The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914

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Title: The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Author: Pratt, Edwin A.
Language: English
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THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER
IN WAR AND CONQUEST
1833-1914

THE
RISE OF RAIL-POWER
IN WAR AND CONQUEST
1833-1914

WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY

BY
EDWIN A. PRATT
Author of "A History of Inland Transport,"
"Railways and their Rates," etc.

LONDON
P. S. KING & SON, LTD.
ORCHARD HOUSE
WESTMINSTER
1915

CONTENTS.

CHAP. PAGE

I A NEW FACTOR 1
II RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR 14
III RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR 26
IV CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR 40
V PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR 54
VI TROOPS AND SUPPLIES 62
VII ARMOURED TRAINS 67
VIII RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT 81
IX PREPARATION IN PEACE FOR WAR 98
X ORGANISATION IN GERMANY 103
XI RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY 122
XII FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71 138
XIII ORGANISATION IN FRANCE 149
XIV ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND 175
XV MILITARY RAILWAYS 205
XVI RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR 232
XVII THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 260
XVIII STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY 277
XIX A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE 296
XX DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY 331
XXI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 345

APPENDIX
INDIAN FRONTIER RAILWAYS 357
THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA 368

BIBLIOGRAPHY 376
INDEX 398

PREFATORY NOTE.

The extent to which railways are being used in the present War of the
Nations has taken quite by surprise a world whose military historians,
in their accounts of what armies have done or have failed to do on the
battle-field in the past, have too often disregarded such matters of
detail as to how the armies got there and the possible effect of good or
defective transport conditions, including the maintenance of supplies
and communications, on the whole course of a campaign.

In the gigantic struggle now proceeding, these matters of detail are
found to be of transcendant importance. The part which railways are
playing in the struggle has, indeed--in keeping with the magnitude of
the struggle itself--assumed proportions unexampled in history. Whilst
this is so it is, nevertheless, a remarkable fact that although much has
been said as to the conditions of military unpreparedness in which the
outbreak of hostilities in August, 1914, found the Allies, there has, so
far as I am aware, been no suggestion of any inability on the part of
the railways to meet, at once, from the very moment war was declared,
all the requirements of military transport. In this respect, indeed, the
organisation, the preparedness, and the efficiency throughout alike of
the British and of the French railways have been fully equal to those of
the German railways themselves.

As regards British conditions, especially, much interest attaches to
some remarks made by Sir Charles Owens, formerly General Manager of
the London and South Western Railway Company, in the course of an
address delivered by him to students of the London School of Economics
on October 12, 1914. He told how, some five or six years ago, he had
met at a social function the Secretary of State for War, who, after
dinner, took him aside and asked, "Do you think in any emergency which
might arise in this country the railways would be able to cope with it
adequately?" To this question Sir Charles replied, "I will stake my
reputation as a railway man that the country could not concentrate men
and materials half so fast as the railways could deal with them; but the
management of the railways must be left in the hands of railway men."
We have here an affirmation and a proviso. That the affirmation was
warranted has been abundantly proved by what the British railways have
accomplished in the emergency that has arisen. The special significance
of the proviso will be understood in the light of what I record in the
present work concerning the control of railways in war.

Taking the railways of all the countries, whether friends or foes,
concerned in the present World-War, and assuming, for the sake of
argument, that all, without exception, have accomplished marvels in the
way of military transport, one must, nevertheless, bear in mind two
important considerations:--

(1) That, apart from the huge proportions of the scale upon which,
in the aggregate, the railways are being required to serve military
purposes, the present conflict, in spite of its magnitude, has thus far
produced no absolutely new factor in the employment of railways for war
except as regards the use of air-craft for their destruction.

(2) That when hostilities were declared in August, 1914, the subject
of the employment of railways for the purposes of war had already been
under the consideration of railway and military experts in different
countries for no fewer than eighty years, during which period, and
as the result of vast study, much experience, and many blunders in
or between wars in various parts of the world, there had been slowly
evolved certain fixed principles and, also, subject to constant
amendments, a recognised and comprehensive organisation which, accepted
more or less completely by the leading nations, with modifications to
suit their national circumstances and conditions, was designed to meet
all contingencies, to provide, as far as human foresight could suggest,
for all possible difficulties, and be capable of application instantly
the need for it might arise.

The time has not yet come for telling all that the railways have thus
far done during the war which has still to be fought out. That story, in
the words of a railway man concerned therein, is at present "a sealed
book." Meanwhile, however, it is desirable that the position as defined
in the second of the two considerations given above should be fully
realised, in order that what the railways and, so far as they have
been aided by them, the combatants, have accomplished or are likely to
accomplish may be better understood when the sealed book becomes an open
one.

If, as suggested at the outset, the world has already been taken by
surprise even by what the railways are known to have done, it may be
still more surprised to learn (as the present work will show) that
the construction of railways for strategical purposes was advocated
in Germany as early as 1833; that in 1842 a scheme was elaborated for
covering Germany with a network of strategical railways which, while
serving the entire country, would more especially allow of war being
conducted on two fronts--France and Russia--at the same time; and that
in the same year (1842) attention was already being called in the French
Chamber to the "aggressive lines" which Germany was building in the
direction of France, while predictions were also being made that any new
invasion of France by Germany would be between Metz and Strasburg.

If, again, it is found that a good deal of space is devoted in the
present work to the War of Secession, criticism may, perhaps, be
disarmed by the explanation that the American Civil War was practically
the beginning of things as regards the scientific use of railways for
war, and that many of the problems connected therewith were either
started in the United States or were actually worked out there,
precedents being established and examples being set which the rest of
the world had simply to follow, adapt or perfect. The possibility of
carrying on warfare at a great distance from the base of supplies by
means of even a single line of single-track railway; the creation of
an organised corps for the restoration, operation or destruction of
railways; the control of railways in war by the railway or the military
interests independently or jointly; the question as to when the railway
could be used to advantage and when it would be better for the troops
to march; the use of armoured trains; the evolution of the ambulance or
the hospital train--all these, and many other matters besides, are to
be traced back to the American Civil War of 1861-65, and are dealt with
herein at what, it is hoped, will be found not undue length.

As for the building up of the subsequent organisation in
Europe--Germany, France and England being the countries selected
for special treatment in relation thereto--this, also, has had to
be described with some regard for detail; and, incidentally, it is
shown (1) that the alleged perfection of Germany's arrangements when
she went to war with France in 1870-71 is merely one of the fictions
of history, so far as her military rail-transport was concerned; (2)
that France learned the bitter lesson taught her by the deplorable and
undeniable imperfections of her own transport system--or no-system--on
that occasion, and at once set about the creation of what was to become
an organisation of the most complete and comprehensive character; and
(3) that the "beginning of things" in England, in the way of employing
railways for the purposes of war, was the direct outcome of the
conditions of semi-panic created here in 1859 by what was regarded as
the prospect of an early invasion of this country by France, coupled
with the then recognised deficiencies of our means of national defence.

Military railways, as employed in the Crimean War, the Abyssinian
Campaign, the Franco-German War, the Russo-Turkish War and the Sudan
are described; a detailed account is given of the use of railways in
the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War; and this is followed by a
description of the strategical railways constructed in Germany for the
purpose of facilitating war on the possessions of her neighbours.

Chapters XIX and XX deal with the building of railways which,
whether avowedly strategical or what I have described as
"economic-political-strategical," are intended to effect the purposes
of conquest, with or without the accompaniment of war. The former of
these two chapters, which shows how, with the help of railways, Germany
proposed to transform the African continent into an African Empire of
her own, should be found deserving of notice, and especially so in view
of the statements quoted (p. 311) as having been made by German officers
in what was then German South-West Africa, to the effect that the main
objective of Germany in going to war would be the conquest of Africa,
"the smashing up of France and Great Britain" being regarded only as
"incidents" which, followed by seizure of the possessions of the smaller
Powers, would make Germany the supreme Power in Africa, and lead to the
whole African continent becoming a German possession.

From Chapter XX the reader will learn how Germany proposed to employ
railways for the furthering of her aims against, not only Asiatic
Turkey, but Egypt and India, as well.

The subsidiary articles on "Indian Frontier Railways" and "The Defence
of Australia" have no direct bearing on that _evolution_ of rail-power
in warfare with which it is the special purpose of the present volume
to deal; but in the belief that they are of interest and importance in
themselves, from the point of view of the general question, they have
been given in an Appendix. The difficulties and other conditions under
which the Sind-Pishin State Railway, designed to serve strategical
purposes, was built to the frontiers of Afghanistan are unexampled in
the history either of railways or of war. As regards Australia, the
gravity of the position there was well indicated by Lord Kitchener when
he wrote of the lines running inland that they were "of little use for
defence, although possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would
have temporary command of the sea."

At the end of the volume there is a Bibliography of books, pamphlets
and review or other articles relating to the use of railways for the
purposes of war. In the first instance this compilation was based on
a "List of References" prepared by the American Bureau of Railway
Economics; but, while many items on that list have here been omitted, a
considerable number of others have been inserted from other sources. The
Bibliography is not offered as being in any way complete, but it may,
nevertheless, be of advantage to students desirous of making further
researches into the matters of history here specially treated.

The assistance rendered in other ways by the American Bureau of Railway
Economics in the preparation of the present work has been most helpful.
In the writing of the chapters concerning German designs on Africa, Asia
Minor, etc., the resources of the well-arranged and admirably-indexed
library of the Royal Colonial Institute have been of great service. I
have, also, to express cordial acknowledgments to the General Managers
and other officers of various leading railway companies for information
given respecting the organisation of railways in this country for
military purposes.

EDWIN A. PRATT.
_November, 1915._

The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest

CHAPTER I

A NEW FACTOR

While the original purpose of railways was to promote the arts of
peace, the wide scope of their possibilities in the direction, also, of
furthering the arts of war began to be realised at a very early date
after their success in the former capacity had been assured in Great
Britain.

Already the canal system had introduced an innovation which greatly
impressed the British public. In December, 1806, a considerable body of
troops went by barge on the Paddington Canal from London to Liverpool,
_en route_ for Dublin, relays of fresh horses for the canal boats being
provided at all the stages in order to facilitate the transport; and in
referring to this event _The Times_ of December 19, 1806, remarked:--"By
this mode of conveyance the men will be only seven days in reaching
Liverpool, and with comparatively little fatigue, as it would take them
above fourteen days to march that distance."

But when, on the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, in
1830, a British regiment was conveyed thereon, in two hours, a journey
of thirty-four miles, which they would have required two days to
accomplish on foot, far-seeing men became still more impressed, and
began to realise that there had, indeed, been introduced a new factor
destined to exercise a powerful influence on the future conduct of war.

The geographical position of the United Kingdom led, in those early
days, to greater importance being attached to the conveniences of
railways as a means of transport than to their actual strategical and
tactical advantages; and the issue by the War Office, in 1846, of a
"Regulation Relative to the Conveyance of Her Majesty's Forces, their
Baggage and Stores, by Rail," may have appeared to meet the requirements
of the immediate situation, so far as this country was concerned.

On the Continent of Europe, however, the rivalry of nations divided from
one another only by a more or less uncertain or varying frontier, and
still powerfully influenced by the recollection of recent conflicts,
resulted in much greater attention being paid to the possibilities of
the new development.

The first definite proposals for the use of railways for strategical
purposes were advanced, as early as 1833, by Friedrich Wilhelm Harkort,
a Westphalian worthy who came to be better known in his native land
as "Der alte Harkort." A participant in the Napoleonic wars, he had
subsequently shown great energy and enterprise in the development of
steam engines, hydraulic presses, iron-making, and other important
industries in Germany; he had been the first writer in that country to
give an account--as he did in 1825--of the progress England was making
in respect to railways and steamships; and he had, in 1826, placed a
working model of a railway in the garden of the Elberfeld Museum. These
various efforts he followed up, in 1833, by bringing forward in the
Westphalian Landtag a scheme for the building of a railway to connect
the Weser and the Lippe. Later in the same year he published "Die
Eisenbahn von Minden nach Köln," in which he laid special stress on the
value to Germany of the proposed line from a military point of view.
With the help of such a railway, he argued, it would be possible to
concentrate large bodies of troops at a given point much more speedily
than if they marched by road; he made calculations as to what the actual
saving in time, as well as in physical strain, would be in transporting
Prussian troops from various specified centres to others; and he
proceeded:--

Let us suppose that we had a railway and a telegraph line
on the right bank of the Rhine, from Mainz to Wesel. Any
crossing of the Rhine by the French would then scarcely be
possible, since we should be able to bring a strong defensive
force on the spot before the attempt could be developed.

These things may appear very strange to-day; yet in the womb
of the future there slumbers the seed of great developments in
railways, the results of which it is, as yet, quite beyond our
powers to foresee.

Harkort's proposals gave rise to much vigorous controversy in Germany.
The official classes condemned as "nonsensical fancies" his ideas, not
only as to the usefulness of railways for the conveyance of troops, but,
also, as to the utility of railways for any practical purposes whatever;
and contemporary newspapers and periodicals, in turn, made him the butt
of their ridicule.

The pros and cons of the use of railways for military purposes were,
none the less, actively discussed in numerous pamphlets and treatises.
Just as, in France, General Rumigny, adjutant to Louis-Philippe, had
already foreshadowed the possibility of a sudden invasion by a German
army reaching the frontier by rail, so, also, in Germany, in the words
of one writer at this period, "anxious spirits shudder at the thought
that, some fine spring morning, a hundred thousand Frenchmen, thirsting
for war, will suddenly invade our peaceful valleys at bird-like speed,
thanks to the new means of locomotion, and begin their old game (_das
alte Spiel_) over again." On the other hand there were military
sceptics--such as the author of a pamphlet "Uber die Militärische
Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Berlin, 1836)--who, basing their
calculations on locomotive performances up to that date, asserted that,
although the railway might be of service in the conveyance of supplies,
guns and ammunition, it would be of no advantage in the transport of
troops. These, they declared, would get to their destination sooner if
they marched.[1]

The most noticeable of the various publications issued in Germany at
this period was a book by Carl Eduard Pönitz ("Pz."), which appeared
at Adorf, Saxony, in 1842, under the title of "Die Eisenbahnen
als militärische Operationslinien betrachtet, und durch Beispiele
erlaütert." The writer of this remarkable book (of which a second
edition was issued in 1853) gave a comprehensive survey of the whole
situation in regard to railways and war, so far as the subject could
be dealt with in the light of railway developments and of actual
experiences of troop movements by rail down to that time; and he argued
strongly in favour of the advantages to be derived from the employment
of railways for military purposes. He even suggested that, in the event
of an inadequate supply of locomotives, or of operations having to be
conducted in a mountainous country where locomotives could not be used
for heavy traffic, the troops might still use their own horses to draw
the coaches and wagons along the railway lines, so that the men would
arrive fresh and fit for immediate fighting at the end of their journey.

Describing railways as the most powerful vehicle for the advancement of
"Kultur" since the invention of printing, Pönitz showed how Belgium and
Saxony were the two countries which had taken the initiative in railway
construction on the Continent of Europe; and his references to the
former country are especially deserving of being recalled, in view of
recent events. He pointed to the good example which had been set by the
"far-sighted and energetic" King of the Belgians, and continued:--

Although, in a land torn asunder by revolutionary factions,
many wounds were still bleeding; and although the newly-created
kingdom was threatened by foes within and without and could
organise means of resistance only with great difficulty, there
was, nevertheless, taken in hand a scheme for the construction
of a network of railways designed to extend over the entire
country, while at the present moment the greater part of
that scheme has, in fact, been carried out. In this way King
Leopold has raised up for himself a memorial the full value
and significance of which may, perhaps, be appreciated only by
generations yet to come.

While Belgium was thus shown to have been setting a good example, the
only railways which Prussia then had in actual operation (apart from
the Berlin-Stettin and the Berlin-Breslau lines, which had been begun,
and others which had been projected) were the Berlin-Potsdam and the
Berlin-Magdeburg-Leipzig lines; though Saxony had the Leipzig-Dresden
line, and Bavaria the Nüremberg-Fürth and the Munich-Augsburg lines.
Pönitz, however, excused the backwardness of Prussia on the ground
that if her Government had refused, for a long time, to sanction
various projected railways, or had imposed heavy obligations in
regard to them, such action was due, not to prejudice, but to "a wise
foresight"--meaning, presumably, that Prussia was waiting to profit by
the experience that other countries were gaining at their own cost.

Having dealt with all the arguments he could advance in favour of the
general principle of employing railways for military purposes, Pönitz
proceeded to elaborate a scheme for the construction of a network of
strategical lines serving the whole of Germany, though intended, more
especially, to protect her frontiers against attack by either France
or Russia. Without, he said, being in the secrets of international
politics, he thought he might safely presume that Germany's only fear of
attack was from one of these two directions; and, although the relations
of the Great Powers of Europe were then peaceful, a continuance of those
conditions could not, of course, be guaranteed. So, he proceeded--

We have to look to these two fronts; and, if we want
to avoid the risk of heavy losses at the outset, we needs
must--also at the outset--be prepared to meet the enemy there
with an overwhelming force. Every one knows that the strength of
an army is multiplied by movements which are rapid in themselves
and allow of the troops arriving at the end of their journey
without fatigue.

In a powerful appeal--based on motives alike of patriotism, of national
defence and of economic advantage--that his fellow-countrymen should
support the scheme he thus put forward, Pönitz once more pointed to
Belgium, saying:--

The youngest of all the European States has given us an
example of what can be done by intelligence and good will.
The network of Belgian railways will be of as much advantage
in advancing the industries of that country as it will be in
facilitating the defence of the land against attack by France.
It will increase alike Belgium's prosperity and Belgium's
security. And we Germans, who place so high a value on our
intelligence, and are scarcely yet inclined to recognise the
political independence of the Belgian people, shall we remain so
blind as not to see what is needed for our own safety?

Pönitz could not, of course, anticipate in 1842 that the time would
come when his country, acting to the full on the advice he was then
giving, would have her strategic railways, not only to the French and
the Russian, but, also, to the Belgian frontier, and would use those in
the last-mentioned direction to crush remorselessly the little nation
concerning which he himself was using words of such generous sympathy
and approbation.

The ideas and proposals put forward by Pönitz (of whose work a French
translation, under the title of "Essai sur les Chemins de Fer,
considérés commes lignes d'opérations militaires," was published by L.
A. Unger in Paris, in 1844) did much to stimulate the discussion of the
general question, while the military authorities of Germany were moved
to make investigations into it on their own account, there being issued
in Berlin, about 1848 or 1850, a "Survey of the Traffic and Equipment of
German and of neighbouring foreign Railways for military purposes, based
on information collected by the Great General Staff."[2]

In France, also, there were those who, quite early in the days of the
new means of transport, predicted the important service it was likely to
render for the purposes of war no less than for those of peace.

General Lamarque declared in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1832, or
1833, that the strategical use of railways would lead to "a revolution
in military science as great as that which had been brought about by the
use of gunpowder."

At the sitting of the Chamber on May 25, 1833, M. de Bérigny, in urging
the "incontestable" importance of railways, said:--

From the point of view of national defence, what advantages
do they not present! An army, with all its material, could, in a
few days, be transported from the north to the south, from the
east to the west, of France. If a country could thus speedily
carry considerable masses of troops to any given point on its
frontiers, would it not become invincible, and would it not,
also, be in a position to effect great economies in its military
expenditure?

In a further debate on June 8, 1837, M. Dufaure declared that railways
had a greater mission to fulfil than that of offering facilities to
industry or than that of conferring benefits on private interests. Was
it a matter of no account, he asked, that they should be able in one
night to send troops to all the frontiers of France, from Paris to
the banks of the Rhine, from Lyons to the foot of the Alps, with an
assurance of their arriving fresh and ready for combat?

Then, in 1842, M. Marschall, advocating the construction of a line from
Paris to Strasburg, predicted that any new invasion of France by Germany
would most probably be attempted between Metz and Strasburg. He further
said:--

It is there that the German Confederation is converging
a formidable system of railways from Cologne, Mayence and
Mannheim.... Twenty-four hours will suffice for our neighbours
to concentrate on the Rhine the forces of Prussia, Austria and
the Confederation, and on the morrow an army of 400,000 men
could invade our territory by that breach of forty leagues
between Thionville and Lauterburg, which are the outposts of
Strasburg and Metz. Three months later, the reserve system
organised in Prussia and in some of the other German States
would allow of a second Army being sent of equal force to the
other. The title of "aggressive lines" given by our neighbours
to these railways leave us with no room for doubt as to their
intentions. Studies for an expedition against Paris by way of
Lorraine and Champagne can hardly be regarded as indicative of a
sentiment of fraternity.

France, however, had no inclination at that time to build railways
designed to serve military purposes, whether from the point of view of
aggression or even from that of national defence; so that in a letter to
his brother Ludwig, written April 13, 1844, von Moltke, then a member
of the General Staff of the Fourth Army Corps of the Prussian Army,
declared that whilst Germany was building railways, the French Chamber
was only discussing them. This was so far the case that when, later on,
Germany had nearly 3,300 miles of railway France was operating only a
little over 1,000 miles.

Apart from the experiences, on quite a small scale, which had been
obtained on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, the earliest example
of what railways could do in the transport of large bodies of troops
was afforded in 1846, when Prussia's Sixth Army Corps--consisting
of over 12,000 men, together with horses, guns, road vehicles and
ammunition--was moved by rail, upon two lines, to Cracow. In 1849 a
Russian corps of 30,000 men, with all its equipment, was taken by rail
from its cantonments in Poland to Göding, Moravia, whence it effected a
junction with the Austrian army. There was, also, a certain movement of
German troops by rail to Schleswig-Holstein in the troubles of 1848-50;
but of greater importance than these other instances was the transport
of an Austrian army of 75,000 men, 8,000 horses and 1,000 vehicles from
Vienna and Hungary to the Silesian frontier in the early winter of 1850.

It is true that, owing to the combined disadvantages of single-line
railways, inadequate staff and rolling stock, unfavourable weather, lack
of previous preparations and of transport regulations, and delays from
various unforeseen causes, no fewer than twenty-six days were occupied
in the transport, although the journey was one of only about 150 miles.
It was, also, admitted that the troops could have marched the distance
in the same time. All the same, as told by Regierungsrat Wernekke,[3]
the movement of so large a body of troops by rail at all was regarded
as especially instructive. It was the cause of greater attention being
paid to the use of railways for military purposes, while it further led
(1) to the drawing up, in May, 1851, of a scheme for the construction
throughout the Austrian monarchy of railways from the special point
of view of strategical requirements; and (2) to a reorganisation of
the methods hitherto adopted for the transport of troops by rail, the
result being that the next considerable movement in Austria--in the year
1853--was conducted with "unprecedented regularity and efficiency," and
this, also, without any cessation of the ordinary traffic of the lines
concerned.

In 1851 a further striking object lesson of the usefulness of railways
was afforded by the moving of a division of 14,500 men, with nearly
2,000 horses, 48 guns and 464 vehicles, from Cracow to Hradish,
a distance of 187 miles, in two days. Reckoning that a large column
of troops, with all its impedimenta, would march twelve miles per
day, and allowing for one day's rest in seven, the movement would, in
this instance, have occupied fifteen days by road instead of two days
by rail.

It was in the _Italian campaign of 1859_ that railways first played a
conspicuous part in actual warfare, both strategically and tactically.
"In this campaign," said Major Millar, R.A., V.C., of the Topographical
Staff, in two lectures delivered by him at the Royal United Service
Institution in 1861[4]--

Railways assisted the ordinary means of locomotion hitherto
employed by armies. By them thousands of men were carried
daily through France to Toulon, Marseilles, or the foot of
Mont Cenis; by them troops were hastened up to the very fields
of battle; and by them injured men were brought swiftly back
to the hospitals, still groaning in the first agony of their
wounds. Moreover, the railway cuttings, embankments and bridges
presented features of importance equal or superior to the
ordinary accidents of the ground, and the possession of which
was hotly contested. If you go to Magenta you will see, close
to the railway platform on which you alight, an excavation full
of rough mounds and simple black crosses, erected to mark the
resting-places of many hundred men who fell in the great fight.
This first employment of railways in close connection with vast
military operations would alone be enough to give a distinction
to this campaign in military history.

The French railways, especially, attained a remarkable degree of
success. In eighty-six days--from April 19 to July 15--they transported
an aggregate of 604,000 men and over 129,000 horses, including nearly
228,000 men and 37,000 horses sent to Culox, Marseilles, Toulon,
Grenoble and Aix by lines in the south-east. The greatest movements
took place during the ten days from April 20 to April 30, when the
Paris-Lyons Company, without interrupting the ordinary traffic, conveyed
an average per day of 8,421 men and 512 horses. On April 25, a maximum
of 12,138 men and 655 horses was attained. During the eighty-six days
there were run on the lines of the same company a total of 2,636 trains,
including 253 military specials. It was estimated that the 75,966 men
and 4,469 horses transported by rail from Paris to the Mediterranean
or to the frontiers of the Kingdom of Sardinia between April 20 and
April 30 would have taken sixty days to make the journey by road. In
effect, the rate of transit by rail was six times greater than the rate
of progress by marching would have been, and this, again, was about
double as fast as the best achievement recorded up to that time on the
German railways. The Chasseurs de Vincennes are described as leaving
the station at Turin full of vigour and activity, and with none of the
fatigue or the reduction in numbers which would have occurred had they
made the journey by road.

As against, however, the advantage thus gained by the quicker transport
of the French troops to the seat of war, due to the successful manner
in which the railways were operated, there had to be set some serious
defects in administrative organisation. When the men got to the end
of their rail journey there was a more or less prolonged waiting for
the food and other necessaries which were to follow. There were grave
deficiencies, also, in the dispatch of the subsequent supplies. On June
25, the day after the defeat of the Austrians, the French troops had
no provisions at all for twenty-four hours, except some biscuits which
were so mouldy that no one could eat them. Their horses, also, were
without fodder. In these circumstances it was impossible to follow up
the Austrians in their retreat beyond the Mincio.

Thus the efficiency of the French railways was to a large extent
negatived by the inefficiency of the military administration; and in
these respects France had a foretaste, in 1859, of experiences to be
repeated on a much graver scale in the Franco-German War of 1870-71.

As regards the Austrians, they improved but little on their admittedly
poor performance in 1850, in spite of the lessons they appeared to
have learned as the result of their experiences on that occasion.
Government and railways were alike unprepared. Little or no real attempt
at organisation in time of peace had been made, and, in the result,
trains were delayed or blocked, and stations got choked with masses
of supplies which could not be forwarded. At Vienna there was such a
deficiency of rolling stock--accelerated by great delays in the return
of empties--that many of the troop trains for the South could not be
made up until the last moment. Even then the average number of men they
conveyed did not exceed about 360. At Laibach there was much congestion
because troops had to wait there for instructions as to their actual
destination. Other delays occurred because, owing to the heavy gradients
of the Semmering Pass, each train had to be divided into three sections
before it could proceed. Between, again, Innsbruck and Bozen the railway
was still incomplete, and the First Corps (about 40,000 men and 10,000
horses) had to march between these two points on their journey from
Prague to Verona. Notwithstanding this fact, it was estimated that they
covered in fourteen days a journey which would have taken sixty-four
days if they had marched all the way. From Vienna to Lombardy the Third
Army Corps (20,000 men, 5,500 horses, with guns, ammunition and 300
wagons) was carried by rail in fourteen days, the rate of progress
attained being four and a half times greater than by road marching,
though still inferior by one and a half times to what the French
troop-trains had accomplished.

On both sides important reinforcements were brought up at critical
periods during the progress of the war. Referring to the attacks by
the allies on Casteggio and Montebello, Count Gyulai, the Austrian
General, wrote:--"The enemy soon displayed a superior force, which was
continually increased by arrivals from the railway"; and the special
correspondent of _The Times_, writing from Pavia on May 21, 1859, said:--

From the heights of Montebello the Austrians beheld a
novelty in the art of war. Train after train arrived by railway
from Voghera, each train disgorging its hundreds of armed men
and immediately hastening back for more. In vain Count Stadion
endeavoured to crush the force behind him before it could be
increased enough to overpower him.

Then, also, the good use made of the railways by the allies in carrying
out their important flanking movement against the Austrians at Vercelli
gave further evidence of the fact that rail-power was a new force which
could be employed, not alone for the earlier concentration of troops at
the seat of war, but, also, in support of strategic developments on the
battle-field itself. Commenting on this fact the _Spectateur Militaire_
said, in its issue for September, 1869:--

Les chemins de fer ont joué un rôle immense dans cette
concentration. C'est la première fois que, dans l'histoire
militaire, ils servent d'une manière aussi merveilleuse et
entrent dans les combinaisons stratégiques.

While these observations were fully warranted by the results
accomplished in regard to concentration, reinforcements and tactical
movements by rail, the campaign also brought out more clearly than
ever before the need, if railways were to fulfil their greatest
possible measure of utility in time of war, of working out in advance
all important details likely to arise in connection with the movement
of troops, instead--as in the case of the Austrians, at least--of
neglecting any serious attempt at organisation until the need arose for
immediate action.

From all these various points of view the Italian campaign of 1859
marked a further important stage in the early development of that new
factor which the employment of railways for the purposes of warfare
represented; though far greater results in the same direction were to
be brought about, shortly afterwards, by the American Civil War of
1861-65. Not only does the real development of rail-power as a new arm
in war date therefrom, but the War of Secession was to establish in a
pre-eminent degree (1) the possibility, through the use of railways,
of carrying on operations at a considerable distance from the base
of supplies; (2) the need of a special organisation to deal alike
with restoration of railway lines destroyed by the enemy and with the
interruption, in turn, of the enemy's own communications; and (3) the
difficulties that may arise as between the military element and the
technical (railway) element in regard to the control and operation of
railways during war. To each of these subjects it is proposed to devote
a separate chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] In 1847 one of the leading military writers in Germany published a
pamphlet in which he sought to prove that the best-organised railway
could not carry 10,000 Infantry a distance equal to sixty English miles
in twenty-four hours. As for the conveyance of Cavalry and Artillery by
train, he declared that this would be a sheer impossibility.

[2] "Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den inländischen
und den benachbarten ausländischen Eisenbahnen für militärischen Zwecke;
nach dem beim grossen Generalstabe vorhanden Materialen zusammen
gestellt."

[3] "Die Mitwirkung der Eisenbahn an den Kriegen in Mitteleuropa."
"Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen," Juli und August, 1912.

[4] "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," vol. v, pp.
269-308. London, 1861.

CHAPTER II

RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR

Such were the conditions under which the War of Secession in the United
States was fought that without the help of railways it could hardly have
been fought at all.

The area of the military operations, from first to last, was equal in
extent almost to the whole of Europe. The line of separation between the
rival forces of North and South was fully 2,000 miles. Large portions
of this region were then unexplored. Everywhere, except in the towns,
it was but thinly populated. Civilisation had not yet progressed so far
that an advancing army could always depend on being able to "live on the
country." There were occasions when local supplies of food and forage
were so difficult of attainment that an army might be wholly dependent
on a base hundreds of miles distant from the scene of its operations.

Of roads and tracks throughout this vast area there were but few, and
these were mostly either indifferent or bad, even if they did not become
positively execrable in wet weather or after a considerable force of
troops had passed along them. In the low-lying districts, especially,
the alluvial undrained soil was speedily converted by the winter floods
into swamps and lakes. Further difficulties in the movement of troops
were offered by pathless forests as large as an English county; and
still others by the broad rivers or the mountain ranges it might be
necessary to cross.

Apart from the deficient and defective roads and tracks, the transport
facilities available for the combatants were those afforded by coastal
services, navigable rivers, canals and railways. Of these it was the
railways that played the most important rôle.

The American railway lines of those days had, generally speaking,
been constructed as cheaply as possible by the private enterprise
which--though with liberal grants of land and other advantages--alone
undertook their provision, the main idea being to supply a railway of
some sort to satisfy immediate wants and to improve it later on, when
population and traffic increased and more funds were available. The
lines themselves were mostly single track; the ballasting was too often
imperfect; iron rails of inadequate weight soon wore down and got out
of shape; sleepers (otherwise "ties"), which consisted of logs of wood
brought straight from the forests, speedily became rotten, especially in
low-lying districts; while, in the early 'Sixties lumber, used either in
the rough or smoothed on two sides, was still the customary material for
the building of bridges and viaducts carrying the railways across narrow
streams, broad rivers or widespread valleys.

All the same, these railways, while awaiting their later betterment,
extended for long distances, served as a connecting link of inestimable
advantage between the various centres of population and production, and
offered in many instances the only practicable means by which troops
and supplies could be moved. They fulfilled, in fact, purposes of such
vital importance from a strategical point of view that many battles
were fought primarily for the control of particular railways, for the
safeguarding of lines of communication, or for the possession, more
especially, of important junctions, some of which themselves became the
base for more or less distant operations.

The North, bent not simply on invasion but on reconquest of the States
which had seceded, necessarily took the offensive; the South stood
mostly on the defensive. Yet while the population in the North was far
in excess of that in the South, the initial advantages from a transport
point of view were in favour of the South, which found its principal
ally in the railways. Generals in the North are, indeed, said to have
been exceedingly chary, at first, in getting far away from the magazines
they depended on for their supplies; though this uneasiness wore off in
proportion as organised effort showed how successfully the lines of
rail communication could be defended.

In these and other circumstances, and especially in view of the
paramount importance the railway system was to assume in the conduct of
the war, the Federal Government took possession of the Philadelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore Railway on March 31, 1861. This preliminary
measure was followed by the passing, in January, 1862, by the United
States House of Representatives, of "An Act to authorise the President
of the United States in certain cases to take possession of railroad and
telegraph lines, and for other purposes."

The President, "when in his judgment the public safety may require it,"
was "to take possession of any or all the telegraph lines in the United
States; ... to take possession of any or all the railroad lines in the
United States, their rolling stock, their offices, shops, buildings
and all their appendages and appurtenances; to prescribe rules and
regulations for the holding, using, and maintaining of the aforesaid
telegraph and railroad lines, and to extend, repair and complete the
same in the manner most conducive to the safety and interest of the
Government; to place under military control all the officers, agents
and employés belonging to the telegraph and railroad lines thus taken
possession of by the President, so that they shall be considered as a
post road and a part of the military establishment of the United States,
subject to all the restrictions imposed by the Rules and Articles of
War." Commissioners were to be appointed to assess and determine the
damages suffered, or the compensation to which any railroad or telegraph
company might be entitled by reason of such seizure of their property;
and it was further enacted "that the transportation of troops, munitions
of war, equipments, military property and stores, throughout the United
States, should be under the immediate control and supervision of the
Secretary of War and such agents as he might appoint."

Thus the Act in question established a precedent for a Government
taking formal possession of, and exercising complete authority and
control over, the whole of such railways as it might require to employ
for the purposes of war; although, in point of fact, only such lines,
or portions of lines, were so taken over by the War Department as were
actually required. In each instance, also, the line or portion of line
in question was given back to the owning company as soon as it was no
longer required for military purposes; while at the conclusion of the
war all the lines taken possession of by the Government were formally
restored to their original owners by an Executive Order dated August 8,
1865.

Under the authority of the Act of January 31, 1862, the following
order was sent to Mr. Daniel Craig McCallum, a native of Johnstone,
Renfrewshire, Scotland, who had been taken to America by his parents
when a youth, had joined the railway service, had held for many years
the position of general superintendent of the Erie Railroad, and was
one of the ablest and most experienced railway men then in the United
States:--

WAR DEPARTMENT.
Washington City, D.C.,
_February 11, 1862_.

_Ordered_, That D. C. McCallum be, and he is hereby,
appointed Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in
the United States, with authority to enter upon, take possession
of, hold and use all railroads, engines, cars, locomotives,
equipments, appendages and appurtenances that may be required
for the transport of troops, arms, ammunition and military
supplies of the United States, and to do and perform all acts
and things that may be necessary and proper to be done for the
safe and speedy transport aforesaid.

By order of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

McCallum commenced his duties with the staff rank of Colonel, afterwards
attaining to that of Brev.-Brig.-General. The scope of the authority
conferred on him, under the War Department order of February 11, 1862,
was widened a year later, when he was further appointed general manager
of all railways in possession of the Federal Government, or that might
from time to time be taken possession of by military authority, in the
departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and of Arkansas,
forming the "Military Division of the Mississippi."

The total mileage of the lines taken over by the Federal Government
during the course of the war was 2,105, namely, in Virginia, 611
miles; in the military division of the Mississippi, 1,201; and in
North Carolina, 293. Much more was involved, however, for the Federal
Government than a mere transfer to themselves of the ownership and
operation of these lines for the duration of the war.

One of the greatest disadvantages of the American railways at the
time of the Civil War lay in their differences of gauge. The various
companies had built their lines with gauges chosen either to suit local
conditions or according to the views of their own engineers, with little
or no consideration for the running of through traffic on or from other
lines. There were, in fact, at that time gauges of 6 ft., 5 ft. 6 in.,
5 ft., 4 ft. 10 in., 4 ft. 9 in., 4 ft. 8½ in. (the standard English
gauge), and various narrower gauges besides. These conditions prevailed
until 1866, when the companies adopted a uniform gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in.

During the Civil War the lack of uniformity was in full force, and
military transport by rail was greatly complicated in consequence. More
than one-half of the lines taken over and operated had a gauge of 5 ft.,
and the remainder had a gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in., except in the case of
one short line, which was 5 ft. 6 in. As locomotives and rolling stock
adapted to one gauge were unsuited to any other, the obligations falling
upon the Director and General Manager of the Federal Military Railways
included that of taking up the lines of certain companies which had
adopted the 5 ft. gauge, and relaying them with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge,
so that the same rolling stock could be used as on lines connecting with
them.

Incidentally, therefore, the Civil War in America taught the lesson that
the actual value of rail-power as influencing warfare in one and the
same country, or on one and the same continent, may vary materially
according to whether there is uniformity or diversity of railway gauge.

In certain instances the lines taken possession of were in so
defective a condition that it was imperatively necessary to relay
them, apart altogether from any question of gauge. When McCallum was
appointed General Manager of Military Railways for the Division of
the Mississippi, the main army was at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and its
supplies were being received from Nashville, 151 miles distant, over
the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. This was necessarily the main
line of supply during the subsequent campaigns from Chattanooga towards
Atlanta, and from Knoxville towards South-western Virginia; yet McCallum
says of it, in the Final Report he presented to the Secretary of War in
1866:--

The track was laid originally in a very imperfect manner,
with a light U-rail on wooden stringers which were badly decayed
and caused almost daily accidents by spreading apart and letting
the engines and cars drop through them.

In still other instances, lines which, though begun, were not finished,
had to be completed; in others new lines had to be constructed
throughout, or extensive sidings provided; so that once more we see
that it was not then simply a question of the Federal Government taking
possession of and operating an existing complete and efficient system of
railways.

Whatever, again, the condition of the lines when taken over, the
railways of both combatants were subjected to constant attack by the
other side with a view to the interruption of communications, the
destruction of railway track, railway bridges, rolling stock and other
railway property being enormous.

Reviewing the general situation at this time, McCallum says in his
report:--

In the beginning of the war military railroads were an
experiment; and though some light as to their management had
been gleaned by the operations of 1862 and 1863, yet so little
progress had been made that the attempt to supply the army of
General Sherman in the field, construct and reconstruct the
railroad in its rear, and keep pace with its march, was regarded
by those who had the largest experience, and who had become
most familiar with the subject, as the greatest experiment of
all. The attempt to furnish an army of 100,000 men and 60,000
animals with supplies from a base 360 miles distant by one line
of single-track railroad, located almost the entire distance
through the country of an active and vindictive enemy, is
without precedent in the history of warfare; and to make it
successful required an enormous outlay for labour and a vast
consumption of material, together with all the forethought,
energy, patience and watchfulness of which men are capable.

To meet the various conditions which had thus arisen, McCallum
was authorised by the Federal Government to create two distinct
departments, destined to bring about a still further development in the
application of rail-power to war by establishing precedents which the
leading countries of the world were afterwards to follow more or less
completely, according to their own circumstances and requirements.

The departments were known respectively as the "Transportation
Department," embracing the operation and maintenance of all the lines
brought under use by the army of the North; and the "Construction
Corps," which was to repair the damage done by wrecking parties of the
enemy, maintain lines of communication, and reconstruct, when necessary,
railways captured from the enemy as the Federals advanced.

Concerning the Construction Corps, and the great work accomplished by it
in keeping the lines open, details will be given in the chapter which
follows.

In regard to the Transportation Department, it may be of interest
to state that this was placed by McCallum in charge of a General
Superintendent of Transportation on United States Railroads in the
Military Division of the Mississippi. For each of the principal lines
there was appointed a Superintendent of Transportation who, acting under
the control of the General Superintendent, was held responsible for the
movement of all trains and locomotives; and these superintendents, in
turn, had under their direction one or more Masters of Transportation,
whose business it was to be constantly moving about over the sections of
line placed under their charge, and see that the railway employés were
attending properly to their duties.

At each of the principal stations there was an Engine Dispatcher who
was required to see that the locomotives were kept in good order and
ready for immediate use whenever required, to exercise control over the
drivers and firemen, and to assign the requisite "crew" to each engine
sent out.

Maintenance of road and structures for each line (as distinct from
the reconstruction work left to the Construction Department) was in
charge of a Superintendent of Repairs, assisted by such supervisors,
road-masters and foremen as he needed to control and direct his working
staff; and maintenance of rolling stock was delegated to (1) a Master
Machinist, responsible for repairs to locomotives, and (2) a Master of
Car Repairs.

These various officers were independent of each other, and all of
them reported direct to the General Superintendent. The maximum force
employed at any one time in the Transportation Department of the
Military Division of the Mississippi (as distinct from the military
lines in Virginia and elsewhere) was about 12,000 men.

A sufficient staff of competent railwaymen for the operation of the
Military Railways was difficult to get, partly because of the inadequate
supply of such men in the United States at that period, and partly
because those still at work on railways not taken over for military
purposes were unwilling to give up what they found to be exceptionally
good posts; but of the men whose services he was able to secure McCallum
speaks in terms of the highest commendation.

Having got his Department and Construction Corps into working order,
McCallum had next to turn his attention to ensuring an adequate supply
of locomotives and cars, with the necessary shops, tools and materials
for keeping them in working order. Here the Secretary of War again
came to his help, issuing, on March 23, 1864, an Order addressed to
locomotive manufacturers in which he stated that Colonel McCallum had
been authorised by the War Department to procure locomotives without
delay for the railways under his charge, and proceeded:--

In order to meet the wants of the Military Department of
the Government, you will deliver to his order such engines as
he may direct, whether building under orders for other parties
or otherwise, the Government being accountable to you for the
same. The urgent necessity of the Government for the immediate
supply of our armies operating in Tennessee renders the engines
indispensable for the equipment of the lines of communication,
and it is hoped that this necessity will be recognised by you as
a military necessity, paramount to all other considerations.--By
order of the President.

In January, 1864, McCallum had estimated that he would require 200
locomotives and 3,000 cars for the lines to be operated from Nashville,
and towards this number he then had only 47 locomotives and 437 cars
available. There was thus a substantial shortage which had to be
made good; but the manufacturers, inspired by "a spirit of zealous
patriotism," responded heartily to the appeal made to them, putting
their full force on to the completion of further supplies. These were
furnished with a speed that surpassed all previous records.

Then, to maintain the locomotives and cars in good condition--more
especially in view of the constant attempts made by the enemy to destroy
them--extensive machine and car shops were built at Nashville and
Chattanooga. Those at Nashville--the terminal station for 500 miles
of railway running south, east or west--had, at times, as many as 100
engines and 1,000 cars awaiting repair.

Next to that insufficiency of engines and rolling stock which hampered
the movements of both combatants came the difficulty in the way of
obtaining further supplies of rails, whether for new lines or to take
the place of those which had either worn out or been so bent and twisted
by the enemy that they could not be used again without re-rolling.
For the Confederates, cut off by the advance of General Grant to the
south and west from their sources of supply, the want of iron for new
rails was declared to be a worse evil than was the lack of gold for the
Federals.

One expedient resorted to by the Federal Government, on finding they
could not procure from the manufacturers all the rails they wanted, was
to pull up the railway lines that were not wanted for military purposes
and use their rails for relaying those that were. Altogether the rails
on over 156 miles of track in Virginia and the Military Division of the
Mississippi were thus taken up and utilised elsewhere. Later on the
Federal Construction Corps erected at Chattanooga some "very superior"
rolling mills, equipped with all the latest improvements in the way of
machinery and mechanical appliances; though these mills did not actually
get to work until April 1, 1865. Their production of new rails during
the course of six months from that date was 3,818 tons, this supply
being in addition to nearly 22,000 tons which the Federal Government
obtained by purchase.

These details may convey some idea of all that was involved in the
utilisation of rail-power in the American Civil War under such
development of railway construction as had then been brought about.
Great, however, as was the outlay, the forethought, the energy, the
patience and the watchfulness spoken of by McCallum, the results were no
less valuable from the point of view of the Federals, who could hardly
have hoped to achieve the aim they set before themselves--that of saving
the Union--but for the material advantages they derived from the use of
the railways for the purposes of the campaign.

Some of the achievements accomplished in the movement of troops from
one part of the theatre of war to another would have been creditable
even in the most favourable of circumstances; but they were especially
so in view alike of the physical conditions of many of the lines, the
inadequate supply of rolling stock, and the risks and difficulties to be
met or overcome.

One of these achievements, carried out in September, 1863, is thus
narrated in an article on "Recollections of Secretary Stanton,"
published in the _Century Magazine_ for March, 1887:--

The defeat of Rosecrans, at Chickamauga, was believed at
Washington to imperil East Tennessee, and the Secretary [of War]
was urged to send a strong reinforcement there from the Army
of the Potomac. General Halleck (General-in-Chief of the Army
of the United States) contended that it was impossible to get
an effective reinforcement there in time; and the President,
after hearing both sides, accepted the judgment of Halleck. Mr.
Stanton put off the decision till evening, when he and Halleck
were to be ready with details to support their conclusions.
The Secretary then sent for Colonel McCallum, who was neither
a lawyer nor a strategist, but a master of railway science. He
showed McCallum how many officers, men, horses, and pieces of
artillery, and how much baggage, it was proposed to move from
the Rapidan to the Tennessee, and asked him to name the shortest
time he would undertake to do it in if his life depended on
it. McCallum made some rapid calculations, jotted down some
projects connected with the move, and named a time within that
which Halleck had admitted would be soon enough if it were
only possible; this time being conditioned on his being able
to control everything that he could reach. The Secretary was
delighted, told him that he would make him a Brigadier-General
the day that the last train was safely unloaded; put him on his
mettle by telling him of Halleck's assertion that the thing
was beyond human power; told him to go and work out final
calculations and projects and to begin preliminary measures,
using his name and authority everywhere; and finally instructed
him what to do and say when he should send for him by and
by to come over to the department. When the conference was
resumed and McCallum was introduced, his apparently spontaneous
demonstration of how easily and surely the impossible thing
could be done convinced the two sceptics, and the movement was
ordered, and made, and figures now in military science as a
grand piece of strategy.

The feat thus accomplished was that of conveying by rail 23,000 men,
together with artillery, road vehicles, etc., a distance of about 1,200
miles in seven days. It was estimated that if the troops had had to
march this distance, with all their impedimenta, along such roads as
were then available, the journey would have taken them three months. By
doing it in one week they saved the situation in East Tennessee, and
they gave an especially convincing proof of the success with which "a
grand piece of strategy" could be carried out through the employment of
rail transport.

In December, 1864, General Schofield's corps of 15,000 men, after
fighting at Nashville in the midst of ice and snow, was, on the
conclusion of the campaign in the west, transferred from the valley of
the Tennessee to the banks of the Potomac, moving by river and rail down
the Tennessee, up the Ohio and across the snow-covered Alleghanies,
a distance of 1,400 miles, accomplished in the short space of eleven
days. In 1865 the moving of the Fourth Army Corps of the Federals from
Carter's Station, East Tennessee, to Nashville, a distance of 373 miles,
involved the employment of 1,498 cars.

What, in effect, the Civil War in America did in furthering the
development of the rail-power principle in warfare was to show that,
by the use of railways, (1) the fighting power of armies is increased;
(2) strategical advantages unattainable but for the early arrival of
reinforcements at threatened points may be assured; and (3) expeditions
may be undertaken at distances from the base of supplies which would
be prohibitive but for the control of lines of railway communication;
though as against these advantages were to be put those considerations
which also arose as to destruction and restoration, and as to the
control of railways in their operation for military purposes.

CHAPTER III

RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR

One of the earliest and most obvious criticisms advanced against the
use of railways in war was based on the vulnerability of the iron
road. The destruction of a bridge, the tearing up of a few rails or
the blocking of a tunnel would, it was argued, suffice to cause an
interruption in the transport of troops or supplies which might be of
serious consequence to the combatants prejudiced thereby, though of
corresponding advantage to the other side. By means of such interruption
the concentration of troops on the frontier might be delayed; an army
might be divided into two or more parts, and exposed to the risk of
defeat in detail; the arrival of reinforcements urgently wanted to
meet a critical situation might be prevented until it was too late for
them to afford the desired relief; a force advancing into an enemy's
country might have its rail connection severed and be left to starve
or to surrender at discretion; invaders would find that the force they
were driving before them had taken the precaution to destroy their
own railways as they retreated; or, alternatively, lines of railway
constructed to the frontier, and depended upon to facilitate invasion of
neighbouring territory, might--unless destroyed--be of material service
to the enemy, should the latter become the invaders instead of the
invaded.

While these and other possibilities--foreshadowed more especially in
the controversies which the whole subject aroused in Germany in the
'Forties--were frankly admitted, it was argued that, however vulnerable
railways might be as a line of communication, it should be quite
possible either to defend them successfully or to carry out on them
such speedy repairs or reconstruction as would, generally speaking,
permit of an early resumption of traffic; though experience was to show
that these safeguards could only be assured through a well-planned and
thoroughly efficient organisation prepared to meet, with the utmost
dispatch and the highest degree of efficiency, all the requirements in
the way of railway repairs or railway rebuilding that were likely to
arise.

The earliest instance of an attempt to delay the advance of an enemy
by interrupting his rail communications was recorded in 1848, when the
Venetians, threatened with bombardment by the Austrians, destroyed
some of the arches in the railway viaduct connecting their island city
with the mainland. Then in the _Italian campaign of 1859_ the allies
and the Austrians both resorted to the expedient of destroying railway
bridges or tearing up the railway lines; although the allies were able,
in various instances, to repair so speedily the damage done by the
Austrians that the lines were ready for use again by the time they were
wanted.

It was the _American Civil War_ that was to elevate railway destruction
and restoration into a science and to see the establishment, in the
interests of such science, of an organisation which was to become a
model for European countries and influence the whole subsequent course
of modern warfare.

The destruction of railways likely to be used by the North for its
projected invasion of the Confederate States was, from the first,
a leading feature in the strategy of the South. Expeditions were
undertaken and raids were made with no other object than that of
burning down bridges, tearing up and bending rails, making bonfires of
sleepers, wrecking stations, rendering engines, trucks and carriages
unserviceable, cutting off the water supply for locomotives, or in
various other ways seeking to check the advance of the Northerners.
Later on the Federals, in turn, became no less energetic in resorting to
similar tactics in order either to prevent pursuit by the Confederates
or to interrupt their communications.

For the carrying out of these destructive tactics use was generally made
either of cavalry, accompanied by civilians, or of bodies of civilians
only; but in some instances, when it was considered desirable to destroy
lengths of track extending to twenty or thirty miles, or more, the
Confederates put the whole of their available forces on to the work.

At the outset the methods of destruction were somewhat primitive; but
they were improved upon as the result of practice and experiment.

Thus, in the first instance, timber bridges or viaducts were destroyed
by collecting brushwood, placing this around the arches, pouring tar or
petroleum upon the pile, and then setting fire to the whole. Afterwards
the Federals made use of a "torpedo," eight inches long, and charged
with gunpowder, which was inserted in a hole bored in the main timbers
of the bridge and exploded with a fuse. It was claimed that with two or
three men working at each span the largest timber bridge could be thrown
down in a few minutes.

Then the method generally adopted at first for destroying a railway
track was to tear up sleepers and rails, place the sleepers in a heap,
put the rails cross-ways over them, set fire to the sleepers, and heat
the rails until they either fell out of shape or could be twisted around
a tree with the help of chains and horses. But this process was found
to require too much time and labour, while the results were not always
satisfactory, since rails only slightly bent could be restored to
their original shape, and made ready for use again, in much less time
than it had taken for the fire to heat and bend them. A Federal expert
accordingly invented an ingenious contrivance, in the form of iron
U-shaped "claws," which, being turned up and over at each extremity,
were inserted underneath each end of a rail, on opposite sides, and
operated, with the help of a long wooden lever and rope, by half a dozen
men. In this way a rail could be torn from the sleepers and not only
bent but given such a spiral or corkscrew twist, while still in the cold
state, that it could not be used again until it had gone through the
rolling mills. By the adoption of this method, 440 men could destroy
one mile of track in an hour, or 2,200 men could, in the same time,
destroy five miles.

The most effective method for rendering a locomotive unfit for service
was found to be the firing of a cannon ball through the boiler.
Carriages and wagons which might otherwise be used by the enemy, and
could not be conveniently carried off, were easily destroyed by fire.
In one period of six months the Federals disposed of 400 in this way.
Stations, water-tanks, sleepers, fuel and telegraph poles were also
destroyed or rendered useless by fire or otherwise.

In the first year of the war--1861--the Confederates gave the Federals a
foretaste of much that was to come by destroying forty-eight locomotives
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and making a complete wreck of 100
miles of the North Missouri Railroad track and everything thereon.

Much more serious than this, however, from a strategical point of
view, was the wholesale destruction carried out by the Confederates,
in April, 1862, on the Fredericksburg Railway, connecting Richmond
and Washington, the immediate result of the mischief done being to
prevent an impending combination between the Federal armies of the
Potomac and the Rappahannock, neither of which could act without the
other, while neither could join the other unless it could make use
of rail communication. There was much that required to be done, for
the Confederates had carried out their work in a most thorough-going
fashion. Several indispensable railway bridges had been destroyed; three
miles of track had been torn up, the rails being carried south and the
sleepers burned; and wharves and buildings had been burned or wrecked.
The whole transportation service, in fact, had been reduced to a state
of chaos.

At the urgent request of the Secretary of War, the work of restoration
was undertaken by Mr. Herman Haupt, a railway engineer who had already
distinguished himself more especially as a builder of bridges, and was
now to establish a further record as the pioneer of those Construction
Corps of which so much was to be heard later on in connection with
railways and war.

In carrying out the necessary repairs the only help which Haupt could
obtain, at first, was that of soldiers detailed from the Federal ranks.
Many of these men were entirely unaccustomed to physical labour; others
were sickly, inefficient, or unwilling to undertake what they did not
regard as a soldier's duties, while the Army officers sent in a fresh
lot daily until Haupt's remonstrances led to their allotting certain
men to form a "Construction Corps." Other difficulties which presented
themselves included an insufficient supply of tools, occasional scarcity
of food, and several days of wet weather; yet the work advanced so
rapidly that the Akakeek bridge, a single span of 120 ft., at an
elevation of 30 ft., was rebuilt in about fifteen working hours; the
Potomac Creek bridge, 414 ft. long with an elevation of 82 ft. above
the water, and requiring the use of as much roughly-hewn timber as
would have extended a total length of six and a half miles, if put end
to end, was completed in nine days;[5] and the three miles of track
were relaid in three days, included in the work done in that time being
the preparation of more than 3,000 sleepers from lumber cut down for
the purpose in woods a mile and a half distant from the track. General
McDowell subsequently said, concerning the Potomac bridge:--

When it is considered that in the campaigns of Napoleon
trestle bridges of more than one story, even of moderate
height, were regarded as impracticable, and that, too, for
common military roads, it is not difficult to understand why
distinguished Europeans should express surprise at so bold a
specimen of American military engineering. It is a structure
which ignores all rules and precedents of military science as
laid down in the books. It is constructed chiefly of round
sticks cut from the woods, and not even divested of bark; the
legs of the trestles are braced with round poles. It is in four
stories--three of trestle and one of crib work.

While constructed in so apparently primitive a fashion, the bridge was,
General McDowell further said, carrying every day from ten to twenty
heavy railway trains in both directions, and had withstood several
severe freshets and storms without injury.

Thus early, therefore, in the more active phases of the Civil War,
evidence was being afforded that, although the railways on which so
much depended might be readily destroyed, they could, also, be rapidly
restored; and subsequent experience was to offer proofs still more
remarkable in support of this fact.

On May 28, 1862, Haupt was appointed Chief of Construction and
Transportation in the Department of the Rappahannock, with the rank of
Colonel. He was raised to the rank of Brigadier-General in the following
year, and did much excellent construction and other work for the
Government, though mainly in Virginia, down to September, 1863. In his
"Reminiscences" he relates that the supplies of repair or reconstruction
materials, as kept on hand by the Federals, included the interchangeable
parts of bridge trusses, in spans of 60 ft., and so prepared that, taken
on flat cars, by ox-teams or otherwise, to the place where they were
wanted, and hoisted into position by machinery arranged for the purpose,
they could, without previous fitting, be put together with such rapidity
that one of his foremen claimed to be able to build a bridge "about as
fast as a dog could trot." When the Massaponix bridge, six miles from
Fredericksburg, was burned down one Monday morning, a new one was put
up in its place in half a day--a feat which, he says, led some of the
onlookers to exclaim, "The Yankees can build bridges quicker than the
Rebs can burn them down." In May, 1862, five bridges over Goose Creek
which the "Rebs" had destroyed were reconstructed in a day and a half.
In the following month five other bridges, each with a span of from 60
ft. to 120 ft., were renewed in one day. At the Battle of Gettysburg
Lee's troops destroyed nineteen bridges on the Northern Central Railroad
and did much havoc on the branch lines leading to Gettysburg; but the
Construction Corps was hard at work on the repairs whilst the battle
was still being waged, and rail communication with both Washington and
Baltimore had been re-established by noon of the day after Lee's retreat.

In some instances railway bridges underwent repeated destruction and
reconstruction. By June, 1863, the bridge over Bull Run, for instance,
had been burned down and built up again no fewer than seven times. Many
of the bridges, also, were swept away by floods, and this even for a
second or a third time after they had been rebuilt. Precautions thus
had to be taken against the destructive forces of Nature no less than
against those of man.

Haupt's pioneer Construction Corps in Virginia was succeeded by the
one set up on much broader lines by McCallum when, in February, 1864,
he became General Manager of railways in the Military Division of the
Mississippi. This corps eventually reached a total of 10,000 men.

"The design of the corps," wrote McCallum, in his final report, "was
to combine a body of skilled workmen in each department of railroad
construction and repairs, under competent engineers, supplied with
abundant materials, tools and mechanical appliances." The corps was
formed into divisions the number of which varied from time to time, in
different districts, according to requirements. In the military division
of the Mississippi the corps comprised six divisions, under the general
charge of the chief engineer of the United States military railroads
for that military division, and consisted at its maximum strength of
nearly 5,000 men. In order to give the corps entire mobility, and to
enable it to move independently and undertake work at widely different
points, each of the six divisions was made a complete unit, under
the command of a divisional engineer, and was, in turn, divided into
sub-divisions or sections, with a supervisor in charge of each. The
two largest and most important sub-divisions in any one division were
those of the track-layers and the bridge-builders. A sub-division was,
again, composed of gangs, each with a foreman, while the gangs were
divided into squads, each with a sub-foreman.[6] Under this method of
organisation it was possible to move either the entire division or any
section thereof, with its tools, camp requirements and field transport,
in any direction, wherever and whenever needed, and by any mode of
conveyance--rail, road, with teams and wagons, or on foot.

To facilitate the operations of the corps, supplies of materials were
kept at points along or within a short distance of the railway lines,
where they would be comparatively safe and speedily procurable in
case of necessity. At places where there was special need for taking
precautionary measures, detachments of the corps were stationed in
readiness for immediate action, while on important lines of railway
Federals and Confederates alike had, at each end thereof, construction
trains loaded with every possible requisite, the locomotives attached
to them keeping their steam up in order that the trains could be
started off instantly on the receipt of a telegram announcing a further
interruption of traffic.

At Nashville and Chattanooga the Federals built extensive storehouses
where they kept on hand supplies of materials for the prompt carrying
out of railway repairs of every kind to any extent and in whatever
direction.

On the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway itself the Construction Corps,
from February, 1864, to the close of the war, relaid 115 miles of
track, put in nineteen miles of new sidings, eight miles apart and each
capable of holding from five to eight long freight trains, and erected
forty-five new water tanks.

The reconstruction of this particular line was more especially needed
in connection with General Sherman's campaign in Georgia and the
Carolinas--a campaign which afforded the greatest and most direct
evidence up to that time alike of the possibilities of rail-power
in warfare, of the risks by which its use was attended, and of the
success with which those risks could be overcome by means of efficient
organisation.

In that struggle for Atlanta which preceded his still more famous march
to the sea, Sherman had with him a force of 100,000 men, together with
23,000 animals. His base of supplies, when he approached Atlanta, was
360 miles distant, and the continuance of his communications with that
base, not only for the procuring of food, clothing, fodder, ammunition
and every other requisite, but for the transport to the rear of sick
and wounded, refugees, freedmen and prisoners, depended on what he
afterwards described as "a poorly-constructed single-track railroad"
passing for 120 miles of its length through the country of an extremely
active enemy. Yet Sherman is said to have made his advance in perfect
confidence that, although subject to interruptions, the railway in his
rear would be "all right"; and this confidence was fully warranted by
the results accomplished.

Early in September, 1864, the Confederate General, Wheeler, destroyed
seven miles of road between Nashville and Murfreesboro', on the
Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, and in the following December Hood
destroyed eight miles of track and 530 ft. of bridges between the same
stations; yet the arrangements of the Federal Construction Corps allowed
of the repairs being carried out with such promptness that in each
instance the trains were running again in a few days.

The Confederate attacks on the Western and Atlantic Railway, running
from Chattanooga at Atlanta, a distance of 136 miles, were more
continuous and more severe than on any other line of railway during
the war; but, thanks again to the speed with which the repair and
reconstruction work was done, the delays occasioned were, as a rule, of
only a few hours, or, at the most, a few days' duration. One especially
remarkable feat accomplished on this line was the rebuilding, in four
and a half days, of the Chattahochee bridge, near Atlanta--a structure
780 ft. long, and 92 ft. high. Hood, the Confederate General, thought
still further to check Sherman's communications by passing round the
Federal army and falling upon the railway in its rear. He succeeded
in tearing up two lengths of track, one of ten miles, and another of
twenty-five miles, in extent, and destroying 250 ft. of bridges; but
once more the work of restoration was speedily carried out, McCallum
saying in reference to it:--

Fortunately the detachments of the Construction Corps which
escaped were so distributed that even before Hood had left the
road two strong working parties were at work, one at each end of
the break at Big Shanty, and this gap of ten miles was closed,
and the force ready to move to the great break of twenty-five
miles in length, north of Resaca, as soon as the enemy had left
it. The destruction by Hood's army of our depôts of supplies
compelled us to cut nearly all the cross-ties required to relay
this track and to send a distance for rails. The cross-ties were
cut near the line of the road and many of them carried by hand
to the track, as the teams to be furnished for hauling them did
not get to the work until it was nearly complete. The rails used
on the southern end of the break had to be taken up and brought
from the railroads south of Atlanta, and those for the northern
end were mostly brought from Nashville, nearly 200 miles distant.

Notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which the labour
was performed, this twenty-five miles of track was laid, and the
trains were running over it in seven and a half days from the
time the work was commenced.

Concluding, however, that it would be unwise to depend on the railway
during his further march to the sea, Sherman collected at Atlanta, by
means of the restored lines, the supplies he wanted for 600,000 men,
sent to the rear all the men and material no longer required, and
then, before starting for Savannah, destroyed sixty miles of track
behind him in so effectual a manner that it would be impossible for the
Confederates--especially in view of their own great lack, at this time,
of rails, locomotives and rolling stock--to repair and utilise the
lines again in any attempted pursuit. It was, in fact, as much to his
advantage now to destroy the railways in his rear as it had previously
been to repair and rebuild them.

All through Georgia, for the 300 miles from Atlanta to Savannah (where
he was able to establish communications with the Federal fleet), Sherman
continued the same tactics of railway destruction; and he resumed them
when his army, now divided into three columns, turned northward to
effect a junction with Grant at Richmond.

On this northward march, also, there was no need for Sherman to make a
direct attack on Charleston. By destroying about sixty miles of track
in and around Branchville--a village on the South Carolina Railroad
which formed a junction where the line from Charleston branched off in
the directions of Columbia and Augusta respectively--one of Sherman's
columns severed Charleston from all its sources of supply in the
interior, and left the garrison with no alternative but to surrender.
Commenting on this event, Vigo-Rouissillon remarks, in his "Puissance
Militaire des États-Unis d'Amérique":--

Ainsi il avait suffi de la destruction ou de la possession
de quelques kilomètres de chemin de fer pour amener la chute de
ce boulevard de l'insurrection, qui avait si longtemps résisté
aux plus puissantes flottes du Nord. Exemple frappant du rôle
reservé dans nos guerres modernes à ce precieux et fragile moyen
de communication.

In the aggregate, Sherman's troops destroyed hundreds of miles of
railway track in their progress through what had previously been
regarded as a veritable stronghold of the enemy's country; though
meanwhile the Construction Corps had repaired and reopened nearly 300
miles of railway in North Carolina and had built a wharf, covering an
area of 54,000 square feet, at the ocean terminus of the Atlantic and
North Carolina Railroad in order both to facilitate Sherman's progress
northwards, by the time of his reaching the lines in question, and to
enable him to obtain supplies from the fleet. The railways, in fact,
contributed greatly to the brilliant success of Sherman's campaign, and
hence, also, to the final triumph of the Federal cause.

The total length of track laid or relaid by the Federal Construction
Corps during the continuance of the war was 641 miles, and the lineal
feet of bridges built or rebuilt was equal to twenty-six miles. The
net expenditure, in respect alike to construction and transportation,
incurred by the department in charge of the railways during their
control by the Government for military purposes was close on $30,000,000.

From this time the interruption of railway communication became a
recognised phase of warfare all the world over; and, not only have
numerous treatises been written on the subject in various languages, but
the creation of special forces to deal alike with the destruction and
the restoration of railways has become an important and indispensable
feature of military organisation. These matters will be dealt with more
fully in subsequent chapters; but it may be of interest if reference
is made here to the experiences of _Mexico_, as further illustrating
the universality of practices with which, in her case, at least, no
effective measures had been taken to deal.

"How Mexican Rebels Destroy Railways and Bridges" was told by Mr. G.
E. Weekes in the _Scientific American_ for September 13, 1913, and the
subject was further dealt with by Major Charles Hine in a paper on "War
Time Railroading in Mexico," read by him before the St. Louis Railway
Club, on October 10, 1913. The term "rebels" applies, of course, in
Mexico to the party that is against the particular President who is in
office for the time being; and in the revolutionary period lasting from
1910 to 1913 the "rebels" of the moment found plenty to do in the way
of destroying railways not only, as in other countries, in order to
retard the advance of their pursuers, but, also, to spite the national
Government, who control about two-thirds of the stock in the railways of
the Republic.

Altogether, the mischief done by one party or the other during the
period in question included the destruction of many hundreds of miles of
track; the burning or the dynamiting of hundreds of bridges, according
as these had been built of timber or of steel; and the wrecking of many
stations and over 50 per cent. of the rolling stock on the national
lines.

Concerning the methods adopted in the carrying out of this work, Mr.
Weekes, who had the opportunity of seeing track and bridge destruction
in full progress, says:--

Up to the past six months track destruction had been
accompanied either by the use of a wrecking crane, which lifted
sections of rails and ties (sleepers) bodily and piled them up
ready for burning, or by the slower process of the claw-bar,
wrench and pick. But a Constitutionalist expert devised a new
system.

A trench is dug between two ties, through which a heavy
chain is passed around two opposite rails and made fast in the
centre of the track. To this one end of a heavy steel cable is
hooked, the other end being made fast to the coupling on the
engine pilot. At the signal the engineman starts his locomotive
slowly backward, and as they are huge 220-ton "consolidations,"
with 22-inch by 30-inch cylinders, one can easily imagine that
something has to give. And it does! The rails are torn loose
from the spikes that hold them to the ties and are dragged
closely together in the centre of the road bed. The ties are
loosened from the ballast and dragged into piles, while in many
cases the rails are badly bent and twisted by the force applied.
A gang of men follows the engine, piling ties on top of the line
and leaving others beneath them. These are then saturated with
oil and a match applied. In a short time the ties are consumed
and the rails left lying on the ground twisted and contorted
into all sorts of shapes and of no further use until after they
have been re-rolled.

As for the bridges, those of timber were saturated with oil and burned,
while in the case of steel bridges rows of holes were bored horizontally
in the lower part of the piers and charged with dynamite, which was then
exploded by means of fuses connected with batteries of the type used in
Mexican coal mines.

Another favourite method adopted for interfering with transportation
by rail was that of attacking a train, compelling it to stop, taking
possession of the locomotive, and burning the cars.

There is no suggestion by either of the authorities mentioned above
of any well-organised Construction Corps in Mexico repairing damage
done on the railway almost as quickly as it could be effected by the
destroyers. Mr. Weekes believed, rather, that it would take years to
restore the roads to the condition they were in before the rebellion
against President Diaz, and he further declared that it would cost
the national lines of Mexico many millions of dollars to replace the
destroyed rolling stock, bridges, stations, etc.

FOOTNOTES:

[5] In May, 1864, when this bridge had been again destroyed, it was
rebuilt, ready for trains to pass over, in forty working hours.

[6] A division, completely organised, consisted of 777 officers and
men, as follows:--Division engineer, assistant engineer, rodman,
clerk, and 2 messengers (6). Sub-division I: Supervisor of bridges and
carpenters' work, clerk and time-keeper, commissionary (taking charge
of transport and issue of rations), quartermaster (in charge of tools,
camp equipment, etc.), surgeon, hospital steward, 6 foremen (1 for
each 50 men), 30 sub-foremen (1 for each 10 men), 300 mechanics and
labourers, blacksmith and helper, and 12 cooks (356). Sub-division II:
Supervisor of track, and remainder of staff as in Sub-division I (356).
Sub-division III: Supervisor of water stations, foreman, 12 mechanics
and labourers, and cook (15). Sub-division IV: Supervisor of masonry,
foreman, 10 masons and helpers, and cook (13). Sub-division V: Foreman
of ox-brigade, 18 ox-drivers, and cook (20). Train crew: 2 conductors, 4
brakesmen, 2 locomotive engineers, 2 firemen, and cook (11).

CHAPTER IV

CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR

Curtailment of the efficiency of railways during war may be due to
friend no less than to foe; and there have been occasions when, of the
two, it is the friend who has caused the greater degree of trouble,
hindrance and interruption.

These conditions have arisen mainly from three causes--(1) questions of
control; (2) irregularities in the employment of railway material; and
(3) absence or inadequacy of organisation for military rail-transport
purposes.

When the use of railways becomes an essential factor in the conduct of
war, it may appear only natural that the military authority charged with
the duty of furthering or defending national interests should, through
the Government concerned, have power to command the transport facilities
of all railway lines the use of which may be necessary for the movement
of troops or other military purposes.

Yet, while the soundness of the principle here involved is beyond
dispute, there is much to be said as to the circumstances and conditions
under which a military control of railways should be exercised.

It is, in the first place, especially necessary to bear in mind that the
railway, as a means of transport, must needs be regarded from a point of
view wholly different from that which would apply to ordinary roads. On
the latter any sort of vehicle can be used, and there are, generally,
alternative roads along which traffic can pass, in case of need.
Railroads are not only available exclusively for vehicles constructed
to run upon them, but the degree of their usefulness is limited by
such considerations as the number of separate routes to a given
destination; the important matters of detail as to whether the lines are
single track or double track and whether they are on the level or have
heavy gradients; the number of locomotives and the amount of rolling
stock available; the extent of the station and siding accommodation;
the provision or non-provision of adequate facilities for loading and
unloading; and, in war time, the damage or destruction of a particular
line or lines by the enemy. The amount of traffic it is possible to
convey between certain points in a given time may thus be wholly
controlled by the physical conditions of the railway concerned, and such
conditions may be incapable of modification by the railway staffs, in
case of a sudden emergency, however great their desire to do everything
that is in their power.

In the next place, all these physical conditions may vary on different
railway systems, and even on different sections of the same system.
It does not, therefore, necessarily follow that military requirements
which can be complied with on one line or in one district can be
responded to as readily, if at all, under another and totally different
set of conditions elsewhere; though it is conceivable that a military
commander or officer who fails to realise this fact may, if he is
left to deal direct with the railway people, become very angry indeed
at non-compliance with his demands, and resent protests that what he
asks for cannot be done at one place although it may have been done at
another.

Then a railway must be regarded as a delicate piece of transportation
machinery which can easily be thrown out of order, and is capable
of being worked only by railwaymen as skilled in the knowledge of
its mechanism, and as experienced in the details of its complicated
operation, as military officers themselves are assumed to be in the
technicalities of their own particular duties. The Chief Goods Manager
of a leading line of railway who offered to take the place of a General
at the seat of war would arouse much mirth in the Army at his own
expense. It is, nevertheless, quite conceivable that the General would
himself not be a complete success as a Chief Goods Manager. In the
earliest days of railways it was assumed that the men best qualified
both to manage them and to control the large staffs to be employed would
be retired Army officers. This policy was, in fact, adopted for a time,
though it was abandoned, after a fair trial, in favour of appointing
as responsible railway officers men who had undergone training in
the railway service, and were practically acquainted alike with its
fundamental principles and its technical details.

In the operation of this delicate and complicated piece of machinery
dislocation of traffic may result from a variety of causes, even
when such operation is conducted by men of the greatest experience
in railway working; but the risk, alike of blocks and interruptions
and of accidents involving loss of life or destruction of valuable
property must needs be materially increased if military commanders, or
officers, themselves having no practical knowledge of railway working,
and influenced only by an otherwise praiseworthy zeal for the interests
of their own service, should have power either to force a responsible
railwayman to do something which he, with his greater technical
knowledge, knows to be impracticable, or to hamper and interfere with
the working of the line at a time of exceptional strain on its resources.

Under, again, a misapprehension of the exact bearing of the principle
of military control of railways for military operations in time of
war, there was developed in various campaigns a tendency on the part
of commanders and subordinate officers (1) to look upon railways and
railwaymen as subject to their personal command, if not, even, to their
own will, pleasure and convenience, so long as the war lasted; (2)
to consider that every order they themselves gave should be at once
carried out, regardless either of orders from other directions or of
any question as to the possibility of complying therewith; and (3) to
indulge in merciless denunciations, even if not in measures still more
vigorous, when their orders have not been obeyed.

Apart from other considerations, all these things have a direct bearing
on the efficiency of the railway itself as an instrument in the
carrying on of warfare; and it is, therefore, a matter of essential
importance to our present study to see how the difficulties in question
had their rise, the development they have undergone, and the steps that
have been taken to overcome or to guard against them.

It was once more in the _American Civil War_ that the control problem
first arose in a really acute degree.

The fundamental principle adopted for the operation of the railways
taken possession of by the Federal Government for military purposes
was that they should be conducted under orders issued by the Secretary
of War or by Army commanders in or out of the field. It was for the
Quartermaster's department to load all material upon the cars, to direct
where such material should be taken, and to arrange for unloading and
delivery; but _because_ the Government had taken possession of the
railways; _because_ the Quartermaster's department was to discharge the
duties mentioned; and _because_ the railways were to be used during the
war for the transport of troops and of Army supplies, therefore certain
of the officers came to the conclusion that the whole operation of the
particular lines in which they were concerned should be left either to
themselves individually or to the Quartermaster's department.

Among those holding this view was General Pope, who, on taking over the
command of the Rappahannock Division, on June 26, 1862, disregarded
the position held by Herman Haupt as "Chief of Construction and
Transportation" in that Division, gave him no instructions, and left him
to conclude that the Army could get on very well without his assistance
as a mere railwayman. Thereupon Haupt went home. Ten days afterwards
he received from the Assistant-Secretary of War a telegram which
said:--"Come back immediately. Cannot get on without you. Not a wheel
moving." Haupt went back, and he found that, what with mismanagement of
the lines and the attacks made on them by Confederates, not a wheel was,
indeed, moving in the Division. His own position strengthened by his now
being put in "exclusive charge of all the railways within the limits
of the Army of Virginia," he was soon able to set the wheels running
again; and from that time General Pope exercised a wise discretion in
leaving the details of railway transportation to men who understood them.

Then there was a General Sturgis who, when Haupt called on him one
day, received him with the intimation, "I have just sent a guard to
your office to put you under arrest for disobedience of my orders in
failing to transport my command." It was quite true. Haupt had failed
to obey his orders. Sturgis wanted some special trains to convey 10,000
men, with horses and baggage, the short distance of eighteen miles.
The railway was a single-track line; it had only a limited equipment
of engines and cars; there was the prospect of further immediate
requirements in other directions, and Haupt took the liberty of thinking
that he had better keep his transportation for more pressing needs than
a journey to a prospective battle-field only eighteen miles away--the
more so as if the men were attacked whilst they were in the train they
would be comparatively helpless, whereas if they were attacked when on
the road--doing what amounted to no more than a single day's march--they
would be ready for immediate defence. These considerations suggest that,
of the two, the railwayman was a better strategist than the General.

Sturgis followed up his intimation to Haupt by taking military
possession of the railway and issuing some orders which any one
possessing the most elementary knowledge of railway operation would have
known to be impracticable. Meanwhile Haupt appealed by telegraph to the
Commander-in-Chief, who replied:--"No military officer has any authority
to interfere with your control over railroad. Show this to General
Sturgis, and, if he attempts to interfere, I will arrest him." Told what
the Commander-in-Chief said in his message, Sturgis exclaimed, "He does,
does he? Well, then, take your damned railroad!"

Haupt found it possible to put at the disposal of Sturgis, early the
following morning, the transportation asked for; but at two o'clock
in the afternoon the cars were still unoccupied. On the attention of
Sturgis being called to this fact he replied that he had given his
orders but they had been disobeyed. Thereupon the cars were withdrawn
for service elsewhere--the more so since no other traffic could pass
until they had been cleared out of the way. The net results of the
General's interference was that traffic on the lines was deranged for
twenty-four hours, and 10,000 men were prevented from taking part in an
engagement, as they might have done had they gone by road.

Of the varied and almost unending irregularities which occurred in the
working of the lines as military railways during the progress of the
same war a few other examples may be given.

One prolific source of trouble was the detention or appropriation
of trains by officers who did not think it necessary to communicate
first with the Superintendent of the Line. A certain General who did
inform the Superintendent when he wanted a train was, nevertheless, in
the habit of keeping it waiting for several hours before he made his
appearance, traffic being meanwhile suspended, in consequence.

Special consideration was even claimed for officers' wives, as well as
for the officers themselves. On one occasion Haupt was much disturbed by
the non-arrival of a train bringing supplies which were urgently wanted
for a body of troops starting on a march, and he went along the line to
see what had happened. Coming at last to the train, which had pulled
up, he made inquiries of the engine-driver, who told him that he had
received instructions to stop at a certain point so that an officer's
wife, who was coming in the train to see her husband on the eve of an
engagement, could go to a neighbouring town to look out for rooms for
herself. At that moment the lady put in an appearance. She took her seat
again and the train then proceeded; but her side-trip in search of rooms
meant a delay of three hours alike for this one train and for three
others following behind.

The impression seems to have prevailed, also, that officers were at
liberty to make any use of the trains they pleased for the conveyance
of their own belongings. To check the abuses thus developed, Haupt was
compelled to issue, on June 25, 1862, the following notice:--

Assistant Quartermasters and Commissaries are positively
forbidden to load on to cars on any of the Military Railroads of
the Department of the Rappahannock any freights which are not
strictly and properly included in Quarter and Commissary stores.
They shall not load or permit to be loaded any articles for the
private use of officers, or other persons, whatever their rank
or position.

Officers, again, there were who, regardless of all traffic
considerations, would order a train to pull up at any point they thought
fit along the main line in order that they could examine the passes and
permits of the passengers, instead of doing this at a terminal or other
station. In still another instance a paymaster adopted as his office a
box car standing on a main line. He placed in it a table, some chairs, a
money-chest and his papers--finding it either more comfortable or more
convenient than a house alongside--and proceeded with the transaction
of all his Army business in the car. Invited to withdraw, on the
ground that he was holding up the traffic, he refused to leave, and
he persisted in his refusal until troops were called up to remove his
things for him.

Defective arrangements in regard to the forwarding of supplies were
another cause of traffic disorganisation. The railwayman made from time
to time the most strenuous efforts in getting to the extreme front large
consignments of articles either in excess of requirements or not wanted
there at all. After blocking the line for some days, the still-loaded
cars might be sent back again, no fewer than 142 of such cars being
returned on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the course of a single
day. If the excessive supplies so sent were unloaded at the front, they
might have to be loaded into the cars again when the Army moved; or, as
was frequently the case in exposed positions, they might be seized or
destroyed by the enemy. Under a well-organised system an adequate stock
of supplies would, of course, have been kept in stores or on sidings at
some point in the rear, only such quantities being forwarded to the
advanced front as were really needed.

At the railway stations there were frequent disputes between the
responsible officers as to which should have the first use of such
troop trains as were available, and Haupt found it necessary to ask the
Commander-in-Chief to delegate some one who would decide in what order
the troops should be forwarded.

Much trouble arose because, in their anxiety to send off as many wounded
as they could, medical officers detained their trains for such periods
as dislocated the service, instead of despatching at schedule time the
men they had ready, and then asking for an extra train for the remainder.

In other respects, also, the arrangements for the transport of the
sick and wounded were defective. Telegraphing on this subject to the
Assistant Secretary of War on August 22, 1862, Haupt said:--

I fear that I may be compelled to-night to do what may
appear inhuman--turn out the sick in the street. Doctors will
persist in sending sick, often without papers, to get them
off their hands, and we cannot send forward the troops if we
must run our trains to Washington with sick to stand for hours
unloaded. My first care is to send forward troops, next forage
and subsistence.

Still more serious were the irregularities due to delays in the
unloading of trucks and the return of empties. The amount of rolling
stock available was already inadequate to meet requirements; but the
effect of the shortage was rendered still worse by reason of these
delays, due, in part, to the too frequent insufficiency of the force
available for unloading a train of supplies with the expedition that
should have been shown, and in part to the retention of the cars for
weeks together as storehouses; though the main cause, perhaps, was
the inability of military men, inexperienced in railway working, to
appreciate, as railwaymen would do, the need of getting the greatest
possible use out of rolling stock in times of emergency, and not
allowing it to stand idle longer than absolutely necessary.

How such delays interfered with the efficiency of the railways was
indicated in one of Haupt's oft-repeated protests, in which he wrote:--

If all cars on their arrival at a depôt are immediately
loaded or unloaded and returned, and trains are run to schedule,
a single-track road, in good order and properly equipped, may
supply an army of 200,000 men when, if these conditions are not
complied with, the same road will not supply 30,000.

On July 9, 1863, he telegraphed to General M. C. Meigs:--

I am on my way to Gettysburg again. Find things in great
confusion. Road blocked; cars not unloaded; stores ordered
to Gettysburg--where they stand for a long time, completely
preventing all movement there--ordered back without unloading;
wounded lying for hours without ability to carry them off. All
because the simple rule of promptly unloading and returning cars
is violated.

As for the effect of all these conditions on the military situation as
a whole, this is well shown in the following "Notice," which, replying
to complaints that railwaymen had not treated the military officers with
proper respect, Haupt addressed "To agents and other employés of the
United States Military Railroad Department":--

While conscious of no disposition to shield the employés or
agents of the Military Railroads from any censure or punishment
that is really merited, justice to them requires me to state
that, so far, examination has shown that complaints against them
have been generally without proper foundation, and, when demands
were not promptly complied with, the cause has been inability,
arising from want of proper notice, and not indisposition.

Officers at posts entrusted with the performance of certain
local duties, and anxious, as they generally are, to discharge
them efficiently, are not always able, or disposed, to look
beyond their own particular spheres. They expect demands on
railway agents to be promptly complied with, without considering
that similar demands, at the same time, in addition to the
regular train service and routine duties, may come from
Quartermasters, Commissaries, medical directors, surgeons,
ordnance officers, the Commanding General, the War Department
and from other sources. The Military Railroads have utterly
failed to furnish transportation to even one-fifth of their
capacity when managed without a strict conformity to schedule
and established rules. Punctuality and discipline are even more
important to the operation of a railroad than to the movement of
an army; and they are vital in both.

It is doubtful if even the Confederate raiders and wreckers had, by
their destructive tactics, diminished the efficiency of the Union
railways to the extent of the four-fifths here attributed to the
irregularities and shortcomings of the Federals themselves. The clearest
proof was thus afforded that, if the new arm in warfare which rail-power
represented was to accomplish all it was capable of doing, it would have
to be saved from friends quite as much as from foes.

Haupt, as we have seen, suffered much from officers during the time
he was connected with the Military Railroads in Virginia. He had the
sympathetic support of the Commander-in-Chief, who telegraphed to him
on one occasion (August 23, 1862), "No military officer will give any
orders to your subordinates except through you, nor will any of them
attempt to interfere with the running of trains"; and, also, of the
Assistant Secretary of War, who sought to soothe him in a message which
said:--"Be patient as possible with the Generals. Some of them will
trouble you more than they will the enemy." But the abuses which arose
were so serious that, in the interest of the military position itself,
they called for a drastic remedy; and this was provided for by the issue
of the following Order:--

War Department,
Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington,
_November 10, 1862_.

SPECIAL ORDER.

Commanding officers of troops along the United States
Military Railroads will give all facilities to the officers
of the road and the Quartermasters for loading and unloading
cars so as to prevent any delay. On arrival at depôts, whether
in the day or night, the cars will be instantly unloaded, and
working parties will always be in readiness for that duty, and
sufficient to unload the whole train at once.

Commanding officers will be charged with guarding the track,
sidings, wood, water tanks, etc., within their several commands,
and will be held responsible for the result.

Any military officer who shall neglect his duty in this
respect will be reported by the Quartermasters and
officers of the railroad, and his name will be stricken from the
rolls of the Army.

Depôts will be established at suitable points under the
direction of the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac,
and properly guarded.

No officer, whatever may be his rank, will interfere with
the running of the cars, as directed by the superintendent of
the road. Any one who so interferes will be dismissed from the
service for disobedience of orders.

By order of the Secretary of War.
J. C. KELTON.

Commenting on this Order, General McCallum says in his report that
it was issued "in consequence of several attempts having been made
to operate railroads by Army or departmental commanders which had,
without exception, proved signal failures, disorganising in tendency and
destructive of all discipline"; and he proceeds:--

Having had a somewhat extensive railroad experience, both
before and since the rebellion, I consider this Order of the
Secretary of War to have been the very foundation of success;
without it the whole railroad system, which had proved an
important element in conducting military movements, would have
been, not only a costly but ludicrous failure. The fact should
be understood that the management of railroads is just as much a
distinct profession as is that of the art of war, and should be
so regarded.

In _Europe_, Germany and Austria-Hungary were the first countries to
attempt to solve problems that seemed to go to the very foundations of
the practical usefulness of rail-transport in war. Various exhaustive
studies thereon were written by railway or military authorities, and
it may be of interest here to refer, more especially, to the views
expressed by an eminent German authority, Baron M. M. von Weber, in "Die
Schulung der Eisenbahnen," published in 1870.[7]

Railway irregularities peculiar to war service were stated by this
writer to be mainly of three kinds:--(i) Delays from unsatisfactory
arrangements of the service and from the misemployment of rolling
stock; (ii) temporary interruption of traffic owing to the crowding of
transport masses at the stations or sidings; (iii) unsuitableness of the
stations and conveyances for the required military services. The special
reasons for the first of these causes he defined as (_a_) the absence
of sufficient mutual comprehension between the military and the railway
officials; (_b_) the strict limitation of the efficiency of individual
railway authorities to their own lines only; (_c_) the ignorance of
the entire staff of each line with regard to the details and service
regulations of the neighbouring lines; and (_d_) the impracticability
of employing certain modes of carrying on business beyond the circuit
to which they belong. It should, however, be borne in mind that these
criticisms of authorities and their staffs relate to the conditions of
the German railway system in 1870, at which time, as told by H. Budde,
in "Die französischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege 1870-71," there were in
Germany fifteen separate Directions for State railways; five Directions
of private railways operated by the State; and thirty-one Directions of
private railways operated by companies--a total of fifty-one controlling
bodies which, on an average, operated only 210 miles of line each.

On the general question von Weber observed:--

The value in practice of mutual intelligence between
military and railway officials has hitherto been far too
slightly regarded.

Demands for services from military authorities,
impracticable from the very nature of railways in general or
the nature of the existing lines in particular, have occasioned
confusion and ill-will on the part of the railway authorities
and conductors. On the other hand the latter have frequently
declared services to be impracticable which were really not so.

All this has arisen because the two parties in the
transaction have too little insight into the nature and
mechanism of their respective callings, and regard their powers
more as contradictory than co-operative, so that they do not,
and cannot, work together.

If, on the contrary, the nature of the railway service,
with its modifications due to differences in the nature of
the ground, the locality, and the organisation of transport
requirements, is apparent to the military officer, even in a
general way; if he appreciates the fact that the same amount of
transport must be differently performed when he passes from a
level line to a mountain line, from a double line to a single
line, from one where the signal and telegraph system are in use
to one in which these organs of safety and intelligence are
destroyed; if he can judge of the capability of stations, the
length of track, and arrangements for the loading, ordering
and passing of trains, etc., he will, with this knowledge,
and his orders being framed in accordance with it, come much
sooner and with greater facility to an understanding with the
railway executives than if his commands had to be rectified by
contradiction and assertion, frequently carried on under the
influence of excited passions, or attempted to be enforced by
violence.

The railway official, also, who has some acquaintance with
military science, who understands from practical experience and
inspection, not confined to his own line, the capabilities of
lines and stations in a military point of view, will, at his
first transaction with the military authorities, enter sooner
into an understanding with them than if he were deficient
in this knowledge, and will find himself in a position to
co-operate, and not be coerced.

Here the suggestion seems to be that the individual Army officer and the
individual railway executive, or railway official, should each become
sufficiently acquainted with the technicalities of the other's business
to be able to conduct their relations with mutual understanding. It
would, however, be too much to expect that this plan could be carried
out as regards either the military element in general or the railway
element in general.

The real need of the situation was, rather, for some intermediary
organisation which, including both elements, would provide the machinery
for close co-operation between the Army on the one side and the railway
on the other, guiding the Army as to the possibilities and limitations
of the railway, and constituting the recognised and sole medium
through which orders from the Army would be conveyed to the railway,
no individual commander or officer having the right to give any direct
order to the railway executives or staffs on his own responsibility, or
to interfere in any way with the working of the railways, except in some
such case of extreme emergency as an attack by the enemy on a railway
station.

All these problems were to form the subject of much more controversy,
together with much further practical experience, in various other
countries--and notably in France during the war of 1870-71--before,
as will be told in due course, they were solved by the adoption of
elaborate systems of organisation designed to provide, as far as
possible, for all contingencies.

FOOTNOTE:

[7] See Bibliography.

CHAPTER V

PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR

The liability of railway lines to interruption or destruction--whether
by bodies of cavalry sent across the frontier for that purpose, and
aiming at damage on a large scale; by smaller raiding parties operating
in the rear of an advancing army; or by individuals acting on their own
account in a hostile country--rendered necessary from an early date
in the railway era the adoption of protective measures of a type and
character varying according to circumstances; while these, in turn,
introduced some further new features into modern warfare.

Under the orders given by General McDowell for the guarding of railways
in the Department of the Rappahannock, in the _American Civil War_,
twelve sentinels were posted along each mile of track; block-houses were
constructed at each bridge, at cross-roads, and at intervals along the
track; pickets were thrown forward at various points; bushes and trees
were cleared away from alongside the line, and the men at each post had
flags and lanterns for signalling. General Sherman took similar measures
to guard his rail communications between Nashville and Atlanta.

Precautions such as these were directed mainly against the enemy in the
field; but an early example was to be afforded of how a civil population
may either concern themselves or be concerned against their will in the
maintenance of rail communication for military purposes. This position
is well shown in the following proclamation, issued July 30, 1863, by
Major-General G. G. Meade from the head-quarters of the Army of the
Potomac at a time when attempts to throw troop trains off the railway
lines were a matter of daily occurrence:--

The numerous depredations committed by citizens or rebel
soldiers in disguise, harboured and concealed by citizens, along
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and within our lines, call
for prompt and exemplary punishment. Under the instructions of
the Government, therefore, every citizen against whom there is
sufficient evidence of his having engaged in these practices
will be arrested and confined for punishment, or put beyond the
lines.

The people within ten miles of the railroad are notified
that they will be held responsible, in their persons and
property, for any injury done to the road, trains, depôts or
stations by citizens, guerillas or persons in disguise; and
in case of such injury they will be impressed as labourers to
repair all damages.

If these measures should not stop such depredations, it will
become the unpleasant duty of the undersigned, in the execution
of his instructions, to direct that the entire inhabitants of
the district of country along the railroad be put across the
lines, and their property taken for Government uses.

On the Manassas Gap Railway General Auger further sought to protect
Federal army trains against guerilla attacks by placing in a conspicuous
position in each of such trains some of the leading Confederates
residing within Union lines, so that, should any accident happen to the
train, they would run the risk of being among the victims.

In the _Austro-Prussian War of 1866_ the principle of punishing
the civil population for attacks on the railway lines underwent a
further development. Captain Webber says in reference to the line
through Turnau, Prague and Pardubitz to Brünn[8]: "The Prussians
were fortunate in being able to preserve the line intact from injury
by the inhabitants, partly by the number and strength of the guards
posted along it, and partly from the terror of reprisals which they
had inspired." Captain Webber suggests that, in the face of an active
enemy, and in a country where the population was hostile, it would
have been impossible to depend on the railway as a principal line of
communication; but the significance of his expression, "the terror of
reprisals," as denoting the policy adopted by Prussia so far back as
1866, will not be lost on those who are only too well acquainted with
more recent developments of the same policy by the same country.

The number of men per mile required for guarding a line of rail
communication is declared by Captain John Bigelow, in his "Principles of
Strategy" (Philadelphia, 1894), to be exceedingly variable, depending
as it does upon the tactical features of the country and the temper of
the inhabitants. According, he says, to the estimate of the Germans for
the conditions of European warfare, the number will average about 1,000
men for every stretch of fifteen miles. At this rate an army sixty miles
from its base requires about 4,000 men for the protection of each line
of communication.

With the help of figures such as these one may, perhaps, understand
the more readily how it is that a Commander-in-Chief, of merciless
disposition, and wanting to retain the active services of every soldier
he possibly can in the interests of an early and successful advance
will, by spreading a feeling of "terror" among the civil population,
seek to reduce to as low a figure as circumstances will permit
the number of men he must leave behind to guard his lines of rail
communication.

These considerations will be found to apply with the greater force
when it is remembered that in the _Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71_ the
Prussians had to adopt an especially elaborate system for safeguarding
their lines of communication with Germany during the time they occupied
French territory. At each railway station they placed a guard formed of
detachments of the Landwehr, while small detachments were stationed in
towns and villages in the neighbourhood. In each signal-box a detachment
of troops was stationed, and the whole line of railway was patrolled
from posts established along it at distances of every three or four
miles. Altogether, the Germans are said to have employed, on over 2,000
miles of French railway lines controlled by them, as many as 100,000
troops for protective purposes only; and even then the _franc-tireurs_
were able to cause many interruptions.

Under a Prussian regulation dated May 2, 1867, it was laid down that
after the restoration of any lines taken possession of in an enemy's
territory, notice should be given that in the event of any further
damage being done to the railway, the locality would be subject to a
fine of at least 500 thalers, the belongings of the inhabitants would be
liable to seizure, and the local authorities might be arrested.

As a further precautionary measure in the war of 1870-71, the Germans
took a hint from the example of the Union Generals in the American Civil
War by compelling a leading citizen of the district passed through to
ride on the engine of each train run by them on French soil. In defence
of this practice, the German General Staff say in their handbook on "The
Usages of War"[9]:--

Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were, without any
fault on their part, thereby exposed to grave danger, every
writer outside Germany has stigmatised this measure as contrary
to the law of nations and as unjustified towards the inhabitants
of the country. As against this unfavourable criticism it must
be pointed out that this measure, which was also recognised on
the German side as harsh and cruel, was only resorted to after
declarations and instructions of the occupying authorities had
proved ineffective, and that in the particular circumstances
it was the only method which promised to be effective against
the doubtless unauthorised, indeed the criminal, behaviour of
a fanatical population. Herein lies its justification under
the laws of war, but still more in the fact that it proved
completely successful, and that wherever citizens were thus
carried on the trains ... the security of traffic was assured.

Writing under date December 16, 1870, Busch offered the following
justification for the course adopted:--

They were taken, not to serve as a hindrance to French
heroism, but as a precaution against treacherous crime. The
railway does not carry merely soldiers, ammunition and other
war material against which it may be allowable to use violent
measures; it also conveys a great number of wounded, doctors,
hospital attendants, and other perfectly harmless persons. Is a
peasant or _franc-tireur_ to be allowed to endanger hundreds of
those lives by removing a rail or laying a stone upon the line?
Let the French see that the security of the railway trains is no
longer threatened and the journeys made by those hostages will
be merely outings, or our people may even be able to forgo such
precautionary measures.

In the _South African War_, Field-Marshal Earl Roberts issued at
Pretoria, on June 19, 1900, a proclamation one section of which
authorised the placing of leading men among the Boers on the locomotives
of the trains run by the British on the occupied territory; but this
particular section was withdrawn eight days afterwards.

The English view of the practice in question is thus defined in the
official "Manual of Military Law" (Chap. XIV, "The Laws and Usages of
War," par. 463):--

Such measures expose the lives of inhabitants, not only
to the illegitimate acts of train wrecking by private enemy
individuals, but also to the lawful operations of raiding
parties of the armed forces of the belligerent, and cannot,
therefore, be considered a commendable practice.

To guard against the attacks made on the railway lines in the Orange
Free State and the Transvaal during the British occupation, entrenched
posts were placed at every bridge exceeding a 30-feet span; constant
patrolling was maintained between these posts; and the block-houses
introduced (in 1901) by Lord Kitchener were erected along all the
railway lines, at distances of about 2,000 yards. Each block-house,
also, was garrisoned by about ten men, and each was surrounded by wire
entanglements which, together with various kinds of alarm fences, were
also placed between the block-houses themselves in order both to impede
the approach of the enemy and to warn the garrison thereof.

_Block-houses_ are to-day regarded as one of the chief means of
protecting railways against attacks. Their construction and equipment
are dealt with by Major W. D. Connor, of the Corps of Engineers, U.S.A.,
in "Military Railways" (Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of Engineers,
U.S. Army, Washington, 1910).

Supplementary to the adoption of this block-house system, in time of
war, is the practice followed in various Continental countries, in
time of peace, of building _permanent fortresses_, in solid masonry,
alongside railway bridges crossing important rivers. In some instances
the fortress is so constructed that the railway lines pass through the
centre of it. Not only, as a rule, are these fortresses extremely solid
and substantial, but they may be provided with bomb-proof covers and
be stocked with a sufficient supply of provisions to be able to stand,
if necessary, a fairly prolonged siege. One can assume, also, that the
garrison would have under its control facilities arranged in advance for
the destruction of the bridge, as a last resort, in case of need.

The theory is that such fortresses and their garrisons should be of
especial advantage, on the outbreak of war, in checking any sudden
invasion and allowing time for the completion of defensive measures.
Their construction in connection with all the principal railway bridges
crossing the Rhine was especially favoured in Prussia after the war of
1870-1.

Similar fortresses, or "interrupting forts," as the Germans call them,
are also built for the protection of important tunnels, junctions,
locomotive and carriage works, etc.

Another method adopted for the safeguarding of railway lines in war is
the use of _armoured trains_; though in practice these are also employed
for the purposes of independent attacks on the enemy, apart altogether
from any question of ensuring the safety of rail communication.[10]

For the _protection of locomotives and rolling stock_, and to prevent
not only their capture but their use by the enemy, the most efficacious
method to adopt is, of course, that of removing them to some locality
where the enemy is not likely to come.

When, in 1866, Austria saw that she could not hold back the Prussian
invader, she took off into Hungary no fewer than 1,000 locomotives and
16,000 wagons from the railways in Bohemia and Saxony. Similar tactics
were adopted by the Boers as against ourselves in the war in South
Africa. On the British troops crossing into the Orange Free State,
from Cape Colony, they found that the retreating enemy had withdrawn
all their rolling stock, as well as all their staffs from the railway
stations, leaving behind only a more or less damaged line of railway.
Subsequently, when the forces occupied Pretoria, they certainly did find
there sixteen locomotives and 400 trucks; but the station books showed
that in the previous forty-eight hours no fewer than seventy trains,
many of them drawn by two engines, had been sent east in the direction
of Delagoa Bay.

When it is not practicable to withdraw locomotives and rolling stock
which it is desired the enemy shall not be able to use, the obvious
alternative is that measures should be taken either to remove vital
parts or to ensure their destruction. Certain of the methods adopted
during the Civil War in America were especially efficacious in attaining
the latter result. In some instances trains were started running and
then--driver and fireman leaping off the engine--were left to go into
a river, or to fall through a broken viaduct. In other instances two
trains, after having had a good supply of explosives put in them, would
be allowed to dash into one another at full speed. Many locomotives
had their boilers burst, and wagons were set on fire after having been
filled up with combustibles.

Still another method which has been adopted with a view to preventing
an enemy from using the railways he might succeed in capturing is that
of constructing them with a _different gauge_. The standard gauge of
the main-line railways in France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Denmark,
Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Roumania and Turkey (like that,
also, of railways in Great Britain, Canada and the United States), is
4ft. 8½in., allowing trains to pass readily from one country to the
other with the same rolling stock; but the gauge of the Russian railways
is 5ft., necessitating a transshipment from one train to another when
the frontier is reached. Similar conditions are found in Spain and
Portugal, where the standard gauge is 5ft. 6in.[11]

Russia adopted her broader gauge so that, in case of invasion, the
invader should not be able to run his rolling-stock over her lines, as
Germany, for instance, would be able to do in the case of the railways
of Belgium and France. Thus far, therefore, Russia strengthened her
position from the point of view of defence; but she weakened it as
regards attack, since if she should herself want, either to become the
invader or to send troop trains over neighbouring territory to some
point beyond, she would be at a disadvantage. In the Russo-Turkish War
of 1877-78, when the Russian forces passed through Roumania on their way
to Turkey, the difference in gauge between the Russian and the Roumanian
railways caused great delay and inconvenience by reason of the necessary
transfer of troops, stores, guns, ammunition, torpedo boats, etc., at
the frontier.

It should, also, be remembered that the reduction of a broad gauge to a
narrow one is a much simpler matter, from an engineering point of view,
than the widening of a narrower gauge into a broad one. In the former
case the existing sleepers, bridges, tunnels, platforms, etc., would
still serve their purpose. In the latter case fresh sleepers might have
to be laid, bridges and tunnels widened or enlarged, and platforms and
stations altered, use of the broader-gauge rolling stock thus involving
an almost complete reconstruction of the railway lines. To this extent,
therefore, the balance of advantage would seem to be against the country
having the broader gauge. The conclusion may, at least, be formed that
such a country is far more bent on protecting her own territory than on
invading that of her neighbours.

The course adopted by Germany for overcoming the difficulty which, in
the event of her seeking to invade Russia, the difference of railway
gauge in that country would present, will be told in Chapter XVIII.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866." By Capt. Webber, R.E.
Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., vol. xvi. Woolwich, 1868.

[9] "The German War Book. Being the Usages of War on Land"; issued by
the Great General Staff of the German Army. London, 1915.

[10] The subject of armoured trains will be dealt with more fully in
Chapters VII and XVI.

[11] See "Field Service Pocket Book, 1914," pp. 151-2.

CHAPTER VI

TROOPS AND SUPPLIES

In the earlier controversies as to the use of railways in war, attention
was almost entirely concentrated on questions relating to the movement
of large masses of troops, the saving of time to be effected, and the
strategic advantages to be gained. These considerations quickly passed
from the theoretical to the practical, and when the results attained
were put against such facts as, for instance, the one that in 1805
Napoleon's Grand Army of 200,000 men took forty-two days to march the
700 kilometres (435 miles) between Ulm on the Danube and the French camp
at Boulogne, there was no longer any possibility of doubt as to the
services that railways might render from these particular points of view.

_Quicker transport_ was, however, only one consideration. There was the
further important detail that the movement of troops by rail would bring
them to their point of concentration, not only sooner, but in _more
complete numbers_, than if they had to endure the fatigues of prolonged
marches by road.

According to German authorities, the falling-out of infantry and cavalry
when marching along good roads under conditions of well-maintained
discipline and adequate food supplies averages three per cent. in cool
and dry weather, and six per cent. in hot or wet weather; while in
unfavourable conditions as regards roads, weather and supplies, the
diminution may be enormous. When, in the autumn of 1799, Suvóroff made
his famous march over the St. Gothard, he lost, in eleven days, no
fewer than 10,000 men owing to the hardships of the journey. In his
invasion of Russia, in 1812, Napoleon's losses in men who succumbed to
the fatigues and trials they experienced on the road were out of all
proportion to the casualties due to actual fighting. It was, too, a
saying of Blücher's that "he feared night marches worse than the enemy."

An English authority, Lieut.-Col. R. Home, C.B., R.E., wrote in a
paper on "The Organisation of the Communications, including Railways,"
published in Vol XIX. of the Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution (1875):--

If an army of moderate size, say 50,000 men, simply marches
one hundred miles without firing one shot or seeing an enemy the
number of sick to be got rid of is very great.

Experience has shown that in a good climate, with abundant
food, easy marches, and fair weather, the waste from ordinary
causes in a ten days' march of such a force would be between
2,000 and 2,500 men, while the number of galled, footsore
or worn-out horses would also be very large. A few wet days
or a sharp engagement would raise the number of both very
considerably. An inefficient man or horse at the front is a
positive disadvantage.

Another equally important detail relates to the _provision of supplies_
for the troops and animals thus transported by rail both more quickly
and with less fatigue.

In all ages the feeding of his troops in an enemy's country has been
one of the gravest problems a military commander has had to solve;
and though, in some instances, vast armies have succeeded in drawing
sufficient support from the land they have invaded, there have been
others in which an army intending to "live upon the country" has failed
to get the food it needed, and has had its numbers depleted to the
extent of thousands as the result of sheer starvation. This was the
experience of Darius, King of Persia, who, in 513 B.C., crossed the
Bosporus, on a bridge of boats, with an army of 700,000, followed the
retreating Scythians, and lost 80,000 of his men in wild steppes where
no means existed for feeding them. When, also, Alexander the Great was
withdrawing from India, in 325 B.C., two-thirds of his force died on
the desert plains of Beluchistan from thirst or hunger. Lack of the
supplies from which he found himself entirely cut off was, again, a main
cause of the disaster that overtook Napoleon in his Russian campaign.
Even fertile or comparatively fertile lands, satisfying the needs of
their inhabitants in time of peace, may fail to afford provisions for
an invading army, either because of the great number of the latter or
because the retreating population have destroyed the food supplies
they could not take with them into the interior whether for their own
sustenance or with a view to starving the invaders.

Should the invading army succeed in "living on the country," the effect
of leaving the troops to their own resources, in the way of collecting
food, may still be not only subversive of discipline but of strategic
disadvantage through their being scattered on marauding expeditions at a
time when, possibly, it would be preferable to keep them concentrated.

General Friron, chief of the staff of Marshal Masséna, wrote concerning
Napoleon's campaign in Portugal:--

The day the soldier became convinced that, for the future,
he would have to depend on himself, discipline disappeared
from the ranks of the army. The officer became powerless in
the presence of want; he was no longer disposed to reprimand
the soldier who brought him the nourishment essential to his
existence, and who shared with him, in brotherly goodwill, a
prey which may have cost him incalculable dangers and fatigues.

The extent to which a combination of physical fatigue and shortness of
supplies in an inhospitable country may interfere with the efficiency of
an army is well shown by Thiers ("Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire")
in regard to the conditions at the very outset of Napoleon's Russian
campaign. The French troops arriving on the Niemen--at which point they
were merely on the frontiers of Russia--were already overcome by the
long marches they had made. They had no bread, no salt, and no spirits;
their craving for food could no longer be satisfied by meat without salt
and meal mixed with water. The horses, too, were out of condition for
want of proper food. Behind the army a great number of soldiers dropped
out of the ranks and had lost their way, while the few people they met
in a scantily-populated district could speak nothing but Polish, which
the wearied and famished men were unable to understand. Yet, under the
conditions of former days, it was by troops thus exhausted by marches of
hundreds of miles, done on, possibly, a starvation diet, that battles
involving the severest strain on human energy were fought.

When "living on the country" is no longer practicable, the only
alternative for an army is, of course, that of sending supplies after it
for the feeding of the troops; but when, or where, this has had to be
done by means of ordinary road services, it has involved--together with
the transport of artillery, ammunition and stores--(1) the employment
of an enormous number of vehicles and animals, greatly complicating
the movements of the army; and (2) a limitation of the distance within
which a campaign can be waged by an army depending entirely on its own
resources.

The latter of these conditions was the direct consequence of the former;
and the reason for this was shown by General W. T. Sherman in an article
contributed by him to the _Century Magazine_ for February, 1888 (pp.
595-6), in the course of which he says:--

According to the Duke of Wellington, an army moves upon its
belly, not upon its legs; and no army dependent on wagons can
operate more than a hundred miles from its base because the
teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons,
leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of men and animals
at the front who are fully employed in fighting.

There was, again, the risk when food supplies followed the army by road
either of perishables going bad _en route_, owing to the time taken in
their transport by wagon, or of their suffering deterioration as the
result of exposure to weather, the consequence in either case being a
diminution in the amount of provisions available for feeding the army.

All these various conditions have been changed by the railway, the use
of which for the purposes of war has, in regard to the forwarding of
supplies, introduced innovations which are quite as important as those
relating to the movement of troops--if, indeed, the former advantages
are not of even greater importance than the latter.

Thanks to the railway, an army can now draw its supplies from the
whole of the interior of the home country--provided that the lines of
communication can be kept open; and, with the help not only of regular
rail services but of stores and magazines _en route_ those supplies can
be forwarded to railhead in just such quantities as they may be wanted.
Under these conditions the feeding of an army in the field should
be assured regardless alike of the possible scanty resources of the
country in which it is engaged and of its own distance from the base of
supplies.

CHAPTER VII

ARMOURED TRAINS

In the issue of the now defunct London periodical, _Once a Week_, for
August 13, 1859, there was published an article on "English Railway
Artillery: A Cheap Defence against Invasion," in which it was said,
among other things:--

We have hitherto regarded the rail merely as a vehicle
of transport, to carry materials which are not to be set in
work till off the rails. If we look at the rail as part of an
instrument of warfare, we shall be startled at the enormous
means we have at hand, instantly available, from mercantile
purposes, to convert to engines of war.

The writer was William Bridges Adams (1797-1872), an authority on
railways who had grown up with them, had introduced into their operation
many inventions and improvements (including the fish-joint still used
for connecting rails), and was the author of various books and papers on
railways, transport, and other subjects. His new idea, as set forth in
the article in question, was specially directed to the utilisation of
railways for defending the shores of Great Britain against an invader;
and in developing this idea he was, also, as far as can be traced, the
first to suggest the employment of armoured trains.

The immediate reason alike for the writing of the article and for the
making of the suggestion was that in 1859 Great Britain appeared to be
faced by the prospect of invasion by France,--a prospect which, in view
of the then admittedly defective condition of the national defences,
led to the creation of the Volunteer Corps, to the appointment of a
Royal Commission to inquire into the question of coast defence, and
to suggestions being put forward by many different authorities as to
what should be done. Among those suggestions was one by the writer in
question for supplementing any system of coast defence that might be
adopted by the mounting of guns on railway trucks protected by armour,
such trucks being moved from point to point along the coast railways to
meet, as far as possible, the needs of the military situation.

Heavy artillery, wrote Adams, though the most formidable implement of
modern warfare, had the disadvantage of requiring many horses to draw
it. So the problem arose as to how the horses could be dispensed with.
This could best be done, he thought, by putting artillery on "our true
line of defence,--our rails," and having it drawn, or propelled, by a
locomotive. "Mount," he said, "a gun of twenty tons weight on a railway
truck, with a circular traversing platform, and capable of throwing
a shot or shell weighing one hundred to one and a half a distance of
five miles. A truck on eight wheels would carry this very easily, and
there would be no recoil." Such a battery would be "practically a
moving fortress," and, used on the coast railways, which he regarded as
constituting lines of defence, would be "the cheapest of all possible
fortresses--absolutely a continuous fortress along the whole coast."
Communication with coast railways at all strategical points should,
however, be facilitated by the placing of rails along the ordinary
highways. After giving some technical details as to the construction
alike of coast railways and road tramways, he proceeded:--

With these roads communicating with the railroads, the whole
railway system becomes applicable to military purposes.

The railway system is so especially adapted for defence, and
so little adapted to invaders, that it should become at once a
matter of experiment how best to adapt Armstrong or other guns
to its uses. The process of fitting the engines with shot-proof
walls to protect the drivers against riflemen would be very
easy.... Nothing but artillery could damage the engines or
moving batteries, and artillery could not get near them if it
were desirable to keep out of the way.

One gun transportable would do the work of ten which are
fixtures in forts, and there would be no men to take prisoners,
for no forts would be captured.

The more this system is thought of the more the conviction
will grow that it is the simplest mode of rendering the country
impenetrable to invaders at a comparatively trifling cost.

It will be seen that the scheme here proposed included three separate
propositions--(1) the use of railways, as "engines of war," for coast
defence; (2) the mounting of Armstrong or other guns on railway trucks
from which they could be discharged for the purposes of such defence;
and (3) the providing of the engines with "shot-proof walls" for the
protection of the drivers. A similar protection for the men operating
the guns on the trucks was not then, apparently, considered necessary;
but we have here what was clearly the germ of the "armoured train."

Among the other suggestions advanced on the same occasion were some for
the employment of railways in general for strategical purposes, and more
especially for the defence of London; and here, again, the employment of
armoured trains was advocated.

"A Staff Officer," writing in _The Times_ of July 16, 1860, declared
that the most efficacious and the most economical line of defence which
London could have would be a circular railway forming a complete cordon
around the Metropolis at a distance of fifteen miles from the centre,
and having for its interior lines of operation the numerous railways
already existing within that radius. On this circular railway there
should be "Armstrong and Whitworth ordnance mounted on large iron-plated
trucks" fitted with traversing platforms in the way already recommended
by W. Bridges Adams, the trucks themselves, however, and not only the
locomotives, being protected by "shot-proof shields." The circular
railway was to be constructed primarily for strategical purposes; but
during peace the line would be available for ordinary traffic, and in
this way it could be made to yield at least some return on the capital
expenditure.

The writer of this letter, Lieut. Arthur Walker, then an officer of the
79th Highlanders and the holder of a staff appointment at the School
of Musketry, Fleetwood, followed up the subject by reading a paper
on "Coast Railways and Railway Artillery" at a meeting of the Royal
United Service Institution on January 30, 1865.[12] On this occasion
he specially advocated the use of "moveable batteries" for coast
defence in conjunction with railways constructed more or less within
a short parallel distance of the entire coast line. Field artillery,
he recommended, should be mounted on a truck the sides of which would
be "encased in a cuirass of sufficient thickness," while the engine
and tender would also be "protected by an iron cuirass, and placed
between two cupolas for further protection." He considered that "to
attempt to land in face of such an engine of war as this would be simply
impossible." Moving batteries of this kind would be "the cheapest of
all possible fortresses.... We have nothing to do but to improvise
well-adapted gun-carriages for our rails." At the same meeting Mr. T.
Wright, C.E., gave details of a proposed railway train battery for
coast, frontier and inland defence which was designed to carry ten,
twenty or forty guns or mortars.

Another early advocate of the use of railways as an actual instrument
of warfare was Colonel E. R. Wethered, who, in 1872, wrote to the War
Office suggesting that heavy ordnance should be mounted on wheeled
carriages so constructed that they could be moved along any of the
railways, from point to point. In this way the three-fold advantage
would be gained of (1) utilising the railway system for purposes of
national defence; (2) rendering possible a concentration of artillery
with overwhelming force at any given spot, and, (3) by the use of these
moveable carriages for the conveyance of the guns, exposing the men to
less risk.

Colonel Wethered further communicated to _The Times_ of May 25, 1877,
a letter on "Portable Batteries" in which he declared that if, before
an enemy could effect a landing, we were to provide the means of
concentrating, with unerring certainty, on any given points of the
coast, a crushing force of artillery, with guns of heavier calibre than
even the warships of the invader could command, it would be impossible
for the vessels of an invading force to approach near enough to effect
the landing of their men. He continued:--

My proposal is to take the full advantage which our railway
system, in connection with our insular position, affords, and
provide powerful moveable batteries which can be sent fully
equipped in fighting order direct by railway to any required
point; and the recent experimental trials of the 81-ton gun
have proved that the heaviest ordnance can be moved and fought
on railway metals with considerable advantage.... In connection
with our present main lines of railway, which probably would
require strengthening at certain points, I would construct
branch lines or sidings leading to every strategical point
of our coast and into every fort, as far as possible, with
requisite platforms.... These branch lines during peace would,
doubtless, be of some small commercial value.... I would mount
as many of our heaviest guns as practicable on railway gun
carriages so that they could be moved by rail from one face of a
front to another, and from one place to another.

He also recommended that guns thus mounted, fully equipped, and ready
for use, should be kept at three large central depôts which might be
utilised for the defence of London. At each of them he would station (1)
Militia and Volunteer Artillery able not only to work the guns but to
construct, repair or destroy railway lines, and (2) a locomotive corps
specially trained in the working of traffic under war conditions.

By reading a paper at the Royal United Service Institution on April
24, 1891, on "The Use of Railways for Coast and Harbour Defence,"[13]
Lieut. E. P. Girouard, R.E. (now Major-General Sir E. Percy C. Girouard,
K.C.M.G.), made what was, at that time, an important contribution to a
subject on which there was then still much to be learned. Sketching a
detailed scheme comprising the employment of all the coastal railways
for the purposes of national defence, he emphasised the value of
Britain's "enormous railway power" as the strong point of her defensive
position, whether regarded from the point of view of (1) railway mileage
open as compared with the square mile of coastal area to be defended,
or (2) the length of coast line compared with the railway mileage at or
near that coast line, and, therefore, locally available for its defence.
"Why," he asked, "should we not turn to account the enormous advantage
which our great railway power gives us to concentrate every available
gun at a threatened point in the right and the proper time, which the
proper utilisation of our railways can and will do, thereby practically
doubling or quadrupling our available gun power?"

Whilst the subject had thus been under discussion in the United Kingdom,
America, in her _Civil War of 1861-65_, had set the rest of the world an
example by actually introducing armoured-protected gun-carrying trucks
into modern warfare.

Writing from Washington, under date August 29, 1862, to Colonel Herman
Haupt, then Chief of Construction and Transportation in the Department
of Rappahannock, Mr. P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War,
said:--"An armour-clad car, bullet proof, and mounting a cannon, has
arrived here and will be sent down to Alexandria." A later message, on
the same date added:--"After you see the bullet-proof car, let me know
what you think of it. I think you ought at once to have a locomotive
protected by armour. Can you have the work done expeditiously and well
at Alexandria, or shall I get it done at Philadelphia or Wilmington?"
The car was duly received; but Haupt's comments in respect to it, as
recorded in his "Reminiscences," show that he was not greatly impressed
by the innovation. "P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, sent me,"
he says, "an armour-clad, bullet-proof car, mounting a cannon. The
kindness was appreciated, but the present was an elephant. I could not
use it, and, being in the way, it was finally side-tracked on an old
siding in Alexandria."

It would seem, however, that other armour-clad cars were brought into
actual use during the course of the Civil War.

In the _Railway Age Gazette_ (Chicago) for January 22, 1915, Mr.
Frederick Hobart, associated editor of the New York _Engineer and Mining
Journal_, writes, from personal knowledge, of two armoured cars which
were in use in the Civil War. One of these, formed by heavy timbers
built up on a flat car, was put together in the shops of the Atlantic
and North Carolina Railroad Company at Newberne, N.C., in 1862, about
two months after the city had been captured by the Burnside expedition.
The armour consisted of old rails spiked on the outside of the planking
composing the sides and front of the car. Along the sides there were
slits for musketry fire, and at the front end there was a port hole
covered with a shutter behind which a gun from one of the field
batteries was mounted. The second car was similarly constructed, but was
armed with a naval howitzer. The cars were run ahead of the engine, and
were used in reconnoitring along the railroad line west of Newberne. Mr.
Hobart adds that he was quite familiar with the cars, having assisted in
the design and construction of both.

In the _Century Magazine_ for September, 1887 (page 774), there is given
an illustration ("from a photograph") of an armour-clad car described as
"the Union Railroad Battery" which was, apparently, used in connection
with the springing of the mine in front of Petersburg on July 30, 1864.
The car is shown to have consisted of a low truck with, at one end, a
sloping armour plate coming down almost to the rails, and having a hole
through which the gun placed behind it on the truck could be fired. The
sides of the truck were protected from the top of the sloping armour
downwards, but the back was open. The car was, of course, designed to be
pushed in front of the locomotive.

Mr. L. Lodian, also, contributed to the issue of the American
periodical, _Railway and Locomotive Engineering_, for May, 1915, a
communication, under the title of "The Origin of Armoured Railroad
Cars Unquestionably the Product of the American Civil War," in which,
claiming that "our own Civil War" originated those cars, he said:--

Attached is a picture of one in use on the old
Philadelphia-Baltimore Railroad. The illustration appeared in
Frank Leslie's illustrated periodical on May 18, 1864. No better
proof could be furnished of the authenticity of the fact that
such a car was in use at that time.... There appears to be no
great variation even to-day in armoured car design from the
initial effort of half a century ago. Pictures are appearing
in numerous periodicals, at the period of writing, of those in
use by the European belligerents, and in general appearance
and outline they are about the same as the original, the chief
variation in their use being that the war-going locomotive is
also sheathed in armour, whereas that in use in the sixties was
entirely unprotected, except in front, and then only by reason
of the mailclad car being placed in front to do the fighting.

As against this suggestion, there is the undoubted fact that in the
American Civil War the plan was adopted of having the locomotives
of ordinary troop or supply trains protected by armour-plating as a
precaution against attack when there was no armoured car in front of
them. Writing to the Director of Military Railroads on October 8, 1862,
Haupt said:--

I have been thinking over the subject of locomotives. It
is one which, at the present time, and in view of the future
requirements of the service, demands especial attention.
Experience has shown that on engines men are targets for
the enemy; the cabs where they are usually seated have been
riddled by bullets, and they have only escaped by lying on the
footboard. It will be necessary to inspire confidence in our men
by placing iron cabins (bullet proof) upon all or nearly all our
engines, and the necessity will increase as we penetrate further
into the enemy's country.

Again, it is desirable that the smaller and more delicate
portions of the apparatus should be better protected than at
present, and I would be pleased if you would give to the plans,
of which I spoke to you recently, a careful consideration. It
seems to me that they are peculiarly well adapted to military
service.

Haupt adds that "protected locomotives and bullet-proof cabs were soon
after provided, as recommended"; and elsewhere in his "Reminiscences" he
says, on the same subject:--

The bullet-proof cabs on locomotives were very useful--in
fact, indispensable. I had a number of them made and put on
engines, and they afforded protection to engineers and firemen
against the fire from guerillas from the bushes that lined the
road.

In the _Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71_ guns mounted on four
armour-plated trucks, fitted up in the workshops of the Orléans Company,
under the supervision of M. Dupuy de Lorme, Engineer-in-Chief for Naval
Construction, were taken into action on four occasions during the siege
of Paris, namely, at Choisy-le-Roi, for the sortie preceding the one
from Champigny; near Brie-sur-Marne, to support the Champigny sortie;
at Le Bourget, for one of the attempts to recapture that position; and
at La Malmaison, to support the Montretout sortie. The wagons were
protected by a covering which consisted of five plates of wrought
iron, each two-fifths of an inch thick, and giving, therefore, a total
thickness of two inches. The two engines used were also protected by
armour-plating. One or two of the wagons were struck by field-gun shells
without, however, sustaining further damage than the denting of their
plates. The engines escaped damage altogether. On going into action the
armoured wagons were followed by another bullet-proof engine conveying a
party of men with tools and materials to repair any interruption of the
lines that might interfere with the return of the trains; but the only
damage done was so slight that it was remedied in about a quarter of an
hour.[14]

Further use was made of armoured trains in the _Egyptian Campaign of
1882_. One that was put together to assist in the defensive works at
Alexandria is declared in the official history of the campaign[15] to
have "proved most serviceable." Two of the trucks, fitted with iron
plating and sand bags as a protecting cover, carried one Nordenfelt and
two Gatling guns. A 9-pr. was also placed on one of the trucks, together
with a crane by means of which it could be lowered out immediately.
Other trucks, rendered bullet proof by sand bags and boiler-plating,
and carrying a force of 200 bluejackets, with small arms, completed the
fighting force. On July 28, the train took part in a reconnaissance sent
out to ascertain the extent of the damage which had been done to the
railway lines near Arabi's outpost. Shots were fired at the train by the
enemy, but without effect. The reconnaissance was a complete success
inasmuch as it enabled such repairs to be done to the railway as gave
the use of a second line between Ramleh and Alexandria.

So useful had the train been found that it was now further improved
by adding to it a 40-pr. on a truck protected by an iron mantlet. The
locomotive was put in the middle of the train and was itself protected
by sand bags and railway iron. Thus strengthened, the train went into
action in the reconnaissance in force carried out from Alexandria
on August 5, and "the most interesting incident of the engagement,"
according to the official account, "was the good service done by the
40-pr. from the armoured train."

Early in the morning of September 13 the train, consisting of five
wagons, and having, on this occasion, one Krupp gun and one Gatling in
addition to the 40-pr., was sent to support the attack on Tel el-Kebir.
It was followed by another train having 350 yards of permanent-way
materials, with all the necessary tools and appliances for the prompt
carrying out of any repairs that might be necessary. Owing, however, to
the hazy and uncertain light and to the ever-increasing clouds of smoke
that hung over the battle-field, it was impossible to fire the 40-pr.

In the futile attempt made in 1885 to construct a railway from Suakin
to Berber, in support of the _Nile Expedition of 1884-85_, resort was
had to an armoured train for the purpose of protecting the line from
the constant attacks to which it was subjected by the enemy. The train
carried a 20-pr. B.L., which could be fired only either in prolongation
of the line or at a slight angle from it.

At the Camp of Exercise in _Delhi_ in January, 1886, some important
experiments were carried out with a view to testing the practicability
of firing guns at right angles to an ordinary line of railway, the
result being to establish the fact that a 40-pr. R.B.L. could be fired
with perfect safety broadside from (_a_) small empty wagons mounted
on four wheels; (_b_) small empty wagons weighted up to four tons;
and (_c_) empty eight-wheel bogies. These experiments were especially
successful when account is taken of the fact that no attempt was made to
reduce in any way the energy of recoil.

Other experiments, begun in 1885, were successfully conducted during a
succession of years both by the French Government and by private firms
in _France_ in the transport and the firing of guns from railway trucks
with a view to obtaining definite data on the subject, more especially
in relation to firing at right angles to the line.

In _Italy_ a distinguished officer raised the question in the Italian
Parliament, in 1891, as to whether Sicily should not be defended by
means of a coast railway and armoured trains.

Some experiments carried out at _Newhaven, Sussex_, in 1894, were the
more interesting because the results attained were due to the combined
efforts of Artillery Volunteers and of the London, Brighton and South
Coast Railway Company.

Under the Volunteer mobilization scheme of 1891 there were some 300
members of the 1st Sussex Artillery Volunteers to whom no special
duties had been allotted, and there happened to be, at Shoreham, a
40-pr. Armstrong B.L. gun which was then serving no particular purpose.
Inspired by these two facts, the Secretary of the Committee for National
Defence suggested, in November, 1891, that negotiations should be opened
with the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company with a view
to their mounting the 40-pr. on a specially prepared truck, designed
to form part of an armoured train, experiments in firing the gun from
the truck--in order to test the efficiency of this expedient for the
purposes of coast defence--being afterwards carried out by the Artillery
Volunteers whose services were available for the purpose.

On being approached, the directors of the railway company readily
consented to the fitting up of the truck being carried out at their
engineering and carriage works; they contributed towards the expenses,
and members of their staff entered with great cordiality into the
scheme, Mr. R. J. Billington, the locomotive superintendent, being the
first to suggest the mounting of the gun on a turntable to be fixed on
the truck,--a "bold departure," as it was regarded at the time, and one
expected to produce excellent results. The railway staff were the more
interested, also, in the proposed experiments because a large proportion
of the members of the 1st Sussex Artillery Volunteers consisted of men
employed at the Brighton Company's works.

In commenting upon these facts, Col. Charles Gervaise Boxall, the
commanding officer, said in a paper on "The Armoured Train for Coast
Defence," read by him at a meeting of officers and N.C.O.'s of the
Brigade, held at Newhaven Fort, Sussex, on May 14, 1894:--

When one considers that a railway company is neither
a philanthropic institution nor a patriotic society, the
generous support given to this experiment by so powerful a
body as the directors of the London, Brighton and South Coast
Railway Company is in itself some considerable evidence of
the importance they themselves ascribe to this effort in the
direction of the maintenance of coast defence and protection
from invasion.

Preliminary experiments with the gun were conducted on May 5, 1894,
and they conclusively showed, Col. Boxall said, "that the gun will
require no traversing to correct variation caused by the recoil, while
the muzzle of the gun can be directed to any part of its circumference
by handspike traversing within half a minute." He was evidently proud
of the results even of these preliminary trials. They were the first
occasion on which a heavy gun had been fired broadside on the permanent
way of an English railway, and the truck was the first armour-plated one
on which a turntable, a recoil cylinder, and other inventions introduced
had been employed. So, he further declared:--

We do confidently submit that, having proved that such a
gun as this can be mounted so as to be transportable to any
part of our railway system at a moment's notice, brought into
action, and fired with accuracy either end on, broadside, or in
any other direction, without danger of capsizing, and without
injury to the permanent way, we have become pioneers of a new
departure in artillery which must lead to results of the highest
importance.

This was written prior to the full trials, which took place at Newhaven
on May 19, 1894, in the presence of a distinguished company of military
men and others. An account of the event will be found in _The Times_
of May 21, 1894. The gun and its carriage are described as standing on
a turntable platform pivoted on the centre of the truck, and revolving
on a central "racer." The gun detachments were protected by a plating
six feet high round three sides of the turntable, and the gun was fired
through an aperture in the plating. Drawn by an ordinary locomotive,
the truck on which the gun was mounted was accompanied by two carriages
conveying the Volunteer Artillerymen who were to serve the gun. Several
rounds were fired at a target some 2,500 yards distant, and "the
armoured train passed through the searching and severe ordeal most
successfully, the jar caused being so slight that a stone placed on the
rails remained unmoved by the firing." The truck, it is further stated,
had been provided with some cross girders which could be run out and
supported on blocks in order to secure a broad base when the gun was
fired at right angles to the line, and there was a further arrangement
for connecting the truck to the rails by strong clips; but the truck
remained sufficiently steady without any need for making use of these
appliances.

Finally, as will be told more fully in Chapter XVI, the _South African
Campaign of 1899-1902_ definitely established the usefulness of armoured
trains as an "instrument of war," and led both to the creation of an
efficient organisation for their employment on the most scientific and
most practical lines and to the establishment of certain principles
in regard to such important matters of detail as uses and purposes,
administration, staff, armament, tactics, etc. Published in the
"Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War" which was
issued by the Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, in 1905, these
principles were adopted in the _United States_ with modifications to
suit American conditions, and, so modified, are reproduced in Major
William D. Connor's handbook on "Military Railways," forming No. 32
of the Professional Papers of the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. An
excellent treatment of the subject, from a technical point of view,
will be found in a paper, by Capt. H. O. Nance, on "Armoured Trains,"
published, with photographs and drawings, in "Papers of the Corps of
Royal Engineers," Fourth Series, Vol. I., Paper 4 (Chatham, 1906).

FOOTNOTES:

[12] _See_ the "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" Vol.
IX., pp. 221-31, 1865.

[13] "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," Vol. XXXV., 1891.

[14] For detailed description, with diagrams, of the trains here in
question, _see_ "Armour-plated Railway Wagons used during the late
Sieges of Paris," by Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the Corps of Royal
Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX, 1872.

[15] "Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt." Prepared by
the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition. London, 1908.

CHAPTER VIII

RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT

According to statistics which have been compiled in relation to wars
alike in ancient and in modern times, for every ten men among the
armies in the field who have died from wounds received in battle there
have been from thirty-five to forty who died from sickness or disease.
Writing in the _Journal des Sciences Militaires_, Dr. Morache, a surgeon
in the French Army, has said that while the total number of deaths among
combatants taking part in the Crimean War was 95,000, no fewer than
70,000 were due to typhus, scurvy, cholera or other diseases. In the
Italian campaign of 1859 the French lost 5,498 men, of whom 2,500 died
from sickness. On the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War the Russians
had 51,000 of their troops sick, the ravages of typhus having been
especially severe.

These conditions have been materially aggravated by the gathering
together of great numbers of sick and wounded into overcrowded hospitals
situate on or near to the theatre of war and destined inevitably to
become hot-beds of disease and pestilence far more dangerous to human
life, under these conditions, than even the most deadly weapons which
the art of war had invented for use on the battle-field itself.

Nor was it the armies alone that suffered. Returning troops spread the
seeds of disease among the civil population, causing epidemics that
lingered, in some instances, for several years and carried off many
thousands of non-combatants, in addition to the great number of victims
among the combatants themselves. In a volume of 866 pages, published by
Dr. E. Gurlt, under the title of "Zur Geschichte der Internationellen
und Freiwilligen Krankenpflege im Kriege" (Leipzig, 1873), will be found
many terrible details concerning the ravages in France, Germany and
Austria of the typhus which Napoleon's troops brought back with them on
the occasion of their disastrous retreat from Russia.

The most practicable means of mitigating, if not of avoiding, these
various evils is to be found in the prompt removal of the sick and
wounded from the theatre of war, and their distribution in smaller
units, not simply among a group of neighbouring towns, but over an
area extending to considerable distances inland. The adoption of this
remedy only became possible, however, with a provision of adequate rail
facilities, and even then many years were to elapse before an efficient
system of railway ambulance transport was finally evolved.

The objects which the use of the railway in these directions was to
attain were alike humanitarian and strategical.

To the sick and wounded among the troops, prompt removal and widespread
distribution among hospitals in the interior meant (1) that they avoided
the risks to which they would have been subjected in the aforesaid
overcrowded and pestilential hospitals near the fighting line, where
slight injuries might readily develop dangerous symptoms, and contagious
disease complete the conditions leading to a fatal issue; (2) that,
apart from these considerations, it would be possible to give them a
greater degree of individual attention if they were distributed among a
large number of hospitals away from the scene of the fighting; (3) that
more conservative methods of surgery became practicable when operations
of a kind not to be attempted either on the battle-field or in temporary
hospitals (from which the inmates might have to be suddenly removed,
owing to some change in the strategical position) could be delayed until
the sufferer's arrival at some hospital in the interior, where better
appliances and better facilities would be available, and where, after
the operation, the patient would be able to remain undisturbed until
he was cured; (4) that these improved conditions might more especially
permit of the avoidance of amputations otherwise imperatively necessary;
and (5) that, on the whole, the wounded soldier was afforded a better
chance of effecting a speedy recovery and of saving both life and limb
than would be possible if railways were not available.

To the army in the field the innovation meant that with the speedy
removal of the sick and wounded it would be relieved of the great
source of embarrassment caused by the presence and dependence upon it
of so many inefficients;[16] depôt and intermediate hospitals could
be reduced to the smallest proportions, and would thus occasion less
inconvenience if, owing to a retreat or a change in the strategical
position, they were brought within the sphere of military operations;
with the delegation of so many of the sick and wounded to the care of
civil practitioners in the interior, fewer of the divisional, brigade
and regimental medical officers would require to be detached from the
marching column; a smaller supplementary medical staff would suffice;
a considerable reduction could be effected in the stocks of ambulance
supplies kept on hand at the front; while important strategical
advantages would be gained through (1) the greater freedom of movement
which the army would secure; (2) the decreased risk of the number of
efficients being reduced through the outbreak of epidemics; and (3) the
prospect of a large proportion of the sick and wounded being enabled to
rejoin the fighting force on their making a speedy recovery from their
illness or their wounds.

The earliest occasion on which the railway was made use of for the
conveyance of sick and wounded from a scene of actual hostilities to the
rear was on the occasion of the _Crimean War_, when the little military
line between Balaklava and the camp before Sebastopol, of which an
account will be given in Chapter XV, was so employed. The facilities
afforded were, however, of the most primitive character. Only the
wagons used for the transport of supplies to the front--wagons, that is
to say, little better than those known as "contractors' trucks"--were
available, and there were no means of adapting them to the conveyance
of sufferers who could not be moved otherwise than in a recumbent
position. Sitting-up cases could, therefore, alone be carried; but what
was to develop into a revolution in the conditions of warfare was thus
introduced, all the same.

In the _Italian war of 1859_ both the French and the Austrians made use
of the railways for the withdrawal of their sick and wounded, and, in
his "Souvenir de Solferino," Jean Henri Dumant, the "Father" of the Red
Cross Movement, speaks of the transportation of wounded from Brescia to
Milan by train to the extent of about 1,000 a night. No arrangements for
their comfort on the journey had been made in advance, and the changes
in the military situation were so rapid, when hostilities broke out,
that no special facilities could be provided then. All that was done
was to lay down straw on the floor of the goods or cattle trucks used
for the conveyance of some of the more serious cases. The remainder
travelled in ordinary third-class carriages, and their sufferings on the
journey, before they reached the long and narrow sheds put up along the
railway lines at Milan or elsewhere to serve as temporary hospitals,
must often have been very great. They may, nevertheless, have escaped
the fate of those who died, not from their wounds, but from the fevers
quickly generated in the overcrowded hospitals at the front, where there
was, besides, a general deficiency of ambulance requirements of all
kinds. The good resulting from the removal by train is, indeed, said to
have been "immense."

These experiences in the campaign of 1859 led to a recommendation
being made in the following year by a _German_ medical authority, Dr.
E. Gurlt,[17] that railway vehicles should be specially prepared for
the conveyance of the sick and wounded in time of war. The plan which
he himself suggested for adoption was the placing of the sufferers in
hammocks suspended from hooks driven into the roof of the goods van or
carriage employed, mattresses being first put on the hammocks, when
necessary. By this means, he suggested, the sufferers would travel much
more comfortably than when seated in the ordinary passenger carriages,
or when lying on straw in the goods wagons or cattle trucks.

Dr. Gurlt's pamphlet served the good purpose of drawing much attention
to the subject, and his proposals were duly subjected to the test of
experiment. They failed, however, on two grounds,--(1) because the roofs
of the goods vans, designed for shelter only, were not sufficiently
strong to bear the weight of a number of men carried in the way
suggested; and (2) because the motion of the train caused the hammocks
to come into frequent contact with the sides of the wagon, to the
serious discomfort of the occupants.

In November of the same year (1860) the Prussian War Minister, von Roon,
appointed a Commission to enquire into the whole subject of the care
of the sick and wounded in time of war, and the question of transport
by rail was among the various matters considered. As a result of these
investigations, the Minister issued, on July 1, 1861, an order to the
effect that in future the less seriously wounded should travel in
ordinary first, second or third-class carriages, according to the degree
of comfort they required, care being taken to let them have corner
seats; while for those who were seriously ill, or badly wounded, there
were to be provided sacks of straw having three canvas loops on each
side for the insertion of poles by means of which the sacks and the
sufferers lying upon them could be readily lifted in or out of the goods
wagons set apart for their conveyance. In these wagons they were to be
placed on the floor in such a way that each wagon would accommodate
either seven or eight. In the event of a deficiency of sacks, loose
straw was to be used instead. The door on one side of the truck was to
be left open for ventilation. A doctor and attendants were to accompany
each train, and they were to have a supply of bandages, medicines and
appliances. Of the last-mentioned a list of five articles was appended
as obligatory. The medical officer was to visit the wagons during the
stoppages, and the attendants on duty in the wagons were to carry flags
so that, when necessary, they could signal both for the train to pull
up and for the doctor to come to the sufferers.

This was as far as Prussia had got by 1861, when the arrangements stated
were regarded as quite sufficient to meet the requirements of the
situation. Real progress was to come, rather, from the other side of the
Atlantic.

In the early days of the _War of Secession_ (1861-65) the arrangements
for the conveyance by rail of the sick and wounded from the
battle-fields of the Eastern States to the hospitals in the large
cities were still distinctly primitive. Those who could sit up in the
ordinary cars were conveyed in them. Those who could not sit up, or
would be injured by so doing, were carried to the railway, by hand, on
the mattresses or stretchers they had occupied in the hospitals to which
they had first been taken. At the station the mattresses were placed on
thick layers of straw or hay strewn over the floors of the freight cars
in which supplies had been brought to the front. Large window spaces
were cut in the sides or ends of the cars to provide for ventilation.
On some occasions, when hay or straw was not available, pine boughs or
leaves were used instead. As only the floor space was occupied no more
than about ten patients could be carried comfortably in each car, though
as many as twenty were occasionally crowded in. The wide doors of the
box cars readily permitted of the beds being lifted in or out. Medical
officers, with supplies, accompanied each train. On arrival at New
York, Washington, Philadelphia, Harrisburg, or other destination, the
sufferers were taken out and carried, still on the same mattresses or
stretchers, to the hospitals there.

Large numbers of sick or wounded were conveyed by rail under one or
other of these conditions, and the work was done with great expedition.
Between the morning of June 12 and the evening of June 14, 1863, over
9,000 wounded, victims of the Federal disaster at Chancellorsville,
were taken by the single-track Aquia Creek railroad from Aquia Creek to
Washington. Many even of the severely wounded declared they had suffered
no inconvenience from the journey. After the battle of Gettysburg, July
1-3, 1863, more than 15,000 wounded had been sent by rail from the
field hospitals to Baltimore, New York, Harrisburg or Philadelphia by
July 22. An even more rapid distribution was effected after the battles
of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania when, with a few exceptions, the
transfer to the hospitals in the cities mentioned was effected in the
course of a few days. Following on the battle of Olustree (February 20,
1864), the serious cases were removed on the Mobile Railway by freight
cars bedded with pine boughs, palmetto leaves and a small quantity of
straw, each patient having a blanket, in addition.

As an improvement on these methods of transport, the plan was adopted
of fixing rows of upright wooden posts, connecting floor and ceiling,
on each side of a car as supports for two or three tiers of rough
wooden bunks, a central gangway through the car being left. In this
way the available space in the car was much better utilised than
with the straw-on-floor system. Next, in place of the bunks, came an
arrangement by which the stretchers whereon the patients lay could be
securely lashed to the uprights; while this was followed, in turn, by
the insertion of wooden pegs into the uprights and the placing on them
of large and strong india-rubber rings into which the handles of the
stretchers could readily be slipped, and so suspended. The first car so
arranged came into use in March, 1863.

Meanwhile the Philadelphia Railroad Company had, at the end of 1862,
fitted up an ambulance car on the principle of a sleeping car, but so
planned that the stretchers on which the sufferers lay could be made to
slide in or out of the wooden supports. This particular car was capable
of accommodating fifty-one patients, in addition to a seat at each end
for an attendant. Other innovations introduced on the car were (1) a
stove at which soups could be warmed or tea made; (2) a water tank, and
(3) a locker.

What the introducers of these improvements mainly prided themselves
upon was the fact that the patient could remain, throughout the entire
journey from field hospital to destination, on the stretcher he had been
placed on at the start. The adoption of this principle necessitated,
however, uniformity in the dimensions of the stretchers in order that
these could always be accommodated on the ambulance-car fittings.

The next important development was reached when the ambulance _car_,
run in connection with ordinary trains, and used for exceptionally
severe cases, was succeeded by the ambulance _train_. Here came further
innovations, the nine or ten "ward-cars," of which such a train mainly
consisted in the Eastern States, being supplemented by others fitted
up as dispensary and store-room, kitchen, and quarters for surgeon,
attendants, and staff of train, besides carrying all necessary
appliances and provisions for the journey.

What was now specially aimed at was to make the train as close an
approach to an actual hospital on wheels as circumstances would
permit. "At present," wrote the Medical Director of the Department of
Washington, "the sick and wounded are transferred in cars ill-adapted
for the purpose and with difficulty spared from the other pressing
demands; and lives are lost on the route not infrequently which, in all
probability, might be saved by a more comfortable and easy method of
transportation." The train he caused to be constructed consisted of ten
ward-cars, one car for the surgeon and attendants, one as a dispensary
and store-room, and one as a kitchen, etc. The ward-cars, arranged on
an improved principle, each accommodated thirty recumbent and twenty or
thirty seated patients. The train was to run regularly on the Orange and
Alexandria Railroad between the theatre of war and the base hospitals at
Alexandria and Washington. It was either to supplement or to supersede
the freight cars with their bedding of straw, hay or leaves. If only
from the point of view of the inadequate supply of rolling stock, a car
fitted up to accommodate fifty or sixty patients offered an obvious
advantage, in the speedy removal and distribution of sick and wounded,
over a car, without fittings, in which the floor space alone could be
utilised.

Several complete trains of the type stated were soon running on the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad, within the Union lines, and the
hospital train thus became an established institution in modern warfare.

It was, however, in connection with the chief army in the West, the Army
of the Cumberland, operating under General George H. Thomas, that the
useful purposes which could be served by hospital trains became most
conspicuous.

The need for them in the West was even greater than in the East,
because the distances to be covered were greater and lay, also, to a
considerable extent, in enemy country.

In the fall of 1863 and the winter of 1864, as narrated in the "Medical
and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion," the chief army of the
West was concentrated principally along the line of railroads leading
from Nashville, Tennessee, to the South-west, viâ Chattanooga, Tenn.,
and onwards towards Atlanta, Georgia. At the outset the sick and wounded
who could travel in ordinary passenger cars to points in the North were
so taken. Severe cases had to remain in the nearest available hospital
depôt. In addition to the discomfort suffered by the former in having
to travel in cars not suited to invalids, they were liable to frequent
and prolonged delays on the single-track lines by reason of the constant
passing of supply trains proceeding to the front; and not unfrequently
the detentions were at points where nothing could be obtained for
feeding the sufferers or making them comfortable, while even if rations
could be drawn the train afforded no means of cooking them. So it was
resolved to have a train which would be the equivalent of an ambulating,
self-contained hospital, capable of carrying both recumbent and
sitting-up patients and supplying all their wants on the journey.

On August 11, 1863, instructions were sent from the
Assistant-Surgeon-General's Office to the Medical Officer of the Army
of the Cumberland directing him "to take immediate measures to fit up a
special train for hospital purposes, with every possible comfort," to
run between Nashville, Ten., and Louisville, Ken. General Thomas, in
turn, accorded the fullest authority to the Medical Officer to select
for the purpose the best locomotives and the best cars to be found among
the railway rolling stock, and to have new cars fitted up whenever
necessary. He further directed that the most experienced drivers,
conductors and other necessary railway employés should be selected for
the conduct of the hospital-train service.

Three of these trains were ready by the spring of 1864, and they ran
regularly--each taking a section of the journey--between Atlanta and
Louisville, a distance of 472 miles. They consisted, apparently, in
part of specially-built and in part of adapted rolling stock, the
large open American passenger cars, with their greater freedom from
internal fittings than ordinary European railway carriages, lending
themselves specially to the purpose. In the converted passenger cars
the carrying of the stretchers through the end doors was avoided by
removing two windows and the panelling underneath them from the side of
the car, and making an opening 6 ft. in width which could be closed by
a sliding door. Each train provided five ward-cars (converted passenger
cars) for lying-down patients; a surgeon's car (a passenger car from
which the seats had been removed, with partitions and fittings for the
accommodation of the doctor and his helpers); a dispensary car (in which
an ample supply of medicines, instruments and appliances was carried);
an ordinary passenger car for sitting-up patients or convalescents; a
kitchen car (divided into kitchen, dining-room and store-room); and
a conductor's car. The kitchen car was supplied with a small cooking
range, boilers, and other requisites for the feeding of from 175 to
200 patients. The cars were warmed and lighted in winter, and special
attention was paid to ventilation, so that Dr. F. L. Town, of the
United States Army, was able to report of them:--"In visiting these
hospital trains, the air is found sweet and pure, the wards are neat
and inviting; and it may unhesitatingly be said that men on hospital
trains are often as comfortable and better fed and attended than in many
permanent hospitals." The trains had distinguishing signals which were
recognised by the Confederates, and none of them were ever fired on or
molested in any way.

One, at least, of the trains was despatched daily from the vicinity of
the field hospitals. The services rendered by them during the last
eighteen months of the war were of the greatest value. It has been said,
indeed, that the combined effect of all the provision made for the care
of the sick and wounded and their speedy recovery--including therein, as
one of the most important items, their prompt removal and distribution
by rail--was to ensure for the Federals the retention of a force equal
in itself to an army of 100,000 men. No single fact could show more
conclusively the _strategical_ as well as the humanitarian value of
railway ambulance transport.

These details as to what was accomplished in the American Civil War are
the more deserving of record because they show that the evolution of the
"hospital on wheels," from the initial conditions of a bedding of straw
on the floor of a railway goods wagon, was really carried out, step by
step, in all its essential details, in the United States. The hospital
train was thus _not_ an English invention, as is widely assumed to be
the case; though much was to be done here to improve its construction,
equipment and organisation.

Whilst America had been gaining all this very practical experience, the
_Danish War of 1864_ had given Prussia the opportunity of testing the
system approved by her in 1861 for the conveyance of the less severely
wounded in ordinary passenger carriages and of the seriously wounded on
sacks of straw laid on the floor of goods wagons. The results were found
so unsatisfactory that on the conclusion of hostilities a fresh series
of investigations and experiments was begun, and matters were still at
this stage when war broke out between Prussia and Austria.

The conditions in regard to the care of the sick and wounded in the
_campaign of 1866_ were deplorably defective. Not only, according to
Dr. T. W. Evans[18]--an American medical man, settled in Paris, who
visited the battle-field and assisted in the work of relief--was there
no advance on what had been done in the United States, but the American
example was in no way followed, the combatants having made no attempt
whatever to profit from her experience.

After the battle of Sadowa, thousands of wounded were left on the
battle-field, and many remained there three days and three nights before
they could be removed in the carts and wagons which were alone available
for the purpose. Within five days every village in a radius of four
leagues was crowded with wounded. Those taken to Dresden and Prague in
ordinary passenger carriages or goods vans were detained for days on
the journey owing to the congestion of traffic on the lines. Some of
them, also, were in the trains for two days before their wounds were
dressed. Then the use of straw, depended on by the Austrians, was found
to be unsatisfactory. It failed to afford the sufferers a sufficient
protection against the jolting of the wagons, especially when they
worked through it to the bare boards; and even then there was not always
sufficient straw available to meet requirements. Altogether, it is
declared, the wounded suffered "unheard-of tortures."

Shortly after the conclusion of the war there was appointed in _Prussia_
a further Commission of medical and military authorities to renew the
investigation into the care and transport of sick and wounded. The
Commission sat from March 18 to May 5, 1867. In the result it still
favoured the use of sacks of straw, with canvas loops, as the simplest
and most comfortable method to adopt for the rail transport of recumbent
sufferers, though it recommended that the sacks should be made with
side pieces, giving them the form of paillasses, as this would afford a
greater degree of support to those lying on them. The American system of
suspending stretchers in tiers by means of india-rubber rings depending
from pegs let into wooden uprights was disapproved of, partly because
of the continuous swinging of the stretchers so carried, and partly
because of the assumed discomfort to one set of patients of having
others just above them. The report also recommended the adoption of
the following principles:--(1) Through communication between all the
carriages employed in one and the same train for the conveyance of sick
and wounded; (2) provision, for the severely wounded, either of beds
with springs or of litters suspended from the roof or the sides of the
carriages; and (3) extra carriages for the accommodation of doctor,
nurses, surgical appliances, medical stores, cooking utensils, etc.

These principles were subjected to various tests, and it was found that
in Germany the existing carriages which could best be adapted to the
desired purpose were those belonging to the fourth-class, inasmuch as
they had no internal divisions or fittings, travellers by them being
expected either to stand during the journey or to sit on their luggage.
The only structural alteration necessary was the placing of the doors at
the end of the carriages instead of at the sides, so that, on opening
these end doors, and letting down a small bridge to be provided for the
purpose, access could readily be obtained from one carriage to another.
Instructions were accordingly given that all fourth-class carriages
on the Prussian railways should thenceforward have end doors--an
arrangement which had, in fact, already been adopted in South Germany.
Steps were also taken in Prussia to adapt goods vans and horse boxes
for the conveyance of sick and wounded in the event of the number of
fourth-class carriages not being sufficient to meet requirements.

The widespread interest which was being attracted throughout Europe to
the subject of the care of the sick and wounded in war led to a series
of experimental trials being carried out at the _Paris International
Exhibition of 1867_, when, with the help of a short line of railway laid
down in the exhibition grounds and of a goods wagon supplied by the
Western of France Railway Company, a number of different systems were
tested. On this occasion, also, a model of an American car fitted up
with india-rubber rings for the handles of stretchers was shown.

At this time, and for many years afterwards, the ideal arrangement was
considered, on the Continent of Europe, to be one under which railway
vehicles sent to the front with troops, supplies or munitions could be
readily adapted for bringing back the sick and wounded on the return
journey; and alike in Germany, Russia, France, Austria and Italy the
respective merits of a great variety of internal fittings designed to
adapt existing rolling stock, whether passenger coaches, luggage vans,
Post Office vans or goods wagons, to the serving of these dual purposes
formed the subject of much experiment and controversy. Rope cables
across the roof of a goods wagon, with dependent loops of rope for
the reception of the stretcher handles (as in the Zavodovski method);
stretchers laid on springs on the floor, suspended from the roof either
by strong springs or by rope, resting on brackets attached to the
sides, or partly resting and partly suspended; and collapsible frames
of various kinds, each had their respective advocates.[19] The use and
equipment of ambulance or hospital trains constituted, also, a regular
subject of discussion at all the international congresses of Red Cross
Societies which have been held since 1869.

The experimental trials at the Paris Exhibition of 1867 were followed
by the appointment in _Prussia_ of still another Commission of inquiry,
and, acting on the recommendations of this body, the Prussian Government
adopted the "Grund" system, under which the stretchers whereon the
recumbent sufferers lay in the goods wagons or fourth-class carriages
were placed on poles resting in slots over the convexity of laminated
springs having one end screwed into the floor while the other, and
free, end was provided with a roller designed to respond to the varying
conditions of weight by sliding to and fro. This was the system mainly
used in the "sanitary trains" of the Germans in the _Franco-Prussian
War of 1870-71_. It was criticised on the ground (1) that the sick
and wounded were still subject to the same jolts and concussions as
ordinary seated passengers; (2) that the number who could be carried per
carriage or wagon was very small, since it was still the case that only
the floor space was utilised; and (3) that it was inconvenient for the
doctor and the attendants to have to kneel down in order to attend to
the patients.[20] Apart from these disadvantages, the ambulance service
of the Germans was well organised during the war. Of ambulance trains,
fitted up more or less as complete travelling hospitals, twenty-one were
run, and the total number of sufferers removed by rail is said to have
been over 89,000.

Owing to traffic congestions, the transport to Berlin of wounded from
the army engaged in the investment of Paris occupied no less a period
than six days; but these journeys were made in the special ambulance
trains which, provided in the later stages of the war, ensured full
provision for the feeding, nursing and general comfort of the sufferers.
The fact that such journeys could be undertaken at all showed the great
advance which had been made since the battle of Sadowa, when most of the
wounded could be conveyed no further than to cottages and farm-houses in
neighbouring villages.

In the _South-African War of 1899-1902_ the system favoured was that
of having hospital trains either expressly built for the purpose or
adapted from ordinary rolling stock and devoted exclusively, for the
duration of the war, to the conveyance of the sick and wounded. The
"Princess Christian" hospital train, specially constructed for the
British Central Red Cross Committee by the Birmingham Railway Carriage
and Wagon Company Ltd., according to the plans of Sir John Furley and
Mr. W. J. Fieldhouse, and sent out to South Africa early in 1900,
consisted of seven carriages, each about 36 ft. in length, and 8 ft.
in width, for running on the Cape standard gauge of 3ft. 6in. The
carriages were arranged as follows:--I., divided into three compartments
for (_a_) linen and other stores, (_b_) two nurses and (_c_) two invalid
officers; II., also divided into three compartments, for (_a_) two
medical officers; (_b_) dining-room and (_c_) dispensary; III., IV.,
V., and VI., ward-cars for invalids, carried on beds arranged in three
tiers; VII., kitchen, pantry, and a compartment for the guard. The train
carried everything that was necessary for patients and staff even though
they might be cut off from other sources of supply for a period of two
or three weeks.

Seven other hospital trains, all adapted from existing rolling stock
in Cape Colony or Natal, were made available for the transport of sick
and wounded in the same war. One of these, No. 4, was arranged and
equipped at the cost of the British Central Red Cross Committee, under
the direction of Sir John Furley, then acting as the Society's Chief
Commissioner in South Africa. The arrangement of the other converted
trains was carried out by the Army Medical Service in South Africa,
with the co-operation of the Government Railway officials in Cape Town
and Natal. A number of specially-fitted carriages, placed at convenient
distances on the railways occupied by the British, were made use of to
pick up small parties of sick from the various posts along the lines,
such carriages being attached to passing trains for the conveyance
of the sufferers to the nearest hospital. Many of them had a regular
service up and down a particular stretch of railway. Some were provided
with iron frames for the support of service stretchers, and others were
fitted up similarly to the ward-carriages of the converted hospital
trains. Convalescents and "sitting-up" patients for whom no special
accommodation was necessary travelled in such ordinary trains as might
be available.

In effect, there are four classes of trains by which, under the
conditions of to-day, the sick and wounded may be despatched from the
seat of war:--(1) Permanent hospital trains, specially constructed for
the purpose; (2) temporary hospital trains, made up either entirely
of converted ordinary vehicles or partly of converted and partly of
specially-constructed rolling stock, their use for this purpose
continuing for the duration of the war; (3) ambulance trains improvised
at railhead out of rolling stock bringing troops, supplies and stores to
the front, the internal fittings for "lying-down" cases being of such
a kind that they can be readily fixed or dismantled; and (4) ordinary
passenger carriages for slightly wounded or convalescents.

The advantages conferred on armies from a strategical point of view,
under all these improved conditions, are no less beyond dispute than
the benefits conferred on the individual soldiers, and if railways had
done no more in regard to the conduct of warfare than ensure these dual
results, they would still have rendered a service of incalculable value.
While, also, their provision of an efficient ambulance transport system,
with its speedy removal of non-effectives, has served the purposes
of war, it has, in addition, by its regard for the sick and wounded
themselves, further served to relieve warfare of some, at least, of its
horrors.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] A saying attributed to Napoleon is that he preferred a dead soldier
to a wounded one.

[17] "Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und Kranker im Kriege, nebst
Vorschlägen über die Benutzung der Eisenbahnen dabei." 33 pp. Berlin,
1860.

[18] "Les Institutions Sanitaires pendant le Conflit
Austro-Prussien-Italien." Par Thomas W. Evans. Paris, 1867.

[19] For "A short consideration and comparison of the regulations for
the transport of sick and wounded by rail, as laid down in four of the
leading Continental armies (the German, French, Austrian and Italian),"
see a paper on "Continental Regulations for the Transport of Sick and
Wounded by Rail," by Surg.-Capt. C. H. Melville, A.M.S., _Royal United
Service Institution Journal_, vol. 42 (1898), pp. 560-594.

[20] In an article on "Military Hospital Trains; their Origin and
Progress," in _The Railway Gazette_ of December 4, 1914, it is said:
"The comparatively small loss of the Germans by death from wounds in
1870 was due solely to the fact that they entered upon the war with what
were then considered wonderfully elaborate arrangements for removing the
wounded.... The trains were composed partly of first-class carriages,
for the less badly wounded, and partly of covered goods wagons.... In
these covered vans were placed beds formed of boards laid on springs.
Each van would hold four or five men, and a sister rode in the van." One
would not, however, consider to-day that there was anything wonderfully
elaborate in an arrangement under which no more than four or five
sufferers were accommodated in each goods van.

CHAPTER IX

PREPARATION IN PEACE FOR WAR

The greater the experience gained of the application of rail-power
in practice, and the closer the study devoted to its possibilities,
in theory, the more obvious it became that the fullest degree of
advantage to be derived therefrom could only be assured as the result
of preparation and organisation in peace; and this conclusion appeared
specially to apply to countries whose geographical and political
conditions led them to regard it as expedient that they should always
be ready to meet some great national emergency. The Federal Government
of the United States certainly did succeed, in the early sixties,
in creating an excellent military rail-transport organisation after
hostilities had broken out; but the conditions of warfare to-day make
it essentially necessary that arrangements for the use of railways for
military purposes should, as far as possible, be planned, perfected or
provided for long in advance of any possible outbreak of hostilities.

Among other considerations which strengthen this view are the
following:--

I. The increasing dependence of armies on rail transport owing to
(_a_) the vastly greater number of troops employed now than in former
days; (_b_) the supreme importance of time as a factor in enabling
a Commander-in-Chief to effect, possibly, an earlier concentration
than the enemy, and so obtain the power of initiative; and (_c_) the
magnitude of the supplies, munitions and other necessaries wanted to
meet the daily wants of the prodigious forces in the field, and only
to be assured by the employment of rail transport from a more or less
distant base.

II. The complications, confusion and possible chaos which may result
if, without prior preparation, railway lines designed to serve ordinary
transport purposes are suddenly required to meet military demands taxing
their resources to the utmost extreme.

III. The further troubles that will assuredly arise if, in the
absence of efficient control by properly-constituted and responsible
intermediaries, railwaymen unfamiliar with military technicalities
are left to deal with the possibly conflicting and impracticable
orders of individual military officers themselves unfamiliar with the
technicalities and limitations of railway working.

IV. The imperative necessity of having an organised and well-regulated
system of forwarding military supplies, etc., in order both to avoid
congestion of stations and lines and to ensure the punctual arrival of
those supplies in the right quantities, at the right spot, and at the
right time.

V. The need, in view of the vital importance of the part that railways
may play in war, of having organised forces of railway troops and
railway workers available, together with stores of materials and
appliances, to carry out, speedily and thoroughly, all the work that
may be necessary for the repair, construction or destruction of railway
lines.

In making the necessary preparations, in time of peace, to ensure the
successful realisation of these and other purposes, there is a vast
amount of work that requires to be done.

In readiness for the excessive strain that will be thrown on the
railways as soon as they pass from a peace footing to a war footing, on
the order being given for mobilisation, the military authorities and
the railway authorities must needs have at their command the fullest
information as to the physical conditions, the resources and the
transport capabilities of every line of railway in the country which,
directly or indirectly, may be able to render useful service. Details as
to double or single track; gradients; number of locomotives, carriages,
wagons, horse-boxes and other vehicles available; and facilities
afforded by stations in important centres as regards number and length
of platforms and sidings, water supply, loading, unloading or storage
accommodation, etc., are all carefully compiled and kept up to date.
As regards rolling stock, lines not likely to be called upon to carry
any military transports at all may still be able to contribute to the
supply of carriages and wagons wanted to meet the heavy demands on other
railways. By including all lines of railway in the collected data, it
will be known exactly where additional rolling stock may be obtained
if wanted. The carrying capacity of the different types of carriages,
trucks, etc., is also noted. If necessary, arrangements will be made for
the reduction of gradients, the improvement of curves, the construction
of connecting links between different main lines, the lengthening of
station platforms, or the provision of increased loading or unloading
facilities.

On the basis of the information collected elaborate calculations are
made in regard to such matters as (1) the number of vehicles required
for a given number of men, with horses, guns, munitions, stores, road
vehicles, etc., so that rolling stock can be used to the best advantage
and according as to whether the troops carried belong to the Infantry,
Cavalry or the Artillery; (2) the number of vehicles that can be made
up into a train going by any one route; (3) the length of time likely
to be taken for the entraining and detraining respectively of a given
unit; (4) the time intervals at which a succession of troop trains can
follow one another on the same line; (5) the speed of troop trains; and
(6) the further intervals to be allowed in the arrival at one and the
same station, or centre, of a number of trains starting from different
points, so as to avoid the risk of congestion and of consequent delays.

Military time-tables, corresponding to those in everyday use, have
next to be prepared, showing exactly what trains must run from given
stations, at fixed hours, by clearly defined routes, to specified
destinations as soon as the occasion arises. The great aim kept in view
in the compilation of these time-tables is, not alone preparation in
advance, but the most complete utilisation possible of the available
transport facilities of the country as a whole.

A selection must also be made in advance of the stations at which troops
on long journeys can obtain food, as well as of the stations to be used
as depôts for stores and supplies, all the necessary arrangements being
provided for.

After the initial great strain on the railway resources involved in
mobilisation and concentration, there will still be an enormous amount
of transport to be done during the campaign. In the one direction there
will be a constant despatch of reinforcements, provisions, clothing,
munitions and supplies or stores to the front; in the other direction
there will be a steady flow of sick and wounded, of prisoners of war,
and of materiel not wanted at the front, followed by the final return
home of the troops at the end of the campaign.

At each important point along the lines of communication where special
services in connection with the rail transport, in either direction, are
to be rendered, there must be organisation of such kind as will ensure
that whatever is necessary shall be done promptly and efficiently under
the control of persons of recognised authority and responsibility, and
without any of the friction that would, inevitably, lead to delays,
traffic blocks and other complications.

Nor can the same system of organisation apply to the whole line of
communication, from the base to the limit of the rail service at the
front. A point will be reached therein where the control, if not the
actual operation, of the railway lines must needs be transferred from
the civil to the military authorities, rendering necessary a scheme of
supervision and working different from that which can be followed on the
sections not within the actual theatre of war.

Then, if the army should be compelled to retreat before the enemy,
there should be available a sufficiency of forces skilled in the art of
rapidly and effectively destroying lines, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, or
other railway property, with a view to retarding the enemy's movements
until, it may be, reinforcements can be brought up in sufficient number
to check his further progress. If, alternatively, the army should
advance into the enemy's country, there must again be a provision of
Railway Troops fully qualified by previous training and experience both
to repair quickly the demolitions or the damage which the enemy will
have carried out on his own lines and to construct hastily such new
lines--light railways or otherwise--as the circumstances of the moment
require. These things done, and still further advance being made into
the invaded territory, the need will also arise for a staff capable of
operating, under war conditions, the lines of which possession has been
taken, in order that communications with the advanced front and the
forwarding of reinforcements and supplies can still be maintained.

All these and many other things, besides, must needs be thought out and
prepared for in time of peace, long in advance of any probable or even
any possible war. They are, in fact, made the subject of exhaustive and
continuous study alike by military officers specially entrusted with
the task and by railway managers commanding all the technical knowledge
requisite for making arrangements calculated to ensure the prompt and
efficient satisfaction of all such demands for military rail-transport
as may, with whatever urgency, and under whatever conditions, some day
be put forward.

Still more practical do the preparations in peace for war become when
they include the construction of a network of strategical railways
expressly designed to facilitate the mobilisation of troops, their
speedy concentration on the frontier, or their movement from one point
of attack to another at the theatre of war.

CHAPTER X

ORGANISATION IN GERMANY

In no country in the world was the desirability of preparing in time of
peace for military rail-transport in time of war recognised earlier than
in Germany. In none has the practice of such preparation in peace been
followed up with greater study and persistence.

As shown in Chapter I, the military use of railways led to the proposal
and discussion in Germany of definite schemes for such use as early as
1833; and it is not too much to say that, from that date down to the
outbreak of the World-War in 1914, the whole subject had received there
an ever-increasing degree of attention from the military authorities,
and, also, from a large body of writers as a question of the day in its
relation more especially to German expansion.

One great mistake, however, made alike by historians, by writers in the
Press, and by popular tradition, has been the attributing to Germany of
a far higher degree of credit in regard to the alleged perfection of
her preparations for the _Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71_ than she was
really entitled to claim. Nor, indeed, has the fact been sufficiently
recognised that the organisation eventually elaborated by Germany for
the efficient conduct of her rail-transport in war had been evolved
from studies, investigations, trials, experiments and tests (in actual
warfare or otherwise) extending over a period of half a century or more,
during which time, also, there was issued a bewildering mass of laws,
rules and regulations, each more or less modifying those that had gone
before and adding still further to the elaborate, if not the extremely
complicated, machinery laboriously built up as the result of the
universally recognised genius of the German people for organisation.

The final great test of all this machinery was to be applied in 1914.
Here, however, it must suffice, for present purposes, to show how the
machinery itself was created and the form it finally assumed.

Down to 1861 Prussia had done no more, in the way of organising military
transport by rail, than issue a series of Ordinances dealing with the
movement of large bodies of troops, such Ordinances being akin to those
which all the leading countries of Europe had either compiled or were
engaged in compiling. Directly influenced by the developments of the
Civil War in America, Prussia took the further step, in 1864, of forming
a Railway Section of her General Staff. This new body was actively
employed in the furtherance of Prussia's interests in the Danish War of
the same year, when confirmatory evidence was given of the advantages
to be derived from the use of rail transport for military movements,
journeys that would have taken the troops sixteen days by road being
done within six days by rail.

The organisation thus applied on a comparatively small scale in 1864 was
further developed by Prussia in the _campaign of 1866_.

On that occasion mobilisation and concentration of the Prussian troops
were both carried out mainly by rail, under the direction of an
Executive Commission consisting of an officer of the General Staff and
a representative of the Ministry of Commerce. This Executive Commission
sat in Berlin, and was assisted by Line Commissions operating on the
different railways utilised for military purposes. Movements of troops
by rail were certainly effected in one-third of the time they would have
taken by road, while the Prussians, gaining a great advantage, by the
rapidity of such movements, over Austria, routed her combined forces
within seven days of crossing the frontier, and dictated terms of peace
to her within a month.

Some serious faults were nevertheless developed, even in the course of
this very short campaign, in Prussia's rail-transport arrangements,
such being especially the case in regard to the forwarding of supplies.
These were rushed to the front in excess of immediate requirements, the
only concern of contractors or of officers at the base being to get them
away, while the railway companies--bound to accept goods for transport
and delivery as ordered--dispatched them without regard for any possible
deficiency in the unloading and storage arrangements at the other
end. The supplies, forwarded in bulk, followed as close up behind the
troops as they could be taken; but the provision made for unloading was
inadequate, the railway staffs disclaimed responsibility for the work,
and, before long, stations and sidings at the front were hopelessly
blocked, although elsewhere the shortage of wagons was so great that
everything was at a standstill. Even when wagons had been unloaded, they
were too often left on the lines, in long trains of empties, instead of
being sent where they were most needed. Each railway company disposed
of its own rolling stock independently of the other companies, adopting
the view that it had no concern with what was happening elsewhere. In
some instances special trains were dispatched for the conveyance of a
few hundred men or a few hundredweights of stores. Orders which should
have gone direct from one responsible person to another went through
a variety of channels with the result that serious delays and no less
serious blunders occurred. One East Prussian Battalion, for instance,
was sent off by train in a direction exactly opposite to that which it
should have taken.

All these and other troubles experienced were directly due to the
absence of a central controlling body formed on such a basis that
it could (1) govern the rail-transport arrangements as a whole;
(2) supervise the forwarding of supplies; (3) provide for a proper
distribution, and better utilisation, of rolling stock; (4) secure
the prompt unloading and return of wagons, and (5) form a direct link
between the military authorities and the railway managements and staffs.

Immediately on the close of the war a mixed committee of Staff officers
and railway authorities was appointed, under the supervision of von
Moltke, to inquire what steps should be taken to organise the Prussian
military transport services on such a basis as would avoid a repetition
of the faults already experienced, and give a greater guarantee of
efficiency on the occasion of the next war in which Prussia might be
engaged. The desirability of making such preparations in time of peace
doubtless appeared the greater in proportion as it became more and more
evident that the trial of strength between Prussia and Austria would
inevitably be followed by one between Prussia and France.

The scheme elaborated by the committee in question took the form of a
_Route Service Regulation_ which was approved by the King on May 2,
1867, and was, also, adopted by most of the other German States, but was
kept secret until the time came for applying it in practice, as was done
in the war of 1870-71.

The basis of the scheme was the creation of a system of _Route
Inspection_ ("Etappen Inspektion") constituting a department of the
General Staff, and designed--

I. To watch over the replenishing of the operating army with men,
horses, provisions, ammunition, and other military stores.

II. To see to the removal into the interior of the country of the sick
and wounded, prisoners and trophies of war.

III. With the assistance of the troops appointed for the purpose and
the Railway Field Corps, to maintain the line of communication, viz.,
railway, roads, bridges, telegraphs, and postal arrangements; to
undertake the government of the hostile conquered provinces, and other
duties.

The preparation of the necessary plans for the attainment of these
objects was entrusted to a _Central Commission_ composed, partly of
officers connected with the General Staff and the Ministry of War, and
partly of prominent functionaries on the staffs of the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry and Public Works (then in supreme control over the
railways), and of the Minister of the Interior. Two of its members--a
Staff Officer and a railway expert from the Ministry of Commerce--formed
an _Executive Commission_ and exercised a general supervision over the
arrangements for military transports; though on the removal of the
Great Head-quarters from Berlin, the Executive Commission was to be
succeeded by an _Auxiliary Executive Commission_, which would supervise
the railways in the interior to be made use of for supplying the needs
of the army.

In time of war the Central Commission was to be supplemented by _Line
Commissions_ formed by military officers and railway officers in
combination, and operating each in a leading centre of railway traffic.
Their function it would be--with the assistance of _District Line
Commissions_--not only to communicate to the line or lines of railway in
their district such orders as might be necessary for the transport of
troops, guns, ammunition, horses, and supplies, but, also, to draw up
or make the final arrangements in connection with the time-tables for
the running of military trains; to fix the direction in which the trains
would go; to decide at what stations the troops should stop for their
meals or for their coffee; and, in fact, to arrange everything connected
with the said transport down to--as it appeared at the time--the
smallest details.

In the forwarding of supplies, each Army Corps was to have its own line
of communication, separate and distinct from that of the other Army
Corps, the object aimed at being that of avoiding the confusion and
disorder which might result from the fact of several Army Corps using
the same railway.

Each of such lines of communication would start from some large railway
station forming a _Point of Concentration_ ("Etappenanfangsort") for the
collection and the dispatch therefrom of supplies for the Army Corps it
would serve, or for the receipt and further distribution in the interior
of persons or commodities coming back from the seat of war.

Along the line of railway, at distances of about 100 or 125 miles,
stations were to be selected which would serve as halting-places for the
feeding of troops, for the watering of horses, for the reception of sick
and wounded unable to continue their journey, for the repair of rolling
stock, or for other such purposes. The furthest point to be reached by
rail from day to day would constitute _Railhead_ ("Etappenhauptort"),
whence communication with the fighting line would be carried on by road,
being further facilitated by _Halting Places_ ("Etappenörter") _en
route_.

The whole of this elaborate organisation--and here we come to the
weakest point in the system--was to be under the supreme direction
and control of an _Inspector-General of Communications_--a sort of
Universal Provider of every requirement the Army could possibly need,
and responsible for the fulfilment of a long and exceedingly varied list
of obligations among which the conduct of military rail-transport became
simply one of many items. The special merit of his position was assumed
to be that of a superior authority who, having the rank of Commandant of
a Division, and being in constant touch both with the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army and with the War Minister, would be able to establish
harmony in the operations of the different services and corps. The
principle itself was sound; but, in practice, such a multiplicity of
duties fell upon him, or, through him, on his department, that the
break-down which actually occurred in the campaign of 1870-71 should
have been foreseen in advance.

On the declaration of war the Inspector-General was to organise the
stations for the feeding of the troops and horses proceeding to the
front, and was then himself to go to some station one or two marches
from the fighting-line, and fix, each day, the Railhead Station for the
time being, moving his own head-quarters as occasion might require.
From these head-quarters he was to exercise control and direction over
a staff among whose duties--apart from those relating to railways
or rail-transport--were the following:--A centralisation of all the
services through a Chief of the Staff giving a common impulse to them
according to the instructions of the Inspector-General; the forwarding
of all troops to the front, special precautions having to be taken
that none were left behind; distribution of the troops on arrival at
their destination; the forwarding of all supplies; decision of all
personal questions that might arise in connection with the troops;
the keeping of journals and registers, the drawing up of reports,
and the carrying on of correspondence with the War Minister and the
Chiefs of the army; everything concerned with horses for the troops,
transport and distribution of prisoners of war, and maintenance of good
order among the troops; assurance of an ample supply of ammunition
for the artillery; construction or provision of barracks, huts, or
temporary hospitals; maintenance of roads and telegraphs; control
of telegraphs and postal services at the seat of war; supervision
of road communications; responsibility for the safe and regular
delivery to the troops of all supplies and necessaries ordered to meet
their requirements, and establishment of hospitals, infirmaries and
convalescent homes, with the arrangements for the removal thereto of the
sick and wounded.

In regard to railway matters, the Inspector-General was assisted by a
_Director of Field Railways_ who, in turn, had many duties to perform.
Acting in the name and with the authority of the Inspector-General,
he gave directions to the Line Commissions concerning the succession
in which supplies were to be forwarded, and, in conjunction with
the military and railway authorities, drew up the time-tables for
military transports, submitting them, however, for the approval of
his chief before they were put into operation. The actual transport
of troops and material--on the basis of principles the details of
which would have been worked out in advance--was also to be conducted
under the supervision of the Director of Railways. In the event of
any of the lines being destroyed by the enemy, he was to undertake
their reconstruction, obtaining through the Inspector-General such
helpers--whether soldiers or civilians--as he might require to
supplement his own working staff in the accomplishment of the necessary
work. On the lines being restored, the Director was further to take
control of their operation by means of troops and, also, of railway
employés to be furnished by the Minister of Commerce on the requisition
of the Inspector-General of Communications.

Such was the elaborate machinery which, constructed alike in peace and
in secret by the Great General Staff, under the direct supervision of
von Moltke himself, was to be tested in the inevitable war with France
for which it had been designed.

According to popular belief, Germany's preparations for that war were
so complete that she had only, as it were, to press a button, or pull
a lever, in order to ensure the immediate and perfect working of all
the plans she had made in advance. Whether or not this was really so
in regard to her transport arrangements, at least, is a point to which
attention may now be directed.

At the beginning of the war a _Route Inspection_, organised on the basis
already detailed, and having its own Inspector-General of Communications
in charge of, and responsible for, the efficient working of the entire
network of duties and obligations, was called into being for each of the
three German armies. Subsequently a fourth, under the Crown Prince of
Saxony, was added.

So far as the mobilisation of the German troops and their concentration
on the frontier were concerned the plans worked, on the whole,
remarkably well; though even in this respect complete success was not
attained. There were, in 1870, nine lines of concentration available,
namely, six for the Northern and three for the Southern Army; and
between July 24 and August 3, there were dispatched by these different
routes 1,200 trains, conveying 350,000 men, 87,000 horses, and 8,400
guns or road vehicles. Yet the delays which occurred to some of these
trains were alone sufficient to show that the machinery which had been
elaborated was not working with perfect smoothness. On, for example, the
route known as line "C," the troops sent to Giessen were--as told by
Balck, in his "Taktik"--eleven hours late in their arrival. They then
had their first warm food after a journey which had lasted twenty-one
hours. For the transport to Homburg-in-der-Pfalz and Neunkirchen forty
hours had been allowed. The first train did the journey in the time, but
the next one took ninety hours.

It was, however, in the forwarding of supplies and in the provisioning
of the troops that the greatest difficulties were experienced; and here
there certainly appeared to be little real advance on the shortcomings
of the campaign of 1866, notwithstanding all the preparations which had
been made in the meantime.

Comprehensive as it undoubtedly was, the scheme prepared in time of
peace included no adequate organisation for regulating the transport of
supplies to the front and for ensuring alike their dispatch and their
arrival in just such quantities, and under just such conditions, as
would provide for the needs of the troops from day to day. Magazines
had certainly been set up, but not in sufficient number or always in
the right place. The system, too, of operating them was defective.
Just as in 1866, so in 1870, army officers, contractors and railway
companies, all inspired by zeal for the welfare of the troops, rushed
off train-load after train-load of supplies to stations provided
with an inadequate supply alike of sidings where the wagons could be
accommodated and of labour for the work of unloading. Stores were handed
to the railway staffs under the same conditions as in peace time, the
idea being, apparently, that if they were only dispatched as soon as
possible they would be sure to get to the troops in want of them.

As for the conditions at the other end, it not unfrequently happened
that even though the supply-trains might go to stations where the
facilities for unloading them were ample, the Commissariat or other
officers in charge would follow the example already being set in France
by regarding loaded railway trucks as convenient movable magazines
which should not be unloaded until their contents were really wanted.
This was done regardless of the fact alike that the trucks thus kept
standing on the lines impeded the traffic and that they were urgently
wanted to meet the shortage of trucks elsewhere. But for the stringent
action taken to check it, the evil due to this use of railway trucks for
storage purposes would have assumed even graver proportions than was
actually the case. Defective, also, as the German arrangements in this
respect undoubtedly were, they still did not attain to the same degree
of inefficiency as was the case in France.

All the same, the general result of these various conditions was that
serious difficulties were experienced on the German no less than on the
French railways. No sooner had the concentration of the Prussian troops
been completed than provisions and stores were sent after them in such
volume that a hopeless block, extending to Cologne in one direction and
Frankfort in the other, was speedily produced on the lines along the
left bank of the Rhine, while the feeding of the troops was brought to
a temporary standstill. The combined efforts of the Prussian Executive
Commission, of the Minister of Commerce and of the Line Commissions
failed for a time to overcome the conditions of chaos and confusion thus
brought about, and on August 11, 1870, instructions had to be given that
thenceforward supplies were to be forwarded only on the express order of
the Intendant-General or of an Inspector-General of Communications. Yet
on September 5 there were standing, on five different lines, a total of
no fewer than 2,322 loaded wagons, containing 16,830 tons of provisions
for the Second Army, or sufficient to keep it supplied for a period of
twenty-six days. Such blocks on the German lines--though not always on
so great a scale--were of frequent occurrence throughout the war.

Trouble arose, also, in getting provisions from the railway to the
troops by reason either of the inadequate number of road vehicles or
because of the use of these for the conveyance of ammunition or for
other purposes, instead. Thus the Inspector-General of the First Army
started with 2,000 road vehicles; but on October 17 the total number
still at his disposal was only twenty. The position became still worse
as the retreating French destroyed the lines behind them, increasing the
difficulties of the invaders in maintaining their communications with
the Fatherland.

While the food supplies for the German troops were thus blocking the
railway lines--or, alternatively, were going bad on account either
of the heated conditions of the closed wagons or of exposure to the
weather after unloading--many of the German troops were suffering severe
privations from lack of adequate nourishment; and they would have
suffered still more but for the provision-trains or stores of supplies
seized from the French at Metz, Forbach, Verdun, Dôle, Le Hans, and
elsewhere. If, indeed, the French had only refrained from rushing their
own supplies to the extreme front in excessive quantities, or if they
had destroyed those they could not remove in time, the invaders would,
on various occasions, have found themselves in a condition bordering on
starvation. Even as it was, they were often reduced to the necessity of
dependence on their "iron" rations.

Difficulty was especially experienced in feeding the army of occupation
during the investment of Paris. The supplies received by train from
Germany were equal to scarcely one half of the actual requirements;
a resort to "requisitions" on the French territory occupied yielded
inadequate results; and the making of a regular daily money-allowance
to officers and men, so that they could purchase their own supplies in
the open market or otherwise, was, at first, far from satisfactory. It
was, in fact, only owing to the most strenuous effort on the part of the
responsible officers, both during the investment of Paris and in earlier
phases of the war, that the German troops were often saved from actual
want.[21]

The main reasons for the defects and shortcomings thus developed in a
scheme on which so much care and preparation had been bestowed were
(1) that, while based on fundamentally sound principles, the scheme in
its actual application threw too great a strain on the department of
the Inspector-General of Communications, which, as we have seen, was
expected to look after, not only rail transport, but route marching,
telegraphs, postal arrangements, and a great variety of other things
besides; (2) that, owing to the larger number of Army Corps, it was no
longer possible, as had been done in 1866, to place a separate line of
railway at the disposal of each, so as to allow the said department to
superintend the traffic on the basis of its own organisation; and (3)
the absence of a central administration specially designed (_a_) to
act as an intermediary and to ensure co-operation and mutual working
between the various Line Commissions and, also, between the individuals
and administrations, both military and civil, engaged in the conduct of
rail-transport; and (_b_) to control the traffic as a whole, avoiding
difficulties, blocks and delays assuring a prompt and efficient
distribution of supplies, and guaranteeing the utilisation of rolling
stock to the best advantage.

With a view to overcoming, as far as possible, the trouble due to the
wide extent and the great variety of duties falling on the department
of the Inspector-General of Communications, it was arranged, during
the latter part of the war, to relieve that department of all
responsibility for the railway services and to transfer the control and
direction of these to the Executive Commission established at the Royal
Head-quarters. In this way it was hoped to utilise the rail-transport
facilities to greater advantage, to decrease the risk of collisions
and delays, and, through a central organisation, to distribute the
transport demands more equally among the various railways concerned.
By means of these provisional modifications in the original scheme a
better system of operation was obtained during the remainder of the
war. But the complete reorganisation that was really necessary was then
impracticable, and much friction in the working of the railway services
was still experienced, partly because this needful reorganisation could
not be carried out, and partly because of the conflicting orders coming
from different authorities, each of whom, under the conditions then
existing, was perfectly within his right in giving them.[22]

The difficulties due to the attempts to rush supplies in excessive
quantities direct to the fighting-line, or as near thereto as possible,
were also met, to a certain extent, during the course of the war, by
the setting up of additional railway magazines or depôts where the
forwarding of necessaries could be better controlled; but it was not
until the end of 1870 that any approach to regularity in supplying the
wants of the German forces was finally secured.

No sooner had the war come to an end than the work of remedying the
defects which had been developed was taken in hand by the Minister of
War and the Great General Staff. Following the creation, on October
1, 1871, of a Railway Battalion on a permanent basis came, on July
20, 1872, a new Regulation cancelling the one of May 2, 1867, which
had been in operation during the war, and substituting a new basis of
organisation in its place.

While retaining the principle of a Central Commission in Berlin, the
scheme of 1872 relieved the route authorities of all responsibility
for rail transport as well as for railway restoration and operation
at the theatre of war, transferring to a new military department all
the duties falling under these heads, with the further advantage
that such department would be able to control the railways in time
of war independently of the civil authorities, and without the
disadvantages hitherto resulting from the need to deal, in regard to
railway questions, with nine separate Ministries of Commerce and about
fifty different railway companies. At the same time the principle
of co-ordination was to be maintained by the appointment of an
_Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication_ who, in each
of these departments, would control a far more efficient organisation
than had previously existed, and, also, as director-in-chief, would
constitute a central authority and an intermediary between the services
concerned and the head of the Great General Staff, under whose direction
he would himself act.

Another important feature of the new Regulation was that a distinction
was now drawn between (1) railways on or near to the theatre of war
which could not be worked by their ordinary staffs, and must needs pass
under military operation, with a paramount military control; and (2)
"home" or other railways, in the rear of the fighting, which might
carry ordinary traffic--except so far as the lines were wanted for
military purposes--and might still be worked by their own staffs, but in
the operation of which there should be a military element in time of war
in order to facilitate the transport of troops and military necessaries.

Various other Regulations, and notably a series in 1878 and 1888,
followed that of 1872, and eventually the whole scheme of organisation,
with its additions and modifications, seeking to provide for every
possible contingency, became extremely complicated. Of the multifarious
instructions, provisions and orders which had been compiled, some
applied to peace only, some to war only, and some to both peace and war;
some to "home" railways and some to railways at the seat of war; some
to military men and some to railway men, and so on. As an elaborate
piece of machinery the organisation was more comprehensive and more
complete than ever; but the fear arose that there had again been a
failure to take the human element sufficiently into account. Of those in
the military and the railway service who should have applied themselves
in time of peace to a study of the elaborate and extremely involved
provisions which would apply in time of war, comparatively few, it was
found, were disposed to devote themselves to so uninviting a task.

So there was issued, on January 18, 1899, still another new Regulation
which repealed some of the earlier ones and aimed at amplifying,
condensing, rearranging and facilitating reference to the provisions
remaining in force, in order that the whole scheme should be made
clearer, simpler and easier to grasp. These results were fully attained,
and, though still subject to the final test of a great war, such as that
which broke out in 1914, the German Regulation of 1899 might certainly
be considered a masterpiece of organisation as prepared in time of
peace. One especially useful purpose it served was that of defining
clearly the duties, responsibilities, and spheres of action of all the
authorities, civil or military, concerned in the control and operation
of railways for military purposes.

The various Regulations here in question have been supplemented from
time to time by _Field Service Regulations_, the first series of which,
issued under date May 23, 1887, was designed to take the place of the
Ordinances of 1861 relating to the movement by rail of great bodies of
troops. These Field Service Regulations of 1887 constituted an epoch
in the military history of Germany. They were regarded at the time as
offering a resumé of the most advanced ideas of Moltke, if not, also,
as the crowning glory of military organisation in the reign of William
I; and they certainly exercised a powerful influence on German military
literature. They were, further, the starting-point of a prolonged
series of similar Regulations, all amending, modifying, adding to, or
abbreviating their predecessors. These changes led to the issue, on
January 1, 1900, of a new edition, based on the exhaustive studies of a
Commission of fourteen members; and still later revisions resulted in
the publication of a further series on March 22, 1908.[23]

Here, then, we get still further evidence of the keenness with which
Germany has followed up, in times of peace, her preparations for war,
while the Field Service Regulations, no less than the other Regulations
already detailed, show the important place that military rail-transport
holds in the view of those responsible in Germany for the making of
these arrangements. "Railways," it is declared in the Regulations of
1908, "exercise a decisive influence on the whole conduct of a war. They
are of the greatest importance for mobilising and concentrating the
army, and for maintaining it in a state of efficiency, and they enable
portions of it to be transported from one place to another during the
operations." What the Field Service Regulations do is to present in
concentrated and compact form the working details, in respect to field
service requirements, of those other and fuller Regulations which cover
the whole ground of military transport in general.

Taking these various sources of information, the nature of the
organisation that Germany has thus effected as the result of so many
years of study and experience may be summarised as follows:--

In time of peace the authorities entrusted with the task of ensuring,
by their preparations in advance, the success of the whole system of
military rail-transport include (1) the Minister of War; the Prussian
Chief of the General Staff of the Army; the members of the Railway
Section of the Great General Staff, the Line Commissions and the
Station Commissions; authorities concerned in the forwarding, transport
and receiving of supplies, and representatives of the Commissariat
department; and (2) the Imperial Chancellor, the Imperial Railway
Bureau, the Imperial Administration of Posts and Telegraphs, and the
various railway administrations.

The _Prussian Minister of War_ is the chief representative of the
interests of the Army in all questions relating to the military use of
the railways.

The _Prussian Chief of the General Staff_ of the Army has under his
orders, in time of peace, the military authorities concerned in
rail-transport, and gives them the necessary instructions. He keeps
in close relations with the Imperial Railway Bureau, and serves as
intermediary between that Bureau and the Prussian Minister of War. It is
he who gives the directions according to which the use of the railways
in war-time is regulated, and he prescribes all the preparations
that are to be made in advance for the facilitating of such use. On
mobilisation, he discharges all the duties appertaining to the office
of the Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication until
that officer has himself taken them in hand. From that time he issues
instructions according to circumstances.

The _Railway Section of the Great General Staff_ is required, among
other duties, to collect, and have always available, the fullest and
most complete information as to the powers and facilities of the
railways for the transport of troops, etc. To this end it keeps in
constant communication with the railway administrations, and, also,
with the Imperial Railway Bureau (which centralises all questions
affecting railway administration), completing, if necessary, through
investigations made by its own officers, the information furnished
annually by the Bureau. The Railway Section further takes charge
of a wide range of details and preparations concerning military
rail-transport in war-time.

On the outbreak of hostilities there is appointed for each theatre of
war an _Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication_ who,
receiving his orders from the Chief of the General Staff, co-ordinates
the two groups of services, and ensures harmony in their joint
working. For the operation of the railways, as applied to military
purposes, there is a _Director of Field Railways_ who, acting under the
Inspector-General, controls the whole railway service. Through the Line
Commissions or Commandants subordinate to him he conveys to the railway
authorities the necessary demands or instructions in respect to military
transport, and, in concert with his superior officers, he fixes the
boundary between the lines to be operated on a peace footing and those
that are to be subject to military working. In the discharge of these
and other duties he is assisted by a staff composed partly of military
men and partly of railwaymen. Each officer concerned in the transport
arrangements has a recognised deputy who can act for him in case of need.

Of _Line Commissions_, placed in charge, for military purposes,
over the lines of railway in certain districts, and becoming _Line
Commandants_ on the outbreak of war, there were twenty under the revised
Regulation of 1899, the number being increased in 1904 to twenty-one.
The headquarters of these Commissions are at such centres of traffic as
Berlin, Hanover, Erfurt, Dresden, Cologne, Altona, Breslau, etc. They
serve as intermediaries between the higher military authorities and
the railway administrations with which they are associated. Each Line
Commission consists, normally, of a staff officer of the active army and
a prominent railway functionary, the former having a non-commissioned
officer, and the latter a railway official, as secretary, with such
further assistance as may be needed.

Subordinate, in turn, to the Line Commissions are the _Station
Commissions_, which, receiving instructions from the former, see to the
carrying out of the necessary transport requirements either at their
particular station or on the section of line of which they are placed in
charge.

While full provision is thus made for the representation of the military
element in the conduct of rail-transport in time of war, with a view
to ensuring its efficiency, precautions are no less taken to avoid
repetitions of earlier troubles due to questions of responsibility and
control, and, more especially, to the interference of military officers
in the technical operation of the railway lines. On this subject the
Field Service Regulations of 1900 stated (paragraph 496):--

Railways can only fully accomplish their important and
difficult task during war if no serious hindrances to their
management are created by the conduct of the troops.

In the later Regulations of 1908 it was said (paragraph 527):--

The important rôle which railways have to fulfil renders it
incumbent on every commander to do all in his power to prevent
any interference with the traffic due to delay, etc., on the
part of the troops. The railway staff and conducting officers
are bound by the transport arrangements made by the railway
authorities.

The conducting officer is responsible for the administration
of the detachment of troops or consignment of stores under his
charge. It is his duty, as regards himself and his charge, to
obey the instructions of the railway officials.

Any interference with the service of the railways is
forbidden.

At important stations Railway Staff Officers are appointed
who act as intermediaries between the conducting officers and
the railway officials.

Concerning _Lines of Communication_ the Field Service Regulations of
1908 say:--

A railway station, to serve as a Home Base
("Etappenanfangsort") will be assigned to every Army Corps. From
these home bases supplies are sent forward to Collecting Depôts
("Sammelstationen"), which will be established at not too great
a distance from the theatre of war.

In the theatre of war a base will be assigned to each Army,
the situation of which will change according to the progress
of the operations. The Army Corps are connected with the Field
Base by lines of communication roads ("Etappenstrassen"), and on
these roads posts are formed about 13½ miles apart.

As for the mass of working details also included in the various
Regulations, these may well appear to provide in advance for every
possible requirement in regard to military transport by rail, from
the movement of entire armies down to the supply of drinking water at
stations and the taking of carrier pigeons in the troop trains.

FOOTNOTES:

[21] In "Der Kriegs-Train des deutschen Heeres," by E. Schäffer,
(Berlin, 1883), the author, dealing with the subject of transport
in the war of 1870-71, and its effect on the feeding of the German
Army, says of the situation in August-September, 1870: "Immerhin
wurden den Truppen damals nicht unerhebliche Entbehrungen auferlegt";
while concerning the position of the army of occupation in France he
writes: "Immerhin erforderte es umfassender Massregeln seitens der
Intendantur, die Truppen vor wirklichem Mangel zu schützen, namentlich
da die Requisitionen wenig ergiebig ausfielen, und anfänglich auch der
freihändige Ankauf keinen rechten Erfolg hatte."

[22] "Revue militaire de l'Étranger," 27 Novembre, 1872.

[23] "Field Service Regulations (Felddienst Ordnung, 1908) of the German
Army." Translated by the General Staff, War Office. London, 1908.

CHAPTER XI

RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY

The innovation introduced into modern warfare by the Federal Government
of the United States, in the organisation on a comprehensive scale of a
Construction Corps for the combined purposes of repairing, destroying
and operating the railways on which so much might depend in the conduct
of war, attracted great attention in Europe, and more especially so in
Germany, which was the first country on this side of the Atlantic to
follow the American precedent, since adopted more or less completely by
all nations possessed alike of railways and a standing army.

Down to the time of the War of Secession the need for such a corps
had not been realised in Europe; but the advantages which might be
gained therefrom had been shown in so unmistakable a form that when,
in 1866, there was the certainty of an early conflict between Prussia
and Austria, one of the first steps taken by the former country was to
provide, under a decree of May 6, 1866, for a _Field Railway Section_,
("Feldeisenbahnabteilung,") to be formed, and designed to operate,
on a basis closely approximating to that which had applied to the
corresponding American corps. The special purposes to be served were
defined as those of rapidly repairing lines of railway destroyed by
the enemy and of destroying railways it might be thought expedient to
prevent the enemy from using. The section was to be under the orders
of the General Staff either of the Army or of an Army Corps. It was,
however, not to come into being until its services were really required,
and it was then to act for the duration of the war only.

On the outbreak of hostilities three divisions of the corps were
mobilised, under Cabinet Orders of May 25 and June 1, one division
being allotted to each of the three Prussian armies operating in
different parts of the theatre of war. The composition of the corps was
partly military and partly civil. The military element was supplied by
officers of the Engineers (one of whom acted as chief), non-commissioned
officers, and a detachment of Pioneers, the last-mentioned being either
carpenters or smiths. The civil element comprised railway engineers,
thoroughly acquainted with the construction and repair of permanent
way, bridges, etc.; assistant railway engineers, performing the duties
of clerks of the works; head platelayers, foremen, locomotive drivers,
machinists (for the repair of engines, rolling-stock, water pumps
and water tanks), and others. The members of the civil section were
chosen from the staff of the Prussian State railways by the Minister of
Commerce, their services being placed by him at the disposal of the War
Minister. Each of the three divisions constituted a complete unit.

On the side of the Austrians there was at that time no similar force
available. Three years before there had been published in Vienna
a book, by Oberst. von Panz, entitled "Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom
militärischen Standpuncte," in which the author expressed the view that
details on the following points, among others, concerning railways
should be collected in time of peace and classified for reference
in case of need:--Permanent way: system and construction; gauge and
number of lines; whether lines single or double. Stations: size and
construction; which of them best fitted to serve as depôts. Bridges:
underground works, etc.; which of these could be the most easily
destroyed, or soonest repaired if destroyed, and if prepared beforehand
for destruction. Embankments: size; how made; slope; if provided
with culverts and size of these. Cuttings: length and depth; slopes;
nature of ground; whether much or little water, and whether danger of
landslips. Tunnels: dimensions and construction; if lined or cut in
rock; nature of cuttings at end and whether they can be blocked. Large
bridges and viaducts: system of construction; span of arches; whether or
not the piers are mined.[24] Where men, tools, stores and materials can
be obtained, and to what extent.

These recommendations attracted much attention at the time. They
were quoted by H. L. Westphalen in his book on "Die Kriegführung
unter Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Leipzig, 1868), of which a French
translation was published under the title of "De l'Emploi des Chemins
de Fer en Temps de Guerre" (Paris, 1869); yet when, just before the
outbreak of war with Prussia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian
Northern Army recommended that a Construction Corps should be formed,
the Minister of War replied that "the repair of railways was work which
should be done by the railway companies concerned."

All the same, the retarding of the Prussian advance by interrupting
the rail communications became an important phase of Austrian tactics
and was followed up with great activity. Bridges and viaducts were
destroyed, rails torn up, sleepers burned, points and turntables carried
away, tunnels obstructed and water cranes and pumps rendered useless.
At one place (between Libenau and Sichrau), where the railway passed
through a deep cutting, the explosion of mines along the top of each
bank detached great masses of rock which, falling on the lines, filled
up the cutting to a height of six or eight feet for a distance of about
250 ft., and could not be removed until, by means of blasting, they had
been broken up into pieces sufficiently small to be carried away in
ballast trucks.

The arrangements made by the Prussians were, however, so complete as to
permit, in most instances, of a speedy restoration. Even in the instance
just mentioned, fifty Pioneers, aided by twenty labourers, had the line
clear for traffic again before midnight of the day the destruction was
caused.

Each division of the Construction Corps had at its disposal two
locomotives and thirty closed wagons or open trucks, provision thus
being made for the transport of, among other things, six light covered
carts (for use on the roads in the country to be invaded, horses being
requisitioned therein as necessary); tools; supplies of blasting powder
or gun-cotton; and rails, sleepers, bolts, etc., for 250 yards of
railway, reserve materials for a further quarter of a mile of track
being left at intermediate depôts, supplemented by an unlimited supply
at the base of operations. The construction trains also carried timber,
ropes, nails, scaffolding, clamps, etc., for the prompt repair of
small bridges. Materials for larger bridges or viaducts were stored at
convenient centres.

How the reconnaissance of a line which might have been subjected to the
enemy's destructive tactics was carried out is thus told by Captain C.
E. Webber, R.E., in his "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866":--

The reconnaissance starts with, and, until interrupted,
keeps up with, the advance guard, the movement being covered by
cavalry scouts on each side of the line.

The greater portion of the train in charge of the
department, with one engine in front and another behind,
advances slowly, preceded at a distance of about 500 paces by a
trolley carrying one of the officers, four men to work it, and
a bugler. On arriving at any obstruction the trolley signals
to the train by bugle and extra caution is used in advancing
towards it. If in presence of the enemy, the scouts give warning
to the officer in the trolley, who returns to the train and the
whole retires. The second engine can be detached from the rear
to send messages or bring up fresh supplies.

But for the successes already gained in the same direction by the
Federals in the United States, the speed with which repairs were
carried out by the Prussian Construction Corps--then so recently
organised--would have been regarded as remarkable. In various instances
communication was restored within from one and a half to three days
after the destruction even of important bridges.

As it happened, however, whilst the Austrians had shown an excess of
zeal in some directions by destroying bridges when the tearing up
of the rails would have answered the same purpose, the hesitation
of the responsible Austrian officer to fire the mines which had
already been laid to the bridge over the Elbe at Lobkowitz was of
great advantage to the Prussians, leaving them the use of the line
from Turnau to Prague, Pardubitz and Brünn between July 18 and July
27, on which latter date the bridge was at last destroyed by order
of the governor of Theresienstadt. This particular bridge was one of
exceptional strategical importance, and, according to Captain Webber,
the construction even of a temporary substitute--had the Austrians blown
up the bridge before the Prussians could cross it--would have taken no
less than six weeks. The omission, also, of the Austrians to remove or
to destroy the railway rolling stock they left behind at Prague, on
their retirement from that city, conferred a further benefit on the
Prussians. These examples would seem to show that promptness in carrying
out destruction at a critical moment may be no less important on the one
side than efficient organisation on the other for accomplishing the work
of restoration in the shortest possible time.

While the Construction Corps had thus fully justified its existence,
the sudden creation of such a corps for the purposes of a particular
war, and for the period of the war only, was considered inadequate for
a country where a large standing Army had to be maintained in readiness
for action at any moment, in case of need. Hence it was thought
desirable that Prussia should have a Field Railway Section established
on a permanent and well-organised footing. There was the further
reason for adopting this course because the Pioneers, composed almost
exclusively of reservists, had received no special training in railway
work, while the railway men themselves, accustomed to building lines in
a solid way for public use, were at a disadvantage when called on to
carry out, with great rapidity, and in a rough and ready manner, work
that was wanted only to serve the temporary purposes of the Army with
which they were associated.

It was found, also, that the corps, comprising so large a civil element,
had escaped the supervision and control of the Executive Commission
at Berlin which had for its function the regulation of all matters
concerning military rail-transport. Nor did the Construction _and_
Destruction Corps constitute, as well, an Operation Corps, providing
for the working of railways at the theatre of war, and especially of
railways taken from the enemy. The Prussians had, indeed, been able to
command the services of Austrian railwaymen in working the railways
seized in that country; but there was no certainty that the adoption of
a like expedient would be possible in any future war.

By this time the whole subject of the destruction and restoration of
railway lines as an important element in modern warfare was attracting
attention among military authorities and writers in Germany. A
translation of McCallum's report was published, and the issue was begun
of what was to develop into a long series of technical papers, pamphlets
or books--such as, for example, Wilhelm Basson's "Die Eisenbahnen
im Kriege, nach den Erfahrungen des letzten Feldzuges" (Ratibor,
1867)--dealing with the art of rapidly destroying and restoring railways
in time of war and the most effective measures to be adopted in the
attainment of either end.

These various considerations and developments were, no doubt, the reason
for the issuing, on August 10, 1869, of a Prussian Royal Decree which
created a permanent cadre of _Railway Troops_ to be constituted of
Pioneers who were to undergo regular instruction in everything relating
to the construction, destruction and operation of railways. A new
Battalion of Pioneers was to be raised for the purpose, and the whole
scheme was to be carried into effect in the course of 1871.

When, in 1870, the war with France broke out, the preparations for
the creation of this permanent corps were still proceeding; but the
Prussians were, nevertheless, able to enter on the campaign with four
sections of Railway Troops, subsequently increased to six, including one
Bavarian section. Each section comprised Engineers, Pioneers, railwaymen
and auxiliary helpers, all of whom wore a uniform having the letter "E"
("Eisenbahntruppen") on the shoulder, and carried rifles. Prussia, in
fact, once more started, as in 1866, with such advantage over her enemy
as might result from her control of a Railway Construction Corps. At the
outset France had no similar body, and though, during the progress of
the war, she hurriedly set about the creation of a Construction Corps
of her own, that corps did not do very much beyond collecting at Metz
and Strasburg a great store of railway materials which was afterwards
to fall into the hands of the Prussians, and assist them in their own
operations.

Notwithstanding the advantage thus gained, the practical benefits
secured by the Germans, although important in their effect on the
final issue, were far from being as great as the Army leaders may have
anticipated or desired. The destruction work carried out by the French
on their own railways, on their retirement, was much more serious
than anything experienced in the Prussian campaign in Austria. Thus
the works for the re-establishment of the Paris-Strasburg line (of
primary importance to the Germans for the siege of Paris) extended
from September 17 to November 22. The French had blocked the tunnel
of Nanteuil by the explosion therein of six mines which brought down
the walls and filled the western end of the tunnel with about 4,000
square yards of sand. Attempts to clear away the obstruction were a
failure, owing to the occurrence of fresh slips due to the wet weather,
and eventually the Construction Corps built a loop line which avoided
the tunnel, and so restored communication. The defence of some of the
principal lines by fortresses also contributed to the difficulties of
the invaders; though, on the other hand, these difficulties would have
been greater still if the French had always adopted the best and most
scientific methods of interrupting rail communications, as, presumably,
they would have done if they had had the advantage of a well-organised
corps prepared in advance for the work that required to be done.

At Fontenoy-sur-Moselle, between Nancy and Toul, there was, for example,
a bridge of seven arches, effective destruction of which would have made
a very serious check in the communications along the principal line
between Germany and Paris; but, instead of blowing up the bridge in the
middle, the men entrusted with the work (in January, 1871) brought down
two arches at the side of the bridge, causing a break which the Germans
were able to fill in with stones and earth, restoring communication
in about seventeen days. Then, although several of the tunnels in the
Vosges mountains were mined, the mines had not been charged, and before
instructions to blow up the tunnels had been received by those awaiting
them, the Germans were on the spot and took possession.

On the other hand the absence on the side of the French of an organised
corps for destruction as well as construction did not prevent the
carrying out of some very bold and highly successful work by parties of
_franc tireurs_, who showed alike their appreciation of the importance
of rail communications and their skill in impeding them.

One especially striking feat in this direction was accomplished by a
company known as the "Franc Tireurs of the Meuse."

Learning that a Prussian troop train was to pass through Lanois (on
the line between Reims and Mons) on October 26, 1870, they resolved to
effect its destruction. How they operated is told by Lieutenant Fraser,
R. E.,[25] who arrived on the spot shortly afterwards, and heard the
story from some of the men engaged on the work.

Any obstruction placed on the line would have been seen. Hence a
different course had to be adopted. Selecting a spot where the line ran
along a 12-ft. high embankment, to which a well-wooded slope came down
on one side, the _franc tireurs_ took up a pair of rails, removed the
sleepers, cut a deep trench across the line, laid some pieces of iron
at the bottom of the trench, placed on the iron a box containing thirty
kilos (2 qrs. 10 lbs.) of powder, and fixed into the lid of the box a
French field shell in such a way that, when the rail was replaced over
the box, the head of the fuse would be just below the lower flange of
the rail. In restoring the line again in order that there should be
nothing to attract attention, the _franc tireurs_ omitted one sleeper so
that the weight of the locomotive should in passing press the rail down
on to the head of the fuse. The party--some seventy-five strong--then
withdrew to the shelter of the woods to await developments.

In due time the train of forty coaches approached at the ordinary speed,
the driver not suspecting any danger. When the engine reached the spot
where the "torpedo" had been placed, an explosion occurred which tore
up a mass of earth, rails and sleepers, threw the engine and several
carriages down the embankment, and wrecked the train. Those of the
Prussian troops who got clear from the wreckage were shot down by the
_franc tireurs_ under the protection of their cover. The number of the
enemy thus disposed of was said to be about 400.

Altogether the French, in their efforts to impede the rail movements of
the invader, destroyed many miles of line, together with no fewer than
seventy-eight large bridges and tunnels, apart from minor interruptions.
The repairs and reconstruction thus rendered necessary threw a great
amount of labour on the Prussian Railway Troops, and much trouble arose
from time to time on account, not only of the inadequate supply of
materials even for temporary constructions, but, also, by reason of the
shortcomings of the workers themselves. The sections of Railway Troops
had been so recently formed that the men were still without adequate
training. In 1870-71, as in 1866, military members and civilian members
of the Construction Corps were alike unfamiliar with the special class
of work called for in the repair or the rebuilding of railways under the
emergency conditions of actual warfare. This instruction had, in fact,
to be completed at the theatre of war at a time when the Corps should
have been prepared to show the greatest efficiency.

Difficulties arose, also, on the side of the Germans in operating the
2,500 miles of French railway lines of which they took possession.

There was, in the first place, a deficiency both of locomotives and of
rolling stock. So far as circumstances would permit, the French, as
they retreated, either took their railway rolling stock with them or
destroyed it, in order that it should not be used by the enemy. Attempts
were made to meet the difficulty by obtaining constant reinforcements
of engines and wagons from Germany; but even then the organisation for
controlling the use of rolling stock, among other transport details, was
still so defective that commanders who wanted to ensure the movement of
their own troops by rail did not hesitate to take possession of engines
and carriages set aside for the regular services of the line. There
were, in fact, occasions when, for this reason, the regular services had
to be stopped altogether.

In the next place troubles with the _personnel_ were no less acute
than those with the _matériel_. In proportion as the Germans advanced
towards Paris the bulk of the French population retired, while threats
and offers of liberal pay alike failed to secure from those who remained
assistance either in repairing or in operating the lines of which the
invaders had taken possession. In these circumstances not only engines,
carriages and wagons, but no fewer than 3,500 railwaymen--in addition
to the German Railway Troops already in France--had to be brought
from Germany. Yet even the resort to this expedient started a fresh
lot of troubles. The railwaymen so imported had been in the service
of different German railway companies whose equipment and methods of
operation varied considerably; so that when the men were required to
work together--and that, also, on the lines of a foreign country, with
the accompaniment of much laxity in discipline as well as of much mutual
misunderstanding--a vast amount of friction arose.

All these experiences emphasised and strengthened the conclusion arrived
at even before the campaign of 1870-71--that the real efficiency of
Railway Troops can only be obtained by organising them in time of
peace in readiness for times of war. Such conclusion being now beyond
all possible dispute, action was taken by Prussia with characteristic
promptness.

In accordance with a Royal Order of May 19, 1871, there was added to the
Prussian Army, on October 1 of the same year, a _Railway Battalion_
("Eisenbahnbataillon"), the special purposes of which were (1) to afford
to those constituting it the means of obtaining, in time of peace,
such technical training as would enable them to construct any railway
works necessary in time of war, to repair promptly any damage done to
railways, and to undertake the entire railway traffic along lines of
communication; (2) to procure, or prepare, in time of peace, all plant,
materials, tools, etc., likely to be required in time of war; and (3)
to constitute the nucleus of all necessary railway formations in war.
The Battalion was formed of non-commissioned officers and men of the now
disbanded sections of Railway Troops who were still liable to military
service, supplemented by three-year volunteers and recruits from all
parts of the territory subject to the Prussian Minister of War, only
those being accepted, however, whose previous occupations fitted them
for one or other of the various grades of railway work. The officers
were obtained mainly, though not exclusively, from the Engineers.
Members of that corps, together with others who were mechanical
engineers by profession, were accepted as one-year volunteers.

On a peace footing the Battalion was composed of a Staff and four
Companies, each of 100 or 125 men, with a depôt, and provided with its
own means of transport. One of the Companies consisted exclusively
of platelayers and watchmen. On mobilisation each Company was to be
enlarged into two Construction Companies and one Traffic Company, giving
a total, on a war footing, of eight Construction and four Traffic
Companies. The Corps also had a reserve division consisting of a Staff,
two Companies and a section of railway employés. All officers having
railway experience who had served in the war of 1870-71 were included in
the reserve.

The training of the Battalion was under the direction of the
Inspector-General of the Engineers Corps. It comprised (1) theoretical
and scientific instruction of the officers in all branches of railway
construction, repair and destruction, coupled with the study of every
branch of railway science likely to be of advantage in military
transport, while special importance was attached to a close and
constant intercourse with the staffs of the various railways, and
(2) practical experience of railway construction and operation. This
experience was afforded (_a_) on the Battalion's practice grounds, where
instruction was more especially given in the art of rapidly destroying
railway track; (_b_) through the employment of the men--subject to
the continued maintenance among them of the principle of a military
organisation--on many of the private as well as on the State railways
in Germany, such employment including the repair of bridges, the
laying of track, the enlargement of stations, etc., and (_c_) by the
construction, operation and management of a short line of railway which,
on completion, was devoted to the public service. The period of training
was for either one or three years and the Battalion was kept up to a
normal standard of about 500 men by a succession of recruits. These
recruits were generally men of a good type, admission to the Battalion
being regarded with the greater favour inasmuch as the experience gained
was found to be of advantage to the men in obtaining railway employment
on their return to civil life.

In the giving of this practical instruction the purpose specially
kept in view was that of anticipating as far as possible actual war
conditions, and providing for them accordingly. Thus in the laying of
rails for any new line built by the Railway Troops great importance was
attached to the speed with which the work could be done, the records of
the time taken being very closely watched.

To one group of officers was allocated the duty of studying all
developments in railway science and operation at home or abroad and
conveying information thereon to those under instruction. A further
important feature of the scheme included the publication of a series of
textbooks on railway subjects regarded from a military standpoint. A
beginning was also made with the collection of large supplies of rails,
bridge materials, etc., for use as required.

In December, 1872, Bavaria created a similar Battalion, comprising a
single Company attached to the 1st Bavarian Corps. The constitution
and the operations of this Battalion followed closely the precedents
established by Prussia.

Such was the importance attached by the highest military authorities in
Germany to the formation of these Railway Troops that the Chief of the
Great General Staff was their Inspector-General from the time of the
first Prussian Battalion being created down to the year 1899.

In December 30, 1875, came the conversion of the Railway Battalion into
a _Railway Regiment_. It was felt that the cadres of the former did
not respond sufficiently to the needs of the military rail-transport
situation, and they were accordingly enlarged into a Regiment of two
Battalions, with a regimental Staff of forty-eight, and 502 men in
each Battalion. In 1887 the Prussian Regiment was increased from two
Battalions to four, and the Bavarian Battalion expanded to the extent
of two companies in place of one. In 1890 the Prussian Regiment further
became a _Brigade_ of two Regiments, each of two Battalions, the number
of units thus remaining the same as before; though in 1893 the Prussian
Brigade was augmented by two more Battalions, increasing its force to
three Regiments, each of two Battalions with four Companies in each
Battalion, or a total of twenty-four Companies, of which one was a
Würtemberg Company and two were Saxon Companies, while the Bavarian
Battalion acquired three Companies in the place of two.

In 1899 Prussia took a further new departure by grouping together, as
_Communication Troops_ ("Verkerstrüppen"), all the technical units
concerned in the railway, the telegraphic and the air-craft services.
This new arm was put under the control of an officer holding the rank
of a General of Division and receiving his orders direct from the
Emperor. A change was also effected in regard to the Berlin-Juterbog
railway--a single-track line, 70 km. (44 miles) in length, which,
originally constructed mainly by the Railway Troops, was operated by
them as a means of acquiring experience in railway working. Prior to
the passing of the law of March 25, 1899, troops for the working staff
were supplied by the Brigade, and the frequent changes were a cause of
some inconvenience. Under the new law a section constituted of three
Prussian Companies and a Saxon detachment, with a Lieutenant-Colonel as
director, was specially created for the operation of the line.

Altogether the Railway Troops comprised a total of thirty-one Companies,
having 180 officers and 4,500 non-commissioned officers and men; but
these figures were irrespective of carefully-compiled lists (subjected
to frequent revision) of all reservists possessing railway experience
and still liable for military service. Brigade, Battalions and Companies
thus formed only the cadres of a small army of men considered qualified
to undertake railway work of one kind or another in time of war.

Even in Germany itself the need for having so large a body of Railway
Troops was called into question some years ago, on the ground, partly,
that it was desirable to keep to the lowest practicable minimum the
number of non-combatants closely associated with the Army; and,
partly, because of the view--favoured by Von der Goltz, in his
"Kriegführung"--that much of the construction work which the Railway
Troops would carry out might be left to contractors, without hampering
the Army with further bodies of new troops for special purposes.

To these suggestions it was replied, in effect, (1) that in any future
war the movement of large bodies of troops would be directly associated
with the provision and the maintenance of adequate railway facilities;
(2) that Railway Troops, constituted in time of peace, would alone
be capable of ensuring the rapid renovation of damaged lines, or the
construction of new ones, in time of war; (3) that works of this kind,
done under great pressure, and serving temporary purposes only, would
differ essentially from railway works undertaken in peace by ordinary
contractors; and (4) that Germany required a large body of Railway
Troops on account of her geographical position, inasmuch as she might
have to face an enemy on either, or both, of two fronts--France and
Russia; while if, in the event of a war with Russia, she should want to
send her forces into that country by rail, she would require to have
a large body of Railway Troops available either for the conversion of
the Russian 5 ft. gauge into the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the German lines
(in order that the engines and rolling stock of the latter could be
utilised on Russian territory), or for the construction of special
military railways as substitutes for the Russian lines.

Whatever the merits of these respective arguments, the fact remains
that the Railway Troops of Germany, created under the circumstances and
conditions here detailed, have been maintained in steadily increasing
numbers, and, also, in constantly expanding efficiency thanks to what
is, in effect, their School of Railway Instruction and to the great
amount of practical work they have been called upon to do, whether in
the building of strategical lines or in other departments of railway
construction, destruction or working in which they could gain experience
likely to be of advantage in time of war.

There was, also, according to M. Paul Lanoir, as related by him in his
book on "The German Spy System," a still further purpose that these Army
railwaymen might be called on to serve. He tells how in 1880, the chief
of the system, the notorious Stieber, conceived the idea of securing the
appointment in every portion of the national railway system of France
(and more especially at important junctions or strategical centres) of
German spies who, competent to act as railway workers, would, in the
event of any future war between Germany and France, and on receiving
the necessary instructions, destroy or block the railway lines at those
points in such a manner--as planned, of course, in advance--that great
delay would occur in the mobilisation of the French troops owing to
the traffic being paralysed for the time being; the Germans, in the
meantime, rushing their own forces to the frontier. "The extremely
important rôle which would devolve on our railwaymen," adds M. Lanoir,
"at the moment of the declaration of war, in fulfilling their functions
as indispensable auxiliaries to the combatant army, was already
thoroughly appreciated at this period."

Submitted to Prince Bismarck, Stieber's scheme was approved by him,
and, so far as the obtaining of appointments on the French railways
by Stieber's agents was concerned, the plan had been quietly carried
into effect by the end of 1883; but a casual incident then led to the
discovery of the conspiracy by M. Lanoir himself. Within a week, as the
result of his communications with General Campenau, Minister of War,
the railway companies received a confidential circular requiring that
they should call upon every foreigner employed by them in any capacity
whatever to become naturalised without delay. Those who would not adopt
this course were to be immediately dismissed. The number of foreigners
then in the employ of the railway companies was 1,641, and, although
1,459 of them agreed to become naturalised, there were 182 Germans who
refused so to do. These 182 were at once discharged--the assumption
being that they were the spies, qualified to act as railway workers, by
whom the dislocation of traffic was to have been ensured whenever they
might receive word to that effect.

FOOTNOTES:

[24] Captain A. de Formanoir states in his book, "Des Chemins de Fer en
Temps de Guerre" (Conférences militaires belges. Bruxelles, 1870), that
in France and Austria all the railway bridges have mine-chambers so that
they can be readily destroyed when the occasion arises.

[25] "Account of a Torpedo used for the Destruction of a Railway Train
on the 26th of October, 1870." By Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the
Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 1872.

CHAPTER XII

FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71

When France went to war with Germany in 1870-71, her military
rail-transport was still governed by regulations which, adopted as far
back as 1851 and 1855, related only to such matters of detail as the
financial arrangements between the Army and the railway companies,
the length of troop trains, etc., without making any provision for an
organisation controlling the transport of large bodies of men in time
of war. It certainly had been under these regulations that the French
troops were conveyed to Italy when they took part in the campaign of
1859; but the defects then developed, coupled with the further lessons
taught by the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, had shown the need for
bringing these early French regulations into harmony with the conditions
and requirements of modern warfare.

Impressed by these considerations, and realising the disadvantages and
dangers of the position into which his country had drifted, the French
Minister of War, Marshal Niel, appointed in March, 1869, a "Commission
Centrale des Chemins de Fer," composed of representatives of the Army,
the Ministry of Public Works, and the principal railway companies,
for the purpose not only of revising the existing regulations on
military transports but of preparing a new one to take their place. The
Commission held twenty-nine sittings and it drew up a provisional scheme
on lines closely following those already adopted in Germany and Austria
and based, especially, on the same principle of a co-ordination of the
military with the railway technical element. This provisional scheme
was subjected to various tests and trials with a view to perfecting
it before it was placed on a permanent basis. But Marshal Niel died;
no new regulation was adopted; the projected scheme was more or less
forgotten; time was against the early completion of the proposed
experiments, while political and military developments succeeded one
another with such rapidity that, on the outbreak of war in 1870, it was
no longer possible to carry out the proposed plans. So the studies of
the Commission came to naught, and France embarked on her tremendous
conflict with no organisation for military transport apart from the
out-of-date and wholly defective regulations under which her troops had
already suffered in the Italian war of 1859.

There was an impression that the talent of the French soldier would
enable him to "se débrouiller"--to "pull," if not (in the English sense)
to "muddle," through. But the conditions were hopeless, and the results
speedily brought about were little short of chaos.

So far as the actual conveyance of troops was concerned, the railway
companies themselves did marvels. "The numerical superiority of
Germany," as Von der Goltz says in his "Nation in Arms," "was known in
Paris, and it was thought to neutralise this superiority by boldness
and rapidity. The idea was a good one ... but ... it was needful that
the Germans should be outdone in the rapidity with which the armies
were massed." That the railway managements and staffs did their best to
secure this result is beyond any possibility of doubt.

On July 15, 1870, the Minister of Public Works directed the Est, Nord
and Paris-Lyon Companies to place all their means of transport at the
disposal of the War Minister, suspending as far as necessary their
ordinary passenger and goods services; and the Ouest and Orléans
Companies were asked to put their rolling stock at the disposal of the
three other companies. The Est, to which the heaviest part in the work
involved was to fall, had already taken various measures in anticipation
of an outbreak of war; and such was the energy shown by the companies,
as a whole, that the first troop train was started from Paris at 5.45
p.m. on July 16, within, that is to say, twenty-four hours of the
receipt of the notice from the Minister of Public Works. Between July 16
and July 26 there were despatched 594 troop trains, conveying 186,620
men, 32,410 horses, 3,162 guns and road vehicles, and 995 wagon-loads of
ammunition and supplies. In the nineteen days of the whole concentration
period (July 16-August 4) the companies carried 300,000 men, 64,700
horses, 6,600 guns and road vehicles, and 4,400 wagon-loads of
ammunition and supplies.

All this activity on the part of the railway companies was, however,
neutralised more or less by the absence of any adequate organisation for
regulating and otherwise dealing with the traffic, so far as concerned
the military authorities themselves.

The first regiment to leave Paris, on July 16, arrived at the station
at 2 p.m. for the train due to start at 5.45 p.m. The men had been
accompanied through the streets by an immense crowd shouting "À Berlin!"
and, with so much time to spare, they either blocked up the station or
were taken off by their friends to the neighbouring taverns, where the
consumption of liquor was such that, by the time the train started, most
of the men were excessively drunk. In addition to this, many had been
relieved of their ammunition--taken from them, perhaps, as "souvenirs"
of an historic occasion, though destined to reappear and to be put to
bad use in the days of the Commune, later on.

If, however, at the beginning, the troops got to the station three hours
before there was any need, other occasions were to arise when they kept
trains waiting three or four hours before they themselves were ready to
start.

Then, in Germany the concentration of the troops at some safe point
in the interior, and their transport thence by rail to the frontier
in complete units, took place as separate and distinct operations. In
France the two movements were conducted simultaneously; and this, in
itself, was a prolific source of confusion and disorganisation on the
railways. The troops came to the stations on a peace footing and in
various strengths. One regiment might have only one-third the strength
of another despatched earlier the same day or on the previous day,
although the railway company would have provided the same number of
vehicles for both. There was thus a choice of evils as between removing
two-thirds of the carriages (a procedure which time or the station
arrangements did not always permit); sending the train away only
partially loaded; or filling up the available space either with men
belonging to other corps or with such supplies as might be available
at the moment. Some trains did leave nearly empty, but it was the
last mentioned of the three courses that was generally adopted. Men
of different arms--Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery; mobilised troops,
reservists, and individuals, separated, it might be, from their own
officers and not willing to show themselves amenable to the discipline
of other officers--were thus transported at the same time as, possibly,
a miscellaneous collection of horses, material and commissariat
supplies. Other trains, again, went away so overcrowded that they could
not accommodate all the men who should have gone by them, many being
left behind in consequence.

Confusion and delays at the railway stations during the entraining
of the troops were rendered the more complete because the railway
staffs failed to get an adequate degree of support from the military
authorities. According to one of the articles in those regulations of
1855 which were still in force, "officers were responsible for the
prescribed movements in connection with the entraining, and should
personally co-operate in ensuring observance of the regulations
referring thereto"; but, according to Baron Ernouf, ("Histoire des
Chemins de Fer Français pendant la Guerre Franco-Prussienne,") there
were officers who refused absolutely to concern themselves with the
entraining of their men at the Est station in Paris, declaring that this
was a matter to be looked after by the railway officials with the help
of subordinate officers, if they wanted it.

Under such conditions as these, officers in charge of troops got
hopelessly separated from their men, who themselves might have been
sent off with no knowledge of their proper destination. One General
telegraphed to Paris on July 21:--"Have arrived at Belfort. Not found
my Brigade. Not found General of Division. What should I do? Don't know
where my Regiments are." As for the men, it was not many days before
the stations _en route_ to the front were occupied by a floating mass
of "lost" soldiers, who pretended to be looking for their corps but too
often found it much pleasanter to remain in the station buffets, and
there enjoy the hospitality of local patriots. Such proportions did this
evil assume that in August, 1870, the railway station at Reims had to be
protected against a mob of from 4,000 to 5,000 "lost" ones, who wanted
to plunder the wagons containing supplies for the front.

Confusion, again, was made still worse confounded by the multiplicity
of orders--too often contradictory or impossible to carry out--which
bombarded the railway officials, and must have driven them at times
almost to distraction. Orders came direct from anybody and everybody
possessed of the slightest degree of military authority. They came from
the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Administrative Staff;
from the Quartermaster-General's Department and the Commissariat; from
officers and non-commissioned officers of Infantry, Artillery and
Engineers; while each individual invariably gave his orders based on
the range of his own particular sphere, or the convenience of his own
particular troops, without any regard for the situation as a whole,
for what might be wanted in other spheres, or for whether or not it
was physically possible for the railway staffs to do at all what was
asked of them, even if they were not being overwhelmed with those other
orders, besides. Commanding officers of different corps especially
distinguished themselves by presenting to the railway managements claims
for priority in the despatch of Infantry, Artillery or supplies, as the
case might be, threatening them with grave consequences if, in each
instance, they did not yield such priority at once, though leaving them
to meet an obviously impracticable position as best they could. Then it
might happen that when all the necessary arrangements--involving much
interference with other traffic--had been made, another order would come
countermanding the first one, or postponing the execution of it until a
later occasion.

As though, again, the orders from all these independent military
authorities were not sufficient, the railways were further worried by
local authorities who wanted special trains for some such service as the
conveyance of detachments of garde mobile a distance of ten or twelve
miles to an instruction camp so that the men would not have to march by
road. There were even demands from certain of the local authorities that
they should be allowed to use railway wagons as barracks for troops.

M. Jacqmin, general manager of the Chemin de Fer de l'Est, relates in
his book, "Les Chemins de Fer Pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," that at
the moment when the Compagnie de l'Est was providing for the transport
of Bourbacki's forces, and preparing for the revictualling of Paris,
the préfet of the Rhone demanded the use of railway wagons in which to
house the garde nationale mobilised on the plain of Vénissieux, on the
left bank of the Rhone, there having been a delay in the delivery of
the material for barracks. The company refused the request, and they
had with the departmental authorities a lively controversy which was
only settled by the decision of the Bordeaux Government that those
authorities were in the wrong.

Typical of the general conditions, as they prevailed not only in
Paris but elsewhere in France, were the circumstances under which the
Nineteenth Army Corps, of 32,000 men, 3,000 horses and 300 guns, was
sent from Cherbourg to Alençon. The troops were late in arriving at the
station; the officers neglected to look after the men; the men refused
to travel in goods trucks; orders and counter-orders succeeded one
another in rapid succession; two or three hours were required for the
despatch of each train, and delays occurred which must have disorganised
the traffic all along the line.

Great as the confusion undoubtedly was at the points of despatch, it
was far surpassed by that which prevailed at stations to which trains
were sent regardless of any consideration as to whether or not they
could be unloaded there with such despatch as to avoid congestion.
No transfer stations--constituting the points beyond which only the
supplies wanted for immediate or early use at the extreme front should
be taken, the remainder being forwarded as wanted--had been arranged,
and the consignors, military or civil, had assumed that all supplies
should be sent in bulk to places as near to the troops as possible.
There were, consequently, many stations close to the frontier where the
rails leading to them were occupied for miles together by loaded wagons,
the number of which was being constantly added to by fresh arrivals.
Many of these wagons were, in fact, used as magazines or storehouses on
wheels. The same was, also, being done to a certain extent on the German
lines, though with this difference--that whereas in Germany there were
at the railway stations route commandants whose duty it was to enforce
the prompt unloading of wagons, in France there was no corresponding
authority. It suited the officers or the military department concerned
to keep the supplies in the wagons until they were wanted; and this
arrangement may have appeared an especially desirable one from their
point of view because if the army moved forward--or backward--the
supplies could be more readily moved with it if they were still in the
wagons.

For these various reasons, there were officers who gave the most
stringent orders that the wagons were not to be unloaded until their
contents were actually required. It was evidently a matter of no concern
to them that the wagons they were detaining might be wanted elsewhere,
and that, for lack of them, other troops might be experiencing a
shortage in their own supplies.

When the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded, it might still be
impossible for the unloading to be done because of there being no
military in attendance to do the work. As for the picking out, from
among the large number in waiting, of some one wagon the contents of
which were specially wanted, the trouble involved in this operation must
often have been far greater than if the wagon had been unloaded and the
supplies stored in the first instance.

Even the stations themselves got congested, under like conditions. The
Commissariat wanted to convert them into depôts, and the Artillery
sought to change them into arsenals. There were stations at which no
platform was any longer available and troops arriving by any further
train had to descend some distance away, several days elapsing before
their train could be moved from the place where it had pulled up. At
stations not thus blocked trains might be hours late in arriving, or
they might bring a squadron of cavalry when arrangements had been made
for receiving a battalion of infantry.

In one instance a General refused to allow his men to detrain on arrival
at their destination at night, saying they would be more comfortable
in the carriages than in the snow. This was, indeed, the case; but so
long as the train remained where it was standing no other traffic could
pass. Sometimes it was necessary for troop trains to wait on the lines
for hours because no camp had been assigned to the men, and there was at
least one occasion when a Colonel had to ask the stationmaster where it
was his troops were to go.

Most of the traffic had been directed to Metz and Strasburg, and the
state of chaos speedily developed at the former station has become
historic.

The station at Metz was a large one; it had eight good depôts and four
miles of sidings, and it was equal to the unloading of 930 wagons in
twenty-four hours under well-organised conditions. But when the first
infantry trains arrived the men were kept at the station four or five
hours owing to the absence of orders as to their further destination.
The men detrained, and the wagons containing road vehicles, officers'
luggage, etc., were left unloaded and sent into the sidings. Other
trains followed in rapid succession, bringing troops and supplies, and
the block began to assume serious proportions.

The railway officials appealed to the local Commissariat force to unload
the wagons so that they could be got out of the way. They were told
that this could not be done because no orders had been received. The
Commissariat force for the division also declined to unload the wagons,
saying it was uncertain whether the troops for whom the supplies were
intended would remain at Metz or go further on.

Any unloading at all for several days was next rendered impossible by
the higher military authorities. They asked the railway officers to
prepare for the transport of an army corps of 30,000 men. This was done,
and forty trains were located at various points along the line. An order
was then given that the trains should be brought to Metz, to allow of
the troops leaving at once. Within four hours every train was ready, and
its locomotive was standing with the steam up; but no troops appeared.
The order was countermanded. Then it was repeated, and then it was
countermanded over again.

All this time fresh train-loads of supplies and ammunition had been
arriving at Metz, adding to the collection of unloaded wagons which,
having filled up all the sidings began to overflow and block up, first
the lines leading to the locomotive sheds and next the main lines
themselves. Everything was in inextricable confusion. Nobody knew where
any particular commodity was to be found or, if they did, how to get
the truck containing it from the consolidated mass of some thousands of
vehicles. "In Metz," telegraphed the Commissary-General to Paris, "there
is neither coffee, nor sugar; no rice, no brandy, no salt, only a little
bacon and biscuit. Send me at least a million rations to Thionville."
Yet it was quite possible that the articles specified were already in
some or other of the trucks on hand, had the Commissary-General only
known where they were and how to get them.

The railway people did what they could. They unloaded some of the
consignments and removed them a considerable distance by road--only to
have them sent back again to Metz station for re-loading and conveyance
elsewhere. Hay unloaded at the station was sent into Metz to some
magazines which, in turn, and at the same time, were sending hay to
the railway for another destination. Finally, as a last resource,
and in order both to reduce the block and to get further use out of
the wagons, the railway officials began to unload them and put their
contents on the ground alongside. A big capture alike of wagons and of
supplies was made by the enemy on his occupation of Metz.

Analogous conditions prevailed in many other places. At Dôle (Dep. Jura)
an accumulated stock of loaded wagons not only filled up all the sidings
but blocked up a large portion of the main line. When the evacuation
was decided on a great waste of time occurred in selecting the wagons
to be moved. Orders given one hour were countermanded the next; trains
which had been made up were moved forward and backward, instead of being
got out of the way at once; and, eventually, a considerable quantity of
rolling stock, which might and should have been removed, had to be left
behind.

On the Paris-Lyon railway a collection of 7,500 loaded trucks had
accumulated at a time when a great truck shortage began to be felt,
and the whole of these, together with the provisions and the materials
they contained, fell into the hands of the Germans, whose total haul
of wagons, including those captured at Metz and other places, numbered
no fewer than 16,000. The wagons thus taken were first used by them
for their own military transport during the remainder of the war;
were then utilised for ordinary traffic on lines in Germany, and were
eventually returned to France. Not only, therefore, had the French
failed to get from these 16,000 railway wagons the benefit they should
have derived from their use but, in blocking their lines with them
under such conditions that it was impossible to save them from capture,
they conferred a material advantage on the enemy, providing him with
supplies, and increasing his own means both of transport and of attack
on themselves.

The proportions of the German haul of wagons would, probably, have been
larger still had not some of the French railway companies, on seeing the
advance the enemy was making, assumed the responsibility of stopping
traffic on certain of their lines and sending off their rolling stock
to a place of safety. In taking this action they adopted a course
based alike on precedent and prudence, and one fully warranted by the
principle of keeping railway rolling stock designed for purposes of
defence from being utilised by the enemy for his own purposes of attack.

CHAPTER XIII

ORGANISATION IN FRANCE

While, on the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, Germany began,
as we have seen in Chapter X., to improve her own system of military
rail-transport, with a view to remedying the faults developed
therein, France applied herself with equal, if not with even greater,
determination and perseverance to the task of creating for herself a
system which, in her case, had been entirely lacking.

Recognising alike her own shortcomings, the imperative need to prepare
for future contingencies, and the still more important part that
railways would inevitably play in the next great war in which she might
be engaged, France resolved to create, in time of peace, and as an
indispensable factor in her scheme of national defence, a system of
military transport comprehensive in its scope, complete in its working
details, and leaving nothing to chance. Everything was to be foreseen,
provided for, and, as far as circumstances would permit, tested in
advance.

The Prussian organisation of 1870-71 was, admittedly, and as recommended
by Jacqmin, taken as a starting point for what was to be done. From
that time, also, every new regulation adopted by Prussia in regard to
military transport, and every important alteration made in the Prussian
system, was promptly recorded and commended or criticised in the
ably-conducted French military papers; though in the actual creation
of her own system there was no mere following by France of Prussian
examples. What was considered worth adopting certainly was adopted;
but the organisation eventually built up, as the result of many years
of pertinacious efforts, was, in reality, based on French conditions,
French requirements, and the most progressive ideas of French military
science. The French were, also, to show that, when they applied
themselves to the task, they had a genius for organisation in no way
inferior to that of the Germans themselves.

In his review of the events of 1870-71, Jacqmin declared that, while
the education of France in the use of railways in time of war had still
to be completed, the basis for such education had already been laid
down by Marshal Niel's "Commission Centrale" of 1869. The two essential
conditions were (1) unification of control in the use of railways for
military purposes, whether for the transport of men or of supplies; and
(2) association of the military element and the technical element,--an
association which should be permanent in its nature and apply to every
phase of the railway service, so that before any order was given there
should be a guarantee that it was one possible of achievement, and this,
also, without prejudice to other transport orders already given or
likely to become necessary.

It was these essential conditions that formed the basis of the
organisation which France created.

As early as November, 1872, there was called into existence a
_Commission Militaire Superieure des Chemins de Fer_ consisting of
twelve members, who represented the Ministry of Public Works, the Army,
the Navy, and the great railway companies. Attached to the Ministry of
War, and charged with the task of studying all questions relating to
the use of railways by the Army, the Commission had for its first duty
a revision of the proposals made by Marshal Niel's Commission of 1869.
Following on this came a succession of laws, decrees and instructions
dealing with various aspects of the situation in regard to military
transport and the military organization of the railways, the number
issued between 1872 and 1883 being no fewer than seventeen. These,
however, represented more or less tentative or sectional efforts made in
combination with the railway companies, who gave to the Chambers and to
the administrative authorities their most earnest support and the full
benefit of all their technical knowledge and experience in regard to
the many problems which had to be solved.

In 1884 there were issued two decrees (July 7 and October 29) which
codified, modified or further developed the various legislative
or administrative measures already taken, and laid down both the
fundamental principles and the leading details of a comprehensive
scheme which, after additional modifications or amendments, based on
later experiences, was to develop into the system of organised military
rail-transport as it exists in France to-day.

These later modifications were more especially effected by three
decrees which, based on the law of December 28, 1888, dealt with (1)
the composition and powers of the Commission Militaire Superieure des
Chemins de Fer; (2) the creation of Field Railway Sections and Railway
Troops; and (3) the organisation of the military service of railways.

Since its original formation in 1872, the _Superior Military Commission_
had already undergone reconstruction in 1886, and still further changes,
in addition to those made by the decree of February 5, 1889, were to
follow. In its final form the Commission still retains the principle of
representation thereon alike of the military and the technical (railway)
element. Presided over by the Chief of the General Staff--who, with
the help of a special department of that Staff, exercises the supreme
direction of the military transport services, subject to the authority
of the War Minister--the Commission is composed of six Generals or other
military officers of high rank, three representatives of the Ministry of
Public Works, and the members of the Line Commission appointed for each
of the great railway systems and, also, for the Chemin de Fer d'État.

All the members of the Commission are nominated by the Minister of
War. The function they discharge is a purely consultative one. Their
business it is to give to the Minister their views on all such questions
as he may submit to them for consideration in regard to the use of the
railways by the Army, and more especially in regard to--

1. Preparations for military transports.

2. Examination of all projects for new lines or junctions and
alterations of existing lines, as well as all projects which concern
railway facilities (stations, platforms, water supply, locomotive sheds,
etc.)

3. The fixing of the conditions to be fulfilled by railway rolling stock
in view of military requirements, and the alterations which may be
necessary to adapt it thereto.

4. Special instructions to be given to troops of all arms as to their
travelling by rail.

5. Agreements to be made between railway companies and the War
Department in respect to transport of troops, provisions, etc.

6. Organisation, instruction and employment of special corps of
railwaymen (for repairs, etc.).

7. Measures to be taken for ensuring the supervision and protection of
railways and their approaches.

8. The means of destroying and of rapidly repairing lines of railway.

Heads of the different services at the Ministry of War can attend
meetings of the Commission, in a consultative capacity, in respect to
matters coming within their jurisdiction, and the Commission can, in
turn, apply to the Minister for the attendance of any person it may
desire to hear.

As far as possible, all plans and arrangements concerning the transport
of troops and supplies in time of war, from the moment of mobilisation
onward, are thus prepared, examined or provided for in advance. In
article 8 of the Regulation of December 8, 1913, on Military Transports
by Railway ("Réglement sur les transports stratégiques par chemin de
fer") it is, in fact, stated that--

All the arrangements relating to the organisation and
carrying out of transport for mobilisation, concentration,
revictualling and evacuation are studied and prepared in time
of peace. The Minister gives, to this effect, all the necessary
instructions to the General Staff, to the commanders of Army
Corps, and to the different services. A like course is adopted,
in time of peace, with regard to the study of the conditions
under which the railways will be operated on the lines of
communication.

The creation, under the law of March 13, 1875, of Field Railway Sections
and Railway Troops was the outcome of the obvious need of having an
organised force able to take up the duties of constructing, repairing,
destroying or operating railways at the theatre of war, such force being
established in time of peace and assured all the experience needed to
qualify them for the discharge of those various duties. France, in fact,
was now, in this respect, to follow the example of Germany, just as
Germany had already been inspired by the example of the United States.

Under a decree of February 5, 1889, _Field Railway Sections_ ("Sections
de chemins de fer de campagne") were defined as permanent military corps
charged, in time of war, and concurrently with the Railway Troops,
with the construction, renovation and operation of those railways of
which the working could not be assured by the national companies. Their
personnel was to be recruited from among the engineers, officials
and men employed by the railway companies and by the State Railways
Administration, such recruiting being carried out either voluntarily
or by reason of liability to render military service; and they were to
form a distinct corps, having its own governing body with, as its head,
a commandant exercising the functions of a Chef de Corps. In time of
peace there were to be nine sections, each designated by a distinctive
number according to the particular railway system or systems from which
it was formed; though authority was given to the Minister of War to call
further sections into being in case of war. The number in peace was
increased, in 1906, by the formation of a tenth section from among the
staffs of railways in the "secondary" group, including local lines and
tramways, in order to assure, or to assist in, the operation of these
railways or tramways for military transport in time of war.

In time of peace the sections were to be subject to inspections,
musters, reviews and assemblies, as ordered by the Minister of War. A
further provision in the decree of 1889 says:--"All the arrangements
relative to the mobilisation of each section shall be studied and
planned in time of peace. Each section should always be ready, in the
most complete manner, to render its services to the Minister of War."

Subsequent decrees or instructions constituted each of the sections a
complete unit on the following basis: (1) A central body; (2) three
distinct divisions, namely, (_a_) "movement," (_b_) "voie," and (_c_)
"traction"; (3) a central depôt common to the three divisions and the
central body; and (4) complementary territorial subdivisions in the same
three classes, and attached to the central depôt of the section. The
territorial subdivisions are designed to provide a reserve force of men
who can complete or strengthen the existing sections, or, alternatively,
be constituted into additional sections, if so desired by the Minister
of War. The total strength of each section (including 141 allotted to
the central depôt) was fixed as 1,466.

The administration of a section rests with an Administrative Council
formed by the president and the heads of the several departments, and
meeting at least once in every three months in time of peace, and once
a week in time of war. Authority is exercised over the sections by the
Field Railway Commissions to which they are attached.[26]

Men in the active divisions of the sections who are liable to military
service are excused from taking part in the ordinary military exercises,
but may be assembled for inspections, etc., or to undergo courses of
instruction in railway work. Men in the territorial subdivisions can be
summoned by the Minister of War for "a period of exercises" in railway
work in time of peace; and the fact may be recalled that advantage of
this power was taken during the French railway troubles of 1910, when
the strikers were required to assume the rôle of soldiers doing railway
work under military authority and control.

The _Railway Troops_ ("Troupes de chemin de fer") now constitute a
Railway Regiment ("5e régiment du génie") organised under the decree
of July 11, 1899, and comprising on a peace footing, three Battalions,
each of four Companies.

Recruits for the Railway Regiment come from one or other of the
following classes: (1) Young soldiers who were in the railway service
before they joined the Army; (2) an annual contingent of railway
employés selected by the Minister of War from lists supplied for this
purpose by the administrations of the five great railway companies
and of the State railways, the number so selected not to exceed 240,
distributed as follows: Compagnie du Nord, 42; Est, 18; P. L. M., 54;
Orléans, 42; Midi, 15; État, 69; and (3) soldiers belonging to Infantry
Regiments who, after one year of training therein, are sent to the
Railway Regiment, those chosen for this purpose being, by preference,
men whose previous occupation in life has adapted them for railway work.

The railway administrations are also required to provide from among
their officials a certain number of officers and non-commissioned
officers to form a reserve for the Regiment.

A most complete and systematic course of instruction is arranged.[27] It
is divided into (1) military instruction and (2) technical instruction,
the purpose of the latter being defined as that of qualifying the
Railway Troops to undertake at the theatre of war, subject to the
authority of the Director-General of Railways and Communications,
works of repair or destruction of railway lines, or, in case of need,
the provisional working of the railways. In time of peace it is the
duty of the Superior Military Commission for Railways to advise on all
questions concerning the organisation, instruction and employment of the
special troops for railway work. To enable it to discharge this function
the Commission receives, through the Chief of the General Staff, all
programmes, proposals or reports that may be issued in regard to the
technical instruction of the troops, giving its views thereon, and
making such recommendations as it may consider desirable.

Such technical instruction comprises (_a_) that which is given to the
whole of the troops; (_b_) instruction in particular branches of railway
work given to a limited number of individuals; (_c_) instruction to
groups of men operating in companies or otherwise, and (_d_) instruction
obtained on the ordinary railways. It is further divided into (i)
theoretical and (ii) practical.

Among the measures adopted for ensuring the success of the general
scheme, mention might be made of the issuing of special series of
textbooks; the regular working by the Regiment of about forty miles of
railway--including an important junction--between Chartres and Orléans,
on the State Railway system; and arrangements made with the railway
administrations under which (1) a certain number of Companies belonging
to the Regiment are attached to the ordinary railway systems every
year, for periods of two or three months; and (2) power is given to the
railway administrations to engage the services of the Railway Troops
in carrying out repairs or construction works on their lines, a mutual
advantage thus being obtained.

Finally there is a Railway School ("École de chemins de fer") which
has charge of all the materials, tools, etc., used in the technical
instruction of the troops; draws up, under the orders of the Colonel,
programmes of practical work and instruction; and provides (1) a library
which is supplied with books and periodicals dealing with military,
railway, scientific and historical subjects, together with maps,
plans, decrees, regulations, etc., relating to the military operation
of railways; (2) a collection of tools, instruments and models; (3)
photographic and lithographic departments; (4) stores of railway
construction material for instruction purposes; (5) other stores of like
material for use in case of war; (6) workshops for practical instruction
in railway repairs, etc.; and (7) practice grounds reserved exclusively
for the Railway Troops.

The fact of these two bodies of Field Railway Sections and Railway
Troops being organised on so practical and comprehensive a basis
secured to France the control of forces certain to be of the greatest
service to her in the next war in which she might be engaged. It would,
also, even suffice by itself to prove the earnestness, the vigour and
the thoroughness with which, after 1870-71, France entered upon the
improvement of her system of military rail-transport for national
defence. There was, however, much more to be done, besides, before that
system could be considered complete; and here, again, a vast amount of
study, foresight and energy was shown.

Following, indeed, the laws, decrees, regulations, orders, and
instructions issued down to 1889 came so many others--dealing, in some
instances, with even the minutest detail concerning some particular
phase of the organisation in course of being perfected--that a collected
series of those still in force in 1902 formed a volume of over 700
pages.[28] Since the issue of this somewhat formidable collection, still
further changes have been introduced, the general conditions being
finally modified by decrees passed on December 8, 1913.

Without attempting to indicate all the successive stages in this
prolonged series of legislative and administrative efforts, it may
suffice to offer a general sketch of the French organisation of military
rail-transport on the basis of the laws, regulations and practices in
operation on the outbreak of war in 1914.

Connected with each of the great railway systems there is a permanent
_Line Commission_ ("Commission de réseau") which consists of (1) a
technical member who, in practice, is the general manager of the line;
and (2) a military member, who is a member of the General Staff of the
Army. The former is chosen by the railway administration, subject to
the approval of the War Minister, and the latter by the War Minister
himself. Each Line Commission controls the services of a combined
technical and military staff, and each Commissioner has a deputy who
can take his place and exercise his powers in case of need. While the
Military Commissioner is specially responsible for measures adopted
from a military point of view, the Railway Commissioner is specially
responsible for putting at the command of the Army, as far as may be
necessary or practicable, all the resources of the particular railway
system he represents.

The authority of a Line Commission on any one of the great railway
systems extends to the smaller, or secondary, lines situate within the
same territory; but the smaller companies may themselves claim to be
represented on the Commission by a duly credited agent.

Among the duties to be discharged by a Line Commission in time of peace
are the following:--

1. Investigation of all matters to which military transport on the line
or the system can give rise.

2. Study of all the available resources of the system, in material and
men, from the point of view of military requirements.

3. Preparation of plans, estimates, and other data in connection with
the movement of troops, etc.

4. Verification of reports concerning extent of lines, rolling stock,
and station or traffic facilities.

5. Special instruction of the railway staff.

6. Inspection of lines, bridges, etc.

7. The carrying out of experiments of all kinds with a view to
ameliorating or accelerating the facilities offered by the system in
respect to military transports.

Should several Line Commissions be interested in some particular
question concerning military movements by rail, the Chief of the
General Staff can summon them to a joint conference as often as may be
necessary. The fact, also, that the members of the Line Commissions are
members of the Superior Commission assures co-ordination in the studies
carried on as regards the railways in general, and provides a ready
means by which the central body can obtain the information it desires
concerning any one system or group of systems.

As their district executives, the Line Commissions have such number of
_Sub-Line Commissions_ as may be found necessary. Each of these is,
in turn, composed of a military member, nominated by the Minister,
and a technical member, chosen by the Line Commission. Then, also, to
discharge the function of local executive, there is at every important
centre of traffic a _Station Commission_ ("Commission de gare") which
consists of a military officer and the stationmaster. It receives from
the Line or Sub-Line Commission all orders or instructions concerning
military transport to, from, or passing through, such station, and is
the recognised intermediary for carrying them into effect and seeing
that efficiency is ensured and good order maintained.

A staff, formed of military men and railwaymen acting in combination,
is allotted to each Line, Sub-Line or Station Commission. Concerning
the representation of these two elements, military and civil, on the
one body, article 10 of the decree of December 8, 1913, on Military
Transports says:--

The special function of each of the agents, military or
technical, on the Commissions or Sub-Commissions must, in the
operation of the service, be maintained in the most absolute
manner. At the same time these agents should not lose from their
view the fact that their association is designed to effect
harmony between the exigencies alike of military requirements
and of rail transport, subordinating those of the one to those
of the other, according to circumstances.

From the time that mobilisation begins--or even earlier, on the order
of the War Minister--the members of the Superior Commission take up
their posts _en permanence_ at the War Office, and those of the Line,
Sub-Line and Station Commissions locate themselves at the stations
which will have been allotted to them in time of peace. Thenceforward
each Station Commission is in constant communication by telegraph with
the Line or Sub-Line Commission under which it acts, supplementing
such communication by daily written reports. Among the duties to be
discharged by the Station Commissions are those of superintending the
entrainment or detrainment of troops and the loading or unloading
of material; seeing that the trains required for transport purposes
are provided; preventing congestion of the lines or of the station
approaches; and ensuring the security of the station and of the lines
within a certain radius thereof.

On the outbreak of war the railway companies must place at the service
of the State either the whole or such of their lines, rolling stock, and
other means of transport as may be needed for the conveyance of troops,
stores, etc., to any points served by them. Thenceforward the lines so
required for "strategic transports"--including therein mobilisation,
concentration, reinforcements, supplies and evacuations from the theatre
of war--can be used for ordinary passengers and goods only to such
extent as the Minister may approve.

Following on the order for mobilisation the Minister, after consultation
with the Commander-in-Chief, divides the railways of the country into
two zones--the "Zone of the Interior," and the "Zone of the Armies." Of
these the former passes under the supreme control of the War Minister,
and the latter under that of the Commander-in-Chief. The location of
the _Stations of Transition_, dividing the one zone from the other,
can be varied from time to time by the Minister, in consultation with
the Commander-in-Chief, according to the developments of the military
situation.

The _Zone of the Interior_ is that part of the railway system which,
though not situated at the theatre of war, is subject to military
control by reason of the services required of it in the forwarding of
troops, supplies, guns, ammunition and other necessaries. Operation
by the ordinary staffs of the railway systems is continued, but the
transports ordered by the War Minister are regulated by the Chief of the
General Staff. The execution of the orders given is entrusted from the
day of mobilisation to the Line Commissions, each of which, acting under
the authority of the War Minister, takes charge over the whole of the
services on the lines comprised in its particular territory.

The _Zone of the Armies_ is, in turn, divided into two sections (1)
the "Zone de l'avant," in which military operation of the railways is
necessary on account of their nearness to the fighting-line; and (2)
the "Zone de l'Arrière," in which the railways can still be operated by
the ordinary railway staffs, under the direction of Line and Station
Commissions, as in the adjoining Zone of the Interior.

Orders given by the Commander-in-Chief in respect to transport in the
Zone of the Armies are carried out under the supreme control of an
officer now known as the _Directeur de l'Arrière_. The history of this
important functionary affords an excellent example of the way in which
the whole scheme of operations has been evolved.

The "Règlement général" of July 1, 1874,--one of the earliest attempts
to meet the difficulties which had arisen in 1870-71 in respect to
military rail-transport--was found to be defective inasmuch as it
did not apply, also, to those road and rear services ("Services de
l'Arrière") which are necessarily associated with the rail services
and themselves constitute so important a phase of military transport
as a whole. In 1878 an attempt was made to meet this defect by the
inauguration of a system of "Services des Étapes"; but here, again,
the existence of separate organisations for rail service and road
service, without any connecting and controlling link, was found to be
unsatisfactory. In 1883 a Commission, presided over by General Fay,
was appointed to consider what would be the best course to adopt, and,
in the result, there was issued, on July 7, 1884, a Decree creating
a "Directeur Général des Chemins de Fer et des Étapes," whose duties
were more clearly defined under a Decree of February 21, 1900. In
1908 the title of this officer was changed to that of "Directeur de
l'Arrière," and, after further revisions, the scope of his authority and
responsibility was eventually fixed by the Regulation of December 8,
1913.

Taking up his position at the head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief,
and keeping in close touch, also, with the Minister of War through the
Chief of the General Staff, the Directeur de l'Arrière has for his
special function that of securing complete co-ordination alike between
rail services and road services and between the services in the Zone of
the Interior and those in the Zone of the Armies. Both from the Minister
and from the Commander-in-Chief he receives information as to operations
projected or in progress, and as to the needs of the armies in
_personnel_ and _matériel_. His business it is to see that these needs,
according to their order of urgency--as further communicated to him--are
supplied under conditions which shall provide for all contingencies
and guard against all possible confusion or delays. He fixes, among
other things, the lines of communication; he keeps in close touch with
the road services, and--having, within the limit of his instructions,
complete control over the railways in the Zone of the Armies--he decides
on the conditions to be adopted in respect to all transport alike
from the interior to the armies and from the armies to the interior.
As between, also, the Minister of War and the Commander-in-Chief, he
maintains a constant exchange of information concerning time-tables for
military trains and other such matters.

In the discharge of these duties the Directeur de l'Arrière is aided by
a staff which comprises both the technical and the military elements;
but he is not himself responsible for the actual working of either the
rail or the road services.

Railway services in the Zone of the Armies are--subject to the supreme
authority of the Directeur de l'Arrière--under the control of a
_Director of Railways_ who is assisted by (1) a combined military and
technical staff; (2) a Line Commission for that section of the zone
where the railways can still be worked by their ordinary staffs; and (3)
one or more _Field Line Commissions_ ("Commissions de chemins de fer de
campagne"), together with Railway Troops, for the section where military
operation is necessary.

In the interests of that co-ordination to which so much importance is
rightly attached, the Director of Railways refers to the Directeur
de l'Arrière all demands for transport that concern the railways of
both the Zone of the Interior and the Zone of the Armies or involve
conveyance by road as well as by rail. He also passes on to the
Commissions in charge of either section of the railways included in the
Zone of the Armies the orders he himself receives from the Directeur de
l'Arrière in respect to such transport requirements as may concern them.
Time-tables drawn up, and other arrangements made, by these Commissions
are subject to his approval. He further decides as to the distribution,
within the Zone of the Armies, of the rolling stock and the railway
personnel placed at his disposal by the Commander-in-Chief.

The _Field Line Commissions_ are the executive agents of the Director
of Railways in the discharge of the various duties assigned to him. The
number of these Commissions is decided by the Directeur de l'Arrière,
and the date of their entering on their functions is fixed by the
Director of Railways. Each Commission consists of a staff officer and
a railway engineer. Of these the former is military president of the
Commission and has the controlling voice. When he considers it necessary
that he should accept, in addition to his own responsibility, that of
the technical commissioner, the latter must defer to his views and
to the orders he gives. The president has an assistant--also a staff
officer--who can replace him when necessary, while the Commission has
a staff of secretaries and orderlies as approved by the Minister of
War. The personnel of the Commissions includes Railway Troops ("Sapeurs
de chemins de fer" and "Sections de chemins de fer de campagne"); a
telegraphy staff; Station Commissions; and "gendarmerie" to undertake
police duties in the stations and on the trains.

In addition to making traffic arrangements and undertaking the operation
of those lines at the theatre of war that may pass under full military
control, the Field Line Commissions are required to carry out such
construction, repair, maintenance or destruction work on the railways as
should be found necessary.

On the _Lines of Communication_ passing through the two zones and
ensuring direct communication between the interior and such accessible
points on the railway as may, from time to time, be nearest to the
armies in the field, the leading stations _en route_ are required to
serve a variety of military purposes; though in each and every such
instance the system of organisation is such that the duties to be
discharged or the responsibilities to be fulfilled are undertaken by,
or are under the control of, a Commission formed on the now established
basis of representation thereon of both the military and the technical
elements.

For the conveyance of troops, there are, in the first place,
_Mobilisation Stations_ and _Junction Stations_, whence the men
within a certain district are sent to the _Embarkation Stations_, at
which complete units for the front are made up. These are followed by
_Stations for Meals_ ("Stations haltes-repas"), for men and horses;
though in this case the "stations" may really be goods or locomotive
sheds, able to accommodate a large number of men. At the end of the
railway line, so far as it is available for troops, come the _Detraining
Stations_.

In regard to supplies and stores, the first link in the chain of
organisation is constituted by the _Base Supply Stations_ ("gares de
rassemblement"). Here the supplies going from a certain district outside
the theatre of operations to any one Army Corps must be delivered; and
here they are checked, made up into full train loads, or otherwise dealt
with in such a way as to simplify and facilitate their further transport.

In certain cases full train-loads arriving at these assembling stations
pass through to destination, after being checked; but the general
practice is for the consignments forwarded from base supply stations to
go to the _Supply Depôts_ ("Stations-magasins"), serving the purposes
of storehouses from which supplies, whether received from the base or
collected locally, can be despatched in just such quantities, and at
just such intervals, as circumstances may require. These depôts are
organised on a different basis according to the particular service or
purpose for which they are designed,--Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery,
Medical, Telegraph Corps; provisions, live stock, clothing, camp
equipment, etc. Their number, character, and location are decided by
the Minister of War in time of peace. On the outbreak of war those in
the Zone of the Armies pass under the control of the Commander-in-Chief
together with the railway lines within that zone. The situation of
the depôts may be changed, or additional depôts may be opened, by the
Directeur de l'Arrière, with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief.

Each station depôt is under the charge of the military member of the
Station Commission. His special function it is to supply therefrom the
wants of the Army in accordance with the demands he receives. These
demands he distributes among the different departments of the depôt,
giving instructions as to the time by which the railway wagons must
be loaded. He also takes, with the stationmaster, all the necessary
measures for ensuring the making up, the loading, and the departure of
the trains; but he must not interfere with the internal administration
of the station or with the technical direction and execution of the
railway services.

Provision is also made for the immediate unloading of trains bringing
supplies to the station depôts for storage there, the military
commissioner being expressly instructed to guard against any block on
the lines in or near to the station. Wagons need not be unloaded if
they are to be sent on after only a brief detention, or if they contain
ammunition forming part of the current needs of the Army.

From the supply depôts the supplies and stores pass on to the
_Regulating Station_ ("gare régulatrice"). This is located at such point
on each line of communication as, while allowing of a final regulation
of supplies going to the front, does not--owing to its nearness to the
fighting line--permit of any guarantee of a fixed train service beyond
that point. The locality of the regulating station is changed from day
to day, or from time to time, according to developments in the military
situation.

The regulating station is in charge of a _Regulating Commission_
("Commission régulatrice"), constituted on the same basis as a Sub-Line
Commission. Receiving orders or instructions as to the nature and
quantities of the supplies and stores required by the troops at the
front, and drawing these from the supply depôts, the Commission must
always have on hand a sufficiency to meet requirements. It is, also,
left to the Commission to arrange for the further despatch of the
supplies from the regulating station by means of such trains as, in the
circumstances of the moment, may be found practicable.

As a matter of daily routine, and without further instructions, the
supply depôts send one train of provisions each day to the regulating
station, and the latter sends on one train daily to the front, always,
however, keeping a further day's supply on hand, at or near the
regulating station, to meet further possible requirements. Additional
trains, whether from the supply depôts or from the regulating station
(where rolling stock is kept available) are made up as needed.

Supplementing these arrangements, the Regulating Commission may, at
the request of the Director of Road Services, further keep permanently
within its zone of action a certain number of wagons of provisions in
readiness to meet contingencies, the wagons so utilised as _Stores
on wheels_ being known as "en-cas mobiles." Should the Directeur de
l'Arrière so desire, railway wagons with ammunition can, in the same
way, be kept loaded at any station within the Zone of the Armies, or,
by arrangement with the Minister of War, in the Zone of the Interior.
It is, however, stipulated that the number of these wagons should
be reduced to a minimum, in order to avoid congestion either of the
stations or of the railway lines.

Beyond the regulating station comes _Railhead_, which constitutes the
furthest limit of possible rail-transport for the time being, and
the final point of connection between rail and road services, the
latter being left with the responsibility of continuing the line of
communication thence to the armies on the field of battle.

It is the duty of the Regulating Commission, as soon as it enters on the
discharge of its functions and as often afterwards as may be necessary,
to advise both the General in command of the Army served by the line
of communication and the Director of Road Services as to the station
which can be used as railhead and the facilities offered there for the
accommodation, unloading, and loading of wagons. On the basis of the
information so given the General-in-Command decides each day, or as the
occasion requires, on the particular station which shall be regarded
as railhead for the purposes of transport. He advises the Regulating
Commission and the Director of Road Services accordingly, and he
further notifies to them his wishes in regard to the forwarding of
supplies to the point thus fixed.

These elaborate arrangements for ensuring a maintenance of efficiency
along the whole line of communication from the interior to the front
equally apply to transport of all kinds from the theatre of war to the
interior. In principle, evacuations from the army of sick and wounded,
prisoners, surplus stores, and so on, are effected from railhead by
means of the daily supply-trains returning thence to the regulating
station, where the Regulating Commission takes them in charge, and
passes them on by the trains going back to the Depôt Stations, or
beyond. Should special trains be necessary for the removal of a
large number of wounded, or otherwise, the Director of Road Services
communicates with the Regulating Commission, which either makes up the
desired specials from the rolling stock it has on hand or, if it cannot
do this, itself applies, in turn, to the Director of Railways.

For dealing with the sick and wounded, every possible provision is made
under the authority of the Minister of War and the Director-General,
the arrangements in advance, as detailed in the decrees relating to
this branch of the subject, being on the most comprehensive scale.
Among other measures provided for is the setting up of _Evacuation
Hospitals_ ("hôpitaux d'évacuation") in the immediate neighbourhood of
the Regulating Stations, if not, also, at railhead. Elsewhere along
the line certain stations become _Infirmary Stations_, ("infirmaries
de gare") where, in urgent cases, and under conditions laid down by
the War Minister, the sick and wounded _en route_ to the interior can
receive prompt medical attention in case of need. From the _Distribution
Stations_ ("gares de répartition"), the sick and wounded are sent to the
hospitals in the interior to which they may be assigned.

It will be seen that this comprehensive scheme of organisation aims at
preventing the recurrence of any of those defects or deficiencies which
characterised the military rail-transport movements of France in the war
of 1870-71.

The presence, at every important link in the chain of rail
communication, of a Commission designed to secure regularity and
efficiency in the traffic arrangements should avoid confusion,
congestion and delay.

The association, on each of these Commissions, of the military and
technical elements, with a strict definition of their respective powers,
duties and responsibilities, should ensure the best use of the available
transport facilities under conditions in themselves practicable, and
without the risk either of friction between the representatives of the
two interests or, alternatively, of any interference with the railway
services owing to contradictory or impossible orders being given by
individual officers acting on their own responsibility.

The setting up of the supply depôts and regulating stations along the
line of communication should prevent (i) the rushing through of supplies
in excessive quantities to the extreme front; (ii) the congestion of
railway lines and stations; (iii) the undue accumulation of provisions
at one point, with a corresponding deficiency elsewhere, and (iv) the
possibility of large stocks being eventually seized by the enemy and
made use of by him to his own advantage.

The measures adopted both to prevent any excessive employment of railway
wagons as storehouses on wheels and to secure their prompt unloading
should afford a greater guarantee of the best utilisation of rolling
stock under conditions of, possibly, extreme urgency.

Finally, the unification of control, the co-ordination of the many
different services involved, and the harmony of working established
between all the various sections on the line of communication linking up
the interior of the country with the troops in the fighting line should
assure, not only the nearest possible approach to complete efficiency in
the transport conditions, but the conferring of great advantages on the
armies concerned, with a proportionate increase of their strength in the
field.

The effect of all these things on the military position of France must
needs be great. Had France controlled a rail-transport organisation such
as this--instead of none at all--in 1870-71; and had Germany controlled
a system no better than what we have seen to be the admittedly imperfect
one she put into operation on that occasion, the results of the
Franco-German war and the subsequent course of events in Europe might
alike have been wholly different.

_Tests_ of what were being planned or projected in France as
precautionary measures, for application in war, could not, of course,
be carried out exhaustively in peace; but many parts of the machinery
designed came into daily use as a matter of ordinary routine. Full
advantage was taken, also, of whatever opportunities did present
themselves--in the form of exercises in partial mobilisation, reviews,
and other occasions involving the movement by rail of large bodies
of troops--to effect such trials as were possible of regulations and
instructions already based on exhaustive studies by the military and
railway authorities. In 1892 the results attained were so satisfactory
that a German authority, Lieutenant Becker, writing in his book on "Der
nächste Krieg und die deutschen Bahnverwaltungen," (Hanover, 1893,)
concerning the trials in France, in that year, of the new conditions
introduced by the law of December 28, 1888, was not only greatly
impressed thereby but even appeared disposed to think that the French
were becoming superior to the Germans in that very organisation which
the latter had regarded as their own particular province. The following
passages from his book may be worth recalling:--

Towards the middle of September, 1892, from a military
railway station improvised for the occasion, there were sent off
in less than eight hours forty-two trains conveying a complete
Army Corps of 25,000 men.

In their famous mobilisation test of 1887 the French
despatched from the Toulouse station 150 military trains without
interrupting the ordinary traffic, and without any accident.

Such figures speak a significant language. They show what
enormous masses of troops the railway can carry in the course of
a few hours to a given point....

If I have referred to the results obtained by our neighbours
on their railway systems, it is not because I have the least
fear as to the final issue of the next war. Quite the contrary;
but the fact does not prevent me from asking why the German
Army cannot base on the railways of that country the same hopes
which neighbouring countries are able to entertain in regard to
theirs.

The favourable impression thus given, even to a German critic, by the
progress France was making in her creation, not so much _de novo_ as _ab
ovo_, of a system of organised military rail-transport, were confirmed
by many subsequent trials, experiments and experiences, all, in turn,
leading to further improvements in matters of detail; but it was,
indeed, the "nächste Krieg" concerning which Lieutenant Becker wrote
that was to be the real test of the organisation which, during more than
forty years of peace, France followed up with a zeal, a pertinacity and
a thoroughness fully equal to those of Germany herself.

In any case it would seem that France, though having to make up for
the headway gained by Germany, finally created a system of military
rail-transport which would be able to stand the fullest comparison with
even the now greatly-improved system of her traditional foe; while the
organisation she thus elaborated, not for the purposes of aggression
but as an arm of her national defence, illustrates in a striking degree
the ever-increasing importance of the problem of rail-power, and the
comprehensive nature of the measures for its effective exercise which a
great Continental nation regards as indispensable under the conditions
of modern warfare.

DEFENSIVE RAILWAYS

The measures adopted included, also, the improvement of the French
railway system, since this was no less in need of amendment and
additions in order to adapt it to the needs of the military situation.

Whilst, as we have seen in Chapter I, the important part that railways
were likely to play in war was recognised in France as early as 1833,
and whilst, in 1842, attention was called in that country to the
"aggressive lines" which Germany was then already building in the
direction of the French frontiers, the French railway system itself
was, prior to the war of 1870-71, developed on principles which
practically ignored strategical considerations, were based mainly on
economic, political and local interests, and not only refrained from
becoming "aggressive" in turn, but even failed to provide adequately, as
they should have done, for the legitimate purposes of national defence.

Apart from the absence of any designs on the part of France against
her neighbours' territory, during this period of her history, one of
the main reasons for the conditions just mentioned is to be found in
the predominant position of Paris as the capital and centre-point of
French life and French movement. Germany at this time consisted of a
collection of States each of which had its own chief city and built its
railways to serve its own particular interests, without much regard
for the interests of its sister States, even if it escaped the risk
of cherishing more or less jealousy towards them. In France there was
but one State and one capital, and Paris was regarded as the common
centre from which the main lines were to radiate in all directions.
Communication was thus established as between the capital and the
principal inland towns or important points on the frontiers or on the
coasts of France; but the inadequate number of lateral or transverse
lines linking up and connecting these main lines placed great difficulty
in the way of communication between the provincial centres themselves
otherwise than viâ Paris.

Some of these disadvantages were to have been overcome under a law
passed in 1868 which approved the construction of seventeen new lines
having a total length of 1,840 km. (1,143 miles). When, however, war
broke out in 1870, comparatively little had been done towards the
achievement of this programme, and France entered upon the conflict with
a railway system which had been even less developed towards her eastern
frontiers than towards the north, the west and the south, while for the
purposes of concentrating her troops in the first-mentioned direction
she had available only three lines, and of these three one alone was
provided with double-track throughout. Such were the inadequacies of the
system at this time that the important line between Verdun and Metz had
not yet been completed.

No sooner had the war come to an end than the French Government started
on the improvement of the railway system in order to adapt it to the
possible if not prospective military requirements of the future, so that
they should never again be taken at a disadvantage; and in carrying on
this work--in addition to the reorganisation of their military-transport
system in general--they showed an unexampled energy and thoroughness.
Within five years of the restoration of peace the French railway system
had already undergone an extension which, according to Captain A.
Pernot, as told in his "Aperçu historique sur le service des transports
militaires," would have been possible in but few countries in so short
a period; while of the situation at the time he wrote (1894) the same
authority declared:--"One can say that everything is ready in a vast
organisation which only awaits the word of command in order to prove the
strength of its capacity."

Without attempting to give exhaustive details of all that was done, it
may suffice to indicate generally the principles adopted.

One of the most important of these related to an improvement of the
conditions in and around Paris.

Here the purposes specially aimed at were (1) to establish further
connecting links between the various trunk lines radiating from the
capital, and (2) to obviate the necessity for traffic from, for example,
the south or the west having to pass through Paris _en route_ to the
east or the north.

These aims it was sought to effect by means of a series of circular
railways, or "rings" of railways, joining up the existing lines, and
allowing of the transfer of military transport from one to the other
without coming into Paris at all. An "inner" circular railway ("Chemin
de Fer de Petite Ceinture") had already been constructed within the
fortifications prior to 1870, and this was followed in 1879 by an
"outer" line, ("Chemin de Fer de Grande Ceinture"), which provided a
wider circle at an average distance of about 20 km. (12½ miles) and
established direct rail connection, not only between a large number of
the more remote suburbs, together with the different trunk lines at a
greater distance from the city, but, also, between the various forts
constructed for the defence of Paris.

These circular railways were, in turn, succeeded by a series of
connecting links which ensured the provision of a complete ring of
rail communication at a still greater distance around Paris, the towns
comprised therein including Rouen, Amiens, La Fère, Laon, Reims,
Chalons-sur-Marne, Troyes, Sens, Montargis, Orléans, Dreux, and so on
back to Rouen. Within, again, this outermost ring there was provided
a further series of lines which, by linking up Orléans, Malesherbes,
Montereau, Nogent, Epernay, Soissons, Beauvais and Dreux, established
additional connections between all the lines from Paris to the north and
the east of France, and gave increased facilities for the distribution
in those directions of troops arriving at Orléans from the south-west,
this being once more done without any need for their entering Paris or
even approaching it at a closer distance than about forty miles.

Orléans itself was recognised as a point of great strategical importance
in regard to the movement of troops, and it was, accordingly, provided
with a number of new lines radiating therefrom, and establishing better
connections with other lines. Tours and other centres of military
significance, from the same point of view, were strengthened in a like
manner. At important junctions, and notably so in the case of Troyes
(Champagne), loop lines were built in order that troop trains could be
transferred direct from one line to another without stopping, and with
no need for shunting or for changing the position of the engine.

In the direction of the eastern frontier the line from Verdun to Metz
was completed, and by 1899 the three routes which could alone be made
use of in 1870-71 had been increased to ten. Most of them were provided
with double-track throughout, and all of them were independent of one
another, though having intercommunication by means of cross lines.

Other new railways established connection with or between the forts on
both the eastern and the northern frontiers. Others, again, provided
direct communication between different harbours or between each of
them and strategical points in the interior, thus contributing to the
possibilities of their defence in case of attack from the sea. Still
others were designed for the defence of the French Alps.

Apart from the provision of all these new lines, much was done in
the doubling or even the quadrupling of existing track wherever the
question of military transport came into consideration at all. Then at
railway stations near to arsenals, and at important strategical centres,
specially long platforms were provided to allow of the rapid entraining
of men or material in case of need.

While, also, so much was being done for the improvement of the French
railway system from an avowedly strategical point of view, there were
many additional lines constructed or improvements made which, although
designed to further the interests of trade and travel, also added to the
sum total of available facilities for military transport.

The advantages specially aimed at were (1) the ensuring of a more
rapid mobilisation of troops through the betterment of cross-country
connections; (2) the avoidance of congestion of traffic in Paris; (3)
the securing of a more rapid concentration on the frontiers, especially
when each Army Corps could be assured the independent use of a
double-track line of rails for its own use; and (4) the more effective
defence of all vital points.

National defence, rather than the building of strategical lines
designed to serve "aggressive" purposes, was the fundamental principle
on which the policy thus followed since 1870-71 was based; and if,
as Captain Pernot wrote in 1894, everything was even then ready for
all emergencies, the continuous additions and improvements made since
that time, bringing the railway system of the country more and more
into harmony with the "perfectionnement" aimed at by France in the
organisation of her military transport, must have made the conditions of
preparedness still more complete by 1914.

FOOTNOTES:

[26] For details concerning the functions and duties of the various
divisions, subdivisions, etc., see "Mouvements et Transports. Sections
de chemins de fer de campagne. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er septembre,
1914." Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle.

[27] "Bulletin Officiel du Ministère de la Guerre. Génie. Troupes de
chemins de fer. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er décembre, 1912."

[28] "Transports militaires par chemin de fer. (Guerre et Marine.)
Édition mise à jour des textes en vigueur jusqu'en octobre, 1902."
For later publications, dealing, in separate issues, with particular
departments of the military rail-transport organisation, see
Bibliography.

CHAPTER XIV

ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND

The difference between the geographical conditions of the British Isles
and those of the principal countries on the Continent of Europe led to
the systematic organisation of rail transport for military purposes
being taken in hand at a later date in the United Kingdom than was,
more especially, the case in Germany. Here there was no question of
building lines of invasion or lines to facilitate the massing of troops
on a neighbour's frontiers. The questions that alone seemed to arise
in England were--(1) the relations between the State and the companies
in regard to the use of the railways for the transport of troops and
military necessaries under conditions either of peace or of war; (2)
the employment of railways both for resisting invasion and for the
conveyance of expeditionary forces to the port of embarkation; (3)
the adoption of such means as would ensure the efficient working of
the railways under war conditions; and (4) the creation of an Army
engineering force providing for the construction, repair, operation
or destruction of railways either at home, in case of invasion, or to
facilitate operations in overseas expeditions through the building and
working of military railways.

With these various considerations it may be convenient to deal in the
order as here given.

THE STATE AND THE RAILWAYS

In the Railway Regulation Act, 1842, (5 and 6 Vict., c. 55,) entitled
"An Act for the better Regulation of Railways and for the Conveyance of
Troops," it was provided, by section 20:--

Whenever it shall be necessary to move any of the officers
or soldiers of her Majesty's forces of the line ... by any
railway, the directors shall permit them, with baggage, stores,
arms, ammunition and other necessaries and things, to be
conveyed, at the usual hours of starting, at such prices or upon
such conditions as may be contracted for between the Secretary
at War and such railway companies on the production of a route
or order signed by the proper authorities.

This was the first provision made in the United Kingdom in respect to
the conveyance of troops by rail. It was succeeded in 1844 by another
Act (7 and 8 Vict., c. 85,) by which (sec. 12) railway companies were
required to provide conveyances for the transport of troops at fares
not exceeding a scale given in the Act, and maximum fares were also
prescribed in regard to public baggage, stores, ammunition, (with
certain exceptions, applying to gunpowder and explosives,) and other
military necessaries. In 1867 these provisions were extended to the Army
Reserve. Further revision of the fares and charges took place under
the Cheap Trains Act, 1883, (46 and 47 Vict., c. 34,) entitled "An Act
to amend the Law Relating to Railway Passenger Duty and to amend and
consolidate the law relating to the conveyance of the Queen's forces by
railway."

State control of the railways in case of war was provided for under the
Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, (34 and 35 Vict., c. 86,) "An Act
for the Regulation of the Regular and Auxiliary Forces of the Crown, and
for other purposes relating thereto." Section 16 laid down that--

When her Majesty, by Order in Council, declares that an
emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the public
service that her Majesty's Government should have control
over the railroads of the United Kingdom, or any of them, the
Secretary of State may, by warrant under his hand, empower any
person or persons named in such warrant to take possession in
the name or on behalf of her Majesty of any railroad in the
United Kingdom, and of the plant belonging thereto, or of any
part thereof, and may take possession of any plant without
taking possession of the railroad itself, and to use the same
for her Majesty's service at such times and in such manner as
the Secretary of State may direct; and the directors, officers
and servants of any such railroad shall obey the directions of
the Secretary of State as to the user of such railroad or plant
as aforesaid for her Majesty's service.

Any warrant granted by the said Secretary of State in
pursuance of this section shall remain in force for one week
only, but may be renewed from week to week so long as, in the
opinion of the said Secretary of State, the emergency continues.

Provision was also made for the payment of "full compensation" to the
interests concerned.

The powers of control thus acquired by the Government followed, in
effect, closely upon the precedent already established in the United
States, (see p. 16,) even although they were not defined with the same
elaborate detail. On the other hand greater emphasis is laid in the
English Act on the provision that the Government "may take possession
of any plant without taking possession of the railroad itself." This
gives them the right to take over the locomotives and rolling stock of
any railway in any part of the United Kingdom, even though the lines
in question may not themselves be wanted for the purposes of military
transport.

Under the provisions of the National Defence Act, 1888, (51 and 52
Vict., c. 31,) traffic for naval and military purposes is to have
precedence over other traffic on the railways of the United Kingdom
whenever an Order for the embodiment of the Militia is in force.

It was by virtue of the above section of the Act of 1871 that the
Government took control over the railways of Great Britain on the
outbreak of war in 1914.

As regards the earlier Acts of 1842 and 1844, these were mainly domestic
measures relating to the conveyance of troops in time of peace rather
than war. The beginnings of organisation of military rail-transport
for the purposes of war followed, rather, on a realisation both of the
possibilities of invasion and of the weakness of the position in which
England at one time stood from the point of view of national defence.

INVASION PROSPECTS AND HOME DEFENCE

In 1847 the Duke of Wellington, (then Commander-in-Chief,) addressed
to Sir John Burgoyne a letter in which he said he had endeavoured to
awaken the attention of different Administrations to the defenceless
state of the country. We had, he declared, no defence, or hope of chance
of defence, except in our Fleet, and he was especially sensible both of
the certainty of failure if we did not, at an early moment, attend to
the measures necessary to be taken for our defence and of "the disgrace,
the indelible disgrace," of such failure. Then, in words that greatly
impressed the country, he added:--

I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age, passed in
honour; I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being the
witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries
to take measures to avert.

As the result alike of this pathetic warning; of a "Letter on the
Defence of England by Volunteer Corps and Militia" issued in pamphlet
form by Sir Charles Napier in 1852; and of the Indian Mutiny in 1857,
which event called attention to the defenceless condition of the Empire
as a whole, continuous efforts were made to secure the creation of
Volunteer Corps for the purposes of defence. For a period of twelve
years these efforts met with persistent discouragement, the Government
refusing official recognition to certain corps of riflemen tentatively
formed; but in 1859 the prospect of an early invasion of this country by
France aroused public feeling to such an extent that on May 12 the then
Secretary of State for War, General Peel, addressed a circular to the
Lord-Lieutenants of counties in Great Britain announcing that Volunteer
Corps might be formed under an Act passed in 1804, when a like course
had been adopted as a precautionary measure against the threatened
invasion of England by Napoleon.

The formation of Volunteer Corps was thereupon taken up with the
greatest zeal, and by the end of 1860 the number of Volunteers enrolled
throughout Great Britain was no fewer than 120,000. Other results of the
national awakening in 1859 were the public discussion of the questions
of coast defence and armoured trains, (of which mention has been made in
Chapter VII,) and the appropriation, in 1860, of a loan of seven and a
half millions for the improvement of our coast defences and notably the
fortifications of Portsmouth and Plymouth.

ENGINEER AND RAILWAY STAFF CORPS

Already in December, 1859, the necessity for some definite engineering
instruction for Volunteers was being pointed out, and in January, 1860,
the first corps of Volunteer Engineers was created, under the title
of the 1st Middlesex Volunteer Engineers. Similar corps were formed
in various parts of the country, and by 1867 the number of Volunteer
Engineers enrolled was 6,580.

At the beginning of 1860 a further proposal was made for the formation
of a body which, composed of eminent civil engineers, the general
managers of leading lines of railway, and the principal railway
contractors or other employers of labour, would undertake a variety of
duties considered no less essential in the interests of national defence.

There was, in the first place, the question of the transport by rail
alike of Volunteers and of the regular forces, either on the occasion of
reviews or for the protection of our coasts against an invader. While
it was evident that the railways could be efficiently worked only by
their own officers, it was no less obvious that plans for the movement
of large bodies of men, and especially of troops, with horses, guns,
ammunition and stores, should be well considered and prepared long
beforehand, and not left for the occasion or the emergency when the need
for them would arise.

In the next place it was suggested that the engineering talent of the
country should be made available for the purpose of supplementing the
services of the Royal Engineers in carrying out various defensive
works, such as the destruction of railway lines, bridges and roads, the
throwing up of earthworks, or the flooding of the lowland districts,
with a view to resisting the advance of a possible invader.

Finally the great contractors were to be brought into the combination
so that they could provide the labour necessary for the execution of
these defensive works under the direction of the civil engineers, who
themselves would act under the direction of the military commanders.

Each of the three groups was to discharge the function for which it
was specially adapted, while the co-ordination of the three, for the
purpose of strengthening the country's powers of resisting invasion, was
expected to add greatly to the value of the proposed organisation.

The author of this scheme was Mr. Charles Manby, F.R.S., (1804-1884,) a
distinguished civil engineer who for nearly half a century was secretary
of the Institution of Civil Engineers and was closely associated with
the leading civil engineers, contractors and railway interests of the
country. He submitted his ideas to several members of the Council
of his Institution, and though, at first, the scheme was not well
received, he was subsequently so far encouraged that in August, 1860,
he laid his plan before Mr. Sidney Herbert, then Minister at War in
Lord Palmerston's second administration. Mr. Herbert expressed cordial
approval of the project, giving the assurance, on behalf of the War
Office, that an organisation on the basis suggested could not fail to be
of public benefit; but Mr. Manby still met with difficulties alike from
several members of the Council, who either offered direct opposition
to the scheme or else gave unwilling consent to join, and, also, from
the railway companies, who thought that arrangements for rail-transport
might very well be left to themselves, and that there was no necessity
for the suggested system so far as they, at least, were concerned.

In these circumstances Mr. Manby made, at first, very little progress;
but he was unremitting in his efforts to demonstrate alike to civil
engineers and to the railway companies the practical benefits from
the point of view of public interests that would result from the
organisation he advocated, and in 1864 he felt sufficiently encouraged
to lay his views once more before the War Office. Earl de Grey, then in
charge of that Department, thereupon instructed the Inspector-General
of Volunteers, Colonel McMurdo, (afterwards General Sir W. M. McMurdo,
C.B.,) to inquire into and report to him on the subject.

In the result there was created, in January, 1865, a body known as the
Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, constituted, according to
its rules, "for the purpose of directing the application of skilled
labour and of railway transport to the purposes of national defence,
and for preparing, in time of peace, a system on which such duties
should be conducted." The Corps was to consist of officers only, and its
members were to be civil engineers and contractors, officers of railway
and dock companies, and, under special circumstances, Board of Trade
Inspectors of Railways. Civil engineers of standing and experience who
had directed the construction of the chief railways and other important
works, general managers of railways and commercial docks, and Board
of Trade Inspectors of Railways, were alone eligible for the rank of
Lieutenant-Colonel. Other civil engineers and contractors connected
chiefly with railway works, and, also, railway officers other than
general managers, take the rank of Major. Col. McMurdo was appointed
Honorary Colonel of the Corps on February 9, 1865.[29] As ultimately
constituted, the corps consisted of an Honorary Colonel (now Maj.-Gen.
D. A. Scott, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.C.), thirty Lieutenant-Colonels including
a Commandant, (now Lieut.-Col. Sir William Forbes, general manager of
the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway) and twenty Majors.[30]

FUNCTIONS AND PURPOSES

That the Corps thus created was the direct outcome, first, of the
Volunteer movement, and, through that movement, of the state of
semi-panic into which the country had drifted in 1859, as the result
both of the anticipations of invasion and the admitted weakness, at
that time, of our national defences, has thus been clearly established.
Writing in 1869, Major-General McMurdo, who had been raised to that
rank in 1868, said in a pamphlet he issued under the title of "Rifle
Volunteers for Field Service" that the Corps was "prepared to work,
not for Volunteers alone, but for the entire defensive forces of the
country."

In this same publication Major-General McMurdo gave an account of the
functions and purposes the Corps had been designed to serve. Alluding
first to the Volunteer movement, he showed how the railway carriage must
both carry and shelter the Volunteer when moving from one part of the
country to another; and he proceeded:--

I will ask you to look attentively for a moment at a
Bradshaw's railway map, and you will see that throughout the
network of rails that overspreads the land none of the meshes,
so to speak, in any vital parts of the country, exceed fifteen
miles across, from rail to rail; but as the eye approaches the
Metropolis, or any of the commercial centres, these meshes are
diminished to about one-half the area of the others.

He then dealt with the operations which the movement of troops along
these lines of railway would involve, and continued:--

The railway schemes for the accomplishment of such delicate
operations would emanate from the Council of the Engineer and
Railway Staff Corps....

During peace the railway branch of this body is employed in
working out hypothetical plans of campaign, in the development
of which they manipulate in theory the entire rolling-stock
and railway resources of the country, elaborated by special
time-tables and technical reports.

The share taken by the civil engineers is not confined to
providing merely for the class of railway works contingent on
war, whether of construction, demolition, or of reconstruction,
but in supplying the military engineers with information, advice
and labour. No one, for example, can be more familiar with the
features and character of a district than the engineer who has
constructed a line of railway through it. No one is so well able
to point out the results of _letting in_ that which he had been
so often employed in _keeping out_, viz., the inundations of the
sea. None better acquainted with the existing distribution of
labour power throughout the country, and of the means by which
it could be concentrated upon given points, for the construction
of works of defence. All these elements, in short, by which
the gigantic resources of our country may be safely wielded
for her defence, are now being silently considered and woven
into strategical schemes of operations by these eminent and
patriotic men, the value of whose voluntary services will not be
fully comprehended or appreciated till the day comes when the
discomfiture of the invader shall be accomplished through their
instrumentality.

The same distinguished authority wrote concerning the Engineer and
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps in an article on "Volunteers" which he
contributed to the "Encyclopædia Britannica" (ninth edition):--

The ready labour power of this useful Corps is estimated
at from 12,000 to 20,000 navvies, with tools, barrows and
commissariat complete. It has already performed important
service in tabulating, and printing at great private cost,
complete time-tables and special reports for six general
concentrations against possible invasion. A special return
was also prepared by the Corps (the first of its kind) of the
entire rolling stock of all the railways in Great Britain.
This important work--which is corrected and republished
annually--shows where the requisite number of carriages of every
description can be obtained for the composition of troop trains.

In the official catalogue of books in the War Office Library there is an
item which reads:--"Time Tables for Special Troop Trains, etc. Compiled
by the Railway Companies. 311 pp. 8vo. London, 1866." This, presumably,
refers to the first of the complete time tables mentioned in the
"Encyclopædia Britannica" article as having been compiled by the Corps.
It is evident, from the date given, that the Corps must have got quickly
to work after its formation in 1865.

At one time there was an expectation that the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps would develop into a body exercising still wider
and more responsible duties than those already mentioned. On this point
we have the testimony of the late Sir George Findlay, formerly general
manager of the London and North-Western Railway Company, and himself a
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Corps.

Col. J. S. Rothwell had written some articles[31] in which, while
admitting their practically unlimited resources, he questioned the
ability of the British railways, at a few hours notice, to transport to
any part of our coasts which might be the scene of a hostile invasion a
sufficient body of troops to dispute the advance of an army upon London,
and he further suggested that the whole question was one which had not
yet received the mature consideration it deserved. Col. Rothwell said,
in the course of what he wrote:--

Though the actual working of our railways must be left in
the hands of the proper railway officials, it does not follow
that the planning of the arrangements for the military traffic
should also be entrusted to them exclusively. This, however,
appears to be contemplated, as, under existing circumstances,
such arrangements would rest with the members of a body called
the "Volunteer Engineer and Railway Staff Corps."... Though the
efficiency of these gentlemen in their own sphere is undeniable,
it appears open to question whether they are likely to have
sufficient leisure personally to work out the details of a
large concentration of troops by rail, and whether the special
requirements of military transport will be fully appreciated by
them, or by the subordinates whom they presumably will employ.

Much, he argued, required to be done before the country could be
considered ready to meet a possible invader; and he concluded:--

If the invasion of England is to be regarded as an event
which is within the bounds of possibility, it is surely not
unreasonable to ask that those precautionary measures which
require time for their elaboration shall be thoroughly worked
out before there is any risk of our wanting to employ them. The
organisation for the conveyance of our troops by railway is such
a measure.

To these criticisms Sir George Findlay replied in an article "On the
Use of Railways in the United Kingdom for the Conveyance of Troops,"
published in the _United Service Magazine_ for April, 1892. The complete
network of railways covering these islands, admirably equipped and
efficiently worked as they were, would, he declared, be found equal
to any part they might be called upon to play in a scheme of national
defence. As regarded the attention already paid to the question he
said:--

The War Office, so far from having in any way neglected
the subject, have devoted considerable attention to it, and a
complete scheme for the working of our railways for transport
purposes in time of war has been elaborated, and would at once
be put in operation, if ever the emergency arose.

Passing on to describe the composition and duties of the Engineer and
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, he spoke of its members as meeting in
council at their headquarters to discuss from time to time details of
railway organisation and other matters delegated to their consideration,
afterwards reporting their conclusions to the War Office; and he went on
to say that for the operation of the railways, under State control, on
any occasion of national energy or danger--

A draft scheme has been prepared, has been worked out in
detail, and would, in all probability, be adopted and put in
operation if, unhappily, the necessity should ever arise.

This scheme in its main features provides that, at such
time as we are contemplating, the principal railway officials
in Great Britain and Ireland would at once become, for the
time being, the officers of the State, and in addition to the
general managers of the leading railways, who are officers of
the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, military rank
of some kind would be conferred upon the engineers, locomotive
superintendents, chief passenger superintendents and goods
managers of the principal railway companies, as well as on the
managers of the principal Irish railways.

The railways of the country would be divided into sections,
and for each section there would be a committee composed
of the general managers of the railways included in the
section, together with the principal engineers, locomotive
superintendents and other chief officers. The railways would
be worked and controlled for military purposes by these
committees of sections, each committee having as its president a
Lieutenant-Colonel of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff
Corps, who would be directly responsible for providing transport
for troops and stores over the section of which his committee
had charge, while if the operation to be carried out required
the co-operation of one or more sections of the railways, the
committees of those sections would act in unison. In such a
case the Quartermaster-General's requisition for the service to
be performed would be made upon the president of the section
embracing the point of departure, that officer and his committee
taking the initiative and arranging with the other committees
for the performance of the service.

For each section, or group, of railways, a military officer
of rank would be appointed, with full power to arrange for
food, forage and water for the troops and horses _en route_,
and having at his disposal a sufficient number of soldiers or
labourers to assist in loading and unloading baggage, stores,
etc., at the points of entrainment and detrainment within his
section. He would also be able to command the services of the
Royal or Volunteer Engineers to assist in the erection of
temporary platforms or landings, or the laying down of temporary
rails, and would be instructed to co-operate with, and assist
in every way, the committee of section having charge of his
district, but not in any way to attempt to interfere with the
working of the line or the movement of the trains or traffic.

The number of sections into which the railways were to be divided for
the purposes of this scheme was nine. After defining the various areas,
Sir George continued:--

It is contemplated that during any such period of crisis as
we are now discussing, the Council of the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps would be sitting _en permanence_ at its
headquarters, and, with a full knowledge of the nature and
extent of the operations to be carried out, would have power to
regulate the supply and distribution of rolling stock throughout
the area affected, all the vehicles in the country being, for
the time being, treated as a common stock.

This is a mere outline of the scheme, with the further
details of which it is not necessary to trouble the reader,
though probably enough has been said to show that the subject,
far from having been neglected, as Colonel Rothwell appears to
assume, has been carefully studied and thought out.

Had the scheme in question been matured and adopted on the lines here
stated, a still greater degree of importance would have been attached
to the position and proceedings of a Corps then--and still--almost
unknown to the world at large, since its chief function was to carry out
investigations at the request of the authorities, and prepare reports,
statements and statistics which have invariably got no further than the
War Office and the Horse Guards, where, alone, the value of the services
rendered has been fully understood and appreciated. The scheme was,
however, allowed to drop, the policy eventually adopted being based,
preferably, (1) on the railways of Great Britain being operated in war
time as one group instead of in a series of groups or sections; and (2)
on such operation being entrusted to a body specially created for the
purpose; though prior to the adoption of the latter course there was to
be a fresh development in another direction.

THE WAR RAILWAY COUNCIL

While the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps remained, down to
1896, the only organised body which (apart from the individual railway
companies) Government departments could consult as to the technical
working and traffic facilities of the railways, from the point of view
of military transport, it was thought desirable, in the year mentioned,
to supplement that Corps by a smaller body known at first as the "Army
Railway Council" and afterwards as the "War Railway Council."

Designed to act in a purely advisory capacity, without assuming any
administrative or executive functions, this Council was eventually
constituted as follows:--The Deputy Quartermaster-General (president);
six railway managers, who represented the British railway companies
and might or might not already be members of the Engineer and Railway
Staff Corps; one Board of Trade Inspector of Railways; two members
(not being railway managers) of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps;
the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General; one mobilisation officer;
two Naval officers; and one officer of the Royal Engineers, with a
representative of the Quartermaster-General's Department as secretary.

The Council approximated closely to the "Commission Militaire Superieure
des Chemins de Fer" in France, of which an account has been given in
Chapter IX. It also undertook many of the duties which in the case of
the German Army would be performed by a special section of the General
Staff; though some of these duties it took over from the Engineer and
Railway Staff Corps, reducing the functions and the importance of that
body proportionately.

In time of peace the Council was (1) generally to advise the Secretary
of State for War on matters relating to military rail-transport; (2) to
draw up, in conjunction with the different railway companies concerned,
and on the basis of data to be supplied to them by the War Office, a
detailed scheme for the movement of troops on mobilisation; (3) to
arrange in advance as to the composition of the trains which would be
required for any such movement; (4) to determine the nature of the
data to be asked for from the railway companies,[32] and to prepare
the necessary regulations and instructions in regard to the said troop
movements; (5) to draw up rules for the organisation of a body of
Railway Staff Officers who, located at railway stations to be selected
by the Council, would act there as intermediaries between the railway
officials and the troops; and (6) to confer with the different railway
companies as to the provision of such extra sidings, loading platforms,
ramps, barriers, etc., as might be necessary to facilitate military
transport, and to decide on the best means by which the provision
thereof could be arranged. Information on these subjects was to be
carefully compiled, elaborated, and, with explanatory maps, placed on
record for use as required.

In the event of mobilisation, or of some national emergency, the Council
was, also, to advise the Secretary of State for War in regard to matters
relating to the movement of troops by rail; to act as a medium of
communication between the War Office and the railway companies, and to
make all the necessary arrangements in connection with such movements.

Other questions likely to arise, and requiring consideration in time
of peace, included the guarding of the railways against possible
attack; the prompt repair of any damage that might be done to them; the
equipment of armoured trains, and the provision of ambulance trains on
lines where they might be required.

All these and various other matters were dealt with at the periodical
meetings held by the Council, which, within the range of its limitations
as an advisory body, rendered good service to the War Office; though
that Department was still left to deal with the individual railway
companies in regard to all arrangements and matters of detail directly
concerning them.

RAILWAY TRANSPORT OFFICERS

In the foregoing statement as to the functions to be discharged by the
War Railway Council it is mentioned that these were to include the
drawing up of rules for the organisation of a body of Railway Staff
Officers who were to act as intermediaries between the troops and the
railway station staffs in the conduct of military rail-transport.

We touch here upon those questions of control and organisation of
military traffic which had been a fruitful source of trouble in earlier
wars, and more especially so on the French railways in the war of
1870-71. There was, indeed, much wisdom in the attempt now being made,
as a precautionary measure, to provide well in advance against the risk
of similar experiences in regard to movements of British troops by rail,
while the course adopted led to the creation of a system which was to
ensure excellent results later on.

In the first instance the officers appointed under the system here in
question were known as "Railway Control Officers," (R.C.O.'s,) their
chief as the "Director of Railways," (D.R.,) and the organisation itself
as the "Railway Control Establishment"; but the titles of Railway
Transport Officers (R.T.O.'s), Director of Railway Transport (D.R.T.)
and Transport Establishments were afterwards substituted.

The functions of the Director of Railway Transport are thus defined in
Field Service Regulations, Part II, section 23 (1913):--

Provision of railway transport and administration of
railway transport personnel. Control, construction, working and
maintenance of all railways. Provision of telegraph operators
for railway circuits. Control and working of telephones and
telegraphs allotted to the railway service. For the erection
and maintenance of all telegraph circuits on railways which are
worked by the troops, a representative of the Director of Army
Signals will be attached to his headquarters and the necessary
signal troops allotted to him as may be ordered by the I.G.C.
(Inspector-General of Communications).

As regards the Railway Transport Establishments, the Regulations say
(section 62):--

In railway matters, the authority of each member of a
railway transport establishment will be paramount on that
portion of a railway system where he is posted for duty.

Railway technical officials will always receive the demands
of the troops for railway transport through the railway
transport establishment.

Except when fighting is imminent or in progress, a member of
the railway transport establishment will receive orders from the
Director of Railway Transport only, or his representative.

An officer, or officers, of the railway transport
establishment, recognized by a badge worn on the left arm marked
R.T.O., will be posted for duty at each place where troops are
constantly entraining, detraining, or halting _en route_. Their
chief duties will be:--

1. To facilitate the transport of troops, animals and
material.

2. To act as a channel of communication between the military
authorities and the technical railway personnel.

3. To advise the local military authorities as to the
capacity and possibilities of the railway.

4. To bring to the notice of the Director of Railway
Transport any means by which the carrying power of the railway
may, for military purposes, be increased.

All details as to the entraining and detraining of troops and the
loading and unloading of stores will be arranged in conjunction with the
technical officials by the railway transport establishment, who will
meet all troops arriving to entrain, inform commanders of the times
and places of entrainment, and allot trucks and carriages to units in
bulk. They will see that the necessary rolling stock is provided by
the railway officials, that only the prescribed amount of baggage is
loaded, and that no unauthorised person travels by rail. They will meet
all troop trains, and see that troops and stores are detrained with the
utmost despatch.

It will be observed from these regulations that, whatever his own rank
may be, the R.T.O., subject to the instructions he has received from his
superior Transport Officer, exercises at the railway station to which he
is delegated an authority that not even a General may question or seek
to set aside by giving orders direct to the station staff. The R.T.O.
alone is the "channel of communication" between the military and the
railway elements. He it is who, acting in conjunction with the railway
people, must see that all the details in connection with entraining and
detraining are properly arranged and efficiently carried out, while the
operations of the station staff are, in turn, greatly facilitated alike
by his co-operation and by the fact that there is now only one military
authority to be dealt with at a station instead, possibly, of several
acting more or less independently of one another.

VOLUNTEER REVIEWS

While all these developments had been proceeding, the railway companies
had, since the formation of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff
Corps, given repeated evidence of their capacity to move large bodies
of Volunteers with complete efficiency. They specially distinguished
themselves in this respect on the occasion of the great Volunteer
reviews held from time to time. In a book entitled "England's Naval
and Military Weakness," (London, 1882,) Major James Walter, of the 4th
Lancashire Artillery Volunteers, was highly eulogistic of what was done
by the railways on the occasion of the reviews in Edinburgh and Windsor
in 1881. In regard to the Windsor review he wrote:--

The broad result has been, so far as the railway part of
the business goes, to prove that it is perfectly feasible to
concentrate fifty thousand men from all parts of the kingdom
in twenty-four hours.... The two lines most concerned in the
Windsor review--the Great Western and the South Western--carried
out this great experiment with ... the regularity and dispatch
of the Scotch mail.

Major Walter seems to have had the idea, rightly or wrongly, that the
success of this performance was mainly due to the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps. He says concerning that body:--

Not the least valued result of the Windsor and Edinburgh
reviews of 1881 is the having introduced with becoming
prominence to public knowledge the necessary and indispensable
services of the "Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps."
Until these reviews bore testimony to the national importance of
this Corps, few knew anything of its duties, or even existence,
beyond a list of officers recorded in the Army List.... Since
the embodiment of the Volunteers the Engineer and Railway
Transport Corps has done much service, invariably thorough and
without a hitch.... These several officers of the Railway Staff
Corps set about their transport work of the 1881 reviews in a
manner worthy of their vocation. They proved to the country that
their Corps was a reality and necessity.

In 1893 the authors of the "Army Book for the British Empire" wrote (p.
531):--

There is every reason to believe that, in case of the
military forces in the United Kingdom being mobilised for the
purposes of home defence, and being concentrated in any part
or parts of the country for the purpose of guarding against or
confronting an invasion, the railway arrangements would work
satisfactorily. The remarkable success which has attended the
concentration of large bodies of Volunteers gathered from all
quarters of the Kingdom for military functions and reviews, on
more than one occasion, has shown the extraordinary capabilities
of the British railway system for military transport on a great
scale. Rolling stock is abundant. The more important lines in
England have a double line of rails; some have four or more
rails. Gradients, moreover, as a rule are easy, an important
point, since troop trains are very heavy.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

While no one was likely to dispute these conclusions, it had to be
remembered that the transport by rail even of exceptionally large bodies
of Volunteers, carrying their rifles only, was a very different matter
from the conveyance, under conditions of great pressure, of large forces
of troops accompanied by horses, guns, ammunition, road wagons, stores
and other necessaries for prospective actual warfare. So the accepted
capacity of the British railways had still to stand the test of actual
war conditions, with or without the accompaniment of invasion; and this
test was applied, to a certain extent, by the South African War.

The bulk of the military traffic on that occasion passed over the lines
of the London and South Western Railway Company, troops from all parts
of the country being conveyed by different routes and different lines of
railway to Southampton, whence they and their stores, etc., were shipped
to the Cape. Such was the magnitude of this traffic that between the
outbreak of the war, in 1899, and the end of 1900 there were carried on
the London and South Western, and despatched from Southampton, 6,160
officers; 229,097 men; 29,500 horses; and 1,085 wheeled vehicles. The
conveyance of this traffic involved the running of 1,154 special trains,
in addition to a large number of others carrying baggage, stores,
etc. At times the pressure was very great. On October 20, 1899, five
transports sailed from Southampton with 167 officers and 4,756 men,
besides guns horses and wagons. Yet the whole of the operations were
conducted with perfect smoothness, there being no overtaxing either of
the railway facilities or of the dock accommodation.[33]

Much of this smoothness of working was due to the fact that the War
Office had, in accordance with the principle adopted on the appointment
of the War Railway Council, stationed at Southampton a Railway Transport
Officer who was to act as a connecting link, or intermediary, between
the railway, the docks, the military and the Admiralty authorities,
co-ordinating their requirements, superintending the arrivals by train,
arranging for and directing the embarkation of the troops and their
equipment in the transports allotted to them, and preventing any of
that confusion which otherwise might well have arisen. Similar officers
had also been stationed by the War Office at leading railway stations
throughout the country to ensure co-operation between the military and
the railway staffs and, while avoiding the possibility of friction or
complications, facilitate the handling of the military traffic.

In the account to be given in Chapter XVI. of "Railways in the Boer
War," it will be shown that a like course was pursued in South Africa
for the duration of the campaign.

ARMY MANOEUVRES OF 1912

Further evidence as to what the British railways were capable of
accomplishing was afforded by the Army Manoeuvres in East Anglia
in 1912. This event also constituted a much more severe test than
the Volunteer reviews of former days, since it meant not only the
assembling, in the manoeuvre area, of four divisions of the Army and
some thousands of Territorials, but the transport, at short notice, and
within a limited period, of many horses, guns, transport wagons, etc.,
together with considerable quantities of stores. Certain sections of
the traffic were dealt with by the Great Northern and the London and
North-Western Companies; but the bulk of it was handled by the Great
Eastern and was carried in nearly 200 troop trains, consisting in all
of about 4,000 vehicles. Of these trains 50 per cent. started before
or exactly to time, while the others were only a few minutes late in
leaving the station. Such was the regularity and general efficiency with
which the work of transportation was carried out that in the course of
an address to the Generals, at Cambridge, his Majesty the King referred
to the rapid concentration of troops by rail, without dislocating
the ordinary civilian traffic, as one of the special features of the
manoeuvres. The dispersal of the forces on the conclusion of the
manoeuvres was effected in a little over two days, and constituted
another smart piece of work.[34]

A RAILWAYS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

In view of all such testimony and of all such actual achievements,
there was no reason to doubt that the railway companies, with their
great resources in material and personnel, and with the excellence of
their own organisation, would themselves be able to respond promptly
and effectively to such demands as might be made upon them in a time of
national emergency.

There still remained, however, the singular fact that although, so
far back as 1871, the Government had acquired power of control over
the railways, in the event of an emergency arising, a period of forty
years had elapsed without any action being taken to create, even as
a precautionary measure, the administrative machinery by which that
control would be exercised by the State. Such machinery had been
perfected in Germany, France, and other countries, but in England it
had still to be provided. Not only had section 16 of the Act of 1871
remained practically a dead letter, but even the fact that it existed
did not seem to be known to so prominent a railway manager as Sir George
Findlay when he wrote "Working and Management of an English Railway"
and the article he contributed to the _United Service Magazine_ of
April, 1892, his assumption that the State would control the railways
in time of war being based, not on the Act of 1871--which he failed to
mention--but on the Act of 1888, which simply gives a right of priority
to military traffic, under certain conditions.

Notwithstanding, too, the draft scheme spoken of by Sir George Findlay,
under which the operation of the railways was to be entrusted, in case
of emergency, to the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, that body and,
also, the War Railway Council, continued to occupy a purely advisory
position.

So it was clearly desirable to supplement the recognized efficiency of
the railways themselves by the creation of a central executive body
which, whenever the State assumed control of the railways, under the Act
of 1871, would (1) secure the necessary co-operation between Government
departments and the railway managements; (2) ensure the working of the
various railway systems on a national basis; and (3) co-ordinate such
various needs as naval and military movements to or from all parts of
the Kingdom; coal supply for the Fleet; transport of munitions; the
requirements of the civil population, etc.

The necessity for this machinery--which could not possibly be created at
a moment's notice--became still more apparent in the autumn of 1911, and
steps were taken to provide what was so obviously a missing link in the
existing organisation.

Thus it was that in 1912 the War Railway Council was succeeded by a
Railways Executive Committee which, constituted of the general managers
of leading railway companies, was to prepare plans "with a view to
facilitate the working" of the provisions of the Act of 1871, and would,
also, in the event of the Government assuming control over the railways
of Great Britain, under the provisions of that Act, constitute the
executive body for working them on behalf of the State, becoming the
recognised intermediary (1) for receiving the instructions of Government
departments in respect to military and naval requirements; and (2) for
taking the necessary measures in order to give effect to them through
the individual companies, each of which, subject to the instructions
it received from the Committee, would retain the management of its own
line.

In accordance with the principle thus adopted, it was through the
Railways Executive Committee that the Government, subject to certain
financial arrangements which need not be dealt with here, established
their control over the railways of Great Britain on the outbreak of war
in 1914, the announcement to this effect issued from the War Office,
under date August 4, stating:--

An Order in Council has been made under Section 16 of
the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, declaring that it is
expedient that the Government should have control over the
railroads in Great Britain. This control will be exercised
through an Executive Committee composed of general managers of
railways which has been formed for some time, and has prepared
plans with a view to facilitating the working of this Act.

In a notification issued by the Executive Committee, of which the
official chairman was the President of the Board of Trade and the acting
chairman was Mr. (now Sir Herbert A.) Walker, general manager of the
London and South Western Railway, it was further stated:--

The control of the railways has been taken over by the
Government for the purpose of ensuring that the railways,
locomotives, rolling stock and staff shall be used as one
complete unit in the best interests of the State for the
movement of troops, stores and food supplies.... The staff on
each railway will remain under the same control as heretofore,
and will receive their instructions through the same channels as
in the past.

As eventually constituted, the Committee consisted of the following
general managers:--Mr. D. A. Matheson, Caledonian Railway; Sir Sam
Fay, Great Central Railway; Mr. C. H. Dent, Great Northern Railway;
Mr. F. Potter, Great Western Railway; Mr. Guy Calthrop, London and
North Western Railway; Mr. J. A. F. Aspinall, Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway; Sir Herbert A. Walker, London and South Western Railway; Sir
William Forbes, London, Brighton and South Coast Railway; Sir Guy
Granet, Midland Railway; Sir A. K. Butterworth, North Eastern Railway,
and Mr. F. H. Dent, South Eastern and Chatham Railway, with Mr. Gilbert
S. Szlumper as secretary.

1860 AND 1914

Such, then, was the final outcome of a movement which, started in 1860,
by individual effort, as the result of an expected invasion of England
by France, was, in 1914, and after undergoing gradual though continuous
development, to play an important part on behalf of the nation in
helping France herself, now England's cherished Ally, to resist the
invader of her own fair territory.

With what smoothness the transport of our troops was conducted cannot
yet be told in detail; but the facts here narrated will show that the
success attained was mainly due to three all-important factors,--(1)
the efficiency of the railway organisation; (2) the willingness of the
Government, on assuming control of the railways under the Act of 1871,
to leave their management in the hands of railway men; and (3) the ready
adoption, alike by the railway interests and by State departments,
of the fundamental principle enforced by a succession of wars from
the American Civil War of 1861-65 downwards,--that in the conduct of
military rail transport there should be, in each of its various stages,
intermediaries between the military and the railway technical elements,
co-ordinating their mutual requirements, constituting the recognised
and only channel for orders and instructions, and ensuring, as far as
prudence, foresight and human skill can devise, the perfect working of
so delicate and complicated an instrument as the railway machine.

RAILWAY TROOPS

While Germany, inspired by the American example, had begun the creation
of special bodies of Railway Troops in 1866, it was not until 1882 that
a like course was adopted in England. Prior to the last-mentioned year
it was, possibly, thought that the labour branch of the Engineer and
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps would suffice to meet requirements in
regard to the destruction or the re-establishment of railways at home in
the event of invasion; but the arrangements of the Corps did not provide
for the supply of men to take up railway construction and operation on
the occasion of military expeditions to other countries.

It was this particular need that led, in the summer of 1882, to
the conversion of the 8th Company of Royal Engineers into the 8th
(Railway) Company, R.E., the occasion therefore being the dispatch of
an expeditionary force under Sir Garnet (afterwards Lord) Wolseley to
Egypt, where the necessity for railway work of various kinds was likely
to arise. This pioneer corps of British Railway Troops was formed of
seven officers, one warrant officer, two buglers, and ninety-seven
N.C.O.'s and sappers. So constituted, it was thought better adapted
for railway work under conditions of active service than a body of
civilian railwaymen would be. There certainly was the disadvantage that
those constituting the 8th were not then proficient in railway matters;
but, before they left, both officers and men were given the run of the
London, Chatham and Dover Railway lines, and were there enabled to pick
up what they could of railway working in the locomotive and traffic
departments, while on the London and South Western and the South Eastern
Railways they were initiated, as far as could be done in the time, into
the art of platelaying. The Corps took out to Egypt four small tank
locomotives; two first-class, two second-class and six third-class
carriages; forty cattle trucks; four brake vans; two travelling cranes;
two breakdown vans, and five miles of permanent way, complete, with
accessories, tools, etc. Excellent work was done in carrying on regular
train services, repairing damaged track, etc., running an armoured
train, constructing supplementary short lines, and conveying troops,
sick and wounded, and stores, the practical utility of such an addition
to the engineering forces of the Army being thus fully assured.

In January, 1885, the 10th Company, Royal Engineers, was converted
into the 10th (Railway) Company, and sent to Egypt to assist in the
construction of the then contemplated Suakin-Berber line, to which
further reference will be made in Chapter XV. Both companies also
rendered good service in the South African War.

According to the "Manual of Military Railways," issued with Army Orders
dated March 1st, 1889, the duties likely to be required from the Royal
Engineers with regard to railways are as follows:-- (1) Laying, working,
and maintaining a military line of railway between two places; (2)
restoring an existing line which has been damaged or destroyed by an
enemy; (3) destroying an existing line as much as possible with a given
number of men and in a specified time, and (4) working and maintaining
an existing line. The "Manual" itself gave much technical information as
to the construction, maintenance, destruction and working of railways.
It was re-issued by the War Office in 1898 as Part VI of "Instruction
in Military Engineering," and was stated to embody a portion of the
course of instruction in railways at the school of Military Engineering,
Chatham. In the "Manual of Military Engineering," issued by the General
Staff of the War Office in 1905, instructions are given (Chap. XVII,
pars. 238-244) on the "hasty demolition, without explosives," of
railways, stations, buildings, rolling stock, permanent way, water
supply, etc.; and in Chapter XXIII, "Railways and Telegraphs," the
statement is made that--

The duties likely to be required of troops in the field with
regard to railways (apart from large railway schemes, for which
special arrangements would be necessary,) may be considered as
either temporary repairs or the laying of short lengths of line
to join up breaks, the construction of additional works, such
as platforms, etc., to adapt the line for military use, or the
demolition of an existing line.

Detailed information is given, for the benefit of R.E. officers,
concerning railway construction, repair and reconstruction, and the
main principles on which such work should be carried out for military
purposes are explained. The best system to adopt for the effecting of
rapid repairs is said to be that of establishing construction trains.
"The reconstruction staff live in these trains, which rapidly advance
along the line as it is being repaired, conveying, also, the necessary
material."

The peace training[35] of the Companies includes: reconnaissance, survey
and final location of a railway; laying out station yards; laying out
deviations; rapid laying of narrow-gauge "military" lines; construction
of all kinds of railway bridges; signal installation; water supply;
repairs to telegraphs and telephones necessary for working construction
lines; working of electric block instruments; fitting up armoured
trains; construction of temporary platforms, and working and maintenance
of construction trains.

Instruction in reconnaissance and survey work is given to officers
while at head-quarters, and a certain number of N.C.O.'s and men are
also instructed in railway survey work. Parties, each commanded by an
officer, are sent to carry out a reconnaissance and final location of
a railway between two points about forty miles apart on the assumption
that it is an unmapped country, and complete maps and sections are
prepared. The Companies have also undertaken the construction and
maintenance of the Woolmer Instructional Military Railway,--a 4 ft. 8½
in. gauge military line, about six miles in length, connecting Bordon
(London and South Western Railway) with Longmore Camp. All the plant
necessary for railway work and workshops for the repair of rolling stock
are provided at Longmore.

In time of war the chief duties of a Railway Company, R.E., would be to
survey, construct, repair and demolish railways and to work construction
and armoured trains.

In the South African campaign, when the military had to operate the
railways of which they took possession in the enemy's country, some
difficulty was experienced in obtaining from the ranks of the Army a
sufficient number of men capable of working the lines. As the result
of these conditions, it was arranged, in 1903, between the War Office
and certain of the British railway companies that the latter should
afford facilities in their locomotive departments and workshops for the
training of a number of non-commissioned officers and men as drivers,
firemen and mechanics, (capable of carrying out repairs,) in order to
qualify them better for railway work in the field, in case of need. This
arrangement was carried out down to the outbreak of war in 1914. The
period of training lasted either six or nine months. In order to avoid
the raising of any "labour" difficulties, no wages were given during
this period to Army men who were already receiving Army pay as soldiers,
but a bonus was granted to them by the railway companies, when they
left, on their obtaining from the head of the department to which they
had been attached a certificate of their efficiency.

STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS

The subject of strategical railways will be dealt with, both generally
and in special reference to their construction in Germany, in Chapter
XVIII. In regard to Great Britain it may be said that the position as
explained by Sir George Findlay in his article in the _United Service
Magazine_ for April, 1892, is that whilst Continental countries have
been spending large sums of money on the building of strategical
lines for the defence of their frontiers, (or, he might have added,
for the invasion, in some instances, of their neighbours' territory,)
Great Britain, more fortunate, possesses already a system of railways
which, though constructed entirely by private enterprise, could not,
even if they had been laid out with a view to national defence, "have
been better adapted for the purpose, since there are duplicated lines
directed from the great centres of population and of military activity
upon every point of the coast, while there are lines skirting the coast
in every direction, north, east, south and west."

Some years ago there were certain critics who recommended the building
of lines, for strategical purposes, along sections of our coast which
the ordinary railways did not directly serve; but the real necessity for
such lines was questioned, the more so because the transport of troops
by rail on such short-distance journeys as those that would have been
here in question might, with the marching to and from the railway and
the time occupied in entraining and detraining, take longer than if the
troops either marched all the way, or (in the event of there being only
a small force) if they went by motor vehicles to the coast.

One point that was, indeed, likely to arise in connection with the
movement of troops was the provision of facilities for their ready
transfer from one railway system to another, without change of carriage,
when making cross-country journeys or travelling, for instance, from the
North or the Midlands to ports in the South.

We have seen that in France many such links were established, subsequent
to the war of 1870-71, expressly for strategical reasons; but in
Great Britain a like result has been attained, apart from military
considerations, from the fact that some years ago the different railway
companies established physical connections between their different
systems with a view to the ready transfer of ordinary traffic. When,
therefore, the necessity arose for a speedy mobilisation, or for the
transport of troops from any part of Great Britain to any particular
port for an overseas destination, the necessary facilities for through
journeys by rail, in the shortest possible time, already existed.

In effect, the nearest approach to purely strategical lines in Great
Britain is to be found, perhaps, in those which connect military camps
with the ordinary railways; yet, while these particular lines may
have been built to serve a military purpose, they approximate less to
strategical railways proper, as understood in Germany, than to branch
lines and sidings constructed to meet the special needs of some large
industrial concern.

Generally speaking, the attitude of Parliament and of British
authorities in general has not been sympathetic to suggestions of
strategical railways, even when proposals put forward have had the
support of the War Office itself.

This tendency was well shown in connection with the Northern Junction
Railway scheme which was inquired into by a Select Committee of the
House of Commons in 1913. Under the scheme in question, a railway was
to be constructed from Brentford, on the west of London, to Wood Green,
on the north, passing through Acton, Ealing, Wembley Park, Hampstead
and Finchley, and establishing connections with and between several of
the existing main-line systems. In this respect it compared with those
"outer circle" railway systems which, as a further result of the war of
1870-71, were expressly designed by the French Government for the better
defence of Paris.

The Northern Junction scheme was introduced to the Select Committee
as one which, among other considerations, "would be important from a
military point of view for moving troops from one point to another
without taking them through London." Lieut.-General Sir J. S. Cowans,
Quartermaster-General, a member of the Army Council responsible for
the movement of troops, and deputed by the Secretary for War to give
evidence, said:

The proposed line would be a great advantage in time of
emergency if it was constructed in its entirety. The Army
Council felt that it would provide important routes between
the South of England and East Anglia and the North. At present
trains had to come from Aldershot to Clapham Junction by the
South-Western line, and be there broken up and sent over
congested City lines on to the Great Northern. By the proposed
line military trains could be handled without dividing them and
be transferred to the Great Northern or Great Eastern without
being sent over the congested City lines.

Strong opposition was offered, however, on the ground that the
construction of the line would do "irreparable damage" to the amenities
of the Hampstead Garden Suburb; and, after a sitting which extended
over several days, the Committee threw out the Bill, the Chairman
subsequently admitting that "they had been influenced very largely by
the objection of the Hampstead Garden Suburb."

In 1914 the scheme was introduced afresh into the House of Commons, with
certain modifications, the proposed line of route no longer passing
through the Hampstead Garden Suburb, though near to it. One member
of the House said he had collaborated in promoting the Bill because
"he most earnestly believed this railway was of vital import to the
mobilisation of our troops in time of emergency"; but another declared
that the alleged military necessity for the railway was "all fudge,"
while much was now said as to the pernicious effect the line would have
on the highly-desirable residential district of Finchley. In the result
strategical considerations were again set aside, and the House rejected
the Bill by a majority of seventy-seven.

FOOTNOTES:

[29] Colonel McMurdo had special qualifications for the post.
Becoming a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army in October, 1853, he was
Assistant-Adjutant-General at Dublin from May, 1854, to January,
1855. On February 2, 1855, he was entrusted with the duties of
Director-General of the new Land-Transport Corps, and was sent out to
the Crimea, with the local rank of Colonel, to reorganize the transport
service, then in a deplorably defective condition. He is said to have
accomplished this task with great energy and success. Before the close
of the campaign his corps numbered 17,000 men, with 28,000 horses,
mules, etc. He also took over the working of the pioneer military
railway in the Crimea. In 1857 the Land-Transport Corps was converted
into the Military Train, with Colonel McMurdo as Colonel-Commandant.
Early in 1860, when the Volunteer movement was assuming a permanent
character, Colonel McMurdo was appointed Inspector of Volunteers,
and in June of the same year he became Inspector-General, a post he
retained until January, 1865. He was chosen as Colonel of the Inns of
Court Volunteers on January 23, 1865, and his further appointment to
the post of Colonel of the newly-formed Engineer and Railway Volunteer
Staff Corps followed, as stated above, in February, 1865. He was created
K.C.B. in 1881 and G.C.B. in 1893. He died in 1894.

[30] The names of present members of the Corps will be found in "Hart's
Army List." Under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907
the Corps became part of the Territorial Force, and the designation
"Volunteer" was dropped from its title, which since that date has been
"The Engineer and Railway Staff Corps."

[31] "The Conveyance of Troops by Railway." By Col. J. S. Rothwell,
R.A., Professor of Military Administration, Staff College, _United
Service Magazine_, Dec., 1891, and Jan., 1892.

[32] Detailed information as to the capacity of British rolling stock;
composition of trains required for units at war strength; truck space
taken up by Army vehicles; standard forms of reports on existing
railways, and other matters, is published in the official publication
known as "Railway Manual (War)."

[33] _The Railway Magazine_, May, 1901.

[34] For details as to the nature of the organisation by which these
results were effected, see an article on "The Great Eastern Railway
and the Army Manoeuvres in East Anglia--1912," by H. J. Prytherch,
in the _Great Eastern Railway Magazine_ for November, 1912. In the
_Great Western Railway Magazine_ for November, 1909, there are given,
under the heading, "The Transport of an Army," some details concerning
the military transport on the Great Western system during the Army
manoeuvres of that year. The traffic conveyed was, approximately, 514
officers, 14,552 men, 208 officers' horses, 2,474 troop horses, 25 guns,
34 limbers, and 581 wagons and carts. "The military authorities and the
Army contractors," it is said, "expressed their pleasure at the manner
in which the work was performed by the Company's staff."

[35] "General Principles, Organisation and Equipment of Royal
Engineers," _Royal Engineers Journal_, February, 1910.

CHAPTER XV

MILITARY RAILWAYS

By the expression "military railways" is meant lines of railways which,
as distinct from commercial lines serving public purposes, have been
designed expressly for military use. The fact that any line forming
part of the ordinary railway system of the country is employed for the
conveyance of troops either direct to the theatre of war or to some port
for embarkation therefrom does not constitute that line a "military"
railway, in the strict sense of the term, whatever the extent of its
use for military transport for the time being. Such line remains a
commercial railway, all the same, and the application to it of the
designation "military" is erroneous.

Military railways proper fall mainly into two groups--(1) "field"
or "siege" railways, constructed on the theatre of war for moving
heavy guns, platform materials, etc., to their position; conveying
ammunition and supplies to siege batteries, magazines, advanced
trenches or bombproofs; bringing up reinforcements rapidly in case of
a sortie; conveying working-parties to and from their work; removing
sick and wounded to the rear, and other kindred purposes, the loads
being generally hauled by animals, by gasoline motor or by men; and
(2) "supply" railways, specially constructed to convey troops, stores,
etc., from the base to the front, in time of war, or from an ordinary
main-line railway to a military camp or depôt in time of peace, where
local lines of railway are not available for the purpose.

These two main groups include various types of railways coming under
one or the other designation, and ranging from a very light portable
tramway, put down at express speed to serve an emergency, and worked
by small engines, mules or horses, to substantially built lines, of
standard gauge, designed both to be worked by locomotives and to carry
the largest possible number of troops or amount of freight.

In any case, the details of construction, equipment and operation of
a military railway vary from those of a commercial railway since the
one would be intended to serve only a specific and possibly temporary
purpose, in the attainment of which the question of speed would be a
secondary consideration, whereas the other would require to assume
a permanent form, be capable of higher speeds, and afford adequate
guarantee of safety for the public, by whom it would be used. The
building, also, of a military railway may be, and generally is, carried
out by a corps of Railway Troops to which are specially delegated
the duties of laying, working, maintaining, repairing, restoring or
destroying railways; and, provided the desired lines were built with
sufficient dispatch, and answered the desired purpose, the military
commanders who would alone be concerned might well be satisfied.

In many different ways the resort to military railways, whatever
their particular type, has greatly extended the range of advantages
to be gained from the application of rail-power to war. A full record
of all that has been accomplished in this direction could hardly be
attempted here; but a few typical examples of what has been done in this
direction--though not always with conspicuous success--may be offered.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

The earliest instance of a purely military railway being constructed
to serve the purpose of a campaign occurred in the Crimean War; and,
although the line then made would to-day be regarded as little more than
an especially inefficient apology for a railway, it was looked upon at
the time as a remarkable innovation in warfare. It further established a
precedent destined to be widely followed in later years.

Between the camp of the allies at Sebastopol and their base of supplies
at Balaklava the distance was only seven or eight miles; yet in the
winter of 1854-55 the fatigue parties sent for rations, clothing, fuel,
huts, ammunition and other necessaries were frequently no less than
twelve hours in doing the return journey. The reason was that during
the greater part of that time they were floundering in a sea of mud.
The soil of the Crimea is clay impregnated with salt, and, under the
combined influence of climatic conditions and heavy traffic, the route
between camp and base had been converted into a perfect quagmire.
Horses, mules and carts were, at first, alone available for transport
purposes; but, although plenty of animals were to be obtained in the
surrounding country, only a limited number could be employed by reason
of the lack of forage, a totally inadequate supply having been sent
out from England. As for the animals that were used, their sufferings,
as the result of those terrible journeys, their own shortage of food,
and the effect of the intense cold on their half-starved bodies, were
terrible. "In the rear of each Division," says General Sir Edward
Hamley, in "The War in the Crimea," "a scanty group of miserable ponies
and mules, whose backs never knew what it was to be quit of the saddle,
shivered, and starved, and daily died." They died, also, on every
journey to or from the base. The toil of going through the quagmire
even for their own forage, or of bringing it back when they had got it,
was too great for them, and the whole line of route was marked by their
remains.

As for the troops, they experienced great hardships owing to the
inadequate supplies of provisions and fuel at the camp, although there
might be plenty of both at the base. Apart from the physical conditions
of the roads, or apologies for roads, between the two points, the
campaign was begun without transport arrangements of any kind whatever.
A transport corps formed for the British Army in 1799, under the title
of the Royal Wagon Train, had been disbanded in 1833, and, whether from
motives of economy or because the need for war preparations in time
of peace was not sufficiently appreciated, no other corps had been
created to take its place. Hence the troops sent to the Crimea were
required, at the outset, to look after the transport themselves, and in
many instances they even had to do the work of mules and horses. It was
not until January 24, 1855, that a Land Transport Corps, composed of
volunteers from various arms of the service, was raised by Royal Warrant
and began to provide for a defect in the military organisation which
had, in the meantime, involved the allies, and especially the British,
in severe privations owing to the frequent shortage of supplies.
The original intention to establish a depôt at head-quarters before
Sebastopol had had to be abandoned because of the hopelessness of any
attempt to get a sufficient surplus of provisions to form a store.

Such were the conditions that the pioneer military railway was designed
to remedy. Built, at a very slow rate, by English contractors, who
arrived at the Crimea with their men and material during the month
of January, 1855, the line was a single-track one, with a 4 feet 8½
inch gauge. For the first two miles from Balaklava it was worked by a
locomotive. Then the trucks were drawn up an incline, eight at a time,
by a stationary engine. Six horses next drew two trucks at a time up
another incline. After this came a fairly level piece of road, followed
by two gullies where each wagon was detached in succession and made to
run down one side of the gully and up the other by its own momentum.
Then horses were again attached to the trucks and so drew them, finally,
to the end of the line on the Upland.

Five locomotives, of from 12 to 18 tons weight, were provided, and
there were about forty ordinary side-tip ballast wagons--all entirely
unsuitable for use on a military railway.

At first the men belonging to the contractors' staff--navvies and
others--were entrusted with the working of the line. The question had
been raised as to whether their services should not be made use of in
other directions, as well. On their being sent out from England the
idea was entertained that they might construct trenches and batteries,
in addition to building the railway, and there was a suggestion that
they should, also, join the siege parties in the attack on Sebastopol.
In order to test the question (as recorded by Major-General Whitworth
Porter, in his "History of the Corps of Royal Engineers"), Sir John
Burgoyne wrote to Mr. Beattie, principal engineer of the Railway
Department, asking if he would approve of an invitation being given to
the men to undergo such training as would qualify them to defend any
position in which they might happen to be. In his answer Mr. Beattie
wrote:--

The subject of your letter was very fully and anxiously
discussed in London before I left, and it was determined _not_
to arm the men. They were considered too valuable to be used as
soldiers, and were distinctly told that they would not be called
upon to fight.

Their value, however, did not stand the test it underwent when they
were called on to work the railway they had built. They were found to
be lacking in any sense of discipline; they repeatedly struck work when
their services were most urgently needed, and they had to be got rid of
accordingly. They were replaced by men from the Army Works Corps and the
Land Transport Corps, then in operation in the Crimea, and the members
of the new staff--constituting a disciplined force--worked admirably.
Major Powell, who became traffic manager of the line in March, 1855,
and chief superintendent in the following July, has said concerning
them[36]:--

Many lost their lives in the execution of their duty. When
I required them to work night and day to throw forward supplies
for the great struggle--the capture of Sebastopol--several of
them remained seventy-two hours continuously at work.

The quantities of ammunition and stores which could be carried were
below the requirements of the troops engaged in the siege operations;
but during the last bombardment of Sebastopol--when the line was worked
continuously, night and day, by a staff increased to about 1,000 men, of
whom 400 were Turks--the transport effected rose from 200 tons a day,
the limit attained under operation by the undisciplined navvies, to
700 tons. The line also did excellent work on the re-embarkment of the
troops at the end of the campaign.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

In the American War of Succession, the existing lines of railway
were supplemented in various instances by "surface railroads," which
consisted of rails and sleepers laid on the ordinary ground without
any preparation of a proper road bed, yet serving a useful purpose,
notwithstanding the rough and ready way in which they were put together.

THE ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGN

How a railway specially constructed for the purpose may assist a
military expedition in the prosecution of a "little war" in an
uncivilised country, practically devoid of roads, and offering great
physical difficulties, was shown on the occasion of the British Campaign
in Abyssinia in 1867-68; though the circumstances under which the
line in question was built were not in themselves creditable to the
authorities concerned.

Sent to effect the release of the British prisoners whom King Theodore
was keeping in captivity at Magdala, the expedition under Sir Robert
Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala) entered upon what was to be
quite as much an engineering as a military exploit. Not only was Magdala
300 miles from Annesley Bay, the base of operations on the Red Sea, but
it stood, as a hill fortress, on a plateau more than 9,000 feet above
the sea-level. To reach it meant the construction of roads in three
sections. The first, which, in parts, had to be cut in the mountain
side, rose to a height of 7,400 feet in 63 miles; the second allowed
of no more than a cart road, and the third and final stage was a mere
mountain track where the only transport possible was that of mules or
elephants.

When, in October, 1867, the advance Brigade landed at Zoulla, the port
in Annesley Bay from which the advance inland was to be made, they took
with them the materials for some tramway lines intended to connect
two landing piers with the depôts it was proposed to establish a mile
inland. In November these plans were altered in favour of a line of
railway, twelve miles in length, from the landing-place to Koomayleh, at
the entrance of the Soroo Pass, the route to be taken by the expedition
on its journey to the Abyssinian highlands. All the necessary plant
was to be supplied by the Government of Bombay, who also undertook to
provide the labour; but it was the middle of January, 1868, before a
real start could be made with the work.

Even then, as told by Lieut. Willans, R.E.,[37] who took part in the
expedition, the progress made was extremely slow. The rails obtained
from different railway companies in India were of five different
patterns, of odd lengths, and varying in weight from 30 lb. to 65 lb.
a yard. Some of them had been in use many years on the harbour works
at Karachi, had been taken up and laid down several times, and had,
also, been bent to fit sharp curves or cut to suit the original line.
Some single-flanged rails had been fitted in the Government workshops
at Bombay with fish-plates and bolts; but the holes in the plates and
rails were not at uniform distances, and the bolts fitted the holes so
tightly as to allow of no play. Then, when the rails arrived, no spikes
came with them, and without spikes they could not be laid. When the
spikes followed, it was found that the augurs for boring holes in the
sleepers had been left at Bombay, to come on by another ship; though
this particular difficulty was met by the artisans of the 23rd Punjab
Pioneer Regiment making augurs for themselves.

If the rails gave much trouble--and even when they had been laid it was
no unusual thing for them to break between two sleepers and throw the
engine off the line--the locomotives and rolling stock caused still
more.

Six locomotives were shipped from Bombay; but, owing to the great
difficulty in landing and the labour involved in putting them together,
only four were used. Of these, one was a tank engine which, although
just turned out from the railway workshops at Bombay, required new
driving wheels after it had been running a fortnight. Another came with
worn-out boiler tubes, and these had to be replaced at Zoulla. The
two others, tank engines with only four wheels each, had previously
seen many years' service at Karachi. All the engines were very light,
weighing with coal and water from 16 to 20 tons each. The best of them
could do no more than draw fifteen small loaded trucks up an incline of
one in sixty.

The sixty wagons sent were ordinary trolleys having no springs, no
spring buffers and no grease boxes. Their axle-boxes were of cast iron,
and wore out within a fortnight, owing to the driving sand. As the
railway came into use, every truck was loaded to its fullest capacity,
and the combination of this weight with the jarring and oscillation on a
very rough line led either to the breaking of the coupling chains or to
the coupling bars being pulled from the wagons at starting. When fresh
coupling chains were asked for it was found that the boxes containing
them had either been left behind at Bombay or were buried beneath
several hundred tons of other supplies on board ship. At least forty per
cent. of the trucks were either constantly under repair or had to be put
aside as unfit for use. In May a number of open wagons with springs and
spring buffers arrived from Bombay. Some of these were converted into
passenger carriages.

Difficulties arose in other directions, besides.

The plant forwarded was adapted to the Indian standard gauge of 5 feet
6 inches, and was heavy and difficult to handle, especially under the
troublesome conditions of landing. To-day, of course, a narrow-gauge
railway, easily dealt with, would be employed in circumstances such as
those of the Abyssinian expedition.

The Indian natives who had been sent in the first instance to construct
the line were found unsuitable, and had to be replaced by gangs of
Chinese picked up in Bombay. The latter worked well and gave no trouble.

The country through which the line was laid was timberless, if not,
also, practically waterless. Wells had to be sunk for the water wanted
for the locomotives and the working-parties.

The heat was excessive. The temperature at times was 180 degrees Fahr.
in the sun. English navvies could not have made the line at all.

The two piers where the incoming vessels could alone be unloaded got
so congested with traffic that it was only with the greatest trouble
railway material could be landed.

Use began to be made of the line as soon as any of it was ready, and the
traffic at the shore end at once became so heavy that it was difficult
to get materials and supplies through to the construction parties at
the other end. Officers, also, who should have been superintending the
construction had to devote a good deal of time, instead, to details of
operation, or to looking after the repairs of rolling stock.

In all these circumstances one cannot be surprised at the slow rate of
progress made. One may, rather, wonder that the line got built at all.
As it was, four months were spent on eleven miles of railway, or a total
of twelve miles including sidings. There remained still another mile or
so to be built when, at the end of April, news arrived that the object
of the expedition had been attained, and that Magdala had fallen. It was
then decided not to complete the line, but to devote all energies to
preparing for the heavy traffic to be dealt with in the conveyance of
troops, baggage and stores on the return journey.

From the middle of May to the middle of June the resources of the line
were severely taxed; but a great improvement had been made in the
working arrangements, and a railway which had involved so much trouble
in the making was eventually found to be of great practical service.
Lieutenant Willans says of it:--

The Abyssinian railway was a great success, if one may gauge
it by the amount of assistance it gave to the expedition, by
the celerity and dispatch with which, by its aid, stores were
landed and brought up to the store sheds, and by the rapidity
and ease with which the troops and their baggage were brought
back and re-embarked at once....

As an auxiliary to the expedition, and as an additional
means of transport, no one who had anything to do in connection
with it can have doubted its extreme utility.

Faulty, therefore, as had been the conditions under which the line
was constructed, the results nevertheless established definitely the
principle that, in such campaigns as the one in Abyssinia, military
railways might serve an extremely useful purpose in facilitating the
transport of troops and supplies.

The Abyssinian experiences did, however, further show the desirability
of any country likely to find itself in a position requiring the
construction of military railways--as an aid to wars small or
great--creating in advance an organisation designed to enable it, as far
as possible, to meet promptly whatever emergency might arise, without
the risk of having to deal with defective material, unsatisfactory
labour, and administrative mismanagement.

The same lesson was to be enforced by other expeditions in which
England has taken part, and, down to the period when improvements in
our system--or lack of system--began to be effected, there was much
scope for criticism as to the way in which military railways, designed
to facilitate operations undertaken in countries having a lack of
communications, had been either constructed or worked. Writing, in
1882, in the "Professional Papers" of the Royal Engineers (Chatham) on
"Railways for Military Communication in the Field," Col. J. P. Maquay,
R.E., observed in regard to what had been the experiences to that date:--

In most of the wars that England has undertaken during
the past thirty years, attempts have been made to construct
railways for the transport of stores and materials from the base
of operations. This base must necessarily be on the sea coast
for a country situated as England is. These railways have not
been successful chiefly because, when war had broken out, such
material was hastily got together as seemed most suitable to
the occasion; and, further, the construction of these lines was
not carried out on any system. It is not surprising, therefore,
that our military railways were never completed in time to be
of much use to the troops they were intended to serve.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

In the Franco-German War of 1870-71 the Germans constructed two military
railways--(1) a line, twenty-two miles in length, connecting Remilly, on
the Saarbrück Railway, with Pont à Mousson, on the Metz-Frouard line;
and (2) a loop line, three miles long, passing round the tunnel at
Nanteuil, blown up by the French.

Special interest attached to these two lines inasmuch as they were the
result of construction work done, not in anticipation of a war, or even
immediately preceding hostilities, but during the course of an active
campaign. In addition to this, they afforded an opportunity for showing
what Prussia could do, under pressure, with the Construction Corps she
had formed in order, among other things, to meet just such contingencies
as those that now arose.

At the beginning of the war the Prussian General Staff had (according to
Rüstow) assumed that Metz would offer a prolonged resistance, and that
the defenders would be certain to make an attempt to interrupt the rail
communication between Germany and her troops in the field. To meet the
position which might thus be created, it was decided to build from Pont
à Mousson to Remilly a field railway which, avoiding Metz, would link up
at Remilly with the line proceeding thence to Saarbrück, and so ensure
the maintenance of direct rail communication to and from Germany. On
August 14, 1870, the day of the rearguard action at Borny, the survey
and the levelling of the ground were begun, and three days later a start
was made with the construction. Altogether some 4,200 men were employed
on the work, namely, 400 belonging to two Field Railway Companies; 800
forming four Fortress Pioneer Companies, and about 3,000 miners from the
colliery districts of Saarbrück who had been thrown out of work owing to
the war and accepted employment on the railway. The building corps had
at their disposal a park of 330 wagons and other vehicles, and patrol
and requisition duties were performed for them by a squadron of Cavalry.

Notwithstanding that so considerable a force was available for the
purpose, the work of building the twenty-two miles of railway took
forty-eight days, the line not being ready for operation until October
4. This was in no way a great achievement, and it did not compare
favourably with much that was done by the Federal Construction Corps
employed in the American War of Secession. It is true that the
irregularities of the ground were such as to render necessary numerous
cuttings and embankments, and that two bridges and two viaducts had
to be provided; but the cuttings were only about 3 feet deep, and the
embankments were only 5 feet high, except near one of the viaducts,
where they were 10 feet high. The viaducts and bridges were of timber,
with spans of about 16 feet. The building of the line was, therefore, in
no way a formidable undertaking, from an engineering point of view.

Not only, however, did it take over 4,000 men nearly fifty days to make
twenty-two miles of line, but the work had been done in such a way that
when the autumn rains came on the track settled in many places; traffic
on the lines became very dangerous; one of the bridges was washed away
by the floods, and almost as many men had to be put on to do repairs as
had previously been employed for the construction. Traffic of a very
moderate description--each locomotive drawing only four wagons at a
time--was carried on for just twenty-six days, and then, happily for the
engineers concerned, the developments in and around Metz rendered the
line no longer necessary.

How the restoration of the traffic interrupted through the explosion of
French mines in the tunnel at Nanteuil occupied from September 17 to
November 22 has already been told on page 128.

RUSSO-TURKISH WAR

In the opinion of one English military critic, what short lines were
made in the Franco-German War "were neither so speedily constructed
nor so successful in result as to encourage the idea that lines of any
length could be made during a campaign"; but a different impression
is to be derived from the story of what was accomplished in the same
direction in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.

Russia planned her campaign against Turkey in the hope and expectation
that it would be short, sharp and decisive. She started her mobilisation
in good time, that is to say, in November, 1876, although she did
not declare war until April 24, 1877. Making the mistake, however,
of despising her foe, she anticipated no serious opposition from the
Turks, but expected, rather, to paralyse them by a rapid advance, have a
triumphal march to Constantinople, secure the desired safeguards for the
Christians in Turkey, and see the war over before the end of the summer.

One reason why Russia specially desired to bring the campaign to so
early a conclusion lay in the deficient and precarious nature of the
rail communication. Under a convention which had been agreed to with
Rumania on April 16, 1877, Russia was to have a free passage for her
troops through that country. She was, also, to have the use of the
Rumanian railways and of all their transport facilities. But the only
line then running through Rumania was one that went from Galatz, on the
Russo-Rumanian frontier, to Bucharest, and thence (with a branch to
Slatina) to Giurgevo, on the Danube, where it connected with a Bulgarian
line from Rustchuk, on the south of the river, to Varna, the Turkish
base of supplies on the Black Sea. Not only was the Rumanian railway
system thus limited in extent, but the lines had been indifferently
constructed, they were badly maintained, and they had an inadequate
personnel together with an insufficiency both of rolling stock and of
terminal facilities. Still further, the fact that the Russian railways
had a broader gauge than the railways of Rumania (among other European
countries) caused great delay in the transfer, at the frontier, from the
one system to the other, not alone of 200,000 men, but of the 850 field
and 400 siege guns, of the ammunition, and of much other material the
troops required to take with them. The alternative to dependence on the
railway was a resort to roads impassable in wet weather.

What really caused the Russian plans to miscarry, however, was the
obstinate defence of Plevna by Osman Pasha, who took up his position
there on July 19, subjected the Russians to successive repulses, and did
not capitulate until December 10, the siege costing the Russians 55,000
men and the Rumanians 10,000.

When it was realised that the check at Plevna rendered certain a
prolongation of the campaign, Russia set about the construction of
a series of new lines of railway during the course of the war. The
principal lines thus taken in hand were:--

1. A line in Russia, from Bender, on the Dniester, to Galatz,
establishing direct communication between the Odessa railways and the
Rumanian frontier, and affording improved facilities for the sending of
reinforcements to the seat of war.

2. A line from Fratesti, on the Bucharest-Giurgevo Railway, to Simnitza,
the point on the north bank of the Danube where, on the night of June
26-7, the Russians built the bridge which enabled them to cross the
river.

3. A line from Sistova, on the south side of the Danube, to Tirnova
(Bulgaria), situate about thirty miles south-east of Plevna, and about
twenty-five north of the Shipka Pass.

Of these three lines the construction of the first, 189 miles in
length, was begun at the end of July, 1877. The original intention
was to build a railway to serve the purposes of the war only; but the
conclusion that ulterior strategical and commercial purposes would
alike be served by linking up Odessa with the Rumanian frontier led
to the building of a railway likely to be of permanent usefulness.
The line was a single-track one, with a sufficient number of stations
and passing places to allow of the running of seven trains in each
direction in the twenty-four hours. The construction, carried out by
contract, involved the building of a number of timber bridges and the
provision of several embankments, one of which was over three miles in
length. Great difficulties were experienced in regard to labour, and
especially by reason of the refusal of the men to work either on Sundays
or on their numerous saints' days. Trains were, nevertheless, running
on the line within 100 days of the construction being started, and this
notwithstanding the fact that the number of actual working days had been
only fifty-eight. Whereas, therefore, the Germans had, in 1870, with the
help of a Construction Corps over 4,000 strong, taken forty-eight days
to build twenty-two miles of railway between Pont à Mousson and Remilly,
the Russians in 1877 built, by contract, 189 miles of railway in just
over double the same period.

A railway from Fratesti to Simnitza had become indispensable inasmuch
as the main line of communication for the Russian Army could not be
continued for an indefinite period along the forty miles of defective
roads--speedily worn out by the heavy traffic--which separated the
Bucharest-Giurgevo line from the bridge built across the Danube. The
only important earthwork necessary was an embankment a mile and a half
long and fourteen feet high. The bridges to be provided included one
of 420 feet and two of 210 feet each. In this instance the troubles
experienced were due to the difficulty in getting the necessary
materials for the work of construction owing partly to the existing
Rumanian lines being blocked with military traffic, and partly to the
state of the roads and to the use of all available draught horses for
Army transport purposes. There could thus be no great celerity shown in
construction, and the forty miles of railway, begun in the middle of
September, were, in fact, not ready for working until the beginning of
December.

Like difficulties were experienced, though to a still more acute degree,
in regard to the Sistova-Tirnova line, the length of which was to be
seventy-five miles; and here only the earthworks could be finished
before the end of the campaign.

What, however, had been accomplished during the time the war was in
progress was (1) the completion of 229 miles of new railway, and the
making of the road-bed for another seventy-five miles, together with the
carrying out of a number of minor railway works; (2) the acquisition,
by purchase in different countries, of 120 locomotives and 2,150 wagons
and trucks, all new, and (3) the provision of a steam railway ferry
across the Danube.[38]

So the development of the rail-power principle in warfare was
carried still further by this construction, during the course of the
Russo-Turkish conflict, of a greater length of railways, designed for
military use, than had ever been built under like conditions before.
The world gained a fresh lesson as to the importance of the rôle played
by railways in war, and it was offered, also, a striking example of
what could be done in the way of rapidly providing them in a time of
emergency.

On the other hand it had to be remembered that, of the three railways in
question, the one which included 189 miles out of the total 229 miles
built was constructed on Russian territory where there was no danger of
interruption by the enemy, while the delays which occurred with the two
other lines, owing to the congestion of traffic, under war conditions,
on existing railways depended upon for the supply of materials, seemed
to point (1) to the risk that might, from this cause, be run if the
building of lines necessary or desirable in the interests of some
prospective campaign were left until the outbreak of hostilities, and
(2) to the wisdom of constructing all such lines, as far as necessary
and practicable, in time of peace.

THE SUDAN

If we turn now to the Sudan, we gain examples of military railways
which, designed for the purposes of war, and constructed, in part,
during the progress of active hostilities, first rendered great services
in facilitating the conquest of a vast area, and then developed into a
system of Government railways operated, in turn, for the purposes of
peace, and accomplishing results as conspicuously successful in the
latter direction as they had previously done in the former.

During the time that Saïd Pasha was Viceroy of Egypt (1854-63) there
was brought forward a scheme for the linking up of Egypt and the Sudan
by means of a single line of railway from Cairo to Khartoum, with a
branch to Massowa, on the Red Sea. It was an ambitious proposal, and,
if it could have been carried into effect, the opening up of the Sudan
to civilisation, by means of an iron road, might have altered the
whole subsequent history of that much-suffering land. But the cost was
regarded as prohibitive, and the scheme was abandoned for a time, to
be revived, however, in a modified form in 1871, when Ismail Pasha was
Khedive. It was then proposed that the line should start at Wady Halfa
and be continued to Matemmeh (Shendy), situate about 100 miles north of
Khartoum--a total distance of 558 miles. In 1875 a beginning was made
with the building of this railway, which was to consist of a single
line, with a gauge of 3 feet 6 inches, and was to be made with 50-lb.
rails and 7-ft. sleepers; but when, in 1877, after an expenditure of
about £400,000, the railway had been carried no farther than Sarras,
thirty-three and a half miles from the starting-point, it was stopped
for lack of funds.

In the autumn of 1884 the British expedition to Khartoum, where General
Gordon was endeavouring to maintain his position against the Mahdi's
followers, was resolved upon, and it was then decided to extend the
Sudan Railway beyond the point already reached, at Sarras, in order to
facilitate still further the journey of the troops along the valley of
the Nile, which had been selected as the route of the expedition.

Platelaying for the extension was begun in September by a party of
English and Egyptian infantry and native labourers, afterwards joined
by the 4th Battalion Egyptian Army and the 8th (Railway) Company of the
Royal Engineers. While, however, materials previously stored at Sarras
were found to be still available, the trucks containing rails, etc.,
for the extension work had to be pushed by hand from Sarras to railhead
owing to the absence of engines; sleepers were carried on the backs of
camels, of which 300 were employed for the purpose, and the coolie work
was entrusted to 700 native labourers, mainly old men and boys, most
of whom had deserted by the end of October, when further platelaying
was discontinued. By that time the extension works had reached the
thirty-ninth mile, and the line from Sarras to this point was opened on
December 4.

Following on the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon in January,
1885, came the decision to extend the line to Firket (103 miles), in
view of a then projected further campaign in the autumn of that year.
The extension was sanctioned towards the end of February; fifty-two
miles of permanent way were ordered from England; 300 platelayers
and railway mechanics were obtained from India, to supplement the
construction forces already available; and on August 7 the extension was
completed as far as Akasha (87 miles).

Meanwhile, however, there had been a change of policy which affected
the whole situation. On the return of the expeditionary force to
Korti (situate at the southern extremity of the great Nile bend), the
whole of the country to the south thereof passed under the control of
the Dervishes; and the British Government, reluctant at that time to
enter on the formidable task of reconquest, decided that no further
military operations should be taken in hand, and that the Sudan must be
definitely abandoned. Orders were accordingly given by Lord Wolseley in
May, 1885, for the withdrawal of the troops from all stations south of
Dongola, which itself was abandoned on June 15, the retreat continuing
as far as Akasha. Beyond this point, therefore, platelaying for the
proposed railway extension was not carried, although the formation
levels had been completed to Firket.

Subsequently the British retreat was continued to Wady Halfa, which then
became the southern frontier of Egypt, the railway extension thence to
Akasha, together with all posts to the south of Wady Halfa, being also
abandoned.

Excellent service had, nevertheless, been rendered by the railway, as
far as it was carried.

Operation of the line had been taken over by the 8th (Railway) Company,
R.E., who, at the outset, had at their disposal only five more or less
decrepit locomotives, fifty open trucks, five covered goods vans, and
six brake vans. The troops were conveyed in the open trucks, and by the
end of 1884 all the stores for the opening of the campaign had been
passed up. During the course of 1885 additional locomotives and rolling
stock were obtained from the Cape.

Summing up the work done on the Sudan Military Railway for the Nile
Expedition of 1884-5, Lieut. M. Nathan, R.E.,[39] says that it included
(1) the repair and maintenance of thirty-three and a half miles of
existing railway; (2) the construction of fifty-three and a half
miles of new line through a nearly waterless desert, with no means of
distributing material except the line itself; (3) the transport, for
the most part with limited and indifferent stock, of about 9,000 troops
round the worst part of the second cataract when going up the river, and
round nearly the whole of it when coming down; and (4) the carriage of
40,000 tons for an average distance of thirty-six and a half miles.

As against what had thus been achieved in the Nile Valley must be set a
failure on the Red Sea.

When, on the fall of Khartoum in January, 1885, the British Government
first decided on an extension of the Nile Valley Railway, they further
resolved on the building of a military railway from Suakin to Berber,
on the Nile, in order to have a second line of communication available
for Lord Wolseley's Army; and an Anglo-Indian force was sent to Suakin,
under the command of General Sir Gerald Graham, in order, first, to
defeat the Dervishes in the Eastern Sudan, and then to protect the
construction of the proposed railway. Such a line would obviously have
been of great strategical value to a Nile expeditionary force; but
the attempt to build it broke down owing, in part, to the defective
nature of the organisation resorted to, though still more to the active
opposition of the enemy.

Sir Andrew Clarke, Inspector-General of Fortifications, had from the
first advocated that the line should be supplied and laid by the
military engineering strength then available; but he was over-ruled, and
the work was given to an English firm of contractors in the expectation,
as Major-General Whitworth Porter tells, in volume two of the "History
of the Corps of Royal Engineers," "that the necessary material would be
supplied more readily, and in shorter time, through civilian agency."
It was, however, decided to send the 10th (Railway) Company of Royal
Engineers both to carry out some local works in the neighbourhood of
Suakin and to assist the contractors in the longer undertaking; and
this military element was strengthened, not only by a force of Indian
coolies, but, also, by the addition of thirty-nine members of Engineer
Volunteer Corps in England who had enlisted for the campaign, all having
had experience in trades qualifying them for railway work.[40] There was
thus practically a dual system, workable, in the opinion of Sir Andrew
Clarke, "only by a species of compromise which was both unscientific and
uneconomical."

As for interruptions by the Dervishes, these took the form of constant
attacks both on the line under construction and on the workers. Several
actions were fought, and at Tofrik, near Suakin, the British sustained a
serious loss of life. Posts were erected as the work slowly progressed,
and the bullet-proof train mentioned on page 76 was used for patrolling
the line at night; but in face of all the difficulties experienced the
work was definitely abandoned when only twenty miles of the intended
railway had been completed. The troops were recalled in June, 1885,
the railway material not used was brought back to England, and a line
linking up Suakin (and Port Sudan) with Berber, via Atbara Junction, was
not finally opened until 1906.

Reverting to the Nile Valley Railway, it is gratifying to be able to
say that the success already spoken of as having been attained in this
direction was but a prelude to still more important developments that
were to follow.

To prevent the carrying out of schemes which the Dervishes were known to
be preparing for an invasion of Egypt, the British Government decided,
early in 1896, to allow Egypt to resume occupation of the country along
the Nile Valley abandoned at the time of the withdrawal in 1885, and
on March 12, 1896, Sir Herbert (now Earl) Kitchener, who had succeeded
to the command of the Egyptian army in 1892, received instructions
to advance to the south from Wady Halfa. Akasha, the point to which
the Nile Valley Railway had been built, was occupied on March 20, the
Dervishes retreating to Firket.

As a means towards realising the objects of the expedition, Sir Herbert
Kitchener resolved to continue the railway along the Nile Valley to
Kerma; but this meant the construction of practically a new railway,
since the Dervishes had torn up over fifty of the eighty-seven miles of
the original line between Wady Halfa and Akasha, burning the sleepers
and twisting the rails, while the remainder of the line was in such
a condition that it required relaying. The work of construction was
entrusted to a staff of Royal Engineers operating under Lieut. (now
Major-General Sir E. Percy C.) Girouard, and it was pushed forward with
great energy, the line being urgently required for the forwarding of
stores to the front, and especially so on account of the impediments to
navigation along the Nile due to the cataracts.

With the help of the railway, so far as it had then been restored, Sir
Herbert Kitchener concentrated a force of 9,000 men at Akasha, and
early in June he made a successful advance on Firket. The Dervishes
retired to Dongola; but it was thought prudent, before following them
up, to await a further extension of the railway. This was completed as
far as Kosha, 116 miles from Wady Halfa, by August 4, 1896. Three weeks
later some heavy rains, lasting three days, were the cause of floods
which, in a few hours, destroyed twelve miles of the newly-constructed
line. The repairs were completed in about a week, but in the same month
there was an outbreak of cholera which carried off a large number of the
working staff.

Utilising the railway as far as Kosha, Sir Herbert Kitchener
concentrated the whole of his force at Fereig, on the north of the
Kaibar cataract, and from thence a further advance was made to Dongola,
which place the Dervishes made no attempt to defend.

The immediate purpose of the expedition had thus been attained; but, in
the meantime, a further campaign had been resolved upon for the purpose
of breaking down the power of the Khalifa and effecting the conquest
of Khartoum. To this end the railway was continued another hundred
miles, from Kosha to Kerma, which point was reached in May, 1897. Some
216 miles of railway had thus been completed in about thirteen months,
notwithstanding interruptions which had led to very little progress
being made during five months of this period, and notwithstanding, also,
the fact that construction work had to be carried on simultaneously with
the transport of troops and stores so far as the line had been completed.

Before, however, Kerma was reached, Sir Herbert Kitchener instructed
the staff of the Royal Engineers to make a survey of the Nubian Desert
with a view to seeing whether or not it would be practicable to build
an alternative line of railway across it from Wady Halfa direct to Abu
Hamed (a distance of 232 miles), thus giving a direct route to Khartoum.

A survey carried out at the end of 1896 showed that the work was not
likely to present any unsurmountable engineering difficulties, and that
the absence of water could be overcome by the sinking of wells. The
only doubtful point was whether construction could be carried through
without interruption by a still active enemy.

It was seen that the proposed desert line was likely to be of far
greater importance, both strategically and politically, than a
continuation of the Wady Halfa-Kerma line round the remainder of the
Nile bend. The cutting off of this bend altogether would confer a great
advantage on the Expeditionary Force. It was thus resolved to build the
line, to run the risk of attacks by the enemy, and to push construction
forward with the greatest energy.

A start was made with the work on May 15, 1897, the staff which had
been engaged on the Nile Valley line to Kerma returning to Wady Halfa
in order to take the desert line in hand. By the end of July, 115 of
the 232 miles of line had been completed, and Sir Herbert Kitchener,
utilising the railway which had already been constructed to Kerma, then
sent a force along the Nile Valley to effect the capture of Abu Hamed.
This was accomplished on August 7, and the constructors of the desert
line were thus enabled to resume their work with greater security and
even accelerated speed. Abu Hamed was reached on October 31, 1897,
the two extreme points of the great Nile bend being thus brought into
communication by a direct line of railway. The construction of the
232 miles of track had been accomplished in five and a half months,
notwithstanding the fact that the work was carried on during the hottest
time of the year. An average length of a mile and a quarter of line
was laid per day, while on one day in October a maximum of three and a
quarter miles was attained. So well, too, had the work been done that
trains carrying 200 tons of stores, drawn by engines weighing, without
tender, fifty tons, were taken safely across the desert at a speed of
twenty-five miles per hour.

From Abu Hamed the line was at once pushed on in the direction of
Berber, and its value from a military point of view was speedily to
be proved. Receiving information, towards the end of 1897, that the
Dervishes were planning an attack on Berber, Sir Herbert Kitchener sent
to Cairo for a Brigade of British troops to join with the Egyptian
forces then at Berber in opposing this advance, and the Brigade arrived
in January, 1898, having travelled by the desert railway not only to Abu
Hamed, but to a point twenty miles farther south, which then constituted
railhead. Early in March the Anglo-Egyptian Army was concentrated
between Berber and the Atbara river, and the battle of Atbara, fought in
the following month, led to the complete annihilation of the forces sent
by the Khalifa to drive the Egyptians out of Berber.

There was known to be still an army of 50,000 men in Omdurman, at the
command of the Khalifa; but it was considered desirable, before any
further advance was made by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, to await not
only the completion of the railway to the Atbara but the rise, also, of
the Nile, so that the river would be available for the bringing up of
steamers and gunboats to take part in the attack on Omdurman.

Once more, therefore, Lieut. Girouard and his staff had to make the most
strenuous efforts, and these were again so successful that the line was
carried to the Atbara early in July. It was of the greatest service in
facilitating the concentration of an Anglo-Egyptian Army, 22,000 strong,
at Wad Hamed, and the victory of Omdurman, on September 2, 1898--when
20,000 of the enemy were killed or wounded--followed by the occupation
of Khartoum, meant the overthrow of the Mahdi, the final reconquest of
the Sudan, and the gaining of a further great triumph in the cause of
civilisation.

In the account of these events which he gives in volume three of the
"History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers," Colonel Sir Charles M.
Watson says concerning this ultimate outcome of a rebellion which had
lasted, altogether, for a period of eighteen years:--

Lord Kitchener, of course, by the skill and determination
with which he conducted the operations to a successful
termination, deserves the principal credit for the happy
conclusion of the campaign. But it must not be forgotten that
a large part of the work was carried out by the officers of
the Royal Engineers, especially those who had charge of the
construction and maintenance of that railway without which, it
is fair to say, the campaign could not have been conducted at
all.

The final triumph was the more gratifying because, although the desert
railway had contributed so materially thereto, dependence upon it had
not been without an element of serious risk which cannot be told better
than in the words of Lord Cromer, in his book on "Modern Egypt":--

The interval which elapsed between the occupation of Abu
Hamed and the final advance on Khartoum was a period of much
anxiety. Sir Herbert Kitchener's force depended entirely on
the desert railway for its supplies. I was rather haunted with
the idea that some European adventurer, of the type familiar
in India a century and more ago, might turn up at Khartoum and
advise the Dervishes to make frequent raids across the Nile
below Abu Hamed with a view to cutting the communication of the
Anglo-Egyptian force with Wady Halfa. This was unquestionably
the right military operation to have undertaken; neither, I
think, would it have been very difficult of accomplishment.
Fortunately the Dervishes ... failed to take advantage of the
opportunity presented to them. To myself it was a great relief
when the period of suspense was over. I do not think that the
somewhat perilous position in which Sir Herbert Kitchener's army
was undoubtedly placed for some time was at all realised by the
public in general.

Within about two months of the battle of Omdurman the plans were made
for a further extension of the railway from Atbara to Khartoum, and
Khartoum North was reached on the last day of 1899. The construction
of a bridge over the Blue Nile subsequently allowed of trains running
direct into Khartoum.

To-day this same railway has been carried a distance of 430 miles south
of Khartoum. It continues along the Blue Nile to Sennah, where it turns
to the westward, crosses the White Nile at Kosti, and has its terminus
at El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan Province. What this means is that
an enormous expanse of territory has been opened up both to civilisation
and to commercial development.

Apart from the important gum trade of which El Obeid is the centre, the
Sudan is pre-eminently a pastoral country. The number of its cattle,
sheep and goats is estimated at "several millions"; it has thousands of
square miles available for cotton-growing, already carried on there for
centuries, and it has wide possibilities in other directions, besides;
though stock-raising and cotton cultivation should alone suffice to
ensure for the Sudan a future of great wealth and commercial importance.

Beyond the districts immediately served by the extension there are
others which are to be brought into touch with the railway, either
direct or via the Nile, by means of a "roads system" linking up towns
and villages with a number of highways extending to all the frontiers of
the Sudan. On these roads and highways motor traction will, it is hoped,
be gradually substituted for transport animals, the troubles caused by
the tsetse fly and other pests being thus avoided.

The scheme here in question is certainly an ambitious one, considering
that the Sudan covers an area of 1,000,000 square miles, and is equal
in extent to the whole of British India; but already the outlook is
most promising. For twelve years before its rescue from heathenism by
the British and Egyptian forces in 1898, Khartoum, which formerly had
a population of 50,000, was represented by the mass of ruins to which
it had been reduced by order of the Khalifa. To-day it is a large,
beautiful, and well-built city, possessed of a Governor-General's
palace, cathedrals, a mosque, schools, hospitals, hotels, broad streets,
public gardens, boulevards, imposing business premises, a good water
supply, electric light, tramways, ferries, and other essentials of a
capital city of the most progressive type. Khartoum itself has now about
30,000 inhabitants; in Khartoum North, on the other side of the Blue
Nile, there are 20,000, and in Omdurman 70,000, a total of 120,000 for
the three sister cities. Not only, also, have the natives, once living
under the terror of their oppressors, settled down to peaceful pursuits,
but many thousands of immigrants have come into the Sudan from West
Africa (a striking testimony of the confidence felt by native tribes
in the justice and security of British rule), while great expansion
has taken place in the commercial interests of the Sudan and more
especially in the export of cattle and sheep.

In the bringing about of these developments, affecting the peace and
prosperity of so huge a country and of so many millions of people,
the Sudan Military Railways have played a leading part. They rendered
possible, in the first instance, the conquest of the Sudan, and then
(save for the now abandoned line from Wady Halfa to Kerma) they became,
with their extensions and improvements, the system of "Sudan Government
Railways," having their branches to-day both from Atbara to Port Sudan
and Suakin, on the Red Sea, and from Abu Hamed to Kareima, on the south
side of the great Nile bend, whence there is free communication by water
to the third cataract at Kerma. Concurrently, also, with the carrying
out of the railway extension schemes, and in order to make greater
provision for the prospective increase of traffic, 460 miles of the line
north of Khartoum were relaid with 75-lb. rails, in place of the 50-lb.
rails originally used, and the whole of the track from Khartoum to El
Obeid was also laid with the heavier rails.

So we are enabled to regard military railways from still another point
of view--that, namely, in which they may develop into lines of permanent
communication and promote the blessings of peace and security no less
than afford unquestionable advantages in the prosecution of war. Other
examples of a similar kind might be offered from the history of British
rule in Africa; but the record of what has been accomplished in the
Sudan may suffice to establish the further claim here presented as to
the varied purposes that military railways may serve.

FOOTNOTES:

[36] See lecture by Capt. C. E. Luard, R.E., on "Field Railways and
their general application in war." Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution, vol. xvii, 1873.

[37] "The Abyssinian Railway." By Lieut. Willans, R.E. Papers on
Subjects Connected with the Duties of the Corps of Royal Engineers. New
Series. Vol. xviii. 1870.

[38] "The Construction of Military Railways during the Russo-Turkish
War of 1877-8." By Captain M. T. Sale, R.E. Journal of the Royal United
Service Institution, vol. xxiv, 1881. "De la Construction des Chemins de
Fer en temps de guerre. Lignes construites par l'armée russe pendant la
campagne 1877-78." Par M. P. Lessar, Ingénieur du Gouvernement russe.
Traduit du russe par M. L. Avril. Paris, 1879.

[39] "The Sudan Military Railway." By Lieut. M. Nathan, R.E.
"Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Occasional
Papers," vol. xi, 1885.

[40] In his dispatch of May 30, 1885, Sir Gerald Graham said concerning
these Volunteers: "Their services would have been of great value had
the campaign lasted longer. As it was the Volunteers worked well with
their comrades of the Royal Engineers.... It may be considered the first
experiment in associating the Volunteer force with a combatant branch of
the Regular Army on active service."

CHAPTER XVI

RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR

The South African campaign of 1899-1902 afforded to Great Britain and
to British Imperial interests their greatest, most instructive, and,
also, their most anxious experiences, down to that time, not only of
the services railways can render in the conduct of war, but of the
difficulties and complications which may result from their employment,
and especially from dependence on them for the purposes of military
transport; though, in the result, the services so rendered were a
material factor in the success by which the military operations carried
out by the British forces were crowned.

When the Boers declared war in October, 1899, the various railway
systems, working in direct communication with one another, in South
Africa, had a total length of 4,268 miles, namely, British South Africa,
3,267; the Transvaal, 918; the Orange Free State, 388; and in Portuguese
territory, 55. These railways consisted of single-track, narrow-gauge
lines (3 feet 6 inches), never designed for such heavy traffic as the
transport of an army and all its impedimenta would involve; but it was
obvious from the first that they must needs play a part of paramount
importance in the campaign. Independently of all that was involved in
the conveyance of troops, munitions, supplies, etc., from England to the
Cape, there was the consideration that from Cape Town, the principal
base of our forces, to Pretoria, their eventual objective, the distance
was 1,040 miles. From Port Elizabeth it was 740 miles, and from Durban
511 miles. Journeys such as these could be made only by rail, and
there was seen to be an imperative need, not only for the railways
themselves, but for an organisation which would, among other things,
superintend military rail-transport in order to ensure efficiency in
the movement of troops, stores, etc., and, also, provide for the speedy
repair or rebuilding of damaged lines as well as for the operation of
lines taken possession of in the captured territory.

In view of the uncertainty of events in the Transvaal, and as a
precautionary measure, the 8th (Railway) Company, Royal Engineers, was
sent out to the Cape in July, 1899; and when, subsequently, the dispatch
of an Army Corps was being arranged by the British Government, it was
decided to create a _Department of Military Railways_, of which Major
Girouard, R.E. (now Major-General Sir E. Percy C. Girouard, K.C.M.G.),
who had rendered such valuable services in connection with military
railways in the Sudan, and was then President of the Egyptian Railway
Administration, was put in charge as "Director of Railways for the South
African Field Force." A number of other Royal Engineer officers who had
had experience of railway work in India and other parts of the British
Empire were selected to serve as Assistant Directors or staff officers
in various capacities, and the 10th (Railway) Company, Royal Engineers,
with the 6th, 20th, 31st and 42nd Fortress Companies, were sent to join
the 8th (Railway) Company in the carrying out of railway work.

ORGANISATION AND CONTROL

The creation of this Department of Military Railways for South Africa
carried still further the development of those questions of organisation
and control which, as we have seen, had already raised important issues
in the United States, in Germany, and in France.

According to the official "History of the War in South Africa,
1899-1902," the Director and his staff were (1) to be the intermediaries
between the Army and the technical working administration of the
railway; (2) to see that the ordinary working of the railway was carried
on in such a manner as to ensure the greatest military efficiency;
and (3) to satisfy the demands of the Army on the railway without
disorganising the working of the railway system as a whole.

"In war," the official "History" further declares, "these services are
essential, for the officers of a civil railway administration cannot
discriminate between the demands of the various branches and departments
of the Army, or class them in the order of urgency." This is perfectly
true of the civil railway administration, and it is only what could be
expected of railwaymen who, while competent to discharge their ordinary
railway duties, might not be well versed in military matters, and ought
not to be left with the responsibility of deciding between the possibly
conflicting orders of different military commanders.

All the same, there was another side to the question; and this is dealt
with by Sir Percy Girouard in his "History of the Railways during the
War in South Africa," wherein he says, in regard to rail transport
conditions in time of war:--

Military commanders who have not previously studied the
working of a railway attempt to seize and work the portion of
line nearest to them, regardless of the remainder of the system.
They often look upon trucks as another form of commissariat
wagon which may be kept loaded for an indefinite period. They
expect trains to stop and off-load, or load, on the main line.
They like to have a number of trains ready, either loaded or
unloaded, in case they should be required. They are apt to
give orders for large entrainments and detrainments to be
carried out at any part of the line, regardless of the railway
facilities at that point, although perhaps a suitable place is
within reasonable distance. Frequently they have been known
to countermand their orders for entrainments, heedless of the
fact that, once arrangements have been made to concentrate
rolling stock on a certain place, it takes time to alter these
arrangements, and is sure to cause confusion. Many of them
expect railway accommodation for troops to be on a liberal
scale, and consider that there is no necessity, when close to a
railway, to make any effort to cut down baggage and stores....

Commandants of posts on the line, which are very often
placed at railway stations, are inclined to think that, because
they are called "station commandants," it means that they are
in charge of the railway station, and can give orders to railway
officials as to traffic and other matters....

Civil railway officials have been heard to say that attacks
by the enemy are not nearly so disturbing to traffic as the
arrival of a friendly General with his force.

It was under these circumstances that Sir Percy Girouard saw from the
first the necessity for having in South Africa, for the duration of
the war, a staff of officers whose business it would be, as he himself
defines their duties, (_a_) to keep the military commanders fully
informed of the capacity and possibilities of the railway, and to convey
their orders and requests to the civil railway staff; and (_b_) to
protect the civil railway administration from interference by military
commanders and commandants of posts; in fact, to act as intermediaries
between the army and the civil railway officials.

In arriving at this conclusion Sir Percy was especially impressed by
the rail transport experiences of France in her war with Prussia in
1870-1; and in his Report he gives a digest of Jacqmin's facts and
recommendations by way of further justifying the step that he himself
took. He thought it absolutely necessary that the staff of the Director
of Railways should be paramount on the railway, and that no officer
should be able to give any orders to railway staff officers or other
railway officials unless fighting was actually proceeding at that spot.
"This," he adds, "was the system adopted with great success by the
Germans, the want of which caused such chaos on the French railways, and
the correctness of which has been entirely established by the experience
of this war. It is not too much to say that, unless it had been adopted
in South Africa, the chaos would have been past belief."

The _Military Railway Controlling-Staff_ created, in accordance with
these principles and policy, to co-operate with the technical working
staff under the Director of Railways, was constituted as follows:--

I. An _Assistant-Director of Railways_ for Cape Colony, who was on
the staff both of the Director of Railways and on that of the General
Officer Commanding Lines of Communication, Cape Colony. His business
it was to co-operate with the General Traffic Manager of the Cape
Government Railway, in whose office he was given accommodation. In
this dual capacity it was his duty to inform both the General Officer
Commanding and the Director as to the traffic capacities of the
railways; to take the orders of the G.O.C. while advising him as to the
best method of carrying them out; to inform the railway officials what
was required, and, Sir Percy adds, in giving these details, "to protect
them from interference by unauthorised military officers." It was the
duty, also, of the Assistant-Director to see that proper regulations
were issued to the Army for (_a_) the efficient conduct of entrainments
and detrainments; (_b_) the forwarding of stores, and (_c_) the keeping
of financial accounts in respect to the use made of the lines for
military purposes. As between the General Officer Commanding and the
Chief Traffic Manager, the Assistant-Director of Railways was the sole
channel of communication.

II. Four _Deputy-Assistant-Directors_, undertaking similar duties over
particular sections of the railway system.

III. _Railway Staff Officers_, located at leading stations to
superintend all important movements, and constituting the only means of
communication between the Army and the stationmasters. The latter were
to take orders in respect to military requirements from no one else,
and were, in turn, to be protected by the railway staff officers from
interference with by other officers having no authority to give them
direct orders.

The defective step in the scheme, as originally planned, was in respect
to the railway staff officers, who, of all those constituting the
Military Railway Controlling Staff, were, under Army Regulations, on
the staff of officers commanding lines of communication and thus not
controlled by the Director of Railways. The officers in question, though
charged with the duty of looking after entrainments, detrainments, etc.,
were in no way to interfere with the railway staff in the shunting
or marshalling of trains or in regard to the traffic arrangements
generally. For this reason the framers of the Army Regulations had
assumed that there was no need for the railway staff officers to have
any knowledge of railway operation, or to be under the control of others
who did possess such knowledge.

After the annexation of the Orange Free State railways, the Chief
of the Staff agreed that the railway staff officers in that State
should be under the orders of the Director of Railways through his
Deputy-Assistant-Directors; and a like course was adopted shortly
afterwards in respect to the railway staff officers in Cape Colony. In
this way an undivided chain of responsibility was secured, affording
a much greater guarantee of efficiency alike in control and in actual
operation.

Concerning the Deputy-Assistant-Directors, Sir Percy Girouard says
they were found to be of great benefit to the railway officials, who
appreciated their work and laboured in hearty co-operation with them;
though they experienced difficulty in establishing their position with
the Generals and Staff officers, to whom the arrangement was an entire
novelty, and one they did not at first understand.

In the first instance the principle of military control applied
specially to the lines in Cape Colony, those in Natal being still
operated by the Natal Government Railway Department, with certain
assistance in the matter of repairs; though after eighteen months of
war, the military transport system first established in Cape Colony
became uniform throughout British South Africa.

TRANSPORT CONDITIONS

The need for the elaborate organisation thus brought into existence was
all the greater because of the difficulties by which those responsible
for the conduct of military transport were faced.

In November, 1899, considerable portions of the lines both in Cape
Colony and in Natal were in the possession of the Boers, so that, beyond
a certain distance, the British would have to fight for every mile
of railway before they could make use of it. After, also, regaining
possession of the lines on British territory controlled by the Boers,
they would require first to capture and then to operate those on the
enemy's territory; and in each case they would have to be prepared to
repair the damage the enemy would be certain to do to the lines in order
to prevent their use by the advancing forces. Meanwhile the traffic
must be kept open, as far as possible, for the conveyance of troops and
stores to the theatre of war and for the carrying out of such strategic
movements as the requirements of the military situation might render
necessary, adequate protection of the lines being meanwhile assured.
There were, in fact, occasions when the whole issue of the campaign
seemed to turn upon the question as to whether or not the British could
either secure possession of the railways or, alternatively, repair them
as fast, more or less, as the enemy could demolish them.

Although, again, so elaborate a system of organisation had been
arranged, there was much that required to be done to adapt it to the
conditions of African warfare. Initial mistakes had to be remedied;
old evils reappeared in new forms; regulations had to be made or
modified according to experiences gained; and, while there was at no
time any general failure of transport, there certainly were partial
failures. Not only was there an inadequate supply of trucks, partly
because of the considerable number in the Boer States at the time of
the declaration of war and partly because of the number locked up in
Kimberley and Mafeking, but trucks were kept loaded when they should
have been promptly unloaded and released for service elsewhere; lines
were seriously blocked at critical moments by these loaded trucks, while
chaos in certain large troop movements was only avoided owing to the
control of Cape Town facilities by the Director's staff and to the fact
that the Deputy-Assistant-Directors of Railways were enabled to have
special officers at all important points.

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKED

As regards the _operation of the railways_ during the war Sir Percy
Girouard says:--

Although not, perhaps, so much a matter of railway as of
general staff administration, a word should be said as to the
methods whereby the very limited resources of the single line of
railway communication were allotted to ensure an equal attention
to the requirements of the Army as a whole.

The allocation of railway facilities was reserved strictly
to the Chief of Staff, without whose order, in each case,
nothing could pass by rail towards the front. The number of
trains, or, more accurately, the number of trucks which could
be hauled daily in the "up" direction, being communicated by
the railway authorities to Lord Kitchener, he placed a number,
liable to vary from day to day, at the disposal of the supply
and remount departments, either generally for the maintenance of
their depôts or for specific traffic.

The number reserved for hospital, ordnance, engineer and
special stores was even more closely calculated, and the demands
of these departments had to be submitted for approval in the
utmost detail. All authorisations were passed to the railway
representatives at Headquarters, whose business it was to
notify when the total of such orders outstanding for dispatch
from the advanced base was exceeding the accommodation which
could be provided within a reasonable time under the scheme of
proportion in force for the time being. In such case the issue
of permits fell temporarily into abeyance, or the outstanding
list was revised to accord with the necessities of the moment.
No truck could be loaded and no troops dispatched by rail
without such authority, with the single exception of details
and small parties, who were invariably made to travel upon
the loaded supply trucks. Proposed troop movements by rail
requiring separate accommodation had to be carefully considered
in view of the supply traffic they would displace, and, when
time permitted, were generally made by road. It was this system
alone which co-ordinated the railway requirements of the various
departments and did so much to falsify previously accepted
figures as to the limits of the fighting force which could be
maintained by a single line of railway.

THE IMPERIAL MILITARY RAILWAYS

Following the questions which arose as to the working of railways on
British territory within the sphere of the military operations came
those concerning the _railways taken from the enemy_ in the Boer States,
and converted into a system of Imperial Military Railways for which the
Department also became responsible.

The occupation of Bloemfontein led to that place becoming the base of
supplies for an army of 35,000 men, likely to increase to 100,000, while
eventually the Imperial Military Railways included 1,130 miles of line.
Efficient operation thus became a matter of grave importance, and the
task to be accomplished was one of considerable magnitude, especially
considering that a staff for the working of the system had to be
created. In the traffic and locomotive departments alone no fewer than
3,000 white workers were needed.

Many of the employés of the Netherlands Railway Company were kept on,
even at the risk of their showing hostility to the British; but the
number who thus made themselves available was quite inadequate, even
if they could all have been trusted. The Cape Government Railways were
drawn on to the fullest possible extent for workers; the Railway and
the Fortress Companies of the Royal Engineers in South Africa were
employed in operating the lines; railwaymen in the Special Railway
Reserve in England were sent for, and, of the remaining posts, from
800 to 1,000 were filled--the approval of the Commander-in-Chief being
first obtained--by inviting soldiers and reservists serving in the Army
who had had experience of railway work in civil life to join the staff
of the Imperial Military Railways, pay at Royal Engineer rates being
guaranteed to them. Positions of the least importance were filled by
men who had had no previous railway experience at all. Railway staff
officers were also obtained mainly from among the troops; though many
even of these, being unfamiliar with the details of railway operation,
had to be taught their special duties before they could attempt to
discharge them.

On September 30, 1900, the staff employed on the Imperial Military
Railways comprised close on 18,000 officers and men. From the time these
railways were brought under the control of the British forces to August
31, 1900, they carried 177,000 passengers, 86,000 animals, and 520,000
tons of goods.

As the moral to be drawn from his experiences in having to create, under
circumstances of exceptional difficulty, a staff for the operation of
railways captured from the enemy, Sir Percy Girouard says:--

The South African campaign has fully shown the necessity of
having a number of traffic employés registered in peace time,
who are paid a small retaining fee which will render them liable
to be called out in case of war at home or abroad. The want of
this system forced the Director of Railways in South Africa to
employ a large number of men who had been employed by the enemy,
and who could not be relied on, and also to withdraw from the
fighting-line a large number of soldiers with railway experience
prior to enlistment; and he was compelled to work the railways
with this heterogeneous mass of individuals whose qualifications
were unknown. The amount of correspondence entailed over
conditions of service, pay, transfer, etc., of all these men,
coming from different parts of South Africa and from different
units, was tremendous. The registration system would also
arrange for the men on the railways being subject to Military
Law, the necessity for which has been clearly proved.

REPAIR OF RAILWAYS

Whilst all these arrangements in regard to operation and transport
were thus being perfected, the need had arisen for an equally complete
organisation in another direction, that, namely, of providing for the
_repair or restoration of railway lines_ damaged or destroyed by the
enemy.

Since the American Civil War the art of railway demolition had
made considerable advance by reason of the use for this purpose of
dynamite--an agency which was now to be employed very freely by the
Boers. With dynamite they easily blew up the bridges, or material
portions thereof; they destroyed the track for considerable distances
by the simple process of exploding dynamite cartridges under alternate
rail-joints; they wrecked culverts, pumps and water tanks, and they
effectively damaged locomotives which they had not time or opportunity
to remove. Then, among other things, they derailed engines and trucks
by means of mines; they caused obstructions by throwing down into the
railway cuttings boulders of up to two or three tons in weight; they cut
telegraph lines; they removed or smashed up instruments and batteries at
railway stations; they wrecked the stations; they burned many railway
trucks, or otherwise rendered them useless; they set fire to stacks of
fuel, and, when dynamite cartridges were not available, they deprived
the locomotives of their vital parts and tore up considerable lengths of
rails.

By December, 1899, it had become evident that the Railway Companies
and the Fortress Companies of the Royal Engineers, sent out to the
Cape and brought up to their fullest strength, would be unequal to the
requirements of the prospective situation. The Railway Corps thus formed
was, accordingly, augmented by a Railway Pioneer Regiment, composed of
miners, artisans and labourers who had been employed at Cape Town or
Johannesburg, volunteers from the ranks of the Army (preference being
given to those already possessed of experience in railway work), and
employés of the Orange Free State Railway. Some Field Railway Sections,
created to form the nucleus of a staff to take over the working of
railways in the enemy's country became construction parties, doing
repairs only, and having no control of traffic except at railhead. In
addition to all these, a large number of natives were engaged through
Native Labour Depôts opened at De Aar, Bloemfontein and Johannesburg,
the number so employed at any one time attaining a maximum of about
20,000.

It was in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal that the Boers
displayed their greatest activity in the way of railway destruction.
At Norval's Pont and Bethulie they broke down the bridges crossing the
Orange River, which divided Cape Colony from the Orange Free State.
Before leaving Bloemfontein (occupied by the British March 13, 1900),
they destroyed all the bridges and all the culverts on the railway in
their rear; they blew up miles of the permanent way, and they left the
railway itself an almost complete wreck. North of Bloemfontein they
pursued similar tactics along 180 miles of track, on which they wrecked
more or less completely no fewer than fifty bridges, including the one
over the Vaal River--a high structure with seven spans each of 130 feet.
No sooner, too, had the line been reopened as far as Johannesburg than
Commandant De Wet made a raid on it and undid all that the repairing
parties had done over a length of thirty miles. Speedily following the
re-establishing of rail communication with Pretoria, the Boers began
a fresh series of guerilla attacks on the lines both in the Transvaal
and in the Orange Free State; and they continued these attacks for
months--until, in fact, their power for doing further mischief had been
finally checked.

In carrying out repairs and reconstruction work of such vital importance
to the advance and security of the British forces, the policy adopted
by the Director of Railways was that of employing Royal Engineers to do
rapid temporary repairs--with a view to having a line of some sort made
available with the least possible delay--and leaving permanent or even
semi-permanent repairs to the Railway Pioneer Regiment. At convenient
sidings on the railways throughout the theatre of war _construction
trains_ were stationed in charge of permanent-way inspectors and
sections of Royal Engineers who had at their disposal, at each of such
sidings, a gang of men--whites and natives--varying in number from 300
to 1,000, according to circumstances. Infantry working-parties were also
obtained wherever possible.

Gangers began a patrol of the lines at dawn. Information as to any
break or alarm was communicated to the nearest military post and
telegraphed to the Deputy-Superintendent of Works, who thereupon ordered
the dispatch of a construction train to the scene of any reported or
prospective break without waiting for confirmation of the news received
or of the suspicions aroused.

This well-organised system operated to great advantage. At 2.30
a.m. on January 1, 1901, for instance, information reached the
Deputy-Superintendent of Works at Bloemfontein that a break of the line
had occurred at Wolvehoek, sixty-three miles distant. The construction
train was instantly dispatched, and the repairs were completed by 8
a.m. Rail communication with Johannesburg, notwithstanding the great
amount of destruction done by the Boers, was restored within eleven
days of the arrival of Lord Roberts at that place. It was restored to
Pretoria within sixteen days of the occupation thereof by our troops. On
the western side, where the enemy had been no less active than in the
Orange Free State, rail communication was reopened within thirteen days
of the relief of Mafeking.

In the official report on Field Transport in the South African War, it
is said in regard to the Railways Department:--

All temporary repairs in the Cape Colony, Transvaal, and
Orange River Colony were carried out, with a few exceptions,
by the military railway staff. Up to 31 October, 1900, these
temporary repairs included the restoration of seventy-five
bridges, ninety-four culverts, and 37 miles of line. A detail
of the general advance from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg, a
distance of 265 miles, will give some idea of the expedition
with which repairs were affected. The period during which the
advance was being made was from 3 May to 11 June, 1900, in which
space of time the following temporary repairs were executed:
Twenty-seven bridges, forty-one culverts, 10 miles of line,
including seven deviations, varying in length from 200 yards to
2 miles.

From 6 June to 15 November, 1900, the Imperial Military
Railways were more or less seriously damaged by the enemy on 115
occasions, but all such damages were promptly repaired, and did
not materially affect the working of the railways, except that
the running of trains after dark had to be suspended. During the
same period fully 60 per cent. of damaged bridges and culverts
were permanently or semi-permanently repaired.

Of _bridges_, over 200, with spans ranging from nine feet to 130 feet,
were destroyed wholly or in part during the progress of the war; but
even here the speedy restoration of traffic did not, as a rule, present
any very grave difficulty. The course generally adopted, as one suited
to South African conditions, was, not to start at once on the repair
of the damaged bridge, but, in order to meet the exigencies of the
moment, to construct a diversion or deviation line alongside, with small
low-level bridges on piers, built of sleepers and rails.[41] These
deviation lines offered great disadvantages by reason of their sharp
curves, their steep approaches and their liability to be washed away in
wet weather. The building even of temporary bridges across deep rivers
having a considerable volume of water also caused inevitable delays.
But the lines in question served their purpose until the reconstruction
of the damaged bridges--taken in hand as speedily as possible--could
be effected. Anticipating the needs for this more permanent work, the
Director of Railways had arranged before leaving England for a supply
of girders, similar to those in use in South Africa, to be sent out,
together with sufficient timber, of useful dimensions, to rebuild the
whole of the railway bridges in the Orange Free State, should it become
necessary so to do--as, in point of fact, it did. Of new rails he had
available, at one time, a total length of 300 miles.

By October, 1900, the makeshift repairs completed on all the lines
taken from the enemy were being gradually converted into permanent or
semi-permanent reconstruction by the Works Department of the Imperial
Military Railways; but the continuous guerilla raids of the enemy still
made it impossible to run trains by night. These conditions led to a
resort to the system of _blockhouses_ which, first constructed for the
defence of railway bridges in Natal during the advance for the relief
of Ladysmith, and used extensively when Lord Roberts marched from
Bloemfontein into the Transvaal, leaving a long track of railway lines
behind him, were subsequently so far extended that the whole of the
railway lines in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony were provided
with them.[42] So well did they answer the purpose that by April, 1901,
the worst of the trouble involved in maintaining railway communications
was over, although another year was to elapse before peace was restored.

MILITARY TRAFFIC

An especially remarkable achievement with which, under the various
conditions here narrated, the Department of Military Railways is to be
credited was in connection with the concentration of the force with
which Lord Roberts marched from the Modder River to Bloemfontein. The
movement began on January 21, 1900, by which time the repairs of the
lines had been completed, and within three weeks no fewer than 20,000
men, 13,590 horses and over 24,000 tons of stores had been conveyed over
a single line of railway.

Taking the sum total of the military traffic carried on the Cape
Government and the Natal Government Railways respectively during the war
period, we get the following substantial figures:--

Cape Government Railways, from October 1, 1899, to March 31,
1901:--Officers, men, and other passengers, 1,247,000; supplies, etc.,
1,058,000 tons; horses and other live stock, 540,321, besides many
wagons and guns.

Natal Government Railways:--Officers, men, prisoners of war, sick and
wounded, women and children (including Boer refugees), natives and
Indians, 522,186; baggage and stores, supplies, hay, forage, etc.,
861,000 tons; ammunition, 9,784 boxes; guns, 454; vehicles, 6,430;
pontoons, 48; traction engines, 84; horses and other live stock, 399,000.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES

The figures here given as to the military traffic carried do not
represent the full extent of the work that was done by the South African
railways during the course of the war. One must also take into account
the wide variety of subsidiary services rendered, and these are the
more deserving of attention because they show, more than had, perhaps,
been the case in any previous war, that railways can afford valuable
aid in the conduct of a campaign apart from the achievement of their
fundamental purpose in the transport of men and matériel.

If we look atthe list of services rendered by the Natal Government
Railways we find that the Railway Department--in addition to the
transport work represented by the above figures--adapted six armoured
trains; prepared special carriages for the 6 in. and 4·7 in. guns;
adapted and equipped three hospital trains, withdrawing for this
purpose fully a quarter of the most serviceable carriage stock from
the ordinary traffic; wired and lamped the hospitals at four different
centres, supplying them, also, with electric current; mounted the
electric search-light apparatus with engine, dynamo, etc.; supplied
30,000 troops at Colenso with water; found the plant and fuel at
Ladysmith for condensing water from the Klip River for 20,000 persons
during the four months' siege; allotted and arranged a portion of the
goods-shed as the Base Medical Stores at Durban, and fitted up vans to
follow the army with reserve medical supplies.

The Department's Engineering Staff speedily restored, or temporarily
provided--either on the Natal system or along 100 miles of the Transvaal
railways, when these passed under control of the British forces--72
bridges and culverts, varying in length from 10 to 600 feet; 32
different portions of permanent way; and many water tanks, etc. The
Engineering Staff also effected in seven days a clearance through the
Lang's Nek Tunnel, blown in by the Boers, and constructed several miles
of new lines, sidings and deviations.

The Natal Railway Pioneer Staff advanced with General Buller and worked
the Netherlands Railway as far as Greylingstad, 100 miles beyond
Charlestown (the point of traffic exchange with the Transvaal system),
until the line was taken over by the Imperial authorities on August 15,
1900.

"For nearly six months, up to the relief of Ladysmith," says Mr. C. W.
Francis Harrison, from whose official work on "Natal"[43] these details
are mainly taken, "the Natal lines were robbed of about 40 per cent. of
their total mileage and a quantity of their stock. On the clearance of
the enemy from Natal and the south-eastern portion of the Transvaal,
large supply depôts were formed at Newcastle, Volksrust, Standerton and
intermediate points; and on the joining of the two main portions of the
British army at Heidelberg, the greater portion of the stores for the
forces was conveyed via Natal; and this continued unceasingly until the
termination of hostilities."

ARMOURED TRAINS

It was, again, in the South African war that armoured trains underwent
their greatest development--down to that time--for the purposes alike
of line protection and of attack on the enemy, although their real
usefulness and the conditions necessary to their efficient operation
were not established until after certain early experiences which had
tended to throw doubts upon their efficiency, and had even led to their
being regarded as of little or no account for the purposes of war.

In view of prospective requirements, five armoured trains had been
constructed in advance in the locomotive shops at Cape Town and another
at Natal. Others were put together shortly afterwards; but one of the
Cape trains was wrecked by the Boers the first night of the war, and
two of the Natal trains were locked up in Ladysmith. The remainder
were employed on scouting expeditions during the earlier phases of the
war. Their use not being then rightly understood, they were often sent
considerable distances without any support, with the result that one of
the Natal trains was destroyed by the Boers at Chieveley, on November
15, 1899, and the Cape trains had several narrow escapes of sharing the
same fate.

On the occupation of Bloemfontein by the British, more armoured trains
were constructed at the railway workshops there, and eventually the
number available was increased to a fleet of twenty. Under an improved
system of control and operation, and converted, by the addition of guns,
into what were virtually batteries on wheels, the trains came to be
regarded as offering possibilities of much practical usefulness.

In a lecture on "Railways in War," delivered by him at the Royal
Engineers' Institute, Chatham, and reported in the "Royal Engineers
Journal" for July, 1905, Sir Percy Girouard, said:--

The South African War at one time threatened to produce
a siege, that of Pretoria, where fairly modern forts with
modern armaments were known to exist. At the same time the
enemy at Modder River were giving us some trouble with their
heavy artillery. The Navy came to our rescue with heavy B.L.
guns mounted on wheels. With a view to trying the use of the
railway itself, it was pointed out that the railway department
had both the shops and the goodwill to mount heavy guns, if
required. This offer was approved, and in a few weeks the two
heaviest siege guns ever seen in the field were made ready.
The carriages, designed by the combined wit of the machinery
officers and the Chief Locomotive Superintendent of the Cape
Government Railway, were most creditable achievements, old
engine and tender frames being used as a foundation. The guns
mounted were a 6-inch B.L., and no less a monster than a 9·2
inch B.L. The 6-inch went into action at Modder River. It
was deemed unsafe to fix it at an angle of more than sixteen
degrees to either side of the centre line of the railway; but
by placing it on a so-called firing curve a wider field of fire
was secured. The gun behaved exceedingly well in every way; and
later on it was fired at right angles to the railway, without
any damage either to itself or to the line.

The 9·2-inch gun gave good results in its trials, but, although it was
run up to Pretoria on its truck, there was no opportunity of firing it
on the enemy.

Sir Percy says in his "History" that--

The experiments demonstrated the possibility of big guns
being used in siege operations without any difficulty, the only
limit to the size of the gun being the weight which the railway
bridges will stand.

Apart from the powers of usefulness offered by these batteries on
wheels, there arose, in the early days of the war, the further question
whether the usefulness of armoured trains proper might not be marred as
the result of a defective system of control.

At the outset the trains were placed entirely under the orders of
officers commanding sections of the line; but the arrangement was found
unsatisfactory as the trains were constantly being rushed out regardless
of Traffic Department regulations, and sometimes without even a "line
clear" message. Having, also, the trains at their disposal, as they
considered officers commanding sections of the line often made use of
them to inspect posts between stations, other traffic being stopped
while the inspections were being made. On one occasion, when a large mob
of cattle was being sent to Pretoria and there were no mounted troops
available to convoy them, the expedient was resorted to of employing an
armoured train for the purpose. The train had to adapt its speed to the
rate of progress of the cattle alongside, and such was the interference
with other traffic that the entire length of railway on the Delagoa
main line was blocked until the cattle had reached their destination.
In fact, instead of assisting traffic by preventing the enemy from
interrupting it, the armoured trains caused, Sir Percy Girouard
declares, "more interruptions than the enemy themselves."

With a view both to meet these particular difficulties and to ensure
a better use of the trains, there was appointed an Assistant-Director
of Armoured Trains who was placed on the staff both of the
Commander-in-Chief and of the Director of Railways and had under his
control all the armoured trains in South Africa. Captain H. C. Nanton,
R.E., the officer so appointed, had practical acquaintance alike with
railway requirements and regulations and with armoured trains. In touch
with Headquarters, and kept informed as to which portions of the line
were most threatened by the enemy, it became his duty to order where
the trains should be sent. Once despatched to a particular section of
the line, an armoured train was to be under the control of the General
or other officer commanding that section. The Assistant-Director
had power to remove it, however, if he thought it was more urgently
required elsewhere. It was his duty, also, to work in harmony with
the officers in question; but they, in turn, were not to use as a
private conveyance the train sent to them, and they were not to alter
its garrison or equipment, or to give orders to the officer in charge
which were contrary to the spirit of the general instructions. The
Assistant-Director was himself required to instruct officers in command
of the trains as to the proper tactics to adopt, the best methods
of patrolling, etc., and to see that they "worked in harmony with
the railway officials, and were an assistance and not a hindrance to
traffic."

These improved conditions led to a recognised system for the employment
of armoured trains, the purposes and duties of which were eventually
defined as follows[44]:--

1. In conjunction with columns in the field, to intercept the enemy whom
the columns were driving on to the line.

2. To act on the flank of a column or line of columns, the train being
well advanced so as to prevent the enemy breaking to that flank.

3. To reinforce stations and camps on the railway which were threatened
by the enemy.

4. To escort ordinary traffic trains.

5. To reconnoitre.

6. To patrol by day and night.

7. To protect traffic routes generally.

The garrison of an armoured train consisted of an Infantry escort and
Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer detachments. The R.E. detachment
consisted of one N.C.O. and six sappers skilled in railway repairing
work and in re-setting derailed engines and trucks; two telegraph
linesmen; one telegraph clerk; two engine-drivers and two firemen.
When the train was engaged, all counted as effective rifles with the
exception of the driver and firemen on the footplate, and even they
carried rifles in their engine cab for use against an enemy endeavouring
to gain possession of the engine.

Responsibility for the efficiency of the garrisons was placed upon the
Assistant-Director of Armoured Trains. Whenever, also, a concentration
of the trains had been decided upon, he was to attach himself to one of
them, and take charge of the concerted action of the whole.

In reference to the operation of the trains Captain M. H. Grant
writes[45]:--

It was important that the officer commanding the train
should be a man of judgment and strong nerve. He was often
called upon to act on his own responsibility. His strong
armament and defences enabled him to attack superior forces.
Yet his vulnerable points were many. He had ever to be alert
that the enemy did not cut the line behind him. In addition
to his visible foes and the constant risks of traffic in war
time, he had to contend with skilfully-used automatic and
observation mines, and had to keep his head even amid the roar
which followed the passage of his leading truck over a charge
of dynamite, and then to deal with the attack which almost
certainly ensued. Officers, therefore, had to be chosen from
men of no common stamp. The danger from contact mines was to
a certain extent obviated by a standing order that each train
should propel a heavily-loaded bogie truck. Such trucks had
low sides and ends; they in no way obstructed the view, or
fire, from the trains; and they performed the double purpose of
exploding contact mines and carrying the railway and telegraph
materials. The necessity for this propelled unoccupied bogie was
exemplified on several occasions.

As regards their protection of the railway lines, the armoured trains
rendered an invaluable service, and this was especially the case when
the blockhouse system had been fully developed, and when, concurrently
therewith, the enemy's artillery became scarce. In recording this
opinion, Sir Percy Girouard further observes:--"There is no doubt, also,
that the enemy disliked them intensely, and the presence of an armoured
train had a great moral effect."

In addition to the organisation and running of these armoured trains,
there was included in every ordinary train, as far as possible, a
special gun-truck on which was a pedestal-mounted Q. F. gun, under the
charge of an escort. The trains also carried a machine gun at each end,
arranged with a lateral sweep, to allow the fires to cross on either
side of the train at a distance of from fifty to eighty yards. In
addition to this, armour plates were hung on each side of the driver's
cab, and the first train run each morning had two or three trucks in
front of the engine as a precaution against any mine that might have
been laid over-night.

AMBULANCE AND HOSPITAL TRAINS

Supplementing the references already made on pp. 95-6 to the employment
of ambulance and hospital trains in the South African War, it may here
be stated that three out of the seven adapted from rolling stock already
in use on the Cape or the Natal Government lines had been prepared in
advance of the outbreak of hostilities, namely, two at the Cape and one
in Natal, and these three were, consequently, available for immediate
use.

"In Cape Colony," as stated in "_The Times_ History of the War in South
Africa," "the two hospital trains that had been prepared in September
were manned by a complete _personnel_ from England, and were kept in
constant touch with Lord Methuen's advance. In most cases they were
run up almost into the firing line, and during the actions at Belmont,
Graspan, Modder River and Magersfontein, they relieved the force of its
sick and wounded in an incredibly short time, conveying some to De Aar
and Orange River, and others to the general hospitals at Cape Town." The
services thus rendered by the hospital trains were greatly facilitated
by the fact that during the first three months of the war the fighting
was almost entirely on or alongside the railways. It was, therefore,
possible to arrange for a speedy evacuation of wounded from the field
hospitals.

The same two trains, after working along the line of communication in
Cape Colony, reached Bloemfontein early in April, 1900; and here they
were of great use in helping to remove the sufferers from the enteric
fever which was filling up, not only all the hospitals, but every other
available building, as well, and finally attained, by the end of May, a
maximum of 4,000 cases. Unable to meet all requirements arising under
these exceptional conditions, the two hospital trains were supplemented
by a number of locally-prepared or ordinary trains, made available for
the transport either of sick or of convalescents.

In regard to Natal, "_The Times_ History" says that of all the medical
arrangements made in connection with the war, "those during Sir Redvers
Buller's operations in Natal presented the most satisfactory features."

The line of communication with the base was short, and it was amply
supplied with hospital trains. In addition to the one that had been
formed before the outbreak of hostilities, a second and similar
train was prepared in November, 1889. The hospital train, "Princess
Christian," constructed in England at a cost of £14,000, mainly raised
by Her Royal Highness--with a handsome contribution from the town of
Windsor--reached Cape Town early in February, 1900. It was sent on in
sections to Durban, where it was put together in the Natal Government
Railway workshops. Under the charge of Sir John Furley, who had also
supervised its reconstruction, the train was the first to cross the
temporary trestle bridge provided to take the place of the one across
the Tugela, at Colenso, which had been destroyed by the Boers, and it
was, also, the first train to enter Ladysmith (March 18, 1900) after the
siege. Between this time and September 5, 1901, it made 108 journeys,
mainly on the Natal side and on the Pretoria-Koomati Poort line; it ran
a total of 42,000 miles, and it carried (in addition to the medical and
nursing staff) 321 officers and 7,208 non-commissioned officers and men,
a total of 7,529 sick and wounded, of whom only three died _en route_.
In June, 1901, the train was formally presented by the Central Red Cross
Committee to the Secretary of State for War as a complete hospital
train unit for the use of the military forces in South Africa; but, on
the assumption, apparently, that no further use for its services as a
hospital train was likely to arise, it was subsequently dismantled.

As showing the extent of the work done by the other hospital trains
during the course of the war, it may be added that No. 2 ran 114,539
miles, in 226 trips, between November 22, 1898, and the end of August,
1902, conveying 471 officers and 10,325 non-commissioned officers and
men, a total of 10,796, of whom only seven died _en route_.

TRANSVAAL RAILWAYS AND THE WAR

To the foregoing account of the British use of railways for military
purposes during the course of the South African War it may be of
interest to add a few notes giving the experiences of the Boers, as
detailed in a statement on "The Netherlands South African Railway
Company and the Transvaal War," drawn up at Pretoria, in April, 1900, by
the Secretary of the Company, Mr. Th. Steinnetz, and published in _De
Ingenieur_ of July 14 and 21, 1900.[46]

Under the terms of the concession granted to the Netherlands South
African Railway Company (otherwise the Nederland Zuid Afrikaansche
Spoorweg Maatschappij) by the Government of the Transvaal Republic,
the latter were, in the event either of war or of danger of war, to
have complete control alike over the railway and over everything--and
everybody--necessary for its use, subject to certain undertakings
as to the payment of compensation to concessionaires. By virtue of
these powers the Executive Raad issued a decree on September 13,
1899, establishing Government control over the lines, and stating
further:--"With the view of ensuring that proper use can be made of
the railway, the whole of the _personnel_ of the company are ...
commandeered to do duty on the railways in the functions they now
occupy, and they are placed under the orders of the Commandant-General
and the war officers indicated by him, or of other officials." The
Government, in effect, took possession of all the lines, rolling stock,
workshops and other properties of the railway company for the purposes
of military transport, and they assumed control over the staff in order
to ensure the working, not only of the company's own lines, but, also,
of the lines in such portions of British territory as might be occupied
by the forces of the Republic.

Against the possibility of an immediate invasion of the
Transvaal--"about which," says the statement, "there was much anxiety
on account of the armoured trains, which the English advertised so
loudly"--precautions were taken by preparing for demolition some of the
bridges on the south-eastern section of the company's lines. Guards
were, also, stationed at bridges and other important points throughout
the Transvaal in order to protect them against attack or interference by
"the great number of Anglophiles" assumed to be still in the Republic;
but the statement seems to suggest that, as shown by the small number
of attempts made in this direction, the British rather neglected their
opportunities.

In regard to the transport of Transvaal troops, difficulties arose at
the outset owing to the absence of data, even of the vaguest character,
as to the numbers of burghers, horses and wagons it would be necessary
to convey by train. Consequently, no military time-tables could be
drawn up, and the traffic demands were met as best they could be when
they were made. No more, however, than eleven trains a day, in each
direction, could be run on the south-eastern branch--a single-track
line, with stations and crossing places about one hour's journey apart.
Concerning the amount of traffic carried, Mr. Steinnetz says:--

The total military traffic to the frontier was not so great
as one would expect, in spite of only a portion of the burghers
having taken up arms. From various districts the commandos
marched mounted, with ox-wagons, to the place of assembly, as
had been the custom in the past, although the use of the railway
would have saved time and trouble to both horses and men. Yet
it was not the first time that the Transvaalers had had the
opportunity of learning the use of railways in warfare. At the
time of the Jameson Raid and the Magato Campaign full use had
been made of them.

Among the railway bridges which the Boers had prepared for destruction,
in case of need, was an iron one of 116 ft. span, the blowing up of
which would have checked the anticipated British invasion of the
Transvaal via Lang's Nek; but the concentration of the British forces
at Dundee and Ladysmith allowed the Boers to enter Natal without
resistance; and they took over, in sections, the working of the Natal
railway in proportion as they advanced. At various stations in northern
Natal long platforms had been specially constructed by the British,
and other arrangements made, to permit of large movements of troops
and especially the detraining of cavalry. These improvements, says Mr.
Steinnetz, came in very handy for the Federal Army. The _personnel_
of the lines had "retired in a great hurry," without attempting any
demolitions or doing any damage to the lines beyond what could be easily
repaired. The Lang's Nek tunnel was "wholly untouched." Mr. Steinnetz
continues:--

The Boers themselves, however, through fear of being
surprised by armoured trains, and for other reasons, gave
the breakdown gangs more work to do. The telegraph line was
destroyed by them for long distances, the track was broken up
and two bridges were damaged. In order to obstruct the retreat
of General Yule from Dundee a bridge of two 30-foot spans on
the Dundee branch line was blown up by the Irish Brigade with
a dynamite charge in the central pier. The damage done was not
very great and was easily repaired. The same ineffective measure
was applied with greater success to a similar bridge over a
small spruit near Waschbank. But even here the repair was not
difficult.

These admissions as to the ease with which the work of destruction
could, as a rule, readily be put right again are in full accord with
Sir Percy Girouard's report, in dealing with the same subject. It is
only fair to accept, in turn, the assertion made by Mr. Steinnetz that
the damage which the British did to certain of the railway bridges was
"speedily repaired."

Some of the later destruction work carried out by the Boers was of
a more serious character. The blowing up of the Tugela bridge at
Colenso--a structure consisting of five iron lattice girder spans of
100 ft. each on masonry piles--was entrusted by the Boer military
authorities to an inspector of the railway company who had served in the
Dutch engineers. It was accomplished by the simultaneous detonation of
forty dynamite charges all connected by leads to a Siemens and Halske
"exploder," the bridge being "thoroughly demolished." In the destruction
of the three-span bridge over the Orange River at Norval's Pont the
charge employed consisted of about three and a half chests of dynamite,
or 198 lbs. Concerning the general destruction of bridges by which the
Boers sought to check pursuit after their abandonment of the siege of
Ladysmith, Mr. Steinnitz says:--"There was no lack of explosives, and no
need to spare them."

The central workshops of the Netherlands Company were made use of by the
Government for the repair of guns, rifles, wagons, etc., and for the
manufacture of war material. Four complete ambulance trains were also
fitted up there for the use of wounded burghers.

All the traffic on the lines was done on Government orders, and all
expenses were charged to them. No private traffic at all was carried.
There were, consequently, no railway receipts, and the railway company
had no responsibility.

DEVELOPMENT OF RAIL POWER

In one way or another the South African War of 1899-1902 was concerned
in many of the most complicated of the problems that arise in connection
with the use of railways for military purposes.[47]

In various ways, also, it advanced to a still further stage the whole
question of the nature and possibilities of rail-power in war.

It confirmed under especially remarkable conditions a fact which
the American War of Secession had already established, namely, that
even single lines of railway, passing through country occupied by or
belonging to the enemy, may allow of campaigns being conducted at
such distances from the base of supplies as, but for this means of
communication, would render war impracticable.

It offered further evidence as to the possibility, in favourable
circumstances, of employing railways for the carrying out of important
tactical movements.

It re-established the essential need of organisation for the attainment
of efficiency in military transport and especially in so far as such
organisation deals with questions of control and co-ordination of the
military and the technical elements.

It placed on a recognised and clearly defined basis the uses of armoured
trains and the best methods to be adopted for their construction and
operation.

It showed still more clearly, perhaps, than any previous war had done,
the useful and beneficent purposes served by ambulance and hospital
trains, whether constructed for the purpose or adapted from existing
railway stock.

It proved that, however apparently insecure a line of rail communication
may be, and however active and destructive the attacks made on it by
a pertinacious enemy, yet, with a strong and well-organised force of
Railway Troops following close on the advancing army, and supplemented
by an efficient system of line-protection, repairs and reconstruction
can be carried out with such speed that comparatively little material
delay will be caused, the final result of the campaign will not
necessarily be affected, and the value of rail-power as an instrument of
war will suffer no actual reduction.

FOOTNOTES:

[41] In Vol. II of the "Detailed History of the Railways in the South
African War" (Chatham: Royal Engineers Institute, 1904), there is
a series of 45 full-page photographs of damaged bridges and of the
low-level deviations constructed to take their place.

[42] For a description of these blockhouses, see vol. iii, pp. 125-6, of
the "History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers," by Col. Sir Chas. M.
Watson. Royal Engineers Institute, Chatham, 1915.

[43] "Natal: An Illustrated Official Railway Guide and Handbook."
Compiled and edited by C. W. Francis Harrison. Published by Authority.
London, 1903.

[44] "History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Compiled by
Direction of His Majesty's Government." Vol. IV, Appendix 10: "Notes on
the Military Railway System in South Africa." London, 1910.

[45] Official "History," Vol. IV, Appendix 10.

[46] For English translation, see "Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution," January, 1902.

[47] In the preface of his standard work on "Military Railways," Major
W. D. Connor, of the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, says:
"On the military side I refer to the reports of Colonel Sir E. P. C.
Girouard, K.C.M.G., R.E., of the British Army, whose work in Egypt and
South Africa has set a high standard for any engineer who in future may
be required to meet and solve railway problems in the theatre of war.
These reports give the solution of many points as worked out in the
field, and confirm the main lessons to be learned from the history of
the military railways in our Civil War." (See "Bibliography.")

CHAPTER XVII

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 was a test not so much of the military
strength of the two combatants as of their respective means of
communication and concentration.

From Moscow to Port Arthur the distance is 5,300 miles, and, save for
the sea journey via the Baltic, the North Sea, the Atlantic and the
Indian Ocean, the Russians were dependent for the transport of their
troops and stores to Manchuria on such very inadequate railways as they
then controlled. Japan, on the other hand, was able to rely on her fleet
and her considerably developed mercantile marine; and, as soon as she
had paralysed the Russian fleet and established her own command of the
sea--as she did within two days of the outbreak of hostilities--she
could land her forces whenever she chose at almost any convenient point
on the sea-board of the theatre of war.

The situation recalled, somewhat, the still worse position in which
Russia had found herself at the time of the Crimean War when, in the
absence of any rail facilities at all, her troops had to march, and
their supplies and munitions had to be conveyed, hundreds of miles over
dreary steppes--"huge columns that had quitted the far north and east of
the interior dwindling to a few broken-down Battalions before they came
in sight of Sebastopol"--whereas the allies could send their troops all
the way to the Crimea by sea.

While there are many other causes which, rightly or wrongly, have been
regarded as contributing to the defeat of Russia by Japan--included
therein being personal shortcomings of the Russian officers; mistakes
made by them in strategy and tactics; defects in the Russian military
system, and the half-hearted interest of the Russian nation in the
struggle--the really decisive factors in the situation were the
transport deficiencies of the Siberian and Manchurian railways.

The construction of a _Trans-Siberian Railway_ as a great strategic
line stretching across Asia, facilitating the development of a vast
territory, and, above all, calculated to foster the realisation of
Russia's aims in the Far East, first came under discussion about the
year 1860. It was made the subject of an exhaustive study by a Committee
of Ministers in 1875, but it was not until 1891 that the first sod was
turned.

Military and political considerations being paramount, such energy was
shown in the work of construction that by 1896 the western section
had been carried through Irkutsk to Lake Baikal and from the eastern
shores thereof to Strietensk, while the eastern section--known as the
Usuri Railway--had been made through Russia's Maritime Province from
Vladivostok to Khabarovsk. The original design was that the line should
be constructed on Russian territory all the way to Vladivostok; but
this meant that from Strietensk it would have to follow the great bend
made to the north by the Amur, the southern boundary of Russia, and the
Russian Government thought it desirable to secure a more direct route.

Towards the end of 1896, in return for the great services which she
considered she had rendered to China in the war between that country and
Japan, Russia obtained the concession for a railway which, starting from
Chita, Trans-Baikalia, about 200 miles west of Strietensk, would pass
through Manchuria to Vladivostok, avoiding the great bend of the Amur,
though still offering the disadvantage that one important section of the
through route would not be on Russian territory. Under a contract made
between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, a _Chinese
Eastern Railway Company_ was formed to build and operate the line thus
conceded; but the arrangements made were carried out through the Russian
Minister of Finance, and the line was directly dependent on the Russian
State.

Russia's occupation of Port Arthur in March, 1898, led, in the spring
of the following year, to the further construction being begun of a
southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin, a station on
the Chita-Vladivostok line, to the extremity of the Liao-tung peninsula.

It was these two railways, the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern,
terminating at Vladivostok in the one direction and at Port Arthur in
the other, which came into special consideration in the war of 1904-5.
It was on the Trans-Siberian line, more especially, that Russia was
mainly dependent (as the German official report on the war points out)
not only for the concentration and maintenance of her army but even for
the raising and organisation of most of its units.

When the Trans-Siberian was first built, the desire to avoid undue
expenditure on a line which must necessarily involve a huge expenditure,
with little or no prospect of yielding a return sufficient for the
payment of interest thereon, led to the adoption of an economy which was
to hamper very materially the transport capacity of the railway. Only a
single line of rails was allowed for; a limit was placed on the breadth
of the embankments; the curves were greater than considerations of speed
and safety should have permitted; the gradients were either dangerously
varied or so excessive that divisions of the trains were necessary;
the rails used were of no greater weight than from 42 lbs. to 47 lbs.
per yard, and they were badly laid, even then; the bridges across the
smaller streams were made of wood only; the crossing-places and the
railway stations were few and far between, while all the secondary
constructions were provided on what was almost the cheapest possible
scale.

These conditions necessitated the limitation of the traffic, when the
line was first opened, to the running of three trains a day in each
direction. The length of the trains was restricted to sixty axles. It
was thus impossible to meet the demands even of the ordinary traffic
in peace time, apart altogether from any question as to military
requirements in time of war. No sooner, therefore, were the main
portions of the line ready, in 1898, than there was set aside, for
a railway which was already to cost over £350,000,000, a further sum
of £9,130,000 for relaying those portions of the line with a better
quality of rails and sleepers, the reconstruction of sections dangerous
to traffic, the provision of more stations and more rolling stock, and
other improvements. It was expected that this additional work would be
completed by 1904, by which time the line was to be equal to the running
of thirteen pairs of trains daily.

Reporting on the condition of the Russian railways in 1900 (at which
date the Eastern Chinese line was still unfinished), General Kuropatkin,
then War Minister, afterwards Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria, did not
hesitate to declare that it was still impossible for them to cope with
heavy traffic.

Relations between Russia and Japan became strained towards the end of
1903, though the Government of the former country were desirous that any
outbreak of hostilities should be avoided until they were better able
to undertake them. In his account of "The Russian Army and the Japanese
War" General Kuropatkin says concerning the position at this period:--

Our unreadiness was only too plain, and it seemed at that
time that we should be able, with two or three years' steady
work, so to strengthen our position in the Far East, and improve
the railway, the fleet, the land forces, and the fortresses of
Port Arthur and Vladivostok that Japan would have small chance
of success against us.

Regarding war as inevitable, and disinclined to give Russia an
opportunity of first strengthening her position in the directions here
suggested, Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia on February
6, 1904, this being the immediate prelude to the hostilities that
followed.

In anticipation of a possible rupture, Russia had already despatched
reinforcements and stores to the Far East by sea; but the rupture,
when it did come, found her quite unprepared to send further large
reinforcements by land, while her forces in the Far East were scattered
over the vast area extending from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, and from
Port Arthur to Nikolaievsk. No orders for mobilisation had been issued;
the army was in the midst of rearmament and reorganisation, and the
unreadiness of the railways had prevented the drawing up of time-tables
for the concentration of the troops. Ten days after the outbreak of war
the Russian Government issued a statement in which they said:--

The distance of the territory now attacked and the desire of
the Tsar to maintain peace were the causes of the impossibility
of preparations for war being made a long time in advance.

Not only, too, was the seat of war 5,000 miles away, and not only was
a single-track ill-equipped line of railway the only practicable means
of sending troops and war material there by land, but an exceptionally
great obstacle to traffic had to be met owing to the interruption of
rail communication by Lake Baikal.

Having a length of 380 miles, a breadth ranging from eighteen miles to
fifty-six miles, a mean depth of 850 feet (with a maximum, in parts, of
no less than 4,500 ft.), and a total area of over 13,000 square miles,
_Lake Baikal_ ranks, next to the great lakes of the United States and
Central Africa, as the largest fresh-water lake in the world; though it
should, in reality, be regarded less as a lake than as a great inland
sea. As it happened, also, this vast expanse of water stood in the
direct line of route of the Trans-Siberian railway, and the crossing of
it by the Russian reinforcements going to the Far East constituted a
seriously defective link in the chain of communication.

At an elevation of 1,360 feet above sea level, the lake is subject
alike to severe gales, to heavy fogs, and to frosts so intense that in
mid-winter the water may be frozen to a depth of ten feet. From the end
of April to the end of December troops and travellers arriving by rail
at one side of the lake crossed to the other by passenger steamers.
Goods wagons were taken over by ferry-boats which, also, acted as
ice-breakers early and late in the winter season, so long as the passage
could be kept open. When, in the winter, the ice was strong enough
to bear, traffic was conducted by transport sledges; but when there
was sufficient ice to stop the ferry-boats, though not sufficient to
permit of the sledges being used--conditions which generally prevailed
for about six weeks in the year--the traffic had to be discontinued
altogether.

The question will naturally be asked,--Why had not the constructors of
the line avoided these disadvantages by carrying it round the lake? The
reply is that this had not been done, prior to the outbreak of war,
owing to the formidable nature of the work involved from an engineering
point of view.

Lake Baikal is bordered, on the south--the route a Circum-Baikal line
would have to take--by mountains which rise sheer up from the water's
edge to a height of, in places, no less than 4,600 ft. Across the
mountains, along the rocky shores, and over the intervening valleys the
railway would require to be carried for a distance of 160 miles in order
to link up the two sections then divided by the lake. The difficulties
of the work were likely to be as great as the cost would certainly be
enormous, compared with that of the remainder of the Trans-Siberian
railway. So it was that when the war broke out there were still 112
miles of the Circum-Baikal line to be constructed.

So it was, also, that, pending the completion of this line round the
lake, Russia's reinforcements from Europe for the Far East had to
cross the lake itself; and the outbreak of hostilities in the month of
February placed Russia at an especially great disadvantage in regard to
transport.

The combined ferry-steamers and ice-breakers had made their final
journey for the winter on January 27, and at first the only way in
which the troops could cross the ice was by marching or by sledge.
After a day's rest at Irkutsk, they were brought by train to Baikal
station, at the lake side, arriving there at about four o'clock in
the morning in order that they could complete the journey to Tanchoi
station, on the other side of the lake--a distance of about twenty-five
miles--in the day. The track was marked out by posts, supplemented by
lanterns at night, and it was kept in order by gangs of labourers.
Small bridges were placed over cracks in the ice. Shelters, in
telephonic communication with one another, were provided at four-mile
distances alike for the purpose of rest and for the distribution of food
prepared by regimental field kitchens; but the principal meal of the
day was taken at a more substantial half-way house, where the cooking
arrangements were on a more elaborate scale and better accommodation
was provided. Around the half-way house at night petroleum flares were
burned, so that it could be seen a long way off. In foggy weather, or
during snow storms, bells were rung at all the shelters. Inasmuch as the
temperature fell, at times, to 22 deg., Fahr., below zero, the provision
of these rest-houses must have been greatly appreciated. Baggage was
taken across in sledges, the normal supply of which had been increased
by an additional 3,000. Some of the troops also made the journey by this
form of conveyance, four men being seated in each sledge. The batteries
crossed with their own horses.

As soon as the ice attained a thickness of about 4½ ft., the expedient
was adopted of laying a pair of rails along it in order, more
especially, that the additional engines and railway wagons urgently
needed on the lines east of the lake could be taken across. The
rails were laid on sleepers of exceptional length, the weight being
thus distributed over a greater surface of ice; but, even with this
precaution, it was no easy matter to keep the line in working order
owing to the extreme cold, to storms, to the occasional ice movements
and cracks, or to the effect of earthquake shocks in destroying lengths
of line, sections of which sometimes required to be relaid almost as
soon as they had been put down. The line was begun on February 10 and
completed by the 29th of the same month. Between March 1 and March 26
there were taken across the lake, by this means, sixty-five dismantled
locomotives (rebuilt on arrival on the eastern side), twenty-five
railway carriages, and 2,313 goods wagons. Transport was provided by
horses, the number so used being about 1,000.

Constructed to serve an exclusively military purpose, this
twenty-five-mile line across Lake Baikal may certainly be regarded as
a "military railway," while as a military ice-railway it holds a unique
position in the history of warfare.

When, owing to the advancing season, the ice on the lake could no longer
be trusted to bear either railway trucks or sledges, and when navigation
was again open, dependence had to be placed on the ferry services. There
were, however, only two vessels available for the transfer of railway
trucks across the lake, and each of these, accommodating twenty-seven
trucks at a time, could make no more than three return crossings in the
twenty-four hours.

Only in one way could an improvement be effected in these obviously
inadequate facilities for getting an army to Manchuria, and that was in
carrying the railway round the southern end of the lake, thus avoiding
the delay caused by the hitherto unavoidable transshipment and crossing,
and ensuring a continuous rail journey. The need for this _Circum-Baikal
link_ had, in fact, become urgent, and the work was pushed on with the
greatest vigour.

Mention has already been made of the engineering difficulties which the
construction of the line involved. These will be better understood if
it is added that the 160-mile link passes through thirty-four tunnels,
having an aggregate length of over six miles; that it is carried across
valleys, or open spaces, on two hundred bridges, and that numerous
cuttings and many large culverts had also to be provided. The total
cost worked out at no less than £52,000 per mile--probably the largest
sum per mile ever spent on a railway designed, in the first instance,
to serve a distinctly military purpose, and exceeding by £35,000 the
average cost per mile, down to that date, of the entire system of
Russian railways. Delays occurred, also, through strikes and other
causes, and, in the result, it was not until September 25, 1904--more
than seven months after the outbreak of war--that the line was ready for
use, and that an interruption of the rail journey by the crossing of
Lake Baikal became no longer necessary.

Meanwhile, an inadequate supply of engines and rolling stock had been
a serious hindrance to traffic alike on the Trans-Baikal section of
the Siberian line and on the Eastern Chinese lines. The locomotives and
wagons taken across Lake Baikal either on the ice-railway or on the
ferry boats had served a useful purpose, but six months elapsed before
the Eastern Chinese lines could be worked to their full efficiency.

There were other directions, as well, in which _traffic hindrances_
arose. The freezing, down to the very bottom, of the rivers between
the eastern side of Lake Baikal and Harbin (Manchuria) was a cause of
serious difficulty in the early part of the year in getting water even
for such locomotives as were available. In the western Siberian section
the supply of water was impaired by the great percentage of salt in the
streams. In Manchuria the fuel reserve was inadequate; soldiers were
the only reliable portion of the subordinate railway staff; the railway
workshops were poorly equipped; there were not nearly enough engine
depôts; large supplies of rails, fish-plates, sleepers and ballast were
needed, and much work had to be done in the construction of additional
sidings, etc. All these shortcomings required to be made good whilst
the war was in actual progress, though for the transport of most of the
necessary materials and appliances there was only a single-track line of
railway already overtaxed for the conveyance of troops, munitions and
supplies.

The _number of trains_ that could be run was extremely limited. The
capacity of the line of communication as a whole was fixed by that
of the Eastern Chinese Railway between Chita and Harbin; and after
three months of war it was still possible to run from west to east in
each twenty-four hours no more than three military trains (conveying
troops, supplies, stores and remounts), one light mail train, and, when
necessary, one ambulance train; though these conditions were improved
later on.

The _speed_ at which the trains ran--allowing for necessary stops in
stations or at crossing places on the line--ranged from five to eleven
miles an hour, with seven miles an hour as a good average. For the
journey from Warsaw to Mukden the military trains took forty days,
including one day's rest for the troops at the end of every 600 or 700
miles. In April and May the journey from Wirballen, on the frontier
of Russia and Germany, to Liao-yang, situate between Mukden and Port
Arthur, took fifty days--an average speed of five and a quarter miles
per hour.

What with the transport and other difficulties that arose, it was not
for three months after the outbreak of hostilities that the Russian
troops in the Ear East received reinforcements. It was not until after
seven months of war that the three Army Corps sent from European Russia
to join the field army were all concentrated in Manchuria.

Under these conditions the Japanese, free to send their own armies by
sea to the theatre of war, and able to concentrate them with far greater
speed, had all the initial advantage. The Russian reinforcements arrived
in driblets, and they were either cut off as they came or, as regards,
at least, the fighting from May 14 to October 14, provided only 21,000
men to replace 100,000 killed, wounded or sick; whereas the Japanese
were able to maintain a continuous flow of reinforcements to make good
their own casualties.

General Kuropatkin is of opinion that if the Russians had been able
to command better transport from the outset the whole course of the
campaign would have been changed. He thinks that even a single extra
through troop train per day would have made a material difference, while
the running, from the start, of six trains a day would, he believes,
have secured for Russia alike the initiative and the victory. Referring
to the Siberian and Eastern Chinese Railways he says:--

If these lines had been more efficient, we could have
brought up our troops more rapidly, and, as things turned out,
150,000 men concentrated at first would have been of far more
value to us than the 300,000 who were gradually assembled during
nine months, only to be sacrificed in detail.... If we had had a
better railway and had been able to mass at Liao-yang the number
specified, we should undoubtedly have won the day in spite of
our mistakes.

Kuropatkin himself certainly did all he could to improve the transport
conditions. In a statement he submitted to the Tsar on March 7, 1904,
he declared that of all urgently pressing questions that of bettering
the railway communication between Russia and Siberia was the most
important; and he added:--"It must, therefore, be taken up at once, in
spite of the enormous cost. The money expended will not be wasted; it
will, on the contrary, be in the highest sense productive inasmuch as it
will shorten the duration of the war."

On the Trans-Baikal section six new stations were added, and additional
crossing places to facilitate the passing of trains were provided
elsewhere, so that by May some additional trains per day could be
run. In June orders were given by the Government for the execution of
extensive works designed to increase the capacity of the Siberian and
Eastern Chinese main lines to seven trains per day in each direction,
and that of the southern branch to twelve per day. The cost of these
improvements was estimated at £4,400,000.

In November, 1904, Kuropatkin submitted to the Tsar a recommendation
that the lines should be at once doubled throughout their whole length.
The reinforcements, he declared, were even then still coming in
driblets. "Supplies despatched in the spring are still on the Siberian
side. Waterproofs sent for the summer will arrive when we want fur
coats; fur coats will come to hand when waterproofs are wanted."

There was need, also, to provide stores of provisions for the troops. So
long as the army was a comparatively small one it could depend mainly on
local resources. In proportion as it increased in size it became more
and more dependent on supplies from European Russia; but the collection
of a sufficiency for a single month meant the running of five extra
trains a day for a like period. Even when ample supplies were available
at one point, weakness and inefficiency in the transport arrangements
might lead to the troops elsewhere suffering privations which should be
avoided.

Whether for financial or other reasons, the Russian Government did not
adopt the idea of converting the single track of the railway system
into double track; but the improvements made in the traffic facilities
(including the provision of sixty-nine additional places for the passing
of trains) were such that by the time peace was concluded, on September
5, 1905, the Russians had ten, or even twelve pairs of full-length
trains running in the twenty-four hours, as compared with the two per
day which could alone be run six months before the outbreak of war and
the three per day which were running nine months later. The capacity of
the lines had been increased practically fourfold; though the general
situation remained such as to evoke the following comment from the
writer of the official German account of the war[48]:--

In spite of the efforts made to improve the line, the
connection of the Russian forces in East Asia with their home
country was, and remained, an unreliable and uncertain factor
in the calculations of Army Headquarters. No measures, were
they ever so energetic, could be designed to remove this
uncertainty, and it was only gradually, as the Manchurian Army
itself increased and concentrated, and as the railway works
advanced, that greater freedom of action was assured to the
Commander-in-Chief; but even then the army as a whole, with all
its wants and supplies, remained dependent on the Siberian and
Eastern Chinese Railways.

What the railways did was to enable the Russians to collect at the
theatre of war, by the time the war itself came to an end, an army of
1,000,000 men--of whom two-thirds had not yet been under fire--together
with machine-guns, howitzers, shells, small-arm ammunition, field
railways, wireless telegraphy, supplies, and technical stores of all
kinds. Kuropatkin says of this achievement:--

The War Department had, with the co-operation of other
departments, successfully accomplished a most colossal task.
What single authority would have admitted a few years ago the
possibility of concentrating an army of a million men 5,400
miles away from its base of supply and equipment by means of a
poorly-constructed single-line railway? Wonders were effected;
but it was too late. Affairs in the interior of Russia for which
the War Department could not be held responsible were the cause
of the war being brought to an end at a time when decisive
military operations should really have only just been beginning.

Russia, in fact, agreed to make peace at a time when the prospect of her
being able to secure a victory was greater than it had been at any time
during the earlier phases of the war; but the Japanese failed to attain
all they had hoped for, the primary causes of such failure, in spite
of their repeated victories, being, as told in the British "Official
History" of the war, that "Port Arthur held out longer than had been
expected, and the Trans-Siberian Railway enabled Russia to place more
men in the field than had been thought possible."[49]

Thus, in respect to rail-power, at least, Russia still achieved a
remarkable feat in her transport of an army so great a distance by a
single-track line of railway. Such an achievement was unexampled, while,
although Fate was against the ultimate success of her efforts, Russia
provided the world with a fresh object lesson as to what might have
been done, in a campaign waged more than 5,000 miles from the base of
supplies, if only the line of rail communication had been equal from the
first to the demands it was called upon to meet.

Apart from this main consideration, there were some other phases of the
Russo-Japanese War which are of interest from the point of view of the
present study.

The _Field railways_, mentioned on the previous page, constituted a
network of, altogether, 250 miles of narrow-gauge railways built and
operated by the Russian troops--either alone or with the help of Chinese
labourers--and designed to act as subsidiary arteries of the broad-gauge
Eastern Chinese Railway by (1) providing for the transport therefrom of
troops and supplies to the front; (2) conveying guns and munitions to
the siege batteries, and (3) bringing back the sick and wounded. Horses,
ponies and mules were employed for traction purposes. Each of the three
Russian armies in the field had its own group of narrow-gauge lines,
and the lines themselves served a most useful purpose in a country of
primitive roads and inadequate local means of transport.

In one instance a broad-gauge branch line was built inland, during the
course of the war, from the Eastern Chinese Railway for a distance of
twenty-five miles. A depôt was set up at its terminus, and thence the
supplies were conveyed to the troops by a series of narrow-gauge lines
extending to every part of that particular section of the theatre of war.

Construction of the narrow-gauge line serving the Second Army, and
extending nineteen miles from a point on the Eastern Chinese Railway
near to Port Arthur, necessitated the provision of six bridges and three
embankments. Three lines, the building of which was begun in January,
1905, were siege lines specially designed to serve the positions taken
up at Liao-yang; but all three were abandoned on the evacuation of
Mukden, early in March. It was, however, subsequent to the retreat from
Mukden that the greatest degree of energy in constructing narrow-gauge
lines was shown by the Russians. In addition to the 250 miles brought
into use, there was still another 100 miles completed; but these could
not be operated owing to the inadequate supply of wagons--a supply
reduced still further through seizures made by the Japanese.

During the course of the war the traffic carried on these military
narrow-gauge lines included over 58,000 tons of provisions, stores,
etc., 75,132 sick and wounded, and 24,786 other troops.[50]

For the carrying out of all this construction work, and, also, for the
operation of the Manchurian and Ussuri railways, Russia had twenty-four
companies of _Railway Troops_, the total force of which was estimated
at 11,431. In the first part of the war she relied upon her six East
Siberian Railway Battalions. As the work increased other Battalions were
brought from European Russia.

The Japanese were not well provided with Railway Troops; but they were
none the less active in endeavouring to destroy the Russian lines of
communication, on which so much depended. For instance, the railway
to Port Arthur was cut by them near Wa-fang-tien at 11 p.m. on May 6.
The Russians repaired the line, and by May 10 a further train-load of
ammunition was sent over it into Port Arthur. Three days later the
Japanese cut the line at another point, and from that time Port Arthur
was isolated.

As regards the _operation_ of the Siberian and Eastern Chinese Railways,
Colonel W. H. H. Waters says:--[51]

Taking the railway as a whole, from Chelyabinsk, which is
the western terminus of the Siberian portion, to Mukden, a
distance of close upon 4,000 miles, it has worked better than I
expected; but the one great fault connected with it has been,
and is, the incapacity of Russian railwaymen, civil or military,
to handle heavy station traffic properly. If Russia were to pay
a British or American goods-yard foreman, say from Nine Elms
station, a salary, no matter how high, and let him import his
own staff of assistants, the improvement of the Asiatic lines in
question would be remarkable.

Then, again, Captain C. E. Vickers, R.E., writing on "The Siberian
Railway in War," in the issue of "The Royal Engineers Journal" (Chatham)
for August, 1905, points to the need which was developed for the
_control_ of the railway during war by a separate staff, as distinct
from the staffs concerned in arranging operations, distributing supplies
and munitions, and other military duties.

Whether due to the personal incapacity spoken of by the one authority
here quoted, or to the lack of a separate organisation alluded to by the
other, the fact remains that the operation of the Siberian and Eastern
Chinese lines did give rise to a degree of confusion that must have
greatly increased the difficulties of the position in which the Russians
were placed.

When, for example, in September, 1904, reservists were urgently
wanted at Mukden after the retreat from Liao-yang, the traffic was so
mismanaged that it took the troops seven days to do the 337 miles from
Harbin--an average speed of two miles per hour. On December 5, Harbin
Junction was so blocked in all directions by trains which could neither
move in nor go out that traffic had to be suspended for twelve hours
until the entanglement was set right. Still further, after the fall of
Port Arthur, on January 2, 1905, and the augmentation of the Japanese
forces by Nogi's army, the arrival of reinforcements then so greatly
needed by the Russians was delayed for over one month to allow of the
forwarding of a quantity of stores which had accumulated on the line.

Some, at least, of the difficulties and delays experienced in operation
were undoubtedly due to developments of that _interference by individual
officers_ with the working of the railways of which we have already had
striking examples in the case of the American War of Secession and the
Franco-German War of 1870-71. Colonel Waters writes on this subject:--

It is interesting to note how the working of the line was
interfered with by those who should have been the first to see
that no extraneous calls were made upon it when the organisation
of the army and the strengthening of Port Arthur were of vital
importance.

The chief of the Viceroy's Staff was the intermediary
between Admiral Alexeiev and General Kuropatkin, the former
being at Mukden and the latter at Liao-yang, thirty-seven miles
distant. Frequent conferences took place between Kuropatkin
and this officer, who always used to come in a special train
to Liao-yang. This necessitated the line being kept clear for
indefinite periods of time and dislocated all the other traffic
arrangements, as the then chief of the railways himself declared.

In the first days of May, 1904, the Viceroy and the Grand
Duke Boris were at Port Arthur, and wished to leave it before
they should be cut off. I heard that they actually took three
special trains to quit Port Arthur, namely, one for each of
them, and one for their baggage and stores. This entirely upset
the troop train, supply and ammunition services, at a time,
too, when the scarcity of heavy gun munition in the fortress was
such that, within a week, Kuropatkin called for volunteers to
run a train-load through, which was done a few hours only before
the place was definitely invested.

There were, throughout 1904, plenty of other instances
of special trains being run for, and siding accommodation
occupied by, various individuals, so that the organisation and
maintenance of the army was considerably hampered thereby.

These experiences simply confirm the wisdom of the action which other
countries had already taken (1) to ensure the efficient operation of
railways in time of war by staffs comprising the military and the
technical elements in combination, and (2) to prevent the interference
of the former in the details of the actual working by the latter.

Russia was, in fact, distinctly behind Western nations in these respects
in 1904-5, and the need for placing her military transport system on a
sounder basis was among the many lessons she learnt--and acted upon--as
the result of her experiences in the war with Japan.

FOOTNOTES:

[48] "The Russo-Japanese War. The Ya-Lu. Prepared in the Historical
Section of the German General Staff." Authorized Translation by Karl von
Donat. London, 1908.

[49] "Official History of the Russo-Japanese War." Prepared by the
Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. London, 1910.

[50] "Construction et exploitation des chemins de fer à traction animale
sur le théâtre de la guerre de 1904-5 en Mandchourie." _Revue du Genie
Militaire_, Avril, Mai, Juin, 1909. Paris.

[51] "The Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers attached to
the Japanese and Russians Forces in the Field." Vol. III. General Report
[dated March, 1905] by Col. W. H. H. Waters. London, 1908.

CHAPTER XVIII

STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY

Between "strategical" and "military" railways there are certain
fundamental differences, just as there are, also, between both of them
and ordinary commercial railways.

While designed partly, mainly, or, it may be, exclusively, to serve
military purposes, strategical railways, unlike military railways
proper, form part of the ordinary railway system of the country in which
they are built. They approximate to commercial lines in construction,
equipment and operation, and they are worked in connection with them
for the ordinary purposes of trade and travel; though in their case any
considerations as to whether the traffic they carry is remunerative
does not arise, provided only that they are capable of fulfilling
their real purpose--that, namely, of ensuring such military transports
as may, sooner or later, be required of them. It is possible that in
times of peace the amount of actual traffic passing over them will
be comparatively small, if not even practically _nil_, and that many
years may elapse before the special facilities they must necessarily
offer,--such as extensive siding accommodation and long platforms for
the loading and unloading of troop trains--are likely to be employed to
the fullest extent; but they nevertheless form an integral part both
of the railway system and of the military system of the country, and,
having been constructed, they are, at least, available for military
purposes whenever wanted.

One must, however, again bear in mind that a railway built to meet
the ordinary requirements of trade and travel does not become a
"strategical" any more than a "military" railway simply because, in
time of war, it is used, to whatever extent, for the conveyance of
troops, supplies or war material. The essential factor in each instance
is, not the use that is made of the line, but the particular, or, at
least, the main object it has been built to serve. Just, also, as a
commercial line remains a commercial line notwithstanding its use for
military traffic, so, in turn, a strategical line remains a strategical
line whatever the amount of civilian traffic it may carry in time of
peace.

Yet while the distinction thus drawn between general railways and
strategical railways is abundantly warranted, the increase of the former
may still have an important bearing on the operation of the latter
because of the improvement of transport facilities in the interior,
and because of the greater amount of rolling stock which will be made
available for war purposes. "From a military point of view," said von
Moltke in the Prussian Herrenhaus on March 26, 1876, "every railway is
welcome, and two are still more welcome than one"; and he developed
this idea in a further speech on December 17, 1879, when, in declaring
that the ownership and operation of the leading Prussian railways was
desirable from a military standpoint, he said:--[52]

Railways have become, in our time, one of the most essential
instruments for the conduct of war. The transport of large
bodies of troops to a given point is an extremely complicated
and comprehensive piece of work, to which continuous attention
must be paid. Every fresh railway junction makes a difference,
while, although we may not want to make use of every railway
line that has been constructed, we may still want to make use of
the whole of the rolling stock that is available.

Another important distinction between military and strategical railways
is that whereas the building of the former will be governed primarily
by military requirements, that of the latter may be fundamentally due
to considerations of State policy. Strategical railways are wanted
to serve the purposes of national defence or, alternatively, of
national expansion. They are especially provided to ensure the speedy
concentration of troops on the frontier, whether to resist invasion by
a neighbouring country or to facilitate the invasion either of that
country or, it may be, of territory on the other side thereof. The fact
that they have been built may, in some cases, even further the interests
of peace, should the increased means they offer for military transports
render the country concerned a more formidable antagonist than it
might otherwise be, and influence the policy of other States or lands
accordingly.

In tropical dependencies the building of railways as a practical proof
of "effective occupation" is often regarded as preferable to military
conquest, being likely, in most cases, to answer the same purpose while
offering many other advantages, besides. In West Africa there are not
only railways of this class but others that have, in addition, been
designed as a precautionary measure against a not impossible invasion,
at some future date, by Mohammedan tribes from North Central Africa. All
such lines as these belong to the strategical type, though they may,
also, serve an important part in furthering the economic development of
the territories concerned.

Strategical railways, whether designed for defensive or aggressive
purposes, may, in turn, be divided into two main groups, (1) those that
constitute a network of lines; and (2) single or individual lines for
short or long distances.

A network of strategical railways is generally found in direct
association with frontiers. Single or individual strategical lines fall
into various groups including (1) short lines or branches running out
to some point on or near to a frontier; (2) single lines carried for
long distances, and, possibly, crossing entire continents; (3) circular
or short lines, connecting different railway systems with one another,
in order to facilitate the movement of troops during mobilisation or
concentration or for defensive purposes in the event of invasion; (4)
lines passing round cities or large towns in order to avoid delay of
troop trains; and (5) lines for coast defence.

The ideal conditions for a network of strategical railways was already
a subject of discussion in Germany in 1842, when Pönitz brought
forward his proposal that that country should provide herself with
such a system. There were, he said, theorists who designed, on paper,
strategical railways which, starting from a common centre, radiated in
straight lines to different points on the frontier and were connected
with one another by parallel or intersecting lines of railway on the
principle of a geometrical design, or, he might have added, of a
spider's web. Pönitz admitted the excellence of the idea, suggesting
that if there were, indeed, a group of lines to the frontier connected
by cross lines allowing of a complete interchange of traffic, the enemy
would never know at what point a sudden advance in force might not be
made, while the linking up of the entire system would greatly facilitate
working.

In practice, however, as he proceeded to point out, this ideal system
could not be fully adopted, partly because the planning of railways is
influenced by the configuration of the country, which may not permit
of geometrical designs for iron roads; and partly because the trunk
lines of national systems of rail communication had already been laid
by private enterprise on the principle of catering for the social and
economic needs of the community and of returning interest on capital
expenditure, rather than of serving military or political purposes.

In the proposals which Pönitz himself advanced for providing Germany
with a complete network of strategical lines he sought to combine, as
far as possible, the commercial and the military principle; though the
subsequent predominance, in most countries, of the economic element in
regard to railways in general strengthened the force of his contention
that an ideal system was not necessarily a practicable one. The
suggested geometrical design was, nevertheless, not lost sight of,
and it continued to be regarded as the plan that should, at least, be
followed in respect to strategical railways, as far as circumstances
would permit.

Dealing with this particular subject in his "Geschichte und System
der Eisenbahnbenutzung im Kriege" (Leipzig, 1896), Dr. Josef Joesten
included the following among the conditions which, theoretically
and practically, should enable a railway system to respond to the
necessities of war:--

1. To each of the strategical fronts of the national territory there
should be the largest possible number of railway lines, all independent
the one of the other.

2. The converging lines terminating at the bases of concentration, and
more especially those leading to the coast or to great navigable rivers,
should be crossed by numerous transverse lines in order to allow of the
rapid passing of troops from any one of the lines of concentration to
any other.

3. Positions or localities having a recognised strategical value should
be selected as the places where the two types of lines should cross, and
these intersection points, when they are near to the frontier, should
themselves be protected by fortifications serving as _points d'appui_
for movements of advance or retirement.

It is possible that, if the building of railways in Germany had been
left entirely to the State from the outset, these principles would have
been generally followed there; but in Prussia the private lines taken
over as the result of the policy of nationalisation adopted by that
country--the total length of those acquired since 1872 being now nearly
10,000 miles--had been originally constructed to serve, not strategic,
but economic purposes, and, more especially, the industrial interests
of Westphalia and the Rhineland, the Government having been left by
private enterprise to provide, not alone the strategical lines, but,
also, the lines that were wanted to serve the less promising economic
requirements, of Eastern Prussia. To say, therefore, as some writers
have done, that the Prussian--if not the German--railways as a whole
have been designed to serve military purposes is erroneous. It is none
the less true that the adoption of the principle of State ownership
conferred alike on Prussia and on other German States a great advantage
in enabling them both to build strategical lines as, ostensibly, part
of the ordinary railway system and to adapt existing lines to military
purposes so far as conditions allowed and occasion might require.

In these circumstances any close adherence to ideal systems has, indeed,
not been practicable; yet the activity shown in Germany in providing
either new or adapted strategical lines of railway has been beyond all
question.

Such activity has been especially manifest since the Franco-German war
of 1870-1. It is, indeed, the case that during the last twenty-five
years there have been constant representations by Prussian trading
interests that the railways in Westphalia and Rhineland, numerous
as they might appear to be, were unequal to the industrial needs
of those districts. The reasons for these conditions were that the
Administration, eager to secure railway "profits," had neglected to
provide adequately for improvements, widenings and extensions of
line, and for additions to rolling stock. No one, however, is likely
to suggest that Prussia has shown any lack of enterprise in the
construction of strategical lines which would enable her to concentrate
great masses of troops on her frontiers with the utmost dispatch. "The
rivalry between neighbouring States," writes von der Goltz in "The
Conduct of War," "has had the effect of causing perfectly new lines
to be constructed solely for military reasons. Strategical railways
constitute a special feature of our time"; and in no country has this
fact been recognised more clearly, and acted upon more thoroughly, than
in Germany.

It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to attempt to form a reliable
estimate of the situation, from a strategical point of view, on the
basis of the ordinary German railway maps, and certain reproductions
thereof recently offered in the English Press have been wholly
misleading. Not only may these maps be hopelessly out of date--one, for
instance, that was published in a military journal in the autumn of 1914
contained none of the strategical lines built by Prussia since 1900
for troop movements in the direction of Belgium--but they invariably
draw no distinction between State-owned lines which do come into
consideration in regard to military transports and agricultural or other
lines--including many narrow-gauge ones--which serve local purposes
only and are still owned by private companies, the State not having
thought it necessary in the general interest to take them over.

A more accurate idea of the real bearings of German railways on the
military and strategical situation can be gathered from the large map
("Kartenbeilage I") which accompanies the "Bericht" presented to the
Kaiser, in 1911, by the Prussian Minister of Public Works under the
title of "Die Verwaltung der öffentlichen Arbeiten in Preussen, 1900 bis
1910." On this map a clear distinction is drawn between State-owned and
company-owned lines, while difference in colouring shows the additions
made to the State system during the decade either by construction of new
lines or by State acquisition of existing lines.

One especially noticeable feature brought out by this map is the fact
that, in addition to the innumerable railway lines built either to the
frontiers or establishing intercommunication and exchange of traffic
between those lines themselves, there is an almost unbroken series
running parallel to the coasts of _Pomerania_ and _East Prussia_, and
thence southward all along and close to the frontiers of Russia and
Russian Poland. In this way troops can be moved, not only by different
routes _to_ many points along the Baltic coast or the Russian frontier,
but, also, _from_ one of these coastal or frontier points direct to
another, as may be desired.

The strategical significance of this arrangement is sufficiently
obvious; but any possible doubt as to the purpose aimed at is removed
by some observations thereon made by Joesten, who further says in his
"Geschichte und System der Eisenbahnbenutzung im Kriege":--

If it is true that, generally speaking, the best
railways for general purposes constitute excellent lines of
communication for armies, it is no less true that good, or
very good, strategical lines cannot, and ought not to, in all
cases constitute good commercial lines. In support of this
assertion one can refer to the immense extent of railway lines
on the coasts of Pomerania. These lines, which are of the
first importance from a strategical point of view, have only
a moderate value from a commercial standpoint, considering
that they do not connect the interior of the country with any
district providing goods or passenger traffic on a material
scale, and only provide means of communication between
localities having identical needs.

What is thus admitted in regard to the coastal railways of Pomerania
applies no less to many, if not to most, of the frontier lines in East
Prussia, West Prussia and Silesia.

Not only, again, is the number of German lines going to the frontiers,
and no farther, out of all proportion to the number of those providing
for international communication, but the map on which these observations
are based shows that between 1900 and 1910 there were added to the
Prussian State system many lines which (1) established additional
transverse links between those already going to the Russian frontier,
(2) provided alternative routes thereto, or (3) supplemented the
lines which skirt the frontier, a few miles inland, by branches going
therefrom to strategic points actually on the frontier itself.

As against this construction of an elaborate network of strategical
lines towards and along _the Russian frontier_, there must be put the
fact that although, by this means, Germany acquired the power to effect
a great and speedy concentration of troops on the frontier itself, her
locomotives and rolling stock would not be able to cross into Russia and
run on the railways there because of _the difference in gauge_. On the
eastern frontier the question as to how an invasion in large force could
be effected was, consequently, quite different from that which would
present itself on the western frontiers, where the railway gauges of
Belgium, Luxemburg and France were the same as those of Germany.

It was certain that whenever, in the event of war, German troops were
able to enter Russian territory, Russia would withdraw into the interior
or else destroy such of her locomotives and rolling stock as the enemy
might otherwise utilise for his own purpose. If, therefore, the Germans
wanted to use the existing Russian lines, they would either have to
build, in advance, locomotives and rolling stock capable of running
thereon, or they would have to convert the Russian gauge of 5 feet to
the German gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches, so that German trains could run
on the other side of the frontier. As already remarked on page 61, the
reduction of the broader gauge into a narrower one would involve fewer
engineering difficulties than an expansion of the German gauge into the
Russian gauge; yet even the former procedure, if carried out over any
considerable length of line, would take up a good deal of time, and
this would be still more the case if the Russians, when they retreated,
destroyed the railway track and bridges behind them, as they might
confidently be expected to do.

Dependence, again, on the existing lines across the frontier would,
apart from questions of conversion and reconstruction, still give
Germany only a very small number of railway routes into Russia, and
these, also, at points where the opposition offered might be especially
active.

What, in these circumstances, Germany evidently planned to do as soon
as her troops crossed the frontier, in the event of a war with Russia,
was to supplement the strategical lines on her own side of that frontier
by military light railways which, laid on the ordinary roads, or on
clearances to be effected, on Russian territory, would render her
independent of the ordinary railways there, while offering the further
advantage (1) that the laying of these narrow-gauge military lines--in
rough and ready fashion, yet in a way that would answer the purposes of
the moment--could be effected in shorter time than the gauge-conversion
and the reconstruction of the Russian trunk lines would take; and (2)
that these military railways could be built from any points along
the frontier which were capable of being reached direct from the
German strategical lines, and offered either an existing road or the
opportunity of making one for the purpose.

In the light of this assumption, one can understand more clearly the
reason for those short lines which, branching out from the German
strategical railways that run parallel to the Russian frontier though
some miles from it, are carried to the frontier and there suddenly stop.
It was, presumably, from such terminal points as these that the laying
of the military railways on Russian territory would begin.

As regards the type of railways to be employed and the preparations made
in advance for supplying and constructing them, we have the testimony of
Mr. Roy Norton, an American writer, who says in "The Man of Peace"--one
of the "Oxford Pamphlets, 1914-15," published by the Oxford University
Press:--

On February 14 of this year (1914) I was in Cologne, and
blundered, where I had no business, into what I learned was
a military-stores yard. Among other curious things were tiny
locomotives loaded on flats which could be run off those cars
by an ingenious contrivance of metals, or, as we call them in
America, rails. Also there were other flats loaded with sections
of tracks fastened on cup ties (sleepers that can be laid on the
surface of the earth) and sections of miniature bridges on other
flats. I saw how it was possible to lay a line of temporary
railway, including bridges, almost anywhere in an incredibly
short space of time, if one had the men.... Before I could
conclude my examination I discovered that I was on _verboten_
ground; but the official who directed me out told me that what I
had seen were construction outfits.

Mr. Norton further quotes the following from a letter he had just
received from a Hollander who was a refugee in Germany at the outbreak
of the war, and reached home on August 30, 1914:--

Never, I believe, did a country so thoroughly get ready
for war. I saw the oddest spectacle, the building of a railway
behind a battle-field. They had diminutive little engines and
rails in sections, so that they could be bolted together, and
even bridges that could be put across ravines in a twinkling.
Flat cars that could be carried by hand and dropped on the
rails, great strings of them. Up to the nearest point of battle
came, on the regular railway, this small one.... It seemed to
me that hundreds of men had been trained for this task, for in
but a few minutes that small portable train was buzzing backward
and forward on its own small portable rails, distributing food
and supplies.... I've an idea that in time of battle it would
be possible for those sturdy little trains to shift troops to
critical or endangered points at the rate of perhaps twenty
miles an hour.... A portable railway for a battle-field struck
me as coming about as close to making war by machinery as
anything I have ever heard of.

One may thus reasonably conclude, in regard to the Russo-German
frontier, (1) that the broader gauge of the Russian railways would
itself offer no real obstacle to the German troops whenever the time
came for their invading Russian territory; (2) that in this eventuality
the Germans would be able, by reason of the preparations made by them in
advance, to lay down along the ordinary Russian roads lines of military
light railways already put together in complete sections of combined
rails and sleepers, which sections would only require to be fastened
the one to the other to be at once ready for use; and (3) that these
portable military railways, to be built on Russian territory, were
designed both to supplement and to render still more efficient Germany's
network of strategical railways along her eastern frontier.

In _southern Silesia_ many improvements in the rail communication with
Austria were made in 1900-10. New connections were established with the
frontier railways, offering alternative routes from interior points,
while various lines which stopped short of the frontier were extended to
it and linked up with Austrian lines on the other side.

In her relations with _France_, Germany's efforts to improve still
further her rail communications to the eastern and north-eastern
frontiers of that country have been continuous since the war of 1870-1,
on which campaign she started with a great advantage over the French
since she was able to concentrate her troops on those frontiers by
nine different routes, namely, six in North Germany, and three in
South Germany, whereas France herself had then only three available.
The course adopted by Germany has been (1) to secure a larger number
of routes to the French frontier, South Germany's three lines, for
instance, being increased to six; (2) to provide double track, or to
substitute double for single track, for lines leading to the frontier
and having a strategical importance; (3) to construct lines which
cross transversely those proceeding direct to the French frontiers,
thus allowing of intercommunication and transfer of traffic from one
to another; and (4) improvement of the interior network of lines,
with a view to facilitating military transport services in time of
war. "Altogether," says Joesten, "we have nineteen points at which
our railways cross the Rhine, and sixteen double-track lines for the
transport of our troops from east to west, as against the nine which
were alone available for concentration in 1870."

While showing all this activity on the immediate frontiers of France,
Germany was no less zealous in providing alternative routes for a fresh
invasion of French territory, the adoption of this further policy being
obviously inspired by the energy that France was herself showing in the
strengthening of her north-east frontier against invasion.

One such alternative route was represented by _Luxemburg_. Not only
did Germany have lines of her own on the north, south, and east of
Luxemburg, but the lines within the Grand Duchy itself had passed under
German control; and if Germany thought fit to disregard her treaty
obligations, and use the lines for strategical purposes, Luxemburg was
powerless to prevent her from so doing.

Another alternative route was by way of _Belgium_; and the various
developments of Germany's railway policy on the Belgian frontier since
1908 point in an unmistakable manner to deliberate preparation on her
part for an invasion of that country, whether for the purpose of passing
through it, as a means of reaching a more vulnerable part of French
territory than the strongly fortified north-east corner, or in pursuance
of designs against Belgium itself.

The full story of Germany's activity in this direction will be found in
a series of articles from the _Fortnightly Review_ reproduced by the
author, Mr. Demetrius C. Boulger, in "England's Arch-Enemy: A Collection
of Essays forming an Indictment of German Policy during the last sixteen
years" (London, 1914).[53]

The story opens with the establishment by Germany, about the year 1896,
of a camp at Elsenborn, ten miles north-east of Malmédy, a town situate
close to the Belgian frontier and four miles from the Belgian town of
Stavelot. The camp was begun on a small scale, and at the outset the
establishment of it on the site in question was declared by the Prussian
authorities to have no strategical significance. It steadily developed,
however, in size and importance, and its position, character and
surroundings all suggested that it was designed for aggressive rather
than defensive purposes.

At first the camp was reached from Hellenthal, a station, fourteen miles
away, on a light railway connected with the lines in the Eifel district,
between Cologne and Treves (Trier), on the Moselle; but in 1896 a light
railway was constructed from Aix-la-Chapelle parallel with the Belgian
frontier as far as St. Vith, a distance of fifty miles, the main purpose
of this line being stated to be the securing of a better connection,
from Sourbrodt, for the camp at Elsenborn. The line was, nevertheless,
extended to Trois Vièrges (Ger. Uflingen), where it connected both
with the railway system of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and with the
main lines of the Belgian System from Pepinster, via Spa, Stavelot,
Trois Ponts and Gouvy, to Trois Vièrges. From Trois Ponts there is a
direct route to Liége, while Gouvy, situate only a few miles from Trois
Vièrges, is the junction both for Libramont, on the main line from
Brussels to Metz and Alsace, and for the further junction of Beatrix,
the central point of a Belgian line running parallel with the French
frontier from Dinant to Luxemburg.

The single-track line from Aix-la-Chapelle along the Belgian frontier,
supplemented by a light-railway branch from Weismes to Malmédy, met all
the traffic requirements of a scantily-populated and primitive district,
devoid alike of industries and of local resources, and offering very
little traffic; but in 1908 the Prussian Government suddenly decided
to double the line, first as far as Weismes, and then to St. Vith,
notwithstanding that there was no apparent justification for such a
procedure. The widening involved, also, the reconstruction of a high
embankment originally designed for one set of metals, a fact which
showed that only a few years previously--since when the local traffic
had not materially increased--there was no idea that a double-track
line would ever be wanted. Still more significant was the fact that, in
addition to the second set of metals, sidings were provided on such a
scale at the stations _en route_, in localities possessing only a dozen
or so of cottages, that, in the aggregate, trains containing a complete
Army Corps could have been accommodated on them. At one station three
sidings, each about 500 yards long, were supplied, and at another a
perfect network of sidings was constructed, including two which were at
least half a mile long and were, also, equipped with turntables.[54]

The provision, more especially, of sidings such as these at local
stations where the trains were few and far between and the ordinary
merchandise was represented by some occasional coal trucks, could have
but one purpose. They were obviously designed--in conjunction with
the substitution of double for single track--to permit of a large
body of troops, whether from Aix-la-Chapelle (an important point of
concentration for the Prussian Army, on mobilisation), or elsewhere,
being assembled in the immediate neighbourhood of Weismes, the junction
of the branch line to Malmédy, for an invasion of Belgium. The doubling
of the rails as far as Weismes was completed by May, 1909. It was
afterwards continued to St. Vith, and so on to Trois Vièrges.

We have thus far, however, got only the first chapter of the story. The
second opens with the further attempt of the Prussian Government to
secure an extension of the Weismes-Malmédy line as a "light railway"
across the frontier to Stavelot, three miles east of Trois Ponts, thus
giving a shorter route from Aix-la-Chapelle and the camp at Elsenborn
to Liége, Namur, Louvain and Brussels, and a second route to Gouvy for
Libramont, Bertrix and the north of France.

As the result of the influence they were able to bring to bear on them,
the Germans succeeded in persuading the Belgian Government, not only to
agree to the Weismes-Malmédy branch being continued to Stavelot, but
themselves to build the greater part of this connecting link, and even
to cut, on the north of Stavelot, a tunnel without which that town would
have remained inaccessible by rail.

Once more there could be no suggestion that this connecting link, opened
in October, 1913, was wanted in the interests of the ordinary traffic,
the needs of which were adequately met by the diligence running twice
a day between Malmédy and Stavelot. What was really aimed at was a
rail connection with the Belgian system by means of which the troops
concentrated in those extensive sidings on the Aix-la-Chapelle-St.
Vith line could be poured into Belgium in a continuous stream for the
achievement of designs on Belgium or--operating from either the Belgian
or the Luxemburg frontier--on France.

In helping to provide this connection, Belgium, as subsequent events
were to show, was in a position akin to that of a man forced to dig
the grave in which he is to be buried after being shot; but Belgium,
we are told, "yielded in this and other matters because she could not
resist without support, and no support was forthcoming." There certainly
was an attempt to lull possible suspicions by the designation of the
Malmédy-Stavelot link as a "light railway." It was, also, evident that
the physical conditions of the Weismes-Malmédy branch, with which it
was to connect, would not permit of any heavy traffic along it. But
the so-called "light railway" was built with the same gauge as the
main-line systems on each side of the frontier; the powers obtained in
respect to it allowed of trains being run at a speed of forty miles an
hour, as against the recognised speed of sixteen miles an hour on light
railways proper; while no sooner had the link been established than
Germany discarded the defective Weismes-Malmédy branch for the purposes
of military transport, and built a new line from Malmédy to Weywertz,
a station to the north or north-east of Weismes. This Malmédy-Weywertz
branch would, it was understood, be used exclusively for military
traffic, and the station at Weywertz was, in due course, provided with
its own extensive platforms and network of sidings for the accommodation
of troop trains.

We now come to the third chapter of the story; and here we learn that
what was happening in the immediate proximity of the German-Belgian
frontier was but part of a much wider scheme, though one still designed
to serve the same purpose--that, namely, of ensuring the invasion of
Belgium by German troops with the greatest facility and in the least
possible time.

From Weywertz, the new junction for Stavelot and the Belgian railways
in general, the Germans built a line to Jünkerath, a station north of
Gerolstein, on the line from Cologne to Treves. Then from Blankenheim,
immediately north of Jünkerath, and from Lissendorf, on the south
of the same station, there were opened for traffic, in July, 1912,
new double-track lines which, meeting at Dümpelfeld, on the existing
Remagen-Adenau line, gave a through route for troops from the Rhine,
across the Eifel district to Weywertz, and so on to Stavelot for
destinations (in war-time) throughout Belgium, Luxemburg, or along the
northern frontier of France.

This direct route to Belgium offered the further advantage that it
avoided any necessity for troops from the Rhine to pass through
Cologne, where much congestion might otherwise occur. It also left
the Aix-la-Chapelle-Weywertz route free for troops from Cologne and
Westphalia, while a further improvement of the facilities for crossing
the Rhine made Remagen still more accessible for troops from all parts
of Central Germany destined for Belgium--and beyond.

Reference to the Prussian State Railways official map shows, also, (1)
a new line from Coblenz which joins, at Mayen, the existing railway
from Andernach, on the Rhine, to Gerolstein, in the Eifel, whence the
Belgian border can be reached either via Jünkerath and Weywertz or
via Lammersweiler and the Luxemburg station of Trois-Vièrges; (2) the
extension to Daun, also on the Andernach-Gerolstein route, of a short
branch on the Coblenz-Treves Railway which previously terminated at
Wittlich; and (3) several other small lines in the Eifel district,
offering additional facilities for the concentration of troops on the
Belgian frontier.

So the Malmédy-Stavelot "light railway"--especially in view of this
series of new German lines all leading thereto--had become a railway
of the greatest strategical importance; and the fourth chapter of the
story (though one upon which it is not proposed to enter here) would
show how this network of strategical lines, developed with so much
energy and thoroughness, was brought into operation in 1914 immediately
on the outbreak of war, and, from that time, constituted one of the
main arteries for the passage of German troops to and from Belgium and
Northern France.

In regard to _Holland_, one finds a new line of railway from Jülich--a
station reached from Düren, on the main line between Cologne and
Aix-la-Chapelle--to Dalheim, the German frontier station on the direct
line from Cologne via Rheydt to Roermond, a Dutch station on the right
bank of the Meuse (which is here crossed by two bridges), and thence
through the Belgian stations of Moll and Herenthals and across the flat
expanse of the Campine to Antwerp.

This line obviously offers an alternative route for the transport of
troops from Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle to Dalheim; but of still greater
significance is the information given by the writer of the _Fortnightly
Review_ articles as to the changes carried out at Dalheim itself,
transforming that place from "an unimportant halting-place" into "a
point of concentration of great strategical importance" on the frontiers
of Holland.

Inasmuch as the line from Dalheim to Roermond and on to Antwerp was
already a double one, the alterations made at Dalheim were confined
to a liberal provision of railway sidings in order that, as we have
seen was done on the Belgian frontier, a large body of troops could
be concentrated for a possible invasion, in this instance, either of
Holland itself, or of Belgium by the alternative route across the
south-eastern corner of Dutch territory.

One of the Dalheim sidings, about a quarter of a mile in length,
situate on a high embankment; and, in order that it could be reached
without interfering with other traffic, a bridge over which the main
line runs east of Dalheim station was widened to allow of the laying
across it of a third pair of rails. Other sidings adjoining Dalheim
station have no fewer than ten pairs of parallel rails, and there
are still others on the west of the same station, towards the Dutch
frontier. At Wegberg and Rheydt, east of Dalheim, further sidings were
provided which, like those at Dalheim, would not possibly be required
for other than military reasons.

Summing up the situation in regard alike to the Belgian and the Dutch
frontiers, Mr. Boulger remarks, in his article of February, 1914:--

Thus on an arc extending from Treves to Nijmegen (excluding
from our purview what is called the main concentration on the
Saar, behind Metz), the German War Department has arranged for a
simultaneous advance by fourteen separate routes across Holland,
Belgium and the Grand Duchy.

In view of all these facts, there is no possible room for doubt as to
the prolonged and extensive nature of the preparations made by Germany
for the war she instigated in 1914; but the particular consideration
with which we are here concerned is that of seeing to what extent those
preparations related either to the construction of strategical lines of
railway or to the adaptation of existing lines to strategical purposes.

Leaving Belgium and Holland, and looking at the Prussian State lines in
_Schleswig-Holstein_, one finds on the official map the indication of
a new line (partly built and partly under construction in 1910) which,
starting from Holtenau, at the mouth of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal in the
Baltic, continues the short distance to Kiel, then turns to the west,
connects with the Neumünster-Vandrup main line to Denmark, crosses the
canal, and so on to Husum, a junction on the Altona-Esbjerg west-coast
route. This new line would evidently be of strategical advantage in
moving troops from Kiel either for the defence of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Canal or to resist invasion by sea on the north of the waterway. Then
the existing line from Kiel through Eckernförde to Flensburg, on the
Neumünster-Vandrup route to Denmark, and giving through connection from
Kiel to Tondern and Hoyer on the west coast--has been "nationalised,"
and so added to the Prussian State system; while from two stations just
to the north of Flensburg there are short new lines which, meeting at
Torsbüll, continue to the Alsener Sund, on the west of the Little Belt,
and may--or may not--be of value in improving Prussia's strategical
position in this corner of the Baltic, and in immediate proximity to the
Danish island of Fünen.

Finally a large number of additions have been made in recent years to
the State Railway systems in the interior of Germany; and, although a
good proportion of these may have been provided to meet the increased
economic and social needs of the German people, many of them must
be regarded as strategical lines designed to facilitate (1) the
mobilisation of troops on the outbreak of war; (2) their concentration,
by routes covering all parts of the Empire, as arranged long in advance;
and (3) their speedy transfer across country from one frontier to
another, should several campaigns be fought at the same time.

The resort by Germany to strategical railways in Africa and elsewhere,
as a means of furthering her Weltpolitik, will be dealt with in the two
chapters that follow.

FOOTNOTES:

[52] "Gesammelte Schriften." Berlin, 1891, etc.

[53] The articles which here specially come into question are--"The
Menace of Elsenborn" (published in the _Fortnightly_, July, 1908); "An
Object Lesson in German Plans" (February, 1910); and "A Further Object
Lesson in German Plans" (February, 1914).

[54] They were "hydraulic turntables," according to Major
Stuart-Stephens. See _The English Review_ for June, 1915.

CHAPTER XIX

A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE

Strategical railways in South-West Africa were built by Germany as
a means towards the achievement of her designs on British South
Africa; but these, in turn, were only part of a still greater plan
having for its purpose the transformation of Africa as a whole into a
German-African Empire which should compare in value, if not in glory,
with that of the Indian Empire itself.

Colonisation societies began to be formed in Germany as early as 1849;
though in the first instance the aims of their promoters were directed
mainly to such parts of the world as Brazil, Texas, the Mosquito Shore,
Chili and Morocco. All such places as these, however, offered the
disadvantage that Germans going there could only become foreign settlers
under the more or less civilised Powers already in possession.[55]
In the 60's and 70's of the nineteenth century attention in Germany
began to be diverted, rather, to Africa as a land where vast expanses,
possessing great prospects and possibilities, and not yet controlled by
any civilised Power, were still available not only for colonisation but
for acquisition. So it was that successive German travellers explored
many different parts of Africa and published accounts of their journeys
designed, not merely as contributions to geographical science, but,
also, to impress a then somewhat apathetic German public with the
importance of their acquiring a "footing" on the African continent.
In 1873 a German Society for the Exploration of Equatorial Africa was
founded. This was followed in 1876 by the German African Society, and
subsequently these two bodies were combined under the name of the Berlin
African Society.

Not long after this, evidence was forthcoming that something far more
than the settling of German colonists in Africa and the securing of a
"footing" on African soil by Germany was really being kept in view.

In 1880 Sir Bartle Frere, at that time Governor of the Cape and High
Commissioner for South Africa, forwarded to Lord Kimberley a translation
of an article which had just been contributed to the _Geographische
Nachrichten_ by Ernst von Weber; and, in doing so he informed the
Colonial Secretary that the article contained "a clear and well-argued
statement in favour of the plan for a German colony in South Africa
which was much discussed in German commercial and political circles
even before the Franco-German War, and is said to have been one of the
immediate motives of the German mission of scientific inquiry which
visited southern and eastern Africa in 1870-71."

Von Weber's proposals[56] pointed, however, to the creation, not simply
of "a German colony" in South Africa, but of a German Empire in Africa.
"A new Empire," he wrote, "possibly more valuable and more brilliant
than even the Indian Empire, awaits in the newly-discovered Central
Africa that Power which shall possess sufficient courage, strength and
intelligence to acquire it"; and he proceeded to show (1) why Germany
should be this Power, and (2) the means by which she might eventually
secure control of the whole country.

The establishment of trading settlements was to ensure for the Germans
a footing in the districts north of the Transvaal, and this was to
be followed by the flooding of South Africa generally with German
immigrants. The Boers spread throughout South Africa were already allied
to the Germans by speech and habits, and they would, he thought, be
sure to emigrate to the north and place themselves under the protection
of the German colonies there, rather than remain subject to the hated
British. In any case, "a constant mass-immigration of Germans would
gradually bring about a decided numerical preponderance of Germans over
the Dutch population, and of itself would effect the Germanisation of
the country in a peaceful manner. It was," he continued, "this free,
unlimited room for annexation in the north, this open access to the
heart of Africa, which principally inspired me with the idea, now more
than four years ago, that Germany should try, by the acquisition of
Delagoa Bay and the subsequent continued influx of German immigrants
into the Transvaal, to secure future dominion over the country, and
so pave the way for the foundation of a German-African Empire of the
future."

The procedure to be followed was (1) the acquiring of territory in
Africa by Germany wherever she could get it, whether in the central or
in the coastal districts; (2) co-operation with the Boers as a step
towards bringing them and their Republics under German suzerainty; and
(3) the overthrow of British influence, with the substitution for it of
German supremacy.

These ideas gained wide acceptance in Germany; they became a leading
factor in the colonial policy of the Imperial Government, and they
reconciled the German people, more or less, to the heavy burdens which
the developments of that policy were to involve.

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

The first steps towards the attainment of the aspirations entertained
were taken by Herr Adolf Lüderitz, a Bremen merchant who, acting under
the auspices of the German Colonial Society, and having received from
the Imperial Foreign Office assurances of its protection, established
a trading settlement, in April, 1883, in the bay of Angra Pequeña,
situate between Namaqualand and Damaraland on the west coast of Africa,
and about 150 miles north of Orange River, the northern boundary of
Cape Colony. Acquiring from a Hottentot chief a stretch of territory
215 miles in extent in the Hinterland of Angra Pequeña, Lüderitz
raised the German flag in the settlement, which thus became Germany's
first colony. Further concessions of territory were obtained, and in
September, 1884, Germany announced that the west coast of Africa, from
26 degrees S. latitude to Cape Frio, excepting Walfisch Bay (declared
British in 1878), had been placed under the protection of the German
Emperor. A treaty made between England and Germany in 1890 defined the
limits of the German South-West African Protectorate as bounded on the
south by the Orange River and Cape Colony, on the north by Portuguese
Angola, on the west by the Atlantic, and on the east by British
Bechuanaland, with the so-called "Caprivi Strip," giving Germany access
from the north-east corner of her Protectorate to a point on the Zambezi
River north of Victoria Falls.[57] The total area comprised within these
boundaries was about 322,200 square miles.

At the outset, the new Protectorate aroused little enthusiasm in Germany
as a colony where her surplus population could hope to settle and
prosper under the German flag instead of going to foreign countries,
as so many thousands of Germans were then doing. On a coast-line of
900 miles there was no good natural harbour except the one at Walfisch
Bay, owned by the British. Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht, on which the
German colonists would have to rely, were then little better than open
roadsteads. Considerable expanses of the territory itself consist of
drought-stricken desert. The rainfall in Damaraland and Namaqualand
averages only about three inches a year. In certain districts a period
of five or six years has been known to pass without any rain at all.
A record of rainfall on some parts of the coast has shown a total of
one-fifth of an inch in the course of twelve months. At Walfisch Bay the
British settlement imports its fresh water from Capetown. On the higher
of the series of plateaux rising gradually to the Kalahari desert the
climatic conditions are more favourable, and the better rainfall in the
north-east allows of good crops being grown, while various sections are
favourable for stock-raising. In later years, also, various deposits
of copper were found in the district of Otavi, some 400 miles from
Swakopmund, and diamond fields, which yielded nearly £1,000,000 worth of
stones in the first year, were discovered east of Lüderitzbucht in 1908.
But in Germany the Protectorate was regarded as a desirable acquisition
mainly, if not exclusively, because of the advantages it was expected to
afford as a base for the eventual creation of a German-African Empire.

THE HERERO RISING

The attainment of this higher purpose seemed likely to be furthered as
the result of the steps taken to suppress the risings of the Hereros
and the Hottentots between the years 1903 and 1907. Not only did the
reinforcements sent out from Germany assume such proportions that at one
time the Germans are said to have had no fewer than 19,000 men under
arms in the Protectorate, but the troops took with them a plentiful
supply of pom-poms, mountain guns, field guns and Maxims of various
kinds, the _Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères_ being led to remark
thereon that "the German columns had an unusually large proportion of
artillery, roughly two batteries to three companies of mounted infantry;
and it is difficult to believe that so many guns were necessary,
especially as the Hereros had no artillery at all.[58] Probably,"
the _Revue_ continued, "the artillery could have been dispensed with
altogether; and had this been done, the columns would have been rendered
more mobile."

The military measures taken appeared to be in excess of requirements
even when allowance was made for the fact that the campaign was fought
in difficult country and that the Germans themselves lost about 5,000
men; but the real significance of the policy adopted lay in the keeping
of a considerable proportion of the German expeditionary force in the
colony after the rising had, with German thoroughness, been effectively
crushed.

This procedure attracted attention and adverse comment even in Germany,
where doubts were already being entertained as to whether good value was
being received for the £30,000,000 which the suppression of the troubles
had cost. It was, however, made clear that the still considerable
body of German troops left in the colony was being kept on hand there
in case of the opportunity arising for its employment in another
direction--that, namely, of achieving Germany's aspirations in regard
to the conquest of British South Africa, and the final elimination of
British influence from Africa in general.

Evidence both as to the nature of these continued aspirations and as to
the further purpose it was hoped the troops on the spot might effect was
forthcoming in various directions.

In a book of 416 pages, published in 1905, under the title of "Das
neue Südafrika," Dr. Paul Samassa emphasised the part which the German
people had taken in the settlement of South Africa; pointed to the
close relationship and affinity of feeling between Germans and Boers;
encouraged the idea of their mutually looking forward to the opening up
of South Africa as "a land of settlement for the German race," and said,
further:--

German South-West Africa is, to-day, a strong tramp card in
our hands, from the point of view of Weltpolitik. In England
much has been said of late as to what a good thing it would
be for that country if our fleet were annihilated before it
became dangerous.... On our side we might cool these hot-heads,
and strengthen the peace party in England, if we reminded them
that, whatever the loss to ourselves of a war with that country,
England would run a greater risk--that of losing South Africa.
We have in German South-West Africa to-day about 12,000 troops,
of whom one-half will remain there for a considerable time. In
the event of a war between Germany and England the South African
coast would naturally be blockaded by England; and there would
then be nothing left for our troops to do but to go on to Cape
Colony--for their food supplies.

In so doing they could, he argued, count upon the support of the Boers,
of whom there were 14,000 opposed to the English at the end of the
South African war. As against this possible concentration of German
troops and Boers there was the fact that the English garrison in South
Africa did not exceed 20,000. So, he added, the people in England could
consider "what an incalculable adventure a war with Germany might be,
notwithstanding the superiority of the English fleet."

Speaking in the Reichstag in February, 1906, Herr Ledebour called
attention to the fact that Major von François, who at one time was
in command of German South-West Africa, had declared, in his book,
"Nama und Damara," issued three months previously, that fewer than one
thousand troops would suffice to maintain order in the colony; and Herr
Ledebour added:--"For two years imaginative Pan-German politicians
have been disseminating the idea that a large force must be maintained
in South-West Africa for the purpose of exercising in the sphere of
Weltpolitik pressure upon England, with the eventual object of invading
Cape Colony."

There is the testimony, also, of "An Anglo-German," who, in the course
of an article on "German Clerks in British Offices," published in _The
London Magazine_ for November, 1910, tells the following story:--

During a recent stay in Germany I was introduced by a man
I know to be one of the chief functionaries of the Commerce
Defence League[59] to a friend of his who had just returned
from German South-West Africa. On a subsequent meeting I entered
into conversation with this gentleman, and made inquiries about
German progress in that part of the world. He answered my
questions without reserve. Little headway was being made, and
little was looked for. Men and money were being freely expended,
without present return. The only good harbour (Walfisch Bay) is
a British possession, as likewise are all the islands of any
value which are dotted along the coast.

"Why then," was my inevitable query, "do the Germans persist
in their occupation of the country?"

He smiled craftily.

"We Germans look far ahead, my friend," he replied. "We
foresee a British débácle in South Africa, and we are on the
spot. Thanks to the pioneers of our excellent League, our
plans are all matured. The League finances the scheme and the
Imperial Government supplies the military forces. By cession--or
otherwise--Walfisch Bay will before long be German territory;
but in the meantime British Free Trade opposes no obstacle to
us, and we can pursue our purpose unmolested."

"But what is that purpose?" I asked, with the object of
leading him on.

"Surely you are not so blind as to need enlightenment!" was
his reply. "Germany has long regarded South Africa as a future
possession of her own. When the inevitable happens, and Great
Britain finds her hands full elsewhere, we are ready to strike
the moment the signal is given, and Cape Colony, Bechuanaland,
Rhodesia--all frontier States--will fall like ripe apples into
our grasp."

In order, however, that Germany might be prepared thus to take action
at a moment's notice, two things were essential, in addition to having
troops on the spot, namely, (1) that the colony should possess railways
within striking distance alike of the Cape, of Bechuanaland and of
Rhodesia; and (2) that the military preparations as a whole should be so
complete as to be ready for any emergency.

RAILWAYS IN G.S.W. AFRICA

Railways were indispensable on account, not only of the considerable
distances to be covered, but, also, of the sand-belts and stretches of
desert across which the transport of troops and stores would be a matter
of great difficulty without the help of railways. They were, in fact, a
vital part of the whole scheme.

Following on Germany's annexation of Damaraland and Great Namaqualand,
and her conversion of them into the Protectorate of German South-West
Africa, a party of German engineers and surveyors landed at Swakopmund
with the design of planning a line of railway to be constructed from
that point to Windhoek, and thence across the Kalahari desert to the
Transvaal. About the same time, also, Germans and Boers were alike
working to secure as much of Bechuanaland as they could, without
attracting too much attention to their proceedings. A realisation
of these further aims might have been of great value to Germany in
facilitating the attainment of her full programme in respect to
Africa; but the scheme was frustrated by Great Britain's annexation of
Bechuanaland in September, 1885, the result of the step thus taken being
to drive a wedge of British territory between German South-West Africa
and the Boer Republics.

So the railway in question got no further east than Windhoek, the
capital of the colony, a distance inland of 237 miles.

Having failed in one direction, Germany tried another. Under a
concession granted to them in 1887 by the Government of the Transvaal
Republic, a group of Dutch, German and other capitalists, constituting
the Netherlands South African Railway Company, built a railway from
Delagoa Bay to Pretoria; and the new aim of Germany was, apparently,
to make use of this line, and so get access to the Transvaal--and
beyond--from the east coast instead of from the west.

Confirmation of this fact is to be found in "A Brief History of the
Transvaal Secret Service System, from its Inception to the Present
Time," written by Mr. A. E. Heyer, and published at Cape Town in 1899.
The writer had held a position in the Transvaal which enabled him to
learn many interesting facts concerning the working of the system in
question. Among other things he tells how, at Lisbon, every effort
was made to obtain a port in Delagoa Bay, and how, "aided by Germany,
Dr. Leyds approached Lisbon over and over again with a view to get
Delagoa Bay ceded to the Transvaal"; though the Doctor got no more
from the Portuguese authorities than a reminder that, under the London
Convention of 1884, the South African Republic could conclude no treaty
or engagement with any foreign State or nation (except the Orange Free
State) until such treaty or engagement had been submitted to the Queen
of England for her approval.

That Germany, in giving her "aid" in these matters to the Transvaal
Republic, was inspired by a regard for the furthering of her own
particular schemes is beyond all reasonable doubt; but Mr. Heyer shows,
also, that when the negotiations with Portugal were unsuccessful, there
was elaborated a scheme under which Germany and the Transvaal were to
get what they wanted by means of a _coup de main_. Mr. Heyer says on
this subject:--

I have before me a copy of a document, dated Pretoria,
August 24, 1892 (the original of which is still in a certain
Government office in Pretoria), wherein a Pretoria-Berlin
scheme is detailed, namely, "How a few regiments of Prussian
Infantry could be landed at Delagoa Bay and force their way into
Transvaal territory, and, 'once in,' defy British suzerainty,
and for all time 'hang the annoying question of her paramountcy
on the nail.'" The name of Herr von Herff, then German Consul
at Pretoria, appears on the document. Any one reading this
cleverly-planned "Descent on Delagoa" would be readily convinced
as to how very easily a German raid on Delagoa territory could
be successfully accomplished.

This project, also, proved abortive, and, in default of Delagoa Bay,
Germany had still to regard her South-West African Protectorate, with
its railways and its armed forces, as the base from which British
interests were to be wiped out--sooner or later--from the Cape to Cairo.

At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914, the principal railways in
German South-West Africa--apart from some minor lines which do not come
into consideration--were as follows:--

-----------------+---------------+-------------------
| 2 ft. GAUGE. | 3 ft. 6 in. GAUGE.
RAILWAY. | Miles. | Miles.
-----------------+---------------+-------------------
Northern | 121 | 119½
Otavi | 425 | --
Southern | -- | 340½
North-to-South | -- | 317
-----------------+---------------+-------------------
Total | 546 | 777
-----------------+---------------+-------------------

Granting that the Northern Railway was needed to afford a means of
communication between Swakopmund and the capital of the colony, and that
the original purpose of the Otavi line was to provide an outlet for the
copper obtained from the mines in that district, it is, nevertheless,
the fact that the Southern and the North-to-South lines were designed to
serve what were mainly or exclusively strategical purposes.

When the building of the first section of the Southern line--from
Lüderitzbucht to Aus--was under consideration in the Reichstag, one
of the members of that body, Herr Lattmann, recommended that the vote
should be passed without being referred to a committee; and in support
of his recommendation he said:--

This way of passing the vote would be of particular
importance for the whole nation, since the railway would not
then have to be regarded from the point of view of provisioning
our troops, or with regard to the financially remunerative
character of the colony, but because a much more serious
question lies behind it, namely, what significance has the
railway in the event of complications between Germany and other
nations? Yes, this railway can be employed for other purposes
than for transport from the coast to the interior; our troops
can be easily conveyed by it from the interior to the coast and
thence to other places. If, for example, a war had broken out
with England we could send them into Cape Colony.

From Aus the line was extended in 1908 to Keetmanshoop, a distance
inland of 230 miles from Lüderitzbucht. Situate in the _Bezirk_
(district) of South-West Africa nearest to Cape Province, Keetmanshoop,
with the railway as a source of supply from the chief harbour of the
colony, developed into the leading military station of German South-West
Africa.

At Keetmanshoop all the chief military authorities were stationed. It
became the headquarters of the Medical Corps, the Ordnance Department,
the Engineer and Railway Corps, and the Intelligence Corps of the
Southern Command. It was the point of mobilisation for all the troops
in that Command. It had a considerable garrison, and it had, also, an
arsenal which a correspondent of the _Transvaal Chronicle_, who visited
the town about two years before the outbreak of war in 1914 and gathered
much information concerning the military preparations which had then
already been made,[60] described as four times as large, and, in regard
to its contents, four times as important, as the arsenal at Windhoek.
Those contents included--47 gun carriages; fourteen 16-pounders;
eighteen ambulances; 82 covered convoy vehicles; 3,287 wheels, mostly
for trek ox-wagons; three large transportable marquees used as magazines
and containing 28,000 military rifles; huge quantities of bandoliers,
kits, etc.; three further magazines for ammunition, and large stores
of fodder; while further military supplies were constantly arriving
by train from Lüderitzbucht, whither they were brought from Germany
by German ships. In the arsenal workshops was a staff of men actively
engaged on the making of, among other military requirements, 1,000
saddles and water bags for the Camel Corps kept available for crossing
the desert between the furthest limit of the railway and the Cape
Province border.

It was, also, in this south-eastern district, and in immediate
proximity, therefore, to Cape Province and Bechuanaland, that the
military forces kept in the colony had all their principal manoeuvres.

Of still greater importance, from a strategical standpoint, was the
branch of this Southern Railway which, starting from Seeheim, forty
miles west of Keetmanshoop, continued in a south-easterly direction
to Kalkfontein, eighty miles north of Raman's Drift, on the Orange
River, and less than ninety miles from Ukamas, where the Germans had
established a military post within five miles of Nakob, situate on the
Bechuanaland border, only forty miles from Upington, in Cape Province.
From Kalkfontein the branch was to be continued another thirty miles to
Warmbad, and so on to Raman's Drift--a convenient point for the passage
of the Orange River into Cape Province territory by an attacking force.
At Seeheim, the junction of this branch line, a Service Corps was
stationed; Kalkfontein was the headquarters of the Camel Corps of 500
men and animals; and at Warmbad there was a military post and a military
hospital.

The North-to-South line allowed of an easy movement of troops between
the military headquarters at Keetmanshoop and Windhoek, or vice versâ.
According to the original estimates this line was not to be completed
before 1913. Special reasons for urgency--as to the nature of which it
would be easy to speculate--led, however, to the line being opened for
traffic on March 8, 1912. From Windhoek, also, troops were supplied to
Gobabis, situate 100 miles east of the capital and about forty miles
west of the Bechuanaland frontier. Gobabis became a German military
station in 1895. Provided with a well-equipped fort, it became the chief
strategical position on the eastern border of German South-West Africa.
A railway connecting Gobabis with Windhoek was to have been commenced in
1915.

From Windhoek, as already told, there is rail communication with
Swakopmund.

Grootfontein, the terminus, on the east, of the Swakopmund-Otavi line,
had been a military station since 1899. Its special significance lay
in the fact that it was the nearest point of approach by rail to the
"Caprivi Strip," along which the German troops, conveyed as far as
Grootfontein by rail, were to make their invasion of the adjoining
British territory of Rhodesia. Troop movements in this direction would
have been further facilitated by a link at Karibib connecting the
Swakopmund-Otavi-Grootfontein line with the one to Windhoek and thence
to the military headquarters at Keetmanshoop. Karibib was itself a
military base, in addition to having large railway offices and workshops.

With, therefore, the minor exceptions, the system of railways in German
South-West Africa had been designed or developed in accordance with
plans which had for their basis an eventual attack on British territory
in three separate directions--(1) Cape Province, (2) Bechuanaland and
(3) Rhodesia. The Southern and the North-to-South lines had, also, been
built exclusively with the standard Cape gauge of 3 ft. 6 in., so that,
when "der Tag" arrived, and German succeeded British supremacy in South
Africa, these particular lines could be continued in order to link up
with those which the Germans would then expect to take over from Cape
Province. Keetmanshoop was eventually to be converted from a terminus to
a stopping-place on a through line of German railway from Lüderitzbucht
to Kimberley, the effect of which, it was pointed out, would be to
shorten the distance from Europe to Bulawayo by 1,300 miles as compared
with the journey via the Cape. Surveys had been made for extensions (1)
from Keetmanshoop, via Hasuur, to the Union frontier near Rietfontein,
and (2) from Kalkfontein, on the southern branch, to Ukamas, also on the
frontier and in the direction of Upington, in Union territory. Each of
these additions would have carried the original scheme a stage further,
though it was not, apparently, thought wise to make them before "der
Tag" actually arrived.

On these various railways the Government of German South-West Africa
had expended, so far as the available figures show, a total of,
approximately, £8,400,000, defrayed in part from Imperial funds and
in part from the revenue of the Protectorate. This total includes the
amount paid by the Government to the South-West Africa Company for
their line from Swakopmund to the Company's mines at Otavi and Tsumeb,
but it does not include the cost of the original narrow-gauge Government
line from Swakopmund to Windhoek, of which the section between
Swakopmund and Karibib was abandoned when the Swakopmund-Otavi line, via
Karibib, was taken over, the remaining section from Karibib to Windhoek
being then converted into the Cape 3 ft. 6 in. gauge. On most of the
open lines no more than two or three trains a week were run, and on some
of the branches there was only one train in the week.[61]

MILITARY PREPARATIONS

Further details as to the elaborate nature of the preparations made for
the realisation of Germany's dreams of conquest in Africa are supplied
by Mr. J. K. O'Connor in a pamphlet published at Capetown, towards the
end of 1914, under the title of "The Hun in our Hinterland; or the
Menace of G.S.W.A." Mr. O'Connor made a tour through German South-West
Africa a few months before the outbreak of the war, assuming the rôle
of a journalist in search of data concerning the agricultural resources
of the territory. He obtained much information which had other than an
agricultural interest.

He ascertained, for instance, that the German troops then in the
territory consisted of Mounted Infantry, Field Artillery, Machine Gun
Divisions, Intelligence Divisions, an Engineer and Railway Corps, Field
Railway Divisions, an Etappen-Formation, a Camel Corps, a Police Force
and a Reserve, representing altogether--apart from natives--a trained
European force of approximately 10,000 men, whose duties and location in
the event of war had all been assigned to them in advance.

He found that the railways had been supplemented by a strong transport
service of natives, who had an abundant supply of oxen and mules for
their wagons.

He tells how (in addition to the military stations already mentioned)
the Germans had established throughout the territory a network of
block-houses, strengthened by forts at intervals and supplemented by
magazines and storehouses at central points; while 1,600 miles of
telegraph and telephone wires, together with the "Funken-telegraph,"
placed all these stations and outposts in touch with one another as well
as with the military headquarters and the various towns.[62]

He says concerning Keetmanshoop that its conversion into the chief
military station in the territory was "the first move in the German
game."

He points to the fact that "Das Koloniale Jahrbuch," published by
authority, laid it down that the Boers in British South Africa must be
constantly reminded of their Low-German origin; that German ideas must
be spread among them by means of German schools and German churches, and
he declares:--"For thirty years Teuton ideas have been foisted upon the
Boer population of British South Africa. For thirty years, under the
guise of friendship, Germany has plotted and planned for the elimination
of the Anglo-Saxon element from South Africa."

Mr. O'Connor further writes:--

From what I was able to gather it was evident that the
military plans of the Germans were completed for an invasion of
the Union territory, and that they were only awaiting the day
when Peace would spread her wings and soar from the embassies of
Europe. It was not anticipated, however, that that would be in
August, 1914.

They were confident of success, and from the conversations
that took place between officers and myself it was evident that
the possession of the African continent was the greatest desire
of the Teutons.

The smashing up of France and Great Britain were only
incidents that would lead to the whole continent of Africa
becoming a German possession; and it was considered that as
Germany would accomplish this, despite her late entrance upon
the stage as a Colonial Power, she would have more to show for
her thirty years as such a Power than could either England or
France, who had started colonising centuries before her.

The great aim became to break France and England, for the
purpose of acquiring their African possessions; and, having
broken these Powers, Germany would have turned her attention to
the African possessions of smaller Powers who, having neither
England nor France to rely upon, would have been compelled to
relinquish their possessions, and, by so doing, would have made
Germany the supreme Power in Africa.

Summing up the conclusions at which he arrived, as the result of all
that he saw for himself and all that he had heard from responsible
German officers during the course of his tour, Mr. O'Connor says:--

From the day the Germans set their feet upon South-West
African soil they have prepared themselves for a raid into
British territory. For years the Reichstag has voted two million
pounds per annum for the purpose. Had these millions been spent
on the development of South-West Africa it would, to-day, be a
colony of which any country might be proud. But what can they
show for this expenditure? Nothing but a military camp.

It is evident, then, that this territory has not been
regarded by the Berliners as a colony, but as a jumping-off
ground for an invasion of British South Africa.

Here we have simply an amplification of ideas which, as we have seen,
had long been entertained in Germany; though they were ideas it was now
being sought to reduce to practice by a resort, in advance, to every
step that could possibly be taken for ensuring their realisation. Any
suggestion that the system of strategical railways which had been built,
and the elaborate military preparations which had been effected, were
merely precautions against a further possible rising of the natives
would have been absurd.

RAIL CONNECTION WITH ANGOLA

What Mr. O'Connor says in regard to Germany's attitude towards the
African possessions of the smaller Powers gives additional significance
to a report published in the _Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten_ of May 31,
1914, concerning a project for building a line of railway along the
coast of German South-West Africa to connect with Portuguese Angola.
This was to be the first of a series of lines which "after lengthy
discussions with the Imperial Government," were to be carried out in
German South-West Africa by a syndicate of prominent shipping and
banking houses in Germany, controlling an initial capital of 50,000,000
marks (£2,500,000). It was further reported that in the early part of
1914 the Governor of German South-West Africa made a tour through the
northern part of the Protectorate, going as far as Tiger Bay, in Angola,
"in connection with possible railway construction in the near future."

Angola was certainly an item on the German list of desirable
acquisitions in Africa. It has been in the occupation of Portugal since
the middle of the fifteenth century; but the point of view from which it
was regarded by advocates of German expansion may be judged from some
remarks made in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ by a traveller who returned to
Germany from Angola in June, 1914:--

The game is worth the candle. An enormous market for
industrial products, rich and virgin mineral treasures, a
fruitful and healthy country equally suitable for agriculture,
cattle-breeding and immigration, and the finest harbours on the
west coast--that is the prize that awaits us.

A territory offering these advantages, having an area estimated at
484,000 square miles, and extending inland for a distance of 1,500
miles, might be coveted for its own sake; but its possession would
have been of still greater value to Germany (1) as a continuation,
northwards, of German South-West Africa, and (2) as the starting point
for a chain of communications, under German control, extending right
across the African continent, from west to east.

The coast-railway spoken of by the _Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten_ was
to link up German South-West Africa with Angola, in which country,
also, the Germans hoped to obtain extensive mining and agricultural
concessions, thus forwarding their established policy of peaceful
penetration by means of commerce and railways, and establishing economic
interests which might be expected to lead to political developments in
due course, and so prepare the way for an eventual seizure of "the prize
that awaits us."

The Germans had also sought to finance the completion eastwards of the
Lobito Bay or Benguela Railway, to which reference will be made later
on in connection with the development of the Katanga district of the
Belgian Congo; but the condition they advanced, namely that the control
of the line should be left in their hands, coupled with their adoption
of suspicious lines of policy in other directions,[63] led to their
railway proposals being declined by the Portuguese, with thanks.

GERMAN EAST AFRICA

Then, in order to understand the full scope of the aspirations Germany
was cherishing towards the African Continent, one must take into account
her railways on the east coast no less than those on the west coast,
since these, also, formed an essential part of the general scheme.

The line which stretches right across German East Africa, from
Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of the Protectorate, to Kigoma, on Lake
Tanganyika, and north of Ujiji, has a total length of 1,439 miles;
and if the economic development of a territory estimated as having a
total area of 384,000 square miles had been the sole aim in view, the
Tanganyikabahn would have well deserved to rank as a notable enterprise
in German colonial expansion, and one calling for commendation rather
than criticism. The question arises, however, whether, in addition to
the development of German East Africa itself, the railway in question
was not intended, also, to facilitate the realisation of Germany's
designs against Central Africa as part of her aforesaid scheme for the
eventual conquest of the African continent.

The feverish haste with which the second and third sections of the
railway were built sufficed, in itself, to give rise to suspicions of
ulterior designs. The first section, from Dar-es-Salaam to Morogo (136½
miles), was constructed by a syndicate of German bankers acting under a
State guarantee of interest, and the work, begun in February, 1905, was
completed in September, 1907. The second section, from Morogo to Tabora
(526½ miles), was to have been completed by July 1, 1914; but in 1910,
the Reichstag voted a special credit both for the earlier completion of
this second section--which was thus finished by February 26, 1912--and
for surveys for the third section, from Tabora to Kigoma (776 miles).
Such, again, was the celerity with which the work on this third section
was pushed forward that, although the date fixed for the completion of
the line was April 1, 1915, through rail communication from the Indian
Ocean to Lake Tanganyika was established by February 1, 1914--that is to
say, one year and two months in advance of time.

We here come to the two-fold question (1) Why was the railway extended
at all for the 776 miles from Tabora to Lake Tanganyika, considering
that this portion of the German Protectorate offered, in itself, the
prospect of no traffic at all for the line[64]; and (2) why was it
necessary that such haste should be shown in the completion of the
undertaking?

"THE OTHER SIDE OF TANGANYIKA"

To the first of these questions the reply is (1) that the traffic on
which the western section of the Tanganyikabahn was mainly to rely for
its receipts was traffic originating in or destined for the Belgian
Congo; (2) that the control it was hoped to secure over Belgian trade
was, in combination with the strategical advantages offered by the
railway, to be the preliminary to an eventual annexation by Germany of
the Belgian Congo itself; and (3) that like conditions were to lead, if
possible, to the final realisation of von Weber's dream of 1880.

"That we are directing our gaze to the other side of Tanganyika," said
the _Kolonial Zeitung_ of April 4, 1914, in referring to the completion
of the railway to Kigoma--an event which occasioned a great outburst of
enthusiasm in Germany--"goes, of course, without saying."

There certainly is much on "the other side of Tanganyika" to which
Germany might look with feelings of envy. In regard to mineral wealth,
alone, the resources of the South-eastern section of the Belgian Congo
could not fail to make a strong appeal to her.

The great copper belt in the Katanga district,[65] commences about 100
miles north-west of the British South African post, Ndola (situate
twelve miles south of the Congo border), and extends thence, in a
north-westerly direction, for a distance of 180 miles, with an average
breadth of twenty-five miles. "In the not far distant future, when the
many problems of development are solved, the Katanga copper belt,"
says Mr. J. B. Thornhill,[66] "will be one of the controlling factors
in the copper supply of the world." In the report of the British South
Africa Company for the year ending March 31, 1914, it was stated that
the copper-mining industry in Katanga had attained to considerable
dimensions; that furnaces with a capacity of 1,000 tons of copper per
month were at work, and that further large additions to the plant were
being made.

Katanga has, also, a tin belt, and coal, gold, iron and other minerals
are found there, besides.

In the German territory on the eastern side of Lake Tanganyika there
are, indeed, minerals; but they are found in no such abundance as in the
Belgian territory on the western side of the lake. German East Africa
can, however, produce in great abundance the wheat, the rice and the
other food supplies necessary for the workers in Katanga mines, and
the German view has been that the eastern and the western sides of the
lake should be regarded as complementary the one to the other, and that
the Tanganyikabahn should convey these food supplies to the lake, for
transfer to the other side by steamer, and bring back the products of
the mines for distribution, via the German east coast route and the
Indian Ocean, among the markets of the world. In the same way it was
hoped that all goods and necessaries likely to be imported into the
Katanga and Mweru districts from Europe would reach their destination
via this German East Africa Central Railway; and German business houses
were strongly advised to establish branches in those districts,[67] so
that, apparently, Germany would eventually control the trade as well as
the transport of "the other side of Tanganyika."

The development of the south-western section of Germany's east-coast
Protectorate had, in itself, become a matter of vital importance ("eine
Lebensfrage"[68]); but the Belgian Congo was the only quarter to which
that section could look for markets for its produce. The possibility
of securing sufficient traffic for the Central Railway to ensure its
financial success may have been a secondary consideration; but the
railway itself was to serve a most important purpose, economically, by
helping Germany to capture the Tanganyika and trans-Tanganyika trade,
and by making her East Africa colony more prosperous; politically, by
strengthening her hold on the Belgian Congo through the increase of her
commercial interests there; and strategically, by affording her the
means of effecting a speedy concentration of troops in Central Africa,
should the occasion for so doing arise.

This last-mentioned purpose was to be further attained by the projected
construction of what would have been a purely strategical line from
Tabora, on the Tanganyikabahn, to Mwanza, on the southern shores of the
Victoria Nyanza, whence German troops would--in case of need--be in a
position to make a rear attack on British East Africa.

CENTRAL AFRICA

Germany's hopes of thus strengthening her position in Central Africa
by means of the Tanganyikabahn received, however, a serious set-back
through the activity and enterprise of Belgian and British interests in
providing, opening up or projecting alternative transport routes which
threatened (1) to divert a large proportion of the traffic she had
expected to secure for the East Africa Central line; (2) to diminish
greatly the prospect of her achieving the commercial and political aims
she cherished in regard to the Belgian Congo; (3) to make it still
more difficult for German East Africa to emerge from a position of
comparative isolation, and (4) to impede greatly the realisation of
Germany's aspirations in regard alike to Central Africa and the African
Continent.

It is the more necessary that the bearing of all these facts on the
general situation should be understood because they tend to indicate
the critical nature of the position into which the said aspirations had
drifted, and the imperative necessity by which Germany may, by 1914,
have considered she was faced for adopting some bold course of action if
she were still to look forward to the possibility of those aspirations
being realised.

The principle originally adopted by King Leopold in his efforts to
develop the Congo State was that of supplementing navigation on the
Congo by railways wherever these were necessary either to overcome the
difficulties presented by rapids or to supply missing links in the chain
of communication to or from the west coast. The same policy was followed
by the Belgian Government when they assumed control, and the last of
these links--the line, 165 miles long, from Kabalo to Albertville,
connecting the Congo with the Tanganyika--was opened in March, 1915.
One reason, in fact, given in Germany for the express speed at which
the Tanganyikabahn was completed to Kigoma was an alleged fear that
the Belgians might capture the trade and transport of the territory in
question by getting to the lake first.

This combined river and rail transport still left it necessary for
traffic from the Congo basin to the west coast to follow the winding
course of that river, with a number of transhipments; and if the route
in question had been the only competitor of the Tanganyikabahn, Germany
would have had less cause for uneasiness. Meanwhile, however, the
Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo had built a line--forming a
continuation of the Rhodesian Railways--from the boundary of Northern
Rhodesia, at Elizabethville, to Kambove (Katanga); and a continuation of
this line to Bukama, on the Lualaba, a navigable tributary of the Congo,
was (1) to give shorter and better access to the Congo for products
from Katanga, and (2) to establish combined rail and water transport
between the entire railway system of South Africa and the mouth of the
Congo. Already the minerals from Katanga were finding their outlet to
the sea on the east coast via the Rhodesian Railways and the Portuguese
port of Beira, instead of via the Tanganyikabahn and the German port of
Dar-es-Salaam. The former had, indeed, become the recognised route for
this important traffic in preference to the latter. The line between
Kambove and Bukama had not been completed when war broke out in 1914;
but the provision of this through route, and the various facilities
it would offer, rendered still more uncertain the prospect of Germany
getting control of the trans-Tanganyika traffic for her own lines.

There were other important railway schemes, besides.

From Bukama rail communication is to be continued right across Central
Africa to Matadi, to which point the Congo is navigable for large
vessels from its mouth, less than a hundred miles distant. This line,
in addition to avoiding the great bend of the Congo, will open up and
develop the vast and promising territory in the northern districts of
the Belgian Congo, south of that river.

Another scheme which is to be carried out is a line from Kambove, in the
Southern Katanga, to the south-western boundary of the Belgian Congo,
and thence across Portuguese territory to the present eastern terminus
of the Lobito Bay Railway. This will give to the mining interests of
Katanga direct rail communication, by the shortest possible route, with
a port on the west coast, while the connection at Kambove with the
Rhodesian and South African systems will make the line a still more
important addition to the railways of Africa for the purposes alike of
development in the central districts and as a shorter route to and from
Europe. German financiers were at one time desirous of undertaking the
extension eastward of the Lobito Bay Railway--mainly, as it seemed, with
a view to furthering German interests in Portuguese territory (see page
314); but the Kambove-Lobito Bay line is now to be constructed with
British capital.

Finally there is the Cape-to-Cairo Railway which, passing through the
Katanga mining districts, is likely to divert still more of the traffic
Germany had counted upon alike for her Tanganyikabahn and as a means
towards the attainment of her political aspirations in Central Africa.

Whilst these various developments were proceeding, there were still
others, in the Cameroons, to which attention may now be directed.

THE CAMEROONS, LAKE CHAD AND THE SUDAN

Anticipations of the great results for Germany which would follow from
the building of railways in the Cameroons began to be entertained about
the year 1897. The main objective of the schemes brought forward seems
to have been, however, not simply the internal economic development of
an already vast area, but the carrying of lines of communication to the
furthest limits of that area in order, apparently, to extend German
interests and influence to territories beyond.

One of these schemes was for the building of a line of railway from
Duala, the chief port of the Cameroons, to Lake Chad (otherwise Tsâd), a
sheet of water some 7,000 square miles in extent which, situate on the
western borders of the Sudan, constitutes the extreme northern limits
of German territory in this direction, while the shores of the lake are
occupied jointly by Germany, England and France.

The proposed line was to have an estimated total length of about 1,000
kilometres (621 miles). In September, 1902, the German Imperial
Government granted to a Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Syndikat a concession for
building the line; an expedition sent out by the syndicate made a survey
of the route in 1902-3; and a Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, with a
capital of 17,000,000 marks (£850,000), was formed by a group of bankers
and others in Germany to build the first section.

In December, 1903, the German Emperor, at his reception of the President
of the Reichstag, gave his blessing to all such enterprises by declaring
that an essential condition ("eine Lebensbedingung") for the welfare of
Germany's colonies in Africa was that the building of railways should
be taken earnestly in hand. In 1905 the prospects of the proposed line
seemed so hopeful that the early commencement of construction was
announced as probable; but various difficulties arose, including much
trouble in regard to labour, and the line did not get beyond the end of
its first stage, a distance of only 160 km. (100 miles) from the coast.

Although the scheme was thus not fully carried out, there was no doubt
as to the nature of the purposes it had been designed to serve. In his
official and detailed account of the proposed undertaking[69]--a book
of exceptional merit from the point of view of the clearness and of the
exhaustive data with which "the case for the line" is presented--the
director of the syndicate says:--

My opinion is that only a great railway--one that unites
the Sudan with the Atlantic, and that extends from Lake Chad to
the west coast of Africa--will be in a position both to develop
fully the economic interests of the Cameroons and to assure to
Germany a means of access to the richest territory that Central
Africa possesses.

Had the line been completed as far as Lake Chad, it would have been a
powerful competitor of British railways via the Nile or the Red Sea for
the traffic of the Sudan, with its vast commercial possibilities; and,
had it been found the better route, it might have established German
commercial supremacy in this part of Central Africa, with the inevitable
political developments to follow. "The German Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn," the
director of the syndicate further wrote, "will, especially when it has
been completed, be for the whole of Central Africa a _Kulturwerk_ of the
first importance."

The Germanisation of Lake Chad, combined with an eventual acquiring
by Germany of French interests in the Sahara and North Africa, would
further have permitted the continuation of the Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn from
that lake to Algeria along the route already projected in France for a
Trans-African line linking up the Mediterranean alike with the Congo
and with the Rhodesian and other British railways in South Africa, via
Lake Chad--a line which, it is said, would offer no great technical
difficulty in construction.[70]

THE CAMEROONS AND THE CONGO

Another ambitious scheme was for the building of a Mittellandbahn which,
crossing the Njong, would eventually link up the chief port of the
Cameroons with a navigable tributary of the Congo. Here, again, the line
as actually constructed has not been carried a greater distance than
about 300 km. (186 miles). At one time, in fact, the original project
seemed to have been abandoned; but quite recently it has been brought
forward again under conditions which have a distinct bearing on what has
already been said concerning Germany and Central Africa.

From the views expressed by Emil Zimmermann in his "Neu-Kamerun,"[71]
one gathers that in 1913 Germany was regarding with some degree of
concern alike the outlook for her Tanganyikabahn, on which over
£7,000,000 had been spent, and the prospective set-back to her
aspirations in regard to the Belgian Congo; and Herr Zimmermann, in
giving an account of the additions made to her Cameroons possessions
at the expense of France, under the agreement of November 4, 1911,
following on the Agadir crisis, makes certain overtures to Belgium,
and follows them up with a distinct threat, should she refrain from
responding to them.

Belgium and Germany, he says, in effect, are the two dominant Powers
in Central Africa; and he is of opinion that it will be to their mutual
interest to co-operate in the development of that great territory.
Belgium, however, he finds to be faced by the need for a great outlay
of money (1) on account of necessary improvements of her Congo rail and
river communication, to meet expanding traffic requirements, and (2) in
order to develop her Katanga territory. She cannot herself command the
necessary capital, but Germany could assist her to raise it, and would
do so--provided Belgium undertook that traffic from her Tanganyika and
Mweru districts, and, also, from points east of the Middle Congo, should
reach the sea by "its natural outlet," that is to say, by the German
East African Central Railway.

Should Belgium refuse to agree to these proposals, and should she, by
her high tariffs, continue to impede the flow of traffic to German
territory, then it would be open to Germany to construct lines of
railway from the west coast either to navigable tributaries of the Congo
or to the Congo itself, and so divert the traffic from the Belgian
Congo at certain important points, to the serious prejudice of Belgian
interests.

Apart from what might be done in the way of extending the Duala-Njong
line to the said navigable tributaries of the Congo, as originally
projected, Herr Zimmermann says that, under the treaty of November 4,
1911, Germany has the right to continue her Cameroons railways across
French territory (France having reciprocal rights as regards German
territory); and he points out how she could exercise this power, to the
detriment of Belgium, should that country not accept her proposals in
regard to the Congo basin and Central Africa. He specially mentions the
fact that when the boundaries of the 100,000 square miles of territory
added, at the expense of France, to the German Cameroons (then already
191,000 square miles in extent), were fixed by virtue of the treaty of
1911, the wedge-like strip on the south of Spanish Muni was so defined
as to leave at the eastern point thereof a gap between the Spanish
territory and the French Cameroons wide enough for either a road or a
railway; and he emphasises the fact that, by taking advantage of the
facilities thus open to her, Germany could, under the treaty of 1911,
construct a railway 1,000 km. (621 miles) long from Muni Bay through
the said gap and cross French territory to the junction of the Sangha
with the Congo. Alternatively, and by arrangement with France, the
line could start from Libreville. "What such a railway, tapping the
Congo-Sangha-Ubangi traffic at its most favourable point, would mean,
can," Herr Zimmermann remarks, "be left to the Belgians themselves to
say."

He does not suggest that such schemes as these would in themselves be
of great value to Germany; but he thinks they might have a powerful
influence, both politically and economically, on the solution of the
Tanganyika problem in Germany's favour. In fact, he considers that since
the 1911 treaty Germany has practically controlled the situation in
Central Africa; and from all he says it is a reasonable assumption that
the Agadir crisis, the concession of territory exacted from France, and
the undertaking as to the carrying of German Cameroon railways across
French territory, had far more to do with German designs on the Belgian
Congo and Central Africa than is generally supposed.

In another work, published a year later,[72] the same writer, adopting
now a distinctly different tone, endeavoured to appease an "Anti-Central
Africa agitation" which, he tells us, had developed in Germany and
was protesting alike against the "danger" of acquiring any more
"Congo-swamps" and against the "boundless German plans" in Africa.
He further sought to soothe the suspicions which, he found, had been
excited in Belgium and elsewhere as to the nature of Germany's plans in
Africa. Germany, he declared, had no annexation projects in view. Her
aspirations were purely economic. Kamerun, thanks to the German-French
treaty of 1911 (which, he reiterated, had changed the whole situation),
could now take a considerable share in the development of Central
Africa, and was the more entitled so to do since she had, in Duala, "one
of the best harbours on the west coast of Africa."

OFFICIAL ADMISSIONS

As against, however, affirmations such as these, there is the
undisputable evidence of no less an authority than the German Foreign
Minister himself as to the real nature of Germany's designs on the
Belgian Congo.

In the second Belgian Grey Book, published in August, 1915, under the
title of "Correspondance Diplomatique relative à la Guerre de 1914-15,"
there is given (pp. 2-3) a letter from the Belgian Minister in Berlin,
Baron Beyens, to his Government, recording, under date April 2, 1914,
a conversation which the French Ambassador in Berlin informed him he
had had quite recently (and, therefore, only about four months before
the outbreak of war) with the German Foreign Minister. Herr von Jagow
suggested to him that Germany, France and England should arrive at an
agreement on the construction and linking up of railways in Africa. M.
Gambon replied that in this case Belgium ought to be invited to confer
with them, as she was constructing some new railways on the Congo. He
also expressed the view that any conference held on the subject should
meet at Brussels. To this Herr von Jagow responded, "Oh no; for it is
at the expense of Belgium that our agreement should be made. Do you
not think," he added, "that King Leopold placed too heavy a burden on
the shoulders of Belgium? Belgium is not rich enough to develop that
vast possession. It is an enterprise beyond her financial resources and
her means of expansion." The French Ambassador dissented, but Herr von
Jagow went on to affirm that the great Powers were alone in a position
to colonise, and that the small Powers were destined to disappear or
to gravitate towards the orbit of the large ones. In the words of the
Belgian Minister:--

Il développa l'opinion que seules les grandes Puissances
sont en situation de coloniser. Il dévoila même le fond de sa
pensée en soutenant que les petits États ne pourraient plus
mener, dans la transformation qui s'opérait en Europe au profit
des nationalités les plus fortes, par suite du développement des
forces économiques et des moyens de communication, l'existence
indépendante dont ils avaient joui jusqu'à présent. Ils étaient
destinés à disparaître ou à graviter dans l'orbite des grandes
Puissances.

"DER TAG" AND ITS PROGRAMME

The story here presented of Germany's aims in Africa has taken us over
almost the entire African Continent. It now only remains to be seen how
those aims were to be realised, not merely as the outcome of Pan-German
dreams and advocacy, but as the result of many years of scheming,
plotting and actual preparation, all directed to the wiping out of the
influence in Africa of other Powers, great as well as small, and the
final realisation of Germany's long-cherished purpose.

According to conversations Mr. O'Connor had with military officers in
German South-West Africa just before the outbreak of war in 1914, the
programme under which Germany hoped to become "the supreme power in
Africa" when "der Tag" so long looked forward to should arrive was, in
effect, as follows:--

Belgium was to be disposed of "at one gulp." This would make it an easy
matter for Germany to take over the Belgian Congo.

France would be paralysed; and, being paralysed, she would not be able
to prevent Germany from succeeding to the whole of her possessions in
Africa.

The Dervishes would stir up a rebellion in Egypt,[73] and other
rebellions were anticipated in Ireland and India.

While England was fully occupied in these directions the Afrikanders
were to rise _en masse_ and declare British South Africa an Afrikander
Republic.

The forces in German East Africa would make a sudden raid into British
East Africa. Having annexed that territory and got possession of the
railway, they would next invade Rhodesia from the east, in co-operation
with troops from German South-West Africa advancing to the Zambezi, via
the Caprivi Strip, from the railway terminus at Grootfontein.

Meanwhile German columns would have moved (1) from the military station
at Gobabis into Bechuanaland, crossing the desert of Kalahari, to effect
the capture of Vryburg; and (2) from Keetmanshoop, and other points
served by the Seeheim branch, into northern Cape Province, via Raman's
Drift, Schuit Drift and the south-east corner of the territory.

Rhodesia having been seized, more troops would be available to proceed
to the assistance of the Afrikander forces operating in the Cape
Province, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State--a "rising" on the
part of the Afrikanders as soon as they saw a good opportunity for one
being taken for granted. In return for the services thus rendered by her
to the Afrikanders in establishing their Republic, Germany would take a
portion of the Transvaal, as well as part of the Zululand coast.

With Belgium and France effectively crushed, and the power of Great
Britain in South Africa broken down, those countries would no longer
be in a position to prevent Germany from annexing Portuguese Angola;
and this she was to do next. She would "allow" the Afrikander Republic
to take Delagoa Bay; but the Republic itself was to come under the
"guardianship" of Germany. The word "suzerainty," Mr. O'Connor says, was
not mentioned, "guardianship" being preferred; but, with the exception
of Italian Somaliland--about which nothing was said--practically the
whole of Africa was either to belong to Germany or to be brought
directly or indirectly under her control.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WORLD-WAR

Since the outbreak of the World-War in 1914 there has been much
speculation as to the real objective and purpose of Germany in bringing
it about.

Do the facts stated in the present chapter afford any help towards a
solution of this problem?

We have seen the nature of the aims cherished by Germany towards Africa,
the practical and persistent efforts she made during a long series of
years for their attainment, and the substantial expenditure she incurred
in the hope of at last securing the prize she considered was awaiting
her.

We have seen how the purpose of Germany in Africa was less to develop
colonies for their own sake than to regard them as points from which to
absorb or to control neighbouring territories.

We have seen how the development of rival railways in Central Africa had
recently threatened the supremacy Germany hoped to gain and may, indeed,
have suggested to her the need for early vigorous effort, if she wished
still to secure the realisation of her aims.

We have seen what, in the view of the German Foreign Minister, should be
the fate of small Powers which stand in the way of the aggrandisement of
great ones.

We have seen, also, how, in the opinion of officers serving in
German South-West Africa, the real purpose of the war to which they
were looking forward, and for which they were preparing, was the
German annexation of Africa, and how the "smashing up" of France and
Great Britain, the overthrow of Belgium, the seizure of Portuguese
possessions, and the virtual absorption of the proposed new Boer
Republics were to be the preliminaries to a final transformation of
the whole African Continent into a German possession--the "new Empire"
which, in the words of von Weber, was to be "possibly more valuable and
more brilliant than even the Indian Empire."

May one not conclude, in face of these and of all the other facts which
have here been narrated, that one, at least, of the main objectives
of Germany (apart from minor ones) in provoking the Great War was no
less a prize than the African Continent;[74] and that when she invaded
Belgium and France she did so less with the object of annexing the
former country, and of creating another Alsace-Lorraine in the latter
than of having "something in her hand" with which to "bargain"--in the
interests of her projects in Africa--when the time came for discussing
the terms of peace, assuming that she had not already attained her
purpose at the outset by the sheer force of what she thought would be
her irresistible strength?

If this conclusion should seem to be warranted, on the basis of what
has already been told, it may certainly be regarded as confirmed by the
fact that, down to the moment when these lines are being written, any
suggestions coming from German sources as to possible terms of peace
have invariably included proposals for the concession to Germany of
territory in Africa as "compensation" for the surrender of territory she
has herself occupied in Belgium and France.

Thus, in a despatch published in _The Times_ of September 4, 1915, a
statement was reproduced from the Chicago _Tribune_ giving, on the
authority of "a writer in close touch with the German Embassy," the
terms on which Germany would be prepared to agree to peace. These terms
included the following:--

The cession of the Belgian Congo to Germany, as compensation
for the evacuation of Belgium.

The cession of African colonial territory to Germany by
France, as compensation for the evacuation of Northern France.

Then, also, on October 24, 1915, the _New York American_ published a
long interview with Professor Hans Delbrück on the terms of peace which
Germany hoped to secure if "President Wilson and the Pope" would consent
to act as mediators. The interview (which had been approved by the
German censor) included the following passage:--

It is quite possible that peace could be secured by ceding
to Germany such colonies as Uganda by England and the French
and Belgian Congos as a ransom for the evacuation by Germany of
Northern France and Belgium.

Such concessions, if one can conceive the possibility of their being
made--would still leave Germany far from the attainment of her full
African programme; but the fact of these proposals being put forward at
all as "terms of peace" is quite in keeping with the whole course of
Germany's policy in Africa, and points clearly to what may, in fact,
have been her chief objective in the war itself.

Any moral reflections either on the said policy or on the "programme" by
means of which it was to have been carried out would be beyond the scope
of the present work.

What we are here concerned in is the fact that Germany's dreams of
an African Empire, given expression to by von Weber in 1880, and the
subject of such continuous effort ever since, were, in the possibilities
of their realisation, based primarily on the extension and utilisation
of such facilities for rail-transport as she might be able either to
create or to acquire.

FOOTNOTES:

[55] See Vol. III. of "The Story of Africa," by Robert Brown. London,
1894.

[56] "The Germans and Africa," by Evans Lewin, Librarian of the Royal
Colonial Institute. London, 1915.

[57] Under the terms of the treaty of July 1, 1900, Germany was to have
"free access" from her South-West Africa Protectorate to the Zambezi
River "by a strip which shall at no point be less than twenty English
miles in width."

[58] The Hereros (Damaras) are not a warlike people, and although,
at the time of the rising, many of them were armed with Mausers and
Lee-Enfields, it has been said of them that they were not of much
account with the rifle, their "natural weapon" being the assegai. A
German White Book on the rebellion stated that the cause of the outbreak
was the spirit of independence which characterised the Hereros, "to
whom the increasing domination of the Germans had become insupportable,
and who believed themselves stronger than the whites." According to Mr.
H. A. Bryden ("The Conquest of German South-West Africa," _Fortnightly
Review_, July, 1915) the real causes were the abuses of the white
trader, the brutal methods of certain officials, and the seizure and
occupation of tribal lands. The war developed into one of practical
extermination for the natives concerned. Of the Hereros between 20,000
and 30,000 were either killed outright or driven into the Kalahari
desert to die of starvation. The Hottentots also lost heavily.

[59] The Commerce Defence League, as explained by the writer of the
article, is an organisation of German traders which gives subsidies to
German clerks so that they can take up appointments at nominal salaries
in foreign countries, on the understanding that they are to report to
the League as to the business methods, etc., of those countries and on
openings for German trade or industry therein, the League acting on such
information and dividing among its subscribers the profits derived from
the agencies opened or the competitive businesses started.

[60] See _South Africa_, November 14, 1914.

[61] "Memorandum on the Country known as German South-West Africa.
Compiled from such information as is at present available to the
Government of the Union of South Africa." Pretoria, 1915.

[62] The colony was also in wireless-telegraphic communication, via
Togoland, with Berlin.

[63] For details of so-called "invasions" of Portuguese territory by
German political agents, posing as engineers and prospectors, see an
article on "The Invasion of Angola," by Mr. George Bailey, in the issue
of "United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal," for October,
1915.

[64] "Le Chemin de Fer du Tanganyika et les progrès de l'Afrique
orientale allemande." Par Camille Martin. Renseignements coloniaux, No.
3. Supplément de _l'Afrique française_, Mars, 1914. Paris.

[65] A region on the Belgian Congo about 115,000 square miles in extent
and one of the best watered districts in Africa, lying nearly in the
centre of the African continent, and equidistant, therefore, from the
Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

[66] "Adventures in Africa under the British, Belgian and Portuguese
Flags." London, 1915.

[67] "Welches Interesse hat Deutschland an der Erschliessung des Congo?"
Von Emil Zimmermann. _Koloniale Rundschau_, Mai, 1911. Berlin.

[68] "Die Eroberung des Tanganyika-Verkehrs." Von Emil Zimmermann.
_Koloniale Rundschau_, Jan., 1911. Berlin.

[69] "Kamerun und die Deutsche Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn." Von Carl René,
Director des Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Syndikats. 251 pp. Mit 37 Textbildern
und 22 Tafeln nach Original-Aufnahmen der Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Expediton,
1902-3. Berlin, 1905.

[70] "Bulletin de la Société de Geographie et d'Etudes coloniales de
Marseilles." Tome XXXVI, No. 1. Ie Trimestre, 1912.

[71] "Neu-Kamerun; Reiseerlebnisse und wirtschaftspolitische
Untersuchungen." Von Emil Zimmermann. 135 pp. Map. Berlin, 1913.

[72] "Was ist uns Zentralafrika?" Von Emil Zimmermann. 57 pp. Berlin,
1914.

[73] How Egypt was to be invaded and captured by the Germans and Turks,
in combination, with the help of the railways in Asia Minor, will be
told in the following Chapter.

[74] Should there still be any doubt on this point, it will be removed
by the frank admission of _Die Neue Zeit_, even whilst the Great War
is still in progress, that Germany undertook the war with "the main
object of extending her colonial possessions." As quoted in the _Daily
Express_ of October 8, 1915, _Die Neue Zeit_ further said:--"Herr Paul
Rohrbach favours the acquisition of the whole of Central Africa, but
opines that this territory, vast as it is, will not be adequate to
furnish Germany with all the elbow room she may require within the next
half-century. Professor Delbrück, while agreeing with Herr Rohrbach,
as to the importance of Central Africa, as well as of Angola and the
whole of British East Africa, further emphasises the necessity for the
acquisition of the Sudan and the southern part of the Sahara, now in
the possession of France. We are quite in agreement with these eminent
leaders that we must found an "India" of our own, and that the greater
part of the African continent must furnish the requisite territory.
Once well established in this new empire, we shall link ourselves with
Asiatic Turkey, and also with China, reconstructing the political and
economic foundations of both on a scientific German basis."

CHAPTER XX

DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY

Just as avowedly strategical lines in Africa were to lead the way to the
creation of a German African Empire, so, in turn, was that system of
economic-political-strategical lines comprised within the scheme of what
is known as the "Baghdad Railway" designed to ensure the establishment
of a German Middle-Asian Empire, bringing under German control the
entire region from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and providing
convenient stepping-off places from which an advance might be made on
Egypt in the one direction and India in the other.

The conception of this further programme was spread over (1) the period
during which Germany's aspirations were limited to the inheritance of
Turkey's possessions in Asia; and (2) the period when such inheritance
began to be regarded as a means to the realisation of still greater aims
in the domain of Weltpolitik.

For more than half a century Asiatic Turkey has been looked upon as
Germany's Land of Promise. Anatolia was thought a most desirable
territory for her surplus population. The development, under German
influence, of that territory as a whole--especially with a revival
of the Babylonian system of irrigation--was considered to offer vast
possibilities of commercial prosperity. Wheat, cotton and tobacco,
especially, might be raised in prodigious quantities, and there was the
prospect, also, of a petroleum industry rivalling that of Baku itself.
Turkey was a decadent nation, and as soon as "the Sick Man" succumbed
to his apparently inevitable fate--or even before, should circumstances
permit--Germany was ready to step into his shoes.

That these aspirations had, indeed, long been cherished is a fact
capable of ready proof.

In 1848 Wilhelm Roscher, the leading expounder of the historical school
of political economy in Germany, selected Asia Minor as Germany's share
in the Turkish spoils, whenever the division thereof should take place;
and Johann Karl Robertus (1805-1875), the founder of the so-called
scientific socialism in Germany, expressed the hope that he would live
long enough to see Turkey fall into the hands of Germany, and, also, to
see German soldiers on the shores of the Bosporus.

Coming to a more recent period, we find that Dr. Aloys Sprenger, the
German orientalist, published, in 1886, a pamphlet on "Babylonia, the
richest land in the past, and the most promising field for colonisation
in the present,"[75] in which, after dealing with the history, physical
conditions and resources of Babylonia, he predicted that, before the end
of the century, not only Babylonia but Assyria, which was inseparable
from it, would, if not formally annexed, at least come under the control
of some European Power. Assyria and Syria, he declared, were even better
adapted for colonisation than Babylonia. He continued:--

The Orient is the only territory on earth which has not yet
been taken possession of by some aspiring nation. It offers the
finest opportunities for colonisation, and if Germany, taking
care not to let the opportunity slip, should act before the
Cossacks come along, she would, in the division of the world,
get the best share.... The German Kaiser, as soon as a few
hundred thousand armed German colonists bring these promising
fields into cultivation, will have in his hand the fate of Asia
Minor, and he can--and will--then become the Protector of Peace
for the whole of Asia.

Dr. Karl Kaerger, traveller and economist, lamented, in his "Kleinasien;
ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld" (Berlin, 1892), the enormous loss
sustained by Germany in the migration of so many of her people and of so
much capital to Anglo-Saxon lands; but there were, he affirmed, only two
countries to which German settlers could go with any hope of retaining
alike their nationality and their commercial relations with the
_Mutterland_. Those countries were--Africa and Asia Minor. He had been
especially impressed, during the course of his travels, by the prospects
and possibilities of Anatolia, and he recommended the establishment
there of large German companies which would organise schemes of
colonisation and land cultivation on a large scale. The colonies so
established should be self-governing, free from all taxation for ten
years, have the right of duty-free importation of necessaries, and enjoy
various other privileges, while Turkey, in return for the concessions
she thus made to the settlers, would be assured "the protection of
Germany against attack." Not only hundreds of thousands, but millions,
of colonists could find a second home on those wide expanses. Germany
herself would gain a dual advantage--an economical one, and a political
one. Concerning the latter, Dr. Kaerger observed:--

If the German Empire, while maintaining her friendship with
Austria and Italy--which, under all circumstances, the political
situation in Europe undoubtedly requires--can direct the stream
of her emigration to the fertile territories of Turkey, and if
she can conclude with that country a closer customs convention,
then the entire economic, and with it, also, the political
future of Germany will rest on a broader and a firmer basis
than if the present streams of hundreds of thousands of her
people, and millions of capital, continue to pass in increasing
proportions, year by year, to countries which are economically
hostile to us.

Dr. Kaerger was especially concerned lest Germany might be anticipated
by Russia or England in the realisation of her own designs on Asia
Minor. Should, he declared, either of those countries acquire any
further territory from Turkey, or increase in any way Turkey's
dependence upon them, the result would be the most serious disturbance
of the prevailing situation in Europe that had occurred since 1870.

The development of all these ideas went so far that in 1895 the
_Alldeutscher Blätter_ recommended that Germany should establish a
Protectorate over the Turkish possessions in Asia Minor; and in the
following year the _Alldeutscher_ _Verband_ published a manifesto on
"German claims to the Inheritance of Turkey" ("Deutschlands Anspruch an
das türkische Erbe"), making a formal statement of Germany's alleged
rights to the Turkish succession.

Germany had by this time already secured a footing on the soil of
Asiatic Turkey by virtue of the _Anatolian Railway_. The first
section--a length of about seventy miles, extending from Haidar Pacha
(situate on the north-eastern coast of the Sea of Marmara, and opposite
Constantinople) to Ismidt--was built in 1875 by German engineers to
the order of the Turkish Government. It was transferred in 1888 to a
German syndicate, nominees of the Deutsche Bank. Under the powers then
conferred upon them, the syndicate opened an extension, on the east, to
Angora, in 1892, and another, on the south, to Konia, in 1896, the total
length of line being thus increased to 633 miles.

As the result of the visit of the German Emperor to Constantinople in
1898, followed by negotiations between the Porte and the director of
the Deutsche Bank, authority was given to a new German Company--the
Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company--under conventions of 1889,
1902 and 1903, to continue the existing Anatolian Railway from Konia to
the Persian Gulf, via Adana, Nisibin, Mosul and Baghdad. This extension
was to constitute the main line of the _Baghdad Railway_ proper; but the
Company also acquired control over most of the branch railways already
in operation. One of these was the French Smyrna--Afium Karahissar line,
which constitutes the direct trade route between Smyrna and places
served by the Anatolian railway, and has, also, a branch to Panderma, on
the southern shores of the Sea of Marmara. Another was the short line
from Adana to Mersina, giving access to the Mediterranean. This meant
the substitution of German for French interests, while the course taken
by the Anatolia-Baghdad Railway from the Bosporus to Adana shut off the
possibility of an extension of the British line from Smyrna via Aidin to
Egerdir (west of Konia) into the interior.

Then in 1911 the Company acquired the right to build a _new port at
Alexandretta_, with quays, docks, bonded warehouses, etc., and to
construct thence a short line of railway connecting with the Baghdad
main line at Osmanieh, east of Adana. By these means the Germans
acquired the control over, if not an actual monopoly of, the traffic
between one of the most important ports on the eastern sea-board of the
Mediterranean--a port where a trade valued at three and a half million
sterling is already being done--and the vast extent of territory in Asia
Minor designed to be served by the Baghdad Railway.

From Muslimiyeh, a little town on the north of Aleppo, there is a short
branch connecting the Baghdad Railway with the _Hedjaz line_ from
Damascus to Medina, which is eventually to be carried on to Mecca;
while from Rayak, north of Damascus, a branch built in a south-westerly
direction was to be carried to within a short distance of the Egyptian
frontier.

From the junction for the Aleppo branch, the main line was to continue
across the Mesopotamian plain to Baghdad (whence a branch to Khanikin,
on the Persian frontier was projected) and so on to Basra, for the
Persian Gulf.

Thus the scheme for what passes under the title of the Baghdad Railway
embraces three separate and distinct regions of Asiatic Turkey--(1)
Anatolia, (2) Syria and (3) Mesopotamia. In other words, whereas in
their first phase, German aspirations for Turkish territory were based
on the economic advantages of settlement in Anatolia--a region in
itself large enough to accommodate all the Germans who were likely
to want to settle there--in the second phase those aspirations were
based on an extension of the Baghdad Railway towards Egypt in the
one direction and the Persian Gulf in the other. This dual extension
became the more noticeable, also, inasmuch as for the passage of the
Taurus range of mountains a total of nearly 100 miles of blasting and
tunnelling would have to be carried out, the cost of construction on
certain sections of the line rising to between £35,000 and £40,000 a
mile. The extension, therefore, was likely to be a costly business, the
total length of the Baghdad Railway proper, apart from the Anatolian
system, being, as projected, about 1,350 miles, of which, however,
only about 600 miles were, in June, 1915, available for traffic.[76]
Admitting the desirability of opening up Mesopotamia to commercial and
agricultural development, it may, nevertheless, be asked, were there
other motives--and motives to which still greater weight might have been
attached--for this expansion of the earlier designs?

Abdul Hamid's reason for granting the concession is said to have been
that the extension of the line to the Persian Gulf would greatly
strengthen the military position of Turkey, since it would enable her to
effect a speedy transfer of troops between the Bosporus and the Gulf, or
intermediate places, as against the many months that might be occupied
by marching on foot across plains and mountains.

Germany's reasons for seeking to construct the Baghdad Railway, its
branches and connections, to the full extent of the programme laid
down, were, not simply the development of new trade routes, as certain
inspired representations have sought to make the world believe, and not
simply the gain of various other economic advantages, but (1) a desire
to increase German influence over Turkey; to strengthen her military
and other resources with a view to employing them eventually in the
advancement of Germany's own interests; and to ensure the realisation
of that eventual Protectorate over Turkey which would convert the
country into practically a German province; and (2) the furthering
of Germany's aims against Great Britain in the belief that she, too,
was a decadent country whose possessions, when we could no longer
defend them effectively, Germany would be the more likely to secure
for herself if, with a concentration of Turkish forces to assist her,
she were established within striking distance of some of the most
vulnerable points of the British Empire, ready to take instant advantage
of any favourable opportunity that might present itself, whether in a
prospective break-up of that Empire or otherwise.

Of evidence concerning Germany's efforts to obtain increasing influence
over Turkey there is no lack.

We have, in the first place, the fact that in 1882 a German military
mission, of which General the Baron Colmar von der Goltz was the
principal member, undertook the training of the Turkish Army according
to the principles of German military science, with the result that the
Turkish Army became a more efficient instrument for the attainment, not
only of her own aims or purposes, but those, also, of Germany herself.

The Kaiser, although the supreme head of the Lutheran Church, and
although having no Mohammedan subjects of his own, sought to pose as the
champion of Mohammedans in general and the Defender of _their_ Faith.
During his visit to Damascus in November, 1898, he declared--"May the
Sultan, may the three hundred million Mohammedans living who, scattered
throughout the earth, honour in his person their Caliph, rest assured
that at all times the German Kaiser will be their friend."[77]

Whenever political trouble threatened to fall upon Turkey, as the result
of such occurrences as the Armenian and Macedonian atrocities or the
insurrection in Crete, it was Germany who became her champion as against
the other Powers of Europe.

Everything possible was done to push German trade in Turkey and to
establish closer commercial relations with her. There came a time when
every city of importance in the Turkish Empire was declared to be
"overrun with German bankers, German clerks and German bagmen."

Not only, too, were German engineers active in seeking to get
concessions for new railways, and not only were German financiers
equally active in endeavouring to control existing ones, but, as Dr.
Charles Sarolea points out, in his book on "The Anglo-German Problem,"
there are, in the agreements between the Baghdad Railway Company and the
Porte, financial clauses which must ultimately place Turkey entirely at
the mercy of her professed champion. "In Turkey Germany alone would rule
supreme"; and the aspirations for a German Protectorate over Turkey,
with the Sultan as a vassal of Germany, would then be realised.

Writing on the position as he found it in 1903, M. André Chéradame said
in "La Question d'Orient":--

More and more the Germans seem to regard the land of
the Turks as their personal property. All the recent German
literature relating to Turkey affords proof of the tendency. An
ordinary book of travels is entitled, "In Asia Minor, by German
Railways." In his "Pan-Germanic Atlas" Paul Langhams gives a
map of "German Railways in Asia Minor." So it is, indeed, a
matter of the organised conquest of Turkey. Everywhere and in
everything, Turkey is being encircled by the tentacles of the
German octopus.

Coming, next, to the nature of _Germany's aims against England_ and the
part which the Baghdad Railway was to play in their attainment, we have
the frank confessions of Dr. Paul Rohrbach, an authority on the subject
of Germany's Weltpolitik, and a traveller who has paid four visits to
Asia Minor. In "Die Baghdadbahn" (2nd. edition, 1911) he tells us that
Ludwig Ross, a professor at Halle who was well acquainted with Anatolia,
was the first to point to Asia Minor as a desirable place for German
settlement. At the outset economic considerations were alone concerned,
and in Bismarck's day Germany's relations to England played only a minor
rôle in her foreign politics; but in proportion as Germany's interests
were developed and her soil no longer provided sufficient food for her
people or sufficient raw products for her manufactures, she had to look
abroad for the supply of her surplus needs. In so doing, however, her
interests abroad might be endangered by the British Fleet. Hence the
necessity for a German Fleet; and, although the German sea-power might
not be strong enough, by itself, to attack and conquer England, it
could bring certain considerations home to English policy. Dr. Rohrbach
continues:--

If it came to a matter of war with England, it would be for
Germany simply a question of life and death. The possibility
of a successful issue for Germany depends exclusively on one
consideration, namely, on whether or not we can succeed in
bringing England herself into a dangerous position. That end
can in no way be obtained by means of a direct attack across
the North Sea; any idea of a German invasion of England being
possible is a mere phantasy. One must seek, therefore, another
combination in order to assail England at some vulnerable spot;
and here we come to the point where the relations of Germany to
Turkey, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, are found to
be of decisive importance for German foreign policy. There is,
in fact, only one means possible by which Germany can resist a
war of aggression by England, and that is the strengthening of
Turkey.

England can, from Europe, be attacked by land and mortally
wounded only in one place--Egypt. If England were to lose Egypt
she would lose, not only her control over the Suez Canal and her
connexions with India and the Far East, but, presumably, also,
her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of
Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, such as Turkey, might, in addition,
have a dangerous effect on her 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in
India, besides being to her prejudice in Afghanistan and Persia.

Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until
she controls a fully-developed railway system in Asia Minor
and Syria; until, by the extension of the Anatolian Railway to
Baghdad, she can resist an attack by England on Mesopotamia;
until her army has been increased and improved; and until
progress has been made in her general economic and financial
conditions.... The stronger Turkey becomes, the greater will be
the danger for England if, in a German-English conflict, Turkey
should be on the side of Germany; and, with Egypt for a prize,
it certainly would be worth the while of Turkey to run the risk
of fighting with Germany against England. On the other hand the
mere fact that Turkey had increased in military strength, had
improved her economic position, and had an adequate railway
system, would make England hesitate to attack Germany; and this
is the point at which Germany must aim. The policy of supporting
Turkey which is now being followed by Germany has no other
purpose than that of effecting a strong measure against the
danger of war with England.

From other directions, besides, similar testimony was forthcoming.

The Socialist _Liepziger Volkszeitung_ declared in March, 1911, that
"the new situation shortly to be created in Asia Minor would hasten the
break-up of the British Empire, which was already beginning to totter
(schwanken)."

In _Die Neue Zeit_ for June 2, 1911, Herr Karl Radek said:--

The strengthening of German Imperialism, the first success
of which, attained with so much effort, is the Baghdad Railway;
the victory of the revolutionary party in Turkey; the prospect
of a modern revolutionary movement in India, which, of course,
must be regarded as a very different thing from the earlier
scattered risings of individual tribes; the movement towards
nationalisation in Egypt; the beginning of reform in Egypt--all
this has raised to an extraordinary degree the political
significance of the Baghdad Railway question.

The Baghdad Railway being a blow at the interests of English
Imperialism, Turkey could only entrust its construction to the
German Company because she knew that Germany's army and navy
stood behind her, which fact makes it appear to England and
Russia inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey.

In the _Akademische Blätter_ of June 1, 1911, Professor R. Mangelsdorf,
another recognised authority on German policy and politics, wrote:--

The political and military power an organised railway
system will confer upon Turkey is altogether in the interest
of Germany, which can only obtain a share in actual economic
developments if Turkey is independent; and, besides, any attempt
to increase the power and ambition of England, in any case
oppressively great, is thereby effectively thwarted. To some
extent, indeed, Turkey's construction of a railway system is
a threat to England, for it means that an attack on the most
vulnerable part of the body of England's world-empire, namely
Egypt, comes well within the bounds of possibility.

These declarations and admissions render perfectly clear the reasons for
Germany's professions of friendship for Turkey and for her desire that
that country should become stronger and more powerful. They also leave
no doubt as to the real purpose the south-western branch of the Baghdad
Railway was designed to effect. The _conquest of Egypt_ by a combined
German and Turkish force was the first object to be accomplished
with the help of the railway extension to the Egyptian frontier in
one direction and to Mecca in another; but Dr. Rohrbach's suggestion
that the loss of Egypt by England would entail the loss, also, of her
possessions in Central and East Africa has a further bearing on what has
been told in the previous chapter concerning Germany's designs on Africa
as a whole. The strategical railways in German South-West Africa; the
projected extensions thereof--when circumstances permitted; the German
East African lines, _and_ the south-western branch of the Baghdad
Railway in the direction of Egypt were all to play their part in the
eventual creation of a Cape-to-Cairo German-African Empire.

If we now direct our attention to the south-eastern branch of the
Baghdad Railway, we are met by the repeated protests made by Germany
that in desiring the construction of a railway to the _Persian Gulf_
she was influenced solely by commercial considerations. Against these
protests, however, there are to be put various material facts which
leave no room for doubt that Germany's aims in this direction were
otherwise than exclusively economic, while even the economic purposes
which the Baghdad Railway would, undoubtedly, have served must have
eventually led to a strengthening of Germany's political position, this,
in turn, helping her military and strategical purposes.

As originally planned, the port of Basra (the commercial centre of
trade in Mesopotamia, situate, sixty miles from the sea, on the
Shat-el-Arab--the great river formed by the junction of the Tigris and
the Euphrates--and open to the shipping of the world) was to have been
the terminus of the Baghdad Railway; and if commercial considerations
had, indeed, been exclusively aimed at, this terminus would have
answered all requirements.

No objection was, or could be, raised by the British Government to the
construction of the Baghdad Railway, on Turkish territory, as far as
Basra. In the later developments of the scheme, however, Germany and her
Turkish partner sought to ensure the continuation of the line from its
natural commercial terminus, at Basra, to a political and strategical
terminus, at Koweit, on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The _Abendpost_
(Berlin) voiced the German view when it spoke of Koweit as "the only
possible outlet to the Baghdad Railway."

But the extension of an avowedly German line of railway to Koweit would
have been a direct challenge to the paramountcy which Great Britain
claimed over the Persian Gulf. It would have come into collision with
British policy, interests and prestige in the East. It would have
given the German and Turkish allies an excuse for creating at Koweit a
harbour, with wharves, docks, warehouses, etc., which might be converted
into a naval and military base capable of serving far different purposes
than those of trade and commerce--those, namely, of a new line of
advance on _India_. It would, in combination with the control already
exercised by the Deutsche Bank over the railways in European Turkey,
have assured to Germany the means of sending her Naval forces or her
troops, together with supplies and ammunition, direct to the Persian
Gulf, either to strengthen her fleet or to carry out any further designs
she might cherish in the domain of Weltpolitik as affecting the Far
East. It would have meant that, as far as the head of the Persian Gulf,
at least, rail-power would have rendered her less dependent on the
exercise of sea-power, on her own account, and would have enabled her to
neutralise, also, as far as the said Gulf, the sea-power of England.

What so fundamental a change in the strategical position might imply was
well expressed by so eminent and impartial an authority as A. T. Mahan,
when he said, in his "Retrospect and Prospect" (1902):--

The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of
considerable naval potentiality, a "fleet in being" there, based
upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of
Cadiz, Gibraltar and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank
all the routes to the Farther East, to India and to Australia,
the last two actually internal to the Empire, regarded as
a political system; and, although at present Great Britain
unquestionably could check such a fleet, it might well require a
detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength
of her naval position.... Concession in the Persian Gulf,
whether by positive formal arrangement, or by simple neglect
of the local commercial interests which now underlie political
and military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval
situation in the Farther East, her political position in India,
her commercial interests in both, and the Imperial tie between
herself and Australia.

One is thus led to the conclusion that Koweit, as the terminus of
the south-eastern branch of the Baghdad Railway, and within four days
of Bombay, would have been as vital a point for British interests as
the terminus of the south-western branch within about twelve hours of
Egypt; while the possession of this further advantage by Germany would
have been in full accord with the proposition laid down by Rohrbach
and others as to the line of policy Germany should adopt for "bringing
England herself into a dangerous position."

With a view to safeguarding British interests from any possible
drifting into this position, as regards the Persian Gulf, the claim
was raised, some years ago, that England should have entire control
of the railway from Baghdad to Koweit. Germany did not see her way
to assent to this proposal; but in 1911 she announced that she would
forgo her right to construct the section from Baghdad to Basra on the
understanding that this final section would be completed by Turkey.
By way of compensation for the concession thus made by her to British
views, she secured certain financial advantages and the right both to
build the Alexandretta extension and to convert Alexandretta itself into
practically a German port on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The precise value of the "concession" thus made by Germany was, however,
open to considerable doubt. If she could succeed in her long-cherished
aim of establishing a virtual protectorate over Turkey, then the fact
that the final section of the Baghdad Railway had been built by Turkey,
and not by Germany, would have become a matter of detail not likely to
affect the reality of Germany's control. The line to Basra might have
been nominally Turkish but the directing policy would have been German;
and like conditions would have arisen had Great Britain agreed to allow
Turkey--though not Germany--to continue the railway from Basra to Koweit.

In the wide scope of their aggressive purpose, the Baghdad Railway
and its associated lines can best be compared with those roads which
the Romans, in the days of their pride--the pride that came before
their fall--built for the better achievement of their own aims as
world-conquerors. Apart from the fact that the roads now in question are
iron roads, and that the locomotive has superseded the chariot, the main
difference between Roman and German is to be found in the fact that the
world which the former sought to conquer was far smaller than the one
coveted by the latter.

The programme of Weltpolitik comprised in the German schemes embraced
not only countries but continents. In addition to the aspirations
cherished as regards Europe, that programme aimed at the eventual
annexation to the German Empire of three other Empires--the Turkish,
the Indian, and a new one to be known as the German-African. It was
further to secure the means of sending troops direct from Germany via
Constantinople and the Baghdad Railway to the frontiers of Persia
for possible operations against that country in combination with the
Turkish military forces, these having first been brought under German
control. The Baghdad Railway itself was, in the same way, and with like
support, to afford to Germany the means of threatening Russian interests
both in Persia and in Trans-Caucasia. It was to nullify England's sea
power in the Mediterranean, if not, to a certain extent--through the
establishment of a new Power at the gate of India--in the Far East, as
well. It would, as Mahan showed, have flanked our communications with
Australia, giving Germany an advantage in this direction, also, had Asia
and Africa failed to satisfy her aspirations.

Regarded from the point of view of its designed effect on the destinies
of nations, on the balance of political power, and on the reconstruction
of the world's forces--all for the aggrandisement of a single
people--the full programme must be looked upon as the most ambitious and
the most unscrupulous project of world-conquest that has yet been placed
on record in the history of mankind.

For its attainment, however, it clearly depended no less upon
rail-transport than upon force of arms; and in this respect it
represented Germany's greatest attempt to apply, in practice, that
principle of rail-power to which she had devoted eight decades of
inquiry, trial and organisation.

FOOTNOTES:

[75] "Babylonien, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das lohnendste
Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart." 128 pp. Heidelberg, 1886.

[76] Important extensions have been carried out since.

[77] Dr. Dillon, in _The Contemporary Review_, April, 1906.

CHAPTER XXI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As will have been gathered from the preceding chapters, a prolonged
period of consideration, preparation and application in many different
countries throughout the world, prior to the outbreak of the Great
War in 1914, had established certain definite facts and fundamental
principles in regard to the relations of railways to warfare in
general. These may now be brought together and summarised in four
groups or divisions, namely, (A) Advantages; (B) Conditions Essential
to Efficiency; (C) Limitations in Usefulness; and (D) Drawbacks and
Disadvantages.

A.--ADVANTAGES

Assuming (1) the provision, in advance, of a system or systems of
railways capable of meeting all the requirements of the military
situation on the outbreak of war, or (2) the possibility of constructing
military railways during the progress of hostilities, such railways
should permit of--

A mobilisation of troops and their concentration at the frontier, or
at the seat of war, with a speed that was impossible under earlier
conditions.

Simultaneous use of different routes across the national territory
for concentration either on the frontier or at a point some distance
therefrom where the concentration can be completed without fear of
interruption by the enemy.

Sudden invasion of neighbouring territory by troops sent in a succession
of rapidly-following trains direct from various points in the interior
of the country where they might have been concentrated without the
knowledge of the enemy, this procedure being adopted in preference to
collecting at the frontier in advance a force on such a scale as would
disclose prematurely the intentions entertained.

The possibility of using promptly, for these purposes, the full strength
of the country's available resources--the railway lines in the interior
having already been adapted thereto, as well as those on or directly
connecting with the frontier--with a proportionate increase of the
offensive and defensive power of the State.

The supplementing of increased mobility and celerity by decreased
strain on the physical powers of the troops and the avoidance of such
inevitable reduction in their numbers as would result from the trials
and fatigues of prolonged marches by road (in combination with the
carrying of kits, etc.), should railway lines not be available.

A further consequent increase in the fighting strength of the army.

The possible attainment of the power of initiative through an early
concentration of large forces at points of strategic importance either
on national or on enemy's territory.[78]

The carrying out of strategical combinations on a scale or of a
character which would formerly have been impracticable.

Employment of railways for tactical purposes during the progress of
a war, including therein (_a_) movement of troops from one part of
the theatre of war to another, whether with a view to effecting big
changes of front or otherwise; (_b_) employment of the same Army Corps
on different fronts in succession, their transfer being effected in
the briefest possible interval of time; (_c_) the rapid bringing up
of reinforcements at a critical moment to some position exposed to
overpowering attack which might otherwise be lost; (_d_) surprise
attacks on the enemy; (_e_) the throwing of great masses of troops on
distant points; (_f_) strengthening weak places in the fighting line;
(_g_) strengthening threatened forts by means of troops, guns, munitions
or supplies; (_h_) relief of invested fortresses, and (_i_) retirement
by rail--when circumstances permit--of troops after defeat.

Control of a line of rail communication between the base and the
strategic centre of operations, facilitating the enormous amount of
transport in both directions which must be kept up in the rear of the
army, and for which the elements of speed, safety and regularity may be
of vital importance.

The possibility, thanks to railways, of regarding the whole interior of
the national territory as a base for the supply of requirements at the
front, dependence having no longer to be placed on a base established in
one particular district with its restricted range of possible supplies
and its collection of magazines, stores, workshops, transport parks,
etc., protected by fortresses, entrenched camps, or other means of
defence.

The establishment of supplementary, sectional or advanced bases along
the line of communication, with railway services so arranged that
supplies can be dispatched daily in such regulated quantities, and to
such points, as will serve the immediate needs of the army in the field,
without risk either of shortage or of excess.

Avoidance, under these conditions, of congestion of the railway lines
in the immediate rear of the army by trains or loaded wagons containing
a redundancy of supplies which (_a_) cannot be unloaded, (_b_) restrict
the use of the lines for other purposes, and (_c_) might have to be
abandoned to the enemy in the event of a sudden retreat.

Material benefits from the substitution of rail for road transport of
food, etc., by reason of (_a_) greater speed and regularity; (_b_)
less risk of deterioration from exposure to weather, and other causes;
(_c_) decreased cost of transport as compared with earlier conditions
involving the employment of a greater number of drivers, escort,
guards, horses and road vehicles; and (_d_) the arrival at destination
of the full quantities dispatched, the need for the consumption of an
appreciable proportion _en route_ by men and animals in a convoying
wagon train, carrying supplies for long distances by road, being
non-existent.

Reduction in the need for field ovens and other paraphernalia of the
army cook, since much of the food required--bread, for example--can
be prepared in cities or elsewhere at a distant base and forwarded
regularly by rail.

Freedom, more or less complete, from the once prevalent obligation on
the part of an advancing army that it should "live upon the country"--a
condition which the enormous increase in the size of armies to-day would
render impossible of fulfilment, even assuming that the people of the
country invaded had not withdrawn live stock, vehicles and food supplies
on their retirement before the invader.

In addition to this provision for the wants of an army in its advance
into hostile country, the safeguarding of the troops against the risk
of their becoming a band of demoralized marauders, wandering over a
wide area to seek and appropriate food whenever they can find it--as
was the case, for instance, in the Napoleonic wars--the maintenance of
discipline and the continued usefulness of the troops as a concentrated
body for the military purposes in view being further assured when both
men and leaders are relieved of anxiety as to the continuance of their
supplies.

The conduct of war at a great distance from the base by reason of the
facilities offered for the forwarding alike of troops, reinforcements,
supplies and military materials, the value of even a single line of
railway in the achievement of this purpose having been incontestably
established.

Defence of frontiers by strategical railways which may, also, become
available for general use.

Investment of cities or fortresses in occupied territory when, owing to
the lack or the deficiency of food supplies in the surrounding country,
the troops engaged are mainly if not entirely dependent on those brought
to them by rail from their own base.[79]

Victualling of cities before, and their revictualling after,
investment.[80]

Extension of lines of communication by means of quickly-constructed
narrow-gauge siege railways to be operated by motor traction, animal
power, or otherwise, including therein trench tramways for (_a_) removal
of wounded men from the trenches; (_b_) transport of siege guns to
trenches; and (_c_) supplying ammunition to battery.

Transport of heavy siege guns, mortars, ammunition and other materials
of a size or weight that would render impracticable their conveyance,
whether singly or in the aggregate, along ordinary roads, the railway
offering, in this respect, facilities for ponderous transport comparable
to those of the steamship, with the further advantage of being able, in
most instances, to take the guns, etc., to the spot or to the locality
where they are wanted.

Material aid given to expeditions to countries otherwise devoid of means
of communication, by the construction of military railways.

Employment of armoured trains which, apart from their usefulness in
defending railways against attack, may, as movable fortresses, render
important service in the operations against the enemy.

Removal of sick and wounded from the theatre of war, and the ensuring
of their distribution among hospitals in the rear or throughout the
interior, thus (_a_) avoiding alike the embarrassment to the army and
the many dangers and evils that would result from their remaining in
overcrowded hospitals on or near the battle-field; (_b_) giving the men
a better chance of effecting a speedy recovery and returning soon to
the ranks; and (_c_) adding to the fighting strength of the army by the
combination of these two advantages.

Facilities for giving a short leave to officers and men who, though
neither sick nor wounded, have been so far affected by their strenuous
exertions that they stand in need of a rest, or change, for which they
will fight all the better subsequently.

Dispatch of prisoners of war into the interior by trains which have
brought reinforcements or supplies, the army thus being speedily
relieved of what might otherwise be a hindrance to its operations.

Return of material no longer wanted at the front and constituting
impedimenta of which it is desirable to get rid as soon as possible.

Conveyance into the interior of "trophies of war"--including
plunder--taken from captured towns or cities.

Retirement of troops from occupied territory on the declaration of peace.

B.--CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EFFICIENCY

In the matter of railway construction there should be--

i. Uniformity of gauge, together with physical connections between the
different systems or sections, in order (_a_) that the locomotives and
rolling stock on any one line can be used for military transport on
any other; (_b_) that mobilisation, concentration and the forwarding
of supplies and military material can be facilitated by the running of
through trains from any probable or possible point of dispatch; and
(_c_) that troops can readily be transferred from one front, or from one
part of the coast, to another for the purpose either of attack or of
defence.

ii. Lines linking up the interior of the country with the frontier, with
the coast, or with principal ports by different routes, transverse lines
connecting them, in turn, one with another.

iii. Double track for all lines leading direct to the frontier.

iv. In the case of single-track lines crossing continents or otherwise,
a liberal provision of passing places each capable of accommodating the
longest troop train likely to be run.

v. On all lines, and at all important stations, a sufficiency of
sidings, with provision of, or the possibility of providing speedily,
all such facilities as may be needed for the prompt and efficient
handling of military transports whenever the occasion should arise.

Preparations in advance should include--

i. The carrying out of a scheme of organisation based on recognition
of the following principles:--(_a_) That, while the railway is an
instrument capable of rendering great and even incalculable services in
the conduct of war, the working of it is a highly-skilled business only
to be entrusted to those possessed of the necessary experience; (_b_)
that interference with such working on the part of military officers
not possessing the requisite technical knowledge of the details and
limitations of railway operation may result in chaos and disaster; (_c_)
that railwaymen, in turn, are not likely to be fully acquainted with the
technicalities of military conditions and requirements, and should not,
in any case, be left with the responsibility of having to decide between
the possibly conflicting demands of various military authorities;
(_d_) that, for these reasons, there should be co-ordination of the
military and the technical railway elements, operating throughout
the whole scheme of organisation in its manifold details, avoiding
conflict of authority, ensuring harmony of working, and offering the
fullest guarantee that all military requirements will be met so far as
the capacity of the railway, together with a due regard for safe and
efficient operation, will allow; and (_e_) that effect can best be given
to these various conditions by the appointment of intermediary bodies
which, representing the dual elements, shall alone have power to give
directions, or to make demands, in respect to military rail-transport
during the continuance of war.

ii. Collection of data concerning the physical character, resources and
transport capabilities of the railways both in the national territory
and in any other country to which the war operations may extend.

iii. Study of all movements of troops, etc., likely to be necessary
on the outbreak of war; the preparation of special time-tables for the
running of troop trains, etc., and the working out of all essential
details respecting military transport in general.

iv. Creation and training of bodies of Railway Troops qualified to
undertake the construction, destruction, repair and operation of
railways in time of war.

C.--LIMITATIONS IN USEFULNESS

The usefulness of railways in war is limited by the following
considerations, among others:--

Railways are "inferior to ships in power of simultaneously transporting
heavy loads" (Von der Goltz). For this reason an overland route to
India could never compete, in respect to military transport, with
the sea route via the Suez Canal. Such overland route, also, passing
through foreign countries, would be especially liable to attack and
interruption. Where, however, the overland route goes entirely through
national territory (as in the case of the Trans-Siberian Railway), and
when the questions of time and safety, in regard to an alternative sea
route, suggest possible disadvantages, railways will be preferred to
ships in spite of the said inferiority.

Railways are inferior to roads in so far as, like rivers and canals,
they are on fixed spots. Troops depending on them are thus able to
move only in the direction in which lines have been or can quickly be
laid, whereas if they went by road they might have a greater choice of
alternative routes.

For these reasons the choice of the zone of concentration or of the
"decisive points" may depend less to-day on political, military or
geographical reasons (as in the Napoleonic wars) than on the direction,
extent and capacity of the available railways.

Great masses of troops can be entrained only at stations where
facilities for their so doing have been prepared in advance. The
provision of these facilities is even more necessary in the case of
Cavalry or Artillery than in that of Infantry. Hence the movement of
considerable bodies of troops may be restricted to certain lines, and
their entrainment or detrainment even to certain large stations. In the
case of road marching these restrictions would not apply.

Vehicles specially constructed for the purpose can alone be used on
railways. Any deficiency in their supply must needs cause delay.

During the time the troops are travelling by railway their power of
resisting attack is much more restricted than it would be if they were
marching by road, they can do little or nothing to protect the railway
lines, while if the enemy can only get to the railway he may be in a
position to prevent the train from continuing its journey, and take the
troops in it at a disadvantage.

For these reasons, among others, troop movements by rail at the theatre
of war, and especially in the enemy's country, are attended by a degree
of risk which may render it desirable to abandon the use of the railway
for the time being.

Railways are especially liable to destruction by the enemy, and,
although the arrangements made in advance may permit of speedy repairs
or reconstruction, the interruption of traffic for even a day or half a
day may be a matter of grave importance during the concentration of the
army or at some critical moment.

Destructions of line carried out by a retreating force, in order to
delay pursuit by the enemy, will be to the disadvantage of that force
when, after having driven back the enemy, it would itself make use of
the line it had rendered unserviceable.

Dependence on the railway for the transport of considerable bodies
of troops on short journeys--say for twenty, twenty-five or thirty
miles--is rendered inexpedient by the fact that, when allowance is made
for the time likely to be taken, not only on the journey, but in the
assembling at the station, in the entraining and detraining (perhaps at
some place devoid of adequate platform or siding accommodation), and in
the march from the arrival station to destination, it may well be found
that the troops could cover the distance in less time by road, apart
from the consideration, suggested above, as to their being in a better
position, when marching, to resist attack. Experts in all countries
have studied this question with a view to deciding, on the basis of
their national conditions, within what limit it would be better for
troops to march by road in preference to going by rail.

For reasons akin to those here stated, supplemented by the recent great
expansion of motor transport, less has been heard of late concerning the
proposed construction in this country of strategical railways along a
coast-line remarkable for its sinuosities, and presenting, therefore, an
exceptional position from the point of view of coast railways for purely
defensive purposes.

As regards long-distance journeys, whilst armies marching by road have
often been materially reduced in proportions by the number of men
falling out owing to lameness, exhaustion, or other causes, those who
reached the theatre of war, representing "the survival of the fittest,"
were better able to endure the trials and fatigues of the subsequent
campaign than if they could have made the journey by rail under
conditions involving no strain, but affording them no such exercise and
strengthening of their physical powers.[81]

Experience has further shown that exceptionally long railway journeys
may have a prejudicial effect upon troops from the point of view, also,
of maintenance of discipline.[82]

The services rendered by railways in war relate much more to strategy
than to tactics. Great masses of troops and munitions, brought from
all parts of the interior, may be conveyed readily and safely by rail
to particular points in the theatre of war; but the possibility of
effecting their transport by rail from one point to another on the
battle-field when the opposing forces are in actual contact is subject
to many restrictions and constitutes a much more difficult undertaking.

The imperative need for guarding a long line of railway communications,
more especially in occupied territory, may lead to the withdrawal of a
considerable number of men from the main army, weakening the strength of
the available fighting force proportionately.

D.--DRAWBACKS AND DISADVANTAGES

While, notwithstanding the conditions to be observed and the limitations
to be experienced, the balance of advantage conferred by railways on the
conduct of war may appear so pronounced, from a military and a political
point of view, there is a darker side to the story, as regards the world
at large, which must also be taken into account.

If railways have increased the power of defending a country against
invasion they have, also, increased enormously the power of aggression
at the command of an invader.

They offer vastly greater facilities to military Powers for the making
of sudden attacks on neighbouring countries--themselves, it may be, in a
state of more or less unpreparedness.

They afford the opportunity for overwhelming weaker Powers by means
of armies mobilised and concentrated in the interior and poured on to
or across the frontier in an endless succession of trains following
one another with such rapidity that the initial movement may, in some
instances, be carried out within the short space of twenty-four hours.

They permit of the prosecution of war at distances which, but for
the means offered for military transport by rail, would render war
impracticable.

They allow of war being carried on between a number of nations at one
and the same time, thus spreading the area over which the conflicts of
to-day may extend.

They encourage the cherishing of designs of world-power and dreams of
universal conquest.

They have added to the horrors of war by facilitating the transport and
the employment of the most terrible engines of war.

They have rendered possible the carrying off of plunder from an occupied
territory to an extent which would be impossible if the invaders had to
depend on ordinary road vehicles for their means of transport.

They have brought fresh risks and dangers upon civil populations,
the maintenance of lines of rail communication being a matter of
such paramount importance to an invader that the severest measures
may be adopted by him towards the community in general as a means of
terrorising them and ensuring the security of the railway lines.

What, in effect, count as "advantages" in one direction may be the
gravest of disadvantages in another.

* * * * *

Such, for attack or for defence, for good or for evil, is the nature,
and such are the possibilities, of that rail-power in warfare which,
after eighty years of continuous evolution, was, in the War of the
Nations imposed on mankind in 1914, to undergo a development and an
application on a wider, more impressive, and more terrible scale than
the world had ever seen before.

FOOTNOTES:

[78] Von Moltke is reported to have said on one occasion in the
Reichstag: "Our Great General Staff is so much persuaded of the
advantages to be derived from obtaining the initiative at the outset
of a war that it prefers to construct railways rather than forts. An
additional railway, crossing the whole country, makes a difference of
two days in the assembling of the army, and advances the operations
proportionately." "In the concentration of armies," says von der Goltz
in "The Conduct of War," "we reckon almost by hours."

[79] "Without railroads, it is said, the siege of Paris would have been
impossible" (Bigelow's "Principles of Strategy"). "During the siege
of Paris one railway for some time fed the [German] army of, in round
numbers, 200,000 men, brought up the siege materials and reinforcements
averaging 2,000 to 3,000 men a day, and even, at one time, fed Prince
Frederick Charles' army, as well, with very slight assistance from the
exhausted theatre of war" (Hamley's "Operations of War").

[80] During the thirty-five days preceding the investment, Paris
received by the Western Railway, alone, 72,442 tons of provisions and
67,716 head of cattle. But for these supplies she could not have endured
so long a siege. In the revictualling of Paris, after the siege, the
railways, though much restricted by the Germans, brought into the city,
in the course of twenty days, 155,955 tons of provisions and 42,580 head
of cattle.

[81] "The railways spare the troops fatigue," remarks Lieut.-Col.
Tovey, R.E., in "The Elements of Strategy"; "but it may be that when
they have to use their legs afterwards there will be more falling out
and lagging behind, in consequence." Balck, in his "Taktik," says: "It
is only in respect to the important consideration as to speed that the
rail-transport of troops is to be preferred to road-marching. The real
advantages of marching on foot--which was formerly the rule, and had
the effect of 'separating the chaff from the wheat' and of preparing
the men for the toils of fighting--are not counterbalanced by the fact
that the troops arrive at the theatre of war in their full numbers.
When time permits, marching on foot is preferable because it accustoms
the men both to their new equipment and to marching in large bodies.
After a long railway journey--on which the feet will have swollen and
the new boots will have been especially troublesome--marching becomes
particularly irksome, and the falling out of footsore men is very
considerable. It is, nevertheless, the almost invariable rule that the
troops shall begin their marching immediately they get to the end of
the rail journey, since it may be a matter of great importance that
the station at which they detrain should be cleared again as soon as
possible."

[82] In alluding to the conditions under which Russian reinforcements
were sent to Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, General Kuropatkin
writes ("The Russian Army and the Japanese War"): "In former days troops
had to make long marches in full service order before they reached the
battle-field. If properly conducted these marches hardened the men, and
enabled units to settle down; all superfluous luggage was discarded;
the weaker men were left behind; the officers and men got to know one
another. But, nowadays, with railway transport, the results are very
different. Going to the Far East, our men were crowded in railway
carriages for as long as forty days at a time, out of the control of
their officers, who were in different compartments. In the old and
well-disciplined units in particular no harm was done; but in the case
of newly-formed units ... it was most harmful."

Appendix

INDIAN FRONTIER RAILWAYS

On the north-west frontier of India the plains of the Punjab are
separated from the great central valley of Afghanistan, from the deserts
of Baluchistan, and from the Russian Empire on the north thereof, by
ranges of mountains, otherwise "a gridiron of stupendous ridges and
furrows," intersected by passes which have always been regarded as the
most vulnerable points of the Indian Empire. Through these passes from
the earliest days of recorded history there has come a long succession
of invasions instigated by that incalculable wealth of India which may
well have inspired the envy of dwellers in less favoured lands.[83]

These considerations would alone suffice to establish the need for an
effective control of the more important of the said passes by the Power
which exercises supremacy in India; but the obligation thus devolving
upon the British people as the present holders of that supremacy has
been increased in recent times by two further factors--(1) troubles
with frontier tribes; and (2) the development of that Central Asian
Question which, though now no longer acute, was, not so many years
ago, a source of great anxiety in England and India. Frontier troubles
gave rise to a number of expeditions to Afghanistan from time to time,
while the gravity of the general situation was increased by the once
steady advance of Russia towards India--whether for the purposes of
actual conquest thereof or, alternatively, for the attainment of the aim
cherished by Russia during three centuries for an outlet to a southern
sea, such outlet being sought via the Persian Gulf on her disappointment
in regard to the Dardanelles; though British interests were concerned in
either case.

This combination of circumstances, with the possibility, at one
time, that Afghanistan might become the theatre of war in a conflict
between two great European Powers, invested with special interest and
importance the provision on the north-west frontier of India of railway
lines which, whether constructed to the more important passes or going
actually through them, would form a ready means of concentrating
Anglo-Indian troops at such places on the frontier, or beyond, as
occasion might require.

From this point of view the Bolan and Khyber passes--the former leading
to Quetta and Kandahar and the latter to Kabul--have more especially had
importance attached to them as "the two gates of India."

Proposals for constructing railways through them were advanced as early
as 1857, when Mr. (afterwards Sir) W. P. Andrew, chairman of the Sind,
Punjab and Delhi Railway, acted as spokesman of a deputation which
waited on Lord Palmerston in order to urge the construction of (1) a
railway down the valley of the Euphrates, improving our communications
with India by connecting the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf;
and (2) railways through the Bolan and Khyber passes, not only, as
he urged, facilitating the movement of troops to the frontier, but
offering alternative routes by means of which the flank or the rear
of an enemy operating beyond or between the limits of the two lines
might be threatened. Mr. Andrew followed up with great earnestness and
perseverance for many years his advocacy of these views, publishing a
succession of books and pamphlets, and writing many letters to the Press
on the subject.

Such advocacy had, however, no practical issue, and, though the
arguments originally advanced in favour of the Euphrates railway lost
most of their force on the opening of the Suez Canal, the consequences
of the neglect to provide better means of communication with the
north-west frontier were well manifested in the troubles of 1878-79-80.

The refusal of the Ameer of Afghanistan--who had already accorded an
ostentatious welcome to a Russian Embassy at Kabul--to receive a British
mission led, in 1878, to an order being given for the advance of three
columns of British forces upon Afghan territory, the routes selected for
this purpose being (1) the Khyber Pass, (2) the Kuram Pass, and (3) the
Bolan Pass. At this time, however, the system of frontier railways which
had been advocated so long scarcely existed except on paper. The nearest
point of railway communication with Afghanistan was then at Sukkur, on
the Indus. An extension across the Sind desert to the entrance to the
Bolan Pass had been surveyed, and a very short section had been laid;
but in their advance on Kandahar Sir Donald Stewart and his force had to
march all the way from the Indus, experiencing great trials in crossing
the intervening desert, where many of the men lost their lives. The
work of constructing this desert railway--which presented no engineering
difficulty--was now taken actively in hand, and the line was available
for the troops on their return.

Success attended the expedition of 1878 so far as it led to the flight
of Shere Ali, the occupation of Kandahar by Sir Donald Stewart, the
control by the British of the three main highways between India and
Afghanistan, and the signing of the treaty of Gandamak; but the murder
of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his staff at Kabul, in September, 1879,
rendered necessary the sending of a further expedition, General Sir
Frederick (afterwards Lord) Roberts being directed to proceed with a
British force by the Kuram route to Kabul.

Thereupon the whole question of transport facilities was revived afresh,
and, although the expedition itself was a conspicuous success, delays
and commissariat difficulties arose which might have been avoided had
better railway facilities been available.[84] The terminus, at that
time, of the Punjab State Railway was at Jhelum, seventy miles from
Rawal Pindi, 180 from Peshawar, and 260 from Thal, the frontier post of
the Kuram pass; and in spite of the vigorous efforts made, between 1878
and 1880, to extend the line, Jhelum remained the actual railway base
throughout, no material assistance being gained from the twenty miles of
extension which, owing to the great engineering difficulties presented
by innumerable ravines, could alone be carried out during that period.
Commenting on the "painfully slow" progress being made by the Khyber
column, _The Times_ of October 13, 1879, remarked:--

It is now upwards of a quarter of a century since the
chairman of the Sind railway commenced to broach the idea
of connecting the Khyber and Bolan passes with the railway
system of India. For more than a quarter of a century he
has unsparingly advocated these views.... Had the views so
persistently advocated by Mr. Andrew, and so repeatedly brought
forward by us, been adopted at the commencement of the struggle
last October, as we then ventured to insist upon, vast sums
would have been spared in the hire of transport, and we should
have been spared the ignominy of feeling that a British army,
nominally on active service, has occupied five weeks in covering
less than seventy miles.

Rawal Pindi--one of the most important strategical points in India--was
not reached by the railway until October, 1880, by which time the Afghan
War of 1878-80 had been brought to a close; and the further extension of
the Indian railway system to Peshawar,--another position of the utmost
strategic importance, situate ten miles from the entrance to the Khyber
Pass, and 190 from Kabul--was effected by May, 1883.

From a military point of view, however, still greater importance was
attached, at that time, to the securing of rail communication through
the Bolan Pass to Quetta and Pishin in the direction of Kandahar, this
being the route by which, it was thought, the Russians would be certain
to attempt their invasion of India,--if they should undertake one at all.

Surveys for an extension of the Sukkur-Sibi desert line to Pishin were
made whilst that line was under construction, and early in 1880 the
Government gave directions that the extension was to be proceeded with;
though they decided that the route to be taken from Sibi should be
through the Hurnai Pass in preference to the Bolan route, the former
being regarded as preferable for the broad-gauge line (5 ft. 6 in.) with
which the "Kandahar State Railway," as it was to be called, would be
provided.

Arrangements were at once made for collecting the necessary materials
and for carrying through the work with the least possible delay; but
further progress was checked, in July, 1880, by the disaster at Maiwand.
In the following October the Gladstone Government, who had succeeded
the Beaconsfield Administration and had, apparently, resolved upon a
complete reversal of the Indian policy of their predecessors, followed
up an earlier announcement of their intention to withdraw from Kandahar
by giving orders for the cessation of the work on the Sind-Pishin
railway. Maiwand having been avenged, and some refractory tribes
subdued, Afghanistan was completely evacuated by the British at the end
of April, 1881, and the construction of frontier railways in India was
dropped, for the time being.

In the middle of 1883 came a reconsideration of the position. Russia
was then showing increased activity in the direction of Merv, and
the British Government concluded, apparently, that they had been too
hasty in ordering the abandonment of the Kandahar State Railway scheme
nearly three years before. So they gave orders that the work should be
resumed; though, in order to render this _volte face_ on their part less
conspicuous, they directed that the undertaking should now be known only
as the "Hurnai Road Improvement Scheme"; that it should be proceeded
with quietly, in order that it might not attract too much attention,
and that the suggestion of a "road improvement scheme," instead of
a railway, should be kept up by the engineers not being allowed to
have even a temporary line of rails for conveying stores, materials
for bridges, etc., from the base to the passes. This last-mentioned
stipulation meant that the stores and materials had to be either
transported on the backs of camels or dragged on wheels up stream; and
it was estimated that, in addition to the great loss of time, a sum
of not less than £1,000,000 was wasted in this way before the order
prohibiting the use of temporary rails was rescinded.

A start was made with the work in October, 1883, and the fact that
the Russians were then actually approaching Merv, and that a sudden
advance by them in force was regarded as probable, led to the laying of
great emphasis on the need for construction being pushed on with the
utmost vigour. When, in February, 1884, the Russians did occupy Merv,
the pressure brought to bear on the Engineer-in-chief became still
more acute. Then, in May, the British Government formally announced
that, owing to the encroachments of Russia, the line _would_ be built.
The fiction of a "Hurnai Road Improvement Scheme" was now abandoned.
Henceforth the line under construction was to be known as "The
Sind-Pishin State Railway."

From the very outset, however, the difficulties which crowded upon
Colonel (afterwards Sir James) Browne, R.E., an officer well experienced
in railway and engineering work who was entrusted with the carrying
out of the scheme, were unfavourable to the prospects of speed in
construction. The surveys which had already been made were found not
only worthless but misleading. The first members of his staff were
unacquainted with railway work and had to be succeeded by men brought
from England. The plant and materials previously collected, but disposed
of at scrap-iron prices when the line was abandoned in 1880, had now to
be replaced at an almost fabulous cost, owing to the urgency of the need
for them.

All these were, nevertheless, minor troubles as compared with the
physical conditions to be overcome.

Starting from an elevation, at Sibi, of 300 ft., the line was to rise
6,200 ft. in the 120 miles between Sibi and the summit level at Kach.

Then, for the greater part of the 224 miles to which the line was to
extend, the country was a wilderness of rocks and stones--a land of
barrenness and desolation, where there was no timber, no fuel, scarcely
a blade of grass, and, in places, for stretches of several miles, no
water. It was a land, too, almost devoid of inhabitants, while those
who did dwell there were described as "a savage and blood-thirsty race
of robbers," continually engaged in plunder and inter-tribal warfare,
and not growing sufficient food even for their own consumption. Almost
everything that was wanted--including supplies for from 15,000 to 30,000
workers and materials for the line--had to be imported from a distance.

Still less inviting was this inhospitable region by reason of its range
of climatic conditions. The lowlands have the reputation of being one of
the hottest corners of the earth's surface. A temperature of 124 deg.
Fahr. has been registered in the Nari valley. The highlands, in turn,
offer the alternative of Arctic cold, the temperature there falling in
winter to 18 deg. below zero. Between the lowlands and the highlands
there is a temperate zone; but here the constant pestilence was dreaded
no less than the extremes of heat and cold elsewhere.

As the result of these conditions, the work of construction could be
carried on in certain districts for part of the year only, and the
workers had to be transferred from one section of the line to another
according to the season. Such a movement of front involved the transport
of everything,--stores, tools, offices and some thousands of men. "The
management of this vast exodus," says Captain Scott-Moncrieff, R.E.,
in his paper on "The Frontier Railways of India,"[85] "was a work of
considerable anxiety and difficulty. A sudden influx of people, such
as this, into a desolate and barren land naturally caused a famine.
Everything was eaten up, and for some days the question of supplies was
the burning question of the hour.... Nine hundred camel loads of food
were consumed daily on the works." The customary load for a camel was
400 lbs., but some of the camels carried loads of 800 lbs. up the pass.

The engineering difficulties fell into four principal groups,--(1) the
Nari Gorge; (2) the Gundakin Defile; (3) the Chuppur Rift, and (4) the
Mud Gorge.[86]

The Nari Gorge, about fourteen miles in length, beginning just beyond
Sibi, has been described as "one of the most weird tracks through which
a railway has ever been carried. The hills, absolutely bare, rise above
the valley for many thousands of feet in fantastic pinnacles and cliffs.
It is a scene of the wildest desolation." The Nari river, running
through the gorge, is formed by a combination of three streams having
but little water on ordinary occasions, but becoming, in time of flood,
a raging torrent which fills up the whole gorge for miles, attains a
depth of ten feet, and has a velocity of five feet per second. Over
this river the railway had to be carried in five different places. Not
alone bridges, but heavy embankments, cuttings and tunnels were needed.
At one point there was an especially dangerous tunnel in which so many
accidents occurred, owing to roof or sides falling in, that at last no
workmen would enter it except at a wage five-fold that of the high rate
already being paid. The whole work was liable to be stopped for months
together, owing to the washing away of half-completed embankments or
bridges; though until this portion of the line had been completed no
materials could be sent to the sections beyond.

In the Gundakin Defile, eight miles long, two tunnels had to be made
through some most treacherous material, and four bridges had to be
provided.

The Chuppur Rift is a chasm three miles long in the spurs of a rocky
mountain forming an apparently insuperable barrier. In time of floods
the river attains a height of from 30 to 40 ft. The running of the
railway on a ledge along the side of the mountain being impracticable,
owing to the nature of the rock, the engineers cut a line of continuous
tunnels partly on one side of the rift and partly on the other,
connecting the two series by an iron girder bridge; but, instead of
constructing the tunnels in the usual way, from each end--a procedure
which would have taken much time--they adopted the expedient of driving
openings (adits) into the side of the cliff at various points, and then
cutting the tunnel right and left of each of these openings until the
various sections met. The only way in which the openings could be made
was by lowering men down by ropes several hundred feet from the top of
the cliff until they reached the point where the work for an opening was
to be started. They then drove crowbars into the perpendicular sides of
the cliff in order to gain the necessary support for a platform from
which the blasting operations could be carried on. Six of these openings
were made on one side of the cliff and six on the other. As a separate
gang of men could operate at each it was possible to complete the whole
work in the course of a few months. Altogether there is a collective
length of 6,400 ft. of tunnels in the rift, in addition to a viaduct
75 ft. high, with seven spans of 40 ft. each, and a bridge having an
elevation over the river of 250 ft., and consisting of a central span of
150 ft. and eight spans of 40 ft.

On the summit level, twenty-five miles in length, came the five-mile
long Mud Gorge,--a narrow valley, between precipitous mountains, filled
with a soil little better than dried mud, and of such a character that
several bad slips of road-bed, carrying away the whole of the line,
occurred.

One would think that with all these difficulties--physical, climatic and
engineering--to face, the constructors of the railway might have been
excused any more; but there were others besides.

In August and September, 1884, the troops and native labourers employed
on the work on the lower part of the line were visited by an outbreak
of fever and scurvy of a virulence almost unprecedented in Indian
experience. Large numbers of the men died. In one gang of 200 the
average number of deaths was ten a day. Of those who survived the
majority were so prostrated as to be scarcely capable of doing anything.
Sixty per cent. of the Sappers were in hospital.

Fresh troops, to the extent of three Battalions of Pioneers, were
brought on to the work; but they had scarcely arrived before--in
November--there was a severe outbreak of cholera. The Afghans thereupon
"bolted to a man"; and they were followed by many skilled artisans who
had been collected from various parts of India. Additional labour had to
be obtained from the Eastern Punjab, but much time was lost.

Whilst the engineers were struggling to overcome these manifold
difficulties, the political situation was steadily becoming still more
acute. The climax seemed to be reached by the Penj-deh incident of
March 30, 1885, when a Russian force under General Komaroff seized this
important strategical position, situate near the junction of the Khushk
and Murghab rivers. On April 27, 1885, Mr. Gladstone proposed in the
House of Commons a vote of £11,000,000 for the purposes of what then
seemed to be an inevitable war with Russia. The money was voted the same
night.

So the urgency for completing the line which would now, probably, have
been available for use had it not been stopped in 1880, was greater
than ever. Orders were sent to India that the work must be continued
along all parts of the line regardless of seasons. Within a week or two,
however, of the war vote at Westminster, cholera broke out afresh among
the construction party in India. By the end of May it was spreading
among them "like a raging fire"; while to the cholera itself there was
added a heat so intense that even the most willing of workers found it
almost unendurable.

Under this combination of cholera and excessive heat, work on the lower
sections of the line was stopped altogether for a time--Government
orders and Russians notwithstanding. All possible measures were taken to
mitigate the severity of the epidemic; but the death-rate increased with
frightful rapidity. Some of the best workers, European and Asiatic--men
who could least be spared, on account of the responsible positions they
held--were carried off. During the month of June no fewer than 2,000
died out of 10,000. Of the remainder large numbers sought safety in
flight. Many of the minor Government officials, such as telegraph and
Post Office clerks, went off in a body.

Whilst sickness and disease had thus been afflicting the camps, fresh
troubles had arisen in another direction. Early in 1885 the district
was visited by a succession of floods exceeding in severity anything
known there for sixty years. In the course of three months the rainfall
amounted to 19.27 inches,--a total six times in excess of the average.
Several bridges and many miles of temporary roads were washed away;
numerous accidents were caused; camping grounds were destroyed;
communications were interrupted; food supplies became scarcely
obtainable, and great delay resulted in the prosecution of a work for
which urgency was being so persistently demanded. The floods did not
finally subside until the end of May.

Nature having done so much to impede the progress of the undertaking,
it only remained for politicians and officials to do what they could to
follow her example.

Mention has already been made of the initial prohibition of temporary
lines of rails for the conveyance of stores and materials, and the
loss of time and waste of money involved in the use of camels instead;
but to this one fact may be added another, namely, that after the
Engineer-in-Chief had made his arrangements to obtain sleepers from the
juniper forests on the north of the line--this being the only timber
available in the whole district--the Government vetoed the arrangement
on the ground that it might, possibly, lead to quarrels among the Afghan
tribes. The timber had to be procured from India, instead. Hence more
delay.

Then the original arrangement with the Engineer-in-Chief, that the
work was to be carried out under the Military Department of the Indian
Government, and that, in the interests of urgency, he should have a
free hand, was changed into one which required that the work should
be controlled by a new member of the Public Works Department, who, it
is alleged, interfered with many of the working details which should
have been left to an Engineer-in-Chief, and, by his "unskilled and
unqualified control," caused still further delay, together with much
expense and confusion. A good deal of time was lost, for instance,
before Col. Browne could get even some indispensable instruments and
survey appliances. Especially persistent, also, was Col. Browne's
immediate superior in demanding from him "detailed estimates" which,
on account of the uncertainties of the engineering work and of the
other factors in the situation, it was impossible to prepare whilst the
construction of the line was in progress.

Such, however, was the energy which had been shown, in spite of all
these difficulties and drawbacks, that the work was completed within the
two years and a half fixed by the Engineer-in-Chief at the start as the
period in which--"with money freely granted"--it could be done. On March
27, 1887, an engine ran over the line all the way from Sibi to Quetta,
and the Hurnai Railway was formally declared open for traffic.

In the meantime the apparent certainty of war with Russia, following,
especially, on her seizure of Penj-deh, had led, in April, 1885, to
an order being given for the construction of a light railway from
Sibi through the Bolan Pass to Quetta, as an alternative, more direct
and more quickly constructed route, of which use could be made for
a movement of troops to the frontier on the anticipated partial
mobilisation of the Indian Army.

The laying of this light railway constituted another notable engineering
achievement.

Running through the heart of what has been described as "some of the
boldest mountain scenery in India," the Bolan Pass has a length of about
sixty miles and a breadth ranging from one mile to a space, in places,
of only about twenty yards between the rugged mountain walls which here
convert the pass into a mere defile. The pass is, in fact, practically
the bed of the Bolan River, and is dry for the greater part of the
year, but liable to floods. The temporary narrow-gauge line was to be
laid along the river bed without interfering with the military road
constructed in 1882-84 as far as Quetta.

For the first forty miles there was a fairly good gradient; but beyond
that came a very heavy rise to the top of the pass; and here, at least,
anything more than a metre-gauge line would have been impracticable.
The possibility of constructing a line of railway through the pass at
all had long been the despair of engineers, and this was the reason why
the Hurnai route had been decided on in preference to the Bolan for the
broad-gauge line to Quetta. Unfortunately, too, the climatic were even
greater than the engineering difficulties. The heat in the lower parts
of the pass was "beyond all description," and cholera or other diseases
carried off thousands of the workers.

With these two lines at their disposal, the Government were, in the
spring of 1887, quite prepared for a concentration of British and
Indian forces in Afghanistan, had the political condition rendered such
a course necessary; but the situation had by then greatly improved,
thanks to the negotiations which had been proceeding with Russia for
the demarcation of frontiers. In April, 1877, the British and Russian
commissioners met at St. Petersburg, and, as the result of still further
negotiations, the questions at issue were settled without the appeal to
arms which had at one time appeared inevitable.

In 1892 some fifty miles of the Bolan light railway were abandoned in
favour of another route which, avoiding the first part of the pass,
allowed of a broad-gauge line being laid from Sibi through Quetta
to Bostan Junction, where it connects with what is now known as the
Hurnai-Pishin Loop. A branch ninety miles in length, from Quetta to
Mushki, on the Seistan trade route, was opened in 1905.

To-day the Sind-Pishin railway, with its two sections, via the Bolan
and the Hurnai respectively, has its terminus at New Chaman, on the
actual frontier of Afghanistan, and within seventy miles of Kandahar.
A broad-gauge line throughout, it forms part of the railway system of
India, linking up at Ruk junction with the line running thence along the
north bank of the Indus to Karachi, and, by means of a bridge across the
Indus, with a line on the south of the river which, in one direction
provides an alternative route to Karachi, and in the other connects with
Calcutta and other leading cities. The Sind-Pishin line affords, in
fact, a most valuable means for concentrating on the Afghan frontier,
within a short distance of Kandahar, and in the shortest possible time a
considerable body of troops collected from all parts of India, together
with reinforcements from Europe, landed at Karachi. As a strategical
line, therefore, the railway is of exceptional importance to India and
to British interests in general; though there can be no suggestion that
it would be used otherwise than for purely defensive purposes.

Then, in what, since 1901, has constituted the North-West Frontier
Province of India, there has been a considerable extension of frontier
railways in recent years,--all serving important strategical purposes.
From Peshawar--1,520 miles from Calcutta--there is a broad-gauge
extension, twelve miles in length, to Fort Jamrud, at the mouth of the
Khyber Pass; from Naushahra, a cantonment twenty-seven miles due east
of Peshawar, there is a narrow-gauge line to Dargai, at the foot of
the Malakand Pass; while among other lines is one to Thal, a military
outpost on the extreme limit of British territory which serves also as a
depôt for the trade with Northern Afghanistan passing through the Kurram
valley; and one to Banu, a garrison town, seventy-nine miles south of
Kohat, built on a site chosen for political reasons by Sir Herbert
Edwards in 1848.

A number of other railways on the north-west frontiers of India have
been proposed. Whatever may or may not be ultimately done in regard to
these further schemes, it is obvious that those already constructed have
made an enormous difference in our strategical position in regard to
Afghanistan and the lands beyond as compared with the military transport
conditions of 1878.

THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

With a total area of 2,948,000 square miles, a population of less than
four and a half million, and a coast line of 11,300 miles, the continent
of Australia is peculiarly open to attack, and the possibilities of
invasion, or of attempts at invasion, have not only been much discussed
there of late years, but they have given rise to schemes of land defence
in which the building of strategical railways and the adapting of
existing lines to strategical purposes form important factors.

Under present conditions Western Australia and the Northern Territory
are isolated from the remaining States of the Commonwealth so far as
regards rail communication, and are at the mercy of any invader who
might be able to land a force there unchallenged by the British Fleet.

Since the autumn of 1912, however, there has been under construction a
railway which, starting from Kalgoorlie, the eastern terminus of the
Western Australian system, will proceed in a direct line for 1,063 miles
to Port Augusta, on the South Australian system, thus establishing
through rail connection between Perth (Western Australia) and the
farthest limit of the Queensland railway system, a total distance, that
is, of about 4,000 miles. When this, the first of Australia's proposed
trans-continental lines, is completed, it will be possible to send
troops from the Central or the Eastern States to Western Australia, not
only by rail, but by a railway laid so far inland that they will be safe
from attack from the sea. There would thus be a reasonable certainty
of the troops arriving at their destination; whereas if they had to
go by water there might be the risk of the vessels in which they were
making the journey being captured by the enemy. While, therefore, the
Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line is expected to serve other than purely
strategical purposes, it is, in effect, the latter which claim first
consideration.

Referring to the Northern Territory, in an article contributed by him to
_The Empire Review_ for May, 1910, Mr. F. A. W. Gisborne, an authority
on Australian questions, wrote:--

This vast region embraces 523,620 square miles of land,
and lies close to Asia, the most populous of the continents.
At present it contains, exclusive of the aborigines, barely
one thousand white people and about twice as many Chinese. It
lacks railway communication with the settled parts of Australia,
and is completely isolated from them. Its magnificent harbour,
accessible to the largest vessels afloat, and constituting
the natural gateway to tropical Australia, lies, save for
the British Fleet, absolutely defenceless. Behind it extend
millions of acres of fertile plains never yet tilled, and
never likely to be cultivated by white hands. Practically no
industry flourishes in a region which could support myriads of
agriculturists and operatives.

That some of the peoples of crowded Asia may, sooner or later, seek
a settlement for their surplus millions on what, for them, would be
so desirable a land as the Northern Territory, with its magnificent
opportunities for those capable of working in a tropical climate, is a
contingency that has been fully realised in Australia, and the questions
have arisen (1) as to whether the presence of a thousand whites in a
region half a million square miles in extent constitutes such "effective
occupation" thereof as gives them a right to its exclusive possession;
and (2) whether it would be possible either to prevent Asiatics from
invading the Northern Territory, if they sought so to do, or to eject
them therefrom if they did.

The latter question raises in an especially interesting form the
problem as to the respective merits and possibilities of sea-power and
rail-power.

Sea-power would, assuredly, have to be relied upon for safeguarding
the Northern Territory against invasion, since it would be impossible
for the Commonwealth Government to station troops at every prospective
landing point along 1,200 miles of a tropical coast-line in sufficient
force to keep off any invader who might appear there at some unexpected
moment. For the checking, therefore, of such invasion, dependence would
have to be placed on the power of the British Fleet (1) to stop the
invader, (2) to cut off his connections if he should effect a landing,
or (3) to carry war into the invader's own country.

Nor, if any large Asiatic settlement--as distinct from an "invasion" in
the ordinary acceptation of that term--did take place in the Northern
Territory under conditions that might not call for the intervention of
the British Fleet, is it certain that the ejection of the settlers could
be ensured with the help even of a trans-continental line of railway.
Here the question is not that of the carrying power of a single line
of railway. The examples offered by the War of Secession, the South
African War and the Russo-Japanese War have well established the great
advantages that even single lines, extending for great distances, can
confer in the effecting of military transport. The considerations that
would arise in Australia are, rather, (1) the fact that troops arriving
at Pine Creek or Port Darwin from the south might have to make some
very long and very trying marches across the 523,000 square miles
comprising the Northern Territory before they reached the settlement
of the Asiatics whom they were to eject, while they would be dependent
for their supplies on a far-distant railway base; and (2) the doubt as
to whether Australia could spare a sufficiently large body of troops to
undertake such an expedition, having regard to the defence requirements
of her south-eastern States, the integrity of which would count as of
more vital importance than an Asiatic settlement in her Far North. So
there are those who think that if such a settlement were eventually
effected in the Northern Territory, under conditions not constituting a
_casus belli_, Australia would simply have to accept the situation, and
reconcile herself to it as best she could.

All these things may seem to reflect on the precise value, from the
rail-power point of view, of that direct communication which, more
especially for strategical reasons, Australia has hoped eventually to
obtain between north and south as well as between west and east. It
is, nevertheless, desirable to see what has already been done in this
direction.

The construction of a north-to-south trans-continental line, passing
through the very centre of the Australian mainland, and linking up
the Northern Territory with the southern and eastern States, has
been under discussion for a period of about forty years. Progress
seemed to be assured by the Acceptance Act of 1910, under which the
Government of the Commonwealth, in taking over the Northern Territory
from South Australia, agreed to build a trans-continental line
connecting Oodnadatta, the northern terminus of the South Australian
railway system, and 688 miles from Adelaide, with Pine Creek, the
southern terminus of the Northern Territory system, and 145 miles
distant from Port Darwin. This connecting link would have a length
of 1,063 miles,--the same, by a singular coincidence, as that of the
Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line.

Since this "bargain" between the South Australia and the Commonwealth
Governments was made, there have been many advocates of an alternative,
or, otherwise, a supplementary route which, instead of going direct from
South Australia to the Northern Territory, (passing through the central
Australian desert,) would link up--on their west--with the railway
systems of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, connections with
the new line being made by these States where necessary. This "eastern
deviation route" would, it is argued, offer a greater strategical
advantage, as compared with the other route, because if troops had to
be despatched to the north, they could more readily be supplied from
Melbourne and Sydney--which, between them, contain over one-fourth of
the entire population of Australia--than from Adelaide; while to send
troops from Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria to South Australia
in order that they might start on their journey to the Northern
Territory from Oodnadatta, would involve a material delay under,
possibly, urgent conditions. Thus it is estimated that if the eastern
route were adopted, troops and travellers from Brisbane to Port Darwin
would only travel about 2,234 miles as against 3,691 miles via Sydney,
Melbourne, Adelaide and the central Australian route from Oodnadatta.

How these rival claims and contentions will be eventually settled
remains to be seen; but there has now been added to them a project for
the building of other avowedly strategical lines, establishing a more
direct connection between the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta trans-continental
line, when it is finished, and the capitals of Victoria, New South Wales
and Queensland respectively, facilitating the mutual defence of the
eastern, southern and western States in a time of crisis. This further
scheme is, however, designed only to supplement the trans-continental
lines already mentioned.

As regards the eastern States and the "central" State of South
Australia, the question of an Asiatic invasion may be assumed not to
arise. It has, however, long been regarded as possible that if Great
Britain were at war with some non-Asiatic Power able to challenge her
supremacy on the seas, the enemy might make an attack, not on the
admittedly vulnerable Northern Territory--which he would not want
either as a colony for Europeans or as a "jumping-off" place from which
to conquer the remainder of Australia--but on some point along the
coast-line of nearly 2,000 miles which, stretching from Rockhampton,
in Queensland, to Adelaide, in South Australia, comprises (with a
Hinterland of some 200 miles) the most populous, the most wealthy and
(for non-Asiatics) the most desirable section of the whole Australian
continent.

It is true that Germany--the Power which claims first attention from
this point of view--has shown far greater desire to convert Africa into
a German Empire than she has to effect the annexation of Australia. Yet
that she has recognized the weakness of the Australian situation is
suggested by the fact that, in dealing with the defensive power of the
Commonwealth, Dr. Rohrbach, one of the exponents of German World-Policy,
and author of "Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern," among other works,
has declared that Australia could not resist if her four chief towns,
all of them near the coast, were occupied by an invader.[87]

Which of these four towns, or which particular point along the said
2,000 miles of coast-line, an invader would select for his main
attack--apart from feints elsewhere--must needs be uncertain; but this
very fact only adds to the imperative importance of those responsible
for the defence of Australia being able to move troops freely, and
within the shortest possible period, either from one State to another or
from any place to another within one and the same State, as the defence
conditions might require.

When we thus pass on to consider the question as to the use of existing
lines of railway in Australia for strategical purposes, we find that
the most noteworthy expression of opinion on this branch of the subject
is contained in the following extract from the "Memorandum" which Lord
Kitchener wrote in 1910, as the result of an investigation made by him,
at the request of the Commonwealth Government, into the "Defence of
Australia":--

Railway construction has, while developing the country,
resulted in lines that would appear to be more favourable to an
enemy invading Australia than to the defence of the country.
Different gauges in most of the States isolate each system, and
the want of systematic interior connection makes the present
lines running inland of little use for defence, although
possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have
temporary command of the sea.

The "different gauges" undoubtedly constitute one of the most serious
shortcomings of the existing railways in Australia in regard to those
military movements with which we are here alone concerned.

Strategical considerations as applied to rail transport require, not
only that troops shall be readily conveyed, when necessary, from one
part of a country or one part of a continent to another, but that a
mobilisation of the forces shall be followed by a mobilisation of
railway rolling stock. Locomotives, carriages and trucks on lines which
are not themselves likely to be wanted for military transport should be
available for use on the lines that will be so wanted, in order that all
the rolling stock of all the railways in all parts of the country or of
the States concerned can, at a time of possibly the gravest emergency,
be concentrated or employed on whatever lines, or in whatever direction,
additional transport facilities may be needed.

The importance of this principle was first recognised by von Moltke;
but when the railways of Australia were originally planned, each State
took a more or less parochial view of its own requirements, its own
geographical conditions, or its own resources, and adopted the gauge
which accorded best therewith, regardless of any future need for a
co-ordinated system of rail-transport serving the requirements of the
Australian continent as a whole.

So we find that the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge has been adopted in Queensland,
South Australia (with a further 600 miles of 5 ft. 3 in. gauge), Western
Australia, and the Northern Territory; the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge (the
standard gauge in Great Britain and, also, of over 65 per cent. of
the world's railway mileage,) in New South Wales; and the 5 ft. 3 in.
gauge in Victoria. This means, in most cases, that when the frontier of
a State is reached, passengers, mails, baggage and merchandise must
change or be transferred from the trains on the one system to those of
the other.

Assuming that the west-to-east trans-continental railway (which is
being built with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge) were now available for use, a
traveller by it from Perth, Western Australia, through South Australia,
Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland would require, on account
of the differences in gauge, to change trains at least five times.
This may be regarded as an extreme case; but the evils of the existing
conditions are presented to us in a concrete form by an estimate which
the Defence Department of the Commonwealth recently made as to the time
it would take to move a force of 30,000 mounted troops from Melbourne
to Brisbane. It was shown that, with the present break of gauge, this
operation would occupy no less a time than sixty-three days; whereas
if there were no break of gauge twenty-three days would suffice. Thus
the differences of gauge would mean a loss of forty days in effecting
transfers at the frontier. In this time much might happen if the enemy
had obtained temporary control of the sea. Under these conditions, in
fact, he would be able to move his own forces by sea for the still
longer distance from Adelaide to Brisbane in five days. Brisbane might
thus be captured by the enemy while the reinforcements it wanted were
still changing trains at the State boundaries.

It may be of interest here to recall the fact that at one time there
were still greater differences of gauge on the railways in the
United States; that in 1885 the American railway companies resolved
upon establishing uniformity as a means of overcoming the great
inconveniences due to these conditions; and that in 1886, after adequate
preparation, the conversion of practically the entire system of railways
in the United States to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge was effected in two
days. Strategically, therefore, the United States Federal Government
could now, not only send troops by rail from any one part of their vast
territory to another, but utilise almost the whole of the available
rolling stock for military purposes.[88]

Unification of gauge forms, however, a serious proposition for Australia
on account of the prodigious outlay which, owing to the short-sighted
policy of the past, it would now involve.[89]

The estimated cost of converting all the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge in New South
Wales and all the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge in Queensland, South Australia,
Western Australia and the Northern Territory to the 5 ft. 3 in. gauge of
Victoria is no less than £51,659,000. To convert all the 3 ft. 6 in. and
5 ft. 3 in. railways to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the New South Wales
lines would cost £37,164,000. To convert to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge all
the trunk lines connecting the capitals--and this without shortening the
present circuitous routes or modifying the heavy grades--would alone
cost about £12,000,000.

In addition to this still undecided "battle of the gauges" there
are in Australia other disadvantages, from a strategical standpoint,
in the existing railway system, included therein being (1) an undue
preponderance of single over double track, so that any exceptional
amount of traffic causes a congestion which is likely only to be
aggravated by new lines constructed, or extensions made, before the
carrying capacity of the trunk lines has been increased; and (2) the
building of lines which either lead nowhere or have been expressly
stopped short of the boundaries of a State in order to retain, for the
railways of that State, traffic from outlying districts which would
pass, by a much shorter journey, to the port of a neighbouring State if,
by means of through railway connexion, the residents in the districts
concerned were free to avail themselves of their geographical advantage
in respect to their nearness to such port.

In addition to the efforts she has already made, or is proposing to
make, to effect such improvement both in her railway system and in
her military transport facilities as may be practicable, Australia
has sought to provide for that effective organisation without which,
as experience elsewhere has fully shown, great and even disastrous
confusion may arise at a critical moment owing to conflicts of authority
and other troubles or difficulties in the working of such railways as
may be utilised for military movements.

The action taken in this direction is based on a further recommendation
made by Lord Kitchener, who, in the course of his Memorandum to the
Commonwealth Government in 1910 said (paragraph 85):--

Preparation for mobilisation is primarily the work of
the General Staff, who recommend the lines to be followed
and advise where, and in what quantities, the munitions of
war of the various units should be stored. Concentration can
only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military
authorities are in the closest touch, and work in absolute
harmony. To secure this co-operation, I advise that a War
Railway Council be formed, as is the case in the United Kingdom,
composed of the Chief Railway Commissioner from each State,
under the presidency of the Quartermaster-General of the Citizen
Forces, and with an officer of the Headquarters Staff as
secretary.

A War Railway Council for the Commonwealth was duly constituted in
1911. The Council, which forms an adjunct of the Commonwealth Defence
Department, consists of the Quartermaster-General, (president,) the
senior officer of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps also created
for the railway system alike of the Commonwealth and of each State
(such senior officer being the Chief or the Deputy Commissioner of
Railways); the Consulting Military Engineer of the Commonwealth,
and two representatives of the naval and military forces, with a
military officer as secretary. The duties of the Council in time of
peace are, generally, to furnish advice to the Minister of Defence on
railway matters, and, particularly (_a_) to determine the method of
supplying information to, and obtaining it from, the different railway
departments; (_b_) to suggest regulations and instructions for carrying
out movement of troops; (_c_) to suggest the method of organising
railway staff officers in time of war to act as intermediaries between
the various railway authorities and the troops; (_d_) to consider the
question of extra sidings, loading platforms, etc.; and proposals for
unification of gauges; and (_e_) to suggest the organisation and system
of training of railway troops. In time of war the Council further
advises the Minister of defence on questions of mobilisation. The
organisation for military rail-transport in the several States follows
on the lines of the system already adopted in the United Kingdom, as
laid down in the Field Service Regulations.

FOOTNOTES:

[83] Altogether there have been twenty-six invasions of India, dating
back to about 2,000 years B.C., and of this number no fewer than
twenty-one have ended in conquest.

[84] It has been stated that the number of camels employed during the
expeditions of 1878-80 for transport purposes, in default of better
rail communication, was so great as almost to exhaust the supply of
the frontier provinces of Sind and Punjab, while from 30,000 to 40,000
of them died owing to the excessive toils and trials of the work they
were required to perform, the financial loss resulting therefrom to the
Treasury being estimated at £200,000.

[85] "Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers," Vol xi, 1885.

[86] "Life and Times of General Sir James Browne, R.E., K.C.B.,
K.C.S.I." by General J. J. McLeod Innes, London, 1905.

[87] See "The Origins of the War"; by J. Holland Rose, Litt.D.
Cambridge, 1914.

[88] In the _New York Sun_ of June 18, 1911, there was published an
article which had for its heading, "If Troops had to be Rushed, the
Railroads in this Country could move 250,000 Men a Day."

[89] The mileage of lines open, under construction, or authorised, in
the three gauges, is as follows:--5 ft. 3 in. gauge, 4,979 miles; 4 ft.
8½ in. gauge, 6,160 miles; 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, 11,727 miles.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following list of books, pamphlets and articles bearing on the
evolution and the development of rail-power down to the outbreak of
the Great War in 1914--this alone being the purpose and the scope of
the present work--was originally based on selections from a "List of
References on the Use of Railroads in War" prepared by the Bureau of
Railway Economics, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., and including items from
all the leading libraries of the United States (Library of Congress;
the libraries of the principal Universities, Colleges and learned
or technical societies; State libraries, public libraries, private
railway-libraries, and the library of the Bureau itself), together with
various foreign libraries, such as those of the Minister of Public Works
in Berlin, the International Railway Congress at Berne, and others
besides.

Much valuable help has been derived from the American list; but a large
number of its references, and especially those relating to the World-War
itself, have not here been reproduced, while so many additions have
been gathered in from other sources among which might be mentioned the
published catalogue of the War Office Library; the libraries of the
British Museum, the Royal Colonial Institute, and the Patent Office; the
_Journal_ of the Royal United Service Institution, the publications of
the Royal Engineers' Institute, and official or other publications in
Great Britain, France, etc., that the Bibliography here presented may,
perhaps, be regarded as practically a new compilation, supplementing
the excellent purpose which the list of the American Bureau of Railway
Economics will undoubtedly serve.

EARLIEST REFERENCES (1833-50).

HARKORT, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. Die Eisenbahn von Minden nach
Köln. Hagen, 1833.

[The earliest published work in which the importance and
the possibilities of railways from a military standpoint were
advocated.]

Ueber die militärische Benutzung der Eisenbahnen. Berlin,
1836.

Darlegung der technischen und Verkehrs-Verhältnisse der
Eisenbahnen, nebst darauf gegründeter Erörterung über die
militärische Benutzung derselben. Berlin, 1841.

"Pz." (CARL EDUARD POENITZ). Die Eisenbahn als militärische
Operationslinien betrachtet und durch Beispiele erläutet. Nebst
Entwurf zu einem militärischen Eisenbahnsystem für Deutschland.
Adorf [Saxony], 1842.

---- II. Aufl. Adorf, 1853.

Essai sur les Chemins de Fer, considérés comme lignes
d'opérations militaires. Traduit de l'allemand par L. A. Unger.
Paris, 1844.

[A French translation of the above-mentioned work by
Poenitz, with an introduction by the translator and a map of
Germany and Austria showing railways existing in 1842 and the
"system" projected by the German writer.]

Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den
inländischen und den benachbarten ausländischen Eisenbahnen
für militärische Zwecke; nach den beim grossen Generalstabe
vorhandenen Materialen zusammengestellt. Berlin, 1848-50.

HOFFMANN, C. Amtlich erlassene Vorschriften über Anlage und
Betrieb der Eisenbahnen in Preussen. Berlin, 1849.

WARS AND EXPEDITIONS

CRIMEAN WAR (1854-55)

HAMLEY, GEN. SIR EDWARD. The War in the Crimea. London, 1891.

LUARD, R.E., CAPT. C. E. Field Railways and their general
application in war. _Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution_, Vol. XVII, 1873.

[Refers to military railway built for use in the Crimea.]

ITALIAN WAR (1859)

BARTHOLONY, F. Notice sur les Transports par les Chemins
de Fer français vers le théâtre de la guerre d'Italie. 71 pp.
Paris, 1859.

MILLAR, R.A., MAJOR, Topographical Staff. The Italian
Campaign of 1859. _Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution_, Vol. V, pp. 269-308. London, 1861.

[Introductory reference to use of railways.]

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

Abhandlung über die Thätigkeit der amerikanischen
Feldeisenbahn-Abtheilungen der Nordstaaten; bei den Directionen
der Staatseisenbahnen. Durch das Königl. Ministerium in
Circulation gesetzt. Berlin.

BACON, E. L. How railroads helped save the Union.
_Railroadman's Magazine_, July, 1909.

HAUPT, HERMAN. Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, Chief
of the Bureau of United States Military Railroads in the Civil
War. 321 pp. Illustrations. Milwaukee, Wis., 1901.

HENDERSON, LIEUT.-COL. G. F. R. Stonewall Jackson and the
American Civil War. Second edition. Two vols. London, 1899.

PORTER, W. E. Keeping the Baltimore and Ohio in Repair in
War Time was a Task for Hercules. _Book of the Royal Blue_,
June, 1907.

United States Military Railroads. Report of Brev.-Brig.-Gen.
D. C. McCallum, Director and General Manager, from 1861 to 1866.
Executive Documents, 39th Congress, 1st Session. House. Serial
number, 1251. Washington, 1866.

VIGO-ROUISSILLON, F. P. Puissance Militaire des États-Unis
d'Amérique, d'après la Guerre de la Sécession, 1861-65. IIIe
Partie; chap. viii, Transports généraux. Paris, 1866.

AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (1866)

COOKE, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. A. C. C. Short Sketch of the
Campaign in Austria of 1866. 70 pp. Map. London, 1867.

WEBBER, R.E., CAPT. Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in
1886. Papers of the Corps of the Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol.
XVI. Woolwich, 1868.

ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION (1867-68)

WILLANS, R.E., LIEUT. The Abyssinian Railway. Papers on
Subjects Connected with the Duties of the Corps of Royal
Engineers. N.S. Vol. XVIII. Woolwich, 1870.

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (1870-71)

BUDDE, LIEUT. H. Die Französischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege
1870-71 und ihre seitherige Entwicklung in militärischer
Hinsicht. Mit zwei Karten und zehn Skizzen im Texte. 99 pp.
Berlin, 1877.

[Gives maps of the French railway system in 1870 and 1877
respectively.]

---- Die französischen Eisenbahnen im deutschen
Kriegsbetriebe, 1870-71. 487 pp. Berlin, 1904.

ERNOUF, LE BARON. Histoire des Chemins de Fer français
pendant la Guerre Franco-Prussienne. Paris, 1874.

JACQMIN, F., Ingénieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées. Les
Chemins de Fer pendant la Guerre de 1870-71. 351 pp. Paris, 1872.

---- 2e edition. 363 pp. 1874.

MÜLLER-BRESLAU, F. Die Tätigkeit unserer
Feldeisenbahn-Abteilung im Kriege 1870-71. Berlin, 1896.

Railway Organisation in the late War. _Edinburgh Review_,
January, 1872.

RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1877-78)

LESSAR, P. De la construction des Chemins de Fer en temps de
guerre. Lignes construites par l'armée russe pendant la campagne
1877-78. Traduit du russe par L. Avril. 142 pp. 10 Planches.
Paris, 1879.

SALE, R.E., CAPT. M. T. The Construction of Military
Railways during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. _Journal of
the Royal United Service Institution_, Vol. XXIV. 1880.

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN (1882-99)

History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers. Vol. II. By
Maj.-Gen. Whitworth Porter, R.E. The War in Egypt, 1882-85, pp.
64-87. London, 1889.

---- Vol. III. By Col. Sir Chas. M. Watson. The Sudan
Campaigns, 1885-99, pp. 53-76. Royal Engineers' Institute,
Chatham, 1915.

Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt. Prepared
in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition.
London, 1908.

NATHAN, R.E., LIEUT. M. The Sudan Military Railway.
Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Occasional
Papers, Vol. XI. 1885.

WALLACE, R.E., MAJ. W. A. J. Railway Operations in Egypt
during August and September, 1882. Professional Papers of the
Corps of Royal Engineers, Chatham. Occasional Papers, Vol. IX.

PHILIPPINE WAR (1898)

COLSON, L. W. Railroading in the Philippine War. _Baltimore
and Ohio Employés' Magazine_, Feb., 1913.

Soldiers Running a Railroad. _Railroad Telegrapher_, Sept.,
1899.

[Tells how the 20th Kansas Regiment ran four miles of the
Manila and Dagupan Railroad during the Philippine insurrection.]

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR (1899-1902)

Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War,
1899-1902. Two vols. Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, 1905.

Vol. I.--Organisation, Military Control, Working and Repair
of Cape and Natal Government Railways; Management, Engineering
and other Departments of Imperial Military Railways; Railway
Pioneer Regiment; Organisation, Equipment and Use of Armoured
Trains; Army Labour Depôts.

Vol. II.--61 Photographs and 93 Drawings.

GIROUARD, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. E. P. C., Director of Railways,
South African Field Force. History of the Railways during the
War in South Africa, 1899-1902. 149 pp. Maps. London, 1903.

HARRISON, C. W. FRANCIS. Natal: an Illustrated Official
Railway Guide and Handbook. Published by Authority. London, 1903.

[Gives a statement, on pp. 287-290, as to services rendered
by Natal Government Railways during South African War.]

History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Compiled by
the Direction of His Majesty's Government. Vol. IV, Appendix 10,
Notes on the Military Railway System in South Africa. London,
1910.

Netherlands South African Railway Company and the
Transvaal War. Account by the Secretary, Th. Steinnetz, dated
Pretoria, April, 1900. _De Ingenieur_, July 14 and 21, 1900.
English translation in _Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution_, Jan., 1902.

_The Times_. History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902.
Vol. VI, Part II, chap. iii, The Railway Work in the War, pp.
297-331. London, 1909.

WATSON, COL. SIR CHAS. M. History of the Corps of the Royal
Engineers. Vol. III, chap. iv, The South African War, 1899-1902.
Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, 1915.

Working of Railways: Duties of Staff Officers. Pamphlet.
Published by authority. Pretoria, 1900.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-5)

KUROPATKIN, GENERAL A. N. The Russian Army and the Japanese
War. Translated by Captain A. B. Lindsay. Two vols. Maps,
Illustrations. London, 1909.

MÉTIN, ALBERT. Le Transsibérien et la Guerre. _Revue
Économique Internationale_, Oct., 1904.

Official History of the Russo-Japanese War. Prepared by the
Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. London,
1910.

"P., A." Construction et Exploitation de Chemins de Fer
à Traction animale sur le Théâtre de la Guerre de 1904-5 en
Mandchourie. _Revue du Génie Militaire_, Avril, Mai, Juin, 1909.
Paris.

Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers attached
to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field. Vol. III.
General Report (dated March, 1905) by Col. W. H. H. Waters:
Section XXXVIII, "Railways," pp. 184-9. London, 1908.

Russo-Japanese War. The Ya-Lu. Prepared in the Historical
Section of the German General Staff. Authorised Translation by
Karl von Donat. Chaps. ii and iii. London, 1908.

VICKERS, R.E., CAPT. C. E. The Siberian Railway in War.
_Royal Engineers' Journal_, Aug., 1905. Chatham.

MEXICAN WAR (1910-13)

HINE, MAJ. CHARLES. War Time Railroading in Mexico. Paper
read before the St. Louis Railway Club, Oct. 10, 1913. The
Railway Library, 1913. Chicago.

WEEKS, G. E. How Mexican Rebels Destroy Railways and
Bridges. _Scientific American_, Sept. 13, 1913.

COUNTRIES

AUSTRALIA

ELLISON, H. K. Australia's Trans-Continental Railway.
_Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, June, 1912.

KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT. Memorandum
on the Defence of Australia. Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia, 1910.

Proceedings of the War Railway Council. (1) First and
Second Meetings, Feb. 14-16, 1911, and May 19, 1911. (2) Fifth
Meeting, Nov. 18 and 19, 1914. Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Geschichte der Eisenbahnen der österreichisch-ungarischen
Monarchie. Unsere Eisenbahnen im Kriege. Eisenbahnbureau des K.
u. K. General-Stabes. Wien, 1898-1908.

HARE, R.E., CAPT. W. A. Organisation of the Austrian Railway
and Telegraph Corps. _Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution._ Vol. XXIX, pp. 257-79. London, 1885-6.

JESSEP, R.E., LIEUT. H. L. Railway Works in Connection
with an Army in the Field; forming the Second Division of
the Austrian Guide to Railways. Vienna, 1872 (Translation).
Professional Papers of the Royal Engineers. Chatham. Vol. O.II.

JOESTEN, JOSEF. Studien über die heutigen Eisenbahnen im
Kriegsfalle. Wien, 1892.

Leitfaden des Eisenbahnwesens, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf
den Dienst der Feldeisenbahn-Abteilungen. 2 Bände. Wien, 1872.

NOSINICH, MAJ. Das österreichisch-ungarische Eisenbahn- und
übrige Communications-System. Politisch-militärisch beleuchtet.
77 pp. Wien, 1871.

OBAUER, H., UND E. R. VON GUTTENBERG. Das
Train-Communications und Verpflegungswesen, vom operativen
Standpunkte. Wien, 1871.

PANZ, OBERST V. V. Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom militärischen
Standpunkte. Two vols. Plates. Wien, 1863.

---- Les Chemins de Fer au point de vue militaire. Traduit
de l'Allemand par Costa de Serda. Paris, 1868.

Technischer Unterricht für die K. u. K. Eisenbahn-Truppe.
Theil 3: Strassen, Eisenbahn- und Wasserbau. Theil 7:
Feldmässige Zerstörung von Brücken und Viaducten. Wien, 1898.

TLASKAL, MAJ. L. Uebersichtliche Zusammenstellung der
Grundsätze und der wesentlichen Details aus dem Strassen- u.
Eisenbahn-Baue, mit Berücksichtigung der Zerstörung und der
feldmässigen Wiederherstellung von Eisenbahnen. 90 pp. Plates.
Wien, 1877.

ZANANTONI, OBERSTLT. E. Die Eisenbahnen im Dienste des
Krieges, und moderne Gesichtspunkte für deren Ausnützung. 33 pp.
Wien, 1904.

[See Railways in War and Modern Views as to their
Employment. _Royal Engineers' Journal_, March, 1907.]

BELGIUM

BODY, M. Aide-mémoire portatif de campagne pour l'emploi des
Chemins de Fer en temps de guerre. 253 pp. Plates. Liége, 1877.

---- Les Chemins de Fer dans leurs Applications militaires.
Liége, 1867.

---- Notice sur l'attaque et la défense des Chemins de Fer
en temps de guerre. Liége, 1868.

FORMANOIR, A. DE, Capitaine d'État-Major. Des Chemins de Fer
en temps de guerre. Conférences Militaires Belges. Bruxelles,
1870.

GRANDVALLET, ANTONIN. La neutralité de la Belgique et les
Chemins de Fer français, belges et allemands. 11 pp. Paris, 1889.

FRANCE

ALLIX, G. La Mobilisation des Chemins de Fer français. _Le
Journal des Transports_, Jan. 30, 1915. Paris.

BERGÈRE, CAPITAINE C. Les Chemins de Fer et le Service des
Étapes, d'après les nouveaux règlements. _Journal des Sciences
Militaires._ Neuvième série. Tome vingt-quatrième. Paris, 1886.

BRESSON, L. Réorganisation militaire.... Chemins de Fer. 50
pp. Paris, 1881.

DANY, JEAN. Le Rôle des Chemins de Fer à la Guerre. _Revue
de Paris_, Sept. 15, 1911.

De l'Utilisation des Chemins de Fer dans la prochaine
Guerre. Paris, 1899.

EUGÈNE, J. B., Capitaine du Génie. Études sur les Chemins de
Fer et les Télégraphes Électriques, considérés au point de vue
de la défense du territoire. 2e. édition. Two vols. Paris, 1879.

"G., A." A propos des Réseaux ferrés de la France et de
l'Allemagne. 30 pp. Paris, 1884.

GRANDVALLET, ANTONIN. Les Chemins de Fer français au point
de vue de la Guerre. 85 pp. Map. Paris, 1889.

JACQMIN, F. Étude sur l'exploitation des Chemins de Fer par
l'État. 104 pp. Paris, 1878.

LANOIR, PAUL. Les Chemins de Fer et la Mobilisation. 170 pp.
Paris, 1894.

LANTY ----. Exploitation militaire des Chemins de Fer,
Opérations exécutées par le 5e Régiment du Génie à l'occasion
des grandes manoeuvres de Béance. _Revue de Génie Militaire._
Vol. XX, pp. 345-83. Paris, 1900.

LAPLAICE, A. Notions sur les Chemins de Fer, à l'usage des
officiers et sous-officiers de toutes armes. Paris, 1887.

LEROY, A. Cours Pratique de Chemins de Fer, à l'usage de MM.
les officiers et sous-officiers de toutes armes, des sections
techniques, des ouvriers du génie et des écoles spéciales. 478
pp. Plates and Illustrations. Dijon, 1881.

MARCILLE, CAPT. E. Étude sur l'emploi des Chemins de Fer
avant et pendant la guerre. 96 pp. Paris, 1874.

PARTIOT, L. Transport d'un Torpilleur effectué de Toulon à
Cherbourg par les Chemins de Fer. Paris, 1891.

PERMEZEL, H. Du Régime des Chemins de Fer en temps de
guerre. Paris, 1904.

PERNOT, CAPT. A. Aperçu historique sur le service des
transports militaires. Pp. 492. Paris, 1894.

PICARD, ALFRED. Traité des Chemins de Fer. Vol. IV, Part IV,
chap. iv, Transports militaires par chemins de fer. Paris, 1887.

PIERRON, GÉN. Les Méthodes de Guerre, etc. Tome I, Part III
(Chemins de Fer). Maps and plans. Paris, 1893.

ROVEL, CHEF D'ESCAD. J. J. Manuel des Chemins de Fer, à
l'usage des officiers. 122 pp. Plates. Paris, 1882.

WIBROTTE, LIEUT. Construction et destruction des Chemins de
Fer en campagne. 2e. edition. 40 pp. Plates, Paris, 1874.

VIGO-ROUISSILLON, F. P. Des Principes de l'Administration
des Armées. Paris, 1871.

_Official Publications_

Instruction Speciale pour le Transport des Troupes
d'Infanterie et du Génie par des voies ferrées. 6e édition.
Paris, 1899.

Organisation Générale aux Armées. I. Services de l'arrière
aux armées. Volume arrêté à la date du 8 Décembre, 1913. 171 pp.

---- II. Transports stratégiques. Tirage Novembre, 1914. 291
pp.

Organisation Générale du Service Militaire des Chemins de
Fer. Volume arrêté au 15 Juillet, 1904. 20 pp.

---- Supplément, 31 Décembre, 1912. 8 pp.

Règlements et instructions sur le transport des troupes.
Édition annotée ... jusqu'en Août, 1913. 362 pp.

Réglement Général de 1re Juillet, 1874, pour les
transports militaires par chemins de fer. Paris, 1874.

Sections de Chemin de Fer de campagne. Volume arrêté à la
date du Sept., 1914. 92 pp.

Transports militaires par Chemin de Fer (Guerre et Marine).
Édition mise à jour des textes en vigueur jusqu'en Octobre,
1902. 712 pp. Paris.

Transports ordinaires du matériel de la guerre. 15 Juin,
1912. 270 pp.

Troupes des Chemins de Fer. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er.
Décembre, 1912. 106 pp.

GERMANY

A., H. VON. Ueber die militärischen und technischen
Grundlagen der Truppentransports auf Eisenbahnen. Darmstadt und
Leipzig, 1861.

ALBERT ----. Die Anstellungen im Eisenbahn-Dienst. Handbuch
für Unteroffiziere, welche sich dem Eisenbahnfach zu widmen
beabsichtigen. 59 pp. Berlin, 1884.

ALLIX, G. L'Organisation Militaire des Chemins de Fer
allemands. _Journal des Transports_, 13 Mars., 1915. Paris.

BAUER, HAUPT. Fuhrkolonne ... und Feldbahn. 31 pp. Plates.
Berlin, 1900.

BECK, C. H. Studien über das Etappenwesen. Nordlingen, 1872.

[A detailed account of the rail and road services organised
under the Prussian Regulation of May 2, 1867.]

Le Service des Étapes in guerre. _Revue Militaire de
l'Étranger._ 1er. Mai, 1872.

[A digest of the facts recorded by C. H. Beck.]

BECKER, LIEUT. Der nächste Krieg und die deutschen
Bahnverwaltungen. 62 pp. Hannover, 1893.

Bedeutung der Eisenbahnen für den Krieg. _Jahrbuch für die
deutsche Armee und Marine._ Berlin, 1898.

Die Thätigkeit der deutschen Eisenbahntruppen in China,
1900-1. _Annalen für Gewerbe und Bauwesen_, April 15, 1902.

Eisenbahnen im Kriege, Die. _Zeitung des Vereins_, Oct. 18,
1899.

Erste Benutzung der Eisenbahn für Kriegszwecke. _Zeitung des
Vereins_, Sept. 2, 1914.

"Ferrarius, Miles" (Dr. jur. Joesten). Die Eisenbahn und die
Kriegführung: Eine politisch-militärische Studie. Deutsche Zeit-
und Streit Fragen. Heft 66. 30 pp. Hamburg, 1890.

GIESE, OBERST O. V. Provisorische Befestigungen und
Festungs-Eisenbahnen. 96 pp. Plans. Berlin, 1882.

JOESTEN, JOSEF. Geschichte und System der Eisenbahnbenutzung
im Kriege. Leipzig, 1896.

---- Histoire et Organisation militaires des Chemins de
Fer. Traduit de l'allemand par le Lieut.-Colonel B. ... 226 pp.
Paris, 1905.

LANOIR, PAUL. The German Spy System in France. Translated
from the French by an English Officer. Pp. viii, 264. London,
1910.

[Chapters on "Designs on French Railways" and "German
Strategic Railways."]

SCHAEFFER, EDUARD. Der Kriegs-Train des deutschen Heeres.
Berlin, 1883.

SCHMIEDECKE, OBERST. Die Verkehrsmittel im Kriege. (Die
Eisenbahnen: die Feld- und Förderbahnen.) Maps and plates. 242
pp. Berlin, 1906.

---- 2te. Auflage. 1911.

STAVENHAGEN, HAUPT. W. Verkehrs- und Nachrichten-Mittel in
militärischer Beleuchtung. (Eisenbahnen.) Berlin, 1896.

---- 2te. Auflage, 1905.

W. [WESTPHALEN], HAUPT. H. L. Die Kriegführung, unter
Benutzung der Eisenbahnen, und der Kampf um Eisenbahnen. Nach
den Erfahrungen des letzen Jahrzents. 290 pp. Leipzig, 1868.

---- II Auflage. Neu bearbeitet von einem deutschen
Stabsoffizier. Leipzig, 1882.

De l'emploi des chemins de fer en temps de guerre. Traduit
de l'allemand. 241 pp. Paris, 1869.

[A French translation of the 1st edition of Westphalen's
work.]

WEBER, BARON M. M. VON. Die Schulung der Eisenbahnen für den
Krieg im Frieden. (1870.) Translated into English, under the
title of Our Railway System viewed in Reference to Invasion,
with Introduction and Notes, by Robert Mallet, M.I.C.E., F.R.S.
London, 1871.

WEHBERG, H. Die rechtliche Stellung der Eisenbahnen
im Kriege, nach den Beschlüssen der zweiten Haager
Friedens-Konferenz. _Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen_, Mai-Juni, 1910.
Berlin.

WERNEKKE, REGIERUNGSRAT. Die Mitwirkung der Eisenbahnen an
den Kriegen in Mitteleuropa. _Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen_, Juli
und August, 1912.

_Designs on Africa_

BOULGER, DEMETRIUS C. German Designs on the Congo.
_Fortnightly Review_, Sept., 1914.

[Republished in England's Arch-Enemy: A Collection of Essays
forming an Indictment of German Policy during the last Sixteen
Years, by D. C. Boulger. London, 1914.]

BRYDEN, H. A. The Conquest of German South-West Africa.
_Fortnightly Review_, July, 1915. London.

CRABTREE, THE REV. W. A. German Colonies in Africa. _Journal
of the African Society_, Oct., 1914. London.

LEWIN, EVANS. The Germans and Africa. 317 pp. Map. London,
1915.

MARTIN, CAMILLE. Le Chemin de Fer du Tanganyika et les
progrès de l'Afrique orientale allemande. Renseignments
coloniaux, No. 3. Supplément à _L'Afrique Française_ de Mars,
1914. Paris.

Memorandum on the Country known as German South-West Africa.
Section on Railways, pp. 83-88. Pretoria, Government Printing
Office, 1915.

O'CONNOR, J. K. The Hun in our Hinterland; or the Menace of
German South-West Africa. 43 pp. Map. Cape Town, 1914.

[Gives details concerning strategical railways in German
South-West Africa.]

RENÉ, CARL, Director des Kamerun-Eisenbahn Syndikats.
Kamerun und die Deutsche Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn. 251 pp. Mit 37
Textbildern und 22 Tafeln. Berlin, 1905.

South-West African Notes. Republished from the Transvaal
Chronicle. _South Africa_, Nov. 14 and Dec. 5, 1914. London.

ZIMMERMANN, EMIL. Neu-Kamerun. Zweiter Teil: Neu Kamerun und
das Kongosystem. Deutschland und Zentralafrika. 135 pp. Map.
Berlin, 1913.

---- Was ist uns Zentralafrika? Wirtschafts- und
verkehrspolitische Untersuchungen. 57 pp. Maps. Berlin, 1914.

_Destruction and Restoration of Railways_

Anleitung zur Unterbrechung von Eisenbahnverbindungen,
resp. Zerstörung, etc., sowie zur Wiederherstellung. Berlin,
1861.

BASSON, WILHELM. Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege, nach den
Erfahrungen des letzten Feldzuges. 72 pp. Ratibor, 1867.

[A work dealing with the technicalities of railway
destruction, restoration and operation on (_a_) national and
(_b_) occupied territory.]

TAUBERT ----. Zerstörung, Wiederherstellung und Neubau von
Vollbahnen und deren Kunstbauten in Feindesland. Leipzig, 1896.

Verhandlungen des Kriegs- und Handelsministeriums
über Zerstörungen von Eisenbahnen und die Entstehung der
Allerhöchsten Instructionen vom Jahre 1859 und vom 31 Juli,
1861. Ungedrucktes Actenstück. Berlin.

_Germany and the Baghdad Railway_

CHÉRADAME, ANDRÉ. La Question d'Orient. Le Chemin de Fer de
Bagdad. Cartes. 397 pp. Paris, 1903.

HAMILTON, ANGUS. Problems of the Middle East, Great Britain,
Germany and the Baghdad Railway. Pp. 156-86. London, 1909.

LYNCH, H. F. B. Railways in the Middle East. _Asiatic
Quarterly Review_, April, 1911.

---- The Baghdad Railway. _Fortnightly Review_, March, 1911.

---- The Baghdad Railway: Four New Conventions. _Fortnightly
Review_, May, 1911.

MAHAN, CAPT. A. T. Retrospect and Prospect. VI: The Persian
Gulf and International Relations. Pp. 209-51. London, 1902.

ROHRBACH, DR. PAUL. Die Bagdadbahn. 2. Auflage. 86 pp. Map.
Berlin, 1911.

SAROLEA, CHARLES. The Anglo-German Problem. The Baghdad
Railway and German Expansion in the Near East. Pp. 247-80.
London, 1912.

SCHNEIDER, SIEGMUND. Die Deutsche Bagdadbahn und die
projectirte Ueberbrückung des Bosporus, in ihrer Bedeutung für
Weltwirthschaft und Weltverkehr. Wien und Leipzig, 1900.

SPRENGER, DR. A. Babylonien, das reichste Land in der
Vorzeit und das lohnendste Kolonisationfeld für die Gegenwart.
Ein Vorschlag zur Kolonisation des Orients. 128 pp. Map.
Heidelberg, 1886.

_The Times._ Maps of the Baghdad Railway, showing lines
open, under construction and projected. Dec. 1, 1914, and Nov.
1, 1915.

"X." The Focus of Asiatic Policy. _National Review_, June,
1901.

_Official Publications_

Die Verwaltung der öffentlichen Arbeiten in Preussen,
1900 bis 1910. Kartenbeilage I: Die Preussisch-Hessischen
Staatseisenbahnen am 1 April, 1900, und Ende März, 1910. Berlin,
1911.

Organisation des Transports grosser Truppenmassen auf
Eisenbahnen. Berlin, 1861.

Field Service Regulations (Felddienst Ordnung, 1908) of
the German Army. Translated by the General Staff, War Office.
London, 1908.

_Railway Troops_

Armée allemande. Les troupes de Chemin de Fer. _Revue
Militaire de l'Étranger._ Mai, 1898. Paris.

HILLE, MAJ., UND MEURIN, MAJ. Geschichte der preussischen
Eisenbahntruppen. Teil I. Von 1859 bis zur Beendigung des
deutsch-französischen Krieges. Maps, plans, plates and
illustrations. Two vols. Berlin, 1910.

HILLE, MAJ. Geschichte der preussischen Eisenbahntruppen.
Teil II, 1871-1911. Portraits, maps, plans, plates and
illustrations. Berlin, 1913.

Les troupes allemandes de communications. _Revue Militaire_,
Avril, 1900.

RAWSON, R.E., LIEUT. H. E. The German Railway Regiment.
_Royal United Service Institution Journal_, Vol. XX, 1877.

WEBBER, R.E., CAPT. The Field Army Department of the
Prussian Army. See Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866,
Papers of the Corps of the Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XVI,
Woolwich, 1868.

_Strategical Railways_

LITTLEFIELD, WALTER. Hitherto Unpublished Pages in War's
Prelude. Railway Cartography reveals Germany's elaborate
Preparations. _New York Times_, Nov. 15, 1914.

NORTON, ROY. The Man of Peace. Oxford Pamphlets, 1914-15. 22
pp. Oxford University Press.

STUART-STEPHENS, MAJOR. How I Discovered the Date of the
World War. THE ENGLISH REVIEW, June, 1915.

[Deals with the German strategical railways on the Belgian
frontier.]

"Y." Object Lesson in German Plans. _Fortnightly Review_,
Feb., 1910. London.

---- A Further Object Lesson in German Plans. _Fortnightly
Review_, Feb., 1914.

[These two articles were republished in England's
Arch-Enemy: A Collection of Essays forming an Indictment of
German Policy during the last Sixteen Years By Demetrius C.
Boulger. London, 1914.]

YOXALL, M.P., SIR JAMES. The Kaiser's Iron Web. _The Daily
Graphic_, March 9, 1915.

_Tactics and Strategy_

BALCK, OBERST. Taktik, Band 4. Eisenbahnen, etc. Berlin,
1901.

---- 4te. Auflage, 1909.

Êtude sur le Réseau ferré allemand au point de vue de
la concentration. 32 pp. Avec une carte des chemins de fer
allemands. Paris, 1890.

"FERRARIUS, MILES" (DR. JUR. JOESTEN). Die Anforderungen der
Strategie und Taktik an die Eisenbahnen. 48 pp. Berlin, 1895.

GOLTZ, BARON COLMAR VON DER. Das Volk im Waffen. Ein Buch
über Heereswesen und Kriegführung unserer Zeit. Berlin, 1883.

---- The Nation in Arms. Translated by Phillip A. Ashworth.
New edition. Revised in accordance with the fifth German edition.
London, 1906.

---- Kriegführung. Kurze Lehre ihrer wichtigsten Grundsätze
und Formen. Berlin, 1895.

---- The Conduct of War. A Short Treatise on its most important
Branches and Guiding Rules. Translated by Major G. F. Leverson.
Vol. IV of the Wolseley Series. London, 1899.

LASSMANN, LIEUT. J. C. Der Eisenbahnkrieg. Taktische Studie.
112 pp. Berlin, 1867.

VERDY DU VERNOIS, GEN. J. V. Studien über den Krieg. Theil
III. Strategie. Heft 5. (Einfluss der Eisenbahnen operativer
Linien auf die Kriegführung). Maps and plans. Berlin, 1906.

GREAT BRITAIN

BURGOYNE, F.R.S., SIR J. Railways in War. A paper read
before the British Association at Birmingham. _The Engineer_,
Sept. 22, 1865. p. 182. London.

BURNABY, CAPT. F. G. The Practical Instruction of Staff
Officers in Foreign Armies. _Royal United Service Institution
Journal_, Vol. XVI, pp. 633-44. 1873.

COLLINSON, GEN. T. B. Use of Railways in War. Extracted
from three Royal Engineer Prize Essays for 1878 by Captains
D. O'Brien and T. J. Willans and Lieut. W. H. Turton. 82 pp.
Chatham.

FINDLAY, SIR GEORGE, Assoc. Inst. C.E., Lieut.-Colonel
Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps. Paper on The
Transport of Troops by Rail within the United Kingdom, read
before the Royal United Service Institution, June 20, 1890, and
forming chapter xxiii of Working and Management of an English
Railway. London, 5th edition, 1894.

---- The Use of Railways in the United Kingdom for the
Conveyance of Troops. _United Service Magazine_, April, 1892.

GIROUARD, 2ND LIEUT. E. P. C. The Use of Railways for Coast
and Harbour Defence. _Royal United Service Institution Journal_,
Vol. XXXV, 1891.

GIROUARD, R.E., BREV-LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR E. PERCY C. Railways
in War. A lecture delivered at the Royal Engineers' Institute,
March 23, 1905. _Royal Engineers' Journal_, July, 1905. Chatham.

HOME, C. B., R.E., LIEUT.-COL. R. On the Organisation of the
Communications of an Army, including Railways. _Royal United
Service Institution Journal_, Vol. XIX, 1875.

HOPKINS, R.E., CAPT. L. E. Army Railway Organisation. _The
Royal Engineers' Journal_, August, 1905. Chatham.

LUARD, R.E., CAPTAIN C. E. Field Railways and their General
Application in War. _Royal United Service Institution Journal_,
Vol. XVII, 1873.

MALLET, ROBERT, M.I.C.E., F.R.S. See under GERMANY: Weber,
Baron M. M.

MAQUAY, R.E., COL. J. P. Railways for Military Communication
in the Field. Professional Papers of the Royal Engineers,
Chatham, Vol. VIII. 1882.

PHELP, S. M. The Use of our Railways in the Event of
Invasion or of a European War. _The Railway Magazine_, May, 1901.

PORTER, R.E., MAJ.-GEN. WHITWORTH. History of the Corps of
Royal Engineers. Two vols. London, 1889.

[Vol. III, by Col. Sir Chas. M. Watson, was issued by the
Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, in 1915.]

PRYTHERCH, H. J. The Great Eastern Railway and the Army
Manoeuvres in East Anglia, 1912. _Great Eastern Railway
Magazine_, Nov., 1912.

ROTHWELL, R.A., COL. J. S., The Conveyance of Troops by
Railway. _United Service Magazine_, Dec., 1891, and Jan., 1892.

---- The Reconnaissance of a Railway. Its Utilisation and
Destruction in Time of War. _Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution._ Vol. XXXVI, pp. 369-89. London, 1892.

Strategical Importance of Railways, The. _The Engineer_,
Feb. 16, 1900.

The Part Played by Railways in Modern Warfare. By
"A.M.I.C.E." _Land and Water_, Jan. 30 and Feb. 6, 1915. London.

The Transport of an Army. _Great Western Railway Magazine_,
Nov., 1909.

[An account of the work done by the Great Western Railway on
the occasion of the Army Manoeuvres of 1909.]

TOVEY, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. The Elements of Strategy. [1887.]
Section on Railways, pp. 42-49. 2nd edition, edited by T. Miller
Maguire. London, 1906.

TYLER, R.E., CAPT. H. W., Railway Inspector, Board of Trade.
Railways Strategically Considered. _Journal of the Royal United
Service Institution._ Vol. VIII, pp. 321-41. Maps. London, 1865.

WILLIAMS, J. A. Our Railway in Time of War. _North-Eastern
Railway Magazine_, March, 1912.

_Engineer and Railway Staff Corps_

Army Book for the British Empire, The. London, 1893.

[References to "Railway Volunteer Staff Corps" on pp. 382
and 531.]

Engineer and Railway Staff Corps. _The Railway News_, Aug.
8, 1914.

JEUNE, C. H. The Engineer and Railway Staff Corps. _Great
Eastern Railway Magazine_, July, 1911. London.

MCMURDO, C.B., MAJ.-GEN., Hon. Colonel, Engineer and Railway
Staff Corps. Rifle Volunteers for Field Service; a Letter to
Commanding Officers of Rifle Corps. 27 pp. London, 1869.

MCMURDO, GEN. SIR W. M. Article on "Volunteers,"
Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th edition.

[For references to the "Engineer and Railway Transport
Corps," see p. 295.]

WALTER, MAJ. JAMES, 4th Lancashire Artillery Volunteers.
England's Naval and Military Weakness. The Volunteer Force.
London, 1882.

[References to services rendered by the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps in the Volunteer Reviews of 1881. See p.
305.]

_Official Publications_

Army Service Corps Training. Part III, Transport. Section
VI, Conveyance of War Department Stores. 1--Rail. Appendix III,
Acts of Parliament relating to Transport Services. 1911.

Field Service Pocket Book. Section 30, Transport by Rail.
General Staff, War Office. 1914.

Field Service Regulations. Part I, Operations. 1909.
(Reprinted, with amendments, 1914.) Chap. iii, Movements by
Rail, pp. 62-6. Part II, Organisation and Administration.
1909. (Reprinted, with amendments, 1913.) Chap. viii, Railway
Transport, pp. 91-96. General Staff, War Office.

Instruction in Military Engineering. Part VI, Military
Railways. War Office, 1898.

[Embodies a portion of the course of instruction in railways
at the School of Military Engineering, Chatham. Was first issued
with Army Orders, dated March 1, 1889, as a Manual of Military
Railways, 95 pp.]

Manual of Military Engineering. Chap. xvii: Hasty Demolition
of Railways ... without Explosives. Chap. xxiii: Railways.
(Technical details concerning construction, repairs and
reconstruction.) 144 pp. General Staff, War Office, 1905.

Manual of Military Law. War Office, 1914.

[Includes a brief account of the relations of the State to
the railways in regard to the conveyance of troops (see pp.
184-5), and gives text of various Parliamentary enactments
relating thereto.]

Notes on Reconnaissance and Survey of Military Railways
for Officers of R.E. Railway Companies. Compiled in the
Quartermaster-General's Department of the War Office. 1910.

Railway Manual (War). 64 pp. 1911. Reprinted, with
Amendments, 1914.

Regulations for the Transport of Troops by Railway
Quartermaster-General's Office, Horse Guards, Feb. 28, 1867.

HOLLAND

WIJNPERSSE, KAPT. W. J. M. V. D. De voorbereiding van het
militair gebruik der spoorwegen in oorlogstijd. 76 pp. Plans and
plates. s'Gravenhage, 1905.

INDIA

ANDREW, W. P. Our Scientific Frontier. London, 1880.

INNES, R.E., GEN. J. J. MCLEOD. Life and Times of Gen. Sir
James Browne, R.E., K.C.B., K.C.S.I. 371 pp. London, 1905.

[Gives an account of the construction of the Sind-Pishin
Railway, of which Sir J. Browne was Chief Engineer.]

LYONS, CAPT. GERVAIS. Afghanistan, the Buffer State. Great
Britain and Russia in Central Asia. 232 pp. Maps. Madras and
London, 1910.

[Gives, in summarised form, much information concerning
British Indian frontier and Russian Central Asian Railways.]

Military Railways in India. Précis of Report of the Railway
Transport Committee, India, 1876. Professional Papers of the
Corps of Royal Engineers. Occasional Papers, Vol. II. Chatham,
1878.

ROSS, C.I.E., DAVID. Military Transport by Indian Railways.
109 pp. Maps and plates. Lahore, 1883.

---- Transport by Rail of Troops, Horses, Guns, and War
Material in India. A lecture. 24 pp. London, 1879.

SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, R.E., CAPT. G. K. The Frontier Railways
of India. Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers.
Occasional Papers, Vol. XI, 1885. Chatham.

ITALY

ALLIX, G. La Mobilisation des Chemins de Fer Italiens.
_Journal des Transports_, 3 Juillet, 1915. Paris.

AYMONINO, C. Considérations Militaires et Stratégiques
sur les chemins de fer italiens. Traduit de l'Italien par G.
Malifaud. 3e. éd. 68 pp. Paris, 1889.

Le Ferrovie dello Stato e le grandi manovre del
1911._Rivista Tecnica della Ferrovie Italiane_, Nov., 1912.

ZANOTTI, MAG. B. Impiego dei ferrovieri in guerra. 67 pp.
1902.

RUSSIA

FENDRIKH, COL. A. VON. The Organisation of a Staff for
Military Railway Work and of a Central Management for the
Control of Rolling Stock in War Time. Translated from _The
Russian Military Magazine_, by Capt. J. Wolfe Murray, R.A.,
D.A.A.G. _Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, Vol.
XXXII, 1889.

IGEL, GEN. VON. Russlands Eisenbahnbau an der Westgrenze.
_Deutsche Revue_, Dec., 1902. Stuttgart.

K., H. Das russische Eisenbahn-Netz zur deutschen Grenze in
seiner Bedeutung für einen Krieg Russlands mit Deutschland. 29
pp. Map. Hannover, 1885.

NIENSTÄDT, OBERSTLT. Das russische Eisenbahnnetz zur
deutschen-österreichischen Grenze in seiner Bedeutung für einen
Krieg. 43 pp. Map. Leipzig, 1895.

Strategical Railways. Translated from the Voïénnyi Sbórnik.
_Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, Oct., 1899.

SPAIN

TAYLOR, TEN. T. L. Los ferrocarriles en la guerra. 288 pp.
Plates. Barcelona, 1885.

SWITZERLAND

BLASER, HAUPT. E. Die Zerstörungs- und
Wiederherstellungs-Arbeiten von Eisenbahnen. 22 pp. Plates.
Basel, 1871.

HOFFMANN-MERIAN, T. Die Eisenbahnen zum Truppen-Transport
und für den Krieg im Hinblick auf die Schweiz. 2e. Ausg. Basel,
1871.

NOWACKI, KARL. Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege. 160 pp. Zurich,
1906.

UNITED STATES

Are Railroads Neutralising Sea Power? _American Review of
Reviews_, June, 1913.

BIGELOW, JOHN, Captain 10th Cavalry, U.S. Army. The
Principles of Strategy, illustrated mainly from American
Campaigns. 2nd edition. Philadelphia, 1894.

Commerce of the Ohio and Western Rivers. Importance of
Railroads in a Military point of view. _DeBow's Commercial
Review_, June, 1857.

CONNOR, MAJ. W. D. Military Railways. 192 pp. Illustrations.
Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army.
Washington, 1910.

---- Operation and Maintenance of the Railroad in a Theatre
of War. _Journal of the Military Service Institute._ New York,
1905.

DERR, W. L. The working of railways in Military Operations.
_Engineering Magazine_, Oct., 1898.

Great Railroad Feats during War and Flood. _Washington,
D.C., Post_, April 25, 1913.

GRIMSHAW, ROBERT. War Capacity of United States Railways.
_Scientific American_, May 1, 1915.

HAINES, CHARLES O. Our Railroads and National Defence. _The
North American Review_, Sept., 1915.

HAUPT, HERMAN. Military Bridges ... including designs for
trestle and truss bridges for military railroads, adapted
specially to the wants of the service in the United States. 310
pp. 69 plates. New York, 1864.

Use of Railroads in War. _Journal of the Military Service
Institution._ Vol. XXI. New York, 1897.

PALMER, CAPT. JOHN MCAULEY. Railroad Building as a Mode of
Warfare. _North American Review_, Dec., 1902.

Railroads, and not Bullets, will feature the next War.
_Washington, D.C., Star_, Feb. 11, 1912.

WILSON, W. B. History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
Two vols. The Railroad in War Times, Vol. I, pp. 411-18.
Philadelphia, 1899.

AMBULANCE AND HOSPITAL TRAINS

FURSE, LIEUT.-COL. G. A. Military Transport. Chap.
vii, Railway Ambulance Trains, pp. 185-99. Diagrams and
illustrations. London, 1882.

GURLT, DR. E. Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und
Kranker im Kriege, nebst Vorschlägen über die Benutzung der
Eisenbahnen dabei. 33 pp. Berlin, 1860.

[Contains, so far as can be traced, the earliest
recommendations as to the special fitting up of railway rolling
stock for the transport of the sick and wounded in war.]

LOEFFLER, DR. F. Das Preussische Militär-Sanitätswesen und
seine Reform nach der Kriegserfahrung von 1866. Two parts.
Berlin, 1869.

[In the appendix of Part II of this work will be found
an "Anleitung zur Ausführung der Beförderung verwundeter und
kranker Militairs auf Eisenbahnen," issued July 1, 1861.]

LONGMORE, SURG.-GEN. SIR T. A Manual of Ambulance Transport.
2nd edition. Edited by Surg.-Capt. W. A. Morris. Chap. vi, Class
V, Railway Ambulance Transport, pp. 347-89. Illustrations.
London, 1893.

[The 1st edition was published in 1869 under the title of A
Treatise on the Transport of Sick and Wounded Troops.]

Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion.
Part III, Vol. II, Surgical History. Railway Transportation, pp.
957-71. Diagrams and illustrations of hospital cars, fittings,
etc. U.S.A. Dept. of War. Surgeon-General's Office. Washington,
1883.

[Gives a detailed account of the evolution, in the Civil
War, of the hospital train in vogue to-day. A copy of the work
will be found in the British Museum Library. Pressmark: 7686 i.
4.]

MELVILLE, A.M.S., SURG.-CAPT. Continental Regulations for
the Transport of Sick and Wounded by Rail. _Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution._ Vol. XLII, pp. 560-92. London, 1898.

Military Hospital Trains: Their Origin and Progress. _The
Railway Gazette_, Dec. 4, 1914. London.

NIEDEN, J. Der Eisenbahn-Transport verwundeter und
erkrankter Krieger. 2 Aufl. 271 pp. Berlin, 1883.

OTIS, GEORGE A. A Report on a Plan for Transporting Wounded
Soldiers by Railway in Time of War. Surgeon-General's Office,
War Department, Washington, 1875.

[The material parts of this work are reproduced in the
"Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion."]

Report by the Central British Red Cross Committee on
Voluntary Organisations in aid of the Sick and Wounded during
the South African War. Part VII, Hospital Trains, pp. 32-5.
London, 1902.

Report on the Medical Arrangements in the South African War.
By Surg.-Gen. Sir W. D. Wilson, K.C.M.G., late Principal Medical
Officer, South African Field Force. Part IX, Hospital Trains,
pp. 213-9. London, 1904.

RIDDELL, J. SCOTT. A Manual of Ambulance. Section on Railway
Ambulance Wagons and Ambulance Trains, pp. 168-76. 6th edition.
London, 1913.

ARMOURED TRAINS

ADAMS, W. BRIDGES. English Railway Artillery: A Cheap
Defence against Invasion. _Once a Week_, Aug. 13, 1859. London.

Armoured Truck ("Union Railroad Battery," Petersburg) used
in the American Civil War, 1861-65. See illustration, _Century
Magazine_, Sept., 1887, p. 774.

BOXALL, CHARLES GERVAISE, Col. Commanding 1st Sussex
Artillery Volunteers. Armoured Train for Coast Defence in Great
Britain, The. Paper read at a meeting of Officers and N.C.O.'s
of the Brigade at Newhaven Fort, Sussex, May 14, 1894. 11 pp.

---- Railway Batteries and Armoured Trains. _Fortnightly
Review_, Aug., 1895.

CONNOR, MAJ. W. D. Military Railways. Section on Armoured
Trains, pp. 141-50. Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of
Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, 1910.

Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War,
1899-1902. Vol. I, Section on Organisation, Equipment and Use of
Armoured Trains. Chatham, 1905.

Field Service Regulations. Part I, Operations. 1909.
(Reprinted, with amendments, 1914.) Section 40, Defence of
Railways. General Staff, War Office, London.

FITZGERALD, W. C. The Armoured Train. _The Four-track News_,
March, 1906. New York.

FORBIN, V. Les trains blindés. _Nature_, Dec. 12, 1914.
Paris.

FRASER, R.E., LIEUT. T. Armour-plated Railway Wagons used
during the late Sieges of Paris in 1870-71. Papers of the Corps
of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 1872.

GIROUARD, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. E. P. C. History of the Railways
during the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Section V, The
Organisation and Use of Armoured Trains. London, 1903.

HOBART, FREDERICK. The first Armoured Train. _Railway Age
Gazette_, Jan. 22, 1915. Chicago, U.S.A.

LODIAN, L. The Origin of Armoured Railroad Cars
unquestionably the Product of the American Civil War. _Railroad
and Locomotive Engineering_, May, 1915. New York.

[Reproduces from _Leslie's Weekly_ for May 18, 1864, an
illustration of a "Railroad Battery on the Philadelphia and
Baltimore Railway," showing a "box" car completely covered with
armour plating, with loop-holes at end and side for guns, and
placed on the line in front of the locomotive, itself otherwise
unprotected.]

Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt. Prepared
in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition.
London, 1908.

[References to use of armoured train.]

NANCE, CAPT. H. O. Armoured Trains. Lecture delivered at the
Royal Engineers' Institute. 52 pp. Photographs and drawings.
Professional Papers, fourth series, Vol. I, Paper 4. Chatham,
1906.

[The subject is dealt with in three sections: (1) Uses of
Armoured Trains; (2) Construction, equipment and garrison; (3)
Organisation and administration.]

Railway Manual (War). Chapter VI, Section 15, Armoured
Trains. London, 1911.

WALKER, LIEUT. ARTHUR. Coast Railways and Railway Artillery.
_Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, Vol. IX, pp.
221-23. Plates. London, 1866.

INDEX

ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGN:
Construction and working of military railway, 210-14.

ADAMS, WILLIAM BRIDGES: 67-9.

ADVANTAGES FROM USE OF RAILWAYS: 345-50.

AFRICA, GERMAN DESIGNS ON:
Proposals of von Weber, 297;
German South-West Africa, 298-300;
the Herero rising, 300-1;
railways, 304-10;
military preparations, 307, 310-12;
rail connection with Angola, 312-14;
German East Africa Central Railway, 314-7;
Katanga district, 316;
Central Africa, 318;
rival railway schemes, 319-20;
railway schemes in the Cameroons, 320-5;
official admissions, 325-6;
"der Tag" and its programme, 326-30.

AGADIR CRISIS, THE: 324.

AGGRESSION, USE OF RAILWAYS FOR: 355-6.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT: 63.

ALEXANDRETTA, GERMANY AND: 334, 343.

ALEXEIEV, ADMIRAL: 275.

AMBULANCE TRAINS: _see_ RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR:
What it established, 13;
railway lines, 15;
Federal Government and railways, 16;
mileage taken over, 18;
gauge of lines, 18;
condition of lines, 19;
Transportation Department, 20-1;
locomotives, 21-2;
rolling mills, 23;
movement of troops, 23-5;
destruction of railways, 27-8;
Construction Corps, 29-37;
control of railways, 43-50;
protection of, 54-5;
armoured cars, 72-4;
removal of sick and wounded, 86-91;
American precedents followed in Europe, 104, 122, 153, 177;
"surface railroads," 210;
the Civil War and the South African campaign, 258 (_n._).

ANATOLIA: 331, 335.

ANATOLIAN RAILWAY, THE: 334.

ANGOLA: 299, 312-4, 320.

ARMOURED TRAINS:
Protection of railway lines, 59;
first suggested, 67-9;
proposals of Lieut. A. Walker, 69-70;
of Col. Wethered, 70-71;
of Lieut. E. P. C. Girouard, 71-2;
Civil War, 72-4;
Franco-Prussian War, 75;
Egyptian Campaign, 75-6, 224;
Delhi, 76;
experiments in France, 77;
at Newhaven, Sussex, 77-9;
South African War, 79, 248-52.

ASIA MINOR:
Germany's "share" in the Turkish spoils, 332;
Germany's colonisation field, 332-3;
proposed German protectorate, 333.

ASPINALL, MR. J. A. F.: 197.

ATLANTIC AND NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD: 36, 73.

AUSTRALIA AND THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY: 342, 344.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY:
Early troop movements by rail, 8-9;
scheme for strategical railways, 9;
Italian campaign of 1859, 11-12;
Railway Troops, 123;
German rail communications, 287.

AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN:
Protection of railways, 55, 59;
removal of sick and wounded, 91-2;
Prussian mobilisation, 104;
defective transport arrangements, 104-5;
destruction and restoration of railway lines, 124-6.

BABYLONIA, GERMANY AND: 332.

BAGHDAD RAILWAY, THE:
Concession, 334;
branches, 334-5;
Germany's aims, 336;
the conquest of Egypt, 338-40;
the Persian Gulf, 341;
India, 342;
Capt. Mahan's views, 342;
the desired extension to Koweit, 343;
what the railway was to accomplish, 344.

BALCK: 110.

BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD: 29.

BASSON, WILHELM: 127.

BECKER, LIEUT.: 169-70.

BELGIUM:
Early Railways in, 4-5;
German strategical lines on Belgian frontier, 288-294;
German designs, 323-4, 325-6, 327, 329.

BÉRIGNY, M. DE: 7.

BEYENS, BARON: 325.

BIGELOW, CAPT. J.: 56, 348 (_n._).

BILLINGTON, MR. R. J.: 78.

BISMARCK, PRINCE: 136, 338.

BLOCKHOUSES FOR PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS: 54, 58, 245.

BOULGER, MR. D. C.: 288, 294.

BOXALL, COL. C. G.: 78.

BRITISH CENTRAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE: 95, 254.

BRITISH EAST AFRICA: 317, 327.

BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA:
German designs on, 301, 302, 303, 308, 312, 327.

BRYDEN, MR. H. A.: 300 (_n._).

BUDDE, H.: 51.

BULLER, SIR REDVERS: 254.

BURGOYNE, SIR JOHN: 178, 209.

BUTTERWORTH, SIR A. K.: 197.

CALEDONIAN RLY.: 197.

CALTHROP, MR. GUY: 197.

CAMEROONS, THE: 320-5.

CAMPENAU, GEN.: 137.

CANALS AND TROOPS: 1.

CAPE GOVERNMENT RAILWAYS: 237, 240, 246, 253.

CAPE-TO-CAIRO RAILWAY: 320.

CENTRAL AFRICA: 318-20.

CHÉRADAME, M. ANDRÉ: 338.

CHRISTIAN, PRINCESS: 254.

CLARKE, SIR ANDREW: 224.

COAST DEFENCE: 67, 179.

COMMERCE DEFENCE LEAGUE, THE GERMAN: 303 (_n._).

CONGO, THE BELGIAN: 315-320, 322-6.

CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EFFICIENCY: 350-2.

CONNOR, MAJ. W. D.: 58, 80, 258 (_n._).

CONSTRUCTION CORPS:
U.S.A., 20, 21, 23, 29-37;
Prussia, 122-3, 124-8, 132-6, 215-6, 219;
Austria, 123-4;
Bavaria, 127-133;
France, 128, 152-4;
England, 198-202;
South African War, 242-5;
Russo-Japanese War, 273-4.

CONSTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS:
Military requirements, 350-1.

CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR:
Conditions of operation, 40-3;
American Civil War, 43-50;
views of Baron M. M. von Weber, 50-2;
need for intermediaries, 52;
organisation in peace, 99;
Austro-Prussian War, 104-5;
German system in 1870-71, 106-115;
new regulations, 115-7;
present system, 118-121;
inefficient military control in France in 1870-71, 139-147;
creation of new organisation, 149-170;
State control in England, 176-7;
draft scheme for State operation, 185-7;
Railway Transport Officers, 189-191;
South African War, 233-7, 238-9, 249-52;
Russo-Japanese War, 274-5;
general, 351.

COWANS, LIEUT.-GEN. SIR J. S.: 204.

CRIMEAN WAR:
Deaths from sickness and disease, 81;
removal of sick and wounded by railway, 83;
transport conditions, 207-8;
construction of military railway, 208;
operation, 208-10;
recalled by Russo-Japanese War, 260.

CROMER, LORD: 229.

DANISH WAR (1864): 91, 104.

DELAGOA BAY: 304-5, 327.

DELBRÜCK, PROF. HANS: 330.

DENT, MR. C. H.: 197.

DENT, MR. F. H.: 197.

DESTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS:
Vulnerability, 26-7;
early instances, 27;
American Civil War, 27-37;
Mexican War, 37-9;
Austro-Prussian War, 124, 125-6;
Franco-German War, 128-30;
South African War, 241-5, 256-8;
Russo-Japanese War, 274.

DISADVANTAGES OF RAILWAYS: 355-6.

DUFAURE, M.: 7.

DUMANT, JEAN HENRI: 84.

EAST PRUSSIA, STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS IN: 283.

EGYPT:
German anticipations of rebellion, 326;
aims against Egypt, 338-9;
conquest to be facilitated by railways, 340.

EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS:
Armoured cars, 75-6;
Railway Companies, Royal Engineers, 199.

EIFEL DISTRICT:
German strategical railways, 289-292.

ELSENBORN, GERMAN CAMP AT: 288-9.

ENGINEER AND RAILWAY STAFF CORPS:
Formation, 179-182;
constitution, 181-2;
functions and work done, 182-7, 192;
supplemented by War Railway Council, 187.

ENGLAND, ORGANISATION IN:
Early regulation for troop movements, 2;
legislative enactments, 175-7;
invasion prospects and formation of Volunteer Corps, 178;
Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, 179-187;
attitude of War Office, 180;
War Office and defence scheme, 185-7;
War Railway Council, 187-9;
Railway Transport Officers, 189-191;
Railways Executive Committee, 195-7;
Railway Companies, Royal Engineers, 200-2.

ERNOUF, BARON: 141.

EVANS, DR. T. W.: 91.

FAY, SIR SAM: 197.

FIELDHOUSE, MR. W. J.: 95.

FINDLAY, SIR GEORGE: 184-7, 195, 196, 202.

FORBES, SIR WILLIAM: 182, 197.

FORMANOIR, CAPTAIN A. DE: 124 (_n._).

FORTRESSES FOR PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS: 59.

FRANCE:
Early references in French Chamber, 6-7;
complaints in 1842 of German aggressive lines, 7;
early railways, 7;
railways and the Italian campaign of 1859, 9-11;
early regulations, 138;
Marshal Niel's Commission, 138-9;
experiences in Franco-German War, 139-148;
German railway lines on French frontiers, 287-8;
Germany's alternative routes, via Luxemburg, 288;
via Belgium, 288-93;
French possessions in Africa to be seized by Germany, 326;
to be demanded as "ransom," 329.

FRANCE, ORGANISATION IN:
Early regulations, 138;
action taken after the Franco-German War, 149-50;
Superior Military Commission, 150, 151-2;
Field Railway Sections, 153-4;
Railway Troops, 154-6;
existing organisation, 157-168;
tests, 169;
views of German authority, 169;
defensive railways, 170-4.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR: FRANCE:
Armoured wagons, 75;
rail-transport regulations, 138;
the Niel Commission, 138-9;
despatches by rail, 139-40;
absence of military organisation, 140;
confusion and chaos, 140-2;
conflicting orders, 142;
local authorities, 143;
unloading, 143-4;
congestion at stations, 145-7;
seizure of rolling stock by enemy, 147.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR: GERMANY:
Safeguarding of railway lines, 56-8;
removal of sick and wounded, 94-5;
rail transport conditions, 106-115;
Railway Troops, 127-8;
destruction of lines, etc., 128-30;
operation of French lines by Germans, 130-1;
construction of military lines, 215-6.

FRANC-TIREURS AND RAILWAYS: 57, 129-30.

FRASER, R. E., LIEUT.: 129.

FREDERICKSBURG RAILROAD: 29.

FRENCH TRANS-AFRICAN RAILWAY SCHEME: 322.

FRERE, SIR BARTLE: 297.

FRIRON, GEN.: 64.

FURLEY, SIR JOHN: 95, 96, 254.

GAMBON, M.: 325.

GAUGE, RAILWAY:
Various countries, 60;
Russian policy in respect to, 61;
experiences in Russo-Turkish War, 61, 217;
Germany and Russian lines, 284-6.

GERMAN EAST AFRICA: 314-5, 316-7.

GERMAN EMPEROR, THE:
African railways, 321;
visit to Constantinople, 334;
to Damascus, 337.

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: 298-312.

GERMANY AND EGYPT: 338-40.

GERMANY:
Early proposals for strategical railways, 2-3;
early railways constructed, 5;
possible attacks on two fronts, 5;
"aggressive" lines, 7;
early troop transports, 8;
control of railways in war, 50-52;
railway ambulance transport, 84-6, 91-3, 94;
_see_ also GERMANY, ORGANISATION IN.

GERMANY, ORGANISATION IN:
Influence of American Civil War, 104, 122;
Railway Section of General Staff formed, 104;
Danish War (1864), 104;
Austro-Prussian War, 104-6;
Route Service Regulation, 106-9;
Franco-Prussian War, 110-15;
further Regulations, 115-6;
Field Service Regulations, 117;
present basis of organisation, 118-121;
Railway Troops, 122-37.

GIROUARD, SIR E. PERCY C.: 71, 225, 228, 233-7, 238-9, 240-1,
248-9, 252, 257, 258 (_n._).

GOLTZ, VON DER: 135, 139, 282, 346 (_n._), 352.

GORDON, GEN.: 221, 222.

GRAHAM, GEN. SIR G.: 223, 224 (_n._).

GRANET, SIR GUY: 197.

GRANT, CAPT. M. H.: 251.

GRANT, GEN.: 22.

GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY, 197.

GREAT EASTERN RLY.: 194, 204.

GREAT NORTHERN RLY.: 194, 197, 204.

GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY: 192, 195 (_n._), 197.

GREY, EARL DE: 180.

GRUND SYSTEM OF RAILWAY FITTINGS: 94.

GURLT, DR. E.: 81, 84, 85.

GYULIA, COUNT: 12.

HALLECK, GEN.: 23-4.

HAMLEY, GEN. SIR E.: 207, 349 (_n._).

HARKORT, F. W.: 2-3.

HARRISON, MR. C. W. F.: 247.

HAUPT, HERMAN:
Pioneer of Construction Corps, U.S.A., 29-30;
rebuilding of bridges, 31-2;
control questions, 43-9;
armoured car, 72.

HEDJAZ RAILWAY: 335.

HERBERT, MR. SIDNEY: 180.

HERFF, HERR VON: 305.

HEYER, MR. A. E.: 305.

HINE, MAJ. CHARLES: 37.

HOBART, MR. F.: 73.

HOLLAND:
German strategical lines on Dutch frontier, 293-4.

HOME, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. R.: 63.

HOOD, GEN.: 35.

HOSPITAL TRAINS; _see_ RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT.

INDIA:
German anticipations of rebellion, 326;
the Baghdad railway and India, 342, 344.

INVASION OF ENGLAND:
Fears of, 67, 177-8, 182.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN (1859):
Conveyance of troops by rail, 9-13;
destruction of railway lines, 27;
removal of sick and wounded by rail, 84.

JACQMIN, M.: 143, 148, 235.

JAGOW, HERR VON: 325-6.

JOESTEN, DR. JOSEF: 281, 283.

KAERGER, DR. KARL: 332-3.

KATANGA DISTRICT (Central Africa): 316-20.

KELTON, J. C.: 50.

KITCHENER, LORD: 58, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 239.

KUROPATKIN, GEN.: 263, 269-70, 271, 275, 355 (_n._).

LAMARQUE, GEN.: 6.

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RLY.: 197.

LAND TRANSPORT CORPS (Crimea): 181 (_n._), 208, 209.

LANGHAMS, PAUL: 338.

LANOIR, M. PAUL: 136-7.

LATTMANN, HERR: 306.

LEDEBOUR, HERR: 302.

LEOPOLD, KING: 318, 325.

LIMITATIONS IN USEFULNESS OF RAILWAYS: 352-5.

LIVERPOOL AND MANCHESTER RLY.: 1, 8.

LOBITO BAY RLY.: 314, 319-20.

LODIAN, MR. L.: 73.

LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RLY.: 194, 197.

LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN RLY.: 192, 193, 197, 199, 201.

LONDON, BRIGHTON AND SOUTH COAST RLY.: 77-8, 197.

LONDON, CHATHAM AND DOVER RLY.: 199.

LONDON, DEFENCE OF: 71.

LORME, M. DUPUY DE: 75.

LUARD, R. E., CAPT. C. E.: 209.

LÜDERITZ, ADOLF: 298.

LUXEMBURG RAILWAYS: 288, 289, 292.

MCCALLUM, D. G.:
Appointed Military Director, etc., U. S. railroads, 17-18;
views on situation, 19;
creation of Transportation Department and Construction Corps,
20, 32-37;
movement of troops, 23-4;
question of control, 50;
German translation of report, 127.

MCDOWELL, GEN.: 30, 54.

MCMURDO, GEN. SIR W. M.: 180, 181, 182-3.

MAHAN, CAPT. A. T.: 342, 344.

MANASSAS GAP RAILWAY: 55.

MANBY, F.R.S., MR. C.: 180.

MANGELSDORF, PROF. R.: 340.

MAQUAY, R. E., COL. J. P.: 214.

MARSCHALL, M., 7.

MASSÉNA, MARSHAL: 64.

MATHESON, MR. D. A.: 197.

MEADE, MAJ.-GEN. G. G.: 54.

MEIGS, GEN.: 48.

MEXICO, RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN: 37-9.

MIDLAND RAILWAY: 197.

MILITARY OPERATION OF RAILWAYS:
Civil War, 20-1;
Franco-German War, 130-1;
British organisation, 175;
South African War, 239-41;
Russo-Japanese War, 374.

MILITARY RAILWAYS:
Description of, 205-6;
pioneer military line in Crimean War, 206-10;
American Civil War, 210;
Abyssinian Campaign, 210-14;
Franco-German War, 215-6;
Russo-Turkish War, 216-20;
the Sudan, 220-231;
Russo-Japanese War, 272-3;
general, 349.

MILLAR, R. A., MAJ.: 9.

MOLTKE, VON: 8, 106, 109, 278, 346 (_n._).

MORACHE, DR.: 81.

MUNI (Spanish): 324.

NANCE, CAPT. H. O.: 80.

NANTON, R. E., CAPT. H. C.: 250.

NAPIER OF MAGDALA, LORD: 210.

NAPIER, SIR CHARLES: 178.

NAPOLEON: 62, 63, 64.

NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA RLY.: 33, 34.

NATAL GOVERNMENT RAILWAYS: 237, 246-8, 253.

NATAL RAILWAY PIONEER STAFF: 247.

NATHAN, R. E., LIEUT. M.: 223.

NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT, 1888: 177, 195.

NETHERLANDS SOUTH AFRICAN RLY.: 240, 254-8.

NIEL, MARSHAL: 138, 139.

NORTON, Mr. ROY: 286.

NORTH EASTERN RLY.: 197.

NORTH MISSOURI RAILROAD: 29.

O'CONNOR, MR. J. K.: 310-12, 326-7.

ORANGE AND ALEXANDRIA RAILROAD: 46, 55, 88.

OSMAN PASHA: 218.

PANZ, OBERST. VON: 123.

PEEL, GEN.: 176.

PERNOT, CAPT. A.: 172, 174.

PHILADELPHIA-BALTIMORE RAILROAD: 73.

PHILADELPHIA RAILROAD: 87.

POMERANIA, STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS IN: 283.

PÖNITZ, C. E.: 4-6, 280.

POPE, GEN.: 43.

PORTER, MAJ.-GEN. WHITWORTH: 209, 224.

POTTER, MR. F.: 197.

POWELL, MAJ.: 209.

PREPARATIONS IN PEACE: Need for, 98-102; 106, 123, 138, 149,
178-180, 184, 351-2.

PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR:
American Civil War, 54-5;
blockhouses, 54, 58;
placing of civilians on engines or trains, 55, 57-8;
Austro-Prussian War, 55-6;
Franco-Prussian War, 56-8;
South African War, 58;
permanent fortresses, 59;
use of armoured trains, 59;
removal of rolling stock, 59;
destruction of, 60;
different gauge, 60-1;
terrorising of civil population, 356.

PRUSSIAN RAILWAY TROOPS:
Formation of Field Railway Section, 122;
operations in Austro-Prussian campaign, 123, 124-6;
permanent cadre, 127;
Franco-Prussian War, 127-8, 130-1;
Railway Battalion, 132-4;
Railway Regiment, 134;
Communication Troops, 134;
need for Railway Troops, 135-6;
railwaymen as spies, 136-7;
construction of military lines, 215-6.

RADEK, HERR KARL: 339-40.

RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT:
Deaths from disease and sickness, 81;
importance of prompt removal of sick and wounded, 82-3;
Crimean War, 83;
Italian War, 84;
recommendations by Dr. Gurlt, 84-5;
first Prussian Commission, 85;
American Civil War, 86-91;
Danish War, 91;
Austro-Prussian War, 91-2;
second Prussian Commission, 92-3;
Paris International Exhibition (1867), 93;
third Prussian Commission, 94;
Franco-Prussian War, 94-5;
South African War, 95-6, 253-4;
methods now in vogue, 96-7.

RAILWAY COMPANIES, ROYAL ENGINEERS:
Formation, 199;
services in Egypt, 199;
duties, 200;
training, 200-2;
services in the Sudan, 221-9;
South African War, 233, 240, 242, 243, 251.

RAILWAY PIONEER REGIMENT: 242, 243.

RAILWAYS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: 195-6.

RAILWAY TRANSPORT OFFICERS: 189-191, 193-4.

RAILWAY WAGONS, UNLOADING OF:
American Civil War, 46, 47-8;
Austro-Prussian War, 105;
Franco-German War, 111-2, 144, 145;
South African War, 234, 238, 239.

REGULATION OF THE FORCES ACT, 1871: 176, 177, 195, 196, 197.

RENÉ, CARL: 321-2.

REPRISALS, PRUSSIA AND: 55-6.

RHODESIA: 320, 322, 327.

ROBERTS, LORD: 58, 245.

ROBERTUS, J. K.: 332.

ROHRBACH, DR. PAUL: 338-9, 340.

ROON, VON: 85.

ROSCHER, WILHELM: 332.

ROSS, PROF. LUDWIG: 338.

ROTHWELL, R. A., COL. J. S.: 184.

RUMIGNY, GEN.: 3

RUSSIA:
Early troop movements by rail, 8;
policy in respect to railway gauge, 61, 135-6, 217;
military lines built in campaign against Turkey, 216-220;
German strategical lines on Russian frontier, 284-7.
_See_ also RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR:
Distances from theatre of war, 260;
the Trans-Siberian Railway, 261, 262-3;
Chinese Eastern Railway, 261, 262;
unreadiness of Russia, 263;
Lake Baikal, 263, 264-7;
ice railway across the lake, 266-7;
circum-Baikal line, 267;
traffic hindrances, 268;
number of trains, 268;
speed, 268;
Russian reinforcements in driblets, 269;
rail improvements, 270-1;
dependence on railway, 271;
results accomplished, 271-2;
field railways, 272-3;
Railway Troops, 273-4;
operation, 274;
control, 274-6, 355 (_n._).

RUSSO-TURKISH WAR:
Railway gauge, 61;
construction of military railways, 216-20.

SAÏD PASHA: 221.

SAMASSA, DR. PAUL: 301-2.

SAROLEA, DR. CHARLES: 337.

SCHÄFFER, E.: 113 (_n._).

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN:
German strategical lines, 294.

SCHOFIELD, GEN.: 24.

SCOTT, MAJ.-GEN. D. A.: 181.

SHERMAN, GEN. W. T.: 19, 34-6, 54, 65.

SICK AND WOUNDED IN WAR:
Evacuation hospitals, 167;
infirmary stations, 167;
distribution stations, 167;
general, 349-50.
_See_ also, RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT.

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR:
Removal of locomotives and rolling stock, 59-60;
hospital trains, 95-6, 253-4;
transport of troops for embarkation, 193;
South African railways, 232-3;
creation of Department of Military Railways, 233;
control questions, 233-5;
basis of organisation, 235-7;
transport conditions, 237-8;
how the system worked, 238-9;
Imperial Military Railways, 239-40;
need for operating staff organised in time of peace, 240-1;
destruction and repair of lines, etc., 241-5;
Railway Pioneer Regiment, 242;
blockhouses, 245;
military traffic, 245-6;
miscellaneous services, 246-8;
armoured trains, 248-52;
operation of Netherlands South African Railway by Boers, 254-9;
the war and rail-power, 258-9.

SOUTH CAROLINA RAILROAD: 36.

SOUTH EASTERN AND CHATHAM RLY.: 197.

SOUTH EASTERN RLY.: 199.

SPRENGER, DR. A.: 332.

STANTON, MR.: 23, 29.

STAVELOT-MALMÉDY LINE: 288-292.

STEINNETZ, MR. T.: 255-8.

STRATEGICAL MOVEMENTS BY RAIL: 12, 25, 245-6, 346.

STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS:
Early proposals in Germany, 2, 5-6, 7;
France, 7;
Austria, 9;
defensive lines in France, 170-4;
position in Great Britain, 202;
connecting links, 203;
attitude of Parliament, 203;
Northern Junction line, 203-4;
nature of strategical railways, 277-80;
ideal conditions, 279-81;
position in Germany, 281-4;
Pomerania and East Prussia, 283-4;
Russian frontier, 284-7;
southern Silesia, 287;
French frontier, 287-8;
Belgian frontier, 288-93;
Dutch frontier, 293-4;
Schleswig-Holstein, 294;
German South-West Africa, 304-9;
Angola, 312-4;
German East Africa, 314-5;
Cameroons, 320-4;
Baghdad Railway, 334-344.

STUART-STEPHENS, MAJ.: 290 (_n._).

STURGIS, GEN.: 44.

SUAKIN-BERBER LINE: 199, 223-5.

SUPPLIES FOR TROOPS:
War of Secession, 15-16, 46;
"living on the country," 63, 64, 65;
conditions in pre-railway days, 63-4;
discipline, 64;
road transport, 65;
advantages of rail transport, 65-6;
defective organisation, Austro-Prussian War, 105;
new system for Germany, 107;
Franco-German War, 110-113, 143-6;
present French system, 164-6;
general, 347-8.

SURFACE RAILROADS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: 210.

SUDAN, THE:
Early railway schemes, 221;
Wady Halfa-Sarras line, 221;
extension for expedition of 1884, 221-2;
abandonment, 222;
results attained, 223;
Suakin-Berber line, 223-5;
Nile Valley line, reconstructed and extended, 225-6;
Nubian Desert line, 226-7;
extension to Atbara, 228;
Khartoum, 229;
El Obeid, 229;
military results, 228;
services to civilisation, 230-1;
Germany and the Sudan, 321-2.

SUVÓROFF: 62.

SZLUMPER, MR. G. S.: 197.

TACTICAL MOVEMENTS BY RAIL: 346.

THIERS, M.: 64.

THORNHILL, MR. J. B.: 316.

THOMAS, GEN. G. H.: 89.

TOVEY, R. E., LIEUT.-COL.: 354 (_n._).

TOWN, DR. F. L.: 90.

TRANS-SIBERIAN RLY. _See_ RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

TRANSVAAL, GERMANY AND THE: 304, 305, 311, 327.

TROOP MOVEMENTS BY RAIL:
Early, 8;
Italian campaign of 1859, 9-12;
Civil War, 23-5;
quicker transport, 62;
more complete numbers, 62-3;
Danish War of 1864, 104;
Austro-Prussian War, 104;
Franco-Prussian War, 110, 139-140;
Volunteer reviews and army manoeuvres, 192, 194;
South African War, 193, 245-6;
Russo-Japanese War, 269, 271;
general, 345-6, 352-4.

TURKEY, ASIATIC: Germany's Land of Promise, 331.

TURKEY: Germany's designs against, 331, 336-40.

UNGER, L. A.: 6.

VICKERS, R.E., CAPT. C. E.: 274.

VIGO-ROUISSILLON, M.: 36.

VOLUNTEER CORPS IN GREAT BRITAIN: 67, 178-9, 182, 191-2.

WALKER, LIEUT. ARTHUR: 69.

WALKER, SIR HERBERT A.: 197.

WALTER, MAJ. J.: 191-2.

WAR RAILWAY COUNCIL, THE: 187-9, 193, 196.

WATERS, COL. W. H. H.: 274, 275.

WATSON, COL. SIR CHARLES: 228.

WATSON, MR. P. H.: 72.

WEBBER, R.E., CAPT. C. E.: 55, 125, 126.

WEBER, BARON, M. M. VON: 50-2.

WEBER, ERNST VON: 297, 330.

WEEKS, G. E.: 37-8.

WELLINGTON, DUKE OF: 65, 177.

WELTPOLITIK: 331, 342, 344, 356.

WERNEKKE, REGIERUNGSRAT: 8.

WESTERN AND ATLANTIC RLY.: 34.

WESTPHALEN, H. L.: 124.

WETHERED, COL. E. R.: 70.

WHEELER, GEN.: 34.

WILLANS, R.E., LIEUT.: 211, 213.

WILSON, PRESIDENT: 330.

WOLSELEY, LORD: 199, 222, 223.

WRIGHT, C.E., Mr. T.: 70.

ZAVODOVSKI SYSTEM OF RAILWAY FITTINGS: 94.

ZIMMERMANN, EMIL: 322-5.

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A HISTORY OF INLAND TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION IN ENGLAND.

CONTENTS.

CHAP.

I INTRODUCTORY
II BRITAIN'S EARLIEST ROADS
III ROADS AND THE CHURCH
IV EARLY TRADING CONDITIONS
V EARLY ROAD LEGISLATION
VI EARLY CARRIAGES
VII LOADS, WHEELS AND ROADS
VIII THE COACHING ERA
IX THE AGE OF BAD ROADS
X THE TURNPIKE SYSTEM
XI TRADE AND TRANSPORT IN THE TURNPIKE ERA
XII SCIENTIFIC ROAD-MAKING
XIII RIVERS AND RIVER TRANSPORT
XIV RIVER IMPROVEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION
XV DISADVANTAGES OF RIVER NAVIGATION
XVI THE CANAL ERA
XVII THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
XVIII EVOLUTION OF THE RAILWAY
XIX THE RAILWAY ERA
XX RAILWAY EXPANSION
XXI RAILWAYS AND THE STATE
XXII DECLINE OF CANALS
XXIII DECLINE OF TURNPIKES
XXIV END OF THE COACHING ERA
XXV RAILWAY RATES AND CHARGES
XXVI THE RAILWAY SYSTEM TO-DAY
XXVII WHAT THE RAILWAYS HAVE DONE
XXVIII RAILWAYS A NATIONAL INDUSTRY
XXIX TRAMWAYS, MOTOR-BUSES AND RAIL-LESS ELECTRIC TRACTION
XXX CYCLES, MOTOR-VEHICLES AND TUBES
XXXI THE OUTLOOK
AUTHORITIES
INDEX

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Transcriber's Notes

Obvious errors of punctuation and diacritics repaired.

Note: "Liége" was the correct spelling at that time for what is now
written "Liège".

Hyphen removed: "break-down" (p. 108), "earth-work" (p. 219),
"inter-communication" (p. 173), "plate-laying" (pp. 221, 222),
"rail-head" (pp. 66, 97, 108), "re-built" (p. 266), "re-organisation"
(p. 264), "South-African" (p. 402), "station-master" (p. 145),
"store-houses" (pp. 144, 164), "text-books" (p. 133), "turn-tables" (p.
124), "wide-spread" (pp. 15, 82).

The following variants appear frequently and have not been changed:
block-house / blockhouse, head-quarter(s) / headquarter(s),
sub-division(s) / subdivision(s).

P. 5: "Leipsig" changed to "Leibzig" (Leipzig-Dresden line).

P. 15: "seceeded" changed to "seceded" (the States which had seceded).

P. 17: "Ctiy" changed to "City" (Washington City, D.C.).

P. 31: "Goose Greek" changed to "Goose Creek".

P. 105: "(3)" changed to "(4)" ((4) secure the prompt unloading).

P. 185: "Mazagine" changed to "Magazine" (United Service Magazine).

P. 195: "Raliway" changed to "Railway" (Great Western Railway Magazine).

P. 218: "dependance" changed to "dependence" (to dependence on the
railway).

P. 246: "in." added (4·7 in. guns).

P. 273: "de" changed to "des" (des chemins de fer).

P. 273: "Juni" changed to "Juin".

P. 284: "½" added (4 feet 8½ inches).

P. 290: "moblisation" changed to "mobilisation" (on mobilisation, or
elsewhere).

P. 290: "pursuading" changed to "persuading" (persuading the Belgian
Government).

P. 296: "promotor" changed to "promotors" (the aims of their promoters).

P. 303: "enlightment" changed to "enlightenment" (not so blind as to
need enlightenment).

P. 306: "between" changed to "between" (communication between Swakopmund
and the capital).

P. 315: "Renseignments" changed to "Renseignements" (Renseignements
coloniaux).

P. 321: "Expediton" changed to "Expedition"
(Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Expedition).

P. 328: "possesssion" changed to "possession" (into a German possession).

P. 350: "tranverse" changed to "transverse" (transverse lines connecting
them).

P. 355: "diciplined" changed to "disciplined" (old and well-disciplined
units).

P. 355, footnote 82: added "no" (no harm was done).

P. 373: Railway gauges changed to be consistently 3 ft. 6 in., 5 ft. 3
in., 4 ft. 8-1/2 in.

P. 377: "Eröterung" changed to "Erörterung" (gegründeter Erörterung über
die militärische Benutzung).

P. 377: "militärischen" changed to "militärische" (Eisenbahnen für
militärische Zwecke).

P. 378: "militärische" changed to "militärischer" (in militärische
Hinsicht).

P. 387: "Heidelburg" changed to "Heidelberg".

P. 388: "Fielddienst" changed to "Felddienst" (Felddienst Ordnung).

P. 389: "Lehrer" changed to "Lehre" (Kurze Lehre ihrer wichtigsten
Grundsätze).

P. 393: "Revista Technica" changed to "Rivista Tecnica".

P. 401: Index entry for "Germany, Organisation in, present basis of
organisation" changed from 188-121 to 118-121.

*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914" ***

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