
Roman government.

The first two of these evils are to be found in the American republic
of to-day as well as in the Roman republic of the past; the last of
the three was a disadvantage suffered by Rome but outgrown by the
modern republics. This last evil will be treated by itself in the
succeeding chapter, while the two former will be shown in the
remainder of the volume as the political history of Rome is outlined.



CHAPTER II

ROMAN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES


In one important respect in the management of their political affairs,
the citizens of the Roman republic occupied a most disadvantageous
position in comparison with the citizens of any modern republic. The
greatest defect in the political organization of Rome, as of all other
ancient republics, lay in the utter absence of representative
legislative assemblies. The want of such institutions, in the absence
of all the other causes of disruption, might of itself have been
sufficient to have caused the downfall of the Roman republic.

The invention and development of such representative assemblies has
been the greatest contribution which the Anglo-Saxon race has made to
the political progress of the world. It is largely the existence of
such bodies which renders practical the continued existence of modern
republics, with jurisdiction over extended areas.

The Roman legislative bodies were, throughout the whole period of
Roman history, popular assemblies,--bodies of a character well
adapted for the government of the community when Rome was a mere
city-republic on the Tiber, but entirely inadequate to meet existing
conditions when the Roman territories had been extended far beyond the
confines of Latium and even beyond the shores of the Italian
peninsula.

The system of Roman popular assemblies was so complicated, and these
assemblies were so closely connected with every phase and every
important epoch in Roman political history, that it seems advisable to
stop at the outset and give a brief description of each of these
assemblies; of the manner in which they were constituted; of their
origin; and of the scope of their respective powers.

The oldest of these popular assemblies was the _comitia curiata_,
which for a considerable period was the only body in Rome with the
power to enact laws. This assembly was based upon the original
division of the people into _gentes_ and _curiæ_, and was throughout
its history a distinctively patrician body. The force of the contest
for a share in political power, waged by the plebeians, took in the
main the direction of stripping the comitia curiata of its power
instead of securing for the plebeians the right of membership in this
assembly.

After the creation of the _comitia centuriata_ the powers of the older
comitia rapidly declined, and were in the main limited to the control
of certain portions of the state religion; particularly those
religious formalities connected with elections, legislation, or the
investure of military leaders with the _imperium_. At a still later
time, the comitia curiata ceased to meet at all, and was merely
considered as being represented by the lictors.

The two important assemblies of the people during the period of the
history of the Roman republic were the comitia centuriata and the
_comitia tributa_. The comitia centuriata came into existence during
the period which lies on the border line between mythology and
history. In the legendary history of the Roman kingdom the creation of
this assembly is given as one of the reforms of Servius Tullius.
However this may be, it was undoubtedly in existence (although not in
the exact form which it later acquired) as early as the sixth century
before Christ. This assembly was reorganized some time before the
Punic Wars. In its final form the tribal division was taken as the
primary division of the people; each tribe was divided into five
classes, according to the wealth of the citizens, and each class into
two centuries, one century in each class consisting of _seniores_, or
men above forty-five years of age, and one consisting of _juniores_,
or men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The ten centuries
from each of the tribes made a total of three hundred fifty centuries,
to whom were added eighteen centuries of knights, making a total of
three hundred sixty-eight centuries. Every question submitted to the
comitia centuriata was decided by the vote of a majority of centuries.
Although all freemen had the right to vote in this assembly, the power
of the richer classes was disproportionately great. This was secured
by assigning to the five classes, into which each tribe was divided, a
very disproportionate number of citizens. The first class, to which
only the richest citizens were admitted, was very small in size, while
the fifth (and lowest) class was probably more numerous than the other
four classes combined.

The comitia centuriata was originally an assembly of the Roman
citizens in the form of an army, and the divisions into classes was
based upon the kind of equipment with which each soldier was able to
provide himself. The eighteen centuries of knights represented the
cavalry of the army. These centuries of knights possessed the right of
having their votes taken first, which constituted another advantage
for the wealthy classes. In 241 B.C. the knights were deprived of
their right of voting first, but this privilege was given to the
centuries of the first rank, assigned by lot.

The comitia tributa, or assembly of the tribes, first met in 489 B.C.,
it being convened by the Senate at that time to sit in judgment upon a
patrician, Coriolanus, the responsibility for whose fate the Senate
desired to throw upon the plebeians. This assembly was originally a
strictly plebeian body, and its original authority was limited to the
administration of the business of the plebeian order. The class
character of the comitia tributa is indicated by its original
name--_concilium tributum plebis_, the word _concilium_ indicating a
conference of a certain part of the people rather than a legislative
assembly of the whole people.

It would be hard to say whether it was the increased power of the
tribunes which developed the authority of the comitia tributa, or
whether it was the increased power of the comitia tributa which first
gave to the tribunes the vast power which they were ultimately able to
exercise in Rome. However this may be, the fact is evident that the
power of the comitia tributa and of the tribunes rose together. At a
later date, membership in the comitia tributa was not limited to the
plebeians, but the influence of the patricians in this assembly was
always inconsiderable and they generally absented themselves from its
meetings. Although the wealthy classes had no predominating influence
in the comitia tributa, its decision upon any question was far from
being, necessarily, the decision of the majority. Measures submitted
to the comitia tributa were carried or defeated by the vote of the
majority of the tribes, and the numbers enrolled in each tribe were
very unequal, all the inhabitants of the city of Rome being enrolled
into four tribes, and a very disproportionate power being thus given
to the rural voters.

The meetings of the comitia tributa were generally presided over by a
tribune, although sometimes by one of the consuls. At first the laws
passed by the comitia tributa were required to be confirmed by a vote
of the comitia centuriata, but this requirement was abolished in 339
B.C. by the Publilian and Horatian laws. The provisions of these laws
were reaffirmed by the Hortensian laws in 286 B.C.; and it is certain
that at least from this date the full validity of a law passed by the
comitia tributa was never questioned.

In the comitia centuriata and the comitia tributa we see the anomalous
condition of two independent law-making assemblies; and as there was
no division between them of the field of legislation, it is hard to
see how, even with the controlling influence of the Senate, conflicts
between the two were so generally avoided. So completely were the two
comitiæ on an equality as to the validity of the laws enacted by each
that the records generally fail to show by which assembly any
particular law was passed, but this can generally be ascertained by
looking at the name of the proposer of the law. If a tribune appears
as the proposer of the law it was passed by the comitia tributa; but
if the proposer was a consul, prætor, or dictator, the law was the
work of the comitia centuriata.

The powers of the two comitiæ as to the election of officers were
differentiated. The comitia centuriata, at all stages in the history
of the Roman republic, possessed the right of electing the highest
officers of the republic--the consuls, prætors, and censors. The
comitia tributa originally possessed the right of electing only the
tribunes and the plebeian ædiles; at a later period they elected also
the curule ædiles, the quæstors, the majority of the legionary
tribunes, and all the inferior officers of state. The comitia tributa,
in the later days of the republic, secured an indirect control over
the election of the higher officers also, since the adoption of the
legal principle that all Romans who sought the highest honors of the
state must pass through a regular gradation of offices rendered it
necessary for the comitia centuriata to choose as consuls and prætors
men who had previously been chosen by the comitia tributa as quæstors
and ædiles. It must be remembered, however, that the law relative to
the order in which the various offices must be held was of a
directory rather than a mandatory character; while in the main obeyed,
it was, nevertheless, frequently violated.

The various public offices here referred to will be discussed in the
later chapters as each office first comes into existence in Roman
history. It remains at this time to speak of the organization, powers,
and authority of the Roman Senate, particularly as to its control over
the work of the popular assemblies.

The extent of the power of the Senate over legislation varied greatly
in different periods of Roman history, and these differences were
caused more by the existing political conditions, and by the relative
strength of the aristocratic and popular parties in Rome, than by any
express changes by legislation.

At the very outset of Roman history we see the Senate existing as an
aristocratic body, embodying in itself both the oligarchical
principles upon which the Roman government was based, and also the
patriarchal basis upon which the Roman family organization and later
the organization of the Roman state itself had been built.

Originally, each of the three Roman tribes was divided into ten
gentes, each gens into ten curiæ, and each curia, besides constituting
one of the units in the comitia curiata, furnished one member of the
Roman Senate. The Senate continued after the organization by curiæ had
become obsolete. Membership in the Senate was at all periods for life,
but did not descend from father to son. Vacancies in the Senate were
filled by appointment, these appointments being made first by the
kings, later by the consuls, and finally by the censors. As the
censors were chosen only once in five years, vacancies in the Senate
were filled only at such intervals. The aristocratic party in Rome, by
keeping control of the office of censor, was able to perpetuate their
majority in the Senate. In filling such vacancies, preference was
given to those who had held some of the higher offices during the
preceding five-year-period. Many members of the Senate had held the
office of consul; many more hoped to hold it in the future. All
members of the Senate, with few exceptions, had held some civic
office, and were men of property and of mature age.

All the dignity of Rome and of the Roman government centered in the
Roman Senate. The minister of Pyrrhus described this body as "an
assembly of kings," and it might well have aroused the surprise and
admiration of a foreign ambassador, as nowhere else in the world at
that time was it possible to find such an assembly, either from the
standpoint of the character of the body itself or of the
qualifications of its members.

At an early period no law could be presented before the comitia
centuriata or the comitia tributa without having been previously
approved by the Senate, and after the passage of the act, either by
the comitia centuriata or the comitia tributa, it must be promulgated
by the Senate before it went into effect. The Senate, therefore, was
never possessed of a direct general power of legislation, but had in
the fullest degree both the power of initiating legislation and of
vetoing it. At a later period the control of the Senate over
legislation became theoretically less, but practically greater.

By the Publilian Law (339 B.C.) the control of the Senate over the
comitia centuriata was reduced to a mere formality. By this time,
however, the officers of the state, the tribunes as well as the
consuls, had fallen completely under the control of the Senate, while
the comitia tributa, in turn, fell more and more under the control of
the consuls and tribunes respectively. During the latter period of the
republic the Senate practically legislated, and gave the bill to one
of the tribunes (the tribunes were at this time far more completely
under the control of the Senate than were the consuls) to secure the
mere formality of its passage by the comitia tributa.

The management of foreign affairs was at all times exclusively in the
hands of the Senate, except that the question of declaring war or
concluding peace must be submitted to the vote of the people in one of
the popular assemblies. The Senate also regulated the religious
affairs of the Roman state (after this power fell from the hands of
the comitia curiata); assigned consuls and prætors their provinces of
administration and command; fixed the amount of troops to be raised
both from the Roman citizens and from the Italian allies; sent and
received ambassadors; controlled the calendar, adding to or taking
away from a year so as to lengthen the term of a favorite official or
to shorten the term of an unpopular one; decreed or refused triumphs
to Roman generals, and possessed a general control over the financial
affairs of the state.



CHAPTER III

THE FIRST GREAT MELTING POT


The variety of things which are able to serve as a basis for human
vanity are almost unlimited. This holds true as well in the case of
national vanity as in the case of the vanity of the individual. The
most backward and least attractive of human races generally consider
themselves superior to the rest of mankind, and too often on account
of the peculiarities which, in the minds of others, are the most
convincing proofs of their inferiority. Even among the more advanced
races of mankind great pride is often manifested in attributes which,
properly viewed, are rather a disgrace, or at least a detriment to the
race.

Few things in the world are held in greater respect, by the great
masses of men, than a long line of ancestry of unmixed blood. It seems
to be generally felt that the purity of any race, that is, its freedom
from interbreeding with outsiders, is a matter of credit. The lesson
of history, however, shows that purity of blood in any nation is an
evidence of, or perhaps rather cause of, degeneracy and decay, and
that the great nations of history have been the cosmopolitan races,
the races of mixed descent and hybrid ancestry. If it be thought that
the Jewish people are an exception to this, let it be recalled that
the Jews are a mixed people, originally of many conflicting tribes,
and later continually mixed with other races.

In the pages of ancient history Rome stands out as the first great
cosmopolitan race, or at least the first mixed race, in the creation
of which we are able to watch the melting pot in full operation.

Three thousand years ago the Italian peninsula presented a veritable
medley of races. In the south and along the eastern coast were found
the cities and colonies founded by the two streams of immigration from
the neighboring peninsula across the Adriatic--the Pelasgian and the
Greek. In the center of Italy were to be found the various branches of
the Oscan, Umbrian, and Sabellian races. Farther to the north was the
country of the Latins. Etruscans and Gauls dwelt between Latium and
the Alps. It was only at a much later time that Cisalpine Gaul began
to be considered a part of Italy.

In its earliest days Rome, while possessing many features in common
with the other Italian cities, presented at the same time many
differences.

     "The unfavorable character of the site renders it hard to
     understand how the city could so early attain its prominent
     position in Latium. The soil is unfavorable to the growth of
     fig or vine, and in addition to the want of good
     water-springs, swamps are caused by the frequent inundations
     of the Tiber. Moreover, it was confined in all land
     directions by powerful cities. But all these disadvantages
     were more than compensated by the unfettered command it had
     of both banks of the Tiber down to the mouth of the river.
     The fact that the clan of the Romilii was settled on the
     right bank from time immemorial, and that there lay the
     grove of the creative goddess Dea Dia, and the primitive
     seat of the Arval festival and Arval brotherhood, proves
     that the original territory of Rome comprehended Janiculum
     and Ostia, which afterwards fell into the hands of the
     Etruscans. Not only did this position on both banks of the
     Tiber place in Rome's hands all the traffic of Latium, but,
     as the Tiber was the natural barrier against northern
     invaders, Rome became the maritime frontier fortress of
     Latium. Again, the situation acted in two ways: Firstly, it
     brought Rome into commercial relations with the outer world,
     cemented her alliance with Cære, and taught her the
     importance of building bridges. Secondly, it caused the
     Roman canton to become united in the city itself far earlier
     than was the case with other Latin communities. And thus,
     though Latium was a strictly agricultural country, Rome was
     a center of commerce; and this commercial position stamped
     its peculiar mark on the Roman character, distinguishing
     them from the rest of the Latins and Italians, as the
     citizen is distinguished from the rustic. Not, indeed, that
     the Roman neglected his farm, or ceased to regard it as his
     home; but the unwholesome air of the Campagna tended to make
     him withdraw to the more healthful city hills; and from
     early times by the side of the Roman farmer arose a
     non-agricultural population, composed partly of foreigners
     and partly of natives, which tended to develop urban life."
     (Mommsen's _History of Rome_.)

It was, therefore, as a cosmopolitan, commercial city that the Romans
first came into prominence. The early population was composed of mixed
Etruscan and Latin stock, to which representatives of every Italian
tribe and of the Greeks were soon added. By the beginning of the truly
historical times the Romans had become merged into one race,
representing the combined product of the races of Italy. It was this
fact, very largely, which contributed to her success over the purer
(ethnologically) races which surrounded her.

There were two great divisions of the melting-pot process at Rome; the
first, that existing during the days of the kingdom and of the early
republic; the second, that of the later republic and the empire.
During the first period the process of intermixture, as has been said,
was between the different races of Italy; within the second period
Rome became the center of the civilized world, and her population
included representatives of all the known races of mankind.

In no other despotism in the history of the world is there to be found
so little racial or class distinction as in the Roman empire. Such
distinctions were never able to exist at Rome during any portion of
her history. The permanent privileged classes were those possessed of
wealth, or of military power, and the descendants of both the
conquerors and the conquered of one epoch would be found in the next
indiscriminately divided among the exploiters and the exploited of the
times.

The patricians, the descendants of the early settlers of Rome, were
unable to maintain their special caste privileges, and were compelled
to admit the plebeians to equal political rights and privileges. Class
distinction remained in as marked a degree as ever at Rome, but the
distinction was now between rich and poor, and the rich plebeian took
equal rank with the rich patrician. Nor were the united Roman orders
strong enough to preserve a monopoly of political privileges for
Romans when the territory of Rome was extended over the Italian
peninsula. It was found necessary to extend the franchise first to the
residents of Latium and later to those of the other portions of Italy.

More remarkable still were the conditions which we find after the
establishment of the empire and the extension of Roman territory
around the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. There were no royal house,
no hereditary nobility, and few special privileges left for the
inhabitants of Rome. The distinctions between rich and poor were never
more galling; _but_ high birth conferred no great advantage, and the
lowest born could rise to the highest posts of honor. The ponderous
weight of the empire ground out racial and caste distinctions and
welded together all the heterogeneous mass. The provinces became
Romanized, and the population of Rome became a mixture of all the
races of the provinces. Of how little importance Rome was to the
later empire is shown by the removal of the seat of the empire by
Constantine to Constantinople, and the continued existence of an
empire calling itself Roman for more than a thousand years after Rome
had ceased to constitute a part of such empire.



CHAPTER IV

THE EARLY REPUBLIC


The first epoch of the Roman republic is that extending from the
overthrow of the kings, about 509 B.C., to the passage of the Licinian
Laws in 367 B.C. The history of this century and a half at Rome is
primarily the history of internal strife and class antagonisms. During
these early days the progress made by the republic toward the
expansion of its territories or the extension of its foreign influence
was inappreciable.

Rome, during these days, was contending on a position of near equality
with the neighboring cities of Latium and Etruria. Twice during this
period the independence, perhaps the very existence, of the city was
seriously threatened.

The war against the Etruscans, which followed immediately upon the
expulsion of the last of the Tarquin kings, resulted so unfavorably to
Rome that not only was her territory considerably reduced in size but
even the subjugation of Rome itself might probably have been
accomplished but for the forbearance of her victorious opponents.

Later, in 390 B.C., the capture and sack of Rome by the Gauls nearly
proved the death-blow of the Roman republic. The internal dissensions
of this period were mainly responsible for the lack of military
success. Although it is true that the history of early Rome, unlike
the histories of the various early Grecian states, records few
instances where hatred or bitterness arising from political defeat
induced a citizen to turn traitor to his country, and although the
approach of a foreign foe was generally sufficient to bring about a
truce in Roman political hostilities and the union of all factions in
the city against the common national enemy, still it must be
remembered that the amount of energy possessed by a community is
limited. When the all-absorbing questions agitating a people are those
relative to internal political contests, the energies of the ablest
men of each generation are spent mainly in political contests instead
of being exerted for the common welfare of the community.

The influence which the internal dissensions at Rome must have
exerted on her military success is shown by a comparison of the
military history of the Roman republic prior to 367 B.C. with the
wonderful career of conquest which the Roman republic entered into
immediately after the passage of the Licinian Act. This act, although
producing a partial and temporary cessation of class contests at Rome,
nevertheless sufficiently healed the internal wounds of the state to
enable it to rapidly advance from a city-republic to a world power.

     "The results of this great change were singularly happy and
     glorious. Two centuries of prosperity, harmony, and victory
     followed the reconciliation of the orders. Men who
     remembered Rome engaged in waging petty wars almost within
     sight of the Capitol lived to see her the mistress of Italy.
     While the disabilities of the plebeians continued, she was
     scarcely able to maintain her ground against the Volscians
     and Hernicans. When those disabilities were removed, she
     rapidly became more than a match for Carthage and Macedon."
     (Macaulay.)

The republic created at Rome in the course of the sixth century before
Christ was distinctively an undemocratic republic. The benefits to the
plebeians resulting from the overthrow of the kingdom were of slight,
if any importance. The political power of the state remained almost
entirely in the hands of the patricians, and the right to hold office
was restricted to the members of this caste. At this time the members
of the patrician order were perhaps not very much inferior in numbers
to the plebeian order; but the discrepancy between the numbers of the
two orders so rapidly increased that by the beginning of the fourth
century before Christ the government of Rome had become practically
that of an oligarchy.

In the latter days of the republic, in the contest which resulted in
the overthrow of the republic, the basic reasons for the struggle were
of an economic rather than a political character. In the period now
under discussion the political element predominated in the class
contests, although various elements of disagreement were to be found
existing side by side.

     "Three distinct movements agitated the community. The first
     proceeded from the body of full citizens, and was confined
     to it; its object was to limit and lessen the life-power of
     the single president or king; in all such movements at Rome,
     from the time of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, there
     was no attempt to assert the rights of the individual at the
     expense of the state, nor to limit the power of the state,
     but only that of its magistrates. The second was the demand
     for equality of political privileges, and was the cause of
     bitter struggles between the full burgesses and those,
     whether plebeians, freedmen, Latins, or Italians, who keenly
     resented their political inequality. The third movement was
     an equally prolific source of trouble in Roman history; it
     arose from the embittered relations between landholders and
     those who had either lost possession of their farms, or, as
     was the case with many small farmers, held possession at the
     mercy of the capitalist or landlord. These three movements
     must be clearly grasped, as upon them hinges the internal
     history of Rome. Although often intertwined and confused
     with one another, they were, nevertheless, essentially and
     fundamentally distinct. The natural outcome of the first was
     the abolition of the monarchy--a result which we find
     everywhere, alike in Greek and Italian states, and which
     seems to have been a certain evolution of the form of
     constitution peculiar to both peoples." (Mommsen.)

The overthrow of the monarchy was accomplished quickly and
effectively. Unlike the case in most countries, the monarchy once
overthrown, there was no attempt for nearly five centuries to
reëstablish it. The word "king" was regarded with such hatred that the
mere accusation made against any public leader that he was seeking to
make himself king was generally sufficient to utterly destroy his
influence, even when such charges were unfounded and unsupported by
evidence.

The men who established the new form of government created after the
expulsion of Tarquinius adopted the theory of political checks and
balances which we afterwards find exerting such a strong influence
upon the framers of our American Constitution. It was necessary that
at least a part of the powers formerly exercised by the king should be
intrusted to some official under the new régime. The greatest efforts,
however, were made to render it impossible for any Roman official to
use the governmental powers granted him in such a manner as to secure
for himself the kingly office. The mere provision that the highest
official in the government should be elected, rather than succeed to
the office by right of descent, was rightly judged to be by itself an
insufficient protection against the seizure of supreme power by some
Roman tyrant.

A stronger safeguard was found in the division of the highest power in
the state between two officials, who later came to be known as
consuls. (The officers afterwards known as consuls were for a
considerable period known as prætors; after the term consul came into
use the name prætor at a still later period was given to the possessor
of a new office created shortly after the passage of the Licinian
Act.) The kingly power, or that part of it not absolutely abolished or
given to the religious officials, was vested jointly in the two
consuls, each possessing the full right to exercise all the functions
of the office. Under this division of power each consul was considered
a most effective check upon any ambition for a crown which might be
possessed by the other.

Another safeguard, a safeguard which unfortunately has recently been
too much disregarded in the United States, consisted in the short term
of office prescribed by the new law, the consuls and other Roman
officials being elected for a term of one year only.

While, as has been said, the consuls retained in general all the
former powers of the king, still in some respects these powers were
curtailed:

1. By the Valerian Law of 509 B.C. each person condemned by the consul
to capital or corporal punishment was entitled to an appeal as a
matter of right. It had previously been optional with the king whether
to grant an appeal.

2. The consuls never possessed the various pecuniary rights of the
kings, such as that of having the fields cultivated by the citizens.

3. The quæstors, who had previously been appointed or not by the king
himself, as he saw fit, now became regular state officials.

4. The religious duties and powers of the king did not pass to the
consul. The highest religious officer of the state, the _pontifex
maximus_, was from this time on elected by the Pontifical College. The
various colleges of priests (all of whom had formerly been appointed
by the king) now filled up vacancies in their own numbers. Other
religious officers were appointed by the pontifex maximus. On account
of the close connection between the Roman religion and the Roman
government, the pontifex maximus became a strong political power in
the city. By the power of this officer and his associates to hold the
auspices and regulate the calendar, they were enabled to prevent or
permit the holding of the public assemblies, extend or decrease the
term of office of public officials, and exercise a greater or less
influence on almost every public question or proceeding.

5. The insignia and marks of dignity permitted to the consul were of a
less imposing character than those previously granted to the king.
While the king had been accompanied by twenty-four lictors, the consul
was permitted only twelve, and the axes were taken away. While the
king had worn the purple robe, the consul wore merely the ordinary
Roman toga with a purple border. The royal chariot of the king did not
descend to the consul, who was obliged to travel on foot within the
limits of the city.

6. There had been no provision in the Roman law for any redress for a
wrong done by the king, but the consul, upon the termination of his
year of office, stepped down at once into the mass of the citizens and
could at any time be punished for any malfeasance during his official
life.

7. An indirect restriction of the powers of the consuls arose from the
increased dignity and authority of the Senate. The change in this
respect, however, was practical rather than theoretical. According to
the strict form of the law the Senate still bore the same relation to
the consuls that they had previously borne to the king. The Senate was
still nothing more than an advisory body, and all vacancies among the
senators were filled by appointments made by the consuls. The
increased importance of the Senate arose out of the advantage which an
official holding office for life always possesses over a superior
officer holding office for only a brief term. In the present day it
frequently happens that a political appointee at the head of a
department or bureau, with the workings of which he is not familiar,
finds himself compelled to rely almost implicitly upon some
subordinate official whose working life has been spent in that office.

The short term of a consul and the life term of the members of the
Senate thus tended to secure to this body an ever increasing
influence. It was seldom that any serious conflict arose between the
consul and the Senate. The consuls were men who were already senators
or who expected to become such, while of the senators, many had held
the office of consul and many more hoped to hold it in the future.

This curtailment of the kingly power and the division of the powers
which remained between two consuls of equal rank, while it secured the
protection of the citizens from the danger of a new monarchy, strongly
hindered vigor and unity of action in the prosecution of any
enterprise. There were times, therefore, during the succeeding
centuries in the life of Rome, when to meet temporary emergencies a
stronger and undivided rule was necessary. To meet this need a new
official was created--the dictator--who might be nominated by one of
the consuls upon the authorization of the Senate and who, during the
term of his office, which could not exceed six months, possessed and
exercised almost absolute authority at Rome, and superseded all the
other officials in their duties.

The original intention was that such an official should be appointed
only in cases of military necessity, but later this office was
frequently created to aid the patricians in their contests with the
plebeians. Only the patricians were eligible for any of the newly
created offices. The Senate was composed exclusively of this order,
and it has already been explained, in Chapter II, how, through the
expedient of putting more Roman citizens in some centuries than in the
others, the patricians were able to control the vote of the majority
of the centuries in the comitia centuriata.

It is thus apparent that the mere overthrow of the kings at Rome had
accomplished little for the ordinary Roman citizen. In fact, the rule
of a single monarch is often more beneficial to the poorer classes of
a community than the rule of a favored class. The establishment of a
republic, however, had eliminated one political element, and cleared
the stage for the contest between the patricians and plebeians.

That the economic condition of the poorer classes in Rome changed for
the worse after the institution of the republic is certain. It was for
the interest of the early Roman kings to favor and protect the small
Roman farmers, both for military and economic reasons. While the
permanent interests of the patricians would have been promoted by the
encouragement of this class, their temporary selfish interests called
for the destruction of the Roman middle class, primarily the middle
agricultural class, and the division of all Roman inhabitants into a
small aristocracy on the one hand and a large proletariat on the
other.

The two forms of exactions which fell the heaviest upon the Roman
poorer classes were the barbarous laws against debtors and the
dishonest administration of the public leaders. The desperate
condition of the debtors at Rome at this time was a result of a number
of different causes, including the high rate of interest, the right of
the creditor to sell the debtor into slavery if the debt were not
paid, the policy of the patrician creditors to demand the last pound
of flesh in all their transactions, and the conditions which existed
in Rome at this time which compelled many small landowners, against
their wish and without any fault of their own, to become borrowers of
money.

One harsh feature of this condition was the fact that it was the
military service, which as Roman citizens they were compelled to
render to the state, that more often than any other cause compelled
the plebeians to borrow money and thus ultimately drove them to their
ruin. For example, a small Roman farmer, through absence from his
home on military service for the state, might lose his crop for the
year. To support himself and his family until the next harvest, and to
supply the means for the planting of the next year's crop, he would be
obliged to borrow money, which, under the exorbitant rates of
interest, soon reached an amount out of proportion to the original
loan. Perhaps a second campaign would deprive him of the means of
returning the loan, and his lands would be taken from him and he
himself sold into slavery. As a final blow, the unfortunate plebeian
saw the lands which had been won for the state by armies composed of
his fellow plebeians reserved entirely for the use of the favored
patrician order.

No more pernicious and unfair system could have been evolved than that
which governed the management of the Roman public lands in the very
first years of the republic. The earlier policy, under the kings, had
been to divide the public land of the state into small allotments and
to distribute it among those citizens of the state who most needed it.
With the republic this policy ceased, and the public lands were
nominally retained in the public ownership, but in reality were let
out on leases to the patricians and a few favored men among the
plebeians.

In theory the state retained the right to take back the land at any
time and to receive a rent from the lessee; but in practice both these
rights were disregarded. The lands held in this manner by the
patricians were soon considered by them as much their own property as
those to which they held the legal title, and were devised and pledged
by their owners in substantially the same manner as any other land.
The collection of the rent was soon abandoned; and not only this, but
the land being in theory state land, the lessee (who was supposed to,
but did not, pay rent) was not liable to pay taxes on this land.

The final working out of this matter may be summed up by saying that
the poorer class of the plebeians furnished most of the soldiers for
the campaign, stood most of the expense, suffered nearly all the
losses both of life and property, were excluded from any share in the
land captured in the war, and as a culmination saw their taxes yearly
increased on account of the fact that the patricians, who monopolized
the public land, succeeded in dodging the payment of rent and in
evading the payment of taxes.

It was these conditions which brought about the remarkable spectacle
of what may be well designated the first recorded strike in history--a
strike in the Roman army. In 495 B.C. the Roman citizens were summoned
to take the field for another military campaign. They refused to obey.
One of the consuls, Publius Servilius, however, induced them to make
the campaign by suspending some of the laws bearing most heavily upon
the poor and by releasing all persons in prison for debt. But hardly
had the army returned from a victorious campaign than the other
consul, Appius Claudius, as a reward for their victory began to
enforce the debtor laws with extraordinary severity.

Once more, in the following year, the plebeians were induced to take
the field, mainly on account of the popularity of the dictator
appointed for the management of this campaign, Marius Valerius, and
his promise that upon the termination of the campaign permanent
reforms would be made in the law. Again the Roman army was victorious,
and again the patricians broke faith with the plebeians and refused
to carry out their promised reforms.

The next scene in this conflict is one almost without parallel, either
in ancient or modern history. The plebeians, disgusted by the
selfishness and perfidy of the patricians, determined to abandon Rome
to the patrician order and to found a new city for themselves upon the
"Sacred Mount," a hill situated between the Tiber and the Anio. The
patricians, thunderstruck by this unexpected movement, and being far
more in need of the plebeians than the plebeians were of them,
immediately made sufficient concessions to the plebeians to induce
them to return to Rome.

Some of the concessions made at this time related to temporary
provisions for relief of debtors; but the great innovation was that
which established the office of tribune. The character of the office
of tribune is absolutely unique in the political history of the world.
The tribunes, elected by the people in the comitia tributa, were
plebeian officers who were at first without any constructive part in
the carrying on of the Roman government and whose sole duty at the
outset was to protect the members of the plebeian order from the
oppression of the patrician officials. This protection was exercised
mainly through the use of the veto power given to the tribunes. Under
this power the tribunes had the right at any time to put a stop to any
act either by any of the public assemblies, by the Senate, or by any
of the magistrates. It was a power which, if exercised to its fullest
extent, could put a stop to the very carrying on of the government.

It speaks much for the moderation of the Roman tribunes that through
all the centuries of the Roman republic little serious inconvenience
was experienced from the use of this power. With few and unimportant
exceptions, it was exercised only in cases where the welfare of the
plebeians as a class, or of some particular plebeian, demanded it.

The creation of the office of tribune was merely one more example of
that system of checks and balances which played so prominent a part in
the framing of the government after the expulsion of the king--a
system of checks and balances so strikingly resembling that in our
Federal Constitution. The tribunes were introduced as a protection
for the plebeians and an additional restraint upon the magistrates.

While at first the power and duties of the tribunes were entirely of a
negative nature, they gradually acquired an authority of a positive
character. The tribunes generally presided over the comitia tributa
and took the lead in securing the passage of laws by that body. In
addition they acquired judicial powers, and in cases where a plebeian
had been wronged they could summon any citizen, even the consuls,
before them, and might impose even the death penalty. The persons of
the tribunes were declared inviolable, and any one who attacked them
was thought to be accursed. The number of the tribunes was at first
two, but was later increased to five and still later to ten.

The second great victory won by the plebeians was in the passage of
the Publilian Law in 471 B.C. This law was proposed by the tribune
Valerius Publilius, and was brought about by the murder of the tribune
Gnæus Genucius. The main object of this law was the protection of the
plebeian assembly and the plebeian officers, but its exact details are
unknown. It is believed by some that the comitia tributa really came
into existence with this law, and that previously the plebeians had
voted by curies. The law limited to plebeian freeholders the right to
vote in a plebeian assembly, and excluded nearly all the freedmen and
clients who were under the influence of the patricians as well as the
patricians themselves. It is possible also that the increase in the
number of the tribunes from two to five was made by this law. In 462
B.C. an unsuccessful attempt was made to abolish the office of
tribune; in 457 B.C. came the increase from five tribunes to ten.

From 451 to 450 B.C. the regular system of government at Rome was
interrupted by the election and rule of the _decemvirs_. The episode
of these decemvirs has an important place in Roman history; but (as is
the case with all events in Roman history in the fifth century before
Christ) our knowledge of these men, of their work, and of their
overthrow is very uncertain. The election of these officials was
primarily brought about by the recognized necessity for a reform and
codification of the Roman laws. If the duties of these men had been
limited to the preparation of such code, its character and position
would not have been unsimilar to that of numerous other bodies of men
appointed for a similar purpose in many countries and in all ages. But
the peculiarity about the work of the decemvirs lies in the fact that
upon their appointment all the ordinary Roman offices were
discontinued and the entire judicial and executive administration of
the state passed into the hands of the decemvirs.

During their first year of office the decemvirs drew up ten tables of
laws, so called because the laws were engraved upon tables of copper
and stood up in the Forum on the rostra in front of the Senate house.

According to the legends (for the Roman historical records of this
century are little more than such), it had originally been intended to
intrust the decemvirs with power only for a single year, but their
work being incomplete at the expiration of the first year, they were
chosen for a second year. It is uncertain whether the decemvirs for
the second year were exactly the same men as those for the first year.
According to some reports some of the decemvirs of the second year
were plebeians, while none of those originally elected belonged to
that order.

During their second year of office the decemvirs prepared two more
tables of laws, and these, with the ten tables prepared during the
preceding year, constituted the famous "Law of the Twelve Tables," the
first Roman code of which we have any knowledge. Only fragmentary
extracts from these tables have come down to us, but these fragments
furnish us with such an insight into early Roman laws, institutions,
and customs that they are here inserted:

     THE TWELVE TABLES


     TABLE I

     THE SUMMONS BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE

     1. If the plaintiff summon a man to appear before the
     magistrate and he refuse to go, the plaintiff shall first
     call witnesses and arrest him.

     2. If the defendant attempt evasion or flight, the plaintiff
     shall take him by force.

     3. If the defendant be prevented by illness or old age, let
     him who summons him before the magistrate furnish a beast of
     burden, but he need not send a covered carriage for him
     unless he choose.

     4. For a wealthy defendant only a wealthy man may go bail;
     any one who chooses may go bail for a poor citizen of the
     lowest class.

     5. In case the contestants come to an agreement, the
     magistrate shall announce the fact.

     6. In case they come to no agreement, they shall before noon
     enter the case in the comitium or forum.

     7. To the party present in the afternoon the magistrate
     shall award the suit.

     9. Sunset shall terminate the proceedings.

     10. ... sureties and sub-sureties....


     TABLE II

     JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

     2. A serious illness or a legal appointment with an alien
     ... should one of these occur to the judge, arbiter, or
     either party to the suit, the appointed trial must be
     postponed.

     3. If the witnesses of either party fail to appear, that
     party shall go and serve a verbal notice at his door on
     three days.


     TABLE III

     EXECUTION FOLLOWING CONFESSION OR JUDGMENT

     1. A debtor, either by confession or judgment, shall have
     thirty days' grace.

     2. At the expiration of this period the plaintiff shall
     serve a formal summons upon the defendant, and bring him
     before the magistrate.

     3. If the debt be not paid, or if no one become surety, the
     plaintiff shall lead him away, and bind him with shackles
     and fetters of not less than fifteen pounds' weight, and
     heavier at his discretion.

     4. If the debtor wish, he may live at his own expense; if
     not, he in whose custody he may be shall furnish him a pound
     of meal a day, more at his discretion.

     6. On the third market day the creditors, if there are
     several, shall divide the property. If one take more or
     less, no guilt shall attach to him.


     TABLE IV

     PATERNAL RIGHTS

     3. If a father shall thrice sell his son, the son shall be
     free from the paternal authority.


     TABLE V

     INHERITANCE AND TUTELAGE

     3. What has been appointed in regard to the property or
     tutelage shall be binding in law.

     4. If a man die intestate, having no natural heirs, his
     property shall pass to the nearest agnate.

     5. If there be no agnate, the gentiles shall succeed.

     7. ... if one be hopelessly insane, his agnates and gentiles
     shall have authority over him and his property ... in case
     there be none to take charge....

     8. ... from that estate ... into that estate.


     TABLE VI

     OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION

     1. Whenever a party shall negotiate a nexum or transfer by
     mancipatio, according to the formal statement so let the law
     be.

     5. Whoever in presence of the magistrates shall join issue
     by manuum consertio....

     7. A beam built into a house or vine trellis shall not be
     removed.

     9. When the vines have been pruned, until the grapes are
     removed....


     TABLE VII

     LAW CONCERNING REAL PROPERTY

     5. If parties get into dispute about boundaries....

     7. They shall pave the way. If they do not pave the way with
     stones a man may drive where he pleases.

     8. If water from rain gutters cause damage....


     TABLE VIII

     ON TORTS

     1. Whoever shall chant a magic spell....

     2. If a man maim another, and does not compromise with him,
     there shall be retaliation in kind.

     3. If with the fist or club a man break a bone of a freeman,
     the penalty shall be three hundred asses; if of a slave, one
     hundred and fifty asses.

     4. If he does any injury to another, twenty-five asses; if
     he sing a satirical song let him be beaten.

     5. ... if he shall have inflicted a loss ... he shall make
     it good.

     6. Whoever shall blight the crops of another by incantation
     ... nor shalt thou win over to thyself another's grain....

     12. If a thief be caught stealing by night and he be slain,
     the homicide shall be lawful.

     13. If in the daytime the thief defend himself with a
     weapon, one may kill him.

     15. ... with a leather girdle about his naked body, and a
     platter in his hand....

     16. If a man contend at law about a theft not detected in
     the act....

     21. If a patron cheat his client, he shall become infamous.

     22. He who has been summoned as a witness or acts as
     libripens, and shall refuse to give his testimony, shall be
     accounted infamous, and shall be incapable of acting
     subsequently as witness.

     24. If a weapon slip from a man's hand without his intention
     of hurling it....


     TABLE IX

     (No fragments of this table are extant.)


     TABLE X

     SACRED LAW

     1. They shall not inter or burn a dead man within the city.

     2. ... more than this a man shall not do ... ; a man shall
     not smooth the wood for the funeral pyre with an ax.

     4. Women shall not lacerate their faces, nor indulge in
     immoderate wailing for the dead.

     5. They shall not collect the bones of a dead man for a
     second interment.

     7. Whoever wins a crown, either in person or by his slaves
     or animals, or has received it for valor....

     8. ... he shall not add gold ... ; but gold used in joining
     the teeth.... This may be burned or buried with the dead
     without incurring any penalty.


     TABLE XI

     (No fragments of this table are extant.)


     TABLE XII

     SUPPLEMENTARY LAWS

     2. If a slave has committed theft, or has done damage....

     3. If either party shall have won a suit concerning property
     by foul means, at the discretion of the opponent ... the
     magistrate shall fix the damage at twice the profits arising
     from the interim possession.

The decemvirs were forcibly overthrown before the close of their
second year in office. The stories as to the cause are not only
conflicting but diametrically so. According to one historical theory,
the rebellion against the decemvirs began among the plebeians on
account of the oppression which they suffered from the hands of these
men; while, on the other hand, it is believed by many historians that
the decemvirs were overthrown by the patricians because they were
giving too many concessions to the plebeians. Whatever the cause, the
power of the decemvirs was taken from them and all the former Roman
officials and assemblies were reëstablished, with the old powers and
jurisdictions. The "Law of the Twelve Tables," which the decemvirs had
drawn up, however, remained for centuries as the great basis of Roman
law.

Five years after the deposition of the decemvirs the tribune Canuleius
secured the passage by the comitia tributa of the Canuleian Law, which
marked another milestone passed by the plebeians in their march toward
equality before the law.

Two great concessions were given by this act, one in the field of
private and the other in the field of public law. The law which had
existed from the earliest days in Rome, and which had been
incorporated in the "Law of the Twelve Tables," prohibiting
intermarriage between plebeians and patricians, was abolished. It was
also provided that any year the people, instead of electing consuls,
might elect military tribunes, who should possess all the powers,
although not all the dignities, of the consuls. Either patricians or
plebeians could be elected to the office of military tribunes.

The election of military tribunes was authorized by law many years
before any such officials were elected in Rome; but the fear that the
consular power might sometime fall into the hands of a plebeian
induced the patricians in 443 B.C. to secure the passage of a law for
the creation of new officials who should possess some of the powers
previously held by the consul and who must be chosen from the
patrician order.

These new officials, called censors, were to be two in number and were
to be elected every five years. At first these officials held office
until the time arrived for the election of their successors, but later
their term of office was limited to one year and a half, there thus
being three and one half years out of every five-year period when this
office was in abeyance.

The most important duty given to the censors at the outset seems to
have been the authority of filling vacancies in the Senate as it
became necessary to keep the number up to the required three hundred.
Up to this time this power of appointing senators had been exercised
by the consul. As time went on, however, the powers of this office
rapidly increased until at length it became the highest post of honor
at Rome, the men elected censors being almost invariably former
consuls or military tribunes.

The arbitrary power of inquisition over all the public affairs of Rome
and the private conduct of the Roman citizens was so astonishingly
great that we wonder how it could have existed without constant and
gross abuses. In the later days of the republic the censors had the
right to make a so-called "censorial note" of all Roman citizens, who,
without having gone to the point of violating the criminal law, or at
least without having been convicted of a crime, had been guilty of
dishonorable or immoral conduct. All persons thus named suffered
severe civic penalties. If the person were a senator he lost his seat
in the Senate; if a knight, he lost the peculiar privileges belonging
to this rank. In every case the person lost his membership in the
association of his tribe and was subject to increased taxation.

The exclusive right to serve as censors was one of the last exclusive
privileges retained by the patricians, the plebeians not being made
eligible to this office until 339 B.C.

Although Rome was in an almost constant state of warfare during the
fifth century before Christ, the conflicts were neither on a large
scale nor decisive in their results. The chief enemies of Rome were
the neighboring Latin and Etruscan cities, with one or another of whom
Rome was almost constantly engaged in hostilities. At the beginning
of the fourth century before Christ Rome was attacked by a new and
more terrible enemy from the north, who very nearly changed the whole
course of the world's history by wiping the city of Rome out of
existence before its career of greatness had begun.

This enemy was the Gauls, who captured and burned Rome in the year 390
B.C., but who failed to take the citadel of the city and finally
withdrew, either being driven away or bribed to depart. Not only are
the details of the capture of Rome by the Gauls very uncertain, but by
destroying all the old Roman records and many of the Roman monuments
in their sack of Rome, the Gauls are responsible for much of the
uncertainty which exists as to the truth of the details of the history
of Rome prior to their invasion. In fact, it is generally considered
that the authentic history of Rome begins only after 390 B.C., the
history of the Roman kingdom being little more than mythology; while
what we know of the Roman republic prior to 390 B.C. consists of an
inseparable mixture of true history and legendary tales.

After the departure of the Gauls the question arose whether Rome
should be rebuilt on its old site or whether all the Romans should
migrate in a body to Veii. It was only after a long discussion that it
was finally decided to remain at Rome.

The rebuilding of Rome was immediately followed by another period of
conflict between the patricians and plebeians. Two causes of
discontent brought about the renewal of this contest. The first was
the financial condition of the poorer classes, who had been rendered
more desperate through the losses occasioned by the Gallic invasion;
and second, the desire of the richer plebeians to share in the
political honors reserved exclusively for the patricians.

In this contest the leaders of the plebeians were the tribunes Gaius
Licinius and Lucius Sextius, who were, year after year, reëlected to
this office by the people.

The so-called Licinian Laws, first introduced by these tribunes in 376
B.C., were adopted only after the most bitter political contest which
up to this time had ever been fought in Rome. Time and again, the
tribunes resorted to their veto power to put a stop to the carrying
on of every function of the Roman government. These laws were finally
passed in 367 B.C., their three great provisions being as follows:

1. That of all debts on which interest had been paid, the sum of the
interest paid should be deducted from the principal, and the remainder
paid off in three successive years.

2. That no citizen should hold more than five hundred _jugera_ (nearly
320 acres) of the public land, or should feed on the public pastures
more than one hundred head of larger cattle and five hundred of
smaller, under penalty of a heavy fine.

3. That henceforth consuls, not consular tribunes, should always be
elected, and that one of the two consuls must be a plebeian.

Although the Licinian Laws are generally held to have equalized the
different orders at Rome, to have terminated forever the bitter
jealousy between patricians and plebeians, to have put a stop for a
time to class controversies of all kinds, and to have rendered
possible the great career of foreign conquest upon which Rome soon
entered, the fact remains that the benefit of these laws was
experienced far more by the small class of wealthy plebeians than by
the great mass of this order.

Henceforth, with very few exceptions, one consul was always a
plebeian, Lucius Sextius being the first plebeian consul and Gaius
Licinius the third; but the chance of being elected consul was in
reality limited to a small class of plebeians and conferred little
practical benefit upon the ordinary member of the order.

The laws for the relief of the poorer classes were not so fully
enforced. In particular, the wealthy citizens holding large allotments
of the public land found methods by which to evade the carrying out of
the provisions of this new law, and we are surprised to find Licinius
himself as one of the offenders in this respect.

It was in the period following the passage of the Licinian Laws that
the greatest inequalities in wealth began to appear at Rome, and the
numbers of free small landowners to decrease.

The history of the Licinian Laws and of the following period show
conclusively how mere political equality is never sufficient to secure
the welfare of the mass of the community, and that the power held by
a class possessed of great wealth, but without special political
privileges, is greater than that of a recognized nobility, and far
more apt to be abused, on account of the absence of any feeling of
class honor.

Two slight efforts were made by the patricians to counteract the
political provisions of the Licinian Laws. For the first eleven years
after the passage of the Licinian Laws one consul was a plebeian and
one a patrician. In the thirteen years beginning with 355 B.C., two
patricians were elected consuls in eight of the years; after this,
violations of the law ceased, and one consul belonged to each order
down to the year 172 B.C., when both consulships were open to the
plebeians. The wealthy class of both orders had been so mingled by
this time that thereafter consuls were elected indiscriminately from
either order, although this election was almost invariably restricted
to the members of the great families.

Immediately after the passage of the Licinian Laws the patricians
secured the creation of a new office. The man holding this office was
called _prætor_, and was given the judicial powers formerly belonging
to the consuls. At a later period the number of prætors was increased
to two, one of whom, known as the _prætor urbanus_, had jurisdiction
over controversies between Roman citizens, and the other, the _prætor
peregrinus_, who had jurisdiction over controversies between
foreigners residing at Rome and between Romans and foreigners.



CHAPTER V

THE PERIOD OF FOREIGN CONQUEST


The most glorious period of Roman history, from the military
standpoint, followed closely upon the cessation of fierce national
contests in the fourth century before Christ. The united efforts of
patricians and plebeians, devoted to the task of foreign conquest,
proved sufficient in a few generations to win for Rome her world
empire.

     "The fifth century is the most beautiful century of Rome.
     The plebeians had conquered the consulship and are
     succeeding in conquering their admission to other
     magistracies which the patricians wished to reserve; they
     free themselves from the servitude which, under the name of
     Nexus, weighed on the debtors. They arrive at political
     equality and individual independence; at the same time the
     old aristocracy still dominates in the Senate and maintains
     there the inflexibility of its resolves and the persistence
     of its designs. It was thanks to this interior condition
     that the Roman people was able to survive the strongest
     tests from without over which it had triumphed, and to make
     that progress which cost it most dear. We see the peoples
     fight, one by one, and often all together; the Latin people,
     the Etruscans, the Goths, the Samnites, the other Sabellic
     peoples of the Apennines; and the end is always victory.
     The beginnings of this history were somber. Rome was
     afflicted by one of those pestilences which one finds in all
     the epochs of the history of this unsanitary city. Thence
     was the origin of those scenic pieces imported by the
     Etruscans and giving origin to comedy--a means devised to
     appease the gods; so that Roman comedy had an origin
     religious and dismal. The fifth century is for Rome the age
     of great devotions and of grand sacrifices." (J. J. Ampère
     in _L'empire romaine à Rome_.)

A full description of the various military campaigns of Rome would
tend to obscure rather than to illumine the political and economic
history of the city. An enumeration of the foreign conquests of Rome
during this period, however, is necessary to indicate the rapid
increase in the territorial possessions of Rome, with their inevitable
reaction upon the domestic conditions of the republic.

The first wars of Rome after the passage of the Licinian Laws were
renewed contests with her neighboring enemies. In 361 B.C. Rome was
again threatened by a new invasion of the Gauls. The following year
the Roman records mention a victory over the Hernicans by one Roman
consul, and over the Gauls, and the Latins of Tibur, by the other.
This alliance of the Gauls with a portion of the Latins so alarmed
the majority of the Latin cities that a new league between the Romans
and Latins was formed in 358 B.C. The Gauls soon after retired from
the neighborhood of Latium, and their allies, Tibur and Privernum,
were compelled to enter the new Latin League.

A war waged against Rome by the Etruscan city of Tarquinii and its
allies so seriously threatened Rome that the Roman political factions
forgot their differences so far as to agree to the appointment (for
the first time in the history of the city) of a plebeian, in the
person of C. Marcius Rutilus, to the office of dictator. The old
jealousy of the patricians, however, was soon manifested again in the
opposition of the Senate to the granting of a triumph to this plebeian
for the great military victory which he soon won.

In 350 B.C. a third invasion of the Gauls was repulsed by the Romans.

The next great contest in which Rome was engaged was that with the
Samnites. This race was both the most worthy and the most bitter of
the enemies of Rome within Italy, and the long warfare between Rome
and the Samnites was terminated only by the practical extermination
of the latter race. The First Samnite War extended from 343 to 341
B.C. and was indecisive in its results, the Samnites at its close
agreeing to give a year's pay and three months' provisions to the
Roman army, and being permitted to make war on the Sidicini.

The close of the First Samnite War was followed closely by the Latin
War (340-338 B.C.). This war was brought about by the jealousy felt by
the other Latin towns toward Rome. Rome had been abusing her position
as the capital of the Latin League, and desired to acquire an
acknowledged supremacy over Latium. The war was an effort on the part
of the other Latin cities to restrain the too rapidly increasing power
of Rome and to reëstablish the balance of power in Latium. In this war
was seen the extraordinary spectacle of the Samnites appearing as
allies of Rome. The Hernicans also aided the Romans, and the Sidicini
and Campanians aided the Latins. The war resulted in the complete
overthrow of the Latins; but the Romans showed great generosity and
good judgment in their treatment of the conquered cities after the
war, and thus did much toward binding the Latins to Rome for the
future.

The main provisions of the peace agreements were as follows: Roman
citizenships, in different degrees, were conferred upon the
inhabitants of the various Latin towns, who were, however, forbidden
to form any leagues among themselves or to hold diets; intermarriage
and commerce between the different Latin towns were prohibited; the
_municipium_ such as the Latins had previously possessed was given to
the citizens of Capua, Cumæ, Formiæ, Fundi, and Suessula; the Latin
contingents in the Roman army were henceforth to be permitted to serve
apart from the legions under their own officers; and the Latin public
land, two thirds of that of Privernum, and the lands in the Falernian
district of Campania were taken by Rome, as were also the lands of the
principal families of Velitræ, who were compelled to emigrate beyond
the Tiber.

Ten years of peace followed, and then came the second and greatest of
the Samnite wars (327-304 B.C.). The Samnites were aided during part
of the war by the Etruscans and the Hernicans, but at the end the
Samnites were compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome and give
up their independence. The Hernicans were completely overthrown in 307
B.C., and were united to Rome on conditions very similar to those
possessed by the Latins.

In the Third Samnite War (298-290 B.C.) the Romans were again
victorious, although a league of Samnites, Etruscans, Gauls, and
Umbrians was formed against them. The exact terms of the treaty of
peace at the conclusion of this war are not recorded, but undoubtedly
riveted Roman control still more strongly upon Samnium.

It was the final result of the Roman-Samnite wars which finally
determined the question of the overlordship of Italy. Of all the
numerous races of Italy, two and only two possessed the stamina which
rendered them possible unifiers of the whole peninsula. Rome's defeat
of Samnium left her without a rival in Italy and ready for contests
with her later and greater rivals. The close of the Third Samnite War,
however, did not end the resistance of the Samnites to Roman rule.
Even down to the time of the contests of Marius and Sulla we find this
race grasping every opportunity to strike a blow against Roman
dominion.

In 284 B.C. the Tarentines succeeded in bringing about a union of the
Samnites, Lucanians, Umbrians, Bruttians, Etruscans, and Gauls against
Rome. This war was a series of victories for the Romans. By the year
282 B.C. all of the Roman enemies were subdued except the Etruscans,
with whom the war continued until 280 B.C. In this last-named year the
Romans, alarmed by the danger of war with Pyrrhus, concluded a peace
with the Etruscans on such terms as changed these people from
bitterest enemies into most faithful allies.

The time had now arrived when Rome was called upon for the first time
to cross arms with enemies from beyond the Italian peninsula. The
first of these contests with a foreign power was fought out entirely
within the confines of Italy.

The year 280 B.C. saw the beginning of the contest between Rome and
Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who had been summoned to Italy as an ally of
the Greek city of Tarentum. At the outset the Romans suffered two
great defeats, at Heraclea and on the plain of Apulian Asculum,
largely through their inability to meet the attacks of the phalanxes
and of the war elephants. In the end, however, Pyrrhus, although aided
by all the enemies of Rome in southern and central Italy, ended his
campaign in failure and returned to Epirus in 275 B.C., his dream of a
great western empire forever shattered.

In the ten years following the departure of Pyrrhus the subjugation of
all Italy was completed, followed by a reorganization of the
government of the Roman colonies and subject cities.

The second foreign enemy of Rome was Carthage, and the most dramatic
pages in the whole history of Roman conquest are those which relate
the story of the contest between these two titanic rivals for world
supremacy. The immediate cause of the First Punic War arose over the
possession of Messana, a city in Sicily separated from Italy by only a
narrow strait; but war between Rome and Carthage was inevitable; and
if Messana had not become the bone of contention, another would have
been found. The First Punic War lasted from 264 to 241 B.C. and
resulted in victory for Rome. By the terms of peace Carthage gave up
Sicily and all the small islands between Sicily and Italy, and paid a
heavy war indemnity to Rome. Shortly after the close of the war the
Romans, by threats, compelled the Carthaginians to surrender also the
islands of Sardinia and Corsica.

In 230 B.C. the Romans were engaged in war with the Illyrian pirates;
and from 226 to 221 B.C. with the Insubrian Gauls, both of which
conflicts resulted in easy victories for the Roman arms.

In the meantime Hamilcar, his son Hannibal, and his son-in-law
Hasdrubal had been busy in Spain, reducing it under Carthaginian rule
and preparing it to be used as a base of operation from which an
invasion of Italy might be attempted whenever a favorable opportunity
should present itself.

In 227 B.C. the Romans, becoming alarmed at the spread of the
Carthaginian empire in Spain, insisted on a treaty by which the river
Ebro was fixed as the northern boundary beyond which the control of
Carthage should never extend. In 219 B.C. Hannibal (whose father and
brother-in-law had by this time both fallen in the war) attacked the
city of Saguntum, which, though south of the Ebro, was an ally of
Rome. No heed being taken of the Roman remonstrances, war was again
declared.

The Second Punic War lasted from 218 to 202 B.C. The early years of
this war saw a long series of Carthaginian victories, and their great
general, Hannibal, has ever since ranked as one of the greatest
military geniuses in history. This war, however, has been well
described as that of a man against a nation; and in the end the nation
conquered. The final battle was that of Zama, fought in Africa in 202
B.C.

By the terms of the treaty of peace made at the close of this war
Carthage surrendered to Rome all her territorial possessions outside
of Africa, all her elephants, and all her war ships except three
triremes, and also bound herself to pay a heavy annual tribute for
fifty years. In addition, Carthage was prohibited from making war,
under any circumstances, outside of Africa, nor within Africa except
with the consent of Rome; and was compelled to return to the ally of
the Romans, Masinissa, king of Numidia, all the territory and property
which had been taken from him or his predecessors by Carthage. In
many respects, however, the treaty was favorable to Carthage, who was
permitted to keep her African territory practically intact, who was
also permitted to keep her independence, and was not required to
receive any Roman garrison.

The Second Punic War was the decisive contest between Rome and
Carthage, the First Punic War being indecisive and the third being
merely the destruction of an already conquered people. This Second
Punic War, however, was something more than the decisive contest
between Rome and Carthage; it was the decisive contest between two
continents, two races, two systems of institutions. The battle of
Metaurus has justly been classed as one of the decisive battles of the
world. The capture of Rome by Hannibal could not have failed to have
entirely altered the whole future course of history. If Hannibal had
been able to carry back to Carthage the spoils of a conquered Rome he
would also have carried with them to Africa the scepter of world
empire. He would have wrested race supremacy and the leading place in
civilization from the Aryan for the Hamitic races. For many
centuries, at least, the center of power and civilization would have
been upon the southern instead of the northern shores of the
Mediterranean, and it is at least doubtful whether, even to-day, the
northern races could have completely eradicated the effects of such an
event.

In spite of the earlier triumphs of Persia and Greece, it was not
until the Roman victory over the Carthaginians that the position of
the Aryan races became definitely assured.

Mommsen writes on the results of the Second Punic War as follows:

     "It remains for us to sum up the results of this terrible
     war, which for seventeen years had devastated the lands and
     islands from the Hellespont to the Pillars of Hercules. Rome
     was henceforth compelled by the force of circumstances to
     assume a position at which she had not directly aimed, and
     to exercise sovereignty over all the lands of the
     Mediterranean. Outside Italy there arose the two new
     provinces in Spain, where the natives lived in a state of
     perpetual insurrection; the kingdom of Syracuse was now
     included in the Roman province of Sicily; a Roman instead of
     a Carthaginian protectorate was now established over the
     most important Numidian chiefs; Carthage was changed from a
     powerful commercial state into a defenseless mercantile
     town. Thus all the western Mediterranean passed under the
     supremacy of Rome. In Italy itself, the destruction of the
     Celts became a mere question of time: the ruling Latin
     people had been exalted by the struggle to a position of
     still greater eminence over the heads of the non-Latin or
     Latinized Italians such as the Etruscans and Sabellians in
     lower Italy. A terrible punishment was inflicted on the
     allies of Hannibal. Capua was reduced from the position of
     second city to that of first village in Italy; the whole
     soil, with a few exceptions, was declared to be public
     domain-land, and was leased out to small occupiers. The same
     fate befell the Picentes on the Silarus. The Bruttians
     became in a manner bondsmen to the Romans and were forbidden
     to carry arms. All the Greek cities which had supported
     Hannibal were treated with great severity; and in the case
     of a number of Apulian, Lucanian, and Samnite communities a
     loss of territory was inflicted, and new colonies were
     planted. Throughout Italy the non-Latin allies were made to
     feel their utter subjection to Rome, and the comedies of the
     period testify to the scorn of the victorious Romans.

     "It seems probable that not less than three hundred thousand
     Italians perished in this war, the brunt of which loss fell
     chiefly on Rome. After the battle of Cannæ it was found
     necessary to fill up the hideous gap in the Senate by an
     extraordinary nomination of 177 senators; the ordinary
     burgesses suffered hardly less severely. Further, the
     terrible strain on the resources of the state had shaken the
     national economy to its very foundations. Four hundred
     flourishing townships had been utterly ruined. The blows
     inflicted on the simple morality of the citizens and farmers
     by a camp life worked no less mischief. Gangs of robbers and
     desperadoes plundered Italy in dangerous numbers. Home
     agriculture saw its existence endangered by the proof, first
     given in war, that the Roman people could be supported by
     foreign grain from Sicily and Egypt. Still, at the close and
     happy issue of so terrible a struggle, Rome might justly
     point with pride to the past and with confidence to the
     future. In spite of many errors she had survived all danger,
     and the only question now was whether she would have the
     wisdom to make right use of her victory, to bind still more
     closely to herself the Latin people, to gradually Latinize
     all her Italian subjects, and to rule her foreign dependents
     as subjects, not as slaves--whether she would reform her
     constitution and infuse new vigor into the unsound and
     fast-decaying portion of her state."

Up to the close of the third century before Christ the wars of Rome
had been mainly forced upon her by the aggressions of others, or had
grown out of disputes which had arisen in the natural course of
events; but after the battle of Zama, Rome entered deliberately upon a
career of foreign conquest.

In 200 B.C. a Roman army invaded Macedon, and Philip, the king of this
country, was completely defeated at the battle of Cynoscephalæ in 197
B.C., but the Romans consented to easy terms of peace at this time on
account of the expectation of a war with Syria. The first war between
Rome and Antiochus the Great, king of Syria, began in 191 B.C. and
ended in 187 B.C. By the terms of peace Antiochus gave up all his
claims in Europe, and in Asia west of the Taurus.

The Second Macedonian War began in 172 B.C. and was concluded by the
great Roman victory at Pydna in 168 B.C. Macedon was at first divided
into four republics, between which the rights of _connubium_ and
_commercium_ were prohibited, but soon sank into the condition of a
Roman province. Roman influence and interference were also rapidly
increasing in Greece during this period, although no formal annexation
of territory was made at this time.

The Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.), forced by Rome upon an almost
helpless antagonist, resulted in the complete overthrow of the
greatest of Rome's rivals. Carthage was completely destroyed, and
Africa became a Roman province.

The Achæan War (147-146 B.C.) resulted in the practical subjection of
all Greece to Rome; and between the years 143 and 133 B.C. the
conquest of Spain was completed.

The interest in Roman history during the period from 367 to 133 B.C.
is mainly centered in the military achievements of the republic, but
certain events in the political history of Rome during this period
must be noted before passing to a consideration of the violent
political conflicts which arose over the proposed reforms of the
Gracchi.

By the Lex Horatia and the Lex Publilia (339 B.C.) it was provided
that the _plebiscita_ (that is, the decrees of the comitia tributa)
should be binding as laws; that one of the censors must be a plebeian;
and that the subsequent ratification by the Senate should not be
necessary to render valid the laws passed by the comitia centuriata.

In 326 B.C. the Lex Poetelia Papiria prohibited debtors from assigning
themselves as security for debts. This did not interfere with the
selling of a debtor into slavery by means of the _legis actio per
manus injectionem_; it merely prohibited the debtor from using himself
as a special pledge to secure the payment of the debt.

In 304 B.C. the plebeians secured the publication of a manual
containing full information as to the proper steps in the proceedings
in the various _legis actiones_, and also as to the _dies fasti_. In
the early days at Rome all legal knowledge had belonged to the
patricians, who had always strenuously resisted any movement toward
making such information open to all. An exclusive knowledge of the law
is of great advantage to any special class in any community, and one
eagerly sought under different disguises in many countries. The
present attempt to monopolize legal education in the United States,
and to attack all movements which might tend to a general diffusion of
legal knowledge among the mass of the community, is merely another
manifestation of the same spirit which animated the Roman patricians
in their long contests to keep all legal knowledge away from the
plebeians. While the study of all professions which have no political
signification, such as that of medicine, may safely be regulated by
the government, and while the government may without injustice impose
proper qualifications upon those who desire to practice law as their
profession, any attempt of the government to restrict the teaching or
study of the law, or to impose upon those desiring to take bar
examinations restrictions intended merely to keep out of the
profession those not fortunate enough to belong to the wealthy
classes, can be intended only as an attack on democratic principles
and as an attempt to create a monopoly of legal learning for improper
purposes.

In 286 B.C. was passed the Hortensian Law, which brought about the
complete political equality of plebeians and patricians, whatever
slight distinctions still remained being removed by this law.



CHAPTER VI

THE TRIBES, THE COLONIES, AND THE PROVINCES


Complete equality of political and civil rights has never existed, in
any republic, among those subject to the laws; and throughout the
whole history of the Roman republic the most striking discriminations
existed between different strata in the political and economic
organizations.

The contests arising from caste distinctions among the Romans
themselves are discussed in other chapters of this volume; it is here
proposed to treat of the distinctions existing between Roman citizens,
allies, and subjects and to describe briefly the status of each class.

Just as in the days of the Roman kingdom the test of Roman citizenship
was membership in one of the curiæ, so in the time of the republic the
test became membership in one of the tribes.

In the early days of the republic the number of tribes was twenty-one.
Four new tribes were established in 387 B.C. in the conquered
territories of Veii, Capena, and Falerii. Other tribes were from time
to time created, until by the time of the close of the war with
Pyrrhus the total number of tribes was thirty-three. The twelve new
tribes occupied a district beyond the Tiber extending a little farther
than Veii, a portion of the Sabine and Aequian territory beyond the
Anio, part of Latium, part of the Volscian territory, and the coast
lands as far as the Liris. The last addition to the number of tribes
at Rome took place in 235 B.C., when the number was increased to
thirty-five.

The struggles in Rome for the extension of political rights and
privileges were always of a concrete, never of an abstract character.
We find none of the philosophy of Montesquieu among the Romans; no
discussion of natural rights, no effort for the securing of political
equality in the abstract. The Roman contests for liberty were always
of a strictly practical and, it might perhaps be added, of a strictly
selfish character. We find a series of conflicts, in each of which a
certain class of the citizens (or subjects) of Rome fought for the
right to be enrolled among those possessed of Roman political rights.

At first the contests were all between the actual inhabitants of Rome
itself. The political controversies, however, did not terminate upon
the admission of the plebeians to full political rights. After the
plebeians had won their contests there came the Latins, and after the
Latins the Italians.

The relation between early Rome and the other cities of Latium was of
the closest character. From the remotest times, long before the
foundation of Rome, a league of Latin cities was in existence. At the
head of this league stood Alba Longa (the long white city). Rome in an
early period in her history overthrew Alba Longa and succeeded to her
place at the head of the confederacy. While, however, the primary of
Alba Longa had never extended beyond giving to that city the honorary
presidency of the league, making it the religious center of Latium,
the leadership of Rome was of a real and substantial character. By the
terms of agreement between the members of the new Latin League, Rome
was tacitly ranked as the equal of the other cities combined, it being
agreed that all territory won by the league in war should be divided,
one half to Rome and one half among the other cities. The rights of
intermarriage and of trade existed between all the cities of the
league.

In 384 B.C. Rome was strong enough to compel the league to agree to
the closing of its membership. At that time there were in the league
thirty towns with full Latin rights and seventeen towns without the
right of voting. Towns which in the future should become connected
with the league were to have the rights of intermarriage and of trade
only with Rome.

The Latin League came to an end in 338 B.C. The extension of the
rights of Roman citizenship, either complete or qualified, to other
races in Italy is referred to in other chapters of this book. The
history of this subject is thus summarized by Mommsen:

     "It remains for us to consider the political effect of the
     mighty changes consequent upon the establishment of Roman
     supremacy in Italy. We do not know with exactness what
     privileges Rome reserved for herself as sovereign state. It
     is certain that she alone could make war, conclude treaties,
     and coin money; and that, further, any war or treaty
     resolved upon by the Roman people was legally binding on all
     Italian communities, and that the silver money of Rome was
     current everywhere in Italy.

     "The relations of the Italians to Rome cannot in all cases
     be precisely defined, but the main features are as follows.
     In the first place, the full Roman franchise was extended as
     far as was compatible with the preservation of the urban
     character of the Roman community. Those who received this
     franchise may be divided into three classes. First, all the
     occupants of the various allotments of state lands, now
     embracing a considerable portion of Etruria and Campania,
     were included. Second, all the communities which, after the
     method first adopted in the case of Tusculum, were
     incorporated and completely merged in the Roman state....
     Finally, full Roman citizenship was possessed by the
     maritime or burgess colonies which had been instituted for
     the protection of the coast....

     "Thus the title of Roman citizen in its fullest sense was
     possessed by men dwelling as far north as Lake Sabatinus, as
     far east as the Apennines, and as far south as Formiæ. But
     within those limits isolated communities such as Tibur,
     Præneste, Signia, and Norba, were without the Roman
     franchise; while beyond them other communities, such as
     Sena, possessed it.

     "In the next place, we must distinguish the various grades
     of subjection which marked all the communities not honored
     with the full Roman franchise. As in the case of the
     recipients of full citizenship, so here we may make a
     threefold division. To the first division belong the Latin
     towns: these retained their Latin rights; that is, they were
     self-governing and stood on an equal footing with Roman
     citizens as regards the right of trading and inheritance.
     But it is important to observe that the Latins of the later
     times of the republic were no longer for the most part
     members of the old Latin towns, which had participated in
     the Alban festival, but were colonists planted in Latium by
     Rome, who honored Rome as their capital and parent city, and
     formed the main supports of Roman rule in Latium. Indeed,
     the old Latin communities, with the exception of Tibur and
     Præneste, had sunk into insignificance. It was but natural
     that the Latin colonies, issuing as they did from the
     burgess-body of Rome, should not rest content with mere
     Latin rights, but should aim at the full rights of Roman
     citizens. Rome, on the other hand, now that Italy was
     subjugated, no longer felt her former need of these
     colonies; nor did she deem it prudent to extend the full
     franchise with the same freedom as she hitherto had done....

     "To the second division belong those towns whose inhabitants
     were passive citizens of Rome (_cives sine suffragio_). They
     were liable to service in the Roman legions and to taxation,
     and were included in the Roman census. A deputy or prefect
     appointed annually by the Roman prætor administered justice
     according to laws which were subjected to Roman revision.

     "In the third and last division we may include all allied
     communities which were not Latin states; the relation of
     these towns to Rome was defined by separate treaties, and
     therefore varied in accordance with the terms imposed by
     such agreements....

     "It had taken Rome 120 years to complete the union of the
     Italian peninsula, broken up as it was by mountain ranges
     and naturally favoring the formation and preservation of
     various isolated states. But union it was, rather than a
     subjugation, and each nation was left to the practical
     management of its own affairs. Content with self-government,
     the various communities, for the most part, easily bore the
     yoke of Roman supremacy. Eventually all the municipal towns
     received the full Roman franchise (90 B.C.), and thus
     established the municipal principle of government which
     endures to the present day."

The rights of Roman citizenship were never generally given outside of
the Italian peninsula, although such rights were granted to a few
favored individuals in all portions of the Roman world. The possession
of these rights was the greatest privilege which could be acquired by
any subject of Rome. Even when the strictly political rights of such
citizen disappeared under the empire, the personal distinction and
protection connected with this citizenship remained. As striking an
evidence of the dignity and privileges of a Roman citizen as could be
desired is found in the Bible in the twenty-second chapter of Acts:

     "The chief captain commanded him to be brought into the
     castle, and bade that he should be examined by scourging;
     that he might know wherefore they cried so against him.

     "And as they bound him with thongs, Paul said unto the
     centurion that stood by, Is it lawful for you to scourge a
     man that is a Roman, and uncondemned?

     "When the centurion heard _that_, he went and told the chief
     captain, saying, Take heed what thou doest: for this man is
     a Roman.

     "Then the chief captain came, and said unto him, Tell me,
     art thou a Roman? He said, Yea.

     "And the chief captain answered, With a great sum obtained I
     this freedom. And Paul said, But I was _free_ born.

     "Then straightway they departed from him which should have
     examined him: and the chief captain also was afraid, after
     he knew that he was a Roman, and because he had bound him."

At the close of the Second Punic War Rome was in possession of five
provinces--Sicily, Sardinia, Hither Spain, Farther Spain, and the
Gallic coast of Umbria. This latter province soon became an integral
part of Italy, but the number of Roman provinces was kept at five by
the creation of the province of Cisalpine Gaul. From this time on the
number of Roman provinces rapidly increased. The existence of the
provinces perpetuated the existence of various classes of political
rights.

We will close this account with a description by Gibbon of the
relations between Rome and the provinces as they existed during the
closing years of the republic and the early days of the empire:

     "Till the privileges of Romans had been progressively
     extended to all the inhabitants of the empire, an important
     distinction was preserved between Italy and the provinces.
     The former was esteemed the centre of public unity, and the
     firm basis of the constitution. Italy claimed the birth, or
     at least the residence, of the emperors and the senate. The
     estates of the Italians were exempt from taxes, their
     persons from the arbitrary jurisdiction of governors. Their
     municipal corporations, formed after the perfect model of
     the capital, were intrusted, under the immediate eye of the
     supreme power, with the execution of the laws. From the foot
     of the Alps to the extremity of Calabria, all the natives of
     Italy were born citizens of Rome. Their partial distinctions
     were obliterated, and they insensibly coalesced into one
     great nation, united by language, manners, and civil
     institutions, and equal to the weight of a powerful empire.
     The republic gloried in her generous policy, and was
     frequently rewarded by the merit and services of her adopted
     sons. Had she always confined the distinction of Romans to
     the ancient families within the walls of the city, that
     immortal name would have been deprived of some of its
     noblest ornaments. Virgil was a native of Mantua; Horace was
     inclined to doubt whether he should call himself an Apulian
     or a Lucanian; it was in Padua that an historian was found
     worthy to record the majestic series of Roman victories. The
     patriot family of the Catos emerged from Tusculum; and the
     little town of Arpinum claimed the double honor of producing
     Marius and Cicero, the former of whom deserved, after
     Romulus and Camillus, to be styled the Third Founder of
     Rome; and the latter, after saving his country from the
     designs of Catiline, enabled her to contend with Athens for
     the palm of eloquence.

     "The provinces of the empire (as they have been described in
     the preceding chapter) were destitute of any public force,
     or constitutional freedom. In Etruria, in Greece, and in
     Gaul, it was the first care of the senate to dissolve those
     dangerous confederacies, which taught mankind that, as the
     Roman arms prevailed by division, they might be resisted by
     union. Those princes whom the ostentation of gratitude or
     generosity permitted for a while to hold a precarious
     sceptre were dismissed from their thrones as soon as they
     had performed their appointed task of fashioning to the yoke
     the vanquished nations. The free states and cities which had
     embraced the cause of Rome were rewarded with a nominal
     alliance, and insensibly sunk into real servitude. The
     public authority was everywhere exercised by the ministers
     of the senate and of the emperors, and that authority was
     absolute and without control. But the same salutary maxims
     of government, which had secured the peace and obedience of
     Italy, were extended to the most distant conquests. A
     nation of Romans was gradually formed in the provinces, by
     the double expedient of introducing colonies, and of
     admitting the most faithful and deserving of the provincials
     to the freedom of Rome."



CHAPTER VII

THE CRISIS--THE ATTEMPTED REFORMS OF THE GRACCHI

    "Once to every man and nation comes the moment to decide,
    In the strife of Truth with Falsehood, for the good or evil side;
    Some great cause, God's new Messiah, offering each the bloom or blight,
    Parts the goats upon the left hand, and the sheep upon the right,
    And the choice goes by forever 'twixt that darkness and that light.

           *       *       *       *       *

    "Backward look across the ages and the beacon-moments see
    That, like peaks of some sunk continent, jut through Oblivion's sea;
    Not an ear in court or market for the low foreboding cry
    Of those Crises, God's stern winnowers, from whose feet earth's chaff must fly;
    Never shows the choice momentous till the judgment hath passed by.

    "Careless seems the great Avenger; history's pages but record
    One death-grapple in the darkness 'twixt old systems and the Word;
    Truth forever on the scaffold, Wrong forever on the throne,--
    Yet that scaffold sways the future, and, behind the dim unknown,
    Standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above his own."

    --Lowell's _The Present Crisis_.


The critical days of any contest are seldom those of its final
culmination. The end has generally been long foreshadowed. The time at
which the last stand for the Roman liberties was made was not during
the civil wars of the last century before Christ, but at the time of
the attempted reforms of the previous century. The years in which the
great crisis of the Roman republic was reached were those from 134 to
121 B.C., the years marked by the activities of the Gracchi.

The story of the Gracchi constitutes one of the strangest, grandest,
and saddest stories in the whole course of history. It is a double
story of sacrifice, suffering, and untiring labor; of temporary
success, of ultimate death and failure--but a failure which stands
forth more glorious in the pages of history than the greatest
successes of others. It is the story of two brothers, possessed of
wealth and of high rank and connections, in the richest and most
powerful country of the world--men to whom was open either an easy
path along the old established road to the highest honors of the Roman
state or the life of luxurious ease so eagerly embraced by the
majority of the rich young Romans of that day. Casting aside both
these choices, and recognizing the dangers of their native state,
these brothers sacrificed all in an attempt to restore to Rome those
conditions which in the past had built up her greatness, and to secure
a redress of those conditions which had made the status of the great
mass of the citizens of the "Mistress of the World" hardly superior to
that of the very serfs. It is a story of the most aggravated
selfishness and relentless hatred on the part of those favored few
whose special and illegal interests were threatened by the attacks of
the young reformers. It is also, unfortunately, to too great an extent
a story of ingratitude and cowardice on the part of those for whose
interest Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus sacrificed themselves in vain.

The Gracchi were fortunate in having as father one of those Romans
who still retained the Roman virtues of an earlier age,--patriotism,
bravery, and honor. Not only had the administration of the elder
Gracchus of the offices of consul and censor at Rome been free from
corruption, but his administration of the governorship of the Province
of Ebro had been of great service to his native country and had,
furthermore, endeared his memory to the Spaniards themselves.

The mother of the Gracchi was Cornelia, daughter of Africanus Scipio,
the greatest Roman hero of the previous generation. Of the twelve sons
and one daughter born of this union, only the daughter and two sons
lived to maturity. The two surviving sons were the first born,
Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, born about 166 B.C., and his brother
Gaius, nine years younger.

Few young Romans were afforded the opportunity of such close relations
and intercourse with the leading men of Rome as was Tiberius Gracchus
in his early years. Even in boyhood his mind seems to have been of a
serious cast, more interested in study and speculation than in the
pleasures customary in youth.

In his father's house, which was to a large extent a common meeting
place for all that was best in Roman society, he frequently heard the
leading men of the city lament the disappearance from the country
districts of the free citizens, and the attendant evils which seemed
to be hovering over the Roman state. But what to his elders appeared
lamentable principally on account of its effect upon the recruiting of
the Roman legions, and consequently upon the control of Rome over her
provinces and her foreign influence, was to young Tiberius an evil of
a very different and more serious character. To him alone of this
group did this condition appear as a great moral and social wrong--a
wrong, moreover, whose effect would not be limited to the character of
the soldiers in the Roman army, but which, if not remedied, would,
like a cancer, eat out the very life of the Roman republic. Another
difference was that those evils which brought forth from others
languid, pessimistic, speculative reflections roused in Tiberius
Gracchus the determination to action.

Hardly was the boyhood of Tiberius over when his public life began.

     "Scarcely had Tiberius assumed the garb of manhood when he
     was elected into the college of augurs. At the banquet given
     to celebrate his installation, App. Claudius, the chief of
     the senate, offered him his daughter's hand in marriage.
     When the proud senator returned home, he told his wife that
     he had that day betrothed their daughter. 'Ah,' she cried,
     'she is too young; it had been well to wait a while--unless,
     indeed, young Gracchus is the man.' Soon after his marriage
     he accompanied Scipio to Carthage, where he was the first to
     scale the walls.

     "The personal importance of Gracchus was strengthened by the
     marriage of Scipio with his only sister. But this marriage
     proved unhappy. Sempronia had no charms of person, and her
     temper was not good; Scipio's austere manners were little
     pleasing to a bride; nor were children born to form a bond
     of union between them." (Liddell's _History of Rome_.)

A brief taste of military life was added to the experience and
training of Tiberius Gracchus when he served, while a mere youth, in
the capture of Carthage.

His thirtieth year was spent as a quæstor in Spain. While traveling to
and from this province he was forcibly impressed by the industrial and
economic conditions in Etruria. Throughout this rich and extensive
territory the small freeholder seemed to have entirely disappeared,
and the land was now occupied by large estates cultivated by slaves.
Tiberius returned to Rome just as the so-called "slave war" in Sicily
broke out. This war not only called attention to the vast number and
the depths of wretchedness of the slaves already in Italy and the
adjoining island, but it also served to emphasize the perilous
condition of a state whose foundation rested upon such a smoldering
volcano.

In this servile war the slaves throughout large portions of the island
of Sicily arose in a body, murdered those of their masters who were
not fortunate enough to escape, and selected a Syrian juggler as their
king. A Greek slave, named Achæus, proved not only a skillful
commander in the field but also a capable organizer, and he soon
mustered a large army containing both slaves and free laborers.
Another leader, Cleon, a Sicilian slave, captured the important city
of Agrigentum. The united forces defeated the Roman prætor Lucius
Hypsæus, and temporarily drove the Romans out of Sicily.

It was not until after three years of continued warfare, after the
Romans had suffered numerous defeats and great armies had been sent
under three different Roman consuls, that the rebellion in Sicily was
finally put down.

Upon his return from Spain, and at the breaking out of the servile
war, Tiberius Gracchus had not hesitated to freely express his
feelings as to the cause of the existing evils, and as to the
necessary remedies for their amelioration, and it was not long before
that part of the Roman people who were dissatisfied with existing
conditions turned to Gracchus as the only logical leader for the
reform movement. As his views on the cause of the evils and the
general character of the remedies which he proposed had been shown to
the people by his speeches, Tiberius was elected tribune in 134 B.C.,
taking office on December 10 of that year.

The reforms proposed by Tiberius Gracchus in the bill presented before
the comitia tributa, almost immediately after his installation as
tribune, were entirely of an economic character. In the field of mere
political rights nothing more remained to be asked by the lowest of
the Roman citizens; their pitiable condition was the result of the
existing agrarian situation. The agrarian bill proposed by Tiberius
Gracchus, while a radical departure from existing conditions, was
neither illegal, confiscatory, nor unjust; it merely provided for a
reassumption on the part of the state of land long held illegally by
the "special interests" of the place and age.

The agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus was in its main features merely
a revival of the Licinian agrarian law of 367 B.C. By the original law
(which for more than two centuries had been so flagrantly violated) it
had been provided that no head of a family should hold more than five
hundred jugera (a jugera being a little more than three fifths of an
acre) of the public land. Tiberius proposed to reënact this law, but
with the concession added that adult sons might hold each an
additional two hundred and fifty jugera; but not more than one
thousand jugera, in all, were to be held by any single family. Whoever
was unlawfully in possession of the public land was required to return
the same, above the permitted maximum, to the state; fair
compensation, however, was to be allowed for improvements made by the
holder of the land while it was in his possession.

The law further provided that all public lands were to be placed
under the control of three commissioners. This commission was to allot
the public land, in small parcels, to such poor citizens as might
apply for it. These new occupiers of the land were to hold it in
perpetuity as tenants of the state, paying a small annual rental.
These estates were to descend to the children of the holders, but were
not to be alienated, thus preventing the possibility of the land being
once again gathered together into large estates.

No valid objection could be made to the proposals of Tiberius
Gracchus, which were merely the righting of one of the worst of the
existing scandals of the Roman administration; a reform, moreover,
which was to be carried out in such a manner as to give to the
wrongdoers far greater consideration than that to which they were
entitled. The law, however, dealt a heavy blow against the richest and
most powerful class in Rome. The greater Roman capitalists had so long
held possession, in utter defiance of the law, of the great bulk of
the public lands of the state that their wrongful possessions had, in
their eyes, ripened into a rightfully vested interest.

An indirect method of attack has always been used by the opponents of
Gracchus, both by the opponents of his own day and by those historians
who have attempted to assail his memory. A recent historian,
unfriendly both to Gracchus and to his democratic reforms (Ferrero),
refers to this bill as follows:

     "The bill was very favorably received by the peasants and
     the small proprietors. It appears also to have given great
     satisfaction to the clients, freemen, and artisans, who made
     up the proletariat of the metropolis; they fell into the not
     unnatural mistake--often made by the poor before and
     since--of regarding the greed of the rich, and the
     indifference of the government, as a sufficient explanation
     of their own distress."

The ancient historian Plutarch thus refers to this contest:

     "Tiberius defending the matter, which of itself was good and
     just, with such eloquence as might have justified an evil
     cause, was invincible; and no man was able to argue against
     him to confute him, when, speaking in the behalf of the poor
     citizens of Rome (the people being gathered round about the
     pulpit for orations), he told them, that the wild beasts
     through Italy had their dens and caves of abode, and the men
     that fought, and were slain for their country, had nothing
     else but air and light, and so were compelled to wander up
     and down with their wives and children, having no
     resting-place nor house to put their heads in. And that the
     captains do but mock their soldiers when they encourage them
     in battle to fight valiantly for the graves, the temples,
     their own houses, and their predecessors. For, said he, of
     such a number of poor citizens as there be, there cannot a
     man of them show any ancient house or tomb of their
     ancestors, because the poor men go to the wars, and are
     slain for the rich men's pleasures and wealth; besides, they
     falsely call them lords of the earth, where they have not a
     handful of ground that is theirs. These and such other like
     words being uttered before all of the people with such
     vehemency and truth, so moved the common people withal, and
     put them in such a rage, that there was no adversary of his
     able to withstand him. Therefore, leaving to contradict and
     deny the law by argument, the rich men put all their trust
     in Marcus Octavius, colleague and fellow-tribune in office,
     who was a grave and wise young man, and Tiberius' very
     familiar friend. That the first time they came to him, to
     oppose him against the confirmation of this law, he prayed
     them to hold him excused, because Tiberius was his very
     friend. But, in the end, being compelled to it through the
     great number of the rich men that were importunate with him,
     he withstood Tiberius' law, which was enough to overthrow
     it."

A more deep-dyed treachery than that to which Marcus Octavius at
length consented is, fortunately, but seldom met with in history. It
was a treachery not only to one of his closest friends, not only to
the class which he represented and the voters who had elected him, but
also to the character and traditions of the very office which he held.
The creation of the office of tribune had been the first great victory
won by the plebeians; the duties of those holding this office had been
to protect the lives and property, the rights and the liberties, of
the weaker class in the community--the plebeians.

To make it possible for the tribunes to give such protection, the veto
had been granted to them. From the time when this power had first been
secured by the tribunes down to the day when the agrarian law of
Tiberius Gracchus came before the comitia tributa for its final
decision, the veto power of the Roman tribune had been the greatest
bulwark of the poor man of Rome. Now, in the greatest crisis of the
long contest in Roman history of human rights against class
privileges, this power was to be the weapon by which a traitor was to
secure the victory of the rich landowners over the great body of the
Roman citizens.

The day upon which the bill was to come before the comitia tributa
found the Forum crowded with what was probably the largest number of
citizens who, up to this time, had ever attended a meeting of this
assembly. Tiberius Gracchus made his speech in favor of the law, which
speech was received with great applause. The moment of his great
triumph was apparently just at hand. The clerk was about to read the
words of the bill, before it was voted upon, when the renegade tribune
Marcus Octavius stood up and forbade the clerk to read the bill.
Gracchus was surprised and, for the time, helpless. After much bitter
discussion, the meeting was adjourned; but Gracchus gave notice that
he would take up his bill again upon the next regular meeting day of
the comitia tributa.

The cowardly treachery of his colleague, instead of discouraging
Tiberius Gracchus, merely spurred him on to greater efforts. His
policy, formerly in the main a conciliatory one, now became militant.
In retaliation for the veto of Octavius he too made use of this power.
Indeed, a more thorough and effective use of this power than that made
by Gracchus at this time can hardly be imagined. A veto was put upon
the exercise of any of his functions by any of the Roman officials;
even the treasury was shut up and the courts of justice discontinued.
As the great landowners had now forfeited all claims to consideration
on account of the methods which they had adopted, the compensation
clauses were struck out of the bill, which in its amended form simply
provided that the state should resume possession of all lands held in
contravention of the Licinian Law. Even in this amended form there was
nothing revolutionary about the bill; it was merely the reënactment of
a law which already existed, and should have been in operation.

On the second day when the bill came before the comitia an attempt was
again made to read the law, and this was again prevented by the veto
of the tribune Octavius. Party feeling by this time ran so high that a
riot seemed inevitable. Trouble was for the time averted by an
agreement to refer the matter to the Senate.

A few months before, Gracchus' name would have possessed great
influence in the Senate, and, furthermore, a number of the
senators--the most patriotic and clear sighted, who saw the dangers
with which Rome was confronted--had in the beginning sympathized with
Gracchus in the objects which he sought. By this time, however,
Gracchus had lost all the sympathy and support which he had ever
possessed in this direction. This is sometimes explained by saying
that Tiberius Gracchus had alienated all the conservative elements in
his support by the intemperance of his actions. Such an explanation
cannot stand the scrutiny of history. The proposals and objects of
Gracchus were never anything but moderate--never anything more than
the claim that the existing laws must be enforced. The methods of
Gracchus were not only strictly legal but also strictly conventional
and usual, until the disgraceful tactics of his opponents constrained
him to more forcible action.

At this time Tiberius Gracchus, meeting only reproaches from the
senators, who were enraged at him because he had called attention to
and made an issue of a state of political corruption from which their
class had benefited for generations, returned to the comitia. Upon his
return the meeting was again dissolved; but before it had adjourned
Gracchus gave notice that he would still again bring up his measure
before the comitia tributa, on its next regular meeting day, and that
if Marcus Octavius again interposed the veto power to prevent a vote
being taken upon the bill, he would move the people that Octavius be
deposed as tribune.

Before the day for the next meeting of the comitia tributa arrived,
Gracchus appears to have made every effort to induce his colleague and
former friend to recede from his position. All efforts in this
direction, however, proving ineffectual, Gracchus immediately upon the
assembling of the comitia moved that the tribune Marcus Octavius be
removed from office. Of the first seventeen tribes to vote, each, by a
unanimous or practically unanimous vote, was in favor of the
deposition of Octavius. Before the vote of the eighteenth tribe was
taken, Gracchus made a final appeal to Octavius to withdraw his
opposition. After some hesitation Octavius refused, and the vote of
the next tribe furnished the required majority for his deposition.

For the first time in a popular government the principle of the right
of the people to recall an unworthy public official had been put into
practical operation. A more fitting occasion for this action can
hardly be imagined.

The action of Tiberius Gracchus in adopting this innovation has been
bitterly denounced, and as strongly defended. One of the liberal
historians refers to this action as follows:

     "These acts of Tiberius Gracchus are commonly said to have
     been the beginning of revolution at Rome; and the guilt of
     it is accordingly laid at his door. And there can be no
     doubt that he was guilty in the sense that a man is guilty
     who introduces a light into some chamber filled with
     explosive vapour, which the stupidity or malice of others
     has suffered to accumulate. But, after all, too much is made
     of this violation of constitutional forms and the sanctity
     of the tribunate. The first were effete, and all regular
     means of renovating the republic seemed to be closed to the
     despairing patriot, by stolid obstinacy sheltering itself
     under the garb of law and order. The second was no longer
     what it had been--the recognised refuge and defence of the
     poor. The rich, as Tiberius in effect argued, had found out
     how to use it also. If all men who set the example of
     forcible infringement of law are criminals, Gracchus was a
     criminal. But in the world's annals he sins in good company;
     and when men condemn him, they should condemn Washington
     also. Perhaps his failure has had most to do with his
     condemnation. But if ever a revolution was excusable this
     was; for it was carried not by a small party for small
     aims, but by national acclamations, by the voices of
     Italians who flocked to Rome to vote. How far Gracchus saw
     the inevitable effects of his acts is open to dispute. But
     probably he saw it as clearly as any man can see the future.
     Because he was generous and enthusiastic, it is assumed that
     he was sentimental and weak, and that his policy was guided
     by impulse rather than reason. There seems little to sustain
     such a judgment other than the desire of writers to
     emphasise a comparison between him and his brother." (A. H.
     Beesly, in _The Gracchi, Marius and Sulla_.)

The procedure adopted by Gracchus on this occasion was unknown to the
law, but it is hard to say that it was against the law. If this action
was unconstitutional, and revolutionary, so had been every change
which had ever been made in the fundamental principles of Roman public
law. The truth of the matter was that Rome had neither a written
constitution nor any law governing the method by which its fundamental
law might be changed. Rome, in this respect, was constantly in a
position similar to that in which the state of Rhode Island found
herself in 1841. The old colonial charter, which after the separation
from England had been continued in force as a state constitution, was
no longer suitable for existing conditions, and there was a general
feeling among the inhabitants of the state that the old charter must
give way to a new state constitution. A difficulty, however, here
presented itself in the fact that the old colonial charter, having
been granted by royal authority, contained no provision as to its
amendment by act of the people. In this situation the people of the
state were compelled to go outside of their organic law, and,
disregarding the old charter, to adopt a new constitution and form of
government. All this was not accomplished, however, without much
confusion and an incipient civil war.

Similarly situated, Tiberius Gracchus was now obliged to go beyond the
letter of the existing law, and to vindicate the underlying principle
of Roman law that the duty of the tribune was the protection of the
rights of the people, by introducing a new political expedient into
the scheme of Roman government.

Upon the deposition of Octavius the agrarian law of Gracchus was
immediately passed by acclamation. Three commissioners were appointed
to carry out the provisions of the bill--Tiberius Gracchus, his
brother Gaius, and Appius Claudius, the father-in-law of Tiberius
Gracchus.

For a time the success and popularity of Gracchus was at its zenith;
the commissioners, appointed to allot the land, energetically
prosecuted the work, and the great landowners became more and more
bitter as they saw their illegal gains about to be wrested from them.

One difficulty in the carrying out of the agrarian law was due to the
fact that the poverty of the mass of the Roman citizens was such that
very few who desired to secure an allotment of land were possessed of,
or could secure, the necessary money to stock the new farms and to
erect the necessary buildings. When, therefore, at this crisis, it was
learned that Attalus Philometor, the recently deceased king of
Pergamus, in Asia Minor, had made the Roman people his heirs,
bequeathing to them both his kingdom and all his private lands and
treasures, Gracchus grasped at this opportunity to overcome the
difficulty experienced by the agrarian commission. He proposed a law
providing that all the money so received should be used to furnish
the necessary stock for those to whom the public land was assigned.
About the same time another law was enacted, apparently not proposed
by Tiberius Gracchus, providing that the Agrarian Commission (called
the triumviri) should have final jurisdiction in all controversies
over the question as to whether any particular piece of land was
public or private land. The capitalistic party, setting an example
which has been so often followed in our own country and in our own
day, now attempted to divert the issue from the reforms being put into
operation through the energy of Gracchus, by personal attacks upon the
tribune himself; he was accused of having received a purple robe and
diadem from the envoy of the late king of Pergamus; of having violated
the Roman constitution; of desiring to make himself king over Rome.
Only vindictive partisanship could find any basis upon which to allege
the truth of any of these charges except perhaps that of a technical
violation of the Roman constitution in the deposition of Octavius. The
extreme party in the Senate, led by Publius Scipio Nasica, were openly
plotting the death of Tiberius Gracchus, either by assassination or
by judicial proceedings, as soon as his term of office should expire.

The violent position taken by his opponents clearly showed to Tiberius
Gracchus that both his reforms and his life were in danger. It was
evident that neither the agrarian reforms nor the life of Gracchus
would be safe after he had ceased to hold the office of tribune, and
the course of events finally drove Tiberius into becoming a candidate
for reëlection. To strengthen his hold upon the people he prepared
three new laws. The first law diminished the required period of
military service; the second law changed the procedure in the higher
courts of law, and permitted the jurors to be selected from all
persons possessing a certain amount of property, instead of (as
previously) restricting the selection to members of the Senate; the
third law created the right of appeal from the courts of law to the
assembly of the people in all cases.

The scenes at the election in June, 133 B.C., when Tiberius Gracchus
for the second time came before the comitia tributa as a candidate for
election as tribune, were among the most tumultuous in all Roman
political history. Upon the first day of voting the first tribe gave
its vote for the reëlection of Tiberius Gracchus; upon this, his
opponents immediately raised a protest, declaring that no one could be
twice, in succession, elected to the office of tribune. The debate on
this question developed into such a tumult that any further business
became an impossibility, and the meeting was adjourned until the next
day.

The friends of Tiberius were now thoroughly alarmed for his safety. A
large throng accompanied him to his home, and kept watch before his
doors all night. Before going to the comitia tributa in the morning
Tiberius is reported to have told his friends that if he considered
himself in danger, during the day's proceedings, and thought it
necessary for his friends to repel force by force, he would raise his
hand to his head. No means seems to have been adopted, however, for
any concerted or effectual resistance, and none of his friends who
attended the meeting of the comitia tributa went armed.

On the morning of the second meeting of the comitia tributa the Senate
also met close by in the temple of Faith. Nasica demanded of the
consul Scævola, who presided, to take steps to prevent the reëlection
of Tiberius Gracchus. The consul refused to interfere. At this stage
one of the senators, Fulvius Flaccus, who was friendly to Tiberius,
hastened from the temple to inform him that his death was about to be
resolved upon by the Senate. Upon hearing this news the friends of
Gracchus began hastily to arm themselves with staves, for the
protection of their leader, and Gracchus gave the agreed signal by
raising his hand to his head.

Seizing every opportunity to attack the motives of Gracchus, his
opponents raised the cry that he was asking for a crown, and this
report was carried into the Senate. Nasica, the bitterest of the
enemies of Gracchus and of his reforms, shouted, "The consul is
betraying the republic! Those who would save their country, follow
me!" and rushed out from the meeting of the Senate. He was followed by
many of the senators, and by their slaves and adherents, those who
were not already armed breaking up the benches to make clubs for
themselves. The followers of Gracchus, without any organization among
themselves, were unable to offer effectual resistance to the attack,
and soon fled in all directions. Tiberius Gracchus attempted to take
refuge in the temple of Jupiter, but the priests closed the doors
against him, and, stumbling over a bench, he was killed by repeated
blows on the head before he could rise. In this riot more than three
hundred of the followers of Gracchus were killed by clubs, or by being
driven over the wall at the edge of the Tarpeian rock. The hatred
toward Tiberius Gracchus, on the part of the special interests of the
time, did not end with his murder. Gaius Gracchus was refused
permission, which he sought, to bury his brother, and it was decreed
by the Senate that the bodies of Tiberius Gracchus and his followers
should be thrown into the Tiber before daybreak on the following
morning.

Very divergent views have been taken of the conduct of Tiberius
Gracchus and that of his opponents by different classes of historians.
Historians, equally with politicians, inevitably fall into one of the
two classes into which mankind is divided, the class of the radicals
on the one hand, or of the conservatives on the other; into the class
of those who favor progress and the recognition of the supreme right
of manhood, or into the class of those who wish to keep things as they
are, and worship before the shrine of vested interests. No single
incident in history better serves to bring out the bias of the
historian than does that of the efforts of Tiberius Gracchus in behalf
of his agrarian law. No historian can write this page of Roman history
without throwing open for the inspection of the world the inmost
workings of his mind and sympathies. That class of historians who can
see more pathos in the execution of King Louis XVI than in the
combined misery of the downtrodden millions who lived and died in
France under the two centuries of Bourbon misrule, have attempted to
cast upon Tiberius Gracchus the stigma of a demagogue, of a reckless
leader, of a violator of his country's most fundamental laws; while
the conduct of the leaders of the conservative party, who did not
hesitate at the crisis to resort even to murder rather than surrender
their unlawful profits, is excused as being rendered necessary by the
violence of Tiberius Gracchus.

Yet there are few prominent characters in whose public actions the
impartial critic can find so little to criticize as in that of the
greatest of all Roman tribunes--Tiberius Gracchus. At the outset the
whole policy of Gracchus was moderate and even conciliatory, and it
was only the unyielding selfishness of the great landowners which
forced him into a position where he must either surrender all for
which he was fighting or adopt a more vigorous plan of campaign;
which, finally, against his will, compelled him to adopt those tactics
for which he has been so severely censured by certain historians.

The legality of the deposition of Octavius has already been discussed.
It only remains to consider the action of Tiberius Gracchus in
presenting himself as a candidate for reëlection as tribune. Of the
vital necessity for this action, both to secure the enforcement of the
agrarian law and the personal safety of Tiberius himself, there can be
no doubt. It must be admitted, however, that this by itself is not a
sufficient defense of the action of Gracchus on this occasion. The
fundamental principles of government in any country cannot, generally,
be safely violated merely to meet a temporary exigency. The worst
possible government is generally better, for those who are to live
under it, than anarchy; and the condition of a country where laws can
be habitually broken with impunity is but one step from that of a
country where no laws exist. The breaking of a law with good motives
is often more disastrous than the breaking of it with bad intentions;
because in a former case an example is set which, being looked upon
with approval by a large class of the best people in the community, is
apt to furnish a precedent for future violations of the law, with the
worst motives and for the most dangerous purposes. No true republic
can long continue to exist unless a sense of reverence for and
obedience to law is bred into the mass of its citizens. The right of
overthrowing a corrupt government and of establishing a new civic
system must ever reside with the people; but such a right must be
resorted to only as an extreme, exceptional, and desperate remedy, and
the frequent recurrence of revolutions and rebellions in a republic
results in a substitution of the rule of force for the peaceful rule
of the majority, and is inconsistent with any true idea of democracy.

If, then, Tiberius Gracchus had attempted to override the fundamental
law of Rome for the purpose of obtaining some temporary personal or
partisan advantage he might well have deserved the attacks which have
been made upon his memory. Tiberius Gracchus, however, violated no
provision of the Roman constitution. No evidence exists that there was
ever any law making a Roman tribune ineligible for reëlection.

The prohibition would seem to have arisen from long-continued custom
rather than from law, and to have been of a character not unsimilar to
the so-called "conventions of the English Constitution," or to the
rule in this country that no man shall be elected for a third term as
President. If a law declaring a tribune to be ineligible for
reëlection was ever enacted in Rome (and with the absence of a full
list of Roman laws this is a point on which absolute certainty is
impossible) it was, in all probability, of a directory rather than a
mandatory character. Such was the character of all Roman laws relative
to the qualification of officers. Thus, the Roman laws provided a
regular order in which the principal offices at Rome should be held,
and prohibited any person holding any office until he had held all
those named before it on the list, and until he had reached a certain
specified age.

This law, while in the main followed, was frequently disregarded. The
violations were in the main chargeable to the very class at Rome that
was most bitter in the denunciation of Tiberius Gracchus for offering
himself as a candidate for reëlection as tribune. Under the existing
political conditions at Rome no great blame could be attached to an
occasional disregard either of the law regulating the qualifications
for office or the law, or custom, relative to the reëlection of a
tribune. It is only on this one occasion in Roman history that the
violation of either of these laws was denounced as an attack on the
Roman constitution. Even in the exciting days preceding the passage of
the Licinian Laws the tribunes Licinius and Sextius were reëlected
year after year, without the legality of their election being
questioned. Only ten years after the death of Tiberius Gracchus the
reëlection to the office of tribune of his brother, Gaius Gracchus,
was permitted. It is a striking comment upon the fairness of some of
the historians who attack Tiberius Gracchus for his alleged violation
of the law that they are able to find excuses for the action of that
branch of the senatorial party whose members were so unwilling to
surrender to the state their illegal profits that they resorted to
force to break up a meeting of the comitia tributa and to murder
Gracchus and three hundred of his adherents.

The years which intervened between the tribuneship of Tiberius
Gracchus and that of his brother Gaius were filled with internal
factional discord at Rome, but without any decisive results. Each
party, in turn, was able to secure revenge upon its opponents, in the
conflict connected with the death of Tiberius Gracchus. First, the
popular party was successful in compelling Nasica to retire from
Italy. Next, in 132 B.C., the Senate gave to the consuls a commission
to inquire into the actions of those who had supported Tiberius
Gracchus. By means of this commission the aristocratic party was
enabled to bring about the execution of some of the partisans of
Gracchus and the exile of others.

For the time the leadership of the popular party had passed to C.
Papirius Carbo, a man possessed both of the ability and the vices of
the successful demagogue. He was one of those politicians who are
always to be found in the forefront of every movement for liberty or
reform, and who, by their hypocrisy and selfishness, do more to bring
discredit upon the principles they champion than can possibly be done
by the ablest of the opponents of such principles. No greater contrast
can be imagined than is to be found in a comparison between Tiberius
Gracchus and Carbo. In the case of the former we see a devotion to
principle and to humanity which not even the fear of death could
alter; in the case of Carbo, on the contrary, we can discover nothing
but a striving for selfish ends and personal advancement. He appeared
as a radical among radicals when this attitude seemed to offer the
shortest road to fame and fortune; and with equal facility he became
the most abject tool of the senatorial party when such a change of
position seemed most likely to result to his personal benefit.

Being elected a tribune, Carbo set himself to win the favor of the
people by new popular legislation. He introduced and secured the
passage of a bill extending the use of the ballot into the legislative
assemblies of the people. His next measure, one to formally authorize
the reëlection of tribunes, was defeated. Gaius Gracchus made his
first public speech in support of this measure.

The work of the Agrarian Commission, in the meantime, had been
progressing in spite of the murder of Tiberius Gracchus and the
obstacles which the great landowners were constantly throwing in the
way of the commission. The Roman census shows that in the six years
from 131 to 125 B.C. the number of burgesses was increased by
seventy-six thousand; this increase was almost entirely due to the
operation of the agrarian law, and the work of the commission.

The vacancy in the Agrarian Commission made by the murder of Tiberius
Gracchus had been first filled by the election of P. Licinius Crassus,
father-in-law of Gaius Gracchus. Upon the death of Crassus, and of
Appius Claudius a few years later, these commissioners were succeeded
by Carbo and Fulvius Flaccus, the latter being the senator who had
attempted to warn Tiberius Gracchus of his danger, on the day of his
death.

Carbo, for the time the guiding spirit of the commission, attempted to
win additional popularity by a vigorous policy in carrying out the
agrarian law. Energetic action along this line was undoubtedly needed,
as the great landowners had in many ways succeeded in blocking the
work of the commission. The policy of Carbo, however, was that of the
demagogue rather than that of the statesman, and the result of the
methods which he adopted was a reaction which, for a time, completely
put a stop to the work of the commission, split the popular party, and
created a new political party or faction whose existence had an
important influence upon the course of Roman political history during
the next two generations.

The first step taken by Carbo was the publication of a proclamation
calling for information against owners of public land who had not
voluntarily registered themselves as such. In theory such a proceeding
was undoubtedly a proper mode of procedure against the large holders
of public lands who were endeavoring to evade the agrarian law; but in
practice it resulted in a great deal of hardship. Many of the good
land titles throughout all Italy were without sufficient documentary
proof; and many landowners, whose land was private, were yet at a loss
for evidence to prove that their land was of this character when
information against them was filed with the commission.

The situation was a most delicate one, and one requiring the exercise
of the highest degree of honesty, tact, good judgment, and diligence.
None of these qualities was possessed by Carbo. The commission acted
in the most arbitrary manner and apparently declared a great deal of
private land to belong to the public. The injustice seems to have been
practiced not so much against the great landowners (Carbo appears even
as early as this to have been falling under the influence of the
aristocratic party) as against the small Latin and Italian landowners.
The result was that the Latins and Italians, who had been among the
truest of the adherents of Tiberius Gracchus, now became alienated
from the Roman popular party under the leadership of Carbo, and began
to come under the influence of the senatorial party.

Politics made strange bedfellows two thousand years ago as well as
now, and the new turn of the wheel of Roman politics brought in
Scipio Africanus as the head of the Latins and Italians, and working
in harmony with the Senate.

The first action taken by Scipio was to introduce and secure the
passage of a law taking away from the Agrarian Commission the judicial
power by which it was enabled to decide questions as to the public or
private character of lands and vesting such power in the consuls. This
judicial power was then vested in the consul C. Sempronius Tuditanus;
but he being soon sent to Illyria to conduct a military campaign
against the Iapydes, no person was left in Rome with the power to
settle questions of this character. The work of the Agrarian
Commission was now brought to a stop, and no further reassumption or
allotting of public lands could take place. Thus the great landowners
were finally successful in destroying the effect of the agrarian
legislation of Tiberius Gracchus.

As this result began to make itself manifest, so great criticism arose
against the action of Scipio that he felt called upon to announce that
he would explain and defend his actions both before the Senate and
before the people. In his speech before the Senate he carefully
evaded all reference to the case of the great landowners who still
continued illegally to hold large tracts of the public lands, and
proclaimed his purpose to be to protect the Latin and Italian farmers
whose small holdings of land were being wrongfully taken from them by
the actions of the Agrarian Commission. These small farmers, sympathy
for whom Scipio thus attempted to arouse, thus occupied the position
held by those widows and orphans who to-day appear so prominently
among the stockholders of all law-breaking corporations.

The speech of Scipio was naturally well received in the Senate; what
its reception would have been on the second day, before the people in
the Forum, is problematical. On the morning following his speech in
the Senate Scipio was found dead in his bed. It is one of the unsolved
mysteries of history whether Scipio died from natural causes or was
murdered. Nor is it more certain, if he was murdered, as to who his
murderers were. Strong suspicion was directed against Carbo, and that
hypocritical demagogue was driven into a temporary political
retirement, from which he emerged a few years later as one of the
most serviceable tools of the senatorial party.

The importance, ability, and character of Scipio Africanus have been
greatly over-praised by most historians. A. H. Beesly, however, in his
work _The Gracchi, Marius and Sulla_, gives a discriminating criticism
of this Roman general and statesman:

     "He is usually extolled as a patriot who would not stir to
     humour a Roman rabble, but who, when downtrodden honest
     farmers, his comrades in the wars, appealed to him, at once
     stepped into the arena as their champion. In reality he was
     a reactionist who, when the inevitable results of those
     liberal ideas which had been broached in his own circle
     stared him in the face, seized the first available means of
     stifling them. The world had moved too fast for him. As
     censor, instead of beseeching the gods to increase the glory
     of the State, he begged them to preserve it. Brave as a man,
     he was a pusillanimous statesman. It was well for his
     reputation that he died just then. Without Sulla's personal
     vices he might have played Sulla's part as a politician, and
     his atrocities in Spain as well as his remark on the death
     of Tiberius Gracchus--words breathing the very essence of a
     narrow swordsman's nature--showed that from bloodshed at all
     events he would not have shrunk. It is hard to respect such
     a man in spite of all his good qualities. Fortune gave him
     the opportunity of playing a great part, and he shrank from
     it. When the crop sprang up which he had himself helped to
     sow, he blighted it. But because he was personally
     respectable, and because he held a middle course between
     contemporary parties, he has found favour with historians,
     who are too apt to forget that there is in politics, as in
     other things, a right course and a wrong, and that to
     attempt to walk along both at once proves a man to be a weak
     statesman, and does not prove him to be a great or good
     man."

The fillers in, who had occupied the stage of Roman politics for the
years following the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, were now removed, and
the stage was being rapidly set for the second and final act of the
great historical tragedy of the Gracchi.

The political problems which confronted Rome at the time of the death
of Scipio rapidly reached such an acute state that it became evident
the solution of these problems, and the preservation of the Roman
republic, must be the work of a Man, not of a manikin or a demagogue.
At this crisis Rome was blessed with the best of fortune, only to be
immediately thereafter cursed with the worst of misfortune. The good
fortune consisted in the fact that at this time the man presented
himself for the work; the bad fortune arose from the refusal of Rome
to avail herself of his work.

The agitation of Carbo had added to the bitter contest between rich
and poor, and one perhaps still more bitter, at least temporarily,
between Romans and Italians. An attempt was made to reconcile the
differences between the Romans and Italians by means of a compromise,
by the terms of which the Italians were to consent to the carrying out
of the Agrarian Law, and in return were to be admitted to Roman
citizenship. This last proposal was viewed with great alarm by the
Roman proletariat, most of whom were by this time possessed of nothing
in the world except the rights and privileges of Roman citizenship,
and who saw that the value of such rights and privileges would be
greatly diminished by the great increase now proposed in the number of
those by whom such rights and privileges were to be enjoyed.

The Italians, on their side, delighted at the prospect of obtaining
these rights, began to come to Rome in great numbers. This migration
added fuel to the flame, and in 126 B.C. the tribune, Junius Pennus,
proposed an alien act by which foreigners were compelled to leave
Rome. The law was passed, with unpleasant consequences at a later
date. For the second time in his life Gaius Gracchus made a public
speech, on this occasion appearing on the losing side.

The following year Gaius Gracchus served as quæstor and was sent to
Sardinia under the consul Aurelius Orestes. The Senate, and the
oligarchical party in general, had by this time come to regard the
young Gaius Gracchus with mingled fear and suspicion, and in disregard
of the laws he was first ordered to remain a second year in Sardinia,
and later to remain a third year.

In the meantime, at Rome, events had been moving rapidly. Fulvius
Flaccus, the old friend of Tiberius Gracchus, had been elected consul
and had brought in a bill extending the franchise to all the Latin and
Italian allies. Shortly thereafter, before the bill had been voted
upon, Flaccus had been sent by the Senate upon foreign service, and
the bill was sidetracked. The disappointment at such a result on the
part of those who were denied the right of suffrage, after they had
believed it won, culminated in the rebellion of the Latin city of
Fregellæ. The force with which the city was reduced to submission, and
the severity with which the outbreak was punished, destroyed any
further thought on the part of the Latins and Italians of attempting
to secure their rights by force, but increased the silent discontent
of these people.

It was with these conditions existing at Rome that Gaius Gracchus
returned to the city after two and one-half years' absence in
Sardinia, defying the Senate by disobeying its order to finish out his
third year in the island.

The censors were in office at the time of the return of Gaius Gracchus
to Rome, and his enemies succeeded in having him summoned before them
immediately to answer for his alleged misconduct in leaving the post
to which he had been assigned by the Senate. It was hoped that the
censors could be induced to denounce him, which action would have
rendered him ineligible to hold public office. Gracchus, however, so
strongly defended himself in a speech to the people that the censors
did not dare take any action against him. In his speech he relied on
the well-established principle of the Roman law at that time, that the
Senate had no authority to compel him to serve as quæstor for a longer
period than one year. As to his own conduct in the exercise of the
office of quæstor he said, "No one can say that I have received a
penny in presents, or have put any one to charges on my own account.
The purse which I took out full I have brought back empty; though I
could name persons who took out casks filled with wine and brought
them home charged with money."

Upon his acquittal Gaius Gracchus became a candidate for the office of
tribune, and was elected, in spite of the most strenuous opposition of
the senatorial party and of the great landowners. However, the
opposition to him was so strong that, in the number of votes received,
he stood only fourth in the list of successful candidates.

Before entering upon the work of Gaius Gracchus as Roman tribune it is
admissible to stop for a moment to compare the characters, natures,
and abilities of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. The general judgment of
history seems to assign a far higher place to Gaius Gracchus than to
his elder brother. How far such a view is correct is certainly
questionable. It is a view based largely upon the longer term of
office, the more spectacular reforms, and the more dramatic death of
the younger brother. Without detracting in any degree from the high
character and motives, and the wonderful ability, of Gaius Gracchus,
it may still be said that the higher niche in the temple of history
more properly belongs to Tiberius.

To Tiberius belongs that special honor which properly attaches itself
to the pioneer; perhaps, most of all, to the pioneer in the field of
political, social, or economic reforms. In the case of Tiberius, his
career was deliberately entered upon, as the result of his profound
study and keen observation, acting upon his naturally strong Roman
patriotism, hatred of wrong and oppression, and sympathy for humanity.
Whether the career of Gaius would have taken the direction which it
did but for the memory and influence of his brother, is problematical.
It is certain that the strongest motive which urged him onward in his
career as tribune was the all-mastering desire and determination to
avenge the murder of his brother, and to vindicate his memory by
carrying his measures through to a triumphant conclusion. It might
almost be said that the mainspring of the career of Tiberius was his
love for Rome, while the mainspring of the career of Gaius was his
love for his brother.

Tiberius Gracchus was the greater statesman; Gaius Gracchus the better
politician. Tiberius could see more clearly the great outlines of what
lay at a distance; Gaius could discern more exactly the details of
what was close at hand. If the political activities of the two
brothers could have been at the same time, each would have
supplemented the other, and it is possible that their combined efforts
might have been sufficient to secure the accomplishment of their
purposes.

In many respects Gaius Gracchus surpassed his brother in ability. The
younger brother is generally conceded to have been the greatest orator
who, up to that time, had ever lived in Rome; while Cicero, unfriendly
both to Gaius Gracchus personally and to his measures, lamented his
early death as a loss to Roman literature. It is also probable that
Gaius was superior to his brother in executive ability and in his
wonderful capacity for hard work. Against that must be set the greater
vision displayed by Tiberius Gracchus, in the character and details of
his proposed reforms. There was nothing in the measure proposed by the
elder Gracchus which conflicts with either justice, the soundest
principles of statesmanship, or of political economy; nor was there
any feature which seemed to have been inserted in those measures
merely as a bid for popularity or for votes.

Unfortunately, as much cannot be said for the reforms of Gaius
Gracchus; some of the provisions of the laws which he proposed were
unsound in theory and dangerous in practice, and were probably brought
forward merely as a bid for popularity. Provisions of this character
were not numerous enough, or important enough, to detract from the
general merit of the reforms proposed by Gaius Gracchus, but their
presence in his bills would seem to indicate on his part a less
comprehensive grasp of political principles than that possessed by his
brother.

It is a striking illustration of the irony which fate sometimes makes
use of, that the only part of the measures brought forward by the
Gracchi which were permitted to have a permanent influence upon Roman
life and history were the questionable measures of Gaius Gracchus.

In their temperaments Tiberius appears the calmer, Gaius possessing
the more fiery disposition. Tiberius, throughout his career, continued
to exercise the highest degree of control over both his feelings and
his actions. While fighting for principles which he believed essential
to the safety and welfare of Rome he manifested surprisingly little
animosity toward his opponents. Even in the deposition of Octavius he
seems to have been free from personal malice, as is indicated by his
attempt to secure a reconciliation with his brother tribune after
seventeen out of the necessary eighteen tribunes had voted in favor of
the deposition of the latter.

Gaius, embittered by the murder of his brother Tiberius, developed a
hatred toward his opponents which time never healed. Patience and
judgment led him to bide his time and prepare for the contest which he
considered as fated, and for the revenge upon which he was
determined.

His character might be fitly described in the words of Thomas Moore as
one of those

    "Spirits of fire, that brood not long,
      But flash resentment back for wrong;
    And hearts where, slow but deep, the seeds
      Of vengeance ripen into deeds."

The desire to avenge the death of his brother was indeed the central
idea of Gaius Gracchus throughout his whole political career. It is
when we look at his work from this viewpoint that much which appears
contradictory or obscure becomes easy to appreciate and understand.

One of the first steps taken by Gaius Gracchus in the reform campaign
undertaken by him was an attempt to divide the ranks of those who had
opposed his brother. The oligarchical party had for many generations
been composed of two different elements united for mutual protection,
but whose interests, in many respects, were mutually antagonistic. The
object of Gracchus was to break the political union between the two
factions by arousing the points of antagonism.

The two elements in the aristocratic party above referred to were the
senatorial families and the wealthy mercantile interests. The general
line of demarcation between the two classes was the distinction
between the aristocracy of money and the aristocracy of birth,
generally to be found wherever aristocracies exist. The senators, with
few exceptions, were recruited from the old families which had been
prominent in Rome for generations and even for centuries. The majority
of the members were of patrician descent, but the distinction between
patrician and plebeian was now of little, or no, practical importance.
Some of the senatorial families were wealthy, others were not; where
wealth was possessed it generally consisted of large landed estates.
All members of the Senate, whether rich or poor, were possessed of
valuable political rights and opportunities.

The other element of the aristocracy included the merchants and
speculators, who had control of the financial affairs of the city and
of the government, and who had been rapidly accumulating large
fortunes, during the period which had elapsed since the Punic Wars.
Gracchus played for the support of this element at the same time that
he assailed the power of the Senate.

By the terms of the Calpurnian Law, passed in 149 B.C., it had been
provided that all provincial magistrates accused of dishonesty in
their administration should be tried before the prætor peregrinus and
a jury selected from the Senate. It was now voted that the jury should
be taken not from the Senate but from a body of three hundred men
selected from all Roman citizens who possessed the amount of property
which entitled a person to be enrolled among the equites. From the
standpoint of judicial reform the fairness of this act could not be
questioned. However gross might have been the misgovernment of any
provincial Roman official, it was generally impossible to secure a
conviction before a senatorial jury. As one historian (Liddell) sums
up the matter:

     "These courts had given little satisfaction. In all
     important cases of corruption, especially such as occurred
     in the provinces, the offenders were themselves senators.
     Some of the judges had been guilty of like offences;
     extortion was looked upon as a venial crime; prosecutions
     became a trial of party strength, and the culprit was
     usually absolved."

Equally important in the eyes of Gaius Gracchus, to the judicial
reform thus effected, was the effect which the law had toward raising
the equites to a position where, as an order, they would be a
formidable rival to the Senate. As a further bid for the support of
the moneyed aristocracy as against the old landed aristocracy and the
aristocracy of birth, Gracchus, in providing for the levying of new
taxes in the province of Asia, proposed the innovation of having the
tax farmed out at Rome, instead of in the province itself.

Another law did away with an old established abuse in the assignment
of provinces by the Senate to pro-consuls. Heretofore, each consul had
had his province assigned to him after his election, and the most
desirable provinces had therefore fallen to those toward whom the
Senate was the most friendly. It was now decreed that the provinces
for the two consuls for each year should be assigned before the
election of the consuls, and that the consuls should determine, either
by agreement or by lot, which of the two provinces should fall to
each.

The first of the economic measures of Gaius Gracchus was one to renew
and extend the agrarian law of his brother. In connection with this
law the right to decide whether land was public or private was once
more given to the Agrarian Commission, and provisions were also made
providing that new colonies should be founded in different parts of
Italy and also in the provinces. The carrying into execution of this
last provision was to be postponed until the following year. The
proposal to found colonies beyond the limits of Italy marked an
innovation both in Roman law and in the economic habits and customs of
the Romans.

Another law provided that the Roman government should undertake the
work of providing grain for its citizens; that every person possessing
the Roman franchise should have the right of purchasing grain from the
government at the price of six and a third asses per modius (the set
price being far under the market value); and that the losses sustained
in this grain trade should be taken out of the public treasury. Of all
the proposed reforms of the Gracchi this is the least defensible, and
the one which had the greatest influence upon the future. Lord
Macaulay, in the course of his speech made on the third reading of the
great English Reform Bill of 1832, said:

     "The defect is not in the Reform Bill, but in the very
     nature of government. On the physical condition of the great
     body of people government acts not as a specific, but as an
     alterative. Its operation is powerful, indeed, and certain,
     but gradual and indirect. The end of government is not
     directly to make the people rich, but to protect them in
     making themselves rich--and a government which attempts more
     than this is precisely the government which is likely to
     perform less. Governments do not and cannot support the
     people. We have no miraculous powers--and we have not the
     rod of the Hebrew lawgiver--we cannot rain down bread on the
     multitude from Heaven--we cannot smite the rock and give
     them to drink. We can give them only freedom to employ their
     industry to the best advantage, and security in the
     enjoyment of what their industry has acquired."

The fundamental principles of the science of government and political
economy, so forcibly expressed by Lord Macaulay on this occasion, and
which must be both understood and applied by every successful
lawmaker, were throughout his career thoroughly realized by Tiberius
Gracchus, and were also generally appreciated by his younger brother.
On this occasion, however, Gaius Gracchus lost sight of, or recklessly
disregarded, all the basic principles of the true science of
government or economics. If it became the permanent policy of Rome to
provide food for a great proportion of her citizens, this could only
result finally in their permanent pauperization. The effect of this
law was certain to be the opposite of that sought by the agrarian laws
of the two Gracchi.

The object of the latter laws was to bring the Roman citizens, or as
many of them as possible, "back to the soil"; to develop once more
that race of hardy Roman peasants, whose arms had won the great
military victories of the Roman republic; and to reduce both the
numbers and the influence of the unemployed and dangerous proletariat
of the city. The law as to the sale of grain was not only certain to
have an influence in an exactly opposite direction to that which would
be exerted by the agrarian law, if this latter law could be put into
successful operation, but, more than this, the operation of the grain
law would render the success of the agrarian law far more difficult
and doubtful. The truth of the matter was that the success of the
agrarian law was endangered not only by the opposition of the
aristocracy but also by the present character of the Roman
proletariat. The course of events at Rome during the previous century
and a half had done much to destroy the stamina of the mass of the
Roman people; and a life of economic independence, as the result of
hard labor in the country, held less attractions for the majority of
this class than an easily secured, though meager, living in the city.
Anything which rendered life in Rome easier and more pleasant made it
so much the harder to induce Roman citizens to settle on the farms. No
legislation ever yet passed in Rome had aroused such immediate and
universal enthusiasm among the poorer classes at Rome as did this law
relative to the sale of grain.

This law, the worst of those proposed by the Gracchi, was destined to
have the greatest influence of any of those laws upon the course of
development of Roman history. It is a peculiar phenomenon to be
observed in the study of the psychology of dishonesty that while the
beneficiaries of any system of "graft" will fight to the last
extremity against any infringement upon their interests, sometimes
even, as was the case with French nobility at the time of the French
Revolution, carrying their resistance to such limits as to involve
themselves and their country in a common ruin; nevertheless, it is
often easy to induce these favored interests to assist in the
establishment of some other system of "graft" for the benefit of
certain classes of their opponents.

When a class has become so blinded to the true standard of right and
wrong, and of relative values, as to look upon special privileges for
the few against the many, and long-continued systems of dishonesty, as
"vested interests," it seems to be much easier for them to submit to
wrongful exactions from others than to cease from such wrongful
exactions themselves. Thus, in the case of the grain laws at Rome, the
aristocratic party, unrelenting in their opposition to the agrarian
laws of the Gracchi, which would put an end to long-continued robbing
of the state and go far toward building up again a class of free
yeoman landowners, without opposition acquiesced in the establishment
of a system of wholesale exploitation of the state for the maintenance
at the public expense of a lazy, worthless, and corrupt mob.

The fatal idea contained in the grain law, having obtained a foothold
in the Roman policy, rapidly developed. Fifty years after the law of
Gaius Gracchus it was necessary to limit the amount of grain which
could be purchased by any one citizen to five modii (about one and a
quarter bushels) per month; at this period forty thousand citizens
were regular purchasers of grain from the state. At a little later
period it was provided that five modii per month should be given
without charge to such citizens as might require it. At one time the
number of Roman citizens receiving this free allowance of grain rose
to three hundred and twenty thousand. The Emperor Augustus fixed the
maximum number to whom such allowance should be given at two hundred
thousand.

The permanent and continuing effect of these grain laws was to further
demoralize free labor in Italy and the character of the Roman citizen,
and to bring about a constantly increasing use of slave labor in
agriculture and of mercenaries in war.

One of the minor laws introduced by Gaius Gracchus was that which
fixed the minimum age for military service at seventeen, and provided
that the uniform and arms of the soldiers should be furnished by the
state.

A more important law, and one whose object was both to better economic
conditions and to strike at the power of the Senate, was a law calling
for large expenditures for the purpose of improving the roads through
Italy and building new roads, and which gave the complete management
of such work to the tribunes. Previously, the control of all public
works and improvements had been in the hands of the censors, subject
to the supervision of the Senate.

It was to the carrying out of this last-mentioned law that Gaius
devoted his greatest energies during the year of his first
tribuneship. The improvement of the commercial roads throughout Italy
was a work which all classes in the community must approve; and even
the enemies of Gracchus could but praise the executive ability and the
untiring energy with which he supervised the carrying out of the work.

The great system of internal improvements undertaken this year,
however, attracted to Rome a great multitude of people from all parts
of Italy, and tended to accentuate the bad feeling on the part of the
mass of the Roman citizens toward the Italians.

Gaius Gracchus was, for the time, the complete master of the political
situation. In the consular election of 123 B.C. he was able to secure
the election of C. Fannius, an old friend and supporter of his
brother, and the defeat of L. Opimius, the candidate of the senatorial
party. The position of tribune had now become of such dignity and
importance that Fulvius Flaccus, although he had already held the
office of consul, presented himself as a candidate for this office in
the election of this year.

Gracchus did not present himself as a candidate for reëlection on
account of the law, or custom, against reëlection to this office.
However, he was reëlected tribune this year, although the manner in
which his reëlection was brought about is not very clear to us. The
Roman historians say that as a sufficient number of candidates did not
present themselves to fill all the positions of tribunes, the comitia
tributa reëlected Gracchus under the law which gave them the right to
reëlect a tribune under such conditions.

This is the only occasion upon which we hear anything of this law, and
we have no knowledge as to when it was passed, or as to what were its
exact provisions. Some writers, of that school of historians hostile
to the work of Tiberius Gracchus, hint that a law authorizing the
reëlection of tribunes, under the peculiar circumstances above
mentioned, must have been enacted since the death of Tiberius
Gracchus. The theory of these writers involves the assumption of the
enactment of a law prohibiting the reëlection of tribunes, and then of
another law limiting the application of the first law, although we
have no evidence as to the passage of either of such laws, and no
evidence of their existence, except during the conflicts of the
Gracchi.

Upon his reëlection Gaius Gracchus, probably largely through the
influence of Flaccus, introduced a bill to extend the franchise to all
the Latin colonies and probably to all the citizens of the Italian
communities. The measure was that of a patriot and a statesman, but it
proved the undoing of its author. The measure failed to pass, and its
introduction destroyed a great part of the influence and popularity of
Gaius Gracchus.

Trouble and unpopularity next came to Gaius Gracchus from the
colonies which were to be founded during this year. Gracchus entered
upon this work in a conservative manner, starting out with only a few
colonies, at the outset sending only a few citizens to each colony and
admitting no citizen to any of the colonies unless he was of a
respectable character.

The Senate, seeing the power of Gaius Gracchus tottering, resolved to
destroy him politically by taking away his influence with the people.
To accomplish this purpose Marcus Livius Drusus, who also held the
office of tribune but who was a man of great wealth and affiliated
with the senatorial party, was put forward to outbid Gracchus for the
popular approval. In pursuance of this plan Drusus introduced a law
for the immediate settlement of twelve colonies, each colony to
consist of three thousand families, chosen without regard to their
character, and each colonist to hold his land rent free. The passage
of this Livian Law, as it was called, marked the close of the control
of Gaius Gracchus over the comitia tributa. In the elections of 122
B.C. L. Opimius, the enemy of Gracchus, was elected consul, and
neither Gracchus nor Flaccus was reëlected tribune.

The opponents of Gracchus, however, were not content with having
driven him from political power, but were resolved upon depriving him
of life as well. An excuse for an attack upon Gaius Gracchus was found
in a report from Carthage that the colony founded there by Gracchus
had been situated upon ground which had been cursed by Scipio at the
time of the destruction of Carthage. Acting upon this report, the
Senate directed the tribunes to call a meeting of the comitia tributa
for the purpose of revoking the law relative to the colony at
Carthage.

Upon the day of the meeting of the tribes one of the followers of the
consul Opimius, who had taken occasion to insult Gaius Gracchus, was
stabbed by some unknown person. The senatorial party now had the
opportunity to secure their prey, and immediately proceeded to
accomplish their purpose. The meeting of the comitia tributa was
broken up, and a meeting of the Senate called, at which Gracchus was
declared a public enemy and the consuls directed to take steps to
secure the safety of the republic.

It is outside the purpose of this work to go into the details of the
butchery of the next day in which Gaius Gracchus, Fulvius Flaccus, and
three thousand of their supporters lost their lives. The charge that
Gaius Gracchus had planned to do what Julius Cæsar was to do in the
next century, make himself dictator, or emperor, of Rome, is best
disproved by the absolute lack of any military preparations on the
part of Gracchus, even to the extent of securing his own safety when
he knew his life was in constant danger.

Although the friends of Gracchus and Flaccus had gathered together to
protect their leaders, they were without either proper arms or any
system of military organization, and were cut down, almost without
resistance, by the armed forces which had been collected by the
consul, Opimius. Mention might be made of the fruitless heroism
displayed by some of those friends of Gaius Gracchus who remained true
to him to the last; but the flashes of brightness were few, and the
day must ever be recorded as one of the darkest in all Roman history.

It was this day that marked the final failure of the last movement
which might have saved and rejuvenated the great Roman republic; it
was this day that showed the right of manhood was no longer the
highest right in Rome, and that the rule of special and vested
interests was now supreme.

The singleness of purpose and openness of character in Tiberius
Gracchus leave no opening for speculation or doubt as to the motives
from which he acted or the objects which he sought. Both the character
and the actions of Gaius Gracchus are more complex than those of his
brother, and many historians have doubted the disinterestedness of his
agitation for popular rights. The final summaries upon the character
of this man, of two recent historians, are as follows:

     "The man who originates is always so far greater than the
     man who imitates, and Caius only followed where his brother
     led. The very dream which Caius told to the people shows
     that his brother's spell was still on him, and his telling
     it, together with his impetuous oratory and his avowed
     fatalism, militates against the theory that Tiberius was
     swayed by impulse and sentiment, and he by calculation and
     reason. But no doubt he profited by experience of the past.
     He had learned how to bide his time, and to think generosity
     wasted on the murderous crew whom he had sworn to punish.
     Pure in life, perfectly prepared for a death to which he
     considered himself foredoomed, glowing with one fervent
     passion, he took up his brother's cause with a double
     portion of his brother's spirit, because he had thought more
     before action, because he had greater natural eloquence, and
     because being forewarned he was forearmed.

     "In spite of the labours of recent historians, the
     legislation of Caius Gracchus is still hard to understand.
     Where the original authorities contradict each other, as
     they often do, probable conjecture is the most which can be
     attained, and no attempt will be made here to specify what
     were the measures of the first tribunate of Caius, and what
     of the second. The general scope and tendency of his
     legislation is clear enough. It was to overthrow the
     senatorial government, and in the new government to give the
     chief share of the executive power to the mercantile class,
     and the chief share of the legislative power to Italians.
     These were his immediate aims. Probably he meant to keep all
     the strings he thus set in motion in his own hands, so as to
     be practically monarch of Rome. But whether he definitely
     conceived the idea of monarchy, and, looking beyond his own
     requirements, pictured to himself a successor at some future
     time inheriting the authority which he had established, no
     one can say." (Beesly.)

     "It is clear that he did not wish to place the Roman
     Republic on a new democratic basis, but that he wished to
     abolish it, and introduce in its stead an absolute
     despotism, in the form of an unlimited tribuneship for life.
     Nor can he be blamed for it; as, though an absolute monarchy
     is a great misfortune for a nation, it is a less misfortune
     than an absolute oligarchy. Besides this, he was fired with
     the passion for a speedy vengeance, and was in fact a
     political incendiary--the author not only of the one hundred
     years' revolution, which dates from him, but the founder of
     that terrible urban proletariat which, utterly demoralized
     by corn largesses and the flattery of the classes above it,
     and at the same time conscious of its power, lay like an
     incubus for five hundred years on the Roman commonwealth,
     and only perished with it.

     "Many of the fundamental maxims of Roman monarchy may be
     traced to Gracchus. He first laid down that all the land of
     subject communities was to be regarded as the private
     property of the state--a maxim first applied to vindicate
     the right of the state to tax the land and then to send out
     colonies to it, which later became a fundamental principle
     of law under the empire. He invented the tactics by which
     his successors broke down the governing aristocracy, and
     substituted strict and judicious administration for the
     previous misgovernment. He first opened the way to a
     reconciliation between Rome and the provinces, and his
     attempt to rebuild Carthage and to give an opportunity for
     Italian emigration to the provinces was the first link in
     the chain of that beneficial course of action. Right and
     wrong, fortune and misfortune, were so inextricably blended
     in this singular man and in this marvelous political
     constellation, that it may well beseem history in this
     case--though it beseems her but seldom--to reserve her
     judgment." (Mommsen.)

Much of the criticism of each of these historians is manifestly true;
but the charge that Gaius Gracchus contemplated the substitution of
the rule of a despot for the rule of the oligarchy seems not to be
borne out by the facts.

A true understanding of the policies and objects of Gaius Gracchus can
be had only when we start our investigation with an appreciation of
the strongest motive which urged him onward. This motive was not, on
the one hand, a deep-rooted love and reverence for popular rights (as
was undoubtedly the case with his brother Tiberius); nor, on the other
hand, was it selfish interest, or the desire to usurp to himself the
supreme power in the state. The strongest influence in the life and
character of Gaius Gracchus was the desire to be avenged upon the
senatorial party for the murder of his brother. His efforts in behalf
of popular rights were instigated primarily by the desire to show
respect to his brother's memory and to carry out his brother's
policies. Upon this hypothesis the life and character of Gaius
Gracchus can be easily understood.



CHAPTER VIII

MARIUS AND SULLA


The Roman government after the death of Gaius Gracchus, while still
nominally a republic, had lost all its democratic character and had
once more become an oligarchy such as had existed centuries before,
during the period of the patrician republic. It was evident, however,
that the existing situation could not permanently continue. The
oligarchical government is that form of government which from its very
nature can never acquire stability. Both democracy and monarchy
possess elements of strength which may give to such governments a long
continuance of life; the oligarchy, lacking both the strength of
foundation of the one and the unity of action of the other, must
inevitably be supplanted by a freer or a more restricted system of
government. After the fall of Gaius Gracchus the last opportunity for
the re-creation in Rome of a truly democratic form of government was
lost. It should have been evident to any one who could read the signs
of the future that the power for the time possessed by the senatorial
oligarchy would soon be snatched from it, either by the frenzied hand
of a mob or by the strong hand of a despot.

Few in Rome at this time, however, seem to have been thinking much
about the future. To reactionists or even to conservatives the future
is always almost an unknown word; satisfied with the present, or
looking back with regret to the past, the supporters of special
interests and the votaries of tradition walk backward over the
precipice, the near presence of which they will neither see for
themselves nor be warned of by others.

A flicker of life on the part of the popular party was seen in an
effort by the tribune Decius to indict the former consul Opimius for
his part in the murder of Gaius Gracchus and his friends. The defense
of Opimius was undertaken by the renegade Carbo. The life of this
politician seems an excellent example in proof of the statement that
the demagogue seeks the favor of the people only for his own
advantage, and that as soon as he has acquired such favor, and has
become a person of influence, his next step is to sell himself, now
valuable on account of the political power he has acquired through
his hypocrisy toward the people, to the special interests. No better
contrast can be found in history between the true reformer and the
unprincipled demagogue than is the contrast between Tiberius Gracchus
and Carbo. While it is comparatively easy, however, to go back into
past ages and to separate the sheep from the goats, and to distinguish
between reformer and hypocrite, it is a much harder undertaking to do
this with the living politicians. It often happens that the people are
too ready to follow the demagogue and to repudiate and ridicule the
honest reformer. Striking illustrations of this phenomenon could
easily be given from recent American history. The doctrine of the
survival of the fittest applies in all sciences, social as well as
natural. In all its applications, however, this doctrine is that of
the survival of the fittest to meet existing conditions, not the
survival of the fittest from the standpoint of absolute merit. With
those who attempt to secure the political support of the proletariat
of a great city, merit is to a great extent a handicap, and a certain
class of vices the greatest advantage.

There are some men naturally so constituted that the doctrine that the
end justifies the means can be consistently and safely applied by them
in their public life. To this class have belonged most of those men
through whom all the greatest victories for liberty and the greatest
reforms in this world have been finally achieved. The mass of mankind,
however, are incapable of consistently and permanently following the
doctrine; and with all men, except the few above referred to, the
character of their objects and methods must act and react upon each
other. The result is that those seeking reform and honesty in
politics, in the main seek to accomplish their purposes by honest
methods; while the demagogue, seeking his own interests alone, a
hypocrite as to his motives, will never consider as to the honesty of
his methods. It is only on exceptional occasions that the honest
advocate of popular rights can win the support of the mob by honest
methods. Several causes work together to accomplish this result. In
the lower economic strata the individual is far more strongly
influenced by his own immediate interests than by the permanent
interests of the class to which he belongs. Perhaps it would be too
much to expect the contrary.

We have constantly before us to-day the spectacle of men who--loudest
in their denunciation of the discrimination which public officials
exercise in favor of the special classes and against the common
citizen--at election time, in consideration of a few dollars for
themselves, exert all their influence in favor of the worst exponents
of the system they denounce. By the return, in the form of direct or
indirect bribes to a selected few of the proletariat, of a small
portion of the money previously illegally or unjustly exploited from
the poor, the politicians of the "practical" type are able to secure
the assent of the greater portion of the proletariat to the
continuation of such exploitation.

Again, the candidate or political leader who intends to carry out his
promises is under a disadvantage in comparison with the candidate or
leader who does not. There are limitations to what government can
accomplish; there are no limitations to what a demagogue can promise.
There is no more unfavorable criticism possible upon the lack of
proper intelligence of the majority of the American voters than the
character of the promises and the arguments which are received with
applause at political meetings of every political party.

This criticism upon the political actions of the poorer classes,
economically, by no means indicates that they are the least desirable
class of voters in a country, or that a country would be better
governed if the ballot were taken away from them. The truth of the
matter is that it is mainly by the votes and efforts of the lowest
classes in a community (from the standpoint of wealth and social
status) that every great reform or popular victory must be achieved.
It is at the great crises that the masses are most generally right,
and the classes most generally wrong. No phenomenon of history is more
clear and more striking than that, at every great crisis of the
world's history, the mass of the wealthy and educated classes has been
always wrong. Nowhere is this more plainly to be discerned than in the
history of our own country. In the Revolutionary days the great mass
of the wealth and education in the country was to be found on the
Tory side. At the crisis the concrete question of personal interest
prevails over the abstract idea of public welfare; those who are
personally satisfied with existing conditions are slow to advocate a
change; those who have little to lose find it easier to be courageous.
Next to the small nucleus of true reformers, the first adherents of
any reform movement are apt to be the discontented and restless
elements of the community.

We can see a working example of this phenomenon, many centuries ago,
in the brief account which the Bible gives us of the recruiting of the
force with which David first offered resistance to King Saul. "David
therefore departed thence, and escaped to the Cave Adullam: and when
his brethren and all his father's house heard it, they went down
thither to him. And every one that was in distress, and every one that
was in debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves
unto him; and he became a captain over them."

In the case of the demagogue Carbo, we find him, after a violent
career as a popular tribune, selling his influence and services to the
senatorial party, of which he was henceforth the most servient tool.
He was rewarded for his services to this party by an election as
consul, and it was during his consulship (120 B.C.) that the
indictment was brought against Opimius. Carbo's influence, coupled
with the fear which the murderers of the Gracchi and their followers
had left in the minds of the people, was sufficient to secure the
acquittal of Opimius. The triumph of Carbo, however, was short-lived.
He was himself indicted by L. Licinius Crassus, brother-in-law of
Gaius Gracchus, and the manifestation of the feeling against him
became so bitter that Carbo was driven to take his own life by poison.

The Roman politicians of the next few years, the Metelli, Æmilius
Scaurus, and others, left little impress upon the course of Roman
history, and their lives and triumphs are of little interest to us.
Their aims were of a strictly personal character, their civic work was
of a routine character; if they did little harm to the state, they
conferred no benefit upon it.

The most important event of the closing years of the second century
before Christ was the famous, or rather infamous, Jugurthine War. The
story of this war furnishes the final evidence as to the corruption
and degradation of Roman politics and officials at this time. This war
arose out of a disputed succession to the throne of Numidia. Jugurtha,
at first the friend and ally of Rome, after he had secured possession
of the whole country through the murder of his two rivals, his
cousins, found himself at last at war with Rome. The fortune of war
going against him, he secured an advantageous peace by bribing the
Roman general. The facts relative to this peace becoming known at
Rome, Jugurtha was summoned to appear at Rome to give his account of
the proceedings. His history, during this famous visit to Rome, is
thus related by the Roman historian Sallust:

     "During the course of these proceedings at Rome, those whom
     Bestia had left in Numidia in command of the army, following
     the example of their general, had been guilty of many
     scandalous transactions. Some, seduced by gold, had restored
     Jugurtha his elephants; others had sold him his deserters;
     others had ravaged the lands of those at peace with us; so
     strong a spirit of rapacity, like the contagion of a
     pestilence, had pervaded the breasts of all.

     "Cassius, when the measure proposed by Memmius had been
     carried, and whilst all the nobility were in consternation,
     set out on his mission to Jugurtha, whom, alarmed as he was,
     and despairing of his fortune, from a sense of guilt, he
     admonished 'that, since he had surrendered himself to the
     Romans, he had better make trial of their mercy than their
     power.' He also pledged his own word, which Jugurtha valued
     not less than that of the public, for his safety. Such, at
     that period, was the reputation of Cassius.

     "Jugurtha, accordingly, accompanied Cassius to Rome, but
     without any mark of royalty, and in the garb, as much as
     possible, of a suppliant; and, though he felt great
     confidence on his own part, and was supported by all those
     through whose power or villainy he had accomplished his
     projects, he purchased, by a vast bribe, the aid of Caius
     Bæbius, a tribune of the people, by whose audacity he hoped
     to be protected against the law, and against all harm.

     "An assembly of the people being convoked, Memmius, although
     they were violently exasperated against Jugurtha (some
     demanding that he should be cast into prison, others that,
     unless he should name his accomplices in guilt, he should be
     put to death, according to the usage of their ancestors, as
     a public enemy) yet, regarding rather their character than
     their resentment, endeavoured to calm their turbulence and
     mitigate their rage; and assured them that, as far as
     depended on him, the public faith should not be broken. At
     length, when silence was obtained, he brought forward
     Jugurtha, and addressed them. He detailed the misdeeds of
     Jugurtha at Rome and in Numidia, and set forth his crimes
     towards his father and brothers; and admonished the prince
     'that the Roman people, though they were well aware by whose
     support and agency he had acted, yet desired further
     testimony from himself; that, if he disclosed the truth,
     there was great hope for him in the honour and clemency of
     the Romans; but if he concealed it, he would certainly not
     save his accomplices, but ruin himself and his hopes
     forever.'

     "But when Memmius had concluded his speech, and Jugurtha was
     expected to give his answer, Caius Bæbius, the tribune of
     the people, whom I have just noticed as having been bribed,
     enjoined the prince to hold his peace; and though the
     multitude who formed the assembly were desperately enraged,
     and endeavoured to terrify the tribune by outcries, by angry
     looks, by violent gestures, and by every other act to which
     anger prompts, his audacity was at last triumphant. The
     people, mocked and set at naught, withdrew from the place of
     assembly, and the confidence of Jugurtha, Bestia, and the
     others whom this investigation had alarmed, was greatly
     augmented.

     "There was at this period in Rome, a certain Numidian named
     Massiva, a son of Gulussa and grandson of Masinissa, who,
     from having been, in the dissensions among princes, opposed
     to Jugurtha, had been obliged, after the surrender of Cirta
     and the murder of Adherbal, to make his escape out of
     Africa. Spurius Albinus, who was consul with Quintus
     Minucius Rufus the year after Bestia, prevailed upon this
     man, as he was of the family of Masinissa, and as odium and
     terror hung over Jugurtha for his crimes, to petition the
     senate for the kingdom of Numidia. Albinus, being eager for
     the conduct of a war, was desirous that affairs should be
     disturbed, rather than sink into tranquillity; especially
     as, in the division of the provinces, Numidia had fallen to
     himself, and Macedonia to Minucius.

     "When Massiva proceeded to carry these suggestions into
     execution, Jugurtha, finding that he had no sufficient
     support in his friends, as a sense of guilt deterred some
     and evil report or timidity, others from coming forward in
     his behalf, directed Bomilcar, his most attached and
     faithful adherent, to procure by the aid of money, by which
     he had already effected so much, assassins to kill Massiva;
     and to do it secretly if he could, but if secrecy should be
     impossible, to cut him off in any way whatsoever. This
     commission Bomilcar soon found means to execute; and, by the
     agency of men versed in such service, ascertained the
     direction of his journeys, his hours of leaving home, and
     the times at which he resorted to particular places, and,
     when all was ready, placed his assassins in ambush. One of
     their number sprang upon Massiva, though with too little
     caution, and killed him; but, being himself caught, he made
     at the instigation of many, and especially of Albinus the
     consul, a full confession. Bomilcar was accordingly
     committed for trial, though rather on the principles of
     reason and justice than in accordance with the law of
     nations, as he was in the retinue of one who had come to
     Rome on a pledge of the public faith for his safety. But
     Jugurtha, though clearly guilty of the crime, did not cease
     to struggle against the truth, until he perceived that the
     infamy of the deed was too strong for his interest or his
     money. For that reason, although at the commencement of the
     proceedings, he had given fifty of his friends as bail for
     Bomilcar, yet thinking more of his kingdom than of the
     sureties, he sent him off privately into Numidia, for he
     feared that if such a man should be executed, his other
     subjects would be deterred from obeying him. A few days
     after, he himself departed, having been ordered by the
     senate to quit Italy. But, as he was going from Rome, he is
     said, after frequently looking back on it in silence, to
     have at last exclaimed that 'it was a venal city, and would
     soon perish, if it could but find a purchaser.'"

Upon the resumption of the war with Jugurtha the Romans at first met
with a great disaster, the army under Spurius Albinus being defeated
and compelled to pass under the yoke and withdraw from Numidia. The
result of this defeat was a sweeping investigation of the wholesale
bribery of Roman officials by Jugurtha. Many, though not all, of those
guilty in this respect were punished by banishment. The conduct of the
war was now delegated to Q. Cæcilius Metellus, by whom it was soon
after brought to a successful termination. This result, however, was
due less to the military genius of Metellus than to that of his
lieutenant Gaius Marius, who immediately afterwards became the central
figure in the political arena at Rome.

Marius was born near Arpinum about 157 B.C. of peasant parents.
Abandoning agriculture for the army, at a very early age he had won
distinction not only for personal strength and courage but also for
military ability. As early as the year 132 B.C. Scipio Africanus, once
being asked by a flatterer where a general could be found to fill his
place, touched the arm of Marius, who happened to be present on the
occasion, and answered, "Perhaps here." It was not only in the field
of war but also in that of politics that Marius had won a reputation
before the time that he served under Metellus against Jugurtha. Being
elected tribune in 119 B.C., his actions, upon some unimportant
controversies which arose during the year, had been such as to show
the determination and ferocity of his disposition, and to win the
favor of the populace and the distrust of the senatorial party.
Through the influence of the aristocracy Marius was defeated for both
the ædileships, but was finally elected prætor in 115 B.C.

It was while he was serving under Metellus in Africa that Marius
became a candidate for the consulship. The idea of Marius as consul
was very distasteful to Metellus, who permitted Marius to leave the
camp for Rome only twelve days before the day set for the election.
Marius, by almost superhuman exertions, succeeded in making the
journey to Rome in the first six of these days, and in the remaining
six conducted a successful campaign for the consulship.

The election of Marius to the consulship marks the beginning of the
last age of the Roman republic. With Marius began the habitual rule of
might rather than of right; rule by armies, instead of rule by
majorities. For something over half a century power at Rome was to be
shuffled backward and forward between different military commanders,
until finally a military despot arose strong enough both to overthrow
the oligarchy and to put down the mob. The manner in which the Romans
had abstained from internal violence for centuries, during all the
heat of so many bitter political and class contests, is one of the
wonders of ancient history. The aristocracy first broke this rule by
resorting to force to block the reforms of the Gracchi. Such a
procedure must always be a two-edged weapon, and Marius was the man
fated to turn the sword against those who first drew it in Roman
politics. The very election of Marius as consul (107 B.C.) was the
occasion of much disquietude to the oligarchy.

Although the consulship had at this time, in theory, been for two
hundred sixty years open to all Roman citizens, nevertheless, in
practice, it had, with occasional exceptions, been confined to the
members of the few great families. In fact, so general had this become
that a man who was the first of his family to be elected to this
office was known as a "new man." Not only was Marius a "new man," but
his immediate ancestors, in all probability, were men lower in the
social and economic scale than had been the father and grandfather of
any previous Roman consul. If the rise of Marius was a source of
danger to the senatorial party, the qualities which had rendered his
success possible were a source of danger to the whole community.
Marius was and had been a soldier, and a soldier only. There is
nothing in his whole life to indicate that he combined with the
attributes of the general any of those of the statesman, as did Cæsar
and Napoleon. The same fighting qualities which brought to him success
in war likewise produced success in politics, and the same ferocity of
disposition was manifested in both fields.

The military ability of Marius, in connection with the peculiar
circumstances of the times, soon secured to this general a more
absolute control of the Roman community than had previously been
possessed by any consul of Rome. The military ability of Marius has
never been disputed either by his contemporaries or by later
historians. His military successes after his election to the
consulship were rapid and decisive. Where his predecessors had failed,
Marius succeeded in the Jugurthine War, and the year 104 B.C.
witnessed at Rome the triumph of Marius, with the craftiest, ablest,
and most unscrupulous of African kings walking in chains as a captive
in his train.

Of greater importance and benefit to Rome were the great victories won
by Marius over those terrible invaders, the Teutones and the
Cimbrians, who had been threatening Rome and harassing northern Italy
for a number of years. In 102 B.C. the Teutones were defeated by
Marius at the battle of Aquæ Sextiæ, where the number of the
vanquished who were killed is variously estimated at from one hundred
twenty thousand to two hundred thousand. The following year, during
the fifth consulship of Marius, the Cimbrians were practically
annihilated, sixty thousand being captured and sold as slaves and the
remainder of the vast host, with few exceptions, killed.

The second century before Christ thus closed with brilliant foreign
victories for the Roman arms. This close likewise saw the beginning of
another period of slave insurrections and civil war. As before, the
principal resistance by the slaves occurred in the island of Sicily.
The immediate cause of this insurrection was the neglect or refusal of
the Roman prætor in Sicily to obey a decree of the Senate. So great a
scandal had arisen from the continued actions of the Roman tax
collectors in the East in seizing and selling into slavery persons who
failed to pay the exorbitant taxes demanded from them that the Senate
passed a decree providing that all persons illegally held as slaves
should be immediately released. This decree would have affected so
many slaves in the island of Sicily that the prætor suspended its
operation. The slaves, rendered desperate by seeing this promised
liberty snatched from them, once more rose in rebellion.

Again the slaves were commanded by able leaders, and again they won a
number of victories over Roman armies before they were finally put
down.

     "The revolt was thus apparently suppressed, yet many years
     the disturbances continued, and there were innumerable local
     insurrections, causing great carnage and unspeakable misery.
     A Roman knight, Titus Minucius, harassed by debt, and
     annoyed by the importunities of his creditors, through
     revenge incited an insurrection, and placed himself at the
     head of three thousand slaves. A bloody battle ensued before
     he was put down. Soon after this, two very able slaves,
     Sabrius and Athenio, headed revolts. Their forces were
     marshaled in well-disciplined bands, and for some time they
     successfully repelled all the power Rome could bring against
     them. Several Roman armies were defeated with great loss,
     and the whole island was surrendered to blood and violence.
     The poorer class of the free inhabitants availed themselves
     of the general confusion to indulge in unrestrained license
     and devastation. This insurrection became so formidable,
     that again Rome was compelled to rouse her energies. A
     consular army was sent, which drove the insurgents into
     their strongholds and then subdued them by the slow process
     of siege. The carnage and misery resulting from these
     servile wars no tongue can tell. The whole power of the
     Roman empire was pledged to put down insurrections; and
     though the captives could avenge their wrongs and sell their
     lives dearly, it was in vain for them to hope for ultimate
     success.

     "A law was passed prohibiting any slave from carrying a
     warlike weapon. Rigorously was this law enforced. At one
     time a boar of remarkable size was sent as a present to L.
     Domicius, then prætor of the island. He inquired who had
     killed it. On being informed that it was a slave, who was
     employed as a shepherd, he summoned the man before him, and
     asked how he had contrived to kill so powerful an animal.
     The shepherd replied that he had killed it with a boar
     spear. The merciless Domicius ordered him immediately to be
     crucified for having used a weapon in violation of the law.
     This rigor was pursued so unrelentingly, that, for a long
     period, there were no more revolts!" (Abbott's _History of
     Italy_.)

The victories of Marius over the Teutones and Cimbrians had been
followed by his sixth election to the consulship. This election,
however, had not been secured without great difficulty and tumult. The
aristocratic party had been consistently the opponents and enemies of
Marius throughout his whole career. The great victories which he had
won for Rome, instead of reconciling this class to him, had made them
only the more jealous and fearful of him.

By this time Marius had in addition, to a great extent, alienated the
lower classes of the Roman citizens. The enmity between the
proletariat at Rome and the Italians, which had commenced at the time
of the younger Gracchus, had been constantly increasing. Marius had
inclined more and more toward the side of the Italians. Like most
generals, his thoughts and affections were for his soldiers rather
than for the state which he served; and the soldiers over whom Marius
had command and with whom he had won his great victories were mainly
Italians. The degenerate city mob at Rome no longer desired or was fit
for military life, and the safety of Rome and the extension of her
territories now rested mainly upon those to whom the rights of her
citizenship were denied.

The Italians, probably appreciating both the strength of their
position and the injustice of their treatment, were demanding the
rights of Roman citizenship, and in this demand they found a
sympathizer in the consul Marius. Immediately after his victories in
the north of Italy, Marius, in direct violation of the law, had
granted Roman citizenship to one thousand soldiers in his army who had
distinguished themselves in the campaign. His excuse was
characteristic of the existing conditions and prophetic of the course
of Roman history during the succeeding century: "Amid the din of arms,
I could not hear the voice of the laws."

During his sixth consulship Marius endeavored to secure the Roman
franchise for certain of his soldiers in a more regular manner. The
tribunes, Apuleius Saturninus and Servilius Glaucia, secured the
passage of a law by which Marius was authorized to grant the rights of
Roman citizenship to three persons in every colony which enjoyed the
Latin franchise.

The career of the tribune Saturninus is illustrative of the condition
of anarchy into which Rome was rapidly drifting. Saturninus was the
first of the Roman politicians to rely as a regular practice upon
"strong-arm methods" to carry elections. In his first race for the
tribuneship he had brazenly murdered one of the opposing candidates;
he had been the principal campaign manager for Marius at the time of
his sixth election to the consulship, when the disbanded army of
Marius had been distributed among the Roman citizens in the meetings
of the comitia tributa in such numbers as to overawe all opposition.
Finally, when C. Memmius, a bitter political enemy of his, seemed
about to be elected to the consulship, he caused him to be stabbed in
the Forum by one of the thugs who constituted his own bodyguard.
Saturninus, however, had now reached the point where he stood almost
alone. The senatorial party were his natural enemies; the Roman mob
had, in the main, fallen away from his support on account of his
friendly feeling toward the Italians, and his extreme methods had
compelled even Marius to withdraw his support.

Seeing his political power almost gone, Saturninus, in company with
his fellow-tribune Glaucia and a band of the ruffians with which Rome
was so badly infested at this time, seized the citadel on the capitol
and attempted to raise an insurrection against the republic. The
citadel was considered to be impregnable to an attack, but Saturninus
and his followers were soon forced into submission by the cutting off
of their water supply. The insurgents had surrendered upon the
condition that their lives should be spared. Marius, in order to
protect their safety, imprisoned them in a large building, known as
the Curia Hostilia. The mob, however, climbed to the top of the
building, tore off the roof, and murdered all the prisoners by
dropping rocks upon them.

For centuries one of the most striking characteristics of Roman
political life had been the forbearance with which all political
factions restrained themselves from the use of violence. Such a
condition of affairs, however, no longer existed, and from the
beginning of the first century before Christ the use of force in
political controversies at Rome became the rule rather than the
exception. The exact reasons for the sudden change of sentiment upon
the part of the Roman mob against Saturninus is doubtful. It may have
been solely on account of his advocacy of Italian suffrage, or it may
have been due to the belief by the mob in the accusation made by the
senators that Saturninus was seeking to make himself king.

The political history of Rome during the first quarter of the first
century before Christ was extremely complicated on account of the
existence, side by side, of the two great contests,--the one between
the aristocratic party and the popular party at Rome; the second,
between the Romans and the Italians. Both contests were from this time
on to be marked by the most extreme bitterness on both sides, and each
soon became a military rather than a political contest.

The complicated system of laws regulating the status of the citizens
of the various Italian cities under the Roman republic has already
been discussed in previous chapters. It is also to be noted that at an
earlier date the political rights of a Roman citizen were of doubtful
value and were often refused by Italian cities to which they were
offered. This state of affairs no longer existed, and the time had
come when all Italians desired and demanded the political rights of
the Roman citizen.

The death of Saturninus and the departure of Marius for the East, in
99 B.C., gave an opportunity for a new set of political leaders at
Rome. The first of these politicians to rise into prominence was M.
Livius Drusus. Drusus occupied the unique position among the Roman
politicians of this period of having attempted to play the role of
conciliator between the various conflicting factions. Originally
brought forward in political life by the senatorial party with the
intention that he should play the part formerly taken by his father at
the time of the Gracchian conflicts, and destroy the influence of the
popular leaders by outbidding them in their efforts for popular
support--he soon went beyond the objects of his sponsors and
endeavored to secure real reforms for the benefit of the people and of
the state. Some historians would rank Drusus as the best and ablest of
all the Roman politicians who lived during the latter part of the
republic. It is difficult, however, either to form an accurate opinion
of the policies or merits of Drusus or to assign to him his proper
niche in history. The accounts which we have of his political
activities are conflicting and fragmentary, and his work left few
permanent results. The measure for which he is best remembered was
his proposed law to grant the franchise to the Latins and Italians.
Together with the increase of the franchise Drusus sought to secure
the allotment of land to the needy Roman citizens, and a reform in the
method of administering justice and government in Rome.

The franchise law of Drusus secured for him unbounded popularity
throughout Italy and bitter opposition at Rome. This opposition in his
own city culminated in his assassination in 91 B.C.

The murder of Drusus was the spark which produced the conflagration of
the Social War. Losing hope of securing any justice from Rome
voluntarily, ten of the Italian tribes, the Samnites, Trentanians,
Hirpini, Lucanians, Apulians, Picentines, Vestini, Marrucini,
Marsians, and Pæligni banded themselves together and declared war
against Rome. The Romans seemed to have been completely taken by
surprise. The Roman legates sent to the camp of the Italians were
murdered, together with all the Roman citizens upon whom the
insurgents could lay their hands, and a policy of extermination was
resolved upon. Rome was to be destroyed, and Italy was to be made
into a great republic with Corfinium as its capital. The government of
the new republic was modeled after that of Rome. Marsian and Mutilus
were chosen consuls for the first year of the new Italian republic.

The war at first went against the Romans and for a while it seemed as
if the Italians might even succeed in their scheme for the overthrow
and the destruction of Rome. Again the Romans were obliged to look to
Gaius Marius for their safety. Marius, who shortly before this time
had returned from the East and who had been suffered to hold only a
subordinate command during the first year of the war, now being put in
control of one of the Roman armies turned the tide of the Italian
success by winning the first great victory achieved by the Romans
during the war. The sympathy of Marius, however, was so strongly with
the demands of the Italians, and his desires so great to bring the war
to a close by conceding these demands, that he failed to follow up the
success with his accustomed vigor, with the result that a younger
general was enabled to rise into prominence.

Lucius Cornelius Sulla had already acquired considerable military
reputation from the campaign which he had served in Africa under
Marius, and was now in command of one of the Roman armies. Sulla,
throughout his whole life, was a consistent adherent of the extreme
oligarchical party. Nowhere in his life's history do we find the
slightest degree of regard for popular rights, or any opposition to
injustice which might rest on the lower classes. With no sympathy for
the Italians or the cause which they represented, and possessed with
military ability almost equal to that of Marius, Sulla became the
military hero of the Social War. Nevertheless, it was soon evident
that the Romans themselves would not be able to bring the war to a
successful termination. Therefore, by the Julian Law, the Roman
franchise was extended to those tribes and cities in possession of the
Latin rights, who, in return for the grant of the franchise to
themselves, seemed to have willingly assisted in preventing its
acquisition by the others. With the aid of the Latins, Sulla was able
to compel the subjugation of the Italians, of whom more than three
hundred thousand are reported to have been killed in the short war.

The conclusion of this war, however, brought not even a temporary
peace. The Roman sky was overshadowed with clouds both of foreign
invasion and internal dissension. In the far East the great
Mithridates, king of Pontus, had defeated the Romans, murdered in cold
blood eighty thousand Roman citizens whom he had found in Asia Minor,
and was preparing to invade Greece, which was only too ready to rise
and aid in the overthrow of the hated and oppressive Roman rule.

In the meantime the battle of the Italians, lost in the field, was
being renewed at Rome by the Roman politicians of the popular party.
Under the leadership of the tribune Sulpicius the popular party was
induced to take up the advocacy of the claims of the Italians.

The fear which had been produced in the minds of all Romans by the
disquieting news from the East tended to make all classes willing to
conciliate the Italians, from whom soldiers for foreign service must
mainly be recruited.

By the Lex Plautia-Popiria the very same privileges were extended to
all the Italian allies of Rome that had been extended to a favored few
by the Lex Julia. A few cities in Italy, however, mainly those of
Grecian origin, declined to take advantage of this law, preferring to
retain their local system of self-government rather than become
citizens of Rome.

From the standpoint of Roman supremacy the passage of the Lex
Plautia-Popiria was the wisest action in the whole course of Roman
history. The efforts of years immediately preceding the passage of
this act had shown that the citizenship of Rome, as constituted prior
to the year 90 B.C., was far too limited to be able to long remain as
the base upon which the great pyramid of the Roman foreign possessions
should rest. Nevertheless, by the additions made by the Lex Julia and
the Lex Plautia-Popiria, it was rendered broad and strong enough to
sustain the great weight and bulk of the Roman empire for several
centuries.

The Lex Plautia-Popiria, however, fell far short of giving to the
Italians the full political influence to which their numbers would
entitle them. The number of the new citizens enrolled by the censors
under the provisions of this new act were divided into eight (or
perhaps ten) new tribes, instead of being divided among all the
existing thirty-five tribes as had been demanded by Sulpicius.

The passage of these laws, however, while it terminated one of the
great contests between the Romans and Italians, did nothing toward
terminating that between the oligarchical and the popular parties.
During the period of the Social War the oligarchical and the popular
parties in Rome had been by one common danger united against the
combined force of the Latins, but with the close of the war this union
was brought to an end. The popular party at Rome was augmented by the
masses of the Italians; while with the oligarchical party was
associated the aristocracy and nobles of the various Italian cities.

The contest at Rome soon flamed up again over the question as to whom
the command against Mithridates should be given. Again the question
was settled by force instead of by ballot, Sulla marching to Rome at
the head of his army, and Marius, to whom the command of the army had
been given by the vote of the people, being obliged to flee for his
life. Many stories are told about the hairbreadth escapes of Marius at
this time. It is even related that, being captured in a marsh in
Campania, he was taken before the magistrate at Minturnæ and a
sentence of death passed upon him; that a Gaul was sent to his cell
with the command to cut off his head, but that the barbarian was so
frightened by the look in the eyes of Marius, which seemed to flash
fire in the darkness of the cell, and by the awful tones in which the
old man called out, "Wretch, dare you slay Gaius Marius?" that the
Gaul fled from the prison in dismay without executing his command, and
that Marius was afterwards released and succeeded in reaching Africa.
It is hardly possible, however, in view of the blood which flowed in
Rome at the command of Sulla, both at this time and a few years later
upon his return from the East, that Marius would have succeeded in
escaping death if he had, in reality, been captured by his opponents
at this time.

The political situation in Rome was now in the condition where
political supremacy depended upon force instead of upon the ballot;
and the rule of the aristocratic party in Rome was destroyed by the
departure of Sulla and his army for the East.

The consuls for the year 87 B.C. were Octavius, who belonged to the
aristocratic party, and Cornelius Cinna, the friend of Marius, who
belonged to the popular party. The latter attempted to once more bring
forward the law for dividing the new Italian citizens among all the
tribes of Rome, and was deprived of his consulship and exiled by the
oligarchy on this account. Civil war now again broke out in Rome, and
the city soon found herself threatened from all sides. At one time no
less than four distinct and independent rebellious Roman armies were
marching against Rome, while the Samnites, always the most vindictive
and irreconcilable enemies of Rome, again brought their forces in the
field--nominally to aid the popular party, in reality with the hope of
being able to finally strike a blow against the very existence of
Rome.

Marius, who had fled to Africa, returned to Italy and in connection
with Cinna put himself once more at the head of the popular party. No
military leader of the aristocratic party, capable of successfully
contending against the veteran leader of the popular party, remained
in Italy, and once again the political wheel of fortune revolved in
Rome, leaving the oligarchical party at the mercy of Marius.

His recent experiences had embittered the old soldier, and aroused
within him a desire for vengeance and for blood which he had never
before exhibited in his long political and military life. In dramatic
fashion he placed before the eyes of the Roman citizens the ungrateful
treatment which he had received in return for the great services he
had rendered his country. Clad in the ragged costume of an exile, he
led his victorious army to Rome, and, saying with bitterness that "an
exile must not enter the city," he waited outside the walls of Rome
until the decree of exile against him was formally repealed. If
Marius, however, was scrupulous in his observation of the form of the
laws prior to his entrance into the city, all his regard for either
the form or substance of the law seems to have been lost after such
entrance.

Marius and Cinna declared themselves consuls of Rome for the year 86
B.C. without any election and without even the formality of summoning
a meeting of the comitia tributa. Much more serious than this was the
disregard which was manifested by Marius and his followers for the
life and property of the Roman citizens. For several days Rome was
given up to almost indiscriminate plunder and murder by the soldiers
in the armies of Marius and Cinna; and after a stop was finally
brought to this extra-judicial pillage and murder it was succeeded by
a series of prosecutions almost as destructive, and fully as unjust.

It was with these days of slaughter, the most sanguinary and unjust of
Marius's whole career, that his life was to end. He was now an old man
of seventy, enfeebled by sickness and hardship, and after his desire
for vengeance on his enemies had been satisfied there appeared to him
nothing left in life worth living for. Reports from the East indicated
the military triumph of his great rival Sulla, and the prospect of the
speedy return of the leader. To his other worries there was added the
belief that the present triumph of his party was but temporary.
Finally, overcome by sickness and melancholy, he took to his bed, and
died at the end of seven days. Many believed that he had committed
suicide, but the truth of this theory can never be anything but a
matter of conjecture.

Of the character of Marius little need be said. He was primarily a
soldier, and only incidentally a politician. The debt which Rome owed
to the military ability of Marius can hardly be overestimated. It is
probable that but for his services the Roman republic might have been
destroyed on either of two different occasions.

As a politician Marius exerted little influence on the course of the
development of Roman history. The part which he played was rather
forced upon him by circumstances and the conditions of the times than
one which he himself created. His sympathies throughout were on the
side of popular rights and equal justice. He supported the popular
party at Rome against the oligarchical party, and was one of the
strongest sympathizers with the Italians in their efforts for the
Roman franchise. He was the first to draw the sword to protect the
rights of the people against the oligarchy, but the members of the
oligarchy had themselves drawn it to overthrow the Gracchi, and force,
having been entered into Roman politics, must be met with force,
unless the people were willing to surrender all their claims to right
and justice and permit the whole control of the state to pass to the
aristocracy.

The only real blemish upon the record of Marius is found in the cruel
revenge which he took upon his enemies in the last years of his life.
Even on this occasion there was something more than mere revenge and
cruelty in the policy of Marius. If the control of the popular party
in Rome was to be permanent, it was necessary that the aristocratic
party should be completely crushed before the return of Sulla from the
East.

In concluding the career of Gaius Marius, summaries of his character
given by two historians are here inserted:

     "'When Caius Gracchus fell,' said Mirabeau, 'he seized a
     handful of dust tinged with his blood and flung it toward
     the sky; from that dust was born Marius.' This phrase of
     Mirabeau's, though a whit rhetorical, is historically true.
     The patricians were willing to cede nothing to the Gracchi,
     and they were decimated by Marius. The struggle changed its
     methods: one fought no more with laws as the only weapons,
     but yet more with proscriptions. Marius was the incarnated
     pleb; as ignorant, pitiless, formidable, he had something of
     Danton, except that Danton was no soldier." (J. J. Ampère,
     _L'Empire romaine à Rome_.)

     "The judgment pronounced on Marius by posterity is not, like
     that on many other eminent men, wavering and contradictory.
     He is not one of those who to some have appeared heroes, to
     others malefactors, nor has he had to wait for ages, like
     Tiberius, before his true character became known.
     Disregarding the conscious misrepresentations of his
     personal enemies, we may say that he has always been taken
     for a good specimen of the genuine old Roman, uniting in his
     person in an exceptional degree the virtues and the faults
     of the rude illiterate peasant and the intrepid soldier. No
     one has ever ventured to deny that by his eminent military
     ability he rendered essential service to his country. Nobody
     has doubted his austere virtues, his simplicity and honesty,
     qualities by which, no less than by his genius for war, he
     gained for himself the veneration of the people. On the
     other hand, it is universally admitted that as a politician
     he was incompetent, and that he was only a tool in the hands
     of those with whom he acted. But morbid ambition and
     revengeful passion urged him at last to deeds which make it
     doubtful whether it would not have been better for Rome if
     he had never been born. He has, therefore, neither deserved
     nor obtained unmixed admiration; but as his darkest deeds
     were committed in moments when he was half mad from
     sufferings and indignities he had endured, and when perhaps
     he hardly knew what he was doing, he may, in the opinion of
     humane judges, gain by comparison with Sulla, who acted from
     reflection and in cool blood when he consigned thousands to
     death and enacted the horrid spectacle of the
     proscriptions." (William Ihne, _The History of Rome_.)

Marius was succeeded as consul by Valerius Flaccus, who had held the
same office fourteen years before. The two consuls Cinna and Flaccus
now attempted to fulfill the pledges to the Italians, and censors were
elected for the express purpose of doing away with the eight (or ten)
new Italian tribes and distributing the Italians throughout the whole
thirty-five tribes.

Another important law passed at this time was in the nature of a
temporary bankruptcy law for the relief of the Roman debtors. By this
new law all debtors were enabled to clear themselves of their debts by
paying one fourth of the amount owed.

Sulla, in the meantime, had brought to a successful close the war
against Mithridates, although, on account of his anxiety to return to
Italy as soon as possible, he did not completely crush the king of
Pontus, as he could have done easily at this time. Disregarding the
decree removing him from command of the army and appointing his
successor, Sulla retained the command of his victorious army and
returned with it to Italy, with the express purpose of crushing the
popular party, and placed Rome once more completely under the control
of the oligarchy.

Even before starting for Italy Sulla had issued a manifesto which
showed that no mercy could be expected for his opponents in the event
of his success. The Roman Senate at this crisis made a feeble effort
to act as a mediator between the rival parties. It sent an embassy to
endeavor to dissuade Sulla to desist from his threatened vengeance,
while on the other hand it forbade the consuls to make any military
preparations to resist. Both parties disregarded the orders of the
Senate. Cinna and Carbo, who were at that time the consuls of Rome,
began to make large levies of soldiers for the purpose of resisting
Sulla upon his return. An attempt by Cinna to lead an expedition to
attack Sulla in the East was frustrated by the refusal of his soldiers
to leave Italy, and Cinna himself was soon after murdered.

After the death of Cinna, Carbo for some time remained as the sole
consul of Rome. The worst possible use of this undivided power was
made by the consul at this period, and his terror at the approach of
Sulla was shown by the cruelty with which his enemies in the city were
murdered or exiled.

Sulla returned to Italy with only forty thousand soldiers, while the
popular party, under Carbo and the younger Marius, a nephew of the
veteran general, had secured an army said to have numbered two hundred
thousand. The army of Sulla, however, was composed of trained
veterans, and that of Carbo and Marius consisted, in the main, of
inexperienced recruits.

Soon after his return Sulla was joined by many of the senatorial
party, with large levies of soldiers. Among the most notable
accessions to the army of Sulla was that led by Cneius Pompey, at that
time a youth of only twenty-three years of age but destined later to
be the great rival of Julius Cæsar for the first place in Roman
politics.

The war from the start went against the popular party, and its final
outcome can hardly be said to have been at any time doubtful, although
it dragged along for some considerable time. The first important
battle was near Capua, in the year 83 B.C., where the consul Norbanus
was defeated by Sulla. The final fighting was around the city of
Præneste, where all the generals of the popular party had made their
headquarters.

After the strength of the Roman popular party had been crushed, the
fighting was still kept up by the combined forces of the Samnites,
Lucanians, and Campanians, who, originally drawn into the war as
allies of Carbo and Marius, now continued in a last desperate effort
to overthrow Rome altogether. At the battle of the Colline Gate these
allied Italian forces, under Pontius Telesinus, came very near
inflicting a worse defeat upon Rome than this city had ever received.
The left wing of the Roman army, commanded by Sulla, was in fact
routed, and the battle was saved only by the right wing under the
command of Crassus. In the end the victory of the Romans under Sulla
in this battle was complete, and the great Italian general Pontius
Telesinus was left dead upon the field.

This battle practically ended the fighting, although a few unimportant
cities still held out against Sulla for a short period. The long
contest between the Romans and the Italians was now definitely over.
The victory of the oligarchical party at Rome over the popular party
was merely temporary, although the supremacy of the latter was never
attacked during the lifetime of Sulla. The victory of Sulla was
followed by the terrible proscriptions with which the name of this
general must ever be associated. The number of names appearing in the
list of those who were proscribed, and liable to be killed by any one
willing to carry out the orders of Sulla, reached the enormous total
of forty-seven thousand. In this list were included most of the
leaders of the popular party, all the personal enemies of Sulla
himself, and also the names of all those whom for any reason of
personal enmity or greed the friends of Sulla desired to have
proscribed. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the friends
of the young Julius Cæsar were able to save his life on this occasion.
There is an historic anecdote to the effect that Sulla, in sparing
him, warned the aristocratic party to beware of him in the future, as
in this young man there was more than one Marius. It is hardly
probable that this story is true, as Cæsar at this time had done
nothing to show his ability.

The vengeance which Sulla took upon the Italians who had resisted him
was even more terrible. Whole cities were destroyed, and the Samnite
race was practically annihilated. The vengeance of Sulla extended even
to the remote provinces, where the members of the popular party were
everywhere hunted down and murdered.

In the year 81 B.C. the dictatorship, which had been unknown in the
Roman government for considerably more than a century, was once more
resorted to, and by the means of this office Sulla obtained absolute
power at Rome. The legal changes made by Sulla were few, but all in
favor of the aristocratic party. The laws passed during the previous
half century in favor of the people were disregarded. The presidency
of the courts was limited to the nobility, and the jurymen were again
taken from the senators. Sulla also secured the passage of a large
number of sumptuary laws of the most minute and, it might be added, of
the most ridiculous character.

Because of poor health, Sulla was compelled, in the year 79 B.C., to
resign the dictatorship, and he died the following year at the age of
sixty.

To such minds as naturally incline to the democratic side of political
controversies, whether past or present, the character of Sulla will be
apt to appear as perhaps that character in all Roman history most
absolutely without a redeeming trait.

Sulla's military triumphs consisted in the reconquest of provinces
which had been goaded into rebellion by the terrible exactions of the
Roman tax collectors and the unspeakable atrocities of the Roman slave
hunters.

The historians of the reactionary and aristocratic school, while they
are able to find much to praise in the life and work of this bitterest
of the enemies of human lives and liberty, are nevertheless compelled
to qualify their praise because of the many features of his character
and the many acts of his life which even they are compelled to
condemn. The historian Charles Merivale has made perhaps as strong a
plea for Sulla as it is possible to make, in the following words:

     "The personal rivalry of her two most fortunate generals
     becomes now the main channel of the history of Rome herself.
     In the year which closed the contest of the republic with
     her dependent allies (88), Sulla was forty-nine years old,
     Marius was about seventy. The former was enjoying the full
     breeze of popularity and renown, while the latter, wearied
     but not sated with accumulated honours, was moodily throwing
     away the advantages he had earned in his earlier career.
     From campaign to campaign Sulla, as we have seen, had dogged
     the steps of the elder warrior, always ready to step in and
     seize the opportunities which the other cast recklessly in
     his way. Not that Marius in his exalted station was even
     from the first indifferent to this incipient rivalry. He was
     deeply jealous of his subordinate. He felt chagrin at the
     contrast presented by their respective birth and origin; for
     Sulla, though needy in point of fortune, was a scion of the
     illustrious house of the Cornelii, and plumed himself on the
     distinction and advantage such a lineage conferred. Sulla,
     moreover, was trained in the accomplishments of Hellenic
     education, which Marius, conscious of his want of them,
     vainly affected to despise. Sulla wrote and spoke Greek; his
     memoirs of his own life became the text-book of the Greek
     historians of Rome, from whom we principally derive our
     acquaintance with him. But this varnish of superior culture
     seems to have failed in softening a rough plebeian nature.
     Sulla was one of many noble Romans who combined with
     pretensions to literary taste the love of gross debauchery,
     and pleasure in the society of mimes and vulgar jesters. He
     was a coarse sensualist, and by his disregard of the nuptial
     tie offended even the lax morality of his age. His eyes, we
     are told, were of a pure and piercing blue, and their
     sinister expression was heightened by the coarseness of his
     complexion and a countenance disfigured by pimples and
     blotches, compared by the raillery of the Greeks to a
     mulberry sprinkled with meal. His manners, except when he
     unbent in the society of his inferiors, were haughty and
     morose; nor is there any act of kindliness or generosity
     recorded of him. The nobles who accepted him as their
     champion had no personal liking for him. But selfish and
     ambitious though he was, the aggrandisement of his party and
     order was with Sulla a species of fanaticism. He despised
     the isolated ascendency of a Marius, and aspired to rule in
     Rome at the head of a dominant oligarchy....

     "Slowly and with many a painful struggle the Roman
     commonwealth had outgrown the narrow limits of a rustic
     municipality. The few hundred families which formed the
     original nucleus of her citizenship, and which in her
     earliest and simplest days had sufficed to execute all the
     functions of her government, had been compelled to
     incorporate allies and rivals in their own body, to enlarge
     their views, and to expand their institutions. The main
     object of Sulla's policy was to revive at least the spirit
     of the old restrictions. The old families themselves had
     perished almost to a man; he replaced them by a newer
     growth; but he strove to pare away the accretions of ages,
     and restore the government of the vast empire of Rome to a
     small section of her children. It contravened the essential
     principle of national growth; while the career of conquest,
     to which the Romans devoted themselves, required the most
     perfect freedom of development.

     "Nevertheless the legislation of Sulla was undoubtedly
     supported by a vast mass of existing prejudice. He threw
     himself into the ideas of his time, as far as they were
     interpreted by history, by tradition, and by religious
     usage. The attempt to enlarge the limits of the constitution
     was in fact opposed to every acknowledged principle of
     polity. It was regarded equally by its opponents and its
     promoters as anomalous and revolutionary. It had as yet no
     foundation in argument, or in any sense of right, as right
     was then understood. Society at Rome was in a highly
     artificial state; and Sulla, with many of his ablest
     contemporaries, mistook for the laws of nature the
     institutions of an obsolete and forgotten expediency. But
     nature was carrying on a great work, and proved too strong
     for art. Ten years sufficed to overthrow the whole structure
     of this reactionary legislation, and to launch the republic
     once more upon the career of growth and development. The
     champions of a more liberal policy sprang up in constant
     succession, and contributed, perhaps unconsciously, to the
     great work of union and comprehension, which was now rapidly
     in progress. The spirit of isolation which had split Greece
     and Italy into hundreds of separate communities was about to
     give way to a general yearning for social and moral unity.
     The nations were to be trained by the steady development of
     the Roman administration.

     "But though Sulla's main policy was thus speedily
     overthrown, he had not lived in vain. As dictator he wasted
     his strength in attempting what, if successful, would have
     destroyed his country; but as proconsul he has saved her.
     The tyranny of the Roman domination had set the provinces in
     a blaze. Mithridates had fanned the flame. Greece and Asia
     had revolted. The genius of the king of Pontus might have
     consolidated an empire, such as Xerxes might have envied, on
     either shore of the Ægean Sea. But at this crisis of her
     fate, hardly less imminent than when Hannibal was wresting
     from her allies and subjects within the Alps, Rome had
     confided her fortunes to the prowess of Sulla. The great
     victory of Chæronea checked the dissolution of her empire.
     The invader was hurled back across the Ægean; the cities of
     Greece returned reluctantly to their obedience, never more
     to be tempted to renounce it. Sulla followed Mithridates
     into Asia; one by one he recovered the provinces of the
     republic. He bound his foe by treaties to abstain from
     fomenting their discontents. He left his officers to enforce
     submission to his decrees, and quartered the armies of Rome
     upon the wretched populations of the East. The pressing
     danger of the moment was averted, though it took twenty
     years more to subdue the power of Mithridates, and reduce
     Asia to passive submission. Rome was relieved from the last
     of her foreign invaders; and this was the great work of
     Sulla, which deserved to immortalise his name in her
     annals."



CHAPTER IX

POMPEY


Sulla had hoped by his proscriptions to so completely crush the
popular party in Rome that the aristocratic party would be able to
enjoy a long period of undisputed authority and absolute power. Hardly
was Sulla buried, however, before the popular party began to show
signs of life and renewed resistance. The consuls at the time of
Sulla's death were Lepidus and Catulus, both of them elected on
account of their supposed absolute loyalty to the policies of Sulla
and their disregard of popular rights. The first named, however, soon
began to manifest symptoms of justice and humanity, and the Senate,
alarmed at these views and his increasing popularity, sought to remove
him from participation in Roman politics by sending him as proconsul
to govern the (then considered) remote province of Cisalpine Gaul.
This move only strengthened the position of Lepidus, however, by
providing him with an army. This army being augmented by recruits
consisting partly of enthusiastic adherents of the popular cause and
partly of desperate adventurers, Lepidus considered himself strong
enough to brave the chances of war, and began a march toward Rome. His
army, however, was intercepted by the senatorial army sent to meet
him, and Lepidus, completely defeated, fled to Sardinia, where he soon
died.

One of the leading lieutenants of Lepidus in this campaign was Brutus,
the father of the Brutus who was to be one of the assassins of Julius
Cæsar. The elder Brutus was taken prisoner at this time and put to
death.

In the meantime another rebellion broke out in Spain, where Sertorius
had assumed the government. Neither Metellus nor Pompey was able to
reduce him to submission, and the rebellion was put to an end only by
the murder of Sertorius in 72 B.C.

The epoch of civil wars had now fully begun for Rome, and the same
year which witnessed the murder of Sertorius saw also the breaking out
of the rebellion of the gladiators under Spartacus. This rebellion,
starting in the mere uprising of a handful of gladiators, reached very
large proportions and occasioned the greatest fear at Rome before it
was put down by Crassus in the south of Italy and Pompey in the north.
The credit for putting down this insurrection clearly belonged to
Crassus rather than to Pompey, whose share in the work had been merely
the destruction of a band of fugitives who had fled to the north of
Italy. Nevertheless, the Senate gave the highest honors to Pompey, who
was voted a triumph, while only an ovation was granted to Crassus.

Pompey and Crassus both sought election to the consulship, although
both were ineligible, since Crassus was still a prætor and under the
laws should have waited two years before being a candidate for consul,
and Pompey was only thirty-five years old and had not even been
quæstor. Each of the candidates, however, had an army under his
control at the very gates of Rome, and the two illegal elections were
secured from the people by fear. Pompey and Crassus, the two most
powerful men in Rome at this time, were thus consuls together in the
year 70 B.C.

Pompey, although he had been an ardent supporter of Sulla and a great
favorite of this leader, nevertheless, upon his election as consul,
began to depart from Sulla's policies. The proposals made by Pompey
were the removal of the restrictions placed upon the tribunes by Sulla
and a reform of the judicial system. The first proposal was consented
to by the Senate after some slight protest, but the second met with
bitter opposition. The complete control possessed by the Senate over
the law courts was of such great value to them that they were
determined to retain it, although the administration of the courts
while under their control had been one long-continued scandal. The
administration of justice under the knights, however, had been almost
as corrupt as that of the Senate, and to avoid giving the complete
control of the trials to either of these orders, the new law prepared
by Pompey and proposed by the prætor urbanus Aurelius Cotta provided
that one third of the jurymen should be furnished by the Senate, one
third by the knights, and one third by the tribunes of the treasury.
It was evident that the law was popular and would be adopted if it
came to a vote. To prevent this, the senatorial party again prepared
to engage in civil war. On this occasion, however, the resistance of
the Senate was broken by the result of the still famous Verres trial.

In connection with this trial it is necessary to go back and speak of
the work of another of the great men in the new generation of Roman
politicians. As early as the year 79 B.C. Cicero had won considerable
reputation by his defense of Sextius Roscius. From 77 B.C. down to the
period of which we are now writing Cicero had been actively engaged in
the work of an advocate at Rome, except during the single year 75
B.C., when he served as a quæstor in Sicily, and during this period
had risen in his profession until his reputation in the courts was
second only to that of the greatest lawyer of the age, Hortensius.

Cicero was now a candidate for ædile and tried to aid his candidacy by
some signal achievements. Just at this time a number of the Sicilians,
to whom Cicero had endeared himself by the honesty and ability with
which he had exercised his duty as quæstor in their island, besought
Cicero to undertake the prosecution of C. Cornelius Verres, who had
just returned from three years' service as prætor in Sicily, in which
province he had been guilty of the most extreme extortions,
dishonesty, and cruelty. The evidence Cicero was able to produce
against Verres, and the impassioned eloquence of the orations against
him which he prepared (for the evidence against Verres was so
unanswerable that his counsel, the great Hortensius, threw up the
case, and Verres fled into exile, thus depriving Cicero of an
opportunity of delivering all the carefully prepared speeches orally
in court) so demoralized the senatorial party that opposition to
Cotta's bill now ceased, and the law was passed without further
difficulty.

In the same year, 70 B.C., censors were again appointed, after the
office had been suspended for sixteen years, and the corruption of the
times, and particularly of the Senate, was shown by the fact that by
the action of the censors sixty-four members of the Senate were
degraded from their office.

The greatest military triumphs in the life of Pompey were in the years
following his consulship. In 67 B.C. he was sent to subdue the
Sicilian pirates, armed with more complete powers than had ever before
been voluntarily given by Roman citizens to any Roman general.

     "The terms of the proposal are extraordinary, and require
     close attention. First, a generalissimo was to be appointed
     by the senate from the consulars, to hold supreme command
     over the whole Mediterranean and over all the coast for
     fifty miles inland, concurrently with the ordinary
     governors, for three years. Second, he might select from the
     men of senatorial rank twenty-five lieutenants with
     prætorian powers, and two treasurers with questorian power.
     Third, he might raise an army of 120,000 infantry and 7,000
     cavalry, and a fleet of 500 ships, and for this purpose
     might dispose absolutely of all the resources of the
     provinces. Besides this, a large sum of money and a
     considerable force of men and ships were at once handed over
     to him.

     "By the introduction of this law the government was
     practically taken out of the hands of the senate; it was the
     final collapse of the oligarchic rule. But it was more than
     this--it was practically the institution of an unlimited
     dictatorship.

     "Like all extraordinary commands, this new office no doubt
     required the confirmation of the people; but it was an
     undoubted prerogative of the senate to define the sphere of
     every command, and, in fact, to control and limit it in all
     ways. The people had hitherto interfered only on the
     proposition of the senate, or at any rate of a magistrate
     himself qualified for the office of general. Even during the
     Jugurthine War, when the command was transferred to Marius
     by popular vote, it was only to Marius as consul for the
     year. But now a private man was to be invested by the tribes
     with extraordinary authority, and the sphere of his office
     was defined by themselves. The new commander was empowered
     to confer prætorian powers--that is, the highest military
     and civil authority--upon adjutants chosen by himself,
     though hitherto such authority could only be conferred with
     the coöperation of the burgesses; while the office of
     general, which was usually conferred for one year only, with
     strict limitations as to forces and supplies, was now
     committed almost without reserve to one man, who could draw
     upon the whole resources of the state.

     "Thus at one stroke the government was taken out of the
     hands of the senate, and the fortunes of the empire
     committed for the next three years to a dictator."

The passage of this measure was one of the greatest triumphs in the
life of Pompey. The success of Pompey against the pirates was complete
and immediate, and appeared in striking contrast with the ill-success
which had attended the Roman armies in Asia during the previous few
years.

In 66 B.C. Gaius Manilius, one of the tribunes, introduced a bill
recalling the Roman generals then conducting the war in Asia Minor and
transferring the control of the Roman armies in this section to
Pompey, giving also to Pompey the full power to make peace and
alliances. This proposed law brought about a most peculiar condition
of affairs in Roman politics. Few, if any, truly favored the
procedure, which was in direct violation of all the principles of the
Roman constitution--a greater violation even than the law which had
conferred upon Pompey his extraordinary powers as proconsul of the
seas. But while everybody feared the passage of this law, everybody,
with the exception of the extreme aristocratic party led by Catulus,
feared more to oppose it, and the law was passed with little
opposition.

From a military standpoint this grant of power to Pompey was justified
by the results. Inside of three years he succeeded in completely
overthrowing both Mithridates, the old king of Pontus, Rome's most
dreaded enemy, and Tigranes, the king of Armenia. These successes of
Pompey were followed by the conquest of the greater part of Syria.
From the conquests of Pompey in the East four new Roman provinces were
formed: (1) Pontus and Bithynia; (2) Cilicia, including Isauria and
Pamphylia; (3) Syria; (4) Crete.

The demoralizing effect of these laws conferring such powers upon
Pompey were soon to manifest themselves. Rome was rapidly becoming
accustomed to the disregard of the forms of government and of law, and
to the sight of vast and irresponsible powers being granted to a
single individual. These were the two things needed to prepare Rome to
quietly acquiesce in the abandonment of the republic and the creation
of a despotism. There is never a time in any country where too great a
responsibility or power can be given to a single individual without
the greatest danger to the future of the country. The right of the
people to rule is both meaningless and valueless if such right is
merely to consist in the right to delegate all the duties and powers
of government to the custody of a single individual. A government can
continue free only where the active control of public affairs is
widely distributed, and where the masses of the people are not afraid
to accept responsibility and do not attempt to throw the
responsibility for their safety and welfare upon the shoulders of a
single individual. Where a single individual becomes indispensable to
any free people it is a sign of the degeneracy of the people rather
than of the greatness of the man.



CHAPTER X

CICERO AND CATILINE


Political honors under the Roman republic were generally to be won
only by military success, or by aggressive leadership in the factional
politics of the city. The single instance of a man's rise to a leading
place in Roman politics solely through the power of his oratory is
found in the case of Marcus Tullius Cicero. His success in the defense
of Roscius and in the prosecution of Verres, as well as his growing
reputation as a lawyer and orator, have already been referred to.

In 65 B.C. Cicero was a successful candidate for the consulship. His
letters written to his friend Atticus at Athens, during his campaign,
give a most vivid insight into the practical Roman politics of the
times, and show us the striking similarity, in many respects, between
the political battles of the Roman republic and our own election
contests.

In one of his early letters Cicero wrote: "Let me tell you that there
is no class of people so harassed by every kind of unreasonable
difficulty as candidates for office."

In a later letter he discusses the details of his campaign as follows:

     "The state of things in regard to my candidature, in which I
     know that you are supremely interested, is this, as far as
     can be as yet conjectured. The only person actually
     canvassing is P. Sulpicius Galba. He meets with a good
     old-fashioned refusal without reserve or disguise. In the
     general opinion this premature canvass of his is not
     unfavorable to my interests; for the voters generally give
     as a reason for their refusal that they are under
     obligations to me. So I hope my prospects are to a certain
     degree improved by the report getting about that my friends
     are found to be numerous. My intention was to begin my own
     canvass just at the very time that Cincius tells me that
     your servant starts with this letter, namely, in the campus
     at the time of the tribunician election, on the 17th of
     July. My fellow candidates, to mention only those who seem
     certain, are Galba and Antonius, and Q. Cornificius. At this
     I imagine you smiling or sighing. Well, to make you
     positively smite your forehead, there are people who
     actually think that Cæsonius will stand. I do not think
     Aquitius will, for he openly disclaims it and has alleged as
     an excuse his health and his leading position at the bar.
     Catiline will certainly be a candidate, if you can imagine a
     jury finding that the sun does not shine at noon. As for
     Aufidius and Policanus, I do not think you will expect to
     hear from me about them. Of the candidates for this year's
     election, Cæsar is considered certain. Thermus is looked
     upon as the rival of Silanus. These latter are so weak both
     in friends and reputation that it seems possible to me to
     bring in Curius over both. But no one else seems to think
     so. What seems most to my interests is that Thermus should
     get in with Cæsar. For there is none of those at present
     canvassing who, if left over to my year, seems likely to be
     a stronger candidate, from the fact that he is commissioner
     of the via Flaminia, and when that has been finished I shall
     be greatly relieved to have seen him elected consul this
     election. Such in outline is the position of affairs in
     regard to candidates up to date. For myself I shall take the
     greatest pains to carry out all the duties of a candidate,
     and perhaps, as Gaul seems to have a considerable voting
     power, as soon as business at Rome has come to a standstill
     I shall obtain a _libera legatio_ and make an excursion in
     the course of September to visit Piso, but so as not to be
     back later than January. When I have ascertained the
     feelings of the nobility, I shall let you know. You must
     undertake to secure for me the support of our friend Pompey,
     since you are nearer to him than I. Tell him I shall not be
     annoyed if he does not come to my election."

The year of Cicero's consulship (64 B.C.) was disturbed by the famous
conspiracy of Lucius Sergius Catiline. It was in this conspiracy, and
during this consulship, that the culmination was reached of the
discontent and plotting which had been fermenting at Rome for a
number of years among a large class of the Roman nobility. The most
discontented men in any community are generally to be found among
those who, while belonging by birth to the upper classes of society,
and accustomed to and desirous of the luxuries of life, have lost
their fortunes and are unable to live in the style to which they
consider themselves as of right entitled. Rome, at this time, was
filled with this class of malcontents, the extravagant and wasteful
style of living, combined with the reckless gambling of the age,
having reduced great numbers among the young nobles almost to beggary.

The overthrow of Sulla's system of government, resulting from the
defection of Pompey and the consequential loss of power and prestige
by the Senate, had also roused a bitter feeling of resentment among
the whole aristocratic party. The effect of this resentment upon the
more solid and substantial element of this party had been to lead them
to make preparations for the overthrow of Pompey upon his return to
Rome; while the effect upon the ruined young nobles was to render
them more than ever ready for any desperate undertaking by which they
stood a chance of repairing their fortunes.

No cause, whether good or bad, ever lacks a leader; and the leader at
this time was found in Catiline, a young noble of the most profligate
character, but of some degree of ability and possessed of boundless
audacity and ambition.

Catiline was descended from one of the oldest families in Rome, and
his loyalty to the cause of the aristocracy was proved by the ferocity
with which he had served under Sulla and had assisted in carrying into
execution his most bloodthirsty orders. Catiline did not fail to
derive some profit from these terrible times, as he secured the
proscription and murder of his brother and the grant to himself of his
brother's forfeited estate.

In spite of these and many other equally heinous crimes, Catiline had
been elected prætor in 68 B.C. and had then spent two years in the
government of Africa. Returning to Rome in 66 B.C., he at once offered
himself as a candidate for the consulship. His political hopes on this
occasion, however, were wrecked by an accusation of misconduct in the
government of his province, brought against him by Publius Clodius. In
revenge, Catiline then conspired with Autronius Pætus, who had just
been deprived of the consulship for bribery, and other profligate and
reckless nobles, to murder Cotta and Manilius, the successful
candidates for consul, and to seize the government. According to
rumor, both Crassus and Cæsar were connected with the conspiracy. The
conspiracy was discovered and the enterprise was abandoned; but the
proceedings against the suspected conspirators were stopped by the
interposition of one of the tribunes, and the facts of the matter were
never definitely ascertained.

It is a peculiar fact that Cicero was ready, at this time, to defend
Catiline against the charges of Clodius; which charges, however, were
dropped, without being brought to trial. Two years later, Catiline was
again a candidate for consul, but was defeated by Cicero and Antonius.
Catiline now began to make preparations for civil war. The plot was
betrayed by a woman. Curius, one of Catiline's adherents, boasted of
the plot to his mistress Fulvia, and she not only gave information of
the plot to Cicero but entered into his employ as a spy upon the
conspirators.

In spite of the overwhelming character of the evidence against him,
Catiline continued on his course with the utmost assurance and
insolence. He even took his place in the Senate, and upon being
attacked by Cicero replied, "There are two parties in the
commonwealth; the nobles, weak in both head and body; the people,
strong in body, but headless. I intend to supply this body with a
head."

On the seventh of November Catiline attempted the assassination of
Cicero by two of his adherents, C. Cornelius and L. Vargunteius.
Cicero was immediately informed of this attempt by his spies, and the
attempt was blocked. The following day Cicero summoned a meeting of
the Senate, and upon Catiline appearing in his place, Cicero burst out
in the first of those famous orations against Catiline, so well known
to all Latin students, which begins: "How long, O Catiline, will you
thus abuse our patience? To what end will your unrestrained audacity
display itself?"

It is always one of the most difficult of tasks to persuade the
citizens of any republic that any political leader is actually
planning the overthrow of the republican form of government. This
blindness, not restricted to any one race or age, was so dense at this
time in Rome that many people had refused to believe even in the
existence of the conspiracy of Catiline, and had suspected Cicero of
having invented the whole story with the object of making political
capital for himself.

The fierce fire in the Senate of the oration by Cicero against
Catiline, however, proved sufficient to force Catiline to action; and
the night after Cicero's first oration against him Catiline fled to
Tuscany to join the forces which had been collected there under his
lieutenant Manlius. Catiline, keeping up his deceit and duplicity to
the end, even while en route to the army of the conspirators wrote
letters to Rome declaring that he was the victim of a conspiracy and
that his present purpose was to go into voluntary banishment at
Marseilles.

Upon reaching his army Catiline threw off the mask and prepared to
take active steps for the overthrow and destruction of Rome. The
conspiracy had now passed the point where it was merely intended to
overthrow the duly elected Roman officials, and to install Catiline
and his friends in their places; the conspirators now sought nothing
less atrocious than the sack of Rome and the murder of her wealthiest
citizens. The contest had now become one directed against the rich
class of the nobles by the poor and bankrupt members of the same
order, assisted by all the unprincipled and desperate adventurers of
Italy.

The plans of Catiline and his supporters were that the army in Tuscany
should march upon Rome, while the friends of Catiline in the city
should watch for a favorable opportunity to murder the consuls and set
fire to the city.

To meet this two-sided danger Antonius was sent with an army against
Catiline, while Cicero remained in Rome to secure the safety of the
city. Cicero was the first to complete his part of the work. The
untiring efforts of the consul at length resulted in securing legal
proof against the leading conspirators who had remained at Rome, and
these were immediately arrested and brought to trial. The people were
at length convinced of the truth of the conspiracy, but even now it
was only with the greatest difficulty that Cicero was able to have
the death sentence decreed against the prisoners.

Catiline now attempted to retreat into Gaul, but was pursued by
Antonius, and in the battle which ensued the army of Catiline was cut
to pieces and Catiline himself killed.

Cicero had earned the gratitude of Rome by preserving it from its
threatened destruction at the hands of Catiline; but the rest of his
record as consul was not of a very creditable character. Throughout
his year of office Cicero was the consistent champion of the
senatorial party, and the opponent of all measures to improve the
economic conditions of the people. In particular, Cicero is to be
censured for his opposition to the agrarian law proposed at this time.
Cicero was also largely responsible for the defeat of a bill to
restore the right of citizenship to the children of the men who had
been proscribed by Sulla.



CHAPTER XI

JULIUS CÆSAR


It now remains to relate the life history of the man by whom the
republican form of government at Rome was fated to be finally
overthrown. That the existence of this Roman republic was doomed, that
democratic or oligarchical government must give way either to anarchy
or despotism, had been certain ever since the refusal of the Roman
citizens to support the attempted reforms of the Gracchi.

There is no greater obstacle to the complete success of popular
government than the almost inexplicable tendency of the majority of
men to crucify the true reformer and conscientious lover of humanity
as a disturber of, and a menace to, society, and to heap honors upon
the head of the selfish, unprincipled, egotistical, and vicious
demagogue. The result is that the reforms which might save the country
fail; and later the people, at last roused to a realization of the
evils which surround them, grasp at the promises of the imposter and
follow him with hysterical and insane enthusiasm until their false
leader directs their footsteps to the precipice, over which they fall
to their destruction. If France had adopted the moderate reforms of
Necker and Turgot she might have been saved from the terrible
retribution of the French Revolution; if Rome had not rejected the
leadership of Tiberius Gracchus, and later accepted that of Julius
Cæsar, the Roman republic need not have fallen.

Julius Cæsar was born in the year 100 B.C. His family were of old
patrician stock, and in addition were possessed of considerable
wealth, but the share that was inherited by young Julius was very
quickly squandered. From the outset of his career Cæsar exhibited
talents of a widely diversified character, showing literary ability as
well as strength and skill in athletic exercises and in military life.
With all these Cæsar combined a dissipated character, and extreme
selfish ambition. Cæsar, by the accidental course of events, became
allied with the popular party at Rome; but throughout his whole life
it was with him merely a case of using the popular favor as a means to
promote his personal ends; never a case of sacrificing himself, his
ambition, or his pleasure for the people's welfare. It was by
marriage that Cæsar had become connected with the popular party, his
aunt Julia having become the wife of Marius, while he himself had
married the daughter of Cinna, the colleague of Marius in his last
consulship. On account of these marriage relations Cæsar barely
escaped being included in the proscriptions of Sulla. He finally
succeeded in making his peace with Sulla, and received his first
military experience under Thermus, whom Sulla had left to besiege
Mitylene. In this campaign young Cæsar distinguished himself by
winning a civic crown for saving the life of a citizen. After the
death of Sulla Cæsar made his first attempt to attract attention in
the political field by impeaching Dolabella for extortion in his
administration in Macedonia. Although Dolabella was acquitted, Cæsar
acquired some reputation from this affair.

This trial persuaded Cæsar that he should take up the field of
oratory, and he accordingly set out to study rhetoric at Rhodes under
Molo, the great teacher in this subject at that time. On his way,
Cæsar underwent the second great peril of his life by being captured
by Cilician pirates. After being ransomed he abandoned the idea of
studying rhetoric, and instead fitted up an expedition with which he
captured his former captors, whom he crucified at Pergamus. In 74 B.C.
Cæsar was elected one of the pontifices at Rome, and immediately
returned to the city, where he spent several years in ease and
pleasure, not neglecting, however, to use every effort to win the
favor of the populace.

Cæsar was elected quæstor in 68 B.C., and it was during his year in
this office that he made his first bold play to secure the popular
support. His aunt Julia, the widow of Marius, dying, Cæsar delivered a
panegyric over her in which he spoke far less about his aunt than
about her husband Marius, still the great idol of the popular party,
and in defiance of a still unrepealed statute of Sulla he caused the
bust of Marius to be carried among the family images.

In 65 B.C. Cæsar was elected ædile. He was obliged to plunge himself
heavily into debt to obtain this office; and after his election he did
not hesitate to go still deeper into debt for the purpose of providing
magnificent shows for the people at the public games. In virtue of the
power of his office Cæsar placed the statue of Marius, surrounded by
the trophies of his Cimbrian and Jugurthine victories, among the new
ornaments of the capitol. At the close of his term as ædile Cæsar
sought to be sent to Egypt for the purpose of forming Egypt into a
Roman province, in accordance with the will of the Egyptian king,
Ptolemy Alexander. This important mission, however, was denied to
Cæsar, to whom was assigned the duty of presiding in the tribunal
which conducted the investigation in cases of suspected murder.

The following year, the year of the consulship of Cicero and the
conspiracy of Catiline, Cæsar passed temporarily under a cloud on
account of his suspected connection with the conspiracy. The suspicion
that Cæsar had at least been privy to the plans of the conspirators
was strengthened by his efforts to prevent the death sentence being
passed against their leaders.

The Roman historian Sallust, in his history of Catiline, has reported
Cæsar's speech in the Senate on this occasion, which serves to
illustrate the craftiness of the man. A portion of this speech is here
inserted:

     "In all debates, Conscript Fathers, when the matter under
     deliberation is in its nature doubtful, it is the duty of
     every senator to bring to the question a mind free from
     animosity and friendship, from anger and compassion. When
     those emotions prevail, the understanding is clouded, and
     truth is scarcely perceived. To be passionate and just at
     the same time is not in the power of man. Reason, when
     unbiased, and left to act with freedom, answers all our
     purposes; when passion gains the ascendant, reason is
     fatigued, and judgment lends no assistance.

     "In the case now before us, let it be our wisdom, Conscript
     Fathers, not to suffer the crimes of Lentulus and his
     accomplices to hurry you beyond the bounds of moderation.
     Indignation may operate on your minds, but a due sense of
     your own dignity, I trust, will preponderate. My opinion is
     this; if you know of any pains and penalties adequate to the
     guilt of the conspirators, pronounce your judgment; I have
     no objection. If you think death a sufficient punishment, I
     concur with Silanus; but if the guilt of the prisoners
     exceeds all forms of vindictive justice, we should rest
     contented with the laws known to the constitution.

     "The senators who have gone before me have exhausted the
     colors of rhetoric, and in a pathetic style have painted
     forth the miseries of their country. They have displayed the
     horrors of war, and the wretched condition of the
     vanquished; the young of both sexes suffering violation;
     children torn from the mother's arms; virtuous matrons
     exposed to the brutal passions of the conqueror; the houses
     of citizens, and the temples of the gods, pillaged without
     distinction; the city made a theater of blood and horror; in
     a word, desolation and massacre in every quarter.

     "But why, immortal gods! why all that waste of eloquence?
     Was it to inflame our passions? to kindle indignation? to
     excite a detestation of rebellion? If the guilt of these men
     is not of itself sufficient to fire us with resentment, is
     it in power of words to do it? I answer, No; resentment is
     implanted in our hearts by the hand of nature; every man is
     sensible of injury and oppression; many are apt to feel too
     intensely. But we know, Conscript Fathers, that resentment
     does not operate alike in all the ranks of life: he who
     dwells in obscurity may commit an act of violence, but the
     consequence is confined to a small circle. The fame of the
     offender, like his fortune, makes no noise in the world. It
     is otherwise with those who figure in exalted stations; the
     eyes of mankind are upon them; and the wrong they do is
     considered an abuse of power. Moderation is the virtue of
     superior rank. In that preëminence, no apology is allowed
     for the injustice that proceeds from partiality, from anger,
     aversion, or animosity. The injury committed in the lower
     classes of life is called the impulse of sudden passion; in
     the higher stations, it takes the name of pride and
     cruelty....

     "With regard to capital punishment, it is a truth well known
     that to the man who lives in distress and anguish of heart,
     death is not an evil; it is a release from pain and misery;
     it puts an end to the calamities of life; and after the
     dissolution of the body, all is peace; neither care nor joy
     can then intrude....

     "It may be said, who will object to a decree against the
     enemies of their country? The answer is obvious; time may
     engender discontent; a future day may condemn the
     proceeding; unforeseen events and even chance, that with
     wild caprice perplexes human affairs, may give us reason to
     repent. The punishment of traitors, however severe, cannot
     be more than their flagitious deeds deserve; but it behooves
     us, Conscript Fathers, to weigh well the consequences before
     we proceed to judgment. Acts of state, that sprung from
     policy, and were perhaps expedient on the spur of the
     occasion, have grown into precedents often found to be of
     evil tendency. The administration may fall into the hands of
     ignorance and incapacity; and in that case, the measure,
     which at first was just and proper, becomes by
     misapplication to other men and other times the rule of bad
     policy and injustice.

     "It must be admitted that, in times like the present, when
     Marcus Tullius Cicero conducts the administration, scenes of
     that tragic nature are not to be apprehended. But in a large
     populous city, when the minds of men are ever in agitation,
     a variety of jarring opinions must prevail. At a future day
     and under another consul, who may have an army at his back,
     falsehood may appear in the garb of truth, and gain
     universal credit. In such a juncture, should the consul,
     encouraged by our example, and armed with the power by the
     decree of the Senate, think proper to unsheath the sword,
     who shall stop him in his career? who will be able to
     appease his vengeance?...

     "But you will say, What is the scope of this long argument?
     Shall the conspirators be discharged, and suffered to
     strengthen Catiline's army? Far from it; my advice is this;
     let their estate and effects be confiscated; detain their
     persons in separate prisons, and for that purpose choose the
     strongest of the municipal towns; declare, by a positive
     law, that no motion in their favor shall be brought forward
     in the Senate, and that no appeal shall be made to the
     people. Add to your decree, that whoever shall presume to
     espouse the cause of the guilty shall be deemed an enemy to
     the Commonwealth."

The year following the conspiracy of Catiline Cæsar secured the office
of prætor. By this time Cæsar had secured such a hold upon the popular
mind as to excite both the fear and hatred of the senatorial party.
This fear and hatred were manifested during Cæsar's year of office as
prætor by the Senate passing a decree depriving Cæsar and one of the
tribunes (Cæcilius Metellus Cepos) of their offices. Fear of popular
violence, however, soon induced the Senate to repeal this decree.

In December, 62 B.C., there occurred at Rome one of the best
remembered of historical scandals; but one whose exact nature we are
unable to determine on account of lack of knowledge of the character
of the mysteries which were violated.

The historian Merivale thus describes this scandal:

     "P. Clodius, the corrupt accuser of Catiline, a turbulent
     intriguer like so many members of his house, had ingratiated
     himself with the people by his popular manners. This
     beardless youth, already alike notorious for his debts and
     gallantries, had introduced himself into Cæsar's house in
     female attire during the celebration of the rites of the
     Bona Dea, which should have been studiously guarded from
     male intrusion. A servant maid discovered him and uttered a
     cry of alarm; the mysteries were hastily veiled, and the
     intruder expelled; but the assembled matrons rushing hastily
     home revealed each to her husband the scandal and the sin.
     The nobles affected grave alarm; the pontiffs were summoned
     and consulted, and the people duly informed of the insult
     offered to the deity. As chief of the sacred college, Cæsar
     could not refrain from lending himself to the general
     clamour; but his position was delicate. On the one hand, the
     presumed delinquent was an instrument of his own policy,
     while on the other his own honour and that of his wife
     Pompeia were compromised by the offence. He disappointed
     everybody. He divorced his wife, not because she was guilty,
     but because 'the wife of Cæsar,' as he said, 'should be
     above suspicion.' But he refused to countenance the measures
     which the consuls took, by direction of the senate, for the
     conviction of the reputed culprit; and it may be suspected
     that the money with which Clodius bribed his judges was a
     loan negotiated with Crassus by Cæsar himself. Cicero for
     his part had been lukewarm in an affair, the barefaced
     hypocrisy of which he was perhaps too honourable to
     countenance; but, urged by his wife Terentia, a violent
     woman who meddled much in his affairs, and was jealous at
     the moment of a sister of the culprit, he clearly disproved
     his allegation of absence from the city, and thus embroiled
     himself, to no purpose, with an able and unscrupulous enemy.
     The senate believed their cause gained; the proofs indeed
     were decisive, and they had assigned at their own request a
     military guard to the judges to protect them from the
     anticipated violence of a Clodian mob; but to their
     consternation, on opening the urns, the votes for an
     acquittal were found to be thirty-one opposed to
     twenty-five. 'You only demanded a guard,' then exclaimed
     Catulus with bitter irony, 'to secure the money you were to
     receive.' Cicero attributed to Crassus the scandal of this
     perversion of justice; the nobles sneered at the corruption
     of the knights, and the gulf which separated the two orders
     yawned more widely than ever."

In 60 B.C. Cæsar was given the command of the province of Farther
Spain; and it was here that his great military abilities were for the
first time displayed to the world. It had only been by the means of a
large loan (about one million dollars) received from Crassus that
Cæsar was enabled to pay off his most pressing creditors, and to make
preparations for his journey to Spain; into such a financial state had
Cæsar been reduced by his personal extravagances, his political
campaign expenses, and his lavish expenditures to win the popular
favor.

Upon Cæsar's return from Rome the young general found Pompey still
further alienated from the senatorial party. A comparison of the
character of these two Roman leaders, now for a while about to become
close associates and later (mainly through the limitless ambition and
unprincipled conduct of Cæsar) rivals in a bitter contest for
supremacy, is perhaps proper at this time. The briefest comparison
which can be made perhaps consists in saying that Pompey represented
the best type of an aristocrat--Cæsar the worst type of the
hypocritical popular demagogue. Neither man consistently stood for
those things which he was supposed to represent at the outset of his
career; neither man, it is probable, ever really believed in them. The
training and antecedents of Pompey were of the extreme oligarchical
character; his natural leanings were toward humanity and justice.
Cæsar, shouting his championship of the people from the housetops, was
in practice regardless of everything but his own selfish ambitions.
The populace which he flattered, deceived, and betrayed were to him
merely the tools by which his success was to be won and occupied about
the same position in his philosophy of life as the dice with which he
won large sums of money in gambling.

Pompey was imbued with a strong sense of the sanctity of the law;
Cæsar never regarded any law which stood between him and his goal.
Pompey dismissed his victorious troops before he approached Rome on
his return from his Eastern campaigns; Cæsar did not hesitate to lead
his legions across the Rubicon. Neither possessed any great degree of
constructive political ability. Pompey's life was one devoted to an
attempt to preserve, Cæsar's was devoted to an attempt to destroy.
Cæsar's ability was far greater than that of Pompey in every field of
human activity.

Cæsar's Spanish campaign had been so short in duration that he was
enabled to return to Rome in time to run for the consulship in 60 B.C.
In order to begin his canvass without delay, Cæsar asked leave to
enter the city before receiving his triumph. This permission being
refused, mainly through the influence of Cato and Cicero, Cæsar gave
up his claim to a triumph and, entering Rome immediately, began his
political campaign. Being again hard up for money, Cæsar made an
agreement with a very wealthy candidate for consul, named L. Lucceius,
by the terms of which Lucceius was to provide the campaign funds for
both candidates, while Cæsar was to furnish the reputation and
popularity. This combination resulted better for Cæsar than for
Lucceius; Cæsar received his share of the benefit from the campaign
fund, but the benefit of his popularity did not seem to extend to his
running mate. The election resulted in the choice of Cæsar and M.
Calpurnius Bibulus, the candidate of the Cato-Cicero faction.

At this time Cæsar persuaded Pompey and Crassus to form the first
triumvirate with him. This triumvirate was nothing more nor less than
a Roman political machine, by means of which these three men expected
to be able to make themselves the political bosses of the city. To
cement this political union, Pompey married Julia, the daughter of
Cæsar.

The most important event of Cæsar's consulship was the passage of an
agrarian act providing for the division of public lands in Campania
among the old soldiers of Pompey. The members of the triumvirate
proved themselves to be strong enough to force this measure through in
spite of the opposition of the consul Bibulus, of Cato, and of others.

The measure was not passed, however, without considerable violence and
disregard of the technical rules of the Roman law.

The Senate, acting under the authority of the Sempronian Law, had
assigned the woods and roads as the provinces to which the consuls of
the year were to be assigned after the expiration of their terms of
office. Cæsar, however, who throughout his career never bothered
himself very much as to what the law was, secured the passage by the
comitia tributa of a law introduced by the tribune Vatinius, which
gave to Cæsar the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum and three
legions for five years. Later the Senate (to prevent another appeal by
Cæsar to the people) added Transalpine Gaul and another legion to his
command. The time of his command was also later extended.

It was the success of Cæsar's Gallic campaigns (58-51 B.C.) which
rendered possible his overthrow of the republic, and the importance of
this war is therefore very great, but it is unnecessary to deal with
the military details of these campaigns.

During the years of Cæsar's absence from Rome the first triumvirate
had fallen to pieces. In the year 55 B.C. Pompey and Crassus, without
opposition, had been elected to the consulship for a second term. At
the conclusion of this consulship Crassus was sent with an army
against the Parthians, by whom he was defeated and killed in 53 B.C.
In the meantime Julia, daughter of Cæsar and wife of Pompey, had died
at Rome in 54 B.C. Crassus and Julia had been the two persons who had
kept Cæsar and Pompey together, and from this time these two leaders
rapidly drifted apart.

All this time affairs at Rome were constantly falling into worse and
worse stages of corruption and confusion. In 58 B.C. (through the
efforts of Cæsar's friends, led by Clodius) Cicero had been banished
from Rome; in 57 B.C. he was recalled, and honors were heaped upon
him.

In 54 B.C. all the candidates for the consulship were prosecuted for
bribery, and the consular elections postponed seven months. Many
wanted Pompey named as dictator at this period. A little later he
actually served for a considerable period as sole consul. It would
probably have been possible for Pompey, at this time, to have
anticipated Cæsar and to have made himself emperor of Rome, but his
efforts were rather directed toward the restoration of the old order
of things in the republic. The course of events had once more united
Pompey with the moderate senatorial party.

The election of 52 B.C. was notable, even among the other elections of
this period, for the enormous extent of the corruption funds used by
the various candidates. In the course of this campaign the notorious
Clodius, who was a candidate for prætor, with a retinue of friends and
clients one day chanced to encounter T. Annius Milo, a candidate for
consul belonging to the senatorial party, with a like body of
retainers. A conflict resulted in which Clodius was killed. The next
day Clodius's friends, aided by all the lawless elements of the Roman
population, made a pyre for the corpse out of the seats of the senate
house and burned the dead body of Clodius and the senate house
together.

The Roman historian Florus thus reviews the situation reached by the
Roman republic at the time of the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey:

     "This is the third age of the Roman people, with reference
     to its transactions beyond the sea; an age in which, when
     they had once ventured beyond Italy, they carried their arms
     through the whole world. Of which age, the first hundred
     years were pure and pious, and, as I have called them,
     'golden'; free from vice and immorality, as there yet
     remained the sincere and harmless integrity of the pastoral
     life, and the imminent dread of a Carthaginian enemy
     supported the ancient discipline.

     "The succeeding hundred, reckoned from the fall of Carthage,
     Corinth and Numantia, and from the inheritance bequeathed us
     by King Attalus in Asia, to the times of Cæsar and Pompey,
     and those of Augustus who succeeded them, and of whom we
     shall speak hereafter, were as lamentable and disgraceful
     for the domestic calamities, as they were honourable for the
     lustre of the warlike exploits that distinguished them. For,
     as it was glorious and praiseworthy to have acquired the
     rich and powerful provinces of Gaul, Thrace, Cilicia, and
     Cappadocia, as well as those of the Armenians and Britons,
     so it was disgraceful and lamentable at the same time to
     have fought at home with our own citizens, with our allies,
     our slaves, our gladiators.

     "I know not whether it would have been better for the Romans
     to have been content with Sicily and Africa, or even to have
     been without them, while still enjoying the dominion of
     Italy, than to grow to such greatness as to be ruined by
     their own strength. For what else produced these intestine
     distractions but excessive good fortune? It was the conquest
     of Syria that first corrupted us, and the succession
     afterwards in Asia, to the estate of the king of Pergamus.
     Such wealth and riches ruined the manners of the age, and
     overwhelmed the republic, which was sunk in vices as in a
     common sewer. For how did it happen that the Roman people
     demanded from the tribunes lands and subsistence, unless
     through the scarcity which they had by their luxury
     produced? Hence there arose the first and second sedition of
     the Gracchi, and a third, that of Apuleius Saturninus. From
     what cause did the equestrian order, being divided from the
     senate, domineer by virtue of the judiciary laws, if it was
     not from avarice, in order that the revenues of the state
     and trials of causes might be made a means of gain? Hence
     again it was that the privilege of citizenship was promised
     to the Latins, and hence were the arms of our allies raised
     against us. And what shall we say as to the wars with the
     slaves? How did they come upon us, but from the excessive
     number of slaves? Whence arose such armies of gladiators
     against their masters, if it was not that a profuse
     liberality, by granting shows to gain the favour of the
     populace, made that an art which was once but a punishment
     of enemies? And to touch upon more specious vices, did not
     the ambition for honours take its rise from the same excess
     of riches? Hence also proceeded the outrages of Marius,
     hence those of Sulla. The extravagant sumptuousness of
     banquets, too, and profuse largesses, were not they the
     effects of wealth, which must in time lead to want? This
     also stirred up Catiline against his country. Finally,
     whence did that insatiable desire of power and rule proceed,
     but from a superabundance of riches? This it was that armed
     Cæsar and Pompey with fatal weapons for the destruction of
     the state.

     "Almost the whole world being now subdued, the Roman Empire
     was grown too great to be overthrown by any foreign power.
     Fortune, in consequence, envying the sovereign people of the
     earth, armed it to its own destruction. The outrages of
     Marius and Cinna had already made a sort of prelude within
     the city. The storm of Sulla had thundered even farther, but
     still within the bounds of Italy. The fury of Cæsar and
     Pompey, as with a general deluge or conflagration, overran
     the city, Italy, other countries and nations, and finally
     the whole empire wherever it extended; so that it cannot
     properly be called a civil war, or war with allies; neither
     can it be termed a foreign war; but it was rather a war
     consisting of all these, or even something more than a war.
     If we look at the leaders in it, the whole of the senators
     were on one side or the other; if we consider the armies,
     there were on one side eleven legions, and on the other
     eighteen; the entire flower and strength of the manhood of
     Italy. If we contemplate the auxiliary forces of the allies,
     there were on one side levies of Gauls and Germans, on the
     other Deiotarus, Ariobarzanes, Tarcondimotus, Cotys, and all
     the force of Thrace, Cappadocia, Cilicia, Macedonia, Greece,
     Ætolia, and all the East; if we regard the duration of the
     war, it was four years, a time short in proportion to the
     havoc made in it; if we attend to the space and ground on
     which it was conducted, it arose within Italy, whence it
     spread into Gaul and Spain, and returning from the West,
     settled with its whole force on Epirus and Thessaly; hence
     it suddenly passed into Egypt, then turned towards Asia,
     next fell upon Africa, and at last wheeled back into Spain,
     where it at length found its termination. But the
     animosities of parties did not end with the war, nor
     subsided till the hatred of those who had been defeated
     satiated itself with the murder of the conqueror in the
     midst of the city and the senate.

     "The cause of this calamity was the same with that of all
     others, excessive good fortune. For in the consulship of
     Quintus Metellus and Lucius Afranius, when the majesty of
     Rome predominated throughout the world and Rome herself was
     celebrating, in the theatres of Pompey, her recent victories
     and triumphs over Pontus and Armenia, the overgrown power of
     Pompey, as is usual in similar cases, excited among the idle
     citizens a feeling of envy towards him. Metellus,
     discontented at the diminution of his triumph over Crete,
     Cato, ever an enemy to those in power, calumniated Pompey,
     and raised a clamour against his acts. Resentment at such
     conduct drove Pompey to harsh measures, and impelled him to
     provide some support for his authority. Crassus happened at
     that time to be distinguished for family, wealth, and
     honour, but was desirous to have his power still greater.
     Caius Cæsar had become eminent by his eloquence and spirit,
     and by his promotion to the consulate. Yet Pompey rose above
     them both. Cæsar, therefore, being eager to acquire
     distinction, Crassus to increase what he had got, and Pompey
     to add to his, and all being equally covetous of power, they
     readily formed a compact to seize the government. Striving,
     accordingly, with their common forces each for his own
     advancement, Cæsar took the provinces of Gaul, Crassus that
     of Asia, and Pompey that of Spain; they had three vast
     armies and thus the empire of the world was now held by
     these leading personages. Their government extended through
     ten years, at the expiration of this period (for they had
     previously been kept in restraint by dread of one another) a
     rivalry broke forth between Cæsar and Pompey, consequent on
     the death of Crassus among the Parthians, and that of Julia,
     who, being married to Pompey, maintained a good
     understanding between the son-in-law and father-in-law by
     means of this matrimonial bond. But now the power of Cæsar
     was an object of jealousy to Pompey and the eminence of
     Pompey was offensive to Cæsar. The one could not bear an
     equal, nor the other a superior. Sad to relate, they
     struggled for mastery, as if the resources of so great an
     empire would not suffice for two."

The open rupture between Cæsar on the one side and Pompey and the
Senate on the other came in the year 49 B.C. Cæsar had been promised
the consulship for the year 48 B.C., but fear of the powerful position
in which Cæsar would be placed if put in possession of the highest
civil office of the state, while still holding his influence over his
veteran army, together with distrust of Cæsar's motives and ambitions,
caused great opposition to this plan to develop at Rome.

Cæsar, however, had his active partisans at Rome, among the most
energetic being the tribunes Gaius Curio, Mark Antony, and Gaius
Cassius. The former of these, a man of dissolute character and great
abilities as a politician, proposed to the Senate a resolution calling
upon both Cæsar and Pompey to resign their provinces.

Upon the passage of this resolution by the Senate, by a vote of three
hundred to seventy, Pompey began to raise troops without the proper
legal authority, and Cæsar refused to surrender his province, or to
appear before the Senate without the protection of his army. Cæsar,
however, sent to the Senate an offer to resign the governorship of
Transalpine Gaul and to reduce the size of his army from ten legions
to two, if the Senate would agree that he should retain the government
of Cisalpine Gaul and the two remaining legions until after the
consular election of 48 B.C. This offer was rejected by the Senate,
who then adopted a motion ordering Cæsar to disband his army and
resign his province within a fixed time under penalty of being
declared guilty of high treason. This measure was vetoed by the
tribunes, who, however, abandoned their posts and fled to Cæsar's camp
upon Pompey bringing two legions of his soldiers into Rome.

Cæsar, relying upon the support of his veteran army and of the
Transalpian Gauls, to whom, on his own authority and without any color
of legal right, he had granted the full civic rights of Roman
citizens, now decided on a resort to force.

The war was begun by Cæsar crossing the Rubicon. Pompey and his
friends fled to Greece, where the war was largely fought out. The
really decisive battle of the war was that of Pharsalus, fought on
August 4, 48 B.C. The result of this encounter was the complete
overthrow of Pompey, who fled to Egypt, where he was murdered by those
who hoped in this manner to earn the gratitude of Cæsar. Pompey's
followers in Africa and Spain were soon afterwards put down. The last
battle of the war, on March 17, 45 B.C., was that of Munda, where the
army of Pompey's son was defeated and thirty thousand of his soldiers
killed.

Cæsar entered Rome, to receive his last triumph in September, 45 B.C.
The Roman republic was now overthrown; and the mere puerile expedient
of giving a new name to the monarch, in place of the hated name of
king, did not in any degree alter the truth of the matter. The new
title of _imperator_, or emperor, in fact, soon came to be used to
designate a ruler of a higher rank, and possessed of a greater degree
of arbitrary power, than that of the monarch who ruled under the name
of _rex_ or king. The forms of government of the republic were still
retained; but the officers who were once the chosen representatives of
a free people were now only the ministerial officers through whom a
despot administered the affairs of his empire. Greatest degradation of
all, the tribunes, once the embodiment of the rights of manhood, now
became the especial tools of tyranical control.

Few people are unaffected by the glamour of success. It is this
criterion alone which, as Thomas Moore writes, generally marks the
distinction between the patriot and the traitor.

    "Rebellion! foul, dishonoring word,
      Whose wrongful blight so oft has stained
    The holiest cause that tongue or sword
      Of mortal ever lost or gained.
    How many a spirit, born to bless,
      Hath sunk beneath that withering name,
    Whom but a day's, an hour's success
      Had wafted to eternal fame!
    As exhalations, when they burst
    From the warm earth, if chilled at first,
    If checked in soaring from the plain,
    Darken to fogs and sink again;--
    But if they once triumphant spread
    Their wings above the mountain-head,
    Become enthroned in upper air,
    And turn to sun-bright glories there!"

This success, so necessary to earn for the patriot or reformer the
fame to which he is so justly entitled, is too often able to win
admiration and respect also for the successful enemies of mankind.

Few members of the human race ever deserved less praise from posterity
(unless indeed, as a tribute to great but misdirected abilities) than
Julius Cæsar; but, nevertheless, many tributes have been laid before
the tomb of this destroyer of his country's liberties. For example,
the historian Mommsen, thus eulogizes Cæsar:

     "Cæsar, from the outset and as it were by hereditary right
     the head of the popular party, had for thirty years borne
     aloft its banner without ever changing or even so much as
     concealing his colors; he remained democrat even when
     monarch. As he accepted without limitation, apart of course
     from the preposterous projects of Catiline and Clodius, the
     heritage of his party; as he displayed the bitterest, even
     personal, hatred to the aristocracy and the genuine
     aristocrats; and as he retained unchanged the essential
     ideas of Roman democracy, viz., alleviation of the burdens
     of debtors, transmarine colonization, gradual equalization
     of the differences of rights among the classes belonging to
     the State, emancipation of the executive power from the
     Senate; his monarchy was so little at variance with
     democracy, that democracy on the contrary only attained its
     completion and fulfillment by means of that monarchy. For
     his monarchy was not the Oriental despotism of divine right,
     but a monarchy such as Gaius Gracchus wished to found, such
     as Pericles and Cromwell founded--the representation of the
     nation by the man in whom it puts supreme and unlimited
     confidence. The ideas which lay at the foundation of Cæsar's
     work were so far not strictly new; but to him belongs their
     realization, which after all is everywhere the main matter;
     and to him pertains the grandeur of execution, which would
     probably have surprised the brilliant projector himself if
     he could have seen it, and which has impressed, and will
     always impress, every one to whom it has been presented in
     the living reality or in the mirror of history--to whatever
     historical epoch or whatever shade of politics he may
     belong--according to the measure of his ability to
     comprehend human and historical greatness, with deep and
     ever-deepening admiration."

The laudations of Cæsar, it is perhaps needless to say, are always
from men like Mommsen who are absolutely devoid of any true sympathy
for free government or popular rights. No more striking commentary on
such men can be found than from comparing Mommsen's attack upon the
revolutionary methods of Tiberius Gracchus with his defense of Cæsar,
given above.

The truth of the matter is that Cæsar was never at any time in his
career a sincere member of the popular party. The people were his
dupes, by whose aid he raised himself to the imperial power and
destroyed the political liberties of his native state. His almost
blasphemous use of the names of the great dead leaders and martyrs of
the popular cause as cloaks to cover his own selfish and unpatriotic
schemes is not the least of the indictments against him in the eyes of
the true advocate of popular rights. In such actions, however, Cæsar
does not stand alone. In our politics of to-day nothing is more common
for a politician than to try to cover his corruption by throwing over
himself the mantle of some great national hero. The cloak of Jefferson
in one political party, and of Lincoln in the other, are striven for
by men who desire to use them solely for the purpose of covering their
opposition to everything for which these men stood.

Nor has Cæsar been without imitators in every age, and in every
republic, who, if the opportunity would only permit, desire above all
else to imitate his life and success. The ability of Cæsar, however,
is seldom or never to be found in his imitators; but the ambition
itself is to be found somewhere among the politicians of every
republic. There is also generally a strong influential class that
would prefer the strong settled rule of one man to the constant
political controversies with "their unsettled effect upon business."
And the reality of a republic can always be destroyed without
affecting its form, as was done in Rome by the centering of the powers
of the different officials in Cæsar, or more recently, in Mexico, by
the many successive elections of Diaz to the presidency.

The early and violent death of Cæsar came before his plans were
completed, and before he had assumed the title, as well as the
authority, of a king or emperor. The ancient historian Appianus
Alexandrinus has left a vivid account of the closing scene of Cæsar's
life, some extracts from which are here inserted:

     "A rumor was spread that there was an oracle of the Sibyls
     which declared that the Parthians could not be subdued by
     the Romans, unless they were commanded by a king. This made
     some talk publicly that in regard of other nations taxed
     under the Roman empire, there needed no scruple be made at
     the giving Cæsar that title. He, having still refused it,
     hastened all he could to get out of the city where many
     envied him. But four days before the day appointed for his
     departure he was slain by his enemies in the palace, either
     out of malice to see him raised to such supreme felicity and
     height of command, or else (as themselves said) out of a
     desire to restore the commonwealth to its first estate; for
     they feared that, after having overcome these other nations,
     nothing could hinder him from making himself king; yet as it
     appears to me it was only for the name's sake they
     attempted all things; for in the thing itself there is no
     difference between dictator and king.

     "There were two chiefs of this conspiracy, the son of that
     Brutus whom Sulla put to death, M. Brutus Cæpio, who came
     for refuge to Cæsar himself after the battle of Pharsalus,
     and C. Cassius, who yielded to him the galleys in the
     Hellespont, both of Pompey's party, and with them was joined
     one of Cæsar's most intimate friends, Decimus Brutus
     Albinus.

     "Having all decreed the palace the place of execution, there
     were divers opinions concerning the manner of doing it; some
     being of opinion that they should likewise make away with
     Antony, Cæsar's colleague, the most powerful of his friends,
     and well beloved of the soldiery. But Brutus opposed that,
     saying that it was only by killing Cæsar, who was as a king,
     that they ought to seek for the glory of destroying tyrants;
     and that if they killed his friends too, men would impute
     the action to private enmity, and the faction of Pompey.
     This advice prevailing, they only expected the assembling of
     the Senate. Now the day before, Cæsar being invited to sup
     with Lepidus, carried along with him Decimus Brutus Albinus;
     and during supper the question being proposed what death was
     best for man, some desiring one kind, and some another, he
     alone preferred the suddenest and most unexpected. Thus
     divining for himself, they fell to discourse of the morrow's
     affairs.

     "At the same time that Cæsar went to the palace in his
     litter, one of his domestics, who had understood something
     of the conspiracy, came to find Calpurnia; but without
     saying anything to her but that he must speak with Cæsar
     about affairs of importance, he stayed, expecting his return
     from the Senate, because he did not know all the
     particulars; his host of Cnidus, called Artemidorus, running
     to the palace to give him notice of it, came just at the
     moment of his being killed; another, as he sacrificed before
     the gate of the senate house, gave him a note of all the
     conspiracy; but he going in without reading it, it was after
     death found in his hands. As he came out of his litter,
     Lænas, the same who before had spoken to Cassius, came to
     him, and entertained him a long time in private; which
     struck a damp into the chiefs of the conspiracy, the more
     because their conference was long; they already began to
     make signs to one another that they must now kill him before
     he arrested them; but in the sequel of the discourse,
     observing Lænas to use rather the gesture of suppliant than
     accuser, they deferred it; till in the end, seeing him
     return thanks to Cæsar, they took courage.

     "They left Trebonius at the gate to stop Antony under the
     pretense of discoursing some business with him; and as soon
     as Cæsar was seated, the other conspirators surrounded him
     according to custom, as friends, having each his dagger
     concealed. At the same time Attilius Cimber standing before
     him began to entreat him to grant the return of his brother
     who was an exile; and upon his refusal, under pretence of
     begging it with more humility, he took him by the robe, and,
     drawing it to him, hung about his neck, crying out, 'Why do
     you delay, my friends?' Thereupon Casca first of all
     reaching over his head, thought to strike his dagger into
     his throat, but wounded him only in the breast. Cæsar,
     having disengaged himself from Cimber, caught hold of
     Casca's hand, leaped from his seat, and threw himself upon
     Casca with a wonderful force; but being at handy grips with
     him, another struck his dagger into his side, Cassius gave
     him a wound in the face, Brutus struck him quite through the
     thigh, Bucolianus wounded him behind the head, and he, like
     one enraged, and roaring like a savage beast, turned
     sometimes to one and sometimes to another; till strength
     failing him after the wound received from Brutus, he threw
     the skirt of his robe over his face and suffered himself
     gently to fall before Pompey's statue. They forebore not to
     give him many stabs after he was down; so that there were
     three and twenty wounds found in his body. And those that
     slew him were so eager that some of them, through vehemence,
     without thinking of it, wounded each other."



CHAPTER XII

POST-MORTEM


The daggers of Brutus, Cassius, and their allies, on the Ides of
March, 44 B.C., avenged the republic which they were too late to save.
It thus chanced that the details of the new imperial government were
in the main arranged not by Julius Cæsar but by his great-nephew,
Gaius Octavius Cæsar, who succeeded both to the private fortune and
the public office of the usurper. It was, however, only after another
period of civil warfare that the new Cæsar came into his possessions.

The story of this civil war belongs to the history of the Roman empire
rather than to that of the Roman republic, and will be referred to
only briefly. Octavius Cæsar was in Illyricum at the time of the
assassination of his uncle. Hastening to Rome, he found the city
divided into two factions, one led by Brutus and Cassius, composed of
those who desired to restore the republic; and the other, the old
adherents of Cæsar, under the leadership of Mark Antony.

Octavius had perhaps more to fear from the friends of his uncle than
from his assassinators, as the latter, while they would have prevented
him from assuming the political powers of his uncle, would probably
not have opposed his taking possession of the latter's private
fortune; while Mark Antony, who had possession of Cæsar's papers and
money, was probably intending to seize both the powers and property of
Julius Cæsar. Octavius Cæsar, however, was possessed of a fair share
both of his uncle's ability and perfidy, and proved himself more than
a match for all his enemies, both in open warfare and in secret
treachery.

At first Octavius seemed inclined to enter into an alliance with
Cicero and some of the other senators against Antony, but finding that
Cicero sought to restore the republic and could not be used as his
tool, Octavius reached an agreement with Antony, and the two, together
with Lepidus, formed the second triumvirate.

The immediate result of this coalition was another proscription,
recalling the days of Sulla; the condemnation of all the assassinators
of Cæsar by the Senate; and extensive military preparations to
overthrow the armies which they had collected.

The ancient historian Appian of Alexandria thus describes the terrors
of the proscriptions:

     "The proscription being published, guards were forthwith
     placed at the gates and all the avenues of the city, at the
     seaports, and in the marshes, and in all places where there
     was any likelihood an unhappy man might shelter himself;
     besides, centurions were commanded abroad, to make search in
     the country, which was done all at an instant; so that both
     within and without the city many persons died suddenly
     several kinds of deaths. The streets were filled with the
     sad spectacle of heads carrying to the triumvirs, to receive
     the reward; and every step some person of quality,
     endeavoring to save himself, was met shamefully disguised;
     some running down into wells, and others into privies; some
     hiding themselves in the tops of the chimneys, or under the
     tiles, where they durst not utter a sigh or a groan; for
     they stood in more fear of their wives, or children, or
     freedmen, or slaves, or debtors, or neighbours that coveted
     some of their goods, than of the murderers themselves.

     "All private grudges were now discovered; and it was a
     strange change to see the prime men of the senate,
     consulars, prætors, tribunes, or pretenders to these
     dignities cast themselves at the feet of their slaves with
     tears in their eyes, begging and caressing them, calling
     them their saviours and patrons; and, which is most
     deplorable, not to be able with all these submissions to
     obtain the least favour. The most pernicious seditions and
     cruellest of wars never had anything in them so terrible as
     the calamities wherewith the city was now affrighted; for in
     war and tumult none but enemies were feared, and domestics
     were confided in; whereas now domestics were more dreaded
     than enemies, because having no cause to fear for
     themselves, as in war or tumult, from familiars they became
     of a sudden persecutors; either out of a dissembled hate, or
     out of the hope of recompense publicly proposed, or because
     of some silver or gold hid in the house; so that no person
     found himself secure in his house, servants being ordinarily
     more sensible of profit than of the affection they owe to
     their masters; and though some might be found faithful and
     kind, yet they durst not assist a proscript, nor conceal
     him, nor so much as stay with him, for fear of falling into
     the same misfortune.

     "There was now much more danger than when the seventeen
     first proscribed were fallen upon; for then no person being
     publicly proscribed when on a sudden they saw some killed,
     one man defended another, for fear lest the same should
     happen to him. But after the proscription was published
     those comprised in it were presently forsaken by all the
     world; some that thought themselves secure, having their
     minds bent on profit, sought them to deliver them to the
     murderers, that they might have the reward; others pillaged
     the houses of those that had been killed, and with the
     present gain comforted themselves against the public
     misery.

     "The most prudent and moderate, surprised at a thing so
     extraordinary, stood like men astonished, considering that
     other cities turmoiled with divisions were re-established by
     the concord of their citizens; whereas the Romans, already
     afflicted with civil dissensions, completed their ruin by
     this reconciliation. Some were killed defending themselves;
     others, who thought themselves not condemned, without any
     defence; some let themselves die with hunger, or hanged, or
     drowned themselves, or threw themselves headlong from the
     tops of houses, or cast themselves into the fire, or ran to
     meet their murderers; others again sought to protract the
     time; and either hid themselves, or begged shamefully, or
     fled, or offered money to save their lives. Many likewise
     were slain contrary to the intention of the triumvirs,
     either by mistake, or out of some particular grudge; but the
     bodies of the proscripts might be known from the others,
     because they wanted the head, which was cut off, and carried
     before the tribunal for orations, where they paid the
     reward. On the other side, wonderful examples were to be
     seen of the affection of wives, children, brethren and
     slaves; who found out a thousand inventions to save their
     husbands, fathers, brethren, or masters; died with them when
     they were discovered, or killed themselves upon those bodies
     they were not able to defend.

     "Of those that escaped the proscription, some pursued by
     their ill fortune, perished by shipwreck; others saved
     beyond all probability, came afterwards to exercise
     dignities in the city, to have command of armies and arrive
     at the honour of triumph. Such wonderful things were to be
     seen in those days which do not happen in an ordinary city,
     or in a small kingdom but in the mistress of the world, as
     well by sea as land; Providence disposing it so to reduce
     things to that excellent order wherein you now see them. Not
     but that Rome felt the same miseries under Sulla, and before
     him under Marius; and we have in writing of them reported
     many actions of cruelty, even to the depriving their enemies
     of burial; but what passed under the triumvirs made much
     more noise, because of the height of their reputations; and
     particularly the valour and good fortune of him, who having
     fixed the foundations of this empire, has left it to those
     of his race and name, even to this present."

Among those murdered at this time was the greatest of all Roman
orators, Marcus Tullius Cicero.

An interesting incident connected with the raising of the money for
the campaign against Brutus and Cassius was the refusal of the Roman
women at this time to pay their share of the taxes demanded of the
Roman citizens for the support of the armies to be raised against
Brutus and Cassius.

Hortensia, the daughter of a great orator, was their spokesman. The
burden of her plea was that this was a family quarrel, a civil war,
not one for the defense of Rome. "Let war with the Gauls or the
Parthians come," she said, "and we shall not be inferior to our
mothers in zeal for the common safety, but for civil wars may we never
contribute nor even assist you against one another. Why should we pay
taxes, when we have no part in the honors, the commands, the
statecraft for which you contend against one another with such harmful
results?"

The campaign resulted in the complete destruction of all the armies
opposed to the triumvirate, the most decisive battle of the campaign
being that at Philippi. How Antony and Octavius again quarreled after
their common enemy had been overthrown, how the destruction of Antony
resulted from his infatuation for Cleopatra, and how Octavius at
length secured the undisputed rule of the Roman world need not here be
described.

The date of the beginning of the reign of Octavius Cæsar as Emperor of
Rome is generally taken as 31 B.C. Like his predecessor, Octavius
Cæsar endeavored to preserve as far as possible the empty forms of
republican rule.

In the overthrow of the early Roman kingdom the power of the kings had
mainly passed to the consuls, but partially to other officials, and
some of the powers possessed by the early consuls had been gradually
taken away from them and given to other newly created officials, such
as the censors and prætors. For centuries there had been a continued
policy of division of powers; this policy was now suddenly reversed,
and governmental powers of all kinds reunited in a single official.
This was accomplished by conferring upon Octavius Cæsar, for life,
each of the various offices known in the government of the Roman
republic. Octavius Cæsar became life censor, life consul, and life
tribune. The appointment of his colleagues in all these offices was
likewise in his power. The cycle of governmental change had now been
completed, and the Roman emperor possessed all the old powers of the
Roman kings. In the field of legislation it is indeed probable that
the power of the emperor was greater than that of his early
predecessors.

     "The old popular assemblies for a period after the
     establishment of the Empire still went through the form of
     passing acts, which had been prepared by the real governing
     power, but in addition to this the Emperor was given the
     power of direct legislation by his own authority.

     "Laws which owed their force to the authority of the Emperor
     were known as Constitutiones and may be divided into four
     principal classes, as follows:

     "1. Edicts, which were public ordinances, of universal
     application throughout the Empire. These had the authority
     of laws, inasmuch as they were generally enforced and
     applied to all. In the earlier reigns they were frequently
     renewed, and they derived their authority from the Emperor
     as the prætorian edict did from the prætor. Gradually they
     came to be held as permanently binding the real ground of
     their permanent force, custom was overlooked, and the
     imperial authority was regarded as such ground.

     "2. Decrees, which were decisions in judicial cases brought
     before the Emperor as final court of appeal. Inasmuch as
     they were interpretations of law, they were regarded as
     binding upon all courts.

     "3. Rescripts, which were decisions upon questions of law
     submitted by courts and private persons. They were closely
     connected with the pontifical interpretations.

     "4. Mandates, which were directions to officials in the
     exercise of their offices. These, by repetition in the
     various instructions sent out from time to time by the
     Emperor, became a source of general law. They were
     theoretically in force only during the lifetime of the
     Emperor from which they proceeded; but they became of
     permanent force because of repetition and custom." (Lee's
     _Historical Jurisprudence_.)

There are writers who look with favor upon this establishment of the
Roman empire, just as there are those of the same caliber who, if
some form of a dictatorship should be substituted for our present
republican form of government, would be loudest in their approval of
the change. Dr. Hirschfeld, of the University of Berlin, gives us the
following roseate picture of the benefits which Rome received from the
change:

     "The reorganization of the government by Augustus, open to
     criticism as it is in many respects, was a blessing to the
     Roman empire. The view which prevailed under the republic,
     that the provinces had been conquered only to be sucked dry
     by senators and knights, governors, and tax-farmers in
     league or in rivalry of greed (we have one example out of
     hundreds in Verres, condemned to immortality by the
     eloquence of Cicero), this view was laid aside with the
     advent of the empire, and even if extortion did not wholly
     cease in the senatorial provinces, yet the provincial
     administration of the first two centuries A.D. is infinitely
     superior to the systematic spoliation of the republic. The
     governors are no longer masters armed with absolute
     authority, constrained to extort money as fast as possible
     from the provincials committed to their charge in order to
     meet debts contracted by their own extravagance and, more
     especially, by that bribery of the populace which was
     indispensable to their advancement. They are officials under
     strict control, drawing from the government salaries fully
     sufficient to their needs. It was a measure imperatively
     called for by the altered circumstances of the time and
     fraught with most important consequences to create, as
     Augustus did, a class of salaried imperial officials and
     definitely break with the high-minded but wrong-minded
     principle of the republic by which the higher posts were
     bestowed as honorary appointments, and none but subordinate
     officials were paid, thus branding the latter with the
     stigma of servitude.

     "It is true that the cautious reformer adopted into his new
     system of government the old names and the offices which had
     come down from republican times, with the exception of the
     censorship and the dictatorship, which last had long been
     obsolete. But these were intended from the outset to lead
     but a phantom existence and to take no part in the great
     task of imperial administration. Augustus drew his own body
     of officials from the knightly class, and under the
     unpretentious titles of procurator and præfect practically
     committed the whole administration of the empire to their
     hands, reserving, apart from certain distinguished sinecures
     in Rome, and Italy, for the senators the præfecture of the
     city, all the great governorships except Egypt, and the
     highest commands in the army. The handsome salaries--varying
     in the later days of the empire from £600 to £3,600 ($3,000
     to $18,000)--and the great influence attached to the
     procuratorial career, which opened the way to the lofty
     positions of præfect of Egypt and commander of the prætorian
     guards at Rome, rendered the service very desirable and
     highly esteemed.

     "While the high-born magistrates of the republic entered
     upon their one year's tenure of office without any training
     whatsoever, and were, of course, obliged to rely upon the
     knowledge and trustworthiness of the permanent staff of
     clerks, recorders and cashiers in their department, there
     grew up under the empire a professional class of government
     officials who, schooled by years of experience and
     continuance in office and supported by a numerous staff
     recruited from the imperial freedmen and slaves, were in a
     position to cope with the requirements of a world-wide
     empire. These procurators, some as governors-in-chief of the
     smaller imperial provinces, some as assistants to the
     governors of the greater, watched over the interests of the
     public exchequer and the emperor's private property, or
     looked after the imperial buildings and aqueducts, the
     imperial games, the mint, the corn supply of Rome, and the
     alimentary institutions, the legacies left to the emperors,
     their castles and demesnes in Italy and abroad,--in short,
     everything that fell within the vast and ever widening
     sphere of imperial government. Meanwhile the exchequer of
     the senate dwindled and dwindled, till it finally came to be
     merely the exchequer of the city of Rome."

There is scarcely any event which takes place upon this earth which
produces unmixed evil or unmixed good. There is some slight element of
truth in some of the statements of the last quotation. There was some
temporary restraint placed upon the dishonesty and cruelty of the
Roman tax collectors; and there was undoubtedly a permanent
improvement in the ability of the men holding the minor positions
under the Roman government, through the introduction of what may be
called a civil-service system. But the contention that the
establishment of the empire was for the benefit either of the Roman
citizens or of the Roman subjects is too ridiculous to merit even a
denial. To show the ridiculousness of such a statement it is only
necessary to point to the history of the Roman empire during the half
century following the death of Octavius Cæsar. Corrupt as the
administration of the government often was under the republic, and
cruel as were the successful factional leaders on a few occasions,
such conditions as existed in Rome under the emperors Tiberius,
Caligula, and Nero could never have existed under the republic.

The character of the Roman empire was a most anomalous one. In the
history of the empire we find the unparalleled situation of an
absolute despotism without any hereditary nobility and even without
any well-established principle as to the descent of the royal power to
the children of the deceased emperor. Under the most despotic days of
the empire any Roman citizen might rise to any position of power or
dignity under the emperor; nay, more than this, any subject of the
Roman empire, no matter how low his origin or condition in society,
might be thrust, by a lucky turn of the wheel of fortune, into the
imperial purple itself.

The Roman emperors came from every strata of society, and from every
portion of the Roman empire. At different times we see the son of a
slave, a Syrian sun priest, a Dacian peasant, seated in the chair of
the Cæsars; but this state of affairs in no way alleviated or excused
the evils which the empire brought upon its subjects. The exploitation
of the millions at the hands of a favored few is not rendered more
defensible by the fact that any individual has the chance, by
extraordinary ability, extraordinary dishonesty, or extraordinary good
fortune, to raise himself out of the ranks of the exploited into those
of the exploiters.

The history of Rome, therefore, cannot be so perverted as to teach the
lesson which some seem to draw from it, that the substitution of a
despotism for popular rule may, under some circumstances, be a
benefit to the community. It is never by the destruction of liberty
that the evils of popular rule can be eliminated. In the past, in the
present, and in the future, the only remedy for the evils of liberty
is more liberty; and the lesson which should be learned from the fall
of the Roman republic is that any country, where the privileged
classes are suffered to retain their unjust privileges at the expense
of the community, must in the end suffer some such terrible penalty as
that paid by Rome under the tyranny and misrule of the Roman empire.



CHAPTER XIII

THE COMPARISON


The comparisons between the history and problems of the Roman republic
and those of our own country have been sometimes directly referred to,
sometimes merely indicated, in the course of this book. While it is
hoped that the reader has been able to follow the train of ideas
suggested by the author, and to apply the lessons taught by the story
of the fall of the Roman republic to aid in the solution of the
American problems of to-day, it is thought advisable, in this final
chapter of the book, to combine and summarize the difficult problems
of economics, civics, and politics anticipated in Roman experience.

First of all comes the lesson, so often taught by Roman history, so
often already referred to in this book, that political equality is
never by itself sufficient to secure either the protection of the
weaker members of society or the general welfare of the community.
Political equality means nothing unless supplemented by laws which
secure economic justice.

The oft-repeated cry that politics and business should be kept
separate is the product of a shallow, unreasoning, or hypocritical
mind--generally the latter. This cry is the argument of the
stand-patter, of the man who trembles for the existence of the United
States Constitution and of American institutions when any proposal is
made to pass a law in the interests of the mass of the community, but
who can view with complacency the enactment of statutes for the
benefit of certain favored classes. Economic problems and special
privileges were among the greatest problems and dangers in the Roman
republic, as they are in America to-day.

When we come to the exact form of the economic questions, differences,
of course, begin to appear. Tariffs, trusts, regulation of commerce,
were never great political questions in the days of the Roman
republic. The greatest source of scandal and class favoritism at Rome
was to be found in the management and distribution of the public
lands. This particular problem was one which our country, for nearly a
century of national existence, was able to handle, in the main, wisely
and honestly. The great body of that vast expanse of rich farming
land, which was once the greatest asset of the United States, was
disposed of to actual settlers, who have played an important part in
the development of our wonderful West. Recently, however, corruption
even along this line has begun to manifest itself in America. Passing
over the numerous charges of actual corruption which have been made,
it is to be regretted that the United States government has of late
shown a decided disposition to favor great interests rather than
ordinary individuals in the management of the public resources. An
extremely indefensible discrimination is to be found in the act of
July 1, 1902, which established the form of civil government for the
Philippine Islands. Section 15 of this act, in providing for the
management of the public lands, provided that no more than sixteen
hectares of such land can be disposed of to any one individual, while
a corporation may acquire as much as 1,024 hectares.

From the standpoint of pure governmental science the most interesting
comparison between Rome and the United States lies in the elaborate
and complicated system of checks and balances to be found in each
government. The framers of each system seem generally to have been
thinking more of securing perfect brakes than of installing sufficient
operating power. It is a mere hackneyed remark to say that the most
prominent characteristic of the work of the Federal Constitutional
Convention was the system of checks and balances it developed, while
this same principle was carried to such an extreme in the organization
of the Roman government that it almost seems strange to an outside
observer that at times the resisting power of the "brakes" did not
prove more powerful than the operating power of the government, with
the result of a total failure of all government, and chaos, or
anarchy.

The most interesting of the "checks" in the Roman government was the
veto power of the tribunes--interesting alike for its contemporary
importance at Rome, and perhaps even more so for the great and
strangely directed influence which it has had upon the later
development of governmental institutions throughout the world.

The veto power of the Roman tribune was an innovation in government.
It was, however, a political idea which was destined to take deep
root, and to be copied by countries whose very beginnings were, as
yet, far in the future. There is to-day no constitutional government
in whose organization the veto power is not found in some form; in the
great majority of modern governments the veto power occupies a most
prominent place.

The modern veto power has departed far from that of the Roman tribune,
both in practice and theory. The veto power of the latter was merely a
check upon power; the modern veto power is both a check upon power and
a positive power in the hands of the official to whom it is given.

The Roman veto was given to an officer who had no power except of a
negative character; it could be interposed against executive acts and
judicial proceedings as well as against legislative enactments.

The modern veto power is directed solely against legislative acts and
is put in the hands of the executive department of the government.
Against the legislative department it is a check, but to the executive
department it is a grant of positive power. In the United States the
veto is more a club in the hands of the executive department than a
check upon the legislative. The veto power also tends to break down
the dividing line between the executive and the legislative
departments. In the United States the President and the governors of
the different states in reality constitute a third branch of the
respective legislative departments.

The story of the Gracchi is replete with suggestions of comparisons
with modern conditions. The failure of these reformers was primarily
due to the lack of steadfast perseverance on the part of the mass of
their followers. It is this same phenomenon which does more than any
other to bring about the failure of needed and widely supported
reforms at the present time in our country. It is always much easier
to win the support of a majority of voters to a reform measure than it
is to retain such majority during the tedious delays which the
opponents of reform are so adept in producing. Delay is always the
great weapon of the supporters of any special interest which is
attacked. The beneficiaries from unfair discriminations or special
interests, and their allies, never desert the fight from weariness, no
matter how long it may be continued; but once the first spell of
enthusiasm has passed away, the supporters of the reform gradually
drop by the wayside. How many times have we seen the people vote time
after time in support of a certain reform only to weaken at the
crisis, and allow the ultimate victory to rest with the supporters of
special interests! For illustration we need only cite the long contest
in the metropolis of the West for a fair deal to the people from the
street-car companies, where after nine years of contest the majority
of the voters, at the critical contest, deserted the mayor, who had
resolutely stood for the principles for which the voters had declared
year after year, and gave to the companies a contract giving them all
that they had even dared to hope for.

The deposition of the tribune Marcus Octavius is without question the
first historical application of the principle of the recall of public
officials. This precedent was never again followed at Rome, and the
recall of public officers never became a part of the Roman political
system. Such an expedient, in fact, could never have been necessary at
Rome, except in very extreme cases, on account of the very short terms
of office for which all Roman officials were elected. The only states
of this country which follow the Roman example in this respect are
some of the New England states.

The actions of the Roman proletariat in so consistently supporting the
grain laws of Gaius Gracchus, and in so soon disregarding his
proposals for the allotment of the public land, are very typical of
the attitude of a vast element in every community. The too great
concern for the present and the too great disregard for the future are
among the greatest obstacles to be overcome by those who attempt to
line up the people of any community in the support of true
constructive reforms.

Side by side with the lack of true proportion in the view taken by the
majority of men, of the relative importance of different measures,
stand the constant errors made by the people in their judgment of the
character and objects of different politicians.

The tribune Carbo, the successor of Tiberius Gracchus as the leader of
the popular party, may stand as a typical representative of a
never-changing type of politician.

No one can read of this life without being inevitably reminded of some
politician of his own acquaintance or locality. It is but another
proof of how slowly human nature changes, despite the vast changes in
the external conditions with which mankind is surrounded.

The law proposed by Carbo furnished an illustration of that class of
laws directed against the rich, so often brought forward by
demagogues, not because of any justice in the law, not even because of
any benefit which the law will confer upon the people at large, but
merely for the purpose of winning popular favor and political office.
Such laws are generally supported by unrestrained and indiscriminating
abuse. It is the proposed laws and attacks of this character which
generally lead to a reaction, and in the end work to the benefit of
the classes against which they are directed.

The whole story of Carbo is one well calculated to present in vivid
colors all that is lowest and most despicable. To the faults and
errors already referred to must be added the charge of absolute
insincerity. To Carbo the rights of the people and the popular cause
were dear only as a means by which he could acquire power and money
for himself. When it was for his interest, he became the servile tool
of the senatorial party. America to-day has her full share of
politicians who use popular measures only as a ladder for their own
rise; or, even worse, who seek the leadership of a popular cause with
the premeditated purpose of betraying it, at the proper moment, to the
special interests. Where the purpose at first is sincere, the advocate
of the object frequently deserts the cause when greater gain to him
may be had by a surrender.

The impossibility of the voters being able to discriminate between the
true reformer and the unscrupulous demagogue is shown time and again
in the political history both of Rome and the United States. There has
always been a class of politicians without character, without honesty,
without any pretense of truthfulness, without any ability of a kind to
be of value to the public, but possessed of an almost superhuman
ability to deceive the public and to advertise themselves. Examples of
this class may be found in Roman history in such men as Carbo and
Cæsar; striking examples in recent American history will readily occur
to every one. Notably in municipal politics in the great American
cities, this aspect often appears.

It is not only in great but also in smaller things that we see the
ever-recurring resemblances between Roman and American conditions.
Cicero's complaint, "Let me tell you that there is no class of people
so harassed by every kind of unreasonable difficulty as candidates for
office," finds a responsive chord in every modern American politician.
His account of his campaign for the consulship at Rome, as well as the
historical record of other Roman political contests, shows many points
of similarity between the details of the problems and methods of
ancient and modern political battles.

Political expenditures, in the latter days of the Roman republic, had
become an even greater evil than is the case in the United States
to-day. It is interesting, though alarming, to note that the greater
political freedom became at Rome, the greater became the amount of
political expenditures and the greater the power of money in
elections. A similar alarming phenomenon has recently been noticed in
this country in the greater increase of political expenditures which
have followed the introduction of the direct primaries, and the
consequent greater difficulties of the candidate for office not
possessed of a large fortune.

Innumerable other points of resemblance might be mentioned to complete
the comparison between Roman and American political conditions. A
strong point in the Roman character (at least during the greater part
of the republican period) is found in the fact that foreign
hostilities always produced a cessation, or at least a laxation, of
domestic political hostilities. This was in striking contrast with the
general rule in Grecian cities, where one political faction or another
would generally seize the opportunity offered by the external
difficulties of their state to advance their selfish individual
interests at the expense of the public. The public attitude in America
has always resembled the Roman rather than the Grecian attitude.
Perhaps this attitude in America has sometimes been carried too far,
and resulted in too great a degree of credit and support being given
to the party in power, for victories won by the united efforts of
members of all political parties in the country.

The effect of a mere name, both in Rome and in the United States, has
always been unduly great. The charge (even when entirely unsupported)
that a Roman politician was aiming to make himself a king was
generally sufficient to drive him from power; though the Romans
finally calmly submitted to the rule of an absolute ruler under the
new title of emperor. The efficiency of denunciation by calling names,
instead of by argument, is known and made use of in American politics.

The pretense of patriotism in America assumed by having one's self
designated by a name of patriotic appellation--such as "Honest" John
Doe, "Brave" Richard Roe, and the "Patriot" John Stiles--is but a
parallel to the schemes of the ancient tricksters. Truly, there is
nothing new under the sun, and as man so are republics of men--both
alike in greatness and in littleness.

There is slight opportunity for comparison between the Roman colonial
system and that of our own country. It is true that of both alike it
may be said the beginning of foreign conquest came as an accident, and
the acquisition of territory beyond the seas found them unprepared
for its government. Here, it is to be hoped, the resemblance will be
found to have ceased. When Rome had once tasted the fruits of foreign
conquest, the extension of such conquests became the great object of
Roman ambition. It was not by accident but by deliberately planned
wars of conquest that the so-called world empire of the Romans was
acquired.

With the United States the comparatively few and unimportant insular
possessions are still a matter of secondary concern. But few of the
citizens of this country give any thought or attention to these
possessions, and many even favor their abandonment.

Both Rome and the United States found the problem of reconciling
foreign colonies with republican institutions a difficult one. The
Roman administration of her colonies was always tinged with corruption
and injustice; and, unfortunately, our own insular rule has not been
entirely free from these evils. A great trouble in the case of each
republic was that she failed or refused to make any real effort to
introduce her own principles of government into the government of her
provinces. There is much more excuse for this failure in the case of
Rome than in that of our own country. As was shown in the chapter on
Roman legislative assemblies, her ignorance of the principle of
representative legislative assemblies made the extension of free
government over extended areas impossible, or at least very difficult.
But our own system of local self-government is one adapted to any
country, and capable of indefinite expansion. The highly centered
bureaucracy of the Philippine government is one without precedent in
our own country, and without any fitness for the Philippines or any
other colony. The slight self-government given to the Filipinos is
merely enough to call attention to that which is refused them. No
successful government of these Islands, either by our country or by
the Filipinos themselves, will ever be secured while all questions of
government for so many diverse races are settled by a few high
government officials at the capital--Manila. Particularly will this
objectionable condition continue so long as the places of authority
are filled by men named from every portion of the country except that
part most nearly associated with the destiny of the Islands. The
system of rewarding political service--and that ofttimes of a
questionable character--given in America to men who served ballot-box
emergencies, and to men who hope to reward themselves by fruitful
opportunity, must cease, or government in these outlying possessions
will lead to internal revolt or external military imperialism.

It is plainly to be seen that conditions in the United States of
America have tended toward those of Rome which preceded the latter's
downfall. Particularly true is this of latter-day conditions in the
United States. The monopoly of Crassus in town lots in Rome--and the
exclusive right to dictate the price of farm products by the Fabii and
their successors, which produced riots in the country and uprisings in
the cities--have their parallel in the "corners" of the stock
exchanges and grain houses of America, and in the monopoly in oil and
its elements. These methods and the domination of legislative bodies
by these massive interests, the corrupting of the assemblies of the
people and the defiling of the courts, have created a revolt in the
hearts of the Americans and awakened an insurrection among the
citizenship. These, if not abated by the government's action in
controlling these agencies or restraining with plenary punishment the
perpetrators of the wrong, will surely reproduce a parallel in the
results which befell the Roman republic. Cicero has well said,
"Governments, like all organized creations, have their time to perish
and to fade. The same conduct of persecution or protection work on
each alike in the final results"--a sure continuance of life, or a
sure result of certain death.

Let it be remembered that man is ever himself and mankind ever human.
No ill will be borne that can be overthrown. It will all return to the
first principle of force--Byron puts it well--as the moral of all
human tales:

        "First freedom, then glory;
    With that past--avarice--corruption--
        Barbarism at last--
    And all of history's volumes vast
        Hath writ but one page."

It has been the dream of those who in war fought for, and in peace
strove for, a just republic in the United States, that the awakened
conscience of a people educated anew under a Christian era would be a
guarantee against the repetition of those evils which harassed
government and injured men in the days of the Roman republic. It is
now seen that this dream is being to a most encouraging extent
gratified. In America wrong is at last condemned because it is not
right. Right is approved--for that it is right. Justice is praised and
sustained because it is just to do so, and the oppression of man
resisted and despised because it is unworthy civilized man and in
violation of the dictates of conscience speaking the voice of God.

In this new era America is working out her destiny of equality of man
and equity of mankind, and this by the methods of peaceful
persuasion--dictated from the heart. War is abhorred and brotherhood
of man cherished as a coming state of modern citizenship proving in
all its effect the justice and right of the theory of the American
republic founded on the assertion that "Just governments derive their
power from the consent of the governed." Education, bringing
enlightenment in all avenues of life's pursuits, is rapidly giving to
the American man the assurance and security that his government will
be perpetuated by its citizens, not destroyed--will be glorified as an
ideal after which other nations and people may pattern.

    "Our Fathers' God! from out whose hand
    The centuries fall like grains of sand,

           *       *       *       *       *

    Oh, make Thou us, through centuries long,
    In peace secure, in justice strong:
    Around our gift of freedom draw
    The safeguards of Thy righteous law;
    And, cast in some diviner mold,
    Let the new cycle shame the old."





*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Two Great Republics: Rome and the United States" ***

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