The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume 2

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Title: The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume 2
Author: Davis, Jefferson, 1808-1889
Language: English
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[Frontispiece: Jefferson Davis]

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT.

BY JEFFERSON DAVIS.

VOLUME II

NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
1, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET.
1881.

CONTENTS.

PART IV.--(Continued).

_THE WAR._

CHAPTER XV.

Review of 1861.--Summary of Hostile Acts of United States
Government.--Fuller Details of some of them.--Third Session of
Provisional Congress.--Message.--Subjugation of the Southern States
intended.--Obstinacy of the Enemy.--Insensibility of the North as
to the Crisis.--Vast Preparation of the Enemy.--Embargo and
Blockade.--Indiscriminate War waged.--Action of Confederate
Congress.--Confiscation Act of United States Congress.--Declared
Object of the War.--Powers of United States Government.--
Forfeitures inflicted.--Due Process of Law, how interpreted.--"Who
pleads the Constitution?"--Wanton Destruction of Private Property
unlawful--Adams on Terms of the Treaty of Ghent.--Sectional
Hatred.--Order of President Lincoln to Army Officers in Regard to
Slaves.--"Educating the People."--Fremont's Proclamation.--
Proclamation of General T. W. Sherman.--Proclamation of General
Halleck and others.--Letters of Marque.--Our Privateers.--Officers
tried for Piracy.--Retaliatory Orders.--Discussion in the British
House of Lords.--Recognition as a Belligerent of the Confederacy.--
Exchange of Prisoners.--Theory of the United States.--Views of
McClellan.--Revolutionary Conduct of United States Government.--
Extent of the War at the Close of 1861.--Victories of the Year.--
New Branches of Manufactures.--Election of Confederate States
President.--Posterity may ask the Cause of such Hostile Actions.--
Answer.

CHAPTER XVI.

Military Arrangements of the Enemy.--Marshall and Garfield.--
Fishing Creek.--Crittenden's Report.--Fort Henry; its Surrender.--
Fort Donelson; its Position.--Assaults.--Surrender.--Losses.

CHAPTER XVII.

Results of the Surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson.--Retreat from
Bowling Green.--Criticism on General A. S. Johnston.--Change of
Plan necessary.--Evacuation of Nashville.--Generals Floyd and
Pillow.--My Letter to General Johnston.--His Reply.--My Answer.--
Defense of General Johnston.--Battle of Elkhorn.--Topography of
Shiloh.

CHAPTER XVIII.

General Buell's March.--Object of General Johnston.--His Force.--
Advance from Corinth.-Line of Battle.--Telegram.--The Time of the
Battle of Shiloh.--Results of the First Day's Battle.--One
Encampment not taken.--Effects.--Reports on this Failure.--Death
of General Johnston.--Remarks.

CHAPTER XIX.

Retirement of the Army.--Remnants of Grant's Army.--Its
Reënforcements.--Strength of our Army.--Strength of Grant's Army.--
Reorganization.--Corinth.--Advance of General Halleck.--Siege of
Corinth.--Evacuation.--Retreat to Tupelo.--General Beauregard
retires.-General Bragg in Command.--Positions on the Mississippi
River occupied by the Enemy.--New Madrid.--Island No. 10.--Fort
Pillow.--Memphis.--Attack at Hatteras Inlet.--Expedition of the
Enemy to Port Royal.--Expeditions from Port Royal.--System of Coast
Defenses adopted by us.--Fort Pulaski.

CHAPTER XX.

Advance of General McClellan toward Centreville; his Report.--Our
Forces ordered to the Peninsula.--Situation at Yorktown.--Siege by
General McCellan.--General Johnston assigned to Command; his
Recommendation.--Attack on General Magruder at Yorktown.--Movements
of McClellan.--The Virginia.--General Johnston retires.--Delay at
Norfolk.--Before Williamsburg.--Remark of Hancock.--Retreat up the
Peninsula.--Sub-terra Shells used.-Evacuation of Norfolk.--Its
Occupation by the Enemy.

CHAPTER XXI.

A New Phase to our Military Problem.--General Johnston's Position.--
Defenses of James River.--Attack on Fort Drury.--Johnston crosses
the Chickahominy.--Position of McClellan.--Position of McDowell.--
Strength of Opposing Forces.--Jackson's Expedition down the
Shenandoah Valley.--Panic at Washington and the North.--Movements
to intercept Jackson.--His Rapid Movements.--Repulses Fremont.--
Advance of Shields.--Fall of Ashby.--Port Republic, Battle of.--
Results of this Campaign.

CHAPTER XXII.

Condition of Affairs.--Plan of General Johnston.--The Field of
Battle at Seven Pines.--The Battle.--General Johnston wounded.--
Advance of General Sumner.--Conflict on the Right.--Delay of
General Huger.--Reports of the Enemy.--Losses.--Strength of
Forces.--General Lee in Command.

CHAPTER XXIII.

The Enemy's Position.--His Intention.--The Plan of Operations.--
Movements of General Jackson.--Daring and Fortitude of Lee.--
Offensive-Defensive Policy.--General Stuart's Movement.--Order of
Attack.--Critical Position of McClellan.--Order of Mr. Lincoln
creating the Army of Virginia.--Arrival of Jackson.--Position of
the Enemy.--Diversion of General Longstreet.--The Enemy forced back
south of the Chickahominy.--Abandonment of the Railroad.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Retreat of the Enemy.--Pursuit and Battle.-Night.--Further Retreat
of the Enemy.--Progress of General Jackson.--The Enemy at Frazier's
Farm.--Position of General Holmes.--Advance of General Longstreet.--
Remarkable Features of the Battle.--Malvern Hill.--Our Position.--The
Attack.--Expedition of General Stuart.--Destruction of the Enemy's
Stores.--Assaults on the Enemy.--Retreat to Westover on the James.--
Siege of Richmond raised.--Number of Prisoners taken.--Strength of our
Forces.--Strength of our Forces at Seven Pines and after.--Strength of
the Enemy.

CHAPTER XXV.

Forced Emancipation.--Purposes of the United States Government at
the Commencement of 1862.--Subjugation or Extermination.--The
Willing Aid of United States Congress.--Attempt to legislate the
Subversion of our Social Institutions.--Could adopt any Measure
Self-Defense would justify.--Slavery the Cause of all Troubles,
therefore must be removed.--Statements of President Lincoln's
Inaugural.--Declaration of Sumner.--Abolition Legislation.--The
Power based on Necessity.--Its Formula.--The System of Legislation
devised.--Confiscation.--How permitted by the Law of Nations.--
Views of Wheaton; of J. Q. Adams; of Secretary Marcy; of
Chief-Justice Marshall.--Nature of Confiscation and Proceedings.--
Compared with the Acts of the United States Congress.--Provisions of
the Acts.--Five Thousand Millions of Property involved.--Another
Feature of the Act.--Confiscates Property within Reach.--Procedure
against Persons.--Held us as Enemies and Traitors.--Attacked us
with the Instruments of War and Penalties of Municipal Law.--
Emancipation to be secured.--Remarks of President Lincoln on signing
the Bill.--Remarks of Mr. Adams compared.--Another Alarming
Usurpation of Congress.--Argument for it.--No Limit to the
War-Power of Congress; how maintained.--The Act to emancipate Slaves
in the District of Columbia.--Compensation promised.--Remarks of
President Lincoln.--The Right of Property violated.--Words of the
Constitution.--The Act to prohibit Slavery in the Territories.-The
Act making an Additional Article of War.-All Officers forbidden to
return Fugitives.--Words of the Constitution.--The Powers of the
Constitution unchanged in Peace or War.--The Discharge of Fugitives
commanded in the Confiscation Act.--Words of the Constitution.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Forced Emancipation concluded.--Emancipation Acts of President
Lincoln.--Emancipation with Compensation proposed to Border
States.--Reasons urged for it.--Its Unconstitutionality.--Order of
General Hunter.--Revoked by President Lincoln.--Reasons.--"The
Pressure" on him.--One Cause of our Secession.--The Time to throw
off the Mask at Hand.--The Necessity that justified the President
and Congress also justified Secession.--Men united in Defense of
Liberty called Traitors.--Conference of President Lincoln with
Senators and Representatives of Border States.--Remarks of Mr.
Lincoln.--Reply of Senators and Representatives.--Failure of the
Proposition.--Three Hundred Thousand more Men called for.--
Declarations of the Antislavery Press.--Truth of our Apprehensions.--
Reply of President Lincoln.--Another Call for Men.--Further
Declarations of the Antislavery Press.--The Watchword adopted.--
Memorial of So-called Christians to the President.--Reply of
President Lincoln.--Issue of the Preliminary Proclamation of
Emancipation.--Issue of the Final Proclamation.--The Military
Necessity asserted.--The Consummation verbally reached.--Words of
the Declaration of Independence.--Declarations by the United States
Government of what it intended to do.--True Nature of the Party
unveiled.--Declarations of President Lincoln.--Vindication of the
Sagacity of the Southern People.--His Declarations to European
Cabinets.--Object of these Declarations.--Trick of the Fugitive
Thief.--The Boast of Mr. Lincoln calmly considered.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Naval Affairs.--Organization of the Navy Department.--Two Classes
of Vessels.--Experiments for Floating Batteries and Rams.--The
Norfolk Navy-Yard.--Abandonment by the Enemy.--The Merrimac
Frigate made an Ironclad.--Officers.--Trial-Trip.--Fleet of the
Enemy.--Captain Buchanan.--Resolves to attack the Enemy.--Sinks
the Cumberland.--Burns the Congress.--Wounded.--Executive Officer
Jones takes Command.--Retires for the Night.--Appearance of the
Monitor.--The Virginia attacks her.--She retires to Shoal Water.--
Refuses to come out.--Cheers of English Man-of-war.--Importance of
the Navy-Yard.--Order of General Johnston to evacuate.--Stores
saved.--The Virginia burned.--Harbor Defenses at Wilmington.--
Harbor Defenses at Charleston.--Fights in the Harbor.--Defenses of
Savannah.--Mobile Harbor and Capture of its Defenses.--The System
of Torpedoes adopted.--Statement of the Enemy.--Sub-terra Shells
placed in James River.--How made.--Used in Charleston Harbor; in
Roanoke River; in Mobile Harbor.--The Tecumseh, how destroyed.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Naval Affairs (continued).--Importance of New Orleans.--Attack
feared from up the River.--Preparations for Defense.--Strength of
the Forts.--Other Defenses.-The General Plan.--Ironclads.--
Raft-Fleet of the Enemy.--Bombardment of the Forts commenced.--
Advance of the Fleet.--Its Passage of the Forts.--Batteries below
the City.--Darkness of the Night.--Evacuation of the City by
General Lovell on Appearance of the Enemy.--Address of General
Duncan to Soldiers in the Forts.--Refusal to surrender.--Meeting of
the Garrison of Fort Jackson.--The Forts surrendered.--Ironclad
Louisiana destroyed.--The Tugs and Steamers.--The Governor Moore.--
The Enemy's Ship Varuna sunk.--The McRae.--The State of the City
and its Defenses considered.--Public Indignation.--Its Victims.--
Efforts made for its Defense by the Navy Department.--The
Construction of the Mississippi.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Naval Affairs (continued).--Farragut demands the Surrender of New
Orleans.--Reply of the Mayor.--United States Flag hoisted.--Advent
of General Butler.--Barbarities.--Antecedents of the People.--
Galveston.--Its Surrender demanded.--The Reply.--Another visit of
the Enemy's Fleet.--The Port occupied.--Appointment of General
Magruder.--Recapture of the Port.--Capture of the Harriet Lane.--
Report of General Magruder.--Position and Importance of Sabine
Pass.--Fleet of the Enemy.--Repulse by Forty-four Irishmen.--
Vessels captured.--Naval Destitution of the Confederacy at first.--
Terror of Gunboats on the Western Rivers.--Their Capture.--The most
Illustrious Example.--The Indianola.--Her Capture.--The Ram
Arkansas.--Descent of the Yazoo River.--Report of her Commander.--
Runs through the Enemy's Fleet.--Description of the Vessel.--Attack
on Baton Rouge.--Address of General Breckinridge.--Burning of the
Arkansas.

CHAPTER XXX.

Naval Affairs (continued).--Necessity of a Navy.--Raphael Semmes.--
The Sumter.--Difficulties in creating a Navy.--The Sumter at Sea.--
Alarm.--Her Captures.--James D. Bullock.--Laird's Speech in the
House of Commons.--The Alabama.--Semmes takes Command.--The Vessel
and Crew.--Goes to Sea.--Banks's Expedition.--Magruder at
Galveston.--The Steamer Hattaras Sunk.--The Alabama not a Pirate.--
An Aspinwall Steamer ransomed.--Other Captures.--Prizes burned.--
At Cherbourg.--Fight with the Kearsarge.--Rescue of the Men.--
Demand of the United States Government for the Surrender of the
Drowning Men.--Reply of the British Government.--Sailing of the
Oreto.--Detained at Nassau.--Captain Maffit.--The Ship Half
Equipped.--Arrives at Mobile.--Runs the Blockade.--Her Cruise.--
Capture and Cruise of the Clarence.--The Captures of the Florida.--
Captain C. M. Morris.--The Florida at Bahia.--Seized by the
Wachusett.--Brought to Virginia and sunk.--Correspondence.--The
Georgia.--Cruises and Captures.--The Shenandoah.--Cruises and
Captures.--The Atlanta.--The Tallahassee.--The Edith.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Naval Affairs (concluded).--Excitement in the Northern States on the
Appearance of our Cruisers.--Failure of the Enemy to protect their
Commerce.--Appeal to Europe not to help the So-called "Pirates."--
Seeks Iron-plated Vessels in England.--Statement of Lord Russell.--
What is the Duty of Neutrals?--Position taken by President
Washington.--Letter of Mr. Jefferson.--Contracts sought by United
States Government.--Our Cruisers went to Sea unarmed.--Mr. Adams
asserts that British Neutrality was violated.--Reply of Lord
Russell.--Rejoinder of Mr. Seward.--Duty of Neutrals relative to
Warlike Stores.--Views of Wheaton; of Kent.--Charge of the Lord
Chief Baron in the Alexandra Case.--Action of the Confederate
Government sustained.--Antecedents of the United States
Government.--The Colonial Commissions.--Build and equip Ships in
Europe.--Captain Conyngham's Captures.--Made Prisoner.--
Retaliation.--Numbers of Captures.--Recognition of Greece.--
Recognition of South American Cruisers.--Chief Act of Hostility
charged on Great Britain by the United States Government.--The
Queen's Proclamation: its Effect.--Cause of the United States
Charges.--Never called us Belligerents.--Why not?--Adopts a
Fiction. The Reason.--Why denounce our Cruisers as "Pirates"?--
Opinion of Justice Greer.--Burning of Prizes.--Laws of Maritime
War.--Cause of the Geneva Conference.--Statement of American
Claims.--Allowance.--Indirect Damages of our Cruisers.--Ships
transferred to British Registers.--Decline of American Tonnage.--
Decline of Export of Breadstuffs.--Advance of Insurance.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Attempts of the United States Government to overthrow States.--
Military Governor of Tennessee appointed.--Object.--Arrests and
Imprisonments.--Measures attempted.--Oath required of Voters.--A
Convention to amend the State Constitution.--Results.--Attempt in
Louisiana.--Martial Law.--Barbarities inflicted.--Invitation of
Plantations.--Order of General Butler, No. 28.--Execution of
Mumford.--Judicial System set up.--Civil Affairs to be administered
by Military Authority.--Order of President Lincoln for a Provisional
Court.--A Military Court sustained by the Army.--Words of the
Constitution.--"Necessity," the reason given for the Power to create
the Court.--This Doctrine fatal to the Constitution; involves its
Subversion.--Cause of our Withdrawal from the Union.--Fundamental
Principles unchanged by Force.--The Contest is not over; the Strife
not ended.--When the War closed, who were the Victors?--Let the
Verdict of Mankind decide.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Further Attempts of the United States Government to overthrow
States.--Election of Members of Congress under the Military Governor
of Louisiana.--The Voters required to take an Oath to support the
United States Government.--The State Law violated.--Proposition to
hold a State Convention; postponed.--The President's Plan for making
a Union State out of a Fragment of a Confederate State.--His
Proclamation.--The Oath required.--Message.--"The War-Power our
Main Reliance."--Not a Feature of the Republican Government in the
Plan.--What are the True Principles?--The Declaration of
Independence asserts them.--Who had a Right to institute a
Government for Louisiana?--Its People only.--Under what Principles
could the Government of the United States do it?--As an Invader to
subjugate.--Effrontery and Wickedness of the Administration.--It
enforces a Fiction.--Attempt to make Falsehood as good as Truth.--
Proclamation for an Election of State Officers.--Proclamation for a
State Convention.--The Monster Crime against the Liberties of
Mankind.--Proceedings in Arkansas.--Novel Method adopted to amend
the State Constitution.--Perversion of Republican Principles in
Virginia.--Proceedings to create the State of West Virginia.--A
Falsehood by Act of Congress.--Proceedings considered under
Fundamental Principles.--These Acts sustained by the United States
Government.--Assertion of Thaddeus Stevens.--East Virginia
Government.--Such Acts caused Entire Subversion of States.--Mere
Fictions thus constituted.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Address to the Army of Eastern Virginia by the President.--Army of
General Pope.--Position of McClellan.--Advance of General
Jackson.--Atrocious Orders of General Pope.--Letter of McClellan on
the Conduct of the War.--Letter of the President to General Lee.--
Battle of Cedar Run.--Results of the Engagement.--Reënforcements to
the Enemy.--Second Battle of Manassas.--Capture of Manassas
Junction.--Captured Stores.--The Old Battle-Field.--Advance of
General Longstreet.--Attack on him.--Attack on General Jackson.--
Darkness of the Night.--Battle at Ox Hill.--Losses of the Enemy.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Return of the Enemy to Washington.--War transferred to the
Frontier.--Condition of Maryland.--Crossing the Potomac.--
Evacuation of Martinsburg.--Advance into Maryland.--Large Force of
the Enemy.--Resistance at Boonesboro.--Surrender of Harper's
Ferry.--Our Forces reach Sharpsburg.--Letter of the President to
General Lee.--Address of General Lee to the People.--Position of
our Forces at Sharpsburg.--Battle of Sharpsburg.--Our Strength.--
Forces withdrawn.--Casualties.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Efforts of the Enemy to obtain our Cotton.--Demands of European
Manufacturers.--Thousands of Operatives resorting to the
Poor-Rates.--Complaint of her Majesty's Secretary of State.--Letter
of Mr. Seward.--Promise to open all the Channels of Commerce.--
Series of measures adopted by the United States.--Act of Congress.--
Its Provisions.--Its Operation.--Unconstitutional Measures.--
President Lincoln an Accomplice.--Not authorized by a State of
War.--Case before Chief-Justice Taney.--His Decision.--Expeditions
sent by the United States Government to seize Localities.--An Act
providing for the Appointment of Special Agents to seize Abandoned or
Captured Property.--The Views of General Grant.--Weakening his
Strength One Third.--Our Country divided into Districts, and Federal
Agents Appointed.--Continued to the Close of the War.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

The Enemy crosses the Potomac and concentrates at Warrenton.--
Advances upon Fredericksburg.--Its Position.--Our Forces.--The
Enemy crosses the Rappahannock.--Attack on General Jackson.--The
Main Attack.--Repulse of the Enemy on the Right.--Assaults on the
Left.--The Enemy's Columns broke and fled.--Recross the River.--
Casualties.--Position during the Winter.--The Enemy again crosses
the Rappahannock.--Also crosses at Kelly's Ford.--Converging toward
Chancellorsville, to the Rear of our Position.--Inactivity on our
Front.--Our Forces concentrate near Chancellorsville and encounter
the Enemy.--Position of the Enemy.--Attempt to turn his Right.--
The Enemy surprised and driven in the Darkness.--Jackson fired upon
and wounded.--Stuart in Command.--Battle renewed.--Fredericksburg
reoccupied.--Attack on the Heights.--Repulse of the Enemy.--The
Enemy withdraws in the Night.--Our Strength.--Losses.--Death of
General Jackson.--Another Account.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Relations with Foreign Nations.--The Public Questions.--Ministers
abroad.--Usages of Intercourse between Nations.--Our Action.--
Mistake of European Nations; they follow the Example of England and
France.--Different Conditions of the Belligerents.--Injury to the
Confederacy with a Single Exception.--These Agreements remained
inoperative.--Extent of the Pretended Blockade.--Remonstrances
against its Recognition.--Sinking Vessels to block up Harbors.--
Every Proscription of Maritime Law violated by the United States
Government.--Protest.--Addition made to the Law by Great Britain.--
Policy pursued favorable to our Enemies.--Instances.--Mediation
proposed by France to Great Britain, and Russian Letter of French
Minister.--Reply of Great Britain.--Reply of Russia.--Letter to
French Minister at Washington.--Various Offensive Actions of the
British Government.--Encouraging to the United States.--Hollow
Profession of Neutrality.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Advance of General E. K. Smith.--Advance of General Bragg.--Retreat
of General Buell to Louisville.--Battle at Perryville, Kentucky.--
General Morgan at Hartsville.--Advance of General Rosecrans.--
Battle of Murfreesboro.--General Van Dorn and General Price.--
Battle at Iuka.--General Van Dorn.--Battle of Corinth.--General
Little.--Captures at Holly Springs.--Retreat of Grant to Memphis.--
Operations against Vicksburg.--The Canal.--Concentration.--Raid of
Grierson.--Attack near Port Gibson.--Orders of General Johnston.--
Reply of General Pemberton.--Baker's Creek.--Big Black Bridge.--
Retreat to Vicksburg.--Siege.--Surrender.--Losses.--Surrender of
Port Hudson.--Some Movements for its Relief.

CHAPTER XL.

Inactivity in Tennessee.--Capture of Colburn's Expedition.--Capture
of Streight's Expedition.--Advance of Rosecrans to Bridgeport.--
Burnside in East Tennessee.--Our Force at Chattanooga.--Movement
against Burnside.--The Enemy moves on our Rear near Ringgold.--
Battle at Chickamauga.--Strength and Distribution of our Forces.--
The enemy withdraws.--Captures.--Losses.--The Enemy evacuates
Passes of Lookout Mountain.--His Trains captured.--Failure of
General Bragg to pursue.--Reënforcements to the Enemy, and Grant to
command.--His Description of the Situation.--Movements of the
Enemy.--Conflict at Chattanooga.

CHAPTER XLI.

Movement to draw forth the Enemy.--Advance to Culpeper
Court-House.--Cavalry Engagement at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords.--
Movement against Winchester.--Milroy's Force captured.--
Prisoners.--The Enemy retires along the Potomac.--Maryland
entered.--Advance into Pennsylvania.--The Enemy driven back toward
Gettysburg.--Position of the Respective Forces.--Battle at
Gettysburg.--The Army Retires.--Prisoners.--The Potomac swollen.--
No Interruption by the Enemy.--Strength of our Force.--Strength of
the Enemy.--The Campaign closed.--Observations.--Kelly's Ford.--
Attempt to surprise our Army.--System of Breastworks.--Prisoners.

CHAPTER XLII.

Subjugation of the States of Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Virginia.--Object of a State Government; its Powers are "Just
Powers"; how exercised; its Duty; necessarily sovereign; its Entire
Order; how founded; how destroyed.--The Crime against Constitutional
Liberty.--What is the Government of the United States?--It partakes
of the Nature of a Limited Partnership; its Peaceful Objects.--
Distinction between the Governments of the States and that of the
United States.--Secession.--The Government of the United States
invades the State; refuses to recognize its Government; thus denies
the Fundamental Principle of Popular Liberty.--Founded a New State
Government based on the Sovereignty of the United States
Government.--Annihilation of Unalienable Rights.--Qualification of
Voters fixed by Military Power.--Condition of the Voter's Oath.--
Who was the Sovereign in Tennessee?--Case of Louisiana.--
Registration of Voters.--None allowed to register who could not or
would not take a Certain Oath; its Conditions.--Election of State
Officers.--Part of the State Constitution declared void.--All done
under the Military Force of the United States Government.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Subjugation of the Border States, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.--
A Military Force invades Maryland and occupies Baltimore.--Martial
Law declared.--A Military Order.--Banishment from the State.--
Civil Government of the State suspended.--Unalienable Rights of the
Citizens invaded.--Arrests of Citizens commenced.--Number.--Case
of John Merryman.--Opinion of Chief-Justice Taney.--Newspapers
seized.--Houses searched for Arms.--Order of Commanding General to
Marshals to put Test to Voters.--The Governor appeals to the
President.--His Reply.--Voters imprisoned.--Statement of the
Governor.--Result of the Election.--State Constitutional
Convention.--Emancipation hardly carried.--First Open _Measures_ in
Kentucky.--Interference at the State Election by the United States
Government.--Voters excluded.--Martial Law declared.--Soldiers
keeping the Polls.--The Vote.--Statement of the Governor.--Attempt
to enroll Able-bodied Negroes.--The Governor visits Washington.--
The Result.--Arrests, Imprisonment, and Exile of Citizens.--
Suspension of the Writ of _Habeas Corpus_ by President Lincoln.--
Interference with the State Election.--Order to the Sheriffs.--
Proclamation of the Governor.--Enlistment of Slaves.--Emancipation
by Constitutional Amendment.--Violent _Measures_ in Missouri.--The
Governor calls out the Militia.--His Words.--The Plea of the
Invader.--"The Authority of the United States is Paramount," said
President Lincoln.--Bravery of the Governor.--Words of the
Commanding General.--Troops poured into the State.--Proceedings of
the State Convention.--Numberless Usurpations.--Provisional
Governor.-Emancipation Ordinance passed.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Subjugation of the Northern States.--Humiliating Spectacle of New
York.--"Ringing of a Little Bell."--Seizure and Imprisonment of
Citizens.--Number seized.--Paper Safeguards of Liberty.--Other
Safeguards.--Suspension of the Writ of _Habeas Corpus_ absolutely
forbidden with One Exception.--How done.--Not able to authorize
another.--Abundant Protective Provisions in New York, but all
failed.--Case of Pierce Butler.--Arrest of Secretary Cameron.--The
President assumes the Responsibility of the Crime.--No Heed given to
the Writ of _Habeas Corpus_ issued by the Court.--The Governor
passive.--Words of Justice Nelson--Prison overflowing.--How
relieved.--Oath required of Applicants for Relief.--Oath declined
by some.--Reasons.--Order forbidding the Employment of Counsel by
Prisoners.--Victims in almost Every Northern State.--Defeat at the
Elections.--Result.--Suit for Damages commenced.--Congress
interferes to protect the Guilty.--State Courts subjugated.--How
suspend _Habeas Corpus_.--Congress violates the Constitution.--What
was New York?--Writ suspended throughout the United States.-What is
"Loyalty"?--Military Domination.--Correspondence between General
Dix and Governor Seymour.--Seizure of Newspapers.--Governor orders
Arrest of Offenders.--Interference with the State Election.--Vote
of the Soldiers.--State Agents arrested.--Provost-Marshals
appointed in Every Northern State.--Their Duties.--Sustained by
Force.--Trials by Military Commission.--Trials at Washington.--
Assassination of the President.--Trial of Henry Wirz.--Efforts to
implicate the Author.--Investigation of a Committee of Congress as
to Complicity in the Assassination.--Arrest, Trial, and Banishment
of Clement C. Vallandigham.--Assertions of Governor Seymour on the
Case.

CHAPTER XLV.

Inactivity of the Army of Northern Virginia.--Expeditions of Custer,
Kilpatrick, and Dahlgren for the Destruction of Railroads, the
Burning of Richmond, and Killing the Officers of the Government.--
Repelled by Government Clerks.--Papers on Dahlgren's Body.--Repulse
of Butler's Raid from Bermuda Hundred.--Advance of Sheridan repulsed
at Richmond.--Stuart resists Sheridan.--Stuart's Death.--Remarks
on Grant's Plan of Campaign.--Movement of General Butler.--Drury's
Bluff.--Battle there.--Campaign of Grant in Virginia.

CHAPTER XLVI.

General Grant assumes Command in Virginia.--Positions of the
Armies.--Plans of Campaign open to Grant's Choice.--The Rapidan
crossed.--Battle of the Wilderness.--Danger of Lee.--The Enemy
driven back.--Flank Attack.--Longstreet wounded.--Result of the
Contest.--Rapid Flank Movement of Grant.--Another Contest.--
Grant's Reënforcements.--Hanover Junction.--The Enemy moves in
Direction of Bowling Green.--Crosses the Pamunkey.--Battle at Cold
Harbor.--Frightful Slaughter.--The Enemy's Soldiers decline to
renew the Assault when ordered.--Loss.--Asks Truce to bury the
Dead.--Strength of Respective Armies.--General Pemberton.--The
Enemy crosses the James.--Siege of Petersburg begun.

CHAPTER XLVII.

Situation in the Shenandoah Valley.--March of General Early.--The
Object.--At Lynchburg.--Staunton.--His Force.--Enters Maryland.--
Attack at Monocacy.--Approach to Washington.--The Works.--
Recrosses the Potomac.--Battle at Kernstown.--Captures.--Outrages
of the Enemy.--Statement of General Early.--Retaliation on
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.--Battle near Winchester.--Sheridan's
Force routed.--Attack subsequently renewed with New Forces.--
Incapacity of our Opponent.--Early falls back.--The Enemy
retires.--Early advances.--Report of a Committee of Citizens on
Losses by Sheridan's Orders.--Battle at Cedar Creek.--Losses,
Subsequent Movements, and Captures.--The Red River Campaign.--
Repulse and Retreat of General Banks.--Capture of Fort Pillow.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Assignment of General J. E. Johnston to the Command of the Army of
Tennessee.--Condition of his Army.--An Offensive Campaign
suggested.--Proposed Objects to be accomplished.--General
Johnston's Plans.--Advance of Sherman.--The Strength of the
Confederate Position.--General Johnston expects General Sherman to
give Battle at Dalton.--The Enemy's Flank Movement via Snake Creek
Gap to Resaca.--Johnston falls back to Resaca.--Further Retreat to
Adairsville.--General Johnston's Reasons.--Retreat to Cassville.--
Projected Engagement at Kingston frustrated.--Retreat beyond the
Etowah River.--Strong Position at Alatoona abandoned.--Nature of
the Country between Marietta and Dallas.--Engagements at New Hope
Church.--Army takes Position at Kenesaw.--Senator Hill's Letter.--
Death of Lieutenant-General Polk.--Battle at Kenesaw Mountain.--
Retreat beyond the Chattahoochee.--Results reviewed.--Popular
Demand for Removal of General Johnston.--Reluctance to remove him.--
Reasons for Removal.--Assignment of General J. B. Hood to the
Command.--He assumes the Offensive.--Battle of Peach-tree Creek.--
Death of General W. H. T. Walker.--Sherman's Movement to
Jonesboro.--Defeat of Hardee.--Evacuation of Atlanta.--Sherman's
Inhuman Order.--Visit to Georgia.--Suggested Operations.--Want of
coöperation by the Governor of Georgia.--Conference with Generals
Beauregard, Hardee, and Cobb, at Augusta.--Departure from Original
Plan.--General Hood's Movement against the Enemy's Communications.--
Partial Successes.--Withdrawal of the Army to Gadsden and Movement
against Thomas.--Sherman burns Atlanta and begins his March to the
Sea.--Vandalism.--Direction of his Advance.--General Wheeler's
Opposition.--His Valuable Service.--Sherman reaches Savannah.--
General Hardee's Command.--The Defenses of the City.--Assault and
Capture of Fort McAlister.--The Results.--Hardee evacuates Savannah.

CHAPTER XLIX.

Exchange of Prisoners.--Signification of the Word "loyal."--Who is
the Sovereign?--Words of President Lincoln.--The Issue for which we
fought.--Position of the United States Government.--Letters of
Marque granted by us.--Officers and Crew First Prisoners of the
Enemy.--Convicted as "Pirates."--My Letter to President Lincoln.--
How received.--Act of Congress relating to Prisoners.--Exchanges,
how made.-Answer of General Grant.--Request of United States
Congress.--Result.--Commissioners sent.--Agreement.--Disputed
Points.--Exchange arranged.--Order to pillage issued.--General
Pope's Order.--Proceedings.--Letter of General Lee relative to
Barbarities.--Answer of General Halleck.--Case of Mumford.--Effect
of Threatened Retaliation.--Mission of Vice-President Stephens.--A
Failure.--Excess of Prisoners.--Paroled Men.--Proposition made by
us.--No Answer.--Another Arrangement.--Stopped by General Grant.--
His words, "Put the Matter offensively."--Exchange of Slaves.--
Proposition of Lee to Grant.--Reply of Grant.--Further Reply.--His
Dispatch to General Butler.--Another Proposition made by us.--No
Answer.--Proposition relative to Sick and Wounded.--Some
exchanged.--The Worst Cases asked for to be photographed.--
Proposition as to Medicines.--No Answer.--A Final Effort.--
Deputation of Prisoners sent to Washington.--A Failure.--
Correspondence between Ould and Butler.--Order of Grant.--Report of
Butler.--Responsibility of Grant for Andersonville.--Barbarities of
the United States Government.--Treatment of our Men in Northern
Prisons.--Deaths on Each Side.

CHAPTER L.

Subjugation the Object of the Government of the United States.--The
only Terms of Peace offered to us.--Rejection of all Proposals.--
Efforts of the Enemy.--Appearance of Jacques and Gilmore at
Richmond.--Proposals.--Answer.--Commissioners sent to Canada.--
The Object.--Proceedings.--Note of President Lincoln.--Permission
to visit Richmond granted to Francis P. Blair.--Statement of my
Interview with him.--My Letter to him.--Response of President
Lincoln.--Three Persons sent by me to an Informal Conference.--
Their Report.--Remarks of Judge Campbell.--Oath of President
Lincoln.--The Provision of the Constitution and his Proclamation
compared.--Reserved Powers spoken of in the Constitution.--What are
they, and where do they exist?--Terms of Surrender offered to our
Soldiers.

CHAPTER LI.

General Sherman leaves Savannah.--His March impeded.--Difficulty In
collecting Troops to oppose him.--The Line of the Salkehatchie.--
Route of the Enemy's Advance.--Evacuation of Columbia.--Its
Surrender by the Mayor.--Burning the City.--Sherman responsible.--
Evacuation of Charleston.--The Confederate Forces in North
Carolina.--General Johnston's Estimate.--General Johnston assigned
to the Command.--The Enemy's Advance from Columbia to Fayetteville,
North Carolina.--"Foraging Parties."--Sherman's Threat and
Hampton's Reply.--Description of Federal "Treasure-Seekers" by
Sherman's Aide-de-Camp.--Failure of Johnston's Projected Attack at
Fayetteville.--Affair at Kinston.--Cavalry Exploits.--General
Johnston withdraws to Smithfield.--Encounter at Averysboro.--
Battles of Bentonville.--Union of Sherman's and Schofield's
Forces.--Johnston's Retreat to Raleigh.

CHAPTER LII.

Siege of Petersburg.--Violent Assault upon our Position.--A Cavalry
Expedition.--Contest near Ream's Station.--The City invested with
Earthworks.--Position of the Forces.--The Mine exploded, and an
Assault made.--Attacks on our Lines.--Object of the Enemy.--Our
Strength.--Assault on Fort Fisher.--Evacuation of Wilmington.--
Purpose of Grant's Campaign.--Lee's Conference with the
President.--Plans.--Sortie against Fort Steadman.--Movements of
Grant farther to Lee's right.--Army retires from Petersburg.--The
Capitulation.--Letters of Lee.

CHAPTER LIII.

General Lee advises the Evacuation of Richmond.--Withdrawal of the
Troops. The Naval Force.--The Conflagration in Richmond.--Telegram
of Lee to the President.--The Evacuation complete.--The Charge of
the Removal of Supplies intended for Lee's Army.--The Facts.--
Arrangement with General Lee.--Proclamation.--Reports of Scouts.

CHAPTER LIV.

Invitation of General Johnston to a Conference.--Its Object.--Its
Result.--Provisions on the Line of Retreat.--Notice of President
Lincoln's Assassination.--Correspondence between Johnston and
Sherman.--Terms of the Convention.--Approved by the Confederate
Government.--Rejected by the United States Government.--
Instructions to General Johnston.--Disobeyed.--Statements of
General Johnston.--His Surrender.--Movements of the President
South.--His Plans.--Order of General E. E. Smith to his Soldiers.--
Surrender.--Numbers paroled.--The President overtakes his Family.--
His Capture.--Taken to Hampton Roads, and imprisoned in Fortress
Monroe.

CHAPTER LV.

Number of the Enemy's Forces in the War.--Number of the Enemy's
Troops from Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee.--Cruel
Conduct of the War.--Statements in 1862.--Statements in 1863.--
Emancipation Proclamation.--Statements in 1864.--General Hunter's
Proceedings near Lynchburg.--Cruelties in Sherman's March through
South Carolina.

CHAPTER LVI.

Final Subjugation of the Confederate States.--Result of the
Contest.--A Simple Process of Restoration.--Rejected by the United
States Government.--A Forced Union.--The President's Proclamation
examined.--The Guarantee, not to destroy.--Provisional Governors.--
Their Duties.--Voters.--First Movement made in Virginia.--
Government set up.--Proceedings.--Action of So-called Legislature.--
Constitutional Amendment.--Case of Dr. Watson.--Civil Rights Bill.--
Storm brewing.--Congress refuses to admit Senators and Representatives
to Seats.--Committee on "Reconstruction."--Freedmen's Bureau.--Report
of Committee.--Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.--Extent of
Ratification.--Another Step taken by Congress.--Military Commanders
appointed over Confederate States, with Unlimited Powers.--
Reconstruction by the Bayonet.--Course of Proceedings required.--Two
Governments for Each State.--Major-Generals appointed.--Further Acts
of Congress.--Proceedings commenced by the Major-General at Richmond.--
Civil Governor appointed.--Military Districts and Sub-districts.--
Registration.--So-called State Convention.--So-called Legislature.--Its
Action.--Measures required by Congress for the Enfranchisement of
Negroes adopted by the So-called Legislature.--Assertion of Senator
Garret Davis.--State represented in Congress.

CHAPTER LVII.

Final Subjugation of the Confederate States (continued).--Slaves
declared free by Military Commanders in North Carolina.--Provisional
Governor.--Convention.--Military Commander.--Governor-elect turned
out.--His Protest.--Members of Congress admitted.--Proceedings in
South Carolina.--Arrest of Judge Aldrich.--Military Reversal of
Sentence of the Court.--Post Commanders.--Jurors.--Proceedings in
Georgia.--President's Plan.--Plan of Congress enforced.--Other
Events.--Proceedings in Florida.--Rival Conventions.--Plan of
Congress enforced.--Proceedings in Alabama.--Suspension of Bishop
Wilmer by the Military Commander.--Military Authority.--Action of
Congress.--Proceedings in Mississippi.--Constitutionality of the
Act of Congress before the Supreme Court.--Remarks of Chief-Justice
Chase.--Military Arrests.--Removals.--The Chief-Justice of the
State resigns.--The So-called Constitution rejected.--Ames
appointed Governor.--Proceedings in Louisiana.--Plan of Congress
enforced.--Other Measures.--Arkansas.--Texas.--Opinion of the
United States Attorney-General on Military Commanders.--Consequences
that followed the Measures of Congress.--Increase in State Debts.--
Increase in Frauds and Crimes.--Examples.--Investigating Committees
of Congress.--The Unalienable Rights of Man.--The Sovereignty of
the People and the Supremacy of Law gone.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

Jefferson Davis

General Braxton Bragg

Davis House, at Richmond

Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson

Members of The Confederate Cabinet

Lieutenant-General James Longstreet

General Wade Hampton

General J. E. Johnston

General John B. Hood

Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee

MAPS.

Battle-Field of Fort Donelson

Map used by the Confederate Generals at Shiloh

Battle of Shiloh

Port Hudson

Yorktown and Williamsburg

Operations in Northern Virginia

Operations around Richmond and Petersburg

Battle of Fredericksburg

Operations in Mississippi

Operations in Kentucky and Tennessee

Battle-Field of Chickamauga

Battle of Gettysburg

Operations in Georgia and Tennessee

Fort Fisher

Petersburg

Retreat from Richmond and Petersburg

Operations in Georgia and South Carolina

PART IV--(Continued).

THE WAR.

CHAPTER XV.

The inauguration of the permanent government, amid the struggles of
war, was welcomed by our people as a sign of the independence for
which all their sacrifices had been made, and the increased efforts
of the enemy for our subjugation were met by corresponding
determination on our part to maintain the rights our fathers left us
at whatever cost. We now enter upon those terrible scenes of wrong
and blood in which the government of the United States, driven to
desperation by our successful resistance, broke through every
restraint of the Constitution, of national law, of justice, and of
humanity. But, before commencing this fearful narration, let us sum
up the hostile acts and usurpations committed during the first year.

Our people had been declared to be combinations of insurrectionists,
and more than one hundred and fifty thousand men had been called to
arms to invade our territory; our ports were blockaded for the
destruction of our regular commerce, and we had been threatened with
denunciation as pirates if we molested a vessel of the United States,
and some of our citizens had been confined in cells to await the
punishment of piracy; one of our States was rent asunder and a new
State constructed out of the fragment; every proposition for a
peaceful solution of pending issues had been spurned. An
indiscriminate warfare had been waged upon our peaceful citizens,
their dwellings burned and their crops destroyed; a law had been
passed imposing a penalty of forfeiture on the owner of any faithful
slave who gave military or naval service to the Confederacy, and
forbidding military commanders to interfere for the restoration of
fugitives; the United States Government had refused to agree to an
exchange of prisoners, and suffered those we had captured to languish
in captivity; it had falsely represented us in every court of Europe,
to defeat our efforts to obtain a recognition from foreign powers; it
had seized a portion of the members of the Legislature of one State
and confined them in a distant military prison, because they were
thought merely to sympathize with us, though they had not committed
an overt act; it had refused all the propositions of another State
for a peaceful neutrality, invaded her and seized important
positions, where not even a disturbance of the peace had occurred,
and perpetrated the most despotic outrages on her people; it rejected
the most conciliatory terms offered for the sake of peace by the
Governor of another State, claimed for itself an unrestricted right
to move and station its troops whenever and wherever its officers
might think it to be desirable, and persisted in its aggressions
until the people were involved in conflicts, and a provisional
government became necessary for their protection. Within the Northern
States, which professed to be struggling to maintain the Union, the
Constitution, its only bond, and the laws made in pursuance of it,
were in peaceful, undisputed existence; yet even there the Government
ruled with the tyrant's hand, and the provisions for the freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, and the personal liberty of the
citizen, were daily violated, and these sacred rights of man
suppressed by military force.

But some of these hostile actions require here a more specific
consideration. They were the antecedents of oppressive measures which
the enemy strove to enforce upon us during the entire war.

The third session of the Provisional Congress commenced at Richmond
on July 20, 1861, and ended on August 31st. At the previous session,
a resolution had been passed authorizing the President to cause the
several executive departments, with the archives thereof, to be
removed to Richmond at such time as he might determine prior to July
20th. In my message to the Congress of that date, the cause of
removal was stated to be, that the aggressive movements of the enemy
required prompt, energetic action; that the accumulation of his
forces on the Potomac sufficiently demonstrated that his first
efforts were to be directed against Virginia, and from no point could
necessary measures for her defense and protection be so effectively
provided as from her own capital. My remarks to Congress at this
session were confined to such important facts as had occurred during
the recess, and to the matters connected with the public defense.
"The odious features of the policy and purposes of the Government of
the United States stood revealed; the recent grant of a half million
of men and four hundred millions of dollars by their Congress, was a
confession that their intention was a subjugation of the Southern
States."

The fact thus briefly presented in the message was established by the
course pursued since the first advent to power of those who had come
into possession of the sword and the purse of the Union. Not only by
the legislation cited was the intent to make war for the purpose of
subjugating the Southern States revealed, but also, and yet more
significantly, was the purpose manifested in the evasion and final
rejection of every proposition of the Southern States for a peaceful
solution of the issues arising from secession.

Such extreme obstinacy was unnatural, unreasonable, and contrary to
the general precedents of history, except those which resulted in
civil war. This unfavorable indication was also observable in the
original party of abolition. Its intolerance had a violence which
neither truth nor justice nor religion could restrain, and it was
transferred undiluted to their successors. The resistance to the
demands of the States and persistence in aggressions upon them were
the occasion of constant apprehensions and futile warnings of their
suicidal tendency on the part of the statesmen of the period. For
thirty years had patriotism and wisdom pointed to dissolution by this
perverse uncharitableness. Had the North been contending for a
principle only, there would have been a satisfactory settlement, not
indeed by compromising the principle, but by adjusting the manner of
its operation so that only good results should ensue. But when the
contest is for supremacy on one side and self-defense on the other--
when the aim of the aggressor is "power, plunder, and extended
rule"--there will be no concessions by him, no compromises, no
adjustment of results. The alternative is subjugation by the sword,
or peace by absolute submission. The latter condition could not be
accepted by us. The former was, therefore, to be resisted as best we
might.

An amazing insensibility seemed to possess a portion of the Northern
people as to the crisis before them. They would not realize that
their purpose of supremacy would be so resolutely resisted; that, if
persisted in, it must be carried to the extent of bloodshed in
sectional war. With them the lust of dominion was stronger than the
sense of justice or of the fraternity and the equal rights of the
States, which the Union was formed to secure, and so they were blind
to palpable results. Otherwise they must have seen, when the remnants
of the old Whig party joined hands with abolitionism, that it was
like a league with the spirit of evil, in which the conditions of the
bond were bestowal of power on one side, and the commission of deeds
meet for disunion on the other. The honest masses should have
remembered that when scheming leaders abandon principle, and adopt
the ideas of dreamers and fanatics, the ladder on which they would
mount to power is one on which they can not return, and upon which it
would be a fatal delusion to follow.

The reality of armed resistance on our part the North was slow to
comprehend. The division of sentiment at the South on the question of
the _expediency_ of immediate secession, was mistaken for the
existence of a submission party, whereas the division was confined to
expediency, and wholly disappeared when our territory was invaded.
Then was revealed to them the necessity of defending their homes and
liberties against the ruthless assault on both, and then
extraordinary unanimity prevailed. Then, as Hamilton and Madison had
stated, war against the States had effected the deprecated
dissolution of the Union.

Adjustment by negotiation the United States Government had rejected,
and had chosen to attempt our subjugation. This course, adopted
without provocation, was pursued with a ferocity that disregarded all
the laws of civilized warfare, and must permanently remain a stain
upon the escutcheon of a Government once bright among the nations.
The vast provision made by the United States in the material of war,
the money appropriated, and the men enrolled, furnished a sufficient
refutation to the pretense that they were only engaged in dispersing
rioters, and suppressing unlawful combinations too strong for the
usual course of judicial proceedings.

Further, they virtually recognized the separate existence of the
Confederate States by an interdictive embargo, and blockade of all
commerce between them and the United States, not only by sea but by
land; not only with those who bore arms, but with the entire
population of the Confederate States. They waged an indiscriminate
war upon all: private houses in isolated retreats were bombarded and
burned; grain-crops in the field were consumed by the torch; and,
when the torch was not applied, careful labor was bestowed to render
complete the destruction of every article of use or ornament
remaining in private dwellings after their female inhabitants had
fled from the insults of brutal soldiers; a petty war was made on the
sick, including women and children, by carefully devised measures to
prevent them from obtaining the necessary medicines. Were these the
appropriate means by which to execute the laws, and in suppressing
rioters to secure tranquillity and preserve a voluntary union? Was
this a government resting on the consent of the governed?

At this session of the Confederate Congress additional forces were
provided to repel invasion, by authorizing the President to accept
the services of any number of volunteers not exceeding four hundred
thousand men. Authority was also given for suitable financial
measures hereafter stated, and the levy of a tax. An act of
sequestration was also adopted as a countervailing measure against
the operations of the confiscation law enacted by the Congress of the
United States on August 6, 1861.

This act of the United States Congress, with its complement passed in
the ensuing year, will be considered further on in these pages. One
of the most indicative of the sections, however, provided that,
whenever any person, claimed to be held to labor or service under the
laws of any State, shall be permitted, by the person to whom such
labor or service is claimed to be due, to take up arms against the
United States, or to work, or to be employed in or upon any fort,
intrenchment, etc., or in any military or naval service whatever
against the Government of the United States, the person to whom such
labor is claimed to be due shall forfeit his claim, and, to any
attempt to enforce it, a statement of the facts shall be a sufficient
answer. The President of the United States, in his message of
December 3, 1861, stated that numbers of persons held to service had
been liberated and were dependent on the United States, and must be
provided for in some way. He recommended that steps be taken for
colonizing them at some places in a climate congenial to them.

As the President and the Congress of the United States had declared
this to be a war for the preservation of the Constitution, it may not
be out of place to see what course they now undertook to pursue under
the pretext of preserving the Constitution of the United States. It
had been conceded in all time that the Congress of the United States
had no power to legislate on slavery in the States, and that this was
a subject for State legislation. It was one of the powers not granted
in the Constitution, but "reserved to the States respectively." [1]
All the powers of the Federal Government were delegated to it by the
States, and all which were reserved were withheld from the Federal
Government, as well in time of war as in peace. The conditions of
peace or war made no change in the powers granted in the
Constitution. The attempt, therefore, by Congress, to exercise a
power of confiscation, one not granted to it, was a mere usurpation.
The argument of forfeiture for treason does not reach the case,
because there could be no forfeiture until after conviction, and the
Constitution says, "No attainder of treason shall work corruption of
blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person
attainted." [2] The confiscation act of 1861 undertook to convict and
sentence without a trial, and entirely to deprive the owner of slaves
of his property by giving final freedom to the slaves. Still further
to show how regardless the United States Government was of the
limitations imposed upon it by the compact of Union, the reader is
referred to the fifth article of the first amendment, being one of
those cases in which the people of the several States, in an
abundance of caution, threw additional protection around rights which
the framers of the Constitution thought already sufficiently guarded.
The last two clauses of the article read thus: No person "shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."

Here was a political indictment and conviction by the Congress and
President, with total forfeitures inflicted in palpable violation of
each and of all the cited clauses of the Constitution.

One can scarcely anticipate such effrontery as would argue that "due
process of law" meant an act of Congress, that judicial power could
thus be conferred upon the President, and private property be
confiscated for party success, without violating the Constitution
which the actors had sworn to support.

The unconstitutionality of the measure was so palpable that, when the
bill was under consideration, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, a member of
Congress from Pennsylvania, said: "I thought the time had come when
the laws of war were to govern our action; when constitutions, if
they stood in the way of the laws of war in dealing with the enemy,
had no right to intervene. Who pleads the Constitution against our
proposed action?" [3] This subject is further considered in subsequent
chapters on the measures of emancipation adopted by the United States
Government.

It is to be remembered in this connection that pillage and the wanton
destruction of private property are not permitted by the laws of war
among civilized nations. When prosecuting the war with Mexico, we
respected private property of the enemy; and when in 1781 Great
Britain, attempting to reduce her revolted American colonies, took
possession of the country round and about Point Comfort (Fortress
Monroe), the homes quietly occupied by the rebellious people were
spared by the armies of the self-asserting ruler of the land. At a
later date, war existed between Great Britain and the independent
States of the Union, during which Great Britain got possession of
various points within the States. At the Treaty of Ghent, 1815, by
which peace was restored to the two countries, it was stipulated in
the first article that all captured places should be restored
"without causing any destruction, or carrying away any of the
artillery or other public property originally captured in the said
forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of
the ratifications of this treaty; or any slaves or other private
property." Persistent efforts were made to avoid the return of
deported slaves, and it was attempted to put them in the category of
artillery which had been removed before the exchange of ratification.
Mr. John Quincy Adams, first as United States Minister to England,
and subsequently as United States Secretary of State, conducted with
great vigor and earnestness a long correspondence to maintain the
true construction of the treaty as recognizing and guarding the right
of private property in slaves. In his letter to Viscount Castlereagh,
the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after explaining
the distinction between "artillery or other public property" and
"slaves or other private property," as used in the treaty, and why it
might be impracticable, if they had been removed, to return the
former, but that the reasons did not apply to the latter, for, he
proceeds to say, "Private property, not having been subject to
legitimate capture with the places, was not liable to the reason of
limitation." In the same letter, Mr. Adams writes: "Merchant-vessels
and effects captured on the high-seas are, by the laws of war between
civilized nations, lawful prize, and by the capture become the
property of the captors. . . . But, as by the same usages of
civilized nations, private property is not the subject of lawful
capture in war upon the land, it is perfectly clear that, in every
stipulation, private property shall be respected; or that, upon the
restoration of places taken during the war, it shall not be carried
away." (See "American State Papers," vol. iv, pp. 122, 123.)
Sectional hostility and party zeal had not then so far undermined the
feeling of fraternity which generated the Union as to make a public
officer construe the Constitution as it might favor or injure one
section or another, and Great Britain was, from a sense of right,
compelled to recognize the wrong done in deporting slaves, the
private property of American citizens.

On the 4th of December, 1861, the President of the United States
issued an order to the commander-in-chief relative to slaves as above
mentioned, in which he said, "Their arrest as fugitives from service
or labor should be immediately followed by the military arrest of the
parties making the seizure." Had Congress and the President made new
laws of war?

Although the Government of the United States did not boldly proclaim
the immediate emancipation of all slaves, the tendency of all its
actions was directly to that end. To use a favorite expression of its
leaders, the Northern people were not at that time "educated up to
the point." A revolt from too sudden a revelation of its entire
policy was apprehended. Even as late as July 7, 1862, General
McClellan wrote to the authorities at Washington from the vicinity of
Richmond, "A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery,
will rapidly disintegrate our armies." Nevertheless, when policy
indicated it, the declaration came, as will be seen hereafter.
Meantime, General Fremont, in command in Missouri, issued a
proclamation on August 31, 1861, declaring the property, real and
personal, of all persons in arms against the United States, or taking
an active part with their enemies, to be confiscated, and their
slaves to be free men. This was subsequently modified to conform to
the terms of the above-mentioned confiscation act. General Thomas W.
Sherman, commanding at Port Royal, in South Carolina, was instructed,
on October 14, 1861, to receive all persons, whether slaves or not,
and give them employment, "assuring all loyal masters that Congress
will provide just compensation to them for the loss of the services
of the persons so employed." To others no relief was to be given.
This was, by confiscation, to punish a class of citizens, in the
emancipation of every slave whose owner rendered support to the
Confederate States. Finally, General Halleck, who succeeded Fremont,
and General Dix, commanding near Fortress Monroe, issued orders not
to permit slaves to come within their lines. They were speedily
condemned for this action, because it put a stop to the current of
emancipation, which will be hereafter narrated.

Reference has been made to our want of a navy, and the efforts made
to supply the deficiency. The usual resort under such circumstances
to privateers was, in our case, without the ordinary incentive of
gain, as all foreign ports were closed against our prizes, and, our
own ports being soon blockaded, our vessels, public or private, had
but the alternative of burning or bonding their captures. To those
who, nevertheless, desired them, letters of marque were granted by
us, and there was soon a small fleet of vessels composed of those
which had taken out these letters, and others which had been
purchased and fitted out by the Navy Department. They hovered on the
coasts of the Northern States, capturing and destroying their
vessels, and filling the enemy with consternation. The President of
the United States had already declared in his proclamation of April
19th, as above stated, that "any person, who, under the pretended
authority of the said (Confederate) States, should molest a vessel of
the United States, or the persons or cargo on board," should be held
amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention of
piracy. This was another violation of international law, another
instance of arrogant disregard for universal opinion. The threat, if
meant for intimidation, and to deprive the Confederacy of one of the
usual weapons of war, was unbecoming the head of a Government. To
have executed it upon a helpless prisoner, would have been a crime
intensified by its cowardice. Happily for the United States, the
threat was not executed, but the failure to carry out the declared
purpose was coupled with humiliation, because it was the result of a
notice to retaliate as fully as might need be to stop such a
barbarous practice. To yield to the notice thus served, was a
practical admission by the United States Government that the
Confederacy had become a power among the nations.

On June 3, 1861, the little schooner Savannah, previously a
pilot-boat in Charleston Harbor and sailing under a commission issued
by authority of the Confederate States, was captured by the United
States brig Perry. The crew were placed in irons and sent to New
York. It appeared, from statements made without contradiction, that
they were not treated as prisoners of war, whereupon a letter was
addressed by me to President Lincoln, dated July 6th, stating
explicitly that, "painful as will be the necessity, this Government
will deal out to the prisoners held by it the same treatment and the
same fate as shall be experienced by those captured on the Savannah;
and, if driven to the terrible necessity of retaliation by your
execution of any of the officers or crew of the Savannah, that
retaliation will be extended so far as shall be requisite to secure
the abandonment of a practice unknown to the warfare of civilized
man, and so barbarous as to disgrace the nation which shall be guilty
of inaugurating it." A reply was promised to this letter, but none
came. Still later in the year the privateer Jefferson Davis was
captured, the captain and crew brought into Philadelphia, and the
captain tried and found guilty of piracy and threatened with death.
Immediately I instructed General Winder, at Richmond, to select one
prisoner of the highest rank, to be confined in a cell appropriated
to convicted felons, and treated in all respects as if convicted, and
to be held for execution in the same manner as might be adopted for
the execution of the prisoner of war in Philadelphia. He was further
instructed to select thirteen other prisoners of the highest rank, to
be held in the same manner as hostages for the thirteen prisoners
held in New York for trial as pirates. By this course the infamous
attempt made by the United States Government to commit judicial
murder on prisoners of war was arrested.

The attention of the British House of Lords was also attracted to the
proclamation of President Lincoln, threatening the officers and crew
of privateers with the punishment of piracy. It led to a discussion
in which the Earl of Derby said: "He apprehended that, if one thing
was clearer than another, it was that privateering was not piracy;
and that no law could make that piracy, as regarded the subjects of
one nation which was not piracy by the law of nations. Consequently,
the United States must not be allowed to entertain this doctrine, and
to call upon her Majesty's Government not to interfere." The Lord
Chancellor said: "There was no doubt that, if an Englishman engaged
in the service of the Southern States, he violated the laws of his
country and rendered himself liable to punishment, and that he had no
right to trust to the protection of his native country to shield him
from the consequences of his act. But, though that individual would
be guilty of a breach of the law of his own country, he could not be
treated as a pirate, and those who treated him as a pirate would be
guilty of murder."

The appearance of this little fleet on the ocean made it necessary
for the powers of Europe immediately to define their position
relative to the contending powers. Great Britain, adopting a position
of neutrality, and recognizing both as belligerents, interdicted the
armed ships and privateers of both from carrying prizes into the
waters of the United Kingdom or its colonies. All the other powers
recognized the Confederate States to be belligerents, but closed
their ports against the admission of prizes captured by either
belligerent.

It is worthy of notice that the United States Government (though it
had previously declined) at this time notified the English and French
Governments that it was now willing to adhere to all the conditions
of the Paris Congress of 1856, provided the clause abolishing
privateers might apply to the Confederate States. The offer, with the
proviso, was honorably declined by both France and England.

In the matter of the exchange of prisoners, which became important in
consequence of these retaliatory measures, and the number taken by
our troops at Manassas, the people of the Northern States were the
victims of incessant mortification and distress through the
vacillating and cruel conduct of their Government. It based all its
immense military movements on the theory that "the laws of the United
States have been for some time past and now are opposed and the
execution thereof obstructed, . . . by combinations too powerful to
be suppressed" by the ordinary methods. Under this theory the United
States are assumed to be one nation, and the distinctions among them
of States are as little recognized as if they did not exist. This
theory was false, and thereby led its originators into constant
blunders. When the leaders of a government aspire to the acquisition
of absolute, unlimited power, and the sword is drawn to hew the way,
it would be more logical and respectable to declare the laws silent
than to attempt to justify unlawful acts by unwarranted legislation.
If their theory had been true, then their prisoners of war were
insurrectionists and rebels, and guilty of treason, and hanging would
have been the legitimate punishment. Why were they not hung? Not
through pity, but because the facts contradicted the theory. The
"combinations" spoken of were great and powerful States, and the
danger was that the North would be the greater sufferer by our
retaliation. There was no humane course but to exchange prisoners
according to the laws of war. With this the Government of the United
States refused to comply, lest it might be construed into an
acknowledgment of belligerent rights on our part, which would explode
their theory of insurrectionary combinations, tend to restore more
correct views of the rights and powers of the States, and expose in
its true light their efforts to establish the supreme and unlimited
sovereignty of the General Government. The reader may observe the
tenacity with which the authorities at Washington, and, behind them,
the Northern States, clung to this theory. Upon its strict
maintenance depended the success of their bloody revolution to secure
absolute supremacy over the States. Upon its failure, the dissolution
of the Union would have been established; constitutional liberty
would have been vindicated; the hopes of mankind in the modern
institutions of federation fulfilled; and a new Union might have been
formed and held together with a bond of fraternity and not by the
sword, as under the above revolutionary theory.

By the exchange of prisoners, nothing was conceded except what was
evident to the world--that actual war existed, and that a Christian
people should at least conduct it according to the usages of
civilized nations. But sectional hate and the vain conceit of newly
acquired power led to the idle prophecy of our speedy subjection, and
hence the Government of the United States refused to act as required
by humanity and the usages of civilized warfare. At length, moved by
the clamors of the relatives and friends of the prisoners we held,
and by fears of retaliation, it covertly submitted to abandon its
declared purpose, and to shut its eyes while the exchanges were made
by various commanders under flags of truce. Thus some were exchanged
in New York, Washington, Cairo, and Columbus, Kentucky, and by
General McClellan in western Virginia and elsewhere. On the whole,
the partial exchanges were inconsiderable and inconclusive as to the
main question. The condition at the close of the year 1861, summarily
stated, was that soldiers captured in battle were not protected by
the usage of "exchange," and citizens were arrested without due
process of law, deported to distant States, and incarcerated without
assigned cause. All this by persons acting under authority of the
United States Government, but in disregard of the United States
Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
an indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." [4] "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." [5] These
provisions were of no avail to protect the citizens from the
outrages, because those who derived their authority from the
Constitution used that authority to violate its guarantees. It has
been stated that the rule upon which the United States Government was
conducting affairs was entirely revolutionary. Its efforts to clothe
the Government of the Union with absolute power involved the
destruction of the rights of the States and the subversion of the
Constitution. Hence on every occasion the provisions of the
Constitution afforded no protection to the citizens: their rights
were spurned; their persons were seized and imprisoned beyond the
reach of friends; their houses sacked and burned. If they pleaded the
Constitution, the Government of the Constitution was deaf to them,
unsheathed its sword, and said the Union was at stake; and the
Constitution, which was the compact of union, must stand aside. This
was indeed a revolution. A constitutional government of limited
powers derived from the people was transformed into a military
despotism. The Northern people were docile as sheep under the change,
reminding one of the words of the Psalmist: "All we, like sheep, have
gone astray."

Posterity may ask with amazement. What cause could there have been
for such acts by a government that was ordained "to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"?
Posterity may further ask, Where could a government of limited
powers, constructed only for certain general purposes--and on the
principle that all power proceeds from the people, and that "the
powers not delegated by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"--
find a grant of power, or an authority to perpetrate such injuries
upon the States and the people? As to the first question, it may be
said: There was no external cause for such acts. All foreign nations
were at peace with the United States. No hostile fleets were hovering
on her coasts, nor immense foreign armies threatening to invade her
territory. The cause, if any plausible one existed, was entirely
internal. It lay between it and its citizens. If it had treated them
with injustice and oppression, and threatened so to continue, it had
departed from the objects of its creation, and they had the resulting
right to dissolve it.

Who was to be the umpire in such a case? Not the United States
Government, for it was the creature of the States; it possessed no
inherent, original sovereignty. The Constitution says, "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." [6] The umpireship is, therefore,
expressly on the side of the States, or the people. When the State of
South Carolina, through a sovereign convention, withdrew from the
Union, she exercised the umpireship which rightly belonged to her,
and which no other could exercise for her. This involved the
dissolution of the Union, and the extinction of the Government of the
United States so far as she was concerned; but the officers of that
Government, instead of justly acquiescing in that which was
constitutionally and legally inevitable, drew the sword, and resolved
to maintain by might that which had no longer existence by right. A
usurpation thus commenced in wrong was the mother of all the
usurpations and wrongs which followed. The unhallowed attempt to
establish the absolute sovereignty of the Government of the United
States, by the subjugation of States and their people, brought forth
its natural fruit. Well might the victim of the guillotine exclaim,
"O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!"

As to the other question--Where could a government of limited powers
find authority to perpetrate such injuries upon its own
constituents?--an answer will be given in succeeding pages.

Up to the close of the year the war enlarged its proportions so as to
include new fields, until it then extended from the shores of the
Chesapeake to the confines of Missouri and Arizona. Sudden calls from
the remotest points for military aid were met with promptness enough
not only to avert disaster in the face of superior numbers, but also
to roll back the tide of invasion on the border.

At the commencement of the war the enemy were possessed of certain
strategic points and strong places within the Confederate States.
They greatly exceeded us in numbers, in available resources, and in
the supplies necessary for war. Military establishments had been long
organized, and were complete; the navy and the army, once common to
both, were in their possession. To meet all this we had to create not
only an army in the face of war itself, but also military
establishments necessary to equip and place it in the field. The
spirit of the volunteers and the patriotism of the people enabled us,
under Providence, to grapple successfully with these difficulties. A
succession of glorious victories at Bethel, Manassas, Springfield,
Lexington, Leesburg, and Belmont, checked the invasion of our soil.
After seven months of war the enemy had not only failed to extend
their occupancy of the soil, but new States and Territories had been
added to our confederacy. Instead of their threatened march of
unchecked conquest, the enemy were driven at more than one point to
assume the defensive; and, upon a fair comparison between the two
belligerents, as to men, military means, and financial condition, the
Confederate States were relatively much stronger at the end of the
year than when the struggle commenced.

The necessities of the times called into existence new branches of
manufactures, and gave a fresh impulse to the activity of those
previously in operation, and we were gradually becoming independent
of the rest of the world for the supply of such military stores and
munitions as were indispensable for war.

At an election on November 6, 1861, the chief executive officers of
the provisional Government were unanimously chosen to similar
positions in the permanent Government, to be inaugurated on the
ensuing 22d of February, 1862.

[Footnote 1: Constitution of the United States, Article X.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., Article III, section 3.]

[Footnote 3: Congress of the United States, July, 1861.]

[Footnote 4: Constitution of the United States, Article V.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid., Article IV.]

[Footnote 6: Constitution of the United States, Article X.]

CHAPTER XVI.

Military Arrangements of the Enemy.--Marshall and Garfield.--
Fishing Creek.--Crittenden's Report.--Fort Henry; its Surrender.--
Fort Donelson; its Position.--Assaults.--Surrender.--Losses.

Important changes in the military arrangements of the enemy were made
about this time. Major-General George B. McClellan was assigned to
the chief command of his army, in place of Lieutenant-General Scott,
retired. A Department of Ohio was constituted, embracing the States
of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Kentucky east of the Cumberland and
Tennessee Rivers; and Brigadier-General D. C. Buell was assigned to
its command. At the same time. General Henry W. Halleck superseded
General John C. Fremont in command of the United States Department of
the West. General W. T. Sherman was removed from Kentucky and sent to
report to General Halleck. General A. S. Johnston was now confronted
by General Halleck in the West and by General Buell in Kentucky. The
former, with armies at Cairo and Paducah, under Generals Grant and C.
F. Smith, threatened equally Columbus, the key of the lower
Mississippi River, and the water-lines of the Cumberland and the
Tennessee, with their defenses at Forts Donelson and Henry. The right
wing of General Buell also menaced Donelson and Henry, while his
center was directed against Bowling Green, and his left was advancing
against General Zollicoffer at Mill Spring, on the upper Cumberland.
If the last-named position could be forced, the way seemed open to
East Tennessee, by either the Jacksboro or the Jamestown routes, on
the one hand, and to Nashville on the other. At the northeastern
comer of Kentucky there was a force under Colonel Garfield, of Ohio,
opposed to the Confederate force under General Humphrey Marshall.

The strength of Marshall's force in effective men was about sixteen
hundred. Knowing that a body of the enemy under Colonel Garfield was
advancing to meet him, and that a small force was moving to his rear,
he fell back some fifteen miles, and took position on Middle Creek,
near Prestonsburg. On January 10, 1862, Garfield attacked him. The
firing was kept up, with some intervals, about four hours, and was
occasionally very sharp and spirited. Marshall says in his report:
"The enemy did not move me from any one position I assumed, and at
nightfall withdrew from the field, leaving me just where I was in the
morning. . . . He came to attack, yet came so cautiously that my left
wing never fired a shot, and he never came up sufficiently to engage
my center or left wing." Garfield was said to have fallen back
fifteen miles to Paintsville, and Marshall seven miles, where he
remained two days, then slowly pursued his retreat. He stated his
loss at ten killed and fourteen wounded, and that of the enemy to
have been severe.

The battle of Fishing Creek has been the subject of harsh criticism,
and I think it will be seen by the report herein inserted that great
injustice has been done to General George B. Crittenden, who
commanded on that occasion.

In July, 1880, I wrote to him requesting a statement of the affair at
Fishing Creek, and a short time before his decease he complied with
my request by writing as follows:

"In November, 1862, I assumed, by assignment, the command of a
portion of East Tennessee and southeastern Kentucky, which embraced
the troops stationed at Mill Springs, on the Cumberland River, and
under the command of General Zollicoffer, who, as I understood the
matter, had been stationed there by General Johnston to prevent the
enemy under Schopf, and confronting him on the opposite side of the
river, from crossing and penetrating into Tennessee. Schopf's camp
was at Somerset, on Fishing Creek, a tributary of the Cumberland,
emptying into it a mile above Mill Springs. He was several miles away
from the bank of the Cumberland, so that both the river and creek
intervened between him and General Zollicoffer. While I was detained
in Knoxville, on business connected with my command, I received an
official communication from General Zollicoffer, informing me that he
had crossed the Cumberland by fording, and was fortifying a camp on
the right bank, etc. By the messenger who bore me this communication
I ordered him to recross the river and resume his original position
on the left bank. Early in January, I reached Mill Springs, and
found, to my surprise. General Zollicoffer still on the right bank.
He called on me immediately, and informed me that his messenger who
bore back my order had lost several days in returning, and that when
it was received he supposed that I would arrive almost immediately;
and, hoping to be able to convince me that it would be better to
remain on the right bank, he had postponed crossing until, by a rise
in the river, it had become impossible to do so; that all his
artillery and a large portion of his wagons were on the right bank,
and his only means of transferring them to the other bank were a
small ferry-boat and a very small stem-wheel steamer, entirely
inadequate to the purpose. I was dissatisfied, but, as I knew that
the General had been actuated by pure motives, I accepted his excuse.
Details were promptly placed in the woods, to prepare timber for
flat-boats to transport the artillery and wagons to the left bank of
the river. The weather was execrable, and the men unskilled, so that
the work progressed slowly.

"Such was the posture of affairs, when, on the 18th of January, I was
informed that General Thomas was approaching with a large force of
all arms, and would encamp that night within a few miles of us. Here
was thrust upon me the very contingency which my order to General
Zollicoffer was intended to obviate. It rained violently throughout
this day until late in the afternoon. It occurred to me that Fishing
Creek must so rise as to render it impossible for Schopf to connect
with Thomas. Acting upon this idea, I summoned a council of superior
officers, and, laying before them the circumstances of the case,
asked their advice. There was not one of them who did not concur with
me in the opinion that Thomas must be attacked immediately, and, if
possible, by surprise; that such attack, if successful merely in
repulsing him, would probably give us time to cross the Cumberland
with artillery and wagons, by means of our boats, then being built.

"Accordingly, at twelve o'clock in the night, we marched for the
position of the enemy, ascertained to be some six miles away. We had
scarcely taken up the line of march, when the rain began to fall, the
darkness became intense, and the consequent confusion great, so that
day dawned before we reached his position. The attack, as a surprise,
failed: nevertheless, it was promptly made. It rained violently
throughout the action, rendering all the flint-lock guns useless. The
men bearing them were allowed to fall back on the reserve.

"The action was progressing successfully, when the fall of General
Zollicoffer was announced to me. Apprehending disastrous
consequences, I hastened to the front. My apprehensions were well
founded. I found the line of battle in confusion and falling back,
and, after a vain effort to restore the line, yielded to necessity,
and, by the interposition of the reserve, covered the shattered line
and effected my retreat to camp without loss.

"I reached camp late in the afternoon. Not long afterward the enemy
opened fire at long range; night coming on, he ceased to fire. The
few shot and shells that fell in the camp so plainly demonstrated the
demoralization of the men, that I doubted, even if I had had rations,
which I had not, whether the camp could have been successfully
defended for twenty-four hours. There was not, and had not been for
some time in the camp, rations beyond the daily need. This state of
affairs was due to the exhaustion of the neighboring country, and the
impracticability of the roads.

"It became now my sole object to transfer the men with their arms,
the cavalry-horses, and teams to the left bank of the river. This was
successfully accomplished by dawn of the next day.

"I attributed the loss of the battle, in a great degree, to the
inferiority of our arms and the untimely fall of General Zollicoffer,
who was known and highly esteemed by the men, who were almost all
Tennesseeans. I think I have shown that the battle of Fishing Creek
was a necessity, and that I ought not to be held responsible for that
necessity. As to how I managed it, I have nothing further to say."

General Crittenden's gallantry had been too often and too
conspicuously shown in battle during the war with Mexico and on the
Indian frontier to admit of question, and the criticism has been
directed solely to the propriety of the attack at Fishing Creek. His
explanation is conclusive against any arraignment of him for the
presence of the troops on the right bank of the Cumberland, or for
his not immediately withdrawing them to the left bank when his
position was threatened. Under these circumstances, to attack one
portion of the enemy, when a junction with the other part could not
be effected, was to act in accordance with one of the best-settled
rules of war.

The unforeseen accident of renewed rain, with intense darkness,
delayed his march beyond reasonable expectation; and, whereas the
whole force should have reached the enemy's encampment before dawn,
the advance of two regiments only reached there after broad daylight.
To hesitate, would have been to give the enemy time for preparation,
and I think it was wisely decided to attack at once and rely upon the
rear coming up to support the advance; but the rear, encumbered with
their artillery, were so far behind that, though the advance were
successful in their first encounter, they did not receive the
hoped-for support until they had suffered severely, and then the
long-known and trusted commander of the forces there, the gallant and
most estimable Zollicoffer, fell; whence confusion resulted. General
Crittenden had been but a few days with the troops, a disadvantage
which will be readily appreciated. Had the whole force been in
position at early dawn, so as to have surprised the enemy, the plan
would have been executed, and victory would have been the probable
result; after which, Schöpf's force might have been readily disposed
of. But, had the attack done no more than to check the advance of
Thomas until the boats under construction could have been finished,
so as to enable Crittenden to save his artillery and equipments, it
would have justified the attempt. I therefore think the strategy not
only defensible but commendable, and the affair to be ranked with one
of the many brilliant conceptions of the war. The reader will not
fail to remark the evidence which General Crittenden's report affords
of the fallacy of representing the South as having been prepared by
supplying herself with the _materiél_ necessary for war. The heart of
even a noble enemy must be moved at the spectacle of citizens
defending their homes, with muskets of obsolete patterns and
shot-guns, against an invader having all the modern improvements in
arms. The two regiments constituting the advance were Battle's
Twentieth Tennessee and the Fifteenth Mississippi, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Walthall. With dauntless courage they
engaged the whole array of the enemy, and drove him from his first
position. When at length our forces fell back to their intrenched
camp, it was with sullen determination, and the pursuit was so
cautious that whenever it ventured too near it was driven back by our
rear guard. The valiant advance--the Fifteenth Mississippi and
Twentieth Tennessee--bore the burden of the day. The Mississippians
lost two hundred and twenty out of four hundred engaged, and the
Tennesseeans lost half as many, this being about three fourths the
casualties in our force.

That night General Crittenden crossed his troops over the river, with
the exception of those too badly wounded to travel. He was compelled
to leave his artillery and wagons, not having the means of
transporting them across, and moved with the remnant of his army
toward Nashville.

Both by General Crittenden and those who have criticised him for
making the attack at Fishing Creek, it is assumed that General
Zollicoffer made a mistake in crossing to the right bank of the
Cumberland, and that thence it resulted as a consequence that General
Johnston's right flank of his line through Bowling Green was
uncovered. I do not perceive the correctness of the conclusion, for
it must be admitted that General Zollicoffer's command was not
adequate to resist the combined forces of Thomas and Schopf, or that
the Cumberland River was a sufficient obstacle to prevent them from
crossing either above or below the position at Mill Springs. General
Zollicoffer may well have believed that he could better resist the
crossing of the Cumberland by removing to the right bank rather than
by remaining on the left. The only difference, it seems to me, would
have been that he could have retreated without the discomfiture of
his force or the loss of his artillery and equipments, but, in either
case, Johnston's right flank would have been alike uncovered.

To Zollicoffer and the other brave patriots who fell with him, let
praise, not censure, be given; and to Crittenden, let tardy justice
render the meed due to a gallant soldier of the highest professional
attainments, and whose fault, if fault it be, was a willingness to
dare much in his country's service.

When the State of Tennessee seceded, measures were immediately
adopted to occupy and fortify all the strong points on the
Mississippi, as Memphis, Randolph, Fort Pillow, and Island No. 10. As
it was our purpose not to enter the State of Kentucky and construct
defenses for the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers on her territory,
they were located within the borders of Tennessee, and as near to the
Kentucky line as suitable sites could be found. On these were
commenced the construction of Fort Donelson on the west side of the
Cumberland, and Fort Henry on the east side of the Tennessee, and
about twelve miles apart. The latter stood on the low lands adjacent
to the river about high-water mark, and, being just below a bend in
the river and at the head of a straight stretch of two miles, it
commanded the river for that distance. It was also commanded by high
ground on the opposite bank of the river, which it was intended
should be occupied by our troops in case of a land attack. The power
of ironclad gunboats against land defenses had not yet been shown,
and the low position of the fort brought the battery to the
water-level, and secured the advantage of ricochet firing, the most
effective against wooden ships.

Fort Donelson was placed on high ground; and, with the plunging fire
from its batteries, was thereby more effective against the ironclads
brought to attack it on the water side. But on the land side it was
not equally strong, and required extensive outworks and a
considerable force to resist an attack in that quarter.

In September, 1861, Lieutenant Dixon, of the Engineer Corps, was
instructed to make an examination of the works at the two forts. He
reported that Fort Henry was nearly completed. It was built, not at
the most favorable position, but it was a strong work, and, instead
of abandoning it and building at another place, he advised that it
should be completed, and other works constructed on the high lands
just above the fort on the opposite side of the river. Measures for
the accomplishment of this plan were adopted as rapidly as the means
at disposal would allow.

In relation to Donelson, it was his opinion that, although a better
position might have been chosen for this fortification on the
Cumberland, under the circumstances surrounding the command, it would
be better to retain and strengthen the position chosen.

General Polk, in a report to General Johnston just previous to the
battle of Shiloh, said: "The principal difficulty in the way of a
successful defense of the rivers, was the want of an adequate force--
a force of infantry and a force of experienced artillerists." This
was the unavoidable result of the circumstances heretofore related,
but tells only half of the story. To match the vessels of the enemy
(floating forts) we required vessels like theirs, or the means of
constructing them. We had neither.

The efforts which were put forth to resist the operations on the
Western rivers, for which the United States made such vast
preparations, were therefore necessarily very limited. There was a
lack of skilled labor, of ship-yards, and of materials for
constructing ironclads, which could not be readily obtained or
prepared in a beset and blockaded country. Proposals were considered
both for building gunboats and for converting the ordinary
side-wheel, high-pressure steamboats into gunboats. But the engineer
department, though anxious to avail itself of this means of defense,
decided that it was not feasible. There was not plate-iron with which
to armor a single vessel, and even railroad-iron could not be spared
from its uses for transportation. Unless a fleet could have been
built to match the enemy's, we had to rely on land-batteries,
torpedoes, and marching forces. It was thought best to concentrate
the resources on what seemed practicable. One ironclad gunboat,
however, the Eastport, was undertaken on the Tennessee River, but
under so many difficulties that, after the surrender of Fort Henry,
while still unfinished, it was destroyed, lest it should fall to the
enemy.[7]

The fleet of gunboats prepared by the United States for the
Mississippi and its tributaries consisted of twelve, seven of which
were iron-clad, and able to resist all except the heaviest solid
shot. The boats were built very wide in proportion to their length,
so that in the smooth river-waters they might have almost the
steadiness of land-batteries when discharging their heavy guns. This
flotilla carried one hundred and forty-three guns, some sixty-four
pounders, some thirty-two pounders, and some seven-inch rifled guns
carrying eighty-pound shells.

On February 2d General Grant started from Cairo with seventeen
thousand men on transports. Commodore Foote accompanied him with
seven gunboats. On the 4th the landing of the troops commenced three
miles or more below Fort Henry. General Grant took command on the
east bank with the main column, while General Charles F. Smith, with
two brigades of some five to six thousand men, landed on the left
bank, with orders to take the earthwork opposite Fort Henry, known as
Fort Hindman. On the 5th the landing was completed, and the attack
was made on the next day. The force of General Tilghman, who was in
command at Fort Henry, was about thirty-four hundred men. It is
evident that on the 5th he intended to dispute Grant's advance by
land; but on the 6th, before the attack by the gunboats, he changed
his purpose, abandoned all hope of a successful defense, and made
arrangements for the escape of his main body to Fort Donelson, while
the guns of Fort Henry should engage the gunboats. He ordered Colonel
Hindman to withdraw the command to Fort Donelson, while he himself
would obtain the necessary delay for the movement by use of the
battery, and standing a bombardment in Fort Henry. For this purpose
he retained his heavy artillery company--seventy-five men--to work
the guns, a number unequal to the strain and labor of the defense.[8]

Noon was the time fixed for the attack; but Grant, impeded by the
overflow of water, and unwilling to expose his men to the heavy guns
of the fort, held them back to await the result of the gunboat
attack. In the mean time the Confederate troops were in retreat. Four
ironclads, mounting forty-eight heavy guns, approached and took
position within six hundred yards of the fort, firing as they
advanced. About half a mile behind these came three unarmored
gunboats, mounting twenty-seven heavy guns, which took a more distant
position, and kept up a bombardment of shells that fell within the
works. Some four hundred of the formidable missiles of the ironclad
boats were also thrown into the fort. The officers and men inside
were not slow to respond, and as many as fifty-nine of their shots
were counted as striking the gunboats. On the ironclad Essex a
cannon-ball ranged her whole length; another shot, passing through
the boiler, caused an explosion that scalded her commander, Porter,
and many of the seamen and soldiers on board.

[Map of the Battlefield of Fort Donelson]

Five minutes after the fight began, the twenty-four pounder rifled
gun, one of the most formidable in the fort, burst, disabling every
man at the piece. Then a shell exploded at the muzzle of one of the
thirty-two pounders, ruining the gun, and killing or wounding all the
men who served it. About the same moment a premature discharge
occurred at one of the forty-two pounder guns, killing three men and
seriously injuring others. The ten-inch columbiad, the only gun able
to match the artillery of the assailants, was next rendered useless
by a priming-wire that was jammed and broken in the vent. An heroic
blacksmith labored for a long time to remove it, under the full fire
of the enemy, but in vain. The men became exhausted and lost
confidence; and Tilghman, seeing this, in person served a thirty-two
pounder for some fifteen minutes. Though but four of his guns were
disabled, six stood idle for want of artillerists, and but two were
replying to the enemy. After an engagement of two hours and ten
minutes, he ceased firing and lowered his flag. For this soldierly
devotion and self-sacrifice the gallant commander and his brave band
must be honored while patriotism has an advocate and self-sacrifice
for others has a votary. Our casualties were five killed and sixteen
wounded; those of the enemy were sixty-three of all kinds. Twelve
officers and sixty-three non-commissioned officers and privates were
surrendered with the fort. The Tennessee River was thus open, and a
base by short lines was established against Fort Donelson.

The next movement was a combined attack by land and water upon Fort
Donelson. This fort was situated on the left bank of the Cumberland,
as has been stated, near its great bend, and about forty miles from
the mouth of the river. It was about one mile north of the village of
Dover, where the commissary and quartermaster's supplies were in
depot. The fort consisted of two water-batteries on the hillside,
protected by a bastioned earthwork of irregular outline on the
summit, inclosing about one hundred acres. The water-batteries were
admirably placed to sweep the river approaches, with an armament of
thirteen guns; eight thirty-two pounders, three thirty-two pound
carronade, one ten-inch columbiad, and one rifled gun of thirty-two
pound caliber. The field-work, which was intended for infantry
supports, occupied a plateau about one hundred feet above the river,
commanding and protecting the water-batteries at close musket range.
These works afforded a fair defense against gunboats; but they were
not designed or adapted for resistance to a land attack or investment
by an enemy.

Generals Pillow and Floyd were ordered with their separate commands
to Fort Donelson. General Buckner also was sent with a division from
Bowling Green; so that the Confederate effective force at the fort
during the siege was between fourteen thousand five hundred and
fifteen thousand men.[9] The force of General Grant was not less than
thirty to thirty-five thousand men. On February 12th he commenced his
movement across from Fort Henry, and the investment of Donelson was
made without any serious opposition. On the 13th General Buckner
reports that "the fire of the enemy's artillery and riflemen was
incessant throughout the day; but was responded to by a well-directed
fire from the intrenchments, which inflicted upon the assailant a
considerable loss, and almost silenced his fire late in the
afternoon." The object of the enemy undoubtedly was to discover the
strength and position of our forces. The artillery-fire was continued
at intervals during the night. Nearly every Confederate regiment
reported a few casualties from the shot and shell which frequently
fell inside of the works. Meanwhile, a gunboat of thirteen guns
arrived in the morning, and, taking a position behind a headland,
fired one hundred and thirty-eight shots, when our one hundred and
twenty-eight pound shot crashed through one of her ports, injuring
her machinery and crippling her. The enemy's fire did no damage to
the fort itself, but a shot disabled a gun and killed Captain Dixon,
a valuable engineer, whose loss was greatly deplored.

The weather became cold during the night, and a driving snow-storm
prevailed, so that some of the soldiers were frozen, and the wounded
between the lines suffered extremely. The fleet of gunboats under
Commodore Foote arrived, bringing enforcements to the enemy. These
were landed during the night and the next day, which was occupied
with placing them in position. Nevertheless, though no assault was
made, a rambling and ineffective fire was kept up. About 3 P.M. the
commander of the naval force, expecting an easy victory, like that at
Fort Henry, brought his four ironclads, followed by two gunboats, up
to the attack. Each of the ironclads mounted thirteen guns and the
gunboats nine. Any one of them was more than a match for the guns of
the fort. Their guns were eight, nine, and ten inch, three in the bow
of each. Our columbiad and the rifled gun were the only two pieces
effective against the ironclads. The enemy moved directly toward the
water-batteries, firing with great weight of metal. It was the
intention of Commodore Foote to silence these batteries, pass by, and
take a position where he could enfilade the fort with broadsides. The
gunboats opened at a mile and a half distance, and advanced until
within three or four hundred yards. The shot and shell of the fleet
tore up the earthworks, but did no further injury. But the
Confederate guns, aimed from an elevation of not less than thirty
feet by cool and courageous hands, sent their shot with destructive
power, and overcame all the enemy's advantages in number and weight
of guns. The bolts of our two heavy guns went crashing through iron
and massive timbers with resistless force, scattering slaughter and
destruction through the fleet.[10] Hoppin, in his "Life of Commodore
Foote," says:

"The Louisville was disabled by a shot, which cut away her
rudder-chains, making her totally unmanageable, so that she drifted
with the current out of action. Very soon the St. Louis was disabled
by a shot through her pilot-house, rendering her steering impossible,
so that she also floated down the river. The other two armored
vessels were also terribly struck, and a rifled cannon on the
Carondelet burst, so that these two could no longer sustain the
action; and, after fighting for more than an hour, the little fleet
was forced to withdraw. The St. Louis was struck fifty-nine times,
the Louisville thirty-six times, the Carondelet twenty-six, the
Pittsburg twenty, the four vessels receiving no less than one hundred
and forty-one wounds. The fleet, gathering itself together, and
rendering mutual help to its disabled members, proceeded to Cairo to
repair damages."

The loss of the enemy was fifty-four killed and wounded. The report
of Major Gilmer, who laid out these works, says:

"Our batteries were uninjured, and not a man in them killed. The
repulse of the gunboats closed the operations of the day, except a
few scattering shots along the land defenses."

In consequence of reënforcements to the enemy, the plan of operations
for the next day was determined by the Confederate generals about
midnight. The whole of the left wing of the army except eight
regiments was to move out of the trenches, attack, turn, and drive
the enemy's right until the Wynn's Ferry road, which led to Charlotte
through a good country, was cleared, and an exit thus secured.

The troops, moving in the small hours of the night over the icy and
broken roads, which wound through the obstructed area of defense,
made slow progress, and delayed the projected operations. At 4 A.M.
on the 15th, Pillow's troops were ready, except one brigade, which
came late into action. By six o'clock, Baldwin's brigade was engaged
with the enemy, only two or three hundred yards from his lines, and
the bloody contest of the day had begun. At one o'clock the enemy's
right was doubled back. The Wynn's Ferry road was cleared, and it
only remained for the Confederates to do one of two things: The first
was, to seize the golden moment and, adhering to the original purpose
and plan of the sortie, move off rapidly by the route laid open by
such strenuous efforts and so much bloodshed; the other depended on
the inspiration of a master-mind, equal to the effort of grasping
every element of the combat, and which should complete the partial
victory by the utter rout and destruction of the enemy.

"While one or the other alternative seems to have been the only
possible safe solution," says the author of "The Life of Gen. Albert
Sidney Johnston," "the Confederate commander tried neither. A fatal
middle policy was suddenly but dubiously adopted, and not carried
out. The spirit of vacillation and divided counsels prevented that
unity of action which is essential to success. For seven hours the
Confederate battalions had been pushing over rough ground and through
thick timber, at each step meeting fresh troops massed, where the
discomfited regiments rallied. Hence the vigor of assault slackened,
though the wearied troops were still ready and competent to continue
their onward movement. Ten fresh regiments, over three thousand men,
had not fired a musket. But in the turmoil of battle no one knew the
relations of any command to the next, or indeed whether his neighbor
was friend or foe.

"General Buckner had halted, according to the preconcerted plan, to
allow the army to pass out by the opened road and to cover their
retreat. At this point of the fight, Pillow, finding himself at
Hindman's position, heard of (or saw) preparations by General C. F.
Smith for an assault on the Confederate right; but, whether he
understood this to be the purpose or construed the movement as the
. . . signs of a flight, was left uncertain by his language at the
time. He ordered the regiments which had been engaged to return to the
trenches, and instructed Buckner to hasten to defend the imperiled
point. Buckner, not recognizing him as a superior authorized to
change the plan of battle, or the propriety of such change, refused
to obey, and, after receiving reiterated orders, started to find
Floyd, who at that moment joined him. He urged upon Floyd the
necessity of carrying out the original plan of evacuation. Floyd
assented to this view, and told Buckner to stand fast until he could
see Pillow. He then rode back and saw Pillow, and, hearing his
arguments, yielded to them. Floyd simply says that he found the
movement so nearly executed that it was necessary to complete it.
Accordingly, Buckner was recalled. In the mean time, Pillow's right
brigades were retiring to their places in the trenches, under orders
from the commanders."

The conflict on the left soon ended. Three hundred prisoners, five
thousand stand of small-arms, six guns, and other spoils of victory,
had been won by our forces. But the enemy, cautiously advancing,
gradually recovered most of his lost ground. It was about 4 P.M. when
the assault on the right was made by General C. F. Smith. The enemy
succeeded in carrying the advanced work, which General Buckner
considered the key to his position. The loss of the enemy during the
siege was four hundred killed, seventeen hundred and eighty-five
wounded, and three hundred prisoners. Our losses were about three
hundred and twenty-five killed and one thousand and ninety-seven
wounded; including missing, it was estimated at fifteen hundred.

After nightfall a consultation of the commanding officers was held,
and, after a consideration of the question in all its aspects as to
what should be done, it was decided that a surrender was inevitable,
and, that to accomplish its objects, it must be made before the
assault, which was expected at daylight. General Buckner in his
report, says:

"I regarded the position of the army as desperate, and that the
attempt to extricate it by another battle, in the suffering and
exhausted condition of the troops, was almost hopeless. The troops
had been worn down with watching, with labor, with fighting. Many of
them were frosted by the cold, all of them were suffering and
exhausted by their incessant labors. There had been no regular issue
of rations for several days, and scarcely any means of cooking. The
ammunition was nearly expended. We were completely invested by a
force fully four times the strength of our own."

The decision to surrender having been made, it remained to determine
by whom it should be made. Generals Floyd and Pillow declared they
would not surrender and become prisoners; the duty was therefore
allotted to General Buckner. Floyd said, "General Buckner, if I place
you in command, will you allow me to draw out my brigade?" General
Buckner replied, "Yes, provided you do so before the enemy act upon
my communication." Floyd said, "General Pillow, I turn over the
command.". General Pillow, regarding this as a mere technical form by
which the command was to be conveyed to Buckner, then said, "I pass
it." Buckner assumed the command, sent for a bugler to sound the
parley, for pen, ink, and paper, and opened the negotiations for
surrender.

There were but two roads by which it was possible for the garrison to
retire. If they went by the upper road, they would certainly have to
cut through the main body of the enemy; if by the lower road, they
would have to wade through water three feet deep. This, the medical
director stated, would be death to more than one half the command, on
account of the severity of the weather and their physical prostration.

To cut through the enemy, if effected, would, it was supposed,
involve the loss of three fourths of the command, a sacrifice which,
it was conceded, would not be justifiable.

The enemy had, in the conflict of the preceding day, gained
possession of our rifle-pits on the right flank, and General Buckner,
an experienced soldier, held that the fort would immediately fall
when the enemy attacked in the morning. General Pillow dissented from
this conclusion, believing that the fort could be defended until
boats could be obtained to convey the garrison across the river, and
also advocated an attempt to cut through the investing lines of the
enemy. Being overruled on both points, he announced his determination
to leave the post by any means available, so as to escape a
surrender, and he advised Colonel N. B. Forrest, who was present, to
go out with his cavalry regiment, and any others he could take with
him through the overflow. General Floyd's brigade consisted of two
Virginia regiments and one Mississippi regiment; these, as before
mentioned, it was agreed that General Floyd might withdraw before the
surrender. Two of the field-officers, Colonel Russell and Major
Brown, of the Mississippi regiment, the twentieth, had been officers
of the First Mississippi Riflemen in the war with Mexico; and the
twentieth, their present regiment, was reputed to be well instructed
and under good discipline. This regiment was left to be surrendered
with the rest of the garrison, under peculiar circumstances, of which
Major Brown, then commanding, gives the following narrative:

"About twelve o'clock of the night previous to the surrender, I
received an order to report in person at headquarters. On arriving I
met Colonel N. B. Forrest, who remarked: 'I have been looking for
you; they are going to surrender this place, and I wanted you with
your command to go out with me, but they have other orders for you.'
On entering the room. Generals Floyd and Pillow also informed me of
the proposed proceedings. General Floyd ordered me to take possession
of the steamboat-landing with my command; that he had reserved the
right to remove his brigade; that, after having guarded the landing,
my command should be taken aboard the boat; the Virginia regiments,
first crossing to the other side of the river, could make their way
to Clarksville.

"I proceeded at once with my command to the landing; there was no
steamboat there, but I placed my regiment in a semicircular line so
as to cover the landing-place. About daylight the steamer came down,
landed, and was soon loaded with the two Virginia regiments, they
passing through my ranks. At the same time the General and staff, or
persons claiming to belong to the staff, passed aboard. The boat,
being a small one, was considerably crowded. While the staging of the
boat was being drawn aboard. General Floyd hallooed to me, from the
'hurricane-roof,' that he would cross the river with the troops
aboard and return for my regiment. But, about the time of the
departure of the boat, General S. B. Buckner came and asserted that
he had turned over the garrison and all the property at sunrise;
that, if the boat was not away immediately, he would be charged by
the enemy with violating the terms of the surrender. I mention this
incident as furnishing, I suppose, the reason why my regiment was
left on the bank of the river.

"Sorrowfully I gave the necessary orders to stack arms and
surrender. . . .

"Both morally and materially the disaster was a severe blow to us.
Many, wise after the event, have shown their skill in telling what
all knew afterward, but nobody told before."

[Footnote 7: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]

[Footnote 8: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]

[Footnote 9: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]

[Footnote 10: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]

CHAPTER XVII.

The loss of Forts Henry and Donelson opened the river routes to
Nashville and north Alabama, and thus turned the positions both at
Bowling Green and Columbus. These disasters subjected General
Johnston to very severe criticism, of which we shall take notice
further on in these pages. A conference was held on February 7th by
Generals Johnston, Beauregard (who had been previously ordered to
report to Johnston), and Hardee, as to the future plan of campaign.
It was determined, as Fort Henry had fallen and Donelson was
untenable, that preparations should at once be made for a removal of
the army to Nashville, in rear of the Cumberland River, a strong
point some miles below that city being fortified forthwith to defend
the river from the passage of gunboats and transports. From
Nashville, should any further retrograde movement become necessary,
it would be made to Stevenson, and thence according to circumstances.

As the possession of the Tennessee river by the enemy separated the
array at Bowling Green from the one at Columbus, Kentucky, they must
act independently of each other until they could be brought together:
the first one having for its object the defense of the State of
Tennessee along its line of operation; and the other, of that part of
the State lying between the Tennessee River and the Mississippi. But,
as the possession of the former river by the enemy rendered the lines
of communication of the army at Columbus liable to be cut at any time
by a movement from the Tennessee River as a base, and an overpowering
force of the enemy was rapidly concentrating from various points on
the Ohio, it was necessary, to prevent such a calamity, that the main
body of the army should fall back to Humboldt, and thence, if
necessary, to Grand Junction, so as to protect Memphis from either
point and still have a line of retreat to the latter place, or to
Grenada, and, if needful, to Jackson, Mississippi.

Captain Hollins's fleet of improvised gunboats and a sufficient
garrison was to be left at Columbus for the defense of the river at
that point, with transports near at hand for the removal of the
garrison when the position became no longer tenable.

Every preparation for the retreat was silently made. The defenses of
Bowling Green, originally slight, had been greatly enlarged by the
addition of a cordon of detached forts, mounted with heavy
field-guns; yet the garrison was only sufficiently strong to
withstand an assault, and it was never proposed to submit to a siege.
The ordnance and army supplies were quietly moved southward, and
measures were taken to remove from Nashville the immense stores
accumulated there. Only five hundred men were in the hospital before
the army commenced to retreat, but, when it reached Nashville, five
thousand four hundred out of fourteen thousand required the care of
the medical officers. On February 11th the troops began to move, and
at nightfall on the 16th General Johnston, who had established his
headquarters at Edgeville, on the northern bank of the Cumberland,
saw the last of his wearied columns defile across and safely
establish themselves beyond the river. The evacuation was
accomplished by a force so small as to make the feat remarkable, not
a pound of ammunition nor a gun being lost, and the provisions were
nearly all secured. The first intimation which the enemy had of the
intended evacuation, so far as has been ascertained, was when
Generals Hindman and Breckinridge, who were in advance near his camp,
were seen suddenly to retreat toward Bowling Green. The enemy
pursued, and succeeded in shelling the town, while Hindman was still
covering the rear. Not a man was lost.[11] At the same time
Crittenden's command was brought back within ten miles of Nashville,
and thence to Murfreesboro.

Scarcely had the retreat to Nashville been accomplished, when the
news of the fall of Donelson was received. The state of feeling which
it produced is described by Colonel Munford, an aide-de-camp of
General Johnston, in an address delivered in Memphis. "Dissatisfaction
was general. Its mutterings, already heard, began to break out in
denunciations. The demagogues took up the cry, and hounded on one
another and the people in hunting down a victim. The public press was
loaded with abuse. The Government was denounced for intrusting the
public safety to hands so feeble. The Lower House of Congress appointed
a select committee to inquire into the conduct of the war in the
Western Department. The Senators and Representatives from Tennessee,
with the exception of Judge Swann, waited upon the President." Their
spokesman, Senator G. A. Henry, stated that they came for and in behalf
of Tennessee to ask for the removal of General A. S. Johnston, and the
assignment of a competent officer to the defense of their homes and
people. It was further stated that they did not come to recommend any
one as the successor; that it was conceded that the President was better
able than they were to select a proper officer, and they only asked that
he would give them a general.

Painfully impressed by this exhibition of distrust toward an officer
whose place, if vacated, I was sure could not be filled by his equal,
realizing how necessary public confidence was to success, and wounded
by the injustice done to one I had known with close intimacy in peace
and in war, and believed to be one of the noblest men with whom I had
ever been associated, and one of the ablest soldiers I had ever seen
in the field, I paused under conflicting emotions, and after a time
merely answered, "If Sidney Johnston is not a general, the
Confederacy has none to give you."

On February 17th the rear guard from Bowling Green reached Nashville,
and on the 18th General Johnston wrote to the Secretary of War at
Richmond, saying:

"I have ordered the army to encamp to-night midway between Nashville
and Murfreesboro. My purpose is to place the force in such a position
that the enemy can not concentrate his superior strength against the
command, and to enable me to assemble as rapidly as possible such
other troops in addition as it may be in my power to collect. The
complete command which their gunboats and transports give them upon
the Tennessee and Cumberland renders it necessary for me to retire my
line between the rivers. I entertain the hope that this disposition
will enable me to hold the enemy for the present in check, and, when
my forces are sufficiently increased, to drive him back."

The fall of Fort Donelson made a speedy change of his plans
necessary. General Johnston was now compelled to withdraw his forces
from the north bank of the Cumberland, and to abandon the defense of
Nashville; in a word, to evacuate Nashville or sacrifice the army.
Not more than eleven thousand effective men were left to him with
which to oppose General Buell with not less than forty thousand men,
moving by Bowling Green, while another superior force, under General
Thomas, was on the eastern flank; and the armies from Fort Donelson,
with the gunboats and transport, had it in their power to ascend the
Cumberland, so as to interrupt all communication with the south.

On February 17th and 18th the main body of the command was moved from
Nashville to Murfreesboro, while a brigade remained under General
Floyd to bring on the stores and property upon the approach of the
enemy, all of which would have been saved except for the heavy and
general rains. By the junction of the command of General Crittenden
and the fugitives from Donelson, who were reorganized, the force of
General Johnston was increased to seventeen thousand men. The stores
not required for immediate use were ordered to Chattanooga, and those
which were necessary on the march were ordered to Huntsville and
Decatur. On February 28th the march was commenced for Decatur through
Shelbyville and Fayetteville. Halting at those points for the
purpose, he saved his provisions and stores, removed his depots and
machine-shops, obtained new arms, and finally, at the close of March,
joined Beauregard at Corinth with twenty thousand men, making their
aggregate force fifty thousand.

Considering the great advantage which the means of transportation
upon the Tennessee and Cumberland afforded the enemy, and the
peculiar topography of the State, General Johnston found that he
could not with the force under his command successfully defend the
whole line against the advance of the enemy. He was, therefore,
compelled to elect whether the enemy should be permitted to occupy
Middle Tennessee, or turn Columbus, take Memphis, and open the valley
of the Mississippi. Deciding that the defense of the valley was of
paramount importance, he therefore crossed the Tennessee and united
with Beauregard.

The evacuation of Nashville and the evident intention of General
Johnston to retreat still further, created a panic in the public mind
which spread over the whole State. Those who had refused to listen to
his warning voice, when it called them to arms, were loudest in their
passionate outcry at what they considered a base surrender of them to
the mercies of the invader. He was accused of imbecility, cowardice,
and treason. An appeal from every class was made to the President
demanding his removal. Congress took the matter in hand, and, though
the feeling there resulted merely in a committee of inquiry, it was
evident that the case was prejudged. The Confederate House of
Representatives created a special committee "to inquire into the
military disasters at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, and the surrender
of Nashville to the enemy," and as to the conduct, number, and
disposition of the troops under General Johnston. Great feeling was
shown in the debates.

Generals Floyd and Pillow, the senior officers at Fort Donelson,
after it had been decided to surrender, withdrew, to avoid being made
prisoners. The Secretary of War (Mr. Benjamin) wrote, March 11th, to
General Johnston as follows:

"The reports of Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Pillow are
unsatisfactory, and the President directs that both these generals be
relieved from command until further orders. In the mean time you will
request them to add to their reports such statements as they may deem
proper on the points submitted. You are further requested to make up
a report, from all the sources of information accessible to you, of
all the particulars connected with the unfortunate affair, which can
contribute to enlighten the judgment of the Executive and of
Congress, and to fix the blame, if blame there be, on those who were
delinquent in duty."

This state of affairs, under the command of General Johnston, was the
occasion of the following correspondence:

_Letter from President Davis to General A. S. Johnston._

"RICHMOND, _March 12, 1862._

"MY DEAR GENERAL: The departure of Captain Wickliffe offers an
opportunity, of which I avail myself, to write you an unofficial
letter. We have suffered great anxiety because of recent events in
Kentucky and Tennessee, and I have been not a little disturbed by the
repetitions of reflections upon yourself. I expected you to have made
a full report of events precedent and consequent to the fall of Fort
Donelson. In the mean time, I made for you such defense as friendship
prompted, and many years of acquaintance justified; but I needed
facts to rebut the wholesale assertions made against you to cover
others and to condemn my administration. The public, as you are
aware, have no correct measure for military operations, and the
journals are very reckless in their statements.

"Your force has been magnified, and the movements of an army have
been measured by the capacity for locomotion of an individual.

"The readiness of the people, among whom you are operating, to aid
you in every method, has been constantly asserted; the purpose of
your army at Bowling Green wholly misunderstood; and the absence of
an effective force at Nashville ignored. You have been held
responsible for the fall of Donelson and the capture of Nashville. It
is charged that no effort was made to save the stores at Nashville,
and that the panic of the people was caused by the army.

"Such representations, with the sad forebodings naturally belonging
to them, have been painful to me, and injurious to us both; but,
worse than this, they have undermined public confidence and damaged
our cause. A full development of the truth is necessary for future
success.

"I respect the generosity which has kept you silent, but would
impress upon you that the question is not personal but public in its
nature; that you and I might be content to suffer, but neither of us
can willingly permit detriment to the country. As soon as
circumstances will permit, it is my purpose to visit the field of
your present operations; not that I shall expect to give you any aid
in the discharge of your duties as a commander, but with the hope
that my position would enable me to effect something in bringing men
to your standard. With a sufficient force, the audacity which the
enemy exhibits would no doubt give you the opportunity to cut some of
his lines of communication, to break up his plan of campaign, and,
defeating some of his columns, to drive him from the soil as well of
Kentucky as of Tennessee.

"We are deficient in arms, wanting in discipline, and inferior in
numbers. Private arms must supply the first want; time and the
presence of an enemy, with diligence on the part of commanders, will
remove the second; and public confidence will overcome the third.
General Bragg brings you disciplined troops, and you will find in him
the highest administrative capacity. General E. K. Smith will soon
have in East Tennessee a sufficient force to create a strong
diversion in your favor; or, if his strength can not be made
available in that way, you will best know how to employ it otherwise.
I suppose the Tennessee or the Mississippi River will be the object
of the enemy's next campaign, and I trust you will be able to
concentrate a force which will defeat either attempt. The fleet which
you will soon have on the Mississippi River, if the enemy's gunboats
ascend the Tennessee, may enable you to strike an effective blow at
Cairo; but, to one so well informed and vigilant, I will not assume
to offer suggestions as to when and how the ends you seek may be
attained. With the confidence and regard of many years, I am very
truly your friend,

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

_Letter of General Johnston in answer to that above._

"DECATUR, ALABAMA, _March 18, 1862._

"MY DEAR GENERAL: I received the dispatches from Richmond, with your
private letter by Captain Wickliffe, three days since; but the
pressure of affairs and the necessity of getting my command across
the Tennessee prevented me from sending you an earlier reply.

"I anticipated all that you have told me as to the censure which the
fall of Fort Donelson drew upon me, and the attacks to which you
might be subjected; but it was impossible for me to gather the facts
for a detailed report, or to spare time which was required to
extricate the remainder of my troops and save the large accumulation
of stores and provisions after that disheartening disaster.

"I transmitted the reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow without
examining or analyzing the facts, and scarcely with time to read them.

"When about to assume command of this department, the Government
charged me with the duty of deciding the question of occupying
Bowling Green, Kentucky, which involved not only military but
political considerations. At the time of my arrival at Nashville, the
action of the Legislature of Kentucky had put an end to the latter by
sanctioning the formation of camps menacing Tennessee, by assuming
the cause of the Government at Washington, and by abandoning the
neutrality it professed; and, in consequence of their action, the
occupation of Bowling Green became necessary as an act of
self-defense, at least in the first step.

"About the middle of September General Buckner advanced with a small
force of about four thousand men, which was increased by the 15th of
October to twelve thousand; and, though accessions of force were
received, it continued at about the same strength until the end of
November--measles and other diseases keeping down the effective
force. The enemy's force then was reported to the War Department at
fifty thousand, and an advance was impossible. No enthusiasm, as we
imagined and hoped, but hostility, was manifested in Kentucky.
Believing it to be of the greatest moment to protract the campaign,
as the dearth of cotton might bring strength from abroad and
discourage the North, and to gain time to strengthen myself by new
troops from Tennessee and other States, I magnified my forces to the
enemy, but made known my true strength to the department and the
Governors of States. The aid given was small. At length, when General
Beauregard came out in February, he expressed his surprise at the
smallness of my force, and was impressed with the danger of my
position. I admitted what was so manifest, and laid before him my
views for the future, in which he entirely concurred, and sent me a
memorandum of our conference, a copy of which I send to you. I
determined to fight for Nashville at Donelson, and gave the best part
of my army to do it, retaining only fourteen thousand men to cover my
front, and giving sixteen thousand to defend Donelson. The force at
Donelson is stated in General Pillow's report at much less, and I do
not doubt the correctness of his statement, for the force at Bowling
Green, which I supposed to be fourteen thousand effective men (the
medical report showing only a little over five hundred sick in the
hospital), was diminished more than five thousand by those who were
unable to stand the fatigue of a march, and made my force on reaching
Nashville less than ten thousand men. I inclose medical director's
report. Had I wholly uncovered my front to defend Donelson, Buell
would have known it, and marched directly on Nashville. There were
only ten small steamers in the Cumberland, in imperfect condition,
only three of which were available at Nashville, while the
transportation of the enemy was great.

"The evacuation of Bowling Green was imperatively necessary, and was
ordered before, and executed while the battle was being fought at
Donelson. I had made every disposition for the defense of the fort my
means allowed, and the troops were among the best of my forces. The
generals, Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, were high in the opinion of
officers and men for skill and courage, and among the best officers
of my command. They were popular with the volunteers, and all had
seen much service. No reënforcements were asked. I awaited the event
opposite Nashville. The result of the conflict each day was
favorable. At midnight on the 15th I received news of a glorious
victory; at dawn, of a defeat.

"My column during the day and night was thrown over the river--a
battery had been established below the city to secure the passage.
Nashville was incapable of defense, from its position, and from the
forces advancing from Bowling Green and up the Cumberland. A rear
guard was left, under General Floyd, to secure the stores and
provisions, but did not completely effect the object. The people were
terrified, and some of the troops were disheartened. The
discouragement was spreading, and I ordered the command to
Murfreesboro, where I managed, by assembling Crittenden's division
and the fugitives from Donelson, to collect an army able to offer
battle. The weather was inclement, the floods excessive, and the
bridges were washed away, but most of the stores and provisions were
saved and conveyed to new depots. This having been accomplished,
though with serious loss, in conformity with my original design, I
marched southward and crossed the Tennessee at this point, so as to
coöperate or unite with General Beauregard for the defense of the
valley of the Mississippi. The passage is almost completed, and the
head of my column is already with General Bragg at Corinth. The
movement was deemed too hazardous by the most experienced members of
my staff; but the object warranted the risk. The difficulty of
effecting a junction is not wholly overcome, but it approaches
completion. Day after to-morrow (the 22d), unless the enemy
intercepts me, my force will be with Bragg, and my army nearly fifty
thousand strong. _This must be destroyed before the enemy can attain
his object._

"I have given this sketch, so that you may appreciate the
embarrassment which surrounded me in my attempts to avert or remedy
the disaster of Fort Donelson, before alluding to the conduct of the
generals.

"When the force was detached, I was in hopes that such disposition
would have been made as would have enabled the forces to defend the
fort or withdraw without sacrificing the army. On the 14th I ordered
General Floyd, by telegraph, 'If he lost the fort, to get his troops
to Nashville.' It is possible that might have been done, but justice
requires us to look at events as they appeared at the time, and not
alone by the light of subsequent information. All the facts in
relation to the surrender will be transmitted to the Secretary of War
as soon as they can be collected, in obedience to his order. It
appears from the information received that General Buckner, being the
junior officer, took the lead in advising the surrender, and that
General Floyd acquiesced, and that they all concurred in the belief
that their force could not maintain the position. All concurred that
it would involve a great sacrifice of life to extricate the command.
Subsequent events show that the investment was not so complete as
their information from their scouts led them to believe.

"The conference resulted in the surrender. The command was
irregularly transferred, and devolved on the junior general; but not
apparently to avoid any just responsibility or from any want of
personal or moral intrepidity. The blow was most disastrous, and
almost without a remedy. I therefore, in my first report, remained
silent. This silence you were kind enough to attribute to my
generosity. I will not lay claim to the motive to excuse my course. I
observed silence, as it seemed to be the best way to serve the cause
and the country. The facts were not fully known, discontent
prevailed, and criticism and condemnation were more likely to augment
than to cure the evil. I refrained, well knowing that heavy censures
would fall upon me, but convinced that it was better to endure them
for the present, and defer for a more propitious time an
investigation of the conduct of the generals; for, in the mean time,
their services were required and their influence was useful. For
these reasons Generals Floyd and Pillow were assigned to duty, for I
still felt confidence in their gallantry, their energy, and their
devotion to the Confederacy.

"I have thus recurred to the motives by which I have been governed,
from a deep personal sense of the friendship and confidence you have
always shown me, and from the conviction that they have not been
withdrawn from me in adversity.

"All the reports requisite for a full official investigation have
been ordered. Generals Floyd and Pillow have been suspended from
command.

"You mention that you intend to visit the field of operations here. I
hope soon to see you, for your presence would encourage my troops,
inspire the people, and augment the army. To me personally it would
give the greatest gratification. Merely a soldier myself, and having
no acquaintance with the statesmen or leaders of the South, I can not
touch springs familiar to you. Were you to assume command, it would
afford me the most unfeigned pleasure, and every energy would be
exerted to help you to victory and the country to independence. Were
you to decline, still your presence alone would be of inestimable
advantage.

"The enemy are now at Nashville, about fifty thousand strong,
advancing in this direction by Columbia. He has also forces,
according to the report of General Bragg, landing at Pittsburg, from
twenty-five to fifty thousand, and moving in the direction of Purdy.

"This army corps, moving to join Bragg, is about twenty thousand
strong. Two brigades, Hindman's and Woods's, are, I suppose, at
Corinth. One regiment of Hardee's division (Lieutenant-Colonel Patton
commanding) is moving by cars to-day (March 20th), and Statham's
brigade (Crittenden's division). The brigade will halt at Iuka, the
regiment at Burnsville; Cleburne's brigade, Hardee's division, except
the regiment, at Burnsville; and Carroll's brigade, Crittenden's
division, and Helm's cavalry, at Tuscumbia; Bowen's brigade at
Courtland; Breckinridge's brigade here; the regiments of cavalry of
Adams and Wharton on the opposite bank of the river; Scott's
Louisiana regiment at Pulaski, sending forward supplies; Morgan's
cavalry at Shelbyville, ordered on.

"To-morrow Breckinridge's brigade will go to Corinth, then Bowen's.
When these pass Tuscumbia and Iuka, transportation will be ready
there for the other troops to follow immediately from those points,
and, if necessary, from Burnsville. The cavalry will cross and move
forward as soon as their trains can be passed over the
railroad-bridge. I have troubled you with these details, as I can not
properly communicate them by telegram.

"The test of merit in my profession, with the people, is success. It
is a hard rule, but I think it right. If I join this corps to the
forces of Beauregard (I confess a hazardous experiment), then those
who are now declaiming against me will be without an argument.

"Your friend, A. S. JOHNSTON."

To this letter the following reply was made:

"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, _March 26, 1862._

"MY DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 18th instant was this day delivered by
your aide, Mr. Jack. I have read it with much satisfaction. So far as
the past is concerned, it but confirms the conclusions at which I had
already arrived. My confidence in you has never wavered, and I hope
the public will soon give me credit for judgment, rather than
continue to arraign me for obstinacy.

"You have done wonderfully well, and now I breathe easier in the
assurance that you will be able to make a junction of your two
armies. If you can meet the division of the enemy moving from the
Tennessee before it can make a junction with that advancing from
Nashville, the future will be brighter. If this can not be done, our
only hope is that the people of the Southwest will rally _en masse_
with their private arms, and thus enable you to oppose the vast army
which will threaten the destruction of our country.

"I have hoped to be able to leave here for a short time, and would be
much gratified to confer with you, and share your responsibilities. I
might aid you in obtaining troops; no one could hope to do more
unless he underrated your military capacity. I write in great haste,
and feel that it would be worse than useless to point out to you how
much depends on you.

"May God bless you, is the sincere prayer of your friend,

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

Let us now review the events which had brought such unmeasured
censure on General Johnston for some months preceding this
correspondence. We have seen him, with a force numerically much
inferior to that of the enemy in his front, holding the position of
Bowling Green, and, by active operations of detached commands,
keeping up to foe and friend the impression that he had a large army
in position. With self-sacrificing fortitude he remained silent under
reproaches for not advancing to attack the enemy. When Forts Donelson
and Henry were more immediately threatened, he gave reënforcements
from his small command until his own line became more like one of
skirmishers than an intrenched line of battle; and when those forts
were surrendered, and his position became both untenable and useless,
he withdrew in such order and with such skill that his retreat was
unmolested by the enemy. Though he continued to be the subject of
unreasoning vituperation, he sought not to justify himself by blaming
others, or telling what he would have done if his Government had sent
him the arms and munitions he asked for, but which his Government he
learned did not possess.

There are yet those who, self-assured, demand why Johnston did not go
himself to Donelson and Henry, and why his forces were not there
concentrated. A slight inspection of the map would suffice to show
that, Bowling Green abandoned, the direct road to Nashville would be
open to the advance of Buell's army. Then the forts, if held, would
cease to answer their purpose, and, being isolated, and also between
hostile armies above and below, would be not only valueless but only
temporarily tenable; and of his critics it may be asked, Who else
than himself could, with the small force retained at Bowling Green,
have held the enemy in check so long, and at last have retired
without disaster?

To collect the widely separated troops of his command so as to form
an army which might offer battle to the invading foe was a problem
which must have been impossible, if the organized armies by which he
was threatened had been guided by a capacity equal to his own. It was
done, and, with the genius of a great soldier, he seized the
opportunity, by the rapid combination of new levies and of forces
never before united, to attack the armies of the enemy in detail
while they were endeavoring to form a junction.

The Southwestern States presented a field peculiarly favorable for
the application of a new power in war. Deep rivers, with banks
frequently but little elevated above the water, traverse the country.
On these rivers iron-plated steamboats with heavy guns may move with
a rapidity incomparably greater than that of marching armies. It is
as if forts, with armaments, garrison, and stores, were endowed with
locomotion more swift and enduring than that of cavalry.

The Ohio, Mississippi, Cumberland, and Tennessee Rivers all were in
the field of General Johnston's operations, and at the stage of water
most suited to naval purposes. Apart from the heavy guns which could
thus be brought to bear at interior places upon an army having only
field-artillery, the advantage of rapid transportation for troops and
supplies can hardly be over-estimated. It has been seen how these
advantages were utilized by the enemy at Henry and Donelson, and not
less did they avail him at Shiloh.

As has been elsewhere explained, the condition of the South did not
enable the Confederacy to meet the enemy on the water except at great
odds.

If it be asked, "Why did not General Johnston wait until the enemy
marched from the river instead of attacking him at Shiloh or
Pittsburg Landing?" the answer is, "That would have been to delay
until the junction of the enemy's armies had been effected." To fight
them in detail, it was necessary to attack the first where it lay,
backed by its gunboats. That sound judgment and soldierly daring went
hand in hand in this attack the sequel demonstrated.

Meantime some active operations had taken place in that part of
General Johnston's command west of the Mississippi River. Detached
conflicts with the enemy had been fought by the small forces under
Generals Price and McCulloch, but no definite result had followed.
General Earl Van Dorn had been subsequently assigned to the command,
and assumed it on January 29, 1862. General Curtis was then in
command of the enemy's forces, numbering about twelve thousand men.
He had harassed General Price on his retreat to Fayetteville,
Arkansas, and then had fallen back to Sugar Creek, where he proposed
to make a stand. Van Dorn, immediately on his arrival at the
Confederate camps on Boston Mountain, prepared to attack Curtis. His
first movement, however, was to intercept General Sigel, then at
Bentonville with sixteen thousand men. The want of coöperation in Van
Dorn's forces enabled Sigel to escape. Curtis thus concentrated his
forces at Sugar Creek, and, instead of taking him in detail, Van Dorn
was obliged to meet his entire army. By a circuitous route, he led
Price's army against the enemy's rear, moving McCulloch against the
right flank; but his progress was so slow and embarrassed, that the
enemy heard of it in season to make his dispositions accordingly.

The battle of Elkhorn, or Pea Ridge, was fought on the morning of
March 5th. Van Dorn reported his force to be fourteen thousand men,
and Curtis puts his force at about ten thousand. Van Dorn, with
Price's division, encountered Carr's division which had already
advanced, but was driven back steadily and with heavy loss.
Meanwhile, McCulloch's command met a division under Osterhaus, and,
after a sharp, quick struggle, swept it away. Pushing forward through
the shrub-oak, his wide-extended line met Sigel's, Asboth's, and
Davis's divisions. Here on the ragged spurs of the hills ensued a
fearful combat. In the crisis of the struggle, McCulloch, dashing
forward to reconnoiter, fell a victim to a sharpshooter. Almost at
the same moment, McIntosh, his second in command, fell while charging
a battery of the enemy with a regiment of Texas cavalry. Without
direction or leader, the shattered lines of our forces left the field
to rally, after a wide circuit, on Price's division. When Van Dorn
heard of this misfortune, he urged his attack, pressing back the
enemy until night closed the bloody combat. Van Dorn's headquarters
were then at Elkhorn Tavern, where the enemy's headquarters had been
in the morning. Each army was now on its opponent's line of
communication. Van Dorn found his troops much disorganized and
exhausted, short of ammunition, and without food, and made his
arrangements to retreat. The wagon-trains and all the men not
effective for the coming battle were started by a circuitous route
for Van Buren. The effectives remained to cover the retreat. The
battle was renewed at 7 A.M., and raged until 10 A.M. The gallant
General Henry Little had the covering line with his own and Rives's
Missouri brigades; this stout rear-guard holding off the whole army
of the enemy. The trains, artillery, and most of the army were by
that time well on the road. The order was given to the Missourians to
withdraw, and "the gallant fellows faced about with cheers" retired
steadily, and encamped ten miles from the battle-field at three
o'clock. There was no real pursuit. The attack had failed. Van Dorn
put his loss at six hundred killed and wounded, and two hundred
prisoners. Curtis reported his loss at two hundred and three killed,
nine hundred and seventy-two wounded, and a hundred and seventy-six
missing--total, thirteen hundred and fifty-one.[12]

The object of Van Dorn had been to effect a diversion in behalf of
General Johnston. This failed; but the enemy was badly crippled, and
soon fell back to Missouri, of which he still retained possession.

General Van Dorn was now ordered to join General Johnston by the
quickest route. Yet only one of his regiments arrived in time to be
present at the battle of Shiloh. As has been already stated, General
Beauregard left Nashville on February 14th to take charge in West
Tennessee, and made his headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee, on
February 17th. He was somewhat prostrated by sickness, which
partially disabled him through the campaign. The two grand divisions
of his army were commanded by the able Generals Bragg and Polk. On
March 26th he permanently removed to Corinth. Under his orders the
evacuation of Columbus by General Polk, and the establishment of a
new line resting on New Madrid, Island No. 10, and Humboldt, was
completed. On March 2d Brigadier-General J. P. McCown, an "old army"
officer, was assigned to the command of Island No. 10, forty miles
below Columbus, whither he removed his division. A. P. Stewart's
brigade was sent to New Madrid. At these points some seven thousand
troops were assembled, and the remainder marched under General
Cheatham to Union City. General Polk says:

"In five days we moved the accumulations of six months, taking with
us all our commissary and quartermaster's stores--an amount
sufficient to supply my whole command for eight months--all our
powder and other ammunition and ordnance stores, excepting a few
shot, and gun-carriages, and every heavy gun in the fort, except two
thirty-two pounders and three carronades in a remote outwork, which
had been rendered useless."

The movement of the enemy up the Tennessee River commenced on March
10th. General C. F. Smith led the advance, with a new division under
General Sherman. On the 13th Smith assembled four divisions at
Savannah, on the west bank of the Tennessee, at the Great Bend. The
ultimate design was to mass the forces of Grant and Buell against our
army at Corinth. Buell was still in the occupation of Nashville. On
the 16th Sherman disembarked at Pittsburg Landing, and made a
reconnaissance to Monterey, nearly half-way to Corinth. On the next
day General Grant took command. Two more divisions were added, and he
assembled his army near Pittsburg Landing, which was the most
advantageous base for a movement against Corinth. Here it lay
inactive until the battle of Shiloh.

The Tennessee flows northwest for some distance, until, a little west
of Hamburg, it takes its final bend to the north. Here two small
streams, Owl and Lick Creeks, flowing nearly parallel, somewhat north
of east, from three to five miles apart, empty into the Tennessee.
Owl Creek forms the northern limit of the ridge, which Lick Creek
bounds on the south. These streams, rising some ten or twelve miles
back, toward Corinth, were bordered near their mouths by swamps
filled with backwater from the Tennessee, and impassable except where
the roads crossed them.

[Map used by the Confederate generals at Shiloh]

The inclosed space is a rolling table-land, about one hundred feet
above the river-level, with its water-shed lying near Lick Creek, and
either slope broken by deep and frequent ravines draining into two
streams. The acclivities were covered with forests, and often thick
set with undergrowth. Pittsburg Landing, containing three or four
log-cabins, was situated about midway between the mouths of the
creeks, in the narrow morass that borders the Tennessee. It was three
or four miles below Hamburg, six or seven above Savannah, the depot
of the enemy on the right bank, and twenty-two miles from Corinth.
Thus the position of the enemy was naturally strong. With few and
difficult approaches, guarded on either flank by impassable streams
and morasses, protected by a succession of ravines and acclivities,
commanded by eminences to the rear, it seemed safe against attack,
and easy to defend. No defensive works were constructed.

[Footnote 11: Colonel R. W. Woolley, In "New Orleans Picayune," March,
1863.]

[Footnote 12: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]

CHAPTER XVIII.

General Buell, who was to make a junction with General Grant, deemed
it best that his army should march through by land, as it would
facilitate the occupation of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
through north Alabama, where General Mitchell had been assigned.
Accordingly, Buell commenced his march from Nashville on March 15th,
with a rapid movement of cavalry, followed by a division of infantry,
to seize the bridges. The bridge over Duck River being destroyed, it
was the 31st before his army crossed. His advance arrived at Savannah
on Saturday, April 5th, and our attack on Grant at Pittsburg Landing
was made on the next day, the 6th of April. The advance of General
Buell anticipated his orders by two days, and likewise the
calculations of our commanders.

It had been the object of General Johnston, since falling back from
Nashville, to concentrate his army at Corinth, and fight the enemy in
detail--Grant first, and Buell afterward. The army of General Polk
had been drawn back from Columbus. The War Department ordered General
Bragg from Pensacola, with his well-disciplined army, to the aid of
Johnston. A brigade was sent by General Lovell from Louisiana, and
Chalmers and Walker were already on the line of the Memphis and
Charleston road with considerable commands. These forces collected at
Corinth, and to them were added such new levies as the Governors had
in rendezvous, and a few regiments raised in response to General
Beauregard's call. General Bragg, in a sketch of the battle of
Shiloh, thus speaks of General Johnston's army:

[Picture of General Braxton Bragg]

"In a period of four weeks, fragments of commands from Bowling Green,
Kentucky, under Hardee; Columbus, Kentucky, under Polk; and
Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans, under Bragg, with such new levies
as could be hastily raised, all badly armed and equipped, were united
at and near Corinth, and, for the first time, organised as an army.
It was a heterogeneous mass, in which there was more enthusiasm than
discipline, more capacity than knowledge, and more valor than
instruction. Rifles, rifled and smooth-bore muskets--some of them
originally percussion, others hastily altered from flint-locks by
Yankee contractors, many with the old flint and steel--and shot-guns
of all sizes and patterns, held place in the same regiments. The task
of organizing such a command in four weeks, and supplying it,
especially with ammunition, suitable for action, was simply
appalling. It was undertaken, however, with a cool, quiet
self-control, calling to his aid the best knowledge and talent at his
command, which not only inspired confidence, but soon yielded the
natural fruits of system, order, and discipline."

This force, about forty thousand of all arms, was divided into four
corps, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and
Hardee, and Brigadier-General Breckinridge. General Beauregard was
second in command under General Johnston. General Beauregard says, "A
want of general officers needful for the proper organization of
divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together, and
other difficulties in the way of effective organization, delayed the
movements until the night of April 2d."

About one o'clock on the morning of April 3d preliminary orders were
issued to hold the troops in readiness to move at a moment's notice,
with five days' provisions and a hundred rounds of ammunition. The
orders for march and battle were issued in the afternoon. At that
time General Hardee led the advance, the Third Corps, from Corinth,
by the northernmost route, known as the Ridge road. Bivouacking that
night on the way, he arrived next morning at Mickey's, a house about
eighteen miles from Corinth and four or five miles from Pittsburg.
The Second Corps, under Bragg, marched by the direct road to
Pittsburg through Monterey, which it reached about 11 A.M. on the
4th, and bivouacked that night near Mickey's in the rear of Hardee's
corps. The First Corps, under General Polk, consisted of two
divisions, under Cheatham and Clark. The latter was ordered to follow
Hardee on the Ridge road at an interval of half an hour, and to halt
near Mickey's, so as to allow Bragg's corps to fall in behind Hardee,
at a thousand yards' interval, and form a second line of battle.
Polk's corps was to form the left wing of the third line of battle;
and Breckinridge's reserve the right wing. The other division of
Polk, under Cheatham, was on outpost duty, at and near Bethel, on the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad, about as far from Mickey's as Corinth was.
He was ordered to assemble his forces at Purdy, and pursue the route
to Monterey. He effected his junction on the afternoon of the 5th,
and took position on the left wing of Polk's corps. Breckinridge's
reserve corps moved from Burnsville early on April 4th, by way of
Farmington toward Monterey, distant fourteen miles. It did not effect
its junction with the other corps until late on the afternoon of
Saturday the 5th, being delayed by the rains on Friday and Saturday.
At daylight on the 5th Hardee moved, and by seven o'clock was
sufficiently out of the way to allow Bragg to advance. Before ten
o'clock Hardee's corps had reached the outposts and developed the
lines of the enemy. The corps was immediately deployed into line of
battle about a mile and a half west of Shiloh church, where Lick
Creek and Owl Creek approach most nearly, and are about three miles
apart. Gladden's brigade, of Bragg's corps, was on the right of
Hardee's corps, which was not sufficiently strong to occupy the whole
front. This line extended from creek to creek. Before seven o'clock
Bragg's column was in motion, and the right wing of his line of
battle formed about eight hundred yards in the rear of Hardee's line.
But the division on the left was nowhere to be seen. Even as late as
half-past twelve the missing column had not appeared, nor had any
report from it been received. General Johnston, "looking first at his
watch, then glancing at the position of the sun, exclaimed: 'This is
not _war_! Let us have our horses!' He rode to the rear until he
found the missing column standing stock-still, with its head some
distance out in an open field. General Polk's reserves were ahead of
it, with their wagons and artillery blocking up the road. General
Johnston ordered them to clear the road, and the missing column to
move forward. There was much chaffering among those implicated as to
who should bear the blame. . . . It was about four o'clock when the
lines were completely formed--too late, of course, to begin the
battle then." [13]

The road was not clear until 2 P.M. General Polk got Clark's division
of his corps into line of battle by four o'clock; and Cheatham, who
had come up on the left, promptly followed. Breckinridge's line was
then formed on Polk's right. Thus was the army arrayed in three lines
of battle late Saturday afternoon.[14]

The purpose of General Johnston to attack promptly is evinced in the
correspondence already introduced; it is further shown in his
telegram of April 3d, as follows:

"To the PRESIDENT, _Richmond._

"General Buell in motion, thirty thousand strong, rapidly from
Colombia by Clifton to Savannah. Mitchell behind him, with ten
thousand. Confederate forces forty thousand; ordered forward to offer
battle near Pittsburg.

"Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from
Burnsville, converging to-morrow, near Monterey, on Pittsburg.

"Beauregard second in command, Polk the left, Bragg the center,
Hardee the right wing, Breckinridge the reserve.

"Hope engagement before Buell can form junction." [15]

On the 6th of April I sent a telegram as follows:

"GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON: Your dispatch of yesterday received. I
hope you will be able to close with the enemy before his two
columns unite."

[Map: Battle of Shiloh Part II]

Though much inquiry has been made, I have not been able to recover
that dispatch "of yesterday" the 4th. It was anxiously sought
because, in cipher (private between us), he explained distinctly his
plan of battle, as the previous one had his proposed order of march.
It was in every respect important to attack at the earliest moment
after the advance of Buell's command became known. Every delay diminished
the chances of surprising the enemy, and increased the probability of his
being reënforced. Had the attack been made a day sooner, not only would
Buell's army have been absent, but there would have been no prospect
of their timely arrival; and who can measure the moral effect this
would have produced? It would be useless to review the controversies
as to who was responsible for the confusion and consequent detentions
on the march, the evil of which might have been greater if the
vigilance of the enemy had been equal to his self-sufficiency.

War has been called a fickle goddess, and its results attributed to
chance. The great soldier of our century said, "Fortune favors the
heavy battalions"; but is it not rather exact calculation than chance
which controls the events of war, and the just determination of the
relation of time, space, and motion in the application of force,
which decides the effective weight of battalions? Had the battle of
Shiloh opened a day sooner, it would have been better; had it been
postponed a day, to attack then would have been impracticable. Had
the several columns moved on different roads, converging toward the
field of battle, the movements of some could not have been obstructed
by others, so that the troops would have been in position and the
battle have been commenced on Saturday morning. The programme and
purpose of General Johnston appear from his dispatch of the 3d, and
from the disappointment evinced by him at the failure of a portion of
the command to be present on the field on the morning of the 5th
(Saturday), as he expected.

General Bragg, in a monograph on the battle of Shiloh, says:

"During the afternoon of the 5th, as the last of our troops were
taking position, a casual and partly accidental meeting of general
officers occurred just in rear of our second line, near the bivouac
of General Bragg. The Commander-in-Chief, General Beauregard, General
Polk, General Bragg, and General Breckinridge, are remembered as
present. In a discussion of the causes of the delay and its
incidents, it was mentioned that some of the troops, now in their
third day only, were entirely out of food, though having marched with
five days' rations. General Beauregard, confident our movement had
been discovered by the enemy, urged its abandonment, a return to our
camps for supplies, and a general change of programme. In this
opinion no other seemed fully to concur; and when it was suggested
that 'the enemy's supplies were much nearer, and could be had for the
taking,' General Johnston quietly remarked, 'Gentlemen, we shall
attack at daylight to-morrow.' The meeting then dispersed upon an
invitation of the commanding general to meet at his tent that
evening. At that meeting a further discussion elicited the same
views, and the same firm, decided determination. The next morning,
about dawn of day, the 6th, as the troops were being put in motion,
several generals again met at the camp-fire of the general-in-chief.
The discussion was renewed. General Beauregard again expressing his
dissent; when, rapid firing in the front indicating that the attack
had commenced, General Johnston closed the discussion by remarking:
'The battle has opened, gentlemen; it is too late to change our
dispositions.' He prepared to move to the front, and his subordinates
promptly joined their respective commands, inspired by his coolness,
confidence, and determination. Few men have equaled him in the
possession and display, at the proper time, of these great qualities
of the soldier."

The results of the first day of the famous battle thus began are very
summarily presented in the following brief report of General
Beauregard:

"At 5 A.M., on the 6th instant, a reconnoitering party of the enemy
having become engaged with our advanced pickets, the commander of the
forces gave orders to begin the movement and attack as determined
upon, except that Trabue's brigade of Breckinridge's division was
detached and advanced to support the left of Bragg's corps and line
of battle then menaced by the enemy; and the other two brigades were
directed to advance by the road to Hamburg to support Bragg's right;
and at the same time Maney's regiment of Polk's corps was advanced by
the same road to reënforce the regiment, of cavalry and battery of
four pieces, already thrown forward to watch and guard Grier's,
Tanner's, and Borland's Fords of Lick Creek.

"Thirty minutes after 5 A.M., our lines and columns were in motion,
all animated evidently by a promising spirit. The front line was
engaged at once, but advanced steadily, followed in due order, with
equal resolution and steadiness, by the other lines, which were
brought successively into action with rare skill, judgment, and
gallantry by the several corps commanders, as the enemy made a stand
with his masses rallied for the struggle for his encampments. Like an
Alpine avalanche our troops moved forward, despite the determined
resistance of the enemy, until after 6 P.M., when we were in
possession of all his encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but
one; nearly all of his field-artillery, about thirty flags, colors,
and standards, over three thousand prisoners, including a division
commander (General Prentiss), and several brigade commanders,
thousands of small-arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage,
and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of transportation,
all the substantial fruits of a complete victory--such, indeed, as
rarely have followed the most successful battles, for never was an
army so well provided as that of our enemy.

"The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the
immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the shelter of the heavy guns
of his iron-clad gunboats, and we remained undisputed masters of his
well-selected, admirably provided cantonments, after our twelve hours
of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them
and the contiguous covert, but only by the sustained onset of all the
men we could bring into action."

There are two words in this report which, if they could have been
truthfully omitted, it would have been worth to us the surrender of
all "the substantial fruits of a complete victory." It says: "Our
troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy,
until after 6 P.M., when we were in possession of all his encampments
between Owl and lick Creeks _but one_." It was that "one" encampment
that furnished a foothold for all the subsequent reënforcements sent
by Buell, and gave occasion for the final withdrawal of our forces;
whereas, if that had been captured, and the "waters of the Tennessee"
reached, as General Johnston designed, it was not too much to expect
that Grant's army would have surrendered; that Buell's forces would
not have crossed the Tennessee; but with a skillful commander, like
Johnston, to lead our troops, the enemy would have sought safety on
the north bank of the Ohio; that Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri
would have been recovered, the Northwest disaffected, and our armies
filled with the men of the Southwest, and perhaps of the Northwest
also.

Let us turn to reports and authorities. The author of "The Life of
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston" says:

"Of the two armies, one was now an advancing, triumphant host, with
arm uplifted to give the mortal blow; the other, a broken, mangled,
demoralized mob, paralyzed and waiting for the stroke. While the
other Confederate brigades, which had shared most actively in
Prentiss's capture, were sending back the prisoners and forming again
for a final attack, two brigades, under Chalmers and Jackson, on the
extreme right, had cleared away all in front of them, and, moving
down the river-bank, now came upon the last point where even a show
of resistance was made. Being two very bold and active brigadiers,
they at once closed with the enemy in their front, crossing a deep
ravine and difficult ground to get at him. Here Colonel Webster, of
Grant's staff, had gathered all the guns he could find from
batteries, whether abandoned or still coherent, and with
stout-hearted men, picked up at random, had prepared a resistance.
Some infantry, similarly constituted, had been got together; and
Ammen's brigade, the van of Nelson's division of Buell's corps, had
landed, and was pushing its way through the throng of pallid
fugitives at the landing to take up the battle where it had fallen
from the hands of Grant and Sherman. It got into position in time to
do its part in checking the unsupported assaults of Chalmers and
Jackson."

General Chalmers, describing this final attack in his report, says:

"It was then about four o'clock in the evening, and, after
distributing ammunition, we received orders from General Bragg to
drive the enemy into the river. My brigade, together with that of
Brigadier-General Jackson, filed to the right and formed facing the
river, and endeavored to press forward to the water's edge; but in
attempting to mount the last ridge we were met by a fire from a whole
line of batteries, protected by infantry and assisted by shells from
the gunboats."

In a subsequent memorandum General Chalmers writes:

"One more resolute movement forward would have captured Grant and
his whole army, and fulfilled to the letter the battle-plan of the
great Confederate general, who died in the belief that victory was
ours. . . ."--("The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," p. 637.)

Brigadier-General Jackson, in his report, says:

"My brigade was ordered to change direction again, face toward
Pittsburg, where the enemy appeared to have made his last stand, and
to advance upon him, General Chalmers's brigade being again on my
right, and extending to the swamp of the Tennessee River. Without
ammunition, and with only their bayonets to rely on, steadily my men
advanced under a heavy fire from light batteries, siege-pieces, and
gunboats. Passing through the ravine, they arrived near the crest of
the opposite hill, upon which the enemy's batteries were, but could
not be urged farther without support. Sheltering themselves against
the precipitous sides of the ravine, they remained under this fire
for some time. Finding an advance without support impracticable,
remaining there under fire useless, and believing that any further
forward movement should have been made simultaneously along our whole
line, I proceeded to obtain orders from General Withers, but, after
seeing him, was ordered by a staff-officer to retire. This order was
communicated to me as coming from General Beauregard."

General Hardee, who commanded the first line, says in his report:

"Upon the death of General Johnston, the command having devolved upon
General Beauregard, the conflict was continued until near sunset, and
the advance divisions were within a few hundred yards of Pittsburg,
where the enemy were huddled in confusion, when the order to withdraw
was received. The troops were ordered to bivouac on the field of
battle."

General Polk's report says:

"We had one hour or more of daylight still left, were within one
hundred and fifty to four hundred yards of the enemy's position, and
nothing seemed wanting to complete the most brilliant victory of the
war but to press forward and make a vigorous assault on the
demoralized remnant of his forces."

General Gilmer, the chief engineer of the Confederate States Army, in
a letter to Colonel William Preston Johnston, dated September 17,
1872, writes as follows:

"It is my well-considered opinion that if your father had survived
the day he would have crushed and captured General Grant's army
before the setting of the sun on the 6th. In fact, at the time your
father received the mortal wound, advancing with General
Breckinridge's command, the day was ours. The enemy having lost all
the strong positions on that memorable field, his troops fell back in
great disorder on the banks of the Tennessee. To cover the confusion,
rapid fires were opened from the gunboats the enemy had placed in the
river; but the shots passed entirely over our devoted men, who were
exultant and eager to be led forward to the final assault, which must
have resulted in a complete victory, owing to the confusion and
general disorganization of the Federal troops. I knew the condition
of General Grant's army at the moment, as I had reached a high,
projecting point on the bank of the river, about a mile above
Pittsburg Landing, and could see the hurried movements to get the
disordered troops across to the right bank. Several thousand had
already passed, and a confused mass of men crowded to the landing to
get on the boats that were employed in crossing. I rode rapidly to
General Bragg's position to report what I had seen, and suggested
that, if he would suspend the fire of his artillery and marshal his
infantry for a general advance, the enemy must surrender. General
Bragg decided to make the advance, and authorized me and other
officers to direct the commanders of the batteries to cease firing.

"In the midst of the preparations, orders reached General Bragg from
General Beauregard directing the troops to be withdrawn and placed in
camp for the night--the intention being to resume the contest in the
morning. This was fatal, as it enabled General Buell and General
Wallace to arrive on the scene of action; that is, they came up in
the course of the night. Had General Beauregard known the condition
of the enemy as your father knew it when he received the fatal shot,
the order for withdrawal would certainly not have been given, and,
without such order, I know the enemy would have been crushed." [16]

To General Gilmer's opinion as a scientific engineer, a soldier of
long experience, and a man of resolute will as well as calm judgment,
the greatest respect will be accorded by those who knew him in the
United States Army, as well as his associates in the Confederate Army.

General Bragg, in his official report, says:

"As soon as our troops could be again put in motion, the order was
given to move forward at all points and sweep the enemy from the
field. . . . Our troops, greatly exhausted by twelve hours' incessant
fighting without food, mostly responded to the order with alacrity,
and the movement commenced with every prospect of success, though a
heavy battery in our front and the gunboats on our right seemed
determined to dispute every inch of ground. Just at this time an
order was received from the commanding General to withdraw the forces
beyond the enemy's fire."

In addition to the statements and opinions cited above, I will
introduce from a recent publication by Thomas Worthington, late
colonel of the Forty-sixth Regiment of Ohio Volunteers, two
statements showing the relative condition of the two armies in the
afternoon of the day of battle. It may be proper to say that Colonel
Worthington was regularly educated as a soldier, and had seen service
in Mexico.

He quotes Colonel Geddes, of the Eighth Iowa Volunteers, as follows:

"About 3 P.M. all communications with the river (landing) ceased, and
it became evident to me that the enemy was turning the right and left
flanks of our army. . . . About 2 P.M. the whole Union right,
comprising the Forty-sixth Ohio, which had held that flank two hours
or more, was driven back in disorder, and the Confederate flanking
force cut the center off from the landing, as stated by Colonel
Geddes, soon after General Johnston's fall."

General Beauregard reports as follows:

"It was after 6 P.M. when the enemy's last position was carried, and
his force finally broke and sought refuge behind a commanding
eminence covering Pittsburg Landing, not more than half a mile
distant, and under the guns of the gunboats, which opened on our
eager columns a fierce and annoying fire with shot and shell of the
heaviest description. Darkness was close at hand. Officers and men
were exhausted by a combat of over twelve hours, without food, and
jaded by the march of the preceding day through mud and water; it
was, therefore, impossible to collect the rich and opportune spoils
of war scattered broadcast on the field left in our possession, and
impracticable to make any effective dispositions for their removal to
the rear.

"I accordingly established my headquarters at the church of Shiloh,
in the enemy's encampment, with Major-General Bragg, and directed our
troops to sleep on their arms in such positions in advance and rear
as corps commanders should determine, hoping, from news received by a
special dispatch, that delays had been encountered by General Buell
in his march from Columbia, and that his main forces, therefore,
could not reach the field of battle in time to save General Grant's
shattered fugitives from capture or destruction on the following day."

Such are the representations of those having the best means of
information relative to the immediate causes of the failure to drive
the enemy from his last foothold, and gain possession of it. Some of
the more remote causes of this failure may be noticed. The first was
the death of General Johnston, which is thus described by his son:

"General Johnston had passed through the ordeal (the charge upon the
enemy) seemingly unhurt. His noble horse was shot in four places;
his clothes were pierced by missiles; his boot-sole was cut and torn
by a Minie ball; but, if he himself had received any severe wound, he
did not know it. At this moment Governor Harris rode up from the
right, elated with his own success, and with the vindication of his
Tennesseeans. After a few words. General Johnston sent him with an
order to Colonel Statham, which, having delivered, he speedily
returned. In the mean time knots and groups of Federal soldiers kept
up an angry discharge of firearms as they retreated upon their
supports, and their last line, now yielding, delivered volley after
volley as they retreated. By the chance of war a Minie ball from one
of these did its fatal work As General Johnston, on horseback, sat
there, knowing that he had crushed in the arch which had so long
resisted the pressure of his forces, and waiting until they could
collect sufficiently to give the final stroke, he received a mortal
wound. It came in the moment of victory and triumph from a flying
foe. It smote him at the very instant when he felt the full
conviction that the day was won."

His wound consisted in the cutting of the artery that runs down
through the thigh and divides at the knee, and passes along the
separate bones of the lower part of the leg. The wound was just above
the division or branch of the artery. It was fatal only because the
flow of blood was not stopped by a tourniquet. The narrative
continues:

"General Beauregard had told General Johnston that morning as he rode
off, that if it should be necessary to communicate with him or for
him to do anything, he would be found in his ambulance in bed.
Governor Harris, knowing this, and how feeble General Beauregard's
health was, went first to his headquarters--just in the rear of
where the army had deployed into line the evening before. Beauregard
and his staff were gone on horseback in the direction of Shiloh
Church. He found them there. The Governor told General Beauregard
that General Johnston had been killed. Beauregard expressed regret,
and then remarked, 'Everything else seems to be going on well on the
right.' Governor Harris assented. 'Then,' said Beauregard, 'The
battle may as well go on.' The Governor replied that he certainly
thought it ought. He offered his services to Beauregard, and they
were courteously accepted. General Beauregard then remained where he
was, waiting the issue of events." [17]

Sidney Johnston fell in sight of victory; the hour he had waited for,
the event he had planned for, had arrived. His fame was vindicated,
but far dearer than this to his patriotic spirit was it with his
dying eyes to behold his country's flag, so lately drooping in
disaster, triumphantly advancing. In his fall the great pillar of the
Southern Confederacy was crushed, and beneath its fragments the best
hope of the Southwest lay buried. A highly educated and richly
endowed soldier, his varied experience embraced also civil affairs,
and his intimate knowledge of the country and people of the Southwest
so highly qualified him for that special command that it was not
possible to fill the place made vacant by his death. Not for the
first time did the fate of an army depend upon a single man, and the
fortunes of a country hang, as in a balance, on the achievements of a
single army. To take an example far from us, in time and place, when
Turenne had, after months of successful manoeuvring, finally forced
his enemy into a position which gave assurance of victory, and had
marshaled his forces for a decisive battle, he was, when making a
preliminary reconnaissance, killed by a chance shot; then his
successor, instead of attacking, retreated, and all which the one had
gained for France, the other lost.

To take another example, not quite so conclusive, it was
epigrammatically said by Lieutenant Kingsbury, when writing of the
battle of Buena Vista, that if the last shot, fired at the close of
the second day's conflict, had killed General Taylor, the next
morning's sun would have risen upon the strange spectacle of two
armies in full retreat from each other, the field for which they had
fought being in the possession of neither. What material consequences
would have flowed from the supposed event--how the Mexican people
would have been inspired by the retreat of our army, how far it would
have brought out all their resources for war, and to what extent
results might have been thereby affected--are speculative inquiries
on a subject from which time and circumstance have taken the interest
it once possessed.

The extracts which have been given sufficiently prove that, when
General Johnston fell, the Confederate army was so fully victorious
that, had the attack been vigorously pressed, General Grant and his
army would before the setting of the sun have been fugitives or
prisoners.

As our troops drew near to the river, the gunboats of the enemy
became ineffective, because to fire over the bank required such
elevation of the guns that the shot and shell passed high over the
heads of our men, falling far away in the rear.

General Polk described the troops in advance for that reason as quite
safe from the fire of the gunboats, though it might seem terrible to
those far in the rear, and expressed the surprise and regret he felt
at the order to retire.

Grant's army being beaten, the next step of General Johnston's
programme should have followed, the defeat of Buell's and Mitchell's
forces as they successively came up, and a return by our victorious
army through Tennessee to Kentucky. The great embarrassment had been
the want of good military weapons; these would have been largely
supplied by the conquest hoped for, and, in the light of what had
occurred, not unreasonably anticipated.

What great consequences would have ensued must be matter of
conjecture, but that the people of Kentucky and Missouri generously
sympathized with the South was then commonly admitted. Our known want
of preparation for war and numerical inferiority may well have caused
many to doubt the wisdom of our effort for independence, and to these
a signal success would have been the makeweight deciding their course.

I believe that again in the history of war the fate of an army
depended on one man; and more, that the fortunes of a country hung by
the single thread of the life that was yielded on the field of
Shiloh. So great was my confidence in his capacity for organization
and administration, that I felt, when he was assigned to the
Department of the West, that the undeveloped power of that region
would be made sufficient not only for its own safety, but to
contribute support if need be to the more seriously threatened East.

There have been various suppositions as to the neglect of the wound
which caused General Johnston's death. My own opinion, founded upon
the statements of those who were near him, and upon my long
acquaintance with him and close observation of him under trying
circumstances, is, that his iron nerve and extraordinary
concentration of mind made him regardless of his wound, in the fixed
purpose to dislodge the enemy from his last position, and, while thus
struggling to complete the victory within his grasp, he unheedingly
allowed his life-blood to flow away.

It often happens that men do not properly value their richest gifts
until taken away. Those who had erroneously and unjustly censured
Johnston, convicted of their error by the grandeur of his revealed
character, joined in the general lamentation over his loss, and
malignity even was silenced by the devoted manner of his death. My
estimation of him was based on long and intimate acquaintance;
beginning in our youth, it had grown with our growth without check or
variation, and, when he first arrived in Richmond, was expressed to
some friends yet living, in the wish that I had the power, by
resigning, to transfer to him the Presidency of the Confederate
States.

[Footnote 13: Colonel Munford's address at Memphis.]

[Footnote 14: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," by his son.]

[Footnote 15: Original in the possession of Colonel W. P. Johnston.]

[Footnote 16: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," pp. 635, 636.]

[Footnote 17: "The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," p. 616.]

CHAPTER XIX.

At the ensuing nightfall our victorious army retired from the front
and abandoned its vantage-ground on the bluffs, which had been won at
such a cost of blood. The enemy thereby had room and opportunity to
come out from their corner, reoccupy the strong positions from which
they had been driven, and dispose their troops on much more favorable
ground. Called off by staff-officers, who gave no specific
instructions, our brigades, according to circumstances, bivouacked on
the battle-field, marched to the rear, or made themselves comfortable
on the profuse spoils of the enemy's encampments. General Buell says:

"Of the army of not less than fifty thousand effective men, which
Grant had on the west bank of the Tennessee River, not more than five
thousand were in ranks and available on the battlefield at nightfall
on the 6th, exclusive of Lew Wallace's division, say eight thousand
five hundred men that only came up during the night. The rest were
either killed, wounded, captured, or scattered in inextricable and
hopeless confusion for miles along the banks of the river."

In addition to the arrival of Wallace's division, the entire
divisions of Nelson and Crittenden got across the river during the
night, and by daylight that of McCook began to arrive; all but the
first named belonged to Buell's army. The work of reorganization of
fragments of Grant's force also occupied the night. In the morning
the arrival of reënforcements to the enemy continued.

On the morning of the 7th the enemy advanced about six o'clock, and
opened a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, such as gave assurance
that the reënforcements had arrived, to anticipate which the battle
of the 6th had been fought. A series of combats ensued, in which the
Confederates showed their usual valor; but, after the junction had
been effected between Grant and Buell, which Johnston's movement was
made to prevent, our force was unequal to resist the combined armies,
and retreat was a necessity.

The field return of the Army of Mississippi before and after the
battle of Shiloh was as follows: infantry and artillery, effective
before the battle, 35,953; cavalry, 4,382; total, 40,335. Infantry
and artillery, effective after the battle, 25,555; cavalry, 4,081;
total, 29,636. Difference, 10,699. Casualties in battle: killed,
1,728; wounded, 8,012; missing, 959.

The effective force of General Grant's army engaged in the battles of
April 6th and 7th at Shiloh was 49,314; reënforcements of General
Buell, 21,579; total, 70,893. The casualties in the battle of April
6th in Grant's force were as follows: killed, 1,500; wounded, 6,634;
missing, 3,086; total, 11,220; leaving, for duty on the 7th, 59,673.

On April 9th Major-General H. W, Halleck left St. Louis and proceeded
to Pittsburg Landing to assume command of the enemy's forces in the
field. A reorganization was made, in which General Grant's divisions
formed the right wing, those of General Buell the center, and those
of General Pope, brought from the west side of the Mississippi, the
left wing; and an advance on Corinth was commenced.

Corinth, the position from which our forces had advanced to Shiloh or
Pittsburg Landing, and to which they had now retired, was a small
village in the northeast corner of the State of Mississippi. It was
ninety miles east of Memphis and twenty or twenty-two west of the
Tennessee River. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad ran from west to
east through it, and the Mobile and Ohio road from south to north.
The country between it and the Tennessee River was quite rugged,
broken into ridges, and covered with a heavy forest. The position
itself was flat, the water poor. Being the point at which two
principal railroads crossed, it served admirably for the
concentration of our forces.

Corinth was a strategic point of importance, and it was intended to
be held as long as circumstances would permit; but it was untenable
in the face of a largely superior force, owing to the ease with which
the railroad communications in the rear could be cut by the enemy's
cavalry. The small streams and contiguous flats in its front formed
some obstacles which were not passed by the enemy until after the
retreat of our army. The defenses were slight, consisting of
rifle-pits and earthworks of little elevation or strength.

The movement of General Halleck against this position commenced from
Pittsburg Landing on April 28th with a force exceeding eighty-five
thousand effectives. On May 3d he had reached within eight miles of
Corinth, and on the 21st his batteries were within three miles. This
slow progress was probably the result of a conviction that our force
was very large, rather than of the bad state of the roads. So great
were his precautions, that every night his army lay in an intrenched
camp, and by day it was assailed by skirmishers from our army in more
or less force.

General Sherman, in his report of May 30th, says:

"My division has constructed seven distinct intrenched camps since
leaving Shiloh, the men working cheerfully and well all the time,
night and day. Hardly had we finished one camp before we were called
on to move forward and build another. But I have been delighted at
this feature in the character of my division, and take this method of
making it known. Our intrenchments near Corinth and at Russell's,
each built substantially in one night, are stronger works of art than
the much-boasted forts of the enemy at Corinth."

The line of railroad on the north and east had been cut by the enemy,
and an attempt made on the south. But so well was his apprehension of
our strength maintained, that he continued his intrenched approaches
until within one thousand yards of our main works.

General Sherman says:

"By 9 A.M. of the 29th our works were substantially done, and our
artillery in position, and at 4 P.M. the siege-train was brought
forward. . . . So near was the enemy that we could hear the sound of
his drums and sometimes of voices in command; and the railroad-cars
arriving and departing at Corinth were easily distinguished. For some
days and nights cars have been arriving and departing very
frequently, especially in the night; but last night (the 29th) more
so than usual, and my suspicions were aroused. Before daybreak I
instructed the brigade commanders and the field-officer of the day to
feel forward as far as possible; but all reported the enemy's pickets
still in force in the dense woods to our front. But about 6 A.M. a
curious explosion, sounding like a volley of large siege-pieces,
followed by others, singly, and in twos and threes, arrested our
attention, and soon after a large smoke arose from the direction of
Corinth, when I telegraphed to General Halleck to ascertain the
cause. He answered that he could not explain it, but ordered me to
advance my division and feel the enemy, if still in my front. I
immediately put in motion two regiments of each brigade, by different
roads, and soon after followed with the whole division--infantry,
artillery, and cavalry. General M. L. Smith's brigade moved rapidly
down the main road, entering the first redoubt of the enemy at 7 A.M.
It was completely evacuated, and by 8 A.M. all my division was at
Corinth and beyond."

The force of General Beauregard was less than forty-five thousand
effective men. He estimated that of the enemy to be between
eighty-five and ninety thousand men. All the troops of the enemy in
reserve in Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, and Illinois were brought
forward, except the force of Curtis, in Arkansas, and placed in front
of our position. No definite idea of their number was formed. In the
opinion of Beauregard, a general attack was not to be hazarded; but
on May 3d an advance was made to attack the corps of General Pope,
when only one of his divisions was in position, and that gave way so
rapidly it could not be overtaken. Again, on May 9th, an advance was
made, hoping to surprise the enemy. But a division, which should have
been in position at three o'clock in the morning, or early dawn, was
detained until three in the afternoon by the mistakes of the guide.
The enemy thus became informed of the movement, and no surprise could
be effected. General Beauregard commenced the removal of his sick,
preparatory to an evacuation, on May 26th; on the next day
arrangements for falling back were made, and the work completed on
the 29th. So complete was the evacuation, that not only was the army
successfully withdrawn, but also every piece of ordnance, only a
quantity of damaged ammunition being left behind. The retreat was
continued to Tupelo, without any serious conflict with the enemy; but
during the retreat seven locomotives were reported to be lost by the
burning of a bridge, and a number of cars, most of which were loaded
with stores, were ordered to be burned.

On June 14th orders were sent to General Bragg, from Richmond, to
proceed to Jackson, Mississippi, and temporarily to assume command of
the department then under command of General Lovell. The order
concluded as follows:

"After General Magruder joins, your further services there may be
dispensed with. The necessity is urgent and absolute.

"J. DAVIS."

On application to General Beauregard for the necessary order, he
replied:

"You can not possibly go. My health does not permit me to remain in
charge alone here. This evening my two physicians were insisting that
I should go away for one or two weeks, furnishing me with another
certificate for that purpose, and I had concluded to go--intending
to see you to-morrow on the subject, and leave you in command."

The certificate of the physicians was as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

"TUPELO, _June 14, 1862._

"We certify that, after attendance on General Beauregard for the past
four months, and treatment of his case, in our professional opinion
he is incapacitated physically for the arduous duties of his present
command, and we urgently recommend rest and recreation.

"R. L. Brodie, Surgeon, P. A. C. S.

"Sam Choppin, Surgeon, P. A. C. S."

These facts were telegraphed to me at once by General Bragg. Soon
after, I sent a second dispatch to him, renewing the order, and
expressing my surprise that he should have hesitated to obey, when
the original order stated "the necessity is urgent and absolute."
Before this second dispatch was received by General Bragg, General
Beauregard had transferred the command to him, and had departed for
Bladen Springs. General Bragg thus describes the subsequent
proceedings:

"Prepared to move, I telegraphed back to the President that the
altered conditions induced me to await his further orders. In reply
to this, I was immediately notified by telegraph of my assignment to
the 'permanent command of the army,' and was directed to send General
Van Dorn to execute my first instructions."

From this statement it appears--1. That General Beauregard was not,
as has been alleged, harshly deprived of his command, but that he
voluntarily surrendered it, after being furnished with medical
certificates of his physical incapacity for its arduous duties. 2.
That he did not even notify his Government, still less ask permission
to retire. 3. That the order, assigning another to the command he had
abandoned, could not be sent through him, when he had departed and
gone to a place where there was no telegraph, and rarely a mail. 4.
That it is neither customary nor proper to send orders to the
commander of an army through a general on sick-leave; and in this
case it would have been very objectionable, as a similar order had
just been sent and disobeyed.

Meanwhile some other events had occurred in the Western Department
which should be mentioned. The movement of the forces of the enemy up
the Tennessee River, as has been stated, thus flanking some of our
positions on the Mississippi River, was followed by his fitting out a
naval fleet to move down that river. This fleet, consisting of seven
ironclads and one gun-boat, ten mortar-boats, each carrying a
thirteen-inch mortar, a coal-barge, two ordnance-steamers, and two
transports with troops, left Cairo on March 14th, and arrived at
Hickman that evening. A small force of our cavalry left upon its
approach. Columbus, as has been stated, had previously been evacuated
by our forces and occupied by the enemy. In the morning the fleet
continued down toward Island No. 10. This island is situated in that
bend of the river which touches the border of Tennessee, a few miles
further up the river than New Madrid, although nearly southeast of
that point.

In the latter part of February a large force of the enemy under
Major-General Pope left Commerce, Missouri, and moved south about
fifty miles to New Madrid, with the object of capturing that place.
Aided by the gunboats of Commander Hollins, our small force repulsed
the assaults of the enemy three times, but such was the disparity of
numbers that it soon became manifest that our forces could not
successfully hold the position, and it was evacuated on the night of
March 13th. Its defenses consisted of two earthworks, in which about
twenty guns were mounted. These were spiked and rendered unfit for
use.

The bombardment of Island No. 10, above described, commenced on March
15th, and was continued night and day. Up to April 1st the enemy
fired several thousand thirteen-inch and rifle shells. On March 17th
a general attack with five gunboats and four mortar-boats was made,
and continued nine hours, without any serious result. Finally, the
forces of the enemy were greatly increased, and began to occupy both
banks of the river, and also the river above and below the island,
when a portion of our force retired, and about April 7th the
remainder surrendered.

The fleet, on April 12th, proceeded next to Fort Pillow, about a
hundred and eighty miles below Island No. 10, and a bombardment was
commenced on the next day. This was continued without effect until
the night of June 4th, when both Forts Pillow and Randolph, the
latter some twelve miles below the former, were evacuated--these
positions having become untenable in consequence of the withdrawal of
our forces from Corinth and the adjacent portion of Tennessee.

Nothing now remained to oppose the enemy's fleet but our gunboats at
Memphis, which were, say, seventy miles farther down the river. The
gallantry and efficiency displayed by our improvised river navy at
New Madrid and Island No. 10 gave rise to hopes scarcely justified by
the number of our vessels or their armament. Our boats had fewer guns
than those of the enemy, and they were less substantially
constructed, but their officers and crews took counsel of their
country's need rather than of their own strength. They manfully
engaged the enemy, and disabled one of his rams, but after an hour's
conflict were compelled to retire.

The possession of Memphis being no longer disputed, its occupation by
the enemy promptly followed.

At an early period of the war the Government of the United States
organized some naval and military expeditions, with a view to capture
our harbors, to occupy an extensive tract of country in their
vicinity, and especially to obtain possession of a portion of our
cotton-crop. The first movement of this kind was by a fleet of naval
vessels and transports which appeared off Hatteras Inlet on August
27, 1861. This inlet is a gap in the sandy barrier that lines the
coast of North Carolina about eighteen miles southwest of Cape
Hatteras. It was the principal entrance to Pamlico Sound, a large
body of water lying between the sandy beach and the mainland. The
channel of the entrance had about seven feet of water, and was
protected by two small forts constructed on the sand. Our forces were
under the command of Captain Samuel Barron, an officer of
distinction, formerly in the United States Navy. After a short
bombardment, which developed the strength of the enemy and his own
comparative weakness, he capitulated.

A much larger fleet of naval vessels and transports, carrying fifteen
thousand men, appeared off the harbor of Port Royal, South Carolina,
on November 4, 1861. This harbor is situated midway between the
cities of Charleston and Savannah. It is a broad estuary, into which
flow some two or three streams, the interlacing of which with creeks
forms a group of numerous islands. The parish, of which these are the
greater part, constituted the richest agricultural district in the
State; its staples being sea-island cotton and rice. The principal
defenses were Fort Walker, a strong earthwork on Hilton Head, and
Fort Beauregard on Philip's Island. The attack was made by the enemy
on the 7th, by a fleet consisting of eight steamers and a
sloop-of-war in tow. Some of the steamers were of the first class, as
the Wabash and the Susquehanna. The conflict continued for four
hours, when the forts, because untenable, were abandoned.

In the early part of 1862 several reconnaissances were sent out from
Port Royal, and subsequently an expedition visited Darien and
Brunswick in Georgia, and Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine
in Florida. Its design was to take and keep under control this line
of seacoast, especially in Georgia. Some small steamers and other
vessels were captured, and some ports were occupied.

The system of coast defenses which was adopted and the preparations
which had been at that time made by the Government to resist these
aggressions of the enemy should be stated. By reference to the
topography of our coast, it will be seen that, in the State of North
Carolina, are Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, penetrating far into the
interior; then the Cape Fear River, connecting with the ocean by two
channels, the southwest channel being defended by a small inclosed
fort and a water-battery. On the coast of South Carolina are
Georgetown and Charleston Harbors. A succession of islands extends
along the coast of South Carolina and Georgia, separated from the
mainland by a channel which is navigable for vessels of moderate
draft from Charleston to Fernandina, Florida. There are fewer
assailable points on the Gulf than on the Atlantic. Pensacola,
Mobile, and the mouth of the Mississippi were defended by works that
had hitherto been regarded as sufficiently strong to repulse any
naval attack that might be made upon them. Immediately after the
bombardment of Fort Sumter, the work of improving the seacoast
defense was begun and carried forward as rapidly as the limited means
of the Government would permit.

The work that was now done has been so summarily and satisfactorily
described by General A. L. Long, chief of artillery, in a paper
contributed to the Southern Historical Society, that I avail myself
of a few extracts:[18]

"Roanoke Island and other points on Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds were
fortified. Batteries were established on the southeast entrance of
Cape Fear River, and the works on the southwest entrance
strengthened. Defenses were constructed at Georgetown, and at all
assailable points on the northeast coast of South Carolina. The works
of Charleston Harbor were greatly strengthened by earthworks and
floating batteries. The defenses from Charleston down the coast of
South Carolina and Georgia were confined chiefly to the islands and
salient points bearing upon the channels leading inland. Defensive
works were erected at all important points along the coast. Many of
the defenses, being injudiciously located and hastily erected,
offered but little resistance to the enemy when attacked. These
defeats were not surprising, when we take into consideration the
inexperience of the engineers, and the long line of seacoast to be
defended. As soon as a sufficient naval force had been collected, an
expedition under the command of General E. F. Butler was sent to the
coast of North Carolina, and captured several important points. A
second expedition, under Admiral Dupont and General Thomas W.
Sherman, was sent to make a descent on the coast of South Carolina.
On the 7th of November Dupont attacked the batteries that were
designed to defend Port Royal harbor, as stated above, and almost
without resistance carried them and gained possession of Port Royal.
This is the best harbor in South Carolina, and is the strategic key
to all the South Atlantic coast. Later, Burnside captured Roanoke
Island, and established himself in eastern North Carolina without
resistance. The rapid fall of Roanoke Island and Port Royal Harbor
struck consternation into the hearts of the inhabitants along the
entire coast. The capture of Port Royal gave to the Federals the
entire possession of Beaufort Island, which afforded a secure place
of rest for the army, while the harbor gave a safe anchorage for the
fleet. Beaufort Island almost fills a deep indenture in the main
shore, being separated the greater part of its extent by a narrow
channel, which is navigable its entire circuit. Its northern
extremity extends to within a few miles of the Charleston and
Savannah Railroad. The main road from Port Royal to Pocotaligo
crosses the channel at this point. The evacuation of Hilton Head, on
the southwestern extremity of Beaufort Island, followed the capture
of Port Royal. This exposed Savannah, only about twenty-five miles
distant, to an attack from that direction. At the same time, the
Federals having command of Helena Bay, Charleston was liable to be
assailed from North Edisto or Stono Inlet, and the railroad could
have been reached without opposition by the route from Port Royal to
Pocotaligo.

"Such was the state of affairs when General Lee reached Charleston,
about December 1, 1861, to assume the command of the Department of
North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. His vigorous mind at once
comprehended the situation, and, with his accustomed energy, he met
the difficulties that presented themselves. Directing fortifications
to be constructed on the Stono and the Edisto and the Combahee, he
fixed his headquarters at Coosawhatchee, the point most threatened,
and directed defenses to be erected opposite Hilton Head, and on the
Broad and Salkehatchie, to cover Savannah. These were the points
requiring immediate attention. He superintended in person the works
overlooking the approach to the railroad from Port Royal, and soon
infused into his troops a part of his own energy. The works he had
planned rose with magical rapidity. A few days after his arrival at
Coosawhatchee, Dupont and Sherman sent their first reconnaissance in
that direction, which was met and repulsed by shots from the newly
erected batteries; and now, whether the Federals advanced toward the
railroad or turned in the direction of Charleston or Savannah, they
were arrested by our batteries. The people, seeing the Federals
repulsed at every point, regained their confidence, and with it their
energy.

"The most important points being now secured against immediate
attack, the General proceeded to organize a system of seacoast
defense different from that which had been previously adopted. He
withdrew the troops and material from those works which had been
established on the islands and salient points which he could not
defend to a strong interior line, where the effect of the Federal
naval force would be neutralized. After a careful reconnaissance of
the coast, he designated such points as he considered it necessary to
fortify. The most important positions on this extensive line were
Georgetown, Charleston, Pocotaligo, Coosawhatchee, and Savannah.
Coosawhatchee, being central, could communicate with either
Charleston or Savannah in two or three hours by railroad, and in case
of an attack they could support each other. The positions between
Coosawhatchee and Savannah, and those between the former and
Charleston, could be reënforced from the positions contiguous to
them; there was thus a defensive relation throughout the entire line,
extending from Winyaw Bay to the mouth of St. Mary's River, in
Georgia, a distance of about two hundred miles. These detached and
supporting works covered a most important agricultural country, and
sufficed to defend it from the smaller expeditions made against that
region.

"About March 1st the gunboats of the enemy entered the Savannah River
by way of the channel leading from Hilton Head. Our naval force was
too weak to dispute the possession with them, and they thus cut off
the communication of Fort Pulaski with the city. Soon after, the
enemy landed a force, under General Gillmore, on the opposite side of
the fort. By April 1st they had powerful batteries in position, and
on that day opened fire on the fort. Having no hope of succor, Fort
Pulaski, after striking a blow for honor, surrendered with about five
hundred men." [19]

[Footnote 18: "Seacoast Defenses of the Carolinas and Georgia."]

[Footnote 19: General A. L. Long, in Historical Society Papers.]

CHAPTER XX.

In a previous chapter the retreat of our army from Centreville has
been described, and reference has been made to the anticipation of
the commanding general, J. E. Johnston, that the enemy would soon
advance to attack that position. Since the close of the war we have
gained information not at that time to us attainable, which shows
that, as early as the 31st of January, 1862, the commanding General
of the enemy's forces presented to his President an argument against
that line of operations, setting forth the advantages of a movement
by water-transports down the Chesapeake into the Rappahannock; and
that in the following February, by the direction of President
Lincoln, General McClellan held a council with twelve of the generals
of that army, who decided in favor of the movement by way of
Annapolis, and thence to the Rappahannock, to which their President
gave his assent. When General McClellan, then in the city of
Washington, heard that our army had retired, he ordered a general
movement of his troops toward the position we had lately occupied. A
detachment was sent to make reconnaissance as far as the line of the
Rappahannock, by which it was ascertained that our troops had passed
beyond that river. His account of this movement was given in the
following report:

"FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, _March 11, 1862,_ 8.30 P.M.

"I have just returned from a ride of more than forty miles. Have
examined Centreville, Union Mills, Blackburn's Ford, etc. The rebels
have left all their positions, and, from the information obtained
during our ride to-day, I am satisfied that they have fallen behind
the Rapidan, holding Fredericksburg and Gordonsville. Their movement
from here was very sudden. They left many wagons, some caissons,
clothing, ammunition, personal baggage, etc. Their winter-quarters
were admirably constructed, many not yet quite finished. The works at
Centreville are formidable; more so than at Manassas. Except the
turnpike, the roads are horrible. The country entirely stripped of
forage and provisions. Having fully consulted with General McDowell,
I propose occupying Manassas with a portion of Banks's command, and
then at once throwing all forces I can concentrate upon the line
agreed upon last week. The Monitor justifies this course. I
telegraphed this morning to have the transports brought to
Washington, to start from there. I presume you will approve this
course. Circumstances may keep me out here some little time
longer.[20]

"G. B. MCCLELLAN, _Major-General_.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_."

The reference to the Monitor is to be explained by the condition
previously made in connection with the proposition of going to
Fortress Monroe, that the Merrimac, our Virginia, should first be
neutralized. The order to bring the "transports" to Washington was
due to the fact that they had not dared to run by our batteries on
the Potomac, and intended to avoid them by going to Annapolis for
embarkation. The withdrawal of our batteries from the banks of the
Potomac had removed the objection to going down that river, and the
withdrawal of our forces across the Rappahannock was fatal to the
programme of landing on that river, and marching to Richmond before
our forces could be in position to resist an attack on the capital.
Notwithstanding the assurance given that the destruction of railroads
and bridges proved that our army could not intend to advance,
apprehension was still entertained of an attack upon Washington.

As soon as we ascertained that the enemy was concentrating his forces
at Fortress Monroe, to advance upon our capital by that line of
approach, all our disposable force was ordered to the Peninsula,
between the James and York Rivers, to the support of General John B.
Magruder, who, with a force of seven to eight thousand men, had, by
availing himself of the Warwick River, a small stream which runs
through a low, marshy country, from near Yorktown to the James River,
constructed an intrenched line across the Peninsula, and with equal
skill and intrepidity had thus far successfully checked every attempt
to break it, though the enemy was vastly superior in numbers to the
troops under General Magruder's command. Having a force entirely
inadequate to occupy and defend the whole line, over thirteen miles
long, he built dams in the Warwick River, so as to form pools, across
which the enemy, without bridges, could not pass, and posted
detachments at each dam to prevent the use of them by attacking
columns of the enemy. To defend the left of his line, where the
stream became too small to present a serious obstacle to the passage
of troops, redoubts were constructed, with curtains connecting them.

Between Yorktown and Gloucester Point, on the opposite shore, the
York River is contracted to less than a mile in width, and General
Magruder had constructed batteries at both places, which, by their
cross fire, presented a formidable obstacle to the accent of ordinary
vessels. The fortifications at Norfolk and the navy-yard, together
with batteries at Sewell's Point and Craney Island, in conjunction
with the navy, offered means of defense against any attempt to land
troops on the south side of James River. After the first trial of
strength with our Virginia, there had been an evident disinclination
on the part of the enemy's vessels to encounter her, so that, as long
as she floated, the deep water of the roads and mouth of James River.
was not likely to be invaded by ships of war.

As a second line of defense, a system of detached works had been
constructed by General Magruder near to Williamsburg, where the width
of the Peninsula, available for the passage of troops, was only three
or four miles. The advantage thus secured to his forces, if they
should be compelled to retreat, will be readily appreciated. I am not
aware that torpedoes had been placed in York River to prevent the
entrance of the enemy's vessels; indeed, at that time, but little
progress had been made in the development of that means of harbor and
river defense. General Rains, as will be seen hereafter, had matured
his invention of sensitive fuse-primers for sub-terra shells, and
proposed their use for floating torpedoes. Subsequently he did much
to advance knowledge in regard to making torpedoes efficient against
the enemy's vessels.

Such was the condition of the Virginia Peninsula between the York and
James Rivers when General McClellan embarked the mass of the army he
commanded in northern Virginia and proceeded to Fortress Monroe; and
when the greater part of our army, under the command of General J. E.
Johnston, was directed to move for the purpose of counteracting this
new plan of the enemy.

Early in April, General McClellan had landed about one hundred
thousand men at or near Fortress Monroe.[21] At this time General
Magruder occupied the lower Peninsula with his force of seven or
eight thousand men. Marshes, creeks, and dense wood gave to that
position such advantage that, in his report, made at a subsequent
period, he expressed the belief that with twenty or twenty-five
thousand men he could have held it against any supposable attack.
When McClellan advanced with his immense army, Magruder fell back to
the line of Warwick River, which has been imperfectly described, and
there checked the enemy; and the vast army of invasion, repulsed in
several assaults by the most heroic conduct of our troops, commenced
a siege by regular approaches. After the first advance of the enemy,
General Magruder was reënforced by some troops from the south side of
James River and General Wilcox's brigade, which had been previously
detached from the army under General Johnston. On the 9th of April
General Magruder's command, thus reënforced, amounted to about twelve
thousand. On that day General Early joined with his division from the
Army of Northern Virginia. It had gone by rail to Richmond and thence
down the York and James Rivers in vessels towed by tugs--except the
trains and artillery, which moved by land. This division had about
eight thousand officers and men for duty. General Magruder's force
was thus increased to about twenty thousand. This was the first
detachment from the Army of Northern Virginia which arrived on the
Peninsula.

General McClellan, in a cipher dispatch of the 7th of April, two days
previous, informed Secretary Stanton that prisoners stated that
General J. E. Wharton (no doubt, Johnston) had the day before arrived
in Yorktown with strong reënforcements, and adds: "It seems clear
that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands, probably
not less than one hundred thousand men, and possibly more. . . . When
my present command all joins, I shall have about eighty-five thousand
men for duty, from which a large force must be taken for guards,
escort, etc." After some remarks about the strength of our
intrenchments, and his conviction that the great battle which would
decide the existing contest would be fought there, he urges as
necessary for his success that there should be an attack on the rear
of Gloucester Point, and adds: "My present strength will not admit of
a detachment for this purpose without materially impairing the
efficiency of this column. Commodore Goldsborough thinks the work too
strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Gloucester." [22]

In the cipher dispatch of the 7th of April to President Lincoln,
General McClellan acknowledges a telegram of the previous day, and
adds, "In reply, I have the honor to state that my entire force for
duty only amounts to about eighty-five thousand men." [23] He then
mentions the fact that General Wool's command is not under his
orders, etc.

Subsequent correspondence clearly shows that General McClellan would
not risk making a detachment from his army to turn the position at
Gloucester Point, and that the navy would not attempt to operate
against the battery at that place. He therefore urgently pressed for
reënforcements to act on the north side of York River.

General Magruder had, up to and after the time of receiving the
reënforcements before mentioned, worked day and night in constructing
and strengthening his defenses. His small force had been assisted in
this work by a considerable body of negro laborers, and an active
participant and competent judge, General Early, thus wrote of his
conduct:

"The assuming and maintaining this line by Magruder, with his small
force, in the face of such overwhelming odds, was one of the boldest
exploits ever performed by a military commander; and he had so
manoeuvred his troops, by displaying them rapidly at different
points, as to produce the impression on his opponent that he had a
large army."

As soon as it was definitely ascertained that General McClellan, with
his main army, was on the Peninsula, General J. E. Johnston was
assigned to the command of the Department of the Peninsula and
Norfolk, and directed to proceed thither to examine the condition of
affairs there. After spending a day on General Magruder's defensive
line, he returned to Richmond, and recommended the abandonment of the
Peninsula, and that we should take a defensive position nearer to
Richmond. The question was postponed, and an appointment made for its
discussion, to which I proposed to invite the Secretary of War,
General Randolph, and General Lee, then stationed in Richmond, and in
general charge of army operations. General Johnston asked that he
might invite General Longstreet and General G. W. Smith to be
present, to which I assented.

At this meeting. General Johnston announced his plan to be, the
withdrawal of General Magruder's troops from the Peninsula, and of
General Huger's from Norfolk, to be united with the main body of the
Army of Northern Virginia, and the withdrawal of the troops from
South Carolina and Georgia, his belief being that General Magruder's
line was indefensible with the forces we could concentrate there;
that the batteries at Gloucester Point could not be maintained; that
the enemy would turn the position at Yorktown by ascending the York
River, if the defensive line there should possibly be maintained. To
this plan the Secretary of War objected, because the navy-yard at
Norfolk offered our best if not our only opportunity to construct in
any short time gunboats for coastwise and harbor defense. General
Lee, always bold in his views and unusually sagacious in penetrating
the designs of the enemy, insisted that the Peninsula offered great
advantages to a smaller force in resisting a numerically superior
assailant, and, in the comprehensive view which he usually took of
the necessities of other places than the one where he chanced to be,
objected to withdrawing the troops from South Carolina and Georgia,
as involving the probable capture of Charleston and Savannah. By
recent service in that section he was well informed as to the
condition of those important ports. General G. W. Smith, as well as I
remember, was in full accord with General Johnston, and General
Longstreet partially so.

After hearing fully the views of the several officers named, I
decided to resist the enemy on the Peninsula, and, with the aid of
the navy, to hold Norfolk and keep the command of the James River as
long as possible. Arrangements were made, with such force as our
means permitted, to occupy the country north of Richmond, and the
Shenandoah Valley, and, with the rest of General Johnston's command,
to make a junction with General Magruder to resist the enemy's forces
on the Peninsula. Though General J. E. Johnston did not agree with
this decision, he did not ask to be relieved, and I had no wish to
separate him from the troops with whom he was so intimately
acquainted, and whose confidence I believed he deservedly possessed.

To recur to General Magruder: soon after the landing of the enemy,
skirmishes commenced with our forces, and the first vigorous attempt
was made to break the line at Lee's Mills, where there were some
newly constructed defenses. The enemy was so signally repulsed that
he described them as very strong works, and thereafter commenced the
construction of parallels and regular approaches, having an
exaggerated idea as well of the number of our troops as of the
strength of our works at that time. General Magruder, in his report,
notices a serious attempt to break his line of the Warwick at Dam No.
1, about the center of the line, and its weakest point. Opening with
a heavy bombardment at nine in the morning, which continued until
three P.M., heavy masses of infantry then commenced to deploy, and,
with musketry-fire, were thrown forward to storm our six-pounder
battery, which had been effectively used, and was the only artillery
we had there in position. A portion of the column charged across the
dam, but Brigadier-General Howell Cobb met the attack with great
firmness, the enemy was driven with the bayonet from some of our
rifle-pits of which he had gained possession, and the assaulting
column recoiled with loss from the steady fire of our troops.

The enemy's skirmishers pressed closely in front of the redoubts on
the left of our line, and with their long-range rifles had a decided
advantage over our men, armed with smooth-bore muskets. In addition
to the rifle-pits they dug, they were covered by a dwelling-house and
a large peach-orchard which extended to within a few hundred yards of
our works. On the 11th of April General Magruder ordered sorties to
be made from all the main points of his line. General Wilcox sent out
a detachment from Wynne's Mill which encountered the advance of the
enemy in his front and drove it back to the main line. Later in the
day General Early sent out from Redoubt No. 5 Colonel Ward's Florida
regiment and the Second Mississippi Battalion, under Colonel Taylor.
They drove the sharpshooters from their rifle-pits and pursued them
to the main road from Warwick Court-House, encountered a battery
posted at an earthwork, and compelled it precipitately to retire. On
the approach of a large force of the enemy's infantry, Colonel Ward
returned to our works, after having set fire to the dwelling-house
above mentioned. These affairs developed the fact that the enemy was
in strong force, both in front of Wynne's Mill and Redoubts Nos. 4
and 5. On the next night General Early sent out Colonel Terry's
Virginia regiment to cut down the peach-orchard and burn the rest of
the houses which had afforded shelter to the assailants; and on the
succeeding night Colonel McRae, with his North Carolina regiment,
went farther to the front and felled the cedars along the main road
which partially hid the enemy's movements, and subsequently our men
were not annoyed by the sharpshooters. About the middle of April a
further reënforcement of two divisions from the Army of Northern
Virginia was added to our forces on the Peninsula, which amounted,
when General Johnston assumed command, to something over fifty
thousand.

The work of strengthening the defenses was still continued. On the
16th of April an assault was made on our line, to the right of
Yorktown, which was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy, and such
serious discomfiture that henceforward his plan seemed to be to rely
upon bombardment, for which numerous batteries were prepared.

The views of the enemy, as revealed by the testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, were that he could gain
possession of Gloucester Point only by reënforcements operating on
the north side of York River, or by the previous reduction of
Yorktown. In addition to the answer given by General McClellan, I
quote from the testimony of General Keyes. He said, "The possession
of Gloucester Point by the enemy retarded the taking of Yorktown, and
it also enabled the enemy to close the river at that point," and
added, "Gloucester must have fallen upon our getting possession of
Yorktown, and the York River would then have been open." [24]

With the knowledge possessed by us, General McClellan certainly might
have sent a detachment from his army which, after crossing the York
River, could have turned the position at Gloucester Point and have
overcome our small garrison at that place; but this is but one of the
frequent examples of war in which the immunity of one army is derived
from the mistakes of the other.

An opinion has existed among some of our best-informed officers that
Franklin's division was kept on transports for the purpose of landing
on the north side of York River to capture our battery at Gloucester
Point, and thus open the way to turn our position by ascending the
York River. Upon the authority of Swinton, the fairest and most
careful of the Northern writers on the war, it appears that
Franklin's division had disembarked before the evacuation of
Yorktown; and, upon the authority of the Prince de Joinville, serving
on the staff of General McClellan, it appears that his commanding
general was not willing to intrust that service to a single division,
and plaintively describes the effect produced by the refusal of
President Lincoln to send McDowell's corps to reënforce McClellan. He
writes thus:

"The news was received by the Federal army with dissatisfaction,
although the majority could not then foresee the deplorable
consequences of an act performed, it must be supposed, with no
evil intention, but with inconceivable recklessness. . . . It was
the mainspring removed from a great work already begun. It
deranged everything. Among the divisions of the corps of McDowell,
there was one--that of Franklin--which was regretted more than all
the rest. . . . He [the commander-in-chief] held it in great esteem,
and earnestly demanded its restoration. It was sent back to him
without any explanation, in the same manner as it had been withheld.
This splendid division, eleven thousand strong, arrived, and for a
moment the commander thought of intrusting to it alone the storming
of Gloucester, but the idea was abandoned."

On the 28th of April General J. E. Johnston wrote to Flag-Officer
Tatnall, commanding the naval forces in the James River, requesting
him, if practicable, to proceed with the Virginia to York River for
the purpose of destroying the enemy's transports, to which Commodore
Tatnall replied that it could only be done in daylight, when he would
be exposed to the fire of the forts, and have to contend with the
squadron of men-of-war stationed below them, and that, if this should
be safely done, according to the information derived from the pilots,
it would not be possible for the Virginia to reach the enemy's
transports at Poquosin, while the withdrawal of the Virginia would be
to abandon the defense of Norfolk, and to remove the obstacles she
opposed to "the enemy's operations in the James River." [25]

Meanwhile, the brilliant movements of the intrepid Jackson created
such apprehension of an attack upon Washington City by the Army of
the Shenandoah, that President Lincoln refused the repeated requests
of General McClellan to send him McDowell's corps to operate on the
north side of the York River against our battery at Gloucester Point.

On the 28th of the following June, Mr. Lincoln, noticing what he
regarded as ungenerous complaint, wrote to General McClellan: "If you
have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the
enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy
concentrated on you." [26]

The month of April was cold and rainy, and our men poorly provided
with shelter, and with only the plainest rations; yet, under all
these discomforts, they steadily labored to perfect the defenses,
and, when they were not on the front line, were constantly employed
in making traverses and epaulments in the rear. Whether General
McClellan, under the pressure from Washington, would have made an
early assault,[27] or have adhered to the policy of regular
approaches, and, relying on his superiority in artillery, have waited
to batter our earthworks in breach, and whether all which had been
done, or which it was practicable under the circumstances to do, to
strengthen the main line would have made it sufficiently strong to
resist the threatened bombardment, is questionable; and how soon that
bombardment would have commenced is now indeterminate. A telegram
from President Lincoln to General McClellan is suggestive on this
point. It reads thus:

"WASHINGTON, _May 1, 1862._

"Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me--chiefly
because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be
done?" [28]

By the following telegram sent by me to General J. E. Johnston,
commanding at Yorktown, the contents of that which I had received
from him, and of which I am not now possessed, will be readily
inferred:

"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, _May 1, 1862._

"General J. E. JOHNSTON, _Yorktown, Virginia_.

"Accepting your conclusion that you must soon retire, arrangements
are commenced for the abandonment of the navy-yard and removal of
public property both from Norfolk and Peninsula. Your announcement
to-day that you would withdraw to-morrow night takes us by surprise,
and must involve enormous losses, including unfinished gunboats. Will
the safety of your army allow more time?

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

My next step was to request the Secretary of War, General Randolph,
and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory, to proceed to Yorktown
and Norfolk to see whether the evacuation could not be postponed, and
to make all practicable arrangements to remove the machinery,
material, ordnance, and supplies for future use. At the suggestion of
the Secretary of War, I agreed that he should first go with the
Secretary of the Navy to Norfolk and thence pass over to Yorktown.

On the next morning they left for Norfolk. General Randolph, in his
testimony before a joint special committee of the Confederate
Congress, said:

"A few hours after we arrived in Norfolk, an officer from General
Johnston's army made his appearance, with an order for General Huger
to evacuate Norfolk immediately. . . . As that would have involved
heavy losses in stores, munitions, and arms, I took the
responsibility of giving General Huger a written order to delay the
evacuation until he could remove such stores, munitions, and arms as
could be carried off. . . . Mr. Mallory was with me and gave similar
instructions to the commandant of the navy yard. . . . The evacuation
was delayed for about a week. . . . When the council of war met [the
conference with the President heretofore referred to], it was
supposed that, if the enemy assaulted our army at the Warwick River
line, we should defeat them; but that, if instead of assaulting they
made regular approaches to either flank of the line and took
advantage of their great superiority of heavy artillery, the
probability would be that one flank or both of the army would be
uncovered, and thus the enemy, ascending the York and James Rivers in
transports, could turn the flank of the army and compel it to
retreat. . . . They made regular approaches, mounted the
largest-sized guns, such as we could not compete with, and made the
position of Yorktown untenable. Nearly all of our heavy rifled guns
burst during the siege. The remainder of the heavy guns were in the
water-batteries," etc.

The permanent occupation of Norfolk after our army withdrew from the
lower Peninsula and the enemy possessed it was so obviously
impossible as not to require explanation; but, while the enemy was
engaged in the pursuit of our retreating columns, it was deemed
justifiable to delay the evacuation of Norfolk for the purposes
indicated in the above answer of the Secretary of War. The result
justified the decision.

The order for the withdrawal of the army from the line of the Warwick
River on the night of the 2d of April was delayed until the next
night, because, as I have been informed, some of the troops were not
ready to move. Heavy cannonading, both on the night of the 2d and 3d,
concealed the fact of the purpose to withdraw, and the evacuation was
made so successfully, as appears by the testimony before the United
States Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the
enemy was surprised the next morning to find the lines unoccupied.

The loss of public property, as was anticipated, was great, the
steamboats expected for its transportation not having arrived before
the evacuation was made. From a narrative by General Early I make the
following extract:

"A very valuable part of the property so lost, and which we stood
much in need of, consisted of a very large number of picks and
spades, many of them entirely new. All of our heavy guns, including
some recently arrived and not mounted, together with a good deal of
ammunition piled up on the wharf, had to be left behind."

The land transportation was quite deficient. General Magruder's
troops had scarcely any, and others of the more recent organizations
were in a like condition; as no supplies had been accumulated at
Williamsburg, this want of transportation would necessarily involve
want of rations in the event of delays on the retreat.

At Williamsburg, about twelve miles from Yorktown, General Magruder,
as has been mentioned, had constructed a line of detached works. The
largest of these, Fort Magruder, was constructed at a point a short
distance beyond where the Lee's Mill and Yorktown roads united, and
where the enemy in his pursuit first encountered our retiring forces,
and were promptly repulsed. General Magruder, whose arduous service
and long exposure on the Peninsula has been noticed, was compelled by
illness to leave his division. His absence at this moment was the
more to be regretted, as it appears that the positions of the
redoubts he had constructed were not all known to the commanding
General, and some of them being unoccupied were seized by the enemy,
and held subsequently to our disadvantage. General McClellan, in his
official report from "bivouac in front of Williamsburg, May 5, 1862,"
says, "General Hancock has taken two redoubts and repulsed Early's
rebel brigade by a real charge of the bayonet, taking one colonel and
one hundred and fifty other prisoners," etc. As this is selected for
the brilliant event in the affair before Williamsburg, I will extract
fully from General Early's report:

"LYNCHBURG, June 9, 1862.

"In accordance with orders received the evening before, my brigade
was in readiness to take up the line of march from its camp west of
Williamsburg toward Richmond on the 5th of May. . . . I was directed
by Major-General D. H. Hill not to move my infantry, and in a short
time I was ordered by him to march back, and report with my regiments
to Major-General Longstreet at Williamsburg. . . . Between three and
four o'clock, P.M., I was ordered by General Longstreet to move to
the support of Brigadier-General Anderson of his division, at or near
Fort Magruder. . . . Before my command had proceeded far toward its
destination, I received an order from General Longstreet to send him
two regiments. . . . With the remainder of my command, being my
brigade proper, I proceeded, as near as practicable, to the position
designated by General Longstreet on the left and rear of Fort
Magruder. . . . In a short time Major-General Hill arrived, and,
having ascertained that the enemy had a battery in front of us, he
informed me that he wished me to attack and capture the battery with
my brigade, but before doing so he must see General Longstreet on the
subject. . . . General Hill being on the right and accompanying the
brigade, I placed myself on the left with the Twenty-fourth Virginia
Regiment for the purpose of directing its movements, as I was
satisfied from the sound of the enemy's guns that this regiment would
come directly on the battery. . . . In an open field, in view of Fort
Magruder, at the end farthest from the fort, the enemy had taken
position with a battery of six pieces . . . supported by a brigade of
infantry under the command of Brigadier-General Hancock. In this
field were two or three redoubts, previously built by our troops, of
one, at least, of which the enemy had possession, his artillery being
posted in front of it, near some farmhouses, and supported by a body
of infantry, the balance of the infantry being in the redoubt, and in
the edge of the woods close by. The Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment,
as I had anticipated, came directly upon the battery. . . . This
regiment, without pausing or wavering, charged upon the enemy under a
heavy fire, and drove back his guns and the infantry supporting them
to the cover of the redoubt. ... I sent orders to the other regiments
to advance; these orders were anticipated by Colonel McRae of the
Fifth North Carolina Regiment, who was on the extreme right of my
brigade, and marched down to the support of the Twenty-fourth,
traversing the whole front that should have been occupied by the
other two regiments."

General Early, having received a severe wound, soon after the
Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment charged the battery, was compelled by
exhaustion from loss of blood and intense pain to leave the field
just as the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, led by its gallant
colonel, charged on the enemy's artillery and infantry. Of that
charge General Early writes:

"This North Carolina Regiment, in conjunction with the Twenty-fourth
Virginia Regiment, made an attack upon the vastly superior forces of
the enemy, which for its gallantry is unsurpassed in the annals of
warfare: their conduct was such as to elicit from the enemy himself
the highest praise."

This refers to the chivalric remark made by General Hancock to Dr.
Cullen, left in charge of our wounded, viz., "The Fifth North
Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia deserve to have the word immortal
inscribed on their banners." Colonel McRae, who succeeded to the
command after General Early retired, states in his report that he
sent to General Hill for reënforcements in order to advance, and in
reply received an order to retire: that his men were holding the
enemy to his shelter in such way that they were not at all suffering,
but, when he commenced retiring, the enemy rose and fired upon his
men, doing the greatest damage that was done. Some of them obliqued
too far to the right in going back, and met a regiment of the enemy
concealed in the woods, and were thus captured. General Early writes:
"The two regiments that united in the assault were not repulsed at
all. They drove the enemy to the cover of the redoubt and the shelter
of the woods near it, where he was held at bay by my two regiments,
which had suffered comparatively little at that time." He confidently
expresses the opinion that, had his attack been supported promptly
and vigorously, the enemy's force there engaged must have been
captured, as it had crossed over to that point on a narrow mill-dam,
and had only that way to escape.

The claim of the enemy to have achieved a victory at Williamsburg is
refuted by the fact that our troops remained in possession of the
field during the night, and retired the next morning to follow up the
retreat, which was only interrupted by the necessity of checking the
enemy until our trains could proceed far enough to be out of danger.
The fact of our wounded being left at Williamsburg was only due to
our want of ambulances in which to remove them.

Though General McClellan at this time estimated our force as
"probably greater a good deal" than his own, the fact is, it was
numerically less than half the number he had for duty. Severe
exposure and fatigue must, by sickness, have diminished our force
more than it was increased by absentees returning to duty after the
middle of April, so that at the end of the month the number was
probably less than fifty thousand present for duty. General
McClellan's report on the 30th of April, 1862, as shown by the
certified statement, gives the aggregate present for duty at one
hundred and twelve thousand three hundred and ninety-two.[29]

When the Confederates evacuated Yorktown, General Franklin's division
had just been disembarked from the transports. It was reembarked, and
started on the morning of the 6th up the York River.[30]

After the battle of Williamsburg our army continued its retreat up
the Peninsula. Here, for the first time, sub-terra shells were
employed to check a marching column. The event is thus described by
General Rains, the inventor:

"On the day we left Williamsburg, after the battle, we worked hard to
get our artillery and some we had captured over the sloughs about
four miles distant. On account of the tortuous course of the road, we
could not bring a single gun to bear upon the enemy who were pursuing
us, and shelling the road as they advanced. Fortunately, we found in
a mud-hole a broken-down ammunition-wagon containing five loaded
shells. Four of these, armed with a sensitive fuse-primer, were
planted in our rear, near some trees cut down as obstructions to the
road. A body of the enemy's cavalry came upon these sub-terra shells,
and they exploded with terrific effect.

"The force behind halted for three days, and finally turned off from
the road, doubtless under the apprehension that it was mined
throughout. Thus our rear was relieved of the enemy. No soldier will
march over mined land, and a corps of sappers, each man having two
ten-inch shells, two primers, and a mule to carry them, could stop
any army."

Accounts, contemporaneously published at the North, represent the
terror inspired by these shells, extravagantly describe the number of
them, and speak of the necessity of leaving the road to avoid them.

The next morning after the battle of the 5th, at Williamsburg,
Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions, being those there engaged,
followed in the line of retreat, Stuart's cavalry moving after them--
they marched that day about twelve miles. In the mean time Franklin's
division had gone up the York River, and landed a short distance
below West Point, on the south side of York River, and moved into a
thick wood in the direction of the New Kent road, thus threatening
the flank of our line of march. Two brigades of General G. W. Smith's
division, Hampton's and Hood's, were detached under the command of
General Whiting to dislodge the enemy, which they did after a short
conflict, driving him through the wood to the protection of his
gunboats in York River.

On the next morning the rear divisions joined those in advance at
Barhamsville, and the retreat of the whole army was resumed--Smith's
and Magruder's divisions moving by the New Kent Court-House to the
Baltimore Cross Roads, and Longstreet's and Hill's to the Long
Bridge, where the whole army remained in line facing to the east for
five days.

The retreat had been successfully conducted. In the principal action,
that at Williamsburg, our forces, after General Hill's division had
been brought back to the support of General Longstreet, did not
exceed, probably was not equal to, one half that of the enemy. Yet,
as has been seen, the position was held as long as was necessary for
the removal of our trains, and our troops slept upon the field of
battle. The loss of the enemy greatly exceeded our own, which was
about twelve hundred; while General Hooker, commanding one division
of the Federal army, in his testimony stated the loss in his division
to have been seventeen hundred.[31]

Among the gallant and much regretted of those lost by us, was Colonel
Ward, of Florida, whose conduct at Yorktown has been previously
noticed, and of whom General Early, in his report of the battle of
Williamsburg, says:

"On the list of the killed in the Second Florida Regiment is found
the name of its colonel, George T. Ward, as true a gentleman and as
gallant a soldier as has drawn a sword in this war, and whose conduct
under fire it was my fortune to witness on another occasion. His loss
to his regiment, to his State, and to the Confederacy can not be
easily compensated."

Colonel Ward, with his regiment, had been detached from General
Early's command in the early part of the action. I regret that I have
not access to the report of General Longstreet, where, no doubt, may
also be found due notice of Colonel Christopher Mott, whom I knew
personally. In his youth he served in the regiment commanded by me
during the war with Mexico. He was brave, cheerful, prompt, and equal
to every trial to which he was subjected, giving early promise of
high soldierly capacity. He afterward held various places of honor
and trust in civil life, and there were many in Mississippi who, like
myself, deeply lamented his death in the height of his usefulness.

General Huger, commanding at Norfolk, and Captain Lee, commanding the
navy-yard, by the authority of the Secretaries of War and Navy,
delayed the evacuation of both, as stated by General Randolph,
Secretary of War, for about a week after General Johnston sent orders
to General Huger to leave immediately. While he was employed in
removing the valuable stores and machinery, as we learn from the work
of the Comte de Paris, President Lincoln and his Secretary of War
arrived at Fortress Monroe, and on the 8th of May an expedition
against Norfolk by the troops under General Wool was contemplated. He
writes:

"Being apprised by the columns of smoke which rose on the horizon
that the propitious moment had arrived, Wool proposed to the
President to undertake an expedition against Norfolk. Max Weber's
brigade was speedily embarked, and, to protect his descent, Commodore
Goldsborough's fleet was ordered to escort it. But the Confederate
batteries, not yet having been abandoned, fired a few shots in reply,
while the Virginia, which, since the wounding of the brave Buchanan,
had been commanded by Commodore Tatnall, showed her formidable shell,
and the expedition was countermanded. Two more days were consumed in
waiting. Finally, on the morning of the 10th, Weber disembarked east
of Sewell's Point. This time the enemy's artillery was silent. There
was found an intrenched camp mounting a few guns, but absolutely
deserted. General Wool reached the city of Norfolk, which had been
given up to its peaceful inhabitants the day previous, and hastened
to place a military governor there." [32]

Reposing on these cheaply won laurels, the expedition returned to
Fortress Monroe, leaving Brigadier-General Viele, with some troops
brought from the north side of the river, to hold the place. The
navy-yard and workshops had been set on fire before our troops
withdrew, so as to leave little to the enemy save the glory of
capturing an undefended town. The troops at Fortress Monroe were
numerically superior to the command of General Huger, and could have
been readily combined, with the forces at and about Roanoke Island,
for a forward movement on the south side of the James River. In view
of this probability, General Huger, with the main part of his force,
was halted for a time at Petersburg, but, as soon as it was
ascertained that no preparations were being made by the enemy for
that campaign, so palpably advantageous to him, General Huger's
troops were moved to the north side of the James River to make a
junction with the army of General Johnston.

Previously, detachments had been sent from the force withdrawn from
Norfolk to strengthen the command of Brigadier-General J. B.
Anderson, who was placed in observation before General McDowell, then
at Fredericksburg, threatening to advance with a force four or five
times as great as that under General Anderson, and another detachment
had been sent to the aid of Brigadier-General Branch, who, with his
brigade, had recently been brought up from North Carolina and sent
forward to Gordonsville, for the like purpose as that for which
General Anderson was placed near Fredericksburg.

[Footnote 20: See "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, pp. 10-12,
309-311.]

[Footnote 21: See "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 319. Letter of
President Lincoln to General McClellan, April 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 22: "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 320.]

[Footnote 23: Ibid., p. 321.]

[Footnote 24: "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, pp. 601, 602.]

[Footnote 25: "Life of Commodore Tatnall," pp. 166, 167.]

[Footnote 26: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 340.]

[Footnote 27: On April 6, 1862, President Lincoln wrote to General
McClellan as follows: "You now have over one hundred thousand troops
with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you had better
break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. They will
probably use time as advantageously as you can."--("Report on the
Conduct of the War," pp. 319, 320.)]

[Footnote 28: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 324.]

[Footnote 29: "Report on the Conduct of the War," pp. 323, 324.]

[Footnote 30: "Army of the Potomac," Swinton, p. 117.]

[Footnote 31: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 579.]

[Footnote 32: "History of the Civil War in America," Comte de Paris, vol.
ii, p. 30.]

CHAPTER XXI.

The withdrawal of our army to the Chickahominy, the abandonment of
Norfolk, the destruction of the Virginia, and opening of the lower
James River, together with the fact that McClellan's army, by
changing his base to the head of York River, was in a position to
cover the approach to Washington, and thus to remove the objections
which had been made to sending the large force, retained for the
defense of that city, to make a junction with McClellan, all combined
to give a new phase to our military problem.

Soon after, General Johnston took position on the north side of the
Chickahominy; accompanied by General Lee, I rode out to his
headquarters in the field, in order that by conversation with him we
might better understand his plans and expectations. He came in after
we arrived, saying that he had been riding around his lines to see
how his position could be improved. A long conversation followed,
which was so inconclusive that it lasted until late in the night, so
late that we remained until the next morning. As we rode back to
Richmond, reference was naturally made to the conversation of the
previous evening and night, when General Lee confessed himself, as I
was, unable to draw from it any more definite purpose than that the
policy was to improve his position as far as practicable, and wait
for the enemy to leave his gunboats, so that an opportunity might be
offered to meet him on the land.

In consequence of the opening of the James River to the enemy's
fleet, the attempts to utilize this channel for transportation, so as
to approach directly to Richmond, soon followed. We had then no
defenses on the James River below Drury's Bluff, about seven miles
distant from Richmond. There an earthwork had been constructed and
provided with an armament of four guns. Rifle-pits had been made in
front of the fort, and obstructions had been placed in the river by
driving piles, and sinking some vessels. The crew of the Virginia,
after her destruction, had been sent to this fort, which was then in
charge of Commander Farrand, Confederate States Navy.

On the 15th of April the enemy's fleet of five ships of war, among
the number, their much-vaunted Monitor, took position and opened fire
upon the fort between seven and eight o'clock. Our small vessel, the
Patrick Henry, was lying above the obstruction, and coöperated with
the fort in its defense--the Monitor and ironclad Galena steamed up
to about six hundred yards' distance; the others, wooden vessels,
were kept at long range.

The armor of the flag-ship Galena was badly injured, and many of the
crew killed or wounded. The Monitor was struck repeatedly, but the
shot only bent her plates. At about eleven o'clock the fleet
abandoned the attack, returning discomfited whence they came. The
commander of the Monitor, Lieutenant Jeffers, in his report, says
that "the action was most gallantly fought against great odds, and
with the usual effect against earthworks." . . . He adds, "It was
impossible to reduce such works, except with the aid of a land
force." The enemy in their reports recognized the efficiency of our
fire by both artillery and riflemen, the sincerity of which was made
manifest in the failure to renew the attempt.

[Illustration: The Davis House, at Richmond.]

The small garrison at Fort Drury, only adequate to the service it had
performed, that of repelling an attempt by the fleet to pass up James
River, was quite insufficient to prevent the enemy from landing below
the fort, or to resist an attack by infantry. To guard against its
sudden capture by such means, the garrison was increased by the
addition of Bryan's regiment of Georgia Rifles.

After the repulse of the enemy's gunboats at Drury's Bluff, I wrote
to General Johnston a letter to be handed to him by my aide, Colonel
G. W. C. Lee, an officer of the highest intelligence and reputation--
referring to him for full information in regard to the affair at
Drury's Bluff, as well as to the positions and strength of our forces
on the south side of the James River. After some speculations on the
probable course of the enemy, and expressions of confidence, I
informed the General that my aide would communicate freely to him and
bring back to me any information with which he might be intrusted.
Not receiving any definite reply, I soon thereafter rode out to visit
General Johnston at his headquarters, and was surprised in the
suburbs of Richmond, viz., on the other side of Gillis's Creek, to
meet a portion of light artillery, and to learn that the whole army
had crossed the Chickahominy.

General Johnston's explanation to this (to me) unexpected movement
was, that he thought the water of the Chickahominy unhealthy, and had
directed the troops to cross and halt at the first good water on the
southern side, which he supposed would be found near to the river. He
also adverted to the advantage of having the river in front rather
than in the rear of him--an advantage certainly obvious enough, if
the line was to be near to it on either of its banks.

The considerations which induced General McClellan to make his base
on the York River had at least partly ceased to exist. From the corps
for which he had so persistently applied, he had received the
division which he most valued, and the destruction of the Virginia
had left the James River open to his fleet and transports as far up
as Drury's Bluff, and the withdrawal of General Johnston across the
Chickahominy made it quite practicable for him to transfer his army
to the James River, the south side of which had then but weak
defenses, and thus by a short march to gain more than all the
advantages which, at a later period of the war, General Grant
obtained at the sacrifice of a hecatomb of soldiers.

Referring, again, to the work of the Comte de Paris, who may be
better authority in regard to what occurred in the army of the enemy
than when he writes about Confederate affairs, it appears that this
change of base was considered and not adopted because of General
McClellan's continued desire to have McDowell's corps with him. The
Count states:

"The James River, which had been closed until then by the presence of
the Virginia, as York River had been by the cannon of Yorktown, was
opened by the destruction of that ship, just as York River had been
by the evacuation of the Confederate fortress. But it was only open
as far as Drury's Bluff; in order to overcome this last obstacle
interposed between Richmond and the Federal gunboats, the support of
the land forces was necessary. On the 19th of May Commodore
Goldsborough had a conference with General McClellan regarding the
means to be employed for removing that obstacle. . . . General
McClellan, as we have stated above, might have continued to follow
the railway line, and preserved his depots at Whitehouse, on the
Pamunkey, . . . but he could also now go to reestablish his base of
operations on James River, which the Virginia had hitherto prevented
him from doing. By crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, and
some other fords situated lower down, . . . could have reached the
borders of the James in two or three days. . . . This flank march
effected at a sufficient distance from the enemy, and covered by a
few demonstrations along the upper Chickahominy, offered him great
advantages without involving any risk. . . . If McClellan could have
foreseen how deceptive were the promises of reënforcement made to him
at the time, he would undoubtedly have declined the uncertain support
of McDowell, to carry out the plan of campaign which offered the best
chances of success with the troops which were absolutely at his
disposal." [33]

Without feeling under any obligations for kind intentions on the part
of the Government of the North, it was fortunate for us that it did,
as its friend the Comte de Paris represents, deceive General
McClellan, and prevent him from moving to the south side of the James
River, so as not only to secure the coöperation of his gunboats in an
attack upon Richmond, but to make his assault on the side least
prepared for resistance, and where it would have been quite possible
to cut our line of communication with the more Southern States on
which we chiefly depended for supplies and reënforcements.

It is hardly just to treat the failure to fulfill the assurance given
by President Lincoln about reënforcements as "deceptive promises,"
for, as will be seen, the operations in the Valley by General
Jackson, who there exhibited a rapidity of movement equal to the
unyielding tenacity which had in the first great battle won for him
the familiar name "Stonewall," had created such an alarm in
Washington, as, if it had been better founded, would have justified
the refusal to diminish the force held for the protection of their
capital. Indeed, our cavalry, in observation near Fredericksburg,
reported that on the 24th McDowell's troops started southward, but
General Stuart found that night that they were returning. This
indicated that the anticipated junction was not to be made, and of
this the Prince of Joinville writes:

"It needed only an effort of the will: the two armies were united,
and in the possession of Richmond certain! Alas! this effort was not
made. I can not recall those fatal moments without a real sinking of
the heart." [34]

General McClellan, in his testimony December 10, 1862, before the
court-martial in the case of General McDowell, said:

"I have no doubt, for it has ever been my opinion, that the Army of
the Potomac would have taken Richmond had not the corps of General
McDowell been separated from it. It is also my opinion that, had the
command of General McDowell joined the Army of the Potomac in the
month of May, by the way of Hanover Court-House, from Fredericksburg,
we would have had Richmond within a week after the junction." [35]

Let us first inquire what was the size of this army so crippled for
want of reënforcement, and then what the strength of that to which it
was opposed. On the 30th of April, 1862, the official report of
McClellan's army gives the aggregate present for duty as 112,392;[36]
that of the 20th of June--omitting the army corps of General Dix,
then, as previously, stationed at Fortress Monroe, and including
General McCall's division, which had recently joined, the strength of
which was reported to be 9,514--gives the aggregate present for
duty as 105,825, and the total, present and absent, as 156,838.[37]

Two statements of the strength of our army under General J. E.
Johnston during the month of May--in which General McClellan
testified that he was greatly in need of McDowell's corps--give the
following results: First, the official return, 21st May, 1862, total
effective of all arms, 53,688; subsequently, five brigades were
added, and the effective strength of the army under General Johnston
on May 31, 1862, was 62,696.[38]

I now proceed to inquire what caused the panic at Washington.

On May 23d, General Jackson, with whose force that of General Ewell
had united, moved with such rapidity as to surprise the enemy, and
Ewell, who was in advance, captured most of the troops at Front
Royal, and pressed directly on to Winchester, while Jackson, turning
across to the road from Strasburg, struck the main column of the
enemy in flank and drove it routed back to Strasburg. The pursuit was
continued to Winchester, and the enemy, under their commander-in-chief,
General Banks, fled across the Potomac into Maryland. Two thousand
prisoners were taken in the pursuit. General Banks in his report says,
"There never were more grateful hearts in the same number of men, than
when, at mid-day on the 26th, we stood on the opposite shore."

When the news of the attack on Front Royal, on May 23d, reached
General Geary, charged with the protection of the Manassas Gap
Railroad, he immediately moved to Manassas Junction. At the same
time, his troops, hearing the most extravagant stories, burned their
tents and destroyed a quantity of arms. General Duryea, at Catlett's
Station, becoming alarmed on hearing of the withdrawal of Geary, took
his three New York regiments, leaving a Pennsylvania one behind,
hastened back to Centreville, and telegraphed to Washington for aid.
He left behind a large quantity of army stores. The alarm spread to
Washington, and the Secretary of War, Stanton, issued a call to the
Governors of the "loyal" States for militia to defend that city.

[Illustration: Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson.]

The following is the dispatch sent to the Governor of Massachusetts:

"WASHINGTON, _Sunday, May 25, 1862._

"_To the Governor of Massachusetts._

"Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in
great force are marching on Washington. You will please organize and
forward immediately all the militia and volunteer force in your State.

"EDWIN M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_."

This alarm at Washington, and the call for more troops for its
defense, produced a most indescribable panic in the cities of the
Northern States on Sunday the 25th, and two or three days afterward.
The Governor of New York on Sunday night telegraphed to Buffalo,
Rochester, Syracuse, and other cities, as follows:

"Orders from Washington render it necessary to send to that city all
the available militia force. What can you do?

"E. D. MORGAN."

Governor Curtin, of Pennsylvania, issued the following order:

"(GENERAL ORDER, No. 23.)

"HEADQUARTERS OF PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA,

"Harrisburg, _May 26, 1862._

"On pressing requisition of the President of the United States in the
present emergency, it is ordered that the several major-generals,
brigadier-generals, and colonels of regiments throughout the
Commonwealth muster without delay all military organizations within
their respective divisions or under their control, together with all
persons willing to join their commands, and proceed forthwith to the
city of Washington, or such other points as may be designated by
future orders. By order:

"A. G. CURTIN,

"_Governor and Commander-in-Chief._"

The Governor of Massachusetts issued the following proclamation:

"_Men of Massachusetts!_

"The wily and barbarous horde of traitors to the people, to the
Government, to our country, and to liberty, menace again the national
capital. They have attacked and routed Major-General Banks, are
advancing on Harper's Ferry, and are marching on Washington. The
President calls on Massachusetts to rise once more for its rescue and
defense.

"The whole active militia will be summoned by a general order, issued
from the office of the adjutant-general, to report on Boston Common
to-morrow. They will march to relieve and avenge their brethren and
friends, and to oppose, with fierce zeal and courageous patriotism,
the progress of the foe. May God encourage their hearts and
strengthen their arms, and may he inspire the Government and all the
people!

"Given at headquarters, Boston, eleven o'clock, this (Sunday)
evening. May 25, 1862.

"JOHN A. ANDREW."

The Governor of Ohio issued the following proclamation:

"COLUMBUS, Ohio, _May 26, 1862._

"_To the gallant men of Ohio._

"I have the astounding intelligence that the seat of our beloved
Government is threatened with invasion, and am called upon by the
Secretary of War for troops to repel and overwhelm the ruthless
invaders. Rally, then, men of Ohio, and respond to this call, as
becomes those who appreciate our glorious Government! . . . The
number wanted from each county has been indicated by special
dispatches to the several military committees.

"DAVID TOD, _Governor._"

At the same time the Secretary of War at Washington caused the
following order to be issued:

"WASHINGTON, _Sunday, May 25, 1862._

"_Ordered:_ By virtue of the authority vested by an act of Congress,
the President takes military possession of all the railroads in the
United States from and after this date, and directs that the
respective railroad companies, their officers and servants, shall
hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of troops and
munitions of war, as may be ordered by the military authorities, to
the exclusion of all other business.

"By order of the Secretary of War:

"M. C. MEIGS,

"_Quartermaster-General_."

At the first moment of the alarm, the President of the United States
issued the following order:

"WASHINGTON, _May 24 1862_.

"Major-General MCDOWELL.

"General Fremont has been ordered by telegraph to move to Franklin
and Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks and capture or destroy
Jackson's and Ewell's forces. You are instructed, laying aside for
the present the movement on Richmond, to put twenty thousand men in
motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line or in advance
of the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Your object will be to
capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in coöperation with
General Fremont, or, in case want of supplies or transportation has
interfered with his movement, it is believed that the force which you
move will be sufficient to accomplish the object alone. The
information thus far received here makes it probable that, if the
enemy operates actively against General Banks, you will not be able
to count upon much assistance from him, but may have even to release
him. Reports received this morning are that Banks is fighting with
Ewell, eight miles from Harper's Ferry.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

When the panic thus indicated in the headquarters of the enemy had
disseminated itself through the military and social ramifications of
Northern society, the excitement was tumultuous. Meanwhile, General
Jackson, little conceiving the alarm his movements had caused in the
departments at Washington and in the offices of the Governors of
States, in addition to the diversion of McDowell from coöperation in
the attack upon Richmond, after driving the enemy out of Winchester,
pressed eagerly on, not pausing to accept the congratulations of the
overjoyed people at the sight of their own friends again among them,
for he learned that the enemy had garrisons at Charlestown and
Harper's Ferry, and he was resolved they should not rest on Virginia
soil. General Winder's brigade in the advance found the enemy drawn
up in line of battle at Charlestown. Without waiting for
reënforcements, he engaged them, and after a short conflict drove
them in disorder toward the Potomac. The main column then moved on
near to Harper's Ferry, where General Jackson received information
that Fremont was moving from the west, and the whole or a part of
General McDowell's corps from the east, to make a junction in his
rear and thus cut off his retreat. At this time General Jackson's
effective force was about fifteen thousand men, much less than either
of the two armies which were understood to be marching to form a
junction against him. We now know that General McDowell had been
ordered to send to the relief of General Banks in the Valley twenty
to thirty thousand men. The estimated force, of General Fremont when
at Harrisonburg was twenty thousand. General Jackson had captured in
his campaign down the Valley a very large amount of valuable stores,
over nine thousand small-arms, two pieces of artillery, many horses,
and, besides the wounded and sick, who had been released on parole,
was said to have twenty-three hundred prisoners. To secure these, as
well as to save his army, it was necessary to retreat beyond the
point where his enemies could readily unite. The amount of captured
stores and other property which he was anxious to preserve were said
to require a wagon-train twelve miles long. This, under the care of a
regiment, was sent forward in advance of the army, which promptly
retired up the Valley.

On his retreat, General Jackson received information confirmatory of
the report of the movements of the enemy, and of the defeat of a
small force he had left at Front Royal in charge of some prisoners
and captured stores--the latter, however, the garrison before
retreating had destroyed. Strasburg being General Jackson's objective
point, he had farther to march to reach that position than either of
the columns operating against him. The rapidity of movement which
marked General Jackson's operations had given to his command the
appellation of "foot cavalry"; and never had they more need to show
themselves entitled to the name of Stonewall.

On the night of the 31st of May, by a forced march, General Jackson
arrived with the head of his column at Strasburg, and learned that
General Fremont's advance was in the immediate vicinity. To gain time
for the rest of his army to arrive, General Jackson decided to check
Fremont's march by an attack in the morning. This movement was
assigned to General Ewell, General Jackson personally giving his
attention to preserving his immense trains filled with captured
stores. The repulse of Fremont's advance was so easy that General
Taylor describes it as offering a temptation to go beyond General
Jackson's orders and make a serious attack upon Fremont's army, but
recognizes the justice of the restraint imposed by the order, "as we
could not waste time chasing Fremont," for it was reported that
General Shields was at Front Royal with troops of a different
character from those of Fremont's army, who had been encountered near
Strasburg, _id est_, the corps "commanded by General O. O. Howard,
and called by both sides 'the flying Dutchmen.'" This more formidable
command of General Shields therefore required immediate attention.

Leaving Strasburg on the evening of June 1st, always intent to
prevent a junction of the two armies of the enemy, Jackson continued
his march up the Valley. Fremont followed in pursuit, while Shields
moved slowly up the Valley via Luray, for the purpose of reaching New
Market in advance of Jackson. On the morning of the 5th Jackson
reached Harrisonburg, and, passing beyond that town, turned toward
the east in the direction of Port Republic. General Ashby had
destroyed all the bridges between Front Royal and Port Republic, to
prevent Shields from crossing the Shenandoah to join Fremont. The
troops were now permitted to make shorter marches, and were allowed
some halts to refresh them after their forced marches and frequent
combats. Early on the 6th of June Fremont's reënforced cavalry
attacked our cavalry rear-guard under General Ashby. A sharp conflict
ensued, which resulted in the repulse of the enemy and the capture of
Colonel Percy Wyndham, commanding the brigade, and sixty-three
others. General Ashby was in position between Harrisonburg and Port
Republic, and, after the cavalry combat just described, there were
indications of a more serious attack. Ashby sent a message to Ewell,
informing him that cavalry supported by infantry was advancing upon
his position. The Fifty-eighth Virginia and the First Maryland
Regiments were sent to his support. Ashby led the Fifty-eighth
Virginia to attack the enemy, who were under cover of a fence.
General Ewell in the mean time had arrived, and, seeing the advantage
the enemy had of position, directed Colonel Johnson to move with his
regiment so as to approach the flank instead of the front of the
enemy, and he was now driven from the field with heavy loss. Our loss
was seventeen killed, fifty wounded, and three missing. Here fell the
stainless, fearless cavalier, General Turner Ashby, of whom General
Jackson in his report thus forcibly speaks:

"As a partisan officer I never knew his superior. His daring was
proverbial; his power of endurance almost incredible; his tone of
character heroic; and his sagacity almost intuitive in divining the
purposes and movements of the enemy."

The main body of General Jackson's command had now reached Port
Republic, a village situated in the angle formed by the junction of
the North and South Rivers, tributaries of the South Fork of the
Shenandoah. Over the North River was a wooden bridge, connecting the
town with Harrisonburg. Over the South River there was a ford.
Jackson's immediate command was encamped on the high ground north of
the village and about a mile from the river. Ewell was some four
miles distant, near the road leading from Harrisonburg to Port
Republic. General Fremont had arrived with his forces in the vicinity
of Harrisonburg, and General Shields was moving up the east side of
the Shenandoah, and had reached Conrad's Store. Each was about
fifteen miles distant from Jackson's position. To prevent a junction,
the bridge over the river, near Shields's position, had been
destroyed.

As the advance of General Shields approached on the 8th, the brigades
of Taliaferro and Winder were ordered to occupy positions immediately
north of the bridge. The enemy's cavalry, accompanied by artillery,
then appeared, and, after directing a few shots toward the bridge,
crossed South River, and, dashing into the village, planted one of
their pieces at the southern entrance of the bridge. Meantime our
batteries were placed in position, and, Taliaferro's brigade having
approached the bridge, was ordered to dash across, capture the piece,
and occupy the town. This was gallantly done, and the enemy's cavalry
dispersed and driven back, abandoning another gun. A considerable
body of infantry was now seen advancing, when our batteries opened
with marked effect, and in a short time the infantry followed the
cavalry, falling back three miles. They were pursued about a mile by
our batteries on the opposite bank, when they disappeared in a wood.

This attack of Shields had scarcely been repulsed when Ewell became
seriously engaged with Fremont, moving on the opposite side of the
river. The enemy pushed forward, driving in the pickets, which, by
gallant resistance, checked their advance until Ewell had time to
select his position on a commanding ridge, with a rivulet and open
ground in front, woods on both flanks, and the road to Port Republic
intersecting his line. Trimble's brigade was posted on the right, the
batteries of Courtney, Lusk, Brockenbrough, and Rains in the center,
Stuart's brigade on the left, and Elzey's in rear of the center. Both
wings were in the woods. About ten o'clock the enemy posted his
artillery opposite our batteries, and a fire was kept up for several
hours, with great spirit on both sides. Meantime a brigade of the
enemy advanced, under cover, upon General Trimble, who reserved his
fire until they reached short range, when he poured forth a deadly
volley, under which they fell back; Trimble, supported by two
regiments of Elzey's reserve, now advanced, with spirited
skirmishing, more than a mile from his original line, driving the
opposing force back to its former position. Ewell, finding no attack
on his left was designed by the enemy, advanced and drove in their
skirmishers, and at night was in position on ground previously
occupied by the foe. This engagement has generally been known as the
battle of Cross Keys.

As General Shields made no movement to renew the action of the 8th,
General Jackson determined to attack him on the 9th. Accordingly,
Ewell's forces were moved at an early hour toward Port Republic, and
General Trimble was left to hold Fremont in check, or, if hard
pressed, to retire across the river and burn the bridge, which
subsequently was done, under orders to concentrate against Shields.

Meanwhile the enemy had taken position about two miles from Port
Republic, their right on the river-bank, their left on the slope of
the mountain which here threw out a spur, between which and the river
was a smooth plain of about a thousand yards wide. On an elevated
plateau of the mountain was placed a battery of long-range guns to
sweep the plain over which our forces must pass to attack. In front
of that plateau was a deep gorge, through which flowed a small
stream, trending to the southern side of the promontory, so as to
leave its northern point in advance of the southern. The
mountain-side was covered with dense wood.

Such was the position which Jackson must assail, or lose the
opportunity to fight his foe in detail--the object for which his
forced marches had been made, and on which his best hopes depended.

General Winder's brigade moved down the river to attack, when the
enemy's battery upon the plateau opened, and it was found to rake the
plain over which we must approach for a considerable distance in
front of Shields's position. Our guns were brought forward, and an
attempt made to dislodge the battery of the enemy, but our fire
proved unequal to theirs; whereupon General Winder, having been
reënforced, attempted by a rapid charge to capture it, but
encountered such a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms as to
compel his command, composed of his own and another brigade, with a
light battery, to fall back in disorder. The enemy advanced steadily,
and in such numbers as to drive back our infantry supports and render
it necessary to withdraw our guns. Ewell was hurrying his men over
the bridge, and there was no fear, if human effort would avail, that
he would come too late. But the condition was truly critical. General
Taylor describes his chief at that moment thus: "Jackson was on the
road, a little in advance of his line, where the fire was hottest,
with reins on his horse's neck, seemingly in prayer. Attracted by my
approach, he said, in his usual voice, 'Delightful excitement.'" He
then briefly gave Taylor instructions to move against the battery on
the plateau, and sent a young officer from his staff as a guide. The
advance of the enemy was checked by an attack on his flank by two of
our regiments, under Colonel Scott; but this was only a temporary
relief, for this small command was soon afterward driven back to the
woods, with severe loss. Our batteries during the check were all
safely withdrawn except one six-pounder gun.

In this critical condition of Winder's command, General Taylor made a
successful attack on the left and rear of the enemy, which diverted
attention from the front, and led to a concentration of his force
upon him. Moving to the right along the mountain acclivity, he was
unseen before he emerged from the wood, just as the loud cheers of
the enemy proclaimed their success in front. Although opposed by a
superior force in front and flank, and with their guns in position,
with a rush and shout the gorge was passed, impetuously the charge
was made, and the battery of six guns fell into our hands. Three
times was this battery lost and won in the desperate and determined
efforts to capture and recover it, and the enemy finally succeeded in
carrying off one of the guns, leaving both caisson and limber. Thus
occupied with Taylor, the enemy halted in his advance, and formed a
line facing to the mountain. Winder succeeded in rallying his
command, and our batteries were replaced in their former positions.
At the same time reënforcements were brought by General Ewell to
Taylor, who pushed forward with them, assisted by the well-directed
fire of our artillery.

Of this period in the battle, than which there has seldom been one of
greater peril, or where danger was more gallantly met, I copy a
description from the work of General Taylor:

"The fighting in and around the battery was hand-to-hand, and many
fell from bayonet-wounds. Even the artillerymen used their rammers in
a way not laid down in the manual, and died at their guns. I called
for Hayes, but he, the promptest of men, and his splendid regiment
could not be found. Something unexpected had occurred, but there was
no time for speculation. With a desperate rally, in which I believe
the drummer-boys shared, we carried the battery for the third time,
and held it. Infantry and riflemen had been driven off, and we began
to feel a little comfortable, when the enemy, arrested in his advance
by our attack, appeared. He had countermarched, and, with left near
the river, came into full view of our situation. Wheeling to the
right, with colors advanced, like a solid wall he marched straight
upon us. There seemed nothing left but to set our back to the
mountain and die hard. At the instant, crashing through the
underwood, came Ewell, outriding staff and escort. He produced the
effect of a reënforcement, and was welcomed with cheers. The line
before us halted and threw forward skirmishers. A moment later a
shell came shrieking along it, loud Confederate cheers reached our
delighted ears, and Jackson, freed from his toils, rushed up like a
whirlwind." [39]

The enemy, in his advance, had gone in front of the plateau where his
battery was placed, the elevation being sufficient to enable the guns
without hazard to be fired over the advancing line; so, when he
commenced retreating, he had to pass by the position of this battery,
and the captured guns were effectively used against him--that
dashing old soldier, "Ewell, serving as a gunner." Mention was made
of the inability to find Hayes when his regiment was wanted. It is
due to that true patriot, who has been gathered to his fathers, to
add Taylor's explanation: "Ere long my lost Seventh Regiment, sadly
cut up, rejoined. This regiment was in rear of the column when we
left Jackson to gain the path in the woods, and, before it filed out
of the road, his thin line was so pressed that Jackson ordered Hayes
to stop the enemy's rush. This was done, for the Seventh would have
stopped a herd of elephants--but at a fearful cost."

The retreat of the enemy, though it was so precipitate as to cause
him to leave his killed and wounded on the field, was never converted
into a rout. "Shields's brave 'boys' preserved their organization to
the last; and, had Shields himself, with his whole command, been on
the field, we should have had tough work indeed."

The pursuit was continued some five miles beyond the battle-field,
during which we captured four hundred and fifty prisoners, some
wagons, one piece of abandoned artillery, and about eight hundred
muskets. Some two hundred and seventy-five wounded were paroled in
the hospitals near Port Republic. On the next day Fremont withdrew
his forces, and retreated down the Valley. The rapid movements of
Jackson, the eagle-like stoop with which he had descended upon each
army of the enemy, and the terror which his name had come to inspire,
created a great alarm at Washington, where it was believed he must
have an immense army, and that he was about to come down like an
avalanche upon the capital. Milroy, Banks, Fremont, and Shields were
all moved in that direction, and peace again reigned in the patriotic
and once happy Valley of the Shenandoah.

The material results of this very remarkable campaign are thus
summarily stated by one who had special means of information:

"In three months Jackson had marched six hundred miles, fought four
pitched battles, seven minor engagements, and daily skirmishes; had
defeated four armies, captured seven pieces of artillery, ten
thousand stand of arms, four thousand prisoners, and a very great
amount of stores, inflicting upon his adversaries a known loss of two
thousand men, with a loss upon his own part comparatively small." [40]

The general effect upon the affairs of the Confederacy was even more
important, and the motives which influenced Jackson present him in a
grander light than any military success could have done. Thus, on the
20th of March, 1862, he learned that the large force of the enemy
before which he had retired was returning down the Valley, and,
divining the object to be to send forces to the east side of the
mountain to coöperate in the attack upon Richmond, General Jackson,
with his small force of about three thousand infantry and two hundred
and ninety cavalry, moved with his usual celerity in pursuit. He
overtook the rear of the column at Kernstown, attacked a very
superior force he found there, and fought with such desperation as to
impress the enemy with the idea that he had a large army; therefore,
the detachments, which had already started for Manassas, were
recalled, and additional forces were also sent into the Valley. Nor
was this all. McDowell's corps, under orders to join McClellan, was
detained for the defense of the Federal capital.

Jackson's bold strategy had effected the object for which his
movement was designed, and he slowly retreated to the south bank of
the Shenandoah, where he remained undisturbed by the enemy, and had
time to recruit his forces, which, by the 28th of April, amounted to
six or seven thousand men. General Banks had advanced and occupied
Harrisonburg, about fifteen miles from Jackson's position. Fremont,
with a force estimated at fifteen thousand men, was reported to be
preparing to join Banks's command.

The alarm at Washington had caused McDowell's corps to be withdrawn
from the upper Rappahannock to Fredericksburg. Jackson, anxious to
take advantage of the then divided condition of the enemy, sent to
Richmond for reënforcements, but our condition there did not enable
us to furnish any, except the division of Ewell, which had been left
near Gordonsville in observation of McDowell, now by his withdrawal
made disposable, and the brigade of Edward Johnson, which confronted
Schenck and Milroy near to Staunton. Jackson, who, when he could not
get what he wanted, did the best he could with what he had, called
Ewell to his aid, left him to hold Banks in check, and marched to
unite with Johnson; the combined forces attacked Milroy and Schenck,
who, after a severe conflict, retreated in the night to join Fremont.
Jackson then returned toward Harrisonburg, having ordered Ewell to
join him for an attack on Banks, who in the mean time had retreated
toward Winchester, where Jackson attacked and defeated him,
inflicting great loss, drove him across the Potomac, and, as has been
represented, filled the authorities at Washington with such dread of
its capture as to disturb the previously devised plans against
Richmond, and led to the operations which have already been
described, and brought into full play Jackson's military genius. In
all these operations there conspicuously appears the self-abnegation
of a devoted patriot. He was not seeking by great victories to
acquire fame for himself; but, always alive to the necessities and
dangers elsewhere, he heroically strove to do what was possible for
the general benefit of the cause he maintained. His whole heart was
his country's, and his whole country's heart was his.

[Footnote 33: "History of the Civil War in America," Comte de Paris,
vol. ii, pp. 32-34.]

[Footnote 34: "Campaign on the Peninsula," Prince de Joinville, 1862.]

[Footnote 35: Court-Martial of General McDowell, Washington, December
10, 1862.]

[Footnote 36: "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 322.]

[Footnote 37: Ibid., p. 337.]

[Footnote 38: "Four Years with General Lee," by Walter H. Taylor, p. 50.]

[Footnote 39: "Destruction and Reconstruction" pp. 75, 76.]

[Footnote 40: "Stonewall Jackson," military biography by John Esten
Cooke, p. 194.]

CHAPTER XXII.

Our army having retreated from the Peninsula, and withdrawn from the
north side of the Chickahominy to the immediate vicinity of Richmond,
I rode out occasionally to the lines and visited the headquarters of
the commanding General. There were no visible preparations for
defense, and my brief conversations with the General afforded no
satisfactory information as to his plans and purposes. We had, under
the supervision of General Lee, perfected as far as we could the
detached works before the city, but these were rather designed to
protect it against a sudden attack than to resist approaches by a
great army. They were, also, so near to the city that it might have
been effectually bombarded by guns exterior to them. Anxious for the
defense of the ancient capital of Virginia, now the capital of the
Confederate States, and remembering a remark of General Johnston,
that the Spaniards were the only people who now undertook to hold
fortified towns, I had written to him that he knew the defense of
Richmond must be made at a distance from it. Seeing no preparation to
keep the enemy at a distance, and kept in ignorance of any plan for
such purpose, I sent for General B. E. Lee, then at Richmond, in
general charge of army operations, and told him why and how I was
dissatisfied with the condition of affairs.

He asked me what I thought it was proper to do. Recurring to a
conversation held about the time we had together visited General
Johnston, I answered that McClellan should be attacked on the other
side of the Chickahominy before he matured his preparations for a
siege of Richmond. To this he promptly assented, as I anticipated he
would, for I knew it had been his own opinion. He then said: "General
Johnston should of course advise you of what he expects or proposes
to do. Let me go and see him, and defer this discussion until I
return."

It may be proper here to say that I had not doubted that General
Johnston was fully in accord with me as to the purpose of defending
Richmond, but I was not content with his course for that end. It had
not occurred to me that he meditated a retreat which would uncover
the capital, nor was it ever suspected until, in reading General
Hood's book, published in 1880, the evidence was found that General
Johnston, when retreating from Yorktown, told his volunteer aide, Mr.
McFarland, that "he [Johnston] expected or intended to give up
Richmond." [41]

When General Lee came back, he told me that General Johnston
proposed, on the next Thursday, to move against the enemy as follows:
General. A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flank and rear of
the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to
cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in
flank, and by the conjunction of the two it was expected to double
him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville Bridge and
attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped by
both of us.

On the morning of the day proposed, I hastily dispatched my office
business, and rode out toward the Meadow Bridge to see the action
commence. On the road I found Smith's division halted, and the men
dispersed in the woods. Looking for some one from whom I could get
information, I finally saw General Hood, and asked him the meaning of
what I saw. He told me he did not know anything more than that they
had been halted. I asked him where General Smith was; he said he
believed he had gone to a farmhouse in the rear, adding that he
thought he was ill. Riding on to the bluff which overlooks the Meadow
Bridge, I asked Colonel Anderson, posted there in observation,
whether he had seen anything of the enemy in his front. He said that
he had seen only two mounted men across the bridge, and a small party
of infantry on the other side of the river, some distance below, both
of whom, he said, he could show me if I would go with him into the
garden back of the house. There, by the use of a powerful glass, were
distinctly visible two cavalry videttes at the further end of the
bridge, and a squad of infantry lower down the river, who had covered
themselves with a screen of green boughs. The Colonel informed me
that he had not heard Hill's guns; it was, therefore, supposed he had
not advanced. I then rode down the bank of the river, followed by a
cavalcade of sight-seers, who, I supposed, had been attracted by the
expectation of a battle. The little squad of infantry, about fifteen
in number, as we approached, fled over the ridge, and were lost to
sight. Near to the Mechanicsville Bridge I found General Howell Cobb,
commanding the support of a battery of artillery. He pointed out to
me on the opposite side of the river the only enemy he had seen, and
which was evidently a light battery. Riding on to the main road which
led to the Mechanicsville Bridge, I found General Longstreet, walking
to and fro in an impatient, it might be said fretful, manner. Before
speaking to him, he said his division had been under arms all day
waiting for orders to advance, and that the day was now so far spent
that he did not know what was the matter. I afterward learned from
General Smith that he had received information from a citizen that
the Beaver-dam Creek presented an impassable barrier, and that he had
thus fortunately been saved from a disaster. Thus ended the
offensive-defensive programme from which Lee expected much, and of
which I was hopeful.

In the mean while the enemy moved up, and, finding the crossing at
Bottom's Bridge unobstructed, threw a brigade of the Fourth Corps
across the Chickahominy as early as the 20th of May, and on the 23d
sent over the rest of the Fourth Corps; on the 25th he sent over
another corps, and commenced fortifying a line near to Seven Pines.
In the forenoon of the 31st of May, riding out on the New Bridge
road, I heard firing in the direction of Seven Pines. As I drew
nearer, I saw General Whiting, with part of General Smith's division,
file into the road in front of me; at the same time I saw General
Johnston ride across the field from a house before which General
Lee's horse was standing. I turned down to the house, and asked
General Lee what the musketry-firing meant. He replied by asking
whether I had heard it, and was answered in the affirmative; he said
he had been under that impression himself, but General Johnston had
assured him that it could be nothing more than an artillery duel. It
is scarcely necessary to add that neither of us had been advised of a
design to attack the enemy that day.

We then walked out to the rear of the house to listen, and were
satisfied that an action, or at least a severe skirmish, must be
going on. General Johnston states in his report that the condition of
the air was peculiarly unfavorable to the transmission of sound.

General Lee and myself then rode to the field of battle, which may be
briefly described as follows:

The Chickahominy flowing in front is a deep, sluggish, and narrow
river, bordered by marshes, and covered with tangled wood. The line
of battle extended along the Nine-mile road, across the York River
Railroad and Williamsburg stage-road. The enemy had constructed
redoubts, with long lines of rifle-pits covered by abatis, from below
Bottom's Bridge to within less than two miles of New Bridge, and had
constructed bridges to connect his forces on the north and south
sides of the Chickahominy. The left of his forces, on the south side,
was thrown forward from the river; the right was on its bank, and
covered by its slope. Our main force was on the right flank of our
position, extending on both sides of the Williamsburg road, near to
its intersection with the Nine-mile road. This wing consisted of
Hill's, Huger's, and Longstreet's divisions, with light batteries,
and a small force of cavalry; the division of General G. W. Smith,
less Hood's brigade ordered to the right, formed the left wing, and
its position was on the Nine-mile road. There were small tracts of
cleared land, but most of the ground was wooded, and much of it so
covered with water as to seriously embarrass the movements of troops.

When General Lee and I riding down the Nine-mile road reached the
left of our line, we found the troops hotly engaged. Our men had
driven the enemy from his advanced encampment, and he had fallen back
behind an open field to the bank of the river, where, in a dense
wood, was concealed an infantry line, with artillery in position.
Soon after our arrival, General Johnston, who had gone farther to the
right, where the conflict was expected, and whither reënforcement
from the left was marching, was brought back severely wounded, and,
as soon as an ambulance could be obtained, was removed from the field.

Our troops on the left made vigorous assaults under most
disadvantageous circumstances. They made several gallant attempts to
carry the enemy's position, but were each time repulsed with heavy
loss.

After a personal reconnaissance on the left of the open in our front,
I sent one, then another, and another courier to General Magruder,
directing him to send a force down by the wooded path, just under the
bluff, to attack the enemy in flank and reverse. Impatient of delay,
I had started to see General Magruder, when I met the third courier,
who said he had not found General Magruder, but had delivered the
message to Brigadier-General Griffith, who was moving by the path
designated to make the attack.

On returning to the field, I found that the attack in front had
ceased; it was, therefore, too late for a single brigade to effect
anything against the large force of the enemy, and messengers were
sent through the woods to direct General Griffith to go back.

The heavy rain during the night of the 30th had swollen the
Chickahominy; it was rising when the battle of Seven Pines was
fought, but had not reached such height as to prevent the enemy from
using his bridges; consequently, General Sumner, during the
engagement, brought over his corps as a reënforcement. He was on the
north side of the river, had built two bridges to connect with the
south side, and, though their coverings were loosened by the upward
pressure of the rising water, they were not yet quite impassable.
With the true instinct of the soldier to march upon fire, when the
sound of the battle reached him, he formed his corps and stood under
arms waiting for an order to advance. He came too soon for us, and,
but for his forethought and promptitude, he would have arrived too
late for his friends. It may be granted that his presence saved the
left wing of the Federal army from defeat.

As we had permitted the enemy to fortify before our attack, it would
have been better to have waited another day, until the bridges should
have been rendered impassable by the rise of the river.

General Lee, at nightfall, gave instructions to General Smith, the
senior officer on that part of the battle-field, and left with me to
return to Richmond.

Thus far I have only attempted to describe events on the extreme left
of the battle-field, being that part of which I had personal
observation; but the larger force and, consequently, the more serious
conflict were upon the right of the line. To these I will now refer.
Our force there consisted of the divisions of Major-Generals D. H.
Hill, Huger, and Longstreet, the latter in chief command. In his
report, first published in the "Southern Historical Society Papers,"
vol. iii, pp. 277, 278, he writes:

"Agreeably to verbal instructions from the commanding General, the
division of Major-General D. H. Hill was, on the morning of the 31st
ultimo, formed at an early hour on the Williamsburg road, as the
column of attack upon the enemy's front on that road. . . . The
division of Major-General Huger was intended to make a strong flank
movement around the left of the enemy's position, and attack him in
rear of that flank. . . . After waiting some six hours for these
troops to get into position, I determined to move forward without
regard to them, and gave orders to that effect to Major-General D. H.
Hill. The forward movement began about two o'clock, and our
skirmishers soon became engaged with those of the enemy. The entire
division of General Hill became engaged about three o'clock, and
drove the enemy steadily back, gaining possession of his abatis and
part of his intrenched camp, General Rodes, by a movement to the
right, driving in the enemy's left. The only reënforcements on the
field in hand were my own brigades, of which Anderson's, Wilcox's,
and Kemper's were put in by the front on the Williamsburg road, and
Colston's and Pryor's by my right flank. At the same time the decided
and gallant attack made by the other brigades gained entire
possession of the enemy's position, with his artillery,
camp-equipage, etc. Anderson's brigade, under Colonel Jenkins,
pressing forward rapidly, continued to drive the enemy till
nightfall. . . . The conduct of the attack was left entirely to
Major-General Hill. The entire success of the affair is sufficient
evidence of his ability, courage, and skill."

This tribute to General Hill was no more than has been accorded to
him by others who knew of his services on that day, and was in
keeping with the determined courage, vigilance, and daring exhibited
by him on other fields.

The reference, made, without qualification, in General Longstreet's
report, to the failure of General Huger to make the attack expected
of him, and the freedom with which others have criticised him,
renders it proper that some explanation should be given of an
apparent dilatoriness on the part of that veteran soldier, who, after
long and faithful service, now fills an honored grave.

It will be remembered that General Huger was to move by the Charles
City road, so as to turn the left of the enemy and attack him in
flank. The extraordinary rain of the previous night had swollen every
rivulet to the dimensions of a stream, and the route prescribed to
General Huger was one especially affected by that heavy rain, as it
led to the head of the White-Oak Swamp. The bridge over the stream
flowing into that swamp had been carried away, and the alternatives
presented to him was to rebuild the bridge or leave his artillery. He
chose the former, which involved the delay that has subjected him to
criticism. If any should think an excuse necessary to justify this
decision, they are remanded to the accepted military maxim, that the
march must never be so hurried as to arrive unfit for service; and,
also, they may be reminded that Huger's specialty was artillery, he
being the officer who commanded the siege-guns with which General
Scott marched from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico. To show that the
obstacles encountered were not of such slight character as energy
would readily overcome, I refer to the report of an officer
commanding a brigade on that occasion, Brigadier-General R. E. Rodes,
whose great merit and dashing gallantry caused him to be admired
throughout the army of the Confederacy. He said:

"On the morning of the 31st the brigade was stationed on the Charles
City road, three and a half miles from the point on the Williamsburg
road from which it had been determined to start the columns of
attack. . . . I received a verbal order from General Hill to conduct
my command at once to the point at which the attack was to be made.
. . . The progress of the brigade was considerably delayed by the
washing away of a bridge near the head of White-Oak Swamp, by reason
of which the men had to wade in water waist-deep, and a large number
were entirely submerged. At this point the character of the crossing
was such that it was absolutely necessary to proceed with great
caution to prevent the loss of both ammunition and life. In
consequence of this delay, and notwithstanding that the men were
carried at double-quick time over very heavy ground for a
considerable distance to make up for it, when the signal for attack
was given, only my line of skirmishers, the Sixth Alabama and the
Twelfth Mississippi Regiments, was in position. . . . The ground over
which we were to move being covered with thick undergrowth, and the
soil being marshy--so marshy that it was with great difficulty that
either horses or men could get over it--and being guided only by the
fire in front, I emerged from the woods from the Williamsburg road
under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, with only five
companies of the Fifth Alabama."

General Huger's line of march was farther to the right, therefore
nearer to White-Oak Swamp, and the impediments consequently greater
than where General Rodes found the route so difficult as to be
dangerous even to infantry.

On the next day, the 1st of June, General Longstreet states that a
serious attack was made on our position, and that it was repulsed.
This refers to the works which Hill's division had captured the day
before, and which the enemy endeavored to retake.

From the final report of General Longstreet, already cited, it
appears that he was ordered to attack on the morning of the 31st, and
he explains why it was postponed for six hours; then he states that
it was commenced by the division of General D. H. Hill, which drove
the enemy steadily back, pressing forward until nightfall. The
movement of Rodes's brigade on the right flank is credited with
having contributed much to the dislodgment of the enemy from their
abatis and first intrenchments. As just stated. General Longstreet
reports a delay of some six hours in making this attack, because he
was waiting for General Huger, and then made it successfully with
Hill's division and some brigades from his own. These questions must
naturally arise in the mind of the reader: Why did not our troops on
the left, during this long delay, as well as during the period
occupied by Hill's assault, coöperate in the attack? and Why, the
battle having been preconceived, were they so far removed as not to
hear the first guns? The officers of the Federal army, when called
before a committee appointed by their Congress to inquiry into the
conduct of the war, have by their testimony made it quite plain that
the divided condition of their troops and the length of time required
for their concentration after the battle commenced, rendered it
practicable for our forces, if united--as, taking the initiative,
they well might have been--to have crushed or put to flight first
Keyes's and then Heintzelman's corps before Sumner crossed the
Chickahominy, between five and six o'clock in the evening.

By the official reports our aggregate loss was, "killed, wounded, and
missing," 6,084, of which 4,851 were in Longstreet's command on the
right, and 1,233 in Smith's command on the left.

The enemy reported his aggregate loss at 5,739. It may have been less
than ours, for we stormed his successive defenses.

Our success upon the right was proved by our possession of the
enemy's works, as well as by the capture of ten pieces of artillery,
four flags, a large amount of camp-equipage, and more than one
thousand prisoners.

Our aggregate of both wings was about 40,500. The force of the enemy
confronting us may be approximated by taking his returns for the 20th
of June and adding thereto his casualties on the 31st of May and 1st
of June, because between the last-named date and the 20th of June no
action had occurred to create any material change in the number
present. From these data, viz., the strength of Heintzelman's corps,
18,810, and of Keyes's corps, 14,610, on June 20th, by adding their
casualties of the 31st of May and 1st of June--4,516--we deduce the
strength of these two corps on the 31st of May to have been 37,936 as
the aggregate present for duty.

It thus appears that, at the commencement of the action on the 31st
of May, we had a numerical superiority of about 2,500. Adopting the
same method to calculate the strength of Sumner's corps, we find it
to have been 18,724, which would give the enemy in round numbers a
force of 16,000 in excess of ours after General Sumner crossed the
Chickahominy.

Both combatants claimed the victory. I have presented the evidence in
support of our claim. The withdrawal of the Confederate forces on the
day after the battle from the ground on which it was fought certainly
gives color to the claim of the enemy, though that was really the
result of a policy much broader than the occupation of the field of
Seven Pines.

On the morning of June 1st I rode out toward the position where
General Smith had been left on the previous night, and where I
learned from General Lee that he would remain. After turning into the
Nine-mile road, and before reaching that position, I was hailed by
General Whiting, who saw me at a distance, and ran toward the road to
stop me. He told me I was riding into the position of the enemy, who
had advanced on the withdrawal of our troops, and there, pointing, he
said, "is a battery which I am surprised has not fired on yon." I
asked where our troops were. He said his was the advance, and the
others behind him. He also told me that General Smith was at the
house which had been his (Whiting's) headquarters, and I rode there
to see him. To relieve both him and General Lee from any
embarrassment, I preferred to make the announcement of General Lee's
assignment to command previous to his arrival.

After General Lee arrived, I took leave, and, being subsequently
joined by him, we rode together to the Williamsburg road, where we
found General Longstreet, his command being in front, and then
engaged with the enemy on the field of the previous day's combat. The
operations of that day were neither extensive nor important, save in
the collection of the arms acquired in the previous day's battle.

General R. E. Lee was now in immediate command, and thenceforward
directed the movements of the army in front of Richmond. Laborious
and exact in details, as he was vigilant and comprehensive in grand
strategy, a power, with which the public had not credited him, soon
became manifest in all that makes an army a rapid, accurate, compact
machine, with responsive motion in all its parts. I extract the
following sentence from a letter from the late Colonel R. H. Chilton,
adjutant and inspector-general of the army of the Confederacy,
because of his special knowledge of the subject:

"I consider General Lee's exhibition of grand administrative talents
and indomitable energy, in bringing up that army in so short a time
to that state of discipline which maintained aggregation through
those terrible seven days' fights around Richmond, as probably his
grandest achievement."

[Footnote 41: For recital and correspondence of 1874, see "Advance and
Retreat," by J. B. Hood, Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army,
pp. 153-156.]

CHAPTER XXIII.

When riding from the field of battle with General Robert E. Lee on
the previous day, I informed him that he would be assigned to the
command of the army, _vice_ General Johnston, wounded, and that he
could make his preparations as soon as he reached his quarters, as I
should send the order to him as soon as arrived at mine. On the next
morning, as above stated, he proceeded to the field and took command
of the troops. During the night our forces on the left had fallen
back from their position at the close of the previous day's battle,
but those on the right remained in the one they had gained, and some
combats occurred there between the opposing forces. The enemy
proceeded further to fortify his position on the Chickahominy,
covering his communication with his base of supplies on York River.
His left was on the south side of the Chickahominy, between White-Oak
Swamp and New Bridge, and was covered by a strong intrenchment, with
heavy guns, and with abatis in front. His right wing was north of the
Chickahominy, extending to Mechanicsville, and the approaches
defended by strong works.

Our army was in line in front of Richmond, but without intrenchments.
General Lee immediately commenced the construction of an earthwork
for a battery on our left flank, and a line of intrenchment to the
right, necessarily feeble because of our deficiency in tools. It
seemed to be the intention of the enemy to assail Richmond by regular
approaches, which our numerical inferiority and want of engineer
troops, as well as the deficiency of proper utensils, made it
improbable that we should be able to resist. The day after General
Lee assumed command, I was riding out to the army, when I saw at a
house on my left a number of horses, and among them one I recognized
as belonging to him. I dismounted and entered the house, where I
found him in consultation with a number of his general officers. The
tone of the conversation was quite despondent, and one, especially,
pointed out the inevitable consequence of the enemy's advance by
throwing out _boyaux_ and constructing successive parallels. I
expressed, in marked terms, my disappointment at hearing such views,
and General Lee remarked that he had, before I came in, said very
much the same thing. I then withdrew and rode to the front, where,
after a short time, General Lee joined me, and entered into
conversation as to what, under the circumstances, I thought it most
advisable to do. I then said to him, substantially, that I knew of
nothing better than the plan he had previously explained to me, which
was to have been executed by General Johnston, but which was not
carried out; that the change of circumstances would make one
modification necessary--that, instead, as then proposed, of bringing
General A. P. Hill, with his division, on the rear flank of the
enemy, it would, because of the preparation for defense made in the
mean time, now be necessary to bring the stronger force of General T.
J. Jackson from the Valley of the Shenandoah. So far as we were then
informed, General Jackson was hotly engaged with a force superior to
his own, and, before he could be withdrawn, it was necessary that the
enemy should be driven out of the Valley. For this purpose, as well
as to mask the design of bringing Jackson's forces to make a junction
with those of Lee, a strong division under General Whiting was
detached to go by rail to the Valley to join General Jackson, and, by
a vigorous assault, to drive the enemy across the Potomac. As soon as
he commenced a retreat which unmistakably showed that his flight
would not stop within the limits of Virginia, General Jackson was
instructed, with his whole force, to move rapidly on the right flank
of the enemy north of the Chickahominy. The manner in which the
division was detached to reënforce General Jackson was so open that
it was not doubted General McClellan would soon be apprised of it,
and would probably attribute it to any other than the real motive,
and would confirm him in his exaggerated estimate of our strength.

By the rapidity of movement and skill with which General Jackson
handled his troops, he, after several severe engagements, finally
routed the enemy before the reënforcement of Whiting arrived; and he
then, on the 17th of June, proceeded, with that celerity which gave
to his infantry its wonderful fame and efficiency, to execute the
orders which General Lee had sent to him.

As evidence of the daring and unfaltering fortitude of General Lee, I
will here recite an impressive conversation which occurred between us
in regard to this movement. His plan was to throw forward his left
across the Meadow Bridge, drive back the enemy's right flank, and
then, crossing by the Mechanicsville Bridge with another column, to
attack in front, hoping by his combined forces to be victorious on
the north side of the Chickahominy; while the small force on the
intrenched line south of the Chickahominy should hold the left of the
enemy in check. I pointed out to him that our force and intrenched
line between that left flank and Richmond was too weak for a
protracted resistance, and, if McClellan was the man I took him for
when I nominated him for promotion in a new regiment of cavalry, and
subsequently selected him for one of the military commission sent to
Europe during the War of the Crimea, as soon as he found that the
bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy, he would
not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move
upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other
hand, he should behave like an engineer officer, and deem it his
first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan
proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of
his old _esprit de corps_ manifested itself in General Lee's first
response, that he did not know engineer officers were more likely
than others to make such mistakes, but, immediately passing to the
main subject, he added, "If you will hold him as long as you can at
the intrenchment, and then fall back on the detached works around the
city, I will be upon the enemy's heels before he gets there."

Thus was inaugurated the offensive-defensive campaign which resulted
so gloriously to our arms, and turned from the capital of the
Confederacy a danger so momentous that, looking at it retrospectively,
it is not seen how a policy less daring or less firmly pursued could
have saved the capital from capture.

To resume the connected thread of our narrative. Preparatory to this
campaign, a light intrenchment for infantry cover, with some works
for field-guns, was constructed on the south side of the Chickahominy,
and General Whiting, with two brigades, as before stated, was sent to
reënforce General Jackson in the Valley, so as to hasten the expulsion
of the enemy, after which Jackson was to move rapidly from the Valley
so as to arrive in the vicinity of Ashland by the 24th of June, and, by
striking the enemy on his right flank, to aid in the proposed attack.
The better to insure the success of this movement, General Lawton, who
was coming with a brigade from Georgia to join General Lee, was directed
to change his line of march and unite with General Jackson in the Valley.

As General Whiting went by railroad, it was expected that the enemy
would be cognizant of the fact, but not, probably, assign to it the
real motive; and that such was the case is shown by an unsuccessful
attack of the 26th, made on the Williamsburg road, with the apparent
intention of advancing by that route to Richmond.

To observe the enemy, as well as to prevent him from learning of the
approach of General Jackson, General J. E. B. Stuart was sent with a
cavalry force on June 8th to cover the route by which the former was
to march, and to ascertain whether the enemy had any defensive works
or troops in position to interfere with the advance of those forces.
He reported favorably on both these points, as well as to the natural
features of the country. On the 26th of June General Stuart received
confidential instructions from General Lee, the execution of which is
so interwoven with the seven days' battles as to be more
appropriately noticed in connection with them, of which it is
proposed now to give a brief account.

Our order of battle directed General Jackson to march from Ashland on
the 25th toward Slash Church, encamping for the night west of the
Central Railroad; to advance at 3 A.M. on the 26th, and to turn
Beaver-Dam Creek. General A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge when Jackson advanced beyond that point, and to move
directly upon Mechanicsville. As soon as the bridge there should be
uncovered, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to cross, the former to
proceed to the support of A. P. Hill and the latter to that of
Jackson.

The four commands were directed to sweep down the north side of the
Chickahominy toward the York River Railroad--Jackson on the left and
in advance; Longstreet nearest the river and in the rear. Huger,
McLaws, and Magruder, remaining on the south side of the
Chickahominy, were ordered to hold their positions as long as
possible against any assault of the enemy; to observe his movements,
and to follow him closely if he should retreat. General Stuart, with
the cavalry, was thrown out on Jackson's left to guard his flank and
give notice of the enemy's movements. Brigadier-General Pendleton was
directed to employ the reserve artillery so as to resist any advance
toward Richmond, to superintend that portion of it posted to aid in
the operations on the north bank, and hold the remainder for use
where needed. The whole of Jackson's command did not arrive in time
to reach the point designated on the 25th. He had, therefore, more
distance to move on the 26th, and he was retarded by the enemy.

Not until 3 P.M. did A. P. Hill begin to move. Then he crossed the
river and advanced upon Mechanicsville. After a sharp conflict he
drove the enemy from his intrenchments, and forced him to take refuge
in his works, on the left bank of Beaver Dam, about a mile distant.
This position was naturally strong, the banks of the creek in front
being high and almost perpendicular, and the approach to it was over
open fields commanded by the fire of artillery and infantry under
cover on the opposite side. The difficulty of crossing the stream had
been increased by felling the fringe of woods on its banks and
destroying the bridges. Jackson was expected to pass Beaver Dam
above, and turn the enemy's right, so General Hill made no direct
attack. Longstreet and D. H. Hill crossed the Mechanicsville Bridge
as soon as it was uncovered and could be repaired, but it was late
before they reached the north bank of the Chickahominy. An effort was
made by two brigades, one of A. P. Hill and the other Ripley's of D.
H. Hill, to turn the enemy's left, but the troops were unable in the
growing darkness to overcome the obstructions, and were withdrawn.
The engagement ceased about 9 P.M. Our troops retained the ground
from which the foe had been driven.

According to the published reports, General McClellan's position was
regarded at this time as extremely critical. If he concentrated on
the left bank of the Chickahominy, he abandoned the attempt to
capture Richmond, and risked a retreat upon the White House and
Yorktown, where he had no reserves, or reason to expect further
support. If he moved to the right bank of the river, he risked the
loss of his communications with the White House, whence his supplies
were drawn by railroad. He would then have to attempt the capture of
Richmond by assault, or be forced to open new communications by the
James River, and move at once in that direction. There he would
receive the support of the enemy's navy. This latter movement had, it
appears, been thought of previously, and transports had been sent to
the James River. During the night, after the close of the contest
last mentioned, the whole of Porter's baggage was sent over to the
right bank of the river, and united with the train that set out on
the evening of the 27th for the James River.

It would almost seem as if the Government of the United States
anticipated, at this period, the failure of McClellan's expedition.
On June 27th President Lincoln issued an order creating the "Army of
Virginia," to consist of the forces of Fremont, in their Mountain
Department; of Banks, in their Shenandoah Department; and of
McDowell, at Fredericksburg. The command of this army was assigned to
Major-General John Pope. This cut off all reënforcements from
McDowell to McClellan.

In expectation of Jackson's arrival on the enemy's right, the battle
was renewed at dawn, and continued with animation about two hours,
during which the passage of the creek was attempted, and our troops
forced their way to its banks, where their progress was arrested by
the nature of the stream and the resistance encountered. They
maintained their position while preparations were being made to cross
at another point nearer the Chickahominy. Before these were
completed, Jackson crossed Beaver Dam above, and the enemy abandoned
his intrenchments, and retired rapidly down the river, destroying a
great deal of property, but leaving much in his deserted camps.

After repairing the bridges over Beaver Dam, the several columns
resumed their advance, as nearly as possible, as prescribed in the
order. Jackson, with whom D. H. Hill had united, bore to the left, in
order to cut off reënforcements to the enemy or intercept his retreat
in that direction. Longstreet and A. P. Hill moved nearer the
Chickahominy. Many prisoners were taken in their progress; and the
conflagration of wagons and stores marked the course of the
retreating army. Longstreet and Hill reached the vicinity of New
Bridge about noon. It was ascertained that the enemy had taken a
position behind Powhite Creek, prepared to dispute our progress. He
occupied a range of hills, with his right resting in the vicinity of
McGhee's house, and his left near that of Dr. Gaines, on a wooded
bluff, which rose abruptly from a deep ravine. The ravine was filled
with sharpshooters, to whom its banks gave protection. A second line
of infantry was stationed on the side of the hill, overlooking the
first, and protected by a breastwork of logs. A third occupied the
crest, strengthened with rifle-trenches, and crowned with artillery.
The approach to this position was over an open plain, about a quarter
of a mile wide, commanded by a triple line of fire, and swept by the
heavy batteries south of the Chickahominy. In front of his center and
right the ground was generally open, bounded on the side of our
approach by a wood, with dense and tangled undergrowth, and traversed
by a sluggish stream, which converted the soil into a deep morass.
The woods on the further side of the swamp were occupied by
sharpshooters, and trees had been felled to increase the difficulty
of its passage, and detain our advancing columns under the fire of
infantry massed on the slopes of the opposite hills, and of the
batteries on their crests.

Pressing on toward the York River Railroad, A. P. Hill, who was in
advance, reached the vicinity of New Cold Harbor about 2 P.M., where
he encountered the foe. He immediately formed his line nearly
parallel to the road leading from that place toward McGhee's house,
and soon became hotly engaged. The arrival of Jackson on our left was
momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his approach would
cause the extension of the opposing line in that direction. Under
this impression, Longstreet was held back until this movement should
commence. The principal part of the enemy's army was now on the north
side of the Chickahominy. Hill's single division met this large force
with the impetuous courage for which that officer and his troops were
distinguished. They drove it back, and assailed it in its strong
position on the ridge. The battle raged fiercely, and with varying
fortune, more than two hours. Three regiments pierced the enemy's
line, and forced their way to the crest of the hill on his left, but
were compelled to fall back before overwhelming numbers. This
superior force, assisted by the fire of the batteries south of the
Chickahominy, which played incessantly on our columns as they pressed
through the difficulties that obstructed their way, caused them to
recoil. Though most of the men had never been under fire until the
day before, they were rallied, and in turn repelled the advance of
our assailant Some brigades were broken, others stubbornly maintained
their positions, but it became apparent that the enemy was gradually
gaining ground. The attack on our left being delayed by the length of
Jackson's march and the obstacles he encountered, Longstreet was
ordered to make a diversion in Hill's favor by a feint on the enemy's
left. In making this demonstration, the great strength of the
position already described was discovered, and General Longstreet
perceived that, to render the diversion effectual, the feint must be
converted into an attack. He resolved, with his characteristic
determination, to carry the heights by assault. His column was
quickly formed near the open ground, and, as his preparations were
completed, Jackson arrived, and his right division--that of
Whiting--took position on the left of Longstreet. At the same time,
D. H. Hill formed on our extreme left, and, after a short but bloody
conflict, forced his way through the morass and obstructions, and
drove the foe from the woods on the opposite side. Ewell advanced on
Hill's right, and became hotly engaged. The first and fourth brigades
of Jackson's own division filled the interval between Ewell and A. P.
Hill. The second and third were sent to the right. The arrival of
these fresh troops enabled A. P. Hill to withdraw some of his
brigades, wearied and reduced by their long and arduous conflict. The
lines being now complete, a general advance from right to left was
ordered. On the right, the troops moved forward with steadiness,
unchecked by the terrible fire from the triple lines of infantry on
the hill, and the cannon on both sides of the river, which burst upon
them as they emerged upon the plain. The dead and wounded marked the
line of their intrepid advance, the brave Texans leading, closely
followed by their no less daring comrades. The enemy were driven from
the ravine to the first line of breastworks, over which our impetuous
column dashed up to the intrenchments on the crest. These were
quickly stormed, fourteen pieces of artillery captured, and the foe
driven into the field beyond. Fresh troops came to his support, and
he endeavored repeatedly to rally, but in vain. He was forced back
with great slaughter until he reached the woods on the banks of the
Chickahominy, and night put an end to the pursuit. Long lines of dead
and wounded marked each stand made by the enemy in his stubborn
resistance, and the field over which he retreated was strewed with
the slain. On the left, the attack was no less vigorous and
successful. D. H. Hill charged across the open ground in front, one
of his regiments having first bravely carried a battery whose fire
enfiladed his advance. Gallantly supported by the troops on his
right, who pressed forward with unfaltering resolution, he reached
the crest of the ridge, and, after a sanguinary struggle, broke the
enemy's line, captured several of his batteries, and drove him in
confusion toward the Chickahominy, until darkness rendered further
pursuit impossible. Our troops remained in undisturbed possession of
the field, covered with the dead and wounded of our opponent; and his
broken forces fled to the river or wandered through the woods. Owing
to the nature of the country, the cavalry was unable to participate
in the general engagement. It, however, rendered valuable service in
guarding Jackson's flank, and took a large number of prisoners.

On the morning of the 28th it was ascertained that none of the enemy
remained in our front north of the Chickahominy. As he might yet
intend to give battle to preserve his communications, the Ninth
Cavalry, supported by Ewell's division, was ordered to seize the York
River Railroad, and General Stuart with his main body to coöperate.
When the cavalry reached Dispatch Station, the enemy retreated to the
south bank of the Chickahominy, and burned the railroad-bridge.
During the forenoon, columns of dust south of the river showed that
he was in motion. The abandonment of the railroad and destruction of
the bridge proved that no further attempt would be made to hold that
line. But, from the position the enemy occupied, the roads which led
toward the James River would also enable him to reach the lower
bridges over the Chickahominy, and retreat down the Peninsula. In the
latter event, it was necessary that our troops should continue on the
north bank of the river, and, until the intention of General
McClellan was discovered, it was deemed injudicious to change their
disposition. Ewell was therefore ordered to proceed to Bottom's
Bridge, to guard that point, and the cavalry to watch the bridges
below. No certain indications of a retreat to the James River were
discovered by our forces on the south side of the Chickahominy, and
late in the afternoon the enemy's works were reported to be fully
manned. The strength of these fortifications prevented Generals Huger
and Magruder from discovering what was passing in their front. Below
the enemy's works the country was densely wooded and intersected by
swamps, concealing his movements and precluding reconnaissances
except by the regular roads, all of which were strongly guarded. The
bridges over the Chickahominy in rear of the enemy were destroyed,
and their reconstruction by us was impracticable in the presence of
his whole army and powerful batteries. We were therefore compelled to
wait until his purpose should be developed. Generals Huger and
Magruder were again directed to use the utmost vigilance, and to
pursue the foe vigorously should they discover that he was
retreating. During the afternoon of the 28th the signs were
suggestive of a general movement, and, no indications of his approach
to the lower bridges of the Chickahominy having been discovered by
the pickets in observation at those points, it became inferable that
General McClellan was about to retreat to the James River.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Retreat of the Enemy.--Pursuit and Battle.-Night.--Further Retreat
of the Enemy.--Progress of General Jackson.--The Enemy at Frazier's
Farm.--Position of General Holmes.--Advance of General
Longstreet.--Remarkable Features of the Battle.--Malvern Hill.--
Our Position.--The Attack.--Expedition of General Stuart.--
Destruction of the Enemy's Stores.--Assaults on the Enemy.--Retreat
to Westover on the James.--Siege of Richmond raised.--Number of
Prisoners taken.--Strength of our Forces.--Strength of our Forces
at Seven Pines and after.--Strength of the Enemy.

During the night I visited the several commands along the
intrenchment on the south side of the Chickahominy. General Huger's
was on the right, General McLaws's in the center, and General
Magruder's on the left. The night was quite dark, especially so in
the woods in front of our line, and, in expressing my opinion to the
officers that the enemy would commence a retreat before morning, I
gave special instructions as to the precautions necessary in order
certainly to hear when the movement commenced. In the confusion of
such a movement, with narrow roads and heavy trains, a favorable
opportunity was offered for attack. It fell out, however, that the
enemy did move before morning, and that the fact of the works having
been evacuated was first learned by an officer on the north side of
the river, who, the next morning, the 29th, about sunrise, was
examining their works by the aid of a field-glass.

Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill were promptly ordered to recross
the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and move by the Darbytown and Long
Bridge roads. General Lee, having sent his engineer. Captain Meade,
to examine the condition of the abandoned works, came to the south
side of the Chickahominy to unite his command and direct its
movements.

Magruder and Huger found the whole line of works deserted, and large
quantities of military stores of every description abandoned or
destroyed. They were immediately ordered in pursuit, the former by
the Charles City road, so as to take the enemy's army in flank; and
the latter by the Williamsburg road, to attack his rear. Jackson was
directed to cross the "Grapevine" Bridge, and move down the south
side of the Chickahominy. Magruder reached the vicinity of Savage
Station, where he came upon the rear-guard of the retreating army.
Being informed that it was advancing, he halted and sent for
reënforcements. Two brigades of Huger's division were ordered to his
support, but were subsequently withdrawn, it having been ascertained
that the force in Magruder's front was merely covering the retreat of
the main body.

Jackson's route led to the flank and rear of Savage Station, but he
was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing the "Grapevine" Bridge.

Late in the afternoon Magruder attacked the enemy with one of his
divisions and two regiments of another. A severe action ensued, and
continued about two hours, when night put an end to the conflict. The
troops displayed great gallantry, and inflicted heavy loss; but,
owing to the lateness of the hour and the small force engaged, the
result was not decisive, and the enemy continued his retreat under
cover of night, leaving several hundred prisoners, with his dead and
wounded, in our hands. Our loss was small in numbers but great in
value. Among others who could ill be spared, here fell the gallant
soldier, the useful citizen, the true friend and Christian gentleman,
Brigadier-General Richard Griffith. He had served with distinction in
foreign war, and, when the South was invaded, was among the first to
take up arms in defense of our rights.

At Savage Station were found about twenty-five hundred men in
hospital, and a large amount of property. Stores of much value had
been destroyed, including the necessary medical supplies for the sick
and wounded. The night was so dark that, before the battle ended, it
was only by challenging that on several occasions it was determined
whether the troops in front were friends or foes. It was therefore
deemed unadvisable to attempt immediate pursuit.

Our troops slept upon their arms, and in the morning it was found
that the enemy had retreated during the night, and, by the time thus
gained, he was enabled to cross the White-Oak Creek, and destroy the
bridge.

Early on the 30th Jackson reached Savage Station. He was directed to
pursue the enemy on the road he had taken, and Magruder to follow
Longstreet by the Darbytown road. As Jackson advanced, he captured so
many prisoners and collected so large a number of arms, that two
regiments had to be detached for their security. His progress at
White-Oak Swamp was checked by the enemy, who occupied the opposite
side, and obstinately resisted the rebuilding of the bridge.

Longstreet and A. P. Hill, continuing their advance, on the 30th came
upon the foe strongly posted near the intersection of the Long Bridge
and Charles City roads, at the place known in the military reports as
Frazier's Farm.

Huger's route led to the right of this position, Jackson's to the
rear, and the arrival of their commands was awaited, to begin the
attack.

On the 29th General Holmes had crossed from the south side of the
James River, and, on the 30th, was reënforced by a detachment of
General Wise's brigade. He moved down the River road, with a view to
gain, near to Malvern Hill, a position which would command the
supposed route of the retreating army.

It is an extraordinary fact that, though the capital had been
threatened by an attack from the seaboard on the right, though our
army had retreated from Yorktown up to the Chickahominy, and, after
encamping there for a time, had crossed the river and moved up to
Richmond, yet, when at the close of the battles around Richmond
McClellan retreated and was pursued toward the James River, we had no
maps of the country in which we were operating; our generals were
ignorant of the roads, and their guides knew little more than the way
from their homes to Richmond. It was this fatal defect in
preparation, and the erroneous answers of the guides, that caused
General Lee first to post Holmes and Wise, when they came down the
River road, at New Market, where, he was told, was the route that
McClellan must pursue in his retreat to the James. Subsequently
learning that there was another road, by the Willis church, which
would better serve the purpose of the retreating foe, Holmes's
command was moved up to a position on that road where, at the foot of
a hill which concealed from view the enemy's line, he remained under
the fire of the enemy's gunboats, the huge, shrieking shells from
which dispersed a portion of his cavalry and artillery, though the
faithful old soldier remained with the rest of his command, waiting,
according to his orders, for the enemy with his trains to pass; but,
taking neither of the roads pointed out to General Lee, he retreated
by the shorter and better route, which led by Dr. Poindexter's house
to Harrison's Landing. It has been alleged that General Holmes was
tardy in getting into position, and failed to use his artillery as he
had been ordered. Both statements are incorrect. He first took
position when and where he was directed, and, soon after, he moved to
the last position to which he was assigned. The dust of his advancing
column caused a heavy fire from the gunboats to be opened upon him,
and, in men who had never before seen the huge shells then fired,
they inspired a degree of terror not justified by their
effectiveness. The enemy, instead of being a straggling mass moving
toward the James River, as had been reported, were found halted
between West's house and Malvern Hill on ground commanding Holmes's
position, with an open field between them.

General Holmes ordered his chief of artillery to commence firing upon
the enemy's infantry, which immediately gave way, but a heavy fire of
twenty-five or thirty guns promptly replied to our battery, and
formed, with the gunboats, a cross-fire upon General Holmes's
command. The numerical superiority of the opposing force, both in
infantry and artillery, would have made it worse than useless to
attempt an assault unless previously reënforced, and, as no
reënforcements arrived, Holmes, about an hour after nightfall,
withdrew to a point somewhat in advance of the one he had held in the
morning. Though the enemy continued their cannonade until after dark,
and most of the troops were new levies, General Holmes reported that
they behaved well under the trying circumstances to which they were
exposed, except a portion of his artillery and cavalry, which gave
way in disorder, probably from the effect of the ten-inch shells,
which were to them a novel implement of war; for when I met them, say
half a mile from the point they had left, and succeeded in stopping
them, another shell fell and exploded near us in the top of a
wide-spreading tree, giving a shower of metal and limbs, which soon
after caused them to resume their flight in a manner that plainly
showed no moral power could stop them within the range of those
shells. It was after a personal and hazardous reconnaissance that
General Lee assigned General Holmes to his last position; and when I
remonstrated with General Lee, whom I met returning from his
reconnaissance, on account of the exposure to which he had subjected
himself, he said he could not get the required information otherwise,
and therefore had gone himself.

After the close of the battle of Malvern Hill, General Holmes found
that a deep ravine led up to the rear of the left flank of the
enemy's line, and expressed his regret that it had not been known,
and that he had not been ordered, when the attack was made in front,
to move up that ravine and simultaneously assail in flank and
reverse. It was not until after he had explained with regret the
lost, because unknown, opportunity, that he was criticised as having
failed to do his whole duty at the battle of Malvern Hill.

He has passed beyond the reach of censure or of praise, after serving
his country on many fields wisely and well. I, who knew him from our
schoolboy days, who served with him in garrison and in the field, and
with pride watched him as he gallantly led a storming party up a
rocky height at Monterey, and was intimately acquainted with his
whole career during our sectional war, bear willing testimony to the
purity, self-abnegation, generosity, fidelity, and gallantry which
characterized him as a man and a soldier.

General Huger reported that his progress was delayed by trees which
his opponent had felled across the Williamsburg road. In the
afternoon, after passing the obstructions and driving off the men who
were still cutting down trees, they came upon an open field (P.
Williams's), where they were assailed by a battery of rifled guns.
The artillery was brought up, and replied to the fire. In the mean
time a column of infantry was moved to the right, so as to turn the
battery, and the combat was ended. The report of this firing was
heard at Frazier's Farm, and erroneously supposed to indicate the
near approach of Huger's column, and, it has been frequently stated,
induced General Longstreet to open fire with some of his batteries as
notice to General Huger where our troops were, and that thus the
engagement was brought on. General A. P. Hill, who was in front and
had made the dispositions of our troops while hopefully waiting for
the arrival of Jackson and Huger, states that the fight commenced by
fire from the enemy's artillery, which swept down the road, etc. This
not only concurs with my recollection of the event, but is more in
keeping with the design to wait for the expected reënforcements.

The detention of Huger, as above stated, and the failure of Jackson
to force a passage of the White-Oak Swamp, left Longstreet and Hill,
without the expected support, to maintain the unequal conflict as
best they might. The superiority of numbers and advantage of position
were on the side of the enemy. The battle raged furiously until 9
P.M. By that time the enemy had been driven with great slaughter from
every position but one, which he maintained until he was enabled to
withdraw under cover of darkness. At the close of the struggle nearly
the entire field remained in our possession, covered with the enemy's
dead and wounded. Many prisoners, including a general of division,
were captured, and several batteries with some thousands of
small-arms were taken.

After this engagement, Magruder, who had been ordered to go to the
support of Holmes, was recalled, to relieve the troops of Longstreet
and Hill. He arrived during the night, with the troops of his command
much fatigued by the long, hot march.

In the battle of Frazier's Farm the troops of Longstreet and Hill,
though disappointed in the expectation of support, and contending
against superior numbers advantageously posted, made their attack
successful by the most heroic courage and unfaltering determination.

Nothing could surpass the bearing of General Hill on that occasion,
and I often recur with admiration to the manner in which Longstreet,
when Hill's command seemed about to be overborne, steadily led his
reserve to the rescue, as he might have marched on a parade. The
mutual confidence between himself and his men was manifested by the
calm manner in which they went into the desperate struggle. The skill
and courage which made that corps illustrious on former as well as
future fields were never more needed or better exemplified than on
this.

The current of the battle which was then setting against us was
reversed, and the results which have been stated were gained. That
more important consequences would have followed had Huger and
Jackson, or either of them, arrived in time to take part in the
conflict, is unquestionable; and there is little hazard in saying
that the army of McClellan would have been riven in twain, beaten in
detail, and could never, as an organized body, have reached the James
River.

Our troops slept on the battle-field they had that day won, and
couriers were sent in the night with instructions to hasten the march
of the troops who had been expected during the day.

Valor less true or devotion to their cause less sincere than that
which pervaded our army and sustained its commanders would, in this
hour of thinned ranks and physical exhaustion, have thought of the
expedient of retreat; but, so far as I remember, no such resort was
contemplated. To bring up reënforcements and attack again was alike
the expectation and the wish.

During the night, humanity, the crowning grace of the knightly
soldier, secured for the wounded such care as was possible, not only
to those of our own army, but also to those of the enemy who had been
left upon the field.

This battle was in many respects one of the most remarkable of the
war. Here occurred on several occasions the capture of batteries by
the impetuous charge of our infantry, defying the canister and grape
which plowed through their ranks, and many hand-to-hand conflicts,
where bayonet-wounds were freely given and received, and men fought
with clubbed muskets in the life-and-death encounter.

The estimated strength of the enemy was double our own, and he had
the advantage of being in position. From both causes it necessarily
resulted that our loss was very heavy. To the official reports and
the minute accounts of others, the want of space compels me to refer
the reader for a detailed statement of the deeds of those who in our
day served their country so bravely and so well.

During the night those who fought us at Frazier's Farm fell back to
the stronger position of Malvern Hill, and by a night-march the force
which had detained Jackson at White-Oak Swamp effected a junction
with the other portion of the enemy. Early on the 1st of July Jackson
reached the battlefield of the previous day, having forced the
passage of White-Oak Swamp, where he captured some artillery and a
number of prisoners. He was directed to follow the route of the
enemy's retreat, but soon found him in position on a high ridge in
front of Malvern Hill. Here, on a line of great natural strength, he
had posted his powerful artillery, supported by his large force of
infantry, covered by hastily constructed intrenchments. His left
rested near Crew's house and his right near Binford's. Immediately in
his front the ground was open, varying in width from a quarter to
half a mile, and, sloping gradually from the crest, was completely
swept by the fire of his infantry and artillery. To reach this open
ground our troops had to advance through a broken and thickly wooded
country, traversed nearly throughout its whole extent by a swamp
passable at only a few places and difficult at these. The whole was
within range of the batteries on the heights and the gunboats in the
river, under whose incessant fire our movements had to be executed.

Jackson formed his line with Whiting's division on his left and D. H.
Hill's on his right, one of Ewell's brigades occupying the interval.
The rest of Ewell's and Jackson's own division were held in reserve.
Magruder was directed to take position on Jackson's right, but before
his arrival two of Huger's brigades came up and were placed next to
Hill. Magruder subsequently formed on the right of these brigades,
which, with a third of Huger's, were placed under his command.
Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve, and took no part in
the engagement. Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests
impeding necessary communications, and the extreme difficulty of the
ground, the whole line was not formed until a late hour in the
afternoon. The obstacles presented by the woods and swamp made it
impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose
successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the
enemy, while the field itself afforded us few positions favorable for
its use, and none for its proper concentration.

General W. N. Pendleton, in whom were happily combined the highest
characteristics of the soldier, the patriot, and the Christian, was
in chief command of the artillery, and energetically strove to bring
his long-range guns and reserve artillery into a position where they
might be effectively used against the enemy, but the difficulties
before mentioned were found insuperable.

Orders were issued for a general advance at a given signal, but the
causes referred to prevented a proper concert of action among the
troops. D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field, and engaged
the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but, a
simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found
himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the
overwhelming numbers and numerous batteries opposed to him. Jackson
sent to his support his own division and that part of Ewell's which
was in reserve; but, owing to the increasing darkness and intricacy
of the forest and swamp, they did not arrive in time to render the
desired assistance. Hill was therefore compelled to abandon part of
the ground he had gained, after suffering severe loss and inflicting
heavy damage.

On the right the attack was gallantly made by Huger's and Magruder's
commands. Two brigades of the former commenced the action, the other
two were subsequently sent to the support of Magruder and Hill.
Several determined efforts were made to storm the hill at Crew's
house. The brigade advanced bravely across the open field, raked by
the fire of a hundred cannon and the musketry of large bodies of
infantry. Some were broken and gave way; others approached close to
the guns, driving back the infantry, compelling the advance batteries
to retire to escape capture, and mingling their dead with those of
the enemy. For want of coöperation by the attacking columns, their
assaults were too weak to break the enemy's line; and, after
struggling gallantly, sustaining and inflicting great loss, they were
compelled successively to retire. Night was approaching when the
attack began, and it soon became difficult to distinguish friend from
foe. The firing continued until after 9 P.M., but no decided result
was gained.

Part of our troops were withdrawn to their original positions; others
remained in the open field; and some rested within a hundred yards of
the batteries that had been so bravely but vainly assailed. The
lateness of the hour at which the attack necessarily began gave the
foe the full advantage of his superior position, and augmented the
natural difficulties of our own.

At the cessation of firing, several fragments of different commands
were lying down and holding their ground within a short distance of
the enemy's line, and, as soon as the fighting ceased, an informal
truce was established by common consent. Numerous parties from both
armies, with lanterns and litters, wandered over the field seeking
for the wounded, whose groans and calls on all sides could not fail
to move with pity the hearts of friend and foe.

The morning dawned with heavy rain, and the enemy's position was seen
to have been entirely deserted. The ground was covered with his dead
and wounded, and his route exhibited evidence of a precipitate
retreat. To the fatigue of hard marches and successive battles,
enough to have disqualified our troops for rapid pursuit, was added
the discomfort of being thoroughly wet and chilled by rain. I sent
out to the neighboring houses to buy, if it could be had, at any
price, enough whisky to give to each of the men a single gill, but it
could not be found.

The foe had silently withdrawn in the night by a route which had been
unknown to us, but which was the most direct road to Harrison's
Landing, and he had so many hours the start, that, among the general
officers who expressed to me their opinion, there was but one who
thought it was possible to pursue effectively. That was General T. J.
Jackson, who quietly said, "They have not all got away if we go
immediately after them." During the pursuit, which has just been
described, the cavalry of our army had been absent, having been
detached on a service which was reported as follows: After seizing
the York River Railroad, on June 28th, and driving the enemy across
the Chickahominy, the force under General Stuart proceeded down the
railroad to ascertain if there was any movement of the enemy in that
direction. He encountered but little opposition, and reached the
vicinity of the White House on the 29th. On his approach the enemy
destroyed the greater part of the immense stores accumulated at that
depot, and retreated toward Fortress Monroe. With one gun and some
dismounted men General Stuart drove off a gunboat, which lay near the
White House, and rescued a large amount of property, including more
than ten thousand stand of small-arms, partially burned. General
Stuart describes his march down the enemy's line of communication
with the York River as one in which he was but feebly resisted. He
says:

"We advanced until, coming in view of the White House (a former
plantation residence of General George Washington), at a distance of
a quarter of a mile, a large gunboat was discovered lying at the
landing. . . . I was convinced that a few bold sharpshooters could
compel the gunboat to leave. I accordingly ordered down about
seventy-five, partly of the First and Fourth Virginia Cavalry, and
partly of the Jeff Davis Legion, armed with the rifled carbines. They
advanced on this monster so terrible to our fancy, and a body of
sharpshooters was sent ashore from the boat to meet them. . . . To
save time I ordered up the howitzer, a few shells from which, fired
with great accuracy, and bursting directly over her decks, caused an
instantaneous withdrawal of the sharpshooters, and a precipitous
flight under headway of steam down the river. . . . An opportunity
was here offered for observing the deceitfulness of the enemy's
pretended reverence for everything associated with the name of
Washington--for the dwelling-house was burned to the ground, not a
vestige left except what told of desolation and vandalism.

"Nine large barges, laden with stores, were on fire as we approached;
immense numbers of tents, wagons, and cars in long trains, loaded,
and five locomotives; a number of forges; quantities of every species
of quartermaster's stores and property, making a total of many
millions of dollars--all more or less destroyed. . . . I replied (to
a note from the commanding General) that there was no evidence of a
retreat of the main body down the Williamsburg road, and I had no
doubt that the enemy, since his defeat, was endeavoring to reach the
James as a new base, being _compelled_ to surrender his connection
with the York. If the Federal people can be convinced that this was a
part of McClellan's plan, that it was in his original design for
Jackson to turn his right flank, and our generals to force him from
his strongholds, they certainly never can forgive him for the
millions of public treasure that his superb strategy cost."

Leaving one squadron at the White House, he returned to guard the
lower bridges of the Chickahominy. On the 30th he was directed to
recross and coöperate with Jackson. After a long march, he reached
the rear of the enemy at Malvern Hill, on the night of July 1st, at
the close of the engagement.

On the 2d of July the pursuit was commenced, the cavalry under
General Stuart in advance. The knowledge acquired since the event
renders it more than probable that, could our infantry, with a fair
amount of artillery, during that day and the following night, have
been in position on the ridge which overlooked the plain where the
retreating enemy was encamped on the bank of the James River, a large
part of his army must have dispersed, and the residue would have been
captured. It appears, from the testimony taken before the United
States Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, that it was
not until July 3d that the heights which overlooked the encampment of
the retreating army were occupied, and, from the manuscript notes on
the war by General J. E. B. Stuart, we learn that he easily gained
and took possession of the heights, and with his light howitzer
opened fire upon the enemy's camp, producing great commotion. This
was described by the veteran soldier, General Casey, of the United
States Army, thus:

"The enemy had come down with some artillery upon our army massed
together on the river, the heights commanding the position not being
in our possession. Had the enemy come down and taken possession of
those heights with a force of twenty or thirty thousand men, they
would, in my opinion, have taken the whole of our army except that
small portion of it that might have got off on the transports."

General Lee was not a man of hesitation, and they have mistaken his
character who suppose caution was his vice. He was prone to attack,
and not slow to press an advantage when he gained it. Longstreet and
Jackson were ordered to advance, but a violent storm which prevailed
throughout the day greatly retarded their progress. The enemy,
harassed and closely followed by the cavalry, succeeded in gaining
Westover, on the James River, and the protection of his gunboats. His
position was one of great natural and artificial strength, after the
heights were occupied and intrenched. It was flanked on each side by
a creek, and the approach in front was commanded by the heavy guns of
his shipping, as well as by those mounted in his intrenchments. Under
these circumstances it was deemed inexpedient to attack him; and, in
view of the condition of our troops, who had been marching and
fighting almost incessantly for seven days, under the most trying
circumstances, it was determined to withdraw, in order to afford to
them the repose of which they stood so much in need.

Several days were spent in collecting arms and other property
abandoned by the enemy, and, in the mean time, some artillery and
cavalry were sent below Westover to annoy his transports. On July 8th
our army returned to the vicinity of Richmond.

Under ordinary circumstances the army of the enemy should have been
destroyed. Its escape was due to the causes already stated. Prominent
among these was the want of correct and timely information. This
fact, together with the character of the country, enabled General
McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat, and to add much to the
obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing
columns. We had, however, effected our main purpose. The siege of
Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaign which had been
prosecuted after months of preparation, at an enormous expenditure of
men and money, was completely frustrated.[42]

More than ten thousand prisoners, including officers of rank,
fifty-two pieces of artillery, and upward of thirty-five thousand
stand of small-arms were captured. The stores and supplies of every
description which fell into our hands were great in amount and value,
but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses
in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and
wounded left on every field, while his subsequent inaction shows in
what condition the survivors reached the protection of the gunboats.

In the archive office of the War Department in Washington there are
on file some of the field and monthly returns of the strength of the
Army of Northern Virginia. These are the original papers which were
taken from Richmond. They furnish an accurate statement of the number
of men in that army at the periods named. They were not made public
at the time, as I did not think it to be judicious to inform the
enemy of the numerical weakness of our forces. The following
statements have been taken from those papers by Major Walter H.
Taylor, of the staff of General Lee, who supervised for several years
the preparation of the original returns.

A statement of the strength of the troops under General Johnston
shows that on May 21, 1862, he had present for duty as follows:

Smith's division, consisting of the brigades of Whiting,
Hood, Hampton, Hatton, and Pettigrew . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,592

Longstreet's division, consisting of the brigades of A. P.
Hill, Pickett, R. H. Anderson, Wilson, Colston, and Pryor . . 13,816

Magruder's division, consisting of the brigades of McLaws,
Kershaw, Griffith, Cobb, Toombs, and D. R. Jones . . . . . . 15,680

D. H. Hill's division, consisting of the brigades of Early,
Rodes, Raines, Featherston, and the commands of Colonels Ward
and Crump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,151

Cavalry brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,289

Reserve artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,160
------
Total effective men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,688

Statement of the Strength of the Army Commanded by General R. E. Lee
on July 20, 1862.

Department of Northern Virginia . . . . . . . . Present for Duty
and North Carolina Officers Enlisted men
Department of North Carolina . . . . . . . . 722 . . . . 11,509
Longstreet's division . . . . . . . . . . . . 557 . . . . 7,929
D. H. Hill's division . . . . . . . . . . . . 550 . . . . 8,998
McLaws's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514 . . . . 7,188
A. P. Hill's division . . . . . . . . . . . . 519 . . . . 10,104
Anderson's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 . . . . 5,760
D. R. Jones's division . . . . . . . . . . . 213 . . . . 3,500
Whiting's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 . . . . 3,600
Stuart's cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 . . . . 3,740
Pendleton's artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 . . . . 1,716
Rhett's artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 . . . . 1,355
----- ------
Total, including Department of North Carolina 4,160 . . . 65,399

Army of Northern Virginia, September 22, 1862.
Present for Duty
Officers Enlisted men
Longstreet's command . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,410 . . . 19,001
Jackson's command:
D. H. Hill's division . . . . . . . . . . . 310 . . . . 4,739
A. P. Hill's division . . . . . . . . . . . 318 . . . . 4,435
Ewell's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 . . . . 3,144
Jackson's division . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 . . . . 2,367
----- -----
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,501 . . . 33,686

Army of Northern Virginia, September 30, 1862.
Present for Duty
Officers Enlisted men

Longstreet's command . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,927 . . . 26,489
Jackson's command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,629 . . . 21,728
Reserve artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 . . . 716
----- ------
Total[43] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,606 . . . 48,933

Major Taylor, in his work,[44] states:

"In addition to the troops above enumerated as the strength of
General Johnston on May 21, 1862, there were two brigades subject to
his orders then stationed in the vicinity of Hanover Junction, one
under the command of General Branch; they were subsequently
incorporated into the division of General A. P. Hill, and
participated in the battles around Richmond."

He has no official data by which to determine their numbers, but,
from careful estimates and conference with General Anderson, he
estimates the strength of the two at 4,000 effective.

Subsequent to the date of the return of the army around Richmond,
heretofore given, but previous to the battle of Seven Pines, General
Johnston was reënforced by General Huger's division of three
brigades. The total strength of these three brigades, according to
the "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia," was
5,008 effectives. Taylor says:

"If the strength of these five be added to the return of May 21st, we
shall have sixty-two thousand six hundred and ninety-six (62,696) as
the effective strength of the army under General Johnston on May 31,
1862.

"Deduct the losses sustained in the battle of Seven Pines as shown by
the official reports of casualties, say 6,084, and we have 56,612 as
the effective strength of the army when General Lee assumed command."

There have been various attempts made to point out the advantage
which might have been obtained if General Lee, in succeeding to the
command, had renewed on the 1st of June the unfinished battle of the
31st of May; and the representation that he commenced his campaign,
known as the "Seven Days' Battles," only after he had collected a
great army, instead of moving with a force not greatly superior to
that which his predecessor had, has led to the full exposition of all
the facts bearing upon the case. In the "Southern Historical Society
Papers," June, 1876, is published an extract from an address of
Colonel Charles Marshall, secretary and aide-de-camp to General R. E.
Lee, before the Virginia Division of the Army of Northern Virginia.
In it Colonel Marshall quotes General J. E. Johnston as saying:

"General Lee did not attack the enemy until the 26th of June, because
he was employed from the 1st until then in forming a great army by
bringing to that which I had commanded 15,000 men from North Carolina
under Major-General Holmes, 22,000 men from South Carolina and
Georgia, and above 16,000 men from the 'Valley,' in the divisions of
Jackson and Ewell," etc.

These numbers added together make 53,000. Colonel Marshall then
proceeds, from official reports, to show that all these numbers were
exaggerated, and that one brigade, spoken of as seven thousand
strong--that of General Drayton--was not known to be in the Army of
Virginia until after the "seven days," and that another brigade, of
which General Johnston admitted he did not know the strength, Colonel
Marshall thought it safer to refer to as the "unknown brigade,"
which, he suggests, may have been "a small command under General
Evans, of South Carolina, who did not join the army until after it
moved from Richmond."

General Holmes's report, made July 15, 1862, states that on the 29th
of June he brought his command to the north side of the James River,
and was joined by General Wise's brigade. With this addition, his
force amounted to 6,000 infantry and six batteries of artillery.
General Ransom's brigade had been transferred from the division of
General Holmes to that of General Huger a short time before General
Holmes was ordered to join General Lee. The brigade of General Branch
had been detached at an earlier period; it was on duty near to
Hanover Junction, and under the command of General J. E. Johnston
before the battle of Seven Pines. These facts are mentioned to
account for the small size of General Holmes's division, which had
been reduced to two brigades. Ripley's brigade on the 26th of June
was reported to have an aggregate force of 2,366, including pioneers
and the ambulance corps. General Lawton's brigade, when moving up
from Georgia to Richmond, was ordered to change direction, and join
General Jackson in the Valley. He subsequently came down with General
Jackson, and reports the force which he led into the battle of Cold
Harbor, on the 27th of June, 1862, as 3,500 men.

General Lee, after the battle of Seven Pines, had sent two large
brigades under General Whiting to coöperate with General Jackson in
the Valley, and to return with him, according to instructions
furnished. These brigades were in the battle of Seven Pines, and were
counted in the force of the army when General Lee took command of it.
Lawton's Georgia brigade, as has been stated, was diverted from its
destination for a like temporary service, and is accounted for as
reënforcements brought from the south. These three brigades, though
coming with Jackson and Ewell, were not a part of their divisions,
and, if their numbers are made to swell the force which Jackson
brought, they should be elsewhere subtracted.

General J. A. Early, in the same number of the "Historical Society
Papers," in a letter addressed to General J. E. Johnston, February 4,
1875, makes an exhaustive examination from official reports, and
applies various methods of computation to the question at issue.
Among other facts, he states:

"Drayton's brigade did not come to Virginia until after the battles
around Richmond. It was composed of the Fifteenth South Carolina and
the Fiftieth and Fifty-first Georgia Regiments and Third South
Carolina Battalion. A part, if not all, of it was engaged in the
fight at Secessionville, South Carolina, on the 16th of June, 1862.
Its first engagement in Virginia was on the Rappahannock, 25th of
August, 1862. After Sharpsburg, it was so small that it was
distributed among some other brigades in Longstreet's corps."

After minute inquiry, General Early concludes that "the whole command
that came from the Valley, including the artillery, the regiment of
cavalry, and the Maryland regiment and a battery, then known as 'The
Maryland Line,' could not have exceeded 8,000 men." In this, General
Early does not include either Lawton's brigade or the two brigades
with Whiting, and reaches the conclusion that "the whole force
received by General Lee was about 23,000--about 30,000 less than
your estimate."

Taking the number given by General Early as the entire reënforcement
received by General Lee after the battle of Seven Pines and before
the commencement of the seven days' battles--which those who know
his extreme accuracy and minuteness of inquiry will be quite ready to
do--and deducting from the 23,000 the casualties in the battle of
Seven Pines (6,084), we have 16,916; if to this be added whatever
number of absentees may have joined the army in anticipation of
active operations, a number which I have no means of ascertaining,
the result will be the whole increment to the army with which General
Lee took the offensive against McClellan.

It appears from the official returns of the Army of the Potomac that
on June 20th General McClellan had present for duty 115,102 men. It
is stated that McClellan reached the James River with "between 85,000
and 90,000 men," and that his loss in the seven days' battles was
15,249; this would make the army 105,000 strong at the commencement
of the battles.[45] Probably General Dix's corps of 9,277 men,
stationed at Fortress Monroe, is not included in this last statement.

[Footnote 42: Reports of Generals Robert E. Lee, Pendleton, A. P. Hill,
Huger, Alexander, and Major W. H. Taylor, in his "Four Years with Lee,"
have been drawn upon for the foregoing.]

[Footnote 43: No report of cavalry]

[Footnote 44: "Four Years with General Lee."]

[Footnote 45: Swinton's "History of the Army of the Potomac."]

CHAPTER XXV.

Forced Emancipation.--Purposes of the United States Government at
the Commencement of 1862.--Subjugation or Extermination.--The
Willing Aid of United States Congress.--Attempt to legislate the
Subversion of our Social Institutions.--Could adopt any Measure
Self-Defense would justify.--Slavery the Cause of all Troubles,
therefore must be removed.--Statements of President Lincoln's
Inaugural.--Declaration of Sumner.--Abolition Legislation.--The
Power based on Necessity.--Its Formula.--The System of Legislation
devised.--Confiscation.--How permitted by the Law of Nations.--
Views of Wheaton; of J. Q. Adams; of Secretary Marcy; of
Chief-Justice Marshall.--Nature of Confiscation and Proceedings.--
Compared with the Acts of the United States Congress.--Provisions of
the Acts.--Five Thousand Millions of Property involved.--Another
Feature of the Act.--Confiscates Property within Reach.--Procedure
against Persons.--Held us as Enemies and Traitors.--Attacked us
with the Instruments of War and Penalties of Municipal Law.--
Emancipation to be secured.--Remarks of President Lincoln on signing
the Bill.--Remarks of Mr. Adams compared.--Another Alarming
Usurpation of Congress.--Argument for it.--No Limit to the
War-Power of Congress; how maintained.--The Act to emancipate Slaves
in the District of Columbia.--Compensation promised.--Remarks of
President Lincoln.--The Right of Property violated.--Words of the
Constitution.--The Act to prohibit Slavery in the Territories.-The
Act making an Additional Article of War.--All Officers forbidden to
return Fugitives.--Words of the Constitution.--The Powers of the
Constitution unchanged in Peace or War.--The Discharge of Fugitives
commanded in the Confiscation Act.--Words of the Constitution.

At the commencement of the year 1862 it was the purpose of the United
States Government to assail us in every manner and at every point and
with every engine of destruction which could be devised. The usual
methods of civilized warfare consist in the destruction of an enemy's
military power and the capture of his capital. These, however, formed
only a small portion of the purposes of our enemy. If peace with
fraternity and equality in the Union, under the Constitution as
interpreted by its framers, had been his aim, this was attainable
without war; but, seeking supremacy at the cost of a revolution in
the entire political structure, involving a subversion of the
Constitution, the subjection of the States, the submission of the
people, and the establishment of a union under the sword, his efforts
were all directed to subjugation or extermination. Thus, while the
Executive was preparing immense armies, iron-clad fleets, and huge
instruments of war, with which to invade our territory and destroy
our citizens, the willing aid of an impatient, enraged Congress was
invoked to usurp new powers, to legislate the subversion of our
social institutions, and to give the form of legality to the plunder
of a frenzied soldiery.

That body had no sooner assembled than it brought forward the
doctrine that the Government of the United States was engaged in a
struggle for its existence, and could therefore resort to any measure
which a case of self-defense would justify. It pretended not to know
that the only self-defense authorized in the Constitution for the
Government created by it, was by the peaceful method of the
ballot-box; and that, so long as the Government fulfilled the objects
of its creation (see preamble of the Constitution), and exercised its
delegated powers within their prescribed limits, its surest and
strongest defense was to be found in that ballot-box.

The Congress next declared that our institution of slavery was the
cause of all the troubles of the country, and therefore the whole
power of the Government must be so directed as to remove it. If this
had really been the cause of the troubles, how easily wise and
patriotic statesmen might have furnished a relief. Nearly all the
slaveholding States had withdrawn from the Union, therefore those who
had been suffering vicariously might have welcomed their departure,
as the removal of the cause which disturbed the Union, and have tried
the experiment of separation. Should the trial have brought more
wisdom and a spirit of conciliation to either or both, there might
have arisen, as a result of the experiment, a reconstructed fraternal
Union such as our fathers designed.

The people of the seceded States had loved the Union. Shoulder to
shoulder with the people of the other States, they had bled for its
liberties and its honor. Their sacrifices in peace had not been less
than those in war, and their attachment had not diminished by what
they had given, nor were they less ready to give in the future. The
concessions they had made for many years and the propositions which
followed secession proved their desire to preserve the peace.

The authors of the aggressions which had disturbed the harmony of the
Union had lately acquired power on a sectional basis, and were eager
for the spoil of their sectional victory. To conceal their real
motive, and artfully to appeal to the prejudice of foreigners, they
declared that slavery was the cause of the troubles of the country,
and of the "rebellion" which they were engaged in suppressing. In his
inaugural address in March, 1861, President Lincoln said: "I have no
purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of
slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful
right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." The leader
(Sumner) of the Abolition party in Congress, on February 25, 1861,
said in the Senate, "I take this occasion to declare most explicitly
that I do not think that Congress has any right to interfere with
slavery in a State." The principle thus announced had regulated all
the legislation of Congress from the beginning of its first session
in 1789 down to the first session of the Thirty-seventh Congress,
commencing July 4, 1861.

A few months after the inaugural address above cited and the
announcement of the fact above quoted were made, Congress commenced
to legislate for the abolition of slavery. If it had the power now to
do what it before had not, whence was it derived? There had been no
addition in the interval to the grants in the Constitution; not a
word or letter of that instrument had been changed since the
possession of the power was disclaimed; yet after July 4, 1861, it
was asserted by the majority in Congress that the Government had
power to interfere with slavery in the States. Whence came the
change? The answer is, It was wrought by the same process and on the
same plea that tyranny has ever employed against liberty and
justice--the time-worn excuse of usurpers--necessity; an excuse
which is ever assumed as valid, because the usurper claims to be the
sole judge of his necessity.

The formula under which it was asserted was as follows:

"Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past
and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, etc., by
combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings," etc.

Therefore, says the plea of necessity, a new power is this day found
under the Constitution of the United States. This means that certain
circumstances had transpired in a distant portion of the Union, and
the powers of the Constitution had thereby become enlarged. The
inference follows with equal reason that, when the circumstances
cease to exist, the powers of the Constitution will be contracted
again to their normal state; that is, the powers of the Constitution
of the United States are enlarged or contracted according to
circumstances. Mankind can not be surprised at seeing a Government,
administered on such an interpretation of powers, blunder into a
civil war, and approach the throes of dissolution.

Nevertheless, these views were adopted by the Thirty-seventh Congress
of the United States, and a system of legislation was devised which
embraced the following usurpations: universal emancipation in the
Confederate States through confiscation of private property of all
kinds; prohibition of the extension of slavery to the Territories;
emancipation of slavery in all places under the exclusive control of
the Government of the United States; emancipation with compensation
in the border States and in the District of Columbia; practical
emancipation to follow the progress of the armies; all restraints to
be removed from the slaves, so that they could go free wherever they
pleased, and be fed and clothed, when destitute, at the expense of
the United States, literally to become a "ward of the Government."

The emancipation of slaves through confiscation in States where the
United States Government had, under the Constitution, no authority to
interfere with slavery, was a problem which the usurpers found it
difficult legally or logically to solve, but these obstacles were
less regarded than the practical difficulty in States where the
Government had no physical power to enforce its edicts. The limited
powers granted in the Constitution to the Government of the United
States were not at all applicable to such designs, or commensurate
with their execution. Now, let us see the little possibility there
was for constitutional liberties and rights to survive, when
intrusted to such unscrupulous hands.

In Article I, section 8, the Constitution says:

"The Congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of
marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and
water; to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy;
to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces," etc.

This is the grant of power under which the Government of the United
States makes war upon a foreign nation. If it had not been given in
the Constitution, there would not have been any power under which to
conduct a foreign war, such as that of 1812 against Great Britain or
that of 1846 against Mexico. In such conflicts the nations engaged
recognize each other as separate sovereignties and as public enemies,
and use against each other all the powers granted by the law of
nations. One of these powers is the confiscation of the property of
the enemy. Under the law of nations of modern days this confiscation
is limited in extent, made under a certain form, and for a defined
object.

For the modern laws of war one must look to the usages of civilized
states and to the publicists who have explained and enforced them.
These usages constitute themselves the laws of war.

In relation to the capture and confiscation of private property on
land, in addition to what has been said in previous pages, it may be
added that the whole matter has never been better stated than by our
great American publicist, Mr. Wheaton, in these words:

"By the modern usages of nations, which have now acquired the force
of law, temples of religion, public edifices devoted to civil
purposes only, monuments of art, and repositories of science, are
exempted from the general operations of war. Private property on land
is also exempt from confiscation, with the exception of such as may
become booty in special cases, when taken from enemies in the field
or in besieged towns, and of military contributions levied upon the
inhabitants of the hostile territory. This exemption extends even to
the case of an absolute and unqualified conquest of the enemy's
country,"--("Elements of International Law," p. 421.)

Mr. John Quincy Adams, in a letter to the Secretary of State, dated
August 22, 1815, says:

"Our object is the restoration of all the property, including slaves,
which, by the usages of war among civilized nations, ought not to
have been taken. All private property on shore was of that
description. It was entitled by the laws of war to exemption from
capture."--(4 "American State Papers," 116, etc.)

Again, Mr. William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, in a letter to the
Count de Sartiges, dated July 28, 1856, says:

"The prevalence of Christianity and the progress of civilization have
greatly mitigated the severity of the ancient mode of prosecuting
hostilities. . . . It is a generally received rule of modern warfare,
so far at least as operations upon land are concerned, that the
persons and effects of non-combatants are to be respected. The wanton
pillage or uncompensated appropriation of individual, property by an
army even in possession of an enemy's country is against the usage of
modern times. Such a proceeding at this day would be condemned by the
enlightened judgment of the world, unless warranted by particular
circumstances."

The words of the late Chief-Justice Marshall on the capture and
confiscation of private property should not be omitted:

"It may not be unworthy of remark that it is very unusual, even in
cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than displace the
sovereign, and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of
nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of
justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole
civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be
generally confiscated and private rights annulled. The people change
their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is
dissolved; but their relations to each other and their rights of
property remain undisturbed."--("United States vs. Percheman," 7
Peters, 51.)

The Government of the United States recognized us as under the law of
nations by attempting to use against us one of the powers of that
law. Yet, if we were subject to this power, we were most certainly
entitled to its protection. This was refused. That Government
exercised against us all the severities of the law, and outraged that
sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the
whole civilized world by rejecting the observance of its
ameliorations. The act of confiscation is a power exercised under the
laws of war for the purpose of indemnifying the captor for his
expense and losses; and it is upon this basis that it is recognized.
At the same time there is a mode of procedure attached to its
exercise by which it is reserved from the domain of plunder and
devastation. As has been already shown, there are, under the law,
exemptions of certain classes of property. It is further required
that the property subject to confiscation shall be actually captured
and taken possession of. It shall then be adjudicated as prize by a
proper authority, then sold, and the money received must be deposited
in the public Treasury. Such are the conditions attached by the law
of nations to legal confiscation.

Now, compare these conditions with the act of Congress, that in its
true light the usurpations of that body may be seen. The act of
Congress allowed no exemptions of private property, but confiscated
all the property of every kind belonging to persons residing in the
Confederate States who were engaged in hostilities against the United
States or who were aiding or abetting those engaged in hostilities.
This includes slaves as well as other property. The act provided that
the slaves should go free; that is, they were exempted from capture,
from being adjudicated and sold, and no proceeds of sale were to be
put into the public Treasury. The following sections are from the act
of the United States Congress, passed on August 6, 1861:

"Section 1. That if, during the present or any future insurrection
against the Government of the United States after the President of
the United States shall have declared by proclamation that the laws
of the United States are opposed and the execution thereof obstructed
by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings or by the power vested in the marshals by
law, any person, or persons, his, her, or their agent, attorney, or
employee shall purchase or acquire, sell or give, any property, of
whatsoever kind or description, with intent to use or employ the
same, or suffer the same to be used or employed in aiding, abetting,
or promoting such insurrection or resistance to the laws, or any
person or persons engaged therein, or if any person or persons, being
the owner or owners of any such property, shall knowingly use or
employ or consent to the use or employment of the same as aforesaid,
all such property is hereby declared to be lawful subject of prize
and capture wherever found; and it shall be the duty of the President
of the United States to cause the same to be seized, confiscated, and
condemned.

"Section 3. The proceedings in court shall be for the benefit of the
United States and the informer equally.

"Section 4. That whenever hereafter, during the present insurrection
against the Government of the United States, any person claimed to be
held to labor or service under the law of any State shall be required
or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is claimed
to be due, or by the lawful agent of such person, to take up arms
against the United States, or shall be required or permitted by the
person to whom such labor or service is claimed to be due, or his
lawful agent, to work or to be employed in or upon any fort,
navy-yard, dock, armory, ship, intrenchment, or in any military or
naval service whatsoever against the Government and lawful authority
of the United States, then, and in every such case, the person to
whom such labor or service is claimed to be due shall forfeit his
claim to such labor, any law of the State or of the United States to
the contrary notwithstanding. And, whenever thereafter the person
claiming such labor or service shall seek to enforce his claim, it
shall be a full and sufficient answer to such claim that the person
whose service or labor is claimed had been employed in hostile
service against the Government of the United States contrary to the
provisions of this act."

The following sections are from the act of Congress passed on July
17, 1862:

"Section 6. That if any person, within any State or Territory of the
United States other than those named aforesaid" (Confederate
officers, etc.), "after the passage of this act, being engaged in
armed rebellion against the Government of the United States or aiding
or abetting such rebellion, shall not within sixty days after public
warning and proclamation duly given and made by the President of the
United States, cease to aid, countenance, and abet such rebellion and
return to his allegiance to the United States, all the estate and
property, moneys, stocks, and credits of such person shall be liable
to seizure as aforesaid, and it shall be the duty of the President to
seize and use them as aforesaid, or the proceeds thereof. And all
sales, transfers, or conveyances of any such property, after the
expiration of the said sixty days from the date of such warning and
proclamation, shall be null and void; and it shall be a sufficient
bar to any suit brought by such person for the possession or use of
such property, or any of it, to allege and prove that he is one of
the persons described in this section.

"Section 7. That to secure the condemnation and sale of any such
property, after the same shall have been seized, so that it may be
made available for the purpose aforesaid, proceedings _in rem_ shall
be instituted in the name of the United States in any district court
thereof, or in any territorial court, or in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, within which the
property above described, or any part thereof, may be found, or into
which the same, if movable, may first be brought, which proceedings
shall conform as nearly as may be to proceedings in admiralty or
revenue cases; and if said property, whether real or personal, shall
be found to have belonged to a person engaged in rebellion, or who
has given aid or comfort thereto, the same shall be condemned as
enemy's property and become the property of the United States, and
may be disposed of as the court shall decree, and the proceeds
thereof paid into the Treasury of the United States for the purposes
aforesaid.

"Section 9. That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged
in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or who
shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such
persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army; and all
slaves captured from such persons or deserted by them and coming
under the control of the Government of the United States; and all
slaves of such persons found or being within any place occupied by
rebel forces and afterward occupied by the forces of the United
States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be for ever free
of their servitude, and not again held as slaves.

"Section 10. That no slave escaping into any State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia from any other State, shall be delivered up, or
in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime or
some offense against the laws, unless the person claiming said
fugitive shall first make oath that the person, to whom the labor or
service of such fugitive is alleged to be due, is his lawful owner,
and has not borne arms against the United States in the present
rebellion, nor in any way given aid and comfort thereto; and no
person engaged in the military and naval service of the United States
shall, under any pretense whatever, assume to decide on the validity
of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other
person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of
being dismissed from the service."

These above-mentioned proceedings violated all the principles of the
law of nations, without a shadow of authority for it under the
Constitution of the United States. The armies of the United States
were literally authorized to invade the Confederate States, to seize
all property as plunder, and to let the negroes go free. Our
posterity, reading that history, will blush that such facts are on
record. It was estimated on the floor of the House of Representatives
that the aggregate amount of property within our limits subject to be
acted upon by the provisions of this act would affect upward of six
million people, and would deprive them of property of the value of
nearly five thousand million dollars.

Said Mr. Garrett Davis, of Kentucky:

"Was there ever, in any country that God's sun ever beamed upon, a
legislative measure involving such an amount of property and such
numbers of property-holders?"

But this is only one feature of the confiscation act which was
applied to persons who were within the Confederate States, in such a
position that the ordinary process of the United States courts could
not be served upon them. They could be reached only by the armies.
There was another feature equally flagrant and criminal. It was
extended to all that class of persons giving aid and comfort, who
could be found within the United States, or in such position that the
ordinary process of law could be served on them. It was derived from
Article III, section 3, of the Constitution, which says:

"The Congress shall have the power to declare the punishment of
treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood,
or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted."

The mode of procedure against persons under this power was determined
by other clauses of the Constitution. Article III, section 2,
declared that--

"The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes
shall have been committed."

In section 3, of the same article, it was provided that--

"No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of
two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court."

This feature of the confiscation act, passed by the Congress of the
United States, provided for the punishment of the owner of property,
on the proof of the crime, but excluded the trial by jury, and made
the forfeiture of the property absolute instead of a forfeiture for
life. Heavy fines were imposed, and property was sold in fee. The
property to which the act applied was not a prize under the law of
nations, nor booty, nor contraband of war, nor enforced military
contributions, nor used or employed in the war or in resistance to
the laws. It was private property, outside of the conflict of arms,
and forfeited, not because it was the instrument of offense, but as a
penalty for the assertion of his rights by the owner, which was
imputed to him as a crime. Such proceeding was, in effect, punishment
by the forfeiture of a man's entire estate, real and personal,
without trial by jury, and in utter disregard of the provisions of
the Constitution. It was an attempt to get a man's property, real and
personal, "silver spoons" included, into a prize court, to be tried
by the laws of war.

It will be seen that we were treated by the Congress of the United
States as holding the twofold relation of enemies and traitors, and
that they used against us all the instruments of war, and all the
penalties of municipal law which made the punishment of treason to be
death. The practical operation, therefore, of these laws was that,
under a Constitution which defined treason to consist in levying war
against the United States, which would not suffer the traitor to be
condemned except by the judgment of his peers, and, when condemned,
would not forfeit his estate except during his life, the Government
of the United States did proceed against six million people, without
indictment, without trial by jury, without the proof of two
witnesses, did adjudge our six millions of people guilty of treason
in levying war, and decree to deprive us of all our estate, real and
personal, for life, and in fee, being nearly five thousand million
dollars. And, after we had been thus punished, without trial by jury,
and by the loss in fee of our whole estate, the Government of the
United States assumed the power, on the same charge of levying war,
to try us and to hang us.

The first object to be secured by this act of confiscation was the
emancipation of all our slaves. Upon his approval of the bill,
President Lincoln sent a message to Congress, in which he said:

"It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a
State, and yet, if it were said the ownership of the slave had first
been transferred to the nation, and Congress had then liberated him,
the difficulty would at once vanish. And this is the real case. The
traitor against the General Government forfeits his slave at least as
justly as he does any other property; and he forfeits both to the
Government against which he offends. The Government, so far as there
can be ownership, thus owns the forfeited slaves, and the question
for Congress in regard to them is, 'Shall they be made free or sold
to new masters?'"

It is amazing to see the utter forgetfulness of all constitutional
obligations and the entire disregard of the conditions of the laws of
nations manifested in these words of the President of the United
States. Was he ignorant of their existence, or did he seek to cover
up his violation of them by a deceptive use of language. It may not
be unseasonable to repeat here the words of John Quincy Adams, in his
letter of August 22, 1815, as above stated:

"Our object is the restoration of all the property, including slaves,
which, by the usages of war among civilized nations, ought not to
have been taken."

Let posterity answer the questions: Who were the revolutionists? Who
were really destroying the Constitution of the United States?

The agitation of this subject brought out another still more alarming
usurpation in Congress, and showed that the majority were ready to
throw aside the last fragments of the Constitution in order to secure
our subjugation. The argument for this usurpation was thus framed:
Assuming that the state of the "nation" was one of general hostility,
and that, being so involved, it possessed the power of self-defense,
it was asserted that the supreme power of making and conducting war
was expressly placed in Congress by the Constitution. "The whole
powers of war are vested in Congress."--("United States Supreme
Court, Brown vs. United States," 1 Cranch.) There is no such power in
the judiciary, and the Executive is simply "commander-in-chief of the
army and navy"; all other powers not necessarily implied in the
command of the military and naval forces are expressly given to
Congress.

The theory was that the contingency of actual hostilities suspended
the Constitution and gave to Congress the sovereign power of a nation
creating new relations and conferring new rights, imposing
extraordinary obligations on the citizens, and subjecting them to
extraordinary penalties. There is, under that view, therefore, no
limit on the power of Congress; it is invested with the absolute
powers of war--the civil functions of the Government are, for the
time being, in abeyance when in conflict, and all State and
"national" authority subordinated to the extreme authority of
Congress, as the supreme power, in the peril of external or internal
hostilities. The ordinary provisions of the Constitution peculiar to
a state of peace, and all laws and municipal regulations, were to
yield to the force of martial law, as resolved by Congress. This was
designated as the "war power" of the United States Government.

I should deem an apology to be due to my readers, in offering for
their perusal such insane extravagances, under a constitutional
Government of limited powers, had not this doctrine been adopted by
the United States Government, and subsequently made the basis of some
most revolutionary measures for the emancipation of the African
slaves and the enslavement of the free citizens of the South. One
must allow that the Chamber of Deputies of the French National
Assembly of 1798 had some claims to a respectable degree of political
virtue when compared with the Thirty-seventh Congress and the
Executive of the United States.

The specious argument for this tremendous and sweeping usurpation,
designated as the "war power," as presented by its adherents, may be
stated in a few words, thus: The Constitution confers on Congress all
the specific powers incident to war, and then further authorizes it
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers." The words are these:

"Congress shall have power to declare war; to grant letters of marque
and reprisal; to make rules concerning captures on land and water; to
raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasion; and to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof." [46]

It will be seen that this unlimited, despotic power was claimed for
Congress in the conduct of the war under the last clause above, viz.,
"to make all laws which," etc; whereas no one familiar with the rules
of legal interpretation will seriously contend that the powers of
Congress are one atom greater by the insertion of this provision than
they would have been if it had not appeared in the Constitution. The
delegation of a power gives the incidental means _necessary_ for its
execution.

Another step in the usurpations begun for the destruction of slavery
was the passage by Congress of an act for the emancipation of slaves
in the District of Columbia. The act emancipated all persons of
African descent held to service within the District, immediately upon
its passage. Those owners of slaves who had not sympathized with us
were allowed ninety days to prepare and present to commissioners,
appointed for that purpose, the names, ages, and personal description
of their slaves, who were to be valued by commissioners. No single
slave could be estimated to be worth more than three hundred dollars.
One million dollars was appropriated to carry the act into effect.
All claims were to be presented within ninety days after the passage
of the act, and not thereafter; but there was no saving clause for
minors, _femmes covert_, insane or absent persons. On his approval of
the act, the Executive of the United States sent a message to
Congress, in which he said:

"I have never doubted the constitutional authority of Congress to
abolish slavery in the District, and I have ever desired to see the
national capital freed from the institution in some satisfactory way.
Hence there never has been in my mind any questions upon the subject,
except those of expediency, arising in view of all the circumstances."

For the previous twenty-five or thirty years the subject had again
and again been presented in Congress, and was always rejected. One of
the incidents that led to our withdrawal from the Union was the
apprehension that it was the intention of the United States
Government to violate the constitutional right of each State to adopt
and maintain, to reject or abolish slavery, as it pleased. This step
showed the justness of our apprehensions.

Among the rights guaranteed to every citizen of the United States,
including the District of Columbia, was the right of property. No one
could be deprived of his property by the Government, except in the
manner prescribed and authorized by the Constitution. Its words are
these:

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." [47]

Whenever it was necessary in the administration of affairs that the
Government should take private property for public use, it had the
right to take that private property on the condition of making
compensation for it, and on no other condition. Also, it could not be
taken except for public use, even by making just compensation for it;
nor could it be taken to be destroyed. The simple and sole condition
on which the inviolability of private property could be broken by the
Government itself was, that it was necessary for public use.
Otherwise, there was no constitutional right on the part of the
Government to take the property at all.

Again, this property, thus necessary, must be taken by due process of
law. The Government had not the right to declare the mode, and
arbitrarily fix the limit of price which should be paid. The negro
could be taken only as other property, even admitting that he could
be taken for emancipation. The due process of law required that the
citizen's property should be appraised judicially. A court must
proceed judicially in every case, summon a jury, appoint
commissioners, and, under the supervision and sanction of the court,
the valuation of the slave by them must proceed as it does in
relation to any other property of the citizen that might be taken by
the lawful exercise of the power of Congress or of the United States
Government. Thus it will be seen that by this usurpation of power the
Constitution was violated, not only by taking private property for
other purposes than for public use, but in the neglect to observe the
due process of law which the Constitution required.

The next step in the usurpation of power for the destruction of the
right of citizens to hold property in slaves was the passage by
Congress of an act which declared that, after its passage--

"There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of
the Territories of the United States now existing, or which may at
any time hereafter be formed or acquired by the United States,
otherwise than in the punishment of crimes," etc.

The subject had been brought forward at every session of Congress for
a number of years, and was uniformly resisted by the advocates of
equality among the States. We claimed an equal right with the other
States to the occupation and settlement of the Territories which were
the common property of the Union; and that any infringement of this
right was not only a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, but
destructive of that equality of the States so necessary for the
maintenance of their Union. We further claimed our right under this
express provision of the Constitution:

"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States
or of any particular States." [48]

The obstinate resistance of the consolidation school to our views was
an evidence of their aggressive purposes, and justified still further
our apprehensions of their intention to violate our constitutional
rights.

Another step taken to accomplish the emancipation of our slaves was
the passage by Congress of an act making an additional article of war
for the government of the army of the United States. It was in these
words:

"All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the
United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under
their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from
service or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such
service or labor is claimed to be due; and any officer who shall be
found guilty by a court-martial of violating this article shall be
dismissed from the service."

The Constitution of the United States expressly declares that all
such persons

"Shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or
labor may be due." [49]

In this instance Congress passed an act declaring that they shall not
be delivered up on such claim; and, as a penalty for disobedience,
any officer of the army or navy should be dismissed from the service.
Thus an act of Congress directly forbade that which the Constitution
commanded. A more flagrant outrage upon the constitutional obligation
could not be committed.

But, it may be said, a state of war existed. That does not diminish
the crime of the Congress. The commands of the Constitution are
positive, direct, unchanged, and unrelaxed by circumstances. They are
equally in force in a state of war and in a state of peace. The
powers are delegated, and can not be amended or changed by war or
peace. Its words are these:

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law, and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The Senators
and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath
or affirmation to support this Constitution." [50]

It declares itself to be, within its province, the supreme law of the
United States, not merely during the condition of peace, but
continuing through all times and events supreme throughout the Union,
until it should be altered or amended in the manner prescribed.

Another instance of the like flagrant violation of the Constitution
is to be found in the ninth and tenth sections of the confiscation
act previously referred to. The Constitution of the United States in
Article IV, section 3, says:

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or
regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor."

It will be seen, by reference to the Constitution, that the first
part of the clause here referred to forbids the discharge of the
fugitive, and the second part commands his delivery to the claimant.
It has just been stated in what manner Congress commanded the claim
for delivery to be repudiated. The "discharge from such service and
labor," in consequence of any State law or regulation, is forbidden.
This is a part of the Constitution, and it is thereby made the duty
of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the United
States Government to enforce the prohibition, to make sure that the
fugitive is not discharged by any action of a State.

Will the friends of constitutional liberty believe our assertion that
these acts, the execution of which it was so expressly made the duty
of the United States Government to prevent, that Government itself
did do in the most explicit and effective manner? The Constitution
forbids the discharge; Congress and the Executive, each, not only
commanded the discharge, but, to make it sure and thorough, forbade
the incipiency of an apprehension--not even permitting the shadow of
an occasion for a discharge. Could human ingenuity devise a method
for a more perfect subversion of a constitutional duty? The
provisions of the act are in these words:

"All slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion
against the Government of the United States, or who shall in any way
give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such persons and taking
refuge within the lines of the army; and all slaves captured from
such persons or deserted by them and coming under the control of the
Government of the United States; and all slaves of such persons found
or being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterward
occupied by the forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives
of war, and shall be for ever free of their servitude, and not again
held as slaves."

Again, the next section of the same act says:

"No slave escaping into any State, Territory, or the District of
Colombia from any other State, shall be delivered up, or in any way
impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime or some offense
against the laws, unless the person claiming said fugitive shall
first make oath that the person, to whom the labor or service of such
fugitive is alleged to be due, is his lawful owner, and has not borne
arms against the United States in the present rebellion, nor in any
way given aid and comfort thereto." [51]

In this connection it is worth while to read again the words of the
Constitution:

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or
regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but
shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or
labor may be due."

Let it be observed that there is no limitation, no qualification, no
condition whatever attached to this clause of the Constitution. The
words "no person held to service" included every slave in the United
States. In Article I, section 9, and in Article V, are exceptions
suspending the operation of the general provision. But in this
provision there are none, because it was intended there should be
none. The provision was designed to include every slave, and to be in
force under all circumstances.

Perhaps it may be urged as an objection to this assertion, that the
Confederate States were out of the Union and beyond the protection of
the provisions of the Constitution. This objection can not be
admitted in extenuation of this crime of Congress and the Executive;
for there was, thus far, no act of Congress, nor proclamation of the
President in existence, showing that either of them regarded the
Confederate States in any other position than as States within the
Union, whose citizens were subject to all the penalties contained in
the Constitution, and therefore entitled to the benefit of all its
provisions for their protection. Unhesitatingly it may be said, and
as will be still more apparent farther on in these pages, that all
the conduct of the Confederate States, pertaining to the war,
consisted in just efforts to preserve to themselves and their
posterity rights and protections guaranteed to them in the
Constitution of the United States; and that the actions of the
Federal Government consisted in efforts to subvert those rights,
destroy those protections, and subjugate us to compliance with its
arbitrary will; and that this conduct on their part involved the
subversion of the Constitution and the destruction of the fundamental
principles of liberty. Who is the criminal? Let posterity answer.

[Footnote 46: Constitution of the United States, Article I, section 8.]

[Footnote 47: Constitution of the United States, Article V.]

[Footnote 48: Constitution of the United States, Article IV, section 3,
clause 2.]

[Footnote 49: Constitution of the United States, Article IV, section 2.]

[Footnote 50: Ibid., Article VI.]

[Footnote 51: Laws of the United States, 1862.]

CHAPTER XXVI.

Forced Emancipation concluded.--Emancipation Acts of President
Lincoln.--Emancipation with Compensation proposed to Border
States.--Reasons urged for it.--Its Unconstitutionality.--Order of
General Hunter.--Revoked by President Lincoln.--Reasons.--"The
Pressure" on him.--One Cause of our Secession.--The Time to throw
off the Mask at Hand.--The Necessity that justified the President
and Congress also justified Secession.--Men united in Defense of
Liberty called Traitors.--Conference of President Lincoln with
Senators and Representatives of Border States.--Remarks of Mr.
Lincoln.--Reply of Senators and Representatives.--Failure of the
Proposition.--Three Hundred Thousand more Men called for.--
Declarations of the Antislavery Press.--Truth of our
Apprehensions.--Reply of President Lincoln.--Another Call for
Men.--Further Declarations of the Antislavery Press.--The Watchword
adopted.--Memorial of So-called Christians to the President.--Reply
of President Lincoln.--Issue of the Preliminary Proclamation of
Emancipation.--Issue of the Final Proclamation.--The Military
Necessity asserted.--The Consummation verbally reached.--Words of
the Declaration of Independence.--Declarations by the United States
Government of what it intended to do.--True Nature of the Party
unveiled.--Declarations of President Lincoln.--Vindication of the
Sagacity of the Southern People.--His Declarations to European
Cabinets.--Object of these Declarations.--Trick of the Fugitive
Thief.--The Boast of Mr. Lincoln calmly considered.

The attention of the reader is now invited to a series of usurpations
in which the President of the United States was the principal actor.
On March 6, 1862, he began a direct and unconstitutional interference
with slavery by sending a message to Congress recommending the
adoption of a resolution which should declare that the United States
ought to coöperate with any State which might adopt the gradual
abolition of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used
by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconvenience,
public and private, produced by such change of system. The reason
given for the recommendation of the adoption of the resolution was
that the United States Government would find its highest interest in
such a measure as one of the most important means of self-preservation.
He said, in explanation, that "the leaders of the existing rebellion
entertain the hope that this Government will ultimately be forced to
acknowledge the independence of some part of the disaffected region,
and that all the slave States north of such part will then say, 'The
Union for which we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to
go with the Southern section.' To deprive them of this hope
substantially ends the rebellion, and the initiation of emancipation
deprives them of it and of all the States initiating it."

When it was asked where the power was found in the Constitution to
appropriate the money of the people to carry out the purposes of the
resolution, it was replied that the legislative department of the
Government was competent, under these words in the preamble of the
Constitution, "to provide for the general welfare," to do anything
and everything which could be considered as promoting the general
welfare. It was further said that this measure was to be consummated
under the war power; that whatever was necessary to carry on the war
to a successful conclusion might be done without restraint under the
authority, not of the Constitution, but as a military necessity. It
was further said that the President of the United States had thus far
failed to meet the just expectations of the party which elected him
to the office he held; and that his friends were to be comforted by
the resolution and the message, while the people of the border slave
States could not fail to observe that with the comfort to the North
there was mingled an awful warning to them. It was denied by the
President that it was an interference with slavery in the States. It
was an artful scheme to awaken a controversy in the slave States, and
to commence the work of emancipation by holding out pecuniary aid as
an inducement. In every previous declaration the President had said
that he did not contemplate any interference with domestic slavery
within the States. The resolution was passed by large majorities in
each House.

This proposition of President Lincoln was wholly unconstitutional,
because it attempted to do what was expressly forbidden by the
Constitution. It proposed a contract between the State of Missouri
and the Government of the United States which, in the language of the
act, shall be "irrepealable without the consent of the United
States." The words of the Constitution are as follows:

"No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation,
grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money, etc." [52]

This is a prohibition not only upon the power of one State to enter
into a compact, alliance, confederation, or agreement with another
State, but also with the Government of the United States.

Again, if the State of Missouri could enter into an irrepealable
agreement or compact with the United States, that slavery should not
therein exist after the acceptance on the part of Missouri of the
act, then it would be an agreement on the part of that State to
surrender its sovereignty and make the State unequal in its rights of
sovereignty with the other States of the Union. The other States
would have the complete right of sovereignty over their domestic
institutions while the State of Missouri would cease to have such
right. The whole system of the United States Government would be
abrogated by such legislation. Again, it is a cardinal principle of
the system that the people in their sovereign capacity may, from time
to time, change and alter their organic law; and a provision
incorporated in the Constitution of Missouri that slavery should
never thereafter exist in that State could not prevent a future
sovereign convention of its people from reestablishing slavery within
its limits.

It will be observed, from what has been said in the preceding pages,
that the usurpations by the Government of the United States, both by
the legislative and executive departments, had not only been
tolerated but approved. Feeling itself, therefore, fortified in its
unlimited power from "necessity," the wheels of the revolution were
now to move with accelerated velocity in their destructive work.
Accordingly, a manifesto soon comes from the Executive on universal
emancipation. On April 25, 1862, the United States Major-General
Hunter, occupying a position at Hilton Head, South Carolina, issued
an order declaring the States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina
under martial law. On May 9th the same officer issued another order,
declaring "the persons held as slaves in those States to be for ever
free." The Executive of the United States, on May 19th, issued a
proclamation declaring the order to be void, and said:

"I further make known that, whether it be competent for me as
commander-in-chief of the army and navy to declare the slaves of any
State or States free, and whether at any time or in any case it shall
have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the
Government to examine such supposed power, are questions which, under
my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I can not feel
justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field."

Speaking of this order of Major-General Hunter soon afterward,
President Lincoln, in remarks on July 12, 1862, to the border States
Representatives, said:

"In repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offense, to many
whose support the country can not afford to lose. And this is not the
end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is
increasing."

This pressure consisted in the demand of his extreme partisans that
the whole authority of the Government should be exerted for the
immediate and universal emancipation of the slaves.

By a reference to the statement of the causes of our withdrawal from
the Union of the United States, it will be seen that one of them
consisted in the conviction that the newly elected officers of the
Government would wield its powers for the destruction of the
institutions of the Southern States. The facts already related in
these pages furnish ample proofs of the justice and accuracy of this
conviction.

The time was now close at hand when the mask was to be thrown off,
and, at a single dash of the pen, four hundred millions of our
property was to be annihilated, the whole social fabric of the
Southern States disrupted, all branches of industry to be
disarranged, good order to be destroyed, and a flood of evils many
times greater than the loss of property to be inflicted upon the
people of the South, thus consummating the series of aggressions
which had been inflicted for more than thirty years. All
constitutional protections were to be withdrawn, and the powers of a
common government, created for common and equal protection to the
interests of all, were to be arrayed for the destruction of our
institutions. The President of the United States says: "This is not
the end. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is
increasing." How easy it would have been for the Northern people, by
a simple, honest obedience to the provisions of the Constitution, to
have avoided the commission of all these crimes and horrors! For the
law which demands obedience to itself guarantees in return life and
safety. It is not necessary to ask again where the President of the
United States or the Congress found authority for their usurpations.
But it should be remembered that, if the necessity which they pleaded
was an argument to justify their violations of all the provisions of
the Constitution, the existence of such a necessity on their part was
a sufficient argument to justify our withdrawal from union with them.
If necessity on their part justified a violation of the Constitution,
necessity on our part justified secession from them. If the
preservation of the existence of the Union by coercion of the States
was an argument to justify these violent usurpations by the United
States Government, it was still more forcibly an argument to justify
our separation and resistance to invasion; for we were struggling for
our natural rights, but the Government of the United States has no
natural rights.

How can a people who glory in a Declaration of Independence which
broke the slumbers of a world declare that men united in defense of
liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness are "traitors"? Is it
henceforth to be a dictum of humanity that man may no more take up
arms in defense of rights, liberty, and property? Shall it never
again in the course of human events become lawful "for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another,
and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal
station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle
them"? Is the highwayman, henceforth, to be the lord of the highway,
and the poor, plundered traveler to have no property which he may
defend at the risk of the life of the highwayman?

On July 12, 1862, the President of the United States, persistent in
his determination to destroy the institution of slavery, invited the
Senators and Representatives of the border slaveholding States to the
Executive Mansion, and addressed them on emancipation in their
respective States. He said:

"I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my
opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual
emancipation message of last March, the war would now be
substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the
most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in
rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the
States you represent ever join their proposed confederacy, and they
can not much longer maintain the contest. But you can not divest them
of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a
determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States.
Beat them at elections as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing
daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the
lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and
they can shake you no more for ever."

He further said that the incidents of the war might extinguish the
institution in their States, and added:

"How much better for you as seller and the nation as buyer to sell
out and buy out that without which the war could never have been,
than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting
one another's throats!"

The reply of the majority, consisting of twenty of the twenty-nine
Senators and Representatives, subsequently made to the President, is
worthy of notice. They said that they were not of the belief that
funds would be provided for the object, or that their constituents
would reap the fruits of the promise held out, and added:

"The right to hold slaves is a right appertaining to all the States
of the Union. They have the right to cherish or abolish the
institution, as their tastes or their interests may prompt, and no
one is authorized to question the right, or limit its enjoyment. And
no one has more clearly affirmed that right than you have. Your
inaugural address does you great honor in this respect, and inspired
the country with confidence in your fairness and respect for law."

After asserting that a large portion of our people were fighting
because they believed the Administration was hostile to their rights,
and was making war on their domestic institutions, they further said:

"Remove their apprehensions; satisfy them that no harm is intended to
them and their institutions; that this Government is not making war
on their rights of property, but is simply defending its legitimate
authority, and they will gladly return to their allegiance."

This measure of emancipation with compensation soon proved a failure.
A proposition to appropriate five hundred thousand dollars to the
object was voted down in the United States Senate with great
unanimity. The Government was, step by step, "educating the people"
up to a proclamation of emancipation, so as to make entire abolition
one of the positive and declared issues of the contest.

The so-called pressure upon the President was now organized for a
final onset. The Governors of fifteen States united in a request that
three hundred thousand more men should be called out to fill up the
reduced ranks, and it was done. The anti-slavery press then entered
the arena. Charges were made against the President, in the name of

"Twenty millions of people, that a groat proportion of those who
triumphed in his election were sorely disappointed and deeply pained
by the policy he seemed to be pursuing with regard to the slaves of
the rebels."

This is a simple statement of the progress of events, and it shows to
the world how well founded were our apprehensions, at the hour of its
election, that the Administration intended the destruction of our
property and community independence. They further said:

"You are strangely and disastrously remiss in the discharge of your
official and imperative duty with regard to the emancipation
provisions of the new confiscation act."

They further boldly added:

"We complain that the Union cause has suffered, and is now suffering,
immensely from mistaken deference to rebel slavery. Had you, sir, in
your inaugural address, unmistakably given notice that, in case the
rebellion already commenced was persisted in, and your efforts to
preserve the Union and enforce the laws should be resisted by armed
force, you would recognize no loyal person as rightfully held in
slavery by a traitor, we believe the rebellion would therein have
received a staggering if not fatal blow."

The President replied at length, saying:

"I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the
cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will
help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be
errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to
be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of
official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed
personal wish that all men everywhere could be free."

The education of the conservative portion of the Northern people up
to emancipation was becoming more complete every day, notwithstanding
the professed reluctance of the President. Another call for three
hundred thousand men was made, but enlistments were slow, so that
threats of a draft and most liberal bounties were required. The
champions of emancipation sought to derive an advantage from this
circumstance. They asserted that the reluctance of the people to
enter the army was caused by the policy of the Government in not
adopting bold emancipation measures. If such were adopted, the
streets and by-ways would be crowded with volunteers to fight for the
freedom of the "loyal blacks," and thrice three hundred thousand
could be easily obtained. They said that slavery in the seceded
States should be treated as a military question; it contributed
nearly all the subsistence which supported the Southern men in arms,
dug their trenches, and built their fortifications. The watchword
which they now adopted was, "The abolition of slavery by the force of
arms for the sake of the Union."

Meantime, on September 13th, a delegation from the so-called
"Christians" in Chicago, Illinois, presented to President Lincoln a
memorial, requesting him to issue a proclamation of emancipation, and
urged in its favor such reasons as occurred to their minds. President
Lincoln replied:

"What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do,
especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document
that the whole world would see must necessarily be inoperative, like
the Pope's bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves,
when I can not even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is
there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be
influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would
have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress
which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the
slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I can not
learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. And
suppose they could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from me to
throw themselves upon us, what should we do with them? How can we
feed and care for such a multitude? . . .

"If, now, the pressure of the war should call off our forces from New
Orleans to defend some other point, what is to prevent the masters
from reducing the blacks to slavery again? . . . Now, then, tell me,
if you please, what possible result of good would follow the issuing
of such a proclamation as you desire? I have not decided against a
proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under
advisement."

Nine days after these remarks were made--on September 22, 1862--the
preliminary proclamation of emancipation was issued by the President
of the United States. It declared that at the next session of
Congress the proposition for emancipation in the border slaveholding
States would be again recommended, and that on January 1, 1863--

"All persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a
State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the
United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and for ever free; and
the Executive Government of the United States, including the military
and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom
of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons,
or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual
freedom."

Also, all persons engaged in the military and naval service were
ordered to obey and enforce the article of war and the sections of
the confiscation act before mentioned. On January 1, 1863, another
proclamation was issued by the President of the United States
declaring the emancipation to be absolute within the Confederate
States, with the exception of a few districts. The closing words of
the proclamation were these:

"And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice,
warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the
considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty
God."

Let us test the existence of the military necessity here spoken of by
a few facts. The white male population of the Northern States was
then 13,690,364. The white male population of the Confederate States
was 5,449,463. The number of troops which the United States had
called into the field exceeded one million men. The number of troops
which the Confederate Government had then in the field was less than
four hundred thousand men. The United States Government had a navy
which was only third in rank in the world. The Confederate Government
had a navy which at that time consisted of a single small ship on the
ocean. The people of the United States had a commerce afloat all over
the world. The people of the Confederate States had not a single port
open to commerce. The people of the United States were the rivals of
the greatest nations in all kinds of manufactures. The people of the
Confederate States had few manufactures, and those were of articles
of inferior importance. The Government of the United States possessed
the Treasury of a Union of eighty years with its vast resources. The
Confederate States had to create a Treasury by the development of
financial resources. The ambassadors and representatives of the
former were welcomed at every court in the world. The representatives
of the latter were not recognized anywhere.

Thus the consummation of the original antislavery purposes was
verbally reached; but even that achievement was attended with
disunion, bloodshed, and war. In the words of the Declaration of
Independence:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that, whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends" (life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness), "it is the right of the people to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation
on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. . . .
When a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably
the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute
despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
government, and to provide new guards for their future security."

It is thus seen what the United States Government did, and our view
of this subject would not be complete if we should omit to present
their solemn declarations of that which they intended to do. In his
proclamation of April 15, 1861, calling for seventy-five thousand
men, the President of the United States Government said:

"In any event, the utmost care will be observed, consistently with
the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of
or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful
citizens in any part of the country."

On the 22d of July, 1861, Congress passed a resolution relative to
the war, from which the following is an extract:

"That this war is not waged on our part in any spirit of oppression,
or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of
overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established
institutions of those [Confederate] States; but to defend and
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union
with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States
unimpaired; and that, as soon as these objects are accomplished, the
war ought to cease."

The vote in favor of the resolution was: in the Senate, yeas 30, nays
4; in the House of Representatives, yeas 117, nays 2.

It may further be observed that these proclamations cited above
afforded to our whole people the complete and crowning proof of the
true nature of the designs of the party which elevated to power the
person then occupying the Presidential chair at Washington, and which
sought to conceal its purposes by every variety of artful device and
by the perfidious use of the most solemn and repeated pledges on
every possible occasion. A single example may be cited from the
declaration made by President Lincoln, under the solemnity of his
oath as Chief Magistrate of the United States, on March 4, 1861:

"Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States
that, by the accession of a Republican Administration, their property
and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has
never been any reasonable cause for such apprehensions. Indeed, the
most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and
been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the public
speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of
those speeches when I declare that I have no purpose, directly or
indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the
States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so,
and I have no inclination to do so. Those who nominated and elected
me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar
declarations, and had never recanted them. And more than this, they
placed in the platform for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves
and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:

"_Resolved_, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the
States, and especially the right of each State to order and control
its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment
exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the
perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend, and we
denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State
or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest
crimes."

Nor was this declaration of the want of power or disposition to
interfere with our social system confined to a state of peace. Both
before and after the actual commencement of hostilities, the
Executive of the United States repeated in formal official
communications to the Cabinets of Great Britain and France, that it
was utterly without constitutional power to do the act which it
subsequently committed, and that in no possible event, whether the
secession of these States resulted in the establishment of a separate
Confederacy or in the restoration of the Union, was there any
authority by virtue of which it could either restore a disaffected
State to the Union by force of arms, or make any change in any of its
institutions. I refer especially for the verification of this
assertion to the dispatches addressed by the Secretary of State of
the United States, under direction of the President, to the Ministers
of the United States at London and Paris, under date of the 10th and
22d of April, 1861.

This proclamation was therefore received by the people of the
Confederate States as the fullest vindication of their own sagacity
in foreseeing the uses to which the dominant party in the United
States intended from the beginning to apply their power.

For what honest purpose were these declarations made? They could
deceive no one who was familiar with the powers and duties of the
Federal Government; they were uttered in the season of invasion of
the Southern States, to coerce them to obedience to the agent
established by the compact between the States, for the purpose of
securing domestic tranquillity and the blessings of liberty. The
power to coerce States was not given, and the proposition to make
that grant received no favor in the Convention which formed the
Constitution; and it is seen by the proceedings in the States, when
the Constitution was submitted to each of them for their ratification
or rejection as they might choose, that a proposition which would
have enabled the General Government, by force of arms, to control the
will of a State, would have been fatal to any effort to make a more
perfect Union. Such declarations as those cited from the diplomatic
correspondence, though devoid of credibility at home, might avail in
foreign countries to conceal from their governments the real purpose
of the action of the majority. Meanwhile, the people of the
Confederacy plainly saw that the ideas and interests of the
Administration were to gain by war the empire that would enable it to
trample on the Constitution which it professed to defend and maintain.

It was by the slow and barely visible approaches of the serpent
seeking its prey that the aggressions and usurpations of the United
States Government moved on to the crimes against the law of the
Union, the usages of war among civilized nations, the dictates of
humanity and the requirements of justice, which have been recited.
The performance of this task has been painful, but persistent and
widespread misrepresentation of the cause and conduct of the South
required the exposure of her slanderer. To unmask the hypocrisy of
claiming devotion to the Constitution, while violating its letter and
spirit for a purpose palpably hostile to it, was needful for the
defense of the South. In the future progress of this work it will be
seen how often we have been charged with the very offenses committed
by our enemy--offenses of which the South was entirely innocent, and
of which a chivalrous people would be incapable. There was in this
the old trick of the fugitive thief who cries "Stop thief!" as he
runs.

In his message to Congress one year later, on December 8, 1863, the
President of the United States thus boasts of his proclamation:

"The preliminary emancipation proclamation, issued in September, was
running its assigned period to the beginning of the new year. A month
later the final proclamation came, including the announcement that
colored men of suitable condition would be received into the war
service. The policy of emancipation and of employing black soldiers
gave to the future a new aspect, about which hope and fear and doubt
contended in uncertain conflict. According to our political system,
as a matter of civil administration, the General Government had no
lawful power to effect emancipation in any State, and for a long time
it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without
resorting to it as a military measure. . . . Of those who were slaves
at the beginning of the rebellion, full one hundred thousand are now
in the United States military service, about one half of which number
actually bear arms in the ranks, thus giving the double advantage of
taking so much labor from the insurgent cause, and supplying the
places which otherwise must be filled with so many white men. So far
as tested, it is difficult to say they are not as good soldiers as
any."

Let the reader pause for a moment and look calmly at the facts
presented in this statement. The forefathers of these negro soldiers
were gathered from the torrid plains and malarial swamps of
inhospitable Africa. Generally they were born the slaves of barbarian
masters, untaught in all the useful arts and occupations, reared in
heathen darkness, and, sold by heathen masters, they were transferred
to shores enlightened by the rays of Christianity. There, put to
servitude, they were trained in the gentle arts of peace and order
and civilization; they increased from a few unprofitable savages to
millions of efficient Christian laborers. Their servile instincts
rendered them contented with their lot, and their patient toil
blessed the land of their abode with unmeasured riches. Their strong
local and personal attachment secured faithful service to those to
whom their service or labor was due. A strong mutual affection was
the natural result of this life-long relation, a feeling best if not
only understood by those who have grown from childhood under its
influence. Never was there happier dependence of labor and capital on
each other. The tempter came, like the serpent in Eden, and decoyed
them with the magic word of "freedom." Too many were allured by the
uncomprehended and unfulfilled promises, until the highways of these
wanderers were marked by corpses of infants and the aged. He put arms
in their hands, and trained their humble but emotional natures to
deeds of violence and bloodshed, and sent them out to devastate their
benefactors. What does he boastingly announce?--"It is difficult to
say they are not as good soldiers as any." Ask the bereaved mother,
the desolate widow, the sonless aged sire, to whom the bitter cup was
presented by those once of their own household. With double anguish
they speak of its bitterness. What does the President of the United
States further say?--"According to our political system, as a matter
of civil administration, the General Government had no lawful power
to effect emancipation in any State." And further on, as if with a
triumphant gladness, he adds, "Thus giving the double advantage of
taking so much labor from the insurgent cause, and supplying the
places which otherwise must be filled with so many white men." A rare
mixture of malfeasance with traffic in human life! It is submitted to
the judgment of a Christian people how well such a boast befits the
President of the United States, a federation of sovereigns under a
voluntary compact for specific purposes.

[Footnote 52: Article I, section 10.]

CHAPTER XXVII.

The organization of the Navy Department comprised under its general
supervision a bureau of orders and details, one of ordnance and
hydrography, one of provisions and clothing, and one of medicine and
surgery. The grades of officers consisted of admirals, captains,
commanders, surgeons, lieutenants, and midshipmen. Of the officers at
the close of the first year there were one admiral, twelve captains,
thirty commanders, and one hundred and twelve first and second
lieutenants. All of the principal officers had belonged to the United
States Navy. Owing to the limited number of vessels afloat, many of
these officers were employed on shore-duties.

The vessels of the navy may be reduced to two classes: those intended
for river and harbor defense, as ironclads, rams, floating batteries,
or river-steamboats transformed into gunboats; and sea-going steamers
of moderate size, some of them of great speed, but, not having been
designed for war purposes, were all unsuited for a powerful armament,
and could not be expected to contend successfully with ships of war.

Early in 1861 discussions and experiments were instituted by the Navy
Department to determine how floating batteries and naval rams could
be best constructed and protected by iron plates. Many persons had
submitted plans, according to which cotton-bales might be effectively
used as a shield against shot. Our deficiency in iron, and also in
rolling-mills to prepare it into plates, caused cotton to be
sometimes so employed; though the experiments had satisfied the Navy
Department that, instead of cotton being rendered impenetrable by
compression, it was really less so than in looser condition, and that
iron must needs be of great thickness to resist the direct impact of
heavy shot at short ranges. An officer of the navy, as skillful in
ordnance as he was in seamanship, and endowed with high capacity for
the investigation of new problems--Lieutenant Catesby Ap R. Jones--
had conducted many of these experiments, and, as will be seen
hereafter, made efficient use of his knowledge both in construction
and in battle.

After Virginia had seceded from the United States, but before she had
acceded to the Confederate States--viz., on the 19th of April,
1861--General Taliaferro, in command of Virginia forces, arrived at
Norfolk. Commodore McCauley, United States Navy, and commandant of
the navy-yard, held a conference with General Taliaferro, the result
of which was "that none of the vessels should be removed, nor a shot
fired except in self-defense." The excitement which had existed in
the town was quieted by the announcement of this arrangement; but it
was soon ascertained that the Germantown and Merrimac, frigates in
the port, had been scuttled, and the former otherwise injured. About
midnight, as elsewhere stated, a fire was started in the navy-yard,
which continued to increase, involving the destruction of the
ship-houses, a ship of the line, and the unfinished frame of another;
several frigates, in addition to those mentioned, had been scuttled
and sunk; and other property destroyed, to an amount estimated at
several million dollars. The Pawnee, which arrived on the 19th, had
been kept under steam, and, taking the Cumberland in tow, retired
down the harbor, freighted with a great portion of valuable munitions
and the commodore and other officers of the yard.[53] In the haste
and secrecy of the conflagration, a large amount of material remained
uninjured. The Merrimac, a beautiful frigate, in the yard for
repairs, was raised by the Virginians, and the work immediately
commenced, on a plan devised by Lieutenant Brooke, Confederate States
Navy, to convert her hull, with such means as were available, into an
iron-clad vessel. Two-inch plates were prepared, and she was covered
with a double-inclined roof of four inches thickness. This armor,
though not sufficiently thick to resist direct shot, sufficed to
protect against a glancing ball, and was as heavy as was consistent
with the handling of the ship. The shield was defective in not
covering the sides sufficiently below the water-line, and the prow
was unfortunately made of cast-iron; but, when all the difficulties
by which we were surrounded are remembered, and the service rendered
by this floating battery considered, the only wonder must be that so
much was so well done under the circumstances.

Her armament consisted of ten guns, four single-banded Brooke rifles,
and six nine-inch Dahlgren shell-guns. Two of the rifles, bow and
stern pivots, were seven inch; the other two were six and four tenths
inch, one on each broadside. The nine-inch gun on each side, nearest
the furnaces, was fitted for firing hot shot. The work of
construction was prosecuted with all haste, the armament and crew
were put on board, and the vessel started on her trial-trip as soon
as the workmen were discharged. She was our first ironclad; her model
was an experiment, and many doubted its success. Her commander,
Captain (afterward Admiral) Franklin Buchanan, with the wisdom of age
and the experience of sea-service from his boyhood, combined the
daring and enterprise of youth, and with him was Lieutenant Catesby
Ap R. Jones, who had been specially in charge of the battery, and
otherwise thoroughly acquainted with the ship. His high
qualifications as an ordnance officer were well known in the "old
navy," and he was soon to exhibit a like ability as a seaman in
battle.

Now the first Confederate ironclad was afloat, the Stars and Bars
were given to the breeze, and she was new-christened "the Virginia."
She was joined by the Patrick Henry, six guns, Commander John R.
Tucker; the Jamestown, two guns. Lieutenant-commanding John N.
Barney; the Beaufort, one gun, Lieutenant-commanding W. H. Parker;
the Raleigh, one gun, Lieutenant-commanding J. W. Alexander; the
Teaser, one gun, Lieutenant-commanding W. A. Webb.

The enemy's fleet in Hampton Roads consisted of the Cumberland,
twenty-four guns; Congress, fifty guns; St. Lawrence, fifty guns;
steam-frigates Minnesota and Roanoke, forty guns each. The relative
force was as twenty-one guns to two hundred and four, not counting
the small steamers of the enemy, though they had heavier armament
than the small vessels of our fleet, which have been enumerated. The
Cumberland and the Congress lay off Newport News; the other vessels
were anchored about nine miles eastward, near to Fortress Monroe.
Strong shore-batteries and several small steamers, armed with heavy
rifled guns, protected the frigates Cumberland and Congress.

Buchanan no doubt felt the inspiration of a sailor when his vessel
bears him from the land, and the excitement of a hero at the prospect
of battle, and thus we may understand why the trial-trip was at once
converted into a determined attack upon the enemy. After the plan of
the Virginia had been decided upon, the work of her construction was
pushed with all possible haste. Her armament was on board, and she
was taken out of the dock while the workmen were still employed upon
her--indeed, the last of them were put ashore after she was started
on her first experimental trip. Few men, conscious as Flag-officer
Buchanan was of the defects of his vessel, would have dared such
unequal conflict. Slowly--about five knots an hour--he steamed down
to the roads. The Cumberland and Congress, seeing the Virginia
approach, prepared for action, and, from the flag-ship Roanoke,
signals were given to the Minnesota and St. Lawrence to advance. The
Cumberland had swung so as to give her full broadside to the
Virginia, which silently and without any exhibition of her crew,
moved steadily forward. The shot from the Cumberland fell thick upon
her plated roof, but rebounded harmless as hailstones. At last the
prow of the Virginia struck the Cumberland just forward of her
starboard fore-chains. A dull, heavy thud was heard, but so little
force was given to the Virginia that the engineer hesitated about
backing her. It was soon seen, however, that a gaping breach had been
made in the Cumberland, and that the sea was rushing madly in. She
reeled, and, while the waves ingulfed her, her crew gallantly stood
to their guns and vainly continued their fire. She went down in nine
fathoms of water, and with at least one hundred of her gallant crew,
her pennant still flying from her mast-head.

The Virginia then ran up stream a short distance, in order to turn
and have sufficient space to get headway, and come down on the
Congress. The enemy, supposing that she had retired at the sight of
the vessels approaching to attack her, cheered loudly, both ashore
and afloat. But, when she turned to descend upon the Congress, as she
had on the Cumberland, the Congress slipped her cables and ran
ashore, bows on. The Virginia took position as near as the depth of
water would permit, and opened upon her a raking fire. The Minnesota
was fast aground about one mile and a half below. The Roanoke and St.
Lawrence retired toward the fort. The shore-batteries kept up their
fire on the Virginia, as did also the Minnesota at long range, and
quite ineffectually. The Congress, being aground, could but feebly
reply. Several of our small vessels came up and joined the Virginia,
and the combined fire was fearfully destructive to the Congress. Her
commander was killed, and soon her colors were struck, and the white
flag appeared both at the main and spanker gaff. The Beaufort,
Lieutenant-commanding W. H. Parker, and the Raleigh,
Lieutenant-commanding J. W. Alexander, tugs which had accompanied the
Virginia, were ordered to the Congress to receive the surrender. The
flag of the ship and the sword of its then commander were delivered
to Lieutenant Parker, by whom they were subsequently sent to the Navy
Department at Richmond. Other officers delivered their swords in
token of surrender, and entreated that they might return to assist in
getting their wounded out of the ship. The permission was granted to
the officers, and they then took advantage of the clemency shown them
to make their escape. In the mean time the shore-batteries fired upon
the tugs, and compelled them to retire. By this fire five of their
own men, our prisoners, were wounded. Flag-officer Buchanan had
stopped the firing upon the Congress when she struck her flag, and
ran up the white flag, as heretofore described. Lieutenant Jones in
his official report, referring to the Congress, writes: "But she
fired upon us with the white flag flying, wounding Lieutenant Minor
and several of our men. We again opened fire upon her, and she is now
in flames." The crew of the Congress escaped, as did that of the
Cumberland, by boats, or by swimming, and generously our men
abstained from firing on them while so exposed. Flag-officer Buchanan
was wounded by a rifle-ball, and had to be carried below. His
intrepid conduct won the admiration of all. The executive and
ordnance officer, Lieutenant Catesby Ap R. Jones, succeeded to the
command. It was now so near night and the change of the tide that
nothing further could be attempted on that day. The Virginia, with
the smaller vessels attending her, withdrew and anchored off Sewell's
Point. She had sunk the Cumberland, left the Congress on fire, had
blown up a transport-steamer, sunk one schooner, and had captured
another. Casualties, reported by Lieutenant Jones, were two killed
and eight wounded. The prow of the Virginia was somewhat damaged, her
anchor and all her flag-staffs were shot away, and her smoke-stack
and steam-pipe were riddled; otherwise, the vessel was uninjured,
and, as will be seen, was ready for action on the next morning. The
prisoners and wounded were immediately sent up to the hospital at
Norfolk.

During the night the Monitor, an iron-clad turret-steamer, of an
entirely new model, came in, and anchored near the Minnesota. Like
our Virginia she was an invention, and her merits and demerits were
to be tested in the crucible of war. She was of light draught, and
very little save the revolving turret was visible above the water,
was readily handled, and had good speed; but, also, like the
Virginia, was not supposed by nautical men to be capable of braving
rough weather at sea.

The Virginia was the hull of a frigate, modified into an ironclad
vessel. She was only suited to smooth water, and it had not been
practicable to obtain for her such engines as would have given her
the requisite speed. Her draught, twenty-two feet, was too great for
the shoal water in the roads, and the apprehension which was excited
lest she should go up to Washington might have been allayed by a
knowledge of the deep water necessary to float her. Her great length,
depth, and want of power, caused difficulty in handling to be
anticipated. In many respects she was an experiment, and, had we
possessed the means to build a new vessel, no doubt a better model
could have been devised. Commander Brooke, who united much science to
great ingenuity, was not entirely free in the exercise of either. Our
means restricted us to making the best of that which chance had given
us.

In the morning the Virginia, with the Patrick Henry, the Jamestown,
and the three little tugs, jestingly called the "mosquito fleet,"
returned to the scene of the previous day's combat, and to the
completion of the work, the destruction of the Minnesota, which had,
the evening before, been interrupted by the change of tide and the
coming of night. The Monitor, which had come in during the previous
night, and had been seen by the light of the burning Congress, opened
fire on the Virginia when about the third of a mile distant. The
Virginia sought to close with her, but the greater speed of the
Monitor and the celerity with which she was handled made this
impracticable. The ships passed and repassed very near each other,
and frequently the Virginia delivered her broadside at close
quarters, but with no perceptible effect. The Monitor fired rapidly
from her revolving turret, but not with such aim as to strike
successively in the same place, and the armor of the Virginia,
therefore, remained unbroken. Lieutenant-commanding Catesby Jones, to
whom Buchanan had intrusted the ship when he was removed to the
hospital, soon discovered that the Monitor was invulnerable to his
shells. He had a few solid shot, which were intended only to be fired
from the nine-inch guns as hot shot, and therefore had necessarily so
much windage that they would be ineffective against the shield of the
Monitor. He, therefore, determined to run her down, and got all the
headway he could obtain for that purpose, but the speed was so small
that it merely pushed her out of her way. It was then decided to
board her, and all hands were piped for that object. Then the Monitor
slipped away on to shoal water where the Virginia could not approach
her, and Commander Jones, after waiting a due time, and giving the
usual signals of invitation to combat, without receiving any
manifestation on the part of the Monitor of an intention to return to
deep water, withdrew to the navy-yard.

In the two days of conflict our only casualties were from the
Cumberland as she went down valiantly fighting to the last, from the
men on shore when the tugs went to the Congress to receive her
surrender, or from the perfidious fire from the Congress while her
white flags were flying. None were killed or wounded in the fight
with the Monitor.

As this was the first combat between two iron-clad vessels, it
attracted great attention and provoked much speculation. Some assumed
that wooden ships were henceforth to be of no use, and much has been
done by the addition of armor to protect seagoing vessels; but
certainly neither of the two which provoked the speculation could be
regarded as seaworthy, or suited to other than harbor defense.

A new prow was put on the Virginia, she was furnished with bolts and
solid shot, and the slight repairs needed were promptly made. The
distinguished veteran. Commodore Josiah Tatnall, was assigned to the
command of the Virginia, vice Admiral Buchanan, temporarily disabled.
The Virginia, as far as possible, was prepared for battle and cruise
in the Roads, and, on the 11th of April, Commodore Tatnall moved down
to invite the Monitor to combat. But her officers kept the Monitor
close to the shore, with her steam up, and under the guns of Fortress
Monroe. To provoke her to come out, the little Jamestown was sent in
and pluckily captured many prizes, but the Monitor lay safe in the
shoal water under the guns of the formidable fortress. An English
man-of-war, which was lying in the channel, witnessed this effort to
draw the Monitor out into deep water in defense of her weaker
countrymen, and, as Barney on the Jamestown passed with his prizes,
cut out in full view of the enemy's fleet, the Englishmen, with their
national admiration of genuine "game," as a spectator described it,
"unable to restrain their generous impulses, from the captain to the
side-boy, cheered our gunboat to the very echo." I quote further from
the same witness: "Early in May, a magnificent Federal fleet, the
Virginia being concealed behind the land, had ventured across the
channel, and some of them, expressly fitted to destroy our ship, were
furiously bombarding our batteries at Sewell's Point. Dashing down
comes old Tatnall on the instant, as light stepping and blithe as a
boy. . . . But the Virginia no sooner draws into range than the whole
fleet, like a flushed covey of birds, flatters off into shoal water
and under the guns of the forts"--where they remained. After some
delay, and there being no prospect of active service, the Commodore
ordered the executive officer to fire a gun to windward and take the
ship back to her buoy. Here, ready for service, waiting for an enemy
to engage her, but never having the opportunity, she remained until
the 10th of the ensuing month.

The Norfolk Navy-Yard, notwithstanding the injury done to it by
conflagration, was yet the most available and equipped yard in the
Confederacy. A land-force under General Huger had been placed there
for its protection, and defensive works had also been constructed
with a view to hold it as well for naval construction and repair as
for its strategic importance in connection with the defense of the
capital, Richmond. On the opposite side of the lower James, on the
Peninsula between the James and York Rivers, we occupied an
intrenched position of much natural strength. The two positions,
Norfolk and the Peninsula, were necessary to each other, and the
command of the channel between them essential to both. As long as the
Virginia closed the entrance to the James River, and the intrenchment
on the Peninsula was held, it was deemed possible to keep possession
of Norfolk.

On the 1st of May General Johnston, commanding on the Peninsula,
having decided to retreat, sent an order to General Huger to evacuate
Norfolk. The Secretary of War, General Randolph, having arrived just
at that time in Norfolk, assumed the authority of postponing the
execution of the order "until he [General Huger] could remove such
stores, munitions, and arms as could be carried off." The Secretary
of the Navy, Mr. Mallory, was there also, and gave like instructions
to the commandant of the yard. To the system and energy with which
General Huger conducted the removal of heavy guns, machinery, stores,
and munitions, we were greatly indebted in our future operations,
both of construction and defense. A week was thus employed in the
removal of machinery, etc, and the enemy, occupied with the
retreating army on the Peninsula, did not cross the James River
above, either to interrupt the transportation or to obstruct the
retreat of the garrisons of the forts at Norfolk and its
surroundings. When our army had been withdrawn from the Peninsula,
and Norfolk had been evacuated, and the James River did not furnish
depth of channel which would suffice for the Virginia to ascend it
more than a few miles, her mission was ended. It is not surprising
that her brilliant career created a great desire to preserve her, and
that it was contemplated to lighten her and thus try to take her up
the river, but the pilots declared this to be impracticable, and the
court which subsequently investigated the matter sustained their
opinion that "the only alternative was then and there to abandon and
burn the ship." The statement of Commodore Tatnall shows that the
Virginia could not have been taken seaward, and that such was the
opinion of her first commander. He said: "I consulted Commodore
Buchanan on the character and power of the ship. He expressed the
distinct opinion that she was unseaworthy, that she was not
sufficiently buoyant, and that in a common sea she would founder."
She could not, it therefore appears, ascend the river, was
unseaworthy, and was uncovered by the retreat of the troops with whom
she had coöperated. So, on the 10th of May, the Virginia was taken to
Craney Island, one mile above, and there her crew were landed; they
fell in and formed on the beach, and, in the language of the
eye-witness heretofore quoted, "then and there, on the very field of
her fame, within sight of the Cumberland's top-gallant-masts, all
awash, within sight of that magnificent fleet still cowering on the
shoal, with her laurels all fresh and green, we hauled down her
drooping colors, and, with mingled pride and grief, we gave her to
the flames." [54]

At Wilmington, North Carolina, the Southwest bar was defended by Fort
Caswell, and New Inlet bar by Fort Fisher. The naval defenses
consisted of two ironclads, the North Carolina and the Raleigh. The
former could not cross any of the bars in consequence of her draught
of water. Her steam-power hardly gave propulsion. She sank during the
war off Smithville. The Raleigh's services were almost valueless in
consequence of her deep draught and her feeble steam-power. She made
one futile trip out of New Inlet, and after a few hours attempted to
return, but was wrecked upon the bar.

The brave and invincible defense of Fort Sumter gave to the city of
Charleston, South Carolina, additional luster. For four years that
fort, located in its harbor, defied the army and navy of the United
States. When the city was about to be abandoned to the army of
General Sherman, the forts defending the harbor were embraced in
General Hardee's plan of evacuation. The gallant commander of Fort
Sumter, Colonel Stephen Elliott, Jr., with unyielding fortitude,
refused to be relieved, after being under incessant bombardment day
and night for weeks. It was supposed he must be exhausted, and he was
invited to withdraw for rest, but, on receiving the general order of
retreat, he assembled his brave force on the rugged and shell-crushed
parade-ground, read his instructions, and, in a voice that trembled
with emotion, addressed his men in the glowing language of patriotism
and unswerving devotion to the Confederate cause. The cheers, which
responded to the utterances of their colonel, came from manly and
chivalric throats. Yielding to the inevitable, they claimed for the
Stars and Bars a salute of one hundred guns. As it was fired from
Sumter, it was reëchoed by all the Confederate batteries, and
startled the outside blockaders with the idea that a great victory
had been won by the Confederacy.

The naval force of the Confederacy in Charleston Harbor consisted of
three ironclads. Their steam-power was totally inadequate for the
effective use of the vessels. In fact, when the wind and tide were
moving in the same direction, it was impossible for the vessels to
advance against them, light though the wind might be. Under such
circumstances it was necessary to come to an anchor. On one occasion
the ironclads Palmetto State and Chicora ran out of Charleston Harbor
under favorable circumstances. The Palmetto State assaulted the
Mercideta, commanded by Captain Stellwagen, who unconditionally
surrendered. But the ironclad being under orders to follow her
consort in chase of the enemy, and having no boats to which to
transfer her prisoners, the parole of the officers and men was
accepted, with their promise to observe the same until its return.
The surrender was accepted, and an honest parole was the
consideration for not being sunk on the spot. Captain Stellwagen
abided but a short time, when, getting up steam, he broke his
plighted word, and ran off with the captured vessel. The deficiency
of speed on the part of the Confederate ironclads frustrated their
efforts to relieve the city of Charleston from continued blockade.

The harbor defenses of Savannah were intrusted to Commodore Tatnall,
who defended the approach to the city with a small steamer of one
gun, an inefficient floating battery and ironclad, which had been
constructed from a blockade-runner. Several attempts were made to
attack the enemy's vessels with the ironclad, but these were
frustrated by the delay in opening a passage through the obstructions
in the river when tide and opportunity were offered. Her draught was
too great for the depth of water, except at high tides, and these
were at long intervals. The ironclad was armed with a battery of four
guns, two seven-inch and two six-inch. Her force consisted of some
twenty-one officers and twenty-four men, when she was fully
furnished. Another vessel was under construction and nearly
completed, and Commodore Tatnall, notwithstanding his well-known
combative instincts, was understood to be unwilling to send the
Atlanta alone against the enemy's blockading vessels. Lieutenant
Webb, who had been lately placed in command of the Atlanta, took her
to Warsaw Sound to deliver battle singly to the two ironclads
Weehawken and Nahant, which awaited her approach. The Atlanta got
twice aground--the second time, inextricably so. In this situation
she was attacked, and, though hopelessly, was bravely defended, but
was finally forced to surrender.

Mobile Harbor was thought to be adequately provided for, as torpedoes
obstructed the approach, and Forts Morgan and Gaines commanded the
entrance, aided by the improvised fleet of Admiral Buchanan, which
consisted of the wooden gunboats Morgan and Gaines, each carrying six
guns, and Selma four guns, with the ram Tennessee of six guns--in
all, twenty-two guns and four hundred and seventy men. On August 4,
1864, Fort Gaines was assaulted by the United States force from the
sea-side of the beach. The resistance made was feeble, and the fort
soon surrendered. On the next day Admiral Farragut stood into the bay
with a force consisting of four monitors, or ironclads, and fourteen
steamers, carrying one hundred and ninety-nine guns and twenty-seven
hundred men. One ironclad was sunk by a torpedo. Admiral Buchanan
advanced to meet this force, and sought to run into the larger
vessels with the Tennessee, but they avoided him by their superior
speed. Meanwhile the gunboats became closely engaged with the enemy,
but were soon dispersed by his overwhelming force. The Tennessee
again stood for the enemy and renewed the attack with the hope of
sinking some of them with her prow, but she was again foiled by their
superior speed in avoiding her. The engagement with the whole fleet
soon became general, and lasted an hour. Frequently the Tennessee was
surrounded by the enemy, and all her guns were in action almost at
the same moment. Four of their heaviest vessels ran into her under
full steam with the view of sinking her. While surrounded by six of
these heavy vessels which were suffering fearfully from her heavy
battery, the steering-gear of the Tennessee was shot away, and her
ability to manoeuvre was completely destroyed, leaving the formidable
Confederate entirely at the disposal of the enemy. This misfortune,
it was believed, saved the greater part of Farragut's fleet. Further
resistance becoming unavailable, the wounded Admiral was under the
painful necessity of ordering a surrender. His little fleet became a
prey to the enemy, except the Morgan, which made good her escape to
Mobile.

This unequal contest was decidedly creditable to the Confederacy. The
entire loss of the enemy, most of which is ascribed to the Tennessee,
amounted to quite three hundred in killed and wounded, exclusive of
one hundred lost on the sunken ironclad, making a number almost as
large as the entire Confederate force. On August 22d, Fort Morgan was
bombarded from the land, also by ironclads at sea, and by the fleet
inside. Thus Forts Powel, Morgan, and Gaines shared the fate of the
Confederate fleet, and the enemy became masters of the bay. On this
as on other occasions, the want of engines of sufficient power
constituted a main obstacle to the success which the gallantry and
skill of the seamen so richly deserved.

The system of torpedoes adopted by us was probably more effective
than any other means of naval defense. The destructiveness of these
little weapons had long been known, but no successful modes for their
application to the destruction of the most powerful vessels of war
and ironclads had been devised. It remained for the skill and
ingenuity of our officers to bring the use of this terrible
instrument to perfection. The success of their efforts is very
frankly stated by one of the most distinguished of the enemy's
commanders--Admiral Porter.[55] He says:

"Most of the Southern seaports fell into our possession with
comparative facility; and the difficulty of capturing Charleston,
Savannah, Wilmington, and Mobile was in a measure owing to the fact
that the approaches to these places were filled with various kinds of
torpedoes, laid in groups, and fired by electricity. The introduction
of this means of defense on the side of the Confederates was for a
time a severe check to our naval forces, for the commanders of
squadrons felt it their duty to be careful when dealing with an
element of warfare of which they knew so little, and the character
and disposition of which it was so difficult to discover. In this
system of defense, therefore, the enemy found their greatest
security; and, notwithstanding all the efforts of Du Pont and
Dahlgren, Charleston, Wilmington, and Savannah remained closed to our
forces until near the close of the war."

In 1862, while General McClellan was in command of the enemy's forces
below Richmond, it was observed that they had more than a hundred
vessels in the James River, as if they were about to make an advance
by that way upon the city. This led to an order placing General G. J.
Rains in charge of the submarine defenses; and, on the James River
opposite Drewry's Bluff, the first submarine torpedo was made. The
secret of all his future success consisted in the sensitive primer,
which is unrivaled by any other means to explode torpedoes or
sub-terra shells.

The torpedoes were made of the most ordinary material generally, as,
beer-barrels fixed with conical heads, coated within and without with
rosin dissolved in coal-tar; some were made of cast-iron, copper, or
tin; and glass demijohns were used. There were three essentials to
success, viz., the sensitive fuse-primer, a charge of sixty pounds of
gunpowder, and actual contact between the torpedo and the bottom of
the vessel.

There were one hundred and twenty-three of these torpedoes placed in
Charleston Harbor and Stono River. It was blockaded by thirteen large
ships and ironclads, with six or seven storeships, and some twenty
other vessels. The position of each one was known, and they could be
approached within a half-mile, which made it easy to attack, destroy,
or disperse them at night by floating torpedoes, connected together
by twos by a rope one hundred and thirty yards long, buoyed up and
stretched across the current by two boats, which were to be dropped
in ebbing tide, to float down among the vessels. This plan, says
General Rains, was opposed by General Gilmer, of the engineer corps,
on the ground that "they might float back and destroy our own boat."
One was sent down to go in the midst of the fleet, and made its mark.
An act of devoted daring was here performed by Commander W. T.
Glassell, Confederate States Navy, which claims more than a passing
notice. While the enemy was slowly contracting his lines around
Charleston, his numerous ships of war kept watch-and-ward outside of
the harbor. Our few vessels, almost helpless by their defective
engines, could effect little against their powerful opponents. The
New Ironsides, the pride of their fleet, lay off Morris's Island.
This Glassell resolved to attack with a steam-launch carrying a
torpedo spar at the bow. With an engineer, pilot, and fireman, he
steered for the Ironsides under cover of a hazy night. As he
approached, he was hailed by the lookout, and the next moment struck
the Ironsides, exploding the torpedo about fifteen feet from the
keel. An immense volume of water was thrown up, covering the little
boat, and, pieces of timber falling in the engine, it was rendered
entirely unmanageable, so as to deprive Commander Glassell of the
means of escape on which he had relied. A rapid fire was concentrated
upon him from the deck of the ship, and there remained no chance
except to attempt an escape by swimming ashore. To secure liberty to
his country, he risked and lost his own, and found, for the indignity
to which he was subjected, compensation, inasmuch as the famous New
Ironsides was long rendered useless to the enemy.

One hundred and one torpedoes were planted in Roanoke River, North
Carolina, after a flotilla of twelve vessels had started up to
capture Fort Branch. The torpedoes destroyed six of the vessels and
frustrated the attack.

Every avenue to the outworks or to the city of Mobile was guarded by
submarine torpedoes, so that it was impossible for any vessel drawing
three feet of water to get within effective cannon-range of the
defenses. Two ironclads attempted to get near enough to Spanish Fort
to take part in the bombardment. They both struck torpedoes, and went
to the bottom on Apalachie bar; thenceforward the fleet made no
further attempt to encounter the almost certain destruction which
they saw awaited any vessel which might attempt to enter the
torpedo-guarded waters. But many were sunk when least expecting it.
Some went down long after the Confederate forces had evacuated
Mobile. The Tecumseh was probably sunk, says Major-General D. H.
Maury,[56] on her own torpedo. While steaming in lead of Farragut's
fleet she carried a torpedo affixed to a spar, which projected some
twenty feet from her bows; she proposed to use this torpedo against
the Tennessee, our only formidable ship; but, while passing Fort
Morgan, a shot from that fort cut away the stays by which the torpedo
was secured; it then doubled under her, and, exploding fairly under
the bottom of the ill-fated ship, she careened and sank instantly in
ten fathoms of water. Only six or eight of her crew of a hundred or
more were saved. The total number of vessels sunk by torpedoes in
Mobile Bay was twelve, viz., three ironclads, two tinclads, and seven
transports. Fifty-eight vessels were destroyed in Southern waters by
torpedoes during the war; these included ironclads and others of no
mean celebrity.

[Footnote 53: See "Annual Cyclopaedia," 1861, p. 536.]

[Footnote 54: "The Story of the Confederate Ship Virginia," by William
Norris, Colonel Signal Corps, Confederate Army.]

[Footnote 55: See "Torpedo Warfare," "North American Review,"
September-October, 1878.]

[Footnote 56: Southern Historical Society Papers, January, 1877.]

CHAPTER XXVIII.

New Orleans was the most important commercial port in the
Confederacy, being the natural outlet of the Mississippi Valley, as
well to the ports of Europe as to those of Central and Southern
America. It was the depot which, at an early period, had led to
controversies with Spain, and its importance to the interior had been
a main inducement to the purchase of Louisiana. It had become before
1861 the chief cotton-mart of the United States, and its defense
attracted the early attention of the Confederate Government. The
approaches for an attacking party were numerous. They could through
several channels enter Lake Pontchartrain, to approach the city in
rear for land-attack, could ascend the Mississippi from the Gulf, or
descend it from the Northwest, where it was known that the enemy was
preparing a formidable fleet of iron-clad gunboats. In the early part
of 1862, so general an opinion prevailed that the greatest danger to
New Orleans was by an attack from above, that General Lovell sent to
General Beauregard a large part of the troops then in the city.

At the mouth of the Mississippi there is a bar, the greatest depth of
water on which seldom exceeded eighteen feet, and it was supposed
that heavy vessels of war, with their armament and supplies, would
not be able to cross it. Such proved to be the fact, and the vessels
of that class had to be lightened to enable them to enter the river.
In that condition of affairs, an inferior fleet might have engaged
them with a prospect of success. Captain Hollins, who was in command
of the squadron at New Orleans, and who had on a former occasion
shown his fitness for such service, had been sent with the greater
part of his fleet up the river to join the defense there being made.
Two powerful vessels were under construction, the Louisiana and the
Mississippi, but neither of them was finished. A volunteer fleet of
transport-vessels had been fitted up by some river-men, but it was in
the unfortunate condition of not being placed under the orders of the
naval commander. A number of fire-rafts had been also provided, which
were to serve the double purpose of lighting up the river in the
event of the hostile fleet attempting to pass the forts under cover
of the night, and of setting fire to any vessel with which they might
become entangled.

After passing the bar, there was nothing to prevent the ascent of the
river until Forts Jackson and St. Philip were reached. These works,
constructed many years before, were on opposite banks of the river.
Their armament, as reported by General Lovell, December 5, 1861,
consisted of--Fort Jackson: six forty-two-ponders, twenty-six
twenty-four-pounders, two thirty-two-pounder rifles, sixteen
thirty-two-pounders, three eight-inch columbiads, one ten-inch
columbiad, two eight-inch mortars, one ten-inch mortar, two
forty-pounder howitzers, and ten twenty-four-pounder howitzers. Fort
St. Philip: six forty-two-ponders, nine thirty-two-pounders,
twenty-two twenty-four-pounders, four eight-inch columbiads, one
eight-inch mortar, one ten-inch mortar, and three field-guns.

General Duncan reported that, on the 27th of March, he was informed
by Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, commanding Forts Jackson and St.
Philip, of the coast-defenses, which were under his (General
Duncan's) command, that the enemy's fleet was crossing the bars, and
entering the Mississippi River in force; whereupon he repaired to
Fort Jackson. After describing the condition of the forts from the
excess of water and sinking of the entire site, as well as the
deficiency of guns of heavy caliber in the forts, he proceeds:

"It became necessary in their present condition to bring in and
mount, and to build the platforms for, the three ten-inch and three
eight-inch columbiads, the rifled forty-two-pounder, and the five
ten-inch seacoast mortars recently obtained from Pensacola on the
evacuation of that place, together with the two rifled seven-inch
guns temporarily borrowed from the naval authorities in New Orleans.
It was also found necessary to repair the old water-battery to the
rear of and below Fort Jackson, which had never been completed, for
the reception of a portion of these guns, as well as to construct
mortar-proof magazines, and shell-rooms within the same."

One of the seven-inch rifled guns borrowed from the navy was
subsequently returned, so that, when the forts were attacked, the
armament was one hundred and twenty-eight guns and mortars.

The garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip were about one thousand
men on December 5, 1861; afterward, so far as I know, the number was
not materially changed.

The prevailing belief that vessels of war, in a straight, smooth
channel, could pass batteries, led to the construction of a raft
between the two forts which, it was supposed, would detain the ships
under fire of the forts long enough for the guns to sink them, or at
least to compel them to retire. The power of the river when in flood,
and the drift-wood it bore upon it, broke the raft; another was
constructed, which, when the drift-wood accumulated upon it, met a
like fate. Whether obstructions differently arranged--such as booms
secured to the shores, with apparatus by which they could be swung
across the channel when needful, or logs such as were used, except
that, being unconnected together, but each separately secured by
chain and anchor, they might severally yield to the pressure of the
driftwood, sinking, so as to allow it to pass over them, and, when
relieved of the weight, rising again--or whether other expedient
could have been made permanent and efficient, is a problem which need
not be discussed, as the time for its application has passed from us.

The general plan for the defense of New Orleans consisted of two
lines of works: an exterior one, passing through the forts near the
month of the river, and the positions taken to defend the various
water approaches; nearer to the city was the interior line, embracing
New Orleans and Algiers, which was intended principally to repel an
attack by land, but also, by its batteries on the river-bank, to
resist approach by water. The total length of the intrenchments on
this interior line was more than eight miles. When completed, it
formed, in connection with impassable swamps, a very strong line of
defense. At the then high stage of the river, all the land between it
and the swamps was so saturated with water, that regular approaches
could not have been made. The city, therefore, was at the time
supposed to be doubly secure from a land-attack.

In the winter of 1861-'62 I sent one of my aides-de-camp to New
Orleans to make a general inspection, and hold free conference with
the commanding General. Upon his return, he reported to me that
General Lovell was quite satisfied with the condition of the
land-defenses--so much so as to say that his only fear was that the
enemy would not make a land-attack.

Considered since the event, it may seem strange that, after the fall
of Donelson and Henry, and the employment of the enemy's gunboats in
the Tennessee and Cumberland, it was still generally argued that the
danger to New Orleans was that the gunboats would descend the
Mississippi, and applications were made to have the ship Louisiana
sent up the river as soon as she was completed.

The interior lines of defense mounted more than sixty guns of various
caliber, and were surrounded by wide and deep ditches. On the various
water approaches, including bays and bayous on the west and east
sides of the river, there were sixteen different forts, and these,
together with those on the river and the batteries of the interior
line, had in position about three hundred guns.

One ironclad, the Louisiana, mounting sixteen guns of heavy caliber,
though she was not quite completed, was sent down to coöperate with
the forts. Her defective steam-power and imperfect steering apparatus
prevented her from rendering active coöperation. The steamship
Mississippi, then under construction at New Orleans, was in such an
unfinished condition as to be wholly unavailable when the enemy
arrived. In the opinion of naval officers she would have been, if
completed, the most powerful ironclad then in the world, and could
have driven the enemy's fleet out of the river and raised the
blockade at Mobile. There were also several small river-steamers
which were lightly armed, and their bows were protected so that they
could act as rams and otherwise aid in the defense of the river; but,
from the reports received, they seem, with a few honorable
exceptions, to have rendered little valuable service.

The means of defense, therefore, mainly relied on were the two
heavy-armed forts, Jackson and St. Philip, with the obstruction
placed between them: this was a raft consisting of cypress-trees,
forty feet long, and averaging four or five feet at the larger end.
They were placed longitudinally in the river, about three feet apart,
and held together by gunwales on top, and strung upon two
two-and-a-half-inch chain cables fastened to their lower sides. This
raft was anchored in the river, abreast of the forts.

The fleet of the enemy below the forts consisted of seven steam
sloops of war, twelve gunboats, and several armed steamers, under
Commodore Farragut; also, a mortar-fleet consisting of twenty sloops
and some steam-vessels. The whole force was forty-odd vessels of
different kinds, with an armament of three hundred guns of heavy
caliber, of improved models.

The bombardment of the forts by the mortar-fleet commenced on April
18th, and, after six days of vigorous and constant shelling, the
resisting power of the forts was not diminished in any perceptible
degree. On the 23d there were manifest preparations by the enemy to
attempt the passage of the forts. This, as subsequently developed,
was to be done in the following manner. The sloops of war and the
gunboats were each formed in two divisions, and, selecting the
darkest hour of the night, between 3 and 4 A.M. of the 24th, moved up
the river in two columns. The commanders of the forts had vainly
endeavored to have the river lighted up in anticipation of an attack
by the fleet.

In the mean time, while the fleet moved up the river, there was kept
up from the mortars a steady bombardment on the forts, and these
opened a fire on the columns of ships and gunboats, which, from the
failure to send down the fire-rafts to light up the river, was less
effective than it otherwise would have been. The straight, deep
channel enabled the vessels to move at their greatest speed, and thus
the forts were passed.

Brigadier-General J. K. Duncan, commanding the coast defenses, says,
in his report of the passing of Forts Jackson and St. Philip by the
enemy's fleet:

"The enemy evidently anticipated a strong demonstration to be made
against him with fire-barges. Finding, upon his approach, however,
that no such demonstration was made, and that the only resistance
offered to his passage was the anticipated fire of the forts--the
broken and scattered raft being no obstacle--I am satisfied that he
was suddenly inspired, for the first time, to run the gantlet at all
hazards, although not a part of his original design. Be that as it
may, a rapid rush was made by him in columns of twos in echelon, so
as not to interfere with each other's broadsides. The mortar-fire was
furiously increased upon Fort Jackson, and, in dashing by, each of
the vessels delivered broadside after broadside, of shot, shell,
grape, canister, and spherical case, to drive the men from our guns.

"Both the officers and men stood up manfully under this galling and
fearful hail, and the batteries of both forts were promptly opened at
their longest range, with shot, shell, hot shot, and a little grape,
and most gallantly and rapidly fought, until the enemy succeeded in
getting above and beyond our range. The absence of light on the
river, together with the smoke of the guns, made the obscurity so
dense that scarcely a vessel was visible, and, in consequence, the
gunners were obliged to govern their firing entirely by the flashes
of the enemy's guns. I am fully satisfied that the enemy's dash was
successful mainly owing to the cover of darkness, as a frigate and
several gunboats were forced to retire as day was breaking. Similar
results had attended every previous attempt made by the enemy to pass
or to reconnoiter when we had sufficient light to fire with accuracy
and effect."

The vessels which passed the fort anchored at the quarantine station
about six miles above, and in the forenoon proceeded up the river.
Batteries had been constructed where the interior line of defense
touched both the right and the left bank of the river. The high stage
of the river gave to its surface an elevation above that of the
natural bank; but a continuous levee to protect the land from
inundation existed on both sides of the river. When the ascending
fleet approached these batteries, a cross-fire, which drove two of
the vessels back, was opened upon it, and continued until all the
ammunition was exhausted. The garrison was then withdrawn-casualties,
one killed and one wounded. The regret which would naturally arise
from the fact of these batteries not having a sufficient supply of
ammunition is modified, if not removed, by the statement of the
highly accomplished and gallant officer, Major-General M. L. Smith,
who was then in command of them. He reported:

"Had the fall of New Orleans depended upon the enemy's first taking
Forts Jackson and Philip, I think the city would have been safe from
an attack from the Gulf. The forts, in my judgment, were impregnable
as long as they were in free and open communication with the city.
This communication was not endangered while the obstruction existed.
The conclusion, then, is briefly this: While the obstruction existed,
the city was safe; when it was swept away, as the defenses then
existed, it was within the enemy's power."

On the other hand, General Duncan, whose protracted, skillful, and
gallant defense of the forts is above all praise, closes his official
report with the following sentence: "Except for the cover afforded by
the obscurity of the darkness, I shall always remain satisfied that
the enemy would never have succeeded in passing Forts Jackson and St.
Philip." The darkness to which he referred was not only that of
night, but also the absence of the use of the means prepared to light
up the river. As further proof of the intensity of the darkness, and
the absence of that intelligent design and execution which had been
claimed, I will quote a sentence from the report of Commodore
Farragut: "At length the fire slackened, the smoke cleared off, and
we saw to our surprise that we were above the forts."

On the 25th of April the enemy's gunboats and ships of war anchored
in front of the city and demanded its surrender. Major-General M.
Lovell, then in command, refused to comply with the summons, but,
believing himself unable to make a successful defense, and in order
to avoid a bombardment, agreed to withdraw his forces, and turn it
over to the civil authorities. Accordingly, the city was evacuated on
the same day. The forts still continued defiantly to hold their
position. By assiduous exertion the damage done to the works was
repaired, and the garrisons valiantly responded to the resolute
determination of General Duncan and Colonel Higgins to defend the
forts against the fleet still below, as well as against that which
had passed and was now above. On the 26th Commodore Porter,
commanding the mortar-fleet below, sent a flag-of-truce boat to
demand the surrender of the forts, saying that the city of New
Orleans had surrendered. To this Colonel Higgins replied, April 27th,
that he had no official information that New Orleans had been
evacuated, and until such notice was received he would not entertain
for a moment a proposition to surrender the forts. On the same day
General Duncan, commanding the coast-defenses, issued the following
address:

"SOLDIERS OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP: You have nobly, gallantly,
and heroically sustained with courage and fortitude the terrible
ordeals of fire, water, and a hail of shot and shell wholly
unsurpassed during the present war. But more remains to be done. The
safety of New Orleans and the cause of the Southern Confederacy--our
homes, families, and everything dear to man--yet depend upon our
exertions. We are just as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as we
were before the bombardment. Twice has the enemy demanded your
surrender, and twice has he been refused.

"Your officers have every confidence in your courage and patriotism,
and feel every assurance that you will cheerfully and with alacrity
obey all orders, and do your whole duty as men and as becomes the
well-tried garrisons of Forts Jackson and St. Philip. Be vigilant,
therefore, stand by your guns, and all will yet be well.

"J. K. DUNCAN,

"_Brigadier-General, commanding coast-defenses._"

Not less lofty and devoted was the spirit evinced by Colonel Higgins.
His naval experience had been energetically applied in the attempts
to preserve and repair the raft. As immediate commander of Fort St.
Philip he had done all which skill and gallantry could achieve, and,
though for forty-eight hours during the bombardment he never left the
rampart, yet, with commendable care for his men, he kept them so
under cover that, notwithstanding the long and furious assault to
which the fort was subjected, the total of casualties in it was two
killed and four wounded. Their conduct was such as was to be
anticipated, for, had these officers been actuated by a lower motive
than patriotism, had they been seeking the rewards which power
confers, they would not have taken service with the weaker party.
Their meed was the consciousness of duty well done in a righteous
cause, and the enduring admiration and esteem of a people who had
only these to confer.

During the 25th, 26th, and 27th, there had been an abatement of fire
on the forts, and with it had subsided the excitement which imminent
danger creates in the brave. A rumor became current that the city had
surrendered, and no reply had been received to inquiries sent on the
24th and 25th. About midnight on the 27th the garrison of Fort
Jackson revolted _en masse_, seized upon the guard, and commenced to
spike the guns. Captain S. O. Comay's company, the Louisiana
Cannoneers of St. Mary's Parish, and a few others remained true to
their cause and country. The mutiny was so general that the officers
were powerless to control it, and therefore decided to let those go
who wished to leave, and after daybreak to communicate with the fleet
below and negotiate for the terms which had been previously offered
and declined.

Under the incessant fire to which the forts had been exposed, and the
rise of the water in the casemates and lower part of the works, the
men had been not only deprived of sleep, but of the opportunity to
prepare their food. Heroically they had braved alike dangers and
discomfort; had labored constantly to repair damages; to extinguish
fires caused by exploding shells; to preserve their ammunition by
bailing out the water which threatened to submerge the magazine: yet,
in a period of comparative repose, these men, who had been cheerful
and obedient, as suddenly as unexpectedly, broke out into open
mutiny. Under the circumstances which surrounded him, General Duncan
had no alternative. It only remained for him to accept the
proposition which had been made for a surrender of the forts. As this
mutiny became known about midnight of the 27th, soon after daylight
of the 28th a small boat was procured, and notice of the event was
sent to Captain Mitchell, on the Louisiana, and also to Fort St.
Philip. The officers of that fort concurred in the propriety of the
surrender, though none of their men had openly revolted.

A flag of truce was sent to Commodore Porter to notify him of a
willingness to negotiate for the surrender of the forts. The
gallantry with which the defense had been conducted was recognized by
the enemy, and the terms were as liberal as had been offered on
former occasions.

The garrisons were paroled, the officers were to retain their
side-arms, and the Confederate flags were left flying over the forts
until after our forces had withdrawn. If this was done as a generous
recognition of the gallantry with which the forts had been defended,
it claims acknowledgment as an instance of martial courtesy--the
flower that blooms fairest amid the desolations of war.

Captain Mitchell, commanding the Confederate States naval forces, had
been notified by General Duncan of the mutiny in the forts and of the
fact that the enemy had passed through a channel in rear of Fort St.
Philip and had landed a force at the quarantine, some six miles
above, and that, under the circumstances, it was deemed necessary to
surrender the forts. As the naval forces were not under the orders of
the general commanding the coast-defenses, it was optional with the
naval commander to do likewise or not as to his fleet. After
consultation with his officers. Captain Mitchell decided to destroy
his flagship, the Louisiana, the only formidable vessel he had,
rather than allow her to fall into the hands of the enemy. The crew
was accordingly withdrawn, and the vessel set on fire.

Commodore Porter, commanding the fleet below, came up under a flag of
truce to Fort Jackson, and, while negotiations were progressing for
the surrender, the Louisiana, in flames, drifted down the river, and,
when close under Fort St. Philip, exploded and sank.

The defenses afloat, except the Louisiana, consisted of tugs and
river-steamers, which had been converted to war purposes by
protecting their bows with iron so as to make them rams, and putting
on them such armament as boats of that class would bear; and these
were again divided into such as were subject to control as naval
vessels, and others which, in compliance with the wish of the
Governor of Louisiana and many influential citizens, were fitted out
to a great extent by State and private sources, with the condition
that they should be commanded by river-steamboat captains, and should
not be under the control of the naval commander. This, of course,
impaired the unity requisite in battle. For many other purposes they
might have been used without experiencing the inconvenience felt when
they were brought together to act as one force against the enemy. The
courts of inquiry and the investigation by a committee of Congress
have brought out all the facts of the case, but with such conflicting
opinions as render it very difficult, in reviewing the matter, to
reach a definite and satisfactory conclusion. This much it may be
proper to say, that expectations, founded upon the supposition that
these improvised means could do all which might fairly be expected
from war-vessels, were unreasonable, and a judgment based upon them
is unjust to the parties involved. The machinery of the Louisiana was
so incomplete as to deprive her of locomotion, but she had been so
well constructed as to possess very satisfactory resisting powers, as
was shown by the fact that the broadsides of the enemy's vessels,
fired at very close quarters, had little or no effect upon her
shield. Without power of locomotion, her usefulness was limited to
employment as a floating battery. The question as to whether she was
in the right position, or whether, in her unfinished condition, she
should have been sent from the city, is one, for an answer to which I
must refer the inquirer to the testimony of naval men, who were
certainly most competent to decide the issue.

One of the little river-boats, the Governor Moore, commanded by
lieutenant Beverly Kennon, like the others, imperfectly protected at
the bow, struck and sunk the Varuna, in close proximity to other
vessels of the enemy's fleet. Such daring resulted in his losing, in
killed and wounded, seventy-four out of a crew of ninety-three. Then
finding that he must destroy his ship to prevent her from falling
into the hands of the enemy, he set her on fire, and testified as
follows:

"I ordered the wounded to be placed in a boat, and all the men who
could to save themselves by swimming to the shore and hiding
themselves in the marshes. I remained to set the ship on fire. After
doing so, I went on deck with the intention of leaving her, but found
the wounded had been left with no one to take care of them. I
remained and lowered them into a boat, and got through just in time
to be made a prisoner. The wounded were afterward attended by the
surgeons of the Oneida and Eureka."

This, he says, was the only foundation for the accusation of having
burned his wounded with his ship. Another, the Manassas,
lieutenant-commanding Warley, though merely an altered "tug-boat,"
stoutly fought the large ships; but, being wholly unprotected, except
at her bow, was perforated in many places, as soon as the guns were
brought to bear upon her sides, and floated down the river a burning
wreck. Another of the same class is thus referred to by Colonel
Higgins:

"At daylight, I observed the McRae, gallantly fighting at terrible
odds, contending at close quarters with two of the enemy's powerful
ships. Her gallant commander, Lieutenant Thomas B. Huger, fell during
the conflict, severely, but I trust not mortally, wounded."

This little vessel, after her unequal conflict, was still afloat,
and, with permission of the enemy, went up to New Orleans to convey
the wounded as well from our forts as from the fleet.

On the 23d of April, 1862, General Lovell, commanding the military
department, had gone down to Fort Jackson, where General Duncan,
commanding the coast-defenses, then made his headquarters. The
presence of the department commander did not avail to secure the full
coöperation between the defenses afloat and the land-defenses, which
was then of most pressing and immediate necessity.

When the enemy's fleet passed the forts, he hastened back to New
Orleans, his headquarters. The confusion which prevailed in the city,
when the news arrived that the forts had been passed by the enemy's
fleet, shows how little it was expected. There was nothing to
obstruct the ascent of the river between Forts Jackson and St. Philip
and the batteries on the river where the interior line of defense
rested on its right and left banks, about four miles below the city.
The guns were not sufficiently numerous in these batteries to inspire
much confidence; they were nevertheless well served until the
ammunition was exhausted, after which the garrisons withdrew, and
made their way by different routes to join the forces withdrawn from
New Orleans.

Under the supposition entertained by the generals nearest to the
operations, the greatest danger to New Orleans was from above, not
from below, the city; therefore, most of the troops had been sent
from the city to Tennessee, and Captain Hollins, with the greater
part of the river-fleet, had gone up to check the descent of the
enemy's gunboats.

Batteries like those immediately below the city had been constructed
where the interior line touched the river above, and armed to resist
an attack from that direction. Doubtful as to the direction from
which, and the manner in which, an attempt might be made to capture
the city, such preparations as circumstances suggested were made
against many supposable dangers by the many possible routes of
approach. To defend the city from the land, against a bombardment by
a powerful fleet in the river before it, had not been contemplated.
All the defensive preparations were properly, I think, directed to
the prevention of a near approach by the enemy. To have subjected the
city to bombardment by a direct or plunging fire, as the surface of
the river was then higher than the land, would have been
exceptionally destructive. Had the city been filled with soldiers
whose families had been sent to a place of safety, instead of being
filled with women and children whose natural protectors were
generally in the army and far away, the attempt might have been
justified to line the levee with all the effective guns and open fire
on the fleet, at the expense of whatever property might be destroyed
before the enemy should be driven away. The case was the reverse of
the hypothesis, and nothing could have been more unjust than to
censure the commanding General for withdrawing a force large enough
to induce a bombardment, but insufficient to repel it. His answer to
the demand for the surrender showed clearly enough the motives by
which he was influenced. His refusal enabled him to withdraw the
troops and most of the public property, and to use them, with the
ordnance and ordnance stores thus saved, in providing for the defense
of Vicksburg, but especially it deprived the enemy of any pretext for
bombarding the town and sacrificing the lives of the women and
children. It appears that General Lovell called for ten thousand
volunteers from the citizens, but failed to get them. There were many
river-steamboats at the landing, and, if the volunteers called for
were intended to man these boats and board the enemy's fleet before
their land-forces could arrive, it can not be regarded as utterly
impracticable. The report of General Butler shows that he worked his
way through one of the bayous in rear of Fort St. Philip to the
Mississippi River above the forts so as to put himself in
communication with the fleet at the city, and to furnish Commodore
Farragut with ammunition. From this it is to be inferred that the
fleet was deficient in ammunition, and the fact would have rendered
boarding from river-boats the more likely to succeed. In this
connection it may be remembered that, during the war, John Taylor
Wood, Colonel and A. D. C. to the President, who had been an officer
of high repute in the "old Navy," did in open boats attack armed
vessels, board and capture them, though found with nettings up,
having been warned of the probability of such an attack.[57]

Many causes have been assigned for the fall of New Orleans. Two of
them are of undeniable force: First, the failure to light up the
channel; second, the want of an obstruction which would detain the
fleet under fire of the forts. General Duncan's report and testimony
justify the conclusion that to the thick veil of darkness the enemy
was indebted for his ability to run past the forts.

The argument that the guns were not of sufficiently large caliber to
stop the fleet is not convincing. If all the guns had been of the
largest size, that would not have increased the accuracy but would
have diminished the rapidity of the fire, and therefore in the same
degree would have lessened the chances of hitting objects in the
dark. Further, it appears that the forts always crippled or repulsed
any vessels which came up in daylight.

The forts would have been better able to resist bombardment if they
had been heavily plated with iron; but that would not have prevented
the fleet from passing them as they did. Torpedoes might have been
placed on the bar at the mouth of the river before the enemy got
possession of it, and subsequently, if attached to buoys, they might
have been used in the deep channel above. Many other things which
were omitted might and probably would have been done had attention
been earlier concentrated on the danger which at last proved fatal.
If the volunteer river-defense fleet was ineffective, as alleged,
because it was not subject to the orders of the naval commander, that
was an evil without a remedy. The Governor of Louisiana had arranged
with the projectors that they should not be subject to the naval
commander, and the alternative of not accepting them with that
condition was that they would not agree to convert their steamers
into war-vessels. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that they were
worse than none, their presence can not be properly enumerated among
the causes of the failure.

The fall of New Orleans was a great disaster, over which there was
general lamentation, mingled with no little indignation. The excited
feeling demanded a victim, and conflicting testimony of many
witnesses most nearly concerned made it convenient to select for
censure those most removed and least active in their own
justification. Thus the naval constructors of the Mississippi and the
Secretary of the Navy became the special objects of attack. The
selection of these had little of justice in it, and could not serve
to relieve others of their responsibility, as did the old-time doom
of the scapegoat. New Orleans had never been a ship-building port,
and when the Messrs. Tift, the agents to build the iron-dad steamer
Mississippi, arrived there, they had to prepare a ship-yard, procure
lumber from a distance, have the foundries and rolling-mills adapted
to such iron-work as could be done in the city, and contract
elsewhere for the balance. They were ingenious, well informed in
matters of ship-building, and were held in high esteem in Georgia and
Florida, where they had long resided. They submitted a proposition to
the Secretary of the Navy to build a vessel on a new model. The
proposition was accepted after full examination of the plan proposed,
the novelty of which made it necessary that they should have full
control of the work of construction. To the embarrassments above
mentioned were added interruptions by calling off the workmen
occasionally for exercise and instruction as militiamen, the city
being threatened by the enemy. From these causes, unexpected delay in
the completion of the ship resulted, regret for which increased as
her most formidable character was realized.

These constructors--the brothers Tift--hoped to gain much
reputation by the ship which they designed, and, from this motive,
agreed to give their full service and unremitted attention in its
construction without compensation or other allowance than their
current expenses. It would, therefore, on the face of it, seem to
have been a most absurd suspicion that they willingly delayed the
completion of the vessel, and at last wantonly destroyed it.

Mr. E. C. Murray, who was the contractor for building the Louisiana,
in his testimony before a committee of the Confederate Congress,
testified that he had been a practical ship-builder for twenty years
and a contractor for the preceding eighteen years, having built about
a hundred and twenty boats, steamers, and sailing-vessels. There was
only a fence between his shipyard and that where the Mississippi was
constructed. Of this latter vessel he said:

"I think the vessel was built in less time than any vessel of her
tonnage, character, and requiring the same amount of work and
materials, on this continent. That vessel required no less than two
million feet of lumber, and, I suppose, about one thousand tons of
iron, including the false works, blockways, etc. I do not think that
amount of materials was ever put together on this continent within
the time occupied in her construction. I know many of our naval
vessels, requiring much less materials than were employed in the
Mississippi, that took about six or twelve months in their
construction. She was built with rapidity, and had at all times as
many men at work upon her as could work to advantage--she had, in
fact, many times more men at work upon her than could conveniently
work. They worked on nights and Sundays upon her, as I did upon the
Louisiana, at least for a large portion of the time."

The Secretary of the Navy knew both of the Tifts, but had no near
personal relations or family connection with either, as was
recklessly alleged.

He, in accepting their proposition, connected with it the detail of
officers of the navy to supervise expenditures and aid in procuring
materials. Assisted by the chief engineer and constructor of the
navy, minute instructions were given as to the manner in which the
work was to be conducted. As early as the 19th of September he sent
twenty ship-carpenters from Richmond to New Orleans to aid in the
construction of the Mississippi. On the 7th of October authority was
given to have guns of heaviest caliber made in New Orleans for the
ship. Frequent telegrams were sent in November, December, and
January, showing great earnestness about the work on the ship. In
February and March notice was given of the forwarding from Richmond
of capstan and main-shaft, which could not be made in New Orleans. On
March 22d the Secretary, by telegraph, directed the constructors to
"strain every nerve to finish the ship," and added, "work day and
night." April 5th he again wrote: "Spare neither men nor money to
complete her at the earliest moment. Can not you hire night-gangs for
triple wages?" April 10th the Secretary again says: "Enemy's boats
have passed Island 10. Work day and night with all the force you can
command to get the Mississippi ready. Spare neither men nor money."
April 11th he asks, "When will you launch, and when will she be ready
for action?" These inquiries indicate the prevalent opinion, at that
time, that the danger to New Orleans was from the ironclad fleet
above, and not the vessels at the mouth of the river; but the anxiety
of the Secretary of the Navy and the efforts made by him were of a
character applicable to either or both the sources of danger. Thus we
find as early as the 24th of February, 1862, that he instructed
Commander Mitchell to make all proper exertions to have guns and
carriages ready for both the iron-clad vessels the Mississippi and
the Louisiana. Reports having reached him that the work on the latter
vessel was not pushed with sufficient energy, on the 15th of March he
authorized Commander Mitchell to consult with General Lovell, and, if
the contractors were not doing everything practicable to complete her
at the earliest moment, that he should take her out of their hands,
and, with the aid of General Lovell, go on to complete her himself.
On the 5th of April, 1862, Secretary Mallory instructed Commander
Sinclair, who had been assigned to the command of the Mississippi, to
urge on by night and day the completion of the ship. In March, 1861,
the Navy Department sent from Montgomery officers to New Orleans,
with instructions to purchase steamers and fit them for war purposes.
Officers were also sent to the North to purchase vessels suited to
such uses, and in the ensuing May an agent was dispatched to Canada
and another to Europe for like objects; and in April, 1861, contracts
were made with foundries at Richmond and New Orleans to make guns for
the defense of New Orleans. On the 8th of May, 1861, the Secretary of
the Navy communicated at some length to the Committee on Naval
Affairs of the Confederate Congress his views in favor of iron-clad
vessels, arguing as sell for their efficiency as the economy in
building them, believing that one such vessel could successfully
engage a fleet of the wooden vessels which constituted the enemy's
navy. His further view was that we could not hope to build wooden
fleets equal to those with which the enemy were supplied. The
committee, if it should be deemed expedient to construct an iron-clad
ship, was urged to prompt action by the forcible declaration, "Not a
moment should be lost."

Commander George Minor, Confederate States Navy, Chief of the Bureau
of Ordnance, reported the number of guns sent by the Navy Department
to New Orleans, between July 1, 1861, and the fall of the city, to
have been one hundred and ninety-seven, and that before July
twenty-three guns had been sent there from Norfolk, being a total of
two hundred and twenty guns, of which forty-five were of large
caliber, supplied by the Navy Department for the defense of New
Orleans.

Very soon after the Government was removed to Richmond, the Secretary
of the Navy, with the aid of Commander Brooke, designed a plan for
converting the sunken frigate Merrimac into an iron-clad vessel. She
became the famous Virginia, the brilliant career of which silenced
all the criticisms which had been made upon the plan adopted. On May
20, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy instructed Captain Ingraham,
Confederate States Navy, to ascertain the practicability of obtaining
wrought-iron plates suited for ships' armor. After some
disappointment and delay, the owners of the mills at Atlanta were
induced to make the necessary changes in the machinery, and undertake
the work. Efforts at other places in the West had been unsuccessful,
and this was one of the difficulties which an inefficient department
would not have overcome. The iron-clad gunboats Arkansas and
Tennessee were commenced at Memphis, but the difficulty in obtaining
mechanics so interfered with their construction, that the Secretary
of the Navy was compelled, December 24, 1861, to write to General
Polk, who was commanding at Columbus, Kentucky, asking that mechanics
might be detached from his forces, so as to insure the early
completion of the vessels. So promptly had the iron-clad boats been
put under contract, that the arrangements had all been made in
anticipation of the appropriation, and the contract was signed "on
the very day the law was passed."

On December 25, 1861, Lieutenant Isaac N. Brown, Confederate States
Navy, a gallant and competent officer, well and favorably known in
his subsequent service as commander of the ram Arkansas, was sent to
Nashville. Information had been received that four river-boats were
there, and for sale, which were suited for river defense. Lieutenant
Brown was instructed to purchase such as should be adaptable to the
required service, "and to proceed forthwith with the necessary
alteration and armament."

In the latter part of 1861, it having been found impossible with the
means in Richmond and Norfolk to answer the requisitions for ordnance
and ordnance stores required for the naval defenses of the
Mississippi, a laboratory was established in New Orleans, and
authority given for the casting of heavy cannon, construction of
gun-carriages, and the manufacture of projectiles and ordnance
equipments of all kinds. On December 12, 1861, the Secretary of the
Navy submitted an estimate for an appropriation to meet the expenses
incurred "for ordnance and ordnance stores for the defense of the
Mississippi River."

Secretary Mallory, in answer to inquiries of a joint committee of
Congress, in 1863, replied that he had sent a telegram to Captain
Whittle, April 17, 1862, as follows:

"Is the boom, or raft, below the forts in order to resist the enemy,
or has any part of it given way? State condition."

On the next day the following answer was sent:

"I hear the raft below the forts is not in best condition; they are
strengthening it by additional lines. I have furnished anchors."

To further inquiry about the raft by the Committee, the Secretary
answered:

"The commanding General at New Orleans had exclusive charge of the
construction of the raft, or obstruction, in question, and his
correspondence with the War Department induced confidence in the
security of New Orleans from the enemy. I was aware that this raft
had been injured, but did not doubt that the commanding General would
renew it, and place an effectual barrier across the river, and I was
anxious that the navy should afford all possible aid. . . . A large
number of anchors were sent to New Orleans from Norfolk for the raft."

Though much more might be added, it is hoped that what has been given
above will sufficiently attest the zeal and capacity of the Secretary
of the Navy, and his anxiety, in particular, to protect the city of
New Orleans, whether assailed by fleets descending or ascending the
river.

Having thus reviewed at length the events, immediate and remote,
which were connected with the great catastrophe, the fall of our
chief commercial city, and the destruction of the naval vessels on
which our hopes most rested for the protection of the lower
Mississippi and the harbors of the Gulf, the narrative is resumed of
affairs at the city of New Orleans.

[Footnote 57: Captain Wood had a number of light row-boats built,
holding each about twenty men. They were fitted with cradles to wagons,
and could be quickly moved to any point by road or rail. He writes:
"In August, 1863, I left Richmond with four boats and sixty men for
the Rappahannock, to look after one or two gunboats that had been
operating in that river. Finding always two cruising together, I
determined to attempt the capture of both at once. About midnight,
with muffled oars, we pulled for them at anchor near the mouth of the
river. They discovered us two hundred yards off. We dashed alongside,
cut our way through and over the boarder nettings with the old navy
cutlass, gained the deck, and, after a sharp, short fight, drove the
enemy below. The prizes proved to be the gunboats Satellite and
Reliance, two guns each. Landing the prisoners, we cruised for two
days in the Chesapeake Bay. A number of vessels were captured and
destroyed."]

CHAPTER XXIX.

Sad though the memory of the fall of New Orleans must be, the
heroism, the fortitude, and the patriotic self-sacrifice exhibited in
the eventful struggle at the forts must ever remain the source of
pride and of such consolation as misfortune gathers from the
remembrance of duties well performed.

After the troops had been withdrawn and the city restored to the
administration of the civil authorities, Commodore Farragut, on April
26, 1862, addressed the Mayor, repeating his demand for the surrender
of the city. In his letter he said: "It is not within the province of
a naval officer to assume the duties of a military commandant," and
added, "The rights of persons and property shall be secured." He
proceeded then to demand "that the emblem of sovereignty of the
United States be hoisted over the City Hall, Mint, and Custom-House
by meridian this day. All flags and other emblems of sovereignty
other than those of the United States must be removed from all the
public buildings by that hour." To this the Mayor replied, and the
following extracts convey the general purport of his letter:

"The city is without the means of defense, and is utterly destitute
of the force and material that might enable it to resist an
overpowering armament displayed in sight of it. . . . To surrender
such a place were an idle and unmeaning ceremony. . . . As to
hoisting any flag other than the flag of our own adoption and
allegiance, let me say to you that the man lives not in our midst
whose hand and heart would not be paralyzed at the mere thought of
such an act; nor could I find in my entire constituency so wretched
and desperate a renegade as would dare to profane with his hand the
sacred emblem of our aspirations. . . . Peace and order may be
preserved without resort to measures which I could not at this moment
prevent. Your occupying the city does not transfer allegiance from
the government of their choice to one which they have deliberately
repudiated, and they yield the obedience which the conqueror is
entitled to extort from the conquered.

"Respectfully,

"JOHN T. MONROE, _Mayor._"

On the 29th of April Admiral Farragut adopted the alternative
presented by the answer of the Mayor, and sent a detachment of
marines to hoist the United States flag over the Custom-House, and to
pull down the Confederate flag from the staff on the City Hall. An
officer and some marines remained at the Custom-House to guard the
United States flag hoisted over it until the land-forces under
General Butler arrived. On the 1st of May General Butler took
possession of the defenseless City; then followed the reign of
terror, pillage, and a long train of infamies, too disgraceful to be
remembered without a sense of shame by any one who is proud of the
name American.

Had the population of New Orleans been vagrant and riotous, the harsh
measures adopted might have been excused, though nothing could have
justified the barbarities which were practiced; but, notable as the
city had always been for freedom from tumult, and occupied as it then
was mainly by women and children, nothing can extenuate the wanton
insults and outrages heaped upon them. That those not informed of the
character of the citizens may the better comprehend it, a brief
reference is made to its history.

When Canada, then a French colony, was conquered by Great Britain,
many of the inhabitants of greatest influence and highest
cultivation, in a spirit of loyalty to their flag, migrated to the
wilds of Louisiana. Some of them established themselves in and about
New Orleans, and their numerous descendants formed, down to a late
period, the controlling element in the body-politic. Even after they
had ceased, because of large immigration, to control in the
commercial and political affairs of the city, their social standard
was still the rule. No people were more characterized by refinement,
courtesy, and chivalry. Of their keen susceptibility the Mayor
informed Commodore Farragut in his correspondence with that officer.

When the needy barbarians of the upper plains of Asia descended upon
the classic fields of Italy, their atrocities were such as shocked
the common-sense of humanity; but, if any one shall inquire minutely
into the conduct of Butler and his followers at New Orleans, he will
find there a history yet more revolting.

Soon thereafter, on May 17, 1862, Captain Eagle, United States Navy,
commanding the naval forces before Galveston, summoned it to
surrender, "to prevent the effusion of blood and the destruction of
property which would result from the bombardment of the town," adding
that the land and naval forces would appear in a few days. The reply
was that, "when the land and naval forces made their appearance, the
demand would be answered." The harbor and town of Galveston were not
prepared to resist a bombardment, and, under the advice of General
Herbert, the citizens remained quiet, resolved, when the enemy should
attempt to penetrate the interior, to resist his march at every
point. This condition remained without any material change until the
8th of the following October, when Commander Renshaw with a fleet of
gunboats, consisting of the Westfield, Harriet Lane, Owasco, Clifton,
and some transports, approached so near the city as to command it
with his guns. Upon a signal, the Mayor _pro tem_, came off to the
flag-ship and informed Commander Renshaw that the military and civil
authorities had withdrawn from the town, and that he had been
appointed by a meeting of citizens to act as mayor, and had come for
the purpose of learning the intentions of the naval commander. In
reply he was informed that there was no purpose to interfere with the
municipal affairs of the city; that he did not intend to occupy it
before the arrival of a military commander, but that he intended to
hoist the United States flag upon the public buildings, and claim
that it should be respected. The acting Mayor informed him that
persons over whom he had no control might take down the flag, and he
could not guarantee that it should be respected. Commander Renshaw
replied that, to avoid any difficulty like that which occurred in New
Orleans, he would send with the flag a sufficient force to protect
it, and would not keep the flag flying for more than a quarter or
half an hour.

The vessels of the fleet were assigned to positions commanding the
town and the bridge which connected the island with the mainland, and
a battalion of Massachusetts volunteers was posted on one of the
wharves.

Late in 1862 General John B. Magruder, a skillful and knightly
soldier, who had at an earlier period of the year rendered
distinguished service by his defense of the peninsula between the
James and York Rivers, Virginia, was assigned to the command of the
Department of Texas. On his arrival, he found the enemy in possession
of the principal port, Galveston, and other points upon the coast. He
promptly collected the scattered arms and field artillery, had a
couple of ordinary high-pressure steamboats used in the
transportation of cotton on Buffalo Bayou protected with cotton-bales
piled from the main deck to and above the hurricane-roof, and these,
under the command of Captain Leon Smith, of the Texas Navy, in
coöperation with the volunteers, were relied upon to recapture the
harbor and island of Galveston. Between night and morning on the 1st
of January, 1863, the land-forces entered the town, and the
steamboats came into the bay, manned by Texas cavalry and volunteer
artillery. The field artillery was ran down to the shore, and opened
fire upon the boats. The battalion of the enemy having torn up the
plank of the wharf, our infantry could only approach them by wading
through the water, and climbing upon the wharf. The two steamboats
attacked the Harriet Lane, the gunboat lying farthest up the bay.
They were both so frail in their construction that their only chance
was to close and board. One of them was soon disabled by collision
with the strong vessel, and in a sinking condition ran into shoal
water. The other closed with the Harriet Lane, boarded and captured
the vessel. The flag-ship Westfield got aground and could not be got
off, though assisted by one of the fleet for that purpose. General
Magruder then sent a demand that the enemy's vessels should
surrender, except one, on which the crews of all should leave the
harbor, giving until ten o'clock for compliance with his demand, to
enforce which he put a crew on the Harriet Lane, then the most
efficient vessel afloat of the enemy's fleet, and, while waiting for
an answer, ceased firing. This demand was communicated by a boat from
the Harriet Lane to the commander on the Clifton, who said that he
was not the commander of the fleet, and would communicate the
proposal to the flag-officer on the Westfield. Flags of truce were
then flying on the enemy's vessels, as well as on shore. Commander
Renshaw refused to accede to the proposition, directing the commander
of the Clifton to get all the vessels, including the Corypheus and
Sachem, which had recently joined, out of port as soon as possible,
and that he would blow up the Westfield, and leave on the transports
lying near him with his officers and crew. In attempting to execute
this purpose, Commander Renshaw and ten or fifteen others perished
soon after leaving the ship, in consequence of the explosion being
premature. The General commanding made the following preliminary
report:

"HEADQUARTERS, GALVESTON, TEXAS.

"This morning, the 1st January, at three o'clock, I attacked the
enemy's fleet and garrison at this place, captured the latter and the
steamer Harriet Lane, two barges, and a schooner. The rest, some four
or five, escaped ignominiously under cover of a flag of truce. I have
about six hundred prisoners and a large quantity of valuable stores,
arms, etc. The Harriet Lane is very little injured. She was carried
by boarders from two high-pressure cotton-steamers, manned by Texas
cavalry and artillery. The line troops were gallantly commanded by
Colonel Green, of Sibley's brigade, and the ships and artillery by
Major Leon Smith, to whose indomitable energy and heroic daring the
country is indebted for the successful execution of a plan which I
had considered for the destruction of the enemy's fleet. Colonel
Bagby, of Sibley's brigade, also commanded the volunteers from his
regiment for the naval expedition, in which every officer and every
man won for himself imperishable renown.

"J. BANKHEAD MAGRUDER,

"_Major General._"

The conduct of Commander Renshaw toward the inhabitants of Galveston
had been marked by moderation and propriety, and the closing act of
his life was one of manly courage and fidelity to the flag he bore.

Commander Wainright and Lieutenant-commanding Lea, who fell valiantly
defending their ship, were buried in the cemetery with the honors of
war: thus was evinced that instinctive respect which true warriors
always feel for their peers. The surviving officers were paroled.

It would be a pleasing task, if space allowed, to notice the many
instances of gallantry in this affair, as daring as they were novel,
but want of space compels me to refer the reader to the full accounts
which have been published of the "cavalry charge upon a naval fleet."

The capture of the enemy's fleet in Galveston Harbor, by means so
novel as to excite surprise as well as grateful admiration, was
followed by another victory on the coast of Texas, under
circumstances so remarkable as properly to be considered marvelous.
To those familiar with the events of that time and section, it is
hardly necessary to say that I refer to the battle of Sabine Pass.

The strategic importance to the enemy of the possession of Sabine
River caused the organization of a large expedition of land and naval
forces to enter and ascend the river. If successful, it gave the
enemy short lines for operation against the interior of Texas, and
relieved them of the discomfiture resulting from their expulsion from
Galveston Harbor.

The fleet of the enemy numbered twenty-three vessels. The forces were
estimated to be ten thousand men. No adequate provision had been made
to resist such a force, and, under the circumstances, none might have
been promptly made on which reliance could have been reasonably
placed. A few miles above the entrance into the Sabine River, a small
earthwork had been constructed, garrisoned at the time of the action
by forty-two men and two lieutenants, with an armament of six guns.
The officers and men were all Irishmen, and the company was called
the "Davis Guards." The captain, F. H. Odlum, was temporarily absent,
so that the command devolved upon Lieutenant E. W. Dowling. Wishing
to perpetuate the history of an affair, in which I believe the brave
garrison did more than an equal force had ever elsewhere performed, I
asked General Magruder, when I met him after the war, to write out a
full account of the event; he agreed to do so, but died not long
after I saw him, and before complying with my request. From the
publications of the day I have obtained the main facts, as they were
then printed in the Texas newspapers, and, being unwilling to
summarize the reports, give them at length.

_Captain F. H. Odlum's Official Report._

"HEADQUARTERS, SABINE PASS,

"_September 9, 1863._

"Captain A. N. MILLS, _Assistant Adjutant-General._

"SIR: I have the honor to report that we had an engagement with the
enemy yesterday and gained a handsome victory. We captured two of
their gunboats, crippled a third, and drove the rest out of the Pass.
We took eighteen fine guns, a quantity of smaller arms, ammunition
and stores, killed about fifty, wounded several, and took one hundred
and fifty prisoners, without the loss or injury of any one on our
side or serious damage to the fort.

"Your most obedient servant,

"F. H. ODLUM, _Captain, commanding Sabine Pass._"

_Commodore Leon Smith's Official Report._

"Captain E. P. TURNER, _Assistant Adjutant-General._

"SIR: After telegraphing the Major-General before leaving Beaumont, I
took a horse and proceeded with all haste to Sabine Pass, from which
direction I could distinctly hear a heavy firing. Arriving at the
Pass at 3 P.M., I found the enemy off and inside the bar, with
nineteen gunboats and steamships and other ships of war, carrying, as
well as I could judge, fifteen thousand men. I proceeded with Captain
Odlum to the fort, and found Lieutenant Dowling and Lieutenant N. H.
Smith, of the engineer corps, with forty-two men, defending the fort.
Until 3 P.M. our men did not open on the enemy, as the range was too
distant. The officers of the fort coolly held their fire until the
enemy had approached near enough to reach them. But, when the enemy
arrived within good range, our batteries were opened, and gallantly
replied to a galling and most terrific fire from the enemy. As I
entered the fort, the gunboats Clifton, Arizona, Sachem, and Granite
State, with several others, came boldly up to within one thousand
yards, and opened their batteries, which were gallantly and
effectively replied to by the Davis Guards. For one hour and thirty
minutes a most terrific bombardment of grape, canister, and shell was
directed against our heroic and devoted little band within the fort.
The shot struck in every direction, but, thanks be to God! not one of
the noble Davis Guards was hurt. Too much credit can not be awarded
Lieutenant Dowling, who displayed the utmost heroism in the discharge
of the duty assigned him and the defenders of the fort. God bless the
Davis Guards, one and all! The honor of the country was in their
hands, and nobly they sustained it. Every man stood at his post,
regardless of the murderous fire that was poured upon them from every
direction. The result of the battle, which lasted from 3.30 to 5
P.M., was the capturing of the Clifton and Sachem, eighteen heavy
guns, one hundred and fifty prisoners, and the killing and wounding
of fifty men, and driving outside the bar the enemy's fleet,
comprising twenty-three vessels in all. I have the honor to be your
obedient servant,

"LEON SMITH,

"_Commanding Marine Department of Texas._"

"HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF TEXAS, NEW MEXICO, AND ARIZONA, HOUSTON,
TEXAS, _September 9, 1863._

"(SPECIAL ORDER.)

"Another glorious victory has been won by the heroism of Texans. The
enemy, confident of overpowering the little garrison at Sabine Pass,
boldly advanced to the work of capture. After a sharp contest he was
entirely defeated, one gunboat hurrying off in a crippled condition,
while two others, the Clifton and Sachem, with their armaments and
crews, including the commander of the fleet, surrendered to the
gallant defenders of the fort. The loss of the enemy has been heavy,
while not a man on our side has been killed or wounded. Though the
enemy has been repulsed in his naval attacks, his land-forces,
reported as ten thousand strong, are still off the coast waiting an
opportunity to land.

"The Major-General calls on every man able to bear arms to bring his
guns or arms, no matter of what kind, and be prepared to make a
sturdy resistance to the foe.

"Major-General J. B. MAGRUDER.

"EDMUND P. TURNER, _Assistant Adjutant-General._"

The "Daily Post," Houston, Texas, of August 22, 1880, has the
following:

"A few days after the battle each man that participated in the fight
was presented with a silver medal inscribed as follows: On one side
'D. G.,' for the Davis Guards, and on the reverse Side, 'Sabine Pass,
September 8, 1863.'

"Captain Odlum and Lieutenant R. W. Dowling have gone to that bourn
whence no traveler returns, and but few members of the heroic band
are in the land of the living, and those few reside in the city of
Houston, and often meet together, and talk about the battle in which
they participated on the memorable 8th of September, 1863.

"The following are the names of the company who manned the guns in
Fort Grigsby, and to whom the credit is due for the glorious victory:

"Lieutenants R. W. Dowling and N. H. Smith; Privates Timothy
McDonough, Thomas Dougherty, David Fitzgerald, Michael Monahan, John
Hassett, John McKeefer, Jack W. White, Patrick McDonnell, William
Gleason, Michael Carr, Thomas Hagerty, Timothy Huggins, Alexander
McCabe, James Flemming, Patrick Fitzgerald, Thomas McKernon, Edward
Pritchard, Charles Rheins, Timothy Hurley, John McGrath, Matthew
Walshe, Patrick Sullivan, Michael Sullivan, Thomas Sullivan, Patrick
Clare, John Hennessey, Hugh Deagan, Maurice Powers, Abner Carter,
Daniel McMurray, Patrick Malone, James Corcoran, Patrick Abbott, John
McNealis, Michael Egan, Daniel Donovan, John Wesley, John Anderson,
John Flood, Peter O'Hare, Michael Delaney, Terence Mulhern."

The inquiry may naturally arise how this small, number of men could
take charge of so large a body of prisoners. This required that to
their valor they should add stratagem. A few men were placed on the
parapet as sentinels, the rest were marched out as a guard to receive
the prisoners and their arms. Thus was concealed the fact that the
fort was empty. The report of the guns bombarding the fort had been
heard, and soon after the close of the battle reinforcements arrived,
which relieved the little garrison from its embarrassment.

Official reports of officers in the assaulting column, as published
in the "Rebellion Record," vol. vii, page 425, _et seq_., refer to
another fort, and steamers in the river, coöperating in the defense
of Fort Grigsby. The success of the single company which garrisoned
the earthwork is without parallel in ancient or modern war. It was
marvelous; but it is incredible--more than marvelous--that another
garrison in another fort, with cruising steamers, aided in checking
the advance of the enemy, yet silently permitted the forty-two men
and two officers of Fort Grigsby to receive all the credit for the
victory which was won. If this be supposable, how is it possible that
Captain Odlum, Commander Smith, General Magruder, and Lieutenant
Dowling, who had been advised to abandon the work, and had consulted
their men as to their willingness to defend it, should nowhere have
mentioned the putative fort and coöperating steamers?

The names of the forty-four must go down to posterity, unshorn of the
honor which their contemporaries admiringly accorded.

At the commencement of the war the Confederacy was not only without a
navy, all the naval vessels possessed by the States having been, as
explained elsewhere, left in the hands of our enemies; but worse than
this was the fact that ship-building had been almost exclusively done
in the Northern States, so that we had no means of acquiring equality
in naval power. The numerous deep and wide rivers traversing the
Southern States gave a favorable field for the operation of gunboats
suited to such circumstances. The enemy rapidly increased their
supply of these by building on the Western waters, as well as
elsewhere, and converting existing vessels into iron-dad gunboats.
The intrepidity and devotion of our people met the necessity by new
expedients and extraordinary daring. This was especially seen in the
operations of western Louisiana, where numerous bayous and rivers,
with difficult land-routes, gave an advantage to the enemy which
might well have paralyzed anything less than the most resolute will.

In the earlier period of the war, the gunboats had inspired a terror
which their performances never justified. There was a prevailing
opinion that they could not be stopped by land-batteries, or resisted
on water by anything else than vessels of their own class. Against
the first opinion General Richard Taylor, commanding in Louisiana,
south of Red River, stoutly contended, and maintained his opinion by
the repulse and capture of some of the enemy's vessels by
land-batteries having guns of rather light caliber.

One by one successful conflicts between river-boats and gunboats
impaired the estimate which had been put upon the latter. The most
illustrious example of this was the attack and capture of the
Indianola, a heavy ironclad, with two eleven-inch guns forward, and
two nine-inch aft, all in iron casemates. She had passed the
batteries at Vicksburg, and was in the section of the river between
Vicksburg and Port Hudson, which, in February, 1863, was the only
gate of communication which the Confederacy had between the east and
west sides of the Mississippi. The importance of keeping open this
communication, always great, became vital from the necessity of
drawing commissary's stores from the trans-Mississippi.

Major Brent, of General Taylor's staff, proposed, with the tow-boat
Webb, which had been furnished as a ram, and the Queen of the West,
which had been four or five days before captured by the land-battery
at Fort De Russy, to go to the Mississippi and attack the Indianola.
On the 19th of February the expedition started, though mechanics were
still working upon the needed repairs of the Queen of the West. The
service was so hazardous that volunteers only formed the crews, but
of these more offered than were wanted. On the 24th, while ascending
the Mississippi, Major Brent learned, when about sixty miles below
Vicksburg, that the Indianola was a short distance ahead, with a
coal-barge lashed on either side. He determined to attack in the
night, being assured that, if struck by a shell from one of the
eleven- or nine-inch guns, either of his boats would be destroyed. At
10 P.M. the Queen, followed by the Webb, was driven at full speed
directly upon the Indianola. The momentum of the Queen was so great
as to cut through the coal-barge, and indent the iron plates of the
Indianola. As the Queen backed out, the Webb dashed in at full speed,
and tore away the remaining coal-barge. Both the forward guns fired
at the Webb, but missed her. Again the Queen struck the Indianola,
abaft the paddle-box, crushing her frame and loosening some plates of
armor, but received the fire of the guns from the rear casemates. One
shot carried away a dozen bales of cotton on the right side; the
other, a shell, entered the forward port-hole and exploded, killing
six men and disabling two field-pieces. Again the Webb followed the
Queen, struck near the same spot, pushing aside the iron plates and
crushing timbers. Voices from the Indianola announced the surrender,
and that she was sinking. The river here sweeps the western shore,
and there was deep water up to the bank. General Grant's army was on
the west side of the river, and, for either or both of these reasons.
Major Brent towed the Indianola to the opposite side, where she sank
on a bar, her gun-deck above water. Both boats were much shattered in
the conflict, and Major Brent returned to the Red River to repair
them. A tender accompanied the Queen and the Webb, and a frail
river-boat without protection for her boilers, which was met on the
river, turned back and followed them, but, like the tender, could be
of no service in the battle. For these particulars I am indebted to
General Richard Taylor's book, "Destruction and Reconstruction,"
pages 123-125.

The ram Arkansas, which has been previously noticed as being under
construction at Memphis, was removed before she was finished to the
Yazoo River, events on the river above having rendered this necessary
for her security. After she was supposed to be ready for service,
Commander Brown, then as previously in charge of her, went down the
Yazoo to enter the Mississippi and proceed to Vicksburg. The enemy's
fleet of some twelve or thirteen rams, gunboats, and sloops of war,
were in the river above Vicksburg, and below the point where the
Yazoo enters the Mississippi. Anticipating the descent of the
Arkansas, a detachment had been made from this fleet to prevent her
exit. The annexed letter of Commander Brown describes what occurred
in the Yazoo River:

"STEAMER ARKANSAS, _July 15, 1862._

"GENERAL: The Benton, or whatever ironclad we disabled, was left with
colors down, evidently aground to prevent sinking, about one mile and
a half above the mouth of the Yazoo (in Old River), on the right-hand
bank, or bank across from Vicksburg.

"I wish it to be remembered that we whipped this vessel, made it run
out of the fight and haul down colors, with two less guns than they
had; and at the same time fought two rams, which were firing at us
with great guns and small-arms; this, too, with our miscellaneous
crew, who had never, for the most part, been on board a ship, or at
big guns.

"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"J. N. BROWN,

"_Lieutenant commanding._

"To Brigadier-General M. L. SMITH, _commanding defenses at
Vicksburg_."

When entering the Mississippi the fleet of the enemy was found
disposed as a phalanx, but the heroic commander of the Arkansas moved
directly against it; and, though in passing through this formidable
array he was exposed to the broadsides of the whole fleet, the vessel
received no other injury than from one eleven-inch shot which entered
the gun-room, and the perforation in many places of her smoke-stack.
The casualties to the crew were five killed, four wounded--among the
latter was the gallant commander. General Van Dorn, commanding the
department, in a dispatch from Vicksburg, July 15th, states the
number of the enemy's vessels above Vicksburg, pays a high compliment
to the officers and men, and adds:

"All the enemy's transports and all the vessels of war of the lower
fleet (i. e., the fleet just below Vicksburg), except a sloop of war,
have got up steam, and are off to escape from the Arkansas."

A vessel inspiring such dread is entitled to a special description.
She was an iron-clad steamer, one hundred feet in her length, her
armament ten Parrott guns, and her crew one hundred men, who had
volunteered from the land-forces for the desperate service proposed.
Her commander had been from his youth in the navy of the United
States, and his capacity was such as could well supplement whatever
was wanted of naval knowledge in his crew. The care and skill with
which the vessel had been constructed were tested and proved under
fire. Had her engines been equal to the hull and armor of the vessel,
it is difficult to estimate the value of the service she might have
performed. At this period the enemy occupied Baton Rouge, with
gunboats lying in front of it to coöperate with the troops in the
town. The importance of holding a section of the Mississippi, so as
to keep free communication between the eastern and western portions
of the Confederacy, has been heretofore noticed. To this end it was
deemed needful to recover the possession of Baton Rouge, and it was
decided to make a land-attack in coöperation with the Arkansas, to be
sent down against the enemy's fleet.

Major-General J. C. Breckinridge was assigned to the command of the
land-forces. This distinguished citizen and alike distinguished
soldier, surmounting difficulties which would have discouraged a less
resolute spirit, approached Baton Rouge, and moved to the attack at
the time indicated for the arrival of the Arkansas. In his address to
the officers and soldiers of his command, after the battle, viz., on
August 6, 1862, he compliments the troops on the fortitude with which
they had borne a severe march, on the manner in which they attacked
the enemy, superior in numbers and admirably posted, drove him from
his positions, taking his camps, and forcing him to seek protection
under cover of the guns of his fleet. Major-General Breckinridge
attributes his failure to achieve entire success to the inability of
the Arkansas to coöperate with his forces, and adds:

"You have given the enemy a severe and salutary lesson, and now those
who so lately were ravaging and plundering this region do not care to
extend their pickets beyond the sight of their fleet."

The Arkansas in descending the river moved leisurely, having ample
time to meet her appointment; but, when about fifteen miles above
Baton Rouge, her starboard engine broke down. Repairs were
immediately commenced, and, by 8 A.M. on the 5th of August, were
partially completed. General Breckinridge had commenced the attack at
four o'clock, and the Arkansas, though not in condition to engage the
enemy, moved on, and, when in sight of Baton Rouge, her starboard
engine again broke down, and the vessel was run ashore. The work of
repair was resumed, and next morning the Federal fleet was seen
coming up. The Arkansas was moored head down-stream and cleared for
action. The Essex approached and opened fire; at that moment the
engineers reported the engines able to work half a day. The lines
were cut, and the Arkansas started for the Essex, when the other--
the larboard--engine suddenly stopped, and the vessel was again
secured to the shore stern-down. The Essex now valiantly approached,
pouring a hot fire into her disabled antagonist. Lieutenant Stevens,
then commanding the Arkansas, ordered the crew ashore, fired the
vessel, and, with her flag flying, turned her adrift--a sacrificial
offering to the cause she had served so valiantly in her brief but
brilliant career. Lieutenant Reed, of the ram Arkansas, in his
published account of the affair, states, "After all hands were
ashore, the Essex fired upon the disabled vessel most furiously."

CHAPTER XXX.

To maintain the position assumed by the Confederate States as a
separate power among the nations, it was obviously necessary to have
a navy, not only for the defense of their coast, but also for the
protection of their commerce. These States, after their secession
from the Union, were in that regard in a destitute condition, similar
to that of the United States after their Declaration of Independence.

It has been shown that among the first acts of the Confederate
Administration was the effort to buy ships which could be used for
naval purposes. The policy of the United States Government being to
shut up our commerce rather than protect their own, induced the
wholesale purchase of the vessels found in the Northern ports--not
only such as could be made fit for cruisers, but also any which would
serve even for blockading purposes. There was little shipping of any
kind in the Southern ports, and to that scanty supply we were, for
the time, restricted.

A previous reference has been made to the Sumter, Commander Raphael
Semmes, but a more extended notice is considered due. Educated in the
naval service of the United States, Raphael Semmes had attained the
rank of commander, and was distinguished for his studious habits and
varied acquirements. When Alabama passed her ordinance of secession,
he was on duty at Washington as a member of the Lighthouse Board; he
promptly tendered his resignation, and, at the organization of the
Confederate Government, repaired to Montgomery and tendered his
services to it. The efforts which had been made to obtain steamers
suited to cruising against the enemy's commerce had been quite
unsuccessful, none being found which the naval officers charged with
their selection regarded fit for the service. One of the reports
described a small propeller-steamer of five hundred tons burden,
sea-going, low-pressure engine, sound, and capable of being so
strengthened as to carry an ordinary battery of four or five guns;
speed between nine and ten knots, but the board condemned her because
she could carry but five days' fuel, and had no accommodations for
the crew.

The Secretary of the Navy showed this to Commander Semmes, who said:
"Give me that ship; I think I can make her answer the purpose." She
was to be christened the Sumter, in commemoration of our first
victory, and had the honor of being the first ship of war
commissioned by the Confederate States, and the first to display the
Stars and Bars of the Confederacy on the high-seas. The Sumter was at
New Orleans, to which place Commander Semmes repaired; and, as
forcibly presenting the difficulties under which we labored in all
attempts to create a navy, I will quote from his memoirs the account
of his effort to get the Sumter ready for sea:

"I now took my ship actively in hand and set gangs of mechanics at
work to remove her upper cabins and other top hamper, preparatory to
making the necessary alterations. These latter were considerable, and
I soon found that I had a tedious job on my hands. It was no longer
the case, as it had been in former years, when I had had occasion to
fit out a ship, that I could go into a navy-yard, with well-provided
workshops and skilled workmen, ready with all the requisite materials
at hand to execute my orders. Everything had to be improvised, from
the manufacture of a water-tank to the kids and cans of the
berth-deck messes, and from a gun-carriage to a friction-primer. . . .
Two long, tedious months were consumed in making alterations and
additions. My battery was to consist of an eight-inch-shell gun, to
be pivoted amidships, and of four light thirty-two-pounders of
thirteen hundred weight each, in broadside."

On the 3d of June, 1861, the Sumter was formally put in commission,
and a muster-roll of the officers and men transmitted to the Navy
Department. On the 18th of June she left New Orleans and steamed down
and anchored near the mouth of the river. While lying at the head of
the passes, the commander reported a blockading squadron outside, of
three ships at Passe a l'Outre, and one at the Southwest Pass. The
Brooklyn, at Passe a l'Outre, was not only a powerful vessel, but she
had greater speed than the Sumter. The Powhatan's heavy armament made
it very hazardous to pass her in daylight, and the absence of buoys
and lights made it next to impossible to keep the channel in
darkness. The Sumter, therefore, had been compelled to lie at the
head of the passes and watch for some opportunity in the absence of
either the Brooklyn or the Powhatan to get to sea. Fortunately,
neither of these vessels came up to the head of the passes, where,
there being but a single channel, it would have been easy to prevent
the exit of the Sumter.

On the 30th of June, one bright morning, a boatman reported that the
Brooklyn had gone off in chase of a sail. Immediately the Sumter was
got under way, when it was soon discovered that the Brooklyn was
returning, and that the two vessels were about equally distant from
the bar. By steady courage and rare seamanship the Sumter escaped
from her more swift pursuer, and entered on her career of cutting the
enemy's sinews of war by destroying his commerce.

Numerous armed vessels of the enemy were hovering on our coast, yet
this one little cruiser created a general alarm, and, though a
regularly commissioned vessel of the Confederacy, was habitually
denounced as a "pirate," and the many threats to destroy her served
only to verify the adage that the threatened live long.

During her cruise up to January 17, 1862, she captured three ships,
five brigs, six barks, and three schooners, but the property
destroyed formed a very small part of the damage done to the enemy's
commerce. Her appearance on the seas created such alarm that Northern
ships were, to a large extent, put under foreign flags, and the
carrying-trade, in which the United States stood second only to Great
Britain, passed rapidly into other hands. The Sumter, while doing all
this mischief, was nearly self-sustaining, her running expenses to
the Confederate Government being but twenty-eight thousand dollars
when, at the close of 1861, she arrived at Gibraltar. Not being able
to obtain coal, she remained there until sold.

Captain James D. Bullock, an officer of the old navy, of high ability
as a seaman, and of an integrity which stood the test under which a
less stern character might have given way, was our naval agent at
Liverpool. In his office he disbursed millions, and, when there was
no one to whom he could be required to render an account, paid out
the last shilling in his hands, and confronted poverty without
prospect of other reward than that which he might find id a clear
conscience. He contracted with the Messrs. Laird, of Birkenhead, to
build a strong steam merchant-ship--the same which was afterward
christened "The Alabama" when, in a foreign port, she had received
her armament and crew. So much of puerile denunciation has been
directed against the builder and the ship, which, in the virulent
language of the day, our enemies denominated a "pirate," that the
case claims at my hands a somewhat extended notice.

The senior Mr. Laird was a member of the British Parliament, and,
because of the complaints made by the United States Government, and
the abuse heaped upon him by the Northern newspapers, he made a
speech in the House of Commons, in which he stated that, in 1861, he
was applied to to build vessels for the Northern Government, first,
by personal application, and subsequently by a letter from
Washington, asking him, on the part of the United States Navy
Department, to give the terms on which he would build an iron-plated
ship, "to be finished complete, with guns and everything
appertaining." Mr. Laird continued: "On the 14th of August I received
another letter from the same gentleman, from which the following is
an extract: 'I have this morning a note from the Assistant-Secretary
of the Navy, in which he says, "I hope your friends will tender for
the two iron-plated steamers."'" Mr. Laird then said that, while he
would not give the name of his correspondent, who was a gentleman of
the highest respectability, he was willing, in confidence, to submit
the original letters to the Speaker of the House or the first
Minister of the Crown; that, as "the American Government is making so
much work about other parties whom they charge with violating or
evading the law, when in reality they have not done so, I think it
only right to state these facts."

Those who have listened with credulity to the abuse of the
Confederate Government, as well as that of Great Britain, the one for
contracting for the building of the Alabama and the other for
permitting her to leave a British port, will thus see how little of
sincerity there was in the complaints of the United States
Government. For more than a generation the British people have been
the great ship-builders of the world, and it is a matter of surprise
that they should have given respectful consideration to charges of a
breach of neutrality because they allowed a merchantman to be built
in one of their ports and to leave it without any armament or crew,
which could have enabled it, in that condition, to make war upon a
country with which Great Britain was at peace.

Referring to the Alabama, as she was when she left the Mersey, Mr.
Laird said:

"If a ship without guns and without arms is a dangerous article,
surely rifled guns and ammunition of all sorts are equally and even
more dangerous. I have referred to the bills of entry in the
custom-houses of London and Liverpool, and I find that there have
been vast shipments of implements of war to the Northern States
through the celebrated houses of Baring & Co.; Brown, Shipley & Co.;
and a variety of other names. . . . I have obtained from the official
custom-house returns some details of the sundries exported from the
United Kingdom to the Northern States of America from the 1st of May,
1861, to the 31st of December, 1862.
There were--muskets, 41,500; rifles, 341,000; gun-flints, 26,500;
percussion-caps, 49,982,000; and swords, 2,250. The best information
I could obtain leads me to believe that one third to a half may be
added to these numbers for items which have been shipped to the
Northern States as hardware . . . so that, if the Southern States
have got two ships unarmed, unfit for any purpose of warfare--for
they procured their armament somewhere else--the Northern States
have been well supplied from this country, through the agency of some
most influential persons."

The speech of Mr. Laird, exposing the hypocrisy of the
representations which had been made, as well by commercial bodies as
by the highest officers of the United States, called forth repeated
cheers from the Parliament.

There had been no secrecy about the building of the Alabama. The same
authority above quoted states that she was frequently visited while
under construction, and it is known that the British Government was
applied to to prevent her from leaving port. It was feared that she
might be delayed; but it was not considered possible that British
authorities would prevent an unarmed merchant-ship from leaving her
coast, lest she might elsewhere procure an armament, and, in the
service of a recognized belligerent, revive the terror in the other
belligerent which the little Sumter had recently inspired.

When the Alabama was launched and ready for sea, Captain Bullock
summoned Captain Semmes, lately commander of the Sumter, to
Liverpool, where he spent a few days in financial arrangements, and
in collecting the old officers of the Sumter. The Alabama, then known
as the 290, had proceeded a few days before to her rendezvous, the
Portuguese Island of Terceira, one of the group of the Azores. The
story that the name 290 belonged to the fact that she had been built
by two hundred and ninety Englishmen, sympathizers in our struggle,
was a mere fiction. She was built under a contract with the
Confederate States, and paid for with Confederate money. She happened
to be the two hundred and ninetieth ship built by the Lairds, and,
not having been christened, was called 290. Captain Semmes followed
her, accompanied by Captain Bullock on the steamer Bahama, and found
her at the place of rendezvous, also a sailing-ship which had been
dispatched before the Alabama with her battery and stores. Captain
Semmes, with a sailor's enthusiasm, describes his first impression on
seeing the ship which was to be his future home. The defects of the
Sumter had been avoided, so that he found his new ship "a perfect
steamer and a perfect sailing-ship, at the same time neither of her
two modes of locomotion being at all dependent upon the other. . . .
She was about nine hundred tons burden, two hundred and thirty feet
in length, thirty-two feet in breadth, twenty feet in depth, and
drew, when provisioned and coaled for a cruise, fifteen feet of
water. Her model was of the most perfect symmetry, and she sat upon
the water with the lightness and grace of a swan." She was yet only a
merchant-ship, and the men on board of her, as well as those who came
out with the Captain on the Bahama, were only under articles for the
voyage. She therefore had no crew for future service. When her
armament and stores had been put on board, she steamed from the
harbor out to the open sea, where she was to be christened and put in
commission. Captain Bullock went out on her and stood sponsor at the
ceremony. He had just cause to be proud of the ship, and we to be
thankful to him for the skill and care with which he had designed her
and supervised her construction. The scantling of the vessel was
comparatively light, having been intended for a scourge to the
enemy's commerce rather than for battle, and merely to defend herself
if it became necessary. Her masts were proportioned so as to carry
large canvas, and her engine was of three hundred horse-power, with
an apparatus for condensing vapor to supply the crew with all the
fresh water requisite. The coal, stores, and armament having been
received from the supply-ships, she steamed out to sea on Sunday
morning, August 24, 1862. There, more than a marine league from the
shore, on the blue water over which man holds no empire, Captain
Semmes read the commission of the President of the Confederacy
appointing him a captain, and the order of the Secretary of the Navy
assigning him to the command of the Alabama. There, where no
government held jurisdiction, where the commission of the Confederacy
was as valid as that of any power, the Alabama was christened, and
was henceforth a ship of war in the navy of the Confederate States.
The men who had come thus far under articles no longer binding were
left to their option whether to be paid off with a free passage to
Liverpool, or to enlist in the crew of the Alabama. Eighty of the men
who had come out in the several vessels enrolled themselves in the
usual manner. Captain Semmes had a full complement of officers, and
with this, though less than the authorized crew, he commenced his
long and brilliant cruise. The ship's armament consisted of six
thirty-two-pounders in broadsides and two pivot-guns amidships, one
of them a smooth-bore eight-inch, the other a hundred-pounder rifled
Blakely.

Captain Semmes, from his varied knowledge of affairs both on sea and
land, did not sail by chance in quest of adventure, but directed his
course to places where the greatest number of the enemy's merchantmen
were likely to be found, and to this the large number of captures he
made is in no small degree attributable. On board one of the ships
captured they got New York papers, from which he learned that General
Banks, with a large fleet of transports, was to sail on a certain day
for Galveston. On this he decided to go to the rendezvous appointed
for his coal-ship, and make all due preparation for a dash into the
fleet when they should arrive at the harbor of Galveston, and
therefore directed his course into the Gulf of Mexico.

In the mean time General Magruder had recaptured Galveston, so that
on his arrival the lookout informed him that, instead of a fleet,
there were five ships of war blockading the harbor and throwing
shells into the town, from which his keen perception drew the proper
conclusion that we had possession of the town, and that he was
confronted by ships of war, not transports laden with troops. As each
of the five ships observed by the lookout were supposed to be larger
than his own, he had of course no disposition to run into that fleet.
It therefore only remained to tempt one of the ships to follow him
beyond supporting distance. The hope was soon realized, as a vessel
was seen to come out from the fleet. The Alabama was under sail, and
Captain Semmes says: "To carry out my design of decoying the enemy, I
now wore ship as though I were fleeing from his pursuit, and lowered
the propeller into the water. When about twenty miles from the fleet,
the Alabama was prepared for action, and wheeled to meet her pursuer.
To the first hail made, the answer from the Alabama was, 'This is her
Britannic Majesty's steamer Petrel,' and the answer was, 'This is the
United States ship, ------' name not heard." Captain Semmes then
directed the first lieutenant to call out through his trumpet, "This
is the Confederate States steamer Alabama." A broadside was instantly
returned by the enemy. Captain Semmes describes the state of the
atmosphere as highly favorable to the conduct of sound, and the wind
blowing in the direction of the enemy's fleet. The Federal Admiral,
as afterward learned, immediately got under way with the Brooklyn and
two others of his steamers to go to the rescue. The crews of both
ships must have been standing at their guns, as the broadsides so
instantly followed each other. In thirteen minutes after firing the
first gun the enemy hoisted a light and fired an off-gun as a signal
that he had been beaten. Captain Semmes steamed quite close to the
Hatteras and asked if he had surrendered; then, if he was in want of
assistance. An affirmative answer was given to both questions. The
boats of the Alabama were lowered with such promptitude and handled
with such care that, though the Hatteras was sunk at night, none of
her crew were drowned. When her captain came on board, Captain Semmes
learned that he had been engaged with the United States steamer
Hatteras, "a larger ship than the Alabama by one hundred tons," with
an equal number of guns, and a crew numbering two less than that of
the Alabama. There was a "considerable disparity between the two
ships in the weight of their pivot-guns, and the Alabama ought to
have won the fight, which she did in thirteen minutes." The Alabama
had received no appreciable injury, and, continuing her cruise to the
Island of Jamaica, entered the harbor of Port Royal, where, by the
permission of the authorities. Captain Semmes landed his prisoners,
putting them on parole.

As an answer to the stereotyped charges against Captain Semmes as a
"pirate" and robber, I will select from the many unarmed ships
captured by him one case. He had gone to the track of the California
steamers between Aspinwall and New York, in the hope of capturing a
vessel homeward bound with Government treasure. On the morning before
such a vessel was expected, a large steamer, the Ariel, was seen, but
unfortunately not going in the right direction. An exciting chase
occurred, when she was finally brought to, but, instead of the
million of dollars in her safe, she was outward bound, with a large
number of women and children on board. A boarding officer was sent on
her, and returned, giving an account of great alarm, especially among
the ladies. Captain Semmes sent a lieutenant on board to assure them
that they had "fallen into the hands of Southern gentlemen, under
whose protection the were entirely safe." Among the passengers were a
battalion of marines and some army and navy officers. These were all
paroled, rank and file numbering one hundred and forty, and the
vessel was released on ransom-bond. Captain Semmes states that there
were five hundred passengers on board. It is fair to presume that
each passenger had with him a purse of from three to five hundred
dollars. Under the laws of war all this money would have been good
prize, but not one dollar of it was touched, or indeed so much as a
passenger's baggage examined.

The Alabama now proceeded to run down the Spanish Main, thence bore
eastward into the Indian Ocean, and, after a cruise into every sea
where a blow at American commerce could be struck, came around the
Cape of Good Hope, and, sailing north, ran up to the thirtieth
parallel, where so many captures had been made at a former time. Of
the ship at this date Captain Semmes wrote: "The poor old Alabama was
not now what she had been then. She was like the wearied fox-hound,
limping back after a long chase, foot-sore, and longing for quiet
repose."

She had, in her mission to cripple the enemy's commerce and cut his
sinews of war, captured sixty-three vessels, among them one of the
enemy's gunboats, the Hatteras, sunk in battle, had released nine
under ransom-bond, and had paroled all prisoners taken.

All neutral ports being closed against her prizes, the rest of the
vessels were, of necessity, burned at sea. Much complaint was made on
account of the burning of these merchantmen, though very little
reflection would have taught the complainants that the interests of
the captor would have induced him to save the vessels, and send them
into the nearest port for condemnation as prizes; and, therefore,
whatever grievance existed was the result of the blockade and of the
rule which prevented the captures from being sent into a neutral port
to await the decision of a prize court.

On the morning of the 11th of June, 1864, the Alabama entered the
harbor of Cherbourg. "An officer was sent to call on the port
admiral, and ask leave to land the prisoners from the last two ships
captured; this was readily granted." The next day Captain Semmes went
on shore to consult the port admiral "in relation to docking and
repairing" the Alabama. As there were only government docks at
Cherbourg, the application had to be referred to the Emperor. Before
an answer was received, the Kearsarge steamed into the harbor, sent a
boat ashore, and then ran out and took her station off the
breakwater. Captain Semmes learned that the boat from the Kearsarge
sent on shore had borne a request that the prisoners discharged from
the Alabama might be delivered to the Kearsarge. It will be
remembered that the Government of the United States, in many harsh
and unjust phrases, had refused to recognize the Alabama as a ship of
war, and held that the paroles given to her were void. This request
was therefore regarded by Captain Semmes as an attempt to recruit for
the Kearsarge from the prisoners lately landed by the Alabama, and he
so presented the facts to the port admiral, who rejected the
application from the Kearsarge.

Captain Semmes sent notice to Captain Winslow, of the Kearsarge,
whose presence in the offing was regarded as a challenge, that, if he
would wait until the Alabama could receive some coal on board, she
would come out and give him battle.

As has been shown by extracts previously made, Captain Semmes knew
that, after his long cruise, the Alabama needed to go into dock for
repairs. It had not been possible for him, on account of the rigid
enforcement of "neutrality," to replenish his ammunition. Unless the
niter is more thoroughly purified than is usually, if ever, done by
those who manufacture for an open market, it is sure to retain
nitrate of soda, and the powder, of which it is the important
ingredient, to deteriorate by long exposure to a moist atmosphere.
The Kearsarge was superior to the Alabama in size, and, having in
stanchness of construction, her armament was also greater, the latter
being measured, not by the number of guns, but by the amount of metal
she could throw at a broadside. The crew of the Kearsarge, all told,
was one hundred and sixty-two; that of the Alabama, one hundred and
forty-nine. Captain Semmes says: "Still the disparity was not so
great but that I might hope to beat my enemy in a fair fight. But he
did not show me a fair fight, for, as it afterward turned out, his
ship was iron-clad." This expression "iron-clad" refers to the fact
that the Kearsarge had chains on her sides, which Captain Semmes
describes as concealed by planking, the forward and after ends of
which so accorded with the lines of the ship as not to be detected by
telescopic observation. Many of that class of critics whose wisdom is
only revealed after the event have blamed Captain Semmes for going
out under the circumstances. Like most other questions, there are two
sides to this. If he had gone into dock for repairs, the time
required would have resulted in the dispersion of his crew, and, from
the known improvidence of sailors, it would have been more than
doubtful whether they could have been reassembled. It was, moreover,
probable that other vessels would have been sent to aid the Kearsarge
in effectually blockading the port, so that, if his crew had
returned, the only chance would have been to escape through the
guarding fleet. Proud of his ship, and justly confiding in his crew,
surely something will be conceded to the Confederate spirit so often
exhibited and so often triumphant over disparity of force.

On the 19th of June, 1864, the Alabama left the harbor of Cherbourg
to engage the Kearsarge, which had been lying off and on the port for
several days previously. Captain Semmes in his report of the
engagement writes:

"After the lapse of about one hour and ten minutes, our ship was
ascertained to be in a sinking condition . . . to reach the French
coast, I gave the ship all steam, and set such of the fore and aft
sails as were available. The ship filled so rapidly, however, that,
before we had made much progress, the fires were extinguished. I now
hauled down my colors, and dispatched a boat to inform the enemy of
our condition. Although we were now but four hundred yards from each
other, the enemy fired upon me five times after my colors had been
struck. It is charitable to suppose that a ship of war, of a
Christian nation, could not have done this intentionally."

Captain Semmes states that, his waist-boats having been torn to
pieces, he sent the wounded, and such of the boys of the ship as
could not swim, in his quarter-boats, off to the enemy's ship, and,
as there was no appearance of any boat coming from the enemy, the
crew, as previously instructed, jumped overboard, each to save
himself if he could. All the wounded--twenty-one--were saved; ten
of the crew were ascertained to have been drowned. Captain Semmes
stood on the quarter-deck until his ship was settling to go down,
then threw his sword into the sea, there to lie buried with the ship
he loved so well, and leaped from the deck just in time to avoid
being drawn down into the vortex created by her sinking. He and many
of his crew were picked up by a humane English gentleman in the boats
of his yacht, the Deerhound. Others were saved by two French
pilot-boats which were near the scene. The remainder, it is hoped,
were picked up by the enemy. Captain Semmes states in his official
report, two days after the battle, that about the time of his rescue
by the Deerhound the "Kearsarge sent one and then tardily another
boat." The reader is invited to compare this with the conduct of
Captain Semmes when he sank the Hatteras, and when, though it was in
the night, by ranging up close to her, and promptly using all his
boats, he saved her entire crew.

Mention has been made of the defective ammunition of the Alabama, and
in that connection I quote the following passage from Captain
Semmes's book, on which I have so frequently and largely drawn for
facts in regard to the Sumter and the Alabama (pages 761, 762):

"I lodged a rifle percussion shell near to her [the Kearsarge's]
sternpost--where there were no chains--which failed to explode
because of the defect of the cap. If the cap had performed its duty,
and exploded the shell, I should have been called upon to save
Captain Winslow's crew from drowning, instead of his being called
upon to save mine."

As it appears by the same authority that the Kearsarge had greater
speed than the Alabama, it followed that, though the Captain of the
Kearsarge might have closed with and boarded the Alabama, the Captain
of the Alabama could not board the Kearsarge, unless by consent.

The Alabama, built like a merchant-ship, sailed in peaceful garb from
British waters, on a far-distant sea received her crew and armament,
fitted for operations against the enemy's commerce. On "blue-water"
she was christened, and in the same she was buried. She lived the
pride of her friends and the terror of her enemies. She went out to
fight a wooden vessel and was sunk by one clad in secret armor. Those
rescued by the Deerhound from the water were landed at Southampton,
England.

The United States Government then, through its minister, Mr. Charles
Francis Adams, made the absurd demand of the English Government that
they should be delivered up to her as escaped prisoners. To this
demand Lord John Russell replied as follows:

"With regard to the demand made by you, by instructions from your
Government, that those officers and men should now be delivered up to
the Government of the United States, as being escaped prisoners of
war, her Majesty's Government would beg to observe that there is no
obligation by international law which can bind the government of a
neutral state to deliver up to a belligerent prisoners of war who may
have escaped from the power of such belligerent, and may have taken
refuge within the territory of such neutral. Therefore, even if her
Majesty's Government had any power, by law, to comply with the
above-mentioned demand, her Majesty's Government could not do so
without being guilty of a violation of the duties of hospitality. In
point of fact, however, her Majesty's Government have no lawful power
to arrest and deliver up the persons in question. They have been
guilty of no offense against the laws of England, and they have
committed no act which would bring them within the provisions of a
treaty between Great Britain and the United States for the surrender
of the offenders; and her Majesty's Government are, therefore,
entirely without any legal means by which, even if they wished to do
so, they could comply with your above-mentioned demand."

It will be observed that her Majesty's Minister mercifully forbore to
expose the pretensions that "the persons in question" had been
prisoners, and confined his answer to the case as it would have been
had that allegation been true. There are other points in this
transaction which will be elsewhere presented.

The Oreto, which sailed from Liverpool about the 23d of March, 1862,
was, while under construction at Liverpool, the subject of diplomatic
correspondence and close scrutiny by the customs officers. After her
arrival off Nassau, upon representations by the United States consul
at that port, she was detained and again examined, and, it being
found that she had none of the character of a vessel of war, she was
released. Captain Maffitt, who had gone out with a cargo of cotton,
here received a letter which authorized him to take charge of the
Oreto and get her promptly to sea. She was a steamer of two hundred
and fifty horse-power, tonnage five hundred and sixty, bark-rigged;
speed, under steam, eight to nine knots; with sail, in a fresh
breeze, fourteen knots; crew twenty-two, all told. The United States
Minister, Mr. Adams, had made a report to the British Government,
which, it was apprehended, would cause her seizure at once. This was
soon done, and with great difficulty the vessel was saved to the
Confederacy by her commander. She arrived at Nassau on the 28th of
April, and was detained until the session of the Admiralty Court in
August. As soon as discharged by the proceedings therein, she sailed
for the uninhabited island "Green Kay," ninety miles to the southward of
Providence Island, with a tender in tow having equipments provided by
a Confederate merchant, where she anchored the next day, and
proceeded to take on board her military armament sent out on the
tender. She now became a ship of the Confederate Navy, and was
christened Florida. Her long detention in Nassau had caused the ship
to be infected with yellow fever, and, as she had no surgeon on
board, the vessel was directed to the Island of Cuba, and ran into
the harbor of Cardenas for aid. The crew was reduced to one fireman
and two seamen, and eventually the Captain was prostrated by the
fever. The Governor of Cardenas, under his view of the neutrality
proclaimed by his Government, refused to send a physician aboard, and
warned the steamer that she must leave in twenty-four hours.
Lieutenant Stribling, executive officer of the ship, had been sent to
Havana to report her condition to the Captain-General, Marshal
Serrano. That chivalrous gentleman, soldier, and statesman, at once
invited the ship to the hospitalities of the harbor of Havana,
whither she repaired and received the kindness which her forlorn
situation required.

On the 1st of September, 1862, the vessel left Havana to obtain a
crew; and, to complete her equipment, which was so imperfect that her
guns could not all be used, the vessel was directed to the harbor of
Mobile. On approaching that harbor she found several blockading
vessels on the station, and boldly ran through them, escaping, with
considerable injury to her masts and rigging, to the friendly shelter
of Fort Morgan, where, while in quarantine, Lieutenant Stribling was
attacked with fever and died. He was an officer of great merit, and
his loss was much regretted, not only by his many personal friends,
but by all who foresaw the useful service he could render to his
country if his life were prolonged. Under the disadvantages of being
an infected ship and remote from the workshops, repairs were
commenced, and the equipment of the ship completed.

In the mean time the blockading squadron had been increased, with the
boastful announcement that the cruiser should be "hermetically
sealed" in the harbor of Mobile. Some impatience was manifested after
the vessel was ready for sea that she did not immediately go out, but
Captain Maffitt, with sound judgment and nautical skill, decided to
wait for a winter storm and a dark night before attempting to pass
through the close investment. When the opportunity offered, he
steamed out into a rough sea and a fierce north wind. As he passed
the blockading squadron he was for the first time discovered, when a
number of vessels gave chase, and continued the pursuit throughout
the night and the next day. In the next evening all except the two
fastest had hauled off, and, as night again closed in, the smoke and
canvas of the Florida furnished their only guide. Captain Maffitt
thus describes the ruse by which he finally escaped: "The canvas was
secured in long, neat bunts to the yards, and the engines were
stopped. Between high, toppling seas, clear daylight was necessary to
enable them to distinguish our low hull. In eager pursuit the
Federals swiftly passed us, and we jubilantly bade the enemy good
night, and steered to the northward." She was now fairly on the
high-seas, and after long and vexatious delays entered on her mission
to cruise against the enemy's commerce. She commenced her captures in
the Gulf of Mexico, then progressed through the Gulf of Florida to
the latitude of New York, and thence to the equator, continuing to 12
deg. south, and returned again within thirty miles of New York. When
near Cape St. Roque, Captain Maffitt captured a Baltimore brig, the
Clarence, and fitted her out as a tender. He placed on her Lieutenant
C. W. Read, commander, fourteen men, armed with muskets, pistols, and
a twelve-pound howitzer. The instructions were to proceed to the
coast of America, to cruise against the enemy's commerce. Under these
orders he destroyed many Federal vessels. Of him Captain Maffitt
wrote: "Daring, even beyond the point of martial prudence, he entered
the harbor of Portland at midnight, and captured the revenue cutter
Caleb Cushing; but, instead of instantly burning her, ran her out of
the harbor; being thus delayed, he was soon captured by a Federal
expedition sent out against him." While under the command of Captain
Maffitt, the Florida, with her tenders, captured some fifty-five
vessels, many of which were of great value. The Florida being built
of light timbers, her very active cruising had so deranged her
machinery, that it was necessary to go into some friendly harbor for
repairs. Captain Maffitt says: "I selected Brest, and, the Government
courteously consenting to the Florida having the facilities of the
navy-yard, she was promptly docked." The effects of the yellow fever
from which he had suffered and the fatigue attending his subsequent
service had so exhausted his strength that he asked to be relieved
from command of the ship. In compliance with this request, Captain C.
M. Morris was ordered to relieve him.

After completing all needful repairs, Captain Morris proceeded to sea
and sighted the coast of Virginia, where he made a number of
important captures. Turning from that locality he crossed the
equator, destroying the commerce of the Northern States on his route
to Bahia. Here he obtained coal, and also had some repairs done to
the engines, when the United States steamship Wachusett entered the
harbor. Not knowing what act of treachery might be attempted by her
commander on the first night after his arrival, the Florida was kept
in a watchful condition for battle.

This belligerent demonstration in the peaceful harbor of a neutral
power alarmed both the governor and the admiral, who demanded
assurances that the sovereignty of Brazil and its neutrality should
be strictly observed by both parties. The pledge was given. In the
evening, with a chivalric belief in the honor of the United States
commander, Captain Morris unfortunately permitted a majority of his
officers to accompany him to the opera, and also allowed two thirds
of the crew to visit the shore on leave. About one o'clock in the
morning the Wachusett was surreptitiously got under way, and her
commander, with utter abnegation of his word of honor, ran into the
Florida, discharging his battery and boarding her. The few officers
on board and small number of men were unable to resist this
unexpected attack, and the Florida fell an easy prey to this covert
and dishonorable assault. She was towed to sea amid the execrations
of the Brazilian forces, army and navy, who, completely taken by
surprise, fired a few ineffectual shots at the infringer upon the
neutrality of the hospitable port of Bahia. The Confederate was taken
to Hampton Roads.

Brazil instantly demanded her restoration intact to her late
anchorage in Bahia. Mr. Lincoln was confronted by a protest from the
different representatives of the courts of Europe, denouncing this
extraordinary breach of national neutrality, which placed the
Government of the United States in a most unenviable position. Mr.
Seward, with his usual diplomatic insincerity and Machiavellianism,
characteristically prevaricated, while he plotted with a
distinguished admiral as to the most adroit method of disposing of
the "elephant." The result of these plottings was that an engineer
was placed in charge of the stolen steamer, with positive orders to
"open her sea-cock at midnight, and not to leave the engine-room
until the water was up to his chin, as at sunrise _the Florida must
be at the bottom_." The following note was sent to the Brazilian
_chargé d'affaires_ by Mr. Seward:

"While awaiting the representations of the Brazilian Government, on
the 28th of November she [the Florida] sank, owing to a leak, which
could not be seasonably stopped. The leak was at first represented to
have been caused, or at least increased, by collision with a
war-transport. Orders were immediately given to ascertain the manner
and circumstances of the occurrence. It seemed to affect the army and
navy. A naval court of inquiry and also a military court of inquiry
were charged with the investigation. The naval court has submitted
its report, and a copy thereof is herewith communicated. The military
court is yet engaged. So soon as its labors shall have ended, the
result will be made known to your Government. In the mean time it is
assumed that the loss of the Florida was in consequence of some
unforeseen accident, which casts no responsibility on the Government
of the United States."

The restitution of the ship having thus become impossible, the
President expressed his regret that "the sovereignty of Brazil had
been violated; dismissed the consul at Bahia, who had advised the
offense; and sent the commander of the Wachusett before a
court-martial." [58]

The commander of the Wachusett experienced no annoyance, and was soon
made an admiral.

The Georgia was the next Confederate cruiser that Captain Bullock
succeeded in sending forth. She was of five hundred and sixty tons,
and fitted out on the coast of France. Her commander, W. L. Maury,
Confederate States Navy, cruised in the North and South Atlantic with
partial success. The capacity of the vessel in speed and other
essentials was entirely inadequate to the service for which she was
designed. She proceeded as far as the Cape of Good Hope, and
returned, after having captured seven ships and two barks. Then she
was laid up and sold.

The Shenandoah, once the Sea King, was purchased by Captain Bullock,
and placed under the command of Lieutenant-commanding J. J. Waddell,
who fitted her for service under many difficulties at the barren
island of Porto Santo, near Madeira. After experiencing great
annoyances, through the activity of the American consul at Melbourne,
Australia, Captain Waddell finally departed, and commenced an active
and effective cruise against American shipping in the Okhotak Sea and
Arctic Ocean. In August, 1865, hearing of the close of the war, he
ceased his pursuit of United States commerce, sailed for Liverpool,
England, and surrendered his ship to the English Government, which
transferred it to the Government of the United States. The Shenandoah
was a full-rigged ship of eight hundred tons, very fast under
canvass. Her steam-power was merely auxiliary.

This was the last but not the first appearance of the Confederate
flag in Great Britain; the first vessel of the Confederate Government
which unfurled it there was the swift, light steamer Nashville, E. B.
Pegram, commander. Having been constructed as a passenger-vessel, and
mainly with reference to speed and the light draught suited to the
navigation of the Southern harbors, she was quite too frail for war
purposes and too slightly armed for combat.

On her passage to Europe and back, she, nevertheless, destroyed two
merchantmen. Nearing the harbor on her return voyage, she found it
blockaded, and a heavy vessel lying close on her track. Her daring
commander headed directly for the vessel, and ran so close under her
guns that she was not suspected in her approach, and had passed so
far before the guns could be depressed to bear upon her that none of
the shots took effect. Being little more than a shell, a single shot
would have sunk her; and she was indebted to the address of her
commander and the speed of his vessel for her escape. Wholly unsuited
for naval warfare, this voyage terminated her career.

A different class of vessels than those adapted to the open sea was
employed for coastwise cruising. In the month of July, 1864, a swift
twin-screw propeller called the Atlanta, of six hundred tons burden,
was purchased by the Secretary of the Navy, and fitted out in the
harbor of Wilmington, North Carolina, for a cruise against the
commerce of the Northern States. Commander J. Taylor Wood, an officer
of extraordinary ability and enterprise, was ordered to command her,
and her name was changed to "The Tallahassee." This extemporaneous
man-of-war ran safely through the blockade, and soon lit up the New
England coast with her captures, which consisted of two ships, four
brigs, four barks, and twenty schooners. Great was the consternation
among Northern merchants. The construction of the Tallahassee
exclusively for steam made her dependent on coal; her cruise was of
course brief, but brilliant while it lasted.

About the same time another fast double-screw propeller of five
hundred and eighty-five tons, called the Edith, ran into Wilmington,
North Carolina, and the Navy Department requiring her services,
bought her and gave to her the name of "Chickamauga." A suitable
battery was placed on board, with officers and crew, and Commander
John Wilkinson, a gentleman of consummate naval ability, was ordered
to command her. When ready for sea, he ran the blockade under the
bright rays of a full moon. Strange to say, the usually alert
sentinels neither hailed nor halted her. Like the Tallahassee, though
partially rigged for sailing, she was exclusively dependent upon
steam in the chase, escape, and in all important evolutions. She
captured seven vessels, despite the above-noticed defects.

[Footnote 58: M. Bernard's "Neutrality of Great Britain during the American
Civil War."]

CHAPTER XXXI.

The excitement produced in the Northern States by the effective
operations of our cruisers upon their commerce was such as to receive
the attention of the United States Government. Reasonably, it might
have been expected that they would send their ships of war out on the
high-seas to protect their commerce by capturing or driving off our
light cruisers, but, instead of this, their fleets were employed in
blockading the Confederate ports, or watching those in the West
Indies, from which blockade-runners were expected to sail, and, by
capturing which, either on the high-seas or at the entrance of a
Confederate port, a harvest of prizes might be secured. For this
dereliction of duty, in the failure to protect commerce, no better
reason offers itself than greed and malignity. There was, however, in
this connection, a more humiliating feature in the conduct of the
United States Government.

While, from its State Department, the Confederacy was denounced as an
insurrection soon to be suppressed, and the cruisers, regularly
commissioned by the Confederate States, were called "pirates,"
diplomatic demands were made upon Great Britain to prevent the
so-called "pirates" from violating international law, as if it
applied to pirates. Appeals to that Government were also made to
prevent the sale of the materials of war to the Confederacy, and thus
indirectly to aid the United States in performing what, according to
the representation, was a police duty, to suppress a combination of
some evil-disposed persons--gallantly claiming that they, armed
_cap-a-pie_, should meet their adversary in the list, he to be
without helmet, shield, or lance.

To one who from youth to age had seen, with exultant pride, the flag
of his country as it unfolded, disclosing to view the stripes
recordant of the original size of the family of States, and the
Constellation, which told of that family's growth, it could but be
deeply mortifying to witness such paltry exhibition of deception and
unmanliness in the representatives of a Government around which fond
memories still linger, despite the perversion of which it was the
subject.

If this attempt, on the part of the United States, to deny the
existence of war after having, by proclamation of blockade, compelled
all nations to take notice that war did exist, and to claim that
munitions should not be sold to a country because there were some
disorderly people in it, had been all, the attempt would have been
ludicrously absurd, and the contradiction too bald to require
refutation; but this would have been but half of the story.
Subsequently the United States Government claimed reclamation from
Great Britain for damage inflicted by vessels which had been built in
her ports, and which had elsewhere been armed and equipped for
purposes of war. International law recognizes the right of a neutral
to sell an unarmed vessel, without reference to the use to which the
purchaser might subsequently apply it. The United States Government
had certainly not practiced under a different rule, but had gone even
further than this--so much further as to transgress the prohibition
against armed vessels.

It has already been stated that the Government of the United States,
at the commencement of the war, sought to contract for the
construction of iron-plated vessels in the ports of England, which
were to be delivered fully armed and equipped to her. To this it may
be added that her armies were recruited from almost all the countries
of Europe, down almost to the last month of the war; a portion of
their arms were of foreign manufacture, as well as the munitions of
war; a large number of the sailors of her fleets came from the
seaports of Great Britain and Germany; in a word, whatever could be
of service to her in the conflict was unhesitatingly sought among
neutrals, regardless of the law of nations. At the same time an
effort was made on her part to make Great Britain responsible for the
damage done by our cruisers, and for the warlike stores sold to our
Government.

Some statements of Lord Russell on this point, in a letter to
Minister Adams, dated December 19, 1862, deserve notice. He says:

"It is right, however, to observe that the party which has profited
by far the most by these unjustifiable practices, has been the
Government of the United States, because that Government, having a
superiority of force by sea, and having blockaded most of the
Confederate ports, has been able, on the one hand, safely to receive
all the warlike supplies which it has induced British manufacturers
and merchants to send to the United States ports in violation of the
Queen's proclamation; and, on the other hand, to intercept and
capture a great part of the supplies of the same kind which were
destined from this country to the Confederate States.

"If it be sought to make her Majesty's Government responsible to that
of the United States because arms and munitions of war have left this
country on account of the Confederate Government, the Confederate
Government, as the other belligerent, may very well maintain that it
has a just cause of complaint against the British Government because
the United States arsenals have been replenished from British
sources. Nor would it be possible to deny that, in defiance of the
Queen's proclamation, many subjects of her Majesty, owing allegiance
to her crown, have enlisted in the armies of the United States. Of
this fact you can not be ignorant. Her Majesty's Government,
therefore, has just ground for complaint against both of the
belligerent parties, but most especially against the Government of
the United States, for having systemically, and in disregard of the
comity of nations which it was their duty to observe, induced
subjects of her Majesty to violate those orders which, in conformity
with her neutral position, she has enjoined all her subjects to obey."

Perhaps it may be well to inquire what is, under international law,
the duty of neutral nations with regard to the construction and
equipment of cruisers for either belligerent, and the supply of
warlike stores. Thus the groundlessness of the claims put forth by
the Government of the United States for damages to be paid by Great
Britain will be more manifest, and the lawfulness of the acts of the
Confederate Government demonstrated.

After the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, the Government
of France, owing to the temporary inferiority of her naval force,
openly and deliberately equipped privateers in our ports. These
privateers captured British vessels in United States waters, and
brought them as prizes into United States ports. These facts formed
the basis of demands made upon the United States by the British
plenipotentiary. The demands had reference, not to the accidental
evasion of a municipal law of the United States by a particular ship,
but to a systematic disregard of international law upon some of the
most important points of neutral obligation.

To these demands Mr. Jefferson, then Secretary of State under
President Washington, thus replied on September 3, 1793:

"We are bound by our treaties with three of the belligerent nations,
by all the means in our power, to protect and defend their vessels
and effects in our ports or waters, or on the seas near our shores,
and to recover and restore the same to the right owners when taken
from them. If all the means in our power are used, and fail in this
effort, we are not bound by our treaties with those nations to make
compensation. Though we have no similar treaty with Great Britain, it
was the opinion of the President that we should use toward that
nation the same rule which, under this Article, was to govern us with
other nations, and even to extend it to the captures made on the
high-seas and brought into our ports, if done by vessels which had
been armed within them."

It will be observed that the justice of restitution, or compensation,
for captures made on the high-seas and brought into our ports, is
only admitted by President Washington upon one condition, which is
expressed in these words: "If done by vessels which had been armed
within them." The terms of the contract, which the Government of the
United States endeavored to make at the ship-yards of England, were
for the delivery of the ship or ships of war, "to be finished
complete, with guns and everything appertaining." The contract was
not taken, as too little time was allowed for its execution. But, if
entered into and executed, it would have been a direct violation of
international law.

In the instance of our cruisers built in the ports of England, it
will be observed that they went to sea without arms or warlike
stores, and, at other ports than those of Great Britain, they were
converted into ships of war and put into commission by the authority
of the Confederate Government. The Government of the United States
asserted that they were built in the ports of Great Britain, and
thereby her duty of neutrality was violated, and the Government made
responsible for the damages sustained by private citizens of the
United States in consequence of her captures on the seas. To this
declaration of Mr. Adams, Earl Russell (he had been made an earl)
replied on September 14, 1863, thus:

"When the United States Government assumes to hold the Government of
Great Britain responsible for the captures made by vessels which may
be fitted out as vessels of war in a foreign port, because such
vessels were originally built in a British port, I have to observe
that such pretensions are entirely at variance with the principles of
international law, and with the decisions of American courts of the
highest authority; and I have only, in conclusion, to express my hope
that you may not be instructed again to put forward claims which her
Majesty's Government can not admit to be founded on any grounds of
law or justice."

On October 6, 1863, Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State of the United
States Government, replied to this declaration of Earl Russell,
saying:

"The United States do insist, and must continue to insist, that the
British Government is justly responsible for the damages which the
peaceful, law-abiding citizens of the United States [!] sustain by
the depredations of the Alabama."

Earl Russell answered on October 26, 1863, thus:

"I must request you to believe that the principle contended for by
her Majesty's Government is not that of commissioning, equipping, and
manning vessels in our ports to cruise against either of the
belligerent parties--a principle which was so justly and
unequivocally condemned by the President of the United States in
1793. . . . But the British Government must decline to be responsible
for the acts of parties who fit out a seeming merchant-ship, send her
to a port or to waters far from the jurisdiction of British courts,
and there commission, equip, and man her as a vessel of war."

The duty of neutral nations relative to the supply of warlike stores
is expressed in these words:

"It is not the practice of nations to undertake to prohibit their own
subjects by previous laws from trafficking in articles contraband of
war. Such trade is carried on at the risk of those engaged in it,
under the liabilities and penalties prescribed by the law of nations
or particular treaties." [59]

We now quote from the great American commentator on the Constitution
of the United States and on the law of nations:

"It is a general understanding that the powers at war may seize and
confiscate all contraband goods, without any complaint on the part of
the neutral merchant, and without any imputation of a breach of
neutrality in the neutral sovereign himself. It was contended on the
part of the French nation, in 1796, that neutral governments were
bound to restrain their subjects from selling or exporting articles
contraband of war to the belligerent powers. But it was successfully
shown, on the part of the United States, that neutrals may lawfully
sell at home to a belligerent power, or carry themselves to the
belligerent powers, contraband articles, subject to the right of
seizure _in transitu_. This right has been explicitly declared by the
judicial authorities of this country [United States]. The right of
the neutral to transport, and of the hostile power to seize, are
conflicting rights, and neither party can charge the other with a
criminal act." [60]

In accordance with these principles, President Pierce's message of
December 31, 1855, contains the following passage:

"In pursuance of this policy, the laws of the United States do not
forbid their citizens to sell to either of the belligerent powers
articles contraband of war, to take munitions of war or soldiers on
board their private ships for transportation; and, although in so
doing the individual citizen exposes his property or person to some
of the hazards of war, his acts do not involve any breach of
international neutrality, nor of themselves implicate the Government."

Perhaps it may not be out of place here to notice the charge of the
Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer to the jury in the case of the
Alexandra, a vessel of one hundred and twenty tons, under
construction at Liverpool for our Government. The case came on for
trial on June 22, 1863, in the Court of Exchequer, sitting at _nisi
prius_, before the Lord Chief Baron and a special jury. After it had
been summed up, the Lord Chief Baron said:

"This is an information on the part of the Crown for the seizure and
confiscation of a vessel that was in the course of preparation but
had not been completed. It is admitted that it was not armed, and the
question is, whether the preparation of the vessel in its then
condition was a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The main
question you will have to decide is this: Whether, under the seventh
section of the act of Parliament, the vessel, as then prepared at the
time of seizure, was liable to seizure? The statute was passed in
1819, and upon it no question has ever arisen in our courts of
justice; but there have been expositions of a similar statute which
exists in the United States. I will now read to you the opinions of
some American lawyers who have contributed so greatly to make law a
science. [His lordship then read a passage from Story and others.]
These gentlemen are authorities which show that, when two
belligerents are carrying on a war, a neutral power may supply,
without any breach of international law and without a breach of the
Foreign Enlistment Act, munitions of war--gunpowder, every
description of arms, in fact, that can be used for the destruction of
human beings.

"Why should ships be an exception? I am of opinion, in point of law,
they are not. The Foreign Enlistment Act was an act to prevent the
enlistment or engagement of his Majesty's subjects to serve in
foreign armies, and to prevent the fitting out and equipping in his
Majesty's dominions vessels for warlike purposes without his
Majesty's license. The title of an act is not at all times an exact
indication or explanation of the act, because it is generally
attached after the act is passed. But, in adverting to the preamble
of the act, I find that provision is made against the equipping,
fitting out, furnishing, and arming of vessels, because it may be
prejudicial to the peace of his Majesty's dominions.

"The question I shall put to you is, Whether you think that vessel
was merely in a course of building to be delivered in pursuance of a
contract that was perfectly lawful, or whether there was any
intention in the port of Liverpool, or any other English port, that
the vessel should be fitted out, equipped, furnished, and armed for
purposes of aggression. Now, surely, if Birmingham, or any other
town, may supply any quantity of munitions of war of various kinds
for the destruction of life, why object to ships? Why should ships
alone be in themselves contraband? I asked the Attorney-General if a
man could not make a vessel intending to sell it to either of the
belligerent powers that required it, and which would give the largest
price for it, would not that be lawful? To my surprise, the learned
Attorney-General declined to give an answer to the question, which I
think a grave and pertinent one. But you, gentlemen, I think, are
lawyers enough to know that a man may make a vessel and offer it for
sale. If a man may build a vessel for the purpose of offering it for
sale to either belligerent party, may he not execute an order for it?
That appears to be a matter of course. The statute is not made to
provide means of protection for belligerent powers, otherwise it
would have said, 'You shall not sell powder or guns, and you shall
not sell arms'; and, if it had done so, all Birmingham would have
been in arms against it. The object of the statute was this: that we
should not have our ports in this country made the ground of hostile
movements between the vessels of two belligerent powers, which might
be fitted out, furnished, and armed in these ports. The Alexandra was
clearly nothing more than in the course of building.

"It appears to me that, if true that the Alabama sailed from
Liverpool without any arms at all, as a mere ship in ballast, and
that her armament was put on board at Terceira, which is not in her
Majesty's dominions, then the Foreign Enlistment Act was not violated
at all."

After reading some of the evidence, his lordship said:

"If you think that the object was to furnish, fit out, equip, and arm
that vessel at Liverpool, that is a different matter; but if you
think the object really was to build a ship in obedience to an order,
in compliance with a contract, leaving those who bought it to make
what use they thought fit of it, then it appears to me that the
Foreign Enlistment Act has not been broken."

The jury immediately returned a verdict for the defendants. An appeal
was made, but the full bench decided that there was no jurisdiction.
Against this decision an appeal was taken to the House of Lords, and
there dismissed on some technical ground.

Sufficient has been said to show that the action of the Confederate
Government relative to these cruisers is sustained and justified by
international law. The complaints made by the Government of the
United States against the Government of Great Britain for acts
involving a breach of neutrality find no support in the letter of the
law or in its principles, and were conclusively answered by the
interpretations of _American jurists_. At the same time they are
condemned by the antecedent acts of the United States Government.
Some of these will be presented.

In the War of the American Revolution, Dr. Franklin and Silas Deane
were sent to France as commissioners to look after the interests of
the colonies. In the years 1776 and 1777 they became extensively
connected with naval movements. They built, and purchased, and
equipped, and commissioned ships, all in neutral territory; even
filling up blank commissions sent out to them by the Congress for the
purpose. Among expeditions fitted out by them was one under Captain
Wickes to intercept a convoy of linen-ships from Ireland. He went
first into the Bay of Biscay, and afterward entirely around Ireland,
sweeping the sea before him of everything that was not of force to
render the attack hopeless. Mr. Deane observes to Robert Morris that
it "effectually alarmed England, prevented the great fair at Chester,
occasioned insurance to rise, and even deterred the English merchants
from shipping in English bottoms at any rate, so that, in a few
weeks, forty sail of French ships were loading in the Thames, on
freight, an instance never before known."

In the spring of 1777 the Commissioners sent an agent to Dover, who
purchased a fine, fast-sailing English-built cutter, which was taken
across to Dunkirk. There she was privately equipped as a cruiser, and
put in command of Captain Gustavus Conyngham, who was appointed by
filling up a blank commission from John Hancock, the President of
Congress. This commission bore date March 1, 1777, and fully entitled
Mr. Conyngham to the rank of captain in the navy. His vessel,
although built in England, like many of our cruisers, was not armed
or equipped there, nor was his crew enlisted there, but in the port
of a neutral. This vessel was finally seized under some treaty
obligations between France and England. The Commissioners immediately
fitted out another cruiser, and still another. It was also affirmed
that the money advanced to Mr. John Adams for traveling expenses,
when he arrived in Spain a year or two later, was derived from the
prizes of these vessels, which had been sent into the ports of Spain.

Captain Conyngham was a very successful commander, but he was made a
prisoner in 1779. The matter was brought before Congress in July of
the same year, and a committee reported that this "late commander of
an armed vessel in the service of the States, and taken on board of a
private armed cutter, had been treated in a manner contrary to the
dictates of humanity, and the practice of Christian civilized
nations." Whereupon it was resolved to demand of the British Admiral
in New York that good and sufficient reason be given for this
conduct, or that he be immediately released from his rigorous and
ignominious confinement. If a satisfactory answer was not received by
August 1st, so many persons as were deemed proper were ordered to be
confined in safe and close custody, to abide the fate of the said
Gustavus Conyngham. No answer having been received, one Christopher
Hale was thus confined. In December he petitioned Congress for an
exchange, and that he might procure a person in his room. Congress
replied that his petition could not be granted until Captain
Conyngham was released, "as it had been determined that he must abide
the fate of that officer." Conyngham was subsequently released.

The whole number of captures made by the United States in this
contest is not known, but six hundred and fifty prizes are said to
have been brought into port. Many others were ransomed, and some were
burned at sea.

Prescribed limits will not permit me to follow out in detail the past
history of the United States as a neutral power. It must suffice to
recall the memory of readers to a few significant facts in our more
recent history:

The recognition of the independence of Greece in her struggle with
Turkey, and the voluntary contributions of money and men sent to her;
the recognition of the independence of the Spanish provinces of South
America, and the war-vessels equipped and sent from the ports of the
United States to Brazil during the struggle with Spain for
independence; the ships sold to Russia during her war with England,
France, and Turkey; the arms and munitions of war manufactured at New
Haven, Connecticut, and Providence, Rhode Island, sold and shipped to
Turkey to aid her in her late struggle with Russia.

The reader will observe the promptitude with which the Government of
the United States not only accorded belligerent rights, but, even
more, recognized the independence of nations struggling for
deliverance from oppressive rulers. The instances of Greece and the
South American republics are well known, and that of Texas must be
familiar to every one. One could scarcely believe, therefore, that
the chief act of hostility, or, rather, the great crime of the
Government of Great Britain in the eyes of the Government of the
United States, was the recognition by the latter of the Confederate
States as a belligerent power, and that a state of war existed
between them and the United States. This was the constantly repeated
charge against the British Government in the dispatches of the United
States Government from the commencement of the war down nearly to the
session of the Geneva Conference in 1872. In the correspondence of
the Secretary, in 1867, he says:

"What is alleged on the part of the United States is, that the
Queen's proclamation, which, by conceding belligerent rights to the
insurgents, lifted them up for the purpose of insurrection to an
equality with the nation which they were attempting to overthrow, was
premature because it was unnecessary, and that it was, in its
operation, unfriendly because it was premature."

Again he says, and, if sincerely, shows himself to be utterly
ignorant of the real condition of our affairs:

"Before the Queen's proclamation of neutrality, the disturbance in
the United States was merely a local insurrection. It wanted the name
of war to enable it to be a civil war and to live, endowed as such,
with maritime and other belligerent rights. Without the authorized
name, it might die, and was expected not to live and be a flagrant
civil war, but to perish a mere insurrection."

The first extract in itself contains a fiction. If the Queen's
proclamation possessed such force as to raise the Confederate States
to an equality with the United States as a belligerent, perhaps
another proclamation of the Queen might have possessed such force, if
it had been issued, as to have lifted the Confederate States from the
state of equality to one of independence. This is a novel virtue to
be ascribed to a Queen's proclamation. This idea must have been
borrowed from our neighbors of Mexico, where a _pronunciamiento_
dissolves one and establishes a rival administration. How much more
rational it would have been, to say that the resources and the
military power of the Confederate States placed them, at the outset,
on the footing of a belligerent, and the Queen's proclamation only
declared a fact which the announcement of a blockade of the Southern
ports by the Government of the United States had made manifest!--
blockade being a means only applicable as against a foreign foe.

Nevertheless, the Government of the United States, although refusing
to concede belligerent rights to the Confederate States, was very
ready to take advantage of such concession by other nations, whenever
an opportunity offered. The voluminous correspondence of the
Secretary of State of the United States Government, relative to the
Confederate cruisers and their so-called "depredations," was filled
with charges of violations of international law, which could be
committed only by a belligerent, and which, it was alleged, had been
allowed to be done in the ports of Great Britain. On this foundation
was based the subsequent claim for damages, advanced by the
Government of the United States against that of Great Britain; and,
for the pretended lack of "due diligence" in watching the actions of
this Confederate belligerent in her ports, she was mulcted in a heavy
sum by the Geneva Conference, and paid it to the Government of the
United States.

It is a remarkable fact that the Government of the United States, in
no one instance, from the opening to the close of the war, formally
spoke of the Confederate Government or States as belligerents.
Although on many occasions it acted with the latter as a belligerent,
yet no official designations were ever given to them or their
citizens but those of "insurgents," or "insurrectionists." Perhaps
there may be something in the signification of the words which,
combined with existing circumstances, would express a state of
affairs that the authorities of the Government of the United States
were in no degree willing to admit, and vainly sought to prevent from
becoming manifest to the world.

The party or individuality against which the Government of the United
States was conducting hostilities consisted of the people within the
limits of the Confederate States. Was it against them as individuals
in an unorganized condition, or as organized political communities?
In the former condition they might be a mob; in the latter condition
they formed a State. By the actions of unorganized masses may arise
insurrections, and by the actions of organized people or states,
arise wars.

The Government of the United States adopted a fiction when it
declared that the execution of the laws in certain States was impeded
by "insurrection." The persons whom it designated as insurrectionists
were the organized people of the States. The ballot-boxes used at the
elections were State boxes. The judges who presided at the elections
were State functionaries. The returns of the elections were made to
the State officers. The oaths of office of those elected were
administered by State authority. They assembled in the legislative
chambers of the States. The results of their deliberations were
directory to the State, judicial, and executive officers, and by them
put in operation. Is it not evident that, only by a fiction of
speech, such proceedings can be called an insurrection?

Why, then, did an intelligent and powerful Government, like that of
the United States, so outrage the understanding of mankind as to
adopt a fiction on which to base the authority and justification of
its hostile action? The United States Government is the result of a
compact between the States--a written Constitution. It owes its
existence simply to a delegation of certain powers by the respective
States, which it is authorized to exercise for their common welfare.
One of these powers is to "suppress insurrections"; but there is no
power delegated to subjugate States, the authors of its existence, or
to make war on any of the States. If, then, without any delegated
power or lawful authority for its proceedings, the Government of the
United States commenced a war upon some of the States of the Union,
how could it expect to be justified before the world? It became the
aggressor--the Attila of the American Continent. Its action
inflicted a wound on the principles of constitutional liberty, a
crashing blow to the hopes that men had begun to repose in this
latest effort for self-government, which its friends should never
forgive nor ever forget. To palliate the enormity of such an offense,
its authors resorted to a vehement denial that their hostile action
was a war upon the States, and persistently asserted the fiction that
their immense armies and fleets were merely a police authority to put
down insurrection. They hoped to conceal from the observation of the
American people that the contest, on the part of the central
Government, was for empire, for its absolute supremacy over the State
governments; that the Constitution was roiled up and laid away among
the old archives; and that the conditions of their liberty, in the
future, were to be decided by the sword or by "national" control of
the ballot-box.

With like disregard for truth, our cruisers were denounced as
"_pirates_" by the Government of the United States. A pirate, or
armed piratical vessel, is by the law of nations the enemy of
mankind, and can be destroyed by the ships of any nation. The
distinction between a lawful cruiser and a pirate is that the former
has behind it a government which is recognized by civilized nations
as entitled to the rights of war, and from which the commander of the
cruiser receives his commission or authority, but the pirate
recognizes no government, and is not recognized by any one. As the
Attorney-General of Great Britain said in the Alexandra case:

"Although a recognition of the Confederates as an independent power
was out of the question, yet it was right they should be admitted by
other nations within the circle of lawful belligerents--that is to
say, that their forces should not be treated as pirates, nor their
flag as a piratical flag. Therefore, as far as the two belligerents
were concerned, on the part of this and other governments, they were
so far put on a level that each was to be considered as entitled to
the right of belligerents--the Southern States as much as the other."

The Government of the United States well knew that, after the issue
of the Queen's proclamation recognizing our Government, the
application of the word pirate to our cruisers was simply an
exhibition of vindictive passion on its part. A _de facto_ Government
by its commission legalizes among nations a cruiser. That there was
such a Government even its own courts also decided. In a prize case
(2 Black, 635), Justice Greer delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court, saying:

"It [the war] is not less a civil war, with belligerent parties in
hostile array, because it may be called an 'insurrection' by one
side, and the insurgents be considered as rebels and traitors. It is
not necessary that the independence of the revolted province or State
be acknowledged in order to constitute it a party belligerent in a
war, according to the laws of nations. Foreign nations acknowledge it
a war by a declaration of neutrality. The condition of neutrality can
not exist unless there be two belligerent parties."

In the case of the Santissima Trinidad (7 Wheaton, 337), the United
States Supreme Court says:

"The Government of the United States has recognized the existence of
a civil war between Spain and her colonies, and has avowed her
determination to remain neutral between the parties. Each party is
therefore deemed by us a belligerent, having, so far as concerns us,
the sovereign rights of war."

The belligerent character of the Confederate States was thus fully
acknowledged by the highest judicial tribunal of the United States.
This involved an acknowledgment of the Confederate Government as a
Government _de facto_ having "the sovereign rights of war," yet the
Executive Department of the United States Government, with reckless
malignity, denounced our cruisers as "pirates," our citizens as
"insurgents" and "traitors," and the action of our Government as an
"insurrection."

It has been stated that during the war of the colonies with Great
Britain many of the prizes of the colonial cruisers were destroyed.
This was done by Paul Jones and other commanders, although during the
entire period of the war some of the colonial ports were open, into
which prizes could be taken. In that war Great Britain did not
attempt to blockade all the ports of the colonies. Sailing-vessels
only were then known, and with these a stringent blockade at all
seasons could not have been maintained. But, at the later day of our
war, the powerful steamship had appeared, and revolutionized the
commerce and the navies of the world. During the first months of the
war all the principal ports of the Confederacy were blockaded, and
finally every inlet was either in possession of the enemy or had one
or more vessels watching it. The steamers were independent of wind
and weather, and could hold their positions before a port day and
night. At the same time the ports of neutrals had been closed against
the prizes of our cruisers by proclamations and orders in council.
Says Admiral Semmes:

"During my whole career upon the sea, I had not so much as a single
port open to me, into which I could send a prize."

Our prizes had been sent into ports of Cuba and Venezuela under the
hope that they might gain admittance, but they were either handed
over to the enemy under some fraudulent pretext, or expelled. Thus,
by the action of the different nations and by the blockade with
steamers, no course was left to us but to destroy the prizes, as was
done in many instances under the Government of the United States
Confederation.

The laws of maritime war are well known. The enemy's vessel when
captured becomes the property of the captor, which he may immediately
destroy; or he may take the vessel into port, have it adjudicated by
an admiralty court as a lawful prize, and sold. That adjudication is
the basis of title to the purchaser against all former owners. In
these cases the captor sends his prizes to a port of his own country
or to a friendly port for adjudication. But, if the ports of his own
country are under blockade by his enemy, and the recapture of the
prizes, if sent there, most probable, and if, at the same time, all
friendly ports are closed against the entrance of his prizes, then
there remains no alternative but to destroy the prizes by sinking or
burning. Courts of admiralty are established for neutrals; not for
the enemy, who has no right of appearance before them. If, therefore,
any neutrals suffered during our war for want of adjudication, the
fault is with their own Government, and not with our cruisers.

Many other objections were advanced by the United States Government
as evidence that we committed a breach of international law with our
cruisers, but their principles are embraced in the preceding remarks,
or they were too frivolous to deserve notice. Suffice it to say that,
if the Confederate Government had been successful in taking to sea
every vessel which it built, it would have swept from the oceans the
commerce of the United States, would have raised the blockade of at
least some of our ports, and, if by such aid our independence had
been secured, there is little probability that such complaints as
have been noticed would have received attention, if, indeed, they
would have been uttered.

In January, 1871, the British Government proposed to the Government
of the United States that a joint commission should be convened to
adjust certain differences between the two nations relative to the
fisheries, the Canadian boundary, etc. To this proposition the latter
acceded, on condition that the so-called Alabama claims should also
be considered. To this condition Great Britain assented. In the
Convention the American Commissioners proposed an arbitration of
these claims. The British Commissioners replied that her Majesty's
Government could not admit that Great Britain had failed to discharge
toward the United States the duties imposed on her by the rules of
international law, or that she was justly liable to make good to the
United States the losses occasioned by the acts of the cruisers to
which the American Commissioners referred.

Without following the details, it may be summarily stated that the
Geneva Conference ensued. That decided that "England should have
fulfilled her duties as a neutral by the exercise of a diligence
equal to the gravity of the danger," and that "the circumstances were
of a nature to call for the exercise, on the part of her Britannic
Majesty's Government, of all possible solicitude for the observance
of the rights and duties involved in the proclamation of neutrality
issued by her Majesty on May 18, 1861." The Conference also added:
"It can not be denied that there were moments when its watchfulness
seemed to fail, and when feebleness in certain branches of the public
service resulted in great detriment to the United States."

The claims presented to the Conference for damages done by our
several cruisers were as follows: The Alabama, $7,050,293.76; the
Boston, $400; the Chickamauga, $183,070.73; the Florida,
$4,057,934.69; the Clarence, tender of the Florida, $66,736.10; the
Tacony, tender of the Florida, $169,198.81; the Georgia, $431,160.72;
the Jefferson Davis, $7,752; the Nashville, $108,433.95; the
Retribution, $29,018.53; the Sallie, $5,540; the Shenandoah,
$6,656,838.81; the Sumter, $179,697.67; the Tallahassee, $836,841.83.
Total, $19,782,917.60. Miscellaneous, $479,033; increased insurance,
$6,146,19.71. Aggregate, $26,408,170.31.

The Conference rejected the claims against the Boston, the Jefferson
Davis, and the Sallie, and awarded to the United States Government
$15,500,000 in gold.

But the indirect damages upon the commerce of the United States
produced by these cruisers were far beyond the amount of the claims
presented to the Geneva Conference. The number of ships owned in the
United States at the commencement of the war, which were subsequently
transferred to foreign owners by a British register, was 715, and the
amount of their tonnage was 480,882 tons. Such are the laws of the
United States that not one of them has been allowed to resume an
American register.

In the year 1860 nearly seventy per cent. of the foreign commerce of
the country was carried on in American ships. But, in consequence of
the danger of capture by our cruisers to which these ships were
exposed, the amount of this commerce carried by them had dwindled
down in 1864 to forty-six per cent. It continued to decline after the
war, and in 1872 it had fallen to twenty-eight and a half per cent.

Before the war the amount of American tonnage was second only to that
of Great Britain, and we were competing with her for the first place.
At that time the tonnage of the coasting trade, which had grown from
insignificance, was 1,735,863 tons. Three years later, in 1864, it
had declined to about 867,931 tons.

The damage to the articles of export is illustrated by the decline in
breadstuffs exported from the Northern States. In the last four
months of each of the following years the value of this export was as
follows: 1861, $42,500,000; 1862, $27,842,090; 1863, $8,909,043;
1864, $1,850,819. Some of this decline resulted from good crops in
England; but, in other respects, it was a consequence of causes
growing out of the war.

The increase in the rates of marine insurance, in consequence of the
danger of capture by the cruisers, was variable. But the gross amount
so paid was presented as a claim to the Conference, as given above.

[Footnote 59: Wheaton's "International Law" sixth edition, p. 571, 1855.]

[Footnote 60: Ken's "Commentaries," vol i, p. 145, 1854.]

CHAPTER XXXII.

On the capture of Nashville, on February 25, 1862, Andrew Johnson was
made military Governor of Tennessee, with the rank of brigadier-general,
and immediately entered on the duties of his office. This step was taken
by the President of the United States under the pretense of executing
that provision of the Constitution which is in these words:

"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
republican form of government."

The administration was conducted according to the will and pleasure
of the Governor, which was the supreme law. Public officers were
required to take an oath of allegiance to the United States
Government, and upon refusal were expelled from office.
Newspaper-offices were closed, and their publication suppressed.
Subsequently the offices were sold out under the provisions of the
confiscation act. All persons using "treasonable and seditious"
language were arrested and required to take the oath of allegiance to
the Government of the United States, and give bonds for the future,
or to go into exile. Clergymen, upon their refusal to take the oath,
were confined in the prisons until they could be sent away.
School-teachers and editors and finally large numbers of private
citizens were arrested and held until they took the oath. Conflicts
became frequent in the adjacent country. Murders and the violent
destruction of property ensued.

On October 21, 1862, an order for an election of members of the
United States Congress in the ninth and tenth State districts was
issued. Every voter was required to give satisfactory evidence of
"loyalty" to the Northern Government. Two persons were chosen and
admitted to seats in that body.

That portion of the State in the possession of the forces of the
United States continued without change, under the authority of the
military Governor, until the beginning of 1864. Measures were then
commenced by the Governor for an organization of a State government
in sympathy with the Government of the United States. These measures
were subsequently known as the "process for State reconstruction."
The Governor issued his proclamation for an election of county
officers on March 5th, to be held in the various counties of the
State whenever it was practicable. "It is not expected," says the
Governor, "that the enemies of the United States will propose to
vote, nor is it intended that they be permitted to vote or hold
office." In addition to the possession of the usual qualifications,
the voter was required to take the following oath:

"I solemnly swear that I will henceforth support the Constitution of
the United States, and defend it against the assaults of all its
enemies; that I will hereafter be, and conduct myself as, a true and
faithful citizen of the United States, freely and voluntarily
claiming to be subject to all the duties and obligations, and
entitled to all the rights and privileges, of such citizenship; that
I ardently desire the suppression of the present insurrection and
rebellion against the Government of the United States, the success of
its armies, and the defeat of all those who oppose them; and that the
Constitution of the United States, and all laws and proclamations
made in pursuance thereof, may be speedily and permanently
established and enforced over all the people, States, and Territories
thereof; and, further, that I will hereafter aid and assist all loyal
people in the accomplishment of these results."

Thus to invoke the Constitution was like Satan quoting Scripture. The
election was a failure, and all further efforts at reconstruction
were for a time suspended. An attempt was made at the end of 1864 to
obtain a so-called convention to amend the State Constitution, and a
body was assembled which, without any regular authority, adopted
amendments. These were submitted to the voters on February 22, 1865,
and declared to be ratified by a vote of twenty-five thousand, in a
State where the vote, in 1860, was one hundred and forty-five
thousand. Slavery was abolished, other changes made, so-called State
officers elected, and this body of voters was proclaimed as the
reconstructed State of Tennessee, and one of the United States. Such
was the method adopted in Tennessee to execute the provision of the
Constitution which says:

"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
republican form of government."

The next attempt to guarantee "a republican form of government" to a
State was commenced in Louisiana by the military occupation of New
Orleans, on May 1, 1862. The United States forces were under the
command of Major-General Benjamin F. Butler. Martial law was
declared, and Brigadier-General George F. Shepley was appointed
military Governor of the State. It is unnecessary to relate in detail
the hostile actions which were committed, as they had no resemblance
to such warfare as is alone permissible by the rules of international
law or the usages of civilization. Some examples taken from
contemporaneous publications of temperate tone, will suffice.

Peaceful and aged citizens, unresisting captives, and noncombatants,
were confined at hard labor with chains attached to their limbs, and
held in dungeons and fortresses; others were subjected to a like
degrading punishment for selling medicine to the sick soldiers of the
Confederacy. The soldiers of the invading force were incited and
encouraged by general orders to insult and outrage the wives and
mothers and sisters of the citizens; and helpless women were torn
from their homes and subjected to solitary confinement, some in
fortresses and prisons-and one, especially, on an island of barren
sand, under a tropical sun--and were fed with loathsome rations and
exposed to vile insults. Prisoners of war, who surrendered to the
naval forces of the United States on the agreement that they should
be released on parole, were seized and kept in close confinement.
Repeated pretexts were sought or invented for plundering the
inhabitants of the captured city, by fines levied and collected under
threat of imprisonment at hard labor with ball and chain. The entire
population were forced to elect between starvation by the
confiscation of all their property and taking an oath against their
conscience to bear allegiance to the invader. Egress from the city
was refused to those whose fortitude stood the test, and even to lone
and aged women and to helpless children; and, after being ejected
from their houses and robbed of their property, they were left to
starve in the streets or subsist on charity. The slaves were driven
from the plantations in the neighborhood of New Orleans, until their
owners consented to share their crops with the commanding General,
his brother, and other officers. When such consent had been extorted,
the slaves were restored to the plantations and compelled to work
under the bayonets of a guard of United States soldiers. Where that
partnership was refused, armed expeditions were sent to the
plantations to rob them of everything that could be removed; and even
slaves too aged and infirm for work were, in spite of their
entreaties, forced from the homes provided by their owners, and
driven to wander helpless on the highway. By an order (No. 91), the
entire property in that part of Louisiana west of the Mississippi
River was sequestrated for confiscation, and officers were assigned
to the duty, with orders to gather up and collect the personal
property, and turn over to the proper officers, upon their receipts,
such of it as might be required for the use of the United States
army; and to bring the remainder to New Orleans, and cause it to be
sold at public auction to the highest bidders. This was an order
which, if it had been executed, would have condemned to punishment,
by starvation, at least a quarter of a million of persons, of all
ages, sexes, and conditions. The African slaves, also, were not only
incited to insurrection by every license and encouragement, but
numbers of them were armed for a servile war, which in its nature, as
exemplified in other lands, far exceeds the horrors and merciless
atrocities of savages. In many instances the officers were active and
zealous agents in the commission of these crimes, and no instance was
known of the refusal of any one of them to participate in the
outrages.

The order of Major-General Butler, to which reference is made above,
was as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF, NEW ORLEANS.

"As officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to
repeated insults from women, calling themselves ladies, of New
Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and
courtesy on our part, it is ordered hereafter, when any female shall,
by mere gesture or movement, insult, or show contempt for any
officers or soldiers of the United States, she shall be regarded and
held liable to be treated as a woman about town plying her vocation.

"By command of Major-General BUTLER."

This order was issued on May 15, 1862, and known as General Order No.
28.

Another example was the cold-blooded execution of William B. Mumford
on June 7th. He was an unresisting and noncombatant captive, and
there was no offense ever alleged to have been committed by him
subsequent to the date of the capture of the city. He was charged
with aiding and abetting certain persons in hauling down a United
States flag hoisted on the mint, which was left there by a boat's
crew on the morning of April 26th, and five days before the military
occupation of the city. He was tried before a military commission,
sentenced, and afterward hanged.

On December 15, 1862, Major-General N. P. Banks took command of the
military forces, and Major-General Butler retired. The military
Governor, early in August, had attempted to set on foot a judicial
system for the city and State. For this purpose he appointed judges
to two of the district courts, of which the judges were absent, and
authorized a third, who held a commission dated anterior to 1861, to
resume the sessions. This was an establishment of three new courts,
with the jurisdiction and powers pertaining to the courts that
previously bore their names, by a military officer representing the
Executive of the United States. These were the only courts within the
territory of the State held by the United States forces which claimed
to have civil jurisdiction. But this jurisdiction was limited to
citizens of the parish of Orleans as against defendants residing in
the State. As to other residents of the State, outside the parish of
Orleans, there was no court in which they could be sued. In this
condition several parishes were held by the United States forces.

It was therefore necessary to take another step in order to enable
the military power to administer civil affairs. This involved, as
every reader must perceive, a complete subversion of the fundamental
principles of social organization. According to this advanced step,
the military power, instituted by an organization of its own, creates
for itself a new nature, fixes at will its rules and modes of action,
and determines the limits of its power. It absorbs by force the civil
functions, with absolute disregard of the fundamental principle that
the military shall be subject to the civil authority.

This attempt to administer civil affairs on the basis of military
authority involved, as has been said, the subversion of fundamental
principles. The military power may remove obstacles to the exercise
of the civil authority; but, when these are removed, it can not enter
the forum, put on the toga, and sit in judgment upon civil affairs,
any more than the hawk becomes the dove by assuming her plumage.

However, the next step was taken. It consisted in the publication of
the following order by the President of the United States:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, _October 20, 1862._

"The insurrection which has for some time prevailed in several of the
States of this Union, including Louisiana, having temporarily
subverted and swept away the civil institutions of that State,
including the judiciary and the judicial authorities of the Union, so
that it has become necessary to hold the State in military
occupation; and it being indispensably necessary that there shall be
some judicial tribunal existing there capable of administering
justice, I have therefore thought it proper to appoint, and I do
hereby constitute a provisional court, which shall be a court of
record for the State of Louisiana; and I do hereby appoint Charles A.
Peabody, of New York, to be a provisional judge to hold said court,
with authority to hear, try, and determine all causes civil and
criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty,
and particularly with all such powers and jurisdiction as belong to
the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, conforming his
proceedings, so far as possible, to the course of proceedings and
practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States
and Louisiana--his judgment to be final and conclusive. And I do
hereby authorize and empower the said judge to make and establish
such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the exercise of
his jurisdiction, and to appoint a prosecuting attorney, marshal, and
clerk of the said court, who shall perform the functions of attorney,
marshal, and clerk according to such proceedings and practice as
before mentioned, and such rules and regulations as may be made and
established by said judge. These appointments are to continue during
the pleasure of the President, not extending beyond the military
occupation of the city of New Orleans, or the restoration of the
civil authority in that city and in the State of Louisiana. These
officers shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the War
Department, and compensation shall be as follows.

"By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"W. H. SEWARD, _Secretary of State._"

This so-called court, as its judge said, "was always governed by the
rules and principles of law, adhering to all the rules and forms of
civil tribunals, and avoiding everything like a military
administration of justice. In criminal matters it summoned a grand
jury, and submitted to it all charges for examination." Yet, when its
judgments and mandates were to be executed, that execution could come
only from the same power by which the court was constituted, and that
was the military power of the United States holding the country in
military occupation. Therefore, to this end the military and naval
forces were pledged. Hence it was the military power, as has been
said, administering civil affairs.

The Constitution of the United States says:

"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish," [61]

This provisional court was neither ordained nor established by
Congress; it had not, therefore, vested in it any of the judicial
power of the United States. Neither does the Constitution give to
Congress any power by which it can constitute an independent State
court within the limits of any State in the Union, as Louisiana was
said to be.

This provisional court, therefore, was a mere instrument of martial
law, constituted by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States
forces, not for the usual purposes which justify the establishment of
such courts, but to enter the domain of civil affairs and administer
justice between man and man in the ordinary transactions of peaceful
life. The ministers of martial law are only the representatives of
the conqueror, and they sit in his seat of authority to relieve him
from the burden of excessive duties, and to administer justice to
offenders against his authority and the social welfare, during his
presence. On such grounds the existence of such courts is justified;
but, for the establishment of a court like this provisional one, no
legitimate authority is to be found either in the Constitution of the
United States or outside of it, "_Inter arma silent leges_" is a
maxim nearly two thousand years old; it means that, under the
exercise of military power, the civil administration ceases.

When called upon to state any just grounds for such a measure, the
invader has usually replied that he had, _ex necessitate rei_, the
right to establish such a tribunal. Thus said the Commander-in-Chief
of the United States, and Congress acquiesced--indeed, leading the
way, it had urged the same plea to justify the passage of its
confiscation act. The judiciary has observed the silence of
acquiescence. Thus the doctrine of necessity--the rule that, in the
administration of affairs, both military and civil, the necessity of
the case may and does afford ample authority and power to subvert or
to suspend the provisions of the Constitution, and to exercise powers
and do acts unwarranted by the grants of that instrument--has
apparently become incorporated as an unwritten clause of the
Constitution of the United States.

What, then, is this necessity? Its definition would require an
explanation, from the persons who act under it, of the objects for
which, in every instance, they act. Suffice it to say that the
political wisdom of mankind has consecrated this truth as a
fundamental maxim, that no man can be trusted with the exercise of
power and be, at the same time, the final judge of the limits within
which that power may be exercised. It has fortified this with other
maxims, such as, "Necessity is the plea of despotism"; "Necessity
knows no law." The fathers of the Constitution of the United States
sought to limit every grant of power so exactly that it should
observe its bounds as invariably as a planetary body does its orbit.
Yet within the first hundred years of its existence all these limits
have been disregarded, and the people have silently accepted the plea
of necessity.

It must be manifest to every one that there has been a fatal
subversion of the Constitution of the United States. In estimating
the results of the war, this is one of the most deplorable; because
it is self-evident that, when a constitutional Government once
oversteps the limits fixed for the exercise of its powers, there is
nothing beyond to check its further aggression, no place where it
will voluntarily halt until it reaches the subjugation of all who
resist the usurpation. This was the sole issue involved in the
conflict of the United States Government with the Confederate States;
and every other issue, whether pretended or real, partook of its
nature, and was subordinate to this one. Let us repeat an
illustration: In strict observance of their inalienable rights, in
abundant caution reserved, when they formed the compact or
Constitution--whichever the reader pleases to call it--of the
United States, the Confederate States sought to withdraw from the
Union they had assisted to create, and to form a new and independent
one among themselves. Then the Government of the United States broke
through all the limits fixed for the exercise of the powers with
which it had been endowed, and, to accomplish its own will, assumed,
under the plea of necessity, powers unwritten and unknown in the
Constitution, that it might thereby proceed to the extremity of
subjugation. Thus it will be perceived that the question still lives.
Although the Confederate armies may have left the field, although the
citizen soldiers may have retired to the pursuits of peaceful life,
although the Confederate States may have renounced their new Union,
they have proved their indestructibility by resuming their former
places in the old one, where, by the organic law, they could only be
admitted as republican, equal, and sovereign States of the Union.
And, although the Confederacy as an organization may have ceased to
exist as unquestionably as though it had never been formed, the
fundamental principles, the eternal truths, uttered when our colonies
in 1776 declared their independence, on which the Confederation of
1781 and the Union of 1788 were formed, and which animated and guided
in the organization of the Confederacy of 1861, yet live, and will
survive, however crushed they may be by despotic force, however deep
they may be buried under the debris of crumbling States, however they
may be disavowed by the time-serving and the fainthearted; yet I
believe they have the eternity of truth, and that in God's appointed
time and place they will prevail.

The contest is not over, the strife is not ended. It has only entered
on a new and enlarged arena. The champions of constitutional liberty
must spring to the struggle, like the armed men from the seminated
dragon's teeth, until the Government of the United States is brought
back to its constitutional limits, and the tyrant's plea of
"necessity" is bound in chains strong as adamant:

"For Freedom's battle once begun,
Bequeathed by bleeding sire to son,
Though baffled oft, it ever won."

When the war closed, who were the victors? Perhaps it is too soon to
answer that question. Nevertheless, every day, as time rolls on, we
look with increasing pride upon the struggle our people made for
constitutional liberty. The war was one in which fundamental
principles were involved; and, as force decides no truth, hence the
issue is still undetermined, as has been already shown. We have laid
aside our swords; we have ceased our hostility; we have conceded the
physical strength of the Northern States. But the question still
lives, and all nations and peoples that adopt a confederated agent of
government will become champions of our cause. While contemplating
the Northern States--with their Federal Constitution gone,
ruthlessly destroyed under the tyrant's plea of "necessity," their
State sovereignty made a byword, and their people absorbed in an
aggregated mass, no longer, as their fathers left them, protected by
reserved rights against usurpation--the question naturally arises:
On which side was the victory? Let the verdict of mankind decide.

[Footnote 61: Constitution of the United States, Article III, section 1.]

CHAPTER XXXIII.

But to resume our narration. On December 3d, in compliance with an
order of the military Governor Shepley, a so-called election was held
for members of the United States Congress in the first and second
State districts, each composed of about half the city of New Orleans
and portions of the surrounding parishes. Those who had taken the
oath of allegiance were allowed to vote. In the first district,
Benjamin F. Flanders received 2,370 votes, and all others 273. In the
second district, Michael Hahn received 2,799 votes, and all others
2,318. These persons presented themselves at Washington, and
resolutions to admit them to seats were reported by the Committee on
Elections in the House of Representatives. It was urged that the
military Governor had conformed in every particular to the
Constitution and laws of Louisiana, so that the election had every
essential of a regular election in a time of most profound peace,
with the exception of the fact that the proclamation for the election
was issued by the military instead of the civil Governor of the
State. The law required the proclamation to be issued by the civil
Governor; so that, if these persons were admitted to seats after an
election called by a military Governor, Congress thereby recognized
as valid a military order of a so-called Executive that
unceremoniously set aside a provision of the State civil law, and was
anti-republican and a positive usurpation. Again, all the departments
of the United States Government had acted on the theory that the
Confederate States were in a state of insurrection, and that the
Union was unbroken; under this theory, they could come back to the
Union only with all the laws unimpaired which they themselves had
made for their own government. Congress was as much bound to uphold
the laws of Louisiana, in all their extent and in all their parts, as
it was to uphold the laws of New York, or any other State, whose
civil policy had not been disturbed. Both those persons, however,
were admitted to seats--yeas, 92; nays, 44.

The work of constituting the State of Louisiana out of the small
portion of her population and of her territory held by the forces of
the United States still went on. The proposition now was to hold a
so-called State Convention and frame a new Constitution, but its
advocates were so few that nothing was accomplished during the year
1863. The object of the military power was to secure such civil
authority as to enforce the abolition of slavery; and, until the way
was clear to that result, every method of organization was held in
abeyance.

Meanwhile, on December 8, 1863, the President of the United States
issued a proclamation which contained his plan for making a Union
State out of a fragment of a Confederate State, and also granting an
amnesty to the general mass of the people on taking an oath of
allegiance. His plan was in these words:

"And I do further proclaim, declare, and make known that, whenever,
in any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, and North
Carolina, a number of persons, not less than one tenth in number of
the votes cast in such State at the Presidential election of 1860,
each having taken the following oath and not having since violated
it, and being a qualified voter by the election laws of the State
existing immediately before the so-called act of secession, and
excluding all others, shall reestablish a State government which
shall be republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall
be recognized as the true government of the State, and the State
shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional provision
which declares that The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each
of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature or
the Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), against
domestic violence."

The oath required to be taken was as follows:

"I, ----- -----, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God,
that I will henceforth support, protect, and defend the Constitution
of the United States and the Union of the States thereunder; and that
I will in like manner abide by and faithfully support all acts of
Congress, passed during the existing rebellion, with reference to
slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by
Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court, and that I will, in
like manner, abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the
President, made during the existing rebellion, having reference to
slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by
decision of the Supreme Court. So help me God!"

In a message to Congress, of the same date with the preceding
proclamation, the President of the United States, after explaining
the objects of the proclamation, says:

"In the midst of other cares, however important, we must not lose
sight of the fact that the war-power is still our main reliance. To
that power alone can we look, for a time, to give confidence to the
people in the contested regions that the insurgent power will not
again overrun them."

The intelligent reader will observe that this plan of the President
of the United States to restore States to the Union, to occupy the
places of those which he had been attempting to destroy, does not
contain a single feature to secure a republican form of government,
nor a single provision authorized by the Constitution of the United
States. With his usurped war-power to sustain him in the work of
destruction, he found it easy to destroy; but he was powerless to
create or to restore. In the former case, he had gone imperiously
forward, trampling under foot every American political principle, and
breaking through every constitutional limitation. In the latter case,
he could not advance one step without recognizing sound political
principles and complying with their dictates. On each foundation he
must construct, or his work would be like the house founded on the
sand.

It will now be shown what the true principles are, and then that the
President of the United States perverted them, misstated them, and
sought to reach his ends by groundless fabrications--as if he would
enforce a fiction or establish a fallacy to be as good as truth. It
might be still farther shown, if it had not already become
self-evident, that this method was pursued with such a perversity and
wickedness as to render it a characteristic feature of that war
administration on whose skirts is the blood of more than a million of
human beings.

The whole science of a republican government is to be found in this
sentence of the Declaration of Independence, made by the
representatives of the United States of America, in Congress
assembled, on July 4, 1776. It says:

"That, to secure these rights [certain unalienable rights],
governments are instituted among men--deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the
people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government,
laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
safety and happiness."

Thus it will be seen that civil and political sovereignty was held to
be implanted by our Creator in the individual, and no human
government has any original, inherent, just sovereignty whatever, and
no acquired sovereignty either, beyond that which may be granted to
it by the individuals as "most likely to effect their safety and
happiness." "Deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed," says the Declaration of Independence. All other powers
than those thus derived are not "just powers." Any government
exercising powers "not just" has no right to survive. "It is the
right of the people to alter or abolish it," says the Declaration of
Independence, "and to institute a new government."

Who, then, had a right to "institute" a republican government for
Louisiana? No human beings whatever but the people of Louisiana; not
the strangers, not the slaves, but the manhood that knew its rights
and dared to maintain them. Under what principles, then, could a
citizen of Massachusetts, whether clothed in regimentals or a
civilian's dress, come into Louisiana and attempt to set up a State
government? Under no principles, but only by the power of the invader
and the usurper. If the true principles of a republican government
had prevailed and could have been enforced when Major-General Butler
appeared at New Orleans, he would have been hanged on the first
lamp-post, and his successor, Major-General Banks, would have been
hanged on the second.

Under what principles, then, could the Government of the United
States appear in Louisiana and attempt to institute a State
government? As has been said above, it was the act of an invader and
a usurper. Yet it proposed to "institute" a republican State
government. The absurdity of such intention is too manifest to need
argument. How could an invader attempt to "institute" a republican
State government? an act which can be done only by the free and
unconstrained action of the people themselves. It has been charged
that this and every similar act of the President of the United States
was in violation of his duty to maintain and observe the requirements
and restrictions of the Constitution, and to uphold in each State a
republican form of government. To specify, the following is offered
as an example. He did "proclaim, declare, and make known--

that, whenever any number of persons, not less than one tenth of the
number of voters at the last Presidential election, shall reestablish
a State government, which shall be republican [!] and in no wise
contravening said oath, such shall be recognized as the true
government of the State."

One tenth of the voters can not establish a republican State
government, which requires the consent of the people of the State to
make its powers just, as has been shown above. Therefore, such a
government had not one element of republicanism in it. But what is
astonishingly remarkable is the stultification of requiring the one
tenth of the people to "reestablish a State government, which shall
be republican and in no wise contravening said oath." Either he did
not know how a republican State government was "instituted," or, if
he knew, then he was a participant in that perversity and wickedness,
which was above charged to be the characteristic of his war
Administration.

It will now be shown how he sought "to enforce a fiction or establish
a fallacy to be as good as truth." Of the government thus established
by one tenth of the voters, he says:

"Such shall be recognized as the true government of the State, and
the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the constitutional
provision which declares that 'the United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a republican form of government.'"

It is proper here to inquire who and what was the tenth to whom this
power to rule the State was to be given. It will be seen, by
reference to the proclamation, that each voter of the one tenth, in
order to be qualified, is required to take an oath with certain
promises in it, which are prescribed by an outside or foreign
authority. This condition of itself is fatal to a republican State
government, that "derives its just powers from the consent of the
governed." Free consent--not cheerful consent, but unconstrained and
unconditioned consent--is required that "just powers" may be derived
from it. In this instance, the invader prescribes the requisite
qualifications of the voter, and makes it a condition that the
government established shall "in no wise contravene" certain
stipulations expressed in the oath taken to give the qualification. A
State government thus formed derives its powers from the consent of
the invader, and not "from the consent of the governed." It has no
"just powers" whatever. It is a groundless fabrication. Yet the
President of the United States declared, "The State shall receive
thereunder the benefits of the constitutional provision which
declares that 'the United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a republican form of government.'" Is not this an attempt,
while pretending to establish, to destroy true republicanism?

Now, let the reader bear in mind that these remarks relate to
Louisiana alone, of which more remains to be told; and that there
were eleven States that withdrew from the Union, whose restoration
was to be effected on this rotten system, in addition to several
constitutional amendments, the adoption of which was to be effected
and secured by the votes of these groundless fabrications, in which a
fiction was to be considered as good as the truth. Having attained
all these facts which are yet to be stated, he may begin to form some
estimate of the remnants of the Constitution, and of the probable
existence of any true union of the States.

To proceed with the narration. Under the above-mentioned proclamation
of the President of the United States, Major-General Banks issued at
New Orleans, on January 11, 1864, a proclamation for an election of
State officers, and for members of a State Constitutional Convention.
The State officers, when elected, were to constitute, as the
proclamation said, "the civil government of the State under the
Constitution and laws of Louisiana, except so much of the said
Constitution and laws as recognize, regulate, or relate to slavery,
which, being inconsistent with the present condition of public
affairs, and plainly inapplicable to any class of persons now
existing within its limits, must be suspended." The number of votes
given for State officers was 10,270. The population of the State in
1860 was 708,902. The so-called Government was inaugurated on March
4th, and on March 11th he was invested with the powers hitherto
exercised by the military Governor for the President of the United
States. On the same day Major-General Banks issued an order relative
to the election of delegates to a so-called State Convention. The
most important provisions of it defined the qualifications of voters.
The delegates were elected entirely within the army lines of the
forces of the United States. The so-called Convention assembled and
adopted a so-called Constitution, declaring "instantaneous,
universal, uncompensated, unconditional emancipation of slaves." The
meager vote on the Constitution was, for its adoption, 6,836; for its
rejection, 1,566. The vote of New Orleans was, yeas 4,664, nays 789.
This state of affairs continued after the close of the war. Violent
disputes arose as to the validity of the so-called Constitution. The
so-called Legislature elected under it adopted Article XIII as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting the
existence of slavery in the United States.

It will be seen from these facts that the State of Louisiana was not
a republican State instituted by the consent of the governed; that
its Legislature was an unconstitutional body, without any "just
powers," and that the vote which it gave for the amendment of the
Constitution of the United States was no vote at all; for it was
given by a body that had no authority to give it, because it had no
"just powers" whatever. Yet this vote was counted among those
necessary to secure the passage of the constitutional amendment. Was
this an attempt to enforce a fiction or to establish the truth? Such
are the deeds which go to make up the record of crime against the
liberties of mankind.

The proceedings in Arkansas to "institute" a republican State
government were inaugurated by an order from the President of the
United States to Major-General Steele, commanding the United States
forces in Arkansas. At this time the regular government of the State,
established by the consent of the people, was in fall operation
outside the lines of the United States army. The military order of
the President, dated January 20, 1864, said:

"Sundry citizens of the State of Arkansas petitioned me that an
election may be held in that State, in which to elect a Governor;
that it be assumed at that election, and thenceforward, that the
Constitution and laws of the State, as before the rebellion, are in
full force, except that the Constitution is so modified as to declare
that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude," etc.

The order then directs the election to be held for State officers,
prescribes the qualifications of voters and the oath to be taken, and
directs the General to administer to the officers thus chosen an oath
to support the Constitution of the United States, and the "modified
Constitution of the State of Arkansas," when they shall be declared
qualified and empowered immediately to enter upon the duties of their
offices.

The reader can scarcely fail to notice the novel method here adopted
to modify or amend the State Constitution. It should be called the
process by "assumption"--that is, assume it to be modified, and it
is so modified. Then the President orders the officers-elect to be
required to swear, on their oath, to support "the modified
Constitution of the State of Arkansas." Now, unless the Constitution
was thus modified by assuming it to be modified, these State officers
were required by oath to support that which did not exist. But it was
not so modified. No Constitution or other instrument in the world
containing a grant of powers can be modified by assumption, unless it
be the Constitution of the United States, as shown by recent
experience. Yet the chief object for which these officers were
elected and qualified was to carry out these so-called modifications
of the State Constitution. This adds another to the deeds of darkness
done in the name of republicanism.

Meantime some persons in the northern part of Arkansas, acting under
the proclamation of December 8, 1863, got together a so-called State
Convention on January 8, 1864, and adopted a revised Constitution,
containing the slavery prohibition, etc. This was ordered to be
submitted to a popular vote, and at the same time State officers were
to be elected. President Lincoln acceded to these proceedings after
they had been placed under the direction of the military commander,
General Steele. The election was held, the Constitution received
twelve thousand votes, and the State officers were declared to be
elected. Then Arkansas came forth a so-called republican State,
"instituted" by military authority, and, of course, received the
benefit of the constitutional provision, which declares that "the
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
republican form of government." It should be added that Arkansas,
thus "instituted" a State, was regarded by the Government of the
United States as competent to give as valid a vote as New York,
Massachusetts, or any other Northern State, for the ratification of
Article XIII, as an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, prohibiting the existence of slavery in the United States.
The vote was thus given; it was counted, and served to make up the
exact number deemed by the managers to be necessary. Thus was fraud
and falsehood triumphant over popular rights and fundamental law.

The perversion of true republican principles was greater in Virginia
than in any other State, through the coöperation of the Government of
the United States. In the winter of 1860-'61 a special session of the
Legislature of the State convened at Richmond and passed an act
directing the people to elect delegates to a State Convention to be
held on February 14, 1861. The Convention assembled, and was occupied
with the subject of Federal relations and the adjustment of
difficulties until the call for troops by President Lincoln was made,
when an ordinance of secession was passed. The contiguity of the
northwestern counties of the State to Ohio and Pennsylvania led to
the manifestation of much opposition to the withdrawal of the State
from the Union, and the determination to reorganize that portion into
a separate State. This resulted in the assembling of a so-called
convention of delegates at Wheeling on June 11th. One of its first
acts was to provide for a reorganization of the State government of
Virginia by declaring its offices vacant, and the appointment of new
officers throughout. This new organization assumed to be the true
representative of the State of Virginia, and, after various fortunes,
was recognized as such by President Lincoln, as will be presently
seen. The next act of the Convention was "to provide for the
formation of a new State out of a portion of the territory of this
State." Under this act delegates were elected to a so-called
Constitutional Convention which framed a so-called Constitution for
the new State of West Virginia, which was submitted to a vote of the
people in April, 1862, and carried by a large majority of that
section. Meantime the Governor of the reorganized government of
Virginia, above mentioned, issued his proclamation calling for an
election of members, and the assembling of an extra session of the
so-called Legislature. This body assembled on May 6, 1862, and,
adopting the new Federal process of assumption, it assumed to be the
Legislature of the State of Virginia. This body, or Legislature, so
called, immediately passed an act giving its consent to the formation
of a new State out of the territory of Virginia. The formal act of
consent and the draft of the new Constitution of West Virginia above
mentioned were ordered by this so-called Legislature to be sent to
the Congress of the United States, then in session, with the request
that "the said new State be admitted into the Union." On December 31,
1862, the President of the United States approved an act of Congress
entitled "An act for the admission of the State of West Virginia into
the Union," etc. The act recited as follows:

"_Whereas_, The Legislature of Virginia, by an act passed May 13,
1862, did give its consent to the formation of a new State within the
jurisdiction of the said State of Virginia, to be known by the name
of West Virginia," etc.

Again it recites:

"And whereas both the Convention and the Legislature aforesaid have
requested that the new State should be admitted into the Union, and
the Constitution aforesaid being republican in form, Congress doth
hereby consent that the said forty-eight counties may be formed into
a separate and independent State."

It were well to pause for a moment and consider these proceedings in
the light of fundamental republican principles. The State of Virginia
was not a confederation, but a republic, or nation. Its government
was instituted with the consent of the governed, and its powers,
therefore, were "just powers." When the State Convention at Richmond
passed an ordinance of secession, which was subsequently ratified by
sixty thousand majority, it was as valid an act for the people of
Virginia as was ever passed by a representative body. The legally
expressed decision of the majority was the true voice of the State.
When, therefore, disorderly persons in the northwestern counties of
the State assembled and declared the ordinance of secession "to be
null and void," they rose up against the authority of the State. When
they proceeded to elect delegates to a convention to resist the act
of the State, and that Convention assembled and organized and
proceeded to action, an insurrection against the government of
Virginia was begun. When the Convention next declared the State
offices to be vacant, and proceeded to fill them by the choice of
Francis H. Pierpont for Governor, and other State officers, assuming
itself to be the true State Convention of Virginia, it not only
declared what notoriously did not exist, but it committed an act of
revolution. And, when the so-called State officers elected by it
entered upon their duties, they inaugurated a revolution. The
subsequent organization of the State of West Virginia and its
separation from the State of Virginia were acts of secession. Thus we
have, in these movements, insurrection, revolution, and secession.

The reader, in his simplicity, may naturally expect to find the
Government of the United States arrayed, with all its military
forces, against these illegitimate proceedings. Oh, no! It made all
the difference in the world, with the ministers of that Government,
"whose ox it was that was gored by the bull." She was the
nursing-mother to the whole thing, and to insure its vitality fed it,
not, like the fabled bird, with her own blood, but by the butchery of
the mother of States. The words of the Constitution of the United
States applicable to this case are these:

"No new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of
any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or
more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress." [61]

Will any intelligent person assert that the consent of the State of
Virginia was given to the formation of this new State, or that the
government of Francis H. Pierpont held the true and lawful
jurisdiction of the State of Virginia? Yet the Congress of the United
States asserted in the act above quoted that "the Legislature of
Virginia did give its consent to the formation of a new State within
the jurisdiction of the State of Virginia." This was not true, but
was an attempt, by an act of Congress, to aid a fraud and perpetuate
a monstrous usurpation. For there is no grant of power to Congress in
the Constitution nor in the American theory of government to justify
it. If it is said that the government of Francis H. Pierpont was the
only one recognized by Congress as the government of the State of
Virginia, that does not alter the fact. The recognition of Congress
can not make a State of an organization which is not a State. There
is no grant of power to Congress in the Constitution for that
purpose. If it is said that the government of Francis H. Pierpont was
established by the only qualified voters in the State of Virginia,
that is as equally unfounded as the other assertions. Neither the
Congress of the United States nor the Government of the United States
can determine the qualifications of voters at an election for
delegates to a State Constitutional Convention, or for the choice of
State officers. There was no grant of power either to the President
or to Congress for that purpose. All these efforts were usurpations,
by which it was sought, through groundless fabrications, to reach
certain ends, and they add to the multitude of deeds which constitute
the crime committed against States and the liberties of the people.

When the question of the admission of West Virginia was before the
House of Representatives of the United States Congress, Mr. Thaddeus
Stevens, of Pennsylvania, declared, with expiatory frankness, that he
would not stultify himself by claiming the act to be constitutional.
He said, "We know that it is not constitutional, but it is necessity."

It now became necessary for the Government of Virginia, represented
by Francis H. Pierpont, to emigrate; for the new State of West
Virginia embraced the territory in which he was located. He therefore
departed, with his carpet-bag, and located at Alexandria, on the
Potomac, which became the seat of government of so-called East
Virginia. On February 13, 1864, a convention, consisting of a
representative from each of the ten counties in part or wholly under
the control of the United States forces, assembled at Alexandria to
amend the Constitution of the State of Virginia. Some sections
providing for the abolition of slavery were declared to be added to
the Constitution, and the so-called Convention adjourned. Nothing of
importance occurred until after the occupation of Richmond by the
United States forces. On May 9, 1865, President Johnson issued an
"Executive order to reestablish the authority of the United States,
and execute the laws within the geographical limits known as the
State of Virginia." The order closed in these words:

"That, to carry into effect the guarantee of the Federal Constitution
of a republican form of State government, and afford the advantage of
the security of domestic laws, as well as to complete the
reestablishment of the authority of the laws of the United States and
the full and complete restoration of peace within the limits
aforesaid, Francis H. Pierpont, Governor of the State of Virginia,
will be aided by the Federal Government, so far as may be necessary,
in the lawful measures which he may take for the extension and
administration of the State government throughout the geographical
limits of said State."

This order recognized the factitious organization, which was begun in
West Virginia and then transplanted to Alexandria, as the true
government of the State of Virginia, and, by the aid of the United
States Government, was now removed to Richmond and set up there. No
person was allowed to take any part in this government or to vote
under it unless he had previously taken the purgatorial oath above
mentioned, and had not held office under the Confederate or any State
government. Thus, the taking of this oath, which was prescribed by
the President of the United States, became the most important of the
qualifications of a voter. Here was a condition prescribed by a
foreign authority as necessary to be fulfilled before the first act
could be done by a citizen relative to his State government. Such a
government was not republican, for its powers were not derived from
the consent of the governed. Its powers were derived from voters who
had, under oath, said:

"I will abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress, passed
during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and
so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress or by
decision of the Supreme Court; and that I will in like manner abide
by and faithfully support all proclamations of the President, made
during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and
so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme
Court."

Such a State government was not in the interest of the people, but in
the interest of the United States Government. The true republican
organization, which had been "instituted" by the free "consent of the
governed to effect their safety and happiness," had been repudiated
by the Government of the United States as in rebellion to it; and
this fiction had been set up, not by the free consent of the people,
which alone could give to it any "just powers," not "to effect their
safety and happiness," for which alone a republican State government
can be instituted, but solely to secure the safety and supremacy of
the Government of the United States. The qualification of the voter
was prescribed by the United States Government, and the oath required
him to recognize allegiance to the Union as supreme over that to the
State of which he was a citizen. Thus the voters under the State
government of Virginia were required first to protect the Government
of the United States, and then they were at liberty to look after
their own interests through the State government.

Now, it is charged that such acts on the part of the United States
Government were not only entirely unconstitutional, but they caused
the complete subversion of the States. The Constitution of the United
States knows States in the Union only as they are republican States.
The Government of the United States was conscious of this fact, and
publicly recognized it when it promised to guarantee a republican
form of government to each one that it sought to reconstruct. But it
violated the Constitution when it sought to place in the Union mere
fictions which had' not the first element of a republic, which were
groundless fabrications of its own minions that could not have
existed a day without the military support which they received.
Further, it is to be remembered that it does not come within the
grants of the Constitution, consequently not within the powers of the
Government of the United States, to institute a republican form of
government at any time or in any place. Such an act is neither
contemplated nor known in the Constitution, as such a government can
be instituted only by the free consent of those who are to be
governed by it. Any interference on the part of the United States to
limit, modify, or control this consent goes directly to the nature
and objects of the State government, and it ceases to be republican.
To admit a State under such a government is entirely unauthorized,
revolutionary, subversive of the Constitution, and destructive of the
Union of States.

[Footnote 61: Constitution of the United States, Article IV, section 3.]

CHAPTER XXXIV.

This defeat of McClellan's army led me to issue the following address:

"RICHMOND, July 5, 1862.

"_To the Army of Eastern Virginia._

"SOLDIERS: I congratulate you on the series of brilliant victories
which, under the favor of Divine Providence, you have lately won,
and, as the President of the Confederate States, do heartily tender
to you the thanks of the country, whose just cause you have so
skillfully and heroically served. Ten days ago an invading army,
vastly superior to you in numbers and the materials of war, closely
beleaguered your capital and vauntingly proclaimed its speedy
conquest; you marched to attack the enemy in his intrenchments; with
well-directed movements and death-defying valor you charged upon him
in his strong positions, drove him from field to field over a
distance of more than thirty-five miles, and despite his
reënforcements compelled him to seek safety under the cover of his
gunboats, where he now lies cowering before the army so lately
derided and threatened with entire subjugation. The fortitude with
which you have borne toil and privation, the gallantry with which you
have entered into each successive battle, must have been witnessed to
be fully appreciated; but a grateful people will not fail to
recognize you, and to bear you in loved remembrance. Well may it be
said of you that you have 'done enough for glory'; but duty to a
suffering country and to the cause of constitutional liberty claims
from you yet further effort. Let it be your pride to relax in nothing
which can promote your future efficiency; your one great object being
to drive the invader from your soil, and, carrying your standards
beyond the outer boundaries of the Confederacy, to wring from an
unscrupulous foe the recognition of your birthright, community
independence.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

After the retreat of General McClellan to Westover, his army remained
inactive about a month. His front was closely watched by a brigade of
cavalry, and preparations made to resist a renewal of his attempt
upon Richmond from his new base. The main body of our army awaited
the development of his intentions, and no important event took place.

Meantime, another army of the enemy, under Major-General Pope,
advanced southward from Washington, and crossed the Rappahannock as
if to seize Gordonsville, and move thence upon Richmond.
Contemporaneously the enemy appeared in force at Fredericksburg, and
threatened the railroad from Gordonsville to Richmond, apparently for
the purpose of coöperating with the movements of General Pope. To
meet the advance of the latter, and restrain, as far as possible, the
atrocities which he threatened to perpetrate upon our defenseless
citizens, General Jackson, with his own and Ewell's division, was
ordered to proceed on July 13th toward Gordonsville.

The nature of the atrocities here alluded to may be inferred from the
orders of Major-General Pope, which were as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, _July 18, 1862._

"(GENERAL ORDERS, No 5.)

"Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will
subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In
all cases supplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to
whose department they properly belong, under the orders of the
commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended.
Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they
will be payable at the close of the war upon sufficient testimony
being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the
United States since the date of the vouchers. . . .

"By command of Major-General Pope:

"GEORGE D. RUGGLES,

"_Colonel, A. A.-General, and Chief of Staff._"

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA, _July 18, 1862._

"(GENERAL ORDERS, No. 6.)

"Hereafter, in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command,
no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used, unless
so stated especially in the order for the movement. Two days' cooked
rations will be carried on the persons of the men, and all villages
and neighborhoods through which they pass will be laid under
contribution in the manner specified by General Orders, No. 5,
current series, from these headquarters, for the subsistence of men
and horses. . . .

"By command of Major-General Pope:

"GEORGE D. RUGGLES,

"_Colonel, A. A.-General, and Chief of Staff._"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, _July 18, 1862._

"(GENERAL ORDERS, No. 7.)

"The people of the Valley of the Shenandoah and throughout the region
of operations of this army, living along the lines of railroad and
telegraph, and along routes of travel in the rear of United States
forces, are notified that they will be held responsible for any
injury done the track, line, or road, or for any attacks upon the
trains or straggling soldiers, by bands of guerrillas in their
neighborhood. . . . Evil-disposed persons in the rear of our armies,
who do not themselves engage directly in these lawless acts,
encourage by refusing to interfere, or give any information by which
such acts can be prevented or the perpetrators punished. Safety of
the life and property of all persons living in the rear of our
advancing army depends upon the maintenance of peace and quiet among
themselves, and upon the unmolested movements through their midst of
all pertaining to the military service. They are to understand
distinctly that the security of travel is their only warrant of
personal safety. . . . If a soldier or legitimate follower of the
army be fired upon from any house, the house shall be razed to the
ground and the inhabitants sent prisoners to the headquarters of this
army. If such an outrage occur at any place distant from settlements,
the people within five miles around shall be held accountable, and
made to pay an indemnity sufficient for the case; and any person
detected in such outrages, either during the act or at any time
afterward, shall be shot, without waiting civil process. . . .

"By command of Major-General Pope:

"GEORGE D. RUGGLES, _Colonel._"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, _July 23, 1862._

"(GENERAL ORDERS, No. 11.)

"Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and detached commands
will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within
their lines, or within their reach in the rear of their respective
stations.

"Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United
States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance,
shall be permitted to remain at their homes, and pursue in good faith
their accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall be conducted
south beyond the extreme pickets of the army, and be notified that,
if found again anywhere within our lines or at any point in the rear,
they will be considered spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of
the military law. . . .

"By command of Major-General Pope:

"GEORGE D. RUGGLES,

"_Colonel, A. A.-General, and Chief of Staff._"

Thus was announced a policy of pillage, outrage upon unarmed,
peaceable people, arson, and ruthless insult to the defenseless. Had
the vigor of the campaign been equal to the bombastic manifesto of
this disgrace to the profession of arms, the injuries inflicted would
have been more permanent; the conduct could scarcely have been more
brutal.

In recurring to the letter of General George B. McClellan, written at
"Camp near Harrison's Landing, Virginia, July 7, 1862," to the
President of the United States, one must be struck with the strong
contrast between the suggestions of General McClellan and the orders
of General Pope. The inquiry naturally arises, Was it because of this
difference that Pope had been assigned to the command of the Army of
Virginia? McClellan wrote:

"This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should
be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles
known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to
the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should
not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and
political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political
executions of persons, territorial organizations of States, or
forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment.

"In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons
should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of
military operations; all private property taken for military use
should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated
as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and
offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked.
Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where
active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments
constitutionally, should be neither demanded nor received."

Had these views been accepted, and the conduct of the Government of
the United States been in accordance with them, the most shameful
chapters in American history could not have been written, and some of
the more respectable newspapers of the North would not have had the
apprehensions they expressed of the evils which would befall the
country when an army habituated to thieving should be disbanded.

On the reception of copies of the orders issued by General Pope,
inserted above, I addressed to General Lee, commanding our army in
Virginia, the following letter:

"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, _July 31, 1862._

"SIR: On the 23d of this month a cartel for a general exchange of
prisoners of war was signed between Major-General D. H. Hill, in
behalf of the Confederate States, and Major-General John A. Dix, in
behalf of the United States.

"By the terms of that cartel, it is stipulated that all prisoners of
war hereafter taken shall be discharged on parole until exchanged.

"Scarcely had that cartel been signed, when the military authorities
of the United States commenced a practice changing the character of
the war, from such as becomes civilized nations, into a campaign of
indiscriminate robbery and murder.

"The general order issued by the Secretary of War of the United
States, in the city of Washington, on the very day that the cartel
was signed in Virginia, directs the military commanders of the United
States to take the private property of our people for the convenience
and use of their armies, without compensation.

"The general order issued by Major-General Pope, on the 23d of July,
the day after the signing of the cartel, directs the murder of our
peaceful inhabitants as spies, if found quietly tilling their farms
in his rear, _even outside of his lines_; and one of his
brigadier-generals, Steinwehr, has seized upon innocent and peaceful
inhabitants, to be held as hostages, to the end that they may be
murdered in cold blood if any of his soldiers are killed by some
unknown persons, whom he designates as 'bushwhackers.'

"Under this state of facts, this Government has issued the inclosed
general order, recognizing General Pope and his commissioned officers
to be in the position which they have chosen for themselves, that of
robbers and murderers, and not that of public enemies, entitled, if
captured, to be considered as prisoners of war.

"We find ourselves driven by our enemies in their steady progress
toward a practice which we abhor, and which we are vainly struggling
to avoid. Some of the military authorities of the United States seem
to suppose that better success will attend a savage war in which no
quarter is to be given and no sex to be spared than has hitherto been
secured by such hostilities as are alone recognized to be lawful by
civilized men in modern times.

"For the present, we renounce our right of retaliation on the
innocent, and shall continue to treat the private enlisted soldiers
of General Pope's army as prisoners of war; but if, after notice to
the Government at Washington of our confining repressive measures to
the punishment only of commissioned officers, who are willing
participants in these crimes, these savage practices are continued,
we shall reluctantly be forced to the last resort of accepting the
war on the terms chosen by our foes, until the outraged voice of a
common humanity forces a respect for the recognized rules of war.

"While these facts would justify our refusal to execute the generous
cartel, by which we have consented to liberate an excess of thousands
of prisoners held by us beyond the number held by the enemy, a sacred
regard to plighted faith, shrinking from the mere semblance of
breaking a promise, prevents our resort to this extremity. Nor do we
desire to extend to any other forces of the enemy the punishment
merited alone by General Pope and such commissioned officers as
choose to participate in the execution of his infamous orders.

"You are therefore instructed to communicate to the
commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States the contents of
this letter and a copy of the inclosed general order, to the end that
he may be notified of our intention not to consider any officers
hereafter captured from General Pope's army as prisoners of war. Very
respectfully, yours, etc.,

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

When General Jackson arrived near Gordonsville on July 19, 1862, he
was at his request reënforced by Major-General A. P. Hill. Receiving
information that only a part of General Pope's army was at Culpeper
Court-House, General Jackson, hoping to defeat it before
reënforcements should arrive, moved in that direction the divisions
of Ewell, Hill, and Jackson, on August 7th, from their encampments
near Gordonsville. As the enemy's cavalry displayed unusual activity
and the train of Jackson's division was seriously endangered, General
Lawton with his brigade was ordered to guard it. On August 9th
Jackson arrived within eight miles of Culpeper Court-House and found
the foe in his front near Cedar Run and a short distance west and
north of Slaughter Mountain. When first seen, the cavalry in large
force occupied a ridge to the right of the road. A battery opened
upon it and soon forced it to retire. Our fire was responded to by
some guns beyond the ridge from which the advance had just been
driven. Soon after, the cavalry returned to the position where it was
first seen, and General Early was ordered forward, keeping near the
Culpeper road, while General Ewell with his two remaining brigades
diverged from the road to the right, advancing along the western
slope of Slaughter Mountain. General Early, forming his brigade in
line of battle, moved into the open field, and, passing a short
distance to the right of the road but parallel to it, pushed forward,
driving the opposing cavalry before him to the crest of a hill which
overlooked the ground between his troops and the opposite hill, along
which the enemy's batteries were posted, and opened upon him as soon
as he reached the eminence. Early retired his troops under the
protection of the hill, and a small battery of ours, in advance of
his right, opened. Meantime General Winder with Jackson's brigade was
placed on the left of the road, Campbell's brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel
Garnett commanding, being on the left, Taliaferro's parallel to the
road, supporting the batteries, and Winder's own brigade under Colonel
Roland in reserve. The battle opened with a fierce fire of artillery,
which continued about two hours, during which Brigadier-General Charles
S. Winder, while directing the positions of his batteries, received a
wound, from the effects of which he expired in a few hours. General
Jackson thus spoke of him in his report:

"It is difficult, within the proper reserve of an official report, to
do justice to the merits of this accomplished officer. Urged by the
medical director to take no part in the movements of the day, because
of the then enfeebled state of his health, his ardent patriotism and
military pride could bear no restraint. Richly endowed with those
qualities of mind and person which fit an officer for command, and
which attract the admiration and excite the enthusiasm of troops, he
was rapidly rising to the front rank of his profession. His loss has
been severely felt."

Charles Winder had attracted my special notice, when I was Secretary
of War of the United States, by an act of heroism and devotion to
duty which it gives me pleasure to record. A regiment of artillery,
in which he was a second-lieutenant, being under orders for
California, embarked on the steamer San Francisco, and in a storm
became disabled; drifting helplessly at sea, she was approached by a
bark which, to give succor, hove to. Not being able to receive all
the passengers, the commissioned officers left, as the Colonel
naively reported, in the order of their rank. Winder alone remained
with the troops; in great discomfort and by strenuous exertion the
wreck was kept afloat until a vessel bound for Liverpool came to the
relief of the sufferers.

Arriving at Liverpool, Winder left the soldiers there, went to the
American consul in London, got means to provide for their needs, and
returned with them. Soon afterward, four regiments were added to the
army, and, for his good conduct so full of promise, he was nominated
to be a captain of infantry, and, notwithstanding his youth, was
confirmed and commissioned accordingly. He died manifesting the same
spirit as on the wreck--that which holds life light when weighed
against honor.

The enemy's infantry advanced about 5 P.M., and attacked General
Early in front, while another body, concealed by the inequality of
the ground, moved upon his right. Thomas's brigade, of A. P. Hill's
division, which had now arrived, was sent to his support, and the
contest soon became animated. In the mean time the main body of the
opposing army, under cover of a wood and the undulations of the
field, gained the left of Jackson's division, now commanded by
Brigadier-General Taliaferro, and poured a destructive fire into its
flank and rear. Campbell's brigade fell back in confusion, exposing
the flank of Taliaferro's, which also gave way, as did the left of
Early's. The rest of his brigade, however, firmly held its ground.

Winder's brigade, with Branch's, of A. P. Hill's division, on its
right, advanced promptly to the support of Jackson's division, and
after a sanguinary struggle the assailants were repulsed with loss.
Pender's and Archer's brigades, also of Hill's division, came up on
the left of Winder's, and by a general charge the foe was driven back
in confusion, leaving the ground covered with his dead and wounded.
General Ewell, with the two brigades on the extreme right, had been
prevented from advancing by the fire of our own artillery, which
swept his approach to the enemy's left. The obstacle being now
removed, he pressed forward under a hot fire, and came gallantly into
action. Repulsed and vigorously followed on our left and center, and
now hotly pressed on our right, the whole line of the enemy gave way,
and was soon in full retreat. Night had now set in, but General
Jackson, desiring to enter Culpeper Court-House before morning,
determined to pursue. Hill's division led the advance; but, owing to
the darkness, it was compelled to move slowly and with caution.

The enemy was found about a mile and a half in the rear of the field
of battle, and information was received that reënforcements had
arrived. General Jackson thereupon halted for the night, and the next
day, becoming satisfied that the enemy's force had been so largely
increased as to render a further advance on his part imprudent, he
sent his wounded to the rear, and proceeded to bury the dead and
collect the arms from the battlefield. On the 11th the enemy asked
and received permission to bury those of his dead not already
interred. General Jackson remained in position during the day, and at
night returned to the vicinity of Gordonsville. In this engagement
400 prisoners, including a brigadier-general were captured, and 5,300
stand of small-arms, one piece of artillery, several caissons, and
three colors, fell into our hands. Our killed were 229, wounded
1,047, total 1,276. The loss on the other side exceeded 1,500, of
whom nearly 300 were taken prisoners.

The victory of Cedar Run effectually checked the invader for the
time; but it soon became apparent that his army was receiving a large
increase. The corps of Major-General Burnside, from North Carolina,
which had reached Fredericksburg, was reported to have moved up the
Rappahannock, a few days after the battle, to unite with General
Pope, and a part of General McClellan's army had left Westover for
the same purpose. It therefore seemed that active operations on the
James were no longer contemplated, and that the most effectual way to
relieve Richmond from any danger of an attack would be to reënforce
General Jackson and advance upon General Pope.

Accordingly, on August 13th, Longstreet, Anderson, and Stuart were
ordered to proceed to Gordonsville. On the 16th the troops began to
move from the vicinity of Gordonsville toward the Rapidan, on the
north side of which, extending along the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad in the direction of Culpeper Court-House, the army of
invasion lay in great force. It was determined, with the cavalry, to
destroy the railroad-bridge over the Rappahannock in rear of the
enemy, while Jackson and Longstreet crossed the Rapidan and attacked
his left flank. But, the enemy becoming apprised of our design,
hastily retreated beyond the Rappahannock. On the 21st our forces
moved toward that river, and some sharp skirmishing ensued with our
cavalry that had crossed at Beverly's Ford. As it had been determined
in the mean time not to attempt the passage of the river at that
point with the army, the cavalry withdrew to the south side. Soon
afterward the enemy appeared in great strength on the opposite bank,
and an active fire was kept up during the rest of the day between his
artillery and the batteries attached to Jackson's leading division,
under Brigadier-General Taliaferro.

But, as our positions on the south bank of the Rappahannock were
commanded by those on the north bank, and which served to guard all
the fords, General Lee determined to seek a more favorable place to
cross higher up the river, and thus gain his adversary's right.
Accordingly, General Longstreet was directed to leave Kelly's Ford on
the 21st, and take the position in the vicinity of Beverly's Ford and
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad bridge, then held by Jackson, in
order to mask the movement of the latter, who was instructed to
ascend the river. On the 22d Jackson proceeded up the Rappahannock,
leaving Trimble's brigade near Freeman's Ford to protect his train.
In the afternoon Longstreet sent General Hood with his own and
Whiting's brigade to relieve Trimble. Hood had just reached the
position, when he and Trimble were attacked by a considerable force
which had crossed at Freeman's Ford. After a short but spirited
engagement, the enemy was driven precipitately over the river with
heavy loss. General Jackson attempted to cross at Warrenton Springs
Ford, but was interrupted by a heavy rain, which caused the river to
rise so rapidly as to be impassable for infantry and artillery, and
he withdrew the troops that had reached the opposite side. General
Stuart, who had been directed to cut the railroad in rear of General
Pope's army, crossed the Rappahannock on the morning of the 22d,
about six miles above the Springs, with parts of Lee's and
Robertson's brigades. He reached Catlet's Station that night, but was
prevented destroying the railroad-bridge there by the same storm that
arrested Jackson's movements. He captured more than three hundred
prisoners, including a number of officers. Apprehensive of the effect
of the rain upon the streams, he recrossed the Rappahannock at
Warrenton Springs. The rise of the river, rendering the lower fords
impassable, enabled the enemy to concentrate his main body opposite
General Jackson, and on the 24th Longstreet was ordered by General
Lee to proceed to his support. Although retarded by the swollen
condition of Hazel River and other tributaries of the Rappahannock,
he reached Jeffersonton in the afternoon. General Jackson's command
lay between that place and the Spring's Ford, and a warm cannonade
was progressing between the batteries of General A. P. Hill's
division and those in his front. The enemy was massed between
Warrenton and the Springs, and guarded the fords of the Rappahannock
as far above as Waterloo.

The army of General McClellan had left Westover, and a part had
marched to join General Pope. It was reported that the rest would
soon follow. The greater part of the army of General Cox had also
been withdrawn from the Kanawha Valley for the same purpose. Two
brigades of D. H. Hill's division, under General Ripley, had already
been ordered from Richmond, and the remainder were to follow; also,
McLaws's division, two brigades under General Walker, and Hampton's
cavalry brigade. In pursuance of the plan of operations now
determined upon, Jackson was directed, on the 25th, to cross above
Waterloo and move around the enemy's right, so as to strike the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad in his rear. Longstreet, in the mean
time, was to divert his attention by threatening him in front, and to
follow Jackson as soon as the latter should be sufficiently advanced.

General Jackson crossed the Rappahannock on the 25th, about four
miles above Waterloo, and, after sunset on the 26th, reached the
railroad at Bristoe Station. At Gainesville he was joined by General
Stuart, with the brigades of Robertson and Fitzhugh Lee, who
continued with him during his operations, and effectually guarded
both his flanks.

General Jackson was now between the large army of General Pope and
Washington City, without having encountered any considerable force.
At Bristoe two trains of cars were captured and a few prisoners
taken. Determining, notwithstanding the darkness of the night and the
long and arduous march of the day, to capture the depot of the enemy
at Manassas Junction, about seven miles distant, General Trimble
volunteered to proceed at once to that place with the Twenty-first
North Carolina and the Twenty-first Georgia Regiments. The offer was
accepted, and, to render success more certain, General Stuart was
directed to accompany the expedition with part of his cavalry. About
midnight the place was taken with little difficulty. Eight pieces of
artillery, with their horses, ammunition, and equipments were
captured; more than three hundred prisoners, one hundred and
seventy-five horses, besides those belonging to the artillery, two
hundred new tents, and immense quantities of commissary and
quartermaster's stores, fell into our hands.

Ewell's division, with the Fifth Virginia Cavalry under Colonel
Bosser, were left at Bristoe Station, and the rest of the command
arrived at the Junction early on the 27th. Soon a considerable force
of the enemy, under Brigadier-General Taylor, of New Jersey,
approached from the direction of Alexandria, and pushed forward
boldly to recover the stores. After a sharp engagement he was routed
and driven back, leaving his killed and wounded on the field. The
troops remained at Manassas Junction during the day, and supplied
themselves with everything they required. In the afternoon, two
brigades advanced against General Ewell, at Bristoe, from the
direction of Warrenton Junction, but were broken and repulsed. Their
place was soon supplied with fresh troops, but it was apparent that
the commander had now become aware of the situation of affairs, and
had turned upon General Jackson with his whole force. General Ewell,
perceiving the strength of the column, withdrew and rejoined General
Jackson, having first destroyed the railroad-bridge over Broad Run.
The enemy halted at Bristoe. General Jackson, having a much inferior
force to General Pope, retired from Manassas Junction and took a
position west of the turnpike-road from Warrenton to Alexandria,
where he could more readily unite with the approaching column of
Longstreet. Having supplied the wants of his troops, he was
compelled, through lack of transportation, to destroy the rest of the
captured property. Many thousand pounds of bacon, a thousand barrels
of corned beef, two thousand barrels of salt pork, and two thousand
barrels of floor, besides other property of great value, were burned.

During the night of the 27th of August Taliaferro's division crossed
the turnpike near Groveton and halted on the west side, near the
battle-field of July 21, 1861, where it was joined on the 28th by the
divisions of Hill and Ewell. During the afternoon the enemy,
approaching from the direction of Warrenton down the turnpike toward
Alexandria, exposed his left flank, and General Jackson determined to
attack him. A fierce and sanguinary conflict ensued which continued
until about 9 P.M., when he slowly fell back and left us in
possession of the field, the loss on both sides was heavy. On the
next morning (the 29th) the enemy had taken a position to interpose
his army between General Jackson and Alexandria, and about 10 A.M.
opened with artillery upon the right of Jackson's line. The troops of
the latter were disposed in rear of Groveton, along the line of the
unfinished branch of the Manassas Gap Railroad, and extending from a
point a short distance west of the turnpike toward Sudley Mill,
Jackson's division under Brigadier-General Starke being on the right,
Swell's under General Lawton in the center, and A. P. Hill on the
left. The attacking columns were evidently concentrating on Jackson
with the design of overwhelming him before the arrival of Longstreet.
This latter officer left his position opposite Warrenton Springs on
the 26th and marched to join Jackson. On the 28th, arriving at
Thoroughfare Gap, he found the enemy prepared to dispute his
progress. Holding the eastern extremity of the pass with a large
force, the enemy directed a heavy fire of artillery upon the road
leading to it and upon the sides of the mountain. An attempt was made
to turn his right, but, before our troops reached their destination,
he advanced to the attack, and, being vigorously repulsed, withdrew
to his position at the eastern end of the Gap, keeping up an active
fire of artillery until dark. He then retreated. On the morning of
the 29th Longstreet's command resumed its march, the sound of cannon
at Manassas announcing that Jackson was already engaged. The head of
the column came upon the field in rear of the enemy's left, which had
already opened with artillery upon Jackson's right, as above stated.
Longstreet immediately placed some of his batteries in position, but,
before he could complete his dispositions to attack the force before
him, it withdrew to another part of the field. He then took position
on the right of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans,
being deployed across the turnpike and at right angles to it. These
troops were supported on the left by three brigades under General
Wilcox, and by a like force on the right under General Kemper. D. B.
Jones's division formed the extreme right of the line, resting on the
Manassas Gap Railroad. The cavalry guarded our right and left flanks,
that on the right being under General Stuart in person. After the
arrival of Longstreet the enemy changed his position and began to
concentrate opposite Jackson's left, opening a brisk artillery-fire,
which was responded to by some of A. P. Hill's batteries.

Soon afterward General Stuart reported the approach of a large force
from the direction of Bristoe Station, threatening Longstreet's
right. But no serious attack was made, and, after firing a few shots,
that force withdrew. Meanwhile a large column advanced to assail the
left of Jackson's position, occupied by the division of General A. P.
Hill. The attack was received by his troops with their accustomed
steadiness, and the battle raged with great fury. The enemy was
repeatedly repulsed, but again pressed on the attack with fresh
troops. Once he succeeded in penetrating an interval between General
Gregg's brigade on the extreme left and that of General Thomas, but
was quickly driven back with great slaughter by the Fourteenth South
Carolina Regiment, then in reserve, and the Forty-ninth Georgia of
Thomas's brigade. The contest was close and obstinate; the combatants
sometimes delivered their fire at a few paces. General Gregg, who was
most exposed, was reënforced by Hays's brigade under Colonel Forno.
Gregg had successfully and most gallantly resisted the attack until
the ammunition of his brigade was exhausted and all his
field-officers but two killed or wounded. The reënforcement was of
like high-tempered steel, and together in hand-to-hand fight they
held their post until they were relieved, after several hours of
severe fighting, by Early's brigade and the Eighth Louisiana
Regiment. General Early drove the enemy back with heavy loss, and
pursued about two hundred yards beyond the line of battle, when he
was recalled to the position on the railroad, where Thomas, Pender,
and Archer had firmly held their ground against every attack. While
the battle was raging on Jackson's left, Hood and Evans were ordered
by Longstreet to advance, but, before the order could be obeyed, Hood
was himself attacked, and his command became at once warmly engaged.
The enemy was repulsed by Hood after a severe contest, and fell back,
closely followed by our troops.

The battle continued until 9 P.M., the foe retreating until he
reached a strong position, which he held with a large force. Our
troops remained in their advanced position until early next morning,
when they were withdrawn to their first line. One piece of artillery,
several stands of colors, and a number of prisoners were captured.
Our loss was severe. On the morning of the 30th the enemy again
advanced, and skirmishing began along the line. The troops of Jackson
and Longstreet maintained their position of the previous day. At noon
the firing of the batteries ceased, and all was quiet for some hours.

About 3 P.M. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of General
Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front
line pushed forward until it was engaged at close quarters by
Jackson's troops, when its progress was cheeked, and a fierce and
bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line of great strength
moved up to support the first, but in doing so came within easy range
of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He
immediately ordered up two batteries, and, two others being thrown
forward about the same time by Colonel S. D. Lee, the supporting
lines were broken, and fell back in confusion under their
well-directed and destructive fire. Their repeated efforts to rally
were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the
pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward,
driving everything before them. The enemy retreated in confusion,
suffering severely from our artillery, which advanced as he retired.
General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now
threw his whole command against the center and left. The whole line
swept steadily on, driving the opponents with great carnage from each
successive position, until 10 P.M., when darkness put an end to the
battle and the pursuit.

The obscurity of the night and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull
Run rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning, when
the cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the retreat had
continued to the strong position of Centreville, about four miles
beyond Bull Run. The prevalence of a heavy rain, which began during
the night, threatened to render Bull Bun impassable, and to impede
our movements. Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage
attention and to protect parties for the burial of the dead and the
removal of the wounded, while Jackson proceeded by Sudley's Ford to
the Little River turnpike to turn the enemy's right, and intercept
his retreat to Washington. Jackson's progress was retarded by the
inclemency of the weather and the fatigue of his troops. He reached
the turnpike in the evening, and the next day (September 1st)
advanced by that road toward Fairfax Court-House. The enemy in the
mean time was falling back rapidly toward Washington, and had thrown
a strong force to Germantown, on the Little River turnpike, to cover
his line of retreat from Centreville. The advance of Jackson
encountered him at Ox Hill, near Germantown, about 5 P.M. Line of
battle was at once formed, and two brigades were thrown forward to
attack and ascertain the strength of the position. A cold and
drenching rain-storm drove in the faces of our troops as they
advanced and gallantly engaged. They were subsequently supported, and
the conflict was obstinately maintained until dark, when the enemy
retreated, having lost two general officers, one of whom--
Major-General Kearney--was left dead on the field. Longstreet's
command arrived after the action was over, and the next morning it
was found that the retreat had been so rapid that the attempt to
intercept was abandoned. The proximity of the fortifications around
Alexandria and Washington was enough to prevent further pursuit. Our
army rested during the 2d near Chantilly, the retreating foe being
followed only by our cavalry, who continued to harass him until he
reached the shelter of his intrenchments.

In the series of engagements on the plains of Manassas more than
seven thousand prisoners were taken, in addition to about two
thousand wounded left in our hands. Thirty pieces of artillery,
upward of twenty thousand stand of small-arms, numerous colors, and a
large amount of stores, besides those taken by General Jackson at
Manassas Junction, were captured.

Major-General Pope in his report says:

"The whole force that I had at Centreville, as reported to me by the
corps commanders, on the morning of the 1st of September, was as
follows: McDowell's corps, 10,000 men; Sigel's corps, about 7,000;
Heintzelman's corps, about 6,000; Reno's, 6,000; Banks's, 5,000;
Sumner's, 11,000; Porter's, 10,000; Franklin's, 8,000--in all,
63,000 men. . . . The small fraction of 20,500 men was all of the
91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's landing which ever drew trigger
under my command."

Our losses in the engagement at Manassas Plains were considerable.
The number killed was 1,090; wounded, 6,154--total, 7,244. The loss
of the enemy in killed, wounded, and missing was estimated between
15,000 and 20,000. The strength of our army in July and September is
stated on a preceding page.

CHAPTER XXXV.

The enemy having retired to the protection of the fortifications
around Washington and Alexandria, Lee's army marched, on September
3d, toward Leesburg. The armies of Generals McClellan and Pope had
now been brought back to the point from which they set out on the
campaign of the spring and summer. The objects of those campaigns had
been frustrated, and the hostile designs against the coast of North
Carolina and in western Virginia, thwarted by the withdrawal of the
main body of the forces from those regions.

Northeastern Virginia was freed from the presence of the invader. His
forces had withdrawn to the intrenchments of Washington. Soon after
the arrival of our army at Leesburg, information was received that
the hostile troops which had occupied Winchester had retired to
Harper's Ferry. The war was thus transferred from the interior to the
frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts were made
accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs, in every way
desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass
without endeavoring to impose further check on our assailant, the
best course appeared to be the transfer of our army into Maryland.
Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much of the
material of war, and deficient in transportation, the troops poorly
provided with clothing, and thousands of them without shoes, it was
yet believed to be strong enough to detain the opposing army upon the
northern frontier until the approach of winter should render its
advance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable.

The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of
our army, though numerically inferior to that of the North, would
induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to
provide against contingencies which its conduct toward the people of
that State gave reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped
that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the
citizens of Maryland in any efforts they should be disposed to make
to recover their liberty. The difficulties that surrounded them were
fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the
attainment of our object from the just fears of the Washington
Government than from any active demonstration on the part of the
people of Maryland, unless success should enable us to give them
assurance of continued protection. Influenced by these considerations,
the army was put in motion.

It was decided to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order,
by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to
withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our
communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our
wounded and the captured property from the late battle-field. Having
accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into
western Maryland, establish our communication with Richmond through
the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania,
induce the enemy to withdraw from our territory for the protection of
his own.

General D. H. Hill's division, being in advance, crossed the Potomac,
between September 4th and 7th, at the ford near Leesburg, and
encamped in the vicinity of Frederick. It had been supposed that this
advance would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's
Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the Shenandoah
Valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the
garrisons from those positions before concentrating the army west of
the mountains. For this purpose General Jackson marched very rapidly,
crossed the Potomac near Williamsport on the 11th, sent Hill's
division directly to Martinsburg, and disposed of the rest of the
command so as to cut off retreat to the westward. The enemy evacuated
Martinsburg and retired to Harper's Ferry on the night of the 11th,
and Jackson entered the former on the 12th. Meanwhile General McLaws
had been ordered to seize Maryland Heights on the north side of the
Potomac, opposite Harper's Ferry, and General Walker took possession
of Loudon Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah, where it
unites with the Potomac, and was in readiness to open fire upon
Harper's Ferry. But McLaws found the heights in possession of the
foe, with infantry and artillery, protected by intrenchments. On the
13th he assailed the works, and after a spirited contest they were
carried; the troops made good their retreat to Harper's Ferry, and on
the next day its investment was complete.

At the same time that the march of these troops upon Harper's Ferry
began, the remainder of General Longstreet's command and the division
of D. H. Hill crossed the South Mountain and moved toward Boonsboro.
General Stuart with the cavalry remained east of the mountains to
observe the enemy and retard his advance. Longstreet continued his
march to Hagerstown, and Hill halted near Boonsboro to support the
cavalry and to prevent the force invested at Harper's Ferry from
escaping through Pleasant Valley. The advance of the hostile army was
then so slow as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harper's
Ferry would be accomplished and our troops concentrated before they
would be called upon to meet the foe. In that event it had not been
intended to oppose his passage through South Mountain, as it was
desired to engage him as far as possible from his base. But a copy of
Lee's order, directing the movement of the army from Frederick,
happening to fall into the hands of McClellan, disclosed to him the
disposition of our forces. He immediately began to push forward
rapidly, and on the afternoon of the 13th was reported as approaching
the pass in South Mountain on the Boonsboro and Frederick road.
General Stuart's cavalry impeded his progress, and time was thus
gained for preparations to oppose his advance.

In Taylor's "Four Years with General Lee" some facts relative to this
lost order are stated. An order of battle was issued, stating in
detail the position and duly assigned to each command of the army:

"It was the custom to send copies of such orders, marked
'confidential,' to the commanders of separate corps or divisions
only, and to place the address of such separate commander in the
bottom left-hand comer of the sheet containing the order. General D.
H. Hill was in command of a division which had not been attached to
nor incorporated with either of the two wings of the Army of Northern
Virginia. A copy of the order was, therefore, in the usual course,
sent to him. After the evacuation of Frederick City by our forces, a
copy of General Lee's order was found in a deserted camp by a
soldier, and was soon in the hands of General McClellan. The copy of
the order, it was stated at the time, was addressed to 'General D. H
Hill, commanding division.' General Hill has assured me that it could
not have been his copy, because he still has the original order
received by him in his possession." [62]

General D. H. Hill guarded the Boonsboro Gap, and Longstreet was
ordered to support him, in order to prevent a force from penetrating
the mountains at this point, in the rear of McLaws, so as to relieve
the garrison at Harper's Ferry. Early on the 14th a large body of the
enemy attempted to force its way to the rear of the position held by
Hill, by a road south of the Boonsboro and Frederick turnpike. The
small command of Hill, with Garland's brigade, repelled the repeated
assaults of the army, and held it in check for five hours.
Longstreet, leaving a brigade at Hagerstown, hurried to the
assistance of Hill, and reached the scene of action between 3 and 4
P.M. The battle continued with great animation until night. On the
south of the turnpike the assailant was driven back some distance,
and his attack on the center repulsed with loss. Darkness put an end
to the contest.

The effort to force the pass of the mountain had failed, but it was
manifest that without reënforcements Lee could not hazard a renewal
of the engagement; for McClellan, by his great superiority of
numbers, could easily turn either flank. Information was also
received that another large body of his troops had, during the
afternoon, forced its way through Crampton Gap, only five miles in
rear of McLaws. Under these circumstances it was determined to retire
to Sharpsburg, where we would be on the flank and rear of the enemy
should he move against McLaws, and where we could more readily unite
with the rest of our army. This movement, skillfully and efficiently
covered by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, was
accomplished without interruption. The advance of McClellan's army
did not appear on the west side of the pass at Boonsboro until about
8 A.M. on the following morning.

The resistance that our troops had offered there secured sufficient
time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harper's
Ferry. The attack on the garrison began at dawn on the 15th. A rapid
and vigorous fire was opened by the batteries of General Jackson, in
conjunction with those on Maryland and Loudon Heights. In about two
hours, the garrison, consisting of more than eleven thousand men,
surrendered. Seventy-three pieces of artillery, about thirteen
thousand small-arms, and a large quantity of military stores fell
into our hands. General A. P. Hill remained formally to receive the
surrender of the troops and to secure the captured property.

The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill reached Sharpsburg on the
morning of the 15th. General Jackson arrived early on the 16th, and
General J. G. Walker came up in the afternoon. The movements of
General McLaws were embarrassed by the presence of the enemy in
Crampton Gap. He retained his position until the 14th, when, finding
that he was not to be attacked, he gradually withdrew his command
toward the Potomac, then crossed at Harper's Ferry, and marched by
way of Shepardstown. His progress was slow, and he did not reach the
battle-field at Sharpsburg until some time after the engagement of
the 17th began.

At this time the letter, from which the following extract is made,
was addressed by me to General R. E. Lee, commanding our forces in
Maryland:

"SIR: It is deemed proper that you should, in accordance with
established usage, announce, by proclamation, to the people of
Maryland, the motives and purposes of your presence among them at the
head of an invading army; and you are instructed in such proclamation
to make known," etc.

In obedience to instructions, General Lee issued the following
address:

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, NEAR FREDERICK,
_September 8, 1862._

"TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND: It is right that you should know the
purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits
of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.

"The people of the Confederate States have long watched, with the
deepest sympathy, the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted
upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the South
by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties, and reduced
to the condition of a conquered province.

"Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation
of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and
imprisoned upon no charge, and contrary to the forms of law.

"A faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by a
venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in his better days no
citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and
contempt.

"The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed
strangers; your Legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest
of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been
suppressed; words have been declared offenses by an arbitrary decree
of the Federal Executive; and citizens ordered to be tried by
military commissions for what they may dare to speak.

"Believing that the people of Maryland possess a spirit too lofty to
submit to such a Government, the people of the South have long wished
to aid yon in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to
enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore the independence
and sovereignty of your State.

"In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is
prepared to assist yon with the power of its arms in regaining the
rights of which you have been so unjustly despoiled.

"This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as yon are
concerned. No restraint upon your free-will is intended; no
intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army at least.
Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought
and speech. We know no enemies among you, and will protect all of you
in every opinion.

"It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint.
This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the
Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position
among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free
will.

"R. E. LEE, _General commanding._"

The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, on their arrival at
Sharpsburg, were placed in position along the range of hills between
the town and the Antietam, nearly parallel to the course of that
stream, Longstreet on the right of the road to Boonsboro and Hill on
the left. The advance of the enemy was delayed by the determined
opposition he encountered from Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, and he did not
appear on the opposite side of the Antietam until about 2 P.M. During
the afternoon the batteries on each side were partially engaged. On
the 16th the artillery-fire became warm, and continued throughout the
day. A column crossed the Antietam beyond the reach of our batteries
and menaced our left. In anticipation of this movement Hood's two
brigades had been transferred from the right and posted between D. H.
Hill and the Hagerstown road. General Jackson was now directed to
take position on Hood's left, and formed his line with his right
resting on the Hagerstown road and his left extending toward the
Potomac, protected by General Stuart with the cavalry and
horse-artillery. General Walker with his two brigades was stationed
on Longstreet's right. As evening approached, the enemy fired more
vigorously with his artillery and bore down heavily with his infantry
upon Hood, but the attack was gallantly repulsed. At 10 P.M. Hood's
troops were relieved by the brigades of Lawton and Trimble, of
Ewell's division, commanded by General Lawton. Jackson's own
division, under General J. K. Jones, was on Lawton's left, supported
by the remaining brigades of Ewell.

At early dawn on the 17th his artillery opened vigorously from both
sides of the Antietam, the heaviest fire being directed against our
left. Under cover of this fire a large force of infantry attacked
General Jackson's division. They were met by his troops with the
utmost resolution, and for several hours the conflict raged with
intense fury and alternate success. Our troops advanced with great
spirit; the enemy's lines were repeatedly broken and forced to
retire. Fresh troops, however, soon replaced those that were beaten,
and Jackson's men were in turn compelled to fall back. Nearly all the
field officers, with a large proportion of the men, were killed or
wounded. Our troops slowly yielded to overwhelming numbers, and fell
back, obstinately disputing every point. General Early, in command of
Ewell's division, was ordered with his brigade to take the place of
Jackson's division, most of which was withdrawn, its ammunition being
nearly exhausted and its numbers much reduced. The battle now raged
with great violence, the small commands under Hood and Early holding
their ground against many times their own infantry force and under a
tremendous fire of artillery. Hood was reënforced; then the enemy's
lines were broken and driven back, but fresh numbers advanced to
their support, and they began to gain ground. The desperate
resistance they encountered, however, delayed their progress until
the troops of McLaws arrived, and those of General J. G. Walker could
be brought from the right. Hood's brigade, though it had suffered
extraordinary loss, only withdrew to replenish their ammunition,
their supply being entirely exhausted. They were relieved by Walker's
command, who immediately attacked vigorously, driving his combatant
back with much slaughter. Upon the arrival of the reënforcements
under McLaws, General Early attacked resolutely the large force
opposed to him. McLaws advanced at the same time, and the forces
before them were driven back in confusion, closely followed by our
troops beyond the position occupied at the beginning of the
engagement.

The attack on our left was speedily followed by one in heavy force on
the center. This was met by part of Walker's division and the
brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes, of D. H. Hill's command,
assisted by a few pieces of artillery. General R, H. Anderson's
division came to Hill's support, and formed in rear of his line. At
this time, by a mistake of orders, Rodes's brigade was withdrawn from
its position; during the absence of that command a column pressed
through the gap thus created, and G. B. Anderson's brigade was broken
and retired. The heavy masses moved forward, being opposed only by
four pieces of artillery, supported by a few hundred of our men
belonging to different brigades rallied by Hill and other officers,
and parts of Walker's and B. H. Anderson's commands. Colonel Cooke,
with the Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment, stood boldly in line
without a cartridge. The firm front presented by this small force and
the well-directed fire of the artillery checked the progress of the
enemy, and in about an hour and a half he retired. Another attack was
made soon afterward a little farther to the right, but was repulsed
by Miller's guns, of the Washington Artillery, which continued to
hold the ground until the close of the engagement, supported by a
part of R. H. Anderson's troops. The corps designated the Washington
Artillery was composed of Louisiana batteries, organized at New
Orleans in the beginning of the war, under Colonel I. B. Walton. It
was distinguished by its services in the first great battle of
Manassas, and in nearly every important conflict, as well of the army
of Virginia as that of Tennessee, to the close of the war. In the
official reports and in the traditions of both armies the names of
the batteries of the Washington Artillery have frequent and honorable
mention.

While the attack on the center and left was in progress, repeated
efforts were made to force the passage of the bridge over the
Antietam, opposite the right wing of Longstreet, commanded by
Brigadier-General D. R. Jones. The bridge was defended by General
Toombs with two regiments of his brigade and the batteries of General
Jones. This small command repulsed five different assaults, made by a
greatly superior force. In the afternoon the enemy, in large numbers,
having passed the stream, advanced against General Jones, who held
the ridge with less than two thousand men. After a determined and
brave resistance, he was forced to give way, and the summit was
gained. General A. P. Hill, having arrived from Harper's Ferry, was
now ordered to reënforce General Jones. He moved to his support and
attacked the force now flushed with success. Hill's batteries were
thrown forward and united their fire with those of Jones, and one of
D. H. Hill's also opened with good effect from the left of the
Boonsboro road. The progress of the enemy was immediately arrested,
and his line began to waver. At this moment General Jones ordered
Toombs to charge the flank, while Archer, supported by Branch and
Gregg, moved on the front of the enemy's line. After a brief
resistance, he broke and retreated in confusion toward the Antietam,
pursued by the troops of Hill and Jones, until he reached the
protection of the batteries on the opposite side of the river.

It was now nearly dark, and McClellan had massed a number of
batteries to sweep the approach to the Antietam, on the opposite side
of which the corps of General Porter, which had not been engaged, now
appeared to dispute our advance. Our troops were much exhausted, and
greatly reduced in numbers by fatigue and the casualties of battle.
Under these circumstances it was deemed injudicious to push our
advantage further in the face of these fresh troops added to an army
previously much exceeding the number of our own. Ours were
accordingly recalled, and formed on the line originally held by
General Jones. The repulse on the right ended the engagement, a
protracted and sanguinary conflict in which every effort to dislodge
us from our position had been defeated with severe loss.

This great battle was fought by less than forty thousand men on our
side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and hardships in
the field and on the march. Nothing could surpass the determined
valor with which they met the large army of the enemy, fully supplied
and equipped, and the result reflected the highest credit on the
officers and men engaged.[63]

On the 18th our forces occupied the position of the preceding day,
except in the center, where our line was drawn in about two hundred
yards, our ranks were increased by the arrival of a number of troops,
who had not been engaged the day before, and, though still too weak
to assume the offensive, Lee waited without apprehension a renewal of
the attack. The day passed without any hostile demonstration. During
the night of the 18th our army was withdrawn to the south side of the
Potomac, crossing near Shepardstown, without loss or molestation. The
enemy advanced on the next morning, but was held in check by General
Fitzhugh Lee with his cavalry. The condition of our troops now
demanded repose, and the army marched to the Opequan, near
Martinsburg, where it remained several days, and then moved to the
vicinity of Bunker Hill and Winchester. General McClellan seemed to
be concentrating in and near Harper's Ferry, but made no forward
movement.

The contest on our left in this battle was the most violent. This and
the deprivation of our men are very forcibly shown in the following
account of Major-General Hood:[64]

"On the morning of the 15th my forces were again in motion. My troops
at this period were sorely in need of shoes, clothing, and food. We
had had issued to us no meat for several days, and little or no
bread; the men had been forced to subsist principally on green corn
and green apples. Nevertheless, they were in high spirits and defiant
as we contended with the advanced guard of McClellan on the 15th and
forenoon of the 16th. During the afternoon of this day I was ordered,
after great fatigue and hunger endured by my soldiers, to take
position near the Hagerstown turnpike, in open field in front of the
Dunkard church. General Hooker's corps crossed the Antietam, swung
round with its front on the pike, and about an hour before sunset
encountered my division. I had stationed one or two batteries on a
hillock in a meadow, near the edge of a corn-field, and just by the
pike. The Texas Brigade had been disposed on the left, and that of
Law on the right. We opened fire, and a spirited action ensued, which
lasted till a late hour in the night. When the firing had in a great
measure ceased, we were so close to the enemy that we could
distinctly hear him massing his heavy bodies in our immediate front.

"The extreme suffering of my troops for want of food induced me to
ride back to General Lee, and request him to send two or more
brigades to our relief, at least for the night, in order that the
soldiers might have a chance to cook their meager rations. He said
that he would cheerfully do so, but he knew of no command that could
be spared for the purpose; he, however, suggested that I should see
General Jackson, and endeavor to obtain assistance from him. After
riding a long time in search of the latter, I finally discovered him
alone, lying upon the ground asleep by the root of a tree. I aroused
him, and made known the half-starved condition of my troops; he
immediately ordered Lawton's, Trimble's, and Hays's brigades to our
relief. He exacted of me, however, a promise that I would come to the
support of these forces the moment I was called upon. I quickly rode
off in search of my wagons that the men might prepare and cook their
flour, as we were still without meat; unfortunately, the night was
then far advanced, and, although every effort was made in the
darkness to get the wagons forward, dawn of the morning of the 17th
broke upon us before many of the men had time to do more than prepare
the dough. Soon, thereafter, an officer of Lawton's staff dashed up
to me, saying, 'General Lawton sends his compliments, with the
request that you come at once to his support.' 'To arms!' was
instantly sounded, and quite a large number of my brave soldiers were
again obliged to march to the front, leaving their uncooked rations
in camp.

"Not far distant in our front were drawn up, in close array, heavy
columns of Federal infantry; not leas than two corps were in sight to
oppose my small command, numbering approximately two thousand
effectives. However, with the trusty Law on my right, in the edge of
the wood, and the gallant Colonel Wafford in command of the Texas
Brigade on the left, near the pike, we moved forward to the assault.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming odds of over ten to one against us,
we drove the enemy from the wood and corn-field back upon his
reserves, and forced him to abandon his guns on our left. This most
deadly combat raged till our last round of ammunition was expended.
The First Texas Regiment had lost in the corn-field fully two thirds
of its number; and whole ranks of brave men, whose deeds were
unrecorded save in the hearts of loved ones at home, were mowed down
in heaps to the right and left. Never before was I so continually
troubled with fear that my horse would further injure some wounded
fellow-soldier lying helpless upon the ground. Our right flank,
during this short but seemingly long space of time, was toward the
main line of the Federals, and, after several ineffectual efforts to
procure reënforcements and our last shot had been fired, I ordered my
troops back to Dunkard church for the same reason which had
previously compelled Lawton, Hays, and Trimble to retire (a want of
cartridges). Upon the arrival of McLaws's division we marched to the
rear, renewed our supply of ammunition, and returned to our position
in the wood near the church, which ground we held till a late hour in
the afternoon, when we moved somewhat farther to the right and
bivouacked for the night. With the close of this bloody day ceased
the hardest-fought battle of the war."

The following account of Colonel Taylor, in his "Four Years with
General Lee," is more comprehensive, embracing the other forces
besides Hood's brigade:

"On the afternoon of the 16th, General McClellan directed an attack
by Hooker's corps on the Confederate left--Hood's two brigades--and
during the whole of the 17th the battle was waged, with varying
intensity, along the entire line. When the issue was first joined, on
the afternoon of the 16th, General Lee had with him less than
eighteen thousand men, consisting of the commands of Longstreet and
D. H. Hill, the two divisions of Jackson, and two brigades under
Walker. Couriers were sent to the rear to hurry up the divisions of
A. P. Hill, Anderson, and McLaws, hastening from Harper's Ferry, and
these several commands, as they reached the front at intervals during
the day, on the 17th, were immediately deployed and put to work.
Every man was engaged. We had no reserve.

"The fighting was heaviest and most continuous on the Confederate
left. It is established by Federal evidence that the three corps of
Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner were completely shattered in the
repeated but fruitless efforts to turn this flank, and two of these
corps were rendered useless for further aggressive movements. The
aggregate strength of the attacking column at this point reached
forty thousand men, not counting the two divisions of Franklin's
corps, sent at a late hour in the day to rescue the Federal right
from the impending danger of being itself destroyed; while the
Confederates, from first to last, had less than fourteen thousand men
on this flank, consisting of Jackson's two divisions, McLaws's
division, and the two small divisions, of two brigades each, under
Hood and Walker, with which to resist their fierce and oft-repeated
assaults. The disproportion in the center and on our right was as
great as, or even more decided than, on our left."

In the "Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p.
368, General Sumner testifies as follows:

"General Hooker's corps was dispersed; there is no question about
that. I sent one of my staff-officers to find where they were, and
General Rickets, the only officer he could find, said that he could
not raise three hundred men of the corps. There were troops lying
down on the left, which I took to belong to Mansfield's command. In
the mean time General Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his
corps had also been thrown into confusion."

The testimony of General McClellan, in the same report, Part I, p.
441, is to the same effect:

"The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss had been so great,
and there was so much disorganization in name of the commands, that I
did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day, especially
as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions,
amounting to about fifteen thousand men. As an instance of the
condition of some of the troops that morning, I happen to recollect
the returns of the First Corps. General Hooker's, made on the morning
of the 18th, by which there were thirty-five hundred men reported
present for duty. Four days after that, the returns of the same corps
showed thirteen thousand five hundred."

On the night of the 19th our forces crossed the Potomac, and some
brigades of the enemy followed. In the morning General A. P. Hill,
who commanded the rear-guard, was ordered to drive them back. Having
disposed his forces, an attack was made, and, as the foe massed in
front of General Pender's brigade and endeavored to turn his flank,
General Hill says, in his report:

"A simultaneous daring charge was made, and the enemy driven
pell-mell into the river. Then commenced the most terrible slaughter
that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was
blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the
tale. By their own account, they lost three thousand men killed and
drowned from one brigade alone. Some two hundred prisoners were
taken."

General McClellan states, in his official report, that he had in this
battle, in action, 87,164 men of all arms.

The official reports of the commanding officers of our forces, made
at the time, show our total effective infantry to have been 27,255.
The estimate made for the cavalry and artillery, which is rather
excessive, is 8,000. This would make General Lee's entire strength
35,255.

The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia, on September
22, 1862, after its return to Virginia, and when the stragglers had
rejoined their commands, shows present for duty, 36,187 infantry and
artillery; the cavalry, of which there is no report, would perhaps
increase these figures to 40,000 of all arms.[65]

The return of the United States Army of the Potomac on September 20,
1862, shows present for duty, at that date, of the commands that
participated in the battle of Sharpsburg, 85,930 of all arms.[66]

The loss of the enemy at Boonsboro and Sharpsburg was 14,794.[67]

[Footnote 62: To these remarks Colonel W. H. Taylor adds the following
note: "Colonel Venable, one of my associates on the staff of General
Lee, says in regard to this matter: 'This is very easily explained.
One copy was sent directly to Hill from headquarters. General Jackson
sent him a copy, as he regarded Hill in his command. It is Jackson's
copy, in his own handwriting, which General Hill has. The other was
undoubtedly left carelessly by some one at Hill's quarters." says
General McClellan, "Upon learning the contents of this order, I at
once gave orders for a vigorous pursuit."--(General McClellan's
testimony, "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 440.)]

[Footnote 63: Report of General R. E. Lee.]

[Footnote 64: "Advance and Retreat," by J. B. Hood, p. 41.]

[Footnote 65: Taylor's "Four Years with General Lee."]

[Footnote 66: Official return from Adjutant-General's office, United
States Army. "Report of Committee on Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 492.]

[Footnote 67: Ibid., p. 42.]

CHAPTER XXXVI.

A class of measures was adopted by the Government of the United
States, the object of which was practically and effectually to
plunder us of a large portion of our crop of cotton, and secure its
transportation, to the manufacturers of Europe. The foreign necessity
for our cotton is represented in these words of her Majesty's
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on May 6, 1862, when speaking
of the blockade of our ports:

"Thousands are now obliged to resort to the poor-rates for
subsistence, owing to this blockade, yet her Majesty's Government
have not sought to take advantage of the obvious imperfections of
this blockade, in order to declare it ineffective. They have, to the
loss and detriment of the British nation, scrupulously observed the
duties of Great Britain to a friendly state."

The severity of the distress thus alluded to was such, both in Great
Britain and France, as to produce an intervention of the Governments
of those countries to alleviate it. Instead, however, of adopting
those measures required in the exercise of justice to the
Confederacy, and which would have been sustained by the law of
nations, by declaring the blockade "ineffective," as it really was,
they sought, through informal applications to Mr. Seward, the
Secretary of State for the United States, to obtain opportunities for
an increased exportation of cotton from the Confederacy. This is
explained by Mr. Seward in a letter to Mr. Adams, the Minister at
London, dated July 28, 1862, in which he writes as follows:

"The President has given respectful consideration to the desire
informally expressed to me by the Governments of Great Britain and
France for some farther relaxation of the blockade in favor of that
trade. They are not rejected, but are yet held under consideration,
with a view to ascertain more satisfactorily whether they are really
necessary, and whether they can be adopted without such serious
detriment to our military operations as would render them injurious
rather than beneficial to the interests of all concerned."

In the same letter Mr. Seward had previously said:

"We shall speedily open all the channels of commerce, and free them
from military embarrassments; and cotton, so much desired by all
nations, will flow forth as freely as heretofore. We have ascertained
that there are three and a half millions of bales yet remaining in the
region where it was produced, though large quantities of it are yet
unginned and otherwise unprepared for market. We have instructed the
military authorities to favor, so far as they can consistently with
the public safety, its preparation for and dispatch to the markets
where it is so much wanted."

It has been stated elsewhere in these pages that "it became apparent
that by some understanding, express or tacit, Europe had decided to
leave the initiative in all actions touching the contest on this
continent to the two powers just named (Great Britain and France),
who were recognized to have the largest interest involved." By the
preceding extracts the demands of the Governments of Great Britain
and France for increased facilities, by which to obtain a greater
supply of cotton, are evident; at the same time the determination of
the Government of the United States to fulfill those demands is
apparent, although it placed itself under the necessity of fitting
out some military expeditions against those portions of our territory
where it was supposed the foraging for cotton would be likely to meet
with the greatest success.

By reference to the series of measures adopted by the Government of
the United States to secure possession of our cotton, it will be seen
that it was inaugurated as early as July 13, 1861. This was within
ten days after the commencement of the first and extra session of
Congress, under the Administration of President Lincoln. It is
scarcely credible that that Government, at so early a day, foresaw
the pressing demand from Europe for cotton which would ensue a year
later. Yet it would seem that we must suppose such to have been its
foresight, or else conclude that the first of these measures was the
inauguration of a grand scheme for the plunder of our cotton-crop, to
enrich whomsoever it might concern.

The act of the United States Congress of July 13, 1861, above
mentioned, was entitled "An act to provide for the collection of
duties on imports, and for other purposes." Under the "other
purposes" the important features of the act are contained. Section 5
provides that--

"when said insurgents claim to act under the authority of any State
or States, and such claim is not disclaimed or repudiated by the
persons exercising the functions of government in such State or
States, or in the part or parts thereof in which said combination
exists, or such insurrection suppressed by said State or States, then
and in such case it may and shall be lawful for the President, by
proclamation, to declare that the inhabitants of such State, or any
section or part thereof, where such insurrection exists, are in a
state of insurrection against the United States, and thereupon all
commercial intercourse by and between the same and the citizens
thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States shall
cease, and be unlawful, so long as such condition of hostility shall
continue; and all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming
from said State or section into the other parts of the United States,
and all proceeding to such State or section, by land or water, shall,
together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same, or conveying
persons to or from such State or section, be forfeited to the United
States: _Provided, however_, That the President may, in his
discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse with any such
part of said State or section, the inhabitants of which are so
declared in a state of insurrection, in such articles, and for such
time, and by such persons, as he, in his discretion, may think most
conducive to the public interest; and such intercourse, so far as by
him licensed, shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
And the Secretary of the Treasury may appoint such officers at places
where officers of the customs are not now authorized by law, as may
be needed to carry into effect such licenses, rules, and regulations."

It was provided in Section 9 as follows:

"Proceedings on seizures for forfeitures, under this act, may be
pursued in the courts of the United States in any district into which
the property so seized may be taken, and proceedings instituted."

It will be seen, by reference to the provisions of this section, that
the President of the United States was authorized to issue his
proclamation, declaring the inhabitants of any of our States, or of a
portion of any one of them, to be in insurrection, and thereupon all
commercial intercourse became unlawful, and was required to cease,
and all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, on the way to, or
from, the State or part of a State, were forfeited to the United
States, together with the vessel, or vehicle, in which they were
conveyed. Two effects follow this proclamation: first, the cessation
of all commercial intercourse with the citizens of the United States;
second, the forfeiture of all goods _in transitu_. When this
condition has been reached, the act then authorizes the President, in
his discretion, by license, to reopen the trade in such articles, and
for such time, and by such persons, as he may think most conducive to
the public interest. The articles of trade were to be chiefly cotton
and tobacco; the time during which it might be continued was
evidently so long as it could be used for the purpose in view; the
persons were those who would most skillfully advance the end to be
accomplished; and the public interest was the collection and
transportation of the cotton to the European manufacturers.

One may search the Constitution of the United States in vain to find
any grant of power to Congress, by which it could be authorized to
pass this act; much less to find any authority conferred upon the
President to approve the act, or to justify him in a violation of the
oath he had taken to support and maintain the provisions of the
Constitution. Congress was guilty of a most flagrant usurpation by
the passage of the act, and the President, instead of being a check
upon their unconstitutional measures, for which object the veto power
was granted to him, became, by his approval, an accomplice in their
usurpation. For nothing is more evident than that it is one of the
powers reserved to the States to regulate the commercial intercourse
between their citizens, to the extent even of the establishment of
inspection and quarantine regulations. The former of these is a
benefit to commerce, and the latter, in some special cases, only
retards it temporarily, to secure the health of a community.

Neither did a state of war authorize the Government of the United
States to interfere with the commercial intercourse between the
citizens of the States, although under the law of nations it might be
so justified with regard to foreign enemies. But this relation it
persistently refused to concede to the Confederate States or to their
citizens. It constantly asserted that they were its subjects, in a
state of insurrection; and, if so, they were equally entitled to the
provisions of the Constitution for their protection as well as to its
penalties. Still less could the Government make an absolute
forfeiture of the goods seized, as has already been shown when
treating of the Confiscation Act.

But that a state of war did not enlarge the powers of the Government,
as was assumed by this act, was expressly decided by Chief-Justice
Taney, in a case that arose under this act. The Secretary of the
Treasury issued the regulations for trade, as the act assumed the
power to authorize him to do, in the section presented on a previous
page. One Carpenter neglected or refused to obtain the permit
required, and his goods were seized. He contested the right of seizure,
and the Chief-Justice gave a decision at Baltimore, in May, 1863.
He said:

"If these regulations had been made directly by Congress, they could
not be sustained by a court of justice, whose duty it is to
administer the law according to the Constitution of the United
States. For from the commencement of the Government to this day it
has been admitted on all hands, and repeatedly decided by the Supreme
Court, that the United States have no right to interfere with the
internal and domestic trade of a State. They have no right to compel
it to pass through their custom-houses, nor to tax it. This is so
plainly set forth in the Constitution, that it has never been
supposed to be open to controversy or question. Undoubtedly, the
United States authorities may take proper measures to prevent trade
or intercourse with the enemy. But it does not by any means follow
that they disregard the limits of all their own powers as prescribed
by the Constitution, or the rights and powers reserved to the States
and the people.

"A civil war, or any other, does not enlarge the powers of the
Federal Government over the States or the people beyond what the
compact has given to it in time of war. A state of war does not annul
the tenth article of the amendment to the Constitution, which
declares that 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.' Nor does a civil war, or any
other war, absolve the judicial department from the duty of
maintaining with an even and firm hand the rights and powers of the
Federal Government, and of the States, and of the citizens, as they
are written in the Constitution, which every judge is sworn to
support. Upon the whole the Court is of opinion that the regulations
in question are illegal and void, and that the seizure of the goods
of Carpenter, because he refused to comply with them, can not be
sustained. The judgment of the District Court must, therefore, be
reversed, and the goods delivered to the claimant, his agent, or
proctor."

The proclamation of the President required by the act was issued on
August 16, 1861, declaring certain States and parts of States to be
in insurrection, etc. Under it some licenses were issued to places in
Kentucky and Missouri where the United States forces were located,
without any fruitful results. Some strong military and naval
expeditions were fitted out to invade us and occupy the ports where
cotton and other valuable products were usually shipped. An advance
was made up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers and down the
Mississippi, as has been stated elsewhere. The ports of Beaufort,
North Carolina, Port Royal, South Carolina, and New Orleans,
Louisiana, were declared by proclamation of the President of the
United States to be open for trade under the new system. Licenses
were granted to foreign vessels by United States consuls and to
coasting vessels by the Treasury Department, and the blockade was
relaxed so far as related to those ports, except as "to persons,
property, and information contraband of war." Collectors were
appointed at the above-mentioned ports, and a circular was addressed
to the foreign Ministers at Washington announcing the reopening of
communication with conquered Southern localities.

Again, on March 3, 1863, an act was passed which authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to appoint special agents to receive and
collect all abandoned or captured property in any State or portion of
a State designated as in insurrection. Under this act a paper
division of the whole of our territory was made into five special
districts, and to each a special agent was appointed with numerous
assistants. Abandoned property was defined to be that which had been
deserted by the owners, or that which had been voluntarily abandoned
by them to the civil or military authorities of the United States.
Property which had been seized or taken from hostile possession by
the military or naval forces was also to be turned over to the
special agents to be sold. All property not transported in accordance
with the Treasury regulations was forfeitable. All expenses incurred
in relation to the property were charged upon it.

The views of General Grant on the operation of this system of
measures, as tending to retard the success of subjugation, which was
the object of the war, were presented to the Secretary of the United
States Treasury in a letter dated at Vicksburg on July 21, 1863. He
writes:

"My experience in West Tennessee has convinced me that any trade
whatever with the rebellious States is weakening to us at least
thirty-three per cent. of our force. No matter what restrictions are
thrown around trade, if any whatever is allowed, it will be made the
means of supplying to the enemy what they want. Restrictions, if
lived up to, make trade unprofitable, and hence none but dishonest
men go into it. I will venture to say that no honest man has made
money in West Tennessee in the last year, while many fortunes have
been made there during the time. The people in the Mississippi Valley
are now nearly subjugated. Keep trade out for a few months, and I
doubt not but that the work of subjugation will be so complete that
trade can be opened freely with the States of Arkansas, Louisiana,
and Mississippi."

On September 11, 1863, revised regulations were issued by the
Secretary which divided the country into thirteen districts, from
Wheeling, West Virginia, to Natchez, on the Mississippi, and a
complete system of trade and transportation was organized. In
December, 1864, new regulations were issued, which authorized the
purchase of our products at certain points from any person with bonds
furnished by the Treasury. The products were sold, transportation was
allowed, and the proceeds were made to constitute a fund for further
purchases. A vigorous traffic sprang up under these regulations,
which were suspended by an order of General Grant, issued on March
10, 1865, and revoked on April 11th by himself. On April 29, 1865,
all restrictions upon internal, domestic, and coastwise commercial
intercourse with all the country east of the Mississippi River were
discontinued.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

About the middle of October, 1862, General McClellan crossed the
Potomac east of the Blue Ridge and advanced southward, seizing the
passes of the mountains as he progressed. In the latter part of the
month he began to incline eastwardly from the mountains, moving in
the direction of Warrenton, about which he finally concentrated, his
cavalry being thrown forward beyond the Rappahannock in the direction
of Culpeper Court-House.

On November 15th the enemy was in motion. The indications were that
Fredericksburg was again to be occupied. Sumner's corps had marched
in the direction of Falmouth, and gunboats and transports had entered
Acquia Creek.

McLaws's and Ransom's divisions were ordered to proceed to that city;
and on the 21st it became apparent that the whole army--under
General Burnside, who had succeeded General McClellan--was
concentrating on the north side of the Rappahannock.

About November 26th Jackson was directed to advance toward
Fredericksburg, and, as some of the enemy's gunboats had appeared in
the river at Port Royal, and it was possible that an attempt might be
made to cross in that vicinity, D. H. Hill's division was stationed
near that place, and the rest of Jackson's corps so disposed as to
support Hill or Longstreet, as occasion might require. The fords of
the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg were closely guarded by our
cavalry, and the brigade of General W. H. F. Lee was stationed near
Port Royal to watch the river above and below. The interval before
the advance of the foe was employed in strengthening our lines,
extending from the river about a mile and a half above Fredericksburg
along the range of hills in the rear of the city to the Richmond
Railroad, As these hills were commanded by the opposite heights, in
possession of General Burnside's force, earthworks were constructed
on their crest at the most eligible positions for artillery. To
prevent gunboats ascending the river, a battery, protected by
epaulements, was placed on the bank four miles below the city. The
plain of Fredericksburg is so completely commanded by the Stafford
Heights, that no effectual opposition could be made to the passage of
the river without exposing our troops to the destructive fire of the
numerous batteries on the opposite heights. At the same time, the
narrowness of the Rappahannock and its winding course presented
opportunities for laying down pontoon-bridges at points secure from
the fire of our artillery. Our position was therefore selected with a
view to resist an advance after crossing, and the river was guarded
by detachments of sharpshooters to impede the laying of pontoons
until our army could be prepared for action.

Before dawn, on December 11th, General Burnside was in motion. About
2 A.M. he commenced preparations to throw two bridges over the
Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg, and one about a mile and a
quarter below, near the month of Deep Run. From daybreak until 4
P.M., the troops, sheltered behind the houses on the river-bank,
repelled his repeated efforts to lay bridges opposite the town,
driving back his working parties and their supports with great
slaughter. At the lower point, where there was no such protection, he
was successfully resisted until nearly noon, when, being exposed to
the severe fire of the batteries on the opposite heights and a
superior force of infantry on the river-banks, our troops were
withdrawn, and about 1 P.M. the bridge was completed. Soon afterward,
one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery opened a furious fire upon
the city, causing our troops to retire from the river-bank about 4
P.M. The enemy then crossed in boats, and proceeded rapidly to lay
down the bridges. His advance into the town was bravely contested
until dark, when our troops were recalled, the necessary time for
concentration having been gained.

Brigadier-General William Barksdale, who commanded the force placed
in Fredericksburg to resist the crossing, performed that service with
his well-known gallantry. The enemy was prevented from constructing
bridges, and his attempts to cross in boats, under the cover of
artillery and musketry fire, were repelled until late in the
afternoon, when General Barksdale was ordered to retire; he had
directed Lieutenant-Colonel Fizer, commanding the Seventeenth
Mississippi Regiment, of Barksdale's brigade, to select some skillful
marksmen, and proceed to check the operations of the pioneers, who
had commenced to lay pontoons above the city. Colonel Fizer described
to me the novel and bold expedient to which he successfully resorted.
He said his sharpshooters were placed in rifle-pits, on the bank
opposite to that from which the bridge was started; that his men were
instructed to aim only at the bridge-builders. At dawn the workmen
came forward to lay the cover on the bridge; fire was opened, some
were killed, and the rest of the party driven ashore. Then the
enemy's batteries and riflemen opened a heavy fire on his position,
when his men would sit down in the rifle-pits and remain quiet until
the cannonade ceased. Probably under the supposition that our
sharpshooters had been driven off, the workmen would return; our
sharpshooters would arise and repeat the lesson lately given. This,
he said, with intervals of about an hour, during which a continuous
and heavy fire of artillery was kept up, occurred nine times, with
the same result--a repulse with severe loss; and that, for twelve
hours, every attempt to construct a bridge at that point was
defeated. Then, under orders, they withdrew.

During the night and the succeeding day the enemy crossed in large
numbers at and below the town, secured from material interruption by
a dense fog. Longstreet's corps constituted our left, with Anderson's
division resting on the river, and those of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood
extending to the right. A. P. Hill, of Jackson's corps, was posted
between Hood's right and Hamilton's Crossing, on the railroad. His
front line occupied the edge of a wood. Early and Taliaferro's
divisions constituted Jackson's second line, D. H. Hill's division
his reserve. His artillery was distributed along his line in the most
eligible positions, so as to command the open ground in front.

Shortly after 9 A.M., the partial rising of the mist disclosed a
large force moving in line of battle against Jackson. Dense masses
appeared in front of A. P. Hill, stretching far up the river in the
direction of Fredericksburg. As they advanced, Major Pellham, of
Stuart's horse-artillery, opened a rapid and well-directed enfilade
fire, which arrested their progress. Four batteries immediately
turned upon him, and, upon his withdrawal, the enemy extended his
left down the Port Royal road, and his numerous batteries opened with
vigor upon Jackson's line. Eliciting no response, his infantry moved
forward to seize the position occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker.
The latter, reserving the fire of his fourteen pieces until their
line had approached within less than eight hundred yards, opened upon
it with such destructive effect as to cause it to waver and soon
retreat in confusion.

About 1 P.M., the main attack on the right began by a furious
cannonade, under cover of which three compact lines of infantry
advanced against Hill's front. They were received as before and
momentarily checked, but, soon recovering, they pressed forward,
until, coming within range of our infantry, the contest became fierce
and bloody. Archer and Lane, who occupied the edge of a wood,
repulsed those portions of the line immediately in front of them;
but, before the interval between these commands could be closed, the
assailants pressed through in overwhelming numbers and turned the
left of Archer and the right of Lane. Attacked in front and flank,
two regiments of the former and a brigade of the latter, after a
brave resistance, gave way. Archer held his line until the arrival of
reënforcements. Thomas came to the relief of Lane and repulsed the
column that had broken his line, and drove it back to the railroad.
In the mean time a large force had penetrated the wood as far as
Hill's reserve, where it was met by a fire for which it was not
unprepared. General Hill says:[68] "The advancing columns of the
enemy encountered an obstacle at the military road which they little
expected. Gregg's brigade of South Carolinians stood in the way." The
advancing Federals were allowed to approach quite near, when that
brigade poured a withering fire into the faces of Meade's men, and
Early's division from the second line swept forward, and the contest
in the woods was short and decisive. The enemy was quickly routed and
driven out with very heavy loss, and, though largely reënforced, was
pressed back and pursued to the shelter of the railroad embankment.
Here he was gallantly charged by the brigades of Hoke and Atkinson,
and driven across the plain to his batteries. The attack on Hill's
left was repulsed by the artillery on that part of the line, against
which a hot fire from twenty-four guns was directed. The repulse of
the foe on our right was decisive and the attack was not renewed, but
his batteries kept up an active fire at intervals, and sharpshooters
skirmished along the front during the afternoon.

While these events were transpiring on our right, the enemy, in
formidable numbers, made repeated and desperate assaults upon the
left of our line. About 11 A.M., having massed his troops under cover
of the houses of Fredericksburg, he moved forward in strong columns
to seize Marye's and Willis's Hills. All his batteries on the
Stafford Heights directed their fire upon the positions occupied by
our artillery, with a view to silence it, and cover the movement of
the infantry. Without replying to this furious cannonade, our
batteries poured a rapid and destructive fire into the dense lines of
the infantry as they advanced to the attack, frequently breaking
their ranks, and forcing them to retreat to the shelter of the
houses. Six times did he, notwithstanding the havoc inflicted by our
batteries, press on with great determination to within one hundred
yards of the foot of the hill; but here, encountering the deadly fire
of our infantry, his columns were broken, and fled in confusion to
the town. The last assault was made shortly before dark. This effort
met the fate of those that preceded it, and, when night closed in,
his shattered masses had disappeared in the town, leaving the field
covered with his dead and wounded.

During the night our lines were strengthened by the construction of
earthworks at exposed points, and preparations made to receive the
enemy on the next day. The 14th passed, however, without a renewal of
the attack. The hostile batteries on both sides of the river played
upon our lines at intervals, our own firing but little. On the 15th
General Burnside still retained his position, apparently ready for
battle, but the day passed as the preceding. But, on the morning of
the 16th, it was discovered that he had availed himself of the
darkness of the night and the prevalence of a violent storm of wind
and rain to recross the river. The town was immediately reoccupied,
and our positions on the river-bank resumed.

In the engagement we captured more than 900 prisoners and 9,000 stand
of arms. A large quantity of ammunition was found in Fredericksburg,
On our side 458 were killed and 3,743 wounded; total, 4,201. The loss
of the enemy was 1,152 killed, 9,101 wounded, and 3,234 missing;
total, 13,771.

General Burnside testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War that he "had about 100,000 men on the south side of the river,
and every single man of them was under artillery-fire, and about half
of them were at different times formed in columns of attack." [69]

Lee's then 20,000 Confederate troops were actively engaged. This
number composed about one fourth of the army under General Lee, The
returns of the Army of Northern Virginia show that on the 10th of
December, 1862, General Lee had present for duty 78,228, and, on
December 20th, 75,524 of all arms.[70]

Upon being asked what causes he assigned for the failure of his
attack, General Burnside replied to the Committee on the Conduct of
the War: "It was found impossible to get the men up to the works. The
enemy's fire was too hot for them." [71]

After the battle of Fredericksburg the Army of Northern Virginia
remained encamped on the south side of the Rappahannock until the
latter part of April, 1863. The Federal army occupied the north side
of the river opposite Fredericksburg, extending to the Potomac. Two
brigades of Anderson's division--those of Mahone and Posey--were
stationed near United States Mine or Bank Mill Ford. The cavalry was
distributed on both flanks--Fitzhugh Lee's brigade picketing the
Rappahannock above the mouth of the Rapidan and W. H. F. Lee's near
Port Royal. General Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps, was
detached for service south of James River in February, and did not
rejoin the army until after the battle of Chancellorsville. Excepting
a cavalry engagement near Kelly's Ford, on March 17th, nothing of
interest transpired during this period of inactivity. On April 14,
1863, the enemy's cavalry was concentrating on the upper Rappahannock,
but his efforts to establish himself on the south side of the river were
successfully resisted. About the 21st, small bodies of infantry appeared
at Kelly's Ford and the Rappahannock Bridge; at the same time a
demonstration was made opposite Port Royal. These, movements indicated
that the army, now commanded by Major-General Hooker, was about to
resume active operations. On the 28th, early in the morning, the enemy
crossed the river in boats near Fredericksburg, laid a pontoon-bridge,
and built another about a mile below. A considerable force crossed on
these bridges during the day, and was massed under the high banks of
the river, which afforded protection from our artillery, while the
batteries on the opposite heights completely commanded the wide plain
between our lines and the narrow river. As in the first battle at
Fredericksburg, our dispositions were made with a view to resist a
direct advance against us. But the indications were that the principal
effort would be made in some other quarter. On the 29th it was reported
that he had crossed in force near Kelly's Ford, and that a heavy column
was moving from Kelly's toward Germania Ford on the Rapidan, and another
toward Ely's Ford. The routes they were pursuing, after crossing the
Rapidan, converged near Chancellorsville, whence several roads led to
the rear of our position at Fredericksburg. General Anderson
proceeded to cover these roads on the 29th, but, learning that the
enemy had crossed the Rapidan and was approaching in strong force, he
retired early on the next morning to the intersection of the Mine and
plank roads near Tabernacle Church, and began to intrench himself.
His rear-guard, as he left Chancellorsville, was attacked by cavalry,
but, being vigorously repulsed, offered no further opposition to his
march.

The enemy on our front near Fredericksburg continued inactive, and it
was now apparent that the main attack would be made upon our flank
and rear. It was therefore determined to leave sufficient troops to
hold our lines, and with the main body of the army to give battle to
the approaching column. Early's division of Jackson's corps and
Barksdale's brigade of McLaws's division, with part of the reserve
artillery under General Pendleton, were intrusted with the defense of
our position at Fredericksburg, and at midnight on the 30th General
McLaws marched with the rest of his command toward Chancellorsville.
General Jackson followed at dawn next morning with the remaining
divisions of his corps. He reached the position occupied by General
Anderson at 8 A.M., and immediately began to make preparations to
advance. At 11 A.M. the troops moved forward on the plank and old
turnpike roads. The enemy was soon encountered on both roads, and
heavy skirmishing with infantry and artillery ensued, our troops
pressing steadily forward. A strong attack upon McLaws was repulsed
with spirit by Semmes's brigade; and General Wright, by direction of
General Anderson, diverging to the left of the plank-road, marched by
way of the unfinished railroad from Fredericksburg to Gordonsville
and turned the Federal right. His whole line thereupon retreated
rapidly, vigorously pursued by our troops until they arrived within
about one mile of Chancellorsville. Here the enemy had assumed a
position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a
dense forest filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which
breastworks of logs had been constructed with trees felled in front
so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the
few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from the
front, and commanded the adjacent woods. The left of his line
extended from Chancellorsville toward the Rappahannock, covering the
Bank Mill Ford, where he communicated with the north bank of the
river by a pontoon-bridge. His right stretched westward along the
Germania Ford road more than two miles. Darkness was approaching
before the strength and extent of his line could be ascertained; and,
as the nature of the country rendered it hazardous to attack by
night, our troops were halted and formed in line of battle in front
of Chancellorsville at right angles to the plank-road, extending on
the right to the Mine road, and to the left in the direction of the
"Furnace."

It was evident that a direct attack by us would be attended with
great difficulty and loss, in view of the strength of his position
and his superiority of numbers. It was therefore resolved to endeavor
to turn his right flank and gain his rear, leaving a force in front
to hold him in check and conceal the movement. The execution of this
plan was intrusted to Lieutenant-General Jackson with his three
divisions. The commands of Generals McLaws and Anderson, with the
exception of Wilcox's brigade which during the night had been ordered
hack to Banks's Ford, remained in front of the enemy. Early on the
morning of the 2d General Jackson marched by the Furnace and Brock
roads, his movement being effectually covered by Fitzhugh Lee's
cavalry under General Stuart in person. As the rear of his train was
passing the furnace a large force of the enemy advanced from
Chancellorsville and attempted its capture, but this advance was
arrested. After a long and fatiguing march General Jackson's leading
division under General Rodes reached the old turnpike about three
miles in rear of Chancellorsville at 4 P.M. As the different
divisions arrived, they were formed at right angles to the road--
Rodes's in front, Trimble's, under Brigadier-General Colston, in the
second, and A. P, Hill's in the third line. At 6 P.M. the advance was
ordered. The enemy was taken by surprise, and fled after a brief
resistance. General Rodes's men pushed forward with great vigor and
enthusiasm, followed closely by the second and third lines. Position
after position was carried, the guns captured, and every effort of
the foe to rally defeated by the impetuous rush of our troops. In the
ardor of pursuit through the thick and tangled woods, the first and
second lines at last became mingled and moved on together as one. The
fugitives made a stand at a line of breastworks across the road, but
the troops of Rodes and Colston dashed over the intrenchments
together, and the flight and pursuit were resumed and continued until
our advance was arrested by the abatis in front of the line of works
near the central position at Chancellorsville. It was now dark, and
General Jackson ordered the third line under General Hill to advance
to the front and relieve the troops of Rodes and Colston, who were
completely blended and in such disorder from their advance through
intricate woods and over broken ground that it was necessary to
reform them. As Hill's men moved forward, General Jackson, with his
staff and escort, returning from the extreme front, met the
skirmishers advancing, and in the obscurity of the night were
mistaken for the enemy and fired upon. Captain Boswell, chief
engineer of the corps, and several others, were killed and a number
wounded, among whom was General Jackson, who was borne from the
field. The command devolved upon Major-General Hill, whose division
under General Heath was advanced to the line of intrenchments which
had been reached by Rodes and Colston. A furious fire of artillery
was opened upon them, under cover of which infantry advanced to the
attack, but were handsomely repulsed. General Hill was soon afterward
disabled, and the command was turned over to General Stuart. He
immediately proceeded to reconnoiter the ground and make himself
acquainted with the disposition of the troops. The darkness of the
night and the difficulty of moving through the woods and undergrowth
rendered it advisable to defer further operations until morning, and
the troops rested on their arms in line of battle.

As soon as the sound of cannon gave notice of Jackson's attack on the
enemy's right, the troops in front began to press strongly on the
left to prevent reënforcements being sent to the point assailed. They
advanced up to the intrenchments, while several batteries played with
good effect until prevented by the increasing darkness.

Early on the morning of May 3d General Stuart renewed the attack upon
General Hooker, who had strengthened his right wing during the night
with additional breastworks, while a large number of guns, protected
by intrenchments, were posted so as to sweep the woods through which
our troops had to advance. Hill's division was in front, with Colston
in the second line, and Rodes in the third. The second and third
lines soon advanced to the support of the first, and the whole became
hotly engaged. The breastworks at which the attack was suspended on
the preceding evening were carried by assault, under a terrible fire
of musketry and artillery. In rear of these breastworks was a
barricade, from which the enemy was quickly driven. The troops on the
left of the plank-road, pressing through the woods, attacked and
broke the next line, while those on the right bravely assailed the
extensive earthworks behind which General Hooker's artillery was
posted. Three times were these works carried, and as often were the
brave assailants compelled to abandon them--twice by the retirement
of the troops on their left, who fell back after a gallant struggle
with superior numbers, and once by a movement of the enemy on their
right caused by the advance of General Anderson. The left, being
reënforced, finally succeeded in driving back the enemy, and the
artillery under Lieutenant-Colonels Carter and Jones, being thrown
forward to occupy favorable positions secured by the advance of the
infantry, began to play with great precision and effect. Anderson, in
the mean time, pressed gallantly forward directly upon Chancellorsville,
his right resting upon the plank-road and his left extending around the
furnace, while McLaws made a strong demonstration to the right of the
road. As the troops advancing upon the enemy's front and right converged
upon his central position, Anderson effected a junction with Jackson's
corps, and the whole line pressed irresistibly. General Hooker's army
was driven from all its fortified positions with heavy loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and retreated toward the Rappahannock. By 10 A.M.
we were in full possession of the field. The troops, having become
somewhat scattered by the difficulties of the ground and the ardor of
the contest, were immediately reformed, preparatory to renewing the
attack. The enemy had withdrawn to a strong position nearer to the
Rappahannock, which he had fortified. His superiority of numbers, the
unfavorable nature of the ground, which was densely wooded, and the
condition of our troops, after the arduous and sanguinary conflict in
which they had been engaged, rendered great caution necessary. Our
operations were just completed, when further movements were arrested
by intelligence received from Fredericksburg.

Before dawn, on the morning of the 3d, it was known that the enemy
had occupied Fredericksburg in large force, and laid down a bridge at
the town. He made a demonstration against the extreme right of the
force left to hold our lines, which was easily repulsed by General
Early. Soon afterward a column moved from Fredericksburg along the
river-banks, as if to gain the heights on the extreme left which
commanded those immediately in rear of the town. This attempt was
foiled. Very soon the enemy advanced in large force against Marye's,
and the hills to the right and left of it. Two assaults were
gallantly repulsed. After the second, a flag of truce was sent from
the town to obtain permission to provide for the wounded. Three heavy
lines advanced immediately upon the return of the flag and renewed
the attack. They were bravely repulsed on the right and left, but the
small force at the foot of Marye's Hill, overpowered by more than ten
times their numbers, was captured after an heroic resistance and the
hill carried. The success of the enemy enabled him to threaten our
communications by moving down the Telegraph road, or to come upon our
rear at Chancellorsville by the plank-road. He began to advance on
the plank-road, his progress being gallantly disputed by the brigade
of General Wilcox, who fell back slowly until he reached Salem Church
on the plank-road, about five miles from Fredericksburg.

In this state of affairs in our rear, General Lee led General McLaws
with his three brigades to reënforce General Wilcox. He arrived at
Salem Church early in the afternoon, where he found General Wilcox in
line of battle, with a large force of the enemy--consisting, as was
reported, of one army corps and part of another--in his front. The
enemy's artillery played vigorously upon our position for some time,
when his infantry advanced in three strong lines, the attack being
directed mainly against General Wilcox, but partially involving the
brigades on his left. The assault was met with the utmost firmness,
and after a fierce struggle the first line was repulsed with great
slaughter. The second then came forward, but immediately broke under
the close and deadly fire which it encountered, and the whole mass
fled in confusion to the rear. They were pursued by the brigades of
Wilcox and Semmes, which advanced nearly a mile, when they were
halted to reform in the presence of the hostile reserve, which now
appeared in large force. It being quite dark, General Wilcox deemed
it imprudent to push the attack with his small numbers, and retired
to his original position, the enemy making no attempt to follow. The
next morning General Early advanced along the Telegraph road, and
recaptured Marye's and the adjacent hills without difficulty, thus
gaining the rear of the enemy's left. In the mean time General Hooker
had so strengthened his position near Chancellorsville, that it was
deemed inexpedient to assail it with less than our whole force, which
had been reduced by the detachment led to Fredericksburg to relieve
us from the danger that menaced our rear.

It has been heretofore stated that General Longstreet had been sent
with two divisions of Lee's array to coöperate with General French on
the south side of the James River, in the capture of Suffolk, the
occupation of which by the enemy interrupted our collection of
supplies in the eastern counties of North Carolina and Virginia. When
the advance of Hooker threatened General Lee's front, instructions
were sent to General Longstreet to hasten his return to the army with
the large force detached with him. These instructions were repeated
with urgent insistence, yet his movements were so delayed that,
though the battle of Chancellorsville did not occur until many days
after he was expected to join, his force was absent when it occurred.
Had he rejoined his command in due time, Lee need not have diminished
his force in front of Hooker, so as to delay the renewal of the
attack and force him to a precipitate retreat, involving the loss of
his artillery and trains. It was accordingly resolved still further
to reënforce the troops in front, in order, if possible, to drive
Hooker across the Rappahannock. Some delay occurred in getting the
troops into position, owing to the broken and irregular nature of the
ground, and the difficulty of ascertaining the disposition of the
opposing forces. The attack did not begin until 6 P.M., when the
enemy's troops were rapidly driven across the plank-road in the
direction of the Rappahannock. The speedy approach of darkness
prevented General McLaws from perceiving the success of the attack,
until the foe began to recross the river a short distance below
Banks's Ford, where he had laid one of his pontoon-bridges. His right
brigades advanced through the woods in the direction of the firing,
but the retreat was so rapid that they could only join in the
pursuit. A dense fog settled over the field, increasing the obscurity
and rendering great caution necessary to avoid collision between our
own troops. Their movements were consequently slow. The next morning
it was found that the enemy had made good his escape and removed his
bridges. Fredericksburg was evacuated, and our rear no longer
threatened. But, as General Hooker had it in his power to recross, it
was deemed best to leave a force to hold our lines as before. McLaws
and Anderson being directed to return to Chancellorsville, they
reached their destination during the afternoon, in the midst of a
violent storm, which continued throughout the night and most of the
following day. Preparations were made to assail the enemy's works at
daylight on the 6th, but, on advancing our skirmishers, it was found
that, under cover of the storm and darkness of the night, he had
retreated over the river. A detachment was left to guard the
battle-field, while the wounded were removed and the captured
property collected. The rest of the army returned to its former
position.

The loss of the enemy, according to his own statement, was 1,512
killed and 9,518 wounded; total, 11,030. His dead and a large number
of wounded were left on the field. About 5,000 prisoners, exclusive
of the wounded, were taken, and 13 pieces of artillery, 19,500 stand
of arms, 17 colors, and a large quantity of ammunition fell into our
hands.

Our loss was much less in killed and wounded than that of the enemy,
but of the number was one, a host in himself, Lieutenant-General
Jackson, who was wounded, and died on May 10th. Of this great
captain, General Lee, in his anguish at his death, justly said, "I
have lost my right arm." As an executive officer he had no superior,
and war has seldom shown an equal. Too devoted to the cause he served
to have any personal motive, he shared the toils, privations, and
dangers of his troops when in chief command; and in subordinate
position his aim was to understand the purpose of his commander and
faithfully to promote its success. He was the complement of Lee;
united, they had achieved such results that the public felt secure
under their shield. To us his place was never filled.

The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia, on March 31,
1863, shows as present for duty 57,112, of which 6,509 were cavalry
and 1,621 reserve artillery. On May 20th, two weeks after the battle,
and when Pickett's and Hood's divisions had rejoined the army, the
total infantry force numbered but 55,261 effective men, from which,
if the strength of Hood's and Pickett's divisions is deducted, there
would remain 41,358 as the strength of the commands that participated
in the battles of Chancellorsville.[72]

The Army of the Potomac numbered 120,000 men, infantry and artillery,
with a body of 12,000 well-equipped cavalry, and an artillery force
of four hundred guns.[73]

A brief and forcible account of this battle is given by Taylor:[74]

"A formidable force under General Sedgwick was thrown across the
river below Fredericksburg, and made demonstrations of an intention
to assail the Confederate front. Meanwhile, with great celerity and
secrecy, General Hooker, with the bulk of his array, crossed at the
upper fords, and, in an able manner and wonderfully short time, had
concentrated four of his seven army corps, numbering fifty-six
thousand men, at Chancellorsville, about ten miles west of
Fredericksburg. His purpose was now fully developed to General Lee,
who, instead of awaiting its further prosecution, immediately
determined on the movement the least expected by his opponent. He
neither proceeded to make strong his left against an attack from the
direction of Chancellorsville nor did he move southward so as to put
his army between that of General Hooker and the Confederate capital,
but, leaving General Early, with about nine thousand men, to take
care of General Sedgwick, he moved with the remainder of his army,
numbering forty-eight thousand men, toward Chancellorsville. As soon
as the advance of the enemy was encountered, it was attacked with
vigor, and very soon the Federal army was on the defensive in its
apparently impregnable position. It was not the part of wisdom to
attempt to storm this stronghold; but Sedgwick would certainly soon
be at work in the rear, and Early, with his inadequate force, could
not do more than delay and harass him. It was, therefore,
imperatively necessary to strike--to strike boldly, effectively, and
at once. There could be no delay. Meanwhile, two more army corps had
joined General Hooker, who now had about Chancellorsville ninety-one
thousand men--six corps except one division of the Second Corps
(Conch's), which had been left with Sedgwick at Fredericksburg. It
was a critical position for the Confederate commander, but his
confidence in his trusted lieutenant and brave men was such that he
did not long hesitate. Encouraged by the counsel and confidence of
General Jackson, he determined to still further divide his army; and,
while he, with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, less than
fourteen thousand men, should hold the enemy in his front, he would
hurl Jackson upon his flank and rear, and crush and crumble him as
between the upper and nether millstone. The very boldness of the
movement contributed much to insure its success.

"The flank movement of Jackson's wing was attended with extraordinary
success. On the afternoon of the 2d of May, he struck such a blow to
the enemy on their extreme right as to cause dismay and
demoralization to their entire army; this advantage was promptly and
vigorously followed up the next day, when Generals Lee and Stuart
(the latter then in command of Jackson's wing) joined elbows; and,
after most heroic and determined effort, their now united forces
finally succeeded in storming and capturing the works of the enemy.

"Meantime Sedgwick had forced Early out of the heights at
Fredericksburg, and had advanced toward Chancellorsville, thus
threatening the Confederate rear. General Lee, having defeated the
greater force and driven it from its stronghold, now gathered up a
few of the most available of his victorious brigades and turned upon
the lesser. On May 3d Sedgwick's force was encountered near Salem
Church, and its further progress checked by General McLaws, with the
five brigades detached by General Lee for this service, including
Wilcox's, which had been stationed at Banks's Ford. On the next day.
General Anderson was sent to reënforce McLaws with three additional
brigades. Meanwhile, General Early had connected with these troops,
and in the afternoon, so soon as dispositions could be made for
attack, Sedgwick's lines were promptly assailed and broken, the main
assault being made on the enemy's left by Early's troops. The
situation was now a critical one for the Federal lieutenant. Darkness
came to his rescue, and on the night of the 4th be crossed to the
north side of the river.

"On the 5th General Lee concentrated for another assault on the new
line taken up by General Hooker; but on the morning of the 6th it was
ascertained that the enemy, in General Lee's language, 'had sought
safety beyond the Rappahannock,' and the river flowed again between
the hostile hosts."

[Footnote 68: "Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia," vol. ii, p. 463.]

[Footnote 69: "Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War," Part I,
p. 656.]

[Footnote 70: Taylor's "Four year with General Lee."]

[Footnote 71: "Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War," Part I,
p. 656.]

[Footnote 72: Taylor's "Four Years with General Lee."]

[Footnote 73: Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 269.]

[Footnote 74: "Four Years with General Lee."]

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

The public questions arising out of our foreign relations were too
important to be overlooked. At the end of the first year of the war
the Confederate States had been recognized by the leading governments
of Europe as a belligerent power. This continued unchanged to the
close. Mr. Mason became our representative in London, Mr. Slidell in
Paris, Mr. Rost in Spain, and Mr. Mann in Belgium. They performed
with energy and skill the positions, but were unsuccessful in
obtaining our recognition as an independent power.

The usages of intercourse between nations require that official
communication be made to friendly powers of all organic changes in
the constitution of states. To those who are familiar with the
principles upon which the States known as the United States were
originally constituted, as well as those upon which the Union was
formed, the organic changes made by the secession and confederation
of the Southern States are very apparent. But to others an
explanation may be necessary. Each of the States was originally
declared to be sovereign and independent. In this condition, at a
former period, all of those then existing were severally recognized
by name by the only one of the powers which had denied their right to
independence. This gave to each a recognized national sovereignty.
Subsequently they formed a compact of voluntary union, whereby a new
organization was constituted, which was made the representative of
the individual States in all general intercourse with other nations.
So long as the compact continued in force, this agent represented
merely the sovereignty of the States. But, when a portion of the
States withdrew from the compact and formed a new one under the name
of the Confederate States, they had made such organic changes in
their Constitution as to require official notice in compliance with
the usages of nations.

For this purpose the Provisional Government took early measures for
sending to Europe Commissioners charged with the duty of visiting the
capitals of the different powers and making arrangements for the
opening of more formal diplomatic intercourse. Prior, however, to the
arrival abroad of these Commissioners, the Government of the United
States had addressed communications to the different Cabinets of
Europe, in which it assumed the attitude of being sovereign over the
Confederate States, and alleged that these independent States were in
rebellion against the remaining States of the Union, and threatened
Europe with manifestations of its displeasure if it should treat the
Confederate States as having an independent existence. It soon became
known that these pretensions were not considered abroad to be as
absurd as they were known to be at home; nor had Europe yet learned
what reliance was to be placed in the official statements of the
Cabinet at Washington. The delegation of power granted by the States
to the General Government to represent them in foreign intercourse
had led European nations into the grave error of supposing that their
separate sovereignty and independence had been merged into one common
sovereignty, and had ceased to have a distinct existence. Under the
influence of this error, which all appeals to reason and historical
fact were vainly used to dispel, our Commissioners were met by the
declaration that foreign Governments could not assume to judge
between the conflicting representations of the two parties as to the
true nature of their previous relations. The Governments of Great
Britain and France accordingly signified their determination to
confine themselves to recognizing the self-evident fact of the
existence of a war, and to maintain a strict neutrality during its
progress. Some of the other powers of Europe pursued the same course
of policy, and it became apparent that by some understanding, express
or tacit, Europe had decided to leave the initiative in all action
touching the contest on this continent to the two powers just named,
who were recognized to have the largest interests involved, both by
reason of proximity to and of the extent of intimacy of their
commercial relations with the States engaged in war.

It was manifest that the course of action adopted by Europe, while
based on an apparent refusal to determine the question or to side
with either party, was, in point of fact, an actual decision against
our rights and in favor of the groundless pretensions of the United
States. It was a refusal to treat us as an independent government. If
we were independent States, the refusal to entertain with us the same
international intercourse which was maintained with our enemy was
unjust, and was injurious in its effects, whatever might have been
the motive which prompted it. Neither was it in accordance with the
high moral obligations of that international code, whose chief
sanction is the conscience of sovereigns and the public opinion of
mankind, that those eminent powers should have declined the
performance of a duty peculiarly incumbent on them, from any
apprehension of the consequences to themselves. One immediate and
necessary result of their declining the responsibility of a decision,
which must have been adverse to the extravagant pretensions of the
United States, was the prolongation of hostilities to which our
enemies were thereby encouraged, and which resulted in scenes of
carnage and devastation on this continent and of misery and suffering
on the other such as have scarcely a parallel in history. Had those
powers promptly admitted our right to be treated as all other
independent nations, none can doubt that the moral effect of such
action would have been to dispel the pretension under which the
United States persisted in their efforts to accomplish our
subjugation.

There were other matters in which less than justice was rendered to
the Confederacy by "neutral" Europe, and undue advantage conferred on
the aggressors in a wicked war. At the inception of hostilities, the
inhabitants of the Confederate States were almost exclusively
agriculturists; those of the United States were also to a large
extent mechanics, merchants, and navigators. We had no commercial
marine, while their merchant-vessels covered the ocean. We were
without a navy, while they had powerful fleets built by the money we
had in full share contributed. The power which they possessed for
inflicting injury on our coasts and harbors was thus counterbalanced
in some measure by the exposure of their commerce to attack by
private armed vessels. It was known to Europe that within a very few
years past the United States had peremptorily refused to accede to
proposals for the abolition of privateering, on the ground, as
alleged by them, that nations owning powerful fleets would thereby
obtain undue advantage over those possessing inferior naval force.
Yet no sooner was war flagrant between the Confederacy and the United
States than the maritime powers of Europe issued orders prohibiting
either party from bringing prizes into their ports. This prohibition,
directed with apparent impartiality against both belligerents, was in
reality effective against, the Confederate States only, for they
alone could find a hostile commerce on the ocean. Merely nominal
against the United States, the prohibition operated with intense
severity on the Confederacy by depriving it of the only means of
maintaining its struggle on the ocean against the crashing
superiority of naval force possessed by its enemies. The value and
efficiency of the weapon which was thus wrested from our grasp by the
combined action of "neutral" European powers, in favor of a power
which professes openly its intention of ravaging their commerce by
privateers in any future war, is strikingly illustrated by the terror
inspired among commercial classes of the United States by a single
cruiser of the Confederacy. One small steamer, commanded by officers
and manned by a crew who were debarred by the closure of neutral
ports from the opportunity of causing captured vessels to be
condemned in their favor as prizes, sufficed to double the rates of
marine insurance in Northern ports, and consign to forced inaction
numbers of Northern vessels, in addition to the direct damage
inflicted by captures at sea.

But it was especially in relation to the so-called blockade that the
policy of European powers was so shaped as to cause the greatest
injury to the Confederacy, and to confer signal advantages on the
United States. A few words in explanation may here be necessary.

Prior to the year 1856 the principles regulating this subject were to
be gathered from the writings of eminent publicists, the decisions of
admiralty courts, international treaties, and the usages of nations.
The uncertainty and doubt which prevailed in reference to the true
rules of maritime law, in time of war, resulting from the discordant
and often conflicting principles announced from such varied and
independent sources, had become a grievous evil to mankind. Whether a
blockade was allowable against a port not invested by land as well as
by sea, whether a blockade was valid by sea if the investing fleet
was merely sufficient to render ingress to the blockaded port
evidently dangerous, or whether it was further required for its
legality that it should be sufficient "really to prevent access," and
numerous other similar questions, had remained doubtful and undecided.

Animated by the highly honorable desire to put an end "to differences
of opinion between neutrals and belligerents, which may occasion
serious difficulties and even conflicts" (such was the official
language), the five great powers of Europe, together with Sardinia
and Turkey, adopted in 1856 the following declaration of principles:

"1. Privateering is and remains abolished.

"2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of
contraband of war.

"3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not
liable to capture under enemy's flag.

"4. Blockades, in order to be binding must be effective, that is to
say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the
coast of the enemy."

Not only did this solemn declaration announce to the world the
principles to which the signing powers agreed to conform in future
wars, but it contained a clause to which these powers gave immediate
effect, and which provided that the states, not parties to the
Congress of Paris, should be invited to accede to the declaration.
Under this invitation every independent state in Europe yielded its
assent--at least, no instance is known to me of a refusal; and the
United States, while declining to assent to the proposition which
prohibited privateering, declared that the three remaining principles
were in entire accordance with their own views of international law.

No instance is known in history of the adoption of rules of public
law under circumstances of like solemnity, with like unanimity, and
pledging the faith of nations with a sanctity so peculiar.

When, therefore, this Confederacy was formed, and when neutral
powers, while deferring action on its demand for admission into the
family of nations, recognized it as a belligerent power, Great
Britain and France made informal proposals, about the same time, that
their own rights as neutrals should be guaranteed by our acceding, as
belligerents, to the declaration of principles made by the Congress
of Paris. The request was addressed to our sense of justice, and
therefore met immediate and favorable response in the resolutions of
the Provisional Congress of the 13th of August, 1861, by which all
the principles announced by the Congress of Paris were adopted as the
guide of our conduct during the war, with the sole exception of that
relative to privateering. As the right to make use of privateers was
one in which neutral nations had, as to the then existing war, no
interest; as it was a right which the United States had refused to
abandon, and which they remained at liberty to employ against us; as
it was a right of which we were already in actual enjoyment, and
which we could not be expected to renounce _flagrante bello_ against
an adversary possessing an overwhelming superiority of naval forces--
it was reserved with entire confidence that neutral nations could not
fail to perceive that just reason existed for the reservation. Nor
was this confidence misplaced; for the official documents published
by the British Government contained the expression of the
satisfaction of that Government with the conduct of officials who
conducted successfully the delicate transaction confided to their
charge.

These solemn declarations of principle, this implied agreement
between the Confederacy and the two powers just named, were suffered
to remain inoperative against the menaces and outrages on neutral
rights committed by the United States with unceasing and progressing
arrogance during the whole period of the war. Neutral Europe remained
passive when the United States, with a naval force insufficient to
blockade effectively the coast of a single State, proclaimed a paper
blockade of thousands of miles of coast, extending from the Capes of
the Chesapeake to those of Florida, and encircling the Gulf of Mexico
from Key West to the mouth of the Rio Grande. Compared with this
monstrous pretension of the United States, the blockades known in
history under the names of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, and the
British Orders in Council, in the years 1806 and 1807, sink into
insignificance. Those blockades were justified by the powers that
declared them, on the sole ground that they were retaliatory; yet
they have since been condemned by the publicists of those very powers
as violations of international law. It will be remembered that those
blockades evoked angry remonstrances from neutral powers, among which
the United States were the most conspicuous, and were in their
consequences the chief cause of the war between Great Britain and the
United States in 1812; also, that they formed one of the principal
motives that led to the declaration of the Congress of Paris in 1856,
in the fond hope of imposing an enduring check on the very abuse of
maritime power which was renewed by the United States in 1861 and
1862, under circumstances and with features of aggravated wrong
without precedent in history.

Repeated and formal remonstrances were made by the Confederate
Government to neutral powers against the recognition of that
blockade. It was shown by evidence not capable of contradiction, and
which was furnished in part by the officials of neutral nations, that
the few ports of the Confederacy, before which any naval forces at
all were stationed, were invested so inefficiently that hundreds of
entries were effected into them after the declaration of the
blockade; that our enemies admitted the inefficiency of their
blockade in the most forcible manner, by repeated official complaints
of the sale to us of goods contraband of war--a sale which could not
possibly have affected their interests if their pretended blockade
had been sufficient "really to prevent access to our coasts"; that
they alleged their inability to render their paper blockade effective
as the excuse for the odious barbarity of destroying the entrance to
one of the harbors by sinking vessels loaded with stone in the
channel; that our commerce with foreign nations was interrupted, not
by the effective investment of our ports, but by watching the ports
of the West Indies; not only by the seizure of ships in the attempt
to enter the Confederate ports, but by the capture on the high-seas
of neutral vessels by the cruisers of our enemies, whenever supposed
to be bound to any point on our extensive coast, without inquiry
whether a single blockading vessel was to be found at such point;
that blockading vessels had left the ports at which they were
stationed for distant expeditions, were absent for many days, and
returned without notice either of the cessation or renewal of the
blockade; in a word, that every prescription of maritime law and
every right of neutral nations to trade with a belligerent under the
sanction of principles heretofore universally respected were
systematically and persistently violated by the United States.
Neutral Europe received our remonstrances, and submitted in almost
unbroken silence to all the wrongs that the United States chose to
inflict on its commerce. The Cabinet of Great Britain, however, did
not confine itself to such implied acquiescence in these breaches of
international law which resulted from simple inaction, but, in a
published dispatch of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, assumed to
make a change in the principle enunciated by the Congress of Paris,
to which the faith of the British Government was considered to be
pledged. The change was so important and so prejudicial to the
interests of the Confederacy that, after a vain attempt to obtain
satisfactory explanations from that Government, I directed a solemn
protest to be made.

[Illustration: Members of the Confederate Cabinet]

In a published dispatch from her Majesty's Foreign Office to her
Minister at Washington, under date of February 11th, 1862, occurred
the following passage:

"Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion that, assuming
that the blockade was duly notified, and also that a number of ships
is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port sufficient really
to prevent access to it, _or to create an evident danger of entering
it or leaving it_, and that these ships do not voluntarily permit
ingress or egress, the fact that various ships may have successfully
escaped through it (as in the particular instance here referred to),
will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effectual one
by international law."

The words which I have italicized were an addition made by the
British Government of its own authority to a principle, the exact
terms of which were settled with deliberation by the common consent
of civilized nations, and by implied convention with our Government,
as already explained, and their effect was clearly to reopen to the
prejudice of the Confederacy one of the very disputed questions on
the law of blockade which the Congress of Paris proposed to settle.
The importance of this change was readily illustrated by taking one
of our ports as an example. There was "evident danger," in entering
the port of Wilmington, from the presence of a blockading force, and
by this test the blockade was effective. "Access is not really
prevented" by the blockading fleet to the same port; for steamers
were continually arriving and departing, so that, tried by this test,
the blockade was ineffective and invalid. Thus, while every energy of
our country was evoked in the struggle for maintaining its existence,
the neutral nations of Europe pursued a policy which, nominally
impartial, was practically most favorable to our enemies and most
detrimental to us.

The exercise of the neutral right of refusing entry into their ports
to prizes taken by both belligerents was especially hurtful to the
Confederacy. It was sternly adhered to and enforced.

The assertion of the neutral right of commerce with a belligerent,
whose ports are not blockaded by fleets sufficient really to prevent
access to them, would have been eminently beneficial to the
Confederate States, and only thus hurtful to the United States. It
was complaisantly abandoned.

The duty of neutral states to receive with cordiality and recognize
with respect any new confederation that independent states may think
proper to form, was too clear to admit of denial, but its
postponement was equally beneficial to the United States and
detrimental to the Confederacy. It was postponed.

In this statement of our relations with the nations of Europe, it has
been my purpose to point out distinctly that the Confederacy had no
complaint to make that those nations declared their neutrality. It
could neither expect nor desire more. The complaint was, that the
declared neutrality was delusive, not real; that recognized neutral
rights were alternately asserted and waived in such manner as to bear
with great severity on us, while conferring signal advantages on our
enemy.

Perhaps it may not be out of place here to notice a correspondence
between the Cabinets of France, Great Britain, and Russia, relative
to a mediation between the Confederacy and the United States. On
October 30, 1862, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de
l'Huys, addressed a note to the ambassadors of France at London and
St. Petersburg. In this dispatch he stated that the Emperor had
followed with painful interest the struggle which had then been going
on for more than a year on this continent. He observed that the
proofs of energy, perseverance, and courage, on both sides, had been
given at the expense of innumerable calamities and immense bloodshed;
to the accompaniments of civil conflict was to be added the
apprehension of servile war, which would be the climax of so many
irreparable misfortunes.

If these calamities affected America only, these sufferings of a
friendly nation would be enough to excite the anxiety and sympathy of
the Emperor; but Europe also had suffered in one of the principal
branches of her industry, and her artisans had been subjected to most
cruel trials. France and the maritime powers had, during the
struggle, maintained the strictest neutrality, but the sentiments by
which they were animated, far from imposing on them anything like
indifference, seem, on the contrary, to require that they should
assist the two belligerent parties in an endeavor to escape from a
position which appeared to have no issue. The forces of the two sides
had hitherto fought with balanced success, and the latest accounts
did not show any prospect of a speedy termination of the war.

These circumstances, taken together, seemed to favor the adoption of
measures which might bring about a truce. The Emperor of the French,
therefore, was of the opinion that there was now an opportunity of
offering to the belligerents the good offices of the maritime powers.
He, therefore, proposed to her Majesty, as well as to the Emperor of
Russia, that the three courts should endeavor, both at Washington and
in communication with the Confederate States, to bring about a
suspension of arms for six months, during which time every act of
hostility, direct or indirect, should cease, at sea as well as on
land. This armistice might, if necessary, be renewed for a further
period.

This proposal, he proceeded to say, would not imply, on the part of
the three powers, any judgment on the origin of the war, or any
pressure on the negotiations for peace, which it was hoped would take
place during the armistice. The three powers would only interfere to
smooth the obstacles, and only within the limits which the two
interested parties would prescribe. The French Government was of the
opinion that, even in the event of a failure of immediate success,
those overtures might have proved useful in leading the minds of men
heated by passion to consider the advantages of conciliation and
peace.

The reply of Great Britain, through Lord John Russell, on November
13, 1862, is really contained in this extract:

"After weighing all the information which has been received from
America, her Majesty's Government are led to the conclusion that
there is no ground at the present moment to hope that the Federal
Government would accept the proposal suggested, and a refusal from
Washington at the present time would prevent any speedy renewal of
the offer."

The Russian Government, in reply, said:

"According to the information we have hitherto received, we are
inclined to believe that a combined step between France, England,
and Russia, no matter bow conciliatory, and how cautiously made, if
it were taken with an official and collective character, would run
the risk of causing precisely the very opposite of the object of
pacification, which is the aim of the wishes of the three courts."

The unfavorable reception of the proposal was communicated by the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the representative of France at
Washington. In this communication he said:

"Convinced as we were that an understanding between the three powers
in the sense presented by us would answer as much the interests of
the American people as our own; that even that understanding was, in
the existing circumstances, a duty of humanity, you will easily form
an idea of our regret at seeing the initiative we have taken after
mature reflection remain without results. Being also desirous of
informing Mr. Dayton, the United States Minister, of our project, I
confidently communicated it to him, and even read in his presence the
dispatch sent to London and St. Petersburg. I could not but be
surprised that the Minister of the United States should oppose his
objections to the project I communicated to him, and to hear him
express personally some doubts as to the reception which would be
given by the Cabinet at Washington to the joint offers of the good
offices of France, Russia, and Great Britain."

It has already been stated that, by common understanding, the
initiative in all action touching the contest on this continent had
been left by foreign powers to the two great maritime nations of
Western Europe, and that the Governments of these two nations had
agreed to take no measures without previous concert. The result of
these arrangements, therefore, placed it in the power of either
France or England to obstruct at pleasure the recognition to which
the Confederacy was justly entitled, or even to prolong the
continuance of hostilities on this side of the Atlantic, if the
policy of either could be promoted by the postponement of peace.
Each, too, thus became possessed of great influence in so shaping the
general exercise of neutral rights in Europe as to render them
subservient to the purpose of aiding one of the belligerents, to the
detriment of the other. Perhaps it may not be out of place to present
a few examples by which to show the true nature of the neutrality
professed in this war.

In May, 1861, the Government of her Britannic Majesty assured our
enemies that "the sympathies of this country [Great Britain] were
rather with the North than with the South."

On June 1, 1861, the British Government interdicted the use of its
ports to "armed ships and privateers, both of the United States and
the so-called Confederate States," with their prizes. The Secretary
of State of the United States fully appreciated the character and
motive of this interdiction, when he observed to Lord Lyons, who
communicated it, that "this measure and that of the same character
which had been adopted by France would probably prove a death-blow to
Southern privateering"--a means, it will be remembered, which the
United States had refused to abandon for themselves.

On the 12th of June, 1861, the United States Minister in London
informed her Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs that the fact of
his having held interviews with the Commissioners of our Government
had given "great dissatisfaction, and that a protraction of this
would be viewed by the United States as hostile in spirit, and to
require some corresponding action accordingly." In response to this
intimation her Majesty's Minister gave assurance that "he had no
expectation of seeing them any more."

Further extracts will show the marked encouragement to the United
States to persevere in its paper blockade, and unmistakable
intimations that her Majesty's Government would not contest its
validity.

On May 21, 1801, Earl Russell pointed out to the United States
Minister in London that "the blockade might, no doubt, be made
effective, considering the small number of harbors on the Southern
coast, even though the extent of three thousand miles were
comprehended in the terms of that blockade."

On January 14, 1862, her Majesty's Minister in Washington
communicated to his Government that, in extenuation of the barbarous
attempt to destroy the port of Charleston by sinking a stone fleet in
the harbor, Mr. Seward had explained that "the Government of the
United States had, last spring, with a navy very little prepared for
so extensive an operation, undertaken to blockade upward of three
thousand miles of coast. The Secretary of the Navy had reported that
he could stop up the 'large holes' by means of his ships, but that he
could not stop up the 'small ones.' It has been found necessary,
therefore, to close some of the numerous small inlets by sinking
vessels in the channel."

On May 6, 1862, so far from claiming the right of British subjects as
neutrals to trade with us as belligerents, and to disregard the
blockade on the ground of this explicit confession by our enemy of
his inability to render it effective, her Majesty's Minister for
Foreign Affairs claimed credit with the United States for friendly
action in respecting it. His lordship stated that--

"The United States Government, on the allegation of a rebellion
pervading from nine to eleven States of the Union, have now, for more
than twelve months, endeavored to maintain a blockade of three
thousand miles of coast. This blockade, kept up irregularly, but,
when enforced, enforced severely, has seriously injured the trade and
manufactures of the United Kingdom.

"Thousands are now obliged to resort to the poor-rates for
subsistence owing to this blockade. Yet her Majesty's Government have
never sought to take advantage of the obvious imperfections of this
blockade, in order to declare it ineffective. They have, to the loss
and detriment of the British nation, scrupulously observed the duties
of Great Britain toward a friendly state."

It is not necessary to pursue this subject further. Suffice it to say
that the British Government, when called upon to redeem its pledge
made at Paris in 1856, and renewed to the Confederacy in 1861,
replied that it could not regard the blockade of Southern ports as
having been otherwise than "practically effective in February, 1862,"
and that "the manner in which it has since been enforced gives to
neutral governments no excuse for asserting that the blockade had not
been effectively maintained."

The partiality of her Majesty's Government in favor of our enemies
was further evinced in the marked difference of its conduct on the
subject of the purchase of supplies by the two belligerents. This
difference was conspicuous from the very commencement of the war. As
early as May 1, 1861, the British Minister in Washington was informed
by the Secretary of State of the United States that he had sent
agents to England, and that others would go to France, to purchase
arms; and this fact was communicated to the British Foreign Office,
which interposed no objection. Yet, in October of the same year, Earl
Russell entertained the complaint of the United States Minister in
London, that the Confederate States were importing contraband of war
from the Island of Nassau, directed inquiry into the matter, and
obtained a report from the authorities of the island denying the
allegations, which report was inclosed to Mr. Adams, and received by
him as satisfactory evidence to dissipate "the suspicion thrown upon
the authorities by that unwarrantable act." So, too, when the
Confederate Government purchased in Great Britain, as a neutral
country (with strict observance both of the law of nations and the
municipal law of Great Britain), vessels which were subsequently
armed and commissioned as vessels of war after they had been far
removed from English waters, the British Government, in violation of
its own laws, and in deference to the importunate demands of the
United States, made an ineffectual attempt to seize one vessel, and
did actually seize and detain another which touched at the Island of
Nassau, on her way to a Confederate port, and subjected her to all
unfounded prosecution, at the very time when cargoes of munitions of
war were openly shipped from British ports to New York, to be used in
warfare against us. Further instances need not be adduced to show how
detrimental to us, and advantageous to our enemy, was the manner in
which the leading European power observed its hollow profession of
neutrality toward the belligerents.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Operations in the West now claim attention. General Bragg, soon after
taking command, as has been previously stated, advanced from Tupelo
and occupied Chattanooga. Meantime General E. K. Smith with his force
held Knoxville, in East Tennessee. Subsequently, in August, he moved
toward Kentucky, and entered that State through Big Creek Gap, some
twenty miles south of Cumberland Gap. After several small and
successful affairs, he reached Richmond in the afternoon of August
30th. Here a force of the enemy had been collected to check his
progress, but it was speedily routed, with the loss of some hundred
killed and several thousand made prisoners, and a large number of
small-arms, artillery, and wagons were captured. Lexington was next
occupied; thence he advanced to Frankfort; and, moving forward toward
the Ohio River, a great alarm was created in Cincinnati, then so
little prepared for defense that, had his campaign been an
independent one, he probably could and would have crossed the Ohio
and captured that city. His division was but the advance of General
Bragg's, and his duty to coöperate with it was a sufficient reason
for not attempting so important a movement.

General Bragg marched from Chattanooga on September 5th, and, without
serious opposition, entered Kentucky by the eastern route, thus
passing to the rear of General Buell in Middle Tennessee, who,
becoming concerned for his line of communication with Nashville and
Louisville, and especially for the safety of the latter city,
collected all his force and retreated rapidly to Louisville. This was
a brilliant piece of strategy on the part of General Bragg, by which
he manoeuvered the foe out of a large and to us important territory.
By it north Alabama and Middle Tennessee were relieved from the
presence of the enemy, without necessitating a single engagement.

General Buell in his retreat followed the line of the railroad from
Nashville to Louisville. General Bragg moved more to the eastward, so
as to unite with the forces under General E. K. Smith, which was
subsequently effected when the army was withdrawing from Kentucky.

On September 18th General Bragg issued an address to the citizens of
Kentucky. Some recruits joined him, and an immense amount of supplies
was obtained, which he continued to send to the rear until he
withdrew from the State. The enemy, having received reënforcements,
as soon as our army began to retire, moved out and pressed so heavily
on its rear, under Major-General Hardee, that he halted and checked
them near Perryville. General Bragg then determined there to give
battle.

Concentrating three of the divisions of his old command, then under
Major-General Polk, he directed him to attack on the morning of
October 8th. The two armies were formed on opposite sides of the
town. The action opened at 12.30 P.M., between the skirmishers and
artillery on both sides. Finding the enemy indisposed to advance,
General Bragg ordered him to be assailed vigorously. The engagement
became general soon after, and was continued furiously until dark.
Although greatly outnumbered, our troops did not hesitate to engage
at any odds, and, though the battle raged with varying fortune, our
men eventually carried every position, and drove the Federals about
two miles. The intervention of night terminated the action. Our force
captured fifteen pieces of artillery, killed one and wounded two
brigadier-generals and a very large number of inferior officers and
men, estimated at no lees than four thousand, and captured four
hundred prisoners. Our loss was twenty-five hundred killed, wounded,
and missing.

Ascertaining that the enemy was heavily reënforced during the night,
General Bragg on the next morning withdrew his troops to Harrodsburg.
General Smith arrived the next day with most of his forces, and the
whole were then withdrawn to Bryantsville, the foe following slowly
but not closely. General Bragg finally took position at Murfreesboro,
and the hostile forces concentrated at Nashville, General Buell
having been superseded by General Rosecrans.

Meantime, on November 30th, General Morgan with thirteen hundred men
made an attack on a brigade of the enemy at Hartsville. It was found
strongly posted on a hill in line of battle. Our line was formed
under fire, and the advance was made with great steadiness. The enemy
was driven from his position, through his camps, losing a battery of
Parrott guns, and finally hemmed in on the river-bank, where he
surrendered. The contest was severe, and lasted an hour and a half.
The prisoners numbered twenty-one hundred.

Late in the month of December General Rosecrans commenced his advance
from Nashville upon the position of General Bragg at Murfreesboro.
His movement began on December 26th by various routes, but such was
the activity of our cavalry as to delay him four days in reaching the
battle-field, a distance of twenty-six miles. On the 29th General
Wheeler with his cavalry brigade gained the rear of Rosecrans's army,
and destroyed several hundreds of wagons loaded with supplies and
baggage. After clearing the road, he made the circuit of the enemy
and joined our left. Their strength, as we have ascertained, was
65,000 men. The number of fighting men we had on the field on
December 31st was 35,000, of which 30,000 were infantry and artillery.

Our line was formed about two miles from Murfreesboro, and stretched
transversely across Stone River, which was fordable from the Lebanon
pike on the right to the Franklin road on the left. As General
Rosecrans made no demonstration on the 30th, General Bragg determined
to begin the conflict early on the morning of the 31st by the advance
of his left. The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and his
right was steadily driven until his line was thrown entirely back at
a right angle to his first position and near to the railroad, along
which he had massed reserves. Their resistance after the first
surprise was most gallant and obstinate. At night he had been forced
from every position except the one on his extreme left, which rested
on Stone River, and was strengthened by a concentration of artillery,
and now seemed too formidable for assault.

On the next day (January 1st) the cannonading opened on the right
center about 8 A.M., and after a short time subsided. The enemy had
withdrawn from the advanced position occupied by his left flank; one
or two short contests occurred on the 3d, but his line was unchanged.
Our forces had now been in line of battle five days and nights, with
little rest, as there were no reserves. Their tents had been packed
in the wagons, which were four miles to the rear. The rain was
continuous, and the cold severe. Intelligence was received that heavy
reënforcements were coming to Rosecrans by a rapid transfer of all
the troops from Kentucky, and for this and the reasons before stated
General Bragg decided to fall back to Tullahoma, and the army was
withdrawn in good order.

In the series of engagements near Murfreesboro we captured over 6,000
prisoners, 30 pieces of artillery, 6,000 small-arms, a number of
ambulances, horses, and mules, and a large amount of other property.
Our losses exceeded 10,000, and that of the enemy was estimated at
over 25,000.

After the battle of Shiloh, West Tennessee and north Mississippi were
occupied by a force under General Grant. Subsequently this force was
increased, and General Rosecrans assigned to its command. Many
positions were held in West Tennessee and north Mississippi,
extending from Memphis to the northeastern part of the State of
Mississippi, with garrisons aggregating about 42,000 men. The most
important of these positions was that of the fortified town of
Corinth. As part of the plan to subjugate the Southwestern States,
extensive preparations were made for an advance through Mississippi
and an attack on Vicksburg by combined land and naval forces. A large
number of troops occupied Middle Tennessee and north Alabama. To
defeat their general plan, and to relieve the last-mentioned places
of the presence of the enemy, General Bragg moved his army into
Kentucky, which, by this time, the Federal Government thought it
needless to overawe by the presence of garrisons. General Van Dorn
and General Price commanded the Confederate troops then in north
Mississippi. General Bragg, when he advanced into Kentucky, had left
them with instructions to operate against the Federals in that
region, and especially to guard against their junction with Buell in
Middle Tennessee. Though Van Dorn was superior in rank, he had no
power to command General Price, unless they should happen to join in
the field and do duty together. General Price on this as on other
occasions manifested his entire willingness to make a junction with
his superior officer, and about the last of August proposed to
General Van Dorn to join him, but at that time Van Dorn's available
force for the field had been sent with General Breckinridge in his
campaign against Baton Rouge. After that force had rejoined General
Van Dorn, he wrote to Price, inviting him to unite with him, that,
with their two divisions, they might make an attack upon Corinth, by
the capture of which main position of the enemy in that section of
the country he hoped to be subsequently able to drive him from north
Mississippi and West Tennessee. Price felt constrained by his
instructions to observe and if possible to prevent Rosecrans's forces
in Mississippi from effecting a junction with Buell's in Tennessee;
therefore the invitation was unfortunately postponed to a future time.

Subsequently General Price learned that Rosecrans was moving to cross
the Tennessee and join Buell; he therefore marched from Tupelo and
reached Iuka on the 19th of September. His cavalry advance found the
place occupied by a force, which retreated toward Corinth, abandoning
a considerable amount of stores. On the 24th Van Dorn renewed in
urgent terms his request for Price to come with all his forces to
unite with him and make an attack upon Corinth. On the same day Price
received a letter from General Ord, informing him that "Lee's army
had been destroyed at Antietam; that, therefore, the rebellion must
soon terminate, and that, in order to spare the further effusion of
blood, he gave him this opportunity to lay down his arms." Price
replied, correcting the rumor about Lee's army, thanked Ord for his
kind feeling, and promised to "lay down his arms whenever Mr. Lincoln
should acknowledge the independence of the Southern Confederacy, and
not sooner." On that night General Price held a council of war, at
which it was agreed on the next morning to fall back and make a
junction with Van Dorn, it being now satisfactorily shown that the
enemy was holding the line on our left instead of moving to reënforce
Buell. The cavalry pickets had reported that a heavy force was moving
from the south toward Iuka on the Jacinto road, to meet which General
Little had advanced with his Missouri brigade, an Arkansas battalion,
the Third Louisiana Infantry, and the Texas Legion. It proved to be a
force commanded by General Rosecrans in person. A bloody contest
ensued, and the latter was driven back, with the loss of nine guns.
Our own loss was very serious. General Maury states that the Third
Louisiana regiment lost half its men, that Whitfield's legion
suffered heavily, and adds that these two regiments and the Arkansas
battalion of about a hundred men had charged and captured the enemy's
guns. In this action General Henry Little fell, an officer of
extraordinary merit, distinguished on many fields, and than whom
there was none whose loss could have been more deeply felt by his
Missouri brigade, as well as by the whole army, whose admiration he
had so often attracted by gallantry and good conduct. It was
afterward ascertained that this movement of Rosecrans was intended to
be made in concert with one by Grant moving from the west, but the
former had been beaten before the latter arrived. Before dawn Price
moved to make the proposed junction with Van Dorn, which was effected
at Ripley on the 28th of September, at which time Van Dorn in his
report says: "Field returns showed my strength to be about 22,000.
Rosecrans at Corinth had about 15,000, with about 8,000 additional
men at outposts from twelve to fifteen miles distant." In addition to
this force, the enemy had at Memphis, under Sherman, about 6,000 men;
at Bolivar, under Ord, about 8,000; at Jackson, Tennessee, under
Grant, about 3,000; at bridges and less important points, 2,000 or
3,000--making an aggregate of 42,000 in West Tennessee and north
Mississippi.

Corinth, though the strongest, was from its salient position the
point it was most feasible to attack, and, under the circumstances,
the most important to gain. Van Dorn, therefore, decided to move so
rapidly upon it as to take it by surprise, and endeavor to capture it
before reënforcements could arrive. In a previous chapter notice has
been taken of the character and conduct of General Price; here it is
proposed in like manner to say something of General Van Dorn,
rendered the more appropriate because of the criticism to which his
attack upon Corinth has been subjected. He was an educated soldier,
had served with marked distinction in the war with Mexico; indeed,
had been quite as often noticed in official reports for gallantry and
good conduct as any officer who served in that war. After its close
he had served on the Western frontier, and in Indian warfare
exhibited a like activity and daring as that shown in the greater
battles with Mexico. Immediately on the secession of his native
State, Mississippi, he resigned from the United States Army, and,
together with his veteran commander in Texas, General Twiggs,
commenced recruiting men for the anticipated war. He was among the
first to leave the service of the United States, and came to offer
his sword to Mississippi. In the military organization there
authorized, he was appointed a brigadier-general, and, when the State
troops were transferred to the Confederacy, he entered its service.
Gentle as he was brave, and generous, freely sharing all the dangers
and privations to which his troops were subjected, he possessed, like
his associate Price, both the confidence and affection of his men.
Without entering into details of the disposition of his troops in the
attack on the works at Corinth, the result shows that they were
skillfully made, and, though final success did not crown the effort,
the failure was due to other causes than the defect of plan or want
of energy and personal effort on the part of Van Dorn. His opponent,
Rosecrans, was an engineer of high ability, and proved himself one of
the best generals in the United States Army. He had materially
strengthened the works around Corinth, and had interposed every
possible obstacle to an assault. Our army had moved rapidly from
Ripley, its point of junction, had cut the railroad between Corinth
and Jackson, Tennessee, and at daybreak on the 3d of March was
deployed for attack. By ten o'clock our force confronted the enemy
inside his intrenchments. In half an hour the whole line of outer
works was carried, the obstructions passed, and the battle opened in
earnest; the foe, obstinately disputing every point, was finally
driven from his second line of detached works, and at sunset had
retreated to the innermost lines.

The battle had been mainly fought by Price's division on our left.
The troops had made a quick march of ten miles over dusty roads
without water; the line of battle had been formed in forests with
undergrowth; the combats of the day had been so severe that General
Price thought his troops unequal to further exertion on that day, and
it was decided to wait until morning. Of this, General Van Dorn says:

"I saw with regret the sun sink behind the horizon as the last shot
of our sharpshooters followed the retreating foe into their innermost
lines. One hour more of daylight, and victory would have soothed our
grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not
dishonored field."

During the night batteries were put in position to open on the town
at 4 A.M. At daybreak the action was to begin on the left, to be
immediately followed by an advance on the extreme right. The order
was not executed, the commander of the wing which was to make the
attack failed to do so, and another officer was sent to take his
place. In the mean time the center became engaged, and the action
extended to the left. The plan had been disarranged; nevertheless,
the center and left pushed forward and planted their colors on the
last stronghold of the enemy; his "heavy guns were silenced, and all
seemed about to be ended, when a heavy fire from fresh troops that
had succeeded in reaching Corinth was poured into our thin ranks,"
and, with this combined assault on Price's exhausted corps, which had
sustained the whole conflict, those gallant troops were driven back.
The day was lost. The enemy, reënforced, was concentrated against our
left, and Lovell's division, which was at this time advancing,
pursuant to orders, and was on the point of assaulting the works, was
ordered to move to the left to prevent a sortie, and cover their
retreat. Our army retired during the day to Chewalla without pursuit,
and rested for the night free from molestation.

Our loss was very heavy of gallant men and officers. In the fierce
conflicts the officers displayed not only daring, but high military
skill, their impetuous charges being marked by judicious selection of
time and place. Colonel William S. Barry, who, as commander of the
burial party, visited General Rosecrans, was courteously received by
that officer, who, while declining to admit the command within his
lines, sent assurance to General Van Dorn that "every becoming
respect should be shown to his dead and wounded. . . . He had the
grave of Colonel Rodgers, who led the Second Texas sharpshooters,
inclosed and marked with a slab, in respect to the gallantry of his
charge. Rodgers fell before Gates called on me to reënforce him on
the edge of the ditch of Battery Robbinet." [75] This officer, W. P.
Rodgers, was a captain in the First Regiment of Mississippi Rifles in
the war with Mexico, and the gallantry which attracted the admiration
of the enemy at Corinth was in keeping with the character he acquired
in the former service referred to. Of this retreat, that able soldier
and military critic, General Dabney H. Maury, in a contribution to
the "Annals of the War," wrote:

"Few commanders have ever been so beset as Van Dorn was in the forks
of the Hatchie, and very few would have extricated a beaten army as
he did then. One, with a force stated at ten thousand men, headed him
at the Hatchie Bridge; while Rosecrans, with twenty thousand men, was
attacking his rear at the Tuscumbia Bridge, only five miles off. The
whole road between was occupied by a train of nearly four hundred
wagons, and a defeated army of about eleven thousand muskets. But Van
Dorn was never for a moment dismayed. He repulsed Ord, and punished
him severely; while he checked Rosecrans at the Tuscumbia, until he
could turn his train and army short to the left, and cross the
Hatchie by the Boneyard road, without the loss of a wagon."

He then moved near Holly Springs, Mississippi, to await farther
developments. In the mean time General Grant massed a heavy force,
estimated at eighty thousand men, at various points on the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad. Thence he moved south, through the interior
of Mississippi, until he encamped near Water Valley. The country was
teeming with great quantities of breadstuffs and forage, and he
accumulated an immense depot of supplies at Holly Springs, and
hastened every preparation necessary to continue his advance
southward. Unless his progress was arrested, the interior of the
State, its capital, Jackson, Vicksburg, and its railroads, would fall
into his possession. As we had no force in front sufficient to offer
battle, our only alternative was to attack his communications. For
this purpose. General Van Dorn, on the night of December 15th,
quietly withdrew our cavalry, amounting to less than twenty-five
hundred men, from the enemy's front, and marched for Holly Springs.
That place was occupied by a brigade of infantry and a portion of the
Seventh Illinois Cavalry. The movement of Van Dorn was so rapid that
early on the morning of the 19th he surprised and captured the
garrison, and before eight o'clock was in quiet possession of the
town. The captured property, amounting to millions of dollars, was
burned before sunset, with the exception of the small quantity used
in arming and equipping his command. General Grant was thus forced to
abandon his campaign and to retreat hastily from the State.

After the battle of Murfreesboro, which closed in the first days of
1863, there was a cessation of active operations in that portion of
Tennessee, and attention was concentrated upon the extensive
preparations which were in progress for a campaign into Mississippi,
with Vicksburg as the objective point. The plan, as it was developed,
was for a combined movement by land and river, the former passing
through the interior of Mississippi to approach Vicksburg in rear,
the latter to descend the Mississippi River and attack the city in
front. General Pemberton, with the main body of his command, held the
position on the Tallahatchie and Yazoo Rivers, and among the various
devices to turn that position was one more ingenious than ingenuous.
It was an offer to furnish, at prices lower than ruled in our
markets, provisions of which we stood in need, to be sent through the
Yazoo Pass and transported in boats through to the Yazoo River if we
should desire. I had, some time before, directed that cypress rafts,
as far as practicable, of sinking timber, should be thrown into the
main channel leading down from the Yazoo Pass; and saw that, if it
was not the purpose of the proposer, the effect of accepting the
proposition would be to open a water line of approach from the
Mississippi, below Memphis, then in the hands of the enemy, to the
interior in rear of Vicksburg: for that reason, I resisted much
importunity in favor of allowing the supplies to be brought in that
manner.

In the latter part of December General Sherman, having descended the
Mississippi River, entered the Yazoo with four divisions of land
troops and five gunboats, the object being to reduce our work at
Haines's Bluff and turn Vicksburg so as to attack it in rear. The
first point at which the range of hills extending from Vicksburg up
the Yazoo approaches near to the river is at Haines's Bluff, some
twenty miles by the course of the Yazoo from the Mississippi River.
Here the troops were landed the 26th of December to attack the
redoubts which had been built upon the bluff.

On the 27th little progress was made. On the 28th the attempt, by one
division, to approach the causeway north of the Chickasaw Bayou, was
repulsed with heavy loss. The troops were withdrawn and moved down
the river to a point below the bayou, there to unite with the rest of
the command. At daylight on the 29th the attack was resumed and
continued throughout the most of the day; the enemy were again
repulsed with heavy loss. On the next day there was firing on both
sides without conclusive results. On the 31st General Sherman sent in
a flag of trace to bury the dead.

[Illustration: Map of action of December 26-31]

Thereafter nothing important occurred until the latter part of
January, when the troops under General Grant embarked at Memphis and
moved down the Mississippi River to Young's Point, on the Louisiana
shore, a few miles above Vicksburg. The expected coöperation by his
forces with those of Sherman had been prevented by the brilliant
cavalry expedition under Van Dorn, which captured and destroyed the
vast supplies collected at Holly Springs for the use of Grant's
forces in the land movement referred to. This compelled Grant to
retreat to Memphis, and frustrated the combined movement which had
been projected, in connection with the river campaign, by Sherman,
and a new plan of operations resulted therefrom, in which, however,
still prominently appears the purpose of turning Vicksburg on the
north. After General Grant, descending the Mississippi from Memphis,
arrived (2d of February, 1863) in the neighborhood of Vicksburg and
assumed command of the enemy's forces, an attempt was made, by
removing obstructions to the navigation of the Yazoo Pass and Cold
Water, small streams which flow from the Mississippi into the
Tallahatchie River, to pass to the rear of Fort Pemberton at the
mouth of the latter. The never-to-be-realized hope was to reduce that
work, and thus open the way down the Yazoo River to the right flank
of the defenses of Vicksburg.

[Illustration: Map of action north of Vicksburg]

At the same time another attempt was made, by means of the network of
creeks and bayous on the north side of the Yazoo, to pass around and
enter the Yazoo above Haines's Bluff; but our sharpshooters, availing
themselves of every advantageous position, picked off the men upon
the boats, and Colonel (afterward General) Ferguson, with a few men
and a section of field-pieces, so harassed and beset them that they
were driven back utterly discomfited.

Admiral Porter had, with his fleet, gone some distance up Deer Creek,
and, but for the land-forces sent to sustain him, would probably
never have returned, an adventurous party having passed in below him
with axes to fell trees so as to prevent his egress. He is described
as follows:[76]

"I soon found Admiral Porter, who was on the deck of one of his
ironclads, with a shield made of the section of a smoke-stack, and I
doubt if he was ever more glad to meet a friend than he was to see
me. He explained that he had almost reached the Rolling Fork, when
the woods became full of sharpshooters, who, taking advantage of
trees, stumps, and the levee, would shoot down every man that poked
his nose outside the protection of their armor. . . . He informed me
at one time things looked so critical that he had made up his mind to
blow up the gunboats, and to escape with his men through the swamp to
the Mississippi River."

This attempt to get through to Yazoo, above Haines's Bluff, had so
signally failed, that the expedition was ordered back to the
Louisiana shore above Vicksburg, where they arrived on the 27th of
March, 1863. General Grant was now in command of a large army,
holding various positions on the Mississippi River opposite to
Vicksburg, extending from Milliken's Bend above to New Carthage
below, with a fleet of gunboats in the river above Vicksburg, and
another some eight miles below. Lieutenant-General Pemberton's
military district included Vicksburg, and Major-General Gardner was
in command at Port Hudson. These posts, as long as they could be
maintained, gave us some control over the intermediate space of the
river, about two hundred and sixty miles in length, and to that
extent secured our communication with the trans-Mississippi. The
enemy, after his repeated and disastrous attempts to turn the right
flank of Vicksburg, applied his attention to the opposite direction.
General Grant first endeavored to divert the Mississippi from its
channel, by cutting a canal across the peninsula opposite to
Vicksburg, so as to make a practicable passage for transport-vessels
from a point above to one below the city. His attempt was quite
unsuccessful, and, whatever credit may be awarded to his enterprise,
none can be given to his engineering skill, as the direction given to
his ditch was such that, instead of being washed out by the current
of the river, it was filled up by its sediment.

[Illustration: Map of area north of Vicksburg]

Another attempt to get into the Mississippi, without passing the
batteries at Vicksburg, was by digging a canal to connect the river
with the bayou in rear of Milliken's Bend, so as to have water
communication by way of Richmond to New Carthage. These indications
of a purpose to get below Vicksburg caused General Pemberton, early
in February, 1863, to detach Brigadier-General John S. Bowen, with
his Missouri Brigade, to Grand Gulf, near the mouth of the Big Black,
and establish batteries there to command the mouth of that small
river, which might be used to pass to the rear of Vicksburg, and also
by their fire to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi.

On the 19th of March the flag-ship of Admiral Farragut, with one
gunboat from the fleet at New Orleans, passed up the river in
defiance of our batteries; but, on the 25th, four gunboats from the
upper fleet attempted to pass down and were repulsed, two of them
completely disabled.

On the 16th of April a fleet of ironclads with barges in tow, Admiral
Porter commanding, under cover of the night ran the Vicksburg
batteries. One of the vessels was destroyed, and another one
crippled, but towed out of range. Subsequently, on the night of the
26th, a fleet of transports with loaded barges was floated past
Vicksburg. One or more of them was sunk, but enough escaped to give
the enemy abundant supplies below Vicksburg and boats enough for
ferriage uses. On the 20th of April the movement of the enemy
commenced through the country on the west side of the river to their
selected point of crossing below Grand Gulf.

On the 29th the enemy's gunboats came down and took their stations in
front of our batteries and rifle-pits at Grand Gulf. A furious
cannonade was continued for many hours, and the fleet withdrew,
having one gunboat disabled, and otherwise receiving and inflicting
but little damage. Among the casualties on our side was that of
Colonel William Wade, the chief of artillery, an officer of great
merit, alike respected and beloved, whose death was universally
regretted.

In a short time the fleet reappeared from behind a point which had
concealed them from view. The gunboats now had transports lashed to
their farther side, and, protected by their iron shields, ran by our
batteries at full speed, losing but one transport on the way.

On the evening of the 29th of April the enemy commenced ferrying over
troops from the Louisiana to the Mississippi shore to a landing just
below the mouth of Bayou Pierre. General Green with his brigade moved
thither, and, when the enemy on the night of the 30th commenced his
advance, General Green attacked him with such impressive vigor as to
render their march both cautious and slow. As additional forces came
up, Green retired, skirmishing. In the mean time Generals Tracy and
Baldwin, with their brigades, had by forced marches joined General
Green, and about daylight a more serious conflict occurred, lasting
some two hours and a half, during which General Tracy, a
distinguished citizen of Alabama, of whom patriotism made a soldier,
fell while gallantly leading his brigade in the unequal combat in
which it was engaged. Step by step, disputing the ground, Green
retired to the range of hills three miles southwest of Port Gibson,
where General Bowen joined him and arranged a new line of battle. The
enemy's forces were steadily augmented by the arrival of
reënforcements from the rear. Our troops continued most valiantly to
resist until, between nine and ten o'clock, outflanked both on our
right and left, their condition seemed almost hopeless, when, by a
movement to which desperation gave a power quite disproportionate to
the numbers, the right wing of the enemy was driven back, and our
forces made good their retreat across the bridge over Bayou Pierre.
General Cockerell, commanding our left wing, led this forlorn hope in
person, and to the fortune which favors the brave must be attributed
the few casualties which occurred in a service so hazardous. General
Bowen promptly intrenched his camp on the east side of Bayou Pierre
and waited for future developments. The relative forces engaged in
the battle of the 1st of May were, as nearly as I have been able to
learn, fifty-five hundred Confederates and twenty thousand Federals.
Fresh troops were reported to be joining Grant's army, and one of his
corps had been sent to cross by a ford above so as to get in rear of
our position. The reënforcements which were _en route_ to Bowen had
not yet approached so near as to give him assurance of coöperation.

To divert notice from this movement to get in the rear of Bowen, on
the morning of the 2d, Grant ordered artillery-fire to be opened on
our intrenchments across Bayou Pierre. It was quite ineffectual, and
probably was not expected to do more than occupy attention. During
the forenoon Bowen sent a flag of truce to ask suspension of
hostilities for the purpose of burying the dead. This was refused,
and a demand made for surrender. That was as promptly as decidedly
rejected, and, as the day wore away without the arrival of
reënforcement, Bowen, under cover of night, commenced a retreat, his
march being directed toward Grand Gulf. General Loring with his
division soon joined him. Directions were sent to the garrison at
Grand Gulf to dismantle the fortifications and evacuate the place. On
the morning of the 3d General Grant commenced a pursuit of the
retreating force, which, however, was attended with only unimportant
skirmishes; Bowen, with the reënforcements which were marching to his
support, recrossed the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry, and all, under
the orders of General Pemberton, were assigned to their respective
positions in the army he commanded.

While the events which have just been narrated were transpiring,
Colonel Grierson with three regiments of cavalry made a raid from the
northern border of Mississippi through the interior of the State, and
joined General Banks at Baton Rouge in Louisiana. Among the
expeditions for pillage and arson this stands prominent for savage
outrages against defenseless women and children, constituting a
record alike unworthy a soldier and a gentleman.

Grant with his large army was now marching into the interior of
Mississippi, his route being such as might either be intended to
strike the capital (Jackson) or Vicksburg. The country through which
he had to pass was for some distance composed of abrupt hills, and
all of it poorly provided with roads. There was reasonable ground to
hope that, with such difficult communications with his base of
supplies, and the physical obstacles to his progress, he might be
advantageously encountered at many points and be finally defeated. In
such warfare as was possible, that portion of the population who were
exempt or incapable of full service in the army could be very
effective as an auxiliary force. I therefore wrote to the Governor,
Pettus, a man worthy of all confidence, as well for his patriotism as
his manhood, requesting him to use all practicable means to get every
man and boy, capable of aiding their country in its need, to turn
out, mounted or on foot, with whatever weapons they had, to aid the
soldiers in driving the invader from our soil. The facilities the
enemy possessed in river transportation and the aid which their
iron-clad gunboats gave to all operations where land and naval forces
could be combined were lost to Grant in this interior march which he
was making. Success gives credit to military enterprises; had this
failed, as I think it should, it surely would have been pronounced an
egregious blunder. Other efforts made to repel the invader will be
noticed in the course of the narrative.

After the retreat of Bowen which has been described. General
Pemberton, anticipating an attack on Vicksburg from the rear,
concentrated all the troops of his command for its defense. All
previous demonstrations indicated the special purpose of the enemy to
be its capture. Its strategic importance justified the belief that he
would concentrate his efforts upon that object, and this opinion was
enforced by the difficulty of supplying his army in the region into
which he was marching, and the special advantages of Vicksburg as his
base. The better mode of counteracting his views, whatever they might
be, it would be more easy now to determine than it was when General
Pemberton had to decide that question. The superior force of the
enemy enabled him at the same time, while moving the main body of his
troops through Louisiana to a point below Vicksburg, to send a corps
to renew the demonstration against Haines's Bluff. Finding due
preparation made to resist an attack there, this demonstration was
merely a feint, but, had Pemberton withdrawn his troops, that feint
could have been converted into a real attack, and the effort so often
foiled to gain the heights above Vicksburg would have become a
success. When that corps retired, and proceeded to join the rest of
Grant's army which had gone toward Grand Gulf, Pemberton commenced
energetically to prepare for what was now the manifest object of the
enemy. From his headquarters at Jackson, Mississippi, he, on the 23d
of April, directed Major-General Stevenson, commanding at Vicksburg,
"that communications, at least for infantry, should be made by the
shortest practicable route to Grand Gulf. The indications now are
that the attack will not be made on your front or right, and all
troops not absolutely necessary to hold the works at Vicksburg should
be held as a movable force for either Warrenton or Grand Gulf." On
the 28th Brigadier-General Bowen, commanding at Grand Gulf, reported
that "transports and barges loaded down with troops are landing at
Hard-Times on the west bank." Pemberton replied by asking: "Have you
force enough to hold your position? If not, give me the smallest
additional number with which you can." At this time the small cavalry
force remaining in Pemberton's command compelled him to keep infantry
detachments at many points liable to be attacked by raiding parties
of the enemy's mounted troops, a circumstance seriously interfering
with the concentration of the forces of his command. Instructions
were sent to all the commanders of his cavalry detachments to move
toward Grand Gulf, to harass the enemy in flank and rear,
obstructing, as far as might be, communications with his base. A
dispatch was sent to Major-General Buckner, commanding at Mobile,
asking him to protect the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, as Pemberton
required all the troops he could spare to strengthen General Bowen. A
dispatch was also sent to General J. E. Johnston, at Tullahoma,
saying that the Army of Tennessee must be relied on to guard the
approaches through north Mississippi. To Major-General Stevenson, at
Vicksburg, he sent a dispatch: "Hold five thousand men in readiness
to move to Grand Gulf, and, on the requisition of Brigadier-General
Bowen, move them; with your batteries and rifle-pits manned, the city
front is impregnable." At the same time the following was sent to
General Bowen: "I have directed General Stevenson to have five
thousand men ready to move on your requisition, but do not make
requisition unless absolutely necessary for your position. I am also
making arrangements for sending you two or three thousand men from
this direction in case of necessity."

The policy was here manifested of meeting the enemy in the hills east
of the point of his debarkation, yet all unfriendly criticism has
treated General Pemberton's course on that occasion as having been
voluntarily to withdraw his troops to within the intrenchments of
Vicksburg. His published reports show what early and consistent
efforts he made to avoid that result.

After General J. E. Johnston had recovered from the wound received at
Seven Pines, he was on the 24th of November, 1862, by special order
No. 275, assigned to the command of a geographical department
including the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and parts of
Louisiana, Georgia, and North Carolina. The order gives authority to
establish his headquarters wherever, in his judgment, will best
secure facilities for ready communication with the troops of his
command; and provides that he "will repair to any part of said
command whenever his presence may for the time be necessary or
desirable." While the events which have been described were occurring
in Pemberton's command, he felt seriously the want of cavalry, and
was much embarrassed by the necessity for substituting portions of
his infantry to supply the deficiency of cavalry.

These embarrassments and the injurious consequences attendant upon
them were frequently represented. In his report he states, after
several other applications for cavalry, that on March 25th he wrote
to General Johnston, commanding department, "urgently requesting that
the division of cavalry under Major-General Van Dorn, which had been
sent to the Army of Tennessee for special and temporary purposes,
might be returned." He gives the following extract from General
Johnston's reply of April 3d to his request:

"In the present aspect of affairs, General Van Dorn's cavalry is much
more needed in this department than in that of Mississippi and East
Louisiana, and can not be sent back as long as this state of things
exists. You have now in your department five brigades of the troops
you most require, viz., infantry, belonging to the Army of Tennessee.
This is more than a compensation for the absence of General Van
Dorn's cavalry command."

To this Pemberton rejoined that cavalry was dispensable, stating the
positions where the enemy was operating on his communications, and
the impossibility of defending the railroads by infantry. Referring
to the advance of the enemy from Bruinsburg, Pemberton, in his
report, makes the following statement:

"With a moderate cavalry force at my disposal, I am firmly convinced
that the Federal army under General Grant would have been unable to
maintain its communication with the Mississippi River, and that the
attempt to reach Jackson and Vicksburg would have been as signally
defeated in May, 1863, as a like attempt from another base had, by
the employment of cavalry, been defeated in December, 1862."

Pemberton commenced, after the retreat of Bowen, to concentrate all
his forces for the great effort of checking the invading army, and on
the 6th of May telegraphed to the Secretary of War that the
reënforcements sent to him were very insufficient, adding: "The stake
is a great one; I can see nothing so important." On the 12th of May
he sent a telegram to General J. E. Johnston, and a duplicate to the
President, announcing his purpose to meet the enemy then moving with
heavy force toward Edwards's Depot, and indicated that as the
battle-field; he urgently asked for more reënforcements: "Also, that
three thousand cavalry be at once sent to operate on this line. I
urge this as a positive necessity. The enemy largely outnumbers me,
and I am obliged to hold back a large force at the ferries on Big
Black." This was done to prevent the foe passing to his rear.

Large bodies of troops continued to descend the river, land above
Vicksburg, and, to avoid our batteries at that place, to move on the
west side of the river to reënforce General Grant. This seemed to
justify the conclusion that the main effort in the West was to be
made by that army, and, supposing that General Johnston would be
convinced of the fact if he repaired to that field in person, as well
as to avail ourselves of the public confidence felt in his military
capacity, he was ordered, on the 9th of May, 1863, to "proceed at
once to Mississippi and take chief command of the forces, giving to
those in the field, as far as practicable, the encouragement and
benefit of your personal direction. Arrange to take, for temporary
service, with you, or to be followed without delay, three thousand
good troops," etc.

On the 12th, the same day General Pemberton had applied for
reënforcements, he instructed Major-General Stevenson as follows:

"From information received, it is evident that the enemy is advancing
in force on Edwards's Depot and Big Black Bridge; hot skirmishing has
been going on all the morning, and the enemy are at Fourteen-Mile
Creek. You must move with your whole division to the support of
Loring and Bowen at the bridge, leaving Baldwin's and Moore's
brigades to protect your right."

In consequence of that information, Brigadier-General Gregg, who was
near Raymond, received cautionary instruction; notwithstanding which,
he was attacked by a large body of the enemy's forces, and his single
brigade, with great gallantry and steadiness, held them in check for
several hours, and then retired in such good order as to attract
general admiration. Meantime, bodies of the enemy's troops were sent
into the interior villages, and much damage was done in them, and to
the defenseless, isolated homes in the country.

General Johnston arrived at Jackson on the 13th of May, 1863, and
telegraphed to J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War, as follows:

"I arrived this evening, finding the enemy in force between this
place and General Pemberton, cutting off the communication. I am too
late."

In the order assigning General Johnston to the geographical
Department of the West, he was directed to repair in person to any
part of his command, whenever his presence might be for the time
necessary or desirable. On the 9th of May, 1863, he was ordered to
proceed at once to Mississippi and take chief command of the forces
in the field.

When he reached Jackson, learning that the enemy was between that
place and the position occupied by General Pemberton's forces, about
thirty miles distant, he halted there and opened correspondence with
Pemberton, from which a confusion with consequent disaster resulted,
which might have been avoided had he, with or without his
reënforcements, proceeded to Pemberton's headquarters in the field.
What that confusion or want of co-intelligence was, will best appear
from citing the important part of the dispatches which passed between
them. On May 13th General Johnston, then at Jackson, sent the
following dispatch to General Pemberton, which was received on the
14th:

"I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is
between us, with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to
reestablish communications, that you may be reënforced. If
practicable, come up in his rear at once--to beat such a detachment
would be of immense value. Troops here could coöperate. All the
troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is
all-important."

On the same day, the 14th, General Pemberton, then at Bovina, replied:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication. I
moved at once with whole available force, about sixteen thousand,
leaving Vaughan's brigade, about fifteen hundred, at Big Black
Bridge; Tilghman's brigade, fifteen hundred, now at Baldwin's Ferry,
I have ordered to bring up the rear of my column; he will be,
however, from fifteen to twenty miles behind it. Baldwin's Ferry will
be left, necessarily, unprotected. To hold Vicksburg are Smith's and
Forney's divisions, extending from Snyder's Mills to Warrenton,
numbering effectives seven thousand eight hundred men. . . . I do not
think that you fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg will be
left in; but I comply at once with your order."

On the same day, General Pemberton, after his arrival at Edwards's
Depot, called a council of war of all the general officers present.
He placed General Johnston's dispatch before them, and stated his own
views against the propriety of an advance, but expressed the opinion
that the only possibility of success would be by a movement on the
enemy's communications. A majority of the officers present expressed
themselves favorable to the plan indicated by General Johnston. The
others, including Major-Generals Loring and Stevenson, "preferred a
movement by which the army might attempt to cut off the enemy's
supplies from the Mississippi River." General Pemberton then sent the
following dispatch to General Johnston:

EDWARDS'S DEPOT, _May 14, 1863._

"I shall move as early to-morrow morning as practicable, with a
column of seventeen thousand men, to Dillon's, situated on the main
road leading from Raymond to Port Gibson, seven and a half miles
below Raymond, and nine and a half miles from Edwards's Depot. The
object is to cut the enemy's communication and to force him to attack
me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on
the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson. At
this point your nearest communication would be through Raymond."

The movement commenced about 1 P.M. on the 15th, General Pemberton
states that the force at Clinton was an army corps, numerically
greater than his whole available force in the field; that--

"The enemy had at least an equal force to the south, on my right
flank, which would be nearer Vicksburg than myself, in case I should
make the movement proposed. I had, moreover, positive information
that he was daily increasing his strength. I also learned, on
reaching Edwards's Depot, that one division of the enemy (A. J.
Smith's) was at or near Dillon's."

On the morning of the 16th, about 6.30 o'clock, Colonel Wirt Adams,
commanding the cavalry, reported to General Pemberton that his
pickets were skirmishing with the enemy on the Raymond road in our
front. At the same moment a courier arrived and delivered the
following dispatch from General Johnston:

"CANTON ROAD, TEN MILES FROM JACKSON,

"_May 15, 1863, 8.30_ o'clock A.M.

"Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable.
The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to
Clinton and informing me, that we may move to that point with about
six thousand."

Pemberton reversed his column to return to Edwards's Depot and take
the Brownsville road, so as to proceed toward Clinton on the north
side of the railroad, and sent a reply to General Johnston to notify
him of the retrograde movement and the route to be followed. Just as
the reverse movement commenced, the enemy drove in the cavalry
pickets and opened fire with artillery.

The continuance of the movement was ordered, when, the demonstrations
of the enemy becoming more serious, orders were issued to form a line
of battle, with Loring on the right, Bowen in the center, and
Stevenson on the left. Major-General Stevenson was ordered to make
the necessary dispositions for protecting the trains on the Clinton
road and the crossing of Baker's Creek. The line of battle was
quickly formed in a position naturally strong, and the approaches
from the front well covered. The enemy made his first demonstration
on the right, but, after a lively artillery duel for an hour or more,
this attack was relinquished, and a large force was thrown against
the left, where skirmishing became heavy. About ten o'clock the
battle began in earnest along Stevenson's entire front. About noon
Loring was ordered to move forward and crush the enemy in his front,
and Bowen to coöperate. No movement was made by Loring; he said the
force was too strongly posted to be attacked, but that he would seize
the first opportunity to assault if one should offer. Stevenson soon
found that unless reënforced he would be unable to resist the heavy
and repeated attacks along his line. Aid was sent to him from Bowen,
and for a time the tide of battle turned in our favor. The enemy
still continued to move troops from his left to his right, thus
increasing on that flank his vastly superior forces. General
Pemberton, feeling assured that there was no important force in front
of Loring, again ordered him to move to the left as rapidly as
possible. To this order, the answer was given that the enemy was in
strong force and endeavoring to turn his flank. As there was no
firing on the right, the order was repeated. Much time was lost in
exchanging these messages. At 4 P.M. a part of Stevenson's division
broke badly and fell back. Some assistance finally came from Loring,
but it was too late to save the day, and the retreat was ordered. Had
the left been promptly supported when it was first so ordered, it is
not improbable that the position might have been maintained and the
enemy possibly driven back, although his increasing numbers would
have rendered it necessary to withdraw during the night to save our
communications with Vicksburg unless promptly reënforced. The
dispatch of the 15th from General Johnston, in obedience to which
Pemberton reversed his order of march, gave him the first
intelligence that Johnston had left Jackson; but, while making the
retrograde movement, a previous dispatch from Johnston, dated "May
14, 1863, camp seven miles from Jackson," informed Pemberton that the
body of Federal troops, mentioned in his dispatch of the 13th, had
compelled the evacuation of Jackson, and that he was moving by the
Canton road; he refers to the troops east of Jackson as perhaps able
to prevent the enemy there from drawing provisions from that
direction, and that his command might effect the same thing in regard
to the country toward Panola, and then asks these significant
questions:

"Can he supply himself from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off
from it? Above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of
supplies, beat him? As soon as the reënforcements are all up, they
must be united to the rest of the army. . . . If prisoners tell the
truth, the force at Jackson must be half of Grant's array. It would
decide the campaign to beat it, which can only be done by
concentrating, especially when the remainder of the eastern troops
arrive. They are to be twelve or thirteen thousand."

From Pemberton's communication it is seen that he did not feel his
army strong enough to attack the corps in position at Clinton, and
that he hoped by the course adopted to compel the enemy to attack our
force in position. Whether the movement toward Dillon's was well or
ill advised, it was certainly a misfortune to reverse the order of
march in the presence of the enemy, as it involved the disadvantage
of being attacked in rear. As has been described, the dispositions
for battle were promptly made, and many of the troops fought with a
gallantry worthy of all praise. Though defeated, they were not routed.

Stevenson's single division for a long time resisted a force
estimated by him at "more than four times" his own. In the afternoon
he was reënforced by the unfaltering troops of Bowen's division.
Cockerell, commanding the First Missouri Brigade, fought with like
fortitude under like disadvantage. When Pemberton saw that the masses
assailing his left and left center by their immense numbers were
pressing our forces back into old fields, where the advantages of
position would be in his adversary's favor, he directed his troops to
retire, and sent to Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman instructions to
hold the Raymond road to protect the retreat. General Pemberton says
of him:

"It was in the execution of this important duty, which could not have
been confided to a fitter man, that the lamented General bravely lost
his life."

He was the officer whose devoted gallantry and self-sacrificing
generosity were noticed in connection with the fall of Fort Henry.
This severe battle was signalized by so many feats of individual
intrepidity that its roll of honor is too long for the limits of
these pages.

Though some gave way in confusion, and others failed to respond when
called on, the heroism of the rest shed luster on the field, and "the
main body of the troops retired in good order." The gallant brigades
of Green and Cockerell covered the rear.

The topographical features of the position at the railroad-bridge
across the Big Black were such as, with the artificial strength given
to it, made it quite feasible to defend it against a direct approach
even of an army as much superior in numbers to that of Pemberton as
was that of Grant; but the attack need not be made by a direct
approach. The position could be turned by moving either above or
below by fords and ferries, and thus advancing upon Vicksburg by
other and equally eligible routes. From what has already been quoted,
it will be understood that General Pemberton considered the
occupation of Vicksburg vitally important in connection with the
command of the Mississippi River, and the maintenance of
communication with the country beyond it. It was therefore that he
had been so reluctant to endanger his connection with that point as
his base. Pressed as he was by the enemy, whose object, it had been
unmistakably shown, was to get possession of Vicksburg and its
defenses, the circumstances made it imperative that he should abandon
a position, the holding of which would not effect his object, and
that he should withdraw his forces from the field to unite them with
those within the defenses of Vicksburg, and endeavor, as speedily as
possible, to reorganize the depressed and discomfited troops.

One of the immediate results of the retreat from Big Black was the
necessity of abandoning our defenses on the Yazoo, at Snyder's Mills;
this position and the line of Chickasaw Bayou were no longer tenable.
All stores that could be transported were ordered to be sent into
Vicksburg as rapidly as possible, the rest, including heavy guns, to
be destroyed. During the night of the 17th nothing of importance
occurred. On the morning of the 18th the troops were disposed from
right to left on the defenses. On the entire line, one hundred and
two pieces of artillery of different caliber, principally field-guns,
were placed in position at such points as were deemed most suitable
to the character of the gun. Instructions had been given from Bovina
that all the cattle, sheep, and hogs, belonging to private parties,
and likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, should be driven
within our lines. Grant's army appeared on the 18th.

The development of the intrenched line from our extreme right was
about eight miles, the shortest defensible line of which the
topography of the country admitted. It consisted of a system of
detached works, redans, lunettes, and redoubts, on the prominent and
commanding points, with the usual profile of raised field-works,
connected in most cases by rifle pits. To hold the entire line there
were about eighteen thousand five hundred infantry, but these could
not all be put in the trenches, as it was necessary to keep a reserve
always ready to reënforce any point heavily threatened.

The campaign against Vicksburg had commenced as early as November,
1862, and reference has been made to the various attempts to capture
the position both before and after General Grant arrived and took
command in person. He had now by a circuitous march reached the rear
of the city, established a base on the Mississippi River a few miles
below, had a fleet of gunboats in the river, and controlled the
navigation of the Yazoo up to Haines's Bluff, and was relieved from
all danger in regard to supplying his army. We had lost the
opportunity to cut his communications while he was making his long
march over the rugged country between Bruinsburg and the vicinity of
Vicksburg. Pemberton had by wise prevision endeavored to secure
supplies sufficient for the duration of an ordinary siege, and, on
the importance which he knew the Administration attached to the
holding of Vicksburg, he relied for the coöperation of a relieving
army to break any investment which might be made. Disappointed in the
hope which I had entertained that the invading army would be unable
to draw its supplies from Bruinsburg or Grand Gulf, and be driven
back before crossing the Big Black, it now only remained to increase
as far as possible the relieving army, and depend upon it to break
the investment. The ability of the Federals to send reënforcements
was so much greater than ours, that the necessity for prompt action
was fully realized; therefore, when General Johnston on May 9th was
ordered to proceed to Mississippi, he was directed to take from the
Army of Tennessee three thousand good troops, and informed that he
would find reënforcements from General Beauregard. On May 12th a
dispatch was sent to him at Jackson, stating, "In addition to the
five thousand men originally ordered from Charleston [Beauregard],
about four thousand more will follow. I fear more can not be spared
to you." On May 22d I sent the following dispatch to General Bragg,
at Tullahoma, Tennessee:

"The vital issue of holding the Mississippi at Vicksburg is dependent
on the success of General Johnston in an attack on the investing
force. The intelligence from there is discouraging. Can you aid him?"

To this he replied on the 23d of May, 1863:

"Sent thirty-five hundred with the General, three batteries of
artillery and two thousand cavalry since; will dispatch six thousand
more immediately."

In my telegram to General Bragg, after stating the necessity, I
submitted the whole question to his judgment, having full reliance in
the large-hearted and comprehensive view which his self-denying
nature would take of the case, and I responded to him:

"Your answer is in the spirit of patriotism heretofore manifested by
you. The need is sore, but you must not forget your own necessities."

On the 1st of June General Johnston telegraphed to me that the troops
at his disposal available against Grant amounted to twenty-four
thousand one hundred, not including Jackson's cavalry command and a
few hundred irregular cavalry. Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War, replied
to him stating the force to be thirty-two thousand. In another
dispatch, of June 5th, the Secretary says his statement rested on
official reports of numbers sent, regrets his inability to promise
more, as we had drained our resources even to the danger of several
points, and urged speedy action. "With the facilities and resources
of the enemy time works against us." Again, on the 16th, Secretary
Seddon says:

"If better resources do not offer, you must hazard attack."

On the 18th, while Pemberton was inspecting the intrenchments along
which his command had been placed, he received by courier a
communication from General Johnston, dated "May 17, 1863, camp
between Livingston and Brownsville," in answer to Pemberton's report
of the result of the battles of Baker's Creek and Big Black, and the
consequent evacuation of Snyder's Mills. General Johnston wrote:

"If Haines's Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and can not
be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must
ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing
both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it
is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march
to the northeast."

Pemberton, in his report, remarks:

"This meant the fall of Port Hudson, the surrender of the Mississippi
River, and the severance of the Confederacy."

He recurs to a former correspondence with myself in which he had
suggested the possibility of the investment of Vicksburg by land and
water, and the necessity for ample supplies to stand a siege, and
says his application met my favorable consideration, and that
additional ammunition was ordered. Confident in his ability, with the
preparations which had been made, to stand a siege, and firmly
relying on the desire of the President and of General Johnston to
raise it, he "felt that every effort would be made, and believed it
would be successful." He, however, summoned a council of war,
composed of all his general officers, laid before them General
Johnston's communication, and desired their opinion on "the question
of practicability," and on the 18th replied to General Johnston that
he had placed his instructions before the general officers of the
command, and that "the opinion was unanimously expressed that it was
impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such morale
and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy." He then
announces his decision to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, and
expresses the hope that he may be assisted in keeping this
obstruction to the enemy's free navigation of the Mississippi River.
He closes his letter thus:

"I still conceive it to be the most important point in the
Confederacy."

While the council of war was assembled, the guns of the enemy opened
on the works, and the siege proper commenced.

Making meager allowance for a reserve, it required the whole force to
be constantly in the trenches, and, when they were all on duty, it
did not furnish one man to the yard of the _developed line_. On the
19th two assaults were made at the center and left. Both were
repulsed and heavy loss inflicted; our loss was small. At the game
time the mortar-fleet of Admiral Porter from the west side of the
peninsula kept up a bombardment of the city.

Vicksburg is built upon hills rising successively from the river. The
intrenchments were upon ridges beyond the town, only approaching the
river on the right and left flanks, so that the fire of Porter's
mortar-fleet was mainly effective upon the private dwellings, and the
women, the children, and other noncombatants.

The hills on which the city is built are of a tenacious calcareous
clay, and caves were dug in these to shelter the women and children,
many of whom resided in them during the entire siege. From these
places of refuge, heroically facing the danger of shells incessantly
bursting over the streets, gentlewomen hourly went forth on the
mission of humanity to nurse the sick, the wounded, and to soothe the
dying of their defenders who were collected in numerous hospitals.
Without departing from the softer character of their sex, it was
often remarked that, in the discharge of the pious duties assumed,
they seemed as indifferent to danger as any of the soldiers who lined
the trenches.

During the 20th, 21st, and the forenoon of the 22d, a heavy fire of
artillery and musketry was kept up by the besiegers, as well as by
the mortar- and gun-boats in the river. On the afternoon of the 22d
preparation was made for a general assault. The attacking columns
were allowed to approach to within good musket-range, when every
available gun was opened with grape and canister, and our infantry,
"rising in the trenches, poured into their ranks volley after volley
with so deadly an effect that, leaving the ground literally covered
in some places with their dead and wounded, they [the enemy]
precipitately retreated." One of our redoubts had been breached by
their artillery previous to the assault, and a lodgment made in the
ditch at the foot of the redoubt, on which two colors were planted.
General Stevenson says in his report:

"The work was constructed in such a manner that the ditch was
commanded by no part of the line, and the only means by which they
could be dislodged was to retake the angle by a desperate charge, and
either kill or compel the surrender of the whole party by the use of
hand-grenades. A call for volunteers for this purpose was made, and
promptly responded to by Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. Pettus, Twentieth
Alabama Regiment, and about forty men of Waul's Texas Legion. A more
gallant feat than this charge has not illustrated our arms during the
war. The preparations were quietly and quickly made, but the enemy
seemed at once to divine our intentions, and opened upon the angle a
terrible fire of shot, shell, and musketry. Undaunted, this little
band, its chivalrous commander at its head, rushed upon the work,
and, in less time than it required to describe it, the flags were in
our possession. Preparations were then quickly made for the use of
hand-grenades, when the enemy in the ditch, being informed of our
purpose, immediately surrendered.

"From this time forward, although on several occasions their
demonstrations seemed to indicate other intentions, the enemy
relinquished all idea of assaulting us, and confined himself to the
more cautious policy of a system of gradual approaches and mining."

His force was not less than sixty thousand men. Thus affairs
continued until July 1st, when General Pemberton thus describes the
causes which made capitulation necessary:

"It must be remembered that, for forty-seven days and nights, those
heroic men had been exposed to burning suns, drenching rains, damp
fogs, and heavy dews, and that during all this period they never had,
by day or by night, the slightest relief. The extent of our works
required every available man in the trenches, and even then they were
in many places insufficiently manned. It was not in my power to
relieve any portion of the line for a single hour. Confined to the
narrow limits of trench, with their limbs cramped and swollen,
without exercise, constantly exposed to a murderous storm of shot and
shell. . . . Is it strange that the men grew weak and attenuated? . . .
They had held the place against an enemy five times their number,
admirably clothed and fed, and abundantly supplied with all the
appliances of war. Whenever the foe attempted an assault, they drove
him back discomfited, covering the ground with his killed and
wounded, and already had they torn from his grasp five stands of
colors as trophies of their prowess, none of which were allowed to
fall again into his hands."

Under these circumstances, he says, he became satisfied that the time
had arrived when it was necessary either to evacuate the city by
cutting his way out or to capitulate. Inquiries were made of the
division commanders respecting the ability of the troops to make the
marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful
sortie and force their way through the enemy; all of whom reported
their several commands quite unequal to the performance of such all
effort. Therefore, it was resolved to seek terms of capitulation.
These were obtained, and the city was surrendered on July 4th.

The report of General Pemberton contains this statement:

"Knowing the anxious desire of the Government to relieve Vicksburg, I
felt assured that, if within the compass of its power, the siege
would be raised; but, when forty-seven days and nights had passed,
with the knowledge I then possessed that no adequate relief was to be
expected, I felt that I ought not longer to place in jeopardy the
brave men whose lives had been intrusted to my care. Hence, after the
suggestion of the alternative of cutting my way out, I determined to
make terms, not because my men were starved out, not because I could
not hold out yet a little longer, but because they were overpowered
by numbers, worn down with fatigue, and each day saw our defenses
crumbling beneath their feet. . . . With an unlimited supply of
provisions, the garrison could, for the reasons already given, have
held out much longer."

At the close of General Pemberton's report he notices two officers,
whose gallant services have been repeatedly mentioned in the
foregoing pages, as follows:

"I can not close this report without brief tribute to the memory of
two of the best soldiers in the Confederate service. I refer to
Major-General John S. Bowen and Brigadier-General Martin E. Green.
Always faithful, zealous, and brave, they fell, as became them, in
the discharge of their duty. General Green died upon the lines he had
so long and so gallantly defended. General Bowen, having passed
scathless through the bloody scenes of Shiloh, Iuka, Corinth, Grand
Gulf, Port Gibson, Baker's Creek, and Vicksburg, perished by disease
after the capitulation."

With an unlimited supply of provisions the garrison could not, for
the reasons already given, have held out much longer. Our loss in
killed, wounded, and missing, from the landing of the enemy on the
east to the capitulation, was 5,632; that of the enemy, according to
his own statement, was 8,875. The number of prisoners surrendered, as
near as I can tell, did not exceed 28,000.

In addition to the efforts made to relieve Vicksburg by an attack on
Grant's army in the rear, instructions were sent to General Kirby
Smith, commanding on the west side of the river, to employ a part of
his forces in coöperation with our troops on the east side. From
General Richard Taylor's work, "Destruction and Reconstruction," I
learn that--

"the Federal army withdrew from Alexandria [a town on Red River,
Louisiana] on the 13th of May, and on the 23d crossed the Mississippi
and proceeded to invest Port Hudson. . . . A communication from
General Kirby Smith informed me that Major-General Walker, with a
division of infantry and three batteries, four thousand strong, was
on the march from Arkansas, and would reach me within the next few
days; and I was directed to employ Walker's force to relieve
Vicksburg, now invested by General Grant, who had crossed the
Mississippi on the 1st of May."

General Taylor states that his view was that this force might be best
employed for the relief of Vicksburg by a movement to raise the siege
of Port Hudson, which he regarded as feasible, while a direct
movement toward Vicksburg he considered would be unavailing, because
the peninsula opposite to that city was partially occupied by the
enemy and commanded by the gunboats in the river; he states, however,
that he was overruled, and proceeded with Walker's division to cross
the Tensas and attack two Federal camps on the bank of the
Mississippi, the one ten and the other fourteen miles above
Vicksburg, but that, after driving the troops over the levee, the
gunboats in the river protected them from any further assault. Then,
being convinced that nothing useful could be effected in that
quarter, he, in conformity with his original idea, ordered General
Walker to retire to Alexandria, intending to go thence to the Têche.
He says this order was countermanded and the division kept in the
region between the Tensas and the Mississippi until the fall of
Vicksburg. Taylor had left Mouton's and Green's brigades in the
country west of the Têche, and thither he went in person. At
Alexandria he found three regiments of Texan mounted men, about six
hundred and fifty aggregate, under the command of Colonel (afterward
Brigadier-General) Major, and these were ordered to Morgan's Ferry on
the Atchafalaya. Taylor then proceeded to the camps of Mouton and
Green, on the lower Têche. After giving instructions preparatory to
an attack on a work which the Federals had constructed at Berwick's
Bay, Taylor returned to join Colonel Major's command on the
Atchafalaya, and with it moved down the Fardoche and Grossetete to
Fausse Rivière, opposite to Port Hudson. Here the noise of the
bombardment then in progress could be distinctly heard, and here he
learned that the Federal force left in New Orleans did not exceed one
thousand men.

It was now the 10th of June. He was about one hundred miles from the
Federal force at Berwick's Bay. He furnished Colonel Major with
guides, informed him that he must be at Berwick's Bay on the morning
of the 23d, as Mouton and Green would attack at dawn on that day.
Taylor then hastened to the camp of Mouton and Green. The country
through which Major was to march was in possession of the enemy,
therefore secrecy and celerity were alike required for success. The
men carried their rations, and the wagons were sent back across the
Atchafalaya. In his rapid march. Major captured seventy prisoners and
burned two steamers, and the combined movements of Mouton, Green, and
Major, all reached their goal at the appointed time, of which General
Taylor says: "Although every precaution had been taken to exclude
mistakes and insure coöperation, such complete success is not often
attained in combined military movement; and I felt that sacrifices
were due to fortune."

At Berwick's Bay the Federals had constructed works to strengthen a
position occupied as a depot of supplies. The effective garrison was
small, the principal number of those present being sick and
convalescents. The works mounted twelve guns, thirty-twos and
twenty-fours, and a gunboat was anchored in the bay. Our object was
to capture Berwick's Bay, and thence proceed to the execution of the
plan above indicated. For this purpose, having arrived on the Têche,
a short distance above Berwick's Bay, some small boats (skiffs) and a
number of sugar-coolers were collected, in which the men were
embarked. Major Hunter, of the Texas regiment, and Major Blair, of
the Second Louisiana, were placed in command, and detachments were
drawn from the forces. They embarked at night, and paddled down the
Têche to the Atchafalaya and Grand Lake. They had about twelve miles
to go, and were expected to reach the northeast end of the island, a
mile from Berwick's, before daylight, where they were to remain until
they heard the guns of our force on the west side of the bay. At dawn
on June 23d our guns opened on the gunboat and speedily drove it
away. Fire was then directed on the earthworks, and the enemy
attempted to reply, when a shout was heard in the rear, and Hunter
with his party came rushing on. Resistance ceased at once. The spoils
of Berwick's were of vast importance. Twelve thirty-two- and
twenty-four-pounder guns, many small arms and accouterments, great
quantities of quartermaster's and commissary's, ordnance, and medical
stores, and seventeen hundred prisoners were taken. Then, as promptly
as circumstances would permit, Taylor, with three thousand men of all
arms, proceeded, with the guns and munitions he had acquired, to the
execution of the object of his campaign--to raise the siege of Port
Hudson, by cutting Banks's communication with New Orleans and making
a demonstration which would arouse that city. "Its population of two
hundred thousand was bitterly hostile to Federal rule, and the
appearance of a Confederate force on the opposite bank of the river
would raise such a storm as to bring Banks from Port Hudson, the
garrison of which could then unite with General Joseph Johnston in
the rear of General Grant."

In the first week in July, twelve guns were placed on the river below
Donaldsonville. Fire was opened and one transport destroyed and
several turned back. Gunboats attempted to dislodge our batteries,
but were driven away by dismounted men, protected by the levee. For
three days the river was closed to transports, and mounted scouts
were pushed down to a point opposite Kenner, sixteen miles above New
Orleans. A few hours more, and there would have been great excitement
in the city. But, by the surrender of Port Hudson on July 9th, the
enemy were in sufficient force, not only to arrest Taylor's
movements, but to require a withdrawal from the exposed position
which this little command had assumed for the great object of
relieving that place, and thus giving of its garrison, perhaps about
five thousand men, as a reënforcement to break the investment of
Vicksburg.

Port Hudson, which thus capitulated, was situated on a bend of the
Mississippi, about twenty-two miles above Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and
one hundred and forty-seven above New Orleans. The defenses in front,
or on the water-side, consisted of three series of batteries situated
on a bluff and extending along the river above the place. Farther up
was an impassable marsh forming a natural defense, and in the rear
the works were strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments
and rifle-pits, with heavy trees felled in every direction. General
Banks with a large force landed on May 21, 1863, and on the 27th an
assault was made on the works, and repulsed. A bombardment from the
river was then kept up for several days, and on June 14th another
unsuccessful assault was made. This was their last assault, but the
enemy, resorting to mines and regular approaches, was slowly
progressing with these when the news of the surrender of Vicksburg
was received. Major-General Gardner, who was in command, then made a
proposal to General Banks to capitulate, which was accepted by the
latter, and the position was yielded to him on the next day. The
surrender included about six thousand persons all told, fifty-one
pieces of artillery, and a quantity of ordnance stores. Our loss in
killed and wounded in the assaults was small compared to that of the
enemy, and by the fall of Vicksburg the position of Port Hudson had
ceased to have much importance.

[Illustration: Map of Port Hudson]

More than six weeks the garrison, which had resisted a vastly
superior force attacking by both land and water, had cheerfully
encountered danger and fatigue without a murmur, had borne famine and
had repulsed every assault, and yielded Port Hudson only when the
fall of Vicksburg had deprived the position of its importance. A
chivalric foe would have recognized the gallantry of the defense in
the terms usually given under like circumstances; such, for instance,
as were granted to Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, or, at the least,
have paroled the garrison.

I had regarded it of vast importance to hold the two positions of
Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Though gunboats had passed the batteries
of both, they had found it hazardous, and transport-vessels could not
prudently risk it. The garrisons of both places had maintained them
with extraordinary gallantry, inspired no doubt as well by
consciousness of the importance of their posts as by the soldierly
character common to Confederate troops. Taylor on the 10th received
intelligence of the fall of Port Hudson, and some hours later learned
that Vicksburg had surrendered. His batteries and outposts were
ordered in to the Lafourche, and Mouton was sent to Berwick's to
cross the stores to the west side of the bay. On the 13th a force of
six thousand men followed his retreat down the Lafourche; but Green,
with fourteen hundred dismounted men and a battery, attacked the
Federals so vigorously as to drive them into Donaldsonville,
capturing two hundred prisoners, many small-arms, and two guns.
Undisturbed thereafter, Taylor continued his march, removed all the
stores from the fortification at Berwick's, and on the 21st of July
moved up the Têche. The pickets left at Berwick's reported that the
enemy's scouts only reached the bay twenty-four hours after Taylor's
troops had withdrawn.

In the recital of those events connected with the sieges of Port
Hudson and Vicksburg, enough has been given to show the great anxiety
of the Administration to retain those two positions as necessary to
continued communication between the Confederate States on the east
and west sides of the Mississippi River. The reader will not have
failed to observe that General Johnston, commanding the department,
and General Pemberton, the district commander, entertained quite
different views. The former considered the safety of the garrisons of
such paramount importance, that the position should be evacuated
rather than the loss of the troops hazarded; the latter regarded the
holding of Vicksburg as of such vital consequence that an army should
be hazarded to maintain its possession. When General Pemberton and
his forces were besieged in Vicksburg, every effort was made to
supply General Johnston with an army which might raise the siege.
While General Johnston was at Jackson, preparing to advance against
the army investing Vicksburg, the knowledge that the enemy was
receiving large reënforcements made it evident that the most prompt
action was necessary for success; of this General Johnston manifested
a dear perception, for on the 25th of May he sent Pemberton the
following message:

"Bragg is sending a division; when it comes, I will move to you."

After all the troops which could be drawn from other points had been
sent to him, it was suggested that he might defeat the force
investing Port Hudson, and unite the garrison with his troops at
Jackson, but he replied:

"We can not relieve Port Hudson without giving up Jackson, by which
we should lose Mississippi."

On June 29th General Johnston reports that--

"Field transportation and other supplies having been obtained, the
army marched toward the Big Black, and on the evening of July 1st
encamped between Brownsville and the river."

The 2d and 3d of July were spent in reconnaissance, from which the
conclusion was reached that an attack on the north side of the
railroad was impracticable, and examinations were commenced on the
south side of the railroad. On the 3d a messenger was sent to General
Pemberton that an attempt would be made about the 7th, by an attack
on the enemy, to create a diversion which might enable Pemberton to
cut his way out. The message was not received, and Pemberton,
despairing of aid from the exterior, capitulated on the 4th.

General Grant, in expectation that an attack in his rear would be
made by General J. E. Johnston, formed a provisional corps by taking
brigades from several corps, and assigned General Sherman to command
it. He was sent in the direction of Big Black. Colonel Wilson, then
commanding the Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, was sent to the Big Black
River to watch for the expected advance of Johnston, when Sherman was
to be notified, so that he might meet and hold Johnston in check
until additional reënforcements should arrive. Wilson never sent the
notice. An officer of Grant's army, whose rank and position gave
opportunity for accurate information, writes:

"It was always a matter of surprise to Grant and his commanders that
Johnston failed to make the attempt to break up the siege of
Vicksburg, of which from the long line and consequent weakness of the
army of the North there seemed a fair chance of accomplishment."

General Johnston, being informed on the 5th of the surrender of
Vicksburg, fell back to Jackson, where his army arrived on the 7th.

"On the morning of the 9th the enemy appeared in heavy force in front
of the works thrown up for the defense of the place; these,
consisting of a line of rifle-pits prepared at intervals for
artillery, . . . were badly located and constructed, presenting but a
slight obstacle to a vigorous assault." [77]

The weather was hot, deep dust covered the country roads, and for
about ten miles there was no water to supply the troops who were
advancing in heavy order of battle from Clinton; and the circumstances
above mentioned caused General Johnston, as he states, to expect that
the enemy "would be compelled to make an immediate assault." Sherman,
in command of the attacking column, did not, however, elect to assault
the intrenchments, but moved the left of his line around so as to rest
upon Pearl River above, and then, extending his right so as to reach the
river below, commenced intrenching a line of investment. As early as
May 27th Brigadier-General J. G. Rains had been directed to report to
General Johnston in connection with torpedoes and sub-terra shells, and
a request had been made for "all reasonable facilities and aid in the
supply of men or material for the fair trial of his torpedoes and
shells." There could scarcely have been presented a better opportunity
for their use than that offered by the heavy column marching against
Jackson, and the enemy would have been taken at great disadvantage if
our troops had met them midway between Jackson and Clinton. As the
defenses of Jackson had not been so corrected in location and increased
in strength as to avail against anything other than a mere assault, it
is greatly to be regretted that the railroad-bridge across Pearl River
was not so repaired that the large equipments of the Central road might
have been removed for use elsewhere and at other times. One of the
serious embarrassments suffered in the last two years of the war was
from the want of rolling-stock, with which to operate our railroads, as
required for the transportation of troops and supplies. On the 12th of
July a heavy cannonade was opened, and the missiles reached all parts of
the town. An assault was also made on Major-General Breckinridge's
position on our extreme left. His division, with the aid of Cobb's
and Slocum's batteries, repulsed it, inflicting severe loss, and
capturing two hundred prisoners, besides the wounded, and taking
three regimental colors. On the 15th General Johnston was assured
that the remainder of Grant's army was moving from Vicksburg to
Jackson, and on the night of the 16th he, having previously sent
forward his sick and wounded, successfully withdrew his army across
the Pearl River, and moved toward Brandon, and continued the march as
far as Morton, about thirty-five miles from Jackson. The enemy
followed no farther than Brandon, which was reached on the 19th, and
manifested no higher purpose than that of arson, which was exhibited
on a still larger scale at Jackson.

Thus, within the first half of July, our disasters had followed close
upon the heels of one another. Though not defeated at Gettysburg, we
had suffered a check, and an army, to which nothing was considered
impossible, had been compelled to retire, leaving its opponent in
possession of the field of battle. The loss of Vicksburg and Port
Hudson was the surrender of the Mississippi to the enemy. It was true
that gunboats had run by our batteries, but not with impunity, and
some of them had been sunk in the attempt. Transports for troops,
supplies, and merchandise could not, except at great risk, use the
river while our batteries at those two points remained effective, and
gunboats cruising between them would have but a barren field.
Moreover, they needed to be very numerous to prevent intercourse
between the two sides of the river, which, thus far, they had never
been able to effect.

[Footnote 75: General D. H. Maury.]

[Footnote 76: "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," vol i, pp. 310, 311.]

[Footnote 77: General Johnston's "Report of Operations in Mississippi
and East Louisiana," pp. 12, 13.]

CHAPTER XL.

Inactivity in Tennessee.--Capture of Colburn's Expedition.--Capture
of Streight's Expedition.--Advance of Rosecrans to Bridgeport.--
Burnside in East Tennessee.--Our Force at Chattanooga.--Movement
against Burnside.--The Enemy moves on our Rear near Ringgold.--
Battle at Chickamauga.--Strength and Distribution of our Forces.--
The enemy withdraws.--Captures.--Losses.--The Enemy evacuates Passes
of Lookout Mountain.--His Trains captured.--Failure of General Bragg
to pursue.--Reënforcements to the Enemy, and Grant to command.--His
Description of the Situation.--Movements of the Enemy.--Conflict at
Chattanooga.

After the battle at Murfreesboro, in Tennessee, a period of
inactivity ensued between the large armed forces, which was disturbed
only by occasional expeditions by small bodies on each side. On March
5, 1863, an expedition of the enemy, under Colonel Colburn, was
captured at Spring Hill, ten miles south of Franklin, by Generals Van
Dorn and Forrest. Thirteen hundred prisoners were taken. In April
another expedition, under Colonel Streight, into northern Georgia,
was captured near Rome by our vigilant, daring cavalry leader,
Forrest. This was one of the most remarkable, and, to the enemy,
disastrous raids of the war. Seventeen hundred prisoners were taken.
In June some movements were made by General Rosecrans, which were
followed by the withdrawal of our forces from Middle Tennessee, and a
return to the occupation of Chattanooga. At this time General Buckner
held Knoxville and commanded the district of East Tennessee; General
Samuel Jones commanded the district of southwest Virginia, his
headquarters at Arlington, Virginia. Between the two was Cumberland
Gap, the well-known pass by which the first pioneer, Daniel Boone,
went into Kentucky, and the only one in that region through which it
was supposed an army, with the usual artillery and wagon-train, could
march from the north into East Tennessee or southwest Virginia. It
was, therefore, occupied and partially fortified, which, with the
precipitous heights flanking it on the right and left, would, it was
hoped, suffice against an attack in front, and prove an adequate
barrier to an advance on our important line of communication in its
rear, which Buckner and Jones were relied on to defend.

On the 20th of August Brigadier-General I. W. Frazier, an educated
soldier in whom I had much confidence, assumed, by assignment, the
command of this position, and energetically commenced to perfect the
defenses, and ingeniously though unsuccessfully endeavored to bring a
supply of water into the fortifications. He reported his force to
amount to seventeen hundred effective infantry and artillery, and
about six hundred cavalry; the supply of ammunition was deficient,
and some of it damaged by a badly constructed magazine.

About August 20th it was ascertained that the army under General
Rosecrans had crossed the mountains to Stevenson and Bridgeport. His
force of infantry and artillery amounted to seventy thousand men,
divided into four corps. About the same time General Burnside
advanced from Kentucky, crossed, by using pack-mules, the rugged
mountains west of Cumberland Gap, and, about the 1st of September,
approached Knoxville, East Tennessee, with a force estimated at over
twenty-five thousand men. General Buckner, therefore, evacuated
Knoxville, and took position at Loudon, with a force of about five
thousand infantry, artillery, and cavalry; this rendered the
occupation of Cumberland Gap hazardous to the garrison, and
comparatively of little value to us, but, when its surrender was
demanded by a force which might be resisted, General Frazier promptly
refused to comply with the demand. Subsequently, General Burnside
advanced with a large body of troops, and, approaching from the
south, renewed the demand, when General Frazier, recognizing the
inutility as well as futility of resistance, surrendered on the 9th
of September, 1863.[78] The main body of our army was encamped near
Chattanooga, while the cavalry force was recruiting from fatigue and
exhaustion near Rome, Georgia. The enemy first attempted to strike
Buckner in the rear, but failing, commenced a movement against our
left and rear. On the last of August he had crossed his main force
over the Tennessee River at Carpenter's Ferry, near Stevenson. Our
effective force of infantry and artillery was about thirty-five
thousand. By active reconnaissance of our cavalry, which had been
brought forward, it was ascertained that Rosecrans's general movement
was toward our left and rear, in the direction of Dalton and Rome,
keeping Lookout Mountain between us. The want of supplies in the
country and the force under Burnside on our right rendered hazardous
a movement on the rear of the former with our force. General Lee,
with commendable zeal for the public welfare and characteristic
self-denial, had consented to remain for a time on the defensive for
the purpose of reenforcing Bragg's army, and General Longstreet had
been detached with his corps for that purpose. These troops were to
come by rail from Atlanta, and might soon be expected to arrive. It
was, therefore, determined to retire toward our expected
reënforcements, as well as to meet the foe in front when he should
emerge from the mountain-gorges.

As we could not thus hold Chattanooga, our army, on September 7th and
8th, took position from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette, on the
road leading south from Chattanooga and fronting the east slope of
Lookout Mountain. The forces on the Hiawassee and at Chickamauga
Station took the route by Ringgold. A small cavalry force was left in
observation at Chattanooga, and a brigade of infantry at Ringgold to
cover the railroad.

The enemy immediately moved the corps that threatened Buckner into
Chattanooga, and, shortly after, it commenced to move on our rear by
the roads to Lafayette and Ringgold. Another corps was nearly
opposite the head of McLemore Cove, in Will's Valley, and one at
Colonel Winston's opposite Alpine. During the 9th it was ascertained
that a column, between four and five thousand, had crossed Lookout
Mountain by Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps into McLemore's Cove. An
effort was made by General Bragg to capture this column, with intent
then to turn upon the others, and beat each in succession. But, some
delay having occurred in the advance of our forces through the gap,
the enemy took advantage of it and retreated to the mountain-passes.
He then withdrew his corps from the route toward Alpine to unite with
the one near McLemore's Cove, which was gradually extended toward Lee
and Gordon's Mills. It was now determined to turn upon the Third
Corps of the enemy, approaching us from the direction of Chattanooga.
The forces sent toward the Cove were accordingly withdrawn to
Lafayette, and Polk's and Walker's corps were moved immediately in
the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills, Lieutenant-General Polk
commanding. He was ordered to attack early the next morning, as the
enemy's corps was known to be divided, and it was hoped by successive
attacks to crush his army in detail; but the expectation was not
realized, as his forces withdrew and formed a junction. Our trains
and supplies were then put in a safe position, and all our forces
were concentrated along the Chickamauga, threatening the opposing
force in front. Major-General Wheeler, with two divisions of cavalry,
occupied the extreme left, vacated by Hill's corps, and was directed
to press the enemy in McLemore's Cove; to divert his attention from
the real movement, General Forrest covered the movement on our front
and right; General B. R. Johnson was moved from Ringgold to the
extreme right of the line; Walker's corps formed on his left opposite
Alexander's Bridge, Buckner's next, near Tedford Ford, Polk opposite
Lee and Gordon's Mills, and Hill on the extreme left. Orders were
issued to cross the Chickamauga at 6 A.M., commencing by the extreme
right.

The movements were unexpectedly delayed by the difficulty of the
roads and the resistance of the enemy's cavalry. The right column did
not effect its crossing until late in the afternoon of the 18th; at
this time, Major-General Hood, from the Army of Northern Virginia,
arrived and assumed command of the column. General W. H. T, Walker
had a severe skirmish at Alexander's Bridge, from which he finally
drove the enemy, but not before he had destroyed it; General Walker,
however, found a ford, crossed, and Hood united with him after night.
The advance was resumed at daylight on the 19th, when Buckner's corps
with Cheatham's division of Polk's corps crossed the Chickamauga, and
our line of battle was thus formed: Buckner's left rested on the bank
of the stream about one mile below Lee and Gordon's Mills; on his
right came Hood with his own and Johnson's divisions, and Walker's
formed the extreme right; Forrest with his cavalry was in advance to
the right. He soon became engaged with such a large force that two
brigades were sent from Walker's division to his support. Forrest,
here fighting with his usual tenacity, desperately held in check the
comparatively immense force which he was resisting. General Walker,
being ordered to commence the attack on the right, boldly advanced,
and soon developed opposing forces greatly superior to his own; he,
however, drove them handsomely, capturing several batteries of
artillery, by dashing charges. As he pressed back the force in his
front, it rested upon such heavy masses in the rear, that he was in
turn repulsed. Cheatham's division was ordered to his support; it
came too late. Before it could reach him, assailed on both flanks, he
had been forced back to his first position, but the two commands
united, though yet greatly outnumbered, and, by a spirited attack,
recovered our advantage. These movements on our right were in such
direction as to create an opening between the left of Cheatham's
division and the right of Hood's. To fill this, Stewart's division,
the reserve of Buckner's corps, was ordered up, and soon became
engaged, as now did Hood's whole front. The enemy had transferred
forces from his extreme right so as to concentrate his main body on
his left, acutely perceiving the probability of an effort on our part
to gain his rear, and cut off his communication with his base at
Chattanooga. The main part of the battle, therefore, was fought on
the opposite flank from that where both armies had probably expected
it. Lieutenant-General Polk was now directed to move the remainder of
his corps across the stream, and to assume command in person; Hill's
corps was also directed to move to our right. Stewart, by a gallant
assault, broke the enemy's center, and pushed forward until he became
exposed to an enfilading fire. Hood steadily advanced, driving the
force in his front until night. Cleburne, of Hill's corps,
immediately on reaching the right, closed so impetuously with the
enemy as to create surprise, and drove him in great disorder. From
prisoners and otherwise, the commanding General became satisfied that
his antagonist had by marching night and day succeeded in
concentrating his whole force, and that it had that day been fought
on the field of Chickamauga. A part of the forces on our extreme left
had not reached the field of actual conflict in time to participate
in the engagement of that day; they, together with the remainder of
Longstreet's corps, were brought up and put in position to renew the
battle in the morning. Our troops slept upon the field they had so
bravely contested. The Confederate troops engaged on the right were
as follows:

General W. H. T. Walker's division . . . . . 5,500
Cheatham's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,000
A. P. Stewart's division . . . . . . . . . . 4,040
Cleburne's division . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,115
Hood's, B. R. Johnson's, and Trigg's troops 8,428
Forrest's and Pegram's cavalry . . . . . . . 3,500
------
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,583

General Wheeler with his cavalry had been in observation on the left,
and for a fortnight, daily skirmishing with the enemy. On the 17th he
was ordered to move into McLemore's Cove to make a demonstration in
that direction, where, after a severe engagement, he developed a
force too large to be dislodged. On the 18th he was directed to hold
the gap in Pigeon Mountain, so as to prevent the enemy from moving on
our left. As appeared subsequently, General Rosecrans, by forced
marches, had made a _détour_, and formed a junction of his forces in
front of ours, so that it was no longer needful to hold the passes of
the Pigeon Mountain, and Wheeler with his cavalry was called to take
position on the left of our line.

On the night of the 19th, the whole force having been assembled,
including the five thousand effective infantry sent for temporary
service from Virginia, the command was organized as two corps, the
one on the right to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk; the
other, on the left, to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Longstreet.
These corps consisted respectively as follows: Polk's right wing, of
Breckenridge's, Cleburne's, Cheatham's, and Walker's divisions, and
Forrest's cavalry--aggregate, 22,471; Longstreet's left wing, of
Preston's, Hindman's, Johnson's (Hood's), Law's, Kershaw's, Stewart's
divisions, and Wheeler's cavalry--aggregate, 24,850: grand aggregate
of both wings, 47,321, The forces under Rosecrans, as has been
subsequently learned, consisted of McCook's corps, 14,345; Thomas's,
24,072; Crittenden's, 13,975; Granger's, about 5,000; cavalry, 7,000:
whole number, 64,392. On the night of the 19th General Bragg gave his
instructions orally, to the general officers whom he had summoned to
his camp-fire, as to the position of the different commands; and the
order of battle was that the attack should commence on the right at
daybreak, and be taken up successively to the left. From a
combination of mishaps, it resulted that the attack was not commenced
until nine or ten o'clock in the day, and, what was much more
important, the troops from right to left did not in rapid succession
engage, so as to have that effectiveness which would have resulted
from concert of action. Prodigies of valor were performed, many
partial successes were gained in the beginning of the battle, but in
the first operations the troops so frequently moved to the assault
without the necessary cohesion in a charging line, that nearly all
early assaults by our right wing were successively repulsed with
loss. Though at first invariably successful, our troops were
subsequently compelled to retire before the heavy reënforcements
constantly brought.

Wheeler with his cavalry struck boldly at the enemy's extreme right
and center, and with such effect that, in the Federal battle reports,
it appears the attack was mistaken for a flank movement by General
Longstreet.

Rosecrans having transferred his main strength to our right, the
attack of the left met with less resistance, and was successfully and
vigorously followed up. About 4 P.M. a general assault was made by
the right, and the attack was pressed from right to left until the
enemy gave way at different points, and, finally, about dark, yielded
along the whole line. Our army bivouacked on the ground it had so
gallantly won. The foe, though driven from his lines, continued to
confront us when the action closed. But it was found the next morning
that he had availed himself of the night to withdraw from our front,
and that his main body was soon in position within his lines at
Chattanooga. We captured over eight thousand prisoners, fifty-one
pieces of artillery, fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and
quantities of ammunition, with wagons, ambulances, teams, and
medicines with hospital stores in large quantities. From the
appearance of the field the enemy's losses must have largely exceeded
ours, and the victory was complete; but these results could not
console us for the lives they cost. Pride in the gallantry of our
heroes, rejoicing at the repulse of the invader, was subdued by the
memory of our fallen brave.

After General Rosecrans's retreat to Chattanooga, he withdrew his
forces from the passes of Lookout Mountain, which covered his line of
supplies from Bridgeport. These commanding positions were immediately
occupied by our troops, and a cavalry force was sent across the
Tennessee, which destroyed a large wagon-train in the Sequatchie
Valley, captured McMinnsville and other points on the railroad, and
thus temporarily cut off the source of supplies for the army at
Chattanooga.

The reasons why General Bragg did not promptly pursue are stated in
his report thus:

"Our supplies of all kinds were greatly reduced, the railroad having
been constantly occupied in transporting troops, prisoners, and our
wounded, and the bridges having been destroyed to a point two miles
south of Ringgold. These supplies were ordered to be replenished,
and, as soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted, the army was
moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had
with his supplies in the rear. His important road, and the shortcut
by half to his depot at Bridgeport, lay along the south bank of the
Tennessee. The holding of this all-important route was confided to
Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command, and its possession forced
the enemy to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains,
by wagon transportation. At the same time, our cavalry, in large
force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and
difficult route. These dispositions, faithfully sustained, insured
the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and
forage."

These reverses caused the enemy to send forward reënforcements from
the army at Vicksburg, and also to assign General Grant to the
command in Tennessee. As early as September 23d the Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were detached, and sent
under General Hooker to Tennessee, and assigned to protect
Rosecrans's line of communication from Bridgeport to Nashville. It
was on October 23d that General Grant arrived at Chattanooga, and
only in time to save their army from starvation or evacuation. The
investment by General Bragg had been so close and their
communications had been so destroyed that Bragg was on the point of
realizing the evacuation of Chattanooga, which he had anticipated.
The report of Grant thus describes the situation on his arrival:

"Up to this period our forces in Chattanooga were practically
invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee River, above
Chattanooga, to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain,
below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed nearly
to Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley,
at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a
brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country
north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the
most impracticable roads to army supplies.

"The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation
that they could not have been relied upon for moving anything. An
attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such
supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost
certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within
gunshot of and overlooking our very fortifications, would
unquestionably have pursued retreating forces. Already more than ten
thousand animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops
by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to
Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied
another week."

The first movement under Grant was, therefore, to establish a new and
shorter line of supplies. For this purpose a night expedition was
sent down the river from Chattanooga, which seized the range of hills
at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and covered the Brown's Ferry road.
By 10 A.M. a bridge was laid across the river at the ferry, which
secured the end of the road nearest to our forces and the shorter
line over which the enemy could move troops. General Hooker also
entered Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie, and took up positions for the
defense of the road from Whiteside's, over which he had marched, and
also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry. General
Palmer crossed from the north side of the river opposite Whiteside's,
and held the road passed over by Hooker. An unsuccessful attack was
made on a portion of Hooker's troops the first night after he entered
the valley. Subsequently, we lost the remaining heights held by us
west of Lookout Creek.

Further operations of the enemy were delayed until the arrival of
Sherman's force from Memphis. After his arrival, on November 23d, an
attempt was made to feel our lines. This was done with so much force
as to obtain possession of Indian Hill and the low range of hills
south of it. That night Sherman began to move to obtain a position
just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and by daylight on the
24th he had eight thousand men on the south side of the Tennessee,
and fortified in rifle-trenches. By noon pontoon-bridges were laid
across the Tennessee and the Chickamauga, and the remainder of his
forces crossed. During the afternoon he took possession of the whole
northern extremity of Missionary Ridge nearly to the railroad-tunnel,
and fortified the position equally with that held by us. A raid was
also made on our line of communication, cutting the railroad at
Cleveland. On the same day Hooker sealed the western slope of Lookout
Mountain. On the 26th he took possession of the mountain-top with a
part of his force, and with the remainder crossed Chattanooga Valley
to Rossville. Our most northern point was assailed by Sherman, and
the attack kept up all day. He was reënforced by a part of Howard's
corps. In the afternoon the whole force of the enemy's center,
consisting of four divisions, was moved to the attack. They got
possession of the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and
commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left, and
continued it until the summit was reached, notwithstanding the
volleys of grape and canister discharged at them. Our forces
retreated from the ridge as the multitudinous assailants neared the
thin line on the crest, and during the night withdrew from the
positions on the plain below. General Grant, after advancing a short
distance from Chattanooga, dispatched a portion of his forces to the
relief of Burnside in East Tennessee, where he was closely besieged
by General Longstreet in Knoxville. Longstreet moved east into
Virginia, and ultimately joined General Lee. He had left the army of
General Lee, and moved to the West with his force, on the condition
that he should return when summoned. This summons had been sent to
him. The loss of the enemy in the conflicts at Chattanooga was 757
killed, 4,529 wounded, and 337 missing; total, 5,616. Our loss in
killed and wounded was much less than theirs.

[Footnote 78: Some of the garrison of Cumberland Gap escaped, and stated
to General Jones that the surrender had been made without resistance, on
the demands of the smaller detachments which had preceded General
Burnside, and I was not advised of the fact that Buckner had
previously retreated toward Chattanooga, and that Burnside was in
possession of Knoxville. In my message of December 12, 1863, I
referred to the event, as reported to the War Department, as follows:

"The country was painfully surprised by the intelligence that the
officer in command of Cumberland Gap had surrendered that important
and easily defensible pass, without firing a shot, upon the summons
of a force still believed to have been inadequate to its reduction,
and when reënforcements were in supporting distance and had been
ordered to his aid. The entire garrison, including its commander,
being still held prisoners by the enemy, I am unable to suggest any
explanation of this disaster which laid open Eastern Tennessee and
Southwestern Virginia to hostile operations."

So far as censure of General Frazier was implied in these remarks, I
am now fully satisfied it was unjust, and I can only regret that the
authentic information recently furnished to me had not been received
at an earlier date, so that I might have relieved General Frazier
from the reflection while I held executive authority. It gives me
pleasure now to say that full and exact information justifies the
high estimate I placed upon him when he was assigned to the separate
command of that important post. Full justice can be done to General
Frazier only when his report and those of his subordinate officers
shall have been published.]

CHAPTER XLI.

In the spring of 1863 the enemy occupied his former position before
Fredericksburg. He was in great strength, and, so far as we could
learn, was preparing on the grandest scale for another advance
against Richmond, which in political if not military circles was
regarded as the objective point of the war. The consolidated report
of the Army of the Potomac, then under the command of Major-General
Hooker, states the force present on May 10, 1863, to be 136,704.

General Lee's forces had been reorganized into three army corps,
designated the First, Second, and Third Corps. In the order named,
they were commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell, and A.
P. Hill.

The zeal of our people in the defense of their country's cause had
brought nearly all of the population fit for military service to the
various armies then in the field, so that but little increase could
be hoped for by the Army of Northern Virginia. Under these
circumstances, to wait until the enemy should choose to advance was
to take the desperate hazard of the great inequality of numbers, as
well as ability to reënforce, which he possessed. In addition to the
army under General Hooker, a considerable force occupied the lower
part of the Valley of the Shenandoah.

It was decided by a bold movement to attempt to transfer hostilities
to the north side of the Potomac, by crossing the river and marching
into Maryland and Pennsylvania, simultaneously driving the foe out of
the Shenandoah Valley. Thus, it was hoped, General Hooker's army
would be called from Virginia to meet our advance toward the heart of
the enemy's country. In that event, the vast preparations which had
been made for an advance upon Richmond would be foiled, the plan for
his summer's campaign deranged, and much of the season for active
operations be consumed in the new combinations and dispositions which
would be required. If, beyond the Potomac, some opportunity should be
offered so as to enable us to defeat the army on which our foe most
relied, the measure of our success would be full; but, if the
movement only resulted in freeing Virginia from the presence of the
hostile army, it was more than could fairly be expected from awaiting
the attack which was clearly indicated.

Actuated by these and other considerations, the campaign was
commenced on June 3, 1863. Our forces advanced to Culpeper
Court-House, leaving A. P. Hill to occupy the lines in front of
Fredericksburg. On the 5th Hooker, having discovered our movement,
crossed an army corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, but, as
this was apparently for observation, it was not thought necessary to
oppose it.

On the 9th a large force of the enemy's cavalry crossed at Beverly's
and Kelly's Fords and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement
ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the
afternoon, when Stuart forced his assailant to recross the river with
heavy loss, leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of
artillery, and several stands of colors in our hands.

Meantime, General Jenkins with a cavalry brigade had been ordered to
advance toward Winchester, to coöperate with an infantry expedition
into the lower Valley, and General Imboden made a demonstration
toward Romney to cover the movement against Winchester, and prevent
reënforcements from the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both
these officers were in position when Ewell left Culpeper Court-House
on the 6th. Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, Rodes's
division went to Berryville to dislodge the force stationed there,
and cut off the communication between Winchester and the Potomac.
General Ewell, on the 13th of June, advanced directly upon
Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town. On the
next day he stormed the works, and the whole army of General Milroy
was captured or put to flight. Most of those who attempted to escape
were intercepted and made prisoners. Unfortunately, among the
exceptions, was their commander, who had been guilty of most
unpardonable outrages upon defenseless non-combatants.

General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, entering the
latter place on the 14th, and capturing seven hundred prisoners, five
pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of stores. These
operations cleared the Valley of the enemy. More than four thousand
prisoners, twenty-nine pieces of artillery, two hundred and seventy
wagons and ambulances, with four hundred horses, were captured,
besides a large amount of military stores. Our loss was small. On the
night that Ewell appeared at Winchester, the enemy at Fredericksburg
recrossed the Rappahannock, and on the next day disappeared behind
the hills of Stafford.

The whole army of General Hooker, in retiring, pursued the roads near
the Potomac, offering no favorable opportunity for attack. His
purpose seemed to be to take a position which would enable him to
cover the approaches to Washington City. To draw him farther from his
base, and to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who had left for the
Valley, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and
occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. The cavalry under General Stuart
was in front of Longstreet to watch the enemy, and encountered his
cavalry on the 17th near Aldie, and drove it back. The engagement was
renewed on the next day, but the cavalry of the latter being now
strongly supported by infantry, Stuart was compelled to retire. He
had, however, taken in these engagements about four hundred prisoners
and a considerable number of horses and arms.

Meantime, General Ewell, with the advance of his corps, had entered
Maryland. Jenkins, with his cavalry, penetrated as far as
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. As these demonstrations did not cause the
hostile army to leave Virginia, nor did it seem disposed to advance
upon Longstreet's position, he was withdrawn to the west side of the
Shenandoah. General Hill had already reached the Valley. General
Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and observe the
movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede
as much as possible should he attempt to cross the Potomac, In that
event General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the
Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should
seem best, and take position on the right of our column as it
advanced. General Longstreet says:

"General Stuart held the gap for a while, and then hurried around
beyond Hooker's army, and we saw nothing more of him until the
evening of July 2d, when he came down from York and joined us, having
made a complete circuit of the Federal army."

Longstreet and Hill crossed the Potomac, to be within supporting
distance of Ewell, and advanced into Pennsylvania, encamping near
Chambersburg on the 27th of June. The cavalry, under Colonel White,
advanced to the Susquehanna.

On the night of the 27th information was received that General Hooker
had crossed the Potomac, and was advancing northward, and that the
head of the column had reached South Mountain. This menaced our
communications, and it was resolved to prevent his further progress
by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountain.
Accordingly, the different commands were ordered to proceed to
Gettysburg. This march was conducted more slowly than it would have
been had the movements of Hooker been known. Heth's, the leading
division of Hill's corps, met the enemy in front of Gettysburg on the
morning of July 1st, driving him back to within a short distance of
the town; the advance there encountered a larger force, with which
two of Hill's divisions became engaged. Ewell, coming up with two of
his divisions, joined in the engagement; and the opposing force was
driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about five
thousand prisoners and several pieces of artillery.

Under the instructions given to them not to bring on a general
engagement, these corps bivouacked on the ground they had won.

In an address delivered at Lexington, Virginia, on January 17, 1873,
General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery, makes the following
statement:

"The ground southwest of the town was carefully examined by me after
the engagement on July 1st. Being found much less difficult than the
steep ascent fronting the troops already up, its practicable
character was reported to our commanding General. He informed me that
he had ordered Longstreet to attack on that front at sunrise the next
morning. And he added to myself, 'I want you to be out long before
sunrise so as to reexamine and save time.' He also desired me to
communicate with General Longstreet as well as with himself. The
reconnaissance was accordingly made, as soon as it was light enough
on the 2d, and made through a long distance--in fact, very close to
what there was of the enemy's line. No insuperable difficulty
appearing, and the marching up--far off, the enemy's reenforcing
columns being seen--the extreme desirableness of immediate attack
there, was at once reported to the commanding General; and, according
to his wish, message was also sent to the intrepid but deliberate
corps commander whose sunrise attack there had been ordered. There
was, however, unaccountable delay. My own messages went repeatedly to
General Lee, and his, I know, was urgently pressed on General
Longstreet, until, as I afterward learned from officers who saw
General Lee, as I could not at the time, he manifested extreme
displeasure with the tardy corps commander. That hard-fighting
soldier, to whom it had been committed there to attack early in the
day, did not, in person, reach the commanding General, and with him
ride to a position whence to view the ground and see the enemy's
arriving masses, until twelve o'clock; and his column was not up and
ready for the assault until 4 P.M. All this, as it occurred under my
personal observation, it is nothing short of imperative duty that I
should thus fairly state."

For the reasons set forth by General Pendleton, whose statement, in
regard to a fact coming under his personal observation, none who know
him will question, preparations for a general engagement were
unfortunately delayed until the afternoon, instead of being made at
sunrise; then troops had been concentrated, and "Round-Top," the
commanding position, unoccupied in the morning, had received the
force which inflicted such disaster on our assaulting columns. The
question as to the responsibility for this delay has been so fully
discussed in the Southern Historical Society papers as to relieve me
from the necessity of entering into it.

The position at Gettysburg was not the choice of either side. South
from the town an irregular, interrupted line of hills runs, which is
sometimes called the "Gettysburg Ridge." This ridge, at the town,
turns eastward and then southward. At the turn eastward is Cemetery
Hill and at the turn southward Culps's Hill. From Cemetery Hill the
line runs southward about three miles in a well-defined ridge, since
the battle called Cemetery Ridge, and terminates in a high, rocky,
and wooded peak named Round-Top, which was the key of the enemy's
position, as it flanked their line. The less elevated portion, near
where the crest rises into Round-Top, is termed "Little Round-Top," a
rough and bold spur of the former. Thus, while Cemetery and Culps's
Hills require the formation of a line of battle to face northward,
the direction of Cemetery Ridge requires the line to face westward.
The crest has a good slope to the rear, while to the west it falls
off in a cultivated and undulating valley, which it commands. About a
mile distant is a parallel crest, known as Seminary Ridge, and which
our forces occupied during the battle. Longstreet, with the divisions
of Hood and McLaws, faced Round-Top and a good part of Cemetery
Ridge; Hill's three divisions continued the line from the left of
Longstreet, fronting the remainder of Cemetery Ridge; while Ewell,
with his three divisions, held a line through the town, and, sweeping
round the base of Cemetery Hill, terminated the left in front of
Culps's Hill.

These were the positions of the three corps after the arrival of
General Longstreet's troops.

The main purpose of the movement across the Potomac was to free
Virginia from the presence of the enemy. If this could be done by
manoeuvering merely, a most important result would be cheaply
obtained. The contingency of a battle was of course deemed probable,
and, with any fair opportunity, the Army of Northern Virginia was
considered sure to win a victory.

[Illustration: Lieutenant-General James Longstreet]

It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance
as Gettysburg from our base, unless attacked; but, being unexpectedly
confronted by the opposing army, it became a matter of difficulty to
withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same
time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the
presence of the main army of the enemy, as he was enabled to restrain
our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with
both regular and local troops. Encouraged by the successful issue of
the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results
that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade (who
had succeeded General Hooker), General Lee thought it preferable to
renew the attack.

General Meade held the high ridge above described, along which he had
massed a large amount of artillery. General Ewell occupied the left
of our line, General Hill the center, and General Longstreet the
right. In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position, from
which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could gain
the more elevated ground (Round-Top) beyond, and thus enable our guns
to rake the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor
to carry this position, while General Ewell attacked directly the
high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially
fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the center of the
line, in order to prevent reënforcements to either wing, and to avail
himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack. After
a severe struggle Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and
holding the ground in his immediate front. Ewell also carried some of
the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to
lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the
force in his front. The battle ceased at dark. These partial
successes determined Lee to continue the assault on the next day.
Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet on the
following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the
position gained by him on the day before. The general plan of attack
was unchanged, except that one division and two brigades of Hill's
corps were ordered to support Longstreet.

General Meade, in the mean time, had strengthened his line with
earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and
the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d, and raged with
great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the
advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his
batteries; but, our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition,
the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the
numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most
determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their
advantage and fall back to their original positions with severe loss.

Owing to the strength of the enemy's position and the exhaustion of
our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded,
and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to
continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as could be
removed and a part of the arms collected on the field were ordered to
Williamsport. The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and at
night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it
about four thousand prisoners. Nearly two thousand had been
previously paroled; but the numerous wounded that had fallen into our
hands after the first and second day's engagements were left behind.
Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which
greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the column did not
leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th.
The march was continued during that day without interruption by the
enemy, except an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the
afternoon, when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. The army,
after a tedious march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached
Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 6th and morning of the 7th of July.

The Potomac was so much swollen by the rains, that had fallen almost
incessantly since our army entered Maryland, as to be unfordable. A
pontoon-train had been sent from Richmond, but the rise in the river
gave to it a width greater than was expected, so that additional
boats had to be made by the army on its retreat. Our communication
with the south side was thus interrupted, and it was found difficult
to procure either ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty
being enhanced by the high water impeding the working of the mills.
The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to wait at
Williamsport for the subsiding of the river or the construction of
additional pontoon-boats. The enemy had not yet made his appearance,
but, as he was in a condition to obtain large reënforcements and our
want of supplies was daily becoming more embarrassing, it was deemed
advisable to recross the river. By the 13th a good bridge was thrown
over at Falling Waters. On the 12th Meade's army approached. A
position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from
Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that
and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two
armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in
fortifying his own lines.

General Meade, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct
of the War, said that he ordered an attack on our forces on the
morning of the 14th, and, if it had been made, it was his opinion
that "it would have resulted disastrously." When asked the reasons
for that opinion, he replied:

"If I had attacked the enemy in the position which he then
occupied--he having the advantage of position, and being on the
defensive, his artillery in position, and his infantry behind
parapets and rifle-pits--the very same reasons and causes which
produced my success at Gettysburg would have operated in his favor
there, and be likely to produce success on his part."

Our preparations being completed, and the Potomac, though still deep,
being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the
south side on the night of the 13th. Ewell's corps forded the river
at Williamsport, those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the
bridge. Owing to the condition of the roads the troops did not reach
the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not
completed until 1 P.M., when the bridge was removed. General Lee said
that the enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was
attended with no loss of material except a few disabled wagons and
two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through
the deep mud. During the slow and tedious march to the bridge, in the
midst of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way
to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find many in the
obscurity of the night, and these, with some stragglers, a few of
Heth's division most remote from the bridge, were captured. On the
following day the army marched to Bunker Hill, in the vicinity of
which it encamped for several days. Owing to the swollen condition of
the Shenandoah River, the campaign which was contemplated when the
Potomac was recrossed, could not be immediately commenced. Before the
waters had subsided, the movements of the enemy required us to cross
the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappahannock.

The strength of our army at Gettysburg is stated at 62,000 of all
arms.[79] The report of the Army of the Potomac under General Meade,
on June 30, 1863, states the force present at 112,988 men. Before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Meade, in reference to
his force at Gettysburg, said, "Including all arms of the service, my
strength was a little under 100,000 men--about 95,000."

If the strength of General Lee's forces, according to the last
accessible report before the movement northward, be compared with
that made after his return into Virginia, there is a decrease of
nineteen thousand of the brave men who had set the seal of
invincibility upon the Army of Northern Virginia.

General Lee, in his report, noticing the large loss of men and
officers, says:

"I can not speak of these brave men as their merits and exploits
deserve. Some of them are appropriately mentioned in the accompanying
reports, and the memory of all will be gratefully and affectionately
cherished by the people in whose defense they fell.

"The loss of Major-General Pender is severely felt by the army and
the country. . . . Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnet,
and Semmes, died as they had lived, discharging the highest duty of
patriots with devotion that never faltered, and courage that shrank
from no danger."

The testimony of General Meade, above mentioned, contains this
statement respecting his losses:

"On the evening of the 2d of July, after the battle of that day had
ceased, and darkness had set in, being aware of the very heavy losses
of the First and Eleventh Corps on the 1st of July, and knowing how
severely the Third Corps, the Fifth Corps, and other portions of the
army, had suffered in the battle of the 2d of July--in fact, as
subsequently ascertained, out of the twenty-four thousand men killed,
wounded, and missing, which was the amount of my losses and
casualties at Gettysburg--over twenty thousand of them had been put
_hors de combat_ before the night of the 2d of July."

Thus closed the campaign in Pennsylvania. The wisdom of the strategy
was justified by the result. The battle of Gettysburg was
unfortunate. Though the loss sustained by the enemy was greater than
our own, theirs could be repaired, ours could not.

Had General Lee been able to compel the enemy to attack him in
position, I think we should have had a complete victory, and the
testimony of General Meade quoted above shows that he was not at all
inclined to make the experiment. If General Lee, by moving to the
right, would only have led General Meade to fall back on his
preferred position of Pipe Creek, his ability to wait and the
impossibility under such circumstances for General Lee to supply his
army for any length of time seem to me an answer to that point in the
criticism to which our great Captain has been subjected. To compel
Meade to retire would have availed but little to us, unless his army
had first been routed. To beat that army was probably to secure our
independence. The position of Gettysburg would have been worth
nothing to us if our army had found it unoccupied. The fierce battle
that Lee fought there must not be considered as for the position; to
beat the great army of the North was the object, and that it was of
possible attainment is to be inferred from the various successes of
our arms. Had there been a concentrated attack at sunrise on the
second day, with the same gallantry and skill which were exhibited in
the partial assaults, it may reasonably be assumed that the enemy
would have been routed. This, from the best evidence we have, was the
plan and the expectation of General Lee. These having failed, from
whatever cause, and Meade having occupied in force the commanding
position of Round-Top, it must be conceded that it would have been
better to withdraw than to renew the attack on the third day. The
high morale and discipline of our army, together with the unqualified
confidence of the men in their commanding General, excluded the
supposition that they would be demoralized by retreat. Subsequent
events proved how little cause there was to fear it. It is not
admitted that our army was defeated, and the enemy's claim to a
victory is refuted by the fact that, when Lee halted on the banks of
the Potomac, Meade, instead of attacking as a pursuing general would
a defeated foe, halted also, and commenced intrenching.

The Battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of an unusual amount of
discussion, and the enemy has made it a matter of extraordinary
exultation. As an affair of arms it was marked by mighty feats of
valor to which both combatants may point with military pride. It was
a graceful thing in President Lincoln if, as reported, when he was
shown the steeps which the Northern men persistently held, he
answered, "I am proud to be the countryman of the men who assailed
those heights."

The consequences of the battle have justified the amount of attention
it has received. It may be regarded as the most eventful struggle of
the war. By it the drooping spirit of the North was revived. Had
their army been there defeated, those having better opportunities to
judge than I or any one who was not among them, have believed it
would have ended the war. On the other hand, a drawn battle, where
the Army of Northern Virginia made an attack, impaired the confidence
of the Southern people so far as to give the malcontents a power to
represent the Government as neglecting for Virginia the safety of the
more southern States.

In all free governments, the ability of its executive branch to
prosecute a war must largely depend upon public opinion; in an infant
republic, this, for every reason, is peculiarly the case. The volume
given to the voice of disaffection was therefore most seriously felt
by us.

Shattered, it is true, but not disheartened, the Army of Northern
Virginia after recrossing the Potomac rose like the son of Terra,
with renewed vigor, and entered on the brilliant campaign hereafter
to be generally described.

Early in October General Lee, with two corps (Ewell's and Hill's),
the First Corps of his army having been temporarily detached for
service in Tennessee, crossed the Rapidan to attack the flank of the
enemy, or to compel him to retreat. It resulted in the capture of
fifteen hundred prisoners, and forced Meade's army back to Alexandria
and Centreville. The campaign was an unbroken success, with the
exception of a rash and ill-conducted affair at Bristoe Station,
where our advance engaged a corps, and was repulsed, losing a number
of men and five guns. Thus, without a general battle, a large portion
of the State was for the time liberated.

On November 7th the enemy advanced upon our force at Kelly's Ford, of
the Rappahannock River, effected a crossing, and, rushing upon two
brigades who were at Rappahannock Station defending the bridges,
overwhelmed and captured most of them, taking between twelve and
fifteen hundred men, and four pieces of artillery. The movements of
the enemy were concealed by the darkness, and his attack was a
surprise.

On November 26th the army under General Meade crossed the Rapidan,
with the intention of interposing between the widely separated wings
of his adversary. Instead of being successful, this movement resulted
in an entire failure. General Meade found Lee's army posted behind
Mine Run, and ready to receive an attack whenever he was disposed to
make it. "Meade declared, it is related, that he could carry the
position with a loss of thirty thousand men; but, as that idea was
frightful, there seemed nothing to do but retreat." [80] Lee had
inaugurated that system of breastworks which did him good service in
his long campaign with General Grant. When the troops were halted in
a wood, the men felled the large trees, heavy logs were dragged
without loss of time to the prescribed line, where they were piled
upon one another in double walls, which were filled in rapidly with
earth; so that, in a short space of time, defenses which would turn a
cannon-shot were often constructed. In front, for some distance, the
felled timber made a kind of abatis. As General Meade did not attack,
General Lee, on the night of December 1st, determined to assail his
adversary on the next morning; but, when the dawn broke over the
hills, his camps were seen to be deserted. General Meade had
abandoned the campaign, and was in full retreat toward the Rapidan.
Pursuit was immediately made, but he had too much the start, and
reached the north side of the Rapidan before he could be overtaken.
Both armies then retired to their original positions. We captured
about seven hundred prisoners, four hundred mules and horses, and
destroyed or secured one hundred and twenty wagons.

[Footnote 79: "Four Years with General Lee."]

[Footnote 80: "Life of General R. E. Lee," by J. E. Cooke.]

CHAPTER XLII.

The most painful pages of this work are those which now present the
subjugation of the State governments by the Government of the United
States. The patriot, the lover of his country and of the liberties of
mankind, can not contemplate these facts without a feeling of grief
which will not be comforted. That the work of the fathers of the
republic, that the most magnificent system of constitutional
government which the wisdom of man has devised, should be turned from
its object, changed from its order, rendered powerless to protect the
unalienable rights and sovereignty of the people, and made the
instrument by which to establish and maintain imperialism, is a
revolution unlike any other that may be found in the history of
mankind. The result established the truthfulness of the assertion, so
often made during the progress of the war, that the Northern people,
by their unconstitutional warfare to gain the freedom of certain
negro slaves, would lose their own liberties.

It has been shown that the governments of the States were instituted
to secure certain unalienable rights of the citizens with which they
were endowed by their Creator, and that among these rights were life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that they derived their just
powers from the consent of the governed; and that these powers were
organized by the citizens in such form as seemed to them most likely
to effect their safety and happiness. Where must the American citizen
look for the security of the rights with which he has been endowed by
his Creator? To his State government. Where shall he look to find
security and protection for his life, security and protection for his
personal liberty, security and protection for his property, security
and protection for his safety and happiness? Only to his State
government.

The powers which the State government possesses for the security of
his life, his liberty, his property, his safety, and his happiness,
are "just powers." They have been derived from the unconstrained
consent of the governed, and they have been organized in such form as
seems most likely to effect these objects.

Is the citizen's life in danger from violence? The State guarantees
his protection, and it is its duty to rescue him from danger and
obtain redress from the offender, whether an individual or a foreign
nation. Are the freedom and personal liberty of the citizen in danger
from unlawful arrest and imprisonment? The State guarantees both, and
it is its duty to secure and preserve his freedom. Is the property of
the citizen in danger of a violent and unjust seizure and unlawful
detention or destruction? The State government guarantees his title,
restores the property, or obtains damages. Is the personal property
of the citizen in danger of robbery or abduction? The State
government throws over it the shield of its protection, and regards
the burglar and the robber as the enemies of society. It is
unnecessary to proceed further with this enumeration.

The duty of the State government is to give to its citizens perfect
and complete security. It is necessarily sovereign within its own
domain, for it is the representative and the constituted agent of the
inherent sovereignty of the individuals. For the performance of its
duty of protection it may unite with other sovereignties; and also,
for better safety and security to its citizens, it may withdraw or
secede from such Union.

It will be seen that the entire order of the State government is
founded on the free consent of the governed. From this it springs;
from this it receives its force and life. It is this consent alone
from which "just powers" are derived. They can come from no other
source, and their exercise sources a true republican government. All
else are usurpations, their exercise is a tyranny, and their end is
the safety and security of the usurper, to obtain which the
unalienable rights of the people are sacrificed. The "just powers,"
thus derived, are organized in such form as shall seem to the
governed to be most likely to secure their safety and happiness. It
is the governed who determine the form of the government, and not the
ruler nor his military force, unless he comes as a conqueror to make
the subjugated do his will. The object, or end, for which these "just
powers" are derived from the consent of the governed and organized in
such form as seems most likely to effect that object, is solely to
secure the unalienable rights of men--such as life, liberty,
property, justice, peace and order, and the pursuit of happiness.

It will now be seen by the reader that, whenever any one of the
features of this order is perverted in its origin or progress, or
thwarted, or caused to deviate from its natural operation by any
internal or external interference, the order is destroyed, and the
State government, which represents it, is subverted, turned from its
object, changed from its natural purpose, rendered powerless to
protect the unalienable rights of its citizens, and made an
instrument to strengthen the hands of despotism. The commission of
such a subversion of the peaceful and fraternal States of this once
happy republic is fearlessly charged upon the Government of the
United States, as in itself constituting a monstrous crime against
constitutional liberty; and it is asserted that, when the
circumstances attending the deed are considered--the rage against a
whole people, the pillage, the arson, the inciting of servile war,
the slaughter of defenseless non-combatants, the devastation of whole
peaceful regions, the indiscriminate destruction of property--no
parallel can be found in the annals of mankind.

What, then, is the Government of the United States? It is an
organization of a few years' duration. It might cease to exist, and
yet the States and the people continue prosperous, peaceful, and
happy. Unlike the governments of the States, which find their origin
deep in the nature of man, it sprang from certain circumstances which
existed in the course of human affairs. Unlike the governments of the
States and of separate nations, which have a divine sanction, it has
no warrant for its authority but the ratification of the sovereign
States. Unlike the governments of the States, which were instituted
to secure generally the unalienable rights of man, it has only the
enumerated objects, and is restrained from passing beyond them by the
express reservation of all delegated functions. It keeps no records
of property, and guarantees to no one the possession of his estate.
Marriage, from which springs the family and the State, it can neither
confirm nor annul. It partakes of the nature of an incorporation for
certain purposes, beyond which it has neither influence nor
authority. It is an anomaly among governments, and arose out of the
articles of agreement made by certain friendly States, which proposed
to form a society of States and invest a common agent with specified
functions of sovereignty. Its duration was intended to be permanent,
as it was hoped thus to promote the peaceful ends for which it was
established; but, to have declared it _perpetual_, would have been to
deny the right of a people to alter or abolish their government when
it should cease to answer the ends for which it was instituted.

The objects which its creation was designed to secure to the States
and their people were of a truly peaceful nature, and commended
themselves to the approbation of men. They were stated by its authors
in a form called "the preamble" of their work, which is in these
words:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for
the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution of the United States."

Mankind must contemplate with horror the fact that an organization
established for such peaceful and benign ends did, within the first
century of its existence, lead the assault in a civil war that
brought nearly four millions of soldiers into the field, destroyed
thousands and thousands of millions of treasure, trampled the
unalienable rights of the people under foot, subverted and subjugated
the governments of the States, and ended by establishing itself as
supreme and sovereign over all. Some Christian writer has suggested
the thought that there may not be a spot of the earth's surface in
the Old World but has witnessed the commission of some human crime or
been wet with human gore. How nearly true this may be of the New
World's once-vaunted asylum for the victims of despotism, misrule,
and oppression, these pages can bear some testimony. After all, it is
the civil disorders, the violations of rights, and the perversions of
wise and useful institutions, that are the most disastrous in their
consequences. They last for ages; and often, too often, the lapse of
time brings no remedy to the suffering people. In their despair, they
say the past is gone for ever--a new era has opened; but what
horrors may be developed in its revolving years no mortal can
foresee, so they hug the chains they feel powerless to break.

How distinct in its nature and objects was the Government of the
United States from the governments of the States, may be seen from
that which has already been said. The former was established by
common consent to look after the common interests. It was to make
peace or war with foreign nations, protect the frontiers, extend the
boundaries, decide disputes between citizens of different States, and
administer general affairs in a manner to promote the peace, the
order, and the happiness of all. But, to the fostering care of the
State government, the man, the citizen, the head of the family, the
parent, the child, the woman, the scholar, and the Christian all
looked with full confidence as to their natural and divinely
sanctioned protector against all foes within or without; and relied
upon its ever-present arm for the safety and security of their
persons, their homes, their property, and their institutions. How
wofully the confiding people were betrayed when the usurper came, let
some of the Northern States answer!

Now let us proceed to notice the acts of the Government of the United
States, which subjugated the State governments. The details in the
case of Tennessee have been already stated. In that instance, the
government of the State, which derived its powers from the consent of
the governed, so that they were "just powers," found, in the
discharge of its duty to protect the institutions of its people, that
there were no means by which it could fulfill that duty but by a
withdrawal from the Union, so as to be rid of the Government of the
United States, and thus escape the threatened dangers of usurpation
and sectional hostility. It therefore resolved to withdraw from the
Union, and the people gave their assent to this resolution; so that
the State no longer considered itself a member of the Union, nor
recognized the laws and authority of its Government. The Government
of the United States, then, with a powerful military force, planted
itself at Nashville, the State capital. It refused to recognize the
State government, or any organization under it, as having any
existence, or to recognize the people otherwise than as a hostile
community. It said to them, in effect: "I am the sovereign and you
are the subjects. If you are stronger than I am, then drive me out of
the State; if I am stronger than you are, then I demand an
unconditional surrender to my sovereignty." It is evident that the
Government of the United States was not there by the consent of those
who were to be governed. It had not, therefore, any "just powers" of
government within the State of Tennessee. For, says the Declaration
of Independence of our fathers, governments "derive their 'just
powers' from the consent of the governed." It is further evident
that, by this action, the Government of the United States denied the
fundamental principle of popular liberty--that the people are the
source of all political power. In this instance, it not only
subverted the State government, but carried that subversion to the
extent of annihilation. It, therefore, proceeded to establish a new
order of affairs, founded, not on the principle of the sovereignty of
the people, which was wholly rejected, but on the assumption of
sovereignty in the United States Government. It appointed its
military Governor to be the head of the new order, and recognized no
civil or political existence in any man, except some of its notorious
adherents, until, betraying the State, he had taken an oath of
allegiance to the sovereignty of the Government of the United States.
Now commenced a system of denial of unalienable rights, for the
methods of the usurper are the same everywhere. Freedom of speech was
suppressed by the imposition of fines on those using "seditious"
language, and the demand of security for their future humility. The
freedom of the press was suppressed by suspension of publications and
the confiscation of the offices. Personal liberty was destroyed by
arrests, imprisonment, and exile.

In process of time, an effort was made to erect a form of State
government which should be subservient and subject to the United
States Government. For this purpose, no one could be a voter until he
had bound himself by an oath to support and defend the Government of
the United States. Under the State governments, manhood, which came
by nature, and residence, which came by one's own will, were
sufficient qualifications for the voter.

It will be apparent from this statement that the voter's right to
cast his ballot came not to him as an unalienable right, but rested
upon the permission of the Government of the United States, as his
sovereign, to whom his allegiance was due, and to whom he was
required, in the first instance, to bind himself by an oath of
allegiance without any mention whatever of a State government.
Indeed, a little later, the same oath was required with additional
conditions before a man was permitted to vote for a State
constitutional convention, or for delegates to such a convention.
These conditions were, that he would faithfully support all acts of
Congress and all proclamations of the President of the United States,
passed or made during the rebellion, having reference to slaves.
Thus, the voter's right was made to rest, not only upon his binding
himself in allegiance to the United States as his sovereign, but in
the binding by oath his consent to certain unconstitutional acts and
proclamations expressly designed to destroy one of the most important
institutions of the State. This, sustained by a military force, was
exacted by the United States Government as the lord paramount--the
sovereign within the State. At the same time, the action of the
voter, which should be perfectly free and unconstrained (for, under
American political principles, he is the sovereign over all), is
limited and bound down by an oath faithfully to support certain acts
to which it was presumable he had ever been conscientiously opposed.

Under these circumstances, who was the sovereign in Tennessee? The
Government of the United States. Where was the government of the
State of Tennessee and the sovereign people? The former was subverted
and overthrown, and the latter subjugated. The approval by Tennessee,
under such circumstances, of Article XIII, as an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States prohibiting the existence of
slavery, was of no force; for consent given by a party under
constraint has neither legal nor moral validity. The State
Constitution was so amended as to contain certain new provisions
prescribed by the Government of the United States by a so-called
convention of delegates elected by the voters above specified, and
then submitted to these voters, and said to be ratified by them. They
were little more in numbers than a handful of the people of
Tennessee. Was this a Constitution amended and approved by the
consent of the people of Tennessee, the only sovereigns known under
our institutions, or was it a Constitution amended and voted for by a
small fraction of its population acting under the authority of the
Government of the United Stales, as the only sovereign in the State?
Admitting, even, that those who voted for the amended Constitution
were the only legal voters in the State, the Government of the United
States was no less an unlawful intruder and usurper when it
prescribed the amendments of the Constitution and designated the
voters. Nevertheless, this work was recognized by it, as constituting
a republican State government under the Constitution.

Let us next notice some points in the subversion of the State
government of Louisiana. One of the earliest steps taken for a civil
organization, after the occupation of New Orleans, was to make a
registration of voters. The United States Government was in
possession by military force, and the object was to secure its
permanent supremacy. Therefore, the oath which was administered to
the person applying for registration contained this condition:

"I now register myself as a voter, freely and voluntarily, for the
purpose of organizing a State government in Louisiana, loyal to the
Government of the United States."

It was also announced, with the approval of the military Governor,
that any person swearing falsely to any material part of the oath
would be deemed to be guilty of perjury, and be liable to prosecution
and punishment. The effect of this measure was to secure a
registration only of persons who would maintain the supremacy of the
Government of the United States. A proclamation was next issued by
the commander of the United States forces for an election of State
officers under the laws and Constitution of the State. It was
declared that these officers, when thus elected, would constitute the
so-called civil government of the State, under the Constitution and
laws of Louisiana, "except so much of the said Constitution and laws
as recognize, regulate, or relate to slavery," which were also
declared to be inoperative and void. It was further provided, in the
same proclamation, as follows:

"In order that the organic law of the State may be made to conform to
the will of the people and harmonize with the spirit of the age, as
well as to maintain and preserve the ancient landmarks of civil and
religions liberty, an election of delegates to a convention for the
revision of the Constitution will be held," etc.

The effect of these acts was to establish a number of persons,
pledged to support the Government of the United States, as the only
qualified voters in the State, and to elect so-called State officers
and delegates to a so-called Constitutional Convention by their
ballots. But this was a work that could be done only by the sovereign
people acting through their lawful State government. It was not so
done, because the Government of the United States, with a powerful
military force, had taken possession of New Orleans, refused to
recognize the officers of the State government, and sought to capture
and imprison them, although it recognized the validity of the State
Constitution in part, and commanded these things to be done as if it
was the ultimate sovereign over all.

Thus the government of the State was subverted, the Constitution of
the State in part set aside, and the sovereignty of the people
trampled down by a power that had no rightful authority for such
acts. Subsequently, a so-called convention was held, a so-called new
Constitution adopted, complying with the views of the Government of
the United States, the amendment to the Constitution of the United
States as above mentioned was adopted, the State Representatives were
admitted to seats in Congress, and the people acquiesced in the fraud
which they had not the power to correct.

The proceedings in the States of Arkansas and Virginia, which
resulted in an entire subversion of the State Governments, the
destruction of the sovereignty of the people, and the establishment
of the supremacy of the Government of the United States, have been
stated on a preceding page.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Subjugation of the Border States, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.--
A Military Force invades Maryland and occupies Baltimore.--Martial
Law declared.--A Military Order.--Banishment from the State.--
Civil Government of the State suspended.--Unalienable Rights of the
Citizens invaded.--Arrests of Citizens commenced.--Number.--Case
of John Merryman.--Opinion of Chief-Justice Taney.--Newspapers
seized.--Houses searched for Arms.--Order of Commanding General to
Marshals to put Test to Voters.--The Governor appeals to the
President.--His Reply.--Voters imprisoned.--Statement of the
Governor.--Result of the Election.--State Constitutional
Convention.--Emancipation hardly carried.--First Open Measures in
Kentucky.--Interference at the State Election by the United States
Government.--Voters excluded.--Martial Law declared.--Soldiers
keeping the Polls.--The Vote.--Statement of the Governor.--Attempt
to enroll Able-bodied Negroes.--The Governor visits Washington.--
The Result.--Arrests, Imprisonment, and Exile of Citizens.--
Suspension of the Writ of _Habeas Corpus_ by President Lincoln.--
Interference with the State Election.--Order to the Sheriffs.--
Proclamation of the Governor.--Enlistment of Slaves.--Emancipation
by Constitutional Amendment.--Violent _Measures_ in Missouri.--The
Governor calls out the Militia.--His Words.--The Plea of the
Invader.--"The Authority of the United States is Paramount," said
President Lincoln.--Bravery of the Governor.--Words of the
Commanding General.--Troops poured into the State.--Proceedings of
the State Convention.--Numberless Usurpations.--Provisional
Governor.--Emancipation Ordinance passed.

If the State government is instituted with certain powers which
become "just powers" by the formal consent of the governed, for the
purpose of enforcing security to the unalienable rights of man, it
must be evident that any interference with those rights by which
their enjoyments diminished, endangered, or destroyed, is not only an
obstruction to the operation of the "just powers" of the State
government, but is subversive of the purpose which it was instituted
to effect.

In this manner the State government of Maryland was subjugated. A
military force, under the authority of the Government of the United
States, occupied the city of Baltimore at a time when no invasion of
the State was threatened, and when there had been no application of
the Legislature, or of the Executive, for protection against domestic
violence, which circumstances alone could give a constitutional
authority for this organized military force to occupy the State. The
commanding General, Schenck, soon issued an order, of which the
following is an extract:

"Martial law is declared and hereby established in the city and
county of Baltimore, and in all the counties of the Western Shore of
Maryland. The commanding General gives assurance that this suspension
of civil government within the limits defined shall not extend beyond
the necessities of the occasion. All the civil courts, tribunals, and
political functionaries of State, county, or city authority, are to
continue in the discharge of their duties as in times of peace, only
in no way interfering with the exercise of the predominant power
assumed and asserted by the military authority."

It will be noticed that this military force of the Government of the
United States had no constitutional permission to come into Maryland
and exercise authority; that the commanding General says that the
civil government of the State is suspended within certain limits;
that this suspension will be continued according to the necessities
of the occasion; that the courts and political functionaries may
discharge their duties, only in no way interfering with the exercise
of the predominant military power. Now, where were the "just powers"
of the State government at this time? They were suspended in a part
of the State, says the commanding General, and for so long a time as
the military authority may judge the necessities of the occasion to
require, and that the courts and political functionaries may
discharge their duties while recognizing the supremacy of the
military power. Thus was the State government subjugated.

A further subversion of the State government was now commenced by an
invasion and denial of some of the unalienable rights of the
citizens, for the security of which that government was instituted.
The Constitution of the United States says:

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." [81]

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." [82]

"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." [83]

"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." [84]

The Declaration of Independence says:

"That they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted
among men."

Immediately upon the issue of the order of the commanding General,
the arrests of citizens commenced by provost-marshals. The family
residence of a lady was forced open; she was seized, put on board of
a steamer, and sent to the Confederate States. A man was arrested for
being "disloyal" to the United States Government, and held for
examination. Another was charged with interfering with the
enrollment; he was held for further examination. Another, charged
with being "disloyal" to the United States Government, took the oath
of allegiance, and was released. A woman charged with the attempt to
resist the enrollment was arrested, and subsequently released. A man,
on a charge of "disloyalty," took the oath, and was released.
Another, charged with having given improper information to enrolling
officers, was released on furnishing the information. Another,
charged with having powder in his possession, was released on taking
the oath of allegiance. Two others, charged with abuse of the negroes
laboring on the fortifications, were held for examination. Another,
charged with rendering assistance to wounded Confederate soldiers,
and expressing treasonable sentiments, took the oath of allegiance
and was released. Another, charged with being a soldier in the
Confederate army and paroled, was ordered to be sent across the
lines. A man, charged with treasonable language, was ordered to be
sent across the lines. Two others, charged with aiding Confederate
soldiers, took the oath of allegiance and were discharged. Another,
charged with receiving letters from Confederates for the purpose of
delivery, took the oath of allegiance, and was discharged. Another,
charged with expressing treasonable sentiments, was held for
examination. Two, charged with cheering for Jefferson Davis, took the
oath and were released.

One case more most be stated. On May 25, 1861, John Merryman, a most
respectable citizen of the State, residing in Baltimore County, was
seized in his bed by an armed force, and imprisoned in Fort McHenry.
He petitioned the Chief-Justice of the United States that a writ of
_habeas corpus_ might be issued, which was granted. The officer upon
whom it was served declined to obey the writ. An attachment was
issued against the officer. The marshal was refused admittance to the
fort to serve it. Upon such return being made, the Chief-Justice said:

"I ordered the attachment yesterday, because upon the face of the
return the detention of the prisoner was unlawful upon two grounds:

"1. The President, under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, can not suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_,
nor authorize any military officer to do so.

"2. A military officer has no right to arrest and detain a person not
subject to the rules and articles of war for an offense against the
laws of the United States, except in aid of the judicial authority
and subject to its control; and, if the party is arrested by the
military, it is the duty of the officer to deliver him over
immediately to the civil authority, to be dealt with according to law.

"Under the Constitution of the United States, these principles are
the fundamental law of the Union. In relation to the present return,
I propose to say that the marshal has legally the power to summon out
the _posse comitatus_ to seize and bring into court the party named
in the attachment; but it is apparent he will be resisted in the
discharge of that duty by a force notoriously superior to the _posse
comitatus_ and, such being the case, the Court has no power under the
law to order the necessary force to compel the appearance of the
party.

"I shall reduce to writing the reasons under which I have acted, and
which have led me to the conclusions expressed in my opinion, and
shall report them, with these proceedings, to the President of the
United States, and call upon him to perform his constitutional duty
to enforce the laws; in other words, to enforce the process of this
court."

During the month of July arrests were made of 361 persons, on charges
like the above mentioned, by the military authority. Of this number,
317 took the oath of allegiance to the Government of the United
States, and were released; 5 were sent to Fort McHenry, 3 to
Washington for the action of the authorities there, 11 to the North,
6 across the lines, and 19 were held for further examination.

On September 11, 1863, one of the city newspapers published the poem
entitled "The Southern Cross." The publishers and editor were
immediately arrested, not allowed communication with any person
whatever, and on the same day sent across the lines, with the
understanding that they should not return during the war. On July 2d
an order was issued which forbade the citizens of Baltimore City and
County to keep arms unless they were enrolled as volunteer companies.
The Fifty-first Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers was placed at
the disposal of General E. B. Tyler, assisted by the provost-marshal
and the chief of police. The soldiers, in concert with the police,
formed into parties of three or four, and were soon diligently
engaged in searching houses. Large wagons were provided, and muskets,
carbines, rifles, revolvers of all kinds, sabers, bayonets, swords,
and bird and ducking guns in considerable quantities were gathered.
The Constitution of the United States says:

"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed." [85]

A further subversion of the State government of Maryland was next
made by a direct interference with the elections. An election was to
be held in the State for members of the Legislature and members of
Congress on November 3, 1863. The commanding General, on October
27th, issued an order to all marshals and military officers to cause
their direct interference with the voters. The Governor (Bradford)
applied to the President of the United States to have the order
revoked, and protested against any person who offered to vote being
put to any test not found in the laws of Maryland. President Lincoln
declined to interfere with the order, except in one less important
point. The Governor issued a proclamation on the day preceding the
election, which the military commander endeavored to suppress, and
issued an order charging that the tendency of the proclamation was to
invite and suggest disturbance. One or more regiments of soldiers
were sent out and distributed among several of the counties to attend
the places of election, in defiance of the known laws of the State
prohibiting their presence. Military officers and provost-marshals
were ordered to arrest voters, guilty, in their opinion, of certain
offenses, and to menace judges of election with the power of the army
in case this order was not respected.

But, perhaps, the forcible language of the Governor to the
Legislature will furnish the most undeniable statement of the facts.
He says:

"On Monday evening preceding the election I issued a proclamation
giving the judges of election the assurance of the protection of the
State to the extent of its ability. Before the following morning,
orders were sent to the Eastern Shore, directing its circulation to
be suppressed; the public papers were forbidden to publish it, and an
embargo laid on all steamers in port trading with that part of the
State, lest they might carry it.

"The abuses commenced even before the opening of the polls. On the
day preceding the election, the officer in command of the regiment
which had been distributed among the counties of the Eastern Shore,
and who had himself landed in Kent County, commenced his operations
by arresting and sending across the bay some ten or more of the most
estimable and distinguished of its citizens, including several of the
most steadfast and most uncompromising loyalists of the Shore. The
jail of the county was entered, the jailer seized, imprisoned, and
afterward sent to Baltimore, and prisoners confined therein under
indictment set at liberty. The commanding officer gave the first clew
to the kind of disloyalty against which he considered himself as
particularly commissioned, by printing and publishing a proclamation
in which, referring to the election to take place on the next day, he
invited all the truly _loyal_ to avail themselves of that opportunity
and establish their _loyalty_, 'by giving a full and ardent support
to the whole Government ticket, upon the platform adopted by the
Union League Convention,' declaring that 'none other is recognized by
the Federal authorities as loyal or worthy of the support of any one
who desires the peace and restoration of the Union.'

"This Government ticket was in several, if not all, of those counties
designated by its color. It was a yellow ticket, and, armed with
that, a voter could safely run the gantlet of the sabers and carbines
that guarded the entrance to the polls, and known sympathizers with
the rebellion were allowed to vote unquestioned if they would vote
that ticket, while loyal and respected citizens, ready to take the
oath, were turned back by the officer in charge without even allowing
them to approach the polls. In one district the military officer took
his stand at the polls before they were opened, declaring that none
but the 'yellow ticket should be voted,' and excluded all others
throughout the day. In another district a similar officer caused
every ballot offered to be examined, and, unless it was the favored
one, the voter was required to take the oath, and not otherwise. In
another district, after one vote only had been given, the polls wore
closed, the judges were all arrested and sent out of the county, and
military occupation taken of the town. Other statements might be made.

"These abuses present a humiliating record, such as I had never
supposed we should be called upon to read in any State, still less in
a loyal one like this. Unless it be, indeed, a fallacy to suppose
that any rights whatever remain to such a State, or that any line
whatever marks the limit of Federal power, a bolder stride across
that line that power never made, even in a rebel State, than it did
in Maryland on the 3d of last November. A part of the army, which a
generous people had supplied for a very different purpose, was on
that day engaged in stifling the freedom of election in a faithful
State, intimidating its sworn officers, violating the constitutional
rights of its loyal citizens, and obstructing the usual channels of
communication between them and their Executive."

The result was the election of a majority of members of the
Legislature in favor of a State Constitutional Convention. The acts
necessary for this object were passed. At the election of delegates,
the military authority again interfered in order to secure a majority
in favor of immediate and unconditional emancipation. The so-called
Convention assembled and drafted a so-called Constitution, in which
the twenty-third article of the Bill of Rights prohibited the
existence of slavery in the State, and said, "All persons held to
service or labor as slaves are hereby declared free."

It was urged, in objection to the adoption of the so-called
Constitution by the Convention, that "the election by which the
Convention was called and its members elected was not free for the
legal voters of the State, but was held and conducted in clear
violation of the rights of voters, in consequence of which a majority
of the legal voters of the State were excluded from the polls." A
rigid article on the qualifications of voters at the State elections
was embodied in the Constitution, with the shameless provision that
it should be in force at the election for ratification or rejection
of the so-called Constitution which was to create the disabilities.
The instrument also authorized a poll to be opened in each company of
every Maryland regiment in the service of the United States at the
quarters of the commanding officer, and that the commissioned
officers of such company should act as the judges of election. The
aid of the President of the United States was also obtained to help
on the ratification of the new Constitution, and he concludes a
letter on the subject by saying, "I shall be gratified exceedingly if
the good people of the State shall, by their votes, ratify the new
Constitution."

Notwithstanding the aid of the President, of the soldiers' votes, and
a most stringent oath, and the exclusion of every person who had in
any manner, by word or act, aided the cause of the Confederacy, the
majority for the so-called Constitution was only 375. The total vote
was 59,973. In 1860 the vote of the State was 92,502. Thus was the
State government subjugated and made an instrument of destruction to
the people; thus were their rights ruthlessly violated, and property
millions of dollars in value annihilated.

The reader must have noticed, in all these proceedings which resulted
in the subjugation of the State governments, the cautious and
stealthy manner in which the Government of the United States
proceeded at the outset in each instance until it got a strong
foothold, that then the mask was thrown off, and both Governor and
people were made the unresisting victims of its unscrupulous and
lawless outrages.

In the State of Kentucky, the first open and direct measures taken by
the Government of the United States for the subjugation of the State
government and people, thereby to effect the emancipation of the
slaves, consisted in an interference with the voters at the State
election in August, 1863. This interference was by means of a
military force stationed at the polls to sustain and enforce the
action of some of the servants of the Government of the United
States, the object being to overawe the judges of election, secure
the administration of a rigid oath of allegiance, and thereby the
rejection of as many antagonistic votes as possible. Indeed, it was
intended that none but so-called "Union" men should vote--that is,
men who were willing to approve of every measure which the Government
of the United States might adopt to carry on the war and
revolutionize the State. At the same time, no man was allowed to be a
candidate or to receive any votes unless he was a well-known advocate
of the Government of the United States. It will be seen that these
measures excluded the largest portion of the former Democratic party,
although they might be practically "Union" men, and placed everything
in the hands of the Administration party, where, by the use of
similar machinery, it remained a great many years after the war
closed.

Meantime, on July 31, 1863, the commanding General of the Department
of the Ohio issued an order declaring the State under martial law,
and said, "It is for the purpose, only, of protecting, if necessary,
the rights of loyal citizens and the freedom of elections." He would
have more correctly said, "It is for the purpose of enforcing and
securing a majority for the candidates of my views." The General in
command in the western part of the State issued an order to regulate
the election in that quarter, and the colonels at every post did
likewise. In Louisville, on the day of election, there were ten
soldiers with muskets at each voting-place who, with crossed
bayonets, stood in the doors, preventing all access of voters to the
polls but by their permission, and who arrested and carried to the
military prison all whom they were told to arrest. Out of some eight
thousand voters in the city, less than five thousand votes were
taken. How many of the missing three thousand were deterred from
attempting to vote could not be ascertained, nor was it necessary,
for the intimidation of three thousand voters is no greater outrage
than the intimidation of only three hundred. The interpretation
generally put on the order of the commanding officer by the
opposition party was, that no man was to have the privilege of having
his right to vote tested by the judges of election if he was pointed
out to the guard by any one of the detectives as a proper person to
be arrested. As the commanding officer had not the semblance of legal
or rightful power to interfere with the election, the most sinister
suspicions were naturally aroused, and very many were said to have
been deterred from going to the polls through fear that they would be
made the victims to personal or party malice. Similar intimidation
was practiced in other parts of the State. The result was, that there
was not only direct military interference with the election, but it
was conducted in most of the State under the intimidation of the
bayonets of the Government of the United States. The total vote was
85,695. In 1860 the vote of the State was 146,216. The Governor-elect
in his message spoke, of such an unjust election, as follows:

"The recent elections clearly and unmistakably define the popular
will and public judgment of Kentucky. It is settled that Kentucky
will, with unwavering faith and unswerving purpose, stand by and
support the Government in every effort to suppress the rebellion and
maintain the Union."

The true sense of this language is, that the Government of the United
States had so far subverted the State government and destroyed the
sovereignty of the people that they could not withstand its further
aggressions.

The Government of the United States was now ready to move forward in
its design to destroy one of the most valuable institutions of the
State. Steps were taken by its officers to enroll all able-bodied
male negroes in the State between the ages of twenty and forty-five
years, that they might form a part of its forces. The effect of this
measure was to break up the labor system of the State, and meanwhile
the pseudo-philanthropists furnished food for powder, and indulged
their ideas of freedom at their neighbors' expense. The excitement
produced caused the Governor to visit Washington and effect
agreements by which all recruiting should cease when a county's quota
was full, all recruits should be removed from the State, and other
similar provisions. A year later, he said to the Legislature: "Had
these agreements been carried out, a very different state of feeling
would have existed in Kentucky. But, instead of carrying them out,
the most offensive and injurious modes were adopted to violate them."

The next step taken by the Government of the United States in the
subversion of the government of Kentucky was the destruction of the
unalienable right of personal liberty of the citizens, which the
State was in duty bound to protect. The Union Governor of the State,
whose election was aided by the United States military officers, as
above stated, is the witness for the facts. In his message to the
Legislature of January, 1865, he says:

"The gravest matter of military outrage has been, and yet is, the
arrest, imprisonment, and banishment of loyal citizens without a
hearing, and without even a knowledge of the charges against them.
There have been a number of this class of arrests, merely for
partisan political vengeance, and to force them to pay heavy sums to
purchase their liberation. How the spoils so infamously extorted are
divided, has not transpired to the public information. For partisan
political ends, General John B. Huston was arrested at midnight
preceding the election, and hurried off under circumstances of
shameful aggravation. He was, however, released in a few days; but
that does not atone for the criminality of his malicious arrest and
false imprisonment. The battle-scarred veteran, Colonel Frank
Wolford, whose name and loyal fame are part of his country's proudest
memories, and whose arrest for political vengeance should put a
nation's cheek to blush, is yet held in durance vile, without a
hearing and without an accusation, so far as he or his friends can
ascertain.

"Lieutenant-Governor Jacobs, whose yet unclosed wounds were received
in battle for his country, was made a victim to partisan and personal
enmity, and hurried without a hearing and without any known
accusation through the rebel lines into Virginia. The action in this
case is in defiance of Federal and State Constitutions and laws, in
defiance of the laws of humanity and liberty, dishonors the cause of
our country, and degrades the military rank to the infamous uses of
partisan and personal vengeance. Other cases might be mentioned, but
these are selected because they are known to the whole country; the
acts of these men are part of the glorious history of loyal heroism."

The next step in the progress of the subjugation of the State
government was taken by President Lincoln on July 5, 1864, when he
issued a proclamation establishing martial law throughout the State,
and the suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_. Civil proceedings
were allowed to be continued, "which did not affect the military
operations or the constituted authorities of the Government of the
United States." Arrests of individuals by military force soon
commenced, and a large number of eminent Kentuckians of all
professions and pursuits were imprisoned. A group of persons,
consisting of judges, magistrates, wealthy merchants, and young
women, without having been allowed a hearing, or trial, or any
opportunity to vindicate themselves, were banished from the State. In
this destruction of the unalienable right of personal liberty, the
State government was passive; indeed, it was powerless to resist.

A State election was to be held on the first Monday of August for
local officers and a Judge of the High Court of Appeals from one
district. Chief-Justice Duvall was one of the two candidates. On July
29th an order was issued by the Major-General, commanding, to the
sheriffs of the counties concerned, as follows:

"You will not allow the name of Alvin Duvall to appear upon the
poll-books as a candidate for office at the coming election."

Another name was substituted. The election of a President of the
United States was to be held in November, but the Government of the
United States seems to have regarded the vote of the State as
unnecessary to secure the reelection of its officials, and refrained
from interference. Under these circumstances, the Governor of the
State took courage and issued a proclamation to the election
officers. It is of no importance except as showing their powers and
duties, and how grossly they had neglected them at previous
elections. He said:

"As no officer of any rank, from the President down, has any right or
authority to interfere with elections, no order to do so can legalize
the act. If there be sufficient power in the citizens present, at any
place where such interference may be attempted, to arrest the
offenders, and hold them over to answer to the violated laws, it will
be the duty of the sheriff to make the arrest in such case. He has
authority to require the aid of every citizen, and it should be
readily and promptly given, in defense of a common right--of a
blood-bought franchise. If the force employed to interfere with the
election be too great, at any place of voting, to be arrested, the
officers of election, in such case, should adjourn and not proceed
with the election. If you are unable to hold a free election, your
duty is to hold none at all."

By enlistment, over twenty-two thousand of the most valuable slaves
in the State had gone into the service of the United States, and on
March 3, 1865, its Congress passed an act declaring that the wives
and children of all such soldiers should be free. But the final
moment was near at hand when the annihilation of more than one
hundred millions of property and the destruction of one of the most
important institutions of the State was to take place by one of those
fictions so peculiar to this administration of the Government of the
United States. That was the pretended adoption of a constitutional
amendment, prohibiting the existence of slavery in the United States.
When a whole people suffers itself to be cajoled in this
unaccountable manner by its unscrupulous rulers, it argues as little
regard for the fundamental law of the Union as for the rights of the
States.

The subversion of the State government of Missouri by the Government
of the United States was more rapid and more desperate than in the
case of Kentucky. As previously stated, the Governor of the State, at
the commencement of the difficulties, proposed the most conciliatory
terms to the Government of the United States, which were rejected. He
then, like a Governor, sensible of his duty to protect the rights of
his people and of the sacred obligations of his official oath, issued
his proclamation calling into active service fifty thousand of the
State militia, "for the purpose of repelling invasion, and for the
protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the citizens." He
said:

"A series of unprovoked and unparalleled outrages have been inflicted
upon the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth and upon the rights
and liberties of its people, by wicked and unprincipled men,
professing to act under the authority of the Government of the United
States; solemn enactments of your Legislature have been nullified;
your volunteer soldiers have been taken prisoners; your commerce with
your sister States has been suspended; your trade with your own
fellow-citizens has been and is subjected to the harassing control of
an armed soldiery; peaceful citizens have been imprisoned without
warrant of law; unoffending and defenseless men, women, and children
have been ruthlessly shot down and murdered; and other unbearable
indignities have been heaped upon your State and yourselves."

The plea of the invader was contained in an order issued from
Washington to the commanding General in these words:

"The President observes with concern that, notwithstanding the pledge
of the State authorities to coöperate in preserving the peace of
Missouri, loyal citizens in great numbers continue to be driven from
their homes. It is immaterial whether the outrages continue from
inactivity or indisposition on the part of the State authorities to
prevent them. It is enough that they continue, and it will devolve on
you the duty of putting a stop to them summarily by the force under
your command, to be aided by such troops as you may require from
Kansas, Iowa, and Illinois. . . . The authority of the United States
is paramount, and, whenever it is apparent that a movement, whether
by order of State authority or not, is hostile, you will not hesitate
to put it down."

In this order the only pretext put forward is that of domestic
violence. But in that case the Constitution of the United States
gives no authority to the United States Government to interfere
except on the express conditions of an "application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive, when the Legislature can not be
convened." There had been no application of the Legislature or of the
Executive. On the contrary, the Governor of the State, like a brave
man, told the Executive of the United States to keep his hands off,
and to keep his military forces without the State, and he pledged
himself to preserve its peace and neutrality. But arguments or
pledges on the part of the victim have never yet stopped the progress
of the remorseless usurper. The subjugation of the State government
of Missouri to the will and designs of the Government at Washington
had been determined upon, and the sovereignty of the people was to be
crushed by troops from the sister States of Kansas, Iowa, and
Illinois.

But the bravery of the Governor and the determination of the
Legislature caused the Government of the United States to depart from
its usually stealthy progress in the invasion of the State government
and the sovereignty of the people, and to adopt bolder measures. The
Governor was charged with purposes of treason and secession, for his
attempt faithfully to discharge the duties of a conscientious
Governor to the citizens. Says the commander of the United States
forces, in his proclamation:

"The recent proclamation of Governor Jackson, by which he has set at
defiance the authorities of the United States and urged you to make
war upon them, is but a consummation of his treasonable purposes,
long indicated by his acts and expressed opinions, and now made
manifest."

These are fine words to come from the satrap of a usurper who invades
a State of the Union without lawful permission or authority, with the
design to subvert its government and overthrow the sovereignty of its
people, and to be applied by him to the only Governor in the Northern
States who strove defiantly to protect the unalienable rights and
sovereignty of his constituents!

Troops were now poured into the State by the Government of the United
States so rapidly as to render the successful opposition of the
lawful authorities impossible, and the control of a large portion of
the State was soon held by the military forces. The Governor, unable
to resist, retired to the southern part of the State. Meantime, the
State Convention, which had been called to consider the relations
between the Government of the United States and the State of
Missouri, and to adopt such measures for vindicating the sovereignty
of the State as were necessary, reassembled on the call of its
committee. Entirely forgetful of the objects for which the people had
called it together, it proceeded to declare the State offices vacant,
and to elect a provisional Governor and other officers entirely
subservient to the will and behests of the Administration at
Washington. The commanding General now declared martial law in the
State, and the emancipation of all slaves belonging to persons who
had taken an active part with us. This emancipation clause was soon
modified by the President as in advance of the times.

The attention of the reader is called to the numerous usurpations and
violations of constitutional principles and of laws, by the
Government of the United States and its champions, contained in the
few lines of the preceding paragraph, viz.: the invasion with
military force, the expulsion of the lawful State authorities, the
assumption by the State Convention of unlawful powers, the election
and introduction of persons to offices not vacant, the abandonment of
all protection of the unalienable rights of the people, the
declaration of martial law without any authority for it, and the
attempt to emancipate the slaves in violation of every law and
constitutional principle.

The severity of the Executive of the United States now began to be
felt by the citizens of the State. All disaffected persons were
silenced or arrested, prisoners of war were treated as criminals, and
every obstacle to complete subjugation to the will of the conqueror
sought to be removed. The State government was represented by a
provisional Governor; and a State Convention, that adjourned its
sessions from year to year, after dallying periodically with the
subject of the emancipation of the slaves, finally passed an
ordinance for that purpose, to take effect in 1870. This was not
immediate emancipation, so the disturbances were kept up in the State
until, at a session of the Legislature in February, 1864, a bill was
passed for a so-called State Convention to revise the State
Constitution, and the election of delegates in November. It is
remarkable how much the orders of the commanding General now
contained relative to disorderly persons. This was preparatory to the
occupation of the polls by the military force, and the exclusion of
all opposition voters. The delegates were elected, and the so-called
Convention assembled on January 6, 1865. An immediate emancipation
ordinance was passed, and the State organization was subjugated to do
the will of the usurper and to disregard the will of the sovereign
people.

[Footnote 81: Article V, amendment.]

[Footnote 82: Article IV, amendment.]

[Footnote 83: Article VIII, amendment.]

[Footnote 84: Article I, amendment.]

[Footnote 85: Article II, amendment.]

CHAPTER XLIV.

Subjugation of the Northern States.--Humiliating Spectacle of New
York.--"Ringing of a Little Bell."--Seizure and Imprisonment of
Citizens.--Number seized.--Paper Safeguards of Liberty.--Other
Safeguards.--Suspension of the Writ of _Habeas Corpus_ absolutely
forbidden with One Exception.--How done.--Not able to authorize
another.--Abundant Protective Provisions in New York, but all
failed.--Case of Pierce Butler.--Arrest of Secretary Cameron.--The
President assumes the Responsibility of the Crime.--No Heed given to
the Writ of _Habeas Corpus_ issued by the Court.--The Governor
passive.--Words of Justice Nelson.--Prison overflowing.--How
relieved.--Oath required of Applicants for Relief.--Oath declined
by some.--Reasons.--Order forbidding the Employment of Counsel by
Prisoners.--Victims in almost Every Northern State.--Defeat at the
Elections.--Result.--Suit for Damages commenced.--Congress
interferes to protect the Guilty.--State Courts subjugated.--How
suspend _Habeas Corpus_.--Congress violates the Constitution.--What
was New York?--Writ suspended throughout the United States.-What is
"Loyalty"?--Military Domination.--Correspondence between General
Dix and Governor Seymour.--Seizure of Newspapers.--Governor orders
Arrest of Offenders.--Interference with the State Election.--Vote
of the Soldiers.--State Agents arrested.--Provost-Marshals
appointed in Every Northern State.--Their Duties.--Sustained by
Force.--Trials by Military Commission.--Trials at Washington.--
Assassination of the President.--Trial of Henry Wirz.--Efforts to
implicate the Author.--Investigation of a Committee of Congress as
to Complicity in the Assassination.--Arrest, Trial, and Banishment
of Clement C. Vallandigham.--Assertions of Governor Seymour on the
Case.

Now follows the humiliating spectacle of the subjugation of the State
government of New York--the "Empire" State, as she calls herself--
where, with all her men and treasures, it might have been supposed
that some stanch defenders of constitutional liberty would have
sprung up. On the contrary, under the pretext of "preserving the
Union," her deluded children aided to destroy the Constitution on
which the Union was founded, and put forth all their strength to
exalt the Government of the United States to supremacy. Thus the
States were brought to a condition of subjugation, and their
governments subverted from the protection of the rights for which
they were instituted. These unalienable rights of the people were
left without a protector or a shield before the crushing hand of the
usurper; the sovereignty of the people was set aside, and in its
place arose the sovereignty of the Government of the United States.
With the foundation undermined, the superstructure subverted, the
ends for which the Great Republic was organized entirely lost to
sight, and the true balance of the system destroyed, unless the
dormant virtue and love for their inherited rights shall arouse the
citizens to a vigorous effort to restore the republican institutions
and powers of the States, the emperors and kings of the earth have
only to await calmly the lapse of time to behold a fulfillment of
their evil prophecies in regard to the "Great Republic" of the world.

To show how the laws were disregarded, and how despotically the
personal liberty of the citizen was invaded, let this example bear
witness: The Secretary of State at Washington, William H. Seward, a
favored son of the State of New York, would "ring a little bell,"
which brought to him a messenger, to whom was given a secret order to
arrest and confine in Fort Lafayette a person designated. This order
was sent by telegraph to the United States Marshal of the district in
which would be found the person who was to be arrested. The arrest
being forcibly made by the marshal with armed attendants without even
the form of a warrant, the prisoner without the knowledge of any
charge against him was conveyed to Fort Hamilton and turned over to
the commandant. An aid with a guard of soldiers then conveyed him in
a boat to Fort Lafayette and delivered him to the keeper in charge,
who gave a receipt for the prisoner. He was then divested of any
weapons, money, valuables, or papers in his possession. His baggage
was opened and searched. A soldier then took him in charge to the
designated quarter, which was a portion of one of the casemates for
guns, lighted only from the port-hole, and occupied by seven or eight
other prisoners. All were subjected to prison fare. Some were
citizens of New York, and the others of different States. This manner
of imprisonment was subsequently put under the direction of the
Secretary of War, and continued at intervals until the close of the
war.

In the brief period between July 1 and October 19, 1861, the
Secretary of State, William H, Seward, made such diligent use of his
"little bell," that one hundred and seventy-five of the most
respectable citizens of the country were consigned to imprisonment in
this Fort Lafayette, a strong fortress in the lower part of the
harbor of New York. A decent regard for the memory of the friend of
Washington, and for the services rendered to the colonies in their
struggle for independence, might have led Mr. Seward to select for
such base uses some other place than that which bore the honored name
of Lafayette.

The American citizen has always, like the ancient Roman, felt that
his personal liberty was secure. He supposed himself to be surrounded
with numerous paper safeguards, which, together with the love of
justice and respect for law, common to his fellow-citizens, would be
sufficient for his protection against any usurper. These now proved
to be as weak as the paper upon which they were written. What were
these supposed safeguards? There was the Constitution of the State of
New York, an instrument for the protection and government of the
people. It had received the consent of the people of the State who
were governed by it, and therefore its powers were "just powers." Its
first object was to protect the unalienable rights of its citizens,
relative to which it contains various provisions in its Bill of
Rights: its declarations respecting personal liberty; its regulations
to secure and enforce the great writ of freemen, the _habeas corpus_;
the powers granted to the courts which it created; the Legislature;
the Executive, in whose hands was placed the richest purse and the
strongest sword of the sovereign States to protect the rights of its
citizens.

Further safeguards were placed in the Constitution of the United
States. These were designed to restrain that Government from any
invasion of the citizen's personal liberty. They are as follows:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . shall
not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing . . .
the persons to be seized." [86]

Again:

"No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." [87]

Again:

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury." [88]

Again:

"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." [89]

Among the enumerated powers of Congress is the following clause:

"The privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require." [90]

This clause first forbids the suspension of the writ absolutely. A
single exception is then made by the words "unless the public safety
may require." A condition is attached to this exception which still
farther limits it, by the words "in cases of rebellion or invasion."
There is still another and far more sweeping limitation attached to
this clause. The writ must be suspended by an act of Congress, which
can be passed only when Congress is in session. This suspension must
be positive and absolute by Congress, not indefinite and dependent on
any future contingency. For the acts of Congress are not absolute
powers, if between enactment and enforcement they can be set aside by
a contingency, unless such contingency was attached in the clause of
the grant creating the power. But in these words, of the Constitution
there is no contingency expressed. Congress alone by positive
enactment can suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_. It can not
authorize the President to suspend its force, nor has he any
authority under the Constitution to do it. Neither can Congress make
an intermittent suspension of the force of the writ; but it must be
absolute under the specific condition.

It is evident that the citizen of New York was abundantly provided
with the safeguards of personal liberty; yet they all proved to be of
no avail to secure and enforce his right in the hour of trial. A few
instances will afford an illustration of the facts. Mr. Pierce Butler
was suspected of corresponding with persons in the Confederate
States. He was arrested in Philadelphia on August 19, 1861, by order
of Simon Cameron, then Secretary of War, without process of law and
without any assigned cause. His trunks and drawers, wardrobe, and
entire apartments were searched, and his private papers taken by the
marshal and his four assistants. His office was also examined, and
his books and papers taken, and within an hour he was on his way to
Fort Lafayette with an armed guard. After five weeks of detention he
was liberated. No reason was given for his discharge any more than
for his arrest. As Mr. Cameron was about to sail as Minister to
Russia, in January ensuing, he was arrested for assault and battery
and false imprisonment, at the suit of Mr. Butler. The case was
brought to the knowledge of the President of the United States, and
on April 18, 1862, the Secretary of State, Seward, replied as follows:

"The communication has been submitted to the President, and I am
directed by him to say in reply that he avows the proceeding of Mr.
Cameron referred to as one taken by him when Secretary of War, under
the President's directions, and deemed necessary for the prompt
suppression of the existing rebellion."

The writ of _habeas corpus_ was issued by some of the State courts,
directing the officer in command at the fort to bring some one or
other of the prisoners into court for an investigation of the cause
and authority for his detention. But no attention was given to these
writs by the officer. Neither did the Governor of the State make any
effort to enforce the processes of the courts. He, perhaps, expected
that his efforts might be resisted by an overpowering force. But
expectations, of whatsoever nature, do not justify or excuse the
neglect of a positive duty. It is through such weaknesses that the
liberties of mankind have been too often lost.

Thus the Constitution, the laws, the courts, the Executive of the
State of New York, were subverted, turned aside from the end for
which they were instituted, and all the specific arrangements were of
no avail to secure this guaranteed right of its citizens. Probably
every one of the prisoners was entirely innocent of any act whatever
that was criminal under the laws, either of the State or of the
United States.

In opinion they were opposed to the military proceedings of the
Government of the United States; and these opinions they had
expressed, which liberty is a part of the birthright of freemen.
Indeed, Judge Nelson, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the Circuit of New York, in an opinion delivered about this time,
thus expressed himself:

"Words, oral, written, or printed, however treasonable, seditious, or
criminal of themselves, do not constitute an overt act of treason
within the definition of the crime. When spoken, written, or printed,
in relation to an act or acts which, if committed with a treasonable
design, might constitute such overt act, they are admissible as
evidence, tending to characterize it and show the intent with which
the act was committed."

Finally, the prison in New York Harbor became so full that many
prisoners were sent to Fort Warren in the harbor of Boston. At this
time the Government of the United States used the Old Capitol at
Washington, Fort McHenry of Baltimore, Fort Lafayette at New York,
and Fort Warren at Boston, for the confinement of those whom the
usurper designated as "state prisoners." Still further to relieve the
fullness of the prisons, two men, John A. Dix, of the army, and
Edwards Pierrepont, of civil life, were sent to investigate the cases
of the prisoners, and release some who were willing to take an "oath
of allegiance." Next it was made a condition precedent to an
investigation that the said oath should be taken by the prisoner. As
an instance, this proposal was made to two persons named Flanders,
citizens of the interior of New York. The oath was as follows:

"I do solemnly swear that I will support, protect, and defend the
Constitution and Government of the United States against all enemies,
whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith,
allegiance, and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution, or
law of any State Convention, or Legislature, to the contrary
notwithstanding; and, farther, that I do this with a full
determination, pledge, and purpose, without any mental reservation or
evasion whatsoever; and, further, that I will well and faithfully
perform all the duties which may be required of me by law."

These persons declined to take the prescribed oath. The reasons which
they gave for this refusal furnish painful evidence of the extreme
subjugation of the government of the State of New York, and its
silent submission to the arbitrary and unconstitutional acts of the
Government of the United States, even at the sacrifice of the most
sacred rights of freemen. They said:

"We have been guilty of no offense against the laws of our country,
but have simply exercised our constitutional rights as free citizens
in the open and manly expression of our opinions upon public affairs.
We have been placed here without legal charges, or, indeed, any
charges whatsoever being made against us, and upon no legal process,
but upon an arbitrary and illegal order of the Hon. William H.
Seward, Secretary of State of the United States. Every moment of our
detention here is a denial of our most sacred rights. We are entitled
to and hereby demand an unconditional discharge; and, while we could
cheerfully take the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United
States, because we are, always have been, and ever intend to be loyal
to that instrument (though at the same time protesting against the
right of the Government to impose even such oath upon us as the
condition of our discharge), we can not consent to take the oath now
required of us, because we hold no office of any kind under the
Government of the United States, and it is an oath unknown to and
unauthorized by the Constitution, and commits us to the support of
the Government though it may be acting in direct conflict with the
Constitution, and deprives us of the right of freely discussing, and
by peaceful and constitutional methods opposing its measures--a
right which is sacred to freedom, and which no American citizen
should voluntarily surrender. That such is the interpretation put
upon this oath by the Government, and such its intended effect is
plainly demonstrated by the fact that it is dictated to this as a
condition of our release from an imprisonment inflicted upon us for
do other cause than that we have exercised the above-specified
constitutional rights."

One important fact which illustrates the flagrant outrage committed
on all these prisoners should not be omitted. The Constitution of the
United States declares as follows:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."

On December 3, 1861, the commanding officer at Fort Lafayette came to
the prisoners' quarters, and read a document, of which the following
is a copy:

"_To the political prisoners in Fort Lafayette:_

"I am instructed by the Secretary of State to inform you that the
Department of State of the United States will not recognize any one
as an attorney for political prisoners, and will look with distrust
upon all applications for release through such channels; and that
such applications will be regarded as additional reasons for
declining to release the prisoners.

"And, further, that if such prisoners wish to make any communication
to the Government, they are at liberty to make it directly to the
State Department.

"SETH C. HAWLEY."

Space will not permit me further to notice the instances of this
immense class of cases. In almost every Northern State the victims of
this violence were to be found. That there was no just cause for
these invasions of the rights of the States, and of the citizens, was
demonstrated in the most decisive manner. At this time (November 4,
1862) the friends of the Administration of the United States
Government were decisively defeated at the elections. On November 22d
ensuing, the War Department issued an order releasing all except
prisoners of war. The order was muffled up in a phraseology suited to
hide from the observation of the people that the result of the
elections had stricken home to the sensibilities of the usurpers. It
said:

"_Ordered_--1. That all persons now in military custody, who have
been arrested for discouraging volunteer enlistments, opposing the
draft,[91] or for otherwise giving aid and comfort to the enemy, in
States where the draft has been made or the quota of volunteers and
militia has been furnished, shall be discharged from further military
restraint."

Thus these arrests were for a short period suspended, and then
vigorously renewed.

Many of these persons who had been illegally seized and imprisoned
now commenced suits for damages. This led to another step on the part
of the Government of the United States, by which the judiciary of the
State was entirely subverted and deprived of all jurisdiction in
these cases. Congress passed an act on March 3, 1863, which provided
that any order of the President of the United States, or arrest made
under his authority, when pleaded, should be a defense, in all
courts, to any action or prosecution for any search, seizure, arrest,
or imprisonment made, done, or committed, or any acts omitted to be
done, under or by virtue of such order, or under color of any law of
Congress. The act further provided that all actions against officers
and others for torts in arrests might be removed for trial to the
next Circuit Court of the United States held in the district, and
said:

"It shall then be the duty of the State court to accept the surety
and proceed no further in the cause or prosecution, and the bail that
shall have been originally taken shall be discharged."

It will be noticed that by the terms of this act the case could be
removed to the Circuit Court when the defendant "filed a petition
stating the facts verified by affidavit." Thus the jurisdiction of
all the courts of the State of New York was made to terminate and
cease upon the simple word of the defendant accompanied by an
affidavit. But these courts were instituted by the consent of the
governed, for the protection of the personal freedom of the citizen;
yet in the cases brought before them they ordered the removal on the
ground that they involved the question of the constitutionality of an
act of Congress, over which the courts of the United States had a
jurisdiction. The absurdity of this plea is manifest; for it is
founded on the presumption that the question, whether, under
authority from the President of the United States, any one, without
intervention of the judicial tribunals, can incarcerate a citizen, is
a question which can be treated as constituting a case arising under
the Constitution of the United States. Any statute authorizing such
acts is palpably void, and not entitled to be a ground for a bearing
under an appeal.

The subjugation of the government of the State of New York was made
in another section of the same act of Congress of March 3, 1863. It
declares:

"That, during the present rebellion, the President of the United
States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is
authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ in
any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof."

Let us turn to the words of the Constitution of the United States
which are contained in the grant of powers to Congress:

"The privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it."

It will be seen that two facts are required to exist before the
Congress of the United States can suspend the privilege of this writ.
Congress must, therefore, determine the existence of these facts
before it has power constitutionally to act. If it finds either fact
to exist and not the other, it has no power to suspend the privilege
of the writ. There must be rebellion, and the public safety must
require the suspension. When Congress finds these facts to exist, it
can enact the suspension. It is the judgment of Congress alone that
can determine that the public safety requires the suspension. This
can not be delegated to the judgment of any other department of the
Government. Therefore, when Congress tells the President, in the
above-mentioned act, that he is authorized to suspend the privilege
of this writ whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require
it, then that body undertakes to do that for which it has no
authority in the Constitution. The States delegated the power solely
to Congress; an act to transfer the trust to any other depository
could rightfully have no force whatever.

Now, the State of New York, in which this writ was thus suspended by
the Government of the United States, was one of the Northern States
and a most ardent advocate of the Union. It had contributed more men
and money to support the Government of the United States than any
other State, and than some whole sections of States. Peace reigned
throughout all its borders. Yet, in this quiet and "loyal" State,
whose people had given so freely to aid the Government of the United
States, a claim was now set up to the right to nullify the rights and
immunities of every citizen, by that Government which had already
nullified the powers of every court in the State. This was done by
the declaration of the President that "the public safety" required
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_.

The act of Congress was passed on March 3, 1863, and on September
15th the President issued his proclamation, and, referring to the
authority claimed to have been granted by the act, he proceeded to
say:

"_Whereas_, In the judgment of the President, the public safety does
require that the privilege of said writ shall now be suspended
throughout the United States, in cases where, by the authority of the
President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers
of the United States, or either of them, hold persons under their
custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of
the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen, enrolled, drafted, or
mustered, or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land or naval forces
of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise
amenable to military law, or to the rules or articles of war, or the
rules and regulations prescribed for military and naval service by
the authority of the President of the United States, or for resisting
a draft, or for any other offense against the military or naval
service: Therefore I do hereby proclaim and make known that the
privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ is suspended throughout the
United States in the several cases before mentioned throughout the
duration of said rebellion."

No autocrat ever issued an edict more destructive of the natural
right to personal liberty. Not only was the State government of New
York deprived of the power to fulfill its obligations to protect and
preserve this right of its citizens, but every State government of
the Northern States was in like manner subverted. The only
distinction known among the citizens was that established by the
Government of the United States in answer to the question applied to
each one, "Is he loyal or disloyal?" The only test of loyalty was
based on submission, and, as usual in such cases, the most abject in
spirit were the most loyal to the usurper. Ail those liberties of
conduct and action which stamp the true freeman everywhere throughout
the world disappeared; and the suppressed voice, the apprehensive
look, and the cautious movements were substituted for the free
speech, the open brow, and fearless tread which had characterized the
American.

Another step in the subjugation of the government of the State of New
York was made by the domination over it of the military power of the
Government of the United States. This took place in a time of peace
in the State, when the courts were all open and the civil
administration of affairs was unobstructed. On July 30, 1863, the
United States commanding General of that department addressed a
letter to Governor Seymour, saying:

"As the draft under the act of Congress of March 3, 1863, for
enrolling and calling out the national forces, will probably be
resumed in this city (New York) at an early day, I am desirous of
knowing whether the military power of the State may be relied on to
enforce the execution of the law, in case of forcible resistance to
it. I am very anxious there should be perfect harmony of action
between the Federal Government and that of the State of New York; and
if, under your authority to see the laws faithfully executed, I can
feel assured that the act referred to will be enforced, I need not
ask the War Department to put at my disposal, for the purpose, troops
in the service of the United States."

Governor Seymour replied on August 3d:

"I have this day sent to the President of the United States a
communication in relation to the draft in this State. I believe his
answer will relieve you and me from the painful questions growing out
of an armed enforcement of the conscription law in this patriotic
State, which has contributed so largely and freely to the support of
the national cause during the existing war."

On August 8th General Dix writes again:

"It is my duty, as commanding officer of the troops in the service of
the United States in this department, if called on by the enrolling
officers, to aid them in resisting forcible opposition to the
execution of the law; and it is from an earnest desire to avoid the
necessity of employing for the purpose any of my forces, which have
been placed here to garrison the forts and protect the public
property, that I wished to see the draft enforced by the military
power of the State, in case of armed or organized resistance to
it. . . . I designed, if your coöperation could not be relied on,
to ask the General Government for a force which should be adequate
to insure the execution of the law and to meet any emergency growing
out of it."

Meantime Governor Seymour received no answer to his letter to the
President. He had asked for a suspension of the draft, on the ground
that the enrollments in the city were excessive as compared with
other portions of the State, and that due credit was not given for
the past. He therefore replied to General Dix, saying:

"As you state in your letter that it is your duty to enforce the act
of Congress, and, as you apprehend its provisions may excite popular
resistance, it is proposed you should know the position which will be
held by the State authorities. Of course, under no circumstances, can
they perform duties expressly confided to others, nor can they
undertake to relieve others from their proper responsibilities. But
there can be no violations of good order, or riotous proceedings, no
disturbances of the public peace, which are not infractions of the
laws of the State; and those laws will be enforced under all
circumstances. I shall take care that all the executive officers of
this State perform their duties vigorously and thoroughly, and, if
need be, the military power will be called into requisition. As you
are an officer of the General Government, and not of the State, it
does not become me to make suggestions to you with regard to your
action under a law of Congress. You will, of course, be governed by
your instructions and your own views of duty."

On August 18th General Dix thus wrote to the Governor:

"Not having received an answer from you, I applied to the Secretary
of War on the 14th inst. for a force adequate to the object. The call
was promptly responded to, and I shall be ready to meet all
opposition to the draft."

The force sent by the Secretary of War, to keep the peace and
subjugate the sovereignty of the people, amounted to forty-two
regiments and two batteries. There was no occasion for the exertion
of their powers, but the wrong to the State of New York was none the
less gross.

Again, the subjugation of the government of the State of New York by
the domination of the military power was made still more manifest by
another act on the part of the Government of the United States. A
spurious proclamation, seeming to have been issued by the President,
calling for four hundred thousand men, by a fraudulent imposition
appeared in two papers of New York City (the "Journal of Commerce"
and the "World") on the morning of May 18, 1864. It was immediately
contradicted by the authorities at Washington, and orders were
issued, under which the offices of these papers were entered by armed
men, the property of the owners seized, the premises held by force
for several days, and the publications suspended. At the same time
the office of the independent telegraph line was occupied by a
military force in the name of the Government of the United States.
The operators were taken into custody, and the proprietors of the
newspapers were ordered to be arrested and imprisoned. But these
orders were suspended.

Governor Seymour immediately instructed the District Attorney to
proceed against the offenders, saying:

"In the month of July last, when New York was a scene of violence, I
gave warning that 'the laws of the State must be enforced, its peace
and order maintained, and the property of its citizens protected at
every hazard.' The laws were enforced at a fearful cost of blood and
life. The declaration I then made was not intended merely for that
occasion, or against any class of men. It is one of an enduring
character, to be asserted at all times, and against all conditions of
citizens without favor or distinction. Unless all are made to bow to
the law, it will be respected by none. Unless all are made secure in
their rights of person and property, none can be protected."

An investigation was made by one of the city judges, and warrants
were issued for the arrest of Major-General Dix and several of his
officers. They voluntarily appeared by counsel on July 6th, and the
argument was set down for the 9th. On that day the counsel for the
defense said:

"Since this warrant was issued, the President of the United States
has issued another order to General Dix, which directs him that,
while this civil war lasts, he 'must not relieve himself from his
command, or be deprived of his liberty to obey any order of a
military nature which the President of the United States directs him
to execute.'"

The result of the arguments was that the officers were held to await
the action of the grand jury, who, however, took no action on the
charges. The guilty person was arrested in two or three days after
the appearance of the proclamation, and imprisoned in Fort Lafayette;
the newspaper and telegraph offices were restored to the owners, and
the publications resumed. But the government of New York never
obtained any indemnification of these losses by its citizens.

Another subversion of the State government was brought about by the
military interference on the part of the Government of the United
States with the State election. This was in 1864, when President
Lincoln and General McClellan were the candidates for the Presidency
of the United States. As usual, in all these cases, proceedings to
work up a pretended necessity for interference on the part of the
United States Government were commenced by the appearance of a
grandiloquent proclamation from the commanding General, Dix, telling
what horrible designs, there was reason to believe, the agents of the
Confederate States in Canada had prepared to be executed on
election-day, by an invasion of voters from Canada to colonize
different points. Therefore, to avert these dreadful dangers and
arrest the guilty parties, it was necessary that provost-marshals,
sustained by a military force, should be present with authority at
the polls. At the same time the State Department issued a dispatch,
saying:

"Information has been received from the British provinces to the
effect that there is a conspiracy on foot to set fire to the
principal cities in the Northern States on the day of the
Presidential election."

Thus was created an apparent necessity for the military force to be
very active on the day of election. Governor Seymour issued a
proclamation, saying:

"There is no reason to doubt that the coming election will be
conducted with the usual quiet and order."

Major-General Butler was sent to take command in the city, and seven
thousand additional men were placed in the forts of the harbor, and
proclamations were issued, threatening, by the United States
Government, the severest punishment upon every person who might
attempt improperly to vote at the election in the State of New York.

The State Legislature, at its previous session, had passed an act to
provide for the vote of the soldiers in the field, to be taken
previous to the day of election. Agents were appointed by the State
government, to the localities where the soldiers were stationed, to
receive the votes. The informers of the United States Government
immediately brought charges of fraud against some of these agents,
and they were seized by the military authorities, sent to Washington,
cast into prison, and held to be tried by a military commission. The
Governor of New York immediately appointed Amasa J. Parker and two
other most respectable citizens as commissioners, to proceed to
Washington in behalf of the State and investigate the difficulties.
They informed the Governor that several hundred ballots, which had
been seized, were given up, and that they visited the principal agent
of the State of New York in his prison, through the permission of
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. They reported thus:

"The undersigned availed themselves of the permit granted them to
visit Colonel North, M. M. Jones, and Levi Cohn. They found them in
the 'Carroll Prison,' in close confinement. They then learned that
Messrs. North and Cohn had been confined together in one room, and
had not been permitted to leave it for a moment during the four days
they had been prisoners, even for the purposes of answering the calls
of nature. They had been supplied with meager and coarse
prison-rations, to be eaten in their room, where they constantly
breathed the foul atmosphere arising from the standing odor. They had
no vessel out of which to drink water, except the one furnished them
for the purpose of urination. They had but one chair, and had slept
three of the nights of their confinement upon a sack of straw upon
the floor. They had not been permitted to see a newspaper, and were
ignorant of the cause of their arrest. All communication between them
and the outer world had been denied them, and no friend had been
allowed to see them. The undersigned complained to the acting
superintendent, who seemed humanely disposed, but justified his
course by the prison rules and the instructions of his superiors."

The commissioners further say:

"From the best investigation the undersigned have been able to make,
though there may have been irregularities, they have found no
evidence that any frauds, either against any elector or the elective
franchise, have been committed by any person connected with the New
York agency."

The commissioners then addressed a communication to the Secretary of
War. A few extracts from this communication will show how utter was
the subversion of the authority of the government of the State of New
York. They say:

"They, North, Cohn, and Jones, were not in the military or naval
service of the United States, and by no law of which we are aware
were they subject to the martial and military laws of the United
States, or to the orders of the War Department. . . . The charges, so
far as we can learn, are not for the violation of any law of the
United States, but relate to acts purporting to have been done under
the law of the State of New York concerning elections, and making
provisions for soldiers voting in that State; it being claimed that
certain irregularities hare intervened which give reason to suspect
that frauds and forgeries are intended, and may be consummated. These
suspected and anticipated frauds have respect solely to the election
laws of the State of New York, and the action of the Government in
making the arrest is claimed to be justified upon the ground that,
unless thus prevented, frauds will be perpetrated against the
ballot-box at the approaching election in the State of New York. We
beg leave, in behalf of the State, respectfully to protest against
this jurisdiction, assumed as well over the alleged offense as over
the persons of the accused, who are citizens of the State, in its
employ, and entitled to its protection. The proper business of the
State agency is greatly interfered with by the arrest and detention
of the agents, and the State is deprived of its proper jurisdiction
over its agents and citizens, over offenses against its laws, and
over its own ballot-box and the exercise of the elective franchise
within its limits."

The demands made by the State of New York through these commissioners
were refused. The persons arrested were finally tried before a
military commission, clearly without jurisdiction, in violation of
their personal rights, and in usurpation of the just powers of the
State. They were, however, acquitted and discharged, glad to get off
no worse.

The proposed limits will not permit me further to present the details
relative to the subjugation of the State government of New York by
the Government of the United States. Neither can space be spared to
relate the details of the subjugation of the government of each
Northern State. In many the events were similar to those in New York;
in others they arose under dissimilar circumstances; but, in all, the
sovereignty of the people was entirely disregarded, and the operation
of the institutions which had been established for the protection of
their rights was suspended, or nullified, by a military force of the
Government of the United States. Only such events, therefore, can be
stated as serve to show how universal and how complete was the work
done by the United States Government to secure a recognition of its
supremacy, over not only acts but even words, from every citizen. All
were its subjects; the "loyal," as some were called, were its
friends, and could be trusted; the "disloyal" were its disaffected
subjects, and must be watched by spies and informers, and, if
necessary, put in prison to secure their passive submission.

A military domination was established in all of the Northern States,
under the pretext of securing the arrest of deserters from the army.
This was accomplished on September 24, 1862, by the appointment of a
Provost-Marshal-General of the War Department at Washington, and in
each State one or more special provost-marshals, who were required to
report to and receive instructions from the Provost-Marshal-General.
It was made the duty of the special marshals--

"To arrest all deserters, whether regulars, volunteers, or militia,
and send them to the nearest military commander or military post,
where they can be cared for and sent to their respective regiments;
to arrest, upon the warrant of the Judge Advocate, all disloyal
persons subject to arrest under the orders of the War Department; to
inquire into and report treasonable practices, seize stolen or
embezzled property of the Government, detect spies of the enemy, and
perform such other duties as may be enjoined on them by the War
Department."

To enable these marshals to perform their duties efficiently, they
were authorized to call on any available military force within their
respective districts, or else to employ the assistance of citizens,
constables, sheriffs, or police officers, so far as might be
necessary. No trial was allowed to any person thus arrested except
before a military commission consisting of military officers
designated for the purpose; the prosecutor was the Judge Advocate,
and the punishments were exemplary, unusual, and too often such as
were unknown to the laws. The State governments within whose domains
the courts were open, the civil institutions in quiet operation, and
the transactions of peaceful life uniform and constant, were
powerless to protect their citizens in their unalienable rights of
freedom of speech and personal liberty, and the mandates of their
courts were treated with contempt. In utter disregard of the
principles of civil liberty, a military control was established in
every Northern State, the declarations of rights in their
Constitutions were violated, their laws nullified, and the authority
of their governments subverted by an absolute and direct usurpation
on the part of the Government of the United States.

The country was tilled with horror during 1865 by two trials held
before a military commission in the city of Washington. The first
commenced on May 13th, and ended on June 29th. The specification
was--

"That David E. Harold, Edward Spangler, Lewis Payne, John H. Surratt,
Michael O'Loughlin, Samuel Arnold, George A. Atzerott, Samuel A.
Mudd, and Mary E. Surratt, did on April 15, 1865, combine,
confederate, and conspire together to murder President Abraham
Lincoln, Vice-President Andrew Johnson, Lieutenant-General U. S.
Grant, and Secretary of State William H. Seward."

President Lincoln had been shot, and Secretary Seward was badly
wounded with a knife. The others were uninjured.

The sentence of the commission was that David E. Harold, G. A.
Atzerott, Lewis Payne, and Mary E. Surratt, be hanged by the proper
military authority, under the direction of the Secretary of War, on
July 7, 1865. The others were sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor
for a term of years or for life. With only one day's delay, the
sentences were carried into execution. John H. Surratt escaped before
trial. He was sought for by the spies of the War Department half
round the world, and after a long time was found serving as a soldier
in the corps of Papal Zouaves at Rome. He was brought back to
Washington, tried, and acquitted.

The insertion of my name with those of others, honorable gentlemen,
as "inciting and encouraging" these acts, served as an exhibition of
the malignant spirit with which justice was administered by the
authorities in Washington at that time. The case of Mrs. Surratt, at
whose house some of these persons had boarded, awakened much
sympathy. She was spoken of by her counsel, Reverdy Johnson, of
Maryland, as "a devout Christian, ever kind, affectionate, and
charitable," which was confirmed by evidence and uncontradicted. On
the day of the execution, her daughter, who was quite a devoted and
affectionate person, sought to obtain an audience with President
Johnson to implore at least a brief suspension of the sentence of her
mother. She was obstructed and prevented from seeing the President by
ex-Senator Preston King, of New York, and Senator James H. Lane, of
Kansas, who were reported to have been at the Executive Mansion to
keep guard over President Johnson. Each of these Senators at a later
period committed suicide.

The trial of Major Henry Wirz was the next in importance which came
before a military commission. In April, 1865, President Johnson
issued a proclamation, stating that, from evidence in possession of
the "Bureau of Military Justice," it appeared that I, Jefferson
Davis, was implicated in the assassination of President Lincoln, and
for that reason he offered a reward of one hundred thousand dollars
for my capture. That testimony was subsequently found to be entirely
false, having been a mere fabrication. The manner in which this was
done will be presently stated. Meantime, certain persons of influence
and public position at that time, either aware of the fabricated
character of this testimony or convinced of its insufficiency to
secure my conviction on a trial, sought to find ample material to
supply this deficiency, in the great mortality of the soldiers we had
captured during the war and imprisoned at Andersonville.[92]

Orders were therefore issued by the authorities of the United States
Government to arrest a subaltern officer, Captain Henry Wirz, a
foreigner by birth, poor, friendless, and wounded, and held as a
prisoner of war. He had been included in the surrender of General J.
E. Johnston. On May 7th he was placed in the "Old Capitol" Prison at
Washington. The poor man was doomed before he was heard, and the
permission to be heard according to law was denied him. Captain Wirz
had been in command at the Confederate prison at Andersonville. The
first charge alleged against him was that of conspiring with myself,
Secretary Seddon, General Howell Cobb, General Winder, and others, to
cause the death of thousands of the prisoners through cruelty, etc.
The second charge was alleged against himself for murder in violation
of the laws and customs of war.

The military commission before which he was tried was convened by an
order of President Johnson, of August 19th, directing the officers
detailed for that purpose to meet as a special military commission on
August 20th, for the trial of such prisoners as might be brought
before it. The commission convened, and Wirz was arraigned on the
charges above mentioned, and pleaded not guilty. At the suggestion of
the Judge Advocate, Joseph Holt, he was remanded to prison and the
court adjourned. The so-called trial afterward came on, and lasted
for three months, but no evidence whatsoever was produced showing the
existence of such a conspiracy as had been charged. Wirz was,
however, pronounced guilty, and, in accordance with the sentence of
the commission, he was executed on November 10, 1865.

On April 4, 1867, Mr. Louis Schade, of Washington, and the attorney
for Wirz on the trial, in compliance with the request of Wirz so to
do, as soon as the times should be propitious, published a
vindication of his character. The following is an extract from this
publication:

"On the night previous to the execution of the prisoner, some parties
came to the confessor of Wirz (Rev. Father Boyle) and also to me. One
of them informed me that a high Cabinet officer wished to assure Wirz
that, if he would implicate Jefferson Davis with the atrocities
committed at Andersonville, his sentence should be commuted. He (the
messenger, whoever he was) requested me to inform Wirz of this. In
presence of Father Boyle, I told him next morning what had happened.
The Captain simply and quietly replied: 'Mr. Schade, you know that I
have always told you that I do not know anything about Jefferson
Davis. He had no connection with me as to what was done at
Andersonville. If I knew anything of him, I would not become a
traitor against him or anybody else to save my life.' Thus ended the
attempt to suborn Captain Wirz against Jefferson Davis."

The following is an extract from a letter of Captain C. B. Winder to
Mrs. Davis, dated Eastern Shore of Virginia, January 9, 1867:

"The door of the room which I occupied while in confinement at the
Old Capitol Prison, Washington, was immediately opposite Captain
Wirz's door--both of which were occasionally open. About two days
before Captain Wirz's execution, I saw three or four men pass into
his room, and, upon their coming out, Captain Wirz told me that they
had given him assurances that his life would be spared and his
liberty given to him if he (Wirz) could give any testimony that would
reflect upon Mr. Davis or implicate him directly or indirectly with
the condition and treatment of prisoners of war, _as charged_ by the
United States authorities; that he indignantly spurned these
propositions, and assured them that, never having been acquainted
with Mr. Davis, either officially, personally, or socially, it was
utterly impossible that he should know anything against him, and that
the offer of his life, dear as the boon might be, could not purchase
him to treason and treachery to the South and his friend."

The following letter is from the Rev. Father F. E. Boyle, of
Washington:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., _October 10, 1880._

"Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS.

"DEAR SIR: . . . I know that, on the evening before the day of the
execution of Major Wirz, a man visited me, on the part of a Cabinet
officer, to inform me that Major Wirz would be pardoned if he would
implicate Jefferson Davis in the cruelties of Andersonville. No names
were given by this messenger, and, upon my refusal to take any action
in the matter, he went to Mr. Louis Schade, counsel for Major Wirz,
with the same purpose and with a like result.

"When I visited Major Wirz the next morning, he told me that the same
proposal had been made to him, and had been rejected with scorn. The
Major was very indignant, and said that, while he was innocent of the
cruel charges for which he was about to suffer death, he would not
purchase his liberty by perjury and a crime, such as was made the
condition of his freedom. I attended the Major to the scaffold, and
he died in the peace of God, and praying for his enemies. I know he
was indeed innocent of all the cruel charges on which his life was
sworn away, and I was edified by the Christian spirit in which he
submitted to his persecutors. Yours very truly,

"F. E. BOYLE."

In the other case of the fabrication of evidence by some of the
authorities in Washington relative to myself, it will be sufficient
here to present what others have said and done. The subject is
noticed in these pages only to show the desperate extremities to
which the agents of the Government of the United States proceeded in
order to compass my ignominious death. Three principal measures were
resorted to for the accomplishment of this object: the charge in the
case of Wirz, above mentioned; the fabrications in the case now under
consideration; and the cruel and inhuman treatment inflicted upon me
while a prisoner in Fortress Monroe.

At the session of Congress of 1865-'66, a committee was appointed in
the House of Representatives "to inquire into and report upon the
alleged complicity of Jefferson Davis with the assassination of the
late President Lincoln," or words to that effect. George S. Boutwell
was chairman of the committee, and the majority of the members were
extreme advocates of the war. The charge emanated from the "Bureau of
Military Justice," as it was designated--a similar institution to
the "Secret Committee" of the French Revolution. Of this institution
Judge-Advocate Joseph Holt was the chief. After an investigation
continuing through several months, a majority of the committee made
their report to Congress.

"That report not only failed to establish the charge, but the
committee were forced to confess in it that the witnesses, on whose
testimony Holt had affected to rely, were wholly untrustworthy.
Shortly after this report was presented to the House, Mr. A. J.
Rogers, of the committee, a very respectable member from New Jersey,
made a minority report. He asserted that much of the evidence was
altogether suppressed, and that the witnesses, who had received large
sums of money from Holt for testifying to the criminality of Mr.
Davis, recanted their evidence before the committee, and acknowledged
that they had perjured themselves by testifying to a mass of
falsehoods; that they had been tutored to do so by one S. Conover;
and that, from him down through all the miserable list, the very
names under which these hired informers were known to the public were
as false as the narratives to which they had sworn." [93]

Much more might be added to show the evil purpose of these men,
together with the correspondence of Holt and his associates, but it
would be out of place if it was put in these pages.

Another case of this kind occurred in the State of Ohio, in April,
1863, in the arrest, trial, and banishment of Clement L.
Vallandigham. On April 13th Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside,
commanding the Department, issued an order, declaring--

"That, hereafter, all persons found within our lines who commit acts
for the benefit of the enemies of our country will be tried as spies
or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death." (The different
classes of persons were then named in the order.) "The habit of
declaring sympathies for the enemy will no longer be tolerated in
this department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once
arrested, with a view to being tried as above stated, or sent beyond
our lines into the lines of their friends. It must be distinctly
understood that treason, expressed or implied, will not be tolerated
in this department."

Mr. Vallandigham commented upon this order, on May 1st, at a public
meeting of citizens. Three days afterward a body of soldiers was sent
by railroad from Cincinnati to Dayton, who, with violence, broke into
his residence at three o'clock in the morning, seized, and hurried
him to the cars before a rescue could be made, and departed for
Cincinnati, where he was confined in a military prison. He was
brought to trial before a military commission on May 6th. The
specification made against him in the charge was that "he addressed a
large meeting of citizens at Mount Vernon, and did utter sentiments
in words, or in effect, as follows: declaring the present war 'a
wicked, cruel, and unnecessary war'; a war not being waged for the
preservation of the Union'; 'a war for the purpose of crushing out
liberty and creating a despotism'; 'a war for the freedom of the
blacks and the enslavement of the whites'; stating that, 'if the
Administration had so wished, the war could have been honorably
terminated months ago'; characterizing the military order 'as a base
usurpation of arbitrary authority'; declaring 'that he was at all
times and upon all occasions resolved to do what he could to defeat
the attempts now made to build up a monarchy upon the ruins of our
free government.'" He was adjudged as guilty, and sentenced to
confinement in Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, during the war. This
sentence was changed by President Lincoln to banishment to the
Confederate States. This military usurpation was spoken of by
Governor Seymour, of New York, in a letter written at the time, in
these words:

"The transaction involved a series of offenses against our most
sacred rights. It interfered with the freedom of speech; it violated
our rights to be secure in our homes against unreasonable searches
and seizures; it pronounced sentence without a trial, save one which
was a mockery, which insulted as well as wronged. The perpetrators
now seek to impose punishment, not for an offense against law, but
for a disregard of an invalid order, put forth in utter violation of
the principles of civil liberty. If this proceeding is approved by
the Government and sanctioned by the people, it is not merely a step
toward revolution, it is revolution; it will not only lead to
military despotism, it establishes military despotism. If it is
upheld, our liberties are overthrown. The safety of our persons, the
security of our property, will hereafter depend upon the arbitrary
wills of such military rulers as may be placed over us, while our
constitutional guarantees will be broken down. Even now the Governors
and the courts of some of the great Western States have sunk into
insignificance before the despotic powers claimed and exercised by
military men who have been sent into their borders."

A large number of such arrests were made in Ohio, newspapers were
suspended, and editors imprisoned. Like scenes were very numerous in
Indiana and Illinois. In Pennsylvania arrests were made, newspapers
suspended, editors imprisoned, and offices destroyed. In New
Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin many similar scenes occurred. The
provost-marshal system was used as a weapon of vindictiveness against
influential citizens of opposite political views throughout all the
Northern States. No one of such persons knew when he was safe. A
complaint of his neighbors, supported by affidavit of "disloyal"
words spoken or "disloyal" acts approved, received prompt attention
from all marshals. Everything was brought into subjection to the will
of the Government of the United States and its military officers.

In view of all the facts here presented relative to the Northern
States, let the reader answer where the sovereignty _de facto_
resided. Most clearly in the Government of the United States. That
presided over the ballot-box, held the keys of the prisons, arrested
all citizens at its pleasure, suspended or suppressed newspapers, and
did whatever it pleased under the declaration that the public welfare
required it. But, under the principles of American liberty, the
sovereignty is inherent in the people as an unalienable right; and,
for the preservation and protection of this and other rights, the
State governments were instituted. If, therefore, the people have
lost this inherent sovereignty, it is evident that the State
governments have failed to afford that protection for which they were
instituted. If they have thus failed, it has been in consequence of
their subversion and loss of power to fulfill the object for which
they were established. This subversion was achieved when the General
Government, under the pretext of preserving the Union, made war on
its creators the States, thus changing the nature of the Federal
Union, which could rightfully be done only by the sovereign, the
people of the States, in like manner as it was originally formed. If
they should permit their sovereignty to be usurped and themselves to
be subjugated, individuals might remain, States could not. Of their
wreck a nation might be built, but there could not be a Union, for
that implies entities united, and of a State which has lost its
sovereignty there may only be written, "_It was_."

[Footnote 86: Article IV, amendment.]

[Footnote 87: Article V, amendment.]

[Footnote 88: Article V, amendment.]

[Footnote 89: Article VI, amendment.]

[Footnote 90: Article I, section 9.]

[Footnote 91: The first act of Congress providing for an enrollment and
draft was passed on March 8, 1363, three and a half months later than
this order.]

[Footnote 92: See chapter on exchange of prisoners.]

[Footnote 93: Baltimore "Gazette," September 25, 1866.]

CHAPTER XLV.

Both the Army of Northern Virginia and the army under General Meade
remained in a state of comparative inaction during the months of
January and February, 1864.

On February 26, 1864, while General Lee's headquarters were at Orange
Court-House, two corps of the army of the enemy left their camp for
Madison Court-House. The object was, by a formidable feint, to engage
the attention of General Lee, and conceal from him their plans for a
surprise and, if possible, capture of the city of Richmond. This was
to be a concerted movement, in which General Butler, in command of
the forces on the Peninsula, was to move up and make a demonstration
upon Richmond on the east, while Generals Custer and Kilpatrick and
Colonel Dahlgren were to attack it and enter on the west and north.

Two days later another army corps left for Madison Court-House, and
other forces subsequently followed. At the same time General Custer,
with two ten-inch Parrott guns and fifteen hundred picked men,
marched for Charlottesville by the James City road. His purpose was
to destroy the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, running by
Charlottesville to Gordonsville, where the junction was made of the
railroad running north from Lynchburg, with the Central running to
Richmond. The capture of the army stores there, the destruction of
the tracks running south, west, and east, and cutting the telegraph,
would have severed the communication between Lee's army and Richmond
by that route. This movement, with the destruction of railroads by
General Kilpatrick, and of the Central Railroad and the James River
and Kanawha Canal by Colonel Dahlgren, would have isolated that army
from its base of supplies.

[Illustration: General Wade Hampton]

Three hours later, on the same day on which General Custer started,
General Kilpatrick with five thousand picked cavalry and a light
battery of six guns, left Stevensburg, near Culpeper Court-House, for
the lower fords of the Rapidan. His object was to make a dash upon
Richmond for the purpose of releasing the United States prisoners,
and doing whatever injury might be possible. He moved rapidly,
destroying railroads and depots, and plundering the country, but
found no obstacle except in being closely harassed in his rear by
Colonel Bradley T. Johnson with his sixty Marylanders, who, with
extraordinary daring, activity, and skill, followed him until he
reached the line of the defenses of Richmond. There, while attacked
in the rear by Colonel Johnson and his pickets driven in, he was at
the same time opposed in front by Colonel W. H. Stevens, who, with a
detachment of engineer troops, manned a few sections of light
artillery. After an engagement of thirty minutes, Kilpatrick's entire
force began to retreat in the direction of the Meadow Bridge on the
Central Railroad. At night his camp-fires were discovered by General
Wade Hampton, who dismounted one hundred men to act as infantry, and,
supported by the cavalry, opened his two-gun battery upon the enemy
at short range. He then attacked the camp of Davies's and of a part
of two other brigades. The camp was taken, and the whole force of
Kilpatrick fled at a gallop, leaving one hundred and five prisoners
and more than one hundred horses.

Colonel Dahlgren started with General Kilpatrick, but at
Spottsylvania Court-House was dispatched with five hundred men to
Frederickhall, a depot of the Central Railroad, where some eighty
pieces of our reserve artillery had been parked. His orders were to
destroy the artillery, the railroads, and telegraph-lines. Finding
the artillery too well guarded, he proceeded to destroy the line of
railroad as far as Hanover Junction. Thence he moved toward the James
River and Kanawha Canal, which he reached twenty-two miles west of
Richmond. Thence his command moved toward the city, pillaging and
destroying dwelling-houses, out-buildings, mills, canal-boats, grain,
and cattle, and cutting one lock on the canal. The first resistance
met was by a battalion of General G. W. C. Lee's force, consisting of
about two hundred and twenty of the armory-men, under command of
their major, Ford. This small body was driven back until it joined a
battalion of the Treasury Department clerks, who, in the absence of
their major, Henly, were led by Captain McIlhenney. The officers and
men were all clerks of the Treasury Department, and, like those of
other departments and many citizens of Richmond, who were either too
old or too young to be in the army, were enrolled and organized to
defend the capital in the absence of troops. Captain McIlhenney, as
soon as he saw the enemy, promptly arranged to attack. This was done
with such impetuosity that Dahlgren and his men wore routed, leaving
some eighteen killed, twenty to thirty wounded, and as many more
prisoners. About a hundred horses, with equipments, a number of
small-arms, and one three-inch Napoleon gun were captured. Our loss
was one captain and two lieutenants killed, three lieutenants and
seven privates wounded--one of the latter mortally. This feat of the
Clerks' Battalion commanded the grateful admiration of the people,
and the large concourse that attended the funeral of the fallen
expressed the public lamentation.

Dahlgren now commenced his retreat. To increase the chances of
escape, the force was divided, he leading one party in the direction
of King and Queen County. The home guard of the country turned out
against the raiders, and, being joined by a detachment from the
Forty-second Battalion of Virginia Cavalry and some furloughed
cavalry-men of Lee's army, surprised and attacked the retreating
column of Dahlgren, killed the leader, and captured nearly one
hundred prisoners, with negroes, horses, etc.

On the body of Dahlgren was found an address to his officers and men,
another paper giving special orders and instructions, and one giving
his itinerary, the whole disclosing the unsoldierly means and
purposes of the raid, such as disguising the men in our uniform,
carrying supplies of oakum and turpentine to burn Richmond, and,
after releasing their prisoners on Belle Isle, to exhort them to
destroy the hateful city, while on all was impressed the special
injunction that the city must be burned, and "Jeff Davis and Cabinet
killed."

The prisoners, having been captured in disguise, were, under the
usages of war, liable to be hanged as spies, but their protestations
that their service was not voluntary, and the fact that as enlisted
men they were subject to orders, and could not be held responsible
for the infamous instructions under which they were acting, saved
them from the death-penalty they had fully incurred. Photographic
copies of the papers found on Dahlgren's body were taken and sent to
General Lee, with instructions to communicate them to General Meade,
commanding the enemy's forces in his front, with an inquiry as to
whether such practices were authorized by his Government, and also to
say that, if any question was raised as to the copies, the original
paper would be submitted. No such question was then made, and the
denial that Dahlgren's conduct had been authorized was accepted.

Many sensational stories, having not even a basis of truth, were put
in circulation to exhibit the Confederate authorities as having acted
with unwarrantable malignity toward the deceased Colonel Dahlgren.
The fact was, that his body was sent to Richmond and decently
interred in the Oakwood Cemetery, where other Federal soldiers were
buried. The enormity of his offenses was not forgotten, but
resentment against him ended with his life. It was also admitted
that, however bad his preceding conduct had been, he met his fate
gallantly, charging at the head of his men when he found himself
inextricably encompassed by his foe.

Custer and Kilpatrick, who were to coöperate with him in the
expedition, especially the first-named, manifested a saving degree of
"that rascally virtue," as Charles Lee, of Revolutionary memory,
called it. After the feeble demonstration upon some parked artillery
which has been described, he fancied that he heard the roaring of
cars coming with reënforcements, and retreated, burning the bridges
behind him--a precaution quite in vain, as there were none there to
pursue him.

Kilpatrick, followed as above stated by Colonel Bradley T. Johnson,
who hung close upon his rear, finally reached the defenses of
Richmond. There, out of respect to the field artillery he
encountered, he turned off to cross the Chickahominy, and that night
he was routed by the cavalry command of our gallant cavalier General
Wade Hampton. Thus ended the combined movement with which Northern
papers had regaled their readers by announcing as made "with
instructions to sack the rebel capital."

During the first week in May, Major-General B. F. Butler landed at
Bermuda Hundred with a considerable force, and moved up so as to cut
the telegraph line and reach by a raiding party the railroad at
Chester, between Richmond and Petersburg. General Ransom, then in
command of the defenses at Richmond and those of Drury's Bluff, with
a small force, attacked the advance of General Butler, and after a
sharp skirmish compelled him to withdraw.

Meantime, because of the warning which Stuart had sent, General
Ransom was summoned to Richmond to resist an impending assault by
General Sheridan on the outer works north of the city. Taking the two
disposable brigades of Gracie and Fry and a light battery, he
hastened forward, arriving at the fortifications on the
Mechanicsville Turnpike; just in time to see a battery of artillery,
then entirely unsupported, repulse the advance of Sheridan. During
the night the clerks and citizens, under General G. W. Custis Lee,
had formed a thin line along part of the fortifications on the west
side of the city. As the day advanced, Oracle's brigade was thrown in
front of the works and pressed forward to feel Sheridan; but it was
regarded as worse than useless with two small brigades to engage in
an open country many times their number of well-appointed cavalry,
Sheridan showed no purpose to attack, but withdrew from before our
defenses, and the two brigades returned to the vicinity of Drury's
Bluff--the approach on the south side of James River, by forces
under General Butler, being then considered the most imminent danger
to Richmond.

After the battle of the Wilderness, on May 4th and 5th, as hereafter
narrated, General Grant moved his army toward Spottsylvania
Court-House, and General Lee made a corresponding movement. At this
time Sheridan, with a large force of United States cavalry, passed
around and to the rear of our army, so as to place himself on the
road to Richmond, which, in the absence of a garrison to defend it,
he may have not unreasonably thought might be surprised and captured.

Stuart, our most distinguished cavalry commander--fearless, faithful
Stuart--soon knew of Sheridan's movement, perceived its purpose,
and, with his usual devotion to his country's welfare, hastily
collected such of his troops as were near, and pursued Sheridan. He
fell upon Sheridan's rear and flank at Beaver Dam Station, where a
pause had been made to destroy the railroad, some cars, and
commissary's stores, and drove it before him. The route of the enemy
being unmistakably toward Richmond, Stuart, to protect the capital,
or at least to delay attack, so as to give time to make preparation
for defense, made a _détour_ around Sheridan, and by a forced march
got in front of him, taking position at a place called Yellow Tavern,
about seven or eight miles from Richmond. Here, with the daring and
singleness of purpose which characterized his whole career, he
decided, notwithstanding the great inequality between his force and
that of his foe, to make a stand, and offer persistent resistance to
his advance. The respective strength of the two commands, as given by
Colonel Heros von Borke, chief of General Stuart's staff, was,
Stuart, eleven hundred; Sheridan, eight thousand. While engaged in
this desperate service, General Stuart sent couriers to Richmond to
give notice of the approach of the enemy, so that the defenses might
be manned.

Notwithstanding the great disparity of force, the contest was
obstinate and protracted, and fickle Fortune cheered our men with
several brilliant successes. Stuart, who in many traits resembled the
renowned Murat, like him was always a leader when his cavalry
charged. On this occasion he is represented when he was wounded to
have been quite in advance, to have fired the last load in his
pistol, and to have been shot by a fugitive whom he found cowering
under a fence, and ordered to surrender. The "heavy battalions" at
last prevailed, our line was broken, and our chieftain, though
mortally wounded, still kept in his saddle, invoking his men to
continue the fight.[94] Our gallant chieftain was brought wounded
into Richmond, a noble sacrifice on the altar of duty.

Long accustomed to connect him only with daring exploits and
brilliant successes, there was much surprise and deeper sorrow when
the news spread through the city. Admired as a soldier, loved as a
man, honored as a Christian patriot, to whom duty to his God and his
country was a supreme law, the intense anxiety for his safety made us
all shrink from realizing his imminent danger. When I saw him in his
very last hours, he was so calm, and physically so strong, that I
could not believe that he was dying, until the surgeon, after I had
left his bedside, told me he was bleeding inwardly, and that the end
was near.

Grant's plan of campaign, as now revealed to us, was to continue his
movement against Lee's army, and, if, as experience had taught him,
he should be unable to defeat it and move directly to his objective
point, Richmond, he was to continue his efforts so as to reach the
James River below Richmond, and thus to connect with the array under
General Butler, moving up on the south side of the James. The
topography of the country favored that design. The streams in the
country in which he was operating all trended toward the southeast,
and his change of position was frequently made under cover of them.
Butler, in the mean time, was ordered with the force of his
department, about twenty thousand, reënforced by Gilmer's division of
ten thousand, to move up to City Point, there intrench, and
concentrate all his troops as rapidly as possible. From this base he
was expected to operate so as to destroy the railroad connections
between Richmond and the South. On the 7th of May he telegraphed that
he had "destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which,
with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of Lee's
army."

At this time Major-General Robert Ransom, as before mentioned, was in
command at Richmond, including Drury's Bluff. His force consisted,
for the defense of both places, of the men serving the stationary or
heavy artillery, and three brigades of infantry--Hunton's at
Chapin's Bluff, and Barton's and Gracie's for field service. To
these, in cases of emergency, the clerks and artisans in the
departments and manufactories, were organized, to be called out as an
auxiliary force when needed for the defense of the capital It was
with this field force that Ransom, as has been related, moved upon
Butler, and drove him from the railroad, the destruction of which he
had so vauntingly announced.

A few days thereafter he again emerged from his cover, but this time
changed his objective point, and, diverging from the south bank of
the James River, moved toward Petersburg, and reached the railroad at
Port Walthal Junction, where he encountered some of General
Beauregard's command, which had been ordered from Charleston, and was
driven from the railroad and turnpike. The troops ordered from
Charleston with General Beauregard had, by May 14th, reached the
vicinity of Drury's Bluff. In connection with the works and
rifle-pits on the bluff, which were to command the river and prevent
the ascent of gunboats, an intrenched line had been constructed on a
ridge about a mile south of the bluff, running across the road from
Richmond to Petersburg. This ridge was higher than the ground on
which the fort was built, and was designed to check an approach of
the enemy from the south, as well as to cover the rear of the fort.
In the afternoon of the 14th I rode down to visit General Beauregard
at his headquarters in the field. Supposing his troops to be on the
line of intrenchment, I passed Major Drury's house to go thither,
when some one by the roadside called to me and told me that the
troops were not on the line of intrenchment, and that General
Beauregard was at the house behind me.

My first question on meeting him was to learn why the intrenchments
were abandoned. He answered that he thought it better to concentrate
his troops. Upon my stating to him that there was nothing then to
prevent Butler from turning his position, he said he would desire
nothing more, as he would then fall upon him, cut him off from his
base, etc.

According to my uniform practice never to do more than to make a
suggestion to a general commanding in the field, the subject was
pressed no further. We then passed to the consideration of the
operations to be undertaken against Butler, who had already advanced
from his base at Bermuda Hundred. I offered, for the purpose of
attacking Butler, to send Major-General Ransom with the field force
he had for the protection of Richmond. In addition to his high
military capacity, his minute knowledge of the country in which they
were to operate made him specially valuable. He reported to General
Beauregard at noon on the 15th, received his orders for the battle
which was to occur the next day, and about 10 P.M. was, with a
division of four brigades and a battery of light artillery, in
position in front of the breastworks. Colonel Dunovant, with a
regiment of cavalry not under Ransom's orders, was to guard the space
between his left and the river, so as to give him information of any
movement in that quarter. General Whiting, with some force, was
holding a defensive position at Petersburg. General Beauregard
proposed that the main part of it should advance and unite with him
in an attack upon Butler wherever he should be found between Drury's
and Petersburg. To this I offered distinct objection, because of the
hazard during a battle of attempting to make a junction of troops
moving from opposite sides of the enemy; and proposed that Whiting's
command should move at night by the Chesterfield road, where they
would not probably be observed by Butler's advance. This march I
supposed they could make so as to arrive at Drury's by or soon after
daylight. The next day being Sunday, they could rest, and, all the
troops being assigned to their positions, could move to make a
concerted attack at daylight on Monday. He spoke of some difficulty
in getting a courier who knew the route and could certainly deliver
the order to General Whiting. Opportunely, a courier arrived from
General Whiting, who had come up the Chesterfield road. He then said
the order would have to be drawn with a great deal of care, and that
he would prepare it as soon as he could. I arose to take leave, and
he courteously walked down the stairs with me, remarking as we went
that he was embarrassed for the want of a good cavalry commander. I
saw in the yard Colonel Chilton, assistant adjutant and
inspector-general, and said, "There is an old cavalry officer who was
trained in my old regiment, the First Dragoons, and who I think will
answer your requirements," Upon his expressing the pleasure it would
give him to have Colonel Chilton, I told him of General Beauregard's
want, and asked him if the service would be agreeable to him. He
readily accepted it, and I left, supposing all the preliminaries
settled. In the next forenoon Colonel Samuel Melton, of the adjutant
and inspector-general's department, called at my residence and
delivered a message from General Beauregard to the effect that he had
decided to order Whiting to move by the direct road from Petersburg,
instead of by the Chesterfield route, and, when I replied that I had
stated my objections to General Beauregard to a movement which gave
the enemy the advantage of being between our forces, he said General
Beauregard had directed him to explain to me that upon a further
examination he found his force sufficient; that his operations,
therefore, did not depend upon making a junction with Whiting.

On Monday morning I rode down to Drury's, where I found that the
enemy had seized our line of intrenchments, it being unoccupied, and
that a severe action had occurred, with serious loss to us before he
could be dislodged. He had crossed the main road to the west,
entering a dense wood, and our troops on the right had moved out and
were closely engaged with him. We drove him back, frustrating the
attempt to turn the extreme right of our line. The day was wearing
away, a part of the force had been withdrawn to the intrenchment, and
there was no sign of purpose to make any immediate movement. General
Beauregard said he was waiting to hear Whiting's guns, and had been
expecting him for some time to approach on the Petersburg road. Soon
after this, the foe in a straggling, disorganized manner, commenced
crossing the road, moving to the east, which indicated a retreat, or
perhaps a purpose to turn our left and attack Fort Drury in rear. He
placed a battery in the main road and threw some shells at our
intrenchment, probably to cover his retiring troops. General Ransom,
in an unpublished report, says that, at the time he received the
order of battle, General Beauregard told him, "As you know the
region, I have given you the moving part of the army, and you will
take the initiative." He further states that at dawn of day he moved
to the south of Kingsland Creek, formed two lines with a short
interval, and at once advanced to the attack. A dense fog suddenly
enveloped him, so as to obscure all distant objects. Moving forward,
the skirmishers were quickly engaged, and the fighting was pressed so
vigorously that by sunrise he had captured a brigade of infantry, a
battery of artillery, and occupied about three quarters of a mile of
the enemy's temporary breastworks, which were strengthened by wire
interwoven among the trees in their front; this was not effected,
however, without considerable loss in killed and wounded, and much
confusion, owing to the denseness of the fog. General Ransom's report
continues:

"Having no ammunition-wagons and requiring replenishment of infantry
cartridges, and knowing that delay would mar the effect of the
success gained, I sent instantly to Beauregard, reporting what had
happened, and asked that Ransom's brigade might come to me at once,
so that I might continue the pressure and make good the advantage
already gained."

He then describes the further delay in getting ammunition, and his
renewal of the request for Ransom's brigade, which he had organized
and formerly commanded, but, instead of which, two small regiments
were sent to him, the timely arrival of which, it is to be gratefully
remembered, enabled him to repulse an advance of the enemy. It would
be neither pleasant nor profitable to dwell on the lost opportunity
for a complete victory, or to recount the possible consequences which
might have flowed from it. On the next morning, our troops moved down
the river road as far as Howlett's, about three or four miles, but
saw no enemy. The "back door" of Richmond was closed, and Butler
"bottled up."

Soon after the affair at Drury's Bluff, General Beauregard addressed
to me a communication, proposing that he should be heavily reinforced
from General Lee's army, so as to enable him to crush Butler in his
intrenchments, and then, with the main body of his own force,
together with a detachment from General Lee's army, that he should
join General Lee, overwhelm Grant, and march to Washington. I knew
that General Lee was then confronting an army vastly superior to his
in numbers, fully equipped, with inexhaustible supplies, and a
persistence in attacking of which sufficient evidence had been given.
I could not therefore expect that General Lee would consent to the
proposition of General Beauregard; but, as a matter of courteous
consideration, his letter was forwarded with the usual formed
endorsement. General Lee's opinion on the case was shown by the
instructions he gave directing General Beauregard to straighten his
line so as to reduce the requisite number of men to hold it, and send
the balance to join the army north of the James.

[Footnote 94: Address of Major H. B. McClellan before Army of Northern
Virginia Association.]

CHAPTER XLVI.

It was in March, 1864, that Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, having
been appointed lieutenant-general, assumed command of the armies of
the United States. He subsequently proceeded to Culpeper and assumed
personal command of the Army of the Potomac, although nominally that
army remained under the command of General Meade. Reënforcements were
gathered from every military department of the United States and sent
to that army.

On May 3d General Lee held the south bank of the Rapidan River, with
his right resting near the mouth of Mine Run and his left extending
to Liberty Mills, on the road from Gordonsville to the Shenandoah
Valley. Ewell's corps was on the right, Hill's on the left, and two
divisions of Longstreet's corps, having returned from East Tennessee,
were encamped in the rear near Gordonsville. The army of General
Grant had occupied the north bank of the Rapidan, with the main body
encamped in Culpeper County and on the Rappahannock River.

While Grant with his immense and increasing army was thus posted,
Lee, with a comparatively small force, and to which few
reënforcements could be furnished, confronted him on a line
stretching from near Somerville Ford to Gordonsville. To Grant was
left the choice to move directly on Lee and attempt to defeat his
army, the only obstacle to the capture of Richmond, and which his
vast means rendered supposable, or to cross the Rapidan above or
below Lee's position. The second would fulfill the condition, so
imperatively imposed on McClellan, of covering the United States
capital; the third would be in the more direct line toward Richmond.
Of the three he chose the last, and so felicitated himself on his
unopposed passage of the river as to suppose that he had, unobserved,
turned the flank of Lee's army, got between it and Richmond, and
necessitated the retreat of the Confederates to some point where they
might resist his further advance. So little could he comprehend the
genius of Lee, that he expected him to be surprised, as appears from
his arrangements contemplating only combats with the rear-guard
covering the retreat. Lee, dauntless as he was sagacious, seized the
opportunity, which the movement of his foe offered, to meet him where
his artillery would be least available, where his massive columns
would be most embarrassed in their movements, and where Southern
individuality and self-reliance would be specially effective. Grant's
object was to pass through "the Wilderness" to the roads between Lee
and Richmond. Lee resolved to fight him in those pathless woods,
where mind might best compete with matter.

Providence held its shield over the just cause, and heroic bands
hurled back the heavy battalions shattered and discomfited, as will
be now briefly described.

In order to cross the Rapidan, Grant's army moved on May 3d toward
Germania Ford, which was ten or twelve miles from our right. He
succeeded in seizing the ford and crossing. The direct road from this
ford to Richmond passed by Spottsylvania Court-House, and, when Grant
had crossed the river, he was nearer than General Lee to Richmond.
From Orange Court-House there are two nearly parallel roads running
eastwardly to Fredericksburg. The one nearest the river is called the
"Stone Turnpike," and the other the "Plank-road." The road from the
ford to Spottsylvania Court-House crosses the Old Stone Turnpike at
the "Old Wilderness Tavern," and, two or three miles farther on, it
crosses the plank-road.

As soon as Grant's movement was known, Lee's troops were put in
motion. Swell's corps moved on the Stone Turnpike, and Hill's corps
on the plank-road, into which Longstreet's force also came from his
camp near Gordonsville. Ewell's corps crossed Mine Run, and encamped
at Locust Grove, four miles beyond, on the afternoon of the 4th. On
the morning of the 5th it was again in motion, and encountered
Grant's troops in heavy force at a short distance from the Old
Wilderness Tavern, and Jones's and Battle's brigades were driven back
in some confusion. Early's division was ordered up, formed across the
pike, and moved forward. It advanced through a dense pine-thicket,
and, with other brigades of Rodes's division, drove the enemy back
with heavy loss, capturing several hundred prisoners and gaining a
commanding position on the right. Meantime, Johnson's division, on
the left of the pike, and extending across the road to Germania Ford,
was heavily engaged in front, and Hays's brigade was sent to his left
to participate in a forward movement. It advanced, encountered a
large force, and, not meeting with the expected coöperation, was
drawn back. Subsequently, Pegram's brigade took position on Hays's
left, and just before night an attack was made on their front, which
was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy. During the afternoon
there was hot skirmishing along the whole line, and several attempts
were made by the foe to regain the position from which he had been
driven. At the close of the day, Ewell's corps had captured over a
thousand prisoners, besides inflicting on the enemy very severe
losses in killed and wounded. Two pieces of artillery had been
abandoned and were secured by our troops.

A. P. Hill, on the 4th, with Heth's and Wilcox's divisions of his
corps, moved eastwardly along the plank-road. They bivouacked at
night near Verdiersville, and resumed their march on the 5th with
Heth in advance. About 1 P.M. musketry firing was heard in front; the
sound indicated the presence of a large body of infantry. Kirkland's
brigade deployed on both sides of the plank-road, and the column
proceeded to form in line of battle on its flanks. Hill's advance had
followed the plank-road, while Ewell's pursued the Stone turnpike.
These parallel movements were at this time from three to four miles
apart. The country intervening and round about for several miles is
known as the "Wilderness," and, having very little open ground,
consists almost wholly of a forest of dense undergrowth of shrubs and
small trees. In order to open communication with Ewell, Wilcox's
division moved to the left, and effected a junction with Gordon's
brigade on Ewell's extreme right. The line of battle thus completed
extended from the right of the plank-road through a succession of
open fields and dense forest to the left of the Stone turnpike. It
presented a line of six miles, and the thicket that lay along the
whole front of our army was so impenetrable as to exclude the use of
artillery save only at the roads. Heth's skirmishers were driven in
about 3 P.M. by a massive column that advanced, firing rapidly. The
straggle thus commenced in Hill's front continued for two or three
hours unabated. Heth's ranks were greatly reduced, when Wilcox was
ordered to his support, but the bloody contest continued until night
closed over our force in the position it had originally taken. This
stubborn and heroic resistance was made by the divisions of Heth and
Wilcox, of Hill's corps, fifteen thousand strong, against the
repeated and desperate assaults of five divisions--four divisions of
Hancock's and one of Sedgwick's corps, numbering about forty-five
thousand men. Our forces completely foiled their adversaries, and
inflicted upon them most serious loss.[95] During the day the Ninth
Corps of the enemy under General Burnside, had come on the field. The
third division of Hill's corps, under General Anderson, and the two
divisions of Longstreet's corps, did not reach the scene of conflict
until dawn of day on the morning of the 6th. Simultaneously the
attack on Hill was renewed with great vigor. In addition to the force
he had so successfully resisted on the previous day, a fresh division
of the enemy's Fifth Corps had secured position on Hill's flank, and
coöperated with the column assaulting in front. After a severe
contest, the left of Heth's division and the right of Wilcox's were
overpowered before the advance of Longstreet's column reached the
ground, and were compelled to return. The repulsed portions of the
divisions were in considerable disorder. General Lee now came up,
and, fully appreciating the impending crisis, dashed amid the
fugitives, calling on the men to rally and follow him.

"The soldiers, seeing General Lee's manifest purpose to advance with
them, and realizing the great danger in which he then was, begged him
to go to the rear, promising that they would soon have matters
rectified. The General waved them on with some words of cheer." [96]

The assault was checked.

Longstreet, having come up with two divisions, deployed them in line
of battle, and gallantly advanced to recover the lost ground. The
enemy was driven back over the ground he had gained by his assault on
Hill's line, but reformed in the position previously held by him.
About mid-day an attack on his left flank and rear was ordered by
Longstreet. For this purpose three brigades were detached, and,
moving forward, were joined by General J. R. Davis's brigade, which
had been the extreme right of Hill's line. Making a sufficient _détour_
to avoid observation, and, rushing precipitately to attack the foe in
flank and reverse while he was preparing to resist the movement in
his front, he was taken completely by surprise. The assault resulted
in his utter rout, with heavy loss on that part of his line.

Preparations were now made to follow up the advantages gained by a
forward movement of the whole line under General Longstreet's
personal direction. When advancing at the head of Jenkins's brigade,
with that officer and others, a body of Confederates in the wood on
the roadside, supposing the column to be a hostile force, fired into
it, killing General Jenkins, distinguished alike for civil and
military virtue, and severely wounding General Longstreet. The
valuable services of General Longstreet were thus lost to the army at
a critical moment, and this caused the suspension of a movement which
promised the most important results; and time was thus afforded to
the enemy to rally, reënforce, and find shelter behind his
intrenchments. Under these circumstances the commanding General
deemed it unadvisable to attack.

On the morning of the 6th the contest was renewed on the left, and a
very heavy attack was made on the front, occupied by Pegram's
brigade, but it was handsomely repulsed, as were several subsequent
attacks at the same point. In the afternoon an attack was made on the
enemy's right flank, resting in the woods, when Gordon's brigade,
with Johnson's in the rear and followed by Pegram's, succeeded in
throwing it into great confusion, doubling it up and forcing it back
some distance, capturing two brigadier-generals and several hundred
prisoners. Darkness closed the contest. On the 7th an advance was
made which disclosed the fact that Grant had given up his line of
works on his right. During the day there was some skirmishing, but no
serious fighting. The result of these battles was the infliction of
severe loss upon the foe, the gain of ground, and the capture of
prisoners, artillery, and other trophies. The cost to us, however,
was so serious as to enforce, by additional considerations, the
policy of Lee to spare his men as much as was possible.

A rapid flank movement was next made by Grant to secure possession of
Spottsylvania Court-House. General Lee comprehended his purpose, and
on the night of the 7th a division of Longstreet's corps was sent as
the advance to that point. Stuart, then in observation on the flank,
and ever ready to work or to fight as the one or the other should
best serve the cause of his country, dismounted his troopers, and, by
felling trees, obstructed the roads so as materially to delay the
march of the enemy. The head of the opposing forces arrived almost at
the same moment on the 8th; theirs, being a little in advance, drove
back our cavalry, but in turn was quickly driven from the strategic
point by the arrival of our infantry. On the 9th the two armies, each
forming on its advance as a nucleus, swung round and confronted each
other in line of battle.

The 10th and 11th passed in comparative quiet. On the morning of the
12th the enemy made a very heavy attack on Ewell's front, and broke
the line where it was occupied by Johnson's division. At this time
and place the scene occurred of which Mississippians are justly
proud. Colonel Tenable, of General Lee's staff, states that, on the
receipt of one of the messages from General Rodes for more troops, he
was sent by General Lee to bring Harris's Mississippi brigade from
the extreme right; that General Lee met the brigade and rode at its
head until under fire, when a round shot passed so near to him that
the soldiers invoked him to go back; and when he said, "If you will
promise me to drive those people from our works, I will go back," the
brigade shouted the promise, and Colonel Venable says:

"As the column of Mississippians came up at a double quick an
aide-de-camp came up to General Rodes with a message from Ramseur
that he could hold out only a few minutes longer unless assistance
was at hand. Your brigade was thrown instantly into the fight, the
column being formed into line under a tremendous fire and on very
difficult ground. Never did a brigade go into fiercer battle under
greater trials; never did a brigade do its duty more nobly." [97]

A portion of the attacking force swept along Johnson's line to
Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt movement on that flank.
Several brigades sent to Ewell's assistance were carried into action
under his orders, and they all suffered severely. Subsequently, on
the same day, some brigades were thrown to the front, for the purpose
of moving to the left and attacking the flank of the column which
broke Ewell's line, to relieve the pressure on him, and recover the
part of the line which had been lost. These, as they moved, soon
encountered the Ninth Corps, under Burnside, advancing to the attack.
They captured over three hundred prisoners and three battle-flags,
and their attack on the enemy's flank, taking him by surprise,
contributed materially to his repulse.

Taylor, in his "Four Years with General Lee," says that Lee, having
detected the weakness of "the salient" occupied by the division of
General Edward Johnson, of Ewell's corps, directed a second line to
be constructed across its base, to which he proposed to move the
troops occupying the angle. Suspecting another flank movement by
Grant, before these arrangements were quite completed, he ordered
most of the artillery at this portion of the lines to be withdrawn so
as to be available. Toward dawn on the 12th, Johnson, discovering
indications of an impending assault, ordered the immediate return of
the artillery, and made other preparations for defense. But the
unfortunate withdrawal was so partially and tardily restored, that a
spirited assault at daybreak overran that portion of the lines before
the artillery was put in position, and captured most of the division,
including its brave commander.

The above mentioned attacking column advanced, under cover of a
pine-thicket, to within a very short distance of a salient defended
by Walker's brigade. A heavy fire of musketry and artillery, from a
considerable number of guns on Heth's line, opened with tremendous
effect upon the column, and it was driven back with severe loss,
leaving its dead in front of our works.[98]

Several days of comparative quiet ensued. During this time the army
of General Grant was heavily reënforced from Washington.

"In numerical strength his army so much exceeded that under General
Lee that, after covering the entire Confederate front with double
lines of battle, he had in reserve a large force with which to extend
his flank and compel a corresponding movement on the part of his
adversary, in order to keep between him and his coveted prize--the
capital of the Confederacy." [99]

On the 18th another assault was made upon our lines, but it produced
no impression. On the 20th of May, after twelve days of skirmish and
battle at Spottsylvania against a superior force, General Lee's
information led him to believe that the enemy was about to attempt
another flanking movement, and interpose his army between the
Confederate capital and its defenders. To defeat this purpose
Longstreet was ordered to move at midnight in the direction of
Hanover Junction, and on the following day and night Swell's and
Hill's corps marched for the same point.

The Confederate commander, divining that Grant's objective point was
the intersection of the two railroads leading to Richmond at a point
two miles south of the North Anna River, crossed his army over that
stream and took up a line of battle which frustrated the movement.

Grant began his flanking movement on the night of the 20th, marching
in two columns, the right, under General Warren, crossing the North
Anna at Jericho Ford without opposition. On the 23d the left, under
General Hancock, crossing four miles lower down, at the Chesterfield
or County Bridge, was obstinately resisted by a small force, and the
passage of the river was not made until the 24th. After crossing the
North Anna, Grant discovered that his movement was a blunder, and
that his army was in a position of much peril.

The Confederate commander established his line of battle on the south
side of the river, both wings refused so as to form an obtuse angle,
with the apex resting on the river between the two points of the
enemy's crossing, Longstreet's and Hill's corps forming the two
sides, and Little River and the Hanover marshes the base. Ewell's
corps held the apex or center.

The hazard of Grant's position appears not to have been known to him
until he attempted to unite his two columns, which were four miles
apart, by establishing a connecting line along the river. Foiled in
the attempt, he discovered that the Confederate army was interposed
between his two wings, which were also separated by the North Anna,
and that the one could give no support to the other except by a
double crossing of the river. That the Confederate commander did not
seize the opportunity to strike his embarrassed foe and avail himself
of the advantage which his superior generalship had gained, may have
been that, concluding from past observation of Grant's tactics, he
felt assured that the "continuous hammering" process was to be
repeated without reference to circumstances or position. If Lee acted
on this supposition, he was mistaken, as the Federal commander,
profiting by the severe lessons of Spottsylvania and the Wilderness,
with cautious, noiseless movement, withdrew under cover of the night
of the 26th to the north side of the North Anna, and moved eastward
down to the Pamunkey River.

At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of
Longstreet's corps, which had been on detached service in North
Carolina, and by a small force under General Breckinridge from
southwestern Virginia, twenty-two hundred strong. Hoke's brigade, of
Early's division, twelve hundred strong, which had been on detached
duty at the Junction, here also rejoined its division. On the 29th
the whole of Grant's army was across the Pamunkey, while General
Lee's army on the next day was in line of battle with his left at
Atlee's Station. By another movement eastward the two armies were
brought face to face at Cold Harbor on June 3d. Here fruitless
efforts were made by General Grant to pierce or drive back the forces
of General Lee. Our troops were protected by temporary earthworks,
and while under cover of these were assailed by the enemy:

"But in vain. The assault was repulsed along the whole line, and the
carnage on the Federal side was fearful. I[100] well recall having
received a report, after the assault, from General Hoke--whose
division reached the army just previous to this battle--to the
effect that the ground in his entire front, over which the enemy had
charged, was literally covered with their dead and wounded; and that
up to that time he had not had a single man killed. No wonder that,
when the command was given to renew the assault, the Federal soldiers
sullenly and silently declined. 'The order[101] was issued through
the officers to their subordinate commanders, and from them descended
through the wonted channels; but no man stirred, and the immobile
lines pronounced a verdict, silent yet emphatic, against further
slaughter. The loss on the Union side in this sanguinary action was
over thirteen thousand, while on the part of the Confederates it is
doubtful whether it reached that many hundreds.' After some
disingenuous proposals, General Grant finally asked a truce to enable
him to bury his dead. Soon after this he abandoned his chosen line of
operations, and moved his army so as to secure a crossing to the
south side of James River. The struggle from the Wilderness to this
point covered a period of over one month, during which time there had
been an almost daily encounter of arms, and the Army of Northern
Virginia had placed _hors de combat_, of the army under General
Grant, a number exceeding the entire numerical strength, at the
commencement of the campaign, of Lee's army, which, notwithstanding
its own heavy losses and the reinforcements received by the enemy,
still presented an impregnable front to its opponent."

By the report of the United States Secretary of War (Stanton), Grant
had, on the 1st of May, 1864, two days before he crossed the Rapidan,
120,380 men, and in the Ninth Army Corps 20,780, or an aggregate with
which he marched against Lee of 141,160. To meet this vast force, Lee
had on the Rapidan less than 50,000 men. By the same authority it
appears that Grant had a reserve upon which he could draw of 137,672.
Lee had practically no reserve, for he was compelled to make
detachments from his army for the protection of West Virginia and
other points, about equal to all the reënforcements which he
received. In the "Southern Historical Papers," vol. vi, page 144,
upon the very reliable authority of the editor, there appears the
following statement:

"Grant says he lost, in the campaign from the Wilderness to Cold
Harbor, 39,000 men; but Swinton puts his loss at over 60,000, and a
careful examination of the figures will show that his real loss was
nearer 100,000. In other words, he lost about twice as many men as
Lee had, in order to take a position which he could have taken at
first without firing a gun or losing a man."

On June 12th the movement was commenced by Grant for crossing the
James River. Pontoon-bridges were laid near Wilcox's Wharf for the
passage of his army. J. C. Pemberton, who, after the fall of
Vicksburg, was left without a command corresponding to his rank of
lieutenant-general in the provisional army, in order that he might
not stand idle, nobly resigned that commission, and asked to be
assigned to duty according to his rank in the regular army, which was
that of lieutenant-colonel. Ho was accordingly directed to report to
General Lee for service with the Army of Northern Virginia. Being a
skillful artillerist, he was directed to find a position where he
could place a mortar so as to throw shells on the enemy's bridge when
it should be put into use. By a daring reconnaissance and exact
calculation, he determined a point from which the desired effect
might be produced by vertical fire, over a wood. At the proper moment
he opened upon the bridge, and his expectations were verified by the
shells falling on the troops harassingly. This, his first service
with the Army of Northern Virginia, was interrupted by the failure to
send promptly a cohering force to protect the mortar, the position of
which was disclosed by its fire. The injury it inflicted caused the
Federal commander to send a detachment which drove away the gunners
and captured the mortar.

On the 14th and 15th of June the crossing of Grant's army was
completed. It will be remembered that he had crossed the Rapidan on
the 3d of May. It had therefore taken him more than a month to reach
the south side of the James. In his campaign he had sacrificed a
hecatomb of men, a vast amount of artillery, small-arms, munitions of
war, and supplies, to reach a position to which McClellan had already
demonstrated there was an easy and inexpensive route. It is true that
the Confederate army had suffered severely, and, though the loss was
comparatively small to that of its opponents, it could not be
repaired, as his might be, from the larger population and his
facility for recruiting in Europe. To those who can approve the
policy of attrition without reference to the number of lives it might
cost, this may seem justifiable, but it can hardly be regarded as
generalship, or be offered to military students as an example worthy
of imitation. After an unsuccessful attempt, by a surprise, to
capture Petersburg, General Grant concentrated his army south of the
Appomattox River and commenced the operations to be related hereafter.

[Footnote 95: "Four Years with General Lee."]

[Footnote 96: "Four Years with General Lee."]

[Footnote 97: Letter from Colonel C. S Venable, "Southern Historical
Society Papers," vol. viii, p. 106, March, 1880.]

[Footnote 98: "Memoir of the Last Year," etc, by General Early.]

[Footnote 99: "Four Years with General Lee."]

[Footnote 100: Taylor, "Four Years with General Lee."]

[Footnote 101: Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 487.]

CHAPTER XLVII.

Before the opening of the campaign of 1864, the lower Shenandoah
Valley was held by a force under General Sigel, with which General
Grant decided to renew the attempt which had been made by Crook and
Averill to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad west of
Lynchburg as a means to his general purpose of isolating Richmond;
and a prompt movement of General Morgan had defeated those attempts
and driven off the invaders. Sigel, with about fifteen thousand men,
commenced his movement up the Valley of the Shenandoah. Major-General
Breckinridge, commanding in southwestern Virginia, was notified, on
the 4th of May, of the movement of Sigel, and started immediately
with two brigades of infantry to Staunton, at which place he arrived
on the 9th. The reserves of Augusta County, under Colonel Harmon,
were called out, numbering several hundred men, and the cadets of the
Military Institute at Lexington, numbering two hundred, voluntarily
joined him. With this force Breckinridge decided to march to meet
Sigel. General Imboden, with a cavalry force of several hundred, had
been holding, as best he might, the upper Valley, and joined
Breckinridge in the neighborhood of New Market, informing him that
Sigel then occupied that place. Breckinridge having marched so
rapidly from Staunton that it was probable that his advance was
unknown to the enemy, he determined to make an immediate attack. His
troops were put in motion at one o'clock, and by daylight was in line
of battle two miles south of New Market. Sigel seems to have been
unconscious of any other obstruction to the capture of Staunton than
the small cavalry force under Imboden. At this time Lee was engaged
with the vastly superior force of Grant, which had crossed the
Rapidan, and Sigel's was a movement to get upon our flank, and thus
coöperate with Grant in his attempt to capture Richmond. Breckinridge
had an infantry force not much exceeding three thousand. The hazard
of an attack was great, but the necessity of the case justified it.
Breckinridge's force was only enough to form one line of battle in
two ranks, the cadets holding the center between the two brigades.
There were no reserves, and Colonel Harmon's command formed the guard
for the trains. Skirmish lines were promptly engaged, and soon
thereafter the enemy fell back beyond New Market, where Sigel,
assuming the defensive, took a strong position, in which to wait for
an attack. Our artillery was moved forward, and opened with effect
upon the enemy's position; then our infantry advanced, "with the
steadiness of troops on dress parade, the precision of the cadets
serving well as a color-guide for the brigades on either side to
dress by. . . . The Federal line had the advantage of a stone wall
which served as a breastwork." [102] Sigel's cavalry attempted to turn
our right flank, but was repulsed disastrously, and in a few moments
the enemy was in full retreat, crossing the Shenandoah and burning
the bridge behind him.

Breckinridge captured five pieces of artillery and over five hundred
prisoners, exclusive of the wounded left on the field. Our loss was
several hundred killed and wounded. General Lee, after receiving
notice of this, ordered Breckinridge to transfer his command as
rapidly as possible to Hanover Junction. The battle was fought on the
15th, and the command reached Hanover Junction on the 20th of May.

Before General Breckinridge left the Valley, he issued an order
thanking his troops, "particularly the cadets, who, though mere
youths, had fought with the steadiness of veterans."

Brigadier-General W. E. Jones had, with a small cavalry force, come
from southwestern Virginia to the Valley after Breckinridge's
departure, and this, with the command of Imboden, only sufficient for
observation, was all that remained in the Valley when the Federal
General David Hunter, with a larger force than Sigel's, succeeded the
latter. Jones, with his cavalry and a few infantry, encountered this
force at Piedmont, was defeated and killed. Upon the receipt of this
information, Breckinridge with his command was sent back to the
Valley.

On June 13th Major-General Early, with the Second Corps of Lee's
army, numbering a little over eight thousand muskets and two
battalions of artillery, commenced a march to strike Hunter's force
in the rear, and, if possible, destroy it; then to move down the
Valley, cross the Potomac, and threaten Washington. On the 17th he
reached Lynchburg, and Hunter arrived at the same time. Preparations
were made for the attack of Hunter on the 19th, when he began to
retreat, and was pursued with much loss, until he was disposed of by
taking the route to the Kanawha River. On the 27th Early's force
reached Staunton on its march down the Valley. It now amounted to ten
thousand infantry and about two thousand cavalry, having been joined
by Breckinridge, and Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, with a battalion of
Maryland cavalry. The advance was rapid. Railroad bridges were
burned, the track destroyed, and stores captured. The Potomac was
crossed on the 5th and 6th of June, and the move was made through the
gaps of South Mountain to the north of Maryland Heights, which were
occupied by a hostile force. A brigade of cavalry was sent north of
Frederick to strike the railroads from Baltimore to Harrisburg and
Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the Gunpowder, and to cut the
railroad between Washington and Baltimore, and threaten the latter
place. The other troops moved forward toward Monocacy Junction, where
a considerable body of Federal troops under General Wallace was found
posted on the eastern bank of the Monocacy, with an earthwork and two
block-houses commanding both bridges. The position was attacked in
front and on the flank, and it was carried and the garrison put to
flight. Between six and seven hundred unwounded prisoners fell into
our hands, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater
than ours, which was about seven hundred.

An advance was made on the 10th nearly to Knoxville, on the
Georgetown Pike. On the next day it was continued to Washington, with
the hope of getting into the fortifications before they could be
manned. But the heat and the dust impeded the progress greatly. Fort
Stevens was approached soon after noon, and appeared to be lightly
manned, but, before our force could get into the works, a column of
the enemy from Washington filed into them on the right and left,
skirmishers were thrown out in front, and an artillery-fire was
opened on us from a number of batteries. An examination was now made
to determine if it were practicable to carry the defenses by assault.
"They were found to be exceedingly strong, and consisted of what
appeared to be inclosed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of
lower works in front of each, pierced for an immense number of guns,
the whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and
strengthened by palisades and abatis. The timber had been felled
within cannon-range all around and left on the ground, making a
formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was raked by
artillery." As far as the eye could reach, the works appeared to be
of the same impregnable character. The exhaustion of our force, the
lightness of its artillery, and the information that two corps of the
enemy's forces had just arrived in Washington, in addition to the
veteran reserves and hundred-days-men, and the parapets lined with
troops, led us to refrain from making an assault, and to retire
during the night of the 12th. On the morning of the 14th General
Early recrossed the Potomac, bringing off the prisoners captured at
Monocacy and everything else in safety, including a large number of
beef-cattle and horses. There was some skirmishing in the rear
between our cavalry and that which was following us, and on the
afternoon of the 14th there was artillery-firing across the river at
our cavalry watching the fords. Meantime General Hunter had arrived
at Harper's Ferry and united with Sigel, and some skirmishing took
place; but General Early determined to concentrate near Strasburg, so
as to enable him to put the trains in safety, and mobilize his
command to make an attack. On the 22d he moved across Cedar Creek
toward Strasburg, and so posted his force as to cover all the roads
from the direction of Winchester. Learning on the next day that a
large portion of the column sent after him from Washington was
returning, and that the Army of West Virginia, under Crook, including
Hunter's and Sigel's forces, with Averill's cavalry, was at
Kernstown, he determined to attack at once.

After the enemy's skirmishers had been driven in, it was discovered
that his left flank was exposed, and General Breckinridge was ordered
to move Echols's division undercover of some ravines on our right and
attack that flank. The attacking division struck the enemy's left
flank in open ground, doubling it up and throwing his whole line into
great confusion. The other divisions then advanced, and his rout
became complete. He was pursued by the infantry and artillery beyond
Winchester. Our loss was very light; his loss in killed and wounded
was severe. The whole defeated force crossed the Potomac, and took
refuge at Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. The road was strewed
with debris of the rapid retreat--twelve caissons and seventy-two
wagons having been abandoned, and most of them burned.

On the 26th the Confederate force moved to Martinsburg:

"While at Martinsburg," says General Early in his memoir, "it was
ascertained beyond all doubt that Hunter had been again indulging in
his favorite mode of warfare, and that, after his return to the
Valley, while we were near Washington, among other outrages, the
private residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, a member of the Virginia
Senate, Mr. Alexander R. Boteler, an ex-member of the Confederate
Congress, as well as of the United States Congress, and Edmund I.
Lee, a distant relative of General Lee, all in Jefferson County, with
their contents, had been burned by his orders, only time enough being
given for the ladies to get out of the houses. A number of towns in
the South, as well as private country-houses, had been burned by
Federal troops, and the accounts had been heralded forth in some of
the Northern papers in terms of exaltation, and gloated over by their
readers, while they were received with apathy by others. I now came
to the conclusion that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough,
and that it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to
its enormity by an example in the way of retaliation. I did not
select the cases mentioned as having more merit or greater claims for
retaliation than others, but because they had occurred within the
limits of the country covered by my command, and were brought more
immediately to my attention.[103]

"The town of Chambersburg was selected as the one on which
retaliation should be made, and McCausland was ordered to proceed
with his brigade and that of Johnson's and a battery of artillery to
that place, and demand of the municipal authorities the sum of one
hundred thousand dollars in gold, or five hundred thousand dollars in
United States currency, as a compensation for the destruction of the
houses named and their contents; and in default of payment to lay the
town in ashes, in retaliation for the burning of those houses and
others in Virginia, as well as for the towns which had been burned in
other Southern States. A written demand to that effect was also sent
to the municipal authorities, and they were informed what would be
the result of a failure or a refusal to comply with it. I desired to
give the people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town,
by making compensation for part of the injury done, and hoped that
the payment of such a sum would have the desired effect, and open the
eyes of people of other towns at the North to the necessity of urging
upon their Government the adoption of a different policy.

"On July 30th McCausland reached Chambersburg, and made the demand as
directed, reading to such of the authorities as presented themselves
the paper sent by me. The demand was not complied with, the people
stating that they were not afraid of having their town burned, and
that a Federal force was approaching. The policy pursued by our army
on former occasions had been so lenient that they did not suppose the
threat was in earnest at this time, and they hoped for speedy relief.
McCausland, however, proceeded to carry out his orders, and the
greater part of the town was laid in ashes. He then moved in the
direction of Cumberland, but found it defended by a strong force. He
then withdrew and crossed the Potomac, near the mouth of the South
Branch, capturing the garrison and partly destroying the
railroad-bridge. Averill pursued from Chambersburg, and surprised and
routed Johnson's brigade, and caused a loss of four pieces of
artillery and about three hundred prisoners from the whole command."

Meantime a large force, consisting of the Sixth, Nineteenth, and
Crook's corps, of the Federal army, had concentrated at Harper's
Ferry under Major-General Sheridan. After various manoeuvres, both
armies occupied positions in the neighborhood of Winchester. Early
had about eight thousand five hundred infantry fit for duty, nearly
three thousand mounted men, three battalions of artillery, and a few
pieces of horse-artillery. Sheridan's force, according to the best
information, consisted of ten thousand cavalry, thirty-five thousand
infantry, and artillery that greatly outnumbered ours both in men and
guns.

On the morning of September 19th, the enemy began to advance in heavy
force on Ramseur's position, on an elevated plateau between Abraham's
Creek and Red Bud Run, about a mile and a half from Winchester, on
the Berryville road. Nelson's artillery was posted on Ramseur's line,
covering the approaches as far as practicable; and Lomax, with
Jackson's cavalry and a part of Johnson's, was on the right, watching
the valley of Abraham's Creek and the Front Royal road beyond, while
Fitzhugh Lee was on the left, across the Red Bud, with cavalry,
watching the interval between Ramseur's left and the Red Bud. These
troops held the enemy's main force in check until Gordon's and
Rodes's divisions arrived, a little after 10 A.M. Gordon was placed
under cover in rear of a piece of woods, behind the interval between
Ramseur's line and the Red Bud. Rodes was directed to form on
Gordon's right, in rear of another piece of woods. Meanwhile, we
discovered very heavy columns, that had been massed under cover
between the Red Bud and the Berryville road, moving to attack Ramseur
on his left flank, while another force pressed him in front. Rodes
and Gordon were immediately hurled upon the flank of the advancing
columns. But Evans's brigade, of Gordon's division, on the extreme
left of our infantry, was forced back through the woods from behind
which it had advanced by a column, which followed to the rear of the
woods and within musket-range of seven pieces of Braxton's artillery.
Braxton's guns stood their ground and opened with canister. The fire
was so well directed that the column staggered, halted, and commenced
falling back. Just then Battle's brigade moved forward and swept
through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans's brigade
was rallied and coöperated. Our advance was resumed, and the enemy's
attacking columns, the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, were thrown into
great confusion and fled from the field. General Early exclaims, "It
was a grand sight to see this immense body hurled back in utter
disorder before my two divisions, numbering very little over five
thousand muskets!" This affair occurred about 11 A.M., and a splendid
victory had been gained. But the enemy still had a fresh corps which
had not been engaged, and there remained his heavy force of cavalry.
Our lines were now formed across from Abraham's Creek to Red Bud, and
were very attenuated. There was still seen in front a formidable
force, and away to the right a division of cavalry massed, with some
artillery overlapping us at least a mile. Late in the afternoon, two
divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force that had
been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook's corps, which
had not been engaged, advanced at the same time on the north side of
Red Bud and forced back our brigade of infantry and cavalry. A
considerable force of cavalry then swept along the Martinsburg road
to the skirts of Winchester, thus getting in the rear of our left
flank. This was soon driven back by two of Wharton's brigades, and
subsequently another charge of cavalry was also repulsed. But many of
the men in the front line, hearing the fire in the rear, and thinking
they were flanked and about to be cut off, commenced to fall back. At
the same time Crook's corps advanced against our left, and Evans's
brigade was thrown into line to meet it, but, after an obstinate
resistance, that brigade also retired. The whole front line had now
given way, but was rallied and formed behind some old breastworks,
and with the aid of artillery the progress of the enemy's infantry
was arrested. Their cavalry afterward succeeded in getting around on
our left, producing great confusion, for which there was no remedy.
We now retired through Winchester, a new line was formed, and the
hostile advance checked until nightfall. We then retired to Newton
without serious molestation. Our trains, stores, sick, and wounded
that could be removed had been sent to Fisher's Hill. This battle,
beginning with the skirmishing in Ramseur's front, had lasted from
daylight until dark, and, at the close of it, we had been forced back
two miles, after having repulsed the first attack with great
slaughter, and subsequently contested every inch of ground with
unsurpassed obstinacy. We deserved the victory, and would have gained
it but for the enemy's immense superiority in cavalry. In his memoir
General Early says:

"When I look back to this battle, I can but attribute my escape from
utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent."

Our loss was severe for the size of our force, but only a fraction of
that ascribed to us by the foe, while his was very heavy, and some
prisoners fell into our hands.

On the 22d, after two days spent in reconnoitering, the enemy
prepared to make an attack upon our position at Fisher's Hill; but,
as our force was not strong enough to resist a determined assault,
orders were given to retire after dark. Before sunset, however, an
advance was made against Ramseur's left by Crook's corps. The
movement to put Pegram's brigades into line successively to the left
produced some confusion, when the enemy advanced along his entire
line, and, after a brief contest, our force retired in disorder. We
fell back to a place called Narrow Passage, all the trains being
removed in safety. Some skirmishing ensued as we withdrew up the
Valley, but without important result.

On October 1st our force was in position between Mount Sidney and
North River, and the enemy's had been concentrated around
Harrisonburg and on the north bank of the river. On the 5th we were
reënforced by General Rosser with six hundred mounted men, and
Kershaw's division, numbering twenty-seven hundred muskets, with a
battalion of artillery. On the morning of the 6th it was discovered
that the foe had retired down the Valley. General Early then moved
forward and arrived at New Market with his infantry on the 7th.
Rosser pushed forward on the back and middle roads in pursuit of the
cavalry, which was engaged in burning houses, mills, barns, and
stacks of wheat and hay, and had several skirmishes with it.

A committee, consisting of thirty-six citizens and the same number of
magistrates, appointed by the County Court of Rockingham County, for
the purpose of making an estimate of the losses of that county by the
execution of General Sheridan's orders, made an investigation, and
reported as follows:

"Dwelling-houses burned, 30; barns burned, 450; mills burned, 31;
fences destroyed (miles), 100; bushels of wheat destroyed, 100,000;
bushels of corn destroyed, 50,000; tons of hay destroyed, 6,233;
cattle carried off, 1,750; horses carried off, 1,750; sheep carried
off, 4,200; hogs carried off, 3,350; factories burned, three;
furnaces burned, one. In addition there was an immense amount of
farming utensils of every description destroyed, many of them of
great value, such as reapers and thrashing-machines; also, household
and kitchen furniture, and money, bonds, plate, etc., pillaged."

General Early, having learned that Sheridan was preparing to send a
part of his troops to Grant, moved down the Valley again on the 12th,
and reached Fisher's Hill. The enemy was found on the north bank of
Cedar Creek in strong force. He gave no indication of an intention to
move, nor did he evince any purpose of attacking us, though the two
positions were in sight of each other. At the same time it became
necessary for us to move back for want of provisions and forage, or
to attack him in his position with the hope of driving him from it.
An attack was determined upon by General Early, and, as he was not
strong enough to assault the fortified position in front, he resolved
to get around one of the enemy's flanks and attack him by surprise.
His plan of attack is thus stated by him:

"I determined to send the three divisions of the Second Corps, to
wit, Gordon's, Ramseur's, and Pegram's, under General Gordon, to the
enemy's rear, to make the attack at 5 A.M., which would be a little
before daybreak on the 19th; to move myself with Kershaw's and
Wharton's divisions and all the artillery along the pike through
Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left flank, as soon
as Gordon should become engaged, and for Bosser to move with his own
and Wickham's brigade on the back road across Cedar Creek, and attack
the enemy's cavalry simultaneously with Gordon's attack, while Lomax
should move by Front Royal, cross the river, and come to the Valley
pike, so as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which he was
to judge by the sound of the firing."

Gordon moved at the appointed time. At 1 A.M. Kershaw and Wharton,
accompanied by General Early, advanced. At Strasburg, Kershaw moved
to the right on the road to Bowman's Mill, and Wharton moved along
the pike to Hupp's Hill, with instructions not to display his forces,
but to avoid notice until the attack began, when he was to move
forward, support the artillery when it came up, and send a force to
get possession of the bridge on the pike over the creek. Kershaw's
division got in sight of the enemy at half-past three o'clock. He was
directed to cross his division at the proper time over the creek as
quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades as he did
so, and advance in that manner against the left breastwork, extending
to the right or left as might be necessary. At half-past four he was
ordered forward, and, a very short time after he started, the firing
from Bosser on our left and the picket-firing at the ford at which
Gordon was crossing were heard. Kershaw crossed the creek without
molestation and formed his division as directed, and precisely at
five o'clock his leading brigade, with little opposition, swept over
the left work, capturing seven guns, which were at once turned on the
enemy. At the same time Wharton and the artillery were just arriving
at Hupp's Hill, and a very heavy fire of musketry was heard in the
rear from Gordon's column. Wharton had advanced his skirmishers to
the creek, capturing some prisoners, but the foe still held the works
on our left of the pike, commanding that road and the bridge, and
opened with his artillery on us. Our artillery was at once brought
into action, and opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated his
works, and our men from the other columns rushed into them. Wharton
was immediately ordered forward, Kershaw's division had swept along
the enemy's works on the right of the pike, which were occupied by
Crook's corps, and he and Gordon had united at the pike, and their
divisions had pushed across it in pursuit. A delay of an hour at the
river had occurred in Gordon's movement, which enabled Sheridan
partially to form his lines after the alarm produced by Kershaw's
attack; and Gordon's, which was after daylight, was therefore met
with greater obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherwise have
encountered, and the fighting had been severe. Gordon, however,
pushed his advance with such energy, that the Nineteenth and Crook's
corps were in complete rout, and their camps, with a number of pieces
of artillery and a considerable quantity of small-arms, abandoned.
The Sixth Corps, which was on the right, and some distance from the
point attacked, had had time to get under arms and take position so
as to arrest our progress. A fog which had prevailed soon rose
sufficiently for us to see the Sixth Corps' position on a ridge to
the west of Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong one. The
enemy had not advanced, but opened on us with artillery, and orders
were given to concentrate all our guns on him. In the mean time a
force of cavalry was moving along the pike, through the fields to the
right of Middletown, thus placing our right and rear in great danger.
Wharton was ordered to form his division at once, and take position
to hold that cavalry in check. Discovering that the Sixth Corps could
not be attacked with advantage on its left flank, because the
approach in that direction was through an open flat and across a
boggy stream with high banks, Gordon in conjunction with Kershaw was
ordered to assail the right flank, while a heavy fire of artillery
was opened from our right. In a short time eighteen or twenty guns
were concentrated on the enemy, and he was soon in retreat. Ramseur
and Pegram advanced at once to the position from which he was driven,
and just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily on the right,
and Pegram's division was ordered to move to the north of Middletown
and take position across the pike against the cavalry. As soon as
Pegram moved, Kershaw was ordered from the left to supply his place.
Bosser had attacked the enemy promptly at the appointed time, but had
not been able to surprise him, as he was found on the alert on that
flank. There was now one division of cavalry threatening our right
flank, and two were on the left near the Back road, held in check by
Bosser. His force was so weak he could only watch.

After he had been driven from his second position, the enemy had
taken a new one about two miles north of Middletown. An advance by
Gordon and Kershaw and Ramseur was ordered, but, after it had been
made for some distance, Gordon's skirmishers came back, reporting a
line of battle in front, behind breastworks, and an attack was not
made.

"It was now apparent that it would not do," says General Early, "to
press my troops farther. They had been up all night and were much
jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy at dawn their
own ranks had been much disordered and the men scattered, and it had
required time to reform them. Their ranks were much thinned by the
absence of the men engaged in plundering the enemy's camps."

It was determined, therefore, to try to hold what had been gained,
and orders were given to carry off the captured and abandoned
artillery, small-arms, and wagons. A number of bold attempts were
made, during the subsequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry,
to break our line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed.
Late in the afternoon, his infantry advanced against Ramseur's,
Kershaw's, and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ramseur's and
Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed; but a portion of the
assailants had penetrated an interval which was between Evans's
brigade on the extreme left and the rest of the line, when that
brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon followed. General
Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men and lead them
back, but without avail. This affair was soon known with
exaggerations along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, and their men,
fearing to be flanked, began to fall back in disorder, though no
force was pressing them. At the same time the enemy's cavalry,
observing the disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our
right, but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to rally the
men, but the mass of them continued to resist all appeals. Ramseur
succeeded in retaining with him two or three hundred men of his
division, and about the same number was retained by Major Goggin from
Conner's brigade; these, aided by several pieces of artillery, held
the whole force on our left in check for one hour and a half until
Ramseur was shot down, and the ammunition of the artillery was
exhausted. While the latter was being replaced by other guns, the
force that had continued steady gave way also. Pegram's and Wharton's
divisions and Wofford's brigade had remained steadfast on the right,
and resisted every effort of the cavalry, but no portion of this
force could be moved to the left without leaving the pike open to the
cavalry, which would have destroyed all hope at once. Every effort to
rally the men in the rear having failed, these troops were ordered to
retire. The disorder soon extended to them. The greater part of the
infantry was halted at Fisher's Hill, and Rosser, whose command had
retired in good order on the Back road, was ordered to that point
with his cavalry to cover the retreat, and hold that position until
the troops were beyond pursuit. He fell back on the forenoon of the
20th, when the enemy had not advanced to that place. The troops were
halted at Newmarket, seven miles from Mount Jackson. Our loss in the
battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three pieces of artillery, some
ordnance, and medical wagons and ambulances, about 1,860 killed and
wounded, and something over a thousand prisoners; 1,500 prisoners
were captured from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed
and wounded was very heavy. We had in this battle about 8,500 muskets
and a little over forty pieces of artillery. Sheridan's cavalry
numbered 8,700, and his infantry force was fully as large as at
Winchester.

Subsequently General Early confronted Sheridan's whole force north of
Cedar Creek for two days, November 11th and 12th, without an attack
being made upon him. On November 27th the fortified post at New Creek
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was surprised and captured by
General Rosser. Two regiments of Federal cavalry with their arms and
colors were taken, and eight pieces of artillery and a very large
amount of ordnance, quartermaster, and commissary stores fell into
our hands. Eight hundred prisoners, four pieces of artillery, and
some wagons and horses were brought off. When the campaign closed,
the invader held precisely the same position in the Valley which he
held before the opening of the campaign in the spring.

In the Red River country of Louisiana, it became certain in February,
1864, that the enemy was about to make an expedition against our
forces under General Richard Taylor, not so much to get possession of
the country as to obtain the cotton in that region. Their forces were
to be commanded by Major-General Banks, and to consist of his
command, augmented by a part of Major-General Sherman's army from
Vicksburg, and accompanied by a fleet of gunboats under Admiral
Porter. With these the force under General Steele, in Arkansas, was
to coöperate. Taylor's forces at this time consisted of Harrison's
mounted regiment with a four-gun battery, in the north toward Monroe;
Mouton's brigade, near Alexandria; Polignac's, at Trinity, on the
Washita, fifty-five miles distant; Walker's division, at Marksville
and toward Simmsport, with two hundred men detached to assist the
gunners at Fort De Russy, which, though still unfinished, contained
eight heavy guns and two field-pieces. Three companies of mounted men
were watching the Mississippi, and the remainder of a regiment was on
the Têche.

On March 12th Admiral Porter, with nineteen gunboats and ten thousand
men of Sherman's army, entered the Red River. A detachment on the
14th marched to De Russy and took possession of it. On the 15th the
advance of Porter reached Alexandria, and on the 19th General
Franklin left the lower Têche with eighteen thousand men to meet him.
General Steele, in Arkansas, reported his force at seven thousand
men. The force of General Taylor at this time had increased to five
thousand and three hundred infantry, five hundred cavalry, and three
hundred artillerymen; and Liddel on the north had about the same
number of cavalry and a four-gun battery. Some reënforcements were
soon received. On March 31st Banks's advance reached Natchitoches,
and Taylor moved toward Pleasant Hill, arriving on the next day. On
April 4th and 5th. He moved to Mansfield, concentrating his force in
that vicinity. There two brigades of Missouri infantry and two of
Arkansas, numbering four thousand and four hundred muskets, joined
him. On April 7th the enemy were reported from Pleasant Hill to be
advancing in force, but their progress was arrested by a body of our
cavalry.

General Taylor then selected his position in which to wait for an
attack expected on the next day. It was in the edge of a wood,
fronting an open field eight hundred yards in width and twelve
hundred in length, through the center of which the road to Pleasant
Hill passed. On the opposite side of the field was a fence separating
it from the pine-forest, which, open on the higher ground and filled
with underwood on the lower, spread over the country. The position
was three miles in front of Mansfield, and covered a cross-road
leading to the Sabine. On each side of the main Mansfield-Pleasant
Hill road at two miles' distance, was a road parallel to it, and
these were connected by this Sabine cross-road.

On the 8th General Taylor disposed, on the right of the road to
Pleasant Hill, Walker's infantry division of three brigades with two
batteries; on the left, Mouton's two brigades and two batteries. As
the horsemen came in from the front, they took position, dismounted,
on Mouton's left. A regiment of horsemen was posted on each of the
parallel roads, and cavalry with a battery held in reserve on the
main road. Taylor's force amounted to 5,300 infantry, 3,000 mounted
men, and 500 artillerymen; total, 8,800. Banks left Grand Ecore with
an estimated force of 25,000.

As the enemy showed no disposition to advance, a forward movement of
the whole line was made. On the left our forces crossed the field
under a heavy fire and entered the wood, where a bloody contest
ensued, which resulted in gradually turning their right, which was
forced back with loss of prisoners and guns. On the right little
resistance was encountered until the wood was entered. Finding that
our force outflanked the opponent's left, the right brigade was kept
advanced, and we swept everything before us.

His first line, consisting of all the mounted force and one division
of the Thirteenth Corps, was in full flight, leaving prisoners, guns,
and wagons in our hands. Two miles to the rear of the first position,
the Second Division of the Federal Thirteenth Corps was brought up,
but was speedily routed, losing guns and prisoners. The advance was
continued. Four miles from the original position, his Nineteenth Army
Corps was found drawn up on a ridge overlooking a small stream. Sharp
work followed, but, as our force persisted, his fell back at
nightfall. Twenty-five hundred prisoners, twenty pieces of artillery,
several stands of colors, many thousands of small-arms, and two
hundred and fifty wagons, were taken.

On the next morning the enemy was found about a mile in front of
Pleasant Hill, which occupies a plateau a mile wide from west to east
along the Mansfield road. His lines extended across the plateau from
the highest ground on the west, his left, to a wooded height on the
right of the Mansfield road. Winding along in front of this position
was a dry gully cut by winter rains, bordered by a thick growth of
young pines. This was held by his advanced infantry, his main line
and guns being on the plateau. The force of General Taylor--
Churchill's brigade having joined him now--amounted to twelve
thousand five hundred men against eighteen thousand of General Banks,
among them the fresh corps of General A. J. Smith. The action
commenced about 4.30 P.M. It was the plan of General Taylor, as no
offensive movement on the part of the enemy was anticipated, to turn
both his flanks and subject him to a concentric fire and overwhelm
him. The right was successfully turned, but our force on his left did
not proceed far enough to outflank him. An obstinate contest ensued,
with much confusion, and failure to execute the plan of battle. Night
ended the conflict on our right, and both sides occupied their
original positions. General Banks made no attempt to recover the
ground from which his right and center had been driven. During the
night he retreated, leaving four hundred wounded, and his dead
unburied. On the next morning he was pursued twenty miles before his
rear was overtaken, and on the road were found stragglers, and
burning wagons and stores. Our loss in the two actions of Mansfield
and Pleasant Hill was twenty-two hundred. At Pleasant Hill the loss
was three guns and four hundred and twenty-six prisoners. The loss of
the enemy in killed and wounded was larger than ours. We captured
twenty guns and twenty-eight hundred prisoners, not including
stragglers. Their campaign was defeated. In the second volume of the
"Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War," page 239, a
report of Admiral Porter, dated Grand Ecore, April 14, 1864, says:

"The army here has met with a great defeat, no matter what the
generals try to make of it," etc.

On April 21st General Banks retreated from Grand Ecore to Alexandria,
harassed by a small cavalry force. A large part of our forces had
been taken by General E. K. Smith to follow General Steele. On April
28th Porter's fleet was lying above the falls, then impassable, and
Banks's army was in and around Alexandria behind earthworks. On May
13th both escaped from Alexandria, and on May 19th Banks crossed the
Atchafalaya, and the campaign closed at the place where it began.
Porter was able to extricate his eight ironclads and two wooden
gunboats by building a dam with transports, as shown in the adjoining
cut. General Banks boasted that the army obtained ten thousand bales
of cotton, to which Admiral Porter added five thousand more as
collected by the navy. This was the compensation reported for the
loss of many lives, much public property, and a total defeat. Even
for the booty as well as for the escape of their fleet, they were
probably indebted to the unfortunate withdrawal of a large part of
Taylor's force, as mentioned above.[104]

On April 12, 1864, an attack was made by two brigades of General N.
B. Forrest's force, under Brigadier-General J. R. Chalmers, upon Fort
Pillow. This was an earthwork on a bluff on the east side of the
Mississippi, at the mouth of Coal Creek. It was garrisoned by four
hundred men and six pieces of artillery. General Chalmers promptly
gained possession of the outer works and drove the garrison to their
main fortifications. The fort was crescent-shaped, the parapet eight
feet in height and four feet across the top, surrounded by a ditch
six feet deep and twelve feet in width. About this time General
Forrest arrived and soon ordered his forces to move up. The brigade
of Bell, on the northeast, advanced until it gained a position in
which the men were sheltered by the conformation of the ground, which
was intersected by a ravine. The other brigade, under McCulloch,
carried the intrenchments on the highest part of the ridge,
immediately in front of the southeastern face of the fort, and
occupied a cluster of cabins on its southern face and about sixty
yards from it. The line of investment was now short and complete,
within an average distance of one hundred yards. It extended from
Coal Creek on the north, which was impassable, to the river-bank
south of the fort. In the rear were numerous sharpshooters, well
posted on commanding ridges, to pick off the garrison whenever they
exposed themselves. At the same time, our forces were so placed that
the artillery could not be brought to bear upon them with much effect
except by a fatal exposure of the gunners. During all this time a
gunboat in the river kept up a continuous fire in all directions, but
without effect. General Forrest, confident of his ability to take the
fort by assault, which it seemed must be perfectly apparent to the
garrison, and desiring to prevent further loss of life, sent a demand
for an unconditional surrender, with the assurance that they should
be treated as prisoners of war. The answer was written with a pencil
on a slip of paper, "Negotiations will not attain the desired
object." Meantime, three boats were seen to approach, the foremost of
which was apparently loaded with troops, and, as an hour's time had
been asked for to communicate with the officers of the gunboat, it
seemed to be a pretext to gain time for reënforcements. General
Forrest, understanding also that the enemy doubted his presence and
had pronounced the demand to be a trick, declared himself, and
demanded an answer within twenty minutes whether the commander would
fight or surrender. Meanwhile, the foremost boat indicated an
intention to land, but a few shots caused her to withdraw to the
other side of the river, along which they all passed up. The answer
from the fort was a positive refusal to surrender. Three companies on
the left were now placed in an old rifle-pit and almost in the rear
of the fort, and on the right a portion of Barton's regiment of
Bell's brigade was also under the bluff and in the rear of the fort.

On the signal, the works were carried without a halt. As the troops
poured into the fortification the enemy retreated toward the river,
arms in hand and firing back, and their colors flying, doubtless
expecting the gunboats to shell us away from the bluff and protect
them until they could be taken off or reënforced. As they descended
the bank an enfilading and deadly fire was poured in upon them from
right and left by the forces in rear of the fort, of whose presence
they were ignorant. To this was now added the destructive fire of the
regiments that had stormed the fort. Fortunately some of our men cut
down the flag, and the firing ceased. Our loss was twenty killed and
sixty wounded. Of the enemy two hundred and twenty-eight were buried
that evening and quite a number next day. We captured six pieces of
artillery and about three hundred and fifty stand of small-arms. The
gunboat escaped up the river.

[Footnote 102: I. Stoddard Johnston, "Southern Historical Society
Papers," June, 1879, p. 258, _et seq_.]

[Footnote 103: "I had often seen delicate ladies who had been plundered,
insulted, ind rendered desolate by the acts of our most atrocious
enemies, and, while they did not call for it, yet in the anguished
expressions of their features while narrating their misfortunes,
there was a mute appeal to every manly sentiment of my bosom for
retribution, which I could no longer withstand. On my passage through
the lower Valley into Maryland, a lady had said to me, with tears in
her eyes: 'Our lot is a hard one, and we see no peace; but there are
a few green spots in our lives, and they are when the Confederate
soldiers come along and we can do something far them.' May God defend
and bless these noble women of the Valley, who so often ministered to
the wounded, sick, and dying Confederate soldiers, and gave their
last morsel of bread to the hungry! They bore with heroic courage the
privations, sufferings, persecutions, and dangers to which the war,
which was constantly waged in their midst, exposed them, and upon no
portion of the Southern people did the disasters, which finally
befell our army and country, fall with more crushing effect than on
them."]

[Footnote 104: "Destruction and Reconstruction," Taylor, p. 162, _et.
seq_.]

CHAPTER XLVIII.

On December 16, 1863, I directed General J. E. Johnston to transfer
the command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana to
Lieutenant-General Polk, and repair to Dalton, Georgia, to assume
command of the Army of Tennessee, representing at that date an
effective total of 43,094. My information led me to believe that the
condition of that army, in all that constitutes efficiency, was
satisfactory, and that the men were anxious for an opportunity to
retrieve the loss of prestige sustained in the disastrous battle of
Missionary Ridge. I was also informed that the enemy's forces, then
occupying Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson, with a detached
force at Knoxville, were weaker in numbers than at any time since the
battle of Missionary Ridge, and that they were especially deficient
in cavalry and in artillery and train-horses. I desired, therefore,
that prompt and vigorous measures be taken to enable our troops to
commence active operations against the enemy as early as practicable.
It was important to guard against the injurious results to the morale
of the troops, which always attend a prolonged season of inactivity;
but the recovery of the territory in Tennessee and Kentucky, which we
had been compelled to abandon, and on the supplies of which the
proper subsistence of our armies mainly depended, imperatively
demanded an onward movement. I believed that, by a rapid
concentration of our troops between the scattered forces of the
enemy, without attempting to capture his intrenched positions, we
could compel him to accept battle in the open field, and that, should
we fail to draw him out of his intrenchments, we could move upon his
line of communications. The Federal force at Knoxville depended
mainly for support on its connection with that at Chattanooga, and
both were wholly dependent on uninterrupted communication with
Nashville. Could we, then, by interposing our force, separate these
two bodies of the enemy, and cut off his communication from Nashville
to Chattanooga by destroying the railroad, both conditions were
fulfilled. Of the practicability of this movement I had little doubt;
of its expediency, if practicable, there could be none. I impressed
repeatedly upon General Johnston by letter, and by officers of my
staff and others, sent to him by me for the purpose of putting him in
possession of these views, the importance of a prompt aggressive
movement by the Army of Tennessee. The following were among the
considerations presented to General Johnston, at my request, by
Brigadier-General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery of the Army of
Northern Virginia, on April 16, 1864:

1. To take the enemy at disadvantage while weakened, it is believed,
by sending troops to Virginia, and having others still absent on
furlough.

2. To break up his plans by anticipating and frustrating his
combinations.

3. So to press him in his present position as to prevent his heavier
massing in Virginia.

4. To defeat him in battle, and gain great consequent strength in
supplies, men, and productive territory.

5. To prevent the waste of the army incident to inactivity.

6. To inspirit the troops and the country by success, and to
discourage the enemy.

7. To obviate the necessity of falling back, which might probably
occur if our antagonist be allowed to consummate his plans without
molestation.

General Johnston cordially approved of an aggressive movement, and
informed me of his purpose to make it as soon as reënforcements and
supplies, then on the way, should reach him. He did not approve the
proposed advance into Tennessee. He believed that the Federal forces
in Tennessee were not weaker, but if anything stronger, than at
Missionary Ridge; that defeat beyond the Tennessee would probably
prove ruinous to us, resulting in the loss of his army, the
occupation of Georgia by the enemy, the "piercing of the Confederacy
in its vitals," and the loss of all the southwestern territory. He
proposed, therefore, to stand on the defensive until strengthened,
"to watch, prepare, and strike" as soon as possible. As soon as
reënforced, he declared his purpose to advance to Ringgold, attack
there, and, if successful, as he expected to be, to strike at
Cleveland, cut the railroad, control the river, and thus isolate East
Tennessee, and, as a consequence, force his antagonist to give battle
on this side of the Tennessee River. Simultaneously with, and in aid
of, this movement, General Johnston proposed that a large cavalry
force should be sent to Middle Tennessee, in the rear of the enemy.
These operations, he thought, would result in forcing the Federal
army to evacuate the Tennessee Valley, and make an advance into the
heart of the State safely practicable.

The irreparable loss of time in making any forward movement as
desired having sufficed for the combinations which rendered an
advance across the Tennessee River no longer practicable, I took
prompt measures to enable General Johnston to carry out immediately
his own proposition to strike first at Ringgold and then at
Cleveland, proposing that General Buckner should threaten Knoxville,
General Forrest advance into or threaten Middle Tennessee, and
General Roddy hold the enemy in northern Alabama, and thus prevent
his concentration in our front. This movement, although it held out
no such promise as did the plan of advance before the enemy had had
time to make his combinations, might have been attended with good
results had it been promptly executed. But no such movement was made
or even attempted. General Johnston's belief that General Grant would
be ready to assume the offensive before he could be prepared to do
so, proved too well founded, while his purpose, if the Federal army
did not attack, that we should prepare and take the initiative
ourselves, was never carried out.[105]

On the morning of May 2, 1864, General Johnston discovered that the
enemy, under the command of General Sherman, was advancing against
him, and two days subsequently it was reported that he had reached
Ringgold (about fifteen miles north of Dalton) in considerable force.

At this date the official returns show that the effective strength of
the Army of Tennessee, counting the troops actually in position at
Dalton and those in the immediate rear of that place, was about fifty
thousand. When to these is added General Polk's command (then _en
route_), and the advance of which joined him at Resaca, the effective
strength of General Johnston's army was not less than 68,620 men of
all arms, excluding from the estimate the thousands of men employed
on extra duty, amounting, as General Hood states, to ten thousand
when he assumed command of the army.

Army at Dalton, May 1, 1864, according to General
Johnston's estimates[106] . . . . . . . . . . . . 37,652 infantry.
2,812 artillery.
2,392 cavalry.
Mercer's brigade, joined May 2d . . . . . . . . . 2,000 infantry.
Thirty-seventh Mississippi Regiment, _en route_ 400 "
Dibrell's and Harrison's brigades in rear,
recruiting their horses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,336 cavalry.
Martin's division at Cartersville . . . . . . . . 1,700 "
------
49,292
Polk's command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,330
------
Total effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68,620

To enable General Johnston to repulse the hostile advance and assume
the offensive, no effort was spared on the part of the Government.
Almost all the available military strength of the south and west, in
men and supplies, was pressed forward and placed at his disposal. The
supplies of the commissary, quartermaster, and ordnance departments
of his army were represented as ample and suitably located. The
troops, encouraged by the large accessions of strength which they saw
arriving daily, and which they knew were marching rapidly to their
support, were eager to advance, and confident in their power to
achieve victory and recover the territory which they had lost. Their
position was such as to warrant the confident expectation of
successful resistance at least. Long mountain-ranges, penetrated by
few and difficult roads and paths, and deep and wide rivers, seemed
to render our position one from which we could not be dislodged or
turned, while that of the enemy, dependent for his supplies upon a
single line of railroad from Nashville to the point where he was
operating, was manifestly perilous. The whole country shared the hope
which the Government entertained, that a decisive victory would soon
be won in the mountains of Georgia, which would free the south and
west from invasion, would open to our occupation and the support of
our armies the productive territory of Tennessee and Kentucky, and so
recruit our army in the West as to render it impracticable for the
enemy to accumulate additional forces in Virginia.

On May 6th the Confederate forces were in position in and near
Dalton, which point General Johnston believed that General Sherman
would attack with his whole force. This belief seems to have been
held by General Johnston until the evening of May 12th, when, having
previously learned the proximity of the advance of Lieutenant-General
Polk's command, and that the rest of his troops were hurrying forward
to reënforce him, but discovering that the main body of Sherman's
army was moving round his left flank, via Snake-Creek Gap to Resaca,
under cover of Rocky-Face Mountain, he withdrew his troops from
Dalton and fell back on Resaca, situated on the Western and Atlantic
Railroad, eighteen miles south of Dalton on a peninsula formed by the
junction of the Oostenaula and Conasauga Rivers. The Confederate
position at this place was strengthened by continuous rifle-pits and
strong field-works, by which it was protected on the flanks on the
above-named rivers, and a line of retreat across the Oostenaula
secured. Information, on May 15th, that the right of the Federal army
was crossing the Oostenaula near Calhoun (four miles south of
Resaca), thus threatening his line of communications, induced General
Johnston to fall back from Resaca toward Adairsville, thirteen miles
south on the railroad. General Johnston, in accounting for his
abandonment of his strong position at Dalton, and of his subsequent
position at Resaca, states that he was dislodged from the first
position--that in front of Dalton--by General Sherman's movement to
his right through Snake-Creek Gap, threatening our line of
communication at Resaca; and from the position taken at Resaca to
meet that movement, by a similar one on the part of the Federal
General toward Calhoun--the second being covered by the river, as
the first had been by the mountains.

After abandoning Resaca, General Johnston hoped to find a good
position near Calhoun; but, finding none, he fell back to a position
about a mile north of Adairsville, where the valley of the Oothcaloga
was supposed from the map to be so narrow that his army, formed in
line of battle across it, could hold the heights on both flanks. On
reaching this point, however, it was found that the valley was so
much broader than was supposed, that the army, in line of battle,
could not obtain the anticipated advantage of ground. Hence a further
retreat to Cassville was ordered, seventeen miles farther south, and
a few miles to the east of the railroad. Here, supposing that the
Federal army would divide, one column following the railroad through
Kingston and the other the direct road to the Etowah Railroad Bridge
through Cassville, General Johnston hoped that the opportunity would
be offered him to engage and defeat one of the enemy's columns before
it could receive aid from the other, and, as the distance between
them would be greatest at Kingston, he determined to attack at this
point. The coming battle was announced in orders to each regiment of
the army.

The battle, for causes which were the subject of dispute, did not
take place as General Johnston had originally announced, and, instead
of his attacking the divided columns of the enemy, the united Federal
army was preparing to attack him. Here our army occupied a position
which General Johnston describes as "the best that he saw during the
war," but owing, as he represents, to an expressed want of confidence
on the part of lieutenant-Generals Hood and Polk in their ability to
resist the enemy, the army was again (May 19, 1864) ordered to
retreat beyond the Etowah.

General Hood, in his official report, and in a book written by him
since the war, takes a very different view of the position in rear of
Cassville, and states that he and General Polk explained that their
corps were on ground commanded and enfiladed by the batteries of the
enemy, therefore wholly unsuited for defense, and, unless it was
proposed to attack, that the position should be abandoned. General
Shoup, a scientific and gallant soldier, confirms this opinion of the
defects of the position, as does Captain Morris, chief-engineer of
the Army of Mississippi, and others then on duty there.[107]

The next stand of our army was at Alatoona, in the Etowah Mountains,
and south of the river of that name; but the reported extension of
the Federal army toward Dallas, threatening Marietta, was deemed to
necessitate the evacuation of that strong position. The country
between Dallas and Marietta, eighteen miles wide, and lying in a due
westerly direction from the latter place, constitutes a natural
fortress of exceptional strength. Densely wooded, traversed by ranges
of steep hills, seamed at intervals by ravines both deep and rugged,
with very few roads, and those ill constructed and almost impassable
to wheels, it is difficult to imagine a country better adapted for
defense, where the advantages of numerical superiority in an invading
army were more thoroughly neutralized, or where, necessarily ignorant
of the topography, it was compelled to advance with greater caution.

The engagements at New Hope Church, June 27th and 28th, though severe
and marked by many acts of gallantry, did not result in any advantage
to our army. Falling back slowly as the enemy advanced to Acworth
(June 8th), General Johnston made his next stand in that mountainous
country that lies between Acworth and Marietta, remarkable for the
three clearly defined eminences: Kenesaw Mountain, to the west of the
railroad, and overlooking Marietta; Lost Mountain, half-way between
Kenesaw and Dallas, and west of Marietta; and Pine Mountain, about
half a mile farther to the north, forming, as it were, the apex of a
triangle, of which Kenesaw and Lost Mountains form the base. These
heights are connected by ranges of lower heights, intersected by
numerous ravines, and thickly wooded. The right of our army rested on
the railroad, the line extending four or five miles in a westerly
direction, protected by strong earthworks, with abatis on every
avenue of approach. While the enemy, feeling his way slowly, was
skirmishing on the right of our position, our army, our country, and
mankind at large, sustained an irreparable loss on June 13th in the
death of that noble Christian and soldier, Lieutenant-General Polk.
Having accompanied Generals Johnston and Hardee to the Confederate
outpost on Pine Mountain, in order to acquaint himself more
thoroughly with the nature of the ground in front of the position
held by his corps, he was killed by a shot from a Federal battery six
or seven hundred yards distant, which struck him in the chest,
passing from left to right. Since the calamitous fall of General
Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh and of General T. J. Jackson at
Chancellorsville, the country sustained no heavier blow than in the
death of General Polk.

On June 18th, heavy rains having swollen Nose's Creek on the left of
our position so that it became impassable, the Federal army, under
cover of this stream, extended its lines several miles beyond
Johnston's left flank toward the Chattahoochee, causing a further
retrograde movement by a portion of his force. For several days brisk
fighting occurred at various points of our line.

The cavalry attack on Wheeler's force on the 20th, the attack upon
Hardee's position on the 24th, and the general assault upon the
Confederate position on the 27th were firmly met and handsomely
repulsed. On the 4th of July, it having been reported by General G.
W. Smith, in command of about a thousand militia, and occupying the
extreme left of our army, that the enemy's "cavalry was pressing him
in such force that he would be compelled to abandon the ground he had
been holding and retire before morning to General Shoup's line of
redoubts," [108] constructed on the high ground near the Chattahoochee
and covering the approaches to the railroad-bridge and Turner's
Ferry, General Johnston deemed it necessary to abandon his position
at Kenesaw on July 5th and fall back to the line constructed by
General Shoup, as the enemy's position covered one of the main roads
to Atlanta, and was nearer to that city than the main body of General
Johnston's force. On the 9th, Sherman having crossed the
Chattahoochee with two corps on the day previous, the Confederate
army crossed that river and established itself two miles in its rear.

Thus, from Dalton to Resaca, from Resaca to Adairsville, from
Adairsville to Alatoona (involving by the evacuation of Kingston the
loss of Rome, with its valuable mills, foundries, and large
quantities of military stores), from Alatoona to Kenesaw, from
Kenesaw to the Chattahoochee, and then to Atlanta; retreat followed
retreat, during seventy-four days of anxious hope and bitter
disappointment, until at last the Army of Tennessee fell back within
the fortifications of Atlanta. The Federal army soon occupied the arc
of a circle extending from the railroad between Atlanta and the
Chattahoochee River to some miles south of the Georgia Railroad (from
Atlanta to Augusta) in a direction north and northeast of Atlanta. We
had suffered a disastrous loss of territory.

Whether the superior numerical strength of the enemy, by enabling him
to extend his force beyond the flank of ours, did thereby necessitate
the abandonment of every position taken by our army, and whether the
enemy, declining to assault any of our intrenched camps, would have
ventured to leave it in rear, upon his only line of communication and
supply, or whether we might have obtained more advantageous results
by a vigorous and determined effort to attack him in detail during
some of his many flank movements--are questions upon which there has
been a decided conflict of opinion, and upon which it would be for me
now neither useful nor pleasant to enter. When it became known that
the Army of Tennessee had been successfully driven from one strong
position to another, until finally it had reached the earthworks
constructed for the exterior defense of Atlanta, the popular
disappointment was extreme. The possible fall of the "Gate City,"
with its important railroad communication, vast stores, factories for
the manufacture of all sorts of military supplies, rolling-mill and
foundries, was now contemplated for the first time at its full value,
and produced intense anxiety far and wide. From many quarters,
including such as had most urged his assignment, came delegations,
petitions, and letters, urging me to remove General Johnston from the
command of the army, and assign that important trust to some officer
who would resolutely hold and defend Atlanta. While sharing in the
keen sense of disappointment at the failure of the campaign which
pervaded the whole country, I was perhaps more apprehensive than
others of the disasters likely to result from it, because I was in a
position to estimate more accurately their probable extent. On the
railroads threatened with destruction, the armies then fighting the
main battles of the war in Virginia had for some time to a great
degree depended for indispensable supplies, yet I did not respond to
the wishes of those who came in hottest haste for the removal of
General Johnston; for here again, more fully than many others, I
realized how serious it was to change commanders in the presence of
the enemy. This clamor for his removal commenced immediately after it
became known that the army had fallen back from Dalton, and it
gathered volume with each remove toward Atlanta. Still I resisted the
steadily increasing pressure which was brought to bear to induce me
to revoke his assignment, and only issued the order relieving him
from command when I became satisfied that his declared purpose to
occupy the works at Atlanta with militia levies and withdraw his army
into the open country for freer operations, would inevitably result
in the loss of that important point, and where the retreat would
cease could not be foretold. If the Army of Tennessee was found to be
unable to hold positions of great strength like those at Dalton,
Resaca, Etowah, Kenesaw, and on the Chattahoochee, I could not
reasonably hope that it would be more successful in the plains below
Atlanta, where it would find neither natural nor artificial
advantages of position. As soon as the Secretary of War showed me the
answer which he had just received in reply to his telegram to General
Johnston, requesting positive information as to the General's plans
and purposes, I gave my permission to issue the order relieving
General Johnston and directing him to turn over to General Hood the
command of the Army of Tennessee. I was so fully aware of the danger
of changing commanders of an army while actively engaged with the
enemy, that I only overcame the objection in view of an emergency,
and in the hope that the impending danger of the loss of Atlanta
might be averted.

The following extracts are made from a letter of the Hon. Benjamin H.
Hill, of Georgia, written at Atlanta, October 12, 1878, and handed to
me by the friend to whom it was addressed:

* * * * *

"On Wednesday or Thursday, I think the 28th or 29th of June, 1864, a
messenger came to my house, sent, as he said, by General Johnston,
Senator Wigfall, of Texas, and Governor Brown, of Georgia.

"The purpose of his mission, as he explained, was to persuade me to
write a letter to President Davis urging him to order either Morgan
or Forrest with five thousand men into Sherman's rear, etc. . . .

"The result of this interview was a determination on my part to go at
once to see General Johnston, and place myself at his service. I
reached his headquarters near Marietta, on the line of the Kenesaw,
on Friday morning, which was the last day of June or the first day of
July. We had a full and free interview, and I placed myself
unreservedly at his disposal.

"He explained at length that he could not attack General Sherman's
army in their intrenchments, nor could he prevent Sherman from
ditching round his (Johnston's) flank and compelling his retreat.

"The only method of arresting Sherman's advance was to send a force
into his rear, cut off his supplies, and thus compel Sherman either
to give battle on his (Johnston's) terms or retreat. In either case,
he thought, he could defeat Sherman, and probably destroy his army.

"I said to him, 'As you do not propose to attack General Sherman in
his intrenchments, could you not spare a sufficient number of your
present army, under Wheeler or some other, to accomplish this work?'

"He said he could not--that he needed all the force he had in front.

"He then said that General Morgan was at Arlington, Virginia, with
five thousand cavalry, and, if the President would so order, this
force could be sent into Sherman's rear at once.

"He also said that Stephen D. Lee had sixteen thousand men under him
in Mississippi, including the troops under Forrest and Roddy, and
that, if Morgan could not be sent, five thousand of those under
Forrest could do the work. Either Morgan or Forrest, with five
thousand men, could compel Sherman to fight at a disadvantage or
retreat, and there was no reason why either should not be sent if the
President should give the order. He explained that he (General
Johnston) had had a consultation with Senator Wigfall and Governor
Brown, the result of which was the messenger to me to secure my
coöperation to influence President Davis to make the order. I
repelled the idea that any influence with the President was needed,
and stated that, if the facts were as General Johnston reported them,
the reënforcement would be sent on his request.

[Illustration: J. E. Johnston]

"But the situation was so critical, involving, as I believed and
explained at length to General Johnston, the fate of the Confederacy,
that I said I would go in person to Richmond and lay all the facts
before the President, and I did not doubt he would act promptly.

"I then said to General Johnston: 'How long can you hold Sherman
north of the Chattahoochee River? This is important, because I must
go to Richmond, and Morgan must go from Virginia or Forrest from
Mississippi, and this will take some time, and all must be done
before Sherman drives you to Atlanta.' General Johnston did not
answer this question with directness, but gave me data which
authorized me to conclude that he could hold Sherman north of the
Chattahoochee River at least fifty-four days, and perhaps sixty days.
I made this calculation with General Johnston's data in his presence,
and told him the result, and he assented to it. When this result was
stated, General Hood, who was present, said, 'Mr. Hill, when we leave
our present line, we will, in my judgment, cross the Chattahoochee
River very rapidly.' 'Why, what makes you think that?' said General
Johnston, with some interest. 'Because,' answered General Hood, 'this
line of the Kenesaw is the strongest line we can get in this country.
If we surrender this to Sherman, he can reconnoiter from its summit
the whole country between here and Atlanta, and there is no such line
of defense in the distance.'

"'I differ with your conclusion,' said General Johnston. 'I admit
this is a strong line of defense, but I have two more strong lines
between this and the river, from which I can hold Sherman a long
time.'

"I was delayed _en route_ somewhat, and reached Richmond on Sunday
morning week, which I think was the 9th day of July. I went to the
hotel, and in a few moments was at the Executive mansion.

"This interview with Mr. Davis I can never forget.

"I laid before him carefully, and in detail, all the facts elicited
in the conversation with General Johnston, and explained fully the
purpose of my mission. When I had gone through, the President took up
the facts, one by one, and fully explained the situation. I remember
very distinctly many of the facts, for the manner as well as matter
stated by Mr. Davis was impressive. 'Long ago,' said the President,
'I ordered Morgan to make this movement upon Sherman's rear, and
suggested that his best plan was to go directly from Abingdon through
East Tennessee. But Morgan insisted that, if he were permitted to go
through Kentucky and around Nashville, he could greatly recruit his
horses and his men by volunteers. I yielded, and allowed him to have
his own way. He undertook it, but was defeated, and has retreated
back, and is now at Abingdon with only eighteen hundred men, very
much demoralized, and badly provided with horses.' He next read a
dispatch from General Stephen D. Lee, to the effect that A. J, Smith
had left Memphis with fifteen thousand men, intended either as a
reënforcement for Sherman or for an attack on Mobile; that, to meet
this force, he (Lee) had only seven thousand men, including the
commands of Forrest and Roddy. He would like to have reënforcements,
but anyhow, with or without reënforcements, 'he should meet Smith,
and whip him, too.' 'Ah! there is a man for you,' said Mr. Davis. And
he did meet Smith with his inferior force, and whipped him, too. He
next read a dispatch from a commander at Mobile (who, I think, was
General Maury), to the effect that Canby was marching from New
Orleans with twenty thousand men, and A. J. Smith from Memphis with
fifteen thousand, intending to make a combined attack on Mobile. To
meet this force of thirty-five thousand men he had four thousand, and
Lee, with Forrest and Roddy, seven thousand, making eleven thousand
in all. He asked for reënforcements.

"After going fully through this matter, and showing how utterly
General Johnston was at fault, as to the numbers of troops in the
different commands, the President said, 'How long did you understand
General Johnston to say he could hold Sherman north of the
Chattahoochee River?' From fifty-four to sixty days I said, and
repeated the facts on that subject as above stated. Thereupon the
President read me a dispatch from General Johnston, announcing that
he had crossed or was crossing the Chattahoochee River."

* * * * *

"The next day (Monday), Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, called to
see me. He asked me to reduce my interview with General Johnston to
writing, for the use of the Cabinet, and I did so, and gave it to
him. Mr. Seddon said he was anxious for General Johnston's removal,
and he was especially anxious because, he said, he was one of those
who was responsible for his appointment. He had urged his appointment
very earnestly, but it was a great mistake, and he desired to do all
he could, even at this late day, to atone for it. The President, he
said, was averse to the removal. He made the appointment against his
own convictions, but thought it a very hazardous thing to remove him
now, and he would not do it, if he could have any assurance that
General Johnston would not surrender Atlanta without a battle.

"Other members of the Cabinet, I know, had views similar to those
expressed by Mr. Seddon. The question, or rather the situation, was
referred to General Lee, but he declined to give any positive advice,
and expressed regret that so grave a movement as the removal of
General Johnston, under the circumstances existing, should be found
to be necessary." [109]

* * * * *

"During all the time, a telegraphic correspondence was kept up with
General Johnston--the object being to ascertain if he would make a
determined fight to save Atlanta. His answers were thought to be
evasive. Finally, the question was put to General Johnston
categorically to this effect: 'Will you surrender Atlanta without a
fight?' To this the answer was regarded as not only evasive, but as
indicating the contemplated contingency of surrendering Atlanta, on
the ground that the Governor of the State had not furnished, as
expected, sufficient State troops to man the city while the army was
giving battle outside. 'This evasive answer to a positive inquiry,'
said one of the Cabinet to me, 'brought the President over. He
yielded very reluctantly.' I was informed of the result at once, and
was also informed that Mr. Davis was the last man in the Cabinet to
agree to the order of removal.". . .

General Hood assumed command on the 18th of July. In his report of
the operations of the army while under his command, he states that
the effective strength of his force on that day was forty-eight
thousand seven hundred and fifty men of all arms.

Feeling that the only chance of holding Atlanta consisted in assuming
the offensive by forcing the enemy to accept battle, General Hood
determined, on the 20th of July, to attack the corps of Generals
Thomas and Schofield, who were in the act of crossing Peachtree
Creek, hoping to defeat Thomas before he could fortify himself, then
to fall on Schofield, and finally to attack McPherson's corps, which
had reached Decatur, on the Georgia Railroad, driving the enemy back
to the creek and into the narrow space included between that stream
and the Chattahoochee River. Owing to an unfortunate misapprehension
of the order of battle and the consequent delay in making the attack,
the movement failed. On the 21st, finding that McPherson's corps was
threatening his communications, General Hood resolved to attack him
at or near Decatur, in front and on flank, turn his left, and then,
following up the movement from the right to the left with his whole
army, force the enemy down Peachtree Creek. This engagement was the
hottest of the campaign, but it failed to accomplish any other
favorable result than to check General McPherson's movement upon the
communications of our army, while it cost heavily in the loss of many
officers and men, foremost among whom was that _preux_ chevalier and
accomplished soldier, Major-General W. H. T. Walker, of Georgia.

Beyond expeditions by the enemy, for the most part by cavalry, to
destroy the lines of railroad by which supplies and reënforcements
could reach Atlanta, and successful efforts on our part to frustrate
their movements, resulting in the defeat and capture of General
Stoneman and his command near Macon, the utter destruction of the
enemy's cavalry force engaged by General Wheeler at Newnan, and the
defeat of Sherman's design to unite his cavalry at the Macon and
Western Railroad, and effectually destroy that essential avenue for
the conveyance of stores and ammunition for our army, no movement of
special importance took place between July 22d and August 26th, at
which latter date it was discovered that Sherman had abandoned his
works upon our right, and, leaving a considerable force to hold his
intrenched position at the railroad-bridge over the Chattahoochee,
was marching his main body to the south and southwest of Atlanta, to
use it, as he himself has expressed it, "against the communications
of Atlanta, instead of against its intrenchments." On the 30th, it
being known that he was moving on Jonesboro, the county town of
Clayton County, about twenty miles south of Atlanta, General Hood
sent two corps under General Hardee to confront him at that point, in
the hope that he could drive him across Flint River, oblige him to
abandon his works on the left, and then be able to attack him
successfully in flank. The attack at Jonesboro was unsuccessful.
General Hardee was obliged, on September 1st, to fall back to
Lovejoy's, seven miles south of Jonesboro, on the Macon and Western
Railroad. Thus, the main body of the Federal army was between Hardee
and Atlanta, and the immediate evacuation of that city became a
necessity. There was an additional and cogent reason for that
movement. Owing to the obstinately cruel policy which the United
States Government had pursued for some time, of refusing on any terms
to exchange prisoners of war, upward of thirty thousand prisoners
were at Andersonville in southwestern Georgia at this time. To guard
against the release and arming of these prisoners, General Hood
thought it necessary to place our army between them and the enemy,
and abandon the project, which he thought feasible, of moving on
Sherman's communications and destroying his depots of supplies at
Marietta.

Upon abandoning Atlanta, Hood marched his army in a westerly
direction, and formed a junction with the two corps which had been
operating at Jonesboro and Lovejoy's under General Hardee.

General Sherman, desisting from any further aggressive movement in
the field, returned to Atlanta, which had been formally surrendered
by the Mayor on September 2d, with the promise, as reported, on the
part of the Federal commander, that non-combatants and private
property should be respected. Shortly after his arrival, the
commanding General of the Federal forces, forgetful of this promise,
and on the pretense that the exigencies of the service required that
the place should be used exclusively for military purposes, issued an
order directing all civilians living in Atlanta, male and female, to
leave the city within five days from the date of the order (September
5th). Since Alva's atrocious cruelties to the noncombatant population
of the Low Countries in the sixteenth century, the history of war
records no instance of such barbarous cruelty as that which this
order designed to perpetrate. It involved the immediate expulsion
from their homes and only means of subsistence of thousands of
unoffending women and children, whose husbands and fathers were
either in the army, in Northern prisons, or had died in battle. In
vain did the Mayor and corporate authorities of Atlanta appeal to
Sherman to revoke or modify this inhuman order, representing in
piteous language "the woe, the horror, and the suffering, not to be
described by words," [110] which its execution would inflict on
helpless women and infant children. His only reply was:

"I give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be
occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, because my
orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case."

At the time appointed, the women and children were expelled from
their houses, and, before they were passed within our lines,
complaint was generally made that the Federal officers and men who
were sent to guard them had robbed them of the few articles of value
they had been permitted to take from their homes. The cowardly
dishonesty of its executioners was in perfect harmony with the temper
and spirit of the order.

During the month of September the Federal army in and around Atlanta
made no movement beyond strengthening its defenses and collecting
within it large quantities of military supplies. General Hood,
meantime, held his troops in the vicinity of Jonesboro. His reports
to the War Department represented the morale of his army as "greatly
impaired by the recurrence of retreat," decreasing in numbers day by
day, and the surrounding country devoid of natural strength or any
advantageous position upon which he could retire. With a view to
judge better the situation, and then determine after personal
inspection the course which should seem best to pursue, I visited
General Hood's headquarters at Palmetto. The crisis was grave. It was
not to be expected that General Sherman would remain long inactive.
The rapidity with which he was collecting recruits and supplies at
Atlanta indicated that he contemplated a movement farther south,
making Atlanta a secondary base. To rescue Georgia, save the Gulf
States, and retain possession of the lines of communication upon
which we depended for the supplies of our armies in the field, an
effort to arrest the further progress of the enemy was necessary; and
to this end the railroads in his rear must be effectually torn up,
the great railroad-bridge over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport
destroyed, and the communication between Atlanta, Chattanooga, and
Nashville completely cut off. Could this be accomplished, all the
fruits of Sherman's successful campaign in Georgia would be blighted,
his capture of Atlanta would become a barren victory, and he would
probably be compelled to make a retreat toward Tennessee, at every
mile of which he might be harassed by our army. Or, should he,
relying on Atlanta as a base, push forward through Georgia to the
Atlantic coast, our army, having cut his communications north of
Atlanta, could fall upon his rear, and, with the advantages of a
better knowledge of the country, of the surrounding devoted
population, of the auxiliary force to be expected under the
circumstances, and our superiority in cavalry, it was not
unreasonable to hope that retributive justice might overtake the
ruthless invader.

My first object was to fill up the depleted ranks of the army, to
bring the absentees and deserters back to the ranks, and induce the
Governor and State officials to coöperate heartily and earnestly with
the Confederate Government in all measures that might be found
necessary to give the proposed movement a reasonable prospect of
success.

The avowed objection of the Governor of Georgia to the acts of
Congress providing for raising troops by conscription, and his
persistent opposition to the authority of the Confederate Executive
to appoint the generals and staff officers of the volunteer
organizations received from the States to form the provisional army
of the Confederacy, caused him frequently to obstruct the Government
officials in the discharge of their duty, to withhold the assistance
which he might be justly expected to render, and, in the
contemplation of his own views of the duties and obligations of the
Executive and legislative departments of the General Government, to
lose sight of those important objects, the attainment of which an
exalted patriotism might have told him depended on the coöperation of
the State and Confederate governments. The inordinate exemption from
military service as State officials of men between the ages of
eighteen and forty-live (it was estimated that the number of exempts
in November, 1864 amounted to fifteen thousand) was an abuse which I
endeavored in vain to correct. Were the majority of the men thus
exempted, and who remained at home "that the army might be fed,"
really engaged in that important service, the end might be said to
justify the means; but, for any less exigent demand, patriotism and
humane consideration for the brave men at the front required that the
number of these exempts should be reduced to the minimum, if, indeed,
the number of those unfit for military duty was not sufficient to
perform this service. After a thorough inspection of the Army of
Tennessee at Palmetto, after conference with several prominent
Georgians, and notably with that pure patriot and distinguished
statesman and soldier. General Howell Cobb, whose brain and heart and
means and energies were all at the service of his country, I
proceeded to Augusta during the first week of October, in order, with
Generals Hardee and Cobb and other officers of prominence, to meet
and confer with General Beauregard, whom I had just assigned to the
command of the Military Division of the West, and to impart to him my
views as to the exigencies of the occasion, and how I thought that
they might be most advantageously met.

Before this time General Hood had already crossed the Chattahoochee
with his entire force, moving against the enemy's line of
communication. General Forrest, with a strong force of cavalry, had
been ordered to Tennessee to strike the railroad from Nashville to
Chattanooga. During my visit to Hood's army, I learned that the
morale of it had been partially restored, many absentees had returned
to duty, and the waning hope of the people was beginning to revive.

The plan of operations which I had discussed with General Hood while
at his headquarters was fully explained to General Beauregard at
Augusta, and by him cordially approved. It comprised the occupation
of a strong position on the enemy's line of communication by the
railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga, the capture of his depots
of supplies and the small garrisons left to guard them. If this, as
was probable, should cause Sherman to move to attack as in position,
in that case, if the tone of the troops justified it, a battle should
be joined; otherwise, he should retreat toward Gadsden, where
supplies would be collected, and, should Sherman follow him so far,
then there, on the dividing line of the States of Georgia and
Alabama, the largest practicable number of militia and home-guards of
both States would be assembled as an auxiliary force, and there a
final stand should be made for a decisive battle. If victorious, as
under the circumstances it was hoped we should be, the enemy could
not retreat through the wasted country behind him, and must surrender
or disperse. If Sherman should not pursue our retiring army to
Gadsden, but return to Atlanta to march toward the seacoast, he was
to be pursued, and, by our superiority in cavalry, to be prevented
from foraging on the country, which, according to our information as
to his supplies on hand at Atlanta, and as to his inadequate means of
transportation, would be indispensable for the support of his troops.
Should Sherman, contrary to that information, have supplies and
transportation sufficient to enable him to march across the country,
and he should start toward the seacoast, the militia, the local
troops, and others who could be employed, should obstruct the roads
and fords in his front by felling trees, and, by burning bridges and
other available means, delay his progress until his provisions should
be consumed and absolute want should deplete if not disintegrate his
army. It was supposed that Augusta, on account of our principal
powder-manufactory and some important workshops being located there,
would be the first objective point of Sherman, should he march toward
the east. General Hood's calculation was that, taking a route north
of Sherman, where he would have smaller streams to cross, he could
reach Augusta as soon as Sherman.

General Cobb, the local commander in Georgia, in addition to
obstructing roads, etc., was, in the last supposed contingency, to
assemble at Augusta the invalid soldiers, the militia, and others to
defend the place. General George W. Rains, an accomplished soldier
and military engineer, was instructed to enlarge and strengthen the
defenses of the place, and General G. R. Rains, the author of the
system of defense by sub-terra shells, was, on the coming of the
enemy, to apply his invention to the threatened approaches of the
town. There was another contemplated contingency, viz., that Sherman,
emboldened by his recent successes, would move against Hood with such
overweening confidence as might offer to the latter the opportunity
to strike in detail.

After the full conversation with General Beauregard above noticed,
General Hardee was called in and asked to give his opinion on the
plan, which I regarded as entitled to great consideration, not only
because of his high capacity as a soldier, but also because of his
long connection with the Army of Tennessee, and minute knowledge of
the country in which it was proposed to operate. He had previously
been made fully aware of the plans and purposes discussed between
General Hood and myself, and stated to General Beauregard
substantially that, while he could not say the plan would succeed, he
was confident it was the best which we could adopt, and that, if it
failed, none other with our means would succeed. General Beauregard
left for General Hood's headquarters, as I supposed, to aid in the
execution of the proposed plan, to the success of which the larger
command with which he was invested, it was hoped, would contribute.

General Hood moved as was expected upon the enemy's line of
communication, and his successes at Big Shanty and Acworth, in
capturing those stations and thoroughly destroying the railroad
between them, and his partial success at Allatoona, caused Sherman,
leaving one corps to garrison Atlanta, to move out with his main body
to restore his communications. Hood further succeeded in destroying
the railroad from Resaca to Tunnel Hill, capturing the enemy's posts
at Tilton, Dalton, and Mill-Creek Gap; but, not deeming his army in
condition to risk a general engagement, withdrew his forces in a
southwesterly direction toward Gadsden, which place he reached
October 20th, finding there supplies adequate for the wants of his
troops. Sherman had turned back toward Atlanta, and Hood, instead of
hanging on his rear, not allowing him to repair the damage to the
railroad, and otherwise harassing him in his march as much as
possible, after conference with General Beauregard, decided to
continue his march into Tennessee.[111] His reasons for this change
of plan are elaborately and forcibly presented in his book, "Advance
and Retreat," published since the war, and in which he emphatically
contradicts the attempt which has been made to represent that
campaign into Tennessee as one projected by me. The correspondence of
General Sherman, published in the same work, shows that Hood was not
far wrong in the supposition that Sherman would follow the movement
made on his line of communication; the only error being that he could
thus draw him beyond the limits of Georgia. After my return to
Richmond, a telegram from General Beauregard informed me of the
change of programme. My objection to that movement remained, and,
though it was too late to regain the space and time which had been
lost, I replied promptly on November 30, 1864, as follows:

"General BEAUREGARD, care of Colonel W. M. Browne, _Augusta, Georgia._

"Yours of 24th received. It is probable that the enemy, if short of
supplies, may move directly for the coast. When that is made
manifest, you will be able to concentrate your forces upon the one
object, and I hope, if you can not defeat his attempt, that you may
reduce his army to such condition as to be inefficient for further
operations.

"Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy, he can scarcely
change the plans for Sherman's or Grant's campaigns. They would, I
think, regard the occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky as of minor
importance.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

To the arguments offered to show that our army could not, after it
had reached the Tennessee River, have effectually pursued Sherman in
his march through southern Georgia, it is only needful to reply that
the physical difficulties set forth would not have existed, had our
army commenced the pursuit from Gadsden.

To make the movement into Tennessee a success, even so far as to
recover that country, it was necessary that it should be executed so
promptly as to anticipate the concentration of the enemy's forces,
but unforeseen and unavoidable delays occurred, which gave full time
for preparation. After having overcome many vexatious detentions,
Hood on the 20th of November completed his crossing of the Tennessee
River at Gunter's Landing, and moved forward into Tennessee on the
route to Nashville, whither Sherman had sent General Thomas for the
protection of his depots and communications against an apprehended
attack by cavalry under General Forrest.

Most unwilling to criticise the conduct of that very gallant and
faithful soldier who, battle-scarred and mutilated, survived the war,
and whose recent death our country has so much deplored, I must say
after the event, as I did before it, that I consider this movement
into Tennessee ill-advised.

Thomas having been sufficiently reënforced in Tennessee to enable him
to hold Hood in check, and Sherman relieved from the necessity of
defending himself against an active army, and of protecting a long
line of railroad communication with a fortified base in his rear,
resolved upon his march to the sea, abandoning Atlanta, after having
first utterly destroyed that city by fire. Not a single house was
spared, not even a church. Similar acts of vandalism marked the
progress of the Federal army at Rome, Kingston, Acworth, Marietta,
and every town or village along its route, thus carrying out General
Sherman's order "to enforce a devastation more or less relentless"
along the line of his march, where he only encountered helpless women
and children. The arson of the dwelling-houses of non-combatants and
the robbery of their property, extending even to the trinkets worn by
women, made the devastation as relentless as savage instincts could
suggest.

On November 16th Sherman left his intrenchments around Atlanta, and,
dividing his army into two bodies, each from twenty-five to thirty
thousand strong, the one followed the Georgia Railroad in the
direction of Augusta, and the other took the line of the Macon and
Western Railroad to Jonesboro. Avoiding Macon and Augusta, they
passed through central Georgia, taking Milledgeville on the way,
marching in compact column, and advancing with extreme caution,
although only opposed by detachments of Wheeler's cavalry and a few
hastily formed regiments of raw militia. Partial efforts were made to
obstruct and destroy the roads in the front and on the flanks of the
invading army, and patriotic appeals by prominent citizens were made
to the people, to remove all provisions from its path, but no
formidable opposition was made, except at the railroad-bridge over
the Oconee, where Wheeler, with a portion of his command and a few
militia, held the enemy in check for two or three days. With his
small force, General Wheeler daringly and persistently harassed, and,
when practicable, delayed the enemy's advance, attacking and
defeating exposed detachments, deterring his foragers from venturing
far from the main body, defending all cities and towns along the
railroad lines, and affording protection to depots of supplies,
arsenals, and other important Government works. The report of his
operations from November 14th to December 20th displays a dash,
activity, vigilance, and consummate skill, which justly entitle him
to a prominent place on the roll of great cavalry leaders. By his
indomitable energy, operating on all sides of Sherman's columns, he
was enabled to keep the Government and commanders of our troops
advised of the enemy's movements, and, by preventing foraging parties
from leaving the main body, he saved from spoliation all but a narrow
tract of country, and from the torch millions worth of property which
would otherwise have been certainly consumed.

It soon became manifest that Savannah was General Sherman's objective
point. That city was occupied by General W. J. Hardee with about
eighteen thousand men, a considerable portion of which was composed
of militia, local troops, reserves, and hastily organized regiments
and battalions made up of convalescents from the hospitals and
artisans from the Government shops. On the 10th of December the
enemy's columns reached the immediate vicinity of Savannah, and on
the 12th they occupied a semicircular line extending from the
Savannah River to the Savannah and Gulf Railroad. The defenses of the
city were strong, the earthworks and other fortifications were
flanked by inundated rice-swamps extending across the peninsula
formed by the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, and the causeways leading
through them were well fortified by works mounting heavy guns. With a
sufficient force to occupy his long lines of defense, General Hardee
could have sustained a protracted siege. The city was amply supplied,
and its lines of communication were still open. Although Sherman had
reached Savannah, he had not yet opened communication with the
Federal fleet. Fort McAllister, situated on the right bank of the
Ogeechee, about six miles from Ossabaw Sound, was a serious obstacle
in his way, as it was a work of considerable strength, mounting
twenty-one heavy guns, a deep and wide ditch extending along its
front, with every avenue of approach swept by the guns mounted upon
its bastions. The fort was held by a garrison of two hundred and
fifty men under the command of experienced officers. The work was
attacked on the evening of the 13th, and carried by assault after a
short and feeble resistance. In consequence of the loss of this fort,
Sherman speedily opened communication with the fleet, and became
perfectly secure against any future want of supplies. This also
enabled him to obtain heavy ordnance for use against the city. He
proceeded immediately to take measures to invest Savannah, and in a
few days had succeeded in doing so on every side of the city except
that fronting the river. While Hardee's troops had not yielded a
single position or lost a foot of ground, with the exception of Fort
McAllister, when, on December 20th, he discovered that Sherman had
put heavy siege-guns in position near enough to bombard the city, and
that the enemy was threatening Union Causeway, which extends across
the large swamps that lie between Savannah and Charleston, and
offered the only practicable line of retreat, he determined to
evacuate the place rather than expose the city and its inhabitants to
bombardment. He also thought holding it had ceased to be of any
special importance, and that his troops could do more valuable
service in the field. Accordingly, on the night of December 20th,
having destroyed the navy-yard, the ironclads, and other Government
property, and razed the fortifications below the city, he withdrew
his army and reached Hardeeville on the evening of the 22d, without
hindrance or molestation on the part of the enemy.

[Illustration: General John B. Hood]

Having heretofore stated my objections to the plan of sending Hood's
army into Tennessee after the fall of Atlanta, I will now follow it
in that campaign, relying for the facts on the official report of
General Hood of the 15th of February, 1865. The fidelity and
gallantry of that officer and the well-known magnanimity of his
character are a sufficient guarantee of the impartiality of his
narration.

He reported the arrival of his army at Gadsden on the 20th of
October, 1864, where he was joined by General P. G. T. Beauregard,
commanding the military department. He writes that, after withdrawing
from Atlanta, his hope had been that Sherman in following might offer
an opportunity to strike him in detail, but in this he was
disappointed. Hood reported that the morale of his army, though
improved, was not such as, in the opinion of his corps commanders,
would justify a general engagement while the enemy remained united.
At Gadsden he found a thorough supply of shoes and other stores, but,
after a full and free conference with General Beauregard at
Tuscumbia, he decided to cross the Tennessee and move against Thomas,
who with his corps had been detached by Sherman and sent into Middle
Tennessee. General Beauregard had sent orders to General Forrest to
move with his cavalry into Tennessee; the main body of Hood's cavalry
had been sent to follow Sherman. As the orders to Forrest were
accidentally delayed, and Hood had not cavalry enough to protect his
trains, he was compelled to wait for the coming of Forrest, and, to
hasten the meeting, moved down the river as far as Florence, where he
arrived on the 31st of October. This unfortunate delay gave the enemy
time to repair the railroad to Chattanooga, and accumulate supplies
at Atlanta for a march thence toward the Atlantic coast. Forrest's
cavalry joined on the 21st of November, and the movement began. The
enemy's forces at that time were concentrated at Pulaski and at
Lawrenceburg. Hood endeavored to place his army between these forces
and Nashville, but our cavalry, having driven off the enemy at
Lawrenceburg, gave notice of our advance, and on the 23d he evacuated
Pulaski and moved rapidly by the turnpike and railroad to Columbia.
On the evening of the 27th of November our army took position in
front of the works at that place. During the night the town was
evacuated, and a strong position was taken on the opposite side of
the river, about a mile and a half distant. On the evening of the
28th General Forrest crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia,
and in the morning of the 29th Stewart's and Cheatham's corps
followed the cavalry, leaving Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee's
corps confronting the enemy at Columbia. The cavalry and the two
infantry corps moved in light marching order, the object being, by
advancing rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin
turnpike at or near Spring Hill, to cut off that portion of the foe
at Columbia. The movement having been discovered after Hood's forces
had got well on the flank of the enemy, he began to retreat along the
turnpike toward Spring Hill. About noon of that day the cavalry
attacked his trains, but found them too strongly guarded to be
captured. The retreat was rapidly conducted along the turnpike, with
flankers thrown out to protect the main column. Near Spring Hill
Major-General Cheatham, being in the advance, commenced to come in
contact with the retreating column about two miles from Spring Hill.
He was ordered to attack vigorously, and get possession of the
turnpike. This was so feebly executed that he failed to attain the
object, and the enemy passed on toward Spring Hill. Though the golden
opportunity had passed with daylight, Hood did not abandon the hope
of effecting by a night movement the end he sought. Accordingly,
Lieutenant-General Stewart was furnished with a guide, and ordered to
move his corps beyond Cheatham's, and place it across the road beyond
Spring Hill. In the dark and confusion, he did not succeed in getting
the position desired. About midnight, ascertaining that the enemy was
moving in disorder, with artillery, wagons, and troops intermixed,
Hood sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of
skirmishers, still further to impede the retreat. This was not
accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and
confusion nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity for
striking him for which we had labored so long--the greatest this
campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the war.
Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, left in front of the enemy at Columbia,
was instructed to press him the moment he abandoned his position at
that point. He did not abandon his works until dark, showing that his
trains obstructed the road for fifteen miles during the day and a
great part of the night. At daylight Hood pursued the enemy so
rapidly as to compel him to burn a number of his wagons. On the hills
about four miles south of Franklin, he made demonstration as if to
give battle, but, when our forces deployed for the attack, he retired
to Franklin.

From dispatches captured at Spring Hill, Hood learned that Schofield
was instructed by Thomas to hold that position until Franklin could
be made secure, and thus knew that it was important to attack
Schofield promptly, and concluded that, if he should escape at
Franklin, he would gain the fortifications about Nashville. Hood
reports that "the nature of the position was such as to render it
inexpedient to attempt any other flank movement, and I therefore
determined to attack him in front and without delay."

As this was one of the bloodiest battles of the war, and its results
materially affected the future, before entering on an account of it,
I pause for some general reflections. It is not quite easy to
determine what my gallant friend Hood meant by the expression, "the
nature of the position." It may have referred to the probability that
the enemy, if he attempted a flank movement, would retreat rapidly,
as he had done from Columbia, and it is now known that a part of his
troops and a large part of his train had already been sent across the
Harpeth River. Thomas's dispatch indicated a purpose to hold
Franklin; and its relation to Murfreesboro, where a garrison was
maintained, would seem to render this a probable part of a plan to
maintain communication with Chattanooga. Franklin had to us, as a
mere _military_ question, no other value than that the road to
Nashville led through it. Whether it would have been possible to turn
the position so promptly as to strike the enemy's line of retreat is
a question which no doubt General Hood considered and decided in the
negative, otherwise he would surely have preferred to attack the
enemy on the march rather than in his intrenchments, especially as
these were so near to the town that Hood was restrained from using
his artillery on account of the women and children resident in it.
The position itself was favorable for defense; the Harpeth River by a
short bend flows on two sides of the town, and the works in front had
the center so boldly salient, their flanks resting on the river, as
to inclose the town in something like a square, two sides being river
and two sides intrenchment. The exterior line of defense had been
recently and hastily constructed; the interior line was much
stronger. Behind the town there were two bridges, one on the main
road leading through it, and the other a pontoon-bridge a short
distance above it. Hood had served with distinction under Lee and
Jackson, and his tactics were of that school. If he had, by an
impetuous attack, crushed Schofield's army, without too great a loss
to his own, and Forrest could have executed his orders to capture the
trains when Schofield's army was crushed, we should never have heard
complaint because Hood attacked at Franklin, and these were the hopes
with which he made his assault.

On the 30th of November he formed his line of battle. At 4 P.M. he
gave the order to advance; his troops moved gallantly forward,
carried the first line, and advanced against the interior works; here
the engagement was close and fierce; the combatants occupied the
opposite sides of the intrenchments, our men carrying them in some
places, many being killed entirely inside the enemy's works. Some of
the Tennesseeans, after years of absence, saw again their homes, and
strove with desperation to expel the invader from them; the contest
continued till near midnight, when the enemy abandoned his works and
crossed the river, leaving his dead and wounded behind him, We had
won a victory, but it was purchased at fearful cost. General Hood, in
his letter of December 11, 1864, written near Nashville, reported his
entire loss at about four thousand five hundred, and among them was
Major-General Cleburne, Brigadier-Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl,
and Granberry, all well known to fame, and whose loss we could ill
afford to bear. Around Cleburne thickly lay the gallant men who, in
his desperate assault, followed him with the implicit confidence that
in another army was given to Stonewall Jackson; and in the one case,
as in the other, a vacancy was created which could never be filled.
Hood reported that the number of dead left on the field by the enemy
indicated that his loss was equal to or near our own; that those of
our men who were captured were inside the enemy's works.

The next morning at daylight, the wounded being cared for and the
dead buried, Hood moved forward toward Nashville, about eighteen
miles distant, and Forrest with his cavalry closely pursued the
enemy. On the 2d of December our army took position in front of
Nashville about two miles from the city, Lieutenant-General Lee's
corps in the center resting on the Franklin turnpike, Cheatham's on
the right, Stewart's on the left, and the cavalry on each flank. Hood
then commenced to construct detached works to cover the flanks,
should offensive movements be attempted against our flank and rear.
The enemy still held Murfreesboro with a garrison of about six
thousand, strongly fortified; he also had small forces at Chattanooga
and Knoxville. It was supposed that he would soon have to take the
offensive to relieve his garrisons at those points, or cause them to
be evacuated, in which latter case Hood hoped to capture the forces
at Murfreesboro, and thus open communication with Georgia and
Virginia; and he thought, if attacked in position, that he could
defeat Thomas, gain possession of Nashville with its abundant
supplies, and thus get the control of Tennessee. The people of the
country, in the mean time, were able and willing to furnish our army
with supplies, and we had captured rolling-stock to put the railroad
to Pulaski in successful operation.

Hood sent Major-General Forrest with the greater part of his cavalry
and a division of infantry against Murfreesboro. The infantry did not
fulfill expectation, and it was withdrawn. Mercer's and Palmer's
brigades of infantry were sent to replace the division. Nothing of
importance occurred until the morning of the 15th, and the enemy,
having been reënforced by about fifteen thousand men from the
trans-Mississippi, attacked simultaneously both flanks of our line.
On our right he was repulsed with heavy loss; but on our left, toward
evening, he earned some of the partially completed redoubts. During
the night of the 15th our line was shortened and strengthened, the
left being thrown back and dispositions made to meet any renewed
attack. The corps of Major-General Cheatham was transferred from our
right to the left. Early on the 16th of December the enemy made a
general attack on our lines, accompanied by a heavy fire of
artillery. All his assaults were repulsed with heavy loss until 3.30
P.M., when a portion of our line to the left of the center suddenly
gave way. Up to this time no battle ever progressed more favorably--
the troops in excellent spirits, waving their colors and bidding
defiance to the enemy; but the position he then gained being such as
to enfilade us, caused our entire line to give way in a few moments
and our troops to retreat in the direction of Franklin, most of them
in great confusion. Confidence in the ability to hold the line had
caused the artillery-horses to be sent to the rear for safety, and
the abandonment of the position was so unexpected and sudden that it
was not possible to bring forward the horses to remove the guns which
had been placed in position, and fifty-four of them were consequently
lost. Our loss in killed and wounded was small. At Brentwood, about
four miles from the field of battle, the troops were partially
rallied, and Lieutenant-General S. D, Lee took command of the
rear-guard and encamped for the night. On leaving the field, Hood
sent one of his staff-officers to inform General Forrest of our
defeat, and to direct him to rejoin the army with as little delay as
possible, but heavy rains had so swollen the creeks that he was
unable to effect the junction with his main force until it reached
Columbia. During the 17th the enemy's cavalry pressed boldly on the
retreating column, the open character of the country being favorable
to cavalry operations. Lieutenant-General Lee, commanding the
covering force, was severely wounded, but not until after he and the
corps he commanded had rendered such service as to receive the
special commendation of the General commanding the army.

Hood reports that when he left the field before Nashville he had
hoped to be able to remain in Tennessee, on the line of Duck River;
but, after arriving at Colombia, he became convinced that the
condition of the army made it necessary to recross the Tennessee
without delay. On the 21st he resumed his march for Pulaski, leaving
Major-General Walthall, with five infantry brigades, and General
Forrest, with the main body of his cavalry, at Columbia, to cover the
movements of the army. The retreat continued, and on the 25th, 26th,
and 27th, the army, including the rear-guard, crossed the Tennessee
River at Bainbridge. The enemy had followed the rear-guard with all
his cavalry and three corps of infantry to Pulaski, and thence the
cavalry continued the pursuit to the Tennessee River. After crossing
the river, the army moved by easy marches to Tupelo, Mississippi.
General Hood reported his losses in the Tennessee campaign to have
been about ten thousand men, including prisoners, and that when he
arrived at Tupelo he had 18,500 infantry and artillery, and 2,306
cavalry. I again quote from General Hood's report:

"Here, finding so much dissatisfaction throughout the country, as, in
my judgment, greatly to impair, if not destroy, my usefulness, and
counteract my exertions, and with no desire but to serve my country,
I asked to be relieved, with the hope that another might be assigned
to the command who might do more than I could hope to accomplish.
Accordingly, I was so relieved on the 23d of January, by authority of
the President."

Though, as General Hood states in his book, page 273, I was "averse
to his going into Tennessee," he might well assume that I "was not,
as General Beauregard and himself, acquainted with the true condition
of the army" when they decided on the Tennessee campaign. Of the
manner in which he conducted it, Isham G. Harris, the Governor of
Tennessee, a man of whose judgment, integrity, and manhood I had the
highest opinion, wrote to me, on the 25th of December, 1864:

". . . I have been with General Hood from the beginning of this
campaign, and beg to say, disastrous as it has ended, I am not able
to see anything that General Hood has done that he should not, or
neglected any thing that he should, have done, . . . and regret to
say that, if all had performed their parts as well as he, the results
would have been very different."

To this I will only add that General Hood was relieved at his
reiterated request, made from such creditable motives as are
expressed in the extract above, taken from his official report, and
that it was in no wise due to a want of confidence in him on my part.

[Footnote 105: It was during this time, i. e.. in March and April, 1864,
that Forrest made his extraordinary expedition from north Mississippi
across Tennessee to Paducah, Kentucky, and continued his operations
against depots of supplies, lines of communication, and troops moving
to reënforce Sherman--having, on June 11th, a severe action in
Tishemingo with a force estimated at eight or nine thousand, supposed
to be on their way to join Sherman. The energy, strategy, and high
purposes of Forrest, during all this period, certainly entitle him to
higher military rank than that of a partisan, and enroll him in the
list of great cavalry commanders. Some of his other expeditions are
elsewhere mentioned in these pages.]

[Footnote 106: "Narrative," p. 302.]

[Footnote 107: "Advance and Retreat," by J. B. Hood, pp. 98-116.]

[Footnote 108: Johnston's "Narrative," p. 346.]

[Footnote 109: Mr. Seddon, ex-Secretary of War, in a letter written to
me on the 10th of February, 1879, states, in regard to his interview
with General Lee, that it was held after the determination had been made
"to remove General Johnston from his command at Atlanta," and says of
the purpose of the interview with General Lee: "It was designed
merely to secure General Lee's estimate of qualifications in the
selection of a successor for the command."]

[Footnote 110: Mayor Calhoun's Petition to General Sherman, September 11,
1864.]

[Footnote 111: "Advance and Retreat," by General J. B. Hood; letter of
General Beauregard to President Davis, p. 278, _et seq_.]

CHAPTER XLIX.

Perhaps there was no question in the treatment of which the true
character and intentions of the Government of the United States was
so clearly exposed as in the exchange of prisoners. That we should
dare to resort to arms for the preservation of our rights, and "to
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," was
regarded by our enemies as most improbable. Their aspirations for
dominion and sovereignty, through the Government of the Union, had
become so deep-seated and apparently real as to cause that
Government, at its first step, to assume the haughtiness and
imperiousness of an absolute sovereign. "I appeal to all loyal
citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort," said President
Lincoln, in the first proclamation, calling for seventy-five thousand
men. The term "loyal" has no signification except as applied to the
sovereign of an empire or kingdom. In a republic the people are the
sovereign, and the term "loyal" or its opposite can have no
signification except in relation to the true sovereign. To say,
therefore, that the agent of the sovereign people, the representative
of the system they have organized to conduct their common affairs,
composed the real sovereign, and that loyalty or disloyalty is of
signification in relation to this sovereign alone, is not only a
perversion of language, but an error, that leads straight to the
subversion of all popular government and the establishment of the
monarchical or consolidated form. The Government of the United States
is now the sovereign here, says President Lincoln in this
proclamation, and loyalty consists in the maintenance of that
sovereignty against all its foes. The sovereignty of the people and
of the several and distinct States, in his mind, was only a weakness
and enthusiasm of the fathers. The States and the people thereof had
become consolidated into a national Union. "I appeal," says President
Lincoln, "to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this
effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our
national Union."

The Confederate States refused thus "to favor, facilitate, and aid
this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence
of a national Union." They not only refused to aid, but they took up
arms to defeat the consummation of such a monstrous usurpation of
popular rights and popular sovereignty. It was evident that, if no
efforts for a rescue were made, the time would soon come when the
rights of all the States might be denied, and the hope of mankind in
constitutional freedom be for ever lost. This was the usurpation.
This lay at the foundation of the war. Every subsequent act of the
Government was another step in the same direction, all tending
palpably to supremacy for the Government of the United States, the
subjugation of the States, and the submission of the people.

This was the adversary with whom we had to struggle, and this was the
issue for which we fought. That we dared to draw our swords to
vindicate the rights and the sovereignty of the people, that we dared
to resist and deny all sovereignty as inherently existing in the
Government of the United States, was adjudged an infamous crime, and
we were denounced as "rebels." It was asserted that those of us "who
were captured should be hung as rebels taken in the act." Crushing
the corner-stone of the Union, the independence of the States, the
Federal Government assumed toward us a position of haughty arrogance,
refused to recognize us otherwise than as insurrectionists and
"rebels," who resisted and denied its usurped sovereignty, and who
were entitled to no amelioration from the punishment of death, except
such as might proceed only from the promptings of mercy.

On April 17, 1861, I issued a proclamation in which I offered to
grant letters of marque and reprisal to seamen. On April 19th
President Lincoln issued a counter-proclamation, declaring that, "if
any person, under the pretended authority of said States, or under
any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or
the persons or cargo on board of her, such person shall be held
amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and
punishment of piracy," which was death.

Some small vessels obtained these letters of marque and were
captured. Their officers and crew constituted the first prisoners
that fell into the hands of the enemy. They were immediately
imprisoned, and held for trial as pirates. The trial came on later in
the year. A report of it states that "the views of all the judges
seemed to center upon the one point, that these men were taken in
arms against the Government of the United States, and that, inasmuch
as the laws of that Government did not recognize the authority under
which the men acted, there was no course but to condemn them."

As soon as the treatment of these prisoners was known in Richmond,
before their trial and as early as July 6, 1861, I sent by a special
messenger a communication to President Lincoln, in substance as
follows:

"Haying learned that the schooner Savannah, a private armed vessel in
the service and sailing under a commission issued by the authority of
the Confederate States of America, had been captured by one of the
vessels forming the blockading squadron off Charleston Harbor, I
directed a proposition to be made to the commanding officer of the
squadron for an exchange of officers and crew of the Savannah for
prisoners of war held by this Government, 'according to number and
rank.' To this proposition, made on the 19th ultimo, Captain Mercer,
the officer in command of the blockading squadron, made answer, on
the same day, that 'the prisoners' (referred to) 'are not on board
any of the vessels under my command.'

"It now appears, by statements made without contradiction in
newspapers published in New York, that the prisoners above mentioned
were conveyed to that city, and have been treated not as prisoners of
war, but as criminals; that they have been put in irons, confined in
jail, brought before courts of justice on charges of piracy and
treason; and it is even rumored that they have been convicted of the
offenses charged, for no other reason than that they bore arms in
defense of the rights of this Government and under the authority of
its commission.

"I could not, without grave discourtesy, have made the newspaper
statements above referred to the subject of this communication, if
the threat of treating as pirates the citizens of this Confederacy,
armed for its service on the high-seas, had not been contained in
your proclamation of the 19th of April last. That proclamation,
however, seems to afford a sufficient justification for considering
these published statements as not devoid of probability.

"It is the desire of this Government so to conduct the war now
existing as to mitigate its horrors as far as may be possible, and,
with this intent, its treatment of the prisoners captured by its
forces has been marked by the greatest humanity and leniency
consistent with public obligation. Some have been permitted to return
home on parole, others to remain at large, under similar conditions,
within this Confederacy, and all have been furnished with rations for
their subsistence, such as are allowed to our own troops. It is only
since the news has been received of the treatment of the prisoners
taken on the Savannah, that I have been compelled to withdraw these
indulgences, and to hold the prisoners taken by us in strict
confinement.

"A just regard to humanity and to the honor of this Government now
requires me to state explicitly that, painful as will be the
necessity, this Government will deal out to the prisoners held by it
the same treatment and the same fate as shall be experienced by those
captured on the Savannah; and, if driven to the terrible necessity of
retaliation by your execution of any of the officers or crew of the
Savannah, that retaliation will be extended so far as shall be
requisite to secure the abandonment of a practice unknown to the
warfare of civilized man, and so barbarous as to disgrace the nation
which shall be guilty of inaugurating it.

"With this view, and because it may not have reached you, I now renew
the proposition made to the commander of the blockading squadron, to
exchange for the prisoners taken on the Savannah an equal number of
those now held by us according to rank."

This communication was taken by Colonel Thomas Taylor, who was
permitted to visit Washington, but was refused an audience with
President Lincoln. He was obliged to content himself with a verbal
reply from General Winfield Scott that the communication had been
delivered to President Lincoln, and that he would reply in writing as
soon as possible. No answer ever came. We were compelled to select by
lot from among the prisoners in our hands a number to whom we
proposed to mete out the same fate which might await the crew of the
Savannah. These measures of retaliation arrested the cruel and
illegal purposes of the enemy.

Meantime, as early as May 21, 1861, the Confederate Congress passed
an act which provided that--

"All prisoners of war taken, whether on land or sea, during the
pending hostilities with the United States, shall be transferred by
the captors from time to time, and as often as convenient, to the
Department of War; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War,
with the approval of the President, to issue such instructions to the
quartermaster-general and his subordinates as shall provide for the
safe custody and sustenance of prisoners of war, and the rations
furnished prisoners of war shall be the same in quantity and quality
as those furnished to enlisted men in the army of the Confederacy."

This law of Congress was embodied in the orders issued from the War
Department and from the headquarters in the field, and no order was
ever issued in conflict with its humane provisions.

Nevertheless, the Government of the United States, forgetful of the
conduct of Great Britain toward her revolted colonies, apparently
refused all consideration of the question of exchange of prisoners,
as if impressed with the idea that it would derogate from the dignity
of its position to accept any interchange of courtesy. An exchange
was therefore occasionally made by the various commanders of troops
under flags of truce, while the Federal Government made the paltry
pretense of not knowing it. We released numbers at different points
on parole, and the matter was compromised in various ways.
Fifty-seven wounded soldiers were unconditionally released at
Richmond and sent home. In response, twenty of our soldiers, mostly
North Carolinians, were released from Bedloe's Island, New York, and
sent to Fortress Monroe, to be discharged on condition of taking the
oath, so called, of loyalty to the United States Government.
Thirty-seven confined in the military prison at Washington were
released on taking the oath. On September 3d an exchange was made
between General Pillow and Colonel Wallace, of the United States
Army. Whereupon General Polk proposed an exchange to General Grant,
who replied, on October 14th:

"I can, of my own accordance, make none. I recognize no 'Southern
Confederacy' myself, but will communicate with higher authorities
for their views."

An exchange was made on October 23d between General McClernand and
General Polk. Subsequently, on November 8th, General Grant offered to
surrender to General Polk certain wounded men and invalids
unconditionally. To this proposition General Polk replied:

"My own feelings would prompt me to waive again the unimportant
affectation of declining to recognize these States as belligerents in
the interest of humanity; but my Government requires all prisoners to
be placed at the disposal of the Secretary Of War."

On November 1st General Fremont made an agreement with General Price,
in Missouri, by which certain persons named were authorized to
negotiate for the exchange of any persons who might be taken
prisoners of war, upon a plan previously arranged. General Hunter,
who succeeded General Fremont, on November 7th, repudiated this
agreement. A proposition made in the Confederate Congress to return
the prisoners captured by us at first Manassas, without any formality
whatever, would doubtless have prevailed but for the difficulty in
reference to the crew of the Savannah.

But this determination of the United States Government, not to meet
us on the equal footing consistent with the modern usages of war and
exchange prisoners, thus far prevented any general arrangement for
that object. In consequence, however, of the clamors of the Northern
people for the restoration of their friends, both Houses of Congress
united in a request to President Lincoln to take immediate steps for
a general exchange. Instead of complying with this request, two
respectable commissioners were, however, appointed to visit the
prisoners we held, relieve their necessities, and provide for their
comfort at the expense of the United States. It is impossible to
conceive any reason for such conduct, unless it was to exasperate and
"fire up the Northern heart," as it was expressed, and thus cause the
people to make greater efforts for our devastation. This action on
the part of the Government was at a later day known by the expression
"waving the bloody shirt."

The commissioners arrived at Norfolk, Virginia, but were not allowed
to proceed any farther. A readiness on our part to negotiate for a
general exchange was manifested, and agreed to by them. This was
subsequently approved at Washington. Shortly afterward, on February
14, 1862, an arrangement was made between General Howell Cobb on our
part and General Wool, the commander at Fortress Monroe, by the terms
of which the prisoners of war in the hands of each Government were to
be exchanged man for man, the officers being assimilated as to rank;
our privateersmen were to be exchanged on the footing of prisoners of
war; any surplus remaining on either side was to be released; and
during the continuance of hostilities prisoners taken on either side
should be paroled. The exchange proceeded, and about three hundred in
excess had been delivered, when it was discovered that not one of our
privateersmen had been released, and that our men taken prisoners at
Fort Donelson, instead of being paroled, had been sent into the
interior. Some of the hostages we held for our privateersmen had gone
forward, but the remainder were retained. Being informed of this
state of affairs, I recommended to Congress that all of our men who
had been paroled by the United States Government should be released
from the obligations of their parole so as to bear arms in our
defense, in consequence of this breach of good faith on the part of
that Government. It was subsequently said, on behalf of the United
States Government, that the detention of our privateersmen had been
intended to be only temporary, to make it certain that the hostages
were coming forward.

It is further stated that the only unadjusted point between Generals
Cobb and Wool was, that the latter was unwilling that each party
should agree to pay the expenses of transporting their prisoners to
the frontier, and this he promised to refer to his Government. At a
second interview, on March 1, 1862, General Wool informed General
Cobb that his Government would not consent to pay these expenses, and
thereupon General Cobb promptly receded from his demand, and agreed
to the terms proposed by the other side. But General Wool, who had
said at the beginning of the negotiation, "I am clothed with full
power for the purpose of arranging for the exchange of prisoners,"
was now under the necessity of stating that "his Government had
changed his instructions." And thus the negotiations were abruptly
broken off, and the matter left where it was before.[112] After these
negotiations had begun, the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson had
given to the United States a considerable preponderance in the number
of prisoners held by them, and they at once returned to their
original purpose of an equal treatment.

A suspension of exchange for some months ensued. Finally, a storm of
indignation beginning to arise among the Northern people at the
conduct of their Government, it was forced to yield its absurd
pretensions, and, on July 22, 1862, a cartel for the exchange of
prisoners was executed, based on the cartel of 1812 between the
United States and Great Britain. In accordance with these terms an
exchange commenced, and by the middle of August most of the officers
of rank on either side, who had been for any long period in
captivity, were released.

On the same day on which the cartel was signed, an order was issued
by the Secretary of War, in Washington, under instructions from
President Lincoln, empowering the military commanders in Virginia and
elsewhere "to seize and use any property, real or personal, which may
be necessary or convenient for their several commands for supplies or
for other military purposes," and "to keep accounts sufficiently
accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts and from whom
it shall come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in
proper cases." This was simply a system of plunder, for no
compensation would be made to any person unless he could prove his
fidelity to the Government of the United States.

On the next day, Major-General Pope, in command of the United States
forces near Washington,[113] issued a general order directing the
murder of our peaceful inhabitants as spies, if found quietly tilling
the farms in his rear, even outside of his lines; and one of his
brigadier-generals seized upon innocent and peaceful inhabitants to
be held as hostages, to the end that they might be murdered in cold
blood if any of his soldiers were killed by some unknown persons,
whom he designated as "bushwhackers." Under this state of facts, I
issued a general order, recognizing General Pope and his commissioned
officers to be in the position which they had chosen for themselves--
that of robbers and murderers, and not that of public enemies,
entitled, if captured, to be considered as prisoners of war. Some of
the military authorities of the United States seemed to suppose that
better success would attend a savage war, in which no quarter was to
be given and no age or sex to be spared, than had hitherto been
secured by such hostilities as were alone recognized to be lawful by
civilized men. We renounced our right of retaliation on the innocent,
and continued to treat the soldiers of General Pope's army as
prisoners of war, confining our repressive measures to the punishment
only of commissioned officers as were willing participants in such
crimes. General Pope was soon afterward removed from command.

In August a letter involving similar principles was addressed by
General R. E. Lee to the commanding General at Washington, General
Halleck, making inquiries as to the truth of the case of William B.
Mumford, reported to have been murdered at New Orleans by
Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, and of Colonel John Owens, reported
to have been murdered in Missouri by order of Major-General Pope. I
had also been credibly informed that numerous other officers of the
army of the United States within the Confederacy had been guilty of
felonies and capital offenses, which are punishable by all laws human
and divine. Inquiries were made by letter relative to a few of the
best-authenticated cases. It was announced that Major-General Hunter
had armed slaves for the murder of their masters, and had thus done
all in his power to inaugurate a servile war, which is worse than
that of the savage, inasmuch as it super-adds other horrors to the
indiscriminate slaughter of all ages, sexes, and conditions.

In a letter, dated Port Royal, South Carolina, June 23, 1862, General
Hunter said:

"It is my hope to have organized by the end of next fall, and to be
able to present to the Government, from forty-eight to fifty thousand
of these hardy and devoted soldiers."

Brigadier-General Phelps was reported to have initiated at New
Orleans the example set by General Hunter in South Carolina.
Brigadier-General G. N. Fitch was stated in the public journals to
have murdered in cold blood two peaceful citizens, because one of his
men, when invading our country, was killed by some unknown person
while defending his home. General Lee was further directed by me to
say that, if a reply was not received in fifteen days, it would be
assumed that the alleged facts were true, and were sanctioned by the
Government of the United States, and on that Government would rest
the responsibility of retaliatory measures. The reply of the
commanding General (Halleck) at Washington was in these words:

"As these papers are couched in language insulting to the Government
of the United States, I most respectfully decline to receive them."

On August 20, 1862, I issued an order threatening retaliation for the
lives of peaceable citizens reported to have been executed by
Brigadier-General Fitch. That report was afterward ascertained to be
untrue. On the next day I issued another order, which, after reciting
the principal facts, directed that Major-General Hunter and
Brigadier-General Phelps should be no longer held and treated as
public enemies of the Confederate States, but as outlaws; and that in
the event of the capture of either of them, or that of any other
commissioned officer employed in drilling, organizing, or instructing
slaves, with a view to their armed service in this war, he should not
be regarded as a prisoner of war, but held in close confinement for
execution as a felon, at such time and place as may be ordered.

In the case of William B. Mumford, a letter was received from General
Halleck, dated August 7, 1862, stating sufficient causes for a
failure to make an earlier reply to the letter of July 6th; asserting
that "no authentic information had been received in relation to the
execution of Mumford, but measures will be immediately taken to
ascertain the facts of the alleged execution," and promising that
General Lee should be duly informed thereof. Subsequently, on
November 25, 1862, our agent for the exchange of prisoners, Mr.
Robert Ould, under my instructions, addressed the agent of the United
States, informing him that the explanation promised on August 7th had
not been received; and that, if no answer was sent within fifteen
days, it would be considered that an answer was declined. On December
3d our agent, Mr. Ould, was apprised by the agent of the United
States that his letter had been forwarded to the Secretary of War at
Washington, and no answer was returned, which was regarded as a tacit
admission of the charge. Besides, I had received evidence fully
establishing the fact that the said Mumford, a citizen of the
Confederacy, was actually and publicly executed in cold blood by
hanging after the occupation of New Orleans by the forces under
General Benjamin F. Butler, when said Mumford was an unresisting and
non-combatant captive, and for no offenses even alleged to have been
committed by him subsequent to the date of the occupation of the
city. It appeared that the silence of the Government of the United
States and its maintenance of Butler in high office, under its
authority, afforded evidence too conclusive that it sanctioned his
conduct, and was determined that he should remain unpunished for
these crimes. I therefore pronounced and declared the said Butler a
felon, deserving capital punishment, and ordered that he be no longer
considered and treated as a public enemy of the Confederate States,
but as an outlaw and common enemy of mankind; and that, in the event
of his capture, the officer in command should cause him to be
immediately executed by hanging.

These measures of retaliation were in conformity with the usages of
war, and were adapted to check and punish the cruelties of our
adversary.

At length, so many difficulties were raised and so many complaints
made in the execution of the cartel, that, for the sake of the
unfortunate prisoners, I resolved to seek an adjustment through the
authorities at Washington. For this purpose Vice-President Stephens
offered his services as a commissioner. The following papers will
show the proposition we were prepared to make, and illustrate the
disposition with which our humane designs were regarded by the enemy:

"RICHMOND, _July 2, 1863._

"Hon. ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, _Richmond, Virginia._

"SIR: Having accepted your patriotic offer to proceed as a military
commissioner under flag of truce to Washington, you will receive
herewith your letter of authority to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States. The letter is signed by me, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate land and naval forces.

"You will perceive from the terms of the letter that it is so worded
as to avoid any political difficulties in its reception. Intended
exclusively as one of those communications between belligerents which
public law recognizes as necessary and proper between hostile forces,
care has been taken to give no pretext for refusing to receive it on
the ground that it would involve a tacit recognition of the
independence of the Confederacy. Your mission is simply one of
humanity, and has no political aspect.

"If objection is made to receiving your letter on the ground that it
is not addressed to Abraham Lincoln as President, instead of
Commander-in-Chief, etc., then you will present the duplicate letter
which is addressed to him as President and signed by me as President.
To this latter, objection may be made on the ground that I am not
recognized to be President of the Confederacy. In this event you will
decline any further attempt to confer on the subject of your mission,
as such conference is admissible only on the footing of perfect
equality.

"My recent interviews with you have put you so fully in possession of
my views, that it is scarcely necessary to give you any detailed
instructions, even were I at this moment well enough to attempt it.
My whole purpose is in one word to place this war on the footing of
such as are waged by civilized people in modern times, and to divest
it of the savage character which has been impressed on it by our
enemies, in spite of all our efforts and protests. War is full enough
of unavoidable horrors under all its aspects, to justify and even to
demand of any Christian rulers who may be unhappily engaged in
carrying it on, to seek to restrict its calamities and to divest it
of all unnecessary severities. You will endeavor to establish the
cartel for the exchange of prisoners on such a basis as to avoid the
constant difficulties and complaints which arise, and to prevent for
the future what we deem the unfair conduct of our enemies in evading
the delivery of the prisoners who fall into their hands; in retarding
it by sending them on circuitous routes, and by detaining them
sometimes for months in camps and prisons; and in persisting in
taking captives non-combatants.

"Your attention is also called to the unheard-of conduct of Federal
officers in driving from their homes entire communities of women and
children, as well as of men, whom they find in districts occupied by
their troops, for no other reason than because these unfortunates are
faithful to the allegiance due to their States, and refuse to take an
oath of fidelity to their enemies.

"The putting to death of unarmed prisoners has been a ground of just
complaint in more than one instance; and the recent execution of
officers of our army in Kentucky, for the sole cause that they were
engaged in recruiting service in a State which is claimed as still
one of the United States, but is also claimed by us as one of the
Confederate States, must be repressed by retaliation if not
unconditionally abandoned, because it would justify the like
execution in every other State of the Confederacy; and the practice
is barbarous, uselessly cruel, and can only lead to the slaughter of
prisoners on both sides--a result too horrible to be contemplated
without making every effort to avoid it.

"On these and all kindred subjects you will consider your authority
full and ample to make such arrangements as will temper the present
cruel character of the contest, and full confidence is placed in your
judgment, patriotism, and discretion that, while carrying out the
objects of your mission, you will take care that the equal rights of
the Confederacy be always preserved."

"HEADQUARTERS, RICHMOND, _July 2, 1863._

"SIR: As Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces now waging
war against the United States, I have the honor to address this
communication to you, as Commander-in-Chief of their land and naval
forces.

"Numerous difficulties and disputes have arisen in relation to the
execution of the cartel of exchange heretofore agreed on by the
belligerents, and the commissioners for the exchange of prisoners
have been unable to adjust their differences. Their action on the
subject of these differences is delayed and embarrassed by the
necessity of referring each subject as it arises to superior
authority for decision. I believe that I have just grounds of
complaint against the officers and forces under your command for
breach of the terms of the cartel, and, being myself ready to execute
it at all times in good faith, I am not justified in doubting the
existence of the same disposition on your part.

"In addition to this matter, I have to complain of the conduct of
your officers and troops in many parts of the country, who violate
all the rules of war, by carrying on hostilities, not only against
armed foes, but against non-combatants, aged men, women, and
children; while others not only seize such property as is required
for the use of your forces, but destroy all private property within
their reach, even agricultural implements; and openly avow the
purpose of seeking to subdue the population of the districts where
they are operating, by the starvation that must result from the
destruction of standing crops and agricultural tools.

"Still, again, others of your officers in different districts have
recently taken the lives of prisoners who fell into their power, and
justify their act by asserting a right to treat as spies the military
officers and enlisted men under my command, who may penetrate for
hostile purposes into States claimed by me to be engaged in the
warfare now waged against the United States, and claimed by the
latter as having refused to engage in such warfare.

"I have heretofore, on different occasions, been forced to make
complaint of these outrages, and to ask from you that you should
either avow or disclaim having authorized them, and have failed to
obtain such answer as the usages of civilized warfare require to be
given in such cases.

"These usages justify, and indeed require, redress by retaliation, as
the proper means of repressing such cruelties as are not permitted in
warfare between Christian peoples. I have, notwithstanding, refrained
from the exercise of such retaliation, because of its obvious
tendency to lead to a war of indiscriminate massacre on both sides,
which would be a spectacle so shocking to humanity and so disgraceful
to the age in which we live and the religion we profess, that I can
not contemplate it without a feeling of horror that I am disinclined
to doubt you would share.

"With the view, then, of making one last solemn attempt to avert such
calamities, and to attest my earnest desire to prevent them, if it be
possible, I have selected the bearer of this letter, the Hon.
Alexander H. Stephens, as a military commissioner to proceed to your
headquarters under flag of truce, there to confer and agree on the
subjects above mentioned; and I do hereby authorise the said
Alexander H. Stephens to arrange and settle all differences and
disputes which may have arisen or may arise in the execution of the
cartel for exchange of prisoners of war, heretofore agreed on between
our respective land and naval forces; also to agree to any just
modification that may be found necessary to prevent further
misunderstandings as to the terms of said cartel; and finally to
enter into such arrangement or understanding about the mode of
carrying on hostilities between the belligerents as shall confine the
severities of the war within such limits as are rightfully imposed,
not only by modern civilization, but by our common Christianity. I
am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JEFFERSON DAVIS,

"_Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces of the Confederate
States._

"To ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

"_Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval fores of the United
States._"

On July 3, 1863, Mr. Stephens proceeded down the James River under a
flag of truce, and when near Newport News his further progress was
arrested by the orders of the Admiral of the enemy's fleet. The
object of his mission, with a request for permission to go to
Washington, was made known to that officer, who, by telegraph,
communicated with the Government at Washington. The reply of that
Government was:

"The request is inadmissible. The customary agents and channels are
adequate for all needful military communications and conference
between the United States forces and the insurgents."

This was all the notice ever taken of our humane propositions. We
were stigmatized as insurgents, and the door was shut in our faces.
Does not this demonstrate an intent to subjugate our States?

From the correspondence of our exchange commissioner, Judge Ould, it
appears that, from the date of the cartel on July 22, 1862, until the
summer of 1863, we had an excess of prisoners. During the interval
deliveries were made as fast as the enemy furnished transportation.
Indeed, upon more than one occasion they were urged to send increased
means of transportation. It was never alleged that we failed or
neglected to make prompt deliveries of prisoners who were not held
under charges when they had the excess. On the other hand, the cartel
was openly and notoriously violated by the Washington authorities.
Officers and men were kept in confinement, sometimes in irons or
doomed to cells, without charge or trial. Many officers were kept in
confinement even after the notices published by the enemy had
declared them to be exchanged.

In the summer of 1863 the authorities at Washington insisted upon
exchanges limited to such as were held in confinement on either side.
This was resisted as in violation of the cartel. Such a construction
not only kept in confinement the excess on either side, but ignored
all paroles which were held by the Confederate Government. These were
very many, being the paroles of officers and men who had been
released on capture. The authorities at Washington at that time held
few or no paroles. They had all, or nearly all, been surrendered. We
gave prisoners as an equivalent for them. As long as we had the
excess of prisoners, matters went on smoothly enough; but, as soon as
the posture of affairs in that respect was changed, the cartel could
no longer be observed. So long as the United States Government held
the paroles of Confederate officers and men, they were respected and
made the basis of exchange; but when equivalents were obtained for
them, and no more were in hand, they would not recognize the paroles
which were held by us. In consequence of the position thus assumed by
the Government of the United States, the requirement of the cartel
that all prisoners should be delivered within ten days was
practically nullified. The deliveries which were afterward made were
the results of special agreements.

The wish of the Confederate Government, which it was hoped had been
accomplished by the cartel, was the prompt release of all prisoners
on both sides, either by exchange or parole. When, in 1864, the
cartel was so disregarded by the enemy as to indicate that prisoners
would be held long in confinement, Andersonville, in Georgia, was
selected for the location of a principal prison. The site was chosen
because of its supposed security from raids, together with its
salubrity, the abundance of water and timber, and the productive
farming country around it. General Howell Cobb, then commanding in
Georgia, employed a large number of negro laborers in the
construction of a stockade and temporary shelter for the number of
prisoners it was expected would be assembled there. The number,
however, rapidly increased, and, by the middle of May, gangrene and
scurvy made their appearance. General John H. Winder, who had been
stationed in Richmond in charge of the police and local guards, as
well as the general control of prisoners, went to Andersonville in
June, and found disease prevailing to such an extent that, to abate
the pestilence, he immediately advised the removal of prisoners to
other points. As soon as arrangements could be made, he was
instructed to disperse them to Millen and elsewhere, as in his
judgment might be best for their health, comfort and safety. In July
he made arrangements to procure vegetables, recommended details of
men to cultivate gardens, and that hospital accommodations should be
constructed outside of the prison; all of which recommendations were
approved, and as far as practicable executed. In September General
Winder, with the main body of the prisoners, removed first to Millen,
Georgia, and then to Florence, South Carolina.

Major Wirz thereafter remained in command at Andersonville, and the
testimony of Chief-Surgeon Stevenson, of the hospital at
Andersonville, bears testimony to the success with which Wirz
improved the post, and the good effect produced upon the health of
the prisoners. This unfortunate man--who, under the severe
temptation to which he was exposed before his execution, exhibited
honor and fidelity strongly in contrast with his tempters and
persecutors--it now appears, was the victim of men whom, in his
kindness, he paroled to take care of their sick comrades, and who,
after having violated their parole, appeared to testify against him.

In like manner has calumny pursued the memory of General John H.
Winder, a man too brave to be cruel to anything within his power, too
well bred and well born to be influenced by low and sordid motives. I
have referred only to a few of the facts illustrative of his kindness
to the prisoners after he went to Georgia, and they were in keeping
with his conduct toward the prisoners at Richmond. This latter fact,
together with his sterling integrity and soldierly character, had
caused his selection for the chief control of Confederate prisons.

The Adjutant-General, Samuel Cooper, a man as pure in heart as he was
sound in judgment, was the classmate of Winder; their lives had been
passed in the array in frequent intercourse; and General Cooper, in a
letter of July 9, 1871, wrote that "General Winder, who had the
control of the Northern prisoners, was an honest, upright, and humane
gentleman, and as such I had known him for many years. He had the
reputation, in the Confederacy, of treating the prisoners confided to
his general supervision with great kindness and consideration."

In January, 1864, and even earlier, it became manifest that, in
consequence of the complication in relation to exchanges, the large
mass of prisoners on both sides would remain in captivity for many
long and weary months, if not for the duration of the war. In order
to alleviate the hardships of confinement on both sides, our
commissioner, on January 24, 1863, addressed a communication to
General E. A. Hitchcock, United States commissioner of exchange, in
which he proposed that all prisoners on each side should be attended
by a proper number of their own surgeons, who, under rules to be
established, should be permitted to take charge of their health and
comfort.

It was also proposed that these surgeons should act as commissaries,
with power to receive and distribute such contributions of money,
food, clothing, and medicines as might be forwarded for the relief of
the prisoners. It was further proposed that these surgeons should be
selected by their own Government, and that they should have full
liberty at any and all times, through the agents of exchange, to make
reports, not only of their own acts, but of any matters relating to
the welfare of the prisoners.

To this communication no reply of any kind was ever made.

Again, Commissioner Ould, in a communication published in August,
1868, further says:

"About the last of March, 1864, I had several conferences with
General B. F. Butler, then agent of exchange at Fortress Monroe, in
relation to the difficulties attending the exchange of prisoners, and
we reached what we both thought a tolerably satisfactory basis. The
day that I left there General Grant arrived. General Butler says he
communicated to him the state of the negotiations, and 'most emphatic
verbal directions were received from the Lieutenant-General not to
take any step by which another able-bodied man should be exchanged
until further orders from him'; and that on April 30, 1864, he
received a telegram from General Grant 'to receive all the sick and
wounded the Confederate authorities may send you, but send no more in
exchange.' Unless my recollection fails me, General Butler also, in
an address to his constituents, substantially declared that he was
directed, in his management of the question of exchange with the
Confederate authorities, to put the matter _offensively, for the
purpose of preventing an exchange_."

The signification of the word "offensively," in the preceding line,
relates to the exchange of negro soldiers. The Government of the
United States contended that the slaves in their ranks were such no
longer; that it was bound to accord to them, when made prisoners, the
same protection that it gave all other soldiers. We asserted the
slaves to be property, under the Constitution of the United States
and that of the Confederate States, and that property recaptured from
the enemy in war reverts to its owner, if he can be found, or it may
be disposed of by its captor.

On October 1st, when the number of prisoners was large on either
side. General Lee addressed a note to General Grant, saying:

"With a view of alleviating the sufferings of our soldiers, I have
the honor to propose an exchange of the prisoners of war belonging to
the armies operating in Virginia, man for man, or upon the basis
established by the cartel."

On the next day General Grant replied:

"I could not of a right accept your proposition further than to
exchange those prisoners captured within the last three days, and who
have not yet been delivered to the commanding General of prisoners.
Among those lost by the armies operating against Richmond were a
number of colored troops. Before further negotiations are had upon
the subject, I would ask if you propose delivering these men the same
as white soldiers."

On the next day General Lee said, in rejoinder:

"In my proposition of the 1st inst., to exchange the prisoners of war
belonging to the armies operating in Virginia, I intended to include
all captured soldiers of the United States, of whatever nation and
color, under my control. Deserters from our service and negroes
belonging to our citizens are not considered subjects of exchange,
and were not included in my proposition. If there are any such among
those stated by you to have been captured around Richmond, they can
not be returned."

On October 20th General Grant finally answered, saying;

"I shall always regret the necessity of retaliating for wrong done
our soldiers, but regard it my duty to protect all persons received
into the army of the United States, regardless of color or
nationality; when acknowledged soldiers of the Government are
captured, they must be treated as prisoners of war, or such treatment
as they receive inflicted upon an equal number of prisoners held by
us."

This was "putting the matter offensively, for the purpose of
preventing an exchange," as recommended by General Grant for the
adoption of General Butler.

But let us return to the progress of negotiations. In a dispatch from
General Grant to General Butler, dated City Point, August 18, 1864,
the former says:

"On the subject of exchange, however, I differ from General
Hitchcock. It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to
exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight
our battles. Every man released on parole, or otherwise, becomes an
active soldier against us at once, either directly or indirectly. If
we commence a system of exchange, which liberates all prisoners
taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is
exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more than
dead men. At this particular time to release all rebel prisoners
North would insure Sherman's defeat, and would compromise our safety
here."

We now proposed to the Government of the United States to exchange
the prisoners respectively held, officer for officer and man for man.
We had previously declined this proposal, and insisted on the terms
of the cartel, which required the delivery of the excess on either
side on parole. At the same time we sent a statement of the mortality
prevailing among the prisoners at Andersonville.

As no answer had been received relative to this proposal, a
communication was sent, on August 22, 1864, to Major-General E. A.
Hitchcock, United States commissioner of exchange, containing the
same proposal which had been before delivered to the assistant
commissioner, and a request was made for its acceptance.

No answer was received to either of these letters, and on August 31st
the assistant commissioner stated that he had no communication on the
subject from the United States Government, and that he was not
authorized to make an answer.

This offer, which would have released every soldier of the United
States confined in our prisons, was not even noticed. Indeed, the
United States Government had, at that time, a large excess of
prisoners, and the effect of the proposal, if carried out, would have
been to release all the prisoners belonging to it, while a large
number of ours would have remained in prison awaiting the chances of
the capture of their equivalents.

Thus, having ascertained that exchanges could not be made, either on
the basis of the cartel, or officer for officer and man for man, we
offered to the United States Government their sick and wounded
without requiring any equivalents. On these terms, we agreed to
deliver from ten to fifteen thousand at the mouth of the Savannah
River; and we further added that, if the number for which
transportation might be sent could not be readily made up from sick
and wounded, the difference should be supplied with well men.
Although the offer was made in the summer, the transportation did not
arrive until November. And as the sick and wounded were at points
distant from Georgia, and could not be brought to Savannah within a
reasonable time, five thousand well men were substituted. In return,
some three thousand sick and wounded were delivered to us at the same
place. The original rolls showed that some thirty-five hundred had
started from Northern prisons, and that death had reduced the number
during the passage to about three thousand.

On two occasions we were specially asked to send the very sick and
desperately wounded prisoners, and a particular request was made for
men who were so seriously sick that it was doubtful whether they
would survive a removal a few miles down James River. Accordingly,
some of the worst cases, contrary to the judgment of our surgeons,
but in compliance with the piteous appeals of the sick prisoners,
were sent away, and after being delivered they were taken to
Annapolis, Maryland, and there photographed as specimen prisoners.
The photographs at Annapolis were terrible indeed, but the misery
they portrayed was surpassed by some of those we received in exchange
at Savannah. Why was there this delay between the summer and November
in sending vessels for the transportation of sick and wounded, for
whom no equivalents were asked? Were Federal prisoners left to
suffer, and afterward photographed "to aid in firing the popular
heart of the North"?

In the summer of 1864, in consequence of certain information
communicated to our commissioner, Mr. Ould, by the Surgeon-General of
the Confederate States, as to the deficiency of medicines. Mr. Ould
offered to make purchases of medicines from the United States
authorities, to be used exclusively for the relief of the Union
prisoners. He offered to pay gold, cotton, or tobacco for them, and
even two or three prices if required. At the same time he gave
assurances that the medicines would be used exclusively for the
treatment of Union prisoners; and moreover agreed, on behalf of the
Confederate States, if it were insisted on, that such medicines might
be brought into the Confederate lines by the United States surgeons,
and dispensed by them. Incredible as it may appear, it is,
nevertheless, strictly true that no reply was ever received to this
offer.

One final effort was now made to obtain an exchange. This consisted
in my sending a delegation from the prisoners at Andersonville to
plead their cause before the authorities at Washington. It was of no
avail. President Lincoln refused to see them. They were made to
understand that the interests of the Government of the United States
required that they should return to prison and remain there. They
carried back the sad tidings that their Government held out no hope
of their release.

"We have a letter from the wife of the chairman of that delegation
(now dead) in which she says that her husband always said that he was
more contemptuously treated by Secretary of War Stanton than he ever
was at Andersonville." [114]

Another prisoner, Henry M. Brennan, writes:

"I was at Andersonville when the delegation of prisoners spoken of by
Jefferson Davis left there to plead our cause with the authorities at
Washington; and nobody can tell, unless it be a shipwrecked and
famished mariner, who sees a vessel approaching and then passing on
without rendering the required aid, what fond hopes were raised, and
how hope sickened into despair, waiting for the answer that never
came. In my opinion, and that of a good many others, a good part of
the responsibility for the horrors of Andersonville rests with
General U. S. Grant, who refused to make a fair exchange of
prisoners."

The following extracts are from the official report of Major-General
Butler to "the Committee on the Conduct of the War," which was
appointed by a joint resolution of Congress, during the war:

"Mr. Ould left on the 31st of March, 1864, with the understanding
that I would get authority and information from my Government, by
which all disputed points could be adjusted, and would then confer
with him further, either meeting him at City Point or elsewhere for
that purpose. In the mean time exchanges of sick and wounded, and
special exchanges, should go on.

"General Grant visited Fortress Monroe on April 1st, being the first
time I had ever met him. To him the state of the negotiations as to
exchange[115] was verbally communicated; and most emphatic directions
were received from the Lieutenant-General not to take any step by
which another able-bodied man should be exchanged, until further
orders from him."

General Butler next gives the following from General Mulford, United
States assistant agent of exchange, addressed to him:

"GENERAL: The Confederate authorities will exchange prisoners on the
basis heretofore proposed by our Government--that is, man for man.
This proposition was proposed formally to me after I saw you."

General Butler's report continues as follows:

"Accident prevented my meeting the rebel commissioner, so that
nothing was done; but after conversation with General Grant, in reply
to the proposition of Mr. Ould to exchange all prisoners of war on
either side held, man for man, officer for officer, I wrote an
argument showing our right to our colored soldiers. This argument set
forth our claims in the most offensive form possible, consistently
with ordinary courtesy of language, for the purpose of carrying out
the wishes of the Lieutenant-General that no prisoners of war should
be exchanged. This paper was published so as to bring a public
pressure by the owners of slaves upon the rebel Government, in order
to forbid their exchange."

The report continues:

"In case the Confederate authorities took the same view as General
Grant, believing that an exchange 'would defeat Sherman and imperil
the safety of the Armies of the Potomac and the James,' and therefore
should yield to the argument, and formally notify me that their
former slaves captured in our uniform would be exchanged as other
soldiers were, and that they were ready to return us all our
prisoners at Andersonville and elsewhere in exchange for theirs, then
I had determined, with the consent of the Lieutenant-General, as a
last resort to prevent exchange, to demand that the outlawry against
me should formally be reversed and apologized for, before I would
further negotiate the exchange of prisoners. But the argument was
enough, and the Confederates never offered to me afterward to
exchange the colored soldiers who had been slaves, held in prison by
them."

Further on in the report General Butler gives the history of some
naval exchanges, in the course of which colored prisoners were
delivered, and concludes his observations on that head as follows:

"It will be observed that the rebels had exchanged all the naval
colored prisoners, so that the negro question no longer impeded the
exchange of prisoners; in fact, if we had demanded the exchange of
all, man for man, officer for officer, they would have done it."

The conclusion of the report is as follows:

"I have felt it my duty to give an account with this particular
carefulness of my participation in the business of exchange of
prisoners, the orders under which I acted, and the negotiations
attempted, which comprises a faithful narration of all that was done,
so that all may become a matter of history. The great importance of
the questions; the fearful responsibility for the many thousands of
lives which, by the refusal to exchange, were sacrificed by the most
cruel forms of death, from cold, starvation, and pestilence of the
prison-pens of Raleigh and Andersonville, being more than all the
British soldiers killed in the wars of Napoleon; the anxiety of
fathers, brothers, sisters, mothers, wives, to know the exigency
which caused this terrible, and perhaps, as it may have seemed to
them, useless and unnecessary, destruction of those dear to them, by
horrible deaths, each and all have compelled me to this exposition,
so that it may be seen that those lives were spent as a part of the
system of attack upon the rebellion, devised by the wisdom of the
General-in-Chief of the armies, to destroy it by depletion, depending
upon our superior numbers to win the victory at last. The loyal
mourners will doubtless derive solace from this fact, and appreciate
all the more highly the genius which conceived the plan, and the
success won at so great a cost."

Sufficient facts have been presented to satisfy every intelligent and
candid mind of our entire readiness to surrender, for exchange, all
the prisoners in our possession, whenever the Government of the
United States would honestly meet us for that purpose. At any hour
perfect arrangements could have been made with us for the restoration
to it of all its soldiers held as prisoners by us, if its authorities
at Washington had consented so to do. On them rests the criminality
for the sufferings of these prisoners.

Further, the Government of the United States, in order to effect our
subjugation, devastated our fields, destroyed our crops, broke up our
railroads, and thus interrupted our means of transportation, and
reduced our people, our armies, and consequently their soldiers, who
were our prisoners, all alike, to the most straitened condition for
food. Our medicines for the sick were exhausted, and, contrary to the
usage of civilized nations, they were made, by our enemy, contraband
of war. After causing these and other distressing events--of which
Atlanta, where the women and children were driven into the fields and
their houses burned, and Columbia, with its smoking and plundered
ruins, were prominent examples--after every effort to excite our
slaves to servile war--this Government of the United States turned
to the Northern people, and, charging us with atrocious cruelties to
their sons, who were our prisoners, appealed to them again and again
to recruit the armies and take vengeance upon us by our abject
subjugation or entire extermination. It was the last effort of the
usurper to save himself.

But there is another scene to be added to these cruelties. During all
this time, Northern prisons were full of our brave and heroic
soldiers, of whom there were about sixty thousand. The privations
which they suffered, the cruelties inspired by the malignant spirit
of the Government, which were inflicted upon them, surpass any
records of modern history: yet we have had no occasion to seek out a
Wirz for public trial before an illegal court, that we might conceal
behind him our own neglect and cruel sacrifice of them. That we might
clothe our brave men in the prisons of the United States Government,
I made an application for permission to send cotton to Liverpool, and
therewith purchase the supplies which were necessary. The request was
granted, but only on condition that the cotton should be sent to New
York and the supplies bought there. This was done by our agent,
General Beale. The suffering of our men in Northern prisons caused
the application; that it was granted, refutes the statement that our
men were comfortably maintained.

Finally, to the bold allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners on our
side, and humane treatment and adequate supplies on that of our
opponents, it is only necessary to offer two facts: First, the report
of the Secretary of War, E. M. Stanton, made on July 19, 1866, shows
that, of all the prisoners in our hands during the war, only 22,576
died; while, of the prisoners in our opponents' hands, 26,246 died.
Second, the official report of Surgeon-General Barnes, an officer of
the United States Government, states that, in round numbers, the
number of Confederate States prisoners in their hands amounted to
220,000, the number of United States prisoners in our hands amounted
to 270,000. Thus, out of the 270,000 in our hands, 22,000 died; while
of the 220,000 of our soldiers in their hands, 26,000 died. Thus,
more than twelve per cent. of the prisoners in our opponents' hands
died, and less than nine per cent. of the prisoners in our hands died.

When, in this connection, it is remembered how much our resources
were reduced, that our supply of medicines required in summer
diseases was exhausted, and that Northern men when first residing at
the South must undergo acclimation, and that these conditions in the
Northern States were the reverse in each particular--the fact that
greater mortality existed in Northern than in Southern prisons can
only be accounted for by the kinder treatment received in the latter.
To present the case in a sentence--we did the best we could for
those whom the fortune of war had placed at our mercy; and the enemy,
in the midst of plenty, inflicted cruel, wanton deprivation on our
soldiers who fell within his power.

In regard to the failure in the exchange of prisoners, General B. F.
Butler has irrefutably fixed the responsibility on the Government at
Washington and on General Grant. The obstacles thus thrown in the way
were not only persistently interposed, but artfully designed to be
insurmountable.

On the other hand, the Confederate Government, through Colonel Ould,
its commissioner of exchanges, sought by all practicable means to
execute the obligations of the cartel, and otherwise to relieve the
suffering of prisoners kept in confinement; through a delegation of
the Federal prisoners at Andersonville, it sought to attract the
notice of their Government to their sufferings; and, finally,
confiding in the chivalry characteristic of soldiers, sought, through
General Lee, to make an arrangement with General Grant for the
exchange of all the prisoners held in their respective commands, and
as many more as General Grant could add in response to all held by
the Confederate Government.[116]

[Footnote 112: "Southern Historical Society Papers," March, 1876.]

[Footnote 113: See chapter xxxiv.]

[Footnote 114: Editor of Southern Historical Society Papers.]

[Footnote 115: "The negotiations as to exchange, to which General Butler
refers, were the points of agreement between General Butler and
myself, under which exchanges of all white and free black soldiers,
man for man and officer for officer, were to go on, leaving the
question as to slaves to be disposed of by subsequent arrangement."--
(Letter of Mr. Ould, June, 1879.)]

[Footnote 116: For full and exact information, compiled from official
records and other documents, the reader is referred to "Treatment of
Prisoners," by J. William Jones, D. D., and to "The Southern Side: or
Andersonville Prison, compiled from Official Documents" by R.
Randolph Stevenson, M. D.]

CHAPTER L.

Subjugation the Object of the Government of the United States.--The
only Terms of Peace offered to us.--Rejection of all Proposals.--
Efforts of the Enemy.--Appearance of Jacques and Gilmore
at Richmond.--Proposals.--Answer.--Commissioners sent to Canada.--
The Object.--Proceedings.--Note of President Lincoln.--Permission
to visit Richmond granted to Francis P. Blair.--Statement of my
Interview with him.--My Letter to him.--Response of President
Lincoln.--Three Persons sent by me to an Informal Conference.--
Their Report.--Remarks of Judge Campbell.--Oath of President
Lincoln.--The Provision of the Constitution and his Proclamation
compared.--Reserved Powers spoken of in the Constitution.--What are
they, and where do they exist?--Terms of Surrender offered to our
Soldiers.

That it was the purpose of the Government of the United States to
subjugate the Southern States and the Southern people, under the
pretext of a restoration of the Union, is established by the terms
and conditions offered to us in all the conferences relative to a
settlement of differences. All were comprehended in one word, and
that was subjugation. If the purpose had been an honorable and
fraternal restoration of the Union as was avowed, methods for the
adjustment of difficulties would have been presented and discussed;
propositions for reconciliation with concessions and modifications
for grievances would have been kindly offered and treated; and a way
would have been opened for a mutual and friendly intercourse. How
unlike this were all the propositions offered to us, will be seen in
the proceedings which took place in the conferences, and in the terms
of surrender offered to our soldiers. It should be remembered that
mankind compose one uniform order of beings, and thus the language of
arbitrary power has the same signification in all ages. When Major
Pitcairn marched the British soldiers upon the common, at Lexington,
in Massachusetts, on April 19, 1775, and, drawing his sword, rushed
upon the little line of Continentals, exclaiming: "Disperse, ye
rebels! throw down your arms and disperse!" he expressed the same
conditions which were offered to us in all our negotiations with the
President of the United States and his generals. Does any one doubt
that Major Pitcairn meant subjugation, or that Great Britain meant
subjugation? Let them as dispassionately construe the Government of
the United States in its declarations to us.

Several efforts were made by us to communicate with the authorities
at Washington without success. Commissioners were sent before
hostilities were begun, and the Government of the United States
refused to receive them, or hear what they had to say. A second time
I sent a military officer with a communication addressed by myself to
President Lincoln. The letter was received by General Scott, who did
not permit the officer to see Mr. Lincoln, but promised that an
answer would be sent. No answer was ever received. The third time a
gentleman was sent whose position, character, and reputation were
such as to insure his reception, if the enemy had not been determined
to receive no proposals whatever from our Government. Vice-President
Stephens made a patriotic tender of his services, in the hope of
being able to promote the cause of humanity; and, although little
belief was entertained of his success, I cheerfully yielded to his
suggestions, that the experiment should be tried. The enemy refused
to let him pass through their lines or to hold any conference with
him. He was stopped before he reached Fortress Monroe.

If we would break up our Government, dissolve the Confederacy,
disband our armies, emancipate our slaves, take an oath of
allegiance, binding ourselves to obedience to it and to disloyalty to
our own States, the Government of the United States proposed to
pardon us, and not to deprive us of anything more than the property
already robbed from us, and such slaves as still remained. In order
to render the proposals so insulting as to secure their rejection,
the President of the United States joined to them a promise to
support with his army one tenth of the people of any State who would
attempt to set up a government over the other nine tenths; thus
seeking to sow discord among the people of the several States, and to
excite them to civil war in furtherance of his ends.

The next movement relating to the accommodation of differences
occurred in July, 1864, and consisted in the appearance at Richmond
of Colonel James F. Jacques, of the Seventy-eighth Illinois Infantry,
and James R. Gilmore, of Massachusetts, soliciting an interview with
me. They stated that they had no official character or authority,
"but were fully possessed of the views of the United States
Government, relative to an adjustment of the differences existing
between the North and the South," and did not doubt that a free
interchange of views would open the way to official negotiations,
etc. They had crossed our lines through a letter of General Grant to
Colonel Ould, commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. The
Secretary of State, Mr. Benjamin, to whom they were conducted,
accompanied them to my office. Colonel Jacques expressed the ardent
desire he felt, in common with the men of their army, for a
restoration of peace, using such emphatic terms as that the men would
go home in double-quick time if they could only see peace restored.
Mr. Gilmore addressed me, and in a few minutes conveyed the
information that the two gentlemen had come to Richmond impressed
with the idea that the Confederate Government would accept a peace on
the basis of a reconstruction of the Union, the abolition of slavery,
and the grant of an amnesty to the people of the States as repentant
criminals. In order to accomplish the abolition of slavery, it was
proposed that there should be a general vote of all the people of
both federations, in mass, and the majority of the vote thus taken
was to determine that as well as all other disputed questions. These
were stated to be Mr. Lincoln's views. The impudence of the remarks
could only be extenuated because of the ignorance displayed and the
profuse avowal of the kindest motives and intentions.

I answered that, as these proposals had been prefaced by the remark
that the people of the North were a majority, and that a majority
ought to govern, the offer was, in effect, a proposal that the
Confederate States should surrender at discretion, admit that they
had been wrong from the beginning of the contest, submit to the mercy
of their enemies, and avow themselves to be in need of pardon for
their crimes; that extermination was preferable to dishonor. I stated
that, if they were themselves so unacquainted with the form of their
own government as to make such propositions, Mr. Lincoln ought to
have known, then giving them his views, that it was out of the power
of the Confederate Government to act on the subject of the domestic
institutions of the several States, each State having exclusive
jurisdiction on that point, still less to commit the decision of such
a question to the vote of a foreign people. Having no disposition to
discuss questions of state with such persons, especially as they bore
no credentials, I terminated the interview, and they withdrew with
Mr. Benjamin.

The opening of the spring campaign of 1864 was deemed a favorable
conjuncture for the employment of the resources of diplomacy. To
approach the Government of the United States directly would have been
in vain. Repeated efforts had already demonstrated its inflexible
purpose--not to negotiate with the Confederate authorities.
Political developments at the North, however, favored the adoption of
some action that might influence popular sentiment in the hostile
section. The aspect of the peace party was quite encouraging, and it
seemed that the real issue to be decided in the Presidential election
of that year, was the continuance or cessation of the war. A
commission of three persons, eminent in position and intelligence,
was accordingly appointed to visit Canada, with a view to negotiation
with such persons in the North as might be relied upon to aid the
attainment of peace. The commission was designed to facilitate such
preliminary conditions as might lead to formal negotiations between
the two Governments, and they were expected to make judicious use of
any political opportunity that might be presented.

The commissioners--Messrs. Clay, of Alabama; Holcombe, of Virginia;
and Thompson, of Mississippi--established themselves at Niagara
Falls in July, and on the 12th commenced a correspondence with Horace
Greeley, of New York. Through him they sought a safe-conduct to
Washington. Mr. Lincoln at first appeared to favor an interview, but
finally refused on the ground that the commissioners were not
authorized to treat for peace. His final announcement to them was the
following:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C, _July 18, 1864._

"_To whom it may concern:_

"Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the
integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery, and
which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now
at war against the United States, will be received and considered by
the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by
liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the
bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

This movement, like all others which had preceded it, was a failure.

On December 30, 1864, I received a request from Mr. Francis P. Blair,
a distinguished citizen of Montgomery County, Maryland, for
permission to visit Richmond for certain personal objects, which was
conceded to him. On January 12, 1865, he visited me, and the
following statement of our interview was immediately afterward
prepared:

"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, _January 12, 1865._

"_Memorandum of a confidential conversation held this day with F.
P. BLAIR, of Montgomery County, Maryland._

"Mr. Blair stated that, not receiving an answer to his application
for permission to visit Richmond, which had been sent from the
headquarters of General Grant's army, he returned to Washington and
there received the reply which had been made to his application, but
by some means had been withheld from him and been forwarded after
having been opened; that he had originally obtained permission to
visit Richmond from Mr. Lincoln, after stating to him that he (Mr.
Blair) had for many years held friendly relations with myself. Mr.
Lincoln stopped him, though he afterward gave him permission to visit
me. He stated, in explanation of his position, that he, being a man
of Southern blood, felt very desirous to see the war between the
States terminated, and hoped by an interview with me to be able to
effect something to that end; that, after receiving the pass which
had been sent to him by my direction, he sought before returning to
have a conversation with Mr. Lincoln; had two appointments for that
purpose, but on each occasion was disappointed, and, from the
circumstances, concluded that Mr. Lincoln avoided the interview, and
therefore came not only without credentials but without such
instructions from Mr. Lincoln as enabled him to speak for him. His
views, therefore, were to be regarded merely as his own, and said
they were perhaps merely the dreams of an old man, etc. He said,
despairing of being able to see me, he had determined to write to me,
and had the rough draft of a letter which he had prepared, and asked
permission to read it. Soon after commencing to do so, he said
(pleasantly) that he found his style was marked by his old pursuit,
and that the paper appeared too much like an editorial. He omitted,
therefore, portions of it, reading what he considered the main points
of his proposition. He had recognized the difference of our positions
as not entitling him to a response from me to the arguments and
suggestions which he desired to offer. I therefore allowed him to
read without comment on my part. When he had finished, I inquired as
to his main proposition, the cessation of hostilities and the union
of the military forces for the common purpose of maintaining the
'Monroe doctrine'--how that object was to be reached. He said that
both the political parties of the United States asserted the Monroe
doctrine as a cardinal point of their creed; that there was a general
desire to apply it to the case of Mexico. For that purpose a secret
treaty might be made, etc. I called his attention to my past efforts
for negotiation, and my inability to see--unless Mr. Lincoln's
course in that regard should be changed--how we were to take the
first step. He expressed the belief that Mr. Lincoln would now
receive commissioners, but subsequently said he could not give any
assurance on that point, and proposed to return to Washington to
explain his project to Mr. Lincoln, and notify me, if his hope proved
well founded, that Mr. Lincoln would now agree to a conference for
the purpose of entering into negotiations. He affirmed that Mr.
Lincoln did not sympathize with the radical men who desired the
devastation and subjugation of the Southern States, but that he was
unable to control the extreme party, which now had great power in the
Congress, and would at the next session have still more; referred to
the existence of two parties in the Cabinet, to the reluctant
nomination of Mr. Chase to be Chief-Justice, etc. For himself, he
avowed an earnest desire to stop the further effusion of blood, as
one every drop of whose blood was Southern. He expressed the hope
that the pride, the power, and the honor of the Southern States
should suffer no shock; looked to the extension of Southern territory
even to the Isthmus of Darien, and hoped, if his views found favor,
that his wishes would be realized; reiterated the idea of State
sovereignty, with illustrations, and accepted the reference I made to
explanation given in the 'Globe,' when he edited it, of the
proclamation of General Jackson.

"When his attention was called to the brutal atrocities of their
armies, especially the fiendish cruelty shown to helpless women and
children, as the cause of a deep-seated hostility on the part of our
people, and an insurmountable obstacle to an early restoration of
fraternal relations, he admitted the necessity for providing a new
channel for the bitter waters, and another bond than that of former
memories and interests. This was supposed to be contained in the
proposed common effort to maintain the 'Monroe doctrine' on the
American Continent. It was evident that he counted on the
disintegration of the Confederate States if the war continued, and
that in any event he regarded the institution of slavery as doomed to
extinction. I thought any remark by me on the first proposition would
lead to intimations in connection with public men which I preferred
not more distinctly to hear than as manifested in his general
remarks; on the latter point, for the reason stated, the inequality
of his responsibility and mine, I preferred to have no discussion.
The only difficulty which he spoke of as insurmountable was that of
existing engagements between European powers and the Confederate
States. This point, when referred to a second time as the dreaded
obstacle to a secret treaty which would terminate the war, was met by
me with a statement that we had now no such complication, were free
to act as to us should seem best, and desired to keep state policy
and institutions free from foreign control. Throughout the conference
Mr. Blair appeared to be animated by a sincere desire to promote a
pacific solution of the existing difficulty, but claimed no other
power than that of serving as a medium of communication between those
who had thus far had no intercourse, and were therefore without the
co-intelligence which might secure an adjustment of their
controversy. To his hopeful anticipation in regard to the restoration
of fraternal relations between the sections, by the means indicated,
I replied that a cessation of hostilities was the first step toward
the substitution of reason for passion, of sense of justice for a
desire to injure, and that, if the people were subsequently engaged
together to maintain a principle recognized by both, if together they
should bear sacrifices, share dangers, and gather common renown, that
new memories would take the place of those now planted by the events
of this war, and might, in the course of time, restore the feelings
which preexisted. But it was for us to deal with the problems before
us, and leave to posterity questions which they might solve, though
we could not; that, in the struggle for independence by our colonial
fathers, had failure instead of success attended their effort, Great
Britain, instead of a commerce which has largely contributed to her
prosperity, would have had the heavy expense of numerous garrisons,
to hold in subjection a people who deserved to be free and had
resolved not to be subject. Our conference ended with no other result
than an agreement that he would learn whether Mr. Lincoln would adopt
his (Mr. Blair's) project, and send or receive commissioners to
negotiate for a peaceful solution of the questions at issue; that he
would report to him my readiness to enter upon negotiations, and that
I knew of no insurmountable obstacle to such a treaty of peace as
would secure greater advantage to both parties than any result which
arms could achieve.

"_January 14, 1865._

"The foregoing memorandum of conversation was this day read to Mr.
Blair, and altered in so far as he desired, in any respect, to change
the expressions employed.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

The following letter was given by me to Mr. Blair:

"RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, _January 12, 1865._

"F. P. BLAIR, Esq.

"SIR: I have deemed it proper and probably desirable to you to give
you in this form the substance of remarks made by me to be repeated
by you to President Lincoln, etc., etc.

"I have no disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing
now, as heretofore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of
peace, am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to
suppose it will be received, or to receive a commission if the United
States Government shall choose to send one. That, notwithstanding the
rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise that a
commissioner, minister, or other agent would be received, appoint one
immediately, and renew the effort to enter into conference with a
view to secure peace to the two countries.

"Yours, etc., JEFFERSON DAVIS."

"WASHINGTON, _January 18, 1865._

"F. P. BLAIR, Esq.

"SIR: You having shown me Mr. Davis's letter to you of the 12th
instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and
shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he or any other
influential person now resisting the national authority may
informally send to me with the view of securing peace to the people
of our one common country.

"Yours, etc., A. LINCOLN."

When Mr. Blair returned and gave me this letter of Mr. Lincoln of
January 18th, it being a response to my note to Mr. Blair of the
12th, he said it had been a fortunate thing that I gave him that
note, as it had created greater confidence in Mr. Lincoln regarding
his efforts at Richmond. Further reflection, he said, had modified
the views he formerly presented to me, and that he wanted to have my
attention for a different mode of procedure.

He had, as he told Mr. Lincoln, held friendly relations with me for
many years; they began as far back as when I was a schoolboy at
Lexington, Kentucky, and he a resident of that place. In later years
we had belonged to the same political party, and our views had
generally coincided. There was much, therefore, to facilitate our
conference. He then unfolded to me the embarrassment of Mr. Lincoln
on account of the extreme men in Congress and elsewhere, who wished
to drive him into harsher measures than he was inclined to adopt;
whence it would not be feasible for him to enter into any arrangement
with us by the use of political agencies; that, if anything
beneficial could be effected, it must be done without the
intervention of the politicians. He, therefore, suggested that
Generals Lee and Grant might enter into an arrangement by which
hostilities would be suspended, and a way paved for the restoration
of peace. I responded that I would willingly intrust to General Lee
such negotiation as was indicated.

The conference then ended, and, to report to Mr. Lincoln the result
of his visit, Mr. Blair returned to Washington. He subsequently
informed me that the idea of a military convention was not favorably
received at Washington, so it only remained for me to act upon the
letter of Mr. Lincoln.

I determined to send, as commissioners or agents for the informal
conference, Messrs. Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John
A. Campbell.

A letter of commission or certificate of appointment for each was
prepared by the Secretary of State in the following form:

"In compliance with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing
is a copy, you are hereby requested to proceed to Washington City for
conference with him upon the subject to which it relates," etc.

This draft of a commission was, upon perusal, modified by me so as to
read as follows:

"RICHMOND, _January 28, 1865._

"In conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the foregoing
is a copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington City for an
informal conference with him upon the issues involved in the existing
war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries."

Some objections were made to this commission by the United States
officials, because it authorized the commissioners to confer for the
purpose "of securing peace to the two countries"; whereas the letter
of Mr. Lincoln, which was their passport, spoke of "securing peace to
the people of our one common country." But these objections were
finally waived.

The letter of Mr. Lincoln expressing a willingness to receive any
agent I might send to Washington City, a commission was appointed to
go there; but it was not allowed to proceed farther than Hampton
Roads, where Mr. Lincoln, accompanied by Mr. Seward, met the
commissioners. Seward craftily proposed that the conference should be
confidential, and the commissioners regarded this so binding on them
as to prevent them from including in their report the discussion
which occurred. This enabled Mr. Seward to give his own version of it
in a dispatch to the United States Minister to the French Government,
which was calculated to create distrust of, if not hostility to, the
Confederacy on the part of the power in Europe most effectively
favoring our recognition.

Why Mr. Lincoln changed his purpose, and, instead of receiving the
commissioners at Washington, met them at Hampton Roads, I can not, of
course, explain. Several causes may be conjecturally assigned. The
commissioners were well known in Washington, had there held high
positions, and, so far as there was any peace party there, might have
been expected to have influence with its members; but a more
important inquiry is: If Mr. Lincoln previously had determined to
hear no proposition for negotiation, and to accept nothing less than
an unconditional surrender, why did he propose to receive informally
our agent? If there was nothing to discuss, the agent would have been
without functions.

I think the views of Mr. Lincoln had changed after he wrote the
letter to Mr. Blair of June 18th, and that the change was mainly
produced by the report which he made of what he saw and heard at
Richmond on the night he staid there. Mr. Blair had many
acquaintances among the members of the Confederate Congress; and all
those of the class who, of old, fled to the cave of Adullam,
"gathered themselves unto him."

Mr. Hunter, in a published article on the peace commission, referring
to Mr. Blair's visit to Richmond, says: "He saw many old friends and
party associates. Here his representations were not without effect
upon his old confederates, who for so long had been in the habit of
taking counsel with him on public affairs." He then goes on to
describe Mr. Blair as revealing dangers of such overwhelming disaster
as turned the thoughts of many Confederates toward peace more
seriously than ever before. That Mr. Blair saw and noted this serious
inclining of many to thoughts of peace, scarcely admits of a doubt;
and, if he believed the Congress to be infected by a cabal
undermining the Executive in his efforts successfully to prosecute
the war, Mr. Lincoln may be naturally supposed thence to have reached
the conclusion that he should accept nothing but an unconditional
surrender, and that he should not allow a commission from the
Confederacy to visit the United States capital.

The report of the commissioners, dated February 5, 1865, was as
follows:

"_To the President of the Confederate States:_

"SIR: Under your letter of appointment of the 28th ult. We proceeded
to seek 'an informal conference' with Abraham Lincoln, President of
the United States, upon the subject mentioned in the letter. The
conference was granted and took place on the 30th ult., on board of a
steamer anchored in Hampton Roads, where we met President Lincoln and
the Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States. It
continued for several hours, and was both full and explicit. We
learned from them that the message of President Lincoln to the
Congress of the United States, in December last, explains clearly and
distinctly his sentiments as to the terms, conditions, and method of
proceeding by which peace can be secured to the people, and we were
not informed that they would be modified or altered to obtain that
end. We understood from him that no terms or proposals of any treaty,
or agreement looking to an ultimate settlement, would be entertained
or made by him with the authorities of the Confederate States,
because that would be a recognition of their existence as a separate
power, which under no circumstances would be done; and, for a like
reason, that no such terms would be entertained by him for the States
separately; that no extended truce or armistice (as at present
advised) would be granted or allowed without a satisfactory assurance
in advance of the complete restoration of the authority of the
Constitution and laws of the United States over all places within the
States of the Confederacy; that whatever consequences may follow from
the reestablishment of that authority must be accepted; but that
individuals subject to pains and penalties under the laws of the
United States might rely upon a very liberal use of the power
confided to him to remit those pains and penalties if peace be
restored.

"During the conference, the proposed amendment to the Constitution of
the United States adopted by Congress on the 31st ultimo was brought
to our notice.

"This amendment provides that neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except for crime, should exist within the United States,
or any place within their jurisdiction, and that Congress should have
power to enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation. Very
respectfully, etc.,

"ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS,

"R. M. T. HUNTER,

"JOHN A. CAMPBELL."

Thus closed the conference, and all negotiations with the Government
of the United States for the establishment of peace. Says Judge
Campbell, in his memoranda:

"In conclusion, Mr. Hunter summed up what seemed to be the result of
the interview: that there could be no arrangements by treaty between
the Confederate States and the United States, or any agreements
between them; that there was nothing left for them but unconditional
submission."

By reference to the message of President Lincoln of December 6, 1864,
which is mentioned in the report, it appears that the terms of peace
therein stated were as follows:

"In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national
authority on the part of the insurgents, as the only indispensable
condition to ending the war on the part of the Government, I retract
nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made
a year ago, that 'while I remain in my present position I shall not
attempt to retract or modify the emancipation proclamation, nor shall
I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that
proclamation, or by any act of Congress.'

"If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an
executive duty to reënslave such persons, another, and not I, must be
their instrument to perform it."

On the 4th of March, 1861, President Lincoln appeared on the western
portico of the Capitol at Washington, and in the presence of a great
multitude of witnesses took the following oath:

"I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of
President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability,
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

The first section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the
United States is in these words:

The intelligent reader will observe that the words of this section,
"in consequence of any law or regulation therein," embrace a
President's emancipation proclamation, as well as any other
regulation therein. Thus the Constitution itself nullified Mr.
Lincoln's proclamation, and made it of no force whatever. Yet he
assumed and maintained, with all the military force he could command,
that it set every slave free. Which is the higher authority, Mr.
Lincoln and his emancipation proclamation or the Constitution? If the
former, then what are constitutions worth for the protection of
rights?

Again he says:

"Nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of
that proclamation or by an act of Congress."

But the Constitution says he shall return them--

"but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service
is due."

Who shall decide? Which is sovereign, Mr. Lincoln and his
proclamation or the Constitution? The Constitution says:

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land."

Was it thus obeyed by Mr. Lincoln as the supreme law of the land? It
was not obeyed, but set aside, subverted, overturned by him. But he
said in his oath:

"I do solemnly swear that I will, to the best of my ability,
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Did he do it? Is such treatment of the Constitution the manner to
preserve, protect, and defend it? Of what value, then, are paper
constitutions and oaths binding officers to their preservation, if
there is not intelligence enough in the people to discern the
violations, and virtue enough to resist the violators?

Again the report says:

"We understood from him that no terms or proposals of any treaty or
agreement looking to an ultimate settlement would be entertained or
made by him with the authorities of the Confederate States, because
that would be a recognition of their existence as a separate power,
which under no circumstances would be done; and, for a like reason,
that no such terms would be entertained by him for the States
separately."

Now the Constitution of the United States says, in Article X:

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."

Within the purview of this article of the Constitution the States are
independent, distinct, and sovereign bodies--that is, in their
reserved powers they are as sovereign, separate, and supreme as the
Government of the United States in its delegated powers. One of these
reserved powers is the right of the people to alter or abolish any
form of government, and to institute a new one such as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness; that power is
neither "delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to the States." On the contrary, it is guaranteed to
the States by the Constitution itself in these words:

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."

Mark the words, "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." No one will venture to say that a sovereign State, by the
mere act of accession to the Constitution, delegated the power of
secession. The assertion would be of no validity if it were made; for
the question is one of fact as to the powers delegated or not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution. It is absurd to
ask if the power of secession in a State is delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, or prohibited by it to the States. No
trace of the delegation or prohibition of this power is to be found
in the Constitution. It is, therefore, as the Constitution says,
"reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

The Convention of the State of New York, which ratified the
Constitution of the United States on July 26, 1788, in its resolution
of ratification said:

"We do declare and make known . . . that the powers of Government may
be reassumed by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to
their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is
not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the
United States, or to the departments of the Government thereof,
remains to the people of the several States, or to their respective
State governments, to whom they may have granted the same. . . .
Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid can
not be abridged or violated," etc., etc., "we, the said delegates, in
the name and in behalf of the people of the State of New York, do, by
these presents, assent to and ratify the said Constitution."

With this and other conditions stated in the resolution of
ratification, it was accepted and approved by the other States, and
New York became a member of the Union. The resolution of Rhode Island
asserts the same reservation in regard to the reassumption of powers.

It is unnecessary to examine here whether this reserved power exists
in the States respectively or in the people; for, when the
Confederate States seceded, it was done by the people, acting
through, or in conjunction with, the State, and by that power which
is expressly reserved to them in the Constitution of the United
States. When Mr. Lincoln, therefore, issued his proclamation calling
for seventy-five thousand men to subjugate certain "combinations too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings," he not only thereby denied the validity of the
Constitution, but sought to resist, by military force, the exercise
of a power clearly reserved in the Constitution, and reaffirmed in
its tenth amendment, to the States respectively or to the people for
their exercise. But, in order to justify his flagrant disregard of
the Constitution, he contrived the fiction of "combinations," and
upon this basis commenced the bloody war of subjugation with all its
consequences. Thus, any recognition of the Confederate States, or of
either of them, in his negotiations, would have exposed the
groundlessness of his fiction. But the Constitution required him to
recognize each of them, for they had simply exercised a power which
it expressly reserved for their exercise. Thus it is seen who
violated the Constitution, and upon whom rests the responsibility of
the war.

It has been stated above that the conditions offered to our soldiers
whenever they proposed to capitulate, were only those of subjugation.
When General Buckner, on February 16, 1862, asked of General Grant to
appoint commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation, he replied:

"No terms, except unconditional and immediate surrender, can be
accepted."

When General Lee asked the same question, on April 9, 1865, General
Grant replied:

"The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the
South laying down their arms, they will hasten that most desirable
event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of
property not yet destroyed."

When General Sherman made an agreement with General Johnston for
formal disbandment of the army of the latter, it was at once
disapproved by the Government of the United States, and Sherman
therefore wrote to Johnston:

"I demand the surrender of your army on the same terms as were given
to General Lee at Appomattox, on April 9th, purely and simply."

It remains to be stated that the Government which spurned all these
proposals for peace, and gave no terms but unconditional and
immediate surrender, was instituted and organized for the purposes
and objects expressed in the following extract, and for no others:

[Footnote 117: General Hampton's letter to General Sherman, February 27,
1865.]

[Footnote 118: "The Story of the Great March, from the Diary of a Staff
Officer." By Brevet Major George Ward Nichols, Aide-de-Camp to
General Sherman. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1865, pp. 112, _et seq_.]

CHAPTER LI.

After the evacuation of Savannah by General Hardee, it soon became
known that General Sherman was making preparations to march northward
through the Carolinas with the supposed purpose of uniting his forces
with those of General Grant before Richmond. General Hardee, having
left detachments at proper points to defend the approaches to
Charleston and Augusta, Georgia, withdrew the rest of his command to
the first-named city. General Wheeler's cavalry held all the roads
northward, and, by felling trees and burning bridges, obstructed
considerably the enemy's advance, which in the early part of January
was still further impeded by the heavy rains which had swollen the
rivers and creeks far beyond their usual width and depth.

The seriously impaired condition of our railroad communications in
Georgia and Alabama, the effect of the winter rains on the already
poor and ill-constructed country roads, the difficulty in collecting
and transporting supplies, to impeded the concentration of our
available forces, that Generals Beauregard and Hardee--the former at
Columbia, South Carolina, and the latter at Charleston--could only
retard, not prevent, the onward march of the enemy. At the outset of
his movement the Salkehatchie River presented a very strong line of
defense. Its swollen condition at that time, and the wide, deeply
inundated swamps on both sides, rendered it almost impossible to
force or outflank the position if adequately defended. It might have
been better if we had then abandoned the attempt to hold cities of no
strategic importance, and concentrated their garrisons at this point,
where the chances of successful resistance were greater than at any
subsequent period of the campaign. For, even if our expectation had
been disappointed, and had the superior numerical force of the enemy
compelled us to withdraw from this line, the choice of several good
positions was open to us, any one of which, by moving upon converging
lines, we could reach sooner than was possible to Sherman, whose
passage of the river must have been much encumbered and delayed by
his trains. Of these defensive positions, Branchville and Orangeburg
may be regarded as eligible: had Sherman headed his columns toward
Charleston, our forces would have been in position to attack him in
front and on the flank. Had his objective point been Augusta, he
would have had our army in his rear; and had, as proved to be the
case, Columbia been the place at which he aimed, our army would have
been able to reach there sooner than he could.

[Illustration: Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee]

General Sherman left Savannah January 22, 1865, and reached
Pocotaligo on the 24th. On February 3d he crossed the Salkehatchie
with slight resistance at River's and Beaufort bridges, and thence
pushed forward to the South Carolina Railroad at Midway, Bamberg, and
Graham's. After thoroughly destroying the railroad between these
places, which occupied three or four days, he advanced slowly along
the line of the railroad, threatening Branchville, the junction of
the railroads from Augusta to Columbia and Charleston. For a short
time it was doubtful whether he proposed to attack Augusta, Georgia,
where it was well known we had our principal powder-mill, many
important factories and shops, and large stores of army supplies; but
on the 11th it was found that he was moving north to Orangeburg, on
the road from Branchville to Columbia, the latter city being the
objective point of his march. Early on the morning of the 16th the
head of his columns reached the Congaree opposite Columbia. The
bridge over that stream had been burned by our retreating troops, but
a pontoon bridge, built by the enemy under cover of strong
detachments who had crossed higher up at Saluda Factory, enabled the
main body to pass the river and enter the city on the morning of the
17th, the Confederate troops having previously evacuated it. On the
same day the Mayor formally surrendered the city to Colonel Stone,
commanding a brigade of the Fifteenth Corps, and claimed for its
citizens the protection which the laws of civilized war always accord
to non-combatants. In infamous disregard not only of the established
rules of war, but of the common dictates of humanity, the defenseless
city was burned to the ground, after the dwelling-houses had been
robbed of everything of value, and their helpless inmates subjected
to outrage and insult of a character too base to be described.

Hypocrisy is the tribute which vice pays to virtue; therefore General
Sherman has endeavored to escape the reproaches for the burning of
Columbia by attributing it to General Hampton's order to burn the
cotton in the city, that it might not fall into the hands of the
enemy. General Hampton has proved circumstantially that General
Sherman's statement is untrue, and, though in any controversy to
which General Hampton may be a party, no corroborative evidence is
necessary to substantiate his assertion of a fact coming within his
personal observation, hundreds of unimpeachable witnesses have
testified that the burning of Columbia was the deliberate act of the
Federal soldiery, and that it was certainly permitted, if not
ordered, by the commanding General. The following letter of General
Hampton will to those who know him be conclusive:

"WILD WOODS, MISSISSIPPI, _April 21, 1866._

"To Hon. REVERDY JOHNSON, _United States Senate._

"SIR: A few days ago I saw in the published proceedings of Congress
that a petition from Benjamin Kawles, of Columbia, South Carolina,
asking for compensation for the destruction of his house by tho
Federal army, in February, 1865, had been presented to the Senate,
accompanied by a letter from Major-General Sherman. In this letter
General Sherman uses the following language: 'The citizens of
Columbia set fire to thousands of bales of cotton rolled out into the
streets, and which were burning before we entered Columbia; I,
myself, was in the city as early as nine o'clock, and I saw these
fires, and knew that efforts were made to extinguish them, but a high
and strong wind prevented. I gave no orders for the burning of your
city, but, on the contrary, the conflagration resulted from the great
imprudence of cutting the cotton bales, whereby the contents were
spread to the wind, so that it became an impossibility to arrest the
fire. I saw in your Columbia newspaper the printed order of General
Wade Hampton, that on the approach of the Yankee army all the cotton
should thus be burned, and, from what I saw myself, I have no
hesitation in saying that he was the cause of the destruction of your
city.'

"This charge, made against me by General Sherman, having been brought
before the Senate of the United States, I am naturally most
solicitous to vindicate myself before the same tribunal. But my State
has no representative in that body. Those who should be her
constitutional representatives there are debarred the right of
entrance into those halls. There are none who have the right to speak
for the South; none to participate in the legislation which governs
her; none to impose the taxes she is called upon to pay, and none to
vindicate her sons from misrepresentation, injustice, or slander.
Under these circumstances, I appeal to you, in the confident hope you
will use every effort to see that justice is done in this matter.

"I deny, emphatically, that any cotton was fired in Columbia by my
order. I deny that the citizens 'set fire to thousands of bales
rolled out into the streets.' I deny that any cotton was on fire when
the Federal troops entered the city. I most respectfully ask of
Congress to appoint a committee, charged with the duty of
ascertaining and reporting all the facts connected with the
destruction of Columbia, and thus fixing upon the proper author of
that enormous crime the infamy he richly deserves. I am willing to
submit the case to any honest tribunal. Before any such I pledge
myself to prove that I gave a positive order, by direction of General
Beauregard, that no cotton should be fired; that not one bale was on
fire when General Sherman's troops took possession of the city; that
he promised protection to the city, and that, in spite of his solemn
promise, he burned the city to the ground, deliberately,
systematically, and atrociously. I, therefore, most earnestly request
that Congress may take prompt and efficient measures to investigate
this matter fully. Not only is this due to themselves and to the
reputation of the United States army, but also to justice and to
truth. Trusting that you will pardon me for troubling you, I am, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,

"WADE HAMPTON."

Were this the only instance of such barbarity perpetrated by General
Sherman's army, his effort to escape the responsibility might be more
successful, because more plausible; but when the eulogists of his
exploits note exultingly that "wide-spreading columns of smoke rose
wherever the army went," when it is incontrovertibly true that the
line of his march could be traced by the burning dwelling-houses and
by the wail of women and children pitilessly left to die from
starvation and exposure in the depth of winter, his plea of "not
guilty" in the case of the city of Columbia can not free him from the
reprobation which outraged humanity must attach to an act of cruelty
which only finds a parallel in the barbarous excesses of
Wallenstein's army in the Thirty Years' War, and which, even at that
period of the world's civilization, sullied the fame of that
otherwise great soldier.

In consequence of General Sherman's movements, it was considered
advisable to evacuate Charleston (February 17th), that General
Hardee's command might become available for service in the field; and
thus that noble city and its fortresses, which the combined military
and naval forces of the United States, during an eighteen months'
siege, had failed to reduce, and which will stand for ever as
imperishable monuments of the skill and fortitude of their defenders,
were, on February 21st, without resistance, occupied by the Federal
forces under General Q. A. Gillmore.

Fort Sumter, though it now presented the appearance of a ruin, was
really better proof against bombardment than when first subjected to
fire. The upper tier of masonry, from severe battering, had fallen on
the outer wall, and shot and shell served only to solidify and add
harder material to the mass. Over its rampart the Confederate flag
defiantly floated until the city of Charleston was evacuated.

Every effort that our circumstances permitted was immediately and
thenceforward made to collect troops for the defense of North
Carolina. General Hood's army, the troops under command of General D.
H. Hill at Augusta, General Hardee's force, a few thousand men under
General Bragg, and the cavalry commands of Generals Hampton and
Wheeler, constituted our entire available strength to oppose
Sherman's advance. These were collected as rapidly as our broken
communications and the difficulty of gathering and transporting
supplies would permit.

After the fall of Columbia, General Beauregard, commanding the
military department, retreated toward North Carolina. The Army of
Tennessee (Hood's) was moving from the west to make a junction with
the troops retiring from South Carolina. The two forces, if united
with Hardee's command, then moving in the same direction, would, it
was hoped, be able to make effective resistance to Sherman's advance.
In any event it was needful that they should be kept in such relation
to Lee's army as to make a junction with it practicable. In this
state of affairs I was informed that General Beauregard, after his
troops had entered North Carolina, had decided to march to the
eastern part of that State. This would leave the road to Charlotte
open to Sherman's pursuing column, which, interposing, would prevent
the troops coming from the west from joining Beauregard, enable him
to destroy our force in detail by the joint action of his own army
and that of Schofield, commanding the district of Wilmington. The
anxiety created by this condition of affairs caused me, after full
correspondence with General Lee, to suggest to him to give his views
to General Beauregard, and I sent to General Beauregard's
headquarters the chief-engineer, General J. F. Gilmer, he being
possessed fully of my opinions and wishes. General Beauregard
modified his proposed movements so as to keep his forces on the left
of the enemy's line of march until the troops coming from Hood's army
could make a junction. These were the veteran commands of Stevenson,
Cheatham, and Stewart. Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, though he had
not entirely recovered from a wound received in the Tennessee
campaign, was at Augusta, Georgia, collecting the fragments of Hood's
army to follow the troops previously mentioned. They had not moved
together, and the first-named division had reached Beauregard's army
in South Carolina.

Though it contained an implied compliment, General Lee was not a
little disturbed by occasional applications made to have troops
detached from his army to reënforce others. The last instance had
been a call from General Beauregard for reënforcements from the Army
of Virginia. He had always been attentive, and ready as far as he
could, to meet the wants of other commands of our army, but at this
time those who knew his condition could not suppose he had any men to
spare; yet the fact of thinking so was a compliment to his success in
resisting the large army which was assailing his small one. There had
always been entire co-intelligence and accord between General Lee and
myself, but the Congress about this time thought his power would be
increased by giving him the nominal dignity of general-in-chief,
under which he resumed, as far as he could, the general charge of
armies from which, at his urgent solicitation, I had relieved him
after he took command, in the field, of the Army of Northern Virginia.

A few days subsequent to the events in North Carolina to which
reference has been made, General Lee proposed to me that General J.
E. Johnston should be put in command of the troops in North Carolina.
He still had the confidence in that officer which I had once felt,
but which his campaigns in Mississippi and Georgia had impaired. With
the understanding that General Lee was himself to supervise and
control the operations, I assented to the assignment. General
Johnston, on the 23d of February, at Charlotte, North Carolina,
relieved General Beauregard and assumed command. General Lee's first
instructions to General Johnston were to "concentrate all available
forces and drive back Sherman." The first part of the instructions was
well executed; the last part of it was more desirable than practicable,
though the brief recital made herein of the events of the campaign
claimed the credit due to a vigorous effort.

General Johnston's force, according to his estimate, when he took
command, amounted to about sixteen thousand infantry and artillery,
and four thousand cavalry; if to this be added the portion of the
Army of Tennessee, about twenty-five hundred men, under command of
General Stephen D, Lee, which afterward joined the army at
Smithfield, North Carolina, and that of General Bragg's command at
Goldsboro, which amounted to about eight thousand, the aggregate
would be about thirty thousand five hundred men of all arms.

After leaving Columbia, the course of the Federal army through
Winnsboro, across the Catawba at Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and
Peay's Ferry, and in the direction of Cheraw on the Great Pedee,
indicated that it would attempt to cross the Cape Fear River at
Fayetteville, North Carolina--a town sixty miles south of Raleigh,
and of special importance, as containing an arsenal, several
Government shops, and a large portion of the machinery which had been
removed from Harper's Ferry--and effect a junction at that point
with General Schofield's command, then known to be at Wilmington. Up
to this time, while no encounter of any magnitude had taken place,
the enemy's progress had been much impeded by the Confederate
cavalry, and the robbery of private citizens by gangs of armed
banditti, called "foraging parties," was in a large measure
prevented. The right of an army to forage as it advances through an
enemy's country is not questioned. But the right to forage, to
collect food for men and horses, does not mean the right to rob
household furniture, plate, trinkets, and every conceivable species
of private property, and to burn whatever could not be carried away,
together with the dwellings. General Sherman complained that some of
these "foragers," who were caught in the commission of the
above-named offenses, and had added thereto the greater crime of
assaulting women, had been summarily dealt with by some of those
whose wives and daughters they had outraged, and whose homes they had
made desolate; and he informed General Hampton that in retaliation he
had ordered a number of Confederate prisoners of war to be put to
death. To arrest this brutality General Hampton promptly informed him
that, "for every soldier of mine murdered by you, I shall have
executed at once two of yours, giving in all cases preference to any
officers who may be in our hands," and adding, with a view to check
the inhuman system of burning the houses of those citizens whom they
had robbed, that he had ordered his men "to shoot down all of your
men who are caught burning houses." [117] This notice and the
knowledge that General Hampton would keep his word, produced, it is
believed, a very salutary effect, and thereafter the fear of
punishment wrought a reform which the dictates of honor and humanity
had been powerless to effect.

The historian of Sherman's "Great March," in his illustrated
narrative of that expedition, describes both with pen and pencil the
manner in which "with untiring zeal the soldiers hunted for concealed
treasures. . . . Wherever the army halted," he writes, "almost every
inch of ground in the vicinity of the dwellings was poked by ramrods,
pierced with sabers, or upturned with spades," searching for
"valuable personal effects, plate, jewelry, and other rich goods, as
well as articles of food, such as hams, sugar, flour, etc. . . . It
was comical," adds the chronicler, "to see a group of these
red-bearded, barefooted, ragged veterans punching the unoffending
earth in an apparently idiotic but certainly most energetic way. If
they 'struck a vein,' a spade was instantly put into requisition, and
the coveted wealth was speedily unearthed. Nothing escaped the
observation of these sharp-witted soldiers. A woman standing upon the
porch of a house, apparently watching their proceedings, instantly
became an object of suspicion, and she was watched until some
movement betrayed a place of concealment. The fresh earth recently
thrown up, a bed of flowers just set out, the slightest indication of
a change in appearance or position, all attracted the gaze of these
military agriculturists. It was all fair spoil of war, and the search
made one of the excitements of the march." [118] The author of the
work from which the foregoing is an extract was an aide-de-camp on
the staff of General Sherman. The playful manner in which he
describes these habitual acts of plunder of "plate, jewelry and other
rich goods" from private and undefended dwellings shows that not
only was such conduct not forbidden by the military authorities, but
that it was permitted and applauded, that it was practiced "wherever
the army halted" under the eye of the staff-officers of the General
commanding, and was looked upon as one of the pleasurable
"excitements of the march." Indeed, so agreeable was the impression
made by these scenes of robbery of women's "rich goods" that he has
adorned his narrative with a full-page illustration, exhibiting a
plantation home surrounded by soldiers engaged, as this staff-officer
humorously terms it, in "treasure-seeking," while the lady of the
house--its only apparent occupant--stands upon the veranda, with
hands uplifted, beseeching them not to steal the watch and chain
which they are taking out of a vessel which they have just dug up.
That the foreign mercenaries, of which the Federal army was largely
composed, should have been guilty of such disgraceful conduct, when
free from the observation of their officers, is conceivable; but it
is difficult to imagine that, in the nineteenth century, such acts as
are described above could be committed habitually, in view of the
officer of highest rank in the army of a civilized country, and not
merely pass unpunished or unrebuked, but be recorded with conspicuous
approval in the pages of a military history.

The advance of the enemy's columns across the Catawba, Lynch's Creek,
and the Pedee, at Cheraw, though retarded as much as possible by the
vigilant skill of our cavalry under Generals Hampton, Butler, and
Wheeler, was steady and continuous. General Johnston's hope that,
from the enemy's order of moving by wings, sometimes a day's march
from each other, he could find an opportunity to strike one of their
columns in the passage of the Cape Fear River, when the other was not
in supporting distance, was unhappily disappointed.

On March 6th, near Kinston, General Bragg with a reënforcement of
less than two thousand men attacked and routed three divisions of the
enemy under Major-General Cox, capturing fifteen hundred prisoners
and three field-pieces, and inflicting heavy loss in killed and
wounded. This success, though inspiring, was on too small a scale to
produce important results. During the march from the Catawba to the
Cape Fear several brilliant cavalry affairs took place, in which our
troops displayed their wonted energy and dash. Among these the most
conspicuous were General Butler's at Mount Elon, where he defeated a
detachment sent to tear up the railroad at Florence; General
Wheeler's attack and repulse of the left flank of the enemy at
Hornesboro, March 4th; a similar exploit by the same officer at
Rockingham on the 7th; the attack and defeat by General Hampton of a
detachment on the 8th; the surprise and capture of General
Kilpatrick's camp by General Hampton on the morning of the 10th,
driving the enemy into an adjoining swamp, and taking possession of
his artillery and wagon-train, and the complete rout of a large
Federal party by General Hampton with an inferior force at
Fayetteville on the 11th.

As it was doubtful whether General Sherman's advance from
Fayetteville would be directed to Goldsboro or Raleigh, General
Johnston took position with a portion of his command at Smithfield,
which is nearly equidistant from each of those places, leaving
General Hardee to follow the road from Fayetteville to Raleigh, which
for several miles is also the direct road from Fayetteville to
Smithfield, and posted one division of his cavalry on the Raleigh
road, and another on that to Goldsboro. On the 16th of March General
Hardee was attacked by two corps of the enemy, a few miles south of
Averysboro, a place nearly half-way between Fayetteville and Raleigh.
Falling back a few hundred yards to a stronger position, he easily
repelled the repeated attacks of these two corps during the day, and,
learning in the evening that the enemy's corps were moving to turn
his left, he withdrew in the night toward Smithfield.

Early in the morning of the 18th General Johnston obtained definite
information that General Sherman was marching on Goldsboro, the right
wing of his army being about a day's march distant from the left.
General Johnston took immediate steps to attack the head of the left
wing on the morning of the 19th, and ordered the troops at Smithfield
and General Hardee's command to march at once to Bentonville and take
position between that village and the road on which the enemy was
advancing. An error as to the relative distance which our troops and
those of the enemy would have to move, exaggerating the distance
between the roads on which the enemy was advancing and diminishing
the distance that our troops would have to march, caused the failure
to concentrate our troops in time to attack the enemy's left wing
while in column; but, when General Hardee's troops reached
Bentonville in the morning, the attack was commenced. The battle
lasted through the greater part of the day, resulting in the enemy's
being driven from two lines of intrenchments, and his taking shelter
in a dense wood, where it was impracticable for our troops to
preserve their line of battle or to employ the combined strength of
the three arms. On the 20th the two wings of the Federal army,
numbering, as estimated by General Johnston, upward of seventy
thousand, came together and repeatedly attacked a division of our
force (Hoke's) which occupied an intrenched position parallel to the
road to Averysboro; but every attack was handsomely repulsed. On the
next day (21st) an attempt by the enemy to reach Bentonville in the
rear of our center, and thus cut off our only route of retreat, was
gallantly defeated by an impetuous and skillful attack, led by
Generals Hardee and Hampton, on the front and both flanks of the
enemy's column, by which he was compelled to retreat as rapidly as he
had advanced. In this attack. General Hardee's only son, a noble boy,
charging gallantly with the Eighth Texas Cavalry, fell mortally
wounded. On the night of the 21st our troops were withdrawn across
Mill Creek, and in the evening of the 22d bivouacked near Smithfield.
On the 23d the forces of General Sherman and those of General
Schofield were united at Goldsboro, where they remained inactive for
upward of two weeks.

On the 9th of April the Confederate forces took up the line of march
to Raleigh, and reached that city early in the afternoon of the same
day closely followed by the Federal army.

CHAPTER LII.

After the battle of Cold Harbor, the geography of the country no
longer enabled General Grant, by a flank movement to his left, to
keep himself covered by a stream, and yet draw nearer to his
objective point, Richmond. He had now reached the Chickahominy, and
to move down the east bank of that stream would be to depart further
from the prize he sought, the capital of the Confederacy. His
overland march had cost him the loss of more men than Lee's army
contained at the beginning of the campaign. He now, from
considerations which may fairly be assumed to have been the result of
his many unsuccessful assaults on Lee's army, or from other
considerations which I am not in a position to suggest, decided to
seek a new base on the James River, and to attempt the capture of our
capital by a movement from the south. With this view, on the night of
June 12th he commenced a movement by the lower crossings of the
Chickahominy toward the James River. General Lee learned of the
withdrawal on the next morning, and moved to our pontoon-bridge above
Drury's Bluff. While Grant's army was making this march to James
River, General Smith, with his division, which had arrived at Bermuda
Hundred, was, on the night of the 14th, directed to move against
Petersburg, with an additional force of two divisions, it being
supposed that this column would be sufficient to effect what General
Butler's previous attempts had utterly failed to accomplish, the
capture of Petersburg and the destruction of the Southern Railroad.
On the morning of the 15th the attack was made, the exterior redoubts
and rifle-pits were carried, and the column advanced toward the inner
works, but the artillery was used so effectively as to impress the
commander of the assailants with the idea that there must be a large
supporting force of infantry, and the attack was suspended so as to
allow the columns in rear to come up.

Hancock's corps was on the south side of the James River, before the
attack on Petersburg commenced, and was ordered to move forward, but
not informed that an attack was to be made, nor directed to march to
Petersburg until late in the afternoon, when he received orders to
move to the aid of General Smith. It being night when the junction
was made, it was deemed prudent to wait until morning. Had they known
how feeble was the garrison, it is probable that Petersburg would
have been captured that night; but with the morning came another
change, as marked as that from darkness to light. Lee crossed the
James River on the 15th, and by a night march his advance was in the
entrenchments of Petersburg before the morning for which the enemy
was waiting. The artillery now had other support than the old men and
boys of the town.

The Confederates promptly seized the commanding points and rapidly
strengthened their lines, so that the morning's reconnaissance
indicated to the enemy the propriety of postponing an attack until
all his force should arrive.

On the 17th an assault was made with such spirit and force as to gain
a part of our line, in which, however, the assailants suffered
severely. Lee had now constructed a line in rear of the one first
occupied, having such advantages as gave to our army much greater
power to resist. On the morning of the 18th Grant ordered a general
assault, but finding that the former line had been evacuated, and a
new one on more commanding ground had been constructed, the assault
was postponed until the afternoon; then attacks were made by heavy
columns on various parts of our line, with some partial success, but
the final result was failure everywhere, and with extraordinary
sacrifice of life.

With his usual persistence, he had made attack after attack, and for
the resulting carnage had no gain to compensate. The eagerness
manifested leads to the supposition that it was expected to capture
the place while Lee with part of his force was guarding against an
advance on Richmond by the river road. The four days' experience
seems to have convinced Grant of the impolicy of assault, for
thereafter he commenced to lay siege to the place. On the 21st a
heavy force of the enemy was advanced more to our right, in the
vicinity of the Weldon Railroad, which runs southward from
Petersburg. But General Lee, observing an interval between the left
of the Second and right of the Sixth of the enemy's corps, sent
forward a column under General A. P. Hill, which, entering the
interval, poured a fire into the flank of one corps on the right and
the other on the left, doubling their flank divisions up on their
center, and driving them with disorder and with heavy loss. Several
entire regiments, a battery, and many standards were captured, when
Hill, having checked the advance which was directed against the
Weldon Railroad, withdrew with his captures to his former position,
bringing with him the guns and nearly three thousand prisoners.

On the same night, a cavalry expedition, consisting of the divisions
of Generals Wilson and Kautz, numbering about six thousand men, was
sent west to cut the Weldon, Southside, and Danville Railroads, which
connected our army with the south and west. This raid resulted in
important injury to our communications. The enemy's cavalry tore up
large distances of the tracks of all three of the railroads, burning
the wood-work and laying waste the country around. But they were
pursued and harassed by a small body of cavalry under General W. H.
F. Lee, and, on their return near Ream's Station, were met, near
Sapponey Church, by a force of fifteen hundred cavalry under General
Hampton. That officer at once attacked. The fighting continued
fiercely throughout the night, and at dawn the enemy's cavalry
retreated in confusion. Near Ream's Station, at which point they
attempted to cross the Weldon Railroad, they were met by General
Fitzhugh Lee's horsemen and a body of infantry under General Mahone,
and the force completed their discomfiture. After a brief attempt to
force their way, they broke in disorder, leaving behind them twelve
pieces of artillery, and more than a thousand prisoners, and many
wagons and ambulances. The railroads were soon repaired, and the
enemy's cavalry was for the time rendered unfit for service.

Every attempt made to force General Lee's lines having proved
unsuccessful, General Grant determined upon the method of slow
approaches, and proceeded to confront the city with a line of
earthworks, and, by gradually extending the line to his left, he
hoped to reach out toward the Weldon and Southside Railroads. To
obtain possession of these roads now became the special object with
him, and all his movements had regard to that end. Petersburg is
twenty-two miles south of Richmond, and is connected with the south
and west by the Weldon and Southside Railroads, the latter of which
crosses the Danville Railroad, the main line of communication between
Richmond and the Gulf States. With the enemy once holding these roads
and those north of the city, Richmond would be isolated, and it would
have been necessary for the Confederate army to evacuate eastern
Virginia.

It will be seen from what has been written that, though the
operations against Petersburg have been ordinarily called a siege, it
could not in strictness of language be so denominated, as the
communications in the rear, as well as to the north and south, were
still open. It was really a conflict between opposing intrenchments.

General Grant had crossed a force into Charles City, on the north
bank of the James, and thus menaced Richmond with an assault from
that quarter. His line extended thence across the neck of the
peninsula of Bermuda Hundred, and east and south of Petersburg, where
it gradually stretched westward, approaching nearer and nearer to the
railroads bringing the supplies for our army and for Richmond. The
line of General Lee conformed to that of General Grant. In addition
to the works east and southeast of Richmond, an exterior line of
defense had been constructed against the hostile forces at Deep
Bottom, and, in addition to a fortification of some strength at
Drury's Bluff, obstructions were placed in the river to prevent the
ascent of the Federal gunboats. The lines thence continued facing
those of the enemy north of the Appomattox, and, crossing that
stream, extended around the city of Petersburg, gradually moving
westward with the works of the enemy. The struggle that ensued
consisted chiefly of attempts to break through our lines. These it is
not my purpose to notice _seriatim_; some of them, however, it is
thought necessary to mention. While at Petersburg, the assaults of
the enemy were met by a resistance sufficient to repel his most
vigorous attacks; our force confronting Deep Bottom was known to be
so small as to suggest an attempt to capture Richmond by a movement
on the north side of the James. On the 26th of July a corps of
infantry was sent over to Deep Bottom to move against our
pontoon-bridges near to Drury's Bluff, so as to prevent Lee from
sending reënforcements to the north side of the James, while Sheridan
with his cavalry moved to the north side of Richmond to attack the
works which, being poorly garrisoned, it was thought might be taken
by assault. Lee, discovering the movement after the enemy had gained
some partial success, sent over reënforcements, which drove him back
and defeated the expedition. On the night of the 28th the infantry
corps (Hancock's) was secretly withdrawn from the north side of the
river, to coöperate in the grand assault which Grant was preparing to
make upon Lee's intrenchments. The uniform failure, as has been
stated, of the assaults upon our lines had caused the conclusion that
they could only succeed after a breach had been made in the works.
For that purpose a subterranean gallery for a mine was run under one
of our forts. General Burnside, who conducted the operation, thus
describes the work:

"The main gallery of the mine is five hundred and twenty-two feet in
length, the side-galleries about forty feet each. My suggestion is
that eight magazines be placed in the lateral galleries, two at each
end, say a few feet apart, at right angles to the side-gallery, and
two more in each of the side-galleries, similarly placed by pairs,
situated equidistant from each other, and the end of the galleries,
thus:

[Illustration: Mine Galleries]

"I proposed to put in each of the eight magazines from twelve to
fourteen hundred pounds of powder, the magazines to be connected by a
trough of powder instead of a fuse."

It appears that it was decided that the charge should be eight
thousand pounds instead of the larger amount proposed.[119] Between
four and five o'clock on the morning of the 30th of July the mine was
exploded, and simultaneously the enemy's batteries commenced firing,
when, as previously arranged, the column of attack moved forward to
the breach, with instructions to rush through it and seize the crest
of a ridge in rear of our fort, so as to interpose a force between
our troops and in rear of our batteries. A question had arisen as to
whether the assaulting column should consist of white or negro
troops; of each, there were brigades in General Burnside's division,
which occupied that part of the line nearest to the mine, and
therefore seems to have been considered as the command from which the
troops to constitute the storming column must be selected. The
explosion was destructive to our artillery and its small supporting
force immediately above the mine.

An opening, one hundred and fifty feet long, sixty feet wide, and
thirty feet deep, suddenly appeared in the place of the earthworks,
and the division of the enemy selected for the charge rushed forward
to pierce the opening. A Southern writer[120] thus describes what
ensued:

"The white division charged, reached the crater, stumbled over the
_debris_, were suddenly met by a merciless fire of artillery
fusillading them right and left and of infantry fusillade them in
front; faltered, hesitated, were badly led, lost heart, gave up the
plan of seizing the crest in rear, huddled into the crater man on top
of man, company mingled with company; and upon this disordered,
unstrung, quivering mass of human beings, white and black--for the
black troops had followed--was poured a hurricane of shot, shell,
canister, musketry, which made the hideous crater a slaughter-pen,
horrible and frightful, beyond the power of words. All order was
lost; all idea of charging the crest abandoned. Lee's infantry was
seen concentrating for the carnival of death; his artillery was
massing to destroy the remnants of the charging divisions; those who
deserted the crater, to scramble over the debris and run back, were
shot down; then all that was left to the shuddering mass of blacks
and whites in the pit was to shrink lower, evade the horrible
_mitraille_, and wait for a charge of their friends to rescue them or
surrender."

The forces of the enemy finally succeeded in making their way back,
with a loss of about four thousand prisoners, and General Lee, whose
casualties were small, reestablished his line without interruption.
This affair was subsequently investigated by a committee of the
Congress of the United States, and their report declared that "the
first and great cause of the disaster was the employment of white
instead of black troops to make the charge."

Attacks continued to be made on our lines during the months of August
and September, but, as in former instances, they were promptly
repulsed. On August 18th the enemy seized on a portion of the Weldon
Railroad near Petersburg, and on the 25th this success was followed
up by an attempt, under General Hancock, to take possession of
Reams's Station on the same road, farther south. He was defeated by
Heth's division and a portion of Wilcox's, under the direction of
General A. P. Hill, and, having lost heavily, was compelled to
retreat. These events did not, however, materially affect the general
result. The enemy's left gradually reached farther and farther
westward, until it had passed the Vaughan, Squirrel Level, and other
roads running southwestward from Petersburg, and in October was
established on the left bank of Hatcher's Run. The movement was
designed to reach the Southside Railroad. A heavy column crossed
Hatcher's Run, and made an obstinate attack on our lines, in order to
break through to the railroad. This column was met in front and flank
by Generals Hampton and W. H. F. Lee, with dismounted sharpshooters.
Infantry was hastened forward by General Lee, and the enemy was
driven back. This closed for the winter active operations against our
lines at Petersburg.

When the campaign opened on the Rapidan, General Lee's effective
strength was in round numbers sixty thousand of all arms; that of
General Grant at the same time one hundred and forty thousand. In the
many battles fought before the close of the campaign. Grant's loss
had been a multiple of that sustained by Lee; but the large
reënforcements he had received, both before and after he crossed the
James River, repaired his losses, and must have increased the
numerical disparity between the two armies; yet, notwithstanding the
great superiority in the number of his force, the long-projected
movement for the reduction of Fort Fisher and the capture of
Wilmington was delayed, because of Grant's unwillingness to detach
any of his troops for that purpose until after active operations had
been suspended before Petersburg.

It was proposed to make a combined land and naval attack--
Major-General B. F, Butler to command the land-forces, and Admiral D.
D. Porter the fleet. The enemy seems about this time to have
conceived a new means of destroying forts; it was, to place a large
amount of powder in a ship, and, having anchored off the fort, to
explode the powder and so destroy the works and incapacitate the
garrison as to enable a storming party to capture them. How near to
Fort Fisher it was expected to anchor the ship I do not know, nor
have I learned how far it was supposed the open atmosphere could be
made to act as a projectile. General Whiting, the brave and highly
accomplished soldier, who was in command of the defenses of
Wilmington, stated that the powder-ship did not come nearer to Fort
Fisher than twelve or fifteen hundred yards. He further stated that
he heard the report of the explosion at Wilmington, and sent a
telegram to Colonel Lamb, the commanding officer at the fort, to
inquire what it meant, and was answered, "Enemy's gunboat blown up."
No effect, as might have been anticipated, was produced on the
fort.[121] From the same source it is learned that the combined force
of this expedition was about six thousand five hundred land-troops
and fifty vessels of war of various sizes and classes, several
ironclads, and the ship charged with two hundred and thirty-five tons
of powder. Some of the troops landed, but after a reconnaissance of
the fort, which then had a garrison of about six thousand five
hundred men, the troops were reembarked, and thus the expedition
ended.

On January 15, 1865, the attempt was renewed with a larger number of
troops, amounting, after the arrival of General Schofield, to
twenty-odd thousand. Porter's fleet also received additional vessels,
making the whole number fifty-eight engaged in the attack. The
garrison of Fort Fisher had been increased to about double the number
of men there on the 24th of December. The iron-clad vessels of the
enemy approached nearer the fort than on a former occasion, and the
fire of the fleet was more concentrated and vastly more effective.
Many of the guns in the fort were dismounted, and the parapets
seriously injured, by the fire. The garrison stood bravely to their
guns, and, when the assault was made, fought with such determined
courage as to repulse the first column, and obstinately contended
with another approaching from the land-side, continuing the fight
long after they had got into the fort. Finally, overwhelmed by
numbers, and after the fort and its armament had been mainly
destroyed by a bombardment--I believe greater than ever before
concentrated upon a fort--the remnant of the garrison surrendered.
The heroic and highly gifted General Whiting was mortally, and the
gallant commander of the fort, Colonel Lamb, was seriously, wounded.
They both fell into the hands of the enemy. General Hoke,
distinguished by brilliant service on other fields, had been ordered
down to support the garrison, and under the directions of General
Bragg, commanding the department, had advanced to attack the
investing force, but a reconnaissance convinced them both that his
command was too weak to effect the object. The other forts, of
necessity, fell with the main work, Fisher, and were abandoned. Hoke,
with his small force retiring through Wilmington, after destroying
the public vessels and property, to prevent them from falling into
the hands of the enemy, slowly fell back, fighting at several points,
and seeking to find in the separation of the vastly superior army
which was following him opportunity to attack a force the number of
which should not greatly exceed his own, and finally made a junction
with General Johnston, then opposing Sherman's advance through North
Carolina.

The fixed purpose of General Grant's campaign of 1864 was the capture
of Richmond, the Confederate capital. For this he had assembled the
large army with which he crossed the Rapidan and fought the numerous
battles between there and the James River. For this he had moved
against Petersburg, the capture of which in itself was not an object
so important as to have justified the effort made to that end. It was
only valuable because it was on the line of communication with the
more southern States, and offered another approach to Richmond. In
his attack upon Petersburg it will be seen from the events already
described that he adopted neither of the two plans which were open to
him: the one, the concentration of all his efforts to break the line
covering Petersburg; the other, to move his army round it and seize
the Weldon and Southside Railroads, so as to cut off the supplies of
Lee's army and compel the evacuation of both Petersburg and Richmond.
Had there been approximate equality between his army and that of Lee,
he could not wisely have ventured upon the latter movement against a
soldier so able as his antagonist; but the vast numerical superiority
of Grant's army might well have induced him to invite Lee to meet him
in the open field. He did, however, neither the one nor the other,
but something of both.

In the opening of the campaign of 1865, he continued, as he had done
in 1864, to extend his line to the left, seeking, after having gained
the Weldon Railroad, to reach still farther to that connecting
Petersburg with the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Lee, with a
well-deserved confidence in his troops and his usual intrepidity,
drew from his lines of defense men enough to enable him for a long
time to defeat the enemy in these efforts, by extension to turn his
right flank. After Grant's demonstration on the north side of the
James by sending over Hancock's corps had been virtually abandoned by
its withdrawal, Longstreet's corps, which had been sent to oppose it,
remained for a long time on the north side of the James. Finally,
General Ewell with a few troops, the Richmond reserves, and a
division of the navy under Admiral Semmes, held the river and land
defenses on the east side of Richmond.

General A. R. Lawton, who had become the quartermaster-general of the
Confederate army, ably supported by Lewis E. Harvie, President of the
Richmond and Danville Railroad, increased the carrying capacity of
that line so as to compensate for our loss of the use of the Weldon
Railroad. At the same time, General St. John, chief of the
commissariat, by energetic efforts and the use of the Virginia Canal,
kept up the supplies of General Lee's army, so as to secure from him
the complimentary acknowledgment, made about a month before the
evacuation of Petersburg, that the army there had not been so well
supplied for many months.

During the months of February and March, Lee's army was materially
reduced by the casualties of battle and the frequency of absence
without leave. I will not call these absentees deserters, because
they did not leave to join the enemy, and again, because in some
instances where the facts were fully developed, they had gone to
their necessitous families with intent to return and resume their
places in the line of battle. His cavalry force had been also
diminished by the absence of General Hampton's division, to which
permission had been given to go to their home, South Carolina, to get
fresh horses, and also to fill up their ranks. Long, arduous, and
distant service had rendered both necessary.

In the early part of March, as well as my memory can fix the date,
General Lee held with me a long and free conference. He stated that
the circumstances had forced on him the conclusion that the
evacuation of Petersburg was but a question of time. He had early and
fully appreciated the embarrassment which would result from losing
the workshops and foundry at Richmond, which had been our main
reliance for the manufacture and repair of arms as well as the
preparation of ammunition. The importance of Richmond in this regard
was, however, then less than it had been by the facilities which had
been created for these purposes at Augusta, Selma, Fayetteville, and
some smaller establishments; also by the progress which was being
made for a large armory at Macon, Georgia. To my inquiry whether it
would not be better to anticipate the necessity by withdrawing at
once, he said that his artillery and draught horses were too weak for
the roads in their then condition, and that he would have to wait
until they became firmer. There naturally followed the consideration
of the line of retreat. A considerable time before this General Hood
had sent me a paper, presenting his views and conclusion that, if it
became necessary for the Army of Northern Virginia to retreat, it
should move toward Middle Tennessee. The paper was forwarded to
General Lee and returned by him with an unfavorable criticism, and
the conclusion that, if we had to retreat, it should be in a
southwardly direction toward the country from which we were drawing
supplies, and from which a large portion of our forces had been
derived. In this conversation the same general view was more
specifically stated, and made to apply to the then condition of
affairs. The programme was to retire to Danville, at which place
supplies should be collected and a junction made with the troops
under General J. E. Johnston, the combined force to be hurled upon
Sherman in North Carolina, with the hope of defeating him before
Grant could come to his relief. Then the more southern States, freed
from pressure and encouraged by this success, it was expected, would
send large reënforcements to the army, and Grant, drawn far from his
base of supplies into the midst of a hostile population, it was
hoped, might yet be defeated, and Virginia be delivered from the
invader. Efforts were energetically continued, to collect supplies in
depots where they would be available, and, in furtherance of the
suggestion of General Lee as to the necessary improvement in the
condition of his horses, the quartermaster-general was instructed to
furnish larger rations of corn to the quartermaster at Petersburg.

Though of unusually calm and well-balanced judgment, General Lee was
instinctively averse to retiring from his enemy, and had so often
beaten superior numbers that his thoughts were no doubt directed to
every possible expedient which might enable him to avoid retreat. It
thus fell out that, in a week or two after the conference above
noticed, he presented to me the idea of a sortie against the enemy
near to the right of his line. This was rendered the more feasible,
from the constant extension of Grant's line to the left, and the
heavy bodies of troops he was employing to turn our right. The
sortie, if entirely successful, so as to capture and hold the works
on Grant's right, as well as three forts on the commanding ridge in
his rear, would threaten his line of communication with his base,
City Point, and might compel him to move his forces around ours to
protect it; if only so far successful as to cause the transfer of his
troops from his left to his right, it would relieve our right, and
delay the impending disaster for the more convenient season for
retreat.

Fort Steadman was the point against which the sortie was directed;
its distance from our lines was less than two hundred yards, but an
abatis covered its front. For this service, requiring equal daring
and steadiness, General John B. Gordon, well proved on many
battle-fields, was selected. His command was the remnant of Ewell's
corps, troops often tried in the fiery ordeal of battle, and always
found true as tempered steel. Before daylight, on the morning of the
25th of March, Gordon moved his command silently forward. His
pioneers were sent in advance to make openings through the
obstructions, and the troops rushed forward, surprised and captured
the garrison, then turned the guns upon the adjacent works and soon
drove the enemy from them. A detachment was now sent to seize the
commanding ground and works in the rear, the batteries of which,
firing into the gorges of the forts on the right and left, would soon
make a wide opening in Grant's line. The guides to this detachment
misled it in the darkness of a foggy dawn far from the point to which
it was directed. In the mean time the enemy, recovering from his
surprise and the confusion into which he had been extensively thrown,
rallied and with overwhelming power concentrated both artillery and
infantry upon Gordon's command. The supporting force which was to
have followed him, notwithstanding the notice which was given by the
victorious cheer of his men when they took Fort Steadman, failed to
come forward, and Gordon's brilliant success, like the Dead Sea
fruit, was turned to ashes at the moment of possession. It was
hopeless, with his small force unsupported, to retain the position he
had gained. It only remained as far as practicable to withdraw his
command to our line, and this the valiant soldier promptly proceeded
to do; some of his men were killed on the retreat, many became
prisoners--I believe all, or nearly all, of those who had been
detached to seize other works, and had not rejoined the main body.

The following letter from General Gordon furnishes some important
details of the attack:

"ATLANTA, GEORGIA, _October 16, 1880._

"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The attack upon Fort Steadman was made on the
night of the 25th March, or rather before light on the morning of the
26th March, 1865. A conference had been held between General Lee and
myself at his headquarters the 10th of March, which resulted in
General Lee's decision to transfer my corps from the extreme right of
our army to the trenches in and around Petersburg, with the purpose
of enabling me to carefully examine the enemy's lines, and report to
him my belief as to the practicability of breaking them at any point.
Within a week after being transferred to this new position, I decided
that Fort Steadman could be taken by a night assault, and that it
might be possible to throw into the breach thus made in Grant's lines
a sufficient force to disorganize and destroy the left wing of his
army before he could recover and concentrate his forces, then lying
beyond the James and Appomattox Rivers. Fort Steadman was the point
at which the earthworks of General Grant most nearly approached our
own. This fort was located upon what was known as Hare's Hill, and
was in front of the city of Petersburg, and of the point on our lines
known as Colquitt's Salient. The two hostile lines could not have
been more than two hundred to two hundred and fifty yards apart at
this point; and the pickets were so close together that it was
difficult to prevent constant conversation between those of the
Confederate and Federal armies. Fort Steadman was upon the main line
of General Grant's works, and flanked on either side by a line of
earthworks and other forts, which completely commanded every foot of
the intervening space between the hostile lines. In rear of Fort
Steadman were three other forts, two of which, and perhaps all three,
could command Fort Steadman, in case of its capture by our forces.
These forts in rear of Steadman were protected by an almost
impenetrable abatis, while, in front of Fort Steadman itself, and of
the main line of which it was a part, was a line of sharpened
fence-rails, with the lower ends buried deeply in the ground, their
middle resting upon horizontal poles and wrapped with
telegraph-wires, and their upper ends sharpened and elevated to the
height of four and a half or five feet. These rails, which formed the
obstruction in front of General Grant's lines at Fort Steadman and
along the flanking works, were, as I said, wrapped with
telegraph-wire where they rested on the horizontal poles, so as to
prevent an attacking force from pressing them apart, and buried in
the ground too deeply to be pulled up, and, sharpened at the upper
end, were too high to be mounted by my men. This obstruction,
therefore, had to be cut away with axes before the attacking force
could enter the fort or lines.

"General Lee, after considering the plan of assault and battle which
I submitted to him, and which I shall presently describe, gave me
orders to prepare for the movement, which was regarded by both of us
as a desperate one, but which seemed to give more promise of good
results than any other hitherto suggested. General Lee placed at my
disposal, in addition to my own corps, a portion of A. P, Hill's and
a portion of Longstreet's, and a detachment of cavalry--in all,
about one half of the army.

"The general plan of the assault and battle was this: To take the
fort by a rush across the narrow space that lay between it and
Colquitt's Salient, and then surprise and capture, by a stratagem,
the commanding forts in the rear, thus opening a way for our troops
to pass to the rear, and upon the bank of the left wing of Grant's
army, which was to be broken to pieces by a concentration of all the
forces at my command moving upon that flank. During the night of the
25th my preparations were made for the movement before daylight. I
placed three officers in charge of three separate bodies of men, and
directed them, as soon as the lines of Fort Steadman should be
carried by the assaulting column, to rush through the gap thus
produced to the three rear forts--one of these officers and bodies
of men to go to each fort, and to approach them from their rear by
the only avenue left open and seize those forts. A guide was placed
with each of these officers, who was to conduct him and his troops to
the rear of the front, which he was to surprise. A body of the most
stalwart of my men was organized to move in advance of all the
troops, armed with axes, with which they were to cut down the
obstruction of sharpened and wire-fastened rails in front of the
enemy's lines.

"Next to these were to come three hundred men, armed with bayonets
fixed and empty muskets, who were to mount and enter the fort as the
axemen cut away the obstruction of sharpened rails, bayoneting the
pickets in front and gunners in the fort if they resisted, or sending
them to our rear if they surrendered. Next were to cross the three
officers and their detachments, who were to capture the three rear
forts. Next, a division of infantry was to cross, moving by the left
flank, so as to be in position when halted, and fronted to move
without any confusion or delay immediately down General Grant's
lines, toward his left, capturing his troops, or forcing them to
abandon their works and form under our advancing fire at right angles
to his line of works.

"Next was to cross the cavalry, who were to ride to the rear, cut the
enemy's telegraph-lines, capture his pontoons, and prevent or delay
the crossing of reënforcements from beyond the Appomattox. Next, my
whole force was to swell the column of attack. Then, as the front of
our lines were cleared of the enemy's troops, our divisions were to
change front and join in pressing upon the enemy and driving him
farther from the other wing of General Grant's army, and widening the
breach. Strips of white cloth were tied around the shoulders of our
men, so as to designate them in the darkness.

"Just before daylight, when all was ready, I gave the signal, and the
axemen rushed across, followed by the bodies armed with bayonets and
empty muskets, who captured and sent to the rear the enemy's pickets.
The axemen cut away the sharpened rails so rapidly as scarcely to
cause a halt of the troops following, who mounted the enemy's works
and seized his guns and gunners in the fort, clearing the way and
giving safe passage to detachments and larger bodies which were to
follow and which did follow. The fort and most of the lines between
the fort and the river were captured with the loss of but one man, so
far as I could learn. We captured eleven heavy guns, nine mortars,
about seven hundred prisoners, as I now recollect, among whom was the
brigadier commanding that portion of the line, General McLaughlin.

"Everything was moving as well as I could have desired, when, one
after another, all three of the officers, sent to the rear to capture
by stratagem the rear forts, sent messengers to inform me that they
had passed successfully through the lines of the enemy's reserves in
rear of Fort Steadman, and were certainly beyond the rear forts, but
that their guides had been lost or had deserted, and that they could
not find the forts.

"Although I heard nothing afterward of these guides, yet I did learn
of the fate of the three officers and their commands. Some were shot
down after daylight, some were captured, and a few, very few, made
their way back to our lines. The failure of that portion of the
programme left, of course, these three forts manned by the enemy, and
his heavy guns made it impossible to carry out literally the details
of the plan. Then a large body of the troops sent by General Lee from
General Longstreet's corps were delayed by the breaking down of
trains, or by some other cause, and did not arrive at the appointed
hour, which caused so great a delay that we did not get in the fort
and upon the enemy's flank at as early an hour as was expected, and
daylight found us with the plan only half executed. At daylight, all
the commanding forts in the rear, which we had failed to capture,
opened upon Fort Steadman and that portion of the enemy's lines held
by our troops. Reënforcements were rapidly brought up, so that it
became too hazardous, as General Lee thought, to go forward or
attempt it. So he ordered me back (I may say here that I entirely
approved of this decision of General Lee). Up to this hour we had
lost but few men, and these had been killed or wounded mainly by
artillery. But now the enemy's infantry came up and made several
assaults. They were repulsed by our troops in Fort Steadman and in
the enemy's works on its flanks. It was in the effort to withdraw the
troops that our principal loss occurred. A raking tire was kept up
across the intervening space over which we had moved in capturing the
fort, I was wounded in recrossing to Colquitt's Salient, and many of
our men were killed and wounded in making the same passage back to
our works.

"As I said at the outset, this attack was regarded by both General
Lee and myself as very hazardous; but it seemed necessary to do more
than sit quietly waiting for General Grant to move upon our right,
while each day was diminishing our strength by disease and death.

"Let me also add that the movement made at Hare's Hill mast have
proved a great success but for the unforeseen and unavoidable
miscarriages to which I have referred.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"J. B. GORDON.

"Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS, _Mississippi_."

Immediately following, and perhaps in consequence of this sortie, an
extensive attack was made upon our lines to the left of Fort
Steadman, but without any decisive results. On the 27th of March the
main part of Grant's forces confronting Richmond were moved over to
the lines before Petersburg, and his left was on the same day joined
by Sheridan's division of cavalry. It will be remembered that Lee had
sent Longstreet to the north side of the James as soon as he
discovered that Grant had sent a corps across with the supposed
purpose of attacking Richmond from that side. It was intended that
Longstreet should return whenever the enemy withdrew his main force
from the north side of the James; but it appears that this was so
secretly done as to conceal the fact from General Longstreet, and
that both Hancock and Ord had joined Grant, to swell his forces by
two corps before our troops returned to join Lee. Grant, thus
strengthened, made a more determined movement to gain the right of
Lee's position; before, however, he was ready to make his assault,
Lee marched with a comparatively very small force, took the
initiative, and on the 31st struck the enemy's advance, and repulsed
him in great confusion, following until confronted by the heavy
masses formed in open ground in the rear, when Lee withdrew his men
back to their intrenchments.

A strategic position of recognized importance was that known as Five
Forks. Lee had stationed there Major-General Pickett with his
division, and some additional force. On the next day, the 1st of
April, this position was assaulted, and our troops were driven from
it in confusion. The unsettled question of time was now solved.

Grant's massive columns, advancing on right, left, and center,
compelled our forces to retire to the inner line of defense, so that,
on the morning of the 2d, the enemy was in a condition to besiege
Petersburg in the true sense of that term. Battery Gregg made an
obstinate defense, and, with a garrison of about two hundred and
fifty men, held a corps in check for a large part of the day. The
arrival of Longstreet's troops, and the strength of the shorter line
now held by Lee, enabled him to make several attempts to dislodge his
assailant from positions he had gained. In one of these, the
distinguished soldier whose gallantry and good conduct it has
frequently been my pleasure to notice, Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill,
who had so often passed unscathed through storms of shot and shell,
yielded up the life he had, in the beginning of the war, consecrated
to the Confederate cause; and his comrades, while mourning his loss,
have drawn consolation from the fact that he died before our flag was
furled in defeat.

Retreat was now a present necessity. All that could be done was to
hold the inner lines during the day, and make needful preparations to
withdraw at night. In the forenoon of Sunday, the 2d, I received,
when in church, a telegram announcing that the army would retire from
Petersburg at night, and I went to my office to give needful
directions for the evacuation of Richmond, the greatest difficulty of
which was the withdrawal of the troops who were on the defenses east
of the city, and along the James River.

The event had come before Lee had expected it, and the announcement
was received by us in Richmond with sorrow and surprise; for, though
it had been foreseen as a coming event which might possibly, though
not probably, be averted, and such preparation as was practicable had
been made to meet the contingency when it should occur, it was not
believed to be so near at hand.

At nightfall our army commenced crossing the Appomattox, and, before
dawn, was far on its way toward Amelia Court-House, Lee's purpose
being, as previously agreed on in conference with me, to march to
Danville, Virginia. By a reference to the map, it will be seen that
General Grant, starting from the south side of the Appomattox, had a
shorter line to Danville than that which General Lee must necessarily
follow, and, if Grant directed his march so as to put his forces
between Danville and those of Lee, it was quite possible for him to
effect it. This was done, and thus Lee was prevented from carrying
out his original purpose, and directed his march toward Lynchburg.
The enemy, having first placed himself across the route to Danville,
at Jetersville, subsequently took up the line of Lee's retreat. His
large force of cavalry, and the exhausted condition of the horses of
our small number of that arm, gave the pursuing foe a very great
advantage; but, worn and reduced in numbers as Lee's army was, the
spirit it had always shown flashed out whenever it was pressed. A
division would turn upon a corps and drive it; and General Fitzhugh
Lee, the worthy successor of the immortal Stuart, with a brigade of
our emaciated cavalry, would drive a division of their pursuers.
These scenes were repeatedly enacted during the long march from
Petersburg to Appomattox Court-House, and have been so vividly and
fully described by others that I will pass to the closing event.

Lee had never contemplated surrender. He had, long before, in
language similar to that employed by Washington during the
Revolution, expressed to me the belief that in the mountains of
Virginia he could carry on the war for twenty years, and, in
directing his march toward Lynchburg, it may well be that as an
alternative he hoped to reach those mountains, and, with the
advantage which the topography would give, yet to baffle the hosts
which were following him. On the evening of the 8th General Lee
decided, after conference with his corps commanders, that he would
advance the next morning beyond Appomattox Court-House, and, if the
force reported to be there should prove to be only Sheridan's
cavalry, to disperse it and continue the march toward Lynchburg; but,
if infantry should be found in large force, the attempt to break
through it was not to be made, and the correspondence which General
Grant had initiated on the previous day should be reopened by a flag,
with propositions for an interview to arrange the terms of
capitulation. Gordon, whose corps formed the rear-guard from
Petersburg, and who had fought daily for the protection of the
trains, had now been transferred to the front. On the next morning,
before daylight, Lee sent Colonel Venable, one of his staff, to
Gordon, commanding the advance, to learn his opinion as to the
chances of a successful attack, to which Gordon replied, "My old
corps is reduced to a frazzle, and, unless I am supported by
Longstreet heavily, I do not think we can do anything more." When
Colonel Venable returned with this answer to General Lee, he said,
"Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant."

At that time Longstreet, covering the rear, was threatened by Meade,
so that there was no ability to reënforce Gordon, and thus to explain
why General Lee then realized that the emergency had arisen for the
surrender of his army which, in his note to General Grant of the
previous day, he had said he did not believe to exist. Colonel
Venable, at early dawn, had left Gordon with about five thousand
infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee with about fifteen hundred cavalry, and
Colonel Carter's battalion of artillery, forming his line of battle
to attack the enemy, which, so far as then known, consisted of
Sheridan's cavalry, which had got in front of our retreating column.
The assault was made with such vigor and determination as to drive
Sheridan for a considerable distance; and, if this had been the only
obstacle, the road would have been opened for Lee to resume his march
toward Lynchburg. After Gordon had advanced nearly a mile, he was
confronted by a large body of infantry, subsequently ascertained to
be about eighty thousand. To attack that force was, of course,
hopeless, and Gordon commenced falling back, and simultaneously the
enemy advanced, but suddenly came to a halt. Lee had sent a flag to
Grant, who had consequently ordered a suspension of hostilities.

A leader less resolute, an army less heroically resisting fatigue,
constant watching, and starvation, would long since have reached the
conclusion that surrender was a necessity. Lee had left Petersburg
with not more than twenty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry,
and four thousand artillery. Men and horses all reduced below the
standard of efficiency by exposure and insufficient supplies of
clothing, food,[122] and forage, only the mutual confidence between
the men and their commander could have sustained either under the
trials to which they were subjected. It is not a matter of surprise
that the army had wasted away to a mere remnant, but rather that it
had continued to exist as an organized body still willing to do
battle. All the evidence we have proves that the proud, cheerful
spirit both of the army and its leader had resisted the extremes of
privation and danger, and never sunk until confronted by surrender.

General Grant, in response to a communication under a white flag made
by General Lee, as stated above, came to Appomattox, where a suitable
room was procured for their conference, and, the two Generals being
seated at a small table. General Lee opened the interview thus:

"General, I deem it due to proper candor and frankness to say at the
very beginning of this interview that I am not willing even to
discuss any terms of surrender inconsistent with the honor of my
army, which I am determined to maintain to the last."

General Grant replied:

"I have no idea of proposing dishonorable terms, General, but I would
be glad if you would state what you consider honorable terms."

General Lee then briefly stated the terms upon which he would be
willing to surrender. Grant expressed himself as satisfied with them,
and Lee requested that he would formally reduce the propositions to
writing.

To present a full and satisfactory account of the circumstances and
terms of the surrender, as well as the events immediately preceding
the evacuation of Petersburg, and the retreat thence to Appomattox
Court-House, I annex the subjoined letters:

"APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, _April 9, 1865._

"General R. E. LEE, _commanding Confederate States Army:_

"In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th
inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia on the following terms, to wit:

"Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy
to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained
by such officers as you may designate.

"The officers to give their individual parole not to take arms
against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged,
and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for
the men of their commands.

"The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked
and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them.

"This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their
private horses or baggage.

"This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their
homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authority so long as
they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside.

"Very respectfully,

"U. S. GRANT, _Lieutenant-General._"

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, _April 9, 1865._

"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the
terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, as proposed by
you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your
letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to
designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"R. E. LEE."

"PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA, 3 P.M., _April 2, 1865._

"His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, _Richmond, Virginia._

"MR. PRESIDENT: Your letter of the 1st is just received. I have been
willing to detach officers to recruit negro troops, and sent in the
names of many who are desirous of recruiting companies, battalions,
or regiments, to the War Department. After receiving the general
orders on that subject establishing recruiting depots in the several
States, I supposed that this mode of raising the troops was
preferred. I will continue to submit the names of those who offer for
the service, and whom I deem competent, to the War Department; but,
among the numerous applications which are presented, it is difficult
for me to decide who are suitable for the duty. I am glad your
Excellency has made an appeal to the Governors of the States, and
hope it will have a good effect. I have a great desire to confer with
you upon our condition, and would have been to Richmond before this,
but, anticipating movements of the enemy which have occurred, I felt
unwilling to be absent. I have considered our position very critical;
but have hoped that the enemy might expose himself in some way that
we might take advantage of, and cripple him. Knowing when Sheridan
moved on our right that our cavalry would be unable to resist
successfully his advance upon our communications, I detached
Pickett's division to support it. At first Pickett succeeded in
driving the enemy, who fought stubbornly; and, after being reënforced
by the Fifth Corps (United States Army), obliged Pickett to recede to
the Five Forks on the Dinwiddie Court-House and Ford's road, where,
unfortunately, he was yesterday defeated. To relieve him, I had to
again draw out three brigades under General Anderson, which so
weakened our front line that the enemy last night and this morning
succeeded in penetrating it near the Cox road, separating our troops
around the town from those on Hatcher's Run. This has enabled him to
extend to the Appomattox, thus inclosing and obliging us to contract
our lines to the city. I have directed the troops from the lines on
Hatcher's Run, thus severed from us, to fall back toward Amelia
Court-House, and I do not see how I can possibly help withdrawing
from the city to the north side of the Appomattox to-night. There is
no bridge over the Appomattox above this point nearer than Goode's
and Bevil's over which the troops above mentioned could cross to the
north side, and be made available to us; otherwise I might hold this
position for a day or two longer, but would have to evacuate it
eventually; and I think it better for us to abandon the whole line on
James River to-night, if practicable. I have sent preparatory orders
to all the officers, and will be able to tell by night whether or not
we can remain here another day; but I think every hour now adds to
our difficulties. I regret to be obliged to write such a hurried
letter to your Excellency, but I am in the presence of the enemy,
endeavoring to resist his advance.

"I am most respectfully and truly yours,

"R. E. LEE, _General._"

[Footnote 119: Testimony of General Burnside, "Report of Committee on
the Conduct of the War," vol. i, pp. 16, 17, 1865.]

[Footnote 120: John Esten Cooke, "Life of General R. E. Lee."]

[Footnote 121: "Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War" 1865,
vol. ii, pp. 106, 107.]

[Footnote 122: Falsehood and malignity have combined to invent and
circulate a baseless story to the effect that food ordered to Amelia
Court-House for Lee's troops, was by the Administration at Richmond
diverted from its destination, and the soldiers thus left to needless
suffering. A further notice will be taken of this slander in a subsequent
chapter, and that it had not one atom of truth in it will be shown by
conclusive testimony.]

CHAPTER LIII.

General Lee advises the Evacuation of Richmond.--Withdrawal of the
Troops.--The Naval Force.--The Conflagration in Richmond.--
Telegram of Lee to the President.--The Evacuation complete.--The
Charge of the Removal of Supplies intended for Lee's Army.--The
Facts.--Arrangement with General Lee.--Proclamation.--Reports of
Scouts.

When, on the morning of the 2d of April, the main line of the
defenses of Petersburg was broken, and our forces driven back to the
inner and last line, General Lee sent the telegram, to which
reference has been already made, and advised that Richmond should be
evacuated simultaneously with the withdrawal of his troops that
night. This left little time for preparation, especially in the
matter of providing transportation for the troops holding the eastern
defenses of Richmond. To supply the cavalry, artillery, and
army-wagons with horses, had so exhausted the stock of Virginia as to
leave the quartermaster's department little ability to supplement the
small transportation possessed, or required by troops regarded as a
stationary defense. The consequence was, that their withdrawal had to
be made under circumstances which involved unusual embarrassments
upon the march; but soldiers, sailors, and citizens, constituting the
"reserves," vied with each other in the performance of the hard duty
to which they were called--a night march over unknown roads, to join
a retreating army, pursued by a powerful enemy having large bodies of
cavalry. The opposing lines of intrenchment north of the James were
so near to each other, that our forces could only withdraw when it
was too dark for observation; this required that the movement should
be postponed until the moon went down, which was at a late hour of
the night.

The circumstances attending the withdrawal of Ewell's corps were such
as to make its safety the subject of special solicitude. It was small
in comparison to that retiring from Petersburg, had a greater
distance to march before a junction could be made with the main body,
and most of the men were unused to marching. From reports received
long after the event, I am able to give the principal occurrences of
their campaign.

General G. W. C. Lee moved his division from Chapin's Bluff across
the James River, on the Wilton Bridge; the wagons having been loaded
under the preparatory order, were sent up in the afternoon to cross
at Richmond, and the division moved on to a short distance beyond
Tomahawk Church, where it encamped on the night of the 3d. General
Kershaw's division, with dismounted men of Gary's cavalry brigade,
crossed at Richmond and moved on to the same encampment. Having
ascertained that the Appomattox could not be crossed on the route
they were pursuing, the column was turned up to the railroad-bridge
at the Mattoax Station, which was prepared for the passage of
artillery and troops, and the two divisions, with their trains,
crossed on the night of the 4th and encamped on the hills beyond the
river. On the next day the column moved on to Amelia Court-House; it
was now joined by the Naval Battalion, under Commodore Tucker, and
the artillery battalion of Major Frank Smith, which had been
withdrawn from Howlett's Bluff; both of these were added to G. W. C.
Lee's division. The supply-train not being able to cross the
Appomattox River near Meadville, went farther up, and, having
effected a crossing, proceeded with safety until about four miles
from Amelia Court-House, where it was destroyed by a detachment of
the enemy's cavalry on the morning of the 5th, with the baggage of G.
W. C. Lee's division and about twenty thousand good rations.

At Amelia Court-House Ewell's corps made a junction with Lee's army,
but forced marches with men most of whom were untrained by previous
campaign had greatly reduced the number of Ewell's command, and the
want of rations now was impairing their efficiency. From that place
his corps moved in rear of Anderson's, followed by the train of Lee's
army, which was covered in rear by Gordon's corps. The march was much
impeded by the wagon-trains, consequently slow, and, from frequent
halts, fatiguing. About noon of the 6th, after crossing a small
stream within several miles of Sailor's Creek, the enemy's cavalry
made an attack at the point where the wagon-train turned off to the
right. Skirmishers from Lee's division were thrown out, and soon
repelled the attack; but it was thought necessary to retain these
troops in that position until the trains had passed. General Gordon,
who protected the rear, had frequent combats with the pursuers. As
soon as the trains were out of the way, Ewell's troops moved on after
Anderson's corps. On crossing Sailor's Creek, General Ewell reports
that he met General Fitzhugh Lee, from whom he learned that a large
force of cavalry held the road in front of Anderson, and was so
strongly posted that he had halted. Lee's and Kershaw's divisions
moved on to close upon Anderson; but Gordon having followed the wagon
and artillery train, the enemy's cavalry and also infantry appeared
in the rear, and commenced an attack upon Kershaw's division.
Anderson had proposed to Ewell that, if he would hold the enemy in
check who was coming up on the rear, he would attack the cavalry in
front, to open our line of march in that direction. Lee's and
Kershaw's divisions were therefore formed in line of battle faced to
the rear. Anderson made the attack, but failed. Meantime an
artillery-fire was opened on Kershaw's and Lee's divisions; they,
having no artillery to reply, were subjected to the severe trial of
standing under a fire which they could not return. In their praise,
it was said they unflinchingly bore the test. Supposing probably that
their artillery-fire had demoralized our troops, the enemy's infantry
advanced. They were repulsed, and that portion which attacked G. W.
C. Lee's artillery brigade was charged by it, and driven back across
Sailor's Creek. The enemy had now turned the flank of Kershaw's
division and obliged it to retire. Ewell, while seeking some route by
which his command might be extricated, was captured, and the enemy
closed in on Lee's division, surrounding it on every side. Firing
ceased, and the division was captured. A like fate befell the
division of Kershaw. A portion of Anderson's corps escaped, but
Ewell's was all captured. This corps, when it left Richmond, numbered
about six thousand men. At the battle of Sailor's Creek there
remained about three thousand. The fatigue of constant marching for
days and nights to men unaccustomed to such service might
sufficiently explain the diminution; but to this must be added the
want of rations for the last two days of their campaign. Twenty-eight
hundred were taken prisoners, and about a hundred and fifty killed
and wounded. From General Ewell's report, I learn that the force of
the enemy engaged at Sailor's Creek amounted to thirty thousand men.
In closing his report be says:

"The discipline preserved by General G. W. C. Lee in camp and on the
march, and the manner in which he handled his troops in action, fully
justified the request I had made for his promotion. General Kershaw,
who had only been a few days under my command, behaved with his usual
coolness and judgment."

Lest any should suppose, from the remark of General Ewell, that I had
been unwilling or reluctant to promote my aide-de-camp. Colonel G. W.
C. Lee, it is proper to state that the only obstacle to be overcome
was Lee's objection to receiving promotion. With refined delicacy he
shrank from the idea of superseding men who had been actively serving
in the field, and in one case where the objection did not seem to me
to have any application, he so decidedly preferred to remain with me,
that I yielded to his wishes; but gave him additional rank to command
the local troops for the defense of Richmond. His valuable services
in that capacity, on various occasions, sustained my high opinion of
him as a soldier, and his conduct on that retreat, and in the battle
of "Sailor's Creek," for which he is commended, was only what I
anticipated.

Of the forces constituting the defense of Richmond on the 2d of
April, it only remains to account for the naval force in the James.
After General Ewell had withdrawn his command, Admiral Semmes
embarked the crews of his gunboats on some small steamers, set fire
to his war-vessels, and proceeded up the river to the landing
opposite Richmond. Here he found no land transportation awaiting him,
and the last railroad train had left at early dawn. He, however, with
the energy and capacity so often elsewhere displayed by him, on
finding the railroad station deserted, commenced a search for
material which, with his steam engineers, he could make available. He
states that a few straggling passenger-cars lay uncoupled along the
track, and that there was also a small engine, but no fire, and no
fuel to make one. They coupled the cars together, his marine sappers
and miners cut up a fence for steam-fuel, and thus he got under way,
but the engine proved insufficient to draw the train, and at an
up-grade he was brought to a halt immediately after starting. One of
his engineers, however, found in the workshops another engine; with
the two he was able to proceed, and thus to transport his sailors to
Danville, the best mode known to him to execute the order sent to him
by the Secretary of the Navy, "You will join General Lee in the field
with all your forces." [123] When General Longstreet was withdrawn
from the north side of the James, Colonel Shipp, Commandant of the
Virginia Institute, with the Battalion of Cadets, youths whose
gallantry at the battle of New Market has been heretofore noticed,
and such convalescents in Richmond as were able to march, moved down
to supply the vacancy created by the transfer of Longstreet's force
to Petersburg. General Ewell, in command at Richmond, had for its
defense the naval force at Drury's Bluff under Commander Tucker,
which was organized as a regiment and armed with muskets. On the
north side of the James were General Kershaw's division of
Confederate troops and General G. W. C, Lee's division, composed
mostly of artillery-men armed as infantry, and the "reserves," or
"local troops," coöperating with these was Admiral Semmes's naval
force on the James. On the night of the 2d of April these forces were
withdrawn, and took up their line of march to join General Lee's army
on its retreat.

In obedience to a law of the Congress, General Ewell had made
arrangements to burn the tobacco at Richmond whenever the evacuation
of the city should render the burning necessary, to prevent the
tobacco from falling into the hands of the enemy. Orders were also
given to destroy certain property of the Confederate States,
exceptions being made as in the case of the arsenal, the burning of
which would endanger the city. To prevent the possibility of a
general conflagration he had advised with the Mayor and City Council,
and the necessary precautions were believed to have been taken.
General Ewell's report, December 20, 1865, published in the
"Historical Society Papers" (vol. i, p. 101), satisfactorily
establishes the fact that the conflagration in Richmond of April 3,
1865, did not result from any act of the public authorities. The
burning of the tobacco was only resorted to when the alternative was
to burn or allow it to fall into the hands of the enemy, who, there
was no doubt, would take it without making compensation to the
owners. It was a disagreeable necessity, and therefore every
opportunity was allowed to the owners of that and other articles of
export to place them, if possible, beyond the danger of being applied
to the use of the hostile Government. There is no similitude between
the destruction of public property made by us and the like act of the
invader in our country. The property we destroyed belonged to the
Confederate States only. Armories and ship-yards destroyed by them--
those, for instance, at Harper's Ferry and Norfolk--were the
property of the States in common, which the Federal Government had
emphatically declared it was its bounden duty to preserve, and which
was its first plea in justification of the act of sending an armed
force against the Southern States.

The conflagration at Richmond occurred on the morning of the 3d of
April, after I had left the city, and I therefore have only such
knowledge in regard to it as was subsequently acquired from others.
Those who would learn specifically the facts and speculations in
regard to it are referred to the report of General Ewell, which has
been above cited. Suffice it to say, the troops of neither army were
considered responsible for that calamity.

On Sunday, the 2d of April, while I was in St. Paul's church. General
Lee's telegram, announcing his speedy withdrawal from Petersburg, and
the consequent necessity for evacuating Richmond, was handed to me. I
quietly rose and left the church. The occurrence probably attracted
attention, but the people of Richmond had been too long beleaguered,
had known me too often to receive notice of threatened attacks, and
the congregation of St. Paul's was too refined, to make a scene at
anticipated danger. For all these reasons, the reader will be
prepared for the announcement that the sensational stories which have
been published about the agitation caused by my leaving the church
during service were the creations of fertile imaginations. I went to
my office and assembled the heads of departments and bureaus, as far
as they could be found on a day when all the offices were closed, and
gave the needful instructions for our removal that night,
simultaneously with General Lee's withdrawal from Petersburg. The
event was not unforeseen, and some preparation had been made for it,
though, as it came sooner than was expected, there was yet much to be
done. My own papers were disposed as usual for convenient reference
in the transaction of current affairs, and as soon as the principal
officers had left me the executive papers were arranged for removal.
This occupied myself and staff until late in the afternoon. By this
time the report that Richmond was to be evacuated had spread through
the town, and many who saw me walking toward my residence left their
houses to inquire whether the report was true. Upon my admission of
the painful fact, qualified, however, by the expression of my hope
that we would under better auspices again return, the ladies
especially, with generous sympathy and patriotic impulse, responded,
"If the success of the cause requires you to give up Richmond, we are
content."

The affection and confidence of this noble people in the hour of
disaster were more distressing to me than complaint and unjust
censure would have been.

In view of the diminishing resources of the country on which the Army
of Northern Virginia relied for supplies, I had urged the policy of
sending families as far as practicable to the south and west, and had
set the example by requiring my own to go. If it was practicable and
desirable to hold the south side of the James, then, even for merely
material considerations, it was important to hold Richmond, and this
could best have been done if there had been none there save those who
could aid in its defense. If it was not practicable and desirable to
hold the south side of the James, then Richmond would be isolated,
and if it could have been defended, its depots, foundries, workshops,
and mills could have contributed nothing to the armies outside, and
its possession would no longer have been to us of military
importance. Ours being a struggle for existence, the indulgence of
sentiment would have been misplaced.

Being alone in Richmond, the few arrangements needful for my personal
wants were soon made after reaching home. Then, leaving all else in
care of the housekeeper, I waited until notified of the time when the
train would depart; then, going to the station, started for Danville,
whither I supposed General Lee would proceed with his army.

In a previous chapter I promised to expose the fiction which imputed
to me the removal of supplies intended for Lee's army at Amelia
Court-House, Though manufactured without one fiber of truth, it has
been copied into so many books, formed the staple of so many
jeremiads, and pointed so many malignant reflections, that I deem it
proper for myself and others concerned now to present the evidence
which will overthrow this baseless fabric.

General I. M. St. John, Commissary-General of the Confederate Army,
was requested by me, after the close of the war, to prepare a report
in reply to the widely circulated story that Lee's army had been
compelled to evacuate Petersburg, and subsequently to surrender
because the Administration had failed to provide food for their
support. On the 14th of July, 1873, General St. John addressed to me
a report of the operations and condition of the commissariat
immediately preceding the surrender of Lee's and Johnston's armies.
That report, together with confirmatory statements, will be found in
the "Southern Historical Society Papers" for March, 1877. From it and
the accompanying documents I propose to make brief extracts.

General St. John says that in February, 1865, when he took charge of
the commissary bureau, on account of the military status he

"found that the Army of Northern Virginia was with difficulty
supplied day by day with reduced rations. . . . I at once proceeded
to organize a system of appeal and of private contribution as
auxiliary to the regular operations of the commissary service. With
the earnest and very active aid of leading citizens of Virginia and
North Carolina, this effort was attended with results exceeding
expectation. . . . On or before March 15, 1865, the
Commissary-General was able to report to the Secretary of War that,
in addition to the daily issue of rations to the Army of Northern
Virginia, there lay in depot along the railroad between Greensboro,
North Carolina, Lynchburg, Staunton, and Richmond, at least ten days'
rations of bread and meat, collected especially for that army, and
subject to the requisition of its chief commissary officer; also that
considerably over 300,000 rations were held in Richmond as a special
reserve. . . . There was collected by April 1, 1865, in depot,
subsistence stated in detail as follows:

"At Richmond, Virginia, 300,000 rations bread and meat; at Danville,
500,000 rations bread; at Danville, 1,500,000 rations meat; at
Lynchburg, 180,000 rations bread and meat; at Greensboro, North
Carolina, and vicinity, 1,500,000 rations bread and meat.

"In addition, there were considerable supplies of tea, coffee, and
sugar carefully reserved for hospital issues chiefly. These returns
did not include the subsistence collections by the field-trains of
the Army of Northern Virginia, under orders from its own
headquarters, nor the depot collections at Charlottesville, Staunton,
and other points upon the Virginia Central Railroad, to meet
requisitions from the Confederates operating in the Valley and
western Virginia. South and west of Greensboro, North Carolina, the
depot accumulations were reserved first to meet requisitions for the
forces operating in the Carolinas, and the surplus for Virginia
requisitions. . . ."

The report then refers to a conference between the Secretary of War
(Breckinridge) and the General commanding (Lee) with the
Quartermaster-General (Lawton) and the Commissary-General (St. John).
After a general discussion of the wants of the army in clothing,
forage, and subsistence, to an inquiry by General Lee, General St.
John replied:

"That a daily delivery by cars and canal-boats, at or near Richmond,
of about five hundred tons of commissaries' stores was essential to
provide for the Richmond siege reserve and other accumulations
desired by the General commanding; that the depot collections were
already sufficient to assure the meeting of these requisitions, and,
if the then existing military lines could be held, the
Commissary-General felt encouraged as to the future of his own
immediate department."

The procuring of supplies was only one of the difficulties by which
we were beset. The deteriorated condition of the railroads and the
deficiency of rolling-stock embarrassed transportation, and there was
yet another: the cavalry raids of the enemy frequently broke the
railroads and destroyed trains. General Lawton, with great energy and
good judgment, under the heavy pressure of the circumstances,
improved the railroad transportation. I quote again from the report
of General St. John:

"Upon the earliest information of the approaching evacuation,
instructions were asked from the War Department and the General
commanding for the final disposition of the subsistence reserve in
Richmond, then reported by Major Claiborne, post commissary, to
exceed in quantity 350,000 rations. The reply, 'Send up the Danville
Railroad if Richmond is not safe,' was received from the army
headquarters, April 2, 1865, and too late for action, as all railroad
transportation had then been taken up, by superior orders, for the
archives, bullion, and other Government service, then deemed of prior
importance. All that remained to be done was to fill every accessible
army-wagon; and this was done, and the trains were hurried southward."

It will be seen from this statement that the reply was only directed
to the removal of the subsistence reserve if Richmond was not safe.
It can not be supposed that such a reply emanated from General Lee,
as he surely never contemplated an attempt to hold Richmond after
Petersburg was evacuated. General St. John then adds:

"On March 31st, or possibly the morning of April 1st, a telegram was
received at the bureau in Richmond, from the commissary officer of
the Army of Northern Virginia, requesting breadstuffs to be sent to
Petersburg. Shipment was commenced at once, and was pressed to the
extreme limit of transportation permitted by the movement of General
Longstreet's corps (then progressing southward). No calls, by letter
or requisition, from the General commanding, or from any other
source, official or unofficial, had been received either by the
Commissary-General or the Assistant Commissary-General; nor (as will
be seen by the appended letter of the Secretary of War) was any
communication transmitted through the department channels to the
bureau of subsistence, for the collection of supplies at Amelia
Court-House. Had any such requisition or communication been received
at the bureau as late as the morning of April 1st, it could have been
met from the Richmond reserve with transportation on south-bound
trains, and most assuredly so previous to General Longstreet's
movement."

On the morning of the 3d the Commissary-General left Richmond and
joined General R. E. Lee at Amelia Springs. There were at that time
about eighty thousand rations at Farmville, "there held on trains for
immediate use." On the morning of the 6th the Commissary-General
asked General Lee whether he should send those rations down the
railroad or hold them at Farmville. Not receiving instructions, the
rations remained at Farmville, and on the 7th the army passing there
took a portion of them. On the morning of the 8th the subsistence
trains on the railroad at Pamphlin's Station, twenty miles west of
Farmville, were attacked by the enemy's cavalry and captured, or
burned to avoid capture. The surrender followed on the subsequent
day. The foregoing extracts, I think, prove unquestionably that no
orders were received to place supplies for Lee's army at Amelia
Court-House; that sufficient supplies were in depot to answer the
immediate wants of the army, and that the failure to distribute them
to the troops on their retreat was due to the active operations of
the enemy on all our lines of communication; hence, when the
Commissary-General applied to General Lee for instructions as to
where supplies should be placed, he says, "General Lee replied in
substance that the military situation did not permit an answer."
Lest, however, what has been given should not seem conclusive to
others, I add confirmatory testimony. General John C. Breckinridge,
in a letter to General I. M. St. John, of date May 16, 1871, wrote:

"A few days before the evacuation of Richmond you reported to me that
besides supplies accumulated at different distant points in Virginia
and North Carolina, you had ten days' rations accessible by rail to
[General Lee] and subject to the orders of his chief commissary. I
have no recollection of any communication from General Lee in regard
lo the accumulation of rations at Amelia Court-House. . . . The
second or third day after the evacuation, I recollect you said to
General Lee in my presence that you had a large number of rations (I
think eighty thousand) at a convenient point on the railroad, and
desired to know where you should place them. The General replied that
the military situation made it impossible to answer."

In a letter of the date of September, 1865, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas
G. Williams, assistant commissary-general, wrote to General St. John,
and from his letter I make the following extract:

"On the morning of April 2, 1865, the chief commissary of General
Lee's army was asked by telegram what should be done with the stores
in Richmond. No reply was received until night; he then suggested
that, if Richmond was not safe, they might be sent up on the
Richmond and Danville Railroad. As the evacuation of Richmond was
then actively progressing, it was impracticable to move those
supplies. . . . In reply to your question with regard to the
establishment of a depot of supplies at Amelia Court-House, I have
to say that I had no information of any such requisition or demand
upon the bureau."

Major J. H. Claiborne, assistant commissary-general, in a letter to
General I. M. St. John, from Richmond, June 3, 1873, wrote:

"No order was received by me, and (with full opportunities of
information if it had been given) I had no knowledge of any plan to
send supplies to Amelia Court-House. Under such circumstances, with
transportation afforded, there could readily have been sent about
three hundred thousand rations, with due regard to the demand upon
this post."

During the retreat, supplies were found at Pamphlin's Depot,
Farmville, Danville, Saulsbury, and Charlotte. Major B. P. Noland,
chief commissary for Virginia, wrote to General St. John, April 16,
1874. After saying that he had read with care the report of General
St. John, and expressing the opinion that it was entirely correct, of
which no one in the Confederacy had better opportunities to judge, he
writes:

"I think the plan adopted by your predecessor, Colonel Northrop
(which was continued by you), for obtaining for the use of the army
the products of the country, was as perfect and worked as effectively
as any that could have been devised. . . . I left Richmond at one
o'clock of the night Richmond was evacuated, with orders from you to
make Lynchburg my headquarters, and be ready to forward supplies from
that point to the army. I never heard of any order for the
accumulation of supplies at Amelia Springs."

Lewis E. Harvie, a distinguished citizen of Virginia, and who at the
close of the war was President of the Richmond and Danville and
Piedmont Railroads, wrote to General St. John on January 1, 1876.
From his letter I make the following extracts, referring to the
condition of affairs in 1865. He writes:

"The difficulties of obtaining supplies were very great, particularly
when the roads under my charge were cut, and transportation suspended
on them, which was the case on one or two occasions for several
weeks. Engines and care, and machinery generally, on these roads were
insufficient and inadequate from wear and tear to accomplish the
amount of transportation required for the Government. . . . The
Richmond and Danville and Piedmont Railroads were kept open, and
about that time we added largely to its rolling-stock by procuring
engines and cars from the different roads on the route of the
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad west. Starvation had stared the Army
of Northern Virginia in the face; and the commissary department
organized an appeal to the people on the line of the Richmond and
Danville Railroad for voluntary contributions of supplies, and a
number of gentlemen of influence, character, and position, including
the most eminent clergymen of the State, addressed them in several
counties, urging them to furnish the supply wanted.

"No one who witnessed can ever forget the results. Contribution was
universal, and supplies of food sufficient to meet the wants of the
army at the time were at once sent to the depots on the road until
they were packed and groaned under their weight; and I affirm that at
the time of the evacuation of Richmond, the difficulty of delivering
supplies sufficient for the support of the Army of Northern Virginia
under General Lee was solved and surmounted, for I know that abundant
supplies were in reach of transportation on the Richmond and Danville
Railroad, being massed in Danville, Charlotte, and at other points;
and, from the increased motive power above referred to, they could
have been delivered as fast as they were required. . . . At the time
of the evacuation of the city, there were ample supplies in it, as
well as on the railroad west of Amelia Court-House, to have been
delivered at the latter place for the retreating army, if its numbers
had been double what they were. No orders were ever given to any
officers or employee of the Richmond and Danville Railroad to
transport any supplies to Amelia Court-House for General Lee's army,
nor did I ever bear that any such orders were sent to the commissary
department on the occasion of the evacuation of Richmond, until after
the surrender of the army."

Mr. Harvie then recites his interview, held on Saturday, the day
before evacuation, with the Quartermaster-General, the Secretary of
War, and myself, from whom he learned that he might go home for a
fortnight, there being no expectation that Richmond would be
evacuated in the mean time. He adds that the next day he was informed
by telegraph of the proposed evacuation, and returned to Richmond, at
which place he conferred with myself and the Secretary of War about
the route to be taken by the wagon supply-train, and that he had a
long conversation with me on the care, during our night-ride to
Danville.

In regard to sending supplies to Amelia Court-House, he writes:

"I have never believed that any orders to place supplies of food at
Amelia Court-House were received by the commissary department at the
time of the evacuation of the city, because from Richmond, or from
the upper portions of the railroad, if required, they could at once
have been transported without any delay or difficulty. Neither the
road nor the telegraph was cut or disturbed until the day after the
evacuation of the city."

It may perhaps be thought that the amount of evidence adduced is
greater than necessary to disprove the very improbable assertion
that, instead of burden-cars, a passenger train had been loaded with
provisions for Lee's army at Amelia Court-House, and that these
passenger-cars, without being permitted to unload the freight, had,
in reckless disregard of the wants of our worn and hard-pressed
defenders, been ordered to proceed immediately to Richmond, thus
leaving them to starvation, and the necessity to surrender, in order
to enable the executive department to escape; but, as I had no
personal knowledge of the matter, it was necessary to quote those
whose functions brought them into closer communication with the
subject to which the calumny related.

In the night of the 2d, the same on which General Ewell evacuated the
defenses of the capital and General Lee withdrew from Petersburg, I
left Richmond and reached Danville on the next morning.

Neither the president of the railroad, who was traveling with me, nor
I knew that there was anything which required attention at Amelia
Court-House or other station on the route. Had General Lee's letter
to me, written on the afternoon of the 2d, been received at Richmond,
which I think it was not, the fact that he proposed to march to
Amelia Court-House would have been known; but it would have been
unjust to the officers of the commissary department to doubt that any
requisition made or to be made for supplies had received or would
receive the most prompt and efficient attention. If, however, I had
known that General Lee wanted supplies placed at Amelia Court-House,
I would certainly have inquired as to the time of reaching that
station, and have asked to have the train stopped so as to enable me
to learn whether the supplies were in depot or not. The unfounded
calumny, after perhaps having given it more consideration than it was
worth, is now dismissed.

Though the occupation of Danville was not expected to be permanent,
immediately after arriving there rooms were obtained, and the
different departments resumed their routine labors. Nothing could
have exceeded the kindness and hospitality of the patriotic citizens.
They cordially gave as an "Old Virginia welcome," and with one heart
contributed in every practicable manner to cheer and aid us in the
work in which we were engaged.

The town was surrounded by an intrenchment as faulty in location as
construction. I promptly proceeded to correct the one and improve the
other, while energetic efforts were being made to collect supplies of
various kinds for General Lee's army.

The design, as previously arranged with General Lee, was that, if he
should be compelled to evacuate Petersburg, he would proceed to
Danville, make a new defensive line of the Dan and Roanoke Rivers,
unite his army with the troops in North Carolina, and make a combined
attack upon Sherman; if successful, it was expected that reviving
hope would bring reënforcements to the army, and Grant, being then
far removed from his base of supplies, and in the midst of a hostile
population, it was thought we might return, drive him from the soil
of Virginia, and restore to the people a government deriving its
authority from their consent. With these hopes and wishes, neither
seeking to diminish the magnitude of our disaster nor to excite
illusory expectations, I issued, on the 5th, the following
proclamation, of which, viewed by the light of subsequent events, it
may fairly be said it was over-sanguine:

"The General-in-Chief found it necessary to make such movements of
his troops as to uncover the capital. It would be unwise to conceal
the moral and material injury to our cause resulting from its
occupation by the enemy. It is equally unwise and unworthy of us to
allow our energies to falter and our efforts to become relaxed under
reverses, however calamitous they may be. For many months the largest
and finest army of the Confederacy, under a leader whose presence
inspires equal confidence in the troops and the people, has been
greatly trammeled by the necessity of keeping constant watch over the
approaches to the capital, and has thus been forced to forego more
than one opportunity for promising enterprise. It is for us, my
countrymen, to show by our bearing under reverses, how wretched has
been the self-deception of those who have believed us less able to
endure misfortune with fortitude than to encounter danger with
courage.

"We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from
the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be free to
move from point to point, to strike the enemy in detail far from his
base. Let us but will it, and we are free.

"Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fortitude which never
yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that it is my
purpose to maintain your cause with my whole heart and soul; that I
will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of
any of the States of the Confederacy; that Virginia--noble State,
whose ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still more glorious
recent history; whose bosom has been bared to receive the main shock
of this war; whose sons and daughters have exhibited heroism so
sublime as to render her illustrious in all time to come--that
Virginia, with the help of the people and by the blessing of
Providence, shall be held and defended, and no peace ever be made
with the infamous invaders of her territory.

"If, by the stress of numbers, we should be compelled to a temporary
withdrawal from her limits or those of any other border State, we
will return until the baffled and exhausted enemy shall abandon in
despair his endless and impossible task of making slaves of a people
resolved to be free.

"Let us, then, not despond, my countrymen, but, relying on God, meet
the foe with fresh defiance and with unconquered and unconquerable
hearts.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

While thus employed, little if any reliable information in regard to
the Army of Northern Virginia was received, until a gallant youth,
the son of General Henry A. Wise, came to Danville, and told me that,
learning Lee's army was to be surrendered, he had during the night
mounted his fleet horse, and, escaping through and from the enemy's
cavalry, some of whom pursued him, had come quite alone to warn me of
the approaching event. Other unofficial information soon followed,
and of such circumstantial character as to prove that Lieutenant
Wise's anticipation had been realized.

Our scouts now reported a cavalry force to be moving toward the south
around the west side of Danville, and we removed thence to
Greensboro, passing a railroad-bridge, as was subsequently learned, a
very short time before the enemy's cavalry reached and burned it. I
had telegraphed to General Johnston from Danville the report that Lee
had surrendered, and, on arriving at Greensboro, conditionally
requested him to meet me there, where General Beauregard at the time
had his headquarters, my object being to confer with both of them in
regard to our present condition and future operations.

[Footnote 123: "Memoirs of Service Afloat," Admiral Semmes, pp.
811-815.]

CHAPTER LIV

The invitation to General Johnston for a conference, noticed in a
previous chapter, was as follows:

"GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, _April 11 1865--12 M._

"General J. E. JOHNSTON, _headquarters, via Raleigh:_

"The Secretary of War did not join me at Danville. Is expected here
this afternoon.

"As your situation may render best, I will go to your headquarters
immediately after the arrival of the Secretary of War, or you can
come here; in the former case our conference must be without the
presence of General Beauregard. I have no official report from
General Lee. The Secretary of War may be able to add to information
heretofore communicated.

"The important question first to be solved is, At what point shall
concentration be made, in view of the present position of the two
columns of the enemy, and the routes which they may adopt to engage
your forces before a proposed junction with General Walker and
others. Your more intimate knowledge of the data for the solution of
the problem deters me from making a specific suggestion on that
point.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

In compliance with this request, General J. E. Johnston came up from
Raleigh to Greensboro, and with General Beauregard met me and most of
my Cabinet at my quarters in a house occupied by Colonel J. Taylor
Wood's family. Though I was fully sensible of the gravity of our
position, seriously affected as it was by the evacuation of the
capital, the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the
consequent discouragement which these events would produce, I did not
think we should despair. We still had effective armies in the field,
and a vast extent of rich and productive territory both east and west
of the Mississippi, whose citizens had evinced no disposition to
surrender. Ample supplies had been collected in the railroad depots,
and much still remained to be placed at our disposal when needed by
the army in North Carolina.

The failure of several attempts to open negotiations with the Federal
Government, and notably the last by commissioners who met President
Lincoln at Hampton Roads, convinced me of the hopelessness under
existing circumstances to obtain better terms than were then offered,
i. e., a surrender at discretion. My motive, therefore, in holding an
interview with the senior generals of the army in North Carolina was
not to learn their opinion as to what might be done by negotiation
with the United States Government, but to derive from them
information in regard to the army under their command, and what it
was feasible and advisable to do as a military problem.

The members of my Cabinet were already advised as to the object of
the meeting, and, when the subject was introduced to the generals in
that form, General Johnston was very reserved, and seemed far less
than sanguine. His first significant expression was that of a desire
to open correspondence with General Sherman, to see if he would agree
to a suspension of hostilities, the object being to permit the civil
authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the
existing war. Confident that the United States Government would not
accept a proposition for such negotiations, I distinctly expressed My
conviction on that point, and presented as an objection to such an
effort that, so far as it should excite delusive hopes and
expectations, its failure would have a demoralizing effect both on
the troops and the people. Neither of them had shown any disposition
to surrender, or had any reason to suppose that their Government
contemplated abandoning its trust--the maintenance of the
Constitution, freedom, and independence of the Confederate States.
From the inception of the war, the people had generally and at all
times expressed their determination to accept no terms of peace that
did not recognize their independence; and the indignation manifested
when it became known that Mr. Lincoln had offered to our
commissioners at Hampton Roads a surrender at discretion as the only
alternative to a continuance of the war assured me that no true
Confederate was prepared to accept peace on such terms. During the
last years of the war the main part of the infantry in the Army of
Northern Virginia was composed of men from the farther South. Many of
these, before the evacuation of Petersburg and especially about the
time of Lee's surrender, had absented themselves to go homeward, and,
it was reported, made avowal of their purpose to continue the
struggle. I had reason to believe that the spirit of the army in
North Carolina was unbroken, for, though surrounded by circumstances
well calculated to depress and discourage them, I had learned that
they earnestly protested to their officers against the surrender
which rumor informed them was then in contemplation. If any shall
deem it a weak credulity to confide in such reports, something may be
allowed to an intense love for the Confederacy to a thorough
conviction that its fall would involve ruin, both material and moral,
and to a confidence in the righteousness of our cause, which, if
equally felt by my compatriots, would make them do and dare to the
last extremity.

But if, taking the gloomiest view, the circumstances were such as to
leave no hope of maintaining the independence of the Confederate
States--if negotiations for peace must be on the basis of reunion
and the acceptance of the war legislation--it seemed to me that
certainly better terms for our country could be secured by keeping
organized armies in the field than by laying down our arms and
trusting to the magnanimity of the victor.

For all these considerations I was not at all hopeful of any success
in the attempt to provide for negotiations between the civil
authorities of the United States and those of the Confederacy,
believing that, even if Sherman should agree to such a proposition,
his Government would not ratify it; but, after having distinctly
announced my opinion, I yielded to the judgment of my constitutional
advisers, of whom only one held my views, and consented to permit
General Johnston, as he desired, to hold a conference with General
Sherman for the purpose above recited.

Then, turning to what I supposed would soon follow, I invited General
Johnston to an expression of his choice of a line of retreat toward
the southwest. He declared a preference for a different route from
that suggested by me, and, yielding the point, I informed him that I
would have depots of supplies for his army placed on the route he had
selected. The commissary-general, St. John, executed the order, as
shown in his report published in the "Southern Historical Society
Papers," vol. viii, pp. 103-107.

Referring to the period which followed the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, General I. M. St. John, Commissary-General
Confederate States Army, writes:

"The bureau headquarters were continued in North Carolina until the
surrender of that military department. During the interval
preparations were made for the westward movement of forces as then
contemplated. In these arrangements the local depots were generally
found so full and supplied so well in hand, from Charlotte southwest,
that the commissary-general was able to report to the Secretary of
War that the requisitions for which he was notified to prepare could
all be met. The details of this service were executed, and very ably,
by Major J. H. Claiborne, then, and until the end, assistant
commissary-general."

Major Claiborne, in his report, writes:

"Being placed under orders as assistant commissary-general, I
forwarded supplies from South Carolina to General J. E. Johnston's
army, and also collected supplies at six or seven named points in
that State for the supposed retreat of General Johnston's army
through the State. This duty, with a full determination at the
evacuation of this city [Richmond] to follow the fortunes of our
cause, gave me opportunity of ascertaining the resources of the
country for my department. The great want was that of transportation,
and specially was it felt by all collecting commissaries for a few
months before the surrender."

It will thus be seen that my expectations, referred to above, caused
adequate provision to be made for the retreat of our army, if that
result should become necessary by the failure of the attempt to open
negotiations for an honorable peace. I had never contemplated a
surrender, except upon such terms as a belligerent might claim, as
long as we were able to keep the field, and never expected a
Confederate army to surrender while it was able either to fight or to
retreat. Lee had only surrendered his army when it was impossible for
him to do either one or the other, and had proudly rejected Grant's
demand, in the face of overwhelming numbers, until he found himself
surrounded and his line of retreat blocked by a force much larger
than his own.

After it had been decided that General Johnston should attempt
negotiation with General Sherman, he left for his army headquarters;
and I, expecting that he would soon take up his line of retreat,
which his superiority in cavalry would protect from harassing
pursuit, proceeded with my Cabinet and staff toward Charlotte, North
Carolina. While on the way, a dispatch was received from General
Johnston announcing that General Sherman had agreed to a conference,
and asking that the Secretary of War, General J. C. Breckinridge,
should return to coöperate in it. The application was complied with,
and the Postmaster-General, John H. Reagan, also went at my request.
He, however, was not admitted to the conference.

We arrived at Charlotte on April 18, 1865, and I there received, at
the moment of dismounting, a telegram from General Breckinridge
announcing, on information received from General Sherman, that
President Lincoln had been assassinated. An influential citizen of
the town, who had come to welcome me, was standing near me, and,
after remarking to him in a low voice that I had received sad
intelligence, I handed the telegram to him. Some troopers encamped in
the vicinity had collected to see me; they called to the gentleman
who had the dispatch in his hand to read it, no doubt supposing it to
be army news. He complied with their request, and a few, only taking
in the fact, but not appreciating the evil it portended, cheered, as
was natural at news of the fall of one they considered their most
powerful foe. The man, who invented the story of my having read the
dispatch with exultation, had free scope for his imagination, as he
was not present, and had no chance to know whereof he bore witness,
even if there had been any foundation of truth for his fiction.

For an enemy so relentless in the war for our subjugation, we could
not be expected to mourn; yet, in view of its political consequences,
it could not be regarded otherwise than as a great misfortune to the
South. He had power over the Northern people, and was without
personal malignity toward the people of the South; his successor was
without power in the North, and the embodiment of malignity toward
the Southern people, perhaps the more so because he had betrayed and
deserted them in the hour of their need. The war had now shrunk into
narrow proportions, but the important consideration remained to so
conduct it that, if failing to secure our independence, we might
obtain a treaty or _quasi_-treaty of peace which would secure to the
Southern States their political rights, and to the people thereof
immunity from the plunder of their private property.

I found some cavalry at Charlotte, and soon had the satisfaction to
increase them to five brigades, They had been on detached service,
and were much reduced in numbers. Among the troopers who assembled
there was the remnant of the command which had spread terror north of
the Ohio, under the command of their dauntless leader, General John
Hunt Morgan. Their present chief, worthy to be the successor of that
hero, was General Basil Duke. Among the atrocious, cowardly acts of
vindictive malice which marked the conduct of the enemy, none did or
could surpass the brutality with which the dying and dead body of
Morgan was treated. Hate, the offspring of fear, they might feel for
the valorous soldier while he lived, but even the ignoble passion,
vengeance, might have been expected to stop when life was extinct.

On April 13, 1865, General Johnston wrote to General Sherman as
follows:

"The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the
relative military condition of the belligerents. I am therefore
induced to address you, in this form, the inquiry whether, to stop
the further effusion of blood and the devastation of property, you
are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations;
. . . the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into
the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war."

General Sherman replied, on the 14th:

"I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the
suspension of hostilities between the armies commanded by you and
those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer with you to
that end," etc., etc.[124]

In the same volume, at page 327, General Sherman describes an
interview with Mr. Lincoln, held at City Point on the 27th and 28th
of March preceding, in which he says:

"Mr. Lincoln distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and
the people of North Carolina that, as soon as the rebel armies laid
down their arms, and resumed their civil pursuits, they would at once
be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a common country; and
that, to avoid anarchy, the State governments then in existence, with
their civil functionaries, would be recognized by him as the
government _de facto_ till Congress could provide others."

In a letter of D. D. Porter, vice-admiral, written in 1866, giving
his recollections of that interview, in the same volume, page 330, is
found the following paragraph:

"The conversation between the President and General Sherman, about
the terms of surrender to be allowed Joe Johnston, continued. Sherman
energetically insisted that he could command his own terms, and that
Johnston would have to yield to his demands; but the President was
very decided about the matter, and insisted that the surrender of
Johnston's army must be obtained on any terms."

Hence it appears that Sherman was authorized to say that he was fully
empowered to arrange for the suspension of hostilities; and,
moreover, that he was instructed by Mr. Lincoln to give "any terms"
to obtain the surrender of Johnston's army.

In regard to the memorandum or basis of agreement, Sherman states, in
the same volume, page 353, that, while in consultation with General
Johnston, a messenger brought him a parcel of papers from Mr. Reagan,
Postmaster-General; that Johnston and Breckinridge looked over them,
and handed one of them to him, which he found inadmissible, and
proceeds:

"Then, recalling the conversation with Mr. Lincoln at City Point, I
sat down at the table and wrote off the terms which I thought
concisely expressed his views and wishes."

But, while these matters were progressing, Mr. Lincoln had been
assassinated, and a vindictive policy had been substituted for his,
which avowedly was, to procure a speedy surrender of the army upon
any terms. His evident wish was to stop the further shedding of
blood; that of his successors, like Sherman's, to extract all which
it was possible to obtain. From the memoranda of the interview
between Mr. Lincoln and Sherman it is clearly to be inferred that,
but for the untimely death of Mr. Lincoln, the agreement between
Generals Sherman and Johnston would have been ratified; and the
wounds inflicted on civil liberty by the "reconstruction" measures
might not have left their shameful scars on the United States.

General Sherman, in his "Memoirs," vol. ii, page 349, referring to a
conversation between himself and General Johnston at their first
meeting, writes:

"I told him I could not believe that he or General Lee, or the
officers of the Confederate army, could possibly be privy to acts of
assassination, but I would not say as much for Jeff Davis, George
Saunders, and men of that stripe."

On this I have but two remarks to make: First, that I think there
were few officers in the Confederate army who would have permitted
such a slanderous imputation to be made by a public enemy against the
chief executive of their Government; second, that I could not value
the good opinion of the man who, in regard to the burning of
Columbia, made a false charge against General Wade Hampton, and,
having left it to circulate freely for ten years, then in his
published memoirs makes this disgraceful admission:

"In my official report of this conflagration, I distinctly charged it
to General Wade Hampton, and confess I did so pointedly, to shake the
faith of his people in him," etc.

"Memorandum, or basis of agreement, made this 18th day of April, A.
D. 1865, near Durham Station, and in the State of North Carolina, by
and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate
army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding the army of the
United States in North Carolina, both present:

"1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain their _status
quo_, until notice is given by the commanding General of either one
to its opponents, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.

"2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and
conducted to the several State capitals, there to deposit their arms
and public property in the State Arsenal, and each officer and man to
execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and abide
the action of both Federal and State authorities. The number of arms
and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at
Washington City, subject to future action of the Congress of the
United States, and in the mean time to be used solely to maintain
peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

"3. The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the
several State governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking
the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and,
where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the
legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the
United States.

"4. The reestablishment of all Federal courts in the several States,
with powers as defined by the Constitution and laws of Congress.

"5. The people and inhabitants of all States to be guaranteed, so far
as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well
as their rights of person and property, as defined by the
Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

"6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States
not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long
as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed
hostility, and obey laws in existence at any place of their residence.

"7. In general terms, war to cease, a general amnesty, so far as the
Executive power of the United States can command, or on condition of
the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of arms,
and resumption of peaceful pursuits by officers and men, as hitherto
composing said armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective
principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially
pledge ourselves to promptly obtain necessary authority, and to carry
out the above programme.

"W. T. SHERMAN, _Major-General, etc., etc._

"J. E. JOHNSTON, _General, etc., etc._"

The reader will not fail to observe that the proposition for a
suspension of hostilities to allow the civil authorities to
negotiate, was not even entertained; that the agreement was, in fact,
a military convention, in which all reference to the civil
authorities was excluded, except by the admission that the
negotiators respectively had principals from whom they must obtain
authority, i. e., ratification of the agreement into which they had
entered. There seemed to be a special dread on the part of the United
States officials lest they should do something which would be
construed as the recognition of the existence of a government which
for four years they had been vainly trying to subdue. Now, as on
previous occasions, I cared little for the form, and therefore only
gave my consideration to the substance of the agreement. In
consideration of the disbandment of our armies it provided for the
recognition of the several State governments, guaranteed to the
people of the States their political rights and franchises, as well
as their rights of person and property as defined by the Constitution
of the United States and other States respectively; promised not to
disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, and generally
indicated that the United States Government was to be restricted to
the exercise of the powers delegated in the Constitution.

Though this convention, if ratified, would not have all the binding
force of a treaty, it secured to our people the political rights and
safety from pillage, to obtain which I proposed to continue the war.
I, therefore, with the concurrence of my constitutional advisers,
addressed General Johnston as follows:

"CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA, _April 24, 1865._

"General J. E. JOHNSTON, _Greensboro, North Carolina._

"The Secretary of War has delivered to me the copy you handed to him
of the basis of an agreement between yourself and General Sherman.
Your action is approved. You will so inform General Sherman; and, if
the like authority be given by the Government of the United States to
complete the arrangement, you will proceed on the basis adopted.

"Further instructions will be given after the details of the
negotiation and the methods of executing the terms of agreement when
notified by you of the readiness on the part of the General
commanding United States forces to proceed with the arrangement.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

From the terms of this letter it will be seen that I doubted whether
the agreement would be ratified by the United States Government. The
opinion I entertained in regard to President Johnson and his venomous
Secretary of War, Stanton, did not permit me to expect that they
would be less vindictive after a surrender of our army had been
proposed than when it was regarded as a formidable body defiantly
holding its position in the field. Whatever hope others entertained
that the existing war was about to be peacefully terminated, was soon
dispelled by the rejection of the basis of agreement on the part of
the Government of the United States, and a notice from General
Sherman of termination of the armistice in forty-eight hours after
noon of the 24th of April, 1865.

General Johnston communicated to me the substance of the above
information received by him from General Sherman, and asked for
instructions. I have neither his telegram nor my reply, but can give
it substantially from memory. It was that he should retire with his
cavalry, and as many infantry as could be mounted upon draught-horses,
and some light artillery, the rest of the infantry to be disbanded,
and a place of rendezvous appointed. It was unnecessary to say anything
of the route, as that had been previously agreed on, and supplies
placed on it for his retreating army. This order was disobeyed, and he
sought another interview with Sherman, to renew his attempt to reach an
agreement for a termination of hostilities. Meantime, General Hampton,
commanding the cavalry of Johnston's army, came to me at Charlotte,
told me that he feared the army was to be surrendered, and wished
permission to withdraw his part of it and report to me. I gave the
permission, extending it to all the cavalry, which was in accordance
with the instructions I had sent to General Johnston. He returned
immediately, but I have since learned from him that the cavalry had
been included in a proposition to surrender, before he reached them.

After the expiration of the armistice, I rode out of Charlotte,
attended by the members of my Cabinet (except Attorney-General Davis,
who had gone to see his family, residing in that section, and the
Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Trenholm, who was too ill to accompany
me), my personal staff, and the cavalry which had been concentrated
from different, and some of them distant, fields of detached service.
The number was about two thousand, and they represented six brigade
organizations; though so much reduced in numbers, they were in a good
state of efficiency, and among their officers were some of the best
in our service. To the troops of this command, whose gallantly had
been displayed on many fields, there is due from me a special
acknowledgment for the kind consideration shown to me on the marches
from Charlotte, when the dark shadows which gathered round us
foretold the coming night. General Hampton, finding his troops had
been included in the surrender, endeavored to join me to offer his
individual service, and to share my fate whatever it might be. He
accidentally failed to meet me.

I must now recur to two extraordinary statements made by General J.
E. Johnston in regard to myself while at Charlotte, North Carolina,
on pages 408 and 409, Johnston's "Narrative." The first is that at
Greensboro, on the 19th of April--

"Colonel Archer Anderson, adjutant-general of the army, gave me two
papers, addressed to me by the President. The first directed me to
obtain from Mr. J. N. Hendren, Treasury Agent, thirty-nine thousand
dollars in silver, which was in his hands, subject to my order, and
to use it as the military chest of the army. The second, received
subsequently by Colonel Anderson, directed me to send this money to
the President at Charlotte. This order was not obeyed, however. As
only the military part of our Government had then any existence, I
thought that a fair share of the fund still left should be
appropriated to the benefit of the army."

And so, as revealed in his "Narrative," he took the money, and
divided it among the troops.

When my attention was called to this statement by one who had read
the "Narrative," I wrote to Colonel Anderson, referred to book and
page, and inquired what letters from me as there described he had
received. He responded:

"I do not remember anything connected with the subject, except that
there was a payment of silver coin to the army at Greensboro, and I
have no papers which would afford information."

My letter-book contains no such correspondence, but has a letter
which renders more than doubtful the assertion that I wrote others
such as described. The only letter found in my letter-book on the
subject of the funds in charge of Hendren is the following:

"GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, _April 15, 1865._

"Mr. HENDREN, _C. S. Treasurer, Greensboro, North Carolina._

"SIR: You will report to General Beauregard with the treasure in your
possession, that he may give to it due protection as a military chest
to be moved with his army train. For further instructions you will
report to the Secretary of the Treasury.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS.

"Official: F. R. LUBBOCK, _Colonel and A. D. C._"

From the above it will be seen that, while I exercised authority to
assign officers to their posts or places of duty, I assumed no
control over the public Treasury; but in that connection referred the
subordinate to his chief, the Secretary of the Treasury, by whom
alone could warrants be drawn against the public funds. How very
improbable, then, it is, that I wrote to have the money in the hands
of a treasurer sent to me personally! Yet this is what General
Johnston claims to have resisted, when without any lawful authority
he distributed the money himself. The second statement is:

"As there was reason to suppose that the Confederate Executive had a
large sum in specie in its possession, I urged it earnestly, in
writing, to apply a part of it to the payment of the army. This
letter was intrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Mason, who was instructed
to wait for an answer. Its receipt was acknowledged by telegraph, and
an answer promised. After waiting several days to no purpose. Colonel
Mason returned without one."

Not recollecting to have met Colonel Mason at Charlotte, I wrote to
him, calling his attention to the statement, and asking what was the
fact. Not receiving a reply, I renewed the inquiry, but, though
considerable time has elapsed, he has not answered. It is quite
possible that I might have met the gentleman without recollecting it,
but not at all probable that I should have received such a letter and
have forgotten it. Such intrusion of advice as to what should be done
with the money in the Treasury, and the speculative opinion as to the
amount there, I must suppose would have been very promptly rejected
if it had been presented to me. For years there had been irregularity
and delay in the payment of the troops, and surely no one regretted
it more than myself, or had for years tried more sedulously to
correct it; but, expecting the army to continue in the field, it was
indispensable to have the means of obtaining the necessary supplies
for it.

The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Trenholm, was ill before we
reached Charlotte, and quite so during our stay there, but he knew
there was not a large sum of specie in the Treasury, and with
patriotic desire had been using it to supply the troops after
Confederate money became unavailable for purchases. He did not
contemplate the abandonment of our cause, and it would not have taken
him a minute to answer that more than all the money he had would be
needed in future military operations.

On the 26th, the day on which the armistice terminated, General
Johnston again met General Sherman, who offered the same terms which
had been made with General Lee, and he says, "General Johnston,
without hesitation, agreed to, and we executed the following," which
was the surrender of General Johnston's troops, with the condition of
their being paroled and the officers being permitted to retain their
side-arms, private horses, and baggage.

It is true that these were the terms accepted by Lee, but the
condition of the two armies was very different. Lee's supplies had
been cut off, his men were exhausted by fatigue and hunger; he had no
reënforcements in view; notwithstanding the immense superiority in
numbers and equipments of the enemy pursuing, he had from point to
point fought them in rear and on both flanks, and had, the day before
his line of retreat was closed, rejected the demand for surrender,
and only yielded to it after his starving little army had been
surrounded by masses through which he tried to, but could not, cut
his way.

Johnston's line of retreat was open, and supplies had been placed
upon it. His cavalry was superior to that of the enemy, as had been
proved in every conflict between them. Maury and Forrest and Taylor
still had armies in the field--not large, but strong enough to have
collected around them the men who had left Johnston's army and gone
to their homes to escape a surrender, as well as those who under
similar circumstances had left Lee. The show of continued resistance,
I then believed, as I still do, would have overcome the depression
which was spreading like a starless night over the country, and that
the exhibition of a determination not to leave our political future
at the mercy of an enemy which had for four years been striving to
subjugate the States would have led the United States authorities to
do, as Mr. Lincoln had indicated--give any terms which might be
found necessary speedily to terminate the existing war.

Those who look back upon the period when the States were treated as
subject provinces, and the Congress left to legislate at its will--
when a war professedly waged to bring the seceding States back to the
Union, with all the rights and privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution, was followed by the utter disregard of those rights,
and the miscalled peace was a state of vindictive hostility--will
probably think continued war was not the greatest of evils.

I quote again from the "Memoirs" of Sherman, vol. ii, p. 349.
Referring to the first interview, he writes:

"I then told Johnston that he must be convinced that he could not
oppose my army, and that, since Lee had surrendered, he could do the
same with honor and propriety. He plainly and repeatedly admitted
this, and added that any further fighting would be '_murder_'; but he
thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal, we might arrange
terms that would embrace _all_ the Confederate armies."

Sherman further writes that he told Johnston that the terms given to
General Lee's army were most generous and liberal, which he states
Johnston "admitted, but always recurred to the idea of a universal
surrender, embracing his own army, that of Dick Taylor, in Louisiana
and Texas, and of Maury, Forrest, and others, in Alabama and
Georgia." Considering the character of the authority cited, and the
extraordinary proposition to provide for a universal surrender by a
district commander, it may be well supposed to require confirmation.
I therefore quote from General Richard Taylor, "Destruction and
Reconstruction," page 224:

"Intelligence of the Johnston-Sherman convention reached us, and
Canby and I were requested by the officers making it to conform to
its terms until the civil authorities acted."

The advice may have been well enough, but, as there was an
established channel of communication, and an order of responsibility
necessary for effective coöperation in the public service, something
more than courtesy required that the Executive should have been
advised if not consulted. I had left Charlotte with no other sure
reliance against any cavalry movement of the enemy than the force
which was with me; that, however, I believed to be sufficient for any
probable exigency, if the reënforcements hoped for should not join us
on the way. We proceeded at easy stages; some of the command thought
we went too slow. After making two halts of about half a day each, we
reached the Savannah River. I crossed early in the morning of the 4th
of May, with a company, which had been detailed as my escort, and
rode some miles to a farmhouse, where I halted to get breakfast and
have our horses fed. Here I learned that a regiment of the enemy were
moving upon Washington, Georgia, which was one of our depots of
supplies, and I sent back a courier with a pencil-note addressed to
General Vaughn, or the officer commanding the advance, requesting him
to come on and join me immediately. After waiting a considerable
time, I determined to move on with my escort, trusting that the
others would overtake us, and that, if not, we should arrive in
Washington in time to rally the citizens to its defense. When I
reached there, scouts were sent out on the different roads, and my
conclusion was that we had had a false alarm. The Secretary of State,
Mr. Benjamin, being unaccustomed to traveling on horseback, parted
from me, at the house where we stopped to breakfast, to take another
mode of conveyance and a different route from that which I was
pursuing, with intent to rejoin me in the trans-Mississippi
Department. At Washington, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory,
left me temporarily to attend to the needs of his family. The
Secretary of War, Mr. Breckinridge, had remained with the cavalry at
the crossing of the Savannah River. During the night after my arrival
in Washington, he sent in an application for authority to draw from
the treasure, under the protection of the troops, enough to make to
them a partial payment. I authorized the acting Secretary of the
Treasury to meet the requisition by the use of the silver coin in the
train. When the next day passed without the troops coming forward, I
sent a note to the Secretary of War, showing the impolicy of my
longer delay, having there heard that General Upton had passed within
a few miles of the town on his way to Augusta to receive the
surrender of the garrison and military material at that place, in
conformity with orders issued by General Johnston. This was my first
positive information of his surrender. Not receiving an immediate
reply to the note addressed to the Secretary of War, General
Breckinridge, I spoke to Captain Campbell, of Kentucky, commanding my
escort, explained to him the condition of affairs, and telling him
that his company was not strong enough to fight, and too large to
pass without observation, asked him to inquire if there were ten men
who would volunteer to go with me without question wherever I should
choose. He brought back for answer that the whole company volunteered
on the terms proposed. Gratifying as this manifestation was, I felt
it would expose them to unnecessary hazard to accept the offer, and
told him, in any manner he might think best, to form a party of ten
men. With these. Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Barnwell, of South
Carolina, Colonels F. E. Lubbock, John Taylor Wood, and William
Preston Johnston, of my personal staff, I left Washington. Secretary
Reagan remained for a short time to transfer the treasure in his
hands, except a few thousand dollars, and then rejoined me on the
road. This transfer of the treasure was made to Mr. Semple, a bonded
officer of the navy, and his assistant, Mr. Tidball, with
instructions, as soon as it could be safely done, to transport it
abroad and deliver it to the commercial house which had acted as the
financial agent of the Confederate Government, and was reported to
have incurred liabilities on its account.

Mr. Reagan overtook me in a few hours, but I saw no more of General
Breckinridge, and learned subsequently that he was following our
route, with a view to overtake me, when he heard of my capture, and,
turning to the east, reached the Florida coast unmolested. On the way
he met J. Taylor Wood, and, in an open boat, they crossed the straits
to the West Indies. No report reached me at that time, or until long
afterward, in regard to the cavalry command left at the Savannah
River; then it was to the effect that paroled men from Johnston's
army brought news of its surrender, and that the condition of
returning home and remaining unmolested embraced all the men of the
department who would give their parole, and that this had exercised a
great influence over the troops, inclining them to accept those
terms. Had General Johnston obeyed the order sent to him from
Charlotte, and moved on the route selected by himself, with all his
cavalry, so much of the infantry as could be mounted, and the light
artillery, he could not have been successfully pursued by General
Sherman. His force, united to that I had assembled at Charlotte,
would, it was believed, have been sufficient to vanquish any troops
which the enemy had between us and the Mississippi River.

Had the cavalry with which I left Charlotte been associated with a
force large enough to inspire hope for the future, instead of being
discouraged by the surrender in their rear, it would probably have
gone on, and, when united with the forces of Maury, Forrest, and
Taylor, in Alabama and Mississippi, have constituted an army large
enough to attract stragglers, and revive the drooping spirits of the
country. In the worst view of the case it should have been able to
cross the trans-Mississippi Department, and there uniting with the
armies of E. K. Smith and Magruder to form an army, which in the
portion of that country abounding in supplies, and deficient in
rivers and railroads, could have continued the war until our enemy,
foiled in the purpose of subjugation, should, in accordance with his
repeated declaration, have agreed, on the basis of a return to the
Union, to acknowledge the Constitutional rights of the States, and by
a convention, or _quasi_-treaty, to guarantee security of person and
property. To this hope I persistently clung, and, if our independence
could not be achieved, so much, at least, I trusted might be gained.

Those who have endured the horrors of "reconstruction," who have,
under "carpet-bag rule," borne insult, robbery, and imprisonment
without legal warrant, can appreciate the value which would have
attached to such limited measure of success.

When I left Washington, Georgia, with the small party which has been
enumerated, my object was to go to the south far enough to pass below
the points reported to be occupied by Federal troops, and then turn
to the west, cross the Chattahoochee, and then go on to meet the
forces still supposed to be in the field in Alabama. If, as now
seemed probable, there should be no prospect of a successful
resistance east of the Mississippi, I intended then to cross to the
trans-Mississippi Department, where I believed Generals E. K. Smith
and Magruder would continue to uphold our cause. That I was not
mistaken in the character of these men, I extract from the order
issued by General E. K. Smith to the soldiers of the trans-Mississippi
Army on the 21st of April, 1865:

"Great disasters have overtaken us. The Army of Northern Virginia and
our General-in-Chief are prisoners of war. With you rest the hopes of
our nation, and upon you depends the fate of our people. . . . Prove
to the world that your hearts have not failed in the hour of
disaster. . . . Stand by your colors--maintain your discipline. The
great resources of this department, its vast extent, the numbers, the
discipline, and the efficiency of the army, will secure to our
country terms that a proud people can with honor accept."

General Magruder, with like heroic determination, invoked the troops
and people of Texas not to despond, and pointed out their ability in
the interior of that vast State to carry on the war indefinitely.

General D. H. Maury, after his memorable defense of Mobile, withdrew
his forces on the 12th of April, at the last moment, and moved toward
Meridian. Commodore Farrand, commanding our navy at Mobile Bay,
withdrew his armed vessels and steamers up the Tombigbee River, and
planted torpedoes in the Alabama below. Forrest and Maury had about
eight thousand men, but these were veterans, tried in many hard
engagements, and trained to the highest state of efficiency. Before
Maury withdrew from Mobile, news had been received of Lee's
surrender. Taylor says the news was soon disseminated through his
army, but that the men remained steadfast, and manifested a
determination to maintain the honor of our aims to the last. On pages
224 and 225 of his book, he gives an account of the intelligence
received of the Johnston-Sherman convention of the 18th of April, and
of the meeting between Canby and himself to arrange terms for his
army, and an agreement that there should be an armistice; but he
says, two days after that meeting, news was received of Johnston's
surrender, and the capture of President Davis. The latter was untrue,
and he does not say who communicated it, but that he was at the same
time notified that the Johnston-Sherman convention had been disavowed
by the United States Government, and notice given for the termination
of the armistice. Under these circumstances he asked General Canby to
meet him again, and on the 8th of May, two days before I was actually
captured, but which he supposed had already occurred, he agreed with
Canby on terms for the surrender of the land and naval forces in
Mississippi and Alabama. These terms were similar to those made
between Johnston and Sherman; the mounted men were to retain their
horses, being their private property.

On the 26th of May, the chief of staff of General E. Kirby Smith, and
the chief of staff of General Canby, at Baton Rouge, arranged similar
terms for the surrender of the troops in the trans-Mississippi
Department. On May 11th, after the last army east of the Mississippi
had surrendered, but before Kirby Smith had entered into terms, the
enemy sent an expedition from the Brazos Santiago against a little
Confederate encampment some fifteen miles above. The camp was
captured and burned, but, in the zeal to secure the fruits of
victory, they remained so long collecting the plunder, that General
J. E. Slaughter heard of the expedition, moved against it, and drove
it back with considerable loss, sustaining very little injury to his
command. This was, I believe, the last armed conflict of the war,
and, though very small in comparison to its great battles, it
deserves notice as having closed the long struggle--as it opened--
with a Confederate victory.

The total number of prisoners paroled at Greensboro, North Carolina,
as reported by General Schofield, was 36,817; in Georgia and Florida,
as reported by General Wilson, 52,543; aggregate surrender under the
capitulation of General J. E. Johnston, 89,270.[125] How many of this
last number were men who left General Johnston's army to avoid the
surrender, or were on detached service from the armies of Virginia
and North Carolina, I have no means of ascertaining.

The total number in the Department of Alabama and Mississippi paroled
by General Canby, under agreement with General Richard Taylor, of the
8th of May, 1865, as reported, was 42,293,[126] to which may be added
of the navy a small force--less than 150. The number surrendered by
General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the trans-Mississippi Department,
as reported, was 17,686.[127] To this small dimension had General
Smith's army been reduced when he accepted the terms to which a
reference has already been made. This reduction resulted from various
causes, but it is believed was mainly due to the reluctance of a
large part of his army to accept a parole, preferring to take
whatever hazard belonged to absenting themselves without leave and
continuing their character of belligerents. A few, but so far as I
know very few, even went to the extent of expatriating themselves,
and joined Maximilian in Mexico. Against no one as much as myself did
the hostility of our victorious enemy manifest itself, but I was
never willing to seek the remedy of exile, and always advised those
who consulted me against that resort. The mass of our people could
not go; the few who were able to do so were most needed to sustain
the others in the hour of a common adversity. The example of Ireland
after the Treaty of Limerick, and of Canada after its conquest by
Great Britain, were instructive as to the duty of the influential men
to remain and share the burden of a common disaster.

With General E. K. Smith's surrender the Confederate flag no longer
floated on the land; but one gallant sailor still unfurled it on the
Pacific. Captain Waddell, commanding the Confederate cruiser
Shenandoah, swept the ocean from Australia nearly to Behring's
Straits, making many captures in the Okhobak Sea and Arctic Ocean. In
August, 1865, he learned from the captain of a British ship that the
Confederacy, as an independent Government, had ceased to exist. With
the fall of his Government his right to cruise was of course
terminated; he therefore sailed for the coast of England, entered the
Mersey, and on November 6, 1865, and in due form, surrendered his
vessel to the British Government. She was accepted and subsequently
transferred to the United States.

After leaving Washington in the manner and for the purpose heretofore
described, I overtook a commissary and quartermaster's train, having
public papers of value in charge, and, finding that they had no
experienced woodsman with it, I gave them four of the men of my small
party, and went on with the rest. On the second or third day after
leaving Washington, I heard that a band of marauders, supposed to be
stragglers and deserters from both armies, were in pursuit of my
family, whom I had not seen since they left Richmond, but of whom I
heard, at Washington, that they had gone with my private secretary
and seven paroled men, who generously offered their services as an
escort, to the Florida coast. Their route was to the east of that I
was pursuing, but I immediately changed direction and rode rapidly
across the country to overtake them. About nightfall the horses of my
escort gave out, but I pressed on with Secretary Reagan and my
personal staff. It was a bright moonlight night, and just before day,
as the moon was sinking below the tree-tops, I met a party of men in
the road, who answered my questions by saying they belonged to an
Alabama regiment; that they were coming from a village not far off,
on their way homeward. Upon inquiry being made, they told me they had
passed an encampment of wagons, with women and children, and asked me
if we belonged to that party. Upon being answered in the affirmative,
they took their leave.

After a short time I was hailed by a voice which I recognized as that
of my private secretary, who informed me that the marauders had been
hanging around the camp, and that he and others were on post around
it, and were expecting an assault as soon as the moon went down. A
silly story had got abroad that it was a treasure-train, and the
_auri sacra fames_ had probably instigated these marauders, as it
subsequently stimulated General J. H. Wilson, to send out a large
cavalry force to capture the same train. For the protection of my
family I traveled with them two or three days, when, believing that
they had passed out of the region of marauders, I determined to leave
their encampment at nightfall, to execute my original purpose. My
horse and those of my party proper were saddled preparatory to a
start, when one of my staff, who had ridden into the neighboring
village, returned and told me that he had heard that a marauding
party intended to attack the camp that night. This decided me to wait
long enough to see whether there was any truth in the rumor, which I
supposed would be ascertained in a few hours. My horse remained
saddled and my pistols in the holsters, and I lay down, fully
dressed, to rest. Nothing occurred to rouse me until just before
dawn, when my coachman, a free colored man, who faithfully clung to
our fortunes, came and told me there was firing over the branch, just
behind our encampment. I stepped out of my wife's tent and saw some
horsemen, whom I immediately recognized as cavalry, deploying around
the encampment. I turned back and told my wife these were not the
expected marauders, but regular troopers. She implored me to leave
her at once. I hesitated, from unwillingness to do so, and lost a few
precious moments before yielding to her importunity. My horse and
arms were near the road on which I expected to leave, and down which
the cavalry approached; it was therefore impracticable to reach them.
I was compelled to start in the opposite direction. As it was quite
dark in the tent, I picked up what was supposed to be my "raglan," a
water-proof, light overcoat, without sleeves; it was subsequently
found to be my wife's, so very like my own as to be mistaken for it;
as I started, my wife thoughtfully threw over my head and shoulders a
shawl. I had gone perhaps fifteen or twenty yards when a trooper
galloped up and ordered me to halt and surrender, to which I gave a
defiant answer, and, dropping the shawl and raglan from my shoulders,
advanced toward him; he leveled his carbine at me, but I expected, if
he fired, he would miss me, and my intention was in that event to put
my hand under his foot, tumble him off on the other side, spring into
his saddle, and attempt to escape. My wife, who had been watching,
when she saw the soldier aim his carbine at me, ran forward and threw
her arms around me. Success depended on instantaneous action, and,
recognizing that the opportunity had been lost, I turned back, and,
the morning being damp and chilly, passed on to a fire beyond the
tent. Our pursuers had taken different roads, and approached our camp
from opposite directions; they encountered each other and commenced
firing, both supposing they had met our armed escort, and some
casualties resulted from their conflict with an imaginary body of
Confederate troops. During the confusion, while attention was
concentrated upon myself, except by those who were engaged in
pillage, one of my aides, Colonel J. Taylor Wood, with Lieutenant
Barnwell, walked off unobserved. His daring exploits on the sea had
made him, on the part of the Federal Government, an object of special
hostility, and rendered it quite proper that he should avail himself
of every possible means of escape. Colonel Pritchard went over to
their battle-field, and I did not see him for a long time, surely
more than an hour after my capture. He subsequently claimed credit,
in a conversation with me, for the forbearance shown by his men in
not shooting me when I refused to surrender.

Wilson and others have uttered many falsehoods in regard to my
capture, which have been exposed in publications by persons there
present--by Secretary Reagan, by the members of my personal staff,
and by the colored coachman, Jim Jones, which must have been
convincing to all who were not given over to believe a lie. For this
reason I will postpone, to some other time and more appropriate
place, any further notice of the story and its variations, all the
spawn of a malignity that shames the civilization of the age. We
were, when prisoners, subjected to petty pillage, as described in the
publications referred to, and in others; and to annoyances such as
military _gentlemen_ never commit or permit.

On our way to Macon we received the proclamation of President Andrew
Johnson offering a reward for my apprehension as an accomplice in the
assassination of the late President A. Lincoln. Some troops by the
wayside had the proclamation, which was displayed with vociferous
demonstrations of exultation over my capture. When we arrived at
Macon I was conducted to the hotel where General Wilson had his
quarters. A strong guard was in front of the entrance, and, when I
got down to pass in, it opened ranks, facing inward, and presented
arms.

A commodious room was assigned to myself and family. After a while
the steward of the hotel called and inquired whether I would dine
with General Wilson or have dinner served with myself and family in
my room. I chose the latter. After dinner I received a message from
General Wilson, asking whether he should wait upon me, or whether I
would call upon him. I rose and accompanied the messenger to General
Wilson's presence. We had met at West Point when he was a cadet, and
I a commissioner sent by the Congress to inquire into the affairs of
the Academy. After some conversation in regard to former times and
our common acquaintance, he referred to the proclamation offering a
reward for my capture. Taking it for granted that any significant
remark of mine would be reported to his Government, and fearing that
I might never have another opportunity to give my opinion to A.
Johnson, I told him there was one man in the United States who knew
that proclamation to be false. He remarked that my expression
indicated a particular person. I answered that I did, and the person
was the one who signed it, for he at least knew that I preferred
Lincoln to himself. Some other conversation then occurred in regard
to the route on which we were to be carried. Having several small
children, one of them an infant, I expressed a preference for the
easier route by water, supposing then, as he seemed to do, that I was
to go to Washington City. He manifested a courteous, obliging temper,
and, either by the authority with which he was invested or by
obtaining it from a higher power, my preference as to the route was
accorded. I told him that some of the men with me were on parole, and
that they all were riding their own horses--private property--that
I would be glad they should be permitted to retain them, and I have a
distinct recollection that he promised me it should be done; but I
have since learned that they were all deprived of their horses, and
some who were on parole, viz., Major Moran, Captain Moody, Lieutenant
Hathaway, Midshipman Howell, and Private Messec, who had not violated
their obligations of parole, but had been captured because they were
found voluntarily traveling with my family to protect them from
marauders, were sent with me as prisoners of war, and all
incarcerated, in disregard of the protection promised when they
surrendered. At Augusta we were put on a steamer, and there met
Vice-President Stephens; Hon. C. C. Clay, who had voluntarily
surrendered himself upon learning that he was included in the
proclamation for the arrest of certain persons charged with
complicity in the assassination of Mr. Lincoln; General Wheeler, the
distinguished cavalry officer, and his adjutant, General Ralls. My
private secretary, Burton N. Harrison, had refused to be left behind,
and, though they would not allow him to go in the carriage with me,
he was resolved to follow my fortunes, as well from sentiment as the
hope of being useful. His fidelity was rewarded by a long and
rigorous imprisonment. At Port Royal we were transferred to a
sea-going vessel, which, instead of being sent to Washington City,
was brought to anchor at Hampton Roads. One by one all my companions
in misfortune were sent away, we knew not whither, leaving on the
vessel only Mr. Clay and his wife and myself and family. After some
days' detention, Clay and myself were removed to Fortress Monroe, and
there incarcerated in separate cells. Not knowing that the Government
was at war with women and children, I asked that my family might be
permitted to leave the ship and go to Richmond or Washington City, or
to some place where they had acquaintances, but this was refused. I
then requested that they might be permitted to go abroad on one of
the vessels lying at the Roads. This was also denied; finally, I was
informed that they must return to Savannah on the vessel by which we
came. This was an old transport-ship, hardly seaworthy. My last
attempt was to get for them the privilege of stopping at Charleston,
where they had many personal friends. This also was refused--why, I
did not then know, have not learned since, and am unwilling to make a
supposition, as none could satisfactorily account for such an act of
inhumanity. My daily experience as a prisoner shed no softer light on
the transaction, but only served to intensify my extreme solicitude.
Bitter tears have been shed by the gentle, and stern reproaches have
been made by the magnanimous, on account of the needless torture to
which I was subjected, and the heavy fetters riveted upon me, while
in a stone casemate and surrounded by a strong guard; but all these
were less excruciating than the mental agony my captors were able to
inflict. It was long before I was permitted to hear from my wife and
children, and this, and things like this, was the power which
education added to savage cruelty; but I do not propose now and here
to enter upon the story of my imprisonment, or more than merely to
refer to other matters which concerns me personally, as distinct from
my connection with the Confederacy.

[Footnote 124: "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," vol. ii, pp. 346,
347.]

[Footnote 125: "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," vol. ii, p. 370.]

[Footnote 126: "Annual Cyclopaedia," 1865, p. 11.]

[Footnote 127: Ibid.]

CHAPTER LV.

On April 25th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, General J. E. Johnston
capitulated to General Sherman, as has been stated, and his army was
disbanded. On May 4th General B. Taylor capitulated with the last of
our forces east.

The number of men brought into the field by the Government of the
United States during the war, according to the official returns in
the Adjutant-General's office, Washington, was 2,678,967. In addition
to these, 86,724 paid a commutation.

The rapidity with which calls for men were made by that Government
during the last eighteen mouths of the war, and the number brought
into the field, were as follows:

Men furnished
Calls of October 17, 1863, and February 1, 1864, for
500,000 men for three years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317,092
Call of March 14, 1864, for 200,000 men for three years 259,515
Militia for one hundred days, April to July, 1864 . . . . 83,612
Call of July 18, 1864, for 500,000 men . . . . . . . . . 385,163[128]
Call of December 19, 1864, for 300,000 men . . . . . . . 211,752
---------
Total men furnished in eighteen months . . . . . . . . 1,257,134

The number of men furnished on call of the United States Government,
previous to October 17, 1863, was as follows:

Men furnished
Call of April 15, 1861, for 75,000 men for three months 91,816
Call of May 3, 1861, for 500,000 men . . . . . . . . . . 700,680
Men furnished in May and June, 1862, for three months . . 15,007
Call of July 2, 1862, for 300,000 men for three years . . 421,465
Call of August 4, 1862, for 300,000 militia for nine
months . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87,588
Proclamation of June 15, 1863, for militia for six months 16,361
Volunteers and militia at various times, of sixty days
to one year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,760
Volunteers and militia at various times for three years 75,156
---------
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,421,833

The number of men furnished to the armies of the United States by the
States of Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee, was as follows:

States. Men furnished.
Kentucky . . . . . . . 70,760 equal to 70,832 three years' men.
Maryland . . . . . . . 46,638 " 41,275 " " "
Missouri . . . . . . . 109,111 " 86,530 " " "
Tennessee . . . . . . . 31,092 " 26,394 " " "
------- -------
Total . . . . . . . . 262,601 225,031

The public debt of the Government of the United States on July 1,
1861, and on July 1, 1865 was as follows:

Debt, July 1, 1861 . . . . . . . $90,867,828.68
" July 1, 1865 . . . . . . . 2,682,593,026.53
----------------
Increase in four years . . . . . $2,591,725,197.85

Of the manner in which our adversaries conducted the war I had
frequent occasion to remark. Those observations made at the time
present a more correct representation of facts than could be given in
more recent statements. In a message to Congress on August 15, 1862,
I said:

"The perfidy which disregarded rights secured by compact, the madness
which trampled on obligations made sacred by every consideration of
honor, have been intensified by the malignancy engendered by defeat.
These passions have changed the character of the hostilities waged by
our enemies, who are becoming daily less regardful of the usages of
civilized war and the dictates of humanity. Rapine and wanton
destruction of private property, war upon non-combatants, murder of
captives, bloody threats to avenge the death of an invading soldiery
by the slaughter of unarmed citizens, orders of banishment against
peaceful farmers engaged in the cultivation of the soil, are some of
the means used by our ruthless invaders to enforce the submission of
a free people to a foreign sway. Confiscation bills, of a character
so atrocious as to insure, if executed, the utter ruin of the entire
population of these States, are passed by their Congress and approved
by their Executive. The moneyed obligations of the Confederate
Government are counterfeited by citizens of the United States, and
publicly advertised for sale in their cities, with a notoriety that
sufficiently attests the knowledge of their Government; and the
soldiers of the invading armies are found supplied with large
quantities of these forged notes as a means of despoiling the country
people by fraud out of such portions of their property as armed
violence may fail to reach. Two at least of the generals of the
United States are engaged, unchecked by their Government, in exciting
servile insurrection, and in arming and training slaves for warfare
against their masters, citizens of the Confederacy."

Again, in January, 1863, I said, with regard to the conduct of the
war by our adversaries:

"It is my painful duty again to inform you of the renewed examples of
every conceivable atrocity committed by the armed forces of the
United States at different points within the Confederacy, and which
must stamp indelible infamy, not only on the perpetrators, but on
their superiors, who, having the power to check these outrages on
humanity, numerous and well authenticated as they have been, have not
yet in a single instance, of which I am aware, inflicted punishment
on the wrong-doers. Since my last communication to you, one General
McNeil murdered seven prisoners of war in cold blood, and the demand
for his punishment has remained unsatisfied. The Government of the
United States, after promising examination and explanation in
relation to the charges made against General B. F. Butler, has, by
its subsequent silence, after repeated efforts on my part to obtain
some answer on the subject, not only admitted his guilt, but
sanctioned it by acquiescence. . . . Recently I have received
apparently authentic intelligence of another general by the name of
Milroy, who has issued orders in West Virginia for the payment of
money to him by the inhabitants, accompanied by the most savage
threats of shooting every recusant, besides burning his house, and
threatening similar atrocities against any of our citizens who shall
fail to betray their country by giving him prompt notice of the
approach of any of our forces. And this subject has also been
submitted to the superior military authorities of the United States,
with but faint hope that they will evince any disapprobation of the
act.

"A proclamation, dated on January 1, 1863, signed and issued by the
President of the United States, orders and declares all slaves within
ten of the States of the Confederacy to be free, except such as are
found in certain districts now occupied in part by the armed forces
of the enemy. We may well leave it to the instinct of that common
humanity, which a beneficent Creator has implanted in the breasts of
our fellow-men of all countries, to pass judgment on a measure by
which several millions of human beings of an inferior race--
peaceful, contented laborers in their sphere--are doomed to
extermination, while at the same time they are encouraged to a
general assassination of their masters by the insidious
recommendation 'to abstain from violence, unless in necessary
self-defense.'"

The war, which in its inception was waged for forcing us back into
the Union, having failed to accomplish that purpose, passed into a
second stage, in which it was attempted to conquer and rule our
States as dependent provinces. Defeated in this design, our enemies
entered upon another, which could have no other purpose than revenge
and plunder of private property. In May, 1864, it was still
characterized by the barbarism with which it had been previously
conducted. Aged men, helpless women and children appealed in vain to
the humanity which should be inspired by their condition, for
immunity from arrest, incarceration, or banishment from their homes.
Plunder and devastation of the property of non-combatants,
destruction of private dwellings, and even of edifices devoted to the
worship of God, expeditions organized for the sole purpose of sacking
cities, consigning them to the flames, killing the unarmed
inhabitants, and inflicting horrible outrages on women and children,
were some of the constantly recurring atrocities of the invader.

On June 19, 1864, Major-General Hunter began his retreat from before
Lynchburg down the Shenandoah Valley. Lieutenant-General Early, who
followed in pursuit, thus describes the destruction he witnessed
along the route:

"Houses had been burned, and helpless women and children left without
shelter. The country had been stripped of provisions, and many
families left without a morsel to eat. Furniture and bedding had been
cut to pieces, and old men and women and children robbed of all the
clothing they had, except that on their backs. Ladies' trunks had
been rifled, and their dresses torn to pieces in mere wantonness.
Even the negro girls had lost their little finery. At Lexington he
had burned the Military Institute with all its contents, including
its library and scientific apparatus. Washington College had been
plundered, and the statue of Washington stolen. The residence of
ex-Governor Letcher at that place had been burned by orders, and but
a few minutes given Mrs. Letcher and her family to leave the house.
In the county a most excellent Christian gentleman, a Mr. Creigh, had
been hung, because, on a former occasion, he had killed a straggling
and marauding Federal soldier while in the act of insulting and
outraging the ladies of his family." [129]

A letter dated Charleston, September 14, 1865, written by Rev. Dr.
John Bachman, then pastor of the Lutheran Church in that city,
presents many facts respecting the devastation and robberies by the
enemy in South Carolina. So much as relates to the march of Sherman's
army through parts of the State is here presented:

"When Sherman's army came sweeping through Carolina, leaving a broad
track of desolation for hundreds of miles, whose steps were
accompanied with fire, and sword, and blood, reminding us of the
tender mercies of the Duke of Alva, I happened to be at Cash's Depot,
six miles from Cheraw. The owner was a widow, Mrs. Ellerbe,
seventy-one years of age. Her son, Colonel Cash, was absent. I
witnessed the barbarities inflicted on the aged, the widow, and young
and delicate females. Officers, high in command, were engaged tearing
from the ladies their watches, their ear and wedding rings, the
daguerreotypes of those they loved and cherished. A lady of delicacy
and refinement, a personal friend, was compelled to strip before
them, that they might find concealed watches and other valuables
under her dress. A system of torture was practiced toward the weak,
unarmed, and defenseless, which, as far as I know and believe, was
universal throughout the whole course of that invading army. Before
they arrived at a plantation, they inquired the names of the most
faithful and trustworthy family servants; these were immediately
seized, pistols were presented at their heads; with the most terrific
curses, they were threatened to be shot if they did not assist them
in finding buried treasures. If this did not succeed, they were tied
up and cruelly beaten. Several poor creatures died under the
infliction. The last resort was that of hanging, and the officers and
men of the triumphant army of General Sherman were engaged in
erecting gallows and hanging up these faithful and devoted servants.
They were strung up until life was nearly extinct, when they were let
down, suffered to rest awhile, then threatened and hung up again. It
is not surprising that some should have been left hanging so long
that they were taken down dead. Coolly and deliberately these
hardened men proceeded on their way, as if they had perpetrated no
crime, and as if the God of heaven would not pursue them with his
vengeance. But it was not alone the poor blacks (to whom they
professed to come as liberators) that were thus subjected to torture
and death. Gentlemen of high character, pure and honorable and
gray-headed, unconnected with the military, were dragged from their
fields or their beds, and subjected to this process of threats,
beating, and hanging. Along the whole track of Sherman's army, traces
remain of the cruelty and inhumanity practiced on the aged and the
defenseless. Some of those who were hung up died under the rope,
while their cruel murderers have not only been left unreproached and
unhung, but have been hailed as heroes and patriots. The list of
those martyrs whom the cupidity of the officers and men of Sherman's
army sacrificed to their thirst for gold and silver, is large and
most revolting. If the editors of this paper will give their consent
to publish it, I will give it in full, attested by the names of the
purest and best men and women of our Southern land.

"I, who have been a witness to these acts of barbarity that are
revolting to every feeling of humanity and mercy, was doomed to feel
in my own person the effects of the avarice, cruelty, and despotism
which characterized the men of that army. I was the only male
guardian of the refined and delicate females who had fled there for
shelter and protection. I soon ascertained the plan that was adopted
in this wholesale system of plunder, insult, blasphemy, and
brutality. The first party that came was headed by officers, from a
colonel to a lieutenant, who acted with seeming politeness, and told
me that they only came to secure our firearms, and when these were
delivered up nothing in the house should be touched. Out of the
house, they said, they were authorized to press forage for their
large army. I told them that along the whole line of the march of
Sherman's army, from Columbia to Cheraw, it had been ascertained that
ladies had been robbed and personally insulted. I asked for a guard
to protect the females. They said that there was no necessity for
this, as the men dare not act contrary to orders. If any did not
treat the ladies with proper respect, I might blow their brains out.
'But,' said I, 'you have taken away our arms, and we are
defenseless.' They did not blush much, and made no reply. Shortly
after this came the second party, before the first had left. They
demanded the keys of the ladies' drawers, took away such articles as
they wanted, then locked the drawers and put the keys in their
pockets. In the mean time, they gathered up the spoons, knives,
forks, towels, table-cloths, etc. As they were carrying them off, I
appealed to the officers of the first party; they ordered the men to
put back the things; the officer of the second party said he would
see them d----d first; and, without further ado, packed them up, and
they glanced at each other and smiled. The elegant carriage and all
the vehicles on the premises were seized and filled with bacon and
other plunder. The smokehouses were emptied of their contents and
carried off. Every head of poultry was seized and flung over their
mules, and they presented the hideous picture in some of the scenes
in 'Forty Thieves.' Every article of harness they did not wish was
cut in pieces.

"By this time the first and second parties had left, and a third
appeared on the field. They demanded the keys of the drawers, and,
on being informed that they had been carried off, coolly and
deliberately proceeded to break open the locks, took what they
wanted, and when we uttered words of complaint were cursed. Every
horse, mule, and carriage, even to the carts, was taken away, and,
for hundreds of miles, the last animal that cultivated the widow's
corn-field, and the vehicles that once bore them to the house of
worship, were carried off or broken into pieces and burned.

"The first party that came promised to leave ten days' provisions,
the rest they carried off. An hour afterward, other hordes of
marauders from the same army came and demanded the last pound of
bacon and the last quart of meal. On Sunday, the negroes were dressed
in their best suits. They were kicked, and knocked down and robbed of
all their clothing, and they came to us in their shirtsleeves, having
lost their hats, clothes, and shoes. Most of our own clothes had been
hid in the woods. The negroes who had assisted in removing them were
beaten and threatened with death, and compelled to show them where
they were concealed. They cut open the trunks, threw my manuscripts
and devotional books into a mud-hole, stole the ladies' jewelry, hair
ornaments, etc., tore many garments into tatters, or gave the rest to
the negro women to bribe them into criminal intercourse. These women
afterward returned to us those articles that, after the mutilations,
were scarcely worth preserving. The plantation, of one hundred and
sixty negroes, was some distance from the house, and to this place
successive parties of fifty at a time resorted for three long days
and nights, the husbands and fathers being fired at and compelled to
fly to the woods.

"Now commenced scenes of licentiousness, brutality, and ravishment
that have scarcely had an equal in the ages of heathen barbarity, I
conversed with aged men and women, who were witnesses of these
infamous acts of Sherman's unbridled soldiery, and several of them,
from the cruel treatment they had received, were confined to their
beds for weeks afterward. The time will come when the judgment of
Heaven will await these libidinous, beastly barbarians. During this
time, the fourth party, whom, I was informed by others, we had the
most reason to dread, had made their appearance. They came, as they
said, in the name of the great General Sherman, who was next to God
Almighty. They came to burn and lay in ashes all that was left. They
had burned bridges and depots, cotton-gins, mills, barns, and
stables. They swore they would make the d---d rebel women pound
their corn with rocks, and eat their raw meal without cooking. They
succeeded in thousands of instances. I walked out at night, and the
innumerable fires that were burning as far as the eye could reach, in
hundreds of places, illuminated the whole heavens, and testified to
the vindictive barbarity of the foe. I presume they had orders not to
burn occupied houses, but they strove all in their power to compel
families to fly from their houses that they might afterward burn
them. The neighborhood was filled with refugees who had been
compelled to fly from their plantations on the seaboard. As soon as
they had fled, the torch was applied, and, for hundreds of miles,
those elegant mansions, once the ornament and pride of our inland
country, were burned to the ground.

"All manner of expedients were now adopted to make the residents
leave their homes for the second time. I heard them saying, 'This is
too large a house to be left standing, we must contrive to burn it.'
Canisters of powder were placed all around the house, and an
expedient resorted to that promised almost certain success. The house
was to be burned down by firing the outbuildings. These were so near
each other that the firing of the one would lead to the destruction
of all. I had already succeeded in having a few bales of cotton
rolled out of the building, and hoped, if they had to be burned, the
rest would also be rolled out, which could have been done in ten
minutes by several hundred men who were looking on, gloating over the
prospect of another elegant mansion in South Carolina being left in
ashes. The torch was applied, and soon the large storehouse was on
fire. This communicated to several other buildings in the vicinity,
which, one by one, were burned to the ground. At length the fire
reached the smoke-house, where they had already carried off the bacon
of two hundred and fifty hogs. This was burned, and the fire was now
rapidly approaching the kitchen, which was so near the dwelling-house
that, should the former burn, the destruction of the large and noble
edifice would be inevitable.

"A captain of the United States service, a native of England, whose
name I would like to mention here, if I did not fear to bring down
upon him the censure of the abolitionists as a friend to the rebels,
mounted the roof, and the wet blankets we sent up to him prevented
the now smoking roof from bursting into flames. I called for help to
assist us in procuring water from a deep well; a young lieutenant
stepped up, condemned the infamous conduct of the burners, and called
on his company for aid; a portion of them came cheerfully to our
assistance; the wind seemed almost by a miracle to subside; the house
was saved, and the trembling females thanked God for their
deliverance. All this time, about one hundred mounted men were
looking on, refusing to raise a hand to help us; laughing at the idea
that no efforts of ours could save the house from the flames.

"My trials, however, were not yet over, I had already suffered much
in a pecuniary point of view. I had been collecting a library on
natural history during a long life. The most valuable of these books
had been presented by various societies in England, France, Germany,
Russia, etc., who had honored me with membership, and they or the
authors presented me with these works, which had never been for sale,
and could not be purchased. My herbarium, the labor of myself and the
ladies of my house for many years, was also among these books. I had
left them as a legacy to the library of the Newbury College, and
concluded to send them at once. They were detained in Columbia, and
there the torch was applied, and all were burned. The stealing and
burning of books appear to be one of the programmes on which the army
acted, I had assisted in laying the foundation and dedicating the
Lutheran Church at Columbia, and there, near its walls, had recently
been laid the remains of one who was dearer to me than life itself.
To set that brick church on fire from below was impossible. The
building stood by itself on a square but little built up. One of
Sherman's burners was sent up to the roof. He was seen applying the
torch to the cupola. The church was burned to the ground, and the
grave of my loved one desecrated. The story circulated, that the
citizens had set their own city on fire, is utterly untrue, and only
reflects dishonor on those who vilely perpetrated it. General Sherman
had his army under control. The burning was by his orders, and ceased
when he gave the command.

"I was now doomed to experience in person the effects of avarice and
barbarous cruelty. The robbers had been informed in the neighborhood
that the family which I was protecting had buried one hundred
thousand dollars in gold and silver. They first demanded my watch,
which I had effectually secured from their grasp. They then asked me
where the money had been hid. I told them I knew nothing about it,
and did not believe there was a thousand dollars worth in all, and
what there was had been carried off by the owner, Colonel Cash. All
this was literally true. They then concluded to try an experiment on
me which had proved so successful in hundreds of other instances.
Coolly and deliberately they prepared to inflict torture on a
defenseless, gray-headed old man. They carried me behind a stable,
and once again demanded where the money was buried, or 'I should be
sent to hell in five minutes.' They cocked their pistols and held
them to my head. I told them to fire away. One of them, a
square-built, broad-faced, large-mouthed, clumsy lieutenant, who had
the face of a demon, and who did not utter five words without an
awful blasphemy, now kicked me in the stomach until I fell breathless
and prostrate. As soon as I was able, I rose again. He once more
asked me where the silver was. I answered as before, 'I do not know.'
With his heavy, elephant foot he now kicked me on my back until I
fell again. Once more I arose, and he put the same question to me. I
was nearly breathless, but answered as before. Thus was I either
kicked or knocked down seven or eight times. I then told him it was
perfectly useless for him to continue his threats or his blows. He
might shoot me if he chose. I was ready and would not budge an inch,
but requested him not to bruise and batter an unarmed, defenseless
old man. 'Now,' said he, 'I'll try a new plan. How would you like to
have both your arms cut off?' He did not wait for an answer, but,
with his heavy sheathed sword, struck me on my left arm, near the
shoulder. I heard it crack; it hung powerless by my side, and I
supposed it was broken. He then repeated the blow on the other arm.
The pain was most excruciating, and it was several days before I
could carve my food or take my arm out of a sling, and it was black
and blue for weeks. (I refer to Dr. Kollock, of Cheraw.) At that
moment the ladies, headed by my daughter, who had only then been made
aware of the brutality practiced upon me, rushed from the house, and
came flying to my rescue. 'You dare not murder my father,' said my
child; 'he has been a minister in the same church for fifty years,
and God has always protected, and will protect him.' 'Do you believe
in a God, miss?' said one of the brutal wretches; 'I don't believe in
a God, a heaven, nor a hell.' 'Carry me,' said I, 'to your General.'
I did not intend to go to General Sherman, who was at Cheraw, from
whom, I was informed, no redress could be obtained, but to a general
in the neighborhood, said to be a religious man. Our horses and
carriages had all been taken away, and I was too much bruised to be
able to walk. The other young officers came crowding around me very
officiously, telling me that they would represent the case to the
General, and that they would have him shot by ten o'clock the next
morning. I saw the winks and glances that were interchanged between
them. Every one gave a different name to the officers. The brute
remained unpunished, as I saw him on the following morning, as
insolent and as profane as he had been on the preceding day.

"As yet, no punishment had fallen on the brutal hyena, and I strove
to nurse my bruised body and heal my wounds, and forget the insults
and injuries of the past. A few weeks after this I was sent for to
perform a parochial duty at Mars Bluff, some twenty miles distant.
Arriving at Florence in the vicinity, I was met by a crowd of young
men connected with the militia. They were excited to the highest
pitch of rage, and thirsted for revenge. They believed that among the
prisoners that had just arrived on the railroad-car, on their way to
Sumter, were the very men who committed such horrible outrages in the
neighborhood. Many of their houses had been laid in ashes. They had
been robbed of every means of support. Their horses had been seized;
their cattle and hogs bayoneted; their mothers and sisters had been
insulted, and robbed of their watches, ear and wedding rings. Some of
their parents had been murdered in cold blood. The aged pastor, to
whose voice they had so often listened, had been kicked and knocked
down by repeated blows, and his hoary head had been dragged about in
the sand. They entreated me to examine the prisoners and see whether
I could identify the men that had inflicted such barbarities on me. I
told them I would do so, provided they would remain where they were
and not follow me. The prisoners saw me at a distance, held down
their guilty heads, and trembled like aspen-leaves. All cruel men are
cowards. One of my arms was still in a sling. With the other I raised
some of their hats. They all begged for mercy. I said to them, 'The
other day you were tigers--you are sheep now.' But a hideous object
soon arrested my attention. There sat my brutal enemy--, the vulgar,
swaggering lieutenant, who had ridden up to the steps of the house,
insulted the ladies, and beaten me most unmercifully. I approached
him slowly, and, in a whisper asked him: 'Do you know me, sir?--the
old man whose pockets you first searched, to see whether he might not
have a penknife to defend himself, and then kicked and knocked him
down with your fist and heavy scabbard?' He presented the picture of
an arrant coward, and in a trembling voice implored me to have mercy:
'Don't let me be shot; have pity! Old man, beg for me! I won't do it
again! For God's sake, save me! O God, help me!' 'Did you not tell my
daughter there was no God? Why call on him now?' 'Oh, I have changed
my mind; I believe in a God now.' I turned and saw the impatient,
flushed, and indignant crowd approaching. 'What are they going to do
with me?' said he. 'Do you hear that sound--click, click?' 'Yes,'
said he, 'they are cocking their pistols.' 'True,' said I; 'and if I
raise a finger you will have a dozen bullets through your brain.'
'Then I will go to hell; don't let them kill me. O Lord, have mercy!'
Speak low,' said I, 'and don't open your lips.' The men advanced.
Already one had pulled me by the coat. 'Show us the men.' I gave no
clew by which the guilty could be identified. I walked slowly through
the car, sprang into the waiting carriage, and drove off."

[Footnote 128: Reduced by excess on previous calls.]

[Footnote 129: "Memoir of the Last Year of the War," by Lieutenant-General
Early.]

CHAPTER LVI.

Final Subjugation of the Confederate States.--Result of the
Contest.--A Simple Process of Restoration.--Rejected by the United
States Government.--A Forced Union.--The President's Proclamation
examined.--The Guarantee, not to destroy.--Provisional Governors.--
Their Duties.--Voters.--First Movement made in Virginia.--
Government set up.--Proceedings.--Action of So-called
Legislature.--Constitutional Amendment.--Case of Dr. Watson.--
Civil Rights Bill.--Storm brewing.--Congress refuses to admit
Senators and Representatives to Seats.--Committee on
"Reconstruction."--Freedmen's Bureau.--Report of Committee.--
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.--Extent of Ratification.--
Another Step taken by Congress.--Military Commanders appointed over
Confederate States, with Unlimited Powers.--Reconstruction by the
Bayonet.--Course of Proceedings required.--Two Governments for Each
State.--Major-Generals appointed.--Further Acts of Congress.--
Proceedings commenced by the Major-General at Richmond.--Civil
Governor appointed.--Military Districts and Sub-districts.--
Registration.--So-called State Convention.--So-called
Legislature.--Its Action.--Measures required by Congress for the
Enfranchisement of Negroes adopted by the So-called Legislature.--
Assertion of Senator Garret Davis.--State represented in Congress.

When the Confederate soldiers laid down their arms and went home, all
hostilities against the power of the Government of the United States
ceased. The powers delegated in the compact of 1787 by these States,
i. e., by the people thereof, to a central organization to promote
their general welfare, had been used for their devastation and
subjugation. It was conceded, as the result of the contest, that the
United States Government was stronger in resources than the
Confederate Government, and that the Confederate States had not
achieved their independence.

Nothing remained to be done but for the sovereigns, the people of
each State, to assert their authority and restore order. If the
principle of the sovereignty of the people, the cornerstone of all
our institutions, had survived and was still in force, it was
necessary only that the people of each State should reconsider their
ordinances of secession, and again recognize the Constitution of the
United States as the supreme law of the land. This simple process
would have placed the Union on its original basis, and have restored
that which had ceased to exist, the Union by consent. Unfortunately,
such was not the intention of the conqueror. The Union of free-wills
and brotherly hearts, under a compact ordained by the people, was not
his object. Henceforth there was to be established a Union of force.
Sovereignty was to pass from the people to the Government of the
United States, and to be upheld by those who had furnished the money
and the soldiers for the war.

The first step required, therefore, in the process for the
reconstruction of the new and forced Union, was to prepare those who
had been the late champions of the sovereignty of the people to
become suitable subjects under the new sovereign. Standing
defenseless, stripped of their property, and exposed, as it was
asserted, to the penalties of insurrection on the one hand, and that
of treason on the other, the President of the United States, Mr.
Andrew Johnson, who, as Vice-President, became President after the
death of Mr. Lincoln, on May 29, 1865, thus addressed them:

"To the end, therefore, that the authority of the Government of the
United States may be restored, and that peace, order, and freedom may
be reestablished, I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States,
do proclaim and declare that I hereby grant to all persons who have
directly or indirectly participated in the existing rebellion, except
as hereinafter excepted, amnesty and pardon, with restoration of all
rights of property, except as to slaves, and except in cases where
legal proceedings under the laws of the United States providing for
the confiscation of property of persons engaged in the rebellion have
been instituted; but on the condition, nevertheless, that every such
person shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation,
and thenceforward keep and maintain said oath inviolate; and which
oath shall be registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of
the tenor and effect following, to wit:

"I, ---- ----, do solemnly swear, or affirm, in presence of
Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support and defend
the Constitution of the United States and the Union thereunder, and
that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all laws
and proclamations which have been made during the existing rebellion
with reference to the emancipation of slaves, so help me God."

The permission to take this oath was withheld from large classes of
citizens. It will be seen that there are two stipulations in this
oath, the first faithfully to support the Constitution of the United
States and the Union thereunder. This comprises obedience to the laws
made in conformity to the Constitution, and is all that is requisite
in the simple oath of allegiance of an American citizen. The second
stipulation is:

"To abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which
have been made during the existing rebellion with reference to the
emancipation of slaves."

What need was thereof this second stipulation? Because the laws were
not enacted, nor the proclamation issued under any grant of power in
the Constitution or under its authority. Now, the exercise of a power
by Government, for which it has no constitutional authority, is not
only a usurpation, but it destroys the sanction of all written
instruments of government. Also, what has become of the unalienable
right of property, which all the State governments were created to
protect and preserve? Where was the sovereignty of the people under
these proceedings? Yet the Confederate citizen was required to bind
himself by an oath to abide by and faithfully support all these
usurpations; the alternative being to resist the Government, or to
aid and abet a violation of the Constitution.

Meanwhile, each of the late Confederate States was occupied by a
military force of the Government of the United States, and military
orders were the supreme law; and that Government thereby proceeded to
establish a State organization based on the principle of its own
sovereignty. In the first place, the President of the United States
issued a proclamation in such terms as to be applicable to each of
the Confederate States wherever its affairs were in such process of
subjugation as to permit the commencement of the proposed
organization. This proclamation begins by setting forth four
propositions as the basis of his authority: First, the Constitution
declares that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the
Union a republican form of government, and protect each against
invasion and domestic violence. Second, the President is
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, as well as chief civil
executive officer, and bound to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. Third, the rebellion, in its revolutionary progress,
deprived the people of all civil government. Fourth, it becomes
necessary and proper to enforce and carry out the obligations of the
United States to the people of the State in securing it in the
enjoyment of a republican form of government. Therefore, etc.

These propositions call for a notice as well because of their fallacy
as their enormity. The third declares that the so-called rebellion,
in its progress, deprived the people of each Confederate State of all
civil government. There was a government over each Confederate State,
then existing and in full operation. It was, in all its internal
relations, the same government which existed when the State was a
member of the Union, whereby it was recognized by the Government of
the United States and by the other States as a lawful and republican
State government. It had been created by the free consent of the
people of the State, and they had defended it with their lives and
their fortunes. It had been denied by the Government of the United
States that any one of the Confederate States was a foreign state or
outside the Union by its secession. There was, therefore, neither in
law nor in fact, any foundation for the assertion that the so-called
rebellion had deprived the people of each Confederate State of all
civil government.

Having thus stripped each Confederate State of all civil government,
it was asserted that the Constitution declares that the United States
shall guarantee to each State a republican form of government. But to
guarantee is not to create, to organize, or to bring into existence.
This can be done for a State government only by the free and
unconstrained action of the whole people of a State. The creation of
such a government is beyond the powers of the Government of the
United States, as has already been shown. After a republican
government has been instituted by the people, the Constitution
requires the United States to guarantee its existence, and thereby
forbids them or their Government to overthrow it and set up a
creature of its own. The duty to guarantee commands the preservation
of that which already exists. Such were the governments of the
Confederate States before the war and after the war. Thus the power
granted in the Constitution to preserve and guarantee State
governments was perverted to overthrow and destroy republican
governments, and to erect in their places military Governors,
Legislatures, and judicial tribunals.

The third proposition is that the President is Commander in-Chief of
the Army and Navy and the chief civil executive. His troops already
occupied each of these States, and held the people in subjection. His
proclamation was therefore merely a military order from the hand of
the conqueror. Everything which he can do under such a character
partakes of the nature, simply and solely, of martial law. Therefore
he proceeds under the fourth proposition, wherein it "becomes
necessary and proper to carry out the obligations of the United
States to the people" of each Confederate State, "in securing them in
the enjoyment of a republican form of government." The American
people were now about to witness, on an extensive scale, the
tyrannical experiment of instituting republican governments by the
processes of martial law. They had declared it to be a self-evident
truth that it was "the right of the people to alter or to abolish it
[their government], and to institute a new government, laying its
foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness." [130] This principle of the sovereignty of the people was
now rejected, and the sovereignty of fleets and armies was
substituted.

"Now, therefore," says the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,
and the chief civil executive officer of the United States, "in
obedience to the high and solemn duties imposed upon me by the
Constitution of the United States, and for the purpose of enabling
the loyal people of said State (or States) to organize a State
government, whereby justice may be established, domestic tranquillity
restored, and loyal citizens protected in all their rights of life,
liberty, and property, I do hereby appoint ---- ---- provisional
Governor of the State" It will be here noticed that all the
proceedings are undertaken for the sake of the "loyal" persons in the
State. Who is to decide what persons are "loyal"? He who issues the
military order--the President and his agent the provisional
Governor; and they naturally will decide those to be loyal who
support and obey their orders. The free assent and dissent which are
the basis of the validity of every political action under our system,
are unknown in this case.

The duty of the provisional Governor is declared in the proclamation
to be, "to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary
and proper for convening a convention composed of delegates to be
chosen by that portion of the people of the State who are 'loyal' to
the United States, and no others, for the purpose of altering and
amending the Constitution thereof." In the third of the four
propositions laid down as the basis of authority for the President's
proceedings, above mentioned, it is declared that the so-called
rebellion, "deprived the people of the State of all civil
government"; but here it is made the first duty of the provisional
Governor to procure a convention of "loyal" persons "to alter and
amend the Constitution" of the State. Thus it seems that there was a
State in existence, and a Constitution in full vigor, notwithstanding
the above declaration of the President to the contrary. This was that
Constitution of the State which was in force during that long and
peaceful period through which the Constitution of the United States
was observed, and constitutional laws enacted. Now it was to be
altered and amended from what the sovereign people of those days had
ordained it to be, at the command, and to conform to the views, of
another sovereign. The nature of those alterations and amendments
will be stated hereafter.

This convention was to possess the authority to exercise all the
powers necessary "to restore the State to its constitutional
relations with the Federal Government." It was further provided that
no person should vote unless he had taken the amnesty oath mentioned
on a previous page, and was a qualified voter previous to the
secession of the State. The convention or the subsequent Legislature
was to prescribe the qualification of all voters afterward--"a
power," says the President, "the people of the several States
composing the Federal Union have rightfully exercised from the origin
of the Government to the present time." The proclamation then
continued: "And I do hereby direct: first, that the military
commander of the department and all officers and persons in the
military and naval service aid and assist the said provisional
government in carrying into effect this proclamation; and they are
enjoined to abstain from in any way hindering, impeding, or
discouraging 'loyal' people from the organization of a State
government as herein authorized." The proclamation closed with
instructions to the Secretary of each department of the Government to
proceed to put in operation his department within the limits of the
State.

The first movement for the restoration of the Confederate States to
the Union under subjugation was commenced in Virginia. Richmond was
occupied by the forces of the United States Government, and the
authority of all State officers elected during the war was annulled.
Affairs remained in this position until May 9, 1865, when the
President of the United States issued an order declaring all the acts
and proceedings of the political, military, and civil organizations
in the State which had been in insurrection against the United States
to be null and void; and that all persons who should attempt to
exercise any authority as under the late State or Confederate
officers, should be deemed and taken as in rebellion, etc. At this
time Francis H. Pierpont, who had assumed to exercise the office of
Governor of Virginia over ten counties around Alexandria, was
recognized by the President as the true Governor of the State. He was
aided to remove the seat of his government from Alexandria to
Richmond, and there maintained by the military force. No hostile
opposition, however, was anywhere manifested, while at Alexandria
delegates from the ten counties had assembled in convention and
assumed to amend the State Constitution, and the little so-called
legislative body had undertaken to pass various acts of importance.
The so-called Governor, in presenting a summary of them, concluded by
saying, "Thus, State sovereignty--the _status_ of the African race--
the armed resistance to the Government of the United States--are
disposed of." An election for a new Legislature and State officers
was held on October 12th. All were allowed to vote who had not held
office under the State government or the Confederacy during the war,
after they had taken the amnesty oath. The so-called Legislature
assembled and entered upon the regulation of all the affairs of the
State. A general act of vagrancy was passed, whereupon the
major-general in command issued an order "that no magistrate, civil
officer, or other person shall, in any way or manner, apply, or
attempt to apply, the provisions of the said statute to any colored
person in this department." At the municipal election in Richmond,
the Mayor, Attorney, and Superintendent of the Poor, elected, were
persons who had held office under the Confederate States. They were
not allowed by the military authority to qualify, and subsequently
declined.

In 1865 the Congress of the United States passed an act which
provided that the following amendment to the Constitution should be
submitted to the Legislatures of the several States for ratification
or rejection:

"SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to its jurisdiction.

"SECTION 2. Congress shall have full power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."

One Dr. James L. Watson was tried for killing a negro in Rockbridge
County, and acquitted. Major-General Schofield, in command of the
military forces of the department, immediately ordered his arrest and
trial by a military commission. On the assembling of the commission a
writ of _habeas corpus_ was sued out of the Circuit Court of Richmond
in behalf of Watson, and served on the General. In his answer, he
declined compliance with the writ, saying:

"Dr. Watson is held for trial by military commission, under the
authority of the act of Congress of July 16, 1866, which act directs
and requires the President, through the commissioner and officers of
the Freedmen's Bureau, to exercise military jurisdiction over all
cases and questions concerning the free enjoyment of the right to
have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning
personal liberty, personal security, etc., by all citizens, without
respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery, of the
States whose constitutional relations to the Government of the United
States have been discontinued by the rebellion, and have not been
restored."

In the mean time, the United States Attorney-General having examined
the case, and reported that, in his opinion, the military commission
had not competent jurisdiction, the President thereupon directed that
the commission be dissolved and the prisoner discharged without delay.

Meantime Congress had passed an act, known as the Civil Rights Bill,
and a case came before the Circuit Court, at Alexandria, in which one
of the parties offered to produce negro evidence. The Judge (Thomas)
ruled that, inasmuch as the State laws of Virginia forbade the
introduction of negro testimony in civil suits to which white men
alone were parties, the evidence of the negro was inadmissible; and
that Congressional legislation could not impair the right of the
States to decide what classes of persons were competent to testify in
her courts.

A storm was now brewing which was soon to involve the President and
Congress in open conflict. The reader will remember that, during the
period in which these proceedings took place in Virginia, similar
ones occurred in all the remaining Confederate States. Not only in
Virginia, but in several of the other States, some persons had been
voted for as members of Congress, but in no case had they been
admitted to seats. This was one of the measures taken by Congress to
indicate its disapproval of the President's plan for the treatment of
the late Confederate States.

The difficulties that now arose between the President and Congress
had reference entirely to the affairs of the Confederate States. The
plan of the President left the negroes to the care of the States
alone after the establishment of their emancipation. Congress desired
them to be made American citizens, secure in all the rights of
freemen and voters. The refusal to admit Senators and Representatives
to Congress from the Confederate States served to arrest the
operation of the President's plans to hold these States in abeyance.

No compromise could be made between the two. Each appealed to the
Constitution, forgetful that each had sustained all its ruthless
violations during the last four years. Congress, therefore, commenced
an independent action, and in its reckless course sought,
unsuccessfully, to rid itself of the President by impeachment. Its
first act, at the commencement of the session, in December, 1865, was
the appointment, by a large majority in each House, of a joint
Committee of Fifteen, to which was referred all questions relating to
the conditions and manner in which Congress would recognize the late
Confederate States as members of the Union. Meantime the credentials
of all persons sent as Representatives and Senators from them were
laid upon the table in each House, there to remain until the final
action of the Committee of Fifteen. This was followed by the passage,
in February, 1866, of "an act to establish a bureau for the relief of
freedmen, refugees, and abandoned lands." It proposed to establish
military jurisdiction over all parts of the United States containing
refugees and freedmen. This bill was vetoed by the President, and
passed over his veto.

In March an act was passed "to protect all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their
vindication." The first section declared all persons born in the
United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, to be citizens of the United States, and
enumerates the rights to be enjoyed by those so declared to be
citizens. The second section affords discriminating protection to
colored persons in the full enjoyment of all the rights secured to
them by the preceding section. This bill was vetoed by the President,
and passed over his veto.

On June 8, 1866, a majority and a minority report were made by the
Committee of Fifteen. Meanwhile, a report had been made from the same
committee, at a previous date, in the form of an amendment to the
Constitution, which was debated and amended in each House, and
finally passed by the requisite majority in each. Thus was to be
secured the political support and votes of the negroes, who were
expected to be the controlling citizens of the late Confederate
States.

The amendment to the Constitution was now submitted to the
Legislatures of all the States, to be valid as a part of the
Constitution, when ratified by three fourths, in the following form:

"ARTICLE--, SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

"SECTION 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But,
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

"SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of Congress,
or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort
to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two thirds of
each House remove such disability.

"SECTION 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion,
shall not be questioned. But the United States shall neither assume
nor pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and
claims shall be held illegal and void.

"SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."

It may here be stated that the restoration of the late Confederate
States to all the rights and privileges of States as co-equal members
of the Union, under the plan of President Johnson, received the
approval of the executive and judicial branches of the Government
soon after the cessation of hostilities. Congress, however, not only
withheld its assent, but, during its session in 1866, required as a
condition precedent to a recognition of any one of these States, and
the admission of its Representatives and Senators to seats, the
adoption by its Legislature of the above-mentioned amendment. The
question really involved in this amendment was the admission to
citizenship and the ballot of the negroes in these States. It was the
acknowledged fact that the authority to determine this question
resided in the States severally and nowhere else. The amendment
itself, in its second section, recognized the authority to grant or
withhold the elective franchise as existing in the State governments.

This amendment was submitted to the Legislatures of the States
immediately after its adoption by Congress in June, 1866, and by
March 30, 1867, it had been ratified by twenty States, including West
Virginia, Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee, and rejected by
thirteen, including Delaware and Kentucky, and eleven of the late
Confederate States. There were thirty-four States at that time, and
thirty had voted. A ratification by three fourths was required to
make it valid.

When this amendment was presented for ratification to the Legislature
of Virginia at its session commencing December, 1866, it was rejected
in the Senate by a unanimous vote, and in the House by a vote of
seventy-four to one. Meantime the Freedmen's Bureau was organized and
put in operation in the State, but the military occupation continued,
and the condition of affairs remained unchanged during the
proceedings of Congress to construct its plan for subjugation.

After the vote of the States up to March, 1867, it was manifest that
no real advance had been made in the extension of the franchise to
the negro population of the States. In this position of affairs
Congress, on March 2d, adopted an entirety new system of measures
relative to the late Confederate States, The fiction upon which these
measures were based is thus expressed in the preamble of the first
act:

"_Whereas_, No legal State governments, or adequate protection for
life or property, now exists in the rebel States of Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Florida, Texas, and Arkansas; and, _whereas_, it is necessary that
peace and good order should be enforced in said States, until loyal
and republican State governments can be legally established:
therefore, _be it enacted_," etc.

These States were then divided into five military districts, and it
was further provided:

"Until the people of the said rebel States shall by law be admitted
to representation to the Congress of the United States, all civil
governments that may exist therein shall be deemed provisional only,
and shall be in all respects subject to the paramount authority of
the United States, at any time to abolish, modify, control, and
supersede the same, and in all elections to any office under such
provisional governments, all persons shall be entitled to vote under
the provisions of the fifth section of this act."

Thus these States, when held by military force as conquered
territory, with the sovereignty of the people extinct, were not
allowed to claim to possess any rights under the Federal
Constitution, or any other than such as might be granted by the will
of the conqueror. It was asserted that the right to regulate the
elective franchise, recognized as belonging to the States in the
Union, could not attach to those out of the Union, and having only
provisional political institutions. Congress then proceeded to
declare, in the fifth section of the bill, the terms upon which a
late Confederate State could become a member of the Union:

"SECTION 5. That, when the people of any one of said rebel States
shall have formed a Constitution of government in conformity with
the Constitution of the United States in all respects, framed by a
convention of delegates elected by the male citizens of said State,
twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous
condition, who have been resident in said State for one year previous
to the day of such election, except such as may be disfranchised for
participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law, and when
such Constitution shall provide that the elective franchise shall be
enjoyed by all such persons as have the qualifications herein stated
for electors of delegates, and when such Constitution shall be
ratified by a majority of the persons voting on the question of
ratification who are qualified as electors for delegates, and when
such Constitution shall have been submitted to Congress for
examination and approval, and Congress shall have approved the same,
and when said State, by a vote of its Legislature elected under said
Constitution, shall have adopted the amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, proposed by the Thirty-ninth Congress, and known
as Article XIV, and when said article shall have become a part of the
Constitution of the United States, said State shall be declared
entitled to representation in Congress, and Senators and
Representatives shall be admitted therefrom on their taking the oath
prescribed by law, and then and thereafter the preceding sections of
this act shall be inoperative in said State," etc.

The bill became a law, notwithstanding the veto of the President.

On March 4th a new Congress commenced its session, and on March 23d a
supplement to the preceding act was passed. It ordered a registration
to be made of the qualified voters in each military sub-district of
the State, an election to be held for the State Convention to draft a
Constitution for the State, and for delegates to such convention; and
that such Constitution should be submitted to the voters for adoption
or rejection, and upon its adoption a State government should be
organized, etc. The registration was required to be made of all
citizens as defined by the "act to protect all persons in the United
States in their civil rights," etc. Many disqualifications of voters,
arising from participation in the war, were also expressed. This act
also became a law, notwithstanding the objections of the President.

It will be seen that this act contemplated two distinct governments
in each of the ten States--the one military and the other civil.
Both were provisional, and both were to continue until the new State
Constitution was framed, and the State was admitted to representation
in Congress. The two were to be carried on together, and the people
were made subject to both and obliged to obey both. The law was next
put in operation by constituting the districts, as follows: 1.
Virginia, commander, Major-General Schofield; 2. North Carolina and
South Carolina, commander, Major-General Sickles; 3. Georgia,
Florida, and Alabama, commander, Major-General John Pope; 4.
Mississippi and Arkansas, commander, Major-General Ord; 5. Louisiana
and Texas, commander, Major-General Sheridan.

Previous to adjournment, on July 19, 1867, Congress passed an
additional supplement to the act of March 3d and the supplement of
March 23d. It declared the intent and meaning of the previous acts to
have been: that the civil governments of the ten States were not
legal governments, and, if continued, were to be subject in all
respects to the military commanders and the paramount authority of
Congress. It made the acts of the military commanders subject only to
the disapproval of the General of the Army, U. S. Grant, and
authorized them to remove any person from office under the State
government. It further defined the classes disfranchised, and
directed that no district commander should be bound in his action by
any opinion of any civil officer of the United States.

The President vetoed the bill, and in his message said:

"Thus, over all these ten States, this military government is now
declared to have unlimited authority. It is no longer confined to the
preservation of the public peace, the administration of criminal law,
the registration of voters, and the superintendence of elections;
but, 'in all respects,' is asserted to be paramount to the existing
civil governments. It is impossible to conceive any state of society
more intolerable than this, and yet it is to this condition that
twelve millions of American citizens are reduced by the Congress of
the United States. Over every foot of the immense territory occupied
by these American citizens, the Constitution of the United States is
theoretically in full operation. It binds all the people there, and
should protect them; yet they are denied every one of its sacred
guarantees. Of what avail will it be to any one of these Southern
people, when seized by a file of soldiers, to ask for the cause of
arrest, or for the production of the warrant? Of what avail to ask
for the privilege of bail when in military custody, which knows no
such thing as bail? Of what avail to demand a trial by jury, process
for witnesses, a copy of the indictment, the privilege of counsel, or
that greater privilege, the writ of _habeas corpus_?"

Congress having thus completed its plan of operations, the crashing
wheels of subjugation began to move forward. Let us proceed with the
narration of affairs in Virginia.

On the appearance of Major-General Schofield at Richmond, all the
proceedings of the so-called civil government, for the organization
and restoration of the State to the Union, at once ceased, and he
assumed command. A board of army officers was named by the commanding
General for the purpose of selecting suitable persons for appointment
as registering officers throughout the State. In making the
selections, the preference was given, first, to officers of the army
and of the Freedmen's Bureau, on duty in the State; second, to
persons who had been discharged from the Federal army, after
"meritorious" services during the war; third, to "loyal" citizens of
the county or city where they were to serve. On April 2d an order
appeared from the major-general, suspending all elections, whether
State, county, or municipal, "under the provisional government,"
until after the registration was completed. A lecture on the
"Chivalry of the South," advertised to be delivered in Lynchburg, was
suppressed by the order of the post commander at that place. A
warning was given by the major-general to the editor of the Richmond
"Times," which said, "The efforts of your paper to foster enmity,
create disorder, and lead to violence, can no longer be tolerated."
On the refusal of five magistrates of the Corporation Council of
Norfolk to receive the testimony of a negro, they were arrested on a
process issued under the Civil Bights Bill, and held to bail to
appear before the District Court. All armed organizations in the
State were disbanded. Inflammatory meetings of freedmen and those who
sought their political alliance were held in different parts of the
State.

Military commissioners were appointed over sub-districts for the
suppression of disorder and violence, for the protection of all
persons in their so-called rights of person and property, and clothed
with all the powers of justices of a county or police magistrates of
a city. The State was also divided into sub-districts, and commanders
appointed over the same. These officers were empowered to exercise a
general supervision over the military commissioners, and to furnish
them, when necessary, with sufficient military force to enable them
to discharge their duties. Further orders relative to the
qualification of voters were issued by the major-general, in which it
was declared that "all persons who voluntarily joined the rebel army,
and all persons in that army, whether volunteers or conscripts, who
committed voluntarily any hostile act, were thereby engaged in
insurrection or rebellion; and all who voted for the ordinance of
secession, gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Also all who
voluntarily furnished supplies of food, or clothing, arms,
ammunition, horses, or mules, or any other material of war,
participated in the rebellion," and were disfranchised. The whole
number registered was 116,982 whites and 104,772 blacks. The vote for
the Convention was 14,835 whites and 92,507 blacks; against the
Convention, 61,249 whites and 638 blacks.

The Convention assembled on December 3d and adjourned on April 17,
1868. The Bill of Eights adopted declared that--

"The State shall ever remain a member of the United States of
America, and the people thereof a part of the American nation, and
all attempts, from whatever source, and upon whatever pretext, to
dissolve said Union, or to sever said Union, are unauthorized, and
ought to be resisted with the whole power of the State.

"The Constitution of the United States, and the laws of Congress
passed in pursuance thereof, constitute the supreme law of the land,
to which paramount allegiance and obedience are due from every
citizen, anything in the Constitution, ordinances, or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding."

Suffrage was granted to every male citizen twenty-one years of age.
All officers of the State were required to take the following oath:

"I, ---- ----, do solemnly swear that I will support and
maintain the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
Constitution and laws of the State of Virginia; and that I recognize
and accept the civil and political equality of all men before the
law," etc.

In addition, all State, city, and county officers were required to
take the test-oath prescribed by Congress on July 2, 1862, as follows:

"I do solemnly swear that I have never borne arms against the United
States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily
given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons
engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have never sought or
accepted, nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office
whatever, under any authority, or pretended authority, in hostility
to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to
any pretended government, authority, power, or Constitution within
the United States, hostile or inimical thereto; and I do further
swear that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; that I will take this obligation freely, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and
faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to
enter."

Major-General Schofield, in an address to the Convention in
opposition to these stringent provisions, said:

"You can not find in some of the counties a sufficient number of men
who are capable of filling the offices, and who can take the oath you
have prescribed here, I have no hesitation in saying that I believe
it impossible to inaugurate a government upon that basis."

Meantime the so-called Constitution was adopted by the Convention,
and June 2d fixed for the popular vote upon it. But no appropriation
was made for the expenses of the election, and it was not held.
Major-General Stoneman now succeeded Major-General Schofield.

The utter subjugation of the sovereign people of Virginia was now
manifest. Not a public act of the least importance could they do
without the consent of the military chief who ruled over them, and
who was a stranger in their State. Finding the provisions of this
Constitution were so restrictive as to exclude from the elective
franchise nearly all of the most intelligent and best-educated
citizens, on account of their participation in the late war, a
movement was commenced for a modification of these clauses or their
entire omission. The sovereignty of the people was extinct, so no
relief could be secured except through the action of the sovereign
sitting in Washington. Congress, therefore, passed an act authorizing
the President (Grant), at such time as he might deem best, to submit
the Constitution to the registered voters of Virginia, and also
submit to a separate vote such provisions of the Constitution as he
thought proper. The act also required the Legislature that should be
elected to ratify the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, as a condition precedent "to the
readmission of the State into the Union."

The fifteenth article of amendment to the Constitution was passed by
Congress in February, 1869, and submitted to the Legislatures of the
States. It was as follows:

"SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

"SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."

On the passage of the amendment by the United States Senate, Senator
Garrett Davis, of Kentucky, said:

"Sir, your amendments to the Constitution are all void; they are of
no effect. They were proposed by a mutilated Congress; they were
proposed by a mutilated House of Representatives and Senate."

The election in Virginia took place on July 6, 1869. The vote on the
Constitution was, for it, 206,233; against it, 9,189. For the
disfranchising clause, 84,404; against it, 124,361. In favor of the
test-oath clause, the votes were, 83,114; against it, 124,106. State
officers and a Legislature were chosen.

Meantime the civil or provisional Governor had been removed by the
military commander, Major-General Stoneman, and the commander of the
first district put in the vacancy. At the same time the
President-Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals was a staff-officer
of the General commanding, and assigned to that duty; and another one
of the judges of that court was an officer of the Federal army,
receiving his appointment from the same source.

On October 5th the Legislature assembled, the State officers-elect
having already entered upon their duties. The fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution were adopted,
and Senators elected to Congress. On January 26, 1870, a bill for the
admission of the State into the Union, "without further condition,"
was passed. Her subjugation was now completed. The military
commanders were withdrawn, and she was left in the hands of
"carpet-baggers."

[Footnote 130: Declaration of Independence.]

CHAPTER LVII.

In the preceding chapter the reader will find a narration of the
series of measures, adopted by the Government of the United States,
to complete the final subjugation of the State of Virginia. The same
series was applied, in the same order, to each of the Confederate
States. It is, therefore, unnecessary to repeat the narration of
these details in their application to the other States. But there
were some concurrent incidents and some flagrant outrages in each one
which should be stated, in order to afford a full and comprehensive
view of the universal denial of unalienable personal rights, the
destruction of civil institutions, the disregard of laws, and the
cruel and ignominious treatment, inflicted by the authority of the
Government of the United States upon individuals in every part of the
Southern country.

In North Carolina, immediately on the cessation of hostilities, the
Federal General issued an order, declaring that "all persons
heretofore held in the State as slaves are now free, and that it is
the duty of the army to maintain the freedom of such persons."
Another order was then issued, defining and regulating the relations
of the freedmen and whites. President Johnson issued his proclamation
on May 29th, appointing a provisional Governor, W. W. Holden, as in
the case of Virginia. On August 8th the Governor issued his
proclamation for an election of delegates to a State Constitutional
Convention on September 12th, and stated who would be permitted to
vote, and the manner of election. The election was held, and the
so-called Convention assembled on October 2, 1865. Its first act
declared the uninterrupted existence of the State in the Union, and
that the ordinance of secession was null and void. The next
prohibited slavery. The payment of the debt contracted during the
war, by any future Legislature, was forbidden. The repeal of the
secession ordinance and the prohibition of slavery were ratified by
the people. An election for State officers and members of Congress
was held in November, and those who had taken the amnesty oath were
the voters. The so-called Legislature-elect held a session and
ratified the amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting
slavery. On December 23d the Governor-elect (Worth) was inaugurated,
and the provisional Governor retired, acknowledging Worth to be the
legal and "loyal" Governor. Thus the State was subjugated on the plan
of President Johnson.

The affairs of the State were thus conducted until the military acts
of Congress went into operation, and on March 23, 1867, Major-General
Sickles issued his order assuming command. On April 11th he issued an
order for the relief of debtors, by prohibiting imprisonment for
debt, and ordering the stay of all proceedings for the collection of
debts for twelve months. Writs of execution issuing out of the United
States Circuit Court were not allowed to be served by the military
commander at Wilmington. The question was taken to the Attorney-General
at Washington, and General Sickles appeared in his own defense. It was
decided by the acting Attorney-General to be "simply a case of a high
misdemeanor, legally contemplated." General Sickles was removed, and
Major-General Canby succeeded. The State registration was completed
In October, and contained the names of 103,060 whites and 71,657 blacks.
The so-called election for a Convention was held in November, and the
Convention assembled on February 14, 1868. The Bill of Rights adopted
contained similar clauses to the one adopted by the Virginia Convention.
The Constitution was ratified, and State officers, members of the
Legislature, and representatives to Congress were elected on April
23d. The vote for the Constitution was 93,118; against it, 74,109.
The so-called Republicans had a majority of seventy on joint ballot
in the Legislature.

The State officers elected under the plan of President Johnson had
continued in the peaceful administration of their duties. Therefore,
on the day of the inauguration of the newly-elected Governor (Holden)
the existing Governor (Worth) made a spirited protest, saying:

"I do not recognize the validity of the late election, under which
you and those coöperating with you claim to be invested with the
civil government of the State. You have no evidence of your election,
save the certificate of a major-general of the United States Army. I
regard all of you as, in effect, appointees of the military power of
the United States, and not as deriving your powers from the consent
of those you claim to govern. Knowing, however, that you are backed
by military force here, which I could not resist if I would, I do not
deem it necessary to offer a futile opposition, but vacate the office
without the ceremony of actual eviction, offering no further
opposition than this, my protest. I would submit to actual expulsion
in order to bring before the Supreme Court of the United States the
question as to the constitutionality of the legislation under which
you claim to be the rightful Governor of the State, if the past
action of that tribunal furnished any hope of a speedy trial. I
surrender the office to you under what I deem military duress,
without stopping, as the occasion would well justify, to comment on
the singular coincidence that the present State government is
surrendered, as without legality, to him whose own official sanction,
but three years ago, declared it valid.

"I am, very respectfully,

"JONATHAN WORTH,

"_Governor of North Carolina._"

The so-called Legislature assembled on the appointed day, and the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States was at
once ratified, and on July 11, 1868, the President announced by
proclamation that "North Carolina had complied with the conditions
prescribed by Congress for her restoration to an equal place in the
Union of States."

In South Carolina, proceedings were commenced on June 20, 1865, when
President Johnson issued a proclamation similar to the one in the
case of Virginia, and appointed Benjamin F. Perry as provisional
Governor of the State. He continued all persons in office on taking
the amnesty oath, and all laws in force prior to the secession of the
State were maintained except those conflicting with the proclamation;
delegates to a so-called State Convention were elected on the first
Monday of September, and the Convention assembled on the 13th to
amend the State Constitution. The ordinance of secession was repealed
and slavery abolished. Blacks were made witnesses in all cases where
the rights or property of persons of that class were involved. An
election of State officers and a so-called Legislature were held. The
latter convened on October 25th. The thirteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States prohibiting slavery was ratified.
On November 29th the provisional Governor retired, and the so-called
Governor-elect (Orr) was inaugurated. The work of the Legislature was
very complete. The courts were open to all persons, with equal civil
rights, without distinction of color, and Major-General Sickles,
commander of the Military Department of North Carolina and South
Carolina, ordered all civil and criminal cases to be tried before
them in which the parties were civilians. Previous to this order, and
after the cessation of hostilities, provost-marshals and military
courts were detailed for duty all over the State. These officers knew
only the law martial, and generally very little of that; and took
jurisdiction of all cases both civil and criminal, occasioning great
annoyance, expense, and vexation, deciding as their prejudice,
caprice, or ignorance suggested. After the completion of the
so-called State government, however, the vacancies on the bench were
filled, and the courts opened throughout the State.

Still the people were made to feel that the military hand was over
all. A case occurred in the court in Charleston, before Judge A. P.
Aldrich, in which a white man was indicted for petty larceny, tried,
and found guilty. The punishment prescribed by the law of the State
for this offense was whipping. To this punishment the offender was
sentenced. On the next day an armed soldier came to the court-house
inquiring for the Judge, who was absent. To an inquiry of the sheriff
as to his business, he replied that he was ordered to require the
Judge to report at General Bennet's headquarters, who was the
military commander of the district. On the next day another soldier
in full uniform came to the lodgings of the Judge with a note from
the General requesting the former to report at headquarters.

The reply of the Judge was: "As I have no business with you, I
decline to report. If you have business with me, it will give me
great pleasure to receive you."

On the next day an adjutant appeared saying: "The General is very
much engaged, and asks you to come to his office. I will wait your
convenience."

"I see I am under arrest," replied the Judge. "I will go now."

The adjutant, in full uniform, escorted him through the most public
parts of the city to headquarters, and, entering the office,
announced him. The General was sitting, with his cap on, and writing.
After some time, having finished, he looked up and said, "Sit down,"
adding, "That was a curt note you sent to me yesterday."

"No, sir," answered the Judge, "I intended it to be respectful, but,
as I had no business with you, I did not see why I should be required
to come to your office."

"Do you dispute the authority of the United States Government?" asked
the General, tartly.

"No, sir; I am here in obedience to that authority, but I have always
supposed that, as a mere matter of courtesy, when one gentleman has
business with another, he calls on him. As a matter of etiquette, I
believe a Judge of the Superior Court of a State is equal in rank to
a brevet brigadier-general."

"We will not discuss the question of rank," replied the General, "but
General Sickles requests you to revoke your sentence of the other day
and impose some other penalty."

The Judge replied: "I do not impose the penalty; it is the law, and I
have no discretion."

He then explained the law, and said there was no relief except by a
pardon of the Governor, or by taking the prisoner out of the custody
of the sheriff. A few days after, the prisoner was taken from the
custody of the Sheriff and discharged. The proceeding was brought to
the knowledge of the so-called Governor, who applied to General
Sickles to suspend his order, but the latter declined; whereupon the
Judge, then at Columbia, to hold the court of the circuit, declared
that he would adjourn the court and not proceed on his circuit; that
he would not go through the farce of holding a court when judgments
and sentences could be arrested and prevented by military order. He
then adjourned the court, and passed an order refusing to hold courts
while the military order was in force. General Sickles also issued an
order reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court. The President about
the same time countermanded a like order of the General in North
Carolina, and the Judge resumed his duties.

Under the act of Congress of March 2, 1867, the State was divided
into ten military districts, and a post commander appointed for each.
All local officers, who were regularly elected by the people, were to
be appointed by these commanders. Military orders were issued from
time to time containing social regulations, etc. One on the subject
of criminal arrests and trials required all sheriffs, marshals, and
police officers to report to the Provost-Marshal-General of the
district, their names, residence, official station, salary, and the
authority by which they were appointed; also to investigate and
report all particulars of any crime committed, to the
Provost-Marshal-General, setting forth name, residence, and
description of the offender with the nature of the offense, and steps
taken to secure punishment. Sheriffs were directed to make a full
report of the condition of all jails and prisons within their
jurisdiction. All civil officers in charge of any jail, prison, or
workhouse, were required to make full monthly reports of each inmate
under their care. All sheriffs, constables, and police officers were
required "to obey and execute the lawful orders of the
Provost-Marshal-General, to the same effect as they are required by
law to obey and execute writs, warrants, or other process issued by
civil magistrates," and any resistance or refusal to execute the same
subjected the offender to trial by military commission.

Details of the plan to be followed in making the registration were
fully laid down, and the order then contained the following
instructions:

"Boards will take notice that, according to section 10 of the act of
July 19, 1867, they are not to be bound in their action by any
opinion of any civil officer of the United States.

"Boards are instructed that all the provisions of the several acts of
Congress cited are to be liberally construed, to the end that all the
intents thereof be fully and perfectly carried out.

"It is made the duty of the commanding General to remove from office
all persons who are disloyal to the Government of the United States,
or who use their official influence in any manner to hinder, delay,
prevent, or obstruct the due and perfect administration of the
reconstruction acts."

On September 5, 1867, Major-General Canby took command. General
Sickles, on announcing his retirement, said:

"The undersigned avails himself of the occasion to acknowledge the
fidelity and zeal with which the officers and troops under his
command have discharged their duties."

The question of the qualification of jurors now became important.
General Canby issued an order on September 13th, which required the
jurors to be drawn from the "qualified voters," which included the
newly emancipated slaves. The Judges met, and sent a respectful
request to the General to change the order to conform to the law of
the State. By the jury law, as it then stood, no person was qualified
to serve as a juror unless he was a free white man, twenty-one years
of age. The Judges were sworn to enforce this law and the
Constitution of the State. No notice was taken of the application. At
the next court in Edgefield, Judge Aldrich, charging the grand jury,
brought to their notice the order, the law and the Constitution, and
the oath of office, and then declared "he could not and would not
obey the order." On going to open the court a few days after, the
adjutant of the post delivered to him a military order suspending him
from office. He proceeded and opened the court, read the order and
stated the circumstances, and, laying aside his gown, directed the
sheriff "to let the court stand adjourned while justice is
stifled." [131] The major-general appointed another Judge to the
vacancy.

The registration of voters was completed in the middle of October,
and amounted to 46,346 whites and 78,982 blacks. The vote on a State
Convention was taken on November 19th and 20th, and resulted, for the
Convention, 130 whites and 68,876 blacks; against the Convention,
2,801 whites. The delegates were 34 whites and 63 blacks. The
Convention assembled on January 14, 1868. The Bill of Rights
contained provisions similar to that of Virginia, and the
Constitution was made to conform to the will of Congress. The
ratification of the Constitution, and the election of State officers
and a Legislature, took place on April 14, 15, and 16, 1868. The vote
for the Constitution was 70,758; against it, 27,288; not voting, but
registered, 35,551. The Legislature, with a majority of forty-eight
blacks, assembled on July 6th. The fourteenth constitutional
amendment was adopted, and the construction of the State by Congress
was completed practically on July 13, 1868.

In Georgia, on the cessation of hostilities, the Governor issued a
proclamation calling a session of the Legislature. But the commanding
General issued an order declaring the proclamation to be null and
void. Another military officer, in a letter to the Governor, stated
that he was instructed by the President to say to him, that "the
persons who incited the war and carried it on will not be allowed to
assemble at the call of their accomplice to act again as the
Legislature of the State, and again usurp the authority and
franchises. In calling the Legislature together again, without the
permission of the President, you have perpetrated a fresh crime; and,
if any person presumes to answer or acknowledge your call, he will be
immediately arrested." The military authorities of the United States
then took the control of affairs until the appointment of James
Johnson, on June 17th, by the President, as provisional Governor of
the State, by a proclamation similar to the one issued in the case of
Virginia. On July 13th he issued a proclamation prescribing the
regulations for a State Convention. Provost-marshals had been
stationed all over the State to regulate local affairs, and the laws
in force previous to 1861 were ordered to be enforced. Delegates were
elected on October 4th, and the so-called State Convention assembled
on October 25th. The ordinance of secession was repealed. The payment
of the war debt was prohibited. The emancipation of the slaves was
expressly recognized, and a so-called election for State officers,
members of the Legislature and of Congress, was appointed to be held
on November 15th. The Legislature assembled on December 4th, and
unanimously adopted the thirteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution, prohibiting the existence of slavery. Charles J.
Jenkins, Governor-elect, was inaugurated, and on December 19, 1865,
the provisional Governor relinquished the conduct of the State
affairs to the constituted authorities. The Freedmen's Bureau Act and
the Civil Rights Act of Congress were enforced by the military
authorities.

The State Legislature again assembled on November 1, 1866. The
ratification of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States was repassed to a joint committee of each House, which
reported a resolution to refuse to ratify the same. In the Senate it
was adopted unanimously, and in the House by a vote of 132 to 2. On
April 1, 1866, Major-General John Pope assumed command in the third
military district, containing Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. An
unsuccessful effort was made by the State at this time to bring the
question of the constitutionality of the "reconstruction" acts of
Congress before the Supreme Court. Governor Jenkins took part in the
application to the Supreme Court, and, while at Washington, issued an
address to the people of the State, urging them to take no action
under the laws. He was called upon to make an explanation on his
return by General Pope, as parts of the address were declared in
violation of the military order of the latter. But as the so-called
Governor had not seen the order, his offense was excused. A mayor and
aldermen for Augusta were appointed by General Pope; also the sheriff
and deputy for Bartow County, and other officers.

An order was issued that jurors should be selected from the list of
qualified voters. Judge Reese, of Ocmulgee District, wrote to General
Pope, declaring that, under his oath to sustain the laws, he could
not conform to the order. General Pope replied with an attempt to
show him that he owed allegiance, first of all, to the authority of
the United States, as represented by the military power in the State.
The argument was of no avail, and the Judge was prohibited from
holding court.

The registration of votes was completed early in September, The
number registered was 188,647, and the whites had a majority of about
2,000. The election of delegates to the State Convention took place
from October 29th to November 3d. Of the delegates, 133 were whites
and 33 blacks. The Convention assembled on December 13th, and soon
adjourned to January 8, 1868. Meantime, Major-General Meade had
relieved General Pope as military commander. The Convention, before
this adjournment, ordered the Comptroller to levy a tax to pay its
expenses, and directed the State Treasurer to advance forty thousand
dollars for its pay and mileage. The ordinance was sent to the
Treasurer, endorsed with instructions from General Pope to pay. The
Treasurer refused to advance the money, as he was prohibited by the
Constitution to do so, except on the warrant of the Governor. General
Meade requested the Governor to issue the warrant. He replied that
the Constitution forbade any money to be drawn from the Treasury
except on an appropriation, whereupon General Meade removed both
officers, and appointed others.

The provisions required by the acts of Congress were adopted in the
so-called new Constitution. At the same time, certain provisions were
inserted, which were intended to afford relief to the people. The
Convention, therefore, by resolution, requested General Meade to
require the courts to enforce them "until the State was restored to
its regular relations with the United States, and the State
organization was in full force." An order was, therefore, issued by
the General requiring the courts and officers of the State government
to enforce the provisions, in all respects, the same as if they had
regularly taken effect. One of the Judges, having refused to comply
with this order, was removed by General Meade.

The so-called election on the Constitution, and for State officers,
and Legislature, and members of Congress, was held on April 20th and
following days. The State Constitution was declared to be ratified;
Rufus W. Bullock, the so-called Republican candidate, was declared to
be elected Governor by a majority of seven thousand votes. The
Legislature assembled on July 4, 1868, with three Senators and
twenty-five Representatives who were negroes. The fourteenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution was adopted, and all the
conditions of Congress were fulfilled; and on July 28, 1868, she was
declared to be restored to the Union. Subsequently it appeared that
the State Convention had made no provision which could be construed
as expressly giving the black man a right to hold office, and all
these members were expelled from the Legislature. The matter was
taken up by Congress, and the State was not fully recognized as in
the Union until 1870.

The proceedings in Florida commenced with the usual proclamation of
President Johnson. It was issued on July 13, 1865, and appointed
William Marvin provisional Governor of the State. On August 3d he
issued a proclamation prescribing such rules and regulations as were
deemed necessary for the choice of members of a so-called State
Constitutional Convention, and appointed October 10th for the day of
election, and October 25th as the day on which the delegates should
meet. They "annulled" the secession ordinance, passed an ordinance
prohibiting slavery, with a preamble in these words: "_Whereas_,
slavery has been destroyed in this State by the Government of the
United States; therefore," etc. Another ordinance declared void the
liabilities contracted for the war. Freedmen were made competent
witnesses in any matter wherein a colored person was concerned. An
election of State officers, of the members of the Legislature, and of
Representatives in Congress, was ordered to be held on November 29th,
and the Legislature were required to meet on December 18th. Governor
David S. Walker was inaugurated on December 21st, and on January 18,
1866, the provisional Governor surrendered the conduct of the State
to the so-called constitutional authorities. At this session of the
Legislature, the Lower House unanimously refused to ratify the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The
military rule which has prevailed in local affairs was relaxed on
April 27, 1866, and all civilians under military arrest were turned
over to the civil authorities for trial.

On April 1, 1867, Major-General Pope assumed command under the act of
Congress of March 2d. On June 18th a superintendent of registration
was appointed, and the conditions for the registration of voters were
prescribed. The result of the registration was 11,148 whites and
15,434 blacks. The election of delegates to the so-called State
Constitutional Convention was held on November 14th, 15th and 16th,
and on January 20, 1868, the Convention assembled, and contained
seventeen blacks as members. A disgraceful quarrel arose in the
Convention, and twenty members absented themselves. The twenty-one
remaining claimed to be a quorum, and formed a Constitution, and
adjourned. The absentees then returned, and, with three or four from
the other side, organized and proceeded to form a Constitution. The
others appeared and claimed their seats. Great disorder prevailed,
but by the intervention of Major-General Meade, and by putting in the
chair his sub-commander, some degree of order was restored, and such
an arrangement effected that the second Constitution was completed.
All the requisite measures under it were adopted, and on June 29th,
the surrender of the so-called government of the State by the
military power of the United States to the civil authority was made.
The political quarrel continued long afterward.

In Alabama the proclamation of President Johnson was issued on June
21, 1865, by which Lewis C. Parsons was appointed provisional
Governor and the usual proceedings prescribed. On July 20th the
Governor issued a proclamation, which renewed the powers of the
persons holding the township offices in the State; called a State
Constitutional Convention to assemble on September 10th, and
reordained the civil and criminal laws, except those relating to
slaves, as they existed previous to 1861, and prescribed other
regulations. A peaceful election was held, and the delegates to the
so-called Convention assembled and took an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States and the Union thereof, and all
proclamations relative to the emancipation of slaves. Slavery was
prohibited, the war debt declared void, and the secession ordinance
repealed. An election for State officers, members of the Legislature,
and Representatives in Congress, was ordered on the first Monday of
November. The new Constitution was not submitted to a vote of the
people on account of the delay it would occasion. Robert M. Patton
was elected Governor, and the Legislature assembled on November 20th.
The amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting
the existence of slavery was ratified, and on December 18, 1865, the
provisional Governor surrendered the conduct of the affairs of the
State to the Governor-elect.

During the existence of the Confederate Government, the Protestant
Episcopal Church South was established, and the prayer for the
President of the United States and all in civil authority, in the
"Book of Common Prayer," was changed to one for the Confederate
authorities. Upon the restoration of the authority of the United
States, the prayer for the President was omitted altogether, by the
recommendation of Bishop Wilmer; whereupon Major-General Woods issued
an order by which the Bishop and all his clergy in the diocese of
Alabama "were suspended from their functions and forbidden to preach
or perform divine service." The order was subsequently set aside by
President Johnson.

At the session of the Legislature in November, 1866, the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution was rejected by an
overwhelming majority.

On assuming command of the Third Military Division under the act of
Congress of March 2, 1867, Major-General Pope assigned Major-General
Swayne to the "administration of the military reconstruction bill" in
Alabama. On April 8th the order directing the proceedings in the
registration of voters was issued. Special instructions were issued,
as in all the other States, to boards of registers which declared
that clerks and reporters of the Supreme Court and inferior courts,
and clerks to ordinary county courts, treasurers, county surveyors,
receivers of tax-returns, tax-collectors, tax-receivers, sheriffs,
justices of the peace, coroners, mayors, recorders, aldermen,
councilmen of any incorporated city or town, who were ex-officers of
the Confederacy, and who, previous to the war, occupied these offices
and afterward participated in the war, were all disqualified and not
entitled to registration. Meantime the municipal officers were
removed in several places, and in the city of Mobile the police
administration was suspended and the maintenance of public order
assumed by the commander of the military force. Finally, the chief
officers and councilmen of the city were removed, and others
appointed by the district commander.

The registration was completed in August, and amounted to 72,748
whites and 88,243 blacks. The vote on the Convention and for
delegates was given on the first three days of October. A hundred
delegates were chosen, of whom ninety-six were "radicals"--seventeen
of them were blacks. On November 5th the so-called Convention
assembled and adopted all the amendments required by the act of
Congress. The election for the ratification of the Constitution, for
State officers, members of the Legislature, and Representatives in
Congress, was held on February 4, 1868. A majority of all the
registered vote was required to ratify the Constitution, which was
85,000. The vote cast was 75,000.

On June 20, 1868, Congress passed an act which declared that each of
the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
Alabama, and Louisiana, should be admitted to representation when its
Legislature had ratified the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and farther, "upon the fundamental condition
that the Constitution of neither of said States shall ever be so
amended or changed as to deprive any citizen, or class of citizens,
of the United States of the right to vote in said State, who are
entitled to vote by the Constitution thereof, herein recognized,
except as a punishment for crime," etc.

The so-called State Legislature assembled on July 13th, and Articles
XIII and XIV as amendments to the Constitution of the United States
were ratified. The conduct of the affairs of the State was now
transferred by General Meade to the new civil authorities.

Mississippi, immediately after the cessation of hostilities, was
occupied by a military force of the United States. Meantime the
Governor called an extra session of the Legislature, and made
provision for a Constitutional Convention; but these measures were
set aside by the proclamation of President Johnson, on June 13th,
appointing William L. Sharkey provisional Governor. The system of
measures embraced in the plan of the President for the restoration of
the Confederate States to the Union was immediately commenced and
completed in the election of Benjamin G. Humphreys for Governor, with
the other State officers, members of the Legislature, and
Representatives in Congress.

The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution was unanimously rejected
by the Legislature in January, 1867.

Under the act of Congress of March 2, 1867, Major-General Ord assumed
command of the Fourth Military Division, consisting of Mississippi
and Arkansas. Governor Humphreys sought immediately to bring the
question of the constitutionality of this act before the United
States Supreme Court. Arguments were heard upon it by the Court. The
motion was to enjoin and restrain President Johnson and Major-General
Ord from executing the act and supplements. It was denied, and
Chief-Justice Chase, on delivering the opinion, said:

"If the President refuses obedience, it is needless to observe that
the Court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other
hand, the President complies with the order of the Court, and refuses
to execute the act of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may
occur between the executive and the legislative departments of the
Government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the
President for such refusal?"

Major-General Ord, immediately after assuming command, proceeded to
organize boards for the registration of voters and prescribe their
qualifications and disqualifications. The latter were so numerous as
to embrace, in all these States, every white who had voluntarily done
the most simple act to aid or favor any person engaged in the
Confederate service, or had incited, by words, others to render such
aid, while the entire class of blacks were not disqualified by such
acts, as it was assumed that they were done by compulsion. Thus the
aim and end of registration, after this manner, in a State, were to
throw the entire political power into the hands of the negroes.

Orders were now issued directing the military to coöperate with the
civil officers to break up the crime of horse-stealing, to secure to
labor its share of the crops, and to protect debtor and creditor from
sacrifices by forced sales; to suspend for a time certain sales under
execution; to prohibit interference with the legal tenant; to
ascertain if distillers had paid their taxes; to investigate
complaints made by citizens of persecution by civil authorities; to
notify State and municipal officers of the laws of Congress for the
organization of their governments on the basis of suffrage without
regard to color; to subordinates of the Freedmen's Bureau to
investigate all charges against landholders; to require supervisors,
inspectors, and boards of registration to obtain the names of
suitable persons, white or black, to act as clerks and judges of
elections; to close strictly all bar-rooms and saloons for the day
when political meetings were held; to remove the city marshal, three
justices of the peace, and four members of the City Council of
Vicksburg; to appoint other persons to fill the vacancies, who were
required to take the test oath of Congress; to forbid the assembling
of bodies of citizens under any pretense; to transfer the papers to a
military commission whenever a person who had been in the Federal
service was indicted and apprehended an unfair trial; to notify
overseers of the poor that any neglect to provide for colored paupers
would be regarded as a neglect of duty, etc.

The roistered names amounted to 46,636 whites and 60,167 blacks. The
military appointment for delegates to the Convention was such as to
give to thirty-two counties, having small colored majorities, seventy
of the representatives, and to twenty-nine counties, having small
white majorities, thirty representatives. On November 5th the
election was held, and the so-called Convention assembled on January
8, 1868. The ordinance of secession was declared null and void; the
existence of slavery prohibited; payment of the war debt forbidden;
universal suffrage established, excepting only criminals; an election
to ratify the Constitution and for the election of State officers, a
Legislature, and Representatives in Congress, was ordered to be held
on June 22d, and a large number of radical amendments adopted. At the
election the Constitution was rejected by a majority of 7,629. The
opposition candidate was also elected Governor.

On October 1, 1867, the Chief-Justice of the State, A. H. Handy, sent
his resignation to the Governor. He said:

"It is apparent that the character and dignity of the Court can not
be maintained, and that its powers must be held and exercised in
subordination to the behests of a military commander."

On December 28, 1867, Major-General Ord was succeeded by
Major-General McDowell. On June 15th the latter issued an order
removing Governor Humphreys and appointing Major-General A. Ames to
the vacancy. Governor Humphreys declined to vacate the office, saying
that the attempt to remove him was a "usurpation of the civil
government of Mississippi, unwarranted by and in violation of the
Constitution of the United States." A squadron of soldiers was sent
by the military commander of the post, which marched in and took
possession of the office. The house of the Governor was then demanded
for the new incumbent of the office. As Governor Humphreys refused to
vacate it, a file of soldiers came and ejected him.

After the rejection of the so-called new Constitution, its friends
applied to Congress, as the sovereign, to throw out the vote of
several counties and declare the Constitution to be adopted. This
action was recommended on the ground, as they said, that the election
had not been fairly conducted, and that violence and intimidation
had, in many parts of the State, prevented a full and just vote. The
Constitution was defeated, not, as thus alleged, by fraud and
intimidation, but distinctly for the reason that it was more
vindictive in its spirit than the people, white or black, would
tolerate, and more prescriptive in its provisions than the acts of
Congress required.

In March, 1869, the provisional Governor of the State, Major-General
A. Ames, was made the military commander of the Fourth Military
District. At the same time a joint resolution was passed by Congress,
which ordered that all persons holding office in Mississippi, who
could not take the test-oath prescribed in 1862, should be removed
from office. By the aid of this weapon it was expected that General
Ames would make the State organization so-called Republican.
Meanwhile Congress passed an act which authorized the President to
submit the Constitution of the State to another election by the
people, with a separate vote on its objectionable section.
Preparations for this election were commenced by the issue of an
order of the military commander prescribing stringent regulations
relative to the requisites of voters for registration. The election
was held on November 30 and December 1, 1869, and the Constitution
was ratified. The vote against disfranchising citizens for serving
under the Confederacy during the war was almost unanimous. The
so-called Legislature assembled on January 11, 1870. The fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments of the United States Constitution were
adopted, and on February 12th an act of Congress was passed by which
the State was permitted to be represented in that body.

At the beginning of 1865 Louisiana was under the State government
constructed by General Banks, as has been stated in previous pages.
It occupied New Orleans, and extended its control to the extremity of
the military lines. Within this limit it was treated practically as a
restored portion of the Union. The United States military draft was
enforced. Much disorder in civil affairs prevailed, and some serious
disturbances occurred up to the time when Congress undertook its plan
of restoration. There was, in fact, a military rule during all that
period. On March 19, 1867, Major-General Sheridan was assigned to the
command of the Fifth Military District, embracing Louisiana and
Texas, in accordance with the act of Congress of March 2d. By this
act the existing State government was "declared to be only
provisional, and subject to be abolished, modified, controlled, or
superseded." Major-General Sheridan began his proceedings with the
removal of certain obnoxious officials who were, in his opinion,
dangerous to the peace of the community. The registration of voters
was ordered to commence on May 1st. To an application to General
Grant, the commander-in-chief, for more definite instructions, by
Major-General Sheridan, the former replied on June 28th:

"Enforce your own construction of the military bill, until ordered to
do otherwise."

The Legislature having appropriated four million dollars for the
repairs of levees, and appointed a board to discharge the duties,
Governor Wells became dissatisfied with their action, and appointed
another board. Disputes arising between the two boards, Major-General
Sheridan removed both, and appointed a third, and enforced its
authority. In April, Major-General Sheridan, writing to General
Grant, said:

"I fear I shall be obliged to remove Governor Wells, of this State,
who is impeding me as much as he can."

General Grant replied:

"I would advise that no removals of Governors of States be made at
present. It is a question now under consideration whether the power
exists, under the law, to remove, except by special act of Congress,
or by trial under the sixth section of the act promulgated in Orders
33 (act of March 2d)."

On June 3d Major-General Sheridan issued an order, removing the
so-called Governor, saying that, "having made himself an impediment
to the faithful execution of the act of Congress of March 2d, by
directly and indirectly impeding the General in command in the
faithful execution of the law," etc., Benjamin F. Flanders was
appointed to fill the vacancy.

The registration ceased on July 31st, with the names of 44,732 whites
and 82,907 blacks. Extensive removals from office were now made--
among others, twenty-two members of the City Council of New Orleans,
also the city treasurer and city surveyor, a justice of peace,
sheriff, etc. On August 17th Major-General Sheridan was relieved, and
Major-General Hancock succeeded. "Impediments to reconstruction under
the laws of Congress" continued to be removed, and other persons
assigned to their places.

The election for delegates to the so-called Convention was held on
September 27th and 28th, and that body assembled on November 23d. The
measures required by the act of Congress were adopted, and an
election for its ratification and for State officers, and a
Legislature, was held on April 17th and 18th. The Constitution was
ratified, and the State officers and members of the Legislature were
elected. Meantime Major-General Hancock was relieved, and succeeded
by Major-General Buchanan.

After the election, the registrars of the State proposed to install
the newly elected officers under the provisions of an ordinance of
the Convention. But they were notified by Major-General Buchanan that
it could not be done without permission. To avoid any question as to
the persons who should hold the offices of so-called Governor and
Lieutenant-Governor after the meeting of the Legislature, the
district commander was directed by General Grant to remove the former
incumbents by military order and set up the individuals lately
elected as their successors. This was done on June 27th, and on the
29th the so-called Legislature assembled in pursuance of a notice
from the commanding General. The fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution was adopted; and, as by the act of Congress of
June 25th, Louisiana had been restored to representation in that
body, the commanding General on July 13, 1868, transferred the
administration of civil affairs to the State officers.

I will not pursue these odious details further. Suffice it to say
that Texas and Arkansas, having passed through the same military
process as their sister Confederate States, were admitted to
representation in Congress, the former in 1870 and the latter in 1868.

It will be seen that the power usurped by Congress was without a
limitation, and extended to all the political, civil, and social
relations. Many of the military commanders seem to have regarded
their authority as equally comprehensive. The Attorney-General of the
United States, in his official opinion on these acts of Congress,
addressed to the President on June 12, 1867, says:

"It appears that some of the military commanders have understood this
grant of power as all-comprehensive, conferring on them the power to
remove the executive and judicial officers of the State, and to
appoint other officers in their places; to suspend the legislative
power of the State; to take under their control, by officers
appointed by themselves, the collection and disbursement of the
revenues of the State; to prohibit the execution of the laws of the
State by the agency of its appointed officers and agents; to change
the existing laws in matters affecting purely civil and private
rights; to suspend or enjoin the execution of the judgments and
decrees of the established State courts; to interfere in the ordinary
administration of justice in the State courts, by prescribing new
qualifications for jurors; and to change, upon the ground of
expediency, the existing relations of the parties to contracts,
giving protection to one party by violating the rights of the other
party."

Many instances are then related by the Attorney-General to confirm
his statements. Some of these are worthy of the attention of the
reader, although they may have been mentioned on a preceding page. In
one district the so-called Governor of a State was deposed under a
threat of military force, and another person, called a Governor,
appointed by the military commander to fill the place--thus
presenting the strange spectacle of an official intrusted with chief
power to execute the laws of a State, whose authority was not
recognized by the laws he was called on to execute.

In the same district a Judge was, by military order, ejected from his
office, and a private citizen was appointed Judge in his place by
military authority, and exercised criminal jurisdiction "over all
crimes, misdemeanors, and offenses" committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. This military appointee was certainly not
authorized, as a member of a military tribunal, to try any one for an
offense; and he had just as little authority, as a Judge of a
criminal court of the State, to try and punish any offender. This
person was sole judge in a criminal court whose jurisdiction extended
to the life of the accused. In capital cases he might well change
places with the criminal, for, if the latter had unlawfully taken
life, so too did the Judge.

In another district, a military order commanded the nominal Governor
of the State to forbid the assembling of the Legislature, and thus
suspended the proper legislative power of the State. In the same
district an order was issued "to relieve the Treasurer of the State
from the duties, bond, books, papers, etc.", appertaining to his
office, and to put an "assistant quartermaster of the United States
Volunteers" in place of the removed Treasurer. The duties of this
quartermaster-treasurer were thus summed up: He was to make to the
headquarters of the district "the same reports and returns required
from the Treasurer, and a monthly statement of the receipts and
expenditures; he will pay all warrants for salaries which may be or
become due, and legitimate expenditures for the support of the
Penitentiary, State Asylum, and the support of the provisional State
government; but no scrip or warrants for outstanding debts of other
kind than those specified, will be paid without special authority
from these Headquarters. He will deposit funds in the same manner as
though they were those of the United States." These instances will
suffice, although many more might be related.

Illegal, unjust, and vindictive as were these gross usurpations of
the Congress of the United States in their immediate results, the
consequences which followed were still more disastrous. When the late
Confederate States were restored to representation in Congress, a
large portion of their white citizens remained disfranchised, and the
political power of each was in the hands of the blacks and the
remnant of the whites. Nor was the military force withdrawn, but it
was placed in convenient localities, under the pretext of maintaining
order, but in reality to sustain the new rulers. It must be manifest
that the sovereignty of the people was now extinct, and those ruled
who had the bayonets on their side. With the disfranchised were the
intelligence, the virtue, and the political experience; with the
voters were the ignorance, the lawless passions, and soon a body of
political adventurers from the Northern States, greedy for power and
plunder. These quickly won for themselves the distinctive epithet of
"carpet-baggers". The governments under the control of such popular
sovereigns demonstrated the vindictiveness rather than wisdom of
Congress, and soon brought forth their natural fruits of anarchy,
fraud, and crime. One or two examples must suffice in which to
exhibit these results.

The debt of the ten Confederate States in 1874 was as follows:

Virginia, funded and unfunded . . . . . . . . $45,718,119.73
North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38,921,848.05
South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,866,627.35
Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,620,809.27
Georgia . . . . . . . . $8,105,500 funded
8,000,000 fraudulent 16,105,500.00
Alabama $10,452,593.30
15,051,000.00 railroad endorsement 15,503,593.30
Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,558,629.24
Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,933,407.90
Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,012,421.00
Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,561,000.00
---------------
$148,801,955.80

It is not claimed that all this amount of indebtedness had been
accumulated since the close of the war. Some of the States had debts
previous to the war, but a large proportion of the amount had been
contracted by the spendthrift governments instituted by Congress, and
very little could be found to offset the expenditure.

Again, in Arkansas, on April 16th, Governor Brooks seized and
occupied the State-House with a body of armed men and two cannon. On
the same day, Governor Baxter proclaimed martial law, and marched
with a body of armed men from St. John's College to the Anthony
House, and established his headquarters there. Guards were placed
along the principal streets, and the State-House was completely
surrounded by a cordon of sentinels. Subsequently, he marched to
attack the State-House, but a body of troops belonging to the
Government of the United States appeared before it. Two so-called
Republican Governors of the State, with their troops, were about to
fight for the executive office.

In Louisiana, on January 4, 1875, a body of troops of the Government
of the United States, on the order of Governor W. P. Kellogg, marched
into the hall of the House of Representatives of the State
Legislature, while that body was in session, and forcibly seized and
took out five members as not entitled to seats. The General in
command (De Trobriand) then proceeded to eject the Clerk, and
arrested the proceedings of the House. When expostulated with by the
Speaker, he replied: "I am but a soldier. These are my orders." The
members then retired.

In Mississippi, on December 7, 1874, a serious conflict occurred in
Vicksburg between whites and blacks, which resulted in great loss of
life and caused a widely-spread alarm. It grew out of frauds
committed by public officers.

Again, during the exciting contest in Arkansas, the Congress of the
United States appointed a committee to investigate the affairs in
that State, and "whether said State had now a government republican
in form, the officers of which are duly elected, and, as now
organized, ought to be recognized by the Government of the United
States."

On December 24, 1874, the Congress of the United States appointed a
committee to proceed to New Orleans, and investigate the state of
affairs in Louisiana. This committee reported on January 14, 1875,
that "they could not agree upon any recommendation; but, upon the
situation in Louisiana, as it appeared before us, we are all agreed."

The same Congress, before its adjournment, appointed a committee to
proceed to Mississippi and make an investigation of the state of
affairs there. Thus committees were kept quite busy in traveling back
and forth to these States, and much of the time of Congress was
occupied in discussing their affairs, and in efforts to reconcile the
quarreling factions of so-called Republicans in them, to the great
detriment of the public interests.

Where now were the unalienable rights of man, and sovereignty of the
people, with their safeguards; a Constitution with limited powers,
the reserved rights of the States, and the supremacy of law equally
over both rulers and ruled? All were gone.

It will be seen that, through all these proceedings, the Government
of the United States controlled as the sovereign, and sovereignty of
the people was extinct. The measures adopted were those prescribed by
the Government of the United States; and, subordinate to these and
subject to the conditions of these, such others were permitted as the
necessities of the people required. Affairs were not in such disorder
when the Constitution of the United States was adopted. The uppermost
then had come to be the undermost now, and that which was nothing
then had grown to be over all now. Will it always be thus? Was the
inherent sovereignty of the people destroyed by shot and shell?

The intelligent reader must perceive that this invasion of the
natural and unalienable rights of man, the subjugation of the
sovereignty of the people, the monstrous usurpations of powers not
granted in the Constitution, the trampling under foot of the reserved
rights of the States, the disregard of the supremacy of law, and the
assumption of the sovereignty of the Government of the United States
as the corner-stone of our future political edifice, is a revolution
in our system of Government, deep-seated, reaching to the
foundations, and sending the poisonous waters of despotism throughout
all the branches fed from this fountain. The Confederate States
resisted it from the beginning. They drew their swords for the
sovereignty of the people, and they fought for the maintenance of
their State governments in all their reserved rights and powers, as
the only true and natural guardians of the unalienable rights of
their citizens, among which the most sacred is, that only the consent
of the governed can give vitality and existence to any civil or
political institution.

This overthrow of the rights of freemen and the establishment of such
new relations required a complete revolution in the principle of the
government of the United States, the subversion of the State
governments, the subjugation of the people, and the destruction of
the fraternal Union. The work has been done. Will it stand? Have the
eternal principles of the Declaration of Independence been hid from
our sight for ever? Or, will they again come forth, "redeemed,
disenthralled, regenerated," and rally the reunited people to shout
in thunder-tones for sovereignty of the people and the unalienable
rights of man?

It has been shown in previous pages that the State governments were
instituted to be the special guardians of these unalienable rights of
man; but henceforth they must be the sworn defenders of the
Government of the United States, not of the Constitution and laws
enacted in pursuance thereof, but of such interpolations and
perversions of them as, in cases of necessity, that Government should
find it convenient to make. Whenever it pleases, it can set them
aside; and, whenever it wills, it can destroy them. Unalienable
rights are unknown to this war-begotten theory of the Constitution.
The day has come in which mankind behold this Government founding its
highest claims to greatness and glory upon deeds done in utter
violation of those rights which belonged to its own citizens in every
State, North and South. The palladium of the freeman, the Bills of
Rights, the limitations of power, the written Constitutions, have all
lost their sacred authority, and not a man or a State dare,
single-handed, gainsay the will of the agency which, feeling power,
has forgotten right. It has put its hand on the ballot-box, and the
declaration is made that it is not safe to trust the people to vote,
except under the inspection of its authority, after the example set
by the Roman emperors. When the cause was lost, what cause was it?
Not that of the South only, but the cause of constitutional
government, of the supremacy of law, of the natural rights of man.

[Footnote 131: This incident in the conduct of the Judge recalls a like
exhibition of judicial purity and independence which occurred in the
colonial history of South Carolina, and which I present by extracts
from the charge of Judge William Henry Drayton, delivered November,
1774. Referring to the nature of the civil liberties of the Carolina
colonists, he said: "This is the distinguishing character: English
people can not be taxed, nay, they can not be bound by any law unless
by their consent, expressed by themselves or their representatives of
their own election. This colony was settled by English subjects; by a
people from England herself--a people who brought over with them,
who planted in this colony, and who transmitted to posterity the
invaluable rights of _Englishmen_--rights which no time, no
contract, no climate can diminish. . . . By all the ties which
mankind hold most dear and sacred; your reverence to your ancestors;
your love to your own interests; your tenderness to your posterity;
by the lawful obligations of your oath, I charge you to do your duty;
to maintain the laws, the rights, the Constitution of your country,
even at the hazard of your lives and fortunes.

"Some county judges style themselves the King's servants, a style
which sounds harshly in my ears, inasmuch as the being a servant
implies obedience to the orders of the master, and such judges might
possibly think that, in the present situation of American affairs, my
charge is inconsistent with my duty to the King. But for my part, in
my judicial character, I know no master but the law; I am a servant,
not to the King, but to the Constitution." . . . In the course of his
charge, he quotes a "learned judge" as saying: "Every new tribunal
erected for the decision of facts, without the intervention of a
jury, is a step toward aristocracy, the most oppressive of absolute
governments; and it is therefore a duty which every man owes to his
country, his friends, his posterity, and himself, to maintain to the
utmost of his power this valuable Constitution in all its rights, to
restore it to its ancient dignity, if at all impaired; to amend it
wherever it is defective, and, above all, to guard with the most
jealous circumspection against the introduction of new and arbitrary
methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausible pretenses, may
in time perceptibly undermine this best preservative of English
liberty."--("American Archives," Fourth Series, vol. i, pp. 959,
960.)]

CONCLUSION.

My first object in this work was to prove, by historical authority,
that each of the States, as sovereign parties to the compact of
Union, had the reserved power to secede from it whenever it should be
found not to answer the ends for which it was established. If this
has been done, it follows that the war was, on the part of the United
States Government, one of aggression and usurpation, and, on the part
of the South, was for the defense of an inherent, unalienable right.

My next purpose was to show, by the gallantry and devotion of the
Southern people, in their unequal struggle, how thorough was their
conviction of the justice of their cause; that, by their humanity to
the wounded and captives, they proved themselves the worthy
descendants of chivalric sires, and fit to be free; and that, in
every case, as when our army invaded Pennsylvania, by their respect
for private rights, their morality and observance of the laws of
civilized war, they are entitled to the confidence and regard of
mankind.

The want of space has compelled me to omit a notice of many noble
deeds, both of heroic men and women. The roll of honor, merely, would
fill more than the pages allotted to this work. To others, who can
say _cuncta quorum vidi_, I must leave the pleasant task of paying
the tribute due to their associate patriots.

In asserting the right of secession, it has not been my wish to
incite to its exercise: I recognize the fact that the war showed it
to be impracticable, but this did not prove it to be wrong; and, now
that it may not be again attempted, and that the Union may promote
the general welfare, it is needful that the truth, the whole truth,
should be known, so that crimination and recrimination may for ever
cease, and then, on the basis of fraternity and faithful regard for
the rights of the States, there may be written on the arch of the
Union, _Esto perpetua_.

Note.--The publishers are responsible for the orthography of these
volumes.

[Illustration: Map of Yorktown & Williamsburg, Virginia]
[Illustration: Map of Operations in Kentucky and Tennessee]
[Illustration: Map of Battle of Gettysburg]

INDEX TO VOL. II.

_Abandonment of the Peninsula_, recommended by General J. E.
Johnston, 86; a defensive position nearer to Richmond proposed, 86;
the question discussed in a conference of officers, 87; plan of
General Johnston, 87; concentration of all troops, 87; objections,
87; not adopted, 87; measures determined on, 87.

ADAMS, JOHN QUINCY, Secretary of State, correspondence with the
British Secretary of State relative to the deportation of slaves in
war, 8, 9; on the restoration of slaves captured in war, 163; says
private property, including slaves, can not be taken by the usages of
war, 170.

_Agents of the State of New York_ to take the vote of her soldiers at
the Presidential election, 492; seized with the votes and locked up
in prison by the orders of the Government of the United States, 492;
the description of the imprisonment, 493.

_Aggressions_, the authors of, having acquired power, were eager for
the spoils of victory, 160; the series of, about to be consummated,
182.

_Alabama_, the cruiser, her condition when leaving Liverpool, 250.

_Alarm at Washington_, created by the operations of Jackson in the
Shenandoah Valley, 105.

ALDRICH, Judge A. P., arrested, 741; removed by a military officer,
744.

ANDERSON, General G. B., in command at Sharpsburg, 336.

ANDERSON, General J. R., placed in observation before General
McDowell be fore Fredericksburg, 101.

ANDERSON, General R. H., in command at Sharpsburg, 336.

_Andersonville_, occasion for its selection for the confinement of
prisoners of war, 596; its location, 596; preparations, 596;
treatment, 597.

_Anomaly among Governments_, the Government of the United States, 453.

_Arkansas_, proceedings to institute a State Government inaugurated
by order of President Lincoln, 302; his order, 303; the State
Constitution amended by assumption, or by assuming it to be amended,
303; movements in the northern part of the State, 304; further
proceedings, 304; vote for Article XIII of the United States
Constitution, 304; fraud triumphant, 304.

_Arkansas, The ram_, fight at the mouth of the Yazoo, 242; enters the
Mississippi and runs through the enemy's fleet, 242; description of
the vessel, 243; destined for attack on Baton Rouge, 243; failure of
her engines, 244.

_Arms and munitions of war_ manufactured in the United States for
Turkey in her late war with Russia, 276.

_Army of Northern Virginia_, changes of position before Richmond,
101; re turns to the vicinity of Richmond after McClellan reached
Westover, 152.

_Army of Tennessee_ under General A. S. Johnston, its strength after
fall of Donelson, 39; moves to Murfreesboro, 39; its concentration,
39; joins Beauregard at Corinth, 39.

_Army of the United States_, new generals assigned to command, and
new departments created, 18; under General McClellan--its size when
reported to be crippled for want of reënforcements, 106; size of our
army, 106.

_Army of Virginia_, order of President Lincoln creating, 135; the
commander, and the forces, 135.

ASHBY, General TURNER, commands rear-guard, 112; attacked by
Fremont's cavalry, 112; killed, 112; remarks of General Jackson, 112.

_Assertion, An_, often made during the war, 451.

_Atlanta, The_, a cruiser's name changed to Tallahassee, 265;
commanded by Commander John Taylor Wood, 265; her cruise along the
New England coast, 265.

_Atlanta_ evacuated by General Hood, 563; surrendered by the Mayor to
General Sherman, with the promise that non-combatants and private
property should be respected, 563; Order of Sherman directing all
civilians, mole and female, living in Atlanta to leave the city
within five days from September 5th, 564; Vain appeals of the Mayor
and corporate authorities for a modification of the order, 561; reply
of Sherman, 564.

_Atrocities of the war_: letter of the President to General Lee, 315;
In the Shenandoah Valley, 531; retaliation of General Early, 531;
Butler's proceedings in New Orleans, 232; Pope's military orders in
Virginia, 313; Sherman's expulsion of the inhabitants of Atlanta,
564; march to Savannah, 570; Sherman's burning of Columbia, 627; the
order of President Lincoln to military commanders, 588; order of
General Pope, 588; letter of General Lee to General Halleck, 589;
efforts of General Hunter to inaugurate a servile war, 589:
proceedings of Brigadier-General Phelps, 589; do. of General Butler,
589; extracts from the official report of Major-General Butler to the
Committee on the Conduct of the War relative to the exchange of
prisoners, 603; extract from the message to the Confederate Congress,
in August, 1862, 707; do. in January, 1863, 707; varied stages of the
war, 708; atrocities of Major-General Hunter in the Shenandoah
Valley, 709; statement of Rev. John Bachman of the devastations of
the enemy in South Carolina, 710-715.

_Attrition, The policy of_, can hardly be regarded as generalship, or
be offered to military students as an example worthy of imitation,
526.

BACHMAN, Rev. Dr. JOHN, statement of the devastations of the enemy in
South Carolina, 710-715.

BANKS, Major-General N. P., exclamation of relief on his escape from
Jackson across the Potomac, 106; succeeds General Butler at New
Orleans, 289; expedition into the Red River country, 541; his force,
543; battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, 543, 544; obtains cotton
in the Red River country, 545.

BARKSDALE, Brigadier-General WILLIAM, commands the force placed at
Fredericksburg to resist the enemy's crossing, 353.

BARRON, Captain SAMUEL, commands at Hatteras Inlet, 77; is bombarded
by the enemy's fleet, and capitulates, 77.

BARRY, Colonel WILLIAM S., commander of the burial party at Corinth,
390; his reception by General Rosecrans, 390.

_Baton Rouge_, its importance, 243; occupied by the enemy, 243;
attacked, 244; failure of entire success by the breakdown of the ram
Arkansas, 244.

_Battalion of cadets_, their services at Richmond, 665.

BEAUREGARD, General P. G. T., takes command in West Tennessee, 51;
moves to Corinth, 51; states cause of delay of movements toward
Shiloh, 55; report of result of first day's battle of Shiloh, 60; his
force at Corinth, 73; his estimate of the enemy, 73; retreats to
Tupelo, 74; declines to let Bragg go to Mississippi, 74; his health.
74; certificates of his physicians, 74; transfers the command to
General Bragg and retires to Bladen Springs. 75; statement of the
case, 765 in command near Drury's Bluff, 511; interview with the
President, 511; position of the forces, 512; movements of the enemy,
513; the affair at Drury's bluff, 513; his proposal for a campaign,
514; assigned to the military division of the West, 566; retreats
toward North Carolina, 630; decides to march to the eastern part of
the State, 630; effect of this move, 630; modifies his proposed
movement, 631.

_Beaver Dam_, its naturally strong position near Mechanicsville, 134;
engagement near, 134.

_Belligerents_--in no instance from the opening to the close of the
war did the United States Government speak of us as belligerents,
278; why was it? 278; the signification of the word, combined with
existing circumstances, expressed something it was in no degree
willing to admit before the world, 278; its war was against the
people within the limits of the Confederate States, and were they a
mob or organized political communities? 279; then it was a war
against the States which the world could not justify, 279; opinion of
Justice Green, of the United States Supreme Court, 281; case of the
Santissima Trinidad, 281.

BENJAMIN, JUDAH P., Secretary, letter to General A. S. Johnston, 40;
report on the proceedings of Generals Floyd and Pillow requested, 40.

_Berwick Bay_, capture of the works of the enemy at, 419; the spoils
taken, 419.

_Big Black_ River railroad-bridge, topographical features of the
position, 409; results of the retreat of Pemberton from, 410.

BLAIR, FRANCIS P., visits Richmond, 612; conversation with the
President, 612; letter given to him, 615; answer of Mr. Lincoln, 615;
return of Mr. Blair, 616 his statements, 616; further movements, 617;
his visit, 618.

_Blockade The_, its effect upon English manufactures, 344;
intervention of the Governments of France and England to alleviate
the distress, 344; the passiveness of neutral Europe relative to,
373; other blockades compared, 373; facts shown relative to our
ports, 374; Great Britain assumes to make a change in the principles
announced at Paris, 375; dispatch of the British Minister, 375;
illustration of the importance of this change, 375; other matters
injurious to us, 376; letters of the British Government to United
States, 379, 380; marked encouragement given to persevere in the
blockade, 380; statement of the British Government as to the blockade
of the Southern ports, 381; further facts, 381.

BOWEN, General JOHN S., detached from Vicksburg to Grand Gulf, 397;
retreats toward Grand Gulf, 399; one of the best soldiers of the
Confederate service, 416.

_Bowling Green_, position of General A. S. Johnston's center turned,
36; the consequences, 36, 37; its evacuation, 37.

BRAGG, General BRAXTON, commands a division of Beauregard's forces in
West Tennessee, 51; sent from Pensacola, 54; account of Johnston's
efforts, 54; commands a corps at battle of Shiloh, 55; statement of
affairs at battle of Shiloh, 59; ordered to command the department
under General Lovell, 74; Beauregard declines to permit his departure
owing to ill health, 74; receives the command from Beauregard, 75;
report of subsequent proceedings, 75; advances from Tupelo and
occupies Chattanooga, 382; marches from Chattanooga and enters
Kentucky, 383; passes to the rear of General Buell in Middle
Tennessee, 383; thus relieves north Alabama and Middle Tennessee from
the presence of the enemy, 383; issues an address to the people of
Kentucky, 383; gives battle to the enemy at Perryville, 383; losses,
384; falls back before reënforcements to the enemy, 384; takes
position at Murfreesboro, 384; begins the conflict at Murfreesboro,
385; its result, 385; falls back to Tullahoma, 385; takes a position
south of Chattanooga, 429; his movements, 429; concentrates at
Chickamauga, 429; forms his line of battle, 430; the conflict,
431-433.

_Brazil_, Government of, demands the restoration of the cruiser
Florida, 262; letter of Mr. Seward, 262.

BRECKINRIDGE, Brigadier-General JOHN C, commands a corps at battle of
Shiloh, 55; commands the attack at Baton Rouge, 244; commands in
south-western Virginia, 527; his movements and skirmishes, 528;
ordered to Hanover Junction, 528; returns, 529.

BRENT, Major, attacks and captures the gunboat Indianola, 241.

BROWN, Commander, commands the ram Arkansas, 242.

BROWN, Major, report of the surrender of Fort Donelson, 34.

BUCHANAN, Captain FRANKLIN, commands the Virginia, 196; fight at
Hampton Roads, 197; commands the ironclad Tennessee in the conflict
in Mobile Bay, 206.

BUCKNER, General SIMON, commands a division at Fort Donelson, 29; in
command at Knoxville, 426.

BUELL, General D. C, assigned to command in Kentucky, 18; his
threatening position, 38; his force after fall of Donelson, 39; moves
his army to join Grant at Pittsburg Landing, 54; progress of his
advance, 54; statement of the condition of Grant's army after the
battle of Shiloh, 70; retreats from Nashville to Louisville, fearing
for the safety of the latter city, 383.

BULLOCK, Captain JAMES D., his integrity and efficiency as naval
agent at Liverpool, 248.

_Burglary_, the State government throws its shield over the citizen
for his protection against, 452.

BURNSIDE, General AMBROSE, commands expedition against the coast of
North Carolina, 79; succeeds McClellan in command of the army, 351;
attempts to throw bridges across the river be fore Fredericksburg,
352; finally crosses and lays his bridges, 353; attacks our army,
354; is repulsed, 355; withdraws, 356; losses, 356; the causes he
assigned for his failure, 356; subsequent inactivity of his army,
357; removed from command, 357.

BUTLER, General B. F., commands expedition against the coast of North
Carolina, 79; advances to New Orleans, 223; a reign of terror
follows, 232; lands at Bermuda Hundred, 507; makes a raid to Chester,
508; compelled to withdraw, 508; moves out again to Fort Walthal
Junction, 511; repulsed by troops of General Beauregard from
Charleston, 511; commissioner for the exchange of prisoners, 598.

_Captures on the high seas_, the position taken by Washington and
Jefferson in 1793, 270.

CAMPBELL, JOHN A., appointed to confer with Mr. Lincoln, 617.

_Cause, The_, that was lost. What cause was it? 763.

_Cedar Creek_, Early's battle with the enemy at, 538-540.

_Cedar Run_, its location, 317; the battle at, 317, 319; the forces,
317; losses, 319.

_Chambersburg, Pennsylvania_, retaliatory measures inflicted on, 531,
532.

_Chancellorsville_, forces of the enemy converge near, from the fords
of the Rapidan, 357; Anderson's rear-guard attacked by cavalry, 357;
Lee moves toward, 358; turns the enemy's right, 358; a position of
great natural strength assumed by the enemy, 358; his lines, 358,
359; effort to turn his right flank and gain his rear, 359; to be
done by Jackson with three divisions, 359; success of the movement,
359, 360; the attack in front, 360; Jackson wounded, 360; battle
renewed next day, 361; the enemy retreats toward the Rappahannock,
361; strengthens his position, 361; attack from Fredericksburg on
Lee's rear, 362, 363; battle near Salem Church, 363; attack renewed
on Hooker, 364; enemy recross the river, 364; losses, 364; strength,
365; a brief and forcible account of the battle, 365, 366.

_Change of plans_, necessary after the fall of Fort Donelson, 39.

"_Change of base_," by McClellan, explanation of, by the Comte de
Paris, 104.

_Charge_, against the Government of the United States, 454.

_Charleston Harbor_, the Confederate naval force in, 204; its
strength and efficiency, 204; exploit of the ironclads Palmetto State
and Chicora, 206; number of torpedoes in the harbor, 208; evacuated
by General Hardee, 629; occupied by the enemy's forces, 630;
condition of Fort Sumter, 630.

_Chattanooga_, Grant arrives after the battle of Chickamauga and
assumes command, 434; his description of the situation, 434; his
operations, 435; movements of General Hooker, 435; arrival of
Sherman, 435; attack made by the whole force of the enemy's center,
436; get possession of rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge,
and commence the ascent of the mountain, 436; our forces withdraw,
436; losses, 436; occupied by the enemy, 429.

_Chickahominy River_, its character and course, 122; rising from
heavy rains, 124; position of General Sumner, 124.

_Chickamauga_, Bragg concentrates at, 429; forms his line of battle,
430; commencement of the contest, 430; movements of the forces, 431;
Confederate troops engaged, 431; Bragg reorganizes his command, 432;
strength of the opposing forces, 432; Bragg's order of battle, 432;
movement of troops, 433; enemy yields along the whole line, 433;
withdraws at night, 433; his losses, 433.

CHILTON, Colonel R H., remarks on the talents of General Lee,
displayed in the preparation and command of his army, 129.

_Cincinnati_, alarm at the approach of General E. K. Smith, 382.

_Citizens_, Southern, confined in cells to await the punishment of
piracy, 2; peaceful, an indiscriminate warfare waged upon, 2.

_Citizen's life_, is it in danger? the State guarantees protection,
451; his personal liberty is guaranteed by the State, 451; his
property guaranteed from unlawful seizure and destruction by the
State, 452.

_Citizenship and the ballot_ is wholly within the control of each
State, 729; efforts of Congress to wrest it from each Confederate
State to confer on the negroes, 729.

_Civil government in Maryland_, overthrown by the military force of
the United States, 461.

_Clarence, The_, fitted out as a tender to the Florida, 261.

CLEBURNE, Major-General, killed at the battle of Franklin, 577.

_Coast defenses_, the system adopted, 78; topography of the coast,
78; description of the fortifications constructed, 79; several points
captured by the enemy, 79; state of affairs when General Lee assumed
command of the Department of the Carolinas and Florida, 80; his plans
for coast defenses, 80; the system he organized, 80; its success, 81.

COBB, General HOWELL, arranges a cartel for the exchange of prisoners
with General Wool, 587.

COLBURN, Colonel, captured at Spring Hill by Generals Van Dorn and
Forrest, 426.

_Cold Harbor_, fearful carnage of Grant's soldiers, 524; they
sullenly and silently decline to renew the assault, 524.

_Columbia, South Carolina_, approach of General Sherman's army, 627;
the Mayor surrenders the city, 627; infamous disregard of the
established rules of war, 627; the city burned, 627; attributed by
Sherman to an order of General Hampton to burn the cotton, 627;
denied by General Hampton, 627; his letter, 628; other atrocities of
Sherman's army, 629.

_Columbus, Kentucky_, threatened by the enemy, 18.

_Combinations of insurrectionists,_ the Southern people declared to
be, by the United States Government, 2.

_Conciliatory terms_ offered by the Governor of a State for the sake
of peace, rejected by the United States Government, 2.

_Confederate Government_, early efforts to buy ships, 245; the
lawfulness of its maritime acts demonstrated, 269; its acts relative
to cruisers sustained and justified by international law, 274; by the
interpretations of American jurists, 274; by antecedent acts of the
United States Government, 274; instances, 275, 276.

_Confederate States_ regarded by United States Government as in the
Union, 177; yet deprived of all the protections of the Constitution,
177; all their conduct pertaining to the war consisted in just
efforts to preserve to themselves and their posterity rights and
protections guaranteed in the Constitution, 178; their sagacity
vindicated by President Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, 190.

_Confederate States, The final subjugation of_: when the Confederate
soldiers laid down their arms and went home, all hostilities against
the power of the United States Government ceased, 718; the result of
the contest, 718; a simple process of restoration, 718; rejected by
the United States Government, 718; a forced union, 719; the amnesty
proclamation of President Johnson, 719; the oath required to be
taken, 719; large classes of citizens excluded, 720; its
stipulations, 720; the reason for them, 720; the Government of the
United States proceeds to establish State organizations based on the
principle of its own sovereignty, 720; terms of the next
proclamation, 720; the argument it contained examined, 721; the four
propositions, 721; a provisional Governor appointed for each
Confederate State,723; his duties, 723; to secure a convention to
alter the State Constitution according to the views of the Government
of the United States, 723; instructions to the military authorities,
724; the first movement in Virginia, 724; the so-called Governor,
Francis H. Pierpont, brought from Alexandria and established at
Richmond, 724; new Legislature elected, 726; acts passed, 726; the
amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibiting the
existence of slavery, 726; interference of the military officers of
the United States Government with the administration of civil
affairs, 726; a case under the Civil Rights Bill, 726; a storm
brewing between the President and Congress, relative to affairs of
Confederate States, 726; the plan of the President left the negroes
to the care of the States, Congress desired them to be American
citizens and voters, 726; Congress refused to admit Senators and
Representatives elect from the Confederate States to arrest the
operation of the President's plan and hold these States in abeyance,
727; proceedings of Congress, 727; a Committee of Fifteen appointed,
727; the Freedmen's Bureau Act, 727; the Civil Rights Act, 727; the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, 723; the
adoption of this amendment by a State Legislature required before its
Senators and Representatives could take seats in Congress, 729; the
question really involved in this amendment, 729; to force from the
State citizenship and the ballot for the negroes, 729; rejected by
Virginia, 729; a new system of measures now adopted by Congress, 730;
the fiction upon which they were based, 730; Confederate States
divided into five military districts, 730; the States held as
conquered territory. 730; possessing no rights unless granted by the
will of the conqueror, 730; terms upon which they could become
members of the Union, 731; supplement to this act requiring
registration of voters, etc., 731; two distinct governments in each
State, one military, the other civil, 732; the military commanders,
732; a second supplement, 732; words of President Johnson on vetoing
the bill, 732; Major-General Schofield assumes command in Richmond,
733; a board of army officers appointed to designate officers for the
registration of voters, 733; interference of the military with civil
and social affairs, 733; military officers appointed over
sub-districts, 734; military regulations adopted, 734; the vote
taken, 734; the so-called Convention assembles, 734; Bill of Bights
adopted, 734; amendments, 735; test-oath of Congress adopted, 735; so
stringent that in some counties men could not be found capable of
filling the offices, 735; words of General Schofield, 735; utter
subjugation of the people of Virginia manifest, 736; President Grant
authorized to submit the stringent amendments to a vote of the people
of the State, by Congress, 736; all the amendments to the United
States Constitution passed by the so-called Legislature, 736; the
Senators and Representatives allowed to take seats in Congress, 737.

The same series of measures applied in the same order to each
Confederate State, 738; in North Carolina the military commander
issues an order declaring all slaves to be free, 738; other orders,
738; Constitutional Convention, 738; secession ordinance declared
void, 738; payment of the war debt prohibited, 738; Governor elected
and inaugurated, 739; the military commander orders the stay of all
proceedings for the collection of debts, 739; proceedings under the
measures of Congress, 739; so-called Constitutional Convention and
election, 739; the Governor surrenders his office because he has not
power strong enough to keep it, 739; his protest, 740; Constitutional
amendments adopted, 740; Senators and Representatives take seats in
Congress, 740.

Proceedings in South Carolina, 740; provost-marshals and military
courts detailed for duty all over the State 741; the officers knew
only martial law, 741; interference of the military commander with
the judges of the State courts, 741; the arrest of Judge A. P,
Aldrich, 741; a criminal rescued from the sentence of the law by
military force, 741; the Judge refuses to hold his court, 742; the
State divided into ten military districts, 743; a post-commander
appointed to each, 743; all local officers appointed by the
commanders, 743; military orders issued, 743; details of
registration,743; qualifications of jurors such as to include newly
emancipated slaves, 744; in conflict with the jury law of the State,
744; proceedings of Judge Aldrich, 744; is suspended from office,
744; opens his court, states the circumstances, and declares it
adjourned so long as justice was stifled, 744; a similar instance in
the colonial history of South Carolina, 744; proceedings under the
acts of Congress, and the results, 745.

In Georgia, the Governor, on the cessation of hostilities, called a
session of the Legislature, 745; the commanding General declares the
proclamation null and void, 745; message to the Governor from the
President of the United States, 746; charged with committing a fresh
crime by his act, 746; proceedings under the provisional Governor,
746; these set aside by the military commander of Congress, 747; an
unsuccessful effort to test the constitutionality of the acts of
Congress, 747; the Governor took part in the effort, 747; called to
an account by the military commander as violating an order of the
latter, 747; the matter of jurors, 747; Judge Reese prohibited from
holding court, 747; proceedings under the acts of Congress, 747;
conflict of the Treasurer and Governor with the military commander,
747; both removed from office by the latter and others appointed,
748; the so-called Convention requests the commanding General to
require the courts to enforce certain of its regulations, 748; one of
the Judges of the Supreme Court refuses, and is removed, 748; other
proceedings completed, and the State declared to be restored to the
Union, 748; it appeared some of the measures were defective as to
giving the ballot to the negro, 748; members of the Legislature
expelled, 748; the State held in abeyance by Congress, 748.

In Florida, the proceedings commenced and completed under President
Johnson's proclamation, 748, 749; all set aside by the military
commander under the acts of Congress, 749; a so-called Constitutional
Convention assembles, 749; a disgraceful quarrel and split ensue,
749; the majority form a Constitution, 749; the minority, with some
members of the majority, form another, 749; the commanding General
puts his sub-commander in the chair, and the latter Constitution is
adopted, 749; all requisite measures adopted, 749; the State restored
to the Union, 750.

In Alabama, the proceedings under President Johnson's proclamation
were completed, and State officers elected, 750; the commanding
General suspends the Protestant Episcopal bishop and his clergy from
their functions, and forbids to preach or perform divine service,
750; the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
rejected by an overwhelming majority, 751; proceedings commenced
under the acts of Congress, 751; military orders issued, 751; all
civil officers whatever, who were ex-officers of the Confederacy,
removed and disqualified from registration, 751; municipal officers
removed, 751; police administration suspended in Mobile, 751;
registration completed, 751; Congress declares the condition upon
which North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and
Louisiana shall be admitted to the Union, 752; amendments to the
United States Constitution adopted, 752; conduct of affairs
transferred to the civil authorities, 752.

In Mississippi, the Governor calls an extra session of the
Legislature, 752; set aside by a proclamation of President Johnson,
752; the system of measures under President Johnson's plan completed,
752; the military commander assumes command, under the acts of
Congress, 752; the question of the constitutionality of the acts
brought before the United States Supreme Court, 752; the opinion of
Chief-Justice Chase, 753; boards of registration organized, 753;
disqualifications of voters most sweeping, 753; object to throw the
entire political power into the hands of the negroes, 753; vast
number of military orders issued, 755; public local officers removed,
and others appointed in their places, 753; the Constitution rejected
by a large majority, 754; the Chief-Justice resigns, 764; his
reasons, 754; the Governor removed, and another appointed by the
military commander, 754; the former refuses to retire, 764; a squad
of soldiers sent to dispossess him, 754; ejected from his house by a
file of soldiers, 754; cause of the rejection of the Constitution,
755; Congress authorizes the President of the United States to submit
the Constitution to another election by the people, 756; sweeping
disqualifications of voters ordered, 755; Constitution ratified, 755;
the constitutional amendments adopted, 755; the State permitted to be
represented in Congress, 755.

Louisiana continues under the government set up by General Banks,
756; the military commander under the acts of Congress assumes
command, 756; the existing government declared to be only provisional
and subject to be abolished, modified, controlled, or superseded,756;
officers removed, 756; registration ordered, 756; the military
commander fears he shall be obliged to remove Governor Wells, 756;
correspondence with General Grant, 756; the Governor removed and
another appointed, 756; twenty-two members of the City Councils of
New Orleans removed, 757; Sheriff, City Treasurer, Surveyor, justice
of peace removed, 757; declared to be "impediments to reconstruction,"
757; newly elected officers not allowed to be installed without
permission of the commanding General, 757; the Governor and
Lieutenant-Governor by military order, now removed, those newly elected
set up by the military commander, 757; all requisitions complied with,
757.

Texas and Arkansas passed through the same military process as their
sister Confederate States, 757.

Usurpations of the military commanders, 758; regarded their authority
as comprehensive as the usurpations of Congress, 758; declaration of
United States Attorney-General, 758; instances related, 758, 759; the
disastrous consequences that followed, 759; increase of the debts of
these States, 760; in Arkansas two so-called Republican Governors of
the State with their troops about to fight for the Executive office,
761; in Louisiana a body of troops enter the Legislature in session
and take out five members, 761; in Mississippi a bloody conflict
between whites and blacks, 761; a committee of Congress sent to
Arkansas to "inquire if the State had a government republican in
form," 761; a committee of Congress sent to New Orleans to
investigate the state of affairs, 761; a like committee sent to
Mississippi, 761; where were the unalienable rights of men and the
sovereignty of the people with their safeguards? 762; when the cause
was lost, what cause was it? 763.

_Conference_ of Generals A. S. Johnston and Beauregard after the loss
of Forts Henry and Donelson, 36; conclusions, 36.

_Confiscation Act of the United States Congress_, provisions of one
of its most indicative sections, 6; a forfeiture of all claim to
persons held to service, 6; conceded that Congress had no power over
slavery, 6; one of the reserved powers of the States, 7; a
reservation equally in time of war and in peace, 7; forfeiture for
treason does not touch the case, 7; a conviction by trial must
precede forfeiture, 7; the forfeiture can be only during life, 7:
final freedom to slaves can not be thus obtained, 7; other
limitations, 7; due process of law not an act of Congress, 7; words
of Thaddeus Stevens, 8; who pleads the Constitution against our
action? 8; the object of, 164; adjudication, sale, etc, required for
confiscation by national law, 164; compared with the act of Congress,
164; sections of the act of August 6, 1861, 165; do. of the act of
July 17, 1862, 166; amount of property subject to the provisions of
the act, 167; number of persons liable to be affected by it, 167;
another feature of the confiscation act, 168; equally flagrant and
criminal, 168; trial by jury excluded and forfeiture of property made
absolute, 168; heavy fines imposed and the property sold in fee, 168;
treated as traitors and enemies, 169; first object to be secured by
confiscation was emancipation, 169.

_Conflict, the last armed, of the war_, like the first, a Confederate
victory, 698.

_Congress, Provisional_, its third session, 3; removal of departments
of the Government to Richmond authorized, 3; cause of removal stated
in the President's message, 3; first efforts of the enemy to be
directed against Virginia, 8; acts at its third session, 6;
proceedings relative to the removal of General A. S. Johnston, 38.

_Congress, The United States_, conceded that it had no power over
slavery, 6; a power reserved to the States, 7; this reservation
continued in time of war as in peace, 7; the attempt to exercise a
power of confiscation was a mere usurpation, 7; forfeiture for
treason does not reach the case, 7; words of the Constitution, 7; no
forfeiture with conviction, and only during life, 7; article of first
amendment to the Constitution, 7; "due process of law" not an act of
Congress, 7; who pleads the Constitution against our action? 8; in
1862, declares that the struggle is for existence, and the Government
may resort to any measure that self-defense would justify, 159; the
self-defense of the Government, how authorized by the Constitution,
159; slavery declared to be the cause of all the troubles, 159;
inaugural of President Lincoln, 160; commences to legislate for the
abolition of slavery. 160; asserts that it had the power to interfere
with the institution, 160; the plea of necessity, the source of the
power, 161; usurpations embraced in its system of legislation, 161;
the powers granted in the Constitution, 162; to make foreign war,
162; confiscation, 162; international law on the capture of private
property, 163; its conditions compared with the act of Congress, 164;
another alarming usurpation of, 170; the argument advanced for its
support, 170; the theory on which it was based, 170; another step in
the usurpations for the destruction of slavery, 172; emancipation in
the District of Columbia, 172; prohibits that which the Constitution
commands--a most flagrant usurpation, 175.

_Constitutional liberty_, vindicated by the triumph of the
Confederate States, 14; the wound to the principles of, committed by
the Government of the United States, 279; the crashing blow to the
hopes that mankind had begun to repose in this latest effort for
self-government, 279; sought to palliate the offense by asserting a
fiction that its immense fleets and armies were only a police
authority to put down insurrection, 280.

_Constitution, The_, every restraint of, broken through by the
Government of the United States, 2; this was declared by the United
States Government to be for the preservation of, 6; the course
attempted to be pursued by it under this pretext of preserving the
Constitution, 6; violations of, under the confiscation act of
Congress relative to private property, 7; violations of, in the
treatment of seized and imprisoned citizens, 14; its provisions
afforded no protection to the citizens, 15; the United States
Government transformed in to a military despotism, 15; what cause for
such acts, 15; answer to the question, 15; powers of, not changed by
circumstances, 161; or by peace or war, 161; do. of the United
States, who were really destroying? 170; theory that it was suspended
by actual hostilities, 170; these gave to Congress sovereign power,
170; new relations of citizens and subject to extraordinary
penalties, 170; power of Congress thus unlimited, 170.

_Constitution of the United States_, a fatal subversion of, 293.

_Constitutions, Paper_, of what value are they? 622.

_Constitution of Tennessee_, was it amended by the consent of the
people of Tennessee, the only sovereigns known under our
institutions, or by consent of the Government of the United States,
the usurping sovereign? 457.

_Contest, The_, is not over; it has only entered on a new and
enlarged arena, 294.

CONYNGHAM, Captain GUSTAVUS, commands a cruiser fitted out in France
by United States Government, 275; appointed by filling up a blank
commission from John Hancock, 275; captured and ignominiously
confined, 276; retaliatory measures of United States Congress, 276.

COOK, Colonel, stands, with Twenty-seventh North Carolina regiment,
boldly in line at Sharpsburg without a cartridge, 336.

COOPER, Adjutant-General SAMUEL, testimony relative to General
Winder's humane treatment of prisoners of war, 598.

_Corinth_, our force concentrated at, before the battle of Shiloh,
55; its position, 71; a strategic point of importance, 72; Hallock
advances against it, 72; his precautions, 72; report of Sherman, 72;
intrenched approaches, 73; further report of Sherman, 73; its
position and importance, 387; attempt to capture it by Generals Van
Dorn and Price, 389; battle mainly fought by Price's division, 389;
delay in the attack, 389; course of the battle, 390; fresh troops
arrive to the enemy, 390; our army retires to Chewalla, 390; losses,
390.

_Cotton_, measures of the United States Government to obtain our
cotton, 343; the necessity for it, 344; words of the British
Secretary of State, 344; efforts of foreign governments to obtain
increased exportation, 344; letter of Minister Adams, 344; letter of
Mr. Seward, 344; military expeditions fitted out by the United States
Government to obtain it, 345; act of the United States Congress to
"provide for the collection of duties, and for other purposes," 345;
sections of the act, 346; the President authorized by proclamation to
forbid all commercial intercourse with any of our States, 346;
forfeiture of all goods _in transitu_, and the vessel, 346;
authorized then to reopen the trade for cotton and tobacco by
licenses to the most suitable persons for the end in view, 347; no
grant of power in the Constitution to Congress to pass such an act,
or to the President to approve, in violation of his oath, 347; a
power reserved to the States to regulate commercial intercourse
between their citizens, 347; the case of Carpenter, who refused to
obtain the required permit, 128; decision of Chief-Justice Taney,
348; a civil war or any other war does not enlarge the powers of the
Federal Government over the states or people beyond what the compact
has given to it, 348; issue of the President's proclamation, 349;
military expeditions fitted out to occupy our ports where cotton and
other valuable products were usually shipped, 349; collectors
appointed and licenses granted, 349; special agents appointed to
receive and collect all abandoned or captured property, 349; views of
General Grant on the operation of this system, 350; our country
divided into thirteen districts from Wheeling to Natchez, 350; a
vigorous traffic, 350.

_Crime of the Government of Great Britain_, in the eyes of the
Government of the United States, was the recognition of the
Confederate States as a belligerent, 272; letter of Secretary Seward,
277; the unparalleled virtue of a Queen's proclamation, 277; the
effect of one more, 277; a Mexican _pronunciamiento_ 277;
irrationality of United States Government, 278.

_Crimes and horrors_, how easy for the Northern people, by a simple
obedience to the provisions of the Constitution, to have avoided the
commission of all these! 181.

CRITTENDEN, General GEORGE B., statement of battle of Fishing Creek,
19; takes command, 19; position of his force, 19; advances to attack
General Thomas, 20; destitution of his men, 21; unsuccessful attack,
21; movements afterward, 21, 22.

_Cruisers_, Confederate: the Sumter, her career, 247; no secrecy in
building the Alabama, 350; she sails from Liverpool as a
merchant-ship, 250; her name, 250; description of her, 251; changed
to a man-of-war, 251; her armament, 252; her fight with the Hatteras,
253; capture of an Aspinwall steamer, 253; her cruise, 254; arrival
at Cherbourg, 255; the Kearsarge, her size and strength, 356;
description of the fight of the Alabama with the Kearsarge, 256, 257;
comparison of the vessels, 258; the United States Government absurdly
demands from the English Government the rescued sailors, 256; reply
of Lord John Russell, 256; the Georgia, 262; her career, 262; the
Shenandoah, 263; her career, 262; the Nashville, 263; her cruise,
363; the Tallahassee, 364; the Chickamauga, 364; the cruiser Florida,
original name Oreto, 250; difficulty at Nassau; 259; arrives at Green
Kay, 259; changed to a cruiser, 259; sickness and loss of crew, 259;
arrives at Havana, 260; arrives at Mobile, 260; repaired and
equipped, 260; runs the blockade, 261; her cruise, 261; seized in the
port of Bahia, 262; taken to Hampton Roads, 262; sunk by artifice,
263; demand of Brazil, 262; letter of Mr. Seward, 263; the
circumstances of their construction, 270; Minister Adams's claim for
damages, 270; reply of Earl Russell, 270; answer of Mr. Seward to the
declaration, 271; response of Earl Russell, 271; the proceedings of
the Confederate Government relating to, justified by international
law, 274; and by its own antecedent acts, 274; fitting out cruisers
in France during the Revolutionary War, 274; action of Dr. Franklin
and Silas Deane, 275; cruise of Captain Wickes, 275; do. captain
Conyngham, 275; retaliatory action of U. S. Congress, 276.

_Cumberland Gap_, its position and strength, 427; commanded by
Brigadier-General Frazier, 427; his force, 427: position of General
Rosecrans,427; General Burnside advances from Kentucky, 427; General
Buckner retires, 427; Frazier, seeing the futility of resistance,
surrenders, 427; note in explanation, 427; further movements of the
enemy, 428.

CUSTER, General, marches on a raid, 504; his object, 504; coöperation
of General Kilpatrick and Colonel Dahlgren, 504; after a feeble
demonstration on some parked artillery, retreats, burning bridges
where there was no one to pursue, 507.

DAHLGREN, Colonel JOHN, starts with General Kilpatrick, 505; proceeds
to Hanover Junction, thence to the canal West of Richmond, 505;
pillages, destroys dwellings, out-buildings, mills, canal-boats,
grain and cattle, 505; encounters a body of armory men, citizens and
clerks of Richmond, and is routed, 506; retreats, 506; attacked by
the Home Guard of King's and Queen's Counties and is killed and his
force put to flight, 506; papers found on his body, showing his
purposes, 506; his burial, 507; a denial that his conduct was
authorized, 507.

_Damages for personal injuries_, obtained from the offender by the
State government, 452; claimed by the United States Government
against our cruisers, 283; transfer of ships to foreign owners, 284;
increase in the foreign commerce of the country, 284; decline in
American tonnage, 284; in articles of export, 284; increase in rates
of insurance, 284.

_Danville_, arrival of the President and Cabinet, 676; routine work
of the departments resumed, 676; proclamation of the President, 676,
677.

DAVIS, Brigadier-General J. R., movements of his brigade at the
Wilderness struggle, 519.

DAVIS, Senator GARRETT, remarks on the confiscation act of the United
States Congress, 167.

DAVIS, JEFFERSON, message at the third session of the Provisional
Congress, 3; the schooner, treatment of her crew by the United States
Government, 11; letter to President Lincoln relative to the crew of
the Savannah, 11; instructions relative to retaliatory measures, 11;
answer to members of Congress that requested the removal of General
A. S. Johnston, 88; letter to General A. S. Johnston on state of
affairs, 41; reply to A. S. Johnston's letter, 47; orders Bragg to
command In Mississippi, 74; detained by Beauregard, 74; command
transferred to him by Beauregard, 74; statement of the case, 75;
letter to General J. E. Johnston on the announcement of his intention
to evacuate the Peninsula and Norfolk, 92; sends General Randolph,
Secretary of War, and Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the Navy, to arrange
for the removal of stores and machinery from Norfolk, 92;
conversation with General J. E. Johnston relative to his plans before
Richmond, 101; letter to General J. E. Johnston, 103; goes to meet
him, and finds the whole army had fallen back across the
Chickahominy, 103; the explanation given, 103; remarks relative to
the situation, 103; dissatisfaction with military affairs around
Richmond, 120; conversation with Lee, 120; had no doubts that
Johnston was fully in accord in the purpose to defend Richmond until
recently, 120; his remark to his volunteer aide, 120; plan of
Johnston, 120; goes to the expected battle-field, 121; proceedings,
122; in danger of going into the enemy's camp, 128; meets General G.
W. Smith, 129; announces the assignment of Lee to the command, 129;
conversations with Lee, 131; plan for the future, 131; conversation
with Lee relative to the movements of McClellan, 132; do. with regard
to that of Jackson, 132; offensive-defensive policy inaugurated, 132;
his address on the defeat of McClellan's army, 311; letter to General
Lee on the action of the military authorities of the United States
changing the character of the war into a campaign of indiscriminate
robbery and murder, 315, 316; letter to General Lee in Maryland, 333;
letter to Governor Pettus to get every man into the field, 400; sent
a dispatch to General Bragg for aid for Vicksburg, 411; reply, 412;
response, 412; importance of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, 422; anxiety
of the Administration to hold them, 422; visits Hood's headquarters,
565; his views, 565; conference at Augusta with Beauregard and
others, 566; reply to Hood's change of programme, 569; letter to
President Lincoln, relative to prisoners captured in our privateers,
583; order relative to General Pope, 588; issues retaliatory orders
relative to Generals Hunter and Phelps, 590; efforts to seek an
adjustment of difficulties relative to the exchange of prisoners
through the authorities at Washington, 591; appoints Vice-President
Stephens as a commissioner, 591; letter of instructions, 591; letter
to President Lincoln, 593; the result, 595; conference with General
Lee on the state of affairs, 648; the programme adopted, 648;
receives a telegram from General Lee, advising the evacuation of
Richmond, 661; unprepared state of transportation, 661; receives
notice of General Lee's withdrawal, 667; arrangements, 667; starts
for Danville, 686; arrival, and resumption of routine labors, 676;
issues a proclamation, 676, 677; proposes a conference with General
J.E. Johnston, in North Carolina, 678; his letter, 678; they meet at
Greensboro, 679; state of affairs, 679; object of the conference,
680; proceedings at the conference, 680; conference between Johnston
and Sherman assented to, 681; the route of retreat, 681; supplies
placed on the route, 682; letter of General St. John, 682; do. of
Major Claiborne, 682; proceeds to Charlotte with his Cabinet, 683;
news of the assassination of President Lincoln, 683; remarks, 633;
obtains an increased cavalry force, 684; correspondence between
Generals Johnston and Sherman, 684; Sherman's interview with
President Lincoln, 684; result of the conference with Sherman, 685;
memorandum of agreement, 686; the agreement, a military convention,
687; approved, 687; letter to General Johnston, 688; the basis of
agreement rejected by the United States Government, 689; instruction
to General Johnston, 689; disobeyed, 689; proceeds from Charlotte,
690; statements of General Johnston, 690; explanation, 691; Johnston
surrenders to Sherman, 692; difference in the condition of his army
from Lee's, 692; the former's line of retreat open, and supplies on
it, 692; importance of continued resistance, 693; statement of
General Taylor, 694; the Executive should have been advised, 694;
further movements of the President, 694; his companions, 694; first
information of Johnston's surrender, 695; a small escort selected,
695; Secretary Reagan transfers the money in the Confederate Treasury
to the financial agent who had incurred liabilities, 695; Johnston
could not have been successfully pursued by Sherman, 696;
considerations, 696; thus foiled the enemy's purpose of subjugation,
696; purpose of the President, 697; forces in the trans-Mississippi
Department, 697; General E. K. Smith's address to his soldiers, 697:
the other forces of the Confederacy, 698; surrenders east of the
Mississippi, 698; the lost armed conflict of the war, 698; surrender
of General E. K. Smith, 698; the total number of prisoners paroled at
the close of the war, 699; the Shenandoah the last to float the
Confederate flag, 700; further movements of the President, 700; turns
aside to find his family; 700; apprehensions of on attack of
marauders, 701; preparations to leave, 701; awaiting nightfall, 701;
approach of the enemy, 701; surprise and capture, 701; some of the
escort escape, 702; pillage and annoyances, 703; taken to Macon, 703;
proceed to Port Royal, 704; transferred in a steamer and taken to
Hampton Roads, 704; imprisoned in Fortress Monroe, 704.

_Delegation from the prisoners_ sent from Andersonville to plead
their cause before the authorities at Washington, 602; President
Lincoln refuses to see them, 602; the answer that the interests of
the Government of the United States required that they should return
to prison and remain there, 602; letter from the wife of the chairman
of the delegation, 603; letter from a prisoner, 603.

"_Delightful excitement_," exclamation of Jackson in the hottest of the
battle at Port Republic, 115.

_De Russy, Fort_, token possession of, by the enemy, 542.

_Destruction of our institutions_, the powers of a common government,
created for the common and equal protection to the interests of all,
were to be arrayed for, 182.

_Distinction in its nature and objects_ between the Government of the
States and the State governments, 454, 455.

_District of Columbia_, act of Congress of United States to
emancipate slaves in, 172; right of private property guaranteed in,
by the Constitution, 173; its words, 173; conditions on which such
property might be taken under the Constitution, 173.

_Disunion, bloodshed, and war_, the consummation verbally of the
original antislavery purposes attended with, 188.

DIXON, Lieutenant, as an engineer examines and reports on the sites
and condition of Forts Henry and Donelson, 24.

_Donaldsonville_, a battery elected at, which interrupts river
navigation by the enemy, 420.

_Donelson, Fort_, reason for the selection of the site, 24; its
position, 24; report relative to the fort, 24; details of the fort
and its situation, 28; officers in command, 29; strength of force,
29; the attack, 29; fire of a gunboat, 29; boat disabled, 29; attack
of the ironclads--all their advantages overcome by our heavy guns,
30; scatter destruction through fleet, 30; it retires to Cairo for
repairs, 30; their loss, 31; effect of their fire on our batteries,
31; reënforcements to the enemy, 31; plan of the Confederate
generals, 31; condition of things, 31; vacillation of our commanders,
32; the first success and subsequent loss, 32; consultation of the
commands, 33; condition of the troops, 33; the command transferred to
General Buckner, 33; Generals Pillow and Floyd retire, 34; part of
General Floyd's force left behind, 34; advantages gained by the
enemy, 34; surrender, 34; effects, 36.

_ Donelson and Henry_, the consequences of their loss, 36; change of
plans, 39.

_Drury's Bluff_, a defensive position on the James River, 102;
enemy's fleet open fire on the fort, 102; injuries to the fleet, 102;
report of Lieutenant Jeffers, 102; its position and works, 511;
General Beauregard in command, 511; the battle with Butler's force,
512-514.

"_Due diligence_"; on this foundation was based the claim for damages
by the United States Government at the Geneva Conference, 278.

"_Due process of law_" assumed by the United States Government to
mean an act of Congress, 7.

DUNCAN, General, had command of the coast defenses at New Orleans,
212; his report of the passage of the forts below New Orleans by the
enemy's fleet, 215; do. on their skillful and gallant defense, 216;
address to the garrisons, 217.

_Duration of the Government of the United States_, to have declared
it perpetual would have destroyed the sovereignty of the people,
which possesses the inherent right to alter or abolish their
Government when it ceases to answer the ends for which it was
instituted, 45.

EARLY, General JUBAL E., remarks on the line of defense constructed
by General Magruder at Warwick River, 86; resists the enemy at
Yorktown, 89; report of his conflict before Williamsburg with a force
under General Hancock, 95; further statements, 96; badly wounded and
obliged to retire, 96; engaged at the battle of Cedar Run, 817;
commands Ewell's division at Sharpsburg, 336; resists the attacks of
the enemy on Fredericksburg, 362; regains his former position, 363;
with a force drives Hunter out of the Valley, and advances to the
Potomac and crosses, 529; sends a force to strike the railroads from
Baltimore to Harrisburg, 529; puts to flight a body of troops under
Wallace, 529; approaches Fort Stevens, near Washington, 530; too
strong to assault, 530; recrosses the Potomac, 530; attacks the enemy
at Kernstown, 531; moves to Martinsburg, 531; appearance of Sheridan
with a large force, 533; Early attacks his force near Winchester,
533, 534; retires to Newton, 535; escapes annihilation by the
incapacity of his enemy, 536; withdraws up the Valley, 536;
subsequently moves down the Valley again, 536; the destruction caused
by Sheridan's orders, 536; Early reaches Fisher's Hill, 536; attacks
the enemy at Cedar Creek, 537; his plan, 537; the battle, 538; his
success and subsequent disaster, 540; his losses, 541; subsequently
confronts Sheridan's force north of Cedar Creek, 541; other attacks,
541.

_Edith, The_, a cruiser, name changed to Chickamauga, 265; runs the
blockade under a full moon, 265; her cruise, 265.

_Election, The_, in 1861, officers of the Provisional Government
chosen for the permanent Government, 17.

_Elections in Maryland_, interfered with by an armed force of the
United States Government, 464, 465.

_Elkhorn, or Pea Ridge, battle of_, 50; its object, 51; losses, 51.

ELLIOTT, Colonel STEPHEN, Jr., refused to be relieved at Fort Sumter,
204; salutes his flag on evacuation, 204.

_Elon, Mount_, General Butler defeats a detachment of Sherman's force
sent to tear up the railroad at Florence, 635.

_Emancipation_, efforts of United States Congress to effect
emancipation of slaves by confiscation, 7; violation of the
Constitution, 7; efforts to effect by pillage and deportation, 8; by
President Lincolns order to military; commanders, 9; by Generals
Fremont and T. W. Sherman, 10; the first object to be secured by the
confiscation act, 169; the coöperation of the United States,
recommended by President Lincoln, 179; his reasons, 179; to be
consummated under the war-power, 179; as artful scheme to awaken
controversy in the Southern states, 179; measure approved by
Congress, 180; the terms proposed, 180, expressly forbidden by the
Constitution, 180; order of General Hunter countermanded as too soon,
181; the President claims the right to issue such a one, 181; the
proposition of emancipation with compensation, 183; its failure in
Congress, 184; the preliminary proclamation, 187; its terms, 186; the
necessity for it examined, 187.

_Enemies and traitors_, the twofold relation in which the United
States Government sought to place us, 169; its practical operation,
169.

_Englishmen_ cheer the Virginia in Hampton Roads, 201.

_Events, Review of_, that brought such unmerited censure on General
A. S. Johnston, 48.

_Evidence, Fabrication of_, attempted by some of the authorities of
of Washington in order to compass the death of the President of the
Con federate States, 498, 499; the investigation and report before
the United States Congress, 500.

EWELL, General, engaged at the battle of Cedar Run, 317; unites with
General Jackson for operations in the Shenandoah Valley, 106;
conflict with Fremont near Harrisonburg, 113; serving as a gunner,
116; repulses the enemy at Bristoe Station, 323; commands the Second
Corps of Lee's army, 437; storms Winchester, and captures or puts
Milroy's army to flight, 439; enters Maryland, 439; encamps near
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 440; occupies the left at Gettysburg, 443.

_Facts on record_, such as will make our posterity blush, 167.

FARRAGUT, Commodore, commands the enemy's fleet at New Orleans, 214;
its strength and numbers, 214; report of his passage of the forts,
216; sends a detachment to hoist the United States flag on New
Orleans Custom-House, 231.

FARRAND, Commander, commands at Drury's Bluff, 102.

_Fayetteville, North Carolina_, Sherman's army approaches, 632;
brutality of his forces, 632, 633; description of Sherman's march by
his historian, 633; "the pleasurable excitements of the march," 634.

FERGUSON, General, drives off the enemy that seek to get to the
Yazoo, 395.

"_Fire up the Northern heart_," what was signified by the expression,
386.

_Fisher, Fort_, a movement by a force from Grant's army with the
fleet to attack below Wilmington, 645; an attempt to destroy it by
the explosion of a powder-ship, 645; its failure, 645; subsequently a
renewed attempt, 645; the attack, 645; surrender of the fort, 646.

_Fishing Creek_, the battle of. 19; statement of General Crittenden,
19; the battle a necessity, 21; the case considered, 22; causes of
the ill success, 22; retreat of our force, 23; the question of
crossing to the light bank of the Cumberland considered, 23.

_Five Forks_, a strong position on Lee's line assaulted and carried
by the enemy, 655.

_Five thousand million dollars_, amount of property subject to be
acted on by the provisions of the confiscation act of the United
States Congress, 167.

FIZER, Lieutenant-Colonel, his bold expedient to resist the crossing
of the enemy at Fredericksburg. 353.

_Flag, The Confederate_, the Shenandoah the last to float it, 700.

_Flagrant violation of the Constitution, Another_, the discharge of a
fugitive under the confiscation act, 176; words of the act, 176.

FLANDERS, Messrs., citizens of New York, 482; incarcerated by the
Government of the United States in Fort Lafayette, 482; required to
take an oath of allegiance before the Government permitted their case
to be investigated, 482; the oath, 483; their refusal, 483; their
reasons, 483.

_Fleet of the enemy_, prepared for moving down the Mississippi River,
75; its progress, 76.

FLOYD. General, commands at Fort Donelson, 29; retires from Fort
Donelson, 34; correspondence relative to his conduct at Donelson, 40,
41.

_Forces, The United States_, number of men brought into the field by
the Government of the United States during the war, 706.

_Foreign powers_, our States falsely represented in every court of
Europe, 2; adopt a position of neutrality, 12.

_Foreign relations_, recognized by leading European Governments as a
belligerent, 368; principles upon which the States were originally
constituted and upon which the Union was farmed explained, 368;
commissioners early sent abroad by us, 368; previous communications
of the Government of the United States assuming the attitude of a
sovereign over the Confederate States, and threatening Europe if it
acknowledged it as having an independent existence, 369; error of
European nations, 369; answer of foreign Governments in consequence,
369; re fuse to side with either party, 369; the consequence--a
prolongation of hostilities, 370; other matters in which less than
justice was rendered to us by "neutral" Europe, and undue advantage
given to the aggressors, 370; both parties prohibited from bringing
prizes into their ports, 370; the value of the weapon thus wrested
from our grasp, 371; their policy in reference to the blockade was so
shaped as to cause the greatest injury to the Confederacy, 371;
declaration of principles of the Paris Congress, 372; proposals that
the Confederacy should accede to it, 372; acceded to, with the
exception of privateering, 873; reasons for the exception, 373; the
passiveness of "neutral" Europe relative to its declaration, 373; the
pretension of blockading thousands of miles, 373; other blockades,
373; facts shown, 374; the mediation proposed by France to Great
Britain and Russia, 376; dispatch of the French Minister, 376; reply
of Great Britain, 378; reply of Russia, 378; communication to the
French Minister at Washington by his Government, 378; the initiative
of all measures left by foreign powers to the governments of France
and Great Britain, 379.

FORREST, Colonel N. B., at Fort Donelson, 34; interview with Major
Brown, 34; his expedition from North Mississippi to Paducah,
Kentucky, 550; ordered to strike the railroad from Nashville to
Chattanooga, 566; his movements with General Hood's army, 574; sent
to Murfreesboro, 577.

_Forty-two regiments and two batteries_ sent by the Government of the
United States into the State of New York to maintain the subjugation
of its sovereign people, 490.

_France_, her proposed mediation between the belligerents, 376.

FRANKLIN, General, his division disembarked before the evacuation of
York town, 90; his force reembarks after the evacuation of Yorktown,
97; lands near West Point and threatens the flank of our line of
march, 98.

FRAZIER, Brigadier-General I. W., commands at Cumberland Gap, 427;
approach and strength of the enemy, 427; seeing the inutility of
resistance, surrenders on demand of General Burnside, 427; a note in
explanation by the author, 427.

_Frazier's Farm_, the battle at, one of the most remarkable of the
war, 146; strength of forces, and losses, 147.

_Fredericksburg_, its situation, 352; the enemy attempt to lay
bridges and cross the Rappahannock, 352; repulsed, 352; our troops
withdrawn and bridges laid, 352; attack and repulse of Burnside's
army, 354, 355; withdraws at night, 356; losses, 356; strength of
opposing forces, 356.

_Free consent of the governed_, the only source of all "just powers"
of government, 452.

FREMONT, General JOHN Cl, issues a proclamation confiscating real and
personal property in Missouri, 10; repulsed at Strasburg with ease,
111; follows and attacks General Ashby, 112.

_Fugitives_, their forfeiture ordered, 2; military commanders
forbidden to interfere in their restoration, 2.

_Galveston_, summoned to surrender, 232; the reply, 232; the state of
affairs, 233; subsequent approach of the enemy, and occupation of the
city, 233; arrival of General Magruder, 233; gathers a force to
attack the enemy, 233; protects his steamboats with cotton-bales,
234; attacks the fleet, 234; captures the Harriet Lane, 234; demands
a surrender of the enemy's fleet, 234; it escapes under cover of a
flag of truce, 235.

GARDNER, Major-General, in command at Port Hudson, 395; yields Port
Hudson to General Banks after the capitulation of Vicksburg, 420; his
gallant defense, 421.

GARFIELD, JAMES A., commands in north eastern Kentucky, 18.

_Geneva Conference_, adjustment proposed by Great Britain, 283;
results in the Geneva Conference, 283; the ground of its action, 283.

_Georgia_, the campaign of 1864; General J. E. Johnston ordered to
the command of the Army of Tennessee at Dalton, 547; total effective
strength of the army, 547; positions of the enemy, 547; an onward
movement demanded, 548; considerations relative thereto, 548; do.
presented to General Johnston, 548, 549; his approval of an
aggressive movement, 548; his proposition, 549; prompt measures taken
to enable him to carry out his proposition, 549; no movement at
tempted, 550; Sherman advances against him, 550; official returns of
the strength of the army, 550; efforts of the Government to
strengthen Johnston, 551; his position, 551; hopes of the country,
551; he withdraws from Dalton and falls back to Resaca, 552; the
position, 552; falls back from Resaca to Adairsville, 552; his
reasons, 552; a further retreat to Cassville, 553; a coming battle
announced, 553; it did not take place, 553; another retreat beyond
Etowah, 553; the position in rear of Cassville held by Generals Polk
and Hood, 553; the next stand at Alatoona, 553; Marietta evacuated,
553; the state of the country between Dallas and Marietta, 553;
engagements at New Hope Church, 554; the next stand made by General
Johnston between Acworth and Marietta, 554; character of the country,
554; death of Lieutenant General Polk, 554; brisk fighting for some
days, 555: the pressure on General G. W. Smith, 555; falling back to
the Chattahoochee, 555; losses of mills, foundries, and military
stores in these retreats, 555; position of the enemy, 555; questions
upon which there has been a decided conflict of opinion, 556; the
extreme popular disappointment, 556; the possible fall of the "Gate
City" produced intense anxiety, 556; the removal of General Johnston
demanded, 556; apprehensive of disasters that might result from it,
556; the clamors for his removal, 557; Johnston relieved and Hood
appointed, 557; letter of Hon. B. H. Hill, 557; Hood assumes command,
561; his effective strength, 562; resolved to attack the enemy, 562;
the movement fails, 562; attacks McPherson's corps, 562; various
successful expeditions, 562; Sherman moves to the south and southwest
of Atlanta, 562, 563; evacuation of Atlanta a necessity, 563; Hood
marches westerly, 563; Atlanta surrendered Sherman, 563; inhabitants
expelled by Sherman and robbed by his soldiers 564; the enemy
inactive, 564; Hood's report of the state of his army, 564; visit of
the President to his headquarters, 565; view of the situation, 565;
efforts to fill up the army, 565; action of the Governor of Georgia,
565; exemption of citizens from military service, 566; Hood moves
against the enemy's communications, 566; Forrest ordered to strike
the Nashville road, 566; improvement in the condition of Hood's army,
567; the plan of operations discussed, 567; opinion of General
Hardee, 568; proceeding: of Beauregard, 568; movements of Hood, 568;
withdraws toward Gadsden, 569; conference with Beauregard, 569;
decides to march into Tennessee, 569; telegram of General Beauregard,
569; change of programme, 569; reply, 569; Hood crosses the
Tennessee, 570; the movement ill advised, 570; Sherman's destructive
march, 570; moves from Atlanta, 571; harassed by Wheeler's cavalry,
571; Hardee at Savannah, 572; Sherman reaches Savannah, 572; Fort
McAllister taken, 572; preparations of the enemy to bombard Savannah,
572; Hardee evacuates, 573. (See HOOD, General J. B.)

_Gettysburg_, the enemy met in from Gettysburg and driven through the
town, 440; instructions given not to bring on a general engagement,
440; statement of General Pendleton, chief of artillery, 441;
preparations for general engagement delayed, 442; the position at
Gettysburg, 442; main purpose of the movement across the Potomac,
442; Lee decides to renew the attack, 443; the position of our line,
443; the conflict of the second day, 443; Lee determines to continue
the assault, 443; general plan unchanged, 443; the continued
conflict, 444; its results, 444; army retires, 444; prisoners and
loss, 444; strength of forces, 446; the wisdom of the strategy
justified the result, 447; the battle was unfortunate, 447;
considerations, 447; most eventful struggle of the war, 448.

GLASELL, Com. W. T., attacks the New Ironsides frigate with
torpedoes, 208.

_Gloucester Point_, its position, 83; McClellan urges an attack in
rear, 85; a detachment could have turned it, 90.

GORDON, General JOHN B., selected to command the sortie against Fort
Steadman, in Grant's lines before Petersburg, 649; its result, 649;
his letter furnishing details, 650-654.

_Government permanent, The_, its inauguration welcomed, 1.

_Government of the United States_, rejected adjustment by
negotiation, and chose to attempt subjugation, 5; the course how
pursued, 5; recognized the separate existence of the Confederate
States by an interdictive embargo and blockade of all their commerce
with United States, 5; manner in which the war was conducted, 5; not
a government resting on the consent of the governed, 6; tendency of
its actions directly to the emancipation of slaves, 9; caution of
General McClellan, 9; instructions to General T. W. Sherman, in South
Carolina, to receive all persons, whether slaves or not, 10; other
orders, 10; willing to accede to the terms of the Treaty of Paris,
12; its offer declined by foreign powers, 13; the terms upon which
the offer was made, 13; its object, in 1862, to assail us with every
instrument of destruction that could be devised, 158; all its efforts
directed to our subjugation or extermination, 159; the aid of
Congress called in, 159; did acts which it was expressly made in the
Constitution its duty to prevent, 176; words of the Constitution,
177; what all its acts consisted in, 178; has no natural rights, 181;
insincerity of her complaints to Great Britain for the construction
of our ships, 249; statement of Mr. Laird, 249; employed its
war-vessels to catch blockade-runners instead of capturing our light
cruisers on the ocean, 266; action of its State Department, 266;
appeals to Great Britain to prevent the so-called pirates from
violating international law, 267; a mortifying exhibition of
deception and unmanliness, 267; reclamation sought for, 267; what
international law recognizes, 267; effort of the United States
Government to contract in England for the construction of iron-plated
vessels, 268; other proceedings, 268; statement of Lord Russell, 268;
United States Government profited most by unjustifiable war
practices, 268; upon its interference, a State government immediately
ceases to be republican, 310; its acts of reconstruction entirely
unconstitutional, revolutionary, subversive of the Constitution, and
destructive of the Union, 310; what is it? 453; an organization of a
few years' duration, 453; it might cease to exist, and the States and
people continue prosperous, peaceful, and happy, 453; it sprang from
certain circumstances in the course of human affairs, 453; has no
warrant or authority but the ratification of the sovereign States,
453; unlike the governments of the States instituted for the
protection of the unalienable rights of man, it has only its
enumerated objects, 453; it keeps no records of property, and
guarantees no possession of an estate, 453; marriage it can neither
confirm nor annul, 453; partakes of the nature of an incorporation,
453; right of the people to alter or abolish it, 453; its duration,
454; objects, 454; distinct in its nature and objects from the State
governments, 454; its true character and intentions toward us
exposed, 580; aspirations for dominion and sovereignty, 581; the term
"loyal," its signification, 581; meaning of President Lincoln's
words, 581; hope of mankind in constitutional freedom be for ever
lost, 582; the foundation of the war, 582; the issue for which we
fought, 582; why we were called rebels, 582.

GRANT, General U. S., starts from Cairo with a force to attack Fort
Henry, 26; strength of his force, 26; his movements, 26; moves to
invest Fort Donelson, 29; strength of his force, 29; takes command at
Pittsburg Landing, 52; condition of his army after the battle of
Shiloh, 70; masses a heavy force along the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad, 391; moves south and camps near Water Valley, 391; country
teeming with forage, 391; his object, 391; moves down the Mississippi
to Young's Point, 393; retreat to Memphis compelled by Van Dorn's
destruction of supplies at Holly Springs, 393; attempt to pass to the
rear of Fort Pemberton, 394; do. to enter the Yazoo above Haines's
Bluff, 395; Grant's army, 395; attempts to cut a canal, 396;
unsuccessful, 396; another at attempt to cut one near Milliken's
Bend, 596; lands below Vicksburg, 398; advances into Mississippi to
strike either Jackson or Vicksburg, 399; his expectation of an attack
in his rear by General Johnston, 423; preparations to resist it, 423;
statement of an officer of his army, 424; arrives at Chattanooga and
assumes command, 434; his description of the situation, 434; his
first movement, 435; other operations, 436; his plan of campaign
revealed, 510; to connect with the army of Butler on the south side
of the James, 510; appointed lieutenant-general, 515; assumes command
of armies of United States, 515; his reënforcements, 515; position of
Lee's and Grant's forces, 515; movements open to the choice of
General Grant, 516; the movement which was made, 516; Grant
encountered in the Wilderness, 516; movements of Grant to cross the
Rapidan, 516; his contest in the Wilderness, 517-520; moves to
Spottsylvania Court-House, 520; the battle there, 520, 521; heavily
reënforced, 522; his blunder at Hanover Junction, 523; crosses the
Pamunkey, 524; moves to Cold Harbor, 524; attempts to pierce or drive
back Lee's forces, 524; fearful carnage of his soldiers, 524; his
soldiers sullenly and silently decline to renew the assault, 524; his
force before he crossed the Rapidan, 525; his losses from the
Wilderness to Cold Harbor, 525; statement of Swinton, 525; crosses
the James and concentrates at Petersburg, 525, 526; makes a campaign
of a month and sacrifices a hecatomb of men, 526; his instructions to
General Butler relative to the exchange of prisoners, 599; replies to
General Lee's letters, 599, 600; dispatch to General Butler, 600;
seeks a new base on the James River, 637; advances to Petersburg,
637; the purpose of his campaign, 646; two plans open for him in the
attack on Petersburg, 646; the campaign of 1865, 647. (See
_Petersburg_.)

_Great Britain_, her treatment of private property in wars with us, 8.

_Greece_, recognition of her independence by the United States
Government in the war with Turkey, 276.

GREEN, Brigadier-General MARTIN, attacks the enemy landing below
Vicksburg, 398; one of the best soldiers ii the Confederate service,
416; died a Vicksburg, 417.

GREGG, Brigadier-General, attacked by a large body of the enemy near
Vicksburg, 404.

_Gregg, Battery_, makes an obstinate defense with a small force, 655.

GRIERSON, Colonel, his raid through Mississippi, 399.

GRIFFITH, Brigadier-General RICHARD, killed near Savage Station, 141.

_Gunboats_, efforts to construct, on the Tennessee River, 25; the
fleet prepared by the United States Government, 25; of the enemy
disabled and defeated at Fort Donelson, 30; the terror inspired by
them in the early period of the war, 240; successful contests with
them by river-boats impaired the estimate put upon them, 240; the
appearance of the Indianola, 240; fight with the Webb and Queen of
the West, 241; captured, 241; the ram Arkansas, 242; fight in the
Yazoo, 242; on the Mississippi, 242.

_Haines's Bluff_, attempt of General Sherman to reduce our work at,
and gain the rear of Vicksburg, 392; unsuccessful, 393.

HALLECK, Major-General H. W., assumes command of the enemy's forces
at Shiloh, 71; advances on Corinth, 71; assigned to command by enemy
in the West, 18; his threatening position, 18.

HAMILTON, ALEXANDER, statement regarding war between the States, 5.

HAMPTON, General WADE, attacks Kilpatrick at night, and routs his
force, 503; letter relative to burning cotton, 628; successes against
the enemy at and near Fayetteville, North Carolina, 635; endeavors to
obtain his cavalry, 689; finds it surrendered with Johnston's army,
689.

HANCOCK, General, commands an assault at Williamsburg, 94; chivalric
remark respecting the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia
Regiments, 96.

_Hanover Junction_, the peril of Grant's army near, 523.

HARDEE, General W. G., commands a corps at the battle of Shiloh, 55;
holds Savannah, 571; conflict with the enemy at Bentonville, North
Carolina, 636.

HARRIS, Governor ISHAM G., on the skill of General Hood in his
campaign, 580.

HARVIE, LEWIS E., efforts to increase the capacity of the Danville
Railroad after the loss of the Weldon, 673.

_Hatteras Inlet_, its position and strength, 77; attacked by military
and naval expedition of the enemy, 77; it capitulates, 77.

HAYES, General, his regiment sadly cut up, 116; explanation, 116.

_Hecatomb of men_ sacrificed by General Grant to reach a position to
which McClellan had already demonstrated there was an easy and
inexpensive route, 526.

_Henry, Fort_, its position, 24; report relative to, 24; its
condition, 24; strength of our force at, 26; attacked by the enemy,
26; defended by seventy-five men while our main body retire to Fort
Donelson, 26; cannonade of the ironclads, 26; response of the fort,
27; damage to the enemy's fleet, 27; our losses, 28; surrender of the
fort, 28.

HETH, General, stubborn resistance made by his division, 518.

HIGGINS, Colonel, in command at the forts below New Orleans, 211; his
skill and gallantry in the defense, 218.

_Highwayman, The_, is he henceforth to be the lord of the highway?
183.

HILL, General A. P., advances upon Mechanicsville, 134; forces the
enemy to take refuge on the left bank of Beaver Dam, 134; reaches New
Cold Harbor, 136; becomes hotly engaged, 137; continues the pursuit
to Frazier's Farm, 142; his gallant bearing at Frazier's Farm, 146;
engaged with his division at the battle of Beaver Run, 319; reaches
Sharpsburg and reënforces General Jones in the battle there, 337;
commands the rear-guard as the army retires from Sharpsburg, 342;
drives the enemy into the Potomac, 342; his report, 342; commands the
Third Corps of Lee's army, 437; occupies the line in front of
Fredericksburg, 438; leaves for the Valley, 439; crosses the Potomac,
440; occupies the center at Gettysburg, 443; penetrates an interval
of Grant's force at Petersburg and inflicts great loss, 639; killed
in action, 655.

HILL, Hon. BENJAMIN H., his letter relative to interviews with
General Johnston and President Davis, 557-561.

HILL, General D. H., his services at Seven Pines, 125; forms on the
extreme left of the line, 137; drives the enemy in confusion toward
the Chickahominy, 138; gallantly engages the enemy at Malvern Hill,
168; crosses the Potomac and encamps near Frederick, 330; crosses
South Mountain and moves toward Boonesboro, 330; his position at the
battle of Sharpsburg, 335; stationed near Fredericksburg, 351.

HOKE, General, moves against the enemy attacking Fort Fisher, 646;
retires with his small force, 646.

HOLLINS, Commander, aids with gunboats to repulse Major-General Pope
at New Madrid, 76; commands our squadron at New Orleans, 211;
commands the river fleet at New Orleans, 222.

_Holly Springs_, an immense depot of supplies accumulated by General
Grant for his march on Vicksburg, 391; surprised and captured by
General Van Dorn, 391; supplies destroyed, 391.

HOLMES, General, his movement, 142; a mistake, 142; ordered by
General Lee, 142; remains under fire of enemy's gunboats, 143;
incorrect statements made, 143; their correction, 148; the fire upon
his position, 143; withdraws, 144; importance of his position
developed too late, 144; his character, 144.

HOOD, General J. B., at Sharpsburg battle, 335; account of the
contest on the left at Sharpsburg, 339; appointed to command the Army
of Tennessee, 557; arrives at Gadsden, 573; condition of his army,
573; decides to cross the Tennessee and move against Thomas, 573; an
unfortunate delay, 573; his movements, 574; position of the enemy,
574; pursues him to Franklin, 576; position at Franklin, 576;
considerations, 576; line of battle formed, 576; the battle, 576;
moves toward Franklin, 577; position of the enemy, 577; enemy
reënforced, 578; Hood's line retreats in confusion, 578; retires
pressed by the enemy, 578; crosses the Tennessee, 579; losses, 579;
relieved, 579; moves his forces from the west to aid in the defense
of North Carolina, 630.

HOOKER, Major-General JOSEPH, succeeds General Burnside in the
command of the Federal army, 357; resumes active operations, 357; a
feint before Fredericksburg, 358; a considerable force crosses the
fords of the Rapidan, 357; converged near Chancellorsville, 357;
attacked and repulsed by Lee, 359, 360; recrosses the Rappahannock,
364; arrival near Chattanooga, 435; his movements, 435; scales the
western slope of Lookout Mountain, 436; position of his army at
Fredericksburg in the spring of 1863, 437; retires from
Fredericksburg along the Potomac toward Washington, 439; crosses the
Potomac, 440; this menaces Lee's communications, 440.

_Hornesboro_, left flank of the enemy under Sherman repulsed by
General Wheeler, 635.

_Houses searched_ for arms by an armed force of the United States
Government in Baltimore, 464.

HUGER, General, delays the evacuation of Norfolk, 99; halted at
Petersburg, 100; moves to the north side of the James River and joins
General Johnston, 100; his movements affected by the rain, 125;
statement of General Rodes, 126; his line of march, 127; the
impediments, 127; expected by Longstreet, 127; ordered to pursue the
enemy, 141; his route, 142; his progress, how delayed, 144;
encounters a battery of rifled guns, 144; it is driven off, 145;
probable effect of his non-arrival in time, 146; gallant attack at
Malvern Hill, 148; placed at the Norfolk Navy-Yard for its
protection, 202; ordered to evacuate by General Johnston, 202; order
delayed by Secretary of War, 202; the fruits of Huger's system and
energy, 202, 203.

HUGER, Lieutenant THOMAS B., commands the McRae at New Orleans, 221.

HUNTER, Major-General, issues an order declaring the slaves in his
department for ever free, 181; countermanded as too soon, 181.

HUNTER, R. M. T., appointed to confer with Mr. Lincoln, 617.

"_I have no lawful right to do so_," words of President Lincoln
relative to his interference with slavery, 160.

IMBODEN, General, makes a demonstration toward Romney, 438; joins
Breckinridge in the upper Valley, 527.

_Indianola, The_, a gunboat on the Mississippi, 240; her size and
force, 240; captured by our river-boats, 241.

_Insane extravagances_, an apology for presenting such, to readers
under a constitutional Government of limited powers, 171.

_Intention, The_, to violate our constitutional right shown, 174.

_Interference with "the just powers" of a State_ causes a subversion
and subjugation of them, 460.

_International law_, every restraint of, broken through by the
Government of the United States, 2; violations of, by the Government
of the United States in the pillage and deportation of private
property, 8.

_Ironclads_, the first conflict between, 201.

_Island No. 10_, its situation, 76; its bombardment, 76; a portion of
our force retires and the remainder surrender, 76.

_Issue, the sole_, involved in the conflict of the United States
Government with the Confederate States, 293; an illustration, 293;
the question still lives, 294; the strife not over until the tyrant's
plea is bound in chains strong as adamant, 294; for which we fought,
582; the rights and sovereignty of the people, 582.

_Iuka_, a force of the enemy encountered by General Little, 387; a
bloody contest, 387; enemy driven back with a loss of nine guns, 387;
Grant arrives too late, 387.

Jackson, General T. J., rapid movements in the Shenandoah Valley,
106; attacks Port Royal, 106; arrives at Strasburg, 111; repulses
Fremont, 111; marches up the Valley. 111; reaches Harrisonburg and
turns toward Port Republic, 111; reaches Port Republic, 112; battle
with General Shields near Port Republic, 114; description of him by
General Taylor, 115; material results of this campaign in the Valley,
117; motives which influenced Jackson, 118; his object effected, 118;
recruits his forces, 118; reattacks the enemy, 118; drives him across
the Potomac, 119; plan to bring his force from the Valley to
Richmond, 131; the design masked, 131; instructions to Jackson, 131;
before reënforced, he routs the enemy and then follows Lee's
instructions, 132; directions to, under the order of battle by Lee,
133; ordered to pursue the enemy, 141; his route, 142; probable
effect of his non-arrival in time, 146; arrives on the battle-field,
147; forms his line, 147; his remark on the retreating foe, 150;
ordered with his division to Gordonsville to resist the advance of
General Pope, 312; fights the enemy at Cedar Run, 317; reënforcements
sent to, 320; his movement round the right of General Pope, 322;
attacks left flank of the enemy, 324; battle ensued, 324; enemy
retires, 324; subsequent battle of Manassas, 324; defeat of the
enemy, 326, 327; advances to intercept the retreat, 327; battle at Ox
Hill, 327; enemy escapes, 327; moves to attack Harper's Ferry, 330;
reduces Harper's Ferry, 332; extent of the surrender, 333; position
at Sharpsburg battle, 335; directed to advance toward Fredericksburg,
351; position of his corps at Fredericksburg, 354; turns the enemy's
right at Chancellorsville, 360; wounded by mistake in the darkness,
360.

_Jackson, Mississippi_, held by General J. E. Johnston, 425;
assaulted by Sherman, 425; Johnston withdraws across Pearl River, 425.

JENKINS, General, advances toward Winchester, 438; penetrates to
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 439.

JOHNSTON, General A. S., confronted by new commanders, 18; his
position altered by the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson, 36; his
preparations for retreat, 37; his successful retreat, 37; the enemy
unaware, 37; reaches Nashville, 38; public excitement, 38;
proceedings in Congress, 38; his removal asked, 38; answer of the
President, 38; Johnston's letter to the Secretary of War, 38; his
plans and further movements, 39; movements after the fall of
Donelson, 39; letter from the Secretary of War, 40; do. from the
President, 41; his reply relative to affairs, 42-47; review of the
events that brought such censure upon him, 48; his object to
concentrate at Corinth and fight the enemy in detail, 54; Grant first
and Buell afterward, 54; forces sent to him, 54; Bragg's account of
Johnston's efforts, 34; orders of battle at Shiloh, 55; the march,
55; its progress, 56; exclamation, "This is not war," 56; delay and
its cause, 56; his purpose, 57; his telegram to the President, 57;
the answer, 57; importance of an early attack, 57; conference with
generals, 60; progress of the battle, 58, 59; death of Johnston, 66;
circumstances, 66; case of Turenne, 68; incident at Buena Vista, 68.

JOHNSON, ANDREW. Lincoln, President, appoints Andrew Johnson military
Governor of Tennessee, 285; his object, 285.

JOHNSON, Colonel BRADLEY T., harasses the rear of General Judson
Kilpatrick, 505.

JOHNSTON, General JOSEPH E., ordered to the Peninsula of Virginia,
84; directed to proceed and examine the condition of affairs, 86;
recommends the abandonment of the Peninsula, 86; the recommendation
discussed, 87; anticipates that McClellan will soon advance and
attack Centreville, 87; his plan of operation in the Peninsula, 87;
writes to Commander Tatnall to proceed with the Virginia to York
River, 90; announces his intention to evacuate Yorktown, 92; policy
before Richmond, 101; remark that he expected to give up Richmond,
120; his plan for attacking McClellan, 120; unexpected firing, 122;
assigned to the Southern Department, 402; reply to General
Pemberton's request for cavalry, 402; orders to General Johnston,
403; telegram to the Secretary of War, 404; stops at Jackson and
corresponds with Pemberton, 405; dispatch to General Pemberton, 405;
reply, 406; further dispatches, 408; telegrams to the President and
Secretary of War, 412; communication to Pemberton, 413; entertained
quite different views from General Pemberton, 422; efforts to supply
the army of the former, 423; his message to General Pemberton, 423;
reply to the suggestion of relieving Port Hudson, 423; another
report, 423; falls back to Jackson after the surrender, 424;
appearance of the enemy, 424; extract from his report, 424; movements
of Sherman, 424; withdraws from Jackson, 426; directed to assume the
command of the Army of Tennessee, 547; total effective of the army,
547; position of the enemy's forces, 547; an onward movement
demanded, 548; considerations presented to General Johnston, 548; his
approval of an aggressive movement, 548; his proposition, 549; his
subsequent movements, 550-557; clamors for his removal, 557;
relieved, and Hood appointed, 557; put in command of the troops in
North Carolina, 631; relieves General Beauregard, 631; instructions
from General Lee, 632; Johnston's force, 632; his movements, 632; his
purposes, 634; takes position at Smithfield. 635; failure to
concentrate against the enemy's left wing, 636; moves to Raleigh,
637; conference with the President, 679-681; correspondence with
General Sherman, 684; the idea of a universal surrender, 699.

JOINVILLE, Prince de, describes the effect produced by the refusal of
President Lincoln to send McDowell's corps to reënforce General
McClellan, 90; extract from his letter, 90.

JONES, Lieutenant Catesby Ap R., commands the Virginia in the combat
with the Monitor, 200; signals the Monitor to renew the combat
without success, 201.

JONES, General J. K., at Sharpsburg battle, 335.

JONES, General SAMUEL, commanded in southwest Virginia, 426.

JONES, General W. E., encounters Hunter in the Valley, and is killed,
529.

_Just powers_ of government, only those which are derived from the
free and unconstrained consent of the governed, 2252; object and end
for which they are derived, 452.

KEARNEY, Major-General, left dead on the field, 327.

_Kelly's Ford_, attack and surprise of the enemy at, 449.

KENNON, Lieutenant BEVERLY, sinks the Varuna at New Orleans, 221; his
report, 221.

KENT, Chancellor, on the rights of belligerents, 271.

_Kentucky_, the first step taken for the subjugation of the State
government and the people consisted in an interference, by an armed
force, of the Government of the United States with the voters at the
State election, 468; object to secure the rejection of as many votes
as possible antagonistic to the emancipation measures of the
Government of the United States, 468; none allowed to be candidates
but its friends, 468; martial law declared by General Burnside,
commander of the Department of Ohio, 468; orders regulating the
election issued by military commanders in the State, 469; armed
soldiers stationed at the polls, 469; the result, 469; statement of
the Governor,469; its meaning, 470; negroes enrolled as soldiers by
the United States Government, 470; verbal arrangement effected at
Washington by the Governor, 470; his complaint of its offensive
violations, 470; arrest of peaceful citizens by soldiers of the
United States Government, 470; outrages described by the Governor,
470; declaration of martial law throughout the State by President
Lincoln, and the suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_, 471; a
large number of eminent citizens arrested by the military force of
the Government of the United States, 471; judges, merchants, and
young women banished from the State without a trial or hearing, 471;
at a State election for Judge of the High Court of Appeals, the
commanding General of the United States Government orders that the
name of the Chief-Justice shall not be allowed to appear on the
poll-books as a candidate, 472; the duties of the Governor relating
to elections, 472; twenty thousand slaves enlisted in the armies of
the Government of the United States, 472; United States Congress
passes an act declaring that the wives and children of these soldiers
shall be free, 473; everything swept away by the emancipation
proclamation, 473.

_Kernstown_, the enemy at, attacked by Early, 531; routs him, 531.

KERSHAW, General, moves his division toward Amelia Court-House, 662.

KILPATRICK, General, marches to make a dash on Richmond, 505;
harassed in his rear by Colonel Bradley T. Johnson and sixty
Marylanders, 505; reaches the defenses of Richmond, 505; an
engagement, 505; retreats and is attacked at night by General Wade
Hampton, 505; enemy fled on a gallop, 505.

KINGSBURY, Lieutenant, remark relative to the battle of Buena Vista,
68.

_Kinslon, North Carolina_, a body of Sherman's force attacked and
routed by General Bragg, 635.

LAIRD, Mr., senior, applied to, to build vessels for the Northern
Government, 248; his statement in the British House of Commons, 248;
extracts from, letters, 248; statement of the condition of the
Alabama when she sailed, 249; presents records of the Custom-House on
exports to Northern States, 249.

LAMB, Colonel, seriously wounded in the defense of Fort Fisher, 646.

_Language of the Governor of Maryland_, on the interference by the
United States Government with the State elections, 465, 466.

_Last fragments of the Constitution_ to be thrown aside to secure our
subjugation, 170.

_Law, International_, on the capture and confiscation of private
property in war, 163.

LAWTON, General A. R., ordered to unite with Jackson in the Valley,
133; at Sharpsburg battle, 335; quartermaster of the Confederate
army, 647.

LEE, General Robert E., assumes command of the Carolinas and Florida,
80; his plans for coast defense, 80; the system he organized, 80; its
success, 81; takes command of the army around Richmond, 130;
commences the construction of earthworks, 130; plans for the future,
131; answer to the President, 132; his order of battle in the attack
on General McClellan, 134; advances against General Pope, 312; battle
of Cedar Run, 317; its success, 320; enemy falls back, 320; moves up
the Rappahannock, 321; skirmishes along the fords, 321; Jackson
crosses the river, but falls back owing to a storm, 321; Longstreet
ordered to his support, 322; position of Jackson, 322; position of
the enemy, 322; forces ordered from Richmond, 322; plan of operations
now determined on, 322; movement of Jackson round the right of Pope's
army, 322; Manassas Junction depot captured at night, 323; Ewell
repulses the enemy at Bristoe Station and joins Jackson, 323;
position of General Pope, 323; Taliaferro halts at the Manassas
battle-field, 324; joined by Hill and Ewell, 324; attack of Jackson
on enemy's left flank, 324; enemy retire, 324; battle of Manassas,
324; retreat of the enemy, 326; night puts an end to the pursuit,
327; enemy retreats to Washington, 327; strength of forces, 328;
losses, 328; marches toward Leesburg, 328; decided to cross the
Potomac, 329; reasons for the decision, 329; the plan, 330; movements
of the divisions, 330; slow advance of the enemy, 331; order of
General Lee found by the enemy, 331; facts relative to the lost
order, 331; action at Boonsboro Gap, 332; retires to Sharpsburg, 382;
Harper's Ferry reduced by General Jackson, 332; forces concentrated
at Sharpsburg, 333; letter from the President, 333; address to the
people of Maryland by General Lee, 333; concentrates at Sharpsburg,
334; fights the battle at Sharpsburg, 335, 336; strength of Lee's
army, 338; position of his forces on the next day, 338; withdraws his
army south of the Potomac, 338; moves to Martinsburg and then to the
vicinity of Bunker Hill, 338; the contest on the left, 389; strength
of armies and losses, 342; advances to Fredericksburg, 351; takes a
position to resist an advance of the enemy after crossing the river,
352; advance of Burnside to lay bridges, 352; repelled with great
slaughter, 352, 353; Lee's forces in order and position, 354; the
attack by Burnside's army, 354, 355; its repulse, 355; withdrawn in
the night, 356; a period of inactivity ensues, 357; distribution of
his army, 357; some unimportant engagements, 357; movements of the
enemy indicate the resumption of active operations, 357; our
dispositions made with a view to resist a direct advance, 357; leaves
sufficient to hold the lines and moves the rest of his force toward
Chancellorsville, 358; his successful attack upon Hooker, 359, 360;
in full possession of the field, 361; enemy's successful attack
before Fredericksburg, 362; threatens our communications, 362;
reënforcements sent to Salem Church, 362; enemy repulsed and broke,
363; attack renewed on Hooker, 364; enemy recrosses the river and
retires from Fredericksburg, 364; reorganizes his forces in the
spring of 1863, 437; decides by a bold movement to attempt to
transfer hostilities to the north side of the Potomac, 437; movement
of his forces, 438; further movements, 439, 440; concentrates at
Gettysburg, 440; decides to renew the attack of the first day, 443;
the conflict, 443; determines to continue the conflict, 443; retires
toward the Potomac, 444; crosses, 445; strength of his army at
Gettysburg, 446; do. of Meade, 446; losses, 446; his report, 446;
testimony of General Meade, 447; moves to attack the flank of the
enemy, 449; result, 449; affair at Kelly Ford, 449; puts his troops
in motion soon as Grant's movement was known, 517; his troops
encountered near Old Wilderness tavern, 517; the engagement, 517;
further movements, 518; the line of battle, 518; the struggle, 518;
the adversary completely foiled, 518; the attack renewed, 519; Lee
comes on the field, 519; the assault checked, 519; attack on the
left, 519; the foe surprised and routed, 519; Longstreet wounded by
mistake, 520; on the next day an attack on the right and left flank,
520; Grant makes a rapid flank movement to Spottsylvania Court-House,
520; Lee's movement in advance, 520; on the next day the armies swung
round on their advance and confronted each other in line of battle,
521; a proud scene for Mississippians, 521; the contest of the day,
521; capture of General E. Johnson and most of his division, 522;
divines Grant's objective point and frustrates him, 528; the peril of
Grant's army, 528; reënforcements to Lee, 524; Grant's movements to
Cold Harbor, 524; fruitless efforts of Grant to drive back Lee's
forces, 6524; fearful carnage of the enemy, 524; his force on the
Rapidan with which to meet Grant, 525; his letter to General Halleck
relative to the execution of William B. Mumford, 590; letters to
General Grant relative to the exchange of prisoners, 599, 600;
crosses the James at Drury's Bluff, 637; occupies the intrenchments
at Petersburg, 638; his defense of, 640; conference with the
President on the state of affairs, 648; the programme adopted, 648;
presents the idea of a sortie, 649; adopted, 649; its failure, 650;
his letter to the President stating final movements, 660.

LEE, General G. W. C., moves his division from Chapin's Bluff to
retreat from Richmond, 662; his promotion, 664.

LEE, General W. H. F., watches the fords of the Rappahannock with his
cavalry, 352; repulses a cavalry expedition near Ream's Station, 639.

_Legislature of a State_, some of its members seized and confined in
a distant prison, 2.

_Liberty_, its fundamental principles denied by the action of the
Government of the United States in Tennessee, 456; the people the
source of all power, 460.

_Life, personal liberty, and property_, their protection to be could
only in the State governments, 451.

LINCOLN, President, his message, 6; recommends the colonization of
the negroes at some places in a climate congenial to them, 6; refuses
the repeated requests of General McClellan for McDowell's corps, 91;
writes to McClellan, 91; do. on the strength of his forces, 91;
relative to request for Parrott guns, 92; words of his inaugural
relative to the institution of slavery, 160; the principle thus
announced, 160; message to Congress saying, "It is startling to think
that Congress can free a slave within a State," 169; how the deed
should be attempted, 169; a deceptive use of language, 170; message
to Congress approving the act to emancipate slaves in the District of
Columbia, 172; extract, 172; previous action of Congress, 172; a
series of usurpations by, 178; recommends the adoption of a
resolution that the United States ought to coöperate with any State
which might adopt the gradual abolition of slavery, 179; his reasons
for the measure, 179; objections, 179; his proclamation declaring the
emancipation proclamation of General Hunter void, 181; extract, 181;
his subsequent remarks, 181; remarks to border States Representatives,
183; charges of remissness of his abolition supporters, 185; demands
of Chicago Christians of, 186; answer of Mr. Lincoln, 186; declaration
of his intentions in the proclamation of April 15, 1861, 189; his
declaration under oath, 189; his declarations to the Cabinets of Great
Britain and France, 190; object of such declarations, 190; his boast of
the effect of his emancipation proclamation, 192; the facts presented,
192; his proclamation for making a Union State out of a fragment of a
Confederate State, 297; his reliance on the "war power" declared,
298; declines to prevent the interference with the elections in
Maryland by an armed force of the United States Government, 465;
announcement of his terms of peace, 612; meets our commissioners at
Hampton Roads, 618; results, 619; statement in his message to
Congress on December 6, 1864, 620; the words of his inauguration
oath, 620; words of the Constitution, 621; his words, 621; the
Constitution the supreme law, 621; his oath, 621.

LITTLE, General HENRY, services at the battle of Pea Ridge, 51;
attacks Rosecrans near Iuka, 387; a bloody contest, 387; he is
killed, 387; remarks, 387.

LONG, General A. L., description of our coast defenses, 79.

LONGSTREET, General JAMES, report on battle at Seven Pines, 124;
ordered to attack, 127; explains the delay, 127; made the attack
successfully by aid of Hill, 127; ordered to make a diversion in
favor of Hill, 137; the feint converted into an attack, 137;
continues the pursuit to Frazier's Farm, 145; manner in which he led
his reserve to the rescue at Frazier's Farm, 146; joins Jackson at
Manassas, 324; crosses South Mountain and moves toward Boonsboro,
330; his position at Sharpsburg, 335; occupies the left at
Fredericksburg, 353; recalled from the James River to Chancellorsville,
363; commands the left wing at Chickamauga, 432; besieges Burnside in
Knoxville, 436; moves to Virginia and joins Lee, 436; commands the First
Corps of Lee's army in the spring of 1863, 437; movement to draw Hooker
farther from his base, 439; crosses the Potomac, 440; occupies the right
at Gettysburg, 443; drives the enemy back at the Wilderness struggle, 519;
severely wounded by mistake, 519; further movements, 519.

LORD CHIEF BARON of the Exchequer, his charge in England in the case
of our ship the Alexandra, 272; the rights of belligerents, 272, 273.

LORING, General, joins General Bowen near Grand Gulf, 402.

_Louisiana_ proceedings of General Butler after the occupation of New
Orleans, 287; martial law declared and a military Governor appointed,
287; atrocities committed upon the citizens, 287, 288; Order No. 28,
289; cold-blooded execution of William B. Mumford, 289; local courts
set up, 290; military power attempts to administer civil affairs,
290; order of President Lincoln creating a State court, 290; words of
the Constitution, 292; the court a mere instrument of martial law,
292; asserted his right to do so on the ground of necessity, 292; the
doctrine of necessity considered, 293-295; election of members of
Congress on proclamation of the military Governor, 296; what the law
required, 296; its violation sustained by Congress, 296; proclamation
of President Lincoln to make a State out of a fragment of a State,
297; a so-called election for State officers and members of a State
Constitutional Convention held, 301; so-called State Convention, 302;
attempts to amend the State Constitution, 302; Louisiana not a
republican State, 302; not instituted by the consent of the governed,
302; attempt by the United States Government to enforce a fiction,
302; subversion of the State government, 458; registration of voters
required by the United States Government, 458; the oath, 458;
punishment of perjury threatened, 458; proclamation entering an
election of State officers, 458; further conditions, 458; effect of
these proceedings, 459; effect of these proceedings was to establish
a number of persons pledged to support the United States Government
as voters and State government, 459; this work could be done only by
the sovereign people, 459.

_Louisiana_, an iron-clad, her capacity, 219; destroyed, 219; her
incomplete condition at the defense of New Orleans, 220.

LOVELL, General, sent with a brigade to Corinth, 54; expresses
satisfaction with the land defenses at New Orleans, 213; evacuates
the city, 217; at New Orleans after the fleet passed the forts, 222;
withdraws his force, and public property, 223.

"_Loyal_," the word, its signification, 581.

"_Loyalty or disloyalty_," the only distinction among citizens of the
Northern States, in their relation to the Government of the United
States, 488.

MADISON, James, statement regarding war between the States, 5.

MAFFITT, Captain JOHN N., takes command of the cruiser Florida, 259;
detained in Nassau by yellow fever, 259; sails for Havana, 260; goes
to Mobile for equipment of his vessel, 260; enemy's fleet gather off
the harbor to prevent his escape, 260; runs the blockade and
skillfully evades the enemy, 260; his cruises, 261; fits out the
tender Clarence, 261; captures of the Florida, 261; Maffit, through
sickness, relieved of the command, 261.

MAGRUDER, General JOHN B., in command on the Virginia Peninsula, 83;
constructs an intrenched line across the Peninsula at Warwick River,
83; his force, 83; the form and construction of the line to resist
McClellan's advance, 83; other means of defense, 84; a second line
constructed near Williamsburg, 84; his position on the arrival of
General McClellan, 84; its advantages, 85; falls back to the line of
Warwick River, 85; his labor in constructing and strengthening his
defenses, 86; statement of General Early, 86; attempts to break his
line, 88; he orders sorties, 88; the enemy in strong force, 89;
compelled by illness to leave his division, 94; deficiency of land
transportation on the withdrawal from Yorktown, 94; constructed
defenses at Williamsburg, 94; ordered to pursue the enemy, 141;
attacks, 141; gallant attack at Malvern Hill, 148; assigned command
of the Department of Texas, 233; his conflict in Galveston Harbor
with the enemy's fleet, 234; his success, 234; his report, 235.

_Magruder, Fort_, the largest work at Williamsburg, 94.

_Malvern Hill_, its situation, 147; occupied by McClellan's army,
147; its position, 147; arrangement of our army, 147; use of
artillery impracticable, 148; a general advance ordered, 148; not
simultaneous, 148; the attack on the right, 148; approach of
darkness, 149; nearness of the combatants after the conflict closed,
149; an informal truce established, 140; rain in the morning, and the
enemy's position entirely deserted, 149; evidence of precipitate
retreat, 149; the foe at Harrison's Landing, 150.

MALLORY, Secretary S. R., his efforts to complete the construction of
vessels for the defense of New Orleans, 226, 227; inquiries relative
to the raft below New Orleans, 229.

_Manassas_, the second battle at, 324: retreat of the enemy, 326;
night put an end to the pursuit, 327.

MANN, DUDLEY, our representative in Belgium, 368.

_Mansfield_, battle at, between the forces of General Taylor and
General Banks, 542.

_Maritime war_, the losses of, briefly stated, 282.

MARCY, WILLIAM E., on the capture of private property in war, 163.

_Marque, letters of_, issued by the President of the Confederate
States, 582; vessels captured, 582; treatment of the prisoners, 582;
opinion of United States Court, 582.

MARSHALL, General HUMPHREY, opposed to Colonel Garfield in Kentucky,
18; strength of his force, 18; falls back as Garfield advances, 18;
takes position at at Middle Creek, 19; attacked by Garfield, 19;
report of Marshall, 19; result, 19.

MARSHALL, Chief-Justice JOHN, on the capture and confiscation of
private property, 163.

_Marshals, Provost-General_ and special, appointed by the Government
of the United States in all the Northern States, 495; their duties,
495; civil officers and soldiers made subject to their orders, 495; a
military control established in every Northern State by the
Government of the United States, 496.

_Maryland_, a military force of United States Government occupies
Baltimore, 460; order of the commander declaring martial law, 461;
this force had no constitutional permission to come into Maryland,
461; the civil government suspended, 461; where were the "just
powers" of the State government at this time, 461; suspended by the
commanding General, 461; invasion of some of the unalienable rights
of the citizens, 461; provisions of the United States Constitution,
462; instances of the violations of personal liberty, 462; case of
John Merryman, 463; number of personal arrests in one month, 464;
seizure of newspapers, 464; houses searched for arms, 464;
interference with the State elections by armed force of the United
States Government, 464, 465; President declines to prevent it, 465;
proclamation of the Governor, 465, 466; result, 466; Constitutional
Convention assembled, 467; objections to the Constitution, 467;
voters required to take an oath previous to voting at an election
where the adoption or rejection of the oath was one of the issues,
467; the so-called Constitution declared adopted and the slaves
emancipated, 467; cautious and stealthy proceedings of the United
States Government, 468.

MASON, JOHN M., our representative in London, 368.

MAURY, Captain W. L., commands the cruiser Georgia, 263.

_McAllister, Fort_, taken by Sherman's force, 572.

MCCLELLAN, General GEORGE B., cautions the authorities at Washington
against their emancipation measures, 9; assigned to the chief command
of army of the United States, 18; presents an argument to President
Lincoln against an advance by Centreville and Manassas, but in favor
of a movement down the Chesapeake Bay into the Rappahannock River,
82; his reconnaissance, 82; its results stated by him in a letter,
82; the latter movement approved, 82; reason for ordering his
transports to Washington, 83; concentrates at Fortress Monroe, 83,
84; advances up the Peninsula, 85; repulsed in several assaults at
Yorktown, commences a siege by regular approaches, 85; letter to
Secretary Stanton on the strength of our forces, 85; reports the
strength of his own force, 86; his views at Yorktown, 89; testimony
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 89; report on the
affair between Hancock and Early at Williamsburg, 94; statement of
General Early, 94; testimony at the court-martial of McDowell, 105;
his position regarded as critical, 135; reasons, 135; his failure
apparently anticipated by the United States Government, 135;
reënforcements to, cut off, 135; position behind Powhite Creek, 136;
retreats from Frazier's Farm to Malvern Hill, 147; its situation,
147; his position, 147; his letter on the manner of conducting the
war, 314; part of his forces leave Westover, 320; report of his
strength at Sharpsburg, 342; moves his army southward from
Sharpsburg, 351; approaches Fredericksburg, 351; removed from
command, 351.

MCCOWN, Brigadier-General J. P., as signed to command of Island No.
10, 52.

MCCULLOCH, General BEN, killed in the battle of Pea Ridge, 50.

MCLAWS, General, ordered to seize Maryland Heights, 330; embarrassed
by the presence of the enemy, 333; marches to Sharpsburg, 333.

MCRAE, Colonel, succeeds to the command after General Early retires
wounded at Williamsburg, 96; report of subsequent events, 96.

MEADE, General GEORGE G., succeeds General Hooker, 443; his position
at Gettysburg, 443; continues to strengthen his line, 444; his
opinion that an attack on Lee would have resulted disastrously, 445;
his testimony, 447; moves a force to Madison Court-House, 504; a
feint to engage the attention of Lee, 504; other plans for the
surprise and capture of Richmond, 504.

_Medicines_, proposal by our commissioner to purchase medicines of
the United States authorities, to be used exclusively for the relief
of the Union prisoners, 602; no reply ever received, 602.

_Memphis_, advance of the enemy's fleet toward, 77; encounters our
fleet and has one ram disabled, 77; our fleet retires, 77; occupation
of the town by the enemy no longer disputed, 77.

MERRYMAN, JOHN, seized in his bed by an armed force of the United
States Government, 463; writ of _habeas corpus_ granted, 463;
disobeyed, 463; decision of Chief-Justice Taney, 463.

_Military commissions_, two trials before, filled the country with
horror, 496; specification in the first, 496; for the assassination
of the President, 496; the sentence, 496; insertion of the name of
the President of the Confederate States among those of the
conspirators, an exhibition of the malignancy of the Government of
the United States, 496; the case of Mrs. Surratt awakened much
sympathy, 497; efforts to obtain a respite, 497; the trial of Major
Wirz, 497; proclamation of President Johnson against the President of
the Confederate States, 497; the condemnation of Wirz, 498; efforts
to prevail upon him to implicate the President of the Confederate
States in the great mortality of Northern soldiers as prisoners, 498;
declaration of Mr. Louis Schade, of Washington, 498; letter of
Captain C. B. Winder, 499; do. of Rev. F. E. Boyle, 499; order of
General Burnside in Ohio, 501; comments of C. L. Vallandigham on the
order, 501, 502; his arrest, trial, and sentence to imprisonment in
Boston Harbor, 502; letter of Governor Seymour on the military
usurpation, 502; similar proceedings in Indiana, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Vermont, 502, 503.

_Military power_, its attempt to administer civil affairs, 290; a
subversion of fundamental principles, 290.

_Mine Run_, unsuccessful movement of General Meade, 449; his loss,
450.

_Mississippi, west of_, active operations in the beginning of 1862,
49.

_Mississippi River_ surrendered by the loss of Vicksburg and Port
Hudson, 425.

_Missouri_, proposal of President Lincoln to make an irrepealable
compact with, 180; forbidden by the Constitution, 180; its words,
180; a proposal to the State to surrender its sovereignty, 180; most
conciliatory propositions of the Governor rejected by the Government
of the United States, 473; he calls fifty thousand State militia into
active service for the purpose of repelling invasion and for the
protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the citizens, 473;
his words, 473; order from Washington to the commanding General, 474;
this order a pretext for domestic violence, 474; terms of the
Constitution on which the Government of the United States may
interfere in a State, 474; the bravery of the Governor, 474; charged
by the Government of the United States with purposes of treason, 474,
475; words of the military commander, 475; troops of United States
Government poured into the State, 475; proceedings of the State
Convention, 475; violations of constitutional principles committed,
475; final proceedings, 476.

_Mexico_, our treatment of private property in the war with, 8.

_Mobile Harbor_, its defenses, 205; torpedoes also used, 205; combat
with Admiral Farragut's fleet, 206; quite creditable to the
Confederacy, 206; bombardment of the forts, 207; torpedoes, 209.

_Money in the Confederate Treasury_, transferred to the financial
agent of the Government by Secretary Reagan, 695.

MONROE, JOHN T., the Mayor of New Or leans, 231; reply to the demands
of Commodore Farragut, 231.

_Monstrous crime, A_, fearlessly charged as committed by the
Government of the United States against Constitutional liberty in the
subversion and subjugation of the State governments, 453.

MORGAN, General, attacks a brigade of the enemy at Hartsville, 384;
the brigade surrenders, 384; defeats the efforts of the enemy in the
Shenandoah Valley, 527.

MORRIS, Captain C. M., commands the cruiser Florida, 261; enters the
harbor of Bahia, 262; ship seized by the enemy, 262.

MOTT, Colonel CHRISTOPHER, killed at Williamsburg, 99; a brave
soldier in the war with Mexico, 99.

MUMFORD, WILLIAM B., his cold-blooded execution by Major-General
Butler at New Orleans, 289; letter of General Lee to General Halleck,
relative to the execution of, 590.

_Murfreesboro_, position of General Bragg at, 384; his strength. 384;
Rosecrans advances to attack him, 384; Rosecrans's strength, 384;
position of our line, 384; conflict begun by General Bragg, 385;
result of the series of engagements, 385.

MURRAY, E. C, contracts for building the Louisiana at New Orleans,
225; his testimony, 225.

_Muskets_ of obsolete patterns and shotguns used by our soldiers at
Fishing Creek, 22.

_Nashville_, effect of its evacuation by General A. S. Johnston, 40;
demands for his removal, 40; Congress takes the matter in hand, 40.

_Navy Department, The_, its organization, 194; two classes of vessels,
104; discussions and experiments relative to floating batteries, 194;
agreement relative to Norfolk Navy-Yard, 195; disregarded, 195;
destruction of property, 196; the Merrimac transformed into the
ironclad Virginia, 196; her trial-trip, 196; her consorts, 196; fleet
of the enemy, 197; the Virginia makes an attack, 197; destruction of
the frigate Cumberland, 197; destruction of the frigate Congress,
198; Buchanan wounded, 199; appearance of the Monitor, 199; Virginia
attacks and drives her into shoal water, 200.

"_Necessity_," pleaded by Congress to justify its usurpations of
power, 161; extent of this power from necessity, 179; the existence
of the necessity tested, 187; the doctrine of, incorporated as an
unwritten clause of the Constitution of the United States, 293; what
is this necessity? 293; a fundamental maxim, 293; no man can be
trusted with the exercise of power and be the judge of its limits,
293; the grants of power in the Constitution limited, 293; limits all
disregarded, and the people accepted the plea of necessity, 293; a
fatal subversion of the United States Constitution, 293; the sole
issue of the war, 293; the question still lives, 294; all nations and
peoples that adopt a confederated agent of government will become
champions of our cause, 295.

_Neutrality, Peaceful, of a State_, all propositions for, refused by
the Government of the United States, 2.

_Neutral nations_, what is their duty under international law with
regard to the construction and equipment of cruisers for either
belligerent, and the supply of warlike stores, 269; proceedings of
the United States after the Revolutionary War, 269; demands of the
British plenipotentiary, 269; reply of Mr. Jefferson, 269; the
admission of Washington, 270; attempt of United States Government to
contract, if successful, would have been a direct violation of
international law, 270; circumstances of the construction of our
cruisers, 270; Minister Adams's claim for damages, 270; Earl
Russell's reply, 270; Mr. Seward's answer to Earl Russell, 271; the
response of the latter, 271; views of Chancellor Kent, 271; views of
President Pierce in a message to Congress, 272; charge of the Lord
Chief Baron of the Exchequer, 272, 273.

_New Ironsides_, attacks on her with torpedoes, 208.

_New Madrid_, assaulted by Major-General Pope, 76; assault repulsed
three times, 76; the place evacuated, 76.

_New Orleans_, its importance, 210; numerous approaches for an
attacking party, 210; an attack apprehended to come from up the
river, 210; the bar at the mouth of the river, 211; means of defense
in preparation, 211; the forts, 211; their armament, 211; their
condition stated by General Duncan, 212; the garrisons, 212; the
construction of a raft, 212; repeated failures, 212; general plan of
defense for the city, 213; two lines of works, 213; course of the
exterior one, 213; course of the interior one, and its location, 213;
opinion of General Lovell, 213; guns on the interior line of defense,
213; the ironclads, 214; the main reliance for defense on the forts,
with the obstructions, 214; force of the enemy's fleet, 214;
bombardment of the forts, 214; preparations to pass the forts, 214;
movements of the fleet, 215; Duncan's report of its passage of the
forts, 215; further movements of the fleet, 216; statement of General
Smith respecting the forts on the river, 216; do. of General Duncan,
216; the effect of the darkness of the night, 216; surrender of the
city demanded, 217; evacuated by General Lovell, 217; surrender of
the forts demanded, 217; refused, 217; address of General Duncan to
the garrisons, 217; skill and gallantry of Colonel Higgins, 218;
revolt of the garrison of Fort Jackson, 218; forts surrendered, 219;
destruction of the Louisiana, 219; state of the other defenses
afloat, 220; damage to the enemy's fleet, 221; loss of the Varuna,
221; action of other vessels, 221; confusion in the city when the
fleet arrived, 222; batteries below the city, 222; the city saved
from bombardment, 223; General Lovell retires with his force, 223;
causes assigned for the fall of, 224; their consideration, 224; its
fall a great disaster, 225; attack on the naval constructors and
Secretary of the Navy, 225; testimony, 226; efforts of the Secretary,
226; number of guns sent to, 228; iron plates not to be procured,
228; laboratory at, 228; Commodore Farragut demands the surrender of
the city, 231; request that the United States flag shall be hoisted
on public buildings, 231; reply of the Mayor, 231; Farragut sends a
detachment to hoist and guard the flag, 231; arrival of General
Butler, 232; a reign of terror, pillage, and a long train of
infamies, 232; brief reference to the history of the city, 231.

_New York_, its subjugation, 477; unalienable right of the people
left without a protector, 477; ringing of a little bell, 478;
proceedings at the arrest and imprisonment of an individual, 478;
number arrested and imprisoned, 478; safeguards of the citizen for
the protection of his unalienable rights, 479; what they were in New
York, 479; worthless as the paper on which they were printed, 479;
further safeguards in the Constitution of the United States, 479; the
writ of _habeas corpus_ and the only conditions on which it can be
suspended, 480; instances of the violations of the safeguards of the
citizens in New York by the Government of the United States, 481;
President Lincoln adopts them as his act, 481; utter disregard of the
writ of _habeas corpus_ in New York, 481; the Constitution, the laws,
the courts, the Executive authority of the State, subverted and
turned from the end for which they were instituted, 482; opinion of
Mr. Justice Nelson on the military proceedings of the Government of
the United States, 482; prison of New York Harbor overflows, 482;
surplus sent to Boston Harbor, or Washington, or Baltimore prisons,
482; attempt to relieve them by sending persons to investigate the
cases of those willing to take an oath of allegiance to the
Government of the United States, 482; made a condition precedent that
the prisoner should take the oath, 482; the oath, 483; case of
Messrs. Flanders who refuse the oath, 483; words of the Constitution
declaring that the accused shall have the right of counsel, 484;
Government of the United States refuses to recognize the counsel of
prisoners, and looks with distrust on all such applications, 484;
victims of this violence found in almost every Northern State, 484;
result of the elections causes an order for the release of prisoners
to be issued by the Government of the United States, 484; the order,
485; another step for the subjugation of the judiciary of the State,
485; an act of Congress authorizes the removal of all actions against
officers of the Government for tests in arrests, for trial to the
Circuit Court of the Government itself, 485; its command to the State
courts, 485; the obedience of the New York courts to the command,
486; subjugation of New York and the Northern States by the
suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_ in their limits, 486; two
facts required to exist before Congress could pass such an act, 486;
Congress violates the Constitution, 487; what was New York? 488; the
proclamation of the President suspending the writ of _habeas corpus_
throughout all the Northern States, 488; no autocrat ever issued an
edict more destructive of the natural right to personal liberty, 488;
the subversion of the governments of the Northern States, 488; all
those liberties of conduct and action which stamp the true freeman
were gone, 488; another step in the subjugation of the State of New
York, 488; letter of the commanding General of the United States
forces in New York to the Governor of the State, 488; reply of the
Governor, 489; response of the commanding General, 489; rejoinder of
the Governor, 489; the commanding General now states to the Governor
that the Government of the United States has sent to him "a force
adequate to the object," 490; forty-two regiments and two batteries
sent to New York, 490; another act manifesting the subjugation of the
government of the State by the military power of the Government of
the United States, 490; seizure of newspaper offices in New York by
soldiers under the orders of the Government of the United States,
490; the Governor of the State causes the commanding General to be
taken into custody, 491; the instructions sent by the Government of
the United States to the commanding General that "he must not be
deprived of his liberty to obey any order of a military nature which
the President directs him to execute," 491; the authority of New York
was subjugated, 491; another act of subjugation was the interference
of the Government of the United States with the Presidential election
in the State, 491; a pretended necessity worked up, 491; details of
the preparations, 492; military force increased, 492; vote of the
soldiers in the field to be taken, 492; agents sent by the State to
take the vote seized by soldiers of the Government of the United
States and imprisoned, 492; the description of the imprisonment, 493;
demands of the State in behalf of their agents, 493; refused by the
Government of the United States, 494; tried before a military
commission, 494; terms upon which the State acceded to the Union, 623.

_Norfolk_, its evacuation delayed for the removal of property, 93; an
expedition by the enemy against, contemplated, 100; account of the
Comte de Paris, 100; its evacuation and occupation by the enemy, 100;
detachments previously sent to General Anderson, near Fredericksburg
and elsewhere, 101.

_Norfolk Navy-Yard_, destruction at, 195.

_North Carolina_, efforts to concentrate our troops to resist the
army of General Sherman, 630.

_Northern people_, amazing insensibility to the crisis before them,
4; would not realize the resistance that would be made, 4; blind to
palpable results, 4; a league with the spirit of evil, 4; its
condition, 4; slow to comprehend the reality of armed resistance, 5.

_Northern States_, provisions for the freedom of speech, of the
press, and the personal liberty of the citizen daily violated in, 8;
the events in them similar to those in New York, 494; sovereignty of
the people entirely disregarded by the Government of the United
States, 494; the operation of the institutions established for the
protection of the rights of the people, nullified by the military
force of the Government of the United States, 495; a military
domination established, 495; general and special provost-marshals
appointed in every State, 495; their duties, 496; the forces granted
to aid them, 495; military control established in every Northern
State, by the usurpation of the Government of the United States, 496.

_Oath_, the voters in Maryland required to take an oath previous to
voting at an election where one of the questions was the adoption or
rejection of the oath, 467.

_Object of the war_, the declaration of Congress, 189.

_Objects_ for which the Government of the United States was
instituted, stated in the preamble of the Constitution, 454.

_Obstinacy, extreme_, observable in the original party of abolition,
4.

_Offensive-defensive policy_, how inaugurated at Richmond, 132; its
successful result, 132.

"_Offensively_," signification of the word as used by General Grant
relative to the exchange of prisoners, 599.

_Open brow and fearless tread of the American citizen_, all were gone
in the Northern States, 488.

_Organization of "just powers_" the object for which it is done, 452.

_Origin of the United States Government,_ sprang from certain
circumstances, which existed in the course of human affairs, 453; the
articles of agreement made by certain friendly States proposing to
form a society of States, 453.

"_Other purposes_" the signification of the words explained in an act
of the United States Congress, 345.

OULD, ROBERT C, our commissioner for the exchange of prisoners, 595;
his proposals to the United States commissioner, 598; no reply ever
made, 598; his communication relative to conferences with General
Butler, the United States commissioner of exchange, 598.

_Outrages in Kentucky_, by the soldiers of the Government of the
United States, described by the Governor, 470.

_Panic at Washington_, its cause, 106; movements of Jackson in the
Shenandoah Valley, 106; pursues General Banks across the Potomac,
106; excitement with General Geary, 106; alarm of the enemy at
Catlett's Station, 107; retreat of Duryea to Centreville and telegram
to Washington for help, 107; telegrams of Secretary Stanton to
Northern Governors for militia to defend Washington, 107; call of the
Governor of New York, 107; call of the Governor of Pennsylvania, 107;
call of the Governor of Massachusetts, 108; call of the Governor of
Ohio, 108; order of Secretary Stanton taking military possession of
all the Northern railroads, 109; order of President Lincoln to
General McDowell, 109.

_Paris Congress, The_, its declaration of principles, 372.

_Paul Jones_, destroyed many of his prizes 281; all ports closed to
us, 370.

_Peace negotiations_, our subjugation was the purpose of the
Government of the United States, 608; established by the terms and
conditions offered to us, 608; Major Pitcairn's words, 609;
commissioners sent before hostilities, 609; next a letter sent, 609;
the third time a commissioner sent, 609; not allowed to pass, 609;
the next movement was the appearance of two persons from Washington,
610; their propositions, 610; Mr. Lincoln's views, 610; they depart,
611; Three commissioners appointed to visit Canada, 611; announcement
of Mr. Lincoln, 612; visit of Mr. Francis P. Blair, 612; confidential
conversation with the President, 612, 615; letter given to Mr. Blair,
615; answer of Mr. Lincoln, 616; return of Mr. Blair, 616; his
statements, 616; military convention suggested, 617; com missioners
appointed, 617; their commission, 617; objections, 617; meeting at
Hampton Roads, 618; Mr. Seward's version, 618; change of Mr.
Lincoln's views as to the place of meeting, 618; Mr. Blair's visit,
618; statement of Mr. Hunter, 618; remarks, 619; report of the
commissioners, 619; closing of negotiations, 620; statement of Judge
Campbell, 620; terms of peace stated in Mr. Lincoln's message to
Congress on December 6, 1864, 620; his actions compared with the
Constitution, 621; reserved rights of the States, 622; terms on which
Now York ratified the Constitution, 623; who violated the
Constitution? 624; who is responsible for the war? 624; terms of
surrender offered to our soldiers, 624.

PEGRAM, Commander R. B., sails the Nashville, 264.

PEMBERTON, General J. C, holds a position on the Tallahatchie and
Yazoo Rivers, 392; ingenious device to turn it, 392; in command at
Vicksburg, 395; sends General Bowen to Grand Gulf, 397; assigns
troops to respective positions after crossing the Big Black River,
399; concentrates all troops for the defense of Vicksburg, in rear,
400; instructions to his officers, 401; dispatches to other
commanders, 401; the policy manifested of meeting the enemy in the
hills east of the point of debarkation, 402; his want of cavalry,
402; letter to General Johnston, 402; reply, 402; report on the
advance of the enemy from Bruinsburg, 403; concentrates his forces to
cheek the invading army, 403; telegram to General Johnston, 403;
instructions to General Stevenson, 404; dispatch from General
Johnston, 405; answer, 405; calls a council of officers, 405;
dispatch to General Johnston, 406; moves his force, 406; appearance
of the enemy, 406; dispatch from General Johnston, 406; reply and a
retrograde movement, 407; encounters the enemy, 407; orders to
General Loring, 407; not obeyed, 407; the day lost, 408; dispatches
from General Johnston, 408; considerations, 408; concentrates at
Vicksburg, 410; remarks on a communication from General Johnston,
413; a former correspondence with the President, 413; his confidence
that the siege would be raised, 413; his decision to hold Vicksburg,
413; progress of the siege, 413; states the causes that led to the
capitulation, 415; resigns his rank, 526; shells Grant's army as it
crosses a bridge of the James River, 526.

PENDLETON, General W. N., strives to bring long-range guns to bear on
Malvern Hill, 148; his statement of the appearance at Gettysburg,
441; presents considerations to General J. E. Johnston, 548.

_Peninsula The Virginia_, all our disposable forces ordered there,
83; its topography and means of defense, 83, 84; movements, 85, 88;
strengthening the defenses continued, 88; new defenses constructed,
88; attempts to break Magruder's line at Dam No. 1, 88; the enemy in
strong force, 89; our forces continue the retreat toward Richmond,
98; flank of our line of march threatened by General Franklin, 98;
driven to the protection of his gunboats, 98; army retreat to the
Baltimore Cross-Roads and Long Bridge, 98.

_Perryville_, its location, 383; the battle at, 383; its result, 384.

_Persons_ seized in Baltimore by an armed force of the United States
Government, 464.

_Personal liberty_, proclamation of President Lincoln suspending the
writ of _habeas corpus_ in the Northern States, 488; no autocrat ever
issued an edict more destructive of the natural right to personal
liberty, 488; every Northern State government subverted, 488.

_Petersburg_, an assault by the advance of Grant's army, 638;
repulsed, 638; another assault with a large force, 638; a failure
everywhere, with an extraordinary sacrifice of life, 639; repeated
attacks, with increased carnage, 639; a heavy force advanced to our
right, 639; an interval of the enemy's force penetrated by General A.
P. Hill, and his flanks doubled up with great loss, 639; a cavalry
expedition to the Weldon and other railroads, 639; a fight near
Ream's station, 639; enemy retreat in confusion, 639; a method of
slow approaches adopted by Grant, 640; his object to obtain
possession of the Weldon and Southside Railroads, 640; Grant menaces
Richmond, 640; his line, 640; General Lee's line, 640; movement to
attack the works at Richmond, 641; defeated, 641; a mine run under
one of our forts, 641; a description, 642; a question relative to
negro troops, 642; results of the explosion, 643; repeated attacks on
our lines made and repulsed, 644; force of General Lee at the opening
of the campaign, 644; do. of General Grant, 644; a movement against
Fort Fisher, 644; opening of the campaign of 1865, 647; Grant extends
his line to the left and gains the Weldon Railroad, 647; the troops
in Richmond, 647; capacity of the Richmond and Danville Railroad
increased, 647; diminution of General Lee's forces, 647; his
conference with the President, 648; general view of the state of
affairs, 648; a sortie against Grant's lines determined on by General
Lee, 648; commanded by General John B. Gordon, 649; its failure, 650;
letter of General Gordon, 650-654; an extensive attack by the enemy
follows, 654; secret concentration of the enemy's forces, 654; more
determined effort to gain the right of Lee, 655; the advance repulsed
by General Lee, 655; our strong position at Five Forks assaulted and
carried by the enemy, 655; Battery Gregg makes an obstinate defense,
655; Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill killed, retreat became a
necessity, 655; inner lines held during the day, 655; army retires at
night toward Amelia Court-House, 656; Grant's advantages of position,
656; his movements, 656; Lee's subsequent conference with his
officers, 657; their plan, 657; frustrated, 657; position of Lee's
forces, 657; movements of his advance and rear, 657, 658; condition
of General Lee's army and its weakness, 658; sends a communication to
General Grant, 658; a conference, 658; terms of surrender agreed
upon, 659; the terms, 659; Lee's letter to the President, 660.

PETTUS, Lieutenant-Colonel E. W., leads volunteers to recover a
redoubt at Vicksburg, 415.

PIERCE, President, remarks in his annual message on the rights of
belligerents, 272.

_Pillow, Fort_, its situation, 76; bombardment by the enemy's fleet
commenced, 76; it becomes untenable and is evacuated, 76; captured by
General N. B. Forrest, 545.

PILLOW, General GIDEON J., commands at Fort Donelson, 29; retires
from Fort Donelson, 34; correspondence relative to his course at
Donelson, 40, 41.

_Pirate, A_, who is one? 280; statement of the Attorney-General of
Great Britain, 280.

_Pirates_, some of the Southern people denounced as, 2.

_Pittsburg Landing_, topographical description, 52, 53.

_Plan, The_, of President Lincoln to make a Union State out of a
fragment of a Confederate State, 297; the war-power his main
reliance, 298; does not contain a single feature to secure a
republican form of government, nor a single provision authorized by
the Constitution of the United States, 298.

_Pleasant Hill_, General Banks routed by the force of General Taylor,
544.

_Plunder, A system of_, the order of President Lincoln to military
commanders, 588.

_Policy and purposes of the United States Government_, their odious
features revealed, 3.

POLK, Major-General LEONIDAS, evacuates Columbus, 51; his account of
his movement, 52; commands a corps at battle of Shiloh, 55; commands
the attack on the enemy at Perryville, 383; commands the right wing
at Chickamauga, 432; command of the Department of Mississippi and
East Louisiana transferred to him, 547; killed at an outpost on Pine
Mountain, 554; the greatness of his loss, 554.

POPE, Major-General JOHN, assaults New Madrid and is repulsed, 76;
occupies the place after evacuation, 76; assigned to the command of
the Army of Virginia, 135; commands the Army of Virginia, 312;
advances south from Washington, 312; order to his army to subsist on
the country, 312; order to dispense with supply or baggage trains,
313; order to hold the inhabitants responsible for all assaults,
etc., 313; order "to arrest all disloyal citizens," etc., 314; thus
announces a policy of pillage, outrage on unarmed citizens, and
arson, 314; letter of General McClellan, 314; his forces near
Culpeper Court-House, 317; defeated at Cedar Run, 320; losses, 320;
his forces increased by Burnside's corps, 320; Jackson advances
against him, 320; reënforcements sent to, 322; his subsequent
movements, 323, 327.

_Port Hudson_, its situation, 420; defenses, 420; assaulted by
General Banks, 420; resort to regular approaches, 420; after the
capitulation of Vicksburg, its importance ceased, 420; surrendered by
Major-General Gardner, 420; losses, 420; the gallantry of its
defense, 421.

_Port Republic_, its position, 112; battle near, 212; defeat of the
enemy, 117; prisoners, 117; pursuit, 117.

_Port Royal_, a harbor of South Carolina, 77; its situation, 77; its
defenses, 78; strength of the enemy's fleet, 78; their attack, 78;
the forts abandoned, 78.

PORTER, Admiral, statement of the efficiency of torpedoes used by us
for naval defense, 207; relieves his fleet by a dam above Alexandria
on the Red River, 544.

_Ports, Southern,_ blockaded for the destruction of their commerce, 2.

_Power, where found_, for the United States to coöperate with a State
in emancipation? 179.

_Powhite Creek_, the position of McClellan behind, 136.

PRICE, Major-General STERLING, commands in Missouri, 50; his
movements, 50; battle at Pea Ridge, 50; commands in West Tennessee,
386; moves to Iuka, 386; enemy abandons stores and retires, 386;
letter from General Ord, 387; reply, 387; unites with General Van
Dorn, 387; the combined force, 388; moves upon Corinth, 388; the
battle fought at first mainly by his division, 389; the enemy
reënforced, 389; army retires, 390.

PRINCE de JOINVILLE on the junction of McDowell with McClellan, 105.

_Prisoners, Exchange of_, increase in their numbers in 1861, 13;
vacillating and cruel conduct of the United States Government, 13;
their false theory of combinations, 13; its obstacle, 13; if the
theory was true, hanging was the legitimate punishment, 13; why were
not their prisoners hung? 13; tenacity with which the enemy clung to
the theory, 13; the issues involved 14; further obstacles to
exchange, 14; moved by clamors of the people, United States
Government shut its eyes, 14; some exchanged by military commanders,
14; condition of captured soldiers at the close of 1861, 14; citizens
arrested and held as prisoners, 14; violations of the Constitution,
14; object to clothe the Government with absolute power, 15; efforts
of the Government of the United States to implicate the President of
the Confederate States in the mortality of Northern prisoners, 497;
declarations of Major-General Grant, 497; captures of, in our
privateers, 582; treatment, 582; opinion of United States court, 582,
583; communication sent to President Lincoln by special messenger,
583; the communication, 583; no answer made, 584; act of Confederate
Congress, 584; United States Government refuses to consider the
question of exchange, 585; some exchanges made by officers, 585;
exchange proposed to General Grant in 1861, 585; subsequently offers
to surrender some, 586; reply of General Polk, 586; agreement of
Fremont with General Price, 586; repudiated by General Hunter, 686;
"fire up the Northern heart," 586; commissioners sent from Washington
to Norfolk, 586; the result, 586; difficulties, 587; arrangement of
Generals Cobb and Wool, 587; abruptly broken off, 587; suspension
ensued, 688; indignation at the North, 588; a cartel executed, based
on that of 1812, 588; order of President Lincoln to military
commanders, issued on the same day, to seize and use our property,
588; a system of plunder, 588; order of General Pope to murder
peaceful inhabitants as spies, 588; letter of General Lee to General
Halleck, 589; answer, 590; proceedings of General Hunter, 589; of
Brigadier-General Phelps, 589; retaliatory orders, 590; letter of
General Lee to General Halleck relative to the execution of William
B. Mumford, 590; result, 590; efforts to seek an adjustment of
difficulties through the authorities at Washington, 591;
Vice-President Stephens sent as a commissioner, 591; instructions,
591: letter to President Lincoln, 593; Stephens not allowed to
proceed beyond Newport News, 595; correspondence of our exchange
commissioners, 595; demands of the authorities at Washington, 596;
the wish of the Confederate Government, 596; Andersonville, the
occasion of its selection, 596; advantages of its location, 596; its
preparation, 597; diseases, 597; successful efforts of Major Wirz for
the benefit of the prisoners, 597; humane and kind treatment by
General Winder, 597; statement of Adjutant-General Cooper, 598; a
proposal made to the United States commissioner that all prisoners on
each side should be attended by a proper number of their own
surgeons, 598; further proposals, 598; no reply ever made, 598;
statements of General Butler, 598; letters between Generals Lee and
Grant, 600; dispatch of General Grant to General Butler, 600; another
proposal to the United States Government, 600; no answer received,
601; the offer would have released every soldier of the United States
in our prisons, 601; other offers, 601; requested to send the worst
cases, 602; photographs taken at Annapolis and circulated, 602; worse
cases received by us, 602; proposal to purchase medicines from the
United States authorities to be used exclusively for the relief of
the Union prisoners, 602; no reply ever received, 602; a delegation
of the prisoners at Andersonville sent to Washington to plead their
cause, 602; President Lincoln refuses to see them, 602; their return
and report, 602; letter from the wife of the chairman, 603; letter
from another prisoner, 603; extracts from the official report of
Major-General Butler to the Committee on the Conduct of the War,
603-605; our readiness to surrender for exchange all the prisoners in
our possession, 605; Northern prisons full of our soldiers, 606;
cotton sent by us to New York, and sold to purchase clothing for our
soldiers, 606; report of Secretary Stanton, 607; number of prisoners
that died in our hands, 607; number that died in the hands of the
United States Government, 607; report of Surgeon-General Barnes, 607;
number of Confederate prisoners, 607; number of United States
prisoners, 607; further considerations, 607, 608; the number paroled
at the close of the war, 699.

_Private property_, its pillage and destruction not permitted by the
laws of war, 8; our war with Mexico, how conducted, 8; action of
Great Britain around Point Comfort in 1781, 8; restoration stipulated
in the Treaty of Ghent in 1815, 8; correspondence of John Quincy
Adams with the British Secretary of State, on the deportation of, 8,
9; order of President Lincoln to arrest all persons who arrested
slaves as fugitives, 9; language of General McClellan, 9; action of
Fremont in Missouri, 10; of General T. W. Sherman in South Carolina,
10; do. of others, 10; how made subject to confiscation by United
States Congress, 168; conditions upon which its inviolability might
be broken under the Constitution of the United States, 173.

_Privateering not piracy_, remarks of Earl Derby, 12; do. of the Lord
Chancellor of England, 12.

_Privateers_, resorted to not for purposes of gain, 10; a small fleet
soon fitted out, 10; their cruises, 10; proclamation of President
Lincoln, 10; another violation of international law, 11; its threat
not executed, 11; the case of the schooner Savannah, 11; retaliation
threatened, 11; the case of the schooner Jefferson Davis, 11; remarks
of Earl Derby, 12; do. of the Lord Chancellor of England, 12.

_Prize court_, the attempt to get our private property into, to be
tried by the laws of war, 169.

_Prizes_, captured by foreign-built cruisers of the United States
during the Revolutionary War, 276; more than six hundred, 276; both
belligerents forbidden by European nations to bring prizes into their
ports, 370.

_Queen's proclamation, The_, the force ascribed to it by the United
States Government, 277.

RAINS, General G. R., inventor of sub-terra shells, 97; describes
their use in the retreat from Williamsburg and its effect, 97, 98;
placed in charge of our submarine defenses, 208.

RAINS, Brigadier-General J. G., ordered to report to General Johnston
at Jackson, in connection with torpedoes and sub-terra shells, 424.

RANDOLPH, General, Secretary of War, his testimony relative to
affairs at Norfolk and the position of Yorktown, 93.

RANSOM, Major-General, Summoned to Richmond from Drury's Bluff to
resist an impending assault of General Sheridan, 508; his movements
and success, 508; his position and force, 510; reports to General
Beauregard at Drury's Bluff, 512; his part in the action with
Butler's force, 514.

READ, Lieutenant C. W., commands the tender Clarence, 261.

REAGAN, Secretary JOHN H., transfers the money in the Confederate
Treasury, 695.

_Reconnaissances_, made by the enemy with the design to take and keep
control of the seacoast of Georgia, 78.

_Records of property_, kept under the authority of the State
government, 452.

_Republican government_, the whole science of, where found, 298;
words of the Declaration of Independence, 298; civil and political
sovereignty is in the individual, 299; no human government has any
inherent, original sovereignty, 299; derives its just powers from the
consent of the governed, 299; all other powers than those thus
derived are not just powers, 299; a government exercising powers not
just has no right to survive, 299; who, then, had a right to
institute a government for a State? 239; only the people of the
State,299; how could the Government of the United States appear in a
State and attempt to institute a State government? 299; only as an
invader and a usurper, 299; how could an invader institute a
republican State government, which can be done only by the free
consent of the people themselves? 300; the absurdity of the
pretension, 300; President Lincoln's plan of one tenth, 300; one
tenth of the voters can not establish a republican State government,
300; an effort to enforce a fiction, 300; who were the voters? 301;
those whose consent had been bound by the oath given by the usurper,
301; such a Government derives its powers from the consent of the
usurper, 301; an attempt to destroy true republicanism, 301; a true,
its source, 452; how secured, 452.

_Reserved powers of the Constitution_, sovereignty of the States
therein. 622.

_Revolutionists_, who were the? 170.

_Richmond_, removal of the Government to, authorized, 3; detached
works around it perfected by Lee, 119; intrenched line commenced by
Lee, 130; position of hostile forces, 130; conversations relative to
its defense and the defeat of the enemy, 131; offensive-defensive
policy adapted, 132; preparations for the campaign after Seven Pines
battle, 133; reënforcement sent to Jackson in the Valley, 133;
noticed by the enemy, 133; his unsuccessful attack on Williamsburg
road, 133; route of Jackson covered by Stuart, 133; directions to
Jackson under the order of battle, 133; the order of battle, 133;
position of the respective troops, 134; Hill forces the enemy to take
refuge on the left bank of Beaver Dam, 134; a strong position, 134;
movement of other forces, 134; engagement closes at dark, 134;
critical position of McClellan, 135; action of the United States
Government, 135; renewal of the battle at dawn, 135; arrival of
Jackson, 136; enemy abandons his works, 136; advance of our forces
resumed according to the order, 136; destruction of munitions by the
retreating enemy, 136; takes a position behind Powhite Creek, 136; A.
P. Hill hotly engages, 137; enemy north of the Chickahominy, 137;
fierce battle, 137; Longstreet ordered to make a diversion, 137;
strength of the enemy's position, 137; Jackson's right division forms
on Longstreet's left, 137: position of D. H. Hill, 137; completion of
the lines, 138; a general advance, 138; enemy back to the woods on
the bank of the Chickahominy, 138; night put an end to pursuit, 138;
in the morning none of the enemy north of the Chickahominy, 139; York
River Railroad, 139; enemy in motion south of the river, 139; the
line abandoned, 139; position of the enemy, 139; topography of the
country, 139; on the next morning enemy's works found to be
evacuated, 140; movement of our forces, 140; condition of the enemy's
works, 140; enemy's position, 141; Savage Station, 141; darkness,
141; enemy crosses White-Oak Swamp, 142; resist the rebuilding the
bridge, 142; enemy at Frazier's Farm, 142; we had no maps of the
country in which we were operating, 142; consequent mistakes, 142;
battle at Frazier's Farm, 145; nearly the entire field in our
possession at its close, 146; the siege of, raised, 152; McClellan at
Westover, and his expedition frustrated, 153; prisoners captured in
the battles around Richmond, 153; losses, 153; statement of the
strength of our army at different periods, 153, 154; suggestions on
the delay of Lee, 155; other details relative to the strength of our
army, 156, 157; effective force of General McClellan, 158; the most
effective way to relieve was to reënforce Jackson and advance on
General Pope, 320; its evacuation advised by General Lee, 661; lack
of transportation, 661; movement of the troops, 666; Ewell's corps,
662; G. W. C. Lee's and Kershaw's, 662; other forces, 662; the rear
followed by the enemy, 663; frequent combats, 663; Ewell captured,
664; G. W. C. Lee's division captured, 664; engagement at Sailor's
Creek, 664; the naval force, 665; their retreat to Danville, 665;
troops in and around Richmond, 665; orders given to destroy certain
property of the Confederate States, 666; the conflagration did not
result from any act of the public authorities, 666; distinction from
the case of Harper's Ferry, 666; the troops of neither army
considered responsible, 667; notice of General Lee's withdrawal sent
to the President at church, 667; his proceedings, 667; removal of
families, 668; the President starts for Danville, 668; the supplies
prepared for Lee's army, 669; report of General St. John, in charge
of the commissary bureau, 669; extracts, 669; the daily delivery by
cars and canal-boats, 670; further evidence to expose unfounded
statements, 671; rations on the line of retreat, 671; letter of
General Breckinridge, 672; letter of the assistant commissary-general,
672; other letters, 673, 674.

_Richmond, Kentucky_, enemy routed by General E. E. Smith, 382.

_Rights unalienable_, shall man no more take up arms in defense of?
182.

_Rights of belligerents_, letter of Earl Russell, 271; views of
Chancellor Kent, 271; of President Pierce, 272; charge of the Lord
Chief Baron of the Exchequer, 272, 273.

_Rivers_, the principal difficulty in the way of a successful defense
of, by us, 25; preparations made for resistance, 25.

_Roanoke River_, torpedoes planted there, 209; effect on the enemy,
209.

RODES, General, statement of the obstacles to General Huger's
movement at Seven Pines, 126; in command at Sharpsburg, 336; captures
Martinsburg, with stores, artillery, and a body of the enemy, 439.

RODGERS, Colonel W. P., killed at Corinth, 390; his character, 390.

ROSECRANS, General, succeeds General Buell, 384; advances upon the
position of General Bragg at Murfreesboro, 384; a battle ensues, 385;
subsequently assigned to the command of the force under General Grant
in West Tennessee, 385; his character, 389; treatment of the dead and
wounded at Corinth, 390; occupies Chattanooga, 429; moves on the rear
of General Bragg, 429; concentrates before General Bragg, 432;
concentrates in Chattanooga, 433; reënforcements sent to him, and
Grant assigned to the command, 434.

RUSSELL, Lord JOHN, answer to the demand of the Government of the
United States for the sailors rescued from the sinking Alabama, 258;
his letter stating that the United States Government profited most by
unjustifiable maritime practices, 268; on the principle contended for
by her Majesty's Government, 271.

_Sabine Pass_, its importance, 236; appearance of the enemy's fleet,
236; only means of defense, 236; a report of the engagement, 237; two
gunboats surrendered to forty-two men, 238; the fleet retires, 238;
names of the defenders, 239; success in holding their prisoners, 239;
an unparalleled feat, 239; mistaken reports of the enemy, 239.

_Safeguards_, for the protection of the personal liberty of the
citizen in New York, 479; worthless as the paper on which they were
printed, 479.

_Savage Station_, numbers found in the hospital, 141.

_Savannah, The_, schooner, treatment of her crew by the United States
Government, 11; its harbor defenses, 205; their condition, 205.

SCHOPF, General, commands a force of the enemy at Fishing Creek, 23.

_Security, perfect and complete_, duty of the State government to
give to all its citizens, 452.

SEDDON, JAMES A., Secretary of War, replies to General Johnston as to
the numbers of his army near Vicksburg, 412.

_Self-defense_ of the Government, how authorized by the Constitution,
159.

SEMMES, Commander RAPHAEL, resigns at Washington, 246; enters
Confederate service, 240; obtains the Sumter for a cruiser, 246;
description of her and her preparation, 246; runs the blockade, 247;
career on the sea, 247; her captures, 247; takes command of the
Alabama, 250; collects the old officers of the Sumter, 250; sails for
Terceira, 250; his first impressions on seeing his ship, 251;
proceeds to sea and reads his commission and enrolls his men, 251;
sails for Galveston, 252; decoys out one of the blockading ships,
252; fights and sinks the Hatteras, 253; captures and bonds the
steamer Ariel, 254; a cruise in every sea, 254; arrives at Cherbourg
to repair his ship, 255; appearance of the Kearsarge, 255; a notice
to her captain, 255; defective powder of the Alabama, 255; questions
considered, 256; his report of the engagement with the Kearsarge,
256; Alabama sinks and crew rescued by an English vessel, 257; narrow
escape of the Kearsarge, 257; clad in secret armor, 258; the
Government of the United States demands the rescued sailors, 258;
answer of Lord John Russell, 258; his statement of closed ports, 282;
commands the naval fores at Richmond, 665; order to him from the
Secretary of the Navy, 665.

_Seven Pines_, position of the respective forces, 121; movements of
the enemy, 122; unexpected firing heard, 122; the line of battle,
122, 123; General Johnston wounded and removed, 123; events on the
left, 124; most serious conflict on the right, 124; report of
Longstreet, 124; Huger's delay, 127; Longstreet waits, 127; why did
not the left coöperate? 127; no way appears to have been practicable
to put the enemy to flight, 127; our losses, 127; that of the enemy,
128; evidence of our success, 128; our aggregate force, 128; that of
the enemy, 128; cause of the withdrawal of our forces on the day
after the battle, 128; position of the forces, 130.

SEWARD, Secretary, letter on the export of cotton, 344.

_Sharpsburg_, General Hood's account of the contest on the left, 339;
an account by Colonel Taylor, 241; testimony of General Sumner, 341;
do. of General McClellan, 342; strength of the armies, 343; Lee
concentrates his forces at, 333; address to the people of Maryland,
333; the battle at, 335-338.

_Shenandoah Valley_, operations by which it was cleared of the
enemy's forces, 439; enemy's losses, 439; movements of the enemy to
destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, 527.

SHERIDAN, General, moves with a large force around and to the rear of
General Lee's army, 508; pursued by Stuart, 509; strength of the
respective forces, 509; Stuart places himself in front and resists
the advance of Sheridan, 509; he retires, 509; appears in the Valley
with a large force, 535.

SHERMAN, General W. T., leads a division up the Tennessee, 52;
disembarks at Pittsburg Landing, 52; report of advance on Corinth,
72; its evacuation, 73; enters the Yazoo River to reduce Haines's
Bluff and attack Vicksburg in the rear, 392; repulsed with heavy
loss, 392; reaches Chattanooga with his force, 435; his movements,
436; prepares to march northward through the Carolinas, 625; position
of our forces, 625, 626; leaves Savannah, 626; his movements, 626;
arrives at Columbia, 627; the Mayor surrenders the city. 627; unites
with General Schofield at Goldsboro, 636.

SHIELDS, General, advances toward Jackson's position at Port
Republic, 113; conflict at the bridge, 113; his position, 114;
attacked by Jackson, 114.

"_Shields's brave boys_" preserve their organization to the last,
117; tough work, if Shields had been on the field, 117.

_Shiloh_, description of the battle-field, 52, 53; the battle of--
advance of our forces, 56; delay, 56; cause, 56; importance of attack
at the earliest moment, 57; Buell's advance, 58; result of an earlier
or later attack, 59; purpose of General Johnston, 59; his order of
attack, 59; monograph of General Bragg, 59; result of the first day,
60; one encampment of the enemy not taken, 61; the disastrous
consequences, 61; causes of the failure, 61; statement of the author
of the "Life of General Johnston," 61; report of General Chalmers on
the failure, 62; report of Brigadier-General Jackson, 62; report of
General Hardee, 63; report of Major-General Polk, 63; report of
General Gilmer, chief engineer, 63; statement of General Bragg, 64;
statement of Colonel Geddes, of the Eighth Iowa Volunteers, 65;
report of General Beauregard, 66; some remote causes of this failure,
66; death of General Johnston, 66; its circumstances, 66;
consequences to be expected from Grant's defeat, 68; instance of
Marshal Turenne, 68; Buena Vista, 68; fate of an army and fortunes of
a country hung on one man, 69; confidence in his capacity, 69; at
nightfall our vantage-ground abandoned, 70; the enemy reoccupy, 70;
statement of Buell as to the condition of Grant's army, 70;
reënforcements of the enemy cross the river, 70; advance of the enemy
in the morning, 71; our retreat was a necessity, 71; strength of our
army, 71; casualties, 71; effective force of General Grant, 71; his
casualties, 71; his army reorganized under General Halleck, 71;
advance on Corinth, 71.

_Ships of war_, equipped and sent from ports of the United States to
Brazil in her struggle with Spain for independence, 276; do. sold to
Russia in her war with England and France, 276.

_Six million people_, the number of persons subject to be acted upon
by the confiscation act of the United States Congress, 167.

_Slavery_, declared by Congress to be the cause of all the troubles,
159; wise and patriotic statesmen might easily have furnished relief,
159.

_Slaves_, unconstitutional measures taken by Congress to effect the
emancipation of, 159; grounds upon which its proceedings were based,
159; their power found in the plea of necessity, 161; emancipation by
confiscation, 162; emancipation in the District of Columbia, 172;
prohibition of the extension of slavery to the Territories, 174;
prohibiting the return of fugitives by military or naval officers,
174; another instance of the flagrant violation of the Constitution,
175; declaration by Congress of the objects for which the war was
waged, 189; unconstitutional measures taken by President Lincoln to
effect the emancipation of, 179; message recommending the coöperation
of the United States for the emancipation of, in any State, 179;
countermands the order of General Hunter, and claims for himself to
issue one for emancipation, 181; conference with Senators and
Representatives of the border States to effect emancipation, 183; an
attempt to effect emancipation by compensation, 184; issues a
preliminary proclamation for emancipation, 187; the final
proclamation emancipation, 192; his declaration in the proclamation
calling for seventy-five thousand men, 189.

SLIDELL, JOHN, our representative in Paris, 368.

SMITH, General E. K., occupies Knoxville. East Tennessee, 382;
advances into Kentucky, 382; conflict at Richmond, 382; advances to
Frankfort, 383; great alarm in Cincinnati, 382; unites his forces
with those of General Bragg, 383; orders to, for the relief of
Vicksburg, 417; his movement, 417; his address to his soldiers, 697.

_South, The_, nature of the division of sentiment in, 5; a question
of expediency, 5.

_Southern people_, their love and sacrifices for the Union, 160.

_Southern States_, one of the causes of their withdrawal from the
Union, 181.

_Sovereignty of the State government_, the representative and the
constituted agent of the inherent sovereignty of the individual, 452.

_Spanish provinces_ of South America, their independence recognized
by the United States, 276.

"_Spare neither men nor money_," orders of the Secretary of the Navy
to complete ironclads at New Orleans, 227.

_Spottsylvania Court-House_, twelve days of skirmish and battle at,
between Lee and Grant, 523.

_State, A_, rent asunder and a new one formed of the fragment, 2.

_State governments_, the subjugation of, 450; a revolution unlike any
other that may be found in the history of mankind, 451; an assertion
often made during the war, 451; objects for which the State
governments were instituted, 451; where must the American citizen
look for the security of the rights with which he has been endowed by
his Creator? 451; to the State government, 451; the powers of the
State government are just powers, 451; is the citizen's life in
danger? the State guarantees his protection, 451; is the citizen's
personal liberty in danger? the State guarantees it, 451; duty of the
State government to give its citizens perfect and complete security,
452; necessarily sovereign within its own domain, 452; its entire
order founded on the free consent of the governed, 452; this consent
gives just powers, 452; all else are usurpations, 452; how these
powers are organized, 452; its object, 452; subversion and
subjugation of a State government, how accomplished, 452; the
commission of such a subversion and subjugation fearlessly charged
upon the Government of the United States as a monstrous crime against
constitutional liberty, 453; distinction in nature and objects
between the Government of the United States and the State
governments, 453.

_States, The_, the principles upon which they were originally
constituted and upon which the Union was formed explained, 368.

STEPHENS, A. H., sent as commissioner relative to the exchange of
prisoners to Washington, 591; not allowed to come to Washington, 595;
appointed to confer with Mr. Lincoln, 617.

STEVENS, THADDEUS, his remark, "Who pleads the Constitution against
our proposed action" of confiscation? 8; declaration in Congress on
the admission of West Virginia, 308.

STEVENS, Lieutenant, commands the Arkansas at Baton Rouge, 244.

STEVENSON. Major-General, resists the force of the enemy near
Vicksburg, 407; report of the conflict at the redoubt before
Vicksburg, 415.

"_Stop thief!_" The old trick exemplified, 191.

STREIGHT. Colonel, captured by General Forrest, 426.

STUART, General J. E. B., sent with cavalry to cover the approach of
Jackson from the enemy, 133; subsequent confidential instructions
from Lee, 133; engaged with cavalry on detached service, 150; his
march down the enemy's line of communication described, 150; opens
fire on the enemy with a light howitzer, 151; effect on the enemy,
described by General Casey, 151; remains east of the mountains to
observe the enemy, 330; at Sharpsburg battle, 335; attacked by the
enemy at Kelly's Ford, 438; encounters the enemy's cavalry, 439; left
to guard the passes of the mountains, 440; makes a circuit of the
Federal army, 440; pursues Sheridan in a dash upon Richmond. 509;
places himself in front of Sheridan and resists his advance, 509; is
mortally wounded, 510; his death and character, 510.

_Subjugation of the Southern States_, the Intention of the Government
of the United States, 3; established by the course pursued by it.3;
evasion and final rejection of every proposition for a peaceful
settlement, 3; its extreme obstinacy, 4; observable in the original
party of abolition, 4; futile warnings of its suicidal tendency, 4;
not contending for a principle, but supremacy, 4; no compromise, 4;
of the States by the Government of the United States, 450; object of
the State governments, 451; how accomplished, 452: of the government
of the Stale of New York, by the domination over it of the military
power of the Government of the United States, 488.

_Sub-terra shells_, effect produced on the enemy by their use on the
retreat from Williamsburg, 97.

_Subversion of a State government_, how accomplished, 454.

_Sumter, Fort_, its brave and invincible defense, 204; the manner of
its evacuation, 204; salute and cheers, 204.

_Sumter, The cruiser_, her preparation and career, 246, 247.

_Supplies_ for Lee's army at Petersburg, a statement of facts,
668-670; letter of General Breckinridge, 672; do. of the assistant
commissary-general, 672; another letter, 673; supplies on the
retreat, 673; letter of President Harvie, of the Richmond and
Danville Railroad, 673, 674; do. relative to sending supplies to
Amelia Court-House, 675.

_Supremacy_, when the contest is for, there will be no concessions, 4.

SURRATT, Mrs., her case awakening much sympathy, 497; efforts to
obtain a respite, 497.

TALIAFERRO, General, commands Virginia forces at Norfolk, 195;
commands Jackson's division at Cedar Run, 319.

TANEY, Chief-Justice, decision in the Carpenter case, 348; a civil
war, or any other war, does not enlarge the powers of the Federal
Government over the States or the people beyond what the compact has
given to it, 348; grants the writ of _habeas corpus_ in the case of
John Merryman, 463; disobeyed, 463; decision of the Court, 463.

TATNALL, Commander JOSIAH, objections to proceeding to York River
with the Virginia, 91; takes command of the Virginia, 202; his
statement respecting the Virginia, 203; has charge of the harbor
defense of Savannah, 201.

TAYLOR, General RICHARD, his description of the dangerous moment of
the battle at Port Republic, 116; movements against the enemy west of
the Mississippi, 418; proceeds to raise the siege of Port Hudson by
cutting the communications of General Banks, 419; his movements after
the capitulation of Port Hudson, 422; commands in the Red River
country, 541; his force and movements, 542; encounters General Banks,
542; battle at Mansfield, 542; defeat of Banks at Pleasant Hill, 543,
544.

TAYLOR, Colonel THOMAS, takes a letter to President Lincoln relative
to prisoners, 584.

TAYLOR, Brigadier-General, of New Jersey, advances to recover the
stores captured at Manassas Junction, 323; routed, 323.

_Tennessee_, measures adopted to occupy and fortify strong positions
after her secession, 24; Forts Henry and Donelson, 24; our forces in,
51; their concentration, 52; a military Governor appointed, 285;
public officers driven from office, 285; newspaper offices closed,
285; citizens arrested and imprisoned, 285; election of members of
Congress ordered, 286; a State organization attempted, 286;
qualifications of voters determined and fixed by the military officer
of the Government of the United States, 286; the oath, 286;
amendments to the regular State Constitution attempted, 287; declared
to be adopted by a vote of twenty-five thousand out of a hundred and
forty-five thousand citizens, 287; called "guaranteeing a republican
form of government," as required by the United States Constitution,
287; many positions held by the enemy in, 385; the aggregate force,
385; Rosecrans assigned to command, 385; most important position at
Corinth, 386; plan of the enemy, 886; Vicksburg, the point of attack,
386; Generals Price and Van Dorn in command of our forces, 386; the
former moves from Tupelo to Iuka, 386; the enemy retreats, abandoning
stores, 386; unites with General Van Dorn for an attack on Corinth,
387; battle at Iuka, 387; strength of Van Dorn, 387: do. of the
enemy, 388; attempt to surprise Corinth before reënforcements were
received, 388; its secession proceedings founded on true republican
principles, 455; the proceedings of the Government of the United
States 455; it denies the fundamental principles of liberty, 456; its
proceedings founded on the assumption of the sovereignty of the
Government of the United States, not on the principle of the
sovereignty of the people, 456; invasion of the rights of popular
liberty, 456; efforts to erect a State government subject to the
United States Government, 456; limitation of the will of the voter,
456; voter's right to cast his ballot dependent on the permission of
the United States Government, 456; further conditions required of the
voter, 457; who was the sovereign in Tennessee? 457; the Government
of the United States, 457; where was the government of the State of
Tennessee and the sovereign people? 457; the former was subverted and
overthrown, and the latter subjugated, 457; amendments to the
Constitution, 457; guaranteed to be a republican State, 458; Hood's
campaign in, 578.

_Tennessee_, an iron-clad, 206; her combat with the enemy's fleet in
Mobile Harbor, 206.

_Texas_, recognition of her independence by United States Government
in the war of the former with Mexico, 276.

_Theory of combinations_, of President Lincoln, the issues involved,
14.

"_The pressure is still upon me_," words of President Lincoln
relative to forcible emancipation, 181.

THOMAS, General, commands the enemy's forces at Fishing Creek, 20.

TILGHMAN, General LLOYD, commands at Fort Henry, 26; his bravery, 28;
loses his life in battle near Vicksburg, 409.

TOOMBS, General ROBERT, defends the bridge over the Antietam, 337.

_Torpedoes_, probably more effective than any other means of naval
defense, 207; statement of Admiral Porter as to their successful use
by us, 207; secret of our success was the sensitive primer, 208; how
the torpedoes were made, 208; three essentials to success, 208;
exploits with them in Charleston Harbor, 208; their use at Roanoke
River, 209; successful use at Mobile, 209.

TRIMBLE, General, volunteers to capture the enemy's depot at Manassas
Junction, 323.

TURENNE, Marshal, of France, an example, 68.

_Umpire, Who is the_, on the question of secession, 16; not the
United States Government, as it has no inherent, original
sovereignty, 16; but the States and their people, 16; the case of
South Carolina, 16.

_United States_, number of men furnished during the war, 706; do. to
the United States Government by Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Missouri, 706; debt contracted by the United States Government, 706.

Usurpations of the Government of the United States during the year
1861, 2; the mother of all the, the unhallowed attempt to establish
the absolute sovereignty of the Government of the United States by
the subjugation of the States and their people, 16; embraced in the
system of legislation devised by the United States Congress, 161; of
United States Congress, another alarming one brought out, 170; the
argument by which it was supported, 170; the war-power, 171; another
step for the destruction of slavery, 172; emancipation in the
District of Columbia, 172.

Usurpations of Congress, the next step in usurpation, the passage of
an act prohibiting slavery in the Territories, 174; words of the act,
174; an act making an additional article of war passed, 174; all
military and naval officers prohibited from efforts to return
fugitives from labor, 174; the words of the Constitution, 175;
Congress directly forbids that which the Constitution commands, 175;
excuse of a state of war groundless, 175; a series of, committed by
President Lincoln, 178; all exercises of power not derived from the
free consent of the governed, 452; in what it consisted, 582.

_Usurper, The_, the last effort to save himself, 606.

VAN DORN, General EARL, assigned to command west of the Mississippi,
50; his movements, 50; battle of Elkhorn, or Pea Ridge, 50; his
strength, 50; his object, 51; losses, 51; march to join A. S.
Johnston, 51; in command in north Mississippi, 386; unites with
General Price, 387; his strength, 387; the strength of the enemy,
388; character and conduct of, 388; moves to surprise Corinth, 388;
its result, 389; his hazardous retreat. 390; surprises and captures
Holly Springs and destroys its depot of supplies, 391.

VENABLE, Colonel C. S., statement of the attack of Mississippians
under a promise to General Lee, 521.

_Vessels_ destroyed by torpedoes in Southern waters, 210.

_Vicksburg_, a combined movement against, by land and by the
Mississippi River, planned by the enemy, 392; the position of General
Pemberton, 392; an ingenious device to turn that position, 392;
attempt of Sherman to reduce Haines's Bluff, 392; Grant lands his
army at Young's Point, 393; attempt to pass to the rear of Fort
Pemberton, 394; also to enter the Yazoo above Haines's Bluff, 394;
position of Admiral Porter and his fleet in Deer Creek, 394; position
of Grant's force, 395; Pemberton in command at, 395; unsuccessful
attempt to cut a canal across the peninsula, 396; do. to connect the
river with the bayou at Milliken's Bend, 396; gunboats attempt to run
the batteries, 397; the enemy commence ferrying troops from the
Louisiana to the Mississippi shore, 398; resistance by our troops,
398; battle near Port Gibson, 398; attempt of Grant to get in rear of
General Bowen, 398; he retreats toward Grand Gulf, 399; joined by
General Loring, 399; Grant advances into Mississippi, 399;
concentration of General Pemberton at, 410; strength of the position,
410; length of fortified line, 410; Pemberton's force, 410; efforts
to strengthen the relieving army, 411; dispatches for aid to the
relieving army, 412; siege commenced, 413; assault, 414; bombardment
from the mortar fleet, 414; position of, 414; progress of the siege,
414; another assault, 414; report of General Stevenson, 415; causes
that led to the capitulation, 415; the losses, 417; other efforts to
relieve, 417; movement of General E. K. Smith, 417.

_Victors, Who were the_, when the war closed? 294; let the verdict of
mankind decide, 295.

_Virginia_, first efforts of the enemy directed against her, 3;
greater perversion of republican principles in, by the Government of
the United States, than in any other State, 304; its secession, 304;
opposition in northwestern counties, 304; they hold a convention to
reorganize the government of Virginia, 305; assume to be the State of
Virginia, 305; consent to the formation of a new State, 305; action
of United States Congress, 305; these proceedings viewed in the light
of fundamental principles, 306; involved insurrection, revolution,
and secession, 306; the United States Government the nursing-mother
to the whole thing, 306; words of the United States Constitution,
307; the fraud examined, 307; words of Thaddeus Stevens, 308;
so-called government of Virginia migrates from Wheeling to
Alexandria, 308; subsequent order of President Johnson, 308;
proceedings under the order, 309; such a State government not in the
interest of the people, but of the Government of the United States,
309; voters required first to protect the Government of the United
States, 309.

_Virginia_, former frigate Merrimac, 196; transformed into an
ironclad, 196; her armament, 196; and the Monitor, the combat
between, 200; the latter seeks safety in shoal water, 200; refitted
after her conflict, 201; invites the Monitor to a new contest, 201;
declined, 201; dashes upon the enemy's fleet, 202; abandoned and
burned, 203; the reasons, 203.

_Voter_ in Tennessee, The, the limitation of his will, 456; his right
to cast his ballot vested in the permission of the Government of the
United States as his sovereign, 456.

WADDELL, Lieutenant J. J., commands the cruiser Shenandoah, 264.

WALKER, General J. G., movement of his troops at Sharpsburg, 336.

WALKER, General W. H. T., commences the attack at Chickamauga, 430;
killed in the attack on McPherson's corps, 562.

_War, The_, manner in which it was con ducted by the Government of
the United States, 5; how inappropriate to preserve a voluntary
Union, 6; enlarged its proportions during the year 1861, 16; points
possessed by the enemy, 17; his supply of men and resources of war,
17; a succession of glorious victories to us, 17; the foundation of
the, 582.

WARD, Colonel, his conduct at Yorktown, 88, 89; killed at
Williamsburg, 99; report of General Early on his gallantry, 99.

WARLEY, Lieutenant, attacks the enemy's vessels at New Orleans, 221.

"_War-power, The_, of the United States Government," the theory on
which it was based, 171; its unlimited extent, 171; the specious
argument for, 171; words of the Constitution, 171; President Lincoln
declares his main reliance on it, 298.

_Washington Artillery_, organized in New Orleans, 337; its frequent
and honorable mention in the reports of battles, 337.

_Washington_ threatened by General Early, 530.

_Watchword, The_, "The abolition of slavery by the force of arms for
the sake of the Union," 186.

_Westover_ reached by McClellan's army, 152; protection of the
gunboats, 152; his position, 152; inexpedient to attack him, 152.

WHEATON, on the capture and confiscation of private property, 163.

WHEELER, General, destroys supplies and baggage in the rear of
Rosecrans's army advancing to Murfreesboro, 384; movements with his
cavalry at Chickamauga, 432.

_Which is the higher authority_, Mr. Lincoln's emancipation
proclamation, or the Constitution? 621.

WHITE, Colonel, advances to the Susquehanna, 440.

WHITING, General, sent to reënforce Jackson in the Valley, 133; he is
killed in the defense of Fort Fisher, 646.

_Who is the criminal?_ Let posterity answer, 178.

_Why were they not hung?_ Our soldiers taken prisoners, "as rebels
and traitors," 13.

WICKES, Captain, commands a cruiser fitted out in France by United
States Government in the Revolutionary War, 275.

WILCOX, General, stubborn resistance made by his division, 518.

_Wilderness, The_, the nature of the country, 518; the battle at,
518-520.

WILKINSON, Commander John, commands the Chickamauga, 265; her cruise,
265.

_Williamsburg_, its position on the Virginia Peninsula, 94; line of
defenses constructed by General Magruder, 94; attack of Hancock, 94;
report of General Early on the attack, 95, 96; claim of the enemy to
have achieved a victory at, refuted, 97; strength of our force, 97;
McClellan's estimate, 97; further retreat of our army, 97; our
strength in the principle action at, 98; the position held as long as
was necessary, 99; losses, 99.

_Wilmington, North Carolina_, its defensive works, 204.

WINDER, Brigadier-General CHARLES S., attacks the position of General
Shields, 114; critical condition, 115; killed at the bottle of Cedar
Run, 318; report of General Jackson, 318; his character and an act of
heroism, 318.

WINDER, General JOHN H., his kindness to prisoners of war, 597.

WIRZ, Major, his successful efforts for the benefits of the
prisoners, 597.

WOOD, Captain JOHN T., attacks armed vessels in the Rappahannock in
ope boats, 223.

WOOD, Commander JOHN TAYLOR, commands the Tallahassee, 265; her
cruise, 265.

_Yazoo Pass_, proposal to pass boats through, 392.

_Yorktown_, strengthening the defenses continued, 91; further
improvements on the works, 91; arrangements for evacuation commenced,
92; army withdrawn from the line of Warwick River, 93; evacuation
made successfully, 93: loss of property, 94; statement of General
Early, 94.

ZOLLICOFFER, General, commands at Mill Springs, 19; his position, 19;
General Thomas advances against him, 19; Crittenden takes command and
moves to attack Thomas, 20; Zollicoffer killed, 21.

THE END OF VOL. II.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume 2" ***

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